Court Opinion

ID: 9945391
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-27 20:01:14.112954+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:28.342861
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        FEB 27 2024
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                       No.    22-50202

                Plaintiff-Appellee,             D.C. No. 2:21-cr-00403-PA-1

 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
CHARLES FITZGERALD BRANCH,

                Defendant-Appellant.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Central District of California
                    Percy Anderson, District Judge, Presiding

                            Submitted January 9, 2024**
                               Pasadena, California

Before: CALLAHAN, CHRISTEN, and BENNETT, Circuit Judges.

      Charles Branch appeals his jury conviction and sentence for two counts of

possessing stolen mail in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1708. We presume the parties’

familiarity with the facts and do not discuss them in detail here except as needed to

provide context. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C.

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
§ 3742. We affirm.

      1.     Branch argues that the district court abused its discretion in admitting

Officer Koh’s testimony that, prior to arresting Branch on November 23, 2020, he

overheard on the police radio that a detective had replayed surveillance footage of

the apartment complex’s mailroom and relayed a description of a subject removing

items from mailboxes. Branch argues that this statement constituted inadmissible

hearsay because the declarant—Detective Anderson—did not testify at trial, and the

evidence had no relevance other than to establish the truth of the matter asserted,

i.e., that Branch was observed stealing mail prior to his arrest.

      Branch’s argument fails because Detective Anderson’s statement was offered

to establish the effect it had on the listener—here, Officer Koh—rather than the truth

of the matter asserted. Officer Koh testified that when he arrived at the apartment

complex he saw Branch’s black drawstring bag, and when he searched the

drawstring bag, he found mail not belonging to Branch. When asked why he

searched Branch’s bag, Officer Koh testified that he did so because of Detective

Anderson’s statement that the suspect had put mail into a black drawstring bag.

Detective Anderson’s description of the suspect was therefore not hearsay, as it was

offered to explain Officer Koh’s actions regardless of whether Detective Anderson’s

statement was true. See United States v. Lopez, 913 F.3d 807, 826 (9th Cir. 2019).

      Even if Detective Anderson’s statement were hearsay, it would nonetheless

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be admissible as a present sense impression. Detective Anderson had personal

knowledge of what he was describing, and he described the surveillance footage

“while or immediately after” viewing it. Fed. R. Evid. 803(1); Bemis v. Edwards,

45 F.3d 1369, 1373 (9th Cir. 1995). According to the police report, Detective

Anderson gave his description of the suspect within four minutes of watching the

surveillance footage, indicating he did not have a “chance for reflection” between

seeing the footage and making the description. Bemis, 45 F.3d at 1372; United States

v. Orm Hieng, 679 F.3d 1131, 1142 n.2 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that reports of an

event “some minutes” after the declarant observed that event was “sufficiently close

in time” to satisfy Rule 803(1)).

      2.     Branch further argues that the district court abused its discretion by

admitting evidence of Branch’s parole violation and arrest warrant, and excluding

evidence that Branch was transient at the time of his arrests. According to Branch,

evidence of his parole violation and arrest warrant was prejudicial because it

communicated to the jury that Branch was a criminal and that there could be no

innocent explanation for the mail in his possession. Similarly, Branch asserts that

exclusion of evidence that he was transient at the time of his arrests was prejudicial

because it would have provided an innocent explanation for Branch’s possession of

multiple bags.

      Branch’s arguments do not carry the day.          Even if the district court’s

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evidentiary rulings were an abuse of discretion, any error was harmless because it

did not have a “material impact on the verdict.” United States v. Lopez, 4 F.4th 706,

714 (9th Cir. 2021). Mention of Branch’s parole violation and arrest warrant “came

up only incidentally,” and the government “did not state the crime” for which Branch

had been on parole. United States v. Guerrero, 756 F.2d 1342, 1347 (9th Cir. 1984).

The district court also instructed the jury to not consider “evidence that [Branch]

committed other crimes,” which further supports a finding of harmless error. See

United States v. Neill, 166 F.3d 943, 947 (9th Cir. 1999). Finally, the government

presented extensive evidence for the jury to conclude that Branch committed the

charged offense, including three instances where Branch possessed stolen mail.

Further, the evidence showed that Branch did not simply possess a few pieces of

stolen mail—which perhaps could have happened by accident—but rather possessed

hundreds of items that were not addressed to him. And the mail Branch possessed

was not likely to be mistakenly discarded by others, as it included financial

documents, tax forms, credit card statements, and medical records. Accordingly, the

district court’s evidentiary rulings, even if erroneous, were nonetheless harmless.1

      3.     Branch next argues that his sentence was procedurally and

1
       For these same reasons, Branch’s argument that the cumulative effect of the
district court’s evidentiary errors rendered his trial “fundamentally unfair” also fails.
The evidence of guilt in this case was “otherwise overwhelming.” Parle v. Runnels,
505 F.3d 922, 928 (9th Cir. 2007).

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substantively unreasonable because the district court did not consider the 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a) factors, instead focusing on Branch’s prior unrelated conduct. Branch also

argues that the district court improperly increased his sentence to foster

rehabilitation, in violation of Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319 (2011).

      The record shows that at sentencing, the district court explicitly considered

the § 3553(a) factors, including the need for the sentence to protect the public from

Branch’s future crimes, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C).           The district court also

considered the sentencing range established for Branch under the U.S. Sentencing

Guidelines, id. § 3553(a)(4), and determined that the 18-to-24-month range was

“insufficient and does not satisfy the statutory goals of sentencing.”

      There was no Tapia error, either. Although the district court stated that the

sentence would “hopefully put [Branch] in a position where he can get the help that

he deserves,” a court does not err “by discussing the opportunities for rehabilitation

within prison or the benefits of specific treatment or training programs,” Tapia, 564

U.S. at 334.    Moreover, the district court “adequately explained the sentence” in

view of Branch’s recidivism and the need to protect the public. United States v.

Laurienti, 731 F.3d 967, 975 (9th Cir. 2013); 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(1), 2(C).

      4.       Finally, Branch argues that the district court abused its discretion by

imposing an alcohol condition as part of Branch’s supervised release because he

claims there was no indication that he had prior conduct related to alcohol, that

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alcohol was relevant to the charged offense, or that he drank regularly. For support,

Branch points to United States v. Betts, 511 F.3d 872 (9th Cir. 2007), but in that

case, “there was no evidence that Betts had any past problems with alcohol.” Id. at

878. Here, the record shows that Branch most certainly had “past problems with

alcohol.” For example, Branch had been arrested for driving under the influence of

alcohol with a blood alcohol content of 0.14 percent, and had been arrested for

possessing a controlled substance, during which police officers found him drinking

from an open container of Schlitz Malt liquor. Therefore, unlike in Betts, the district

court here had reason to impose the alcohol condition. The district court also noted

that Branch “began using drugs at an early age,” and had multiple arrests and

convictions for possessing controlled substances and controlled-substance

paraphernalia. In light of Branch’s history of drug abuse, it was reasonable for the

district court to require that Branch stay “drug-free.” United States v. Vega, 545

F.3d 743, 747 (9th Cir. 2008).

      AFFIRMED.

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