Court Opinion

ID: 9470771
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:15:44.288281+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:42:06.134120
License: Public Domain

VAN GRAAFEILAND, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
Although, had I been in Judge Gagliardi’s shoes, I probably would have done exactly as he did, I concur in my colleagues decision to vote for reversal. In voting to decide this very close question in appellant’s favor, I am influenced somewhat by (1) testimony that appellant was treated most unfairly, (2) evidence of corruption and misfeasance in a publicly funded and supervised institution, and (3) the inadequacy of appellant’s legal representation in the district court. I want to make clear, however, that, although I concur in the decision to reverse, I disagree with the majority’s holding that appellant proved as a matter of law the existence of an official HHC policy of punishing “whistle-blowers”.
Appellee is a public benefit corporation created by Chapter 1016 of the Laws of 1969. N.Y.Unconsol. Laws §§ 7381-7406 (McKinney 1979). It is administered by a sixteen member board of directors consisting of New York City’s Administrator of Health Services, Chief Administrative Officer of Health Functions, Director of Community Mental Health Services, Administrator of Human Resources, and Deputy Mayor-City Administrator, together with the Chief Executive Officer of the Corporation, and ten mayoral appointees, five of whom are designated by the City Council. § 7384.
Appellant’s action against the corporation was commenced on April 29, 1982. An amended complaint was served on May 12, *481982, and the case went to trial on May 17, 1982, one day before appellee’s answer was filed. Much of the 17-day interval between the bringing of the suit and the start of trial was devoted to the taking of depositions, transcripts of which apparently had not been completed and exchanged when the case went to trial. No deposition was offered in evidence by appellant’s attorney. At the close of plaintiff’s case, the district court asked in obvious surprise:
You have no further witnesses? Have you had a chance to read and digest the Monell case? I suggest you go to the library either right now or sometime this afternoon and read it.
I will adjourn this case until tomorrow morning at 10:00.
This was a red-flag warning to appellant’s counsel that the district court was not satisfied with the proof he had offered. Nonetheless, counsel rested. It is not at all surprising that the district court thereafter granted appellee’s motion to dismiss.
Appellant’s skimpy proof showed that on August 7, 1981, Stanley Brezenoff, appel-lee’s president, received an anonymous telegram informing him of Harlem Hospital frauds uncovered by appellant and her fear of removal by the “establishment”. Mr. Brezenoff immediately filed a “Confidential Committee Report” with appellee’s “Office of the Inspector General” requesting “any and all information regarding the aforementioned disclosures.” A five-month investigation followed, evidenced by 160 pages of reports. These undisputed facts hardly are indicative of a corporate policy to punish whistle-blowers. Indeed, the very existence of the Office of the Inspector General is indicative of a contrary intent.
The reports from the Inspector General’s office disclosed, among other things, that Carl Carter, whom my colleagues find to be a policy-making official, was not even aware of the fact that he had to put appellant’s relief from duty in writing until a confidential investigator told him to do so. Reporting further on his investigation of Carter, the confidential investigator stated:
The C.I. asked Mr. Carter about the allegations of misconduct mentioned in the complaint. He stated that none of the allegations were [sic] true and that Ms. Rookard is supposed to write a letter to the “Black Voice” saying that they are not true.
Mr. Carter was asked how Ms. Rookard was dismissed from Harlem Hospital. He stated that Ms. Rookard and himself mutually agreed that she would- be relieved of her duties. He continued that Ms. Rookard was unable to get across to Staff. Several times she has been threatened. A nurse actually slapped her according to Carter.
He informed the C.I. that a letter is in her personnel folder indicating that she was reassigned.
These, I suggest, do not read like reports of interviews with a policy-making corporate official.
The report of the investigator’s conversation with appellant reads in part as follows:
She also stated that while she was employed at Harlem Hospital, she was threatened many times with physical harm. The threats began after she was there for a month. According to Ms. Rookard the staff (nursing) was not accountable to anyone for anything and there was a lack of performance.
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She further stated that each time an administrator is removed by a particular faction of individuals it adds fuel to their fire and makes it impossible for a good administrator to survive at Harlem Hospital.
I find it difficult to equate the phrase “a particular faction of individuals” with the officials and administrators who made corporate policy for the association. In sum, I do not agree with the majority that “Rook-ard presented sufficient evidence that her injuries resulted from an HHC policy to chill the exercise of First Amendment rights by punishing those who dare complain of corruption and mismanagement.”
One thing is clear, however, and that is that conditions at Harlem Hospital were chaotic and had been so since appellee as*49sumed jurisdiction over it. In the eleven year period between 1970 and 1981, appellee had five different presidents, and Harlem Hospital had at least eleven Executive Directors. Dr. Summers was replaced after it was learned that he had used $2,000 of Harlem Hospital money to provide a summer job for his son at another hospital. This, however, was only the tip of the iceberg. As Judge Lumbard has pointed out, the Hospital had been bilked of funds in excess of one half million dollars. This was wrongdoing which could exist only if public disclosure was suppressed. If this condition was caused by a lack of supervision or training so severe as to amount to deliberate indifference or gross negligence on the part of top echelon corporate officials, resulting in a deprivation of appellant's constitutional right to speak out for what was right, section 1983 liability may be found to exist. Doe v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 649 F.2d 134, 141-47 (2d Cir.1981); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1246 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979).
I concur in the order to reverse because, examining appellant’s evidence with the aid of a powerful magnifying glass, I am able to make out the barest glimmer of a prima facie case on the above-described grounds.