Court Opinion

ID: 9645670
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 21:32:12.21729+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:13:42.308441
License: Public Domain

STOVER, Justice,
concurring.
I concur with the majority. Although this case does not involve unique issues of law, it *792does present the recurring problem arising from a jury verdict of liability coupled with an award of $0 damages.
The “zero damages rule” is one method which Texas courts have employed to review a jury’s finding of no damages. Hammond v. Estate of Rimmer, 643 S.W.2d 222, 223 (Tex.App.—Eastland 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.). When applied in the strictest sense, it simply means that in eases involving unliquidated damages, the jury must award something for every element of damage proved, or else the case will be remanded for a new trial. See R. Gonzalez and R. Gilbreath, Appellate Review of a Jury’s Finding of “Zero Damages,” 54 Tex.B.J. 418 (1991). The “zero damages rule” has been most often applied in situations where a jury finds a defendant negligent, awards the plaintiff some elements of damage, such as medical expenses and past pain and mental anguish, but fails to award any damages for future pain and mental anguish. In those instances, some courts have held that the jury must award something for every element of damages. Taylor v. Head, 414 S.W.2d 542 (Tex.Civ.App.—Texarkana 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Bolen v. Timmons, 407 S.W.2d 947 (Tex.Civ.App.—Amarillo 1966, no writ).
The strict application of the “zero damages rule” is, however, inconsistent with the standard of review articulated by the Texas Supreme Court in Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629 (Tex.1986). Appellate Review, 54 TexJB.J. at 420. Under the Pool standard, an appellate court must consider and weigh all of the evidence in the ease, both the evidence that tends to support the existence of a vital fact and evidence that tends to disprove its existence. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex.1986). Reversal is authorized only if the jury’s finding is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust. In re King’s Estate, 150 Tex. 662, 244 S.W.2d 660, 661 (1951).
In reviewing a case under a strict construction of the “zero damages rule,” however, an appellate court must reverse the judgment of the trial court in the event that the jury finds both liability and $0 damages. In contrast, a review of a case under the Pool standard does not preclude affirmance of a judgment under that same scenario. Unlike the “zero damages rule,” the Pool standard is not inflexible; it allows the jury to weigh the evidence in arriving at a decision about liability and damages.
Recent appellate court decisions in cases dealing with $0 damages have applied the Pool standard with differing results. Disparate results have occurred, not because of differing interpretations of the Pool standard, but because of different types of evidence presented to the jury. In some cases, there is objective, uncontroverted evidence of injury. In others, the only evidence presented to the jury regarding the injury is subjective. In still other cases, the jury is asked to consider both objective and subjective evidence regarding the injury. Regardless of the type of evidence presented, however, each case must be reviewed on an individual basis. Rather than an analysis based on the “zero damages rule”, each case should be reviewed under the Pool standard in order to ascertain whether the jury finding is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust.
In one group of cases, the jury was presented with both objective and subjective evidence of injury. In Srite v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 870 S.W.2d 556, 559 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993), rev’d on other grounds, 897 S.W.2d 765 (Tex.1995), the court of appeals upheld the jury’s $0 damages finding, because, although objective evidence of the injury was present, the plaintiffs’ testimony, for the most part, concerned subjective indicia of their injuries. 870 S.W.2d at 563. With the preponderance of the evidence of injury being subjective, the jury could conclude that an award of $0 damages was warranted. Moreover, the testimony from plaintiffs’ experts regarding the cause and extent of impairment was contradicted in many respects by the testimony of defendants’ experts. The appellate court concluded that the jury’s finding of $0 for past damages was not so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust.
The court of appeals in Srite departed from the standard articulated by Justice Keith in his concurring opinion in Dupree v. *793Blackmon, 481 S.W.2d 216, 220-221 (Tex.Civ. App.—Beaumont 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.). There Justice Keith applied a variation of the “zero damages rule” by finding that the existence of objective evidence of injury necessitates a jury finding of damages. The concept of the preponderance of subjective evidence over objective evidence or the existence of evidence controverting or conflicting with objective evidence of injury was not considered or at issue in that case. Those principles have been advanced in later cases such as Srite.
As in Srite, the jury in Pilkington v. Kornell, 822 S.W.2d 223 (Tex.App.— Dallas 1991, writ denied), was presented with conflicting evidence regarding damages. Although the jury did award Pilkington some past and fixture medical expenses, it did not award any damages for past and future pain, suffering and mental anguish, lost earning capacity, or physical impairment. The appellate court found the evidence regarding those elements of damage to be conflicting. Faced with conflicting evidence, the jury may believe one witness and disbelieve others. McGalliard v. Kuhlmann, 722 S.W.2d 694, 697 (Tex.1986). The jury is the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and the weight to be given their testimony. Leyva v. Pacheco, 163 Tex. 638, 358 S.W.2d 547, 549 (1962). Finding that the jury in Pilkington was not convinced by a preponderance of the evidence to award compensation for the pain and suffering elements of damage, the Dallas court concluded that the jury finding was not so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust. 822 S.W.2d at 224.
