Court Opinion

ID: 9729571
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:43:01.438983+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:59.714051
License: Public Domain

Black, J.
(concurring in grant of writ). As in Douglas v. Edgewater Park Co., 369 Mich 320, 331, *229this Court faces anew forked trails of divergent legal travel. The only difference is that this time, should the Court take the wrong path of commitment, a final turning point will have been reached and passéd in the ever-continuing battle to preserve inviolate a basic right which, throughout this State’s history commencing with the Ordinance of 1787,1 has remained under vigilant guardianship of the Supreme Court of Michigan.
The right of trial by jury is pricelessly precious. Yet for years the busiest of professorial legal ghouls have planned new and virtuously varnished erosions of that right, and now we come to grips with the latest and boldest of their strokes.2 What is proposed for this typical common-law negligence case— separate trials of, separate instructions concerning, and separate deliberations upon the historically conjoined issues of liability as charged and damages as claimed — strikes directly at Michigan’s century-old processionary pledge; that the right of trial by jury, as it was known to the common-law and to “the previous jurisprudence of the State,” shall remain inviolate.
As we shall see Michigan has come to know that pledge best by the words of Chief Justice Cooley and his revered associates. By itself, and distinctly separate from the application of the seventh amendment of the Constitution of the United States to the courts of the United States (see Gasoline Products Co., Inc., v. Champlin Refining Co., 283 US 494, 498 [51 S Ct 513, 75 L ed 1188]; Galloway v. United States, 319 US 372, 390 [63 S Ct 1077, 87 L ed 1458] and the recent opinion of Judge Wilson in Moss v. *230Associated Transport, Inc. [ED Tenn], 33 FRD 335, 338-340), Michigan’s continuant pledge appears in the record of the Ordinance of 1787, art 2; in the record of the Constitution of 1835, art 1, § 9; in the record of the Constitution of 1850, art 6, § 27; in the record of the Constitution of 1908, art 2, § 13; and in the record of the Constitution of 1963, art 1, § 14.
I oppose the stated proposal and call up the support of our nationally distinguished predecessors.
“The constitutional principle which underlies the right is one to which the people governed by the common law have clung with, perhaps, more tenacity than to any other, and they have justly regarded it as not preserving simply one form of investigating the facts in preference to another, where both would have attained the same result, but as securing the mode of trial which was best calculated to ensure a just result and to secure the citizens against the usurpation of authority and against arbitrary or prejudiced action on the part of single individuals, who chanced to be possessed of judicial power.” Cooley, C. J., in Van Sickle v. Kellogg, 19 Mich 49, 52.
“The right of trial by jury is secured by constitutional provisions, and it would not be competent to make any substantial changes in its character. As suggested in People v. Marion, 29 Mich 31, one of its substantial elements is the right of the jury to give a general verdict on the merits.” Campbell, J., in Underwood v. People, 32 Mich 1, 2 (20 Am Rep 633). (Italics by present writer.)
“The Constitution [1850] of the State provides that ‘The right of trial by jury shall remain, but shall be deemed to be waived in all civil cases, unless demanded by 1 of the parties in such manner as shall be prescribed by law.’ article 6, § 27. The right is to remain. What right? Plainly the right as it existed before; the right to a trial by jury as *231it had become known to the previous jurisprudence of the State. Underwood v. People, 32 Mich 1 (20 Am Rep 633). The right is not described here; it is not said what shall be its incidents'; it is mentioned as something well known and understood, under a particular name; and by implication at least, even a waiver of its advantages is forbidden.” Cooley, J., in Swart v. Kimball, 43 Mich 443, 448. (Italics by Justice Cooley.)
“It is too well settled to need further citation of authority or argument to show that this part of the Constitution (1850, art 6, § 27), providing that ‘the right of trial by jury shall remain,’ means the right as it existed at the common law, which was well understood in the previous jurisprudence of the State at the time of the adoption of the Constitution in 1850.” (Long, J.", in McRae v. Grand Rapids, L. & D. R. Co., 93 Mich 399, 405 [17 LRA 750].)
So long as they offend no Federal right (no such offense is or could be claimed in today’s instance) the States respectively have a right to warrant by their Constitution scrupulous preservation of the common-law-understood right of trial by jury. They have the unquestioned power also to define that right as it was “understood in the previous jurisprudence of the State.” That is what Michigan has done. So has Tennessee, along with other States. The appellate court of Tennessee recently (Winters v. Floyd [Tenn App, May 10, 1963], 367 SW2d 288) followed 1 of its earlier decisions, Harbison v. Briggs Bros. Paint Manfg. Co., 209 Tenn 534 (354 SW2d 464) to the same point as was made in the Michigan decisions quoted above. From Winters (p 290) I take this connected passage from the Harbison Case (p 541):
“The right of trial by jury, as thus guaranteed by our Constitution, is the right as it existed at common law up to the time of our separation from England *232and the formation of our Constitution. Garner v. State, 13 Tenn 160, 176-178; State v. Sexton, 121 Tenn 35, 41 (114 SW 494); Manning v. State, 155 Tenn 266, 275 (292 SW 438, 451).” 354 SW2d 467.
“At the time of the formation of our Constitution, an incident of the right of trial by jury at common law was that the jury, under proper instructions from the judge as to the law, had the right to decide all the issues of fact, to give a general verdict, compounded of law and fact, in favor of one side or the .other.” 354 SW2d 468.
Some cautionary declarations should be recorded lest shrills of fearsome consequences become too noisy.
A. I conclude only that an objected-to order for separate trials of the historically, linked issues of liability and damages, when such issues have been presented in a typical common-law negligence case, offends Michigan’s constitutional right of trial by jury. I do not conclude that there may not be a separate trial of an additional issue, made say by special plea or affirmative defense (see for example Denton v. Utley, 350 Mich 332), which issue may always have been cognizable in equity. And I do not conclude, once there has been a conventional jury trial of the 2 issues defined above, that there may not thereafter be a partial retrial of such issues; which issue may have been tainted in some way by error committed during the original trial.3
B. What has been written is not to be interpreted 'as criticism of what we know as special verdict prac*233tice. From the beginning, vouchered by Hendrickson v. Walker,4 that practice has been known to the common law and has been preserved as part of the mentioned guarantee of right of trial by jury.

