Court Opinion

ID: 9680065
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:18:38.789959+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:25.167179
License: Public Domain

SIMEONE, Presiding Judge
(concurring).
I concur in the opinion of Kelly, J., and add a few comments.
This case exemplifies the old principle that general principles do not resolve concrete cases. The cases relied upon by the respondent are factually distinguishable and are not dispositive of the circumstances in this record. Here there was little more than a seven-month delay between the time of the “non est” return and effective service upon the respondent — June 18, 1973, through February 11, 1974.
*888The record indicates that on May 14, 1973, plaintiffs filed their petition. The petition listed the defendant, Margaret Schmittgens, as residing at “8810 Manda, Crestwood, Missouri.” A summons was issued against the defendant by the clerk of the circuit court who delivered the summons to the Sheriff of St. Louis County for service on the defendant. The summons was returned “non est” on June 18, 1973, indicating that she lives in St. Charles and is married but indicating her married name was unknown. The fifth anniversary of plaintiffs’ cause of action arrived four days later, on June 22, 1973. On February 1, 1974, an alias summons was requested by plaintiffs’ counsel to issue against Margaret M. Schmittgens, “now named Margaret M. Kuehler, whose present address is at 530 Morgan, St. Charles County, Missouri 63301.” The alias summons was issued on February 6,1974, delivered to the Sheriff of St. Charles County for service on the defendant, served on February 11, 1974, and returned on February 27,1974. The return indicated that “Margaret M. Schmittgens, n/k/a Margaret M. Kuehler,” had been personally served on February 11,1974, at 2940 Hummingbird, St. Charles, Missouri. Under these circumstances, it can reasonably be inferred that some effort was made by counsel for appellant prior to February, 1974 to determine the new facts and obtain service on February 11, 1974.
In my opinion, the seven-month delay here does not measure up to the unexcused delays in the Mayne, Wooliver, Continental and Hennis cases.1 Delay is only one factor to be considered in determining due diligence. Seven months is not an inordinate amount of time under the unique circumstances in this record and does not necessarily show a lack of due diligence. We only rule on this case.

. Cf. Mayne v. Jacob Michel Real Estate Co., 237 Mo.App. 952, 180 S.W.2d 809 (1944) — period of ten years passed after a “non est” return on the original summons before service was attempted and effectuated on an alias summons; Wooliver v. Schopp, 509 S.W.2d 216 (Mo.App.1974)—two year delay in obtaining service on defendant in a medical malpractice suit which carries a two-year limitation period; Continental Electric Company v. Ebco, Incorporated, 375 S.W.2d 134 (Mo.1964), and Hennis v. Tucker, 447 S.W.2d 580 (Mo.App.1969)—delays of eight and eleven months respectively found to amount to a lack of due diligence in these mechanic’s lien cases which carry a six-month limitation period.