Court Opinion

ID: 9539575
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:06:14.179253+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:58:58.297063
License: Public Domain

BEALES, J.,
concurring, in part, and dissenting, in part.
I concur with the majority’s holding that the trial court erred in using the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine to admit Mrs. Crawford’s affidavit for the truth of the matters asserted therein, given the United States Supreme Court’s recent holding in Giles v. California, — U.S.-, 128 S.Ct. 2678, 171 L.Ed.2d 488 (2008). I also concur with the majority’s holding that the trial court did not err in admitting the statements of Mrs. Crawford’s co-workers under the state-of-mind exception to the hearsay rule, see Clay v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 258, 257-58, 546 S.E.2d 728, 730 (2001). However, I disagree with the majority’s sufficiency analysis, and, therefore, I dissent in part from the majority opinion.
I concur with the majority’s resolution of the issues related to the grand larceny,8 rape,9 capital murder,10 and use of a *165firearm in the commission of a murder convictions. I also agree that admission of the affidavit for the truth of the matters asserted therein was not harmless error in relation to the abduction with intent to defile conviction because the affidavit could have influenced the jury’s decision on that conviction. However, unlike the majority, I would reverse and remand the abduction with intent to defile conviction, as well as the related firearm charge, for retrial on the lesser-included offense of simple abduction, rather than dismiss this conviction. Therefore, although I concur in other respects, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion on the abduction conviction and the related conviction for use of a firearm during the commission of an abduction.

