Court Opinion

ID: 9946908
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-01 18:02:42.744848+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:43.016819
License: Public Domain

Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before publication in the PACIFIC REPORTER.
     Readers are requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate Courts,
     303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878, email
     corrections@akcourts.gov.

              THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA

LIZ VAZQUEZ, CHRIS DUKE, )
RANDY ELEDGE, STEVE STRAIT, )                         Supreme Court No. S-18619
and KATHRYN WERDAHL,                      )
                                          )           Superior Court No. 3AN-22-09325 CI
                    Appellants,           )
                                          )           OPINION
       v.                                 )
                                          )           No. 7689 – March 1, 2024
STATE OF ALASKA, OFFICE OF                )
LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR,                      )
DIVISION OF ELECTIONS, and                )
NANCY DAHLSTROM, in an official )
capacity as Lieutenant Governor for the )
State of Alaska, and CAROL                )
BEECHER, in an official capacity as       )
Director of Division of Elections for the )
State of Alaska,                          )
                                          )
                    Appellees,            )
                                          )
       and                                )
                                          )
JENNIE ARMSTRONG,                         )
                                          )
                    Intervenor-           )
                    Appellee.             )
                                          )

             Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third
             Judicial District, Anchorage, Herman G. Walker, Judge.

             Appearances: Stacey C. Stone, Richard R. Moses, and Anna
             E. Cometa, Holmes Weddle & Barcott, PC, Anchorage, for
             Appellants. Laura Wolff, Assistant Attorney General,
             Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau,
             for Appellees. Scott M. Kendall and Samuel G. Gottstein,
             Cashion Gilmore & Lindemuth, Anchorage, for Intervenor-
             Appellee.

             Before: Winfree, Chief Justice, and Carney and Henderson,
             Justices.     [Maassen and Borghesan, Justices, not
             participating.]

             HENDERSON, Justice.
             CARNEY, Justice, dissenting.

      INTRODUCTION
             The losing candidate in the 2022 general election for Alaska’s House
District 16 and four House District 16 voters challenge the winning candidate’s
eligibility to serve in the legislature. To qualify as a member of the legislature under
article II, section 2 of the Alaska Constitution, a candidate must have been a resident of
Alaska for at least three years immediately before filing for office. For the November
2022 election, a candidate for the legislature must have been eligible on or before the
June 1, 2022 filing deadline.
             The winning candidate filed her candidacy on June 1, 2022, and maintains
that she became an Alaska resident on May 20, 2019. The losing candidate argues that
the winning candidate did not become an Alaska resident until June 7, 2019 at the
earliest, thereby making her ineligible as of the filing deadline.
             Applying the election-related residency statutes in Title 15, the superior
court held that the winning candidate became a resident on May 20, 2019. We disagree
with the court’s use of Title 15 to determine state residency and hold that Title 1 governs
the state residency requirement for determining eligibility of a candidate for the
legislature. However, because the court did not clearly err in making factual findings
that ultimately support the winning candidate’s establishment of residency on May 20,

                                          -2-                                        7689
2019 under Title 1, we affirm the court’s conclusion that the winning candidate is
eligible to serve in the legislature.
       FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
       A.     Facts
              Representative Jennifer “Jennie” Armstrong’s journey to Alaska began in
January 2019. Armstrong was born and raised in Louisiana, and attended college there.
Starting sometime in 2016 she had sold most of her belongings, put a few things in
storage in Louisiana, and began travelling. Around that time, Armstrong considered
herself “location independent.” On a video call with a mutual friend, she met Benjamin
Kellie. Kellie, born in Fairbanks and raised in Nikiski, had lived full time in Alaska
since 2015. During the call, which the mutual friend intended as a “set-up” for the
couple, Kellie invited Armstrong to come to Alaska.
              Between January and May 2019, Armstrong and Kellie maintained regular
communication, and their relationship became romantic and serious. By all accounts
Kellie produced a pair of highly persuasive PowerPoint presentations convincing
Armstrong to visit him in Alaska. Kellie later testified that his plan for the visit was to
“showcase” Alaska in the hope that Armstrong might relocate. According to Kellie, he
informed Armstrong during this period that he did not intend to live anywhere except
Alaska.
              Armstrong booked a flight and visited Kellie from May 10-20, 2019.
When she booked her flight, it was not her intent to move to Alaska. During the visit,
though, she spoke with Kellie and friends about deciding where she would choose to
move and put down roots. Both Armstrong and Kellie later testified about significant
events that occurred during the visit as Armstrong began to seriously consider
establishing her home in Alaska. Both testified that on May 14 while at Chena Hot
Springs, the couple had conversations about the seriousness of their relationship and its
future. Both testified that on May 18 while visiting Seward, the couple first discussed
marriage and having children together. Between May 18 and May 20 Kellie asked

