Court Opinion

ID: 9657922
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 20:41:16.173206+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:49.471955
License: Public Domain

*859Newton, J.
Plaintiff, a teacher in the Scottsbluff, Nebraska, public schools, entered into a contract to teach again during the 1967-68 school year. He later received an opportunity to enter into a business and on August 11, 1967, resigned his teaching position. Complaint was made to the State Board of Education that plaintiff had violated his contract. After hearing on the complaint, plaintiff’s teaching certificate was suspended for 1 year commencing December 8, 1967. An appeal was taken but no effort made to supersede the order or have it set for immediate hearing in the district court. The case was heard on December 12, 1968, and dismissed as moot. We affirm the judgment of the district court.
Section 79-1252, R. R. S. 1943, specifically authorizes the State Board of Education to suspend a teacher’s certificate for not to exceed 1 year if, after hearing, it is determined that the teacher has violated his contract without just cause. The plaintiff does not dispute' the facts stated above, but on the contrary, admits their truth.
At the time of the hearing in the district court, the 1-year period of suspension had elapsed. It was impossible for the court to undo what had already transpired or to give plaintiff any effective relief from the order of suspension. From this standpoint, the case was. definitely moot. He insists, however, that he is entitled to a determination of the case on its merits on the theory that he will continue to be adversely affected by the suspension. In this regard he states that it will limit future opportunities to pursue his profession.
We are not inclined to agree with him on this proposition. He admits that he violated his contract and it is this fact, rather than an administrative decision thereon, that might have such a limiting effect. No action of the court could serve to nullify that act or remedy the consequences stemming from it. The criminal cases cited by plaintiff are not in point. When a defendant in a criminal action denies guilt, he is presumed innocent until *860finally adjudged to be guilty. If he has served his sentence before his case is heard on appeal, he is still entitled to have his guilt or innocence determined in the hope of removing the stigma attached to the conviction and regaining the civil rights of which he has been deprived. In McFarland v. State, 165 Neb. 487, 86 N. W. 2d 182, the court stated: “In view of what has already been said of civil and criminal contempt, and the purposes thereof, it is self evident that no issue remains to be decided here. Nothing could be gained by our holding that the commitment was improper for respondent is no longer in jail. He has not been found guilty of criminal contempt, in which case he would be entitled to have his conviction reviewed.” The present case is akin to one in which a defendant voluntarily pleads guilty and then later insists that his conviction should be set aside on the sole ground that it tends to limit his opportunities for gainful employment. It is not the fact of his conviction, but rather the fact of his guilt, that is damaging. Here the plaintiff does not deny a willful contract violation, but, in effect, pleads guilty to it.
Plaintiff had the opportunity to obtain a determination of his appeal to the district court on its merits, but failed to take steps to bring this about. He sat back and permitted the period of suspension to run before securing a hearing. Under such circumstances, he cannot meritoriously complain of the finding by the court that the case is now moot. See McCarter v. Lavery, 101 Neb. 748, 164 N. W. 1054.
“An appellate court may properly decline to express an opinion on a mere abstraction or to determine a moot case * * Dodge Agricultural Credit Assn. v. Tighe, 121 Neb. 458, 237 N. W. 404.
The judgment of the district court dismissing plaintiff’s cause of action could not in any event have been prejudicial to plaintiff. Plaintiff appealed from the decision of the State Board of Education under the provisions contained in section 84-917, R. R. S. 1943, and in *861taking the appeal demanded and obtained the inclusion in the trancsript on appeal of the evidence adduced at the hearing before the State Board of Education. This evidence is also included in the transcript on appeal to this court. It discloses that the plaintiff testified at the hearing and personally verified the fact of his resignation as a teacher on August 11, 1967, for the reason that he wished to enter into a local business. “Just cause” for a contract violation as contemplated by the statute means a legal or lawful ground for such action. The fact that plaintiff wished to enter some other field of endeavor does not constitute a legal or lawful reason for the violation of his contract. It is therefore apparent that plaintiff is not entitled to any relief as a matter of law. “A judgment will not ordinarily be reversed where the complaining party would not be entitled to succeed in any event.” Swink v. Smith, 173 Neb. 423, 113 N. W. 2d 515.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
Affirmed.