Court Opinion

ID: 9403743
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-21 16:09:19.298947+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:09.098113
License: Public Domain

Supreme Court

                                        No. 2021-328-Appeal.
                                        (K 92-543)

 Anne Capaldi               :

       v.                   :

Steven Capaldi.             :

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision
before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers
are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme
Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence,
Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone (401) 222-3258 or
Email opinionanalyst@courts.ri.gov, of any typographical
or other formal errors in order that corrections may be
made before the opinion is published.
                                                        Supreme Court

                                                        No. 2021-328-Appeal.
                                                        (K 92-543)

              Anne Capaldi                 :

                    v.                     :

             Steven Capaldi.               :

             Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, and Long, JJ.

                                   OPINION

      Justice Long, for the Court. This appeal concerns the long-ago divorce of

the plaintiff, Anne Farrer (Anne),1 and her former husband, Steven Capaldi (Steven),

the defendant. 2 Steven challenges the trial justice’s decision to reopen the case and

award a portion of his pension to Anne more than two decades after the Family Court

finalized their divorce. This case came before the Supreme Court pursuant to an

order directing the parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised in this

appeal should not be summarily decided. After considering the parties’ written and

oral submissions and reviewing the record, we conclude that cause has not been

1
 At the time of the parties’ divorce in 1992, the trial justice decreed Anne Capaldi
could resume her maiden name Anne Farrer.
2
 Throughout this opinion we refer to the parties by their first names for the purpose
of clarity. This Court intends no disrespect to the parties.
                                        -1-
shown and that we may decide this appeal without further briefing or argument. For

the reasons set forth in this opinion, we vacate the orders of the Family Court that

award Anne a portion of Steven’s pension.

                          Facts and Procedural History

      Anne and Steven married in 1975. Steven subsequently began working at the

Rhode Island Department of Corrections as a Senior Probation Counselor, a position

he held for the rest of the marriage. Anne, on the other hand, went to work for the

Town of Coventry in 1986. She initially worked part-time and earned no benefits,

but began working full-time for the town in 1992 after filing for divorce from Steven

on May 26 of that year.

      During the course of the divorce proceedings, neither party conducted

discovery, nor prepared expense sheets under oath. Steven drafted a proposed

property-settlement agreement and presented it to Anne and her counsel. Anne

accepted the property-settlement agreement, modifying it only insofar as to require

that Steven provide health insurance coverage until she remarried. Anne’s counsel

did not request financial disclosures from Steven or take any steps to inquire about

the existence of assets not identified in the property-settlement agreement.

      On August 11, 1992, a trial justice of the Family Court held a nominal hearing

on the divorce proceedings. Anne was represented by counsel, but Steven was not.

Both parties testified about their agreement as to the distribution of the marital

                                        -2-
property, and although Steven was unrepresented at the hearing, he testified that he

discussed the settlement with his own attorney. Steven also testified that he was

employed by the Department of Corrections at the time. In rendering a decision

from the bench, the trial justice found that the parties entered into the property-

settlement agreement upon the advice of counsel, with a full understanding of its

terms and conditions; and he granted Anne’s complaint for divorce and merged the

property-settlement agreement into the final decree.

      The property-settlement agreement contemplates the distribution of the

marital home, life insurance policies, and medical insurance coverage. It makes no

mention of Steven’s pension. Paragraph 33 of the property-settlement agreement

provides:

            “This Agreement shall be construed and governed in
            accordance with the laws of the State of Rhode Island and
            in accordance with the practices and procedures of the
            Rhode Island Family Court.              This Agreement
            encompasses the entire Agreement between the parties,
            and in writing, of HUSBAND and WIFE. This Agreement
            shall be binding upon the parties hereto, and their legal
            representatives, executors, administrators, and assigns.
            Both parties acknowledge receipt of a full disclosure of
            any and all of the assets of the other and the respective
            value attributable to same. In the event it shall be
            discovered that either party has concealed any asset of any
            kind, he or she, covenants herein that he or she will give
            one half of said asset to the other. This Agreement
            constitutes the entire Agreement between the parties and
            may not be modified in any manner, except by order of the
            Rhode Island Family Court.”

