Court Opinion

ID: 9953393
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-22 00:01:31.89368+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:46:05.008939
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-40580   Document: 117-1        Page: 1   Date Filed: 03/21/2024

       United States Court of Appeals
            for the Fifth Circuit                                United States Court of Appeals
                                                                          Fifth Circuit
                         ____________                                   FILED
                                                                  March 21, 2024
                          No. 22-40580
                         ____________                              Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                        Clerk
Rodney Mahan, Joel Barton, John Riggins,

                                              Plaintiffs—Cross-Appellees,

Justin Sikes,

                                                    Plaintiff—Appellant,

                               versus

Department of Public Safety,

                                   Defendant—Appellee/Cross-Appellant,

Director Steven McCraw; Chairman Steven Mach,

                                     Defendants—Appellees.
            ______________________________

            Appeal from the United States District Court
                 for the Eastern District of Texas
                      USDC No. 9:20-CV-119
            ______________________________
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                                        No. 22-40580

Before Richman, Chief Judge, Stewart, Circuit Judge, and Scholer,
District Judge.
Per Curiam:*
       This appeal arises from actions taken by Defendant-Appellee/Cross-
Appellant Texas Department of Public Safety (“DPS”) against five troopers
in the Texas Highway Patrol division: Plaintiff-Appellant Justin Sikes,
Plaintiffs-Cross-Appellees Rodney Mahan, Joel Barton, and John Riggins,
and non-party John Henley.1 The five troopers filed suit against DPS,
asserting First Amendment and retaliation claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
and the Texas Whistleblower Act (“Act”), respectively. The district court
dismissed Sikes’s and Henley’s claims on summary judgment as well as all
claims raised under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Only Mahan’s, Barton’s, and
Riggins’s (collectively, “Trial Plaintiffs”) claims under the Act proceeded to
trial. The jury found DPS liable, and the district court entered judgment for
Trial Plaintiffs, subsequently amending the judgment to include equitable
relief. Sikes and DPS each appealed. On appeal, Sikes challenges the district
court’s partial summary judgment dismissing his claims under the Act. On
cross-appeal, DPS challenges the denial of DPS’s Renewed Motion for
Judgment as a Matter of Law and the Amended Final Judgment.
       For the reasons stated herein, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant
of summary judgment as to Sikes’s claims under the Act. After concluding
we have jurisdiction to consider DPS’s cross-appeal, we AFFIRM the
district court’s denial of DPS’s Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter

       _____________________
       
           District Judge of the Northern District of Texas, sitting by designation.
       *
           This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
       1
          Although Henley filed a timely notice of appeal, his appeal was dismissed
pursuant to his motion.

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of Law, VACATE the entry of equitable relief in the Amended Final
Judgment, and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
                       I. Factual Background
       On September 21, 2018, Riggins submitted a Chain-of-Command
Review Request Form to Major Terry Truett. Per the DPS Manual, which
contains DPS’s policies, regulations, and procedures, a Chain-of-Command
Review is one of the grievance procedures available to DPS troopers. In both
the Chain-of-Command Review Request Form and during a follow-up
meeting with Truett, Riggins alleged that his supervisor, Sergeant Robert
Shugart, (1) enforced an unlawful quota system for arrests and traffic stops
in violation of Texas law, (2) purchased awards for the troopers with the most
traffic stops, and (3) created a hostile work environment at the Center, Texas,
duty station. Riggins also forwarded his request to the Office of Inspector
General (“OIG”), which began a division referral investigation and notified
the Chief of the Texas Highway Patrol Division at the time, Ron Joy.
       Truett assigned DPS Lieutenant Carl Currie to investigate the
allegations against Shugart. Currie conducted multiple interviews and spoke
with Mahan, Barton, Riggins, and Henley. Each trooper reported concerns
with Shugart’s conduct. At trial, Barton testified that after he met with
Currie, Shugart called Barton into his office, accused Barton of “going
rogue,” and warned Barton that he was aware of the ongoing investigation.
       Based on Currie’s investigation report, Lieutenant James Brazil
recommended that Shugart, Mahan, Henley, and Riggins attend mediation.
Chief Dispute Resolution Officer Kevin Meade was to serve as the mediator.
       Thereafter, DPS allegedly began retaliating. On January 15, 2019,
Barton emailed Shugart and Brazil to express interest in applying for the
Region 2 Crisis Negotiation Unit (“CNU”) and request chain-of-command

