Court Opinion

ID: 9368677
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-06 17:07:16.328977+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:09.957700
License: Public Domain

J-S37030-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    JASON HARDING                              :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 883 EDA 2022

       Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 19, 2021
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                        No(s): CP-51-CR-0001709-2020

BEFORE: BOWES, J., LAZARUS, J., and OLSON, J.

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.:                            FILED FEBRUARY 6, 2023

        Jason Harding appeals from the judgment of sentence, entered in the

Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, after being convicted by a jury

of third-degree murder,1 carrying a firearm without a license,2 and carrying a

firearm in a public place in Philadelphia.3 After review, we affirm.

        On December 21, 2018, Harding and four other individuals4 were filming

a “rap video” near 2100 Middleton Street in Philadelphia County. N.T. Jury

____________________________________________

1   18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(c).

2   Id. at § 6106(a)(1).

3   Id. at § 6108.

4   Harding was accompanied by his younger brother and three friends.
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Trial, 9/1/21, at 70.5 At approximately 10:00 PM, the victim, Bernell Gibson,

inquired as to what the group was doing on the street and requested that they

leave. Id. When Harding first saw the victim approach the group, Harding

saw a light and thought the victim was holding a firearm. In response, Harding

removed his firearm from his pocket. Upon realizing the light Harding saw

was the victim’s phone, Harding placed his firearm under his shirt. Id. at 76-

77; see Exhibit D-1.

       Harding testified that the victim’s tone was “aggressive,” id. at 70, and

that the victim was “calling for somebody.” Id. at 71. Harding “[saw the

victim’s] right hand [go] down[] his body [and go] sideways [] and it looked

like he went to reach for something, that’s when I started shooting.” Id. at

71. Harding testified, “When I shot [the victim], I thought that he was going

to try to reach for a gun and start shooting at me. . . . The first couple of shots

[were] warning shots. And then the second time I started shooting, it was []

out of fear.” Id. at 72. Harding was “probably seven feet” away from the

victim during the incident, id. at 75, and fired a semi-automatic firearm nine

times.6 Detective Thorston Lucke testified that surveillance video shows “[the

victim] turn and kind of run away as he’s being shot.” Id., 8/31/21, at 42.

____________________________________________

5 The entire incident was captured on surveillance video and shown to the
jury. See Exhibit D-1.

6 Detective James Poulos testified that nine .40 caliber shell casings were
found at the scene and the casings were consistent with the firing of a semi-
automatic weapon. N.T. Jury Trial, 8/31/21, at 92, 110.

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The parties stipulated that the victim died due to a gunshot wound to his torso.

Id. at 117-18.

       On September 7, 2019,7 Harding was arrested and charged with murder,

a violation of the Uniform Firearms Act, and possessing an instrument of a

crime. A preliminary hearing was held on February 30, 2021, during which

Harding pled not guilty to all charges. Harding proceeded to a jury trial on

August 30, 2021, after which he was found guilty of third-degree murder,

carrying a firearm without a license, and carrying a firearm in a public place

in Philadelphia.        Sentencing was deferred pending a pre-sentencing

investigation (PSI) report and a mental health evaluation.

       On November 19, 2021, the court sentenced Harding to an aggregate

term of 22½ to 45 years’ incarceration followed by 5 years of probation.

Harding filed a timely post-sentence motion, which was denied. This timely

appeal followed.      Both Harding and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P.

1925. Harding raises the following claims for our review:

       1. Whether the adjudication of guilt for [third-degree murder] is
          based upon insufficient evidence because the Commonwealth
          did not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that [Harding]
          possessed the mens rea necessary for [third-degree murder]?

       2. Whether the adjudication of guilt for [t]hird[-d]egree [m]urder
          is against the weight of the evidence where the evidence
          adduced at trial established that the victim approached
          [Harding] with hostility[,] demanding that [Harding] and his
____________________________________________

7 Harding was identified and arrested by Philadelphia police when they were
called to the scene of a robbery on September 8, 2019. N.T. Jury Trial,
8/31/21, at 11-12, 15.

