Court Opinion

ID: 9911047
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-19 14:02:21.381037+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:55:40.953366
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

                                                    Decided: December 19, 2023

                      S23A0894. SCOGGINS v. THE STATE.

        PETERSON, Presiding Justice.

        Christopher Reid Scoggins appeals his convictions for murder

and other offenses stemming from the shooting death of Stephanie

Daniel. 1 He argues that the evidence was insufficient to support

        1 Daniel was killed on the night of July 5, 2015. On March 21, 2016, a

Gordon County grand jury indicted Scoggins and co-defendant Fred Jason
Charles for various crimes: malice murder, two counts of felony murder,
aggravated assault, two counts of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon,
theft by taking, conspiracy to commit arson in the second degree, and six
counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. The case
was tried before a jury in September 2016. The jury found both defendants
guilty on all counts. Charles received a sentence of life without the possibility
of parole for the malice murder count, as well as other sentences for additional
counts. We affirmed Charles’s convictions. See Charles v. State, 315 Ga. 651
(884 SE2d 363) (2023). On October 6, 2016, Scoggins was sentenced to life
without parole for malice murder, plus a concurrent five-year sentence for
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, ten years consecutive for theft by
taking, five years consecutive for conspiracy to commit arson in the second
degree, and two five-year sentences for possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony, consecutive to the arson sentence and concurrent to
one another. The other counts merged or were vacated by operation of law.
Scoggins filed a motion for new trial on October 7, 2016, and amended the
certain of his convictions and that his trial counsel was ineffective

for failing to request a jury instruction on concealing the death of

another or hindering the apprehension of a felon.2 We conclude that

the evidence was sufficient as to all of the challenged convictions and

that trial counsel did not perform deficiently by failing to request

the cited instructions. We therefore affirm.

      1.   Scoggins first argues that the evidence was insufficient as

a matter of constitutional due process to sustain his convictions for

malice murder, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and

possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. 3 We

motion on April 9, 2018. The trial court held hearings on the motion on January
28, 2022, and March 17, 2022, and orally denied the motion at the close of the
March 17 hearing. Scoggins filed a notice of appeal on April 4, 2022; the motion
ripened when the trial court entered an order denying the motion for new trial
on April 27, 2022. See Southall v. State, 300 Ga. 462, 464-467 (1) (796 SE2d
261) (2017). The case was docketed to this Court’s August 2023 term of court
and orally argued on November 7, 2023.
      2 Another enumeration of error, regarding evidence suggesting that

Scoggins was part of a gang, was withdrawn by defense counsel at oral
argument.
      3 Scoggins also argues that the evidence was insufficient as to the felony

murder and aggravated assault charges, but because those counts merged or
were vacated by operation of law, with no sentence being entered on them, such
arguments are moot given our conclusion that the evidence was sufficient to
sustain Scoggins’s malice murder conviction. See White v. State, 287 Ga. 713,
714-715 (1) (a) (699 SE2d 291) (2010). We note that Scoggins does not challenge

                                       2
disagree.

     In considering a claim that evidence was insufficient in

violation of federal due process under Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.

307 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979), “our review is limited to an

evaluation of whether the trial evidence, when viewed in the light

most favorable to the verdicts, is sufficient to authorize a rational

trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt

of the crimes of which he was convicted.” Goodman v. State, 313 Ga.

762, 766 (2) (a) (873 SE2d 150) (2022) (citation and punctuation

omitted). So viewed, the evidence admitted at trial is as follows.

     On July 5, 2015, Fred Jason Charles was living with his father,

Herbert Charles (“Herbert”), at Herbert’s mobile home in Gordon

County. Charles slept in an upstairs bedroom in the original part of

the mobile home, while Herbert had a bedroom and living room in

an addition to the home. Daniel, Charles’s girlfriend, had been

staying in the mobile home for several days. Daniel drove a dark-

the sufficiency of the evidence as to his convictions for theft by taking or
conspiracy to commit arson.
                                     3
colored Nissan Xterra.

