Court Opinion

ID: 9861571
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 00:10:21.989739+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:28:40.721263
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE BOWMAN, dissenting in part: I respectfully dissent. In particular, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that, under People v. Crespo, 203 Ill. 2d 335 (2003), defendant’s eight convictions must be reduced to two. According to my colleagues, the indictment in this case violated Crespo by failing to differentiate among eight separate acts of penetration. Because they determine that the counts charged defendant with only two separate acts of penetration under different theories of criminal culpability, they conclude that defendant was not apprised, prior to trial, that the State intended to prosecute him for separate acts. In my opinion, Crespo does not mandate the result reached by my colleagues. First, I believe that a fair reading of the indictment in this case put defendant on notice of the need to defend against multiple charges of criminal sexual assault and aggravated criminal sexual assault. The indictment alleged acts of forcible sex over a period of time, with each count specifically referencing the sexual penetration as well as the applicable time frame. Specifically, defendant was charged with two counts each of criminal sexual assault and aggravated criminal sexual assault based on instances of vaginal penetrations from September 5, 1998, to December 5, 2000, and two counts each of criminal sexual assault and aggravated criminal sexual assault based on anal penetrations either from September 5, 2000, to December 1, 2000, or from September 5, 1998, to December 5, 2000. Because defendant’s conduct consisted of separate acts on separate occasions, and because specific dates are often not ascertainable for crimes involving minors, I believe that the indictment was sufficiently specific to inform defendant of the need to defend against multiple counts. Moreover, the facts in this case are stronger than those in People v. Olivieri, 334 Ill. App. 3d 311, 317 (2002), where the indictment failed to reference the specific sexual penetration in each count. While the majority concludes that Olivieri is not controlling here because the defendant in that case was notified at a preliminary hearing, prior to trial, that the State intended to seek multiple convictions, this distinction overlooks the holding in Olivieri. In Olivieri, the court specifically held that “the State clearly charged defendant with three separate counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault, and defendant was on notice of his need to defend against all three counts.” Olivieri, 334 Ill. App. 3d at 315. In making this determination, the Olivieri court rejected the defendant’s claim that he was charged alternatively with three counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault. Olivieri, 334 Ill. App. 3d at 315. Applying the reasoning of Olivieri to the present case, where the indictment was more specific, I believe that defendant was on notice that he was charged with eight separate acts of sexual assault. That said, I also believe that, from a procedural standpoint, the practice of charging separate acts by separate counts in the charging instrument avoids some of the issues raised in Crespo. Second, I believe that the indictment, coupled with the State’s treatment of the crimes at trial, provides clear evidence of the State’s intention to treat defendant’s conduct as multiple acts. Indeed, the State’s handling of the crimes in this case further supports the conclusion that the indictment alleged separate acts. The Crespo court based its decision not only on the indictment, but also on the way in which the crime was argued to the jury. Crespo, 203 Ill. 2d at 344. Accordingly, it is appropriate to consider both the indictment and the State’s treatment of the crime at trial. However, by focusing exclusively on the notice defendant received prior to trial, the majority ignores a major factor in the Crespo decision. For this reason, I believe that the majority’s interpretation of Crespo is too narrow. In this case, the State’s treatment of the crimes at trial informed defendant that he was being prosecuted for separate acts. In the opening statement, the State indicated: “A couple of times a week, [Q.B.] would be called into [defendant’s] bedroom. *** After hearing [Q.B.] tell you about the repeated sexual abuse, the acts of her father, what he forced her to do *** you will be able to find the defendant guilty not of one, but in all counts, that he has been charged with, of aggravated sexual assault, and criminal sexual assault in this case.” (Emphasis added.) Further, in the closing statement, the State consistently referred to defendant’s conduct as “years of abuse.” Finally, the jury received eight different verdict forms and found defendant guilty on all eight counts. For these reasons, I believe that the indictment, coupled with the State’s treatment of the crimes at trial, sufficiently informed defendant that he was being prosecuted for separate offenses that occurred over a period of time. As a final point, I believe that the concerns addressed in Crespo are not present here. Unlike Crespo, which involved multiple stab wounds inflicted in a single episode, defendant’s conduct here consisted of separate acts on separate occasions. The State alleged that, over a period of at least two years, defendant engaged in separate acts of criminal sexual assault and aggravated criminal sexual assault. Thus, I fail to see how a more specific indictment would have aided defendant in preparing his defense. The majority suggests that the counts could have indicated two separate time frames or contained language that the acts were “separate.” However, I do not believe that the failure of the State to include such language rendered the indictment insufficient under Crespo. As the Crespo court stated: “Today’s decision merely holds that in cases such as the one at bar, the indictment must indicate that the State intended to treat the conduct of defendant as multiple acts in order for multiple convictions to be sustained.” Crespo, 203 Ill. 2d at 345. Given the nature of the crimes, which involved separate acts over a substantial period of time, I believe that the indictment reflected the State’s intention to treat defendant’s conduct as separate acts. Accordingly, I would not vacate any of defendant’s convictions based on our supreme court’s decision in Crespo.