Court Opinion

ID: 9396515
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-22 20:03:54.245114+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:17.596784
License: Public Domain

Filed 5/22/23 Taylor v. Dimonte CA2/1
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION ONE

 RICHARD TAYLOR et al.,                                              B310227

           Plaintiffs and Appellants,                                (Los Angeles County
                                                                     Super. Ct. No. 19STCV19048)
           v.

 ANTHONY A. DIMONTE et al.,

           Defendants and Respondents.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Ruth Ann Kwan, Judge. Affirmed.
      Law Office of Stewart Levin, Stewart Levin; Joseph S.
Socher, Esq., APC and Joseph S. Socher for Plaintiffs and
Appellants.
      Kaufman Dolowich Voluck, Andrew J. Waxler, Courtney
Curtis-Ives and Jennifer E. Newcomb for Defendants and
Respondents.
                     ______________________
       Plaintiffs and appellants Richard Taylor and Wingate
Holdings, LLC (the LLC) sued their former attorneys, defendants
and respondents Anthony A. Dimonte, Elyssia Musolino and Adli
Law Group, P.C., for legal malpractice and related claims.
Defendants successfully moved to compel arbitration of the
dispute. Months later, claiming they could not afford the
expected arbitration fees, plaintiffs filed a motion to have the
trial court either order defendants to pay all the required
arbitration fees or alternatively find defendants waived their
contractual right to arbitration by failing to pay those fees. The
court denied the motion, finding that plaintiffs had failed to
establish an inability to pay their share of the fees.
       Plaintiffs now appeal, arguing the trial court erred in
finding both that plaintiffs failed to establish an inability to pay
the applicable arbitration fees and that Taylor’s testimony about
his finances was not credible. We find no reversible error and
affirm.
      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A.     Taylor and the LLC Sue for Legal Malpractice
       On May 31, 2019, Taylor and the LLC sued defendants for
legal malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty and client
abandonment. The complaint alleged that Taylor was the sole
member of the LLC and that “[the company’s] property was for
all practical purposes owned and controlled [by] Taylor.”
Plaintiffs alleged that defendants incompetently represented
them in an underlying elder abuse lawsuit brought against them
by Taylor’s mother concerning a real estate project, and
pressured and manipulated Taylor into accepting a settlement
that failed to adequately compensate plaintiffs for their interests
in the project. Taylor alleged that he was not competent to enter

                                 2
the settlement as a result of “a severe and significant breakdown
of his mental and physical health” which began in March 2016.
B.     The Trial Court Grants Defendants’ Motion to
       Compel Arbitration
       Defendants filed a motion to compel arbitration on
August 29, 2019. The record does not include the pleadings
concerning that motion or a reporter’s transcript for the hearing
on it, but the parties agree the motion was based on a mandatory
arbitration provision in the attorney retainer agreement. The
court granted the motion on November 26, 2019.
C.     The Parties Discuss Arbitrator Selection and
       Payment
       Approximately three months later, on February 17, 2020,
plaintiffs’ counsel wrote to defendants saying Taylor was unable
to afford his share of the arbitration costs. Counsel requested
that defendants “agree to either pay plaintiff’s share of the
arbitration cost in this matter or waive the right to arbitrate.”
Two days later, defendants responded. Defense counsel noted
plaintiffs’ letter did not mention the LLC, and therefore
defendants assumed only Taylor was requesting relief. Defense
counsel requested that Taylor provide evidentiary support for his
financial hardship claim in the form of a statement signed under
penalty of perjury along with supporting documentation.
       Taylor then clarified that neither he nor the LLC could pay
the arbitration fees. He provided an affidavit in which he
averred that his “earned income” for 2017 through 2019 was less
than $15,612.60 and that he “ha[d] no assets which c[ould] be
sold to raise funds to defray the cost of arbitration.” The
declaration stated Taylor’s 2017 to 2019 tax returns were
attached as exhibits; no such returns were in fact appended.

