Court Opinion

ID: 9518951
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:05:47.866149+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:39:12.262316
License: Public Domain

Cavanagh, J.
I dissent from the conclusion reached by the majority. While it is apparent that the defendant did, in fact, receive different sentences from the federal and state courts on these charges, his potential sentencing exposure was substantially similar. The majority correctly declines the unwarranted invitation of the prosecution to overrule People v Cooper, 398 Mich 450; 247 NW2d 866 (1976), but then erroneously attempts to stretch this case to fit within Cooper's “substantially different” exception. Id. at 462. Because it is clear to me that the case does not fit within that exception, I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
i
Now and again, and more recently it seems, this Court is called on to revisit a longstanding doctrine in light of supposed changes in circumstances or logic. A scant two years ago, this Court reviewed a question nearly identical to the one we face today in People v Mezy, 453 Mich 269; 551 NW2d 389 (1996). While the Court did not reach the merits of the continuing vitality of Cooper, the lead opinion found cause to attack such vitality, compelling the dissent to defend the continuing applicability of Cooper. There were questions in Mezy regarding whether the defendant indeed had been charged twice for what was substantially *224the same act, and, eventually, this Court settled on remanding the matter for further proceedings.
Appellant now calls on us to revisit the basic question of Cooper, whether this state will subscribe to the doctrine of “dual sovereignty” in resolving double jeopardy questions dealing with subsequent federal and state prosecutions, a question Cooper clearly answered in the negative. While, once again, the parties expend considerable effort disputing whether the acts charged under the state and federal prosecution were in fact the same, it seems the Court has resolved this question affirmatively.1 The more interesting factual point, however, is that the Court of Appeals has left intact two other convictions of the defendant that resulted in concurrent sentences identical to the ones disputed in this case.2 Thus, while it is clear that the instant dispute is in no way moot, in that it involves two substantive convictions, it would seem the sole “real-world” effect of our review of this case is to once again subject Cooper to the peril of being overruled. I must wonder if the Court’s resources would not be better spent visiting areas where we are lacking clearly established precedent that has governed without difficulty over the last twenty years.
That said, the majority having declined to reach Cooper, I will refrain from yet another defense of it, continuing to favor the view of Justice Levin in part n *225of his dissent in Mezy. To the extent one might read the majority’s opinion to invite an opportunity to return to this area once again, that is expressly disavowed.3
n
Turning to the matter as decided by the majority, the majority correctly notes that “the key point is whether the state and federal interests are substantially different.”4 I would hold they are not. As the majority agrees, the Cooper factors include the questions “whether the maximum penalties of the statutes involved are greatly disparate, whether some reason exists why one jurisdiction cannot be entrusted to vindicate fully another jurisdiction’s interests in securing a conviction, and whether the differences in the statutes are merely jurisdictional or are more substantive.”5
As the majority again agrees, the maximum penalties under both the military and state statutes are identical — life imprisonment. The majority falters, *226however, when it proceeds beyond the bounds of the Cooper factors to assess the actual sentences imposed. Cooper deals in particular with the maximum penalties of the statutes in question. One could infer that this Court recognized a fact that is well known — among various judges there most certainly will be some level of disparity in sentencing. By turning to the maximum penalty proscribed by law, however, one can refer to a benchmark that reflects the seriousness with which a particular jurisdiction views the offense. Here such penalties are exactly equal, and quite severe. The proper conclusion to be drawn then is that both the military system and our state view criminal sexual conduct to be one of the most severe violations of law, and thus subject those who commit such offense to the severe sanction of life imprisonment.6
As to the second factor, the majority has pointed to no reason why the federal system could not be entrusted to vindicate Michigan’s interests, and, likewise, I can find none to exist. The last factor, how*227ever, is the most telling, and one where the majority, again, clearly fails to grasp the import of Cooper.
With regard to whether the differences in the statutes are “merely jurisdictional or are more substantive,” the majority seemingly answers with references to the Michigan sex-offender registry and mandatory hiv testing. Such differences are of the sort that seem to clearly be “merely jurisdictional,” which is to say, no two jurisdictions are likely to penalize a crime identically. The fact that minor differences may exist between the various federal and state statutes is exactly what Cooper was referring to in its exclusion of “merely jurisdictional” differences.7 Rather than pointing to an underlying disparity in the interests vindicated by the statutes, these minor inconsistencies seem to indicate that Michigan addresses the same basic interests in a slightly different fashion. Such slight distinctions do not amount to the substantive disparities spoken of in Cooper. The fact that two statutes might seek to serve interests differently does not mean they inherently serve different interests.
m
While the majority, appropriately, has declined an unwarranted invitation to overrule Cooper, I fear that in doing so it seeks to carve an exception to the rule of Cooper that would soon leave it but a hollow shell. Cooper contains an inherent recognition that the fed*228eral and state statutes applicable to a given matter will never be exactly identical. They need, under Cooper, only be substantially comparable. In the instant case, the statutes clearly were so, and prohibited substantially the same act in vindication of substantially the same interests. Accordingly, under Cooper, the state prosecution should be found to be both unwarranted and impermissible.
I would, therefore, affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Brickley and Kelly, JJ., concurred with Cavanagh, J.

 It is clear that both the federal and state prosecutions were based on the same criminal acts. [Ante at 219.]
I do not disagree with this conclusion.

 Defendant has applied for leave to appeal from this portion of the holding of the Court of Appeals. By order of this Court, the defendant’s application is being held in abeyance for our decision in this case.

 Justice Levin’s dissent in Mezy contained a reference that was particularly appropriate to our return to this area of law, even before the Court granted leave in the instant matter:
There is a limit to the amount of error that can plausibly be imputed to prior Courts. If that limit should be exceeded, disturbance of prior rulings would be taken as evidence that justifiable reexamination of principle had given way to drives for particular results in the short term. The legitimacy of the Court would fade with the frequency of its vacillation. [Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v Casey, 505 US 833, 866; 112 S Ct 2791; 120 L Ed 2d 674 (1992). Mezy at 303 (Levin, J., dissenting).]

 Ante at 219.

 These are the factors listed in Cooper that a prosecutor could point to in order to show that the state’s interests were not sufficiently vindicated by the federal prosecution. Id. at 461. The general teaching of Cooper is that, “[w]hen state and Federal interests do coincide, prosecution by one sovereign will satisfy the need of the other.” Id. at 460.

 It is further inappropriate to compare the specific sentences imposed in this case when one considers that the Michigan sentences were imposed pursuant to a negotiated plea of nolo contendere under People v Cobbs, 443 Mich 276; 505 NW2d 208 (1993). The plea was specifically negotiated so that all four sentences would be served concurrently. Additionally, the trial court agreed that the minimum sentence imposed would be one equal to the defendant’s military sentence. While the majority would focus on the maximum sentence imposed, the point of this discussion is that the sentence itself was negotiated. Such a case and fact-specific event does not provide an adequate basis for comparing the interests of two jurisdictions in prohibiting a certain type of conduct. Conversely, to the extent the sentencing judge, over the initial objection of the prosecutor, agreed to impose a sentence equal to the federal sentence, it would seem the trial court did not view the federal sentence to be one insufficient to vindicate the state’s interests.

 Indeed, it is most likely that such differences exist in nearly all cases, and on both sides of the equation. The military system, for example, has shown a greater preference for including hard labor in its incarceration penalties than has our state’s system. See, e.g., United States v Cuellar, 22 MJ 529 (NM CMR, 1986), aff'd 27 MJ 50 (CMA, 1988), and United States v Carter, 22 MJ 771 (ACMR, 1986), aff’d 26 MJ 428 (CMA, 1988).