Court Opinion

ID: 9692228
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 15:47:57.039506+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:33.351308
License: Public Domain

A motion for rehearing was granted April 30, 1963, confined to two questions, without oral argument.
Briefs on rehearing were filed for the appellants by Foley, Sammond & Lardner and John R. Collins, all of Milwaukee, and for the respondent Herbert Stuewer by Arnold, Murray & O’Neill of Milwaukee.
*235bThe following opinion was filed August 6, 1963:
Per Curiam
{on rehearing). The two questions on which rehearing was granted were as follows;
(1) Was notice of breach of warranty essential to plaintiffs’ cause of action against Herbert Stuewer for breach of express warranty ?
(2) Would the record sustain a finding that a proper notice of breach was given, if required ?
1. Necessity of notice. The tires were sold and delivered in Wisconsin, where plaintiffs reside and ordinarily keep their car, albeit Stuewer was aware of plaintiffs’ plan to travel outside the state. The injury occurred while plaintiffs were passing through Indiana. Plaintiffs concede that Wisconsin law is applicable to questions of scope and extent of the warranties, but contend that Indiana law controls as to the necessity of notice of breach of warranty.1
This action is founded upon an express warranty in connection with a sale, made and completed in Wisconsin, of an article intended to be principally used in Wisconsin. Although the damages were directly caused by an event in Indiana, we perceive no sound reason why the question whether notice must be given of breach of the Wisconsin warranty should be decided by the law of Indiana, simply because the injury occurred there.
Several courts have decided that in a personal-injury action against a seller on the ground of breach of warranty, liability is determined in accordance with the law of the place in which defendant sold the product.2 It has been held, *235chowever, that the entire transaction from sale to injury should be considered and the law of the place “most closely associated with” the transaction should be applied.3 In the present case, either rule would require application of Wisconsin law.
The late Judge Goodrich endorsed the view that all matters connected with the performance of a contract are regulated by the law of the place where it is to be performed.4 For various purposes, validity and interpretation, as well as breach, several different formulae are used for deciding which law will be applied, i.e., place of making, place of performance, intention of the parties, grouping of contacts.5 Any of these formulae would require application of Wisconsin law to the present case.
It is true that the majority of courts have held that in products-liability actions founded on negligence, the law of the place of the wrong governs, and the place of the wrong is the place where the injury was sustained.6 It is not easy to find a rational explanation why, when plaintiff’s injury occurs in state A, and all other material facts, including the acts and omissions of defendant take place in state B, the law of state A will apply if the cause of action be based on negligence, but the law of state B, if based on breach of contract.7 In any event, the present case is thoroughly grounded *235din contract, and it seems clear that the consequences of failure to give notice of breach are so closely related to the rights arising out of the contract of sale, that both should be governed by the same law.
We conclude that the law of Wisconsin governs the necessity of prompt notice of breach.
This court has not addressed the question whether a plaintiff seeking to recover damages for personal injury arising out of a breach of warranty is bound by sec. 121.49, Stats, (sec. 49, Uniform Sales Act, 1A U. L. A., p. 99), to give the seller timely notice of breach.8 Most courts hold that plaintiff is bound by sec. 49.9
The majority rule has been subjected to criticism. Learned authors have suggested that although the notice requirement is a sound rule of commerce, and by requiring prompt assertion of claims, protects sellers from claims which arise from afterthought, the injured consumer is often unfamiliar with business usage and is more likely, because of ignorance, to delay the assertion of an otherwise valid claim.10
*235eThe ihtermediate appellate courts of New York have held notice of breach unnecessary in personal-injury actions based on breach of warranty.11
It seems to us, however, that these authorities are expressing dissatisfaction with the statute, rather than a choice between reasonable interpretations of its provisions.
The supreme court of Indiana has held notice of breach unnecessary in such cases.12 This holding was based upon an interpretation of sec. 70, Uniform Sales Act, 1A U. L. A., p. 406, providing that nothing in the act shall affect the right of the buyer or seller to recover interest or special damages where by law interest or special damages may be recoverable. The court concluded that since such damages could have been recovered without notice before the act, sec. 70 exempted liability for personal injuries from the notice requirement in sec. 49. We consider, however, that the purpose of sec. 70 is to make it clear that under the Sales Act liability arising out of breach of warranty may extend to interest and special damages, even though the remedy provisions of the act do not mention either, and that it was not the purpose of sec. 70 to exempt such elements from the part of sec. 49 which provides that upon buyer’s failure to give timely notice of breach, “the seller shall not be liable therefor.”
We are aware of the view that the law of warranty is a somewhat-awkward instrument with which to determine when .to impose strict liability to consumers for personal injuries arising out of insufficiencies of a commercial product for its intended use, or failure to fulfil advertised representations.13 We have previously mentioned the criticism *235fof the notice requirement as applied to claims for personal injury.
A valid argument can be made, however, that it is important to guard against personal-injury claims which are generated by afterthought as to warranties made, and that a person who honestly feels that his injury was caused by a breach of warranty is very likely to assert his claim promptly. There is no such absurdity in applying the notice requirement to personal-injury claims to warrant reading them out of the statute.
Although we find no basis in the statute for an exception of personal-injury claims from the notice requirement of sec. 49, that section does permit some liberality in terms of content and timeliness of notice where a personal-injury claimant is involved and the interest of justice so requires.
“Although most courts require notice, they have been liberal on the whole in passing upon the adequacy of notice and the question of reasonable time. It need not take any particular form, or be a claim for damages, or be in writing. But it ‘. . . must refer to particular sales, must fairly advise the seller of the alleged defects and specify with reasonable particularity in what the breach consists [and] is sufficient if it is reasonably inferable therefrom that the buyer is asserting a violation of his legal rights.’ ” 14
2. Sufficiency of telephone conversation as notice. We have reconsidered the record in the light of the policy considerations in support of greater liberality in personal-injury actions in determining whether a particular communication to the seller is sufficient as a notice of breach under sec. 121.49, Stats. Taking the testimony most favorable to plaintiffs, we conclude that a jury could reasonably infer that Wojciuk was asserting, in his telephone conversation, a violation of plaintiffs’ legal rights arising out of their purchase of a tire.
*235gIt is true that Wojciuk made no demand for damages nor statement that he would hold Stuewer accountable. Had the same words been said in a casual conversation, the case might be different, but here the circumstances are of substantial importance. The call was made the same day as the accident, while the Wojciuks were several hundred miles from Milwaukee. The record suggests no reason for Wojciuk to call Stuewer unless he felt that Stuewer had some obligation because of the tire failure.
In our original decision we held that as a matter of law the conversation could not suffice as notice of breach. Upon reconsideration we now hold that its sufficiency as notice of breach would, under the evidence, present a jury question.
3. Costs. Plaintiffs have now, on rehearing, obtained a new trial of their cause of action against Stuewer for breach of express warranty. To that extent they have prevailed against him and are entitled to costs. They have not, however, prevailed against the other defendants. On both sides, the cases were briefed and presented together, so that a proper award of costs must reflect a discretionary division. We deem it fair that plaintiffs be allowed to tax against defendant Stuewer one half of their total costs taxable on the appeal prior to rehearing and their full costs taxable on rehearing. The defendants other than Stuewer were not involved in the motion for rehearing and may tax against plaintiffs their full costs on the appeal prior to the rehearing.
It is ordered that the mandate entered March 5, 1963, be modified to read:
Insofar as the judgment dismissed plaintiffs’ cause of action against defendant Stuewer and awarded him costs, the judgment is reversed, and cause remanded for a new trial. In all other respects the judgment is affirmed. Costs are to be taxed as stated in the memorandum on rehearing.

