Court Opinion

ID: 9636594
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 14:34:41.086392+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:47.206783
License: Public Domain

CLARK, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
In its affirmance of the summary dismissal of the plaintiff’s application the court has taken a long step in the interpretation and limitation of the new Lanham Trade Mark Act; in effect it has cut this Act so extensively heralded by sponsoring groups down to a size consistent with the court’s conceptions of public policy. While I regard these conceptions highly, I am troubled by the fact that the Act is rather clearly the expression of contrary views vigorously held by persons and groups who were able to exercise a persuasive influence *181in the halls of Congress during its long period of germination. That other interests, those of consumers, for example, may have been more imperfectly represented there does not seem to me to lessen our problem, for we must take the legislative process as we find it, not as we wish it might be. The question seems to me therefore a vastly important one as to the relations of court and legislature; and I am indeed sorry that it is left with only a statement of the court’s policy views as full justification for the narrowing interpretation. For some time 1 have been urging my colleagues to a consideration of the impact of the new legislation;1 but I must confess now to a feeling of frustration that discussion, when had, is thus limited.
It may be that when a court feels a responsibility to curtail the possible scope of undesirable legislation, the best thing it can do is to rest its case straightforwardly on policy grounds without getting involved in the views expressed by the legislative proponents. Even if we concede as much, I still think it extremely desirable to await the full telling of the story, rather than to bar the way summarily at the beginning.2 As it stands, it must be assumed that the new legislation affords no relief, though all the allegations of the plaintiff he accepted in full.3 This is a pretty extensive position and may well be unnecessary; a hearing of the facts might show that the plaintiff had a somewhat exaggerated view of its own grievances. And if they are true as stated, it still is not clear but that some additional remedies, perhaps not as much as are asked for, might he devised which would make a better adjustment of the troublesome situation between these parties.4 Whatever may be the law, we cannot be very happy at a decree which, on the plaintiff’s allegations, has proven completely stultifying in that it takes away with one breath what it appears to grant by way of relief on another. Summary disposition of the case is a repudiation of any attempt to find a real workable remedy for an adjudicated wrong.5
Since I am in very real doubt as to how strict should be the interpretation of the new Act, I shall not try here to advance a definitive interpretation in contrast with that stated in the opinion, but only to suggest the questions which arise in my mind. As is pointed out, the Lanham Act certainly made extensive and far-reaching changes *182in the law of trademarks as a whole, some of which are cited. In this particular connection it substituted for the definitely restrictive language of the older Act limiting infringing sales to those of goods which were “substantially of the same descriptive properties as those set forth in such registration” a broad recovery for a use “likely to cause confusion or mistake or to deceive purchasers as to the source of origin of such goods or services.” 15 U.S.C.A. § 1114(1). These broadening provisions, twice stated in this subsection, seem quite consistently carried out through the Act.6 Having in mind the well-known intent of the sponsors to broaden tradémark protection, they would seem to point strongly to a definite plan to grant recovery wherever a mark is “intended to be used to cause confusion or mistake or to deceive purchasers,” to quote the concluding words of the subsection. In fact, it appears to be substantially conceded that the literal reading is that way; but it is held that this reading must be rejected for two reasons. The first, which is little stressed, is not overclear to me; it seems to be that just as the 1905 Act was designed to bring the law up to that date, so this 1946 Act is designed to bring the law up to the 1946 date. But unfortunately there does not appear to be a quite clear law of 1946, as I fear those who have struggled with our decisions such as Triangle Publications v. Rohrlich, 2 Cir., 167 F.2d 969, compared with Best & Co. v. Miller, 2 Cir., 167 F.2d 374, certiorari denied 335 U.S. 818, 69 S.Ct. 39, will understand. Moreover, this assumes what is set out to be proven and what is contrary to the professed desire oí the protagonists, namely, that the Act was intended only as declaratory of existing law. The argument which is really stressed, however — “the strongest possible reason for not reading the language literally” — is the argument of policy already forecast in certain previously existing authorities.7
Even though the policy stated, the hardship to others and the unjustified power given the first user of a mark to pre-empt new markets, is compelling, yet there are countervailing arguments which have appealed to many. This is not a monopoly of a natural product or of an invention, but of a name or mark built up by judicious advertising. The question is insistently *183asked why in that case it is necessary to permit another to reap the rewards of the diligence and money expended by the original exploiter. Here, for example, it is urged, and any devotee of the radio knows, that one of the most famous and presumably one of the most expensive of the popular evening radio hours has for years advertised the plaintiff’s products. Yoder, The McGees of Wistful Vista, 222 Sat. Eve. Post No. 41, pp. 26, 86, 87, Apr. 9, 1949. One can have little doubt that, as the plaintiff offers to prove, the original defendant, who has already associated with himself four others, one a Johnson, the three others non-Johnsons, is reaping the benefit of the plaintiff’s advertising of its •own products. The literature heralding and explaining the new Act — coming, it must be conceded, mainly from those favoring the legislation — is already vast and has gone over into nonlegal publications.8 Criticism of restrictive interpretation of the statute has also begun. Thus the well-known case of California Fruit Growers Exchange v. Sunkist Baking Co., 7 Cir., 166 F.2d 971, requiring a showing of competitive practices, has been the subject of extensive criticism.9 Lunsford, Trade Mark Infringement and Confusion of Source: Need for Supreme Court Action, 35 Va.L.Rev. 214; Callmann, 38 Trade Mark Rep. 304, 308; Note, 48 Col.L.Rev. 648; and see also Callmann, False Advertising As a Competitive Tort, 48 Col.L.Rev. 876; 17 Geo.Wash.L.Rev. 112; 29 B.U.L. Rev. 137; 26 N.C.L.Rev. 424; and 22 Temp.L.Q. 301 as to other decisions. Of course in this field we touch at once issues of the most highly controversial nature. Thus a different philosophy (though without discussion of the effect of the new Act) is ably presented in Brown, Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade Symbols, 57 Yale L.J. 1165; and see also Zlinkoff, supra note 7. I cite these authorities not to express agreement now with any of them, but rather to lend point to my belief that sooner or later we shall have to accord a more full-dressed hearing to proponents of this legislation than we have yet been willing to do.
I must also express a word of concern about a point of practice, suggested somewhat indirectly in the opinion, that there may be some need of permission from this court for the filing of the new application by the plaintiff. Under the clear-cut provisions of the Federal Rules there seems to me such a complete absence of place for any such restriction that I regret the judicial doubt thus imported into an otherwise clear situation. Perhaps question has arisen because permission was sought below under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 15(d), 28 U.S.C.A., and this seemed like seeking to amend a pleading in a case in the appellate court; though even here the functions of the appellate court seem properly limited to the judicial review of the judgment itself. See Markert v. Swift & Co., 2 Cir., 173 F.2d 517. But since the *184case is in judgment, the obvious and necessary course is under F.R. 60(b); which in its presently amended form gives a complete scheme for relief. Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 69 S.Ct. 384. Not only does this not call for appellate permission when a case has been affirmed on appeal, but it is obvious that such permission is an ■ unnecessary and undesirable clog on the proceedings. An appellate court cannot act understandingly under F.R. 60(b) without the necessary record which the proceedings in the trial court must supply.10 To expect it to grant or withhold permission in advance is a futility and an obstruction. The rules themselves quite carefully show when, if ever, appellate permission is to be sought. See F.R. 60(a) as amended, and compare also-amended F.R. 73(a) and 75(h).
I would reverse and remand for a hearing of the parties’ evidence.

