Court Opinion

ID: 9928409
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-31 18:03:01.199207+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:48:13.005349
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/31/24 Scurlock v. City of Coronado CA4/1
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                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

JON SCURLOCK,                                                        D081136

         Plaintiff and Appellant,

         v.                                                         (Super. Ct. No. 37-2021-
                                                                   00000841-CU-WM-CTL)
CITY OF CORONADO,

         Defendant and Respondent.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
John S. Meyer, Judge. Affirmed.
         Procopio, Cory, Hargreaves & Savitch, Kendra J. Hall for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
         Burke, Williams & Sorenson, Mark J. Austin, Thomas B. Brown, and
Eric S. Phillips for Defendant and Respondent.
                                             I. INTRODUCTION
         Homeowner Jon Scurlock (Scurlock) challenges a series of decisions
issued by the City of Coronado (Coronado), which collectively prevented his
desired design for a new primary residence. That design included an
integrated accessory dwelling unit (ADU), and Scurlock relies on the law
governing ADUs to establish error. However, Coronado’s actions were
consistent with the text and purpose of the ADU law, and Coronado acted
within its broad discretion over local zoning matters. We therefore affirm the
judgment for Coronado.
            II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      A. Government Code Section 65852.2.
      An ADU is an “attached or a detached residential dwelling unit that
provides complete independent living facilities for one or more persons and is
located on a lot with a proposed or existing primary residence.” (Gov. Code,

§ 65852.2, subd. (j)(1).)1 The Legislature determined that ADUs are essential
to addressing California’s housing crisis, finding that “[ADUs] are a valuable
form of housing in California,” and that ADUs “provide[] additional rental
housing stock” for our state. (§ 65852.150, subd. (a)(1) & (4).)
      The Legislature enacted section 65852.2, which eased building
restrictions on ADUs, to encourage their construction and allow ADUs in
formerly prohibited areas. (See generally, § 65852.2; Sounhein v. City of San
Dimas (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1181, 1184 (Sounhein).) “The evident intent of
the Legislature in enacting section 65852.2 was to increase the state’s supply
of affordable housing without dramatically changing the character and
stability of existing family neighborhoods. The statute is a careful balancing
of the two competing interests.” (Sounhein, at p. 1190.)
      B. Procedural History.
      In April 2020, Scurlock sought approval from Coronado to demolish an
existing house and construct a new single-family residence in its place.

1    All further statutory references are to the Government Code unless
otherwise indicated.
                                        2
Scurlock’s plans included an ADU integrated into the primary residence at
the southern corner of the first floor. The ADU shared two walls with the
primary residence, and the second floor of the primary residence extended
over the ADU. The plans also included a carriage house over a detached
garage. The total floor area of the project was 4,633 square feet. The ADU
was 680 square feet, and the square footage of the other structures was
3,953.
      Coronado elected to defer its review of the ADU, and it required
Scurlock to submit separate applications for the project: one for the primary
residence without the ADU and one for the ADU.
      In August 2020, Scurlock submitted a second set of plans that omitted
the ADU. The space previously designated an ADU was now labeled a
bedroom. The plans also converted a bedroom located on the eastern corner
of the first floor into a covered patio and removed the carriage house over the
garage. The total floor area in the second set of plans was 3,958 square feet.
Coronado approved these plans in September 2020.
      In December 2020, Scurlock submitted a third set of plans that were
similar to the first set. These plans converted the first-floor southern corner
back into an ADU with the same design as the originally proposed ADU
except for slight modifications to the kitchen and closet. The third set of
plans also enclosed the covered patio at the eastern corner of the first floor,
converting it into a den. This new den was a bedroom in the original plans.
Finally, these plans expanded the detached garage and added back the
carriage house on top of it. The carriage house was the same design as in the
first set of plans. The ADU was 680 square feet, but it did not alter the
existing square footage because it sat entirely within the walls of the primary

