Court Opinion

ID: 2964819
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:31:36.563706+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:58.980801
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                           UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                ____________________
          No. 96-2265
                                 CHERYL T. RECUPERO,
                               Plaintiff - Appellant,
                                         v.
                              NEW ENGLAND TELEPHONE AND
                             TELEGRAPH COMPANY, ET AL.,
                               Defendants - Appellees.
                                ____________________
                    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
                  [Hon. Robert B. Collings, U.S. Magistrate Judge]
                                ____________________
                                       Before
                       Bownes and Cyr, Senior Circuit Judges,
                            and Keeton,* District Judge.
                                _____________________
               Lynn Thomas Johnson, with whom Blaine J. DeFreitas and  Saab
          Law Firm were on brief for appellant.
               Lisa 
                   M. 
                     Birkdale, 
                               New 
                                   England Telephone and Telegraph Company,
          for appellees.
                                ____________________
                                    July 7, 1997
                                ____________________
          *  Of the District of Massachusetts, sitting by designation.

                    KEETON, District Judge.   This  appeal presents  issues
          regarding the scope of jurisdiction of federal courts over claims
          for benefits under an  employee benefits plan that is subject  to
          regulation  under the  Employee  Retirement Income  Security  Act
          (ERISA).  In particular,  we must decide what standards apply  to
          judicial 
                  review 
                         of 
                           the 
                               decisions of the out-of-court decisionmakers
          in this case.
                    Without 
                           doubt, in the circumstances of this case, as the
          parties agree, the district  court had jurisdiction for  judicial
          review   of  the   out-of-court   decisions,  under   29   U.S.C.
          SS 1132(a)(1)(B)  and 1132(c),  for  at least  one purpose:    to
          determine 
                   whether those decisions should be set aside as arbitrary
          and capricious.  In  turn, this court has jurisdiction, under  28
          U.S.C. SS 636(c)(3)  and 1291, to consider  plaintiff-appellant's
          appeal from the district court's judgment for defendants.
                    In  cases  involving  this  kind  of  judicial  review,
          ordinarily the appropriate judgment for a district court to order
          is 
            one 
                or 
                   the 
                      other 
                            of 
                               two kinds.  If the district court determines
          that 
              the 
                  out-of-court decisions were arbitrary and capricious, the
          appropriate form of  order is one  remanding to the  out-of-court
          decisionmaker for further proceedings to decide whether the claim
          or claims have merit.   Otherwise, the usual  form of order is  a
          final  judgment  affirming  the  decisions  of  the  out-of-court
          decisionmaker. 
                         
                         In 
                           this 
                                case, however, appellees assert that "[t]he
          only 
              salient 
                     issue 
                           before the court is whether the determination of
          the 
             Committee to deny Recupero accident benefits was arbitrary and
                                         -2-

          capricious."  (Appellee's Br.  at 2.)  Though acknowledging as  a
          general matter the possibility of a remand "to the Committee  for
          further consideration" (id.), in the end appellees request only a
          recognition  that "the  Committee's reasonable  decision must  be
          permitted 
                   to 
                      stand" and an order that the district court's summary
          judgment for defendant  "be affirmed." (Id.  at 22.)   Appellant,
          also, 
               seeks 
                     a final decision in this court.  Thus, no party to the
          appeal asks for remand to the out-of-court decisionmaker (or even
          to the  district  court on  conclusion  of this  appeal),  except
          possibly as  an alternative request,  not clearly  argued in  the
          briefs and barely mentioned in oral argument apart from responses
          to  questions from  the  court.   Instead,  the parties  join  in
          contending that, if we  conclude that the out-of-court  decisions
          were for  some reason arbitrary  and capricious,  then we  should
          (1) 
             decide 
                   this 
                        controversy finally, or order the district court to
          do so, making any factual findings necessary to a decision on the
          merits, 
                 or 
                    (2) 
                       decide 
                              that the claim is finally resolved on grounds
          of some procedural bar, estoppel, or harmless error.
                    In  these   circumstances,  this   appeal  presents   a
          fundamental question  about  the  scope of  jurisdiction  of  the
          district court and this court.  After stating relevant background
          matter in  Part  I, we  address this  fundamental  jurisdictional
          question 
                  in 
                     Part 
                         II, 
                             concluding that the courts do not have plenary
          jurisdiction to decide all  questions bearing on the merits.   In
          Part  III  we  turn  to  other issues,  over  which  we  do  have
          jurisdiction,
                       and conclude that the judgment of the district court
                                         -3-

          against  plaintiff-appellant is  to be  affirmed, though  without
          approval  of  all details  of  the  district  court's  reasoning.
                                   I.  Background
                    The incident that forms the basis for this civil action
          and 
             this 
                  appeal occurred on January 18, 1990, while the plaintiff-
          appellant, Cheryl Recupero, was working for New England Telephone
          and Telegraph Company  ("NET") as a Service Representative.   The
          District Court recited, as an undisputed fact, that:
                      At 9:30  am on January  18, she left  her
                      workstation on  the sixth  floor for  the
                      purpose of going for coffee at a shop  on
                      the 
                         ground 
                                floor.  She entered an elevator
                      and was injured in a mishap while in  the
                      elevator.
          (Recupero v. New England Telephone & Telegraph Co., Civil  Action
          No. 94-12266-MLW, Memorandum and Order, Sept. 20, 1996 at 2.)
                    As a  result of  injuries sustained  in this  incident,
          Recupero applied for benefits under the NET plan.  (Id.)  She was
          granted 
                 benefits under the Sickness provision of the plan, but was
          denied Accident benefits.   (Id. at 3-4.)
                    The NET plan provides that an employee is:
                      [Q]ualified    to    receive    [Accident
                      Disability]  payments   on   account   of
                      physical disability to work by reason  of
                      accidental 
                                injury ...arising out of and in
                      the course of employment by the Company. 
           
          (Id. at 3)(emphasis added).
                    The plan further elaborates that:
                                         -4-

                      Accidental 
                                injuries shall be considered as
                      arising  out of  and  in  the  course  of
                      employment  only  where  the  injury  has
                      resulted solely from accident during  and
                      in direct connection with the performance
                      of  duties  to  which  the  employee   is
                      assigned...
          (Id.)(emphasis added).   The only limitation  on the duration  of
          payment of Accident  Disability Benefits, under the terms of  the
          plan, 
               is 
                  that 
                      the 
                          employee remains unable to work.  (Id. at 4 n.2.)
                    The 
                       plan 
                            does 
                                not 
                                    explicitly define what "sickness" is in
          the section providing for Sickness Disability Benefits, but  does
          state that "sickness shall  include injury other than  accidental
          injury arising  out of  and in the  course of  employment by  the
          Company."   (Id.  at  4)(emphasis added).    Sickness  Disability
          Benefits are subject to a  duration limit of 52 weeks, under  the
          terms 
               of 
                  the 
                     plan. 
                           (Id.
                                
                                at 4, n.2.)  NET paid and Recupero accepted
          52 weeks of Sickness Disability Benefits.  (Id. at 3.)
                    The Benefits Office  determined that  Recupero was  not
          entitled to Accident Disability Benefits because her injuries did
          not arise out of or occur in the course of her employment.  (Id.)
          Recupero 
                  appealed this decision to the Employee Benefits Committee
          ("EBC"  or "Committee"),  which denied  her appeal  by letter  on
          December 15, 1993, stating that "it was determined that there  is
          evidence that you were not eligible for Accident Benefits for the
          incident report on January 18, 1990."  (Id.)  Recupero then filed
          an identical  appeal  with  the Employee  Benefits  Claim  Review
          Committee ("EBRC" or "Review  Committee"), which also denied  her
          appeal,  stating  that  "after  consideration  of  all  available
                                         -5-

          information, 
                      including 
                               the information you provided, the [EBRC] has
          determined 
                    that 
                         there 
                              is 
                                 no reason to reverse the original decision
          of the [EBC]."  (Id. at 5.)   
                    Recupero 
                            filed a civil action for judicial review in the
          United States District Court  for the District of  Massachusetts.
          The 
             district 
                      court assigned the case to Magistrate Judge Collings,
          under 28 U.S.C. S 636(c)(1) and Local Rules of the district. 
                    In 
                      the 
                          district court, Recupero contended that:  (1) the
          EBC 
             and 
                 the 
                     EBRC acted arbitrarily and capriciously by erroneously
          interpreting 
                      the 
                         provisions of the plan; (2) the Committees' denial
          of her claim lacked good  faith; and (3) the Committees gave  her
          inadequate notice of the denial.  (Id. at 9.) 
                    The district court decided the case by ruling on  cross
          motions for summary judgment.
                    The court initially  noted the appropriate standard  of
          review, 
                 stating that the arbitrary and capricious standard applies
          where the benefit plan vests the fiduciary with the discretionary
          authority to determine benefits eligibility and to construe  plan
          provisions.    (Id.)     The  court   then  made  the   following
          determination:
                      [T]he NET  plan enumerates in  sufficient
                      detail the broad discretionary powers  of
                      both the EBC and the EBCRC necessary  for
                      application 
                                 of the deferential standard of
                      review.   Thus,  the rulings  of the  NET
                      committees will  not be disturbed  unless
                      the 
                         denials 
                                 were arbitrary and capricious.
          (Id. at 8.)
                                         -6-

