Court Opinion

ID: 9778809
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 21:21:30.783664+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:13.374796
License: Public Domain

Sweeney, J.
¶36 (dissenting) — The jury, not this court or the trial court, should have been allowed to decide whether or not James Walters’ level of intoxication was such that he was unable to form the necessary intent to commit these crimes. Neither court has the ability to divine whether a properly instructed jury would have concluded that Mr. Walters’ level of intoxication inhibited his ability to form the requisite mens rea for each of these crimes. And, more significantly, Mr. Walters had a constitutional right to have a jury, rather a single judge or a panel of judges, make that determination. Wash. Const, art. I, § 21.
*87¶37 A voluntary intoxication instruction allows a jury to consider the effect of voluntary intoxication by alcohol or drugs on a defendant’s ability to form the necessary mental state for a charged crime. State v. Coates, 107 Wn.2d 882, 889, 735 P.2d 64 (1987). Indeed, our Supreme Court has held that a voluntary intoxication instruction, if requested, is mandatory because, without it, the jury is not informed of the legal significance of intoxication and counsel cannot effectively present the defense. E.g., State v. Rice, 102 Wn.2d 120, 123, 683 P.2d 199 (1984).
¶38 The facts of this case, when viewed in a light most favorable to Mr. Walters, support a voluntary intoxication instruction. I, then, would conclude that it was prejudicial error not to give one.
¶39 A defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on his theory of the case when he produces sufficient evidence to support the instruction. State v. Williams, 132 Wn.2d 248, 259-60, 937 P.2d 1052 (1997). Failure to then instruct is reversible error. Id. A defendant is entitled to a voluntary intoxication instruction when (1) the crime charged includes a mental state, (2) there is substantial evidence of drinking, and (3) there is substantial evidence that the drinking affected the defendant’s ability to form the requisite intent or mental state. State v. Gallegos, 65 Wn. App. 230, 238, 828 P.2d 37 (1992). The evidence “must reasonably and logically connect the defendant’s intoxication with the asserted inability to form the required level of culpability to commit the crime charged.” State v. Gabryschak, 83 Wn. App. 249, 252-53, 921 P.2d 549 (1996).
¶40 The effects of alcohol are commonly known, and jurors can draw reasonable inferences from testimony about alcohol use. State v. Thomas, 123 Wn. App. 771, 782, 98 P.3d 1258 (2004); State v. Kruger, 116 Wn. App. 685, 692-93, 67 P.3d 1147 (2003); State v. Smissaert, 41 Wn. App. 813, 815, 706 P.2d 647 (1985). So neither this court nor the trial court is privileged to weigh the evidence here. The only question before us is whether there was sufficient evidence produced from which a jury could find that Mr. Walters’ *88level of intoxication affected his ability to form the intent necessary to commit these crimes. Williams, 132 Wn.2d at 259-60.
¶41 This court and the trial court must view the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to Mr. Walters. State v. Douglas, 128 Wn. App. 555, 561-62, 116 P.3d 1012 (2005). Circumstantial evidence is no less reliable than direct evidence. State v. Liden, 138 Wn. App. 110, 117, 156 P.3d 259 (2007). And credibility determinations are for the trier of fact, not us. Id. So when the evidence conflicts, like it does here, we must let the jury decide what evidence is most persuasive and then defer to that decision. Id.
¶42 When the evidence is viewed in a light most favorable to Mr. Walters, the evidence showed:
• The bartender said Mr. Walters arrived at about 6:00 p.m. and had seven beers and two shots of liquor.
• Mr. Walters said he arrived about 7:00 p.m. and had at least 10 beers and a number of shots.
• Mr. Walters did not remember leaving the bar.
• He had vague recollections of his interactions with the officers.
• He had slurred speech; had droopy, bloodshot eyes; and was swaying back and forth when he was in the alley at 2:18 a.m.
• He did not respond to pain compliance techniques: Officer Bartz had to use a stun gun twice to restrain him.
• The bartender rated Mr. Walters’ intoxication as a 4 on a scale of 1 to 10.
• The officers rated Mr. Walters’ intoxication as anywhere from a 4 to a 6.
Despite this evidence, the State vigorously argued "the evidence was not that he [Walters] was so intoxicated that he couldn’t form an intent or know what was going on or know what he was doing.” Report of Proceedings (Apr. 20, 2010) at 169.
*89¶43 The State relies on Gabryschak, 83 Wn. App. 249. There, the court begins its analysis with the observation that “[i]ntoxication is not an all-or-nothing proposition. A person can be intoxicated and still be able to form the requisite mental state, or he can be so intoxicated as to be unconscious.” Id. at 254. The Gabryschak court’s observations are correct. But it ignores an important question — who gets to decide that question, the jury or a panel of Court of Appeals judges? The court in Gabryschak then goes on to evaluate the trial evidence on the defendant’s level of intoxication and finds that the defendant there was not drunk enough, as a matter of fact, to connect his level of intoxication to the mental state required to commit the crime. Id. at 254-55. Significantly, Gabryschak does not discuss or even mention what standard of review the court was applying. That is an important omission. The question before the court in Gabryschak and the question before us is whether the defendant has met his burden of production, State v. Huff, 64 Wn. App. 641, 655, 826 P.2d 698 (1992), that is, whether there was sufficient evidence presented to this jury to require the instruction. Gallegos, 65 Wn. App. at 237-38. Anything more moves us into deciding just how persuasive this evidence is. See Gabryschak, 83 Wn. App. at 254-55. And that is the jury’s function. Huff, 64 Wn. App. at 655.
¶44 This court sits in Spokane and reads a cold record. We, or at least I, do not have any idea what a jury in Adams County would have found — beyond a reasonable doubt no less — if it had been properly instructed. There is certainly plenty of evidence that Mr. Walters knew what he was doing and could form the necessary intent despite his level of intoxication. But there is also ample evidence that he was drunk and could not have formed the intent necessary to commit these crimes, even if he wanted to form that intent.
¶45 The majority is willing to divine what a properly instructed jury would have decided on the assault and resisting arrest charges. I am not. There is evidence that Mr. Walters was drunk, and I am simply not comfortable *90parsing out when this obvious intoxication affected his ability to form the necessary mens rea, when it did not, and ultimately whether the mental elements of these crimes were satisfied. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.