Court Opinion

ID: 9394294
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-13 00:00:35.281222+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:58.648395
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-10708    Document: 00516749339        Page: 1    Date Filed: 05/12/2023

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit                        United States Court of Appeals
                                                                      Fifth Circuit

                               ____________                         FILED
                                                                May 12, 2023
                                 No. 21-10708                   Lyle W. Cayce
                               ____________                          Clerk

   United States of America,

                                                          Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                     versus

   Edward Eugene Robinson,

                                          Defendant—Appellant.
                 ______________________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Northern District of Texas
                          USDC No. 4:19-CR-352-2
                 ______________________________

   Before Richman, Chief Judge, and King and Higginson, Circuit
   Judges.
   Stephen A. Higginson, Circuit Judge:
         Defendant-appellant Edward Eugene Robinson was convicted by a
   jury on five counts arising from a series of armed robberies of cell-phone
   stores in the Fort Worth, Texas area. He now appeals his convictions and
   sentence. We AFFIRM.
                                       I.
         From May through September 2019, Robinson and coconspirators
   Aaron Hardrick and Ncholeion Hollie cased and robbed multiple Sprint and
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   T-Mobile stores in the Fort Worth area. Two of those robberies, committed
   in June of 2019, are relevant to this appeal.
                                         A.
          First, on June 14, 2019, Robinson and Hardrick entered a Sprint store
   in Fort Worth, wearing hoodies, baseball caps, masks, and gloves. Robinson
   had a taser, and Hardrick had a gun. They maintained an open-line phone
   call with Hollie, who was outside the store on lookout. Once inside, Hardrick
   confronted the employee at the front counter, gripping a gun in his
   waistband, and told her to go to the back of the store and open the safe. When
   the employee did not immediately stand up, Hardrick slapped a cell phone
   from her hand, grabbed her arm, and pushed her to the back of the store.
   Hardrick removed the gun from his waistband and pointed it at her.
   Robinson followed Hardrick and the employee to the storage room with a
   duffel bag in hand.
          Once in the room, Robinson got the store keys and locked the front
   door. Robinson and Hardrick instructed the employee to open two safes and
   told her to turn around and face the wall. After Robinson threatened her with
   his taser, the employee complied, and Hardrick zip-tied her hands behind her
   back. Robinson and Hardrick put all the phones from one of the safes into a
   duffel bag, and eventually left the store through the back exit. Fort Worth
   police later determined that Robinson and Hardrick had stolen $23,257.68
   worth of merchandise.
          Five days later, on June 19, 2019, Robinson and Hardrick robbed a
   Sprint store in Bedford, Texas. Again, Robinson and Hardrick entered the
   store, where only one employee was present, while Hollie acted as lookout.
   Hardrick pointed his gun at the employee and pushed her into the back
   storage room, followed by Robinson holding the duffel bag. Robinson and
   Hardrick got the keys from the employee, locked the front door, and told the

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   employee to open two safes. Though they attempted to zip-tie her, she “did
   not let them,” and they proceeded to remove cell phones from the safe. The
   employee managed to escape through the back door and began screaming for
   help. As she ran away, Hardrick chased her, grabbed her by her hair, and hit
   her in the head with his gun. Both Hardrick and the employee fell to the
   ground. The employee ran into a neighboring business, and Hardrick
   returned to the Sprint store. He and Robinson exited through the front door
   with the duffel bag, having stolen $3,501.97 worth of cell phones.
          Robinson, Hardrick, and other unidentified coconspirators later
   robbed multiple T-Mobile stores in the Fort Worth area on July 7, July 21,
   and July 23, 2019.
                                        B.
          Robinson was arrested on September 23, 2019 in Odessa, in the
   Western District of Texas. He was transferred to the Northern District of
   Texas, where a federal public defender was appointed to represent him.
          On October 16, 2019, Robinson’s public defender and Hardrick’s
   counsel filed a joint, unopposed motion to continue the time for the
   Government to indict. In the motion, the parties noted that the Speedy Trial
   Act requires that an indictment be returned within thirty days of the
   defendant’s arrest or service with a summons. This meant that, for Robinson
   and Hardrick, the indictment deadline was to be October 23, 2019. Counsel
   stated that the Government was “planning to indict both defendants on
   October 17, 2019,” i.e., the following day. The movants sought a forty-five-
   day extension of the Speedy Trial Act’s indictment deadline “to allow time
   to review discovery, investigate the case, discuss the case and discovery with
   their clients, and engage in plea negotiations with the government.” They
   contended that “the granting of th[e] continuance would be in the interest of
   judicial economy, would serve the ends of justice, and would outweigh the

