Court Opinion

ID: 9838156
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-05 14:15:25.88197+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:34:47.173333
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

            Present: Judges Raphael, White and Senior Judge Petty
PUBLISHED

            Argued by videoconference

            BRYAN TEMPLE SMITH
                                                                                 OPINION BY
            v.     Record No. 0169-22-2                                   JUDGE STUART A. RAPHAEL
                                                                             SEPTEMBER 5, 2023
            COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

                               FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CAROLINE COUNTY
                                           Sarah L. Deneke, Judge1

                           David C. Reinhardt (Elliott B. Bender; Reinhardt Law Firm, PLLC;
                           Bender Law Group, PLLC, on briefs), for appellant.

                           Rebecca M. Garcia, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares,
                           Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

                   Bryan Temple Smith challenges his convictions for driving with a revoked license while

            intoxicated and for driving while intoxicated (DWI), third offense within 10 years. Ten days

            after state troopers stopped Smith for driving with a missing tag light in violation of Code

            § 46.2-1003, an amendment took effect that prohibited traffic stops based on such violations and

            that barred the Commonwealth from introducing any evidence “obtained as the result of a stop in

            violation of” the amendment. 2020 Va. Acts Spec. Sess. I chs. 45, 51. We disagree with Smith

            that the amendment was retroactive. We also disagree with Smith that the trial court erred in

            admitting (or that the jury erred in relying on) a Department of Motor Vehicles transcript to

            evidence Smith’s two prior DWI convictions. And we find no error in the trial court’s decision

            to permit the Commonwealth’s expert to testify about the effects of alcohol on the body to

                   1
                    Judge Charles S. Sharp presided over the pretrial motions hearing, and Judge Sarah L.
            Deneke presided over the trial and sentencing hearings.
corroborate that what the troopers observed was, in fact, the behavior of an intoxicated driver.

Accordingly, we affirm Smith’s convictions.

                                          BACKGROUND

       On appeal, we recite the facts “in the ‘light most favorable’ to the Commonwealth, the

prevailing party in the trial court.” Hammer v. Commonwealth, 74 Va. App. 225, 231 (2022)

(quoting Commonwealth v. Cady, 300 Va. 325, 329 (2021)). Doing so requires that we “discard”

the defendant’s evidence when it conflicts with the Commonwealth’s evidence, “regard as true

all the credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth,” and read “all fair inferences” in the

Commonwealth’s favor. Cady, 300 Va. at 329 (quoting Commonwealth v. Perkins, 295 Va. 323,

323-24 (2018)).

       On February 19, 2021, Virginia State Police Troopers Zachary Homlish and Robert Swift

stopped a tan Ford Bronco, driven by Smith, after observing that the truck was missing a tag

light. When asked for his license and registration, Smith responded that “he was not supposed to

be driving” because “he was in rehab due to a previous [DWI] in Henrico.” Homlish smelled the

faint odor of alcohol, and Smith admitted to having consumed “a couple of beers.”

       Smith complied with the troopers’ request to perform field sobriety tests. When Smith

was asked to follow an object with his eyes without moving his head, Homlish observed

nystagmus, an “involuntary jerking of the eyes.” Smith repeatedly moved his head during the

test after being instructed not to. And Smith was unable to stand on one leg for longer than four

seconds. Stumbling, he explained to the trooper, “I already told you I’ve been drinking.” He

later admitted to having drunk “six beers” since “lunchtime.” The troopers arrested Smith and

transported him to jail to have his blood drawn. When read the implied-consent form for the

blood draw, Smith responded, “how do you expect a drunk person to understand all that?”

                                               -2-
       Smith was indicted for (1) driving with a revoked license while intoxicated, in violation

of Code § 46.2-391(D)(2)(a)(ii), and (2) DWI, third offense within 10 years, in violation of Code

§§ 18.2-266 and -270. Smith was not charged with operating a vehicle with a defective tag light.

