Court Opinion

ID: 9630418
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 10:10:46.596684+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:39:02.141036
License: Public Domain

EAGEN, Justice
(dissenting).
I do not condone the tactics of the police in keeping Roane and his mother separated after she arrived at the police station. By the same token, I cannot join in the ruling of the majority that Roane’s willingness to talk with the police without the assistance of counsel was not knowing and intelligent.
It is noteworthy that nowhere in its opinion does the majority say or contend Roane was unaware of his right to the assistance of counsel before telling the police what happened. In fact the record clearly demonstrates he was very much aware of this right. How then can it *397reasonably be said that his waiver thereof was unknowing?
The thrust of the majority opinion, as I read it, is that a sixteen-year-old, regardless of maturity and experience, may not effectively waive his right to counsel when questioned by the police if a parent is present who is unwilling to join in the waiver. In my view, such a prophylactic rule is unrealistic and overlooks the key to the entire case — that is — what did Roane himself want and was his decision voluntary, and based on a knowing and intelligent understanding of his constitutional rights. At the time Roane was sixteen years of age and mature at least with regard to police procedure, since he had prior contact with the authorities. He was of average intelligence, and in the eleventh grade of high school. He was aware of his constitutional rights and the charges against him. This was not an incommunicado interrogation, since his mother and sister were with him. Moreover, the period of questioning before he first implicated himself was relatively short in duration, and he was not physically abused or threatened.
Hence, we are left with one question: May a sixteen-year-old, under the instant circumstances, refuse the advice of a parent and waive his Miranda rights. In the instant case, the mother was given an opportunity to confer with her son and during this time she made her wishes known to him; yet, in the face of this, he indicated to the police he wanted to give a statement. This decision on his part was made with complete knowledge of his constitutional rights, the charges and the wishes of his mother. I know of no ruling of the United States Supreme Court, or of this Court, which denies him the right to make such a decision.
The underlying fear of the line of cases which confront the issue of juvenile waivers has centered around two considerations: First, the will of the juvenile may be overborne by police tactics and he may become a victim *398of fear, panic or coercion in the face of the presence of the law and give either an involuntary or untrustworthy statement. Second, because of his tender years he will not be able to understand his constitutional rights or the consequences of waiving these rights; thus, he does not effectively enjoy the benefits of his constitutional rights, or the protections which these rights provide. Under the facts of the instant case, however, both of these considerations are alleviated. Presently, Roane did not stand alone against the authorities because his mother and sister were present; hence, we do not have the fear of an involuntary statement. Moreover, his constitutional rights were explained to him, he was apprised of the wishes of his mother, and, based on his age, maturity, and intelligence he knowingly and understanding^ chose to waive those rights. Under like circumstances, we have held such waivers to be valid. See Commonwealth v. Moses, 446 Pa. 350, 287 A.2d 131 (1971), and Commonwealth v. Darden, 441 Pa. 41, 271 A.2d 257 (1970). The fact that his mother was present and indicated she wanted her son to have the aid of an attorney only adds to the Moses and Darden rulings in the face of the aforementioned considerations. Roane had the benefits of the guidance of his parent, something Moses and Darden did not.
Consequently, I would hold that the waiver of constitutional rights by a sixteen-year-old is valid, even after an adult or guardian expresses the view he or she does not want him to waive his rights, if the sixteen-year-old of his own volition, with a complete knowledge and understanding of his rights, chooses to disregard the advice of the adult. To hold otherwise is to say a sixteen-year-old may never effectively waive his constitutional rights without the consent of his parent or guardian.
JONES, C. J., and POMEROY, J., join in this opinion.