                                       -3-
      The parties signed the property-settlement agreement on September 19, 1992,

and the Family Court incorporated and merged the property-settlement agreement

into the final judgment entered on February 1, 1993. On June 27, 2017, Anne filed

a motion for post-judgment relief seeking an award of one-half interest of the marital

portion of Steven’s pension. Anne did not allege that Steven engaged in any fraud

or misrepresentation, but asserted that Steven “concealed” the pension by “not

address[ing] this asset at the time of the Divorce” and by “not mak[ing] this asset

known to [Anne] or her Counsel.”

      A second trial justice heard testimony from both parties on June 26, 2018.

Anne testified that she was not previously aware that Steven had a pension. She

explained that, to her recollection, the parties never discussed the pension during

their marriage, during preparation of the property-settlement agreement, or during

the divorce proceedings. She testified that Steven never mentioned pension or

retirement benefits to her, and that he alone drafted the terms of the property-

settlement agreement. Anne explained that she first became aware of the pension in

2017 after a conversation with her current husband and his son, when the son asked

whether she received a portion of Steven’s pension since Steven worked for the State

of Rhode Island. In arguing an entitlement to one-half of the marital portion of

Steven’s pension, Anne asserted that common law contract law compelled an award.

She also argued that the court could consider her motion “to be in the nature of a

                                        -4-
Rule 60(b) motion” or, alternatively, that the trial justice could treat it as an

independent claim as in Zaino v. Zaino, 818 A.2d 630 (R.I. 2003). 3

      Steven’s testimony confirmed that he never filed anything with the court

mentioning that he had a pension. However, he also testified that he recalled

discussing the pension with Anne and his counsel argued that, pursuant to paragraph

33 of the property-settlement agreement, the parties had “acknowledg[ed] receipt of

a full disclosure of any and all assets of the other [party.]” He argued that the statute

of limitations and the doctrine of laches barred Anne’s motion, filed twenty-four

3
  Rule 60(b) of the Family Court Rules of Domestic Relations Procedure sets out
that relief from judgment may be afforded for:

             “(1) Mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;

             “(2) Newly discovered evidence which by due diligence
             could not have been discovered in time to move for a new
             trial under Rule 59(b);

             “(3) Fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an
             adverse party;

             “(4) The judgment is void;

             “(5) The judgment has been satisfied, released, or
             discharged, or a prior judgment upon which the judgment
             is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no
             longer equitable that the judgment should have
             prospective application; or

             “(6) Any other reason justifying relief from the operation
             of the judgment.”
                                        -5-
years after finalization of their divorce; he maintained that Anne knew or should

have known about the pension at the time of divorce, or soon thereafter, particularly

as Anne had counsel who should have inquired about any possible pension.

      The trial justice issued a bench decision on August 3, 2018. She found that

the parties did not conduct discovery in 1992 and that Steven did not file an expense

sheet (DR-6). The trial justice contemplated whether Steven disclosed his pension

to Anne before or during the divorce. She ultimately found that he did not and

determined that Steven concealed his pension based on this failure to disclose.

Having decided that Anne did not know about the pension until 2017, the trial justice

held that neither the statute of limitations nor laches barred the action, and she

granted Anne’s motion.

      On October 12, 2021, a written order entered enforcing paragraph 33 of the

property-settlement agreement and awarding Anne one-half of the marital portion of

Steven’s pension. Steven filed a notice of appeal prior to entry of an order stating

the retroactive amount owed; we remanded for determination of that amount. On

August 1, 2022, the trial justice ordered that Steven owed Anne monthly payments

of $414.35 from November 2005 to July 2022, which reached a total of $83,284.35.

                               Standard of Review

      Our review of a Family Court justice’s decision “is deferential.” Giarrusso v.

Giarrusso, 204 A.3d 1102, 1106 (R.I. 2019). Where the trial justice’s “decision

                                        -6-
reasonably indicates that [she] exercised [her] independent judgment in passing on

the weight of the testimony and the credibility of the witnesses it will not be

disturbed on appeal unless it is clearly wrong or otherwise incorrect as a matter of

law.” V. George Rustigian Rugs, Inc. v. Renaissance Gallery, Inc., 853 A.2d 1220,

1225 (R.I. 2004) (quoting Connor v. Sullivan, 826 A.2d 953, 960 (R.I. 2003)).

