Court Opinion

ID: 9777960
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 20:28:58.845456+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:02.788393
License: Public Domain

TEAGUE, Judge,
dissenting.
A jury found Tommy L. Dorsey, hereinafter referred to as the appellant, guilty of committing the offense of burglary of a habitation with the intent to commit sexual assault and also assessed his punishment at twenty-five years’ confinement in the Department of Corrections.
The Dallas Court of Appeals overruled the appellant’s sole ground of error, to-wit: “The trial court erred in overruling the defense objection to an argument which was outside of the record,” and affirmed the trial court’s judgment of conviction. Dorsey v. State, 685 S.W.2d 763 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1985).
This Court granted the appellant’s petition for discretionary review in order to make the determination whether the court of appeals correctly overruled the appellant’s ground of error. Finding that the court of appeals incorrectly overruled the appellant’s ground of error, I vote to reverse its judgment of affirmance.
The complained of argument, which occurred at the punishment stage of the trial, follows:
MR. ISENBERG (THE PROSECUTING ATTORNEY): And what kind of person is the victim? You know, it’s an insult for the defense counsel to get up here and say, well, put him on probation and give her money. I mean, that’s just the most ridiculous thing that I’ve ever heard. She didn’t want money. She doesn’t want anything from him other than—
*211MR. THOMPSON (THE DEFENSE ATTORNEY): Judge, that’s outside the record. She hasn’t testified as to what she wants on punishment.
THE COURT: No, overruled. Its argument.
MR. ISENBURG: She doesn’t want anything but for him to be put away to where he can’t do it to some other neighbor that he might have, whoever bought that house from them.
The majority opinion concludes that the above argument of the prosecuting attorney was improper but then goes on to hold that the prosecuting attorney’s argument, “that M.L.T. did not desire any restitution, but wanted appellant to be put away,” was a proper response to the appellant’s counsel’s argument “that the only way M.L.T. would get any kind of restitution was by allowing appellant to be placed on probation.”
The majority opinion, however, does not state, nor could it, that the appellant’s counsel’s argument was improper, which it was not. Appellant’s counsel’s argument was not outside the record.
The record clearly reflects that counsel for the appellant, during his argument, in his plea to the jury to recommend that the appellant be granted probation, in referring to the condition of probation that concerns restitution, stated the following: “[The complainant] has suffered pecuniary financial losses because of this case, and she’s not going to get that money with him [the appellant] sitting in Sterrett [referring to the Lew Sterrett Criminal Justice Center which is the name of the Dallas County Jail]. The only way she’s going to get any kind of restitution is by probation, and that’s in your hands.” By no stretch of any rational person’s imagination can it be said that the above argument invited the following response, “She doesn’t want anything but for him to be put away to where he can’t do it to some other neighbor that he might have, whoever bought that house from them.”
Even if it can be argued that counsel invited response to his statement, such did not give the prosecuting attorney a license to stray beyond the scope of the invitation. Kincaid v. State, 534 S.W.2d 340 (Tex.Cr.App.1976). In this instance, the invitation did not give the prosecuting attorney permission to make a personal appeal to the expectations or demands of the complainant or of the members of the neighborhood community, which has been long condemned by this Court. The prosecuting attorney’s argument actually represents nothing less than an attempt to put new garb on an old emperor. Cortez v. State, 683 S.W.2d 419, 420-421 (Tex.Cr.App.1984). Also see Adams v. State, 219 S.W. 460 (Tex.Cr.App.1920); Robillard v. State, 641 S.W.2d 910 (Tex.Cr.App.1982); Reynolds v. State, 505 S.W.2d 265 (Tex.Cr.App.1974); Clayton v. State, 502 S.W.2d 755 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); Fowler v. State, 500 S.W.2d 643 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); Baldwin v. State, 499 S.W.2d 7 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); Hickerson v. State, 162 Tex.Cr.R. 446, 286 S.W.2d 437 (1956); Alford v. State, 158 Tex.Cr.R. 632, 258 S.W.2d 817 (1953); Spinks v. State, 157 Tex.Cr.R. 612, 252 S.W.2d 159 (1952); Clark v. State, 156 Tex.Cr.R. 526, 244 S.W.2d 218 (1951). Cf. Chapter 37, Book of Genesis, concerning “Joseph’s Coat.” (King James Version of the Bible.)
I also find that when the prosecuting attorney argued to the jury “She doesn’t want anything but for him to be put away to where he can’t do it to some other neighbor that he might have, whoever bought that house from them” this amounted to an indirect plea to the expectations or demands of the neighborhood community for a particular result, which is highly improper argument that cannot even be cured by an instruction to the jury to disregard. See Cortez v. State, supra, in which this Court thoroughly discussed the fact that an appeal through argument to the expectations or demands of the community is highly improper. The terms “community” and “neighborhood community”, although not synonymous, have many of the same characteristics. The term “community” simply means the area itself. “Neighborhood community”, on the other hand, means that *212it is that part of the area in which a number of persons forming a large loosely cohesive community live close or fairly close together. Cf. Ables v. State, 519 S.W.2d 464, 467 (Tex.Cr.App.1975); Arocha v. State, 495 S.W.2d 957 (Tex.Cr.App.1973). In implicitly referring to the expectations or demands of the community, it matters not that the prosecuting attorney did not expressly use the term “community” or the term “neighborhood community.”
In holding that the prosecuting attorney’s argument was a proper response to the appellant’s counsel’s argument, the majority opinion, either intentionally or inadvertently, overlooks what a majority of this Court, speaking through Judge Miller, recently stated in Walker v. State, 664 S.W.2d 338, 340-341 (Tex.Cr.App.1984);
When defense counsel’s argument is not outside the record, however, the State may not in reply go outside the record and argue facts not in evidence.
The prosecuting attorney in this instance clearly violated this rule, which, however, is being implicitly overruled by the majority opinion.
I respectfully dissent for the reasons stated.