Court Opinion

ID: 9381772
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-23 19:00:33.16688+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:34.475771
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 21-12877    Document: 50-1     Date Filed: 03/23/2023   Page: 1 of 9

                                                            [PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 21-12877
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiff-Appellee,
       versus
       PATRICK FREDERICK WILLIAMS,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Southern District of Florida
                   D.C. Docket No. 2:03-cr-14041-KMM-1
                          ____________________
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       2                       Opinion of the Court                 21-12877

       Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and HULL and MARCUS, Cir-
       cuit Judges.
       WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge:
              Patrick Williams argues that he is entitled to a reduced sen-
       tence under the First Step Act because his sentence of life impris-
       onment exceeds the 30-year statutory maximum for his offense.
       The district court denied Williams’s motion for a reduced sen-
       tence, and he argues that this denial was a per se abuse of discre-
       tion. But we disagree. Because the First Step Act never requires that
       a movant receive a reduced sentence, we affirm.
                                I. BACKGROUND
               Williams was sentenced to life imprisonment for a 2004 con-
       viction for possessing between five and 50 grams of cocaine base.
       At the time of his conviction, that sentence was the statutory max-
       imum for his crime. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(iii) (2000) (allow-
       ing a life sentence for possession of more than five grams of cocaine
       base if the offender had a previous felony drug conviction). After
       we vacated his first sentence, see United States v. Williams, 609
       F.3d 1168, 1169 (11th Cir. 2010), Williams received his current life
       sentence in 2010. The district court selected this sentence because
       of Williams’s denial of guilt—he alleged that there was a conspiracy
       to frame him—and, more importantly, because of his considerable
       criminal history.
               Williams’s criminal career began at age 13 with multiple
       thefts, including thefts of firearms. In between stints in juvenile and
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       21-12877                Opinion of the Court                         3

       adult correctional facilities, Williams’s crimes steadily increased in
       gravity. He stole a car at age 15. At 18, he was convicted for vio-
       lently resisting arrest. He received his first cocaine-trafficking con-
       viction a year later. After he was released on probation for his drug
       conviction, Williams stormed into his girlfriend’s grandmother’s
       house and struck his girlfriend in the face. In 2007, before the re-
       sentencing relevant to this appeal, Williams was found guilty of
       second-degree murder and conspiracy to commit first-degree mur-
       der for his role in a murder-for-hire scheme and received a life sen-
       tence.
              Congress enacted the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L.
       No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372, shortly before Williams’s relevant re-
       sentencing. The Fair Sentencing Act raised the threshold cocaine
       base quantity required to authorize a sentence of life imprisonment
       from five grams to 28 grams. Compare 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(iii)
       (2006), with 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(iii) (2012). Williams’s crime no
       longer triggered the drug-quantity sentencing enhancement, so the
       maximum sentence for his offense was only 30 years’ imprison-
       ment under the Fair Sentencing Act. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C)
       (2012). So Williams’s 2010 life sentence exceeded the statutory
       maximum for his crime. But Williams did not appeal his sentence
       on that ground because it complied with the statutory maximum
       in force at the time of his conviction. See United States v. Gomes,
       621 F.3d 1343, 1346 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Fair Sentenc-
       ing Act did not benefit defendants who committed their crimes
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       4                      Opinion of the Court                 21-12877

       before its enactment), overruled by Dorsey v. United States, 567
       U.S. 260, 264 (2012).
              In 2012, the Supreme Court held in Dorsey v. United States
       that defendants who had been convicted but not sentenced before
       the Fair Sentencing Act should be sentenced in accordance with
       that Act. 567 U.S. at 264; see also United States v. Hinds, 713 F.3d
       1303, 1305 (11th Cir. 2013) (holding that Dorsey also applies to re-
       sentencing that occurs after the Fair Sentencing Act). Williams
       moved to vacate his sentence after Dorsey, see 28 U.S.C. § 2255,
       but he did not argue that Dorsey entitled him to a lower sentence.
       The district court denied his motion.
               In 2018, Williams filed a motion for a reduced sentence un-
       der the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194.
       Williams was eligible for relief under the First Step Act because his
       offense was “a violation of a Federal criminal statute, the statutory
       penalties for which were modified by section 2 or 3 of the Fair Sen-
       tencing Act of 2010, that was committed before August 3, 2010.”
       Id. § 404(a) (internal citation omitted). The district court exercised
       its discretion to deny relief. Cf. id. § 404(b) (“A court that imposed
       a sentence for a covered offense may . . . impose a reduced sen-
       tence . . . .” (emphasis added)).
              The district court reviewed the parties’ arguments and based
       its decision primarily on the factors that it applied at his original
       sentencing. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). As it had on previous occa-
       sions, the district court highlighted Williams’s extensive criminal
       history, which “include[d], but [was] not limited to: armed
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       21-12877                Opinion of the Court                          5

       robberies, multiple offenses involving firearms, grand theft, battery
       on a law enforcement officer, possession with intent to sell a con-
       trolled substance, and[,] most notably, second degree murder.”
       The district court found that concerns about disparities in sentenc-
       ing and evidence of Williams’s rehabilitation weighed somewhat
       in his favor. But it determined that Williams’s “significant criminal
       history present[ed] considerations that [were] unique to this case
       and weigh[ed] heavily against a reduction [in] sentence.” The dis-
       trict court left Williams’s life sentence intact “to adequately reflect
       the seriousness of [Williams’s] conduct, provide for adequate spe-
       cific and general deterrence, and protect the public from further
       crimes by [Williams].”
              In his first notice of supplemental authority to the district
       court, Williams argued that Dorsey meant his 2010 life sentence
       was illegal, so the district court “must correct that error” and “va-
       cate[]” his sentence. The district court rejected this argument be-
       cause it determined that “[t]he First Step Act does not provide a
       mechanism for a [d]efendant to challenge the legality of his sen-
       tence” under Dorsey. Instead, the district court suggested that Wil-
       liams’s arguments were better suited for a motion to vacate. And
       the district court “decline[d] to exercise its discretion” in Williams’s
       favor on the basis of the legal error in his 2010 sentencing.
               In his second supplemental filing, Williams cited United
       States v. Collington, 995 F.3d 347 (4th Cir. 2021). In that decision,
       the Fourth Circuit held that in First Step Act proceedings, the dis-
       trict court is “constrained by the retroactively applicable statutory
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       6                       Opinion of the Court                 21-12877