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approval in advance of the January 17, 2019, application deadline.
Approximately three hours after Barton made the request, Shugart emailed
Brazil recommending that Barton be considered for the position. Shugart did
not respond directly to Barton with approval, and never having received
chain-of-command approval, Barton did not submit his application for the
Region 2 CNU.
       On February 8, 2019, attorney Paul A. Robbins, representing Riggins,
Mahan, Barton, and Henley, sent a letter to Meade explaining why the
scheduled mediation process would be ineffective, notifying Meade that each
trooper “suffered bullying, various forms of abuse, retaliation and
intimidation directly from their Sgt. Robert Shugart,” raising concerns about
the DPS investigation into the allegations against Shugart, and informing
Meade that if DPS did not resolve the issues, the troopers would “take
further and public action to secure a satisfactory remedy.” The mediation
was postponed as a result of the letter.
       OIG Lieutenant Riccardo Lopez was assigned to further investigate
the allegations against Shugart in March 2019. Lopez’s investigation lasted
approximately twelve months and included over thirty witness interviews,
including interviews with Sikes and Trial Plaintiffs. During his interview,
Sikes discussed his experience with Shugart while working at the duty
stations in Jasper and Center, his belief that Shugart created a hostile work
environment, and Shugart’s use of awards to create competition among the
troopers. There is no evidence that he discussed the alleged retaliation that
became the subject of his claims under the Act. On April 1, 2019, Barton met
with Lopez. During the meeting, Barton specifically identified Shugart’s
failure to respond to Barton’s promotion request as one of the “examples he
believed to be retaliation by Sgt. Shugart for the Division Referral
investigation.”

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       Meanwhile, the alleged retaliation continued throughout the OIG
investigation. In May 2019, Mahan and Riggins were transferred from their
duty station in Nacogdoches, Texas, to a duty station in Houston County,
Texas. Mahan and Riggins each reported to Lopez that they believed their
transfers were retaliatory, and the OIG opened a second investigation to
address their complaints of retaliation.
       On September 10, 2019, Sikes requested a secondary school office in
the Broaddus Independent School District. Sikes claims that his request was
initially ignored as retaliation for speaking to Lopez and then denied after
Sikes joined the instant lawsuit. Sikes further claims that in September and
October 2019, DPS supervisors began stalking his aunt’s house and his home
in Lufkin, Texas.
       After the conclusion of his investigation, Lopez submitted two
internal reports: the first addressed Riggins’s and Mahan’s allegations of
retaliation, and the second concerned Riggins’s original three allegations
against Shugart. On April 3, 2020, Texas Highway Patrol Chief Dwight
Mathis informed Shugart of the investigation’s outcome, which did not
sustain the allegation that Shugart had instituted a traffic enforcement quota
for arrests and traffic stops but did sustain the allegations that Shugart had
purchased awards for the troopers with the most traffic stops and that
Shugart created a hostile work environment at the Center duty station.
Riggins, Mahan, Barton, and Henley received a summary of the
investigation’s outcome on May 6, 2020.
                      II. Procedural History
       On May 26, 2020, Riggins, Mahan, Barton, and Henley filed suit
against DPS in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Texas. They brought claims for violations of their First Amendment rights to
free speech and to petition under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and retaliation claims

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under the Act. One month later, they filed the First Amended Complaint,
adding Sikes as an additional plaintiff and Director Steven McCraw and
Chairman Steven Mach as defendants in their official capacities.
       On May 26, 2021, DPS, McCraw, and Mach jointly moved for
summary judgment on all claims. The district court granted in part and
denied in part the summary judgment motion. The district court dismissed
all claims under Section 1983 as well as Henley’s and Sikes’s claims under
the Act.2 Relevant to this appeal, the district court determined that there was
no evidence Sikes had initiated any grievance or appeal procedure under DPS
policy and therefore had not satisfied the procedural prerequisite to filing
suit. Sikes timely filed a notice of appeal.
       The district court denied the Motion for Summary Judgment as to
Trial Plaintiffs’ claims under the Act, concluding that each trooper had
complied with the Act’s prerequisite to filing suit. These claims proceeded
to trial on June 21, 2022.
       Trial Plaintiffs rested on the fourth day of trial, and DPS moved for
judgment as a matter of law on the grounds that Trial Plaintiffs did not initiate
grievance procedures regarding the personnel actions that were challenged at
trial. The district court denied DPS’s motion. After DPS’s case-in-chief,
DPS renewed its motion for judgment as a matter of law, and the district
court again denied DPS’s motion.
       On June 28, 2022, the jury found in favor of Trial Plaintiffs.
Specifically, the jury found that Mahan’s and Riggins’s reports regarding
Shugart were a cause of their transfers to Houston County in May 2019 and
that the transfers were adverse personnel actions. The jury found that

