Court Opinion

ID: 9791964
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:21:05.892839+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:39.779364
License: Public Domain

GRABER, P. J.,
dissenting.
The majority distorts the parties’ contract, apparently in order to achieve what it believes to be the better result. Because that result is not one for which the parties bargained and because the majority applies the wrong standard of review, I dissent.
We stated the issue in the first review in this case, OSEA v. Rainier School Dist. 13, 91 Or App 42, 44-45, 754 P2d 9 (1988):
“Petitioner alleged numerous violations of ORS 243.672 in its complaint to ERB. The only allegation which it continues to assert here is that the firing violated Article VII.D of the collective bargaining agreement. See ORS 243.672(l)(g). Article VII.D provides, as material:
“ ‘No employee covered by this agreement shall be disciplined without just cause. Employees being disciplined shall be afforded due process as outlined in Administrative Rule 329e * * *.’
“Administrative Rule 329e provides:
" ‘Employe Infractions.
“ ‘The following procedure shall be applicable to all employes of District No. 13 who are hired by the Board.
“ ‘It is the obligation of the supervisor to observe* and document infractions pertaining to the employe’s performance in accordance with his/her job description.

“ ‘Procedure.

“ T. All infractions must be made in writing, dated, and a copy placed in the employe’s personnel file. The employe shall receive the original copy, and shall be thereby notified of the matter.
*521“ ‘2. The notification must specifically list the items that are wrong with his/her performance.
“ ‘3. Also, the notification should state what measures are being considered if performance does not improve.
“ ‘4. The employe must be given an opportunity to a hearing and to refhte the charges in writing, including his/ her opinions(s) which shall also be placed in the employe’s personnel file.
“ ‘*This procedure is for guidance of supervisors and in no way limits a supervisor’s responsibility to investigate and possibly reprimand an employe for an infraction that the supervisor did not personally observe.’ (Emphasis in original.)
“Petitioner’s sole argument to us is that the district did not comply with Rule 329e and that ERB erred by not so concluding. Specifically, petitioner contends, certain time cards and other documents evidencing particular episodes of Gamble’s tardiness were not included in his personnel file or otherwise treated in accordance with the rule. Petitioner argues that each episode was an ‘infraction,’ subject to the rule’s requirements, and that the district’s failure to follow those requirements before it discharged Gamble violated Article VII.D, which incorporates the rule by reference.”
The majority holds that the district must follow Rule 329e for each incident of misconduct on which it relies to discipline an employee. 100 Or App at 516, 520. There are two major flaws in its reasoning.
The first flaw is the majority’s decision to treat the issue as “a question of law,” because of its assertion that there is “no relevant bargaining history or other extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intent.” 100 Or App 516. As the majority acknowledges, however, there is some evidence; what the majority does is simply discount it and thereby usurp ERB’s function. It may not do that. ORS 183.482(8); OSEA v. Pendleton School Dist. 16R, 85 Or App 309, 313, 736 P2d 204, rev den 304 Or 55 (1987). It is ERB’s role in the first instance to interpret the collective bargaining agreement and, if the words are ambiguous, to make findings about the parties’ intent. Indeed, petitioner does not claim that ERB’s findings lack support in the record.
The original ERB order found facts that relate to the bargaining history behind the reference to Rule 329e and facts *522concerning its enforcement. For example, the reference to Rule 329e replaced a lengthy description, which OSEA proposed, of a disciplinary process for an “employee whose performance is judged to not meet district standards”; such an employee would, among other things, receive a “statement of deficiencies.'” (Emphasis supplied.) Moreover, ERB found that, in the past, including once during the life of the same collective bargaining agreement, the district demoted a custodian, because his performance “had slipped two to three months before the transfer. [The demoted employee] had specific problems with taking extended lunch breaks and leaving the premises for long periods of time without leave.” (Emphasis supplied.) If ERB had before it the relevant bargaining and enforcement history of the clause in issue, it is not our function to substitute our judgment for the agency’s, even if we would prefer to reach a different result. Springfield Education Assn. v. School District, 290 Or 217, 621 P2d 547 (1980); OSEA v. Pendleton School Dist. 16R, supra. ERB’s findings are supported by substantial evidence, and its reasoning from the facts to its conclusions is rational and complete. Therefore, we must affirm.
Second, even if the majority were correct that we are to interpret the contract anew as a matter of law, its interpretation strains to the breaking point the words that the parties used. The contract requires only that employees who are “being disciplined shall be afforded due process as outlined in Administrative Rule 329e.” (Emphasis supplied.) In turn, the rule uses the word “infraction” to mean “disciplinary notice”; otherwise, the rule would make no sense. It provides, for instance, that “[a]ll infractions must be made in writing, dated, and a copy placed in the employe’s personnel file.” In context, “infraction” cannot sensibly be read to mean “episode of misconduct,” as the majority wishes to read it. Nothing in the contract requires that the district make all evidence of misconduct, such as the time cards, subject to the procedures in Rule 329e. ERB correctly interpreted the contract.
For these reasons, I dissent.