Court Opinion

ID: 9950726
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-14 17:03:48.392766+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:36:15.382756
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/14/24

                              CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 THE PEOPLE,                                        H051311
                                                   (Santa Clara County
           Petitioner,                              Super. Ct. No. C2200594)

           v.

 THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SANTA
 CLARA COUNTY;

           Respondent;

 JOHN KEVIN WOODWARD,

           Real Party in Interest.

       In this petition for extraordinary writ relief, we consider whether constitutional
prohibitions against double jeopardy bar the refiling of a murder charge after its dismissal
by court order in 1996 following two mistrials.
       In 1992, John Kevin Woodward was charged with the murder of Laurie Houts.
The case proceeded to trial and twice resulted in deadlocked juries and declarations of
mistrial. After the second mistrial in 1996, the trial court dismissed the case pursuant to
Penal Code former section 1385.1 In a written order, the trial court explained the
dismissal was “in the furtherance of justice for insufficiency of the evidence.”

       1
           Unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
       Advancements in DNA technology led to new evidence against Woodward. In
2022, the Santa Clara County District Attorney (district attorney) refiled the murder
charge against him. Woodward moved to dismiss the complaint on double jeopardy
grounds. The trial court agreed that the 1996 dismissal of the case for insufficiency of
the evidence operated as an acquittal and dismissed the refiled complaint.
       Petitioner district attorney brings this petition for writ of mandate. He asks this
court to order the trial court to vacate its dismissal order and enter a new order denying
real party in interest Woodward’s motion to dismiss. The district attorney disputes that
the murder charge against Woodward was dismissed due to legal insufficiency of the
evidence and contends the trial court erred in construing the 1996 dismissal order as an
acquittal.
       We agree. Applying the standard articulated in People v. Hatch (2000) 22 Cal.4th
260 (Hatch), we decide the trial court’s section 1385 dismissal order does not clearly
indicate an intent to dismiss for legally insufficient evidence and preclude retrial. As
double jeopardy principles do not bar the refiling of the case against Woodward, we will
issue a peremptory writ directing the trial court to vacate its order dismissing the refiled
murder charge.
                  I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
              A. 1992–1996 Murder Prosecution
       On September 5, 1992, Laurie Houts was found dead in her car, parked about one
mile from her place of work in Mountain View. She had been strangled with a rope
while seated in the driver’s seat. The rope had been pulled through her mouth like a gag,
knotted behind the neck, and left in place. The cause of death was strangulation.
       Woodward was identified as a suspect. At the time, he lived with Houts’s
boyfriend Brent Fulmer. Woodward had reportedly displayed possessive behavior
toward Fulmer and became jealous when Houts began spending time with Fulmer. Two
latent fingerprints belonging to Woodward were recovered on the outside of Houts’s car,
                                                  2
and fibers collected from masking tape on the free end of the rope used to strangle Houts
showed characteristics similar to the outside of Woodward’s sweatpants. Woodward had
no alibi for the window of time in which Houts was killed. During a pretext phone call
between Woodward and Fulmer, Woodward never denied killing Houts. Based on these
and other circumstances and evidence, the district attorney charged Woodward with
Houts’s murder.
       The first jury trial resulted in a hung jury, with the majority (8 to 4) voting for
acquittal. The prosecution elected to retry the case, resulting in a second jury deadlock
with the majority (7 to 5) again voting for acquittal. The same judicial officer presided
over both trials.
               B. 1996 Dismissal of Case
       At a posttrial hearing on August 7, 1996, the trial court ordered the murder case
dismissed pursuant to former section 1385.2 The court’s dismissal order is reflected in
two documents issued on August 7, 1996, a minute order3 and a written order signed by
the judge (“written decision”) (collectively the “1996 dismissal order”).
       The minute order states as follows: “In open court at 9:49 [a.m.] with above-
named counsel and defendant present. [¶] The [c]ourt reads the written decision into the
record dismissing this case pursuant to Penal Code [s]ection 1385 based on insufficient
evidence. The written decision is ordered filed and defendant’s bail is ordered
exonerated.”

       2
          We refer to former section 1385 when referencing the version of section 1385 in
effect in 1996 when the trial court issued its dismissal order. (Former § 1385, as
amended (Stats. 1986, ch. 85, § 2, eff. May 6, 1986).)
        3
          The term “ ‘minute order’ ” generally refers to the written entry of a court’s
ruling into the minutes. (See Southwestern Law School v. Benson (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th
Supp. 1, 9.)

                                                  3
       The written decision cites the relevant factors for dismissing a case “in furtherance
of justice” under former section 1385, subdivision (a) (hereafter former section 1385(a))
and describes the prosecution theories and evidence presented in both jury trials.
       Regarding the evidence, it states that “[a] comparison of the first trial and the
second trial shows that the prosecution has presented no new evidence pointing to the
defendant’s guilt and there is no probability that new evidence will become available.
Absent new evidence there is no likelihood that a jury would be able to convict the
defendant of murder.” The decision critiques the quality of the evidence, noting that
while over 300 items of evidence and 30 witnesses were presented during each trial, “the
prosecution was not able to utilize the evidence to prove” guilt beyond a reasonable doubt
because “[t]he substantive quality of the evidence did not lend itself to proving the
prosecution’s contentions.” It explains, “This lack of quality meant that the prosecution
was limited to very little evidence with which to try its case. With the possible exception
of the fingerprints and the defendant’s apparent inconsistent statements, the vast majority
of the evidence does not point to the defendant’s guilt.”
       The written decision also addresses the prosecution’s theory that Woodward killed
Houts out of jealousy, stating there was “insufficient proof that such a jealousy existed.”
Citing Tibbs v. Florida (1982) 457 U.S. 31 (Tibbs), it explains that a dismissal would
further the interests of justice “by preventing the prosecution from honing its trial
strategies and perfecting its presentation of the evidence through successive attempts at
conviction.” It further cautions, citing Tibbs, that “[r]epeated prosecutions would create a
risk of conviction through sheer governmental perseverance.”
       The final two paragraphs of the written decision reiterate the trial court’s
reasoning for the dismissal order. It states, “The prosecution has not met its burden of
proof in two trials and absent new evidence it will be unable to do so in subsequent trials.
Another trial would only serve to harass the defendant. It is reasonable to believe that
society will not be endangered by this decision and the interest of justice will best be
                                                 4
served by a dismissal. [¶] A dismissal of this case is not meant to criticize the work done
by the prosecution or deprive the victim’s family of an opportunity to see their daughter’s
killer brought to justice. There is simply a lack of evidence on which to convict
[Woodward]. Without new evidence, the result of this case will be the same at each
successive trial. Due to the lack of evidence in this case, a jury will never be able to
reach a unanimous verdict of guilty. It appears that justice would best be served if the
charges were dismissed.” The decision orders “that the case be dismissed in the
furtherance of justice for insufficiency of the evidence.”
              C. 2022 Refiling of Murder Charge
       In 2021, the district attorney, Mountain View police detectives, and the Santa
Clara County crime lab collaborated in follow up on the investigation into Houts’s
murder. According to the declaration of Mountain View Police Department Detective
Sergeant David Fisher, whose statement of facts accompanied the refiling of charges
against Woodward, new technology applied to evidence in the case supports a finding of
Woodward’s guilt. This evidence includes a DNA sample collected from the rope that
had been found on Houts and fibers collected from Woodward’s sweatpants, as well as
the discovery of additional latent fingerprints on the outside of Houts’s vehicle.4
       In 2022, the district attorney refiled a felony complaint in the Santa Clara County
Superior Court charging Woodward with one count of murder, in violation of section

       4
        The evidence referenced in the declaration supporting the refiled complaint
includes the use of DNA technology to process a DNA sample collected from the end of
the rope that had been used to murder Houts. A Y-STR analysis of the sample
determined that Woodward’s DNA profile matched the DNA sample from the rope at all
25 markers, while a second DNA sample from the rope contained a mixture of at least
three male individuals and was unsuitable for comparison. Houts’s then-boyfriend
Fulmer and another male friend who had carpooled with Houts were both excluded as the
sources of the DNA. The 2021 follow up also identified two additional latent fingerprints
matching Woodward on the exterior of Houts’s car. In addition, new technology used by
the county crime lab to analyze the fibers from Woodward’s sweatpants showed the
fibers were indistinguishable from the fibers found on the rope.
                                                 5
187, subdivision (a). The complaint alleged, pursuant to section 1170, subdivision (b),
and California Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1), (a)(3), (a)(8), (a)(11), and (b)(1),
respectively, that the crime involved great violence, threat of great bodily harm, or other
acts disclosing a high degree of cruelty, viciousness, or callousness; that the victim was
particularly vulnerable; that the crime involved planning, sophistication, or
professionalism; that Woodward took advantage of a position of trust or confidence to
commit the offense; and that Woodward had engaged in violent conduct that indicated a
serious danger to society.
              D. Motion to Dismiss
       Woodward moved in the trial court to dismiss the charges, arguing that the
prosecution violated his state and federal constitutional protections against double
jeopardy. Woodward’s motion invoked the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution and article I, section 15 of the California Constitution.
       Woodward contended that under settled law as articulated by the California
Supreme Court in Hatch, supra, 22 Cal.4th 260, the 1996 dismissal order for
insufficiency of the evidence “serves the same function as an acquittal for double
jeopardy purposes” and bars retrial. In support of the motion to dismiss, Woodward
asked the trial court to take judicial notice of the 1996 dismissal order.
       The district attorney opposed the motion to dismiss. The district attorney argued
that a dismissal under section 1385 is not an acquittal for double jeopardy purposes under
Hatch unless the trial court clearly intended to exercise that power and applied the
substantial evidence standard, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, in deciding no reasonable jury could convict. (See Hatch, supra, 22 Cal.4th
at pp. 271, 273.) The district attorney disputed that the 1996 dismissal order offered any
clear indication that the trial court had intended the dismissal to serve as an acquittal or
applied the substantial evidence standard in deciding to dismiss the charges.

