Court Opinion

ID: 9957997
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-06 00:06:51.38697+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:17:39.348375
License: Public Domain

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
                       Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

                              STATE OF MINNESOTA
                              IN COURT OF APPEALS
                                    A23-0694

                                  State of Minnesota,
                                     Respondent,

                                          vs.

                                 Erik Everett Wenzel,
                                      Appellant.

                                  Filed April 1, 2024
                                       Affirmed
                                    Larson, Judge

                            Otter Tail County District Court
                                File No. 56-CR-21-2116

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Jacob Campion, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Michelle Eldien, Otter Tail County Attorney, Fergus Falls, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sara L. Martin, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

       Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Larson, Judge; and Florey,

Judge. ∗

∗
 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
                           NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

LARSON, Judge

       After a jury trial, appellant Erik Everett Wenzel challenges two convictions for first-

degree criminal sexual conduct under Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(a), (g) (2014).

Wenzel argues the district court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for

in camera review of the victim’s medical records, sustained the state’s objection to

testimony about his alleged medical condition, and denied his motion for a Schwartz

hearing. 1 Wenzel also argues the district court erred when it entered judgment for two

first-degree criminal-sexual-conduct convictions. We affirm.

                                          FACTS

       In August 2021, the state charged Wenzel with two counts of first-degree criminal

sexual conduct pursuant Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(a), (g). 2 We derive the following

facts from the evidence presented at trial.

       The victim, I.M., was born in 2010. Wenzel was married to I.M.’s aunt, and they

lived on a 20-acre property in Otter Tail County. The couple frequently babysat I.M. and

1
  A Schwartz hearing is a proceeding in which a district court determines whether a guilty
verdict was the result of juror misconduct. See Schwartz v. Minneapolis Suburban Bus
Co., 104 N.W.2d 301, 303 (Minn. 1960). When a hearing is warranted, “the [district] court
may summon the juror who alleges jury misconduct and permit, with proper safeguards,
an examination to be conducted in the presence of counsel for all interested parties and the
[district court] judge.” Zimmerman v. Witte Transp. Co., 259 N.W.2d 260, 263 (Minn.
1977).
2
  The state also charged Wenzel with two counts of second-degree criminal sexual conduct
pursuant Minn. Stat. § 609.343, subd. 1(a), (g). Although the jury found Wenzel guilty on
these charges, the district court correctly did not enter judgment of conviction because they
were lesser-included offenses. See Minn. Stat. § 609.04 (2014).

                                              2
her siblings for extended overnight visits. I.M. testified that Wenzel sexually assaulted her

multiple times during those visits. As relevant here, I.M. testified that Wenzel sexually

assaulted her in a fish house around the time when she was in first grade (fish-house

incident). I.M. also testified that Wenzel sexually assaulted her in the upstairs of his home

around the time when she was in second grade (upstairs incident). I.M.’s testimony was

corroborated by her mother’s testimony that I.M. described memories consistent with the

two incidents and a social worker’s testimony that I.M. described both incidents during an

interview.

       Before trial, Wenzel moved for the district court to review I.M.’s medical records

in camera to see if they contained information relevant to the case—specifically whether

I.M. had contracted a sexually transmitted infection (STI). In his motion, Wenzel requested

that the district court compel the state to obtain the records. The district court denied

Wenzel’s motion without prejudice, reasoning in part that Wenzel’s request was

procedurally defective because the district court cannot compel the state to access privately

held medical records, and Wenzel had not sought a third-party subpoena for the medical

records. 3

       During trial, Wenzel attempted to testify that he had an STI and wanted to compare

his alleged diagnosis to the lack of evidence that I.M. had the same STI. The state objected,

and the district court sustained the objection. The district court reasoned, in part, that

(1) Wenzel failed to present any expert testimony regarding the STI’s transmission and

3
  After the district court denied his motion, Wenzel never sought a third-party subpoena
for the medical records.

                                             3
(2) the evidence was irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial. The jury found Wenzel guilty on

both first-degree criminal-sexual-conduct counts. The district court then entered two

convictions for those counts.

