Court Opinion

ID: 9834553
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-02 00:00:30.865637+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:26:40.321333
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-10460       Document: 00516882189           Page: 1     Date Filed: 09/01/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit                             United States Court of Appeals
                                                                              Fifth Circuit

                                   ____________                             FILED
                                                                    September 1, 2023
                                    No. 22-10460
                                                                       Lyle W. Cayce
                                   ____________                             Clerk

   United States of America,

                                                                 Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                         versus

   Bryan Reshad Hill,

                                             Defendant—Appellant.
                    ______________________________

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Northern District of Texas
                            USDC No. 3:19-CR-86-20
                   ______________________________

   Before Duncan and Wilson, Circuit Judges, and Schroeder, District
   Judge.*
   Cory T. Wilson, Circuit Judge:
          A jury found Bryan Reshad Hill guilty of conspiring to possess a
   controlled substance with the intent to distribute it and distributing a
   detectable amount of a substance containing cocaine base.                   Hill now
   challenges his sentence on several grounds. We affirm.

          _____________________
          *
             United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Texas, sitting by
   designation.
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                                    No. 22-10460

                                        I.
          Su Mun purchased the HanGil Hotel in Dallas, Texas, sometime
   before 2018. The facility was formerly a nursing home, but Mun quickly
   converted it into a free-wheeling drug emporium, allowing dealers to use the
   hotel’s rooms as “trap rooms” from which they sold a plethora of illegal
   narcotics 24 hours a day, seven days a week. These trap rooms were
   equipped with surveillance cameras, and individuals worked as armed
   guards. For his trouble, Mun charged the drug dealers a higher room rate.
          The HanGil first appeared on law enforcement’s radar in July 2018
   following several overdose deaths there. After reading numerous Google
   reviews that confirmed the hotel’s status as a drug market, law enforcement
   began investigating the HanGil. But surveillance proved difficult, as all the
   hotel’s rooms faced an interior hallway. Flummoxed, law enforcement put
   up a “pole camera” near the hotel. The pole camera captured footage of
   people coming and going from the hotel day and night; the open-air use of
   narcotics; and individuals openly carrying firearms, including assault rifles.
   Throughout 2018, Dallas police officers conducted numerous code
   inspections of the HanGil, and each uncovered significant evidence of a large
   drug operation—despite Mun’s warning his tenants of the inspections
   beforehand. The cat-and-mouse game only ended when Erick Freeman, a
   prolific HanGil drug dealer who had a penchant for violence—including use
   of a blowtorch to torture people—was arrested in early 2019 and cooperated
   with law enforcement.
          Hill was involved in the HanGil’s activities throughout most of the
   hotel’s sordid history. At first, he worked for Mun as hotel security. Then,
   he operated a trap room selling cocaine base and heroin. But when Hill lost
   most of his customers due to his own addiction and the arrival of other

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   dealers, including Freeman, he began working for Freeman in several
   capacities.
          As Freeman’s enforcer, Hill, brandishing a firearm, stood guard at the
   entrance of Freeman’s trap rooms. His job was to intimidate and coerce
   Freeman’s customers and other people that Freeman believed owed him
   money. On one occasion, Hill and two others beat a homeless man until he
   was unconscious. On another, someone paid Hill $250 to remove a body
   from one of the trap rooms. In addition to his enforcer and doorman duties,
   Hill also cut, bagged, and sold drugs for Freeman, including heroin and
   cocaine base.
          But Hill’s behavior proved too abhorrent even for the HanGil. In the
   early morning hours of December 27, 2018, Hill was working the door of one
   of Freeman’s trap rooms. Freeman’s room surveillance camera captured the
   events. A customer, L.R., was using drugs provided by Hill. After L.R.
   smoked what appeared to be crack cocaine, she injected an unknown
   substance into her arm as Hill watched. As L.R. was falling in and out of
   consciousness, Hill put on gloves and took her into the bathroom of the trap
   room. The two were in the bathroom for 26 minutes. Another person
   working for Freeman testified that she heard people having sexual
   intercourse. When Hill exited the bathroom, he was still wearing gloves but
   neither his shirt nor his necklace. He threw his shirt into a trash can, put on
   his necklace, and made the sign of the cross. Freeman’s other employee
   entered the bathroom and found L.R. unresponsive with her hair covering
   her face and her pants pulled down. Freeman subsequently investigated, and,
   determining that L.R. had died, recruited two individuals to help him dispose
   of her body. Freeman thereafter banished Hill from the HanGil.
          After Freeman’s arrest in 2019, law enforcement used the recorded
   surveillance footage of his trap rooms to build their case against the HanGil’s

