Court Opinion

ID: 9492852
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:51:53.681209+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:31.418908
License: Public Domain

KING, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
The district court correctly concluded that the denial by the Nottoway County Board of Supervisors of 360° Communications’ permit application was not supported by substantial evidence. In this respect, I agree fully with my colleague Judge Niemeyer that the denial of the special use permit to 360° Communications lacked substantial supporting evidence. Contrary to the view of Judge Niemeyer, however, I believe § 704(a)1 of the Telecommunica*711tions Act of 1996 (the “Act”), 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii), to be constitutional. Accordingly, I would affirm the district court’s rejection of the Board’s constitutional challenge. Because the other panel members would, for their separate reasons, reverse the district court, I am compelled to dissent.2
I.
The Board’s argument that § 704(a) violates the fundamental principles of federalism embodied in the Tenth Amendment is indeed ironic. In the name of federalism, the Board would force Congress to deprive states of the substantial zoning authority that § 704(a) leaves in their hands, instead concentrating all zoning authority over the siting of telecommunications towers in the nation’s capital. And to promote political accountability, the Board would have us strike down a statute passed by a popularly elected Congress regarding a subject squarely within the scope of the Commerce Clause.
In searching for precedential support, the Board inappropriately attempts to shoehorn § 704(a) under an inapplicable Supreme Court holding in New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992). However, § 704(a) can be forced into the analytical structure of New York only by reviving the repudiated rule of National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 96 S.Ct. 2465, 49 L.Ed.2d 245 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 105 S.Ct. 1005, 83 L.Ed.2d 1016 (1985). Finally, this view would necessarily require us to distinguish binding and adverse Supreme Court precedent on the basis of immaterial factual distinctions. See ante at 704 (discussing FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 102 S.Ct. 2126, 72 L.Ed.2d 532 (1982)).
II.
Congress passed § 704(a) of the Act pursuant to its authority under the Commerce Clause, which authorizes Congress to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations and among the several States.... ” U.S. Const, art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The subject matter of § 704(a) is squarely within the scope of the Commerce Clause itself; that is, the siting of telecommunications towers substantially affects interstate commerce, and thus is a proper subject for congressional regulation. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995) (“Congress’ commerce authority includes the power to regulate ... those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.”) (citations omitted).
The Act itself unquestionably focuses on issues central to the national economy: “[The] Act ... promotes competition and reduces regulation in order to secure lower prices and higher quality services for American telecommunications consumers and encourage the rapid deployment of new telecommunications technologies.” H.R. Rep. No. 104-204, at 47 (1996), reprinted in .1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10. More specifically, the provisions that eventually became § 704(a) were driven by Congress’s desire to address the “inconsistent and, at times, conflicting patchwork of [state and local] requirements” that hindered the development of “[a] high quality national wireless communications network.” Id. at 94-95, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 61. There is no doubt that the field addressed by the Act in *712general, and § 704(a) in particular, is within the scope of the Commerce Clause.
Indeed, my friend Judge Niemeyer acknowledges that regulation of interstate wireless communications “falls well within Congress’ commerce power.” Ante at 705. But he assails § 704(a) on the ground that it allegedly contravenes the Tenth Amendment. Unless § 704(a) encroaches on the Tenth Amendment, it is a valid exercise of Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause.
Because I am convinced that Congress did not violate the Tenth Amendment when it enacted § 704(a), I would hold the statute constitutional and, except for the nature of the relief granted, affirm the judgment of the district court.3
A.
The Commerce Clause grants Congress plenary power to regulate activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. See FERC v. Mississippi 456 U.S. 742, 753, 102 S.Ct. 2126, 72 L.Ed.2d 532 (1982). Even so, when Congress, in exercising this broad power, does not regulate individuals directly, but seeks instead to induce the states themselves to regulate in a manner that Congress favors, Congress’s power is limited by the Tenth Amendment. For example, the Tenth Amendment prohibits Congress from directly commanding states to pass or enforce laws: “The Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program.” New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992). Likewise, Congress may not issue such mandates to state executive officers without violating the Tenth Amendment. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 117 S.Ct. 2365, 138 L.Ed.2d 914 (1997).
