Court Opinion

ID: 9372427
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-21 17:00:25.041601+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:35.450767
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION

   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
        FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

In re: CLEAN WATER ACT                 No. 21-16958
RULEMAKING
                                          D.C. Nos.
------------------------------         3:20-cv-04636-
                                           WHA
AMERICAN RIVERS; AMERICAN              3:20-cv-04869-
WHITEWATER; CALIFORNIA                     WHA
TROUT; IDAHO RIVERS UNITED;            3:20-cv-06137-
COLUMBIA RIVERKEEPER;                      WHA
SIERRA CLUB; SUQUAMISH
TRIBE; PYRAMID LAKE PAIUTE
TRIBE; ORUTSARARMIUT                     OPINION
NATIVE COUNCIL; STATE OF
CALIFORNIA; STATE WATER
RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD;
STATE OF OREGON; STATE OF
NEW JERSEY; STATE OF NEW
YORK; STATE OF MARYLAND;
STATE OF RHODE ISLAND;
STATE OF COLORADO; DISTRICT
OF COLUMBIA; STATE OF
NORTH CAROLINA;
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA;
STATE OF NEW MEXICO; STATE
OF VERMONT; STATE OF
MINNESOTA; STATE OF
CONNECTICUT; STATE OF
2        AMERICAN RIVERS V. AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE

WASHINGTON; STATE OF
MICHIGAN; COMMONWEALTH
OF MASSACHUSETTS; STATE OF
NEVADA; STATE OF WISCONSIN;
STATE OF MAINE; STATE OF
ILLINOIS,

                 Plaintiffs-Appellees,

    v.

ANDREW R. WHEELER; U.S.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY,

                 Defendants-Appellees,

NATIONAL HYDROPOWER
ASSOCIATION,

                 Intervenor-Defendant,

STATE OF ARKANSAS; STATE OF
LOUISIANA; STATE OF
MISSISSIPPI; STATE OF
MISSOURI; STATE OF MONTANA;
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA;
STATE OF WYOMING; STATE OF
TEXAS,

                 Intervenors,

and
       AMERICAN RIVERS V. AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE      3

AMERICAN PETROLEUM
INSTITUTE; INTERSTATE
NATURAL GAS ASSOCIATION OF
AMERICA,

                  Intervenor-Defendants-
                  Appellants.

In re: CLEAN WATER ACT                     No. 21-16960
RULEMAKING
                                              D.C. Nos.
------------------------------             3:20-cv-04636-
                                               WHA
AMERICAN RIVERS; AMERICAN                  3:20-cv-04869-
WHITEWATER; CALIFORNIA                         WHA
TROUT; IDAHO RIVERS UNITED;                3:20-cv-06137-
COLUMBIA RIVERKEEPER;                          WHA
SIERRA CLUB; SUQUAMISH
TRIBE; PYRAMID LAKE PAIUTE
TRIBE; ORUTSARARMIUT
NATIVE COUNCIL; STATE OF
CALIFORNIA; STATE WATER
RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD;
STATE OF OREGON; STATE OF
NEW JERSEY; STATE OF NEW
YORK; STATE OF MARYLAND;
STATE OF RHODE ISLAND;
STATE OF COLORADO; DISTRICT
OF COLUMBIA; STATE OF
NORTH CAROLINA;
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA;
STATE OF NEW MEXICO; STATE
4        AMERICAN RIVERS V. AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE

OF VERMONT; STATE OF
MINNESOTA; STATE OF
CONNECTICUT; STATE OF
WASHINGTON; STATE OF
MICHIGAN; COMMONWEALTH
OF MASSACHUSETTS; STATE OF
NEVADA; STATE OF WISCONSIN;
STATE OF MAINE; STATE OF
ILLINOIS,

                 Plaintiffs-Appellees,

    v.

ANDREW R. WHEELER; U.S.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY,

                 Defendants-Appellees,

AMERICAN PETROLEUM
INSTITUTE; INTERSTATE
NATURAL GAS ASSOCIATION OF
AMERICA,

                 Intervenor-Defendants,

STATE OF ARKANSAS; STATE OF
LOUISIANA; STATE OF
MISSISSIPPI; STATE OF
MISSOURI; STATE OF MONTANA;
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA;
STATE OF WYOMING; STATE OF
       AMERICAN RIVERS V. AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE      5

TEXAS,
                  Intervenors,

and

NATIONAL HYDROPOWER
ASSOCIATION,

                  Intervenor-Defendant-
                  Appellant.

In re: CLEAN WATER ACT                     No. 21-16961
RULEMAKING
                                              D.C. Nos.
------------------------------             3:20-cv-04636-
                                               WHA
AMERICAN RIVERS; AMERICAN                  3:20-cv-04869-
WHITEWATER; CALIFORNIA                         WHA
TROUT; IDAHO RIVERS UNITED;                3:20-cv-06137-
COLUMBIA RIVERKEEPER;                          WHA
SIERRA CLUB; SUQUAMISH
TRIBE; PYRAMID LAKE PAIUTE
TRIBE; ORUTSARARMIUT
NATIVE COUNCIL; STATE OF
CALIFORNIA; STATE WATER
RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD;
STATE OF OREGON; STATE OF
NEW JERSEY; STATE OF NEW
YORK; STATE OF MARYLAND;
STATE OF RHODE ISLAND;
STATE OF COLORADO; DISTRICT
OF COLUMBIA; STATE OF
6        AMERICAN RIVERS V. AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE

NORTH CAROLINA;
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA;
STATE OF NEW MEXICO; STATE
OF VERMONT; STATE OF
MINNESOTA; STATE OF
CONNECTICUT; STATE OF
WASHINGTON; STATE OF
MICHIGAN; COMMONWEALTH
OF MASSACHUSETTS; STATE OF
NEVADA; STATE OF WISCONSIN;
STATE OF MAINE; STATE OF
ILLINOIS,

                 Plaintiffs-Appellees,

STATE OF ARKANSAS; STATE OF
LOUISIANA; STATE OF
MISSISSIPPI; STATE OF
MISSOURI; STATE OF MONTANA;
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA;
STATE OF WYOMING; STATE OF
TEXAS,

                 Intervenors-Appellants,

    v.

