Court Opinion

ID: 9555267
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-11 14:11:35.681663+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:42:07.589237
License: Public Domain

Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
08/11/2023 09:11 AM CDT

                                                       - 889 -
                               Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                                        314 Nebraska Reports
                                          BOONE RIVER, LLC V. MILES
                                              Cite as 314 Neb. 889

                        Boone River, LLC, and 11T NE, LLC, Nebraska
                        limited liability companies, appellees, v. Nancy
                          J. Miles and Cheryl L. Bettin, appellants,
                              and Robert R. Moninger, appellee.
                                                   ___ N.W.2d ___

                                        Filed August 11, 2023.   No. S-22-673.

                 1. Standing: Appeal and Error. An appellate court reviews the lower
                    court’s factual findings on standing for clear error and reviews de novo
                    the ultimate question whether the plaintiffs have standing.
                 2. Judgments: Questions of Law: Claim Preclusion: Issue Preclusion:
                    Appeal and Error. The applicability of claim and issue preclusion is a
                    question of law. On a question of law, an appellate court reaches a con-
                    clusion independent of the court below.
                 3. Claim Preclusion: Appeal and Error. Any factual determinations in
                    applying claim preclusion are reviewed for clear error.
                 4. Actions: Parties: Standing: Jurisdiction. Whether a party who com-
                    mences an action has standing and is therefore the real party in interest
                    presents a jurisdictional issue.
                 5. Unjust Enrichment: Proof. To recover on a claim for unjust enrich-
                    ment, the plaintiff must show that (1) the defendant received money, (2)
                    the defendant retained possession of the money, and (3) the defendant in
                    justice and fairness ought to pay the money to the plaintiff.
                 6. Judgments: Claim Preclusion. Claim preclusion bars the relitigation
                    of a claim that has been directly addressed or necessarily included in a
                    former adjudication if (1) the former judgment was rendered by a court
                    of competent jurisdiction, (2) the former judgment was a final judgment,
                    (3) the former judgment was on the merits, and (4) the same parties or
                    their privies were involved in both actions.
                 7. Claim Preclusion. The doctrine of claim preclusion bars relitigation not
                    only of those matters actually litigated, but also of those matters which
                    might have been litigated in the prior action.
                                  - 890 -
           Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                    314 Nebraska Reports
                      BOONE RIVER, LLC V. MILES
                          Cite as 314 Neb. 889

 8. Actions: Parties. Privity requires, at a minimum, a substantial identity
    between the issues in controversy and a showing that the parties in the
    two actions are really and substantially in interest the same.

  Appeal from the District Court for Douglas County: LeAnne
M. Srb, Judge. Affirmed in part, and in part reversed.

   Aimee S. Melton, Ronald E. Reagan, and Megan E. Shupe,
of Reagan, Melton & Delaney, L.L.P., for appellants.

  Marc Odgaard for appellees Boone River, LLC, and 11T
NE, LLC.

  Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke,
Papik, and Freudenberg, JJ.

   Papik, J.
   Boone River, LLC, purchased a tax certificate for property
owned by Nancy J. Miles, Cheryl L. Bettin, and Robert R.
Moninger and later obtained a tax deed. Boone River then
transferred the property to 11T NE, LLC (11T). In a previous
lawsuit, 11T sued Miles, Bettin, and Moninger to quiet title to
the property, and Miles, Bettin, and Moninger brought Boone
River into the case as a third-party defendant. The district
court found that Boone River did not comply with the tax
sale statutes in obtaining the tax deed, voided the tax deed
held by 11T, and quieted title to the property in Miles, Bettin,
and Moninger.
   Boone River and 11T subsequently brought this lawsuit
against Miles, Bettin, and Moninger for unjust enrichment.
Boone River and 11T sought to be reimbursed for taxes paid
on the property during the time that they held the tax certifi-
cate and tax deed. The case proceeded to a bench trial, and the
district court found that Miles, Bettin, and Moninger would
be unjustly enriched if they were not required to make reim-
bursement of the taxes. Miles and Bettin appealed; Moninger
did not.
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         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  314 Nebraska Reports
                   BOONE RIVER, LLC V. MILES
                       Cite as 314 Neb. 889

   We agree with Miles and Bettin that the present lawsuit
against them is barred by claim preclusion. We therefore
reverse the judgment against them. We affirm the judgment
against Moninger.

