Court Opinion

ID: 9848640
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:23:54.098459+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:32.761009
License: Public Domain

RAWLINGS, Justice
(dissenting).
Being unable to agree with the reasoning and result reached in Division I of the majority opinion, I respectfully dissent.
Code § 795.2, relating to speedy trial, is quoted by the majority and need not be repeated. In brief, it mandates trial within 60 days after return of an indictment (or filing of information) absent a showing of good cause by the State for any delay beyond the statutory period. See State v. Leonard, 240 N.W.2d 690, 691-692 (Iowa 1976).
Application of Code § 795.2 in the present case can best be understood by this chronological portrayal of relevant events:
October 7, 1974, county attorney’s information filed in Hamilton County. October 14, 1974, defendant arraigned and given ten days to file pretrial motions; he refused to waive his right to speedy trial.
October 22, 1974, defendant moved for dismissal and demurred.
October 31, 1974, State filed resistance to defendant’s motion and demurrer. November 18, 1974, trial court fixed December 9,1974, as the time for hearing on defendant’s motion and demurrer. December 6, 1974, the 60 day period from filing of the county attorney’s information expired.
December 9, 1974, hearing on defendant’s motion and demurrer was not held, purportedly because defendant and his attorney did not personally appear.
December 13, 1974, defendant moved for continuance of the separate Webster County criminal case on grounds of illness.
December 24,1974, order entered overruling defendant’s motion to dismiss and demurrer in the present case.
January 22, 1975, defendant moved for dismissal based on denial of a speedy trial per Code § 795.2.
January 27, 1975, trial commenced.
The record also reveals defendant filed a motion to dismiss and demurrer in the separate Webster County prosecution, October 22, 1974, the same date he moved to dismiss and demurred in the instant case. The documents filed in both Hamilton and Webster Counties are identical. October 30, 1974, defendant’s Webster County motion and demurrer were overruled.
Assuming, arguendo, trial court was justified in considering the Webster County illness-based December 13, 1974, motion for continuance as good cause for some delay in *442this separate case, we should also consider the fact that the Webster County court was able to process and dispose of defendant’s like pretrial motion and demurrer in eight days, whereas 62 days were here inexplicably consumed in the same process. In addition, defendant’s illness did not become a delay-causing factor until December 13, 1974, seven days after expiration of the 60 day speedy trial period provided by Code § 795.2.
Significantly, the majority concedes there was a delay of seven days beyond the aforesaid statutory limitation, but this is brushed aside. In doing so, however, the majority overlooks this apt pronouncement in State v. Sassman, 226 N.W.2d 808, 809 (Iowa 1975):
“The time lag involved here is insignificant, and defendant made no attempt to show he was prejudiced thereby. However, it is not necessary that he do so. Cf. State v. Nelson, 222 N.W.2d 445, 449 (Iowa 1974) and State v. Hines, 225 N.W.2d 156, 159 (1975). We have said that the State cannot excuse its failure to comply with the statute by showing it was violated only a little bit. Like all limitation statutes, § 795.1 has an arbitrary deadline. The State may avoid its impact only by showing good cause for the delay.”
See also State v. Goff, 244 N.W.2d 579, 582 (Iowa 1976).
Goff recognized unreasonable court delay in processing a defense motion is not good cause attributable to an accused. Id., 244 N.W.2d at 583. There the delay came about after submission of State’s resistance to the motion. Here it occurred both before and after submission of the motion and demurrer. Moreover, the issues thereby raised by defendant were not so complex as to require the time expended to effectuate a ruling thereon. See Goff, supra.
Demonstrably, the dismissal motion was based on alleged constitutional violations because defendant did not have a preliminary hearing. It was palpably devoid of merit and could have been readily acted upon. See Furgison v. State, 217 N.W.2d 613, 616 (Iowa 1974), and citations. And the demurrer was based on the ground treated in Division V of the majority opinion. It too was plainly without merit and required no lengthy or time-consuming study.
It is also to me evident the majority places unwarranted importance on the fact that one judge was unavoidably incapacitated during the period of time here involved. The State neither claimed nor did anything in the record show any causal relationship between disability of one judge in the judicial district and the delay. Moreover, we should take judicial notice of the fact that 14 judges were then serving in the Second Judicial District. In brief, it is to me inconceivable that the absence of one judge justifiably precluded timely trial on the instant Hamilton County charge. See Iowa R.Civ.P. 378.
It may be assumed defendant’s illness constituted good cause for not bringing his cases on for trial between December 13, 1974 and January 27, 1975. But this cannot justify or excuse the earlier seven day delay in no way attributable to defendant.
Of course, Code § 795.2 was only “violated a little bit” but such constituted a clear-cut violation of the statutorily mandated deadline. See State v. Sassman, supra; State v. Nelson, 222 N.W.2d 445, 449 (Iowa 1974).
It therefore follows the limited discretion vested in trial court was here abused.
I would reverse and remand with directions to sustain defendant’s motion to dismiss the Hamilton County charge. See State v. Johnson, 217 N.W.2d 609, 611-612 (Iowa 1974).
MASON and McCORMICK, JJ„ join this dissent.