Court Opinion

ID: 9737562
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:28:44.347953+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:23:59.810477
License: Public Domain

Hanley, J.
(dissenting). The interpretation given sec. 121.54 (1), Stats., by the majority denies equal protection 1 of the law to certain groups of schoolchildren.
*513“Subsections (2) and (6) and s. 121.57 do not apply to pupils who reside in cities . . . .” Sec. 121.54 (1), Stats.
The majority finds that the classification “pupils who reside in cities” is a reasonable classification. I cannot agree. The classification not only fails to meet the test laid down by this court in Union Free High School Dist. v. Union Free High School Dist. (1934), 216 Wis. 102, 256 N. W. 788; it also leads to an absurd situation.
In the Union Free High School Dist. Case, supra, at page 107, this court stated:
“It is generally held that the legislature, in enacting laws, may resort to classification without violating constitutional provisions when a classification is based upon substantial differences or distinctions between classes, is germane to the purposes of the law, is not based upon existing circumstances only, applies equally to members of a class, and the character of one class is so different from another class as reasonably to suggest the necessity or propriety, having regard for the public good, of substantially different legislative treatment. . . .”
The classification employed here is neither “germane” to the purpose of the law, nor is the “public good” served by the distinction.
The purpose of the law is obviously to provide for the safety and welfare of schoolchildren.2 The legislation makes it mandatory to transport pupils who live in the country to their city schools if the distance between home and school is greater than two miles. However, it is not mandatory to transport pupils who live in cities and attend rural schools which are farther than two miles from their homes. Thus the safety and welfare of rural children is entitled to protection. But the safety and welfare of city children, who travel the very same high*514way, for the very same distance, at approximately the very same time (but in different directions), does not require the very same protection. Bearing in mind the purpose of the legislation, such a conclusion is obviously absurd in theory.
As applied to the facts of this case, the conclusion is equally absurd. St. Mary’s Springs Academy is located more than two miles from the city of Fond du Lac. The St. Mary’s pupils who live in Fond du Lac must find their own way to school. However, certain children who live directly across the highway from St. Mary’s, but who attend school in Fond du Lac, are transported to their classes. Both groups of students use the same highway and encounter the same hazards. One group is protected and the other group is not. For this reason, if the legislation is read literally, I must hold the attempted classification arbitrary and unreasonable and a denial of equal protection.
However, the statute is open to an interpretation which would render it constitutionally valid.
“ ‘A statute may be plain and unambiguous in its letter, and yet, giving it the meaning thus suggested, it may be so unreasonable or absurd as to involve the legislative purpose in obscurity. Rice v. Ashland County, 108 Wis. 189, 84 N. W. 189. In such case, or when obscurity otherwise exists, the court may look to the history of the statute, to all the circumstances intended to be dealt with, to the evils to be remedied, to its reason and spirit, to every part of the enactment, and may reject words, or read words in place which seem to be there by necessary or reasonable inference, and substitute the right word for one clearly wrong, and so find the real legislative intent, though it be out of harmony with, or even contradict, the letter of the enactment. . . .’ ” Connell v. Luck (1953), 264 Wis. 282, 284, 285, 58 N. W. 2d 633, quoting from Pfingsten v. Pfingsten (1916), 164 Wis. 308, 313, 159 N. W. 921.
To this writer the intent of the legislature in enacting sec. 121.54 (1), Stats., was to provide an exception for *515pupils who reside in a city and attend city schools. This group is not exposed to rural highway hazards. They walk on city sidewalks and generally have public transportation available. Thus, I read sec. 121.54 (1) as follows:
“Subsections (2) and (6) and s. 121.57 do not apply to pupils who reside in cities” and go to school in cities.
This interpretation would meet the test for classifications set down in the Union Free High School Dist. Case, supra, and the constitutionality of the legislation would be preserved. It is a firmly established rule of this court that:
“. . . if a law is open to two constructions, that construction which will save it from condemnation will be adopted in preference to one which renders it unconstitutional. . . . The . . . rule applies even though a different construction would be more obvious or natural. . . . ” Petition of Breidenbach (1934), 214 Wis. 54, 62, 252 N. W. 366.
Besides saving the constitutionality of the legislation there is ample evidence that the legislature intended the statute to furnish the result which is reached here.
The original law limiting the transportation of schoolchildren who reside in cities was enacted in 1927 as sec. 40.34 of the Wisconsin statutes. Sub. (6) then provided:
“This section does not apply to children who reside in cities.” A comparable provision has been in all the school transportation statutes since that time. Each city, however, in the public school system is a separate school district 3 and, consequently, children who reside in cities *516would go to school in the same city. The legislature did not say “pupils who reside in cities and go to school in that city” because it was unnecessary. If you lived in the city, you went to school in that city.
When the legislature authorized the transportation of private school pupils,4 however, the situation changed somewhat. Private schools were not subject to the geographical limitations of school districts and they were often located outside the city limits. Nonetheless, the state is just as concerned with the safety and welfare of these children as it is with any other children. The interpretation the majority gives to sec. 121.54 (1), Stats., denies the protection of the school transportation legislation to some pupils, while it protects other pupils from the identical circumstances.
I respectfully dissent and would affirm the judgment of the circuit court. I am authorized to state that Mr. Justice Robert W. Hansen joins this dissent.

 “An express guaranty of equal protection of the laws is found only in the Fourteenth amendment of the constitution of the United States hut since early days it has been read into the Wisconsin constitution. . . .” State ex rel. Steeps v. Hanson (1957), 274 Wis. 544, 549, 80 N. W. 2d 812, and cases cited therein.

 The purpose of the legislation is obvious from its provisions. It is also detailed in sec. (1) of the enabling legislation:
“PURPOSE. The intent of this act is to provide for the safety and welfare of children by providing for their transportation to and from public and private schools.” Ch. 68, Laws of 1967.

 When the limitation on transporting city students was adopted in 1927, sec. 40.51, Stats., was also amended:
“Each city, affected by this plan, is a single and separate school district . . . .”
Our present sec. 120.41 (as created by Laws of 1907, ch. 92, sec. 17, provides:
“. . . Every city operating a school system under this sub-chapter is a single and separate school district . . . .”

 Ch. 68, Laws of 1967.