Court Opinion

ID: 9674641
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:32:26.277593+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:28.609825
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing
HARWOOD, Justice.
Both the appellee and appellant have filed applications for rehearing.
The appellee argues principally that we erred in reducing the amount awarded by the lower court as alimony in gross. We have reconsidered our opinion in this aspect and adhere to our original conclusions.
In brief on application for rehearing counsel for appellee has also requested that a solicitor’s fee be awarded for representation of Mrs. Leo in this appeal. No such request was made upon original submission, and therefore no consideration was given to such question. Having been raised for the first time on application for rehearing, it comes too late for our consideration.
The application of the appellee for a rehearing is denied.
The appellant, in his application for rehearing, suggests that our original opinion should be modified by eliminating certain items from the debts incurred by Mrs. Leo after the separation of the parties and which the lower court decreed should be paid by Mr. Leo. Upon further considera*15tion, we are of the opinion that appellant’s contentions in this regard are well taken.
In our original opinion, we discussed several of these debts, and rendered an opinion eliminating them from debts to be paid by the appellant.
While Mrs. Leo testified in reference to a few of these items, the evidence concerning the debts incurred by her after the separation consists only of her exhibit No. 7, listing some twenty-five to thirty of her creditors.
Appellee’s exhibit No. 7, supra, bears the descriptive title: “Credit Obligation of Mrs. Clyde W. Leo.”
Some sixteen of the items listed on this exhibit are clearly for medical, drug, or other expenses related to medical treatment of Mrs. Leo. These medical items aggregate $617.24. As- before stated, the appellant has in the past always paid appellee’s medical expenses, and on this appeal has not questioned the lower court’s order in ■reference to the payment by him of the medical expenses incurred by Mrs. Leo after the separation. •
In Frazier v. Frazier, 273 Ala. 53, 134 So. 2d 204, the lower court in its decree of divorce had ordered the husband to pay certain bills incurred by the wife after the couple had separated. The wife during such time had purchased in her own name wearing apparel and personal miscellaneous items for herself. The lower court had ordered the husband to pay these hills on the assumption they were necessities for which the husband was liable.
In reversing the decree of the lower court in the aspect of ordering the husband to pay these debts, and rendering it in such aspect, this court wrote:
“In the light of the authorities this ruling cannot be sustained. Appellee purchased these goods on her own account, on her own contract and no credit was extended to appellant, nor was there any express or implied assent on his part to pay for these goods purchased by his wife.
“The apposite principle is stated in Gafford v. Dunham, 111 Ala. 551, 553, 20 So. 346, 347:
‘The common-law liability of the husband for necessaries and suitable comforts has always rested upon the assumption that credit was given to the husband, and not to the wife, and that the purchase was made with his implied assent. In no case did this liability arise when the facts showed affirmatively that credit was given to the wife, and charged to her, and not to the husband, and the goods were sold not upon his implied assent that they were to be charged to him.’
“Also, ‘the fact that the charge was to her, shows prima facie at least, that the credit was given to her.’ Pearson v. Darrington, 32 Ala. 227, 243. See McMillan v. Fabretta, 231 Ala. 188, 163 So. 793; O’Connor v. Chamberlain, 59 Ala. 431, 436. In fact, there is no. evidence to the contrary and, in our view, the . learned trial court erred in decreeing that these debts incurred by appellee be paid by the appellant.”
The above doctrines necessitate the conclusion that the portion of the decree now being considered ordering the appellant (Mr. Leo) to pay the debts of Mrs. Leo incurred by her following their separation can be affirmed only to the extent of payment of Mrs. Leo’s debts for medical expenses, i.e., $617.24.
As to the remaining portion of the debts of Mrs. Leo incurred after the separation, over and above the debts for medical expenses of $617.24, which remainder was ordered by the court to be paid by Mr. Leo, the decree of the lower court is reversed to this extent and one is hereby rendered in favor of the appellant, Mr. Leo.
*16'■ 'The application of the appellant for a réhearing is granted, and our original opinion is modified to the extent indicated.
Appellee’s application for rehearing denied.
Appellant’s application for rehearing granted and opinion modified.
• -LIVINGSTON, C. J., and SIMPSON and MERRILL, JJ., concur.