Court Opinion

ID: 9391060
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-29 07:02:48.065915+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:39.076855
License: Public Domain

Supreme Court of Florida
                            _____________

                          No. SC2023-0531
                            _____________

                       DARRYL B. BARWICK,
                           Appellant,

                                  vs.

                        STATE OF FLORIDA,
                             Appellee.

                            April 28, 2023

PER CURIAM.

     Darryl B. Barwick, a prisoner under sentence of death for

whom a warrant has been signed and an execution set for May 3,

2023, appeals the circuit court’s orders summarily denying his

second successive motion for postconviction relief, which was filed

under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851; denying his motion

for a stay of execution; and sustaining objections to his public

records requests, which were made under rule 3.852. We have

jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. For the reasons that

follow, we affirm.
                         I. BACKGROUND

     On March 31, 1986, after observing the victim sunbathing at

her Panama City apartment complex, Barwick returned to his home

to retrieve a knife and walked back to the apartment complex. He

followed the victim into her apartment, stabbed her thirty-seven

times, wrapped her in a comforter, and left her body in the

bathroom for her sister to find when she returned to their shared

apartment that evening. Bloody fingerprints were found on the

victim’s purse and wallet, and her bathing suit had been displaced.

Semen was found on the comforter wrapped around her body, and

it was determined that Barwick was included within the two percent

of the population who could have left the stain. Barwick was

arrested and confessed to law enforcement and multiple family

members. Barwick v. State, 660 So. 2d 685, 688-89 (Fla. 1995).

     Barwick was indicted on charges of first-degree murder, armed

burglary, attempted sexual battery, and armed robbery. He was

initially found guilty as charged and subsequently sentenced to

death for the murder in 1987, but the convictions and sentences

                                -2-
were vacated due to a Neil violation during jury selection.1 Id. at

689. At his retrial in 1992, the jury again found Barwick guilty as

charged and unanimously recommended a sentence of death. The

trial court found that the following aggravators had been

established beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) previous convictions for

the violent felonies of sexual battery with force likely to cause death

or great bodily harm and burglary of a dwelling with an assault; (2)

the murder was committed during an attempted sexual battery; (3)

the murder was committed to avoid arrest; (4) the murder was

committed for pecuniary gain; (5) the murder was especially

heinous, atrocious, or cruel; and (6) the murder was committed in a

cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of

moral justification. The trial court found that each potential

mitigator proposed by Barwick was either not established by the

      1. Barwick had objected to the State’s use of peremptory
challenges to excuse three black jurors, and the trial court
incorrectly believed that Barwick had no standing to make an
objection under State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1984)—which
prohibits the use of peremptory challenges on prospective jurors
based solely on their race—due to the fact that both he and the
victim were white. See Barwick v. State, 547 So. 2d 612, 612 (Fla.
1989).

                                 -3-
evidence or was not a significant mitigating circumstance. The trial

court followed the jury’s recommendation of a sentence of death for

the murder and also sentenced Barwick to life for armed burglary

with a battery, thirty years for attempted sexual battery, and life for

armed robbery. Id. at 689-90.

     On appeal after retrial, this Court concluded that although the

trial court erred in applying the cold, calculated, and premeditated

aggravator, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and

Barwick’s convictions and sentences were affirmed. Id. at 696-97.

The convictions and sentences became final when the United States

Supreme Court denied certiorari in 1996. Barwick v. Florida, 516

U.S. 1097 (1996).

     In the decades since, Barwick has unsuccessfully challenged

his convictions and sentences in state and federal court. See

Barwick v. State, 88 So. 3d 85 (Fla. 2011) (affirming the denial of

Barwick’s initial motion for postconviction relief and denying his

state habeas petition); Barwick v. Crews, 5:12cv00159-RH, 2014

WL 1057088 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 19, 2014) (denying Barwick’s federal

habeas petition); Barwick v. Sec’y, Fla. Dept. of Corr., 794 F.3d 1239

(11th Cir. 2015) (affirming the denial of Barwick’s federal habeas

                                 -4-
petition); Barwick v. State, 237 So. 3d 927 (Fla. 2018) (affirming the

denial of Barwick’s first successive motion for postconviction relief).