                        I. BACKGROUND
                    1. Factual Background
  Miles, Bettin, and Moninger are siblings. In 2005, Miles and
Bettin took title to their deceased father’s home (the property),
subject to a life estate held by Moninger.
  Some years later, Moninger failed to pay taxes levied on the
property. In 2015, Boone River purchased a tax certificate. The
property was not redeemed, and in August 2018, the Douglas
County treasurer issued a treasurer’s tax deed to Boone River.
Then in October 2018, Boone River transferred the property to
11T by warranty deed.

                         2. First Lawsuit
    After obtaining the tax deed, 11T sued Miles, Bettin, and
Moninger. 11T sought to quiet title to the property. Miles,
Bettin, and Moninger filed a counterclaim against 11T and a
third-party complaint against Boone River seeking to quiet
title in themselves; the siblings contested the validity of the
treasurer’s tax deed that had been issued to Boone River. The
siblings also deposited a $20,000 bond with the clerk of the
court to cover costs for back taxes, interest, and any other costs
relating to the tax certificate.
    The first lawsuit ended with the district court granting
summary judgment in favor of Miles, Bettin, and Moninger.
It ruled that because Boone River failed to comply with cer-
tain statutory requirements, the treasurer’s tax deed that had
been issued to Boone River was void. The court ordered 11T
to deliver the property to Miles and Bettin, subject to a life
estate vested in Moninger. 11T executed a quitclaim deed with
those terms.
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         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  314 Nebraska Reports
                  BOONE RIVER, LLC V. MILES
                      Cite as 314 Neb. 889

   There is no dispute that 11T and Boone River never requested
in the first lawsuit that they be reimbursed for taxes paid on
the property and that 11T and Boone River did not collect any
of the funds deposited with the clerk of the court.

                      3. Current Lawsuit
   After the first lawsuit ended, Boone River and 11T brought
the current lawsuit against Miles, Bettin, and Moninger for
unjust enrichment. Boone River and 11T sought compensation
for taxes paid and maintenance costs incurred on the property
before the tax deed to the property was voided in the first
lawsuit. Among other affirmative defenses, Miles and Bettin
asserted that the lawsuit was barred because 11T and Boone
River should have pursued their claims for unjust enrichment
in the first lawsuit.
   Moninger, representing himself, filed a form answer and
general denial. Moninger does not appear to have otherwise
defended the action.
   The case proceeded to a bench trial. Evidence received at
trial established that in 2015, Boone River purchased the tax
certificate and paid taxes on the property, the combined total
of which was approximately $5,500. Boone River thereafter
transferred the tax deed to 11T. When 11T held the tax deed,
Homebuyers Incorporated (Homebuyers), its parent company
and sole owner, paid approximately $11,000 in property taxes
“on behalf of” 11T. Evidence was also offered showing that
after 11T filed this lawsuit, Homebuyers assigned to 11T
“any and all claims, demands, and causes of action of any
kind whatsoever” Homebuyers held against Miles, Bettin, and
Moninger related to the property.
   Miles and Bettin also took the stand. They testified that
neither they nor Moninger had paid taxes on the property
from 2013 to 2019. Miles and Bettin also testified that they
posted a $20,000 bond in the prior lawsuit “to cover the back
taxes and any other expenses.” A copy of the answer, counter-
claim, and third-party complaint Miles, Bettin, and Moninger
                             - 893 -
         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  314 Nebraska Reports
                   BOONE RIVER, LLC V. MILES
                       Cite as 314 Neb. 889

filed in the first lawsuit was also received into evidence. In
that pleading, they asserted that they were depositing $20,000
with the clerk of the court to “cover more than the amount the
third-party has expended for taxes and accrued interest.”
   Following the bench trial, the district court entered judgment
in favor of Boone River and 11T and against Miles, Bettin,
and Moninger. Although the district court found no merit
to the claim that Miles, Bettin, and Moninger were unjustly
enriched by the payment of maintenance costs on the property,
the district court found that they were unjustly enriched by
the payment of taxes on the property before the tax deed was
declared void.
   After the district court modified the judgment amount in
response to a motion to alter or amend, Miles and Bettin
appealed. Moninger did not file an appeal.

               II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
   Miles and Bettin assign six errors, but we need to consider
only two to resolve this appeal: (1) that the district court
erred in concluding Boone River and 11T had standing and
(2) that claim preclusion did not bar their claims for unjust
enrichment.

