Court Opinion

ID: 9963652
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-26 00:00:53.204077+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:55.398341
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-50330       Document: 58-1     Page: 1    Date Filed: 04/25/2024

        United States Court of Appeals
             for the Fifth Circuit
                            ____________
                                                                United States Court of Appeals
                                                                         Fifth Circuit
                              No. 23-50330
                            ____________                               FILED
                                                                   April 25, 2024
Good River Farms, L.P.,                                           Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                       Clerk
                                                        Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                   versus

TXI Operations, L.P.; Martin Marietta Materials,
Incorporated,

                                       Defendants—Appellants.
               ______________________________

               Appeal from the United States District Court
                    for the Western District of Texas
                         USDC No. 1:17-CV-1117
               ______________________________

Before Smith, Haynes, and Douglas, Circuit Judges.
Dana M. Douglas, Circuit Judge:
      This appeal follows a “120-year flood” event that occurred near
Austin, Texas, on October 30, 2015. The disputing parties own land directly
across from each other along the Colorado River. Plaintiff-Appellee Good
River Farms (“Good River”) sustained severe damage to its pecan farm and
subsequently sued Defendants-Appellants Martin Marietta Materials and
TXI Operations (collectively “Martin Marietta”), who utilize the land for
strip mining. Good River claimed that the mining resulted in the presence of
a large pit filled with groundwater that breached and released a deluge of
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                                  No. 23-50330

impounded surface water onto their property. Following a jury trial, Good
River was awarded $659,882.00 in damages, prevailing on claims for
violations of Texas Water Code § 11.086 and for negligence. Martin Marietta
appealed. Mindful of our deferential review of jury verdicts and the unique
factual scenario present in this case, we AFFIRM.

                                       I
         Good River operates a pecan farm on the north side of the Colorado
River. In 2015, Good River’s property covered 377 acres and included 8,000
pecan trees, as well as several buildings where equipment and harvested
pecans could be processed and stored. Martin Marietta operates a sand and
gravel mine on the south side of the Colorado River, directly across from
Good River’s pecan farm.         Martin Marietta’s operation includes the
presence of a large freshwater pit near the river, directly across from Good
River.
         Parts of Good River’s pecan farm are in a 100-year floodplain. In the
past, Good River experienced flooding in 1992 and 2013, although no damage
occurred on the property. However, on Martin Marietta’s property, the 2013
flooding caused two breaches on the west and east sides of the north end of
the freshwater pit. In early 2015, Dennis Schiwitz, Martin Marietta’s
Equipment Operator, repaired the west breach of the pit but failed to repair
the east breach until 2017. In 2015, the conditions outside Austin led to a
“120-year flood” event. Both parties’ properties flooded, with Martin
Marietta’s facilities covered by up to three feet of water.
         Testimony elicited at trial indicated that water overflowed the north
wall of Martin Marietta’s freshwater pit and ran perpendicular to the current
of the Colorado River to reach Good River’s property. For example, S.
Turner Wimberly, manager and part owner of Good River, testified that he
had been present at the property one or two days before the flood. He stated

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that immediately prior to October 30, Martin Marietta’s southern
embankment “had piled dirt really high” and looking across from Good
River’s property, none of Martin Marietta’s property behind the
embankment could be seen. He further testified that when surveying the
water damage the next morning, he discovered objects from within his
business’ buildings scattered across the property and a significant amount of
sand and gravel strewn throughout. Mr. Wimberly also testified that Martin
Marietta’s embankment looked visibly different on October 31, 2015, and
that portions of its property could now be seen.
       Antonio Garcia Guerrero testified that he had worked on the Good
River property for 17 years and had seen the property flood in 2013 and 2015.
On October 30, he arrived at the property at 10:30 or 11:00 a.m., after it had
stopped raining, and noted that the Colorado River looked normal at that
time. He noticed the water level rising in the Colorado River around 3:00
p.m. He identified that at 3:30 p.m., the level of the river was higher, but that
water did not come onto the farm until around 6:00 p.m. He testified that
after this time, the level of the water on the farm began rising quickly, and
that emergency services arrived to rescue his coworker and his son around
7:00 p.m., requiring boats to do so. He corroborated Mr. Wimberly’s
testimony that more of Martin Marietta’s property was visible the day after
the flood. Guerrero also testified that the water flowing onto Good River’s
property flowed northward, rather than in the normal eastward flow of the
Colorado River.
       Jorge Lopez Tapia testified that he had worked at the Good River
property for more than 20 years and had seen flooding in 1992, 2013, and
2015, although the first two flood incidents caused no damage. On October
30, the Colorado River was normal, and its water level was not rising at 10:30
to 11:00 a.m., but had begun rising at around 3:00 or 3:30 p.m., when he began
monitoring the river for rising water. Like Guerrero, Tapia noted that water