     Governor Ron DeSantis signed Barwick’s death warrant on

April 3, 2023. Barwick then filed a second successive motion for

postconviction relief under rule 3.851, raising three claims: (1) the

scheduling of Barwick’s execution and warrant litigation violates his

right to due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments

to the United States Constitution and the corresponding provisions

of the Florida Constitution and deprives him of the effective

assistance of postconviction counsel; (2) newly discovered evidence

shows that the death penalty is a categorically unconstitutional

punishment for individuals who were under age twenty-one when

they committed their capital offenses; and (3) because of his severe

neuropsychological disorder, lifelong cognitive impairments, and

low mental age, executing Barwick would violate the Eighth and

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The

circuit court summarily denied all three claims, as well as Barwick’s

motion for a stay and certain requests for public records. This

appeal followed.

                                 -5-
                           II. ANALYSIS

    A. Due Process, Effective Assistance of Postconviction
       Counsel, Stay of Execution, and Public Records

     In his first issue on appeal, Barwick claims primarily that the

compressed warrant litigation schedule resulted in the denial of his

rights to due process and the effective assistance of postconviction

counsel. He addresses these claims as a single issue, asserting that

due process depends on the effective assistance of counsel, and that

the accelerated warrant schedule and other attendant

circumstances made it impossible for Barwick to be provided with

effective assistance of postconviction counsel.

     The circuit court summarily denied this consolidated claim,

finding that Barwick was not denied due process because he did not

allege that he was ever denied notice or an opportunity to be heard

and that he was not denied effective assistance of postconviction

counsel because he has no right to effective assistance of

postconviction counsel. We agree that summary denial of this claim

was proper.

     Barwick has made it abundantly clear in his pleadings filed in

both the circuit court and this Court that the post-warrant litigation

                                 -6-
in this case has been very arduous for his counsel due to certain

circumstances that happened to coincide with the beginning of the

warrant period, such as the occurrence of Holy Week, Passover, and

Ramadan; co-counsel being ill; and the presence of another inmate

on Death Watch. 2 Indeed, post-warrant litigation is arduous, even

without such circumstances. Yet none of the obstacles identified by

Barwick resulted in a denial of due process.

     The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the

United States Constitution provides that no state shall “deprive any

person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S.

Const. amend. XIV. The Florida Constitution similarly provides

that “[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without

due process of law.” Art. I, § 9, Fla. Const. “Due process requires

that a defendant be given notice and an opportunity to be heard on

a matter before it is decided.” Asay v. State, 210 So. 3d 1, 27 (Fla.

2016) (citing Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982, 982 (Fla. 1993)). But as

the circuit court recognized in summarily denying this claim,

    2. “Death Watch” is a designated area of Florida State Prison
where death row inmates under an active death warrant are
housed.

                                 -7-
Barwick has not identified any matter on which he was denied

notice or an opportunity to be heard before it was decided. We have

previously denied a due process claim raised in the death warrant

context on this basis. See id. at 27-28 (rejecting due process claim

where capital defendant under a death warrant failed to state when

he was denied notice or an opportunity to be heard at any stage of

his postconviction proceedings). Because Barwick has failed to

state when he was denied notice or an opportunity to be heard, his

due process claim fails.

     Barwick also alleges that the thirty-day warrant period and the

difficult attendant circumstances identified by Barwick made it

impossible for postconviction counsel to provide effective

assistance, thereby violating what he claims is his “statutory right

to effective postconviction counsel.” Under Florida law, individuals

sentenced to death are entitled to the appointment of capital

postconviction counsel for the purpose of pursuing any collateral

attacks on their convictions and sentences. See § 27.702(1), Fla.

Stat. (2022) (“The capital collateral regional counsel shall represent

each person convicted and sentenced to death in this state for the

sole purpose of instituting and prosecuting collateral actions

                                 -8-
challenging the legality of the judgment and sentence imposed . . .

.”). Barwick argues that along with the entitlement to counsel,

section 27.711(12), Florida Statutes (2022), establishes a “statutory

right to effective postconviction counsel.”

     Section 27.711(12) provides:

           The court shall monitor the performance of assigned
     counsel to ensure that the capital defendant is receiving
     quality representation. The court shall also receive and
     evaluate allegations that are made regarding the
     performance of assigned counsel. The Justice
     Administrative Commission, the Department of Legal
     Affairs, or any interested person may advise the court of
     any circumstance that could affect the quality of
     representation, including, but not limited to, false or
     fraudulent billing, misconduct, failure to meet continuing
     legal education requirements, solicitation to receive
     compensation from the capital defendant, or failure to file
     appropriate motions in a timely manner.

