Court Opinion

ID: 9952715
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-20 16:07:02.558065+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:43:49.939660
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                       Mar 20 2024, 9:31 am

                                                                           CLERK
                                                                       Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                          Court of Appeals
                                                                            and Tax Court

                                            IN THE

            Court of Appeals of Indiana
          Ashley Jackson, as Personal Representative of the Estate of
                       Michael L. Jackson, Deceased,
                                          Appellant-Plaintiff

                                                    v.

        E&B Paving, LLC, Hanson Professional Services, Inc., Fox
      Contractors Corp., Crawford Murphy & Tilly, Inc., Indiana Sign
      & Barricade, Inc., City of Indianapolis, Marion County Board of
       Commissioners, and Marion County Board of Public Works,
                                        Appellees-Defendants

                                           March 20, 2024
                                    Court of Appeals Case No.
                                           23A-CT-950
                            Appeal from the Marion Superior Court
                            The Honorable Patrick J. Dietrick, Judge
                                       Trial Court Cause No.
                                       49D12-2004-CT-13459

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-950 | March 20, 2024        Page 1 of 20
                                          Opinion by Judge Riley
                                       Judges Foley and Felix concur.

      Riley, Judge.

      STATEMENT OF THE CASE 1
[1]   Appellant-Plaintiff, Ashley Jackson, as personal representative of the Estate of

      Michael L. Jackson (the Estate), appeals the trial court’s summary judgment in

      favor of Appellees-Defendants, E&B Paving, LLC (E&B), Fox Contractors,

      Corp. (Fox), and Hanson Professional Services, Inc. (Hanson) (collectively, the

      Defendants).2

[2]   We affirm.

      ISSUE
[3]   The Estate presents this court with one issue, which we restate as: Whether

      genuine issues of material fact exist precluding summary judgment for the

      1
       On February 27, 2024, we held oral argument. Our thanks to Wabash College for its hospitality and to
      Prof. Jeffrey Drury, Chair of the Rhetoric Department, for his continued support of the Court’s traveling oral
      arguments. We also thank counsel for the parties for their professional presentations.
      2
       Litigation is ongoing against co-defendants Crawford, Murphy & Tilly, Inc., and the City of Indianapolis,
      who did not move for summary judgment and do not participate in this appeal. Co-defendants Marion
      County Board of Commissioners and Marion County Board of Public Works do not participate in this
      appeal. After the Estate filed its appellate brief, it settled with Indiana Sign & Barricade, Inc., the
      subcontractor/provider of traffic control signage and markers for the Project. On September 27, 2023, the
      motions panel of this court granted the joint motion of the Estate and Indiana Sign & Barricade, Inc., to
      dismiss with prejudice the Estate’s appeal against Indiana State & Barricade, Inc., only. Therefore, we
      disregard the Estate’s appellate arguments pertaining to that co-defendant.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-950 | March 20, 2024                                 Page 2 of 20
      Defendants on the issue of whether they owed Michael L. Jackson (Jackson)

      any duty of care sufficient to support its negligence claims.

      FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[4]   In the summer of 2018, the City of Indianapolis (the City) was in the midst of a

      project to repave, add sidewalks, and add pedestrian traffic control devices to

      sections of Mitthoeffer 3 Road on the east side of Indianapolis between 30th and

      38th Streets (the Project). The portions of Mitthoeffer Road involved in the

      Project did not have any pre-existing accommodations for pedestrians in the

      form of sidewalks, dedicated pedestrian travel paths, or dedicated pedestrian

      footpaths. Prior to the commencement of the Project, the west side of

      Mitthoeffer Road had no sidewalk, and the east side of Mitthoeffer Road had a

      paved shoulder.

[5]   The firm of Crawford, Murphy & Tilly (CMT) designed the Project, which did

      not provide for any pedestrian traffic management in the form of crosswalks,

      alternate pedestrian walkways, or in any other manner during the Project. The

      City contracted with E&B to be its general contractor on the Project (the

      Agreement). The City also hired Hanson through the Professional Services

      Agreement (PSA) to be its resident project representative (RPR) on the Project,

      meaning that it was to observe the Project for compliance with CMT’s plans

      and report to the City, among other duties. E&B subcontracted with Fox to

      3
          “Mitthoeffer” is at times spelled “Mitthoefer” in the record.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-950 | March 20, 2024       Page 3 of 20
      provide certain services, including excavation of the paved shoulder on the east

      side of Mitthoeffer, for the Project. E&B, Fox, and Hanson did not design any

      plans or specifications for the Project.

