Court Opinion

ID: 9493922
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:23:23.905188+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:56:06.541604
License: Public Domain

GILMAN, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
The majority has interpreted Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 114 S.Ct. 807, 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994), as totally eliminating the § 1983 cause of action for malicious prosecution in our circuit. Because I believe that the majority reaches this conclusion based on a flawed interpretation of Albright and in disregard of binding Sixth Circuit precedent, I respectfully dissent.
I.- ANALYSIS
A. The majority opinion’s interpretation of Albright
The majority asserts that “this case involves a scenario which is substantively identical to Albright.” See Maj. Op. at 875. I disagree. In Albright, the plaintiff appealed the dismissal of his action for malicious prosecution brought under 42 *878U.S.C. § 1983. He had based that claim on the alleged violation of his substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. As such, the Albright court was faced with the discrete question of whether there exists “a substantive right under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to be free from criminal prosecution except upon probable cause.” Albright, 510 U.S. at 268, 114 S.Ct. 807. The Court answered, albeit through a plurality opinion, that “it is the Fourth Amendment, and not substantive due process, under which [petitioner’s § 1983 malicious prosecution] claim must be judged.” Id. at 271, 114 S.Ct. 807.
In contrast, Frantz has specifically sued for malicious prosecution under § 1983 on the basis of the Fourth Amendment, even though he relies on our circuit’s pre-AJ-bright case of McMaster v. Cabinet for Human Resources, 824 F.2d 518 (6th Cir.1987), for the proposition that the elements of a claim for malicious prosecution under § 1983 must derive from the state-law tort of the same name. His reliance on the wrong standard is perhaps understandable in light of this circuit’s unpublished opinions that have inconsistently articulated the elements of a § 1983 malicious prosecution cause of action in the wake of Al-bright. See Maj. Op. at 874-75. But the majority’s assertion that “neither [Frantz’s] Fourth Amendment claims nor any challenges to them are before this court,” Maj. Op. at 875, is simply incorrect.
I agree with the conclusion in Section II.B. of the majority’s opinion that the elements of malicious prosecution under § 1983 cannot depend on the varying state laws within our circuit. This result is consistent with the Supreme Court’s directive to “peg” a § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution on the.Fourth Amendment. See Albright, 510 U.S. at 271 & n. 4, 114 S.Ct. 807. I believe, however, that the majority has gone too far in Section II.C. of its opinion to conclude that a cause of action for malicious prosecution under § 1983 is a “non-existent claim.” Maj. Op. at 876.
The effect of Albright was to eliminate reliance on substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment as the basis for a § 1983 claim of malicious prosecution. See Albright, 510 U.S. at 275, 114 S.Ct. 807. But it did not eliminate the cause of action altogether. See id. (“We express no view as to whether petitioner’s claim would succeed under the Fourth Amendment, since he has not presented that question in his petition for certiorari.”). Consequently, I read Albright to say that until the Supreme Court decides otherwise, the cause of action for malicious prosecution under § 1983 remains viable. See id. at 271, 114 S.Ct. 807. (“We hold that it is the Fourth Amendment, and not substantive due process, under which petitioner Albright’s claim must be judged.”).
Despite the considerable uncertainty about the contours of a § 1983 malicious prosecution cause of action, no other circuit has found Albright to be a bar to a malicious prosecution claim under § 1983. The only circuit that does not recognize malicious prosecution as an actionable claim under § 1983 is the Eighth. See Gordon v. Hansen, 168 F.3d 1109, 1114 (8th Cir.1999). But the Eighth Circuit reached this conclusion well before Al-bright, holding that common-law claims for malicious prosecution do not state a constitutional injury under § 1983. See Gunderson v. Schlueter, 904 F.2d 407, 409 (8th Cir.1990). In contrast, nine of our sister circuits recognize the claim, despite then-struggle to identify the elements of the cause of action in light of Albright. See Lambert v. Williams, 223 F.3d 257, 261-62 (4th Cir.2000) (surveying circuit caselaw on this topic after Albright). Because I would join our nine sister circuits that *879continue to recognize the § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution, I disagree with the majority’s decision to the contrary.
