Court Opinion

ID: 9845445
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:22:06.324083+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:07.958798
License: Public Domain

RAPER, Justice,
concurring.
I concur in the opinion of the court, except insofar as it may conflict with this concurring opinion.
The only reason I do so, however, is because we are compelled to follow the direction of the legislature which places the onerous burden on the public and the courts of providing a trial by jury in a petty case of $17.00 — $12.00 fine plus $5.00 costs.
Lapp v. City of Worland, Wyo., 612 P.2d 868 (1980), as urged by appellee is not authority for dispensing with trial by jury in justice of the peace courts. It honors the discretion of the legislature that there be trial by jury upon demand as a substantive right but only as a matter of procedure recognized the right of this court to by rule place the jury trial in the trial court where it belongs rather than in the district court sitting as an appellate court. In Lapp, footnote 7 points out that many courts hold that the constitutional provision that the right to trial by jury shall remain inviolate does not require a jury trial in petty offenses.
Shafsky v. City of Casper, Wyo., 487 P.2d 468 (1971), also cited by appellee, was not disposed of on the basis that the defendant was not entitled to a jury trial in municipal court even when demanded but only recognized the right of an appellate court, the district court there, to dismiss appeals for lack of prosecution. In Shafsky, however, this court peripherally dismissed the proposition that there is a constitutional requirement that a trial by jury be afforded in petty cases. It was only discussed as incident to the right of the district court to dismiss appeals for lack of prosecution. The question of the trial court’s right to deny a jury was not squarely before the court as it is here.
*1244The Lapp and Shafsky decisions have in common expressions by this court that failure to provide for a jury in petty cases is not unconstitutional. Those opinions may not have adequately pointed out to the legislature that it need not continue to statutorily provide for trial by jury in petty cases for constitutional reasons.
Section 31-5-1201, W.S.1977, Cum.Supp. 1981, of the Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on Highways, provides:
“(a) It is a misdemeanor for any person to violate any of the provisions of this act unless such violation is by this act or other law of this state declared to be a felony.
“(b) Every person convicted of a misdemeanor for a violation of any of the provisions of this act for which another penalty is not provided shall for a first conviction thereof be punished by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars ($100.00) or by imprisonment for not more than ten (10) days; for a second such conviction within one (1) year thereafter such person shall be punished by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars ($100.00) or by imprisonment for not more than twenty (20) days or by both such fine and imprisonment; upon a third or subsequent conviction within one (1) year after the first conviction such person shall be punished by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars ($100.00) or by imprisonment for not more than six (6) months or by both such fine and imprisonment, provided, however, that evidence of a prior conviction or convictions shall not be introduced during the trial of any case, but shall be introduced only after the completion of the trial for the purpose of determining the penalty to be imposed upon a conviction hereunder.
“(c) Every person convicted of a violation of W.S. 31 — 130(b)(iii) [§ 31-5-301(b)(iii)] may be fined a maximum of one dollar ($1.00) per mile for each mile per hour in excess of fifty-five (55) miles per hour and up to and including seventy-four (74) miles per hour, and assessed a maximum of five dollars ($5.00) for court costs. Persons convicted of exceeding speeds above seventy-four (74) miles per hour shall be fined at the discretion of the judge but not less than twenty-five dollars ($25.00) nor more than the maximum penalties provided by subsection (b) of this section, with assessed court costs. Convictions shall not be considered pursuant to W.S. 31-276.26(b)(i) [§ 31-7-127(b)(i) ] for driver license revocations for speeding violations of less than seventy-five (75) miles per hour.
$ * * * * * #
There are other penalties of a fine or imprisonment to not exceed 30 days which apply to the trucking industry, § 31-5-1005, W.S.1977. There are other serious offenses in the traffic act with severe penalties, such as vehicular homicide, § 31-5— 1117, W.S.1977, Cum.Supp.1981, and driving a vehicle under the influence of liquor or drugs, § 31-5-233, W.S.1977, Cum.Supp. 1981, which includes a driver’s license suspension. I am not protesting trial by jury for serious crimes.
In Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968), it was said that there is a class of petty crimes or offenses which is not subject to the Sixth Amendment1 jury trial provision and should not be subject to the Fourteenth
*1245Amendment2 jury trial requirement which is applied to the states. The Supreme Court went on to say that:
“ * * * Crimes carrying possible penalties up to six months do not require a jury trial if they otherwise qualify as petty offenses, Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 [86 S.Ct. 1523, 16 L.Ed.2d 629] (1966). But the penalty authorized for a particular crime is of major relevance in determining whether it is serious or not and may in itself, if severe enough, subject the trial to the mandates of the Sixth Amendment. * * *” 391 U.S. at 159, 88 S.Ct. at 1453.
It was noted in Duncan that in 49 of the 50 states there is a class of crimes subject to trial without a jury. By statute there is no class of offenses in Wyoming subject to trial without a jury except when waived by the defendant.
In Duncan, the court recognized that the guarantee of a jury trial was to prevent oppression by the government, to give the accused a “safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge.” But it also noted that fundamental rights should only attach when defendants are charged with “serious crimes.”
“ * * * [T]he possible consequences to defendants from convictions for petty offenses have been thought insufficient to outweigh the benefits to efficient law enforcement and simplified judicial administration resulting from the availability of speedy and inexpensive nonjury adjudications. These same considerations compel the same result under the Fourteenth Amendment. * * * ” 391 U.S. at 160, 88 S.Ct. at 1453.
It appears that the Supreme Court of the United States has drawn the line at six months imprisonment as the top limit of petty offenses. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 68, 90 S.Ct. 1886, 1887, 26 L.Ed.2d 437, 440 (1970). Petty offenses 3 in the Federal establishment need not be tried by juries. District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 57 S.Ct. 660, 81 L.Ed. 843 (1937). See also Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 24 S.Ct. 826, 49 L.Ed. 99 (1904), for an excellent discussion of the history and reasons for not requiring a jury trial in petty cases.
It is urged that there is no need or justification for jury trials where the limit of imprisonment is six months. It is nothing more than a useless and expensive burden on the public and the administration of justice. There is no reason why our practice should be any different than in the Federal Government. The case before us vividly demonstrates the need for reform but we cannot take that step — the legislature must act. There is no indication in the record that appellant’s potential sentence would have been more than a fine. Section 31-5-1201(c), supra. It is travesty on the public that it bear all the expense of the prolonged judicial proceedings here involved over a $12.00 fine and $5.00 costs. Jury trials should be reserved for serious cases.

. Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution:
“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”
Article 1, § 9, Wyoming Constitution:
“The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate in criminal cases, but a jury in civil cases in all courts or in criminal cases in courts not of record, may consist of less than twelve men, as may be prescribed by law. Hereafter a grand jury may consist of twelve men, any nine of whom concurring may find an indictment, but the legislature may change, regulate or abolish the grand jury system.”

. Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution reads in pertinent part:
“All persons bom or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”

. 18 U.S.C. § 1 classifies offenses:
“Notwithstanding any Act of Congress to the contrary:
“(1) Any offense punishable by death or imprisonment for a term exceeding one year is a felony.
“(2) Any other offense is a misdemeanor. “(3) Any misdemeanor, the penalty for which does not exceed imprisonment for a period of six months or a fine of not more than $500, or both, is a petty offense.”
Section 6-1-102, W.S.1977, classifies offenses:
“Offenses which may be punished by death, or by imprisonment in the penitentiary, are ‘felonies’; all other offenses are ‘misdemeanors.’ ”