Court Opinion

ID: 9371668
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-16 17:09:35.744844+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:29.403673
License: Public Domain

J-A29036-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    BRANDON JAMES WIBLE                        :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 754 WDA 2021

         Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 1, 2021,
             in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County,
            Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0005385-2020.

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., OLSON, J., and KUNSELMAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.:                       FILED: FEBRUARY 16, 2023

       Brandon James Wible appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed

following his convictions of persons not to possess firearms and other

offenses.    We reverse the denial of his motion to suppress, vacate his

judgment of sentence, and remand.

       After an incident on July 16, 2020, Monroeville Detective Steven Maritz1

filed a criminal complaint charging Wible with persons not to possess firearms,

receiving stolen property, carrying a firearm without a license, possession of

heroin with intent to deliver, possession of heroin and Gabapentin, and

possession of drug paraphernalia.2 All counts were held for court.
____________________________________________

1The detective’s name was spelled Maritz in the criminal complaint and Moritz
at the suppression hearing. We use the former spelling throughout.
218 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6105(a)(1), 3925(a), and 6106(a)(1), and 35 P.S. § 780-
113(a)(30), (a)(16), and (a)(32), respectively.
J-A29036-22

       On December 30, 2020, Wible filed a motion to suppress.                The

suppression court heard the matter on January 7, 2021. Detective Maritz was

the only witness at the suppression hearing.

       In its opinion on appeal,3 the suppression court set out the facts adduced

at the suppression hearing:

       Detective Steven Maritz of the Monroeville Police Department
       testified that while on patrol on July 16, 2020 he observed a
       vehicle in the parking lot of the Sheetz Gas Station. The vehicle
       stayed in the parking lot for nearly 30 minutes. The officer
       observed the defendant exit the vehicle, enter the gas station and
       return to the vehicle as a passenger. He appeared to be stumbling
       as he walked, as though under the influence of a controlled
       substance or alcohol.       The vehicle left the Sheetz lot and
       proceeded onto Rt. 22 towards Westmoreland County and the
       officer followed.

             The front and right rear tires were in the right turn lane at
       the intersection of Elliott Road and Rt. 22, while the rest of the
       vehicle was in the left turn lane.

              The vehicle was in both the right and left turn lane. The
       vehicle turned left onto Rt. 22 and crossed the solid white fog line
       three times. [Detective Maritz] initiated lights and sirens for the
       foregoing traffic violations he observed[, and the driver pulled
       over]. [Detective Maritz] opined that the traffic violations [were]
       consistent with somebody driving under the influence. The court
       found probable cause to stop [the] vehicle for [Vehicle Code]
       violations.

____________________________________________

3 By rule, a suppression court must enter findings of fact and conclusions of
law on the record at the conclusion of a suppression hearing. Pa.R.Crim.P.
581(I); see Commonwealth v. Sharaif, 205 A.3d 1286, 1289 (Pa. Super.
2019) (citing Commonwealth v. Millner, 888 A.2d 680, 689 (Pa. 2005)).
Although “a 1925(a) opinion is no substitute for the failure to make findings
of fact and conclusions of law on the record at the conclusion of a suppression
hearing,” review is possible based on facts in a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion.
Commonwealth v. Grundza, 819 A.2d 66, 68 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citing
Commonwealth v. Reppert, 814 A.2d 1196, 1200 (Pa. Super. 2002)).

                                           -2-
J-A29036-22

           [Officers Cuccaro and Hoffner arrived for back-up.] The
      [passenger,] who didn’t have any ID, was identified as [Wible].

            [Wible] gave his name and date of birth to [Officer Cuccaro].
      This information was provided to police dispatch, resulting in
      information that there were two arrest warrants outstanding for
      Defendant Brandon Wible from Allegheny County at the time.

            [Based on the arrest warrants, Wible] was taken into
      custody. The validity of the warrants has not been challenged and
      based on the foregoing the arrest of Mr. Wible was lawful.