§ 27.711(12), Fla. Stat. But Barwick ignores other provisions within

chapter 27 that make it clear that the “quality representation”

referenced in section 27.711(12) does not create a right to effective

assistance of postconviction counsel. Section 27.711(10) plainly

states that “[a]n action taken by an attorney who represents a

capital defendant in postconviction capital collateral proceedings

may not be the basis for a claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel.” § 27.711(10), Fla. Stat. (2022). Section 27.7002(1) states

                                 -9-
that capital defendants may not “challenge in any form or manner

the adequacy of the collateral representation provided,” and section

27.7002(2) provides that the “sole method of assuring adequacy of

representation provided shall be in accordance with the provisions

of s[ection] 27.711(12),” i.e., court monitoring. §§ 27.7002(1), (2),

Fla. Stat. (2022). The fact that these provisions of chapter 27

expressly prohibit capital defendants from raising claims of

ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel or otherwise

challenging the adequacy of their postconviction representation

forecloses any argument that section 27.711(12) creates a right to

effective postconviction counsel.

     Despite the plain language of these statutes, Barwick argues

that this Court recognized the right to effective assistance of capital

postconviction counsel when it stated in Spalding v. Dugger, 526

So. 2d 71, 72 (Fla. 1988), that “under section 27.702, each

defendant under sentence of death is entitled, as a statutory right,

to effective legal representation by the capital collateral

representative in all collateral relief proceedings.” But in Asay, we

clarified that “Spalding only requires that a defendant be

represented by an attorney during postconviction proceedings.”

                                 - 10 -
210 So. 3d at 28. And none of the cases cited by Barwick in

support of what he claims to be Spalding’s “holding” compel a

different conclusion.

     We have also specifically held that “[u]nder Florida and federal

law, a defendant has no constitutional right to effective collateral

counsel.” Zack v. State, 911 So. 2d 1190, 1203 (Fla. 2005).

Further, the United States Supreme Court has “refused to extend a

due process requirement for effective collateral counsel to situations

where a state, like Florida, has opted to afford collateral counsel to

indigent inmates.” Id. (citing Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551

(1987)). Thus, a claim of ineffective assistance of postconviction

counsel does not provide a valid basis for relief.

     Within this first issue on appeal, Barwick also challenges the

circuit court’s denial of his motion for a stay of execution. We agree

with the circuit court that Barwick did not establish any substantial

grounds upon which relief might be granted if a stay had been

ordered. As a result, his motion was properly denied. See Dillbeck

v. State, 357 So. 3d 94, 103 (Fla.) (“ ‘[A] stay of execution on a

successive motion for postconviction relief is warranted only where

there are substantial grounds upon which relief might be granted.’

                                 - 11 -
”) (quoting Davis v. State, 142 So. 3d 867, 873-74 (Fla. 2014)), cert.

denied, 143 S. Ct. 856 (2023).

      Finally, to the extent that Barwick has also raised a claim that

the circuit court erred in denying his access to certain public

records under rule 3.852(h)(3), it is insufficiently pleaded because

he has not identified which updated records he was denied. Thus,

Barwick is not entitled to relief regarding his public records

requests. See Heath v. State, 3 So. 3d 1017, 1029 n.8 (Fla. 2009)

(“Vague and conclusory allegations on appeal are insufficient to

warrant relief.”).

      After consideration of each of the arguments raised in this

issue, we find no error in the circuit court’s summary denial of

Claim 1 of Barwick’s second successive motion for postconviction

relief.

          B. Newly Discovered Evidence/Extension of Roper

      In his second issue on appeal, Barwick argues that the circuit

court erred in denying Claim 2 of his second successive

postconviction motion, in which he argued that he is categorically

exempt from execution because he was under the age of twenty-one

when he committed his capital offense. Barwick asserts that

                                 - 12 -
“[n]ewly discovered evidence of a definitive consensus regarding

adolescent brain development demonstrates that the death penalty

is a categorically unconstitutional punishment for individuals who

committed their offenses when they were between the ages of 18 to

21.” At its core, this is a claim that Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.

551, 578 (2005)—which held that “[t]he Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendments forbid imposition of the death penalty on offenders

who were under the age of 18 when their crimes were committed”—

should be extended to individuals who were under the age of

twenty-one at the time their capital offenses were committed.

