Court Opinion

ID: 9650222
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 15:27:15.983545+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:19.079237
License: Public Domain

SPAETH, Judge,
concurring:
It is beyond dispute that “the Fourth Amendment [of the United States Constitution] protects people, not places.” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351, 88 S.Ct. 507, 511, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). However, the scope of this protection is uncertain. See Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368, 88 S.Ct. 2120, 20 L.Ed.2d 1154 (1968) (seizure of papers from labor union office unreasonable although office shared by several officials); United States v. Romano, 388 F.Supp. 101, 105 (E.D.Pa.1975) (seizure of newspapers from drainpipe on rear wall of townhouse reasonable); Commonwealth v. Cooper, 240 Pa.Super. 477, 489-490, 362 A.2d 1041, 1049-50 (1976) (conversation overheard by police lawfully in adjacent hotel room admissible); Commonwealth v. Cubler, 236 Pa. Super. 614, 346 A.2d 814 (1976) (Opinion by WATKINS, former P. J., joined by PRICE and VAN der VOORT, *487JJ. — proper to seize black bag placed in dog house in back yard; but see dissenting opinion by HOFFMAN, J., id., 236 Pa.Supér. at 621, 346 A.2d at 817); Commonwealth v. Hernley, 216 Pa.Super. 177, 263 A.2d 904 (1970) (seizure of evidence through uncurtained window reasonable).
Here, I think it unnecessary to determine whether the scope of protection afforded by the Fourth Amendment extended to defendants’ premises, because the police obtained sufficient evidence from their initial surveillance from the railroad right of way and their later examination of items left on the railroad right of way to establish probable cause for the issuance of the search warrants. Defendants had no reasonable expectation of privacy as to this right of way because it was located parallel to defendants’ warehouse but was not part of the premises. Therefore, the police were lawfully on the right of way and the information gained from this vantage point or from items left on it could properly be considered in determining whether there was probable cause for issuance of the warrants. Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236, 88 S.Ct. 992, 19 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1968).
During the initial surveillance the police learned by checking the license plate number that a truck parked on the right of way was registered in the name of defendant Rovanna Best-Bey. A criminal record check made with the Philadelphia Police Department revealed that defendant Rovanna Best-Bey had an extensive number of arrests for vehicle thefts, receiving stolen property, and related offenses. Furthermore, during one of their nighttime surveillances the police obtained a vehicle identification number from a motor and transmission that had been left on the right of way and were covered only by a tarpaulin. This vehicle identification number belonged to a stolen car.
Thus, in addition to the unidentified informant’s tip, the magistrate could properly have considered these facts: that defendant Rovanna Best-Bey was the registered owner of a truck parked near the premises; that he had an extensive criminal record involving vehicle theft; and that the parts *488found on the railroad right of way belonged to a stolen car. These facts were sufficient to give the magistrate probable cause to believe that illegal activity was going on "in the premises.
Accordingly, I agree with the majority that the lower court’s order suppressing the evidence obtained as a result of the searches should be reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings.
JACOBS, President Judge, joins in this opinion.