Court Opinion

ID: 9517585
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 00:22:29.756815+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:29:03.732285
License: Public Domain

LeGRAND, Senior Judge
(dissenting).
In this case, the majority opinion decides it cannot address the principal question raised because that course would take the court into matters outside the petition, a *598forbidden area in considering a motion to dismiss. I disagree, and I therefore dissent.
At the heart of the plaintiff’s case — the postulate without which he cannot under any circumstances succeed — is whether Kossuth County can be liable in tort for the actions of its officers, agents, and employees under a rule of law first adopted some ten years after the conduct complained of. It is true these circumstances are not detailed in plaintiffs petition, but they are nevertheless properly before the court by virtue of judicial notice. We should decide now this determinative issue.
Plaintiff was convicted of first-degree murder in 1970. This court affirmed his conviction by unanimous opinion in State v. Cunha, 193 N.W.2d 106 (Iowa 1971). A federal district court rejected his habeas corpus petition, and this result was affirmed in Cunha v. Brewer, 511 F.2d 894 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 857, 96 S.Ct. 108, 46 L.Ed.2d 83 (1975).
Thus, Cunha’s conviction for murder became final under Iowa law in 1971 and under federal law in 1975. In 1979, a third federal court granted plaintiff habeas corpus on the ground the evidence upon which his conviction rested was insufficient as a matter of law to support his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This decision in turn was based on a changed rule of evidence first announced by the Supreme Court in 1979. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 309, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2784, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, 567 (1979). See State v. Robinson, 288 N.W.2d 337 (Iowa 1980) for a discussion of the application of Jackson under Iowa law.
The entire history of this matter is properly before us by virtue of judicial notice. Iowa R.Civ.P. 94; In re Drumheller Estate, 252 Iowa 1378, 1381-82, 110 N.W.2d 833, 834-35 (1961); 87 A.L.R.2d 1233, 1236 (1963). Although the rule is different for a trial court, this court may take judicial notice of these decisions. See Brady v. Beams, 132 F.2d 985, 987-88 (10th Cir.1943); Divide Creek Irrigation District v. Hollingsworth, 72 F.2d 859, 862 (10th Cir.1934); 96 A.L.R. 937, 942 (1935).
The application of this rule seems particularly appropriate here because the circumstances are not only beyond contradiction but must be established by plaintiff himself before any cause of action can arise.
Thus, I believe the motion is properly here for decision on the merits. On that question, I am convinced the motion should have been sustained in its entirety. It is contrary to all principles of fairness and justice to hold a party civilly liable for conduct free of any impropriety when performed and subject to attack only because the criterion for conviction was changed years later. We have rejected such arguments in other cases. Cf. Aller v. Rodgers Machinery Manufacturing Co., 268 N.W.2d 830, 836-37 (Iowa 1978) (negligence of manufacturer based on knowledge available at the time of manufacture, not time of injury). We should do no less here.
In summary, I believe the motion should be considered on its merits and that it should be sustained in its entirety.
REYNOLDSON, C.J., and HARRIS and SCHULTZ, JJ., join this dissent.