Court Opinion

ID: 9881901
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-04 16:28:26.698199+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:23.298231
License: Public Domain

J-S31005-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  SAUL ALVAREZ                                       :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                                     :        PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellant                     :
                                                     :
                                                     :
                v.                                   :
                                                     :
                                                     :
  JOSEPH TERRA                                       :   No. 782 EDA 2023

              Appeal from the Order Entered December 1, 2022
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Civil Division at No(s):
                              2022-09460-MJ

BEFORE: OLSON, J., STABILE, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:                                      FILED OCTOBER 4, 2023

       Appellant, Saul Alvarez, appeals from the December 1, 2022 order

dismissing his petition for writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum and petition

for leave to proceed in forma pauperis.                   We affirm, albeit on different

grounds.1

       The facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. Appellant

initiated the present matter on November 29, 2022 by filing a petition for writ

of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum and petition for leave to proceed in forma

pauperis. In Appellant’s petition for habeas corpus, he sought relief regarding

his    sentences       imposed        at       the       following   criminal   dockets:

CP-15-CR-0003051-2007 (hereinafter, “Docket Number 3051-2007”) and
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1 It “is well settled that where the result is correct, an appellate court may

affirm a lower court’s decision on any ground without regard to the ground
relied upon by the lower court itself.” Commonwealth v. Lehman, 275 A.3d
513, 520 n.5 (Pa. Super. 2022) (quotation omitted).
J-S31005-23

CP-15-CR-0001959-2013        (hereinafter,   “Docket     Number   1959-2013”).

Appellant alleged that the trial court failed to “award him []credit for time

served prior to his [v]iolation of [p]robation” and, as such, issued an illegal

sentence. Appellant’s Petition, 11/29/22, at 5. Appellant also set forth claims

of ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 9-14.

      On December 1, 2022, the trial court entered an order dismissing

Appellant’s petition for habeas corpus relief pursuant to Pa.R.Civ.P. 240(j)(1)

(“If, simultaneous with the commencement of an action or proceeding or the

taking of an appeal, a party has filed a petition for leave to proceed in forma

pauperis, the court prior to acting upon the petition may dismiss the action,

proceeding or appeal if the allegation of poverty is untrue or if it is satisfied

that the action, proceeding or appeal is frivolous.”). The trial court did so

based upon its conclusion that “the relief requested [was] only cognizable

pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act             [(“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A.

§§ 9541-9546]” and that, “as presented, th[e] action lack[ed] an arguable

basis in law and fact.” Trial Court Order, 12/1/22, at 1, n.1. The trial court

also dismissed Appellant’s petition for leave to proceed in forma pauperis as

moot. Trial Court Order, 12/1/22, at 1. Thereafter, on February 9, 2023,

Appellant filed an application for leave to file an appeal nunc pro tunc, which

the trial court granted the next day. Trial Court Order, 2/10/23, at 1. This

appeal followed.

      Appellant raises the following issues on appeal:

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          1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion and/or
             committed an error of law in denying and dismissing
             Appellant’s petition for writ of habeas corpus ad
             subjiciendum without a hearing or issu[ing] a rule to show
             cause?

          2. Why this appeal should         not   be   transferred   to   the
             Commonwealth Court?

          3. Did the sentencing court err as a matter of law or fact when
             it sentenced [Appellant] in violation of 42 Pa.C.S.[A.]
             § 9760(1) by not awarding [Appellant] credit for time served
             prior to his violation of probation?

          4. Did the trial court err as a matter of law when it s[e]ntenced
             [Appellant] in violation of 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9725[] by failing
             to regard the nature and circumstances of the crime and the
             history, character and condition of [Appellant]?

Appellant’s Brief at 4 (superfluous capitalization omitted, emphasis added).

      When confronted with a filing styled as a petition for habeas corpus, but

which sets froth claims cognizable under the PCRA, this Court has previously

stated:

          It is well-established that the timeliness of a PCRA petition is
          jurisdictional and that if the petition is untimely, courts lack
          jurisdiction over the petition and cannot grant relief. [T]he
          PCRA is intended to be the sole means of achieving
          post-conviction collateral relief. If an issue is cognizable under
          the PCRA, the issue must be raised in a timely PCRA petition
          and cannot be raised in a petition for writ of habeas corpus. In
          other words, a defendant cannot escape the PCRA time-bar by
          titling his petition or motion as a writ of habeas corpus.
          Moreover, regardless of how a petition is titled, courts are to
          treat a petition filed after a judgment of sentence becomes final
          as a PCRA petition if it requests relief contemplated by the
          PCRA.

Commonwealth v. Fantauzzi, 275 A.3d 986, 994–995 (Pa. Super. 2022)

(internal quotations, citations and brackets omitted).

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      Appellant, on November 29, 2022, filed a petition titled “writ for habeas

corpus ad subjiciendum,” arguing that, because the trial court failed to award

him with credit for time served, the trial court issued an illegal sentence.

