Court Opinion

ID: 9851752
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:19:01.634863+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:14.603122
License: Public Domain

Thompson, J.
(concurring)—I agree with the majority that failure to timely enter disposition was error and since Eugene W. admitted he suffered no prejudice from the delay, the juvenile court should be affirmed. However, the burden of showing prejudice should not rest with the party for whose benefit the time limits were imposed. I also disagree with the rule that before the court will impose a remedy, a juvenile must meet the same stringent constitutional standard of demonstrating delay was purposeful and oppressive as if no time limits were set. Here, there are time limits.
The cases relied on by the majority were not construing a statute and court rule containing a specific sentencing time limit. They were construing a court rule that provided sentencing must occur without "unreasonable delay" and a legal concept referred to as the "constitutional right to a speedy sentence". Since RCW 13.40.130(8) and JuCR 7.12(a) provide the time within which disposition should be imposed, cases construing the meaning of "unreasonable delay" and setting a constitutional speedy sentence standard are inapplicable.
Because Eugene W. has admitted he was not prejudiced, dismissal would not serve the ends of justice. But in those instances where statutes or court rules impose time limits, the party who violates that time limit should have the laboring oar. To hold otherwise allows a party to ignore time limits with impunity save in those rare instances *763where a showing of prejudice and purposeful or oppressive delay can be demonstrated. To obviate this result I would require the State to show the absence of prejudice to the accused.
Review denied by Supreme Court November 8, 1985.