Court Opinion

ID: 9496427
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 16:26:18.274706+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:57:34.408925
License: Public Domain

PAULINE NEWMAN, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
This thoroughly tried ease produced not only several careful and well-considered opinions by the district court, but a month’s trial to a jury. The majority now negates the rulings of the district court and the findings of the jury, and rules that digital-to-digital conversion by software is not within the scope of the disclosed “conversion.” I cannot agree.
The patent specification describes every function that is included in the claims, and includes a microfiche appendix containing the software for the functions that are unique to the patented invention. The specification states that these computer-managed functions are conducted by software. Both sides testified that software routines for digital-to-digital conversion are within routine skill. The majority has created inappropriate conditions for computer-based inventions; conditions that are, nonetheless, met. Grounds of overturning the results of trial have not been shown.
I
The invention is a computer-implemented system that aids in brain surgery by providing the superposition and manipulation of images from various sources, thereby enhancing precision in visualizing the brain. The claims include the clause: “means for converting said plurality of images into a selected format.” This clause is the focus of the majority opinion, and is the ground on which the claim is held not infringed.
The majority holds that “the district court erred by identifying software as an additional corresponding structure for this limitation,” my colleagues finding that software is not disclosed in the specification. However, the specification states that the claimed functions are performed by software. Claims 8 and 30 of the '846 patent are specific to the use of software. E.g.:
8. The invention of claim 1 wherein all said means are software-programmable.
The district court correctly found that software procedures for digital-to-digital conversion were well known to persons skilled in the field. The panel majority states that “we have no reason to doubt” this finding, but also holds that it is irrelevant. The majority states:
However, that is not the correct inquiry. The correct inquiry is to look at the disclosure of the patent and determine if one of skill in the art would have understood that disclosure to teach software for digital-to-digital conversion and been able to implement such a program, not simply whether one of skill in the art would have been able to write such a software program.
Maj op. at 1212. The majority is not correct. The patent specification need not “teach software” and the writing of routine programs in order to teach how to practice the described method. It suffices if one of skill in the art “would have been able to write” a standard program of digital-to-digital conversion. If one of skill in the programming art would have been able to write such a program without undue experimentation, the statutory requirements are met. See, e.g., Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co. v. Chemque, Inc., 303 F.3d 1294, 1301 (Fed. Cir.2002) (enablement requires that the disclosure teach how to carry out the claimed invention without undue experimentation).
The specifications of both the '684 and the '846 patents, at column 11:37-43 and column 11:38-44 respectively, state that “image editing” is performed by “modular *1224software subroutines.” The district court found that “the specification is clear that digital data acquired via an Ethernet connection or magnetic transport media must be converted to a common format.” In evidence were several publicly available routines for digital-to-digital procedures, including a Programmer’s Manual from the commercial purveyor ITEX. Midco states that the Programmer’s Manual contained “routines for changing the number of pixels in an image data file.” Midco’s expert explained: “The actual aspects of changing the digital format from one, for instance, number of pixels to another number of pixels, is not disclosed or discussed in the document, presumably ... because it was well-known in the art and required no explanation.” It is not clear whether the majority opinion finds its fatal flaw in the description or the enablement requirement, for compliance with both was established at trial, and is supported by the evidence at trial.
The specification included the full details of those programs that are unique to the invention, including 8 sheets of microfiche, with 65 frames per sheet. The specification stated:
Software usable with the apparatus hardware to practice and to carry out the desiderata of the invention is disclosed herewith.
The program listings in the microfiche appendix are directed to the programmed interface to computer video processor; an electrophysiological maps program, an anatomical maps program, a probe placement program, a stereotactic frame calibration program, an icon layout program and a touchscreen control program. These programs are unique to the invention. Other programs used in practicing the invention, such as image manipulation programs, are either commercially available or within the skill of practitioners in the programming arts.
'846 patent, 12:15-28. The panel majority appears to understand that the software programs it says are lacking are “commercially available or within the skill of ordinary practitioners,” but holds that that does not suffice. Precedent is clearly contrary. For decades the rule and practice has been that such software need not be included in the specification. Over thirty years ago this court’s predecessor endorsed this format, stating in In re Chiron, 58 C.C.P.A. 1207, 442 F.2d 985, 991 (CCPA 1971), that “if such a selection would be ‘well within the skill of persons of ordinary skill in the art,’ such functional-type block diagrams may be acceptable and, in fact, preferable if they serve in conjunction with the rest of the specification to enable a person skilled in the art to make such a selection and practice the claimed invention with only a reasonable degree of routine experimentation.” See Creo Products, Inc. v. Presstek, Inc., 305 F.3d 1337, 1347 (Fed.Cir.2002) (“To the extent that [Plaintiff-Appellant] contends that additional structure is required for completely performing the function of ‘rotating each cylinder,’ we consider such structure to be implicit in the disclosure of the '368 patent. Under our case law interpreting § 112, ¶ 6, knowledge of one skilled in the art can be called upon to flesh out a particular structural reference in the specification for the purpose of satisfying the statutory requirement of definiteness.”)
