Court Opinion

ID: 9697763
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:29:05.750652+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:35.184251
License: Public Domain

ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.
¶ 72. (dissenting). This case turns on the majority's interpretation of a post-verdict exchange between the circuit court and defense counsel. It interprets the exchange as a defense stipulation to the mode of proof for prior convictions. This interpretation is the linchpin of the majority opinion. Without it, the opinion collapses. Because I conclude that the majority improperly recasts a cursory and ambiguous exchange into a "precise" stipulation, and erroneously determines that a copy of an uncerti-fied judgment of conviction is sufficient to prove repeater status, I respectfully dissent.
HH
¶ 73. The majority concedes that Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1) (1999-2000)1 clearly requires that, absent a personal admission by the defendant, the State bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt *625the existence of qualifying prior convictions it seeks to use as repeater enhancements. No one asserts that Saunders personally admitted to the prior conviction. Thus, in order to sustain his sentence, the majority must conclude that the exchange constitutes a stipulation as to the mode of proving the prior conviction.
¶ 74. According to the majority, the following exchange constitutes a stipulation that is "precise ... as to the existence of [prior conviction] evidence." Majority op at ¶ 60. The majority also opines that the exchange clearly demonstrates the circuit court expressing 1) that an uncertified copy of a prior judgment of conviction was in the file; and 2) that the State was proffering the copy to meet its burden of proof under Wis. Stat. 973.12(1). Majority op. at ¶ 61. I conclude that the majority is overreaching in its interpretation and set forth the exchange for the reader to decide:
THE COURT: The Information alleges that the defendant is a repeat offender, having been convicted of [a] felony on March 22, 1991, at Rock County, Wisconsin, and there is a judgment of conviction, as a matter of fact in the file. Is there any dispute that that is the fact?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: No. I believe that there is a conviction in Rock County and another one in Illinois, so that the repeater aspects of it is not in dispute.
THE COURT: Is not in dispute is that what you said?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Is not in dispute.
THE COURT: Accordingly I find that the defendant is a repeat offender under our law.. . .
¶ 75. Was this exchange "precise"? Does it clearly demonstrate the introduction of evidence by the State *626sufficient to meet its burden of proof under § 973.12(1)? I do not think so, and I am not alone.
¶ 76. The circuit court did not think so. In denying Saunders' postconviction motion, the circuit court referred only to the sentencing hearing, the presen-tence investigation report (PSI) before the court at the hearing, and a conviction in the PSI that was "acknowledged as factual" at that hearing.
¶ 77. The court of appeals did not think so. It construed the exchange as an admission by defense counsel, which was insufficient to satisfy the personal admission requirement of § 973.12(1).
¶ 78. Even the State apparently did not think so, at least not until it raised the argument for the first time in this court. In its brief to the court of appeals, the State acknowledged that the "not in dispute" statement by Saunders' counsel was in reference to the fact of conviction, not to whether the file contained a copy of a judgment of conviction.
¶ 79. I think the record speaks for itself. The exchange was not the "precise and correct" inquiry the majority terms it.
f 80. If this exchange is a stipulation to the mode of proof, then it is no longer clear what difference remains between a stipulation to mode of proof and an admission by defense counsel, which is barred under § 973.12(1). To interpret the exchange as does the majority is to render meaningless the requirement that an admission by the defendant for purposes of § 973.12(1) be personal to the defendant.
¶ 81. Given the weakness of its reliance on this "not in dispute" exchange, the majority opinion seeks to bolster its conclusion by reference to other information in the record, although it acknowledges the inadequacy *627of this information as proof under § 973.12(1). It bases its conclusion on the totality of the evidence and couches its review of the circuit court's finding of repeater status in terms of "reasonableness." Majority op. at ¶¶ 53, 63-64.
