Court Opinion

ID: 9407438
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-07 00:00:34.144269+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:38.373276
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-10077      Document: 00516812016          Page: 1     Date Filed: 07/06/2023

            United States Court of Appeals
                 for the Fifth Circuit                                 United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                Fifth Circuit

                                 _____________                                FILED
                                                                           July 6, 2023
                                  No. 22-10077                           Lyle W. Cayce
                              consolidated with                               Clerk
                                  No. 22-10534
                                _____________

   U.S. Navy SEALs 1-26; U.S. Navy Special Warfare
   Combatant Craft Crewmen 1-5; U.S. Navy Explosive
   Ordnance Disposal Technician 1; U.S. Navy Divers 1-3,

                                                             Plaintiffs—Appellees,

                                        versus

   Joseph R. Biden, Jr., in his official capacity as President of the United
   States of America; Lloyd Austin, Secretary, U.S. Department of Defense,
   individually and in his official capacity as United States Secretary of Defense;
   United States Department of Defense; Carlos Del
   Toro, individually and in his official capacity as United States Secretary of the
   Navy,

                                           Defendants—Appellants.
                   ______________________________

                  Appeals from the United States District Court
                       for the Northern District of Texas
                            USDC No. 4:21-CV-1236
                  ______________________________

   Before Graves, Ho, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.
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                                   No. 22-10077
                                 c/w No. 22-10534

   Stuart Kyle Duncan, Circuit Judge:
          Our nation’s guarantees of religious freedom protect those serving in
   the military. See U.S. Const. amend. I; Religious Freedom
   Restoration Act (“RFRA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb et seq.; see also,
   e.g., Singh v. Berger, 56 F.4th 88, 92 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (observing that “the
   Political Branches have repeatedly required the military to carefully balance
   its need for disciplined uniformity with the religious needs of service
   members”). For good reason, then, courts have halted the military’s recent
   attempts to force servicemembers, on pain of draconian penalties, to receive
   COVID-19 vaccines against their sincere religious objections. See Doster v.
   Kendall, 54 F.4th 398, 419 (6th Cir. 2022) (upholding preliminary injunction
   because plaintiffs were likely to “prove that the Air Force violated RFRA
   when it denied their requests for religious exemptions”); U.S. Navy Seals
   1-26 v. Biden, 27 F.4th 336, 350 (5th Cir. 2022) (per curiam) (denying the
   Navy’s requested stay because “at a minimum, [Plaintiffs’] RFRA claims
   are meritorious”), preliminary injunction partially stayed sub nom. Austin v.
   U.S. Navy Seals 1-26, 142 S. Ct. 1301 (2022) (mem.).
          This appeal involves the Navy’s near-categorical refusal to
   accommodate servicemembers’ inability to receive a vaccine due to their
   religious convictions. The district court twice enjoined the Navy’s policies
   as likely illegal under RFRA. After entry of those injunctions, however,
   Congress ordered the military branches to rescind their mandates. The Navy
   complied with that directive and then went above and beyond it—rescinding
   all the challenged policies and formally announcing that COVID-19 vaccines
   would not be imposed on any servicemember.
         The Navy’s actions moot this appeal. So, despite the overwhelming
   importance of the issues presented, we lack jurisdiction to address them. In
   reaching that conclusion, we join other circuits that have dismissed similar

                                        2
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                                   No. 22-10077
                                 c/w No. 22-10534

   challenges as moot. See, e.g., Roth v. Austin, 62 F.4th 1114 (8th Cir. 2023);
   Navy Seal 1 v. Austin, No. 22-5114, 2023 WL 2482927 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 10,
   2023) (unpublished); Dunn v. Austin, No. 22-15286, 2023 WL 2319316 (9th
   Cir. Feb. 27, 2023) (unpublished).
         We therefore DISMISS the appeal and REMAND for further
   proceedings consistent with this opinion.
                                        I.
                                        A.
          On August 24, 2021, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin ordered all
   members of the Armed Forces to be vaccinated against COVID-19.
   Secretary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro followed suit soon after, mandating
   vaccination for all Navy servicemembers.
          The Navy mandate was fleshed out by three policies relevant here.
   First, unvaccinated servicemembers, absent an exemption, would be
   separated from service. As a result, they would also risk losing veteran’s
   benefits and having to repay the cost of their training. See NAVADMIN
   225/21 (Oct. 13, 2021). Second, servicemembers seeking an exemption could
   not re-enlist, execute orders, be promoted, or deploy. See NAVADMIN
   256/21 (Nov. 15, 2021). Third, even servicemembers granted an exemption
   remained ineligible to deploy—but only if the exemption was granted on
   religious grounds. See Manual of the Navy Medical Department
   (“MANMED”) 15-105(3)(n)(9).
         Plaintiffs are thirty-five members of Naval Special Warfare Command
   units. 1 Each sought an exemption due to a sincere religious objection to the

