Court Opinion

ID: 9539176
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 09:08:47.647728+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:58:28.979204
License: Public Domain

In the
               Court of Appeals
       Second Appellate District of Texas
                at Fort Worth
            ___________________________

                 No. 02-22-00201-CR
            ___________________________

SULAIMON ALHADAD AKA SALAIMON ALHADAD, Appellant

                           V.

                THE STATE OF TEXAS

         On Appeal from the 485th District Court
                Tarrant County, Texas
              Trial Court No. 1563418D

           Before Kerr, Bassel, and Wallach, JJ.
          Memorandum Opinion by Justice Kerr
                          MEMORANDUM OPINION

      Sulaimon Alhadad aka Salaimon Alhadad (al-Hadad) appeals his conviction for

continuous sexual abuse of a young child.1 See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.02. As a

result of al-Hadad’s disruptive behavior during trial, the trial-court judge had him

removed from the courtroom. In two points, al-Hadad argues that (1) the trial court

abused its discretion by failing to find that his conduct raised the issue of his

competency to stand trial and (2) the trial court denied him the right to confront his

accusers during trial in violation of his right of confrontation under the United States

and Texas Constitutions. We will affirm.

                                   I. Background

      Al-Hadad does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his

conviction. We will therefore set out only those facts essential to our analysis of his

competency and confrontation-right points.

A. Plea-Offer Hearings and al-Hadad’s Attempt to Represent Himself

      A grand jury indicted al-Hadad in November 2018, and the trial court

appointed him counsel. During a February 2022 plea-offer hearing, al-Hadad

repeatedly insisted that he did not understand the nature of the law or the nature of

the charges against him and questioned the trial court’s jurisdiction. The trial-court

judge explained to al-Hadad that the court had jurisdiction, that he wasn’t required to

      1
        During a pretrial hearing, al-Hadad’s attorney notified the trial court of the
correct spelling of al-Hadad’s last name, which we use here.

                                           2
understand the law in order for the case to proceed, and that he had been appointed

an experienced attorney who did understand the law to represent him. Al-Hadad

retorted,

       Okay. So to be sure, my attorney, the Court, and all of its officers are
       allowed to understand the law, understand the nature of the law and the
       letter of the law, and to proceed in the jurisdiction with rules and laws
       and procedures and penal codes and all that kind of stuff -- you guys are
       allowed to understand these things; but I, the accused, am not?

The trial court responded,

       You are allowed to be given the nature of the accusation against you. If
       you continue to say you don’t understand that, then we can for sure have
       you examined for competency. But that has no bearing on whether or
       not you understand -- where you come in here and say that you
       understand how the law works. Because you can stand here all day and
       say you don’t understand, and unless a doctor says that you are legally
       incompetent to proceed, we’re going to proceed.

Al-Hadad then claimed that he did not want the trial court to think he was “trying to

play games.” The trial court replied, “That’s 100 percent what you are doing.”

       After more back and forth with al-Hadad regarding the charges against him and

the trial court’s jurisdiction,2 the trial-court judge stated,

       I cannot control what you do not understand because there seems to be
       a lot of things today that you’re saying that you do not understand. And
       from my perception of what I’m seeing today, what I am observing
       about you, you are competent to proceed.

       During this discussion, al-Hadad stated that he understood that he was the
       2

accused but claimed that he did not understand that he was also the defendant in the
case.

                                               3
            You are answering questions by saying you don’t understand
      when, in fact, the very basic and simple questions, you do understand.
      You do not appear to me to be a person who has an incapacity to
      understand these things. You appear to me to be a person who is
      answering to be manipulative.

             This is what . . . I’m observing in open court; that the basic “yes”
      or “no” questions, you have refused to answer, and you have turned
      them around and said that you do not understand a basic question of did
      your attorney say certain words to you.

             ....

             At this point, I am taking from the fact that you will not answer
      any questions or that you’re saying that you do not understand that you
      are rejecting [the State’s plea-bargain] offer.

      About two months after the plea-offer hearing—in March 2022—the trial

court heard al-Hadad’s request to represent himself. During that hearing, the trial

court explained the difficulties of self-representation and asked al-Hadad several times

if he was going to represent himself or keep his appointed attorney. Each time,

however, al-Hadad sidestepped the inquiry by insisting that he did not understand the

law, by complaining about proceeding with the case despite his alleged lack of

understanding, and by questioning the trial court’s jurisdiction.

      Because al-Hadad refused to answer the trial court’s questions about whether

he wanted to forgo legal representation, the trial court noted for the record that

      there has been no indication from your attorney or otherwise, that you
      are [not] a competent person who understands the charges against him,
      [or] that you are [not] a person who is able to communicate with your
      attorney about the nature of the charges against you and any defenses
      that you would like to raise.

                                            4
            There is nothing that I have observed in court, nor has any
      information been provided to me, that there’s any indication that you are
      not competent to proceed in trial.

