Court Opinion

ID: 9729306
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:31:33.974035+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:56.754596
License: Public Domain

OPINION AND ORDER
This cause comes before the Court on motion of the Judicial Conduct Commission1 for an order declaring William R. Woods ineligible, by reason of his removal from the office of District Court Judge, to seek election to that office in the November 2000 special election to fill the unexpired term. From the facts, two issues emerge that we must address. First, we must decide whether this Court may consider the motion as an original action under Ky. Const. § 110(2)(a), and in the event this question is answered affirmatively, we must determine the minimum duration pursuant to Ky. Const. § 121 of the removal from judicial office.
On June 21, 2000, the Judicial Conduct Commission, acting pursuant to Ky. Const. § 121 and SCR 4.000, et seq., entered a unanimous final order removing William R. Woods from the Office of District Court Judge of the Thirty-seventh Judicial District. The Commission determined that, among other things, Woods had verbally abused citizens who came before him as a judge and had similarly mistreated court personnel and other officials with whom he worked. The Commission also determined that he had openly displayed a handgun during a session of the Morgan District Court, and it concluded that during a two-week period after he had lost an election, Woods engaged in conduct that could only be described as “judicial tyranny.” Thus, the Commission believed “the most severe discipline” was warranted.
It is unnecessary to more thoroughly review the evidence as Woods did not appeal from the order removing him from office. The Order of Removal is now final.
In July 2000, public statements were attributed to Woods to the effect that he *472intended to seek election in the November 2000 special election to the judicial office from which he had just been removed. On July 14, 2000, an original action was filed in this Court by the Judicial Conduct Commission seeking enforcement of its order of removal thereby prohibiting Woods from pursuing election to the unexpired term. Woods responded to the Commission’s petition on July 25, 2000. On August 8, 2000, Woods filed as a candidate for the office of District Judge for the Thirty-seventh District.2 On August 16, 2000, this Court heard oral argument on the Commission’s motion. The Commission was represented by its counsel, George F. Rabe, and Woods was represented by his counsel, Philip D. McKenzie.
Woods asserts that the Judicial Conduct Commission lacks standing or authority to seek enforcement of the order of removal. The Commission responds that its constitutional power to remove a judge from office necessarily includes the authority to seek judicial enforcement of its orders, and that this Court may entertain such actions pursuant to Ky. Const. § 110(2)(a).
This Court has original jurisdiction pursuant to Ky. Const. § 110(2)(a) “as may be required to exercise control of the Court of Justice.” While in most cases this Court’s jurisdiction is appellate only, the Constitution recognizes that the highest court of our unified judicial system must be able to exercise necessary supervisory authority. This proposition was considered most recently in Abernathy v. Nicholson,3 in which we compared Sections 110(2)(a) and 112(5) of the Constitution of Kentucky in deciding where an original action should be brought when no specific forum was identified. In response to the contention that we could exercise original jurisdiction under § 110(2)(a), we acknowledged:
... this Court possesses the raw power to entertain any case which fits generally within the rubric of its constitutional grant of authority. As Section 110(2)(a) of the Constitution contains a provision which grants the Supreme Court supervisory control of the Court of Justice, virtually any matter within that context would be subject to its jurisdiction.4
However, due to the breadth of § 110(2)(a) and its discretionary tone, we held the deciding factor in taking an original action under § 110(2)(a) is not whether this Court could exercise jurisdiction, but whether it should.5 In the exercise of restraint, we concluded in Abernathy that § 110(2)(a) original actions should be entertained by this Court “only in well defined or compelling circumstances” and “generally only in cases where no other court has power to proceed.”6 This is just such a case.
The Supreme Court of Kentucky is the only court with the authority to affirm, modify, set aside, or remand orders of the Commission.7 Thus, it follows that this Court is empowered to interpret and enforce those orders. Moreover, this is a classic situation where we should exercise original jurisdiction to maintain supervisory control of the Court of Justice. The Commission voted to remove Woods from office for egregious misconduct. Yet Woods now seeks to regain that same office without having sought judicial review of the Commission’s order of removal. *473Without our intervention, the traditional appellate process will have been circumvented, the Commission’s authority undermined, and the orderly election process endangered. It is therefore incumbent upon this Court to render a final interpretation of the Commission’s order.
