Court Opinion

ID: 9449309
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 16:06:40.867334+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:37:28.812291
License: Public Domain

Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Wendy Barrow Culberson, AG No. 3,
September Term, 2022, Opinion by Booth, J.

ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE – SANCTIONS – DISBARMENT

Respondent Wendy Barrow Culberson violated the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of
Professional Conduct 1.4 (Communication), 1.5(a) (Fees), 1.7 (Conflict of Interest—
General Rule), 1.15(a) (Safekeeping Property), 8.1(a) (Bar Admissions and Disciplinary
Matters), and 8.4(a)–(d) (Misconduct), and Maryland Rule 19-407(a)(2)–(4) (Attorney
Trust Account Record-Keeping).

During a period spanning several years, Ms. Culberson misappropriated hundreds of
thousands of dollars from her client by using her client’s power of attorney to make cash
withdrawals from bank accounts held for her client’s benefit. Ms. Culberson failed to
provide her client with any contemporaneous invoices, accounting, or other documentation
that might reflect any legitimate use of the cash withdrawals. Ms. Culberson failed to
maintain any client matter records or client ledgers. During Bar Counsel’s investigation
into this matter, Ms. Culberson made knowing and intentional misrepresentations of
material facts to Bar Counsel and created inaccurate and false documentation in an effort
to conceal her misappropriation.

The Supreme Court of Maryland concluded that disbarment is the appropriate sanction.
Circuit Court for Harford County
Case No.: C-12-CV-22-000314
Argued: March 2, 2023
                                                                         IN THE SUPREME COURT
                                                                             OF MARYLAND*

                                                                                  AG No. 3

                                                                            September Term, 2022

                                                                 ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION
                                                                         OF MARYLAND

                                                                                      v.

                                                                     WENDY BARROW CULBERSON

                                                                             Fader, C.J.,
                                                                             Watts,
                                                                             Hotten,
                                                                             Booth,
                                                                             Biran,
                                                                             Gould,
                                                                             Eaves,

                                                                                    JJ.

                                                                             Opinion by Booth, J.

                                                                             Filed: March 27, 2023

                                                                * At the November 8, 2022 general election, the
                                                                voters of Maryland ratified a constitutional
                                                                amendment changing the name of the Court of
Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials
Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this
                                                                Appeals of Maryland to the Supreme Court of
document is authentic.                                          Maryland. The name change took effect on
                    2023-08-04 10:17-04:00                      December 14, 2022.

Gregory Hilton, Clerk
       The Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland (“Commission”), acting through

Bar Counsel, filed a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action (“the Petition”) against

Respondent, Wendy Barrow Culberson, a member of the Maryland Bar, arising out of her

representation of Gabrielle Buck and Bar Counsel’s subsequent investigation.           The

Commission alleged that Ms. Culberson violated the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of

Professional Conduct (“MARPC”)1 1.4 (Communication), 1.5(a) (Fees), 1.7 (Conflict of

Interest—General Rule), 1.15(a) (Safekeeping Property), 8.1(a) (Bar Admissions and

Disciplinary Matters), and 8.4(a)–(d) (Misconduct), and Maryland Rule 19-407(a)(2)–(4)

(Attorney Trust Account Record-Keeping).2

       The hearing judge assigned to this matter found by clear and convincing evidence

that Ms. Culberson committed all of the violations alleged by the Commission. The

hearing judge also determined the presence of eight aggravating factors and one mitigating

factor. Bar Counsel recommends a sanction of disbarment. Ms. Culberson filed exceptions

to a number of the hearing judge’s findings of fact and to all of the hearing judge’s

conclusions of law. For the reasons set forth herein, we determine that the hearing judge’s

       1
        Effective July 1, 2016, the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct,
which employed the numbering format of the American Bar Association Model Rules,
were renamed the MARPC and recodified without substantive modification in Title 19,
Chapter 300 of the Maryland Rules. For ease of reference and comparison with our prior
opinions and those of other courts, we will refer to the MARPC rules using the numbering
of the model rules, as permitted by Rule 19-300.1(22).
       2
        The Petition also charged Ms. Culberson with violating Rule 8.1(b), but Bar
Counsel later withdrew that charge.
findings of fact were not clearly erroneous, concur with the hearing judge’s conclusions of

law, and impose a sanction of disbarment.

                                             I

                                Procedural Background

      The Commission filed the Petition on March 16, 2022. On June 30, Bar Counsel

served interrogatories and a request for production of documents on Ms. Culberson’s

counsel. Ms. Culberson, through counsel, requested a ten-day extension, which Bar

Counsel granted. Thereafter, Ms. Culberson’s counsel withdrew from the case. On August

17, Bar Counsel sent Ms. Culberson an email advising her that her discovery responses

were overdue and inquiring as to when Ms. Culberson intended to provide them. Having

received no response, on August 29, Bar Counsel sent a follow-up email advising that if

discovery responses were not provided by September 1, Bar Counsel would seek sanctions.

      Ms. Culberson failed to respond to Bar Counsel’s emails and failed to respond to

the outstanding discovery. Bar Counsel filed a motion for sanctions on September 2. Ms.

Culberson wrote to the hearing judge on September 23 and advised that she had not

received the motion for sanctions. Thereafter, Bar Counsel filed a renewed motion for

sanctions and a motion to shorten time, which were served on Ms. Culberson. In its motion

to shorten time, Bar Counsel acknowledged that, due to an internal administrative error,

Ms. Culberson had not been served with the initial motion. Ms. Culberson filed a response

to the renewed motion for sanctions, stating that she had advised Bar Counsel “on

                                            2
numerous occasions” that she “ha[d] no other information or documents to provide” and

Bar Counsel therefore was “not prejudiced” by her failure to respond.

       On October 7, the hearing judge granted Bar Counsel’s motion and entered an order

striking Ms. Culberson’s answer to the Petition and prohibiting Ms. Culberson from calling

witnesses, presenting records, or testifying on anything other than mitigation at the

evidentiary hearing.3 The hearing judge held an evidentiary hearing on October 19, 2022.

