Court Opinion

ID: 9881591
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-03 15:00:27.803236+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:12:54.727612
License: Public Domain

22-1179-cr
United States v. Fortune

                           UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                               FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                    SUMMARY ORDER

Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order
filed on or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 32.1 and this court’s Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a
document filed with this court, a party must cite either the Federal Appendix or an
electronic database (with the notation “summary order”). A party citing a summary order
must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by counsel.

       At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the
City of New York, on the 3rd day of October, two thousand twenty-three.

       PRESENT:            Guido Calabresi,
                           Steven J. Menashi,
                           Myrna Pérez,
                                  Circuit Judges.
____________________________________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                 Appellee,

          v.                                                   No. 22-1179-cr

TYRIEK FORTUNE, AKA Sealed Defendant 1, AKA Rico Balla,

                 Defendant-Appellant.
____________________________________________
For Appellee:                          ANDREW JONES, Assistant United States
                                       Attorney (David Abramowicz, Assistant
                                       United States Attorney, on the brief), for
                                       Damian Williams, United States Attorney
                                       for the Southern District of New York, New
                                       York, New York.

For Defendant-Appellant:               DONALD J. YANNELLA III, Donald Yannella
                                       P.C., New York, New York.

      Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York (Caproni, J.).

      Upon due consideration, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and
DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

      Defendant-Appellant Tyriek Fortune appeals from the judgment of the
district court dated May 26, 2022, imposing a sentence following Fortune’s guilty
plea to unlawfully possessing a firearm as a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1). The district court applied two sentencing enhancements. First, because
Fortune had also unlawfully possessed other firearms prior to his arrest, the
district court added four levels to his sentence. Second, because Fortune had also
trafficked in firearms, the court added another four levels. Fortune argues that the
district court erred in applying these enhancements. We assume the parties’
familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the
issues on appeal.

      “The district courts have discretion to select an appropriate sentence, and in
doing so are statutorily bound to consider … the advisory Guidelines range. The
courts of appeals then review for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Cavera, 550
F.3d 180, 188 (2d Cir. 2008). A district court must “find facts relevant to sentencing

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by a preponderance of the evidence.” United States v. Garcia, 413 F.3d 201, 220 n.15
(2d Cir. 2005). We then “review[] the district court’s interpretation of the
Sentencing Guidelines de novo, and review[] the district court’s findings of fact for
clear error.” United States v. Rubenstein, 403 F.3d 93, 99 (2d Cir. 2005).

                                               I

       We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in applying
the first enhancement. Under the Sentencing Guidelines, the sentence for an
offense should take account of conduct that is “part of the same course of conduct
or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(2).
Instances of unlawful conduct are “part of the same course of conduct if they are
sufficiently connected or related to each other as to warrant the conclusion that
they are part of a single episode, spree, or ongoing series of offenses.” Id. § 1B1.3
comment. (n.5(B)(ii)). When a defendant has been convicted of unlawful
possession of a firearm as a felon, courts generally decide that the defendant’s
recent possession of other firearms is sufficiently related to the offense of
conviction to qualify as part of the same course of conduct. 1 In this case, Fortune
unlawfully possessed the additional firearms no more than four months prior to
his arrest—not so removed in time as to form a separate course of conduct. See
United States v. Santiago, 906 F.2d 867, 873 (2d Cir. 1990) (“[W]e cannot conclude
that the mere fact that the events were separated by some eight months means they
are not part of the same course of conduct.”). Fortune’s first sentence enhancement
was therefore warranted under the Guidelines.

       Fortune argues that the government did not prove that the firearms in the
images and videos appearing on his phone were real firearms. Fortune claims that,
as an aspiring rapper, he “had access to replica and ‘prop’ firearms.” Appellant’s

1 See United States v. Parlor, 2 F.4th 807, 812 (9th Cir. 2021); United States v. Brummett, 355
F.3d 343, 345 (5th Cir. 2003); United States v. Santoro, 159 F.3d 318, 321 (7th Cir. 1998);
United States v. Windle, 74 F.3d 997, 1000-01 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v. Powell, 50 F.3d
94, 104 (1st Cir. 1995).

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Br. at 9. At a Fatico hearing, however, an officer of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms and Explosives testified that at least eleven of the firearms in the images
and videos were real. The officer testified that no replicas were available for six of
the guns. On an additional five, certain features—such as the serial number on a
Glock or the loaded ammunition in a Smith & Wesson 5906—distinguished the
firearms in the images and videos from replicas. The district court concluded that
“the government’s evidence was persuasive that the guns looked real” because
“[t]hey were handled like they were real, they were loaded, and at least one was
fired,” J. App’x 241, and that “there are very specific facts about five of those guns
that would lead me to conclude by clear and convincing evidence that they were
… not replica guns,” id. at 223. The district court did not clearly err in finding that
Fortune possessed at least eight guns, warranting a four-level enhancement.

                                          II

      Fortune challenges the second enhancement on two grounds. First, he
claims that the government did not prove he sold any firearms. The first element
of the gun-trafficking sentence enhancement is satisfied, however, if the defendant
“received two or more firearms with the intent to transport, transfer, or otherwise
dispose of firearms to another individual.” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 comment. (n.13(A)(i))
(emphasis added). The district court found, based on text messages recovered
from Fortune’s phone, that Fortune intended to transfer the firearms. That finding
was not clearly erroneous.

      Second, Fortune argues that the government did not prove that he knew or
had reason to believe that the use of the firearms by “Sleazy Spade”—the
counterparty in the text message exchanges—would be unlawful, as required for
the enhancement. Id. § 2K2.1 comment. (n.13(A)(ii)). The record supports the
district court’s finding that Sleazy Spade likely intended to use the guns
unlawfully. Sleazy Spade told Fortune that he needed guns “ASAP”—“[a]s many
as possible”—which suggests violent activity. J. App’x 208. Furthermore, this was
a black-market transaction involving firearms acquired out of state, which could

                                          4
lead a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the purchaser’s use of the firearms
would be unlawful. As the district court observed, the fact that “gun control laws
in New York are [very] strict and … [Fortune] is not in the legitimate business of
selling guns” suggests that “Sleazy Spade’s possession was unlawful and that he
intended to use the gun unlawfully.” Id. at 243. The district court also credited
expert testimony, based on the use of code words in the text messages, that Sleazy
Spade was a member of a gang. These findings were not clearly erroneous, so the
district court did not abuse its discretion in applying the second enhancement.

                                         III

      Finally, Fortune argues that N.Y. Penal Law § 265.01—which, according to
the government’s sentencing memorandum, Sleazy Spade would have violated by
possessing a firearm without a license—is unconstitutional pursuant to the
Supreme Court’s recent decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 142
S. Ct. 2111 (2022). For that reason, Fortune suggests, Sleazy Spade’s possession
would not have been unlawful. Fortune did not raise this argument before the
district court, so we review this issue only for plain error. See Johnson v. United
States, 520 U.S. 461, 464 (1997). Under that standard, the error must be “clear or
obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute.” United States v. Montague, 67
F.4th 520, 528 (2d Cir. 2023) (quoting Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135
(2009)).

      Neither we nor the Supreme Court have addressed the constitutionality of
N.Y. Penal Law § 265.01, and for that reason the constitutionality of the provision
is not “clear under current law.” United States v. Whab, 355 F.3d 155, 158 (2d Cir.
2004). “[T]ypically,” we do not identify a plain error when “the operative legal
question is unsettled, including where there is no binding precedent from the
Supreme Court or this Court.” Id. The district court in this case did not plainly err.

                                   *      *      *

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For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

                               FOR THE COURT:
                               Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

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