Court Opinion

ID: 9945649
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-28 07:12:12.085771+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:35.440529
License: Public Domain

Reverse and Remand and Opinion Filed February 20, 2024

                                      In The
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                               No. 05-22-00842-CV

            LONGHORN CREEK LTD., Appellant
                         V.
GARDENS OF CONNEMARA LTD. AND EMERSON FARM COMPANY,
                   LTD., Appellees

               On Appeal from the 429th Judicial District Court
                            Collin County, Texas
                   Trial Court Cause No. 429-00851-2022

                                  OPINION
         Before Chief Justice Burns, Justice Molberg, and Justice Carlyle
                           Opinion by Justice Molberg
      This appeal concerns the granting of appellees Gardens of Connemara Ltd.

and Emerson Farm Company, Ltd.’s rule 91a motion to dismiss appellant Longhorn

Creek Ltd.’s declaratory judgment action. Longhorn Creek argues the trial court

erred in granting the rule 91a motion because its claim for declaratory relief had a

basis in fact and law. Because we agree, we reverse and remand.

                                I.    Background

      Longhorn Creek filed suit on February 21, 2022. It alleged Connemara and

Emerson filed a conservation easement assessment agreement and declaration
providing for a “private transfer fee” of one percent of the value of conveyed land

for all land covered by the agreement. Longhorn Creek alleged the fee applied to

any conveyance, including granting, selling, assigning, and transferring any

possessory interest or estate in the land. Longhorn Creek alleged it owned property

that Connemara and Emerson claimed was subject to the private transfer fee

obligation. It sought a declaration it was not obligated to pay the private transfer fee

because (1) Connemara and Emerson had failed to file statutorily compliant notices

pursuant to Texas Property Code § 5.203, (2) Connemara and Emerson waived the

fee obligation based on subsequent amendments to the assessment agreement and

releases of multiple parties from their transfer fee obligations, (3) the private transfer

fee covenant does not touch and concern the property, and (4) the private transfer

fee is ineffective or void as to the property.

       On May 16, 2022, Connemara and Emerson filed a rule 91a motion to dismiss,

arguing Longhorn Creek’s claim had no basis in law or fact.

       On June 16, 2022, Longhorn Creek filed an amended petition for declaratory

relief. Longhorn Creek alleged that, in 2005, Connemara, Emerson, and two other

entities1 entered into a written agreement titled, “Conservation Easement

Assessment Agreement and Declaration,” which Connemara filed in the real

property records of Collin County.              Longhorn Creek attached a copy of the

   1
      The other two entities are Montgomery Farm Company and Bethany Corner, Ltd. We will hereinafter
refer solely to the two appellees before us, Connemara and Emerson.
                                                –2–
assessment agreement to its amended petition as Exhibit A.            The assessment

agreement, among other things, required the payment of a fee equal to one percent

of the value of conveyed land (“private transfer fee” or “fee”) for all land covered

by the agreement. Longhorn Creek alleged the fee purported to last in perpetuity,

burdening all subsequent purchases of land covered by the assessment agreement.

On its face, Longhorn Creek alleged, the private transfer fee sought to “encumber

and extract value ad nauseam from all transactions involving a transfer of the ‘bundle

of rights’ inherent to both residential and commercial sales, as well as leases and

inheritances.”

       Longhorn Creek alleged it purchased property2 in Allen, Texas, in February

2021, and Connemara and Emerson claimed the property was subject to the private

transfer fee obligation.

       Longhorn Creek alleged the assessment agreement had been amended

numerous times. It alleged multiple parties had secured “partial releases” whereby

the party paid a one-time 1.1 percent fee at sale instead of paying one percent transfer

fees on all subsequent leases of the property. Longhorn Creek here cited exhibits

B-1 through B-11, “true and correct copies of the amendments and releases,”

attached to its amended petition. For example, Longhorn Creek alleged Connemara

and Emerson released certain residential properties on December 11, 2019, from the

   The amended petition stated the description of the property as “WATTERS CREEK AT
   2

MONTGOMERY FARM PHASE 1, BLK A, LOT 3R-1A.”
                                          –3–
assessment agreement obligations, and that Connemara and Emerson had not

collected any fees on residential property sales since that date.

