Court Opinion

ID: 9364459
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-19 17:02:43.757935+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:38.312733
License: Public Domain

COURT OF CHANCERY
                                      OF THE
    SAM GLASSCOCK III           STATE OF DELAWARE                         COURT OF CHANCERY COURTHOUSE
     VICE CHANCELLOR                                                               34 THE CIRCLE
                                                                            GEORGETOWN, DELAWARE 19947

                           Date Submitted: December 13, 2022
                            Date Decided: January 19, 2023

    M. Jane Brady, Esquire                            Sarah A. Fruehauf, Esquire
    Brady Legal Group LLC                             Zi-Xiang Shen, Esquire
    36365 Tarpon Drive                                Delaware Department of Justice
    Lewes, Delaware 19958                             Carvel State Office Building
                                                      820 North French Street, 6th Floor
                                                      Wilmington, Delaware 19801

                 Re: Michael Mennella v. The Honorable Anthony J. Albence, in his
                 official capacity as State Election Commissioner, and State of
                 Delaware Department of Elections, C.A. No. 2022-0179-SG

Dear Counsel:

         The Plaintiff here seeks a declaratory judgment that certain state statutes are

unconstitutional. The Plaintiff, Michael Mennella, a registered Delaware voter and

inspector of elections,1 brought this action against Defendants, the Delaware State

Election Commissioner and the state Department of Election (collectively, the

“DoE” or the “State”).2 The Plaintiff challenges the constitutionality of 15 Del. C.

§ 5402, et seq. and 15 Del. C. § 5503(k).3

1
  Verified Compl. Declaratory J. and Injunctive Relief ¶ 8, Dkt. No. 1.
2
  Id. ¶¶ 9–11.
3
  Id. 15–16 (Prayer for Relief).
       15 Del. C. § 5402, et seq. (the “Early Voting Statute”) is a statute that permits

votes to be cast in person before the day of the general election.4 Plaintiff avers that

the Early Voting Statute violates Article V, Section 1 of the Delaware Constitution

of 1897 because the statute “expand[s] the administration of the general election

beyond its constitutionally designated day.”5

       15 Del. C. § 5503(k) (the “Absentee Voting Statute”) is a statute that requires

the DoE to “‘automatically send an absentee ballot to each person in permanent

absentee status for each election in which the person is entitled to vote.’”6 Plaintiff

contends that this statute violates Article V, Section 4A of the Constitution of

Delaware because it “grant[s] eligibility to vote by absentee ballot indefinitely, and

without consideration of the applicant’s eligibility at each subsequent election.”7

       By way of remedy, the Plaintiff seeks a declaration that these statutes are

unconstitutional.8 Presuming this declaratory relief, the Plaintiff then seeks to enjoin

their enforcement by the State.9 Before me is the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.10

The matter was fully briefed,11 but no argument ensued; consideration was

4
  Id. ¶ 15.
5
  Id. ¶ 47.
6
  Id. ¶ 20 (quoting 15 Del. C. § 5503(k)).
7
  Id. ¶ 58.
8
  Id. 15 (Prayer for Relief).
9
  Id. 16 (Prayer for Relief).
10
   See Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss, Dkt. No. 8.
11
   Opening Br. Supp. Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss, Dkt. No. 12; Pl. Michael Mennella’s Br. Opp’n Defs.’
Mot. Dismiss, Dkt. No. 13; Reply Br. Further Supp. Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss, Dkt. No 15.
                                              2
suspended during pendency of another election-law challenge. That case, Higgin v.

Albence,12 had certain issues in common with this action. Unlike this action,

however, Higgin was expedited in light of the then-impending November 2022

election.13 Higgin has since been resolved,14 and I consider the Motion to Dismiss

to be pending decision here. Among the issues briefed on the Motion to Dismiss

was subject-matter jurisdiction. As that matter is dispositive, I need not consider the

other grounds for dismissal posed by the Defendant, and dismiss the matter based

on the complaint and the briefing, without argument.15

       Chancery is a court of limited jurisdiction. Absent a statutory grant of

jurisdiction—not alleged here—jurisdiction in this court is limited to equitable

actions16—again not present—and to cases where equitable relief is required.17 Per

the complaint, the request for injunctive relief, to follow a determination that the

statutes in question are unconstitutional, is sufficient to covey subject matter

jurisdiction on the latter ground. It is not.