Appellant’s Petition, 11/29/22, at 5-9. In addition, Appellant raised various

claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 9-14. Thus, Appellant’s

submission set forth issues cognizable under the PCRA.         See 42 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 9543(a)(2)(i) (authorizing collateral relief where conviction or sentence

results from violation of Pennsylvania Constitution or the Constitution or laws

of the United States); Commonwealth v. Wyatt, 115 A.3d 876, 879 (Pa.

Super. 2015) (“It [is] only when the petitioner challenges the legality of a trial

court's alleged failure to award credit for time served as required by law in

imposing sentence, that a challenge to the sentence [is] deemed cognizable

as a due process claim in PCRA proceedings.”) (citation omitted); see also 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(ii) (authorizing collateral relief where conviction or

sentence results from ineffective assistance of counsel). As such, the court

was required to      treat Appellant’s filing as a PCRA petition.            See

Commonwealth v. Torres, 223 A.3d 715, 716 (Pa. Super. 2019) (stating,

“so long as a pleading falls within the ambit of the PCRA, the court should

treat any pleading filed after the judgment of sentence is final as a PCRA

petition”) (citation omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Hromek, 232 A.3d

881, 884 (Pa. Super. 2020) (“Generally, the PCRA ‘shall be the sole means of

obtaining collateral relief and encompasses all other common law and

statutory remedies . . . including habeas corpus and coram nobis.’”) (quotation

                                      -4-
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and citation omitted). Therefore, before considering the merits of Appellant’s

submission, we must first determine whether it is timely under the PCRA's

jurisdictional time-bar.

      A PCRA petition, “including a second or subsequent petition, shall be

filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final.” 42 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 9545(b)(1). Judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review,

“including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and

the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking

the review.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). Herein, Appellant’s petition related

to two criminal dockets: Docket Number 3051-2007 and Docket Number

1959-2013. Upon review, we conclude that Appellant’s judgment of sentence

at Docket Number 3051-2007 became final on January 9, 2008, when the

30-day time period for filing a direct appeal to this Court expired after the

Appellant entered his guilty plea and the trial court issued its sentence. See

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3); see also Pa.R.A.P. 903 (notice of appeal “shall be

filed within 30 days after the entry of the order from which the appeal is

taken”). In addition, we conclude that Appellant’s judgment of sentence at

Docket Number 1959-2013 became final on June 12, 2014, when the 30-day

time period for filing a direct appeal to this Court expired after the Appellant

entered his guilty plea and the trial court issued its sentence. See id. Based

upon the foregoing, we conclude that Appellant’s current petition, filed on

November 29, 2022, is patently untimely, as it was filed more than 14 years

after his judgment of sentence at Docket Number 3051-2007 became final

                                     -5-
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and eight years after his judgment of sentence at Docket Number 1959-2013

became final.

      There are, however, three exceptions to the one-year PCRA time-bar,

set forth at 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1).      Indeed, Section 9545(b) provides

that, to surmount the PCRA’s timeliness requirements, a petitioner must allege

and prove that:

       (i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of
       interference by government officials with the presentation of
       the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this
       Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States;

       (ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown
       to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the
       exercise of due diligence; or

       (iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was
       recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the
       Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided
       in this section and has been held by that court to apply
       retroactively.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). Additionally, Section 9545(b)(2) requires

that any petition attempting to invoke one of these exceptions “be filed within

one year of the date the claim could have been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 9545(b)(2).

      Herein, Appellant makes no attempt to plead and prove, much less

invoke, one of the enumerated exceptions to the PCRA’s time-bar.               As

indicated above, the PCRA is “the sole means of achieving post-conviction

collateral relief” and Appellant “cannot escape the PCRA time-bar by titling his

petition . . . as a writ of habeas corpus” and baldly asserting its jurisdictional

                                      -6-
J-S31005-23

requirements are inapplicable. Fantauzzi, 275 A.3d at 995 (citation omitted).

Because Appellant's petition was untimely and because he failed to properly

invoke an exception to the PCRA's timeliness requirements, neither the trial

court nor this Court has jurisdiction over the instant claims for collateral relief,

including all claims alleging that trial counsel was ineffective or that the trial

court imposed an illegal sentence.2              Accordingly, we affirm the order

dismissing Appellant's PCRA petition.

       Order affirmed.

Date: October 4, 2023

____________________________________________

2   Appellant, of course, remains free to litigate claims before the
Commonwealth Court which challenge the Department of Corrections
calculation of his sentence. See Wyatt, 115 A.3d at 879 (“If the alleged error
is thought to be the result of an erroneous computation of sentence by the
Bureau of Corrections, then the appropriate vehicle for redress would be an
original action in the Commonwealth Court challenging the Bureau's
computation”) (citation omitted).

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