Court Opinion

ID: 9590007
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:50:53.066005+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:58.006685
License: Public Domain

GOOLSBY, Judge
(dissenting):
I respectfully dissent. Unlike the majority, I would uphold the trial court’s conclusion that assumption of the risk is a complete defense to an action based on negligence.
Alvin Davenport asserts the trial court erred in directing a verdict for Cotton Hope Plantation Horizontal Property Regime on the ground of assumption of the risk, arguing (1) that assumption of the risk is no longer a complete defense to a negligence action since our supreme court’s adoption of comparative negligence, and (2) that whether Davenport assumed the risk was a fact question for the jury’s determination. I would find no error.
In Nelson v. Concrete Supply Co., 303 S.C. 243, 399 S.E.2d 783 (1991), our supreme court adopted the doctrine of comparative negligence and overruled South Carolina’s long-standing rule of contributory negligence.
Davenport bases his argument that South Carolina’s adoption of comparative negligence eliminated assumption of the risk as a complete bar to recovery in a negligence action on the ground that assumption of the risk is merely a “branch” of *519contributory negligence. It is well established in South Carolina, however, that contributory negligence and assumption of the risk are separate and distinct concepts. See Ruth v. Lane, 254 S.C. 431, 175 S.E.2d 820 (1970) (explaining the distinction between the two defenses); cf. Rule 8(c), SCRCP (listing contributory negligence and assumption of the risk as separate defenses).
In Litchfield Co. of S.C. v. Sur-Tech, Inc., 289 S.C. 247, 345 S.E.2d 765 (Ct.App.1986), this court discussed the distinction:
The traditionally recognized distinction between the two defenses is that the former is a matter of some fault or departure from the standard of conduct of a reasonable person, while the latter is a matter of knowledge of a danger and voluntary acquiescence in it.
In some cases, a plaintiff may be acting reasonably in assuming a risk and thus not be negligent because the risk he assumes is outweighed by the advantage of his conduct. For example, if a plaintiff dashed into a fire because it was necessary to save his child, it might be argued that he assumed the risk of being injured but it could scarcely be argued that he acted unreasonably under the circumstances.
In other cases, the conduct of a plaintiff in assuming a risk may itself be unreasonable and thus negligent because the risk he assumes is out of all proportion to the advantage which he is seeking to gain. For example, if a plaintiff dashed into a fire in order to save his hat, it might well be argued that he both assumed the risk of being injured and that he acted unreasonably. In such cases, a defendant can maintain both defenses.
Id. at 249, 345 S.E.2d at 766 (citation omitted). I would therefore reject the notion that assumption of the risk is a mere branch of contributory negligence and hold that our state’s adoption of comparative negligence did nothing to eliminate assumption of the risk as a complete bar to a negligence action. See Clements v. Long, 167 Ga.App. 11, 305 S.E.2d 830 (1983); Riley v. Davison Constr. Co., 381 Mass. 432, 409 N.E.2d 1279 (1980); Singleton v. Wiley, 372 So.2d 272 (Miss.1979); Kennedy v. Providence Hockey Club, Inc., 119 R.I. 70, 376 A.2d 329 (1977) (all retaining assumption of the risk as an absolute defense despite adoption of a comparative *520fault system); see also Roberts v. King, 102 Ga.App. 518, 116 S.E.2d 885 (1960); Sandberg v. Hoogensen, 201 Neb. 190, 266 N.W.2d 745 (1978); Bartlett v. Gregg, 77 S.D. 406, 92 N.W.2d 654 (1958) (all distinguishing assumption of the risk from contributory negligence).
Davenport also argues the question of whether he assumed the risk was a fact question that the trial court should have submitted to the jury. I would not address that argument because it has not been properly preserved for our review. See Schofield v. Richland County Sch. Dist., 316 S.C. 78, 447 S.E.2d 189 (1994) (an issue not raised to or ruled on by the trial court is not preserved for appellate review). In his argument at trial in response to Cotton Hope’s motion for a directed verdict, Davenport essentially conceded he assumed the risk when he argued only that assumption of the risk was no longer the law of this state.1
Because I would hold assumption of the risk remains an affirmative defense in actions based on negligence and the question of whether Davenport assumed the risk was not preserved, I would not reach the question of whether the trial court erred in directing a verdict in favor of Cotton Hope on the additional ground that Davenport’s negligence in walking down a darkened stairwell exceeded any negligence on Cotton Hope’s part.
I would further hold the trial court erred in directing a verdict for Carson Landscaping, Inc., on Cotton Hope’s third-party claim for attorney fees. I believe whether or not Cotton Hope is ultimately held liable to Davenport, it presented sufficient evidence to recover against Carson under either a contractual indemnification theory or an equitable indemnification theory.
Viewing the facts regarding the third-party claim in the light most favorable to Cotton Hope, there was ample evidence to support the inferences that Carson negligently failed to fix the stairway lights and negligently cut the wires that *521caused the lights to malfunction in the first place. The contract between Cotton Hope and Carson specifically provided Carson would indemnify Cotton Hope for attorney fees arising from personal injury claims resulting from Carson’s negligence, whether or not the claim was partially attributable to any negligence on Cotton Hope’s part. Under these circumstances, then, Cotton Hope presented sufficient evidence to support a claim for contractual indemnification. See Federal Pac. Elec. v. Carolina Prod. Enters., 298 S.C. 23, 378 S.E.2d 56 (Ct.App.1989) (a contract for indemnification will not be construed to indemnify the indemnitee against losses resulting from its own negligent acts unless such intention is expressed in clear and unequivocal terms).
In addition, there was evidence reasonably supporting each of the elements of an equitable indemnification claim, specifically (1) that Cotton Hope had become involved in a legal dispute because of Carson’s negligence; (2) that the dispute was with a third party, namely Davenport; and (3) that Cotton Hope had incurred attorney fees in defending the action.2 See Addy v. Bolton, 257 S.C. 28,183 S.E.2d 708 (1971) (stating the elements a plaintiff must prove to recover attorney fees and costs under an equitable indemnification theory). Moreover, contrary to Carson’s argument that, as a matter of law, Cotton Hope’s own negligence precluded its claim for equitable indemnification, there was evidence reasonably supporting the inference that no conduct on Cotton Hope’s part constituted negligence proximately causing Davenport’s accident. Cf. Abeles v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 244 S.C. 508, 137 S.E.2d 604 (1964) (contributory negligence has ordinarily been an issue for the jury and has rarely been a question of law for the court).

. Davenport’s counsel, responding to the trial court’s assertion that the case at bar was a perfect assumption of the risk case, stated, “Yes, Sir, that would be probably true, your Honor, if we were in another day and age but unfortunately, your Honor, Mr. Stemke’s position, the law in this State we believe has changed."

. The trial court had alerted all parties it would receive evidence of Cotton Hope’s attorney fees after the verdict if Cotton Hope received a favorable verdict on its indemnification claim.