          _____________________
          1
            They include Navy SEALs, Navy Divers, Navy Special Warfare Combatant
   Craft Crewmen, and Navy Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technicians.

                                         3
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                                        c/w No. 22-10534

   Navy’s authorized vaccines. None was exempted. In fact, the Navy did not
   grant a single religious exemption to anyone until this litigation was well
   underway, despite granting several hundred medical exemptions. U.S. Navy
   Seals 1-26, 27 F.4th at 341–42.
          Plaintiffs sued Secretary Austin, Secretary Del Toro, and the
   Department of Defense (collectively, “the Navy”), alleging that the mandate
   violated the First Amendment and RFRA. They also sought a preliminary
   injunction to block enforcement of the policies described above. Specifically,
   they asked the court to enjoin “any adverse action” based on their
   vaccination status, such as job loss, ineligibility to deploy, and restrictions on
   promotion and training opportunities.
          The district court granted a preliminary injunction that did two things.
   It enjoined the Navy “from applying MANMED § 15-105(3)(n)(9);
   NAVADMIN 225/21; Trident Order #12[2]; and NAVADMIN 256/21 to
   Plaintiffs.” Further, it prohibited the Navy “from taking any adverse action
   against Plaintiffs on the basis of Plaintiffs’ requests for religious
   accommodation.” The gravamen of the court’s reasoning was that the
   Navy’s review process was mere “theater” with each request ending in a
   “rubber stamp[ed]” denial of a religious exemption.
          The Navy appealed and sought a stay of the injunction pending
   appeal. A motions panel denied the stay, U.S. Navy Seals 1-26, 27 F.4th 336,
   but a divided Supreme Court granted it in part, staying the injunction
   “insofar as it precludes the Navy from considering respondents’ vaccination
   status in making deployment, assignment, and other operational decisions.”
   Austin v. U.S. Navy Seals 1-26, 142 S. Ct. 1301 (2022) (mem.).

          _____________________
          2
              Trident Order #12 was rescinded prior to this appeal and is no longer at issue.

                                                 4
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                                    No. 22-10077
                                  c/w No. 22-10534

          Subsequently, the district court granted Plaintiffs’ motion to certify a
   class consisting of “all Navy servicemembers subject to the vaccine mandate
   who have submitted religious accommodation requests.” It then granted the
   class a preliminary injunction prohibiting enforcement of the same policies
   named in its first injunction. The Navy again appealed, challenging both the
   injunction and the class certification. We consolidated the two appeals.
                                         B.
          Before we heard oral argument, President Biden signed into law a
   statute directing Secretary Austin to rescind the vaccine mandate. See James
   M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023, Pub. L.
   No. 117-263, § 525, 136 Stat. 2395, 2571–72 (2022) (“NDAA”). As relevant
   here, the NDAA provides that
          [n]ot later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this
          Act, the Secretary of Defense shall rescind the mandate that
          members of the Armed Forces be vaccinated against COVID-
          19 pursuant to the memorandum dated August 24, 2021,
          regarding “Mandatory Coronavirus Disease 2019 Vaccination
          of Department of Defense Service Members.”
   Ibid. The NDAA gave no further instructions.
          Secretary Austin duly rescinded the mandate on January 10, 2023. See
   Memorandum, Secretary of Defense, Rescission of August 24, 2021, and
   November 30, 2021, Coronavirus Disease 2019 Vaccination Requirements
   for Members of the Armed Forces (Jan. 10, 2023). He ordered the military to
   stop separating servicemembers who had sought an exemption and to
   “remove any adverse actions solely associated with denials of such
   requests.” Ibid. Secretary Del Toro then rescinded the Navy mandate,
   “suspend[ing] any new adverse administrative actions associated with
   refusing the COVID-19 vaccine.” NAVADMIN 005/23 (Jan. 11, 2023).
   Both Secretary Austin and Secretary Del Toro clarified, however, that

