Court Opinion

ID: 9889581
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-10 18:08:49.62208+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:18.223627
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/10/23 In re Luis M. CA2/7
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION SEVEN

In re LUIS M. et al., Persons                                B318632
Coming Under the Juvenile Court
Law.                                                          (Los Angeles County
                                                              Super. Ct. No. 21CCJP03959B-E)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

         Plaintiff and Appellant.

         v.

LUIS M.,

         Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Nancy Ramirez, Judge. Dismissed.
     Cristina Gabrielidis, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Jessica S. Mitchell, Senior Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
                    _______________________

                        INTRODUCTION

       Luis M. (Luis Sr.), father of minor children Luis M.,
Katelynn M., Julian M., and Alexa M., appeals from the juvenile
court’s February 18, 2022 jurisdiction findings and disposition
orders declaring his four minor children dependents of the court,
removing them from him and placing them with their mother
with monitored visits, and ordering him to complete a drug and
alcohol program and sex abuse awareness counseling. The
juvenile court sustained a petition under Welfare and
Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b)(1), (d) and (j),1
finding that: (1) Katelynn was sexually abused by a neighbor in
Luis Sr.’s presence while Luis Sr. was sleeping after becoming
intoxicated; (2) Luis Sr. stated he was diabetic and was aware
that he gets intoxicated quickly by alcohol; (3) Luis Sr. should
have known that his intoxication would disable him from the
ability to protect Katelynn; and (4) Katelynn’s abuse and her
parents’ failure to protect put her siblings at substantial risk of
being abused and neglected. The juvenile court dismissed
additional allegations under section 300, subdivision (b)(1), that
Luis Sr. currently abused methamphetamine and amphetamine,
rendering him incapable of providing regular care for the

1     Further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.

                                 2
children, because there was no established nexus between his use
of methamphetamine and his ability to protect the children.
       While this appeal was pending, on May 19, 2023 the
juvenile court held a review hearing under section 364 and
terminated its jurisdiction with orders terminating family
preservation services and releasing the minor children to both
parents. Luis Sr. did not appeal from these orders, nor did the
Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services
(Department).
       Because we cannot provide Luis Sr. any effective relief—
that is, relief that “can have a practical, tangible impact on the
parties’ conduct or legal status” (In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266,
277)—we conclude his appeal is moot. In addition, after
considering the factors the Supreme Court identified in
In re D.P., we decline to exercise our discretion to consider Luis
Sr.’s moot appeal on its merits. The Department conceded its
cross-appeal was moot and does not ask for discretionary review.
Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal and the cross-appeal.

      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

      Luis Sr. and Sandra B. are the parents of minor children
Luis (born March 2010), Katelynn (born November 2011), Julian
(born January 2016), and Alexa (born October 2018).2 A prior
referral to the Department in December 2012 alleged the parents
emotionally abused and neglected their children, and that Luis
sustained injuries falling off a bicycle while not properly

2     Sandra’s older daughter Karla M. (born October 2003) was
named in the relevant petition but turned 18 years old during the
juvenile court proceedings and is not a subject of this appeal.

                                 3
supervised. Those allegations of emotional abuse and neglect
were deemed inconclusive.
       In July 2021 the Department received a referral alleging
that Sandra neglected Katelynn and that a neighbor of the
family, Renee L., had sexually abused nine-year-old Katelynn in
October 2020. According to the police report and social worker
interviews, Katelynn stated her parents had been drinking with
Renee most of the night, and Luis Sr. had “passed out” at an
outdoor table at their home. Katelynn was sitting next to her
intoxicated father “comforting him,” when Renee sat down beside
her and began feeling her body and touching her breasts and
private area, stopping whenever her mother came into the room,
then Renee began kissing Katelynn’s face. Sandra returned to
the room and observed Renee kissing Katelynn and fondling her;
she slapped Renee and told him to leave. Sandra did not inform
Luis Sr. of the abuse until July 2021 because she feared he would
act violently toward Renee, and she continued to permit Renee to
attend family gatherings but did not leave Katelynn
unsupervised with Renee. When Luis Sr. finally learned what
had occurred, he immediately reported it to the police.
       In August 2021 the Department filed a section 300 petition
on behalf of Karla, Luis, Katelynn, Julian, and Alexa alleging the
minors needed the protection of the juvenile court based on
Katelynn being sexually abused by Renee, Sandra’s failure to
protect the child by allowing Renee to frequent the home despite
knowing he had sexually abused Katelynn, and Luis Sr.’s failure
to protect the child because he was intoxicated during the sexual
abuse. The petition further alleged Luis Sr. was a current abuser
of methamphetamine and amphetamine, which rendered him
incapable of providing regular care and supervision of the

