Court Opinion

ID: 9963790
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-26 12:02:55.048737+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:59.952721
License: Public Domain

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                                Ajdini v. Frank Lill & Son, Inc.

                  AJREDIN AJDINI v. FRANK LILL & SON,
                             INC., ET AL.
                              (SC 20836)
                      Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria, Mullins,
                            Ecker, Alexander and Dannehy, Js.

                                           Syllabus

         Pursuant to statute (§ 31-294c (b)), whenever an employer contests liability
            to pay workers’ compensation benefits, the employer ‘‘shall file’’ with
            the workers’ compensation administrative law judge, on or before the
            twenty-eighth day after the employer has received the employee’s written
            notice of claim, a notice of intention to contest the employee’s right to
            compensation benefits.

         The defendants, F Co. and F Co.’s insurer and third-party workers’ compensa-
            tion benefit administrator, appealed from the decision of the Compensa-
            tion Review Board, which upheld the decision of the administrative law
            judge precluding the defendants from contesting liability for injuries
            sustained by the plaintiff during the course of his employment with F
            Co. Within twenty-eight days of receiving the plaintiff’s notice of claims,
            F Co. mailed to the administrative law judge a notice of intention to
            contest the plaintiff’s right to compensation benefits pursuant to § 31-
            294c (b), but the administrative law judge did not receive the notice of
            intention until after the twenty-eight day statutory period elapsed. The
            administrative law judge thereafter granted the plaintiff’s motion to
            preclude the defendants from contesting liability, concluding that,
            because F Co. had failed to commence payment for the claims or file
            its notice of intention to contest within twenty-eight days following
            receipt of the plaintiff’s notice of claims, as required by § 31-294c (b),
            the defendants were presumed to have accepted the compensability of
            the plaintiff’s alleged injuries and precluded from contesting his claims.
            The board upheld the administrative law judge’s decision, and, there-
            after, the defendants appealed.

         Held that the board properly upheld the administrative law judge’s decision
            to preclude the defendants from contesting liability, as F Co. did not
            file its notice of intention to contest with the administrative law judge
            on or before the twenty-eighth day after receiving the plaintiff’s notice of
            claims and, therefore, failed to satisfy the requirements of § 31-294c (b):

             Because the statutory scheme did not define the word ‘‘file,’’ this court
             looked to dictionary definitions for its commonly approved usage and
             concluded that, under § 31-294c (b), it was plain and unambiguous that
             an employer’s notice of intention to contest an employee’s right to com-
             pensation benefits must be delivered, and not just mailed, to the adminis-
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                            Ajdini v. Frank Lill & Son, Inc.
         trative law judge on or before the twenty-eighth day after the employer
         received the employee’s notice of claim.

         Moreover, in addition to requiring the employer to ‘‘file’’ a notice of
         intention to contest with the administrative law judge, § 31-294c (b)
         requires the employer to ‘‘send’’ a copy of its notice of intention to the
         employee, the use of the words ‘‘send’’ and ‘‘file’’ in the same provision
         suggested that the legislature intended for the terms to have different
         meanings, and, if the legislature had wanted for an employer to meet
         its statutory requirements by simply mailing its notice of intention to
         the administrative law judge, it could have used the word ‘‘send’’ rather
         than the word ‘‘file,’’ the plain meaning of which requires an employer
         to do more than place the notice in the mail.

         Contrary to the defendants’ argument, the mailbox rule did not apply in
         the present case, as that rule provides that a properly stamped and
         addressed letter that is placed in a mailbox or submitted to the United
         States Postal Service raises a rebuttable presumption that it will be
         received, and a presumption that the notice of intention will be received
         does not raise a presumption that that notice will be received timely,
         on or before the twenty-eighth day after the employer receives the
         employee’s notice of claim.

                Argued February 8—officially released April 23, 2024

                                  Procedural History

          Appeal from the decision of the administrative law
       judge for the Fourth District of the Workers’ Compensa-
       tion Commission granting the plaintiff’s motion to pre-
       clude the defendants from contesting liability as to his
       claims for certain workers’ compensation benefits,
       brought to the Compensation Review Board, which
       affirmed the administrative law judge’s decision, and
       the defendants appealed. Affirmed.

