Court Opinion

ID: 9902736
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-27 15:22:43.479359+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:58.496463
License: Public Domain

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                STATE OF FLORIDA
                 _____________________________

                      Case No. 5D21-2407
                    LT Case No. 2005-CA-0186
                 _____________________________

CRAIG A. MARLOWE,

    Appellant,

    v.

CITY OF ST. AUGUSTINE, KEVIN
VAN DYKE, MARCY A. VAN DYKE,
PAUL A. LEONARD AND SUSAN J.
LEONARD, TRUSTEES OF THE
LEONARD FAMILY REVOCABLE
LIVING TRUST DATED 23RD
JANUARY, 2007, ET AL.,

    Appellees.
                 _____________________________

On Appeal from the Circuit Court for St. Johns County.
Kenneth J. Janesk, Judge.

Michael J. Korn, of Korn & Zehmer, P.A., Jacksonville, for
Appellant.

Isabelle C. Lopez, City Attorney, St. Augustine, and Michael
Cavendish, of Cavendish Partners, P.A., Jacksonville, for Appellee,
City of Saint Augustine.

Rebecca Bowen Creed, of Creed & Gowdy, P.A., Jacksonville, and
Bruce B. Humphrey and Lauren E. Howell, of Birchfield &
Humphrey, Ponte Vedra Beach, for Appellees, Kevin Van Dyke
and Marcy A. Van Dyke.
Gary S. Edinger, of Benjamin, Aaronson, Edinger & Patanzo, P.A.,
Gainesville, for Appellees, Paul A. Leonard and Susan J. Leonard,
Trustees of the Leonard Family Revocable Living Trust Dated
23rd January, 2007.

                        September 8, 2023

      ON APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR REHEARING OR
                  CLARIFICATION

       Appellant has timely moved for rehearing or clarification “as
to certain limited, discrete elements of [this court’s] July 14, 2023
opinion . . . [that] do not affect the outcome of this appeal.” We
conclude that a minor clarification of the original opinion is
appropriate; and, therefore, we issue the following revised opinion
to provide additional clarity. Appellant’s motion is otherwise
denied. No further motions for rehearing will be entertained.

LAMBERT, J.

     Craig A. Marlowe appeals the final summary judgment
entered against him and in favor of the City of St. Augustine (the
“City”) and Kevin and Marcy A. Van Dyke (the “Van Dykes”).
Marlowe also appeals the order denying his motion for attorney’s
fees as a sanction against the City, filed pursuant to section
57.105(1), Florida Statutes (2020). We affirm, without further
discussion, the order denying Marlowe’s section 57.105(1) motion
for attorney’s fees. However, for the reasons that follow, we
reverse the final summary judgment and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

              FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

      Marlowe initially filed the underlying lawsuit in 2005
against the owners of a single parcel of real property that is
directly adjacent to real property owned by Marlowe in St.
Augustine, Florida. What began as a dispute between two
neighboring properties regarding riparian rights—based on
Marlowe’s allegation that the neighbors’ dock obstructed and
interfered with his riparian rights (particularly his right to build

                                 2
his own dock that accesses the navigable waters of Hospital
Creek)—evolved into a complicated multiparty litigation involving
several nearby properties, as well as disputes over the correct
property boundaries and the historical ownership of the subject
waterfront land dating back to Spanish colonial Florida in the
early nineteenth century.

     The City and the Van Dykes were later added as defendants
because—though Marlowe did not assert any claim directly
against them—they were found by the trial court, in an earlier
order on a motion to dismiss filed by a different defendant, to be
“indispensable parties” based on the possibility that a
determination as to Marlowe’s riparian rights might affect the
riparian rights appurtenant to nearby waterfront properties
owned by the City and the Van Dykes, respectively. Specifically,
the City owns a thirty-foot right-of-way road called San Carlos
Avenue, part of which borders the entire northern boundary of
Marlowe’s property. San Carlos Avenue allegedly runs all the way
to Hospital Creek, which is east of all of the separate tracts of land
owned by the parties to the lawsuit. The Van Dykes own the
waterfront real property immediately north of San Carlos Avenue,
which separates their property from Marlowe’s property. The
other defendants in the initial stages of the underlying litigation 1
own property bordering the south of Marlowe’s property.

