Court Opinion

ID: 9409168
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-16 07:11:02.44567+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:49.193790
License: Public Domain

Petition for Writ of Mandamus Conditionally Granted and Memorandum
Opinion filed July 13, 2023.

                                     In The

                    Fourteenth Court of Appeals

                               NO. 14-23-00413-CV

IN RE WL & D VENTURES, LLC D/B/A MASSAGE HEIGHTS, MASSAGE
 HEIGHTS FRANCHISING, LLC, MASSAGE HEIGHTS, LP, MASSAGE
       HEIGHTS HOLDINGS, LLC, AND TODD DICK, Relators

                         ORIGINAL PROCEEDING
                           WRIT OF MANDAMUS
                              164th District Court
                             Harris County, Texas
                       Trial Court Cause No. 2021-61192

                        MEMORANDUM OPINION

      On June 13, 2023, relators WL & D Ventures, LLC d/b/a Massage Heights,
Massage Heights Franchising, LLC, Massage Heights, LP, Massage Heights
Holdings, LLC, and Todd Dick (“relators”) filed a petition for writ of mandamus in
this Court. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 22.221; see also Tex. R. App. P. 52. In
the petition, relators asks this Court to compel the Honorable C. Elliott Thornton,
presiding judge of the 164th District Court of Harris County, to vacate the trial
court’s May 15, 2023 order denying relators’ motion to designate responsible third
party. We conditionally grant the petition for writ of mandamus.

                                      BACKGROUND

       The underlying case involves an alleged sexual assault by a massage
therapist employed at a Massage Heights location on September 22, 2019. On
September 21, 2021, one day before the statute of limitations on her claim expired,
the real party in interest, Jane Doe (proceeding pseudonymously), sued the relators
for negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Doe served relators
with her lawsuit on September 28 and 29, 2021, which was after limitations
expired.

       The trial court signed a docket control order on September 28, 2022,
establishing, among other dates, a joinder deadline of February 24, 2023, and a
trial date of July 24, 2023.

       On January 9, 2023, relators filed a motion for leave to designate massage
therapist Glenn Davis as a responsible third party pursuant to Sections 33.004 and
33.011 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.1 The motion stated that
“Davis’ alleged sexual assault of [Doe] caused and/or contributed to” Doe’s
alleged injuries.    On January 24, 2023, Doe objected to relators’ motion as
untimely pursuant to Section 33.004(d) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies
Code. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 33.004(d). Doe asserted that “the
statute of limitations expired on September 22, 2021,” the case was “on file for one
       1
           Relators filed their motion for leave to designate responsible third party 196 days
before the July 24, 2023 trial setting.
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year and four months” before relators filed their motion, and “[Relators] had a duty
to timely disclose their intention to designate Glenn Davis as a responsible Third
Party, and they did not.” In reply, relators asserted that their motion for leave to
designate a responsible third party was timely filed and that the statute of
limitations does not bar designating Glenn Davis as a responsible third party.

      On May 15, 2023, the trial court denied relators’ motion. This mandamus
followed.

                                      ANALYSIS

A.    STANDARD OF REVIEW

      In order to obtain mandamus relief, relators must show both that the trial
court has abused its discretion and that they have no adequate appellate remedy. In
re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135–36 (Tex. 2004) (orig.
proceeding). “A trial court abuses its discretion if it reaches a decision so arbitrary
and unreasonable as to amount to a clear and prejudicial error of law.” In re
Dawson, 550 S.W.3d 625, 628 (Tex. 2018) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam)
(internal quotation omitted). A trial court also abuses its discretion if it fails to
correctly analyze or apply the law. Id.

B.    RESPONSIBLE THIRD PARTY

      Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code chapter 33 governs the designation
of a responsible third party. “Responsible third party” is defined as

      any person who is alleged to have caused or contributed to causing in
      any way the harm for which recovery of damages is sought, whether
      by negligent act or omission, by any defective or unreasonably

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      dangerous product, by other conduct or activity that violates an
      applicable legal standard, or by any combination of these.

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 33.011(6). Motions to designate responsible third
parties “must be filed on or before the 60th day before the trial date unless the
court finds good cause to allow the motion to be filed at a later date.” Tex. Civ.
Prac. & Rem Code § 33.004(a). Section 33.004(d) sets forth an exception to this
rule applicable when the defendant files a motion to designate after the statute of
limitations has expired. “Thus, under chapter 33, an identifiable responsible third
party generally must be identified at least sixty days before trial and before the
statute of limitations period runs on that person.” In re VC PalmsWestheimer,
L.L.C., 615 S.W.3d 655, 661 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, orig.
proceeding). If a motion for leave to designate a known individual as a responsible
third party is filed after the statute of limitations period ran for that person, the
movant must have complied with any previously existing obligations to identify
that person. See id.