                                                  6
       The district attorney attached documents in support of its opposition, though it did
not request judicial notice of the items. These included Woodward’s motion for
judgment of acquittal, filed pursuant to section 1118.1 during the second trial, the
opposition thereto, and a minute order showing the trial court denied the motion for
judgment of acquittal, as well as a copy of an unfiled “motion to dismiss after deadlocked
jury” that “presumably” had been filed by Woodward’s deputy public defender after the
second mistrial (but was not found in the trial court’s review of its files). The district
attorney argued that the trial court’s denial of the acquittal motion, in which the parties
had expressly identified substantial evidence as the standard for acquittal based on
insufficient evidence, stood in contrast with the court’s later decision to dismiss the case
pursuant to section 1385. This, according to the district attorney’s opposition, illustrated
that the trial court “clearly knew what was required for a dismissal for insufficient
evidence as a matter of law” but elected instead to apply the standard for dismissal in
furtherance of justice.
       The opposition also attached a declaration of the prosecuting attorney for both
trials that expressed his recollection of the trial judge’s statements at the dismissal
hearing regarding refiling of the case; a contemporaneous newspaper article from the San
Jose Mercury News, dated August 22, 1996, covering the dismissal of charges and
statements by the prosecutor and defense counsel regarding the likelihood of refiling
charges; and an excerpt of Woodward’s motion to set bail in response to the refiled
charges. The district attorney argued that these materials further demonstrated that the
1996 dismissal order was not intended to preclude a later refiling of the case in the event
the district attorney obtained additional evidence against Woodward.
       In reply, Woodward countered that under former section 1385, only the minute
order (and not the concurrently filed written decision) should be used to determine the
effect of the dismissal. Woodward argued that the district attorney’s proffer of other
extrinsic evidence, such as the prosecutor’s declaration and the newspaper article, was
                                                  7
improper. Woodward argued the trial court should not consider the evidence and should
order it stricken. Woodward maintained that the district attorney’s argument failed to
recognize the 1996 dismissal order’s citation (in the written decision) to the United States
Supreme Court’s decision in Tibbs, which explains why a dismissal for insufficient
evidence bars a retrial. Both parties submitted additional briefing.
       At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the trial court indicated it had carefully
considered all the briefing and had made several attempts to find “any and all portions
of” the original court file. It explained that “[a]fter a very thorough and diligent search”
the court was unable to find any other portions of the trial court record.
       On August 22, 2023, the trial court issued a written order granting Woodward’s
motion to dismiss. It granted Woodward’s request for judicial notice of the 1996
dismissal order but rejected the argument that it should consider only the minute order
and not the written decision. The court declined to consider the unfiled, unsigned copy of
the “motion to dismiss after deadlocked jury” that arguably prompted the 1996 dismissal
order, since there was no file stamp or any indication that the motion had been filed, and
similarly declined to consider the declaration of the prosecutor, the newspaper article
regarding the 1996 dismissal, and the bail motion. The court reasoned that the section
1118.1 acquittal motion and opposition were of minimal relevance, insofar as they served
to contrast the discussion of substantial evidence with the absence of any reference to that
standard in the unfiled motion to dismiss but noted it would consider the acquittal motion
and opposition “to contrast their content with the standards articulated” in the written
decision.
       On the merits, the trial court evaluated the 1996 dismissal order under Hatch. It
found that while the 1996 dismissal order did not expressly apply the substantial evidence
standard, “the minute order clearly evidenced an intent to dismiss based on the
insufficiency of the evidence.” The court emphasized that the written decision cites
Mannes v. Gillespie (9th Cir. 1992) 967 F.2d 1310 (Mannes), in which the Ninth Circuit
                                                 8
Court of Appeals held that “ ‘ “[i]nsufficient evidence” ’ ” is a term of art, the use of
which courts have found to mean—absent contrary indication—insufficient as a matter of
law. (Id. at p. 1315.) While noting the written decision does not cite Mannes for that
proposition, the court found the citation to Mannes suggests the trial court was aware of
that use of the term “ ‘insufficient evidence.’ ” The court further reasoned that insofar as
former section 1385 required the reasons for the dismissal to appear in the minute order,
it was “telling” that the minute order listed only insufficiency of the evidence. The court
rejected the district attorney’s position that the dismissal was “in furtherance of justice”
based on the written decision’s invocation of those factors, since “all dismissals under
section 1385 were required to be in the interest of justice.”
              E. Writ Proceedings in this Court
       Shortly after the trial court issued its dismissal order, the district attorney filed in
this court a petition for writ of mandate and request for stay of order of dismissal
(petition). The district attorney requested that this court stay the trial court’s dismissal
order and “[i]ssue an alternative writ of mandate, and thereafter a peremptory writ,
commanding respondent court to vacate its order dismissing the complaint, and enter a
new order denying [r]eal [p]arty’s motion to dismiss; [or] [¶] . . . [¶] [] any other
appropriate relief.”
       This court issued a stay of the trial court’s order and requested that Woodward (as
real party in interest) file a preliminary opposition to the petition. After Woodward filed
his preliminary opposition, the district attorney filed a notice of appeal seeking appellate
review of the same dismissal order at issue in this writ proceeding. The appeal is pending
in this court (No. H051416) and currently awaits briefing.
       This court subsequently issued an order to show cause why a peremptory writ
should not issue, as requested by the district attorney. In his return, Woodward contends
there is no basis for granting writ relief because the 1996 dismissal order for
“ ‘insufficient evidence’ ” indicates the trial court deemed the evidence insufficient as a
                                                   9
matter of law, barring retrial. Woodward also challenges the petition on procedural
grounds, arguing in his demurrer that the petition fails to allege specific facts showing
entitlement to relief, including because the district attorney has not alleged the absence of
a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy justifying writ review.
       We analyze those objections below before turning to the merits of the petition.
                                     II. DISCUSSION
              A. Propriety of Writ Relief and Demurrer
       Woodward disputes the propriety of writ review in this case. He demurs to the
petition on the ground that it fails to state a claim showing entitlement to relief by not
explicitly alleging any error in the trial court’s August 22, 2023 dismissal of the charges.
He also contends that the petition fails to allege the lack of a plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy at law.
       We overrule the demurrer as to both grounds.
       A proceeding in mandamus is generally subject to the rules of pleading governing
civil actions. (Chapman v. Superior Court (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 261, 271 (Chapman),
citing Gong v. City of Fremont (1967) 250 Cal.App.2d 568, 573; Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 1109.) A petition that fails to allege specific facts showing entitlement to relief may be
subject to general demurrer. (Chapman, at p. 271.) We independently determine
whether the petition states a cause of action as a matter of law. (Jones v. Omnitrans
(2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 273, 277 (Jones).) In so doing, “[w]e give the petition a
reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and viewing its parts in context. We
deem to be true all material facts that were properly pled, as well as all facts that may be
inferred from those expressly alleged. [Citation.] We also accept as true all recitals of
evidentiary facts contained in exhibits attached to the petition. [Citation.] We interpret
the petition’s allegations liberally, with a view toward substantial justice between the
parties.” (Id. at pp. 277–278.)