[6]   On July 22, 2018, while walking within the Project zone on the east side of

      Mitthoeffer Road near John Jay Drive, Jackson was struck and killed by a

      vehicle driven by Karl R. Satter, II (Satter). 4 On April 8, 2020, the Estate filed a

      Complaint, which it amended for the final time on June 25, 2020, alleging

      wrongful death due to negligence and naming, among others, CMT, the City,

      E&B, Fox, and Hanson.

[7]   Each of the Defendants appeared and answered the Complaint. On September

      3, 2020, July 21, 2022, and August 2, 2022, Fox, Hanson, and E&B,

      respectively, filed its motion, memorandum, and designation of evidence in

      support of summary judgment. Copious summary judgment briefing ensued.

      The Defendants argued in relevant part that they owed no duty to Jackson to

      provide an alternate pedestrian route during construction and that they

      followed CMT’s plans which contained no provisions for an alternate

      pedestrian route. The Estate argued in relevant part that E&B, Fox, and

      4
        The Estate named Satter as a co-defendant in the Complaint. Satter subsequently settled with the Estate.
      On May 12, 2021, Satter was dismissed from the instant lawsuit by stipulation of the parties. The trial court
      took judicial notice of the fact that Satter was convicted of Level 5 felony failure to remain at the scene of an
      accident that resulted in death relating to the July 22, 2018, fatal collision.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-950 | March 20, 2024                                    Page 4 of 20
      Hanson had assumed a duty to Jackson through the contractual terms of the

      Agreement and the PSA.

[8]   On August 3, 2022, and on January 30, 2023, the trial court held hearings on

      the Defendants’ motions. On March 30, 2023, the trial court issued three

      separate orders granting summary judgment to E&B, Fox, and Hanson based

      on its conclusion that, as a matter of law, none of the Defendants owed a duty

      of care to Jackson. As to E&B, the trial court entered the following relevant

      findings and conclusions:

              7. There was nothing in the design plans regarding temporary
              walkways or sidewalks on the east side of the roadway. While a
              [City] project specification provided that “pedestrian traffic shall
              be maintained and disruption kept to a minimum”, the designer
              of the project did not consider plans or designs which redirected
              pedestrian traffic because there was no existing sidewalk or other
              pedestrian pathway which was being closed. The designer
              testified that the design complied with the [Indiana Department
              of Transportation’s (INDOT)] specifications and the Indiana
              Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices [(IMUTCD)].

              ****

              1. E&B did not have a duty to provide [Jackson] with a
              pedestrian pathway at the time of the subject accident;

              2. The plans and specifications relative to the subject contract,
              which did not provide for the construction of a pedestrian
              pathway, were not so obviously dangerous that no reasonable
              contractor would follow them;

              3. That E&B did not breach any duty to [Jackson] to perform its
              work in conformance with the applicable plans and
              specifications;

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-950 | March 20, 2024           Page 5 of 20
        4. To the extent Fox . . . performed [its] respective work in a
        negligent manner and/or in violation of the applicable plans and
        specifications, and the same was a responsible cause of
        [Jackson’s] death, E&B is without liability for any such acts or
        omissions.

(Appellant’s App. Vol. II, pp. 39, 42). The trial court entered the following

relevant findings and conclusions regarding Fox:

        26. CMT testified that the designs complied with the INDOT
        specifications and the [IMUTCD].

        ****
        36. [] Fox was contracted by E&B to perform specific work as
        part of the Mitthoeffer Project. No employees of Fox were
        present on the Mitthoeffer Project on the date of Jackson’s
        incident, July 22, 2018. The last time any Fox employee
        performed work on the Mitthoeffer Project was July 18, 2020,
        four (4) days prior to the incident. Additionally, the area of
        Fox’s work on July 18, 2020 was approximately 1400 feet south
        of the location of this accident.

        37. Furthermore, the undisputed evidence establishes Fox’s
        work on the project was performed in compliance with the
        [P]roject plans and specifications, including the IMUTCD. The
        [P]roject plans and design drawings did not have any alternative
        pedestrian paths called for related to the shoulder removal.
        There is no support in either the contract documents or
        deposition testimony of the parties that there was any
        requirement for an alternative pedestrian pathway to be provided
        related to the shoulder removal.