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   interest of the public in a speedy trial.” The magistrate judge granted the
   motion the next day, setting the deadline to indict as December 9, 2019.
          On December 3, 2019—six days before the Government’s extended
   deadline to indict—a grand jury returned an indictment charging Robinson,
   Hardrick, and Hollie on three counts related to the robberies.
          On January 15, 2020, a grand jury charged Robinson with five counts
   in a superseding indictment: (1) conspiracy to interfere with commerce by
   robbery, based on the robberies dated June 14, June 19, July 7, July 21, and
   July 23, 2019, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a); (2) interference with
   commerce by robbery, based on the June 14 robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
   §§ 1951(a) and 2; (3) using, carrying, and brandishing a firearm during a
   crime of violence, i.e., the June 14 robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
   §§ 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) and 2; (4) interference with commerce by robbery, based
   on the June 19 robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951(a) and 2; and
   (5) using, carrying, and brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence, i.e.,
   the June 19 robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) and 2.
          Throughout 2020, Robinson cycled through multiple lawyers. On
   November 16, 2020, Robinson through trial counsel filed a motion to dismiss
   the indictment based on a Speedy Trial Act violation. Robinson asserted that
   his original public defender did not consult him when she decided to move
   for a continuance of the time to indict. He pointed to the absence of any
   “signature or mark” on the motion “indicat[ing] that he has given his
   express or implied consent to afford the government more time in which to
   seek formal charges against him.” Robinson contended that his Speedy Trial
   Act rights were therefore violated because his December 3, 2019 indictment
   came down too long after his arrest.
          The district court denied the motion.          The court noted that
   Robinson’s counsel had requested an extension of the Government’s

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   deadline to indict and explained that the Speedy Trial Act excludes time
   “resulting from a continuance granted by any judge . . . at the request of the
   defendant or his counsel.” The court rejected Robinson’s assertion that his
   consent was required for the filing of such a motion.
          Shortly before trial, the district court docketed four pro se filings it
   received by mail from Robinson. Among those filings was a “supplemental”
   motion to dismiss on the basis of purported Speedy Trial Act violations, in
   which Robinson re-urged his prior motion’s assertion that his original public
   defender moved to continue the indictment deadline without consulting him,
   and contended that “[i]f not for the additional time given to the government
   by [counsel]’s motion for a continuance, the very strong likelihood exists that
   Mr. Robinson would not have been indicted.” At a status conference held
   the same day, the district judge orally denied all of Robinson’s pro se motions
   without prejudice.
                                         C.
          Robinson’s jury trial lasted from March 8 through March 10, 2021.
   The Government and defense counsel agreed that the case was about
   identity—that is, whether Robinson was one of the people who committed
   the robberies. The Government called a number of witnesses and presented
   evidence seeking to show that Robinson was among the robbers of the cell-
   phone stores.        The Government’s evidence included eyewitness
   identifications of Robinson, records from Robinson’s phone showing contact
   with his coconspirators during the robberies, police identification of
   Robinson based on surveillance footage, identification of Robinson’s voice on
   phone-call audio from both robberies, and FBI expert testimony placing
   Robinson near cell towers in the area of the crime scenes on both June 14 and
   June 19. The defense did not call any witnesses.

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           At the end of trial, the district judge read the jury charge. As to counts
   two and four1—affecting commerce by robbery—the charge read as follows:
           Title 18, United States Code, Section 1951(a), makes it a crime
           for anyone to obstruct, delay, or affect commerce by robbery.
           Robbery means the unlawful taking or obtaining of or attempting
           or conspiring to unlawfully take or obtain personal property
           from the person or in the presence of another, against her will,
           by means of actual or threatened force, or violence, or fear of
           injury, immediate or future, to her person or property in her
           custody or possession.
   The jury charge continued:
           For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be
           convinced that the government has proved each of the
           following beyond a reasonable doubt:
           First:      That the defendant unlawfully obtained or attempted
                       to obtain personal property from a person or in her
                       presence, against her will;
           Second: That the defendant did so by means of actual or
                   threatened force, or violence, or fear of injury,
                   immediate or future, to her person or property in her
                   custody or possession; and
           Third:      That the defendant’s conduct in any way or degree
                       obstructed, delayed or affected commerce or the
                       movement of any article or commodity in
                       commerce.

