Court Opinion

ID: 9926340
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-24 17:04:05.100925+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:43.600844
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                         Jan 24 2024, 9:04 am

                                                                              CLERK
                                                                         Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                            Court of Appeals
                                                                              and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                     ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Caryn E. Wallace                                           Emily A. Szczepkowski
Chrzan Law, LLC                                            Franklin Law, LLC
Fort Wayne, Indiana                                        Fort Wayne, Indiana

                                            IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In Re: the Visitation of: C.B.                             January 24, 2024

Terri Welbaum,                                             Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                           23A-MI-1586
Appellant-Petitioner,
                                                           Appeal from the Allen Superior
        v.                                                 Court
                                                           The Honorable Lori Morgan,
Courtney Bowser,                                           Judge
                                                           The Honorable Beth Webber,
Appellee-Respondent,                                       Magistrate

and                                                        Trial Court Cause No.
                                                           02D08-2110-MI-000871
Grant Bockelman,
Appellee-Intervenor

                                   Opinion by Judge May
                                Judges Bailey and Felix concur.

May, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-1586 | January 24, 2024                             Page 1 of 9
[1]   Terri Welbaum (“Grandmother”) appeals the trial court’s denial of her motion

      to correct error following the dismissal for lack of standing of her petition for

      grandparent visitation with C.B. (“Child”). Grandmother argues she had

      standing to pursue grandparent visitation based on the plain language of

      Indiana Code chapter 31-17-5, otherwise known as the Grandparent Visitation

      Act (“GVA”). We reverse and remand.

      Facts and Procedural History
[2]   Child was born on April 21, 2014, to Courtney Bowser (“Mother”) and Grant

      Bockelman (“Father”). Mother and Father were never married. Father

      established paternity of Child approximately one year after her birth. Mother is

      Child’s custodial parent. Grandmother is Mother’s mother.

[3]   Mother and Child lived with Grandmother during the first year of Child’s life,

      and Grandmother provided in-home care for Child from September 2014 to

      May 2019. Starting in May 2019, Mother began restricting the amount of time

      Grandmother spent with Child. Mother eventually allowed Grandmother to

      visit with Child only with Mother’s supervision. In December 2020, Mother

      began completely denying Grandmother visitation with Child, and

      Grandmother has not seen Child since.

[4]   On October 11, 2021, Grandmother filed a petition for grandparent visitation

      with Child. She argued grandparent visitation was in Child’s best interests

      because Mother had mental illness that made her an unfit parent and because

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-1586 | January 24, 2024       Page 2 of 9
      Grandmother and Child have a close relationship. On December 15, 2021, the

      trial court ordered, among other things, the parties to engage in mediation.

[5]   On April 7, 2022, Grandmother filed a motion for temporary supervised

      grandparent visitation. The trial court held a hearing on the matter on May 6,

      2022, and scheduled a follow-up hearing for May 27, 2022. However, the trial

      court later vacated the May 27 hearing because Mother and Grandmother had

      reached an agreement.

[6]   On October 7, 2022, Father filed a motion to intervene. On October 25, 2022,

      the trial court granted Father’s motion to intervene. On December 2, 2022,

      Mother and Father filed a joint motion to dismiss Grandmother’s request for

      visitation with prejudice. Therein, they argued Grandmother did not have

      standing to pursue visitation pursuant to the GVA. On the same day, Mother

      and Father filed a joint motion to dismiss Grandmother’s request for temporary

      supervised grandparent visitation in which they made the same standing

      argument.

[7]   On January 6, 2023, the trial court held a hearing on the motions for dismissal

      filed by Mother and Father. On February 1, 2023, the trial court issued its

      order in which it determined Grandmother did not have standing to pursue

      grandparent visitation because she was the parent of Mother, who was Child’s

      custodial parent. It accordingly dismissed Grandmother’s petition for

      grandparent visitation.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-1586 | January 24, 2024     Page 3 of 9
[8]    On March 3, 2023, Grandmother filed a motion to correct error. The trial court

       held a hearing on Grandmother’s motion to correct error on May 19, 2023. On

       June 13, 2023, the trial court denied Grandmother’s motion to correct errors.

       Discussion and Decision
[9]    We review a trial court’s denial of a motion to correct error for an abuse of

       discretion, reversing only when the ruling is clearly against the logic and effect

       of the facts and circumstances before the court or when the trial court has erred

       as a matter of law. Perkinson v. Perkinson, 989 N.E.2d 758, 761 (Ind. 2013). We

       also consider the standard of review for the underlying ruling. See B.A. v. D.D.,

       189 N.E.3d 611, 614 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied. Here, the underlying

       order is the trial court’s order dismissing Grandmother’s petition for

       Grandparent visitation based on lack of standing. We review de novo a trial

       court’s decision dismissing a case for lack of standing. Pflugh v. Indianapolis

       Hist. Pres. Comm’n, 108 N.E.3d 904, 908 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied.

       “Standing is a judicial doctrine that focuses on whether the complaining party is

       the proper party to invoke the trial court’s jurisdiction.” Liberty Landowners

       Assoc., Inc. v. Porter Cnty. Comm’rs, 913 N.E.2d 1245, 1250 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009),

       trans. denied.

[10]   The trial court’s dismissal of Grandmother’s petition is based on its

       interpretation of the GVA. Grandmother asserts the current version of the

       GVA, Indiana Code chapter 31-17-5 et seq., does not prohibit a parent of a

       custodial parent from seeking grandparent visitation and, thus, she has standing

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-1586 | January 24, 2024       Page 4 of 9
       to pursue visitation with Child. Interpretation of a statute is a pure question of

       law that we review de novo. Jones v. Lofton, 201 N.E.3d 676, 678 (Ind. Ct. App.

