Court Opinion

ID: 9963108
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-24 16:11:15.562434+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:41.023237
License: Public Domain

04/24/2024

        IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
                         AT KNOXVILLE
                               February 28, 2024 Session

               STATE OF TENNESSEE v. JUSTIN MCDOWELL

                  Appeal from the Criminal Court for Knox County
                  Nos. 123967, 114922    Steven W. Sword, Judge

                             No. E2024-00478-CCA-R3-CD

In 2020, the Defendant, Justin McDowell, pleaded guilty to possession with intent to sell
or deliver less than .5 grams of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a Drug Free Zone, a park. The
trial court imposed an effective sentence of five years of incarceration. The Defendant
filed a motion for resentencing pursuant to an amendment to the Drug Free Zone Act. See
T.C.A. § 39-17-432. The trial court held a hearing and denied relief. On appeal, the
Petitioner contends that his motion for resentencing should have been granted. After
review, we dismiss the appeal.

               Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Appeal Dismissed

ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which CAMILLE R.
MCMULLEN, P.J., and TIMOTHY L. EASTER, J., joined.

Chelsea C. Moore, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Justin McDowell.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Katherine C. Redding, Assistant
Attorney General; Charme P. Allen, District Attorney General; and G. Lawrence Dillon,
Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

                                         OPINION
                                 I. Facts and Background

      This case arises from the Defendant’s evading arrest and being found in possession
of cocaine. A Knox County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant for evading arrest,
possession with intent to sell or deliver .5 grams of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a park,
possession with intent to sell or deliver .5 grams of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a childcare
center, and criminal trespass. By agreement, in 2020, the Defendant pleaded guilty to
possession with intent to sell or deliver .5 grams of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a park, and
the State dismissed the remaining charges. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a
Range I offender to five years of incarceration with 100% service.

       In 2023, the Defendant filed a motion for resentencing pursuant to an amendment
to the Drug Free Zone Act found at Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-432. In his
motion, the Defendant argued that, pursuant to the amendment, he qualified for a reduced
sentence.

       The trial court held a hearing on the motion, at which the parties presented
arguments, and the Defendant’s daughter testified that she wanted her father home to
participate in their family. At the conclusion, the trial court made the following statement:

               I wanted to review the status of the drug-free school zone 2018, which
       is [the offense date] for which [the Defendant] is before the Court on today
       seeking resentencing. As we’ve already stated, the Court had previously
       granted his request for a resentencing in the one that went to trial. And I
       think it was an A felony, actually, that he was convicted of, and lowered that
       to a B, I believe, and reduced the percentage to serve.

              This, after that case, was resolved by reaching a plea agreement. It
       was charged as the B felony, over half a gram, within a zone, and the
       agreement was that it would be dropped to the C, less than a half a gram, still
       in a zone, which is why it ended up being a hundred percent at five years.

               And so both sides have talked about the fact that this was a plea
       agreement. That really doesn’t come into play until you get to the interest of
       justice portion where you determine whether or not the interest of justice
       would require resentencing, and so I know judges across the state have really
       struggled with this [be]cause they feel like what their job is, is to figure out
       a new negotiated settlement, but that’s actually, I don't believe, what the law
       is intended or certainly not what the law says.

             And so what the Courts are required to do is make certain findings as
       when a defendant makes such a petition as we’re here today. And then the
       Court has to make certain findings.

              And the first is the [D]efendant bears the burden of proof to show the
       defendant would be sentenced to a shorter period of confinement under the
       section if the defendant’s offense had occurred on or after September 1st,
                                              2
2020. And so there’s a couple factors of that. First, you-look and see under
the new drug-free school zone would this be a drug-free school zone case?
There’s an argument I think the state can make in this.

       But I do believe that there’s--the proof that we heard during the
stipulation of this plea did not indicate that vulnerable persons were exposed
to the dangers inherent in the drug trade. So I think if the drug-free school
zone had been written in [ ] the way it is now, it would not have applied. But,
remember, the first part of that sentence says, the defendant bears the burden
to show the defendant would be sentenced to a shorter period of confinement
under the section had the law been that way.

       So what would have happened, had the law been that way, this would
not have been a B felony. It would have been a C felony. And in the other
case where he was convicted on an A felony, he was sentenced as a range II
multiple offender because his prior felony convictions. So he would be a
range II multiple offender on the C felony. So what would his potential
sentence be on this? It’d be six to ten at 35 percent. What sentence did he
get? Five years.

       And so when the law says a defendant bears the burden of proof to
show the defendant would be sentenced to a shorter period of confinement,
he’s unable to do that in this case [be]cause he actually got a shorter length
of sentence than he would have gotten had he been convicted at trial or pled
as charged without it being drug-free school zone.

        And so when you read that sentence, you’re not taking into [ac]count
release eligibility date. You’re just taking into [ac]count length of sentence,
and so, even though this would have dropped it from a B to a C, he still got
a sentence shorter than he would have gotten had he pled as charged without
the zone. So I don’t think [] the defense has been able to meet their burden
in this one, although they did in the other [case].

      So I’m going to deny your request in this one because I don’t think
you can get a shorter sentence than what was negotiated.

It is from this judgment that the Defendant appeals.

                                 II. Analysis

                                      3
        The Defendant claims that he has a right to appeal the denial of his motion for
resentencing pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(b). He acknowledges
that his right of appeal is not enumerated in the rule, but he contends that the language and
subsequent application of the rule have been too strictly construed and should be applied
more broadly. He also contends that his right to appeal is established by the Post-
Conviction Procedure Act found at Tennessee Code Annotated section 16-5-108. Finally,
he contends that the court should be vested with jurisdiction pursuant to the common law
writ of certiorari. The State responds that the Defendant’s claim does not have jurisdiction
conferred upon it by either Rule 3(b) or the Post-Conviction Procedure Act. The State
further responds that the Defendant’s claim is not appropriate for review pursuant to a writ
of certiorari. We agree with the State.