             [Defense counsel], at this time, do you have any information that
      would contradict that Mr. [a]l[-H]adad is competent to proceed in a jury
      trial?

             [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: No, Your Honor.

             THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

              So what I am going to say at this time is you are competent to
      proceed. At this time, what I am going to note for the record, in my
      observations through this process, is that you are asking questions in
      circles; that the things that you say that you do not understand are not as
      a result of you not being competent to proceed to trial under the legal
      definition of “competency,” but they are a choice that you are making to
      prolong and to make a gamesmanship of this process or in some way
      manipulate this process because you have read somewhere by someone
      that you may be able to present these things to a Court.

             I don’t know what your motivation is in any of this. But at this
      point when you say that you don’t understand, I believe the things that
      you don’t understand do not go to competency and are not covered by
      the fact that you have been appointed an attorney who is very capable to
      represent you on this charge.

      At another plea-offer hearing in April 2022, al-Hadad refused to answer any

questions until the trial court’s jurisdiction had been proved and repeatedly declared

that he was there “sui juris in propria persona.”3

      3
        Translation: “of one’s own right,” “in one’s own person.” See Sui juris & In
propria persona, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).

                                            5
B. Appointed Counsel’s Motion to Withdraw and Continuance Motion

       In June 2022, al-Hadad’s appointed attorney moved to withdraw because a

conflict had developed between him and al-Hadad that affected their ability to

communicate and to prepare for al-Hadad’s upcoming trial. In light of the length of

counsel’s representation (three and a half years) and al-Hadad’s imminent trial setting

(that week), the trial court denied the withdrawal motion.

       The trial court then considered al-Hadad’s motion to continue the trial based

on al-Hadad’s mental health, which his counsel claimed had deteriorated. Al-Hadad’s

counsel pointed to the results from a court-ordered competency evaluation, which

had been completed a few days before. Although the examining psychologist had

determined that al-Hadad was competent to stand trial, he had diagnosed him with

“unspecified anxiety disorder.”4 Over the State’s objection, the trial court continued

the trial to late August 2022.

C. Al-Hadad’s Trial

       On the morning of August 22, 2022, the trial court called the case to trial.5

Outside the venire’s presence, al-Hadad once again claimed that he did not

understand the nature of the case or the proceedings and complained that the case

was nevertheless going forward. The trial court responded that al-Hadad’s attorney

       This psychologist generated a written report containing his findings and
       4

conclusions and filed that report with the trial court under seal.

       Visiting Judge Mollee Westfall presided over the trial.
       5

                                           6
could answer any questions that al-Hadad had about the case. Al-Hadad also claimed

not to understand that he could wear civilian clothing provided to him instead of his

jail jumpsuit. Nevertheless, his counsel confirmed that he was competent to stand

trial:

               THE COURT: Okay. Mr. al-Hadad, do you understand that the
         Court . . . will provide to you civilian clothes for you to have your trial
         in?

                 THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, the only thing I understand
         is that whatever –

                THE COURT: Okay. So you being provided clothes to dress out
         in, you have opted to not change into those clothes.

               THE DEFENDANT: I don’t really understand.

               THE COURT: Okay. Well, do you understand my question that
         you can have a trial in the jail jumpsuit, which is what you’re in right
         now, but your attorneys do not want you to do that, and that is not your
         best option.

               THE DEFENDANT: Is that part of the proceedings?

               THE COURT: That is part of the proceedings, sir

                THE DEFENDANT: That’s what I’m asking to ask you
         questions about.

                THE COURT: Okay, Mr. al-Hadad. I’m not here to answer your
         questions. You need to listen to me. I’m here to tell that you can change
         into different clothes, and I see that you have opted not to do that.

               So, Mr. al-Hadad, to this indictment, you may . . . plead guilty or
         not guilty. What is your plea, sir?

                THE DEFENDANT: So I’m going to participate in proceedings
         I don’t understand?

                                             7
                 THE COURT: To this indictment, you may plead guilty or not
       guilty.

             THE DEFENDANT: All right. Your Honor, I don’t understand
       the proceedings.

             THE COURT: Okay. I’m going to enter a plea of not guilty on
       your behalf.

             THE DEFENDANT: If I don’t know what I’m doing, how can
       you ask me to do something . . . in a realm that I don’t know the rules?

            THE COURT: And, Counsel, do you believe your client to be
       competent to engage in these proceedings?

                 [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes, Your Honor.

       The venire was then brought in, and al-Hadad was present in the courtroom

for the entire jury-selection process. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 33.03.

       That afternoon, during a hearing outside the jury’s presence, al-Hadad claimed

that he didn’t feel well:

                 THE DEFENDANT: Can I go in the back, please? I --

              [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: He says he doesn’t feel good. He’s
       going to pass out, Your Honor.

                 THE COURT: You need to sit down.

                 [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Sit down.