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began rising faster around 6:00 p.m. and that it was around 6:00 to 6:30 p.m.
that water began rising onto Good River’s property. He testified that he
could see water coming over the dirt embankment on Martin Marietta’s
property, with the flow of water quickly increasing until it was up to his chest.
Like the other witnesses, Tapia indicated that no flowing water remained on
Good River’s property by the next day.
       Jon McIntyre, Good River’s expert, who reviewed river and stream
flow and rainfall data for October 30 concurred with Martin Marietta’s
expert that modeling showed peak water flow in the Colorado River at the
Good River property would have occurred around 5:00 p.m.
       Finally, Dennis Schiwitz, a heavy equipment operator at Martin
Marietta, testified that when he arrived to work on October 30, it was not
raining, but that water began rising at the Martin Marietta property around
7:00 a.m., and the property was evacuated by 3:00 p.m. because there was
three feet of water at the onsite office. He noted that the rise in water on
October 30 was the most rapid he had seen at the Martin Marietta property.
       On October 27, 2017, Good River filed its petition for permanent
injunction and exemplary damages in Texas state court, asserting claims for
nuisance, negligence, negligence per se, and violation of Texas Water Code
§ 11.086. On November 27, 2017, Martin Marietta timely removed the case
to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction.
       The case proceeded to a jury trial on August 22, 2022. After Good
River rested its case-in-chief, Martin Marietta presented its Rule 50(a)
Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law orally and in a written motion.
When the Rule 50(a) arguments concluded, the trial court said “I think this
is, frankly, a close case, but I’m going to reserve judgment. I’m going to let
this go to the jury without prejudice for you to re-urg[e] this in light of
whatever the jury is going to do with this.”

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         Three of Good River’s original claims were submitted to the jury:
nuisance, Texas Water Code § 11.086, and negligence. The jury rejected
Good River’s nuisance claims. The jury answered “yes,” to the questions
whether “Defendants diverted or impounded the natural flow of surface
waters in a manner that proximately caused damage to Plaintiff’s property”
(under     Texas    Water   Code     § 11.086)    and   whether   Defendants’
“negligence . . . proximately cause[d] the injury to Plaintiff’s property on or
around October 30, 2015.” The trial court entered final judgment on that
verdict on August 24, 2022, awarding Good River $659,882.00 in damages
and denying all other relief.
         Martin Marietta filed its renewed motion for judgment as a matter of
law under Rule 50(b). The trial court denied the motion on April 11, 2023.
Good River Farm, LP v. Martin Marietta Materials, Inc., No. 1:17-CV-1117-RP,
2023 WL 2904577 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 11, 2023). On May 5, 2023, Martin
Marietta timely filed its notice of appeal from the trial court’s final judgment
and its order denying its renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law. We
have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

                                       II
         “A motion for judgment as a matter of law . . . in an action tried by
jury is a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting the
jury’s verdict.” Orozco v. Plackis, 757 F.3d 445, 448 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting
SMI Owen Steel Co. v. Marsh USA, Inc., 520 F.3d 432, 437 (5th Cir. 2008)).
We “review de novo the district court’s denial of a motion for judgment as a
matter of law, applying the same standard as the district court.” Carley v.
Crest Pumping Techs., LLC, 890 F.3d 575, 578 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Heck
v. Triche, 775 F.3d 265, 272 (5th Cir. 2014)). Under Rule 50(b), “[a] motion
for judgment as a matter of law should be granted if there is no legally

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sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for a party.” Orozco,
757 F.3d at 448.
       At this stage, a court’s review of a jury verdict is “especially
deferential.” OneBeacon Ins. Co. v. T. Wade Welch & Assocs., 841 F.3d 669,
675 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting SMI Owen Steel Co., 520 F.3d at 437)). We
“view the entire record in the light most favorable to the non-movant,
drawing all factual inferences in favor of the non-moving party, and ‘leaving
credibility determinations, the weighing of evidence, and the drawing of
legitimate inferences from the facts to the jury.’” Aetna Casualty & Surety
Co. v. Pendleton Detectives of Miss., Inc., 182 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 1999)
(quoting Conkling v. Turner, 18 F.3d 1285, 1300 (5th Cir. 1994)). A motion
for judgment as a matter of law may be granted “[o]nly when the facts and
reasonable inferences are such that a reasonable juror could not reach a
contrary verdict.” Baltazor v. Holmes, 162 F.3d 368, 373 (5th Cir. 1998). “If
reasonable persons could differ in their interpretation of the evidence, the
motion should be denied.” Id.

