Court Opinion

ID: 9695691
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:27:39.516978+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:15.763245
License: Public Domain

SNYDER, J.
¶ 31. (dissenting). In reversing the trial court's summary judgment dismissal of this strict liability dog bite case, my colleagues relate that "[o]ur review of these Wisconsin cases leads us to conclude that Seefeldt had not relinquished keeper status, as she still maintained the dog at her premises, and in fact, the dog charged out at Colleen from Seefeldt's front door." Majority, ¶ 17. Whether a person is a keeper of a dog depends upon the peculiar facts and circumstances of each individual case. Hagenau v. Millard, 182 Wis. 544, 547, 195 N.W. 718 (1923). Because the undisputed facts and circumstances here, as applied under Wis. Stat. § 174.02(1), and the cases cited by the majority lead me, as they did the trial court, to conclude that Seefeldt had relinquished dominion, care, control, custody, responsibility for, and authority over Waterman's dog to Waterman at the time of the injury to Colleen, I respectfully dissent.
¶ 32. The majority concludes that the facts and circumstances are "sparse" but, for the purpose of summary judgment disposition, are "undisputed." Majority, ¶ 14. The majority then, citing to the holdings in Armstrong v. Milwaukee Mutual Insurance Co., 202 Wis. 2d 258, 549 N.W.2d 723 (1996); Janssen v. Voss, 189 Wis. 222, 207 N.W. 279 (1926); and Koetting v. Conroy, 223 Wis. 550, 270 N.W. 625 (1936), opines that the case law supports its conclusion that Seefeldt's keeper status could only end when Seefeldt "relin*817quishes not only control, but also shelter or custody— such that the custody, care and control of the dog are all exercised by the owner. It is then that the keeper's 'authority' over the dog is at an end." Majority, ¶ 23. In arriving at this opinion, the majority must concede that a keeper can relinquish authority over a dog to a legal owner. Consistent with that concession, the undisputed facts, the circumstances, and the applicable law here support a conclusion as a matter of law that Seefeldt's limited keeper authority over the dog had been relinquished to Waterman at the time of Colleen's injury.
¶ 33. A keeper relinquishing total authority and control over a dog to its legal owner is discussed in Janssen. Janssen held:
Where the keeper is not the owner, it may be assumed, as a general proposition, that the dominion or authority of the keeper over the dog is a limited one, subject to be terminated at any time by the owner. In the absence of special circumstances, the owner may terminate the dominion of the keeper over the dog at any time and remove the dog from the custody of the keeper. The moment that is done, the dual authority theretofore exercised over the dog by the owner and the keeper is merged in the owner, and at that very moment the keeper's rights and responsibilities concerning the dog are at an end.
Janssen, 189 Wis. at 224.
¶ 34. The Janssen holding is on point when applied to the facts and circumstances in this case. Seefeldt is not the owner of the dog. Seefeldt is a keeper of Waterman's dog, limited in dominion and control by Waterman's ownership. In seeking to distinguish this case from Janssen, the majority suggests that Janssen is limited by its facts and circumstances; specifically then, it would only apply to an owner who places a dog *818in a hospital with restrictions and when the issue involved a parent homeowner not present at the time of the injury. Janssen has a much broader application. Here, the dog, at the time of causing injury, was with its legal owner, Waterman. Seefeldt was not involved in any way with the dog's whereabouts, actions, or freedom of movement. Rather, Waterman was present and had custody and dominion over his dog at the time Colleen was injured. According to the facts, Waterman acknowledged and acted upon his duty to control his dog by chasing after it as it ran for Colleen. Under Janssen, Waterman terminated Seefeldt's limited keeper dominion when he left the house with his dog. The moment that was done, the "dual authority" shared by Seefeldt and Waterman was "merged in the owner," and Seefeldt's "rights and responsibilities concerning the dog Lwere] at an end." See id. The Janssen analysis, it appears, has greater application to the appellate issue presented here than it did under the Janssen facts and circumstances, and, notably, in Janssen the dog bite victim was denied recovery under Wis. Stat. § 174.02(1).
¶ 35. While concluding that Seefeldt was a keeper of Waterman's dog, the majority fails to address and apply the Janssen distinction between a keeper whose "authority. . . over the dog is a limited one," and an owner who "[i]n the absence of special circumstances . . . may terminate the dominion of the keeper over the dog at any time and remove the dog from the custody of the keeper." See Janssen, 189 Wis. at 224. The majority does not point to any "special circumstances" that would negate the termination of Seefeldt's dual authority over the dog, negate the merger of all authority and control of the dog in its owner, Waterman, or negate a conclusion that "at that very moment" of the injury to Colleen that *819Seefeldt's rights and responsibilities concerning the dog had ended.
¶ 36. The majority also discusses the Koetting holding. In Koetting, the court imposed strict liability upon the father of the owner of a dog, the owner being an adult daughter who lived with and was supported by her father, where the adult daughter took her dog to a public park, let the dog run free off its leash, and the dog injured another park user. Koetting, 223 Wis. at 552. The Koetting decision states that the plaintiff had to show facts "which brought the circumstances of the injury within the [strict liability] statute." Id. Then, somewhat mysteriously, the court abandoned that standard and, citing to prior case law, decided the question of the father's strict liability based upon the familial relationship between father and (adult) daughter:
It must be held that the [father of the adult daughter] was the keeper of the dog if we adhere to what was said in Hagenau v. Millard, 182 Wis. 544, 547, 195 N.W. 718:
"Where a child is the owner of a dog kept on the premises of the father, who supplies it with food and furnishes it with shelter upon his premises, the father is deemed to be a keeper of the dog."