       3
         Ms. Culberson excepts to the hearing judge’s entry of the sanctions order. She
argues that if Bar Counsel had properly served her with the first motion, the motion to
shorten time would not have been necessary and the motion for sanctions “would not have
[been] ripe to be ruled upon by the [hearing judge] prior to the expiration of the discovery
deadline[.]” We overrule Ms. Culberson’s exception. After Bar Counsel discovered that
the motion had not been properly served, Bar Counsel promptly filed a renewed motion,
which was properly served. Ms. Culberson filed a response to Bar Counsel’s renewed
motion for sanctions in which she admitted that she had no intention of complying with her
discovery obligations under the Maryland Rules because “all information and
documentation” was provided to Bar Counsel “long ago” in response to Bar Counsel’s
requests for documents and information in connection with its initial investigation. On
October 7, 2022—four days after Ms. Culberson filed her response to the motion and two
days after the discovery deadline—the hearing judge entered her order granting the motion
for sanctions. Given Ms. Culberson’s unwillingness to comply with her discovery
obligations, the hearing judge did not abuse her discretion in entering the sanctions order.
In overruling Ms. Culberson’s exception, we point out that, unless a party files a motion
for a protective order under Maryland Rule 2-403 that is granted by the court, there is
nothing in the Maryland Rules that excuses a party from answering interrogatories in
accordance with Maryland Rule 2-421, or from serving a written response to a request for
production of documents under Maryland Rule 2-422.

        As part of her exceptions, Ms. Culberson also asserts that Bar Counsel failed to
properly answer discovery that she propounded. We overrule this exception. Other than
Ms. Culberson’s unsupported assertion in her exceptions, there is nothing in the record to
reflect that she served discovery. Moreover, assuming she in fact propounded discovery
under the Maryland Rules, she did not file a motion with the hearing judge asserting that
Bar Counsel failed to respond to discovery requests and requesting any relief in connection
therewith.
                                             3
Ms. Culberson did not appear. The hearing judge admitted Bar Counsel’s Exhibits 1-30.4

Bar Counsel called its investigator, Charles E. Miller, IV, CPA, who provided testimony

concerning his review of Ms. Buck’s bank records and the various withdrawals and

transactions undertaken by Ms. Culberson in connection with her client’s bank accounts

over a span of several years. Bar Counsel submitted Proposed Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law. Ms. Culberson filed a response to Bar Counsel’s Proposed Findings

of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Thereafter, the hearing judge issued Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law.

       Bar Counsel did not file any exceptions. As noted above, Ms. Culberson filed

exceptions to the factual findings and legal conclusions rendered by the hearing judge.

With this Court’s permission, Ms. Culberson appeared remotely via Zoom at oral argument

and presented her argument in support of her exceptions as well as her request that this

Court not disbar her but instead impose an “alternative resolution.”

       Ms. Culberson also excepts to Bar Counsel’s failure to provide her with the
transcript from the evidentiary hearing until she requested it. She acknowledges that, when
she requested the transcript, it was provided. Ms. Culberson’s exception is overruled.
       4
        Bar Counsel’s exhibits included: a retainer agreement dated February 27, 2014
between Gabrielle Buck and Ms. Culberson; Ms. Buck’s Power of Attorney dated March
24, 2016; emails between Ms. Buck and Ms. Culberson dated July 10, 2019; Ms. Buck’s
Complaint to Bar Counsel; correspondence between Bar Counsel and Ms. Culberson; legal
invoices that were prepared by Ms. Culberson and provided to Bar Counsel but never
delivered to Ms. Buck; records for PNC Bank accounts under Ms. Buck’s control for the
years 2014–2019; an affidavit of the PNC Bank records custodian attesting that the records
were produced pursuant to a subpoena; charts prepared by Bar Counsel’s investigator,
Charles E. Miller, IV, CPA, summarizing the bank records; and the transcript of Ms.
Culberson’s statement under oath taken on November 30, 2020.
                                             4
       When no exception is made to a hearing judge’s finding of fact, this Court may

accept it as established. Maryland Rule 19-740(b)(2)(A). When a party excepts to a

finding, we must determine whether the finding is established by the requisite standard

of proof—in the case of an allegation of misconduct, clear and convincing evidence.

Maryland Rules 19-740(b)(2)(B), 19-727(c). The standard of review where a party

excepts to a hearing judge’s factual findings is the clearly erroneous standard. Attorney

Grievance Comm’n v. Chanthunya, 446 Md. 576, 588 (2016). A factual finding is not

clearly erroneous “if there is any competent material evidence to support it.” Attorney

Grievance Comm’n v. McDonald, 437 Md. 1, 16 (2014) (cleaned up). We review a

hearing judge’s conclusions of law de novo. Maryland Rule 19-740(b)(1).

       Ms. Culberson’s General Exceptions

       Ms. Culberson has filed “General Exceptions” to the hearing judge’s Findings of

Fact and Conclusions of Law in its entirety, except for a few pages of the findings. Because

of the general nature of these exceptions, which permeate nearly all the factual findings

and legal conclusions, it is appropriate to address them at the outset.

       First, Ms. Culberson argues that it was inappropriate for the hearing judge to adopt,

in large part, Bar Counsel’s Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that were

submitted after the evidentiary hearing. Relatedly, Ms. Culberson asserts that there is

nothing to suggest that the hearing judge conducted “an independent review” of the 30

exhibits that were entered into evidence.

       Second, Ms. Culberson excepts to the findings of fact because she contends that

there was no “substantive evidence or direct evidence” from her client, Ms. Buck. Ms.

                                              5
Culberson appears to suggest that Bar Counsel could not satisfy its burden of proving the

alleged misconduct by clear and convincing evidence without calling Ms. Buck as a

witness.

        Third, Ms. Culberson excepts to the fact that the hearing judge “totally

disregard[ed]” information provided by her to refute the allegations.

        We overrule these general exceptions for the following reasons. First, based upon

our independent review of the record, the hearing judge correctly concluded that Bar

Counsel met its burden of establishing Culberson’s misconduct by clear and convincing

evidence. Ms. Buck’s testimony was not required to prove the misconduct alleged in this

case.     Indeed, in many instances, the exhibits establishing the misconduct are Ms.

Culberson’s own statement under oath and her written correspondence to Bar Counsel. As

we have often repeated, “‘the hearing judge is entitled to ‘pick and choose which evidence

to rely upon’ from a conflicting array when determining findings of fact.’” Attorney

Grievance Comm’n v. Kane, 465 Md. 667, 676 n.4 (2019) (quoting Attorney Grievance

Comm’n v. Guida, 391 Md. 33, 50 (2006)). Second, Ms. Culberson’s exceptions recite

many facts and conclusions that are not contained in the record. Ms. Culberson essentially

asks this Court to accept her version of the facts that are not part of the record (due to her

failure to comply with her discovery obligations and her failure to appear at the evidentiary

hearing). Third, there is nothing inappropriate about a hearing judge’s decision to adopt a

party’s proposed findings of fact or conclusions of law where they are supported by the

record.

                                              6
      We summarize below the hearing judge’s findings of fact and other undisputed

matters in the record as they pertain to the alleged violations. To the extent that they

have not already been overruled, we also address any additional exceptions in relation to

the findings to which they pertain.

