Court Opinion

ID: 9918948
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-16 22:14:21.912155+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:06:45.920646
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

STATE OF WASHINGTON
                                                 No. 84478-4-I
                      Appellant,
                                                 DIVISION ONE
              v.
                                                 UNPUBLISHED OPINION
DAVID STEFANOS,

                      Respondent.

       HAZELRIGG, A.C.J. — David Stefanos was charged with one count of felony

driving while under the influence of alcohol or drugs (DUI) based on his criminal

history, which includes convictions for three prior gross misdemeanor DUI offenses

committed within the ten years preceding the new offense. Stefanos filed a motion

to exclude one of the predicate misdemeanor offenses, arguing that it was

constitutionally infirm.   The trial court granted the motion and the State now

appeals. We agree with the State that the trial court misapplied the controlling

legal standard and, accordingly, reverse and remand.

                                      FACTS

       On October 19, 2020, Stefanos was driving in Renton when his car left the

roadway and landed upside-down in a ravine. A witness to the accident called 911

and reported that Stefanos was trapped in the car. Responding police officers

found Stefanos in the driver’s seat. He was not physically injured but the officers

noted that he appeared disoriented and displayed a “blank stare, rigid muscle
No. 84478-4-I/2

tone,” “repetitive speech, agitated behavior,” and had difficulty speaking. Stefanos

admitted to the officers that he had taken phencyclidine (PCP), a schedule II

controlled substance. 1 He was charged in King County Superior Court with one

count of felony DUI and one count of reckless driving, a gross misdemeanor. The

felony DUI was predicated on convictions for three prior offenses within ten years

pursuant to RCW 46.61.5055(4) and 46.61.5055(14). The gross misdemeanor

DUI predicate offenses the State used to elevate the 2020 DUI charge to a felony

were a 2012 conviction from Seattle Municipal Court, a 2016 conviction from Las

Vegas Municipal (LVM) Court, and a 2017 conviction from Seattle Municipal Court.

        Stefanos filed a pretrial motion to exclude the 2016 2 LVM conviction as

constitutionally invalid for purposes of serving as a predicate offense to elevate the

2020 DUI to a felony. In the LVM case, Stefanos had also been accused of driving

under the influence of PCP. He was convicted upon the court’s acceptance of a

plea of nolo contendere or no contest. The court then imposed a 179-day jail

sentence, suspended for a period of one year on condition of compliance with a

number of requirements, such as payment of a fine, completion of a court-

approved victim impact panel and online DUI school, and an order to “stay out of

trouble during the pendency of these proceedings.”

        The written plea statement that Stefanos signed provides that the plea was

made knowingly and voluntarily, recites that the city attorney would recommend

        1 RCW 69.50.206(e)(4).
        2 The date of violation for this offense is listed as June 24, 2015, and defense counsel

referred to it as a “2015 case from Las Vegas Municipal Court” in the motion before the trial court.
However, in briefing on appeal, the case at issue is referred to as the “2016 conviction.”
        The inclusion of the precise Las Vegas Municipal Court case number in both the trial court
record and now on appeal establish that each variant designation is intended to reach the same
case, which we refer to herein as the LVM conviction.

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No. 84478-4-I/3

suspension of the jail sentence so long as Stefanos completed the listed

requirements, and sets out a number of constitutional rights being waived pursuant

to entry of the plea. 3 It also affirmatively states that he “believe[s] entering this

plea of GUILTY is in [his] best interest, and that a trial would be contrary to [his]

best interest,” that he was not acting under duress or coercion and that he had

consulted with his attorney regarding the plea. The LVM judgment, signed by both

the judge and the court clerk, contains a checked box marked “Not

Present - Presence Waived,” but none of the LVM case documents obtained by

the State and filed in the 2020 King County case explicitly mention the

constitutional right to be present for the entry of a guilty plea. There is no evidence,

or assertion by the defense, that Stefanos ever sought to withdraw his guilty plea

or otherwise appeal the LVM conviction.