¶ 82. Specifically, the majority references both the PSI and the pretrial record in support of the circuit court's finding of repeater status. However, as the majority must concede, neither the PSI nor the pretrial history qualifies as proof sufficient for purposes of § 973.12(1). The PSI does not indicate the date of conviction and consequently, it does not qualify as an "official report" under § 973.12(1). See State v. Caldwell, 154 Wis. 2d 683, 693-94, 454 N.W.2d 13 (Ct. App. 1990). Also, as the majority concedes, the pretrial record does not support a finding that the State met its post-trial proof requirement. Majority op. at ¶ 68.
¶ 83. Despite these concessions, the majority concludes that based on the totality of the evidence and the "reasonable inferences to be drawn from it," the circuit court properly determined that Saunders was a repeater. Majority op. at ¶ 69. It thereby applies a sort of "new math" for proving repeater status in which zero (the purported stipulation) plus zero (the PSI) plus zero (the pretrial record) equals beyond a reasonable doubt for purposes of § 973.12(1).
¶ 84. I apply the old math under which zero plus zero plus zero still equals zero. The State failed to offer evidence in support of its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt under § 973.12(1).
II
¶ 85. Unlike the majority, I would interpret § 973.12(1) to require that a copy of a judgment of conviction be certified. Several considerations lead me *628to this conclusion: (1) the seriousness of the liberty interest at stake, (2) a comparison to the form of proof necessary in other repeater contexts, and (3) good public policy.
¶ 86. The majority goes to great lengths to determine whether the proceeding at which the State proves repeater status is more like part of a trial or more like sentencing. In doing so, it acknowledges that proof of prior convictions "directly affects the sentence .. . and thus affects a major liberty interest." Majority op. at ¶ 49. Ultimately, however, it concludes that proof of repeater status "fits much better with the process of sentencing." Majority op. at ¶ 46.
¶ 87. I disagree. The serious liberty interest at stake tips the scales in favor of requiring more formal methods of proof like those required at trial. The requirement under § 973.12(1) that proof be beyond a reasonable doubt reinforces my conclusion, contrary to the majority, that proof of repeater status does not fit "much better" with sentencing.
¶ 88. The effect of a finding of repeater status is more like that of an element of a crime that goes to the grade of a crime than it is like that of a sentencing factor. It may significantly increase the defendant's maximum criminal exposure. Here, for example, a finding of repeater status increased Saunders' maximum exposure from 40 to 60 years in prison.
¶ 89. Professor LaFave explains that many states have recognized the serious liberty interest at stake: "In light of the effect of [repeater] statutes in extending the defendant's term beyond the maximum allowed for the offense of conviction, a substantial number of jurisdictions impose more formal procedures *629for determining repeat-offender status." Wayne R. LaFave, 5 Criminal Procedure § 26.6(b), p. 799 (2d ed. 1999).
¶ 90. Wisconsin is one of these jurisdictions. In light of the liberty interest involved, the purpose of § 973.12(1) is to require formal proof of repeater allegations. See State v. Koeppen, 195 Wis. 2d 117, 131, 536 N.W.2d 386 (Ct. App. 1995). What could be more consistent with a formal proof requirement than requiring a copy of a judgment of conviction to be certified?
¶ 91. Section 973.12(1) should also be interpreted to require a certified copy based on previous case law addressing repeater status in other contexts. The majority's interpretation is at odds with this precedent.
¶ 92. In State v. Wideman, 206 Wis. 2d 91, 556 N.W.2d 737 (1996), and State v. Spaeth, 206 Wis. 2d 135, 556 N.W.2d 728 (1996), this court addressed repeater status in the context of OWI and OAR. Those cases established that § 973.12(1) does not apply to OWI and OAR repeater status and that the State carries a lower burden in proving OWI and OAR repeater status than the burden required under § 973.12(1). Wideman, 206 Wis. 2d at 102; Spaeth, 206 Wis. 2d at 146-47. The majority recognizes, as it must, that the proof requirement for OWI and OAR "remains less imposing than the proof requirement under § 973.12(1)." Majority op. at ¶ 33.