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   principals. A series of indictments followed, with Hill being indicted on
   October 9, 2019. After a superseding indictment that charged Hill with one
   count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute a controlled
   substance, Hill went to trial on April 7, 2021. The jury deadlocked, and the
   district court declared a mistrial. The Government responded with a three-
   count superseding indictment, charging Hill with conspiracy to possess with
   intent to distribute a controlled substance (count one), possession with intent
   to distribute a Schedule II controlled substance (count two), and distribution
   of a Schedule II controlled substance (count three). After a seven-day trial,
   the second jury convicted Hill on counts one and three but acquitted him on
   count two.
          Hill was sentenced under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) for conspiracy to
   possess with intent to distribute a controlled substance, which, unlike its
   more lenient neighboring subsections, carries a sentence of 120 months to
   life. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii). To obtain a conviction under § 841(b)(1)(A), the
   Government must show that the defendant knew that the conspiracy involved
   a minimum quantity of the controlled substance. The threshold for heroin is
   one kilogram; for cocaine base, 280 grams. § 841(b)(1)(A)(i) & (iii). In Hill’s
   case, the jury charge and verdict form—specifically, whether they facilitated
   a jury finding that Hill had knowledge of the drug quantities involved in the
   HanGil conspiracy—are at issue.
          The jury charge given by the district court instructed the jury to
   convict if it found that Hill “knew that the scope of the conspiracy involved
   at least a detectable amount of heroin or at least 280 grams of a mixture or
   substance containing cocaine base.”        The verdict form used special
   interrogatories for the jury to determine specific drug quantities involved in
   the conspiracy. The first asked whether the “substance that was intended to
   be distributed as part of the conspiracy contained a detectable amount of
   cocaine base,” and the jury checked “yes.” The next asked for the amount

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   of cocaine base, and the jury checked “280 grams or more.” The last
   question asked whether the conspiracy included a detectable amount of
   heroin, and again the jury checked “yes.” The jury was not specifically asked
   via the verdict form whether Hill knew the scope of the conspiracy
   envisioned these amounts.
          Post verdict, Hill raised several objections to the presentence
   investigation report (PSR). Relevant here, he objected to the PSR’s drug
   quantity determination.      The PSR recommended that Hill be held
   accountable for one kilogram of cocaine base and one kilogram of heroin per
   month for nine months. The PSR did not explain how it arrived at that
   number, only stating the amounts were “consistent with what other
   codefendants were held accountable for through the case[.]” In fact, the PSR
   conceded that “[t]he specific quantities of narcotics being sold from each
   room in the HanGil Hotel [are] unknown[.]” The district court overruled
   Hill’s objection, finding that the PSR’s drug quantity determination was
   supported by “statements of several unindicted co-conspirators and co-
   defendants, former customers of [Hill’s], criminal background checks, and
   evidence introduced at [Hill’s] trial.” Specifically, the court cited Hill’s own
   statements in which he admitted to selling drugs at the HanGil and the trial
   testimony of other witnesses who testified as to the amount of drugs
   distributed each day.
          Hill’s total offense level was 44, reduced to the maximum level of 43
   allowed by the Guidelines, and his criminal history category was III. See
   U.S.S.G., Ch. 5, Pt. A, cmt. (n.2). The result was a Guidelines range of life
   imprisonment. The district court varied downward, tracking the proposed
   EQUAL Act, then-pending legislation in Congress that would have
   eliminated the sentencing disparity between crack and powder cocaine.
   Thus, the court gave Hill the benefit of an unenacted law and sentenced him
   as if it applied. In the end, the district court sentenced Hill to 480 months on