                 THE COURT: You need to sit down, sir.

             [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Sit down. You’ll be okay. She asked
       you to sit down.

                                           8
            THE COURT: Standing up never helped anyone who’s about to
      pass out. You need to sit down.

             THE DEFENDANT: You can’t make me. I’m going in the back.

             [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: No. Don’t.

             THE DEFENDANT: Take me to the back.

             THE COURT: No, you need to --

             THE DEFENDANT: I don’t want to be a part of this, and you
      can’t make me.

      Al-Hadad was then placed in the holdover cell, but the trial court ensured that

the door was left open so that he could hear the proceedings. The trial court

instructed the bailiffs to tell al-Hadad that he could rejoin the proceedings in the

courtroom at any time. But al-Hadad declined the trial court’s invitation to return to

the courtroom and began singing. Al-Hadad’s counsel requested a continuance until

al-Hadad could be convinced to return to the courtroom. Al-Hadad briefly stopped

singing but then started again. Al-Hadad’s counsel again asked for a continuance until

al-Hadad could “be present at his own proceeding” because he had a “constitutional

right to be present at the proceeding that has his liberty at stake.” The trial court

denied the continuance:

      It is clear to this Court that Mr. al-Hadad has stepped back into the
      holdover voluntarily, despite the Court’s repeated requests through the
      bailiffs for him to rejoin us, despite the Court’s offer that he be able to
      sit in the holdover door and listen.

             He is now in [the holdover] cell and has been continuously
      singing very loud prayers in Arabic. It’s the Court’s supposition that’s

                                          9
       [what we’ve been] hearing for the last ten minutes, so loud that it’s very
       difficult for us to hear each other. So he has voluntarily absented himself
       and has continued to do so. And I’m going to overrule your objection
       based on that.

       Al-Hadad continued to sing loudly while the hearing resumed. Al-Hadad sang

continuously for 30 minutes, disrupting both his trial and the jury selection taking

place in an adjacent courtroom. But after al-Hadad’s attorney told al-Hadad that he

would be taken back to jail if he didn’t stop singing, there were no further disruptions

that day.

       Before opening statements the following day, al-Hadad objected, “You’re not

going to afford me the Sixth Amendment right to understand the charges . . . but

you’re going to proceed with this trial even though I don’t understand . . . the charges

against me,” which prompted the trial court to excuse the jury. Outside the jury’s

presence, the trial court reprimanded al-Hadad about his behavior:

       All right, Mr. al-Hadad. We had a few problems yesterday with your --
       with you being disruptive back in the holdover, saying that you weren’t
       going to attend your own trial. You excused yourself to the holdover,
       and then you proceeded to sing for many, many minutes very loudly. We
       didn’t have the jury in the box.

              To attend this trial, you are going to have to not be disruptive. So
       what you just said is disruptive. Not being disruptive is sitting quietly.
       You do not have a speaking part unless you testify from the witness
       stand.

The trial court went on to explain that the trial was going forward, but al-Hadad kept

interjecting that he did not understand the charges against him. The trial-court judge

cautioned al-Hadad that if he continued to be disruptive, she would put him in the

                                           10
holdover cell, where he could “listen to [his] own trial quietly from there.” The trial

court warned that if that didn’t work, al-Hadad would be taken back to the jail where

he could watch the trial over Zoom.

      The jury was brought back into the courtroom, and the State began its opening

statement. Al-Hadad interrupted the State by objecting, demanding to know what the

charges were against him, and asking the trial-court judge if she was going to proceed

with the trial without affording him his constitutional rights. The trial court excused

the jury and had al-Hadad put in the holdover cell. The trial court ensured that the

holdover cell’s door was open and that al-Hadad could hear the proceedings.

       Once in the holdover cell, al-Hadad began repeatedly screaming “objection”

and complained that he could not face his accuser “from back [there].” At that point,

the trial court explained for the record,

       All right. Because of Mr. al-Hadad’s continued disruption of this trial, he
       cannot be out in this courtroom without continually asserting that he
       does not understand the charges and that I’m violating his Sixth
       Amendment.

              I -- I wanted to do an intermediate step and have him be
       physically present in the courtroom so that I could check in with him
       from time to time to see if he’s changed his behavior and is going to be
       able to be in this courtroom and not be a distraction.

             In the holdover, he started screaming “objection” over and over
      loudly and continuously. So I’m taking the third step, and he’s going to
      be in front of a Zoom terminal in the jail. So he’s going to be remote
      from this proceeding, but he is going to -- because we have 360-degree
      cameras all over this courtroom, he’ll be able to see the witness, he’ll be
      able to see Counsel, he’ll be able to see the courtroom as if he was here,
      and I have the ability to mute him so that he can watch and listen

                                            11
      without us hearing him being continually disruptive, which seems to be
      part of his strategy for this trial, to disrupt it and delay it by whatever
      means.

