Court Opinion

ID: 9533920
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:35:30.521496+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:29:13.223496
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE McLAREN, specially concurring: I specially concur because I believe the BOCA National Fire Prevention Code of 1993 (BOCA Code) under its own terms “shall be construed to secure its expressed intent, which is to ensure public safety, health, and welfare insofar as they are affected by conditions which cause fire or explosion and panic resulting therefrom; and, in general, to secure safety to life and property from fire hazards incident to the occupancy and maintenance of structures or premises.” (Emphasis added.) BOCA Code of 1993 § F — 101.5 Intent. The BOCA Code contains references that indicate that the code is designed to protect the public welfare, reduce fire hazards generally, reduce fire hazards to adjoining property, and require minimum standards to reduce the danger of one of the most volatile hazards known to man. See BOCA Code § F — 110.3 Unsafe conditions (referencing public welfare); BOCA Code § F — 301.1 Scope for precautions against fire and the spread of fire; § F — 403.5 Location (open burning) (“The location for any open burning [(emphasis in original)] shall not be less than 50 feet (15240 mm) from any structure, and provisions shall be made to prevent the fire from spreading to within 50 feet (15240 mm) of any structure. Fires in approved containers shall be permitted, provided that such fires are not less than 15 feet (4572 mm) from any structure” (emphasis added)); BOCA Code § F — 1802.6.5 Building Clearances (oil and gas production) (“A sump or other basin for the retention of oil or petroleum products shall not be closer than 250 feet (76200 mm.) to any building that is not necessary for the operation of the well” (emphasis added)); BOCA Code § F — 1904.4 Drainage (organic coatings) (“Drainage facilities shall be provided *** where *** flammable and combustible liquids [(emphasis in original)] are capable of flowing *** so as to constitute a fire hazard to premises of other persons” (emphasis added)); BOCA Code § F — 2302.1 Definitions: Detached storage structure (“A *** structure *** utilized for the storage of hazardous materials [(emphasis in original)] and located an approved distance from all structures” (emphasis added)); BOCA Code § F — 2315.4.2 Overflow (“Overflow from the secondary containment system shall be provided to direct liquid leakage and fire protection water to a safe location away from the structure, control valves, means of egress [emphasis in original], fire lanes, adjoining property or public sewers” (emphasis added)); BOCA Code § F — 3504.2.1 Distance from storage to exposures (“Outside storage of irritants, sensitizers, and other health hazards [(emphasis in original)] shall be located 25 feet (7620 mm.) or more from any lot line, public way, exit discharge or exterior wall opening” (emphasis added)). The plaintiff alleged that the defendant violated section F — 503.1 requiring fire protection systems, including, inter alia, automated sprinkler systems. The plaintiff further alleged the defendant failed to place smoke detectors in each room, a violation of section F — 503.4, and failed to keep said smoke detectors in proper working condition, a violation of section F — 513.7. The plaintiff also alleged that the defendant failed to maintain fire extinguishers in proper condition, a violation of section F — 509.0, Halogenated Extinguishing Systems. The authoring justice concludes that the record is insufficient to consider the merits of whether a duty or duties exist under the BOCA Code. A trial court is required to take judicial notice of an ordinance once brought to its attention. Ralls v. Village of Glendale Heights, 233 Ill. App. 3d 147, 157 (1992). The violation of an ordinance designed to protect human life or property is prima facie evidence of negligence; to recover, a plaintiff need only establish that he was within the class of persons to be protected by the ordinance and that the violation of the ordinance proximately caused his injury. Ralls, 233 Ill. App. 3d at 157. The appellate court may take judicial notice of matters not of record. See Nameoki Township v. Cruse, 155 Ill. App. 3d 889, 895 (1987); Village of Glen Ellyn v. Fujinaga, 190 Ill. App. 3d 584, 586 (1989). However, judicial notice need not be taken if the document is not accessible. Faustrum v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 240 Ill. App. 3d 947, 950 (1993). I obtained a copy of the BOCA Code from the reference desk of the Wheaton Public Library. Additionally, there are several editions of the BOCA Code at the Du Page County Law Library. I believe this court can and should consider the merits of the plaintiffs BOCA Code contentions. The question to be resolved is whether or not the plaintiff is within the class of persons to be protected by the ordinance. I believe the answer is yes. A fair reading of the BOCA Code indicates that it is primarily concerned with the prevention and spread of fire and other dangerous materials both on and off premises. The very nature of fire is that it is not easily extinguished or contained once it reaches a certain stage or level of intensity. Some regulations are designed to require the authorities to be notified quickly so that response time is minimal and attempts to control and extinguish the fire are successful. Some regulations are designed to prevent fires from starting. Some regulations are designed to have firefighting equipment available so as to control or extinguish the fire as quickly as possible. Some regulations are designed to prevent the spread of fire to other structures and other premises. Whether any or all of these regulations were relevant and material to the issue of proximate cause is an issue of fact. However, I consider it unreasonable to conclude that an adjoining landowner is not a person in the class of persons whose interests, property, and safety are considered and affirmatively affected by the BOCA Code. Accordingly, the plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a prima facie case. Thus, the plaintiff now should be given the opportunity to prove that the negligence of the defendant was a proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries.