Court Opinion

ID: 9709497
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 03:48:55.256765+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:49.392230
License: Public Domain

*123SULLIVAN, Judge,
concurring.
The actions of Joseph Kroslack, Jr. were said to be “in bad faith and with obdurate behavior”. He litigated a defense “after it had become frivolous, groundless and unreasonable”. This is certainly obdurate conduct. The majority, however, feels unable to justify the award of attorney fees on this basis. The majority believes that an obdurate behavior award may only be made in favor of a defendant. I believe the majority to be in error in this respect.
Kikkert v. Krumm (1985) Ind., 474 N.E.2d 503, does use the plaintiff-defendant distinction as one of two reasons for not applying the obdurate behavior exception. However, the heart of that decision was the fact that the obdurate conduct occurred not as part of a law suit but was the very conduct which gave rise to the other party’s claim.
Kahn v. Cundiff (1989) 1st Dist.Ind.App., 533 N.E.2d 164, adopted upon transfer 543 N.E.2d 627, did not discuss the obdurate behavior exception except in the context of I.C. 34-1-32-1 itself. Kahn was apparently arguing that the statute merely codified the common law standard. In this connection, the statute clearly contemplates a fee award against “either party” with regard to an “action or defense”.
In my view, the inherent power of the court to award fees as part of the common law exception to the American Rule includes the power to award fees to a plaintiff who has been made to litigate against a clearly frivolous defense. Subject to these comments, I concur in the award of attorney fees in the amount of $17,500.
I fully concur in the majority’s treatment as to prejudgment interest and attorney fees.