                                                 10
       To be entitled to relief, the petitioner must show that the respondent has a clear,
present, and ministerial duty, and that the petitioner has a correlative right to performance
of that duty entitling him to a writ of mandate. (Kavanaugh v. West Sonoma County
Union High School Dist. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 911, 916; accord People v. Picklesimer
(2010) 48 Cal.4th 330, 340; In re Dohner (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 590, 597.) The
petitioner also must demonstrate “no ‘plain, speedy, and adequate’ alternative remedy
exists (Code Civ. Proc., § 1086).” (Picklesimer, at p. 340.)
       The district attorney’s verified petition meets these criteria. While the petition
does not explicitly aver that the respondent trial court erred, it alleges that the prosecution
opposed dismissal of the murder charge and attaches exhibits demonstrating the district
attorney’s opposition to dismissal of the charges against Woodward.
       Giving the petition a reasonable interpretation, it is apparent that the district
attorney is challenging the respondent court’s dismissal order as an erroneous application
of the law. The allegations imply a duty that the trial court is obligated to perform in a
prescribed manner required by law when a given state of facts exists. (Jones, supra, 125
Cal.App.4th at p. 278.) We decline to sustain the demurrer for failure to state a claim.
(See Chapman, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at p. 272.)
       We further conclude that writ review is proper under the circumstances presented.
Typically, mandamus relief will not issue if there is “a plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy” at law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1086.) Thus, “a judgment that is immediately
appealable is not subject to review by mandate or other extraordinary writ.” (Powers v.
City of Richmond (1995) 10 Cal.4th 85, 112.) However, an exception may arise “when
the remedy by appeal would be inadequate or the issues presented are of great public
importance and must be resolved promptly. [Citations.] A remedy by immediate direct
appeal is presumed to be adequate, and a party seeking review by extraordinary writ
bears the burden of demonstrating that appeal would not be an adequate remedy under the
particular circumstances of that case.” (Id. at p. 113.)
                                                  11
       “When the petitioner may immediately appeal, his remedy is considered adequate
and writ relief is precluded, unless the petitioner ‘can show some special reason why it is
rendered inadequate by the particular circumstances of his case.’ ” (Baeza v. Superior
Court (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1214, 1221 (Baeza).) “The adequacy of an appellate
remedy depends on the circumstances of the case, vesting a large measure of discretion in
the appellate court to grant or deny a writ.” (City of Oakland v. Superior Court (1996) 45
Cal.App.4th 740, 750.)
       The district attorney acknowledges that he has a right to appeal the dismissal order
(§ 1238, subd. (a)(8)) and has, in fact, noticed an appeal after filing the writ petition.
Nevertheless, the district attorney argues the right to an appeal does not preclude writ
relief because the circumstances here warrant expedited review of the trial court’s ruling.
       We agree that the factors asserted in the petition establish the inadequacy of the
remedy in the direct appeal. Specifically, the district attorney asserts there is a need to
ensure that Woodward remains subject to the court’s jurisdiction pending appellate
review of the dismissal order. Without such a retention of jurisdiction, Woodward might
be able to return to his primary place of residence outside the United States, risking a
potential delay of several years in extradition efforts to retrieve him if review were to
proceed successfully by direct appeal.5
       In addition to maintaining jurisdiction over Woodward, other considerations
render the right of appeal inadequate. These include the age of the case and the risk of

       5
          The petition includes exhibits related to this issue and to the district attorney’s
initial request to the trial court to stay its dismissal order until the writ petition was filed.
The declaration of Mountain View Police Department sergeant and primary investigator
for the case explains that Woodward’s primary residence and business are in the
Netherlands. Woodward was arrested “opportunistically” (not based on a voluntary
surrender) on the current charge during a vacation to New York in 2022 and is currently
residing out of custody on house arrest with a GPS monitor and living in a family home
in Modesto. According to the investigator, a dismissal and discharge from the court’s
jurisdiction will enable Woodward to return to his home and work in the Netherlands,
where any future extradition process would likely take several years.
                                                   12
loss of evidence (including aging witnesses) for both parties, the public’s interest and
victim’s family’s interest in the right to a speedy trial (Cal. Const., art. I, §§ 28, subds.
(b)(9), (e), 29 [providing the victim’s immediate family and the People the constitutional
right to a speedy trial]), and the interest in minimizing the duration of pretrial restraints
on Woodward. Woodward’s state and federal constitutional speedy trial rights (U.S.
Const., 6th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 15, cl. 1) attached in this case as of the time of
the 2022 refiling of the murder charge. (People v. Nelson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1242, 1250.)
Given the seriousness of the charge and date of the crime more than 30 years ago, further
delaying adjudication of the dismissal for double jeopardy only aggravates the potential
hardship for all parties awaiting resolution, including Woodward. (See U.S. v. Marion
(1971) 404 U.S. 307, 320 (Marion).)
       Woodward counters that the remedy of an appeal is not inadequate merely because
it might take longer than pursuing relief by extraordinary writ. (Duke v. Superior Court
(2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 490, 498.) Citing People v. Superior Court (Kaulick) (2013) 215
Cal.App.4th 1279, he also questions the district attorney’s assertion that maintaining
jurisdiction is provided by writ review and a stay, but not by appeal. However, Kaulick
does not assist Woodward. In that case, the appellate court determined that an appeal
would not provide a speedy and adequate remedy where the defendant “was scheduled
for imminent release” from prison. (Id. at p. 1296.) The court reasoned that even if it
stayed the matter while an appeal was pending, the matter required speedy resolution,
including because any delay in resolving an appeal would leave the defendant
unnecessarily incarcerated, contrary to his own interest as well as to the interest of the
“public fisc.” (Ibid., fn. 16.)
       Similarly in this case, even assuming a mechanism to retain court jurisdiction over
Woodward pending appeal, the age of the case, risk of evidence becoming lost or
growing more stale, interest of the victim’s immediate family as well as the people of
California in obtaining a speedy trial and resolution, and interest in not prolonging
                                                  13
Woodward’s pretrial restraint and home monitoring, together confirm that a direct appeal
in the ordinary course of law would be neither speedy nor adequate. (See U.S. Const.,
6th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, §§ 15, cl. 1, 28, subds. (b)(9), (e), 29; Marion, supra, 404
U.S. at p. 320.) We conclude that under the unusual circumstances of this case, the
prospect of a direct and immediate appeal of the dismissal order is inadequate to serve the
interests of the parties and the public. (Baeza, supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at p. 1221.) We
overrule the demurrer and turn to the merits of the petition.
              B. Standard of Review
       Where the question presented is one of law on undisputed facts, we exercise de
novo review and are not bound by the findings of the trial court. (Ghirardo v. Antonioli
(1994) 8 Cal.4th 791, 799.) Deference to trial court findings of fact does not extend to
rulings on questions of law. (People v. Aldridge (1984) 35 Cal.3d 473, 477.) Just as
courts determine the meaning and effect of a judgment “according to the rules governing
the interpretation of writings generally” (Rancho Pauma Mutual Water Co. v. Yuima
Municipal Water Dist. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 109, 115), we apply the same principles to
our review of the 1996 dismissal order. Because the underlying facts are undisputed, our
review of the trial court’s ruling on the operation of the 1996 dismissal order is de novo.
              C. Principles Governing Double Jeopardy After a Section 1385 Dismissal
       The constitutional principle of double jeopardy prohibits a defendant from being
“twice put in jeopardy” for the same offense. (U.S. Const., 5th & 14th Amends.; see also
Cal. Const., art. I, § 15.) It “ ‘serves principally as a restraint on courts and
prosecutors.’ ” (People v. Fields (1996) 13 Cal.4th 289, 298.) Under both the federal
and state Constitutions, the double jeopardy clause protects against a second prosecution
for the same offense after acquittal. (United States v. Wilson (1975) 420 U.S. 332, 342–
343; Hatch, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 271.) In applying double jeopardy protections,
California courts take guidance from “those decisions interpreting the double jeopardy
clauses of both the United States and California Constitutions.” (Hatch, at p. 271.)
                                                  14
       Under both federal and California law, the double jeopardy clause precludes retrial
if a court determines the evidence at trial was insufficient to support a conviction as a
matter of law. (Hatch, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 271, citing Burks v. United States (1978)
437 U.S. 1, 18; People v. Pierce (1979) 24 Cal.3d 199, 210.) A determination of legal
insufficiency of the evidence—whether made at the trial or appellate level—serves as a
constitutional bar to retrial for that offense. (Hatch, at p. 272; see Hudson v. Louisiana
(1981) 450 U.S. 40, 42–43.)
       On the other hand, “[w]here a court merely ‘disagrees with a jury’s resolution of
conflicting evidence and concludes that a guilty verdict is against the weight of the
evidence,’ [] a reversal or dismissal on that ground does not bar retrial.” (Hatch, supra,
22 Cal.4th at p. 272, quoting Tibbs, supra, 457 U.S. at p. 42.) The same exception
applies under California’s double jeopardy clause. “[T]he reversal of a conviction based
on a reweighing of evidence does not bar retrial under the California Constitution.”
(Hatch, at p. 272.)
       A reversal based on legal insufficiency of the evidence has the same double
jeopardy effect as an acquittal “because it means that no rational factfinder could have
voted to convict the defendant.” (Tibbs, supra, 457 U.S. at p. 41.) By contrast, a
determination based on the weight of the evidence “does not mean that acquittal was the
only proper verdict.” (Id. at p. 42.) Instead, the court “sits as a ‘thirteenth juror’ and
disagrees with the jury’s resolution of the conflicting testimony.” (Ibid.) As in the case
of a deadlocked jury, a court’s disagreement about the weight of the evidence “does not
result in an acquittal barring retrial under the Double Jeopardy Clause.” (Ibid.)
       The trial court dismissed Woodward’s case pursuant to section 1385. Since its
codification in 1872, section 1385 has authorized California courts to dismiss actions in
furtherance of justice. (§ 1385(a); People v. Bonnetta (2009) 46 Cal.4th 143, 149.)
       The trial court’s authority under section 1385 is “broad” but not “absolute.”
(People v. Orin (1975) 13 Cal.3d 937, 945 (Orin).) It is “limited by the amorphous
                                                  15
concept which requires that the dismissal be ‘in furtherance of justice.’ As the
Legislature has provided no statutory definition of this expression, appellate courts have
been faced with the task of establishing the boundaries of the judicial power conferred by
the statute as cases have arisen challenging its exercise. . . . [¶] From the case law,
several general principles emerge. Paramount among them is the rule ‘that the language
of that section, “furtherance of justice,” requires consideration both of the constitutional
rights of the defendant, and the interests of society represented by the People, in
determining whether there should be a dismissal.’ ” (Id. at p. 945, italics omitted.)
       As our Supreme Court has observed, “section 1385 dismissals often are not based
on the insufficiency of the evidence as a matter of law.” (Hatch, supra, 22 Cal.4th at
p. 273.)6 Nevertheless, trial courts may acquit pursuant to section 1385 for legal
insufficiency of the evidence. (Ibid.) Because dismissals under section 1385 are “often
[] not based” on insufficiency of the evidence, but sometimes are, courts reviewing such
dismissals for double jeopardy purposes much determine whether to construe the
dismissal as an acquittal. (Ibid.)
       The leading case in California for determining when the exercise of the broad
dismissal authority under section 1385 triggers application of the double jeopardy bar is
Hatch, supra, 22 Cal.4th 260. Hatch explained that because section 1385 dismissals are
often based on factors other than insufficiency of the evidence, they “should not be
construed as an acquittal for legal insufficiency unless the record clearly indicates the
trial court applied the substantial evidence standard. Specifically, the record must show
that the court viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and
concluded that no reasonable trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”

