Court Opinion

ID: 9954210
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-25 20:03:22.796449+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:11:53.018393
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/25/24 In re M.T. CA2/4
         NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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     IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                            SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION FOUR

In re M.T., a Person Coming                                   B327856
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
                                                              (Los Angeles County
                                                              Super. Ct. No. NJ30388)
THE PEOPLE,

         Plaintiff and Respondent,

         v.

M.T.,

         Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, John C. Lawson II, Judge. Affirmed.
      Michael C. Sampson, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Wyatt E. Bloomfield and William H. Shin,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                         INTRODUCTION
       Appellant M.T. was charged with second degree robbery as
a juvenile under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602.1 The
juvenile court found the allegation true, deemed M.T. a ward of
the court, and placed him on probation with an order that
included a curfew of 8:00 p.m. unless M.T.’s mother “[k]nows
where you are and who you are with.” On appeal, M.T. asserts
his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the curfew
condition. We find no error and affirm.
       FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       The People filed a petition under section 602 alleging that
M.T., age 17 at the time of the offense, committed attempted
second degree robbery, a felony, by attempting to take personal
property from A.G. by means of force or fear. (Pen. Code, §§ 211,
664.) The case proceeded to a trial.
       A.G., age 15, testified that on March 31, 2022 he was at a
park near his high school with his friends A.R. and M. Three
people, including M.T., began to approach A.G. and his friends;
A.G. handed his phone to M. One person (not M.T.) pulled out a
knife, and with the blade closed, held the knife to A.G.’s
abdomen. He told A.G. to hand over any valuables, and said if
A.G. moved, he would open the knife’s blade and cut him. M.T.
and the third person approached A.G. from behind; they also told
A.G. to give them any valuables. The three people felt A.G.’s
pockets. M.T. and the third person moved to A.G.’s backpack,
which was on the ground nearby, and searched the backpack,
taking out A.G.’s books and pencils. The three people took a blue

1     All undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare
and Institutions Code.

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knit cap off A.G.’s head; they did not take anything else. A.G.
recognized the three individuals from school.
       A.G. and his friends approached police officers nearby and
told them about the incident. As they were talking to the officers,
A.G. saw M.T. and identified him as one of the individuals
involved in the incident. The officers detained M.T.
       M.T. and his brother, F., testified that on the day of the
incident they were together at the skate park within the park
where the incident occurred. M.T. and F. testified that they
observed two people wearing ski masks wield a knife and pull
someone’s backpack off. They testified that M.T. got involved in
the incident only to push the people away from each other. On
cross-examination, F. admitted that his testimony differed from
what he told investigators, and M.T. admitted that he never told
police this version of the events.
       The trial court found the allegation to be true beyond a
reasonable doubt and sustained the petition. The court deemed
M.T. a ward of the court under section 602 and placed him on
probation with an order that included various conditions, such as
requiring M.T. to continue working toward getting his high school
diploma. M.T.’s mother was present, and the court asked her,
“[D]o you have a curfew in your house?” The court clarified, “A
time where you tell [M.T.] to be in the house?” M.T.’s mother
answered yes, “No later than 8:00.” The court then imposed a
curfew from “8:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. unless your mother says
otherwise and she knows – 8:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. unless your
mother knows otherwise. Knows where you are and who you are
with.”
       In a question that was not necessarily about the curfew,
M.T. told the court that he had a job and asked the court about

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working while finishing school. The court told M.T. he could
work around a school schedule: “[I]f there are morning classes,
then you have an afternoon shift. If you got [ ] afternoon classes,
then you work the morning or you work at night. Or if you got
night classes for high school, you go to the night classes.” The
court added, “[Y]ou make your schedule the way you want to
make it that’s the best for you,” as long as it involved earning
credits toward a diploma.
      The curfew is not reflected in the trial court’s minute order.
However, the minute order instructs that M.T. must obey the
rules of his parents, caregivers, and school officials. M.T.’s
counsel did not object to any portion of the court’s ruling.
      M.T. timely appealed.
                             DISCUSSION
      M.T.’s sole argument on appeal is that his counsel was
ineffective for failing to object to the 8:00 p.m. curfew. He asserts
that an objection would have been granted, because the curfew is
unreasonable under People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481 (Lent).2
We are not persuaded.
      “‘“To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant
must show that (1) counsel’s representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing
professional norms, and (2) counsel’s deficient performance was
prejudicial, i.e., there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s failings, the result would have been more favorable to
the defendant. [Citation.] ‘A reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’”’”
(People v. Rices (2017) 4 Cal.5th 49, 80, citing Strickland v.

