Court Opinion

ID: 9400715
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-08 23:04:45.617842+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:47.510828
License: Public Domain

Filed 5/10/23; Certified for Publication 6/8/23 (order attached)

                  IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                     SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 ANISSA MOHLER,                                                     H049994
                                                                   (Santa Clara County
             Plaintiff and Appellant,                               Super. Ct. No. 21CV384330)

             v.

 COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA, et al.,

             Defendants and Respondents.

         In this matter, Plaintiff Anissa Mohler sues the County of Santa Clara and four
members of its Board of Supervisors (collectively, the County). She claims that the
County has committed waste under Code of Civil Procedure section 526a by allowing the
Reid-Hillview Airport to fall into disrepair. 1 The County demurred, and the trial court
sustained the demurrer without leave to amend. Mohler now appeals, arguing that she
stated a valid cause of action under section 526a or, alternatively, should have been
granted leave to amend. We affirm the trial court’s rulings.
                             I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
         In reviewing the dismissal of Mohler’s claim on demurrer, we accept as true the
facts properly alleged in her complaint, which are set forth below. (See, e.g., Whittemore
v. Owens Healthcare-Retail Pharmacy, Inc. (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1194, 1197.)

        Subsequent statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless
         1

otherwise designated.
       The Reid-Hillview Airport, which the County has owned and operated since 1961,
is a reliever airport for the San Jose International Airport. Reid-Hillview serves general
aviation—i.e., all aviation other than commercial passenger flights and air carrier
aviation. The airport also supports emergency responses for Bay Area hospitals and
houses Cal Fire and Civil Air Patrol operations, which provide disaster relief such as
search and rescue during earthquakes and wildfires.
       Although the County is required to operate the land occupied by the Reid-Hillview
Airport as an airport until at least 2030, in December 2018 the County’s Board of
Supervisors voted to engage with the City of San Jose in a joint planning process
concerning possible alternatives uses of Reid-Hillview after 2031. Mohler claims that, in
furtherance of this plan, the County intentionally has allowed the airport “to fall into a
state of wasteful disrepair.”
       In June 2021, Mohler sued the County, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief
under section 526a. The complaint alleged that the County has committed waste in
several ways. First, by failing to perform basic maintenance, it has allowed vegetation
and trash to accumulate around the airport’s perimeter and weeds to overgrow its
taxiways and runways, creating cracks, bumps, and soft spots in the asphalt. Second, the
County has failed to repair hangars, rendering one nonfunctional and allowing rust to take
over another hangar and to drip onto planes. Finally, the County has failed to renew
soon-to-expire leases for fixed base operators (which provide support operations such as
flight training, aircraft maintenance or repair, and aircraft rental), threatening significant
losses in revenue. For relief, Mohler seeks an order preventing the County from studying
alternative uses of the Reid-Hillview site and a permanent injunction requiring the
County to “comply with necessary maintenance obligations.”
       The County demurred on the ground that the complaint failed to allege facts
sufficient to state a cause of action. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave
to amend. It observed that section 526a’s prohibition against waste requires more than a

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mistaken exercise of judgment or discretion. Then, because Mohler failed to show that
the County has any duty to maintain the Reid-Hillview Airport, the court concluded that
“the County’s decisions are discretionary and thus not subject” to section 526a. The
court also found that Mohler sought impermissibly vague relief.
       After final judgment was entered on March 29, 2022, Mohler timely appealed.
                                        II. DISCUSSION
       We review de novo the trial court’s order sustaining the demurrer and consider
whether defects in the complaint may be cured by amendment, with the plaintiff bearing
the burden of proof. (See, e.g., T.H. v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. (2017) 4 Cal.5th
145, 162 (Novartis); Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.)
       A.     Intentional Waste
       Mohler’s primary argument on appeal is that she was not required to show that the
County violated any duty by failing to maintain the Reid-Hillview Airport because, even
absent such a duty, “intentional waste” violates section 526a. This argument sweeps too
far: local governments may decide not to maintain property intentionally without
committing waste under section 526a. And while such decisions might constitute waste
in extreme circumstances, Mohler has not alleged such circumstances.
       Section 526a creates a statutory taxpayer action against local governments. The
section has three main components. 2 First, it confers broad standing, authorizing any
resident or corporation that pays or is assessed a tax that funds a local agency to sue the

       2
         These components are contained in subdivision (a) of section 526a: “An action to
obtain a judgment, restraining and preventing any illegal expenditure of, waste of, or
injury to, the estate, funds, or other property of a local agency, may be maintained against
any officer thereof, or any agent, or other person, acting in its behalf, either by a resident
therein, or by a corporation, who is assessed for and is liable to pay, or, within one year
before the commencement of the action, has paid, a tax that funds the defendant local
agency, including, but not limited to, the following: [¶] (1) An income tax. [¶] (2) A
sales and use tax or transaction and use tax initially paid by a consumer to a retailer. [¶]
(3) A property tax, including a property tax paid by tenant or lessee to a landlord or lessor
pursuant to the terms of a written lease. [¶] (4) A business license tax.”

