Court Opinion

ID: 9771845
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:55:26.482132+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:37.978538
License: Public Domain

JONES, Justice,
dissenting.
The totality of the evidence presented in this case convinced me that Brown was not so intoxicated as to require the trial court to instruct on the defense of voluntary intoxication.
A neighbor, Eva Gooch, testified that in the early evening of September 20, 1975, Brown came to her home to call the rescue squad for Archie Boggs. She further testi*453fied that approximately ten minutes later Brown returned and requested her to call the sheriff since “He had shot and killed Clyde Sears.” The neighbor could not tell whether Brown had been drinking.
The neighbor was asked, “Did Wallace Lee Brown appear to be drinking at the time you saw him?” “You couldn’t tell it.” “Was he staggering around or was his speech slurred or anything of that nature?” “No, he was calm.”
The city fire chief testified that he could smell the odor of alcohol and that Brown had been drinking when he admitted shooting Sears. He testified that Brown was not staggering too much.
The sheriff testified that Brown was able to walk by himself and got around and that he needed no help to go down the steps.
A deputy sheriff testified that Brown told him he shot a man and that Brown walked “good” up the steps unassisted and was not belligerent. He testified also that he did not detect the smell of alcohol.
A detective who took Brown’s statement testified that Brown had been drinking and that he could smell it on him and his ability was somewhat impaired but not to the extent that he did not have control of his faculties.
The reversal of Brown’s conviction with directions that he be granted a new trial, in my view, is an exercise in futility. An instruction on the defense of voluntary intoxication, more than likely will enhance his penalty.
In my opinion, the Court of Appeals correctly adjudged that no instruction on intoxication in this case was required. It affirmed on the ground that the trial court’s instructions included offenses requiring intent and lesser included offenses which do not require intent. It also held that the effect of voluntary intoxication is to negate the intent and reduced the offense to the lesser included offenses.
For the reasons stated I respectfully dissent and conclude by saying that I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals,
I am authorized to say that CLAYTON and STERNBERG, JJ., join in this dissent.