       6
         This feature distinguishes a dismissal pursuant to section 1385 from the Georgia
statutory scheme examined by the United States Supreme Court in McElrath v. Georgia
(2024) 601 U.S. ___ [144 S.Ct. 651]), which constituted a “verdict of acquittal under
state law” and therefore engaged the double jeopardy bar. (Id. at p. 659.)
                                                 16
(Id. at p. 273, fn. omitted.) The court further reasoned that “[a]bsent such a showing, we
will assume the court did not intend to dismiss for legal insufficiency and foreclose
reprosecution.” (Ibid.)
       Under Hatch, the distinction between a decision based on legal insufficiency of
the evidence and one based on a reweighing of the evidence (or other factors applicable
to a section 1385 dismissal), lies in the application of the substantial evidence standard.
A court “must apply the substantial evidence standard when making” a determination of
legal insufficiency. (Hatch, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 272.) Under this standard, courts
“must review ‘the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment’ and decide
‘whether it discloses substantial evidence . . . such that a reasonable trier of fact could
find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (Ibid.) “ ‘[T]he relevant question
is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.’ ” (Ibid.)
       At the same time, the court in Hatch cautioned that it did “not intend to impose
rigid limitations on the language trial courts may use to dismiss for legal insufficiency of
the evidence pursuant to section 1385.” (Hatch, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 273.) Instead, it
offered the following guidance: “[C]ourts need not restate the substantial evidence
standard or use certain ‘magic words’ whenever they determine that the evidence is
insufficient as a matter of law” but should “make their rulings clear enough for reviewing
courts to confidently conclude they viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution and found that no reasonable trier of fact could convict.” (Ibid.)
       The court in Hatch explained that by construing a section 1385 dismissal as an
acquittal for legal insufficiency only when the record clearly indicates the trial court
applied the substantial evidence standard, the reviewing court “properly balances the
competing interests embodied in the constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy.”
(Hatch, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 273.) This balance, on the one hand, seeks to ensure
                                                  17
against “repeated prosecutions [which] unfairly burden a defendant and increase the risk
of conviction through sheer perseverance” (ibid.), while on the other hand acknowledging
“the ‘important public interest in finally determining whether [a defendant] committed’
an offense.” (Id. at p. 274.) The court concluded that “barring retrial only when a trial
court clearly makes a finding of legal insufficiency” enables courts to abide by these
governing principles. (Ibid.)
       Applying its rule to the facts of the case, the court in Hatch concluded retrial was
permitted because the record did “not clearly show an intent by the trial court to dismiss
for legal insufficiency of the evidence.” (Hatch, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 274.) Among the
factors the high court considered, it noted the trial court’s minute order “merely states
that ‘no reasonable jury would convict . . . based on the evidence presented in court.’ ”
(Ibid.) It observed that the language of the minute order did not indicate the court had
viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, especially given that
its “use of the word ‘would’ rather than ‘could’ suggests a reweighing of evidence rather
than an application of the substantial evidence standard.” (Ibid.) The court stated it was
“impossible” considering these “ambiguities” to conclude the trial court intended to
dismiss for lack of sufficient evidence as a matter of law. (Ibid.)
       The Hatch court found further support for its interpretation of the minute order in
the reporter’s transcript, which gave no indication that the trial court had viewed the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. (Hatch, supra, 22 Cal.4th at
p. 274.) Instead, it viewed the court’s inquiries about additional evidence, its remarks on
the quality of the trial presentations and the apparent pro-prosecution bent of the jury (id.
at pp. 274–275), and its comments on the improbability of a unanimous verdict of guilt,
as “an assessment of the strength of the evidence.” (Id. at p. 275.) The court in Hatch
thus declined to construe the section 1385 dismissal as an acquittal for double jeopardy
purposes. (Ibid.)

                                                 18
              D. The 1996 Dismissal Order Does Not Bar Retrial of the Murder Charge
       Applying the rule of Hatch to the 1996 dismissal order, we conclude the record
does not clearly indicate that the trial court applied the substantial evidence standard,
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, in dismissing the
case. We recognize the consequences of this determination are significant. Nevertheless,
we believe construing the 1996 dismissal order as an acquittal would be inconsistent with
Hatch. That decision provides that, unless the record clearly indicates the court applied
the substantial evidence standard in deciding the evidence was legally insufficient to
prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, “we will assume the court did not intend to
dismiss for legal insufficiency and foreclose reprosecution.” (Hatch, supra, 22 Cal.4th at
p. 273.)
       Woodward contends that the respondent trial court correctly concluded the minute
order was clear and unambiguous in stating that the reason for the 1996 dismissal was
insufficiency of the evidence. He argues that the minute order’s use of the term
insufficient evidence is significant because, at the time the court issued the 1996
dismissal order, former section 1385 required the reasons for dismissal to be set forth in
the minute order.7
       Woodward points out that the trial court both quoted the statute in its written
decision and cited extensively to People v. Andrade (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 963
(Andrade), which devotes an entire section of the opinion to the requirement that the
reasons for a section 1385 dismissal must be set forth in the minutes. (Id. at p. 975.)
Because the trial court knew the law and included only one reason for dismissal in the
minute order—that of insufficient evidence—Woodward asserts the use of the term

       7
         The current language of section 1385 requires “[t]he reasons for the dismissal
[to] be stated orally on the record.” (§ 1385(a).) However, former section 1385 in effect
at the time of the 1996 dismissal order, as well as when the Supreme Court decided
Hatch, required “[t]he reasons for the dismissal [to] be set forth in an order entered upon
the minutes.” (Former § 1385(a); see Hatch, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 274.)
                                                 19
“insufficient evidence” controls. Even if the minute order is construed as a shorthand
reference to the reasons for dismissal stated in the written decision, Woodward points out
that the written decision similarly cites “ ‘insufficiency of the evidence’ ” as the basis for
the dismissal. Furthermore, because the written decision also cites the Ninth Circuit’s
decision in Mannes, in which the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals construed “insufficient
evidence” as a term of art meaning insufficient as a matter of law, Woodward argues the
trial court used the term with that same intended meaning, barring retrial.
       The district attorney counters that Woodward places improper weight and
significance on the minute order over that of the written decision. He argues that despite
both sides’ agreement that Hatch does not require that a court use specific language to
engage the bar on retrial, Woodward attempts to place just such significance on the trial
court’s use of the term “insufficient evidence.” The district attorney contends that
because there is no clear indication in the 1996 dismissal order that the trial court viewed
the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and found the evidence legally
insufficient, the 1996 dismissal order is ambiguous and may not be construed as an
acquittal.
       We agree with the district attorney that the 1996 dismissal order may not be
construed solely based on the minute order or on a presumed understanding of the trial
court’s intended meaning for its use of the term “insufficient evidence.” Instead, in
construing the 1996 dismissal order, we will review the entire available record of the
court’s decision, including the minute order and written decision, considering the
language of former section 1385, contemporaneous case authority on dismissals “in
furtherance of justice,” and the Supreme Court’s guidance in Hatch.
       Former section 1385 frames the 1996 dismissal order. The minute order states
that the dismissal is “pursuant to Penal Code [s]ection 1385,” and the written decision
quotes subdivision (a) of former section 1385 and discusses the statutory requirements for
a section 1385 dismissal according to contemporaneous case authority. Former section
                                                 20
1385 states, “The judge or magistrate may, either of his or her own motion or upon the
application of the prosecuting attorney, and in furtherance of justice, order an action to be
dismissed. The reasons for the dismissal must be set forth in an order entered upon the
minutes.”
       The trial court undoubtedly understood the requirement that it set forth the reasons
for dismissal in the minute order. In Orin, supra,13 Cal.3d 937, the California Supreme
Court reiterated it was “settled law” that the requirement under former section 1385(a) to
set forth the reasons for dismissal in the minute order was “mandatory and not merely
directory,” (Orin, at p. 944) and that the failure to do so was enough to invalidate the
dismissal. (Id. at p. 945.) The high court explained the purpose of the mandatory
requirement was to insure against “ ‘improper or corrupt’ ” dismissals and “to impose a
purposeful restraint upon the exercise of judicial power.” (Id. at p. 944.) The court in
Orin thus rejected the trial court’s purported exercise of authority under former section
1385, where the trial court had “merely check[ed] a box” on a printed form and neither
specified any reasons to justify its dismissal of the charges nor provided any statement
“which by clear incorporation or reference” could be deemed to be the reasons set forth
in a minute order. (Ibid.)
       Here, the trial court not only specified in the minute order that it had “read[] the
written decision into the record” but also expressly directed the concurrent filing of the
written decision. The minute order couched the reason stated for dismissal in terms of its
reading the written decision into the record: “The [c]ourt reads the written decision into
the record dismissing this case pursuant to Penal Code [s]ection 1385 based on
insufficient evidence.” This language suggests an intent to include in the minute order, or
incorporate by reference, the more detailed written decision. (See Orin, supra, 13 Cal.3d
at p. 944.)
       A contrary interpretation of the record would artificially limit this court’s
understanding of the basis for the 1996 dismissal order to the sparse statement in the
                                                 21
minute order, contrary to the language of the minute order itself. Such a restrictive
approach would be inconsistent with the California Supreme Court’s analysis in Hatch,
which considered the reporter’s transcript in relation to the minute order under review
and found the transcript bolstered its conclusion. (Hatch, supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 274–
275; see also People v. Salgado (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 5, 10 (Salgado) [citing trial
court’s minute order based on insufficient evidence as well as its repeated reference to
“insufficient evidence” during the hearings]; Andrade, supra, 86 Cal.App.3d at p. 975
[noting “[m]inutes have been interpreted to include a filed and signed written
memorandum opinion intended to be and in fact filed as part of the court minutes”].)
       As in Hatch, the written decision in this case is not inconsistent with the minute
order and does not require an attempt to reconcile the minutes with contradictory
statements elsewhere in the record. (Cf. People v. Smith (1983) 33 Cal.3d 596, 599
[rejecting a mechanical rule and seeking to harmonize, if possible, discrepancies between
the minute order and reporter’s transcript].) It is therefore appropriate to consider both
the language of the minute order and the concurrently filed written decision in construing
the 1996 dismissal order.8
       Together, the minute order and written decision reflect the trial court’s analysis of
the factors relevant to a section 1385 dismissal and its determination that a dismissal of
the case against Woodward would be “ ‘in the furtherance of justice for insufficiency of