                III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
   [1] We review the lower court’s factual findings on stand-
ing for clear error and review de novo the ultimate ques-
tion whether the plaintiffs have standing. Western Ethanol
Co. v. Midwest Renewable Energy, 305 Neb. 1, 938 N.W.2d
329 (2020).
   [2,3] The applicability of claim and issue preclusion is a
question of law. On a question of law, we reach a conclusion
independent of the court below. Strode v. City of Ashland, 295
Neb. 44, 886 N.W.2d 293 (2016). Any factual determinations
in applying claim preclusion are reviewed for clear error. State
v. Marrs, 295 Neb. 399, 888 N.W.2d 721 (2016).
                             - 894 -
         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  314 Nebraska Reports
                   BOONE RIVER, LLC V. MILES
                       Cite as 314 Neb. 889

                        IV. ANALYSIS
                          1. Standing
   [4] Whether a party who commences an action has standing
and is therefore the real party in interest presents a jurisdic-
tional issue, so we address Miles and Bettin’s standing argu-
ments first. See Millard Gutter Co. v. Farm Bureau Prop. &
Cas. Ins. Co., 312 Neb. 629, 980 N.W.2d 437 (2022). Miles
and Bettin raise similar but distinct “factual challenge[s]” to
the standing of both Boone River and 11T, so we address them
in turn. See Valley Boys v. American Family Ins. Co., 306 Neb.
928, 940, 947 N.W.2d 856, 866 (2020).

                        (a) Boone River
    With respect to Boone River, Miles and Bettin claim that
the trial record did not disclose whether Boone River itself
paid any taxes on the property. And without such proof, argue
Miles and Bettin, Boone River cannot show that it has stand-
ing. This argument is inconsistent with the record. At trial, a
senior manager in the Douglas County treasurer’s office testi-
fied that Boone River paid $2,854.22 to purchase the tax cer-
tificate in March 2015 and later paid $2,718.55 in taxes on the
property. The manager’s testimony is supported by a business
record that lists “Boone River, LLC,” as paying those amounts
in taxes on the property. The district court did not err in con-
cluding that Boone River had standing to pursue its claim for
unjust enrichment.

                            (b) 11T
   Whether 11T has standing is more complicated. The com-
plaint alleged that after Boone River transferred the property
to 11T via warranty deed, 11T paid overdue taxes levied on
the property, and that 11T was entitled to be reimbursed for
those payments. As noted above, however, the evidence at trial
was that Homebuyers paid those taxes “on behalf of” 11T.
Miles and Bettin claim that because 11T itself did not pay
any taxes, it does not have a personal stake in the outcome of
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         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  314 Nebraska Reports
                   BOONE RIVER, LLC V. MILES
                       Cite as 314 Neb. 889

the case, is not entitled to any reimbursement, and therefore
lacks standing.
   [5] Miles and Bettin’s argument is based on an incorrect
assumption about who may pursue a claim for unjust enrich-
ment. We have explained that to recover on a claim for unjust
enrichment, the plaintiff must show that (1) the defendant
received money, (2) the defendant retained possession of the
money, and (3) the defendant in justice and fairness ought
to pay the money to the plaintiff. Zook v. Zook, 312 Neb.
128, 978 N.W.2d 156 (2022). We do not appear, however,
to have ever limited restitution for unjust enrichment only
to those plaintiffs who themselves conferred a direct benefit
on the defendant. And, in fact, the Restatement (Third) of
Restitution and Unjust Enrichment § 47 at 130 (2011) also
stakes out a more permissive rule: “If a third person makes a
payment to the defendant in respect of an asset belonging to
the claimant, the claimant is entitled to restitution from the
defendant as necessary to prevent unjust enrichment.” See,
also, id., § 48 at 144 (“[i]f a third person makes a payment to
the defendant to which (as between claimant and defendant)
the claimant has a better legal or equitable right, the claimant
is entitled to restitution from the defendant as necessary to
prevent unjust enrichment”).
   The animating principle of § 47 of the Restatement (Third)
applies here. Homebuyers paid taxes “in respect of” property
for which 11T held a deed; when 11T’s deed was voided, the
tax payments benefited Miles and Bettin by reducing their
tax burden. See id. at 130. Under § 47 of the Restatement
(Third), 11T (the claimant) could claim an entitlement to
restitution from Miles and Bettin (the defendants) in the
amount of taxes that Homebuyers (a third party) paid on the
property, which payment reduced Miles’ and Bettin’s tax bill.
11T thus has standing to pursue its claim. See id., comment
d. at 135-36 (“[a] claim under § 47 often arises against the
background of a transfer of ownership between claimant and
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         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  314 Nebraska Reports
                   BOONE RIVER, LLC V. MILES
                       Cite as 314 Neb. 889