 The supreme court of Indiana has decided that sec. 49, Uniform Sales Act, does not require prompt notice of breach of warranty where the claimed liability is for personal injury. Wright-Bachman, Inc., v. Hodnett (1956), 235 Ind. 307, 133 N. E. (2d) 713.

 Anno. 76 A. L. R. (2d) 130.

 Bowles v. Zimmer Mfg. Co. (7th Cir. 1960), 277 Fed. (2d) 868, 874, 76 A. L. R. (2d) 120. See also Stumberg, Conflict of Laws (2d ed.), ch. 12, p. 405.

 Goodrich, Conflict of Laws (3d ed.), p. 342, sec. 114. See Stumberg, Conflict of Laws (2d ed.), ch. 8, p. 263.

 Estate of Knippel (1959), 7 Wis. (2d) 335, 96 N. W. (2d) 514.

 Anno. 76 A. L. R. (2d) 130.

 The Tentative Drafts of Restatement, Conflict of Laws (2d), indicate a tendency to resolve the choice in either case on the basis of the state with which the contract or occurrence has its most “significant relationship.” Tentative Draft No. 6, Contracts, pp. 6 and 83, secs. 332 and 346c; Tentative Draft 8, Wrongs, p. 3, sec. *235d379. See also Ehrenzweig, Products Liability in the Conflict of Laws — Toward a Theory of Enterprise Liability Under Foreseeable and Insurable Laws, 69 Yale Law Journal (1960), 794, 800, for the suggestion that in products-liability cases, plaintiff should be able to choose the law most favorable to him among all the states having some contact with the case.

 The decision of this court in Marsh Wood Products Co. v. Babcock & Wilcox Co. (1932), 207 Wis. 209, 240 N. W. 392, is sometimes cited for the rule that notice of breach is necessary where plaintiff seeks damages for personal injuries. In that case, however, there were several plaintiffs. The warranty cause of action was for property damage, and the personal-injury actions were based on negligence.

 2 Harper and James, Law of Torts, p. 1574, sec. 28.17; James, Products Liability, 34 Texas Law Review (1955), 192, 197; Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 Yale Law Journal (1960), 1099, 1130.

 James, Products Liability, supra, footnote 9; Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, supra, footnote 9.

 Kennedy v. F. W. Woolworth Co. (1923), 200 N. Y. Supp 121, 205 App. Div. 648; Silverstein v. R. H. Macy & Co., Inc. (1943), 266 App. Div. 5, 40 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 916.

 Wright-Bachman, Inc., v. Hodnett, supra, footnote 1.

 James, Products Liability, supra, footnote 9; Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, supra, footnote 9.

 2 Harper and James, Law of Torts, supra, p. 1575, footnote 9, and cases cited therein.