Court Opinion

ID: 9685925
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 15:08:33.893499+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:11.366571
License: Public Domain

FINE, J.
¶ 79. (dissenting). Judge Schudson and I agree with the lead opinion's resolution of the issues discussed in Section II A., B., and C. We also believe, however, that the lead opinion's discussion of the "discovery" issue in Section II D. would, if adopted, be a sea change in our law that would eliminate the requirement that injured plaintiffs exercise "reasonable diligence" in seeking to ascertain possible causes of their injuries, and would transmute the rule into one of discovery-in-fact. See Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1). Accordingly, Section 1 of this opinion is the opinion of the court on the discovery-rule issue. See State v. Dowe, 120 Wis. 2d 192, 194, 352 N.W.2d 660, 662 (1984).
¶ 80. Judge Schudson joins in the lead opinion's resolution of the "respondeat superior" issue, discussed in Section II E. of that opinion. For the reasons set out in Section 2 of this opinion, I respectfully dissent from the majority's Section E.
1. The "discovery" rule.
¶ 81. We start with the paradigm that although summary judgment may not be granted unless there are no disputed issues of material fact, and, therefore, a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, Wis. Stat. Rule 802.08(2), the party with the burden of proof on an element in the case can only avoid summary judgment if that party submits evidentiary material "set[ting] forth specific facts," Wis. Stat. Rule 802.08(3), that raise genuine issues as to that element. Transportation Ins. Co. v. Hunzinger Constr. Co., 179 Wis. 2d 281, 290-292, 507 N.W.2d 136, 139-140 (Ct. App. 1993). *189If the party with that burden does not show that there is a genuine issue of material fact with respect to an element, summary judgment "shall" be granted on that element. Rule 802.08(2).
¶ 82. As the lead opinion recognizes, we review de novo a trial court's determination whether summary judgment is required. Green Spring Farms v. Kersten, 136 Wis. 2d 304, 315-316, 401 N.W.2d 816, 820-821 (1987). Here, the trial court, a careful, insightful judge, determined that the plaintiffs did not exercise reasonable diligence in attempting to timely determine the role of Mary Jo Zimmer, M.D., in the tragic death of Sarah M. Hegarty. On Judge Schudson's and my de novo analysis, we agree.
¶ 83. As material to the issue of whether the statute of limitations ran in connection with the plaintiffs' claims against Dr. Zimmer, Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1) requires that a medical-malpractice action be commenced:
(a) Three years from the date of injury, or
(b) One year from the date the injury was discovered or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have been discovered, except that an action may not be commenced under this paragraph more than 5 years from the date of the act or omission.
The focus is on whether the plaintiffs exercised reasonable diligence in ascertaining Dr. Zimmer's role in the care and treatment of Sarah Hegarty while Sarah Hegarty was at Children's Hospital.
¶ 84. The reasonable-diligence test is an objective one. Carlson v. Pepin County, 167 Wis. 2d 345, 353, 481 N.W.2d 498, 501 (Ct. App. 1992). Additionally, what a *190lawyer retained by a plaintiff knows is imputed to that plaintiff. Groom v. Professionals Ins. Co., 179 Wis. 2d 241, 250 n.3, 507 N.W.2d 121, 125 n.3 (Ct. App. 1993). This means that what the Hegartys actually knew is not dispositive. Rather, assuming lack of personal knowledge, the issue is what in the exercise of reasonable diligence either the Hegartys or their lawyers should have known. Carlson, 167 Wis. 2d at 353, 481 N.W.2d at 501.
¶ 85. Embedded in the duty to exercise reasonable diligence is the duty to inquire. Doe v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 211 Wis. 2d 312, 319, 340, 565 N.W.2d 94, 96, 105 (1997) ("Plaintiffs may not ignore means of information reasonably available to them, but must in good faith apply their attention to those particulars which may be inferred to be within their reach.") (recognizing "duty to inquire") (affirming trial courts' grants of summary judgment that plaintiffs' claims were barred by the statute of limitations); Spitler v. Dean, 148 Wis. 2d 630, 638, 436 N.W.2d 308, 311 (1989) ("Plaintiffs may not close their eyes to means of information reasonably accessible to them and must in good faith apply their attention to those particulars which may be inferred to be within their reach."). The lead opinion ignores this duty.
