Court Opinion

ID: 9788303
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 00:40:08.186939+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:07.839498
License: Public Domain

Justice COATS,
dissenting:
In these consolidated cases, the majority extends its holding in Martin v. People, 27 P.3d 846 (2001), by concluding that a person convicted of a sex offense committed between July 1, 1996 and November 1, 1998 is subject to a period of "discretionary parole" no longer than the remainder of the maximum sentence of incarceration imposed by the court. Because I disagree that the term "maximum sentence" in section 17-2-201(5)(a.5), 6 C.R.S. (2000), is limited to the incarceration component of a sentence, and because I do not believe the legislature intended to retroactively eliminate the five-year mandatory parole - requirement - of- section - 18-1-105(1)(a)(V)(C), 6 C.R.S. (2000), for sentences imposed after July 1, 1996, I respectfully dissent.
For the reasons expressed in my dissenting opinion in Martin, I believe that when the General Assembly changed the sentencing scheme in 1998 by mandating that felony sentences include a term of parole in addition to a term of incarceration, it lengthened the "maximum sentence" imposed by the court by the amount of that parole term. Although the new mandatory parole provisions, in effect, rendered superfluous the existing limitations on parole for sex offenders found in section 17-2-201(5)(a), they in no way conflicted with them. Section 17-2-201(5)(a) merely barred a parole term greater than five years, which was precisely the term mandated for sex offenders by the 1998 parole scheme, or a parole term, regardless of its absolute length, extending beyond the "maximum sentence" imposed by the court, which (after the 1998 amendments) was the sum of the defendant's term of incarceration and his mandatory parole term. Subsection (5)(a.5) superceded subsection (5)(a) in 1996 but did not change its "maximum sentence" limitation in any way. Therefore, when a defendant's "maximum sentence" is properly understood to include his sentence to a term of incarceration plus his mandatory sentence to an additional term of parole, section 17-2-201(5)(a.5) (for crimes after July 1, 1996) was no more in conflict with the existing mandatory parole provision of section 18-1-105(1)(a)(V)(C), than was subsection (5)(a) (for crimes committed before July 1, 1996).
Whatever various members of the General Assembly may have had in mind, the sentencing scheme that existed both before and after the 1996 amendment was consistent in requiring that the sentences of sex offenders include a five-year parole period, whether or not the offender actually had that amount of time remaining on his sentence to incarceration. However, in 1998, two years after the enactment of section 17-2-201(5)(a.5) and five years after the reintroduction of mandatory parole terms over and above a sentence to incarceration, the legislature again amended the mandatory parole provisions for sex offenses, - found - in _- section 18-1-105(1)(a)(V)(C). The lack of understanding or agreement about earlier amendments to sex offender sentencing provisions pales by comparison to the mystery surrounding the intent behind the 1998 amendment. In the first regular session of the sixty-first General Assembly, section 18-1-105(1)(a@)(V)(C) was amended in two different bills, without reference to each other, each with slightly different language, different applicability provisions, and different effective dates. See ch. 303, see. 4, § 18-1-105, 1998 Colo. Sess. *359Laws 1278, 1289; ch. 189, see. 6, § 18-1-105, 1998 Colo. Sess. Laws 389, 399.1
In the earlier of the two, House Bill 98-1177, the amendment was joined with a number of generally unrelated sexual offense provisions, the most substantial of which expanded the requirements for registration of sex offenders. Although it did not become effective until April 21, 1998, it purported to limit the existing parole provisions of section ,. 18-1-105(1)(a)(V)(C) to erimes committed before July 1996 and to amend the parole provisions for sex offenses committed on or after July 1, 1996. For post-1996 offenses, the amendment replaced the mandatory, five-year period of parole imposed by the court as part of the sentence, with a period of parole to be set by the parole board, within the parameters provided by section 17-2-201(5)(a.5). While this 1998 amendment did nothing to change the plain meaning of the term "maximum sentence," which necessarily includes any additional parole component of a sentence, it arguably eliminated any court-imposed parole component of sex offender sentences to which it applied. Intentionally or not, it in effect removed sex offenders from the mandatory parole scheme and reduced their "maximum sentence" by the amount of the former mandatory parole term.
