Court Opinion

ID: 9508628
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 21:35:44.852776+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:07:35.583443
License: Public Domain

W. JONES,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority Opinion in this case because the majority did not properly consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether Trooper Jayne’s actions constituted an unlawful seizure. The facts are as follows: on March 17, 2009, Idaho State Police Trooper Jeff Jayne was traveling down a two-way highway when he noticed a silver Subaru wagon pass him with only one working headlight.1 A Toyota pickup truck was traveling immediately be*569hind the Subaru. The Respondent, Irvin C. Ray, was a passenger in the Toyota pickup.2 Trooper Jayne made a U-turn with the purpose of effectuating a traffic stop of the Subaru. Because the stretch of Highway 200 approaching Clark Road is very narrow, Trooper Jayne was unable to pull in directly behind the Subaru. Instead, Trooper Jayne followed both ears and then activated his overhead lights before approaching a turnout. When Trooper Jayne activated his lights, he was directly behind Ray’s pickup. Both the Subaru and the pickup pulled off the highway and into the turnout. Trooper Jayne positioned his police vehicle directly behind the Subaru and approximately three to five car lengths in front of Ray’s pickup. Trooper Jayne testified that he only intended to stop the Subaru and assumed that the pickup would drive away after the officer pulled in behind the lead vehicle. When the pickup made no attempt to leave, Trooper Jayne decided to explain to the occupants of the Toyota that they were free to leave.
Within seconds after Trooper Jayne parked between the two vehicles, he got out of his patrol car and began walking toward Ray’s pickup.3 The overhead lights of Trooper Jayne’s patrol car were still activated when the officer approached Ray’s pickup. As the officer walked to the driver’s side window of the pickup, he greeted the occupants “hello” and noticed a strong smell of fresh marijuana emanating fi’om the vehicle. Trooper Jayne searched Ray and found a marijuana pipe, rolling papers, and a small baggie of marijuana inside Ray’s pockets. The officer then searched the vehicle and found a backpack containing 8.2 ounces of marijuana.
Ray filed a motion to suppress the evidence against him in both cases, arguing that it was the fruit of an unlawful detention. The district court granted Ray’s Motion to Suppress, finding that although Trooper Jayne passed Ray’s pickup, the officer’s act of walking back to the pickup constituted a sufficient show of authority that a reasonable person would not feel free to leave. Therefore, the district court concluded that Trooper Jayne’s conduct created an unlawful seizure requiring the suppression of evidence and ordered the dismissal of both cases against Ray. The Court of Appeals ultimately affirmed the district court’s Order granting Ray’s Motion to Suppress, holding that the officer’s act of walking toward the pickup invoked the “except when otherwise directed” language of Idaho Code section 49-625(1), making a reasonable person feel that he or she was not free to leave. On appeal to this Court, the majority reverses the district court’s Order suppressing the evidence, holding that Ray was not seized when Trooper Jayne approached Ray’s vehicle.
For purposes of the Fourth Amendment, a seizure only occurs “when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen.” State v. Nickel, 134 Idaho 610, 612, 7 P.3d 219, 221 (2000) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n. 16, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879 n. 16, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 905 n. 16 (1968)). “A seizure initiated through a show of authority requires words or actions, or both, by a law enforcement officer that would convey to a reasonable person that the officer was ordering him or her to restrict his or her movement.” State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 486, 211 P.3d 91, 95 (2009) (internal citations omitted). “The test to determine if an individual is seized for Fourth Amendment purposes is an objective one, evaluating whether under the totality of the circumstances ‘a reasonable person would feel free to decline the officers’ requests or otherwise terminate the encounter.’ ” State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 658, 152 P.3d 16, 19 (2007) (quoting Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 436, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 2387, 115 L.Ed.2d 389, 400 (1991)). Thus, an officer’s subjective intent is only relevant if that intent has been objectively conveyed to the person in question. Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 260-61, *570127 S.Ct. 2400, 2408-09, 168 L.Ed.2d 132, 141-42 (2007).
Idaho Code section 49-625(1) mandates that drivers yield in response to an officer’s activation of its vehicle’s overhead lights and provides as follows:
Upon the immediate approach of an authorized emergency or police vehicle making use of an audible or visible signal, meeting the requirements of section 49-623, Idaho Code, the driver of every other vehicle shall yield the right-of-way and immediately drive to a position parallel to, and as close as possible to, the nearest edge or curb of the highway lawful for parking and clear of any intersection, and stop and remain in that position until the authorized emergency or police vehicle has passed, except when otherwise directed by a peace officer.
(Bold and italics emphasis added).
