Court Opinion

ID: 9779884
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 00:54:42.700951+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:57:46.761066
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE O’MALLEY, specially concurring: I agree with the majority that it was reasonable for the police to enter apartment 4, canvass it, and arrest defendant, all without a warrant. This case presents a straightforward application of what the majority recognizes as the “emergency” exception. Officer Moore’s reasonable belief that a burglary, with all its attendant dangers, was occurring in apartment 4 sufficed by itself to justify his warrantless entry into the apartment. So the majority concludes early on. 397 Ill. App. 3d at 704-06. This should have ended the matter, but the majority goes on to apply the Dorman test, which is inapposite to an emergency situation posed by an ongoing crime presenting an immediate threat to persons or property. The Dorman “exigency” exception and the “emergency” exception are both outgrowths of the principle that a warrantless entry for search, seizure, or arrest is permissible where “ ‘the inevitable delay incident to obtaining a warrant must give way to an urgent need for immediate action.’ ” United States v. Santa, 236 F.3d 662, 669 (11th Cir. 2000), quoting United States v. Burgos, 720 F.2d 1520, 1526 (11th Cir. 1983). Each exception, however, serves a distinct value: “The ‘emergency’ exception stems from the police officers’ ‘community caretaking function’ and allows them ‘to respond to emergency situations’ that threaten life or limb; this exception does ‘not [derive from] police officers’ function as criminal investigators.’ [Citation.] By contrast, the ‘exigency’ exception does derive from the police officers’ investigatory function; it allows them to enter a home without a warrant if they have both probable cause to believe that a crime has been or is being committed and a reasonable belief that their entry is ‘necessary to prevent *** the destruction of relevant evidence, the escape of the suspect, or some other consequence improperly frustrating legitimate law enforcement efforts.’ [Citation.]” (Emphasis in original.) Hopkins v. Bonvicino, 573 F.3d 752, 763 (9th Cir. 2009). In Dorman: “The issue [was] whether the police acted unreasonably, and in violation of constitutional rights, when they proceeded, in furtherance of their objective to arrest a suspect they had probable cause to believe was an armed felon, to make a warrantless, unconsented, non-forcible entry into his home late in the evening, at a time some few hours after the offense and within an hour after they obtained eyewitness identification of the suspect, and when a magistrate was not readily available.” Dorman, 435 F.2d at 388. Dorman crafted its factors as aids in determining whether exigency exists “where the entry is for the purpose of making an arrest of a suspected felon.” Dorman, 435 F.2d at 390. The factors thus have been used to elaborate the decree in Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 576, 590, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639, 644, 653, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 1374, 1382 (1980), that the fourth amendment “prohibits the police from making a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a suspect’s home in order to make a routine felony arrest,” i.e., that “[a]bsent exigent circumstances [or consent], [the] threshold [of the home] may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant.” (Emphasis added.) See People v. Abney, 81 Ill. 2d 159, 168 (1980) (noting that Payton did not attempt to define exigent circumstances but finding guidance in Dorman). Illinois courts have continued to apply the Dorman factors in judging “exigency in circumstances involving warrantless entry into a private residence to effectuate an arrest.” People v. McNeal, 175 Ill. 2d 335, 345 (1997). The Dorman test is a poor fit for emergency scenarios that involve ongoing crime, because the test presupposes a completed crime. Dorman’s first factor is whether “the crime under investigation was recently committed” (emphasis added) (Williams, 161 Ill. 2d at 26), not whether the crime was simply complete. See 3 W. LaFave, Search & Seizure §6.6, at 450-51 (4th ed. 2004) (noting that Payton and its progeny are “concerned with the entry of private [property] by police for the purpose of arresting a person thought to be within or for the purpose of finding the fruits, instrumentalities or evidence of some past crime” and noting that “clearly police have occasion to enter premises without a warrant for a variety of other purposes” (emphasis added)). The Dorman factors attempt to strike a balance between two governmental and societal interests: maintaining the sanctity of the dwelling and apprehending with all due swiftness a suspect believed to be within that dwelling. The concern for the integrity of the home is perhaps most explicit in the factor of whether “the police entry was made peaceably, albeit nonconsensually” (Williams, 161 Ill. 2d at 27). Where, however, there is ongoing crime that supports “a reasonable belief that immediate action is necessary for the purpose of providing aid to persons or property in need thereof’ (People v. Griffin, 158 Ill. App. 3d 46, 50 (1987)), the analysis is radically simplified. The emergency exception shows no overt concern for the privacy of the place to be entered; that interest is overridden by the urgency posed, subject to the requirement of “some reasonable basis, approximating probable cause, to associate the emergency with the area or place to be searched” (Griffin, 158 Ill. App. 3d at 51). See United States v. Snipe, 515 F.3d 947, 952 n.6 (9th Cir. 2008) (refusing to incorporate Dorman factor of “gravity of the underlying offense” into the emergency exception because it would lead officers to weigh the degree of the emergency while deciding whether to obtain a warrant, and hence would dangerously slow response time); State v. Barboza, 57 Wash. App. 822, 830, 790 P.2d 647, 651 (1990) (Dorman not applicable because its factors “apply to entries made to effect an arrest, such as in a situation of ‘hot pursuit,’ ” but the case at hand “involve[d] entry made to rescue any injured persons and for the safety of the public and police”). The majority not only applies the inapposite Dorman factors but makes a finding under the factors that is in tension with its prior conclusions under the emergency exception. In applying the emergency exception, the majority concluded that Moore’s belief that “a suspected burglary” was occurring in apartment 4 gave him cause to believe “there was an immediate need for his assistance to protect life or property” and permitted him to enter without a warrant. 397 Ill. App. 3d at 706. Under the Dorman factors, however, the majority finds that “burglary—the most serious offense Moore suspected might be occurring in the unit—does not constitute a grave offense.” 397 Ill. App. 3d at 711. I fail to see how an ongoing burglary could suffice, without more, to allow warrantless entry to a dwelling yet not be a “grave offense.” This tension becomes more prominent given the majority’s belief that there are two distinct exigency tests. “The first approach concludes that exigent circumstances are present if there is probable cause to believe that a burglary is in progress,” while “[t]he second approach utilizes the Dorman factors.” 397 Ill. App. 3d at 709. Hence for the majority, an ongoing burglary is not a “grave offense” under one exigency test, yet, under another exigency test, it is sufficient in itself to permit a warrantless entry. If the case law does indeed reach such divergent conclusions, the majority ought to choose a side rather than adopt that dichotomy into its analysis. Better yet, the majority should have been content to apply the emergency exception alone.