Nevertheless, Congress may, consistent with the Tenth Amendment, enact legislation that seeks to induce — without directly compelling — states to act according to federal policy. See FERC, 456 U.S. at 766, 102 S.Ct. 2126 (noting that “valid federal enactments may ... be designed to induce state action in areas that otherwise would be beyond Congress’ regulatory authority”). For example, in exercising its spending power, “Congress may attach conditions on the receipt of federal funds.” South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206, 107 S.Ct. 2793, 97 L.Ed.2d 171 (1987). And of importance to this case, the Supreme Court has blessed Congress’s conditional use of its preemptive powers under the Commerce Clause (a legislative technique that, for convenience’s sake, I denominate “conditional preemption”). See FERC, 456 U.S. at 766, 102 S.Ct. 2126; accord New York, 505 U.S. at 173-74, 112 S.Ct. 2408; Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclam. Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 289, 101 S.Ct. 2352, 69 L.Ed.2d 1 (1981).
Conditional preemption is made possible by the Constitution, specifically the combined effects of the Commerce Clause, U.S. Const, art. I, § 8, cl. 3, and the Supremacy Clause, art. VI, cl. 2. The Supremacy Clause declares the “Laws of the United States” to be the “supreme Law of the Land, ... any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” Id. The Commerce Clause, of course, empowers Congress to regulate interstate commerce. As a result of these constitutional underpinnings, when Congress enacts laws regulating interstate commerce, those laws preempt contrary state laws: “A wealth of precedent attests to Congressional authority to displace or preempt state laws regulating private activity affecting interstate commerce when these laws conflict with federal law.” Hodel, 452 U.S. at 290, 101 S.Ct. 2352.
*713Congress need not directly preempt state law whenever it wishes to regulate private activity affecting interstate commerce. Instead, it may employ conditional preemption; that is, Congress may seek to induce states to regulate activities affecting interstate commerce by threatening to preempt contrary state regulation if the state itself fails to regulate in accordance with federal instruction. E.g., id. at 288-89, 101 S.Ct. 2352; FERC, 456 U.S. at 765, 102 S.Ct. 2126. The Supreme Court has repeatedly reaffirmed Congress’s authority to enact such legislation:
Where federal regulation of private activity is within the scope of the Commerce Clause, we have recognized the ability of Congress to offer States the choice of regulating that activity according to federal standards or having state law preempted by federal regulation.
New York, 505 U.S. 144, 173-74, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 120 L.Ed.2d 120; see also, FERC, 456 U.S. at 767 n. 30, 102 S.Ct. 2126 (“Congress may condition the validity of State enactments in a preemptible area on their conformity with federal law....”).
The Supreme Court both reconfirmed and further delineated Congress’s conditional preemption authority in New York v. United States. See 505 U.S. at 173-77, 112 S.Ct. 2408. In that case, the Court reviewed provisions of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 (LRWPAA), to which New York had raised a Tenth Amendment challenge.4 It concluded that one of the challenged provisions of the LRWPAA was a valid example of conditional preemption, and therefore consistent with the Tenth Amendment. That provision presented a choice to states that produce low-level radioactive waste; those states could: (1) in accordance with federal standards, regulate the disposal of radioactive waste produced within their borders, either by building in state sites or by joining a compact with a state that has such a site; or (2) be subject to federal regulations permitting states that do have storage sites (“sited” states) to exclude waste produced within unsited states. Id. at 174, 112 S.Ct. 2408.
In analyzing this regulatory plan, the Court first established that the second option — permitting sited states ultimately to deny access to waste from unsited states— would have been constitutional if enacted alone. Id. at 173, 112 S.Ct. 2408. The Court reasoned that because Congress may “authorize the States to discriminate against interstate commerce,” it could have passed this provision independently. Id. (citing Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Governors, 472 U.S. 159, 105 S.Ct. 2545, 86 L.Ed.2d 112 (1985)).
Having determined that this option would be a valid, independent exercise of congressional power, the Court held that Congress had not violated the Tenth Amendment by conditioning the exercise of that power on whether a state established its own waste storage facility in accordance with federal regulations. Id. at 173-74, 105 S.Ct. 2545. This plan, the Court concluded, “represents a conditional exercise of Congress’ commerce power, along the lines of those we have held to be within Congress’ authority.” Id. at 174, 105 S.Ct. 2545 (citing Model, 452 U.S. at 288, 101 S.Ct. 2352; FERC, 456 U.S. at 764-65, 102 S.Ct. 2126). Thus the New York Court reconfirmed that Congress may “condition the validity of State enactments in a preemptible area on their conformity with federal law.” FERC, 456 U.S. at 767 n. 30, 102 S.Ct. 2126.
In addition to confirming the continued vitality of FERC and Hodel, the Court concluded that another provision of the LRWPAA fell outside the scope of those cases. In so doing, it held that one of the LRWPAA’s incentive plans violated the *714Tenth Amendment. This plan gave individual states the following options: (1) regulate low-level radioactive waste according to federal standards; or (2) take title to and possession of all such waste produced within the state’s borders, agreeing thereby to become liable for any damage waste producers suffer because of the state’s failure to act promptly. The Court determined that Congress lacked the power to enact either of these options as mandatory, independent legislation. New York, 505 U.S. at 176, 112 S.Ct. 2408. As a result, the Court held that Congress could not force states to choose between these two unconstitutional options:
Because an instruction to state governments to take title to waste, standing alone, would be beyond the authority of Congress, and because a direct order to regulate, standing alone, would also be beyond the authority of Congress, it follows that Congress lacks the power to offer the States a choice between the two.

Id.

The New York Court’s treatment of the two LRWPAA provisions discussed above clarifies the scope of Congress’s conditional preemption power. It demonstrates the difference between statutes that constitute proper, persuasive exercises of conditional preemption and those that “eross[ ] the line distinguishing encouragement from coercion.” Id. at 175, 112 S.Ct. 2408. Congress may not force states to choose between two courses of action, neither of which Congress could constitutionally require the state to follow. Id. at 176, 112 S.Ct. 2408. Such a scheme necessarily encroaches on state sovereignty: “A choice between two unconstitutionally coercive regulatory techniques is no choice at all.” Id. But where Congress acts in a field in which it could preempt state law entirely, Congress may still require states to choose between regulating in accordance with federal standards or being preempted by other-wise valid federal regulation. Id. at 174, 112 S.Ct. 2408; Hodel, 452 U.S. at 288-89, 101 S.Ct. 2352; FERC, 456 U.S. at 764-65, 102 S.Ct. 2126. Thus Congress retains the power of conditional preemption, even though it cannot unconditionally command states to pass any particular regulation. New York, 505 U.S. at 188, 112 S.Ct. 2408.
B.
When § 704(a) is examined under the analytical framework employed in New York, it does not in any way infringe the Tenth Amendment. Section 704(a) presents states with the following choice: (1) if the state denies an application to place, construct, or modify “personal wireless service facilities,” it must do so upon a written record containing “substantial evidence” supporting the state’s decision; or (2) the state must not regulate the placement, construction, or modification of such facilities at all. Judge Niemeyer acknowledges the substance of this choice. See ante at 705 (“[I]n the [Act], Congress mandated either application of federal standards or the abdication of all zoning authority over communications facilities.”). To determine whether § 704(a) is a valid exercise of Congress’s conditional preemption authority, we must decide whether Congress could constitutionally enact option (2) alone, thereby preempting all state zoning authority over wireless service facilities. If it could, then Congress also can condition its exercise of that authority on the state processing permit applications for wireless facilities in accordance with the standards of § 704(a). See New York, 505 U.S. at 173-74, 112 S.Ct. 2408.