     During the earlier stages of this litigation, Marlowe had
apparently obtained a title opinion that advised him that a
dissolved corporation, St. Augustine North Beach and Toll Bridge
Company (“Toll Bridge Company”), not Marlowe, owned the
easternmost portion of what Marlowe had considered to be his own
property. Marlowe would later acknowledge that, as a result, he
discontinued actively pursuing resolution of the instant lawsuit for
over seven years while he took steps that he believed were

    1 As of the date that the summary judgment was entered, the

neighboring property and dock that were owned by the original
defendants had come under ownership of the appellees Paul A.
Leonard and Susan J. Leonard, Trustees of the Leonard Family
Revocable Living Trust Dated 23rd January, 2007 (“the
Leonards”).

                                  3
necessary to acquire the subject property from Toll Bridge
Company via adverse possession.

      In early 2017, Marlowe filed a fifth amended complaint in
which he added Toll Bridge Company as a defendant, together
with “any and all unknown parties claiming by, through, under
and against St. Augustine North Beach & Toll Bridge Company
who may be dead or alive, if said unknown parties may claim an
interest through said company as spouses, heirs, devisees,
grantees, or otherwise.” Marlowe alleged for the first time that
Toll Bridge Company owned all of the relevant waterfront land
south of San Carlos Avenue other than the waterfront land owned
by Marlowe and, thus, they were the only parties to the lawsuit
who had riparian rights appurtenant to property south of San
Carlos Avenue.

      The following year, Marlowe filed a sixth amended
complaint, which is the operative complaint. Marlowe revealed in
this complaint that he had filed a separate lawsuit solely against
Toll Bridge Company to quiet title and that, in November 2016, he
obtained a default judgment against Toll Bridge Company. In that
default judgment, the trial court found that when Marlowe
acquired his property, Toll Bridge Company “may have had some
right, title, and/or interest” in part of the property—specifically,
the easternmost part of the property, nearest to Hospital Creek—
but that Marlowe had become the true record titleholder of that
property by virtue of adverse possession. The default judgment
further found that, as to “any or all accreted[2] lands that may be
appurtenant to [the subject property acquired by Marlowe through
adverse possession],” Marlowe “has the superior right to the
accreted lands east of and appurtenant to [that subject property],
subject to any other lawfully superior claims of adjacent owners to
the accreted lands, if any.”

    2 Black’s Law Dictionary defines “accretion” as “[t]he gradual

accumulation of land by natural forces, esp[ecially] as alluvium is
added to land situated on the bank of a river or on the seashore.”
Accretion, Black’s Law Dictionary (3d Pocket Ed. 2006).

                                 4
     Returning to the operative complaint in the underlying case,
Marlowe asserted three causes of action requesting: (1) a
declaration as to his riparian rights; (2) an injunction ordering the
Leonards and another defendant3 to remove their docks and
restraining the defendants from further interfering with his
riparian rights; and (3) quiet title and a declaration that Marlowe
owns “the accreted property adjacent to his upland property,”
including a portion of allegedly accreted land claimed by the
Leonards. Marlowe’s claims in the underlying lawsuit depended
upon Marlowe owning waterfront property and the riparian rights
thereunto appertaining.

     After the various parties filed their responses to this sixth
amended complaint, the City filed a motion for summary
judgment. The City argued that it, and not Marlowe or Toll Bridge
Company, owned that easternmost part of the land claimed by
Marlowe as his own, including all lands east of Marlowe’s property
to the waters of Hospital Creek. The City asserted that Marlowe
could not have obtained that easternmost waterfront land because,
when he purchased the property in 2004, the prior owner of
Marlowe’s property who sold it to him did not own that
easternmost waterfront portion.