         Peter M. LoVerme, for the appellants (defendants).
         Andrew E. Wallace, for the appellee (plaintiff).

                                       Opinion

        ROBINSON, C. J. The sole issue in this appeal is
       whether an employer meets its statutory obligation pur-
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                                Ajdini v. Frank Lill & Son, Inc.

         suant to General Statutes § 31-294c (b)1 to ‘‘file’’ notice
         of its intention to contest liability to pay compensation
         for an employee’s workers’ compensation claim by plac-
         ing that notice in the mail within the twenty-eight day
         statutory period, regardless of whether that notice is
         received after the statutory period has elapsed. The
         defendants, Frank Lill & Son, Inc. (employer), and its
         workers’ compensation carriers,2 appeal3 from the deci-
         sion of the Compensation Review Board (board) affirming
         the decision of the administrative law judge for the
         Fourth District of the Workers’ Compensation Commis-
         sion (commission), who granted the motion to preclude
         filed by the plaintiff, Ajredin Ajdini. On appeal, the
         defendants claim that the board incorrectly concluded
         that the employer had not timely complied with its
         statutory obligation under § 31-294c (b) to contest liabil-
         ity because it placed the notice in the mail within the
         statutory period, and ‘‘mailing’’ is the same as ‘‘filing’’
         for purposes of § 31-294c (b). We disagree with the
         defendants and, accordingly, affirm the decision of
         the board.
            1
              General Statutes § 31-294c (b) provides in relevant part: ‘‘Whenever liabil-
         ity to pay compensation is contested by the employer, he shall file with the
         administrative law judge, on or before the twenty-eighth day after he has
         received a written notice of claim, a notice . . . stating that the right to
         compensation is contested . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.)
            Since the dates of the incidents in question, the legislature has amended
         § 31-294c to make technical changes. Effective October 1, 2021, the legisla-
         ture enacted No. 21-18, § 1, of the 2021 Public Acts, which amended § 31-
         194c (b) by substituting the words ‘‘administrative law judge’’ for the word
         ‘‘commissioner.’’ See also Public Acts 2022, No. 22-89, § 2 (making additional
         technical changes to § 31-294c (b)). Because these technical changes have
         no bearing on the merits of this appeal, for purposes of clarity, all references
         in this opinion to § 31-294c (b) are to the current revision of the statute.
            2
              Arch Insurance Group, Inc., which insures Frank Lill & Son, Inc., and
         Gallagher Bassett Services, a third-party administrator for workers’ compen-
         sation benefits, are also defendants in this appeal. Hereinafter, we refer to
         Frank Lill & Son, Inc., Arch Insurance Group, Inc., and Gallagher Bassett
         Services collectively as the defendants.
            3
              The defendants appealed from the decision of the board to the Appellate
         Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to General
         Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-1.
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                        Ajdini v. Frank Lill & Son, Inc.

          The record reveals the following undisputed facts
       and procedural history. The plaintiff was employed by
       the employer and alleged that, in the course and scope
       of his employment, he sustained two separate injuries
       in July, 2018. The plaintiff thereafter properly sent to
       the commission and the employer a Form 30C notice
       of claim for compensation for each injury pursuant to
       § 31-294c (a). The forms were received by the commis-
       sion and the employer on May 3, 2019. On May 29, 2019,
       the employer mailed to both the commission and the
       plaintiff a Form 43 notice of intention to contest the
       plaintiff’s rights to compensation benefits for each injury
       pursuant to § 31-294c (b). The commission received the
       forms on June 3, 2019, and the plaintiff received the
       forms on June 6, 2019.
          The plaintiff then filed with the commission a motion
       to preclude, arguing that, because the employer had
       failed to commence payment of the claims or to file a
       notice of intention to contest the claims within twenty-
       eight days following its receipt of the notice of claims,
       as required by § 31-294c (b), the employer should be
       presumed to have accepted the compensability of the
       plaintiff’s alleged injuries and precluded from con-
       testing the claims. Concluding that the employer had
       failed to comply with the statute, the administrative
       law judge granted the plaintiff’s motion and ordered
       that the defendants be conclusively presumed to have
       accepted the compensability of the plaintiff’s alleged
       injuries.
          The defendants subsequently filed with the board a
       petition for review of the finding of preclusion. Before
       the board, the defendants argued that the commission’s
       Form 43 states ‘‘that it ‘must be served [on] the [a]dmin-
       istrative [l]aw [j]udge and [the claimant]’ ’’ and that ‘‘the
       mailbox rule suggests that the date of service is deemed
       to be the date of mailing.’’ (Emphasis omitted.) Conclud-
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                          Ajdini v. Frank Lill & Son, Inc.