        In his motion to exclude the LVM conviction, Stefanos argued that the

conviction was constitutionally invalid for purposes of serving as a predicate

offense to elevate the 2020 DUI charge to a felony because, in order for a plea to

be valid, the court must find that the defendant has made a knowing, intelligent,

and voluntary waiver of their rights and that cannot be done when the defendant

is not present. 4 At the motion hearing, the court placed the burden to prove the

        3   The constitutional rights and privileges listed on the agreement as waived were the
privilege against self-incrimination, the rights to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury, to
confront and cross-examine witnesses against him, to subpoena witnesses to testify on his behalf,
to testify in his own defense, and to appeal the conviction.
          4 At argument before this court, defense counsel conceded that circumstances could exist

where entry of a guilty plea in absentia (when the defendant is not present) does not violate the
constitution, but reiterated Stefanos’ position that the predicate offense at issue here is not
constitutionally valid. Wash. Ct. of Appeals oral argument, State v. Stefanos, No. 84478-4-I (Nov.
7, 2023), at 8 min., 33 sec.; 16 min., 55 sec., video recording by TVW, Washington State’s Public
Affairs Network, https://tvw.org/video/division-1-court-of-appeals-2023111126.

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No. 84478-4-I/4

validity of the LVM conviction on the State and ultimately granted Stefanos’ motion,

finding that the conviction was not constitutionally valid and therefore inadmissible

for use in the prosecution of Stefanos’ felony DUI charge in King County. The

court reasoned that it was unable to make the required finding that a guilty plea is

entered knowingly and voluntarily “without the Defendant being present at the plea

hearing, or at least without a clear record that the Defendant made a knowing,

intelligent and voluntary waiver of [their] right to be present at [their] plea hearing.”

In the order, the court explained that the practical effect of its ruling was a

termination of the felony charge, although the State, in its discretion, could still

proceed with a charge of misdemeanor DUI based on the 2020 incident.

       The State timely appealed.

                                      ANALYSIS

       The State argues that the trial court erred by applying the wrong legal

standard in its consideration of Stefanos’ motion to exclude the LVM conviction as

a predicate offense. It further asserts that the controlling legal test under State v.

Summers, 120 Wn.2d 801, 812, 846 P.2d 845 (1993), required that Stefanos first

make a “colorable, fact-specific” showing supporting the claimed constitutional

error—that he had not waived his presence at the plea hearing that resulted in the

LVM conviction. The State then assigns error to the court’s conclusion that the

plea in the LVM case was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary and to its finding

that Stefanos did not waive his right to presence at the entry of his nolo contendere

plea, and challenges its suppression of the LVM conviction on those bases. While

Stefanos concedes that the established legal standard under Summers requires

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No. 84478-4-I/5

him to first raise a “colorable, fact-specific argument supporting a claim of

constitutional error in the prior conviction,” 120 Wn.2d at 812, he asserts that this

threshold showing was met and the burden then properly shifted to the State.

I.     Predicate Offenses as Elements of Felony DUI

       An essential element of felony DUI is the existence of the necessary

predicate offenses, which the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt. State

v. Chambers, 157 Wn. App. 465, 481, 237 P.3d 352 (2010). The viability of a

predicate offense is a “threshold determination to be decided by the trial court.” Id.

A challenge to the constitutional validity of a predicate conviction is not a collateral

attack on that conviction, but rather, an attempt to “‘foreclose the prior conviction’s

present use to establish an essential element’” of the crime. Summers, 120 Wn.2d

at 810 (quoting State v. Swindell, 93 Wn.2d 192, 196, 607 P.2d 852 (1980)); see

also Chambers, 157 Wn. App. at 468 (“[W]hether a prior offense . . . qualifies as a

predicate offense is not an essential element of the crime. Rather, the question of

whether a prior offense meets the statutory definition is a threshold question of law

to be decided by the court before admitting a prior offense into evidence at trial.”).