       At the time of Smith’s arrest, Code § 46.2-1003 provided that it was “unlawful for any

person to use or have as equipment on a motor vehicle operated on a highway any device or

equipment . . . which is defective or in unsafe condition.” 2017 Va. Acts ch. 670 (Code

§ 46.2-1003). Smith moved to suppress the Commonwealth’s evidence, arguing that a 2020

amendment to Code § 46.2-1003 prohibited law-enforcement officers from stopping vehicles for

defective equipment. See 2020 Va. Acts Spec. Sess. I chs. 45, 51 (Code § 46.2-1003(C)).

       The prosecutor acknowledged at the suppression hearing that the officers who stopped

Smith had been advised to be on the lookout for his vehicle based on a tip from a witness. The

witness reported seeing the vehicle swerving; the driver then stopped to buy beer and drove off

with his hazard lights on. Smith argued that suppression was warranted because the purpose of

the 2020 law was to guard against “[p]retextual stops” based on minor traffic offenses. But the

trial court denied Smith’s motion, concluding that the amendment was not retroactive.

       At trial, after the prosecution failed to prove that the blood draw was performed by a

person qualified under Code § 18.2-268.5,2 the trial court refused to admit the certificate of

analysis into evidence. Without the certificate of analysis, the Commonwealth sought to prove

Smith’s intoxication through the troopers’ testimony and the dash-camera footage of the traffic

stop. In addition, over Smith’s objection, the prosecution called Dr. Jon K. Dalgleish, Ph.D., as

an expert on the effects of alcohol on a typical individual.

       2
          Code § 18.2-268.5 provides that “only a physician, registered nurse, licensed practical
nurse, phlebotomist, graduate laboratory technician or a technician or nurse designated by order
of a circuit court acting upon the recommendation of a licensed physician . . . shall withdraw
blood for the purpose of determining its alcohol . . . content.”
                                               -3-
       Dr. Dalgleish testified that a person with a blood-alcohol content (BAC) of 0.08 would

experience “significant adverse effects in judgment,” a slower processing speed, less fine-motor

control, slower reaction times, and impaired balance. He also testified that a person with a BAC

of 0.15 would have “more adverse effects in balance and coordination, slurring of speech,

problems forming sentences, [and] problems maintaining an upright posture or stumbling.” And

the more alcohol in the system, he explained, the more pronounced the “horizontal gaze

nystagmus” effect, an involuntary jerking of the eyes.

       To prove that Smith had two prior DWI convictions, the Commonwealth introduced a

DMV transcript showing that Smith was convicted in the Henrico County General District Court

of (1) driving while intoxicated in May 2016, and (2) driving while intoxicated, second offense

within 10 years, in June 2020. The Commonwealth also presented the June 2020 court order,

signed by the judge, stating that Smith pleaded guilty to the DWI-second offense. The

Commonwealth did not offer the court order reflecting the DWI-first conviction in 2016.

       The troopers were permitted to testify that they reviewed the DMV transcript at the

scene. Trooper Swift told the jury that Smith had two prior DWI convictions as shown in the

DMV transcript; Swift admitted, however, that he never saw a copy of Smith’s DWI-first

conviction. The trial court denied Smith’s motion to exclude the DMV transcript and denied his

motion to strike the Commonwealth’s evidence.

       In Smith’s case-in-chief, the trial court received into evidence a letter addressed “To

Whom It May Concern,” signed by a deputy clerk for the Henrico County General District

Court. The prosecutor’s office had given the letter to Smith’s counsel in discovery. The letter

identified Smith and the case number for the DWI-first conviction shown on the DMV transcript.

The letter stated: “After conducting a search for the above referenced case, we are unable to

locate it at this time.” After Smith rested, the trial court denied his renewed motion to strike.

                                                -4-
        The jury convicted Smith of both charges, and the trial court sentenced him to ten years’

imprisonment with eight years and six months suspended. Smith noted a timely appeal.

                                               ANALYSIS

        Smith’s five assignments of error can be grouped into three categories. We consider

them in order.