                                             II

                                      Findings of Fact

      Ms. Culberson was admitted to the Maryland bar in 1994. Between 1995 and 2020,

Ms. Culberson was a solo practitioner who focused primarily on family law.           She

maintained an office for the practice of law in Cecil County. She closed her law practice

in September 2020.

      Representation of Gabrielle Buck

      Ms. Culberson represented Gabrielle Buck in her divorce proceeding in 2013.

Following that representation, Ms. Culberson became Ms. Buck’s family attorney, and they

became close personal friends.

      Ms. Buck lives on an approximately 800-acre farm called Mt. Ararat Farm in Port

Deposit, Maryland with her two adult sons. She is the beneficiary of two family trusts

(collectively, “the DB Trusts”) that, as of September 2014, were valued at $23 million.

Raymond James Financial and Esther Streete are the co-trustees of the DB Trusts. In

addition, Ms. Buck is the sole trustee of the Gabrielle Brown Buck Revocable Living Trust

(“the GBB Trust”), which she created in June 2015.

      During the period in question, the GBB Trust received a monthly distribution in the

amount of $38,000 from one of the family trusts, which Ms. Buck used to cover personal

                                             7
expenses and the costs of operating the farm. Each month, the distribution was transmitted

to a PNC Bank checking account (“the GBB Account”), and thereafter approximately

$8,000 to $10,000 was transferred from the GBB Account to another PNC bank account

(“the Farm Account”), which was used to subsidize Mt. Ararat farming operations.

       In February 2014, Ms. Buck executed an agreement with Ms. Culberson, in which

Ms. Culberson agreed to help manage Ms. Buck’s business and farm interests (“the

Retainer Agreement”). Under the Retainer Agreement, Ms. Buck retained Ms. Culberson

to manage her “business and farm related matters or for any other matters that [Ms. Buck]

may request [Ms. Culberson’s] involvement except for matters which involve legal

services (court proceedings; lawsuits; appeals; etc.).” Ms. Buck agreed to pay Ms.

Culberson a monthly flat fee of $3,500, and any additional legal matters would be billed at

a rate of $200/hour. The Retainer Agreement specifically stated that “no legal services,

other than those directly related to the matters(s) referred to herein, will be rendered to [Ms.

Buck] unless and until a separate written contract of employment is entered[.]” The

Retainer Agreement also stated that Ms. Culberson would “render a full and final

accounting of all sums paid to [Ms. Culberson] in connection with” the services provided

under the Agreement.

       Under the monthly flat fee arrangement established by the Retainer Agreement, Ms.

Culberson managed Ms. Buck’s interests in the family trusts and other personal and

business interests that arose, including serving as a liaison between Ms. Buck and the

trustees of the DB Trusts. In her statement under oath, Ms. Culberson testified that she

communicated more effectively than Ms. Buck with the trustees of the DB Trusts, thereby

                                               8
ensuring that Ms. Buck received her requested discretionary distributions from those trusts.

Ms. Culberson’s additional responsibilities included paying various bills, “getting the

EzPass account straightened out,” and “working with the bookkeeper for the farm including

transferring money to the farm account.” The hearing judge concluded that all such

services were non-legal in nature and were covered by the monthly flat fee in the amount

of $3,500.

       Between February 2014 and April 2016, Ms. Buck wrote checks from the GBB

Account to Ms. Culberson for the monthly $3,500 flat fee. Ms. Culberson considered the

$3,500 monthly fee earned upon receipt and deposited the funds into her personal account.

During this period, Ms. Buck occasionally wrote checks to Ms. Culberson in excess of the

monthly $3,500 flat fee. Ms. Buck paid Ms. Culberson $66,000 in 2014, and $45,216 in

2015, for both legal and non-legal services provided under the Retainer Agreement.

       In March 2016, Ms. Buck executed a power of attorney naming Ms. Culberson as

her agent and giving her access to both the GBB Account and the Farm Account.

According to Ms. Culberson, she advised Ms. Buck to give her a power of attorney because

Ms. Culberson “got tired of chasing [Ms. Buck] down” to receive funds to pay bills.

       Almost immediately after Ms. Buck appointed Ms. Culberson as her agent, Ms.

Culberson began making cash withdrawals from the GBB Account. Between April 2016

and July 2019, Ms. Culberson made 323 cash withdrawals from the GBB Account totaling

$940,297. Of the amounts withdrawn, Ms. Culberson deposited $342,500 into the Farm

Account to subsidize farm expenses. On occasion, Ms. Culberson would withdraw cash

from the GBB Account, deposit a portion of the funds withdrawn into the Farm Account,

                                             9
and retain a portion of the funds.5 Ms. Culberson was unable to account for the remaining

$597,797 that was not deposited into the Farm Account.

       Assuming that Ms. Culberson was entitled to a monthly flat fee of $3,500 pursuant

to the Retainer Agreement, the hearing judge found that Ms. Culberson would have charged

and collected $133,000 between May 2016 and June 2019. During the representation, Ms.

Culberson failed to provide Ms. Buck with any time records or billing invoices to

substantiate any legal services provided or additional fees incurred in excess of $133,000.

Ms. Culberson never provided Ms. Buck with any accounting of the funds that she

withdrew from the GBB Account using the Power of Attorney.               When Ms. Buck

occasionally questioned Ms. Culberson regarding the cash withdrawals from the GBB

Account, Ms. Culberson advised her that the withdrawals were used to pay farm bills,

insurance, or other expenses. The hearing judge found that Ms. Culberson failed to advise

Ms. Buck that Ms. Culberson retained the majority of the cash withdrawals for her own

personal use and benefit.

       In June 2019, Ms. Buck became frustrated with Ms. Culberson’s representation, in

part because Ms. Culberson had failed to provide her with invoices and estimates from

contractors hired to perform repair work on the farm. Ms. Buck, with the help of her

financial advisor, accessed her GBB Account online and discovered Ms. Culberson’s cash

withdrawals. Ms. Buck terminated Ms. Culberson’s services in July 2019. Ms. Buck sent

       5
         For example, the hearing judge found that, on December 1, 2016, Ms. Culberson
withdrew $12,500 in cash, deposited $10,000 into the Farm Account, and retained $2,500
for herself.
                                            10
Ms. Culberson an email on July 10 requesting that Ms. Culberson provide documentation

supporting her cash withdrawals, including “detailed invoices of [her] legal bills and other

services [] provided.” Ms. Culberson assured Ms. Buck that she would provide “a full

accounting” of withdrawals from the GBB Account.

