Court Opinion

ID: 9416905
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 19:58:03.810866+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:33.967473
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice FIELD
(with whom concurred Mr. Justice CLIFFORD and Mr. Justice MILLER), dissenting.
I am unable to concur in the judgment rendered by the majority of the court in this case; I agree with them that sure*376ties on a recognizance can only be discharged from liability' by the peiformance of the condition stipulated, unless that become impossible by the act of God, or of the law, or of the obligee. But I differ from them in the application of their term act of the law. If I understand correctly their opinion they limit the term’to a proceeding'authorized by a law enacted by the State where the recognizance was executed. I am of opinion that the term will also embrace a proceeding authorized by any law of the United States. A proceeding sanctioned by such law, which renders the performance of the condition of the recognizance impossible, ought, in my judgment, upon plain principles of justice and according to the authorities, to release the sureties.
The Constitution of the United States declares its own supremacy, and. that of the lavvs made in pursuance of it, and of treaties contracted under the authority of the United States. As the supreme law of the land they are, of course, to be enforced and obeyed, however much they may interfere with the law or constitution of any State-
Now the Constitution provides that “a person charged in any State with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice aud be found in another State, shall, on demand of the executive authority of tlie State from which he fled, be delivered up to be removed to the State having jurisdiction of the crime.”* The act of Congress of February 32th, 1793, was passed to carry into effect this provision, aud has made it the duty of the executive of the State or Territory to which a person charged with .one of the crimes mentioned has- fled, upon proper demand to cause the fugitive to be arrested and delivered up. In pursuance' of this, act the principal on the recognizance in suit was arrested by order of the governor of New York, and delivered up as a fugitive from justice to-the officers of the State of Maine. By them he was taken to that State, aud having been previously indicted for a felony, was there tried, convicted, and sentenced to the penitentiary for fifteen years. Thus in the *377execution of a valid law of the United States, passed to carry out an express constitutional provision, the prisoner was taken against his will from the custody of, his bail, and-placed iu the custody of officers of another Státe, from whom the bail could not recover him to make a surrender pursuant to the condition of their recognizance. It is no answer to say that the prisoner, when called in Connecticut, was detained by the State of Maine, and .not by any proceeding or order under an act-of Congress, because that proceeding or order had been executed, and was no lunger operative. He was taken out of the custody aud played beyond the reach of his bail by a proceeding under the act, and therefore to such proceeding their inability to surrender him must be attributed.
The case is not essentially different from a surrender of a fugitive from justice under an extradition treaty. The United States have such treaties with several European nations, and whatever may have been the extravagant doctrines respecting the rights of the States, at'one time in some.parts of the country, it will not nowhe .pretended that with the enforcement of such treaties any State, by her laws or judicial proceedings, can interfere. . If the fugitive, after his arrival in this country, should commit a crime and be held to. bail, it would be a question .with the authorities of the General Government whether he should be surrendered under the treaty; but if surrendered it would be manifestly unjust to the bail to hold them to the performance of the conditions of the recognizance.
It seems to me that it would be a more just rule to hold, that whenever sureties on a recognizance are rendered unable to surrender their principal, because he has been taken from, their custody without their assent, in the regular execution of a law or treaty of the United States, their inability thus created should constitute for their default a good and sufficient excuse. The execution of the laws aud treaties of the United States should never be allowed in the courts of the United States to work oppression to any one.

 Article 4, section 2.