Court Opinion

ID: 9535779
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:52:57.795347+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:33:19.813195
License: Public Domain

BAXTER, J., Concurring.
I agree with the majority’s reasoning and result. I write separately to make two additional points.
First, the People have consistently asserted that even if misdemeanor child molestation (Pen. Code, § 647.6, subd. (a) (section 647.6(a))1 were a lesser necessarily included offense of the felony of lewd touching of a child (§ 288, subd. (a) (section 288(a))), defendant would have had no right to a sua sponte instruction on that lesser offense, because there was no substantial evidence he was guilty of the lesser rather than the greater offense. The majority note the issue, even to the point of describing defendant’s contrary argument, but they decline to resolve it. Rather than leave any impression that substantial evidence of mere molestation may have existed, I would conclude, as a separate and independent ground for affirming the judgment of the Court of Appeal, that the People are correct.
*295As the majority generally explain, a violation of section 288(a) is committed whenever one touches a child under the age of 14 for the immediate purpose of giving or receiving sexual gratification. The external circumstances or appearances of the touching are irrelevant; the crime is defined by the subjective mental state of the toucher. On the other hand, a violation of section 647.6(a) requires conduct toward a child, not limited to touching, which a reasonable person would unhesitatingly find irritating or annoying. However, as interpreted by the case law, this offense also requires perverse sexual motivation; the irritating or annoying behavior must stem from an unnatural or abnormal sexual interest in the child.
Here the evidence was conclusive that defendant touched Arielle H. on her vagina through her dress. In response to specific questions during his police interview, defendant repeatedly admitted he was sexually attracted to children, approached Arielle H. for that reason, and touched her private parts for the purpose of obtaining immediate sexual gratification. By his own admission, therefore, defendant satisfied all the elements of a violation of the charged offense, section 288(a).
Defendant posits there was evidence from which the jury could infer that the touching was done not for immediate gratification, as is required under section 288(a), but was a mere preparatory act intended to remove Arielle H. to another place where gratification could occur. This inference, defendant suggests, would in turn permit the conclusion that he did not violate section 288(a), but did nonetheless engage in irritating or annoying conduct toward Arielle H. for sexual reasons, and thus molested her within the meaning of section 647.6(a).
However, there is no evidence that defendant engaged in. sexually motivated conduct other than a lewd touching. Defendant made no suggestion that he merely happened to touch Arielle’s vagina during a preparatory act; instead, he admitted a touching for the purpose of immediate gratification. Defendant notes the testimony of Arielle’s friend Vicky that she thought defendant was trying to lift Arielle, but Vicky’s opinion cannot contradict defendant’s own description of his intent and state of mind when the touching occurred.
At various times in his police interview, defendant did state that he was just telling his interrogators what they wanted to hear, and that his real motive for approaching and touching Arielle H. was that he had a methamphetamine problem, was not ready to reunite with his family, and therefore wished to be caught and returned to prison. This alternate explanation does not support the theory of a sexually motivated preparatory act which defendant has pursued on appeal. Indeed, this version suggests an absence of the sexual elements of both the charged offense and the lesser offense.
*296Thus, only speculation, contradicted by defendant’s express descriptions of his conduct and specific mental state, supports the notion that he engaged in annoying and irritating conduct toward Arielle for sexual reasons, but did not touch her for the purpose of immediate sexual gratification. For this reason, in addition to that set forth by the majority, the instant trial court had no sua sponte obligation to instruct on misdemeanor molestation.
Second, some additional comments on the meaning of the terms “annoy[]” and “molest[],” as used in section 647.6(a), may be in order. As the majority explain, to “annoy[] or molest[]” a child in violation of this statute is to engage in conduct, directed at a person under the age of 18, (1) by which a normal person would “ ‘unhesitatingly be irritated’ ” (People v. Carskaddon (1957) 49 Cal.2d 423, 426 [318 P.2d 4] (Carskaddon), quoting People v. McNair (1955) 130 Cal.App.2d 696, 698 [279 P.2d 800] (McNair)) and (2) which is “ ‘motivated by an unnatural or abnormal sexual interest’ ” in the underage victim (People v. Maurer (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1121, 1127 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 335], quoting In re Gladys R. (1970) 1 Cal.3d 855, 867 [83 Cal.Rptr. 671, 464 P.2d 127] (Gladys R.)). Whether the conduct would unhesitatingly irritate a reasonable person is judged by an objective standard, does not depend on whether the victim was annoyed in fact, and is distinct from the issue of the perpetrator’s actual perverse sexual motive (e.g., People v. Kongs (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 1741, 1750 [37 Cal.Rptr.2d 327]; People v. Thompson (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 459, 464-467 [253 Cal.Rptr. 564] (Thompson)), which motive must be separately proven.
On the other hand, I question any inference that in deciding whether particular conduct was objectively irritating or annoying, the fact finder must consider only the inherent nature of the behavior itself, in utter isolation from its factual context. I doubt that section 647.6(a) is violated only by conduct which is objectively offensive in any setting and under any circumstances.
The statute, of course, speaks of “annoy[ing] or molest[ing] a child.” (§ 647.6(a), italics added.) Thus, the question becomes whether the conduct would be “unhestitatingly” irritating or annoying to a reasonable person when .directed at a child. Moreover, the principal purpose of the molestation statute is not to shield children from rude or frightening encounters. Instead, the terms “annoyG” and “molestG,” in their statutory context, carry “ ‘a connotation of abnormal sexual motivation on the part of the offender’ ” (Carskaddon, supra, 49 Cal.2d 423, 426, quoting People v. Pallares (1952) 112 Cal.App.2d Supp. 895, 901 [246 P.2d 173] (Pallares), italics added), and the purpose of section 647.6(a) is to protect children from interference by sexual offenders. (Gladys R., supra, 1 Cal.3d 855, 868.) As was said of the predecessor of section 647.6(a), “ ‘It is common knowledge that the subject *297of sex offenders, and particularly the protection of the young from improper advances, has in recent years engaged the close attention of the Legislature and of the general body of the citizens of this state.’ ” (People v. Moore (1955) 137 Cal.App.2d 197, 199 [290 P.2d 40] (Moore), quoting Pallares, supra, 112 Cal.App.2d at p. Supp. 900, italics added.)