         ing that these arguments were flawed, the board upheld
         the finding of preclusion. This appeal followed.
            On appeal, the defendants claim that, pursuant to the
         mailbox rule, mailing a Form 43 within the twenty-eight
         day statutory period satisfies the requirements of § 31-
         294c (b). They argue that the definition of the mailbox
         rule, guidance from title 31 of the Regulations of Con-
         necticut State Agencies, and the legislature’s intent with
         respect to the workers’ compensation statutes all com-
         pel a conclusion that the filing of a Form 43 is effective
         on the date of mailing and not the date of receipt.
         In response, the plaintiff contends that, although the
         mailbox rule could apply if a statute requires notice,
         issuance, or mailing, it cannot apply when, as here, the
         statute requires filing. Filing, according to the plaintiff,
         requires receipt, and to conclude otherwise would, in
         contravention of the intent of the statute, create delays
         and leave claimants in limbo. See, e.g., Russell v. Mystic
         Seaport Museum, Inc., 252 Conn. 596, 610–11, 748 A.2d
         278 (2000) (observing that § 31-294c sought to correct,
         among other things, delays by employers or insurers in
         payment of benefits). We agree with the plaintiff and
         conclude that the employer did not meet its statutory
         obligation pursuant to § 31-294c (b) because the com-
         mission did not receive the forms on or before the
         twenty-eighth day after the employer received written
         notice of the plaintiff’s claims.
            We begin with the principles that govern our standard
         of review in workers’ compensation appeals, which are
         well established. ‘‘[A]though not dispositive, we accord
         great weight to the construction given to the workers’
         compensation statutes by the commissioner and [the]
         board. . . . We have determined, [however], that the
         traditional deference accorded to an agency’s interpre-
         tation of a statutory term is unwarranted when the
         construction of a statute . . . has not previously been
         subjected to judicial scrutiny [or to] . . . a governmen-
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                             Ajdini v. Frank Lill & Son, Inc.

       tal agency’s time-tested interpretation . . . .’’ (Internal
       quotation marks omitted.) Vitti v. Milford, 336 Conn.
       654, 659, 249 A.3d 726 (2020). Because the defendants
       do not challenge a time-tested interpretation of the
       workers’ compensation statutes, ‘‘[w]e . . . apply ple-
       nary review and established rules of construction.’’
       (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 660; see also
       General Statutes § 1-2z.
           Beginning with the statutory language, as required
       by § 1-2z, we observe that § 31-294c (b) provides in
       relevant part: ‘‘Whenever liability to pay compensation
       is contested by the employer, he shall file with the
       administrative law judge, on or before the twenty-eighth
       day after he has received a written notice of claim, a
       notice . . . stating that the right to compensation is
       contested . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) Because the word
       ‘‘file’’ is not defined by the statutory scheme, we con-
       strue it according to its ‘‘commonly approved usage’’;
       General Statutes § 1-1 (a); by looking to its dictionary
       definition. See, e.g., Commission on Human Rights &
       Opportunities v. Edge Fitness, LLC, 342 Conn. 25, 32,
       268 A.3d 630 (2022). At the time the legislature passed
       the 1993 amendments to § 31-294c,4 ‘‘file’’ was defined
       in relevant part as ‘‘[t]o deliver an instrument or other
       paper to the proper officer or official for the purpose
       of being kept on file by him as a matter of record and
       reference in the proper place. . . .’’ (Emphasis added.)
       Black’s Law Dictionary (6th Ed. 1990) p. 628; see also
       Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1993) p.
       849 (defining ‘‘file’’ in relevant part as ‘‘to deliver (as a
       legal paper or instrument) . . . to the proper officer
       for keeping on file or among the records of his office’’
       (emphasis added)). According the word ‘‘file’’ its ordi-
       nary meaning, we are satisfied that, under § 31-294c (b),
         4
           The language set forth in § 31-294c (b) originated in No. 93-228, § 8, of
       the 1993 Public Acts. The legislature subsequently made a minor technical
       change to that subsection in No. 93-419, § 8, of the 1993 Public Acts.
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                          Ajdini v. Frank Lill & Son, Inc.