Id.

¶ 37. The Koetting decision lacks relevance to this case for several reasons. First of all, it equates an adult daughter to a child. Second, the statement from Hagenau that Koetting relies upon is dicta, Koetting having nothing to do with a father's responsibility for a child dog owner. Third, even if the father was the keeper of his daughter's dog at certain times under certain circumstances, the Koetting decision ignores the Janssen distinction between a legal owner and a limited *820keeper. See Koetting, 223 Wis. at 558-59. This is a distinction that the majority also fails to address here, limiting its holding only to whether Seefeldt was a keeper. The Koetting decision earlier established that the plaintiff must not only show facts "which made [the defendant] the keeper of the dog," but must also show facts "which brought the circumstances of the injury within the [strict liability] statute." Id. at 552 (emphasis added). Unfortunately, the Koetting court abandoned the latter standard, ignoring the Janssen proviso, as does the majority in this case.
¶ 38. The Armstrong case, cited in the majority as favorable to Koetting, addressed whether a person employed to care for dogs at a dog kennel is a "keeper" of a dog under Wis. Stat. § 174.02(1). Armstrong, 202 Wis. 2d at 260. Armstrong relates that the "[resolution of this appeal therefore requires this court to interpret a statute as it applies to a set of facts." Id. at 264. Armstrong held, under its set of facts, that "where a [dog] keeper is injured by the dog and there is no evidence of negligence on the part of the legal owners, a keeper may not recover damages from the legal owners of the dog under § 174.02(1)."
¶ 39. Armstrong is inapposite. This is not a case about a keeper suing an owner for injuries inflicted by the dog. Furthermore, Armstrong does not address Janssen or distinguish the liability of a keeper from an owner where the facts support the termination of dual responsibility of the keeper by the dog owner, the situation present here.
¶ 40. The majority terminates its analysis after concluding that Seefeldt was a keeper of the dog. The majority fails to address whether Seefeldt's keeper status, limited by Waterman's legal ownership of the dog in question, was terminated by Waterman's pres*821ence and his assumption of dominion and control over the dog at the time of the injury to Colleen. Such an analysis is mandated by the language in Janssen, and Seefeldt is entitled to the application of all legal precedent applicable to her liability.
¶ 41. It is unfortunate that Waterman's dog caused injury to Colleen. It is also unfortunate that Waterman cannot be located for the purpose of this litigation. See Majority, ¶ 5. However, this court has no authority to ignore the Janssen holding when analyzing Seefeldt's strict liability exposure for injury caused by Waterman's dog.
¶ 42. Because the majority fails to fully acknowledge and address the Janssen decision relating to the relinquishment of Seefeldt's limited keeper status to Waterman at the time of the injury to Colleen, I respectfully dissent. Applying the Janssen distinction to the undisputed facts and circumstances here, specifically the distinction between a limited keeper and a legal owner of the dog at the time of injury, the record supports the trial court's summary judgment conclusion. I would affirm the trial court summary judgment.