Court Opinion

ID: 9464617
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 23:38:25.586667+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:38:43.990762
License: Public Domain

CHOY, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
Since I cannot conscientiously find that the evidence supporting the Board’s majority decision is substantial, I must dissent. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488, 71 S.Ct. 456, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1950); Arizona Public Service Co. v. NLRB, 453 F.2d 228, 230 (9th Cir. 1971). Rather, I agree with the two dissenting members of the Board that the plain meaning of the *262Union’s waiver of initiation fees, which was communicated to the company employees four days before the union election, violated the rule of NLRB v. Savair Manufacturing Co., 414 U.S. 270, 94 S.Ct. 495, 38 L.Ed.2d 495 (1973).
The three majority Board members’ reading of the waiver by inserting the word “incoming” before “member” is unwarranted. The sentence “There will be no initiation fee for any member presently working in the plant” must be read through the eyes of the employees of the company who were the targets of the waiver. It seems only natural to me that they concluded that they must be presently working there and be members of the union — prior to the election, not afterwards. I believe the minority Board members were entirely correct in their conclusion that the conditional waiver had the proscribed effect of allowing the union “to buy endorsements [from the employees] and thus painted a false portrait of employee support during its election campaign.” Savair, 414 U.S. at 277, 94 S.Ct. at 499.
I would deny enforcement.