      The City next asserted that Marlowe could not have obtained
that easternmost waterfront property from Toll Bridge Company
as a result of the default judgment because Toll Bridge Company
did not own that land. As evidence in support of its summary
judgment motion, the City filed, among other documents, records
from the St. Johns County Property Appraiser identifying the
easternmost waterfront portion of the land claimed by Marlowe (as

    3 Between the initiation of the lawsuit and the filing of the

sixth amended complaint, Marlowe had added as defendants the
owners of the property immediately south of the Leonards’
property, Christopher and Georgia C. Park (the “Parks”). The
Parks also had a dock between their property and Hospital Creek,
and Marlowe had alleged that both the Leonards’ dock and the
Parks’ dock interfered with his riparian rights. The Parks have
not participated in this appeal.

                                 5
well as the waterfront land separating from Hospital Creek all of
the parcels south of Marlowe’s property that are owned by other
defendants)—i.e., land that Marlowe argued had been owned by
Toll Bridge Company and that he subsequently acquired through
adverse possession—as Tax ID Parcel 1493300000 that is owned
by the City.

      The City thirdly argued that the default judgment obtained
by Marlowe against Toll Bridge Company in the separate suit was
void as a matter of law because it was obtained against a “non-
existent” entity for which there are no records substantiating its
“existence” later than the 1930s. The City reminded that since it
was never joined as a party in Marlowe’s separate suit against Toll
Bridge Company, the default final judgment entered in that case
had no res judicata effect against it.

      The City also argued that while Toll Bridge Company
operated a horse-drawn railway car over a nearby bridge in the
1910s and 1920s and that Toll Bridge Company had some deeded
interest in some of the disputed land at that time, the land held by
Toll Bridge Company was not waterfront property. Instead, the
City argued that there had always been unsurveyed and unplatted
sovereignly owned land between the privately owned property
involved in this case and Hospital Creek. 4

     Lastly, the City asserted in its motion that Marlowe’s claim to
ownership of the disputed waterfront land is fatally flawed due to
Marlowe’s failure to plead the necessary element of “state action.”
According to the City, Marlowe was suing a sovereign entity for a
determination of the sovereign’s property rights but the trial court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the claim because Marlowe
failed to allege some “state action” by the City in the form of a

    4 The City did acknowledge that some new land had been
formed along the subject waterfront stretch between the 1920s and
the present—although the City asserted that it was formed by
“dumped street sweepings during years of public works projects,”
as opposed to natural accretion—but the City maintained that
there had always been some sovereign land between Hospital
Creek and the privately owned land in that specific location.

                                 6
taking or infringement upon Marlowe’s private property rights.

     Marlowe filed a response to the City’s summary judgment
motion. He asserted that in the early 1800s (prior to the United
States acquiring Florida from Spain), Spain transferred the
subject waterfront property into private ownership and that the
surveyed and platted property owned by Toll Bridge Company was
originally waterfront property—and was so as late as the 1920s.
Therefore, Marlowe asserted that all of the unplatted land
between Toll Bridge Company’s original property and Hospital
Creek is new land (whether formed by accretion or the City’s filling
activities), title to which was vested in Toll Bridge Company, as
owner of the immediately upland property, and was now vested in
him, as a result of the default final judgment entered in the
separate suit finding adverse possession.

      Marlowe further responded that the City’s “state action”
argument was unavailing because he had not sought judicial
determination as to the City’s ownership interest in any land;
rather, the City was only added as a defendant because the trial
court believed it to be an indispensable party due to the possibility
that a determination of Marlowe’s riparian rights might affect the
City’s riparian rights arising from its neighboring waterfront
property (i.e., San Carlos Avenue).

