Court Opinion

ID: 9781105
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 16:06:47.862073+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:10:44.311944
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                  No. 22-1351
                             Filed August 30, 2023

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF LINDSEY SUE ROUTT
AND FREDERICK MICHAEL ROUTT JR.

Upon the Petition of
LINDSEY SUE ROUTT,
      Petitioner-Appellee,

And Concerning
FREDERICK MICHAEL ROUTT JR.,
     Respondent-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

      Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Davis County, Myron L. Gookin,

Judge.

      A father appeals the physical care and visitation provisions in a dissolution

modification order. AFFIRMED.

      Ryan J. Mitchell of Orsborn, Mitchell & Goedken, P.C., Ottumwa, for

appellant.

      Carly M. Schomaker of Gaumer, Emanuel, Carpenter & Goldsmith, P.C.,

Ottumwa, for appellee.

      Considered by Bower, C.J., and Tabor and Greer, JJ.
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TABOR, Judge.

      The district court denied Frederick “Ricky” Routt’s request to modify the

custody provision in the decree dissolving his marriage to Lindsey Routt. That

ruling left physical care of their two children with Lindsey. But the court awarded

Ricky “structured liberal visitation” with his son and daughter. Ricky appeals both

the physical care and visitation provisions in the modified decree. Because the

district court’s ruling is in the best interests of the children, we affirm. We also

award Lindsey attorney fees.

      I.     Facts and Prior Proceedings

      Ricky and Lindsey married in 2011 and have two children in common. They

were living in New Mexico when they divorced in 2014.           At that time, their

daughter—L.R.—was five months old, and their son—A.R.—was not quite two

years old. The New Mexico decree ordered shared physical care, but the parties

did not follow that fifty-fifty schedule. Ricky moved to Ohio. And Lindsey moved

with the children to Bloomfield. Given those distances, Lindsey sought to modify

the decree in 2015. When Ricky did not appear for the modification hearing, the

Iowa district court entered a default order placing physical care with Lindsey.1 The

order stated the Ricky would have visitation “at such times and places as agreed

to by [the parties]” accounting for the physical distance between them.

      Two years later, Lindsey successfully petitioned to have Ricky’s parental

rights terminated. But that order was vacated in 2020 when the pair reconciled.

1 Ricky complains that Lindsey knew he lived in Ohio but published notice of her

petition in the Bloomfield Democrat. Lindsey testified that she informed Ricky
about the 2015 modification hearing by text message.
                                          3

They lived together in Iowa from September 2018 until January 2020, when

Lindsey moved out with the children. Their relationship has been contentious

since.    Lindsey testified to stalking behavior by Ricky.       He also called the

Department of Health and Human Services to allege that Lindsey was neglecting

and abusing the children. Those investigations resulted in unfounded reports.

Meanwhile, Lindsey filed a domestic violence petition against Ricky that was

denied. Ricky also complained that Lindsey rarely allowed him visitation.

         Acting on that complaint, Ricky petitioned to modify physical care of the

children.2 At the modification proceeding in June 2022, the district court heard

from nine witnesses, including Lindsey; Ricky; and Lois Vroom, the appointed child

and family reporter. That August, the court decided the children, then ages eight

and ten, would remain in Lindsey’s physical care. But the court did provide Ricky

with more certain visitation:

                a. Every other weekend from Friday after school (or 3:30 p.m.
         when the children are not in school) to Sunday at 5:00 p.m. except
         in during summer school break the alternating weekend visitation
         shall extend to Monday at 9:00 a.m.
                b. Every Tuesday after school (or 3:30 p.m. when the children
         are not in school) until 8:00 p.m.
                c. Such other visitation that can be agreed upon by the
         parties.

On top of that schedule, the court allowed Ricky alternating holidays with the

children, as well as three weeks of exclusive summer visitation.

2 Ricky’s petition, filed without counsel, sought “sole legal custody” of the children

or “primary physical placement” with him. But the district court found that his
evidence at trial, where he still represented himself, was “limited to his request that
the court order joint/shared physical care of the children with equal parenting time.”
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         Ricky now appeals the modification ruling, asking for joint physical custody

of the children. Short of that change, he asks for expanded visitation.

         II.    Scope and Standard of Review

         Because Ricky’s action to modify the decree was in equity, we review the

ruling de novo. See In re Marriage of Brown, 778 N.W.2d 47, 50 (Iowa Ct. App.

2009). Under that standard, we give weight to the district court’s fact findings,

especially on witness credibility, but they do not bind us. Id.

         III.   Analysis

         A. Physical Care

         As the party seeking modification, Ricky, had the burden to prove by a

preponderance of the evidence that a substantial change in circumstances

occurred after the decree was entered. See In re Marriage of Harris, 877 N.W.2d

434, 440 (Iowa 2016). That change must affect the children’s welfare, not have

been contemplated when the decree was issued, and be more or less permanent.

