Court Opinion

ID: 9901477
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-21 20:03:11.489132+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:33.647165
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/21/23 Martinez v. CalCom Roofing CA4/1
                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 ROSA MARIA REYES MARTINEZ et                                         D082216
 al.,

           Plaintiffs and Appellants,
                                                                      (Super. Ct. No. RIC1904392)
           v.

 CALCOM ROOFING, INC. et al.,

           Defendants and Respondents.

         APPEAL from judgments of the Superior Court of Riverside County,
Daniel A. Ottolia and Craig Riemer, Judges. Affirmed.

         Steven B. Stevens, A Prof. Corp., and Steven B. Stevens; Jacoby &
Meyers Attorneys and Laura F. Sedrish, for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
         Law Office of Jillisa L. O’Brien, Inc., Jillisa L. O’Brien, Conor H.
McElroy, for Defendant and Respondent CalCom Roofing, Inc.
         Horvitz & Levy, Curt Cutting, Bradley S. Pauley; Law Offices of
Beth M. Henderson and Robert E. Henke, for Defendants and Respondents
Bryan Industrial Properties, Inc., Hoyt Gregory S RSH FT TR B SETT TR,
and RS Hoyt Jr. Family Trust.
      Defendants Bryan Industrial Properties, Inc., Hoyt Gregory S RSH FT
TR B SETT TR, and RS Hoyt Jr. Family Trust (Bryan Industrial/Hoyt) hired
CalCom Roofing, Inc. to reroof their commercial warehouse building. Bryan
Industrial/Hoyt defined the project to include removing the roof’s two layers
of cap sheet from the existing plywood roof deck and then installing new roof
board over the plywood.
      CalCom hired Honeycutt Construction Management, LLC to tear off
the existing cap sheet and Elite Roofing Supply to supply and deliver the
roofing materials and load them onto the roof. On the day that Honeycutt
began tearing off the cap sheet, Elite Roofing began loading materials onto an
area of the roof that it and Honeycutt selected. While Elite Roofing
employee, Willfred Reyes, was carrying sheets of roof board on the roof, a
portion of the roof that Honeycutt had stripped of cap sheet gave way
underneath him. Reyes fell through the roof to his death.
      Reyes’ parents, Rosa Maria Reyes Martinez and Rodrigo Delgado
Fernandez (the Parents), recovered workers’ compensation benefits from
Elite Roofing for Reyes’ death. They then filed a wrongful death negligence
and premises liability action against Bryan Industrial/Hoyt, CalCom, and
Honeycutt.
      Under Privette v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 689 (Privette), an
independent contractor’s employee is generally barred from recovering
damages from the contractor’s hirer for an on-the-job injury. (SeaBright Ins.
Co. v. US Airways, Inc. (2011) 52 Cal.4th 590, 594 (SeaBright).) Two
exceptions exist: (1) where the injury results from a concealed hazardous
condition on the property that the landowner-hirer knew or should have
known of, that the contractor did not know of and could not reasonably
ascertain, and about which the landowner-hirer failed to warn the contractor

                                      2
(Kinsman v. Unocal Corp. (2005) 37 Cal.4th 659, 664 (Kinsman)), and
(2) where the hirer retained control over any part of the work and exercised
that control in a way that affirmatively contributed to the worker’s
injury (Hooker v. Department of Transportation (2002) 27 Cal.4th 198, 202
(Hooker)).
      Bryan Industrial/Hoyt and CalCom separately moved for summary
judgment on the grounds that Privette applied and barred the claims against
them. The Parents opposed both motions, contending that the Kinsman and
Hooker exceptions applied. The trial court disagreed and granted the
motions, finding the Privette doctrine applied and the Parents had not shown
a triable issue of fact as to either exception’s application.
      On appeal, the Parents argue—for the first time—that the Privette
doctrine cannot apply to Elite Roofing because it was a mere “material
supplier” and not a contractor. The Parents further argue in the alternative
that, even assuming Elite Roofing was a contractor to which Privette applied,
a triable issue of fact exists as to either or both exceptions. First, they
contend there is substantial evidence that Bryan Industrial/Hoyt and
CalCom knew or should have known about the roof’s allegedly hazardous
condition because the plywood underneath the roof’s cap sheet had been
weakened by age and water damage. Second, they contend there is
substantial evidence that Bryan Industrial/Hoyt and CalCom retained
control over the reroof project and exercised that control in a manner that
affirmatively contributed to Reyes’ fall, including by requiring that the cap
sheet be removed and by failing to provide a fall protection system on the
roof. We disagree with each of these contentions and affirm the judgments in
favor of Bryan Industrial/Hoyt and CalCom.

                                         3
                                       I.
                                      A.
      In 1967, Bryan Industrial built a commercial warehouse in Anaheim,
California for Hoyt. When constructing the roof, Bryan Industrial used the
thinnest plywood panels—three-eighths of an inch—acceptable for the roof
deck at the time. As of 2019, the warehouse’s roof was still comprised of the
original three-eighths inch plywood, which was covered with the original
layer of cap sheet and a second layer from a past reroof.
      Bryan Industrial also managed the warehouse property for Hoyt. In
2001, Bryan Industrial hired property manager Kevin Zeigler, who had
decades of experience in roofing, inspecting roof systems, conducting leak
investigations, and providing general consulting for roof system installations.
Bryan Industrial also hired CalCom to perform annual maintenance on the
warehouse roof, much of which was preventative. According to CalCom, this
maintenance included applying new roof mastic over the top of any areas on
the cap sheet roofing system where existing roof mastic showed signs of
cracking or where a nail head might have popped through the cap sheet.
Then CalCom applied a white reflective paint over the new roof mastic to
proof it from the sun and water.
      Over the years, CalCom also repaired water leaks in the warehouse’s
roof. In April 2013, CalCom repaired a water leak in the roof’s northwest
corner. It patched a leak in the roof’s southwest corner where water from the
roof went into a downspout and was leaking into an office. CalCom
additionally repaired leaks around May 2015 and December 2018. During
this time, no one informed CalCom of any concerns about the roof plywood’s
safety or condition.