                    The district court next examined in detail the  various
          claims and contentions.  Recupero, using the word "Committee"  to
          refer to either or both of the Benefits Committee and the  Review
          Committee,  stated  as her  first  argument  that  the  Committee
          improperly 
                    categorized 
                               her injury as "off-duty" when it should have
          been treated as an "on-duty" injury.  (Id. at 9.)  This  argument
          concluded 
                   with 
                       the 
                           assertion that it was not "rational" to classify
          incidents that occur during  breaks, taken at a time required  or
          directed by the employer, as being "off-duty" incidents.   (Id.) 
                    The district  court concluded  (contrary to  Recupero's
          contention) that  the EBC  and EBRC  had not  been arbitrary  and
          capricious 
                    in 
                      interpreting the plan as defining break-time as "off-
          duty" time.  The court stated:
                      Recupero 
                              does not point to any language in
                      the  plan   which  indicates   that   the
                      committee interpretation is not rational.
                      Nor does  she  point  to  language  which
                      suggests that the  scope of the  Accident
                      Benefits  Provision  should  be  given  a
                      broader reading and  be applied when  the
                      injury occurs as a result of an otherwise
                      non-job-related   activity    which    is
                      marginally  motivated  by  a  job-related
                      exigency.    On  the  contrary,  and  the
                      defendants point out, the plain  language
                      of the plan militates for a far  narrower
                      reading.
          (Id. at 10-11.)
                    The 
                       court 
                             below 
                                  also 
                                       emphasized that the definition of an
          injury that would  qualify an employee for accident benefits  had
          words of  limitation, such as  "only," "solely,"  and "in  direct
          connection."  (Id. at 11.)  These words, the court reasoned,  are
                                         -7-

          plain and  unambiguous, and require that  for an employee "to  be
          eligible 
                  for 
                      accident benefits, the activity in which the employee
          is engaged at the time of injury must be a duty or responsibility
          required by her job."  (Id.)  Thus, the court concluded:
                      It 
                        is 
                           an 
                              undisputed fact that Recupero was
                      taking her break and going to get  coffee
                      at the time  she sustained her  injuries.
                      Breaks fall  outside the  purview of  the
                      plain language  of the  Accident  Benefit
                      Provisions.     Therefore,   given   that
                      Recupero was on  break at  the time,  her
                      injury cannot be said to be a direct  and
                      sole result of her job responsibilities.
          (Id.)
                    Because, as  the  court below  viewed the  matter,  the
          plaintiff 
                   had failed to raise an issue of material fact, the court
          ruled that the Committees' interpretation was consistent with the
          language  of  the plan,  and  that  the Committees  did  not  act
          arbitrarily or capriciously in denying Recupero's claim.  (Id. at
          12.)
                    Recupero's  second  contention   below  was  that   the
          Committees 
                    acted with a lack of good faith toward her because, she
          claimed, 
                  the 
                      EBC and the EBRC either never met to review her claim
          or 
            failed 
                   to 
                      have a quorum present when they did meet.  (Id.)  The
          court 
               below 
                     determined that Recupero's claim of lack of good faith
          was without evidentiary support in the record. (Id. at 13.)
                    The final issue decided by the court below was  whether
          the 
             notices 
                     of denial sent to Recupero by the Committees conformed
          with  the statutory  requirements  of  ERISA.   (Id.)    Recupero
          contended that the failure of the Committees to include  specific
                                         -8-

          reasons for denying  her claim, or to  cite to any specific  plan
          provisions upon which  the denial was  based, precluded her  from
          obtaining 
                   the information that was necessary for her to pursue her
          claim.  (Id. at 14.)
                    On the issue of notice, the court below concluded that:
                      The 
                         denial 
                                letters sent to Recupero failed
                      to conform  strictly to the  requirements
                      set forth in ERISA,  29 U.S.C. S 33,  and
                      were insufficient  as  a matter  of  law.
                      Nonetheless, as  a practical matter,  the
                      letters were substantially sufficient  to
                      inform Recupero that  her claim had  been
                      denied.
          (Id.)
                    Having so concluded,  the lower  court then  considered
          whether any remedy was available to Recupero for NET's failure to
          conform to the requirements of 29 U.S.C. S 33.  (Id.)   The court
          concluded that a remand to the EBC or the EBRC would be a useless
          formality 
                   because the evidence taken as a whole indicated that the
          denial of benefits was correct.  (Id. at 15.)   
                    On this reasoning,  the district court granted  summary
          judgment for  NET on all  claims.  Recupero  appealed.  No  cross
          appeal was filed.
                      II.  The Scope of Jurisdiction in a Case 
                 Involving Judicial Review of Out-of-Court Decisions
          A.  Circumstances of the Present Appeal
                    As 
                      already 
                              noted, the district court had, and this court
          has, authority for judicial review of the out-of-court  decisions
          that preceded commencement  of this civil action in the  district
                                         -9-

          court.  29  U.S.C.  SS  1132(a)(1)(B)  and  1132(c);  28   U.S.C.
          SS 636(c)(3) and 1291.  Also, Recupero does not dispute that  the
          judicial 
                  review is to be "de novo" and that she has the burden, in
          the circumstances of this case, of showing that the denial of her
          claim  violated   the   "arbitrary  and   capricious"   standard.
          (Appellant's Br. at 9, citing Firestone Tire and Rubber, Inc.  v.
          Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 113 (1989); Pagan v. NYNEX, 52 F.3d 438, 442
          (2d Cir.  1995)  (judicial review  of  decision by  pension  plan
          administrator
                       to deny long-term disability benefits, where pension
          provisions  gave  the  plan  administrator  broad  discretion  to
          determine 
                   eligibility issues and no material fact was genuinely in
          dispute; "we are not free to substitute our judgment for that  of
          the  NYNEX Committee  as  if we  were  considering the  issue  of
          eligibility  anew,"  and  as  if  free  to  upset  a   reasonable
          interpretation; court  reviews  only the  decision of  the  NYNEX
          Committee 
                   and, 
                        even 
                            if 
                               plan provisions were drafted by NYNEX, which
          is  an  entity  different from  the  NYNEX  Committee,  and  were
          ambiguous, the rule contra proferentum is inapplicable); Diaz  v.
          Seafarers Union, 13  F.3d 454, 456-57 (1st Cir. 1994)  (trustees'
          decision 
                  denying retired seaman's claim for higher monthly pension
          benefit 
                 under Seafarers International Union's Pension Plan did not
          improperly apply the trustee rules about "break in service"  that
          were promulgated  pursuant  to powers  that the  Plan  instrument
          granted 
                 to 
                   the 
                       trustees); Stuart v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 664
          F.  Supp.  619,  622-23 (D.  Me.  1987)  (declining  to  overturn
          recoupment from worker, of sum equal to lump-sum Social  Security
                                        -10-

          payments, by insurer  under Group Insurance  Policy taken out  by
          Plan)).
                    Though 
                          the 
                              contentions of the parties about the scope of
          the jurisdiction of the district court and this court differ, all
          parties to this appeal  urge us to take an exceedingly  expansive
          view of the scope of the courts' jurisdiction in reviewing  ERISA
          benefit 
                 determinations. 
                                 
                                 Each party to this appeal, at least in the
          alternative,  urges  us  to hold  that  the  district  court  had
          jurisdiction not  only  to  apply the  arbitrary  and  capricious
          standard of review to  at least some aspects of the  out-of-court
          decisions, but also  to make findings  on material and  genuinely
          disputed 
                  factual 
                         issues 
                                that allegedly should have been decided and
          were not.   In essence, we are asked to decide on the merits,  or
          direct the district court to decide on the merits, every material
          factual 
                 issue 
                       as 
                         to 
                            which the out-of-court decisions under judicial
          review  are  challenged.    We  are  asked  to  exercise  plenary
          jurisdiction of the most expansive form.
                    We  acknowledge that  statements  made about  "de  novo
          review"  in some  passages from  authoritative sources,  standing
          alone, may seem to support the parties' expansive  jurisdictional
          contentions. 
                       
                      We 
                         conclude, however, that a close examination of the
          entire array of relevant authority discloses that contentions  of
          the parties in this respect flow from a misreading of  Firestone,
          and a resulting  misunderstanding of that  case and its  sequels.
          Such a misreading  was anticipated by Justice (then Chief  Judge)
          Breyer's 
                  opinion 
                          for 
                             the 
                                 First Circuit in Diaz, 13 F.3d at 458.  In
                                        -11-

          that case  an argument was made  that a Plan amendment,  granting
          broad discretion to trustees, showed that the previous provisions
          of 
            the 
                Plan 
                     did not grant discretion that broad.  The Diaz opinion
          responds  that the  amendment "merely  made express  a power  ...
          plainly 
                 implied 
                        all 
                            along," perhaps because the trustees "wanted to
          play it safe in light of Firestone and the possibility that lower
          courts would later misread it."  Id. 
                    The parties' expansive views about jurisdiction derive,
          at 
            least 
                  to 
                     some extent, from their reading of what Firestone said
          about "de novo review."  In that case, the Court declared:
                      ... 
                         Consistent with established principles
                      of trust  law, we hold  that a denial  of
                      benefits challenged under S 1132(a)(1)(B)
                      is 
                        to 
                           be 
                              reviewed under a de novo standard
                      unless  the   benefit  plan   gives   the
                      administrator or fiduciary  discretionary
                      authority to  determine  eligibility  for
                      benefits or to construe the terms of  the
                      plan.
          489 U.S. at 115 (emphasis added).
                    In several significant respects, the case before us  in
          this appeal differs from Firestone.  Nevertheless, in this  case,
          one 
             of 
                the 
                   questions 
                             we 
                                must address may be stated in a generalized
          way 
             in 
                exactly the same phrase as that used by Justice O'Connor in
          describing the  first of two questions  before the Court in  that
          case:  "First,  we address the  appropriate standard of  judicial
          review  of  benefit   determinations  by   fiduciaries  or   plan
          administrators under ERISA."  489 U.S. at 105.
                    The plans involved in Firestone were Firestone's  three
          "pension  and  welfare  benefit  plans  for  its  employees:    a
                                        -12-

          termination pay  plan, a retirement  plan, and  a stock  purchase
          plan."  Id.  "All three of the plans were ... governed (albeit in
          different 
                   ways) 
                        by 
                           ERISA."  Id.  In our case, also, the NET plan is
          governed  by  ERISA, but  in  some  respects by  the  same  ERISA
          provisions that  applied  to the  Firestone  plans and  in  other
          respects 
                  by 
                    different 
                              ERISA provisions.  One difference is that the
          Firestone
                   
                   plans were "welfare and pension plans," and the NET plan
          is 
            not. 
                  