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   the first count and 240 months on the second count, to run concurrently. Hill
   timely appealed.
                                         II.
          Hill raises four issues on appeal. He contends that (A) the district
   court imposed a “trial penalty” in sentencing him, i.e, the court sentenced
   Hill more harshly than it otherwise would have because he went to trial. Hill
   also argues that (B) the district court erred in determining the quantity of
   drugs attributable to him, and he challenges (C) the propriety of the jury
   charge and verdict form. Finally, Hill asserts that (D) the district court
   imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence. Reviewing these arguments
   in turn, we find each to be without merit.
                                         A.
          Hill asserts that the district court sentenced him more harshly because
   he went to trial, thereby imposing a trial penalty. The Sixth Amendment
   provides, in part, that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
   the right to a speedy and public trial.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. “[A]
   defendant cannot be punished by a more severe sentence because he
   unsuccessfully exercises his constitutional right to stand trial.” United States
   v. Gozes-Wagner, 977 F.3d 323, 335 (5th Cir. 2020) (citation and quotation
   marks omitted). A defendant can show a trial penalty in two ways: (1) by
   comparison to the sentences of “similarly situated” defendants, or (2) by the
   district court’s “plain[] state[ment] that it was punishing the defendant more
   severely than it otherwise would because she went to trial[.]” Id. at 337
   (citation omitted). In assessing the question, though, we remain mindful that
   the “bargained-for leniency inherent in the plea negotiation process is not
   available once a trial has been held[.]” United States v. Velasquez, 881 F.3d
   314, 343 (5th Cir. 2018) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

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          We have previously utilized two standards of review for trial penalty
   claims. In one unpublished case, we applied de novo review. See United States
   v. Molina, No. 20-11232, 2022 WL 3971588, at *4–5 (5th Cir. Aug. 31, 2022),
   cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 619 (2023). But in another, we reviewed the sentence
   for plain error. See United States v. Guy, 633 F. App’x 851, 855 (5th Cir.
   2015), as revised (Dec. 15, 2015). In any event, we need not pick the correct
   standard today because Hill’s claim fails under even de novo review. See
   Gozes-Wagner, 977 F.3d at 335 n.7 (similar).
          Hill argues that the district court explicitly stated that it was
   sentencing him more harshly because he went to trial, thus imposing a trial
   penalty. He points to two comments from his sentencing, one by the
   Government and another by the district court. Arguing that Hill deserved
   life in prison, counsel for the Government stated:
          [O]f all the defendants in this case . . . the only defendant that
          did not . . . provide the Government with some assistance to
          stop this madness was [Hill]. That’s why Mr. Freeman is not
          in prison for the rest his life, that is why Mr. Washington is not
          in prison for the rest of his life. Yes, they engaged in some
          horrific acts, they were involved in this conspiracy, they were
          high up in the food chain, but when they were caught, they
          stepped up, they helped find [L.R.’s] body, they cooperated
          and help[ed] identify all the other individuals that were
          involved in this case. This Defendant chose not to. That’s his
          right. That is absolutely his right to put the Government to the
          test to come in here and prove its case. We did.

   And in relevant part, the district court explained that it “agree[d] with the
   Government’s counsel that as heinous as the crimes by Messrs. Freeman and
   Washington were, it’s a very different situation there than here. They
   accepted responsibility. They were both [Rule] 11(c)(1)(C) agreements [sic]
   and so on.” Hill contends that these statements, considered together,

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   indicate that both the Government and district court relied on Hill’s not
   pleading guilty, i.e., his going to trial, to justify a significantly higher sentence
   than his co-conspirators, Freeman and Washington, who both received 360
   months.
          We disagree. The statements made by the Government at sentencing
   are only relevant insofar as they inform the meaning of the district court’s
   statements. And the district court’s statements during Hill’s sentencing
   must be viewed in context. See Gozes-Wagner, 977 F.3d at 340 n.12 (“One
   stray comment does not create error when it can be understood in the context
   of a lengthy sentencing hearing.”). The district court’s comments came
   during its discussion of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors.
   Specifically, the court mentioned the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing
   disparities among defendants before making the challenged statement. It is
   thus reasonable to assume that the district court sought to distinguish
   Freeman and Washington as not similarly situated for purposes of 18 U.S.C.
   § 3553(a)(6). See United States v. Duhon, 541 F.3d 391, 397 (5th Cir. 2008)
   (stating that a “[d]isparity in sentences between a defendant who provided
   substantial assistance and one who provided no assistance . . . is not
   unwarranted” (citation and quotation marks omitted)).
          Further, we do not read the district court’s recognition that Freeman
   and Washington “accepted responsibility” as centering on their forfeiture of
   their right to jury trial. Rather, we read that statement as indicative of
   Freeman’s and Washington’s cooperation with the Government, especially
   considering the district court’s recognition that their plea agreements were
   reached pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(B), which

