Court Opinion

ID: 9483727
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 09:30:07.325182+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:49:48.477676
License: Public Domain

SILBERMAN, Circuit Judge,
concurring in the judgment:
Although I reach the same result as Judge Ginsburg (and agree with her that the error cannot be thought harmless), I think that Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938), requires us to decide the case under the Federal Rules of Evidence. We there*576fore should avoid any discussion of D.C. law, which we should leave to our colleagues across the street to modify if they so wish. Under Erie, of course, the substantive law of the forum state binds a federal court sitting in diversity jurisdiction, see Erie, 304 U.S. at 78-80, 58 S.Ct. at 822-23, but federal law governs in procedural matters. See, e.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 85 S.Ct. 1136, 14 L.Ed.2d 8 (1965); Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 65 S.Ct. 1464, 89 L.Ed. 2079 (1945); see also C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure §§ 4508, 4512 (1982).
I agree with Judge Ginsburg that the claims-minded instruction can be nothing other than an evidentiary rule relating to “evidence of prior acts used to discredit a witness’ testimony.” Opinion of Judge Ginsburg at 6. As the District of Columbia Court of Appeals stated in Manes v. Dowling, 375 A.2d 221 (D.C.1977), “the purpose of a claim-minded-plaintiff instruction is to allow a jury to ‘discount or disregard testimony which runs counter to normal experience.’ ” Id. at 223 (quoting Mintz v. Premier Cab Ass'n, Inc., 127 F.2d 744 (D.C.Cir.1942)). The instruction certainly could not be thought of as an affirmative defense to liability (whatever common sense such a rule might embody). We have previously made clear that an evidentiary rule such as this is part of the procedural, not substantive, law of the District of Columbia and that it is displaced in our court by the Federal Rules of Evidence. See Ealy v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 897 F.2d 1159 (D.C.Cir.1990); Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 857 F.2d 823 (D.C.Cir.1988).
Under Rule 608(b) of the Federal Rules, prior acts used to undermine a witness’ credibility must be “probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness.” Fed.R.Evid. 608(b). The commentary to Rule 608 even refers to this requirement as a “safeguard” that limits the inquiry into prior acts. Id. Notes of Advisory Committee on 1972 Proposed Rules. As Judge Ginsburg points out, mere evidence of prior claims without any evidence that the claims were false is not probative of truthfulness. Cf. Outley v. City of New York, 837 F.2d 587, 592 (2d Cir.1988).