       Between late July and early August 2019, Ms. Culberson provided Ms. Buck with

numerous boxes of documents. On August 12, 2019, for the first time, Ms. Culberson

provided Ms. Buck with “fee statements” purportedly for legal work performed between

January 2016 and August 2019. Ms. Culberson later provided Bar Counsel with invoices

summarizing the same information. The invoices totaled $293,014.24. They included

hourly charges for non-legal services that, pursuant to the Retainer Agreement, were to be

provided as part of the $3,500 monthly flat fee.6 Ms. Culberson never provided Ms. Buck

with an accounting of the cash withdrawals from the GBB Account and failed to provide

any accounting showing how the invoices for attorney’s fees were paid.

       Bar Counsel Investigation

       In December 2019, Ms. Buck, through counsel, filed a complaint with Bar Counsel,

alleging that Ms. Culberson misappropriated funds and failed to account for $594,247 that

she withdrew from the GBB Account. By letter dated February 12, 2020, Bar Counsel

forwarded the complaint to Ms. Culberson and requested a response. Ms. Culberson

       6
          For example, Ms. Culberson charged Ms. Buck her hourly rate for communicating
with the co-trustees of the DB Trusts regarding Ms. Buck’s finances and preparing budgets
for the trustees. She also charged Ms. Buck her hourly rate for resolving issues surrounding
Ms. Buck’s E-ZPass account, which was a service Ms. Culberson explicitly acknowledged
was provided under the monthly flat fee.
                                            11
responded in a letter dated March 2, 2020, in which she stated that: (1) in December 2015,

Ms. Culberson and Ms. Buck agreed to increase Ms. Culberson’s monthly flat fee from

$3,500 to $5,000; and (2) that Ms. Buck told Ms. Culberson not to send her periodic

invoices.    The hearing judge determined that these statements were knowing and

intentional misrepresentations to Bar Counsel, finding that Ms. Buck never agreed to

increase the monthly flat fee, and never advised Ms. Culberson not to send her invoices.7

      Ms. Culberson also provided Bar Counsel with copies of various spreadsheets

purporting to account for the funds that she withdrew from the GBB Account between 2016

and 2019. Ms. Culberson’s spreadsheets purported to account for: the funds she withdrew

and transferred to the Farm Account; the funds she withdrew to pay her fees; and the funds

she withdrew to provide cash to Ms. Buck. The hearing judge found that the spreadsheets

were never provided to Ms. Buck. The hearing judge also determined that, in many

      7
         In finding that Ms. Culberson’s statements to Bar Counsel were knowing and
intentional misrepresentations, the hearing judge relied upon Ms. Buck’s complaint to Bar
Counsel, as well as the following additional exhibits:

      •A budget Ms. Culberson prepared for Ms. Buck on March 29, 2019,
      indicating that the flat fee was $3,500 per month.

      •An email that Ms. Culberson sent to one of the trustees of the DB Trusts on
      April 16, 2019, in which she explained the following with respect to the fees
      paid to her:

            The legal expenses are two separate things. The $3,500.00 is the
            monthly amount [Ms. Buck] pays me for management of everything
            I do (which covers many, many things (basically 24/7) but does not
            include specific legal work). The $3,000 covers actual legal fees
            which includes legal work such as current pending litigation against
            Cecil County regarding a zoning violation issue and other ongoing
            legal matters.
                                            12
instances, Ms. Culberson’s spreadsheets did not match the GBB Account records that were

provided by the bank pursuant to a subpoena. The hearing judge determined that Ms.

Culberson’s spreadsheets did not include cash withdrawals totaling $50,005, contained

numerous errors and intentional misrepresentations, and were created after the fact by Ms.

Culberson in an attempt to conceal her misappropriation of funds. The hearing judge also

observed that, when Ms. Culberson was questioned during her statement under oath about

the discrepancies between her spreadsheets and the PNC Bank records, she was unable to

explain why numerous cash withdrawals were not listed on her spreadsheet, nor was she

able to account for other discrepancies and errors.8 Ms. Culberson testified that she

withdrew funds from the GBB Account “however [she] wanted to do it” and did so “as she

needed or wanted.”

       By letter dated July 16, 2020, Bar Counsel requested that Ms. Culberson provide

the bank account information where she deposited fees associated with her representation

of Ms. Buck. Bar Counsel also requested her client matter records and client ledger

maintained on behalf of Ms. Buck. By letter dated August 10, 2020, Ms. Culberson,

through counsel, told Bar Counsel that she no longer had client matter records and a client

ledger maintained on behalf of Ms. Buck because her assistant’s computer crashed. Ms.

       8
         By way of some examples, Ms. Culberson’s spreadsheets did not reflect checks
written to her by Ms. Buck in 2016 totaling $6,500. In other instances, Ms. Culberson’s
spreadsheets reflect that she withdrew funds but do not reflect the accurate amount
withdrawn. For instance, on October 31, 2016, the bank records reflect that Ms. Culberson
withdrew $6,823, but her spreadsheet only reflects that she withdrew $2,400. Nor do the
cash withdrawals from the GBB Account correlate with the $3,500 monthly flat fee or the
purported monthly fees reflected on Ms. Culberson’s invoices.
                                            13
Culberson also stated that she “accounted for every dollar that was withdrawn from Ms.

Buck’s” GBB Account. The hearing judge also found that, in a letter dated December 10,

2020, Ms. Culberson provided unsubstantiated explanations for why at least 26 cash

withdrawal transactions were not accounted for on her spreadsheets. She told Bar Counsel

that 15 of the cash withdrawal transactions, totaling $26,700, were funds taken by Ms.

Culberson as fees but mistakenly not accounted for. Ms. Culberson could not account for

four cash withdrawals totaling $14,250.

       Bar Counsel subpoenaed Ms. Culberson’s attorney trust account records for the

period between July 2018 through July 2019. Bar Counsel sent Ms. Culberson a letter in

February 2021 requesting that she provide copies of her client matter records and client

ledger records associated with her attorney trust account as required by Maryland Rule 19-

407(a)(3). Ms. Culberson followed up with a letter stating that she did not have client

matter records or client ledgers associated with her attorney trust account, and as a result,

failed to provide them.

                                                III

                    Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct

       Based upon the record and the above-summarized findings of fact, the hearing judge

concluded, by clear and convincing evidence, that Ms. Culberson violated MARPC 1.4

(Communication),      1.5(a)   (Fees),    1.7     (Conflict   of   Interest—General   Rule),

1.15(a) (Safekeeping Property), 8.1(a) (Bar Admissions and Disciplinary Matters), and

8.4(a)–(d) (Misconduct), and Maryland Rule 19-407(a)(2)–(4) (Attorney Trust Account

Record-Keeping). Ms. Culberson filed specific exceptions to all of the conclusions of law

                                                14
with the exception of the violations of MARPC 1.15 and Maryland Rule 19-407. Bar

Counsel did not except to any of the hearing judge’s findings. Based upon our de novo

review, we agree with the hearing judge’s conclusions of law and overrule Ms. Culberson’s

exceptions.

