Court Opinion

ID: 9530635
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:01:56.479378+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:12.187143
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE RAKOWSKI, specially concurring: I agree that claimant’s injury arose out of and in the course of his employment. I write separately because I respectfully disagree with the rationale employed in the majority opinion. The majority correctly states the general rule that an accident occurring while an employee is traveling to or from work is not considered to be in the course of employment. This is true whether the employee is driving his own car or a vehicle provided by employer. The mere fact that an employee is driving a company vehicle does not in and of itself put an employee in the course of employment. However, there is authority that where an employer agrees to furnish transportation to and from work, the employee is considered to be in the course of employment. Sjostrom v. Sproule, 33 Ill. 2d 40, 210 N.E.2d 209 (1965) (employee was paid six cents per mile to drive himself and co-employee to temporary jobsite). In the instant case, however, claimant was not given a mileage allowance and was in fact “charged” for mileage to and from his home. Thus, it is clear from the record that there was no agreement for employer to provide transportation to and from employee’s home. The majority next correctly states exceptions to the general rule, including traveling employees and where an employer provides transportation to and from work for the employer’s own benefit. Again, I agree. However, the opinion then concludes that because the instant case “has elements falling under both of these exceptions,” claimant’s injury arose in the course of employment. 305 Ill. App. 3d at 1049-50. I disagree. In order for an employee to be in the course of employment, his activity must constitute an exception to the general rule—not part of an exception or some elements of an exception, but all of the elements of the exception. The majority does not cite any authority stating that employees who meet a part of, but not all of, two or more exceptions are in the course of employment. Nor can I find any such authority. Next, I disagree that claimant is a traveling employee. A traveling employee is an employee “whose duties require [him or her] to travel away from [his or her] employer’s premises.” Wright v. Industrial Comm’n, 62 Ill. 2d 65, 68, 338 N.E.2d 379, 381 (1975). “Injuries to employees whose duties require them to travel away from home are not governed by the rules applicable to other employees.” Howell Tractor & Equipment Co. v. Industrial Comm’n, 78 Ill. 2d 567, 573, 403 N.E.2d. 215, 218 (1980); Johnson v. Industrial Comm’n, 278 Ill. App. 3d 59, 64, 662 N.E.2d. 156, 160 (1996); Bailey v. Industrial Comm’n, 247 Ill. App. 3d 204, 208, 617 N.E.2d 305, 308 (1993). See Wright, 62 Ill. 2d at 69, 338 N.E.2d at 381; David Wexler & Co. v. Industrial Comm’n, 52 Ill. 2d 506, 510, 288 N.E.2d 420, 421 (1972); Ace Pest Control, Inc. v. Industrial Comm’n, 32 Ill. 2d 386, 388-89, 205 N.E.2d 453, 455 (1965); Chicago Bridge & Iron, Inc. v. Industrial Comm’n, 248 Ill. App. 3d 687, 694, 618 N.E.2d 1143, 1148 (1993). This exception stems from the fact that employees whose employment dictates that they travel away from home are subject to certain risks created by such travel and being away from home. The rule originated in resident employee cases and was then applied to employees who were required to travel and stay in lodgings. It was first applied to risks incident to staying in a hotel or motel and risks incident to eating meals. Such activities were found to be incidental to the conduct of business. 2 A. Larson & L. Larson, Workers’ Compensation Law § 25.21(a) (1998). The rule was then extended to bathing and dressing activities (2 A. Larson & L. Larson, Workers’ Compensation Law § 25.22 (1998)), U.S.O. entertainers (2 A. Larson & L. Larson, Workers’ Compensation Law § 25.23(a) (1998)), travel abroad in risky countries (2 A. Larson & L. Larson, Workers’ Compensation Law § 25.23(b) (1998)), and then to all travel (2 A. Larson & L. Larson, Workers’ Compensation Law § 25.23(c) (1998)). The rule has also been applied to include recreational activities while traveling since employees reasonably can be expected to partake in recreational activities on their day off. See Bagcraft Corp. v. Industrial Comm’n, 302 Ill. App. 3d 334, 705 N.E.2d. 919 (1998). Under a traveling employee analysis, determination of whether an injury arose out of and in the course of the employee’s employment depends on the reasonableness of the employee’s conduct at the time of the injury and whether the employer could anticipate or foresee the employee’s conduct or activity. Johnson, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 64, 662 N.E.2d at 160; Bailey, 247 Ill. App. 3d at 208, 617 N.E.2d at 308. See also Howell Tractor & Equipment Co., 78 Ill. 2d at 573, 403 N.E.2d at 218; Wright, 62 Ill. 2d at 70, 338 N.E.2d at 381-82; David Wexler & Co., 52 Ill. 2d at 510, 288 N.E.2d at 422; Ace Pest Control, 32 Ill. 2d at 388-89, 205 N.E.2d at 455; Chicago Bridge & Iron, Inc., 248 Ill. App. 3d at 694, 618 N.E.2d at 1148. Thus, an employee traveling away from home may be considered in the course of employment, not just while working, but 24 hours a day so long as his activities are reasonable and foreseeable. In the instant case, claimant was en route to a service call at Central Du Page Hospital located a few miles from his house. I respectfully submit that claimant was not a traveling employee and that this case has nothing to do with the traveling employee doctrine. Finally, I find it unnecessary to address whether allowing claimant to drive the truck home was a benefit to employer. Unlike Stevenson Olds Sales & Service v. Industrial Comm’n, 140 Ill. App. 3d 703, 489 N.E.2d 328 (1986), where employee was killed on his way home from his regular workplace, claimant in the instant case was en route to Central Du Page Hospital for a service call. The fact that he decided to stop at the shop to check to see if there were other service calls he could make while on this particular call does not in any way change this fact. As the majority opinion points out, claimant’s decision to stop at the shop conferred a benefit to employer. The fact question before the Commission was whether claimant was on his way to Central Du Page Hospital and decided to stop at the shop or whether his intention was to drive to work as usual and then go to the hospital. Although such a distinction may seem insignificant in the usual course of events, in this particular instance, it determines whether claimant was in the course of employment at the time of the accident. I agree with the majority that the Commission’s decision is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.