Id. He also had to show that the parties were on equal footing in their ability to

care for the children and that joint care was in the children’s best interests. See In

re Marriage of Rigdon, No. 22-1147, 2023 WL 4530133, at *3 (Iowa App. July 13,

2023).

         The district court first decided that Ricky “failed to prove a more or less

permanent, substantial and material change in circumstances related to the

children’s welfare” since the entry of the 2015 custody order. But the court added

that, even assuming a change in circumstances, the record evidence did not justify

switching the children to joint physical care. On appeal, Lindsey does not defend
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the district court’s decision on the first ground. Instead, she focuses on whether

joint physical care was in the children’s best interests. We do the same.

       To decide whether joint physical care is in the children’s best interests, we

look to the four non-exclusive factors from In re Marriage of Hansen, 733 N.W.2d

683, 700 (Iowa 2007). Those are: (1) the stability and continuity of caregiving;

(2) the parents’ ability to communicate and show mutual respect; (3) the level of

conflict between the parents; and (4) how much they agree in their approach to

daily matters of parenting.3

       On the first Hansen factor, the district court emphasized that “Lindsey has

unquestionably been the primary caretaker of these children all of their lives.” On

appeal, Ricky argues that it is unfair to rely on this approximation factor when

Lindsey has been recalcitrant recently in allowing him visitation. Lindsey counters

that even when they lived in the same home, Ricky “was frequently gone” and did

not provide equal parenting. We agree with the district court that it would not be

in the children’s best interest to upend the stability they have enjoyed with Lindsey.

Without a doubt, they have flourished in her physical care. And they have excelled

in school while enjoying many activities such as sports, dance, and fishing. Any

perceived unfairness to Ricky is not a sound basis to change the physical care

arrangement.

       The remaining three Hansen factors also weigh against moving to joint

physical care. Vroom, the child and family reporter, noted that the parents did not

communicate well—each blaming the other for their rocky relationship. Vroom

3 We also consider the general custody factors in Iowa Code section 598.41(3)

(2022) and in In re Marriage of Winter, 223 N.W.2d 165, 166 (Iowa 1974).
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believed that joint physical care “would put the children in the middle” far more than

their current situation. The record also shows little agreement between Lindsey

and Ricky on their approach to everyday parenting matters.

       Beyond the Hansen factors, Ricky argues that the court overlooked A.R.’s

desire for a shared-care arrangement. Ten-year-old A.R. told Vroom that he would

like “a 50/50 schedule” to compensate for the interactions he missed with Ricky

during the past two years.       True, courts must consider whether a custody

arrangement is in accord with a child’s wishes, considering the child’s age and

maturity. Iowa Code § 598.41(3)(f). In our de novo review, we find that the decree

appropriately addresses A.R.’s wishes by providing Ricky with a more robust

visitation schedule. While A.R. may be impatient to make up lost time with his

father, we agree with the district court’s acceptance of Vroom’s recommendation

to ease the children into more consistent contact with Ricky.

       Like the district court, we find the children’s best interests are served by

remaining in Lindsey’s physical care. This is especially so given the children will

be participating in structured and predictable visitation with Ricky.

       B. Visitation

       If he is not awarded joint physical care, Ricky asks for expanded visitation.

He offers three suggestions: (1) extend his mid-week visit to an overnight;

(2) change his summer session to four weeks; and (3) increase his holiday visits

to twenty-four hours. He argues the current visitation schedule does not provide

the children with “maximum continuing physical and emotional contact with both

parents” as contemplated by Iowa Code section 598.41(1).
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       We disagree and decline to expand the already liberal visitation ordered by

the district court. The record shows that the court’s decision on visitation did

equity. See In re Marriage of Brown, 778 N.W.2d 47, 55 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009).

Indeed, in Vroom’s conversations with L.R., the younger child expressed concerns

about overnights and longer stays at her father’s house.          Considering those

concerns, the modified decree offered opportunities for parenting time that were

reasonable and served both children’s best interests.

       C. Appellate Attorney Fees

       In a modification action, we may grant the prevailing party’s fee request.

Iowa Code § 598.36; In re Marriage of Erlandson, 973 N.W.2d 601, 609 (Iowa Ct.

App. 2022). In exercising our discretion, we consider the parties’ relative abilities

to pay, whether the party resisting modification was successful, and whether a

party had to defend the court’s decision on appeal. In re Marriage of Michael, 839

N.W.2d 630, 639 (Iowa 2013).

       In her appellee’s brief, Lindsey seeks attorney fees for defending the district

court’s modification decision. She notes that Ricky’s annual income exceeds hers

by over $15,000. She also points out that he chose to represent himself in the

district court—saving trial attorney fees. Her counsel filed an affidavit asking for

$7,682.50. Ricky resists that request in his reply brief.

       For the reasons listed by Lindsey, we find she is entitled to attorney fees in

the amount requested. We also order Ricky to pay the costs of the appeal.

       AFFIRMED.