                                4
children; on prior occasions, he was under the influence of alcohol
and intoxicated while the children were in his care and
supervision; he had a criminal history of an arrest for
possession/transport of a controlled substance; and Sandra failed
to protect the children from his substance abuse.
       The juvenile court ordered the children detained from
Luis Sr. with monitored visitation and released the children to
Sandra. In doing so, the court noted with regard to the sexual
abuse that “the background of this event was that father was
passed out drunk and his nine-year-old daughter [Katelynn] was
outside taking care of him when the event occurred.” The court
stated, “I think it’s pretty clear that an important issue, if not the
most important issue in this case, is father’s drinking and drug
use. Also, obviously making sure that this child is protected from
anything similar ever happening again, and the child receives
some support to help her deal with what did happen back in
October [2020].”
       On February 18, 2022 the juvenile court held a combined
jurisdiction and disposition hearing, declared the children
dependents of the court under section 300, and sustained the
petition on the sexual abuse-related counts under section 300,
subdivisions (b)(1), (d), and (j), as pleaded. For each subdivision,
the court sustained the same allegation, as follows: “On a prior
occasion in October 2020, the child Katelynn M[.] was sexually
abused by Renee L[.], . . . the unrelated adult male fondled the
child’s breast, kissed the child’s face and lips, while the unrelated
adult male placed his hands on the child’s lap. The children’s
mother Sandra B[.], knew of the sexual abuse of the child
Katelynn by the unrelated adult male and failed to protect the
child in that mother continued to allow the unrelated adult male

                                  5
to frequent the home and [have] unlimited access to the child.
The child’s father Luis M[.] failed to protect the child as the
father was intoxicated during the sexual abuse of the child
Katelynn by the unrelated adult male. The sexual abuse of the
child Katelynn by the unrelated adult male and the mother and
father’s failure to protect the child Katelynn, endangers the
child’s physical health and safety and places the child, and the
child’s siblings, Karla M[.], Luis M[.], Katelynn M[.], Julian M[.]
and Alexa M[.], at risk of serious physical harm, damage, danger,
sexual abuse, and failure to protect.”
       The juvenile court dismissed the counts related to Luis Sr.’s
substance abuse and Sandra’s failure to protect the children from
his substance abuse under section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (j).
The court concluded the Department “has not established a nexus
between [Luis Sr.’s] use of methamphetamine and his ability to
protect the children. The court notes that it also mentioned that
[Luis Sr.] was under the influence of alcohol while the children
were in his care at the time of the sex abuse incident; however,
the court has sustained count b-1 with regard to that. The court
is finding no nexus between [Luis Sr.’s] drug use and placing the
children at risk of harm.”
       The juvenile court ordered the children removed from Luis
Sr. and released to Sandra with monitored visitation and family
maintenance services. The court ordered Luis Sr. to complete a
full drug and alcohol program with aftercare; random or on-
demand testing every other week; a 12-step program with a court
card and sponsor; a developmentally appropriate parenting
program; sex abuse awareness counseling; individual counseling;
and a psychological evaluation.

                                 6
       Luis Sr. timely appealed from the juvenile court’s
jurisdiction findings and disposition orders with respect to
Katelynn, Luis, Julian, and Alexa. The Department cross-
appealed from the same findings and orders, contending the
petition should also have been sustained as to Luis Sr.’s
substance abuse.
       While these appeals were pending, on May 19, 2023 the
juvenile court held a review hearing under section 364 and
terminated its jurisdiction with orders terminating family
preservation services and releasing the minor children to both
parents. No party appealed from these orders.