¶ 93. What the majority does not recognize is that in Spaeth, the court specifically outlined three alternative minimum proof requirements in OAR cases. See 206 Wis. 2d at 153. The court indicated that one of the alternatives was a copy of the judgment of conviction; the court did not specify that the copy must be certi*630fied.2 Id. It is difficult to reconcile this rule from Spaeth with the majority's rule that an uncertified copy is sufficient under § 973.12(1). How can the minimum proof sufficient to meet the lower standard also be sufficient to meet the higher standard? Tellingly, the majority does not answer this question.
¶ 94. Finally, an interpretation of §973.12(1) to require that a copy of the judgment be certified is good public policy. The court of appeals stated eight years ago:
In recent times, this court has seen a substantial number of cases involving pleading and proof issues under the repeater statute. We are aware of the heavy burdens and caseloads confronting prosecutors. However, correctly pleading and proving a prior conviction for purposes of obtaining an enhanced sentence does not strike us as a particularly onerous or complicated prosecutorial task.
State v. Goldstein, 182 Wis. 2d 251, 261, 513 N.W.2d 631 (Ct. App. 1994). Shortly thereafter, the court of appeals repeated a similar admonition, see Koeppen, 195 Wis. 2d at 130-31, and this court has as well, see Wideman, 206 Wis. 2d at 108. Similarly, the majority now "strongly urge[s]" prosecutors to acquire certified copies of judgments "to avoid unnecessary proof problems."3 Majority op. at ¶ 55.
¶ 95. In light of the serious liberty interests at stake, our previous cases addressing repeater status in *631the OWI and OAR context, and good public policy, I conclude that an uncertified copy of a judgment of conviction is insufficient to prove repeater status beyond a reasonable doubt in accordance with § 973.12(1). I would stop urging and start requiring.
l h-< 1 — 1
¶ 96. Unlike the majority, I conclude that the cursory and ambiguous post-verdict exchange was not a "precise" stipulation that clearly demonstrated the State was proffering evidence in support of its burden of proof. I also conclude that an uncertified copy of a judgment of conviction is insufficient to prove repeater status beyond a reasonable doubt as required by § 973.12(1). Because I determine that the State failed to meet its burden of proof under § 973.12(1), I conclude that Saunders' sentence was greater than that authorized by law. When a court imposes a sentence greater than that authorized by law, the excess portion of the sentence is void and commuted without further proceedings. Spaeth, 206 Wis. 2d at 155-56 (citing Wis. Stat. § 973.13); see also Koeppen, 195 Wis. 2d at 131.
¶ 97. I would affirm the court of appeals decision, which remanded to the circuit court to vacate the repeater portion of Saunders' conviction and to enter a new judgment of conviction reflecting a sentence without the repeater enhancement. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
¶ 98. I am authorized to state that SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE joins this dissent.

 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1999-2000 version unless otherwise indicated. Wisconsin Stat. § 973.12(1) provides in part:
(1) Whenever a person charged with a crime will be a repeater or a persistent repeater under s. 939.62 if convicted, any applicable prior convictions may be alleged in the complaint, indictment or information or amendments so alleging at any time before or at arraignment, and before acceptance of any plea. The court may, upon motion of the district attorney, grant a reasonable time to investigate possible prior convictions before accepting a plea. If the prior convictions are admitted by the defendant or proved by the state, he or she shall be subject to sentence under s. 939.62 unless he or she establishes that he or she was pardoned on grounds of innocence for any crime necessary to constitute him or her a repeater or a persistent repeater. An official report of the P.B.I. or *625any other governmental agency of the United States or of this or any other state shall be prima facie evidence of any conviction or sentence therein reported.

 The other two alternatives given were (1) an admission, and (2) a teletype from the Department of Transportation. State v. Spaeth, 206 Wis. 2d 135, 153, 556 N.W.2d 728 (1996).

 The majority recognizes that this court and the court of appeals have similarly implored prosecutors in the past, yet apparently continues to believe that urging is sufficient.