defendant, particularly if the transfer is involuntary and there-
fore unanticipated”).
   Furthermore, during the litigation, Homebuyers assigned to
11T “all claims, demands, and causes of action of any kind
whatsoever” that it had against Miles and Bettin. Homebuyers
paid property taxes when 11T held the tax deed, but when
that deed was voided, Miles and Bettin received the benefit
of Homebuyers’ property tax payments. Homebuyers essen-
tially paid Miles’ and Bettin’s property taxes by mistake,
giving Homebuyers its own claim for unjust enrichment. See
id., § 6 at 59 (“[p]ayment by mistake gives the payor a claim
in restitution against the recipient to the extent payment was
not due”).
   Despite all this, Miles and Bettin argue that 11T lacks stand-
ing to pursue Homebuyers’ claim for unjust enrichment in this
action, because the assignment of that claim was made after
the litigation had begun. We disagree. “The assignee of a thing
in action may maintain an action thereon in the assignee’s own
name and behalf, without the name of the assignor.” Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 25-302 (Reissue 2016). That describes exactly what
11T did here: It sought relief on the claim for unjust enrich-
ment that Homebuyers had assigned to it. Miles and Bettin
offer no reason why a plaintiff who is assigned an additional
cause of action during litigation against the same defendant
lacks standing.

                    2. Claim Preclusion
   Miles and Bettin next argue that the doctrine of claim pre-
clusion bars Boone River and 11T from pursuing their claims
of unjust enrichment in this lawsuit. According to Miles and
Bettin, because Boone River and 11T could have sought reim-
bursement of taxes they paid on the property in the quiet title
suit, Boone River and 11T should not be allowed to litigate
those claims here.
   [6,7] Generally, claim preclusion bars the relitigation
of a claim that has been directly addressed or necessarily
                             - 897 -
         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  314 Nebraska Reports
                   BOONE RIVER, LLC V. MILES
                       Cite as 314 Neb. 889

included in a former adjudication if (1) the former judgment
was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, (2) the for-
mer judgment was a final judgment, (3) the former judgment
was on the merits, and (4) the same parties or their privies
were involved in both actions. Hara v. Reichert, 287 Neb.
577, 843 N.W.2d 812 (2014). Our cases also make clear that
the claim in the prior suit and the claim in the present suit
must be based on the same cause of action. See, Schaeffer
v. Frakes, 313 Neb. 337, 984 N.W.2d 290 (2023); Pflasterer
v. Koliopoulos, 213 Neb. 330, 328 N.W.2d 789 (1983). The
doctrine of claim preclusion bars relitigation not only of those
matters actually litigated, but also of those matters which
might have been litigated in the prior action. Schaeffer, supra.
We separately consider whether Boone River and 11T are pre-
cluded from bringing the present suit.

                         (a) Boone River
   With respect to the unjust enrichment claim asserted by
Boone River, the parties do not dispute that the first four ele-
ments of claim preclusion are easily met: The district court had
jurisdiction of the first lawsuit, its judgment was final and on
the merits, and the same parties are involved in both actions.
Rather, they dispute only whether the quiet title suit and Boone
River’s present claim for unjust enrichment involved the same
“cause of action.” See Schaeffer, 313 Neb. at 346, 984 N.W.2d
at 298.
   We have articulated two different tests to decide whether
the cause of action litigated in a prior lawsuit is the same
as that asserted in a subsequent lawsuit. One line of cases
asks “whether the right to be vindicated rests upon the same
operative facts,” id., while a different line of cases frames the
question as whether the “same evidence will sustain both the
underlying case and the instant action,” Baer v. Southroads
Mall Ltd., 252 Neb. 518, 525, 566 N.W.2d 734, 738 (1997).
Despite our differing explanations of what constitutes the
same cause of action for claim preclusion purposes, we agree
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         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  314 Nebraska Reports
                   BOONE RIVER, LLC V. MILES
                       Cite as 314 Neb. 889

