Court Opinion

ID: 9544392
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:55:17.409918+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:12:55.099008
License: Public Domain

BARNES, Justice
(dissenting):
I cannot agree with that part of the Majority Opinion in which it arrives at the holding announced in the second paragraph of its syllabus that:
Final judgments and decrees of a court of competent jurisdiction may not be interpreted or clarified under the Oklahoma Declaratory Judgment Act, 12 O. S.1971, §§ 1651-1657.
I am of the opinion that said Act authorizes District Court actions for declaratory judgments clarifying and/or interpreting previous judgments in civil cases generally. But this is not to say that in such an action a previous judgment may be changed or modified, or that rights therein determined or fixed may be redetermined, re-fixed, or again adjudicated.
The present action evolved out of a factual background whose basic elements are as hereinafter described.
The former husband and wife involved in this case, sometimes referred to herein as “Mills” and “Mary”, or “H” and “W” *152while married, had two sons, and acquired several parcels of real estate, some in Oklahoma City and some in other areas of the State. Some of these properties were acquired in his name and some in hers. The only part thereof involved in this appeal consists of a lot purchased for $16,000.00 and located between Oklahoma City’s North Western Street and Classen Boulevard, with a 100-foot frontage on Northwest 23rd Street, and a commercial building the parties constructed on it at a cost of $35,000.00. This property will be referred to as “the subject property” or “Parcel C”.
After the couple separated, they executed a rather lengthy written contract, whose terms and conditions they therein agreed should become a part of any decree of divorce either might obtain from the other, if approved by the divorcing court. As to the subject parcel of property, the contract provided, in essential part, as follows (using the aforementioned initials “H” and “W” to designate the parties) :
H shall have the control and management, and shall hold the title to the property, subject only to the right of W to part of its net rental and part of its net sale price, as therein provided, and H shall have sole discretion in the property’s sale and shall have the sole right and discretion in its leasing or renting, and shall have the right to convey it without the joining of W, provided that any sale made shall be for an adequate consideration, and provided further that H shall have and receive and keep all rents and income from said property, paying all taxes, expense of upkeep and any other cost and expense that may arise, without claim of W thereto, for a period of eight (8) years from this date, or for the period of time that the sons of the parties are in school pursuing their education and H is paying all their expenses and maintenance. At the expiration of eight (8) years from this date, or at such time as the sons of the parties have completed their education, whichever occurs first, H shall pay over to W one-half of the net rents and income from the said property as said rents and income is collected and received, and in the event H shall sell the said property, at any time from and after this date, W shall be entitled to receive one-third of the net proceeds of the sale thereof.
Thereafter, on the same day the above described contract was executed (October 31, 1952), the District Court of Oklahoma County entered its decree in its Cause No. 74,783 granting H a divorce from W, after therein expressly approving said contract as describing an equitable division of the parties’ property. At that time, this Parcel C was under lease to Carnation Ice Cream Company. The highest rental paid by Carnation under this lease was $442.00 per month.
Thereafter, Mills and his present wife, Mabel, acquired a part of two lots, with a 47-foot frontage (apparently adjoining Parcel C) on Northwest 23rd Street, which property will hereinafter be referred to as “Parcel D”, and two lots adjacent thereto and hereinafter referred to as “Parcel E”, with a 50-foot frontage on Northwest 24th Street.
When Carnation’s lease on Parcel C expired on April 1, 1965, Mills also rented Parcel D to that Company for the months of April and May at a total rental (for the two-month period) of $2,400.00. Out of this $2,400.00, he allocated $400.00 for the rental on Parcel C. Under a new lease which Mills and Mabel entered into about this same time, they rented Parcels C, D, and E to Mills & Associates, Inc., under one and the same lease for a total net rental of $1,000.00 per month. Mills allocated this total sum to the three properties as follows: $400.00 for Parcel C, $200.00 for Parcel D, and $400.00 for Parcel E.
