Court Opinion

ID: 9734019
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:23:04.809821+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:45.135924
License: Public Domain

Smith, J.
{dissenting). The area of my disagreement with my Brother is narrow but critical. ' It relates almost exclusively to the deference to be accorded by this Court to the findings of the trial court. The trial court found that appellants had made no demand for the award until December 31, 1951, and that laches barred their claim for interest subsequent to a 2-month period thereafter. My Brother finds a demand on May 3, 1951, and rejects the doctrine of laches. In following such holding, I believe we would not be exercising an appellate function but would be, contrary to established law and precedent, substituting our judgment in an action at law, turning primarily on controverted fact issues, for that of the trial court.
The matter of laches largely controls substantial recovery here and will receive our first consideration: Plaintiffs received a large award from the condemnation. They were notified thereof by letter dated *624July 26, 1950. Disagreement having arisen between representatives of the payor and payee as to just what instruments were to be furnished by the latter in exoneration of the obligation of the former, it soon became apparent that such differences could be resolved only by legal action. With this knowledge appellants delayed filing suit until May 5, 1954. No excuse whatever is offered for the long delay in instituting the action which was eventually taken. Plaintiffs assert their right to interest for substantially all of this period, thus converting their delay and inaction into a profitable investment at the expense of the public. This the trial court refused to allow and I am in complete accord with its holding.
It has been held from the earliest times that the creditors of a State may not by their own inaction increase their demands upon the public treasury through the accumulation of interest. In People, ex rel. Bank of Monroe, v. Canal Commissioners, 5 Denio (NY) 401, the court, after commenting upon the State’s liability for interest in the case then before it, and the necessity of making proper demand for the principal sum, goes on to state that it is not to be taken from.the foregoing (p 405):
“that the public creditor may refrain from demanding it and entitle himself to interest as long as he chooses to forbear asking for it after it becomes due, and to demand it when he pleases with the accruing interest. Such a result would be oppressive to the State and intolerable for its inconvenience.”
The supreme court of the United States has held likewise. In United States v. Sherman, 98 US 565 (25 L ed 235), the court held as follows with respect to a claim for interest (pp 567, 568):
*625“Moreover, whenever interest is allowed either by statute or by common law, except in cases where there has been a contract to pay interest, it is allowed for delay or default of the debtor. But delay or default cannot be attributed to the government. It is presumed to be always ready to pay what it owes. Certainly there was no delay in the present case. The government paid the amount recovered against Callicott, vis., the sum for which the verdict and judgment were given, as soon as its liability accrued.”
We have expressed ourselves in similar terms. In Connor v. State Treasurer, 333 Mich 219, 227, we held:
“Connor’s claim for interest after the judgment and up to the present time should similarly be denied until proper demand is made. If Connor is correct in its contention that the award draws interest to date, it could have waited for years, refusing to accept the amount of the awards on some technicality or other, until it needed the money, in the meantime drawing 5% interest on the whole amount at the expense of the State.”
The trial court concluded that, under the circumstances, plaintiffs had been guilty of laches. The issue presented was primarily one of fact. In so saying we do not lose sight of the inherent difficulties in borderline cases, in distinguishing matters of fact from those of law. See, generally, Morris, Law and Fact, 55 Harvard LB, 1303. Here, however, the question, phrased differently, is whether, under all of the circumstances, plaintiffs’ delay in commencing action had been unreasonable, negligent, slothful, rendering, with the passage of time, the assertion of the right inequitable. This is generally, and here, a question of fact, Oliver v. Poulos, 312 Mass 188 (44 NE2d 1, 142 ALR 1094); Shanik v. White Sewing Machine Corporation, 25 Del Ch 371 (19 A2d *626831); and, on certiorari to review mandamus, this Court is limited to questions of law. Nephew v. Dearborn Library Commission, 298 Mich 187 (135 ALR 1340).
We do not, of course, lose sight of the doctrine that a fact determination in the trial court may be so grossly in error that it, in law, is no determination at all and, hence, involves error of law. Such an error of law will result where a court finds that “We have been unable to discover any question of fact, depending upon conflicting evidence, in the case.” Bedlow v. New York Floating Dry Dock Co., 112 NY 263, 269 (19 NE 800, 802, 2 LRA 629); or where the “court, against remonstrance, finds a material fact which is not supported by any evidence whatever,” The E. A. Packer, 140 US 360, 364 (11 S Ct 794, 35 L ed 453); or where “the finding of the trial justice on such a question of fact is entirely without legal evidence to support it,” Mondillo v. Ward Baking Co., 73 RI 473, 479 (57 A2d 447, 450); or where the trial court “finds facts without evidence or contrary to the only conclusion which may be drawn from the evidence.” Sanfacon v. Gagnon, 132 Me 111, 113 (167 A 695, 696). Our Court is in full accord. “A finding, we have held, unsupported by evidence will be considered erroneous in law.” First National Bank of Allegan v. Grand Rapids & Indiana Railway Co., 195 Mich 1, 13.
