Court Opinion

ID: 9861055
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 23:40:14.665335+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:27:09.471182
License: Public Domain

Pkoctoh, J.
(dissenting). With today’s decision, The Port of Hew York Authority becomes the only litigant in the State of Hew Jersey with the exclusive right in condemnation proceedings to determine whether trial shall be by jury. I must dissent, because I think that N. J. S. A. 32:1-132, insofar as it confers that exclusive right on the Authority violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. For the purpose of analyzing the issue raised by this appeal it is essential to distinguish between the rights inherent in the concept of due process and the concept of equal protection of the law. The majority devotes considerable effort to demonstrate that due process is satisfied if the property owner is afforded reasonable notice and the opportunity to have his case heard by an impartial tribunal. *166It also emphasizes that, in the context of determining just compensation for condemned property, dne process does not require a jury trial. I agree with both propositions. But the appellants in this case have never argued that N. J. S. A. 32:1-132 deprives them of due process. Their assertion is that they have been denied equal protection of the law in that the Authority is given the right to elect trial by jury while they are not. Equal protection is a distinct constitutional guarantee which in effect provides that lawmakers must afford to all persons within a class equality of treatment, even though such persons also enjoy the protections of due process. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, 42 S. Ct. 124, 66 L. Ed. 254 (1921). It also requires that any legislative classification of persons be reasonably related to a recognized objective of government. Washington National Ins. Co. v. Board of Review, 1 N. J. 545 (1949).
Is a property owner afforded equality of treatment, within the meaning of the above-outlined principles, when the Authority as opposing party litigant alone has the right to decide whether trial shall be by jury? Otherwise stated, is there something so peculiar about the status of the Authority as a litigant that it may justifiably be put in a class apart from condemnee-litigants and be afforded the important advantage of selecting what tribunal shall decide the amount of just compensation? I don’t think so. The majority, in an exhaustive opinion, has not cited a single case where a public agency is given a similar option and I know of none. Furthermore, I do not believe that the cases which are cited are apposite to the issue before us for decision.
■ The majority relies in part, for example, on cases which sustain condemnation procedures prescribed by the Tennessee Valley Authority Act. Welch v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 108 F. 2d 95 (6 Cir. 1939), certiorari denied Welch v. United States ex rel. and for use of Tennessee Valley Authority, 309 U. S. 688, 60 S. Ct. 889, 84 L. Ed. 1030 (1940); United States ex rel. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Puryear, *167105 F. Supp. 534 (D. C. W. D. Ry. 1952). But these merely hold that different classes of condemnors need not follow the same condemnation procedures. Whereas condemnors are ordinarily entitled under Rule 71A of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to a jury determination of compensation, the T. V. A. must have that issue determined without a jury. I have no doubt that the T. Y. A. as a condemnor is in a class which may be reasonably differentiated from other condemnors, but the fact here pertinent is that when the T. Y. A. condemns property neither it nor the condemnee-litigant may choose to have a trial by jury. Under the statute both are afforded equality of treatment since neither can avoid the requirement of having compensation determined without a jury. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Eshleman, 166 Cal. 640, 137 P. 1119, 50 L. R. A., N. S., 652 (Sup. Ct. 1913), also relied on by the majority, is simply the reverse side of the coin. There it was held that the equal protection clause does not require the same condemnation procedures to be applied to different classes of condemnees. The Constitution of California which provided for trial by jury in general eminent domain proceedings also provided that when utility land was taken compensation would be fixed by the Railroad Commission without a jury. I have no doubt that utilities may reasonably be differentiated as a class from other condemnees for purposes of deciding which are entitled to a jury trial on compensation, but again the fact here pertinent is that when utility land is condemned neither the condemnor nor eondemnee-utility may choose to have compensation determined by a jury. Both are confined to a determination by the Railroad Commission alone.
Furthermore, I do not see how any of the cases cited by the majority for the proposition that a public agency may elect to proceed under one or another of several legislatively created procedures is authority for the issue before us. Only the Few Hampshire and the two Few York cases concerned alternative condemnation procedures for determining com*168pensation, at least one of which included trial by jury. Manchester Housing Authority v. Fisk, 102 N. H. 280, 155 A. 2d 186 (Sup. Ct. 1959); United States v. 243.22 Acres of Land, 129 F. 2d 678 (2 Cir. 1942), certiorari denied Lambert v. United States, 317 U. S. 698, 63 S. Ct. 441, 87 L. Ed. 558 (1943); United States v. Certain Lands, 43 F. Supp. 578 (D. C. E. D. N. Y. 1942). Manchester Housing Authority v. Fish, supra, is the closest to the present case, but not helpful to a resolution of the issue before us. There it was held that a condemning agency could proceed under one of several statutes which provided different procedures for the assessment of compensation without violating due process. I agree that the demands of due process were satisfied in that case. But that is not the issue before this court. The condemnee in Manchester evidently did not argue that he was denied equal protection of the law and the court nowhere considered his rights under that constitutional provision. Involved in the two Uew York cases was the provision of the Uew York Constitution that compensation for private property taken for public use “shall be ascertained by a jury, or by the Supreme Court without a jury * * It is true, as the majority states, that
“Both courts recognized the right of the State to select any one of the methods outlined so long as it provided a fair and reasonable avenue to just compensation.” But it was the judiciary, not the condemning agency, which selected the appropriate method for trial in those cases. This distinction is vital to a determination of whether the condemnees were afforded equal protection of the law. The trial judge, as an impartial decision-maker, could choose that procedure which he regarded as best adapted to a determination of just compensation, unmotivated by the litigious interest which might affect the condemning agency as party-plaintiff. A similar procedure is followed under Rule 71A of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Ordinarily %ay party may have a jury trial on demand, but the court, not the condemning agency, may decide in its discretion that the peculiar circum*169stances of the case require a determination by appointed commissioners.