                                         5
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                                      No. 22-10077
                                    c/w No. 22-10534

   commanders remained free to consider vaccination status in making
   deployment, assignment, and operational decisions.
          Following oral argument, the Navy promulgated additional policies
   that eliminated any remaining distinctions between vaccinated and
   unvaccinated personnel. Notably, the Navy issued a policy stating that
   “[u]nder no circumstances shall a Commander mandate that any Navy
   Service member receive the COVID-19 vaccination.” NAVADMIN
   038/23 (Feb. 15, 2023). It further provided that “COVID-19 vaccination
   status shall not be a consideration in assessing individual service member
   suitability for deployment or other operational missions.” Ibid. Later, the
   Department of Defense also barred the military branches, including the
   Navy, from considering vaccination status for deployment and assignment-
   related decisions so long as the COVID-19 vaccine remained optional. 3
                                          II.
          Whether an appeal is moot is a jurisdictional issue that we review de
   novo. See Freedom From Religion Found. v. Abbott (FFRF), 58 F.4th 824, 831
   (5th Cir. 2023); Lauren C. ex rel. Tracey K. v. Lewisville Indep. Sch. Dist., 904
   F.3d 363, 371 (5th Cir. 2018).
                                         III.
                                          A.
          The Navy argues that events subsequent to the preliminary injunction
   have mooted the appeal. We agree.

          _____________________
          3
             See Deputy Secretary of Defense, Guidance for Implementing Rescission of
   August 24, 2021 and November 30, 2021 Coronavirus Disease 2019 Vaccination
   Requirements for Members of the Armed Forces (Feb. 24, 2023) (“Feb. 24 DoD
   Rescission Guidance”).

                                           6
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                                       No. 22-10077
                                     c/w No. 22-10534

          If a dispute ceases mid-litigation, so does our jurisdiction. See U.S.
   Const. art. III, § 2 (limiting federal jurisdiction to “Cases” and
   “Controversies”); see also FFRF, 58 F.4th at 831–32 (under Article III, “[w]e
   are . . . permitted ‘to adjudicate only live disputes’” (quoting Hinkley v.
   Envoy Air, Inc., 968 F.3d 544, 548 (5th Cir. 2020))). One way that happens is
   when a challenged policy is repealed. See, e.g., Houston Chron. Pub. Co. v.
   League City, 488 F.3d 613, 619 (5th Cir. 2007) (“It goes without saying that
   disputes concerning repealed legislation are generally moot.”). “In that case,
   mootness is the default.” FFRF, 58 F.4th at 832 (collecting authorities).
          That default rule of mootness applies here. Obeying a newly enacted
   federal statute, the Navy rescinded its COVID-19 mandate. Then it revoked
   each of the implementing policies addressed by the preliminary injunction.
   Then it promulgated new policies providing that no vaccine mandate will be
   imposed on Navy servicemembers. As other circuits have held, such actions
   moot a dispute over the lawfulness of military vaccine mandates. 4
          Another sure sign that this appeal is moot is that the preliminary
   injunctions no longer provide Plaintiffs “any effectual relief.” See Spell v.
   Edwards, 962 F.3d 175, 179 (5th Cir. 2020) (“A matter is moot ‘when it is
   impossible for a court to grant any effectual relief whatever to the prevailing
   party.’” (quoting Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 567 U.S. 298,
   307 (2012))). The district court enjoined specific vaccine policies and
          _____________________
          4
             See Roth, 62 F.4th at 1119 (“The rescission of the COVID-19 vaccination
   mandate, as directed by the [NDAA], provides the Airmen all of their requested
   preliminary injunctive relief and renders this appeal moot.”); Navy Seal 1, 2023 WL
   2482927, at *1 (sua sponte dismissing as moot appeals from denials of preliminary
   injunctions “[i]n light of the January 10, 2023 Memorandum issued by the Secretary of
   Defense rescinding the military’s COVID-19 vaccination mandate for all service
   members, and the subsequent directives formally implementing the Secretary of Defense’s
   rescission of the COVID-19 vaccination requirement”); Dunn, 2023 WL 2319316, at *1
   (same).

