Court Opinion

ID: 9807968
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 20:22:43.388325+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:05:56.487280
License: Public Domain

WalKbb, J.,
dissenting: Being unable to concur in the opinion of the Court in this case, I will state briefly the reasons and grounds of my dissent. It does not appear in this case that A. J. Evans, who made the *185affidavit as to tbe correctness of the account upon which the suit was brought, had any interest therein, or could in the least be affected by the result of the action. He is not within the terms or intent of the statute disqualifying persons as witnesses from testifying against the estate of deceased parties, that is, against executors or administrators of such parties, as to personal transactions or communications with them. So far as appears, Evans will not lose or gain anything however the .action may terminate. He is but treasurer of the company bringing this action, and I know of no legal principle by which if the plaintiff prevails and gets a judgment he will be entitled to any part of the recovery, or how, if the plaintiff is cast in the suit, he will lose anything. He would certainly not be liable as treasurer, or otherwise, even for any part of the cost.
The case cited by the Court in its opinion (Banking Co. v. Walker, 121 N. C., 115) does not begin to sustain the contrary view of The Code, sec. 590. In that case Justice Montgomery, who delivered the opinion of the Court, is careful to state and to repeat that the witness, who was the cashier of the plaintiff bank, and whose testimony was excluded because of his interest in the event of the action, was not only cashier of the plaintiff bank, hut a stockholder, and it is perfectly apparent that the ruling of the Court excluding his testimony was based on the latter fact alone. So that Banking Co. v. Walker, supra, so much relied on by the Court to support its position, wholly fails to do so.
The reasoning by which the Court comes to the conclusion that because the president of a corporation is required to be a stockholder, and that any two offices of the corporation may be held by the same person, it follows that a treasurer may be a stockholder, and this being so, it follows that the presumption must be that he is one, but this is a complete non sequitior. Such assertion does not logically or legally lead to the conclusion reached by the Court. The president must be a stockholder in order to hold that office, but this does not mean, or begin to prove, that if the company consolidates two offices, president and treasurer, the latter must also be a stockholder, because there is no restriction on the company to associate a nonstockholding officer with one who owns no stock, and is not required to own any. It seems to be conceded, or, at least, should be, that the officer making the affidavit of the correctness of the account must be a stockholder in order to be interested in the event within the meaning of the statute. The mere fact that he is an officer does not in any sense make him interested in the event of the action, for no judgment can be entered for him or against him that will in the least affect his personal interests, but that is not enough. He may have a sort of sentimental interest, if that; but that is not enough, and •that is certainly all that he can have. And,'again, I am compelled to *186say that the argument by wbicb the Court reaches the conclusion that tbis power to unite two offices disqualifies the treasurer, wbo bas no stock,, wben joined witb the president, is also a complete non sequitur, and surely the conclusion cannot be warranted on the ground assumed. I bave referred above to the conclusion of the Court in tbis branch of the case as being a non sequitur, and it is rightly so denominated, wben tbis part of the opinion is considered witb what immediately follows, because the last part and the conclusion are inseparably connected witb the first part, and, in fact, are unmistakably based upon it, but neither can stand without the help and assistance of the other.
The last proposition is clearly untenable. the Court says: “the statute permits an ex parte affidavit to be offered as prima facie evidence of the correctness of the account, but we do not think it was the intention of the Legislature to permit one to speak by affidavit wbo otherwise would be incompetent to testify. Nor do we think it was the purpose-of the Legislature to deprive the adverse x>arty of bis right to question the admissibility of such evidence.” In tbis connection we may safely concede the correctness of the proposition stated there, that the Legislature did not intend to permit one to speak by affidavit wbo is incompetent to testify, nor to withdraw the right of the adverse party to make proper objection to the admission of incompetent evidence. But one of the conclusive answers is that the Legislature bas done no such thing. the defendant bas the right and the opportunity, by proper procedure, to-make due objection to any incompetent testimony. But that does not mean that be bas the right, or should bave it, to place the burden on the party wbo offers testimony to show primarily that it is competent, for tbis would violate every rule of evidence we bave ever beard of, as testimony offered, at least such as is apparently competent, must be admitted unless proper objection is made to it and supported by the facts, wbicb every rule as to the burden of proof requires should rest upon the objector, be wbo is the actor and affirms and not be wbo refutes, denies,, or is silent, and occupies merely a defensive position. If it be true that' the objector is entitled to demand the presence of the witness so that be may conduct a preliminary inquiry and cross-examine him, as to his competency, it is perfectly clear that the statute would be practically nullified, or come to naught, as that was what the law was intended to avoid. the extreme position taken by the Court in tbis respect would require all persons having knowledge of the facts, or likely to bave such knowledge, to be present wben the affidavit is offered, that they be examined as to its admissibility. Tbis would, of course, be in violation of the spirit and purpose of the statute, and entirely destroy the benefits intended to be conferred by it, besides, ignoring every known rule of *187evidence upon tbe subject. It would, besides, require tbe party offering tbe evidence to do precisely wbat the statute was intended to prevent.
