Court Opinion

ID: 9684204
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:50:33.218065+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:54.042816
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.
{concurring). I join the majority opinion. I write separately to discuss two issues not addressed by the majority opinion.
h — I
As the majority opinion observes, an insurer is liable for all damages which are the proximate result of its tortious bad faith conduct. Attorney fees incurred in proving a bad faith claim are not awarded as attorney fees, but rather as an item of damages caused by an insurer's bad faith refusal to pay benefits owed.
But the very theory supporting an award of attorney fees as damages resulting from an insurer's bad faith precludes an award of attorney fees incurred in proving punitive damages. Punitive damages are "awarded in addition to compensatory damages for the tort." Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 85 Wis. 2d 675, 697, 271 N.W.2d 368 (1978). To assess punitive damages, then, "something must be shown over and above the mere breach of duty for which compensatory damages can be given." Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 268, 294 N.W.2d 437 (1980) (quoting Meshane *581v. Second Street Co., 197 Wis. 382, 387, 222 N.W. 320 (1928)). To recover punitive damages in bad faith tort cases, "there must be a showing of an evil intent deserving of punishment or of something in the nature of special ill-will or wanton disregard of duty or gross or outrageous conduct." Anderson, 85 Wis. 2d at 697.
Because punitive damages are awarded in addition to and apart from damages proximately resulting from bad faith conduct, attorney fees incurred in proving punitive damages cannot be construed as damages resulting from tortious bad faith conduct. Instead, they begin as attorney fees and remain attorney fees, never undergoing a transvaluation into damages.
In the instant case, the special verdict question correctly asked the jury what "amount of money would fairly compensate plaintiff for damages caused by defendant's bad faith conduct?" The jury crossed out the dollar sign and filled in the blank with "100%" rather than a number. As a consequence, the plaintiff in this case was awarded all of his attorney fees, including attorney fees that might have been incurred in proving the issue of punitive damages.
The record leaves unclear what if any attorney fees the plaintiff incurred in proving his punitive damages claim. The jury heard that the plaintiff had received bills in excess of $50,000 for attorney fees incurred up until trial. After trial the plaintiffs counsel submitted statements for services, including services rendered during the trial.
The insurer's objection to the plaintiffs attorney fees award did not specifically raise the issue of attorney fees incurred on the punitive damages claim. Consequently, the defendant has waived any objection he might have had to the fee award on the basis that it *582included attorney fees for the plaintiff's punitive damages claim.
I therefore concur in the majority's decision to uphold the award of attorney fees. I write to caution that I do not interpret this decision as allowing attorney fees incurred in the punitive damages part of a case as damages proximately resulting from the tort of bad faith.
II.
As the majority opinion observes, the parties in this case were asked to file supplemental briefs because a question phrased by the court of appeals in its certification memorandum and adopted by this court in its acceptance of the certification unduly limited the parties' discussion of the award of attorney fees in bad faith actions.1 Furthermore, having limited the issues it would consider on certification, this court must now remand three issues to the court of appeals.2 *583Thus the case is not yet over and may even come back to this court.
Had the court taken jurisdiction of the entire appeal, the parties would have briefed the issue of attorney fees as originally stated by both parties in their respective court of appeals briefs.3 Furthermore, the court would have been free to decide all the issues, if it had wished.4
In the future, when the court issues an order limiting the issues it accepts on certification, it should offer the parties an opportunity to comment on whether the issues accepted have been framed appropriately. Had the court done so in this case, for example, the parties could have pointed out, as did the plaintiff in his brief to this court, that framing the question of whether attorney fees were appropriate in terms of Elliot v. Donahue, 169 Wis. 2d 310, 485 N.W.2d 403 (1992), did *584not allow the parties to fully and adequately discuss the award of attorney fees in a bad faith claim.5 This process would have enabled , the parties to brief and argue the correct issue and would have saved the court and the parties time and effort.
For the reasons set forth, I concur.

 Ordinarily when this court grants direct review on certification of an appeal, it acquires jurisdiction of the entire case. State v. Stoehr, 134 Wis. 2d 66, 70, 396 N.W.2d 177 (1986); Wis. Stat. § 808.05(2) (1993-94) and Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.61 (1993-94).

 The three issues being remanded are:
1. Is a lump-sum award of the present value of projected future benefits under a disability insurance policy appropriate where the insured has prevailed in a breach of contract and insurance bad faith action?
2. Is evidence concerning the injuries sustained by a passenger in an automobile accident in which plaintiff was injured relevant and admissible on the question of whether the plaintiff himself is "totally disabled" as that term is defined in a disability policy of insurance?
3. Is it appropriate for an absent witness instruction to be given to the jury where (1) the requesting party made no showing of reasonable relationship between the other party's failure to *583produce the witness and the inference that the testimony, having been placed before the jury, would have been unfavorable to the party's cause; (2) the requesting party had deposed the "absent witness" and could have introduced his testimony at trial; and (3) the testimony of the witness would have been cumulative?

 In its brief to the court of appeals, the insurer stated the issue as follows:
Do attorney's fees incurred by plaintiff in prosecuting a breach of contract and insurance bad faith action, and/or bond premiums incurred to obtain a preliminary injunction with such action, constitute compensable damages for bad faith?
Court of Appeals Brief for Defendant at vii. The plaintiff stated the issue similarly. Court of Appeals Brief for Plaintiff at 1.

 For a discussion of the disadvantages of limiting cases on appeal, see unpublished order on file with the Clerk of the Supreme Court in DeChant v. Monarch Life Ins., No. 93-2220 (Dec. 16, 1994) (Abrahamson and Geske, J. J., objecting to limiting the issues accepted on appeal).

 In his initial, brief to this court the plaintiff pointed out that he could not discuss various alternative bases for upholding the award of attorney fees because of the way this court limited the issues on accepting certification. Brief for Plaintiff at 9 n 3.