Court Opinion

ID: 9687716
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:43:12.065543+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:30.362622
License: Public Domain

Fahrnbruch, J.,
dissenting.
While I agree with the majority’s analysis that the phrase used in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-311.01(l)(c) (Reissue 1989) is not unconstitutionally vague, I must dissent on the basis that no final order was entered by the trial court, and, therefore, the State’s appeal is not properly before us.
The county attorney may take exception to any ruling or decision of the court made during the prosecution of a cause by presenting to the trial court the application for leave to docket an appeal to the Supreme Court with reference to the rulings or decisions of which complaint is made. . .. Such application shall be presented to the trial court within twenty days after the final order is entered in the cause.... The county attorney shall then present such application to the Supreme Court within thirty days from *126the date of the final order.
(Emphasis supplied.) Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2315.01 (Reissue 1989).
Although no party in this appeal has raised the issue of jurisdiction, “[t]his court has a duty to determine issues of jurisdiction which are apparent from the record.” J.L. Healy Constr. Co. v. State, 236 Neb. 759, 762, 463 N.W.2d 813, 816(1990).
We have dismissed proceedings for lack of jurisdiction under quite similar circumstances because there was no final, appealable order. In State v. Hutter, 145 Neb. 312, 16 N.W.2d 176 (1944), at the conclusion of all the testimony, the trial court dismissed the charges against Charles Hutter as to murder in the first and second degree, but submitted a manslaughter charge to the jury. After the jury was unable to reach a verdict, it was discharged and the cause continued for further proceeding. Thereafter, Hutter’s plea in bar as to first and second degree murder was sustained, and he was ordered to be tried on the charge of manslaughter. At that point, the State filed error proceedings in this court pursuant to the statutory antecedents of Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 29-2315.01 to 29-2316 (Reissue 1989), see Comp. Stat. §§ 29-2314 to 29-2316 (1929), contesting the partial granting of the plea in bar.
By motion, the question was raised whether a final order must be entered in the court below before proceedings could be brought in the Supreme Court. Section 29-2314 (1929), the statutory predecessor of § 29-2315.01 (Reissue 1989), was silent as to any requirement of a final order. Nonetheless, this court held that “a final order or judgment completely disposing of the case shall have been entered below before we will decide any questions therein presented, unless it is clearly shown by the record that the decision can in no manner reverse or affect the case in which the bill was taken.” Hutter, supra at 315, 16 N.W.2d at 177. See, also, State v. Linn, 192 Neb. 798, 224 N.W.2d 539 (1974) (under the terms of § 29-2315.01, the right of a county attorney to review questions of law in criminal cases is limited to those cases in which a final order or judgment in the criminal case has been entered); Huffman v. Huffman, 236 Neb. 101, 459 N.W.2d 215 (1990) (generally, when multiple *127issues are presented to a trial court for simultaneous disposition in the same proceeding and the court decides some of the issues, while reserving some issue or issues for later determination, the court’s determination of less than all of the issues is an interlocutory order and is not a final order for purposes of an appeal). In applying that rule, this court in Hutter, supra, dismissed the appeal because the decision might have reversed or affected the action still pending in the trial court.
In State v. Taylor, 179 Neb. 42, 136 N.W.2d 179 (1965), a county attorney brought error proceedings pursuant to §§ 29-2315.01 to 29-2316 after a defendant’s motion for a new trial had been sustained. The cause was dismissed because there was no final order. This court’s explanation bears repeating:
By their terms, these statutes do not permit an appeal by the State from any interlocutory ruling of the trial court in a criminal proceeding. Such an interpretation would permit piecemeal review, create chaos in trial procedure, and destroy the orderly and expeditious trial of criminal cases. The statute provides for a determination of such questions on appeal to this court after a “final order” has been entered by the trial court.... To hold otherwise would be to hold that the Legislature intended that a succession of appeals could be granted in the same case to secure advisory opinions to govern the further action of the trial court.
Taylor, supra at 45, 136 N.W.2d at 181.
Hutter, supra, is directly on point. Like the defendant in Hutter, Bourke still has charges pending. As the district court clearly stated in its order of January 26, 1990, it remains to be determined whether Bourke committed terroristic threats under § 28-311.01 (1)(a). Any decision by this court would affect the case in which the appeal was taken. As policy considerations support a result opposite the majority’s decision, I can see no reason to depart from precedent set nearly 50 years ago.
Caporale, J., joins in this dissent.