The majority’s finding that the use of software was not disclosed has led the court to find non-infringement under § 112 ¶ 6. Now requiring that more must be recited than that the computerized conversion is run by software, it is far from clear what my colleagues are requiring. Is this court now requiring a five-foot-shelf of ze*1225ros and ones? These patent documents, drawn by and for professionals in the field, fully explained at trial, have not been shown to be deficient. Experts for both sides agreed that the programming for digital-to-digital conversion was routine. Elekta’s expert testified: “There are numerous and varied routines and algorithms available for moving, altering and manipulating digital data.” The claimed conversions are all performed by software, analog to digital or digital to digital as appropriate, as is recognized in the specification.
As the appellate tribunal, our obligation is to determine whether the jury verdict could have been reached by a reasonable jury, on the correct law and supported by substantial evidence — not to strain for ways to reject the verdict. See Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645, 653, 66 S.Ct. 740, 90 L.Ed. 916 (1946) (“Only when there is a complete absence of probative facts to support the conclusion reached does a reversible error appear. But where, as here, there is an evidentiary basis for the jury’s verdict, the jury is free to discard or disbelieve whatever facts are inconsistent with its conclusion. And the appellate court’s function is exhausted when that evidentia-ry basis becomes apparent, it being immaterial that the court might draw a contrary inference or feel that another conclusion is more reasonable.”)
The evidence at trial was directly concerned with the description of the conversion step and how it was conducted. The district court ruled that “the jury had ample uncontroverted evidence that the software in the accused products fulfills the elements of the patents as construed by the Court.” There was substantial evidence supporting the jury verdict. From my colleagues inappropriate reversal of that verdict I must, respectfully, dissent.
II
The panel majority, having found nonin-fringement, nonetheless remands for determination of the issue of validity. However, with this court’s decision, the case is over. I agree of course that Cardinal Chemical Co. v. Morton International, Inc., 508 U.S. 83, 113 S.Ct. 1967, 124 L.Ed.2d 1 (1993), requires the Federal Circuit to review validity when (as here) the district court decided validity. But Cardinal Chemical does not require the parties and the district court to continue to litigate when the controversy has ended. This is not a matter of discretion on remand; the case is over.
The issue before the Court in Cardinal Chemical was whether a finding of nonin-fringement by the Federal Circuit was “a sufficient reason for vacating a declaratory judgment holding the patent invalid.” The Court determined that “even after affirming the finding of noninfringement” the Federal Circuit has jurisdiction to review an appeal from a declaratory judgment of invalidity, and ruled: “The Federal Circuit’s practice is therefore neither compelled by our cases nor supported by the ‘case or controversy’ requirement of Article III.” Id. at 99, 113 S.Ct. 1967. The Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s practice of routinely vacating a district court’s judgment on the issue of validity after an appellate ruling of noninfringement, stating that the interests of the public, the alleged infringer, and the patentee, all require appellate review of a decision on the merits of a counterclaim on the issue of validity. The Court “acknowledge^] that factors in an unusual case might justify [the Federal Circuit’s] refusal to reach the merits of a validity determination — a determination which it might therefore be appropriate to vacate. A finding of nonin-fringement alone, however, does not justify such a result.” Id. at 102, 113 S.Ct. 1967.
*1226In this case, the district court on summary judgment decided Elekta’s defenses on the issues of validity. Medical Instrumentation and Diagnostics Corp. v. Elekta AB, No. CV-97-2271 (S.D.Cal. Nov. 5, 2001) (Order). On appeal to this court, Elekta argues that the district court usurped the jury’s function, and the panel majority apparently agrees, for they now send the matter back for trial, stating that “the district court erred in finding that Elekta failed to demonstrate the existence of an issue of material fact on obviousness.”
I agree that the issue of validity is not ripe for appellate review. But on remand there remains no continuing controversy between the parties. Perhaps this is, as contemplated in Cardinal Chemical, a case in which a validity determination warrants simple vacatur. Surely it is inappropriate for the appellate court to propose that the parties may continue to litigate in the district court, after noninfringement has been found on appeal.