Court Opinion

ID: 9947286
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-04 16:00:48.029882+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:21.286479
License: Public Domain

23-1178-cv
Nwoye v. Obama

                             UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                         SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A
SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS
GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S
LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH
THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC
DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

      At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the
City of New York, on the 4th day of March, two thousand twenty-four.

       PRESENT: GUIDO CALABRESI,
                        JOSÉ A. CABRANES,
                        RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,
                                Circuit Judges.
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       IKEMEFUNA STEPHEN NWOYE,

                       Plaintiff-Appellant,

                 v.                                                         No. 23-1178-cv

       BARACK HUSSEIN OBAMA,
       Former President of the United States
       of America/Senior Citizen,
       MICHELLE LAVAUGHN
       ROBINSON OBAMA, Former First
       Lady of the United States of
       America/Senior Citizen,

                        Defendants-Appellees.
       ------------------------------------------------------------------

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      FOR APPELLANT:                               Ikemefuna Stephen Nwoye,
                                                   pro se, Jersey City, NJ

      FOR APPELLEES:                               No appearance

      Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the

Southern District of New York (Valerie E. Caproni, Judge).

      UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,

AND DECREED that the judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED.

      Plaintiff Ikemefuna Stephen Nwoye, a lawyer proceeding pro se, appeals

from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of

New York (Caproni, J.) dismissing his claims against former President Barack

Obama and former First Lady Michelle Obama and denying him leave to file a

second amended complaint. In March 2022 Nwoye sued the Obamas for breach

of contract, unjust enrichment, quantum meruit, and declaratory judgment based

on legal and consulting work Nwoye performed through a pro bono externship

with the law firm Sidley Austin LLP. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the

underlying facts and the record of prior proceedings, to which we refer only as

necessary to explain our decision to affirm.

      We review de novo the District Court’s dismissal of Nwoye’s complaint and

its denial of leave to amend on futility grounds. See Empire Merchs., LLC v.

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Reliable Churchill LLLP, 902 F.3d 132, 139 (2d Cir. 2018). Because Nwoye is a

lawyer, he is not entitled to the “special solicitude” we afford pro se litigants. See

Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 990 F.3d 191, 203 (2d Cir. 2021).

         Nwoye’s argument that the District Court failed to provide sufficient

notice before dismissing his complaint is meritless. Nwoye had notice and an

opportunity to be heard in response to the District Court’s order to show cause,

and as the Obamas had not appeared, 1 the District Court was not required to

provide them notice before ruling in their favor. See Snider v. Melindez, 199 F.3d

108, 112–13 (2d Cir. 1999).

         Moving to the merits, the District Court correctly concluded that Nwoye’s

unjust enrichment and quantum meruit claims are untimely. Under New York

law, 2 the statute of limitations for both claims is six years. Cohen v. S.A.C. Trading

Corp., 711 F.3d 353, 364 (2d Cir. 2013); Simon v. FrancInvest, S.A., 192 A.D.3d 565,

567 (App. Div. 2021). An unjust enrichment claim accrues “upon the occurrence

of the wrongful act giving rise to a duty of restitution.” Cohen, 711 F.3d at 364

1   Nwoye failed to properly serve the Obamas.

2New York law applies because this case arises from Nwoye’s externship at the Sidley Austin
office located in New York. See GlobalNet Financial.Com, Inc. v. Frank Crystal & Co., Inc., 449 F.3d
377, 383–84 (2d Cir. 2006).
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(quotation marks omitted). A quantum meruit claim accrues “immediately”

after the plaintiff’s services for the defendant have concluded. Universal

Acupuncture Pain Servs., P.C. v. Quadrino & Schwartz, P.C., 370 F.3d 259, 263 (2d

Cir. 2004); see Demian v. Calmenson, 156 A.D.3d 422, 423 (App. Div. 2017). As a

result of the COVID-19 pandemic, the statute of limitations was tolled in New

York from March 20, 2020 through November 3, 2020, adding an additional 228

days to the limitations period for Nwoye’s claims. See McLaughlin v. Snowlift,

Inc., 214 A.D.3d 720, 721 (App. Div. 2023). Because Nwoye filed his complaint on

March 3, 2022, his claims must have accrued no earlier than July 19, 2015.

Nwoye’s unjust enrichment claim is premised on his work as an extern for Sidley

Austin from October 2013 through May 2014, and Nwoye’s quantum meruit

claim is premised on conversations he had with a Sidley Austin partner in 2014.

We thus conclude that both claims are untimely because they accrued in 2014.

      Nor did the District Court err in dismissing Nwoye’s breach of contract

claim. Nwoye fails to allege that he entered into an agreement with the Obamas,

an essential element of a breach of contract claim. See Donohue v. Hochul, 32 F.4th

200, 206–07 (2d Cir. 2022). He claims that the Obamas entered into a contract

with him through Sidley Austin, but he alleges no facts showing that Sidley

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Austin had the authority to contract with Nwoye on the Obamas’ behalf.

      Finally, the District Court did not err in denying Nwoye leave to amend to

add breach of contract and equitable estoppel claims against Sidley Austin on the

grounds that it would have been futile to do so. In his proposed second

amended complaint, Nwoye alleges that he had one “express” and two “oral”

agreements with Sidley Austin and further, that he and the law firm entered into

a “written contract” under which he made “intellectual contributions for which

he has been denied recognition.” District Court Docket No. 23, ¶¶ 7, 31. But

these allegations alone fail to state a breach of contract claim, and on appeal

Nwoye does not identify other facts that could support such a claim. See Express

Indus. & Terminal Corp. v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Transp., 93 N.Y.2d 584, 589 (1999)

(“To create a binding contract, there must be a manifestation of mutual assent

sufficiently definite to assure that the parties are truly in agreement with respect

to all material terms.”); Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 427 (2d Cir.

2004). We thus agree with the District Court that any amendment to add the

breach of contract claim would be futile. See TechnoMarine SA v. Giftports, Inc.,

758 F.3d 493, 505–06 (2d Cir. 2014).

      We also agree with the District Court that Nwoye’s proposed addition of

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an equitable estoppel claim against Sidley Austin is futile. Nwoye does not

allege that Sidley Austin falsely represented or concealed any material facts

regarding his externship. Nwoye therefore does not state a claim for equitable

estoppel. See Fundamental Portfolio Advisors, Inc. v. Tocqueville Asset Mgmt., L.P., 7

N.Y.3d 96, 106–07 (2006) (noting that “evidence that a party was misled by

another’s conduct” is “an essential element of estoppel” (quotation marks

omitted)); In re Vebeliunas, 332 F.3d 85, 93–94 (2d Cir. 2003).

      Because the dismissal of Nwoye’s substantive claims eliminates any

“actual controversy” under the Declaratory Judgment Act, see 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a);

Admiral Ins. Co. v. Niagara Transformer Corp., 57 F.4th 85, 92 (2d Cir. 2023), we also

conclude that the District Court did not err in dismissing Nwoye’s declaratory

judgment claim.

      We have considered Nwoye’s remaining arguments and conclude that

they are without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District

Court is AFFIRMED.

                                        FOR THE COURT:
                                        Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

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