Court Opinion

ID: 9950509
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-14 14:10:03.173271+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:37:20.697744
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-2262-17

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

REGGIE JACKSON, a/k/a
SINCERE ALLAH,

     Defendant-Appellant.
________________________

                   Submitted on February 28, 2024 – Decided March 14, 2024

                   Before Judges Susswein and Vanek.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
                   Law Division, Passaic County, Indictment No. 96-
                   11-1121.

                   Reggie Jackson, appellant pro se.

                   Camelia M. Valdes, Passaic County Prosecutor,
                   attorney for respondent (Leandra L. Cilindrello,
                   Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM
      Defendant Reggie Jackson continues to serve a prison term of life plus

forty years for murder, attempted murder, aggravated assault and a multitude of

weapons offenses. In 1999, defendant was convicted for shooting a rival drug

dealer and his rival's friends, and killing a fifteen-year-old boy who was sitting

on a bicycle in front of the house where the shootout occurred. Defendant

appeals the December 8, 2017 order denying his second petition for post-

conviction relief (PCR).     In this second PCR appeal, defendant asserts he

received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial, on his direct appeal, and in his

first PCR petition, raising new trial errors that he argues necessitate reversal of

his conviction. Most of defendant's arguments are precluded under Rules 3:22-

4 and -5. For those arguments that are not procedurally barred, we affirm for

substantially the same reasons set forth by Judge Marilyn C. Clark in the

thorough twenty-four-page decision accompanying the December 8, 2017 order.

      The salient facts and procedural history were previously recounted in our

decisions on plaintiff's direct appeal, State v. Jackson (Jackson I), No. A-5416-

98 (App. Div. Mar. 21, 2001), and first PCR appeal, State v. Jackson (Jackson

II), No. A-0028-11 (App. Div. June 20, 2014). We briefly set forth only the

facts material to our determination of defendant's second PCR appeal.

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                                         2
      On July 15, 1996, defendant and co-defendant, Emir Outlaw, arrived at a

private residence in Paterson and began shooting bullets toward the home's

porch. Prior to the incident, defendant and Outlaw had several altercations with

the resident of the home, Kevin Jackson, 1 including armed confrontations that

turned violent, stemming from disputes regarding overlapping territories for

drug sales and a stolen "stash" of drugs. In addition to Jackson, Deshon Brisbon,

David Staggers, and Antwan Wilson were on or around the porch at

approximately eleven o'clock in the evening. Gloria Sexton, another resident,

was inside the home, and Tyeem Price, a fifteen-year-old who lived in the

neighborhood, was sitting on his bike in front of the residence talking to another

individual.

      Jackson went to an alley beside the house to retrieve drugs. When he

emerged, he saw two men dressed in black approaching the house. Both men

were hooded, and one wore a mask. The men pulled out guns, one a handgun,

the other a shotgun, and started shooting. Price died at the scene. Staggers lost

vision in one eye, suffered severe injury to his other eye, and suffered other

injuries that permanently impaired his cognitive and neurological functions.

1
  Defendant and Kevin Jackson share a surname but are not otherwise related.
For clarity to the reader, we will refer to Kevin Jackson as "Jackson" and Reggie
Jackson as "defendant."
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                                        3
Jackson suffered injuries to his abdomen that resulted in the removal of his

spleen and portions of his liver, kidney and pancreas. Brisbon and Sexton

suffered less severe injuries.

      On November 19, 1996, defendant and Outlaw were charged in a thirty-

one-count indictment with crimes including murder, aggravated assault, and a

multitude of weapons charges. The jury trial commenced on January 27, 1999,

after defendant's case was severed from Outlaw's, and continued through

February 4.2 As we have previously set forth in our prior opinion, although the

facts of the case "were essentially uncontested, defendant disputed that he was

one of the gunmen." Jackson II, slip op. at 4. "The State presented both

circumstantial and direct evidence that defendant and . . . Outlaw[] were the

shooters." Ibid.

