Court Opinion

ID: 9452259
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 17:34:47.381857+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:33:08.393268
License: Public Domain

KAUFMAN, Circuit Judge
(concurring) :
I agree with the majority that the search of the car was justified as “incidental to a lawful arrest.” But, I have difficulty agreeing with the alternative ground for affirmance in Judge Friendly's well reasoned opinion. I do not think the search was justified by 49 U.S.C. §§ 781-789.
The statute, when read in toto, contains no indication that Congress intended to enlarge the number of instances in which searches without warrants would be justified. The purpose of the statute, as I see it, was to create an additional penalty for possessing contraband^ — -forfeiture of the vehicle used to transport it — and nothing more.1 I do not agree with the majority that the section being construed here is similar to the statute which was before the Supreme Court in Carroll. That statute, it should be noted, was specifically addressed to searches. It was obligatory under the Act, that a search warrant be obtained before a search of a private dwelling; but it was completely silent as to the necessity for warrants before searching a vehicle. The Supreme Court quite properly held — following the very clear legislative history — that a vehicle being driven along the highway could be searched for illegal liquor without a warrant, if probable cause existed, because of the apparent likelihood that the automobile would be promptly driven out of jurisdiction; requiring a warrant in advance in such an instance would be sheer folly. But here, no such Congressional purpose is apparent; from all that appears the statute is designed to create only an additional penalty for transporting or having transported any kind of contraband. Moreover, contrary to the facts in Carroll, the car in the case before us was not moving. And I realize that anyone with keys to this car could have driven it away if the police left the scene to obtain a warrant; but, this reasoning applies with equal force to any counterfeit money which may have been hidden in the house. There, too, someone could have removed the money while the police were engaged in obtaining a search warrant. I see no reason, therefore, to make any distinction in this case between the search of the car and the house. In short, I believe the majority places too much reliance on Carroll.
It is true, courts have held that once an automobile is seized and forfeited the police can search it without a warrant. But, this is not our case. Here the search of the car preceded its seizure. The search was not ancillary to a seizure as it would have been had the car been seized, driven to a police garage pending forfeiture, and then searched. Instead, the seizure of the car was incidental— almost an afterthought — to the search of the car. To hold-the search to be justified because the seizure was justified is to permit the tail to wag the dog.
In any event, as I have stated, I am-confident that the search was “incidental to the lawful arrest” of Anne Francolino,, and therefore I see no need to rely on-the statute as an alternative ground for upholding the conviction.

. The word “seizure” in the statute describes a method for commencing the forfeiture proceedings. Although it is often found together with the word “searches,” there is no reference to searches in this statute, and I think it unwarranted to-read this word into the statute.