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residence. The other modifications added 639 square feet to the primary
residence.
      On February 12, 2021, Coronado issued two separate decisions on the
third set of plans. One decision approved the ADU conversion. The other
denied the remaining modifications because they added square footage that
would exceed the maximum floor area ratio (FAR) for Scurlock’s lot. FAR “is
the total of the ‘gross floor area’ plus the ‘floor area equivalent’ of all
buildings on a lot divided by the ‘gross lot area’ ” with various exclusions not
relevant here. (Coronado Mun. Code, § 86.04.308.) The maximum FAR for
Scurlock’s lot allowed for structures totaling 4,004 square feet. In
determining the allowable square footage for the other modifications,
Coronado added the square footage of the existing primary residence,
including the ADU (3,958), and the square footage of the other modifications
(639). The total was 4,597, which exceeded the maximum of 4,004 by 593.
      Scurlock challenged Coronado’s decisions through an appeal to the
Coronado City Council and a writ petition filed in the trial court. Both efforts
failed and this appeal followed.
                                III. DISCUSSION
      Scurlock argues that Coronado (1) erred by including the square
footage of the ADU in the FAR calculation for the additional modifications,
(2) impermissibly required him to split his initial application so it could
manufacture a basis to deny a portion of the project, (3) failed to properly
process his third set of plans by approving the ADU first so it could deny the
additional modifications, and (4) applied the ADU law in a manner that leads
to absurd results contrary to the intent of the Legislature. Coronado
acknowledges that the order in which permit applications for an ADU, and
primary residence are considered may change the outcome, but nonetheless

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contends it complied with the letter and spirit of the ADU law. We first
address the FAR calculation and find Coronado was authorized to include the
square footage of the ADU. We then jointly address Scurlock’s remaining
claims and find no error because the ADU law has been satisfied and
Coronado acted within its discretion.
      A. Standard of Review.
      We review Coronado’s decisions for abuse of discretion. (See American
Chemistry Council v. Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment
(2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 1113, 1138.) “ ‘Abuse of discretion is established if the
[public agency] has not proceeded in the manner required by law, the order or
decision is not supported by the findings, or the findings are not supported by
the evidence.’ ” (County of Kern v. State Dept. of Health Care Services (2009)
180 Cal.App.4th 1504, 1510.) “In determining whether an agency has abused
its discretion, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the
agency, and if reasonable minds may disagree as to the wisdom of the
agency’s action, its determination must be upheld.” (Helena F. v. West Contra
Costa Unified School Dist. (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1793, 1799.)
      However, “[w]e independently review issues of statutory
interpretation.” (Reznitskiy v. County of Marin (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th
1016, 1025.) “ ‘Our primary task . . . is to determine the Legislature’s intent,
giving effect to the law’s purpose.’ ” (Ibid.) We first consider the words of a
statute, giving them their ordinary meaning, and construing them based on
the statute as a whole and the statute’s purpose. (Ibid.) If there is no
ambiguity, the plain meaning governs. (Ibid.) If the language is susceptible
of multiple reasonable interpretations, “we ‘ “ ‘may examine the context in
which the language appears, adopting the construction that best harmonizes
the statute internally and with related statutes.’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.) We also look to

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extrinsic aids, including the “ ‘ “ ‘objects to be achieved, the evils to be
remedied, the legislative history, [and] public policy. . . .’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.)
      B. Inclusion of the ADU in the FAR Determination.
      Scurlock argues Coronado disregarded state law by including the
square footage of the ADU in its FAR calculation for the modifications to the
primary residence. Specifically, he relies on section 65852.2, former
subdivision (a)(8) (former section 65852.2(a)(8)) and section 65852.2, former
subdivision (c)(2)(C) (former section 65852.2(c)(2)(C)).
      When Scurlock initially applied for construction permits, section
65852.2, former subdivision (c)(1) permitted a local agency to establish
minimum and maximum unit size requirements for both attached and
detached ADUs. (§ 65852.2, former subd. (c)(1).) However, former section
65852.2(c)(2)(C), prohibited a local agency from establishing:
                 Any other minimum or maximum size for an
          accessory dwelling unit, size based upon a percentage of the
          proposed or existing primary dwelling, or limits on lot
          coverage, floor area ratio, open space, and minimum lot
          size, for either attached or detached dwellings that does not
          permit at least an 800 square foot accessory dwelling unit
          that is at least 16 feet in height with four-foot side and rear
          yard setbacks to be constructed in compliance with all other
          local development standards. (§ 65852.2, former
          subd. (c)(2)(C), added by Stats. 2019, ch. 659, § 1.5.)2