       _____________________
       2
           In doing so, the district court dismissed all claims against McCraw and Mach.

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Barton’s report was a cause of Shugart’s inaction and/or delay with respect
to Barton’s promotion request and that this inaction and/or delay was an
adverse personnel action. The jury awarded each Trial Plaintiff $500,000 in
compensatory damages. On July 20, 2022, the district court entered its Final
Judgment, which reduced the damages award to $250,000 per Trial Plaintiff
based on the statutory damages cap and awarded costs to Trial Plaintiffs.
       On August 4, 2022, Trial Plaintiffs filed their Motion to Amend the
Court’s Final Judgment to Include Equitable Relief. Meanwhile, DPS filed
its Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law, which the district
court denied. On October 19, 2022, during a hearing on Trial Plaintiffs’
motion, the district court stated it had mistakenly entered a final judgment
based on the jury verdict and took the motion under advisement.
       On December 1, 2022, the district court sua sponte entered its
Amended Final Judgment that vacated the original Final Judgment and
ordered certain equitable relief. Specifically, the Amended Final Judgment
ordered DPS to (1) place in Trial Plaintiffs’ personnel files a copy of the
Amended Final Judgment and jury verdict, (2) remove Shugart’s 2020
Manager Evaluation from Barton’s and Mahan’s personnel files and the
online system, (3) deliver to each employee who testified during trial a copy
of a letter attached to the order on DPS letterhead, (4) require the chain of
command for the Highway Patrol Division Region 2 to verify they have read
the Act, and (5) file a written certification of compliance with the district
court’s orders. The district court denied as moot Trial Plaintiffs’ Motion to
Amend the Court’s Final Judgment to Include Equitable Relief.
       On December 5, 2022, DPS filed an Emergency Motion to Stay
Pending Appeal requesting that the district court stay the Amended Final
Judgment. In the motion, DPS stated that it “intends to file a notice of appeal
to the Fifth Circuit from” the Amended Final Judgment. The district court

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granted the motion the following day, noting DPS’s “intent to appeal the
Court’s Amended Final Judgment.” On January 24, 2023, DPS filed its
Motion for Extension of Time to File Formal Notice of Appeal, asking the
district court to recognize that DPS’s Emergency Motion to Stay Pending
Appeal constituted a timely notice of appeal under Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 3(c) and, alternatively, requesting an extension of time to file a
formal notice of appeal. The district court granted the motion in part, finding
that the emergency motion constituted a timely notice of appeal. The district
court ordered DPS to refile its emergency motion as a notice of appeal and
pay the required fees.
                             III. DISCUSSION
       There are four issues on appeal: first, whether the district court erred
in granting summary judgment on Sikes’s retaliation claim under the Texas
Whistleblower Act; second, whether this court has jurisdiction over DPS’s
cross-appeal; third, whether the district court erred in denying DPS’s motion
for judgment as a matter of law; and fourth, whether the district court erred
in entering its Amended Final Judgment to include equitable relief against
DPS. We address each of these issues in turn.
       A. Summary Judgment on Sikes’s Claim
       We turn first to the grant of summary judgment as to Sikes’s
retaliation claim. We review de novo the district court’s granting of a motion
for summary judgment, applying the same standard as the district court.
Brand Servs., L.L.C. v. Irex Corp., 909 F.3d 151, 155–56 (5th Cir. 2018)
(quoting Reingold v. Swiftships, Inc., 126 F.3d 645, 646 (5th Cir. 1997)).
“Summary judgment is proper only when it appears that there is no genuine
issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Id. at 156 (quoting Reingold, 126 F.3d at 646). “An issue of
material fact is genuine if a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the