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         friends[,] who were innocently shooting a rap video[,] leave
         the victim’s neighborhood, where the victim reached for what
         [Harding] believed to be a weapon[,] and where [Harding]
         unreasonably believed that[,] under the circumstances[,] he
         was justified in using lethal force to protect himself or his
         friends

      3. Whether the [sentencing c]ourt abused its discretion at
         sentencing

             a. when it sentenced [Harding] to an aggregate sentence of
                22½ [to] 45 years[’ incarceration] plus 5 years [of]
                probation where the aforesaid sentence is excessive and
                contrary to the norms underlying the Sentencing Code
                and therefore constitutes a substantial question that the
                sentence is inappropriate?

             b. where [it] failed to give proper weight to the mitigating
                factors set forth in the [PSI], the [m]ental [h]ealth
                [e]valuation[,] and by witnesses who testified at the
                [s]entencing [h]earing[,] and where this constitutes a
                substantial question that the sentence is inappropriate
                because it is contrary to the norms underlying the
                Sentencing Code?

Appellant’s Brief, at 6-7 (reordered for ease of disposition).

      Harding first claims that the evidence is insufficient to establish beyond

a reasonable doubt that he acted with malice, the mens rea necessary for

third-degree murder. Appellant’s Brief, at 20-22. Specifically, he contests

the inferences drawn by the jury that he exhibited malice based on the number

of shots he fired at the victim and their direction of travel, and that the victim

was either retreating or had ceased to be hostile.       Id. at 20.   Harding is

entitled to no relief.

      This Court’s review of sufficiency claims is well-settled:

      When reviewing challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, [this
      Court] evaluates the record in the light more favorable to the
      Commonwealth as verdict winner, giving the prosecution the

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      benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence.
      Evidence will be deemed sufficient to support the verdict when it
      establishes each material element beyond a reasonable doubt.
      However, the Commonwealth need not establish guilt to a
      mathematical certainty, and it may sustain its burden by means
      of wholly circumstantial evidence. In addition, the court may not
      substitute its judgment for that of the fact finder, and where the
      record contains support for the convictions, they may not be
      disturbed. Lastly, the finder of fact is free to believe some, all, or
      none of the evidence presented.

Commonwealth v. Smith, 146 A.3d 257, 261-62 (Pa. Super. 2016)

(quotations and citations omitted).

      Third-degree murder is defined as murder that is not first-degree

murder (intentional killing) or second-degree murder (killing where defendant

was a principal or accomplice in the perpetration of a felony).                 See 18

Pa.C.S.A.      2502(a)-(c).         “To     establish   [third-degree    murder],      the

Commonwealth need only prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the

defendant killed an individual, with legal malice, i.e., [] wickedness of

disposition,    hardness      of   heart,    wantonness,    cruelty,    recklessness    of

consequences, or a mind lacking regard for social duty.” Commonwealth v.

Devine, 26 A.3d 1139, 1146 (Pa. Super. 2011) (internal quotations and

citations omitted). The jury need not inquire as to whether the defendant had

a specific intent to kill. Commonwealth v. Meadows, 787 A.2d 312, 317

(Pa. 2001).

      Evidence is sufficient to establish malice where a defendant shoots the

victim in a vital part of his body. In Commonwealth v. Crosley, 180 A.3d

761, (Pa. Super. 2018), this Court found malice where the defendant fired his

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weapon into the victim’s torso, a vital part of the body, three times from about

an inch away. Id. at 764, 767-78; cf. Commonwealth v. Sepulveda, 855

A.2d 783, 789 (Pa. 2004) (defendant was shot in the abdomen, a vital part of

his body); Commonwealth v. Drumheller, 808 A.2d 893, 908 (Pa. 2002)

(torso may be considered a vital part of the body).

        In Commonwealth v. Jones, 271 A.3d 452 (Pa. Super. 2021), this

Court found sufficient evidence of malice where the defendant intentionally

fired a gun, in rapid fire succession, directly at the victim and did not stop

shooting as the victim fell to the floor. Id. at 460. The Jones Court reasoned

that the evidence was clearly sufficient to show malice where the defendant

“intentionally fired a gun directly at [the victim].” Id.; see Commonwealth

v. Young, 431 A.2d 230, 232 (malice established where defendant

“intentionally pointed a loaded gun at the victim and shot him in the chest”);

Commonwealth v. Patterson, 180 A.3d 1217, 1223 (Pa. Super. 2018)

(malice established where defendant intentionally pointed a revolver at victim

and fired, striking victim in the head).