                                3
Taylor instead provided an unsworn statement from a certified
public accountant dated February 25, 2020, stating, “I am able to
attest after seeing Richard T. Talylor’s [sic][1] tax returns for
2017 and 2018, that his income for both years (specifically
including earned income) was below 125 [percent] of the federal
poverty level for a single person and was in fact below 100
[percent] of that level for both years. [¶] Further, although the
2019 return is not complete, the information to hand [sic] is
consistent with the figures for 2017 and 2018.”
       When defense counsel requested the tax returns mentioned
in the declaration but not attached, plaintiffs’ counsel responded
that Taylor was concerned with releasing his tax returns, and “If
that really makes a large difference to you I might be able to
arrange a private viewing . . . .” Defense counsel then requested
Taylor instead fill out and sign the Judicial Council court fee
waiver form. Defense counsel also indicated research showed
Taylor’s name associated with real property at 455 Nauset Road,
Eastham, Massachusetts, and that the property was recently
transferred for nominal value to someone with whom Taylor had
a longstanding relationship; defense counsel asked whether
Taylor still had an interest in the property.
       Taylor refused to provide a completed fee waiver form,
saying he was “concern[ed] about his financial information falling
into the wrong hands.” Taylor indicated he was willing to make
available redacted copies of his Form 1040s for the last three

      1  In addition to misspelling Taylor’s last name, the
accountant’s note identified Taylor’s middle initial as “T”; this
conflicts with Taylor’s later declaration, which identified his
middle initial as “P.”

                                  4
years for viewing on an attorney eyes-only basis. No such returns
were in fact made available for review. Plaintiffs’ counsel later
emailed saying Taylor would submit an affidavit to defense
counsel “so that you can reconsider payment of costs.” No further
affidavit was provided.
      During the same time the parties were discussing proof of
Taylor and the LLC’s financial condition, counsel for both parties
also discussed selection of an arbitrator but were unable to agree
on either an arbitration service provider or an individual
arbitrator. On February 19, 2020, in their initial response to
plaintiffs’ request regarding the arbitration fees, defendants
proposed that instead of using the American Arbitration
Association, as required by the parties’ agreement, the parties
could use a less expensive provider such as JAMS, ADR Services
or Judicate West. Plaintiffs’ counsel initially rejected the
proposal, insisting defendants first agree to pay all arbitration
fees. Plaintiffs’ counsel later sent an e-mail stating plaintiffs
“may be open to using Judicate West or JAMS”; counsel proposed
“using a retired judge without prior experience with either side’s
counsel” or someone else on whom the parties could mutually
agree. On May 6, 2020, defense counsel proposed five JAMS
arbitrators and one Judicate West arbitrator with no prior
experience with defense counsel. Plaintiffs’ counsel responded by
asking for further vetting about the arbitrators’ prior experiences
which defense counsel declined to do. Plaintiffs did not propose
any arbitrators.

                                5
D.     Taylor and the LLC Move to Compel Payment of
       Plaintiffs’ Share of the Arbitration Fees and the
       Court Denies the Motion
       On May 8, 2020, Taylor and the LLC filed a motion
pursuant to Roldan v. Callahan & Blaine (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th
87 (Roldan) to compel defendants to pay plaintiffs’ share of the
arbitration fees or waive their right to arbitration. Roldan holds
that indigent plaintiffs can seek to “be excused from the
obligation to pay fees associated with arbitration.” (Id. at p. 95.)
Roldan requires the trial court first “estimate the anticipated
cost of the arbitration proceeding previously ordered, and then
determine whether any of [the] plaintiffs are financially able to
pay their pro rata share of that cost. If the court determines that
any plaintiff is unable to do so, it must issue an order specifying
that [the defendants] ha[ve] the option of either paying that
plaintiff’s share of the arbitration cost or waiving [their] right to
arbitrate that plaintiff’s case and allowing the case to proceed in
court.” (Ibid.)
       In seeking relief, plaintiffs relied on declarations from their
counsel and Taylor. Although the parties had not yet agreed on
an arbitrator, counsel declared that the arbitration costs,
including the forum’s fees and the fees charged by the arbitrator,
would likely be between $75,000 and $135,000; counsel’s
declaration did not specify whether this estimate was for the total
arbitration cost to both parties, or only plaintiffs’ share, although
based on the calculations it appears to be a total cost to both
parties. In his declaration, Taylor averred that he “anticipate[d]
the overall costs to plaintiffs to complete arbitration would be
upwards of $100,000, not including expert witness and discovery-
related fees”; this was based in part on his assertion that the

