Court Opinion

ID: 9744249
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:57:57.098619+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:47.882071
License: Public Domain

Concurring Opinion
Kelley, C. J.
I concur in the result of the main opinion, but with two observations:
It seems that much was said in the opinion which was unnecessary to the conclusion reached. It is provided by statute, Sec. 2-3233, Burns’ 1946 Replacement, that “the court shall not reverse the proceedings any further than to include the first error.” The mandate of the constitution (Section 5, Article 7, Constitution of Indiana) that the court shall “give a statement in writing of each question arising in the record” has reference to a question in the record “the decision, of which is necessary to the final determination of the cause; and which the record presents with a fullness and distinctness rendering it. possible for the court to comprehend it in all its bearings.” Willets v. Ridgway (1857), 9 Ind. 367, 370; Weer et al. v. State (1941), 219 Ind. 217, 229, 37 N. E. 2d 537.
In the instant case the question in the record “necessary to the final determination of the cause” and the “first error” requiring reversal was the alleged error in giving appellee’s instruction number 8 over appellants’ specific objection thereto. That was the only question which, in my opinion, it was necessary to decide; and the determination of that question constituted the doctrine of the case. Much danger, it seems to me, in passing upon questions not necessary to the final determination of the cause, lies in the possibility that the statements made by the appellate tribunal may be later accepted by the courts and the profession as dependable legal pronouncements when, in truth, they may constitute only obiter. Thereby, error may creep into proceedings in the trial courts *502and the legal counselor may be lead into the position of wrongly advising and directing his client. It follows that my concurrence in the result reached is necessarily limited to the said specific question necessary to the determination of the cause.
My second observation is that the question determined upon is restricted to the particular facts apparent upon the record. Specifically, it must be borne in mind that the appellee did not attempt to prosecute the action in her own personal right as the mother of the decedent child but as the administratrix of her deceased husband’s estate. What her rights, if any, may have been, after the death of the father, to maintain án action, as the mother of the deceased child, for’ his death, under the provisions of Sec. 2-217, Burns’ 1946 Replacement, were not presented in the case and were not, in my opinion, in any way determined upon, and whether, under said statute, the ap-pellee, in her own right as mother of the deceased child, would be entitled to recover for any pecuniary loss to her from the date of the death of her husband (the father) to the time the child would have reached his majority, was a matter not presented in this appeal.
The objected to instruction was not limited to such allowable elements of damage as may have been recoverable by the father to the time of his death, but undertook to permit a recovery by his personal representative for damages not accruing to his estate.
Upon these considerations, I concur in the result evidenced by the main opinion.
Note. — Reported in 148 N. E. 2d 194.