                              A. Retroactivity (Assignment of Error 1)

        Smith argues that the evidence against him should have been suppressed because the

troopers’ stated reason for stopping him was for driving with a defective tag light in violation of

Code § 46.2-1003. On November 9, 2020, three months before the stop, the Governor signed

into law chapters 45 and 51 of the Acts of Assembly. 2020 Va. Acts Spec. Sess. I chs. 45, 51. A

provision of that bill added subsection C to Code § 46.2-1003, barring a law-enforcement officer

from stopping a person for driving a motor vehicle with defective vehicle equipment. Id. (Code

§ 46.2-1003(C)). The amendment also imposed a statutory exclusionary rule for evidence

obtained through a violation of that requirement:

                 No evidence discovered or obtained as the result of a stop in
                 violation of this subsection, including evidence discovered or
                 obtained with the operator’s consent, shall be admissible in any
                 trial, hearing, or other proceeding.

Id. When Smith was stopped on February 19, 2021, however, the 2020 law had not yet taken

effect. Without an emergency-enactment clause, the bill did not become law until March 1,

2021, “the first day of the fourth month following the month of adjournment of the special

session.” Va. Const. Art. IV, § 13; Code § 1-214(B).

        Yet Smith claims that the amendment should be given retroactive effect. “Whether a

statute should be applied retroactively is . . . a question of law that an appellate court reviews de

novo.” Street v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. App. 298, 304 (2022). “The ‘usual rule’ regarding a

new statute is ‘that legislation is . . . prospective’ only.” Id. at 305 (alteration in original)
                                                  -5-
(quoting Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 343, 357 (1999)). “The retroactivity of statutes is

disfavored,” and ordinarily “[a] statute is retroactive only if the legislature includes an express

provision or other clear language indicating that it applies retroactively.” Id. (citing McCarthy v.

Commonwealth, 73 Va. App. 630, 647 (2021)). “[E]very reasonable doubt is resolved against a

retroactive operation of a statute, and words of a statute ought not to have a [retroactive]

operation unless they are so clear, strong[,] and imperative that no other meaning can be annexed

to them.” Id. (third alteration in original) (quoting Taylor v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. App. 179,

185 (2004)).

       The 2020 legislation in question amended 19 separate code provisions that previously

provided a basis for law-enforcement officers to conduct a lawful stop. 2020 Va. Acts Spec.

Sess. I chs. 45 (H.B. 5058), 51 (S.B. 5029). The amending language was similar for all 19

provisions, providing that “[n]o evidence discovered or obtained” through a “violation” of the

particular code section would be “admissible in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding” (the “in-

violation-of” language).3

       We have already addressed the retroactivity of several of these 19 in-violation-of

provisions, holding each time that the provision was not retroactive. First, in Montgomery v.

       3
          See 2020 Va. Acts Spec. Sess. I chs. 45, 51 (Code § 15.2-919(B) (motorcycle, moped,
or motorized skateboard or scooter noise); Code § 18.2-250.1(F) (odor of marijuana); Code
§ 46.2-334.01(F) (driving without license or permit); Code § 46.2-335(E) (using wireless device
while driving on learner’s permit); Code § 46.2-646(E) (driving less than four months after
expiration of registration sticker); Code § 46.2-810.1(C) (smoking in vehicle with minor
present); Code § 46.2-923(C) (pedestrian jay-walking); Code § 46.2-926(B) (stepping onto a
highway where the pedestrian cannot be seen); Code § 46.2-1003(C) (defective motor-vehicle
equipment); Code § 46.2-1013(B) (defective tail lights); Code § 46.2-1014(B) (defective brake
lights); Code § 46.2-1014.1(B) (missing or non-compliant supplemental high-mount stop light);
Code § 46.2-1030(F) (defective headlights and illuminating devices); Code § 46.2-1049(B)
(defective exhaust system); Code § 46.2-1052(P) (use of tinting films); Code § 46.2-1054(B)
(suspended objects that obstruct view); Code § 46.2-1094(F) (front-seat occupants without
seatbelts); Code § 46.2-1157(E) (expired vehicle-inspection sticker); Code § 46.2-1300(E)
(violating local ordinance relating to motor-vehicle ownership or maintenance)).
                                                -6-
Commonwealth, 75 Va. App. 182, 200 (2022), we held that Code § 18.2-250.1(F)—prohibiting

police from stopping a person based “on the odor of marijuana”—did not apply to arrests made

before the March 1, 2021 effective date. We emphasized the statutory phrase, “evidence

discovered or obtained pursuant to a violation of this subsection.” 75 Va. App. at 195 (quoting

