Court Opinion

ID: 9391835
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-03 15:00:30.646687+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:16.555137
License: Public Domain

20-1618
     Mureed Hussain v. Garland
                                                                             BIA
                                                                         Lurye, IJ
                                                                     A208 418 739
                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                  SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION
TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED
AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS
COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX
OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A
PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

 1        At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
 2   for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
 3   United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
 4   New York, on the 3rd day of May, two thousand twenty-three.
 5
 6   PRESENT:
 7            DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,
 8                 Chief Judge,
 9            GERARD E. LYNCH,
10            BETH ROBINSON,
11                 Circuit Judges.
12   _____________________________________
13
14   BILAL MUREED HUSSAIN,
15            Petitioner,
16
17                     v.                                  20-1618
18                                                         NAC
19   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
20   STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
21            Respondent.
22   _____________________________________
23
24   FOR PETITIONER:                   Tobin Kohane, Esq., New York, NY.
25
26   FOR RESPONDENT:                   Brian Boynton, Acting Assistant
27                                     Attorney General; Keith I.
28                                     McManus, Assistant Director; Scott
 1                             M. Marconda, Trial Attorney,
 2                             Office of Immigration Litigation,
 3                             United States Department of
 4                             Justice, Washington, DC.

 5       UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a

 6   Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby

 7   ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review

 8   is DENIED.

 9       Petitioner Bilal Mureed Hussain, a native and citizen of

10   Pakistan, seeks review of an April 24, 2020, decision of the

11   BIA affirming a July 19, 2018, decision of an Immigration

12   Judge (“IJ”) denying his application for asylum, withholding

13   of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture

14   (“CAT”).     In re Bilal Mureed Hussain, No. A 208-418-739

15   (B.I.A. Apr. 24, 2020), aff’g No. A 208-418-739 (Immig. Ct.

16   N.Y.C July 19, 2018).    We assume the parties’ familiarity

17   with the underlying facts and procedural history.

18       We have considered both the IJ’s and BIA’s decisions “for

19   the sake of completeness.”   Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland

20   Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006).   We deny the petition

21   because Mureed Hussain has failed to exhaust or raise any

22   challenge to dispositive grounds for the agency’s decisions.

23       Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1), we “may review a final order

                                   2
 1   of   removal   only   if   .    .   .   the    alien   has   exhausted   all

 2   administrative remedies available to the alien as of right.”

 3   In addition to this statutory requirement that a petitioner

 4   exhaust administrative remedies by appealing to the BIA, we

 5   require a petitioner to raise to the BIA the specific issues

 6   he seeks to raise in this Court.              See Foster v. INS, 376 F.3d

 7   75, 78 (2d Cir. 2004).          While not jurisdictional, the issue

 8   exhaustion requirement is “mandatory,” particularly where, as

 9   here, the Government raises it as an affirmative defense.

10   Lin Zhong v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 480 F.3d 104, 119–24 (2d

11   Cir. 2007).

12        Before the BIA, Hussain did not assert any challenges to

13   the IJ’s credibility findings.              He argued that the IJ did not

14   acknowledge country conditions evidence that the Taliban

15   targets Shia Muslims.          He also argued that the IJ failed to

16   consider the broader political context or that his family

17   could   not    relocate    within       Pakistan. 1    And   he   generally

18   asserted that he established a likelihood of torture.                    But

19   he did not address the credibility determination or allege

     1The IJ did not make findings about Hussain’s ability to relocate
     in  Pakistan.      CAR  at  41–50   (IJ  Dec.);   see  8   C.F.R.
     § 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(B).
                                             3
 1   any errors in individual findings.           Accordingly, Hussain

 2   failed to exhaust any challenge to the adverse credibility

 3   determination.      See Foster, 376 F.3d at 78.         The adverse

 4   credibility determination is dispositive of Hussain’s claims

 5   for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief because

 6   all three claims are based on the same factual predicate—

 7   Hussain’s alleged conversion to Shia Islam and attacks he

 8   allegedly suffered as a result.        See Paul v. Gonzales, 444

9    F.3d 148, 156–57 (2d Cir. 2006).

10         Hussain   argues   that   general   conditions   in     Pakistan

11   concerning the treatment of Shia Muslims alone satisfies his

12   burden to show a well-founded fear of future persecution.

13   But, while a well-founded fear of future persecution might in

14   some circumstances be established by showing membership in a

15   group against which the government has a pattern or practice

16   of persecution, see Hongsheng Leng v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 135,

17   142    (2d   Cir.    2008),     the   IJ’s   adverse    credibility

18   determination    against   Hussain    extended   not   only    to   his

19   anecdotes of past persecution but implicitly also extended to

20   his testimony that he converted to Shia Islam, see Siewe v.

21   Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 170 (2d Cir. 2007) (“An IJ may, either

                                       4
 1   expressly or impliedly, rely on falsus in uno [the maxim

 2   “false in one thing, false in everything”] to discredit

3    evidence   that   does   not   benefit    from    corroboration        or

4    authentication     independent       of   the    petitioner’s         own

 5   credibility.”     (emphasis    in     original)).      2    Accordingly,

 6   Hussain’s failure to challenge the IJ’s adverse credibility

 7   determination before the BIA is fatal to his argument that he

 8   may show a well-founded fear of future persecution based

 9   solely on country conditions evidence.           For       the   foregoing

10   reasons, the petition for review is DENIED.                  All pending

11   motions and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED.

12                                  FOR THE COURT:
13                                  Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
14                                  Clerk of Court

     2Hussain additionally argues that the IJ exerted pressure to
     conclude his merits hearing early, which hastiness exacerbated
     the IJ’s misunderstanding of the facts of his case. But, again,
     Hussain did not contest any specific factual finding of the IJ
     before the BIA, meaning that no such a claim has been preserved
     for review. To the extent Hussain argues that the IJ violated
     his constitutional right to due process, he has failed to
     demonstrate how the IJ’s attempts to streamline his testimony
     during the merits hearing deprived him of “a full and fair
     opportunity to present [his] claims” or “otherwise deprived
     [him] of fundamental fairness.” Burger v. Gonzalez, 498 F.3d
     131, 134 (2d Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citations
     omitted).
                                      5