      The trial court is required to grant leave to designate the known individual as
a responsible third party unless another party files an objection to the motion for
leave within fifteen days of service of the motion. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code
§ 33.004(f).   However, a timely objection only prevents the trial court from
granting leave if the objecting party establishes that the defendants “did not plead
sufficient facts concerning the alleged responsibility of the person to satisfy the
pleading requirements of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure” after having been
granted leave to replead. Id. § 33.004(g). The designation of a responsible third

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party is automatic when the trial court grants a motion for leave to designate. Id.
§ 33.004(h).

C.     Trial court abused its discretion by denying relators’ motion for leave to
       designate responsible third party

       In their petition, relators maintain the trial court abused its discretion by
denying their motion to designate responsible third party without providing
defendants an opportunity to replead, arguing that (1) relators filed the motion
more than sixty days before trial and (ii) relators had no obligation to disclose the
massage therapist as a potential responsible third party before the statute of
limitations expired.

       In her response to the petition for writ of mandamus, Doe concedes that
relators’ motion for leave to designate responsible third party “cannot be denied on
the basis of timeliness.” Nonetheless, Doe contends that the trial court’s order
denying the motion should be upheld because relators failed to plead sufficient
facts in their motion.2 See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 33.004(g).

       Additionally, without a request from this Court, respondent (the trial judge)
filed a response to this mandamus. Respondent claims that she “did not penalize
the [relators] for not responding prior to the statute running” because relators were
not made aware of the lawsuit prior to the running of the statute limitations.
Respondent, however, opines that she thought relators delayed in filing their
motion to join the responsible third party.

       2
         In her objection filed with the trial court, Doe’s only argument was relators’ motion
was untimely.
                                              5
      “The filing of a petition near or after the expiration of the statute of
limitations does not prevent a defendant from moving for leave to designate a
responsible third party.” VC PalmsWestheimer, LLC, 615 S.W.3d at 662; see also
In re Bustamante, 510 S.W.3d 732, 736–37 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016, orig.
proceeding) (reversing denial of motion to designate when suit was filed one day
before the statute of limitations expired). A defendant’s failure to disclose a
potential responsible third party before limitations expires is the natural
consequence of a plaintiff’s “decision to wait to file suit until limitations were
nearing terminus.” See In re Mobile Mini, Inc., 596 S.W.3d 781, 785 (Tex. 2020)
(orig. proceeding).

      Here, it is undisputed that relators could not have timely disclosed the
potential responsible third party before the statute of limitations period ran because
relators were not served with the lawsuit until after limitations had expired; thus,
section 33.004(d) does not deprive relators of their right to designate Davis as a
responsible third party. See id. at 787. Relators’ failure to disclose the responsible
third party before limitations expired was not the result of “the gamesmanship
concerns section 33.004(d) operates to prevent.” See id. at 785. Instead, it “was
the natural consequence of” Doe’s “decision to wait to file suit until limitations
were nearing terminus.” See id.

      To the extent Doe now argues that relators’ motion failed to contain
sufficient facts (which was not argued by the real party in her objection filed in the
underlying trial court), Doe is mistaken. Relators’ motion contained sufficient
facts to support their request to designate Glenn Davis as a responsible third party.
See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 33.011(6). Specifically, relators alleged that
                                          6
Glenn Davis is a responsible party because “Davis’ alleged sexual assault of [Doe]
caused and/or contributed to the alleged injuries to [Doe]” for which recovery of
damages is sought. Relators pled sufficient facts for the trial court to determine
that there is a reasonable probability that the alleged actions of Glenn Davis were
improper. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 33.004(g).

      In sum, the trial court’s docket control order provided a deadline to join
parties (including responsible third parties) of February 24, 2023. Relators’ motion
to designate was filed January 9, 2023, which was within the deadline set by the
trail court in its docket control order.       Relators were entitled to rely on the
deadlines in the trial court’s docket control order.          Respondent erred by
disregarding the docket control order and retroactively imposing a new deadline—
a deadline only known by respondent—and denying relators’ motion as
“untimely.” We conclude respondent’s denial of relators’ motion to designate
responsible third party was an abuse of discretion.

                                   CONCLUSION

      Relators have established that they are entitled to mandamus relief.
Accordingly, we conditionally grant relators’ petition for writ of mandamus, and
we direct the trial court to vacate its May 15, 2023 order denying relators’ motion
to designate responsible third party. We are confident the trial court will act in
accordance with this opinion and the writ will issue only if the trial court fails to
comply.

                                       PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Chief Justice Christopher and Justices Jewell and Zimmerer.

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