            What appeared to be fresh injection marks were observed
      on [Wible’s] left hand. The marks were bleeding and not scabbed
      over.

            The officer had made several hundred narcotics arrests and
      had seen similar marks made by intravenous drug users, where
      heroin is used on top of the hand.

             When removing [Wible] from the car, two needles were
      observed in the map pocket of the passenger door. A black
      satchel-type bag was on the floor of the passenger side of the car
      at [Wible’s] feet. A search of the bag revealed a SCCY 9 MM CP-
      2 firearm and six bricks of suspected heroin or fentanyl.

Suppression Court Opinion, 3/17/22, at 3–5 (record citations omitted).

      On February 17, 2021, the suppression court announced its ruling

denying suppression. Initially, the court concluded that the Commonwealth

had not proven that there were exigent circumstances to justify the

warrantless search of the satchel where Wible’s feet had been. However, the

suppression court determined that it was a valid search incident to arrest. The

court explained:

      [Defense counsel], in regard to Mr. Wible, your client, again, with
      regard to my decision to deny your suppression motion, you have
      never challenged the legality of the arrest. There were warrants
      outstanding for him. Once he was arrested, then the search of
      that bag within the immediate area was a lawful search incident
      to an arrest. It really had nothing to do with the car or the --

                                     -3-
J-A29036-22

       actually there was a basis to stop the car for [Vehicle] Code
       violations. But the search was conducted I find incident to a lawful
       arrest. You’ve never challenged the lawfulness of the arrest on
       the arrest warrants that were outstanding when the car was
       stopped.

N.T., 2/17/2021, at 9–10.

       Wible moved for reconsideration on March 3, 2021, challenging the

application of the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine. The suppression court

denied Wible’s motion for reconsideration on March 9, 2021.

       On March 8, 2021, the case proceeded to a stipulated non-jury trial.

The trial court acquitted Wible of receiving stolen property and found him

guilty of the remaining offenses. On June 1, 2021, the court sentenced Wible

to an aggregate term of 11½ to 23 months of imprisonment followed by 2

years of probation. On June 11, 2021, Wible filed a post-sentence motion

requesting additional credit for time served; the trial court granted Wible’s

motion with an amended sentence order on July 9, 2021.

       Wible filed a notice of appeal on July 1, 2021, while his post-sentence

motion was pending.4 Wible filed a concise statement of errors on December

15, 2021. The trial court entered its opinion on March 17, 2022.

       Wible raises the following issue for our review:

       Whether the trial court erred in denying Mr. Wible’s motion to
       suppress, where the police conducted a warrantless search of his
       satchel bag found inside the vehicle in which he was a passenger,
       but the search-incident-to-arrest exception did not apply under
       the facts and circumstances at hand?
____________________________________________

4 We decline to quash the premature appeal and instead treat it as filed when
the trial court granted Wible’s post-sentence motion. Commonwealth v.
Little, 879 A.2d 293, 296 n.6 (Pa. Super. 2005); Pa.R.A.P. 905(a)(5).

                                           -4-
J-A29036-22

Wible’s Brief at 6.

      Wible does not contest the validity of the traffic stop or his arrest based

on outstanding warrants. Rather, he argues that the suppression court erred

because the search of his satchel exceeded the constitutionally permissible

scope of a search incident to arrest. Wible’s Brief at 16–30. He directs us to

Commonwealth v. Lutz, 270 A.3d 571, 579–80 (Pa. Super. 2022), where

this Court recently reversed the denial of suppression of the fruits of a search

of a handcuffed arrestee’s vehicle.

      The Commonwealth gives three ways to affirm the denial of suppression.

Commonwealth’s Brief at 13–23. First, it argues that the search was valid as

incident to arrest because Wible could reach the satchel and the satchel could

have contained evidence of drug use. Second, it submits that the search was

part of a protective sweep before letting the driver back in her car. Third, it

posits that the evidence would have been inevitably discovered in an inventory

search.

