Court Opinion

ID: 9864360
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 12:53:54.256485+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:10:32.965988
License: Public Domain

Robins, J., on rehearing. There is no dispute as to the principles of law governing this case. The only question is one of fact, and that is confined within narrow limits and apparently should be of easy solution. The fact situation is one about which there -ought to be no room for argument, for the means of making it certain at the trial below were available to both sides. A correct map of the lands involved in this suit and other adjacent lands of appellee, showing houses, fences and other artificial monuments would have furnished the answer to the question of fact about which the uncertainty has arisen. A mail was introduced in evidence, but it did not show these structures, and the testimony of witnesses who indicated location of objects on this map as “here” was, no doubt, helpful to the lower court, but we have only the map and the record of what these witnesses said; and we have had difficulty in ascertaining where the pointed out locations were. There seems to be no dispute that appellee originally owned the entire 160 acre tract, which was a part of a larger tract, known as the Taylor plantation, owned by appellee. It is also conceded that the tax sale through which appellant Nall obtained his title was void; and the sole reliance of appellant to sustain his claim is possession for two years under his void deed from the State, winch, he asserts, vests title in him under the provisions of § 8925, Pope’s Digest. Appellee concedes, and the lower court found, that appellant had shown such possession as to 70 acres. The sole issue in this case then is: Had the appellant such possession of the remaining 90 acres as to give him title thereto under the two-year statute, supral Appellant does not claim that he has had actual possession of said 90 acres or that it has ever been enclosed with the 70 acre tract. But on his behalf it is insisted that, since he has had actual possession of part of the 160 acre tract conveyed to him, he has during the same time had constructive possession of the remainder of the land described in his deed. The lower court found that appellant had not had such constructive possession, but, on the contrary, appellee had all the while had actual possession of the 90 acres. From a careful review of the record we cannot say that this finding is against the preponderance of the testimony. The testimony of appellee tended to show that the entire 160 acre tract, along with other lands, was enclosed by fence owned by appellee and fence of a fencing district to which he liad joined, and that all this 'land, except the 70 acre tract, was used regularly as a. pasture by appellee. Appellant admitted that appellee’s cattle were pastured in the 90 acre tract, and appellee’s theory of the matter is somewhat strengthened by the fact that, after this suit was begun, appellee, at appellant’s request, built fences along the boundary of the 70 acre tract awarded to appellant for the purpose of protecting appellant’s crops from the ravages of appellee’s cattle. Now it is difficult to understand'why, if appellant had been in possession of the entire 160 acre tract, appellant would have asked for a fence to protect part of his land from depredations of appellee’s cattle roaming on another part of appellant’s land. Appellee claims and the lower court found that appellee had been in possession of the 90 acres; but assuming that neither of the parties had actual possession, appellee, having the superior title, must be deemed to have been in possession. 2 C. J. S. 800. Since the decree of the lower court is not shown to be contrary to the weight of the testimony, the rehearing must be granted and the decree of the lower court affirmed.