Court Opinion

ID: 9892940
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-25 16:10:03.758088+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:00:46.080186
License: Public Domain

J-S27020-23

                                   2023 PA Super 215

  KRISTIN ALLYN WEATHERHOLTZ                   :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  DYLAN JACOB MCKELVEY                         :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 190 MDA 2023

              Appeal from the Order Entered January 17, 2023
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County Civil Division at No(s):
                               2018-40012

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

OPINION BY BOWES, J.:                                FILED: OCTOBER 25, 2023

       Dylan Jacob McKelvey appeals from the final protection order entered

on the petition filed by Kristin Allyn Weatherholtz (“Appellee”) pursuant to the

Protection of Victims of Sexual Violence or Intimidation Act (“PVSVIA”), 42

Pa.C.S. §§ 62A01-62A20. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the order

and dismiss the petition with prejudice.

       We glean from the record that in 2009 or 2010, when Appellee was

fourteen years old, she was the victim of unspecified sexual offenses

committed by Appellant. He entered a guilty plea and, as part of his sentence,

was required to have no contact with Appellee.1 In January 2018, Appellant

____________________________________________

1 The certified record does not reveal the underlying offenses, their grading,

or the particulars of Appellant’s criminal sentence. The trial court indicates in
its opinion that Appellant was convicted of sexual abuse of children pursuant
to 18 Pa.C.S. § 6312(b), but the criminal charges and judgment of sentence
do not appear within the certified record.
J-S27020-23

attempted by numerous means to contact Appellee.            She filed a PVSVIA

petition and the court entered a three-year protective order.

       Appellee took no steps to seek an extension of the order, and therefore

it expired by its terms on January 18, 2021. Thereafter, on June 6, 2022,

Appellee encountered Appellant at a flea market. Appellant approached within

twenty feet of her, made eye contact, smiled, waved, and then fled after a

few seconds. Based upon this interaction, Appellee experienced a new onset

of anxiety and fear, prompting her to file the petition sub judice. The court

held an evidentiary hearing, during which Appellant admitted that he was at

the flea market but denied seeing Appellee and maintained that it had been

years since he had any contact with her. Additionally, he argued that the trial

court was barred from entering a protective order because the statute of

limitations had expired. Following the hearing, the court entered a new three-

year protective order.2

       This timely filed notice of appeal followed. Both Appellant and the trial

court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. On appeal, Appellant raises the following

issues for our consideration:

       A. Did the lower court err by denying [Appellant’s] motion to
          dismiss that cited the six-year statute of limitations applicable
          to the [PVSVIA]?

       B. Did the lower court err by holding that the statute of limitations
          for the PVSVIA does not begin to run from the date of the act
____________________________________________

2 Appellant filed a post-trial motion for relief, which the trial court properly
dismissed pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1957(b) (“No motion for post-trial relief may
be filed to the final order” in an PVSVIA action.).

                                           -2-
J-S27020-23

         of sexual violence or intimidation committed by the
         [Appellant], but rather from the date of the act or
         circumstances that demonstrates a continued risk of harm to
         the victim?

      C. Did the lower court err by holding that the Plaintiff’s right to
         relief under the PVSVIA arose when [Appellant] committed an
         act of harassment and/or intimidation on or about June 6,
         2022, despite the fact that the underlying act of sexual violence
         or intimidation occurred more than six years prior to the filing
         of the petition?

      D. Did the lower court err in granting [Appellee’s] request for a
         protective order under the PVSVIA despite [Appellee’s] failure
         to provide evidence that she was a victim of sexual violence or
         intimidation of the type specifically enumerated in the
         definitions of those terms in 42 Pa.C.S. § 62A03?

      E. Did the lower court err by finding that [Appellant’s] alleged
         action of smiling at [Appellee] and waving constituted an act of
         harassment and/or intimidation that was sufficient to trigger a
         right to relief under the PVSVIA?

      F. Did the lower court improperly grant an extension of the prior
         protective order that expired over a year and a half prior to the
         petition for relief?

Appellant’s brief at 6-8 (cleaned up).