                                             7
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                                        No. 22-10077
                                      c/w No. 22-10534

   prohibited “any adverse action” against noncomplying Plaintiffs. 5 But
   Plaintiffs, both individually and as a class, have now received everything
   those injunctions required, mooting the appeal. See, e.g., Amawi v. Paxton,
   956 F.3d 816, 821 (5th Cir. 2020) (finding preliminary injunction moot where
   revisions to a challenged law “provided the plaintiffs the very relief their
   lawsuit sought”); Harris v. City of Houston, 151 F.3d 186, 189 (5th Cir. 1998)
   (“[A] request for injunctive relief generally becomes moot upon the
   happening of the event sought to be enjoined.”).
           Start with the vaccine policies themselves. They forced Plaintiffs to be
   vaccinated or face severe penalties. No more. Secretary Austin’s January 10
   rescission order rendered all military “policies, directives, and guidance
   implementing those vaccination mandates as no longer in effect.” Feb. 24 DoD
   Rescission Guidance (emphasis added). In fact, the military branches were
   required to “formally rescind” those nullified policies. Ibid. There is no need
   to enjoin policies that no longer exist. See Spell, 962 F.3d at 179 (“Once the
   [challenged] law is off the books, there is nothing injuring the plaintiff and,
   consequently, nothing for the court to do.”).
           Plaintiffs also no longer face any threat of “adverse action” from
   refusing a COVID-19 vaccine. Navy policies now formally prohibit “any
   new adverse administrative actions” against unvaccinated servicemembers
   and require removing past adverse actions. NAVADMIN 005/23 (January
   11, 2023); Memorandum, Secretary of the Navy, Department of the Navy
   Actions to Implement Coronavirus Disease 2019 Rescission (Feb. 24, 2023).

           _____________________
           5
             The district court’s class-wide preliminary injunction was narrower, only
   enjoining the four vaccination policies. So, our discussion of the individual Plaintiffs’
   preliminary injunction necessarily encompasses the class-wide injunction.

                                              8
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                                         No. 22-10077
                                       c/w No. 22-10534

           Critically, the Navy has also ruled out using vaccination status to deny
   deployment eligibility, training opportunities, and assignments. This was the
   central threat that, Plaintiffs argued, hung over their heads even post-
   rescission. The Navy has now abjured it. No fewer than three binding policies
   now forbid considering vaccination status for such decisions. 6 Because the
   Navy has definitively restored Plaintiffs to equal footing with their vaccinated
   counterparts through repeated formal policy changes, enjoining “adverse
   action” offers Plaintiffs no effectual relief.
           In sum, the Navy has given Plaintiffs “the precise relief” provided by
   the preliminary injunctions, leaving us “unable to provide relief beyond what
   [the Navy] already gave.” Franciscan All., Inc. v. Becerra, 47 F.4th 368, 375
   (5th Cir. 2022). Thus, absent an exception to mootness, we lack jurisdiction
   to reach the merits. It is to those exceptions that we now turn.
                                              B.
           Plaintiffs argue the appeal remains live under two exceptions to
   mootness: voluntary cessation and capable of repetition yet evading review.
   We consider each in turn.
                                               1.
           “It is well settled that a defendant’s voluntary cessation of a
   challenged practice does not deprive a federal court of its power to determine

           _____________________
           6
             See NAVADMIN 038/23 (Feb. 15, 2023) (“COVID-19 vaccination status shall
   not be a consideration in assessing individual service member suitability for deployment or
   other operational missions.”); Feb. 24 DoD Rescission Guidance (“DoD Component
   heads and commanders will not . . . consider a Service member’s COVID-19 immunization
   status in making deployment, assignment, and other operational decisions, absent
   establishment of a new immunization requirement . . . .”); NAVADMIN 065/23 (March
   7, 2023) (“COVID-19 vaccination status shall not be a consideration in assessing individual
   Service member suitability for deployment or other operational decisions.”).

