Court Opinion

ID: 9737474
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:26:18.723495+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:23:59.195779
License: Public Domain

KIRSCH, Judge,

dissenting.

I respectfully dissent.
My dissent is not from the majority’s statement of the law. The majority clearly, correctly and articulately analyzes the seven factors set forth by our supreme court in Hale v. Kemp, 579 N.E.2d 63 (Ind.1991), reviews the evidence on each of the factors and holds that the evidence is sufficient on a sufficient number of the factors to conclude that the trial court’s decision was not clearly erroneous.
Rather, my dissent is based on public policy concerns and what I believe to be a misapplication of such concerns by our courts. In its opinion, the majority iterates the oft-repeated statement that “public policy favors the inclusion of employees within the scope of the Worker’s Compensation Act,” citing Davis v. Central Rent-A-Crane, 663 N.E.2d 1177, 1179 (Ind.Ct.App.1996). The purpose underlying this policy was to insure that workers injured in workplace accidents in the course of their employment would receive the health and disability benefits mandated by the act. The purpose was not to immunize third-party tort feasors and their liability insurers from liability for negligence which results in serious injuries to one who is not in their employ. And yet, that is the result of the application of the foregoing policy to cases such as the one now before us.
It is from the application of this policy that the burden is shifted to the injured employee to prove that the claim falls outside the coverage of the act. Davis, 663 N.E.2d at 1179. Here, the trial court concluded that the employee had failed to meet his burden and the majority holds that conclusion was not clear*545ly erroneous. While there is clearly some evidence to support the trial court’s conclusions on each of the seven Hale factors, that evidence is not conclusive on any of the factors and, if the burden were not shifted to the injured employee, would clearly support a contrary conclusion.
By way of example, I point to the first two conclusions of the trial court, that Custom indirectly retained a right to discharge and indirectly paid the crane operator. The evidence supporting these conclusions was that Custom could have requested Cannon assign a different crane operator if it was dissatisfied with the one assigned and that Custom paid Cannon for the services of the operator and Cannon in turn compensated the operator. Virtually every independent contractor arrangement involves such indirect rights and obligations.
If it is the public policy of this state to allow third-party tort feasors and their liability insurers to use the Indiana Worker’s Compensation Act as a shield by which to immunize themselves from liability for their wrongful acts resulting in serious injuries to the employee of another, then it is a policy which should be re-examined. I would not apply the policy in this way, would not shift the burden to the injured employee, and would remand this case to the trial court for further consideration.