       The day after trial, a juror emailed the district court, expressing regret that he agreed

to the guilty verdicts. As relevant to the issues raised in this appeal, the juror stated that

the foreman “somehow got us all to agree to convict.” After the district court received the

email, Wenzel moved for a Schwartz hearing. The district court denied his motion.

       The district court sentenced Wenzel concurrently to 144 months in prison on

count I, indicating the sentence was for the fish-house incident, and 180 months in prison

on count II, indicating the sentence was for the upstairs incident. This appeal follows.

                                         DECISION

       Wenzel argues the district court abused its discretion when it made certain pretrial,

evidentiary, and posttrial decisions that warrant a new trial. Wenzel also challenges the

district court’s decision to enter two first-degree criminal-sexual-conduct convictions,

asserting that we should reverse and remand for the district court to vacate one conviction.

We address both issues below.

                                              I.

       Wenzel argues the district court erred when it denied his motion to review I.M.’s

medical records in camera, sustained the state’s objection to testimony about his alleged

STI, and denied his motion for a Schwartz hearing. We review these issues for an abuse

of discretion. State v. Hokanson, 821 N.W.2d 340, 349 (Minn. 2012) (in camera review of

medical records); State v. Larson, 787 N.W.2d 592, 597 (Minn. 2010) (evidentiary rulings);

                                               4
State v. Church, 577 N.W.2d 715, 721 (Minn. 1998) (Schwartz hearing). “A district court

abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is

against logic and the facts in the record.” State v. Hallmark, 927 N.W.2d 281, 291

(Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted).

A.     Medical Records

       Wenzel first argues the district court abused its discretion when it denied his motion

to review I.M.’s medical records in camera. In doing so, Wenzel makes several arguments

regarding whether he made a “plausible showing” that I.M.’s medical records contained

information “material and favorable to his defense.” See State v. Hummel, 483 N.W.2d 68,

72 (Minn. 1992) (quotation omitted). But Wenzel wholly fails to address the district

court’s primary reason for denying his motion: the district court cannot compel the state to

access privately held medical records, and Wenzel failed to seek a third-party subpoena to

access the medical records.

       A valid request for in camera review must comply with the procedural rules to

compel disclosure. See State v. King (In re Program to Aid Victims of Sexual Assault), 943

N.W.2d 673, 676-77 (Minn. App. 2020). Generally, Minn. R. Crim. P. 9.01 provides the

mechanism for a defendant to obtain matters in the state’s possession. See id. at 676. But

when the defendant seeks to compel disclosure of matters held by a third party, the

defendant must comply with Minn. R. Crim. P. 22.02, subd. 2(c), which provides: “A

subpoena requiring the production of privileged or confidential records about a victim . . .

may be served on a third party only by court order.”

                                             5
       In King, the district court ordered a counseling center to produce a victim’s records

after the state failed to obtain the documents. 943 N.W.2d at 675. We granted the

counseling center’s writ of prohibition, preventing the district court from enforcing its

order. Id. at 676-77. We reasoned that, to obtain a victim’s privileged or confidential

records from a third party, the defendant needed to obtain a subpoena under Minn. R. Crim.

P. 22.01, subd. 2(c). Id. Because the defendant failed to do so, the district court lacked the

authority to compel the counseling center to disclose the records. Id. at 677.

       Here, Wenzel requested that the district court compel the state to obtain I.M.’s

privately held medical records. Wenzel did not move for a court-ordered subpoena under

rule 22.02, subdivision 2(c). Consistent with King, the district court denied Wenzel’s

motion without prejudice on the ground that Wenzel had not requested a third-party

subpoena. See id. at 676-77. And after the district court advised Wenzel that a third-party

subpoena was necessary, Wenzel still did not file a motion under rule 22.01,

subdivision 2(c), to seek a subpoena for I.M.’s medical records.