       Stefanos urges this court to consider this appeal under the abuse of

discretion standard, suggesting that the trial court’s decision was an evidentiary

ruling because he objected to the admission of the LVM conviction as a predicate

offense. Trial courts determine whether evidence is admissible, and appellate

courts review the trial court’s rulings for abuse of discretion. State v. Jennings,

199 Wn.2d 53, 59, 502 P.3d 1255 (2022). However, the constitutional validity of a

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No. 84478-4-I/6

predicate offense is a question of law that this court reviews de novo. State v.

Robinson, 8 Wn. App. 2d 629, 635, 439 P.3d 710 (2019).

       In Summers, our Supreme Court affirmed the burden of proof standards for

challenging the constitutionality of a predicate offense established in Swindell and

explained that the defendant “bears the initial burden of offering a colorable, fact-

specific argument supporting the claim of constitutional error in the prior

conviction.” 120 Wn.2d at 812. “First, a defendant may raise a defense to such a

prosecution by alleging the constitutional invalidity of a predicate conviction, and

second, upon doing so, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the

predicate conviction is constitutionally sound.” Id. Under this clearly established

standard, the State is correct that the court erred by not requiring Stefanos to first

demonstrate a colorable, fact-specific claim that the LVM conviction suffered from

a constitutional defect. Only if Stefanos carried his burden on this first step of the

analysis would the burden have shifted to the State to prove beyond a reasonable

doubt that the conviction was constitutionally valid in order to use it as a predicate

offense to elevate the current offense to a felony.

II.    Burden Shifting Under Controlling Case Law

       During oral argument on Stefanos’ motion in the trial court, the judge stated,

“The burden isn’t shifted to the State. The State has the burden to show that a

waiver of a constitutional right was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary” and that

constitutional validity would not be presumed. In response, the State asserted that

“first, defense must raise whether or not there’s a colorable fact-specific claim” and

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No. 84478-4-I/7

proceeded to explain the Swindell standard to the court. 5 The court nonetheless

granted Stefanos’ motion, finding it “highly persuasive” that none of the paperwork

he had signed explicitly advised him of the right to be present during the plea

hearing and that he was knowingly waiving that right. After the court announced

its ruling, the deputy prosecuting attorney (DPA) sought further explanation of the

court’s reasoning:

        [DPA]: Can I just ask one clarifying question for purposes of the
        record? So the court is finding that the defense record made a
        colorable fact-specific—

        COURT: I don’t think I’m finding that I have to make that finding.

        [DPA]: And so Your Honor is finding that the burden is on the State
        regardless of what the defense presents?

        COURT: I think for there to be a valid plea, there needs to be a clear
        record that the plea was entered into knowingly, intelligently, and
        voluntarily with a full understanding of the defendant’s rights in a
        knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of those rights, and those
        rights include [] Stefanos’ right to be present at his plea hearing.

(Emphasis added.) This is consistent with the court’s earlier confusion as to the

proper standard under the law, both of which demonstrate that the court committed

reversable error in misinterpreting, and therefore misapplying, the law.                       The

Supreme Court was clear in Summers that “[o]nly after the defendant has made

this initial showing does the State’s burden arise.” 120 Wn.2d at 812 (emphasis

added). The court disregarded the controlling standard and improperly placed the

initial burden of proof on the State. Accordingly, reversal is required.

        5 Swindell, Summers, and Chambers were all before the trial court prior to the hearing as

cited and argued in the initial defense motion to exclude and in the State’s response to the motion.

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No. 84478-4-I/8

III.   Colorable, Fact-Specific Showing

       In his motion before the trial court, Stefanos acknowledged that Summers

establishes that he bears the initial burden of making a “colorable, fact-specific

argument supporting the claim of constitutional error in the prior conviction” before

the State must meet its burden to “prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the

predicate conviction is constitutionally sound.” Id. Washington case law has not

clearly defined what is required to establish a colorable, fact-specific claim.

