Court Opinion

ID: 9648236
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 14:10:57.503437+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:30:44.505938
License: Public Domain

*353ANDELL, Justice,
dissenting.
By allowing the harmless error rule, which is promulgated for the efficient administration of justice, to take precedence over the fifth amendment under the facts in this case, the majority has today taken an unnecessary and unjustifiable step onto the slippery slope of government intrusion into our fives. U.S. Const. amend. V provides: “[N]or shall any person ... be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself....” After relator claimed this privilege, the trial court ordered him to the stand to be sworn and to testify. In so doing, the trial court contradicted a tenet of American liberty as well as a well known concept that as words are formed from the mouth the body also speaks — announcing many unintended things to the fact finder in violation of a defendant’s right to protection from self-incrimination. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
There was a Constitutional Violation
All justices of this Court agree that in Ex parte Werblud, 536 S.W.2d 542, 548 (Tex.1976), and in Ex parte Stringer, 546 S.W.2d 837, 839 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, orig. proceeding) (op. on reh’g), the Texas Supreme Court and this Court held that the accused (or his attorney on his behalf) in a criminal contempt proceeding could assert his privilege against self-incrimination before being sworn and, in such case, could not be sworn and could not be compelled to testify. The majority agrees that the trial court erred in compelling relator to be sworn and to testify over his attorney’s timely objection. Next, however, the majority concludes that there was no harm in this violation of relator’s fifth amendment right against self-incrimination.
If the majority had concluded that the trial court’s action in ordering relator to testify was, in fact, not a violation of his fifth amendment rights, and, hence, not error, then it would have been appropriate to overrule relator’s argument and deny relief.1 The same disposition would have been appropriate if the majority had concluded that relator had waived his constitutional rights.2 The majority opinion does not suggest waiver or absence of error. It turns upon whether the error was harmful.3
Which Harmless Error Rule?
We should consider the purpose behind the harmless error rule if we are to apply it properly. It helps if we compare our own state rule with the federal rule. The Texas harmless error rule for criminal cases4 states:
If the appellate record in a criminal case reveals error in the proceedings below, the appellate court shall reverse the judgment under review, unless the appellate court determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the error made no contribution to the conviction or to the punishment.
Tex.R.App.P. 81(b)(2) (emphasis added). The phrasing of the rule itself reveals an implicit tendency toward reversal when error is presented to this Court. When error is presented, we shall reverse unless the error is “harmless.”
The federal harmless error rule reads:
On the hearing of any appeal or writ or certiorari in any case, the court shall give judgment after an examination of the record without regard to errors or defects *354which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties.
28 U.S.C.S. § 2111 (1992) (emphasis added). While this federal rule requires that the reviewing court evaluate the error or defect for whether it “affect[s] the substantial rights of the parties[,]” the language of the rule does not suggest the same inclination to reverse that we have embodied in our Texas rule. The United States Supreme Court has yet to apply this federal statutory rule to federal constitutional error. Brecht v. Abrahamson, — U.S. -, -, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1718, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993).
The Court has, however, held that even constitutional violations are subject to a harmless error analysis. In Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 19, 87 S.Ct. 824, 825, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), the petitioners’ fifth amendment rights were violated by the State’s repeated references to the petitioners’ failure to testify at trial. The Court explicitly rejected the petitioners’ contention that all federal constitutional errors are harmful. 386 U.S. at 21-22, 87 S.Ct. at 827. The Court continued:
We conclude that there may be some constitutional errors which in the setting of a particular case are so unimportant and insignificant that they may, consistent with the Federal Constitution, be deemed harmless, not requiring the automatic reversal of the conviction.
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[O]ur prior eases have indicated that there are some constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as harmless error_
Chapman, 386 U.S. at 22-23, 87 S.Ct. at 827-28 (emphasis added). The Chapman Court then fashioned a harmless-constitutional-error rule: “[B]efore a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” 386 U.S. at 24, 87 S.Ct. at 828 (emphasis added).5
Burden on the UPLC to Show No Harm
In Chapman, the Court observed that “the original common-law harmless-error rule put the burden on the beneficiary of the error either to prove that there was no injury or to suffer a reversal of his erroneously obtained judgment.” 386 U.S. at 24, 87 S.Ct. at 828. The Court then noted that its holding left the recipient of the error with the burden to show that was harmless. 386 U.S. at 24, 87 S.Ct. at 828. The Supreme Court has very recently revisited this issue. Referring to its Chapman holding, the Court restated this burden in more direct language: “The State bears the burden of proving that an error passes muster under under this standard.” Brecht, — U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 1717.
In this case, the UPLC6 did not ask this court to apply a harmless error analysis. It simply claimed, without citing any authority of any kind, that there was no error. The majority disagrees and holds that it was error. The UPLC, which was the beneficiary of this error, has failed to meet its burden to show harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt.
Here, all that relator was compelled to testify to was his name and address. We must remember, however, that the trial court as fact finder is entitled to observe and take into account the demeanor of a witness. The content of relator’s answers may, indeed, have been “harmless.” But it is possible that the manner in which he delivered his answers, through his demeanor, his tone of voice, his eye movements, and his facial expressions, may have been harmful.
