Court Opinion

ID: 9778852
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 21:22:59.986601+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:14.392590
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
PER CURIAM.
In the principal opinion we have said that error in instructing the jury by the giving of plaintiff’s Instruction No. 5 was prejudicial to defendants-appellants, East Texas and Freeman, as to the issues of negligence submitted under both plaintiff’s claim and defendant Bell’s cross-claim. Cross-claimant Bell by motion for rehearing has pointed out that defendants East Texas and Freeman did not assign error in their motion for a new trial in the giving of Instruction No. 5 as affecting the trial of the issues of defendant Bell’s cross-claim against those defendants. Supreme Court Rule 3.23; 42 V.A.M.S. We have further re-examined the brief of defendants East Texas and Freeman and have ascertained that they did not urge error in giving plaintiff’s Instruction No. 5 as affecting the issues of defendant Bell’s cross-claim against those defendants’. Lansford v. Southwest Lime Co., Mo.Sup., 266 S.W.2d 564; Supreme Court Rule 1.08. We continue to be of the opinion that the error in giving Instruction No. 5 was prejudicial as to the issues of plaintiff’s claim against defendants East Texas and Freeman, but we are now of the opinion that error, if so, in giving the instruction, with respect to the issues of defendant Bell’s cross-claim was not preserved by our review. This makes it necessary for us to re-examine defendants-appellants’ allegations and contentions of error in the trial of the issues of the cross-claim.
We have held in the principal opinion that cross-claimant Bell was not con-tributorily negligent as a matter of law, and that he made out a submissible case against East Texas and Freeman as submitted in cross-claimant Bell’s Instruction No. 6, that is, that those defendants “negli*133gently and carelessly caused and permitted the said tractor and trailer * * * to collide with the rear end of the said van-type truck * * The specific negligence so submitted was not so precisely and specifically alleged in defendant Bell’s cross-petition, but we hold it was not error to so submit cross-claimant’s case. Specific negligence as submitted was within the reasonable purview of the allegations of the cross-petition, and the evidence tending to show the specific negligence as submitted went in without objection. See and compare Biehie v. Frazier, 360 Mo. 1068, 232 S.W.2d 465. We find no further assignment of error in the trial of the issue of liability on cross-claimant’s claim.
We shall now consider contentions of error made by defendants-appellants East Texas and Freeman upon the trial of the issue of damages under the cross-claim.
 It is inferred that Ozark Beverage Company had paid cross-claimant Bell the sum of $1,500 and that he had executed a covenant not to sue Ozark. This amount was under the law to be credited against whatever judgment defendant Bell should recover, because an injured party may have but one satisfaction for his injuries. When an injured party compromises or settles with one of concurrent or joint tort-feasors for a portion of the injuries, the injured person retains his claim or cause of action against the other tort-feasor and recovery may be had for the balance of the damages for the injury (unless the damage caused by each of concurrent or joint tort-feasors is clearly separable, permitting the definite assignment of responsibility to each). Berry v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 343 Mo. 474, 121 S.W.2d 825; Carr v. St. Louis Auto Supply Co., 293 Mo. 562, 239 S.W. 827. The trial court permitted the introduction of evidence tending to show that cross-claimant Bell had been paid the sum of $1,500 on account of his injuries, but the trial court excluded evidence showing that the stated sum was paid by Ozark. There is no contention that this sum was not paid by Ozark; and, in this case we believe it was not prejudicial to exclude evidence of the source of the payment, if the jury were clearly instructed to deduct the sum from the amount of the verdict. In this connection the trial court instructed the jury in cross-claimant Bell’s measure of damages Instruction (,No. 7) that “in arriving at the amount of your verdict you may take into consideration the fact that Defendant Dewey Bell, has been paid the sum of Fifteen Hundred Dollars as mentioned in evidence.” (Our italics.) The instruction was faulty in failing to direct the jury that they were required to make the deduction. However, the jury was directed in-Instruction No. 9 that “if you further find and believe from the evidence that said sum ($1500) was full and adequate compensation for whatever injuries and damages he (cross-claimant Bell) may have ■ sustained * * *, then your verdict must be in favor of defendants,” East Texas and Freeman. But, it is not necessary to consider whether Instruction No. 9 clarified and cured the stated fault or error in Instruction No. 7. The Instruction (No. 7) was erroneous and prejudicially so, we believe, in the further respect that, having enumerated the elements to be considered in measuring the damages of cross-complaint Bell, the instruction continued as follow's, “And ón the question of damages you are instructed that the law does not afford ,any standard of measurement more accurate than that .given above, but in connection therewith and all credible evidence relating thereto, the law does permit you to take into consideration your common knowledge and experiences in life, * * The quoted language tended to depreciate the accuracy of the “standard of measurement” and the enumerated elements thereof to be taken into account in the jury’s admeasurement of damages, and permitted and encouraged the jurors to take into consideration whatever other conceivable elements they wished in connection with those the court had enumerated. Moreover, the jurors, having read the instruction, no doubt believed they were to consider the amounts which they may have received or, in their experience, knew had been received by others for injuries like or unlike those sustained by Bell, and without *134restriction and reference to the evidence introduced and the elements of damages as enumerated, but “in connection therewith.”
The principal opinion is modified only as to the reversal of the judgment of cross-claimant Bell against East Texas and Freeman. This judgment is now affirmed on the issue of liability, and reversed (and the cause remanded) for retrial on the issue of damages.