        Longhorn Creek next discussed in its amended petition the passage in 2011 of

legislation relating to private transfer fees. The legislature adopted Chapter 5,

Subchapter G, of the Texas Property Code to regulate private transfer fees.3 The

legislation made private transfer fee obligations created on or after June 17, 2011,

void and unenforceable against a subsequent owner or purchaser of real property.

TEX. PROP. CODE § 5.202(a). Fee obligations created before then were made subject

to strict notice requirements, which the parties agree must be strictly complied with

or else the obligations may become void. A person receiving such a private transfer

fee is required to file a notice of the private transfer fee obligation in the real property

records of the county in which it is located. Id. § 5.203(a). The notice is required to

(1) be printed in at least fourteen-point boldface type; (2) state the amount of the fee

and any method of determination; (3) state the date or any circumstance under which

the fee obligation expires, if any; (4) state the purpose for which the money from the

fee obligation is to be used; (5) state the name of each payee and each payee’s contact

information; (6) state the name and address of the payee of record to whom the

    3
       The Code defines “private transfer fee” as “an amount of money, regardless of the method of
determining the amount, that is payable on the transfer of an interest in real property or payable for a right
to make or accept a transfer.” TEX. PROP. CODE § 5.201(4). “Private transfer fee obligation” means an
obligation to pay a private transfer fee created under “(A) a declaration or other covenant recorded in the
real property records in the county in which the property subject to the private transfer fee obligation is
located; (B) a contractual agreement or promise; or (C) an unrecorded contractual agreement or promise.”
Id. § 5.201(5).
                                                    –4–
payment of the fee must be sent; (7) include the acknowledged signature of each

payee or authorized representative of each payee; and (8) state the legal description

of the property subject to the private transfer fee. Id. § 5.203(c). Additionally, a

person required to file a notice of a private transfer fee obligation must refile the

notice every three years thereafter. See id. § 5.203(d). Failure to comply with these

“strict notice requirements” subjects the party seeking the fee to certain

consequences, including the voiding of the private transfer fee obligation. Id.

§ 5.203(f). Longhorn Creek attached an attorney general’s opinion discussing these

provisions as Exhibit C.4

        Longhorn Creek alleged Connemara and Emerson filed its § 5.203 notice in

2012 and refiled it in 2015, 2018, and 2021, and it attached copies of the notices to

its amended petition as exhibits D through G. It alleged Connemara and Emerson’s

notices failed to adhere to the statutory requirement of stating the legal description

of the property subject to the private transfer fee obligation and failed to provide the

legal description of the property in at least fourteen-point boldface type. Instead,

Longhorn Creek alleged Connemara and Emerson “simply pointed to exhibits to

provide the description of the property subject to the private transfer fee.” Longhorn

Creek also alleged Connemara and Emerson stated they had unfettered discretion to

    4
      Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. KP-0195 at 2 (2018) (stating, inter alia, that, if the payee of a private transfer
fee obligation fails to comply with the notice requirements under § 5.203 of the property code, the private
transfer fee obligation is void, and the property is not subject to further obligation under the private transfer
fee obligation).
                                                     –5–
determine the purpose for which the money acquired from the fee would be used and

that they failed to use all of the funds exclusively for the purposes set out in the

assessment agreement and notices. Longhorn Creek alleged the notice stated:

      As the purpose for which the money from the private transfer fee
      obligation will be used is not prescribed or limited by the Assessment
      Agreement or otherwise, the payee of the private transfer fee will
      determine the purpose for which the money from the private transfer
      fee obligation will be used. However, the current intended use of the
      money from the private transfer fee obligation includes the
      maintenance and improvement of the Conservation Land.

