Court Opinion

ID: 9631953
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 10:56:53.666147+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:08:04.810447
License: Public Domain

McInturff, C.J.
(dissenting)—I respectfully dissent because the majority's holding subverts the public policy underlying Washington's underinsured motorist act. That policy is summarized in Finney v. Farmers Ins. Co., 92 Wn.2d 748, 751, 600 P.2d 1272 (1979):
RCW 48.22.030 is to be liberally construed in order to provide broad protection against financially irresponsible motorists. Touchette v. Northwestern Mut. Ins. Co., 80 Wn.2d 327, 494 P.2d 479 (1972). The purpose of the statute is to allow an injured party to recover those damages which would have been received had the responsible party maintained liability insurance. Touchette v. Northwestern Mut. Ins. Co., supra.
To adopt the insurer's argument that "motor vehicle" includes only those vehicles designed primarily for use on a highway defeats this well founded and essential public policy of providing broad protection against financially irresponsible motorists.3 No doubt the average person acquiring automobile insurance believes he/she is insured for everything not specifically excepted in the statute that can happen on the highway. The innocent motorist who has paid for underinsured motorist coverage has a legitimate expectation that he will be protected financially should he collide with an uninsured or underinsured motor vehicle while using the road.
*605I could not locate any case which has addressed whether an airplane is a motor vehicle for purposes of underinsured motorist coverage. But two cases from other jurisdictions cite the "public policy" of uninsured motorist statutes in support of holdings that mechanically propelled devices such as a dirt bike and a snowmobile are "uninsured motor vehicles." Thompson v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 122 Ariz. 18, 592 P.2d 1284, 1286 (1979) (dirt bike); Rooney v. Detroit Auto. Inter-Ins. Exch., 94 Mich. App. 448, 288 N.W.2d 445 (1979) (snowmobile).
As with a dirt bike or a snowmobile, the fact an airplane normally is not used on the highway should not control in determining whether an airplane is a motor vehicle. The significant facts are whether the device is mechanically self-propelled and was being used in the space contemplated for users of a public road at the time in question. This space includes not only the roadway's surface, but also airspace necessary to utilize the road. Although an airplane colliding with a vehicle driven on the highway is not a common occurrence, it is not without precedent.4 If the airplane is underinsured, then RCW 48.22.030(1) should apply to protect the innocent injured victims.
My conclusion is buttressed by the rule of statutory construction that presumes the Legislature, in enacting a law, intends it to be consistent with existing relevant statutes. Sanchez v. Department of Labor & Indus., 39 Wn. App. 80, 85, 692 P.2d 192 (1984); Citrano v. Berkshire Mut. Ins. Co., *606171 Conn. 248, 368 A.2d 54, 57 (1976). Here, RCW Title 48, the title which encompasses underinsured motorist coverage, also defines "vehicle insurance" as "insurance against loss or damage to any land vehicle or aircraft or any draft or riding animal . . . and against any loss or liability resulting [therefrom] ..." (Italics mine.) RCW 48.11.060. By adding the adjective "motor" to the term "vehicle" in RCW 48.22.030(1), the underinsured motorist statute, the Legislature excluded draft or riding animals, but did not exclude airplanes.5
The insurer and the majority also argue that to include airplanes in the phrase "motor vehicle" is inconsistent with the meaning of "motor vehicle" as used in subsection 2 of RCW 48.22.030, which states:
No . . . policy . . . insuring against loss resulting from liability imposed by law for bodily injury, death, or property damage . . . shall be issued with respect to any motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this state unless coverage is provided . . . for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of underinsured motor vehicles . . .
(Italics mine.) There is no inconsistency. The broad overriding public policy stated initially in this dissent from Finney applies to subsection 2 also and supports an interpretation of "motor vehicle", as used there, that includes airplanes.
Justice Holmes has commented that " [t]he true grounds of decision are considerations of policy and of social advantage, and it is vain to suppose that solutions can be attained merely by logic and the general propositions of law which nobody disputes." H. Shriver, The Judicial Opinions of Oliver Wendell Holmes 65 (1940). Here, the majority's reliance on the general rule that terms in insurance con*607tracts are to be given their common and ordinary meaning subverts the Legislature's policy decision that persons injured or damaged by financially irresponsible motorists should be protected. That public policy is no "unruly horse", as described by the majority, but a long recognized principle that runs like a thread connecting Washington's reported decisions in this area.
Keeping in mind that broad public policy, I would hold RCW 48.22.030(1), which uses "motor vehicle", rather than "land motor vehicle" or some other restrictive term, provides protection to persons injured in roadway collisions with uninsured airplanes.
Review denied by Supreme Court November 4, 1987.

The insurer and the majority cite to Annot., Airplane as Within Terms "Vehicle," "Motor Vehicle," Etc., 165 A.L.R. 916 (1946) and numerous cases, including Certain British Underwriters at Lloyd's v. Jet Charter Serv., Inc., 789 F.2d 1534, 1537 (11th Cir. 1986), which state that although the result is always contingent upon the particular wording involved, it has been almost invariably held that airplanes are not within the terms "vehicles'1 or "motor vehicles". However, none of these cases involve an interpretation of an underinsured motorist statute.

We can take judicial notice that when the propeller has ceased to turn effectively, unless divine guidance occurs, the laws of physics mandate a generally downward attitude. That attitude necessarily means there will he a contact with the ground not originally anticipated. Obviously, contact with some areas of the ground are more survivable than others, and it is foreseeable that a pilot, after considering all the circumstances, may determine that a highway is the only practical surface available for an emergency landing. In fact, the record here contains an Aviation Accident Data System report from the National Transportation Safety Board which reflects that 157 collisions between airplanes and land motor vehicles occurred in the 11-year period from January 1971 to December 1981. These numbers indicate to me that an interpretation of the statute which includes airplanes would serve the policy of protecting motorists while not appreciably impacting insurance companies.

Thus, Brown v. Farmers Ins. Group, 31 Wn. App. 593, 643 P.2d 926 (1982), which held that a motorist who collided with a riderless horse was not covered by the uninsured motorist provision of his policy, is distinguishable. A horse is not a motor vehicle, i.e., it is not a mechanically self-propelled device, to say nothing of several other differences too numerous and personal to the horse for this footnote.