Court Opinion

ID: 9516583
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 23:46:05.461191+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:40:41.106729
License: Public Domain

CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON, dissenting: Because we denied Semmer ling’s separate petition for leave to appeal, which challenged the appellate court’s judgment reversing the circuit court’s dismissal of Concrete Doctor’s complaint for contribution against the fourth-party defendants (Guerino v. Depot Place Partnership, 184 Ill. 2d 556 (1999) (leave to appeal denied)), the propriety of that judgment would normally be beyond our review in this proceeding. See, e.g., Vroegh v. J&M Forklift, 165 Ill. 2d 523, 527-28, 531 (1995). As the majority opinion notes, however, Waste Management’s petition, which we did allow, expressly incorporated the issues raised by Semmerling, and Semmerling was subsequently granted leave to file a separate brief which raised the points it had previously asserted in its petition for leave to appeal. Under these circumstances, it would be disingenuous for us to now hold that Semmerling was barred from challenging the appellate court’s judgment regarding the validity of Concrete Doctor’s fourth-party claim. For this reason, I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the matter is properly before us. I disagree, however, with how the matter has been resolved. Contrary to my colleagues, I do not believe that Concrete Doctor failed to state a claim for contribution against the fourth-party defendants. Whether a party is potentially liable in tort is determined at the time of the injury out of which the right to contribution arises, not at the time the action for contribution is brought. Vroegh, 165 Ill. 2d at 529. In the case before us, there is no doubt that Concrete Doctor was potentially liable in tort at the time Guerino was injured. As Guerino’s employer, Concrete Doctor could have invoked the Workers’ Compensation Act as an affirmative defense had it been sued by plaintiff directly, but the law is well established that the availability of such an affirmative defense does not preclude a defendant from availing itself of the Contribution Act. Vroegh, 165 Ill. 2d at 529-30. The fourth-party defendants were also potentially liable in tort at the time of Guerino’s injury. That potential liability was not negated by their subsequent success in invoking the statute of limitations. As with the Workers’ Compensation Act defense available to Concrete Doctor, the limitations defense available to the fourth-party defendants did not oust them from the provisions of the Contribution Act. Delaney v. McDonald’s Corp., 158 Ill. 2d 465 (1994). Because Concrete Doctor and the fourth-party defendants were all potentially liable in tort as a result of Guerino’s injury, there was a “right of contribution among them” within the meaning of section 2(a) of the Contribution Act (740 ILCS 100/2(a) (West 1996)). Contrary to the majority’s holding, Concrete Doctor’s right to seek contribution from the other tortfeasors was not extinguished by the dismissal of the third-party action against it. Because of its agreement with Depot Place, Concrete Doctor remained liable for Guerino’s injuries. Although Concrete Doctor assumed liability for Guerino’s injuries contractually, the ultimate basis for Concrete Doctor’s liability is irrelevant. All that matters under the Contribution Act is that the party seeking contribution and the party from whom contribution is sought be potentially liable to the plaintiff, in tort, at the time the plaintiff was injured. Vroegh, 165 Ill. 2d at 529. As previously indicated, that condition was satisfied here. I note, moreover, that while Concrete Doctor’s ultimate liability flowed from its contractual agreement with Depot Place, the damages for which Concrete Doctor was liable were based on the injuries sustained by Guerino which were compensable under tort law. The contractual provisions merely shifted the burden of paying the damages for those injuries from Deport Place back to Concrete Doctor. It is exactly as if Concrete Doctor had been sued in tort directly. Because Concrete Doctor was potentially liable in tort at the time Guerino was injured and because the damages it paid were based on Guerino’s tort claims, the appellate court was correct in concluding that Concrete Doctor’s complaint for contribution should not have been dismissed. Concrete Doctor had a viable claim under the Contribution Act, and allowing that claim to go forward is fully consistent with the Act’s purposes. Accordingly, I believe that our court should proceed to the question for which we granted Waste Management’s petition for leave to appeal, namely, whether the settlement for which Concrete Doctor seeks contribution was made in good faith. That is an issue my colleagues have failed to address but should. I therefore dissent. JUSTICE BILANDIC joins in this dissent.