ANDREW R. WHEELER; U.S.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY,

                 Defendants-Appellees,
      AMERICAN RIVERS V. AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE   7

AMERICAN PETROLEUM
INSTITUTE; INTERSTATE
NATURAL GAS ASSOCIATION OF
AMERICA; NATIONAL
HYDROPOWER ASSOCIATION,

              Intervenor-Defendants.

and

STATE OF ARKANSAS; STATE OF
LOUISIANA; STATE OF
MISSISSIPPI; STATE OF
MISSOURI; STATE OF MONTANA;
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA;
STATE OF WYOMING; STATE OF
TEXAS,

              Intervenors-Appellants,

       Appeal from the United States District Court
         for the Northern District of California
        William Alsup, District Judge, Presiding

        Argued and Submitted November 15, 2022
                  San Jose, California

                 Filed February 21, 2023

   Before: Susan P. Graber, Richard C. Tallman, and
         Michelle T. Friedland, Circuit Judges.

               Opinion by Judge Friedland
8      AMERICAN RIVERS V. AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE

                          SUMMARY *

                  Remands / Agency Action

     Reversing the district court’s order granting a voluntary
remand and vacating an Environmental Protection Agency
(“EPA”) regulation promulgated under the Clean Water Act
(“CWA”), the panel held that a court granting a voluntary
remand lacks authority to also vacate the regulation without
first holding it unlawful.
    One CWA requirement, known as Section 401
certification, obligates any applicant for a federal license or
permit to conduct activity that may result in a discharge into
the navigable waters of the United States to obtain
certification (or waiver of certification) from the state
governing the area where a discharge would originate. The
Section 401 regulatory scheme remained unchanged until
July 2020, when the EPA promulgated CWA Section 401
Certification Rule (“2020 Rule”).
    Several states, environmental groups, and tribes
(“Plaintiffs”) filed lawsuits challenging the 2020 Rule. A
different set of states and energy industry groups intervened
to defend the 2020 Rule. Before the litigation reached the
summary judgment stage, a new President was elected. The
EPA publicly announced its intent to revise the 2020 Rule,
and moved in district court for a remand of the 2020 Rule so
that the agency could reconsider it. The district court
granted the EPA’s remand motion, and granted Plaintiffs’

*
  This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
      AMERICAN RIVERS V. AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE         9

request for vacatur of the 2020 Rule. Intervenor-Defendants
appealed the district court’s order vacating the 2020 Rule.
After unsuccessfully seeking a stay pending appeal from the
district court and this court, the Supreme Court granted an
emergency stay, so that the 2020 Rule has been in effect
since.
    The panel held that it had jurisdiction to review the
district court’s remand order. Plaintiffs’ goal in bringing this
lawsuit was to have the 2020 Rule vacated, and Intervenor-
Defendants sought to keep it in place. When the district
court vacated the 2020 Rule in conjunction with granting the
request for a voluntary remand, it gave Plaintiffs everything
they wanted and left nothing else for the court to do. The
district court’s order was thus final and appealable. The
panel rejected the EPA’s argument that Alsea Valley
Alliance v. Department of Commerce, 358 F.3d 1181 (9th
Cir. 2004), applied here. Instead, general finality principles
applied.
    The panel exercised its jurisdiction and held that courts
may not vacate agency actions in conjunction with granting
requests for voluntary remands without first holding the
agency actions unlawful. Plaintiffs contended that if
voluntary remands before merits determinations existed,
then so too must the authority to vacate the challenged
authority in the interim. The panel held that federal courts
do not have unlimited equitable authority. Precedent
suggests that permanent equitable remedies can be awarded
against only illegal executive action. Illegality requires
establishing that there has been (or will be) a violation of the
law.
   Even if Plaintiffs could point to some precedent
supporting a court’s authority to vacate executive action
10    AMERICAN RIVERS V. AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE

without a merits ruling, the panel read the Administrative
Procedure Act (“APA”) as foreclosing any authority of
courts to vacate agency actions not first held
unlawful. Because Congress set forth in the APA a detailed
process for repealing rules, the panel held that it could not
endorse a judicial practice that would help agencies
circumvent that process. The panel rejected two
counterarguments raised by Plaintiffs. First, Plaintiffs
argued that, because voluntary remands exist in a realm of
equity that comes before a judicial ruling on the merits, the
APA’s judicial-review section had nothing to say about what
equitable remedies courts may fashion in the voluntary-
remand context. The panel held that the APA’s judicial-
review section cannot be construed so narrowly. Second,
citing policy concerns, Plaintiffs urged that the APA should
be read to give courts the authority to vacate regulations
without first holding them unlawful. The panel held that
policy concerns cannot trump the best interpretation of the
statutory text. The APA’s text is best read as authorizing a
court to vacate an agency action only when that court first
held that action unlawful.
    The panel concluded that the district court lacked
authority to vacate the 2020 Rule without first holding it
unlawful. The panel reversed the district court’s order in its
entirety and sent the case back on an open record for
reconsideration of the EPA’s remand motion.
      AMERICAN RIVERS V. AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE   11