 As in Best & Co. v. Miller, 2 Cir., 167 F.2d 374, 378, and see also California .Apparel Creators v. Wieder of California, 2 Cir., 162 F.2d 803, 900, 901, 174 A.L.R. 481, certiorari denied 332 U.S. 816, 68 S.Ct. 156, 92 L.Ed. 393, and LaTouraine Coffee Co. v. Lorraine Coffee Co., 2 Cir., 157 F.2d 115, 118, 119, certiorari denied Lorraine Coffee Co. v. LaTouraine, 329 U.S. 771, 67 S.Ct. 389, 91 L.Ed. 663.

 See L. Hand, J., dissenting in California Apparel Creators v. Wieder of California, supra. Tlie fact that I think this is an inappropriate case for a summary judgment does not, however, signify disapproval of the salutary principle of the rule itself, F. R. 56 — as distinguished from some of the restrictive judicial . glosses put upon it. See my article in 15 Brooklyn L.Rev. 1, 9, also 48 Col.L. Rev. 780; 45 Col.L.Rev. 964 ; 61 Harv. L.Rev. 375; 55 Yale L.J. 810; 34 A.B. A.J. 187.

 Thus plaintiff desired to introduce -evidence of an extensive survey showing the widespread acceptance by housewives of plaintiff as the producer of defendants’ product, notwithstanding the operation of the injunction previously entered herein.

 The defendants’ label, which is here fully approved, does appear to be quite similar to the plaintiff’s; it would not seem out of the way now to order changes which would tend to compel dissimilarity. Among points which might be considered are the similar yellow background (not directly touched upon in the injunction), the emphasis here permitted the defendants to emphasize a company, “Johnson Products Company,” as is the plaintiff, rather than a collection of individuals, as are the defendants, and the substantial nonreadability of the location, “Buffalo, N. Y.,” by reason of its position in the oval lettering on the right side reading from the bottom up on the label.