     The “definitive consensus” to which Barwick refers is reflected

in an August 2022 “resolution” from the American Psychological

Association (APA). 3 In short, the resolution states that “based upon

the rationale of the Roper decision and currently available science,

APA concludes the same prohibitions that have been applied to

application of the penalty of death for persons who commit a

serious crime at ages 17 and younger should apply to persons ages

      3. APA RESOLUTION on the Imposition of Death as a Penalty
for Persons Aged 18 Through 20, Also Known As the Late Adolescent
Class, American Psychological Association (August 2022),
https://www.apa.org/about/policy/resolution-death-penalty.pdf.

                                - 13 -
18 through 20,” because “there is no neuroscientific bright line

regarding brain development that indicates the brains of 18- to 20-

year-olds differ in any substantive way from those of 17-year-olds.”

The circuit court summarily denied this claim as procedurally

barred, untimely, and without merit.

     The circuit court was correct in concluding that this claim is

procedurally barred because it is a variation of claims that were

raised in prior proceedings. In Claim 22 of his initial postconviction

proceedings, Barwick argued that because he suffers from brain

damage and a mental and emotional age of less than eighteen

years, his execution would offend the evolving standards of decency,

serve no legitimate penological goal, and violate the Eighth and

Fourteenth Amendments under Roper. He argued that his

“neuropsychological impairments and his youth warrant

consideration” and that he “lacks the requisite ‘highly culpable

mental state’ ” for capital punishment. In denying relief, the

postconviction court recognized this claim as a Roper-extension

claim and declined to “extend the holding in Roper.”

     Similarly, in Argument 1 of his petition for a writ of habeas

corpus, filed in this Court in 2008, Barwick argued that due to his

                                - 14 -
brain damage, mental impairment, and mental and emotional age of

less than eighteen years, his execution would offend the evolving

standards of decency of a civilized society, serve no legitimate

penological goal, and violate the Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendments under Roper. He further argued that capital

punishment should not be imposed where a defendant, like himself,

lacks the requisite “highly culpable mental state.” See Barwick, 88

So. 3d at 106 (rejecting habeas claim that because Barwick’s

mental age is less than eighteen due to brain damage and mental

capacity, his execution is unconstitutional under Roper).

     These initial postconviction and state habeas claims both

asserted that although Barwick was nineteen when he committed

the murder, Roper’s categorical ban on executing juveniles should

be extended to him because he had a “mental and emotional age of

less than eighteen years” at the time of the murder. The argument

at the core of the instant claim is similarly that the mental and

emotional age of eighteen- to twenty-year-olds cannot be

distinguished reliably from that of sixteen- to seventeen-year-olds,

and Roper should therefore extend to individuals who, like Barwick,

                                - 15 -
were eighteen to twenty years old when they committed their capital

murders.

     There is no doubt that Barwick is attempting to relitigate the

same issue—that Roper should extend to him—that he has raised in

two prior proceedings, now disguised as a claim of newly discovered

evidence. Barwick acknowledges in his second successive motion

that he previously “has raised the factual basis of [this] claim.”

Barwick is admittedly using “a different argument to relitigate the

same issue,” which is inappropriate. Medina v. State, 573 So. 2d

293, 295 (Fla. 1990). The circuit court was correct in denying this

claim as procedurally barred because versions of it were raised in

prior proceedings.

     The circuit court also denied this claim as untimely because

the APA resolution does not constitute newly discovered evidence

such that it creates an exception to the one-year time limitation for

filing postconviction claims. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(d)(1)

(requiring that “[a]ny motion to vacate judgment of conviction and

sentence of death shall be filed by the defendant within 1 year after

the judgment and sentence become final”); Fla. R. Crim. P.

3.851(d)(2)(A) (creating an exception to the one-year time limitation

                                 - 16 -
if “the facts on which the claim is predicated were unknown to the

movant or the movant’s attorney and could not have been

ascertained by the exercise of due diligence”).

     The APA resolution appears to be the association’s official or

public stance that the death penalty should be banned in cases

where the offender was under twenty-one years of age at the time of

the capital offense. The resolution cites approximately fifty sources

in support of this position, including articles published in

psychology journals, law reviews, by universities, and by at least

one of each of the following: a “nonprofit think tank,” a “research

and advocacy center,” a federal agency, and a news outlet. It also

cites reports, books, online registries, and meta-analyses. Thus, it

is fair to say that the APA’s resolution is based on a compilation of

studies, research, data, and reports, published between 1992 and

2022 and relying on data from as early as 1977, and therefore does

not constitute newly discovered evidence under rule 3.851(d)(2)(A).