      On February 3, 1999, the trial court granted defendant's motion to

suppress evidence that was collected during a search of defendant's sleeping area

in the jail where he was detained. 3 State v. Jackson, 321 N.J. Super. 365, 383

2
   Outlaw was tried before defendant, was convicted of various crimes, and
received an aggregate life sentence with forty years of parole ineligibility.
3
  The court rendered its decision on defendant's motion on February 3, 1999,
during the pendency of the trial. The court issued a supplemental written

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                                       4
(Law Div. 1999). The court determined that the search was pretextual and "at

the specific request of the prosecutor, who sought to recover incriminating

evidence, including letters and writings believed to be in defendant's possession"

regarding a possible alibi defense. Id. at 367, 369-71. This court concluded

"that a cell search of a pretrial detainee implicates Fourth Amendment

protections against unreasonable searches and seizures" and, accordingly, it

suppressed any "evidence seized by the jail authorities without the benefit of a

warrant." Id. at 367.

      On February 5, 1999, defendant was convicted of knowing and purposeful

murder, conspiracy to commit murder, two counts of attempted murder, two

counts of aggravated assault and ten counts involving weapons offenses . As to

the remaining counts, the jury either acquitted defendant or found defendant

guilty of lesser included offenses. 4

      On April 7, 1999, the court sentenced defendant to an aggregate prison

term of life plus forty years with fifty years of parole ineligibility. Defendant

opinion on April 6, 1999. The opinion was approved for publication on May 6,
1999.
4
  On February 3, 1999, the court dismissed count four – third-degree unlawful
possession of a sawed-off shotgun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(b) and N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6 –
because of insufficient evidence.
                                                                            A-2262-17
                                        5
appealed his conviction, and we affirmed on March 21, 2001. Jackson I, slip

op. at 20. On February 11, 2002, the Supreme Court denied certification. State

v. Jackson, 171 N.J. 338 (2002).

      On May 14, 2003, defendant filed his first PCR petition. The PCR court

held a hearing on the PCR petition over five days. At the conclusion of the

hearing, the PCR court denied defendant's request for relief.           Defendant

appealed, arguing primarily that his trial counsel was deficient for not presenting

an alibi defense and for failing to request a hearing to challenge the reliability

of the witnesses' identification of his tattoo pursuant to United States v. Wade,

388 U.S. 218 (1967).

      On June 20, 2014, after careful consideration of defendant's arguments,

the record and controlling law, we affirmed. Jackson II, slip op. at 1. We agreed

with the trial court that "[b]ased on the evidence presented by defendant and the

State at the PCR hearing, . . . defendant had failed to establish both elements of

an ineffective-assistance claim." Id. at 18.

      As to defendant's argument that his trial counsel was ineffective for not

presenting an alibi defense or by failing to request a Wade hearing, we

determined defendant had not shown a hearing would have established a

reasonable probability of defendant's success at trial, as required under the

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                                        6
second prong of Strickland.5 Id. at 14-22. We determined that the remainder of

defendant's arguments did not merit extended discussion in our written opinion.

Id. at 22-26. On December 3, 2014, the Supreme Court denied certification,

State v. Jackson, 220 N.J. 100 (2014).

       On February 26, 2015, defendant filed his second PCR petition. The pro

se brief in support of his petition set forth nineteen arguments as to why he

should be afforded relief including: violation of due process; improper jury

instructions regarding evidence of defendant's prior crimes; impermissible scope

of expert testimony; incorrect assignment of accomplice liability; prosecutorial

misconduct; unduly prejudicial testimony from Price's mother; admission of

hearsay; failure of the court to decide dispositive motions prior to trial; judicial

misconduct; ineffective assistance of trial, appellate, first PCR, and first PCR

appellate counsel; and cumulative prejudicial errors.

       On December 8, 2017, Judge Clark denied the second PCR request and

entered a thorough twenty-four-page decision addressing each of defendant's

arguments in full.    Judge Clark noted this court had already substantively

addressed and rejected many of defendant's arguments in its prior decisions,

Jackson I and Jackson II.       Among other rulings, Judge Clark considered

5
    Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984).
                                                                              A-2262-17
                                         7
defendant's assertions regarding jury instructions, prejudicial testimony and

evidence admissibility and found that each of them was previously disposed of

and substantively without merit. As to defendant's argument regarding the jury's

consideration of defendant's other crimes, the judge found defendant had

proffered a "complete misstatement of the law" and the trial court had properly

instructed the jury as to these matters.