The principle of Hosiery Co. v. Express Co., 184 N. C., 478, may be easily conceded, and yet the argument and conclusion drawn from tbat principle is this, tbat wben a particular fact, necessary to be proved, lies peculiarly witbin the knowledge of one of the parties to the controversy, upon him is cast the burden of proving such fact. But I do not believe it will be asserted, at least not successfully so, nor tbat we have ever been taught, tbat where one party offers evidence, be must go further and show tbat bis evidence is competent before it will be beard. Tbat is going entirely too far, and has no authority to support it.
But tbe statute simply requires tbat an affidavit, such as was made in tbis case, shall be sufficient, without anything else, to constitute a prima facie case, and wben we require more to be done, we are simply legislating and not construing tbe statute, or declaring wbat tbe law is. If tbe law is wrong or unjust, or inadequate to protect rights, let tbe Legislature correct by amendment, and not we by forced construction or arbitrary doctrine, having no legitimate reason to justify it. I do not contend, of course, tbat incompetent testimony should be admitted, and there is a sufficient remedy for its exclusion if it is offered. If defendant bad objected and alleged tbat tbe evidence proposed to be introduced was incompetent as a transaction by an interested witness with a deceased party, and also alleged tbat be was not able to show it for lack of time and opportunity to do so, tio court would deny bis (or her) request for reasonable time and opportunity to make tbe objection good, and, if it did, I may safely assert tbat tbis Court would not sustain any such ruling. But to sustain tbe objection in its present form would be simply to refuse enforcement of tbe law as written (ita, lex scripta est), and tbe mandate of tbe Legislature, which would be wrong and an invasion of tbe legitimate function of tbe legislative department. Whether tbe law is just or not, or needs' amendment or reformation, is not our concern, and, to speak plainly of it and in common parlance, “is none of our business.” We can only inquire wbat tbe law is, and not wbat it should be, and it is our imperative duty to enforce it as we find it.
As has been well said: “It may safely be laid down tbat the less the process of inquiry is fettered by rules and restraints, founded on supposed considerations of policy and convenience, the more certain and efficacious will it be in its operation. Formerly the very means devised for the discovery of truth and advancement of justice were not infrequently perverted to the purposes of injustice, and made the instruments of the most grievous and cruel oppression. It is to be hoped not only tbat those imperfections which still subsist, which have been spared from their antiquity, and exist as a kind of prescriptive evil, will in time be *188removed by legislative, if they be beyond the reach and scope of judicial, authority. ‘The rules of evidence/ said Lord Ellenborough, in Pritt v. Fairclough (3 Campb., 305), ‘must expand according to the exigencies of society.’ The admission of every light which reason and experience can supply for the discovery of truth, and the rejection of that only which serves not to guide, but to bewilder and mislead, is ,the great principle that ought to be the foundation of every system of evidence. Common experience rather than technical rules should be adopted as the test. Mercantile and industrial life, producing, as they do, nearly all the transactions of men that come before the courts of law and equity, are essentially practical. That which is the final basis of action, of calculation, reliance, investment, and general confidence in every business enterprise, may safely, in general, be resorted to to prove the main fact. The courts need not discredit what the common experience of mankind relies upon. Judge- Cooley once said that ‘courts would justly be the subject of ridicule if they should deliberately shut their eyes to the sources of information which the rest of the world relies upon.’ Lastly, wherever there is any serious doubt in the law as to whether certain proof is or is not permissible, a safe rule to pursue is to permit the testimony to go to the jury.” 10 R. C. L., pp. 861-862. It has also been said that “in assailing a prima facie right, the party must aver and prove facts sufficient to overcome it; otherwise, he cannot ordinarily put the defendant to the proof of a perfect indefeasible title or right. And it makes no difference as to the point of burden of proof that the evidence to rebut the demandant’s prima facie right comes in part or wholly from the defendant’s witnesses on cross-examination.” 10 R. C. L., p. 899, sec. 48; Foster v. Hall, 12 Pick. (Mass.), 89 (22 Am. Dec., 400); Hardman v. Cabot, 60 W. Va., 664; 9 Ann. Cases, 1030; 7 L. R. Anno. (N. S.), 506.
The cases cited by the Court (Cecil v. High Point, 165 N. C., 431, and Nall v. Kelly, 169 N. C., 717) have, I must most respectfully say, no bearing upon or relevancy to the points in this case. It is a very “far cry” from them to this case, or from this case to them. They are all altogether different, and no legitimate deduction, or inference, can be drawn from them that would in any aspect support the contention as stated in the Court’s opinion. The statute, and its meaning, are so plain and simple that he who runs may read and know what the law is, as enacted by the Legislature. Our duty is also simple, and demands faithful obedience to its plain mandate. It was passed so as to abolish what was deemed to be a great injustice imposed upon a creditor in collecting his just debt, when he was required, at undue cost and expense, to establish his case before a justice or court. It makes the affidavit only prima facie evidence, and requires more proof when it is seriously con*189tested, unless tbe plaintiff is willing to take tbe risk of losing bis case. To adopt tbe rule and procedure I bave suggested would fully protect tbe debtor and work no injustice to tbe creditor, and I believe that it should be declared as tbe law and tbe rule of decision in tbis case.
For tbe reasons given by me, I dissent from tbe opinion and judgment of tbis Court.
Clare, O. J., concurs in tbe foregoing dissenting opinion of Walker, J.