Court Opinion

ID: 9951007
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-15 15:18:09.289491+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:35:54.733888
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: MARCH 8, 2024; 10:00 A.M.
                            NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                    Commonwealth of Kentucky
                               Court of Appeals
                                   NO. 2023-CA-0019-MR

TRINO JOSE ARREOLA ORTEGA                                            APPELLANT

                   APPEAL FROM JESSAMINE CIRCUIT COURT
v.                HONORABLE C. HUNTER DAUGHERTY, JUDGE
                           ACTION NO. 19-CR-00203

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                               APPELLEE

                                          OPINION
                                         AFFIRMING

                                        ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: ACREE, GOODWINE, AND JONES, JUDGES.

GOODWINE, JUDGE: Trino Jose Arreola Ortega (“Ortega”) appeals from a

Jessamine Circuit Court judgment and sentence after a jury convicted him of one

count of sexual abuse in the first degree (victim under twelve years of age).1 He

1
    Kentucky Revised Statute (“KRS”) 510.110, a Class C felony.
was sentenced to five years in prison. After carefully reviewing the record and

finding no error, we affirm.

                                        BACKGROUND

                 A Jessamine County Grand Jury indicted Ortega on charges of rape,

first-degree (victim under twelve years of age); sexual abuse, first-degree (victim

under twelve years of age); and sexual abuse, first-degree (victim over the age of

twelve but under the age of sixteen) based on allegations from D.H.G., Ortega’s

niece by marriage.

                 D.H.G. testified that in 2011 or 2012, when she was five or six years

old, she visited her cousins2 frequently at their house for sleepovers a few times a

month. She testified that on one such visit, Ortega raped her. There was no

physical injury, bleeding, or trauma.

                 D.H.G. testified that the rape happened only once but that on multiple

occasions, she would wake during the night to Ortega touching her. Sometimes,

Ortega touched her on top of her clothes, but other times, he put his hands inside

her underwear. D.H.G. testified that the sexual abuse began after the rape, within a

few months but not more than a year, although she could not be more specific. She

testified that the sexual abuse lasted until she was twelve or thirteen years old.

D.H.G. disclosed Ortega’s abuse in 2019, about a year or two after the abuse

2
    Ortega and his wife Veronica’s children.

                                               -2-
ended. The Commonwealth called four additional witnesses to testify. Their

testimony is not at issue on appeal.

             Ortega testified in his defense and denied D.H.G.’s allegations of rape

and sexual abuse. He did not know why she would make up the allegations. No

other witnesses testified on Ortega’s behalf.

             After closing arguments, the trial court explained the deliberation

process to the jury. Specifically, as to cell phone use, the trial court said that while

“[s]ome judges take your cell phones away[,] I’m not going to do that. You’re not

kids.” (Video Record (“VR”) 7/19/22; 11:04:40.) But the trial court admonished

that the jurors were prohibited from “us[ing] them unless in the presence of the

bailiff” for purposes of planning logistics with family members. Id. After the

admonition, jurors retired to the jury room and began deliberations. The jurors

retained their cell phones without objection from either party.

             At approximately 3:35 p.m., the jury requested D.H.G.’s testimony,

which the parties agreed to play back in the courtroom. While rewatching the

video, the Commonwealth notified the trial court that some recordings were

skipped. The video was rewound, but too far back, and a portion of D.H.G.’s

testimony was played again. The replayed testimony detailed Ortega sexually

abusing D.H.G., including where she stated that he would sometimes touch her

outside and inside her clothes.

                                          -3-
                 Defense counsel timely objected and moved for a mistrial, arguing

poor sound quality of the video playback, concerns about the replay issue, and his

belief that it presented an unbalanced second viewing of D.H.G.’s testimony while

unduly emphasizing portions of her statements. The trial court overruled the

motion for a mistrial and allowed deliberations to continue.

                 At approximately 5:00 p.m., the jury submitted a question about

logistics, asking if they were expected to finish deliberations that day or if they

could continue the next day. Approximately two hours later, the jury asked to go

home. With the parties’ agreement, the trial court brought the jury back into open

court and asked the foreperson if the jurors were deadlocked or wanted to leave for

another reason.

                 The foreperson told the trial court and attorneys that the jury had

reached a verdict on one count and was close to reaching a verdict on the other two

counts but wanted to break for the evening. After reading the Allen3 charge, the

trial court told the foreperson that they would see how deliberations were going in

another thirty minutes but did not put a limit on that timeframe.