                                      III
                A. Texas Water Code § 11.086
       Martin Marietta argues that as a matter of law, it cannot be liable
under § 11.086 because that statute applies only to damage caused by
“surface water” diverted or impounded by the defendant, and there was not
legally sufficient evidence that “surface water” from Martin Marietta’s
property crossed the Colorado River to flood Good River’s property on the
other side. Instead, it argues that because the Colorado River flows between
the properties, the water ceased being surface water when it reached the river
and became flood water. Because Good River “did not establish that the
water that flooded its pecan orchard was ‘surface water’ from Martin

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Marietta’s operation,” Martin Marietta argues it is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.
       Good River counters that “[m]uch of Appellants’ argument can be
summarized as claiming that once water touched the channel of the Colorado
River no further liability could attach because the water instantly became
state controlled floodwater.” It points to evidence showing that the water
that came onto Good River’s property did not follow a defined course and
had not gathered into or formed a natural body of water, “but rather flowed
across and overwhelmed the riverine current” pointing to support from the
expert modeling and eyewitness testimony.
       Texas Water Code § 11.086 states, “No person may divert or
impound the natural flow of surface waters in this state, or permit a diversion
or impounding by him to continue, in a manner that damages the property of
another by the overflow of the water diverted or impounded.” Tex. Water
Code Ann. § 11.086(a). It further states, “A person whose property is
injured by an overflow of water caused by an unlawful diversion or
impounding has remedies at law and in equity and may recover damages
occasioned by the overflow.” Id. § 11.086(b).
       The term “surface water” is not defined in the statute but has been
interpreted by Texas courts to mean water “which is defused over the ground
from falling rains or melting snows, and continues to be such until it reaches
some bed or channel in which water is accustomed to flow.” Dalon v. City of
DeSoto, 852 S.W.2d 530, 538 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1992, writ denied).
“Surface waters do not follow a defined course or channel and do not gather
into or form a natural body of water.” Id. “The chief characteristic of surface
water is its inability to maintain its identity and existence as a body of water,
distinguishing it from water flowing in a natural watercourse.” Id. Damages
are permitted under § 11.086 when “(1) a diversion or impoundment of

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surface water, (2) causes, (3) damage to the property of the plaintiff
landowner.”     Dietrich v. Goodman, 123 S.W.3d 413, 417 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (emphasis omitted).
       Texas courts have denied liability where the defendant diverted or
impounded a watercourse or floodwater, rather than surface water. A
watercourse is defined as having “(1) a bank and bed, (2) a current of water,
and (3) a permanent source of supply.” Dietrich, 123 S.W.3d at 418 (quoting
Hoefs v. Short, 273 S.W. 785, 787 (Tex. 1925)). Floodwaters “are those
which, generally speaking, have overflowed a river, stream or natural water
course and have formed a continuous body with the water flowing in the
ordinary channel.” Valley Forge Ins. Co. v. Hicks Thomas & Lilienstern, LLP,
174 S.W.3d 254, 258 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. denied)
(quoting Sun Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Bunkley, 233 S.W.2d 153, 155 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 1950, writ ref’d)).
       Texas courts have also held that “surface water” may change in
character once it comes “under the control and direction of a watercourse.”
Dietrich, 123 S.W.3d at 420; Dalon, 852 S.W.2d at 538-39 (“[I]f the
floodwater forms a continuous body with the water flowing in the ordinary
channel, or if it temporarily overflows presently to return, as by recession of
the waters, it is to be regarded as still a part of the stream”) (internal citation
omitted).
       The plain language of the statute does not require that the water which
damages the property of another be purely surface water. Instead, the statute
asks whether the defendant’s conduct diverted or impounded surface water
in a way that causes damage to another when that water overflows. See Tex.
Water Code Ann. § 11.086(a). Martin Marietta’s insistence that the
damage be caused entirely from surface water appears to read a requirement
into the statute that does not exist. The Texas Supreme Court instructs not