2     Lent was superseded by statute on other grounds as stated
in People v. Moran (2016) 1 Cal.5th 398, 403, fn. 6. (Moran)

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Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 694.) “Reviewing courts defer to
counsel’s reasonable tactical decisions in examining a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel [citation], and there is a ‘strong
presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance.’” (People v. Lucas (1995) 12
Cal.4th 415, 436-437.)
       A “juvenile court has wide discretion to select appropriate
conditions” of probation (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875,
889), and therefore the court “may impose and require any and
all reasonable conditions that it may determine fitting and proper
to the end that justice may be done and the reformation and
rehabilitation of the ward enhanced.” (§ 730, subd. (b).) A
condition of probation will not be held invalid unless it “‘(1) has
no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted,
(2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3)
requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to
future criminality.’” (Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 486; see also
People v. Moran, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 403 (Moran).) “‘This test
is conjunctive—all three prongs must be satisfied before a
reviewing court will invalidate a probation term. [Citations.] As
such, even if a condition of probation has no relationship to the
crime of which a defendant was convicted and involves conduct
that is not itself criminal, the condition is valid as long as the
condition is reasonably related to preventing future criminality.’”
(Moran, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 403.)
       Here, we do not find that counsel’s failure to object fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing
professional norms. M.T. lived with his mother. In a portion of
the order not challenged on appeal, the juvenile court ordered
M.T. to comply with his mother’s rules. In court, M.T.’s mother

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said she held M.T. to an 8:00 p.m. curfew, so the court imposed
that curfew “unless” M.T.’s mother knew where M.T. was and
who he was with. The court made clear that the curfew should
not interfere with M.T.’s schooling or work schedule.
       A curfew condition is statutorily required in a juvenile case:
“If a minor is found to be a person described in Section 601 or 602
and the court does not remove the minor from the physical
custody of the parent or guardian, the court as a condition of
probation . . . shall: . . . (c) Require the minor to be at his or her
legal residence between the hours of 10:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m.
unless the minor is accompanied by his or her parent or parents,
legal guardian or other adult person having the legal care or
custody of the minor.” (§ 729.2; see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule
5.790(b)(3).) Section 729.2 does not “limit the probation
conditions the juvenile court may fashion to serve the court’s
purpose of rehabilitation and preservation of family ties. Section[
] 729.2 thus serve[s] as a floor, not a ceiling, for juvenile
probation conditions.” (In re Walter P. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 95,
99.)
       Here, M.T.’s counsel reasonably could have seen the trial
court’s imposition of an earlier curfew—which was imposed only
if M.T.’s mother did not know where M.T. was—as supportive of
M.T.’s rehabilitation. The court emphasized that M.T. should
finish earning his high school diploma, he could continue working
while earning high school credits, and he could “make your
schedule the way you want to make it that’s the best for you.”3
M.T.’s counsel may have chosen not to object based on a
determination that M.T. would benefit from additional

3     M.T.’s contention that the juvenile court’s 8:00 curfew
limited him from attending school is contradicted by the record.

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supervision from his mother, or that following his mother’s house
rules was reasonably related to supporting M.T.’s education and
rehabilitation. “[J]uveniles are deemed to be more in need of
guidance and supervision than adults.” (In re Antonio R. (2000)
78 Cal.App.4th 937, 941.) In addition, “‘[t]here is a “well known
correlation between education and the crime rate.” [Citations.]
Performance in school is reasonably related to future criminality,
both by deterring current delinquency, and by enhancing the
ability to maintain prospective employment or to continue in
advanced education upon graduation. A court may reasonably
conclude a juvenile, without an adequate education, is more
likely to resort to criminal activities.’” (In re N.R. (2017) 15
Cal.App.5th 590, 597.)
       This case is not similar to People v. Nassetta (2016) 3
Cal.App.5th 699, upon which M.T. relies. There, “Nassetta was
28 years old when he was placed on probation, and he was not
ordered to live with his parents or continue his education.” (Id.
at p. 705.) Nassetta therefore is distinguishable. In addition,
“‘[a] condition of probation which is impermissible for an adult
criminal defendant is not necessarily unreasonable for a juvenile
receiving guidance and supervision from the juvenile court.’” (In
re Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113, 1118.)
       M.T. also has not demonstrated a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s failure to object, the result would have
been more favorable to him. M.T. did not challenge the juvenile
court’s order that he must obey the rules of his parents. M.T.’s
mother told the court she imposes a curfew of 8:00 p.m., and M.T.
was required to comply with his mother’s rules. Thus, M.T. has
not demonstrated a probability of a different result had counsel
objected.

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                       DISPOSITION
     The judgment is affirmed.

     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                 COLLINS, ACTING P. J.

We concur:

MORI, J.

ZUKIN, J.

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