Stefanos offers definitions from outside our state, including from a number of

federal cases. He provides several cases wherein the Ninth Circuit Court of

Appeals has variously described a colorable claim as one that is “‘appearing to be

true, valid, or right,’” “‘seemingly valid and genuine,’” or “‘requir[ing] some evidence

tending to show the existence of the essential elements of the defense.’” Chavez

v. Brnovich, 42 F.4th 1091, 1101 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY

(11th ed. 2019)), cert. denied sub nom. Chavez v. Mayes, 143 S. Ct. 1768 (2023);

Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rts. Comm’n, 165 F.3d 692, 705-06 (9th Cir.) (first

quoting W EBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 449 (1986); then quoting

United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 468, 116 S. Ct. 1480, 134 L. Ed. 2d 687

(1996)), reh’g granted, opinion withdrawn, 192 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 1999).

Webster’s defines “colorable” as “seemingly valid and genuine : having an

appearance of truth, right, or justice : PLAUSIBLE.”          W EBSTER’S THIRD NEW

INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 449 (2002).

       Washington cases do, however, provide some guidance through examples.

In Swindell, the defendant demonstrated that the predicate conviction, which

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No. 84478-4-I/9

purportedly rendered him ineligible to possess firearms, was invalid. 93 Wn.2d

194. Swindell ultimately established that the underlying guilty plea was involuntary

after he first asserted that he only saw his lawyer once, he was taken to an

impromptu meeting with the prosecutor at the prosecutor’s request and without his

attorney, and was not informed of his right to have his attorney present at that

meeting. Id. at 197. Summers met his burden to show that a prior manslaughter

conviction was constitutionally invalid as a predicate offense to support a

subsequent conviction on a firearm charge by showing that the jury in the

manslaughter case was not properly instructed on the burden of proof related to

Summers’ claim of self-defense. Summers, 120 Wn.2d at 807-08. Finally, in a

recent unpublished 6 opinion of this court, State v. Benson, we held that the

accused made a colorable, fact-specific claim that ineffective assistance of counsel

rendered a prior conviction constitutionally invalid to serve as a predicate offense

to elevate his current charge to a felony DUI. No. 83255-7-I (Wash. Ct. App. Nov.

7,   2022)    (unpublished),      https://www.courts.wa.gov.opinions/pdf/832557.pdf,

review denied, 1 Wn.3d 1013 (Wash. June 7, 2023). In support of his motion to

exclude a prior felony DUI conviction from use as a predicate offense to elevate

the pending DUI charge to a felony, Benson established that the first felony DUI

was invalid because it rested upon a constitutionally infirm gross misdemeanor

conviction. Benson, slip op. at 13. Benson provided documentary evidence that,

with regard to the gross misdemeanor predicate underlying the prior felony DUI,

       6  Pursuant to GR 14.1(c), we may cite to unpublished opinions as “necessary for a
reasoned decision.” Benson is offered for illustrative purposes only as a recent example of the
analysis and application of the controlling legal standard.

                                             -9-
No. 84478-4-I/10

he was a class member in a federal lawsuit that found complete deprivation of the

right to counsel in two municipal courts. Id. at 6-8.        More specifically, he

demonstrated that the appeal of the gross misdemeanor case in question had been

dismissed for want of prosecution when he was represented by one of the public

defenders named in the federal suit. Id. at 8-9. Further, both Benson’s trial and

appellate counsel in the first felony DUI case, which the State sought to use to

elevate the pending charge, testified that they were unaware that they could have

challenged the constitutional validity of the gross misdemeanor predicate offenses

underlying Benson’s earlier felony DUI, essentially admitting ineffective

assistance. Id. at 12. In all three of these cases, the arguments to exclude the

purportedly infirm predicate offense relied on the particularized circumstances of

each defendant’s case, and each made specific claims as to the precise manner

by which their rights were violated. In contrast, in State v. Reed, the court held

that a colorable, fact-specific showing was not satisfied based solely on Reed’s

broad assertion that he was unaware of the predicate drug offense. 84 Wn. App.