           _____________________
           1
            There is no dispute on appeal about the jury instructions on the conspiracy charge
   (Count 1).

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             As to counts three and five—using, carrying, or brandishing a firearm
   during and in relation to a crime of violence—the jury charge instructed as
   follows:
             Title 18, United States Code, Section 924(c)(1) makes it a
             crime for anyone to knowingly use, carry, or brandish a firearm
             during and in relation to a crime of violence.
             For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be
             convinced that the government has proven each of the
             following beyond a reasonable doubt:
             First:    That the defendant committed the crime alleged in
                       Counts Two and Four. I instruct you that affecting
                       commerce by robbery is a crime of violence; and
             Second: That the defendant aided and abetted Aaron
                     Hardrick in committing the crime of violence alleged
                     in Counts Two and Four, and knew in advance that
                     Aaron Hardrick would be armed.
             On March 10, 2021, the jury returned its verdict, finding Robinson
   guilty on all five counts: the conspiracy count (Count 1), and the two
   robberies (Counts 2 and 4) with their respective firearm counts (Counts 3
   and 5).
                                           D.
             Robinson was sentenced on July 8, 2021. The district court calculated
   that Robinson had a total offense level of 35 as to the primary robbery counts
   (Counts 1, 2, and 4), which, with a criminal history category of IV, resulted
   in a guideline range of 235 to 293 months’ imprisonment. As to the firearm
   counts (Counts 3 and 5), Robinson faced a mandatory minimum of seven
   years per count, to run consecutively with other counts. See 18 U.S.C.
   § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii).

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          Robinson sought a downward variance, based on his difficult
   childhood and family support. The Government sought an upward variance,
   based on victim impact and a comparison to Hardrick’s sentence. The court
   varied upward, imposing a sentence of 124 months as to Counts 1, 2, and 4,
   and 84 months as to counts 3 and 5, with all counts to run consecutively,
   resulting in a total sentence of 540 months. The court also sentenced
   Robinson to three years of supervised release as to Counts 1, 2, and 4, and
   five years of supervised release as to Counts 3 and 5, with all counts to run
   concurrently. The court also ordered restitution.
          The district judge explained that an upward variance was warranted
   “for several reasons.” He explained:
          [T]his defendant is a determined recidivist. That is, he has
          continually engaged in criminal conduct for almost four
          decades, indeed going back to when he was 14-years-old up to
          the present time. The only time that his criminal conduct has
          ever been hindered is during his terms of incarceration.
          Indeed, even while he was incarcerated the defendant has had
          numerous disciplinary problems. Additionally, the defendant
          has went [sic] on a spree of robberies which were not
          considered in the guideline calculations . . . .
          ...
          If you look at Mr. Robinson’s criminal record, he came out with
          a criminal history category of IV. However, there were five
          felonies or other crimes that he committed as an adult that
          weren’t even included in his . . . criminal history category
          calculations. I think that it’s a very good case, indeed the
          classic case, where the underrepresentation of somebody’s
          criminal history category — at a minimum, his criminal history
          category to me and his history of violent crimes looks more to
          me like it should be a category VI, at the very least a category
          V criminal history. I think it’s understated as the way the
          calculations came up.

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          I think it’s also worth noting that this is one of the most heinous
          crimes, if not the most heinous crime, that I’ve had to preside
          over as a judge, either on the State District Court, as a Federal
          prosecutor when I used to do criminal work, on the Court of
          Appeals for the State of Texas, or indeed these last two years
          presiding over 300 criminal sentencings here in the Northern
          District of Texas. This is absolutely abhorrent. This defendant
          has no regard for the law. No regard for the welfare of others
          or their property.
          I think it’s also worth noting that this sentence and this
          variance is necessary and appropriate to avoid unnecessary
          sentencing disparity with the codefendant, Mr. Hardrick, who
          received the same sentence. Indeed, you could argue that I
          could go even higher, considering that all the evidence
          demonstrated to me that Mr. Robinson was the leader in this
          spree.
   The court stated that the 540-month sentence was sufficient, but not greater
   than necessary, to comply with the purposes set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
          Robinson objected to the sentence on Eighth Amendment grounds,
   arguing that the sentence was excessive. The court overruled the objection.
   Robinson timely appealed.