                 Approximately twenty minutes later, the jury told the trial court that it

had reached a verdict on Count 1 but not Counts 2 and 3. Thirty minutes later, the

jury unanimously reached a verdict on all three counts, convicting Ortega of sexual

3
    Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 17 S. Ct. 154, 41 L. Ed. 528 (1896).

                                                  -4-
abuse in the first degree (victim under the age of twelve) (Count 2) and acquitting

Ortega of rape (Count 1) and sexual abuse in the first degree (victim over the age

of twelve but less than sixteen (Count 3).

                Before sentencing, Ortega filed a timely motion for a new trial on

Counts 2 and 3.4 Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion and

sentenced Ortega to five years in prison per the jury’s recommendation. This

appeal followed.

                Additional facts will be discussed in the analysis.

                                STANDARD OF REVIEW

                The trial court’s decision to grant a mistrial is within its sound

discretion, and it will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Shemwell v.

Commonwealth, 294 S.W.3d 430, 437 (Ky. 2009) (citations omitted).

Ortega has requested that we review his unpreserved claims for palpable error

under RCr5 10.26. Under palpable error review, a defendant must show “the

probability of a different result . . . so fundamental as to threaten his entitlement to

due process of law.” Huddleston v. Commonwealth, 542 S.W.3d 237, 245 (Ky.

2018) (citation omitted). We must determine whether the alleged defect “is so

4
  It is unclear why Ortega requested a new trial on Count 3 when the jury returned a verdict of
not guilty on that count (Record (“R.”) at 88), and the trial court subsequently entered a
judgment of acquittal on Count 3. R. at 121.
5
    Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.

                                               -5-
manifest, fundamental and unambiguous that it threatens the integrity of the

judicial process.” Id. (citation omitted).

                                     ANALYSIS

             On appeal, Ortega argues the trial court erred by (1) permitting jurors

to have access to their cell phones during deliberations, (2) allowing jury

separation, (3) denying his motion for a mistrial, (4) utilizing an improper Allen

charge, and (5) cumulative error. We address each in turn.

             First, Ortega argues that the trial court erred by permitting jurors to

keep their cell phones during deliberations. Ortega did not object before the jury

began deliberations, and he acknowledges this oversight in his brief. Had Ortega

objected to the trial court allowing jurors to access their cell phones, the standard

of review would be an abuse of discretion. Winstead v. Commonwealth, 327

S.W.3d 386, 402 (Ky. 2010). However, since the issue is not properly preserved, it

is subject to palpable error. Elery v. Commonwealth, 368 S.W.3d 78, 97-98 (Ky.

2012) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (“[A]n appellant preserves

for appellate review only those issues fairly brought to the attention of the trial

court. . . . A new theory of error cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”).

             Following closing arguments and before releasing the jury to begin

deliberations, the trial court said, “While some judges take your cell phones

away[,] I’m not going to do that. You’re not kids.” (VR 7/19/22; 11:04:40.) But

                                             -6-
the trial court admonished the jurors that they were prohibited from “us[ing] them

unless in the presence of the bailiff” for purposes of planning logistics with family

members. Id.

             First, we acknowledge that the best practice for trial judges is to

refrain from allowing jurors to retain electronic communication devices during

deliberations, including but not limited to cell phones. Allowing jurors to keep

such devices during deliberations only invites questions and concerns about

possible juror impropriety, even where none exists. Although it has criticized the

practice, our Supreme Court has not adopted a bright-line rule against jurors

retaining cell phones during deliberations. Arnett v. Commonwealth, 470 S.W.2d

834, 837 (Ky. 1971). This issue could have been addressed had Ortega objected to

the trial court permitting the jurors to retain their cell phones during deliberations.

             Ortega argues that permitting jurors to use their cell phones in the

bailiff’s presence but outside other jurors resulted in impermissible jury separation.

Ortega claims this issue was properly preserved under his motion for a new trial.

He explains that he only became aware that jurors could use their cell phones to

call or text family members about scheduling when preparing for sentencing. Once

he became aware of it, he immediately supplemented his motion for a new trial to

include the jury separation issue. After that, the trial court scheduled the motion

for an evidentiary hearing.

                                          -7-
             Generally, raising an issue for the first time in a post-judgment motion

for a new trial is insufficient to preserve an error for appellate review. Smith v.