B. The majority’s conclusion is in conflict with binding circuit precedent
Not only does the majority abolish a cause of action for malicious prosecution under § 1983 based on what I believe is an erroneous interpretation of Albright, it also disregards binding circuit precedent that commands the opposite result. Our circuit adopted Albright’s, Fourth Amendment rationale in Spurlock v. Satterfield, 167 F.3d 995 (6th Cir.1999) (upholding the district court’s denial of summary judgment to a police officer in a § 1983 malicious prosecution case based on the plaintiffs Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures). Spurlock cited Smith v. Williams, No. 94-6306, 1996 WL 99329 (6th Cir. Mar.6, 1996) (per curiam) (unpublished table decision) (analyzing a malicious prosecution claim under the Fourth Amendment in light of Al-bright, without delving into the state-law elements of the tort by the same name), to assert that “the right to be free from malicious prosecution [is] a right clearly established under the Fourth Amendment.” Spurlock, 167 F.3d at 1006. Spurlock did not, as the majority asserts, “fail[ ] to acknowledge Albright’s ultimate holding ...” Maj.Op. at 876. Instead, Spurlock cites Albright to reach the conclusion that this circuit must analyze a § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution under the Fourth Amendment rather than under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth. See id. at 1006 n. 19.
Spurlock confirmed that, in the wake of Albright, our circuit continues to recognize a § 1983 cause of action for malicious prosecution under the Fourth Amendment. The majority, however, is effectively overruling Spurlock on the basis that “[ble-cause we find that the Albright holding controls our disposition of the present case and because Spurlock failed to address that holding, we cannot rely on Spurlock.” Maj. Op. at 876. But one panel of this court cannot overrule the decision of another panel, see United States v. Washington, 127 F.3d 510, 517 (6th Cir.1997), no matter how much it may disagree with the reasoning of the prior decision. The earlier opinion remains the controlling authority until a subsequent decision of the Supreme Court requires modification of the decision or this court sitting en banc overrules the prior precedent. See id. (citing Salmi v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 774 F.2d 685, 689 (6th Cir.1985)). Because the Supreme Court has not intervened since Spurlock was decided in 1999, I believe that the majority has exceeded its authority in attempting to eliminate malicious prosecution as a viable cause of action under § 1983.
C. The elements of a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim
Spurlock did not elaborate on the elements of a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim. Because I believe that Spurlock is still the controlling authority in this circuit, I have set forth below an analysis of the cause of action that I believe is consistent with Albright, Spurlock, and with what I perceive to be the better-reasoned decisions of our sister circuits. Based on these precedents, I conclude that three factors lie at the core of a claim for malicious prosecution under § 1983.
The first element is the most obvious. In light of Albright’s pronouncement that § 1983 claims for malicious prosecution must be grounded in the Fourth Amendment in order to constitute a deprivation of a constitutional right, see Albright, 510 U.S. at 271, 114 S.Ct. 807, the plaintiff must allege an unreasonable “seizure” as understood by Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Among other things, this *880means that the state actor who allegedly committed the constitutional deprivation must be someone not otherwise protected from suit under the long-standing doctrines of prosecutorial discretion, see Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 119, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975) (an accused is not “entitled to judicial oversight or review of the decision to prosecute”), or absolute prosecutorial immunity, see Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976) (“We hold only that in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State’s case, the Prosecutor is immune from a civil suit for damages under § 1983.”).
