Court Opinion

ID: 9365649
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-24 18:01:31.729437+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:46.937430
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                         FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        JAN 24 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                             FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ATHENA COSMETICS, INC., a Delaware              No.    22-55159
corporation,
                                                D.C. No.
                Plaintiff,                      2:20-cv-05526-SVW-SHK

 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
AMN DISTRIBUTION, INC., a Delaware
corporation; MOISHE NEWMAN, an
individual, DBA Brush Express,

                Defendants-Appellees,

 v.

MARINA LOUISE LANG; SOCAL IP
LAW GROUP, LLP,

      Real-party-in-interest-
      Appellants.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Central District of California
                   Stephen V. Wilson, District Judge, Presiding

                             Submitted January 9, 2023**

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
                               Pasadena, California

Before: CALLAHAN, R. NELSON, and H.A. THOMAS, Circuit Judges.

      Appellants and real-parties-in-interest, Marina Lang and her law firm, the

SoCal IP Law Group, LLP, represented Athena Cosmetics (Athena) against AMN

Distribution and Moishe Newman (collectively, AMN) in a trademark dispute before

District Judge Stephen V. Wilson. Lang appeals Judge Wilson’s imposition of civil

contempt sanctions against her and her firm in the form of a fine to compensate the

defendants for their attorney fees from the trial.1 We have jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. § 1291, see David v. Hooker, Ltd., 560 F.2d 412, 415–16 (9th Cir. 1977), and

affirm.2

      1. We review a civil contempt order for abuse of discretion and factual

findings in connection with a contempt order for clear error. Kelly v. Wengler, 822

F.3d 1085, 1094 (9th Cir. 2016). A contempt finding must be supported by “clear

and convincing evidence.” Ahearn ex rel. NLRB v. Int’l Longshore & Warehouse

Union, Locs. 21 & 4, 721 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2013). “An appellate court

should not reverse a finding of contempt ‘unless [it has] a definite and firm

1
 Lang acknowledges that she lacks an appellate remedy for her period of temporary
confinement and does not appeal it, so we express no views on that issue.
2
 We grant Lang’s request for judicial notice of a public reprimand issued by Texas’s
State Commission on Judicial Conduct (ECF Dkt. No. 13) because the reprimand is
a fact that “can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy
cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2).

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conviction that the district court committed a clear error of judgment after weighing

the relevant factors.’” Peterson v. Highland Music, Inc., 140 F.3d 1313, 1323 (9th

Cir. 1998) (quoting In re Dual-Deck Video Cassette Record Antitrust Litig., 10 F.3d

693, 695 (9th Cir. 1993)). These factors include whether the contemnor substantially

complied with the court’s order and whether the contemnor acted based on a good

faith and reasonable interpretation of the order. In re Dual Deck, 10 F.3d at 695.

      Despite a clear pretrial order forbidding testimony or argument about the

nature of the allegedly counterfeit products sold by AMN, Lang repeatedly

mentioned counterfeit products in her opening statement, while questioning the only

witness during the trial, and in her closing statement. She did this despite verbal

warnings from Judge Wilson reminding her of the scope of the pretrial order. This

is not a “technical” violation, as Lang urges, but a direct violation of a clear court

order. Judge Wilson acted within his discretion in concluding that Lang was not

acting based on a reasonable or good faith interpretation of his order. See Wolfard

Glassblowing Co. v. Vanbragt, 118 F.3d 1320, 1323–24 (9th Cir. 1997).

      Lang asserts that she did not violate any court orders by arguing evidentiary

rulings. But Judge Wilson’s oral rulings and instructions during trial were court

orders that Lang should have obeyed. Cf. In re Gustafson, 650 F.2d 1017, 1020 (9th

Cir. 1981) (en banc) (affirming summary criminal contempt against attorney who

“repeatedly ignored objections sustained by the court” and “disregarded the judge’s

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instruction as to permissible argument”). Shouting objections in defiance of verbal

orders “disrupted the progress of the trial and hence the orderly administration of

justice” and supported the civil contempt finding against Lang. United States v.

Wilson, 421 U.S. 309, 315–16 (1975).

      2. Lang next argues that Judge Wilson did not afford her due process because

he canceled the in-person contempt hearing. “The issue of whether a district court

provided an alleged contemnor due process . . . is a legal question subject to de novo

review on appeal.” Thomas, Head & Greisen Emps. Tr. v. Buster, 95 F.3d 1449,

1458 (9th Cir. 1996).

      The amount of process due depends on whether the sanctions are civil or

criminal in nature. “[C]riminal penalties may not be imposed on someone who has

not been afforded the protections that the Constitution requires of such criminal

proceedings, including the requirement that the offense be proved beyond a

reasonable doubt.” Hicks ex rel. Feiock v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 632 (1988). Civil

penalties, in contrast, may be imposed without a jury trial or proof beyond a

reasonable doubt. Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S.

821, 827 (1994).

      Here, the fine against Lang is properly characterized as a civil sanction.

Although civil sanctions typically coerce “future compliance with a court order” and

are “avoidable through obedience,” id., they may be nonconditional and instead

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“compensate the complainant for losses sustained.” United States v. United Mine

Workers of Am., 330 U.S. 258, 303–04 (1947). Judge Wilson used opposing

counsel’s billing records for the November 2021 trial to calculate the appropriate

sanctions because Lang’s conduct had caused him to grant a new trial to AMN. Id.

(requiring compensatory fine to be tailored to actual loss). Because Judge Wilson

granted a new trial to AMN based on Lang’s conduct, this fine only compensated

AMN for a direct consequence of Lang’s actions.

      Since the sanctions were civil, Judge Wilson’s show-cause order, which

informed Lang of the basis for his contempt finding and provided her an opportunity

to respond, satisfied due process requirements. Even for indirect contempt—that is,

misconduct outside the courtroom—we have affirmed sanctions imposed without an

in-person hearing. See Thomas, Head & Greisen Emps. Tr., 95 F.3d at 1458 (noting

that allowing the contemnors to brief an issue provided “ample notice and

opportunity to respond”). An in-person hearing was not required under these

circumstances.

      AFFIRMED.

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