                                       4
                                       B.
      At some point, Hoyt and Bryan Industrial decided to replace the
warehouse roof during the approximately one-month period that the
warehouse would be vacant between tenants. Zeigler testified that they
decided to replace the roof because they had been experiencing a few roof
leaks over the years, and although the roof had some more “life left to it,” it
was extremely difficult to install a new roof when the warehouse was
occupied by a tenant.
      In May 2019, Bryan Industrial hired CalCom to reroof the warehouse.
Bryan Industrial also hired an air conditioning contractor, AccuTemp, to
remove some of the rooftop’s air conditioning ducts and exhaust fans that
were no longer in use. In addition, Zeigler tasked Bryan Industrial’s
maintenance supervisor, Octavio Salcedo, with preparing the warehouse for
the reroof project. That work included locating and removing roof
penetrations—pipes through the roof—that were no longer in use, marking
from inside the warehouse where skylights would be installed, and cutting
out the insulation where the skylights would be placed.
      On May 31, 2019, Bill Leinenweaver of CalCom, Zeigler and Salcedo of
Bryan Industrial, and Kirk Vasquez of AccuTemp performed a jobsite
walkthrough for the reroofing project, which included assessing the overall
condition of the warehouse and rooftop. At the time of the walkthrough, the
warehouse’s existing cap sheet roofing system was still in place. During the
walkthrough, Zeigler, Salcedo, Leinenweaver, and Vasquez walked “all over
the roof,” and Zeigler did not locate any weak or compromised areas.
Likewise, Leinenweaver of CalCom did not discover or observe anything that
concerned him about the roof’s condition.

                                        5
      Bryan Industrial and Hoyt defined the reroof project for CalCom to
include removing the two layers of cap sheet roof and then installing
DensDeck roof board over the existing plywood substrate, which was
underneath the cap sheet. CalCom’s responsibilities included adding the new
DensDeck roofing material; determining which contractors to hire to perform
the tear off of the existing roof and to provide the necessary roofing supplies;
and managing the sequencing of the contractors it hired for the job.
      To that end, CalCom hired Honeycutt to tear off the existing cap sheet
roofing. CalCom also purchased roofing supplies from Elite Roofing and
hired Elite Roofing to deliver and load the supplies onto the rooftop. CalCom
did not offer or promise Honeycutt or Elite Roofing that it would provide any
type of safety measures related to their work.
                                       C.
      On June 7, 2019, Elite Roofing began delivering the materials to the
jobsite for CalCom. Before loading materials onto any roof at a jobsite, Elite
Roofing’s normal procedure was to inspect the roof, including inspecting
inside the building to ensure the beams were “okay” and then checking while
on the actual roof to ensure the roof was strong. If the Elite Roofing
employees felt the roof was unsafe or weak, they could use fall restraint
harnesses kept in Elite Roofing’s truck.
      Before going onto the roof on June 7, 2019, Elite Roofing employees
determined that the roof appeared to be safe by inspecting the roof from
inside the warehouse and using a ladder to visually inspect the roof from the
outside. Jose Hernandez, an Elite Roofing employee, testified that he and
two other Elite Roofing employees conducted a visual inspection of the
warehouse’s interior to ensure the beams were “solid” before going onto the
roof. Elite Roofing employees testified that they decided fall restraint devices

                                        6
were unnecessary for their work on the warehouse roof because the roof was

flat and “they were not going to get near the edge.”1
      When Elite Roofing started loading the roof with supplies, Honeycutt
was already on the roof tearing off the cap sheet. Elite Roofing employees
used a forklift—which they brought to the property—to load the materials
onto the roof. Elite Roofing employees decided to stack the materials on the
roof in a location that they and a Honeycutt employee determined would be
safest and out of Honeycutt’s way. CalCom did not direct Elite Roofing or its
employees on how to deliver the materials or where to load them on the roof.
At no time during Elite Roofing’s work did Elite Roofing observe anything on
the roof deck that appeared unsafe.
      While two Elite Roofing employees—Willfred Reyes and a coworker—
together carried some sheets of roof board near the center of the warehouse’s
roof, the plywood underneath Reyes gave way, and he fell through the roof to
his death.
      The location where Reyes fell was not an area where there had been
any previously repaired water leaks and was not near any penetrations
removed by AccuTemp or Salcedo. Earlier that day, Salcedo of Bryan
Industrial had walked in the general area where Reyes later fell, including on
the plywood deck after the cap sheet had been removed, and he did not see a
hole or notice anything out of the ordinary. CalCom had not been to the