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agency. (§ 526a, subd. (a); see also id., § 526a, subd. (d)(1) [defining “[l]ocal agency” to
include counties].) Second, it has a substantive component: it prohibits “illegal
expenditure of, waste of, or injury to, the estate, funds, or other property” of the local
agency. (Id., subd. (a).) Third, it specifies the relief available: a judgment “restraining
and preventing” the prohibited expenditure, waste, or injury. (Ibid.)
       This case involves section 526a’s prohibition against waste, which is not well
defined in either the statute or the case law. There are numerous cases applying the
section’s prohibition against “illegal expenditure,” which has long been used to enjoin
government conduct that is unconstitutional or otherwise illegal. (See, e.g., Blair v.
Pitchess (1971) 5 Cal.3d 258 (Blair) [enjoining seizure of personal property without a
hearing or judicial establishment of probable cause]; Vogel v. County of Los Angeles
(1967) 68 Cal.2d 18 [enjoining loyalty oaths]; Wirin v. Parker (1957) 48 Cal.2d 890
[enjoining wiretapping].) By contrast, there are comparatively few decisions concerning
Section 526a’s prohibition against “waste,” and therefore only the general contours of the
prohibition are clear. (See Chiatello v. City and County of San Francisco (2010) 189
Cal.App.4th 472, 482 (Chiatello) [“Just what amounts to ‘waste’ is more readily intuited
than enunciated.”].)
       Although “waste” is a common law term for conduct “on the part of the person in
possession of land which is actionable at the behest of . . . another owner of an interest in
the same land” (Cornelison v. Kornbluth (1975) 15 Cal.3d 590, 597-598), no court has
interpreted Section 526a to adopt the common law standard for waste, which imposes
liability if a possessor “physically changes the real estate . . . in a manner that reduces its
value” or “fails to maintain and repair the real estate in a reasonable manner” 3 (Rest.3d,
Property, Mortgages, § 4.6(a)(1) & (a)(2)). Instead, courts have interpreted

       3
         Because section 526a does not incorporate the common law standard for waste,
Mohler’s reliance on Hickman v. Mulder (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 900, which applies that
standard, is misplaced.

                                               4
section 526a’s prohibition against waste more narrowly. When the California Supreme
Court first addressed the term “waste” in 1925, almost 16 years to the day after section
526a was enacted, it equated waste with the “useless expenditure” of public funds.
(Harnett v. Sacramento County (1925) 195 Cal. 676, 683.) Sixty years later, when the
Supreme Court next addressed the term, it observed that under section 526a waste
“ ‘means something more than an alleged mistake by public officials in matters involving
the exercise of judgment or wide discretion.’ ” (Sundance v. Municipal Court (1986) 42
Cal.3d 1101, 1138 (Sundance), quoting City of Ceres v. City of Modesto (1969) 274
Cal.App.2d 545, 555 (Ceres).) Thus, section 526a’s prohibition against waste “does
not . . . apply to the vast majority of discretionary decisions made by state and local units
of government.” (Chiatello, supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at pp. 482-483.) Instead, it applies
to expenditures that “provide[] no public benefit” (Sundance, supra, at p. 1139), are
“ ‘totally unnecessary’ ” or “ ‘useless’ ” (County of Ventura v. State Bar (1995) 35
Cal.App.4th 1055, 1059), or impose significant additional cost “without . . . any
additional public benefit” (Los Altos Property Owners Assn. v. Hutcheon (1977) 69
Cal.App.3d 22, 30).
       This restrictive interpretation of waste is compelled by separation of powers
considerations. One of “[t]he core functions of the legislative branch” is “making
appropriations.” (Carmel Valley Fire Protection Dist. v. State of California (2001) 25
Cal.4th 287, 299.) Accordingly, the Supreme Court has admonished courts to “not
interfere with [a] County’s legislative judgment on the ground that the County’s funds
could be spent more efficiently.” (Sundance, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 1139.) Similarly,
courts should not “ ‘take judicial cognizance of disputes which are primarily political in
nature’ ” or attempt to enjoin “ ‘every expenditure which does not meet with a taxpayer’s
approval.’ ” (Ibid, quoting Ceres, supra, 274 Cal.App.2d at p. 555.) Such a broad
interpretation of waste, the Supreme Court recognized, “ ‘would invite constant
harassment of city and county officers” and “could seriously hamper our representative