In his separate opinion, Judge Niemeyer acknowledges that Congress may regulate interstate wireless communications under the Commerce Clause. Ante at 705. Further, he necessarily concedes that, in exercising this authority, Congress could bar states from regulating the siting of wireless towers: “[Congress] could enact a federal law preempting the field and directly regulating the siting of communications towers.” Ante at 705 (emphasis added). Any federal law “preempting the field” would necessarily bar any state action re*715garding siting of wireless towers. U.S. Const, art. VI, cl. 2 (“[T]he Laws of the United States ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land.”). The Supreme Court agrees that, where the subject to be regulated is private activity affecting interstate commerce, “[T]he Commerce Clause empowers Congress to prohibit all — and not just inconsistent — state regulation of such activities.” Hodel, 452 U.S. at 290, 101 S.Ct. 2352.
The Supreme Court has confirmed that Congress may exercise this preemptive power in areas that states care deeply about and in ways states may consider unwise:
Although such congressional enactments obviously curtail or prohibit the States’ prerogatives to make legislative choices respecting subjects the States may consider important, the Supremacy Clause permits no other result.
Id. For example, Congress may preempt state regulation in fields of such local importance as land-use planning. E.g., id. at 289, 101 S.Ct. 2352 (upholding constitutionality of Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (SMCRA) despite argument that it “interferes with the States’ ability to exercise their police powers by regulating land use”); FERC, 456 U.S. at 767 n. 30, 102 S.Ct. 2126 (noting that Ho-del upheld SMCRA’s land use regulations although “regulation of land use is perhaps the quintessential state activity”).
Further, Congress may choose preemption even where it has not provided affirmative federal regulations to take the place of preempted state laws. See FERC, 456 U.S. at 766, 102 S.Ct. 2126. In FERC, the Supreme Court reviewed a provision of the Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA), under which Congress gave states a choice between considering certain federal regulatory proposals or “abandoning regulation of the field altogether.” Id. In upholding this section of PURPA against a Tenth Amendment challenge from the State of Mississippi, the Court noted that a state which chose to “abandon the field” would leave an area of great local importance unregulated:
We recognize, of course, that the choice put to the States — that of either abandoning regulation of the field altogether or considering the federal standards— may be a difficult one. And that is particularly true when Congress, as is the case here, has failed to provide an alternative regulatory mechanism to police the area in the event of state default.
Id. (emphasis added). Nevertheless, the Court held that Congress could constitutionally require states to choose between taking affirmative, federally prescribed action or ceasing all regulation of the locally important — but preemptible — field of utilities regulation. Id. at 765, 102 S.Ct. 2126.
By acknowledging that Congress has authority to “preempt the field” of telecommunication tower siting, Judge Niemeyer concedes, a fortiori, that Congress may forbid states from regulating this subject. And Supreme Court precedent mandates this result. See Hodel, 452 U.S. at 290, 101 S.Ct. 2352. Because Congress could validly prohibit states from regulating the siting of telecommunications towers, it may constitutionally offer states a choice between (1) being subject to such a prohibition or (2) processing permit applications for communications towers in accordance with § 704(a). New York, 505 U.S. at 173-74, 112 S.Ct. 2408; Hodel, 452 U.S. at 288, 101 S.Ct. 2352. In other words, § 704(a) does not become unconstitutional “simply because Congress chose to allow the states a regulatory role” in a preemptible field. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 290, 101 S.Ct. 2352.
As a result, I conclude that § 704(a) does not violate the Tenth Amendment, and, because the Board has not demonstrated otherwise, its constitutionality must be upheld. See Marshall v. Rose, 616 F.2d 102, 104 (4th Cir.1980) (“The constitutionality of a statute promulgated under the authority of the Commerce Clause is presumed.... ”).
*716III.
On the other hand, Judge Niemeyer would hold today that the choice § 704(a) presents to states — regulate according to federal standards or not at all — unconstitutionally “commandeers” state legislative processes, and thus violates the Tenth Amendment. E.g., ante at 703. This conclusion would require us to force the facts of this case into the scope of inapposite Supreme Court precedent and adopt a position that the Court has expressly rejected.
A.