                                  6
administrative fees would depend on the amount of the claim,
and the “current amount at issue in this case is likely to exceed”
$16 million.
       Taylor averred that neither he nor the LLC could afford the
initial arbitration filing fee or their share of the arbitrator’s fees.
Taylor did not provide any information regarding the LLC’s
finances, but averred as follows regarding his own finances. His
“earned income” for the previous three years had been less than
$15,612.60 and it was “likely that [his] ability to earn income for
2020 w[ould] be even less.” He was “not working as a result of
the COVID-19 pandemic and ha[d] no assets which [he could]
liquidate to fund” his share of the arbitration costs. “On March
13, 2014, [Taylor] conveyed [his] ownership in 455 Nauset Road,
Eastham, Massachusetts to the Hillary Madigan Trust,”2 and
Taylor was “not the trustee of that trust.” In addition, “455
Nauset Road is encumbered with loans that exceed the current
2020 tax assessor-appraised value.” He had “a single checking
account with a balance of less than $1,000 and a retirement
account with [a] balance less than $500,” and had “no other
business or personal investments or accounts.”
      Taylor stated in his declaration, “I am prepared to provide
partially redacted copies of my federal tax returns for 2017-2019
for an in[ ]camera, court’s eyes-only review, or other means as

      2 Taylor later referred to the trust as the “Hillary Madigan
Family Trust.” Subsequent references to the trust will identify it
as the “Hillary Madigan Family Trust.”

                                   7
ordered by the [c]ourt.”3 (Italics omitted.) Taylor explained that
he did not want to disclose his tax information more broadly
because defendants and others had previously improperly used
his personal information. As an exhibit to his declaration, Taylor
submitted the February 25, 2020, unsworn certified public
accountant note referenced above.
       Defendants opposed the motion, contending that Taylor
and the LLC had not provided sufficient information for the court
to determine how much the arbitration would cost them.
Defendants argued that Taylor and the LLC had not cooperated
in selecting an arbitrator, which made it difficult to accurately
estimate the arbitration fees. Defendants also contended that
Taylor had not provided a sufficiently complete summary of his
financial condition. In addition, they argued that plaintiffs’
motion was a delay tactic, pointing out that plaintiffs could have
presented their claim of inability to pay the arbitration fees in
response to the motion to compel arbitration, but instead waited
nearly three months after the court had granted the motion to
raise the issue with defendants.
       On August 20, 2020, the court heard oral argument on the
motion and continued the hearing to October 22, 2020. The
record contains no reporter’s transcript for this hearing. The
court’s minute order reflects that “The parties will select an
arbitrator through J[AMS] by [September 30, 2020]” and that
Taylor “will submit an additional declaration regarding assets
and liabilities by [September 30, 2020].”

      3  Although Taylor indicated he was prepared to provide
partial, redacted tax returns to the court in camera, there is no
indication in the record he ever attempted to do so.

                                 8
       On September 29, 2020, Taylor submitted a supplemental
declaration in which he set forth his employment history in real
estate development, and averred that by 2016 he had “amassed
over $17[ million] of assets and receivables, in addition to [his]
home,” but he “was incapacitated between 2016 and 2018 as a
result of both physical and mental health matters that required
24-hour a day monitoring and care.” He claimed the elder abuse
lawsuit brought against him by his mother and defendants’
alleged actions in defending it “were the primary cause of [his]
financial losses” from his $17 million net worth without further
specifics.
       As to his then-current financial status, Taylor averred as
follows. He “d[id] not have any direct or indirect ownership or
beneficiary rights in any investment, brokerage or financial
accounts” other than his checking account (which had a balance
of $1,000) and his retirement account (which had a balance of less
than $500) and “d[id] not have any beneficiary rights or
ownership in any LLC’s, corporations, or partnerships except” the
LLC which had “no assets.” He “d[id] not have any beneficiary
rights in any trusts except the Hillary Madigan Family Trust
(established in 2014) and a client trust account with [defendant]
Adli Law Group PC (established 2016).” He “ha[d] approximately
$8,000 in credit card debt, $1,030,000 in real estate debt and a
personal loan in the principal amount of $246,000 which [wa]s
collateralized by approximately $130,000 in beneficiary rights to
equity in the 455 Nauset Road real property.” Taylor calculated
his net equity in the Nauset Road property to be $130,000 by
assuming its value was $1,230,000 (based on an appraisal from