                                               9
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                                      No. 22-10077
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   the legality of the practice.” City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, Inc., 455 U.S.
   283, 289 (1982). That is because “[a] defendant, without court compulsion,
   could legally return to its former ways.” K.P. v. LeBlanc, 627 F.3d 115, 121
   (5th Cir. 2010). The doctrine of voluntary cessation evaluates the risk that a
   defendant is engaging in “litigation posturing” to avoid judicial review. See
   Yarls v. Bunton, 905 F.3d 905, 910 (5th Cir. 2018); Aladdin’s Castle, 455 U.S.
   at 289 n.10. Accordingly, it must be “absolutely clear” that the defendant’s
   challenged conduct “could not reasonably be expected to recur” to divest us
   of jurisdiction. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs. (TOC), Inc.,
   528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000) (quoting United States v. Concentrated Phosphate
   Exp. Ass’n, 393 U.S. 199, 203 (1968)).
          The voluntary cessation analysis is somewhat different with respect to
   a government defendant. “[G]overnmental entities bear a ‘lighter
   burden’ . . . in proving that the challenged conduct will not recur once the
   suit is dismissed as moot.’” FFRF, 58 F.4th at 833 (quoting Stauffer v.
   Gearhart, 741 F.3d 574, 582 (5th Cir. 2014)) (some internal quotation marks
   omitted); see also, e.g., Sossamon v. Texas, 560 F.3d 316, 325 (5th Cir. 2009)
   (same), aff’d, 563 U.S. 277 (2011). “That is so because we presume that state
   actors, as public representatives, act in good faith.” FFRF, 58 F.4th at 833
   (citing Amawi, 956 F.3d at 821); see also, e.g., Sossamon, 560 F.3d at 325
   (explaining that “government actors in their sovereign capacity and in the
   exercise of their official duties are accorded a presumption of good faith
   because they are public servants, not self-interested private parties”).
   Accordingly, “[w]ithout evidence to the contrary, we assume that formally
   announced changes to official government policy are not mere litigation
   posturing.” Yarls, 905 F.3d at 911 (quoting Sossamon, 560 F.3d at 325).

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                                        No. 22-10077
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           Plaintiffs argue that voluntary cessation applies here because the
   NDAA left the Navy free to implement a new mandate or at least resume its
   differential treatment of unvaccinated servicemembers. We disagree. 7
           It is true, as the Navy concedes, that it could implement a new vaccine
   mandate in the future. That does not change the mootness calculus, though.
   It is black-letter law that the government’s mere “ability to reimplement the
   statute or regulation at issue is insufficient to prove the voluntary-cessation
   exception.” FFRF, 58 F.4th at 833; see also Roth, 62 F.4th at 1119–20 (Stras,
   J., concurring in the judgment) (“Voluntary cessation does not necessarily
   moot a case, but statutory changes generally do, even if the power to reenact
   the challenged provision remains.”) (citations omitted; cleaned up); Nat’l
   Black Police Ass’n v. District of Columbia, 108 F.3d 346, 349 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
   (“[T]he mere power to reenact a challenged law is not a sufficient basis on
   which a court can conclude that a reasonable expectation of recurrence
   exists.”).
           Nor do we think that the Navy’s conduct “raises suspicions of
   ‘litigation posturing.’” Yarls, 905 F.3d at 910. Litigation posturing typically
   involves some sign of bad faith or insincerity. See, e.g., Texas v. Biden, 20
   F.4th 928, 962–64 (5th Cir. 2021), rev’d on other grounds, 142 S. Ct. 2528
   (2022) (finding voluntary cessation where government “repeatedly exhibited
   gamesmanship in its decisionmaking” by hiding evidence and engaging in

           _____________________
           7 The Navy argues that voluntary cessation does not apply merely because it acted
   involuntarily—that is, the Navy opposed the NDAA and rescinded the mandate only at
   Congress’s command. We need not address this argument. Whether or not the Navy
   rescinded the mandate involuntarily, it took other actions to remedy Plaintiffs’ asserted
   harms that the NDAA did not expressly require: namely, treating unvaccinated and
   vaccinated servicemembers alike for purposes of deployment, assignment, and operational
   decisions. We express no opinion on whether the appeal would be moot if the Navy had
   only rescinded the mandate but done nothing more.