Judge Niemeyer concludes that the choice § 704(a) presents states is “[similar to the option offered to states” by the LRWPAA’s “take title” provision, which the Supreme Court rejected in New York. Ante at 703. Specifically, his separate opinion views the policy decision to abandon zoning regulation of telecommunication towers as “not a viable option,” ante at 703; as a result, he concludes that § 704(a) is “no less coercive than” the take title provision. Ante at 703. But regardless of whether § 704(a) is “similar” to the take title provision, the dissimilarities between these laws are dispositive in this case.
Put simply, the take title provision — in contrast to § 704(a)' — was not a conditional exercise of any Congressional power. Justice O’Connor, writing for the majority in New York, acknowledged and emphasized this fact: “Unlike the first two sets of incentives, the take title incentive does not represent the conditional exercise of any congressional power enumerated in the Constitution.” New York, 505 U.S. at 176, 112 S.Ct. 2408. Instead, the Court reasoned, the provision unconstitutionally presented states with a “choice” between regulating in accordance with one mandatory federal instruction or regulating according to another: “Either way, the Act commandeers the legislative processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program .... ” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Because the take title provision was not a conditional exercise of valid Congressional authority, the Court struck it down, ultimately issuing its oftcited holding: “The Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program.” Id. at 188, 112 S.Ct. 2408.
Although Judge Niemeyer correctly identifies this holding of New York, I am not persuaded it applies here. Unlike the take title provision — which gave states no legal option but to take affirmative, federally mandated actions — § 704(a) provides states an alternative to reviewing permit applications in accordance with federal standards: A state unwilling to process applications as § 704(a) directs may abandon the field.5 The Supreme Court has repeatedly blessed statutory schemes that require states to abandon a preemptible regulatory field if they do not wish to regulate in accordance with federal instructions. FERC, 456 U.S. at 764-65, 102 S.Ct. 2126; Hodel, 452 U.S. at 288, 101 S.Ct. 2352. This is the essence of conditional preemption, a regulatory technique that New York reaffirms. New York, 505 U.S. at 173-74, 112 S.Ct. 2408.
Nevertheless, Judge Niemeyer insists that § 704(a) is not actually an example of conditional preemption because, in his view, the Act does not afford states a *717“meaningful” choice: “Indeed it is not a choice at all. The [Act] does not suggest it, and it cannot be implied except in an ontological sense....” Ante at 703. But if § 704(a) provides states no implied choice, then the Supreme Court was wrong to find such a choice implicit in PURPA, the statute at issue in FERC. PURPA flatly mandated that each state take certain federally prescribed actions, ie., hold public hearings to consider adopting federal regulatory standards and, if it rejected the standards, publish a written statement of its reasons. See FERC, 456 U.S. at 764-71, 102 S.Ct. 2126. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court read PURPA as containing an implicit choice identical to the one implied by § 704(a): “[I]f a State has no utilities commission, or simply stops regulating in the field, it need not even entertain the federal proposals.” Id. at 764, 102 S.Ct. 2126 (emphasis added); see also id. at 766, 102 S.Ct. 2126 (“We recognize, of course, that the choice put to the States— that of either abandoning regulation of the field altogether or considering the federal standards — -may be a difficult one.”) (emphasis added).
Regardless of whether the choice implicit in § 704(a) is “meaningful” or “viable,” ante at 699-700, 703, that choice undeniably exists, as it did in FERC. Judge Niemeyer’s analysis confirms the substance of this choice. See, e.g., ante at 705 (“[I]n the [Act], Congress mandated either application of federal standards or the abdication of all zoning authority over communications facilities.”) (emphasis added). Consequently, his opinion fails in its attempt to cast § 704(a) as the type of unconditional federal command that New York forbids.
B.
Despite these dispositive differences between the statutes, Judge Niemeyer insists that § 704(a) is “no less coercive than” the take title provisions of the LRWPAA, and is therefore unconstitutional. Ante at 703. In reaching this conclusion, he contends that the option § 704(a) has given states— to refrain from regulating the siting of wireless towers altogether — is somehow an impermissible use of the commerce power. As best I can determine, his separate opinion would hold that Congress cannot prohibit state zoning decisions in this field because zoning involves a state’s exercise of its “core powers of regulating land use” through “its traditional legislative process” ante at 705. Because these matters are among the “most vital aspects” of the “core function of local government,” ante at 703, he apparently concludes that states may not be required to relinquish those functions.
