Court Opinion

ID: 9542351
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:33:26.783567+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:07:45.737801
License: Public Domain

ME. JUSTICE JOHN C. HAEEISON
dissenting:
I dissent. I would order a new trial. I believe more consideration should have been given to both the facts and the law of this case.
The majority opinion makes light of the effect of the collision but the fact remains that Mr. DeLeon’s car was hit so hard that even though he had his foot on the brake the car was thrown forward some 10 to 12 feet where it bumped into another car. In addition, it is interesting to note from the testimony of both parties that the woman who was driving the first car came back and registered a complaint to both drivers. Unfortunately she was unknown and the plaintiff was unable to find her at the time of trial. While the sound of the crash was not loud enough to be heard around the world, the results of the crash showed that defendant’s car suffered $225 damage and the plaintiff’s damage was $300.
The first issue presented on this appeal was whether the ad*293mission of Roentgenological Interpretation given by Dr. Sawyer, a separate report accompanying the X-rays taken by Dr. Sawyer, into evidence was prejudicial error.
As the majority opinion notes, this court recently considered the question of the admission of medical reports where there is no opportunity to cross-examine the maker of the report, in the case of Shillingstad v. Nelson, 141 Mont. 412, 378 P.2d 393. There this court held that the admission of such an unsworn report was hearsay and not within an exception to the rule against hearsay evidence.
Recognizing that every case has a different fact situation and that the facts of the Shillingstad case are different from this case, we should however be bound by the law unless the facts presented here bring the case within an exception of the hearsay rule. The prejudicial effect of Dr. Sawyer’s interpretation is obvious, “normal cervical spine.” It is clearly hearsay and as such should have been excluded unless coming within some exception to the rule against hearsay evidence. As to what is hearsay evidence see 58 Am.Jur, Witnesses, § 622; 31A C.J.S. Evidence § 193; 98 C.J.S. Witnesses § 377b; 5 Wigmore on Evidence (3rd ed.), § 1361, p. 2. The necessity of establishing an exception to the hearsay rule is recognized by counsel for the defendant respondent in his argument that:
(1) The witness, Dr. Duchesneau, was being cross-examined, and great latitude is permitted in the cross examination of a medical expert.
(2) The witness, Dr. Duchesneau, had testified at length on his interpretation of the very same X-rays, which he ordered Dr. Sawyer to take and upon which he routinely secured a report from Dr. Sawyer.
(3) A portion of the evidence was in evidence and the remainder was properly admitted.
(4) The report by Dr. Sawyer was a part of the professional records of Dr. Duchesneau.
While I agree with counsel that wide latitude is and must be *294allowed in the cross-examination of expert witnesses, but to allow him to get into evidence a report which under the rules governing the admission of evidence is otherwise inadmissible, would in my opinion do violence to the trial practice. Most certainly counsel could have asked Dr. Duehesneau whether Dr. Sawyer agreed with his interpretation of the X-rays, but the admission of the unsworn report with no opportunity to further explore by the plaintiff is in my opinion prejudicial, particularly in view of the fact they were the first X-rays taken and within a very short time of the accident.