Courts have reached a different conclusion, however, where there is uncontroverted, objective evidence of injury. In that instance, a jury award of $0 damages is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust. Monroe v. Grider, 884 S.W.2d 811 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1994, writ denied); Wagner v. Taylor, 867 S.W.2d 404 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 1993, no writ) (evidence held to be conflicting); Hammett v. Zimmerman, 804 S.W.2d 663, 665 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1991, no writ).
In contrast to the holdings described above, there are those instances, particularly in soft tissue injury cases, where the evidence of plaintiffs injury is purely subjective. Given that circumstance, a jury may deny an award of damages. Monroe v. Grider, 884 S.W.2d at 820; Srite, 870 S.W.2d at 559; Hyler v. Boytor, 823 S.W.2d 425, 427-428 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ). Under Pool, such a finding would not be so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust.
The instant case falls within the category of objective, uncontroverted evidence of injury. As the majority notes, Ms. Davis’ injury was established by medical records, medical bills, and her own testimony. This objective evidence was uncontroverted. In applying the Pool standard set out above, it is apparent that the jury finding of $0 damages is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust.
One may pose the question as to how the jury could make a finding which is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence — particularly in those cases where there is uncontroverted evidence of injury. The problem lies, at least in part, with the questions submitted to the juiy.
In the instant case, it would come as no surprise if the jury members were confused as to what Question No. 3 in the charge actually meant. As submitted by the court to the jury, Questions Nos. 1 and 3 conform to 1 State BAR of Texas, Texas Patteen Jury Charges PJC 4.01B, 7.02B (1987); those questions are set out below without the accompanying instructions: QUESTION 1
Did the negligence, if any, of the persons named below proximately cause the occurrence in question?
Answer “Yes” or “No” for each of the following:
(a) Stephen Darrel McMillian _
(b) Paula Davis -
QUESTION 3
What sum of money, if paid now in cash, would fairly and reasonably compensate Paula Davis for her injuries, if any, that resulted from the occurrence in question?
Consider the elements of damages listed below and none other. Consider each element separately. Do not include damages for one element in any other element. Do not include interest on any amount of damages you find.
*794(a) Physical pain and mental anguish.
(b) Medical care.
Do not reduce the amounts, if any, in your answers because of the negligence, if any, of Paula Davis.
Answer in dollars and cents for damages, if any, that were sustained in the past.
Answer: $_
(emphasis added)
As worded, Question No. 3 appears to give the juiy the option of finding no damages even in a case where the injury is uncontro-verted and where the jury has already found liability on the part of Davison in Question No. 1. In answering Question No. 3, the jury may have concluded that the injury was not serious and that the plaintiff suffered no permanent disability. Whatever the reason for its answer of $0 damages to Question No. 3, the jury was unaware of the rule that it must award something in damages if there is uneontroverted, objective evidence of injury. Having the option of $0 damages available to it, by virtue of the “if any” phrasing in Question No. 3, the jury took that option— even when it was incorrect to do so. Thus arises the anomalous situation where the jury is given an option in Question No. 3 to award nothing in damages, but where, in reality, no such option exists.
In those situations where the issue of injuly is proven by objective evidence and is uncontroverted, one solution to the problem would be to substitute the term “injury” for the term “occurrence” used in Question No. 1 and to omit the “if any” phrases in Question No. 3. In that instance, a finding of “yes” as to Question No. 1 would obviate the necessity of the use of the qualifying phrase “if any” in Question No. 3. In answering Question No. 3, the jury would not then assume it had the option of awarding $0 damages.
The problem associated with the wording of jury questions and the answer of $0 damages has been recently discussed in Upjohn Co. v. Freeman, 885 S.W.2d 538 (TexApp.— Dallas 1994, writ denied). There, the Dallas court concluded that when the term “occurrence,” rather than “injury,” is used in the liability question (Question No. 1), then the injury issue is not covered in Question No. 1. Instead, the injury issue is subsumed under the damages question in Question No. 3. In other words, Question No. 3 contains a dual submission of both injury and damages. Consequently, according to the Dallas court, when the juiy in Upjohn found $0 damages in answer to Question No. 3, it was also finding at the same time that there was no injury.
In contrast, the dissent in Upjohn concludes that the terms “injury” and “occurrence” when used in Question No. 1 are interchangeable; the dissent finds no difference (except in special cases) between occurrence-causing liability and injury-causing liability. Thus, according to the dissent in Upjohn, by finding negligence in Question No. 1, the jury is also finding injury.
Regardless of where one finds the injury issue to be located, whether impliedly found in Question No. 1 or subsumed under Question No. 3, the problem of submitting unclear questions to the jury remains. To alleviate the problem associated with jury findings of $0 damages, noted both in Upjohn and in this case, I would suggest the solution described above in those cases where the evidence of injury is uncontroverted.
Given the existence of uncontroverted, objective evidence of Ms. Davis’ injury in the instant case, and the inherent confusion of the wording in jury Question No. 3,1 concur with the majority that the judgment must be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.