      After al-Hadad had been relocated to “a Zoom terminal” in the jail, his counsel

objected to his being removed from the courtroom without his consent and being

unable to participate in his trial in violation of his confrontation rights under the

United States and Texas Constitutions. The trial court responded that it was al-

Hadad’s own behavior keeping him from being in the courtroom and that the trial

court would accommodate “every reasonable request” for defense counsel to confer

with al-Hadad. The trial court explained that it would not stop the trial simply

“because [al-Hadad was] continually disruptive with illegitimate complaints of not

understanding what is going on.”

      At that point, al-Hadad held a sign in front of the camera that stated, “I do not

understand the charges. My attorney failed to explain the nature and cause.” The trial

court warned al-Hadad not to display any more signs. Al-Hadad then disconnected

Zoom and proceeded to pull several wires from the computer. According to the trial

court, al-Hadad “made some statements about that he’s not going to attend and

that . . . he wants to act up so someone will have to shoot him.” The trial-court judge

then stated that she believed that the only option at that point was to physically

restrain him so that he could not “sever the connection between himself and this trial

any longer.” After al-Hadad was restrained and the Zoom connection had been

restored, the trial court announced,

                                          12
             All right. So for the record, we had Mr. al-Hadad restrained as to
             his hands so he could no longer grab the computer.

                    He has dumped himself out of the chair that he was sitting
             in, and he is laying on the floor now. So we will have to have him
             restrained to the chair, I suppose. That’s the next level that I can
             think of that’s -- I don’t see how he can participate in this trial
             laying on the floor.

                    So if you could let them know that we need to restrain him
             to the chair.

                    It appears he is pretending to be unconscious, but I don’t
             think he is unconscious.

      As a result of al-Hadad’s purposely falling out of the chair he had been sitting

in, the trial court asked for a “sturdier chair that he could be physically restrained to.”

While a sturdier chair was being obtained, al-Hadad removed his clothing and

threatened suicide. He then put his head in a toilet “in an apparent attempt to drown

himself.” The trial court advised,

       And now he’s being checked out by medical. And at this point, we are
       going to restrain him with the least amount of restraint that is possible in
       order to have him participate in this trial. And if we cannot do that in a
       way that it’s appropriate to look at him, then I will mute the video to
       where we cannot see him, but he can continue to see us and this trial and
       hear this trial.

             And I will periodically put his attorney in a breakout room with
       him. He has a Zoom link, and he is on Zoom right now, and he has
       Zoomed with him previously, and he can Zoom with him from time to
       time and talk to him from . . . an office where he is going to . . . be able
       to have a private conversation with his client, and we’ll continue that
       way.

            The Court does continue to try to find ways that Mr. al-Hadad
       can both see and hear his trial since he has shown that he won’t

                                            13
         participate without disrupting when he’s within earshot of the jury. And
         I’ll continue to do the best I can to make it to where he has the most
         access to this trial with the least prejudice to himself and the least
         amount of restraint possible.

               ....

               For the record, Mr. al-Hadad is now redressed in a jail muumuu.
         He is in a restraint chair with his limbs restrained to the chair, and I
         assume his feet; although, I can’t see that. But he has opted to bend all
         the way over so that in order to --

               THE DEFENDANT: (Inaudible.)

               THE COURT: In order to see the top of his head -- in order to
         see him, we can see just the top of his head.

               Now he is leaning back in the chair and wailing. I have muted
         him. So in order for him to see and hear this proceeding, I am going to
         mute his video, and he’ll be able to see and hear his trial, should he
         choose to do that.

         The trial court brought the jury back into the courtroom, and the State

continued with its opening statement. A short time later, al-Hadad slipped out of the

restraint chair and disconnected Zoom again. The trial court sent the jury on another

break.

         While al-Hadad was being put back into restraints, he spit on jail staff and tried

to bite a deputy. He started continually screaming and thrashing once restrained. The

trial court then concluded,

         Mr. al-Hadad has voluntarily absented himself from this proceeding.
         There is no possible way that he can see or hear and perceive any
         content.

                                             14
             I am concerned that he is in the process of harming himself
      from . . . the continual screaming that is apparent from watching the
      video.

             So . . . at this point, I’m going to have him put back in his [jail]
      cell, and then we will check back with him to see if he is willing to
      participate in any way that will be meaningful to him and not disrupt
      these proceedings and not harm him or the jail staff. So it’s so ordered.

             ....

             So take him back to the [jail] cell, and then we’ll check back with
      him. If we can get to an afternoon break, we will check back with him to
      see where he is.

             I can see that he continues to scream continually and to pull at his
      restraints.

               All right. So we will sign off from Zoom. I’ll sign him
      off. . . . [J]ust keep it open over there, if you would, and I’m going
      to . . . mute the video, or I’ll put it in the breakout room, and if he can
      come back onto Zoom, then we’ll try that.

