Court Opinion

ID: 9718270
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:19:53.376853+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:58.166947
License: Public Domain

WILLIAM J. CORNELIUS, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
Because I believe that the alleged “extraneous” acts referred to in the majority opinion are not extraneous acts, but constituted same transaction contextual evidence, I respectfully dissent.
A careful reading of the reporter’s record reveals that the indicted offense and all of the other acts occurred at or near the same time. All of them occurred in the same house. All but the fondling occurrence occurred in the same room with the same persons present. The entire episode was a continuous course of sexual abuse. The record does not show that the so-called extraneous acts occurred at any specific date, and the victim’s testimony, as well as the overall history, shows that all of the acts occurred within a brief time span.
Additionally, Hayden’s counsel vigorously and extensively inquired into all of the alleged extraneous acts and attempted to show that they were caused by, or were part of, a course of nudity or lack of modesty on the part of the victim and her female friend, as demonstrated by their going about the room and watching television while wearing only their loose-fitting underwear. Hayden did not even object to the other acts on the ground that they were not same transaction contextual evidence. He objected only on the ground that they were the kind of extraneous acts covered by the notice requirements of Rule 404(b). Same transaction contextual *78evidence does not constitute extraneous acts, and it is not subject to the notice requirements of Rule 404(b). See Tex.R. Evid. 404(b); Hodge v. State, 940 S.W.2d 316, 319 (Tex.App.-Eastland 1997, pet. ref'd).
Requiring the State to prove only the indicted offense without showing the other acts would require the State to prove the offense in a vacuum, omitting facts showing the context and the circumstances of the offense, including Hayden’s intent to gratify his sexual desire and his defensive claim of complicity on the part of the children. Showing that Hayden engaged in indecent conduct with the other children tends to show that he intended to gratify his sexual desire rather than acting innocently as a surrogate parent.
The majority opinion states that the indicted offense could have been proved without proving the other acts. But that is not the test for same transaction contextual evidence. Almost any offense can be proved in a vacuum, but the State is not required to limit its proof to the indicted act when the other acts surrounding it are a part of the same transaction and will assist the jury in understanding the circumstances of the offense and the motivation for it. This is especially true in child sexual abuse cases. See Cole v. State, 987 S.W.2d 893, 897 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1998, pet. ref'd).
Even if the acts in question here did constitute extraneous acts subject to the notice requirements, I would hold that the State substantially complied with the requirements. Hayden’s counsel admittedly was aware of the acts and was not surprised by their introduction. The State had provided Hayden’s counsel with copies of the statements of K.S. and K. R., which detailed all of the alleged extraneous acts. Although we do not have the statements before us, Hayden’s counsel does not dispute the State’s assertion that the statements were delivered to Hayden’s counsel and that they fully revealed the alleged extraneous acts. The admissions of counsel relating to the delivery of the statements are sufficient to raise an inference that Hayden’s counsel knew that the State intended to introduce evidence of the alleged extraneous matters and that the notice required by Rule 404(b) was adequately satisfied.
I would affirm the judgment.