Court Opinion

ID: 9698743
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:58:46.960846+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:42.792587
License: Public Domain

JOHNSON, Judge,
dissenting.
The majority finds that Pennsylvania case law requires counsel be provided in termination proceedings. The majority then presumes that counsel would and should be effective. To the extent that the majority holds that there exists a fight to effective assistance of counsel in proceedings for involuntary termination of parental rights under the Adoption Act, I dissent.
The principle of effective assistance of counsel is a legal term of art. It has very clear constitutional underpinnings within the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution. I have found no case where our federal Supreme Court discusses effective assistance of counsel outside a sixth amendment context. In fact, the Supreme Court has refused to extend the right to appointed counsel to include prosecutions which, though criminal, do not result in the defendant’s loss of liberty. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-374, 99 S.Ct. 1158, 1162, 59 L.Ed.2d 383, 388-389 (1979).
It is true that our Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that an indigent mother whose parental rights were being terminated was entitled to be advised of her right to counsel and to appointment of counsel prior to the hearing at which *640her rights were terminated. In re Adoption of R.I., 455 Pa. 29, 312 A.2d 601 (1973). The opinion by Justice O’Brien highlights criminal cases in the federal Supreme Court in reasoning that an individual is entitled to counsel in any proceeding which might lead to deprivation of “substantial rights.” 455 Pa. at 31, 312 A.2d at 602. There is nothing in Adoption of R.I. from which one can deduce that our supreme court ever considered, within the framework of involuntary termination of parental rights, the concept of ineffective assistance of counsel. Although the court considers, in a footnote, an allegation of hearsay evidence and its improper admission, it is considered by the court in terms of the different result which might have obtained had counsel been appointed and present at the time of the hearing rather than the parent having been advised after the hearing of her right to counsel. 455 Pa. at 33, n. 4., 312 A.2d at 603, n. 4.
Since the case In re Adoption of R.I., supra, relies heavily on federal criminal cases involving the sixth amendment, its value as precedent may have been substantially weakened by Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 101 S.Ct. 2153, 68 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981). In Lassiter, the Supreme Court held that the due process Clause of the fourteenth amendment does not require appointment of counsel in every parental status termination proceeding. The Court stated that there is a presumption that an indigent litigant has a right to appointed counsel only when, if he or she loses, the litigant may be deprived of his or her physical liberty. 452 U.S. at 27-28, 101 S.Ct. at 2159-60, 68 L.Ed.2d at 649. Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, recognized that standards increasingly urged by informed public opinion and now widely followed by the states call for assistance of appointed counsel in termination proceedings, but he made it clear that there is nothing in the concept of fundamental fairness under the fourteenth amendment to require such enlightened policies. 452 U.S. at 33-34, 101 S.Ct. at 2162-63, 68 L.Ed.2d at 653-654.
*641It appears clear that there is no federal constitutional requirement for appointment of counsel in parental status termination proceedings. Lassiter, supra. The only case in Pennsylvania suggesting the right to counsel, In re Adoption of R.I. supra, was decided before Lassiter, utilizing federal precedent which has been rendered inapposite by the Supreme Court’s express holding in Lassiter. Although our state supreme court might, in the future, determine that a parent may raise ineffectiveness of counsel as a separate ground for reviewing the trial court’s action in a parental rights termination case, it has not as yet done so.
In fact, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has extended the right to effective counsel in only one non-criminal context, civil commitment proceedings involving an alleged mental incompetent, consistent with the protections required when the state seeks to deprive an individual of her physical liberty. In re Hutchinson, 500 Pa. 152, 454 A.2d 1008 (1982), affirming 279 Pa.Super. 401, 421 A.2d 261 (1980). The liberty interests of S.F. are not implicated on this appeal. Consequently, I am unwilling to assume, as does the majority, that ineffectiveness of counsel is a relevant consideration within the context of a termination hearing.
The central question as I see it is not how the issue of ineffectiveness of counsel may be raised and measured, but rather whether any sound argument can be advanced for further extending this term of legal art beyond its home in the sixth amendment.
I found no such persuasive argument in a companion case involving a dependency proceeding, In the Matter of J.P., — Pa.Super.-, 573 A.2d 1057 (1990) (Dissenting Opinion, Johnson, J.). I find no such argument here. The concept of ineffective assistance of counsel has no place in a civil parental status proceeding where the court, in terminating the rights of a parent, is obliged to give primary consideration to the needs and welfare of the child. 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). I would not consider how and when such *642a concept might be raised. I would also reject any attempt to introduce the principle into adoption proceedings.
As a result of my independent review of the record, I conclude that there exists clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion terminating appellant’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(5). I find no merit in the second issue raised urging insufficiency of the evidence. I would reject appellant’s attempt to argue the alleged ineffectual assistance of trial counsel. The order of August 9, 1988, confirming the adjudication and decree terminating parental rights should be affirmed.