                  Other differences emerge as we apply the reasoning of the
          Court in Firestone to the present case.
                    Firestone determines that:
                      [f]or   purposes    of   actions    under
                      S 1132(a)(1)(B), the de novo standard  of
                      review applies regardless of whether  the
                      plan at issue  is funded or unfunded  and
                      regardless 
                                of whether the administrator or
                      fiduciary 
                               is 
                                  operating under a possible or
                      actual conflict of interest.  
          489 U.S. at 115.  The role of the district court in  applying the
          "de novo  standard" is  affected, however,  by the  terms of  the
          particular plan at issue.  For example, "if a benefit plan  gives
          discretion 
                    to an administrator or fiduciary who is operating under
          a 
           conflict 
                    of 
                      interest 
                               that conflict must be weighed as a 'facto[r]
          in  determining  whether  there  is  an  abuse  of   discretion.'
          Restatement (Second) of Trusts S 187, Comment d (1959)."  Id.
                    In this case, no party challenges the proposition  that
          NET plan documents did give some discretion, subject to  judicial
          review, 
                 to 
                    the EBC and EBRC.  Nor does any party question that the
          Committees 
                    were acting on behalf of an entity that was, within the
          meaning of the statutory phrase, an "administrator or fiduciary."
                                        -13-

          Also, 
               we 
                  do 
                    not 
                        understand the briefs of the parties as challenging
          the proposition that the Committees had some responsibility,  and
          associated authority, with respect to "constru[ing] the terms  of
          the plan," as that phrase is used in Firestone, 489 U.S. at  115.
          In any event, if this proposition is challenged, we conclude that
          the challenge is without merit.  
                    As 
                      previously discussed, when the benefit plan gives the
          administrator  or  fiduciary  discretion  to  determine   benefit
          eligibility or  construe plan  terms, Firestone  and its  progeny
          mandate  a deferential  "arbitrary  and capricious"  standard  of
          judicial  review.    Id.   Thus,  a  deferential  "arbitrary  and
          capricious" standard of review applies, even though the review is
          also to be "de novo  review" to assure compliance of the  out-of-
          court decisionmakers with standards of conduct analogous to those
          applied 
                 to 
                   trustees 
                            under judicially developed law (which Firestone
          adopts  to fill  the gap  left because  "ERISA does  not set  the
          appropriate standard of review for actions under S  1132(a)(1)(B)
          challenging benefit eligibility  determinations.").  489 U.S.  at
          109.
                    Because  of   the  combination   of  similarities   and
          differences  between  the  circumstances  in  Firestone  and  the
          circumstances before us in this case with respect to the array of
          different plan provisions and with respect to which among ERISA's
          various 
                 provisions apply, however, we must be especially observant
          of 
            the 
                extent to which the Firestone "de novo standard of judicial
          review" 
                 requires de novo determinations by the reviewing court and
                                        -14-

          the extent to which, instead, it requires deference to an out-of-
          court decision that is not "arbitrary and capricious."
                    An example of the kind of problems we must consider  is
          the determination  of the meaning of  provisions of the NET  plan
          regarding "eligibility for benefits" of various types -- in  this
          case, "Sickness  Disability  Benefits" and  "Accident  Disability
          Benefits."   Determining  the  meaning of  such  plan  provisions
          ordinarily 
                    depends solely on deciding an issue of law with respect
          to manifested  meaning of  relevant provisions  of the  plan.   A
          reviewing court,  at  least in  the  absence of  plan  provisions
          explicitly declaring  otherwise, has authority  to decide that  a
          committee  interpretation  that  varies  from  an   unambiguously
          manifested meaning  is  arbitrary  and capricious,  and  must  be
          disregarded. 
                       If, instead, the reviewing court determines that the
          plan 
              provisions 
                        are 
                            ambiguous or otherwise unclear, in some respect
          material 
                  to 
                     the outcome of the case, this determination of lack of
          clarity 
                 does 
                      not necessarily lead to treating the issue of meaning
          as one  for decision by  findings of fact  in the district  court
          (either 
                 by 
                    a 
                      jury 
                          or 
                             by 
                                the district judge).  Instead, interpretive
          issues of this kind may be decided by the court as matters of law
          are decided, or they may be partly decided in court and partly on
          remand to the out-of-court decisionmakers, or applicable law  may
          require 
                 some 
                      other allocation of decisionmaking functions.  We say
          more 
              on 
                 this 
                     subject 
                             in 
                                Parts II.B and II.C of this opinion, below.
                    Summarizing, we  conclude that in  view of the  Supreme
          Court's 
                 pronouncement 
                              in 
                                 Firestone, it is no longer in dispute that
                                        -15-

          federal 
                 courts 
                       review 
                              some ERISA claims de novo.  Even when de novo
          review is  appropriate,  however, it  is  often subject  to  some
          limitations.  Thus, the phrase  "de novo review," as used in  the
          context of  judicial review of  out-of-court decisions of  ERISA-
          regulated plan administrators or fiduciaries does not mean that a
          district 
                  court has "plenary" jurisdiction to decide on the merits,
          anew, a benefits claim.
                    We 
                      use 
                          the 
                             term 
                                  "plenary" to describe jurisdiction of the
          court 
               to 
                  disregard completely an "out-of-court decision" the court
          is reviewing and itself (with or without participation by a jury)
          decide anew all  questions of fact bearing  on the merits of  the
          benefits claim.  
          B.  Contrasting Court Roles Because of Limits on Jurisdiction
                     1.  Limits Incident to Fiduciary Discretion
                            Under Terms of a Benefit Plan
                    With  respect  specifically   to  an  issue   regarding
          eligibility of a claimant for benefits, precedents recognize that
          district courts  do not  have expansive  plenary jurisdiction  to
          decide the merits of a claim anew if "the benefit plan gives  the
          administrator or fiduciary  discretionary authority to  determine
          eligibility for benefits or  to construe the terms of the  plan."
          Bellino v. Schlumberger  Technologies, 944 F.2d 26, 29 (1st  Cir.
          1991) (quoting  Firestone, 489 U.S. at  115); see also Martin  v.
          Bissonette
                   , 
                    1997 
                         WL 
                            280602, *12 (1st Cir. May 29, 1997) (remarking,
          in the context  of judicial review of state court  determinations
          bearing 
                 upon 
                     habeas 
                            writs, "we find a myriad of situations in which
                                        -16-

          federal courts review others' decisions with a thumb on the scale
          ....[,] [t]he  most conspicuous  ... [being]  judicial review  of
          agency  adjudications").     Thus,  if   an  ERISA   out-of-court
          decisionmaker
                       is given some discretion, the court reviews at least
          some (if  not all) aspects of  the out-of-court decision only  to
          determine 
                   whether 
                          that 
                               decision was arbitrary and capricious.  This
          key point expressed  in Bellino is entirely consistent with  many
          earlier and  later  First Circuit  decisions that  recognize  the
          authority of the court to be less deferential, or not deferential
          at 
            all, 
                 of 
                    out-of-court decisions by fiduciaries to whom a benefit
          plan 
              did 
                  not
                      
                      grant discretionary authority to decide the matter at
          issue.  Smart v. Gillette Co. Long-Term Disability Plan, 70  F.3d
          173,  181 (1st  Cir.  1995) ("In  ERISA  cases ...  court  should
          scrutinize an ostensible waiver with care in order to ensure that
          it  reflects  the  purposeful  relinquishment  of  an  employee's
          rights."); Hughes v. Boston Mut. Life Ins. Co., 26 F.3d 264,  267
          (1st Cir. 1994) ("Where, as here, the administrator of an  ERISA-
          regulated plan does not  allege that it has discretion under  the
          plan to  interpret the terms  of the  insurance policy,  judicial
          review  of a  denial  of benefits  entails  no deference  to  the
          administrator's explanation of the plan ...."); Diaz, 13 F.3d  at
          456-58 (arbitrary  and capricious standard  of review applied  to
          trustee  rules  promulgated  pursuant  to  "broad,  discretionary
          authority" granted  to  the  trustee in  the  trust  instrument);
          Rodriguez-Abreu
                        
                        v. 
                           Chase 
                                 Manhattan Bank, N.A., 986 F.2d 580, 583-84
          (1st Cir.  1993) (de novo  standard properly  applied where  "the
                                        -17-

          relevant 
                  plan 
                      document 
                               did not grant discretionary authority to the
          Plan Administrator  and the Named  Fiduciaries did not  expressly
          delegate 
                  their 
                       discretionary authority to the Plan administrator");
          Allen v. Adage, Inc., 967 F.2d 695, 697-98 (1st Cir. 1992) (where
          nothing 
                 in 
                    the Plan indicates that another approach is to be used,
          it 
            is 
               appropriate for a reviewing court to afford de novo review).
                              2.  Jurisdictional Limits
                             in Federal Courts Generally
                    An inquiry  that  is in  essence jurisdictional  is  an
          appropriate 
                     early step toward full understanding of the meaning of
          the constitutional, statutory, and decisional mandates  regarding
          the scope of the authority of federal courts in a case  involving
          judicial review of an out-of-court claims decision.
                    Article III  courts and  other federal  courts are  not
          courts 
                of 
                   general jurisdiction.  See, e.g., Owen Equip. & Erection
          Co.
             
             v. 
                Kroger
                      , 437 U.S. 365, 374 (1978).  Even when some source of
          subject-matter  jurisdiction appears  of  record  (by  reason  of
          complete diversity of citizenship, for example, or the dependence
          of a  claim on  some federal  question), federal  courts are  not
          automatically
                       authorized to adjudicate every kind of related claim
          a 
           party 
                 wishes to have decided.  Rather, except as to instances of
          jurisdiction over claims  of unconstitutionality of  legislation,
          limits on the scope of jurisdiction of federal courts (other than
          the Supreme  Court of the  United States)  are partly  statutory.
          E.g.
             , 
               Kokkone
                      n v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375,
          377 (1994). 
                                        -18-

                    A 
                     central 
                             characteristic of federal jurisdiction is that
          it tends to be  claim-based, and thus specific to claims,  rather
          than case-based, and thus general to an entire case if the  court
          has jurisdiction  over any claim.   See  American Law  Institute,
          Federal 
                 Judicial Code Revision Project, Tentative Draft No. 1, 33-
          34 
            (Apr. 
                  8, 
                    1997) 
                          (Commentary).  The Reporter for this ALI Project,
          Professor John B.  Oakley, in an  introductory Memorandum to  the
          Members of the Institute,  identifies as an organizing  principle
          used from an early stage of the history of this ALI Project,  the
          observation that: 
                      subject-matte
                                  r jurisdiction of the federal
                      district  court  operates  on  a  'claim-
                      specific'  basis that  is  concealed  and
                      confused 
                              by 
                                 the 'action-specific' language
                      of the basic statutory grants of original
                      jurisdiction to the district courts.
          Id. at xvii.  He adds:
                      .... Although the basic statutes  purport
                      to  confer   federal  jurisdiction   over
                      particular  types  of  'civil   actions,'
                      'cases,' 
                              'proceedings,' and the like, they
                      have 
                          been 
                               administered on a claim-specific
                      rather than  action-specific basis,  with
                      the  law  of  supplemental   jurisdiction
                      functioning  in  the  background  as  the
                      mechanism for  determining  which  claims
                      joined to a particular action that do not
                      directly involve the  kinds of issues  or
                      parties within the  scope of Article  III
                      are nonetheless  within federal  judicial
                      power because  of their  relationship  to
                      other claims involving issues or  parties
                      that fall within Article III's criteria.
          Id.
             