                                          II.
          Robinson first contends that he suffered a Speedy Trial Act violation
   because he was indicted more than thirty days after his arrest. We review
   interpretations of the Speedy Trial Act de novo and factual findings for clear
   error. United States v. Vinagre-Hernandez, 925 F.3d 761, 765 (5th Cir. 2019)
   (citation omitted).
          Under the Speedy Trial Act, an indictment or information must be
   filed within thirty days from arrest or service with a summons related to the

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   charges. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b). When calculating elapsed time under the
   Speedy Trial Act, courts must exclude “[a]ny period of delay resulting from
   a continuance granted by any judge . . . at the request of the defendant or his
   counsel,” so long as “the judge granted such continuance on the basis of his
   findings that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the
   best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.” 18 U.S.C.
   § 3161(h)(7)(A) (emphasis added).          Moreover, in granting such a
   continuance, the court must “set[] forth, . . . either orally or in writing, its
   reasons for [so] finding.” Id.
          Here, because Robinson was arrested on September 23, 2019, his
   initial indictment deadline was October 23, 2019. His counsel moved for a
   forty-five-day continuance of the deadline on October 16, 2019. The next
   day, the magistrate judge granted the continuance, for the reasons set forth
   in counsel’s motion and because “the ends of justice served by the granting
   of [the] continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the
   defendant in a speedy trial.” This continuance thus satisfies the statutory
   criteria for excluding the resulting delay from Robinson’s thirty-day Speedy
   Trial Act period. Id. Accordingly, Robinson’s thirty-day clock stopped on
   October 17, and was to resume in December. On December 3—with almost
   a week left to go before expiration of the continued deadline—Robinson was
   indicted. His thirty days had not elapsed, and his indictment therefore did
   not violate the Speedy Trial Act.
          Robinson does not dispute that the continuance satisfies the statutory
   language for exclusion. He contends instead that the extended time should
   nonetheless not be excluded because his counsel did not consult with him
   before filing the motion to continue. This argument is without merit.
          First, this contention runs counter to the statutory text of the Speedy
   Trial Act, which expressly carves out delays resulting from continuances

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   sought “at the request of the defendant or his counsel.”            18 U.S.C.
   § 3161(h)(7)(A) (emphasis added). The text does not require that counsel
   obtain her client’s consent to seek a continuance.
          Second, while this court has not yet addressed this question, every
   other circuit to have considered the issue has ruled that, for Speedy Trial Act
   purposes, it is not necessary that the defendant consent to a continuance
   sought by his counsel. See United States v. Gates, 709 F.3d 58, 66 (1st Cir.
   2013) (“[D]efense counsel has the power to seek a[] [Speedy Trial Act]
   continuance without first informing his client or obtaining his client’s
   personal consent.”); United States v. Lynch, 726 F.3d 346, 356 (2d Cir. 2013)
   (“[A] district court may grant a continuance sought by counsel without the
   consent of the defendant so long as the district court determines that the ends
   of justice would be served . . . and sets forth its reasons on the record.”);
   United States v. Stewart, 628 F.3d 246, 254 (6th Cir. 2010) (“[W]here an
   attorney seeks a continuance without the client’s approval, . . . the Speedy
   Trial Act ‘does not require a defendant’s consent to the continuance’ in
   order for a judge to be able to grant a motion in furtherance of the ends of
   justice.” (citation omitted)); United States v. Herbst, 666 F.3d 504, 510 (8th
   Cir. 2012) (“[The defendant’s] opposition to his counsel’s request for a
   continuance does not prevent that time from being excluded from the speedy
   trial calculation.”); United States v. Daychild, 357 F.3d 1082, 1094 (9th Cir.
   2004) (excluding time resulting from continuances that were requested by
   counsel “without [the defendant]’s knowledge or consent”); cf. United
   States v. Fields, 39 F.3d 439, 443 (3d Cir. 1994) (“The defendant’s arguments
   are disturbing because he would have us order the dismissal of his indictment
   based on continuances that his own attorney sought.”); United States v.
   Bryant, 134 F.3d 364 (Table), 1998 WL 39393, at *3 (4th Cir. 1998) (per
   curiam) (unpublished) (rejecting defendant’s argument that his consent was
   necessary for a continuance in the Speedy Trial Act context because such a

