Court Opinion

ID: 9629097
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:37:02.706507+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:35.008462
License: Public Domain

BAKES, Justice,
dissenting:
I agree with the majority’s analysis up to and including its conclusion “that income benefits are time barred by I.C. § 72-706(2), unless the commission has retained jurisdiction of the claim.” Ante at 298. However, I disagree strongly with this Court’s unwarranted conclusion that the Industrial Commission has retained jurisdiction. The Court states, ante at 299, “We deem that conditional closure of the file a clear indication of the intent to retain jurisdiction for future determination of permanent disability.” The Court then concludes “that the Industrial Commission has retained jurisdiction of this claim for a future determination of permanent disability, and the order of the Industrial Commission, to the extent it is inconsistent herewith, is reversed.” Ante at 299. It is incongruous to state that there is “a clear indication of the intent to retain jurisdiction,” and then immediately thereafter to reverse the commission’s determination that it did not intend to retain jurisdiction, stating that it is “inconsistent herewith.”
While it may be a prudent practice for the Industrial Commission to retain jurisdiction in cases such as these, there is nothing in the law which requires the retention of jurisdiction. In our recent opinion of Reynolds v. Browning Ferris Industries, 106 Idaho 894, 684 P.2d 296 (1984), it is clear that the Industrial Commission knows how to retain jurisdiction when it intends to do so.
The Industrial Commission specifically considered the question of whether or not the rubber stamp on the summary and award was an act by the commission resulting in retained jurisdiction. At the hearing, Mr. Defenbach stated:
“MR. DEFENBACH: For the record, I’m going to say this, I hope I speak on behalf of the Commission: I’m going to make a record as to the history of the stamp of the Commission on Exhibit No. 1. That is, it was placed on there, apparently, October 28, 1974 “Approved subject to determination of permanent disability, if any.”
“Then, let the record show that the Commission takes judicial notice of that particular type of stamp as it exists today which reads, to this effect that quote *898approved subject to the determination of permanent disability, if any, within the prescribed statutory periods of limitation unquote.”
The Industrial Commission then concluded that:
“The statement entered on the Summary and Award cannot be construed as an Order reserving jurisdiction____ The statement on the form is not signed by the Commission and does not purport to be an Order of the Commission. It does not purport to reserve jurisdiction of the Commission in any manner.”
The Court’s ruling today is unfortunate. It turns the judicial power of the Industrial Commission over to a staff member with a rubber stamp, thus depriving the duly appointed members of the Industrial Commission the authority vested in them by the statutes of this state. I.C. § 72-506 provides:
“72-506. Acts of commission or reference — Hearing officers. — (1) Any investigation, inquiry or hearing which the commission has power to undertake or hold may be undertaken or held by or before any member thereof or any hearing officer, referee or examiner appointed by the commission for that purpose. “(2) Every finding, order, decision or award made by any member, hearing officer, referee, or examiner pursuant to such investigation, inquiry or hearing, when approved and confirmed by the commission, and ordered filed in its office, shall be deemed to be the finding, order, decision or award of the commission.”
The action of the clerk in stamping the particular form has not been approved and confirmed by the commission. In fact, the commission has expressly disavowed that it has retained jurisdiction in this matter. This Court’s ruling that the action of the staff member in stamping the claim was a retention of jurisdiction by the commission is in direct conflict with I.C. § 72-506(2).
Furthermore, this Court’s action today constitutes a gross interference with the administration of the Industrial Commission. This Court has often stated that the Industrial Commission is a specialized tribunal, and that we would defer to their administrative experience and expertise. Thom v. Callahan, 97 Idaho 151, 540 P.2d 1330 (1975); Dawson v. Hartwick, 91 Idaho 561, 428 P.2d 480 (1967). The commission has stated that it never retained jurisdiction in this case. If there was ever a case where this Court ought to defer to the commission’s own interpretation of its action, and not meddle in its internal administrative affairs, this is the case.