                          DISCUSSION

A.     The Mootness Doctrine in Dependency Appeals
       “A court is tasked with the duty “‘to decide actual
controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and
not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions,
or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the
matter in issue in the case before it.’”” (In re D.P., supra,
14 Cal.5th at p. 276.) In dependency cases, the reviewing court
decides on a case-by-case basis whether subsequent events in a
juvenile dependency matter render a case moot and whether the
court’s decision would affect the outcome of a subsequent
proceeding. (Ibid.)
       A dependency case becomes moot when events “‘“render[ ] it
impossible for [a] court, if it should decide the case in favor of
plaintiff, to grant him any effect[ive] relief.”’” (In re D.P., supra,
14 Cal.5th at p. 276; see In re N.S. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 53, 60
[“the critical factor in considering whether a dependency appeal

                                  7
is moot is whether the appellate court can provide any effective
relief if it finds reversible error”].) To show the reviewing court
can provide effective relief, the appellant first “must complain of
an ongoing harm. Second, the harm must be redressable or
capable of being rectified by the outcome [the appellant] seeks.”
(In re D.P., at p. 276.)
       In In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th 266, the Supreme Court
explained that “relief is effective when it ‘can have a practical,
tangible impact on the parties’ conduct or legal status.’
[Citation.] It follows that, to show a need for effective relief, the
plaintiff must first demonstrate that he or she has suffered from
a change in legal status. Although a jurisdictional finding that a
parent engaged in abuse or neglect of a child is generally
stigmatizing, complaining of ‘stigma’ alone is insufficient to
sustain an appeal. The stigma must be paired with some effect
on the plaintiff’s legal status that is capable of being redressed by
a favorable court decision.” (Id. at p. 277.) Example of non-moot
cases include where a jurisdiction finding affected parental
custody rights, curtailed a parent’s contact with his or her child,
or resulted in disposition orders that continued to adversely
affect a parent. (Id. at pp. 277-278.) The Court held “speculative
future harm” is not sufficient to avoid mootness. (Id. at p. 278.)
By contrast, “when a parent has demonstrated a specific legal or
practical consequence that will be averted upon reversal,” then
“the case is not moot, and merits review is required.” (Id. at
p. 283.)

                                  8
       “When a parent has not made such a showing, the case is
moot, but the court has discretion to decide the merits
nevertheless.” (In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 283, see id. at
p. 282 [reviewing court has “‘inherent discretion’” to reach the
merits of an appeal even where case is moot].) “Because
dismissal of an appeal for mootness operates as an affirmance of
the underlying judgment or order [citation], such dismissals may
‘“ha[ve] the undesirable result of insulating erroneous or
arbitrary rulings from review”’ [citation].” (Id., at p. 285.) A
reviewing court decides on a case-by-case basis whether to reach
the merits of a moot appeal. (Id. at p. 287.)
       Courts generally only exercise their discretion to review a
moot case “when ‘the case presents an issue of broad public
interest that is likely to recur,’ ‘when there may be a recurrence
of the controversy between the parties,’ or ‘when a material
question remains for the court’s determination.’” (In re D.P.,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 282.) Dependency appeals, however, are
uniquely prone to mootness problems (see id. at pp. 284-285
[discussing common factors rendering dependency appeals
moot]), and often “[p]arents may appeal an order that is later
changed, or jurisdiction over the child may terminate before an
appeal is finally resolved, as in this case.” (Id. at p. 285.)
Accordingly, the Supreme Court identified several additional
factors reviewing courts may consider (but are not limited to
considering) when deciding whether discretionary review of a
moot dependency case is warranted. (Id. at pp. 284-286.)
       Courts may consider, for example, (1) whether the
challenged jurisdiction finding could impact current or future
dependency proceedings, by influencing a child protective
agency’s decision to file a new dependency petition or a juvenile

