Court Opinion

ID: 9946571
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-29 21:02:43.733061+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:24:54.449813
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

    RALPH DORSEY,1                           §
                                             § No. 38, 2024
     Petitioner Below,                       §
     Appellant,                              § Court Below—Family Court
                                             § of the State of Delaware
     v.                                      § File No. CN22-02379
                                             § Petition No. 22-11199
    DAPHNE DORSEY,                           §
                                             §
     Respondent Below,                       §
     Appellee.                               §

    RALPH DORSEY,                            §
                                             § No. 40, 2024
     Petitioner Below,                       §
     Appellant,                              § Court Below—Family Court
                                             § of the State of Delaware
     v.                                      § File No. CN22-02379
                                             § Petition No. 22-11199
    DAPHNE DORSEY,                           §
                                             §
     Respondent Below,                       §
     Appellee.                               §

1
 The Court previously assigned pseudonyms to the parties in these appeals under Supreme Court
Rule 7(d).
RALPH DORSEY,                          §
                                       § No. 70, 2024
   Petitioner Below,                   §
   Appellant,                          § Court Below—Family Court
                                       § of the State of Delaware
   v.                                  § File No. CN22-02379
                                       § Petition No. 22-11199
DAPHNE DORSEY,                         §
                                       §
   Respondent Below,                   §
   Appellee.                           §

RALPH DORSEY,                          §
                                       § No. 71, 2024
   Petitioner Below,                   §
   Appellant,                          § Court Below—Family Court
                                       § of the State of Delaware
   v.                                  § File No. CN22-02379
                                       § Petition No. 22-11199
DAPHNE DORSEY,                         §
                                       §
   Respondent Below,                   §
   Appellee.                           §

Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and GRIFFITHS, Justices.

                                    ORDER

        (1)    This order addresses four appeals filed by the appellant (“Ex-

Husband”) against the appellee (“Ex-Wife”). We first summarize the relevant

background and then address the disposition of each appeal in turn. In sum, Appeal

Nos. 38 and 40, 2024, are dismissed and interlocutory Appeal Nos. 70 and 71, 2024,

are refused.
                                        2
                                         Background

       (2)    Ex-Husband filed a petition for divorce in April 2022. He did not

request ancillary relief. Ex-Wife did not respond, and on August 30, 2022, the

Family Court entered a divorce decree (the “Original Decree”). On March 20, 2023,

Ex-Wife filed a motion seeking to reopen ancillary matters under Family Court Rule

of Civil Procedure 60(b).2 Among other grounds for relief, Ex-Wife asserted that

she had not been served with the divorce petition and that she was unaware of the

divorce proceeding until September 2022, after the Family Court had entered the

Original Decree. Ex-Husband opposed reopening, arguing that Ex-Wife had not

established that she was entitled to relief under Rule 60(b) because, among other

things, she had received notices of the proceedings at a New Jersey address that she

provided and her participation in various court matters in Delaware and New Jersey

demonstrated that she was aware of the divorce proceeding.

       (3)    At the conclusion of an evidentiary hearing on the Rule 60(b) motion

on September 20, 2023, the Family Court orally granted the motion. On September

22, 2023, the Family Court entered a written order (the “Ancillary Reopening

Order”)3 that granted the motion for the reasons stated on the record. The Ancillary

2
  It appears that Ex-Husband has been represented by counsel since the outset of the Family Court
proceedings, and Ex-Wife has been represented by counsel in the Family Court proceedings since
March 18, 2023. To be clear, the numerous filings described in this order were filed by counsel
on the parties’ behalf.
3
  The Ancillary Reopening Order is one of the orders from which Ex-Husband filed the notices of
appeal at issue.
                                               3
Reopening Order directed Ex-Wife to file her request for reservation of jurisdiction

over ancillary matters, including name change, within twenty days, after which the

court would enter a scheduling order regarding ancillary relief. Ex-Wife then filed

a “Notice for Ancillary Jurisdiction,” requesting that the court retain jurisdiction

over property division, alimony, attorneys’ fees, and court costs and that the court

permit Ex-Wife to change her name. Ex-Husband objected, asserting that a valid

and enforceable “reconciliation agreement” (the “Separation Agreement”)4

governed property-division issues and limited the scope of ancillary matters that

could be subject to court resolution solely to the issue of alimony.