      At the outset, we observe that the PVSVIA provides for the “protection

of victims of sexual violence or intimidation regardless of a preexisting

relationship.”   E.A.M. v. A.M.D. III, 173 A.3d 313, 316 (Pa.Super. 2017)

(cleaned up).    On appellate review, “we employ the identical standard of

review that we use to review the propriety of an order entered pursuant to

the Act’s seasoned counterpart addressing the protection of victims of physical

or sexual abuse by family members, i.e., the Protection From Abuse Act

(‘PFA’)[.]” Id. (cleaned up).

                                     -3-
J-S27020-23

      Applying that standard, “we must determine whether the evidence, in

the light most favorable to petitioner and granting [her] the benefit of all

reasonable inferences, was sufficient to sustain the trial court’s determination

. . . by the preponderance of the evidence.” S.W. v. S.F., 196 A.3d 224, 228

(Pa.Super. 2018) (citation omitted). Assessing the “[c]redibility of witnesses

and the weight accorded their testimony is within the exclusive province of

the [trial court] as fact finder.” Mescanti v. Mescanti, 956 A.2d 1017, 1020

(Pa.Super. 2008) (citation omitted).

      Appellant’s first three issues assail the trial court’s rejection of his

statute of limitations claim. When this Court is tasked with determining “the

application of the statute of limitations[,]” we are presented with “a question

of law” for which our standard of review is de novo. K.A.R. v. T.G.L., 107

A.3d 770, 775 (Pa.Super. 2014). Our Supreme Court has held that petitions

seeking a protective order under the PVSVIA are subject to the six-year catch-

all statute of limitations pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 5527(b). See K.N.B. v.

M.D., 259 A.3d 341, 344 (Pa. 2021). “Statutes of limitation begin to run when

a claim accrues.” Kornfeind v. New Werner Holding Co., 280 A.3d 918,

928 (Pa. 2022) (cleaned up). “Normally, a cause of action accrues when an

injury is inflicted. Thus, the clock begins to run as soon as the right to institute

and maintain a suit arises. . . . If the plaintiff fails to file before the clock

expires, the statute of limitations bars the suit.” Rice v. Diocese of Altoona-

Johnstown, 255 A.3d 237, 246–47 (Pa. 2021) (cleaned up).

                                       -4-
J-S27020-23

      The PVSVIA provides victims of sexual violence and intimidation “with a

civil remedy requiring the offender to stay away from the victim, as well as

other appropriate relief.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 62A02. Individuals seeking relief under

the PVSVIA must “fil[e] a petition with the court alleging the need for

protection from the defendant with respect to sexual violence or intimidation.”

42 Pa.C.S. § 62A05(a). Thereafter, a hearing shall be conducted as follows:

      (a) General rule.--Within ten business days of the filing of a
      petition under this chapter, a hearing shall be held before the
      court where the plaintiff must:

            (1) assert that the plaintiff or another individual, as
            appropriate, is a victim of sexual violence or intimidation
            committed by the defendant; and

            (2) prove by preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff
            or another individual, as appropriate, is at a continued risk
            of harm from the defendant.

      (a.1) Right to counsel.--The court shall, at the time the
      defendant is given notice of the hearing, advise the defendant of
      the right to be represented by counsel. The notice shall be printed
      and delivered in a manner that easily attracts attention to its
      contents.

      (b) Temporary orders.--If a plaintiff seeks a temporary order
      for protection from an immediate and present danger, the court
      shall conduct an ex parte proceeding. The court may enter a
      temporary order as it deems necessary to protect the plaintiff or
      another individual, as appropriate, when it finds the plaintiff or
      another individual is in immediate and present danger from the
      defendant. The temporary order shall remain in effect until
      modified or terminated by the court after notice and hearing.

      (c) Continued hearings.--If a hearing under subsection (a) is
      continued and no temporary order is issued, the court may make
      ex parte temporary orders under subsection (b), as it deems
      necessary.