      Scurlock’s reliance on former section 65852.2(c)(2)(C) is misplaced. He
claims it evinces an intent to encourage property owners to add square
footage that would not otherwise be allowed, and that square footage of an
ADU cannot be taken away from the primary residence. However, former

2     In 2022, the Legislature amended former section 65852.2(c)(2)(C). (See
Stats. 2022, ch. 650, § 1; Stats. 2022, ch. 664, § 2.5.) However, its substance
remains unchanged.

                                           6
section 65852.2(c)(2)(C) only prohibited local governments from enforcing
FAR if it would prevent an ADU of 800 square feet or less. It did not address
the current issue, which is whether square footage of an ADU may be
considered when determining the FAR for modifications to the primary
residence.
      As noted, Scurlock also claims that Coronado’s inclusion of the square
footage of the ADU in its FAR calculation violated former section
65852.2(a)(8). At the time of Scurlock’s initial application, that section
provided, “The accessory dwelling unit shall not be considered in the
application of any local ordinance, policy, or program to limit residential

growth.” (§ 65852.2, former subd. (a)(8), added by Stats. 2016, ch. 735, § 1.5,3
italics added.) Scurlock contends “residential growth” includes FAR, so
Coronado was prohibited from considering the square footage of the ADU in
its FAR calculation.
      However, as Coronado points out, in the land-use context, limitations
on residential growth mean controlling the number of dwellings. (See, e.g.,
Pacifica Corp. v. City of Camarillo (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 168, 172
[“residential growth control ordinance” limited the number of units that could
be constructed and established a board to evaluate the impact of a planned
residential development]; Building Industry Assn. v. City of Camarillo (1986)
41 Cal.3d 810, 815 [city adopted a growth control ordinance that limited the
number of dwelling units to achieve “a steady rate of residential growth”]; Del
Oro Hills v. City of Oceanside (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1060, 1067 [“residential
growth control ordinance” set a maximum number of dwelling units to be

3     This provision is now in subdivision (a)(11) in the current version of
section 65852.2.
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constructed each year]; Arcadia Development Co. v. City of Morgan Hill
(2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 253, 257 [local measure distributed a limited number
of housing allotments to limit growth and “concentrate residential growth
toward the center of the city”].)
      By comparison, FAR limits the total square footage of all structures on
a single lot based on the size of the lot. It governs the structures’ mass, not
the number of dwellings or dwelling units. While increased floor area can
provide space for additional residents as Scurlock suggests, that is not FAR’s
main use. Rather, FAR limitations are imposed to control the bulk of
buildings, not the number of residents or dwellings. Accordingly, the term
“residential growth” in former section 65852.2(a)(8) did not refer to FAR, and
it did not prohibit Coronado from including the square footage of the ADU in
its FAR calculation.
      Our interpretation of the ADU law is consistent with the Government
Code sections that grant bonuses to low-income housing developments. The
available benefits in that context include a “density bonus,” which increases
the allowable number of units (§ 65915, subds. (f), (o)(6)), and a “floor area
ratio bonus,” which increases the allowable FAR. (§ 65917.2, subd. (a)(3).)
This reflects that matters of population concentration, like residential
growth, are treated separately from matters of building concentration, such
as FAR. Further, the absence of a floor area ratio bonus for the primary
residence in section 65852.2 indicates the Legislature did not intend ADUs to
confer additional square footage to primary residences.
      Scurlock’s approach also leads to inconsistent results. If residential
growth includes FAR, then former section 65852.2(a)(8) would have exempted
an ADU of any size from FAR limitations. That would have undermined