     Scoggins was with Charles throughout the day on July 5, and

Charles was carrying a firearm. Sometime after lunchtime on July

5, Charles stopped at the house of a neighbor, James Hunter, driving

an Xterra. Another man, whom Hunter did not recognize, stayed in

the car. Charles showed Hunter a revolver and asked where he could

shoot it. At dusk later that day, Charles briefly stopped by Hunter’s

home in the Xterra; the same man was with him. Additionally,

Charles’s friend Stephanie Baldwin identified Scoggins as being

with Charles at a motel sometime between 10:00 p.m. and 11:00 p.m.

on July 5. Charles showed Baldwin a firearm, and Baldwin saw a

black Nissan Xterra in the parking lot that she thought looked like

Daniel’s.

     At some point during the day of July 5, Herbert saw Charles

and Scoggins at the mobile home. In the evening, Herbert observed

Charles and Scoggins leaving in Daniel’s vehicle.

     That evening, around 7:30 p.m. or 8:00 p.m., another neighbor,

Jeff Ingle, saw Daniel and Charles arrive at Herbert’s mobile home.

                                 4
Ingle testified that he did not see Scoggins with Charles, but

acknowledged, “I wouldn’t know [Scoggins] if I saw him.” Shortly

thereafter, the neighbor saw Charles throw a firecracker and then

leave. The sound of fireworks could be heard across the

neighborhood throughout the evening.

     At some point after Charles left, Herbert noticed that the door

to Charles’s bedroom was open, and he saw Daniel lying on a bunch

of clothes on the bed in Charles’s bedroom and asked if she was

alright. Daniel did not respond, and Herbert “figured she had just

went to sleep” and proceeded to watch television downstairs.

     Between 9:21 p.m. and 11:00 p.m. on July 5, the mother of

Scoggins’s child, Alisha Nelson, who was incarcerated at the time,

called Scoggins multiple times. She testified that she understood

Charles to be with Scoggins during those calls.4 On a call that began

at 9:21 p.m., Nelson overheard Scoggins telling Charles, “[D]on’t

     4 Those calls were recorded and formally admitted at trial, but the jury

never heard the recordings. The quotations from those calls are from Nelson’s
words in her testimony, or the language of examining counsel with which she
agreed.
                                     5
shoot yourself in the toe,” and, “[I]t’s loaded.” On a call that began

at 9:37 p.m., Nelson heard Scoggins praise the Nissan Xterra in

which he and Charles were traveling. On a call that began at 10:32

p.m., Nelson heard Scoggins say that he and Charles were “going

down the road,” Scoggins adding, “I’m fixing to hang out the ‘f’ing

window and ‘f’ing blow somebody’s tires out.” Nelson testified that it

sounded like Scoggins and Charles were having a good time.

     At some point, Charles and Scoggins returned to the mobile

home, and Herbert told them to check on Daniel. Charles and

Scoggins did not say anything, but simply went into Charles’s

bedroom before leaving again. Herbert later that night discovered

that Daniel was still lying in Charles’s bedroom, bleeding and

unresponsive. He called 911 just after midnight.

     Officers responded and found Daniel dead in the bedroom with

a bullet wound in her chest and an abrasion, consistent with a graze

from a bullet, on her arm. Officers also found a bullet hole in one of

Charles’s bedroom windows, with indications that the bullet

creating that hole (which was never recovered) had been fired from

                                  6
inside the room. Writing on the wall of the bedroom said, among

other things, “Kill fake friends” and “Fred Jason Charles.” A coroner

who pronounced Daniel dead at the mobile home estimated that

when he encountered her at about 4:50 a.m. on July 6, she had been

dead for about four to six hours, meaning that Daniel likely died

sometime between 10:50 p.m. and 12:50 a.m.

      Charles, accompanied by Scoggins, was seen on video putting

gas into the victim’s vehicle at a gas station around 12:20 a.m. on

July 6.