In the later of the two bills, the amendment to section 18-1-105(1)(a)(V) was one of a number of conforming amendments attached to an entirely new sexual offender sentencing scheme, entitled, "Lifetime Supervision of Sex Offenders." The new sentencing scheme, approved in June 1998, to become effective by its own terms on November 1, 1998, and to apply only to sex offenses committed on or after that date, reinstituted a type of indeterminate sentencing for sex offenders. The new sex offender sentencing scheme required the imposition of a minimum sentence, of at least the minimum of the presumptive range for the defendant's level of offense, and a maximum sentence of the remainder of the sex offender's natural life. The maximum sentence beyond which a sex offender could be subject to parole supervision therefore became the end of the offender's natural life. Although House Bill 98-1156 was approved after House Bill 98-1177, its amendments to section 18-1-105(1)(a)(V) did not acknowledge the previous amendment, and the revisor of statutes merely included both sets of amendments in the revised code.2
*360Unless the General Assembly intended to extend the possibility of parole supervision for sex offenses committed on or after November 1, 1998 to the end of the offender's life, and at the same time retroactively bar any parole supervision beyond the offender's sentence to incarceration for offenses committed in the narrow window between July 1, 1996 and November 1, 1998, it is likely that the latter effect was not intended by the 1998 amendment to section 18-1-105(1)(a)(V). In light of the legislature's clear distinction between pre- and post-July 1, 1996 offenses, and its express return to reliance on section 17-2-201(5)(a.5) for post 1996 offenses, it seems more likely that the 1996 amendments to section 18-1-105(1)(a)(V)(C) were understood as increasing the length of possible supervision, and the "maximum sentence" formula was understood to permit an absolute parole term just as long as the offender's term of incarceration rather than to restrict parole supervision to the unserved remainder of the defendant's sentence. As the majority points out, however, such an understanding is simply not consistent with the historical meaning and prior constructions by this court of this very provision. Maj. op. at 855-356.
While the first principle of statutory construction is to effect legislative intent and interpret ambiguous and conflicting provisions to accomplish that end, it is not the role of the courts to rewrite or eliminate clear and unambiguous statutes merely because they do not believe the General Assembly would have intended the consequences of its enactments. Whatever extrinsic aids to construction may indicate about the likely purpose or intent of the General Assembly, the language in which it has expressed itself must be susceptible of an interpretation that implements that intent. Even though the legislature may not have fully understood that section 17-2-201(5)(a.5) limited parole to the remainder of the defendant's maximum sentence or appreciated that by removing the five-year mandatory parole sentence of seetion 18-1-105(1)(a)(V) it was actually shortening a sex offender's "maximum sentence," the terms of its enactment cannot be construed to avoid their inescapable consequences.
It is less clear, however, to which sex offenders these 1998 amendments to section 18-1-105(1)(a)(V) should apply. See § 24-301, 1 C.R.S. (2000) (if amendments to same statute are enacted at same session of legislature without reference to each other and they conflict, the amendment with the latest effective date should prevail). Because the legislature could not apply its acts in violation of the fundamental law of this state or the United States, its statutes must be applied if possible to avoid such constitutional violations. See Bd. of Educ. v. Booth, 984 P.2d 639, 658 (Colo.1999). Although section 18-1-~105(1)(a)(V)(C), 6 CRS. (2000) (as amended by H.B. 98-1177), is restricted on its face only to offenses committed on or after July 1, 1996, and section 18-1-105(1)(a)(V)(C.8), 6 C.R.S. (2000) (as amended by H.B. 98-1156), is restricted only to offenses committed on or after July 1, 1996 and before November 1, 1998, I do not believe that either could enlarge the five-year term of parole to which a sex offender had already been sentenced without violating constitutional limitations on ex post facto legisla*361tion. See Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 250-51, 120 S.Ct. 1362, 146 L.Ed.2d 286 (2000) (indicating that retroactive changes in laws governing the parole of prisoners violate the Ex Post Facto Clause when they create a sufficient risk of increasing the measure of punishment attached to the covered crimes); Gasper v. Gunter, 851 P.2d 912, 916 (Colo.1998).
Similarly, the legislature is constitutionally prohibited from shortening or commuting a final sentence in Colorado. See Colo. Const. art. IV, § 7; Mamula v. People, 847 P.2d 1135, 1137 (Colo.1993) (recognizing the "constitutional principle that only the executive department may modify a legally imposed criminal sentence after the conviction upon which it is based has become final"); People v. Herrera, 188 Colo. 155, 162, 516 P.2d 626, 628 (1978) (observing governor's exclusive power to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons after conviction and the inability of the legislature to confer executive powers upon the judiciary); cf. People v. Macias, 631 P.2d 584, 586 (Colo.1981) (noting that a defendant is entitled to the benefits of amen-datory legislation mitigating criminal penalties only before conviction becomes final); People v. Thomas, 185 Colo. 395, 398, 525 P.2d 1136, 1138 (1974) (same). Since section 18-1-105(1)(a)(V)(C) required the imposition of a five-year parole term as a separate and distinct element of a sex offender's sentence until the 1998 amendments limited this requirement to pre-1996 offenses, retroactive application of those amendments to sex offenders who had already been convicted and whose sentences had become final, with the effect of shortening their five-year parole term, would amount to an unconstitutional commutation of a sentence.