             at 
                xviii.  We interpret "action," as used both in this passage
          and 
             in 
                a 
                  passage 
                         of 
                            the 
                                F
                                 irestone opinion, quoted above, as meaning
          "civil 
                action," not "cause of action."  Professor Oakley adds that
                                        -19-

          these background themes are  a part of the complex "structure  of
          federal   jurisdiction,"   commonly   recognized   as   involving
          constitutiona
                      l, statutory, and decisional "tiers" of authorization
          and limitation.  Id. at 36-45.
                    We 
                      conclude 
                               that 
                                   a 
                                     theme 
                                           of claim-specific limitations on
          the scope of federal judicial power extends also to a distinction
          between 
                 plena
                      ry jurisdiction, in a broad sense including authority
          to  decide  anew on  the  merits, and  a  more confined  type  of
          jurisdiction over  a specific type  of claim  within the  court's
          jurisdiction.
                        A district court's subject-matter jurisdiction over
          a claim  may be  solely for  judicial review  of an  out-of-court
          decision on the merits of the claim.  This kind of limitation  is
          primarily 
                   statutory 
                            in 
                               origin.  It may be implicit, for example, in
          a statutory authorization  for judicial review over  out-of-court
          substantive  decisions  (of   many  different   types)  made   by
          governmental agencies,  under  provisions of  the  Administrative
          Procedure 
                   Act, 
                        5 
                         U.S.C. 
                                S 706(2)(A).  Also, this kind of limitation
          may be implicit  in statutory provisions  for judicial review  of
          special 
                 kinds 
                      of 
                         out-of-court substantive decisions made by private
          decisionmakers such as those acting under employee benefits plan,
          making decisions reviewable  in this case under ERISA, 29  U.S.C.
          SS 1132(a)(1)(B) and 1132(c).
                    In a  regime  characterized in  large part  by  limited
          jurisdiction, 
                       a 
                        statutory authorization for judicial review of out-
          of-court decisions does  not imply authorization  for a court  to
          expand its jurisdiction to a plenary authority to decide, itself,
                                        -20-

          all genuinely disputable factual issues decisive of the merits of
          claims.  This point applies both  to a court's acting on its  own
          initiative 
                    and 
                        to 
                          a 
                            court's acting upon a consensual request by the
          parties that a court accept an expansion of its jurisdiction.  We
          say more about consensual requests in Part II.E, below.
                    Also, 
                         to 
                           understand 
                                      fully a source of authority regarding
          the scope of a court's jurisdiction when judicially reviewing  an
          out-of-court  claims  decision, one  must  take  account  of  the
          distinctive nature  of  a court's  role  in judicial  review,  in
          contrast 
                  with 
                       the 
                          role 
                               of a court in other civil actions generally.
                    A civil action for  judicial review of an  out-of-court
          decision is fundamentally different from a paradigm civil  action
          asserting tort,  contract, or  property claims,  or even  alleged
          rights to equitable or declaratory relief.  In cases of  judicial
          review, 
                 ordinarily no right to jury trial is involved, and no need
          or 
            authority 
                      exists to make factual findings of the kind regularly
          made by a jury, or by the trial judge in a nonjury trial.
                    If a need exists for deciding disputable factual issues
          in 
            the 
                course 
                      of 
                         judicial review of an out-of-court decision on the
          merits 
                of 
                   a 
                     benefits claim, typically that need is associated with
          a 
           dispute 
                   about 
                        the 
                            "record."  We turn next to considering disputes
          of this kind.
          C.  Deciding Disputes About the "Record"
                         1.  The Contrast Between Disputes 
                          About the "Record" and Disputes 
                                 About the "Merits"
                                        -21-

                    Deciding disputable factual issues about what is or  is
          not  properly a  part  of the  "record"  for judicial  review  is
          fundamentally different from  deciding disputable factual  issues
          going to the merits of a benefits claim.
                    The out-of-court decision under judicial review in this
          case was, or at least in ordinary circumstances should have been,
          a 
           decision 
                    on
                       the merits.  The standard of judicial review of that
          decision, in whatever way it may be phrased and described, is  to
          some extent deferential in the sense that the reviewing court  is
          not 
             to 
                set 
                   aside 
                         a 
                           factual finding of historical fact for which the
          record on which the decision was made contained adequate support.
                    Ordinarily the  deference to a  decision on the  merits
          extends also to deference to an evaluative inference on which the
          decision 
                  on 
                     the merits depends, at least unless the inference is a
          mixed-legal-factual inference.  Just as appellate courts tend  to
          give 
              somewhat 
                      less 
                           deference to a trial court's mixed-legal-factual
          inference --  see, e.g.,  AIDS  Action Comm.  of Mass.,  Inc.  v.
          Massachusetts  Bay Transp. Auth.,  42 F.3d 1,  7 (1st Cir.  1994)
          (appellate court accords  significant deference to trial  court's
          factual determinations  and  most  of its  resolutions  of  mixed
          fact/law issues,  letting  them  stand unless  they  are  clearly
          erroneous,  but  engages  in de  novo  review  of  trial  court's
          application  of a First  Amendment standard to  the facts of  the
          particular 
                    case); In re Extradition of Howard, 996 F.2d 1320, 1328
          (1st  Cir. 1993)  ("The standard  of review  applicable to  mixed
          questions 
                   usually 
                          depends upon where they fall along the degree-of-
                                        -22-

          deference 
                   continuum; 
                             the 
                                 more fact-dominated the question, the more
          likely it is that the  trier's resolution of it will be  accepted
          unless shown  to be clearly erroneous.")  -- so likewise a  court
          engaged 
                 in 
                    judicial review of an out-of-court decision may tend to
          give less deference to  an inference-based decision that  appears
          possibly to have been influenced by a mistake about the existence
          or 
            meaning 
                    of an applicable legal rule or about how the legal rule
          applies in  the particular  instance.   In applying  such a  less
          deferential 
                     standard, however, a reviewing court is not authorized
          to 
            make, 
                  itself, a new decision replacing every factual finding of
          the out-of-court  decisionmaker that goes  to the  merits and  is
          challenged.   The judicial review of  the decision on the  merits
          continues to be to some extent deferential.
                    In contrast,  the trial judge's  decision of a  dispute
          about the record is typically not deferential. 
                    A factual dispute about  the record of an  out-of-court
          decision of a claim under an employee benefits plan may involve a
          contention, by either party, that the "record" as produced by the
          decisionmaking entity contains documents or descriptions of  non-
          documentary 
                     evidence not considered before the challenged decision
          was made, or  documents or descriptions of evidence not  properly
          considered (which one party or the other asks the trial court  to
          "strike" or  otherwise treat as  irrelevant to judicial  review).
          Obversely, 
                    the 
                       dispute 
                               may involve a contention that the record for
          the out-of-court  decision  should have  included, and  did  not,
                                        -23-

          additional materials (which one party or the other asks the trial
          court to rule must be taken into account).  
                    If, after taking such a supplementation of the "record"
          into account,  the  trial judge  determines  that, by  reason  of
          departures 
                    from fair process, the challenged out-of-court decision
          cannot be affirmed, one obvious possibility is an order of remand
          for 
             reconsideration by the committee or other entity that made the
          procedurally flawed out-of-court decision.
                    That  form  of  remedy  fits.    Concerning  a  court's
          obligation generally, in framing relief, to fashion a remedy that
          fits and  does not overburden a  party, see, e.g., California  v.
          Yamasaki
                 , 
                   442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979) (injunctive relief should be no
          more 
              burdensome 
                         to 
                           the 
                               defendant than necessary to provide complete
          relief 
                to 
                   the plaintiffs); E.E.O.C. v. Astra U.S.A., Inc., 94 F.3d
          738, 746 (1st Cir. 1996) (same).
                    First, 
                          the 
                              remedy for the departure from fair process is
          easily  framed to  fit within  the authorized  scope of  judicial
          review. 
                  
                  Second, 
                         the 
                             nature of the remedy matches the nature of the
          error. 
                 
                 Moreover, 
                          if 
                             the 
                                 error was solely an error of the committee
          or 
            other 
                  deciding entity, any other form of order is likely not to
          fit 
             because 
                     it tends to place an undeserved burden or disadvantage
          on one party or the other.  
                    We leave to be  considered in Parts III.C and III.D  of
          this opinion a defense contention in this case that if the record
          failed to contain evidence that would have supported  plaintiff's
                                        -24-

          claim, plaintiff  failed to  use her  available opportunities  to
          proffer more evidence.
                    To  complete an  explanation  of the  contrast  between
          deciding 
                  disputes about the merits and deciding disputes about the
          record, we must take account of legal authority bearing on who is
          to decide a dispute about the record and by what procedures.
                                  2.  Who Decides?
                    As to who is to  decide a dispute about the record,  we
          canvass three  possibilities (and  variations on  each) that  are
          apparent in  this case:   (1) the  out-of-court decisionmaker  on
          remand  from the district  court; (2) the  court or courts  where
          judicial 
                  review 
                        occurs; 
                                and (3) a jury (or trial judge as finder of
          fact in  a nonjury proceeding),  guided on the  law by the  trial
          judge's rulings,  those rulings  being subject  to correction  on
          appeal.
                    The  first  possibility  (remand  to  the  out-of-court
          decisionmaker) may  sometimes be  appropriate, but  is likely  to
          result 
                in 
                   delay, 
                         and 
                             perhaps very extended delay and expense if the
          dispute is  not resolved to  the satisfaction  of all  interested
          parties, 
                  and 
                      promptly. That kind of delay is inconsistent with the
          objective 
                   of 
                      providing workers and their dependents an inexpensive
          and 
             expeditious method of resolving disputes over benefits claimed
          under an  employee benefits plan.   This is  one of the  multiple
          objectives underlying ERISA.  See, e.g., Quesinberry v. Life Ins.
          Co. of  North America, 987 F.2d  1017, 1023-1025 (4th Cir.  1993)
                                        -25-

          (citing Perry  v. Simplicity Eng'g, 900  F.2d 963, 966 (6th  Cir.
          1990)).
                    The availability of the third possibility -- jury trial
          -- 
            in 
               ERISA 
                     cases is a matter on which many courts have spoken but
          in  ways that  may  reasonably  be understood  as  creating  some
          unresolved conflicts.  E.g.,  compare Turner v. Fallon  Community
          Health Plan, Inc., 953 F. Supp. 419 (D. Mass. 1997), with Padilla
          De 
            Higginbotham v. Worth Publishers, Inc., 820 F. Supp. 48 (D.P.R.
          1993).  We do not speak further to this conflict in this opinion,
          for 
             the 
                 reason 
                       that 
                            in 
                               any event the record before us fails to show
          any disputable issue of fact appropriate for submission to a jury
          in this case, as we explain below.
                    The use of a jury to resolve disputes about the  record
          for 
             judicial 
                      review 
                            of 
                               out-of-court decisions in this case would be
          fundamentally
                       inconsistent with the regime of limited jurisdiction
          of federal courts.   Jurisdiction for  judicial review cannot  be
          expanded 
                  to 
                     encompass a jury role inconsistent with limitations on
          the 
             court's 
                     jurisdiction.  The jury is an arm of the court, and an
          arm that performs  only a designated court  function.  In a  case
          before the court  solely for judicial  review of an  out-of-court
          decision, the jurisdiction of the court as a whole, including the
          jury, 
               is 
                  limited 
                         to 
                            the 
                                function of determining whether the out-of-
          court decision  is to  be affirmed,  or  is to  be set  aside  as
          arbitrary 
                   or 
                      capricious, or is to be reconsidered by the committee
          or other entity designated to decide the merits.
                                        -26-