Conclusion

As the debate rages, over this “new approach” to jury trial of these traditionally entwined issues of fact, the protagonists of such approach make it abundantly clear that their aimed purpose is avoidance of jury “prejudice” which, as they say, affects the jury’s verdict upon liability issues and is caused by the harrowing facts of injury, or death and dependence arising from death. If so that is no good reason for destruction of a known and constitutionally guaranteed right. Too, it affronts the oath, taken by “the twelvers”, to faithfully employ the instructions of the court to their deliberations. It suggests finally that judges know and apply no “prejudice,” subconsciously or otherwise as jurors allegedly are wont to do,5 and that it is no longer *234safe or fair to trust juries to decide such issues upon 1 set of instructions, 1 continued deliberation, and 1 report to the court of the result of such deliberation. But if the charge is beyond contradiction, that juries are prejudiced habitually in favor of the injured, I would answer the charge with the words of Justice Holmes (Collected Legal Papers, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Harcourt, Brace & Howe, Inc., 1920, pp 237, 238):
“I confess that in my experience I have not found juries specially inspired for the discovery of truth. I have not noticed that they could see further into things or form a saner judgment than a sensible and well trained judge. I have not found them freer from prejudice than an ordinary judge would be. Indeed 1 reason why I believe in our practice of leaving questions of negligence to them is what is precisely 1 of their gravest defects from the point of view of their theoretical function: that they will introduce into their verdict a certain amount — a very large amount, so far as I have observed — of popular prejudice, and thus keep the administration of the law in accord with the wishes and feelings of the community.”
The jury is, as some legal writer said years ago, a bridge between the people and the courts which enables Americans to participate directly in courthouse democracy. I would maintain that bridge with vigilance, its value and integrity having been steadily guaranteed by the Constitution, rather than accept more of these innovational and costly novelties; novelties which, perceivably now, insidiously and slyly sap the right of trial by jury.
*235I concur in grant of the writ, noting agreement with Justice Souris that plaintiff’s stated and accepted question No 26 should be answered in the negative. See Wilson v. Saginaw Circuit Judge, 370 Mich 404 at 413, 414 (footnote 2).

 Section 14, Art 2 of articles of compact. — Reporter.

 See “Court Congestion: a New Approach,” 45 ABA Journal 1265. Yes, indeed, what was ordered in the circuit court below was “a new approach”; an approach unknown to the common law and “the jurisprudence of the State.”

 See, however, our quotation with approval (Kistler v. Wagoner, 315 Mich 162, at 173, 174) as follows, from Norfolk Southern R. Co. v. Ferebee, 238 US 269, 273 (35 S Ct 781, 59 L ed 1303):
“Damages and contributory negligence are so blended and interwoven, and the conduct of the plaintiff at the time of the aeeident is so' important a matter in the assessment of damages, that the instances would be rare in which it would be proper to submit to a jury the question of damages without also permitting them to consider the conduct of the plaintiff at the time of the injury.”

 “Tlie power to find sqieeial verdicts is as old as tlie common law, and was always competent. It is a very proper and convenient practice when there is no serious difference between parties on the facts, and in such cases it is not unusual for counsel to agree upon the verdict. This is not so common now as formerly, since our laws have enabled courts to pass upon eases without a jury. But a special verdict is no less competent than before. The statute authorizing special questions contemplates that they shall be put in explanation or aid of a general verdict, but it in no way destroys the competency of the former practice. — See Keeler v. Robertson, 27 Mich 116” (Campbell, J., in Hendrickson v. Walker, 32 Mich 68, 69).

 “Deep below consciousness are other forces, tlie likes and the dislikes, tlie predilections and the prejudices, the complex of instinets and emotions and habits and convictions, which make the man, whether he be litigant or judge. I wish I might have found the time and opportunity to pursue this subject farther. I shall be able, as it is, to 'do little more than remind you of its existence. There has been a certain lack of candor in much of the discussion of the theme, or rather perhaps in the refusal to discuss it, as if judges must lose respect and confidence by the reminder that they are subject to human limitations. I do not doubt the grandeur of the conception which lifts them into the realm of pure reason, above and beyond the sweep of perturbing and deflecting forces. None the less, if there *234is anything of reality in my analysis of the judicial process, they do not stand aloof on these chill and distant heights; and we shall not help the canse of truth by acting and speaking as if they do. The great tides and currents which engulf the rest of men, do not turn aside in their course, and pass the judges by.” Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process, pp 167, 168.

 “2. Did the circuit judge abuse his discretion under Michigan Court Rule No 35, § 6 (1945), as added in 1952 (see 334 Mich xl) and amended (see 352 Mich xvii), in denying plaintiff’s request for the exchange of a list of known witnesses before trial?”