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   rule “would put the district court in the precarious position of having to
   determine whether a defendant’s legal counsel or the defendant himself is
   actually speaking for a defendant”). This court would be alone among courts
   of appeals in holding that a defendant’s consent is necessary for the purpose
   of obtaining an excludable continuance under the Speedy Trial Act. We join
   our sister circuits in rejecting such a requirement.
          Third, giving effect to a motion by counsel—without requiring
   consent or acquiescence by the defendant—is consistent with the well-
   established principle that, “because counsel is the defendant’s agent, the
   defendant ‘must accept the consequences of the lawyer’s decisions.’”
   United States v. Cabello, 33 F.4th 281, 295 (5th Cir. 2022) (cleaned up)
   (quoting Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 418 (1988)). Indeed, in New York v.
   Hill, the Supreme Court held, in a unanimous opinion, that counsel could
   effectively waive a defendant’s right to a timely trial under the Interstate
   Agreement on Detainers. 528 U.S. 110 (2000). Noting that even “the most
   basic rights of criminal defendants are subject to waiver,” id. at 114 (cleaned
   up) (citations omitted), and that “[s]cheduling matters are plainly among
   those for which agreement by counsel generally controls,” id. at 115, the
   Court rejected the defendant’s argument that his assent was required for
   waiver. Id.; see also Gonzalez v. United States, 553 U.S. 242, 250 (2008) (“To
   hold that every instance of waiver requires the personal consent of the client
   himself or herself would be impractical.”). These principles reinforce our
   conclusion that, for the purposes of excluding time from a defendant’s
   Speedy Trial Act calculation, the defendant is bound by counsel’s decision
   to seek a continuance, and his personal consent is not required.
          For these reasons, Robinson’s Speedy Trial Act claim fails. The
   district court did not err in denying Robinson’s motion to dismiss the
   indictment on Speedy Trial Act grounds.

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                                              III.
           Robinson also argues that the district court erred in its jury
   instructions on his § 924(c) charges (Counts 3 and 5). He contends that the
   court erroneously defined the predicate offense, a “crime of violence,” as
   including attempted Hobbs Act robbery. Because trial counsel did not object
   to the instruction below, this issue is reviewed for plain error.
           To establish plain error, a litigant must show that (1) the district court
   erred, (2) the error was clear and obvious, and (3) the error affected his
   substantial rights. Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009) (citations
   omitted). If he makes such a showing, this court has the discretion to correct
   the error if the error seriously affects the “fairness, integrity or public
   reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (citations omitted).
           Section 924(c) imposes criminal penalties against “any person who,
   during and in relation to any crime of violence . . . uses or carries a firearm,
   or who, in furtherance of any such crime, possesses a firearm.” 18 U.S.C.
   § 924(c)(1)(A). The statute defines a crime of violence as a felony offense
   that “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical
   force against the person or property of another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A).2
           Here, Robinson was charged with two violations of § 924(c), one
   pertaining to the June 14 robbery and the other to the June 19 robbery. The
   predicate “crime of violence” for each violation is the corresponding
   substantive Hobbs Act robbery, charged in Counts 2 and 4, respectively.

           _____________________
           2
            The statute also defined “crime of violence” in the alternative as a felony offense
   “that by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or
   property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.” 18 U.S.C.
   § 924(c)(3)(B). But in 2019, the Supreme Court struck this provision as unconstitutionally
   vague. United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 2336 (2019).

