Court Opinion

ID: 9393798
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-11 15:00:28.217366+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:55.881774
License: Public Domain

22-6028
    Pineda v. Garland
                                                                                   BIA
                                                                           Thompson, IJ
                                                                           A094 766 501

                         UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                             FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                              SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL
APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY
CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL.

           At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
    Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley
    Square, in the City of New York, on the 11th day of May, two thousand twenty-
    three.

    PRESENT:
               JOSEPH F. BIANCO,
               WILLIAM J. NARDINI,
               SARAH A. L. MERRIAM,
                     Circuit Judges.
    _____________________________________

    REYES T. PINEDA,
               Petitioner,

                    v.                                           22-6028
                                                                 NAC
    MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
    STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
               Respondent.
    _____________________________________

    FOR PETITIONER:                   Perham Makabi, Esq., Kew Gardens, NY.
FOR RESPONDENT:                       Brian Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant
                                      Attorney General; John S. Hogan, Assistant
                                      Director; Christina R. Zeidan, Trial Attorney,
                                      Office of Immigration Litigation, United
                                      States Department of Justice, Washington,
                                      D.C.

         UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of

Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED.

         Petitioner Reyes T. Pineda, a native and citizen of El Salvador, seeks review

of a December 14, 2021, decision of the BIA affirming a February 6, 2019, decision

of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying asylum, withholding of removal, and relief

under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Reyes T. Pineda, No. A094

766 501 (B.I.A. Dec. 14, 2021), aff’g No. A094 766 501 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Feb. 6,

2019).     We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and

procedural history.

         Under the circumstances, we have reviewed the IJ’s decision as

supplemented and modified by the BIA. See Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,

426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 2005); Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir.

2005). We review the agency’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings

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for substantial evidence. See Y.C. v. Holder, 741 F.3d 324, 332 (2d Cir. 2013).

“[T]he administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable

adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary[.]”            8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(b)(4)(B). An asylum applicant has the burden to establish past persecution

or a well-founded fear of future persecution. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i); 8

C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1). Because Pineda does not challenge the agency’s finding

that he failed to establish past persecution, the only issue before us is whether he

met his burden to establish a well-founded fear of future persecution or a

likelihood of torture. See Norton v. Sam’s Club, 145 F.3d 114, 117 (2d Cir. 1998)

(“Issues not sufficiently argued in the briefs are considered waived and normally

will not be addressed on appeal.”).

      Pineda testified that in 1991 he refused an order from a guerilla commander

of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (“FMLN”) to join his unit and

instead joined the Salvadoran army. The FMLN commander and his associates

threatened Pineda four times in the 1990s until he fled El Salvador for the United

States in 1999, and he fears harm from the commander or the FMLN if he returns

to El Salvador. He argues that the agency did not sufficiently address either his

fear of future harm or country conditions evidence showing that the FMLN

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currently has power and influence in El Salvador and is engaged in an ongoing

conflict with a rival political party.

      Pineda had the burden to establish that his fear of future persecution was

“objectively reasonable.” Hernandez-Chacon v. Barr, 948 F.3d 94, 101 (2d Cir. 2020).

A “fear may be well-founded even if there is only a slight, though discernible,

chance of persecution.” Diallo v. INS, 232 F.3d 279, 284 (2d Cir. 2000); see also

Hernandez-Chacon, 948 F.3d at 101. But a fear is not objectively reasonable if it

lacks “solid support” in the record and is merely “speculative at best.” Jian Xing

Huang v. INS, 421 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir. 2005). Whether a fear is objectively

reasonable “is largely dependent upon the context and believability [an applicant]

can establish for his claims through presentation of reliable, specific, objective

supporting evidence.” Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 178 (2d Cir. 2004)

(quotation marks and citation omitted). An applicant can meet this burden by

showing that he would be “singled out individually” for persecution or by

establishing a “pattern or practice … of persecution of a group of persons similarly

situated to the applicant[.]” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(iii); see also Mufied v. Mukasey,

508 F.3d 88, 91 (2d Cir. 2007).

                                           4
      The record establishes that the FMLN transitioned from a guerilla force to a

political party after the 1992 civil war and won the presidency in 2009. However,

these facts do not show that Pineda would be “singled out” for persecution or that

the FMLN has a “pattern or practice” of persecuting people who refused to join

them decades earlier or who were military members during the civil war. 8 C.F.R.

§ 1208.13(b)(2)(iii). Nor did Pineda present other facts that support his claim. As

the agency found, Pineda was last threatened in the 1990s, more than 20 years

earlier, and there was no subsequent contact between the FMLN and Pineda or

between the FMLN and Pineda’s family in El Salvador.             Moreover, Pineda

remained in El Salvador until 1999, and neither the commander nor his associates

acted on the threats or attempted to harm Pineda. Pineda did not provide any

evidence that the commander was capable of harming him; there was no evidence

that the commander is still in El Salvador, what his status there might be, or indeed

even whether he is still alive. This record does not compel a conclusion that

Pineda’s fear is more than speculative.      See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Jian Xing

Huang, 421 F.3d at 129.

      Pineda’s failure to establish a well-founded fear of persecution is dispositive

because an applicant who fails to establish fear of harm required for asylum

                                         5
“necessarily” fails to meet the higher standard for withholding of removal and

CAT relief. Lecaj v. Holder, 616 F.3d 111, 119–20 (2d Cir. 2010).

      For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. All pending

motions and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED.

                                      FOR THE COURT:
                                      Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
                                      Clerk of Court

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