      Marcus Gunnin was camping in the Strawberry Mountain area

of Walker County on July 6 when he saw two “30ish, white males”

walking along an unpaved road toward Manning Mill Road around

3:00 a.m. 5 About 45 minutes later, Gunnin heard the sounds of a car

cranking up and doors slamming, coming from the direction the men

had been heading.

      5 Scoggins is white. An exact date of birth for him is not apparent from

the record, and it does not appear that the jury was told his age. But a search
of the Georgia Department of Corrections web site indicates he was
approximately 30 years old at the time of the murder, and the jury was able to
observe his appearance at the trial that took place the following year.
                                      7
     In the early hours of July 6, Scoggins called his sister, Crystal

Scoggins (“Crystal”). At 1:58 a.m., Crystal reached out to a friend for

a ride. They proceeded to pick up Scoggins and Charles on an

unpaved road that intersected Manning Mill Road in the Strawberry

Mountain area, sometime between 2:00 a.m. and 4:00 a.m. Crystal

described Scoggins as “happy and giddy,” laughing at a joke during

a stop for gas; her friend said Charles and Scoggins were “cutting up

and acting goofy” in the car. After picking up Charles and Scoggins,

Crystal drove the men back to the house where she and Scoggins

lived with their parents. While there, Charles made a noose with a

belt, held the noose in Crystal’s presence, and “dared [her] to say a

word.” Scoggins proceeded to sleep on the couch, while Crystal and

Charles stayed up all night.

     On July 6, officers found Daniel’s vehicle, burned down to the

metal frame at the end of the unpaved forestry road that intersects

Manning Mill Road.

     At trial, a firearms examiner testified that a bullet recovered

from Daniel’s body was likely fired from one of several different

                                  8
models of handguns. Although Herbert owned a handgun, the

firearms examiner ruled out Herbert’s handgun as the source of the

bullet that killed Daniel. And Herbert’s hands, swabbed by law

enforcement at approximately 4:27 a.m. on July 6, 2015, tested

negative for gunshot residue.

     The State also introduced certified copies of Scoggins’s July

2013 felony drug convictions.

     (a) Scoggins argues that the evidence was insufficient to

sustain his malice murder conviction because, although he was

present at the time of the murder, there was no evidence supporting

a conclusion that he was even a party to that crime. We disagree.

     A jury may find a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt

if the evidence shows either that he directly committed the crime or

that he was a “party thereto.” OCGA § 16-2-20 (a). A person is a

party to the crime if he aids or abets in its commission or if he

“advises, encourages, hires, counsels, or procures another” to

commit it. OCGA § 16-2-20 (b) (3), (4); see also Willis v. State, 315

Ga. 19, 24 (2) (880 SE2d 158) (2022). “And although the defendant’s

                                 9
mere presence at the scene is not enough to convict him as a party

to the crime, the jury may infer his criminal intent from his

presence, companionship, and conduct before, during, and after the

offense.” Willis, 315 Ga. at 24 (2) (citation and punctuation omitted).

The required criminal intent for liability under a party-to-a-crime

theory is the same as that of the underlying crime. See Downey v.

State, 298 Ga. 568, 570 (1) & n.3 (783 SE2d 622) (2016). For a malice

murder conviction, the requisite criminal intent is that of malice,

which incorporates the intent to kill. See Benton v. State, 305 Ga.

242, 244 (1) (a) (824 SE2d 322) (2019); OCGA § 16-5-1 (a). “The

malice necessary to establish malice murder may be formed in an

instant, as long as it is present at the time of the killing.” Benton,

305 Ga. at 244 (1) (a). Whether a killing was intentional and

malicious is for the jury to determine. See id. Here, there was

sufficient evidence from which the jury could find that Scoggins was

guilty of the malice murder of Daniel, at least as a party to the crime.

     The State does not appear to argue on appeal that there was

evidence from which the jury could infer that Scoggins himself shot

                                  10
Daniel. But Scoggins admitted in both his brief and oral argument

that he was present when Daniel was shot.6 And the evidence was

consistent with that concession. Multiple witnesses said that

Scoggins and Charles were together for most of the day on July 5.