                    A  recent decision  of  the  Supreme Court  in  a  very
          different 
                   context 
                          helps 
                                to explain both the rejection of this third
          possibility and the distinctive  nature of the role of the  trial
          judge in deciding disputes about the record as distinguished from
          disputes about the merits.  That context involved a dispute about
          who decides an  issue of interpretation of  a patent claim as  to
          which reasonable  persons familiar with  both the intricacies  of
          patent law and  all the relevant circumstances of the  particular
          case might differ.  Justice Souter, in the opinion of the  Court,
          observed that a trial judge  is better positioned than a jury  to
          decide  this  kind  of  factual  issue.    Markman  v.   Westview
          Instruments, 
                      Inc.
                         , 
                           116 
                               S. Ct. 1384, 1387 (1996) ("Since evidence of
          common law practice  at the time of  the Framing does not  entail
          application of  the  Seventh Amendment's  jury guarantee  to  the
          construction 
                      of 
                        the 
                            [patent] claim document, we must look elsewhere
          to 
            characterize this determination of meaning in order to allocate
          it as  between court or jury.   Existing precedent, the  relative
          interpretive skills  of judges and  juries, and statutory  policy
          considerations all favor  allocating construction  issues to  the
          court."). 
                    Much 
                        of 
                           the 
                              reasoning 
                                        of 
                                           the Court in Westview applies to
          the 
             role 
                  of 
                    a 
                      trial 
                            judge in deciding disputes about the record for
          judicial 
                  review.  Compared with judges, jurors typically have less
          experience 
                    and training relevant to competence to review decisions
          of 
            others 
                   with 
                       an 
                          appropriate degree of deference while at the same
          time assuring no misunderstanding or misapplication of  governing
                                        -27-

          law. 
               
               And, 
                   historically, 
                                 juries have had no part in judicial review
          of out-of-court decisions.
                    Concerning 
                              factors bearing upon who is better positioned
          to decide, in determining  whether responsibility for deciding  a
          factual 
                 dispute 
                         of 
                           a 
                             distinctive kind should be allocated to juries
          or  instead to  judges, the  Westview opinion  cited other  Court
          decisions made in other contexts, including Miller v. Fenton, 474
          U.S. 104,  114 (1985) (when an  issue "falls somewhere between  a
          pristine 
                  legal standard and a simple historical fact, the fact/law
          distinction  at times has  turned on a  determination that, as  a
          matter of the sound administration of justice, one judicial actor
          is  better  positioned  than  another  to  decide  the  issue  in
          question.").  Other decisions  in the 1980s and 1990s have  added
          more illustrations that, by analogy, reinforce the conclusion  we
          reach 
               in 
                  this case about the role of the judge in judicial review.
          See, e.g ., Thompson v.  Keohane, 116 S.  Ct. 457 (1995)  (habeas
          petitioner  serving  a sentence  under  a  state  conviction  had
          confessed, during a two-hour tape-recorded session at the  Alaska
          state trooper headquarters, to  killing his former wife;  federal
          district 
                  court denied his petition for habeas relief on the ground
          that 
              the 
                  trooper 
                         had 
                             obtained his confession without giving Miranda
          warnings; the Ninth Circuit affirmed on the ground that the state
          court's ruling that the accused was not "in custody" for  Miranda
          purposes  was  a  "fact" determination  as  to  which  S  2254(d)
          establishes  a  presumption  of  correctness;  this  "Court   has
          classified 
                    as 
                      'factual 
                               issues' within S 2254(d)'s compass questions
                                        -28-

          extending beyond the  determination of 'what happened'";  "[t]his
          category notably includes:  competence to stand trial; and  juror
          impartiality"; "[w]hile these issues encompass more than  'basic,
          primary, 
                  or 
                     historical facts,' their resolution depends heavily on
          the trial court's appraisal of witness credibility and demeanor";
          "[t]his 
                 Court has reasoned that a trial court is better positioned
          to make decisions of  this genre, and has therefore accorded  the
          judgment 
                  of 
                     the jurist-observer 'presumptive weight'"; even so, we
          independently review the state "in-custody" determination because
          "[c]lassifying  'in custody'  as a  determination qualifying  for
          independent review potentially may guide police, unify precedent,
          and stabilize the law"); Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of  United
          States, 
                 Inc.,
                       466 U.S. 485, 501 n.17 (1984) ("A finding of fact in
          some 
              cases 
                    is inseparable from the principles through which it was
          deduced.  At some point, the reasoning by which a fact is 'found'
          crosses the line between application of those ordinary principles
          of logic and common experience which are ordinarily entrusted  to
          the finder of fact into the realm of a legal rule upon  which the
          reviewing 
                   court 
                        must 
                             exercise its own independent judgment.").  See
          also U.S. Term  Limits, Inc. v. Thornton,  115 S. Ct. 1842,  1875
          (1995)  (Thomas,  J.,  dissenting,  joined  by  Rehnquist,  C.J.,
          O'Connor, J.,  and Scalia, J.)  (citing Bose  and declaring:  "In
          certain areas, indeed, this  Court apparently gives quite  little
          deference to the initial factfinder, but rather 'exercise[s]  its
          own 
             independent 
                        judgment' about the factual conclusions that should
          be drawn from the record."). 
                                        -29-

                          3.  Methods of Deciding Generally
                    We turn  next to considering how  a trial judge may  go
          about performing  the  function of  deciding disputes  about  the
          record.
                                 (a) Non-jury Trial
                    Precedents 
                              support a district court's holding a non-jury
          "trial"  for distinctive  and  limited purposes  associated  with
          judicial 
                  review.  An example is an opinion of Justice (then Judge)
          Breyer for the First Circuit in the context of judicial review of
          a decision of a governmental agency.  E.g., Valley Citizens for a
          Safe Environment v. Aldridge,  886 F.2d 458, 460 (1st Cir.  1989)
          (Breyer,  J.) ("It  could happen  that a  particular instance  of
          judicial 
                  review 
                         of 
                           an 
                              EIS raises a 'genuine' and 'material' dispute
          of 
            facts 
                  that requires a trial:  Did the agency know, for example,
          about some  important matter that  the EIS  ignored? ...  However
          desirable this kind  of evidentiary supplementation as an aid  to
          understanding highly technical, environmental matters, its use is
          discretionary 
                       with 
                           the 
                               reviewing court.") (citations omitted).  The
          practice seems equally applicable  to judicial review of  out-of-
          court decisions of  private actors, such as the Committees  whose
          decisions are under judicial review in this case.
                    Even 
                        when 
                             a 
                              district 
                                       court proceeds with a non-jury trial
          of this kind, or a  proceeding to take "evidence on motion,"  and
          determines that it is necessary to make some finding with respect
          to some historical fact (or to draw some reasoned inference  from
          evidence) as to  which a genuine dispute exists, ordinarily  that
                                        -30-

          factual 
                 finding 
                         made 
                             by 
                                the trial judge concerns matters bearing on
          fairness 
                  of 
                     the 
                        process 
                                by which the out-of-court decision was made
          and not the merits of the claim.  A determination by a court that
          it has jurisdiction to perform this distinctive function does not
          imply 
               that 
                    it 
                      must 
                           also 
                                have jurisdiction to find facts relevant to
          the merits.
                               (b)  Evidence on Motion
                    Also, with respect to preparing for ruling on a pending
          motion, 
                 a 
                   trial judge has, under Federal Rules, explicit authority
          to convene  a kind of  evidentiary proceeding  that differs  from
          taking evidence at  trial under Federal  Rule of Civil  Procedure
          43(a).
                      Evidence on Motions.   When  a motion  is
                      based 
                           on 
                              facts not appearing of record the
                      court may hear  the matter on  affidavits
                      presented by the respective parties,  but
                      the court may  direct that the matter  be
                      heard wholly or partly on oral  testimony
                      or deposition.
          Fed. R.  Civ.  P. 43(d).    This procedural  authority,  however,
          regarding 
                   the manner of taking evidence, does not expand the trial
          court's jurisdiction.   Rules of procedure apply to how the court
          may go about performing whatever function and role it is assigned
          by constitutional, statutory,  and decisional  law governing  the
          court's jurisdiction.  
                    Federal 
                           Rules 
                                 of 
                                   Civil 
                                         Procedure do not purport to expand
          the court's jurisdiction from a role of judicial review to a role
          of plenary adjudication.   This is a proposition inherent in  the
                                        -31-

          general aim that a court system's procedural rules be focused  on
          fair 
              and 
                  efficient procedures rather than either jurisdictional or
          substantive law.  And it is a proposition inherent in the  claim-
          based  rather than  case-based  theme of  federal  subject-matter
          jurisdiction, explained in Part II.B above.
                     (c) An Issue on Which Decision is Reserved
                    We have not decided, and need not decide today, whether
          a court, when reviewing  a benefits determination, must  restrict
          itself to  the "record" as  considered by  the decisionmaker  who
          interpreted the employee benefits plan.  See Mongeluzo v.  Baxter
          Travenol Long  Term Disability Ben. Plan,  46 F.3d 938 (9th  Cir.
          1995); 
                Quesinberry
                           