                                     -5-
J-S27020-23

42 Pa.C.S. § 62A06.

      As it pertains to the first prong that a petitioner must assert at a hearing,

the statute defines intimidation, sexual violence, and victim thusly:

      “Intimidation.” Conduct constituting a crime under either of the
      following provisions between persons who are not family or
      household members:

            18 Pa.C.S. § 2709(a)(4), (5), (6) or (7) (relating to
            harassment) where the conduct is committed by a person
            18 years of age or older against a person under 18 years of
            age.

            18 Pa.C.S. § 2709.1 (relating to stalking) where the conduct
            is committed by a person 18 years of age or older against a
            person under 18 years of age.

            ....

      “Sexual violence.” Conduct constituting a crime under any of
      the following provisions between persons who are not family or
      household members:

            18 Pa.C.S. Ch. 31 (relating to sexual offenses), except 18
            Pa.C.S. §§ 3129 (relating to sexual intercourse with animal)
            and 3130 (relating to conduct relating to sex offenders).

            18 Pa.C.S. § 4304 (relating to endangering welfare of
            children) if the offense involved sexual contact with the
            victim.

            18 Pa.C.S. § 6301(a)(1)(ii) (relating to corruption of
            minors).

            18 Pa.C.S. § 6312(b) (relating to sexual abuse of children).

            18 Pa.C.S. § 6318 (relating to unlawful contact with minor).

            18 Pa.C.S. § 6320 (relating to sexual exploitation of
            children).

            ....

                                      -6-
J-S27020-23

      “Victim.” A person who is the victim of sexual violence or
      intimidation.

42 Pa.C.S. § 62A03.

      Finally, the statute outlines the following permissible avenues for relief

should a petitioner prevail at the hearing:

      (a) Order or consent agreement.--The court may issue an
      order or approve a consent agreement to protect the plaintiff or
      another individual, as appropriate, from the defendant.

      (b) General rule.--An order or a consent agreement may
      include:

            (1) Prohibiting the defendant from having any contact with
            the victim, including, but not limited to, restraining the
            defendant from entering the victim’s residence, place of
            employment, business or school.           This may include
            prohibiting indirect contact through third parties and also
            prohibiting direct or indirect contact with other designated
            persons.

            (2) Granting any other appropriate relief sought by the
            plaintiff.

      (c) Duration and amendment of order or agreement.--A
      protection order or an approved consent agreement shall be for a
      fixed period of time not to exceed 36 months. The court may
      amend its order or agreement at any time upon subsequent
      petition filed by either party.

      (d) Extension of protection orders.—

            (1) An extension of an order may be granted:

                  (i) Where the court, after a duly filed petition, notice
                  to the defendant and a hearing, in accordance with
                  the procedures set forth in sections 62A05 (relating to
                  commencement of proceedings) and 62A06 (relating
                  to hearings), finds that the extension is necessary
                  because the defendant engaged in one or more acts
                  or finds some other circumstances that, in the

                                     -7-
J-S27020-23

                 discretion of the court, demonstrate a continued risk
                 of harm to the victim.

                 (ii) When a contempt petition or charge has been filed
                 with the court or, in a county of the first class, a
                 hearing officer, but the hearing has not occurred
                 before the expiration of the protection order, the order
                 shall be extended, at a minimum, until the disposition
                 of the contempt petition.

           (2) Service of an extended order shall be made in
           accordance with section 62A05(d).

           (3) There shall be no limitation on the number of extensions
           that may be granted.

     (e) Notice.--Notice shall be given to the defendant stating that
     violations of the order will subject the defendant to arrest under
     section 62A12 (relating to arrest for violation of order) or
     contempt of court under section 62A14 (relating to contempt for
     violation of order).

     (f) Incarceration.--When the defendant is or was incarcerated
     and will be released from custody in the next 90 days or has been
     released from custody within the past 90 days, a plaintiff does not
     need to show that the defendant engaged in one or more acts that
     indicate a continued risk of harm to the victim in order to obtain
     an extension or a subsequent protection order under this chapter.

     (g) Identifying information.--Any order issued under this
     chapter shall, when furnished by either party, specify the Social
     Security number and date of birth of the defendant.

