Court Opinion

ID: 9497965
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 17:04:47.201321+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:58:31.990569
License: Public Domain

CUDAHY, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
Having been the dissenter in the earlier consideration of this case, I would much prefer now to join my colleagues in making a proper disposition in accordance with the Supreme Court’s reversal. However-, I find that I cannot concur in the course now being adopted.
The essential issue in this case was whether the Tax Court was within its rights in refusing to include in the record on appeal the report of the special tax court judge who presided over the trial. The Supreme Court has now decided that the rules of the Tax Court do not authorize the suppression of this document. This report must be included in the record, and I see no reason why it cannot b.e produced without further delay. It was improperly withheld, and that nondisclosure ought to cease — -now.
The Commissioner argues that the Court also disapproved the “collaborative” procedure followed by the Tax Court in dealing with the special trial judge’s report. Therefore, apparently before the undisclosed report is produced, the Commissioner seeks a remand so the Tax Court can somehow deal with the Supreme Court’s disapproval of its procedure. But this seems to me to put the cart before the horse. The “collaborative” procedure was only adopted in light of the decision to keep the report secret, in order to deal with the requirement that the findings of the report be granted due deference. There would have been no need for a “collaborative” procedure had there been no decision to keep the report secret, and *935it is this secrecy from which all other purported improprieties spring.
There may or may not be need for a remand here, so that the Tax Court may adopt some unspecified measures for somehow correcting the “collaborative” procedure. I perhaps could be persuaded of such a need if the Commissioner were more specific in indicating exactly how the process of correction would proceed and what purpose it would further. However, I am not persuaded that any requirement to undo the “collaborative” procedure is an adequate excuse for refusing at this late date to produce the report. Other problems in this case all flow from the unfortunate decision to refuse to disclose the report, and I believe that error should be rectified without further delay.
I therefore respectfully dissent.