       The Van Dykes filed their own motion for summary
judgment. They joined in and adopted the arguments raised by
the City in its summary judgment motion, explicitly emphasizing
the argument that Marlowe possesses no riparian rights because
he does not own the unplatted waterfront land between the
easternmost platted property and Hospital Creek. The Van Dykes
also argued that even if Marlowe were found to have riparian
rights, any determination of Marlowe’s riparian rights could not
affect their riparian rights because their waterfront property and
Marlowe’s property are separated by San Carlos Avenue and thus
not immediately adjacent. Lastly, the Van Dykes asserted that
Marlowe’s claim against them was time-barred under section
95.12, Florida Statutes (2004).

     Lastly, Marlowe filed his own motion for partial summary
judgment. He asked that the trial court hold that the eastern

                                 7
boundary of the subject platted property was originally waterfront
and is, thus, riparian property and that he owns that easternmost
portion of the platted property east of and appurtenant to his
undisputed property, as well as “all accretions” east of his
property.

      Following a hearing on the three summary judgment
motions, the trial court entered an order granting the City’s and
the Van Dykes’ motions and denying Marlowe’s motion and
thereafter entered final summary judgment consistent with its
order. The trial court first concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to
determine ownership of the unplatted land because Marlowe failed
to satisfy the “state action” requirement raised by the City, as he
did not show or even allege any “deprivation, taking or
infringement” by the City against his private property interests.

      The trial court then proceeded to engage in “a complete
analysis of the arguments.” It first found that the summary
judgment evidence did not support Marlowe’s claim that the
subject waterfront property was transferred into private
ownership by Spain in the early 1800s. It instead concluded that
the evidence established beyond a genuine dispute of material fact
that the unplatted land east of Marlowe’s property and separating
the platted property from Hospital Creek was owned by the City
as sovereign.

       The trial court then addressed the default judgment
obtained by Marlowe against Toll Bridge Company. The court did
not find the default final judgment to be void, stating that it “[did]
not wish to question or rewrite the history of another case,” but
concluded that it was “not inclined to give any further validity to a
default decision against a company that stopped existing decades
before Marlowe even purchased the property.”

       As to the summary judgment in favor of the Van Dykes, the
trial court found that even if Marlowe possessed riparian rights,
under this court’s decision in Lake Conway Shores Homeowners
Ass’n v. Driscoll, 476 So. 2d 1306 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985), any
determination as to those rights could not affect the Van Dykes’
riparian rights because the Van Dykes’ property does not “adjoin”
Marlowe’s property. The court also separately found that any

                                  8
riparian rights claim asserted by Marlowe against the Van Dykes
was time-barred by section 95.12.

       On appeal, Marlowe asserts numerous arguments in support
of his request that this court reverse the summary judgment.
Applying the de novo standard of review, see Volusia Cnty. v.
Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P., 760 So. 2d 126, 130 (Fla. 2000),
we find that four of Marlowe’s arguments merit reversal of the
final summary judgment.

                                 I.

      Marlowe argues that the trial court erred in finding that it
lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the “state action” theory
forwarded by the City. As previously indicated, the trial court
explained that “state action” required that “there must be some
deprivation, taking or infringement by the sovereign against a
private citizen’s property interest before that private citizen can
request [that the court] determine the sovereign’s property rights.”
We reverse on this issue for two reasons.

      First, Marlowe did not allege that the City took some
affirmative action depriving or infringing against his property
interests. Marlowe sought a declaration as to his own riparian
rights, injunctive relief against the owners of two pieces of private
property with two corresponding private docks, and to quiet title
to the easternmost waterfront portion of what he claimed to be his
own property. Marlowe did not allege, nor did his complaint
appear to contemplate, that the City might have some claim to that
land. Marlowe later added the City as a defendant in response to
the trial court’s finding, in an earlier order that it entered on a
motion to dismiss filed by a prior defendant, that the City was an
indispensable party because its riparian rights arising from the
City’s ownership of adjacent property might be affected by a
determination of Marlowe’s riparian rights, if any.