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nonmovant.” Jackson v. Cal-Western Packaging Corp., 602 F.3d 374, 377
(5th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). We “draw all reasonable inferences in
favor of the nonmoving party, and avoid credibility determinations and
weighing of the evidence.” Goudeau v. Nat’l Oilwell Varco, L.P., 793 F.3d
470, 474 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Sandstad v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 309 F.3d
893, 896 (5th Cir. 2002)).
       Because Sikes’s participation in the OIG investigation was wholly
unrelated to his claim under the Act, we find that Sikes did not initiate action
under DPS grievance procedures and therefore did not satisfy the Act’s
prerequisite to suit.
       The Texas Whistleblower Act protects public employees from
retaliation by a public employer when the employee “in good faith reports a
violation of law by the employing governmental entity or another public
employee to an appropriate law enforcement authority.” Tex. Gov’t
Code Ann. § 554.002(a). Prior to filing suit, the Act requires employees to
“initiate action under the grievance or appeal procedures of the employing
state or local governmental entity relating to . . . adverse personnel action.”
Id. § 554.006(a). “[A]n employee with a Whistleblower Act claim must
strictly abide by the procedural limitations set out in the Act to obtain relief.”
City of Madisonville v. Sims, 620 S.W.3d 375, 379 (Tex. 2020) (per curiam)
(citation omitted).
       As this court has explained, “[t]he purposes of the exhaustion
requirement are to give the employer notice of a grievance and a chance to
resolve it.” Breaux v. City of Garland, 205 F.3d 150, 163 (5th Cir. 2000).
Because the Act does not define what it means for an employee to “initiate”
a grievance or appeal process, the “grievance or appeal procedures of the
employing state or local governmental agency” govern. See Tex. Gov’t
Code Ann. § 554.006(a); see also City of Waco v. Lopez, 259 S.W.3d 147,

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154 (Tex. 2008) (“[T]he Whistleblower Act . . . requir[es] the employee to
bring a grievance under the procedures that are provided by the public
employer.” (citation omitted)).
       While it is undisputed that Sikes participated in the grievance process
initiated by management and the other troopers, Sikes failed to initiate a
grievance procedure related to the adverse personnel actions that were the
basis of his claims under the Act; namely, the alleged stalking and denial of
his request for a secondary school office. See Jordan v. Ector County, 290
S.W.3d 404, 406 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2009, no pet.) (“We hold that such
a grievance does not meet the requirements of Section 554.006(a) because it
fails to address the termination, which is the subject of this lawsuit.”). Prior
to the alleged retaliation, Sikes was interviewed with regard to Riggins’s
original three complaints—the allegations that Shugart (1) instituted an
illegal quota system, (2) used awards to create competition among the
troopers, and (3) created a hostile work environment—however, Sikes’s
participation in a grievance procedure initiated by another trooper failed to
satisfy the Act’s prerequisite where his interview was wholly unrelated to the
adverse personnel actions in his claims. The record on summary judgment
does not contain any evidence that Sikes initiated or participated in a
grievance procedure such that DPS was on notice of Sikes’s allegations that
he was being stalked by his supervisors and that the denial of his request for
a secondary school office was retaliatory. In fact, because Sikes’s request for
a secondary office was denied after the lawsuit was filed, DPS was not given
an opportunity to investigate and address the specific grievance before
defending against it in court.
       On appeal, Sikes argues that there was a genuine dispute of material
fact as to whether his participation in the grievance procedure initiated by
management is sufficient to satisfy the Act’s prerequisite and invoke the
district court’s jurisdiction. In support, Sikes contends that in Garrett v.

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Judson Independent School District, 299 F. App’x 337, 342 (5th Cir. 2008) (per
curiam), this court implicitly recognized that an employee satisfies the Act’s
prerequisite where the employee either authorizes another person to initiate
a grievance procedure on his or her behalf or participates in a grievance
procedure to pursue his or her claim. However, Sikes’s reliance on Garrett is
misplaced because there is no evidence that Sikes authorized anyone to
initiate a grievance on his behalf, much less a grievance regarding his
allegations of retaliation. And Sikes’s conclusory arguments on appeal do not
suffice. Ramey & Schwaller, L.L.P. v. Zions Bancorporation NA, 71 F.4th 257,
261 (5th Cir. 2023) (“[U]nsupported allegations or . . . testimony setting
forth ultimate or conclusory facts and conclusions of law are insufficient to
defeat a motion for summary judgment[.]” (second alteration in original)
(quoting Clark v. Am.’s Favorite Chicken Co., 110 F.3d 295, 297 (5th Cir.
1997)).
       Sikes’s argument that it would have been “redundant and
unnecessary” to initiate procedures that “were already in motion” also
misses the mark because there is no evidence that Sikes complained of
retaliation at any point during the ongoing grievance procedures. As a result,
DPS was never afforded the opportunity to investigate Sikes’s allegations of
retaliation or resolve them prior to litigation.
       We find that Sikes did not initiate action under DPS grievance
procedures related to his retaliation claims prior to filing suit as required by
the Act. Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not commit
reversible error in dismissing Sikes’s claims under the Act on summary
judgment.
       B. Jurisdiction Over DPS’s Cross-Appeal
       We now consider whether we have jurisdiction over DPS’s cross-
appeal. Because DPS’s Emergency Motion to Stay Pending Appeal provided