ANALYSIS

Appellant was convicted of abduction with intent to defile. As the majority found, admission of the affidavit into evidence for the truth of the matters asserted therein violated appellant’s constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him, and, given the standard set by the United States Supreme Court for harmless error involving a constitutional issue, see Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 828, 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710-11 (1967), that error was not harmless. Therefore, the conviction for abduction with intent to defile must be reversed. See Dearing v. Commonwealth, 259 Va. 117, 123, 524 S.E.2d 121, 124-25 (2000). If appellant had not also argued that the evidence was insufficient to prove he committed abduction with intent to defile, then we would simply remand the abduction with intent to defile conviction for a new trial. See, e.g., Owens v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 315, 218 S.E.2d 530 (1975) (finding a certificate of analysis was improperly admitted into evidence and reversing and remanding for retrial on the original charge “if the Commonwealth be so advised”). However, appellant does argue that the evi*166dence was insufficient to prove his abduction with intent to defile conviction. Therefore, this Court must examine the sufficiency of the evidence here to determine whether the conviction should be dismissed or remanded for a new trial.
While I agree with the majority that the evidence, viewed under the traditional sufficiency standards of deference to the fact finder and examining the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, would not support the intent element of the crime of abduction with intent to defile, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the evidence was also insufficient to prove the act of simple abduction. Instead, I would find that the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for the lesser-included offense of simple abduction, and so this charge should be remanded for retrial along with the associated firearm charge.
As this Court has explained previously:
The consistent practice in Virginia, when the evidence is found insufficient to sustain a felony conviction on appeal, but sufficient to sustain a conviction on a lesser-included misdemeanor offense, has been to remand the case for retrial on the lesser-included offense.
This practice is consistent with case law from other jurisdictions that holds that a post-trial finding of insufficient evidence to support a conviction requires an acquittal only as to the greater charge for which the evidence was insufficient, but does not require acquittal of a lesser-included offense adequately supported by the evidence.
Gorham v. Commonwealth, 15 Va.App. 673, 678-79, 426 S.E.2d 493, 496-97 (1993) (citations omitted). In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence here, we should examine all of the evidence, including the affidavit, in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth. Hargraves v. Commonwealth, 37 Va.App. 299, 312-13, 557 S.E.2d 737, 743 (2002) (“[W]e consider all admitted evidence, including illegally admitted evidence,” when assessing the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal.).
*167The majority’s discussion of the act of abduction focuses on the evidence regarding Mrs. Crawford’s intention to meet her estranged husband on the morning of November 19th. The evidence does support a conclusion that, initially, Mrs. Crawford willingly met with appellant that morning. However, that evidence does not prove that Mrs. Crawford willingly and voluntarily continued to stay with her husband that morning. In fact, additional facts in the record prove that, while they were together, the situation changed, and appellant then abducted Mrs. Crawford.
Appellant told the police that his reason for meeting his wife was to reconcile with his wife. However, Mrs. Crawford clearly did not have the same intention. The affidavit, the preliminary protective order, and the testimony of her coworkers and her parents proved that Mrs. Crawford was not interested in reuniting with her husband. See Hodges v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 418, 436-37, 634 S.E.2d 680, 689-90 (2006) (discussing the relevance of a victim’s state of mind); Elliot v. Commonwealth, 30 Va.App. 430, 437-38, 517 S.E.2d 271, 275 (1999) (discussing state of mind). Although she asked the JDR court to dismiss the protective order, nothing in the record suggests that, by withdrawing her request for a protective order, Mrs. Crawford had forgiven her husband for all of his abuse and now wanted to reconcile with him. Many other explanations exist for the refusal to go forward with a permanent protective order. Here, although appellant alleged in his statement that they were meeting to attempt a reconciliation, the Commonwealth’s evidence proved Mrs. Crawford apparently wanted to meet with her estranged husband to obtain his signature on a form that freed her father from liability on their apartment’s lease, creating the strong inference that she did not intend to move back into that apartment.
Appellant had made threats and committed acts of violence against Mrs. Crawford. She was afraid that he would kill her, based on statements she included in the affidavit. Appellant himself apparently felt so unsure about their alleged reconciliation that he took a loaded gun with him when they met on the morning of November 19th. Although appellant packed a *168suitcase and took it with him to the motel, the motel room contained none of Mrs. Crawford’s luggage—only her purse. Nothing in the room suggested she intended to go away for the weekend with her estranged husband. In fact, she had told her employer that she expected to be at work by 1:00 that afternoon, and she had a date with another man the next evening. Based on the evidence here, the jury could reject appellant’s statement to the police that the spouses intended to reconcile and instead could have believed that he was lying to the police.
In addition, appellant’s actions after shooting his wife support the jury’s conclusion that appellant abducted his wife. After shooting her, instead of going into the McDonald’s where he alleged the shooting occurred and asking for help, appellant removed Mrs. Crawford from the driver’s seat of her car and placed her in the back seat. He then drove her away from the scene of the shooting. He did not take Mrs. Crawford directly to a hospital or to a doctor, although her desperate need for medical attention was obvious. He contacted no medical personnel or anyone else who might have been able to help her. Instead, he threw her cell phone out of the car, and he then drove to a motel in Charlottesville, preventing her from contacting anyone who might have been able to help her.
Appellant admitted to the police who arrested him in Florida that he took Mrs. Crawford to a motel and left her there alone after the shooting. At that point, according to the assistant medical examiner, Mrs. Crawford could not move her body due to the severing of her spine. Given that appellant admitted that he shot her—and Mrs. Crawford’s urgent need for medical attention—the evidence proved overwhelmingly that Mrs. Crawford did not willingly leave the scene of the shooting to go with appellant to a motel. Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the evidence supports the jury’s finding that appellant abducted his wife.
The majority opinion finds the timing of Mrs. Crawford’s death is relevant to our review of the evidence of abduction on appeal. However, in his arguments to this Court, appellant *169has never argued that Mrs. Crawford died before they arrived at, or even started driving to, the motel. His entire argument on appeal regarding the sufficiency of the evidence to prove abduction rests upon his allegation that Mrs. Crawford was with him willingly; he makes no claim that she died before any asportation of her occurred. Therefore, I would not address the timing of Mrs. Crawford’s death in our discussion of the sufficiency of the evidence here. See Rule 5A:18.
However, as the majority does address the timing of Mrs. Crawford’s death, I do note various facts upon which the jury could rely to find Mrs. Crawford did not die instantly after the shooting. First, the medical examiner testified that Mrs. Crawford could have lived for up to an hour after she was shot, although he also said that she might have lived only a few minutes. As appellant testified that the shooting occurred in Charlottesville, the medical expert’s testimony could support the conclusion that Mrs. Crawford was alive when they reached the motel, which was also in Charlottesville.11 In addition, appellant told the police that his wife talked to him after the shooting, although he did not indicate more specifically when she spoke to him. Also, appellant apparently attempted to minister to Mrs. Crawford once they were in the motel room—something he would be unlikely to do if she were already dead. Appellant put her on the bed, undressed her, and put a make-shift dressing on the gunshot wound. Even if Mrs. Crawford was not alive when they reached the motel, I would find that, once appellant shot her and she was in need of medical attention, the evidence is sufficient to conclude that Mrs. Crawford did not want to take a drive to a motel in Charlottesville with the man who had just shot her and, therefore, she was abducted at the point that he drove her away from the scene of the shooting. Therefore, I would find *170that the evidence was sufficient to prove that Mrs. Crawford was alive when appellant, the man who shot her, forced her into the back seat of the car and then, instead of taking her to a hospital or getting some assistance anywhere, drove her away from the scene of the shooting and any possible medical assistance to a motel in Charlottesville, thereby committing abduction of Mrs. Crawford.12
Finally, I find it appropriate to comment on the conclusion reached here, and in the majority opinion, that various convictions be remanded for retrial on lesser-included offenses, rather than simply remanding these convictions for resentencing on the lesser-included offenses. Based on the Virginia Supreme Court’s recent decision in Britt v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 569, 667 S.E.2d 763 (2008), we cannot simply remand for resentencing, as was done in Commonwealth v. South, 272 Va. 1, 630 S.E.2d 318 (2006), because the parties here did not concur in asking this Court for a remand for resentencing of the abduction with intent to defile conviction on the lesser-included offense of simple abduction (or for a remand for resentencing of the capital murder conviction on the lesser-included offense of first-degree murder). Therefore, as directed by the Supreme Court in Britt, I believe the appropriate result here is to remand the abduction with intent to defile conviction to the trial court for a new trial on the lesser-included offense of simple abduction and for retrial on the attending conviction for the use of a firearm in the commission of an abduction, if the Commonwealth be so advised. I also concur in the majority opinion’s remand of the capital murder conviction for retrial on the lesser-included offense of first-degree murder and for retrial on the related use of a firearm *171in the commission of a murder conviction, if the Commonwealth be so advised.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part from the majority opinion.