                                9
July 2020 in that amount) and subtracting $1,020,0004 in real
estate debt and $80,000 based on “typical sales costs of 6[
percent].” Taylor had earned “approximately $15,000 in 2019 for
providing property management services,” and had been
receiving unemployment benefits since March 2020, which were
set to expire on December 31, 2020.
       Taylor also provided additional information about the
Hillary Madigan Family Trust. He stated that he established the
trust in 2014 and placed his home at 455 Nauset Road and his
interest in the LLC into the trust.5 He described the 455 Nauset
Road property as “a single-family home with two Accessory
Dwelling Units.” Kenley Branscome was the trustee of the
Hillary Madigan Family Trust; Branscome “maintain[ed] a home
outside the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and also reside[d]
at the 455 Nauset Road property.” Taylor was “obligated to pay
$1,000 per month for housing expenses and $500 per month for
household expenses to . . . Branscome . . . in accordance with the
terms of the loan [they] entered in 2018”; this was apparently the
$246,000 loan which was “collateralized” by Taylor’s “beneficiary
rights to equity in the 455 Nauset Road real property.” Taylor

      4 Taylor averred in one part of his declaration that he had
$1,030,000 in real estate debt and in another part that he had
$1,020,000 in real estate debt.
      5  As noted above, plaintiffs’ complaint alleges that Taylor
was “the sole member” of the LLC and “[the company’s] property
was for all practical purposes owned and controlled [by] Taylor.”
In his supplemental declaration, however, Taylor averred he “was
a 51 [percent] beneficiary of” the LLC; three other individuals
(Erik Grunigen, Patricia Taylor, and Jaden Taylor) were
identified as the beneficiaries of the remaining 49 percent.

                                10
understood that Branscome “makes approximately $150,000
annually,” but stated that Branscome had “no obligation to
support” him.
       Taylor did not attach any documentation to corroborate the
statements made in his supplemental declaration, other than an
unsigned one-page document without any attribution as to who
prepared it titled “Financial Statement (Unaudited)
September 15, 2020,” which listed “[a]ssets/[l]iabilities” totaling
negative $90,450, average gross monthly employment income in
2020 of $3,060 per month, and “[m]onthly [e]xpenses” totaling
$3,220 per month.
       On October 22, 2020, the court held a further hearing. The
hearing was not transcribed. The court’s minute order indicates
the court denied plaintiffs’ motion based on findings “that
[Taylor] failed in his burden to show he has no ability to pay for
arbitration” and “that [Taylor] is hiding assets through the
trust.” The court ordered defendants to submit a proposed order.
       On December 2, 2020, the court adopted and filed the
proposed order submitted by defendants. The order states, in
relevant part, “The [c]ourt finds that [p]laintiffs failed to meet
their burden of proving they are not financially able to pay their
anticipated share of arbitration costs. The [m]otion to [c]ompel
was initially heard on August 20, 2020. The [c]ourt found that
[p]laintiffs had not carried their burden. The [c]ourt provided
[p]laintiffs with the opportunity to provide additional financial
information for consideration. The [c]ourt therefore continued
the hearing on the [m]otion to [c]ompel to October 22, 2020[,] and
ordered [p]laintiffs to file a supplemental declaration with
specific information regarding all financial interests whether
direct or indirect. Plaintiffs filed the Supplemental Declaration