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former section 65852.2(c)(2)(C), which only exempted ADUs of 800 square
feet or less from FAR limitations.
      Turning to the legislative history, part of the problem that motivated
section 65852.2 was the trend toward fewer people living in more space.
(Sen. Local Government Com., staff analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1534 (1981–
1982 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 12, 1982, p. 1.) According to a legislative
staff analysis from the Senate Committee on Local Government, older
individuals were underutilizing large single-family homes, but they were
trapped in those homes due to the housing market. (Ibid.) Because larger
homes were part of the problem that section 65852.2 sought to address, the
statute should be interpreted to allow enforcement of building standards
regarding the size of the primary residence, so long as those standards do not
constrain ADUs.
      Additionally, several amendments to section 65852.2 targeted local
governments that discouraged ADUs with unnecessary conditions and
procedural obstacles. (See, e.g., Sen. Floor Analysis, 3d reading of
Assem. Bill No. 3198 (1993–1994 Reg. Sess.) as amended Aug. 18, 1994;
Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis of
Assem. Bill No. 1866 (2001–2002 Reg. Sess.) as amended Aug. 22, 2002;
Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 1069
(2015–2016 Reg. Sess.) as amended Aug. 30, 2016.) That evil is not
implicated here, as including the square footage of the ADU in the FAR
calculation for modifications to the primary residence affects the primary
residence, not the ADU.
      In short, section 65852.2 provides a square footage bonus to enable an
ADU, but it does not provide a corresponding bonus to the square footage of
the primary residence. Coronado was therefore authorized to include the

                                       9
ADU when determining the FAR for the modifications to Scurlock’s primary
residence.
      C. Coronado’s Permit Application Process.
      As noted, Scurlock argues Coronado’s permit application process
allowed it to manufacture a basis to deny a portion of his project. He
challenges the requirement of separate applications for the primary residence
and ADU, and the order in which Coronado reviewed his third set of plans.
He contends Coronado’s procedure leads to absurd results because the order
in which permit applications are reviewed will lead to different outcomes.
      Local governments “have been constitutionally endowed with wide-
ranging discretion” in land use matters. (DeVita v. County of Napa (1995)
9 Cal.4th 763, 781–782 (DeVita).) “The Legislature, in its zoning and
planning legislation, has recognized the primacy of local control over land
use.” (Id. at p. 782.) In enacting the chapter in which section 65852.2 is
located, the Legislature intended “to provide only a minimum of limitation in
order that counties and cities may exercise the maximum degree of control
over local zoning matters.” (§ 65800.) “ ‘[T]he Legislature has been sensitive
to the fact that planning and zoning in the conventional sense have
traditionally been deemed municipal affairs. It has thus made no attempt to
deprive local governments . . . of their right to manage and control such
matters, but rather has attempted to impinge upon local control only to the
limited degree necessary to further legitimate state interests.’ ” (DeVita, at
p. 782.)
      The Legislature also intended that any restrictions imposed on ADUs
by local governments have “the effect of providing for the creation of [ADUs]”
and “are not so arbitrary, excessive, or burdensome so as to unreasonably

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restrict the ability of homeowners to create [ADUs] in zones in which they are
authorized.” (§ 65852.150, subd. (b).)
      Regarding Coronado’s requirement of separate applications for the
primary residence and ADU, the version of section 65852.2 in effect when
Scurlock submitted his first set of plans stated:
         If the permit application to create an accessory dwelling
         unit or a junior accessory dwelling unit is submitted with a
         permit application to create a new single-family dwelling
         on the lot, the permitting agency may delay acting on the
         permit application for the accessory dwelling unit or the
         junior accessory dwelling unit until the permitting agency
         acts on the permit application to create the new single-
         family dwelling, but the application to create the accessory
         dwelling unit or junior accessory dwelling unit shall be
         considered without discretionary review or hearing.
         (§ 65852.2, former subd. (a)(3), added by Stats. 2019,
         ch. 659, § 1.5 (former section 65852.2(a)(3)).)4