. Nothing in the affidavit mentioned automobiles or theft, and appellant did not argue that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he stole his father-in-law’s car.

. The affidavit clearly alleged a previous rape several months before the murder, which constituted inadmissible evidence of the same crime with which appellant was charged, and the evidence in the record was also insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the sexual intercourse between appellant and the victim that apparently occurred on November 19, 2004, was not consensual.

. I agree with the majority that both the rape and abduction with intent to defile convictions are not supported by the evidence in the record. As these convictions form the statutorily mandated predicate offenses for the capital murder conviction, we cannot remand for retrial *165on capital murder, although we can remand the use of a firearm in the commission of a murder conviction for a new trial. Therefore, I agree that appellant must have a new trial on the lesser-included offense of first-degree murder, if the Commonwealth be so inclined.

. The exact location of the shooting is not known. The physical evidence suggested that it occurred somewhere in or near Manassas, but appellant in his statement claimed it happened in Charlottesville. No evidence was presented to prove where the car was parked when the shooting occurred. Therefore, the actual distance between the scene of the shooting and the motel is unknown.

. The indictment charged appellant with use of a firearm in the commission of an abduction, not with use of a firearm in the commission of an abduction with intent to defile, and the relevant jury instruction likewise defined the crime as use of a firearm in the commission of an abduction. The final order states that appellant was convicted of use of a firearm in the commission of an abduction. Therefore, as the predicate offense, i.e., an abduction, was proven, I would not dismiss this conviction.