       (4)    On October 5, 2023, the Family Court entered an order retaining

jurisdiction over property division, alimony, attorneys’ fees, and court costs;

providing that the court would issue a new divorce decree incorporating by reference

the Separation Agreement and changing Ex-Wife’s name; and stating that the

incorporation of the Separation Agreement into the divorce decree “shall not be

construed as an admission by [Ex-Husband] as to its enforceability, which [Ex-

Husband] retains the right to contest on proper application.” That same day, the

Family Court entered an “Amended Final Decree” of divorce (the “Amended

4
  The parties dispute whether the agreement is a “separation agreement” or a “reconciliation
agreement” and the legal effect of such distinction. By referring to it as the “Separation
Agreement,” we do not intend any substantive determination of those issues; we have selected that
terminology merely to correspond to the title of Ex-Wife’s motion seeking to set aside the
agreement, which is discussed below.
                                               4
Decree”) that incorporated the Separation Agreement, changed Ex-Wife’s name, and

stated that the effective date of the decree was October 5, 2023.

       (5)    Ex-Husband filed two motions for reargument or relief from judgment

in October 2023. In the first motion (“First Motion”), which appears to have been

filed after the Family Court issued the Ancillary Reopening Order but before the

court issued the Amended Decree (or before Ex-Husband was aware of the Amended

Decree), Ex-Husband argued that the court should not have reopened ancillary

matters or, at most, should have reopened solely as to alimony. In the second motion

(“Second Motion”), which appears to have been filed after Ex-Husband received the

Amended Decree, Ex-Husband argued that the court inadvertently or mistakenly

changed the effective date of the divorce and that the Amended Decree should be

dated effective August 30, 2022, the date of the Original Decree.5 Ex-Wife filed an

opposition to the First Motion; she does not appear to have responded to the Second

Motion. Around the same time, Ex-Wife also filed a motion to set aside the

Separation Agreement, which Ex-Husband opposed.

       (6)    On January 24, 2024, the Family Court entered an order (the “January

Order”)6 that addressed several of the outstanding motions. First, the court denied

5
  As discussed below, Ex-Husband later informed the court that he had remarried in September
2023. His motion filed in October 2023 did not so inform the court, however.
6
  The January Order is one of the orders from which Ex-Husband filed the notices of appeal at
issue.
                                             5
Ex-Husband’s motion for reargument or relief from judgment as to the Amended

Decree. The court held that the motion was an untimely attempt to relitigate the

September 22, 2023 Ancillary Reopening Order and that Ex-Husband had not

established entitlement to relief under Rule 60(b). The substance of the court’s

ruling focused primarily on Ex-Husband’s First Motion for reargument and not on

his Second Motion, which related to the Amended Decree’s effect on the date of

divorce. Although the court did note Ex-Husband’s argument regarding the date,

the court did not change the date of the Amended Decree at that time. Second, the

court granted Ex-Wife’s motion to set aside the Separation Agreement, concluding

that the agreement should be set aside as unconscionable. Finally, the court

addressed another motion, filed by Ex-Wife, that does not appear to be at issue in

these appeals.

      (7)   On January 30, 2024, Ex-Husband filed a motion for reargument or

relief from judgment as to the January Order (the “Third Motion”). In the Third

Motion, Ex-Husband argued that the Second Motion—the motion that sought to

address the date of the Amended Decree—was not untimely, because it was filed

eight days after the entry of the Amended Decree, when the court first changed the

date of divorce. The Third Motion also asserted substantive reasons why the

Amended Decree erroneously changed the date of the divorce. Like the Second

                                        6
Motion, the Third Motion did not inform the Family Court that Ex-Husband had

remarried in September 2023.

                                          The Appeals

       (8)     On January 31, 2024, Ex-Husband filed two appeals. The notice of

appeal in No. 38, 2024, identifies the Ancillary Reopening Order and the January

Order as the subjects of the appeal. It appears that Ex-Husband’s counsel intends

Appeal No. 38, 2024, to challenge the Family Court’s decision to reopen ancillary

matters.7 The notice of appeal in No. 40, 2024, identifies only the January Order as

the subject of the appeal. It appears that Ex-Husband’s counsel intends Appeal No.

40, 2024, to relate to the portion of the January Order that granted Ex-Wife’s motion

to set aside the Separation Agreement.8 The Senior Clerk of this Court issued notices

to show cause why each of these two appeals should not be dismissed for “failure to

comply with Rule 42 when taking an appeal from an apparent interlocutory order.”