        Here, Harding intentionally fired a semiautomatic weapon nine times in

the direction of the victim, striking the victim in his torso, a vital part of the

body.    N.T. Jury Trial, 8/31/21, at 92, 110, 117-18; Patterson, supra;

Jones,     supra; Pappert,     supra.      Moreover,   evidence    supports   the

determination that the victim had either ceased to be hostile or was retreating.

In particular, Detective Lucke testified that the victim was holding a cell

phone, not a weapon, and was backing away from Harding and his friends as

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Harding continued shooting. Id. at 42, 44 (Detective Lucke testifying “[Y]ou

see the cell phone flickering in [the victim’s] hand there. Shooting happens.”).

      In light of the foregoing, and giving the Commonwealth the benefit of

all reasonable inferences, the evidence is sufficient to establish, beyond a

reasonable doubt, that Harding acted with malice. Smith, supra.

      Harding next claims that his adjudication is against the weight of the

evidence where he was justified in using lethal force on the victim, who was

aggressive and hostile to Harding and his friends. This Court reviews weight

of the evidence claims for an abuse of discretion:

      The weight of the evidence is exclusively for the finder of fact[,]
      who is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence and to
      determine the credibility of the witnesses. [This Court] cannot
      substitute its judgment for that of the finder of fact. Thus, we
      may only reverse the lower court’s verdict if it is so contrary to
      the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice. Moreover, where
      the trial court has ruled on the weight claim below, [this Court’s]
      role is not to consider the underlying question of whether the
      verdict is against the weight of the evidence. Rather, appellate
      review is limited to whether the trial court palpably abused its
      discretion in ruling on the weight claim.

Commonwealth v. Hunzer, 868 A.2d 498, 506-07 (Pa. Super. 2005).

Additionally, “[a] motion for a new trial on the grounds that the verdict is

contrary to the weight of the evidence concedes that there is sufficient

evidence to sustain the verdict. Thus, the trial court is under no obligation to

review the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict winner.”

Commonwealth v. Dupre, 866 A.2d 1089, 1101 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citations

omitted).

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      “A successful claim of self-defense negates the malice element of third-

degree murder.” Commonwealth v. Marks, 704 A.29 1095, 1099 (Pa.

Super. 1997) (citation omitted). There must, however, be some evidence to

justify a finding of self-defense. Commonwealth v. Torres, 766 A.2d 342,

345 (Pa. 2001).

      The use of force against a person is justified when the actor
      believes that such force is immediately necessary for the purpose
      of protecting himself against the use of unlawful force by the other
      person. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 505(a). When a defendant raises the
      issue of self-defense, the Commonwealth bears the burden to
      disprove such a defense beyond a reasonable doubt. While there
      is no burden on a defendant to prove the claim, before the defense
      is properly at issue at trial, there must be some evidence, from
      whatever source, to justify a finding of self-defense.

Id. at 345 (citations omitted).

      [I]t must be shown that [(1)] the actor was free from fault in
      provoking or continuing the difficulty which resulted in the use of
      deadly force; [(2)] the actor must have reasonably believed that
      he was in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury, and
      that there was a necessity to use such force in order to save
      himself or others therefrom; and [(3)] the actor did not violate
      any duty to retreat or to avoid the danger.

Commonwealth v. Harris, 665 A.2d 1172, 1174 (Pa. 1995) (citations

omitted).

      A corollary to the defense of justification or self-defense is []
      imperfect self-defense. As our Supreme Court has characterized
      this defense:

         A self-defense claim under this theory is imperfect in only
         one respect–an unreasonable rather than a reasonable
         belief that deadly force was required to save the actor’s life.
         All other principles of justification under 18 Pa.C.S. § 505
         must [still be met in order to establish] unreasonable belief
         voluntary manslaughter. [(Commonwealth v. Serge, 837

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         A.2d 1255, 1265-66 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citing]
         Commonwealth v. Tilley, [] 595 A.2d 575, 582 (Pa.
         1991)).

Commonwealth v. Austin, 906 A.2d 1213, 1222 (Pa. Super. 2006) (internal

quotations omitted).