12
   2022 WL 4239590, (Del. Ch. Sept. 14, 2022), judgment entered, (Del. Ch. 2022), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part, 2022 WL 5333790 (Del. Oct. 7, 2022), and amended, (Del. Ch. 2022), and aff’d in
part, rev’d in part, 2022 WL 5333790 (Del. Oct. 7, 2022).
13
   Id. at *6.
14
   See Albence v. Higgin, 2022 WL 17591864, (Del. Dec. 13, 2022).
15
   The Defendant moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), which, given my decision here, I need
not—and must not—reach.
16
   That is, actions based on equitable relationships.
17
   Delawareans for Educ. Opportunity v. Carney, 2018 WL 4849935, at *5 (Del. Ch. Oct. 5,
2018).
                                               3
       As this Court has had reason to point out recently,18 a declaratory judgement

is available at law, and a simple request for a follow-on injunction is insufficient to

convey Chancery jurisdiction. The syllogism, per Plaintiff, supporting jurisdiction,

is as follows:

       1) A government ukase is unconstitutional or otherwise unsustainable;

       2) The court should, accordingly, declare the ukase unenforceable, and;

       3) Equity is required to enforce the declaratory judgement just referenced.19

Such a self-proving rationale, to my mind, approaches fatuity.20

        In the case of a government—Delaware government comes to mind—that is

rule-driven, step three is superfluous. In a lawless society, injunctive relief is

insufficient. In neither case is equity invoked.21

       As I have had occasion to recently point out, equity can have a vital role

in cases of constitutional violation:

       Where there is a real chance that relief will not be forthcoming absent
       injunction, equity is invoked. Where the right requires a remedy
18
   See In re COVID-Related Restrictions on Religious Servs., 2022 WL 17101449, (Del. Ch.
Nov. 21, 2022); see also Birney v. Delaware Dep’t of Safety & Homeland Sec., 2022 WL
16955159, (Del. Ch. Nov. 16, 2022).
19
   As I understand the Plaintiffs’ argument, as an election inspector Mennella would be unable to
comply with his oath of office if the State attempts to enforce unconstitutional election law. See
generally Pl. Michael Mennella’s Br. Opp’n Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss.
20
   To the Plaintiff’s credit, perhaps, he fails to respond directly to the Defendants’ contention that
he lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See id.
21
   In a (probably apocryphal) response to a United States Supreme Court decision with which he
disagreed, Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S 515, Andrew Jackson supposedly stated that “John
Marshall has made his decision, now let him enforce it.” I find it unlikely that the dictatorial
President Jackson of this legend would have nonetheless been swayed, had the court only
appended an order providing for injunctive relief.
                                                  4
       bespoke to the facts, equity is invoked. Where an ongoing deprivation
       of rights needs a remedy by interim relief, equity is invoked.22

This is neatly illustrated by the companion case to the instant action, Higgin, referred

to above. In Higgin, equity was invoked in a constitutional challenge to election

law, in light of an imminent election, seeking a restraining order to prevent

irreparable harm.23       Therefore, presumptively, this Court had subject-matter

jurisdiction in Higgin.24 By contrast, nothing in this action requires equity to act.

       Nothing in this Letter Opinion should be read to imply that the Plaintiff’s

allegations are inconsequential. In fact, they challenge the enforceability of acts of

the General Assembly as violative of the Delaware Constitution, in the single

arena—voting rights—most fundamental to a functioning democracy. These are

important issues; they are also issues outside the jurisdiction of this Court.

Accordingly, this matter is dismissed with leave to transfer to the Superior Court.

An order is attached.

                                                    Sincerely,

                                                    /s/ Sam Glasscock III

                                                    Sam Glasscock III

22
   Birney, 2022 WL 16955159, at *2 (citation omitted).
23
   Higgin v. Albence, 2022 WL 4239590, at *6.
24
   This issue was does not appear to have been specifically addressed in Higgin.
                                                5
    IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

MICHAEL MENNELLA,                             )
                                              )
                    Plaintiff,                )
                                              )
                                              )
                                              )
                                              )
                                              )
       v.                                     ) C.A. No. 2022-0179-SG
                                              )
THE HONORABLE ANTHONY J.                      )
ALBENCE, in his official capacity             )
as State Election Commissioner,               )
and STATE OF DELAWARE                         )
DEPARTMENT OF ELECTIONS,                      )
                                              )
                    Defendants.               )
                                              )

ORDER DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO TRANSFER

      AND NOW, this Thursday, January 19, 2023, upon review of Plaintiffs’

Verified Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief (the

“Complaint”), together with the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and the briefing

thereon, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Complaint is DISMISSED in its

entirety with leave to transfer subject to 10 Del C. § 1902.

                                              /s/ Sam Glasscock III

                                              Vice Chancellor