                                 9
court’s determination about whether to order further
reunification services. (In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 285.)
Reviewing courts, in deciding whether discretionary review is
warranted, also may consider (2) “whether the jurisdictional
finding is based on particularly pernicious or stigmatizing
conduct.” (Id. at pp. 285-286, citing In re M.W. (2015)
238 Cal.App.4th 1444, 1452, and In re L.O. (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th
227, 237.) The “more egregious the findings against the parent,
the greater the parent’s interest in challenging such findings.”
(In re D.P., at p. 286.) And, a court may consider (3) “why the
appeal became moot.” (Ibid.) For example, it may serve the
interest of justice to review a parent’s appeal where a case is
moot “because one parent appealed and not the other, but the
findings against the parent who has appealed are based on more
serious conduct,” or “where a parent does not challenge all
jurisdictional findings, but only one finding involving particularly
severe conduct.” (Ibid.) “Principles of fairness” also may favor
discretionary review of cases rendered moot “by the prompt
compliance or otherwise laudable behavior of the parent
challenging the jurisdictional finding on appeal.” (Ibid.)
       In deciding whether to exercise their discretion, reviewing
courts “should be guided by the overarching goals of the
dependency system: ‘to provide maximum safety and protection
for children’ with a ‘focus’ on ‘the preservation of the family as
well as the safety, protection, and physical and emotional well-
being of the child.’” (See In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 286;
see also § 300.2, subd. (a).)

                                10
B.     Luis Sr.’s Appeal Is Moot, as is the Department’s Cross-
       appeal
       In supplemental appellate briefing on the issue of
mootness, Luis Sr. does not “complain of an ongoing harm” (In re
D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 276), and concedes his appeal “may
have been rendered moot by the termination of jurisdiction” and
he “may not demonstrate a specific legal or practical consequence
that will be averted upon reversal.”
       We agree. Luis Sr.’s appeal from the February 2022
disposition order is moot because the juvenile court’s May 2023
orders terminating jurisdiction and family preservation services
and releasing the minor children to both parents superseded the
disposition order, and the juvenile court did not issue any exit
order that continued to impact the parents. Luis Sr. cannot
demonstrate any ongoing harm, nor in any event would any harm
be “redressable or capable of being rectified by the outcome [he]
seeks” (In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 276), because the orders
issued at the May 2023 hearing are now final. No appeal was
taken from these orders terminating jurisdiction and family
preservation services and releasing the minor children to Luis Sr.
and Sandra, thus we do not have jurisdiction to review and
change them or the underlying jurisdiction finding, and “the
juvenile court has no jurisdiction to conduct further hearings in
the now-closed case.” (In re Rashad D. (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th
156, 164; accord, In re Michelle M. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 326, 330
[“where jurisdiction has been terminated and is final. . . .
jurisdiction cannot be conferred upon the appellate court”]; see
also § 304 [juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction to hear
proceedings regarding custody “until the time that the petition is
dismissed or dependency is terminated”]; Cal. Rules of Court,

                                11
rule 5.620(a) [same].) We cannot grant Luis Sr. effective relief
from an order that no longer affects him, even one based on
allegedly erroneous jurisdiction findings.
       The Department represented in its letter brief that, “There
is no effective relief this Court can provide father and there are
no possible future consequences stemming from the initial
assumption of jurisdiction that warrant this Court’s review.
Accordingly, to the extent this Court agrees that father’s appeal
should be dismissed as moot, the Department’s cross-appeal
stemming from the underlying appeal would also be moot.” The
Department does not request discretionary review of its moot
cross-appeal.

C.     Discretionary Review of Luis Sr.’s Moot Appeal Is Not
       Warranted
       Luis Sr.’s appeal does not present circumstances that
generally warrant discretionary review of a moot case, such as an
issue of broad public interest that is likely to recur, the likelihood
of a recurrence of the controversy between the parties, or a
material question that remains for the court’s determination.
(See In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 282.) Nevertheless, Luis
Sr. argues other factors warrant our discretionary review,
specifically that the jurisdiction “findings against father are
egregious and could potentially impact future dependency
proceedings against him.”
       A finding that a parent failed to adequately protect their
child from sexual abuse “carries a particular stigma.” (See
In re M.W., supra, 238 Cal.App.4th at p. 1452.) And as
previously noted, although “stigma alone will not sustain an
appeal, a court may consider the nature of the allegations against

