Court Opinion

ID: 9832070
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 21:35:49.045524+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:41.649753
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Appellant Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company has filed its motion for rehearing, and in vieW of the fact that it had by permission of the court filed its supplemental or reply brief whereby it argued and discussed its assignments 1, 3, 7, and 8, it justly complains of our statement that it had waived such assignments.
Believing that appellant is now entitled to have us consider such assignments, we shall now proceed to do so.
By such assignments appellant insists that the trial court erred in not ’ dismissing it from the suit upon its plea in abatement, wherein it was alleged that the suit as against it was prematurely brought: Eirst, because at the time such suit was brought and at the time of the trial no judgment had been rendered against the insured, and therefore, under the terms of its policy, no cause of action existed against it; and, second, because it was shown on the face of plaintiff’s petition that the joinder of appellant as a party defendant was not authorized, in that said petition shows that the suit agains.t it was prematurely brought.
We overrule the assignments.
For authority to sustain its contention appellant relies upon the decision in Bilbo v. Lewis (Tex. Civ. App.) 45 S.W.(2d) 653. In its brief it says that the proposition advanced was distinctly novel; that prior to the rendition of such decision there had been no decision either way on the particular point involved; that the Bilbo Case is the only one which counsel for appellant has been able to find dealing with the precise problem here involved.
We agree with appellees in saying: “An inspection of that case will show that the plaintiffs in that suit did not sue upon the policy as being one for the benefit of the plaintiffs and wholly relied upon the provisions of the statute as grounds for their recovery. Under the pleadings in that case, the plaintiffs were held to not be entitled to keep the insurance company in the suit. The case at bar is considerably different from that case, because in the case at bar the plaintiffs sued the insurance company upon its contract as well as under the provisions of the statute.”
In the Bilbo Case the insurance company was not sued upon the policy. The court upon motion for rehearing said that the judgment of the court was without prejudice to the plaintiff’s right to sue the insurance company direct upon its policy.
The policy in the present case, among other things, in effect provides that the insurer will pay within the limits of $5,000 any loss by liability imposed by law upon the assured for inflicting injury or death upon another by means of the use of the truck in question. By such policy the insurer agrees to defend, in the name of assured, any suit alleging bodily injury or death by means of the machine in question. It is substantially provided by the clause designated as “H” (bankruptcy clause), that the company, the insurer, is bound, to the extent of its liability under the policy, to pay and satisfy any judgment that may be recovered against the assured or other persons upon a claim covered by the policy; that the company is bound to the extent of its liability under the policy to pay and satisfy such judgment as might be rendered against the insured, and that an action may be maintained upon such judgment by the injured person, or his or her heirs, to enforce the liability of the company as in the policy set forth; that the bankruptcy or insolvency of the assured shall not release the company from the payment of damages for injuries or death sustained, or loss occasioned within the provisions of the policy.
We think appellant the insurance company was properly joined in the suit and that the court did not err in so holding.
Under the laws of this state dual suits *323should always be avoided whenever all parties can have a fair trial when joined in one suit. Ayhile it is true that appellees could have first prosecuted their claim against Thurman to judgment and then have sued the insurance company on such judgment, had they so desired, the law does not make it imperative that they should do so. Under the law they are permitted to dis-posé of the whole matter in one suit. American Automobile Insurance Co. v. Struwe, (Tex. Civ. App.) 218 S. W. 534, 535.
In the case cited it is said: “The rule has often been announced in Texas that when two causes of action are connected with each other, or grow out of the same transaction, they may be properly joined, and in such suit all parties against whom the plaintiff asserts a common or an alternative liability may be joined as defendants. Clegg v. Varnell, 18 Tex. 294; Love v. Keowne, 58 ,Tex. 191; Jones v. Ford, 60 Tex. 127; National Bank v. Texas Investment Co., 74 Tex. 421, 12 S. W. 101; Mathonican v. Scott, 87 Tex. 396, 28 S. W. 1063. Even if appellants had presented any plea in abatement as to joinder of damages arising from a tort with those arising from a contract, it could not, under the facts of this case, be sustained, for the rule is that a suit, may include an action for breach of contract and one for tort, provided they are connected with each other or grow out of the same transaction. Peoples v. Brockman [Tex. Civ. App.] 153 S. W. 907.”
In Texas Landscape Company v. Longoria (Tex. Civ. App.) 30 S.W.(2d) 423, 425, it is said:
“So it appears that the assured does not have to pay the judgment first and then sue the insurance company for reimbursement; but the insurance company agrees ‘to pay and satisfy judgments rendered against the assured’ in the first instance. As soon as the judgment is rendered against the assured, the insurance company is bound under its policy to pay and satisfy the judgment. The policy clearly contemplates and provides that the payment will be made by the insurance company directly to the injured party, and provides for the payment whether assured has become a bankrupt or not, whether solvent or insolvent.
“The right of appellees to sue the insurance company is not merely based on the insolvency clause, but upon the clause which expressly and unequivocally obligates the insurance company ‘to pay and satisfy judgments rendered against the assured in legal proceedings defended by the Corporation and to protect the assured against the levy of executions.’ Clearly the entire policy inures to the benefit of injured persons, who have the right to enforce its terms, so that the insurance company may be compelled to do what it has contracted to do. This policy is for the benefit of injured persons as well as for the assured, and the plaintiffs committed no error in making the insurance association a party to this suit.”
For other cases supporting our conclusions and holding, see American Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Williams (Tex. Civ. App.) 34 S.W.(2d) 396; Monzingo v. Jones (Tex. Civ. App.) 34 S.W.(2d) 662; Kuntz v. Spence (Tex. Civ. App.) 48 S.W.(2d) 413.
It is clear, we think, that the courts of this state have rejected the contention that an insurance company may not be joined in a suit of the kind of the present one, because, under the terms of the policy, it can be held liable only in the event judgment is rendered against the assured.
Appellant’s motion for rehearing is in all things refused.
Refused.