Court Opinion

ID: 9960681
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-16 20:00:54.986647+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:45.129358
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 23-1149     Document: 010111033036       Date Filed: 04/16/2024    Page: 1
                                                                                  FILED
                                                                      United States Court of Appeals
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                           April 16, 2024
                          _________________________________
                                                                          Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                              Clerk of Court
  UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

        Plaintiff - Appellee,

  v.                                                          No. 23-1149
                                                   (D.C. Nos. 1:23-CV-00029-RBJ &
  MICHAEL ROBERT STEVENS,                               1:19-CR-00508-RBJ-1)
                                                               (D. Colo.)
        Defendant - Appellant.
                       _________________________________

                              ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
                          _________________________________

 Before TYMKOVICH, PHILLIPS, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges.
                  _________________________________

       Michael Robert Stevens appeals pro se from the district court’s denial of his

 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence.1 This court

 granted a certificate of appealability (COA) on the following issue: “Whether

 Mr. Stevens’s claim that his counsel was constitutionally ineffective in failing to

 appeal from his conviction and sentence after Mr. Stevens asked counsel to appeal

       *
         After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
 unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
 this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
 ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
 precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
 estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
 Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
       1
        We liberally construe Mr. Stevens’s pro se filings but do not act as his
 advocate. See James v. Wadas, 724 F.3d 1312, 1315 (10th Cir. 2013).
Appellate Case: 23-1149    Document: 010111033036        Date Filed: 04/16/2024        Page: 2

 was timely asserted under § 2255(f).” Order Granting COA at 2. We now reverse

 and remand for further proceedings.

       Mr. Stevens was charged in a two-count indictment with being a convicted

 felon knowingly in possession of a firearm and ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C.

 § 922(g)(1); and with knowingly possessing an unregistered destructive device as

 defined in 26 U.S.C. §§ 5845(a)(8) and (f), in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d). He

 entered a “blind” plea to both charges (that is, a guilty plea without an agreement

 with the government). On September 14, 2020, the district court sentenced him to

 concurrent terms of 56 months on the two counts. The district court specified that its

 sentence was to run concurrently to the sentence imposed in a state case, El Paso

 County District Court Case No. 2018CR6615, and consecutively to El Paso County

 District Court Nos. 2018CR3217 and 2018CR5269.2

       Mr. Stevens did not appeal from the district court’s judgment. Over two years

 later, on January 4, 2023, he filed his pro se § 2255 motion. The district court denied

 the motion as untimely, without holding an evidentiary hearing.

                                    BACKGROUND

       Mr. Stevens’s § 2255 claims primarily asserted alleged sentencing-related

 errors. But he also asserted that he asked his trial counsel “to file an appeal and

 argue the issue at hand,” but his counsel had failed to do so. R., vol. 1 at 103.

       2
         Case No. 2018CR6615 was a DUI conviction arising from the same incident
 that was the subject of Mr. Stevens’ federal case. The other two state court
 convictions were for crimes committed prior to his conduct in the federal case.

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       Mr. Stevens explained that he had entered a blind plea to avoid the appeal

 waiver typically included in a plea agreement with the government, but “[c]ounsel

 failed to file anything on [his] behalf.” Id. at 104. He also asserted that because he

 was incarcerated in a state facility, he had been unable to contact counsel to discuss

 matters further. Id. He claimed it was only when he was moved to a federal facility

 on July 25, 2022, and attempted once again to contact counsel, that he discovered his

 trial counsel had retired from the practice of law without filing a notice of appeal.

       The government moved to dismiss the § 2255 motion as untimely. See

 § 2255(f) (establishing a one-year limitations period for § 2255 motions).

 Mr. Stevens responded by reasserting his ineffective assistance argument. He argued

 his trial counsel had provided constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to file

 a notice of appeal as he had requested. Mr. Stevens further asserted that once he was

 taken into state custody he was “unable to reach his Federal Public Defender . . . or

 the public defender[’]s office [to check on the status of his federal case] because he

 was in a State Facility.” R., vol. 1 at 119. After he was paroled from his state

 sentence and held as a federal detainee, he was finally able to contact the federal

 public defender. It was then he discovered that his counsel had retired.