        38. “There is no breach of duty and consequently no negligence
        where a contractor merely follows the plans or specifications
        given him by the owner so long as they are not so obviously
        dangerous or defective that no reasonable contractor would
        follow them.” Peters v. Forester, 804 N.E.2d 736, 742 (Ind. 2004); see
        also Raytheon Engineers Y Constructors, Inc. V. Sargent Elec. Co., 932
        N.E.2d 691 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-950 | March 20, 2024            Page 6 of 20
              39. The [c]ourt finds there is no evidence the [P]roject plans
              prepared by CMT and followed by Fox as it relates to the
              shoulder removal were obviously dangerous or defective.

      (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, pp. 47-49). Lastly, as to Hanson, the trial court

      entered the following relevant findings and conclusions:

              64. [The Estate] argues Hanson purportedly had a duty to ensure
              compliance by others on the Project with all aspects of the
              IMUTCD and other applicable laws, regardless of the
              information set forth in the design documents.

              65. [The Estate’s] argument relies on provisions set forth in the
              [“Policy and Procedures Manual for Inspection of Locally
              Funded Construction Projects” (City Manual)] (incorporated by
              reference into the [PSA]) and the IMUTCD (referenced in the
              [City] Manual). However, the preamble to the [City] Manual
              states as follows: “Nothing in this manual shall operate as or be
              construed as modifying, supplementing, or otherwise changing or
              altering the provisions of the Contract Documents between the
              Contractor and the [City], including, without limitation Article 8
              of the General Conditions or the provisions of the [PSA] between
              [Hanson] and [the City].” Based on the plain, unambiguous
              terms of these documents, the [c]ourt finds that neither the [City]
              Manual nor the IMUTCD can be interpreted in a manner that
              would “modify, supplement, or otherwise change or alter” the
              terms of the [PSA]. As such, no provisions or terms in the [City]
              Manual or IMUTCD can serve as a basis for imposing a
              contractual duty on Hanson.

      (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, pp. 62-63) (record citations and emphasis omitted).

      Pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 54(B), the trial court entered its summary

      judgments as final, appealable judgments.

[9]   The Estate now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-950 | March 20, 2024        Page 7 of 20
       DISCUSSION AND DECISION
       I. Standard of Review

[10]   The Estate appeals following the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to

       E&B, Fox, and Hanson. Our supreme court recently reiterated our standard of

       review of a trial court’s summary judgment as follows:

               We review the trial court’s summary judgment decision de novo.
               [The moving party] is entitled to summary judgment if the
               designated evidence shows there is no genuine issue of material
               fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A
               genuine issue of material fact exists when there is contrary
               evidence showing differing accounts of the truth, or when
               conflicting reasonable inferences may be drawn from the parties’
               consistent accounts and resolution of that conflict will affect the
               outcome of a claim. To the extent we have any doubts
               concerning the existence of a genuine issue of material fact, we
               must resolve those doubts in favor of the nonmoving party.

       Z.D. v. Com. Health Net., Inc., 217 N.E.3d 527, 531 (Ind. 2023) (citations and

       internal quotes omitted). The party moving for summary judgment bears the

       initial burden of making a prima facie showing that there are no genuine issues

       of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Sargent v.

       State, 27 N.E.3d 729, 731 (Ind. 2015). “Summary judgment is improper if the

       movant fails to carry its burden, but if it succeeds, then the nonmoving party

       must come forward with evidence establishing the existence of a genuine issue

       of material fact.” Id. at 731-32. The nonmoving party against whom summary

       judgment was entered has the burden on appeal to persuade us that the trial

       court’s grant of summary judgment was in error, but we will scrutinize the trial

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-950 | March 20, 2024          Page 8 of 20
       court’s decision to ensure that the nonmovant is not improperly denied his day

       in court. Gochenour v. CSX Transp., Inc., 44 N.E.3d 794, 799 (Ind. Ct. App.

       2015), trans. denied. When reviewing the grant of summary judgment, we may

       affirm the trial court’s ruling on any basis apparent in the record. Markey v.