      Instantly, Harding argues he was acting in self-defense or in defense of

another when he fired shots at the victim. Harding supports his defense with

the following facts: He did not initiate the violence; he, his brother and his

friends were innocently and lawfully filming a rap video; the victim was

aggressive and hostile when he approached the group; the victim began

calling down the block for assistance; and Harding observed the victim

reaching for something, which Harding believed to be a gun. Appellant’s Brief,

at 18-19. Harding’s weight of the evidence claim is without merit.

      Although Harding testified that the victim’s tone was “aggressive,” id.

at 70, and that the victim was “calling for somebody,” id. at 71, Harding’s

testimony is devoid of any claim that the victim threatened the group with a

deadly weapon. Additionally, Harding conceded that he did not see the victim

holding a weapon. Id. at 77; see Jones, 271 A.3d at 461 (no self-defense

where no weapon of any kind was found on victim and threats from victim did

not involve use of firearm or another weapon).

      Moreover, the jury is free to make credibility determinations and adopt

Detective Lucke’s testimony as opposed to Harding’s testimony. See Hunzer,

supra. While Harding testified it looked like the victim was reaching for a gun

and this prompted Harding to fire his weapon, see N.T. Jury Trial, 9/1/21, at

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72, Detective Lucke testified, “[Y]ou see the cell phone flickering in [the

victim’s hand there.   Shooting happens.”     Id. at 44.   Detective’s Lucke’s

testimony supports the determination that Harding and the group were not in

imminent danger because the victim was holding his phone, not a firearm.

      Moreover, the evidence shows that the victim was turning away from,

and moving in the opposite direction of, Harding as Harding shot at the victim.

N.T. Jury Trial, 8/31/21, at 42. This testimony is supported by the surveillance

video showing the victim backing up and turning away as Harding continued

shooting. See Exhibit D-1. This evidence, showing that the victim attempted

to flee, supports the determination that Harding and the group were not in

imminent danger.

      Additionally, the evidence shows Harding was able to retreat to his car

in complete safety. In Commonwealth v. Yanoff, 690 A.2d 260 (Pa. Super.

1997), this Court found a violation of the duty to retreat where “at all times

[during the incident], [defendant] was near his car.”      Id. at 264.    Here,

Harding was near his car at all times, including when the victim first

approached the group and when the victim began calling for somebody.

Instead of driving away, Harding intentionally positioned himself behind the

car, see N.T. Jury Trial, 9/1/21, at 73, and moved the firearm from his pocket

to under his shirt. Id. at 76-77; see Exhibit D-1. Harding violated his duty

to retreat.

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       The trial court did not palpably abuse its discretion in finding that

Harding was not acting self-defense or defense of another. Hunzer, supra.

Accordingly, his weight of the evidence claim must fail.8

       Harding’s third claim challenges the discretionary aspects of his

sentence, from which there is no automatic right to appeal.                See

Commonwealth v. Austin, 66 A.3d 798, 807-08 (Pa. Super. 2013). Rather,

when an appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence, we

must consider his brief on this issue as a petition for permission to appeal.

Commonwealth v. Yanoff, 690 A.2d 260, 267 (Pa. Super. 1997). Prior to

reaching the merits of a discretionary aspects of sentencing issue,

       [this Court conducts] a four-part analysis to determine: (1)
       whether the appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see
       Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly
       preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify
       sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. [720]; (3) whether appellant’s brief
       has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a
       substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not
       appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).

____________________________________________

8 Harding’s claim that the “first couple of shots [were] warning shots,” N.T.
Jury Trial, 9/1/21, at 72, is belied by the record. The surveillance video shows
Harding pointing his weapon in the direction of the victim. Exhibit D-1; see
Commonwealth v. Kresege, 240 A.3d 905, *11 (Pa. Super. 2020)
(unpublished memorandum decision) (where testimony indicated defendant
pointed the gun upward, Court characterized as “warning shot”). Even if
Harding could justify the warning shots, he continued to fire his weapon
another seven times, see N.T. Jury Trial, 9/1/21, at 76, while the victim was
“turn[ing] and kind of runn[ing] away, id., 8/31/21, at 42, and, thus, used
excessive force. See Commonwealth v. Truong, 36 A.3d 592, 599 (Pa.
Super. 2012) (no self-defense where defendant uses “more force than
reasonably necessary to protect against death or serious bodily injury”).

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Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa. Super. 2010) (quotation

marks and some citations omitted).