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   indicates some level of cooperation.1             Moreover, during its extended
   explanation of Hill’s sentence, the district court listed various reasons for the
   sentence it was imposing—which incorporated a downward variance—
   including Hill’s involvement in the conspiracy from start to finish, his violent
   behavior, and his sexual assault of an incapacitated victim.
           Finally, the district court considered that Freeman and Washington
   were inapt comparators because they cooperated with the Government.
   “[A] defendant who cooperates with the Government is not similarly
   situated to one who refuses to do so.” Gozes-Wagner, 977 F.3d at 337
   (citation omitted). “We cannot compare apples to oranges when deciding
   whether a sentence is ‘more severe’ for trial penalty purposes.” Id. Based
   on the record before us, we conclude that the district court did not make any
   statement, plain or otherwise, that it was sentencing Hill more harshly
   because he went to trial. And Washington and Freeman were not “similarly
   situated” to Hill, so their sentences are irrelevant. We discern no reversible
   error as to this issue.
                                             B.
           Hill next argues that the district court erred in calculating the drug
   quantity attributable to him. We disagree.
           A participant in a drug conspiracy is responsible for all drug quantities
   with which he was “directly involved,” as well as for quantities “involved in
   transactions carried out by other participants, if those transactions were
   within the scope of, and in furtherance of, the jointly undertaken criminal
   activity and were reasonably foreseeable in connection with that criminal

           _____________________
           1
             The hearing transcript states that the plea agreements were made under Rule
   11(c)(1)(C). But the Government clarified in its briefing that Freeman’s and Washington’s
   plea agreements were struck pursuant to Rule 11(c)(1)(B).

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   activity.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, cmt. (n.3(D)); see United States v. Johnson, 14
   F.4th 342, 347 (5th Cir. 2021). We review the district court’s drug quantity
   determination for clear error. See United States v. Ekanem, 555 F.3d 172, 175
   (5th Cir. 2009).
          In calculating the drug quantity attributable to Hill, the PSR provided:
          The specific quantities of narcotics being sold from each room
          in the HanGil Hotel [are] unknown, which is primarily a result
          of the difficulty in investigating this case . . . . However,
          because no other way to calculate drug quantities is available,
          and to remain consistent with what other codefendants were
          held accountable for through the case, the defendant will be
          held accountable for 1 kilogram of heroin and 1 kilogram of
          cocaine base (crack) for each month Hill was involved in the
          conspiracy.

   Hill attacks these statements as unsupported, and thus insufficiently reliable
   to support the district court’s ultimate drug quantity attribution. So he
   argues we should remand for resentencing.
          A PSR generally “bears sufficient indicia of reliability to be considered
   as evidence by the sentencing judge in making factual findings.” United
   States v. Harris, 702 F.3d 226, 230 (5th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted).
   “However, mere inclusion in the PSR does not convert facts lacking an
   adequate evidentiary basis with sufficient indicia of reliability into facts a
   district court may rely upon at sentencing.” United States v. Gentry, 941 F.3d
   767, 788 (5th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
   “Bald, conclusionary statements do not acquire the patina of reliability by
   mere inclusion in the PSR.” Harris, 702 F.3d at 230 n.2 (citation and
   quotation marks omitted).         “If the factual recitation in the PSR lacks
   sufficient indicia of reliability, then it is error for the district court to consider
   it at sentencing—regardless of whether the defendant objects or offers