                           v. 
                              Lif
                                 e Ins. Co. of North America, 987 F.2d 1017
          (4th Cir. 1993);  Luby v. Teamsters Health, Welfare, and  Pension
          Trust Funds,  944 F.2d 1176 (3d  Cir. 1991); compare Davidson  v.
          Prudential  Ins. Co. of  America, 953 F.2d  1093, 1095 (8th  Cir.
          1992).
                    Rather,  we simply  emphasize for  clarity that  making
          factual findings about what is or  is not properly a part of  the
          "record"  for judicial  review  is fundamentally  different  from
          asserting plenary authority  to decide the  merits of a  benefits
          claim.
                    As stated above,  a trial court  may take "evidence  on
          motion" 
                 or 
                    convene 
                           a 
                             nonjury "trial" in order to develop a "record"
          suitable 
                  for 
                     judicial 
                              review of a challenged out-of-court decision.
          Also, a court may convene either of these kinds of proceedings to
                                        -32-

          determine whether the "record" on which the out-of-court decision
          was  made  is  complete and,  if  not,  what  supplementation  is
          appropriate. 
                       That the trial court has some range of discretion in
          this respect is reinforced by analogy to precedent.  For example,
          a 
           Fourth 
                  Circuit decision, calling attention to limitations on the
          district 
                  court's discretion, also declares that the court has some
          range of discretion to take evidence. 
                      [W]e 
                          continue to believe that the purposes
                      of ERISA described  in our Berry  opinion
                      warrant  significant  restraints  on  the
                      district 
                              court's ability to allow evidence
                      beyond   what  was   presented   to   the
                      administrator.   In  our view,  the  most
                      desirable approach to the proper scope of
                      de novo review  under ERISA is one  which
                      balances 
                              these multiple purposes of ERISA.
                      Consequently, we adopt a scope of  review
                      that permits  the district  court in  its
                      discretion to allow evidence that was not
                      before  the  plan  administrator.     The
                      district  court   should   exercise   its
                      discretion,     however,    only     when
                      circumstances  clearly   establish   that
                      additional  evidence   is  necessary   to
                      conduct an adequate de novo review of the
                      benefit decision.
          Quesinberry, 987 F.2d at 1025. 
                   4.  Comparison with Summary Judgment Procedures
                    Proceeding in the way just suggested may be better, for
          very pragmatic  reasons, than hearing  and deciding  a motion  or
          cross-motions for summary judgment.  See, e.g., Charlton Memorial
          Hosp. v. Foxboro Co., 818 F. Supp. 456 (D. Mass. 1993).   Summary
          judgment procedures were designed  primarily for prompt and  fair
          determination of factual issues of the kind that go to the merits
                                        -33-

          and would be decided by the jury in a jury trial if  genuinely in
          dispute.  Under  summary judgment procedure,  the movant has  the
          opportunity 
                     and 
                        burden 
                               of making a showing that no material factual
          issue is genuinely in dispute.  The opponent has the  opportunity
          and 
             burden 
                    of proffering admissible evidence sufficient to support
          a factual finding favorable to the challenged claim, Fed. R. Civ.
          P. 
            56. 
                 
                 Under Rule 56 and local rules implementing its mandates, a
          litigant 
                  who 
                      fails 
                           to 
                              take advantage of its opportunity by a timely
          proffer of evidence  may be procedurally precluded from doing  so
          later 
               on 
                 grounds 
                         concerned with fair process.  E.g., Mas Marques v.
          Digital Equip. Corp., 637 F.2d 24, 29-30 (1st Cir. 1980).
                    Invoking summary judgment procedures for factual issues
          of 
            the 
                kind 
                     that 
                         do 
                            not 
                                go to the merits and would not be submitted
          to a jury in any event is likely to produce misunderstanding  and
          confusion 
                   about 
                         when 
                             and 
                                 how the factual dispute is to be resolved.
          See Charlton Memorial Hosp., 818 F. Supp. at 53-54.  If the trial
          judge 
               needs 
                     to hear and consider evidence to be prepared to decide
          the dispute  over a factual issue  bearing upon the "record"  for
          judicial 
                  review, 
                          Rule 
                              56 
                                 constraints do not apply, though the trial
          judge 
               has 
                   discretion 
                             to 
                                invoke like procedures.  Thus, no formal or
          procedural barrier exists to the trial judge's deciding  disputed
          factual issues about "the record," in proceedings upon a pretrial
          motion rather than at trial.  Such a pretrial motion need not  be
          labeled as one for summary  judgment.  If giving the motion  that
          label leads trial lawyers or  the trial judge to assume that  the
          judge 
               can 
                   never decide before trial if a finding with respect to a
                                        -34-

          genuinely disputable  fact must be  made, this flawed  assumption
          reflects 
                  a 
                    misunderstanding that is likely to create confusion and
          delay.  If, in any event, the decision of a factual dispute about
          the record  is to be made by the judge, not by a jury, the  trial
          judge 
               is 
                  not 
                     required 
                              to 
                                 await trial.  Instead, the trial judge may
          exercise  discretion  about  the  method  of  proceeding,  taking
          advantage  of the  opportunity for  flexibility about  scheduling
          hearings in preparation for the decision about the record.
                             5.  Providing for Discovery
                          and Proffers of Relevant Evidence
                    Of 
                      course, 
                              the 
                                 trial 
                                       judge should (and absent some ground
          of preclusion, must), before deciding a disputable factual  issue
          that 
              may 
                  be 
                     decisive of a dispute about the "record", give parties
          a fair  opportunity  to discover  and present  relevant  evidence
          bearing upon the issue.  Ordinarily  it is a good practice to  do
          this by an order of record that clearly specifies the time within
          which any proffer  is to be  made, and thus  reduces any risk  of
          misunderstanding.
                    Once 
                        this 
                             requirement 
                                        of 
                                           fair process has been satisfied,
          ordinarily it is in the  public interest and the interest of  the
          parties 
                 that 
                     factual 
                             disputes of the kind that are to be decided by
          the trial judge,  and in no  event by a  jury, be decided  sooner
          rather 
                than 
                     later.  Exceptional circumstances of a particular case
          may 
             make 
                  deferral appropriate, however, and this opinion is not to
          be interpreted as stating any hard-edged rule of practice in this
          respect. 
                   
                   We 
                     have 
                          called 
                                 attention to these matters in this opinion
                                        -35-

          solely 
                for 
                    the purpose of clarifying the nature of judicial review
          in respects that appear to have generated misunderstandings.
          D.  Independent Claims and Overlapping Elements
                       1.  Various Types of Independent Claims
                    For completeness,  we take  note of  another source  of
          potential misunderstanding, even though it does not apply to this
          case.   In some  instances,  an independent  claim over  which  a
          district court does  have plenary jurisdiction  for trial on  the
          merits may include, among the elements of that claim or a defense
          to 
            it, 
                a 
                  factual issue that is the same or almost the same as some
          factual 
                 element of a claim for benefits under an employee benefits
          plan, decisions  regarding which are  subject to judicial  review
          rather than trial on the merits.  In such an instance, the  court
          has jurisdiction to  try the independent  claim, even though  the
          court's role in relation to the plan benefits claim is limited to
          judicial  review.   Some potential  illustrations are  identified
          immediately below.  
                          2.  Forbidden Retaliatory Motive
                           or Other Discriminatory Animus
                    An 
                      independent 
                                  claim 
                                       may 
                                           arise when a party contends that
          gender 
                or 
                   racial animus was a motive for termination of employment
          in retaliation for previous protected conduct of the employee  in
          asserting that conditions of employment were discriminatory.   If
          (1) the party making such  a contention demands a jury trial  and
          proffers 
                  sufficient evidence to show a genuine dispute of material
                                        -36-

          fact, and (2) jury trial of the independent claim is  appropriate
          under the law governing trial of that claim, the trial judge  has
          two very distinct and materially different responsibilities.  One
          is to  determine, "as  a matter  of law,"  whether the  proffered
          evidence is sufficient, if  credited by the jury, to support  the
          independent 
                     claim of discriminatory termination of employment and,
          if so, to submit that claim to the jury by an appropriate  charge
          and verdict form.   The trial judge's other responsibility is  to
          perform the function of judicial review of the challenged out-of-
          court decision  of  the claim  for  benefits under  the  employee
          benefits plan.  For the reasons explained in Parts II.B and  II.C
          above,  this responsibility  continues  to be  performed  without
          participation of the jury, even though the independent claim that
          is before the court in the same civil action is tried to a jury.
                             3.  Violation of Obligation
                             to Provide Plan Information
                    Another 
                           kind 
                                of 
                                  claim 
                                        that, in appropriate circumstances,
          might 
               be 
                  treated 
                         as 
                            an 
                               independent claim is a claim of violation of
          the 
             ERISA 
                   requirement of production of plan information, 29 U.S.C.
          S 432(c).  We do not probe this possibility in this case, because
          Recupero 
                  has 
                      not 
                         claimed 
                                 a violation of this provision; instead, as
          explained in Part III.D of this opinion, below, she has claimed a
          violation of notice requirements, with respect to her opportunity
          to challenge a committee decision, under 29 U.S.C. S 1133.
                                        -37-

                 4.  Overlapping Components of an Independent Claim
                          and a Claim Under Judicial Review
                    It is possible that in some circumstances some  factual
          component of an independent claim, or the measure of recovery  if
          that  claim is  proved, will  closely coincide  with a  component
          decisive of the merits of the out-of-court decision that is under
          judicial review.  If this happens, a host of debatable issues may
          exist concerning  claim or issue  preclusion, the  right to  jury
          trial,  and  procedural  rules  and  practices  bearing  on  case
          management in the district court.
                    No 
                      independent 
                                  claim 
                                       was 
                                           alleged in the complaint in this
          case, 
               however, and we do not undertake to address any of the added
          complexities 
                      that 
                          arise 
                                from joinder of a claim for judicial review
          and 
             some 
                  independent claim.  This case presents only a question as
          to scope  of jurisdiction in a  more typical setting of  judicial
          review of an out-of-court benefits decision.
          E.  Consensual Arrangement for Claims Determinations
                    In this  case, the parties assigned  to the EBC in  the
          first instance,  and to  the  EBRC in  the second  instance,  the
          function 
                  of 
                     making decisions about the merits of individual claims
          to 
            benefits 
                     under 
                          the 
                              plan.  This kind of consensual arrangement is
          legally permissible. See Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115.
                    Here, 
                         however, 
                                 each 
                                      party is in essence asking this court
          to  construe   plan   provisions   as   consensually   overriding
          constitutional and  statutory limits on  the jurisdiction of  the
          courts, 
                 or 
                    to hold that an opposing party is estopped or precluded
                                        -38-