       (9)     On or about February 4, 2024—after this Court issued the notices to

show cause in the first two appeals, but before Ex-Husband responded to them—Ex-

Husband also filed in the Family Court two applications for certification of

7
  See Dorsey v. Dorsey, No. 38, 2024, Docket Entry No. 1, Notice of Appeal (Del. filed Jan. 31,
2024) (stating that appellant appeals “from the orders of the Family Court . . . dated September 22,
2023 and January 24, 2024 in case number 22-111999 (Motion to Reopen Pursuant to Rule
60(b))”).
8
  See Dorsey v. Dorsey, No. 40, 2024, Docket Entry No. 1, Notice of Appeal (Del. filed Jan. 31,
2024) (stating that appellant appeals “from the order of the Family Court . . . dated January 24,
2024 in case number 22-11199 (Motion to Set-Aside the Parties Separation Agreement)”).
                                                 7
interlocutory appeal. Ex-Wife opposed certification. In a letter dated February 7,

2024, Ex-Husband’s counsel informed the Family Court—for the first time—that

Ex-Husband had remarried in September 2023 and again asked the Family Court to

address the issue of the date of the Amended Decree.9

       (10) The Family Court denied the applications for certification of

interlocutory appeal on February 15, 2024. The court also entered an order, nunc

pro tunc, rescinding the Amended Decree and correcting the Original Decree to

allow Ex-Wife’s name change and to incorporate the Separation Agreement into the

divorce decree. To implement that order, the court issued an “Amended Final

Decree” bearing the date of August 30, 2022, providing for the name change, and

reflecting the incorporation of the Separation Agreement (the “Current Decree”).

       (11) On February 20, 2024, Ex-Husband filed two notices of interlocutory

appeal in this Court. Like the notice of appeal in No. 38, 2024, the notice of

interlocutory appeal in No. 70, 2024, identifies the Ancillary Reopening Order and

the January Order as the subjects of the appeal and appears intended to challenge the

reopening of the ancillary matters. And like the notice of appeal in No. 40, 2024,

the notice of interlocutory appeal in No. 71, 2024, identifies the January Order as

9
 The letter stated that Ex-Husband advised counsel “today [February 7, 2024] that he remarried
on September 13, 2023 over a year after the original decree was entered and approximately 3 weeks
before the decree was amended to October 5, 202[3].”
                                               8
the subject of the appeal and appears intended to relate to the portion of the January

Order that granted Ex-Wife’s motion to set aside the Separation Agreement.

           Appeal Nos. 38 and 70, 2024—Reopening of Ancillary Matters

       (12) In response to the notice to show cause in No. 38, 2024, Ex-Husband

asserts that the appeal “concerns the Family Court’s decision to grant [Ex-Wife’s]

motion [to] have ancillary matters reopened pursuant to Rule 60(b).” He contends

that the Family Court could not reopen ancillary matters under Rule 60(b) because

that rule applies only to reopen a judgment or order. He reasons that, because there

was no judgment or order regarding ancillary matters, there was nothing to reopen

under Rule 60(b). Moreover, he contends that the effect of the Family Court’s

decisions was to allow Ex-Wife to pursue ancillary relief after the entry of a final

divorce decree, in violation of 13 Del. C. § 1518(c).10 Ex-Husband also asserts

various arguments as to the Amended Decree’s change in the effective date of the

divorce.11 In response, Ex-Wife argues that an order reopening ancillary matters is

not a final, appealable order because such an order does not clearly declare the trial

court’s intention that it be the court’s final act in the case.

10
   See 13 Del. C. § 1518(c) (“In the decree granting or denying a petition for divorce or annulment,
or by separate order or orders preceding or following such decree, the Court shall dispose of all
other prayers for relief, where appropriate under the facts and law; but an application for such
relief and a hearing thereon must be presented in the petition or response, or by motion after notice
to the other party prior to the entry or denial of such decree.”).
11
   As stated above, the Family Court has rescinded the Amended Decree and issued the Current
Decree, with an effective date of August 30, 2022, the date of the Original Decree.
                                                 9
       (13) “An aggrieved party can appeal to this Court, as a matter of right, only

after a final judgment is entered by the trial court.”12 “[A]n order is deemed final

and appealable if the decision is the trial court’s last act in disposing of all justiciable

matters within its jurisdiction.”13 In appeals from Family Court, “the final order

granting a divorce decree and a final order regarding ancillary relief are severable.”14

Title 13, Section 1518(a) provides:

       A decree granting or denying a petition for divorce or annulment is final
       when entered, subject to the right of appeal. An appeal that does not
       challenge the decree of divorce or annulment, but challenges only
       rulings with respect to relief awarded under other sections of this
       chapter, or other matters incidental or collateral to such decree, shall
       not delay the finality of the decree of divorce or annulment, and the
       parties may remarry while the appeal is pending.15

