Court Opinion

ID: 9749015
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 16:21:17.339832+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:42.181244
License: Public Domain

OLSZEWSKI, Judge,
dissenting.
I believe that the trial court in the instant matter was authorized to require restitution compensation to the Department of Corrections. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
Initially, I believe that the majority has misapprehended the predominate issue in this case. This case does not turn upon whether the Department of Corrections qualifies as a “victim” pursuant to subsection (c)(l)(ii)(A) of the restitution statute. Rather, in accordance with the cannons of statutory construction, this case requires the Court to interpret all of the provisions of section (c) of 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1106. See e.g., 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1922 (“The General Assembly intends the entire statute be effective and certain.”); Commonwealth v. Lopez, 444 Pa.Super. 206, 209-11, 663 A.2d 746, 748 (1995) (When construing one section of a statute, courts must read that section with reference to, and in light of, other sections because there is a presumption that the General Assembly intended the entire statute to be effective.).
As such, I strenuously disagree with those portions of the majority opinion which rely upon Commonwealth v. Runion, 541 Pa. 202, 662 A.2d 617 (1995). See, e.g., majority opinion at 491 (“[W]e find the facts to parallel that of Runion and thus are constrained to reverse the trial court decision based on the *629rationale set forth by our Supreme Court in Runion.” “[I]n accordance with Runion, the Department cannot be deemed a victim under section 1106.”). In Runion, our Supreme Court held that a Commonwealth entity, because it is not a person, cannot be considered a “victim” within the meaning of the restitution statute. Runion, 541 Pa. at 206-08, 662 A.2d at 619. Clearly, as a Commonwealth entity, the Department cannot qualify for restitution based upon its status as a victim.1
A subsequent amendment to § 1106 redefined “victim” to include, under the appropriate circumstances, the Crime Victim’s Compensation Fund and insurance companies. The amendments to § 1106 were, however, more expansive than merely redefining the term “victim.” In addition to that alteration, the amendments expanded the class of entities eligible for restitution compensation.
Specifically, aside from the victim, the Crime Victim’s Compensation Board, insurance companies and “any government agency which has provided reimbursement to the victim as a result of the defendant’s criminal conduct,” may now receive restitution from the defendant. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1106(c). In the instant matter, the entity purportedly eligible for restitution is the Department of Corrections.
Therefore, the issue to be decided is not whether the Department qualifies as a “victim” pursuant to Runion, but whether it “provided reimbursement to the victim as a result of the defendant’s criminal conduct.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. *630§ 1106(c)(l)(ii)(C). If so, appellants must indemnify the Department regardless of the precedent established in Runion.
Section 1106 does not define the term “reimbursement.” Interpretation is therefore guided by the Statutory Construction Act, 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1501 et seq., which requires that the words and phrases in statutes be construed according to their common usage and everyday understanding. See, e.g., 1 Pa. C.S.A. § 1903; San Van, Inc. v. School Dist. of Derry Township, 160 Pa.Cmwlth. 483, 635 A.2d 254 (1993).
In addressing this issue, the majority holds that the term reimbursement requires that “the governmental agency must have compensated the victim in a monetary fashion” and that, because injured prisoners are entitled to medical care, the victim in the instant matter was not “reimbursed” within the meaning of § 1106. Majority opinion at 492.
The majority misses the point. While it is true that the Commonwealth has a duty to provide adequate medical facilities and treatment to incarcerated persons, see, e.g., Dept. of Public Welfare v. Kallinger, 134 Pa.Cmwlth. 415, 421-23, 580 A.2d 887, 891 (1990), it is an illogical extension of this established premise to then conclude that prison medical care must be provided at the state’s expense. The mere fact that the state is required to provide a service does not mean that the service must be provided free of charge.
To the contrary, our courts have specifically held that “the correctional system is not a medical provider and should not be considered solely liable for the expense of treatment for every person who at some point is placed in the system.” Commonwealth v. Lyles, 77 Pa.Cmwlth. 15, 18-19, 464 A.2d 712, 714 (1983). See also Lyles, 77 Pa.Cmwlth. at 18 n. 6, 464 A.2d at 713 n. 6 (noting that prisoner medical care costs may be defrayed by, inter alia, social security, medicare and medical assistance payments).
More recently, our General Assembly enacted the Prison Medical Services Act (Act No. 1996-40 S.B. No. 856, effective May 16, 1996). This Act, codified in 61 P.S. § 1011 et seq., established a co-pay program requiring non-indigent inmates *631to reimburse the Department of Corrections for all or part of certain medical expenses. Importantly, subsection 3(b), relating to fees, provides that “[i]n addition to other medical services provided to the inmate, an inmate may be required to pay a fee for medical services provided because of injuries the inmate inflicted upon himself or another inmate.” 61 P.S. § 1013 (emphasis added). Finally, the Act permits the Department to collect the fees either while the prisoner is incarcerated or, by way of a civil action, after the inmate is released from prison. See 61 P.S. § 1015.2
Accordingly, I cannot agree with the majority that the General Assembly did not intend to permit restitution to the Department of Corrections because “[mjedical care of an injured prisoner is an entitlement, not compensation.” Majority opinion at 493. As previously stated, while the access to adequate treatment may be a constitutionally protected right, there is no corresponding guarantee that the state will pay for such care where the criminal conduct causing such injury is directly and unequivocally traceable to a guilty party.
For these reasons, I believe that the amended restitution statute authorizes compensation to a government agency which has reimbursed a victim of criminal conduct either by direct monetary payment or though services rendered. To hold otherwise would refute the plain language of section (c), which permits government entities to seek restitution from those guilty of criminal acts. This statute squarely places the burden for restitution on those convicted of crimes, and not upon the courts or the consumers of government services.3 *632In enacting the amendments to § 1106, the General Assembly clearly intended for Commonwealth entities to be eligible for restitution of expenditures made on behalf of crime victims that were necessitated by the actor’s criminal conduct. It is immaterial whether the expenditure was directly monetary or, instead, in the form of a service. This Court is bound to effectuate that intent.
In the instant case, appellants’ intentional criminal conduct directly resulted in serious injuries to a fourth prisoner who, prior to his death, received medical treatment at S.C.I. Somerset totaling $51,314.83. While the victim was entitled to adequate medical treatment, the state was not commensurately required to provide that service free of charge.
When reviewing restitution orders, this Court has repeatedly held that the decision of whether to require restitution as a part of a defendant’s sentence is within the sound discretion of the trial court. See, e.g., Runion, 541 Pa. at 206-08, 662 A.2d at 619. In exercising its discretion, the trial court must consider both the damage resulting from the perpetrator’s actions and the amount that the offender can afford to pay. Id. It is no impediment to such an order, however, that defendant will be required to make substantial sacrifices in order to comply with the restitution order. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Stock, 346 Pa.Super. 60, 76-77, 499 A.2d 308, 317 (1985); Commonwealth v. Wood, 300 Pa.Super. 463, 467-69, 446 A.2d 948, 950 (1982). Rather, such sacrifices are fully in accord with the purpose of the restitution statute; this is, to impress upon the perpetrator the magnitude of his or her criminal conduct. Id.
Having found that the trial court, after taking into consideration the particular facts of this case, was authorized pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1106(c) to order restitution to the Department of Corrections, I would affirm the judgment of the lower court.

