Court Opinion

ID: 9623814
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:44:03.086661+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:35.068591
License: Public Domain

Fletcher, Justice,
concurring.
I agree with the majority that the conduct of a public official who participates in a meeting which has been closed in violation of the Open Meetings Act can become a ground for recall under the Recall Act of 1989 (the “Act”).6
I write separately to express my concerns with provisions of the Act, as amended on April 10, 1991 and subsequent to the superior court review involved in the present case, which declare that the superior court’s review shall not be for a determination “as to the truth” of the facts alleged in the application, but “only for the determination of the legal sufficiency of such alleged fact or facts as to *647form . . . and shall not include . . . evidentiary hearings.”7 Accordingly, the truth of the facts alleged in an application for a recall petition will not be reviewed by any court.8
Decided November 1, 1991.
Remar & Graettinger, John S. Graettinger, Jr., Susan M. Garrett, Jenny E. Jensen, for appellants.
Sullivan, Hall, Booth & Smith, Jack G. Slover, Jr., for appellees.
James F. Grubiak, Oliver Hunter, amici curiae.
I hope that the majority’s decision in Division 2 (b) will discourage neither persons who currently serve as local public officials nor persons who are considering entering public service. Rather, I trust that the decision will be accepted as clear direction from this court to public officials and their attorneys. The practical side of the majority decision is to point out that if there is the slightest doubt, or any question whatsoever, as to whether a matter can be the subject of a closed meeting, DO NOT CLOSE. To err in favor of openness will not result in the imposition of penalties on public officials, however, to err otherwise may well result in such penalties. It is also my hope that, from this concurrence, others will come to recognize and share my concern with the extremely limited nature of the judicial review afforded by the 1991 amendment to the Act.

 It is not entirely clear to me what the Act means by “legal sufficiency” as that term is applied to the review proceeding which the officer sought to be recalled can avail himself of in the superior court following submission of an application for recall petition to the election superintendent. The portion of the Act which defines legal sufficiency appears only to define the term as it applies to the review of the application to be conducted by the election superintendent.

 I note that the 1991 amendment to the Act basically returns OCGA § 21-4-6 of the Act to the language and procedure contained in that portion of the Act when it was originally enacted in 1989. The only difference between that section of the Act as originally enacted and as amended in 1991 are the provisions as to the way in which a judge is to be selected for the superior court’s review of the application.

 An exception might be a criminal action filed against the petition circulator or petition chairperson (see OCGA § 21-4-5 (b) (1) (ii)). However, if such a criminal proceeding were to occur, in all likelihood it would not occur until long after the recall election had been held. How then can a determination ever be made as to the wilfulness which the Act declares to be a necessary element of “misconduct in office?” OCGA § 21-4-3 (8). Are we not allowing form to prevail over substance and fact?