Court Opinion

ID: 9957143
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-03 19:08:07.253026+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:07.247885
License: Public Domain

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                STATE OF FLORIDA
                 _____________________________

                        No. 1D2022-1460
                 _____________________________

TONY JEROME BYRD JR.,

    Appellant,

    v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

    Appellee.
                 _____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Okaloosa County.
John T. Brown, Judge.

                          April 3, 2024

PER CURIAM.

     Appellant Tony Jerome Byrd, Jr., was convicted of trafficking
in methamphetamine. The charge followed a controlled buy of the
contraband by an undercover police officer, who later testified at
trial. Appellant here argues that the trial court erred in denying
his motions to exclude certain portions of a recording made during
the controlled buy. Appellant also argues the trial court erred in
denying his motion for a mistrial concerning the testimony of the
undercover officer. For the reasons more fully set forth below, we
find both claims to be without merit and affirm.

     As noted, Appellant was charged after selling contraband to
an undercover police officer. Prior to the sale, the undercover
officer and Appellant conversed through text messages and cell
phone calls. At trial, Appellant admitted he sold
methamphetamine to the officer. However, he claimed that he was
entrapped into selling 14 grams, the threshold amount for a charge
of trafficking, a first degree felony. See § 893.135(1)(f)1.a., Fla.
Stat. (2019). During the transaction, the officer was wearing a
recording device which recorded conversations the officer had with
Appellant as well as with another officer. Prior to trial, Appellant
moved to exclude the crosstalk between police officers on the
recording as “immaterial, irrelevant and potentially prejudicial.”
At the hearing on the motion, the defense added that the crosstalk
was self-serving. The trial court denied the motion to exclude.

    During the direct examination of the undercover officer by the
State, he provided the context of some of the communications
between him and Appellant. At one point during the on-going
negotiations, after the officer indicated he wanted “one quarter of
cream,” the following exchange occurred:

    THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, where you at?

    UNDERCOVER OFFICER: I’m out in Fort Walton.

    THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, but you got to give me, like,
    an hour because I’m not even that way right now. I
    be back that way in probably a minute, and I’ll pull up on
    you.

    UNDERCOVER OFFICER: All right, man. Yeah, hit me
    back. You got my number, right?

(Emphasis added).

    The prosecutor asked the officer to explain the call, and he
answered:

    So I -- I was basically asking him if I could buy drugs
    from him, and he said, well, what do you want? And my
    response is a quarter of cream is what you heard on the
    audio. That would be a quarter ounce, or grams, of
    methamphetamine. Cream would be a street name for
    methamphetamine. His response saying, I haven’t been

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    that way in a minute, it’s going to take me some time,
    basically to me says that he –

    Appellant objected to the officer’s interpretation of what
Appellant meant, and the objection was sustained. The following
exchange then occurred between the prosecution and the witness:

    Q. [by the Prosecutor] Sergeant, based on your training
    and experience, what does the statement, “I hadn’t been
    that way in a bit. I’m going to need some time. I ain’t
    been that way in a bit”, what, based on your training and
    experience, does that mean to you?

    [Defense Counsel]: Again, objection.

    THE COURT: The objection’s overruled.

    A. Basically that means that he deals in larger amounts
    of drugs than what I’m asking to purchase, so he’s going
    to have to break that down and separate it out and
    repackage it and reweigh it, and it’s going to take some
    time to do so. Again, we’re talking about ounces, right,
    and then a quarter of an ounce, so to me that suggested
    that he was typically selling a much larger weight - -

    [Defense Counsel]: Judge, again, I’m going to object to
    that testimony about what -

    THE COURT: I understand. If you’ll approach.

     The trial court instructed the prosecutor ensure the witness
answered only the questions asked of him. After the witness
concluded his testimony, the defense sought a mistrial. The trial
court denied the motion, but acknowledged a curative instruction
was warranted. With the agreement of the defense, the trial court
instructed the jury:

    Previously you heard on the recording [Appellant] state,
    “I ain’t been that way”. You all heard the deputy give his
    opinion on what that meant, and he stated that
    [Appellant] was holding a larger amount of

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    methamphetamine and it needed to be broken down into
    smaller amounts. The Court has ruled that, that answer
    is inadmissible in evidence, and you should disregard it.
    Thank you.

     Appellant first argues before this court that the conversations
between the undercover officer and another officer, described as
his “handler,” should have been excluded as cumulative and self-
serving. Below, the defense did not claim that the chat between
the officers was cumulative. So, that argument is not preserved
for appellate consideration. See Tillman v. State, 471 So. 2d 32, 35
(Fla.1985) (“In order to be preserved for further review by a higher
court, an issue must be presented to the lower court and the
specific legal argument or ground to be argued on appeal or review
must be part of that presentation if it is to be considered
preserved.”).

     As for the argument that the chatter was “self-serving,” this
court has explained that such an objection carries no legal weight.
In Alexander v. State, 627 So. 2d 35, 43 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993), we
held, “No legal principle excludes statements or conduct of a party
solely on the ground that such statements or conduct is self-
serving.” See also Beckman v. State, 230 So. 3d 77, 92 (Fla. 3d DCA
2017); Stiles v. State, 672 So. 2d 850, 851–52 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996).
It would be the rare instance indeed, and a pointless act, when a
party offers evidence which did not serve that party.

     As for the denial of a mistrial, the extensive case law
concerning mistrials is in accord that a declaration of mistrial is
an act of last resort. A ruling on a motion for mistrial is within the
trial court’s discretion, but crucially, a mistrial is appropriate only
where the error is so prejudicial as to “vitiate the entire trial.”
England v. State, 940 So. 2d 389, 402 (Fla. 2006); Payne v. State,
233 So. 3d 512, 515 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017). This court has explained
the propriety of a mistrial as follows: “In this State the rule has
been long established and continuously adhered to that the power
to declare a mistrial and discharge the jury should be exercised
with great care and caution and should be done only in cases of
absolute necessity.” Salvatore v. State, 366 So. 2d 745, 750 (Fla.
1978) (emphasis added); see also Dickerson v. State, 285 So. 3d 353,

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358 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019). A mistrial was not an absolute necessity
in this case.

     As detailed above, a curative instruction was given with the
approval of the defense. While the trial court initially allowed the
undercover officer to expound more than he should have, the trial
court instructed the jury that such elaboration was not to be
considered. Appellant has not explained why the jury would not
have heeded this instruction any less than it heeded the other
numerous instructions given at his trial. See Jennings v. State,
124 So. 3d 257, 266 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (“Generally speaking, the
use of a curative instruction to dispel the prejudicial effect of an
objectionable comment is sufficient.” (quoting Rivera v. State, 745
So. 2d 343, 345 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999))).

     Importantly, the conversations between the officer and
Appellant, the recordings of which were admitted without
objection, repeatedly reveal that the officer inquired about
purchasing seven grams of methamphetamine and that Appellant
countered with an offer of sale of a greater amount, 14 grams.
Thus, the testimony was not the only evidence which contradicted
the defense’s claim of entrapment.

    Accordingly, Appellant’s conviction is AFFIRMED.

BILBREY, WINOKUR, and TANENBAUM, JJ., concur.

                 _____________________________

    Not final until disposition of any timely and
    authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
    9.331.
               _____________________________

Jessica J. Yeary, Public Defender, and Kevin P. Steiger, Assistant
Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Julian E. Markham,
Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

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