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timely and sufficient notice of the cross-appeal under the applicable rules, we
find that we do.
       Pursuant to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, an appeal “may
be taken only by filing a notice of appeal with the district clerk within the time
allowed by Rule 4.” Fed. R. App. P. 3(a)(1). “[T]he notice of appeal
required by Rule 3 must be filed with the district clerk within 30 days after
entry of the judgment or order appealed from.” Fed. R. App. P.
4(a)(1)(A). “If a document filed within the time specified by Rule 4 gives the
notice required by Rule 3, it is effective as a notice of appeal.” Smith v. Barry,
502 U.S. 244, 248–49 (1992). To act as a notice of appeal, a filing must set
forth (1) the party taking the appeal, (2) the judgment being appealed from,
and (3) the court to which the party is appealing. See Fed. R. App. P.
3(c)(1).
       DPS’s Emergency Motion to Stay Pending Appeal was filed within
thirty days of the entry of the district court’s Amended Final Judgment and
satisfies each criterion of Rule 3. The motion (1) specifies that DPS is the
party taking the appeal, (2) references the district court’s Amended Final
Judgment as the order being appealed, and (3) provides that the appeal will
be made to this court. “[K]eeping in mind that Rule 3 must be liberally
construed in favor of appeals,” we find that DPS’s Emergency Motion to
Stay Pending Appeal acted as a notice of appeal and was filed within the time
period prescribed in the rules; therefore, the jurisdictional requirement is
satisfied. United States v. Cantwell, 470 F.3d 1087, 1089 (5th Cir. 2006)
(citing Smith, 502 U.S. at 248).
       C. DPS’s Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law
       Having concluded we have jurisdiction to consider DPS’s cross-
appeal, we now turn to the merits of the cross-appeal.

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       DPS challenges the district court’s denial of DPS’s Renewed Motion
for Judgment as a Matter of Law, specifically whether Trial Plaintiffs satisfied
the Act’s prerequisite to suit and whether the trial evidence was legally
sufficient to support the jury’s findings as to Barton. We review the district
court’s ruling on a Rule 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law de novo.
Brown v. Bryan County, 219 F.3d 450, 456 (5th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).
A motion for judgment as a matter of law is granted only if “the facts and
inferences point so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of one party that
the [c]ourt believes that reasonable men could not arrive at a contrary
verdict.” Broussard v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 523 F.3d 618, 624 (5th Cir.
2008) (quoting Brown, 219 F.3d at 456). “We consider all of the evidence,
drawing all reasonable inferences and resolving all credibility determinations
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Brown, 219 F.3d at 456
(citation omitted).
       Because each Trial Plaintiff initiated a grievance procedure under
DPS rules regarding their retaliation claims under the Act, we find that Trial
Plaintiffs satisfied the Act’s prerequisite to suit. And because we conclude
that a reasonable jury could find that Shugart did not act with respect to
Barton’s promotion request and that Barton’s report was a but-for cause of
Shugart’s inaction, we find that the evidence is legally sufficient to support
the jury’s findings as to Barton.
              i. Prerequisite to Suit: Riggins and Mahan
       DPS contends that Riggins’s and Mahan’s complaints to an OIG
investigator regarding their transfers did not satisfy the Act’s prerequisite
because the purpose of the OIG procedure is to investigate rather than
resolve a grievance. We disagree.
       As stated above, prior to filing suit, the Act requires employees to
initiate action under the grievance or appeal procedures of the employing

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entity. Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 554.006(a). In this case, the relevant
procedures are set forth in the DPS Manual.
       There is no question that both Riggins and Mahan reported to Lopez
that they were being transferred and that they believed the transfers were
retaliatory. And because both Riggins and Mahan complained to the OIG
about their transfers, these complaints became the subject of a secondary
OIG investigation and were directly addressed in a separate OIG report. The
two OIG investigation reports, including the report addressing Shugart’s
alleged retaliation, were then provided to DPS management.
       Thus, the only question is whether a DPS trooper can initiate the
grievance process by complaining to the DPS OIG. To answer this question,
we consider the DPS Manual and evaluate the function of the OIG division
referral in this context. The DPS Manual encourages troopers to first engage
in face-to-face meetings to resolve disputes. “If the discussions fail to result
in resolution, then dispute resolution methods—such as conflict coaching,
chain-of-command       review,    facilitation,   or   mediation—should        be
utilized. . . .” The manual defines “[d]ispute [r]esolution” as “[a]ny strategy
or method used to resolve grievances, conflicts, or disputes, including, but
not limited to, consultation with a dispute resolution officer, conflict coaching,
chain-of-command review, facilitation, and mediation.” The manual
provides multiple options for employees to address their grievances. “In
addition to the informal avenues for an employee to address grievances or
concerns with management, including consulting with a dispute resolution
officer and conflict coaching, there are two formal procedures that may be
used.” Nothing in the DPS Manual suggests this is an exhaustive list of the
informal grievance procedures that an employee can use, and nothing
prevents employees from utilizing other informal grievance procedures, such
as reporting retaliation to the OIG.