Longhorn Creek alleged the notice referred parties seeking to identify the property

subject to the notice to “four exhibits found in the agreement.” The subsequent

notices refiled at three-year intervals, Longhorn Creek alleged, “simply incorporated

the 2012 notice and consequently failed to include a statutorily sufficient property

description that satisfied the strict requirements prescribed in section 5.203.”

      Longhorn Creek alleged Connemara and Emerson failed to adhere to the

statutory notice requirements when they amended the assessment agreement and

released multiple parties, allowing them to circumvent the fee obligation. Despite

these releases, Longhorn Creek alleged Connemara and Emerson subsequently filed

notices of the private transfer fee obligation, maintaining that the property continued

to be subject to the obligation.

      Longhorn Creek alleged it was interested in selling or leasing some or all of

its property and that a justiciable controversy existed between it and Connemara and

Emerson regarding whether the property was subject to the private transfer fee

                                         –6–
obligation. Longhorn Creek alleged the declaration it was requesting would resolve

the controversy between the parties.        Longhorn Creek sought the following

declarations: (1) there is no obligation to pay the private transfer fee, as Connemara

and Emerson’s notice and subsequent notices were statutorily noncompliant; (2)

Connemara and Emerson waived the private transfer fee obligation based on the

subsequent amendments to the assessment agreement and partial releases of multiple

parties from their private transfer fee obligations; (3) Connemara and Emerson’s

private transfer fee covenant did not touch and concern the property; (4) Connemara

and Emerson’s failure to use the fees collected to benefit the conservancy rendered

the private transfer fee void; and (5) the private transfer fee was ineffective and/or

void as to Longhorn Creek’s property. Longhorn Creek also sought attorney’s fees

under § 37.009 of the civil practice and remedies code.

      On June 22, 2022, Connemara and Emerson filed an amended rule 91a motion

to dismiss, arguing Longhorn Creek’s cause of action had no basis in law or fact.

They argued the notices of the private transfer fee obligation were in fourteen-point

boldface type and referenced the volume and page numbers of the Collin County

real property records where the assessment agreement could be found. Thus, they

argued, the notices provided the legal description of the encumbered properties by

reference. Connemara and Emerson also argued that releasing other parties from

their private transfer fee obligations does not mean they waived their right to enforce

the private transfer fee against Longhorn Creek. Finally, they argued § 5.203 trumps

                                         –7–
the “touch and concern” common law principles raised by Longhorn Creek.

Connemara and Emerson sought reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees pursuant

to rule 91a.

      The trial court heard Connemara and Emerson’s amended motion to dismiss

on July 21, 2022, and granted the motion, finding that Longhorn Creek’s first

amended petition failed to state a viable cause of action. Connemara and Emerson

subsequently filed an application for attorney’s fees. The trial court granted their

application and awarded Connemara and Emerson $31,047.50 in attorney’s fees,

plus conditional appellate fees. This appeal followed.

                                  II.   Discussion

   A. Applicable law

      Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a provides in pertinent part as follows:

      91a.1 Motion and Grounds. Except in a case brought under the Family
      Code or a case governed by Chapter 14 of the Texas Civil Practice and
      Remedies Code, a party may move to dismiss a cause of action on the
      grounds that it has no basis in law or fact. A cause of action has no basis
      in law if the allegations, taken as true, together with inferences
      reasonably drawn from them, do not entitle the claimant to the relief
      sought. A cause of action has no basis in fact if no reasonable person
      could believe the facts pleaded.

      91a.2 Contents of Motion. A motion to dismiss must state that it is
      made pursuant to this rule, must identify each cause of action to which
      it is addressed, and must state specifically the reasons the cause of
      action has no basis in law, no basis in fact, or both.

      ....

                                         –8–
      91a.6 Hearing; No Evidence Considered. Each party is entitled to at
      least 14 days’ notice of the hearing on the motion to dismiss. The court
      may, but is not required to, conduct an oral hearing on the motion.
      Except as required by 91a.7, the court may not consider evidence in
      ruling on the motion and must decide the motion based solely on the
      pleading of the cause of action, together with any pleading exhibits
      permitted by Rule 59.

TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.1, .2, .6.

      We review the merits of a rule 91a ruling de novo. In re Farmers Tex. Cnty.

Mut. Ins. Co., 621 S.W.3d 261, 266 (Tex. 2021) (orig. proceeding). Whether a

defendant is entitled to dismissal under the facts alleged is a legal question. Id.

      Because rule 91a provides a harsh remedy, we strictly construe the rule’s

requirements. Bedford Internet Off. Space, LLC v. Tex. Ins. Grp., Inc., 537 S.W.3d

717, 720 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2017, pet. dism’d); see also Renate Nixdorf GmbH

& Co. KG v. TRA Midland Props., LLC, No. 05-17-00577-CV, 2019 WL 92038, at

*10 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 3, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.). The rule is not a

substitute for special exception practice under rule 91 or summary judgment practice

under rule 166a, “both of which come with protective features against precipitate

summary dispositions on the merits.” Long v. Long, 681 S.W.3d 805, 816 (Tex.

App.—Dallas 2023, no pet. h.); Davis v. Homeowners of Am. Ins. Co., No. 05-21-

00092-CV, 2023 WL 3735115, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 31, 2023, no pet.);

Royale v. Knightvest Mgmt., LLC, No. 05-18-00908-CV, 2019 WL 4126600, at *4

(Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 30, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.).

                                         –9–
      When an order granting a rule 91a motion to dismiss does not specify the

grounds for dismissal, an appellant seeking reversal of a rule 91a dismissal must

negate the validity of each ground on which the trial court could have relied in

granting the dismissal. Lopez v. Sunstate Equip. Co. LLC, No. 05-21-00100-CV,

2022 WL 3714496, at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 29, 2022, pet. abated) (mem.

op.); Buholtz v. Gibbs, No. 05-18-00957-CV, 2019 WL 3940973, at *3 (Tex. App.—

Dallas Aug. 21, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.).

      A cause of action has no basis in fact “if no reasonable person could believe

the facts pleaded.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.1. This prong of rule 91a relates to the

believability of the facts alleged by a plaintiff in pleading a cause of action and, thus,

“seldom rises to a point of contention in the case law.” Davis, 2023 WL 3735115,

at *2. The Supreme Court of Texas has acknowledged that the “no basis in fact”

prong is a “factual-plausibility standard.” See City of Dallas v. Sanchez, 494 S.W.3d

722, 724 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam). We do not consider whether the allegations “are

likely, or even if the conduct alleged is outlandish, but only if a reasonable person

could believe the alleged conduct.” Drake v. Walker, No. 05-14-00355-CV, 2015

WL 2160565, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 8, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.).

      A cause of action alleged by a claimant has no basis in law “if the allegations,

taken as true, together with inferences reasonably drawn from them, do not entitle

the claimant to the relief sought.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.1. At the outset, “[t]o

determine whether dismissal under rule 91a is required in this case, we apply the

                                          –10–
fair-notice pleading standard applicable in Texas to determine whether the

allegations of the petition are sufficient to allege a cause of action.” Thomas v. 462

Thomas Fam. Props., LP, 559 S.W.3d 634, 639 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2018, pet.

denied). In Thomas, we stated:

      Our procedural rules merely require that the pleadings provide fair
      notice of the claim and the relief sought such that the opposing party
      can prepare a defense. A petition is sufficient if it gives fair and
      adequate notice of the facts upon which the pleader bases his claim.
      Even the omission of an element is not fatal if the cause of action may
      be reasonably inferred from what is specifically stated. Under this
      standard, courts assess whether an opposing party can ascertain from
      the pleading the nature of the controversy, its basic issues, and the type
      of evidence that might be relevant.

Id. at 639–40 (cleaned up).