Notably, Hodel confirms that Congress may forbid states from regulating certain major aspects of land use — there, surface mining' — unless they promulgate regulations consistent with federal standards. 452 U.S. at 288, 101 S.Ct. 2352. Judge Niemeyer simply ignores Hodel altogether and cites no Supreme Court — or any other — precedent for the proposition that, when exercising its powers under the Commerce Clause, Congress may not displace states’ power to carry out their “traditional” or “core” government functions.
However, the Supreme Court did announce a rule nearly identical to this position in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 96 S.Ct. 2465, 49 L.Ed.2d 245 (1976). In National League of Cities, the Court concluded that certain amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) violated the Tenth Amendment to the extent that they subjected state employers to federal minimum wage and maximum hours restrictions. The Court held that the structure of our federal system of government prevented Congress from overriding state authority in this traditionally state-controlled field:
We hold that insofar as the challenged amendments operate to directly displace the States’ freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional government functions, they are not within the authority granted Congress by Art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
Id. at 852, 96 S.Ct. 2465 (emphasis added).
However, this rule of National League of Cities has been expressly overruled by *718the Supreme Court. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 557, 105 S.Ct. 1005, 83 L.Ed.2d 1016 (1985). In overruling National League of Cities, the Court disavowed the precise rule Judge Niemeyer would revive today:
We therefore now reject, as unsound in principle and unworkable in practice, a rule of state immunity from federal regulation that turns on a judicial appraisal of whether a particular governmental function is “integral” or “traditional.”
Garcia, 469 U.S. at 546-47, 105 S.Ct. 1005. Nevertheless, Judge Niemeyer invokes — in various formulations — the “traditional function” standard that Garcia rejected: “Because application of § 704(a) ... would require us to overrule the will of Nottoway County exercised through its traditional legislative process, we must address the provision’s constitutionality. ...” Ante at 710 (emphasis added); see also ante at 697 (describing § 704(a) as an “uninvited intrusion into traditional state and local zoning authority ...”) (emphasis added); ante at 704 (§ 704(a) “effectively requires state and local governments who choose to exercise their core powers of regulating land use to apply a federally mandated standard and process”) (second emphasis added); ante at 703 (§ 704(a) gives local governmental body the choice to “end its existence in one of its most vital aspects.”) (emphasis added).
Importantly, the Supreme Court has not expressly overruled Garcia.6 Given the unambiguous manner in which the Court rejected the National League of Cities rule, it would be unwise to infer that it has implicitly resurrected that rule. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 557, 105 S.Ct. 1005 (“National League of Cities v. Usery is overruled.”) (citations omitted). And a recent en banc decision of this court reminds us to be wary of inferring that the Supreme Court has silently discarded its precedent. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst., 169 F.3d 820, 880 (4th Cir.1999) (en banc) (announcement that Supreme Court precedent has been overruled “must come from that Court itself’). Without a more affirmative pronouncement from the Court, “[W]e are without authority to deviate from binding Supreme Court precedent.” Id. at 889; see also id. at 926 n. 10 (Motz, J., dissenting) (“Garcia ... remains the law of the land.... ”). As a result, I cannot endorse the apparent attempt to resurrect the traditional function rule, which the Supreme Court expressly rejected fourteen years ago.
It is telling that the application of the traditional function standard to this case evinces some of the same flaws the Garcia court warned against. In that ease, the Court rejected the traditional function standard partly because it allowed the contours of the Tenth Amendment to vary with the local policy preferences of federal judges:
Any rule of state immunity that looks to the “traditional,” “integral,” or “necessary” nature of governmental functions inevitably invites an unelected federal judiciary to make decisions about which state policies it favors and which ones it dislikes.