                                          -3-                                        7689
Armstrong to move in with him. Both testified that sometime late on May 19 or early
on May 20, Armstrong accepted Kellie’s invitation to live with him in Anchorage.
Armstrong testified that at that time she “was all in.”
              Later on May 20th — the same day she decided to reside in Alaska and
make it her home — Armstrong left the state as previously planned to attend “prior
commitments.” Her commitments included attending a training in Washington, D.C.,
a friend’s bachelorette party in Rhode Island, and a wedding shower in New Orleans.
She later testified that when she left Alaska, her intent was to return to live with Kellie.
Armstrong also claimed that immediately upon leaving she looked into a return flight.
Armstrong further considered returning to Alaska between her commitments, but
eventually decided it was not logistically or financially feasible. Armstrong left some
personal belongings at Kellie’s house for the duration of her time away. She booked
her return ticket on May 25, and returned to Alaska on June 8.
              Over the summer of 2019 Armstrong took several steps further
demonstrating her intent to remain in Alaska and to “put down substantial, permanent
roots.” In July Armstrong re-licensed her business in Alaska and moved into a duplex
she and Kellie renovated. In August she obtained an Alaska driver’s license and
registered to vote in Alaska. Since that summer Armstrong has continued to build her
life in Alaska. Armstrong and Kellie purchased a home in Anchorage in September
2020. They married in October 2020. They also had a child together, have co-parented
Kellie’s daughter, and have served as informal guardians to two girls.
              Several times since May 2019 Armstrong has posted on social media and
sent text messages indicating she believed she moved to Alaska in May 2019. In August
2019 Armstrong sent a text message to a colleague indicating that she had moved her
“home base” to Alaska in May, but was still “traveling a ton.” In another text message
dated January 2020 Kellie said that Armstrong “moved up here last May from NOLA.”
Both later testified that at the time the messages were sent Armstrong had no intention
of running for office in Alaska. On May 14, 2020, Armstrong published a social media

                                           -4-                                        7689
post stating, “[T]his time a year ago i began an epic adventure in alaska [sic].” On May
11, 2021, Armstrong published a social media post stating, “[T]wo years ago today I
landed in Alaska because Ben made a PowerPoint inviting me to road trip the state with
him . . . I never left.” Somewhat inconsistently, Armstrong also posted on Thursday,
June 13, 2019, that “last weekend I moved to Alaska.”
             When Armstrong applied for two non-resident fishing permits in June
2019, she listed her childhood home in Louisiana as her permanent mailing address.
Armstrong later testified she had no intent at that point to make Louisiana her home,
despite listing Louisiana as her permanent mailing address. But she testified that Kellie
had instilled in her how “serious” Alaska takes its fishing license residency
requirements and she therefore erred “on the side of caution” by listing the Louisiana
address.
             Armstrong obtained annual resident sport fishing licenses in 2020, 2021,
and 2022. On the 2022 license she listed her residency as one month longer than on her
previous two licenses. Armstrong testified that she listed the start of her residency on
the 2020 and 2021 licenses as around June 1, 2019, in “an abundance of caution” to
avoid claiming extra time as a resident. On the 2022 application Armstrong testified
that she claimed an additional month of residency because she had “recently determined
the exact date she became a resident of Alaska.”
             Armstrong testified that she did not consider running for public office
until May 2022. All candidates for state office must state, under oath, their length of
residency in the state and district for which they are running, and certify that they “meet
the specific residence and citizenship requirements of [the] office” they seek.
Armstrong thereafter researched the residency requirements, stating that it was “the first
time [she] had ever pinpointed [her] exact date of residency.” Armstrong signed her
declaration of candidacy for House District 16 on May 31, 2022, and submitted it on
June 1. In her declaration Armstrong stated she had been an Alaska resident since May
20, 2019, and included a certification affirming that she provided true and complete

                                          -5-                                        7689
information and met the residency requirements of the office. The Division of Elections
(Division) reviewed and approved Armstrong’s candidacy. No one challenged her
candidacy or eligibility at that time.
              Armstrong was elected Alaska State House District 16 Representative
during the 2022 General Election.1 The Division certified her election by November
30, 2022.2
       B.     Proceedings
              Liz Vazquez, Armstrong’s challenger for House District 16 in the election,
and several voters in House District 16 (collectively “Vazquez”) sued the Division the
day the results were certified.3     The complaint alleged that “Armstrong did not
demonstrate the intent to remain in Alaska” until at the earliest, June 7, 2019. A June
7 residency date would render Armstrong ineligible to hold public office because when
she declared her candidacy on June 1, 2022, she could not meet the Alaska
Constitution’s three-year state residency requirement. The complaint requested the
court declare Liz Vazquez the winner “because she received the most votes of any
legally qualified candidate.”     Armstrong intervened. The superior court held an
evidentiary hearing in December and issued a ruling on January 9, 2023.
              The superior court first determined which statutes governed the contested
questions.   The court looked to AS 01.10.055 as a source of general residency
requirements for all persons, and to AS 15.05.020 and 15.25.043 as providing specific

       1
           2022 General Election Official Results Summary Report, Nov. 8, 2022,
ALASKA DIV. OF ELECTIONS (Nov. 30, 2022), https://www.elections.alaska.gov/results/
22GENR/ElectionSummaryReportRPT.pdf.
       2
              Id.
       3
             The State did not seek to be dismissed from this case below or on appeal,
but nonetheless asks us to consider whether the Division of Elections officials were
proper defendants in Vazquez’s election contest. We decline to reach this issue, as it
was neither thoroughly briefed nor argued and ultimately, the State participated
throughout this appeal.

                                         -6-                                      7689
guidance for determining residency for voters and candidates for public office. The
court determined that only Title 15 controlled the analysis of Armstrong’s residency for
purposes of her eligibility to serve in the legislature. The court noted that Title 1 is
“broad by design” and was meant to apply “in the construction of the laws of the state
unless the construction would be inconsistent with the manifest intent of the
legislature.” The court further determined that AS 01.10.055 specifically allows for
other “more restrictive” statutory requirements to refine the general Title 1
requirements. The court considered the Title 15 requirements to be more restrictive,
and held that only Title 15 applied to the residency requirement at issue in this case.
The court did not directly consider or determine whether Armstrong met the Title 1
residency requirements.
             In framing its interpretation of Title 15, the superior court concluded that,
under our precedent, residency is a “question of fact” and courts should consider
“subjective evidence of residency that is supported by sufficient objective evidence.”4
The court, again quoting our precedent, also pointed out that courts “should accept the
statements of the voter as to their intended residency if supported by sufficient indicia
of residency.”5 The court further considered what qualifies as an “act of removal” under
AS 15.05.020(3) to determine when Armstrong changed her residence to Alaska.6
Citing a 1909 case from Montana for guidance,7 the court determined that “some
affirmative act, such as selecting a home, coupled with the intent to make that place a
home may constitute a sufficient act of removal.”