42 Pa.C.S. § 62A07.

     This Court has identified two prongs to a cause of action under the

PVSVIA:

     Pursuant to § 62A06(a)(1) and (2), in order to prevail on a PVSVIA
     claim and to achieve the desired result of a final no-contact order,
     a petitioner must[, at the mandatory hearing,] (1) assert that the
     plaintiff or another individual, as appropriate, is a victim of sexual
     violence or intimidation committed by the defendant; and (2)

                                     -8-
J-S27020-23

      prove by preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff or
      another individual, as appropriate, is at a continued risk of harm
      from the defendant.

E.A.M., supra at 319 (cleaned up). Thus, we must determine which is the

pertinent prong for determining when the cause of action accrues pursuant to

the six-year statute of limitations.

      Here, the trial court answered this question by relying on the second

prong, i.e., the date of the conduct evincing a continued risk of harm.

Therefore, it held that Appellee’s right to relief under the PVSVIA arose on

June 6, 2022, when Appellant confronted Appellee at the flea market, and

therefore the petition was not barred by the statute of limitations. See Trial

Court Opinion, 3/31/23, at 7. The trial court and Appellee utilize the June

2022 date because they contend that a plaintiff does not have a cause of

action under the PVSVIA until a defendant commits an act evidencing a

continued risk of harm. See id.; Appellee’s brief at 11.

      Appellant contests this conclusion and asserts that the statute of

limitations expired before Appellee filed her petition. He argues that: (1) a

petition under the PVSVIA is subject to a six-year statute of limitations; (2)

the statute begins to run from the date of an act constituting sexual violence

or intimidation; and (3) because his conduct on June 6, 2022 did not amount

to sexual violence or intimidation as defined by the PVSVIA, the court should

have considered the 2009 or 2010 acts for when the cause of action accrued.

See Appellant’s brief at 19-23.

                                       -9-
J-S27020-23

      Simply put, Appellant’s argument is that the statute of limitations is

premised upon the first prong of § 62A06(a), i.e., the cause of action accrues

on the date the petitioner became a victim of sexual violence or intimidation,

whereas the trial court and Appellee focus on the second prong, i.e., the most

recent date demonstrating that the defendant poses a continued risk of harm

to the petitioner.

      Notably, there is scant case law concerning the PVSVIA, none of which

expressly addresses this precise issue. Regardless, we determine that our

Supreme Court’s decision in K.N.B. controls. In that case, K.N.B. alleged that

the defendant, a fellow college student, sexually assaulted her in September

2015. She did not report the assault to police in 2015. However, after seeing

the defendant at a Walmart in 2018, at which time he was no longer a student,

she reported the assault and petitioned the court for a protective order

pursuant to the PVSVIA.

      The defendant argued that K.N.B.’s 2018 petition was barred by the

two-year statute of limitations because the initial sexual assault occurred in

2015, more than two years before the petition was filed. See K.N.B., supra

at 344-45. The trial court rejected the defendant’s argument, concluding that

six-year catch-all limitation applied and had not run, and entered a protective

order. Id. at 345. On appeal to this Court, we again rejected the defendant’s

argument and affirmed the protective order. Id. at 346-47. The defendant

petitioned for allowance of appeal with our Supreme Court, again raising the

                                    - 10 -
J-S27020-23

same arguments. In line with the trial court and this Court, after concluding

that the two-year statute of limitations did not apply, but rather the six-year

catch-all, the High Court held that K.N.B.’s petition was not barred by the

statute of limitations. Id. at 350.

      In so holding, the Supreme Court did not explicitly state that the first

prong was the relevant focal point for statute of limitations purposes. Indeed,

the focus of its analysis was on whether the two-year or six-year statute of

limitations period applied, not when the period began to run. However, its

holding implies that the statute began to run at the time of the underlying

sexual violence or intimidation. To wit, the defendant’s statute of limitations

argument was premised on the date of the initial sexual assault, not the 2018

Walmart encounter giving rise to the PVSVIA petition.      In determining the

appropriate limitations period, the High Court did not identify a starting date

different from the initial sexual assault. See K.N.B. v. M.D., 227 A.3d 918,

923 (Pa.Super. 2020) (setting forth that the defendant argued that “K.N.B.’s

petition was untimely because the petition was subject to the two-year time

limitation and it was filed more than two years after the alleged assault”),

affirmed by K.N.B., supra.