Garcia, 469 U.S. at 546, 105 S.Ct. 1005.
Having ignored Garcia’s warning, it is not surprising that Judge Niemeyer seeks to buttress his constitutional analysis by emphasizing the importance of local zoning policy and the dangers inherent in preemption of local zoning authority. He reasons that the Board cannot be forced to refrain from regulating the siting of towers because “land-use decisions are a core junction of local government. Few other *719municipal functions have such an important and direct impact on the daily lives of those who live or work in a community.” Ante at 703 (quoting Gardner v. City of Baltimore, 969 F.2d 63, 67 (4th Cir.1992)). Judge Niemeyer then trots out a “parade of horribles” to describe the adverse effects that, he believes, would flow from the lack of local zoning control over telecommunications towers. For example, he warns against falling property values and “the possibility that aesthetic quality of every area in the jurisdiction would be desti’oyed.” Ante at 703. Finally, Judge Niemeyer rejects the idea of withdrawing local zoning authority in this field because, as a policy matter, it is not a “viable option for state and local governments.” Ante at 703.
Presumably, then, Judge Niemeyer’s conclusion would be different if § 704(a) gave local governments the option of relinquishing a function that he deemed less important. However, the boundaries of the Tenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause cannot shift based on which courses of action federal judges think are important or “viable” as a matter of local governmental policy, or which functions judges view as the “most vital aspects” of local government. This is exactly the result the Supreme Court warned against in Garcia, and one of its primary reasons for rejecting the traditional function standard. See 469 U.S. at 546,105 S.Ct. 1005.
C.
The final precedent with which Judge Niemeyer unsuccessfully wrestles is FERC. He attempts to distinguish FERC on its facts, point-ing out that the provision of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA) challenged in FERC required states only to consider federally prescribed regulations — rather than requiring them to enact such regulations — as a precondition to continued state regulation of public utilities. Ante at 704-05. While this distinction does exist, it makes no difference here.
The Court in FERC cited Hodel approvingly, and it characterized the law at issue in Hodel as follows: “There, the Federal Government could have preempted all surface mining regulations; instead, it allowed the States to enter the field if they promulgated regulations consistent with federal standards. In the Court’s view, this raised no Tenth Amendment problem.... ” FERC, 456 U.S. at 764, 102 S.Ct. 2126 (emphasis added). Because it approved of Hodel, the Court in FERC obviously did not view a conditional command that states promulgate federally prescribed regulations as any less constitutional than the conditional command to consider promulgating such regulations at issue in FERC.
At bottom, the laws reviewed in FERC and Hodel — like § 704(a) — required states to take affirmative, federally prescribed actions as the price of continued state regulation in a preemptible field. E.g., id. at 765, 102 S.Ct. 2126 (“While the condition here is affirmative in nature ... nothing in this Court’s cases suggests that the nature of the condition makes it a constitutionally improper one.”). Under Judge Niemeyer’s own analysis, the extent of the state action conditionally required cannot be relevant, because “the command that the Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program is categorical.” Ante at 700 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus Judge Niemeyer, under his own logic, cannot distinguish FERC by asserting that the law at issue there sought to induce less state action than does § 704(a).
As a factual matter, though, it is not even clear that the state action mandated by PURPA, and upheld in FERC, was less extensive than that required by § 704(a). In addition to requiring state governments to consider adopting federal standards, PURPA mandated the procedures that states were to follow when they did consider those standards. For example, PURPA required the states to examine each standard in a public hearing after notice. FERC, 456 U.S. at 748, 102 S.Ct. 2126. Additionally, if states rejected the federal standards, they were required to provide a *720written statement of their reasons to the public. Id. The Supreme Court expressly-held that these procedural standards did not violate the Tenth Amendment:
If Congress can require a state administrative body to consider proposed regulations as a condition to its continued involvement in a pre-emptible field — and we hold today that it can — there is nothing unconstitutional about Congress’ requiring certain procedural minima as that body goes about undertaking its tasks.
Id. at 771, 102 S.Ct. 2126. Consequently, PURPA went a good deal further in prescribing the details of state action than does § 704(a).