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   “eleventh-hour” policy changes); Opulent Life Church v. City of Holly
   Springs, 697 F.3d 279, 284 (5th Cir. 2012) (amending challenged law “the
   night before oral argument” did not moot case); Sossamon, 560 F.3d at 325
   (requiring “evidence that the voluntary cessation is a sham for continuing
   possibly unlawful conduct”). We see no signs of such gamesmanship here.
           The Navy rapidly complied with the NDAA. It then promulgated
   multiple binding policies going beyond what Congress required to eradicate
   the effects of the mandate. It has even expressly assured that “[u]nder no
   circumstances shall a Commander mandate that any Navy Service member
   receive the COVID-19 vaccination” and that “COVID-19 vaccination
   status shall not be a consideration in assessing individual service member
   suitability for deployment or other operational missions.” NAVADMIN
   038/23 (Feb. 15, 2023). Those official assurances assuage any concern that
   the Navy is trying to duck judicial scrutiny. See Miraglia v. Bd. of Supervisors
   of La. State Museum, 901 F.3d 565, 572 (5th Cir. 2018) (voluntary cessation
   inapplicable “when a government entity assures a court of continued
   compliance, and the court has no reason to doubt the assurance”). 8
           In sum, we cannot assume, without evidence to the contrary, that the
   upper echelons of the Navy, including the Secretary of the Navy, issued the
   post-rescission policies with an eye toward resuming the challenged conduct
   as soon as the courts were done. Accordingly, we adhere to the presumption
   that “formally announced changes to official governmental policy are not
   mere litigation posturing.” Sossamon, 560 F.3d at 325. The voluntary
   cessation exception does not apply here.

           _____________________
           8
             We therefore respectfully disagree with our dissenting colleague that the Navy is
   not entitled to the normal presumption, well-settled in our precedent, that a government
   entity acts in good faith when it ceases challenged conduct. Post, at 2.

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                                          2.
          Alternatively, Plaintiffs argue that this appeal falls into the exception
   for controversies that are capable of repetition yet evade judicial review. This
   exception applies where “(1) the challenged action [is] in its duration too
   short to be fully litigated prior to cessation or expiration, and (2) there [is] a
   reasonable expectation that the same complaining party [will] be subject to
   the same action again.” Empower Texans, Inc. v. Geren, 977 F.3d 367, 370 (5th
   Cir. 2020) (alterations in original) (quoting Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v.
   United States, 579 U.S. 162, 170 (2016)). It applies “only in exceptional
   situations.” Ibid. (quoting Kingdomware, 579 U.S. at 170).
          We need not consider this exception, however, because the issues
   Plaintiffs raise can still be litigated in the district court and appealed after a
   final judgment, assuming they remain justiciable. The capable-of-repetition
   exception “is inapplicable in those situations in which the issues underlying
   the moot appeal are not moot in the case remaining before the district court.”
   Marilyn T., Inc. v. Evans, 803 F.2d 1383, 1385 (5th Cir. 1986), abrogated on
   other grounds by Litton Fin. Printing Div. v. NLRB, 501 U.S. 190 (1991); see
   also Indep. Party of Richmond Cnty. v. Graham, 413 F.3d 252, 256 (2d Cir.
   2005). The mootness of this interlocutory appeal does not prevent the
   district court from ruling on any of Plaintiffs’ claims that remain justiciable.
   See Marilyn T., 803 F.2d at 1385.
                                          C.
          Finally, we decline the Navy’s invitation to vacate our motion panel’s
   published opinion denying a stay pending appeal. U.S. Navy Seals 1-26, 27
   F.4th 336. “Judicial precedents are presumptively correct and valuable to the
   legal community as a whole. They are not merely the property of private
   litigants and should stand unless a court concludes that the public interest
   would be served by a vacatur.” ODonnell v. Salgado, 913 F.3d 479, 481 (5th