“When the Family Court retains jurisdiction to consider requests for ancillary relief,

following the entry of a divorce decree, each final ruling on a request for a specific

type of ancillary relief is directly and separately appealable to this Court.”16 But

“[a]ll rulings that are made within the context of a particular ancillary proceeding

are not necessarily final.”17 For example, “an award of interim alimony is clearly

not a final ruling on an ancillary application for alimony.”18 “An appeal from an

12
   Lipson v. Lipson, 799 A.2d 345, 347 (Del. 2001).
13
   Id. at 348.
14
   Id. at 347.
15
   13 Del. C. § 1518(a).
16
   Lipson, 799 A.2d at 347.
17
   Id.
18
   Id.
                                              10
interlocutory ruling, which is made within the course of deciding a particular request

for ancillary relief, is subject to the requirements of Supreme Court Rule 42.”19

       (14) After careful consideration, we have determined that Appeal No. 38,

2024, is interlocutory and must be dismissed for failure to comply with Rule 42. The

appeal challenges the Family Court’s decision to reopen ancillary matters. That

decision was not final and appealable, because it left the substance of ancillary

matters to be litigated and decided. Thus, the proper vehicles for Ex-Husband to

seek this Court’s review of his arguments that the Family Court erroneously

reopened ancillary matters are either (i) an appeal from a final decision on the

ancillary matters;20 or (ii) a procedurally proper interlocutory appeal. Because

Appeal No. 38, 2024, is neither of those, it is dismissed.

       (15) In Appeal No. 70, 2024, Ex-Husband has petitioned this Court under

Supreme Court Rule 42 to accept an interlocutory appeal from the Family Court’s

decision granting Ex-Wife’s motion to reopen ancillary matters. In his application

for certification of an interlocutory appeal, Ex-Husband argued that the Family Court

should certify the appeal because (i) the Family Court’s decision involves a question

19
   Id.
20
   See, e.g., Ravine v. Ravine, 2006 WL 453213 (Del. Feb. 22, 2006) (addressing wife’s arguments
that Family Court erroneously granted husband’s motion to reopen the divorce to enable husband
to request alimony, in appeal taken following Family Court’s final judgment awarding husband
alimony); Flood v. Flood, 1993 WL 22038 (Del. Jan. 22, 1993) (holding that Family Court abused
its discretion by granting wife’s motion to reopen the divorce so that the court could divide marital
property, in appeal taken by husband following Family Court’s final judgment ordering that the
property at issue be sold at auction).
                                                 11
of first impression;21 (ii) the decision sustained the controverted jurisdiction of the

Family Court;22 (iii) the decision opened a judgment of the trial court;23 and (iv) Ex-

Husband’s success on appeal would terminate the litigation.24 The Family Court

denied certification, concluding that it had not decided a substantial issue of material

importance that merits appellate review before a final judgment.25

       (16) We conclude that interlocutory review is not warranted in this case.

Applications for interlocutory review are addressed to the sound discretion of this

Court.26 Importantly, we reiterate that the Family Court has rescinded the Amended

Decree and reinstated the date of divorce from the Original Decree. Thus, continued

proceedings on ancillary matters do not appear to leave a cloud over the validity of

Ex-Husband’s second marriage. With that issue having been addressed by the

Family Court, it seems that the parties’ dispute—which raises intertwining legal,

procedural, and factual issues as to the standards that apply to a post-divorce request

for ancillary relief when there may or may not be an enforceable contract between

the parties27—can best and most efficiently be resolved after the Family Court enters

21
   DEL. SUPR. CT. R. 42(b)(iii)(A).
22
   Id. R. 42(b)(iii)(D).
23
   Id. R. 42(b)(iii)(F).
24
   Id. R. 42(b)(iii)(G).
25
   Id. R. 42(b)(i).
26
   Id. R. 42(d)(v).
27
   See generally Rockwell v. Rockwell, 681 A.2d 1017 (Del. 1996) (holding that modification of
the alimony provisions of a separation agreement that was incorporated into a final divorce decree
is subject to statutory standard for modification if the alimony was judicially determined but is
controlled by contract principles if the alimony was determined by an agreement of the parties that
                                                12
a final judgment on the ancillary matters. Thus, exceptional circumstances that

would merit interlocutory review of the Family Court’s decisions do not exist in this

case,28 and the application for interlocutory review does not meet the strict standards

for certification under Supreme Court Rule 42(b).