¶ 86. In our view, plaintiffs, "in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have . . . discovered," Wis. Stat. § 893.55(l)(b), Dr. Zimmer's role in Sarah Hegarty's death more than one year before December 20, 1999, (when they filed their amended complaint naming Dr. Zimmer as a defendant for the first time) at the very latest. December 19, 1998, is thus the critical date. This is what the plaintiffs knew well before December 19, 1998:
*191Dr. Zimmer was Sarah Hegarty's personal physician before Sarah Hegarty's admission to Children's Hospital that is the subject of this action;
Before Sarah Hegarty's admission to Children's Hospital that is the subject of this action, Dr. Zimmer attempted to treat Sarah Hegarty for the ailment from which she ultimately died;
Dr. Zimmer's attempted treatment of Sarah He-garty before her admission to Children's Hospital that is the subject of this action was unsuccessful, in large measure — if not wholly— because of a misdiagnosis of Sarah Hegarty's ailment as irritable bowel syndrome;
Sarah Hegarty's admission to Children's Hospital that is the subject of this action was on March 20, 1996, at 4:29 p.m., and Dr. Zimmer is listed on the admitting form as Sarah Hegarty's primary physician;
Dr. Zimmer arrived at Children's Hospital at 7:30 a.m. on March 21, 1996;
At 8:08 p.m., on March 20, 1996, Angela Beauchaine, the resident examining Sarah He-garty, completed the Children's Hospital form headed "History and Physical Examination" (up-percasing omitted);
At 8:15 a.m., on March 21, 1996, Dr. Zimmer signed as the "ATTENDING Physician" the "History and Physical Examination" form filled out by Dr. Beauchaine the previous evening;
The "History and Physical Examination" form filled out by Dr. Beauchaine and countersigned *192by Dr. Zimmer as the "ATTENDING Physician" clearly indicates that Dr. Beauchaine is a "RESIDENT Physician";
Dr. Zimmer's telephone number is written in what appears to be Dr. Beauchaine's handwriting at the top of the "History and Physical Examination" form;
The Children's Hospital "Emergency Service Admission Orders" (uppercasing omitted) form for Sarah Hegarty dated March 20, 1996, recites: "Admit to: [X] PRIVATE patient Dr. Zimmer (Notified and accepted patient)" (all text but the word "Zimmer" is pre-printed);
The Children's Hospital "Patient Admission Information" (uppercasing omitted) form for Sarah Hegarty dated March 20, 1996, and bearing a time imprint of 7:47 p.m. contains the following: "ATT1 ZIMMER, MARY JO" and also lists Dr. Zimmer as Sarah Hegarty's primary physician;
The Children's Hospital "Progress Notes" (up-percasing omitted) form has twenty-six lines of a handwritten entry, dated March 21, 1996, at 8:15 a.m., by Dr. Zimmer of substantive medical matters pertaining to Sarah Hegarty's care and treatment;
The Children's Hospital "Progress Notes" form with entries made by Dr. Beauchaine at 12:44 p.m. on March 21, 1996, which recounts Sarah Hegarty's condition, records that Sarah Hegarty was "reevaluated between 630 & 700 this am." These entries by Dr. Beauchaine were countersigned by Dr. Zimmer. A separate note on that form in Dr. Zimmer's handwriting and signed by *193her, but without the time noted, records that Sarah Hegarty was transferred to a surgical unit;
• In April of 1997, the plaintiffs' lawyers sought Sarah Hegarty's medical records, not only from Children's Hospital, but also from Dr. Zimmer's office;
• There is no evidence in the record that the documents that the plaintiffs lawyers sought from Children's Hospital and from Dr. Zimmer's office were not timely received;
The original December 18, 1998, complaint alleged that the defendants named in that complaint, including Dr. Beauchaine, "failed to have a physician see [Sarah He-garty], after being seen in the Emergency room, from the time she was admitted to Children's Hospital of Wisconsin on March 20, 1996, at approximately 4:15 p.m., until approximately 8:30 a.m., on March 21, 1996." The original complaint also alleged that Sarah Hegarty "coded at 1:00 p.m. and she was emergently [sic] rushed to surgery at approximately 2:45 p.m. on March 21, 1996." The complaint alleged that "[t]here was an approximate 22-hour delay from the time of Sarah Hegarty's hospital admission to the time of surgery, when the standard of care required that she be seen by a physician within a short period of time after admission from the emergency room." As we have seen, a note recording Sarah Hegarty's transfer to surgery on March 21, 1996, was made by Dr. Zimmer in her handwriting.