      On a challenge to the denial of a motion to suppress, this Court’s review:

      is limited to determining whether the factual findings are
      supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn
      from those facts are correct. We are bound by the suppression
      court’s factual findings so long as they are supported by the
      record; our standard of review on questions of law is de novo.
      Where, as here, the defendant is appealing the ruling of the
      suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the
      Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as
      remains uncontradicted. Our scope of review of suppression
      rulings includes only the suppression hearing record and excludes
      evidence elicited at trial.

                                      -5-
J-A29036-22

Commonwealth v. McMahon, 280 A.3d 1069, 1071 (Pa. Super. 2022)

(quoting Commonwealth v. Yandamuri, 159 A.3d 503, 516 (Pa. 2017)).

      “The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
      Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution protect
      individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures, thereby
      ensuring the right of each individual to be let alone.”
      Commonwealth v. By, 812 A.2d 1250, 1254 (Pa. Super. 2002)
      (citations and quotation marks omitted). “A warrantless search
      or seizure is presumptively unreasonable under the Fourth
      Amendment and Article I, § 8, subject to a few specifically
      established, well-delineated exceptions.” Commonwealth v.
      McCree, [924 A.2d 621, 627 (Pa. 2007)] (citation omitted).
      These exceptions include “the consent exception, the plain view
      exception, the inventory search exception, the exigent
      circumstances exception, the automobile exception, ... the stop
      and frisk exception, and the search incident to arrest exception.”
      Commonwealth v. Simonson, 148 A.3d 792, 797 (Pa. Super.
      2016) (citation omitted).

Commonwealth v. Smith, 285 A.3d 328, 332 (Pa. Super. 2022).

      We provide a brief history of the automobile exception in Pennsylvania.

Previously, a warrantless vehicle search required both probable cause (that

the vehicle contains evidence of criminal activity) and exigent circumstances

(that prevent the police from securing a warrant). E.g., Commonwealth v.

White, 669 A.2d 896, 900 (Pa. 1995) (listing as a third requirement the

inherent mobility of a vehicle—that its occupants will drive off with its contents

never found again). In 2014, a plurality of the Supreme Court fully adopted

the federal automobile exception, requiring only probable cause, not exigent

circumstances.    Commonwealth v. Gary, 91 A.3d 102, 104 (Pa. 2014)

(OAJC) (requiring no more exigency than a vehicle’s inherent mobility). On

December 22, 2020, the court returned to the pre-Gary rule requiring both

                                      -6-
J-A29036-22

probable cause and exigent circumstances, a case-specific determination.

Commonwealth v. Alexander, 243 A.3d 177, 207–08 (Pa. 2020).

      Here, Wible moved to suppress eight days after the Alexander decision

and has consistently argued for its application to his case. He thus receives

the benefit of Alexander’s exigent circumstances requirement, even though

the search happened while Gary controlled. Commonwealth v. Heidelberg,

267 A.3d 492, 502–03 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citing Commonwealth v. Grooms,

247 A.3d 31, 37 nn.8–9 (Pa. Super. 2021)) (limiting retroactive application of

Alexander unless the defendant preserved the issue before the suppression

court).   Here, under Alexander, because the suppression court found no

exigent circumstances, the search was illegal unless another exception to the

warrant requirement applies.

      In denying suppression, the suppression court concluded that the police

did not need a warrant because the search of the satchel was incident to

Wible’s arrest.

             “The search incident to arrest exception allows arresting
      officers, in order to prevent the arrestee from obtaining a
      weapon or destroying evidence, to search both the person
      arrested and the area within his immediate control.”
      Commonwealth v. Simonson, 148 A.3d 792, 799 (Pa. Super.
      2016) (citation omitted; emphasis added). Furthermore, this
      “exception to warrantless searches permits police to search an
      arrestee’s person as a matter of course, without a case-by-case
      adjudication of whether such search is likely to protect officer
      safety or evidence.” Commonwealth v. Yorgey, 188 A.3d 1190,
      1198 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en banc) (emphasis added; citation
      omitted). “Stated another way, in all cases of lawful arrests,
      police may fully search the person incident to the arrest.”