                                11
of Richard P. Taylor (the ‘Supplemental Declaration’) on
September 29, 2020. [¶] The [c]ourt finds that the Supplemental
Declaration, along with the other pleadings filed by [p]laintiffs,
are not sufficient to satisfy [p]laintiffs’ burden of proof. The
[c]ourt also finds . . . Taylor not to be credible. The [c]ourt
believes that . . . Taylor is using the Hillary Madigan Family
Trust (the ‘Trust’) to hide assets. The Supplemental Declaration
fails to provide any information regarding the income or expenses
of the Trust, even though . . . Taylor established this Trust, is a
beneficiary of this Trust, and now owns his primary residence
through this Trust. The Supplemental Declaration similarly fails
to provide any information regarding the nature or use of the two
accessory dwelling units at . . . Taylor’s residence, i.e.[,] whether
any income is derived therefrom. [¶] The [c]ourt also questions
the true nature of the financial relationship with trustee Kenley
Branscome. No information was provided in the Supplemental
Declaration regarding the basis for the $150,000 in income paid
to Mr. Branscome. Further[,] no information, or documentation,
was provided regarding the purported loan that Mr. Branscome,
a [t]rustee of the Trust, made to . . . Taylor, secured by . . .
Taylor’s residence which is owned by the Trust.”
       Plaintiffs timely appealed.6

      6After the notice of appeal was filed, defendant Adli Law
Group, P.C. filed for bankruptcy, automatically staying
proceedings in this court. This court was informed in August
2022 that the bankruptcy court had lifted the automatic stay
with regard to this appeal.

                                 12
                          DISCUSSION
A.    Appellate Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
      1.    The Collateral Order Doctrine
       We first address our jurisdiction to hear an appeal of the
order at issue. “ ‘Appellate courts have jurisdiction over a direct
appeal, like the present one, only where there is an appealable
order or judgment.’ [Citation.]” (Levinson Arshonsky & Kurtz
LLP v. Kim (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 896, 903.) Plaintiffs contend,
defendants do not dispute, and we agree that the order at issue is
appealable under the collateral order doctrine, an exception to
the one final judgment rule. (Spence v. Omnibus Industries
(1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 970, 976 [order requiring payment of
arbitration filing fee appealable as collateral order, because “if
this order remains unchallenged it might well deprive [the
plaintiffs] of any forum for resolving their complaints”].)
      2.    Standard of Review
      We review pure questions of law de novo. (Mendez v. Mid-
Wilshire Health Care Center (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 534, 541.)
As for factual findings, “the trial court sits as a trier of fact,
weighing all the affidavits, declarations, and other documentary
evidence, as well as oral testimony received at the court’s
discretion, to reach a final determination.” (Engalla v.
Permanente Medical Group, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951, 972.) “If
the superior court’s decision regarding arbitrability is based on
resolution of disputed facts, we review the decision for
substantial evidence.” (Baker v. Italian Maple Holdings, LLC
(2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 1152, 1158; see also Hang v. RG Legacy I,
LLC (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1243, 1255-1257 [reviewing findings
of inability to pay arbitration fees and costs for substantial

                                 13
evidence].) “ ‘We must accept the trial court’s resolution of
disputed facts when supported by substantial evidence; we must
presume the court found every fact and drew every permissible
inference necessary to support its judgment, and defer to its
determination of [the] credibility of the witnesses and the weight
of the evidence. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Engineers & Architects
Assn. v. Community Development Dept. (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th
644, 653.)
       “Where . . . ‘ “the trier of fact has expressly or implicitly
concluded that the party with the burden of proof did not carry
the burden and that party appeals,” ’ generally ‘ “the question for
a reviewing court becomes whether the evidence compels a
finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of law. [Citations.]
Specifically, the question becomes whether the appellant’s
evidence was (1) ‘uncontradicted and unimpeached’ and (2) ‘of
such a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial
determination that it was insufficient to support a finding.’ ” ’
[Citations.]” (Phipps v. Copeland Corp. LLC (2021) 64
Cal.App.5th 319, 333.)7

      7  We reject defendants’ contention that an abuse of
discretion standard applies here. A trial court has discretion over
how to assess a party’s ability to pay arbitration fees, whether
through submission of a Judicial Council fee waiver form,
declarations with supporting exhibits, permitting limited
discovery, or an evidentiary hearing. (Aronow v. Superior Court
(2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 865, 884-885.) Plaintiffs raise no appellate
issue about the trial court’s decision to proceed by way of
declaration and supporting exhibits as opposed to other means.
We therefore agree with plaintiffs that abuse of discretion review
is inapposite.