       It was the City, in fact, that first suggested sovereign
ownership of the property that Marlowe claimed to own. The City
filed its motion for summary judgment and presented evidence in
the form of records from the St. Johns County Property Appraiser
that conflicted with Marlowe’s evidence as to ownership. To the

                                 9
extent that the City’s subsequent claim of ownership over land to
which Marlowe sought to quiet title somehow transformed
Marlowe’s claim into one seeking a determination of a sovereign’s
property rights, the City’s claim of ownership in derogation of
Marlowe’s claim of ownership that he based on deeds and the
default judgment against Toll Bridge Company would arguably
satisfy the requirement of a “deprivation, taking, or infringement.”

      Second, the authorities cited by the trial court in its order do
not support the City’s “state action” argument. In Blessey v.
Walton County, Case No. 3:18cv1415/MCR/CJK, 2018 WL 4291735
(N.D. Fla. Sept. 7, 2018), a beachfront property owner filed suit in
federal court seeking a declaration that Florida’s common law
“customary use doctrine”—providing that “the public maintains a
right to use the dry sand beach adjacent to the mean high-water
line without interference by the property owner”—was
unconstitutional. Id. at *1. To demonstrate the injury to his own
property that was a prerequisite to obtaining the declaration that
he sought, the plaintiff alleged only that the county was
“intending” to assert “customary use” over all shoreline in the
county, including shoreline owned by the plaintiff. Id. at *2.

       The federal district court found that until the county
actually asserted customary use over the plaintiff’s property, his
requested declaratory relief was premature. Id. at *4 (“Addressing
a challenge to the common law doctrine with no state action and
no concrete or immediate threat of injury would require [the court]
to make a constitutional determination based on hypothetical
facts” and “in the abstract, which [the court] may not do.” (citing
Gagliardi v. TJCV Land Tr., 889 F.3d 728, 733 (11th Cir. 2018);
In re Checking Acct. Overdraft Litig., 780 F.3d 1031, 1038 (11th
Cir. 2015))).

     Blessey is inapposite to the resolution of the instant case.
Marlowe’s complaint does not seek a declaration as to some future
action that the City is considering, and Marlowe’s complaint
alleges an actual injury supporting his requested relief—that is,
Marlowe alleges that his neighbors’ docks interfere with his
riparian rights. Therefore, unlike the plaintiff in Blessey, Marlowe
is not seeking a declaration “in the abstract” or “based on
hypothetical facts.” Gagliardi is likewise inapposite to the instant

                                 10
case. See Gagliardi, 889 F.3d at 732–34 (holding that a property
owner’s lawsuit in federal court seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief against a city related to the city’s approval of the building of
a religious center in a residential area became moot when other
property owners sued the city in state court seeking to block that
same project and successfully obtained for all similarly situated
property owners the relief that the Gagliardi plaintiffs sought in
federal court).

                                  II.

      We next address the default judgment that Marlowe
obtained against Toll Bridge Company in the separate suit.
Marlowe argued, among other things, that the default final
judgment evidenced his interest in a portion of the subject real
property. In granting summary judgment to the City, the trial
court stopped short of declaring the default final judgment against
Toll Bridge Company to be void. It did, however, express that it
was “not inclined to give any further validity to a default decision
against a company that stopped existing decades before Marlowe
even purchased the property.” To the extent that the trial court,
in the context of a summary judgment, disregarded the default
judgment because Toll Bridge Company was a long-dissolved
Florida corporation, the court erred.

       Marlowe served his quiet title complaint upon Toll Bridge
Company by publication. “Service of process by publication may
be made in any court on any party identified in [section 49.021,
Florida Statutes], in any action or proceeding” to, inter alia, “quiet
title or remove any encumbrance, lien, or cloud on the title to any
real or personal property within the jurisdiction of the court.” §
49.011(2), Fla. Stat. (2015).

      “Where personal service of process or, if appropriate, service
of process under [section] 48.194[5] cannot be had, service of process

    5 Section 48.194, Florida Statutes (2015), controls personal

service of process outside of the State of Florida.