          from asserting that the plan provisions do not authorize  plenary
          consideration of  plaintiff-appellant's  claims  on  the  merits.
          Included  is the  request that  the district  court make  factual
          findings 
                  on 
                    any 
                        genuinely disputable issues material to the outcome
          on the merits.
                    When the  law  authorizes  parties to  make  their  own
          consensual 
                    arrangement 
                               for deciding individual claims for benefits,
          ordinarily the parties may prescribe their own set of rules about
          how decisions are to be made,  as long as they do not  transgress
          prescribed legal  limits on the  scope and  nature of  consensual
          arrangements.  E.g., Mitsubishi  Motors Corp. v. Soler  Chrysler-
          Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628-39 (1985)(parties' agreement to
          arbitrate anti-trust  claims is enforceable  absent a showing  of
          circumstances
                       that would warrant setting aside the forum selection
          clause).   If, however, the parties  attempt by their consent  to
          expand the scope  of a district court's jurisdiction beyond  that
          authorized by law, their attempt is legally unenforceable in this
          respect for the reasons explained in Parts II.B and II.C of  this
          opinion.
          F.  Summary of Conclusions Regarding Scope of Jurisdiction
                    The 
                       constitutionally 
                                       and 
                                           statutorily limited jurisdiction
          of federal  courts cannot be expanded  by a stipulation or  joint
          request of the  parties that the  courts become their  privately-
          appointed alternative to the method of adjudication available  to
          them under  law.   Ordinarily, claims  benefit determinations  of
                                        -39-

          consensually  designated  private  decisionmakers  on  whom  plan
          provisions confer authority to exercise discretion are subject to
          judicial 
                  review 
                         under 
                              an 
                                 arbitrary and capricious standard, but not
          to plenary determinations on the merits.
                    In 
                      contrast, 
                                the decision of disputes about the "record"
          for 
             judicial 
                     review 
                            ordinarily are within the scope of the district
          court's 
                 jurisdiction, 
                              and the trial judge's role ordinarily extends
          to deciding factual as well as legal components of such a dispute
          about the "record."
                    Independent claims in addition to a claim for  judicial
          review may present added complexities, but we need not and do not
          address these matters because no independent claim is asserted in
          this case.
                    With these  fundamental  characteristics of  the  legal
          system as background, one may locate the legal and factual issues
          of 
            a 
              particular 
                        civil 
                              action in the larger legal landscape.  In the
          remainder of  this  opinion, we  consider  each of  the  material
          contentions 
                     of the parties regarding the precise way in which this
          controversy has proceeded both before and after the filing of the
          civil action in the United States District Court for the District
          of Massachusetts.
                      III.  Particular Contentions in This Case
          A.  Introduction
                    The 
                       parties 
                               to 
                                 this 
                                      appeal have acknowledged, and we have
          noted, that some aspects of the out-of-court decisions of the NET
                                        -40-

          Committees must  be judicially reviewed  under an "arbitrary  and
          capricious" standard.  Other aspects of the challenged  decisions
          must be decided either as matters  of law are decided or under  a
          standard  less deferential  than  an "arbitrary  and  capricious"
          standard.  Also,  as proceedings have  developed both before  and
          after the  filing of  the civil  action, some  issues earlier  in
          controversy have become moot or an opportunity for challenge  has
          been lost under rules of procedural preclusion.
                    In this Part III, we discuss separately these different
          kinds  of  issues, beginning  with  asserted  violations  of  the
          applicable "arbitrary and capricious" standard.
          B.  Alleged Violations of "Arbitrary and Capricious" Standard
                    Having determined  that  the role  of the  courts  with
          respect  to typical  claims under  an employee  benefits plan  is
          jurisdictionally limited  to review, if  a plan administrator  or
          fiduciary 
                   was given discretion to decide particular claims, we now
          consider 
                  whether Recupero has shown that the Committees created to
          decide claims of the type at issue in this case acted arbitrarily
          and capriciously.  Recupero argues: 
                      Ms. Recupero was seriously injured in  an
                      elevator accident at her workplace  while
                      she  was on-duty  and being  paid by  the
                      company.  At the time of her accident she
                      was in the  course of her employment  and
                      was 
                         under 
                               the direction and control of her
                      employer.  The only reasonable meaning of
                      the Plan  language is  that Ms.  Recupero
                      sustained 
                               an 
                                  "accident" and not "sickness"
                      and 
                         it 
                            was 
                                arbitrary and capricious of the
                      Plan to  deny her  "accident"  disability
                      claim.
                                        -41-

          (Appellant's Br. at 6-7.)   Recupero contends that she was:
                      ...  en route  to  obtain coffee  in  the
                      building lobby  at the  direction of  her
                      supervisor on company time at the time of
                      the  accident.     She   made  ...   [an]
                      adjustment [from  her  usual time  for  a
                      break] at the direction of her supervisor
                      for 
                         the 
                             sole 
                                  purpose of furthering, and in
                      direct 
                            connection with, the performance of
                      her duties to  enable her to establish  a
                      conference call with a customer at a time
                      when she would  otherwise have been  away
                      from her usual work station. 
          (Id.
              
              at 
                 13). 
                       Thus, she argues, she was "on-duty" at the time that
          she sustained her injury, and is entitled to "accident benefits."
          (Id. at 14.)
                    The 
                       defendant-appellee counters that "[i]t is undisputed
          that 
              Recupero 
                      was 
                          injured during break time, after leaving her work
          station  while  on  an  elevator en  route  to  a  coffee  shop."
          (Appellees' Br.  at 7.)    This fact,  NET contends,  shows  that
          Recupero 
                  was 
                     not 
                         "solely" and "directly" engaged in the performance
          of duties  at the time of the  injury.  (Id.)  Thus, the  defense
          argument  goes,  the  Committees  did  not  act  arbitrarily  and
          capriciously in  determining that  Recupero was  not entitled  to
          "accident benefits."  (Id.)
                    As already noted, the district court ruled in favor  of
          NET 
             on 
                this 
                     issue. 
                            
                            The 
                                district court rejected Recupero's argument
          that, because  she was  taking her break  at the  request of  her
          employer, her injuries should entitle her to "Accident Disability
          Benefits."  The court stated:
                      Recupero's argument is predicated on  the
                      assertion that she was taking her  coffee
                                        -42-

                      break a half hour early at the request of
                      her supervisor in order to accommodate  a
                      job-related  phone  call  which  she  was
                      expecting.  Such  a fact is not  properly
                      before the court for two reasons.  First,
                      the 
                         court, 
                                when applying the arbitrary and
                      capricious standard  of review, may  only
                      review the  actions of  the fiduciary  in
                      light of the evidence which was before it
                      at  the  time it made  its decision.   It
                      does not  appear  that the  NET  Benefits
                      Office,  the EBC  or  the EBCRC  had  the
                      benefit of considering this fact.   (#20,
                      Exh. 
                          2, 
                             Affidavit of Richard Waldron, q7).
                      Second,  this  is  a  "mere   allegation"
                      unsupported 
                                 "by affidavits or as otherwise
                      provided" under  Fed.  R. Civ.  P.  56(e)
                      since Recupero offers no evidence to this
                      court to support this contention.
          (Recupero v. New England Telephone & Telegraph Co., Civil  Action
          No. 94-12266-MLW, Memorandum and Order, Sept. 20, 1996 at 9 n.5.)
                    The 
                       EBC 
                           and 
                               the EBRC decided that Recupero qualified for
          "Sickness 
                   Disability Benefits" only.  The district court correctly
          concluded that  this decision was  not arbitrary and  capricious.
          Three lines of reasoning support this conclusion. 
                    First.   The  court  below  correctly  determined  that
          Recupero had not proffered evidence before the EBC or EBRC of any
          irregularity in  the break  from work that  she was  on when  the
          incident occurred.   (Id.)    Nothing  in the  record before  the
          Committees, the record  before the district court, or the  record
          before 
                this 
                    court 
                          suggests otherwise.  If Recupero did not proffer,
          before the Committees, factual support for a contention that  the
          circumstances of the incident brought it within the meaning of an
          "accident" 
                    because she was taking her break at a specific time, at
          the 
             behest 
                    of her supervisor, in order to allow her to perform her
                                        -43-

          duties 
                at 
                   a 
                    later 
                          time, 
                                then the record before the EBC and the EBRC
          was not sufficient to support a court determination, on  judicial
          review, that the  decisions of the Committees were arbitrary  and
          capricious.
                    Second. 
                            
                            Despite 
                                   the 
                                       difficulties of drawing bright lines
          of 
            separation and fitting every conceivable circumstance of injury
          into  either  the  category of  "accident"  or  the  category  of
          "sickness," 
                     the 
                        Committees did not act arbitrarily and capriciously
          when interpreting "on-duty" to exclude break time, regardless  of
          the  nature of any reason or reasons  for the break.  A plan  may
          prescribe a definition  of "on-duty" that takes into account  the
          myriad 
                of 
                   possible 
                           ways 
                                in which and times at which an employee may
          be injured.  A plan that does so may require of the  out-of-court
          decisionmakers, in deciding a particular claim, that they make an
          evaluative  determination  rather   than  a  rigorously   logical
          application of  bright-line  rules  that leave  no  choice,  even
          reasoned 
                  choice, in arriving at a decision concerning the merit of
          a particular claim. 
                    It is true that in  the context of trial of a  paradigm
          tort 
              or 
                 contract claim, "evaluative issues" often go to a jury for
          decision.  See, e.g., Springer v. Seamen, 821 F.2d 871, 876  (1st
          Cir. 
              1987) 
                    (in tort law, not only ordinary fact questions but also
          "evaluative applications  of legal standards  (such as the  legal
          concept of  'foreseeability')  to  the facts  are  properly  jury
          questions"), cited  with approval in  Dedham Water v.  Cumberland
          Farms Dairy, 972 F.2d 453 (1st Cir. 1992).  
                                        -44-

                    In  the context  of  judicial  review  of  out-of-court
          decisions, however, if  employee benefit  plan provisions  confer
          discretion  on  an  out-of-court  decisionmaker,  ordinarily  the
          evaluative determinations  of that  decisionmaker are  judicially
          reviewed under a deferential standard, as explained in Parts II.B
          and II.C of this opinion.
                    Section 
                           5(5) 
                                of the plan before us in this record is one
          of the provisions  the interpretation of which was challenged  in
          this case.  It provides:
                      Relationship  of  Injury  to  Employment.
                      Accidental 
                                injuries shall be considered as
                      arising  out of  and  in  the  course  of
                      employment  only  where  the  injury  has
                      resulted solely from accident during  and
                      in direct connection with the performance
                      of  duties  to  which  the  employee   is
                      assigned 
                              in 
                                 the service of the Company, or
                      was assigned by  the Former Affiliate  or
                      Associated or  Allied Company from  which
                      the employee was reassigned as of January
                      1,  1984, or  which  he  is  directed  to
                      perform  by   proper  authority,  or   in
                      voluntarily  protecting   the   Company's
                      property or interests.   There must be  a
                      clear and well-established history of the
                      cause   and   circumstances   of   injury
                      accidentally  inflicted,  which  must  be
                      sufficient to produce the alleged injury,
                      and there  must be satisfactory  evidence
                      that  such injury  renders  the  employee
                      unable to perform his duty in the service
                      of the Company.
          (Appellees' Br.  at 59-60)  (emphasis  added).   In view  of  the
          emphasized phrase in this passage quoted from the plan, we cannot
          say 
             that 
                  the 
                     district 
                              court erred in its interpretation of the plan
          as supporting NET's position in this appeal.  
                                        -45-

                    Third. 
                           
