Court Opinion

ID: 9582784
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:31:19.701661+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:38:26.784761
License: Public Domain

Stukes, Justice
(concurring).
I concur in the opinion of Mr. Justice Taylor because the order under appeal was within the discretion of the court and, in view of the facts, I do not think it can be soundly held that there was a clear abuse of discretion. Decision on motion to answer after time is expressly left in the discretion of the court under the terms of Sec. 10-609 of the Code.
As stated in the code annotation of this section, Vol. 1, pp. 679, 680, “Nearly all of the cases pertaining to this section state the principle that the discretion expressly vested in the circuit court [county court here] by this section will not be disturbed except in a case of clear abuse. [Citing many cases.] Or unless exercise of discretion was controlled by some error of law, [Citing cases] and such abuse must be *49gross [Citation]. There is no test to determine abuse. — Under this section no hard and fast rule for the exercise of the court’s discretion can be laid down, and because some other judge might have decided in a different way does not establish an abuse of discretion. Bishop v. Jacobs, 108 S. C. 49, 93 S. E. 243.”
The factual showing of appellant consisted only of the affidavit of the manager of its Jacksonville branch office, which’ follows in part:
“The letter and Summons and Complaint were forwarded by our Home Office in Bloomington, Illinois and received by our Jacksonville, Florida Branch Office on or about December 8th, 1954. The claim filed was not located until December 14th, 1954, at which time we acknowledged Mr. R. Lee Kelly’s letter of December 2nd, 1954. All coverage and policy defenses are considered and passed on by our General Claims Staff in Bloomington, Illinois. On December 16th, 1954, the entire claim file, including the Summons and Complaint was mailed to our General Claims Staff in Bloomington, Illinois for their immediate consideration and instructions. Our General Claims Staff received the file on December 20th, 1954 at which time they ruled to defend the lawsuit against the Company. The claim file was returned to the Jacksonville, Florida, Branch Office on December 23rd, at which time we called our Attorneys to check the Answer date.”
It is noted, that no reason or excuse is offered for the failure to locate the file during the period from December 8 to December 14, nor for the failure to forward the file to the home office until December 16. Neglect is shown, but no excuse for it.
The affiant further says in his affidavit, quoting, “we figured twenty days from December 6 as the answer date,” which was the date of the delivery of the summons and complaint by registered mail to the home office, whereas he should have “figured” from the date of service upon the Insurance Commissioner which was December 2. The case is *50thus similar to Lucas v. North Carolina Mutual Life Ins. Co., 184 S. C. 119, 191 S. E. 711, 712, which was under the present Code Sec. 10-1213 (then a part of Sec. 495 of the Code of 1942) to open up a default judgment and allow answer. The agent of the defendant company there thought the service of process upon an agent of the company, instead of the Insurance Commissioner, was legally insufficient, and he permitted default; as we said in the opinion, “he mistook the law." Denial of relief was affirmed and it was further said: “It is always a matter of regret that a party should not have his day in court. However, when legal process is duly and regularly served upon a defendant, and he assumes to know the law thereabout, and in so doing mistakes the law, he must, under the circumstances shown here, suffer the consequences of such mistaken assumption.” Anderson v. Toledo Scale Co., 192 S. C. 300, 6 S. E. (2d) 465, is a parallel case; there the defendant disregarded service of summons without complaint, thinking that service of complaint was necessary to start the running of time. These authorities fully support the conclusion of the hearing judge in the instant case, which is quoted in the opinion of Mr. Justice Taylor.
Johnson v. Finger, 102 S. C. 354, 86 S. E. 673 and Savage v. Cannon, 204 S. C. 473, 30 S. E. (2d) 70, which are relied upon by appellant, are distinguishable from this case because in them the defendants employed counsel within the time for answering and counsels’ mistakes caused the defaults. This distinguishing feature is emphasized in the opinion in the Savage case by repeated references to it. In both of the last cited cases the orders of the circuit court were affirmed.
Oxner and Legge, JJ., and J. Woodrow Lewis, Acting Associate Justice, concur.