      Judge Clark concluded there were no arguments asserting ineffective

assistance of counsel presented in the second PCR petition that had not already

been considered in one of defendant's prior appeals, and her review of those

decisions found no errors. Given her rejection of all of defendant's arguments,

the judge found no merit in defendant's final assertion that the cumulative impact

of the trial court's errors was prejudicial sufficient to merit reversal. Judge Clark

found that "[b]ased upon [her] review of all of the proceedings, [she] strongly

conclude[d] that [defendant] received a very fair trial."

      On appeal from the denial of his second PCR petition, defendant contends:

             POINT I

             THE    APPELLANT    WAS    DENIED    HIS
             CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO THE EFFECTIVE
             ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AND THE COURT
             SHOULD REMAND THE MATTER TO THE LAW
             DIVISION FOR AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING.

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                                           8
     a. THE PCR COURT ERRED WHEN IT
        RULED   DEFENDANT    DID   NOT
        RECEIVE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
        OF COUNSEL DUE TO COUNSEL'S
        FAILURE TO MOVE TO QUASH THE
        INDICTMENT FOLLOWING GROSS
        PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT.

     b. STANDARD FOR DECIDING A FIFTH
        AMENDMENT     DUE     PROCESS
        VIOLATION.

     c. THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE DIRECTED
        BY THE PROSECUTOR’S OFFICE
        AMOUNTS      TO    "OUTRAGEOUS"
        GOVERNMENT CONDUCT REQUIRING
        DISMISSAL OF THE INDICTMENT.

POINT II

THE PCR COURT ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT
DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS WERE NOT VIOLATED
BY THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO INSTRUCT
THE JURY THAT IT COULD NOT CONSIDER THE
OTHER CRIMES EVIDENCE FOR THE PURPOSE
OF MOTIVE UNTIL AFTER IT HAD FOUND
DEFENDANT GUILTY OF THE HOMICIDE
BEYOND      A     REASONABLE      DOUBT;
INDEPENDENTLY OF THE OTHER CRIMES
EVIDENCE.

POINT III

THE PCR COURT ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT
DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS WERE NOT VIOLATED
BY   THE   TRIAL  COURT'S   ERRONEOUS
INSTRUCTION ON ORAL STATEMENTS OF THE
DEFENDANT.

                                           A-2262-17
                   9
            POINT IV

            THE PCR COURT ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT
            DEFENDANT'S    RIGHT    TO    EFFECTIVE
            ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL WAS NOT VIOLATED
            WHEN APPELLATE COUNSEL FAILED TO RAISE,
            AS ERROR, THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO
            REINSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE LAW OF
            ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY AS WAS REQUESTED
            BY THE JURY AND BOTH PARTIES.

            POINT V

            THE PCR COURT ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT
            DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS WERE NOT VIOLATED
            BY PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT DURING
            OPENING STATEMENTS AND SUMMATION
            CONCERNING DEFENDANT'S ALIAS.

            POINT VI

            THE PCR COURT ERRED WHEN IT FOUND THAT
            THE CUMULATIVE ERRORS PRESENTED IN HIS
            PETITION FOR [PCR] DID NOT WARRANT
            REVERSAL OF HIS CONVICTION.

      We review the legal conclusions of a PCR court de novo. State v. Harris,

181 N.J. 391, 419 (2004) (quoting Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of

Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)). PCR "is New Jersey's analogue to the

federal writ of habeas corpus." State v. Afanador, 151 N.J. 41, 49 (1997) (citing

State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 459 (1992)). It is the vehicle through which a

defendant may, after conviction and sentencing, challenge a judgment of

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                                      10
conviction by raising those issues "which could not have been raised on direct

appeal" and, therefore, "ensures that a defendant was not unjustly convicted."

State v. McQuaid, 147 N.J. 464, 482 (1997).

      Pursuant to Rule 3:22-5, "prior adjudication upon the merits of any ground

for relief is conclusive whether made in the proceedings resulting in the

conviction or in any post-conviction proceeding brought pursuant to this rule or

prior to the adoption thereof, or in any appeal taken from such proceedings."

This procedural bar specifically applies "if the issue raised is identical or

substantially equivalent to that adjudicated previously on direct appeal." State

v. Marshall III, 148 N.J. 89, 150 (1997) (quoting State v. Bontempo, 170 N.J.

Super. 220, 234 (Law Div. 1979)).

