Court Opinion

ID: 9522115
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:18:08.12669+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:02:18.776027
License: Public Domain

Crawford, Supr. J.,
¶45. Specially Assigned, dissenting. I dissent from the majority decision because I disagree with the application of a clear-and-convincing-evidenee standard to family court decisions about parent-child contact in divorce and parentage cases. A higher standard of proof is constitutionally mandated in cases in which the state seeks to deprive an individual of a liberty interest so that the possibility of error is borne more heavily by the state. In disputes over custody and visitation between individuals, however, the higher burden simply shifts the possibility of error from one parent to another. As explained below, because the private interests are equally balanced, there is *474no compelling reason that one individual should more heavily bear the burden of error.
¶ 46. In Mullin v. Phelps, 162 Vt. 250, 647 A.2d 714 (1994), this Court interpreted the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Chapter I, Article 10 of the Vermont Constitution to require the family court to make findings of sexual abuse by clear and convincing evidence before parent-child contact can be denied to the noncustodial parent. This ruling, largely unprecedented at the time, extended a decision of the U.S. Supreme Court requiring the higher standard of proof in termination of parental rights cases. See Santosky n Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 768 (1982) (concluding that in termination cases an equal allocation of risk between parents and the state is “constitutionally intolerable”). Although this Court has continued to enforce this higher standard of proof in cases in which one parent seeks to effectively end the other’s parent-child contact, see Gabriel v. Pritchard, 173 Vt. 452, 455, 788 A.2d 1, 5 (2001) (mem.) (requiring clear and convincing evidence of the child’s best interest before suspending a parent’s right to visitation); Fournier v. Fournier, 169 Vt. 600, 603-04, 738 A.2d 98, 102-03 (1999) (mem.), I believe Mullin’s extension of Santosky to private disputes was in error.
¶ 47. In government-initiated proceedings in which the interests of individuals are particularly important, the purpose of requiring proof by clear and convincing evidence as a matter of due process is to move the risk of erroneous findings away from the individual and onto the state. Thus, in addition to cases concerning the termination of parental rights, the state must meet the higher evidentiary standard in cases involving civil commitment, deportation, and naturalization. New now question the wisdom and constitutional necessity of limiting the police power of the state in these cases by requiring a heightened level of proof.
¶ 48. It is a very different matter, however, to favor the claims of one side over another in a private custody dispute. As the account of the facts provided by the majority reveals, the burden of proof can greatly affect the outcome of a case. The evidence of father’s actions, including inappropriate kissing, touching, and partial nudity over the course of many years, supported the trial court’s conclusion that it was more likely than not that he had sexually abused his daughter. The trial court was scrupulous in concluding that this evidence, as compelling as it appears in the paper record, fell short of the clear-and-convincing-evidence stan*475dard in much the same way that it evidently fell short of the proof-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt threshold in father’s related criminal prosecution.
¶ 49. What constitutional principle requires the family court to order continued visitation in a divorce case when the evidence shows that it is more likely than not that one parent has committed sexual abuse? The three-part test adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), addresses the competing interests in cases initiated by the state which may lead to the deprivation of an individual’s liberty or property. There are three factors identified in Matthews: “the private interest that will be affected by the official action”; “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used”; and the countervailing governmental interest in avoiding additional fiscal and administrative burdens through substitute procedural requirements. Id. at 335. The balancing of these factors dictates what types of procedural protections due process requires.
¶ 50. The presence of important private interests is misleading when we seek to apply the constitutional test in a custody case. In Mathews, the private interest was the property interest of an individual in continuing to receive Social Security disability benefits. The state had a competing interest at least as strong in terminating the benefits after an individual recovered or returned to work. These interests can be weighed against one another and, if the individual interest is high enough, due process requires the state to meet the higher burden of proof.
¶ 51. In a custody case, there is no state interest to be balanced against private interests. In constitutional terms, the state has not taken any action to deprive an individual of liberty or property because the state is not a party and has no interest. In contrast, both parents have strong interests in the outcome of the case, but these are private interests which cannot be weighed against some competing interest of the state. There is no constitutional basis for deciding that one parent’s interest in visitation outweighs the other’s interest in safeguarding the child from abuse. In the balancing test required by decisions like Mathews, both parents’ interests appear on the same side of the ledger and should receive no greater deference or protection.
¶ 52. Finally, the Mullin rule is not necessary in Vermont given that the relevant statutes already provide procedural protections *476and direct judicial decision-making in custody disputes. The “best interests of the child” are paramount, and the legislation sets out nine factors to guide the court in determining these interests. 15 V.S.A. § 665. Procedural due process is satisfied by a custody hearing in which each parent has an equal opportunity to persuade the court that his or her position on these factors is more likely true. See In re Smith, 169 Vt. 162, 172, 730 A.2d 605, 612-13 (1999) (“Where substantial interests exist on both sides, due process demands no more than an equal apportionment of the risk of error, which the preponderance standard accomplishes.”). As this case demonstrates, the Mullin rule — privileging as it does the evidence of one party over another — results in rulings which are contrary to the best interests of the child.
¶ 53. It is time to reconsider the wisdom of the Mullin decision. It arose out of a factual context in which the claims of abuse were highly suspect. The constitutional principle has not found support in the decisions of other states. And, most compellingly, in cases in which a child’s word is offered against an adult’s, it can result in rulings which favor contact with a probable abuser over safety for children.
¶ 54. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. I would affirm the decision of the trial court.