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form of government at the local level.’ ” (Ibid, quoting Ceres, supra, 274 Cal.App.2d at
p. 555.)
       Mohler’s contention that section 526a should be interpreted expansively to cover
all “intentional waste” cannot be reconciled with the Supreme Court’s much more limited
interpretation and the separation of powers considerations underlying that interpretation.
A local government rationally and legitimately may decide that a facility such as a batting
cage, a skateboard park, a community theater, or even a school is not worth maintaining
because due to changing demographics or tastes it is no longer used by enough people, or
because there is a severe budget crisis requiring funds to be devoted to other, more
important matters. While such decisions may allow government property to fall into
disrepair intentionally, section 526a should not be interpreted to authorize courts to
interfere with such quintessentially legislative judgments about government spending.
When a local government decides rationally and legitimately that a property is no longer
worth maintaining, the remedy for those disagreeing with that decision is in the political
process, not the courts.
       It is true that California courts have “consistently construed section 526a broadly
to achieve [its] remedial purpose.” (Blair, supra, 5 Cal.3d at p. 268.) Section 526a’s
remedial purpose, however, is not to allow courts to second guess legislative judgments
on government spending. (Sundance, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 1139.) Its purpose is to
expand standing and thereby enable citizens to challenge government actions that
“ ‘would otherwise go unchallenged because of the standing requirement.’ ” (Blair,
supra, at p. 268; but see Weatherford v. City of San Rafael (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1241, 1250
[noting that in some ways Section 526a “narrow[ed] the category of taxpayers able to sue
to enjoin certain expenditures of governmental funds”].) Accordingly, the Supreme
Court has broadly interpreted the standing provisions of Section 526a (Blair, supra, at pp
268-270), not its substantive restrictions.

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       Mohler also advances a narrower argument: a local government commits waste
under section 526a when its failure to maintain government property is so thoroughly
unjustified that it rises “to the level of fraud, corruption, or collusion.” That may be
correct. The Supreme Court has stated that a court applying section 526a “must not close
its eyes to wasteful, improvident and completely unnecessary public spending.”
(Sundance, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 1139, quoting Ceres, supra, 274 Cal.App.2d at p. 555.)
By analogy, in some circumstances a local government’s failure to maintain or repair a
property may be so completely irrational or lacking any legitimate justification that it
constitutes waste.
       Mohler, however, has not alleged such circumstances. Far from suggesting that
the County acted irrationally, she alleged that the County decided to stop maintaining the
Reid-Hillview Airport for a reason: “[t]he County’s current business plan promotes non-
aviation use of [the airport’s] land,” and “[i]n furtherance of its plan, the County has
allowed [the airport] to fall into disrepair.” There is nothing irrational or illegitimate
about reducing or avoiding maintenance expenses, especially long-term ones, on a
property whose use may change. While not fully maintaining an airport may allow it to
fall into disrepair and reduce its value as an airport, such disrepair may not affect the
property’s value for other uses, such as for a housing complex or a retail development,
that require extensive investment and alteration. Indeed, if restricted maintenance and
repair of a property would not affect its value for another use, it may be wasteful to incur
full maintenance and repair costs once the decision to change the property’s use has been
made. Section 526a does not authorize courts to second guess such decisions. Thus,
Mohler has failed to state a cause of action under section 526a based on the County’s
failure to maintain the Reid-Hillview Airport.
       The conclusion might be different if Mohler had shown that the County has a duty
to continue operating the Reid-Hillview Airport indefinitely and therefore lacked any

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legitimate justification for not maintaining it as an airport. Mohler, however, has chosen
not to assert such a duty and to argue instead that she is not required to show any duty.
       B. Dangerous Conditions
       In her briefs, Mohler argues in the alternative that the County committed waste
under section 526a by failing to maintain taxiways and runways because it has a duty as a
government property owner to prevent dangerous conditions. 4 It is not clear that Mohler
adequately raised this argument in the trial court: while she asserted a duty to maintain
the Reid-Hillview Airport in a safe manner, she did so only in passing. In any event,
even if this argument was properly raised, it fails because the complaint does not
adequately allege any dangerous conditions at the Reid-Hillview Airport.
       While Mohler makes general allegations that the Reid-Hillview Airport has fallen
“into disrepair” and not been maintained in “a serviceable condition,” under section 526a
“ ‘[g]eneral allegations, innuendo, and legal conclusions are not sufficient [citation];
rather, the plaintiff must cite specific facts and reasons’ ” demonstrating an “ ‘illegal
expenditure or injury to the public fisc.’ ” (County of Santa Clara v. Superior Court
(2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 119, 130.) Mohler has not satisfied this requirement. In
asserting that there are dangerous conditions at the airport, Mohler points to allegations
that, as a result of the County’s failure to perform maintenance, taxiways and runways
have become “overgrown with weeds over 6 inches in height” and that the weeds have
made “cracks and holes in the asphalt” and their root systems have created “bumps and
soft spots” in the asphalts. Mohler also notes allegations concerning vegetation and trash
that have “accumulate[d] around the perimeter of the airport.”