      Under Rule 3:22-4(b), a second PCR petition must be dismissed unless it

is timely and it alleges:

             (A) that the petition relies on a new rule of
                 constitutional law, made retroactive to
                 defendant’s petition by the United States Supreme
                 Court or the Supreme Court of New Jersey, that
                 was unavailable during the pendency of any prior
                 proceedings; or

             (B) that the factual predicate for the relief sought
                 could not have been discovered earlier through the
                 exercise of reasonable diligence, and the facts
                 underlying the ground for relief, if proven and
                 viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would

                                                                          A-2262-17
                                      11
                  raise a reasonable probability that the relief
                  sought would be granted; or

            (C) that the petition alleges a prima facie case of
                ineffective assistance of counsel that represented
                the defendant on the first or subsequent
                application for post-conviction relief.

            [R. 3:22-4(b)(2).]

      We consider whether defendant's arguments comport with Rule 3:22-

4(b)(2). Our careful review of the record confirms there were no assertions of

recently established constitutional protections or newly discovered evidence

under Rule 3:22-4(b)(2).         Therefore, we can only consider defendant's

arguments that fall under Rule 3:22-4(b)(2)(C), positing that defendant's first

PCR counsel was ineffective. Accordingly, we affirm the second PCR court's

denial of relief as to defendant's arguments in Points II, III, IV, V and VI of his

merits brief. We, therefore, need only consider his argument in Point I as to

ineffective assistance of counsel on his first PCR appeal.

      To establish a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel,

defendant must satisfy the two-prong test articulated in Strickland, 466 U.S. at

687, which our Supreme Court adopted in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987).

"First, the defendant must show . . . . counsel made errors so serious that counsel

was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed . . . by the Sixth Amendment."

                                                                             A-2262-17
                                       12
Fritz, 105 N.J. at 52 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). Defendant must then

show counsel's "deficient performance prejudiced the defense." Ibid. (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). To show prejudice, defendant must establish by

"a reasonable probability that" the deficient performance "materially contributed

to defendant's conviction." Id. at 58.

      We view defendant's arguments set forth in regarding the deficiency of

counsel on his first PCR appeal through this lens. Although defendant argues

his first PCR counsel was deficient, on appeal, he does not provide any

substantive examples, explanation or law as to this bald assertion. "An issue not

briefed on appeal is deemed waived." Sklodowsky v. Lushis, 417 N.J. Super.

648, 657 (App. Div. 2011).

      The only particularized grievance with his first PCR counsel defendant

identifies in his latest merits brief is in the passing assertion that the attorney

did not argue trial counsel was deficient by failing to move to have the

indictment quashed for prosecutorial misconduct stemming from the warrantless

search of his sleeping area at the county jail before trial. We found this very

argument, raised in Point III of defendant's first PCR petition, to be "without

sufficient merit to warrant extended discussion in a written opinion" pursuant to

                                                                             A-2262-17
                                         13
Rule 2:11-3(e)(2). Jackson II, slip op. at 12, 24. However, we did offer the

following:

             [D]efendant contends that the State gained insight into
             his trial strategy by orchestrating the seizure of letters
             he had composed to his attorney while he was in jail
             awaiting trial. The circumstances are set forth in the
             trial court's opinion suppressing the State's use of the
             evidence.      Jackson, 321 N.J. Super. 365.          The
             information obtained by the State involved defendant's
             alibi defense. Id. at 371. Defense counsel successfully
             moved to suppress it. Id. at 383. It is clear from trial
             counsel's testimony at the PCR hearing that the
             evidence played no role in counsel not presenting an
             alibi defense. Defendant's argument to the contrary
             consists of unsupported, conclusory assertions.

             . . . . And there is virtually no likelihood that a motion
             to dismiss the indictment based on the illegal search of
             his jail cell would have succeeded.

             [Jackson II, slip op. at             25-26     (emphasis
             added)(citations reformatted).]

      As we have noted, "a prior adjudication on the merits ordinarily

constitutes a procedural bar to the reassertion of the same ground as a basis for

post-conviction review." Preciose, 129 N.J. at 476 (citing R. 3:22-5). We need

not consider defendant's argument a second time as we have already

substantively decided the same issue in connection with the first PCR petition.

      To the extent we have not addressed defendant's remaining arguments, we

are satisfied they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).

                                                                            A-2262-17
                                        14
Affirmed.

                 A-2262-17
            15