Court Opinion

ID: 9680785
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:38:36.507408+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:30.490356
License: Public Domain

WASSERSTROM, Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the conclusion of the principal opinion but differ slightly in theory. The sole purpose of this concurrence is to expound that difference.
The principal opinion stresses that the emergency exception does not justify the seizure of any evidence other than that found in plain view. It in effect limits the emergency doctrine to giving an excuse for entry, without affording any justification for a search. According to the reasoning of the principal opinion, a search and seizure of evidence can be justified, if at all, only under the separate plain view doctrine.
My reading of Epperson and Mincey leads to a broader interpretation of the emergency exception and convinces me that this doctrine does in fact authorize a limited type of search and affords a basis for seizure of evidence independent of the plain view doctrine. This would seem the plain meaning of Epperson, which pointedly distinguishes the two doctrines at p. 268: “. . . the bodies, plastic bags and chloroformed socks and Venetian blind cord were discovered in the bedroom and admissible under the plain view doctrine and the evidence from the other part of the house (i. *720e., the gasoline can, chisel, bottle of chloroform and certain of the photographs) were within the scope of the emergency exception.” The importance of the distinction so drawn can be fully appreciated only by remembering that Epperson had already held (at p. 266): “The admission of evidence from rooms of the house other than the bedroom . . . cannot be justified under the plain view doctrine . . . ”
Nevertheless, the emergency exception did not extend to permit seizure of the evidence challenged here. Epperson acknowledges that a search under the emergency exception must be one of “limited intensity” and ruled that the search there involved was so limited and was therefore distinguishable from the one held unjustified in Mincey v. Arizona. As pointed out in the principal opinion, the search here was an intensive one, including the deliberate and systematic search into hidden places. Because of this feature, the present case is like Mincey and unlike Epperson. So, the search in this case was unconstitutional, and the evidence seized should have been suppressed.