Court Opinion

ID: 9625829
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:52:14.18761+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:56:48.537085
License: Public Domain

Bussey, Justice
(concurring and dissenting) :
I agree that the judgment below should be reversed but not being in accord with much of the majority opinion, I set forth my views as to the appropriate disposition of this appeal.
At the outset, I should state that most of the material, concurrent findings of fact below are to my mind not against the clear preponderance of the evidence and should not be set aside. The special referee is an experienced attorney and a life long resident of the vicinage. He, of course, had oppor*212tunity to observe the witnesses, their demeanor, etc. and most likely some of them were known to him. His findings as to where the truth lay are entitled to great weight.
There was competent evidence, other than that mentioned in the majority opinion from which the referee logically concluded that the value of the property was $75,000 at the time of conveyance, but even if it was worth $85,000 to $100,000, as contended by Coleman, the evidence shows that as between the grantor and the Daniels there was no gross inadequacy of consideration from which any inference of fraud could be drawn. The uncontradicted evidence is that the Daniels became obligated to support Mr. and Mrs. L. L. Rogers for the balance of their lives and this obligation when added to the consideration paid contemporaneously with the transfer could well have exceeded tire value of the land. As against Coleman, however, the agreement of the Daniels for the future support of Mr. and Mrs. Rogers was not a good consideration and is some evidence, under the circumstances, of fraudulent intent on the part of Mr. Rogers. Matthews v. Matthews, 207 S. C. 170, 35 S. E. (2d) 157.
It makes little, if any difference, however, under the facts of this case what the intent of Mr. Rogers was. The consideration paid by the Daniels contemporaneously with the transfer (by way of mortgage assumption, cancellation of the debts of Mr. Rogers, and payments of his debts or otherwise) has not been proved with precision but did not exceed approximately $40,000. Since future consideration was not good against Coleman, it follows that the conveyance was, in effect, a voluntary one to the extent that the value of the property exceeded the consideration contemporaneously paid by the grantees. Everyone concedes that the property was worth at least $75,000, with the result that there was a voluntary conveyance of the real property to the extent of at least $35,000, a sum quite adequate to pay the indebtedness to Coleman, and, hence, the conveyance was a legal fraud upon Coleman, regardless of the intent of any of the parties. If, as Coleman currently contends, *213the property is worth approximately $100,000, its value is quite adequate to pay Coleman’s indebtedness,, interest and costs without depriving the Daniels of that for which they have paid most valuable and substantial consideration. Under these circumstances, it is not at all necessary to consider whether any fraudulent intent on the part of L. Rogers was imputable to the grantees, although I am of the view that the findings thereabout below are supported by the clear preponderance of the evidence.
Pertinent to the proper disposition of the present controversy is the following from 37 C. J. S. p. 984 Fraudulent Conveyances § 158:
“With respect to, a partial insufficiency of the consideration of conveyances, there is an important difference between law and equity. At law a conveyance is wholly good or wholly bad. In equity, when the property is of greater value than the consideration, the conveyance may be impeached as being voluntary to a partial extent, and if there is no actual fraud on the part of the grantee, will be sustained to the extent of the consideration, but only to that extent.”
South Carolina cases in accord with the foregoing principle include, Davidson & Simpson v. Graves (1831), 8 S. C. Eq. (Bailey) 268; Brown v. McDonald (1887), 10 S. C. Eq. (1 Hill) 297; Parker v. Holmes, 2 Hill Eq. 95; Ferguson v. Harrison, 41 S. C. 340, 19 S. E. 619; Sternberger v. Summerford, 150 S. C. 60, 147 S. E. 627; Steinmeyer v. Steinmeyer, 64 S. C. 413, 42 S. E. 184, 185.
The judgment below should be reversed but the cause remanded for the court to determine, as precisely as possible, the consideration actually paid or assumed by the grantees, approximately contemporaneously with the conveyance to them, excluding of course all obligation for the future support of Mr. and Mrs. L. L. Rogers. Unless the indebtedness to Coleman be otherwise paid, the property should then be sold and Coleman’s indebtedness and costs paid to the extent that the sales price of the property exceeds the consid*214eration determined to have been actually paid or assumed by the grantees.