Upon our determination that this Court may proceed, the decisive issue turns to the proper interpretation of the term “remove” as found in § 121 of the Constitution of Kentucky. Specifically, for what period of time, if any, does removal disqualify a former judge from holding judicial office? Woods contends that removal lacks any definite duration. Unlike suspension for a definite term, he believes removal is in the nature of a punishment amounting to a permanent stigma on the record of the removed judge. Thus, according to his argument, a removed judge is not precluded from immediately regaining the office from which he was removed, either for the same term or a succeeding term. In response, the Commission argues that removal means, at a minimum, disqualification for the remainder of the current term of office.
Section 121 of the Constitution of Kentucky gives the Judicial Conduct Commission the authority to take three different types of actions with regard to judicial misconduct or unfitness for office. A judge may be retired for disability, suspended without pay, or removed for good cause. Although the Constitution does not define removal, the concept is not arcane and is addressed in the Sixth Edition of Black’s Law Dictionary. Therein, “Removal from office” is defined as follows:
Deprivation of office by act of competent superior officer acting within scope of authority. “Suspension” is the temporary forced removal from the exercise of office; “removal” is the dismissal from office.
The Fourth Revised Edition of Black’s provides, similarly, that “suspension” is “[a]n interim stoppage or arrest of official power and pay; — not synonymous with ‘removal’ which terminates wholly the incumbency of the office or employment.” These definitions make clear that removal is not merely a stigma placed upon a judge as Woods maintains, but the complete disqualification from serving in the office from which the judge was removed. Moreover, it is not the role of the Commission to stigmatize or punish judges. The Commission’s role is to improve the quality of justice by hearing specific complaints of judicial misconduct and taking the least severe action necessary to remedy the situation.8
A recent decision from the Supreme Court of Louisiana, In re Johnson,9 supports the idea that removal from judicial office is for the remainder of the term, at a minimum. In Johnson, while the removal case was pending, the judge was re-elected for a term commencing after the removal judgment was to become final. The court held that the removal order applied to the term of office that the judge was serving at the time he was removed and to the subsequent term to which he was elected while the removal case was pending.
Returning to Ky. Const. § 121, we discover guidance as to the proper interpretation of removal in the structure of the provision. Undoubtedly, removal is a more severe sanction than suspension for a definite term without pay. We have characterized removal as a “more extreme penalty” than suspension10 and the Commission, in its order of removal, concluded that “the most severe discipline is warranted in this case.” It would be absurd to hold that the Commission could suspend without pay for some significant period of time, but that the more severe measure of *474removal for good cause permits immediate resumption of judicial office.
Upon the authorities discussed herein-above, and our analysis of the language and structure of § 121 of the Constitution of Kentucky, we have no doubt that the remedy of removal disqualifies a former judge from judicial office for at least the remainder of the current term. To hold otherwise would render removal less severe than suspension and possibly convert Woods’ removal into a suspension of only a few months. The question of whether Woods’ ineligibility for office should last longer than the remainder of the current district court judge’s term is not now before the Court. The relief sought by the Commission was Woods’ disqualification from serving in the office from which he was removed during the remainder of the term and that relief will be granted.
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that William R. Woods shall be and is hereby declared ineligible for election to the office of District Court Judge for the Thirty-seventh Judicial District in the November 7, 2000, election, and his name shall not be certified as a candidate for that office. Furthermore, William R. Woods is hereby prohibited from seeking the office of District Court Judge from the Thirty-seventh Judicial District by any means during the remainder of the current term of district court judges, and he is likewise prohibited from seeking or holding any other judicial office of the Kentucky Court of Justice during said term.11
COOPER, JOHNSTONE and STUMBO, JJ., concur.
KELLER, J., files a separate dissenting opinion in which GRAVES and WINTERSHEIMER, JJ., join.
GRAVES, J., files a separate dissenting opinion in which WINTERSHEIMER, J., joins.
ENTERED: August 25, 2000.
/s/ Joseph E. Lambert CHIEF JUSTICE

. The Commission is a creature of Ky. Const. § 121 and is vested with authority to discipline judges for official misconduct.

. At oral argument, Woods objected to the Commission's motion to supplement the record with a copy of his filing papers. Upon the belief that such filing papers are relevant in view of the claims and defenses, we have this day by separate order granted the Commission’s motion to so supplement the record.

. Ky., 899 S.W.2d 85 (1995).

. Id. at 88.

. Id. at 89.

. Id. at p. 89. Former Chief Justice Stephens, joined by Justice Stumbo, thought we went too far. They believed that because the issue was administrative in nature, this Court had the inherent authority to exercise supervision.

. Ky. Const. § 121; SCR 4.290.

. Nicholson v. Judicial Retirement and Removal Commission, Ky., 562 S.W.2d 306 (1978).

. 689 So.2d 1313 (La. 1997).

. Long v. Judicial Retirement and Removal Commission, Ky., 610 S.W.2d 614, 615 (1980).

. Ky. Const. § 119.