Code § 18.2-250.1(F)). We explained that the evidence in that case “was not discovered or

obtained ‘pursuant to a violation’ of Code § 18.2-250.1(F), because one cannot violate a statute

or break a rule that does not [yet] exist.” Id. at 196 (quoting Code § 18.2-250.1(F)). “Because

the statute was not in effect at the time of the search, no law enforcement officer could have

violated it.” Id.

        After Code § 18.2-250.1(F) was repealed, amended, and reenacted as Code

§ 4.1-1302(A) of the Cannabis Control Act, see 2021 Va. Acts Spec. Sess. I chs. 550, 551, we

reaffirmed in Street that its language was not retroactive to a search conducted in 2019, before

the effective date of either Code § 18.2-250.1(F) or § 4.1-1302. 75 Va. App. at 305. Street

repeated Montgomery’s emphasis on the in-violation-of language. Id. at 307. “Simply put, the

2019 search could not violate a nonexistent statute . . . . As a result, a plain reading of the statute

supports application of the general rule that it does not apply retroactively.” Id. at 307-08. We

added that if the General Assembly had wanted the amendment to apply retroactively, it “could

have said so explicitly,” or it could have said “‘obtained in such a manner’ (based on odor),”

rather than “pursuant to a violation of this subsection.” Id. at 308.

        We considered a second of those 19 provisions in Hogle v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. App.

743 (2022), holding that Code § 46.2-646(E) did not apply retroactively to bar evidence seized

during a traffic stop for an expired registration sticker. We focused again on the in-violation-of

language. When the trooper there “stopped Hogle in September of 2019, the evidence

discovered or obtained was not ‘the result of a stop in violation of th[e] subsection’. . . . Because

                                                 -7-
the [subsection] was not in effect at the time of the search, no law enforcement officer could

have violated it.” Id. at 751-52 (first and third alterations in original) (quoting Montgomery, 75

Va. App. at 196).

       We have applied the same reasoning in unpublished opinions4 to hold that the

amendments to two of the other 19 statutes do not apply retroactively, including the one at issue

here, Code § 46.2-1003(C). See Moore v. Commonwealth, No. 0942-22-1, slip op. at 4-5, 2023

WL 3695931, at *2-3 (Va. Ct. App. May 30, 2023) (holding that Code § 46.2-1003(C) is not

retroactive); Swinson v. Commonwealth, No. 0351-22-3, slip op. at 6-10, 2023 WL 1111688, at

*3-5 (Va. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2023) (same); Bolden v. Commonwealth, No. 0999-22-3, slip op. at

4-6, 2023 WL 3468331, at *2-3 (Va. Ct. App. May 16, 2023) (holding that Code § 46.2-1013(B)

is not retroactive). As Moore explained, “[o]ur recent precedent forecloses” the argument that

Code § 46.2-1003(C) is retroactive because its language “is indistinguishable from the language

this Court analyzed in Street.” Slip op. at 1, 3, 2023 WL 3695931, at *1, *2.

       Montgomery and Street described that language as creating a statutory “exclusionary

rule” that provided broader protection for defendants than is required by the Fourth Amendment.