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       DPS argues that while troopers can report retaliation to the OIG, such
reports do not qualify as initiating grievance procedures under the Act
because the OIG and DPS are functionally independent. However, the legal
authority DPS cites in support of this contention is inapposite because it
relies on grievance procedures specific to the City of Houston, not DPS. See
City of Houston v. Garcia, 668 S.W.3d 419, 423–24 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2023, no pet.); see also City of Houston v. Cotton, 31 S.W.3d 823,
825 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. denied).
       Testimony from nearly every DPS official in the troopers’ chain of
command confirms that DPS employees can and were encouraged to address
a grievance by reporting misconduct to their immediate supervisor or to the
OIG. DPS’s own brief chronicles the interaction between OIG and DPS
department heads throughout a division referral, which provides for a
resolution of employee grievances. Moreover, the evidence at trial showed
that the OIG kept DPS apprised of its investigation, and both the OIG report
of investigation and accompanying recommendations were provided to the
DPS chief and DPS general counsel, who are authorized to decide the
appropriate outcome.
       For these reasons, Riggins’s and Mahan’s complaints to the OIG
constituted actions under DPS’s grievance procedures and thus satisfied the
Act’s prerequisite to suit.
              ii. Prerequisite to Suit: Barton
       DPS contends that Barton, too, failed to satisfy the Act’s prerequisite
to suit because the February 8, 2019, letter does not reference Shugart’s
inaction and/or delay with respect to Barton’s application to the Region 2
CNU. We conclude that Barton satisfied the Act’s prerequisite to suit.
       The parties agree that compliance with the Act’s prerequisite to suit
“does not require the use of particular words.” Ward v. Lamar Univ.,

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484 S.W.3d 440, 447 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.). The
parties also agree that the February 8, 2019, letter to the Chief Dispute
Resolution Officer invoked a grievance procedure under the DPS Manual.
However, DPS argues that it was error to deny DPS’s Renewed Motion for
Judgment as a Matter of Law as to Barton because the February 8, 2019, letter
did not provide DPS with fair notice of Barton’s grievance. Specifically, DPS
contends that the letter failed to address the personnel action that ultimately
went before the jury at trial.
       DPS cites Montgomery County Hospital District v. Smith, 181 S.W.3d
844 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2005, no pet.), in support of its argument that
notice of an unspecified action cannot satisfy the Act’s prerequisite to suit.
The Smith court found that “no reasonably prudent employer could have
been subjectively aware” that the plaintiff intended to invoke the disciplinary
appeal process by sending an email where the plaintiff’s email made “no
reference to [plaintiff’s] desire to initiate [defendant’s] appeal and grievance
process.” Id. at 850. In Smith, the plaintiff’s email only requested that the
employer “reconsider . . . the amount she was offered in severance pay,” not
the termination or job reassignment the plaintiff sought to challenge in court.
Id. In the present case, by contrast, the February 8, 2019, letter is an attempt
to initiate the grievance process with respect to a specified action, retaliation.
It begins a consultation with a dispute resolution officer—a mechanism
recognized in the DPS Manual—and the letter states that Barton suffered
retaliation at the hands of Shugart.
       DPS further argues that references to retaliation without specificity
are insufficient because the Garcia court found that a plaintiff’s statement
that “she may be retaliated against for speaking out against the City” was
insufficient to satisfy the Act’s prerequisite. Garcia, 668 S.W.3d at 425.
However, as the Garcia court explained, such statements are insufficient
because the “language refers only to the possibility that Garcia might be