      The plain language of former section 65852.2(a)(3) authorized Coronado
to delay review of an ADU proposed with a new primary residence. It also
referred to separate permit applications for the ADU and the primary
residence, indicating the Legislature contemplated a process involving two
separate permit applications. As such, Coronado acted consistently with
former section 65852.2(a)(3) when it deferred review of the ADU and required
Scurlock to submit separate permit applications.
      Further, the pertinent inquiry is whether the local government’s
actions “ha[d] the effect of providing for the creation of [ADUs],” and are “not
so arbitrary, excessive, or burdensome so as to unreasonably restrict the
ability of homeowners to create [ADUs].” (§ 65852.150, subd. (b).) Scurlock

4     This provision was subsequently amended. (Stats. 2020, ch. 198, § 3.5;
Stats. 2022, ch. 650, § 1; Stats. 2022, ch. 664, § 2.5.) The current version is
substantially similar and found at section 65852.2, subdivision (a)(3)(A).
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was ultimately allowed to construct an ADU substantially like the one he
originally proposed. The approved ADU has the same square footage and is
located in the same area. It also keeps the same design as the original plan,

except for minor modifications to the closet and kitchen.5
      Accordingly, Coronado’s splitting of Scurlock’s initial application did
not violate the ADU law. Separate permits and delayed review of the ADU
are consistent with the plain language of former section 65852.2(a)(3), and
Coronado’s actions did not unreasonably obstruct the desired ADU.
      As for the claim that Coronado improperly approved the ADU first
when reviewing Scurlock’s third set of plans, it is premised on Scurlock’s
belief that the square footage of the ADU should be deducted from the
primary residence’s square footage. This premise is incorrect for the reasons
stated above. Because there is no deduction, the order in which Coronado
considered Scurlock’s third set of plans did not affect the outcome. The
modifications to the primary residence would have exceeded the allowable
FAR regardless of whether they were considered before or after the ADU.
      Turning to the claimed absurdity, Coronado acknowledges that the
sequence of permit review could affect the size of the primary residence. For
example, Scurlock poses a hypothetical where he could have gained
additional square footage by first obtaining approval for his primary
residence at the maximum square footage, and then adding the ADU later.
That point was conceded at oral argument.

5     There is no indication that Coronado asked for these modifications.

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      Although the sequence of review may affect the outcome, we find no

absurdity. FAR limitations are set and controlled by local governments,6 and
the state has impinged on that control for the limited purpose of allowing
ADUs where they would not otherwise be authorized. (See DeVita, supra,
9 Cal.4th at p. 782; §§ 65800, 65852.150.) The only thing that changed based
on the sequence of review employed by Coronado is the size and design of
Scurlock’s primary residence. That process did not constrain Scurlock’s
ability to construct his desired ADU. As such, the state’s interest in the
matter has been satisfied, and enforcement of FAR against the primary
residence was a matter within Coronado’s wide-ranging discretion. (See
DeVita, at pp. 781–782.)
      As noted above, larger homes were part of the problem section 65852.2
sought to address. (Sen. Local Government Com., staff analysis of
Sen. Bill No. 1534 (1981–1982 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 12, 1982, p. 1.)
Additionally, section 65852.2 is a balance between increasing affordable
housing and maintaining the character of existing neighborhoods. (Sounhein,
supra, 47.Cal.App.4th at p. 1190.) With this in mind, Coronado did not abuse
its discretion in using a process that resulted in a smaller primary residence
but nonetheless allowed the desired ADU.
      Based on the foregoing, Scurlock has not shown any error regarding
Coronado’s permit application procedure.

6     For example, Coronado has established its FAR restrictions for
single-family residences in Coronado Municipal Code section 86.08.035.
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                          IV. DISPOSITION
    The judgment is affirmed. Coronado is awarded costs on appeal.

                                                     McCONNELL, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

O'ROURKE, J.

KELETY, J.

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