with a commentator that the two tests are, in substance, the
same. See John P. Lenich, Nebraska Civil Procedure § 8:10
(2023). Simply put, “Claims are based on the same evidence
when they rely on the same basic facts.” Id. at 407.
    Here, the same operative facts that were at issue in Miles
and Bettin’s quiet title suit also underlie Boone River’s sub-
sequent lawsuit for unjust enrichment. Both claims seek legal
resolution based on the same basic story: Miles and Bettin
failed to pay property taxes, Boone River purchased the tax
certificate by paying the property taxes owed, Boone River
paid additional taxes on the property, and Boone River even-
tually obtained a tax deed. Litigation regarding those basic
facts followed.
    In this respect, this case is like another in which this court
found that a subsequent lawsuit was barred by claim preclu-
sion, Graham v. Waggener, 219 Neb. 907, 367 N.W.2d 707
(1985). In that case, a group of investors first brought suit
against their agent to terminate the agency relationship and
for an accounting. After that litigation concluded, the agent
brought a lawsuit seeking a contractual fee for the services he
had provided. Even though the group of investors brought the
first suit and the agent brought the second, the court held that
the suits involved the same cause of action.
    But even if all of the required claim preclusion elements
are present, Boone River contends that it should not be barred
in this case. It contends that its suit in this case cannot be
barred based on its failure to assert a counterclaim in the quiet
title suit. It observes that Nebraska’s pleading rules do not
provide for compulsory counterclaims, see Neb. Ct. R. Pldg.
§ 6-1113(a), and points out that the Nebraska Court of Appeals
has held that claim preclusion does not apply to “permissive
cross-claims that could have been raised in a former action but
were not.” Shriner v. Friedman Law Offices, 23 Neb. App. 869,
884, 877 N.W.2d 272, 284 (2016).
    We disagree with Boone River that claim preclusion cannot
apply in these circumstances. Again, we find guidance from
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         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  314 Nebraska Reports
                   BOONE RIVER, LLC V. MILES
                       Cite as 314 Neb. 889

our decision in Graham, supra. In Graham, we rejected the
agent’s argument that because he had not raised a counter-
claim in the first action, claim preclusion could not apply. We
reasoned that because the relief the investor group sought in
the first action was an accounting, which “by its very nature
[is] the setting off of credits and debits,” the agent could
have obtained any fees to which he was entitled without even
asserting a counterclaim. Id. at 909, 367 N.W.2d at 709. As the
commentator we cited earlier has explained, Graham held that
preclusion applies when the “relief the defendant seeks could
have been awarded in the prior action as part of the relief the
plaintiff sought.” Lenich, supra, § 8:13 at 419.
   We see similarities between a request for an accounting and
Miles and Bettin’s request for title to the property to be qui-
eted in their names and an accompanying payment of funds
into the court to cover back taxes. In a Wisconsin case we
cited in Graham, supra, the court explained that in an action
for an accounting, “the complaint implies an offer by the
plaintiff to pay any balance that may be found due the defend­
ant. The complaint itself raises the issue.” Miller v. Joannes,
262 Wis. 425, 428, 55 N.W.2d 375, 376 (1952). So too here
did Miles and Bettin’s request in the first lawsuit to have title
quieted in their name come with an offer to make reimburse-
ment for back taxes. As a condition precedent to having title
quieted in their favor, Miles and Bettin were required by
a long line of Nebraska case law to tender payment in the
amount of the taxes that others had paid on the property. See,
Adair Holdings v. Johnson, 304 Neb. 720, 731, 936 N.W.2d
517, 526 (2020) (“one who seeks equity must do equity”);
Howell v. Jordan, 94 Neb. 264, 143 N.W. 217 (1913); Wygant
v. Dahl, 26 Neb. 562, 572, 42 N.W. 735, 738 (1889) (“the
duty of paying the taxes lawfully assessed upon land [is] a
condition precedent to obtaining it”). They sought to do so
by “paying to the clerk of the court the delinquent taxes with
costs and interest” via the $20,000 bond. Adair Holdings,
304 Neb. at 731, 936 N.W.2d at 526. Their counterclaim and
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         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  314 Nebraska Reports
                   BOONE RIVER, LLC V. MILES
                       Cite as 314 Neb. 889

third-party complaint alleged that they were depositing funds
to cover taxes that had been paid on the property.
   Just as the fees the agent sought in Graham v. Waggener,
219 Neb. 907, 367 N.W.2d 707 (1985), could have been
awarded as part of the accounting sought by the investor group,
Boone River’s claim for reimbursement for taxes paid could
have been awarded as part of the relief Miles and Bettin sought
in the first lawsuit. Accordingly, Boone River is now precluded
from seeking those back taxes in this separate action.

