Court Opinion

ID: 9460503
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 21:52:33.987317+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:36:39.157099
License: Public Domain

*113BAZELON, Chief Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur in part II of the court’s opinion. I disagree, however, with two conclusions reached in part III.
I
The first relates to the trial court’s refusal to declare a mistrial sought by the defense on the ground that the prosecutor asked a highly prejudicial improper question in the face of a stern warning from the trial court not to do so. The prosecutor’s question may have suggested to the jury that there was some connection between the weapons found in appellant’s car, and a shooting that had occurred at the time and near the scene of his arrest.1 This revelation was blatantly prejudicial; it is too fanciful even to speculate that a curative instruction could erase the damage.2 Nevertheless, this court sustains the refusal to grant a mistrial, thereby tacitly condoning, rather than forthrightly condemning, inexcusable prosecutorial misconduct. The effect is to undermine confidence in the fair administration of justice in this jurisdiction.3
II
The second conclusion relates to the court’s holding that the government’s failure to produce a fingerprint report was not fatal. I find the present record inadequate for disposition of this issue.
Appellant’s defense, based on the testimony of one witness, was that someone had borrowed his ear on the day in question, and unbeknownst to him had placed the weapons in his trunk. He argued at trial, and again on appeal, that he *114should be given access to any fingerprint report in the possession of the government because it might show that the prints on the weapons were those of the man whom appellant claims placed the guns in his car. The government answered that it was unable to locate any fingerprint report. The evidence indicated that some effort had been made to lift prints from these weapons. The officer who had initialled the weapons, indicating that he had fingerprinted them-, was on vacation at the time of trial. Appellant subpoenaed his supervisor who testified that department regulations required that all attempts to lift prints, even unsuccessful ones, .were to be entered in “department log books.” He also said that he had checked the books, but found no entry with respect to the weapons in question. The trial court ruled that nothing could be done at that time because the fingerprinting officer was unavailable. He said that if the defense could subsequently show that the government had suppressed the fingerprint report, or that “there were fingerprints favorable to the defendant,” he would order a new trial. The record reflects nothing further on this issue.
I would remand to determine what, if any, efforts were made to contact the officer who supposedly tried to lift the prints, and what was the outcome of such efforts. The majority opinion fails to consider this question.
I would also remand because the trial judge ignored our decision in United States v. Bryant, 142 U.S.App.D.C. 132, 439 F.2d 642 (1971), and therefore limited his concern to the issue of suppression of the fingerprint report. Bryant, however, held that the government would be responsible not only for suppressing evidence, but also “for non-disclosure based on loss of evidence unless [it] can show that it has promulgated, enforced and attempted in good faith to follow rigorous and systematic procedures designed to preserve all discoverable evidence gathered in the course of a criminal investigation.” 4 439 F.2d at 652 (emphasis in original).
The majority dismisses appellant’s Bryant-claim on the ground that:
here there were police procedures for preservation of this evidence. The problem is that occasionally even with the best of procedures reports get mislaid, and the question is, what to do?
The answer, in short, is to establish affirmatively that the most earnest efforts were pursued to recreate the substance of the lost evidence. In the present case, the agent who tried to fingerprint the weapons could be called; he might be able to reveal whether his efforts were futile or fruitful, and if fruitful, whose prints were discovered. Such a procedure would enhance the appearance of justice, if not its substance.
Moreover, when evidence is lost due to an apparent failure to comply with existing procedures, and its substance cannot be recreated, Bryant requires a hearing to insure that the government has adequately “enforced” the procedures, and that there has been a “good faith” effort to abide them in the case at hand. To be sure, there will be times when evidence is lost, and cannot be recreated, despite scrupulous efforts to follow comprehensive procedures. Lacking a crystal ball, howevér, I prefer to make that determination on the basis of a full factual record, rather than on the blind guess of my brethren.
The majority claims that such an inquiry was not required in this case because “[d]efense counsel showed no interest in . any possible fingerprints,” until testimony at trial indicated “that some effort had been made to lift the prints.” As soon as counsel was advised that there had been an effort made to lift prints, he explicitly called the Bryant case to the attention of the *115court. Thus, the failure to hold a Bryant-type hearing was due to the court’s unwillingness to apply that decision, and not to counsel’s failure to “timely raise” the issue, as the majority suggests. Indeed, if appellant’s Bryant-claim was foreclosed by counsel’s failure to act promptly, appellant may have received ineffective assistance of counsel. In United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197 (1973), we held that one of the obligations of defense counsel was to make “efforts to secure information in the possession of the prosecution and law enforcement authorities.” (Id. at 1204.)
In short, appellant was denied the benefits of a full factual hearing into the missing report either because of the trial court’s refusal to apply Bryant, or his counsel’s ineffectiveness. Thus, I cannot join my colleagues in concluding that it is appellant who must suffer the consequences.5

. For a discussion of the question, and the context in which it was asked, see pp. 111-112 supra.

. See Macklin v. United States, 133 U.S.App.D.C. 347, 410 F.2d 1046 (1969); cf. Lee v. United States, 125 U.S.App.D.C. 126, 368 F.2d 834 (D.C.Cir.1966).

. We have in the past reversed several convictions secured by this former assistant U. S. Attorney because he went beyond the bounds of permissible advocacy. See United States v. Carter, 157 U.S.App.D.C. 149, 482 F.2d 738 (1973); United States v. Whitmore, 156 U.S.App.D.C. 262, 480 F.2d 1154 (1973); United States v. Hawkins, 156 U.S.App.D.C. 259, 480 F.2d 1151 (1973); United States v. Phillips, 155 U.S.App.D.C. 93, 476 F.2d 538 (1973).

. See also Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963); Levin v. Katzenbach, 124 U.S.App.D.C. 158, 363 F.2d 287 (1966); Levin v. Clark, 133 U.S.App.D.C. 6, 408 F.2d 1209 (1967).

. The majority “fail [s] to see how the defendant can assert prejudice from this handling of the matter by the trial judge . . . .” The prejudicé alleged, and suffered, was a denial of rights protected by Bryant. A hearing may have uncovered fingerprint evidence strongly corroborating appellant’s defense, or it may have indicated that the government failed to satisfy Bryant.