Court Opinion

ID: 9447554
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 22:37:33.456016+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:05.501503
License: Public Domain

MATHEWS, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
On January 11,1954, there was filed in the United States District Court for the District of Montana an information1 charging: “That on or about the 20th *480day of December, 1953, at a place about three (3) miles east of the Fort Belknap Indian Agency Office, on and within the exterior boundaries of the Fort Belknap Indian Reservation, being in Indian Country within the State and District of Montana, [appellee] and Benny Bakon, Indian persons, committed the offense of rape by accomplishing an act of sexual intercourse upon the person of Savannaha First Chief, a female Indian of the age of 13 years and not being the wife of either [appellee] or Benny Bakon.”
The information was based on § 1153, 18 U.S.C.A.2 and § 94-4101, Revised Codes of Montana, 1947.3
Appellee was arraigned, pleaded not guilty,4 had a jury trial resulting in a mistrial and a second jury trial resulting in a verdict finding him guilty as charged in the information. Thereupon, on March 4, 1954, a judgment of conviction was entered, sentencing appellee to be imprisoned for 15 years. From that judgment no appeal was taken.
On May 4, 1959, appellee, while a prisoner in custody under the sentence,5 filed in the District Court a motion to vacate and set aside the judgment and sentence —a motion under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255.6 That motion, hereafter called the motion of May 4, 1959, was based on six stated grounds. On May 8, 1959, the District Court entered an order denying, without hearing, the motion of May 4, 1959, in so far as it was based on grounds 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6. From that order no appeal was taken.
On May 11, 1959, the motion of May 4, 1959, in so far as it was based on ground 5, was heard by and submitted to the District Court. On May 15, 1959, the District Court entered an order vacating and setting aside the judgment and sentence, dismissing the information and discharging appellee from custody. This appeal is from that order.
Ground 5 of the motion of May 4,1959, was “That the sentence is in error for other reasons apparent of record.” There was nothing to indicate what the “error” was or what the “reasons” were. Obviously, ground 5 was not a valid or *481sufficient ground for a motion under § 2255.

*480
4

*481However, the motion of May 4, 1959, in so far as it was based on ground 5, was treated by the District Court as a motion based on the ground that the information failed to charge an offense. So treating it, the District Court concluded that the information did so fail. The order appealed from was based on that conclusion.
The motion of May 4, 1959, in so far as it was based on ground 5, was not, and should not have been treated as, a motion based on the ground that the information failed to charge an offense. Nowhere in the motion of May 4, 1959, was any such failure alleged or suggested. Hence the question whether the information failed to charge an offense was not before the District Court and should not have been considered or decided.
The order appealed from should be reversed, and the case should be remanded to the District Court with directions to enter an order denying the motion of May 4, 1959, in its entirety.

. Prosecution by indictment was waived pursuant to Rule 7(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 18 U.S.C.A.

. Section 1153 provides: “ * * * As used in this section, the offense of rape shall be defined in accordance with the laws of the State in which the offense was committed, and any Indian who commits the offense of rape upon any female Indian within the Indian country, shall be imprisoned at the discretion of the court. * * *»

. Section 94-4101 provides:
“Rape defined. Rape is an act of sexual intercourse, accomplished with a female, not the wife of the perpetrator, under any of the following circumstances: “1. When the female is under the age of eighteen years. * * * ”

. Appellee never moved to dismiss the information, nor did he at any time challenge its validity or sufficiency by motion or otherwise.

. Appellee was a prisoner in custody of the warden of the United States penitentiary at Leavenworth, Kansas.

. Section 2255 provides:
“A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence. * * *
“Unless * * * the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court shall cause notice thereof to be served upon the United States attorney, grant a prompt hearing thereon, determine the issues and make findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect thereto. If the court finds that the judgment was rendered without jurisdiction, or that the sentence imposed was not authorized by law or otherwise open to collateral attack, or that there has been such a denial or infringement of the constitutional rights of the prisoner as to render the judgment vulnerable to collateral attack, the court shall vacate and set the judgment aside and shall discharge the prisoner or resentence him or grant a new trial or correct the sentence as may appear appropriate. * * * ”