Court Opinion

ID: 9850653
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:00:56.313328+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:41.004190
License: Public Domain

J. H. Gillis, J.
(dissenting). In Park the Supreme Court reversed the appeal board’s denial of compensation because the “basic disqualification” finding required in the first sentence of section 29(1) (b) was not supported by the record, the “basic disqualification” then being unemployment “because of a labor dispute in the establishment in which [claimant was] last employed.” Unlike my colleagues, I conclude that Park is now obsolete on the point cited because of the 1963 amendments which expanded the definition of the “basic disqualification” to cover unemployment caused by a labor dispute in any other establishment “functionally integrated” with the establishment last employing the claimant. Indeed, the record below and the briefs here disclose no dispute between the parties that an amended basic disqualification applies to the claimants. Issue is joined, however, on whether the claimants were “directly involved” in the labor dispute within the meaning of the last of the tests set forth in subsections I, II, III and IV of section 29(1) (b), which provides:
“No individual shall be disqualified under this paragraph (b) if he is not directly involved in such dispute. For the purposes of this paragraph (b), no individual shall be deemed to be directly involved in a labor dispute unless it is established that: * * %
“IV. His total or partial unemployment is due to a labor dispute which was or is in progress in any department or unit or group of workers in the same establishment.”1
*378Subsection IY was likewise added in 1963 after the decision in Parle. We must assume, since the legislature was careful to avoid Parle’s import by adding to the pre-1963 “basic disqualification,” that when the fourth condition precedent to a finding of direct involvement was added, i.e., “a labor dispute * ** * in the same establishment,” the legislature did not intend “same establishment” to include an establishment different from but functionally integrated with the establishment in which the claimant was last employed. Such a construction of subsection IY would make it redundant with the basic disqualification. In this respect, I am in agreement with my colleagues. Our disagreement is over the nature and validity of the appeal board’s findings of fact.
The appeal board adopted the referee’s finding that the supermarket outlets, the Sanders retail stores and the bakery were one establishment. My colleagues affirm the rejection of that finding of fact by the lower court, concluding that since the facts were undisputed there is in reality but a question of law to be decided. This, in my judgment, is an unwarranted judicial invasion of the decision-making powers granted to the appeal board by the legislature. Even on undisputed facts different permissible inferences may be drawn in reaching the ultimate fact. Here the appeal board found that there was but one establishment. I cannot agree that as a matter of law they are wrong. The courts are bound to accept not only the factual finding’s of an administrative agency based upon a disputed record, but also the permissible inferences which they have drawn from'undisputed facts.2 Cf. Baugh-*379man v. Vicker’s Inc. (1949), 323 Mich 710, 715. There is respectable authority that even as to questions of law, though the courts are not bound by an administrative agency’s conclusions, they should be reluctant to overturn them and should give these conclusions of law special consideration “in light of the commission’s long record of practical experience with this subject and its responsibility for the administration and enforcement of this law.” Levinson v. Spector Motor Service (1947), 330 US 649, 672 (67 SCt 931, 91 L Ed 1158).
The appeal board did not rely upon functional integration alone in determining that the supermarket outlets, the bakery and the retail stores constituted one establishment. Even though the referee, perhaps improperly, relied in part upon the fact that production schedules were geared to sales of the company’s products in the store outlets and supermarkets, this would not in my judgment be sufficient basis for setting aside the administrative finding of one establishment. The referee’s opinion makes it clear that this was not the determinative factor in his decision.
“The undisputed facts in the instant case clearly establish that these claimants, members of Local 876, performed their services under the same general supervision as the hourly-rated workers at Oakman Boulevard who went out on strike August 31, 1964, and which resulted in the unemployment of these claimants. Although they have their own local union and seniority lists, the other factors pointed out [in Park which militated against a finding of one establishment] are not present.
*380“Ill the very nature of the setup, the production schedules in the factory are geared to the sales of the company’s products in the store outlets and supermarkets. There is only one industrial relations director, and only one general employment office. These cover all groups or classes or units of employees. These facts support a finding that these claimants were employed in the ‘same establishment’ and their unemployment was due to the labor dispute in active progress in this establishment. Membership in a separate union, with a separate bargaining agreement, is not inconsistent with this finding.” (Referee’s opinion p 8.) .i
My colleagues’ opinion leaves unclear whether each of the supermarket outlets constitutes a separate establishment. They expressly decline to determine whether the supermarket outlets constitute one establishment separate from the retail stores. In other words, the majority opinion here rejects the finding of the appeal board without giving it useful guidelines to follow in future decisions.
I would reverse the decision of the court below and affirm the appeal board’s denial of compensation.

 I disagree with my colleagues that disqualification under this clause is automatic if employment in the dispute establishment is *378proven. {ante, p 374.) This is hut a condition, precedent to a finding of direet involvement which would disqualify an employee from benefits.

 For this reason, -Northwest is not in point. Aside from the fact that Northwest construed the statute as it was before 1963. *379it was a 4-1-3 decision upholding the appeal board’s grant of compensation based upon its finding of separate establishments. Had the appeal board reached a.contrary conclusion, that, too, might well have been affirmed by an equally divided Court. See Justice Black’s concurring opinion, 378 Mich at 135.