Court Opinion

ID: 9686753
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:04:51.996012+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:21.881147
License: Public Domain

CuRRiE, J.
(dissenting). I cannot agree that the erroneous instruction on res ipsa loquitur was not prejudicial in the instant case.
The only item of negligence found against the defendant Van Hoof was in “using the Wesley trailer hitch without a safety lock” (sub. (b) of the first question of the verdict).
As to the subdivision of the verdict dealing with this particular item of negligence the trial court instructed the jury as follows:
“You are instructed that in order to answer subdivision (b) of the first question ‘Yes,’ you must be convinced to a reasonable certainty by the greater weight of the credible evidence or from inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence that the defendant, Van Ploof, either knew that the Wesley hitch was defective because of the absence of a locking device, or that in the exercise of ordinary care he should have known that the Wesley hitch was defective because of the absence of such locking device, and further that he knew, or in the exercise of ordinary care should have known, that it was dangerous to use the Wesley hitch without such locking device.
“You are instructed that where the car attached to the trailer by a hitch is under the management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if the defendant who had the management and control of the combination vehicle used proper care, the accident itself affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from negligence of the defendant.” (Italics supplied.)
*467The effect of such instruction taken as a whole is to tell the jury that in order to answer sub. (b) of the first question of the verdict “Yes” the jury must find either that Van Hoof knew or should have known of the absence of the locking device, but that this could be inferred from the happening of the accident itself. However, the happening of the accident has no relevancy whatever on the issue of Van Hoofs actual or constructive knowledge of the absence of a locking device. It is hard to conceive how such an erroneous instruction could fail to be prejudicial.
The fact that the jury answered sub. (a) of the first question of the verdict in Van Hoof’s favor is wholly a non sequitur. This is because the erroneous instruction apparently only related to sub. (b) or at least the jury were warranted in so assuming.
Because of the prejudicial nature of the attacked instruction the judgment should be reversed, and the cause remanded for a new trial.
I am authorized to state that Mr. Justice Brown and Mr. Justice Wingert concur in this dissent.