                                  11
by publication may be had upon any party, natural or corporate,
known or unknown, including,” inter alia, “[a]ny corporation or
other legal entity, whether its domicile be foreign, domestic, or
unknown, and whether dissolved or existing, and, when described
as such, the unknown assigns, successors in interest, trustees, or
any other party claiming by, through, under, or against any named
corporation or legal entity.” § 49.021(2), Fla. Stat. (2015). This
statute does not provide any time limit on how long a corporation
may be dissolved and still be served by publication. Therefore, the
trial court’s premise in the proceeding below in which it apparently
weighed and then summarily disregarded evidence of the default
judgment because Toll Bridge Company has long been dissolved
was incorrect. 6

    6 To the extent that the City and the Van Dykes argue, and

the trial court implied, that the default judgment could be declared
void based on lack of personal jurisdiction over Toll Bridge
Company, actions that are in rem or quasi in rem, which would
include Marlowe’s quiet title action against Toll Bridge Company,
do not require the establishment of personal jurisdiction over a
defendant landowner. See Hinton v. Gold, 813 So. 2d 1057, 1059
(Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (citing McDaniel v. McElvy, 108 So. 820, 830
(Fla. 1926); T.J.K. v. N.B., 237 So. 2d 592, 594 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970);
Wolf v. Indus. Guar. Bancorp., 281 So. 2d 598, 599 (Fla. 3d DCA
1973)); Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot.
ex rel Bd. of Trs. of the Int. Imp. Trust Fund, 78 So. 3d 31, 33 (Fla.
2d DCA 2011). However, a trial court obtains jurisdiction in such
actions “only after the plaintiff wishing to bring suit complies with
the requirements of due process,” which requires “that the
defendant be given fair notice and a reasonable opportunity to be
heard before a judgment is rendered.” Hinton, 813 So. 2d at 1059–
60 (citing Ryan’s Furniture Exch. v. McNair, 162 So. 483, 487 (Fla.
1935); Wyatt v. Haese, 649 So. 2d 905, 907–08 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)).
Service of process by publication, when effected in compliance with
statutory requirements, satisfies this due process requirement for
in rem jurisdiction. See, e.g., Honegger v. Coastal Fertilizer &
Supply, Inc., 712 So. 2d 1161, 1162 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (citing
Bedford Comput. Corp. v. Graphic Press, Inc., 484 So. 2d 1225,
1227 (Fla. 1986); Est. of Bobinger v. Deltona Corp., 563 So. 2d 739,
748 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)).

                                 12
     Neither the Van Dykes nor the City presented any evidence
or argument that Marlowe failed to comply with Florida’s service
of process by publication statutes, nor did the trial court make any
such finding. Furthermore, to the extent that the trial court found
that the default judgment was unenforceable because, as a matter
of law, the City, and not Toll Bridge Company, owned the subject
property, we conclude that there are genuine disputes of material
fact that preclude summary judgment. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(a)
(requiring a showing “that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact” and that “the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law” before a summary judgment may be granted).

    At the summary judgment hearing, both Marlowe and the
City presented and relied upon the original 1924 plat map of the
development area encompassing all of the parties’ subject
properties. The plat map identified Toll Bridge Company as the
owner of the proposed development. Marlowe presented a chain of
deeds arguably supporting Toll Bridge Company’s ownership of
the subject property, including the easternmost portion of the
surveyed and platted property in dispute.

      That easternmost portion of the surveyed and platted
property was dedicated as a roadway in the 1924 plat map.
However, the road was never built, and the dedicated right-of-way
was expressly abandoned by the City by ordinance in 1966. As
demonstrated in the paragraphs that follow, because Toll Bridge
Company may arguably have held title to the entire dedicated-
then-abandoned roadway, 7 comprising the easternmost boundary
of the surveyed and platted property, and because the evidence

    7 See Pelican Creek Homeowners, LLC v. Pulverenti, 243 So.

3d 467, 470–71 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018); Lehmann v. Cocoanut Bayou
Ass’n, 269 So. 3d 599, 608–10 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019). We reject,
without further discussion, the City’s and the Van Dykes’
argument that section 177.085(2), Florida Statutes (1972),
undermines Marlowe’s theory as to Toll Bridge Company’s
ownership of the easternmost portion of the subject platted
property. See Pelican Creek Homeowners, 243 So. 3d at 472–73;
Lehmann, 269 So. 3d at 613–14.