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   rebuttal evidence.” United States v. Zuniga, 720 F.3d 587, 591 (5th Cir. 2013)
   (cleaned up).
           Hill might be correct that the PSR, viewed in isolation, does not
   contain facts carrying sufficient indicia of reliability to substantiate the drug
   quantity determination. However, “[w]hen making factual findings for
   sentencing purposes, a district court may consider any information which
   bears sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy.” Id. at
   590 (citation and quotation marks omitted). Here, the district court “[found]
   that the facts in the PSR [were] supported by statements of several
   unindicted co-conspirators and co-defendants, former customers of [Hill’s],
   criminal background checks, and evidence introduced at [Hill’s] trial.”
   Specifically, the court cited Hill’s prior statements, in which he admitted to
   selling drugs at the HanGil, and the trial testimony of other witnesses,
   including Kimberly Robinson, who, like Hill, bagged and sold drugs for
   Freeman. Robinson detailed the quantity of drugs distributed each day.2

           _____________________
           2
              Robinson testified that she routinely sold at least two to three 25-gram “cookies”
   of crack cocaine during a 12-hour shift, from just one of Freeman’s trap rooms. She also
   testified that she sold “lots” of heroin, which was sold in 3.1-gram quantities for $125 each,
   and could make as much as $3,000 during a good 12-hour shift. Working two or three shifts
   a week, Robinson thus personally sold at least 100, and maybe over 200, grams of crack
   cocaine during a week. Conservatively extrapolating, if approximately 100 grams of crack
   cocaine were sold daily in this one trap room, well more than 1000 grams of crack cocaine
   would plausibly have been sold from Freeman’s trap rooms each month. Based on
   Robinson’s testimony alone, the PSR’s estimate was if anything conservative in its
   calculations.
            Similarly, Monica Saucedo testified that, as a bagger for Freeman, she sold
   approximately $2,000 of heroin and five or six 14-gram “cookies” of crack cocaine (70
   grams, on the low end) every day for Freeman. Assuming that 3.1-gram quantities of heroin
   sold for $125, then Saucedo sold approximately 50 grams of heroin daily. Thus, well more
   than one kilogram of heroin was sold monthly out of one of Freeman’s trap rooms, before
   adding the quantity sold by Hill himself. As with the cocaine estimate, the PSR’s heroin
   quantity calculation was, if anything, skewed in Hill’s favor.

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   Considering this evidence, the court concluded that “the drug quantities in
   the PSR [are] supported by a preponderance of the evidence.”
          The district court’s reliance on evidence not expressly cited in the
   PSR was consistent with our caselaw, see Zuniga, 720 F.3d at 590, and the
   evidence provided an adequate basis for the PSR’s ultimate drug quantity
   calculations, which the district court expressly found was calculated “to the
   benefit of [Hill].” Notably, Hill also fails to rebut the evidence. The district
   court’s determination of the quantity of drugs attributable to Hill was not
   clearly erroneous.
                                         C.
          Hill challenges the propriety of the jury charge and verdict form as to
   count one, which charged Hill with conspiracy to possess 280 grams or more
   of a mixture containing a detectable amount of cocaine base with the intent
   to distribute it, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(A). As noted
   supra in Part I, when the Government seeks an enhanced sentence under
   § 841(b)(1)(A), the jury must “determine the [drug] amount which each
   defendant knew or should have known was involved in the conspiracy.”
   United States v. Montemayor, 55 F.4th 1003, 1012 (5th Cir. 2022) (citation and
   quotation marks omitted). A district court therefore errs if it imposes a
   mandatory minimum under § 841(b)(1)(A) based on a jury finding of the drug
   quantity attributable to the entire conspiracy, as opposed to the amount of
   drugs the particular defendant knew, or should have known, was involved.
   United States v. Haines, 803 F.3d 713, 741–42 (5th Cir. 2015).
          Hill contends that the jury charge and verdict form did not require the
   jury to find that he knew that the scope of the conspiracy included 280 grams
   of cocaine base. The jury charge on this element instructed the jury to
   determine whether Hill “knew that the scope of the conspiracy involved at
   least a detectable amount of heroin or at least 280 grams of a mixture or