       In State v. Bobo, this court decided the issue of whether the Defendant has a right
to appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(b). The decision in Bobo
was based on the reasoning below:

               In 2022, our legislature amended the Act creating a procedure
       allowing defendants to request resentencing in accordance with the 2020
       revision of the Act. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-432(h) (2022). More
       specifically, a defendant who was sentenced under the Act for an offense
       committed “prior to September 1, 2020, may, upon motion of the defendant
       or the district attorney general or the court's own motion” seek to be
       resentenced. Id. Upon the filing of such motion, the trial court shall hold a
       hearing to determine if the defendant would have received “a shorter period
       of confinement under this section if the defendant’s offense had occurred on
       or after September 1, 2020.” Id. “The court shall not resentence the
       defendant . . . if the court finds that resentencing the defendant would not be
       in the interests of justice.” Id. In determining whether a new sentence would
       be in the interests of justice, the trial court may consider the defendant’s
       criminal record, his behavior since being incarcerated, the circumstances
       surrounding the defendant’s offense, and other factors that it deems relevant.
       Id. However, we note that despite granting the defendant an opportunity to
       seek resentencing in accordance with the amended statute, the legislature did
       not provide the defendant or the State with an avenue to appeal the trial
       court’s decision under the statute.

              A defendant in a criminal case does not have an appeal as of right in
       every instance. State v. Rowland, 520 S.W.3d 542, 545 (Tenn. 2017) (“A
       defendant in a criminal case does not have an appeal as of right in every
       instance.”) Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(b) provides when a
       defendant in a criminal case has an appeal as of right:
                                             4
       In criminal actions an appeal as of right by a defendant lies
       from any judgment of conviction entered by a trial court from
       which an appeal lies to the Supreme Court or Court of Criminal
       Appeals: (1) on a plea of not guilty; and (2) on a plea of guilty
       or nolo contendere, if the defendant entered into a plea
       agreement but explicitly reserved the right to appeal a certified
       question of law dispositive of the case pursuant to and in
       compliance with the requirements of Rule 37(b)(2)(A) or (D)
       of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, or if the
       defendant seeks review of the sentence and there was no plea
       agreement concerning the sentence, or if the issues presented
       for review were not waived as a matter of law by the plea of
       guilty or nolo contendere and if such issues are apparent from
       the record of the proceedings already had. The defendant may
       also appeal as of right from an order denying or revoking
       probation; an order denying a motion for reduction of sentence
       pursuant to Rule 35(d), Tennessee Rules of Criminal
       Procedure; an order or judgment entered pursuant to Rule 36
       or Rule 36.1, Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, from a
       final judgment in a criminal contempt, habeas corpus,
       extradition, or post-conviction proceeding, from a final order
       on a request for expunction, and from the denial of a motion to
       withdraw a guilty plea under Rule 32(f), Tennessee Rules of
       Criminal Procedure.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3(b).

        Rule 3(b) does not specifically provide for an appeal as of right from
an order denying resentencing pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-432(h)
(2022). A defendant in a criminal case has no appeal as of right unless it is
enumerated in Rule 3(b). Rowland, 520 S.W.3d at 545; see also State v.
Lane, 254 S.W.3d 349, 353 (Tenn. 2008) (holding there is no appeal as of
right from an order denying a defendant’s motion to modify a condition of
probation)[.]

       ....

      Neither Rule 3 nor the most recent amendment to Tenn. Code Ann. §
39-17-432(h) (2022) provides for an appeal as of right for the defendant.

                                      5
State v. Bobo, 672 S.W.3d 299, 301-03 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2023) (see also State v. Patton,
No. M2023-00801-CCA-WR-CO, 2024 WL 634887, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 15,
2024) (concluding that orders denying resentencing are not included in the criminal actions
for which a direct appeal lies [Tenn. R. App. P. 3(b)], and the statute governing the
resentencing of sentences enhanced under the Drug-Free School Zone Act [Tenn. Code
Ann. § 39-17-432(h)] does not provide a right to appeal from the denial of a resentencing)).

        In accordance with our reasoning in Bobo, we similarly conclude that the Defendant
in this case does not have a right to an appeal on this issue.

       The Defendant claims that the Post-Conviction Procedure Act, found at Tennessee
Code Annotated section 16-5-108(a), provides jurisdiction for his appeal. Section 16-5-
108 states that this court has appellate jurisdiction over final judgments of trial courts in
criminal cases and “other cases or proceedings instituted with reference to or arising out of
a criminal case.” T.C.A. § 16-5-108(a)(1), (a)(2). As this is not an appeal from a judgment
of conviction, an order denying or revoking probation, or a final judgment in a criminal
contempt, habeas corpus, extradition, or post-conviction proceeding, this section does not
confer jurisdiction upon the Defendant’s claim.

       Lastly, as to the Defendant’s argument that his appeal requires the granting of a writ
of certiorari, we point out that the common law writ of certiorari is an “extraordinary
judicial remedy,” State v. Lane, 254 S.W.3d 349, 355 (Tenn. 2008), and may not be used
“to inquire into the correctness of a judgment issued by a court with jurisdiction.” State v.
Adler, 92 S.W.3d 397, 401 (Tenn. 2002) (citing State v. Johnson, 569 S.W.2d 808, 815
(Tenn. 1978)). We, therefore, decline to extend the “extraordinary judicial remedy” of a
writ of certiorari.

                                      III. Conclusion

       Based on the foregoing reasoning and authorities, we dismiss this appeal.

                                                  _______________________________
                                                  ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, JUDGE

                                             6