      4
            Lake & Peninsula Borough Assembly v. Oberlatz, 329 P.3d 214, 222
(Alaska 2014).
      5
             Id.
      6
            For a person to establish a “change of residence” under AS 15.05.020,
there must be an “act of removal joined with the intent to remain in another place.”
AS 15.05.020(3).
      7
             Carwile v. Jones, 101 P. 153, 157-59 (Mont. 1909).

                                         -7-                                        7689
             After outlining the legal requirements for establishing residency, the
superior court evaluated whether Armstrong met them. First the court decided that
Armstrong’s declaration on May 20, 2019, that she intended to move in with Kellie,
was an “act of removal” under AS 15.05.020(3). The court found that Armstrong’s
subsequent absence from Alaska from May 20 until June 8 was “temporary” and that
during this time she “maintained her intent to return while she was away.” The court
specifically credited Armstrong’s and Kellie’s testimony and text messages as evidence
that Armstrong’s intent to live in Alaska was established as of May 20.
             The superior court further decided that in determining questions of
residency under our precedent, it could consider “the emotional and physical connection
to one’s residence.” The court found that Armstrong had made an “emotional decision
to make Alaska her home” because she “fell in love.” It also found that her attachment
to Alaska did not start when she arrived in May 2019, but instead “began after the video
call” with Kellie in January 2019 and that May 20 represented only the final decision.
             The court noted that Armstrong’s driver’s license and voting registration
dates were “not dispositive of the exact date of residency.” The court considered
Armstrong’s fishing license applications as “insufficient to support [that] she
considered anywhere else other than Alaska [as home]” and credited Armstrong’s
testimony that despite listing Louisiana on her 2019 fishing license, she at no point
intended to make Louisiana her home. As for the “length of residency” that Armstrong
listed on her 2020-2022 fishing licenses, the court credited Armstrong’s testimony that
she was being cautious, and that she did not determine the “exact date” she became a
resident until May 2022. The court ultimately found that Armstrong was credible and
that there was no evidence of fraud or pretext in the dates or testimony Armstrong had
provided.
             The superior court fixed Armstrong’s Alaska residency as beginning May
20, 2019. It therefore held that Armstrong was qualified to hold public office because
she had been a resident for more than three years when she filed her declaration of

                                         -8-                                      7689
candidacy on June 1, 2022. The court upheld the Division’s certification of the
November 2022 election.
              On January 10, 2023, one day after the superior court issued its decision,
Vazquez appealed. The general legislative session was set to begin one week later on
January 17.8 We granted Vazquez’s motion to expedite the appeal, reviewed the
parties’ briefs on an expedited schedule, and held oral argument on January 13.
Following argument we issued a short order affirming the court’s ultimate conclusion.
We now detail our reasoning in full.
         STANDARD OF REVIEW
              We apply our independent judgment to questions of constitutional law,
and adopt the rule of law that is most persuasive in light of precedent, reason, and
policy.9 Statutory interpretation, including the applicability of a statute, and whether
factual findings satisfy statutory requirements, are questions of law that we review de
novo.10
              We review factual findings for clear error.11 Clear error exists when a
review of the record leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
been made.12 Where the superior court’s factual findings are based upon the court’s

         8
              Alaska Const. art. II, § 8 (providing general legislative session convening
date may be set by law); AS 24.05.090 (setting third Tuesday in January for convening
general legislative session); see 2023 H. Journal 1 (showing January 17, 2023 as first
day of general legislative session); 2023 S. Journal 1 (same).
         9
              Gefre v. Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP, 306 P.3d 1264, 1271 (Alaska
2013).
         10
              See Wielechowski v. State, 403 P.3d 1141, 1146 (Alaska 2017); Sam M. v.
State, Dep’t of Health & Soc. Servs., Off. of Child.’s Servs., 442 P.3d 731, 736 (Alaska
2019).
         11
            Lake & Peninsula Borough Assembly v. Oberlatz, 329 P.3d 214, 221
(Alaska 2014).
         12
              Id.

                                         -9-                                       7689
assessment of witness credibility and its weighing of conflicting evidence, those
findings receive “particular deference”; we do not reweigh evidence or make credibility
determinations.13
       DISCUSSION
       A.      Constitutional And Statutory Residency Requirements Govern
               Whether An Alaska Legislative Candidate Is Qualified.
               1.     The Alaska Constitution sets out three requirements for a
                      member of the legislature.
               “Our analysis of a constitutional provision begins with, and remains
grounded in, the words of the provision itself.”14 We give constitutional provisions “a
reasonable and practical interpretation in accordance with common sense” based on the
“purpose of the provision and the intent of the framers.”15
               Article II, section 2 of the Alaska Constitution states “[a] member of the
legislature shall be a qualified voter who has been a resident of Alaska for at least three
years and of the district from which elected for at least one year, immediately preceding
[her] filing for office.”16 This section plainly imposes three requirements for a person
to serve in the legislature. The person must: (1) be a qualified voter; (2) have been a
resident of Alaska for three years immediately prior to filing for office; and (3) have
been a resident of the district from which elected for at least one year immediately prior
to filing for office.17
               Vazquez does not challenge Armstrong’s status as a qualified voter or her
residency within her house district for at least one year. Therefore, the sole issue before

       13
               Sheffield v. Sheffield, 265 P.3d 332, 335 (Alaska 2011).
       14
           State v. Alaska Legis. Council, 515 P.3d 117, 123 (Alaska 2022) (quoting
Wielechowski, 403 P.3d at 1146).
       15
               Id. (quoting Hickel v. Cowper, 874 P.2d 922, 926 (Alaska 1994)).
       16
               Alaska Const. art. II, § 2.
       17
               Id.

