Court Opinion

ID: 9797560
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:24:08.228178+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:57:10.433912
License: Public Domain

*646Judge VOGT
dissenting.
I agree with the majority that Scott v. Scott, 136 P.3d 892 (Colo.2006), controls our determination of whether the order before us is final and appealable. However, I read Scott as supporting the conclusion that it is. I therefore respectfully dissent from the majority’s dismissal of the appeal.
The Scott court recognized that the determination of the finality of probate court orders turns on “what constitutes a proceeding.” Scott, 136 P.3d at 896 (“Because we hold that an order of the probate court is final when it ends the particular proceeding in which the probate court enters the order, we must next determine what constitutes a proceeding.”). Addressing various probate code provisions bearing on that issue, the court noted, as pertinent here, “that the unsupervised administration of an estate may involve multiple proceedings.” Scott, 136 P.3d at 896.
The case before the supreme court in Scott involved two pleadings, both denominated “petitions,” filed in a single probate court proceeding. Relying on In re Estate of Newalla, 114 N.M. 290, 837 P.2d 1373 (App.1992), for the proposition that, once a petition is filed, further pleadings relating to the same subject matter, whether labeled motions or petitions, are part of the same proceeding, the supreme court rejected the argument that the second petition instituted an independent proceeding. In so concluding, the court twice observed that the second petition was filed “under the same case number” as the petition that instituted the proceeding, and it interpreted the language of the second petition as demonstrating “that the parties did not intend this petition to initiate a new proceeding.” Scott, 136 P.3d at 898.
The facts of this case differ significantly from those found dispositive in Scott. Here, petitioner filed a petition to compel accounting and, according to counsel’s statement at oral argument, paid a filing fee. The probate court assigned a new case number to the petition. Petitioner served respondent with a summons, showing the new case number, and a copy of the petition. The parties then filed various pleadings addressing the issues raised in the petition. Thereafter, the probate court entered the order at issue here, declining to grant the relief requested in the petition and stating: “This case is dismissed and the file is closed.”
Thus, the record here shows that petitioner intended the petition to initiate a new proceeding, that the probate court treated it as such by assigning a new case number, and that the probate court viewed its order as concluding that proceeding. These facts distinguish this case from Scott and, in my view, require the conclusion that the order before us is final and appealable.
Unlike the majority, I do not view the factual differences between this case and Scott as mere matters of form, not substance. Nor can I conclude that the probate court’s consideration of the underlying case when it entered the order at issue here shows that this was not a new proceeding. Further, although the parties indicated at oral argument that respondent’s ongoing accounting obligations will continue to be litigated in the context of the 2000 case, I do not agree with the majority that the parties’ statements establish that the probate court’s order under review cannot be final because it will have no preclusive effect. See In re Estate of Bell, 4 P.3d 504 (Colo.App.2000); see also In re Estate of Newalla, supra (rejecting argument that order before it could not be final because there were still matters to be decided that would be affected by the order).
I share the majority’s concern about piecemeal appeals and about the potential for parties to manipulate the process in order to obtain a final appealable judgment. I note that the latter concern could potentially be alleviated in the probate court by consolidation of a separately filed proceeding with an ongoing proceeding. Here, however, respondent did not seek, and the probate court did not order, such consolidation.
In any event, as I read Scott, if a new proceeding is instituted and resolved by an order dismissing the proceeding, we have jurisdiction to address the merits of the appeal. I do not believe we may decline to exercise that jurisdiction, regardless of our view of the motivation of the party seeking review. I would therefore entertain the ap*647peal and address petitioner’s contentions on their merits.