Court Opinion

ID: 9428391
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:23:36.6438+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:13.238587
License: Public Domain

Justice Stewart,
dissenting.
I would not dismiss the writ of certiorari. I would, to the contrary, reverse the judgment before us because the California Court of Appeal has wrongly held that the State may consider a person’s race in making promotion decisions.1
So far as the Constitution goes, a private person may engage in any racial discrimination he wants, cf. Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U. S. 193, but under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment a sovereign State may never do so.2 And it is wholly irrelevant whether the State gives a “plus” or “minus” value to a person’s race, whether the discrimination occurs in a decision to hire or fire or promote, or whether the discrimination is called “affirmative action” or by some less euphemistic term.3
A year ago I stated my understanding of the Constitution in this respect, and I repeat now a little of what I said then:
“The equal protection standard of the Constitution has one clear and central meaning — it absolutely prohibits invidious discrimination by government. That standard must be met by every State under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. . . .
“Under our Constitution, the government may never act to the detriment of a person solely because of that person’s race. The color of a person’s skin and the country *129of his origin are immutable facts that bear no relation to ability, disadvantage, moral culpability, or any other characteristics of constitutionally permissible interest to government. ... In short, racial discrimination is by definition invidious discrimination.
“The rule cannot be any different when the persons injured . . . are not members of a racial minority. . . .
“. . . Most importantly, by making race a relevant criterion, . . . the Government implicitly teaches the public that the apportionment of rewards and penalties can legitimately be made according to race — rather than according to merit or ability — and that people can, and perhaps should, view themselves and others in terms of their racial characteristics. . . .
“There are those who think that we need a new Constitution, and their views may someday prevail. But under the Constitution we have, one practice in which government may never engage is the practice of racism . . . .” Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448, 523, 525-526, 532 (dissenting opinion) (footnote omitted).
I respectfully dissent.

 This ruling is “final” for purpose of the jurisdiction of this Court. See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469, 482-483.

 It is self-evident folly to suppose that a person’s race may constitutionally be taken into account, but that it must not be controlling.

 California’s policy of racial discrimination was sought to be justified as an antidote for previous discrimination in favor of white people. But, even in this context, two wrongs do not make a right. Two wrongs simply make two wrongs.