1     It is also undisputed that the warehouse roof did not have any anchor
points or harness systems installed for use with fall restraint devices.
However, the parties do not identify any evidence suggesting that Elite
Roofing employees noticed the lack of anchor points or harness systems on
the roof or that this influenced their decision not to wear their fall restraint
harnesses.
                                        7
jobsite at any point between the time Honeycutt began tearing off the cap
sheet and Reyes’ fall.
       At some point after Reyes’ fall, Zeigler arrived to the jobsite. He later
used a drone to take photographs of the roof, which showed that Reyes fell
through a portion of the roof where Honeycutt had already removed the two
layers of cap sheet.
       Following the accident, CalCom hired an engineer to design a fall
protection system, and installed tie-off anchors and walkways for workers to
use on the roof. In August 2019, Honeycutt and CalCom crews walked the
entire roof deck during the tear off and reroof process without the plywood
roof deck breaking or giving way in any other area.
                                        D.
       After Reyes’ death, the Parents received workers’ compensation
benefits from Elite Roofing’s insurer. They additionally filed a wrongful
death action against CalCom, Honeycutt, Bryan Industrial, and Hoyt for
general negligence and against Bryan Industrial and Hoyt for premises
liability.
       Bryan Industrial/Hoyt and CalCom separately moved for summary
judgment, contending that the Parents’ claims were barred by Privette, which
held that the hirer of an independent contractor generally is not liable for
on-the-job injuries sustained by the independent contractor’s employees. The
Parents opposed both motions, arguing exceptions to Privette’s nonliability
rule applied, including that (1) defendants retained control over the jobsite
and affirmatively contributed to Reyes’ death and (2) defendants failed to
warn Elite Roofing about the roof’s concealed hazardous condition.
       In support of their oppositions to both motions for summary judgment,
the Parents filed the declaration of their civil engineer expert, Brad P. Avrit.

                                        8
Avrit opined that three-eighths inch plywood has decreased weightbearing
capacity and is more susceptible to structural compromise due to age,
exposure to the elements, and other factors compared to thicker five-eighths
inch or half inch plywood. He averred that because the warehouse building’s
original three-eighths inch plywood panels “were essentially over 50 years
old,” they were “subject to aging and deterioration factors that would
typically compromise such an old structural component.” He opined that he
inspected the plywood panel that collapsed under Reyes and found that
“either due to the old age of the plywood and/or inherent conditions, the
subject plywood panel was delaminated, dried out, and/or otherwise defective,
which is visible and/or identified in [his] inspection photographs.” He further
averred that Honeycutt’s scraping and removal of layers of cap sheet further
eroded the plywood panel’s structural integrity and stability.
      Avrit concluded that CalCom, Bryan Industrial, and Hoyt knew “there
was a high likelihood of rotted and/or degraded wood panels on the roof.” As
support for this opinion, he noted the roof’s 50-year-old age and observed that
CalCom’s June 3, 2019 contract included line items for replacement of “rotted
plywood,” and that the property had experienced previous water leaks in the

southwest and northwest corners repaired by CalCom.2
      Avrit further concluded that CalCom, Bryan Industrial, and Hoyt knew
or should have known of the roof’s “defective condition” and the dangerous
roofing operation at the time of Reyes’ accident. As to CalCom, Avrit
observed that CalCom had knowledge of prior leaks and repairs over the

2      As additional support for his opinion, Avrit stated that Zeigler had
testified the plywood was either installed damaged or was damaged by water
intrusion. However, as the parties acknowledged in letters they submitted
after oral argument, this purported deposition testimony is not in the record
before us. Therefore, we need not and cannot consider it.
                                       9
previous decade, and as to all three defendants, they had the “knowledge,
experience and roofing expertise to best assess the roof conditions.”
      Bryan Industrial/Hoyt and CalCom objected to Avrit’s declarations filed
in opposition to their respective motions. The court overruled all objections to
Avrit’s declarations and granted Bryan Industrial/Hoyt’s and CalCom’s
motions for summary judgment. In both of its orders on the motions for
summary judgment, the trial court found Privette barred liability and that no
exceptions to Privette applied. The court then entered judgments in favor of
Bryan Industrial/Hoyt and CalCom, and the Parents appealed.
                                       II.
                                       A.
      Under California’s Privette doctrine, an employee of an independent
contractor is generally barred from recovering damages from the hirer of that
contractor for an on-the-job injury. (SeaBright, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 594.)
The doctrine is based on the rationale that California’s “workers’
compensation scheme ‘is the exclusive remedy against an employer for injury
or death of an employee.’ ” (Privette, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 697.) It follows
that “ ‘an independent contractor’s employee should not be allowed to recover
damages from the contractor’s hirer, who is “indirectly paying for the cost of
[workers’ compensation] coverage, which the [hired] contractor presumably
has calculated into the contract price.” ’ ” (Alvarez v. Seaside Transportation
Services LLC (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 635, 640 (Alvarez).) In other words, an
independent contractor’s employee injured on the job is generally entitled to
no greater damages than a similarly situated employee of the hirer—both are
limited to workers’ compensation benefits.
      Over time, our Supreme Court has “recast [the] primary rationale for
the Privette doctrine in terms of delegation rather than workers’

                                       10
compensation.” (Sandoval v. Qualcomm Incorporated (2021) 12 Cal.5th 256,
270 (Sandoval).) Because contractors typically are expected to perform the
contracted work more safely than hirers, the Supreme Court has “endorsed a
‘strong policy’ of presuming that a hirer delegates all control over the
contracted work, and with it all concomitant tort duties, by entrusting work
to a contractor.” (Ibid.) As a result, “[t]here is a strong presumption under
California law that a hirer of an independent contractor delegates to the
contractor all responsibility for workplace safety.” (Gonzalez v. Mathis (2021)
12 Cal.5th 29, 37 (Gonzalez).)
      There are two narrow exceptions to the Privette doctrine, which “apply
where delegation is either ineffective or incomplete.” (Sandoval, supra,
12 Cal.5th at p. 271.) One such exception—known as the concealed hazard
exception—applies when “a hirer intends to delegate its responsibilities to
the contractor in principle but, by withholding critical safety information,
fails to effectively delegate its responsibilities in practice.” (Ibid.) The
other—known as the retained control exception—similarly applies where the
delegation is incomplete. That exception is triggered when “the hirer retains
control over any part of the work and actually exercises that control so as to
affirmatively contribute to the worker’s injury.” (Ibid.)
                                        B.
      On appeal from a judgment entered after an order granting summary
judgment, we review the record de novo to determine whether triable issues
of material fact exist and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 860
(Aguilar).) Because the Privette doctrine affects the burden of producing
evidence, once the defendant hirer establishes the foundational facts for the
Privette doctrine to apply—that the defendant hired the plaintiff’s employer

