Court Opinion

ID: 9530733
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:03:03.587014+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:14.172113
License: Public Domain

Justice VOLLACK
dissenting:
I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the 1988 amendment to section 16-11-309, 8A C.R.S. (1986), effected a change, rather than a clarification, in the law concerning consecutive sentencing for violent crimes. This conclusion is contrary to the legislative intent underlying the enactment of the 1985 amendment to section 16-11-309(l)(a). Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.
On January 14, 1988, Benito Robles and Victor Robles each received five consecutive sentences for the five substantive counts for which violent crime findings were made. The pertinent mandatory sentencing provision for violent crimes is set forth in section 16-11-309, 8A C.R.S. (1986). Until 1985, this statute required more severe punishment for crimes of violence but was silent on the topic of consecutive sentencing for defendants who commit multiple crimes of violence during a single criminal incident. In 1985, the legislature amended section 16-ll-309(l)(a) by adding the following consecutive-sentencing mandate: “A person convicted of two separate crimes of violence arising out of the same incident shall be sentenced for such crimes so that sentences are served consecutively rather than concurrently.” (Emphasis added.) See Ch. 145, sec. 1, § 16-ll~309(l)(a), 1985 Colo.Sess.Laws 647-48. This version of section 16 — 11— 309(l)(a) was in effect for three years and applies to the Robleses’ criminal acts committed in 1987. In 1988, the legislature amended section 16-ll-309(l)(a)’s consecutive-sentencing provision to read: “A person convicted of two or more separate crimes of violence arising out of the same incident shall be sentenced for such crimes so that sentences are served consecutively rather than concurrently.” (Emphasis added.) See Ch. 116, sec. 1, § 16-ll-309(l)(a), 1988 Colo.Sess.Laws 679.
The majority now concludes that the “two or more” language in the 1988 amendment was not meant to clarify the intended meaning of the 1985 amendment. Instead, the majority construes the 1988 alteration from “two separate crimes of violence” to “two or more ” as a change in the law on consecutive sentencing for multiple crime-of-violence convictions. See Maj. op. at 807. Thus, in the majority’s view, the 1985 amendment unambiguously required that at least two sentences be served consecutively, regardless of the number of crime-of-violence convictions, and it was not until the 1988 amendment that the legislature mandated that each separate crime-of-violence conviction be punished with a consecutive sentence. I, however, reach a different conclusion based on my review of the legislative history preceding the enactment of the 1985 amendment to section 16-ll-309(l)(a).
In accordance with the principles of statutory construction, this court must construe a statute so as to give effect to the legislative purpose underlying its enactment. E.g., Farmers Group, Inc. v. Williams, 805 P.2d 419, 422 (Colo.1991); Griffin v. S.W. Devanney & Co., 775 P.2d 555, 559 (Colo.1989). When the statutory language in question “is uncertain as to its intended scope, with the result that the statutory text lends itself to alternative constructions, then a court may appropriately look to pertinent legislative history in determining which alternative construction is in accordance with the objective sought *809to be achieved by the legislation.” Id. Although it is presumed that statutory amendments are intended to change the law, People v. Hale, 654 P.2d 849, 851 (Colo.1982), the majority acknowledges that this presumption may be rebutted when “more specific sections are added to a general section because such legislative action may indicate the legislature’s intention to clarify the existing statute.” Maj. op. at 806 (citing Hale, 654 P.2d at 851). Where it appears that an amendment is arguably an attempt to clarify a statute, then an examination of the legislative history surrounding the enactment of the statute is in order to discern legislative intent. See Hale, 654 P.2d at 851.
The 1988 amendment to section 16-11-309(l)(a)’s consecutive-sentencing mandate from “two” to “two or more” has generated uncertainty as to the legislature’s intended instruction for the consecutive sentencing of violent-crime offenders. In determining whether the legislature intended to clarify the 1985 enactment of the consecutive-sentencing provision or to change the 1985 law, the contemporaneous statements of individual legislators are relevant to judicial inquiry into the legislature’s objective. See Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. State, 690 P.2d 177, 183 (Colo.1984).
The original provision mandating consecutive sentencing for violent crimes appeared in House Bill No. 1320. At a House Judiciary Committee hearing on February 21, 1985, Representative Don Mielke, the House sponsor of the bill, made the following statements in regard to his consecutive-sentencing proposal:
I also came up with an idea I had for another bill — the problem with the crimes of violence that judges in the justice system can sentence those to concurrent sentences, and if someone commits two crimes of violence, they still are only sentenced for four years rather than consecutive sentences. So I want the crimes of violence to be consecutive sentences, meaning two sentences of two four-years or a sentence of eight years so that person if they [sic] commit two or more serve consecutive sentences.
Hearing on H.B. 1320 Before the House Judiciary Committee, 55th Gen.Assembly, 1st Reg.Sess. (hearing tape 85-10, February 21, 1985, at 3:22:06 p.m.) (emphasis added). Representative Mielke’s statement evinces a clear legislative intent to punish each crime of violence with an additional consecutive sentence, and effectively rebuts the presumption that the 1988 amendment was intended to change the consecutive-sentencing clause. The essence of his statement is that violent-crime offenders pose a greater threat to society than nonviolent criminal offenders and are therefore deserving of more severe sanctions. Thus, in Representative Mielke’s words, a person who commits “two or more” crimes of violence would serve consecutive sentences for each offense with the enactment of House Bill No. 1320. The 1988 amendment was therefore a clarification added to reflect the original intent of the 1985 consecutive-sentencing law for violent crimes.
I respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to say that Justice ERICKSON joins in this dissent.