                                 14
B.     The Applicable Law
       Our Legislature has declared that “our legal system cannot
provide ‘equal justice under law’ unless all persons have access to
the courts without regard to their economic means.” (Gov. Code,
§ 68630, subd. (a).) Thus, “under California law when a litigant
in a judicial proceeding has qualified for in forma pauperis
status, a court may not consign the indigent litigant to a costly
private alternative procedure that the litigant cannot afford and
that effectively negates the purpose and benefit of in forma
pauperis status.” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 622.)
       In Roldan, indigent plaintiffs were excused from paying
fees for an ordered arbitration, because “to rule otherwise might
effectively deprive them of access to any forum for resolution of
their claims.” (Roldan, supra, 219 Cal.App.4th at p. 96.) The
Roldan court stated that while it could not “order the arbitration
forum to waive its fees” and did not “have authority to order [the
defendants] to pay [the] plaintiffs’ share of those fees,” it did have
authority to “give [the defendants] a choice: if the trial court
determines that any of [the] plaintiffs is unable to share in the
cost of the arbitration, [the defendants] can elect to either pay
that plaintiff’s share of the arbitration cost and remain in
arbitration or waive [their] right to arbitrate that plaintiff’s
claim.” (Ibid.) Roldan provides that a trial court should first
estimate the anticipated cost of the previously ordered
arbitration proceeding, and then determine whether any of the
plaintiffs are financially able to pay their pro rata share of that
cost. (Ibid.) If the trial court determines that any plaintiff is
unable to do so, it should order that the defendant has the option
of either paying that plaintiff’s share of the arbitration cost or
waiving the defendant’s right to arbitrate that plaintiff’s case and

                                 15
allow the case to proceed in court. (Ibid.; see also Hang v. RG
Legacy I, LLC, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1253-1255; Weiler v.
Marcus & Millichap Real Estate Investment Services, Inc. (2018)
22 Cal.App.5th 970.)8
      It is “the trial court [that] should decide the issue of
arbitrator fee payment and it should be resolved before
commencement of the arbitration.” (Aronow v. Superior Court,
supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 884.) A party need demonstrate only
an inability to pay the necessary fees; in forma pauperis status
such as eligibility for a court fee waiver is not required. (Id. at
pp. 880-881, 884.)
C.     The Trial Court Did Not Err in Denying Plaintiffs’
       Motion
       At the August 20, 2020 hearing, the court concluded that
plaintiffs’ evidence did not show they were unable to pay the
arbitration fees. The trial court nevertheless provided plaintiffs
with another opportunity to submit evidence regarding their
financial condition. The court also provided the parties with time
to select an arbitrator, which would allow a more accurate cost
estimation. After reviewing plaintiffs’ additional submission and
holding another hearing, the court concluded that plaintiffs had
failed to carry their burden to demonstrate they could not afford
the arbitration fees. The court additionally found that Taylor

      8  Although defendants do not argue it should apply, we
note that MKJA, Inc. v. 123 Fit Franchising, LLC (2011) 191
Cal.App.4th 643 (MKJA) held that “a trial court may not lift a
stay of litigation merely because a party cannot afford the costs
associated with [an ordered] arbitration.” (Id. at p. 660.) We find
MKJA unpersuasive for the reasons explained in Aronow v.
Superior Court, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at pages 873-883.

                                16
was not credible, and stated its belief that Taylor was using the
Hillary Madigan Family Trust to hide assets.
       Plaintiffs first assert the court erred by failing to determine
the cost of the arbitration as required by Roldan, supra, 219
Cal.App.4th 87, in either the minute order or the order after
hearing. We reject this argument because we “ ‘presume the
court found every fact and drew every permissible inference
necessary to support its judgment.’ ” (Engineers & Architects
Assn. v. Community Development Dept., supra, 30 Cal.App.4th at
p. 653; see also Jameson v. Desta, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 609 [“ ‘In
the absence of a contrary showing in the record, all presumptions
in favor of the trial court’s action will be made by the appellate
court’ ”].)
       There is no contrary showing here. We lack a reporter’s
transcript, and the record available to us indicates that the court
did consider the amount of potential arbitration fees, as it both
received plaintiffs’ initial estimate and allowed additional time
for the parties to select an arbitrator so they could provide a
further estimate before the court ruled. While the court’s order
after hearing does not set forth a specific amount of expected
arbitration fees, there is substantial evidence of the anticipated
fees in the record and “[f]indings will be normally implied to
support . . . orders if supported by substantial evidence.” (In re
Marriage of Ackerman (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 191, 197.)9