This purpose is undermined by any inference that the statute only applies to behavior which would be overtly obnoxious, repulsive, frightening, or disconcerting in any context.2 Sex offenders do not always approach their underage victims with behavior that is rude, obscene, or offensive on its face. Often they employ subtler means, capitalizing on childish naiveté and vulnerability to befriend, entice, and lure. Cognizant of this danger, the community understands that conduct deemed innocuous when it occurs among adults, or in a setting of family or friends, may take on a more sinister connotation when directed, for example, toward a child whom the perpetrator does not know.
Accordingly, in my view, irritating or annoying conduct, for purposes of section 647.6(a), includes behavior toward a child which a reasonable person aware of all the external circumstances would readily suspect to be motivated by an unnatural or abnormal sexual interest in the victim. By necessary inference, any basis for such a suspicion that is well grounded in the objective facts renders the conduct in question “unhesitatingly” irritating and annoying to a reasonable person.
Thus, in deciding whether conduct not offensive on its face was nonetheless unhesitatingly irritating or annoying in context, the factfinder should be able to consider all the circumstances in which it occurred. These may include, among other things, the prior relationship, if any, between the child and the defendant, whether there was any legitimate reason for contact between the defendant and the child, the respective ages of the defendant and the child, both absolute and relative to each other, whether adults were present when the contact occurred, and whether the nature and persistence of the contact would readily cause a reasonable person to suspect the defendant’s perverse motivation.
Such a construction of section 647.6(a) does not ignore the separate requirement that the conduct actually be motivated by the perpetrator’s unnatural or abnormal sexual interest in the child. Conduct toward a child which a reasonable person would readily suspect to be motivated by a perverse sexual interest in the victim may be unhesitatingly irritating or *298annoying to such a person, but it still does not violate the statute unless there was perverse sexual motivation in fact.3
Furthermore, this interpretation does not affect the majority’s conclusion that molestation, as defined by section 647.6(a), is not a lesser necessarily included offense of lewd touching, as defined by section 288(a). It remains true that a violation of section 288(a) can be committed without necessarily committing a violation of section 647.6(a). This is because the former statute can be violated even by a touching that a reasonable person would not readily suspect to be sexually motivated, if the touching was actually done to give or receive immediate sexual gratification. (Martinez, supra, 11 Cal.4th 434, 444-452.)
Nor has prior authority so settled the construction of section 647.6(a) as to require an overtly lewd, obscene, or offensive act. Quoting the Court of Appeal opinion in this case, the majority observe that “ ‘In every reported case in which the courts have upheld convictions under section 647.6[(a)j, the defendant’s objective conduct would have unhesitatingly irritated or disturbed a reasonable person had it been directed at that person regardless of the defendant’s intent. [Fn. omitted.]’ ” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 291, italics added.) However, because the issue was not narrowly presented therein, none of those decisions clearly hold that the statute cannot be violated except by conduct which rises to that level.
Nor does Carskaddon, supra, 49 Cal.2d 423, clearly require that the objectionable act itself be overtly lewd, obscene, or offensive. While Carskaddon noted that its facts were distinguishable on that ground from those of McNair, supra, 130 Cal.App.2d 696, and Moore, supra, 137 Cal.App.2d 197, the narrow holding of Carskaddon is only that the particular evidence there at issue was insufficient to establish a violation of the molestation statute.
In that case, a citizen observed the defendant in the company of a six-year-old girl and a four-year-old boy in a public park. (Carskaddon, supra, 49 Cal.2d 423, 425.) After the boy left, the defendant remained under *299a tree with the girl for about 10 minutes. (Ibid.) The two then went to a concession stand, where he bought her an ice cream bar. (Ibid.) Thereafter, the defendant “walked down a public street with the little girl by his side, and . . . when stopped and queried by [a police] officer, . . . stated that the girl was lost and he was taking her home.” (Id., at p. 426.) The girl told the officer the defendant was taking her down to the river “ ‘to show her—,’ ” but her statement was interrupted. (Ibid.) Although the two were walking in a direction away from the girl’s address, Carskaddon reasoned, there was no evidence the defendant was not “innocently befriending” the girl and did not ultimately intend to escort her home after taking her to the river for an innocent purpose. (Ibid.) Thus, Carskaddon concluded, there was no substantial evidence of anything other than “friendly noncriminal activity”; suspicions of an ulterior motive were mere “speculation.” (Ibid.)
Carskaddon did not indicate whether it found insufficient evidence that the conduct was objectively annoying, or whether the perceived deficiency related to the defendant’s subjective intent. Indeed, Carskaddon did not appear to recognize these two independent elements of the offense as they have since been confirmed (see, e.g., Gladys R., supra, 1 Cal.3d 855, 867), and may thus have assumed that if the act itself were not “ ‘so lewd or obscene that the normal person would unhesitatingly be irritated by it’ ” (Carskaddon, supra, 49 Cal.2d 423, 426, quoting McNair, supra, 130 Cal.App.2d 696, 698), problems of vagueness and overbreadth might arise.4 Moreover, the evidence in Carskaddon was indeed ambiguous with respect to both elements. The defendant claimed the child he befriended was lost, and so far as appears in the Carskaddon opinion, no evidence contradicted that claim. Hence, there may have been neither a basis for “ready” suspicion, and thus “unhesitating” irritation, concerning the defendant’s objective conduct, nor adequate proof that the defendant actually was motivated by sexual interest in the child.
*300Accordingly, I do not read Carskaddon as precluding the construction I propose. Nor, at length, do I interpret the majority’s opinion to foreclose such an interpretation in a case where the issue is directly presented. With these caveats, I join the reasoning and result adopted by the majority.