Second, in order to distinguish the § 1983 cause of action for malicious prosecution from that for false arrest, the complaint must allege that the unconstitutional seizure resulted from unreasonable prose-cutorial action taken to bring the plaintiff before the court independent of any initial physical seizure. The Second Circuit expressed a similar notion when it held that “to successfully pursue a § 1983 claim of malicious prosecution in violation of ... Fourth Amendment rights, [the plaintiff] must show some post-arraignment deprivation of liberty that rises to the level of a constitutional violation.” Singer v. Fulton County Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110, 117 (2d Cir.1995) (defining a warrantless deprivation of liberty from the time of arrest to arraignment as the tort of false arrest, while classifying post-arraignment deprivations of liberty within the tort of malicious prosecution); see also Gallo v. City of Philadelphia, 161 F.3d 217, 225 (3d Cir.1998) (holding that malicious prosecution involves “the abuse of the judicial process by government agents”). Requiring that a claim for malicious prosecution include bringing the plaintiff before a court will ensure that it remains a distinct, actionable tort under § 1983. Furthermore, despite the name of the cause of action, the reasonableness of a seizure for purposes of a Fourth Amendment violation should be analyzed without any inquiry concerning “malice.” See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) (determining that the reasonableness of a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment must be analyzed by an objective inquiry that does not look to intent or motivation).
Finally, in order for a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim to succeed, the plaintiff must prove that the criminal proceeding terminated in a manner favorable to the plaintiff. This rule derives from the common-law tort of malicious prosecution, but was recognized by the Supreme Court as an element of a § 1983 claim in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 484-87, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994) (drawing on common-law elements of malicious prosecution to aid in the analysis of a § 1983 claim for damages for an “allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid”). The Court held that “[o]ne element that must be alleged and proved in a malicious prosecution action is termination of the prior criminal proceeding in favor of the accused.” Id. at 484, 114 S.Ct. 2364. Accord Singer v. Fulton County Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110, 118 (2d Cir.1995); Whiting v. Traylor, 85 F.3d 581, 585-86 (11th Cir.1996).
In sum, the three elements that I believe are necessary to state a claim for malicious prosecution under § 1983 are: (1) a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment by someone not entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity, (2) objectively unreasonable prosecutorial action taken to bring the plaintiff before the court that is independent of any initial physical seizure, and (3) termination of the criminal proceeding in favor of the plaintiff. My analysis appears consistent with *881other circuits that have summarized the essence of this cause of action. See Brooks v. City of Winston Salem, N.C., 85 F.3d 178, 183-84 (4th Cir.1996) (“[A plaintiffs] allegations that [an officer] seized him pursuant to legal process that was not supported by probable cause and that the criminal proceedings terminated in his favor are sufficient to state a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim alleging a seizure that was violative of the Fourth Amendment.”); Whiting v. Traylor, 85 F.3d 581, 584 n. 4 (11th Cir.1996) (“referring to a federal ‘right’ to be free from malicious prosecution is actually a description of the right to be free from an unlawful seizure which is part of a prosecution”); Singer v. Fulton County Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110, 117 (2d Cir.1995) (distinguishing between claims for false arrest and malicious prosecution on the basis of whether the offending action occurred either pre- or post-arraignment).
As a final point on this subject, I cannot help but note that designating the constitutional claim as one for “malicious prosecution” is both unfortunate and confusing. A better name that would perhaps grasp the essence of this cause of action under applicable Fourth Amendment principles might be “unreasonable prosecutorial seizure.” Our circuit, however, has long since recognized malicious prosecution as a cause of action under § 1983 and has referred to it as such. See Dunn v. Tennessee, 697 F.2d 121, 124-25 (6th Cir.1982); Coogan v. City of Wixom, 820 F.2d 170, 174-75 (6th Cir.1987); Spurlock v. Satterfield, 167 F.3d 995, 1006 (6th Cir.1999). Because our sister circuits and Albright have also acknowledged the existence of a § 1983 claim for “malicious prosecution,” I will assume that we are stuck with that label. Regardless of the label, however, I believe that the majority has seriously erred in holding that our circuit is not “stuck” with the underlying cause of action.
II. CONCLUSION
The majority, in my opinion, has disregarded binding circuit precedent and the weight of authority from our sister circuits in eliminating the cause of action for malicious prosecution under § 1983. I therefore respectfully dissent.