                                      Discussion

       Steven argues that the trial justice erred in granting Anne’s motion for relief

because, he maintains, the motion was untimely filed. More specifically, he asserts

that the statute of limitations in G.L. 1956 § 9-1-17 and the doctrine of laches bar

Anne’s belated request to reopen the final judgment entered on February 1, 1993.

Alternatively, Steven argues that the trial justice erred by failing to consider all

equitable distribution factors in G.L. 1956 § 15-5-16.1 when she reopened the

judgment and awarded Anne one-half of the marital portion of Steven’s pension.

       We agree that § 9-1-17 bars Anne’s motion for relief and is dispositive of this

appeal. 4

       Upon the incorporation and merger of the parties’ property-settlement

agreement into the court’s judgment on February 1, 1993, “the agreement [wa]s no

4
 We need not reach Steven’s arguments concerning the equitable doctrine of laches,
but note the longstanding principle that “equity follows the law in [respect to statutes
of limitations], for the reason that one should not be allowed to enforce a claim in
equity which upon grounds of public policy could not be enforced at law.” Taylor v.
Slater, 21 R.I. 104, 106, 41 A. 1001, 1002 (1898).
                                         -7-
longer a private contract between the parties, [and] the rules that govern the

enforcement of a divorce judgment control.” Ramsbottom v. Ramsbottom, 542 A.2d

1098, 1100 (R.I. 1988). Section 9-1-17, which governs the limitations of actions on

judgments, dictates that “actions shall be commenced and sued within twenty (20)

years next after the cause of action shall accrue and not after * * *.”

      A straightforward application of this limitation of actions therefore required

Anne to commence any action on the final judgment—at the latest—before

February 1, 2013, or within twenty years after February 1, 1993.          After Anne

initiated divorce proceedings on May 26, 1992, she had an opportunity to conduct

discovery and to seek disclosure of Steven’s assets prior to the nominal hearing held

on August 11, 1992. At the nominal hearing, Steven testified about his employment

with the State of Rhode Island; moreover, the trial justice queried both parties about

their property-settlement agreement, found that they fully understood its terms,

directed that the property-settlement agreement be reduced to writing, and ordered

that it be incorporated and merged into the court’s final order. One month later, on

September 19, 1992, the parties signed the written property-settlement agreement,

and the court entered final judgment several months later.

      Regardless of whether Anne was aware of Steven’s pension at the time of

filing the complaint for divorce, she had ample time and opportunity to discover

what marital assets existed, and to seek an equitable distribution of the complete

                                         -8-
marital estate. However, she did not seek such relief until more than twenty-four

years after final judgment was entered. Her request was clearly untimely. See

Tworog v. Tworog, 45 A.3d 1194, 1199 (R.I. 2012) (affirming the Family Court’s

denial of the plaintiff’s motion to reopen the final judgment of divorce where the

plaintiff “filed no interrogatories, requested no other discovery, and did not require

or seek that [the defendant] prepare and provide any financial DR-6 [f]orm to the

[c]ourt”).

      Anne emphasizes the finding by the trial justice that Anne credibly testified

that she did not know about Steven’s pension until 2017. She also highlights the

finding by the trial justice that Steven failed to disclose his pension during the

divorce proceedings. Anne argues that these findings are entitled to deference and

should not be disturbed. Moreover, Anne asserts that her latent discovery of

Steven’s pension in 2017 tolled the running of the statute of limitations. In making

her latent-discovery argument, Anne relies on this Court’s decision in Anthony v.

Abbott Laboratories, 490 A.2d 43 (R.I. 1985), which articulates the discovery rule,

as well as § 9-1-20, a statutory basis for tolling where there has been fraudulent

concealment. However, we disagree that her case was tolled under either scenario.

      The discovery rule operates to delay the accrual of a cause of action, such

“that the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the plaintiff discovers, or

with reasonable diligence should have discovered, the wrongful conduct of the

                                         -9-
[defendant].” Mills v. Toselli, 819 A.2d 202, 205 (R.I. 2003) (quoting Supreme

Bakery, Inc. v. Bagley, 742 A.2d 1202, 1204 (R.I. 2000)). We have restricted the

application of the discovery rule to a “limited class of cases,” Hyde v. Roman

Catholic Bishop of Providence, 139 A.3d 452, 461 (R.I. 2016), and “narrowly

defined factual situations,” Polanco v. Lombardi, 231 A.3d 139, 146 (R.I. 2020)

(quoting Boudreau v. Automatic Temperature Controls, Inc., 212 A.3d 594, 600

(R.I. 2019)).   This class includes cases of medical malpractice, Wilkinson v.

