Court Opinion

ID: 9706580
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:46:52.275639+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:23.735649
License: Public Domain

*585GARY S. STEIN, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
This case involves a challenge to the validity of an ordinance of the City of Newark imposing a multiplicity of restrictions on the business of peddling. Of the ordinance’s nineteen sections, twelve impose restrictions on the location of a peddler’s cart on the City’s sidewalks, four regulate the size and configuration of the carts, and three regulate other aspects of the peddler’s business, including hours of operation and retention of receipts. As the majority opinion acknowledges, the ordinance represents Newark’s third attempt in the past twenty-five years to regulate the business of peddling. Ante at 571.
After trial, the Law Division invalidated all or part of ten sections of the ordinance. The Appellate Division reversed in part, reinstating seven of these sections. Brown v. City of Newark, 202 N.J.Super. 1 (App.Div.1987). The Court today upholds all but one section of the ordinance, acknowledging, however, that if “the ordinance as enforced has the effect of prohibiting peddling, plaintiffs may institute an appropriate action.” Ante at 584. To the extent that the majority opinion reflects the Court’s concern that this ordinance, in its specific applications, may become a mechanism for harassment or selective prosecution of peddlers, I share that concern.
Thus, I am fully in accord with the Court’s conclusion that section (d), the so-called “perpetual motion” provision of the ordinance, read literally, “is not rationally related to the purpose of reducing sidewalk congestion,” ante at 576-577, and, if construed as suggested by Newark’s counsel, is void for vagueness. Ante at 578. However, I disagree with the majority’s conclusions in upholding sections (l), (m), (p), and (q) of the ordinance, invalidated by the Law Division but reinstated by the Appellate Division, and sections (e)(4) and (5), which also were invalidated by the Law Division and upheld by the Appellate Division.
*586Sections (l), (m), (p), and (q) restrict the location of the peddler’s cart on the sidewalk. Among the other sections that impose analogous restrictions are section (b), which prohibits a peddler from maintaining a cart on the sidewalk closer than thirty feet to another peddler, and section (k), which prohibits a peddler from maintaining his cart or merchandise closer than ten feet from intersecting streets or sidewalks. In addition, section (o) prohibits peddling on the sidewalk along any street that has been designated as a bus stop, although the majority opinion construes this section to apply only to a point within sixty feet of a bus-stop sign, except for the “north side of Market Street west of Broad Street and the east side of Broad Street south of Market Street,” which are “designated as bus stops in their entirety * * Ante at 583.
Therefore, apart from the requirements of sections (l), (m), (p), and (q), a peddler must be thirty feet from any other peddler, ten feet away from an intersecting street or sidewalk, and at least sixty feet away from a bus stop.
The four sections invalidated by the trial court prohibit a peddler from engaging in the following conduct:
(l) [to] [s]tation, place, set up or maintain his cart or allow it to remain on any sidewalk if to do so would reduce the unobstructed pedestrian right of way to less than 6 feet. The Department of Engineering may from time to time by regulation change the width of pedestrian right of way space required, as circumstances require;
(m) [to] [e]ngage in the business of peddling within 10 feet of any location where the curb has been depressed to facilitate pedestrian or vehicle movement;
(p) [to] [e]ngage in the business of peddling on any sidewalk or along any street within 15 feet of any fire hydrant, crosswalk or driveway.
(q) [to] [s]tation, place, set up or maintain his cart or goods against display windows of fixed location businesses, nor shall they be within 20 feet from an entranceway to any building, store, theatre, library, school, museum, movie house, sports arena or other place of public assembly.
Thus, in addition to observing a minimum distance of thirty feet from another peddler, ten feet from an intersecting street or sidewalk, and sixty feet from a bus stop, a peddler must maintain an unobstructed pedestrian right-of-way of not less *587than six feet, and place his cart at least ten feet from a curb depression, fifteen feet from a fire-hydrant, crosswalk, or driveway, and twenty feet from the entranceway to any building, store, theatre, library, school, museum, movie house, sports arena or other place of public assembly, bearing'in mind the observation in the majority opinion that the sidewalks in the downtown area of Newark average only twenty feet in width. Ante at 576-577. Moreover, section (d) of the ordinance, prior to its invalidation, would have compelled a peddler who had completed these observations and calculations to repeat them throughout the working day each time that the cart was relocated.