                                        11
to perform work on the jobsite and the plaintiff was injured while working at
the site—the burden shifts to the plaintiff to raise a triable issue of material
fact. (Alvarez, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at pp. 643–644.) Thus, the plaintiff can
rebut Privette’s presumption of delegation only by presenting admissible
evidence making a prima facie showing of a triable issue of fact in support of
one or more exceptions to Privette. (Id. at pp. 644–646.) However, if the
defendant “provided sufficient evidence to trigger the Privette presumption
and [the] plaintiff d[oes] not raise a triable issue of fact,” the defendant is
entitled to summary judgment. (Id. at p. 646.)
                                        III.
                                        A.
      In their motions for summary judgment, CalCom and Bryan
Industrial/Hoyt both established with undisputed evidence that Bryan
Industrial/Hoyt hired CalCom for the reroofing project; CalCom hired Reyes’
employer, Elite Roofing, to supply, deliver, and load roofing materials onto
the roof; and Reyes fell while performing that delivery and loading work for
his employer, Elite Roofing. That was enough to establish the Privette
doctrine applied and to “shift[ ] the burden to [the Parents] to raise a triable
issue of fact” as to the applicability of an exception to Privette. (Alvarez,
supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 644.)
      Yet, for the first time on appeal, the Parents argue the Privette doctrine
does not apply. In an argument they did not raise either in briefing or during
the summary judgment hearings before the trial court, the Parents now
assert that Elite Roofing was merely a “vendor” or “materials supplier” and
not a “contractor”—which they define, without authority, as someone who
“actually d[id] work on the land, building, or project.” The Parents’ theory
goes that Privette applies only to “contractors,” and because Elite Roofing

                                        12
simply delivered and supplied roofing materials without performing any
“work” on the warehouse roof, Privette cannot apply.
      We need not consider the Parents’ new argument because it was not
raised before the trial court and thus, is forfeited. “[P]ossible theories that
were not fully developed or factually presented to the trial court cannot
create a ‘triable issue’ on appeal.” (American Continental Ins. Co. v. C & Z
Timber Co. (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1271, 1281; cf. Ryan v. Real Estate of the
Pacific, Inc. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 637, 644 [considering plaintiffs’ new
theory on appeal regarding an issue that plaintiffs had previously challenged
in the trial court because it presented a pure question of law to be applied to
undisputed facts].) “A party is not permitted to change his [or her] position
and adopt a new and different theory on appeal. To permit him [or her] to do
so would not only be unfair to the trial court, but manifestly unjust to the
opposing litigant.” (Ernst v. Searle (1933) 218 Cal. 233, 240–241.)
      Having determined that CalCom and Bryan Industrial/Hoyt carried
their burden of establishing the Privette presumption applies to bar liability,
we next consider whether the Parents have produced admissible evidence
raising a triable issue of fact as to either exception’s application.
                                        B.
      In a premises liability action, the “usual rules about landowner
liability” are “modified, after Privette, as they apply to a hirer’s duty to the
employees of independent contractors.” (Kinsman, supra, 37 Cal.4th at
p. 674.) Because the landowner delegates responsibility for employee safety
to the independent contractor, “a hirer has no duty to act to protect the
employee when the contractor fails in that task and therefore has no
liability.” (Ibid.) Under the concealed hazard exception, however, “the hirer
as landowner may be independently liable to the contractor’s employee . . . if

                                        13
(1) [the landowner] knows or reasonably should know of a concealed, pre-
existing hazardous condition on [the] premises; (2) the contractor does not
know and could not reasonably ascertain the condition; and (3) the landowner
fails to warn the contractor.” (Id. at p. 675.) The Parents contend a triable
issue of fact exists as to whether this exception applies to their claims against
Bryan Industrial/Hoyt and CalCom. We disagree.
                                       1.
      As to their premises liability claim against Bryan Industrial/Hoyt, the
Parents argue a reasonable jury could find each element of the exception:
(1) Bryan Industrial/Hoyt knew, or should have known, of a concealed
preexisting hazardous condition on the roof; (2) Elite Roofing did not know
and could not reasonably have discovered the hazardous condition; and
(3) Bryan Industrial/Hoyt failed to warn Elite Roofing about the hazardous
condition. (Kinsman, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 675.) Pointing to their expert’s
declaration, the Parents contend a preexisting concealed hazard existed
because the plywood roof deck had not been replaced in 50 years, it was built
using the thinnest plywood permitted at the time of its construction so that
its “weight bearing potential declines” compared to thicker plywood, and the
plywood was more susceptible to structural compromise because of its age
and weather exposure.
      Even accepting that the roof plywood was weak and constituted a
“concealed hazardous condition,” however, the Parents fail to identify
substantial evidence that Bryan Industrial/Hoyt knew or should have known
of it. The Parents contend Bryan Industrial/Hoyt clearly knew of the
plywood’s condition because they included a line item in their reroofing
contract with CalCom requiring CalCom to “replace rotted plywood as
necessary.” We do not agree that this single line item, without more, creates

