Court Opinion

ID: 9950319
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-13 19:04:39.410814+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:36:36.849626
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/13/24 P. v. Sardin CA2/5
  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
 not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
        has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                        SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                       DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE,                                              B325169

        Plaintiff and Respondent,                        (Los Angeles County
                                                         Super. Ct. No. A771092)
        v.

DEON LOREN SARDIN,

        Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Craig E. Veals, Judge. Affirmed.
      James Koester, under the appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Heidi Salerno,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                  ___________________________
      Deon Loren Sardin appeals the trial court’s order denying
his petition for vacatur of his murder conviction and resentencing
under Penal Code section 1172.6.1 The trial court found Sardin
ineligible for relief as a matter of law because the jury convicted
him as the actual killer.
       On appeal, Sardin argues the trial court improperly relied
on minute orders and facts contained in the appellate court’s
prior opinion to deny the petition at the prima facie stage. We
affirm the trial court’s order.

                    PROCEDURAL HISTORY

      In 1987, the jury found Sardin guilty of first degree murder
(§ 187, subd. (a); count 1), petty theft (§ 484; count 2), first degree
burglary (§ 459; count 3), and rape (§ 261.2; count 4). The jury
found true the allegations that Sardin intentionally committed
the murder during the commission of a rape and in the
commission of a burglary (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)), and personally
used a deadly and dangerous weapon, a strangulation cord
(§ 12022, subd. (b)). Sardin was sentenced to 25 years to life in
prison without the possibility of parole.
      In 1989, another panel of this court affirmed the trial
court’s judgment.
      On July 28, 2022, Sardin filed a form petition for vacatur of
his murder conviction and resentencing pursuant to section
1172.6. On August 8, 2022, the trial court appointed counsel, and
issued a tentative ruling. A hearing was held on the matter on

      1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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October 10, 2022.2 Following the hearing, the trial court issued a
minute order that adopted its August 8, 2022 tentative ruling,
stating, as relevant here:
      “The facts of [petitioner’s] crimes, summarized from the
appellate decision, are as follows. On August 13, 1985, petitioner
broke into the empty residence of his neighbor, Mary Emanuele,
to search for items of value. When Ms. Emanuele unexpectedly
returned home, petitioner grabbed her and rendered her
unconscious by choking her to death with a long piece of
telephone cord. He then proceeded to rape her and left with
nothing of value. Ms. Emanuele died from the attack.
      “Based on this evidence, petitioner’s jury subsequently
convicted him of murder in the first degree, along with his other
crimes, and also found petitioner personally used a deadly and
dangerous weapon in the commission of the offense. Petitioner
therefore was not convicted on any theory of imputed malice, but
instead because he alone was the actual killer.”
      Sardin timely appealed.

                          DISCUSSION

Legal Principles

      “Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with
malice aforethought. (§ 187, subd. (a).) ‘ “Under the felony-
murder doctrine as it existed at the time of [Sardin’s] trial, ‘when

      2 The record does not reflect whether the People filed a
response or defense counsel filed a reply and does not contain a
reporter’s transcript of the hearing to determine prima facie
eligibility.

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the defendant or an accomplice kill[ed] someone during the
commission, or attempted commission, of an inherently
dangerous felony,’ the defendant could be found guilty of the
crime of murder, without any showing of ‘an intent to kill, or even
implied malice, but merely an intent to commit the underlying
felony.’ [Citation.] Murders occurring during certain violent or
serious felonies were of the first degree, while all others were of
the second degree. [Citations.]” [Citations.]’ (People v. Wilson
(2023) 14 Cal.5th 839, 868.)” (People v. Bodely (2023) 95
Cal.App.5th 1193, 1199.)
       Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature enacted Senate
Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015;
Senate Bill 1437) “ ‘to amend the felony murder rule and the
natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to
murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a
person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to
kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who
acted with reckless indifference to human life.’ (Stats. 2018, ch.
1015, § 1, subd. (f).) ‘As amended by Senate Bill No. 1437, the
text of section 189 provides no additional or heightened mental
state requirement for the “actual killer” prosecuted under a
felony-murder theory; it requires only that “[t]he person was the
actual killer.” [Citation.]’ (People v. Albert Garcia (2022) 82
Cal.App.5th 956, 967.) ‘In our view, the Legislature’s purpose in
revising the law as it relates to felony-murder liability was to
ensure proportionate punishment for accomplices in the felony-
murder context, and that the term “actual killer” is meant to
distinguish the person who actually caused the victim’s death,
including in circumstances where two or more persons