See Montgomery, 75 Va. App. at 198; Street, 75 Va. App. at 309 n.7. Under the Fourth

Amendment, “the constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops” does not “depend[] on the actual

motivations of the individual officers involved.” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813

(1996). “An officer’s ‘ulterior motive,’ whatever it might be, does not nullify an objectively

valid ‘legal justification’ for his actions.” Thomas v. Commonwealth, 57 Va. App. 267, 274

(2010) (quoting Whren, 517 U.S. at 813). In other words, even if an officer uses the defendant’s

minor traffic offense as a “legal pretext to stop the car,” it does not invalidate the reasonableness

       4
          “Although not binding precedent, unpublished opinions can be cited and considered for
their persuasive value. Rule 5A:1(f).” Otey v. Commonwealth, 61 Va. App. 346, 350 n.3 (2012).
                                              -8-
of the stop under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 273-74. See, e.g., Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532

U.S. 769, 772 (2001) (“[A] traffic-violation arrest . . . [will] not be rendered invalid by the fact

that it was ‘a mere pretext for a narcotics search.’” (second and third alterations in original)

(quoting Whren, 517 U.S. at 812-13)). But “States are free to provide protections ‘beyond the

level that the Fourth Amendment requires . . . exclusively as matters of state law.’” Street, 75

Va. App. at 309 n.7 (alteration in original) (quoting Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 171

(2008)). The General Assembly chose to add such protections for persons stopped by law-

enforcement officers based on one of the 19 listed offenses.

       Given the similar language and common purpose of the amendments in the 2020

legislation, it is impossible to distinguish the in-violation-of language in Code § 46.2-1003(C)

from the parallel amendments to the other 18 provisions, including the ones construed in

Montgomery and Hogle. The troopers who stopped Smith in February 2021 because his tag light

was out could not have stopped him “in violation of” subsection C because that subsection had

not yet become law. Thus, the trial court did not err in denying Smith’s suppression motion.

                               B. Objections to the DMV Transcript

       Smith raises three assignments of error relating to the trial court’s admitting the DMV

transcript into evidence. We consider his objections in order, after briefly describing the

statutory scheme.

       Code § 18.2-270 increases the penalty for driving while intoxicated if the defendant has

been previously convicted of a DWI offense. As relevant here, the statute provides that a

“person convicted of three [DWI] offenses . . . committed within a 10-year period shall upon

conviction of the third offense be guilty of a Class 6 felony.” Code § 18.2-270(C)(1). The

punishment must “include a mandatory minimum sentence of 90 days” and “a mandatory

minimum fine of $1,000.” Id. The Commonwealth must prove “all elements of [the] crime,

                                                 -9-
including prior convictions, beyond a reasonable doubt.” Mwangi v. Commonwealth, 277 Va.

393, 395 (2009).

        The prior convictions, however, may be proved by the admission of a DMV abstract or

transcript of the defendant’s driver-conviction record. Code § 46.2-384. When a person is

convicted of a motor-vehicle offense, the clerk of the general district court or circuit court in

which the conviction is rendered must “forward an abstract of the record to the [DMV]

Commissioner within 18 days after such conviction.” Code § 46.2-383(A). When a law-

enforcement officer arrests a person for certain driving offenses, including DWI, the officer must

request from the DMV “an abstract or transcript of the person’s driver’s conviction record on file

at the Department.” Code § 46.2-384. And when “a necessary element of the offense charged is

that the defendant was previously convicted of the same or similar offense,” the DMV’s certified

copy of “that portion of the transcript relating to the relevant prior conviction, shall be prima

facie evidence of the facts stated therein with respect to the prior offense.” Id.

                   1. Proof of the DWI-First Conviction (Assignment of Error 2)

        Smith argues that the trial court should have granted his motion to strike the evidence on

the DWI third-offense charge. In his view, the letter stating that the clerk could not find the file

for the DWI-first conviction negated the Commonwealth’s proof that Smith was convicted of the

requisite “first” offense.5

        “When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, ‘[t]he judgment of the trial court is

presumed correct and will not be disturbed unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to

support it.’” McGowan v. Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 513, 521 (2020) (alteration in original)

(quoting Smith v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 450, 460 (2018)). “The relevant issue on appeal is,

        5
         Smith does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his conviction for
driving with a revoked license.
                                              - 10 -
‘upon review of the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, whether any rational

trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’”

Lambert v. Commonwealth, 298 Va. 510, 515 (2020) (quoting Pijor v. Commonwealth, 294 Va.

502, 512 (2017)).