I would therefore hold that the 1998 amendments to section 18-1-105(1)(a)(V)(C), and the addition of (C.8), can be applied only to those sex offenders who committed their offenses between July 1, 1996 and November 1, 1998, and to whom application would neither violate ex post facto prohibitions nor amount to commutation of a sentence. Unlike the majority, I would not relieve all sex offenders from 1996 to 1998 of the General Assembly's express, mandatory parole requirements, but would instead require a case by case determination whether retroactive application of section 18-1-105(1)(a)(V)(C) would actually deprive defendants of their constitutional rights or reduce an existing final sentence.
For the reasons expressed above and in my dissent in Martin, I believe the holdings of the court of appeals in these consolidated cases were too broad. I therefore respectfully dissent.
Justice KOURLIS and Justice RICE join in the dissent.

. House Bill 98-1177, which became effective on April 21, 1998 and applied to offenses committed on or after that date, amended section 18-1-105 as follows:
(1)(a)(V)(C) Notwithstanding sub-subpara-graph (A) of this subparagraph (V), the mandatory period of parole for a person convicted of a felony offense COMMITTED PRIOR TO JULY 1, 1996, pursuant to part 4 of article 3 of this title, or part 3 of article 6 of this title, shall be five years. NOTWITHSTANDING SUB SUBPARAGRAPH (A) OF THIS SUBPARA-GRAPH (V), THE PERIOD OF PAROLE FOR A PERSON CONVICTED OF A FELONY OFFENSE COMMITTED ON OR AFTER JULY 1, 1996, PURSUANT TO PART 4 OF ARTICLE 3 OF THIS TITLE, OR PART 3 OF ARTICLE 6 «OF THIS TITLE, SHALL BE SET BY THE STATE BOARD OF PAROLE PURSUANT TO SECTION C.R.S., BUT IN NO EVENT SHALL THE TERM OF PAROLE EXCEED THE MAXIMUM SENTENCE IMPOSED UPON THE INMATE BY THE COURT.
House Bill 98-1156, which became effective November 1, 1998 and applied to offenses committed on or after that date, amended section 18-1-105 in relevant part as follows:
(1)(a)(V)(C) Notwithstanding sub-subpara-graph (A) of this subparagraph (V), the mandatory period of parole for a person convicted of a felony offense COMMITTED PRIOR TO JULY 1, 1996, pursuant to part 4 of article 3 of this title, or part 3 of article 6 of this title, shall be five years.
(C.3) NOTWITHSTANDING THE - PROVL SIONS OF SUB-SUBPARAGRAPH (A) OF THIS SUBPARAGRAPH (V), THE PERIOD OF PAROLE FOR A PERSON CONVICTED OF A FELONY OFFENSE, COMMITTED ON OR AFTER JULY 1, 1996, BUT PRIOR TO NOVEMBER 1, 1998, PURSUANT TO PART 4 OF ARTICLE 3 OF THIS TITLE OR PART 3 OF ARTICLE 6 OF THIS TITLE, SHALL BE SET BY THE STATE BOARD OF PAROLE PURSUANT TO SECTION 17-2-201(5)(a.5), C.R.S. (C.5) NOTWITHSTANDING THE - PROVL-SIONS OF SUB-SUBPARAGRAPH (A) OF THIS SUBPARAGRAPH (V), ANY PERSON SENTENCED FOR A SEX OFFENSE, AS DEFINED IN SECTION 16-13-803(5) CRS., COMMITTED ON OR AFTER NOVEMBER 1, 1998, SHALL BE SENTENCED PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF PART 8 OF ARTICLE 13 OF TITLE 16, C.R.S.

. See § 18-1-105(1)(a)(V). 105(1)(a)(V) provides in part: Section - 18-1-
(C) Notwithstanding sub-subparagraph (A) of this subparagraph (V), the mandatory period of *360parole for a person convicted of a felony offense committed prior to July 1, 1996, pursuant to part 4 of article 3 of this title, or part 3 of article 6 of this title, shall be five years. Notwithstanding sub-subparagraph (A) of this subparagraph (V), the period of parole for a person convicted of a felony offense committed on or after July 1, 1996, pursuant to part 4 of article 3 of this title, or part 3 of article 6 of this title, shall be set by the state board of parole pursuant to section 17-2-201(5)(a.5), C.R.S., but in no event shall the term of parole exceed the maximum sentence imposed upon the inmate by the court.
(C.3) Notwithstanding the provisions of sub-subparagraph (A) of this subparagraph (V), the period of parole for a person convicted of a felony offense committed on or after July 1, 1996, but prior to November 1, 1998, pursuant to part 4 of article 3 of this title, or part 3 of article 6 of this title, shall be set by the state board of parole pursuant to section 17-2-201(5)(a.5), C.R.S.
(C.5) Notwithstanding the provisions of sub-subparagraph (A) of this subparagraph (V), and person sentenced for a sex offense, as defined in section 16-13-803(5), C.R.S., committed on or after November 1, 1998, shall be sentenced pursuant to the provisions of part 8 of article 13 of title 16, C.R.S.