Court Opinion

ID: 9858644
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 16:34:21.819867+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:55:22.699562
License: Public Domain

Hale, J.,
(dissenting).
I dissent, believing the evidence insufficient to warrant a finding of bad faith by the insurer in the defense of the Davis case.
(a) It was not bad faith for the insurer to accept at face value the statement of Daniel Briscoe Cox, the agent for and co-defendant with Norris, and make defense upon that basis.
(b) It was not bad faith for Cantrell to fail to read the newspaper account of this accident wherein mention was made of the witness McMurray. In this connection it is interesting to note that McMurray was not used as a witness in the criminal ease against the said Cox.
*676(c) It was not bad faith for having delayed obtaining medical testimony nntil shortly before the trial. According to the undisputed testimony of B-oss Stuart, claims attorney for the insurer, the rule prevailing in Hamilton County allows only one medical examination which, of course, makes it highly desirable to have it as near the time of trial as is possible.
(d) It was not bad faith on the part of Mr. Williams to file a plea in abatement to the jurisdiction. Although this plea was not sustained there were some indications that the criminal prosecution of Cox in Hamilton County was simply a ruse to get him back there so that he might be sued civilly with counterpart process to Knox County for Norris. Both the insured and the insurer were very anxious to avoid a trial in Hamilton County.
(e) It was not bad faith for Mr. Williams to have made the abortive effort to disqualify opposing counsel, although this was not authorized by the record. Certainly no prejudice resulted to Norris.
(f) It was not bad faith to have delayed making propositions of compromise. We cannot blind our eyes to the prevailing custom of waiting until nearly trial time before instituting negotiations for settlement. As a rule the longer a damage claim is pending the softer it gets, as is shown by the reduction of the Davis claim from $19,500 to $9,500.
(g) It was not bad faith for Mr. Williams to have misunderstood that the offer made by Mr. Hite was to “recommend” a settlement for $9,500, even though Mr. Hite and Major Whittaker both testify this was a “firm” offer. Mr. Williams understood it was an offer to “recommend” this sum as is shown by his conversation with Mr. Stuart, and both then acted in good faith upon that understanding, even though it might have been erroneous. *677Having in mind the frailty of human memory, especially after the lapse of considerable time, this could not be the basis of an inference of bad faith. Stuart authorized and Williams made a firm offer of $7,500 in an effort to get opposing counsel to make a counter-offer which was then upped to $12,000.
(h) Nor was it bad faith on the part of Mr. Williams to have exhibited what may be termed as excessive zeal in the conduct of the trial. A good trial lawyer must believe in his client’s cause, and although this partisanship may have in it elements of weakness in blinding him to the strength of the opposition, it cannot be termed bad faith.
As I see it, the entire strength of the case of the plaintiff below is based upon hindsight and second guessing, which is far different from the bad faith that should be required as a basis for liability in cases of this nature.
I would reverse and dismiss.