                       COUNSEL

George P. Sibley, III (argued), Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP,
Richmond, Virginia; Deidre G. Duncan and Erica N.
Peterson, Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP, Washington, D.C.;
Clare Ellis, Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP, San Francisco,
California; Misha Tseytlin, Troutman Pepper Hamilton
Sanders LLP, Chicago, Illinois; Charles Sensiba, Troutman
Pepper Hamilton Sanders LLP, Washington, D.C.; Elizabeth
Holt Andrews, Troutman Pepper Hamilton Sanders LLP,
San Francisco, California; Joseph S. St. John, Deputy
Solicitor; Elizabeth B. Murrill, Solicitor General; Jeff
Landry, Attorney General; Louisiana Department of Justice,
Baton Rouge, Louisiana; James Kaste, Deputy Attorney
General, Office of the Attorney General, Cheyenne,
Wyoming; Leslie Rutledge, Attorney General, Little Rock,
Arkansas; Lynn Fitch, Attorney General, Jackson,
Mississippi; Eric Schmitt, Attorney General, Springfield,
Missouri; Austin Knudsen, Attorney General, Helena,
Montana; Benjamin D. Wilson, Deputy Solicitor General;
Ken Paxton, Attorney General; Office of the Attorney
General, Austin, Texas; Patrick Morrisey, Attorney General,
Charleston, West Virginia; for Intervenor-Defendants-
Appellants.
Kevin W. McArdle (argued), Leslie M. Hill, and Elisabeth
H. Carter, Attorneys, Environment and Natural Resources
Division; Todd Kim, Assistant Attorney General; United
States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; Alexis
Wade, Peter Ford, Andrea Priest, and Alexander Mullee,
Attorneys, United States Environmental Protection Agency,
Washington, D.C.; for Defendants-Appellees.
12    AMERICAN RIVERS V. AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE

Kelly T. Wood (argued), Assistant Attorney General; Leslie
Griffith, Deputy Solicitor General; Robert W. Ferguson,
Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General, Olympia,
Washington; Brian M. Lusignan, Assistant Attorney
General; Laura Etlinger, Assistant Solicitor General; Andrea
Oser, Deputy Solicitor General; Letitia James, Attorney
General; Office of the Attorney General, Albany, New York;
Adam Levitan and Tatiana K. Gaur, Deputy Attorneys
General; Eric Katz and Sarah E. Morrison, Supervising
Deputy Attorneys General; Rob Bonta, Attorney General;
Office of the Attorney General, Los Angeles, California;
Bryant B. Cannon, Deputy Attorney General, Office of the
Attorney General, San Francisco, California; Jason R.
Flanders, Aqua Terra Aeris Law Group, Oakland,
California; Peter M. K. Frost and Sangye Ince-Johannsen,
Western Environmental Law Center, Eugene, Oregon;
Andrew M. Hawley, Western Environmental Law Center,
Seattle, Washington; Kristen L. Boyles, Earthjustice,
Seattle, Washington; Olivia Glasscock, Earthjustice, Juneau,
Alaska; Nathan Matthews, Sierra Club, Oakland, California;
Moneen S. Nasmith and Michael Z. Youhana, Earthjustice,
New York, New York; Annette M. Quill, Senior Assistant
Attorney General; Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General; Office
of the Attorney General, Denver, Colorado; Jill Lacedonia,
Assistant Attorney General; William Tong, Attorney
General; Office of the Attorney General, Hartford,
Connecticut; Karl A. Racine, Attorney General; Caroline S.
Van Zile, Solicitor General; Office of the Attorney General,
Washington, D.C.; Kwame Raoul, Attorney General,
Springfield, Illinois; Jillian R. O’Brien, Assistant Attorney
General; Aaron Frey, Attorney General; Office of the
Attorney General, Augusta, Maine; John B. Howard, Jr.,
Special Assistant Attorney General; Brian Frosh, Attorney
      AMERICAN RIVERS V. AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE   13

General; Office of the Attorney General, Baltimore,
Maryland; Maura Healey, Attorney General, Boston,
Massachusetts; Gillian E. Wener, Assistant Attorney
General; Dana Nessel, Attorney General; Office of the
Attorney General, Lansing, Michigan; Peter Surdo, Special
Assistant Attorney General; Keith Ellison, Attorney
General; Office of the Attorney General; Saint Paul,
Minnesota; Aaron D. Ford, Attorney General, Carson City,
Nevada; Lisa Morelli, Deputy Attorney General; Matthew J.
Platkin, Attorney General; Office of the Attorney General,
Trenton, New Jersey; Hector Balderas, Attorney General,
Santa Fe, New Mexico; Taylor H. Crabtree, Assistant
Attorney General; Joshua S. Stein, Attorney General; Office
of the Attorney General, Raleigh, North Carolina; Paul
Garrahan, Assistant Attorney General; Ellen F. Rosenblum,
Attorney General; Office of the Attorney General, Salem,
Oregon; Alison B. Hoffman, Special Assistant Attorney
General; Peter F. Neronha, Attorney General; Office of the
Attorney General, Providence, Rhode Island; Laura B.
Murphy, Assistant Attorney General; Suzanne R. Young,
Attorney General; Office of the Attorney General,
Montpelier, Vermont; Gabe Johnson-Karp, Assistant
Attorney General; Josh Kaul, Attorney General; Office of
the Attorney General, Madison, Wisconsin; Christopher E.
Bergin Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Office of the
Attorney General, Richmond, Virginia; William Grantham,
Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General,
Albuquerque, New Mexico; Matthew Ireland, Assistant
Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General, Boston,
Massachusetts; Heidi Parry Stern, Solicitor General, Office
of the Attorney General, Las Vegas, Nevada; Jason E.
James, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney
General, Chicago, Illinois; for Plaintiffs-Appellees.
14     AMERICAN RIVERS V. AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE

                             OPINION

FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judge:

    When a federal regulation is challenged in court, the
promulgating agency may ask the court to remand the
regulation to the agency for an opportunity to reevaluate it
and correct any errors. Courts often grant such voluntary
remands without ruling on the lawfulness of the challenged
regulation. The question we face today is whether a court
granting a voluntary remand may also vacate the regulation
without first holding it unlawful, as the district court did
here. We hold that courts lack the authority to do so, and we
therefore reverse.
                                   I.
                                  A.
       The Clean Water Act (“CWA”), 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et
seq., as its name suggests, aims to “restore and maintain the
. . . integrity of the Nation’s waters.” County of Maui v. Haw.
Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462, 1468 (2020) (citation
omitted). Among other things, the CWA entrusts states with
the authority to set water-quality standards within their
borders, 1 and it imposes certain requirements before
pollutants may be discharged into the navigable waters of the
United States. See PUD No. 1 of Jefferson Cnty. v. Wash.

1
  A state’s water-quality standards are subject to federal approval to
ensure that they meet the minimum requirements of federal law. See
PUD No. 1 of Jefferson Cnty. v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700,
704-08 (1994). But “[s]tates may adopt water quality standards that are
more stringent than federal law requires.” Cal. State Water Res. Control
Bd. v. FERC, 43 F.4th 920, 924 (9th Cir. 2022).
       AMERICAN RIVERS V. AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE             15

Dep’t of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 704-08 (1994); Wildlife
Fund, 140 S. Ct. at 1468.
    One CWA requirement, known as Section 401
certification, obligates “[a]ny applicant for a Federal license
or permit to conduct any activity . . . which may result in any
discharge into the navigable waters” of the United States to
obtain a certification (or a waiver of certification) from the
state 2 governing the area where a discharge would originate.
33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1). Such a certification affirms that the
discharge would comply with various water-quality
provisions of the CWA—including the federally approved
water-quality standards set by the state. Id.; see also PUD
No. 1, 511 U.S. at 707-08; Cal. State Water Res. Control Bd.
v. FERC, 43 F.4th 920, 924-25 (9th Cir. 2022) (explaining
one state’s process for conducting its review of an
applicant’s certification request). The CWA imposes a time
limit within which the state must act once it receives a
request for certification: If a state “fails or refuses to act on
a request for certification[] within a reasonable period of
time (which shall not exceed one year) after receipt of such
request,” the CWA provides that “the certification
requirements . . . shall be waived.” 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1).
Because a state may impose water-quality standards that are
more stringent than federal standards, waiver could result in
federal approval of a license or permit to discharge
pollutants into waters within the state’s borders even though
the discharge would violate state water-quality standards.
See Cal. State Water Res. Control Bd., 43 F.4th at 924.

2
 The CWA also authorizes the EPA “to treat an Indian tribe as a State”
for purposes of Section 401 in certain circumstances. 33 U.S.C. §
1377(e).
16    AMERICAN RIVERS V. AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE

    Initially, the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”)
implemented the Section 401 certification process by
carrying forward preexisting regulations that had governed
the certification process found in the CWA’s predecessor
federal water-quality statute. See State Certification of
Activities Requiring a Federal License or Permit, 36 Fed.
Reg. 8563 (May 8, 1971) (40 C.F.R. pt. 121 (2019)). Those
regulations imposed certain requirements on the state
agencies responsible for certifying compliance with water-
quality standards. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 121.1(e), 121.2 (2019).
One regulation required the state certifying authority to
provide a “statement that there [was] a reasonable assurance
that the activity [would] be conducted in a manner which
[would] not violate applicable water quality standards.” Id.
§ 121.2(a)(3). Another required the state certifying authority
to provide a “statement of any conditions which [it]
deem[ed] necessary or desirable with respect to the
discharge of the activity.” Id. § 121.2(a)(4).
    In addition, the regulations explained how a state could
waive certification. Id. § 121.16 (2019). Either the state
could provide written notice waiving the certification
requirement to the federal agency issuing the permit or
license, or that federal agency could send the EPA “[w]ritten
notification” that the state failed to act on the certification
request “within a reasonable period of time after receipt of
such request, as determined by the [federal] agency.” Id.
The regulations specified that the time period “shall
generally be considered to be 6 months, but in any event
shall not exceed 1 year.” Id. § 121.16(b). Because of this
time limit and some states’ exacting requirements for
obtaining certification, a practice developed in which an
applicant would withdraw and resubmit its certification
request to restart the clock for the state to act on the request,
      AMERICAN RIVERS V. AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE        17