      Appeal Nos. 40 and 71, 2024—Setting Aside of Separation Agreement

       (17) In response to the notice to show cause in No. 40, 2024, Ex-Husband

asserts that the Family Court’s decision to set aside the Separation Agreement

equates to an entry of a declaratory judgment in Ex-Wife’s favor and is therefore

final and appealable. Ex-Wife concedes that a declaratory judgment “can be” a final,

appealable order if it disposes of all the issues in a case and leaves nothing for future

determination or consideration. But she asserts that the Family Court’s decision

granting Ex-Wife’s motion to set aside the Separation Agreement is not such a final

judgment, but rather is a “factual determination made on the enforceability of the

agreement” and “was not intended to be case dispositive or the court’s final act.”

was made an order of the court); Sanders v. Sanders, 570 A.2d 1189 (Del. 1990) (holding, before
statutory amendment to subject-matter jurisdiction of Family Court, 67 Del. Laws ch. 446
(approved Oct. 5, 1990), that Family Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over an independent
action for contractual rescission and ancillary relief when the agreement was not merged into the
divorce decree and the action was not part of divorce proceedings and followed the parties’
divorce, but stating that wife was not without a remedy because she could seek to reopen the
divorce to seek ancillary relief).
28
   DEL. SUPR. CT. R. 42(b)(ii). Cf. Goode v. Goode, 2024 WL 807334 (Del. Feb. 27, 2024)
(refusing interlocutory appeal from order denying ex-husband’s motion to dismiss petition for
specific performance of separation agreement filed by ex-wife).
                                               13
Ex-Wife further argues that the Family Court’s “final act will be the determination

of ancillary matters.”

          (18) After careful consideration of the parties’ positions, the portions of the

January Order relating to the motion to set aside the Separation Agreement, and the

complex procedural posture of this case, we conclude that the Family Court’s

decision to set aside the Separation Agreement is not a final, appealable order and

that Appeal No. 40, 2024, is therefore interlocutory and must be dismissed for failure

to comply with Rule 42. Ex-Husband can assert his challenges to the Family Court’s

determination that the Separation Agreement should be set aside in an appeal from

a final decision on the ancillary matters.

          (19) In Appeal No. 71, 2024, Ex-Husband has petitioned this Court under

Supreme Court Rule 42 to accept an interlocutory appeal from the Family Court’s

decision to set aside the Separation Agreement. In his application for certification

of an interlocutory appeal, Ex-Husband argued that the Family Court should certify

the appeal because the Family Court’s decision involves a question of first

impression,29 which he characterized as “the enforceability of a reconciliation

agreement executed during the marriage which is neither a premari[t]al agreement

nor a[n] agreement resolving ancillary matters following a divorce.” He also

29
     DEL. SUPR. CT. R. 42(b)(iii)(A).
                                             14
asserted that his success on appeal would terminate the litigation,30 “except the issue

of alimony,” and he argued that “probably 90% of the litigation expenses will be

eliminated if property division is not an issue.”31               The Family Court denied

certification, concluding that the interlocutory order did not decide a substantial

issue of material importance that merits appellate review before a final judgment.32

We conclude that interlocutory review is not warranted in this case, for the reasons

discussed above with respect to the refusal of Appeal No. 70, 2024.

       NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED this 29th day of February, 2024, that:

           (i)     Appeal No. 38, 2024, is DISMISSED;

           (ii)    Interlocutory Appeal No. 70, 2024, is REFUSED;

           (iii)   Appeal No. 40, 2024, is DISMISSED;

           (iv)    Interlocutory Appeal No. 71, 2024, is REFUSED; and

30
   Id. R. 42(b)(iii)(G).
31
   He further stated that “[a]ll litigation will be terminated if respondent’s action to reopen the
divorce proceedings is reversed on appeal.” Ex-Husband’s arguments buttress our conclusion that
the issues presented by Ex-Husband’s various appeals are intertwined and should be resolved
together by the Family Court in the first instance.
32
   DEL. SUPR. CT. R. 42(b)(i).
                                                15
           (v)    Ex-Husband’s motion asking this Court to order the Family Court

                  to dismiss Ex-Wife’s motion for interim alimony is DENIED AS

                  MOOT.33

                                             BY THE COURT:

                                             /s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr.
                                                  Chief Justice

33
   The motion asserted that the Family Court lacked jurisdiction to act on the request for interim
alimony while Appeal No. 38, 2024, was pending.
                                               16