Court Opinion

ID: 9580912
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:10:12.099196+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:35.823202
License: Public Domain

SCHWAB, C. J.,
dissenting.
I would reverse the manslaughter conviction.
A person commits criminal homicide when he “causes the death of another human being.” ORS 163.005 (1). Criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter when it “is committed recklessly.” ORS 163.125 (1) (a). Reckless means “that a person is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the result [death] will occur.” ORS 161.085 (9).
As I see it, the question is whether defendant’s reckless conduct “caused” the death of the victim. The problem here is not “causation in fact,” it is “legal causation.” See generally, LaFave and Scott, Criminal Law 246-267 (1972); Perkins, Criminal Law 685-738 (2d ed 1969). In unusual eases like this one, whether certain conduct is deemed to be the legal cause of a certain result is ultimately a policy question. The question of legal causation thus blends into the question of whether we are willing to hold a defendant responsible for a prohibited result. Or, stated differently, the issue is not causation, it is responsibility. In my opinion, policy considerations are against imposing *496responsibility for the death of a participant① in a race on the surviving racer when his sole contribution to the death is the participation in the activity mutually agreed upon.
Commonwealth v. Root, 403 Pa 571, 170 A2d 310, 82 ALR2d 452 (1961), illustrates the rule I would adopt. In that case, two persons were racing their cars on the highway. One of the racers collided with another car, resulting in that racer’s death. The court reversed the surviving racer’s manslaughter conviction, holding the necessary legal causation to be absent as to a fellow participant in the race, but suggesting legal causation② would be present had the victim not been a participant. Accord: Thacker v. State, 103 Ga App 36, 117 SE2d 913 (1961).
The facts of Commonwealth v. Atencio, 345 Mass 627, 189 NE2d 223 (1963), are another illustration. In that case, three persons were playing “Russian roulette” and one of them shot and killed himself. A sur*497vivor’s conviction for manslaughter, i.e., recklessly causing the death of another, was affirmed. I would vote to reverse such a conviction. Since the participants had knowingly and voluntarily joined in a reckless course of conduct, I would not impose liability for manslaughter on the survivors.
It is not unheard of for people to engage in hazardous vocations and avocations. It could be said, for example, that professional racetrack drivers earn their living by consciously disregarding a substantial risk that death will occur on the racetrack. Yet, it would probably strike most people as strange if the surviving drivers were prosecuted for manslaughter following a fatal racetrack accident. But that result could follow from the majority’s analysis of legal causation; that result would not be possible under my analysis.
And some people engage in recreational activities — everything from skydiving to deep-sea diving— knowing they involve a risk of death. Suppose two fishermen knowingly and voluntarily take a small boat into the ocean even though a severe storm is predicted. Each encourages the other to do so. If one drowned in the storm, would we say the survivor “caused” his death? The majority’s analysis would answer that question in the affirmative; my analysis would answer it in the negative.
My point is that people frequently join together in reckless conduct. As long as all participants do so knowingly and voluntarily, I see no point in holding the survivor(s) guilty of manslaughter if the reckless conduct results in death. Contrary to the majority, I find no expression of legislative policy on this issue in the manslaughter statute, or in any other statute. The *498issue here is “legal causation,” an issue which has been traditionally left to the courts.③ Of course, all participants could be prosecuted if their reckless conduct constitutes some other offense. And all participants could be prosecuted if their reckless conduct results in the death or injury of a nonparticipant. Drawing the line at that point, however, seems to be a sufficient deterrent to me. Extending the concept of legal causation beyond that point, as the majority does, can only be justified to deter people from jointly engaging in hazardous activity, knowing what the risks are and being willing to take them. I would leave that a matter of choice for each individual.
Finally, I join the majority in affirming defendant’s conviction for failure to perform the duties required of a driver “involved in an accident.” ORS 483.602 (1) and (2). I would hold “involved in an accident” means either physical involvement or doing an act that was a contributing cause in fact of an accident. There was evidence from which the trier of fact was entitled to conclude that defendant’s act of racing contributed to causing the fatal accident.

 Although the victim in this case was a passenger in one of the cars, rather than a driver, he was there knowingly and voluntarily. Indeed, there was evidence that he first suggested the idea of racing. Thus, I regard the victim as a participant in the race. Cf., Nikkila v. Niemi, 248 Or 594, 433 P2d 825 (1968); Annotation, 84 ALR2d 448 (1962). Admittedly, it is difficult to reconcile the language of Nikkila with the language of Lemons v. Kelly, 239 Or 354, 360, 397 P2d 784 (1964), quoted by the majority.

The suggestion is implicit in the holding rather than contained in the language of the opinion. As pointed out by LaFave and Scott, Criminal Law at 265, in analyzing the Pennsylvania court’s holding in Commonwealth v. Root, 403 Pa 571, 170 A2d 310, 82 ALR2d 452 (1961), and in Commonwealth v. Redline, 391 Pa 486, 137 A2d 472 (1958):
“It is submitted that the true reason for the holding in these two cases is the court’s feeling, not clearly expressed in the two cases, that A should not, in all justice, be held for the death of B who was an equally willing and foolhardy participant in the bad conduct which caused his death * *

 “* * * Since most penal codes contain no statutory provision defining causation, imputing responsibility to a defendant for having ‘caused’ or brought about a result requires finding a standard that fits the policy underlying the particular crime, as defined by statute * * Ruy, Causation in Criminal Law, U of Pa Law Rev 773, 785 (1958).