                                       14
a triable issue of fact. The contract also required CalCom to install the
DensDeck roof board over the existing plywood, rather than removing and
replacing the plywood first. Thus, we cannot reasonably infer that Bryan
Industrial/Hoyt, knowing the roof’s plywood was in such a hazardous and
rotten condition, would pay a company to install roof board over that plywood
without replacing it first. It is also undisputed that CalCom was not
informed the plywood was in poor condition or that there were any concerns
about its safety. Accordingly, we cannot conclude this single contract term is
evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer that Bryan Industrial/Hoyt
actually knew the plywood was hazardous. (See Roddenberry v. Roddenberry
(1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 634, 651 (Roddenberry) [“Inferences may constitute
substantial evidence, but they must be the product of logic and reason.
Speculation or conjecture alone is not substantial evidence.”]; LaChapelle v.
Toyota Motor Credit Corp. (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 977, 981 [A party “cannot
avoid summary judgment by asserting facts based on mere speculation and
conjecture, but instead must produce admissible evidence raising a triable
issue of fact.”].)
       Likewise, there is no evidence from which a reasonable jury could find
that Bryan Industrial/Hoyt reasonably should have known of the plywood’s
concealed hazardous condition. Before Reyes’ fall, there were several visual
inspections of the roof, all of which indicated that the roof’s condition
appeared safe. One of those inspections took place during a May 31, 2019
walkthrough, before Honeycutt began tearing off the roof’s cap sheet. During
that pre-job walkthrough, representatives from CalCom, Bryan Industrial,
and AccuTemp walked “all over the roof,” and both Bryan Industrial’s and

                                        15
CalCom’s representatives testified they did not discover or observe anything
concerning about the roof’s condition.
      A second inspection took place about a week later, on the morning of
Reyes’ fall. The undisputed evidence shows that before loading materials
onto the roof, Elite Roofing employees visually inspected the roof from both
the inside and outside of the warehouse and determined that the roof
appeared safe. Elite Roofing employees also testified that they never
observed anything on the roof deck—even where the cap sheet had been
removed by Honeycutt—that appeared unsafe. Finally, the undisputed
evidence also shows that Salcedo of Bryan Industrial walked on the plywood
deck after the cap sheet’s removal in the general area where Reyes later fell
and did not observe a hole or notice anything out of the ordinary.
      The Parents attempt to challenge some of this evidence by
characterizing Elite Roofing as an unsophisticated delivery company that
lacked sufficient roofing knowledge or expertise to evaluate a roof’s safety.
The undisputed evidence, however, shows that Elite Roofing regularly loaded
materials onto roofs using specialized equipment like forklifts and that its
normal procedure before doing so included inspecting the roof at a jobsite,
both from the interior and exterior of the building. Elite Roofing employees
also testified to having received training from Elite Roofing about inspecting
roofs and safety.
      The Parents further contend the inspection-related evidence
“establishes nothing conclusively.” But that is not Bryan Industrial/Hoyt’s
burden. Rather, it is the Parents’ burden to proffer admissible evidence
showing a triable issue of fact as to whether Bryan Industrial/Hoyt knew or
should have known of the plywood’s hazardous condition. Although we
construe all reasonable inferences in the Parents’ favor, we cannot reasonably

                                         16
infer from this evidence that, as the Parents contend, the inspections were
somehow “unreasonable.” (Annod Corp. v. Hamilton & Samuels (2002)
100 Cal.App.4th 1286, 1298–1299.)
      The Parents additionally complain that this inspection evidence does
not conclusively establish “there were no weaknesses in the roof.” As
discussed above, we assume for purposes of our analysis that the plywood
roof was weak and posed a hazardous condition.
      The Parents next emphasize Zeigler’s significant roofing experience
and expertise. In their separate statement, the Parents relied on their
expert’s opinion that someone with Zeigler’s experience should have known
“there was a high likelihood of rotted and/or degraded wood panels on the
roof” because of the age of the roof and previously repaired water leaks. But
expert opinion that someone should have known of a “high likelihood” of a
hazardous condition existing is not evidence from which a jury could
reasonably find that person knew or reasonably should have known of an
existing concealed hazardous condition. (See also Roddenberry, supra,
44 Cal.App.4th at p. 651 [“Opinion testimony which is conjectural or
speculative ‘cannot rise to the dignity of substantial evidence.’ ”].) Moreover,
the expert’s opinion that, simply by virtue of his credentials, Zeigler knew or
should have known of the plywood’s hazardous condition is not substantial
evidence raising a triable issue of fact, particularly where (1) the undisputed
evidence shows that the plywood’s condition was not visible when covered by
the cap sheet at the time Zeigler inspected the roof and (2) Zeigler expressly
testified that he was unaware of the plywood’s hazardous condition.
      Throughout their briefing on appeal, the Parents additionally insinuate
that Bryan Industrial/Hoyt should have known of the plywood’s condition
because water leaks and/or the three-eighths inch thickness of the plywood

                                       17
may have contributed to its unsafe state. Those arguments, too, are
unpersuasive. First, the Parents offer no evidence that any of the previously
repaired water leaks occurred in the vicinity of Reyes’ fall. Meanwhile,
Bryan Industrial/Hoyt produced undisputed evidence that no leaks had been
previously observed in the roof’s central area where Reyes fell. Second, it is
undisputed that the plywood’s three-eighths inch thickness was code-
compliant at the time the roof was built, and the Parents identify no evidence
indicating, for example, that other parts of the plywood roof had to be
replaced with thicker plywood during the reroofing project. In other words,
the Parents’ expert’s opinion that thinner three-eighths inch plywood is
generally more likely to weaken over time than thicker plywood does not
create a triable issue that Bryan Industrial/Hoyt reasonably should have
known this roof’s three-eighths inch plywood was, in fact, dangerously weak
and unsafe.
      Moreover, the Parents do not identify any admissible evidence
supporting the second element of this Privette exception—that Elite Roofing
could not reasonably have discovered the plywood roof deck’s hazardous
condition. Because Elite Roofing was hired to deliver materials to the roof,
the area of the roof without cap sheet that Elite Roofing selected for
placement of those materials was necessarily part of the worksite and within
its duty to inspect. (See Acosta v. MAS Realty (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th, 634,
662 [“[A]lthough Acosta’s employer, Horizon, was not hired to inspect or
repair the roof hatch, the electrical work for which it was hired required roof
access. Because Horizon, through Acosta, chose to access the roof through
the roof hatch by means of the fixed ladder, the roof hatch and ladder
necessarily were part of the worksite and were within Horizon’s duty to
inspect.”].) Thus, to the extent the roof’s unsafe condition was ascertainable

