Court Opinion

ID: 9489626
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 13:19:55.118968+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:53:37.490870
License: Public Domain

MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD,
Circuit Judge, dissenting.
Because I believe that the court errs in rejecting Mr. Hill’s contention that the state of Arkansas failed to make a submissible case against him, I respectfully dissent from the judgment in this case. A bare majority of the Arkansas Supreme Court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to convict Mr. Hill of felony murder, that is, of killing Mr. Sturdivant in the course of perpetrating *1090a robbery. See Ark.Code Ann. § 5-10-101(a)(1). With respect, it appears to me that this determination was error, even when it is afforded the deference that it is due. See, e.g., Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 323-24, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2791-92, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).
I begin my consideration of this case with a statement of the principles that should have guided the court’s decision. Due process is violated, and a habeas petitioner is entitled to relief, if a conviction has been obtained on the basis of insufficient evidence. Id. at 321, 99 S.Ct. at 2790. Evidence is insufficient if from it no rational factfinder could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime with which he or she is charged. Id. at 319, 324, 99 S.Ct. at 2789, 2791-92. If, in other words, the state of the evidence is such that a reasonable juror would necessarily have a doubt about the defendant’s guilt, and that doubt is not based on fancy or on whim but on reason, id. at 317, 99 S.Ct. at 2788, then the defendant cannot constitutionally be found guilty. Id. at 324, 99 S.Ct. at 2791-92.
We have granted habeas relief in a similar case at least once. See Ward v. Lockhart, 841 F.2d 844, 845-47, 849 (8th Cir.1988). In that case, the defendant was convicted of burglary, yet no evidence placed him at or inside the school from which certain property was stolen. Id. at 846-48. In that case as well, there was evidence of possession of stolen property and implausible and conflicting stories concerning the defendant’s acquisition of the property and concerning his whereabouts at critical times. Id. at 846-47. We stated that while “the evidence was clearly sufficient to support a conviction for theft of property or theft by receiving, ... it was not [constitutionally] sufficient to permit a legal inference” that the defendant was guilty of being inside the school from which the property was taken. Id. at 847.
In this case, the Supreme Court of Arkansas concluded that Mr. Hill’s guilt was more probable than any other reasonable hypothesis supported by the evidence. See Hill v. State, 299 Ark. 327, 773 S.W.2d 424, 426 (1989). But, with respect, this conclusion provides an answer to the wrong question. The question is not whether under the evidence Mr. Hill’s guilt was more probable than any other reasonable hypothesis, but whether under the evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, there was some other hypothesis that was reasonable. If there was, the defendant must be acquitted. Mr. Justice Newbem of the Arkansas Supreme Court in his dissent identified a number of hypotheses inconsistent with guilt that were both reasonable and consistent with the evidence, even when that evidence is viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict. Id. 773 S.W.2d at 427. I note that Mr. Hill was never placed at the scene of the crime, but even if he had been, it is entirely possible that he simply stole the car and the other goods that were found in his possession without in any way participating in the murder. Since this is a reasonable hypothesis, and since I believe that a rational juror would have had to entertain it, Mr. Hill’s conviction cannot stand.
This conclusion, moreover, seems to me required by the fact that Mr. Hill was charged with felony murder, that is, with killing a person in the course of the commission of a robbery. Even if Mr. Hill killed Mr. Sturdivant, there is no proof whatever that Mr. Hill did not kill Mr. Sturdivant with deliberate premeditation and then decide to make off with his goods as an afterthought. This possibility is as likely as his having killed Mr. Sturdivant in the course of a robbery and by itself, entitles Mr. Hill, as a constitutional matter, to an acquittal. “Under our system of criminal justice even a thief is entitled to complain that he has been unconstitutionally convicted and imprisoned as a burglar.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 323-24, 99 S.Ct. at 2791. I agree with Mr. Justice Newbem that “Johnny Lee Hill, or whatever his name may be, is guilty of something, but the state has not proven him guilty of murder.” Hill v. State, 773 S.W.2d at 426.
I respectfully disagree with the court’s suggestion that my proposed disposition of this case would conflict with the principles laid down in Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326, 99 S.Ct. at 2792-93. I presume, of course, as the Court did in Jackson, that the jury is entitled to resolve any “conflicts in favor of the prosecution.” Id. What I rely on here as the predicate for my analysis is an assumption that the jury believed all of the evidence favorable to the government, indulged in all reasonable inferences that could *1091have been drawn from that evidence, and disbelieved all of the evidence favorable to the defendant. That is what I mean when I say that I have viewed the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict. The cases that the court relies on to support its judgment are all eases in which there were conflicts in the testimony that the jury, of course, was entitled to resolve. I admit the applicability to this case of the principle announced in those cases, but I suggest that its application does not lead to the conclusion that the court reaches.
I would therefore grant Mr. Hill’s petition for relief and remand this ease to the district court with instructions to release Mr. Hill from custody.