     This Court has routinely held that resolutions, consensus

opinions, articles, research, and the like, do not constitute newly

discovered evidence. See, e.g., Foster v. State, 258 So. 3d 1248,

1253 (Fla. 2018) (rejecting as untimely an extension-of-Roper claim

                                - 17 -
relying on scientific research and a 2018 American Bar Association

(ABA) resolution recommending individuals under twenty-two be

exempt from execution, because they do not qualify as newly

discovered evidence); Branch v. State, 236 So. 3d 981, 984-87 (Fla.

2018) (rejecting as untimely an extension-of-Roper claim that relied

on new scientific research, scientific consensus, international

consensus, and the 2018 ABA resolution, because they do not

qualify as newly discovered evidence); Schwab v. State, 969 So. 2d

318, 325 (Fla. 2007) (holding that “new opinions” and “research

studies” are not newly discovered evidence); Rutherford v. State, 940

So. 2d 1112, 1117 (Fla. 2006) (holding that a 2006 ABA report was

not newly discovered evidence because it was “a compilation of

previously available information”). Because the August 2022 APA

resolution does not qualify as newly discovered evidence, this claim

was properly summarily denied as untimely.

     This claim is also without merit because this Court lacks the

authority to extend Roper. The conformity clause of article I,

section 17 of the Florida Constitution provides that “[t]he

prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment, and the

prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, shall be

                                - 18 -
construed in conformity with decisions of the United States

Supreme Court which interpret the prohibition against cruel and

unusual punishment provided in the Eighth Amendment to the

United States Constitution.” This means that the Supreme Court’s

interpretation of the Eighth Amendment is both the floor and the

ceiling for protection from cruel and unusual punishment in

Florida, and this Court cannot interpret Florida’s prohibition

against cruel and unusual punishment to provide protection that

the Supreme Court has decided is not afforded by the Eighth

Amendment.

     Because the Supreme Court has interpreted the Eighth

Amendment to limit the exemption from execution to those whose

chronological age was less than eighteen years at the time of their

crimes, this Court is bound by that interpretation and is precluded

from interpreting Florida’s prohibition against cruel and unusual

punishment to exempt individuals eighteen or more years old from

execution on the basis of their age at the time of their crimes. This

Court simply does not have the authority to extend Roper to

Barwick based on his age of nineteen at the time of the murder.

Accordingly, Barwick is not entitled to relief.

                                 - 19 -
                       C. Extension of Atkins

     Barwick’s final claim on appeal is that the circuit court erred

in denying Claim 3 of his second successive postconviction motion,

in which he argued that there is no meaningful distinction between

his reduced moral culpability on account of his “trifecta of

vulnerabilities”—severe neuropsychological disorder, immutable

cognitive impairments, and low mental age at the time of the

murder—and that of individuals with indistinguishable deficits due

to intellectual disability, and therefore his execution, like that of an

intellectually disabled person or a juvenile, would violate the Eighth

and Fourteenth Amendments. In short, Barwick asserts that even

though he is not intellectually disabled, he is entitled to the same

protection under Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), which held

that the Eighth Amendment prohibits execution of the intellectually

disabled. The circuit court also framed this as an “extension-of-

Atkins” claim and denied it as procedurally barred, untimely, and

without merit.

     We agree that this claim is procedurally barred because it, or a

variation of it, has been raised in a prior proceeding. In Claim 5 of

his initial motion for postconviction relief, Barwick argued that

                                 - 20 -
because he is intellectually disabled, his execution would violate the

Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments under Atkins. See Barwick,

88 So. 3d at 92 n.6 (identifying as Claim 5 of Barwick’s initial

postconviction proceedings that “Barwick is ineligible for the death

penalty pursuant to Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), and

section 921.1[3]7, Florida Statutes (2010), because he is

[intellectually disabled]”).

     Similarly, as explained in Issue 2, Claim 22 in Barwick’s initial

postconviction proceedings was that because he suffers from

neuropsychological impairments, a mental and emotional age of

less than eighteen years, and lacks the requisite highly culpable

mental state his execution would violate the Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendments. And in Argument 1 of his state habeas petition,

Barwick also argued that his execution would violate the Eighth

and Fourteenth Amendments, due to his brain damage, mental

impairment, mental and emotional age of less than eighteen years,

and lack of the requisite highly culpable mental state.