       Failure to Communicate (Rule 1.4)

       Rule 1.4(a)(2) and (3) provide that “[a]n attorney shall . . . keep the client reasonably

informed about the status of the matter” and “promptly comply with reasonable requests

for information[.]” Additionally, Rule 1.4(b) provides that “[a]n attorney shall explain a

matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions

regarding the representation.” The hearing judge found that Ms. Culberson violated Rule

1.4(a) and (b) when she failed to: (1) provide Ms. Buck with information about the fees

and expenses that she claimed were charged and collected, thereby depriving Ms. Buck of

the ability to make informed decisions about her personal, business, and legal affairs; (2)

provide Ms. Buck with billing invoices between April 2016 and June 2019, which deprived

Ms. Buck of the ability to confirm or refute whether the legal services charged were

actually provided or appropriate under the terms of the Retainer Agreement; (3) provide

Ms. Buck with any accounting of the withdrawn funds, either during the course of her

representation of Ms. Buck or after her services were terminated, despite Ms. Buck’s

request for an accounting; and (4) advise Ms. Buck that Ms. Culberson retained the

majority of the cash withdrawals from the GBB Account for her own personal use and

benefit.

                                              15
      Ms. Culberson excepts to the hearing judge’s conclusion that she violated Rule 1.4,

arguing that Bar Counsel introduced no evidence of communications between Ms.

Culberson and Ms. Buck that would support a finding of a violation of this rule. We

overrule this exception. In her statement under oath, Ms. Culberson admitted that she never

provided any invoices between April 2016 and July 2019. The subpoenaed bank records

also clearly reflect cash withdrawals made by Ms. Culberson. Bar Counsel’s investigator,

Charles E. Miller, IV, CPA, testified, based upon his review of the bank records,

concerning the errors, discrepancies, and unaccounted funds in Ms. Culberson’s invoices

for services that were provided sometime after Ms. Buck terminated Ms. Culberson’s

representation. Mr. Miller’s summary charts identifying the various withdrawals and

discrepancies were admitted into evidence. Emails exchanged between Ms. Buck and Ms.

Culberson in July 2019 reflect that Ms. Buck requested “any accounting of the withdrawals

every month from my checking account.” No accounting was forthcoming. Bar Counsel

established a violation of Rule 1.4 by clear and convincing evidence.

      Charging Unreasonable Fees (Rule 1.5(a))

      Rule 1.5(a) states:

      (a)    An attorney shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect an
             unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses. The
             factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee
             include the following:
             (1)    the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the
                    questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal
                    service properly;
             (2)    the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of
                    the particular employment will preclude other employment of
                    the attorney;

                                            16
              (3)    the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal
                     services;
              (4)    the amount involved and the results obtained;
              (5)    the time limitations imposed by the client or by the
                     circumstances;
              (6)    the nature and length of the professional relationship with the
                     client;
              (7)    the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorney or
                     attorneys performing the services; and
              (8)    whether the fee is fixed or contingent.

       The hearing judge concluded that Ms. Culberson charged and collected

unreasonable fees in connection with her representation of Ms. Buck in violation of Rule

1.5(a). Ms. Culberson excepts to the conclusion that she violated Rule 1.5, asserting that

there was no evidence before the hearing judge that the fees charged to Ms. Buck were

unreasonable. We overrule this exception.

       We agree with the hearing judge’s conclusion that Ms. Culberson violated this rule

by withdrawing hourly fees from the GBB Account for services covered under the monthly

flat fee established by the Retainer Agreement, such as resolving issues in connection with

Ms. Buck’s E-ZPass account and communicating with the trustees of the DB Trusts

concerning Ms. Buck’s finances. We also agree with the hearing judge’s conclusion that

Ms. Culberson violated Rule 1.5 by failing to bill Ms. Buck in the manner required by the

Retainer Agreement.     The Retainer Agreement provided that “any and all services

unrelated to [the management of business and farm related activities] will be billed to [Ms.

Buck] separately at [Ms. Culberson’s] standard hourly rate, over and beyond” the $3,500

monthly flat fee. The Retainer Agreement also stated that “[p]ayment of any bill is due on

receipt of the bill.” We agree with the hearing judge’s conclusion that Ms. Culberson’s

                                            17
failure to provide regular billing invoices to Ms. Buck between 2016 and 2019 was

inconsistent with the express terms of the Retainer Agreement and constituted a violation

of Rule 1.5. See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Rand, 445 Md. 581, 629 (2015) (failure

to provide invoices as agreed upon in the attorney’s fee agreement violated Rule 1.5);

Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Green, 441 Md. 80, 91–92 (2014) (failure to provide

invoices as agreed upon in the attorney’s retainer agreement violated Rules 1.4(a) and

1.5(a)).

       Acting with a Prohibited Conflict of Interest (Rule 1.7)

       Rule 1.7(a) states, in pertinent part, that “an attorney shall not represent a client if

the representation involves a conflict of interest.” A conflict of interest exists where “there

is a significant risk that the representation” of a client “will be materially limited by . . . a

personal interest of the attorney.” Rule 1.7(a)(2). Comment [1] to Rule 1.7 provides:

“Loyalty and independent judgment are essential elements in the attorney’s relationship to

a client. Conflicts of interest can arise from the attorney’s responsibilities to another

client[] . . . or from the attorney’s own interests.”

       Ms. Culberson excepts to this conclusion because she claims that there was “no

evidence” of the relationship between Ms. Buck and Ms. Culberson. We overrule this

exception. The record in this case includes Ms. Buck’s Power of Attorney, which Ms.

Culberson used to make cash withdrawals from her client’s bank account for her personal

use and benefit. The Power of Attorney clearly established a fiduciary relationship

between Ms. Buck, as the principal, and Ms. Culberson, as her agent. We agree with the

hearing judge’s conclusion that Ms. Culberson violated Rule 1.7 when she engaged in self-

                                               18
dealing as it relates to the unreasonable fees charged to Ms. Buck, and fees she paid herself

in her role as Ms. Buck’s agent or attorney, without providing any accounting, oversight,

or authorization. See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Robbins, 463 Md. 411, 460–61

(2019) (finding a violation of Rule 1.7 where an attorney, in his role as trustee, paid himself

from the trust without providing appropriate billing statements or accounting, despite

repeated requests for information about his charges); see also Attorney Grievance Comm’n

v. Hodes, 441 Md. 136, 193 (2014) (concluding that an attorney, acting as trustee, violated

Rule 1.7 when he engaged in self-dealing that had an adverse impact on his duty of loyalty

to the client and the trust). Ms. Culberson’s use of her client’s power of attorney to make

cash withdrawals in excess of one-half of a million dollars over a several year period,

unaccompanied by any contemporaneous explanation, accounting, or invoicing, constitutes

a clear and unequivocal violation of Rule 1.7.