effectively extending the one-year time limit rather than
having the request denied under the state’s certification
process. See Cal. State Water Res. Control Bd., 43 F.4th at
924-25 (describing the withdrawal-and-resubmission
practice). That practice “afford[ed] the project applicant
more time to comply with procedural and substantive
prerequisites to certification [in the state] and the state more
time to decide whether and under what conditions it [would]
grant the certification request.” Id. at 925.
                              B.
    The Section 401 regulatory regime remained unchanged
for decades, until July 2020, when the EPA promulgated the
Clean Water Act Section 401 Certification Rule (“2020
Rule”). See Clean Water Act Section 401 Certification Rule,
85 Fed. Reg. 42210 (July 13, 2020) (40 C.F.R. pt. 121
(2021)). Two provisions in the 2020 Rule are relevant here.
    One provision aims to reduce the scope of states’
certification authority. The 2020 Rule provides that
certification is “limited to assuring that a discharge from a
Federally licensed or permitted activity will comply with
water quality requirements [as defined in the 2020 Rule].”
40 C.F.R. § 121.3 (2021) (emphasis added); id. § 121.1(n)
(defining “[w]ater quality requirements”).         The EPA
explained that it made this change to focus the certification
criteria on “discharges” affecting water quality, not
“activities” that affect water quality more generally. Clean
Water Act Section 401 Certification Rule, 85 Fed. Reg. at
42251; see also id. at 42253 (listing potential examples of
such activities).
   The second relevant provision addresses when the one-
year time limit for acting on a certification request begins
and ends. The 2020 Rule provides that “the reasonable
18    AMERICAN RIVERS V. AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE

period of time” within which a state may act on a
certification request “shall not exceed one year from [the
date of] receipt,” 40 C.F.R. § 121.6(a), which is “the date
that a certification request is documented as received by a
[state] in accordance with applicable submission
procedures,” id. § 121.1(m). It further instructs that a state
“is not authorized to request the project proponent to
withdraw a certification request and is not authorized to take
any action to extend the reasonable period of time” beyond
one year from the date of receipt. Id. § 121.6(e). These
clauses were aimed at shortening how long a state has to act
on a certification request. See Clean Water Act Section 401
Certification Rule, 85 Fed. Reg. at 42223, 42235-36.
                              C.
    Shortly after the EPA published the final 2020 Rule,
several states, environmental groups, and tribes
(collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed three lawsuits challenging
the Rule in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California. Plaintiffs argued that the Rule was
inconsistent with the CWA, and they sought an order
vacating it under the Administrative Procedure Act
(“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 706. A different set of states and energy
industry groups (collectively, “Intervenor-Defendants”)
intervened to defend the Rule in the three cases, which the
district court consolidated.
    Before the litigation reached the summary judgment
stage, a new President was elected. On his first day in office,
President Biden directed federal agencies to review
regulations concerning the protection of public health and
the environment that were enacted under the previous
Administration. Exec. Order No. 13,990, 86 Fed. Reg. 7037,
7037 (Jan. 20, 2021). The EPA responded by asking the
      AMERICAN RIVERS V. AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE         19

district court to stay the proceedings so that the agency could
review the 2020 Rule.
    A few months later, the EPA publicly announced its
intent to revise the 2020 Rule. See Notice of Intention to
Reconsider and Revise the Clean Water Act Section 401
Certification Rule, 86 Fed. Reg. 29541 (June 2, 2021). The
EPA explained that, after considering the “text of CWA
Section 401” and other factors, it had “identified substantial
concerns with a number of provisions of the [2020] Rule that
relate to cooperative federalism principles and CWA Section
401’s goal of ensuring that states are empowered to protect
their water quality.” Id. at 29542. Citing those concerns, the
EPA moved in district court for a remand of the 2020 Rule
so that the agency could reconsider it, and the agency asked
the district court to leave the 2020 Rule in effect during that
remand.
    In response, Plaintiffs argued that the district court
should either deny the motion so that the litigation to
invalidate the 2020 Rule could proceed, or grant the EPA’s
remand request but also vacate the 2020 Rule. Plaintiffs
argued that keeping the 2020 Rule in place during a
potentially lengthy remand would severely harm water
quality by frustrating states’ efforts to limit the adverse water
quality impacts of federally licensed projects.
    Intervenor-Defendants took no position on the EPA’s
motion for remand, but opposed Plaintiffs’ request for
vacatur, arguing that the district court lacked the authority to
vacate the 2020 Rule without first making a merits
determination. In Intervenor-Defendants’ view, the APA
permits courts to set aside only unlawful agency action.
Because the district court had not yet determined whether the
2020 Rule was lawful—nor had merits briefing even
20    AMERICAN RIVERS V. AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE

begun—Intervenor-Defendants contended that the district
court lacked the authority to vacate it.
    The district court granted the EPA’s remand motion and,
rejecting Intervenor-Defendants’ arguments, also granted
Plaintiffs’ request for vacatur.
    Intervenor-Defendants timely appealed the district
court’s order vacating the 2020 Rule. After unsuccessfully
seeking from the district court and our court a stay of the
vacatur of the 2020 Rule pending appeal, Intervenor-
Defendants sought an emergency stay in the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court granted that stay, so the 2020 Rule has
been in effect since. Louisiana v. Am. Rivers, 142 S. Ct.
1347 (2022) (granting stay of the district court’s order
“insofar as it vacates the [2020 Rule]”).
                              D.
    On appeal, Intervenor-Defendants reprise the argument
that they pressed before the district court: under the APA, a
court may vacate only unlawful agency action. Because the
district court vacated the 2020 Rule without ever holding it
unlawful, Intervenor-Defendants contend that the district
court exceeded its authority.
    Plaintiffs and the EPA argue that we lack jurisdiction to
even consider Intervenor-Defendants’ argument because the
district court’s decision is not a final appealable order. But
to the extent that we have jurisdiction, the EPA and Plaintiffs
part ways on the merits. The EPA agrees with Intervenor-
Defendants that the APA prohibited the district court from
vacating the 2020 Rule without first holding it unlawful.
Plaintiffs, on the other hand, argue that principles of equity
authorized the district court to vacate the Rule without first
holding it unlawful.
      AMERICAN RIVERS V. AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE        21