      Ordinarily, when there is a lack of fair notice or other insufficiency in a

pleading, a complaining party is required to invoke special exception practice under

rules 90 and 91. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 90 (curable pleading defects must be pointed out

by timely exception, otherwise the defect is waived); TEX. R. CIV. P. 91 (“A special

exception shall not only point out the particular pleading excepted to, but it shall also

point out intelligibly and with particularity the defect, omission, obscurity, duplicity,

generality, or other insufficiency in the allegations in the pleading excepted to.”).

        In applying the fair-notice pleading standard to our review in a rule 91a

context, “we must construe the pleadings liberally in favor of the plaintiff, look to

the pleader’s intent, and accept as true the factual allegations in the pleadings to

determine if the cause of action has a basis in law or fact.” In re RNDC Tex., LLC,

                                         –11–
No. 05-18-00555-CV, 2018 WL 2773262, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 11, 2018,

no pet.) (mem. op.). “[I]f nothing in the pleading itself triggers a clear legal bar to

the claim, then there is a basis in law and the motion should be denied.” Id.

      Typically, there are two circumstances in which a court may determine that a

cause of action has no basis in law under rule 91a: (1) where the plaintiff fails to

plead a legally cognizable cause of action, or (2) where the allegations in the

plaintiff’s own pleading establish a complete legal bar to the plaintiff’s claims by

affirmatively negating entitlement to the relief requested. See Long, 681 S.W.3d at

817–18; Reaves v. City of Corpus Christi, 518 S.W.3d 594, 608 (Tex. App.—Corpus

Christi–Edinburg 2017, no pet.); see also In re Shire PLC, 633 S.W.3d 1, 18 (Tex.

App.—Texarkana 2021, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]) (review of Texas Supreme

Court cases reveals the defendant must establish the plaintiff’s claims are

“foreclose[d] as a matter of law” because either “(1) the causes of action in the

petition are not recognized by Texas law or (2) the causes of action are recognized,

but the plaintiff has alleged facts that defeat those claims under settled law (i.e., the

plaintiff has pleaded itself out of court)”). Further, as the supreme court stated

recently, “[a] cause of action has no basis in law under Rule 91a if it is barred by an

established legal rule and the plaintiff has failed to plead facts demonstrating that

the rule does not apply.” In re First Rsrv. Mgmt., L.P., 671 S.W.3d 653, 661 (Tex.

2023) (orig. proceeding).

                                         –12–
      In ruling on the rule 91a motion, except as required by rule 91a.7, which

relates to attorney’s fees and is not at issue here, a court may not consider evidence

and must decide the motion based solely on the pleading of the cause of action,

together with any pleading exhibits permitted by rule 59. TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.6. Rule

59 permits as “pleading exhibits” only “[n]otes, accounts, bonds, mortgages,

records, and all other written instruments, constituting, in whole or in part, the claim

sued on, or the matter set up in defense.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 59. Because “[n]o other

instrument of writing shall be made an exhibit in the pleading,” id., rule 91a permits

consideration of only a “narrow class of exhibits” in addition to the pleading of the

cause of action. See Bethel v. Quilling, Selander, Lownds, Winslett & Moser, P.C.,

595 S.W.3d 651, 654 (Tex. 2020). The court may not resort to evidence proffered

by the rule 91a movant, such as through affidavits, transcribed testimony, or

documents in deciding whether the non-movant’s claims enjoy no basis in law.

Davis, 2023 WL 3735115, at *5 n.6. Further, as we stated recently in Davis:

      Pleading exhibits are not evidence. They are exhibits in aid of, and to
      factually amplify allegations in, pleadings and, if used, must be
      incorporated by reference into the pleadings in some manner. In other
      words, they are viewed as constituting a part of the pleading to which
      they are attached. In the rule 91a context, only the non-movant’s
      pleading may be looked to when determining whether the cause of
      action pleaded has a basis in law. Thus, rule 59 exhibits attached to the
      non-movant’s pleading may be considered in the quest to determine
      whether the cause of action has a legal basis. In contrast, a court may
      consider a movant’s pleading only to determine whether an affirmative
      defense has been properly raised in the pleading of the movant. Rule
      59 hardly grants carte blanche to litigants to attach unauthenticated,
      hearsay, unduly prejudicial, or other traditionally objectionable

