Court Opinion

ID: 9883342
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 01:40:35.091019+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:22.667526
License: Public Domain

RANDALL, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the opinion of the majority and would affirm the decision of the trial court to bar reprosecution on the grounds of double jeopardy.
The majority opinion quotes the on-record conversation between the trial court, prosecutor and defense counsel. In chambers after the prosecutor moved for a mistrial based on his own comments during the opening argument, the trial court asked defense counsel if she had the right to grant a mistrial, and defense counsel answered, “Sure you do.” Shortly thereafter, the prosecutor made a motion on the record for a mistrial. The trial court offered defense counsel the opportunity to respond. Defense counsel stated that he did not know what he could say, but he felt the court had the power to grant the mistrial.
The majority opinion settles on a subjective interpretation of that conversation to the effect that the defense attorney’s answers to the trial court’s questions were lacking in candor. In examining the verbatim conversation, I find no overt lack of candor, much less overt deceit.
When defense counsel later made a formal motion to dismiss, the trial court found that his answers did not rise to the level of consent to a mistrial. The trial court, in its memorandum sustaining the motion to dismiss, found, and I agree, that:
It is true that defense counsel could have noted an objection to the motion in an unambiguous fashion; however, since the question of consent involves essentially the waiver of a constitutional protection, this court is unwilling to regard mere acquiesence as sufficient for consent.
The trial court alone was privy to that conversation in chambers and is undeniably in the best position to interpret what she asked defense counsel and what he responded. I find no basis to declare the court’s interpretation of the facts clearly erroneous as a matter of law, nor do I find the trial court misinterpreting the law on the question of second trials in criminal prosecution when there has been a finding that defendant did not consent to the first mistrial.
The trial court correctly found that if the mistrial was declared without defendant’s consent, then the case could be retried only if the mistrial was dictated by “manifest necessity or the ends of public justice.” State v. Gwara, 311 Minn. 106, 108, 247 N.W.2d 417 (1976); United States v. Perez, 9 Whet 579, 6 L.Ed. 165 (1824).
The trial court concluded that manifest necessity was not present. The court balanced the defendant’s right to avoid multiple trials and the state’s interest in having at least one full and fair opportunity to present its case. See Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 507, 98 S.Ct. 824, 831, 54 L.Ed.2d 717 (1978).
The majority opinion holds that defense counsel impliedly consented to the mistrial and thus the trial court erred. They base this interpretation on the “totality of the *307circumstances.” See United States v. Goldstein, 479 F.2d 1061, 1067 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 873, 94 S.Ct. 151, 38 L.Ed.2d 113 (1973). With the majority opinion conceding that consent was not express and had to be determined from the circumstances, it becomes a finding of fact. The trial court’s decision is to be reviewed in light of Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure 52.01:
Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.
As expressed above, I find no such clear error.
The court, finding that manifest necessity did not dictate a second trial, noted:
It would be unfair to permit a retrial in this case. The mistrial resulted from a prosecutorial error that created a bias in favor of defendant. Defendant’s constitutional protections should not be subro-gated to permit the prosecution to correct its own error through a new trial.
I find this analysis persuasive. The prosecutor made, at least in his own mind, a poor opening argument and wanted the relief of a second trial to start over. It can be said as a general proposition that the prosecution does not have the right to make opening statement after opening statement until it gets a good one that it feels it can live with.
I do not find State v. McDonald, a decision relied upon by the majority, controlling. In that case prospective jurors, shortly before trial, had been exposed to a plea of guilty by the defendant pursuant to a plea bargain which the court rejected. Those facts involve neither prosecutorial nor defense misconduct. The court was justified in declaring a mistrial and permitting a second trial. The court there had no way of knowing exactly what the jurors had overheard, nor what impression it made on them, nor whether what they might have overheard would be neutral, favor the prosecution or the defense.
To me, that is an essential difference between McDonald and the case we are deciding. Here it is undisputed that the prosecutor made what he felt was an error in his opening argument and wanted a second trial out of concern that he had inadvertently hampered his chances for a conviction.
I cannot disagree with the trial court finding that a careful balancing of the » rights of the State and those of the defendant resulted in a bar to the second trial on the grounds that jeopardy had attached in the first, and that none of the stated exceptions to the prohibitions against second trial once jeopardy attaches were present.
I agree that the question is close. Had the trial court, after listening to defendant’s motion to dismiss the charges on the basis of double jeopardy, denied it and the defendant appealed, I cannot predict my decision on those hypothetical facts. Here, the trial court, uniquely on top of the facts, decided that the defendant should not have to stand trial a second time; I feel the correct decision is to affirm the trial court.
The majority opinion concludes that the public’s interest in a fair trial and a just judgment and the victim’s interest in seeing the complaint prosecuted override, in the balancing test, the rights of the defendant. I find otherwise. Double jeopardy is a constitutional issue of the first magnitude. U.S. Const.Amend. V., Minn. Const. Art. I, Sec. 7.
Double jeopardy was not written into the United States and Minnesota Constitutions for the purpose of protecting victims. Arguably, if there is no second trial, there is now not fairness to the victim. However, when the defense of double jeopardy is successfully raised, there is no second trial for the victim, not because the victim is not hurt nor because the victim has no rights, but because under the Constitution the greater good prevails, i.e. the government is allowed just one chance to deprive a citizen of life, liberty and property.
I would affirm the decision of the trial court.