Court Opinion

ID: 9628694
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:29:28.492626+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:36.112178
License: Public Domain

BERNSTEIN, Justice
(dissenting).
I dissent from the decision of the majority.
I agree that the issue here presented does not raise a question of Federal Constitutional law. In Palko v. State of Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 58 S.Ct. 149, 82 L.Ed. 288, the Supreme Court of the United States held that a Connecticut statute permitting the state to appeal in a criminal case does not so “violate those ‘fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions’ ” as to infringe the “due process” clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States (302 U.S. at page 328, 58 S.Ct. at page 153).
The Palko case did not purport, however, to construe the “double jeopardy” clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States or similar provisions of state constitutions. Nor was there any intention, by this exercise of Federal judicial self-restraint, to limit the states to striking down as violative of their own constitutions only what subjects an individual to “a hardship so acute and shocking that our polity will not endure it” (Palko v. State of Connecticut, supra, 302 U.S. at page 328, 58 S.Ct. at page 153). Under our federal system the states no less than the Federal Government are guardians of the rights of the people.
The question is whether a retrial of defendant Thomas for the crime of murder violates the Arizona Constitution, and particularly Article II, Section 10, thereof:
“No person shall * * * be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.”
In Territory of Arizona v. Dorman, 1 Ariz. 56, 25 P. 516, a judgment convicting defendant of murder was set aside with direction for a new trial. This Court there ruled that the defendant could be tried again *274for the crime of which he had been convictedand not, as here, for a crime of which the jury had failed to convict him.
The issue thus presented herein has not been previously determined by this Court. Other jurisdictions have considered this problem and have virtually split in result. These authorities are collated in Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 216-218, 78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199, footnote 4, which shows that of the thirty-six states which had then considered the question, nineteen permitted retrial of the defendant for the greater offense, while seventeen states held such retrial to be a violation of their double jeopardy provisions. See also Annotation, 61 A.L.R.2d 1141.
In the Green case, supra, the Supreme Court of the United States, in a five-to-four decision, held that a retrial, similar to that sought in the instant case, violates the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Since that decision in December 1957, two states, listed in footnote 4 of the Green case as permitting retrial for the greater offense, have adhered to that position (Blanton v. Commonwealth, Ky., 320 S.W.2d 626; People ex rel. Hetenyi v. Johnston, 10 A.D.2d 121, 198 N.Y.S.2d 18); two other states similarly listed have since held, in reliance on the Green case, that such a retrial violates their double j eopardy provisions (State v. Schoel, 54 Wash.2d 388, 341 P.2d 481; State v. Williams, 30 N.J. 105, 152 A.2d 9); and one state, overruling prior decisions permitting a retrial in certain circumstances, has adopted the Green rule in full (Gomez v. Superior Court, 50 Cal.2d 640, 328 P.2d 976).
Although the rule forbidding a retrial of the greater offense is now followed in a majority of the jurisdictions which have considered this question, that alone is not persuasive. Our duty is to adopt that rule which “best serves the rights and liberties of the people” of our State (State v. Williams, supra, 152 A.2d at page 13). The majority opinion fails to consider that objective.
In the instant case defendant Thomas was tried on a charge of murder in the first degree. Under our procedure the jury was instructed to determine, first, whether the defendant was guilty of murder in the first degree; if not, then murder in the second degree; and only if the jury found the defendant not guilty of murder, was it to determine whether defendant had been proved guilty of manslaughter beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury returned a verdict finding defendant guilty of manslaughter and judgment was entered thereon. From that judgment the State did not and could not appeal.
It is not significant whether we call the jury’s failure to convict the defendant of murder an “acquittal” or “implied acquittal”. Its effect is to bar the court from entering a judgment of conviction or imposing pun*275ishment for that crime. The effect of the majority decision is to permit the State to accomplish collaterally what it is precluded from doing directly, and solely as a consequence of defendant’s exercise of his constitutional right of appeal. Arizona Constitution, Article II, Section 24. There is no reasonable justification or rational basis for subjecting defendant to a second trial of a crime for which he has once been tried and not convicted, merely because he has appealed from conviction of another, though related and lesser, crime.
It has been suggested that defendant’s decision to appeal from the manslaughter conviction constitutes a “waiver” of his right not to be retried for murder. Waiver is a legal conclusion predicated on a party’s voluntary relinquishment of a known right. A holding that an appeal from a conviction for the lesser offense does not permit retrial for the greater offense means that no right has been relinquished. Even the majority decision herein does not afford application to defendant Thomas of the consequences of waiver. This decision is the first to construe the double jeopardy provisions of the Arizona Constitution and, accordingly, it cannot fairly be said that defendant Thomas knew that his appeal constituted a relinquishment of his right not to be tried for the greater offense. Defendant might be said to have voluntarily and knowingly relinquished or waived this right, if at all, only if this Court had, prior to his appeal, determined and made known the effect of such appeal.
Indeed, the consequences of the so-called waiver flow not from the fact of defendant’s appeal, but rather from its success. If the defendant had failed to demonstrate on appeal that error prejudicial to him had been committed in the trial court, the judgment of conviction would have been affirmed and the State thereafter precluded from retrying defendant for the greater offense. Only the fact that defendant was prejudiced by error made in the course of the trial, requires him to stand trial a second time for the greater offense. The point is that the rule adopted by the majority penalizes not the defendant whose appeal has been unsuccessful, but only the defendant who has demonstrated that substantial justice was once denied him (see Arizona Constitution, Article VI, Section 22). Thus, the defendant who was not accorded substantial justice the first time suffers risks greater than those incurred by the defendant who has once received a fair trial.
The injustice of the majority decision is that it imposes upon a defendant an awful choice which may, as in the instant case, compel him to ante his own life in a gamble for his freedom. The defendant who has cause for a successful appeal must decide whether to avail himself of his constitutional right of appeal and incur the risks attendant upon a retrial of the greater crime for which he has once been tried and not *276convicted; or to relinquish that right and suffer a conviction, albeit for the lesser offense, founded on error. How lightly, indeed, we esteem this constitutional right when we require that it be exercised in a manner so perilous to the person intended to be benefited by it.
The majority opinion is a precedent for the triumph of technical rules over substantial justice. It is founded on the procedural happenstance that a defendant is tried for the several degrees of murder and manslaughter in one trial. If our procedure required a separate trial or a separate judgment for each degree of homicide, and permitted a defendant to limit his appeal to a particular judgment, there would be no basis, even procedurally, for a retrial of the degree of homicide for which a non-appeal-able judgment of no conviction had been entered. No reason appears why this slight distinction in procedure should effect a weighty difference in substance.
The constitutional rights and privileges of our citizens ought to be enhanced, not restricted. The spirit and purpose of the rule against double jeopardy deserves our careful consideration and respect.
“The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty.” Green v. United States, 355 U.S. at pages 187-188, 78 S.Ct. at page 223.
o
I believe that the decision of the majority renders a disservice to our constitutional rights and privileges. The certified question should be answered Yes.