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          In charging the jury on Robinson’s Hobbs Act robbery counts, the
   district court correctly instructed that the first element was satisfied if the
   Government had met its burden to prove that “the defendant unlawfully
   obtained or attempted to obtain personal property from a person or in her
   presence, against her will.” See 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (imposing criminal
   penalties on anyone who “obstructs, delays, or affects commerce . . . by
   robbery or extortion or attempts or conspires so to do.”).
          Then, on the § 924(c) counts, the district court instructed the jury
   that the predicate-offense requirement was satisfied if the Government had
   met its burden to prove that “the defendant committed the crime alleged in
   Counts Two and Four.” The court then said, “I instruct you that affecting
   commerce by robbery is a crime of violence.” The district court thus did not
   distinguish between completed and attempted robbery.
          At the time of Robinson’s trial, this instruction was proper under Fifth
   Circuit case law. In United States v. Smith, this court held that “[w]hen a
   substantive offense would be a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C.
   § 924(c)(3)(A), an attempt to commit that offense is also a crime of violence.”
   957 F.3d 590, 595 (5th Cir. 2020) (emphasis added) (quoting United States v.
   Dominguez, 954 F.3d 1251, 1261 (9th Cir. 2020)). But after Robinson’s trial,
   the Supreme Court took up the question in United States v. Taylor, and
   ultimately rejected this conclusion. 142 S. Ct. 2015 (2022). The Court
   explained that attempted Hobbs Act robbery has two elements: “(1) The
   defendant intended to unlawfully take or obtain personal property by means
   of actual or threatened force, and (2) he completed a ‘substantial step’
   toward that end.” Id. at 2020. “And whatever a substantial step requires, it
   does not require the government to prove that the defendant used, attempted
   to use, or even threatened to use force against another person or his
   property.” Id. Accordingly, “[w]hatever one might say about completed

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   Hobbs Act robbery, attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not satisfy” the
   § 924(c) definition of a “crime of violence.” Id. (emphasis in original).
          In light of Taylor, the Government here concedes that the instruction
   to Robinson’s jury was clear error and thus satisfies prongs one and two of
   this court’s plain-error review. This is correct, notwithstanding that the law
   was different at the time of trial. “[W]here the law at the time of trial was
   settled and clearly contrary to the law at the time of appeal[,] it is enough that
   an error be ‘plain’ at the time of appellate consideration.” Johnson v. United
   States, 520 U.S. 461, 468 (1997); see also United States v. Escalante-Reyes, 689
   F.3d 415, 423 (5th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (“[T]he ‘plainness’ of the error
   should be judged by the law at the time of appeal.”)
          The remaining questions, therefore, are (1) whether the error affected
   Robinson’s substantial rights, and, if so, (2) whether the court should
   exercise its discretion to correct the error because failing to do so would
   seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of the proceeding.
   See Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135. To show that the error affected his substantial
   rights, Robinson must “‘show a reasonable probability that, but for the
   error,’ the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.” United
   States v. Jones, 935 F.3d 266, 272 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Molina-Martinez v.
   United States, 578 U.S. 189, 194 (2016)). Robinson has not made such a
   showing.
          The error here is the district court’s failure to distinguish between
   completed and attempted robbery when instructing on the § 924(c) counts,
   or to otherwise clarify that attempted robbery is not a “crime of violence”
   under § 924(c). A review of the trial record indicates that, even if this error
   were corrected, Robinson still would have been convicted on the § 924(c)
   counts.

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          At trial, there was no suggestion, through the evidence or arguments,
   that the robberies at issue were attempted rather than completed. The store
   clerks from both the June 14 and June 19 robberies (i.e., the two predicates)
   testified about their respective incidents, from the robbers’ entry, to the theft
   of the merchandise, to their eventual escape. The predicate offenses did not
   involve aborted, foiled, or otherwise partial robberies. The Government did
   not state in its closing argument that attempt is sufficient to convict, nor did
   it otherwise call the jury’s attention to this avenue for conviction.
   Accordingly, the record suggests no possibility that the jury convicted
   Robinson of Hobbs Act robbery on an attempt theory and therefore a similar
   impossibility that his § 924(c) convictions rested on such a basis.
          On the contrary, the fact that completed robberies occurred was
   essentially undisputed at trial. The issue was not whether, or how, or to what
   degree, the stores were robbed, but rather who did it. As both parties made
   clear in their opening statements, the key dispute in the case was identity.
   Defense counsel said in his opening: “[t]he[se] robberies probably did occur
   based on what the prosecutor mentioned, but you’re not going to be able to
   put my client at the scene because he’s not there.” In service of this theory,
   counsel’s     cross   examination      consistently     focused   on   witnesses’
   identifications of Robinson. In closing, defense counsel pressed this theory
   home, seeking to cast doubt on the Government’s audio, video, and
   photographic evidence, and telling the jury, “That’s not my client leaving
   the store. Look at it.” Our review of the trial record reveals no meaningful
   challenge to, or dispute about, the events constituting the predicate
   robberies—much less a dispute going to an “attempt” theory. We see no
   basis to conclude that the jury may have opted for an avenue to conviction
   that received no airtime at trial.
          While Robinson asserts that “it is not clear” on which theory—
   attempted or completed—the jury relied, this generalized contention does