      Moreover, if the claim did not accrue until K.N.B. encountered the

defendant at a Walmart in 2018, then the applicability of a two-year versus

six-year statute of limitations would have been of no moment as the claim

would not have been barred under either limitation period. As the Supreme

                                      - 11 -
J-S27020-23

Court believed it critical to determine the duration of the statute of limitations

period before determining whether the petition was barred and did not correct

the defendant’s use of the initial sexual assault date for determining whether

the limitations period had passed, we infer that the Court construed the

accrual date for purposes of the statute of limitations based upon the conduct

underlying the first prong.

      With respect to the first prong, “the plaintiff must assert that he or she

was a victim of [sexual violence or] intimidation committed by the defendant

and the court must find the assertion credible.” Pietz v. Hadrych, 293 A.3d

645, 2023 WL 2253325, at *3 (Pa.Super. 2023) (non-precedential decision)

(cleaned up). In the trial court’s Rule 1925(a) opinion, it noted that Appellee

was the victim of sexual offenses committed by Appellant in 2009 or 2010,

when Appellee was fourteen years old. The only alleged conduct potentially

amounting to sexual violence occurred at that time in 2009 or 2010, well

before the six years preceding the 2022 petition.         Similarly, any act of

intimidation could have only happened in 2014, at the latest, as after such

time Appellee would no longer have been under eighteen years of age. As the

petition in this case was filed in 2022, no act of intimidation could have

occurred within the statute of limitations.

      Critically, Appellant’s conduct at the flea market in 2022 did not entail

sexual violence, and while Appellee certainly may have felt intimidated,

Appellant’s conduct could not have constituted intimidation as defined by the

                                     - 12 -
J-S27020-23

statute because Appellee was not under eighteen years of age.         Moreover,

even if his conduct violated the no-contact provision of Appellant’s criminal

sentence, such a violation was not introduced into the certified record, and,

even if it had been, would still not meet the statutory definition of sexual

violence or intimidation. Thus, Appellee’s 2022 petition was filed after the six-

year statute of limitations had run and is barred by the statute of limitations.

      Appellee asserts that because defendants who are convicted of a crime

of sexual violence “are in jail for more than [six] years,” basing the statute of

limitations upon the first prong “would render protections of this Act utterly

useless in most cases.”    Appellee’s brief at 8.    We understand Appellee’s

frustrations with such an interpretation, as it puts her out of court, but we do

not believe that it renders the PVSVIA useless. Plaintiffs may pursue criminal

charges against a defendant and a defendant may be ordered to have no

contact with the victim as part of a sentence, as was apparently the case here.

Simultaneously, or within six years, a plaintiff may also seek a protective order

under the PVSVIA. If a defendant is in jail at the time, the plaintiff need not

prove an act demonstrating a continued risk of harm to obtain a protective

order or an extension of an existing order. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 62A07(f). After

obtaining the initial protective order, a plaintiff may seek an unlimited number

of extensions so long as the court “finds that the extension is necessary

because the defendant engaged in one or more acts or finds some other

circumstances that, in the discretion of the court, demonstrate a

                                     - 13 -
J-S27020-23

continued risk of harm to the victim.”             42 Pa.C.S. § 62A07(d)(1)(i)

(emphasis added). Thus, while the PVSVIA’s protections may not be as broad

as Appellee would like,3 they still offer significant protection to victims whose

offenders serve jail time or continue to pose a risk of harm for an extended

period of time.

       Based on the foregoing, we reverse the protective order. In light of our

disposition, we decline to address Appellant’s remaining issues.

       Order reversed. Petition dismissed with prejudice.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 10/25/2023

____________________________________________

3 To that end, we note that nothing in the PVSVIA indicates that its protections

are meant to be applied retroactively to acts of sexual violence or intimidation
committed prior to its enactment in 2015. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1926 (“No statute
shall be construed to be retroactive unless clearly and manifestly so intended
by the General Assembly.”).

                                          - 14 -