Court Opinion

ID: 9949276
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-11 09:09:41.975007+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:29:23.677557
License: Public Domain

In the
        Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
         at Fort Worth
     ___________________________

          No. 02-23-00119-CR
     ___________________________

    JASON SCOTT DAVIS, Appellant

                    V.

         THE STATE OF TEXAS

  On Appeal from the 372nd District Court
         Tarrant County, Texas
       Trial Court No. 1672108D

  Before Kerr, Womack, and Walker, JJ.
 Memorandum Opinion by Justice Womack
                           MEMORANDUM OPINION

                                  I. INTRODUCTION

      A jury convicted Appellant Jason Scott Davis of one count of continuous

sexual abuse of a young child and one count of indecency with a child. See Tex. Penal

Code Ann. §§ 21.02, 21.11(a)(1). The trial court assessed his punishment at eighty

years’ confinement for continuous sexual abuse of a young child and twenty years’

confinement for indecency with a child, with the sentences to run concurrently. In

two issues, Davis argues that the trial court erred by not conducting a thorough

inquiry into his complaint that his trial counsel had a conflict of interest and that the

trial court abused its discretion by not explicitly finding that certain proffered

extraneous-offense evidence—pertaining to Davis’s sexual abuse of his son—was

adequate to support a finding that he had committed the extraneous offense beyond a

reasonable doubt. We will affirm.

                                  II. BACKGROUND

      In early 2021, Davis was indicted for, among other things, continuous sexual

abuse of a young child and indecency with a child stemming from his sexual abuse of

his daughter’s friend, J.S. (Julia).1 Davis was appointed trial counsel in February 2021.

In August 2022, Davis filed pro se a “Declaration of Conflict Between Attorney and

      1
       To protect the complainant’s anonymity, we use an alias to refer to her. See
Tex. R. App. P. 9.8 cmt., 9.10(a)(3); McClendon v. State, 643 S.W.2d 936, 936 n.1 (Tex.
Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1982).

                                           2
Client and Motion for Substitution of Appointed Counsel” in which he complained

about his trial counsel (the Declaration).2 In the Declaration, Davis complained that

he had only spoken to his trial counsel three times; that each time that he had met

with his trial counsel, it had been in a holding cell in which other persons were

present; that he had tried to reach out to his trial counsel on multiple occasions but

had received no response; and that he did not know what was going on with his case.

Davis requested that the trial court substitute new trial counsel, and he asked for a

hearing on that request.

      Despite the filing of the Declaration, Davis’s case proceeded to trial in

October 2022. During appearances before the trial court that month, Davis did not

mention the Declaration, nor did he voice any complaint to the trial court regarding

his trial counsel despite the trial court’s asking him questions that touched upon his

dealings with his trial counsel. To that end, at Davis’s October 10, 2022 arraignment,

the following exchange occurred:

      THE COURT: All right. You and your attorney have received a copy
      of the detailed indictment and your lawyer tells me you can read and
      understand English, read it yourself and certainly understand it after
      discussing it together.

             Is that correct, sir?

             THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

      2
       The Declaration was verified by Davis in April 2022, mailed to the trial judge
in May 2022, and ultimately filed in the trial court in August 2022.

                                          3
      ....

              THE COURT: Your lawyer also tells me that with your consent
      on your behalf, he’s entering a plea of not guilty to every charging
      allegation in your indictment with your approval.

             Is that correct?

             THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

Prior to voir dire beginning on October 20, 2022, the following exchange occurred:

             THE COURT: Mr. Davis, you are before the Court in this case,
      charged in a five-count indictment with the felony offense of sexual
      abuse -- continuous sexual abuse of a child under 14. Have you been
      over this indictment with your attorney?

             THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

      ....

            THE COURT: When you talk to [your trial counsel], can you
      understand his legal advice?

             THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

             THE COURT: Have you been able to assist him in getting the
      case ready for today?

             THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

      During Davis’s trial, Julia testified that she was the best friend of Davis’s

daughter. Due to that friendship, Julia spent many weekends at Davis’s home. Julia

testified that during many of those visits, Davis would wake her up and sexually abuse

                                          4
her.3 She also indicated that Davis had touched her stomach and vagina over her

clothes on an occasion when he was driving her home. Julia stated that the abuse

started when she was “nine or ten” and that it continued until she was “14 or 15.”4

      Later during Davis’s trial, the State indicated that it wanted to call Davis’s son,

R.D. (Richie)5 as a witness, and the State asked for a hearing pursuant to Article 38.37

of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.37,

§ 2-a. The jury was excused, and during the hearing, Richie testified that he had been

sexually abused by Davis when he was “between the ages of four and eight.” Davis’s

trial counsel informed the trial court that the Tarrant County District Attorney’s

Office had dismissed the case against Davis stemming from his abuse of Richie, and

he objected based on relevance and his view that the probative value of the evidence

was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.         The trial court

overruled Davis’s objections and granted him running objections, and Richie testified

about the abuse before the jury.

      The jury ultimately convicted Davis of continuous sexual abuse of a young

child and indecency with a child, and this appeal followed.

      3
       Because Davis does not complain about the sufficiency of the evidence to
support his convictions, we need not detail Julia’s testimony regarding the sexual
abuse. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.
      4
       Julia was seventeen at the time of trial.

      We use an alias to refer to Davis’s son. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.8 cmt., 9.10(a)(3);
      5

McClendon, 643 S.W.2d 936, 936 n.1.

                                            5
                                   III. DISCUSSION

A. Davis’s First Issue

      In his first issue, Davis argues that the trial court erred by not conducting a

thorough inquiry into his complaint that his trial counsel had a conflict of interest.

      1. Applicable Law

      A conflict of interest exists if counsel is required to make a choice between

advancing his client’s interest in a fair trial or advancing other interests to the

detriment of his client’s interest. Routier v. State, 112 S.W.3d 554, 582 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2003) (citing James v. State, 763 S.W.2d 776, 779 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989)). To

demonstrate a violation of the right to reasonably effective assistance of counsel based

on a conflict of interest, a defendant must show that counsel was actively representing

conflicting interests and that the conflict had an adverse effect on specific instances of

counsel’s performance. Ex parte Morrow, 952 S.W.2d 530, 538 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997);

Palacios v. State, No. 01-02-00498-CR, 2003 WL 21357328, at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston

[1st Dist.] June 12, 2003, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication). When

a trial court knows, or reasonably should know, that a particular conflict of interest

exists, the court has an obligation to investigate and determine whether the risk of the

conflict of interest is too remote to warrant separate counsel. Routier, 112 S.W.3d

at 581.

                                            6
       2. Analysis

       We begin our analysis of this issue by determining whether Davis has preserved

it for our review.    To preserve a complaint for our review, a party must have

presented to the trial court a timely request, objection, or motion sufficiently stating

the specific grounds, if not apparent from the context, for the desired ruling. Tex. R.

App. P. 33.1(a)(1); Montelongo v. State, 623 S.W.3d 819, 822 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021).

Further, the party must obtain an express or implicit adverse trial-court ruling or

object to the trial court’s refusal to rule. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(2); Dixon v. State,

595 S.W.3d 216, 223 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020). Because it is a systemic requirement,

this court should independently review error preservation, and we have a duty to

ensure that a claim is properly preserved in the trial court before we address its merits.

Dixon, 595 S.W.3d at 223.

       Here, Davis filed his Declaration complaining of his trial counsel in

August 2022. But nothing more was done by Davis with respect to his Declaration.

His case proceeded to trial in October 2022, and at the outset of that trial, Davis

stated that he had discussed the indictment with his trial counsel; that his trial counsel

had entered a plea on his behalf with his approval; that he understood the legal advice

given by his trial counsel; and that he had been able to assist his trial counsel in getting

the case ready for trial. At no point during his trial did Davis mention the Declaration

or voice any complaint regarding his trial counsel. Perhaps more importantly, Davis

                                             7
never complained to the trial court that it had failed to conduct an inquiry into the

alleged conflict of interest—the very complaint he now makes on appeal.

