Court Opinion

ID: 9753472
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 19:15:09.798233+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:00:26.355276
License: Public Domain

Johnson, J.,
concurring and dissenting. I agree with the Court’s holding in every respect except for the last issue, which decides the case against the tenants and upholds their ultimate eviction from Section 8 housing. I agree with the tenants that, on the face of the record and the facts as found by the trial court, the conclusion was inescapable that the landlords sought eviction in retaliation for complaints filed by the tenants. Therefore, I respectfully dissent from part III of the Court’s opinion.
*95Closing arguments reveal that, because the landlords amended the complaint on the day of trial to a claim for nonrenewal of the lease, the tenants had to fight to keep the issue of retaliatory eviction in the case. The trial court was not convinced that the defense should be allowed on the nonrenewal ground. Rather than face the legal issue, however, the trial court accepted the defense in theory and simply concluded it had not been proved. As a consequence, the trial court gave short shrift to this issue. It found that there was a retaliatory motive on April 1,1999, when the first notice to quit was issued, but that the “evidence does not support a finding that as of September 24, 1999 [second notice to quit], the motive of the plaintiff was a retaliatory one. At this time many of the repairs had been completed . . . [a]nd three days later the plaintiffs waived their opportunity for a trial to proceed with their eviction case.”
As we have found in the majority opinion, a defense of retaliatory eviction is a question of fact in every case, and our standard of review is deferential on the trial court’s findings of fact; nevertheless, the conclusion must follow from the facts as found. Begins v. Begins, 168 Vt. 298, 303, 721 A.2d 469, 471 (1998); Bisson v. Ward, 160 Vt. 343, 350-51, 628 A.2d 1256, 1261 (1993).
In judging motive in a retaliatory eviction case, the inquiry is an objective one. As we stated in Gokey v. Bessette, 154 Vt. 560, 564, 580 A.2d 488, 491 (1990), “[w]hile animus or bad motive may properly be considered in evaluating what is ‘retaliatory,’ the statute does not contemplate use of a subjective test. A subjective test would effectively establish such a high burden of proof for tenants that the benefit the Legislature intended to confer would be an illusion. In determining what is and is not retaliatory, the events must speak for themselves.” Under an objective view of the facts, the trial court’s conclusion that the eviction was not retaliatory does not withstand analysis.
The court’s apparent theory was that while the requests for repairs were outstanding, the landlords thought they could avoid the repairs by evicting the tenants. When that did not work, and the City of Barre got involved, the landlords made the repairs. Despite its finding that the original notice to quit was retaliatory, the court had to conclude that the retaliatory motive vanished after the landlords were forced to spend money on the apartment. The making of repairs does not provide any support for the conclusion that the landlords no longer had a motive to retaliate. In the absence of other evidence, the *96contrary is true because the landlords have suffered a detriment, and the successful action by these tenants could very well encourage others to complain about conditions. Landlords had every reason to evict for an improper purpose and advanced no reasons other than expiration of the lease, to meet tenants’ claim of retaliation.
Nor does the fact that the landlords gave up a trial date for the eviction support the court’s conclusion. As outlined by the majority, this eviction action began in May 1999. The tenants raised affirmative defenses, including retaliation. Trial was set for July 7, 1999, but was continued for reasons of discovery and because the landlords had recently retained counsel. Trial was rescheduled for October 8, 1999. On September 24, 1999 the landlords changed the ground of the eviction by issuing a notice to quit based on nonrenewal of the lease on October 31,1999. The case was continued on September 27,1999 by agreement of the parties because the hope was that the tenants would leave at the expiration of the lease. The tenants did not leave and the matter came to trial on December 15, 1999. At that time, the court granted the landlords’ motion to amend their complaint to seek possession on the ground of nonrenewal. In other words, the parties proceeded on the same eviction action, but the grounds were amended on the day of trial. If anything, the procedural history of the case showed the steadfastness with which the landlords wanted the tenants out. It strains credulity to conclude that their motive changed between April and September. The only thing that changed was that the landlords hired counsel, who changed the legal ground of the complaint.
Moreover, the change of motive defense was raised by the trial court, not the landlords. Their position throughout was that their motive for the eviction was irrelevant because the lease had expired and tenants were barred from raising retaliatory eviction as a defense. Not surprisingly, the landlords offered no evidence to rebut the case. Although it was the tenants’ burden to prove retaliation, they more than made out their prima facie ease by the objective facts surrounding the first notice to quit and the subsequent disagreements over repairs. The trial court agreed that the first notice to quit was retaliatory. No other evidence — the fact that repairs were made and the trial date continued — undercut the tenants’ case. To the extent the court’s determination that the landlord had no retaliatory motive on September 24th is a finding of fact, it is unsupported by the evidence and clearly erroneous. *97Therefore, because the landlords raised no defense to the retaliation, judgment should have been entered for the tenants.
It is distressing that the tenants have won the battle, but lost the war, and lost their Section 8 housing because they complained, contrary to the protection of the statute (9 V.S.A. § 4465) that we have just affirmed. I would reverse and enter judgment for the tenants.
I respectfully dissent. I am authorized to state that Justice Dooley joins in this dissent.