Court Opinion

ID: 9782861
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 19:25:40.55464+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:35:15.422878
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE McDADE, dissenting: The State charged defendant with “Obstructing a Peace Officer (Class A Misdemeanor) in that, said defendant knowingly obstructed the performance of Jeffrey German of an authorized act within his official capacity, being the investigation of [defendant], *** in that he *** failed to disperse from the scene after being ordered to do so.” The majority has found that “the sole issue on review is whether defendant’s actions, involving his refusal to disperse or leave the scene after being ordered to do so, impeded the officers’ performance of their official duties at the scene in this case.” 408 Ill. App. 3d at 1015. I believe the threshold and dispositive question is whether defendant’s actions, accepting them as the majority has described (408 Ill. App. 3d at 1016 (citing People v. McCoy, 378 Ill. App. 3d 954, 962 (2008), and People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261 (1985))), are sufficient to state the offense charged in the amended complaint. “When a charging instrument fails to state an offense, this constitutes a defect implicating due process concerns, and the defective charge may be attacked at any time. [Citation.] *** If all the facts alleged may be true but nevertheless fail to constitute an offense, the charge is insufficient.” People v. Alvarado, 301 Ill. App. 3d 1017, 1022-23 (1998). The State cites People v. Weaver, 100 Ill. App. 3d 512 (1981), for the proposition that an officer has the duty to maintain public order wherever he may be, and thus a police officer so acting is always engaged in the execution of his official duties. However, the “official duty” alleged in the charging instrument was not maintaining public order, nor was it searching the suspect vehicle, nor preventing the “develop[ment] into a much worse situation” as found by the trial court. The official duty was “investigating” (left undefined in the charging instrument) defendant. “A complaint for a statutory offense must either set out the offense in the language of the statute or specifically set forth the facts which constitute the crime and must notify the accused with reasonable certainty of the precise offense charged. [Citation.] *** The State must prove the essential elements of the charging instrument as alleged and without variance.” (Emphasis added.) People v. Miller, 253 Ill. App. 3d 1032, 1035-36 (1993). It is of no help to argue, but the State does, that defendant impeded the officers’ attempt to secure the scene of their investigation, because the officers ordered defendant to leave. There is simply no way defendant could have impeded an investigation into his criminal activity (but I note again the charging instrument did not allege what police were allegedly investigating) by remaining at the scene of the investigation. In this case the State had to prove that defendant’s actions in refusing to leave the “scene of the investigation” obstructed the police from investigating him. The majority has found that a criminal defendant who walks in the street between a vehicle police have stopped and are searching, “act[ing] very irate, yelling profanities at the officers and threatening the officers” (408 Ill. App. 3d at 1017), is “directed *** to leave the area” (408 Ill. App. 3d at 1017), and “did not comply with *** repeated directives to disperse and depart” (408 Ill. App. 3d at 1017), somehow comes in the way of (408 Ill. App. 3d at 1016) a police officer attempting to “investigate” the defendant (408 Ill. App. 3d at 1011) that the police are trying to get to leave. I would find that all the facts alleged in the charging instrument and found by the trial court may be true but nevertheless fail to constitute an offense. I would find that this defect in the charging instrument, on which defendant now stands convicted of a crime, renders it void and, therefore, that defendant suffered a clear and unequivocal denial of due process. See People v. Cooper, 182 Ill. App. 3d 243, 252 (1989) (Pincham, J., dissenting) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 314 (1979)); People v. Holmes, 397 Ill. App. 3d 737, 741 (2010) (“A *** court may dismiss an indictment if the defendant establishes that he has suffered a prejudicial denial of due process. [Citation.] However, the defendant must establish that the denial of due process is ‘unequivocally clear’ and that the prejudice is ‘actual and substantial.’ [Citation.]”). I would dismiss the charges against defendant. People v. Redwood, 335 Ill. App. 3d 189, 193 (2002) (“A charge that sets forth elements that do not amount to an offense may be dismissed under section 114—1(a)(8) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.”). Accordingly, I dissent.