379, 385, 928 P.2d 469 (1997). Critically, he presented “no evidence that the plea

was not made voluntarily.” Id.

      Stefanos now argues that his motion properly presented a colorable, fact-

specific argument because it is undisputed that a guilty plea is a critical stage of

prosecution where he has a right to be present and that none of the waivers he

signed expressly address this right. “As a matter of due process, ‘a criminal

defendant has a fundamental right to be present at all critical stages of a trial.’”

State v. Jones, 185 Wn.2d 412, 426, 372 P.3d 755 (2016) (quoting State v. Irby,

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No. 84478-4-I/11

170 Wn.2d 874, 880, 246 P.3d 796 (2011)). Regarding a right to be present, critical

stages are those where the defendant’s presence “‘has a relation, reasonably

substantial, to the fullness of [their] opportunity to defend against the charge.’”

Irby, 170 Wn.2d at 881 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105-06,

54 S. Ct. 330, 78 L. Ed. 674 (1934), overruled in part on other grounds sub nom.

Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 84 S. Ct. 1489, 12 L. Ed. 2d 653 (1964)). The State

properly agrees that Stefanos has these rights.

       In the “DUI Admonishment of Rights” that Stefanos signed in the LVM case,

a number of constitutional rights are listed, 7 but there is no explicit notice of the

right to be present for entry of a guilty plea. The judgment entered pursuant to

Stefanos’ nolo contendere plea simply shows a checked box labeled “Not

Present - Presence Waived.”             However, in his motion to exclude the LVM

conviction, Stefanos did not assert, or present any evidence to indicate, that he did

not waive his presence at that plea hearing or that his attorney in that case failed

to advise him of his right to be present. He did not allege that his plea in that case

was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. Instead, he made a general argument

that it is “axiomatically impossible” for the court to find that a defendant is making

a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of rights if they are not present for a

plea and have not expressly waived the right to be present. Stefanos argued

broadly that it “is simply constitutionally deficient for a [c]ourt to enter a plea of

       7 The constitutional rights set out in this document are the right to a speedy trial, to require

the State prove the charges beyond a reasonable doubt, to confront and question witnesses, to
subpoena witnesses and compel their attendance, to remain silent, and to appeal conviction.

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No. 84478-4-I/12

guilty without conducting a colloquy with the defendant” and that his plea is

therefore invalid. 8

        Critically, unlike the defendants in Swindell, Summers, and Benson,

Stefanos did not make any “fact-specific” showing that the particular circumstances

of his case rendered the predicate LVM conviction unconstitutional. Stefanos fails

to produce evidence to demonstrate, nor does he precisely allege, that he was not

advised by his attorney about his right to be present for entry of plea when he was

advised about the other rights set out in the plea documents, or that he did not

waive that right. The entirety of the LVM record, including a plea statement that

he signed and notarized in King County, Washington, supports the assertion

contained therein that he had “discussed with [his] attorney any possible defenses,

defense strategies and circumstances which might be in [his] favor” and that he

“believe[d] entering this plea of GUILTY [wa]s in [his] best interest and that a trial

would be contrary to [his] best interest.” Nor does any of his briefing in the trial

court or on appeal directly assert that his LVM plea was not knowing, intelligent,

and voluntary.        Even under the arguably low “seemingly valid and genuine”

standard set out in the federal cases Stefanos offers in support of his position, a

general argument severed from the facts of the LVM conviction is inadequate to

satisfy the burden required of Stefanos before the State must make any showing

in response.

        8 In briefing, Stefanos acknowledges that pleas in absentia “may be routine in Las Vegas,”

but asserts that they are “no less constitutionally deficient for being routine.”

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No. 84478-4-I/13

      Because the trial court both misinterpreted and misapplied the well-settled

and controlling case law, we reverse the ruling to exclude the LVM conviction and

remand with instructions to apply the proper standard consistent with this opinion.

WE CONCUR:

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