       Estate of Markey, 38 N.E.3d 1003, 1006-07 (Ind. 2015). Inasmuch as the Estate’s

       claims require us to construe contractual provisions, those are matters of law

       particularly suitable for summary judgment which we review de novo.

       Alexander v. Linkmeyer Dev. II, LLC, 119 N.E.3d 603, 612 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).

[11]   Before proceeding to the merits of the Estate’s claims, we observe that the trial

       court entered findings of fact and conclusions thereon. Special findings are not

       required in summary judgment proceedings and are not binding on appeal.

       AutoXchange.com. Inc. v. Dreyer and Reinbold, Inc., 816 N.E.2d 40, 48 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 2004). However, such findings offer this court valuable insight into the

       trial court’s rationale for its review and facilitate appellate review. Id.

       II. Assumption of Duty Through Contract

[12]   The Estate brought wrongful death claims sounding in negligence against E&B,

       Fox, and Hanson. In order to prevail in a negligence suit, a plaintiff must prove

       “three elements: (1) a duty on the part of the defendant in relation to the

       plaintiff; (2) a failure by the defendant to conform its conduct to the requisite

       standard of care; and (3) an injury to the plaintiff proximately caused by the

       failure.” Coleman v. Charles Court, LLC, 797 N.E.2d 775, 788 (Ind. Ct. App.

       2003). To prevail on a motion for summary judgment in a negligence suit, a

       defendant must show that the undisputed facts negate at least one of these

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-950 | March 20, 2024             Page 9 of 20
       elements. Id. In the absence of a duty, “there can be no negligence or liability

       based upon the breach.” Goodwin v. Yeakle’s Sports Bar and Grill, Inc., 62 N.E.3d

       384, 386 (Ind. 2016). The existence of a duty is a question of law for the court

       to decide. Id. at 387.

[13]   “A duty of care may arise where one party assumes a duty.” Estate of Staggs v.

       ADS Logistics Co., LLC, 102 N.E.3d 319, 323 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied.

       A party may assume a duty through contractual provisions if those provisions

       affirmatively evince an intent to assume the duty. Id. In determining whether a

       contracting party assumed a duty of care, we are guided by well-established

       principles of contract interpretation. Ryan v. TCI, 72 N.E.3d 908, 914 (Ind.

       2017). We will determine the intent of the parties at the time they entered into

       the contract by examining the language used to express the parties’ rights and

       duties. Id. We look at the contract as a whole, and we interpret the contract in

       a manner which harmonizes all its provisions, giving the contract’s clear and

       unambiguous terms their ordinary meaning. Id. The Estate contends that

       E&B, Fox, and Hanson each assumed a contractual duty to the public using

       Mitthoeffer Road during the Project, including Jackson, to safeguard pedestrian

       traffic. We examine this claim as to each Defendant in turn.

       A. E&B

[14]   The Agreement between E&B and the City listed a number of “Contract

       Documents”, which included the Agreement itself, the Project plans, the City’s

       Standards and Specifications, and INDOT’s Standard and Supplemental Series,

       Sections 200 through 900, listed in that order. The Agreement provided that

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-950 | March 20, 2024       Page 10 of 20
       the Contract Documents “accurately and fully describe the terms and

       conditions upon which [E&B] is willing to furnish the labor, tools, material,

       equipment, services and perform the [w]ork called for by the Contract

       Documents . . . .” (Appellant’s App. Vol. VII, p. 22). The City and E&B

       agreed that the Contract Documents were “as fully a part of this Agreement as

       if set out verbatim herein or attached hereto and the same do in all particulars

       become the Agreement between the parties hereto in all matters and things set

       forth herein and described[.]” (Appellant’s App. Vol. VII, p. 23). Another

       provision of the Agreement provided that “[a] requirement occurring in one

       Contract Document is binding as though occurring in all Contract

       Documents[.]” (Appellant’s App. Vol. VII, p. 23).

[15]   One of the City’s Standards and Specifications provided that

               [p]edestrian traffic also shall be maintained and disruption
               thereof kept to a minimum. . . . If adequate sidewalk area is not
               available, the CONTRACTOR shall divert pedestrian traffic
               across the street and shall provide all materials necessary to
               provide for the crossover.