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   Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (quoting U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall
   P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 29 (1994)). The Navy has not argued, much less shown,
   that the public interest would be served by vacatur. 9
                                                ***
           In sum, this interlocutory appeal is moot because the Navy’s vaccine
   policies challenged here have been rescinded and because no exception to
   mootness applies. That does not end the litigation, however. See Univ. of Tex.
   v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 394 (1981). Plaintiffs’ case remains before the
   district court, which will decide in the first instance whether any of Plaintiffs’
   claims are justiciable. We express no view on that question.
                                                IV.
           We DISMISS the appeal as moot and REMAND for further
   proceedings consistent with this opinion. 10

           _____________________
           9
             The partially concurring opinion would vacate the stay panel’s opinion under
   United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36 (1950). But “vacatur of a prior stay-panel
   opinion once a case becomes moot on appeal is inappropriate” under Munsingwear
   “because that stay-panel opinion cannot spawn binding legal consequences regarding the
   merits of the case.” Democratic Exec. Comm. of Fla. v. Nat’l Republican Senatorial Comm.,
   950 F.3d 790, 795 (11th Cir. 2020) (emphasis removed); see also Hand v. Desantis, 946 F.3d
   1272, 1275 n.5 (11th Cir. 2020); F.T.C. v. Food Town Stores, Inc., 547 F.2d 247, 249 (4th Cir.
   1977); Serv. Emps. Int’l Union Loc. 1 v. Husted, 531 F. App’x 755, 756 (6th Cir. 2013).
           10
               There is no need to vacate the preliminary injunctions because they no longer
   have any practical effect on the parties. “[I]f the case remains alive in the district court, it
   is sufficient to dismiss the appeal without directing that the injunction order be vacated.”
   13C Alan Wright, Arthur Miller, & Edward H. Cooper, Fed. Prac.
   and Proc. § 3533.10.3 (3d ed. April 2023). Indeed, dismissal without vacatur is the
   “usual practice” for interlocutory appeals, and we have no cause to deviate. See Fleming v.
   Gutierrez, 785 F.3d 442, 449 (10th Cir. 2015); Democratic Exec. Comm. of Fla., 950 F.3d at
   795; Hous. Works, Inc. v. City of New York, 203 F.3d 176, 178 (2d Cir. 2000); McLane v.
   Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 3 F.3d 522, 524 n.6 (1st Cir. 1993); see also Marilyn T., 803
   F.2d at 1385.

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Case: 22-10077     Document: 00516812016          Page: 15     Date Filed: 07/06/2023

                                    No. 22-10077
                                  c/w No. 22-10534

   James E. Graves, Jr., Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting
   in part:
          I concur in parts I.B, II, III.A, III.B., and IV of the majority opinion.
   Because I would vacate the stay panel opinion under United States v.
   Munsingwear, Inc., I respectfully dissent from part III.C of the opinion. 340
   U.S. 36, 41 (1950) (“[vacatur] is commonly utilized in precisely this situation
   to prevent a judgment, unreviewable because of mootness, from spawning
   any legal consequences.”). In Democratic Exec. Comm. of Fla. v. Nat’l
   Republican Senatorial Comm., the Eleventh Circuit declined to vacate a stay-
   panel opinion because “the necessarily tentative and preliminary nature of a
   stay-panel opinion precludes the opinion from having an effect outside that
   case.” 950 F.3d 790, 795 (11th Cir. 2020). However, it elaborated that
   vacatur of a stay panel opinion may be warranted in “a rare case where a party
   could identify any ruling within a stay-panel opinion that would have
   precedential effect beyond the preliminary decision on the stay.” Id. at n.2.
   This stay panel opinion presents such a rare case. It is a published decision,
   so its analysis and application of Mindes v. Seaman, 453 F.2d 197 (5th Cir.
   1971) has precedential effect beyond its preliminary decision on the stay.
   While we would not have been bound by that analysis in reaching a final
   decision on the merits, the appeal was mooted before we had that
   opportunity. Since the Navy can no longer seek review of the published stay
   panel opinion, the public interest would be served by its vacatur.
   Munsingwear, 340 U.S. at 41; see also United States v. Schaffer, 240 F.3d 35,
   38 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“When a case becomes moot on appeal, whether it be
   during initial review or in connection with consideration of a petition for
   rehearing or rehearing en banc, this court generally vacates the District
   Court’s judgment, vacates any outstanding panel decisions, and remands to
   the District Court with direction to dismiss.”).