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participated in the felony.’ (Id. at p. 968.)” (People v. Bodely,
supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1199–1200.)
       “ ‘Senate Bill 1437 also created a procedural mechanism for
those convicted of murder under prior law to seek retroactive
relief. [Citations.] Under section 1172.6, the process begins with
the filing of a petition declaring that “[t]he petitioner could not
presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder because of
changes to [s]ection 188 or 189” made by Senate Bill 1437.
[Citation.] The trial court then reviews the petition to determine
whether a prima facie showing has been made that the petitioner
is entitled to relief. [Citation.] “If the petition and record in the
case establish conclusively that the defendant is ineligible for
relief, the trial court may dismiss the petition. [Citations.]”
[Citation.]’ (People v. Wilson, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 869, fn.
omitted.)” (People v. Bodely, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th 1193, 1200.)
       “The record of conviction will necessarily inform the trial
court’s prima facie inquiry under section 1170.95, allowing the
court to distinguish petitions with potential merit from those that
are clearly meritless. . . . [¶] While the trial court may look at the
record of conviction after the appointment of counsel to determine
whether a petitioner has made a prima facie case for section
[1172.6] relief, the prima facie inquiry under subdivision (c) is
limited. . . . ‘[A] court should not reject the petitioner’s factual
allegations on credibility grounds without first conducting an
evidentiary hearing.’ [Citation.] ‘However, if the record,
including the court’s own documents, “contain[s] facts refuting
the allegations made in the petition,” then “the court is justified
in making a credibility determination adverse to the
petitioner.” ’ ” (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 971.) “In
reviewing any part of the record of conviction at this preliminary

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juncture, a trial court should not engage in ‘factfinding involving
the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion.’
[Citation.] . . . [T]he ‘prima facie bar was intentionally and
correctly set very low.’ ” (Id. at p. 972.) If the petitioner makes a
prima facie showing of eligibility, the trial court must issue an
order to show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing. (Ibid.)
       We independently review a trial court’s determination of
whether a petitioner has made a prima facie showing. (People v.
Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 52.) “[W]e may affirm a ruling
that is correct in law on any ground.” (People v. Cortes (2022) 75
Cal.App.5th 198, 204.)

Analysis

       On appeal, Sardin argues that the trial court impermissibly
relied on the facts contained in the Court of Appeal’s prior
opinion and “records it was able to cull together from the micro-
fiche copies of minute orders memorializing appellant’s
convictions and sentencing in Superior Court case [No.]
A771092,” rather than “the original trial court file or appellate
transcripts from appellant’s trial.”
       Even assuming that the trial court’s reliance on certain
portions of the record of conviction, and in particular the opinion
in Sardin’s direct appeal, was impermissible at the prima facie
stage of proceedings, we affirm the trial court’s order because
Sardin is ineligible for relief as a matter of law. (See People v.
Cortes, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 204.) The instructions and
the jury’s verdicts demonstrate that the jury convicted Sardin as
the actual killer. Although the jury was instructed that it could
find Sardin guilty of first degree murder if it found that “[t]he

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unlawful killing of a human being, whether intentional,
unintentional, or accidental . . . occur[ed] as the result of
 . . . robbery, burglary, or rape and . . . there was in the mind of
the perpetrator the specific intent to commit such crime”
(CALJIC No. 8.21), the felony murder instructions given did not
instruct the jury that it could convict Sardin based on the conduct
or mental state of an accomplice to one or more of those offenses.
Further, the trial court did not instruct on accomplice liability or
advise the jury that it could impose vicarious liability for murder
on Sardin based on the actions or mental state of an accomplice.
Rather, the court instructed the jurors that they could only find
Sardin guilty of felony murder if he perpetrated the underlying
inherently dangerous felony and in the course of committing that
felony he personally killed the victim. An actual killer may still
be convicted of felony murder following the amendments to
sections 188 and 189. (People v. Bodely, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1199; People v. Albert Garcia, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 967.)

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                         DISPOSITION

       We affirm the trial court’s order denying Sardin’s petition
for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6.
       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                           MOOR, J.

We concur:

                  BAKER, Acting, P. J.

                  LEE, J.*

      * Judge of the Superior Court of San Bernardino County,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of
the California Constitution.

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