       Because the district court appropriately denied Wenzel’s motion for in camera

review on the ground that he had failed to follow the proper procedure, we conclude the

district court did not abuse its discretion.

B.     STI Testimony

       Wenzel next argues that the district court erred when it sustained the state’s

objection to Wenzel testifying that he had an STI. The district court sustained the state’s

objection on the grounds that the testimony was irrelevant, unfairly prejudicial, and—with

regard to transmissibility of the STI—required an expert opinion. Wenzel argues the

                                               6
evidentiary ruling deprived him of his constitutional right to present a complete defense.

See State v. Richards, 495 N.W.2d 187, 191 (Minn. 1992) (“Under our system of

jurisprudence, every criminal defendant has the right to be treated with fundamental

fairness and afforded a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.” (quotation

omitted)).

       When a “defendant claims that the exclusion of evidence deprived him of his

constitutional right . . . to present a complete defense,” we reverse if the district court’s

abuse of discretion “was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Zumberge, 888

N.W.2d 688, 694 (Minn. 2017). “An error in excluding evidence is harmless only if” we

are “satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that if the evidence had been admitted and the

damaging potential of the evidence had been fully realized, a [reasonable] jury would have

reached the same verdict.” State v. Olsen, 824 N.W.2d 334, 340 (Minn. App. 2012)

(alteration in original) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 27, 2013). Here, even

if the district court had abused its discretion when it excluded Wenzel’s testimony, Wenzel

has failed to show that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The state

presented a robust case against Wenzel. I.M. testified in great detail about the two

incidents. And both I.M.’s mother and a social worker corroborated I.M.’s testimony,

testifying that I.M. previously described the same incidents. Under these circumstances,

we are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that if the evidence had been admitted the jury

would have reached the same verdict.

                                             7
C.     Schwartz Hearing

       Wenzel also argues the district court abused its discretion when it denied his motion

for a Schwartz hearing. Wenzel argues that the juror’s email presented a prima facie case

for a Schwartz hearing because the juror alleged that he compromised his honest beliefs

due to pressure from the foreman. We are not persuaded.

       After trial, a defendant may move to impeach a jury verdict and the district court

may order a hearing to examine jurors “under oath [with] their testimony recorded.” Minn.

R. Crim. P. 26.03, subd. 20(6). This hearing, known as a Schwartz hearing, investigates

“whether a jury verdict is the product of misconduct.” State v. Greer, 635 N.W.2d 82, 93

(Minn. 2001). A defendant is entitled to a Schwartz hearing when they present a prima

facie case that, “standing alone and unchallenged, would warrant the conclusion of jury

misconduct.” State v. Martin, 614 N.W.2d 214, 225-26 (Minn. 2000) (quotation omitted).

       A district court “should be liberal in granting [a Schwartz] hearing.” Zimmerman v.

Witte Transp. Co., 259 N.W.2d 260, 263 (Minn. 1977). Nevertheless, a juror’s testimony

must be admissible under Minn. R. Evid. 606(b). See Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.03, subd. 20(6).

Therefore, to require a hearing, some alignment must exist between the juror’s allegations

and the type of testimony rule 606(b) permits a defendant to elicit. See Martin, 614 N.W.2d

at 226. Under rule 606(b), “a juror may testify” about conduct including “whether

extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury’s attention or

whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror, or as to any

threats of violence or violent acts brought to bear on jurors.” Accordingly, when a juror

alleges that other jurors exerted pressure, but does not allege “threats of violence or violent

                                              8
acts,” a district court does not abuse its discretion when it denies a motion for a Schwartz

hearing. See State v. Jackson, 615 N.W.2d 391, 396 (Minn. App. 2000), rev. denied (Minn.

Oct. 17, 2000); Minn. R. Evid. 606(b) 1989 comm. cmt. (“The [district] court must

distinguish between testimony about ‘psychological’ intimidation, coercion, and

persuasion, which would be inadmissible, as opposed to express acts or threats of

violence.”).