      Presently, Harding filed a timely notice of appeal and preserved his

issues in a post-sentence motion for reconsideration. Further, Harding’s brief

includes a concise statement of reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal

with respect to the discretionary aspects of his sentence pursuant to Rule

2119(f). Thus, we must determine if Harding raises a substantial question.

      A substantial question exists when “the appellant advances a colorable

argument that the sentencing judge’s actions were either: (1) inconsistent

with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary to the

fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing process.” Commonwealth

v. Austin, 66 A.3d 789, 808 (Pa. Super. 2013). Additionally, “we cannot look

beyond the statement of questions presented and the prefatory Rule 2119(f)

statement     to   determine    whether    a   substantial   question   exists.”

Commonwealth v. Radecki, 180 A.3d 441, 468 (Pa. Super. 2018).

      Harding’s Rule 2119(f) statement and questions presented on appeal

allege that the sentencing court abused its discretion in sentencing because it

failed to “give due consideration [his] mitigating circumstances,” including the

PSI report, mental health evaluation and witness testimony at the sentencing

hearing.    Appellant’s Brief, at 7, 14.   Harding also claims his sentence is

excessive and contrary to the norms underlying the Sentencing Code.

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Appellant’s Brief, at 7.       When considered together, these claims pose a

substantial question.9

       A defendant poses a substantial question where he makes an

excessiveness claim in conjunction with an assertion that the [sentencing]

court failed to consider mitigating factors. Mouzon, 812 A.2d 617, 627 (Pa.

2002) (substantial question raised where defendant sufficiently articulates

that a sentence violates a particular fundamental norm underlying the

sentencing process); Commonwealth v. Raven, 97 A.3d 1244, 1253 (Pa.

Super. 2014) (excessiveness claim asserting trial court failed to consider

mitigating factors raises a substantial question); see Commonwealth v.

Perry, 883 A.2d 599, 602 (Pa. Super. 2005) (same). As such, we may review

Harding’s claim on the merits to determine if he is entitled to relief.

       In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court explained it considered the

following when sentencing Harding:

       A [PSI] as well as a mental health evaluation had been prepared
       and examined in this case[. In addition, a] sentencing memoranda
       [was] prepared by the parties as well as letters on behalf of the
       defendant and [a statement regarding] the impact upon the
       victim’s family. The sentencing guidelines direct an offense
       gravity score of [14]. Harding’s prior record score was [1]. The
____________________________________________

9We note that Harding’s abuse of discretion claims individually do not raise a
substantial question. In Commonwealth v. Downing, 990 A.2d 788 (Pa.
Super. 2010), this Court determined that, “inadequate consideration of
mitigating factors does not raise a substantial question for our review.” Id.
at 794. Additionally, in Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 812 A.2d 617 (Pa.
2022), our Supreme Court stated that “[t]he obligation lies with the
challenging party to say why that sentence is manifestly excessive – failure to
do so is failure to raise a substantial question.” Id. at 628.

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      deadly weapon matrix recommends a guidelines minimum range
      of one hundred and two months to the statutory limit of two
      hundred and forty months. [The sentencing court considered] the
      nature of the crime, the defendant’s background, the likelihood of
      rehabilitation and the need for the public to be protected from his
      behavior by [Harding] again. [Harding was sentenced] within the
      guidelines.

Trial Court Opinion, 5/2/22, at 9-10. Therefore, Harding’s claim that the trial

court failed to consider Harding’s “great deal of family support” as described

in the mental health evaluation, see Appellant’s Brief, at 23, and the PSI’s

determination that Harding suffered no physical abuse or neglect growing up,

the presence of which would indicate risk to the community and danger of

reoffending, id., is meritless. The trial court considered these circumstances

in fashioning Harding’s sentence.

      Additionally, Harding’s claim that his sentence is excessive because the

trial court failed to consider provocation by the victim and that Harding

believed he was saving the lives of the people he was with, Appellant’s Brief,

at 23, affords him no relief. Because Harding was not acting in self-defense

or in defense of others, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by not

considering self-defense as a mitigating factor.       See N.T. Sentencing,

11/19/21, at 40; see also Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 835 A.2d 720, 735

(Pa. Super. 2003) (jury did not accept defendant’s justification defense and,

“accordingly, self-defense could not have reasonably been considered as a

mitigating factor at sentencing”).

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 2/6/2023

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