      9  Plaintiffs also argue the trial court failed to consider that,
even if they were able to pay their share of the fee for initiating
the arbitration, they did not have enough money to pay for the
arbitrator’s fees. This argument fails because we presume the
court considered all the arbitration fees, not just the initial fee

                                  17
       Plaintiffs further assert their evidence of limited financial
means was undisputed, and therefore sufficient to carry their
burden of proof. It is more accurate to say, however, that
plaintiffs’ evidence was uncontradicted, not that it was
undisputed. While defendants did not submit evidence
contradicting Taylor’s declarations, Taylor’s evidence was
disputed as defendants contested its veracity and probative
value. “[T]he trial court is not bound by uncontradicted
evidence.” (Adoption of Arthur M. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 704,
717.) Given the trial court’s finding that plaintiffs failed to carry
their burden of proof, the question for this court is whether
plaintiffs’ evidence compels a finding in their favor, specifically
whether that uncontradicted evidence was (1) unimpeached and
(2) of such a character and weight as to leave no room for a
judicial determination that it was insufficient to support a
finding that plaintiffs lacked the ability to pay the required
arbitration fees. (Phipps v. Copeland Corp. LLC, supra, 64
Cal.App.5th at p. 333.)
       While it may have been uncontradicted, the evidence before
the court was impeached through internal inconsistencies and
omissions, and left ample room for a judicial determination that
it was insufficient to carry plaintiffs’ burden of proof. The pre-
motion correspondence between the parties submitted to the

imposed by the forum. There is no indication that the trial court
considered only the forum’s initial fee; notably, the evidence
plaintiffs provided did not present any specific estimate of the
forum’s initial fee. In any event, if plaintiffs’ financial situation
meaningfully changes during the arbitration our decision does
not preclude them from requesting relief based on future facts
and circumstances.

                                 18
court showed Taylor repeatedly promising to provide financial
information to support his claims of penury, only to then renege.
Taylor’s complaint asserted he was the sole member of the LLC
and that “[the company’s] property was for all practical purposes
owned and controlled [by] Taylor”; he then flip-flopped and
asserted he had only a 51 percent interest in the LLC as a result
of a transfer that occurred years before he filed his complaint. No
corroborating information about the LLC’s finances was ever
provided; the only evidence was Taylor’s ipse dixit statements
about its purported lack of assets and income.
       Nor did Taylor submit sufficiently comprehensive evidence
regarding his finances, including the assets and income of the
Hillary Madigan Family Trust. The evidence he did submit
contained red flags and lacked credibility. His initial declaration
focused only on his earned income, which leaves out many
potential sources of income including the type of passive income
often received by individuals involved in real estate development
like Taylor. Taylor initially averred that he had transferred his
interest in the 455 Nauset Road property to the Hillary Madigan
Family Trust, and that he was “not the trustee of that trust,”
without disclosing that he was a beneficiary of the trust or
providing any other information regarding the trust or its assets.
In his supplemental declaration, Taylor admitted he was a trust
beneficiary but provided incomplete information regarding the
assets held in the trust for his benefit. As the trial court
observed, “[Taylor’s] Supplemental Declaration fails to provide
any information regarding the income or expenses of the [Hillary
Madigan Family] Trust, even though . . . Taylor established this
Trust, is a beneficiary of this Trust, and now owns his primary

                                19
residence through this Trust.”10 As the trial court further
observed, the supplemental declaration “similarly fails to provide
any information regarding the nature or use of the two accessory
dwelling units at . . . Taylor’s residence, i.e.[,] whether any
income is derived therefrom.”11