Soon afterward a dispute arose between Mary and Mills as to their respective rights in Parcel C, and in August, 1966, Mary commenced the present action as plaintiff against him as defendant.
*153In addition to the facts I have already mentioned, plaintiffs petition alleged that under the parties’ aforementioned contract and divorce decree she was vested with an undivided one-third interest in the fee of the subject property (Parcel C),
“together with a vested incorporeal property right to one-half (½) of the net rents and income from said land from and after the expiration of eight years from October 31, 19S2, or at such time as the sons of the parties had completed their education, whichever event occurred first. That the said vested one-third (⅛) interest in fee in the above-described property and the right to one-half (½) of the net rents and income therefrom as provided in said property settlement agreement and divorce decree were intended and are estates and incorporeal property interests owned by the plaintiff which are transferable by her during her lifetime or devisable by will in accordance with the statutes and laws of Oklahoma and are such interests which would continue to exist and survive the death of the plaintiff and pass, in absence of a will, to her heirs at law.
“ * * * That the defendant in the exercise of said control is a constructive trustee for the benefit of the plaintiff and has the legal duty to be fair and equitable in the renting or leasing of said property and to account to the plaintiff for one-half (½) of the net rentals and income therefrom, and in the event of a sale to pay over to the plaintiff, her heirs, devisees, executors, administrators or assigns, one-third (½) of the net proceeds of any such sale.
“4. That since the entry of said divorce decree, the defendant has abused his discretion in exercising his custody, control and management of the above-described property; has failed to properly account to the plaintiff for the rents and income therefrom; has made improper charges against the income interest of the plaintiff in said property; and has devised a design or plan whereby the above-described property is leased in a package lease along with other properties owned by the defendant (in which other properties the plaintiff has no interest) and made unjustifiable allocations of rent to the various properties leased in such package lease to the end that this plaintiff has been deprived thereby of her fair and proper share of the rent and income from the property above described.
“5. That on or about June 13, 1966, the defendant by and through his counsel notified plaintiff that she had no vested rights in the above-described property but was only entitled for her life to one-half (½) of the net income therefrom which would terminate automatically at her death and only in the event the plaintiff were alive at the time of any sale of said property would she be entitled to one-third (Vs) of the net proceeds of any such sale. Defendant claims that the interests of the plaintiff in the above-described property are mere personal rights which endure for her lifetime but which are not transferable either voluntarily or by operation of law.”
In the prayer of her petition, plaintiff prayed for judgment decreeing her to be the owner, as a tenant in common, with defendant (under the previous divorce decree and contract), of a vested one-third interest in the fee of the property, subject only to defendant’s right to hold its legal title and lease it or rent it on reasonable terms, and sell it for an adequate consideration, one-third of the net thereof to belong to her or her heirs, devisees, administrators, executors or assigns.
Plaintiff further prayed the court to determine the reasonable rental value of the property, whether leased by itself or with other properties, and that defendant be ordered to account to her for her share of such rental as was properly attributable or allocable to her said interest therein; and that she recover from him such sums as weire determined to be due her.
*154After a trial of the case without a jury, both parties requested the court to make written findings of fact and conclusions of law, and both parties submitted requested findings and conclusions. Thereafter, the court filed its written findings and conclusions and incorporated them, by reference, in the judgment he rendered for plaintiff.
As to the matter upon which I take issue with the Majority Opinion, the trial court concluded as follows:
“1. That there exists between the parties to this action an actual and justi-ciable controversy as to the interpretation of the Divorce Decree and Contract of October 31, 1952, and the provisions of the Declaratory Judgment Act of the State of Oklahoma are applicable to this action and the legal rights of the parties can be construed and determined by this Court pursuant to the provisions of 12 O.S.1961, § 1651, et seq.