       (Appellant’s App. Vol. VII, p. 37). Another Contract Document, INDOT’s

       Standard Specification Section 801.03, referenced the IMUTCD, sections 6A

       and 6D of which provide that the “needs and control of all road users

       [including pedestrians] . . . shall be an essential part of highway construction”

       and that if a temporary traffic control zone “affects the movement of

       pedestrians, adequate pedestrian access and walkways shall be provided.”

       (Appellant’s App. Vol. VII, p. 66) (additional emphasis in original omitted).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-950 | March 20, 2024           Page 11 of 20
       Citing these provisions, the Estate argues that E&B assumed a duty to provide

       pedestrian crossovers or walkways during the Project or to safeguard pedestrian

       safety in some other manner, such as alerting the City of the need for additional

       pedestrian safety measures at the Project.

[16]   We cannot agree. In addition to the Agreement provisions and the selected

       portions of the Contract Documents which were incorporated into the

       Agreement by reference, the Agreement contained the following provisions:

               In resolving conflicts, errors, discrepancies[,] and disputes
               concerning the nature, character, scope or extent of [work] to be
               performed or furnished by [E&B], or other rights and obligations
               of the [City and E&B], arising from or prescribed by one or more
               of the Contract Documents, the following rules shall govern:

               ****

               .3 The Contract Documents shall be given precedence in the
               order listed in Paragraph 1.1. above; and

               .4 In documents of equal priority, if any such conflict, error,
               discrepancy or dispute cannot be resolved or reconciled by
               application of the rules in Subparagraphs 1.2.1 through 1.2.3,
               then the provision expressing the greater quantity, quality, or
               scope of work, or imposing the greater obligation upon the
               CONTRACTOR or affording the greater right or remedy to the
               [City] shall govern, without regard to the party who drafted such
               provisions.

       (Appellant’s App. Vol. VII, pp. 23-24). The City and INDOT specifications

       relied upon by the Estate only specifically refer to the provision of pedestrian

       crossovers and/or pedestrian walkways. Those specifications do not refer to

       any larger or expanded duty to report issues or to safeguard pedestrian safety

       through other means. It is a well-settled principle of contract interpretation that
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-950 | March 20, 2024        Page 12 of 20
       we do not add terms to a contract. See Care Group Heart Hosp., LLC v. Sawyer, 93

       N.E.3d 745, 756 (Ind. 2018) (“[W]e will not add tacit terms into the parties’

       express, agreed-upon ones.”). Therefore, we reject the Estate’s proposition to

       read into the Agreement additional pedestrian safeguarding measures beyond

       the provision of crossovers and sidewalks.

[17]   It is undisputed that the Project plans did not provide for pedestrian crossovers

       or walkways. The incorporation of the City and INDOT specifications into the

       Agreement created a conflict or a discrepancy between the Project plans and the

       City and INDOT specifications. Pursuant to subparagraph .3 of the

       Agreement’s conflict resolution provision, the Project plans, which were listed

       before the City and INDOT specifications, took precedence over the cited

       specifications. Subparagraph .4 does not apply here, as the Project plans, City

       Standards and Specifications, and the INDOT Standard Specifications were not

       Contract Documents of equal priority. Therefore, according to the plain and

       unambiguous terms of the Agreement, E&B’s scope of work did not extend to

       the provision of pedestrian crossovers and walkways, and E&B did not assume

       any duty to provide the same.

[18]   Contrary to the Estate’s assertions, Smith v. Walsh Construction Company II, LLC,

       95 N.E.3d 78 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied, does not support the existence

       of a duty of care on the part of E&B. In that case, a motorist was killed when

       his vehicle allegedly encountered a substantial amount of mud that had

       accumulated on the surface of the roadway near an INDOT bridge construction

       project. Id. at 83. The motorist’s estate sued the general contractor, Walsh, and

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-950 | March 20, 2024       Page 13 of 20
       several subcontractors, among others, for wrongful death. Id. at 83-84. In

       affirming the denial of summary judgment for Walsh, another panel of this

       court found that Walsh owed a non-delegable duty of care to the killed motorist

       and to the public who used the roadway due to specific, express provisions in

       Walsh’s contract with INDOT in which Walsh agreed to “take all reasonably

       necessary actions to protect . . . the safety of the public . . .”, to provide a stable

       construction entrance to be built of twelve inches of stone where construction

       traffic would enter the roadway, to address any and all degradation and erosion

       control issues occurring at the site, to ensure that “the roadway, structures,

       barricades, and construction [be] kept in satisfactory condition at all times”, and

       to provide for the prompt removal of all dirt and other materials deposited on

       the roadways by construction operations if the accumulation was enough to

       form mud or create a traffic hazard. Id. at 85-86. The Smith court further

       concluded that, even if these duties had been delegable, there was no genuine

       issue of material fact that Walsh had not, indeed, delegated those duties to any

       of its subcontractors. Id. at 86. Therefore, the court held that “[b]y deciding to

       perform this work, Walsh elected to assume a duty of care with respect to the

       work.” Id.