      10   Plaintiffs contend in their opening brief that “The
undisputed evidence . . . was that the residence was the only
asset in the [Hillary Madigan Family] Trust.” However, they fail
to provide any citation to the record to support this contention.
“Every brief must support any reference to a matter in the record
by a citation to the volume and page number of the record where
the matter appears. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C).)
. . . If a party fails to support an argument with the necessary
citations to the record, the argument will be deemed waived.”
(LA Investments, LLC v. Spix (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 1044, 1061.)
      11 With their reply brief, plaintiffs filed a motion requesting
we take judicial notice under Evidence Code sections 451, 452
and 459 of two documents: (1) correspondence dated March 3,
2023, from the Town of Eastham regarding the 455 Nauset Road
property, and (2) an order from the bankruptcy proceeding
involving respondent Adli Law Group, P.C. Defendants opposed
the motion. We decline to take judicial notice of these documents.
Neither document was submitted to the trial court. “[N]ormally
‘when reviewing the correctness of a trial court’s judgment, an
appellate court will consider only matters which were part of the
record at the time the judgment was entered.’ [Citation.]” (Vons
Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 444,
fn. 3.) While an exception can be made in “exceptional
circumstances” (ibid.), no such circumstances exist here.
Furthermore, the documents are submitted for the truth of
matters asserted in them, and we cannot take judicial notice for
this purpose. (Arce v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. (2010)
181 Cal.App.4th 471, 482 [“While we may take judicial notice of

                                 20
       In addition, Taylor never provided any reliable or credible
underlying financial documents to corroborate his assertions.
With his initial declaration Taylor submitted a note from an
accountant. Plaintiffs state in their appellate brief that the
accountant’s note was signed under penalty of perjury and was a
“declaration” but this is simply untrue—the document was not
signed under penalty of perjury. Nor was it a standard financial
statement or report, and it lacked other indicia of reliability.
Furthermore, the note addressed only Taylor’s income, which left
unaddressed other possible forms of income including potential
distributions from the trust and the LLC, as well as the assets of
Taylor, the LLC, and the trust.
       With his supplemental declaration, Taylor submitted a one-
page document titled “Financial Statement (Unaudited)
September 15, 2020.” The document was unsigned and there was
no indication who had prepared it or what it was based on. In
addition to being unaudited, the statement contained no back-up
schedules or explanatory details. The trial court could properly
disregard this document.
       Taylor stated that he was “prepared to provide partially
redacted copies of [his] federal tax returns for 2017-2019 for an
in[ ]camera, court’s eyes-only review, or other means as ordered
by the [c]ourt.” (Italics omitted.) It is unclear what information
Taylor proposed to redact and there is no indication in the record
that Taylor took any steps to submit copies of his tax returns in
camera. Plaintiffs state in their opening brief that “[t]he trial

court records and official acts of state agencies (Evid. Code, § 452,
subds. (c), (d)), the truth of matters asserted in such documents is
not subject to judicial notice”].)

                                 21
court . . . declined to order such a review,” but cite to nothing in
the record supporting this assertion.
       Finally, we note the trial court found Taylor’s testimony not
credible. “[U]nder substantial evidence review, appellate courts
defer to a trial court’s credibility determinations ‘whether the
trial court’s ruling is based on oral testimony or declarations.’
[Citations.]” (Estate of El Wardini (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 870,
885-886.) “[S]o long as the trier of fact does not act arbitrarily
and has a rational ground for doing so, it may reject the
testimony of a witness even though the witness is uncontradicted.
[Citation.] Consequently, the testimony of a witness which has
been rejected by the trier of fact cannot be credited on appeal
unless, in view of the whole record, it is clear, positive, and of
such a nature that it cannot rationally be disbelieved.” (Beck
Development Co. v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co. (1996) 44
Cal.App.4th 1160, 1204.) For the reasons explained above and in
its order, the trial court could rationally disbelieve Taylor’s
testimony. Plaintiffs’ challenge to the trial court’s finding that
they failed to carry their burden to show an inability to pay
arbitration fees and costs therefore fails.

                                22
                          DISPOSITION
       The trial court’s order denying plaintiffs’ motion to compel
payment of arbitration fees is affirmed. Defendants are awarded
their costs on appeal.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                                           WEINGART, J.

We concur:

             CHANEY, J.

             BENDIX, Acting P. J.

                                23