Court Opinion

ID: 9575019
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:10:43.330622+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:47:48.769286
License: Public Domain

Smith, J.
(dissenting): I dissent from the foregoing opinion because I cannot distinguish the facts pleaded in this opinion from those in Gilmore v. Kansas City, 157 Kan. 552, 142 P. 2d 699. True, that case was an appeal from a jury verdict while the instant case is an appeal from a ruling as to the sufficiency of the petition. But in both instances there was the question of what constitutes a defect as a matter of law. The defect as alleged in the instant pe*632tition is quite the same as the defect established by the evidence in the Gilmore case. There the plaintiff stepped into an open hole in the parking where a pole had been removed. We held the city liable. In this petition the hole into which plaintiff stepped was covered with a thin and worn-out tin lid. The reasonable inference was that the city had covered the hole with such' 'a lid or manhole cover. Both holes were in the parking and both injuries happened after dark. In my opinion, there is no way to distinguish between the two petitions. On that account, I cannot concur in the majority opinion.
Arn, J., joins in this dissent.
Wedell, J. (dissenting).