Court Opinion

ID: 9466185
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 01:07:36.195335+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:39:35.349592
License: Public Domain

ELY, Circuit Judge
(dissenting):
I respectfully dissent. Unlike my Brothers, I am not prepared to reject the time-honored “Larrison ” rule in favor of the more stringent test enunciated by the Second Circuit in United States v. Stofsky, 527 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819, 97 S.Ct. 65, 50 L.Ed.2d 80 (1976). This disagreement is based upon my conviction that newly discovered evidence of trial perjury by a material government witness should not be treated in the same manner as other post-conviction revelations. See 8A Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 33.03[1] and ¶ 33.06[1] (2d ed. 1978).
*847Not only do I believe that the “might” or “possibility” standard applied by the Larrison line of cases1 is the more appropriate standard when, as here, the chief prosecution witness recants material portions of her trial testimony, but I consider the application of such a test required by the teaching of Mesarosh v. United States, 352 U.S. 1, 77 S.Ct. 1, 1 L.Ed.2d 1 (1956). There, Chief Justice Warren wrote for the Court:
[The chief prosecution witness], by his [tainted] testimony, has poisoned the water in the reservoir, and the reservoir cannot be cleansed without first draining it of all impurity. This is a federal criminal case, and this Court has supervisory jurisdiction over the proceedings of the federal courts. If it has any duty to perform in this regard, it is to see that the waters of justice are not polluted. Pollution having taken place here, the condition should be remedied at the earliest opportunity.
Id. at 14, 77 S.Ct. at 8. See Williams v. United States, 500 F.2d 105, 107-08 (9th Cir. 1974). Cf. Communist Party of United States v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 351 U.S. 115, 124, 76 S.Ct. 663, 100 L.Ed. 1003 (1956); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340-41, 63 S.Ct. 608, 87 L.Ed. 819 (1943).
Under the Larrison rule, a new trial must be granted if, on the basis of newly discovered evidence of trial perjury or recantation of trial testimony, “ ‘(a) The court is reasonably well satisfied that the testimony given by a material witness is false [and] (b) That without it the jury might have reached a different conclusion.’ ” United States v. Strauss, 443 F.2d 986, 989 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 851, 92 S.Ct. 87, 30 L.Ed.2d 90 (1971), quoting from Larrison v. United States, 24 F.2d 82, 87 (7th Cir. 1928).
The recanting witness in this case, Worley, was the Government’s chief witness providing testimony of Krasny’s knowing and willful participation in the heroin smuggling conspiracy. Krasny’s defense rested, essentially, upon his claim that his limited participation in the conspiracy began only after certain alleged threats had been directed against the safety of his family. Worley’s trial testimony flatly contradicted Krasny’s defense.
At trial, Worley painted a picture of her role in the conspiracy as merely serving as the agent of Krasny and as never having been involved in past drug dealings with co-conspirator Bennett. It was Worley who testified that Krasny was one of the principals in the conspiracy, downplaying her own role. Tapes of telephone conversations with Krasny offered at trial corroborate Worley’s story. But, the post trial revelations, consisting of admissions made by Worley to government agents that she had in fact been heavily involved in narcotics trafficking with Bennett in the past, severely discredit Worley’s trial testimony and lend new credence to Krasny’s explanation of the taped telephone conversations.
In such circumstances, I conclude that the Larrison test has been fully met and that, under Mesarosh, Krasny should have been granted a new trial. The fact finder in another trial, when the true story of Worley’s involvement in the drug dealings is honestly exposed, “might” well come to a different conclusion. See Mejia v. United States, 291 F.2d 198, 201 (9th Cir. 1961).
I would vacate the judgment of conviction and remand the cause for a new trial.

. See cases at pages 607 and 843, supra of the majority opinion.