Commonwealth, 366 S.W.2d 902 (Ky. 1962). In Smith, our then highest court held

that in cases other than death penalty cases, arguing improper jury separation for

the first time in a motion for a new trial is too late for proper preservation. Under

palpable review, Ortega must show that there was an error that was “clear or plain

under current law” and that it affected his substantial rights. Commonwealth v.

Jones, 283 S.W.3d 665, 668 (Ky. 2009); RCr. 10.26.

             However, Ortega’s claim presents a rather unique issue regarding

which standard of review we should undertake. Assuming, arguendo, that Ortega

brought his concerns to the trial court as soon as practicable once he became aware

of the problem, his claims still fail even under the abuse of discretion standard.

             Courts in Kentucky have refused to grant a new trial due to improper

jury separation if the bailiff or another supervising official was present, and there is

a showing by the Commonwealth that no outside person exerted improper

influence on the juror. Davenport v. Commonwealth, 285 Ky. 628, 148 S.W.2d

1054, 1062 (Ky. 1941). In this case, Deputy Upton positioned himself where he

could monitor jurors making calls outside of the jury room and jurors inside the

jury room. He could hear whether the jurors on the phone discussed the case.

Deputy Upton testified that he could observe all jury members simultaneously.

                                          -8-
(VR 11/22/22; 1:28.) However, Deputy Upton testified that some jurors used text

messages and that he did not review said text messages.

             During the evidentiary hearing on his motion for a new trial, the trial

court addressed Ortega’s concerns. The trial court summarized Deputy Upton’s

testimony and indicated that Deputy Upton was following his instructions. He did

not believe the witness who testified that one or more jurors exited the jury room

or room adjacent to the jury room and used their cell phones outside the presence

of Deputy Upton.

             Concerning the text messages, the trial court said, “I guess we can

bring all the jurors in here who used text and put them under oath and have them

testify about whether they talked to anybody about the case. . . if you all want to

complete the record, I guess we could get the jurors in here. . . .” (VR 11/22/23;

2:23:09.) Ortega did not take the trial court up on its offer, nor did he object to the

trial court not bringing the jurors in to testify regarding the use of text messages.

             Ortega’s rights were not substantially affected. There was no

evidence that the jurors’ use of cell phones swayed their decision. The trial court

admonished the jury several times against using cell phones, telling them that “you

cannot use [cell phones] unless in the presence of the bailiff.” (VR 7/19/22; 11:04-

40.) Deputy Upton testified that all phone calls he overheard related to childcare

or alerting family members that they were unsure when they would be home. (VR

                                          -9-
11/22/22; 1:30:30.) Given the jurors’ limited use of their cell phones to notify

family members of scheduling issues, we cannot conclude that Ortega’s rights

were affected. The trial court did not abuse its discretion. Concerning the text

messages, not having objected to the trial court’s ruling, Ortega waived this issue.

Under palpable review, there is no manifest injustice. Ortega was acquitted of the

most serious allegation and received the minimum sentence for the count of which

he was convicted.

             Next, Ortega argues that the technical issues during the requested

replay of D.H.G.’s testimony placed an undue emphasis on her testimony and

resulted in an unfair trial. Ortega asked the trial court for a mistrial because of the

“poor sound and replay” that allegedly “taint[ed] . . . the trial.” (VR 7/19/22;

6:05:30.) “The decision to grant a mistrial is within the sound discretion of the

trial court and such a ruling will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.”

Shemwell, 294 S.W.3d at 437 (citations omitted).

             In exercising discretion to replay testimony for the jury, a trial court

must balance the risk of emphasizing testimony against the need to prevent juror

confusion. Baze v. Commonwealth, 965 S.W.2d 817, 825 (Ky. 1997). As such,

courts exercise caution when allowing juries to reexamine testimony during

deliberations because there is some concern that jurors may give greater weight to

testimony they review or hear again. Wright v. Premier Elkhorn Coal Co., 16

                                          -10-
S.W.3d 570, 572 (Ky. App. 1999). Ultimately, there is an aversion to unduly

emphasizing testimony or evidence. McAtee v. Commonwealth, 413 S.W.3d 608,

628-29 (Ky. 2013).

