Court Opinion

ID: 9910125
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-14 20:08:41.910186+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:50:58.516803
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Stoyer v. Natl. Church Residences Commons at Livingston I & II Mgt., 2023-Ohio-4556.]

                             IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                                  TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

[Donald W. Stoyer,                                  :

                Plaintiff-Appellant,                :
                                                                   No. 23AP-192
v.                                                  :        (M.C. No. 2022CVR-39478)

NCR CAL II Management,                              :        (REGULAR CALENDAR)

                Defendant-Appellee].                :

                                           D E C I S I O N

                                  Rendered on December 14, 2023

                On brief: Donald W. Stoyer, pro se. Argued: Donald W.
                Stoyer.

                       APPEAL from the Franklin County Municipal Court

LELAND, J.
        {¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, Donald W. Stoyer, appeals from a judgment of the
Franklin County Municipal Court denying his motion to transfer, overruling his objection
to the magistrate’s decision, and dismissing his counterclaim against defendant-appellee,
National Church Residence Commons at Livingston I & II Management.
I. Facts and Procedural History
        {¶ 2} On December 2, 2022, appellant filed an application to deposit rent with the
clerk of the trial court. Appellant deposited a rental payment into an escrow account with
the trial court on December 2, 2022 and January 4, 2023.
        {¶ 3} On December 20, 2022, appellee served appellant with notice to leave the
premises on or before January 23, 2023. On December 22, 2022, appellee filed an
application for recovery of rent deposited by appellant with the trial court. Appellee
contended it was entitled to the rental payments in escrow because appellant failed to
No. 23AP-192                                                                                2

comply with the notice requirement of R.C. 5321.07. On January 10, 2023, appellant filed
a memorandum contra appellee’s application. The trial court granted appellee’s application
for the release of escrow payments on January 23, 2023, finding appellant was not current
on rent and was therefore ineligible pursuant to R.C. 5321.07(B) to deposit rental payments
with the trial court. On January 25, 2023, the trial court filed an entry adopting the
magistrate’s decision. Appellant filed an objection to the magistrate’s decision on
February 6, 2023.
       {¶ 4} Appellant filed a counterclaim against appellee on January 4, 2023. In his
counterclaim, appellant alleged discrimination on the basis of race, disability, and age, as
well as other claims relating to the habitability of his rented apartment. All told, appellant
sought $56,800,000 in monetary damages. Appellee filed an answer to appellant’s
counterclaim on February 3, 2023, to which appellant filed a reply on February 7, 2023.
Also on January 4, 2023, appellant filed a motion to transfer the case to the Franklin County
Court of Common Pleas.
       {¶ 5} On February 24, 2023, the trial court entered its decision denying appellant’s
motion to transfer, dismissing his counterclaim, and overruling his objection to the
magistrate’s decision.
       {¶ 6} Appellant timely appeals.
II. Assignments of Error
       {¶ 7} Appellant presents the following four assignments of error for our review:
              [I.] Within the magistrate’s trial court abused its
              discretion with hostility toward the Defendant-
              Appellant only on concerns of tactics to prove oppositions
              argument that the rent was or was not current pursuant to
              O.R.C. § 5321.07(B), when the issues were not addressing
              the prima faci evidence attached to the counterclaim of
              the government inspection finding much needed repairs
              by the Appellee who failed pursuant to O.R.C. § 5321.07(A)
              with more than a thirty (30) days’ notice, where Appellant was
              unfairly denied his right to defend the “grace period” within
              the lease contract that is binding pursuant to O.R.C. §
              1310.15, as the magistrate coerced this party with his
              tactical questions?

              [II.] Within the judge’s ORDER presented as unforgiving
              abuse of discretion concerning this Appellant’s “due
              process” and “equal protections rights” by changing the
No. 23AP-192                                                                                  3

              “parties from plaintiff to defendant and defendant to
              plaintiff,” and causing confusion within her ORDER. Factual
              evidence, proves this is a violation to state law concerning
              O.R.C. § 5321.09; Cannon Rule 2.2; Local R 3.04, since
              our legislators’ purpose was to protect Ohio citizens’ rights
              under the Ohio and U.S. Constitution concerning any change
              without      any    approval    would     be   a   vindictive
              misrepresentation to her ethics or not?

              [III.] Within the magistrate’s and judge of the trial courts did
              they severely abused its discretion with its overpowering
              hostility toward this Defendant-Appellant by not sua
              sponte considering the “grace period” through an act of
              “injustice in law concerning the time period during which
              particular rule exceptionally does or does not apply, since
              through contractual law it does not allow it to partially
              apply, because both parties rely on current rental
              payments.” In the event of the lease contract depends on
              this party, otherwise, it misrepresents the truth and creates
              a “ruse to payment” where this lease contract depends
              on payment or is it void?