       Based on this record, we hold that Davis has not preserved his complaint that

the trial court failed to conduct a thorough inquiry into his trial counsel’s alleged

conflict of interest. See Palacios, 2003 WL 21357328, at *7 (holding that appellant

waived complaint regarding alleged conflict of interest with trial counsel where

appellant filed pro se motions complaining about dissatisfaction with trial counsel but

later indicated that he understood that trial counsel had been working on his behalf

and case proceeded to trial); see also Smith v. State, No. 2-03-080-CR, 2004 WL 595069,

at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 25, 2004, pet. ref’d) (per curiam) (not designated

for publication) (holding that trial court could have reasonably concluded that

appellant was satisfied with trial counsel’s representation based on statements made in

written plea admonishments despite appellant’s previous complaint of conflict with

trial counsel).

       Even if Davis had preserved this issue, we are not persuaded that the trial court

had a duty to inquire about the complaints raised by Davis in the Declaration. To that

end, while the Declaration referenced a “conflict” between Davis and his trial counsel,

the facts in support of that alleged “conflict” simply related to a purported lack of

communication between Davis and his trial counsel. Indeed, none of the facts

mentioned in the Declaration suggest that Davis’s trial counsel was required to make a

choice between advancing Davis’s interest in a fair trial or advancing other interests to

                                           8
the detriment of Davis’s interest. See Routier, 112 S.W.3d at 582. Thus, we hold that

the trial court was under no obligation to inquire about the complaints raised by Davis

in the Declaration. See Cooper v. State, No. 05-18-01246-CR, 2019 WL 6606364, at *3

(Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 5, 2019, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for

publication) (“[I]t is not always necessary for the court to hold a hearing concerning

an alleged conflict when a substitution motion does not advance a valid basis for the

asserted conflict.”); Corona v. State, No. 04-02-00861-CR, 2004 WL 56922, at *2 (Tex.

App.—San Antonio Jan. 14, 2004, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for

publication) (holding that “trial court was under no obligation to initiate an inquiry”

into appellant’s complaint that “merely alleged that [his] attorney was not adequately

preparing for trial and was no longer trusted by [appellant]”); Harrell v. State, No. 12-

00-00356-CR, 2002 WL 31656213, at *3 (Tex. App.—Tyler Nov. 26, 2002, pet. ref’d)

(not designated for publication) (“Although Appellant established a potential conflict of

interest, his statements to the trial court do not establish an actual conflict. Therefore,

the trial court was not obligated to conduct any further inquiry to ascertain whether

Appellant’s counsel should have been removed.”).

      We overrule Davis’s first issue.

B. Davis’s Second Issue

      In his second issue, Davis argues that the trial court abused its discretion by not

explicitly finding that the extraneous-offense evidence concerning his sexual abuse of

                                            9
Richie was adequate to support a finding that he had committed the extraneous-

offense beyond a reasonable doubt.

      1. Applicable Law

      Generally, an accused may be tried only for the offense for which he is charged

and may not be tried for a collateral crime or for being a criminal generally. Stafford v.

State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 506 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Gusman v. State, No. 02-18-00157-

CR, 2018 WL 3060213, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 21, 2018, pet. ref’d)

(mem. op., not designated for publication). But Article 38.37, Section 2 of the Texas

Code of Criminal Procedure permits—in a prosecution for certain enumerated

crimes, including continuous sexual abuse of a young child and indecency with a

child—the admission of extraneous evidence that a defendant had committed a

separate identified sexual offense “for any bearing the evidence has on relevant

matters, including the character of the defendant and acts performed in conformity

with the character of the defendant.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.37, § 2(b).

Before a trial court admits such evidence, the court must “determine that the evidence

likely to be admitted at trial will be adequate to support a finding by the jury that the

defendant committed the separate offense beyond a reasonable doubt” and “conduct

a hearing out of the presence of the jury for that purpose.” Id. art. 38.37, § 2-a.

      2. Analysis

      We begin our review of this issue by determining whether Davis has preserved

this complaint for appeal. See Dixon, 595 S.W.3d at 223. As noted above, to preserve

                                            10
a complaint for our review, a party must have presented to the trial court a timely

request, objection, or motion sufficiently stating the specific grounds, if not apparent

from the context, for the desired ruling. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1); Montelongo,

623 S.W.3d at 822. A complaint will not be preserved if the legal basis of the

complaint raised on appeal varies from the complaint made at trial. Polk v. State,

No. 02-13-00556-CR, 2015 WL 1883014, at *7 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 23,

2015, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication); see Aquino Calderon v. State,

No. 01-22-00512-CR, 2023 WL 8262710, at *11 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

Nov. 30, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“A defendant also

fails to preserve error when the contention urged on appeal does not match with the

specific complaint made in the trial court.”).