                           Recupero apparently bases her argument, in part,
          on an  assumption  that because  she  was eligible  for  worker's
          compensation,
                       her injury should be treated, as a matter of law, as
          having occurred "on-duty."  This assumed premise is erroneous, as
          a matter of law.  Neither ERISA nor any other source of authority
          declares  that  the   standards  of   eligibility  for   workers'
          compensation benefits and  accident disability benefits under  an
          ERISA-regulated 
                         plan 
                             be 
                                the same.  See Pagan v. NYNEX Pension Plan,
          52 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 1995).  Further, the plan provisions in this
          case do not explicitly prescribe a test for "on-duty" status that
          mirrors the test commonly used in worker compensation systems. 
                    For these reasons, we conclude that the district  court
          did 
             not 
                 err 
                     in deciding that the decisions of the EBC and the EBRC
          were not arbitrary and capricious.    
          C.  Recupero's Request for Reclassification of Benefits
                    We take  note that plaintiff  is not seeking  "Sickness
          Disability 
                    Benefits" 
                             beyond those already paid to her.  Rather, she
          is asking merely that we  order, or direct the district court  to
          order,  that  the  benefits already  paid  to  her  as  "Sickness
          Disability Benefits" be declared to be reclassified as  "Accident
          Disability Benefits."  (Appellant's Br. at 1 n.1.)  
                    Recupero 
                            does not argue, nor do we know of any ground on
          which she could creditably do so, that she was entitled to such a
          reclassificat
                      ion decision by the district court, or is entitled to
          have 
              this 
                   court 
                        declare 
                                such a reclassification.  Instead, she asks
                                        -46-

          this 
              court, 
                     as a matter of discretion in the interests of justice,
          to 
            declare 
                   the 
                       reclassification or order the district court to make
          a discretionary decision regarding reclassification.
                    We are not persuaded that we should exercise discretion
          in this way at this late stage in the development of  proceedings
          regarding Recupero's  claim  for benefits,  even  if we  were  to
          determine 
                   that we have jurisdiction to do so.  Recupero has failed
          to 
            place 
                  before us, or before the district court, a record showing
          that 
              she 
                  made 
                      a 
                        request 
                                that the Committees make a determination of
          this 
              type. 
                     
                     Nor has she called to our attention any good cause for
          determining that she should be allowed to present this request at
          this 
              late 
                   point in the face of the apparent unfairness of allowing
          a 
           claimant 
                    to 
                      proceed 
                              on 
                                 one set of contentions to the threshold of
          final resolution and only then assert a new theory of claim.   In
          these  circumstances,   without  undertaking   to  resolve   very
          substantial 
                     doubts about our jurisdiction to entertain such a late
          request 
                 for 
                    a 
                      declaration of "reclassification" of benefits she was
          paid and accepted as "Sickness Disability Benefits," we  conclude
          that her request must be denied as untimely.  This conclusion  is
          amply  supported by  precedent.    See, e.g.,  United  States  v.
          Bongiorno, 106  F.3d 1027, 1034  (1st Cir. 1997)  (constitutional
          arguments  not raised in  the lower court  cannot be advanced  on
          appeal); 
                  Armstrong
                           
                           v. 
                              Jef
                                 ferson Smurfit & Corp., 30 F.3d 11, 13 n.4
          (1st Cir.  1994)  (argument that  reimbursement of taxes paid  in
          lump-sum payments could be benefits under ERISA waived when  made
          for the first time on appeal.)
                                        -47-

          D.        Interpretation of Plan Provisions
                    As  a  general  rule  (independently  of  the   special
          characteristics   of   ERISA   claims   cases),   disputes   over
          interpretation 
                        of 
                          a 
                            document (or set of documents taken together as
          a 
           unit) 
                 are 
                     decided as matters of law are decided.  See, e.g., Den
          Norske 
                Bank, 
                     A.S. 
                          v. 
                             Firs
                                 t Nat. Bank of Boston, 75 F.3d 49, 52 (1st
          Cir. 
              1996)("Normally, contract interpretation is a question of law
          for the court.").  And,  as a general rule, courts may  determine
          that 
              an 
                 out-of-court decision was arbitrary and capricious if that
          decision was explicitly or implicitly founded on an error of law.
          E.g.
             , 
               United 
                     States
                            
                            v. 
                               Me
                                 mbers of Estate of Boothby, 16 F.3d 19, 21
          (1st  Cir. 1994)  ("In  scrutinizing  administrative  actions,  a
          reviewing court is free to correct errors of law, but, otherwise,
          the court  is limited  to a  search for  arbitrary or  capricious
          behavior.").
                    If a  genuine dispute exists  regarding existence of  a
          contract, ordinarily that issue  "is a question of fact, for  the
          jury ... [unless] the  evidence consists only of writings, or  is
          uncontroverted," in which even "the court can decide the  issue."
          American Private Line Services, Inc. v.  Eastern Microwave, Inc.,
          980 F.2d 33, 35 (1st Cir. 1992).  Even if the core of the dispute
          is what interpretation to give to a document or to uncontroverted
          oral  communications, in  exceptional circumstances  an issue  of
          interpretatio
                      n on which reasonable persons may differ is submitted
          to 
            a 
              "trier 
                     of 
                       fact." 
                               
                               Bo
                                 ston Edison Co. v. F.E.R.C., 856 F.2d 361,
          367 n.3 (1st Cir. 1988).  But this exception cannot be invoked by
                                        -48-

          a 
           party 
                 who 
                     has failed to make any proffer of documentary or other
          evidence 
                  sufficient 
                            to 
                               support a determination of ambiguity in some
          respect material to disposition on the merits of the  controversy
          before the court.  See, e.g., Donoghue v. IBC USA (Publications),
          Inc., 70 F.3d 206, 215 (1st Cir. 1995) (a hypothetical allegation
          of meaning, whether ambiguity is alleged or not, is inadequate to
          present a genuine dispute as to a material issue; even if a party
          is "claiming  to benefit from  ambiguity (for  example, by  being
          allowed   to   proffer   extrinsic   evidence   supporting    its
          interpretatio
                      n) [that party] must show ambiguity in the meaning of
          the agreement with respect to  the very issue in dispute").   The
          record before us in this case is devoid of any such proffer.
                    For  these  reasons,  we  conclude,  without   deciding
          unsettled issues about  jury trial in ERISA cases generally  (see
          decisions cited in Part II.C.2, supra), that in no event would it
          be 
            proper 
                   in 
                     this 
                          case 
                               to submit to a jury issues of interpretation
          of the  NET  plan provisions  bearing upon  "Accident  Disability
          Benefits" claimed  by Recupero.   Moreover, such an  interpretive
          question could go to a jury only if the court, in which  the jury
          sits, 
               has 
                  plenary 
                          jurisdiction.  For the reasons explained in Parts
          II.B 
              and 
                  II.C of this opinion, the exceptional allowance of a jury
          decision  on an  interpretive question  does not  apply when  the
          court's role  is limited to  judicial review  of an  out-of-court
          decision. 
                                        -49-

          E.  Futility of Remand
                    NET  argues  that  the   same  outcome  on  issues   of
          interpretation of NET plan provisions must be reached on  another
          ground. 
                  
                  The 
                      argument is that the record before the district court
          was sufficient, and the record on appeal is sufficient, for  this
          court  to determine  that remand  would be  futile because,  from
          undisputed 
                    facts 
                         that 
                              Recupero does not suggest could be challenged
          if 
            remand 
                   were ordered, it is apparent that Recupero's claim fails
          on  the  merits.    We  conclude  that,  though  from  a  limited
          perspective,  the  decision of  this  matter  might  have  seemed
          debatable,  closer probing  supports this  defense position  with
          respect to issues concerning the meaning and application to  this
          case of  the NET plan  provisions regarding "Accident  Disability
          Benefits."  
                    Recupero 
                            has 
                                entirely failed, in proceedings before this
          civil action was filed, in proceedings in the court below, and on
          appeal, to  make any proffer of  relevant evidence that could  be
          determined to be sufficient to support her contentions that  plan
          provisions on eligibility for Accident Disability Benefits should
          be interpreted in a way that would present a genuinely disputable
          factual issue bearing upon her claim on the merits.  
          F.  Denial of Notice
                    As an independent basis for rejecting Recupero's  claim
          for some form of relief because of alleged violation of 29 U.S.C.
          S 
           1133 
                with 
                     respect to notice about how to pursue her rights under
                                        -50-

          the plan  after denial of her  benefits claim, NET contends  that
          Recupero 
                  failed 
                        to 
                           proffer any admissible evidence, at any stage of
          proceedings,  to  support  any  finding  of  prejudice  to   her.
          (Appellees' Br. at 9, 20-21.)  The district court determined that
          Recupero 
                  had 
                     not 
                         proffered evidence sufficient to support a finding
          of prejudice  in  any relevant  sense.   (Memorandum  and  Order,
          Sept. 20, 1996 at 14-15.)  
                    In  effect,  Recupero  has  attempted  to   demonstrate
          prejudice by arguing that it is inherent in the circumstances  of
          any claim  of the type  she has made,  rather than by  proffering
          evidence, either to the  Committees or to the district court,  to
          show that in some special way the circumstances of her case  were
          unique 
                or 
                   at 
                      least exceptional.  We conclude that allowing a claim
          for relief  because of inadequacy  of formal  notice without  any
          showing that a precisely correct form of notice would have made a
          difference would result  in benefit claims outcomes  inconsistent
          with ERISA aims  of providing secure funding of employee  benefit
          plans.  
                    In  these   circumstances,   we   conclude   that   the
          determination by the district court that Recupero failed to  show
          prejudice in  a  relevant sense  is unassailable,  regardless  of
          whether we treat it as a factual finding by the district court or
          instead as a determination of insufficiency of proffered evidence
          "as a matter of law." 
                                        -51-

                                     CONCLUSION
                    For the reasons stated in this opinion, it is ORDERED:
                    The 
                       judgment 
                                of 
                                  the 
                                      district court is AFFIRMED.  Costs of
          the appeal are awarded to Appellees.
                                        -52-