              [IV.] Within the judge’s order presented an unforgiving error
              that severely abused its discretion by not considering any
              claims submitted in the counterclaim where even
              specifically many or all claims were based clearly within this
              party’s motion to transfer. See: Defendant’s Motion to
              Transfer Entire Action to The Common Pleas Court., page 3 of
              4. After all, within this parties “motion to transfer” was to
              each of the formalities used and not sued, where this judge
              admits to claims being present, except was not specific to
              explain why they were not appropriate where it they were not
              considered is misrepresentation or fraud unless
              consideration to due process law of being allowed to
              amend said counterclaim, which is allowed or not?

(Emphasis sic.) (Sic passim.)

III. Analysis
       {¶ 8} This court has held that “[b]efore a municipal court certifies a case, it should
first determine whether, on its face, the counterclaim satisfies the pleading formalities of
[Civ.R. 8(A)].” Tractor Serv. & Supply, Inc. v. Dyke Station Mining Co., 10th Dist. No.
81AP-210 (Sept. 3, 1981). Civ.R. 8(A) requires “[a] pleading that sets forth a claim for relief”
to “contain (1) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the party is entitled to
No. 23AP-192                                                                                 4

relief, and (2) a demand for judgment for the relief to which the party claims to be entitled.”
Courts have interpreted this language, finding it requires plaintiffs to plead “sufficient,
operative facts” that correspond to the allegations. Clemens v. Katz, 6th Dist. No. L-08-
1274, 2009-Ohio-1461, ¶ 7, citing Doe v. Robinson, 6th Dist. No. L-07-1051, 2007-Ohio-
5746, ¶ 17. A pleading must provide information “sufficient to give fair notice of the nature
of the action.” Truist Bank v. Eichenberger, 10th Dist. No. 22AP-334, 2023-Ohio-779, ¶ 51,
citing Ford v. Brooks, 10th Dist. No. 11AP-664, 2012-Ohio-943, ¶ 13. “[T]o constitute fair
notice, the complaint (or counterclaim) must allege sufficient underlying facts that relate
to and support the alleged claim; it may not simply state legal conclusions.” Id., citing
Montgomery v. Ohio State Univ., 10th Dist. No. 11AP-1024, 2012-Ohio-5489, ¶ 20. See
DeVore v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 32 Ohio App.2d 36, 38 (7th Dist.1972).
       {¶ 9} Furthermore, courts must construe “[a]ll pleadings” so “as to do substantial
justice.” Civ.R. 8(F). To that end, courts must construe pleadings “liberally in order that
substantive merits of the action may be served.” Boyland v. Giant Eagle, 10th Dist. No.
17AP-133, 2017-Ohio-7335, ¶ 15, citing MacDonald v. Bernard, 1 Ohio St.3d 85 (1982).
       {¶ 10} We construe appellant’s first, third, and fourth assignments of error as
contending the trial court abused its discretion when the trial court examined whether rent
was current under R.C. 5321.07(B) rather than addressing the many alleged deficiencies of
appellant’s housing. The issue before the trial court, however, was not whether appellant’s
housing was adequately clean or safe; rather, the trial court was obligated to decide whether
appellee was entitled to the rental payments held in escrow and whether the case qualified
for transfer to the court of common pleas. By statute, a tenant must be current on rent to
be eligible to deposit rental payments with the clerk of the municipal court.              See
R.C. 5321.07(B). Once it determined appellant was not current on rent, the trial court then
had no choice but to release the rent held in escrow to appellee. We find the trial court did
not err in finding appellant was late in paying rent and, further, we find the trial court did
not err in ordering the release of the escrow funds to appellee.
       {¶ 11} Accordingly, appellant’s first, third, and fourth assignments of error are

overruled.

       {¶ 12} We construe appellant’s second assignment of error as arguing the trial court
abused its discretion in labeling appellant as “plaintiff” and appellee as “defendant,” despite
No. 23AP-192                                                                               5

R.C. 5321.09 seeming to contemplate the landlord acting as plaintiff to retrieve rental
payments held in escrow. Although the language of R.C. 5321.09 would tend to result in
labels of tenant-defendant and landlord-plaintiff, the statute does not so require.
Furthermore, to the extent appellant is concerned with any confusion resulting from these
labels, the trial court addressed the matter in a footnote to its decision—the trial court
referred to appellant as plaintiff “[f]or the sake of consistency and clarity.” We find no
prejudice or error in this decision.
       {¶ 13} Accordingly, appellant’s second assignment of error is overruled.
       {¶ 14} Finally, to the extent any of appellant’s assignments of error allege the trial
court erred in dismissing his counterclaim, denying his motion to transfer, or overruling
his objection to the magistrate’s decision, we likewise find no error in the trial court’s
decision. The trial court correctly found appellant failed to properly set forth a claim for
relief, even under the permissive standard of Civ.R. 8(A).
       {¶ 15} Accordingly, all of appellant’s assignments of error are overruled.
IV. Conclusion
       {¶ 16} Having overruled appellant’s four assignments of error, we affirm the
judgment of the Franklin County Municipal Court.
                                                                       Judgment affirmed.

                       LUPER SCHUSTER and BOGGS, JJ., concur.