Court Opinion

ID: 9740857
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:42:59.801398+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:20.775872
License: Public Domain

Brickley, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I concur in the adoption of the rule defined in Luce v United States, 469 US 38; 105 S Ct 460; 83 L Ed 2d 443 (1984). I write, however, to express my disagreement with the lead opinion’s disposition of the instant case and with certain other elements of that opinion.
The lead opinion states that "[w]e hold that the Luce rule will apply in any case tried after the release date of this opinion,” and permits review in some cases pending on appeal even where the *527defendant did not testify. I therefore conclude that Luce is being given purely prospective application, and I cpncur with that understanding. I would not, however, apply Luce from the day the Court’s decision is issued, but rather from November 1, 1988, to ensure that attorneys representing criminal defendants will be made aware of this new procedural requirement.
The application of Luce being prospective, we must then decide the instant case, and the cases we hold in abeyance for this decision, on the basis of the law as it existed prior to today’s decision. The lead opinion fails to state what it believed that law to be, but I think it is fair to say that it suggests that the rules defined in United States v Cook, 608 F2d 1175 (CA 9, 1979), had been adopted in Michigan prior to today’s decision. I do not agree.
The lead opinion cites our decision in People v Wakeford, 418 Mich 95, 117; 341 NW2d 68 (1983), where we stated that the Cook procedure "has much to commend it.” However, we also stated in Wakeford that "we do not today make such a procedure mandatory.” Id. I do not see how an explicit refusal to adopt a procedural requirement can be read as an adoption of that requirement, however laudatory it may be. This Court has not discussed Cook since the Wakeford decision, and it cannot fairly be said that by any action of this Court the Cook requirements had been adopted as a preservation requirement.
The lead opinion also cites People v Allen, 429 Mich 558; 420 NW2d 499 (1988), as an example in which the Cook requirements were met. It states that in Allen "defendants had done everything necessary at the time to preserve the issue” and in an accompanying footnote states:
*528The discussion in Allen reveals that defendants Pedrin and Allen proffered to the trial court the expected nature of their testimony. . . . Defendants Gray and Brooks testified at trial.
The lead opinion fails to note that in Allen defendant Smith did not testify, and the Allen opinion does not indicate that he proffered to the trial court the expected nature of his testimony. Nevertheless, his claim was reviewed. Similarly, although Allen makes clear that Pedrin and Allen made proffers, there is nothing in the opinion to suggest that they also "establish[ed] on the record that [they would] in fact take the stand and testify if [the] challenged prior convictions [were] excluded” 608 F2d 1186. Finally, even if all the Allen defendants had complied with Cook, that could not be seen as an adoption of Cook by this Court.
Three Court of Appeals cases are also cited for the principle that Cook was the law in Michigan. These cases do in fact stand for the proposition since they held that review would not be provided where Cook had not been complied with. However, I do not believe that these isolated cases, one of which was decided after defendant’s trial, can be viewed as representing the general body of Michigan law on this question. Numerous MRE 609(a) cases, including many in which defendant failed to testify, have been reviewed without any mention of the Cook test. These opinions have noted only that the defendant moved for exclusion of his prior convictions or objected to their admission. See, e.g., People v Woods, 416 Mich 581; 331 NW2d 707 (1982); People v Hughes, 411 Mich 517; 309 NW2d 525 (1981); People v Steele, 115 Mich App 758; 321 NW2d 804 (1982); People v Kramer, 108 Mich App 240; 310 NW2d 347 (1981); People v Gary Johnson, *529105 Mich App 332; 306 NW2d 501 (1981). In addition, there are other cases in which review was denied for failure to preserve the issue, but in those cases the failure to preserve was found in the lack of objection, not in a failure to state an intention to testify or make a proffer of an outline of the testimony. People v Henry, 395 Mich 367; 236 NW2d 489 (1975); People v Moore, 391 Mich 426; 216 NW2d 770 (1974); People v Gaines, 129 Mich App 439; 341 NW2d 519 (1983); People v Shrader, 88 Mich App 680; 279 NW2d 47 (1979); People v Holt, 54 Mich App 60; 220 NW2d 205 (1974); People v Averill, 59 Mich App 507; 229 NW2d 827 (1975); People v Jones, 44 Mich App 633; 205 NW2d 611 (1973).
I thus conclude that prior to today’s adoption of Luce, the rule in Michigan was that in order to preserve for appeal the issue of impeachment by prior conviction, a defendant had to object to its introduction or move for its exclusion. Defendant Finley did object to the admission of this evidence. I therefore would remand this case to the Court of Appeals for review of his claim that MRE 609 was violated. See People v Allen, 429 Mich 558; 420 NW2d 499 (1988).
My second disagreement with the lead opinion is with some aspects of its criticism of Justice Levin’s dissenting opinion. The lead opinion states that
whether or not the defendant actually intends to take the stand, it is predictable that such a hearing would always take place in order to protect the claim on appeal [ante, p 520],
and that
a reverse-Luce hearing will predictably be held in every case. [Ante, p 521.]
*530I believe these statements mischaracterize Justice Levin’s opinion. His proposal would still require the defendant to commit himself to testify before the jury if the judge ruled in his favor on the admission of a prior conviction, and, if a defendant refused to testify after a ruling in his favor, his proffered testimony would be read to the jury. I believe it is therefore incorrect to suggest that a defendant who does not in fact want to take the stand, but seeks only to create an appellate issue, would avail himself of the procedure suggested in Justice Levin’s opinion. Once the defendant took the stand in a "reverse-Luce hearing,” he would have no option but to have the jury hear his testimony and cross-examination. While this procedure may suffer from inherent inefficiencies, having such a hearing occur in every case is not one of them, nor is there any danger that had we adopted this approach that it would have provided a vehicle for defendants to create an "appellate parachute.”
My third disagreement with the lead opinion is its inclusion of what I believe is overly broad dictum. The lead opinion states:
[T]he straightforward logic of Luce not grasped by either dissent is that as to evidentiary rulings, error does not occur until error occurs; that is, until the evidence is admitted. Obviously, in other contexts, if an offer of proof is made and the court erroneously permits the introduction of hearsay, character evidence, similar acts, or the myriad of evidence objectionable under the MRE, there is no error requiring reversal unless the evidence actually is introduced. [Ante, p 512.]
The lead opinion cites no authority to support this sweeping dictum, the future readings of which *531cannot be foreseen. In addition, the notion that reviewable error does not occur until admission of the challenged evidence does not square with actual practice. Interlocutory appeals are regularly taken on evidentiary questions and pretrial rulings are often deemed erroneous in spite of the fact that their effect has not yet been felt at trial. Error can also occur at trial in varying forms, and the Court should not be so quick to define a universal principle, particularly since the specific grounds for the adoption of the Luce requirement are so clearly explained by the Chief Justice.
In conclusion, I concur in the adoption of the Luce rule, and believe its application should be strictly prospective, beginning November 1, 1988. In my view, therefore, the instant case must be decided under the preservation requirements in force before today’s decision. Since defendant objected to the admission of his prior conviction, I would remand this case to the Court of Appeals to determine if the admission of that conviction was erroneous. Lastly, as just described, I do not concur in two particular passages of the lead opinion.