Court Opinion

ID: 9698008
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:39:19.846533+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:37.590835
License: Public Domain

On Application for Rehearing.
PER CURIAM.
We are of the opinion that the judgment •of the Court of Appeal as well as the judgment of this court on original hearing with reference to the tax title is correct.
However, we have given more thought to the nature of the exception which the defendant in this case filed in the Court of Appeal on application for rehearing, and have decided, contrary to our original opinion, that an exception which questions the right or interest of a married woman to file a petitory action and stand in judgment is the peremptory exception of want of interest, or no right of action, and .not the dilatory exception of want of capacity.
It is clear that the dilatory exception of want of capacity is not involved here, as the exception of want of capacity puts at issue only the procedural capacity of the plaintiff, and does not raise the question of whether the plaintiff has any interest in enforcing judicially the right asserted. See Outdoor Electric Advertising v. Saurage, 207 La. 344, 21 So.2d 375; McMahon, Parties Litigant in Louisiana, The Exception of Want of Capacity, 11 Tul.L. Rev. 538, 546-547. On the other hand, the exception of want of interest, or no right of action, does raise the question of whether the plaintiff has any interest in enforcing judicially the right asserted. Art. 15, La. Code Prac.; Ritsch Alluvial Land Co. v. Adema, 211 La. 675, 30 So.2d 753. Moreover, the exception of want of interest, or no right of action, is a peremptory exception which can be filed at any time before definitive judgment by the court of last re*115sort, and which will even he noticed by the court ex proprio motu if necessary. Brown v. Saul, 4 Mart.,N.S., 434; State v. Desforges, 5 Rob. 253; see McMahon, Parties Litigant in Louisiana, The Exception of Want of Interest, 11 Tul.L.Rev., 527-538.
In Succession of Howell, 177 La. 276, 148 So. 48, this court held that an exception challenging the right of a married woman to sue and stand in judgment is the peremptory exception of no right of action (want of interest), and not the dilatory exception of want of capacity. See also Smith v. Brock, La.App., 200 So. 342; Hand v. Coker, La.App., 11 So.2d 272; Casente v. Lloyd, La.App., 68 So.2d 329.
After further thought we have also concluded that we erred in our original opinion in holding that the plaintiff in this case established the property in dispute as belonging to her separate estate simply by introducing in evidence — without objection by the defendant — the deed to the property, which is in her name and which contains the statement that the purchase is being made with separate and paraphernal funds for her separate estate.1 It is elementary that a recitation of paraphernality in a realty deed does not affect the presumption which exists in this state that property purchased in the name of either spouse during the marriage is community property. Houghton v. Hall, 177 La. 237, 148 So. 37; Johnson v. Johnson, 213 La. 1092, 36 So.2d 396; Succession of Le Jeune, 221 La. 437, 59 So.2d 446.
Tn this court respondent, Mrs. Nellie Stevens, filed a motion praying that we remand the case to the lower court so that evidence might be adduced on the exception of no right of action filed by relator, and she annexed to her motion affidavits in support of her contention that the property here involved was acquired with separate and paraphernal funds. As this is a court of appellate jurisdiction, we cannot consider these affidavits in these proceedings. However, instead of granting a rehearing in this case we have decided to remand it to the lower court so that relator’s exception of no right of action may be tried, evidence adduced, and a ruling obtained from the trial judge on this issue. See Art. 346, La.Code Prac.; Waterhouse v. Star Land Co., 139 La. 177, 71 So. 358.
We realize that our procedure in this case is unusual. However, in the interest of justice and under the special circumstances here existing we think it best tb remand the case for trial of the exception. If this land is in fact the separate' property of Mrs. Stevens, she has the right to recover it in a petitory action.
This case is ordered remanded to the Twenty-Sixth Judicial District Court for the Parish of Webster solely for trial and *117■decision on the exception of want of interest, or no right of action. The district judge is to dismiss this suit if the exception is well founded.

. This is the only evidence in the record which tends to show whether this is separate or community property.