                                    -7-
J-A29036-22

       Commonwealth v. Ingram, 814 A.2d 264, 272 (Pa. Super.
       2002) (emphasis added; citation omitted).

Lutz, 270 A.3d at 579–80. The Supreme Court explained that “an automobile

search incident to a recent occupant’s arrest is constitutional (1) if the arrestee

is within reaching distance of the vehicle during the search, or (2) if the police

have reason to believe that the vehicle contains ‘evidence relevant to the

crime of arrest.’” Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 234–35 (2011)

(citing Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343 (2009)); accord White, supra;

Commonwealth v. Timko, 417 A.2d 620, 622–23 (Pa. 1980).5

       Here, the suppression court’s factual findings do not support that Wible

was within reaching distance of the satchel when the police searched it. Even

if the arrest and search happened at the same time,6 there is no evidence that

Wible could have grabbed the satchel when he was arrested outside of the

car.   Further, the suppression court found that Wible was arrested for

outstanding warrants, not for suspected drug use.        Thus, the police would

have had no reason to believe that the car contained evidence relevant to “the

crime of arrest” to permit a warrantless search. Davis, supra. Therefore,

the suppression court erred in concluding that the warrantless search of the

satchel was valid under the search-incident-to-arrest exception.

____________________________________________

5 Wible has not argued how Pennsylvania law on the scope of a search incident
to arrest would provide greater protections than federal law in this case. See
Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 895 (Pa. 1991).
6 Detective Maritz testified that he searched the satchel “[o]nce [Wible] was
removed from the vehicle.” N.T., 1/7/21, at 15.

                                           -8-
J-A29036-22

       Since we may affirm on any ground, we next examine the other reasons

the Commonwealth argues the search was still valid. First, the Commonwealth

contends that the search of the satchel on the floor of the car was justifiable

as a protective sweep before the police allowed the driver back to the car.

The suppression court did not enter a factual finding whether the police

intended to let the driver return to the car.7 Because the suppression court

did not find the requisite facts to support this theory, we decline to affirm the

denial of suppression on this basis.

       Second, the Commonwealth argues that the evidence was admissible

under the inevitable discovery doctrine.         However, the record is clear that

Wible left the satchel in the car when he was arrested. Thus, Wible was not

bringing the satchel with him to the station. Therefore, the police would not

have searched it when taking inventory of his personal effects. As such, there

would have been no inevitable discovery.

       In sum, the police did not have a valid reason to conduct a warrantless

search of the satchel. The suppression court found no exigent circumstances.

The court did not find that the satchel was within Wible’s reach at the time of

the search, nor that Wible was arrested for an offense that would have

suggested the satchel contained relevant evidence of the crime, either of

which would have permitted the police to search the satchel incident to Wible’s

____________________________________________

7 Detective Maritz testified that the driver was free to leave “prior to the
search.” N.T., 1/7/21, at 18. Wible stated in his brief to the suppression court
that she was detained and not free to leave. Brief, 1/21/21, at 5–6.

                                           -9-
J-A29036-22

arrest. Further, the suppression court did not find that the driver was free to

go, which could have supported the search of the satchel as part of a

protective sweep. And finally, the police would not have searched the satchel

from the car when Wible arrived for booking, because Wible left it in the car.

For the police to search the satchel, they needed a warrant or a valid reason

to open it without a warrant. Because they had neither, the suppression court

erred in denying Wible’s motion to suppress. Accordingly, we reverse.

      Judgment of sentence vacated. Order denying suppression reversed.

Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 2/16/2023

                                    - 10 -