                                             -10-                                    7689
us is whether Armstrong established her Alaska residency for at least three years
immediately prior to filing for office.
              2.     Title 15 determines whether a person is a qualified voter and a
                     resident of a district. Title 1 determines whether a person is an
                     Alaska resident.
              With the three basic constitutional requirements for eligibility to serve in
the legislature in mind, we look next to Alaska law for the more specific contours of
these requirements.     The legislature has defined both qualified voter status and
residency status. Alaska Statute 01.10.055 contains a general residency definition: “[a]
person establishes residency in the state by being physically present in the state with
the intent to remain in the state indefinitely and to make a home in the state.”18 This
general definition is supplanted when the legislature enacts a specific definition for a
specific purpose.19 We have noted previously that “the legislature has defined ‘resident’
differently for different purposes [throughout] the Alaska Statutes.” 20 Relevant here,
Title 15 contains residency requirements for becoming an eligible voter and for
qualifying as a resident within a house district.
              First, voter qualification is controlled by AS 15.05.010. To “vote at any
election,”21 a person must have “been a resident of the state and of the house district in
which the person seeks to vote for at least 30 days just before the election.” 22 In turn,

       18
              AS 01.10.055(a) (emphasis added).
       19
              See AS 01.10.020.
       20
               Heller v. State, Dep’t of Revenue, 314 P.3d 69, 78-79 (Alaska 2013)
(discussing different residency requirements for permanent fund dividend purposes);
see also, e.g., AS 16.05.415 (setting out residency requirements for hunting and fishing
licenses); AS 14.43.125(a)(3) (setting out residency requirements for student loans).
       21
             AS 15.05.010. Several other sections address voter qualification for
specific special circumstances like overseas voters or for presidential elections. See
AS 15.05.011-.012.
       22
              AS 15.05.010(3).

                                          -11-                                      7689
the law “[f]or the purpose of determining residence for voting” is provided in
AS 15.05.020, which lists eight requirements to establish residency.23 In general, a
residence is “that place in which the person’s habitation is fixed, and to which,
whenever absent, the person has the intention to return.”24 And as the superior court
analyzed here, to change residence, there must be an “act of removal joined with the
intent to remain in another place.”25
              Second, AS 15.25.043 describes how to determine whether candidates are
residents of the districts they seek to represent. That statute specifically applies to
“determin[e] the residence within a house district of a qualified voter for the purposes
of compliance with art. II, sec. 2, Constitution of the State of Alaska.”26 Incorporating
the rules contained in AS 15.05.020, the statute additionally requires a candidate to
maintain a habitation at a specific location within the district, and specifies that a person
loses residence by voting in another house district or state.27
              This leaves the final constitutional requirement: a person must also have
“been a resident of Alaska for at least three years” immediately before filing.28 The
superior court considered whether Title 1 applied to this determination, but ultimately
ruled that “Title 15 controls the analysis for qualification of candidates.” The court
reasoned that AS 01.10.055 was a broad and general residency definition, and thus was
supplanted by the more restrictive residency definitions found in Title 15. 29 The

       23
              AS 15.05.020.
       24
              AS 15.05.020(2).
       25
              AS 15.05.020(3).
       26
              AS 15.25.043.
       27
              Id.
       28
              Alaska Const. art. II, § 2.
       29
               See AS 01.10.020 (directing that general residency definition shall control
“unless the construction would be inconsistent with the manifest intent of the
legislature”).

                                            -12-                                       7689
Division agreed with this interpretation. The Division further argued that Title 15
“provides a complete definition of residency for candidates.” Upon a close review of
the statutory language, we disagree. We hold that Title 1 provides the requirements for
establishing legislative candidates’ state residency under article II, section 2 of the
Alaska Constitution.
             Title 15 does not define how or when a person establishes residency in
Alaska, because both of the residency provisions in Title 15 are limited to separate
purposes. The definition in AS 15.05.020 is specifically directed toward the purpose
of determining residency “for voting.”30 The definition in AS 15.25.043 is specifically
directed toward the purpose of determining residency “within a house district.”31
Neither provision addresses the broader determination of residency in Alaska.
             When interpreting statutes, we presume “that the legislature intended
every word, sentence, or provision of a statute to have some purpose, force, and effect,
and that no words or provisions are superfluous.”32 The actual text of AS 15.25.043
states that the section pertains only to “determin[e] the residence within a house
district.”33 We give this statutory phrase meaning and will not ignore its clear limiting
purpose in order to apply the statute to residency both in a house district and residency
in Alaska.     We note that because Title 15’s voter and candidate residency
determinations require a fixed habitation, interpreting Title 15 to govern Alaska state
residency determinations would improperly exclude individuals who come to Alaska

      30
             AS 15.05.020 (emphasis added).
      31
             AS 15.25.043 (emphasis added).
      32
              McDonnell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 299 P.3d 715, 721 (Alaska
2013) (quoting State, Dep’t of Com., Cmty., & Econ. Dev., Div. of Ins. v. Progressive
Cas. Ins. Co., 165 P.3d 624, 629 (Alaska 2007)).
      33
             AS 15.25.043 (emphasis added).