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subjected to adverse personnel action in the future.” Id. (emphasis added).
Unlike the statements in Garcia, the February 8, 2019, letter addressed the
troopers’ whistleblowing accusations and provided that the retaliation had
already occurred.
       For these reasons, the letter was sufficient to put DPS on notice of
Barton’s intent to initiate a grievance procedure regarding Shugart’s
retaliation. Barton further clarified his grievance during his interview with
Lopez when he identified Shugart’s failure to respond to his promotion
request as an example of retaliation by Shugart. Therefore, Barton satisfied
the Act’s prerequisite to suit.
              iii. Sufficiency of the Evidence: Barton
       We now consider whether the evidence was legally sufficient to
support the jury’s verdict as to Barton. As stated above, we review the district
court’s ruling on a motion for judgment as a matter of law de novo. Brown, 219
F.3d at 456. “A motion for judgment as a matter of law . . . in an action tried
by jury is a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting the
jury’s verdict.” Harrington v. Harris, 118 F.3d 359, 367 (5th Cir. 1997)
(alteration in original) (quoting Hiltgen v. Sumrall, 47 F.3d 695, 699
(5th Cir. 1995)).
       Because the evidence shows that Shugart never responded directly to
Barton, we hold that a reasonable jury could find that Shugart did not act
and/or delayed acting with respect to Barton’s promotion request. We
further hold that the evidence is legally sufficient to support the jury’s finding
that Barton’s report of Shugart’s misconduct was a but-for cause of
Shugart’s inaction and/or delay.
       To prevail under the Act, a plaintiff must prove that he or she (1) is a
public employee, (2) acted in good faith in making a report, (3) reported a
violation of law by either an agency or employee, (4) made the report to “an

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appropriate law enforcement authority,” and (5) suffered retaliation.
Tharling v. City of Port Lavaca, 329 F.3d 422, 428 (5th Cir. 2003) (citation
omitted). “While the Texas Whistleblower Act does not explicitly require an
employee to prove a causal link between the report and the subsequent
[retaliation], the Texas Supreme Court has held that [a] plaintiff must prove
causation by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. at 430 (citing City of Fort
Worth v. Zimlich, 29 S.W.3d 62, 67 (Tex. 2000)).
       On cross-appeal, DPS contends that no reasonable jury could find that
Shugart failed to act with respect to Barton’s promotion request, much less
that Barton’s whistleblowing caused Shugart to retaliate. As to whether
Shugart engaged in retaliation, DPS points to evidence showing Shugart
approved Barton’s request for a recommendation approximately three hours
after the request was made. In response, Barton argues that the same
evidence DPS cites supports the jury verdict because Shugart’s email
approving Barton’s request was sent only to Brazil. We agree with Barton.
       The record shows that Shugart’s email approving Barton’s request
was never sent to Barton, and in fact, it was not until litigation began that
Barton learned of Shugart’s approval. At trial, Barton testified that it was
common practice to seek chain-of-command approval, and on most occasions
his immediate supervisors responded to him “fairly quickly” with the
requested approval. Moreover, the email soliciting applications for the
Region 2 CNU, which Barton sent to Shugart along with his request, required
“Chain-of-Command approval (via email)” and stated that “applications
along with required documentation must be received by close of business on
01/17/2019.” Considering this evidence, a reasonable jury could conclude
that Shugart’s failure to respond directly to Barton was a departure from the
typical practice and constituted retaliatory inaction on Shugart’s part.

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       Turning next to causation, DPS argues that the jury engaged in
impermissible speculation when it concluded that Barton’s report was a
cause of Shugart’s inaction and/or delay. “Texas courts have consistently
held that ‘[c]ircumstantial evidence may be sufficient to establish a ca[us]al
link between the adverse employment action and the reporting of illegal
conduct.’” Bosque v. Starr County, 630 F. App’x 300, 306–07 (5th Cir. 2015)
(per curiam) (alterations in original) (quoting Zimlich, 29 S.W.3d at 69).
Here, we find that a reasonable jury could have relied on the available
circumstantial evidence to conclude there was a causal link between Barton’s
report and Shugart’s inaction. Not only did Shugart have knowledge of the
troopers’ reports against him, but he also expressed a negative attitude
toward the troopers who reported him. Barton testified that in October 2018
Shugart accused him of “going rogue” and warned him that Shugart was
aware of the ongoing investigation. Further, the retaliation took place while
DPS and OIG were actively investigating the accusations regarding Shugart’s
misconduct. Even without engaging in what DPS labels “impermissible
speculation,” a reasonable jury could infer that Barton’s report was a but-for
cause of Shugart’s inaction with respect to Barton’s promotion request.
       Viewing the evidence “in the light most favorable to the jury’s
determination,” the evidence supports the jury’s finding that Shugart failed
to act on Barton’s promotion request and that such inaction was caused by
Barton’s report of a perceived illegal quota system and other violations of
DPS policy. Harrington, 118 F.3d at 367 (quoting Hiltgen, 47 F.3d at 700).
Accordingly, we hold that the evidence is legally sufficient to support the
jury’s verdict as to Barton.
       For the foregoing reasons, we find that the district court did not
commit reversible error by denying DPS’s Renewed Motion for Judgment as
a Matter of Law.