      Al-Hadad’s counsel then asked for a continuance to have a competency exam

done to determine al-Hadad’s competency to stand trial. Counsel also renewed his

right-of-confrontation objection. The trial court denied the continuance request and

overruled the objection:

      And at this point, the Court finds that Mr. al-Hadad’s behavior is a
      functional constructive equivalent to him exiting this courtroom and
      exiting this city and state and country and deciding to go far, far away
      and not be at this trial.

             All of his behavior was by his own choice, that the Court and the
      court staff has taken every opportunity to calm him, de-escalate him, to
      exhort him to continue to participate in this trial, to not be disruptive, to
      not make decisions that are not going to be helpful to him, and to make
      decisions that enable him to participate in his own trial. However, I’m

                                           15
      not going to allow Mr. al-Hadad to create his own continuance, which is
      exactly what he is trying to do.

             He did not want this case to go to trial. He’s made several
      different attempts to try to delay this trial, to divert this trial, to change
      the procedure of this trial, and to stop the procedure of this trial, and
      I’m not going to let his choices and his behavior do that.

              Everything that the Court has observed with respect to Mr. al-
      Hadad appears to be his own choice in acting disruptive and becoming
      increasingly angry and acting outrageous. He has decided to scream and
      thrash and put his head in the toilet and do everything he can to prevent
      this trial going forward. That is not grounds for a continuance.

            I am going to see if we can have the doctor who examined him
      two weeks ago[6] come check back in with him and give us a report
      tonight or tomorrow, but that is not going to be the basis of a
      continuance at this time, because, as I’ve stated previously, Mr. al-Hadad
      is not going to, by his own disruptive behavior, create his own
      continuance.

      Al-Hadad did not rejoin the trial remotely or in person for the rest of the day.

The following morning, al-Hadad was back in the holdover cell just outside the

courtroom. According to his attorney, al-Hadad wanted “to participate in the

proceedings from the holdover cell . . . because he believe[d] that [it was] the best

location for him . . . to be present and listen to the proceedings.” But his attorney

      6
        The trial court apparently misspoke here because nothing in the record shows
that al-Hadad had been examined two weeks before trial. As noted, a psychologist
examined al-Hadad in June 2022, about two months before trial. Additionally, there is
an invoice for psychological services in the record indicating that al-Hadad was
examined about a month before trial. But there is no written report from this
examination in our record, and neither al-Hadad nor the State mentions the
examination. We contacted the trial-court clerk, who informed us that there is no
report from this examination in the trial-court record.

                                           16
objected again on right-of-confrontation grounds and moved for a continuance to

have al-Hadad “examined . . . to see if there’s been some kind of mental health issue

that’s . . . arisen and . . . get a definitive answer on whether or not he can participate

voluntarily.” The trial court overruled the objection and denied the motion, observing

that

       [a]ll of the issues . . . that you have so ably outlined are brought on by
       your client’s voluntary choices and behaviors.

              The Court has had [the] opportunity to reflect on yesterday
       afternoon, which were -- his behaviors were startling and disturbing.
       And the Court has been in the criminal justice system -- I’ve been in the
       criminal justice system for over 26 years, and I’ve never seen anyone act
       like Mr. al-Hadad.

               However, Mr. al-Hadad’s very bad behavior, disruptive behavior,
       his violence, his lack of cooperation, his screaming, his thrashing, as
       soon as no one is watching or he doesn’t have anything to gain from that
       behavior, that behavior has -- based on the Court’s observation and what
       has been relayed to the Court by deputies, it abruptly stops. He can turn
       it off and on.

              He immediately stops behaving the way that I described yesterday
       with the thrashing and the wailing and the spitting that we saw with him
       in the restraint chair as soon as the camera was off and he was allowed
       to go back to his [jail] cell. That behavior immediately stopped.

             Mr. al-Hadad gets disruptive in this courtroom and starts yelling
       about how he’s not able to understand the charges and his Fifth -- Sixth
       Amendment rights are being violated.

              As soon as he goes back to the holdover, I can audibly hear him
       having rational conversations with the people who are interacting with
       him back there about what’s going to happen next, about his
       dissatisfaction with going forward on this trial. This is a strategy decision
       on his part.

                                            17
              He was examined two weeks ago and found to be competent.[7]
      His family has testified that he has no history of mental illness. He has
      not suddenly developed a mental illness in the last two weeks, based on
      this Court’s opinion and observations and knowledge of how mental
      illnesses work.

            Brain-based mental illnesses don’t suddenly develop at the
      moment when they would be the most appropriate and helpful to
      someone. They develop completely independently of that, and he has
      not developed a mental illness, in this Court’s opinion.

             I’m still working to get him examined, but I don’t see any reason
      to delay this trial. We will have him examined at the earliest possible
      moment. . . .