                                         -13-                                      7689
intending to remain and make their homes here, but move from place to place within
Alaska during their first years in the state.
              The statutory text does state that the definition is “for the purposes of
compliance” with article II, section 2 of the Alaska Constitution.34 This language could
be construed to indicate that the provision broadly encompasses residency both in a
house district and in Alaska, since compliance with article II, section 2 requires both.
But if that had been the legislative intent, the statute could have mentioned all or none
of the three constitutional requirements. Instead, the statutory text specifically calls out
only the constitutional requirement of residence in a house district. We give that choice
purpose, and will not read in additional language in order to apply the statute to
residency both in a house district and residency in Alaska.
              The State points out that AS 15.25.043 is titled “Determination of
residency of a candidate,” which broadly interpreted could indicate that it provides a
comprehensive definition of residency for all candidates.35 But the title of the statute is
not law, and any persuasive authority the title may have is far outweighed by the actual
statutory text.36 We therefore hold that AS 15.25.043 applies only to the constitutional
requirement that a candidate has been a “resident . . . of the district from which elected
for at least one year, immediately preceding [her] filing for office.”37

       34
              Id.
       35
             Armstrong makes no express argument on this point, but similarly implies
that the language of the statute’s title indicates that it should be used to determine
Alaska residency for candidates.
       36
              “[C]hapter, article, section, subsection, and paragraph headings” are not
law. AS 01.05.006; see Ketchikan Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. State, Alcoholic
Beverage Control Bd., 602 P.2d 434, 438 (Alaska 1979); DeNuptiis v. Unocal Corp.,
63 P.3d 272, 278 n.15 (Alaska 2003).
       37
              Alaska Const. art II, § 2. We also note that AS 15.05.010(3)’s voter
qualification requirements similarly distinguish between residency in “the state” and

                                           -14-                                       7689
             Given that Title 15 does not govern how a person becomes a resident of
Alaska, applying the general definition of state residency contained in AS 01.10.055 is
consistent “with the manifest intent of the legislature” that the definition should serve
as “a general catch-all.”38 We have previously used AS 01.10.055 to define residency
when it is undefined in other law and statutes; doing the same here is consistent with
that precedent.39 Lacking any other definition, the definition of residency contained in
AS 01.10.055 therefore applies when determining whether a candidate has “been a
resident of Alaska for at least three years” as required by the Alaska Constitution.40
             This means that three separate statutory sections are implicated in
determining a person’s eligibility to serve in the legislature: (1) the person must be a
qualified voter as per AS 15.05.010 and AS 15.05.020; (2) the person must have been
a resident of Alaska for three years as per AS 01.10.055; and (3) the person must have
been a resident of the house district from which elected for at least one year as per
AS 15.25.043 and AS 15.05.020.
      B.     Armstrong’s Alaska State Residency Began On May 20, 2019.
             Alaska Statute 01.10.055 states that “[a] person establishes residency in
the state by being physically present in the state with the intent to remain in the state
indefinitely and to make a home in the state.”41 Thus, establishing Alaska residency

residency “of the house district.” This further supports our interpretation that state
residency requirements differ from house district residency requirements.
      38
            AS 01.10.020; Minutes, H. State Affs. Standing Comm. Hearing on H.B.
323, 13th Leg., 1st Sess. 1:15-2:00 p.m. (Apr. 13, 1983) (statements of Bob Maynard,
Counsel).
      39
            See, e.g., Mouritsen v. Mouritsen, 459 P.3d 476, 484 (Alaska 2020)
(holding term “presently resides” in Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction &
Enforcement Act should be interpreted consistently with general residency definition).
      40
             Alaska Const. art II, § 2.
      41
             AS 01.10.055(a).

                                          -15-                                      7689
requires two conditions to occur simultaneously: physical presence in the state and an
intent to remain permanently and make a home.
             After a person establishes residency, Title 1 requires that a person
demonstrate intent to remain indefinitely and retain residency by acting consistently
with the intent to remain, even during absences.42 Subsection (b) describes how a
person must “demonstrate” the required “intent to remain” in Alaska: by showing intent
by “maintaining a principal place of abode in the state for at least 30 days” and by
providing other proof of intent as required by law or regulation. 43 Additionally, a
resident retains residency during an absence unless the resident establishes residency
elsewhere or is “absent under circumstances that are inconsistent with the intent” to
make Alaska home.44
             Given the superior court’s factual findings, which are supported by
evidence in the record, we conclude that Armstrong met the Title 1 requirements for
establishing residency in Alaska as of May 20, 2019.
             1.    On May 20, 2019, Armstrong was physically present in Alaska
                   with the intent to remain indefinitely and make her home here.
             On May 20, 2019, Armstrong established Alaska residency under Title 1
by being physically present with the intent to remain and make her home here. We
analyze a person’s intent to remain and make a home as part of a “holistic approach”
under Title 1.45 There is no dispute that Armstrong was physically present in Alaska
on May 20, 2019. And there is no dispute that Armstrong did, at some point, form the
intent necessary to become a resident of Alaska. The parties’ disagreement focuses on
when Armstrong formed the necessary intent.

      42
             AS 01.10.055(b), (c).
      43
             AS 01.10.055(b).
      44
             AS 01.10.055(c).
      45
             Mouritsen v. Mouritsen, 459 P.3d 476, 480 (Alaska 2020).