¶ 87. The December 20, 1999, complaint repeats in substantially the same language quoted in the preceding paragraph how the defendants named in that *194new complaint, this time including Dr. Zimmer, were negligent:
That Sarah M. Hegarty sustained the described injuries and damages that ultimately resulted in her death as a result of the negligence of the defendants who failed to have a licensed physician see her, after being seen in the Emergency Room, from the time she was admitted to Children's Hospital of Wisconsin on March 20, 1996, at approximately 7:20 p.m., until approximately 8:15 a.m., on March 21, 1996. Sarah Hegarty subsequently coded at approximately 11:30 a.m. and she was emergently [sic] rushed to surgery at approximately 2:45 p.m. on March 21, 1996. There was an approximate 22-hour delay from the time of Sarah Hegarty's emergency admission to the time of surgery, when the standard of care required that she be seen by a physician within a short period of time after admission from the emergency room.
Although it is true, as the lead opinion opines, that there are some facts in dispute, none of those disputed facts raise a genuine issue affecting the grant of summary judgment. Simply put, the. medical records that were available to the plaintiffs and their lawyers revealed extensive involvement by Dr. Zimmer during what both the 1998 complaint, which did not name Dr. Zimmer, and the 1999 complaint, which did name Dr. Zimmer, reference as the critical "22-hour delay." At the very least, these records, combined with what both the plaintiffs and their lawyers knew about Dr. Zimmer's involvement in the care and treatment of Sarah Hegarty before her admission to Children's Hospital on March 20, 1996, were enough to trigger the duty to inquire: Again, "[pjlaintiffs may not close their eyes to means of information reasonably accessible to them and must in good faith apply their attention to those particulars which may be inferred to be within their reach." Spitler, 148 *195Wis. 2d at 638, 436 N.W.2d at 311. But this is precisely what the lead opinion would approve.
¶ 88. Part of the lead opinion's rationale is founded upon Jandrt v. Jerome Foods, Inc., 227 Wis. 2d 531, 597 N.W.2d 744 (1999), which upheld the trial court's determination that the continuation, but not the filing, of a toxic-tort action was frivolous. Id., 227 Wis. 2d at 562, 573, 597 N.W.2d at 760, 764. There are two problems with the majority's reliance on Jandrt. First, Jandrt was decided in July of 1999, and, therefore, could not have affected either the plaintiffs' decision not to add Dr. Zimmer to the December, 1998 complaint, or whether they exercised reasonable diligence in not discovering Dr. Zimmer's role in the care and treatment of Sarah He-garty prior to December 19, 1998. See Groom, 179 Wis. 2d at 251-252 n.6, 507 N.W.2d at 125 n.6 (affidavit had no bearing on what plaintiff reasonably should have known before affidavit was filed).
¶ 89. Second and more significant, Jandrt recognized that an approaching statute-of-limitations deadline affects whether the commencement of an action is reasonable. Jandrt, 227 Wis. 2d at 560, 597 N.W.2d at 759 ("[T]he amount of time an attorney has to investigate a claim is one consideration that shapes the objective standard for determining whether an attorney's inquiry was reasonable."). Here, the looming expiration of the statute of limitations in March of 1999, when added to all that the plaintiffs and their lawyers knew by that time would have made filing an action the prudent or, to paraphrase Wis. Stat. § 893.55(l)(b), the reasonably diligent, thing to do. Indeed, even by the plaintiffs' own rationale, namely, that they needed .to take Dr. Zimmer's deposition before they could ascertain the true extent of her involvement in Sarah Hegarty's care, plaintiffs could have easily ascertained all they needed to *196know by the March 21,1999, statute-of-limitations deadline. Once they filed their initial complaint in December of 1998, they could have, and, we submit, in light of all of Dr. Zimmer's fingerprints all over Sarah Hegarty's care and treatment, should have, taken Dr. Zimmer's deposition well in-advance of the March 21,1999, deadline. See Wis. Stat. Rule 804.05(1) ("After commencement of the action... any party make take the testimony of any person ... by deposition upon oral examination.") (emphasis added). That they did not is hardly prudence; it is hardly "reasonable diligence." We affirm the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims against Dr. Zimmer as being barred by the statute of limitations.
2. Respondeat superior.
¶ 90. I agree with the majority's analysis and conclusion that "employee" and "servant" are not synonymous for respondeat superior purposes. Unlike the majority, however, I do not agree that any evidentiary material that the plaintiffs have submitted, or that the majority recounts, raises a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Dr. Beauchaine was a "servant" of Medical College of Wisconsin Affiliated Hospitals in connection with her work at Children's Hospital. All that the extensive documentation and other evidentiary material in the record shows is that Affiliated Hospitals was a clearing house, with the additional rights to: 1) set policies that would be enforced by others, and 2) terminate a resident's participation if those supervising the resident reported information that made termination appropriate. Nothing the majority recounts shows *197anything more — there are no genuine issues of material fact that need to he tried. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from Section 2 E. of the majority's opinion.