       Smith relies on Mwangi, in which the Supreme Court held that a DMV transcript

evidencing a DWI conviction was “rebutted” when the Commonwealth also introduced a

“summons” that negated the conviction’s validity. 277 Va. at 394-95. Although the summons

indicated that Mwangi had entered a guilty plea, was found guilty, and was sentenced to jail, the

judge had not signed the disposition on the back of the summons. Id. “In a court-not-of-record,

a judge’s signature proves the rendition of a judgment,” and because the summons was not

signed, the “‘purported disposition on the back of [the] warrant [was] not an order.’” Id.

(quoting Moreau v. Fuller, 276 Va. 127, 137 (2008)). So the Court vacated Mwangi’s DWI-

third conviction and remanded the case to retry Mwangi on a lesser-included DWI charge, “if the

Commonwealth be so advised.” Id. at 395.

       Unlike the unsigned disposition in Mwangi, the clerk’s letter here did not rebut the DMV

transcript as a matter of law. Taken in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the letter

reported only that the clerk could not “locate” the file “at this time.” It did not show that the

criminal case never existed or that the DWI-first conviction was invalid because the judge failed

to sign the disposition. Absent such decisive rebuttal evidence, the DMV transcript was “prima

facie evidence” of the first and second DWI convictions. Code § 46.2-384. Although the

conviction order was not introduced to corroborate the May 2016 conviction, “[p]rior

convictions may be proved by any competent evidence.” Farmer v. Commonwealth, 62

Va. App. 285, 290 (2013) (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted). That the DWI-first

conviction was rendered as shown on the DMV transcript was buttressed by the “presumption of

                                                - 11 -
regularity,” id. at 289, that the Henrico clerk transmitted an abstract of the conviction to the

DMV, as required by Code § 46.2-383(A). And both the second conviction order and the DMV

transcript reported the June 2020 conviction as a second DWI offense, corroborating that the

May 2016 conviction shown on the DMV transcript was the first DWI conviction.

       To be sure, a finder of fact could properly conclude that the prosecution’s evidence of a

prior conviction based solely on a DMV transcript is outweighed by other evidence that the

DMV report may be in error. Still, it was reasonable for the jury here to have concluded from

the DMV transcript, together with Smith’s conviction order for a second DWI in 2020, that

Smith had been convicted of two prior DWI offenses within the preceding ten years. The clerk’s

letter affected the weight of the DMV transcript but did not invalidate it.

                           2. DMV Transcript (Assignment of Error 3)

       Smith next claims that the trial court should have excluded the DMV transcript

altogether. He argues in light of the clerk’s “To Whom It May Concern” letter that the probative

value of the DMV transcript was “substantially outweighed by . . . the danger of unfair

prejudice.” Va. R. Evid. 2:403(a)(i).

       “It is well-settled that ‘[t]he responsibility for balancing the competing considerations of

probative value and prejudice rests in the sound discretion of the trial court.’” Walker v.

Commonwealth, ___ Va. ___, ___ (June 1, 2023) (alteration in original) (quoting Ortiz v.

Commonwealth, 276 Va. 705, 715 (2008)). Since “all probative direct evidence generally has a

prejudicial effect to the opposing party,” Lee v. Spoden, 290 Va. 235, 251 (2015), Rule

2:403(a)(i) focuses on “unfair” prejudice. It refers “to the tendency of some proof to inflame the

passions of the trier of fact, or to invite decision based upon a factor unrelated to the elements”

of the offense. Lee, 290 Va. at 251. Appellate courts give “deference . . . to trial judges in

                                                - 12 -
balancing probative value with undue prejudice.” Walker, ___ Va. at ___. Absent an abuse of

discretion, we will not disturb how the trial judge struck that balance. Lee, 290 Va. at 251.

       We find no such abuse of discretion here. As “prima facie evidence” of Smith’s two

prior DWI convictions, Code § 46.2-384, the DMV transcript had substantial probative value.