                            (b) 11T
   As with standing, the claim preclusion analysis is slightly
more complicated for 11T because 11T is pursuing two sepa-
rate claims: its own claim for unjust enrichment, as well
as Homebuyers’ claim for unjust enrichment it acquired via
assignment.
   We first address whether claim preclusion bars 11T’s own
claim for unjust enrichment. Regarding that claim, the parties
again dispute only whether the quiet title suit and the pres-
ent claim for unjust enrichment constitute the same “cause
of action.” See Schaeffer v. Frakes, 313 Neb. 337, 346, 984
N.W.2d 290, 298 (2023). Our analysis above regarding Boone
River dictates the outcome to that debate: The same opera-
tive facts that supported Miles and Bettin’s quiet title suit also
underlie 11T’s current claim for unjust enrichment. In other
words, the quiet title suit and 11T’s unjust enrichment claim
are based on the same cause of action.
   11T thus finds itself in a similar situation to the plaintiff
in Vantage Enterprises, Inc. v. Caldwell, 196 Neb. 671, 244
N.W.2d 678 (1976). There, a contractor built a house pursuant
to a written contract with the purchaser. When the purchaser
refused to pay for the house, the contractor sued for breach
of contract and lost. The contractor then filed a second law-
suit for quantum meruit, seeking compensation outside the
contract for building the house. We held that the contractor’s
second lawsuit was barred by claim preclusion because the
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         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  314 Nebraska Reports
                   BOONE RIVER, LLC V. MILES
                       Cite as 314 Neb. 889

“same evidence” that supported the contractor’s breach of con-
tract claim supported his quantum meruit claim: In both suits,
the contractor would need to show that he built the house and
was not paid for his services. Id. at 676, 244 N.W.2d at 681.
The contractor thus should have stated his quantum meruit
claim in the alternative in the event that his contract claim
failed, because each constituted the same “cause of action”
for claim preclusion purposes. See id. Like the contractor in
Vantage Enterprises, Inc., 11T could have asserted its claim for
unjust enrichment in the quiet title suit as an alternative theory
of relief in the event title were quieted in Miles and Bettin.
Because that claim is based on the same cause of action and
11T did not do so, it cannot assert that claim now.
    This leaves the question whether 11T is also barred from
litigating in this action the claim that Homebuyers assigned to
it. Generally, to determine whether an assignee is barred from
litigating an assigned claim, a court must analyze whether the
assignor would be barred from litigating that same claim. See
Perry v. Globe Auto Recycling, Inc., 227 F.3d 950 (7th Cir.
2000). See, also, Zapata v. McHugh, 296 Neb. 216, 226, 893
N.W.2d 720, 727 (2017) (“[a]n assignee stands in the shoes
of the assignor”). That separate analysis is not required, how-
ever, if Homebuyers and 11T were in privity in the quiet title
suit. Where the other elements are met, claim preclusion bars
successive actions brought by “the same parties or their priv-
ies.” Hara v. Reichert, 287 Neb. 577, 580, 843 N.W.2d 812,
816 (2014) (emphasis supplied). And given that we already
determined that 11T is precluded from bringing its own claim,
if Homebuyers and 11T were in privity, 11T would be pre-
cluded from bringing Homebuyers’ claim as well.
    [8] We have said that privity requires, at a minimum, a
substantial identity between the issues in controversy and
a showing that the parties in the two actions are really and
substantially in interest the same. See Risor v. Nebraska
Boiler, 274 Neb. 906, 744 N.W.2d 693 (2008). Homebuyers
is the sole corporate member of 11T, which raises the specter
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         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  314 Nebraska Reports
                   BOONE RIVER, LLC V. MILES
                       Cite as 314 Neb. 889