       8
         We decline to consider the other documents submitted by the district attorney in
support of its opposition to Woodward’s motion to dismiss the refiled charge on double
jeopardy grounds. These include the unfiled copy of the defense “motion to dismiss after
deadlocked jury,” the declaration of the prosecutor regarding his recollections of the trial
court’s statements to counsel at the dismissal hearing, and the news article referring to
statements of the prosecutor and defense counsel after the 1996 dismissal. We agree with
Woodward that the district attorney has forfeited any argument that this evidence should
be considered by having failed to allege error in its writ petition based on the trial court’s
ruling that it would not consider these documents. We likewise decline to consider
Woodward’s motion to set bail in response to the refiling of charges as irrelevant to the
interpretation of the prior dismissal.
                                                 22
the evidence.’ ” The parties dispute the extent to which these aspects of the trial court’s
decision define the nature of its dismissal order by rendering it an acquittal based on legal
insufficiency of the evidence or a dismissal in the furtherance of justice.
       However, these options are not mutually exclusive. As the California Supreme
Court explained in Hatch, “trial courts historically have had the power to acquit for legal
insufficiency of the evidence pursuant to section 1385.” (Hatch, supra, 22 Cal.4th at
p. 268.) The power to acquit for legal insufficiency of the evidence does not depend on
the stage of the case (i.e., before submission to the jury under § 1118.1, or after
submission to the jury under § 1385) or on the “ ‘the form of the judge’s action.’ ” (Id. at
p. 270.) Rather, it depends on “ ‘whether the ruling of the judge, whatever its label,
actually represents a resolution, correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements of
the offense charged.’ ” (Ibid., quoting United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co. (1977)
430 U.S. 564, 571.) Thus, neither the trial court’s identification of insufficient evidence
as the reason for the 1996 dismissal order, nor the court’s analysis of various “interest of
justice” factors relevant to a section 1385 dismissal, is determinative unless the record
demonstrates the court intended to exercise its power to acquit. Hatch is unambiguous on
this point: while the trial court has the power to dismiss for insufficient evidence as a
matter of law pursuant to section 1385, the reviewing court “will not construe its
dismissal as an acquittal for double jeopardy purposes absent clear evidence the court
intended to exercise this power.” (Hatch, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 271.)
       Woodward contends the dismissal meets the standard for acquittal under Hatch
because the minute order and written decision expressly cite “insufficiency of the
evidence” as the basis for the dismissal. He argues that because all dismissals under
section 1385 must be in furtherance of justice, the trial court’s discussion of factors
relevant to that determination, based on cases like Andrade and People v. Bracey (1994)
21 Cal.App.4th 1532 (Bracey), demonstrates compliance with former section 1385 but

                                                 23
does not indicate the court meant the dismissal for insufficient evidence “to actually be
for some other reason not stated in the minutes.”
       This argument overlooks several critical points elucidated in Hatch, particularly its
articulation of the default presumption. The default presumption, absent clear evidence
to the contrary, is that a dismissal pursuant to section 1385 is not based on application of
the substantial evidence standard. (Hatch, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 273 [“Because section
1385 dismissals often are not based on the insufficiency of the evidence as a matter of
law, we believe these dismissals should not be construed as an acquittal for legal
insufficiency unless the record clearly indicates the trial court applied the substantial
evidence standard.”].) Further, that courts “need not restate the substantial evidence
standard or use certain ‘magic words’ whenever they determine that the evidence is
insufficient as a matter of law” (ibid.) does not change the underlying requirement that,
for purposes of an acquittal, the dismissal must be based on the application of that
standard. The ruling must be “clear enough for reviewing courts to confidently conclude
[the trial court] viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and
found that no reasonable trier of fact could convict.” (Ibid.) Moreover, not all dismissals
based on an evaluation of the evidence engage the double jeopardy bar. Hatch contrasts
the distinction between a ruling based on legal insufficiency of the evidence that is
functionally equivalent to an acquittal with a dismissal based on a reweighing of the
evidence or other justice-related factors that do not preclude retrial. (Id. at p. 272.)
       Applying these points to the 1996 dismissal order, we observe that although the
trial court articulated “insufficient evidence” as the primary basis for its dismissal in
furtherance of justice under section 1385, the record does not “clearly indicate[]” that the
court applied the substantial evidence standard to conclude the evidence was insufficient
as a matter of law to support a conviction. (Hatch, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 273.) Further,
there is no indication the trial court viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution. On the contrary, the court’s reasoning suggests it independently assessed
                                                  24
the strength and weight of the evidence and deemed the available evidence insufficient to
justify retrying Woodward given the relevant interest of justice factors.
       Citing Bracey and Andrade, the trial court framed its analysis of the case against
Woodward in terms of the requirements and relevant considerations for a dismissal in
furtherance of justice under former section 1385. In Bracey, the court defined a dismissal
“ ‘in furtherance of justice’ ” as requiring “consideration of the constitutional rights of the
defendant and the interests of society represented by the People.” (Bracey, supra, 21
Cal.App.4th at p. 1541; see Orin, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 945.) In Andrade, the court listed
factors relevant to this consideration, including the weight of the evidence indicative of
guilt or innocence, the nature of the crime involved, whether the defendant is or has been
incarcerated awaiting trial and length of incarceration, the possibility of harassment, the
likelihood of new or additional evidence at trial, and the effect on public safety if the
defendant should actually be guilty. (Andrade, supra, 86 Cal.App.3d at pp. 976–977.)
       The trial court used the framework of these decisions to compare the public
interest in providing the prosecution with a full and fair opportunity to convict
Woodward against the likelihood of the prosecution obtaining a conviction in the absence
of new evidence. It considered that having had two opportunities to convict Woodward,
the prosecution in both instances “has been unable to prove the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt” and had produced hung juries “with the majority of jurors voting for
acquittal.” The court linked these results to the “lack of quality” evidence and observed
that despite the volume of evidence presented by the prosecution, its “substantive quality
. . . did not lend itself to proving the prosecution’s contentions.”
       Specifically, the trial court viewed the hair and fingerprint evidence as
“insufficient to convict [Woodward] of murder” because the fingerprints were found on
only the outside of the car and “lack[ed] the evidentiary strength usually attributable” to
that evidence, while the prosecution could not “conclusively show” the hair found in the
victim’s car was Woodward’s. The court reasoned that “[a]bsent more compelling
                                                  25
evidence that places the defendant in the car at the time of the murder, the hair evidence
taken together with the fingerprint evidence is insufficient to convict [Woodward] of
murder.” The court cited other weaknesses in the prosecution’s evidence, including the
prosecutor’s struggle to “cast any doubt on [Woodward]’s veracity” after his testimony in
the second trial, and found the theory that Woodward killed Houts out of jealousy was
“not [] credible” given there was insufficient proof of jealousy so great that it would have
led Woodward to kill Houts.
       Following its assessment of the evidence, the trial court identified other factors
that supported a dismissal in furtherance of justice. The court explained, citing Tibbs,
that dismissal would “further the interests of justice by preventing the prosecution from
honing its trial strategies and perfecting its presentation of the evidence” and thus “create
a risk of conviction through sheer governmental perseverance.” It noted that “[a]nother
trial would only serve to harass [Woodward]” and found it “reasonable to believe that
society will not be endangered by this decision.” The court concluded its explanation by
stating, “There is simply a lack of evidence on which to convict the defendant. Without
new evidence, the result of this case will be the same at each successive trial. Due to the
lack of evidence in this case, a jury will never be able to reach a unanimous verdict of
guilty. It appears that justice would best be served if the charges were dismissed. [¶] It
is therefore the order of this [c]ourt that the case be dismissed in the furtherance of justice
for insufficiency of the evidence.”
       The trial court’s discussion of the evidence bears comparison to Hatch, which
involved a dismissal under former section 1385 after several days of jury deliberations
resulted in a deadlock on all counts. (Hatch, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 266.) The trial court
in Hatch stated in dismissing the case that “ ‘there is no reason to believe another jury
would reach a verdict in this case one way or the other’ ” and “ ‘[t]he court finds that no
reasonable jury would convict the defendant of the charges alleged in the information
based on the evidence presented in court.’ ” (Ibid.) The minute order stated that “ ‘no
                                                 26
reasonable jury would convict the defendant of the charges alleged in the information
based on the evidence presented in court.’ ” (Ibid.) In reviewing both the minute order
and reporter’s transcript of the section 1385 dismissal, the high court found no indication
that the trial court had viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution
and thus intended to dismiss for lack of sufficient evidence as a matter of law. (Id. at
p. 274.)
       The trial court’s findings in the 1996 dismissal order that “the result of this case
will be the same at each successive trial” and “[d]ue to the lack of evidence . . ., a jury
will never be able to reach a unanimous verdict of guilty” are comparable to those
statements assessed by the California Supreme Court in Hatch as not implicating the bar
on successive prosecution. Like in Hatch, the trial court considered and weighed the
evidence presented and concluded it was insufficient to support a unanimous verdict.
The trial court’s assessment of the substantive quality of the evidence and likelihood that
a jury would be able to convict Woodward in the absence of new evidence “suggests a
reweighing of evidence rather than an application of the substantial evidence standard.”
(Hatch, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 274.)
       Indeed, in the absence of any indication in the minute order or reporter’s transcript
that the trial court in Hatch had applied the substantial evidence standard, the California
Supreme Court characterized the court’s “inquiries about additional evidence and . . .
remarks on the quality of the trial presentations” (Hatch, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 274) as
“an assessment of the strength of the evidence.” (Id. at p. 275.) The Supreme Court also
rejected an argument that the trial court’s “comments on the improbability of an
unanimous verdict of guilt” (id. at p. 275) supplied the requisite standard for a finding of
legal insufficiency of the evidence, since “the mere likelihood of disagreement among
rational men ‘is not in itself equivalent to a failure of proof by the State.’ ” (Ibid.; see
also Tibbs, supra, 457 U.S. at p. 42, fn. 17.)