⅝ ⅜ ⅜ ⅜ ⅜
“4. That a declaratory judgment is proper in this case to determine the effect and meaning of the Divorce Decree and Contract of October 31, 1952, entered in Case No. 74783
(citing decisions in four other States). That there is a well recognized distinction between ''construction’ of a judgment and the ‘modification’ of a judgment, and this Court under the Oklahoma Declaratory Judgment Act has the authority to construe the meaning and effect of the provisions of the former contract and decree herein without such action constituting a collateral attack upon the prior judgment or an attempt to modify or change the same in derogation of the provisions of Title 12, O.S. § 1031, et seq. relating to vacation and modification of prior judgments.
⅜ * ⅜: ⅜ ⅝ ⅝ »
On the basis of such conclusions and its findings of fact, the court, in its judgment, determined, inter alia, that:
Defendant, as holder of the property’s legal title, has the sole right to lease, rent, or sell it for an adequate consideration, but that plaintiff owns interests in said property entitled her to ½ of its net income and ⅛ of the net proceeds of its sale in the event of such sale; that plaintiff’s said interests are “vested equitable estates” that she may convey during her life and devise to others by will, or they may pass upon her death to her heirs at law, if she dies intestate.
As I read the Majority Opinion, its conclusion that the trial court’s above described judgment is not authorized under Oklahoma’s Declaratory Judgment Act is based upon a misinterpretation of said judgment and upon decisions promulgated in Arizona and Utah, which have different laws. The Majority Opinion ignores the wording of our Act’s first section (§ 1651), which I think plainly authorizes a declaratory judgment in an action like the present one. Title 12 O.S. 1971 and 1961, § 1651, provides:
“District and Superior Courts may, in cases of actual controversy, determine rights, status, or other legal relations, including but not limited to a determination of the construction or validity of any deed, contract, trust, or other instrument or agreement or of any statute, municipal ordinance or other governmental regulation, whether or not other relief is or could be claimed, except that no such declaration shall be made concerning liability or nonliability for damages on account of alleged tortious injuries to persons or to property either before or after judgment or for compensation alleged to be due under workmen’s compensation laws for injuries to persons or concerning obligations alleged to arise under policies of insurance covering liability or indemnity against liability for such injuries. The determination may be made either before or after there has been a breach of any legal duty or obligation, and it may be either affirmative or negative in form and effect; provided however, that a court may refuse to make such determination where the judgment, if rendered, would not *155terminate the controversy, or some part thereof, giving rise to the proceeding.” (Emphasis added.)
The Utah statute (§ 78-33-2, U.C.A.1953), construed in Crofts v. Crofts, 21 Utah 2d 332, 445 P.2d 701, cited in the Majority Opinion, reads:
“Any person interested under a deed, will or written contract, or whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract or franchise, may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract or franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder.”
The Arizona statutes (§ 27-702, A.C.A. 1939), construed in Glassford v. Glassford, 26 Ariz. 220, 262 P.2d 382, cited in the Majority Opinion, reads:
“Any person interested under a deed, will, written contract or other writing, or whose rights, status or legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract or franchise, may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract, or franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder. A contract may be construed either before or after there has been a breach thereof.”
By comparing the wording of the above quoted sections of the three different States’ Declaratory Judgment Acts, it will be noted that the authorization given our District Courts to make determinations under the Oklahoma Act is “not limited” to those determinations specifically mentioned in Section 1651, supra. The only portion of the Oklahoma Act that restricts its operation is its last section (§ 1657), which reads as follows:
“This act shall not be applicable to orders, judgments or decrees made by the State Industrial Court, the Corporation Commission, or any other administrative agency, board or commission of the State of Oklahoma.”
Plaintiff's position, as reflected in the Majority Opinion, is that the last quoted section’s mention of the orders, judgments or decrees, to which the Act shall not apply, is further evidence of legislative intent that it shall apply to the construction of orders, judgments or decrees of the other adjudicative bodies (“District and Superior Courts”) named in Section 1651, supra, applying the maxim “expressio unius est exclusio alterius.” Concerning the rule of statutory construction exemplified by this maxim, this Court, in Cummings v. Board of Education, 190 Okl. 533, 536, 125 P.2d 989, 993, said:
“The enumeration of specific exceptions by the legislature excludes all others by implication, and usually precludes the court from creating additional exceptions by judicial construction(Emphasis added.)