       Here, Wenzel failed to present a prima facie case that “standing alone and

unchallenged” shows juror misconduct. See Martin, 614 N.W.2d at 225-26. The juror’s

email to the district court only asserts that the juror experienced psychological pressure:

“somehow [the foreman] got us all to agree to convict.” The juror did not indicate that he

experienced violence, a threat of violence, or other circumstances he could have testified

about under rule 606(b). 4 See Jackson, 615 N.W.2d at 396. Therefore, we conclude the

district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Wenzel’s motion for a Schwartz

hearing.

                                            II.

       Wenzel alternatively argues that the district court erred when it convicted him of

two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct on the ground that the jury could have

based both guilty verdicts on the same conduct.         See Minn. Stat. § 609.04 (2014)

4
  Wenzel relies heavily on our nonprecedential case State v. Schwendeman, No. A20-0762,
2021 WL 2645468 (Minn. App. June 28, 2021). There, a juror alleged that the court bailiff
instructed the jury during deliberations to “compromise.” Id. at *4. We concluded that the
district court abused its discretion when it denied the defendant’s motion for a Schwartz
hearing because the defendant alleged “someone other than the court [gave] instructions to
the jury.” Id. at *8. Here, the juror did not report any outside influence on the jury.

                                             9
(prohibiting multiple convictions for offenses arising from the same conduct). We review

whether an offense is subject to multiple convictions de novo. State v. Cox, 820 N.W.2d

540, 552 (Minn. 2012). “Upon prosecution for a crime, the actor may be convicted of

either the crime charged or an included offense, but not both.” Minn. Stat. § 609.04,

subd. 1. Minnesota appellate courts have consistently construed section 609.04 to bar

multiple convictions for the same offense stemming from a single act. See, e.g., State v.

Cruz, 997 N.W.2d 537, 556 (Minn. 2023) (vacating, sua sponte, a duplicative second-

degree intentional-murder conviction when defendant was also convicted of first-degree

felony murder stemming from a single killing); State v. Holmes, 778 N.W.2d 336, 340

(Minn. 2010) (“This statute ‘generally forbids two convictions of the same offense . . . on

the basis of the same conduct.’” (quoting State v. Haase, 341 N.W.2d 879, 881 (Minn.

1984))); State v. Spears, 560 N.W.2d 723, 726-27 (Minn. App. 1997) (vacating three of six

convictions of first-degree criminal sexual conduct where convictions were based on three

distinct acts), rev. denied (Minn. May 28, 1997). The bar on multiple convictions for a

single act includes duplicative first-degree criminal-sexual-conduct convictions. See State

v. Bowser, 307 N.W.2d 778, 779 (Minn. 1981).

       Here, the record shows the jury found Wenzel guilty of two counts of first-degree

criminal sexual conduct for separate events. At trial, I.M. testified in detail that the fish-

house and upstairs incidents were separate events that occurred at different times. During

closing argument, the prosecutor explicitly connected count I to the fish-house incident and

count II to the upstairs incident. The jury instructions correlated count I with conduct that

occurred during the fish-house incident and count II with conduct that occurred during the

                                             10
upstairs incident. And upon convicting Wenzel, the district court stated on the record that

it premised Wenzel’s sentence for count I on the fish-house incident and his sentence for

count II on the upstairs incident. Therefore, the record clearly shows the jury based its

guilty verdicts on, and the district court entered convictions of, separate acts. 5 We conclude

the district court did not err when it imposed two convictions.

       Affirmed.

5
  To the extent Wenzel separately argued the district court erred when it imposed two
sentences for his first-degree criminal-sexual-conduct convictions, we also conclude the
record shows the district court sentenced Wenzel for offenses arising out of two separate
behavioral incidents under Minn. Stat. § 609.035 (2014). See State v. Barthman, 938
N.W.2d 257, 265-66 (Minn. 2020).

                                              11