Court Opinion

ID: 9670288
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:18:17.252399+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:03.647324
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.
(concurring). I write separately because I agree with the basic rule established in Klieger v. Alby, 125 Wis. 2d, 468, 373 N.W.2d 57 (Ct. App. 1985), and its successor cases, although I do not agree with all of Klieger's rationale or language.1 The majority errs in overruling Klieger. Finally, I do not agree with the approach of, or result reached by, the court of appeals in the case at bar, Steinberg v. Jensen, 186 Wis. 2d 237, 519 N.W.2d 753 (Ct. App. 1994).
*476I.
I read the Klieger rule as prohibiting ex parte discussions of a substantive nature between a defense attorney and a patient's treating physician after the patient has initiated a lawsuit. Klieger, 125 Wis. 2d at 474. Klieger does not prohibit a lawyer from communicating with a treating physician about insubstantial matters such as scheduling or procedural matters. See Haack v. Temple, 150 Wis. 2d 688, 442 N.W.2d 522 (1989). The majority opinion, however, overrules Klieger without adequately setting forth the Klieger rule or indicating the flaws of that rule. Majority op. at 471.
The Klieger rule, as I understand it, serves to balance a patient's privacy interest in preserving confidential communications with a physician, against a defendant's interest in presenting an effective defense, and against the public's interest in having the full disclosure needed to obtain a fair resolution of the dispute. Klieger recognizes that substantive information necessary for a defense can be obtained through the established channels of discovery. Klieger, 125 Wis. 2d at 474. The Klieger rule minimizes communication to the greatest extent feasible by forbidding ex parte substantive communication between a defense lawyer and a patient's treating physician.
Finally, the rule against substantive ex parte communication does not rest on the assumption that "physicians or lawyers will engage in professional misconduct _" Majority op. at 467. Instead, it recognizes that a patient's right to keep certain information confidential outweighs the potential that a communication between a defense attorney and a treating physician might, even unintentionally, result in a breach of confidential information. Similarly, this court's rule *477prohibiting ex parte communications between a judge and a lawyer appearing before that judge is not premised on the assumption that judges and lawyers will engage in misconduct.2 It merely recognizes that the right to a fair trial is important enough to guard against anything that could potentially undermine, or have the appearance of undermining, that right.
The plaintiffs urge the court to read Klieger as prohibiting all communications between a defense lawyer and a treating physician. The plaintiffs assert that even insubstantial communications pose the risk of disclosing confidential information. While I recognize this risk, I believe that a bright line "no-communications-about-anything-under-any-circumstances" rule would be overprotective of a plaintiff to the detriment of a defendant, who might be subject to sanctions for even minor, irrelevant infractions of the rule. Such inequities would be resolved by exceptions that chipped away at the rule until the rule eventually resembled the mandate that Klieger already represents.
Instead of following the majority's lead to overrule Klieger, I believe this court should strengthen the protection and balance that Klieger attempts to provide. One way is to explain more fully the legal basis and public policy implications of Klieger, as Justice Janine Geske's concurrence does. Other techniques might *478include a protective order or a restrictive authorization about ex parte communications issued by the circuit court; this court's requirement that a record be made of any ex parte communication;3 this court's requirement that when an ex parte communication occurs between a defense lawyer and a plaintiffs treating physician, the lawyer should "promptly notif~y the lawyer for the other party or the other party, if unrepresented, of such communication . . .." SCR 20:3.5(b) (relating to ex parte communications with a judge). Still another technique is suggested by the majority opinion, namely that defense attorneys advise treating physicians about confidential communications before any discussion. Majority op. at 468. Plaintiffs, defendants and the public interest can be protected in various ways. I believe the court would be wise to explore them.
*477A lawyer shall not:
(b) communicate ex parte with [a judge, juror, prospective juror or other official] . . . except as permitted by law or for scheduling purposes if permitted by the court: If communication between a lawyer and judge has occurred in order to schedule a matter, the lawyer involved shall promptly notify the lawyer for the other party or the other party, if unrepresented, of such communication.
*478II.
I next turn to apply the Klieger rule to the case at bar. In this case the circuit court determined that the three-way telephone conversation of Dr. Jensen, his lawyer and Dr. Hanna violated the Klieger rule because the conversation included a discussion of Dr. Hanna's treatment of Mrs. Steinberg. The circuit court also concluded that the meeting of Drs. Jensen, Ber-oukhim and Wong did not violate the Klieger rule because Dr. Jensen's lawyer did not participate in the conversation, the conversation was not of a substantive nature, and the doctors were entitled to see the medical records involved. The circuit court voiced perplexity about the appropriate sanctions for the Klieger rule *479violation, ultimately deciding that because the violation was not egregious, severe sanctions were not required.4 Instead, the circuit court admonished Dr. Jensen's lawyer to adhere to Klieger in the future.
An appellate court reviews a circuit court's determination of a Klieger violation and the sanctions warranted under the erroneous exercise of discretion standard. The circuit court's determination will not be reversed on appeal if it has a reasonable basis and was made in accord with the facts of record and with accepted legal standards. Wikrent v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., 179 Wis. 2d 297, 306, 507 N.W.2d 130, 133 (Ct. App. 1993).
Although the court of appeals referred to the erroneous exercise of discretion standard, I do not think the court of appeals applied that standard in this case. Rather, as I read its decision, the court of appeals reviewed the record de novo, concluding that both conversations violated the Klieger rule and that a new trial was the appropriate sanction against the defendant.
I conclude that the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion. The circuit court examined the facts of the case and reasoned its way to a reasonable conclusion consistent with applicable law. Accordingly I believe that the court of appeals should have affirmed the circuit court's decision.
For the reasons set forth, I concur in the mandate.

 For a commentator's view of the law of Wisconsin on ex parte contacts with a treating physician, see Terry E. Nilles, Ex Parte Contacts with Expert Witnesses, Wis. Law., Dec. 1994, at 18.
For discussions of the issue of ex parte communications with a plaintiffs treating physician and the different state rules, see, e.g., John Jennings, The Physician-Patient Relationship: The Permissibility of Ex Parte Communications Between Plaintiff's Treating Physicians and Defense Counsel, 59 Mo. L. Rev. 441 (1994); Elizabeth Eggleston Drigotas, Restricting Ex Parte Interviews with Nonparty Treating Physicians, 69. N.C. L. Rev. 1381 (1991); Charles F. Redden and William B. Bower, Qualifications to the Bar of Ex Parte Contacts with Physicians, 79 Ill. B. J. 442 (1991); David L. Woodard, Shielding the Plaintiff and Physician: The Prohibition of Ex Parte Contacts with a Plaintiff's Treating Physician, 13 Campbell L. Rev. 233 (1991); Philip H. Corboy, Ex Parte Contacts Between Plaintiff's Physician and Defense Attorneys: Protecting the Patient-Litigant's Right to a Fair Trial, 21 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 1001 (1990).

 Supreme Court Rule 20:3.5(b) provides:

 See Jacqueline M. Asher, et al., Ex Parte Interview with Plaintiff's Treating Physicians-The Offensive Use of the Physician-Patient Privilege, 67 U. Det. L. Rev. 501 (1990).

 The sanction that should be imposed for a Klieger violation poses a very difficult question. A sanction should be fair to both parties and should be neither meaningless nor overly harsh.