                                       18
as the Parents contend, Elite Roofing was in the best position to discover the
hazard because its employees were the individuals who inspected the roof
deck after Honeycutt began tearing off the cap sheet.
      Accordingly, because the Parents identify no evidence sufficient to
create a triable fact on either the issue of whether Bryan Industrial/Hoyt
knew or reasonably should have known that the roof’s plywood constituted a
concealed hazard for Elite Roofing workers, or that Elite Roofing could not
have reasonably ascertained the plywood’s hazardous condition, we agree
with the trial court that this exception does not apply.
                                        2.
      The Parents’ argument that a triable issue of fact exists as to the
concealed hazard exception’s application to CalCom fails for a different
reason. Because CalCom did not own the property where Reyes fell, CalCom
was not a “landowner-hirer.” And as CalCom contends, the concealed hazard
exception to the Privette doctrine applies only to landowner-hirers and thus,
cannot apply to CalCom. (Sandoval, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 282.)
      We are unpersuaded by the Parents’ reliance on Michael v. Denbeste
Transportation, Inc. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 1082, 1097 (Michael) for the
proposition that “[u]nder the Privette doctrine, there is no legal distinction
between a general contractor and landowner who hires independent
contractors; both are ‘hirers’ within the meaning of the doctrine.” The
appellate court’s statement in Michael does not undermine our Supreme
Court’s later observation in Sandoval that the concealed hazard exception to
the Privette doctrine “applie[s] only to landowner-hirers.” (Sandoval, supra,
12 Cal.5th at p. 282.) Regardless, even if we were to assume that CalCom
was subject to the exception, we would still conclude that no triable fact

                                       19
existed as to its application to CalCom for many of the same reasons we
found it did not apply to Bryan Industrial/Hoyt.
                                       C.
      The Parents next contend that triable issues of fact exist as to whether
Bryan Industrial/Hoyt and CalCom owed Reyes a duty under the retained
control exception to the Privette doctrine. (See Hooker, supra, 27 Cal.4th at
p. 202.) That exception applies where the hirer “retained control” over the
contracted work and “negligently exercise[d] that retained control in a
manner that affirmatively contribute[d] to the [worker’s] injury.” (Gonzalez,
supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 38.) We conclude the Parents fail to show a triable
issue of fact on any element of this exception.
                                        1.
      First, there is no evidence that Bryan Industrial/Hoyt or CalCom
retained or exercised control over the reroof project or Reyes’ work on it. “[A]
hirer’s authority over the contracted work amounts to retained control only if
the hirer’s exercise of that authority would sufficiently limit the contractor’s
freedom to perform the contracted work in the contractor’s own manner.”
(Sandoval, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 275.) Here, there is no evidence that
Bryan Industrial/Hoyt “sufficiently limit[ed]” CalCom’s freedom to execute
the reroofing project in its own manner, or that Bryan Industrial/Hoyt in any
way managed or directed the contractors that CalCom hired for the job.
Likewise, there is no evidence that CalCom retained or exercised control over
the work of Elite Roofing or Honeycutt. Specifically, there is no evidence that
CalCom provided instruction to Elite Roofing about how to deliver the roofing
materials, load the roofing materials onto the roof, or perform any other work
necessary to the job. There is also no evidence that CalCom instructed
Honeycutt on how to tear off the cap sheet roof it was hired to remove.

                                       20
Finally, it is undisputed that CalCom did not offer or promise Elite Roofing or
Honeycutt that it would provide any safety measures related to their work.
      The Parents’ contentions to the contrary are unpersuasive. They posit
that Bryan Industrial/Hoyt retained control by hiring CalCom to perform the
reroofing project, by requiring CalCom to remove the two layers of cap sheet,
and by selecting the roof system to be installed. To accept this argument,
however, would mean broadening the retained control exception to include a
hirer’s act of defining a particular project for the contractor hired to complete
it. Similarly, the Parents allege that CalCom retained control by hiring
Honeycutt to remove the cap sheet and by scheduling, or “sequencing,” the
contractors it hired for the reroof job. Again, the Parents’ position requires
stretching the retained control exception to impose liability on a contractor
for carrying out its contracted work and for hiring other independent
contractors to perform aspects of that work. We disagree that this
conduct—typical of how contractors function in relation to one
another—amounts to retaining control, much less that it qualifies as
affirmative conduct. The Parents offer no authorities supporting such broad
readings of this exception.
      The Parents next theorize that Bryan Industrial retained control by
organizing the May 31, 2019 pre-job walkthrough to schedule the roof project
and to provide “instructions” to CalCom and Bryan Industrial’s maintenance
supervisor, Salcedo. The evidence, however, shows that the purpose of the
walkthrough was to give the contractors an overview of the property and
proposed project, the roof’s condition, and the access points—not to control
the way that CalCom conducted the reroof work, as the Parents suggest.
Although the Parents point to Salcedo’s presence at the walkthrough as
evidence that Bryan Industrial retained control, Salcedo—Bryan Industrial’s