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   substance containing cocaine base.” (emphasis added). Thus, though the
   charge contained the requisite scienter, it was written in the disjunctive,
   allowing for conviction under either a cocaine base or heroin theory of guilt.
          According to Hill, because the verdict form did not include a special
   interrogatory centered on his knowledge of the amount of cocaine base
   involved in the conspiracy, the jury did not find that he had such knowledge.
   Therefore, the Government failed to prove the required § 841(b)(1)(A)
   elements, and Hill should not be subject to the mandatory minimum under
   that subsection. Instead, the jury could only have convicted him of violating
   § 841(b)(1)(C), which carries a statutory maximum of 240 months, such that
   his 480-month sentence under count one must be set aside.
          Hill did not object to the jury charge or verdict form at trial.
   Ordinarily, failure to abide by the contemporaneous objection rule
   “precludes the raising on appeal of the unpreserved claim of trial error.”
   Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009) (citation omitted). But
   Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b) “recognizes a limited exception to
   that preclusion,” in that “[a] plain error that affects substantial rights may be
   considered even though it was not brought to the court’s attention.” Id.
   (quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b)).
          “To establish plain error, ‘a defendant must show (1) error, (2) that
   is clear or obvious, and (3) that affected the defendant’s substantial rights.’”
   Montemayor, 55 F.4th at 1010 (quoting United States v. Hinojosa, 749 F.3d
   407, 411 (5th Cir. 2014)). If the first three prongs are satisfied, then the court
   has the discretion to “remedy the error only if it (4) seriously affect[s] the
   fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (citation
   and quotation marks omitted). “Meeting all four prongs is difficult, as it
   should be.” Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
   And the Supreme Court has “repeatedly cautioned that [a]ny unwarranted

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   extension of the authority granted by Rule 52(b) would disturb the careful
   balance it strikes between judicial efficiency and the redress of injustice[.]”
   Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).
          We assume arguendo that there was clear or obvious error in the jury
   charge and corresponding verdict form, though whether there actually was
   plain error is at least debatable. The jury charge conformed to our pattern
   jury instructions, see Fifth Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions
   (Criminal Cases) 2.97 (2019), but contained two distinct theories of
   guilt (cocaine and heroin). Any uncertainty caused by the “or” in the jury
   charge is somewhat ameliorated by the verdict form’s special interrogatories,
   because from them, we know that the jury convicted Hill of conspiracy to
   possess with intent to distribute and found that the conspiracy involved at
   least 280 grams of cocaine base. Nevertheless, we are left with the lack of an
   express finding that Hill knew that the conspiracy involved at least 280 grams
   of cocaine base, even if that is implied in the jury’s responses.           See
   Montemayor, 55 F.4th at 1012–14; see also United States v. Benitez, 809 F.3d
   243, 250 (5th Cir. 2015) (holding that the jury must find individualized drug
   weight and a failure to do so “satisfies the first two prongs of the plain error
   analysis”); cf. United States v. Gonzales, 841 F.3d 339, 346 (5th Cir. 2016)
   (“With respect to special interrogatories, we have repeated the refrain that
   they should not be used in criminal trials.” (cleaned up)).
          More clearly, any error that occurred affected Hill’s substantial rights.
   This prong of the analysis “may be satisfied by showing a reasonable
   probability that, but for the error, the outcome of the proceeding would have
   been different.” Montemayor, 55 F.4th at 1010 (citation and quotation marks
   omitted). If Hill had not been convicted under § 841(b)(1)(A), then the
   maximum sentence he faced for count one would have been 240 months, half
   of the 480 months he received. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C). Simply put,