They were the last two persons seen with the victim before Herbert

found her body and alerted authorities. Herbert was ruled out as a

perpetrator by law enforcement through a gunshot residue test.

Although Ingle testified that Charles and Daniel arrived at the

mobile home without Scoggins around 7:30 p.m or 8:00 p.m., Ingle

also testified that he did not know Scoggins, such that the jury could

have concluded that his failure to recall Scoggins’s presence was due

to either Ingle’s lack of memory or Scoggins entering the home at a

slightly different time than Charles and Daniel. Charles was seen

setting off a firework before leaving around that time, which the jury

      6 We note that generally we no longer review sua sponte the sufficiency

of the evidence, except that of murder convictions resulting in the death
penalty. See Davenport v. State, 309 Ga. 385, 398-399 (4) (b) (846 SE2d 83)
(2020). Thus, instead of considering all conceivable sufficiency-related issues,
we limit our consideration to only the argument that Scoggins actually makes
in challenging the sufficiency of the evidence as to his malice murder conviction
— in essence, that his mere presence for the shooting of Daniel, even coupled
with flight, was insufficient.
                                       11
could have inferred was done in order to give cover to the sound of a

gunshot, and Herbert found Daniel unresponsive after seeing

Charles leave. And even if Daniel was not shot until after Charles

and Scoggins returned to the mobile home later, the two men were

seen going into Charles’s bedroom together at that time.

     Even if the evidence did not conclusively establish which of the

two defendants shot Daniel, “there was evidence of a common

criminal intent, including [Scoggins’s] presence, companionship,

and conduct before and immediately after the fatal shooting.” State

v. Cash, 302 Ga. 587, 596 (807 SE2d 405) (2017). “[I]f a defendant

has knowledge of the crime which is intended and shares in the

criminal intent of the principal actor, that defendant is an aider and

abettor.” Id. “Consequently, if such defendant is at the scene and

does not oppose the commission of the crime, the trier of fact may

consider such conduct in connection with prior knowledge and is

authorized to conclude that the defendant assented and lent

approval to the commission of the crime, and thus, was aiding and

abetting it.” Id. at 596.

                                 12
     Here, despite being admittedly present when Daniel was shot,

Scoggins made no attempt to seek medical aid for her. Indeed, after

Herbert found Daniel unresponsive, he told Scoggins and Charles to

check on her; according to Herbert’s testimony, Scoggins and

Charles “didn’t say nothing” when they went to check on Daniel, and

Herbert did not see Charles again that night. Instead of summoning

aid, Scoggins left the scene with Charles in Daniel’s vehicle, giving

rise to an inference that Scoggins shared Charles’s criminal intent.

See Jenkins v. State, 313 Ga. 81, 88-89 (3) (868 SE2d 205) (2022)

(flight from scene of crime generally is circumstantial evidence of

guilt); Powell v. State, 291 Ga. 743, 744-745 (1) (733 SE2d 294)

(2012) (concluding evidence sufficient to sustain murder conviction

of defendant on party to a crime theory, in part based on his presence

at the shooting, his failure to summon help for the victim, his fleeing

with the other possible perpetrator of the shooting, and his

continued association afterward).

     It appears that Scoggins may have claimed at trial that he did

                                  13
not share Charles’s criminal intent but instead acted under duress.7

The evidence belies any such claim. After Scoggins and Charles

disposed of Daniel’s vehicle,8 Scoggins obtained a ride for himself

and Charles, stayed overnight with Charles, and continued to laugh

and joke around Charles even in the hours after the shooting — all

of which undercut Scoggins’s apparent claim that he was acting

under duress. Consequently, the evidence was sufficient to enable a

rational trier of fact to find Scoggins guilty beyond a reasonable

      7 Scoggins did not testify at trial, and the State did not introduce at trial

any statement by him to law enforcement. Closing arguments were not
transcribed. But trial counsel testified at the motion for new trial hearing that
her theory of the case was that Scoggins was “innocent” of Daniel’s murder and
subsequently acted “in fear for his own life.” The trial court declined to give
Scoggins’s requested instruction on coercion.
       8 The State seeks to rely on the burning of Daniel’s vehicle in arguing

