Court Opinion

ID: 9773627
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:52:01.836284+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:55.573104
License: Public Domain

*941ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
TED Z. ROBERTSON, Justice, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I would grant the appellee’s motion for rehearing and affirm the appointment of a receiver.
The record reflects that on May 28, the trial court made all of the determinations required by article 7.05 of the Business Corporation Act. The trial court was required to find, and did find: (1) that all other requirements of law were complied with by the petitioner; (2) that all other remedies available at law or in equity were inadequate; and (3) that this was an action where receiver had heretofore been appointed by usages of the court of equity. Although this court may conclude that the appointment of a receiver was improvident, we are not authorized to overturn the decision of the trial court on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion. I find no abuse of discretion in light of the emergency of this proceeding. Collegiate Recovery & Credit Assistance Programs, Inc. v. State, 525 S.W.2d 900, 901 (Tex.Civ.App. — Waco 1975, no writ). In the event that the May 28 order was improperly entered, I am of the opinion that the June 16 order should stand.
In the absence of a supersedeas bond, the district court retained authority to modify or change its order appointing a receiver pending the appeal. See Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Grays, 122 Tex. 491, 62 S.W.2d 113, 117-18 (Tex.Comm’n App.1933, opinion adopted) (appellant entitled to supersede trial court’s order appointing a receiver when the appeal is from such an appointment). The trial court’s order of June 16 had the effect of rendering moot the issues presented by the appeal of the May 28 order appointing a receiver. Tharp v. Lammons, 520 S.W.2d 951, 951-52 (Tex.Civ.App. — Dallas 1975, no writ) (in the absence of a super-sedeas bond, the trial court retains jurisdiction to vacate the order appointing a receiver). See also Charton Corp. v. Brockette, 534 S.W.2d 401, 404 (Tex.Civ.App. — Corpus Christi 1976, writ ref’d n.r.e.). Humble has not perfected an appeal from the order of June 16. Consequently, this court is without authority to vacate that order.
Therefore, the relief requested by Humble should in all things be denied.