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       D. Amended Final Judgment
       Finally, we turn to the district court’s imposition of equitable relief in
its Amended Final Judgment. We review the district court’s decision to enter
a corrected judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(a) for abuse
of discretion. Rivera v. PNS Stores, Inc., 647 F.3d 188, 193 (5th Cir. 2011)
(citation omitted). “But the determination of whether it is Rule 60(a) that
authorizes the correction—as opposed to Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b)—is a
question of law that we review de novo.” Id. (citation omitted).
       Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(a) permits a district court to
“correct a clerical mistake or a mistake arising from oversight or omission
whenever one is found in a judgment.” Although a court may exercise its
authority under Rule 60(a) at any time, “it may do so only to provide ‘a
specific and very limited type of relief,’ relief that is different in kind from an
alteration or amendment of the judgment under Rule 59(e) or relief due to
mistake or inadvertence under Rule 60(b)(1).” Rivera, 647 F.3d at 193
(footnote and citation omitted). “To be correctable under Rule 60(a), the
‘mistake must not be one of judgment or even of misidentification, but
merely of recitation, of the sort that a clerk or amanuensis might commit,
mechanical in nature.’” In re Galiardi, 745 F.2d 335, 337 (5th Cir. 1984) (per
curiam) (quoting Dura-Wood Treating Co. v. Century Forest Indus., Inc., 694
F.2d 112, 114 (5th Cir. 1982)). Rule 60(a) “does not grant a district court
carte blanche to supplement by amendment an earlier order by what is
subsequently claimed to be an oversight or omission.” Id.
       “Our past decisions have looked to three criteria to determine
whether a mistake can be corrected under Rule 60(a): (1) the nature of the
mistake; (2) the district court’s intent in entering the original judgment; and
(3) the effect of the correction on the parties’ substantial rights.” Rivera, 647
F.3d at 193.

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       As to the first factor, the change to the judgment did not target a
clerical mistake. The Amended Final Judgment awarded Trial Plaintiffs
equitable relief. In its original Final Judgment, entered July 20, 2022, the
district court awarded only compensatory damages.
       As to the second factor, the district court explained that the omission
of equitable relief was “erroneous[].” But the record contains no indication
of the district court’s intent to award equitable relief at the time it entered
the original Final Judgment. During the hearing on October 19, 2022, the
district court admitted it had “made a mistake” when it “overlooked” the
component of equitable relief and entered the Final Judgment based solely on
the jury’s verdict. A court’s “‘own subsequent statements of [its] intent’ are
reliable evidence in the Rule 60(a) context.” Rivera, 647 F.3d at 197 (citation
omitted).
       However, moving on to the third factor, the amendment here
“impermissibly affects the parties’ substantial rights.” Id. at 199.
Specifically, the amended judgment requires DPS to provide equitable relief
that was not contemplated by the original judgment. See Rutherford v. Harris
County, 197 F.3d 173, 190 (5th Cir. 1999) (“[C]orrection of an error in
substantive judgment is outside the reach of Rule 60(a).” (citation omitted)).
Accordingly, we find that it was error to amend the judgment under
Rule 60(a) to impose equitable relief.
       Trial Plaintiffs invite us to consider the district court’s authority to
amend the judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), which
allows a party to file “[a] motion to alter or amend a judgment . . . no later
than 28 days after the entry of the judgment.” However, we decline to
speculate beyond the plain language of the Amended Final Judgment to
invoke this rule, particularly where the record shows the district court took
under advisement Trial Plaintiffs’ Rule 59(e) motion, DPS’s response, and

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the parties’ oral argument and yet, the district court did not include any
language in the Amended Final Judgment to suggest that it was applying its
authority under Rule 59(e).
       Because the district court’s correction in the Amended Final
Judgment was substantive and affected DPS’s substantial rights by requiring
specific performance that was not included in the original Final Judgment,
we find the district court’s imposition of equitable relief under Rule 60(a)
was an abuse of discretion.
                              IV. CONCLUSION
       For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s order
granting DPS’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to Sikes’s claims under
the Act, AFFIRM the district court’s order denying DPS’s Renewed
Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law as to Trial Plaintiffs’ claims under
the Act, VACATE the imposition of equitable relief in the Amended Final
Judgment, and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.

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