that the evidence is sufficient to support the convictions challenged on
sufficiency grounds. But, in responding to Scoggins’s ineffective assistance of
counsel claim about jury instructions, the State insisted before the trial court
and this Court that there is no evidence that Daniel’s vehicle was burned for
the purpose of destroying evidence of the murder. The State at oral argument
before this Court acknowledged the inconsistency in these two positions. We
recognize the possibility that the jury might have inferred that Scoggins
participated in the burning of the victim’s vehicle in an attempt to disassociate
himself from the car, rather than keeping it, because he had been involved in
her killing. But we place virtually no weight on this in our sufficiency analysis,
because it is not necessary to consider this evidence — and thus it is not
necessary to resolve the contradiction in the State’s arguments — in order to
find that the evidence was sufficient.
                                       14
doubt of the crime of malice murder. See Shockley v. State, 297 Ga.

661, 663-665 (1) (777 SE2d 245) (2015) (concluding evidence was

sufficient to support murder conviction where defendant was

present for the shooting, fled the scene with co-indictee, and later

fled the jurisdiction).

     (b) Scoggins also argues that the evidence was insufficient to

sustain his convictions for possession of a firearm during the

commission of a felony and possession of a firearm by a convicted

felon. We disagree.

     Scoggins does not make any particular argument as to the

firearm offenses, relying on his general argument that mere

presence, even coupled with flight, is insufficient to make one a

party to a crime. Regarding Scoggins’s conviction for possession of a

firearm during the commission of a felony, of course whoever shot

Daniel possessed a firearm during the shooting. And even if Charles

was the shooter, a defendant may be convicted of possession of a

firearm during the commission of a felony under a party-to-a-crime

theory. See Dublin v. State, 302 Ga. 60, 65-66 (3) (805 SE2d 27)

                                 15
(2017); Johnson v. State, 276 Ga. 368, 371 (1) (578 SE2d 885) (2003).

Given our conclusion that there was sufficient evidence to sustain

Scoggins’s murder conviction under the theory that he was a party

to the murder of Daniel, the evidence was sufficient to support

Scoggins’s conviction for possession of a firearm during the

commission of a felony under that theory, as well.

     As for Scoggins’s felon-in-possession conviction, a defendant

may be convicted of that offense under a party-to-a-crime theory,

where the defendant is a party to possession of a firearm by someone

else who is a convicted felon. In that scenario, a defendant need not

even constructively possess a firearm in order to be guilty of the

crime. See Lebis v. State, 302 Ga. 750, 757-759 (II) (B) (808 SE2d

724) (2017) (concluding that evidence was sufficient for jury to

conclude that defendant was guilty of felony murder as a party to

her husband’s possession of a firearm as a convicted felon). But here

the felon-in-possession counts against Scoggins clearly alleged that

he, not Charles, had previously been convicted of a felony. Indeed,

the State clarified at oral argument that these counts were

                                 16
predicated on the theory that Scoggins himself constructively

possessed a firearm.

     “[I]f a person has both the power and the intention at a given

time to exercise dominion or control over a thing, then the person is

in constructive possession of that thing.” Lebis, 302 Ga. at 753 (II)

(citation and punctuation omitted). “Mere proximity to contraband,

absent other evidence connecting a suspect with that contraband, is

not enough to establish constructive possession.” Id. at 754 (II).

Whether the evidence shows more than mere proximity, and

whether circumstantial evidence of possession has excluded every

reasonable hypothesis save that of constructive possession, “are

questions committed principally to the trier of fact, and we should

not disturb the decisions of the trier of fact about these things unless

they cannot be supported as a matter of law.” Id. (citation and

punctuation omitted).

     Given the jury’s role in that regard, we conclude that there was

sufficient evidence that Scoggins constructively possessed a firearm.