[19]   The Smith court reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the

       subcontractor responsible for installing erosion control measures, Roudebush,

       also concluding, as it had for Walsh, that Roudebush had assumed a

       contractual duty towards the killed motorist and the general public. Id. at 93-

       94. As to Roudebush, the estate had argued that the subcontractor should have

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-950 | March 20, 2024            Page 14 of 20
       done more than simply follow the design plans for the bridge contract for

       erosion control measures by insisting that silt fencing or other erosion control

       measures not called for by the plans be installed. Id. at 93. The subcontract

       between Walsh and Roudebush contained specific, express provisions that

       Roudebush was assuming toward Walsh all of the obligations Walsh had

       assumed in its contract with INDOT. Id. at 93. The subcontract further

       provided that Roudebush had a duty to notify Walsh of any defects in its own

       work or in the work of any other entity, to notify Walsh of any unsafe site

       conditions not expressly within its responsibility, and to keep the public streets

       and roadways free of dirt. Id. at 93-94. The Roudebush/Walsh subcontract

       also incorporated by reference some INDOT requirements pertaining to the

       installation of temporary erosion and sediment control measures that were

       contained in the Walsh/INDOT contract. Id. at 94. The Smith court held that

       “[i]n light of these contractual provisions as a whole, it is apparent that

       Roudebush had a contractual duty to consider whether additional erosion

       control measures (in addition to those specific in [the designer’s] plans) were

       required[.]” Id.

[20]   Contrary to the Estate’s arguments on appeal, Smith does not stand for the

       proposition that, simply by entering into contracts pertaining to a public project,

       a general contractor or subcontractor always owes a duty of care to the general

       public, that a contractor always has a duty to investigate or inquire into

       additional ways of accomplishing a project plan’s goals or directives, or that the

       incorporation of INDOT specifications into a contract is always binding.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-950 | March 20, 2024         Page 15 of 20
       Rather, Smith turned on the terms of the specific contracts involved between

       INDOT, Walsh, and Roudebush which differ from the Agreement in the

       instant case in material aspects, in that the Agreement did not contain express

       provisions that E&B would guarantee public safety, did not provide for the

       installation of pedestrian crossovers and sidewalks, and did contain a conflict

       resolution clause that made the Project plans prevail over any conflicting City

       and INDOT specifications. See id. at 85-86, 93-94. Therefore, although we do

       so on different grounds relied upon by the trial court, we affirm the entry of

       summary judgment in favor of E&B. See Markey, 38 N.E.3d at 1006-07

       (holding that we may affirm a summary judgment on any basis supported by

       the record).

       B. Fox

[21]   On appeal, the Estate claims, as it did during summary judgment proceedings

       below, that subcontractor Fox owed a duty to Jackson and to other pedestrians

       because its contract with general contractor E&B incorporated “multiple

       components” of E&B’s contract with the City, including “General Conditions

       and Provisions, Plans, Specifications, [and] Special Provisions[.]” (Appellant’s

       Br. p. 9). Thus, the Estate’s argument for the existence of a duty on Fox’s part

       is predicated on the existence of a duty by E&B. Having concluded that E&B

       did not assume such a duty in its own contract with the City, we must conclude

       that neither did Fox. Accordingly, we do not disturb the trial court’s entry of

       summary judgment as to Fox.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-950 | March 20, 2024       Page 16 of 20
       C. Hanson

[22]   Hanson entered into the PSA with the City, pursuant to which it agreed to

       provide a resident project representative, inspectors, and clerical and secretarial

       personnel, to perform administrative and record keeping functions, to serve as a

       liaison between the Project contractors and the City, to observe the unfolding

       construction work, and to inspect work for compliance with the Project plans.