                                                  27
       So, too, in this case the trial court’s determination that “a jury will never be able to
reach a unanimous verdict of guilty” does not imply that no reasonable trier of fact could
find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Rather, it suggests the trial court
believed that retrial would likely produce yet another non-unanimous result. It further
explains the court’s finding that “[t]he prosecution has not met its burden of proof in two
trials and absent new evidence it will be unable to do so in subsequent trials. Another
trial would only serve to harass [Woodward].” In addition, nowhere does the decision
state that the trial court viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution—a critical consideration articulated in Hatch.
       Woodward contends the 1996 dismissal order is distinguishable from Hatch
because it specifically identifies “ ‘insufficient evidence’ ” as the basis for dismissal. By
contrast, the dismissal order in Hatch did not use the term “ ‘insufficient evidence’ ”—a
fact noted by the California Supreme Court in addressing whether the Ninth Circuit’s
holding in Mannes would alter the high court’s double jeopardy analysis. (Hatch, supra,
22 Cal.4th at p. 276.) Woodward argues Mannes is germane because, unlike Hatch, it
specifically addresses use of the term “ ‘insufficient evidence’ ” in context of a section
1385 dismissal. He maintains that by citing to Mannes in its written decision, the trial
court in this case implicitly adopted its holding and used the term “ ‘insufficient
evidence’ ” knowing it was a term of art that functioned as an acquittal.
       Woodward further points out that courts since Mannes have treated the phrase as a
term of art with an established meaning. (See People v. Hampton (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th
1092, 1105 (Hampton) [noting that while there are no “ ‘magic words’ ” to establish legal
insufficiency, there appears to be no published case wherein a court dismissed for
“ ‘insufficient evidence’ ” and the dismissal was not found to operate as an acquittal]; see
also People v. Pedroza (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 635, 646 (Pedroza) [affirming double
jeopardy bar where trial court explicitly stated it found the evidence insufficient as a
matter of law and had not ruled as a 13th juror]; Salgado, supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at p. 10
                                                 28
[concluding the trial court applied substantial evidence standard in finding (albeit
incorrectly) there was “ ‘not legally sufficient evidence to support a conviction for the
carjacking’ ” and “ ‘really no evidence to’ ” establish aiding and abetting the
carjacking].)
       Although we recognize the force of these arguments, we decide that Mannes is not
dispositive here. California courts are not bound by decisions of the lower federal courts,
even on federal questions. (People v. Avena (1996) 13 Cal.4th 394, 431.) Although the
California Supreme Court in Hatch recognized the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Mannes, it
distinguished it as inapplicable and did not opine on its reasoning. (Hatch, supra, 22
Cal.4th at p. 276.) Because Hatch did not directly address whether a trial court’s
dismissal for insufficient evidence, in the absence of contrary indication, necessarily
implies application of the substantial evidence standard, we are not bound to follow the
reasoning of Mannes. Nevertheless, we do not view Hatch and Mannes as entirely
irreconcilable under the circumstances of this case.
       In Mannes, the trial court dismissed murder charges pursuant to section 1385 after
a mistrial. (Mannes, supra, 967 F.2d at p. 1312.) The trial court based the dismissal on
“insufficient evidence” of certain elements of the charges (such as that the defendant
acted with “ ‘implied malice,’ ” and that she was aware at the time of driving drunk that
her act carried a high probability of death to herself or others). (Id. at p. 1314.) In
concluding the dismissal was an acquittal for purposes of double jeopardy, the Ninth
Circuit noted there was no indication the trial judge had resolved questions of credibility
and rejected the argument that the dismissal was based on “ ‘weight,’ ” rather than
“ ‘sufficiency’ ” of the evidence. (Id. at p. 1315.) It explained that “ ‘insufficient
evidence’ is a term of art” that—absent clear indication to the contrary—means “the
evidence presented at the trial was not legally sufficient to support a conviction for the
crime charged, rather than that the judge ‘entertained personal doubts about the
verdict.’ ” (Ibid.)
                                                 29
       The presumption articulated in Mannes differs from our Supreme Court’s direction
to not presume application of the substantial evidence standard unless the dismissal under
section 1385 clearly evidences an intent by the trial court to dismiss for legal
insufficiency of the evidence. (Hatch, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 273.) We are, of course,
bound by the standard articulated by our Supreme Court. (People v. Perez (2020) 9
Cal.5th 1, 13.) Applying the Hatch rule, we decline to impute application of the
substantial evidence standard into the trial court’s dismissal decision based solely on the
presumption that it employed “ ‘insufficient evidence’ ” as a term of art. (Hatch, at
p. 276.)
       Furthermore, the 1996 dismissal order contains indication to the contrary,
including language pertaining to the “weight” of the evidence, the likelihood of new
evidence at trial, the possibility of harassment, and the effect on public safety if the
charges are dismissed. (See Andrade, supra, 86 Cal.App.3d at pp. 976–977.) Because
Mannes treated “ ‘insufficient evidence’ ” as a term of art only in the absence of contrary
indication (Mannes, supra, 967 F.2d at p. 1315), it appears consistent with both cases to
refrain from assuming application of the term of art here. In this context, the variety of
considerations that factored into the 1996 dismissal order, including the trial court’s
examination of factors not relevant to a dismissal for legal insufficiency of the evidence,
inject ambiguity into the record as to the intended basis for the section 1385 dismissal.
Notwithstanding the court’s use of the term insufficient evidence, these “ambiguities” in
the 1996 dismissal order provide “clear indication to the contrary” (Mannes, at p. 1315)
and “make it impossible for us to conclude that the court intended to dismiss for lack of
sufficient evidence as a matter of law.” (Hatch, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 274.)
       This outcome is also consistent with other decisions cited by Woodward, including
Hampton, Pedroza, and Salgado. In Hampton, like in Mannes, there was nothing in the
record to suggest a contrary indication for the meaning attributable to the court’s use of
the term insufficient evidence. The record simply showed that the trial court dismissed
                                                 30
the robbery-murder special-circumstance allegation for “insufficient evidence” on the
prosecutor’s request after the jury convicted the defendant for first degree murder and
robbery but could not reach a verdict as to the allegation. (Hampton, supra, 74
Cal.App.5th at pp. 1096, 1097.) The same is true for Pedroza and Salgado. Both cases
involved express findings of legal insufficiency, with the trial court in Pedroza going so
far as to reject the prosecutor’s argument that it “sat as a 13th juror when ruling on the
new trial motion” and explaining its conclusion that it found “there was insufficient
corroboration as a matter of law” and retrial was barred under United States Supreme
Court precedent. (Pedroza, supra, 231 Cal.App.4th at p. 643.)
       Nor are we persuaded that the trial court’s citation of the United States Supreme
Court’s decision in Tibbs indicates the section 1385 dismissal was for legal insufficiency
of evidence based on application of the substantial evidence standard. The written
decision cites Tibbs as support for the trial court’s decision that dismissing the murder
charge would further the interests of justice by preventing successive attempts at
conviction and risking “conviction through sheer governmental perseverance.” (Tibbs,
supra, 457 U.S. at p. 41.) While it is true that the passages of the opinion cited by the
trial court come under the United States Supreme Court’s discussion of double jeopardy
and the principle that the prosecution cannot be afforded “ ‘another opportunity to supply
evidence which it failed to muster in the first proceeding’ ” (ibid.), the trial court’s
written decision mentions only those passages in Tibbs that discuss the risks of repeated
prosecution. These references equally support a decision based on furthering the interests
of justice, since “the possible harassment and burdens imposed upon the defendant by a
retrial” is among the factors in furtherance of justice that courts consider under section
1385. (Orin, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 946; see Andrade, supra, 86 Cal.App.3d at p. 977.)
Indeed, Hatch specifically recognized the relevance of this factor to a section 1385
dismissal. (Hatch, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 273.)