There was evidence that Scoggins and Charles rode around together

                                  17
in a vehicle on the day of the shooting, with Charles displaying a

firearm at various points that day. Although there was little

evidence about how that firearm was carried while the two were

driving around (i.e., whether the gun was in a place where Scoggins

could freely reach it, as opposed to being kept on Charles’s person),

the jury heard evidence that, while riding around with Charles,

Scoggins told his girlfriend that he was “fixing to . . . blow somebody’s

tires out.” From this evidence, the jury could infer that Scoggins

either actually possessed a gun at that time, or that he had “both

the power and the intention” to exercise control over a gun at that

time, such that he had constructive possession of that firearm.

Under these particular circumstances, we conclude that the

evidence was sufficient to find that Scoggins possessed a gun while

a convicted felon.

     2.    Scoggins also argues that trial counsel was ineffective in

that she failed to request “a charge of” concealing the death of

another or hindering the apprehension of a felon. We disagree.

     To prove his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Scoggins

                                   18
must show that counsel’s performance was deficient and that

counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced Scoggins’s defense. See

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d

674) (1984). “To show that his lawyer’s performance was deficient,

the defendant must demonstrate that the lawyer performed his

duties in an objectively unreasonable way, considering all the

circumstances and in the light of prevailing professional norms.”

State v. Spratlin, 305 Ga. 585, 591 (2) (826 SE2d 36) (2019) (citation

and punctuation omitted). “In reviewing a ruling on a claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel, we defer to the trial court’s findings

of fact unless they are clearly erroneous, but we apply the law to the

facts de novo.” See id.

     Scoggins argues that trial counsel should have “request[ed] a

charge of” concealing the death of another or hindering the

apprehension of a felon because had the jury been given “the

opportunity to hold [Scoggins] accountable for his actions” by finding

him guilty of those crimes, “it is highly likely that he would be

convicted of” those offenses. “A written request to charge a lesser

                                   19
included offense must always be given if there is any evidence that

the defendant is guilty of the lesser included offense.” Soto v. State,

303 Ga. 517, 520 (2) (813 SE2d 343) (2018) (citation and punctuation

omitted). But “[i]t is error to charge the jury on an offense not

embraced in the indictment.” Nalls v. State, 304 Ga. 168, 181-182 (3)

(c) (815 SE2d 38) (2018); see also State v. Hightower, 252 Ga. 220,

222-223 & n.2 (312 SE2d 610) (1984) (“[W]here the defendant is

charged by a narrowly drawn indictment with a specific crime it is

not within the power of the judge or the jury to interpret the facts as

presented at trial to support an alternative, separate offense.

Criminal indictments are not deemed amendable to conform to the

evidence.”).

     As Scoggins conceded at oral argument, neither concealing the

death of another nor hindering the apprehension of a felon is

included within any of the offenses with which Scoggins actually was

charged. A conviction for concealing the death of another requires

proof that the defendant “by concealing the death of any other

person, hinders a discovery of whether or not such person was

                                  20
unlawfully killed[.]” OCGA § 16-10-31. And a conviction for

hindering the apprehension of a felon requires proof that the

defendant   “with   intention   to    hinder   the   apprehension   or

punishment of a person whom he knows or has reasonable grounds

to believe has committed a felony” either “[h]arbors or conceals such

person” or “[c]onceals or destroys evidence of the crime.” OCGA § 16-

10-50. None of these elements are elements of the crimes with which

Scoggins was charged, and thus neither hindering nor concealing is

a lesser offense included within any of the charged offenses. See

OCGA § 16-1-6 (defining included crimes); see also Nalls, 304 Ga. at

176 (3) (a) (hindering the apprehension of a criminal is not included

within the crime of murder); Chapman v. State, 280 Ga. 560, 561 (4)

(629 SE2d 220) (2006) (concealing the death of another is not a lesser

offense of felony murder predicated on aggravated assault).

Therefore, counsel was not deficient for failing to request

instructions on either offense. See Jeffrey v. State, 296 Ga. 713, 716

(2) (770 SE2d 585) (2015) (“[T]rial counsel’s failure to request an

inapposite instruction cannot form the basis for an ineffectiveness

                                 21
claim.”).

     Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

                                22