       Failing to Safekeep Property (Rule 1.15(a))

       Rule 1.15(a) states:

       An attorney shall hold property of clients or third persons that is in an
       attorney’s possession in connection with a representation separate from the
       attorney’s own property. Funds shall be kept in a separate account
       maintained pursuant to Title 19, Chapter 400 of the Maryland Rules, and
       records shall be created and maintained in accordance with the Rules in that
       Chapter. Other property shall be identified specifically as such and
       appropriately safeguarded, and records of its receipt and distribution shall be
       created and maintained. Complete records of the account funds and of other
       property shall be kept by the attorney and shall be preserved for a period of
       at least five years after the date the record was created.

       We agree with the hearing judge’s conclusion that Ms. Culberson violated Rule

1.15(a) by misappropriating funds from Ms. Buck’s GBB Account for her own personal

                                              19
use and benefit. As we previously observed, misappropriation is “any unauthorized use by

an attorney of a client’s funds entrusted to him or her, whether or not temporary or for

personal gain or benefit.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Goodman, 426 Md. 115, 129–

30 (2012) (cleaned up) (concluding that the attorney misappropriated his clients’ settlement

funds when he comingled client and personal funds and did not provide financial records

to establish how the funds were spent). The record in this case is clear that Ms. Culberson

failed to safekeep Ms. Buck’s property by: using her client’s power of attorney to make

cash withdrawals from Ms. Buck’s GBB Account for a period spanning several years;

failing to provide any billing invoices that would reflect any appropriate or legitimate use

of the funds; and failing to keep any record or accounting of the funds she withdrew from

the GBB Account while acting as her client’s agent. In sum, Ms. Culberson’s cash

withdrawals under the circumstances constituted misappropriation of her client’s funds and

an egregious violation of Rule 1.15.

       Attorney Trust Account Record-Keeping (Md. Rule 19-407)

       “Rule 19-407[9] sets forth the requirements by which all attorneys must abide in

connection with trust-account record keeping.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Silbiger,

478 Md. 607, 631 (2022). These requirements include

       the creation and maintenance of detailed records of all deposits and
       disbursements of client funds and funds held on behalf of third persons,

       9
           Rule 19-407(a) states in relevant part:

       (a)      Creation of Records. The following records shall be created and
                maintained for the receipt and disbursement of funds of clients or of
                third persons:

                                               20
records required for each client matter in which the attorney receives funds
in trust, a monthly reconciliation of attorney trust account records, client
matter records, funds of the attorney held in the trust account, and record
retention requirements.

      ***

      (2)    Deposits and Disbursements. A record for each account that
             chronologically shows all deposits and disbursements, as
             follows:
             (A) for each deposit, a record made at or near the time of the
                    deposit that shows (i) the date of the deposit, (ii) the
                    amount, (iii) the identity of the client or third person for
                    whom the funds were deposited, and (iv) the purpose of
                    the deposit;
             (B) for each disbursement, including a disbursement made
                    by electronic transfer, a record made at or near the time
                    of disbursement that shows (i) the date of the
                    disbursement, (ii) the amount, (iii) the payee, (iv) the
                    identity of the client or third person for whom the
                    disbursement was made (if not the payee), and (v) the
                    purpose of the disbursement;
             (C) for each disbursement made by electronic transfer, a
                    written memorandum authorizing the transaction and
                    identifying the attorney responsible for the transaction.
      (3)    Client Matter Records. A record for each client matter in
             which the attorney receives funds in trust, as follows:
             (A) for each attorney trust account transaction, a record that
                    shows (i) the date of the deposit or disbursement; (ii) the
                    amount of the deposit or disbursement; (iii) the purpose
                    for which the funds are intended; (iv) for a
                    disbursement, the payee and the check number or other
                    payment identification; and (v) the balance of funds
                    remaining in the account in connection with the matter;
                    and
             (B) an identification of the person to whom the unused
                    portion of a fee or expense deposit is to be returned
                    whenever it is to be returned to a person other than the
                    client.
      (4)    Record of Funds of the Attorney. A record that identifies the
             funds of the attorney held in each attorney trust account as
             permitted by Rule 19-408(b).
                                     21
Id. at 631. We agree with the hearing judge’s conclusion that Ms. Culberson violated Rule

19-407(a)(2)–(4). In a letter from Ms. Culberson’s counsel to Bar Counsel, she admitted

that she did not have client matter records or client ledgers associated with her attorney

trust account.

       General Misconduct (Rule 8.4)

       Rule 8.4(a) provides that an attorney commits professional misconduct if the

attorney “violate[s] or attempt[s] to violate the [MARPC], knowingly assist[s] or induce[s]

another to do so, or do so through the acts of another.” As a result of Ms. Culberson’s

violations of other disciplinary rules, the hearing judge found, and we agree, that she

violated Rule 8.4(a).

       Under Rule 8.4(b), it is professional misconduct for an attorney to “commit a

criminal act that reflects adversely on the attorney’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as

an attorney in other respects[.]” Ms. Culberson excepts to this conclusion because Ms.

Buck has not filed criminal charges against her and asserts that the record in this case

contains no evidence that she violated a criminal statute. We overrule her exception.

       As we have observed on several occasions, “[an] attorney may be disciplined for

acts which are criminal but do not result in a criminal conviction if Bar Counsel proves the

underlying conduct at the disciplinary proceeding.” Silbiger, 478 Md. at 629 (quoting

Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Garland, 345 Md. 383, 395 (1997)); see also Attorney

Grievance Comm’n v. Yates, 467 Md. 287, 301 (2020) (stating that “it is not a prerequisite

to a finding of a violation of Rule 8.4(b) that the attorney have been charged with, or

convicted of, a violation of [a] criminal statute”). “To establish a violation of Rule 8.4(b),

                                             22
there need only be clear and convincing evidence of a criminal act.” Yates, 467 Md. at

301; see also Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Collins, 477 Md. 482, 508 (2022) (stating

that “to establish a violation of MARPC 8.4(b), Bar Counsel must prove two elements by

clear and convincing evidence: (1) the attorney committed a criminal act; and (2) that

criminal act reflects adversely on the attorney’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a

lawyer in other respects”) (cleaned up).