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to read requirements into a statute that do not appear to exist under the plain
language. See State v. Shumake, 199 S.W.3d 279, 284 (Tex. 2006) (“[W]hen
possible, we discern [legislative intent] from the plain meaning of the words
chosen.”).
       Despite this, Martin Marietta raises a strong argument rooted in
Texas appellate court cases. The definitions provided for surface water by
Texas appellate courts suggest that surface water continues to be such “until
it reaches some bed or channel in which water is accustomed to flow.” Dalon,
852 S.W.2d at 538. Here, the surface water from Martin Marietta’s property
necessarily had to cross the Colorado River to reach Good River’s property.
But Dalon also states that “[s]urface waters do not follow a defined course or
channel and does not gather into or form a natural body of water.” Id. at 538.
According to the witnesses, the current of water on the Good River property
was moving south to north, instead of west to east like the Colorado River,
suggesting it did not “follow a defined course or channel” or “gather into or
form a natural body of water.” See id. This, among other reasons, makes the
cited cases distinguishable.
       For example, in both Dalon and Dietrich, the courts discussed whether
defendants had manipulated surface or floodwaters, and ultimately
concluded that the defendants’ actions impounded only water that had
already become floodwater prior to the impoundment. Dalon, 852 S.W.2d at
539 (concluding that the overflowed creek is a natural waterway, and once
rainfall enters the creek it is no longer surface water and cannot give rise to
liability under § 11.086); Dietrich, 123 S.W.3d at 419-20 (concluding that the
water flowed downstream in a well-defined bed was not surface water when
impounded). Here, Martin Marietta does not argue that it impounded
floodwater, but only that impounded surface water transformed into
floodwater when it reached the Colorado River. It does not dispute that the
water in its freshwater pit was surface water.

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       In the additional cases cited, such as Bonin v. Sabine River Authority of
Texas, the district court concluded that plaintiffs could not recover because
they did not “include any facts in the operative complaint to even remotely
suggest that the waters which damaged their properties were surface
waters.” Bonin v. Sabine River Auth. of Tex., No. 1:17-CV-00134-TH, 2019
WL 1246259, at *6-7 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 1, 2019), report and rec. adopted, No.
1:17-CV-00134-TH, 2019 WL 1244705 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 18, 2019), aff’d, 961
F.3d 381 (5th Cir. 2020). The surface water flowed into the Sabine River and
the damage occurred downstream, so the surface water had been flowing in
the natural channel and transitioned to floodwater. Id. Likewise, Salazar v.
Sanders denied liability for downstream flooding. 440 S.W.3d 863, 873 (Tex.
App.—El Paso 2013, pet. denied). Here, Good River alleged facts that
surface waters damaged its property and do not indicate that any water
flowed downstream. Instead, the water ran perpendicular to the river to cross
it onto Good River’s property.
       As Good River notes, in most of these Texas appellate decisions, the
water had been traveling in a natural watercourse before the defendant
diverted it. It notes that unlike the cited cases, “surface water detained by
Appellants did not enter the stream and flow down the course of the river,
but rather crossed over the normal flow of the river and did not become a part
of the natural watercourse.” Because of this, the case presents a unique set
of factual circumstances that have not been previously addressed by any case.
       The district court found support for its holding in Texas Woman’s
University v. The Methodist Hospital, 221 S.W.3d 267 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.).      There, the district court denied summary
judgment to defendants because it could not show that the damage to
plaintiff’s property “was flooded exclusively due to a . . . natural
watercourse.” Id. at 280. Importantly, the Texas Woman’s University court
focused on the identity of the water at the time it was diverted—not the

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identity of the water when it flooded plaintiff’s property. Id. at 279-83; see
also Tenaris Bay City Inc. v. Ellisor, No. 14-22-00013-CV, 2023 WL 5622855,
at *8 (Tex. App. —Houston [14th Dist.] 2023) (“[T]he relevant inquiry is
whether it was surface water at the time of diversion.”) (emphasis added).
       Martin Marietta concedes that the district court properly instructed
the jury on the definition of “surface water.” Further, the jury relied on
evidence including testimony that Martin Marietta’s embankment had
significantly decreased, sand and gravel was found strewn about Good
River’s property, and eyewitness accounts of water surging from Martin
Marietta’s pit across the Colorado River inundated Good River’s property.
As noted by Good River, the waters that flooded its property were not a
“continuous body of water flowing in the ordinary channel.” Instead, as
noted by witnesses, “the river was flowing from West to East, while the
waters that entered Good River’s property were flowing from South to
North.” The jury apparently concluded that the water was not overflow from
the river, but surface water accumulated in such quantity that it ran contrary
to the riverine flow. A motion for judgment as a matter of law may be granted
“[o]nly when the facts and the reasonable inferences are such that a
reasonable juror could not reach a contrary verdict.” Baltazor, 162 F.3d at
373. Here, “reasonable persons could differ in their interpretation of the
evidence,” and accordingly, the district court properly denied the Rule 50(b)
motion for judgment as a matter of law and the jury verdict should be
affirmed. Id.
                             B. Negligence
       Turning to the jury’s finding of negligence, Martin Marietta argues
that Good River did not adduce legally sufficient evidence that the flooding
of its pecan farm was proximately caused by the negligence of Martin
Marietta, nor that it owed an independent duty to control floodwater. It also