       As part of its analysis, the district court considered whether Mr. Stevens’s

 motion was timely because he filed it within one year of the date on which he could

 have discovered, through the exercise of due diligence, that his attorney had not filed

 the appeal as he had instructed. See § 2255(f)(4). The court rejected this contention

 for three reasons: (1) there was “no evidence, such as a writing of some kind, that

                                             3
Appellate Case: 23-1149    Document: 010111033036        Date Filed: 04/16/2024      Page: 4

 Mr. Stevens asked his public defender to file an appeal from his federal sentence,”

 and it was unlikely that “a federal public defender, and in particular the individual

 who was his lawyer at the time,” would have failed to do so if asked, R., vol. 1 at

 130; (2) “it does not appear that there was a meritorious basis for an appeal,” id.; and

 (3) Mr. Stevens’s discovery in July 2022 that an appeal was not filed did not

 constitute a fact that could not have been discovered earlier through the exercise of

 due diligence. The district court noted Mr. Stevens did not contact the public

 defender’s office until more than 22 months after he was sentenced and “[e]ven then

 there is no indication that he complained to that office that his former public defender

 had failed to honor his request that an appeal be filed on his behalf,” id. at 131. But

 the district court did not address Mr. Stevens’s contention that he was unable to

 contact the federal public defender until he was returned to federal custody.

                                     DISCUSSION

       When a district denies a § 2255 motion without an evidentiary hearing, our

 review is de novo. United States v. Baker, 49 F.4th 1348, 1354 (10th Cir. 2022).

       The district court concluded no hearing was necessary on the timeliness issue.

 We disagree. Because the district court did not hold a hearing, the record is

 inadequate to determine (1) whether, when, and how Mr. Stevens asked his attorney

 to file a notice of appeal, and (2) at what point Mr. Stevens could have discovered,

 through the exercise of due diligence, that his attorney had failed to do so. See

 United States v. Denny, 694 F.3d 1185, 1190 (10th Cir. 2012) (stating requirement

 for reasonable diligence “depends on what one has notice of at that time”); see also

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Appellate Case: 23-1149     Document: 010111033036          Date Filed: 04/16/2024     Page: 5

 Wims v. United States, 225 F.3d 186, 190-91 (2d Cir. 2000) (date on which movant

 could have discovered his attorney’s failure to file an appeal is a fact-specific

 inquiry).

        Among other things, Mr. Stevens asserts that he was unable reach his trial

 counsel for reasons beyond his control. Without an adequate record on these issues,

 it is not possible to determine whether Mr. Stevens’s ineffective assistance claim was

 timely filed. A remand for further fact-finding is therefore required. See § 2255(b)

 (“Unless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that

 the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court shall . . . grant a prompt hearing

 thereon . . . .”); see also, e.g., United States v. Garrett, 402 F.3d 1262, 1266-67

 (10th Cir. 2005) (remanding for a hearing concerning whether counsel disregarded

 movant’s requested to file a notice of appeal, even though movant pled guilty and his

 plea agreement contained an appeal waiver).

                                      CONCLUSION

        We reverse the district court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings.

 We grant Mr. Stevens’s motion for leave to proceed without prepayment of costs or

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 fees. To the extent Mr. Stevens seeks a COA on grounds other than the ground

 addressed in this order and judgment, we deny a COA.3

                                            Entered for the Court

                                            Veronica S. Rossman
                                            Circuit Judge

       3
          Mr. Stevens’s equitable tolling argument relies in part on his attorney’s
 failure to file a notice of appeal and to communicate with him. Although we deny a
 COA on the equitable tolling issue at this juncture, we do not intend to foreclose
 reassertion of such an argument to the extent additional facts developed at a hearing
 might warrant relief under the doctrine of equitable tolling.

                                           6