                                         15
Case: 22-10077     Document: 00516812016         Page: 16     Date Filed: 07/06/2023

                                    No. 22-10077
                                  c/w No. 22-10534

   James C. Ho, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
          History will record that, in this battle over the Navy’s COVID-19
   vaccination mandate, the Navy SEALs won multiple victories, while the
   Navy suffered repeated losses. First, the SEALs vindicated their religious
   liberty claims by securing a preliminary injunction. See U.S. Navy SEALs 1-
   26 v. Biden, 578 F. Supp. 3d 822 (N.D. Tex. 2022). Next, the Navy asked
   our court for a stay, but lost unanimously. See U.S. Navy SEALs 1-26 v.
   Biden, 27 F.4th 336 (5th Cir. 2022). Unfortunately (for the Navy SEALs),
   the Supreme Court responded by awarding a partial stay to the Navy, over
   the objection of three Justices. See Austin v. U.S. Navy SEALs 1-26, 142 S.
   Ct. 1301 (2022). But then Congress stepped in to support the SEALs. See
   James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023,
   Pub. L. No. 117–263, § 525, 136 Stat. 2395, 2571–72 (2022).
          Yet the Navy continued to resist.          The Secretary of Defense
   maintained his fervent opposition to Congress’s repeal of his mandate. He
   also insisted that, notwithstanding Congress, the entire Armed Forces,
   including the Navy, could continue to discriminate based on vaccination
   status in deployment and other operational decisions. See Lloyd Austin,
   Rescission of August 24, 2021 and November 30, 2021 Coronavirus Disease 2019
   Vaccination Requirements for Members of the Armed Forces (Jan. 10, 2023).
          Even during oral argument in this appeal, the Navy refused to admit
   illegality or assure the SEALs that their religious convictions would be
   respected in the future. It was only after oral argument that the Navy abruptly
   abandoned its discrimination policy, in an obvious effort to evade our review
   by purporting to render this proceeding moot. See, e.g., Opulent Life Church
   v. City of Holly Springs, 697 F.3d 279, 284–86 (5th Cir. 2012) (change of
   government policy “the night before oral argument” did not moot case).

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Case: 22-10077      Document: 00516812016            Page: 17      Date Filed: 07/06/2023

                                       No. 22-10077
                                     c/w No. 22-10534

          If this was a confession of error—if this sudden policy change was
   sincere rather than strategic—the Navy could just ask us to dismiss its appeal.
   But the Navy has not confessed error. To the contrary, the Navy by all
   accounts stands by its position—indeed, it asks us to vacate the preliminary
   injunction—based on a new policy it can rescind unilaterally at any time,
   without legislation or even the need for notice and comment.
          “[A] defendant cannot automatically moot a case”—and thereby
   avoid accountability—“simply by ending its unlawful conduct once sued.”
   Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85, 91 (2013). “[S]ubsequent events
   [must] make it absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not
   reasonably be expected to recur.” Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc.,
   v. Comer, 137 S.Ct. 2012, 2019 n.1 (2017) (cleaned up) (emphasis added).
   That’s because an official “could engage in unlawful conduct, stop when
   sued to have the case declared moot, then pick up where he left off, repeating
   this cycle until he achieves all his unlawful ends.” Already, 568 U.S. at 91.
          The majority says we should presume the military’s good faith. Ante,
   at 10–11. But the military’s record on these issues does not inspire trust. We
   should be “suspicious . . . of officials who try to avoid judicial review by
   voluntarily mooting a case”—especially in the absence of an admission of
   illegality or credible assurance of future compliance. Tucker v. Gaddis, 40
   F.4th 289, 295 (5th Cir. 2022) (Ho, J., concurring). See also id. at 295–96.
          That said, if there is any silver lining here, perhaps it’s that the
   majority appears to leave it open for the district court on remand to conclude
   that the SEALs should ultimately prevail in this case. See ante, at 13 (“the
   issues Plaintiffs raise can still be litigated in the district court”); id. at 14.
          It’s been said that “cowards never start, the weak never finish,
   winners never quit.” These faithful SEALs have shown that they will not
   quit—and that they deserve to win.

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