It is apparent from the 'above that the situation referred to is unusual and extreme. The cases speak of findings of fact “without evidence,” or “entirely unsupported by evidence.” The terminology employed reflects the unique character of the error presented. It is an error, in short, so gross as to vitiate judgment. There is none of that in the case at bar. And to the extent that we in this Court equate evidence which we ourselves do not credit, to “no evidence whatever,” precisely to that extent do we *627substitute our'judgment on the printed record for that of the trial court which saw, heard, and observed.-
Here, as in any cáse involving laches in the commencement of an action, a defense sounding in equity, appealing to the discretion and conscience of the courtj it is pertinent to consider the business experience of the parties, their reliance upon counsel, the experience and skill of counsel, the difficulties of the •legal problems involved, and the reásons, or lack thereof, for failure to prosecute the action. The trial judge saw the witnesses, observed their demeanors, heard their reasons and excuses, or lack thereof, in support of their actions, himself at times questioned them, heard arguments of able counsel, and finally •concluded, in a careful opinion covering 7 printed page's of record, that plaintiffs had unreasonably delayed their action. If we are to reverse on such a record we are simply substituting our judgment oh what is here an issue of fact for that of the trial court. We are aware, of course, that injustice may -result from an error in a determination of fact by the trier of the facts.' But we are also aware that even appellate judges may err in their determinations of facts, and sound judicial prudence would suggest that such determination, made by a judge who has seen and heard the witnesses, be respected by us in the absence of gross and obvious error, so overwhelming as to impeach his judgment. Such is not present in this case.
' : The matter of the demand is more complex. It is put in issue by the provisions of Detroit’s charter, which provides that the award shall be paid “on demand.” - What is a demand! It comprises 3 elements: . (1) A distinct demand to the sum of money (2) to which the person making the demand is (3) then entitled. It cannot be made by a stranger, even though the sum be certain and presently due. *628Nor can it be made by the obligee óf a sum neither due nor certain. Here the obligees are prescribed by the charter. They must be “the persons entitled thereto.” Entitled thereto not by common repute, or by the chain of title of record, but by “the verdict of the jury.”
But the difficulty here is that one of the persons named in the judgment roll, namely, United Platers, Inc., had, subsequent to-the commencement of the condemnation, and, in fact,, by deed dated during the trial period, conveyed its interest in the property in question to the plaintiffs. Is United Platers thereafter -entitled to make demand for the money? Should the demand be made by United Platers’ transferee? What is reasonable proof to the city that the person presenting himself for United Platers has, in fact and in law, the. authority to give a binding acquittance on behalf .of United Platers? The simplest solution, as a -matter of strict charter compliance, was an amendment of the verdict roll, but as counsel for plaintiffs put it, “we thought that was a lot of unnecessary work and the disclaimer was so easy to get.” Easy to get, it is true, but more difficulty arose in convincing the city that it should be accepted, even' when tendered, which question itself brings up a sharp issue of fact. There is testimony that such disclaimer was tendered and accepted on December 31st, and the trial court held that it was not until such date that written “or satisfactory” evidence was supplied that demand was made in conformity with the charter of the city of Detroit. The trial court found that it was on such date that Mr. Weaver, attorney for plaintiffs,
“went to the city hall and there saw assistant corporation counsel Mr. Ingalls, and there placed in his hand a written disclaimer from United Platers, Inc., óne of the 4 parties who were jointly entitled to the $140,000 award made by The jury, and who were *629entered as the persons entitled to that award on the verdict of the jury.
“The testimony indicates that whatever subsequent arguments concerning a waiver of interest may have divided the parties from that point forward in relation to the payment of this award, that no objection by the city was made to this disclaimer as being insufficient to establish that the plaintiffs were in fact entitled to the total sum of $140,000.”
A disclaimer, then, was tendered to the city officials, and accepted by them on December 31st, and on this date the trial court found a valid demand. ■Had a valid demand also been made on a prior date, May 3d? As to that, we again are in an area of sharp dispute of fact. Mr. Repp, the condemnation award clerk, who had had a total of. 18 years of experience in this office, says positively that no demand was then made. My Brother finds demand on such date. I cannot agree without rejecting certain testimony and accepting other, all, on the record before me, equally credible, involving both eminent counsel and trusted public officials. The choice between them lies with the trial judge, not with us. As the Indiana court put it in Kelley v. Dickerson, 213 Ind 624, 630 (13 NE2d 535, 538): “This court cannot be both a court of review and a trial court.”
Affirmed. No costs.
Sharpe, J., concurred with Smith, J.