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argues that negligence cannot be established when the defendant does no
more than furnish a condition which makes a plaintiff’s injuries possible.
       Good River argues that its injuries are proximately traceable to the
actions of Martin Marietta in diverting and impounding surface water. It
contends that Martin Marietta had a duty to control accumulated surface
water and a general duty of care arising from the parties’ particular
circumstances, particularly where Martin Marietta knew there would be a
risk of flood because its embankments had breached during a prior flood in
2013 and were not fully repaired prior to the 2015 flood. As to proximate
cause, Good River points out that direct witness testimony established
significant impoundment of surface waters occurring on Martin Marietta’s
site before Good River’s property suffered any intrusion of water, and that
witnesses testified that Martin Marietta’s embankment was constructed of
loose sediment without meaningful engineering. Finally, Good River notes
that Martin Marietta did more than merely furnish a condition because
evidence showed a direct, causal connection between Martin Marietta’s
activities in modifying and utilizing its site, and the fact that the Colorado
River was already subsiding at the time the deluge engulfed Good River’s
property.
       Negligence requires showing that a legal duty is owed to a plaintiff,
breach of that duty, and that damages were proximately caused by that
breach. See, e.g., Nabors Drillings, USA, Inc. v. Escoto, 288 S.W.3d 401, 404
(Tex. 2009). The parties do not dispute that the State of Texas has a non-
delegable duty to control floodwaters. TWU, 221 S.E.3d at 278. A private
defendant cannot be held liable for failing to control floodwaters because
Texas and Texas alone possesses that duty. Id. Martin Marietta’s theory
here is similar to its theory regarding Texas Water Code § 11.086: its duty to
control surface water ended when the surface water mixed with the Colorado
River floodwater before flowing onto Good River’s farm. But the jury, when

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given the elements for negligence, found that it was foreseeable that surface
water accumulating in Martin Marietta’s pit would have overflowed and
resulted in a deluge on Good River’s property. Regardless of whether Martin
Marietta had no duty to control floodwaters, it had a duty to control the
surface water impounded on its property.          The jury could reasonably
conclude that it was foreseeable that surface water would gather in such large
quantities that when it overflows, it could flood surrounding land.
       As to proximate cause, the jury heard evidence that the Colorado
River’s flooding peaked well before Good River was flooded and that
eyewitnesses saw the water crest over Martin Marietta’s property and head
toward Good River’s farm. Concluding that Martin Marietta proximately
caused Good River’s injury was reasonable given the evidence. And we must
“leav[e] credibility determinations, the weighing of evidence, and the
drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts to the jury.” Aetna Casualty
& Surety Co., 182 F.3d at 378.
       Finally, as to Martin Marietta’s argument that it merely furnished a
“condition” leading to Good River’s injuries, its understanding does not
comport with that of the Texas Supreme Court. To be clear, the parties do
not dispute but-for causation. The Texas Supreme Court uses the word
“condition” to describe scenarios with “but-for” causation without
proximate causation. See Allways Auto Grp., Ltd. v. Walters, 530 S.W.3d 147,
149 (Tex. 2017) (holding that loaning a friend a car was a “condition” that
did not create liability for an accident 18 days later); Union Pump Co. v.
Allbritton, 898 S.W.2d 773 (Tex. 1995), abrogated by Ford Motor Co. v.
Ledesma, 242 S.W.3d 32 (Tex. 2007) (holding that a fire was a “condition”
when, hours after it was extinguished, a person slipped and fell trying to close
a valve on the site of the fire). Here, the conduct was not so attenuated—the
flooding flowed rapidly from Martin Marietta’s property, over the Colorado
River, and onto Good River’s property. Accordingly, Martin Marietta did

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not merely create a condition leading to injury and the jury’s verdict on
negligence should be affirmed.

                                     IV
      Although this case presents a close call, the jury verdict demands our
deference. Because sufficient evidence supports its conclusions that Martin
Marietta violated Texas Water Code § 11.086 and committed common law
negligence, we AFFIRM.

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