               But, again, I -- I think this is a strategy on his part to delay this
      trial, to have this trial not happen, and I’m not going to reward this level
      of behavior, which has been overwhelmingly inappropriate and
      completely outside the bounds of the way that I’ve ever seen anyone act
      during a trial. I’m not going to reward that behavior by giving him a
      continuance.

             I do want him to be in this courtroom, if that’s at all possible. He
      is in the holdover, and he can hear this proceeding, and you can easily
      reach him to confer with him. If he can’t sit in that chair and be
      appropriate, that’s the second[-]best place for him to be, is in the
      holdover.

      The trial continued with al-Hadad sitting in the holdover cell with the door

open so that he could hear the proceedings and “have a chance to confer freely with

his attorney at his attorney’s request.” While the State played a video of al-Hadad’s

interview with law enforcement, a psychologist arrived to examine al-Hadad. 8 Because

      7
       See supra note 6.
      8
       On its own motion, the trial court had ordered a competency examination and
appointed a psychologist to examine al-Hadad. The psychologist who had examined

                                           18
al-Hadad had stuffed toilet paper in his ears and was thus not listening to the video’s

audio, the trial court decided to have the psychologist examine al-Hadad while the

video played. Al-Hadad’s attorney re-urged his earlier objections based on al-Hadad’s

absence from the courtroom and moved for a mistrial. The trial court overruled the

objections and denied the mistrial request:

       And, again, I’m ready to accommodate Mr. al-Hadad should he wish to
       join us and attend his trial. I want him to do that, and . . . at any
       moment, he will be restored in this courtroom when he can assure
       Counsel and the Court that he will not disrupt the proceedings.

       After the examination was finished, al-Hadad returned to the holdover cell

while the video was still playing. 9 Later, outside the jury’s presence, the trial court

reported that the psychologist had concluded that al-Hadad was competent to stand

trial and that “he [was] malingering in order to get out of trial.” 10

       The trial continued with al-Hadad in the holdover cell. He did not disrupt the

proceedings for the rest of the day. The next day, al-Hadad was present in the

courtroom and did not disrupt the proceedings. The jury found him guilty of

continuous sexual abuse of a young child as charged in the indictment.

al-Hadad in June 2022 was unavailable, so the trial court appointed a different
psychologist to examine al-Hadad.
       9
        The video was over three hours long.

        The trial court also stated that the psychologist was going to provide a written
       10

report either later that day or the next day. The report was filed under seal and, at the
State’s request, this report, along with the psychologist’s report from the June
2022 examination, was included in a sealed supplemental clerk’s record filed with us.

                                             19
      Al-Hadad was also present in the courtroom the following day for the

punishment phase. He apologized to the trial court before testifying:

      If we’re going to start with the events from the last couple of days, I’d
      first like to apologize for my previous misconduct and disruptive
      behavior in the court. It was unprofessional, careless, and probably
      intimidating. It certainly did not help my case. I realize the law is more
      professional and can be more intimidating than careless.

He also admitted to doing “everything [he] could to prevent this trial from

proceeding.” At the hearing’s conclusion, the trial court assessed al-Hadad’s

punishment at 35 years’ confinement and sentenced him accordingly. Al-Hadad has

appealed, raising two points related to his competency and his right of confrontation.

                            II. Al-Hadad’s Competency

      Requiring an incompetent person to stand trial violates due-process principles.

Owens v. State, 473 S.W.3d 812, 816 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). A defendant is presumed

competent to stand trial unless proved incompetent by an evidentiary preponderance.

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46B.003(b). A person is incompetent to stand trial if

he does not have “(1) sufficient present ability to consult with [his] lawyer with a

reasonable degree of rational understanding; or (2) a rational as well as factual

understanding of the proceedings against [him].” Id. art. 46B.003(a).

      “Procedurally, a trial court employs two steps for making competency

determinations before it may ultimately conclude that a defendant is incompetent to

stand trial.” Boyett v. State, 545 S.W.3d 556, 563 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). The first step

is an informal inquiry, and the second step is a formal competency trial. Id. A formal

                                           20
competency trial is required if, after the informal-inquiry stage, the trial court

determines that “there is more than a scintilla of evidence that would support a

rational finding of fact that the accused is incompetent to stand trial.” Turner v. State,

422 S.W.3d 676, 696 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); see Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art.

46B.005.

      Al-Hadad argues in his first point that the trial court abused its discretion by

not making an informal inquiry into his competency to stand trial and by not further

ordering a formal competency trial because he “displayed bizarre, erratic, violent[,]

and irrational behavior” immediately before and during his trial. We review challenges

to the adequacy of a trial court’s informal competency inquiry, and its findings

following such an inquiry, for an abuse of discretion. See Luna v. State, 268 S.W.3d 594,

600 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); Thomas v. State, 312 S.W.3d 732, 736–37 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. ref’d).

      The trial court’s duty to informally inquire into the issue of a defendant’s

competency is triggered when it receives information “suggesting that the defendant

may be incompetent to stand trial.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46B.004(a), (c).

