Court Opinion

ID: 9706347
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:41:13.262265+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:21.780513
License: Public Domain

PATRICIA L. COHEN, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I would hold that the record does not contain sufficient competent and substantial evidence to support the Commission’s determination that Mr. Dunn is not permanently and totally disabled. See Hampton v. Big Boy Steel Erection, 121 S.W.3d 220 (Mo. banc 2003).
At the time of the injury to his right shoulder in February 2001, Mr. Dunn, then a 56-year-old with a tenth grade education, had suffered three heart attacks, two arthroscopic left knee surgeries, and two right shoulder surgeries. He also *276was obese and suffered from COPD, gout, a herniated disc, low back pain, and sleeping problems. Following the 2001 injury, Mr. Dunn underwent three more unsuccessful surgeries on the injured right shoulder. The only two experts who provided opinions on employability in the open labor market, Dr. Lipede and James England, the vocational expert, opined that Mr. Dunn’s preexisting injuries and disabilities combined with his 2001 injury to render him unemployable. The SIF proffered no contrary medical or expert testimony.
Our recent cases of Highley v. Von Weise Gear, 247 S.W.3d 52 (Mo.App. E.D.2008) and Richardson v. Missouri State Treasurer, 254 S.W.3d 242 (Mo.App. E.D.2008) provide the proper framework for analyzing this case. In Highley, we held unsupported by competent and substantial evidence the Commission’s finding that the claimant’s last injury combined with her prior disabilities did not render her unemployable in the open labor market. Highley, 247 S.W.3d at 56. We declined to apply the so-called Alexander rule in Highley because we concluded that the Commission did not make a credibility determination when it failed to resolve differences in the evidence in favor of the testimony of a particular expert, and instead merely pointed out “flaws” in the expert testimony. Id. at 57; see also Corp v. Joplin Cement Co., 337 S.W.2d 252, 258 (Mo.1960) (holding that where the record “reveals no conflict in the evidence or impeachment of any witness, the reviewing court may find the award was not based upon disbelief of the testimony of the witnesses.”).
Richardson expands upon Highley and illustrates the appropriate circumstances for application of the rule articulated in Alexander. In contrast to both Highley and this case, in Richardson, we premised our application of Alexander on the conclusion that Mr. England’s opinion conflicted with the evidence of a testifying physician on the issue of whether the claimant was capable of employment: “Unlike the court in Highley, we are faced with contradictory testimony and a determination that one expert opinion is more ‘persuasive’ than the other based upon the evidence in the record as a whole. Therefore, we must follow the rule set forth in Alexander and leave the acceptance or rejection of medical evidence for the commission.” Richardson, 254 S.W.3d at 245.
As in Highley, this record does not i’e-veal any conflicts in the evidence on the issue of employability in the open labor market. The only two witnesses who testified on the issue of permanent disability opined that Mr. Dunn was unemployable. Furthermore, the flaws that the Commission identified in the expert testimony are not supported by the record. With respect to Mr. England, the Commission stated that Mr. England’s opinion was not credible because it was based on Mr. Dunn’s statement that “he would have continued working a sedentary to light job if he were able to do so consistently.” However, a review of Mr. England’s testimony reveals otherwise. Mr. England clearly based his opinion on the medical evidence and not on Mr. Dunn’s view:
But I think the combination of problems he had, including difficulty sitting long, difficulty using his arms effectively, the sleep deprivation at night, the difficulties then with staying awake when he is in a seated position during the day, I felt that would negate his ability to do even sedentary work on a consistent basis.
With respect to Dr. Lipede, the Commission stated that it found his testimony unpersuasive because it was based on the restrictions set by Dr. Nogalski and Dr. Haupt. However, a review of the record *277reveals that Dr. Lipede’s findings with respect to Mr. Dunn’s “ability to stand, walk, sit and lift” were based upon a “kinesiological analysis” involving weighted walking, lifting, pushing and pulling. When Dr. Lipede was asked by the SIF’s counsel whether he took into account “permanent restrictions imposed by other medical doctors, in particular, Dr. Haupt,” he stated “No. We are blind to that when we are doing the analysis.”1 See Zimmerman v. City of Richmond, Heights, 194 S.W.3d 875, 879 (Mo.App. E.D.2006) (reversing Commission’s decision where Commission’s finding as to expert’s opinion was contradicted by expert’s deposition testimony).
I am not persuaded by the Commission’s use of the word “credible” and our consequent invocation of the Alexander rule when the record does not show any reasonable or substantial basis for refusing to credit the uncontradicted and unim-peached testimony of the only two experts testifying on the issue of employability in the open labor market. Where, as here, the Commission’s determination is not supported by the record and is against the overwhelming weight of the evidence, it should be reversed.

. It should also be noted that the Commission relied on Dr. Lipede's opinion when it came to the conclusion that "Claimant’s pre-exist-ing conditions to his right shoulder, left knee, heart and lungs create a hindrance or obstacle to Claimant's employment or re-employment.” As the Southern District noted, "such conduct bespeaks Commission’s recognition and acceptance of Employee's evidence as credible, not a rejection thereof.” Houston v. Roadway Express, Inc., 133 S.W.3d 173, 180 (Mo.App. S.D.2004).