       The hearing judge concluded that Ms. Culberson violated Rule 8.4(b) because Bar

Counsel presented clear and convincing evidence that she violated the elements of Md.

Code, Criminal Law Article (“CL”) § 7-113, which states:

       (a)    A fiduciary may not:

              (1)    Fraudulently and willfully appropriate money or a thing of
                     value that the fiduciary holds in a fiduciary capacity contrary
                     to the requirements of the fiduciary’s trust responsibility; or
              (2)    Secrete money or a thing of value that the fiduciary holds in a
                     fiduciary capacity with a fraudulent intent to use the money or
                     thing of value contrary to the requirements of the fiduciary’s
                     trust responsibility.

       The hearing judge concluded that Ms. Culberson used her client’s Power of

Attorney to “misappropriate[] funds from the [GBB] Account for her own personal use and

benefit.” Based upon our review of the record, it is evident that the elements of fraudulent

and willful misappropriation by Ms. Culberson in her fiduciary capacity were established

by clear and convincing evidence. There is overwhelming evidence in this record that Ms.

Culberson used her client’s Power of Attorney to access her client’s bank account to make

numerous cash withdrawals for her own personal benefit. Ms. Culberson admitted that she

provided no contemporaneous invoices to her client that might have provided

                                            23
documentation to support her contention that the funds were used for Ms. Buck’s benefit.

To say that misappropriation of a client’s funds “reflects adversely on the attorney’s

honesty, trustworthiness or fitness” is an understatement and constitutes an obvious

violation of Rule 8.4(b).

       Under Rule 8.4(c), it is professional misconduct to “engage in conduct involving

dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation[.]” The hearing judge found that Ms.

Culberson violated Rule 8.4(c) by: (1) withdrawing funds from the GBB Account that she

could not account for or substantiate as being for a legitimate expense related to Ms. Buck;

(2) providing Ms. Buck with false and misleading billing invoices in an attempt to justify

and conceal her misappropriation; and (3) by charging her hourly rates on the billing

invoices that were for services provided under the $3,500 monthly flat fee agreement. We

have consistently determined that an attorney’s intentional misappropriation of client funds

violates Rule 8.4(c). See Silbiger, 478 Md. at 629–30; Attorney Grievance Comm’n v.

Karambelas, 473 Md. 134, 167 (2021); Goodman, 426 Md. at 129–30. The hearing judge

also concluded that the misrepresentations made by Ms. Culberson to Bar Counsel that

form the basis for a violation of Rule 8.1(a) (discussed infra) also constitute a violation of

Rule 8.4(c). For the same reasons that we conclude that Ms. Culberson violated Rule

8.1(a), we similarly conclude that she violated Rule 8.4(c).

       Under Rule 8.4(d), it is professional misconduct to “engage in conduct that is

prejudicial to the administration of justice[.]” The hearing judge found that Ms. Culberson

violated Rule 8.4(d) when she misappropriated Ms. Buck’s funds. As noted above, Ms.

Culberson’s use of her client’s Power of Attorney to make cash withdrawals from her

                                             24
client’s bank account with no contemporaneous explanation or documentation that might

have otherwise reflected an appropriate use of the funds for her client’s benefit, is clearly

conduct that “negatively impacts the public’s perception of the legal profession[.]”

Karambelas, 473 Md. at 169. We agree with the hearing judge’s assessment that Ms.

Culberson’s conduct was prejudicial to the administration of justice in violation of

Rule 8.4(d).

       Impeding Bar Counsel’s Investigation (Rule 8.1(a))

       Rule 8.1(a) states that “[a]n applicant for admission or reinstatement to the bar, or

an attorney in connection with a bar admission application or in connection with a

disciplinary matter, shall not: (a) knowingly make a false statement of material fact[.]”

       The hearing judge found that Ms. Culberson violated Rule 8.1(a) “on multiple

occasions.” First, she knowingly and intentionally misrepresented that Ms. Buck had

agreed to increase the retainer amount to $5,000 per month. Second, she “knowingly and

intentionally misrepresented to Bar Counsel that Ms. Buck instructed her not to send

invoices.” Third, she “knowingly and intentionally misrepresented that she no longer had

client matter records or client ledgers maintained on behalf of Ms. Buck because her

assistant’s computer crashed.”10 Lastly, Ms. Culberson violated Rule 8.1(a) when she

provided Bar Counsel with spreadsheets “that falsely claimed to account for the totality of

funds [Ms. Culberson] withdrew” from the GBB Account.

       10
         To support her finding, the hearing judge pointed out that, during Ms. Culberson’s
statement under oath, she testified that the spreadsheets provided to Bar Counsel were the
only records she had created and maintained that reflected the payments that she withdrew
from the GBB Account.
                                             25
       Ms. Culberson excepts to this legal conclusion, asserting that there was “no

evidence” of knowing and intentional misrepresentations because no one with “personal

knowledge of the communications” between Ms. Culberson and Ms. Buck testified at the

hearing. We overrule Ms. Culberson’s exception. For the reasons discussed in part II of

this opinion, there was clear and convincing evidence in the record to support the hearing

judge’s factual findings that Ms. Culberson made knowing and intentional material

misrepresentations to Bar Counsel. We agree with the hearing judge’s conclusion that Ms.

Culberson knowingly made false statements of material fact to Bar Counsel in violation of

Rule 8.1(a).

                                            IV

                                        Sanction

       As we have often stated, the purpose of attorney discipline proceedings is not to

punish the attorney but to protect the public and deter other lawyers from engaging in

misconduct. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Yi, 470 Md. 464, 499 (2020) (citing Attorney

Grievance Comm’n v. Woolery, 456 Md. 483, 497–98 (2017)). The public is protected

when sanctions are “commensurate with the nature and gravity of the violations and the

intent with which they were committed[.]” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Hamilton, 444

Md. 163, 198 (2015) (quotations omitted). To determine the appropriate sanction in

attorney disciplinary proceedings, we consider the facts of the particular case, as well as

the presence of any aggravating and mitigating factors.

                                            26
       Aggravating Factors

       Aggravating factors are factors that “‘militate in favor of a more severe sanction.’”

Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Bonner, 477 Md. 576, 608 (2022) (quoting Attorney

Grievance Comm’n v. Miller, 467 Md. 176, 233 (2020)). When fashioning a sanction, we

consult the aggravating factors articulated in Standard 9.22 of the American Bar

Association (“ABA”) Standards for Imposing Sanctions. See Bonner, 477 Md. at 608; see

also Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Sperling, 459 Md. 194, 275 (2018) (outlining the list

of recognized factors). In this case, the hearing judge found that Bar Counsel had proven

the existence of eight aggravating factors: (1) a dishonest or selfish motive; (2) a pattern of

misconduct; (3) bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding; (4) submission of

false evidence and false statements during the disciplinary process; (5) refusal to

acknowledge the wrongful nature of her conduct; (6) substantial experience in the practice

of law; (7) indifference to making restitution; and (8) illegal conduct.