“Either party may suggest by motion, or the trial court may suggest on its own

motion, that the defendant may be incompetent to stand trial.” Id. art. 46B.004(a). “If

evidence suggesting the defendant may be incompetent to stand trial comes to the

attention of the court, the court on its own motion shall suggest that the defendant

may be incompetent to stand trial.” Id. art. 46B.004(b). Upon suggestion that a

                                           21
defendant lacks competency to stand trial, the trial court “shall determine by informal

inquiry whether there is some evidence from any source that would support a finding

that the defendant may be incompetent to stand trial.” Id. art. 46B.004(c). In

conducting an informal inquiry, the trial court may “appoint one or more disinterested

experts to . . . examine the defendant and report to the court on the competency or

incompetency of the defendant.” Id. art. 46B.021(a)(1).

      A trial court is not required to follow specific procedures during an informal

inquiry. See George v. State, 446 S.W.3d 490, 501 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014,

pet. ref’d). Here, after observing al-Hadad’s erratic, disruptive behavior immediately

before and during trial and after al-Hadad’s attorney requested a competency

examination, the trial court ordered Dr. Kristi Compton to examine al-Hadad. Dr.

Compton examined al-Hadad and reported to the trial court that in her opinion, al-

Hadad was malingering to avoid trial but was competent. Consistent with these

conclusions, Dr. Compton’s written report stated that (1) “[t]here is no evidence of a

genuine mental disorder”; (2) al-Hadad’s “presentation and testing results are positive

for malingering[,] which is designed to avoid and/or delay prosecution”; and

(3) “there is a reasonable degree of scientific certainty that [al-Hadad] has an adequate

understanding of his case, parties, [and] proceedings, [and] can assist his attorney,

testify [o]n his own behalf, and maintain appropriate courtroom decorum if he

chooses to do so.” See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46B.024. Based on these

findings, Dr. Compton determined that al-Hadad was competent to stand trial. We

                                           22
thus conclude that contrary to al-Hadad’s contention on appeal, the trial court here

adequately conducted an informal inquiry into his competency.11

      Al-Hadad next asserts that his erratic, bizarre behavior and the fact that the

trial-court judge admitted that she had never seen behavior like al-Hadad’s in her

26 years in the justice system was some evidence to support a finding that al-Hadad

was incompetent to stand trial. Al-Hadad argues the trial court was thus required to

hold a formal competency trial. We disagree.

      During the informal-inquiry stage, the trial court must focus on three matters.

“First, . . . [it must consider] whether there is ‘some evidence’ of incompetency to

stand trial.” Boyett, 545 S.W.3d at 563. This “some evidence” standard requires only

that there be “more than none or a scintilla [of evidence] that rationally may lead to a

conclusion of incompetency.” Turner, 422 S.W.3d at 692 (quoting Ex parte LaHood,

401 S.W.3d 45, 52–53 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013)). “Second, a trial court must consider

only evidence of incompetency, and it must not weigh evidence of competency

against the evidence of incompetency.” Boyett, 545 S.W.3d at 564. And third, the

evidence must be such that “it may rationally be inferred not only 1) that the defendant

suffers some degree of debilitating mental illness, and that 2) he obstinately refuses to

      11
        Al-Hadad complains that Dr. Compton’s report was not admitted into
evidence and that Dr. Compton did not “testify to her testing and findings that [al-
Hadad] was competent to stand trial.” Al-Hadad did not raise these complaints in the
trial court, and they are thus not preserved for our review. See Tex. R. App. P.
33.1(a)(1); Montelongo v. State, 623 S.W.3d 819, 822 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021).

                                           23
cooperate with counsel to his own apparent detriment, but also that 3) his mental

illness is what fuels his obstinacy.” Id. “Thus, it is not enough to present evidence of

either a defendant’s mental illness alone or his refusal to cooperate with counsel—

rather, there must be some evidence indicating that the defendant’s refusal to

rationally engage with counsel is caused by his mental illness” before the trial court is

required to hold a competency trial. Id.; see Clark v. State, 592 S.W.3d 919, 927 (Tex.

App.—Texarkana 2019, pet. ref’d).

      As outlined above, Dr. Compton determined that al-Hadad was not mentally

ill. And although there was evidence that al-Hadad had an anxiety disorder, nothing

linked his on-and-off courtroom and Zoom behavior to anxiety. There was thus no

evidence from which it could “rationally be inferred” that al-Hadad “suffer[ed] some

degree of debilitating mental illness” that “fuel[ed]” his obstinate refusal “to cooperate

with [his] counsel to his own apparent detriment.” Boyett, 545 S.W.3d at 564; see Clark,

592 S.W.3d at 928–29.

      Accordingly, we conclude and hold that the trial court did not abuse its

discretion by not holding a formal competency trial and by determining that al-Hadad

was competent to stand trial. We overrule al-Hadad’s first issue.