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   not suffice to carry his burden to show a reasonable probability that the
   outcome would have been different if the jury were instructed that attempt
   does not qualify. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993) (noting
   that the difference between a harmless-error inquiry and a plain-error
   substantial-rights inquiry is that under plain-error review, “[i]t is the
   defendant . . . who bears the burden of persuasion”).3
           Robinson correctly points out that in multiple cases this court has
   vacated convictions based on jury instructions that combine valid and invalid
   predicates. See, e.g., Jones, 935 F.3d at 273-74; United States v. McClaren, 13
   F.4th 386, 413-14 (5th Cir. 2021); United States v. Hankton, 51 F.4th 578, 591-
   94 (5th Cir. 2022). But those cases indeed reinforce that this determination,
   at least on plain-error review, is case-specific and turns on the underlying
   predicates as well as the evidence and arguments presented at trial. For
   example, in United States v. Jones, this court vacated § 924(c) convictions
   because the record demonstrated a reasonable probability that the jury would
   not have convicted on § 924(c) absent the erroneous instruction that a RICO
   conspiracy was a crime of violence. 935 F.3d at 273-74. The court pointed
   out that the invalid predicate (RICO conspiracy) and the valid predicate
   (controlled-substance conspiracy) were “not coextensive,” and that the
   RICO conspiracy “included a broader range of conduct.” Id. at 273. The
   court discussed the government’s opening statement and closing argument,
   which suggested that the RICO conspiracy encompassed conduct beyond the
           _____________________
           3
              At oral argument, Robinson’s counsel offered a more specific theory of why the
   jury might have convicted based on attempt. The theory involved a jury question regarding
   the meaning of “personal property from a person or in her presence,” and the implications
   of the fact that the store clerk robbed on June 19 escaped through the back door while the
   robbery continued. While we are ultimately unpersuaded by the theory, we note that we
   do not consider it in the first place. The argument was not included in Robinson’s briefs,
   and we do not consider arguments raised for the first time at oral argument. Jackson v.
   Gautreaux, 3 F.4th 182, 188 n.* (5th Cir. 2021) (collecting cases).

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   drug conspiracy, as well as witness testimony that “described RICO conduct
   unrelated to the controlled-substance conspiracy.” Id. The court ultimately
   found that, while it was a “close question,” the appellants had demonstrated
   plain error because there was a reasonable probability that the jury would not
   have convicted on § 924 if the invalid predicate were excluded from the
   verdict form. Id. at 274-75. McClaren and Hankton also involved a RICO-
   versus-drug-offense problem and cited Jones in vacating for plain error.
   McClaren, 13 F.4th at 413-14; Hankton, 51 F.4th at 591-94.
          This case does not present the same problems. Here, the invalid
   predicate (attempted robbery) features nowhere at trial—through the
   evidence, arguments, or elsewhere. It is for this reason that Robinson cannot
   show a reasonable probability that, but for the error, the outcome of the
   proceedings would have been different. See United States v. Montemayor, 55
   F.4th 1003, 1011 (5th Cir. 2022) (declining to vacate a § 924(c) conviction
   based on an invalid predicate, and distinguishing Jones by explaining, “[t]he
   reason for reversal in Jones was that jurors were given two theories of guilt,
   and some jurors may have accepted only the invalid one,” and that because
   this case presented no such problem, “under plain error review, . . . the
   substantial rights of the defendants were [not] affected”); see also United
   States v. Steward, 793 F. App’x 188, 190 (4th Cir. 2019) (finding no reason to
   vacate a § 924(c) conviction based on the erroneous instruction that
   conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act Robbery was a valid predicate because
   “[t]he conspiracy offense and the robbery offense are coextensive, and the
   conspiracy offense related solely to the robbery offense”).
          Because Robinson has not shown that his substantial rights were
   affected by the erroneous jury instruction, he fails plain-error review. We
   hold alternatively that, even if the error affected his substantial rights, we
   would not exercise our discretion to correct the error because, for the reasons

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   discussed, the error here did not seriously affect the fairness, integrity or
   public reputation of the proceeding. See Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135.
          We accordingly affirm Robinson’s convictions despite the error.