As I interpret it, this rule thus forbids exactly what the Majority Opinion has done, i. e., adding, by judicial construction, exceptions to the Declaratory Judgment Act, not contemplated therein. And the only reason the Majority Opinion gives for not interpreting the Act, as it is written, is that this “would unnecessarily prolong litigation and provide a new and novel method of modification or appeal.” I submit that the trial court’s judgment does not modify the previous divorce decree, nor does it attempt to change, reverse, vacate, or set aside any ruling or determination, expressed or implied, in said divorce decree.
I recognize that the “exclusio” rule should never be applied to defeat apparent legislative intent (In Re Arbuckle Master Con., Dist., D.Ct, M. Co., No. 9660, Okl., 474 P.2d 385, 392), nor to leave a statute with a meaning contrary to reason or justice; but, as will hereinafter appear, the construction given the Declaratory Judgment Act by the trial court obtains exactly the opposite result, and carries out the legislative will, in accord with reason and justice.
In expressing disbelief that the legislature could have intended to make district *156court judgments subject to the Act, while, at the same time, excluding from its operation the orders, judgments or decrees of the bodies mentioned in Section 1657, supra, the Majority Opinion fails to recognize that, had not these exclusions been written into the Declaratory Judgment Act, said Act would have been in conflict with other Oklahoma statutes and with our Constitution. For instance, by statute and by amendment of the Oklahoma Constitution, the State Industrial Court has been given jurisdiction, exclusive of that of district courts generally, over what Section 1651, supra — consistent with Section 1657, supra —refers to as “liability or nonliability for compensation alleged to be due . . .” under our Workmen’s Compensation Laws. See Roberts v. Merrill, Okl., 386 P.2d 780. Also, under our Constitution and statutes, the Corporation Commission, to the exclusion of district courts, is vested with jurisdiction over such matters as the supervision, regulation and control of transportation and transmission companies doing business in this State (Art. IX, Okla.Const.) and of controversies affecting the conservation of oil and gas (Title 52 O.S.1971 and 1961, § 81ff; State v. Public Service Co., 187 Okl. 182, 102 P.2d 139). And both this Court and the Federal Court have recognized that tribunal’s original jurisdiction to clarify or construe its own orders under Section 112, Title 52, supra. See Application of Martin, Okl., 321 P.2d 659, 672, 673, citing Cabot Carbon Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Company, Okl., 287 P.2d 675, and Constantin v. Martin, 10 Cir., 216 F.2d 312, and notice that in Martin (p. 665) we, like the trial court in the present case, recognized the difference between the construction or clarification of a former order or decree, and changing or modifying it.
As to the administrative agencies, boards and commissions covered by this State’s Administrative Procedures Act, Title 75 O.S.1971 and 1963 Supp., §§ 301-325, both inclusive, it must be remembered that said Act contains a specific provision (§ 306) with reference to declaratory judgments in the district court.
From the foregoing, it will be seen that, in drafting the Declaratory Judgment Act, the legislature had the best of reasons— that of avoiding a collision with our Constitution and previous statutes — for distinguishing between orders, judgments or decrees of the district courts and those of the tribunals and bodies referred to in Section 1657, supra, and for excluding the latter from operation of the Act. It therefore follows that viewing the district court’s authority under the Act restrictively, because of the Act’s exclusion from its operation of the orders, judgments or decrees of those tribunals and bodies, is without any reasonable or logical basis. The Act should be interpreted as written, and, when this is done, the trial court’s ruling that it has jurisdiction to render the declaratory judgment, it rendered, must be affirmed.
For the reasons herein set forth, I respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that Justice HODGES concurs in this dissenting opinion.