Court Opinion

ID: 9579333
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:54:08.577084+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:35:27.689724
License: Public Domain

EOBEET W. HANSEN, J.
Most of the issues raised on this appeal deal with the manner of removal of the petitioner by the board of veterans affairs. But, before we can get to the HOW of the removal, we must first determine WHO had the right to remove him from the secretaryship. Certainly, in this case, although not in the dictionary, WHO comes before HOW. The threshold question is who had the statutory right and authority to remove the petitioner as secretary of veterans affairs.
In this state the right to remove legislative or appointive state officers is given by statute to the person or body that made the appointment of such officer. This is codified in a removal statute1 creating certain categories of officers. These categories relate the right to remove an officer with the person or body that made the appointment.2 One such category is “state officers appointed by the governor by and with the advice and consent of the senate, or appointed by any other officer or body, subject to the concurrence of the governor.” State officers in this category can be removed from office only “by the governor at any time, for cause.”3 Another category is “[o]ther state officers appointed by any officer or body without the concurrence of the governor.” State officers in this category can be removed from office “by the officer or body that appointed them, at pleasure.”4 If the petitioner is in the first category, he can be removed only by the governor for cause. But *415if the second applies, he is removable by the board, at its pleasure.
Moses’ appointment as secretary of veterans affairs was made by the governor and confirmed by the senate. It is conceded that prior to the 1977 amendment to sec. 15.05(1) (b) Moses could be removed only by the governor for cause.5 His removal for cause by the governor could be accomplished only in compliance with sec. 17.16, Stats., requiring written and verified charges preferred by a taxpayer, a public hearing and a “full opportunity to be heard in his defense, personally and by counsel.”6 The governor having made the appointment, only the governor could remove his appointee, and he could do so only for cause and after a hearing.
The claim of the board that it had the right to remove from office without cause and without a hearing one who had been appointed by the governor and confirmed by the senate is based on the amendment to sec. 15.05(1) (b), the appointment statute, which took away the exceptional status of the appointment of a secretary of veterans affairs.7 The change is illustrated by the language below stricken.
“. . . If a department is under the direction and supervision of a board, the board shall appoint a secretary to serve at the pleasure of the board, except that the secretary of- veterans-affairs s-hal-b-bc appointed by the governor with the advice and consent of the-senate-for an indefinite term, outside the classified service.”
This amendment, a mere deletion of an exception, changed the manner of appointment of a secretary of veterans affairs. What the deletion in the appointment statute did not change was the fact that John R. Moses was the secretary of veterans affairs by virtue of an *416appointment by a governor, confirmed by the senate, as prescribed by the law at the time of his appointment. This was as true on the day the 1977 deletion became effective as it was on the day before. The 1977 amendment changed the method of appointment, but it left the method of removal of a state officer appointed by the governor, by and with the advice and consent of the senate, unchanged. As long as Moses remains an officer appointed by the governor, confirmed by the senate, he remains removable from office only by the governor, for cause.
The board counters that although Moses was once removable only by the governor for cause, by virtue of the amendment he is now an officer appointed without the concurrence of the governor. To erase the fact that Moses was in fact appointed by a governor, the board asks this court to interpret the word “officer” in sec. 17.07 “to embrace the term ‘office.’ ”8 By that the board means that the determination of which category of “officer” in sec. 17.07, Stats., to apply should be determined by considering the nature of the “office” held and that the nature of the office of secretary of veterans affairs changed when the appointment statute was amended.9 “Embrace” is hardly the word to use, for what the board asks this court to do is to change the word “officer” in sec. 17.07 to “office,” so that whenever the legislature amended the appointment of an officer the legislature would have ipso facto changed the manner of removal.
There is more than one good reason why the suggested rewriting of see. 17.07 should not be done. The removal statute, sec. 17.07, repeatedly refers to state officers, not to state offices, and our court has recognized the *417distinction in the meaning of the two terms.10 Reference to an “officer,” as distinguished from an “office,” creates no ambiguity, and in the absence of ambiguity, language is to be given its ordinary and accepted meaning.11 Sec. 17.07(3), from which the board would like to escape, refers to officers “appointed” by the govern- or.12 It is not easy to appoint “offices.” It is people who are appointed. Sec. 17.07(5), where the board would like to end up, uses the pronoun “them” to refer to “officers.” This is clearly a reference to people and not to positions.13 Moreover, when the manner of removal of an officer is to depend on the office held and not the manner of appointment of the individual officer, the statute provides accordingly.14
*418The cases cited by the board as to when an individual is or is not a state officer at all15 are not applicable to the issue here raised which is whether Moses is an “officer” under sec. 17.07 (3) or an “officer” under sec. 17.07 (5). It is not the nature of the duties performed that determines who can remove. Rather the determinative question is who made the appointment. As to the petitioner, the answer to the question WHO is the governor, with the consent of the senate. We therefore hold that Moses was an officer “appointed by the governor by and with the advice and consent of the senate” both before and after the enactment of the ch. 4, Laws of 1977, amendment to sec. 15.05(1) (b), Stats., and, as such, he was removable under sec. 17.07(8), Stats., only by the governor and only for cause. The board’s attempted removal of this petitioner from office on May 20, 1977, was without statutory authority. The board’s order removing John R. Moses from his office as secretary of veterans affairs is set aside. The trial court judgment is reversed. The respondent board’s discharged is vacated. The acts of those persons serving as acting secretary or secretary of the board between the date of the attempted discharge of John R. Moses and the date of remittitur of this appeal are to be considered the acts of a de facto officer and are not invalidated by this opinion. It is so ordered.
By the Court, — Judgment reversed.

 Sec. 17.07, Stats., entitled Removals; legislative and appointive state officers.

 Sec. 17.07(1), (2), (8), (4) and (5), Stats.

 Sec. 17.07(3), Stats.

 Sec. 17.07(5), Stats.

 Respondents’ Brief at 8.

 Sec. 17.16(3), Stats.

 Ch. 4, sec. 1, Laws of 1977.

 Eespondents’ Brief at 15.

 Id. at 14.

 State ex rel. Reuss v. Giessel, 260 Wis. 524, 529, 51 N.W.2d 547 (1952) defines “officer” as a term that refers to the individual and not to the office held: “The use of the term ‘public officer’ rather than ‘public office’ in sec. 26, art. IV, Const., suggests that it applies to the individual rather than the statutory term.”

 Vigil v. State, 76 Wis.2d 133, 142, 250 N.W.2d 378 (1977), also holding that the popular reasonable import of words should be given effect. See also: State v. Killory, 73 Wis.2d 400, 413, 243 N.W.2d 475 (1976), in which we stated the “well-recognized rule of statutory construction that nontechnical words and phrases are to be construed in accordance with their common and ordinary usage.” See also: Sec. 990.01(1), Stats., providing: “All words and phrases shall be construed according to common and approved usage.”

 Sec. 17.07(3), Stats.

 Sec. 17.07(5), Stats. See also: Sec. 17.16(3), Stats., providing that in the procedure for removal for cause: “[S]aid officer shall have full opportunity to be heard in his defense, personally and by counsel.” The reference is clearly to a person and not an office.

 See. 17.07(3), Stats., states: “State officers appointed by the governor by and with the advice and consent of the senate, or appointed by any other officer or body subject to the concurrence of the governor, by the governor at any time, for cause; but the commissioner of banking and state auditor may be so removed *418only by and with the consent of a majority of the members of the senate.” [Emphasis supplied.]

 Burton v. State Appeal Board, 88 Wis.2d 294, 156 N.W.2d 386 (1968); Martin v. Smith, 239 Wis. 314, 1 N.W.2d 163 (1941).