       In its “Description of Services” section, the PSA provided that Hanson agreed

       to “[a]dminister the contract in accordance with the current edition of [the City

       Manual]”. (Appellant’s App. Vol. V, p. 117). The City Manual contained the

       following two sections relevant to the Estate’s summary judgment arguments:

               2-1. Gather Documents and Review

               ****

               [Hanson] should become completely familiar with all documents
               necessary for the inspection and construction of the [P]roject
               prior to commencement of construction.

               ****

               2-5. Field Visit

               After the Contract Documents 5 have been reviewed, and well in
               advance of construction, [Hanson] shall visit the [P]roject site
               and become familiar with existing site conditions. [Hanson] shall
               perform an onsite field check of the entire [P]roject with the
               [P]roject plans, note locations of key elements of the [P]roject,

       5
        “Contract Documents” are defined in the PSA as the “plans, addenda, and the contract information book”,
       which is the book with the City’s “project requirements including the bid front end documents, technical
       specifications and special conditions.” (Appellant’s App. Vol. V, pp. 68, 70).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-950 | March 20, 2024                          Page 17 of 20
               and become familiar with possible interferences with existing
               residences, businesses, pedestrian traffic, or the motoring public
               prior to the contractor starting work.

       (Appellant’s App. Vol. VIII, pp. 70, 72) (emphasis added). In addition, the City

       Manual incorporates as reference material the IMUTCD containing the

       previously-cited provisions relevant to pedestrian safety. The Estate contends

       that these portions of the City Manual, as incorporated into the PSA, created a

       duty of care on Hanson’s part to Jackson and to the public.

[23]   However, as found by the trial court, the City Manual’s Introduction contains

       the following statement:

               Nothing in this manual shall operate as or be construed as
               modifying, supplementing, or otherwise changing or altering the
               provisions of the Contract Documents between [Hanson] and the
               [City], including without limitation, Article 8 of the General
               Conditions or the provisions of the [PSA].

       (Appellant’s App. Vol. VIII, p. 66). Therefore, by its plain and unambiguous

       terms, the City Manual cannot be construed in a way that modifies or

       supplements the PSA, and, therefore, it cannot provide a basis for establishing a

       contractual duty for Hanson in the manner the Estate argues. On appeal, the

       Estate emphasizes that the PSA incorporates the City Manual’s provisions

       within its terms, and it contends that our reading renders the PSA’s provision

       incorporating the City Manual a nullity. Yet, the PSA incorporates the entire

       City Manual, including the Introduction, and the Estate does not provide us

       with any legal authority for its implication that we may ignore the Introduction

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-950 | March 20, 2024            Page 18 of 20
       of the City Manual. Neither does the Estate contend that the Introduction is

       ambiguous. When entering into the PSA, the parties could have disavowed or

       excluded the cited portion of the Introduction, but they did not. Rather, the

       City and Hanson’s inclusion of the Introduction evinces their intent that the

       City Manual would not modify or supplement their contract. Accordingly, we

       also affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to Hanson. 6

       CONCLUSION
[24]   Based on the foregoing, we hold that there exist no genuine issues of material

       fact and that E&B, Fox, and Hanson are entitled to summary judgment as a

       matter of law.

[25]   Affirmed.

       Foley, J. and Felix, J. concur

       ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
       Clayton C. Miller
       Clayton Miller Law, P.C.
       Indianapolis, Indiana
       R.T. Green
       Letha A. Maier
       Collin W. Green

       6
         Given the Estate’s framing of the issues in its Appellant’s Brief, our de novo standard of review, and our
       conclusions, we do not address the trial court’s other rationales for granting summary judgment to E&B,
       Fox, and Hanson. In addition, because we have not relied on any challenged or disputed factual matters in
       reaching our conclusions, we do not address the Estate’s arguments challenging the trial court’s factual
       findings.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-950 | March 20, 2024                               Page 19 of 20
Team Green Law
Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES
Bruce P. Clark
Bruce P. Clark & Associates
St. John, Indiana
Richard R. Skiles
Carlo T. Girolamo
Skiles DeTrude
Indianapolis, Indiana
William E. Kelley, Jr.
Tyler L. Jones
Drewry Simmons Vornehm, LLP
Carmel, Indiana

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-950 | March 20, 2024   Page 20 of 20