                              II.
    We review de novo jurisdictional questions, United
States ex rel. Alexander Volkhoff, LLC v. Janssen
Pharmaceutica N.V., 945 F.3d 1237, 1241 (9th Cir. 2020),
as well as “questions of statutory interpretation” and
“questions involving [a] court’s authority to act.” United
States v. Ray, 375 F.3d 980, 988 (9th Cir. 2004).
                              III.
    We first consider whether we have jurisdiction to review
the district court’s remand order. We hold that we do.
     Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we have “jurisdiction only over
appeals from final orders.” Chugach Alaska Corp. v. Lujan,
915 F.2d 454, 457 (9th Cir. 1990). In general, a “decision
by the District Court that ends the litigation on the merits and
leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment”
is final under § 1291. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437
U.S. 463, 467 (1978) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
    The district court’s order here terminated the only
dispute between the parties, which was whether the 2020
Rule should stay in effect. Plaintiffs’ goal in bringing this
lawsuit was to have the 2020 Rule vacated, and Intervenor-
Defendants sought to keep it in place. When the district
court vacated the 2020 Rule in conjunction with granting
EPA’s request for a voluntary remand, it gave Plaintiffs
everything they wanted and left nothing else for the court to
do. The district court’s order is thus final and appealable.
    The EPA resists this conclusion by arguing that, under
Alsea Valley Alliance v. Department of Commerce, 358 F.3d
1181 (9th Cir. 2004), district court remands to agencies are
not final appealable orders. In Alsea, we held that we lacked
22    AMERICAN RIVERS V. AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 over an intervenor’s
appeal from a district court order that had held invalid,
vacated, and remanded an agency regulation. Id. at 1183-86.
Our decision explained that remand orders to agencies
generally are not final but that a remand order will be treated
as final when “(1) the district court conclusively resolves a
separable legal issue, (2) the remand order forces the agency
to apply a potentially erroneous rule which may result in a
wasted proceeding, and (3) review would, as a practical
matter, be foreclosed if an immediate appeal were
unavailable.” Id. at 1184 (quoting Collord v. U.S. Dep’t of
the Interior, 154 F.3d 933, 935 (9th Cir. 1998)). Applying
that test, we held that the district court’s decision remanding
the vacated regulation was not a final appealable order
because it failed the third prong. Id. at 1184-85. We
explained that later appellate review would not be foreclosed
because the intervenor could challenge the result of the
agency’s reconsideration process if dissatisfied with it. Id.
    Alsea does not control here. That case involved a
particular kind of order: one in which a district court reaches
a merits decision on the lawfulness of a challenged
regulation and returns the matter to the agency to remedy the
problems identified in the merits decision. It is for
evaluating that type of order that we developed the three-part
finality test applied in Alsea. See Stone v. Heckler, 722 F.2d
464, 467 (9th Cir. 1983) (setting forth the general framework
to determine whether a district court decision remanding to
an agency after a merits decision is final and appealable);
Chugach Alaska Corp., 915 F.2d at 457 (first articulating the
inquiry as a three-part finality test to determine jurisdiction
to review a district court decision remanding to an agency
after a merits decision). That role is obvious from the
wording of the test itself, which presupposes a reasoned
      AMERICAN RIVERS V. AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE        23

merits order that could “conclusively resolve[] a separable
legal issue” or announce “a potentially erroneous rule.”
Alsea, 358 F.3d at 1184 (quoting Collord, 154 F.3d at 935).
Consistent with this analysis, we have applied the Alsea
finality test only to reasoned merits orders. See, e.g., Crow
Indian Tribe v. United States, 965 F.3d 662, 676 (9th Cir.
2020) (applying the three-part finality test to determine
jurisdiction to review a district court decision remanding to
an agency after a merits decision); Pit River Tribe v. U.S.
Forest Serv., 615 F.3d 1069, 1074-77 (9th Cir. 2010) (same).
The three-part test thus has no application to a district court
decision that entirely skips over any merits adjudication.
Because there was no merits adjudication here, Alsea is
inapposite.
    Instead, general finality principles apply. The “core
application [of § 1291] is to rulings that terminate an action.”
Gelboim v. Bank of Am. Corp., 574 U.S. 405, 409 (2015).
Again, the district court’s decision to vacate the rule here
resolved the only dispute between the parties and terminated
this action. We therefore have appellate jurisdiction to
review the district court’s order.
    Our conclusion comports with that reached by the D.C.
Circuit in a similar situation. In Limnia, Inc. v. United States
Department of Energy, 857 F.3d 379 (D.C. Cir. 2017), the
D.C. Circuit considered a voluntary remand in a dispute over
whether the Department of Energy had improperly denied
loan applications from a battery company called Limnia. Id.
at 381. Limnia argued that the denial violated the APA and
that Limnia’s applications should be approved. Id. at 382.
The agency moved for a remand, and the district court
granted the motion without addressing the substance of
Limnia’s APA claims. Id. at 382-84. It was clear that the
district court’s order anticipated that, on remand, the original
24    AMERICAN RIVERS V. AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE

loan applications would be disregarded and that Limnia
would have to file new loan applications and pay a new
application fee if it wished to continue to pursue a loan from
the agency. Id. at 386 (explaining that the district court had
accepted the agency’s position that “remand was
appropriate, even though [the agency] was not offering to
reconsider the denial of Limnia’s . . . loan applications or
waive the . . . application fee”). Limnia appealed the remand
order, and the agency argued that the D.C. Circuit lacked
jurisdiction because remand orders typically are not final.
Id. at 385. The D.C. Circuit rejected that argument. Id. at
385-86. The court explained that the district court’s decision
was final because it effectively ended the parties’ core
dispute by denying Limnia the relief it sought in court: a
grant of its original loan application. Id. at 386. The D.C.
Circuit reasoned that it “would strain common sense” to treat
that district court order as non-final simply because it was
labeled a remand and remands typically are not final. Id.
(quoting New Mexico ex rel. Richardson v. Bureau of Land
Mgmt., 565 F.3d 683, 699 (10th Cir. 2009)). Instead, the
court focused on the practical effect of the district court’s
order, which was to leave in place the agency’s denial of the
original loan applications—the same result that would have
been achieved had the litigation proceeded and the agency
had prevailed. Id. Similarly, here, vacatur of the 2020 Rule
is the same result that would have been achieved had the
litigation proceeded and Plaintiffs had prevailed. In both
situations, the practical effect of the remand order was to end
the parties’ dispute, creating the finality needed for appellate
jurisdiction.
                              IV.
   We now exercise our jurisdiction to consider whether
courts may vacate agency actions in conjunction with
      AMERICAN RIVERS V. AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE        25

granting requests for voluntary remands without first
holding the agency actions unlawful. We hold that they may
not.
                              A.
    When an agency’s action is challenged in court, the
agency will sometimes request that the court remand the
challenged action—usually a regulation—so that the agency
can correct any errors in the first instance. See Cal. Cmtys.
Against Toxics v. EPA, 688 F.3d 989, 992 (9th Cir. 2012).
For such a voluntary remand to be granted, “the agency
ordinarily . . . need[s] to profess intention to reconsider, re-
review, or modify the original agency decision that is the
subject of the legal challenge.” Limnia, Inc., 857 F.3d at
387; see also NRDC v. EPA, 38 F.4th 34, 60 (9th Cir. 2022).
    Voluntary remands conserve judicial resources by
allowing agencies to correct their errors before courts reach
merits determinations requiring them to do so. See, e.g.,
NRDC, 38 F.4th at 60-62 (granting a voluntary remand
without making a merits determination). Courts retain
“broad discretion” in deciding whether to grant a voluntarily
requested remand but have “generally grant[ed] an agency’s
request for voluntary remand unless the request is frivolous
or made in bad faith.” Id. at 60 (first passage quoting Util.
Solid Waste Activities Grp. v. EPA, 901 F.3d 414, 436 (D.C.
Cir. 2018)).
                              B.
    Plaintiffs argue that principles of equity support pairing
the authority to grant a voluntary remand (which usually
occurs without a merits decision) with a corresponding
authority to vacate the challenged rule during a voluntary
remand. Otherwise, Plaintiffs assert, voluntary remands
26    AMERICAN RIVERS V. AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE

could lead to inequitable consequences: While an agency
reassesses the challenged rule on remand, a plaintiff may be
forced to live with a rule that it contends is unlawful. In
short, Plaintiffs contend that if voluntary remands before
merits determinations exist, so too must the authority to
vacate a challenged rule in the interim.
    Plaintiffs’ argument overlooks that federal courts do not
have unlimited equitable authority. As the Supreme Court
has explained, the equitable authority of the federal courts
extends only so far as that which the courts of equity in
England traditionally exercised “at the time of the
separation” between the United States and England. Grupo
Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. All. Bond Fund, Inc., 527
U.S. 308, 318 (1999) (quotation marks omitted). Plaintiffs
have pointed to no legal precedent or historical examples
suggesting that courts of equity were empowered to vacate
an executive action not first held to violate the law, and we
are aware of none.
    Precedent instead suggests that permanent equitable
remedies can be awarded against only illegal executive
action. And illegality, of course, requires establishing that
there has been (or will be) a violation of the law. See
Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 575 U.S. 320,
326-27 (2015). It is well settled that federal courts have
equitable authority to “enjoin unconstitutional actions by
state and federal officers.” Id. at 327. The Supreme Court
has also long recognized the inherent authority of federal
courts to award equitable remedies against other types of
unlawful executive actions. See, e.g., Osborn v. Bank of the
U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 748-49, 871 (1824) (affirming
an order of restitution against a state tax officer in favor of
the Bank of the United States when money “was taken out
of the Bank unlawfully” (emphasis added)); Am. Sch. of
        AMERICAN RIVERS V. AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE                    27

Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94, 108-11 (1902)
(remanding with instructions that the district court enter an
order requiring the Postmaster General to deliver mail that
he had been withholding without statutory authority to do
so). In all instances, the authority of courts to impose
permanent equitable remedies was invoked only after
holding the executive action unlawful. 3 Because we are
unaware of any precedent or historical examples supporting
the power of courts to vacate executive action not first held
unlawful, we reject Plaintiffs’ argument that the district
court had such authority.
                                     C.
    Moreover, even if Plaintiffs could point to some
precedent supporting a court’s authority to vacate executive
action without a merits ruling, we read the APA as
foreclosing any authority of courts to vacate agency actions
not first held unlawful. See Armstrong, 575 U.S. at 327
(“The power of federal courts of equity to enjoin unlawful
executive action is subject to express and implied statutory
limitations.”).
                                     1.
    In its judicial-review section, the APA instructs courts to
“set aside” (i.e., to vacate) agency actions held to be