                                        -16-                                     7689
              Armstrong contends, and the superior court found, that Armstrong formed
the intent to remain in Alaska indefinitely and to make her home here on May 20, 2019.
Vazquez argues that Armstrong did not form or demonstrate the necessary intent until
at least June 7 or 8, 2019. Recognizing that the superior court carefully weighed the
evidence on this issue, and observing that the court’s findings are supported by evidence
in the record, we conclude that the court did not clearly err by identifying May 20, 2019,
as the date upon which Armstrong formed an intent to remain in the state indefinitely
and to make Alaska her home.46
              Although Vazquez emphasizes evidence that tends to question or
contradict the superior court’s finding, the record contains ample evidence supporting
the finding that Armstrong intended to remain in Alaska and make her home at Kellie’s
Anchorage address as of May 20, 2019. Armstrong and Kellie testified that Armstrong
selected her home in Alaska with Kellie between May 19 and May 20, 2019, following
substantial discussions about marriage, children, and moving in together at Kellie’s
Anchorage address. The superior court described this as Armstrong’s “emotional
decision to spend the rest of her life with Kellie, a factor relevant to establish her
residency.” The court also noted that “Armstrong’s emotional attachment to Alaska did
not start when she arrived in May 2019; it began after the video call . . . in January 2019.
Both Armstrong and Kellie testified that their relationship became ‘romantic’ prior to
her arrival in May.” The court recognized that Armstrong decided to “move to Alaska
because she was in love.” The court expressly found both Armstrong’s and Kellie’s

       46
             In its findings, the superior court addressed the Title 15 residency
requirements. However, those factual findings, which are not clearly erroneous, also
support establishment of Title 1 residency as of May 20, 2019.

                                           -17-                                       7689
testimony on the relevant points to be credible, with no indication of fraud or
misrepresentation.47
             Armstrong’s objective actions at the time and since support the testimony
offered by both she and Kellie. Armstrong indicated in an August 2019 text to her
colleague that she had moved her “home base” to Alaska in May, and her actions since
are consistent with this assertion. Armstrong left some belongings in Anchorage when
she departed, and her trip out of state was for the sole purpose of attending prior
commitments. She returned to Alaska just a few weeks later, and attempted to return
even earlier. Additionally, in July and August 2019 Armstrong re-licensed her business
in Alaska, obtained an Alaska driver’s license, and registered as an Alaska voter. Later,
Armstrong had her books shipped to Alaska and emptied a shared storage unit in
Louisiana.
             Armstrong and Kellie ultimately enacted the plans they testified to making
on May 20, 2019, further demonstrating Armstrong’s intent to remain and make her
home in Alaska. Armstrong and Kellie renovated a home in 2019 and they purchased
a home in Anchorage in September 2020. They married in October 2020. They also
had a child together, have co-parented Kellie’s daughter, and have served as non-legal
guardians to two girls in Alaska. We consider these later actions consistent with a
finding that Armstrong intended to remain and make her home in Anchorage as of May
20, 2019.
             Vazquez repeatedly references a series of Instagram posts as evidence that
Armstrong publicly stated on June 13, 2019, that she moved to Alaska “last weekend,”
or June 7 at the earliest. The superior court did not reference these arguments in its

      47
             Cf. Lake & Peninsula Borough Assembly v. Oberlatz, 329 P.3d 214, 222
(Alaska 2014) (instructing courts to consider whether voter’s statement of intent was
supported by “sufficient indicia of residency,” or contradicted by objective “indicia of
fraud or unreasonableness or implausibility”).

                                         -18-                                      7689
order. But while this evidence does raise an inconsistency, it does not convince us that
the court clearly erred in its findings.
              On June 13, 2019, Armstrong posted thirteen images, accompanied by
free-form present-tense diaristic captions that were location-tagged broadly from the
Alaska Wildlife Conservation Center to Talkeetna to Seattle to New York. One caption
does state that “I’m in Toronto with [Kellie] right now, but last weekend I moved to
Alaska.” But other captions say “I’m in Seattle and hopping on the light rail”; “It’s my
last day in Alaska”; “We wake up Saturday in Seward”; “We land in Talkeetna”; and
“I am leaving L.A. for Anchorage.” As Armstrong could not physically be at all of
these places on June 13, the posts represent a stylized collection of experiences over a
two-week timespan, and in that context we are not convinced that Armstrong’s
reference to “last weekend” necessarily means June 7-8. Armstrong testified that she
would frequently draft language for her Instagram posts ahead of time, so her posts
were more diaristic recollections than precise calendar updates. And as Armstrong
argues, the captions themselves “left no doubt that this series of Instagram posts was
clearly not drafted contemporaneously with their posting.” Given the style and content,
the superior court need not have credited any one of Armstrong’s loosely written
captions as clear evidence of her whereabouts or timeline for moving to Alaska.
              In addition, two other social media posts support Armstrong’s residency
beginning in May 2019. On May 14, 2020, Armstrong posted a picture with a caption
of: “this time a year ago i began an epic adventure in alaska [sic].” And in May 2021
Armstrong stated, “Two years ago today I landed in Alaska [and] . . . I never left.”
Thus, Armstrong’s Instagram captions do not clearly contradict the superior court’s
finding that Armstrong intended to remain and make her home in Alaska on May 20,
2019.
              While there is some additional evidence that could weigh against the
finding that Armstrong intended to remain and make a permanent home in Alaska in
May 2019, that evidence ultimately does not render the superior court’s finding clearly