                                 12
the parent when deciding whether discretionary review is
proper.” (In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 286.) However,
dependency jurisdiction by definition necessarily involves conduct
harmful to children, and our assessment of severity or
perniciousness is a relative analysis, which we undertake in light
of the other factors and policy concerns relevant to undertaking
discretionary review of a moot appeal.
       Luis Sr. relies on two cases cited in In re D.P., supra,
14 Cal.5th 266, but these cases do not help him. First, he argues
his case is similar to In re M.W., supra, 238 Cal.App.4th 1444. In
that case, the juvenile court sustained jurisdiction on multiple
grounds, including the mother’s failure to protect her children
from a substantial risk of physical and sexual abuse by allowing
access to their father, who had a history of domestic violence and,
unbeknownst to mother, was a registered sex offender (although
there was no allegation he abused their children). (See id. at
pp. 1450-1452.) Mother appealed those jurisdiction findings
(conceding findings related to her substance abuse and findings
against father) while case proceedings were still active in juvenile
court. (Id. at pp. 1446, 1452.) The appellate court determined
her appeal was moot but merits review was warranted because
“[t]he findings that mother knowingly or negligently exposed her
children to a substantial risk of physical and sexual abuse are
pernicious[,]” motivated the juvenile court’s ongoing order that
she address domestic violence in her individual counseling
sessions, and “could potentially impact the current or future
dependency proceedings.” (Id. at p. 1452.)

                                13
       In In re M.W., supra, 238 Cal.App.4th 1444, the mother’s
appeal was moot—not because the juvenile court terminated
jurisdiction and issued exit orders (as in Luis Sr.’s case)—but
rather because mother did not contest all jurisdiction findings,
and thus the jurisdiction findings would not be reversed
regardless of the outcome of her appeal. (Id. at p. 1452.)
Further, the juvenile court proceedings were still active, and the
children were removed from mother, making it more likely that
an erroneous jurisdiction finding against her would affect ongoing
proceedings and currently operative orders. (Ibid.) Our
discretion to reach the merits of a moot appeal is more
appropriately exercised in situations like In re M.W. By contrast,
here dependency jurisdiction was terminated in Luis Sr.’s favor,
and he was reunified with his family. There is no current
proceeding that could be impacted, and Luis Sr. makes no
showing or particularized argument regarding how the
challenged jurisdiction findings could potentially impact a future
dependency proceeding. Further, Luis Sr. will be able to explain
in any future dependency or family law proceedings that the
juvenile court ultimately released his children to his care,
reflecting the judgment that he did not pose a continuing risk to
the children.
       Second, Luis Sr. cites In re L.O., supra, 67 Cal.App.5th 227.
There, the juvenile court assumed jurisdiction based on findings
against both parents. Only father appealed, challenging the
court’s findings of failure to protect under section 300,
subdivision (b)(1), for risk of harm based on exposure to domestic
violence by father, and for sexual abuse or risk of sexual abuse
under section 300, subdivision (d), because father exposed his
six-year-old son to sexualized behaviors (based on the child

                                14
observing father having sex with his girlfriend, which the child
imitated). (Id. at p. 233.) As with In re M.W., the case was moot
not because jurisdiction had been terminated, but because only
father appealed and did not contest the jurisdiction findings
against mother. Proceedings were also ongoing in the juvenile
court, and the son was removed from parental custody. (Id. at
p. 236.) The appellate court exercised its discretion to review the
jurisdiction findings there because such findings “‘could
potentially impact the current or future dependency
proceedings,’” and “[t]he jurisdictional findings are also the basis
for the dispositional order that Father challenges on appeal.” (Id.
at pp. 237-238.) Again, Luis Sr.’s case does not present such
circumstances.
      We recognize this is also a case that was rendered moot by
Luis Sr.’s ultimate compliance with the case plan, eventually
resulting in the termination of jurisdiction and return of the
children to both parents. (See In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at
p. 286 [“It would perversely incentivize noncompliance if
mootness doctrine resulted in the availability of appeals from
jurisdictional findings only for parents who are less compliant or
for whom the court has issued additional orders.”].) However,
while expeditious compliance may favor discretionary review,
Luis Sr. makes no argument his compliance was prompt.
      Therefore, on balance the factors the Supreme Court
identified in In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th 266, do not warrant
discretionary review of Luis Sr.’s moot appeal.

                                15
                         DISPOSITION

      The appeal filed by Luis Sr. is dismissed as moot, and the
cross-appeal of the Department is also dismissed as moot.

                              MARTINEZ, J.

We concur:

      PERLUSS, P. J.

      SEGAL, J.

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