This Court has previously held that although an officer’s activation of its overhead lights does not create a de facto seizure implicating the Fourth Amendment, the use of emergency lights is a significant factor for the court to consider under the totality of the circumstances. Willoughby, 147 Idaho at 487, 211 P.3d at 96. Here, Trooper Jayne activated his emergency lights while he was driving directly behind Ray’s pickup and Ray responded by pulling off of the highway. At that moment, Ray was acting in compliance with the law. In accordance with Idaho Code section 49-625(1), Ray was obligated by law to remain stopped until Trooper Jayne passed Ray’s vehicle “except when otherwise directed.” See I.C. § 49-625(1). I agree with the majority that a driver who pulls over and stops as required by Idaho Code section 49-625(1) “is not seized unless he or she is directed by a peace officer not to leave.” However, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that Trooper Jayne’s act of walking towards Ray’s pickup did not constitute a show of authority that implicated the “except when otherwise directed” language of the statute, especially when considering the totality of the circumstances.
Although police officers typically pull in behind the lead vehicle which they were pursuing, once they step out of the patrol car, the emergency overhead lights usually remain flashing and the officers approach the vehicle without any hand gestures, or weapons drawn. The manner in which Trooper Jayne caused Ray’s vehicle to pull-over (by activating his overhead lights while driving directly behind Ray’s pickup) is typical of how a suspicious driver is pulled over for further investigation. Likewise, the manner in which Trooper Jayne approached Ray’s vehicle is typical of how an officer would approach a vehicle that was stopped with reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The only indication that Ray was not the subject of the stop was that Trooper Jayne parked his vehicle in front of Ray’s pickup and behind the Subaru. But again, when looking at the totality of the circumstances, this scenario is riddled with ambiguity because two ears pulled into the turn-out. At that moment, a reasonable person would have felt unsure about which vehicle was the target of the stop. But as soon as Trooper Jayne got out of his car and immediately began walking towards Ray’s vehicle, he confirmed, at least to a reasonable person, that the officer wanted Ray to remain stopped.
Even the majority acknowledged that Trooper Jayne’s act of walking toward Ray’s vehicle “certainly indicated that he wanted to talk to the driver.” The majority went on to admit that “the average person may not have felt comfortable just driving away at that point, knowing that the officer wanted to say something.” Despite acknowledging that a reasonable person would not be comfortable driving away after being pulled over and then having the officer approach the vehicle, somehow the majority reached the conclusion that Ray knew or should have known that he was free to accelerate and leave and that he was not seized when Trooper Jayne approached his pickup. In other words, the majority admitted that an average person in these circumstances would not have felt comfortable to just drive away, but also concluded that a reasonable person would have felt free to leave, despite being approached by the same trooper that just activated his lights behind the driver causing him or her to pull over just moments earlier. In my opinion, the majority’s logic is flawed, especially *571when considering the totality of the circumstances. For instance, Ray’s vehicle was pulled over late at night and when Trooper Jayne emerged from his patrol car, with its emergency lights still flashing, he was wearing his Idaho State Trooper uniform, which included a badge and a gun. All of these factors contributed to Trooper Jayne’s show of authority when he began walking towards Ray’s pickup. It is in that precise moment that Ray was unlawfully seized because his freedom of movement was restricted by the officer’s conduct and show of authority. Such a restriction of liberty was not supported by reasonable suspicion.
For the majority to conclude that a reasonable person would have felt free to drive away as soon as the officer was stepping out of his patrol ear and turning towards the vehicle, simply because the officer’s patrol car had passed the vehicle, would be unfathomable and inconsistent with constitutional principles. In fact, had Ray not waited and just sped off as soon as Trooper Jayne passed Ray’s vehicle to park in front of him, that kind of behavior would raise reasonable suspicion and it is highly likely that Trooper Jayne would have responded by chasing after Ray for resisting or obstructing a public officer in violation of Idaho Code section 18-705.4 When a reasonable person is unsure about why he was pulled over or whether he, or another car, was the subject of the stop, a reasonable person would wait for further clarification from the officer. That clarification came in the form of Trooper Jayne stepping out of his patrol car and walking towards Ray’s vehicle. Once Trooper Jayne began walking toward Ray, the trooper conveyed a sufficient show of authority causing a reasonable person to believe that he or she was the target of the trooper’s stop and therefore causing the individual to feel that he or she was not free to leave.
I recognize that an officer has the right to approach individuals and ask them questions without implicating their Fourth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable search and seizures.
A seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual on the street or other public place, by asking him questions, or by putting questions to him if he is willing to listen____ Even when officers have no basis for suspecting a particular individual, they may generally ask the individual questions and ask to examine identification. Thus, where an officer merely approaches a person who is standing on the street, or seated in a non-moving vehicle located in a public place, and poses a few questions, no seizure has occurred____[T]he critical inquiry is whether, taking into account all of the circumstances surrounding the encounter, “the police conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that he was not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about his business.”
State v. Osborne, 121 Idaho 520, 523-24, 826 P.2d 481, 484-84 (Ct.App.1991) (internal citations omitted).
I agree with the majority that, under some circumstances, an officer is free to approach a person on the street or parked in a car to ask him or her questions. Yet the facts presented in this case cannot be compared to the situation where a police officer approaches an individual in daylight and in a public place, and the individual has no prior indication that the officer wants to talk to him or her until the officer speaks directly to the person. Even in uniform, an officer merely approaching an individual does not constitute a sufficient show of authority to convey to a reasonable person that he or she is not free to leave. This seems to be where the majority rests its reasoning, but in my opinion, the majority is ignoring the totality of the circumstances by not taking into account the factors that led up to the trooper approaching Ray’s vehicle. When considering the totality of the circumstances surrounding Trooper Jayne’s advance toward Ray, I remain firmly convinced that the *572trooper’s conduct would have conveyed to a reasonable person that he or she was not free to ignore the trooper’s presence and simply drive away as the officer was approaching. These circumstances, which fundamentally changed the dynamic of Trooper Jayne’s approach, include the fact that Trooper Jayne activated his lights when he was directly behind Ray, causing him to pull over, and the close temporal proximity between Ray yielding to the officer’s emergency lights and Trooper Jayne stepping out of his car to approach Ray’s vehicle. After considering the totality of the events leading up to Trooper Jayne walking toward Ray’s vehicle, I am convinced that a reasonable person would believe that his freedom to move was restrained or restricted. In fact, during oral argument on appeal to this Court, counsel for the State even admitted that she would not have felt comfortable to leave while the officer was approaching her vehicle given the chain of events in this case. Although the trooper passed Ray, Trooper Jayne “otherwise directed” Ray to remain stopped when he began walking towards Ray’s pickup.
Trooper Jayne could have easily waved, from his patrol car, the occupants of Ray’s vehicle to move along. There was no need to approach Ray’s vehicle, at least unless they ignored his hand signal to move along and remained in the turn-out. Trooper Jayne admitted that he had no probable cause or reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to stop Ray’s pickup. At the suppression hearing, Trooper Jayne explained that Ray was free to leave before he got to the vehicle, “[b]ut as soon as I got that odor of marijuana they were not free to leave.” Although the officer testified about how probable cause developed as he was walking up to Ray’s pickup, Trooper Jayne does not indicate at what point he smelled the marijuana or that his body language or conduct changed in any way as a result. For instance, once Trooper Jayne detected the smell of marijuana, he did not suddenly raise his hand or tell the occupants to “stop.” Instead, he just continued walking, objectively manifesting the exact same behavior as he was exhibiting when Ray was supposedly free to leave. This supports my conclusion that Trooper Jayne’s subjective intent was not objectively conveyed by his outward conduct. After yielding to an officer’s emergency lights, which were activated behind the driver, and seeing that officer approach the vehicle without making any hand gestures to move along, a reasonable person would not believe that they were free to drive away and leave when a police officer is approaching their vehicle, and that is the test to determine whether an unlawful seizure occurred. Therefore, I agree with the district court judge and the court of appeals, and I would affirm the district court’s suppression order, holding that the evidence was the fruit of an unlawful seizure.

. Trooper Jayne testified that he noticed the Subaru because it was missing a front license plate, yet the video recording of the encounter shows that Trooper Jayne only mentioned the headlight concern to the driver following the traffic stop.

. Although Ray was a passenger in the Toyota on the night of the arrest, he is the owner of the vehicle and his son was driving the truck that evening.

. The district court determined that "from the time you hear the door click open to the time that the officer says hello to the driver of the pickup truck, there’s about 16 seconds that elapses.”

. Idaho Code section 18-705 states:
Every person who wilfully resists, delays or obstructs any public officer, in the discharge, or attempt to discharge, of any duty of his office or who knowingly gives a false report to any peace officer, when no other punishment is prescribed, is punishable by a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000), and imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding one (1) year.