                                         –13–
       documents to pleadings and have them considered as “evidence” in the
       traditional sense. Rule 59 pleading exhibits merely imbue or augment
       the allegations of the pleading to which they are attached. They gain
       no talismanic quality by being attached to a pleading and, perforce, they
       are dispositive of nothing without more. Simply, unless later offered
       and admitted into evidence, pleading exhibits are not evidence.

Id. (internal citations omitted).

   B. Analysis

       Longhorn Creek argues on appeal the trial court erred in granting Connemara

and Emerson’s rule 91a motion to dismiss because its declaratory judgment action

has a sufficient basis in law and in fact to proceed. It argues that taking the

allegations in its amended petition as true, there is a basis in law and fact for

concluding the private transfer fee is void. We agree.

       To begin with, we conclude Longhorn Creek’s declaratory judgment action

has a basis in fact. The amended petition reveals no basis to conclude no reasonable

person could believe the facts pleaded.5 Under rule 91a, “this ends the inquiry.” See

Royale, 2019 WL 4126600, at *7. Thus, to the extent the trial court granted the

motion to dismiss on this basis, it was error.

       Next we consider whether the trial court erred in dismissing the cause of

action because it lacks a basis in law. Under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments

Act, a person interested under a written contract or other writing constituting a

   5
      Moreover, at oral argument, Connemara and Emerson conceded they were no longer arguing the
allegations lacked a basis in fact.
                                             –14–
contract or whose rights, status, or other legal relations are affected by a contract

may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the

contract and obtain a declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations thereunder.

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 37.004(a). The Act’s purpose is to settle and afford

relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status, and other legal

relations, and it is to be liberally construed and administered. Id. § 37.002(b). A

declaratory judgment action will lie when a justiciable controversy exists as to the

rights and status of the parties before the court for adjudication and the requested

declaration will actually resolve the controversy. HMT Tank Serv. LLC v. Am. Tank

& Vessel, Inc., 565 S.W.3d 799, 808 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no

pet.); Transp. Ins. Co. v. WH Cleaners, Inc., 372 S.W.3d 223, 227 (Tex. App.—

Dallas 2012, no pet.).

      Longhorn Creek’s allegations in the amended petition pleaded a justiciable

controversy that would be resolved by the declarations it seeks. Longhorn Creek

alleged Connemara and Emerson were the beneficiaries of a private transfer fee

obligation created in 2005 by the assessment agreement that burdened Longhorn

Creek’s property. Longhorn Creek alleged the § 5.203 notices filed by Connemara

and Emerson failed to use an at-least-fourteen-point type and to state the legal

description of the property subject to the private transfer fee obligation, and thus, it

sought a declaration that the private transfer fee obligation was void. See TEX. PROP.

CODE § 5.203(f). It alleged and sought a declaration that Connemara and Emerson

                                         –15–
engaged in conduct by amending the assessment agreement and releasing other

parties that waived its right to enforce the fee obligation against Longhorn Creek.

Finally, Longhorn Creek sought a declaration that the fee obligation did not touch

and concern the property, and Connemara and Emerson’s failure to use the fees

collected to benefit the conservancy rendered the private transfer fee void. Because

these declarations would resolve the controversy between the parties, we conclude

Longhorn Creek stated a viable declaratory judgment action.

      Despite this, Connemara and Emerson argue Longhorn Creek’s own

allegations establish a complete legal bar to its claims. They argue the notices were

printed in fourteen-point boldface type and referenced records that sufficiently

described the property subject to the private transfer fee—they rely on the notices

attached as pleading exhibits to Longhorn Creek’s amended petition for this

contention. As stated previously, we may not consider evidence in deciding a rule

91a motion but only the pleading of the cause of action and the narrow class of

exhibits permitted by rule 59. TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.6; Bethel, 595 S.W.3d at 654.

