Court Opinion

ID: 9951414
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-16 00:00:38.54267+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:40:05.642391
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-20093            Document: 78-1         Page: 1      Date Filed: 03/15/2024

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit
                                   ____________                       United States Court of Appeals
                                                                               Fifth Circuit

                                                                             FILED
                                    No. 23-20093
                                                                       March 15, 2024
                                  Summary Calendar
                                  ____________                          Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                             Clerk
United States of America,

                                                                    Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                          versus

Davionne Owens,

                                            Defendant—Appellant.
                   ______________________________

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Southern District of Texas
                            USDC No. 4:18-CR-407-2
                   ______________________________

Willett, Duncan, and Ramirez, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam: *
       Davionne Owens pleaded guilty without a plea agreement in federal
court to aiding and abetting interference with commerce by robbery and
aiding and abetting brandishing of a firearm during and in relation to a crime
of violence. He was sentenced to 147 months’ imprisonment and ordered to
pay $627,971 in restitution, jointly and severally with his codefendants. He

       _____________________
       *
           This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 23-20093        Document: 78-1       Page: 2    Date Filed: 03/15/2024

                                 No. 23-20093

timely appealed his conviction and sentence. He asks us to (1) reduce his
restitution obligation because the magistrate judge varied from Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 11(b)(1)(K) by failing to advise him of the district
court’s authority to order restitution, and (2) remand so that the district
court can correct a clerical error in his written judgment.
                                       I
       We begin with Owens’s Rule 11 argument. Owens requests that we
reduce his restitution award to the amount of the fine ($500,000) that the
magistrate judge warned he might face, like we did in United States v. Glinsey,
209 F.3d 386 (5th Cir. 2000). But Owens does not cite, and we have not
found, any case in which we have applied Glinsey’s restitution-reduction
approach since the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Vonn, 535
U.S. 55 (2002), supplanted Glinsey’s harmless-error review with plain-error
review. “The critical factor in our decision not to apply a Glinsey-type
remedy is that we review the voluntariness of guilty pleas for plain error [not
harmless error] when the defendant did not [make] a contemporaneous
objection.” United States v. Imeh, 291 F. App’x 637, 641 (5th Cir. 2008) (per
curiam).
       Because Owens raises this issue for the first time on appeal, we review
for plain error. See Vonn, 535 U.S. at 58–59. To establish plain error, Owens
must show that the magistrate judge (1) committed an error (2) that is clear
or obvious and (3) that affects his substantial rights. See Puckett v. United
States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009). To show that the Rule 11 error affects his
substantial rights, Owens must demonstrate “a reasonable probability that,
but for the [Rule 11] error, he would not have entered the plea.” See United
States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 83 (2004). We consider several
factors, including: (1) “the difference between the maximum possible fine of
which the defendant was advised at rearraignment and the total amount of

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 Case: 23-20093         Document: 78-1          Page: 3      Date Filed: 03/15/2024

                                      No. 23-20093

restitution and finds imposed by the district court at sentencing”;
(2) “whether the plea agreement advised the defendant of the court’s
authority to order restitution and, if so, whether the defendant acknowledged
that he had read and understood the plea agreement during the
rearraignment”; and (3) “whether the defendant was jointly and severally
liable with codefendants for making restitution.” United States v. Baldon, 457
F. App’x 393, 397 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam). Even if Owens carries his
burden on the first three plain-error prongs, we will exercise our discretion
to correct the error only if it “seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or
public reputation of judicial proceedings.” See Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135
(alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736
(1993)).
        The magistrate judge’s failure to notify Owens that the district court
had the authority to order restitution was clear and obvious error. See Imeh,
291 F. App’x at 642; Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(K). However, the error
did not affect Owens’s substantial rights. The approximately $128,000
difference between the fine of which Owens was warned ($500,000) and his
judgment amount ($0 fine and $627,971 in restitution) is significantly smaller
than the multi-million-dollar differences in United States v. Patel, 786 F.
App’x 452, 453–54 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam), and Baldon, 457 F. App’x at
396, that we said favored the defendant. 1 The remaining two Baldon factors
further indicate that the Rule 11 error did not affect Owens’s substantial
rights. Although Owens did not have a plea agreement advising him of the
district court’s authority to order restitution, he was informed of the exact
restitution amount in his presentence investigation report and at sentencing.

        _____________________
        1
         But even with those multi-million-dollar differences, we still concluded that the
Rule 11 error did not affect the defendant’s substantial rights upon review of the other
Baldon factors. Patel, 786 F. App’x at 453–54; Baldon, 457 F. App’x at 397.

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                                No. 23-20093

See United States v. Chaudhari, 795 F. App’x 297, 298 (5th Cir. 2020) (per
curiam); Patel, 786 F. App’x at 454. Owens did not object or move to
withdraw his guilty plea. See United States v. Maharaj, 176 F. App’x 536, 539
(5th Cir. 2006) (stating that it was “most important[]” that the defendant
“did not object to the rule 11 violation”). Nor does he argue on appeal that
he would not have pleaded guilty had the magistrate judge complied with
Rule 11. Moreover, he was held jointly and severally liable with his
codefendants for making restitution. See Patel, 786 F. App’x at 454; Maharaj,
176 F. App’x at 539. On view of the entire record, Owens’s decision to plead
guilty was informed. Owens has not shown a reasonable probability that, but
for the Rule 11 error, he would not have pleaded guilty. See Dominguez
Benitez, 542 U.S. at 83.
       In addition, Owens makes no attempt to show that the error
“seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.” See Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135. We refuse to correct errors
“when, as here, the complaining party makes no showing as to [this] fourth
prong.” United States v. Caravayo, 809 F.3d 269, 273–74 (5th Cir. 2015) (per
curiam) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Regardless,
Owens’s failure on multiple occasions to object to the court’s statements
about restitution suggests that the error did not jeopardize the judicial
proceedings. See Baldon, 457 F. App’x at 398. We would not exercise our
discretion to remedy the error even if Owens satisfied the other prongs of
plain-error review. See id.
       Accordingly, the district court did not plainly err. We therefore
decline to reduce Owens’s restitution obligation.

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                                     No. 23-20093

                                         II
        Owens also asserts, and the Government agrees, that the written
judgment misstates the statute of conviction for Owens’s firearm offense and
should be corrected under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.
        Rule 36 allows the district court to “at any time correct a clerical error
in a judgment.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 36. This rule applies “[w]here the
record makes it clear that an issue was actually litigated and decided but was
incorrectly recorded in or inadvertently omitted from the judgment.” United
States v. Ramirez-Gonzalez, 840 F.3d 240, 247 (5th Cir. 2016) (citation
omitted); see also United States v. Cooper, 979 F.3d 1084, 1089 (5th Cir. 2020).
        The record clearly shows that Owens pleaded guilty to aiding and
abetting brandishing of a firearm during or in relation to a crime of violence
in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). However, the written
judgment states that Owens’s statute of conviction is § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii),
which prohibits discharging a firearm. The written judgment thus
“incorrectly recorded” Owens’s statute of conviction. See Ramirez-
Gonzalez, 840 F.3d at 247 (citation omitted); Cooper, 979 F.3d at 1089
(citation omitted). Because this clerical error falls within Rule 36’s reach, we
remand for the district court to correct the judgment. See Cooper, 979 F.3d at
1089.
                                 *        *         *
        Accordingly, the judgment is AFFIRMED, and the case is
REMANDED for the limited purpose of correcting the clerical error in the
written judgment.

                                          5