Court Opinion

ID: 9696996
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:03:07.618312+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:28.447488
License: Public Domain

Thompson, J.
(dissenting) — Injustices and inequalities in tax systems grow more unjust and oppressive as the tax burden becomes heavier. It is inescapable that a system of taxation which exempts certain properties from taxation throws a heavier load upon those not so exempted. Many owners of property are not members of any church; yet their property must bear a heavier load because those who see fit to band themselves together in church organizations are favored by our taxing statutes. This amounts to discrimination; a discrimination which the legislature, the policy-making body, is empowered to make. But it furnishes a strong reason why the legislative intent in granting exemptions should be closely scrutinized and strictly construed against the discrimination whenever the language used in the statute will reasonably permit such a holding. There is of course the additional reason, pointed out by the majority, that taxation is the rule and exemption the exception, and that one who claims an exemption must bear the burden of showing that his property falls within the exemption statute. Additionally, the majority says that the reason for statutes exempting property of churches and religious organizations is the encouragement of morality. This is the reason often given; but it seems that a morality which depends upon some discriminatory advantage over the ordinary taxpayer is a feeble one at best. Morality should not be measured in dollars and cents. It is hoped that those who believe in limiting exemptions of church property *205from taxation will not be elassed as being against morality and in favor of sin.
I. The majority properly say that the modern tendency is to restrict such exemptions as the one claimed here. People ex rel. Pearsall v. Methodist Episcopal Church, 315 Ill. 233, 146 N.E. 165; Trinity Methodist Episcopal Church v. City of San Antonio, Tex. Civ. App., 201 S.W. 669, 670 (“It is well settled by excellent authority that the exemption of church property does not include a rectory or parsonage”); Church of the Redeemer v. Axtell, 41 N. J. L. 117, 119; Township of Teaneck v. Lutheran Bible Institute, 20 N. J. 86, 118 A.2d 809, 811; Watterson v. Halliday, 77 Ohio St. 150, 82 N.E. 962, 11 Ann. Cas. 1096; Pittsburg v. Third Presbyterian Church, 10 Pa. Super. 302; Second Church of Christ Scientist v. City of Philadelphia, 398 Pa. 65, 157 A.2d 54, 75 A. L. R.2d 1103; Trustees of Methodist Episcopal Church v. Ellis, 38 Ind. 3; Third Congregational Society v. Springfield, 147 Mass. 396, 18 N.E. 68; William T. Stead Memorial Center v. Town of Wareham, 299 Mass. 235, 12 N.E.2d 725. Many other authorities might be cited to the same effect.
II. As I understand the majority opinion, it bases its reversal of the judgment of the trial court upon the doctrine of stare decisis and feels we are compelled to follow the interpretation of the statute found in The Trustees of Griswold College v. The State of Iowa, 46 Iowa 275, 26 Am. Rep. 138. There, by a 3 to 2 decision, this court held that a house owned by a church and used as a parsonage was within the exemption provided by what is now section 427.1(9) of the 1962 Code. It was then found in section 797 of the existing Code, and so far as material here the language used was identical with our present statute.
The majority thinks that because this interpretation of the statute has been known to the legislature since 1877, and it has not seen fit to change it, we are not now at liberty to overrule the decision. There is force in this contention; but it is not an invariable rule. Past authorities should be followed generally, in the interest of stability in the law; but there are exceptions. If the unsoundness of the reasoning of the precedent is apparent, and much mischief will result from following it, it should *206be set aside and a sound rule adopted. Three Justices of this court have recently given notice that the doctrine of governmental immunity in tort actions is in mortal danger as soon as the question is squarely presented to us. See special concurring opinion in Moore v. Murphy, 254 Iowa 969, 973-976, 119 N.W.2d 759, 762, 763. This form of governmental immunity has been recognized in Iowa since the earliest days of our jurisprudence; but there is at least some opinion in this court that it should now be denied.
The unsoundness of the rule followed by the majority in The Trustees of Griswold College v. The State of Iowa, supra., is demonstrable, at least as applied to' the present ease. The contract between the church and the Reverend Mr. Koester, the minister of religion who occupies the property in question, provides that his salary shall be $5000 per year, plus certain other benefits and plus “suitable residence supplied.” That is to say, part of his compensation was the provision of a dwelling house. If this property had been rented to one not employed by the church, no one would contend that it comes within the meaning of the statute, even though the income so received were used in renting another home for the minister. What difference is there, then, when the minister is furnished a residence as part of his compensation? The statute exempts from the exemption buildings “leased or otherwise used with a view to pecuniary profit.” Surely a building used to furnish part of the compensation for a minister is used for pecuniary profit. And the mischief which. results from an unwise and unwarranted extension of the exemption statutes is apparent. It flies in the face of the principle that taxation is the rule and exemption is the exception, and that one who claims an exemption must carry the burden of showing himself entitled to it. In fact the showing here is that the church is using this property for profit; the profit being that it thereby pays a part of the minister’s salary. The majority opinion results in discrimination against those who are not members of churches; and against all nonexempt property, as has been pointed out; and, in addition, there is a discrimination in favor of a wealthy church and against the poorer church which does not have funds to purchase a residence property for its pastor but must pay *207rent for him in a leased property. It bas no exemption therefor. I think the rule of the majority opinion in the Griswold College ease is unsound, discriminatory and not within any fair interpretation of the statute, and that it should be overruled.
III. However, for those who think the majority opinion in the Griswold case is so ancient and venerable it should not be disturbed, it must be pointed out that the majority opinion here goes even further. The.property in question is not occupied by the preaching or principal pastor of the church, but is a second one devoted to carrying out the church’s contract with a second minister, a “teaching” minister. If it is to be held that a church may have several pastors, assistant pastors, and teaching ministers, and may provide a tax exempt dwelling for each of them as part of their compensation, there seems no limit to the amount of real estate that may be taken off the tax rolls. While the majority stresses the point that the Reverend Mr. Koester came to the church upon its call, and devotes his full time to church work, I am unable to see the significance of the “call” here. A musical director or a custodian of a church may not be “called” to the work of the church, but many of these devote their full time to it. They are as essential to the “appropriate objects” of the church in many ways as is a “teaching minister”. Most churches place much stress upon their musical programs, and no one will contend that a custodian is not a necessary employee. Are we then to be called upon to hold that if as a part of the pay of the musical director or the custodian the church agrees to and does furnish a dwelling house for him and his family, such dwelling is exempt from taxation f
If the Griswold ease is to be reaffirmed, I would limit it strictly to one dwelling for the principal pastor of the church; I would nót extend it to assistant pastors, teaching ministers, or other full-time employees of the church. The modern trend of authority and the increasingly heavy load of taxation upon nonexempt properties demand that we do not extend this unsound doctrine further.
I would affirm.
Hays, LarsoN and Moore, JJ., join in this dissent.