       maximums in [21 U.S.C. section] 841, such that the district court
       abuse[s] its discretion” if it leaves intact “a sentence that was made
       illegal under the Fair Sentencing Act.” Id. at 357. Collington’s rea-
       soning, Williams implicitly argued, entitled him to a reduced sen-
       tence as a matter of law because his sentence exceeded statutory
       limits when it was imposed and was not “made illegal” after the
       fact. Id. The district court disagreed. It did not find Collington per-
       suasive “in light of the clear language of the First Step Act, which
       states that nothing in [section] 404 shall be construed to require a
       court to reduce any sentence pursuant to this section.” (internal
       quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Jones, 962 F.3d
       1290, 1298 (11th Cir. 2020)).
                          II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
             “We review for abuse of discretion the denial of an eligible
       movant’s request for a reduced sentence under the First Step Act.”
       United States v. Jackson, 58 F.4th 1331, 1335 (11th Cir. 2023) (cita-
       tion omitted).
                                 III. DISCUSSION
              We divide our discussion into two parts. We first explain
       that the district court had the discretion to leave Williams’s sen-
       tence intact. We then explain that the district court gave an ade-
       quate “brief statement of reasons” for the exercise of its discretion,
       contrary to Williams’s arguments. See Concepcion v. United
       States, 142 S. Ct. 2389, 2404 (2022).
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       21-12877                Opinion of the Court                          7

              The text of the First Step Act forecloses Williams’s argument
       that because his current sentence exceeds the statutory maximum,
       he is entitled to a reduced sentence as a matter of law. The First
       Step Act provides that a district court “may . . . impose a reduced
       sentence” if the movant is eligible for relief. First Step Act, § 404(b)
       (emphasis added). So a district court has the discretion to deny any
       eligible movant’s request for a reduced sentence. See, e.g., Jama v.
       Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 543 U.S. 335, 346 (2005) (“The word
       ‘may’ customarily connotes discretion.”). Even if section 404(b)
       were ambiguous—and it is not—the Act also provides that
       “[n]othing in this section shall be construed to require a court to
       reduce any sentence pursuant to this section.” First Step Act,
       § 404(c) (emphasis added). It cannot be, as Williams argues, “a per
       se abuse of discretion” for a district court “to leave an illegal sen-
       tence intact under [s]ection 404(b).” No argument for a reduced
       sentence can make denying relief a per se abuse of discretion.
               While this appeal was pending, the Supreme Court con-
       firmed the plain meaning of section 404(b), and the Fourth Circuit
       recognized that the Collington decision on which Williams relies is
       no longer good law. The Supreme Court explained that “a district
       court is not required to modify a sentence for any reason.” Con-
       cepcion, 142 S. Ct. at 2402 (emphasis added). Instead, the First Step
       Act imposes on district courts only “the standard obligation to ex-
       plain their decisions and demonstrate that they considered the par-
       ties’ arguments” in “a brief statement of reasons.” Id. at 2404. The
       Fourth Circuit later acknowledged that “Concepcion makes clear
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       8                        Opinion of the Court                    21-12877

       that district courts . . . are not required to reduce any sentence. . . .
       Thus, Collington’s reasoning and holding conflict with the Su-
       preme Court’s reasoning in Concepcion.” United States v. Reed, 58
       F.4th 816, 821 (4th Cir. 2023).
               Williams’s argument that the district court committed a per
       se abuse of discretion is a veiled collateral attack on the legality of
       his sentence. But Williams “cannot use a motion for a reduced sen-
       tence to relitigate” the statutory maximum penalty for his offense,
       just as movants cannot use First Step Act motions to relitigate fac-
       tual predicates for sentencing enhancements. See Jackson, 58 F.4th
       at 1338. Instead, a motion to vacate is the proper vehicle for collat-
       eral challenges to the legality of a federal sentence, and Williams
       missed his chance for that relief by failing to raise Dorsey in his 2012
       motion. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (allowing a motion to correct a sen-
       tence that “was in excess of the maximum authorized by law”); id.
       § 2255(h) (barring second or successive motions, subject to narrow
       exceptions).
               The district court also adequately explained its decision to
       deny Williams’s motion. Williams argues that the district court
       “provided no reasoned basis” for its decision and that we can affirm
       only if we “interpret[] . . . [s]ection 404(c) as conferring limitless dis-
       cretion to deny relief.” The record flatly contradicts this assertion.
       The district court recounted Williams’s arguments, weighed the
       section 3553 factors—especially Williams’s grave criminal his-
       tory—to guide its discretion, and addressed Williams’s notices of
       supplemental authority. Neither the First Step Act nor Concepcion
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       21-12877                Opinion of the Court                         9

       requires more. See Concepcion, 142 S. Ct. at 2404 (requiring only
       “a brief statement of reasons” that establishes that the district court
       considered the movant’s arguments).
                                IV. CONCLUSION
              We AFFIRM the order denying Williams’s motion to reduce
       his sentence.