                                13
presented by the City through the St. Johns County Property
Appraiser records attributed ownership of the easternmost,
waterfront portion of the disputed property to the City, a genuine
dispute of material fact exists as to whether the City or Toll Bridge
Company owned the easternmost, waterfront portion of the
property claimed by Marlowe when Marlowe obtained the default
judgment against Toll Bridge Company in adverse possession.

     While the City maintains that there have always been
unsurveyed and unplatted sovereign lands between the subject
platted property and the waters of Hospital Creek, Marlowe
asserted that the platted property (particularly, the dedicated-
then-abandoned roadway comprising the eastern boundary of the
platted property) was originally waterfront property and that all
of the unplatted waterfront land to the east was newly formed
since the dedication of the plat in 1924. The summary judgment
evidence on this issue is conflicting, with some maps from the
1920s depicting a large and undefined space between the creek and
the platted property, with other maps from the 1920s suggestive
that the creek’s waters ran closer to the platted property. One map
also depicted the waters of the creek bordering and slightly
overlapping the platted property.

      This disputed fact bears upon ownership of all of the land
between the platted property and Hospital Creek. If the platted
property was waterfront property, then the upland owner of the
easternmost portion of platted property could have arguably held
title to the newly formed land adjacent thereto, whether that land
was formed by accretion or by the City’s filing activities. Compare
Walton Cnty. v. Stop Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102,
1111–12 (Fla. 2008) (recognizing the riparian/littoral 8 right to
ownership of accretions), with § 253.12(9), Fla. Stat. (1993)
(granting, under certain circumstances, the state’s right, title, and

    8   “Riparian” technically refers to rights appurtenant to
ownership of property abutting a river or stream, while “littoral”
refers to rights appurtenant to ownership of property abutting an
ocean, sea, or lake. Nevertheless, Florida case law and the Florida
Statutes often use the terms interchangeably. See Stop Beach
Renourishment, 998 So. 2d at 1105 n.3.

                                 14
interest in tidally influenced land that has been created by fill
before July 1, 1975, to “the landowner having record or other title
to all or a portion thereof or to the lands immediately upland
thereof and its successors in interest”). This Court need not, and
we therefore do not, reach the hypothetical issue of whether Toll
Bridge Company, if it owned originally waterfront property and if
the new land was formed by the City’s filling activities, could have
obtained title to the newly formed land pursuant to section
253.12(9). The genuinely disputed factual issues of who owned the
easternmost portion of the disputed property and whether the
platted property was originally waterfront property—not to
mention the unsettled issue of whether the newly formed land was
created by accretion, by fill, or by a combination of both—render
erroneous the trial court’s summary judgment.

                                 III.

      Turning to the summary judgment entered in favor of the
Van Dykes on Marlowe’s claim of riparian rights, the trial court,
citing to this court’s decision in Lake Conway Shores, determined
that whatever may be the riparian rights of Marlowe, they could
not affect the Van Dykes’ riparian rights because the Van Dykes’
property was not directly adjacent to Marlowe’s property. We
reverse.

      Lake Conway Shores does not support this conclusion that
the determination of a waterfront property owner’s riparian rights
could only possibly affect the riparian rights of immediately
adjacent waterfront property owners. See 476 So. 2d 1306. The
only relevant holding from Lake Conway Shores, which is not
dispositive of the instant parties’ summary judgment motions, is
that using the “prolongation of property line” method (i.e.,
extending the interested parties’ property lines into the navigable
waters to determine the areas in which the parties may exercise
their respective riparian rights) cannot be used if it eviscerates
another waterfront property owner’s riparian or littoral rights.
See id. at 1308–09. Here, a “riparian survey” filed by Marlowe
similarly used the “prolongation of property line” method to draw
“riparian boundaries,” but the “riparian lane” proposed in the
survey veered toward and even cut across the Van Dykes’ property.