3
  Even when equitable relief is sought on a temporary basis, a court
cannot enter such relief without first evaluating the merits. See, e.g., hiQ
Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., 31 F.4th 1180, 1188 (9th Cir. 2022) (“A
plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely
to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the
absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor,
and that an injunction is in the public interest.” (emphasis added)
(quoting Winter v. NRDC, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008))).
28    AMERICAN RIVERS V. AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE

unlawful. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (instructing courts to “set
aside” those actions “found to be,” for example, “arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law”). By granting courts authority to “set
aside” agency actions “found to be” unlawful, id., the APA
not only expressly explains when a court may set aside
agency action (upon a holding of unlawfulness), it also
implicitly explains when a court cannot (without a holding
of unlawfulness). This reading follows from the basic canon
of construction establishing that an “explicit listing” of some
things “should be understood as an exclusion of others” not
listed—even when a statute “does not say expressly that
only” the listed things are included. Silvers v. Sony Pictures
Ent., Inc., 402 F.3d 881, 885 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc). And
this reading is further reinforced by our precedent holding
that, when a statute lists certain remedies, we should be
“chary of reading others into it.” Owner-Operator Indep.
Drivers Ass’n v. Swift Transp. Co. (AZ), 632 F.3d 1111, 1121
(9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers
Ass’n v. Landstar Sys., Inc., 622 F.3d 1307, 1323-24 (11th
Cir. 2010)).
    In addition, the APA defines rulemaking as the “agency
process for formulating, amending, or repealing a rule.” 5
U.S.C. § 551(5) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court has
interpreted that provision as requiring that “agencies use the
same procedures when they amend or repeal a rule as they
used to issue the rule in the first instance.” Perez v. Mortg.
Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 101 (2015). Endorsing the
practice of voluntary-remand-with-vacatur where there is no
merits ruling would essentially turn courts into the
accomplices of agencies seeking to avoid this statutory
requirement, as it would allow agencies to repeal a rule
merely by requesting a remand with vacatur in court.
      AMERICAN RIVERS V. AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE       29

Because Congress set forth in the APA a detailed process for
repealing rules, we cannot endorse a judicial practice that
would help agencies circumvent that process.
                              2.
    We address two counterarguments presented by
Plaintiffs, both of which fail. Plaintiffs first argue that the
APA’s judicial-review section is not relevant because
voluntary remand “avoids judicial review.” In other words,
Plaintiffs argue that, because voluntary remands exist in a
realm of equity that comes before a judicial ruling on the
merits, the APA’s judicial-review section has nothing to say
about what equitable remedies courts may fashion in the
voluntary-remand context. We do not think that the APA’s
judicial-review section can be construed so narrowly. It
speaks to how courts can respond to challenges to agency
actions and specifies when it is appropriate to set aside such
actions. The APA’s judicial-review section therefore
informs us what authority courts have in the voluntary-
remand context.
    Plaintiffs next cite policy concerns as a reason for us to
recognize judicial authority to vacate a challenged rule
without first holding it unlawful when granting voluntary
remands. Voluntary remands, Plaintiffs contend, permit
agencies to thwart the judicial review of agency action
alleged to be unlawful that, if left standing during a remand,
could cause significant harm. Given those risks, Plaintiffs
urge that the APA should be read to give courts the authority
to vacate regulations without first holding them unlawful.
    We cannot agree. “[P]olicy concerns cannot trump the
best interpretation of the statutory text.” Patel v. Garland,
142 S. Ct. 1614, 1627 (2022). And as explained earlier, the
APA’s text is best read as authorizing a court to vacate an
30    AMERICAN RIVERS V. AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE

agency action only when that court has first held that action
unlawful.
    In any event, Plaintiffs’ policy concerns are misplaced.
To begin, if a court suspects that a request for a voluntary
remand is frivolous or made in bad faith—for example,
because the agency does not actually intend to reconsider the
challenged regulation, or because the agency seeks a
voluntary remand simply to forestall judicial review—that is
reason enough to deny a voluntary remand. See NRDC, 38
F.4th at 60. And courts possess “broad discretion” in
deciding whether to grant voluntary remands. Id. (quoting
Util. Solid Waste, 901 F.3d at 436). That broad discretion
allows a court to deny a voluntary remand—and thus to
proceed to decide the merits of the case—if the risk of harm
from indefinitely leaving an allegedly unlawful rule in place
outweighs considerations of judicial and administrative
efficiency. But, under the APA, that discretion does not
include the power to vacate a rule without first holding it
unlawful.
                              V.
    For the forgoing reasons, the district court lacked the
authority to vacate the 2020 Rule without first holding it
unlawful. We therefore must reverse the district court’s
order in its entirety and send this case back on an open record
for reconsideration of the EPA’s remand motion. We cannot
engage in the factfinding that might be needed to identify
any harms that keeping the 2020 Rule in place during a
remand might cause, nor can we weigh, in the first instance,
those harms against considerations of judicial and
administrative efficiency. See Saucillo v. Peck, 25 F.4th
1118, 1133 (9th Cir. 2022) (explaining that factfinding is the
province of district courts and that a remand is called for
      AMERICAN RIVERS V. AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE       31

when a district court has relied on an incorrect legal standard
to exercise its discretion). We accordingly reverse and
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
   REVERSED.