                                           -19-                                   7689
erroneous. For example, the majority of Armstrong’s personal items arrived in Alaska
at a later date and she did not empty her out-of-state shared storage unit until sometime
in 2020. But as the superior court noted, the date the majority of Armstrong’s
belongings arrived is not necessarily dispositive because the amount or type of
belongings she left is “not in itself indicative” of her intent to remain. Armstrong also
obtained her Alaska driver’s license and registration to vote in August 2019, but we
agree with the superior court that “evidence of voter registration does not establish the
date of residency.”48 We also note that while moving possessions and obtaining a
license may provide objective evidence of a person’s intent to remain, those actions
regularly occur after a person’s intent is formed and do not provide a good indication
of a person’s exact date of residency.
             Finally, Armstrong’s fishing licenses are inconsistent in their reflection of
the beginning of her state residency. But the superior court expressly found credible
Armstrong’s testimony about why she provided the date of her first full month spent in
Alaska on her first two resident sport fishing licenses — instead of the exact date her
Alaska residency began — in “an abundance of caution.” The court determined that it
was “not unreasonable or otherwise fraudulent” for Armstrong to list her residency in
that manner for fishing licenses because it was “not indicative of an intent to ‘back-
date’ her residency.”     The court expressly found Armstrong’s testimony to be
reasonable and to be free from “fraud or misrepresentation.”49 Moreover, in weighing
the evidence, the court specifically deemed “evidence of Armstrong’s fishing
licenses . . . insufficient to support [that] she considered anywhere else other than
Alaska” as home during the period at issue. In light of the deference we give to the

      48
              Residence can be established without registering to vote. Cf. Cissna v.
Stout, 931 P.2d 363, 368 (Alaska 1996) (not filing new voter registration insufficient to
defeat claim that residence has changed).
      49
             Oberlatz, 329 P.3d at 222.

                                          -20-                                      7689
superior court’s assessments of credibility and weighing of evidence,50 the evidence
related to Armstrong’s fishing licenses does not render the superior court’s findings
regarding Armstrong’s intent clearly erroneous.
             2.     After establishing residency on May 20, 2019, Armstrong
                    demonstrated her intent to remain and retained her residency.
             After a person forms the intent necessary to establish residency, Title 1
requires that person to demonstrate intent by maintaining a principal place of abode
within Alaska for at least 30 days and by acting consistently with the intent to remain,
even during absences.51 We conclude that Armstrong met both requirements. She
maintained her principal place of abode in Alaska for at least 30 days after May 20,
2019, and her absences after establishing residency were not inconsistent with her
residency in Alaska.52
             Armstrong’s principal place of abode in Alaska was Kellie’s Anchorage
home, and after establishing her residency there on May 20 she maintained that
principal place of abode for at least 30 days. The superior court made several findings
consistent with this conclusion. For example, Armstrong left personal belongings at

      50
             Sheffield v. Sheffield, 265 P.3d 332, 335 (Alaska 2011).
      51
              AS 01.10.055(a)-(c). We note that these requirements are among the
limiting principles that the dissent suggests are missing when it comes to analyzing the
establishment of one’s residency in the state. See Dissent at 1.
      52
               We reject any interpretation of AS 01.10.055 that would lead to the
conclusion Armstrong was not a resident because she had not been physically in the
state for “at least 30 days,” and note that Vazquez correctly did not attempt to advance
such an interpretation. This interpretation would fail on the clear text of the statute.
And we decline to interpret the statute as a durational residency requirement, which is
“more susceptible to constitutional infirmity” as a burden on the right to migrate. Heller
v. State, Dep’t of Revenue, 314 P.3d 69, 78 (Alaska 2013). The statute clearly states
that residency is established at the moment at which a person is “physically present in
the state with the intent to remain.” AS 01.10.055(a). Thus, remaining in the state for
30 days is not a requirement to establish residency; rather, it is evidence demonstrating
the requisite intent to remain once residency has been established.

                                          -21-                                      7689
Kellie’s house beginning on May 20. Prior to this date Armstrong considered herself
“location independent” and had sold most of her belongings. Thus, by leaving behind
a portion of what few personal belongings she had and designating a place as her “home
base,” she established a principal place of abode.53
             Further, Armstrong retained her Alaska residency after establishing it on
May 20 because her subsequent absence, though substantial, was still consistent with
Alaska residency. Armstrong left Alaska on May 20 to attend “prior commitments.”
Attendance at these commitments, which included a professional training and wedding
events, were in no way inconsistent with an intent to make Alaska her residence. She
testified that when she left she intended to return to her new Anchorage home with
Kellie. Armstrong even considered returning to Alaska between her commitments, but
eventually decided it was not feasible. The superior court found no evidence that
Armstrong’s trip from May 20 to June 8 somehow negated her intent to maintain Alaska
residency, and Vazquez points to no evidence that establishes clear error.
             Vazquez contends that allowing establishment of residency in
circumstances like Armstrong’s might open the door to “any of the millions of cruise
ship passengers who visit Alaska each year” and allow those persons to form an intent
and then backdate their residency to their vacation.       But we are not persuaded.
Armstrong’s circumstances in becoming a resident are very distinct from those of the
many cruise ship passengers and others who visit Alaska yearly. Starting on May 20,
2019, Armstrong both formed the intent to make her home in and remain in Alaska, and

      53
              Cf. 20 Alaska Administrative Code 15.060(h)(4) (listing evidence that can
show someone’s principal place of abode is in Alaska for student loan purposes,
including “rent receipts, proof of home ownership, or other proof, . . . including the
location of the recipient’s household goods”). Because Armstrong moved in with
Kellie, she would not have rent receipts or proof of home ownership, but she did
establish the location of her household goods. We note that the ease with which
Armstrong was able to establish a principal place of abode is unique, due to her previous
status as “location independent” and ability to move in with another person.