                                15
      The Florida Supreme Court’s opinion in Hayes v. Bowman,
91 So. 2d 795 (Fla. 1957), is instructive. The parties in that case
disputed the proper location of riparian or littoral lanes. Id. at 798.
Each party used different angles to prolong their property line into
an available channel. Id. The Florida Supreme Court recognized
the bedrock common law riparian rights of “an unobstructed view”
and “access,” holding that

              the common law riparian rights to an
              unobstructed view and access to the
              Channel over the foreshore across the
              waters toward the Channel must be
              recognized over an area as near “as
              practicable” in the direction of the
              Channel so as to distribute equitably the
              submerged lands between the upland and
              the Channel.

Id. at 801.

      The court, however, observed the difficulty at times in
protecting and establishing these rights, holding:

                     It is absolutely impossible to
              formulate a mathematical or geometrical
              rule that can be applied to all situations of
              this nature. The angles (direction) of side
              lines of lots bordering navigable waters
              are limited only by the number of points
              on a compass rose. Seldom, if ever, is the
              thread of a channel exactly or even
              approximately parallel to the shoreline of
              the mainland. These two conditions make
              the mathematical or geometrical certainly
              [sic] implicit in the rules recommended by
              the contesting parties literally impossible.
              We must therefore search elsewhere for a
              solution to this admittedly difficult
              problem.

Id.

                                   16
       In other words, the court appeared to appreciate that when
determining riparian rights, there is no exclusive right to any
geometrically drawn “riparian lane.” In some circumstances, such
as with a relatively straight shoreline and consistently straight
navigable channel, those rights might look like or take the shape
of straight “lanes” with docks, but that is often not true:

                     Riparian rights do not necessarily
              extend into the waters according to upland
              boundaries nor do such rights under all
              conditions extend at right angles to the
              shore line.    Our own precedents are
              completely     inconsistent     with     the
              appellees’ view that such rights extend
              over an area measured by lines at right
              angles to the Channel. It should be borne
              in mind that littoral or riparian rights are
              appurtenances to ownership of the
              uplands.     They are not founded on
              ownership of the submerged lands. It is
              for this reason, among others that we
              cannot define the area within which the
              rights    are    to   be    enjoyed    with
              mathematical exactitude or by a metes
              and bounds description.

Id. at 802.

      From these principles, we conclude that the fact that the Van
Dykes’ property is not directly adjacent to Marlowe’s property does
not show, beyond a genuine dispute of material fact, that a
determination of Marlowe’s riparian rights could not possibly
affect the Van Dykes’ own riparian rights. The trial court,
therefore, erred in entering summary judgment in favor of the Van
Dykes on this basis.

      The trial court also held that Marlowe’s claim against the
Van Dykes to set the riparian rights was barred by the seven-year
statute of limitations codified in section 95.12. This statute
provides, in its entirety:

                                  17
            No action to recover real property or its
            possession shall be maintained unless the
            person seeking recovery or the person’s
            ancestor, predecessor, or grantor was
            seized or possessed of the property within
            7 years before the commencement of the
            action.

§ 95.12, Fla. Stat. (2004).

       As such, the plain language of section 95.12 applies to
actions involving the recovery of real property or its possession.
Here, Marlowe did not assert a claim against the Van Dykes
seeking the recovery or possession of real property; rather, as
indicated, the Van Dykes are joined because a determination as to
Marlowe’s riparian rights could affect the Van Dykes riparian
rights arising from their nearby waterfront property. We find that
the trial court erred in ruling that Marlowe’s claim against the Van
Dykes was time-barred by section 95.12.

      In summary, we reverse the final summary judgment
entered in favor of the City and the Van Dykes, and we remand for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

      REVERSED and REMANDED.

WALLIS and HARRIS, JJ., concur.

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