. In an effort to support the general, overbroad, proposition that restitution awards cannot be made to governmental entities, the majority cites the recent Superior Court case of Commonwealth v. Yanoff, 456 Pa.Super. 222, 690 A.2d 260 (1997). Any reliance upon Yanoff is misleading and improper. While the effective date of amended § 1106 was nineteen days before the sentencing date in Yanoff, section (c) was not analyzed or interpreted at all in Yanoff. Indeed, far from discussing the potential applicability of section (c), the Yanoff Court reversed the restitution award to the Bureau of Laboratory and Communication Services “pursuant to the ruling in Runion.” (690 A.2d at 265). As the overriding issue in the instant matter concerns the applicability of amended section (c) to restriction awards made to governmental entities, Yanoff is neither instructive nor controlling.

. I note that the sentencing date in the instant matter was approximately six weeks prior to the effective date of the Prison Medical Services Act. I do not mean to imply that the Act itself is applicable to appellants. Rather, I cite the Act in an effort to ascertain the everyday understanding of the term ''reimbursement” and in an attempt to demonstrate that prison medical care costs are not an entitlement.

. The majority fails to recognize this crucial distinction. This dissent does not argue for the establishment of a general rule requiring restitution from all users of government services. This dissent merely argues that the General Assembly has clearly mandated that those who commit crimes causing harm to victims must pay restitution to, inter alia, *632government agencies who provide services to victims of their criminal conduct. This is a case-by-case determination.