       4
         At oral argument, Mohler also asserted that Civil Code section 1714, California
Code of Regulations, title 21, section 3542, subdivisions (e) and (f), the County’s Roads
and Airports Department website, and Santa Clara County Ordinance, section A13-13,
each impose a duty on the County to maintain Reid-Hillview Airport. As these
arguments were raised for the first time at oral argument, we do not consider them. (See,
e.g., Palp, Inc. v. Williamsburg National Ins. Co. (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 282, 291 fn. 2.)

                                              8
       These allegations do not show dangerous conditions. While public entities have a
duty to protect against dangerous conditions (Gov. Code, § 835), a condition qualifies as
dangerous in this context only if it “creates a substantial (as distinguished from a minor,
trivial, or insignificant) risk of injury” (Id., § 830, subd. (a)). Mohler has not alleged such
a risk. While the complaint alleges that there are weeds on taxiways and runways, and
that the pavement has cracks, bumps, and soft spots, notably absent from the complaint is
any allegation that these conditions create a substantial risk of injury. To the contrary,
while the photos embedded in the complaint show tall grasses and weeds in some parts of
the airport in the one photo of a runway, there are no potholes or other apparent hazards,
nor even any discernible vegetation, on the runway itself. Similarly, the allegation that
the County has allowed some hangars to rust and that rust drips down onto aircraft parked
below does not show a substantial risk of injury. As a consequence, the complaint fails to
allege any dangerous condition, especially under the heightened pleading standard
applicable to claims against government entities. (See, e.g., Lopez v. Southern Cal. Rapid
Transit Dist. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 780, 795; see also Brenner v. City of El Cajon (2003) 113
Cal.App.4th 434, 439 [“claim alleging a dangerous condition may not rely on generalized
allegations [citation] but must specify in what manner the condition constituted a
dangerous condition.”].) Here again, Mohler fails to state a cause of action for waste
under section 526a.
       Because the complaint does not adequately allege dangerous conditions, we need
not reach the County’s arguments that Mohler is attempting improperly to enforce grant
assurances made by the County to the Federal Aviation Administration or that this Court
should abstain from considering any claim of dangerous conditions at Reid-Hillview
Airport in deference to the administrative remedies available before the agency. In
addition, because the complaint fails to state a cause of action under section 526a, we
need not consider whether the relief requested by Mohler is impermissibly vague.

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       C. Leave to Amend
       Mohler also argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her leave to
amend. Where a demurrer was sustained without leave to amend, “[t]he plaintiff bears
the burden of proving an amendment could cure the defect.” (Novartis, supra, 4 Cal.5th
at p. 162.) Mohler has not satisfied this burden. While she offers to plead additional
facts to support her claim of “intentional waste” and to “articulate … with an amendment
” the County’s duty to maintain the Reid-Hillview, she fails to describe what additional
facts she would plead. As a consequence, she has not satisfied her burden of showing
that she can amend the complaint to cure its defects.
                                     III.   DISPOSITION
       The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

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                                        ____________________________
                                        BROMBERG, J.

WE CONCUR:

____________________________
BAMATTRE-MANOUKIAN, ACTING P.J.

_____________________________
WILSON, J.

Mohler v. County of Santa Clara et al
H049994
Filed 6/8/23
                            CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

               IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                             SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 ANISSA MOHLER,                                    H049994
                                                  (Santa Clara County
         Plaintiff and Appellant,                  Super. Ct. No. 21CV384330)

         v.

 COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA et al.,

         Defendants and Respondents.

        BY THE COURT:
        The opinion in the above-entitled matter filed on May 10, 2023, was not certified
for publication in the Official Reports. For good cause it now appears that the opinion
should be published in the Official Reports, and it is so ordered.

                                             1
Dated:                                   ____________________________________
                                         BAMATTRE-MANOUKIAN, ACTING P.J.

________________________________
BROMBERG, J.

________________________________
WILSON, J.

Mohler v. County of Santa Clara et al.
H049994

                                           2
Trial Court:                                   Santa Clara County
                                               Superior Court No.: 21CV384330

Trial Judge:                                   The Honorable Christopher G. Rudy

Attorney for Plaintiff and Appellant           McManis Faulker
Anissa Mohler:
                                               James McManis
                                               Matthew Schechter
                                               Tyler Atkinson
                                               Cherrie Tan

Attorneys for Defendants and Respondents       Office of the County Counsel
County of Santa Clara et al.:
                                               James R. Williams,
                                               County Counsel

                                               Xavier M. Brandwajn,
                                               Deputy County Counsel

Mohler v. County of Santa Clara et al.
H049994

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