             It was permissible for the jury to review D.H.G.’s testimony. RCr

9.74 (“No information requested by the jury or any juror after the jury has retired

for deliberation shall be given except in open court in the presence of the defendant

. . . and the entire jury[.]”). Nothing in the record supports Ortega’s claim that the

testimony replay – and accompanying video glitches – resulted in an undue

emphasis on D.H.G.’s testimony.

             The jury watched the testimony between 4:30 p.m. and 4:39 p.m. and

then deliberated over two more hours and acquitted him of the most serious

allegation, rape in the first degree, and the least severe allegation of sexual abuse in

the first degree (victim older than the age of twelve but less than the age of

sixteen). The jury recommended a minimum sentence of five years on the more

serious allegation of sexual abuse in the first degree (victim under the age of

twelve).

             The Kentucky Supreme Court has held that the skipping and

rewinding of a recording was harmless. Burkhart v. Commonwealth, 125 S.W.3d

848, 850 (Ky. 2003), as modified on denial of reh’g (Feb. 19, 2004). In Burkhart,

the appellant challenged the video playback of a surveillance video in slow motion

                                         -11-
during deliberations, arguing that it was unduly prejudicial. Id. at 849. The

Supreme Court found no definitive evidence that the slow-motion replay of the

tape prejudiced the appellant. Id. at 851. The slow-motion replay was not done on

purpose or for any emphasis. Id. Likewise, there was no evidence that the

Commonwealth or the trial court deliberately caused D.H.G.’s testimony to skip.

Instead, like Burkhart, it was a technical mistake. Without an intentional emphasis

and actual prejudice, Ortega’s claim fails. The trial court did not abuse its

discretion in denying the motion for a mistrial because the technical malfunction

did not warrant it.

             Next, Ortega argues that the trial court’s Allen charge improperly

forced an agreement among the jurors. This argument was not properly preserved

and will be reviewed for palpable error. Ortega does not argue that the trial court

erred in giving the Allen charge or that the language used was problematic.

Instead, the crux of his argument is that the Allen charge pressured the jury to

render a verdict. Ortega supports this claim by pointing to the amount of time that

lapsed from the issuance of the Allen charge to the jury reaching a verdict.

             The lapse between an alleged coercive Allen charge and verdict can be

considered, although it is undoubtedly not outcome-determinative. Bell v.

Commonwealth, 245, S.W.3d 738 (Ky. 2008), overruled on other grounds by Harp

v. Commonwealth, 266 S.W.3d 813 (Ky. 2008). “The time lapse between the

                                         -12-
alleged coercive comment and the verdict may be relevant as part of the totality of

circumstances, though not decisive.” Id. at 742. Instead, it is a totality of the

circumstances that matter, including the language of the trial court and whether

taken with the time between the Allen charge and the decision, the trial court’s

language forced, rather than encouraged, a verdict. The jury deliberated fifty

minutes after the Allen charge and until the submission of the verdict form for all

three counts. Ortega points to no evidence in the record to argue that this

timeframe demonstrated coerciveness.

                    The trial court read an Allen charge6 to the jury, asking if they would

“give it another thirty minutes or so.” (VR 7/19/22; 6:50:40.) Similar language

and circumstances are noncoercive. In Commonwealth v. Gray, the court told the

jury “to give it some more time and a little discussion and see if you guys can

reach a verdict in this matter.” 479 S.W.3d 94, 98 (Ky. App. 2015). This

statement was found to have no “indicia of coercion” but “merely encouraged

6
    Specifically, the trial court said:

                            To return a verdict, each juror must agree to that verdict. Jurors
                    must consult with one another to deliberate with a view to reaching an
                    agreement if it can be done without violence to individual judgment. Each
                    juror must decide the case, but only after an impartial consideration of the
                    evidence with the other jurors. In the course of deliberations, a juror
                    should not hesitate to reexamine their views and change their opinion if
                    convinced it is erroneous. No juror should surrender their honest
                    conviction as to the weight or effect of the evidence solely because of the
                    opinion of the other jurors or for the mere purpose of reaching a verdict.

(VR: 7/19/22; 6:57:03.)

                                                       -13-
further deliberation.” Id. Here, the trial court suggested that an additional thirty

minutes of deliberation could be helpful to the jury. He encouraged more

thoughtful debate that evening without precluding further deliberations the next

day.

              Elders v. Commonwealth, 395 S.W.3d 495 (Ky. App. 2012), further

illustrates the propriety of the trial court’s Allen charge and absence of coercion.