                                         IV.
          Robinson also argues that the district court erred by varying upward
   based on coconspirator Hardrick’s sentence, rather than on national
   sentencing statistics. He concedes (1) that this issue is subject to plain-error
   review because he did not object in the district court, and (2) that his
   argument is foreclosed by our precedent. He is correct on both fronts, and
   his claim therefore fails.
          This court has held that it is plain error for a sentencing court to vary
   downward based solely on national sentencing statistics. United States v.
   Willingham, 497 F.3d 541, 545-46 (5th Cir. 2007). The court explained in
   Willingham that “[a]lthough the statistics may show a disparity . . . , there is
   no indication that the disparity is unwarranted.” Id. at 544. Along similar
   lines, the court in United States v. Naidoo rejected a defendant’s argument
   that his sentence was unreasonable in light of national sentencing statistics.
   995 F.3d 367, 383 (5th Cir. 2021). Quoting Willingham, the court explained
   that “national averages of sentences with no details underlying the sentences
   are unreliable to determine unwarranted disparity.”          Id. (cleaned up)
   (quoting Willingham, 497 F.3d at 544).
          In light of this circuit law, the district court did not plainly err in
   sentencing Robinson without reference to national sentencing statistics. We
   affirm Robinson’s sentence as to this issue.

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                                         V.
          Finally, Robinson argues that the district court erred by varying
   upward without a showing that Robinson and Hardrick were similarly
   situated. He again concedes that this issue is reviewed only for plain error
   because he did not object in the district court.
          Robinson contends that he and Hardrick are “not necessarily similarly
   situated . . . simply because they each have been convicted of the same
   offense,” and that Hardrick was sentenced for robberies in both Texas and
   California, while Robinson was only sentenced for Texas robberies. He also
   asserts that the district court’s sentence did not “take into account
   differences between their total offense levels, criminal history categories, and
   aggravating factors present for one defendant and not the other.” Robinson
   does not elaborate on what those differences are.
          A sentencing court shall consider, among other factors, “the need to
   avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar
   records who have been found guilty of similar conduct.”             18 U.S.C.
   § 3553(a)(6). Courts may look to codefendants’ sentences in assessing the
   (a)(6) factor. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 789 F. App’x 410, 413 (5th
   Cir. 2019) (comparing the defendant’s sentence to that of a codefendant and
   concluding that the two are not similarly situated and thus the disparity
   between them was not unwarranted.). Here, the only distinction that
   Robinson identifies between him and Hardrick is that some of Hardrick’s
   convictions were for robberies in California. But this is a distinction without
   a difference; Hardrick, like Robinson, was convicted on three robbery counts
   and two related firearm counts. And he, like Robinson, was sentenced to 124
   months per robbery count and 84 months per firearm count. Beyond this
   attempted distinction, Robinson fails to explain in what ways he and
   Hardrick—who committed the charged robberies together—are not

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                                      No. 21-10708

   similarly situated. He therefore provides this court with no basis for finding
   an error in the sentencing court’s comparison between the two defendants.
            Finally, even if there were an error, and even if the error were clear,
   Robinson has not shown that it affected his substantial rights. To make this
   showing, Robinson must “‘show a reasonable probability that, but for the
   error,’ the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.” Jones,
   935 F.3d at 272. The district court made clear that the sentence was also
   based on Robinson’s history of recidivism, as well as his view that Robinson’s
   criminal-history category failed fully to account for his lengthy criminal
   history, that the crime was particularly “heinous” and “abhorrent,” and that
   the evidence suggested that Robinson was in fact the “leader in this spree.”
   Even without a comparison to Hardrick’s sentence, Robinson’s upward
   variance was still supported by the “several [other] reasons” listed by the
   court.
            The district court did not plainly err in varying upward based in part
   on Hardrick’s sentence. We affirm Robinson’s sentence as to this issue.

                                          VI.
            For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM Robinson’s convictions and
   sentence.

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