Focusing on sections (l), (m), (p), and (q), the trial court determined that the distance requirements imposed by these provisions were invalid, concluding that the multiple regulations affecting the lawful placement of a peddler’s cart were so complex and detailed that it would be unreasonable for the City to demand compliance:
In this regard, Ms. Jackson testified that she was unable to triangulate the distances either with or without instruments and that, in order to measure at all, the peddler had to leave his or her cart unattended. Mr. King and Mr. Brown testified that they were unable to figure out the distances alone and were only able to figure out the distances, but not triangulate them, with the aid of another person and then only on a week-end when there was less pedestrian traffic. Frederick Kent the plaintiffs expert, testified that he needed measuring instruments to take the measurements, and that he had difficulty triangulating those measurements. Officer Gabriel, on page 124 of his deposition, testified that it was extremely difficult, if not impossible, for him to determine if a peddler was complying with the distance requirements of the ordinance.
Furthermore, these sections require peddlers to make calculations from innumerable locations many times during the day since, under section (d), peddlers are prohibited from remaining in even a theoretical “legal” location when a sale is not being transacted. If a peddler attempts to comply with the ordinance by using rulers and attempting to triangulate the distances, he or she is in violation of 8:7-6(i) by leaving his or her cart unattended while completing the calculations. There was testimony from Officer Pollitto that he could not triangulate the distances required by the ordinance but had to rely instead on *588“eyeball measurements.” If those who are charged with the enforcement of the ordinance are unable to determine accurately where it is legal to peddle, we cannot reasonably expect those who are asked to comply with the ordinance to do more. Indeed, the testimony, which we found to be credible, made the point repeatedly that the triangulation calculations could not be measured. [Brown v. City of Newark, supra, No. L34066-81 (slip op. at 18-19) (emphasis added).]
Notwithstanding this finding of fact by the Law Division based on the testimony before it, the Appellate Division concluded that the distances “are measurable or may be readily approximated by eye.” Brown v. City of Newark, supra, 202 N.J.Super. at 7. The majority observes that the question whether the ordinance can be complied with is a question of law rather than fact, and agrees with the Appellate Division that “the distances reasonably serve legislative objectives and that they are measurable by eye.” Ante at 581.
Whether or not these complicated rules governing where a peddler may or may not park his cart are too complex to be complied with simultaneously is obviously a question of fact— not law. Thus, I believe the Court has unwisely ignored factual findings by the trial court that are “supported by adequate, substantial and credible evidence.” Rova Farms Resort v. Investors Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 483-84 (1974). Moreover, the majority ignores the regulatory context in which the Law Division judge invalidated these sections. In concluding, based on the testimony, that “the triangulation calculations could not be measured,” the trial court obviously was impressed by the practical difficulties inherent in conducting a peddling business while being required at all times to observe and comply with a profusion of distance restrictions. I question whether the majority would find such distances readily “measurable by eye” were it to attempt such measurements from the perspective of a peddler selling from a cart on the sidewalks of Newark, required to move that cart from time to time, and to recalculate the required distances each time the cart is stopped at a new location. The trial court concluded that these sections were *589unduly burdensome because the myriad of distance restrictions were “impossible of compliance,” and its finding was supported by testimony from peddlers as well as police officers. I would uphold the Law Division’s invalidation of sections (l), (m), (p), and (q).
I also would invalidate section (e)(4), which prohibits a peddler from maintaining a cart in such a way as would “increase traffic congestion, cause or increase traffic delay or hazards;” and section (e)(5), which prohibits a peddler from maintaining a cart in a way that would “cause or create or constitute a danger to life, health or property.”
The ‘Court construes section (e)(5), based on counsel’s representation at oral argument, as prohibiting only “outrageous conduct,” and concludes that counsel’s representation saves the ordinance from invalidity because of vagueness. Similarly, the Court sustains section (e)(4) based on a representation by counsel that that section “simply prohibits vendors from causing pedestrian and traffic congestion.” Ante at 579-580.
I disagree with the Court’s conclusion that these sections of the Newark ordinance can somehow acquire meaning sufficiently precise to avoid constitutional challenge on the basis of counsel’s generalized concessions at oral argument before us. Not only are such concessions of no value to peddlers who must conform their conduct to the requirements of the Newark ordinance, but they offer little or no guidance to those charged with its enforcement. The inevitable result will be selective, arbitrary, and individualized enforcement of these vague, general, and obfuscatory provisions. I would invalidate sections (e)(4) and (e)(5) on vagueness grounds. See Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162, 92 S.Ct. 839, 843, 31 L.Ed.2d 110, 115 (1972) (vagueness challenge sustained where vagrancy ordinance “fail[ed] to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct [was] forbidden” by the *590ordinance, and because it “encourage[d] arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions”); State v. Cameron, 100 N.J. 586, 591 (1985) (“[t]o avoid the pitfall of vagueness, zoning ordinance must enable a person of ‘common intelligence, in light of ordinary experience’ to understand whether contemplated conduct is lawful”).
I join in the majority’s resolution of the challenges asserted to sections e(l), e(2), e(3), (n), and (o) of the ordinance.