As mentioned above, the remainder of the cases which the majority cites for the proposition that a condemning agency may select one or another of several legislatively created procedures do not involve trial with or without a jury. More significantly, these cases concern a choice of procedures which by its nature could not involve a question of equal protection. Union School District of City of Jackson v. Starr Commonwealth for Boys, 322 Mich. 165, 33 N. W. 2d 807 (Sup. Ct. 1948) is typical. There the condemning agency was taking land for the erection of a school. Under one state statute, the agency was required first to negotiate with the condemnee before initiating condemnation proceedings. Under another statute negotiations prior to taking were unnecessary. The school district chose to proceed under the latter statute; and the Michigan Supreme Court held that the choice of procedure did not violate the condemnee’s constitutional rights. As the majority here notes, the State or its agencies alone institute condemnation proceedings; the condemnee, except in rare instances, cannot. The right to take land by eminent domain as distinct from determination of compensation is so fundamental an attribute of sovereignty that, given an admitted public use, no hearing need be afforded a condemnee. It therefore seems to me that a condemnee cannot claim denial of equal protection because the condemning agency is afforded a choice of procedures for the taking. But that is not the issue here.
The majority has enunciated its adherence to a principle which should be dispositive of the case before us. It says:
“It is obvious in this instance that the proceeding prescribed for arriving at just compensation under the eminent domain act or under the airport terminal act is sufficient unto itself as a due process mechanism. Each one is designed to produce and is capable of producing a just result. No one suggests to the contrary. If there were inequality within the frameivorlc of either procedure, for example, if the Authority were given and the property owner were denied a right of appeal, [citations omitted] or the right to introduce *170evidence of comparable sales, or offers to sell or purchase [citation omitted], in one mode of procedure which the condemnor had the option to select and did select in the particular case, a deprivation of equal protection of laxo xoould exist." (Italics supplied)
The majority expressly says that a statute giving a condemning agency a unilateral right of appeal from a compensation award would he unconstitutional. The ultimate purpose of such an agency in appealing from an award is to achieve a redetermination of the compensation at a lower amount. Similarly, realistically viewed, it seems to me the Authority will exercise its option under N. J. 8. A. 32:1-132 to elect that tribunal (judge or jury) which the Authority thinks will award a lower amount. In condemnation proceedings, therefore, where the only issue in dispute, as here, is the amount of compensation, a unilateral right to trial by jury is no less offensive than a unilateral right of appeal.
Applying logically to the facts of the present case the majority’s principle that a unilateral option -within the framework of a statutory procedure would be invalid, I take it that if N. J. 8. A. 32:1-132, without reference to the Eminent Domain or Airport Terminal Acts, gave the Authority power to condemn land for approaches to bridges and tunnels and provided that the Authority alone might choose to have a judge or jury determine just compensation, the statute would be unconstitutional. It seems to me highly artificial to make a condemnee’s rights under the equal protection clause depend on whether the Authority’s option derives from the self-contained provisions of a single statute or from the incorporation by reference of procedures in two distinct statutes. In either case, the result and the effect upon the condemnee are the same. What the court said in In re City of Rochester, 224 N. Y. 386, 121 N. E. 102 (Ct. App. 1918), cited with approval by the majority, is particularly applicable to the present case:
“In the courts, parties similarly situated are entitled to equal rights and privileges. The Constitution forbids discrimination between them.” Id., 224 N. 7., at p. 397, 121 N. M., at p. 105.
*171The concept of fair play is the heart of equal protection; and it seems to me that fair play requires that the same officially prescribed advantages and disadvantages should be enjoyed or suffered by both parties to a law suit. I would therefore hold that N. J. 8. A. 32:1-132, insofar as it affords to the Port of New York Authority alone the right to choose whether compensation for condemned property will be tried by jury, is unconstitutional as a denial of the condemnee’s right to equal protection of the law. Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment below. I am authorized to say that Mr. Justice Sohettino joins in this dissent.
For affirmance—Chief Justice Weintraub, and Justices Jacobs, Eraucis and Hail—4.
For reversal—Justices Proctor and Schettino—2.