Finally, Judge Niemeyer quotes the FERC Court’s statement that it “never has sanctioned explicitly a federal command to the States to promulgate and enforce laws and regulations.” Ante at 704 (quoting FERC, 456 U.S. at 761-62, 102 S.Ct. 2126). Nevertheless the Court in FERC reaffirmed Hodel, which the Court itself characterized as involving a conditional command to “promulgate[ ] regulations consistent with federal standards.” FERC, 456 U.S. at 764, 102 S.Ct. 2126. Apparently, the Court did not equate such a conditional command — which gave states the option of abandoning the field — with an unconditional command, like those it would later strike down in New York and Printz. Indeed, the language of New York itself confirms that Congress may condition the exercise of its preemption power on states actually “regulating ... according to federal standards.” New York, 505 U.S. at 173-74, 112 S.Ct. 2408.
Consequently, the argument that FERC sanctions only conditional commands that states consider adopting federal standards is inconsistent with the text of FERC and the plain language of New York.
IV.
Because § 704(a) is a valid exercise of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause, the Board’s constitutional challenge should be rejected by this court. And because the district court was right to find the Board’s decision unsupported by substantial evidence, I would affirm the district court’s judgment, with a modification of its remedy. Therefore, I must respectfully dissent.

. The Board contests the constitutionality of only one part of § 704(a), namely the following requirements found in § 704(a)(7)(B)(iii): Any decision by a State or local government or instrumentality thereof to deny a request to place, construct, or modify personal wireless service facilities shall be in writing and supported by substantial evidence contained in a written record. *711The Board does not attack the other substantive requirements of § 704(a)(7)(B). However, for the sake of convenience and in order to avoid confusion, I adopt Judge Niemeyer’s convention of referring to the disputed provision— § 704(a)(7)(B)(iii) — simply as § 704(a).

. As noted, I agree with Judge Niemeyer's conclusion that the Board lacked substantial evidence to support its denial of the special use permit. Accordingly, I do not further address the issue of the insubstantiality of the evidence before the Board. However, because of the import of Judge Niemeyer's conclusion that § 704(a) violates the Tenth Amendment, I am compelled to more extensively discuss the bases of my view that § 704(a) passes constitutional muster.

. The district court’s grant of a writ of mandamus against the Board is inconsistent with our recent decision in AT & T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. Winston-Salem Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 172 F.3d 307, 312 n. 3 (4th Cir.1999). As a result, I would vacate the writ of mandamus and remand this case for entry of an order for relief, consistent with Winston-Salem.

. In addition to the two provisions discussed below, the Mew York Court reviewed a third set of provisions, which involved the imposition of surcharges on interstate shipments of low-level radioactive waste. See 505 U.S. at 171-73, 112 S.Ct. 2408. Although the Court did hold this third set of provisions constitutional, its analysis is not directly relevant here.

. Contrary to Judge Niemeyer's suggestion, § 704(a) does not conditionally preempt all local zoning decisions regarding all types of facilities. See ante at 702 (“Nottoway County observes that its only choice would be to abandon the business of land-use regulation ....") (emphasis added); ante at 703 ("The 'choice' suggested — that Nottoway County comply with § 704(a) ... or end its role as a land-use regulator ....”) (emphasis added); ante at 703 (“To suggest that a local governmental body withdraw from land-use regulation ....“) (emphasis added). States must simply follow § 704(a)’s procedures or not regulate the siting of telecommunications towers that are covered by the Act. They may, of course, continue to exercise zoning authority over all other types of structures.

. At the time Garcia was decided, it was predicted that Garcia would be overruled. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 580, 105 S.Ct. 1005 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (predicting that the National League of Cities rule will "in time again command the support of a majority of this Court.”). However, given that the Chief Justice himself has predicted that Garcia would be overruled, 469 U.S. at 580, 105 S.Ct. 1005, it seems especially unlikely that the Court would take that step without acknowledging that it was fulfilling the Chief Justice's prediction.