                                                  31
       We decide that the 1996 dismissal order does not satisfy the rule articulated in
Hatch for construing a section 1385 dismissal as an acquittal based on a finding of
insufficient evidence as a matter of law. The reasons for the dismissal as set forth in the
trial court’s minute order and written decision suggest the court found insufficient
evidence to reach a unanimous verdict and justify retrial under section 1385’s broad
standard for dismissal, based on factors including the poor quality of evidence,
unlikelihood that new evidence would be presented at another trial, risk of wearing down
Woodward through repeated prosecutions, and harassment of Woodward. There is no
clear indication in the record that the trial court viewed the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution and concluded that no rational trier of fact could have found
the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (Hatch, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 273.)
We therefore cannot construe the section 1385 dismissal order as an acquittal. We
conclude the constitutional protection against double jeopardy does not bar the refiling of
the murder charge against Woodward.
                                      III. DISPOSITION
       Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue directing respondent superior court to
vacate its August 22, 2023 order granting the motion to dismiss on double jeopardy
grounds and to enter a new order denying the motion. Upon issuance of the remittitur,
this court’s stay order is vacated.

                                                 32
                               ______________________________________
                                          Danner, Acting P. J.

I CONCUR:

____________________________________
Bromberg, J.

H051311
People v. Superior Court (Woodward)
Lie, J., Concurring:
       I join the court in its application of People v. Hatch (2000) 22 Cal.4th 260
(Hatch). Our adherence to Hatch is compelled by Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior
Court (1962) 57 Cal. 2d 450. The California Supreme Court has observed that on
questions of federal law, however, a state high court “operate[s] as an intermediate court
and not as a court of last resort.” (People v. Lopez (2019) 8 Cal.5th 353, 366 (Lopez).)
“ ‘When emergent [United States] Supreme Court case law calls into question a prior
opinion of [a state] court, that court should pause to consider its likely significance before
giving effect to [its] earlier decision.’ [Citation.] This is so even when the high court’s
decision does not directly address the continuing validity of the [state court’s] rule . . .;
the high court’s guidance may nonetheless erode the analytical foundations of the old rule
or make clear that the rule is substantially out of step with the broader body of relevant
federal law.” (Id. at pp. 366–367.) I write separately to explain my concern that
decisions of the United States Supreme Court have eroded the analytical foundations of
the rule announced in Hatch.
       As Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson wrote this term for a unanimous United States
Supreme Court, “it is well established that whether an acquittal has occurred for purposes
of the [Fifth Amendment’s] Double Jeopardy Clause is a question of federal, not state,
law.” (McElrath v. Georgia (2024) 601 U.S. ___ [144 S.Ct. 651, 659] (McElrath).) For
double jeopardy purposes, federal law has long defined an acquittal broadly. (Evans v.
Michigan (2013) 568 U.S. 313, 318 (Evans); see id. at p. 320 [holding that defendant was
acquitted by the trial court’s “determination that the State had failed to prove its case,”
despite errors of law informing the directed verdict].) When the state has failed its
“ ‘ “one complete opportunity to convict” ’ ” (Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania (2003) 537 U.S.
101, 115), “an ‘acquittal’ includes ‘a ruling . . . that the evidence is insufficient to
convict,’ a ‘factual finding [that] necessarily establish[es] the criminal defendant’s lack of
criminal culpability,’ and any other ‘rulin[g] which relate[s] to the ultimate question of
guilt or innocence’ ” (Evans, at p. 319, italics added, quoting United States v. Scott
(1978) 437 U.S. 82, 98, fn. 11 (Scott).) “These sorts of substantive rulings stand apart
from procedural rulings that may also terminate a case midtrial.” (Evans, at p. 319.)
“[T]he relevant distinction is between judicial determinations that go to ‘the criminal
defendant’s lack of criminal culpability,’ ” which bar retrial, “and those that hold ‘that a
defendant, although criminally culpable, may not be punished because of a supposed’
procedural error,” which do not. (Id. at pp. 323–324.) “Culpability (i.e., the ‘ultimate
question of guilt or innocence’) is the touchstone . . . .” (Id. at p. 324.) Even the lone
dissenter in Evans agreed that “the Court’s ‘double-jeopardy cases have consistently’
defined an acquittal as a decision that ‘ “actually represents a resolution, correct or not, of
some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 336 (dis. opn. of
Alito, J.).) Notably absent from the breadth of the constitutional definition of “acquittal”
is any requirement that the court making the ruling find the evidence insufficient as a
matter of law, drawing all inferences in favor of the prosecution.
       Under controlling federal law, it is immaterial that the trial court’s evaluation of
the evidence here was a dismissal “in the interest of justice” under Penal Code
section 13851 and not a directed verdict under section 1118.1. “ ‘[L]abels’—including
those provided by state law—‘do not control our analysis . . . .’ [Citation.] Thus, it is not
dispositive whether a factfinder ‘incanted the word “acquit” ’; instead, an acquittal has
occurred if the factfinder ‘acted on its view that the prosecution had failed to prove its
case.’ ” (McElrath, supra, 601 U.S. at p. ___ [144 S.Ct. at p. 660], quoting Evans, supra,
568 U.S. at pp. 322, 325; see also United States v. Sisson (1970) 399 U.S. 267, 270, 288
(Sisson) [treating “arrest of judgment” as an acquittal because “bottomed on factual
conclusions . . . made on the basis of evidence adduced at the trial”].)

       1
           Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

                                                  2
       It is also immaterial—given the jury’s inability here to return a guilty verdict—
that the trial court did not rule that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law. A
final judicial determination that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law is of
course sufficient to constitute an acquittal. (See, e.g., Sisson, supra, 399 U.S. 267
[dismissing appeal for lack of jurisdiction, where trial court’s arrest of judgment after
jury’s guilty verdict was in essence a directed acquittal based on the trial evidence].) It
does not follow, however, that a determination of legal insufficiency is constitutionally
necessary to an acquittal.2 Only after a conviction has the United States Supreme Court
conditioned the Double Jeopardy bar on a judicial determination that the evidence was
“legally insufficient.” (See Tibbs v. Florida (1982) 457 U.S. 31, 45–47 (Tibbs) [holding
that reversal of a conviction based on a reviewing court’s disagreement with the jury’s
weighing of the evidence does not bar retrial under the Double Jeopardy Clause unless
the evidence were insufficient as a matter of law].)
       Against this backdrop, the Hatch court understood that it was announcing a new
rule—reflecting the court’s “belie[f] [that section 1385] dismissals should not be
construed” to foreclose retrial “unless the record clearly indicates that the trial court
applied the substantial evidence standard” and its “proper[] balanc[ing of] the competing
interests embodied in the constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy.” (Hatch,
supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 273.) The innovation of Hatch was to presumptively authorize

       2
          A number of United States Supreme Court precedents examining district court
rulings under rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure naturally address the
district court’s application of rule 29’s legal insufficiency standard. But this is a matter
of federal rule and not constitutional doctrine, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
having no equivalent to section 1385. California courts, on the other hand, are at once
obligated (like federal district courts under rule 29) to direct a verdict of acquittal when
the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law (§ 1118.1) and authorized to dismiss in the
interest of justice (§ 1385).