In Elders, the judge did not make any statements about deciding on all counts that

evening but told the jury they could find the defendant guilty of one count and

acquit on another. 395 S.W.3d at 503-04. This was not demanding or hinting at

the need for a verdict. Id. Similarly, the trial court informed the jury that they

could “reach a conclusion on one count and not reach a conclusion on other

counts.” (VR 7/19/22; 6:58:45.) Like Elders, the trial court merely informed the

jury of its options.

              Given the totality of the circumstances, including the lack of

intimidating language or action by the trial court and the lapse of time, we cannot

conclude that the Allen charge was coercive. Thus, no palpable error substantially

affecting Ortega’s rights resulted in manifest injustice.

              Next, Ortega contends that the jury’s role was complete when the trial

court ordered it to complete the verdict form for Count 1. Logically, the jury

                                         -14-
completed its job by filling out a full verdict form. Again, this issue was

unpreserved and will be reviewed for palpable error.

             A jury completes its task only when it finishes deliberations,

announces the result in open court, and no juror dissents when polled. The very

nature of deliberations may change the views on counts previously considered. A

judge’s instruction to complete a verdict form does not lead to the end of the jury’s

role if the jury has not reached a unanimous verdict on all counts.

             No case law supports Ortega’s contention that the “role of the jury

was finished” when the court directed the jury to complete the verdict form.

Ortega argues that the jury was forbidden from deliberating further on counts two

and three and “disobeyed” the court’s instructions to complete the verdict form for

count one. Neither statutory nor common law provides that juries cannot

deliberate further once the trial judge asks for a verdict form.

             At Ortega’s request, the trial court wrote a note to the jury asking if it

could complete Count 1 of the verdict form. (VR 7/19/22; 7:21:30.) The trial

court did not instruct the jury that it was forbidden to continue to deliberate on the

other counts or prohibited from returning all the verdict forms. Given the back-

and-forth between the jury and the trial court that led to the Allen charge, it is

reasonable that the jury believed it was its job to complete all the forms if it could

                                          -15-
do so. It is reasonable that, given the intensity of their discussions as indicated by

the foreperson, some consensus may have been reached in these final moments.

             This case is distinguishable from York v. Commonwealth, 285 Ky.

492, 148 S.W.2d 337 (1941), the sole case Ortega cites to support his argument. In

York, the jury was released into the public until the court became aware of a

dissenting statement on the back of the instructions. Id. at 338. Nothing factually

similar happened here, where deliberations were ongoing, and the jury had yet to

submit any verdict forms to the court.

             Ultimately, the jury’s role was not complete when it returned to

complete the verdict form, and it was permissible for the jury to continue

deliberating. Thus, there was no error. The deliberations were ongoing as the jury

worked to complete its duty of reaching a unanimous verdict. In doing so, the jury

acquitted Ortega on Count 3. Ortega’s rights were not substantially affected to the

point where there was a manifest injustice. Therefore, the jury did not improperly

continue deliberations.

             Finally, Ortega requests this Court to reverse for cumulative error.

Because no reversible error occurred, this argument fails. “Cumulative error is the

doctrine under which multiple errors, although harmless individually, may be

deemed reversible if their cumulative effect is to render the trial fundamentally

unfair.” Mason v. Commonwealth, 559 S.W.3d 337, 344 (Ky. 2018) (internal

                                         -16-
quotation marks and citation omitted). The Kentucky Supreme Court notes that

“[w]here . . . none of the errors individually raised any real question of prejudice,

[the Court has] declined to hold that the absence of prejudice plus the absence of

prejudice somehow adds up to prejudice.” Id. at 345 (quoting Brown v.

Commonwealth, 313 S.W.3d 577, 631 (Ky. 2010)). The doctrine of cumulative

error is inapplicable because each of the alleged errors failed, resulting in no

prejudice, and their cumulative effect did not render Ortega’s trial fundamentally

unfair.

                                  CONCLUSION

             Based on the foregoing analysis, we AFFIRM the judgment of the

Jessamine Circuit Court.

             ALL CONCUR.

 BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:                      BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

 David J. Guarnieri                         Daniel Cameron
 Lexington, Kentucky                        Attorney General of Kentucky

                                            Matthew F. Kuhn
                                            Solicitor General

                                            Rachel A. Wright
                                            Assistant Solicitor General
                                            Frankfort, Kentucky

                                         -17-