 All further unlabeled statutory references are to the Penal Code.

 Indeed, other statutes criminalize lewd or obscene public acts. (E.g., §§ 314, subd. 1 [indecent exposure], 647, subd. (a) [lewd or dissolute public behavior].)

 This is not to say that the circumstances of the conduct are not relevant or probative on the issue of the defendant’s subjective state of mind. (Cf. People v. Martinez (1995) 11 Cal.4th 434, 445 [45 Cal.Rptr.2d 905, 903 P.2d 1037] [lewd touching] (Martinez).) Of course, the focus of the molestation statute is on the defendant’s “unnatural or abnormal” sexual interest. (People v. Maurer, supra, 32 Cal.App.4th 1121, 1127.) That narrow focus would appear to place beyond the statute’s purview any normal sexually motivated conduct, not otherwise prohibited, between an 18-year-old high school senior and his or her 16- or 17-year-old sweetheart.

 In Thompson, supra, 206 Cal.App.3d 459, the court noted Carskaddon’s failure to distinguish the objective conduct element from the subjective intent element. (Id. at p. 465.) Thompson further confirmed that the objective conduct need not be overtly lewd or obscene. (Id. at p. 466.) Of course, the words “annoy[]” and “molest[]” in section 647.6(a) must be interpreted with sufficient precision and certainty to give adequate public notice of what acts are prohibited. (See, e.g., In re Sheridan (1964) 230 Cal.App.2d 365, 372 [40 Cal.Rptr. 894]; Pallares, supra, 112 Cal.App.2d Supp. 895, 901.) But that obligation is satisfied by limiting those terms to confrontations with a child (1) that would “unhesitatingly” irritate or annoy a reasonable person, either because they are overtly offensive, or because a reasonable person would readily suspect them to stem from an unnatural or abnormal sexual interest in the victim, and (2) that are in fact motivated by perverse sexual interest. Under this standard, all ambiguities must be resolved in the defendant’s favor, and there is no danger of conviction “on mere suspicion or reputation, [or] by mistake.” (Thompson, supra, 206 Cal.App.3d at p. 466, italics added.)