      On appeal, Davis complains that the trial court did not make an explicit finding

that the extraneous-offense evidence concerning his sexual abuse of Richie was

adequate to support a finding that he had committed the extraneous offense beyond a

reasonable doubt. But Davis did not lodge such a complaint with the trial court.

While Davis did object to the admission of Richie’s testimony on the grounds that it

was irrelevant and that its probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger

of unfair prejudice, those objections do not match the complaint Davis now makes on

appeal. See Polk, 2015 WL 1883014, at *7; Aquino Calderon, 2023 WL 8262710, at *11.

We thus hold that Davis has failed to preserve this complaint. See Gary v. State,

No. 02-21-00171-CR, 2023 WL 2805477, at *5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 6, 2023,

                                            11
no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“Here, Gary failed to object to

the lack of an Article 38.37 hearing. He has thus failed to preserve that complaint for

our review.”); Kimberlin v. State, No. 05-18-00018-CR, 2019 WL 1292471, at *3 (Tex.

App.—Dallas Mar. 21, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“To

the extent appellant argues the trial court did not conduct a sufficient hearing to

satisfy the requirement of [A]rticle 38.37, he waived his complaint by not objecting

and raising this argument to the trial court during the hearing when the trial court had

the opportunity to cure any potential error.”).

      Even if Davis had preserved this complaint for our review, we would still reject

it because Article 38.37 does not require that a trial court make an explicit finding that

the proffered extraneous-offense evidence would support a finding by the jury that

the defendant had committed the separate offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See

Gonzales v. State, No. 04-21-00573-CR, 2022 WL 17970588, at *3 (Tex. App.—San

Antonio Dec. 28, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (rejecting

appellant’s argument that trial court erred by not making any “specific findings” under

Article 38.37 and noting that it could find no authority requiring a trial court to make

such “specific findings”); Swegheimer v. State, No. 02-17-00095-CR, 2018 WL 1528477,

at *7 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 29, 2018, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for

publication) (stating that the “plain language” of Article 38.37, Section 2-a(1) “does

not require an explicit finding”); see also Gutierrez v. State, No. 01-19-00718-CR,

2021 WL 2931358, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 13, 2021, pet. ref’d)

                                           12
(mem. op., not designated for publication) (finding no authority indicating that a trial

court must announce its Article 38.37 findings in any particular format).

      Article 38.37 simply requires a trial court to “determine that the evidence likely

to be admitted at trial will be adequate to support a finding by the jury that the

defendant committed the separate offense beyond a reasonable doubt” and “conduct

a hearing out of the presence of the jury for that purpose.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc.

Ann. art. 38.37, § 2-a. We are satisfied that that was done here. To that end, the trial

court conducted a hearing where it listened to Richie’s proffered testimony regarding

Davis’s sexual abuse,6 it overruled Davis’s objections to such proffered testimony, and

it allowed Richie to testify in front of the jury. By conducting the hearing and later

permitting Richie to testify, the trial court implicitly determined that Richie’s

testimony was adequate to support a finding by the jury that Davis committed the

separate offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Villalon v. State, 791 S.W.2d 130, 136

(Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (“Even though the trial court submitted no written findings

that the statement is reliable, . . . the trial court’s ruling at the hearing outside the

presence of the jury implied that it found the nurse’s testimony to be reliable, thereby

complying with [Article 38.072, Section 2(b)(2)].”); Gabriel v. State, 973 S.W.2d 715,

718 (Tex. App.—Waco 1998, no pet.) (holding that trial court implicitly found outcry

      6
        “[T]he testimony of a child victim alone is sufficient to support a conviction
for indecency with a child.” Garner v. State, No. 02-15-00171-CR, 2016 WL 4247970,
at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 11, 2016, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for
publication).

                                           13
testimony to be reliable where it conducted a reliability hearing, overruled appellant’s

objection to such testimony, and allowed outcry witness to testify before the jury).

      We overrule Davis’s second issue.

                                  IV. CONCLUSION

      Having overruled Davis’s two issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

                                                      /s/ Dana Womack

                                                      Dana Womack
                                                      Justice

Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: March 7, 2024

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