                                                  3
retrial after a section 1385 acquittal when the prosecution at trial had failed to secure a
conviction. (Ibid.) A defendant could overcome the presumption that “the court [despite
its dismissal] did not intend to . . . foreclose reprosecution” by demonstrating that the
court “viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and found that
no reasonable trier of fact could convict.” (Ibid.) And Hatch required the trial court in
dismissing the proceeding to “make [its ruling] clear enough for reviewing courts to
confidently conclude [it] viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution and found that no reasonable trier of fact could convict.” (Ibid.) In making
legal insufficiency (or at least a trial court’s view of it) the linchpin under the Double
Jeopardy Clause, the Hatch court extrapolated from Tibbs, supra, 457 U.S. 31 that
“[w]here a court merely ‘disagrees with a jury’s resolution of conflicting evidence and
concludes that a guilty verdict is against the weight of the evidence,’ . . . a reversal or
dismissal on that ground does not bar retrial.” (Hatch, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 272.)
       But the United States Supreme Court’s much broader definition of an acquittal
later reaffirmed in Evans and most recently in McElrath makes clear that the procedural
posture of Tibbs was critical to the United States Supreme Court’s holding in that case.
The jury in Tibbs returned a guilty verdict from which the defendant obtained relief based
not on the legal insufficiency of the evidence but the weight of that evidence—“ ‘a
determination . . . that a greater amount of credible evidence supports one side of an issue
or cause than the other.’ ” (Tibbs, supra, 457 U.S. at pp. 37–38.) The Florida Supreme
Court’s reversal of the conviction under state law represented mere “disagree[ment] with
[the] jury’s resolution of conflicting evidence” on the convicted defendant’s appeal. (Id.
at p. 42; see also id. at pp. 37–38 [distinguishing “weight of the evidence” reversal under
Florida law from reversal for “insufficient evidence”].) The Tibbs court accordingly
framed its holding as grounded in the conviction and the defendant’s election to
challenge that conviction by an appeal necessarily contemplating retrial: “[T]he Double
Jeopardy Clause does not prevent an appellate court from granting a convicted defendant
                                                   4
an opportunity to seek acquittal through a new trial.” (Id. at p. 45, italics added; see also
id. at p. 45, fn. 22 [analogizing a defendant’s motion for new trial following guilty
verdict]; cf. Evans, supra, 568 U.S. at p. 326 [distinguishing a defendant’s mistrial
motion, which effectively “consents to a disposition that contemplates reprosecution,”
unlike a defendant who moves for acquittal]; People v. Eroshevich (2014) 60 Cal.4th
583.) The court in Tibbs derived its holding from the long-standing rule that “a criminal
defendant who successfully appeals a judgment against him ‘may be tried anew . . . for
the same offence of which he had been convicted.’ ” (Tibbs, at pp. 39–40, italics added,
quoting United States v. Ball (1896) 163 U.S. 662, 672; see Tibbs, at p. 40, citing North
Carolina v. Pearce (1969) 395 U.S. 711, 721 [explaining “the premise that the original
conviction has, at the defendant’s behest, been wholly nullified and the slate wiped
clean”].) Tibbs distinguished the high court’s contrary decisions in Burks v. United
States (1978) 437 U.S. 1 and Greene v. Massey (1978) 437 U.S. 19 as representing “a
narrow exception from the understanding that a defendant who successfully appeals a
conviction is subject to retrial” where “ ‘the reviewing court has found the evidence
legally insufficient’ to support conviction.” (Tibbs, at pp. 40–41.) The Florida high
court’s reversal based on the weight of the evidence rather than its sufficiency did not
meet that narrow exception. (Id. at pp. 37–38.) In short, Tibbs arose from a distinct
strand of Double Jeopardy jurisprudence focused not on acquittals but on convictions and
on the assent to retrial—unless acquittal on retrial could be assured as a matter of law—
presumed by a convicted defendant’s appeal. (Id. at pp. 42–43.)
       “ ‘A reversal based on the weight of the evidence’ ” as in Tibbs, however, “ ‘can
occur only after the State both has presented sufficient evidence to support conviction
and has persuaded the jury to convict.’ ” (Mannes v. Gillespie (9th Cir. 1992) 967 F.2d
1310, 1315, italics added (Mannes).) Tibbs is thus inapplicable here, where the People
failed twice to secure a guilty verdict, leading the trial court to exercise its discretion
under section 1385 to independently assess the trial evidence of Woodward’s culpability.
                                                   5
Here, unlike in Tibbs, Woodward was not “a convicted defendant” appealing for “an
opportunity to seek acquittal through a new trial.” (Tibbs, supra, 457 U.S. at p. 45, fn.
omitted.) “[T]here was no occasion to set aside a verdict as ‘against the weight’ of the
evidence, since no verdict was reached.” (Mannes, supra, 967 F.2d at p. 1315, quoting
Tibbs, supra, 457 U.S. at pp. 42–43.) Absent a conviction followed by an appeal or
motion for new trial that would implicate Tibbs, I respectfully submit that Evans and
McElrath, in reaffirming post-Hatch the broad definition of acquittal first articulated in
Scott, would have us assess only whether the trial court’s dismissal under section 1385
“ ‘relate[s] to the ultimate question of guilt or innocence.’ ” (Evans, supra, 568 U.S. at
p. 319; McElrath, supra, 601 U.S. at p. ___ [144 S.Ct. at p. 658].)
       At bottom, our application of Hatch is no more than a determination that the trial
court’s dismissal—expressly based on “the insufficiency of the evidence”—failed to
conform to a state-law standard even though it is an acquittal as defined by the United
States Supreme Court. To my mind, this makes the acquittal here indistinguishable from
those in Evans (where the trial court based its dismissal on the erroneous belief that the
charged offense required proof of another element) and McElrath (where the jury’s
acquittal on one count was nullified, along with a conviction on another count, under
state law “repugnancy doctrine”). Even where the trial court is “egregiously” wrong, its
error does not exempt the acquittal from the double jeopardy bar. (Evans, supra, 568
U.S. at p. 318.) “[T]he fact that ‘the acquittal may result from erroneous evidentiary
rulings or erroneous interpretations of governing legal principles,’ . . . affects the
accuracy of that determination, but it does not alter its essential character.” (Scott, supra,
437 U.S. at p. 98.)3 McElrath made explicit that the states’ “ ‘primary authority for

       3
         For example, the trial court’s dismissal of sexual assault charges in Hatch
followed defense argument that no jury would believe 15-year-old “Doratee L.’s
‘behavior [to be] consistent with someone who was being pressured and forced into doing
something against their will’ ” (Hatch, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 266)—an argument that
betrays some incomprehension of both juvenile executive functioning and the nuance of
                                                  6
defining and enforcing the criminal law’ and ‘. . . regulat[ion of] procedures under which
[their] laws are carried out’ ” did not extend to “whether the Double Jeopardy Clause
recognizes an event as an acquittal.” (McElrath, supra, 601 U.S. at p. ___ [144 S.Ct. at
p. 660].)
       That the acquittal here was by a judge and not, as in McElrath, by a jury is
constitutionally irrelevant, given the juries’ inability to convict. In United States v.
Martin Linen Supply Co. (1977) 430 U.S. 564, for example, the high court rejected the
government’s contention “that only a verdict of acquittal formally returned by the jury
should absolutely bar further proceedings and that ‘[o]nce the district court declared a
mistrial and dismissed the jury, any double jeopardy bar to a second trial dissolved.’ ”
(Id. at p. 572.) As the court instructed, “ ‘The constitutional requirement of a jury trial in
criminal cases is primarily a right accorded to the defendant.’ [Citations.] Any
Government right to demand a jury verdict is limited to that afforded by [federal rule]
(jury trial waivable with the consent of the Government) and, of course, can be qualified
by authority granted the trial judge” by rule. (Id. at pp. 574–575, fn. 13; see also Sisson,
supra, 399 U.S. at p. 288.)
       I agree that the court’s dutifully exacting scrutiny of the trial court’s dismissal
order here yields “contrary indications” vitiating the otherwise unambiguous
“insufficiency of the evidence” conclusion—suggesting that the trial court did not
uniformly view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. But beyond
Evans and McElrath, it bears noting how foreign our examination is to our customary
appellate function: Under Hatch, we apply a presumption in favor of a petitioner for
extraordinary relief and not in favor of the respondent court’s 2023 judgment or

coercion within otherwise consensual relationships. And joining the court’s application
of Hatch here, I have no reason to believe that the trial court in 1996—had it anticipated
the new evidence that now prompts the petitioner to reprosecute—would have intended to
foreclose retrial.

                                                  7
1996 acquittal; and we accord no deference to the respondent court’s contrary finding on
the trial court’s “intent.” Consequently, our decision today turns on how deeply and
transparently the trial judge chose to scrutinize the trial evidence, with the through-the-
looking-glass result that rote adoption of a party’s “insufficiency of the evidence” recital
is necessarily an acquittal (see, e.g., People v. Hampton (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 1092,
1097), while the painstaking critique of evidence presented to two deadlocked juries is
not.
       But for our continuing duty to follow Hatch, I would instead conclude the
section 1385 dismissal here is an acquittal that bars retrial under Evans and McElrath.
Because Evans and McElrath “erode the analytical foundations” of Hatch (Lopez, supra,
8 Cal.5th at p. 367), I respectfully urge the California Supreme Court to reexamine the
continuing vitality of Hatch’s narrow definition of an acquittal under federal double
jeopardy principles.

                                                 8
                               Lie, J.

H051311
People v. Superior Court (Woodward)
Trial Court:   County of Santa Clara

Trial Judge:   Hon. Shella Deen

Counsel:           Jeffrey F. Rosen, District Attorney, Kaci R. Lopez, Supervising
                   District Attorney, and David R. Boyd, Deputy District Attorney for
                   Petitioner.

                   No appearance for Respondent.

                   Nolan Barton Olmos & Luciano, LLP, Daniel L. Barton and Evan C.
                   Greenberg for Real Party in Interest.

       H051311
       People v. Superior Court (Woodward)