                                       21
maintenance supervisor—testified that he attended the walkthrough merely
to learn “what was going to happen” during the reroof project and to complete
his limited role of removing fixtures from the roof and marking out where the
skylights would be in preparation for the reroof work. In contrast to the
Parents’ characterization of Salcedo as “boots on the ground” for Bryan
Industrial, there is no evidence that Salcedo was tasked with supervising
CalCom’s or the other contractors’ work. Tellingly, the Parents again do not
identify any authority supporting such broad interpretations of retained
control.
      As another theory supporting retained control, the Parents contend
that because Elite Roofing was not invited to attend the May 31, 2019
walkthrough, we should infer “there was no expectation . . . [Elite Roofing]
would have any rol[e] or responsibility for actual work on the roof.” The
undisputed evidence, however, shows that CalCom did not hire Elite Roofing
until June 4, 2019, after the May 31, 2019 walkthrough. Thus, the Parents’
proposed inference is not supported by the evidence. Moreover, that
inference is further undermined by the testimony of Elite Roofing employees
regarding their understanding of their role on the project and their roofing
experience and training.
      Next, the Parents allege that CalCom’s installation of a fall protection
system after Reyes’ accident is evidence of CalCom’s control over the jobsite.
First, such evidence is inadmissible to prove negligence as a matter of law.
(See Evid. Code, § 1151 [“When, after the occurrence of an event, remedial or
precautionary measures are taken, which, if taken previously, would have
tended to make the event less likely to occur, evidence of such subsequent
measures is inadmissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct in
connection with the event” (emphasis added)].) The Parents’ reliance on a

                                      22
distinguishable case that preceded the Supreme Court’s creation of the
Privette doctrine is unpersuasive and does not require a contrary conclusion.
(See Morehouse v. Taubman Co. (1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 548, 555 [in pre-Privette
case, post-accident evidence admissible to show defendant’s “control of the
premises, and as to whose duty it was under the contract to take such safety
measures”].) Second, and even if it were admissible, we conclude that
evidence of CalCom’s actions taken in the months after Reyes’ accident are
not evidence that, before Reyes’ accident, CalCom controlled the jobsite.
Relatedly, and in contrast to the Parents’ arguments, we also see no basis for
concluding that CalCom’s actions are evidence that Bryan Industrial or Hoyt
controlled the jobsite.
      We are similarly unpersuaded by the Parents’ attempt to show Bryan
Industrial/Hoyt’s control by arguing that Zeigler of Bryan Industrial
controlled the work of a structural engineer, who CalCom hired after Reyes’
accident to develop a fall protection system for the roof. First, CalCom’s
hiring of the engineer after Reyes’ accident is again an inadmissible
subsequent remedial measure. (See Evid. Code, § 1511.) And although the
Parents contend that Zeigler’s communications with the engineer are
evidence that Bryan Industrial/Hoyt controlled the engineer’s work, a review
of this evidence shows the opposite. In fact, Zeigler was uninvolved in
CalCom’s hiring of the engineer, and Zeigler met the engineer at the jobsite
only to give him access to the warehouse’s interior because CalCom did not
have a key. There is no evidence that Zeigler directed or managed CalCom’s
engineer’s work in any capacity.
                                       2.
      Even assuming there was a triable issue of fact that Bryan
Industrial/Hoyt controlled the reroof job, the Parents still fail to demonstrate

                                       23
a triable issue that Bryan Industrial/Hoyt or CalCom negligently used their
purported control in a way that “affirmatively contributed” to Reyes’ fall. The
Parents identify no affirmative conduct by either Bryan Industrial/Hoyt or
CalCom that related to Reyes’ fall from the roof. Indeed, neither Bryan
Industrial/Hoyt nor CalCom supervised Elite Roofing or any of its employees
during their work on the roof. And they did not direct Elite Roofing on how to
load the materials onto the roof or where on the roof to load them. In fact,
besides Bryan Industrial’s maintenance supervisor (Salcedo), no one from
Bryan Industrial/Hoyt or CalCom was present at the jobsite when Reyes fell.
There is also no evidence that Salcedo retained or exercised control over the
work of Honeycutt, Elite Roofing, or CalCom on the day of Reyes’ accident or
at any other time.
      The Parents argue that Bryan Industrial/Hoyt’s and CalCom’s
decisions not to install a fall protection system on the roof before Reyes’ fall
constitutes sufficient affirmative conduct because they “induced the
workers . . . to rely on the apparent strength of the roof.” We disagree.
California courts have consistently held that a hirer’s passive failure to
provide safety equipment is not enough to establish the hirer’s affirmative
contribution to injuries sustained by a contractor’s employee, unless there is
evidence the hirer or contractor agreed to implement those measures. (See
e.g., Seabright, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 594 [hirer’s failure to install OSHA-
required safety guards did not create liability]; Delgadillo v. Television
Center, Inc. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 1078, 1093 (Delgadillo) [hirer did not
affirmatively contribute to death of contractor’s employee by failing to
provide anchor points for window washer’s cables].) Here, there is none.
      The Parents’ evidence does not require a different conclusion. For
example, the Parents again point to Bryan Industrial/Hoyt’s and CalCom’s

                                        24
contract, which includes Bryan Industrial/Hoyt’s brief list of tasks required
by the project, including, “Provide all necessary equipment to complete the
project.” Without more, we are not persuaded that this single line item about
“all necessary equipment” creates a triable issue that CalCom agreed to
provide all safety measures for the project, including a fall protection system.
      Moreover, for induced reliance to constitute affirmative conduct under
the retained control exception, there must be actual direction by the hirer
upon which the worker relied. (Gonzalez, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 47.) In
other words, “[t]o be liable, a hirer must instead exercise its retained control
over any part of the contracted-for work—such as by directing the manner or
methods in which the contractor performs the work; interfering with the
contractor’s decisions regarding the appropriate safety measures to adopt;
requesting the contractor to use the hirer’s own defective equipment in
performing the work; contractually prohibiting the contractor from
implementing a necessary safety precaution; or reneging on a promise to
remedy a known hazard in a manner that affirmatively contributes to the
injury.” (Id. at pp. 46–47.) Yet, the Parents identify no evidence that Bryan
Industrial/Hoyt or CalCom promised to implement any safety measures,
prevented Elite Roofing from taking safety measures it deemed necessary, or
prevented Elite Roofing from stopping its work had Elite Roofing felt there
was a safety concern. For that reason, there can be no induced reliance
amounting to affirmative conduct.
      Madden v. Summit View, Inc. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1267 (Madden)
came to the same conclusion about a similar argument, finding that the
general contractor-hirer was not liable for injuries suffered by an
independent contractor’s employee, who fell from a raised patio during
construction of a residential home. (Id. at pp. 1271, 1276–1278.) The injured

