Court Opinion

ID: 9463303
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 23:02:35.749592+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:38:01.244014
License: Public Domain

JONES, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
The majority of the panel holds, if I rightly read its opinion, that the letter of intent from the Superintendent of the School Board to a principal created a property interest in re-employment of which he could not be divested without a Due Process hearing. This, I think, is wrong.
The majority agrees with the district court’s conclusion that the:
“letter of intent created more than a unilateral expectation of re-employment. It created a property interest in re-employment which entitled Principal to a hearing under the principles enunciated in Perry v. Sindermann, 1972, 408 U.S. 593, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 L.Ed.2d 570, and Board of Regents v. Roth, 1972, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548.”
In Perry it was recognized that a teacher may, despite the lack of tenure or a formal contract, have a property interest in continued employment. This property interest could take the form of an implied contract arising from rules and understandings with the employer or from the circumstances and facts of the service. In Perry, such an implied contractual right to re-employment was created by Sindermann’s reliance upon guidelines promulgated by the state university system and provisions that were present in a faculty guide. The court held that, in the absence of such a property interest, “a mere subjective expectancy” is not protected by procedural due process. In Roth, the court determined that the property interest entitling one to a Due Process hearing must consist of more than a “unilateral expectation” of re-employment, and that there must be a legitimate claim of entitlement to the interest. The court concluded that the teacher did not possess a legitimate claim to re-employment because there was no “state statute or University rule or policy that secured his interest in re-employment.”
By these decisions it is made apparent that whether the peculiar facts of the particular case create an implied contract which requires a Due Process hearing for its termination is a question of state law.
The applicable statute of Louisiana provides for a procedure which, as in the Roth case, precludes the acquisition of a property interest in employment until a contract has been made as required by the statute. The Louisiana statute provides that the Parish School Board:
“shall determine the number of schools to be opened, the location of the school houses, the number of teachers to be employed, and select such teachers from nominations made by the parish superintendent, provided that a majority of the full membership of the board may elect teachers without the endorsement of the superintendent.” LSA-R.S. 17:81.
The Louisiana courts are not unfamiliar with the requirement that contracts of employment of teachers cannot be made by a letter from the Superintendent without the action of the school board. The Louisiana Court of Appeals has said:
“this letter falls far short of constituting such a contract as is contemplated under the statute. In the first place, under section 20 of the Act, the School Board itself is charged with the selection of teachers, such selection to be made from nominations presented it by the Parish Superintendent. The Board itself has the authority to employ teachers either by the month or the year and to fix their salaries. Under Section 49 of the Act it is provided that no person shall be appointed to teach without a written contract for the scholastic year in which the school is to be taught, which contract is to be signed by the Superintendent. It is to be noted that the letter on which plaintiff relies is in the first place purely an offer of a position as plaintiff is therein specifically-asked by the Superintendent to let him know if he will accept the *536position tendered to him. In the second place there is absolutely nothing in the letter itself, nor in plaintiff’s petition to indicate that the Superintendent was authorized by the School Board to make the offer therein contained.” Blankston v. Tangipahoa Parish School Board, La. App., 1st Cir. 1939, 190 So. 177.
In Richie v. Ascension Parish School Board, La.App., 1st Cir. 1941, 200 So. 681, it was held that a letter from the parish superintendent to a teacher, requesting that she report for work, could not be construed into contract between the teacher and the board because there was no evidence that it was authorized by the board.
Not only is a letter from the parish superintendent insufficient to create a property interest in continued employment, but the parish superintendent is powerless to create, unilaterally, any right to employment. In State v. Winn Parish School Board, La. App., 2d Cir. 1942, 9 So.2d 342, the plaintiff maintained that she became an employee of the school board when the parish superintendent permitted her to teach in a parish school. The court determined that there was no employment contract prior to the execution of a contract between the teacher and the school board. The court said:
“Therefore, since the power to select, employ and discharge employees is a privilege and a power peculiar to a school board and may not be delegated, ■ it unquestionably follows that the action of a superintendent in selecting and, so far as he is able, employing a teacher without the knowledge or consent of the board, is so palpably ultra vires as to create no obligation whatever as against the board, and this being true, certainly' by no stretch of the imagination could such teacher enjoy the status of employee of the board.”
The property interest, required by the Perry case, supra, may not arise through an estoppel against the school board. In the Bankston case, supra, and Brown v. St. Bernard Parish School Board, La.App., Orleans 1930, 131 So. 760, the court rejected plaintiffs' contentions and held that the teacher selection processes, the actions of the superintendent in assigning teaching positions prior to the actual execution of a contract with the school board, and reliance upon the superintendent’s nominations and letters did not estop the school board from denying the existence of an employment contract. The court stated that the school board is not bound by the acts of the parish superintendent. In Brown it is said that:
“a private corporation which by its conduct leads one to believe that an agent has authority is therefore estopped to deny that authority, but that rule does not apply to a public body or board the duties and powers of whose officers are fixed by law. Those who deal with such officers are bound to know the law with reference thereto. In State v. La Cypress Lumber Company, 144 La. 559, 80 So. 722, the court said: ‘The state is not estopped by the unauthorized acts of officers whose powers are defined and limited by law’ ”.
Employment may not arise through an estoppel against the school board, but only through the execution of contracts between the teacher and the board. State v. Winn Parish School Board, La.App., 2d Cir. 1942, 9 So.2d 342; Richie v. Ascension School Board, supra.
The appellant had nothing more than an expectancy. This does not create a right or consummate a contract. The Louisiana court has said:
“There is no binding employment on the part of the school board or the teacher until the written contract between them is executed by both parties thereto. Pri- or to the signing or execution of the contract, either the teacher or school board may withdraw from any former agreement without any reason and without liability on the part of either, for the reason that there is no binding contract or agreement until the written contract is executed.” Lanier v. Catahoula Parish School Board, La.App., 2d Cir. 1934, 154 So. 469.
More might be said. Enough has been said. The principal had no tenure. He had *537no property right, contractual or otherwise, to re-employment. His claim to the protection of the constitution must be based upon a right created by the Louisiana law. I can see no such right. The majority vacate and remand. I would reverse and remand with directions to enter judgment for the school board.