And we have rejected Smith’s claim that, as to the DWI-first conviction, the clerk’s “To Whom

It May Concern” letter rebutted the DMV transcript as a matter of law. In short, the trial court

could properly conclude from the transcript that Smith would not suffer unfair prejudice from the

transcript’s admission. The evidence, for instance, did not invite the jury to decide Smith’s guilt

based on matters “unrelated to the elements” of the offense. Lee, 290 Va. at 251. To the

contrary, the number of prior convictions was essential to establishing a third DWI offense

within ten years.

                    3. Testimony About Prior Convictions (Assignment of Error 5)

       Smith argues in his fifth assignment of error that if the trial court erred in admitting the

DMV transcript, it necessarily erred in allowing the troopers’ testimony about Smith’s DWI

convictions listed on that transcript. Given our conclusion that the trial court did not err in

admitting the DMV transcript, this issue is moot. See Rozario v. Commonwealth, 50 Va. App.

142, 146 (2007) (en banc) (holding that the defendant’s sufficiency argument was moot because

its sole “premise—that the [BAC] results were admitted in error—[was] untrue”).

                            C. Expert Testimony (Assignment of Error 4)

       Finally, Smith argues that the trial court abused its discretion by permitting Dr.

Dalgleish’s expert testimony about the effects of alcohol on the body after the court excluded the

certificate of analysis showing Smith’s actual BAC. “In a Virginia criminal proceeding, a

qualified expert witness is allowed to testify if ‘the subject matter is beyond the knowledge and

experience of ordinary persons, such that the jury needs expert opinion in order to comprehend

                                                - 13 -
the subject matter, form an intelligent opinion, and draw its conclusions.’” Castillo v.

Commonwealth, 70 Va. App. 394, 439 (2019) (quoting Va. R. Evid. 2:702(a)(ii)). “[W]e review

‘a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude expert testimony under an abuse of discretion

standard.’” Arch Ins. Co. v. FVCbank, ___ Va. ___, ___ (Dec. 29, 2022) (quoting Condo. Servs.,

Inc. v. First Owners’ Ass’n of Forty Six Hundred Condo., Inc., 281 Va. 561, 575 (2011)).

       Code § 18.2-266 does not require proof of the defendant’s BAC to prove that he was

driving while intoxicated. The statute makes it unlawful to drive a motor vehicle “(i) while such

person has a blood alcohol concentration of 0.08 percent or more by weight by volume” or “(ii)

while such person is under the influence of alcohol.” Code § 18.2-266. The amended indictment

here charged those two grounds in the alternative. After the trial court excluded the certificate of

analysis of the blood draw, however, the jury was instructed to determine simply whether Smith

drove “under the influence of alcohol.”

       The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Dr. Dalgleish’s testimony about

how intoxication affects a person’s behavior.6 Without evidence to show Smith’s intoxication

based on his BAC, the Commonwealth depended on the observations of Troopers Homlish and

Swift, as well as on the dash-camera video. Dr. Dalgleish’s testimony helped the jury understand

how Smith’s behavior reflected being under the influence of alcohol. For example, Dr. Dalgleish

explained that the greater the level of alcohol in one’s system, the more pronounced the “gaze

nystagmus” effect—the “involuntary jerking of the eye,” like a “dry wiper on a windshield,”

occurring when alcohol interrupts signals to the brain. That testimony was “beyond the

knowledge and experience of ordinary persons,” Va. R. Evid. 2:702(a)(ii), and it assisted the jury

       6
         Although Smith also complains that the trial court did not perform the requisite
balancing test, trial courts need not state factual findings or legal conclusions unless required by
statute. E.g., Bowman v. Commonwealth, 290 Va. 492, 500 n.8 (2015). “The trial court is
presumed to know and correctly apply the law,” absent contrary evidence. Rainey v. Rainey, 74
Va. App. 359, 377 (2022).
                                                 - 14 -
to understand that what the troopers observed during the field sobriety test—“involuntary

jerking” of both of Smith’s eyes—evidenced Smith’s intoxication. So we cannot say that the

trial court abused its discretion by permitting Dr. Dalgleish’s testimony.

                                           CONCLUSION

       None of Smith’s arguments warrants reversing his convictions.

                                                                                       Affirmed.

                                               - 15 -