Harrington, 104 R.I. 224, 238, 243 A.2d 745, 753 (1968), certain products liability

actions, Romano v. Westinghouse Electric Co., 114 R.I. 451, 462, 336 A.2d 555, 561

(1975); Anthony, 490 A.2d at 48, and real property damage, Lee v. Morin, 469 A.2d

358, 360 (R.I. 1983). Anne does not address the limited nature of the discovery rule

or demonstrate how the facts of this case warrant its application. We decline to

extend the discovery rule in this case.

      Turning to Anne’s second argument, § 9-1-20 tolls the statute of limitations

when the defendant fraudulently conceals, “by actual misrepresentation,” a cause of

action from the plaintiff. Section 9-1-20 provides “the cause of action shall be

deemed to accrue against the person so liable at the time when the person entitled to

sue thereon shall first discover its existence.” To prove fraudulent concealment, the

plaintiff must demonstrate “(1) that the defendant made an actual misrepresentation

of fact; and (2) that, in making such misrepresentation, the defendant fraudulently

                                          - 10 -
concealed the existence of the plaintiff’s causes of action.” Polanco, 231 A.3d at 153

(quoting Boudreau, 212 A.3d at 601). The defendant’s misrepresentation must have

been “express” or the defendant must have “engaged in other affirmative conduct”

that “could reasonably deceive another and induce him or her to rely thereon to his

or her disadvantage.” Boudreau, 212 A.3d at 601-02 (quoting Hyde, 139 A.3d at

466).

        Based on the testimony, the trial justice found that Steven “failed to disclose

his pension, which was a marital asset at the time of the divorce * * *.” However,

we have held that “mere silence or inaction on the part of the defendant does not

constitute actual misrepresentation * * *.” Polanco, 231 A.3d at 153-54 (quoting

Boudreau, 212 A.3d at 602). Thus, even accepting as true that Steven did not

mention his pension during the divorce proceedings, that omission alone is not

sufficient to establish fraudulent concealment by actual misrepresentation. See Hyde,

139 A.3d at 466. Anne has not claimed that Steven engaged in any affirmative act

of misrepresentation. Rather, she has consistently claimed Steven “concealed” the

pension by “not address[ing]” it and failing to mention it to her. The record does

not indicate that Steven was asked if he had a pension and denied that he did, thereby

engaging in an express misrepresentation.         Absent evidence “of any factual

misrepresentation,” § 9-1-20 has no applicability to this case and does not toll the

statute of limitations. Boudreau, 212 A.3d at 602.

                                         - 11 -
      We conclude that the trial justice’s decision granting Anne’s motion for relief

was incorrect as a matter of law. The request for an award of one-half interest of the

marital portion of Steven’s pension was clearly untimely, and Anne’s latent

discovery of Steven’s pension did not toll the running of the statute of limitations.

                                     Conclusion

      For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the orders of the Family Court that award

Anne a portion of Steven’s pension, and remand the case to the Family Court for

entry of a final order consistent with this opinion.

      Justice Lynch Prata did not participate.

                                         - 12 -
                                              STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
                                         SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE
                                               Licht Judicial Complex
                                                 250 Benefit Street
                                               Providence, RI 02903

                                     OPINION COVER SHEET

Title of Case                            Anne Capaldi v. Steven Capaldi.

                                         No. 2021-328-Appeal.
Case Number
                                         (K 92-543)

Date Opinion Filed                       June 21, 2023

Justices                                 Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, and Long, JJ.

Written By                               Associate Justice Melissa A. Long

Source of Appeal                         Kent County Family Court

Judicial Officer from Lower Court        Associate Justice Karen Lynch Bernard

                                         For Plaintiff:

                                         Edward C. Roy, Jr., Esq.
Attorney(s) on Appeal
                                         For Defendant:

                                         Jean A. Boulanger, Esq.

SU-CMS-02A (revised November 2022)