that those two entities were in privity in the quiet title suit.
See Midwest Franchise Corp. v. Wakin, 201 Neb. 450, 268
N.W.2d 737 (1978) (holding that sole shareholder of cor-
poration was in privity with corporation). Corporations and
limited liability companies are treated the same for purposes
of claim preclusion. See, Restatement (Second) of Judgments
§ 61 (1982); Daz Management, LLC v. Honnen Equipment
Co., 508 P.3d 84 (Utah 2022).
   Though an owner of a corporation is generally not bound by
a judgment against the corporation itself, a different rule gov-
erns corporations where “one or a few persons hold substan-
tially the entire ownership in it.” Restatement (Second), supra,
§ 59(3) at 94. For such entities,
      The judgment in an action by or against the corporation is
      conclusive upon the holder of its ownership if he actively
      participated in the action on behalf of the corporation,
      unless his interests and those of the corporation are so
      different that he should have opportunity to relitigate
      the issue[.]
Id., § 59(3)(a) at 94. Although we do not appear to have
expressly adopted this test for closely held corporations, nei-
ther are the concepts foreign to our law. See, Risor, supra
(holding that for privity to be found, parties must have same
substantial interests); Hickman v. Southwest Dairy Suppliers,
Inc., 194 Neb. 17, 21, 230 N.W.2d 99, 103 (1975) (analyzing
whether nonparty to prior litigation “had control of or actively
participated in” that litigation).
   Here, the evidence adduced at trial and arguments from the
parties compel the conclusion that Homebuyers and 11T were
in privity in the quiet title suit. As to whether Homebuyers
controlled the litigation, the controller of Homebuyers testified
that 11T was “100 percent owned by Homebuyers.” And 11T
acknowledged in its appellate brief in this case that it
      necessarily must have been given the consent and author-
      ity, by Homebuyers, to file the [quiet title] lawsuit
      because Homebuyers is the only member, and the only
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      possible person or entity that could grant 11T the author-
      ity. But for the consent of Homebuyers, 11T could not
      initiate or maintain the litigation.
Brief for appellees at 13.
   The evidence adduced at trial also showed that the inter-
ests of Homebuyers and 11T were substantially the same.
Homebuyers paid the property taxes and other maintenance
costs on the property “on behalf of” 11T when 11T held the tax
deed. Homebuyers’ controller testified that she made the tax
payments when “[w]e were in care and custody of the prop-
erty.” At that time, 11T held the deed to the property.
   Additionally, as described in the standing analysis above,
both Homebuyers and 11T could have claimed an entitle-
ment to restitution based on Homebuyers’ payment of the
property taxes while 11T held the deed to the property. Both
Homebuyers and 11T could not have recovered the full
amount, however. Miles and Bettin could have “eliminate[d]
both liabilities by discharging either of them.” See Restatement
(Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment § 6, comment b.,
illustration 1 at 60 (2011). See, also, id., § 47, comment b.,
illustration 1. In other words, had 11T pursued its claim for
unjust enrichment in the quiet title suit and succeeded, its par-
ent, Homebuyers, would no longer have had an independent
claim of its own. With respect to their claims for taxes paid,
Homebuyers’ and 11T’s interests in the quiet title suit were
the same.
   Because Homebuyers controlled 11T’s involvement in the
quiet title suit and the two entities’ interests were aligned,
Homebuyers and 11T were in privity in the quiet title suit. And
because Homebuyers and 11T were in privity in the quiet title
suit, 11T is also precluded from litigating Homebuyers’ unjust
enrichment claim now. The sole owner of a company is pre-
cluded from bringing a subsequent lawsuit regarding the same
facts when the owner and the company are in privity, even if
the owner was not a party to the initial litigation. See Griswold
v. County of Hillsborough, 598 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2010).
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   For these reasons, claim preclusion bars both 11T’s own
claim and the claim Homebuyers assigned to it.
                3. Judgment Against Moninger
   Finally, we address the judgment against Moninger.
Moninger did not appeal. He also did not plead claim preclu-
sion in the district court. Claim preclusion is an affirmative
defense which must ordinarily be pleaded to be available. See
Ballard v. Union Pacific RR. Co., 279 Neb. 638, 781 N.W.2d
47 (2010). Because Moninger did not plead claim preclusion in
the district court and because he did not appeal and present any
arguments challenging the judgment against him, we affirm the
judgment against him.
                   V. CONCLUSION
  Because we find that Miles and Bettin have shown that
Boone River and 11T are precluded from litigating the unjust
enrichment claims against them, we reverse the judgment
against Miles and Bettin. We affirm the judgment against
Moninger.
                Affirmed in part, and in part reversed.