     At their core, all three of the aforementioned prior claims and

the instant claim on appeal have posited that Barwick should be

exempt from execution due to his mental deficiencies. Thus, the

                                - 21 -
instant claim is a variation of claims that were raised in prior

proceedings, and as such, is procedurally barred.

     Even if this claim had not been raised in a prior proceeding, it

is still procedurally barred because it could have been raised

previously. See Branch, 236 So. 3d at 986 (holding that an

extension-of-Roper claim was procedurally barred in an active

warrant case because it could have been raised previously);

Simmons v. State, 105 So. 3d 475, 511 (Fla. 2012) (rejecting as

procedurally barred a claim, based on Roper and Atkins, that the

defendant was exempt from execution based on mental illness and

neuropsychological deficits because it could have been raised in

prior proceedings).

     This claim was also properly denied as untimely. Barwick

asserts that the circuit court erred in denying this claim as

untimely, because, according to Barwick, procedural bars do not

apply to claims of categorical exemption from execution. Barwick is

wrong. Procedural bars do apply to exemption-from-execution

claims. See Dillbeck, 357 So. 3d at 100 (holding that this Court’s

precedent “flatly refutes Dillbeck’s contention that no time limits

apply to categorical exemption claims”).

                                - 22 -
     Finally, even if it were not procedurally barred or untimely,

this claim is without merit. As we have very recently reiterated,

“the categorical bar of Atkins that shields the intellectually disabled

from execution does not apply to individuals with other forms of

mental illness or brain damage.” Id.; see also Carroll v. State, 114

So. 3d 883, 887 (Fla. 2013) (rejecting as untimely, procedurally

barred, and meritless, claim that the protections of Atkins and

Roper should be extended to defendant who is less culpable as a

result of mental illness); Simmons, 105 So. 3d at 511 (holding claim

that persons with mental illness must be treated similarly to those

with intellectual disability due to reduced culpability to be without

merit); Lawrence v. State, 969 So. 2d 294, 300 n.9 (Fla. 2007)

(rejecting assertion that the Equal Protection Clause requires

extension of Atkins to the mentally ill due to their reduced

culpability).

     This claim is also meritless because, like Barwick’s Roper-

extension claim, under the Eighth Amendment conformity clause in

article I, section 17 of the Florida Constitution, this Court must

interpret Florida’s prohibition against cruel and unusual

punishment in conformity with decisions of the Supreme Court,

                                 - 23 -
which has limited the categorical ban announced in Atkins so that

individuals with mental deficiencies other than intellectual

disability are outside the scope of that ban. Just as this Court

lacks the authority to extend Roper to individuals over the age of

seventeen, it also lacks the authority to extend Atkins to individuals

who, like Barwick, are not intellectually disabled as provided in

Atkins. Thus, Barwick’s “trifecta of vulnerabilities” does not exempt

him from execution.

                         III. CONCLUSION

     For the reasons stated above, we affirm the circuit court’s

order summarily denying the second successive postconviction

motion and its orders sustaining the objections to the public

records requests and denying a stay of execution.

     No motion for rehearing will be entertained by this Court. The

mandate shall issue immediately.

     It is so ordered.

MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, COURIEL, GROSSHANS, and
FRANCIS, JJ., concur.
LABARGA, J., concurs in result with an opinion.

                                - 24 -
LABARGA, J., concurring in result.

     As the majority observes, “post-warrant litigation is arduous,”

see majority op. at 7, and a death warrant by its very nature

requires expedited proceedings. However, these solemn proceedings

ultimately involve carrying out a sentence of death for the most

aggravated and least mitigated of murders and must still ensure

due process of law. I am extremely concerned by the recent pace of

death warrants and the speed with which the parties and involved

entities must carry out their respective duties.

     Barwick has raised concerns about the accelerated timetable

and argues that “[t]he death warrant proceedings in [his] case

lacked any indicia of meaningfulness.” While I agree that Barwick’s

claims are not entitled to relief under this Court’s precedent, I

nonetheless caution that even in this final stage of capital

proceedings, a meaningful process must be ensured.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Bay County,
    Christopher N. Patterson, Judge
    Case No. 031986CF000940XXAXMX

Robert Friedman, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Karin L.
Moore, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, and Drew A.
Sena, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Northern
Region, Tallahassee, Florida,

                                - 25 -
    for Appellant

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Jason W. Rodriguez, Assistant
Attorney General, and Steven Edward Woods, Assistant Attorney
General, Tallahassee, Florida,

    for Appellee

                             - 26 -