Court Opinion

ID: 9674896
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:37:00.819578+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:30.112033
License: Public Domain

ON MOTIONS FOR REHEARING
Both parties have filed motions for rehearing. We shall discuss the appellee’s motion first.
In his motion for rehearing, the appellee complains that the court is bound by the trial court’s finding of fact no. 14 to the effect that there was no material misconduct on the part of the jury panel. First, it should be pointed out that the trial court erred in making such a fact finding, since such question is a matter of law. White Cabs v. Moore, 146 Tex. 101, 203 S.W.2d 200 (1947). The trial court was authorized to find whether there was jury misconduct which is a question of fact and we think that it did so. The findings of fact to the effect that the subject of attorney’s fees was mentioned; of whether Bobby Baird would ever be able to pay his part of the judgment; of how much a disability insurance policy might pay for various kinds of injuries; and that lawyers do not pick the amounts they sue for out of the air, but that such amounts are chosen for a reason, show on their face that jury misconduct did occur. Whether or not injury probably resulted is a question of law which we must consider regardless of how the trial court ruled upon the identical matter. Treasure City v. Strange, 590 S.W.2d 816 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1979, no writ). Flores v. Dosher, 608 S.W.2d 831 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1980), rev’d on other grounds 622 S.W.2d 573 (Tex.1981).
The appellee has mentioned the inadmissibility of the alleged jury misconduct under Rule 606(b) of our present Texas Rules of Evidence, which became effective September 1, 1983. Suffice it to say that such rule would not be applicable to the case before us because the cause of action arose on October 7, 1977, went to trial on July 5, 1982, and the appellant’s motion for new trial was overruled November 5, 1982.
Finally, we consider the appellee’s cross-point which we failed to address in the original opinion. We have carefully reviewed the evidence adduced which would tend to show whether Bobby Baird was an independent contractor or an employee of the appellant. By his pleadings, the appel-lee sought to hold the appellant vicariously liable for the negligence of Bobby Baird.
An independent contractor has been defined as any person who, “in the pursuit of an independent business, undertakes to do a specific piece of work for other persons, using his own means and methods, without submitting himself to their control in respect to all its details.” William Sommerville & Sons, Inc., v. Carter, 571 S.W.2d 953, 956 (Tex.Civ.App.—Tyler 1978), aff’d. 584 S.W.2d 274 (Tex.1979).
The standard tests for determining whether one is acting in the capacity of an independent contractor measure the amount of control that the employer exerts or has a right to exert over the details of the work. Newspapers Inc. v. Love, 380 S.W.2d 582 (Tex.1964).
Generally, the court analyzes five factors: (1) the independent nature of the workman’s business; (2) his obligation to furnish necessary tools, supplies, and materials to perform the job; (3) his right to control the progress of the work except as to final results; (4) the time for which he is employed; (5) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job. Pitchfork Land and Cattle Co. v. King, 162 Tex. 331, 346 S.W.2d 598, 603 (1961); William Sommerville & Son, supra; Eagle *856Trucking Co. v. Texas Bitulithic Co., 590 S.W.2d 200 (Tex.Civ.App.—Tyler 1979, rev’d on other grounds, 612 S.W.2d 503 (Tex.1981).
If, after examining these five factors, the court finds that there is conflicting evidence as to the status of the workman, the issue should be submitted to the jury. Eagle Trucking Co., supra. However, if the facts are not disputed, and the evidence is “reasonably susceptible of but a single inference, the question whether the relationship of employee and independent contractor exists is one of law for the court.” Id. at 212; Rodriquez v. Zavala, 279 S.W.2d 604, 606-7 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1955, no writ); 57 C.J.S., “Master and Servant,” § 617.
The undisputed evidence before the trial court indicated that Baird performed tractor work, such as cutting sidewalks and driveways on construction sites. He also did clean-up work, hauled dirt to and from construction sites, and hauled trash.
During all of these operations, Baird used his own equipment consisting of two tractors and three trucks; paid his own employees who worked on the appellant’s construction sites, and paid for his own gas. His wife did the bookkeeping and prepared the bills which were submitted to the appellant. Baird worked only as needed for the appellant and was usually paid either a set rate or at an hourly set-rate, depending on whether he could predict the amount of time necessary to complete a job.
Generally, the only control that the job superintendent Yargo exerted over Baird was in directing what needed to be cleared, cut, or hauled away. Yargo also testified that if he saw Baird operating the tractor in an unsafe manner, he would direct him to stop, or would have fired him. The fact that the appellant exercised some general control or supervision over Baird did not show that appellant had the right to control the details of the work. Newspapers Inc., supra; Elder v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 149 Tex. 620, 236 S.W.2d 611, 613 (1951).
The evidence shows that appellant exercised control over Baird for the purpose of seeing that work was done properly and expeditiously. The cases are legion which hold that “This manner of general control over an independent contractor does not result in making him a servant.” Texas Employers Insurance Ass’n v. Bewley, 560 S.W.2d 147 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1977, no writ).
We find the controlling facts by which we determine whether an individual is an independent contractor to be undisputed. This presented a question of law which we hold that the trial court properly resolved by granting the appellant’s partial summary judgment motion. All of the appellee’s points of error are overruled and his motion for rehearing is denied.
In considering the appellant’s motion for rehearing, we notice that no new points of view are presented to the position previously stated in the appellant’s brief. We therefore deny the appellant’s motion for rehearing.
For Publication. TEX.R.CIV.P. 452(b).