That narrow class includes “[n]otes, accounts, bonds, mortgages, records, and all

other written instruments, constituting, in whole or in part, the claim sued on, or the

matter set up in defense.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 59. The copies of the notices attached to

the amended petition may be important future evidence for some of Longhorn

Creek’s allegations, but they cannot be said to constitute the claim sued on. See City

of Paris v. Bray, 175 S.W. 432, 433 (Tex. 1915) (in city’s suit to recover amount of

                                        –16–
a paving assessment, a copy of a notice of the paving attached to the petition was

“not a written instrument forming in any part the basis of the cause of action for the

enforcement of the assessment” even though it was “one of the requirements of the

law,” and thus was not to be considered in testing the sufficiency of the pleading;

instead, the cause of action was “constituted by the debt and lien”—it was “not one

founded in whole or in part upon any written instrument, but has its origin in the

provisions of law governing the levy of the assessment”). Consequently, we

consider only Longhorn Creek’s pleading in determining whether the cause of action

has any basis in law. Because we must take as true the allegations pleaded in the

amended petition, we categorically reject Connemara and Emerson’s contention that

Longhorn Creek’s claim has no basis in law.

      Connemara and Emerson also argue the facts alleged by Longhorn Creek

cannot constitute waiver of their transfer fee rights as a matter of law. Waiver is the

intentional relinquishment of a known right or intentional conduct inconsistent with

claiming that right. LaLonde v. Gosnell, 593 S.W.3d 212, 218–19 (Tex. 2019). It is

generally “a fact-intensive inquiry involving multiple factors.” BCH Dev., LLC v.

Lakeview Heights Addition Prop. Owners’ Ass’n, No. 05-17-01096-CV, 2019 WL

2211479, at *9 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 21, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.); First

Interstate Bank of Tex., N.A. v. S.B.F.I., Inc., 830 S.W.2d 239, 248 (Tex. App.—

Dallas 1992, no pet.). The question before us is not whether Longhorn Creek proved

its waiver claim. The question is whether anything in Longhorn Creek’s pleading

                                        –17–
triggers a clear legal bar to its claim regarding waiver. See RNDC Tex., 2018 WL

2773262, at *1. Construing the pleading liberally, we cannot conclude this claim is

legally impossible. As our sister court articulated in Shire, a petition’s failure to

state sufficient detail regarding the facts upon which a claim is based “is not an

argument upon which dismissal can be granted under Rule 91a.” Shire, 633 S.W.3d

at 35.

         Connemara and Emerson argue the declarations sought by Longhorn Creek

that the private transfer fee covenant does not touch and concern the property and

Connemara and Emerson’s failure to use the fees collected to benefit the

conservancy rendered the private transfer fee void have no basis in law. They argue

the adoption of the statutory scheme governing private transfer fees forecloses

Longhorn Creek’s common law claim. We cannot agree. Our review here is limited

to whether Longhorn Creek pleaded facts that defeat its claims under settled law.

See id. at 18. For a statutory provision to preempt a common law principle or claim,

the statute must “directly conflict” with the principle. See Cash Am. Int’l Inc. v.

Bennett, 35 S.W.3d 12, 16 (Tex. 2000) (noting that abrogating common law claims

is “disfavored”). Connemara and Emerson point to nothing in settled law providing

that Chapter 5, Subchapter G, directly conflicts with the common law principles 6

    6
      In order for a party to enforce an agreement burdening land against a successor to the party with whom
he covenanted, the agreement must run with the land. Wayne Harwell Props. v. Pan Am. Logistics Ctr.,
Inc., 945 S.W.2d 216, 218 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997, writ denied). A covenant runs with the land

