Court Opinion

ID: 9735489
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 18:18:50.452937+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:59.215265
License: Public Domain

DRAPER, P. J.—I dissent.
Defendants’ brazenly flagrant flouting of an order obviously made for their own protection can hardly evoke sympathy for them. Nonetheless, I feel that the pretrial order of the municipal court goes beyond permissible limits and thus cannot afford a basis for punishment. (In re Berry, 68 Cal.2d 137, 147-149 [65 Cal.Rptr. 273, 436 P.2d 273].)
The seemingly broad admonition of the United States Supreme Court (Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 [16 L.Ed.2d 600, 620, 86 S.Ct. 1507]) is subject to limitations recognized but not emphasized in that opinion.
The 11 clear and present danger” limitation applies. The Sheppard opinion cites with approval a number of decisions emphasizing that rule (e.g., Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 [91 L.Ed. 1546, 67 S.Ct. 1249]; Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 [90 L.Ed. 1295, 66 S.Ct. 1029]; Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 [86 L.Ed. 192, 62 S.Ct. 190, 159 A.L.R. 1346]). The essence of that rule is that the ‘ ‘ substantive evil must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high before utterances can be punished” (Bridges v. California, *805supra, at p. 263 [86 L.Ed. at p. 203]). Review of the authorities makes clear that the requisite degree of clarity and imminence is rarely found.
The order here was issued on the court’s own motion. Thus we have no moving papers, affidavits, or exhibits. The order contains no recital of facts which were before the court, merely stating that “to secure a fair trial in this case it is essential to keep pretrial publicity to an absolute minimum. ’ ’ This statement, of course, would apply to most cases awaiting trial, and does not show any past or threatened events to establish the requisite degree of clarity and imminence of danger in this trial. Appellants’ counsel- have lodged with us clippings from three newspapers for the period from December 1 to close of trial, but they have two deficiencies for our present inquiry. It is doubtful that this material establishes the requisite clear and present danger. More important, we do not know that they were before the eonrt or motivated its decision to issue the order. Thus I have grave doubts that this first test of the order has been met.
In any event, the order seems to me too broad and uncertain to support penal sanctions. Overbreadth and uncertainty in a penal statute render it void (Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 [84 L.Ed. 1093, 60 S.Ct. 736]; Fort v. Civil Service Com., 61 Cal.2d 331 [38 Cal.Rptr. 625, 392 P.2d 385]). When an enactment restricting free speech is attacked upon these grounds, the courts may consider the operation of the enactment as to factual situations and parties other than those presently before the court (N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432-433 [9 L.Ed.2d 405, 417-418, 83 S.Ct. 328]; In re Hoffman, 67 Cal.2d 845 [64 Cal.Rptr. 97, 434 P.2d 353]; Fort v. Civil Service Com., supra). The rule against overbreadth and uncertainty applies to a temporary restraining order (In re Berry, supra, 68 Cal.2d 137). It seems clear that a pretrial order of the type before us, restricting release of information pending trial, is subject to like limitations.
This order bars release to news media of “information or opinion concerning the trial or any issue likely to be involved therein.” The prohibition was not limited to assertions of views in a context relating them to the issues of the trial, but could be construed to bar even comments which made no reference to the trial, so long as they dealt with any subject ‘ ‘ likely to be involved ” in it. Similarly, the order could well be read to bar the use of news media by either side in a search for witnesses to the events of the demonstration. I recognize *806that the trial judge doubtless intended no such restriction, and that violation in these respects was unlikely to be punished. But the rule on overbreadth nonetheless strikes down the order.
Moreover, the restrictions were specifically extended to the “Regents of the University of California and their agents and employees and to the Associated Students of the Univ'eristy of California, their members and affiliated organizations.” Literally applied, this restricted students and faculty; not parties to the pending action, from discussing among themselves events and issues of great and immediate concern to them, whenever newsmen might be present. The prohibition of release “directly or indirectly” could have this effect even if publicity were neither sought nor anticipated.
However provocative the words of defendants, they can be punished only if the order is valid. Disagreement with the words spoken does not warrant limiting the freedom to speak them. Unpleasant as it is to me to deprive defendants of the limited martyrdom for which they seemed so anxious, I would reverse the judgment and direct the municipal court to sustain the demurrer.
Appellants’ petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied May 14, 1969. Peters, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.