       2022), trans. denied. Our goal when interpreting a statute is to give effect to the

       legislature’s intent, and the best evidence of that intent is the language of the

       statute itself. Id. If a statute is unambiguous, we must give the statute its clear

       and plain meaning. Id. A statute is not necessarily ambiguous just because the

       parties disagree about the statute’s meaning. Southwest Allen Cnty. Fire Protection

       Dist. v. City of Fort Wayne, 142 N.E.3d 946, 954 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans.

       denied.

[11]   Prior to 1993, the statute regarding grandparent visitation stated, in relevant

       part:

                 (a) A court may not grant visitation under this chapter after May
                 8, 1989, to a grandparent who is the parent of a person:

                        (1) who is not deceased; and

                        (2) who has been awarded custody of the grandchild.

                 (b) A child’s maternal grandparent may seek visitation rights,
                 regardless of whether the paternity of the child has been
                 established, if:

                        (1) the child’s mother is deceased;

                        (2) the marriage of the child’s parents has been dissolved in
                        Indiana; or

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-1586 | January 24, 2024          Page 5 of 9
                 (3) the child was born out of wedlock.

        (c) A child’s paternal grandparent may seek visitation rights if:

                          (1) the child’s father is deceased;

                          (2) the marriage of the child’s parents has been
                          dissolved in Indiana; or

                          (3) the child was born out of wedlock and the
                          paternity of the child has been established in the son
                          of the grandparent.

Ind. Code § 31-1-11.7-2 (1992). In 1993, the Indiana Legislature amended that

statute by removing subsection (a). In 1997, the Indiana Legislature repealed

Indiana Code section 31-1-11.7-2 (1993) and recodified it, with virtually

identical language, as Indiana Code section 31-17-5-1, which provides:

        (a) A child’s grandparent may seek visitation rights if:

                 (1) the child’s parent is deceased;

                 (2) the marriage of the child’s parents has been dissolved in
                 Indiana; or

                 (3) subject to subsection (b), the child was born out of
                 wedlock.

        (b) A court may not grant visitation rights to a paternal
        grandparent of a child who is born out of wedlock under

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-1586 | January 24, 2024               Page 6 of 9
                subsection (a)(3) if the child's father has not established paternity
                in relation to the child.

       Grandmother contends the Legislature’s 1993 amendment of Indiana Code

       section 31-1-11.7-2, which removed “a provision that barred custodial

       grandparents from seeking grandparent visitation[,]” indicates the Legislature’s

       intent to allow the parent of a custodial parent to seek grandparent visitation.

       (Br. of Appellant at 10.) As a result, Grandmother claims, under the current

       language of the statute, she has standing to pursue grandparent visitation with

       Child.

[12]   We recently examined this issue in Stoner v. Stoner, 223 N.E.3d 278 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 2023). In that case, the grandfather sought to establish grandparent

       visitation with his grandson pursuant to the GVA. Id. at 279. The grandson’s

       parents shared physical and legal custody of him. Id. The trial court found,

       based on In re Matter of E.H., 121 N.E.3d 594 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), that the

       grandfather, as the parent of one of grandson’s custodial parents, did not have

       standing to pursue grandparent visitation. Id. at 280.

[13]   The grandfather appealed and argued In re Matter of E.H. relied upon case law

       decided prior to the 1993 amendment to the GVA, which removed language

       regarding the parent of the custodial parent’s inability to pursue grandparent

       visitation, and “‘[n]o longer does the GVA make any kind of distinction

       between custodial parent and noncustodial parent.” Id. at 280. We outlined

       the evolution of the GVA, including the 1993 amendment that “eliminat[ed]

       the language precluding a court from granting visitation to a grandparent who is
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-1586 | January 24, 2024             Page 7 of 9
       the parent of a person who has been awarded custody of the grandchild.” Id. at

       281. Based thereon, we concluded Indiana Code section 31-17-5-1, the current

       version of the GVA, “does not preclude a grandparent from seeking visitation

       with a child where the custodian of the child is the grandparent’s child.” Id. at

       282.

[14]   Here, Grandmother is the parent of Mother, who is the custodial parent of

       Child. As stated in Stoner, Indiana Code section 31-17-5-1 does not preclude

       Grandmother from pursuing grandparent visitation with Child. Therefore, the

       trial court erred when it dismissed Grandmother’s petition for grandparent

       visitation with Child based on her alleged lack of standing. See, e.g., Moses v.

       Cober, 641 N.E.2d 668, 671 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (noting the 1993 amendment

       of the GVA “reflects [the legislature’s] purpose to protect a grandparent whose

       child, as the custodial parent, was denying visitation with a grandchild due to

       conflict between grandparent and child”) (abrogated on other grounds by

       Daugherty v. Ritter, 652 N.E.2d 502, 503 (Ind. 1995) (Moses determined merits of

       visitation claim by focusing on relationship between grandmother and

       granddaughter, while ignoring evidence of conflict between grandmother and

       her daughter, and Daugherty held trial courts should instead consider the totality

       of the circumstances between the grandparent, parent, and child when

       determining whether grandparent visitation is in child’s best interests).

       Conclusion

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-1586 | January 24, 2024        Page 8 of 9
[15]   Because Grandmother is not precluded by the GVA from seeking visitation

       with Child, the trial court erred when it dismissed Grandmother’s petition for

       grandparent visitation based on her alleged lack of standing. Accordingly, we

       reverse the trial court’s order and remand for proceedings consistent with this

       opinion.

[16]   Reversed and remanded.

       Bailey, J., and Felix, J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-1586 | January 24, 2024     Page 9 of 9