                                                  –18–
raised by Longhorn Creek. They point to § 5.202(b)(9), arguing it demonstrates the

law of covenants does not apply to private transfer fees. Under that provision, a fee

paid to an organization exempt from federal taxation under §§ 501(c)(3) 7 or

501(c)(4)8 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is not considered a private transfer

fee obligation only if the organization uses the payments to directly benefit the

encumbered property by: (A) supporting or maintaining only the encumbered

property; (B) constructing or repairing improvements only to the encumbered

property; or (C) providing activities or infrastructure to support quality of life,

including cultural, educational, charitable, recreational, environmental, and

conservation activities and infrastructure, that directly benefit the encumbered

property. TEX. PROP. CODE § 5.202(b)(9). But this provision does not generally

exclude from the meaning of private transfer fee obligations those fees used to

benefit the encumbered property in the ways enumerated in the statute—it does so

only with respect to certain tax-exempt organizations.

        Finally, Connemara and Emerson argue that, because nothing in the property

code requires them to use the private transfer fees collected to benefit the

conservancy, this cannot be the basis for a declaration voiding the fee obligation.

when it, among other things, touches and concerns the land. Inwood N. Homeowners’ Ass’n, Inc. v. Harris,
736 S.W.2d 632, 635 (Tex. 1987).
    7
     26 U.S.C.A. § 501(c)(3) (relating to charitable, religious, and other organizations organized and
operated exclusively for exempt purposes set forth in statute).
    8
      26 U.S.C.A. § 501(c)(4) (relating to non-profit organizations operated exclusively for the promotion
of social welfare).
                                                 –19–
However, construing Longhorn Creek’s amended petition liberally, as we must, see

RNDC Tex., 2018 WL 2773262, at *1, we conclude this requested declaration relates

to the one immediately preceding it—that the “private transfer fee covenant does not

touch and concern the property.”

      Accordingly, we conclude nothing pleaded by Longhorn Creek triggers a

“clear legal bar” to its claim, see id., and the trial court therefore erred in dismissing

Longhorn Creek’s declaratory judgment action on this basis.

      In sum, the issues raised by Connemara and Emerson go beyond a

determination of whether the claim as pleaded is baseless under rule 91a standards.

See Weizhong Zheng v. Vacation Network, Inc., 468 S.W.3d 180, 185 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. denied). Rule 91a is not a procedure that allows a

court to generally weigh the merits of a case. Instead, Connemara and Emerson’s

argument seems fit for a summary judgment motion in that it asserts that the

evidence and authority negate the pleaded facts; thus, they may present their

contentions under summary judgment standards. See id.; TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a.

Failing that, factual issues may be submitted to a trier of fact.

      In reversing the trial court’s dismissal order, we also vacate the trial court’s

order granting Connemara and Emerson’s application for attorney’s fees. See TEX.

R. CIV. P. 91a.7; Sanchez v. Striever, 614 S.W.3d 233, 248 (Tex. App.—Houston

[14th Dist.] 2020, no pet.).

                                          –20–
                                III.   Conclusion

      We reverse the trial court’s rule 91a dismissal order and vacate the award of

attorney’s fees and costs.   We remand the case to the trial court for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

                                            /Ken Molberg/
220842F.P05                                 KEN MOLBERG
                                            JUSTICE

                                       –21–
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                  JUDGMENT

LONGHORN CREEK LTD.,                          On Appeal from the 429th Judicial
Appellant                                     District Court, Collin County, Texas
                                              Trial Court Cause No. 429-00851-
No. 05-22-00842-CV           V.               2022.
                                              Opinion delivered by Justice
GARDENS OF CONNEMARA                          Molberg. Chief Justice Burns and
LTD. AND EMERSON FARM                         Justice Carlyle participating.
COMPANY, LTD., Appellees

       In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the order of the trial
court is REVERSED and this cause is REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

       It is ORDERED that appellant LONGHORN CREEK LTD. recover its
costs of this appeal from appellees GARDENS OF CONNEMARA LTD. and
EMERSON FARM COMPANY, LTD.

Judgment entered this 20th day of February 2024.

                                       –22–