       The hearing judge determined that Ms. Culberson demonstrated a dishonest and

selfish motive when she misappropriated Ms. Buck’s funds for her own use and benefit

between 2016 and 2019. The misappropriation of funds over the course of several years

demonstrates a pattern of misconduct. The hearing judge found that Ms. Culberson made

knowing and intentional false statements to Bar Counsel during the disciplinary process

and submitted numerous false documents in an effort to conceal the misappropriation. The

hearing judge further determined that Ms. Culberson engaged in bad faith obstruction of

the disciplinary proceeding by failing to participate in the proceedings before the court,

including failing to respond to discovery and failing to appear for trial. “‘This Court has

                                              27
found bad faith obstruction when attorneys knowingly fail[] to respond to Bar Counsel’s

requests for documents, attend evidentiary hearings, submit written responses, or otherwise

fail to comply with the rules or directives of the [Commission].’” Attorney Grievance

Comm’n v. Young, 473 Md. 94, 129 (2021) (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v.

McLaughlin, 456 Md. 172, 204 (2017)).

       The hearing judge further determined that Ms. Culberson refused to acknowledge

the wrongful nature of her misconduct, insisting that she could “account for every dollar”

withdrawn from Ms. Buck’s GBB Account. In addition to failing to provide Ms. Buck

with any accounting of the cash withdrawals from the GBB Account or an explanation for

how her invoices for attorney’s fees were paid, the hearing judge found that Ms. Culberson

failed to provide a refund to Ms. Buck of any misappropriated funds. Having been admitted

to the Maryland Bar since 1994, the hearing judge determined that Ms. Culberson had

substantial experience in the law. Finally, the hearing judge found that Ms. Culberson’s

misappropriation of funds through the use of her client’s Power of Attorney constituted

illegal conduct. We conclude that there is clear and convincing evidence in the record to

support the hearing judge’s findings on all eight factors, for the reasons articulated by the

hearing judge.

       Mitigating Factors

       “In attorney grievance proceedings, this Court considers several mitigating factors

based upon ABA Standard 9.32.” Bonner, 477 Md. at 609 & n.17 (quoting Sperling, 459

Md. at 277–78 (listing the recognized mitigating factors)). In this case, Ms. Culberson did

not participate in the evidentiary proceeding and therefore did not testify regarding any

                                             28
alleged mitigation, despite being permitted by the hearing judge to present such evidence.

Bar Counsel represented to the hearing judge that Ms. Culberson had no prior disciplinary

complaints.   Based upon Bar Counsel’s representation, the hearing judge found the

presence of one mitigating factor: the absence of a prior disciplinary record.

       Although Ms. Culberson did not participate in the evidentiary hearing, she

submitted a written response to Bar Counsel’s Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions

of Law in which she argued that the record supported the presence of the following

additional mitigating factors: (1) absence of a dishonest or selfish motive; (2) personal or

emotional problems; (3) timely good faith efforts to make restitution or to rectify

consequences of misconduct; (4) full and free disclosure to the Commission or a

cooperative attitude toward the attorney discipline proceeding; (5) character or reputation;

(6) delay in the disciplinary proceedings; and (7) imposition of other penalties or sanctions.

       After summarizing in detail Ms. Culberson’s recitals contained in her written

response and the arguments made in support of these mitigating factors, the hearing judge

determined that Ms. Culberson failed to prove any of the mitigating factors by a

preponderance of the evidence. In making this finding, the hearing judge pointed out that

Ms. Culberson: (1) deliberately failed to cooperate with Bar Counsel in this proceeding,

which resulted in the sanctions order limiting her participation in this case; and (2) failed

to attend the evidentiary hearing, and did not request to participate remotely pursuant to

Maryland Rule 2-800, et seq. Based upon her complete lack of participation in the

proceeding, the hearing judge pointed out that the court did not receive any evidence to

                                             29
support Ms. Culberson’s written arguments on mitigation and was also unable to assess

Ms. Culberson’s credibility.

       We agree with the hearing judge’s conclusions that Ms. Culberson failed to present

any evidence on mitigating factors for the reasons expressed by the hearing judge. When

an attorney fails to participate in the disciplinary proceeding, this Court will not accept the

attorney’s arguments concerning mitigation as a substitute for the requirement that

mitigation evidence be presented to the hearing judge and established by a preponderance

of the evidence.

       Disbarment is the Appropriate Sanction

       Bar Counsel recommends that Ms. Culberson be disbarred from the practice of law.

Ms. Culberson requests that, in lieu of disbarment, the Court impose a sanction less severe

than disbarment because she “has not practiced law in over two years and has made it clear

she has no intention to practice or seek to practice law again[.]”

       Under our well-established case law, “when an attorney engages in knowing and

intentional conduct that involves the misappropriation of funds, disbarment is warranted.”

Silbiger, 478 Md. at 634–35. We recently observed that this Court has “not imposed a

sanction less than disbarment” when an attorney has engaged in theft or misappropriation

of funds. Id. at 643. An attorney who misappropriates funds entrusted to her by her client

for her own benefit without the client’s knowledge or consent “violate[s] one of the most

sacred obligations of an attorney[.]” Id. at 644. “It has been our long-held and consistent

position that the entrustment to attorneys of the money and property of others involves a

responsibility of the highest order” and that “appropriating any part of their funds to their

                                              30
own use and benefit without clear authority to do so cannot be tolerated.” Attorney

Grievance Comm’n v. Jones, 428 Md. 457, 469 (2012) (cleaned up).

      We are not persuaded to deviate from our sanction jurisprudence based upon Ms.

Culberson’s representation to this Court that she has no intention of practicing law in the

future. Nor does the presence of one mitigating factor overcome her many transgressions

along with several aggravating factors. The only sanction appropriate for Ms. Culberson’s

conduct is disbarment.

                                         IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT
                                         SHALL PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY
                                         THE    CLERK   OF   THIS   COURT,
                                         PURSUANT TO MARYLAND RULE 19-
                                         709, FOR WHICH SUM JUDGMENT IS
                                         ENTERED    IN   FAVOR    OF   THE
                                         ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION
                                         AGAINST       WENDY       BARROW
                                         CULBERSON.

                                            31
The correction notice(s) for this opinion(s) can be found here:

https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/import/appellate/correctionnotices/coa/3a22agcn.pdf