         it is plain and unambiguous that a notice of intention
         to contest compensation must be delivered, not just
         mailed, to the administrative law judge on or before the
         twenty-eighth day after the employer received written
         notice of claim.
            Beyond the definition of the word ‘‘file,’’ § 31-294c (b)
         contains contextual clues that reinforce our conclusion
         that the legislature intended the word ‘‘file’’ to require
         receipt by the commission. In addition to requiring the
         employer to file the notice with the commission, subsec-
         tion (b) requires the employer to ‘‘send a copy of the
         notice to the employee in accordance with section 31-
         231.’’ (Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 31-294c (b).
         The word ‘‘send’’ means, in relevant part, ‘‘to deposit
         in the mail or deliver for transmission by any other
         usual means of communication with postage or cost of
         transmission provided for and properly addressed
         . . . .’’ Black’s Law Dictionary, supra, p. 1361; see also
         Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, supra,
         p. 2065 (defining ‘‘send’’ in relevant part as ‘‘to cause
         (something) to be conveyed or transmitted by an agent
         to a destination’’). We conclude that, if the legislature
         had wanted, as the defendants argue, for an employer
         to satisfy its statutory obligation by simply mailing the
         notice, it could have used the word ‘‘send,’’ just as it
         did in the same subsection with respect to providing
         notice to the employee. See, e.g., Stafford v. Roadway,
         312 Conn. 184, 194, 93 A.3d 1058 (2014) (‘‘[i]t is a well
         settled principle of statutory construction that the legis-
         lature knows how to convey its intent expressly’’ (inter-
         nal quotation marks omitted)). Instead, the legislature
         used the word ‘‘file,’’ the plain meaning of which
         requires an employer to do more than place the notice
         in the mail. ‘‘[T]he use of the different terms . . .
         within the same statute suggests that the legislature
         acted with complete awareness of their different mean-
         ings . . . and that it intended the terms to have differ-
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                             Ajdini v. Frank Lill & Son, Inc.

       ent meanings . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks
       omitted.) Felician Sisters of St. Francis of Connecticut,
       Inc. v. Historic District Commission, 284 Conn. 838,
       850, 937 A.2d 39 (2008).
          The defendants nonetheless argue that the mailbox
       rule renders the acts of ‘‘filing’’ and ‘‘mailing’’ the same
       thing.5 We are not persuaded. The mailbox rule is a
       common-law principle that ‘‘provides that a properly
       stamped and addressed letter that is placed into a mail-
       box or handed over to the United States Postal Service
       raises a rebuttable presumption that it will be received.’’
       Echavarria v. National Grange Mutual Ins. Co., 275
       Conn. 408, 418, 880 A.2d 882 (2005). Even if that rule
       did apply in the present case, the presumption that
       the Form 43 would be received is not enough for the
       employer to meet its statutory obligation pursuant to
       § 31-294c (b). Put differently, a Form 43 must be deliv-
       ered to the administrative law judge on or before the
       twenty-eighth day after the employer has received a
       written notice of claim in order to be timely filed under
       § 31-294c (b). A presumption that the form will be
       received does not raise a presumption that the form
       will be received timely.
          The decision of the Compensation Review Board is
       affirmed.
          In this opinion the other justices concurred.

         5
           We note that the definition of ‘‘mailbox rule’’ cited by the defendants is
       not contemporary to the passage of No. 93-228, § 8, of the 1993 Public Acts,
       which enacted the language at issue in § 31-294c. See, e.g., Ledyard v. WMS
       Gaming, Inc., 338 Conn. 687, 697, 258 A.3d 1268 (2021) (‘‘in the absence of
       statutory definitions, we look to the contemporaneous dictionary definitions
       of words to ascertain their commonly approved usage’’ (emphasis added)).
       The Black’s Law Dictionary definition of mailbox rule when the legislature
       passed the act provided: ‘‘In contract law, unless otherwise agreed or pro-
       vided by law, acceptance of offer is effective when deposited in mail if
       properly address.’’ Black’s Law Dictionary, supra, p. 952.