 Thus, in accepting the finding below of confusion among the plain tiff’s customers caused by the defendant’s use of the name we said: “We should have so found ourselves; and indeed the testimony leaves no doubt that, while he did not actively instigate his employees to mislead customers, the defendant instructed them not to undeceive any who were already misled and to take advantage of their confusion.” 116 F.2d 427, 429.

 Thus, see, inter alia, the provisions as to registrable trademarks, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1052(d) (denying registration to a mark so resembling a registered mark “as to be likely, when applied to the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion or mistake or to deceive purchasers” — a provision which needs to be read in its entirety for its full impact); § 1064(c) (cancellation of registration); § 1066 (interference); § 1115 (b) (the defense of invalidity of the mark) ; the intent of the Act stated in § 1127; and the broad action for false description or representation of goods generally given in § 1125(a), referred to in California Apparel Creators v. Wieder of California, supra, 2 Cir., 162 F.2d 893, at pages 900, 901, footnote 12.

 It should be noted, however, that there is strong authority for what is called the “federal” rule or is “popularly known as the Hand Doctrine” from its original impulse in the Second Circuit, cf. Lunsford, op. cit. infra, 35 Va.L.Rev. 214, 217, that relief will be granted as between noncompeting goods if there is confusion as to the source. Thus see, e.g., Standard Brands v. Smidler, 2 Cir., 151 F.2d 34, the analysis by Judge Yankwieh in Sunbeam Corp. v. Sunbeam Lighting Co., D.C.S.D.Cal., 83 E.Supp. 429, of Ninth Circuit cases, including Stork Restaurant v. Sahati, 9 Cir., 166 F.2d 348, the effect given by Judge Wyzanski to the new Massachusetts statute, Stat. 1947, c. 307, in Food Pair Stores v. Food Fair, D.C.Mass., 83 F. Supp. 445, and the extensive collection of cases in the annotation to Lady Esther, Ltd. v. Lady Esther Corset Shoppe, 317 Ill.App. 451, 46 N.E.2d 165, 148 A.L.R. 6, at pages 12, 36-39, 48, 53-92. And this appears to be the view of a great many commentators; thus, in addition to the articles hereinafter cited, see the authoritative statement in 3 Restatement, Torts, §§ 730, 731, 1938. Some commentators speak specifically of the Act as a codification of this rule of law. 2 Wyo.L.Rev. 66; 26 N.C.L.Rev. 424. For the view that the recent trend of cases (prior to the Act) has been to restrict the doctrine, see Zlinkoff, Monopoly Versus Competition; Significant Trends in Patent, Anti-Trust, TradeMark, and Unfair Competition Suits, 53 Yale L.J. 514, 538-541, and Brown, op. cit. infra, 57 Yale L.J. 1165, at 1193. So which view, if either, does the new Act codify?

 I have cited some of these references in the cases in note 1 supra. See also the discussion in the February, 1949, issue of Fortune, vol. 39, p. 147. Thus Miss Daphne Robert, author of The New 'Trade-Mark Manual, stresses the change in wording from the former Act which is here so important and goes on to say flatly of the now Act: “The goods or services need not be identical or even remotely related. If it is shown that purchasers .are likely to be misled by the mark into thinking that the same concern is selling, ■ offering for sale or advertising the goods • or services of both parties, relief will be granted.” Commentary on The Lanham Trade-Mark Act, 15 U.S.C.A. page 265, at page 286, compare Brown, Book Review, 58 Yale L.J. 511, 512. This is the -view she takes in her Manual, pp. 162, .163, and is of course not unusual among trademark lawyers, e.g., Callmann, The “Sunkist” Decision: Trade Marks at the Crossroads, 38 Trade Mark Rep. 304, 308; also references in note 7 supra and in the text infra.

 But the court there said “the words ‘the same general class of merchandise’ and ‘goods of substantially the same descriptive properties’ are facts essential to infringement under the 1905 Act, and not under the Lanham Act.” Its actual decision is thus explained: “In any view of this case, the record is wholly devoid of any finding, or substantial evidence to support a finding, of a likelihood of confusion as to the source of origin, as required to constitute infringement under the Lanham Act.” 166 F.2d 971, 973, 975. Hence it is not in point as to the present case in view of the clear finding supra note 5.

 Note also the precise provisions of F.R.' 60(b) that a motion thereunder “does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation,” thus rounding out the special and separate character of the proceeding, as therein fully described.