                      III. Al-Hadad’s Right of Confrontation

      The right of confrontation under the Sixth Amendment to the United States

Constitution and under Article I, Section 10 of the Texas Constitution guarantees a

criminal defendant the right to be physically present during all phases of the

                                           24
proceedings against him, unless the defendant waives that right through his own

conduct. Miller v. State, 692 S.W.2d 88, 90 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985); see U.S. Const.

amend. VI; Tex. Const. art. I, § 10; see also Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338, 90 S. Ct.

1057, 1058 (1970). Consistent with these constitutional guarantees, Article 33.03 of

the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides that in all felony prosecutions, “the

defendant must be personally present at the trial” unless he “voluntarily absents

himself after pleading to the indictment or information, or after the jury has been

selected when trial is before a jury.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 33.03. In his

second point, al-Hadad contends that the trial court abused its discretion by removing

him from the courtroom during trial because doing so violated his constitutional and

statutory rights to be physically present during trial.

       As al-Hadad recognizes, a criminal defendant can forfeit his right to be present

at trial if, “after he has been warned by the judge that he will be removed if he

continues his disruptive behavior, he nevertheless insists on conducting himself in a

manner so disorderly, disruptive, and disrespectful of the court that his trial cannot be

carried on with him in the courtroom.” Allen, 397 U.S. at 343, 90 S. Ct. at 1060–61.

“It is essential to the proper administration of criminal justice that dignity, order, and

decorum be the hallmarks of all court proceedings,” and the “flagrant disregard in the

courtroom of elementary standards of proper conduct should not and cannot be

tolerated.” Id., 90 S. Ct. at 1061. Trial-court judges “confronted with disruptive,

contumacious, stubbornly defiant defendants must be given sufficient discretion to

                                             25
meet the circumstances of each case,” and “[n]o one formula for maintaining the

appropriate courtroom atmosphere will be best in all situations.” Id., 90 S. Ct. at 1061.

When faced with a disruptive defendant, a trial court may deal with him in at least

“three constitutionally permissible ways”: (1) bind and gag him, thereby maintaining

his presence in the courtroom, (2) cite him for contempt, and (3) remove him from

the courtroom until he agrees to conduct himself in an appropriate manner. Id. at

343–44, 90 S. Ct. at 1061.

      Al-Hadad complains that he could not waive his confrontation rights because

he was incompetent. He maintains that his behavior was not “sufficiently egregious to

[warrant] his removal from the courtroom” and, alternatively, that he did not

voluntarily absent himself. We disagree.

      We have overruled al-Hadad’s competency-to-stand-trial complaint. As set out

above, Al-Hadad’s unruly behavior disrupted his trial, and despite the trial court’s

warnings, his unwillingness to conduct himself in a dignified manner prevented the

trial from being continued with him in the courtroom. The trial court thus acted

within its discretion by removing al-Hadad from the courtroom and sending him back

to the jail to participate in his trial remotely via Zoom. Once there, al-Hadad’s

behavior was so outrageous and self-destructive that the trial court could have

reasonably inferred that he was, in effect, voluntarily absenting himself from the trial

altogether. Cf. Bottom v. State, 860 S.W.2d 266, 267 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1993, no

pet.) (concluding that continuing trial in the absence of defendant, who was in the

                                           26
hospital because he had attempted suicide or some harm to himself, was not an abuse

of discretion because defendant’s absence at trial was voluntary to the extent that he

chose to ingest large quantities of aspirin and arthritis medication). Moreover, there

were times that al-Hadad chose to remain in the holdover cell rather than sit in the

courtroom. Lastly, not only did Dr. Compton determine that al-Hadad could have

maintained appropriate courtroom decorum if he had chosen to, but al-Hadad later

admitted to doing everything he could to prevent his trial from going forward. See

Moore v. State, 670 S.W.2d 259, 261 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (“In most instances, the

validity of a trial court’s decision that a defendant’s absence was voluntary will have to

be determined in hindsight.”). We thus conclude that the trial court did not abuse its

discretion by removing al-Hadad from the courtroom and by concluding that he had

voluntarily absented himself from trial. See Kimithi v. State, 546 S.W.2d 323, 326 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1977) (explaining that because defendant “demonstrated his unwillingness

to conduct himself in a dignified manner each time he was brought into the

courtroom,” his “absence from the courtroom during the proceedings and the

resulting denial of personal confrontation of the witnesses against him were a

consequence of his own acts, which acts constituted a waiver of those rights to the

extent that the exercise of them was impaired by his lawful removal from the court”

(footnote omitted)). We overrule al-Hadad’s second point.

                                    IV. Conclusion

      Having overruled al-Hadad’s two points, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                           27
                                 /s/ Elizabeth Kerr
                                 Elizabeth Kerr
                                 Justice

Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: August 3, 2023

                            28