                                         -22-                                      7689
she demonstrated her intent through subsequent actions. Indeed, a casual visit to Alaska
in itself would not demonstrate the intent necessary to establish residency. And in
contrast to a typical temporary visitor, Armstrong both maintained a principal place of
abode in the state and refrained from behavior tending to support residency elsewhere
as of May 20. Indeed, Armstrong proceeded to build a life and a family in Alaska.
Vazquez’s cruise ship hypothetical simply fails to capture Armstrong’s circumstances.
Such temporary visitors to Alaska are unable to prove the necessary intent under
AS 01.10.055(b) when they have no abode in Alaska and generally return to their non-
Alaska abode at the end of their vacation.54
              3.     Summary
              The superior court’s factual findings, supported by the record, establish
that Armstrong became an Alaska resident on May 20, 2019, when she was both present
in the state and decided to move into the home of her now husband. Armstrong’s later
actions were consistent with those of a new resident with a permanent home in Alaska.
The superior court’s findings on these points are not clearly erroneous. We therefore
conclude that Armstrong satisfied Title 1’s state residency requirements, was a resident
of Alaska for at least three years prior to the candidacy filing deadline, and is eligible
to serve in the legislature.

       54
              The dissent presents a similar hypothetical where the visitor, in addition
to forming the intent to remain in Alaska, rents a room from a property owner before
leaving the state as originally scheduled, and later travels extensively before returning
to Alaska. See Dissent at 1. Missing from this hypothetical, however, is any further
analysis of whether the facts particular to this tourist demonstrated that he “maintain[ed]
a principal place of abode in the state” and provided other proof of intent pursuant to
AS 01.10.055(b) or whether the tourist acted or was absent from the state under
circumstances inconsistent with the intent to remain under AS 01.10.055(c). Here, the
superior court heard and considered detailed evidence regarding each of these points,
and after weighing that evidence, determined that Armstrong demonstrated the requisite
intent.

                                          -23-                                       7689
       CONCLUSION
              We AFFIRM the superior court’s decision that Armstrong met the
constitutional requirements, including the three-year state residency requirement, for
serving in the legislature.

                                        -24-                                     7689
CARNEY, Justice, dissenting.
             I do not question the sincerity of Jennie Armstrong’s love for and
commitment to her life in Alaska, a commitment she has demonstrated in both her
personal and now professional life. But because I am not persuaded that she established
her residency here before June 1, 2019, I respectfully dissent.
             The court’s decision appears to open the door for almost any tourist that
falls in love with Alaska or an Alaskan to immediately become a state resident.
Consider a hypothetical tourist who arrived in Alaska for a ten-day vacation. On the
last day of his vacation, the tourist decided he wanted to make Alaska his home. He
talked to a local property owner, who agreed he could rent a room when he returned
and that he could leave a few belongings with the property owner in the meantime. The
tourist then left Alaska as scheduled to the place his trip began. Before returning to
Alaska, the tourist travelled extensively. He returned to his prior abode only to collect
the remainder of his belongings and had them sent to Alaska. After completing his
travels, the tourist returned to Alaska and moved into the room he had arranged to
occupy while he was on vacation.
             As I understand today’s decision, because the tourist stated his intent to
return to Alaska before leaving the state at the end of his original vacation, he became
an Alaska resident at that moment. If there is a limiting principle to the court’s
interpretation of AS 01.10.055 I am unable to discern it; unless the new resident, like
Armstrong, wants to run for a legislative seat, Title 15’s requirements do not apply. Is
there a time when a person’s absence from Alaska after stating an intent to become an
Alaskan is too long? The court makes clear that several weeks is not too long.1 Would
a month be too long? Several months? A year?

      1
             See Opinion at 18.

                                         -25-                                      7689
              The court acknowledges that Armstrong’s situation is unique, noting her
lack of previous fixed address.2 But what truly makes this case unique is the importance
of the date Armstrong established residency to her candidacy. If not for the June 1
deadline for her “last-minute” decision to run for office, it would be of little importance
whether her residency started when she declared she was “all in” in late May or when
she flew back to Anchorage on June 8 and began to live there. This case is also likely
unique because even if the court agreed with my position, the final result could be the
same. The likely remedy would have been to require a new election for that position;
by that date, Armstrong’s residency would be undisputed.3
              I recognize the deference we accord to the superior court’s findings of
fact.4 But I believe that the court clearly erred both in its reliance on after-the-fact
actions and its consideration of Armstrong’s fishing licenses.           The sincerity of
Armstrong’s intent to become an Alaskan was not questioned, yet the evidence that the
superior court and this court relied upon (her marriage, her community involvement,
her Alaska business and fishing licenses) supports that sincerity rather than the date on
which she established and began to maintain “a principal place of abode” in the state.5
In particular it appears that the court did not consider whether any indicia of
implausibility6 accompanied Armstrong’s assertion that the 2022 fishing license,
obtained nearly two months after the filing deadline to run for office, was simply more
accurate than the previous ones. Or the assertion that the difference in the dates was

       2
              Opinion at 22 n.53.
       3
              See Boucher v. Bomhoff, 495 P.2d 77, 82-83 (Alaska 1972).
       4
              Sheffield v. Sheffield, 265 P.3d 332, 335 (Alaska 2011).
       5
              AS 01.10.055(b) (describing how a person demonstrates the requisite
intent to establish Alaskan residency).
       6
            Lake & Peninsula Borough Assembly v. Oberlatz, 329 P.3d 214, 222
(Alaska 2014).

                                          -26-                                       7689
due to the “importance” of Alaska fishing licenses, as opposed to the importance of
meeting the qualifications to run for elected office.
             I respectfully dissent.

                                          -27-                                7689