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   there is a reasonable probability that, but for the error, Hill would have
   received a significantly shorter sentence. See Montemayor, 55 F.4th at 1013.
          But even if Hill establishes the first three prongs of plain error, he
   falters on the fourth. To succeed on plain error review, the error must
   “seriously affect[] the fairness, integrity[,] or public reputation of judicial
   proceedings.” Id. (citation omitted). Only then may we exercise our
   discretion to remedy the error. See id. at 1010, 1013. In Montemayor, we
   weighed whether to do so faced with a similar scenario, i.e., when the jury
   had not made the requisite individualized drug finding. Id. at 1012–14. We
   held that, notwithstanding clear error that affected their substantial rights,
   the evidence against the defendants was “overwhelming,” so that the error
   did not satisfy the fourth prong. Id. at 1014. We reach the same conclusion
   in Hill’s case.
          There was overwhelming evidence that Hill “knew or should have
   known [the drug amount that] was involved in the conspiracy[.]” Haines,
   803 F.3d at 741; see also Montemayor, 55 F.4th at 1014. Besides operating his
   own trap room selling cocaine base, he also served as hotel security for Mun
   and as an enforcer and bagger for Freeman. He served in these varied roles
   from the time Mun bought the HanGil until late 2018. During his tenure
   providing security, Hill would have been privy to each of the trap rooms and
   known that cocaine base was being sold. And when working for Freeman,
   Hill bagged cocaine base and facilitated its distribution while hundreds of
   grams of cocaine base were sold out of Freeman’s trap rooms. See supra n.2.
   Based on Hill’s personal involvement in the broader HanGil enterprise, his
   personal drug dealing, and his work for Freeman, it is inconceivable that he
   did not know that the conspiracy involved at least 280 grams of cocaine base.
   Thus, regardless if there was plain error in the jury charge and verdict form,
   Hill has “not shown that the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the
   judicial proceedings was seriously affected.” Monetmayor, 55 F.4th at 1014.

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                                    No. 22-10460

                                         D.
          Finally, Hill asserts that the district court imposed a substantively
   unreasonable sentence. Our review for substantive reasonableness “is highly
   deferential[] because the sentencing court is in a better position to find facts
   and judge their import under the § 3553(a) factors[.]” United States v. Diehl,
   775 F.3d 714, 724 (5th Cir. 2015) (citation and quotation marks omitted). A
   sentence below the Guidelines range enjoys a presumption of reasonableness.
   United States v. Scully, 951 F.3d 656, 672 (5th Cir. 2020).
          The Guidelines range calculated for Hill’s sentence was life
   imprisonment. But the district court varied downward from the Guidelines
   range, using the base offense level that would have applied under the
   unenacted EQUAL Act to determine what the hypothetical range would be.
   By sentencing Hill to 480 months, the district court thus gave Hill the benefit
   of proposed legislation via a downward departure from the actual Guidelines
   range. So the presumption of reasonableness most certainly applies here.
          Hill can rebut this presumption “only upon a showing that the
   sentence does not account for a [sentencing] factor that should receive
   significant weight, it gives significant weight to an irrelevant or improper
   [sentencing] factor, or it represents a clear error of judgment in balancing
   sentencing factors.” United States v. Cooks, 589 F.3d 173, 186 (5th Cir. 2009)
   (citation omitted). Hill argues that the district court did not account for “the
   need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with
   similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct[.]” 18 U.S.C.
   § 3553(a)(6). Specifically, he points out that Mun, who owned the HanGil
   hotel, only received 240 months; Freeman, the leader of the drug conspiracy
   who tortured people with a blowtorch, only received 360 months; and
   Washington, one of Freeman’s enforcers who helped Freeman torture
   someone, only received 360 months.          Hill argues that his 480-month

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                                     No. 22-10460

   sentence creates an unwarranted disparity because he had a comparatively
   minor role in the conspiracy and never tortured anyone.
          Hill fails to rebut the presumption that his sentence was substantively
   reasonable. For the same reasons as described supra in Part II.A., he was not
   similarly situated to the other defendants. He did not plead guilty, and he did
   not cooperate with the Government. See Duhon, 541 F.3d at 397 (stating that
   a “[d]isparity in sentences between a defendant who provided substantial
   assistance and one who provided no assistance . . . is not unwarranted”
   (citation and quotation marks omitted)). The district court also expressly
   considered the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities among
   defendants, but distinguished Hill from Freeman and Washington based on
   their cooperation with the Government. We discern no abuse of discretion
   in the district court’s sentencing Hill, and this claim lacks merit.
                                        III.
          Each of Hill’s four challenges to his sentence fails. The judgment of
   the district court is therefore
                                                                   AFFIRMED.

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