                                       25
worker claimed the general contractor-hirer was negligent for failing to
install a protective railing along the open side of the raised patio. (Id. at
pp. 1270–1271.) The court held this was insufficient to amount to affirmative
contribution, explaining that, although the worker alleged its contractor-
employer had no authority to install a protective railing, there was also no
evidence that the general contractor-hirer “participated in any discussion
about placing a safety railing along the patio, became aware of any safety
concern due to the lack of such a railing, or intervened in any way to prevent
such a railing from being erected.” (Id. at p. 1277.) Put another way, there
was no evidence that the general contractor-hirer “directed that no
guardrailing or other protection against falls be placed along the raised patio,
or that it acted in any way to prevent such a railing from being installed.”
(Id. at pp. 1276–1277.) Similarly, here, there is no evidence that either
Bryan Industrial/Hoyt or CalCom directed that no safety measures or fall
protection system be implemented, or that it acted in any way to prevent
such measures from being implemented.
      The Parents complain it would have been expensive and inefficient for
Elite Roofing to install a fall protection system on the warehouse’s roof. The
California Supreme Court has squarely addressed the issue and concluded
that this risk is nonetheless delegated to the contractor, explaining: “We
acknowledge that there will sometimes be financial and other real world
factors that might make it difficult for an independent contractor to raise
safety concerns with the hirer or to simply walk away from a job it has
deemed to be unsafe. But independent contractors can typically factor the
cost of added safety precautions or any increased safety risks into the
contract price.” (Gonzalez, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 51.) The same logic applies
here. The testimony of Elite Roofing employees about their decision not to

                                        26
wear fall protection harnesses indicates they understood their role to include
making their own safety decisions and that they did not believe the roof was
unsafe. Although we acknowledge the expense and difficulty of installing a
fall protection system or implementing other safety measures on the roof,
Elite Roofing is still presumed under the law to have “factor[ed] the cost of
added safety precautions or any increased safety risks into the contract
price.” (Ibid.) Accordingly, we disagree with the Parents that this forms a
basis for imposing a duty on Bryan Industrial/Hoyt or CalCom.
      The Parents further contend that various state and federal regulations
required Bryan Industrial/Hoyt and CalCom to implement certain safety
measures at the jobsite, which they failed to do. Under Privette, however,
Bryan Industrial/Hoyt delegated to CalCom, and CalCom delegated to Elite
Roofing, any tort law duty they owed to provide a safe workplace for Elite
Roofing’s employees. Our conclusion is consistent with caselaw addressing
this argument. For example, in SeaBright, supra, 52 Cal.4th 590, the
California Supreme Court addressed whether a hirer could be liable where an
employee of an independent contractor hired to maintain and repair a
luggage conveyor belt was injured because the conveyor belt lacked the safety
guards required by Cal-OSHA regulations. (Id. at pp. 594–595.) In finding
the retained control exception did not apply, the Supreme Court explained
that although the hirer’s regulatory duty to install the safety guards
preexisted the contract, the hirer delegated to the independent contractor
“any tort law duty it owe[d] to the contractor’s employees to ensure the safety
of the specific workplace that is the subject of the contract.” (Id. at p. 594; see
also id. at pp. 601, 603.)
      Other Court of Appeal decisions have likewise found no hirer liability
in circumstances like those presented here. In Delgadillo, supra,

                                        27
20 Cal.App.5th 1078, an employee of an independent contractor fell to his
death when his descent apparatus detached from the roof while he was
washing a commercial warehouse’s windows. (Id. at p. 1081.) The plaintiffs
submitted evidence that (1) the warehouse’s owners had a statutory and
regulatory duty to provide approved anchor points on the roof to support
window washers; (2) the warehouse contained no such anchor points; and
(3) without the anchor points, there was no safe way to clean the
windows. (Id. at pp. 1083–1084.) The appellate court nevertheless
determined the owners owed no duty because, under SeaBright, they
delegated to the contractor the duty to comply with all statutory and
regulatory requirements necessary to provide a safe workplace. (Id. at
p. 1091.) The court also found that the owners did not exercise retained
control over the contractor’s work in a manner that affirmatively contributed
to the injury because, although the warehouse had inadequate anchor points,
the owners did not “suggest or request” that the contractor use them in
cleaning the windows. (Id. at p. 1093.)
      Like SeaBright, Delgadillo illustrates that even where an unsafe
condition exists at a jobsite due to the hirer’s failure to comply with specific
statutory and regulatory duties, the hirer is not liable because it is the hired
contractor who is responsible for its own workers’ safety. The same logic
applies here. Regardless of whether Bryan Industrial/Hoyt and CalCom
failed to comply with their regulatory safety duties, they are not liable
because it was Elite Roofing who was responsible for the safety of its own
workers, including Reyes.
      For these reasons, we conclude that no triable issue of fact existed as to
the application of either exception to Privette, and thus, summary judgment
was properly granted in favor of Bryan Industrial/Hoyt and CalCom.

                                        28
                                     IV.
      The judgments granting summary judgment are affirmed.
Respondents are entitled to recover their costs on appeal.

                                                             CASTILLO, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

KELETY, J.

                                      29