Errors that are Harmful Per Se
The Chapman Court indicated three types of constitutional errors that could not be subject to a harm analysis: (1) the use of a coerced confession; (2) the denial of the right to counsel; and (3) the denial of the right to an impartial judge. 386 U.S. at 24, n. 8, 87 *355S.Ct. at 828, n. 8.7
This “official” list of per se harmful constitutional errors has deleted' one and added three more through decisions of the United States Supreme Court after Chapman, resulting in a new total of five. Specifically, the Court deleted the first Chapman item from this list when it held in Arizona v. Fulminante that the use of a coerced confession is, indeed, subject to a harm analysis. 499 U.S. 279, 295-96, 308, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 1257, 1261, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991). The three additional per se harmful constitutional errors that the Court has added are: (1) the unlawful exclusion of members of the defendant’s race from a grand jury; (2) the denial of a defendant’s right to self-representation at trial; and (3) the right to a public trial. See Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 310, 111 S.Ct. at 1265 (citing Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 106 S.Ct. 617, 88 L.Ed.2d 598 (1986)); McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177-78, n. 8, 104 S.Ct. 944, 950-51. n. 8, 79 L.Ed.2d 122 (1984); and Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 49, n. 9, 104 S.Ct. 2210, 2217, n. 9, 81 L.Ed.2d 31 (1984). These five constitutional violations have been identified as harmful per se. I would hold that the actions taken by the trial court in the present case constitute a sixth.
Trial Errors vs. Structural Defects
The Supreme Court later distinguished two categories of constitutional violations: (1) trial errors, involving the presentation of the case to the jury, and which may be subject to a harm analysis; and (2) “structural defects in the constitution of the trial mechanism, which defy analysis by ‘harmless-error’ standards.” Brecht, — U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 1717 (emphasis added).8
Silence may be Golden, But it’s Fool’s Gold
Until today, defendants could maintain a measure of security by relying on the fifth amendment to protect them from being forced to testify at trial. With that expectation, a nervous, inarticulate defendant could sit calmly at the counsel table and remain composed, knowing that he would not be called upon to speak. The majority’s holding today makes this a false sense of security.9 The privilege against self-incrimination is not what it seemed to be.
In Brecht, a habeas case, the petitioner had requested relief on grounds that the State had violated his fifth amendment privilege when it attempted to impeach him by repeatedly referring to his post-Miranda10 silence. — U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 1713-14. The Court held that this violation was of the trial error type, and that such cases were subject to the harmless error rule. A court’s reference to a defendant’s post-Miranda silence, however, is different from the present case precisely because the defendant was allowed to remain silent. While references to such silence are fifth amendment violations, they are not as fundamental as forcing the defendant to speak against his will, as in the present case. Therefore, Brecht is distinguishable and does not control.
Here, the majority follows Montoya v. State, 744 S.W.2d 15, 37-38 (Tex.Crim.App.1987) (op. on reh’g), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1227, 108 S.Ct. 2887, 101 L.Ed.2d 921 (1988), and Hicks v. State, 815 S.W.2d 299, 302-03 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no pet.), where the prosecutors commented on the defendants’ failure to testify, and the reviewing courts analyzed for harm. Again, as with Brecht, the defendants were allowed to re*356main silent and this was used against them. But in neither case was the defendant coerced into taking the stand, being sworn, and testifying against himself.
Montoya and Hicks involved the defendants’ silence at trial, whereas Brecht involved the defendant’s post-Miranda silence before trial. In each case, the defendant’s silence was unlawfully used against him. In the present ease, the defendant’s silence was taken away from, him. This is substantively different from the cases upon which the majority relies. I have found no case, state or federal, prior.to this one, in which the reviewing court applied the harmless error rule to the compelled testimony of an accused. I would hold that, under the Supreme Court’s categorization in Fulminante and Brecht, the trial court’s action in the present case constitutes a structural defect in the trial mechanism, and that it cannot be evaluated for harm. See Brecht, — U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 1717
We Cannot Review that which Cannot be Presented to Us
In Ex parte Snow, 677 S.W.2d 147, 149 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, orig. proceeding), this Court held that the relator’s contempt was proven before he took the stand, and any error in compelling him to testify was harmless. Unlike Snow, the majority in the present case does not indicate any comparable belief that relator’s contempt had already been proven before he took the stand. Even as relator approached the witness stand, his face may have paled in apparent trepidation. We do not know. We cannot know. The trial court could have been prejudiced by its observation of these and other nonverbal or paralinguistic indicators that do not get recorded for appellate review. We are not in a position to conduct a harm analysis on what cannot be brought before us.
I believe this Court’s opinion in Stringer, more correctly than Snow, states the law concerning the compelling of an alleged criminal contemnor to testify:
A finding of prejudice is not required to support our holding that the order holding Relator for contempt is void. The failure to accord a defendant in a criminal contempt proceeding his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination renders the subsequent imposition of a penalty void and subject to collateral attack.
Stringer, 546 S.W.2d at 842-43 (citations omitted).
States may provide greater protection to their citizens against government intrusion and coercion than that provided by the United States Constitution, but they cannot provide less. See, e.g., Cooper v. State, 386 U.S. 58, 62, 87 S.Ct. 788, 791, 17 L.Ed.2d 730 (1967) and Heitman v. State, 815 S.W.2d 681, 682-83 (Tex.Crim.App.1991). The United States Constitution establishes the floor below which we may not go. Cooper, 386 U.S. at 62, 87 S.Ct. at 791; Heitman, 815 S.W.2d at 682. States are free to apply their own harmless error rule to violations of their own state law when there is no federal constitutional violation. Cooper, 386 U.S. at 62; 87 S.Ct. at 791. If we apply our own harmless error rule to violations of fundamental rights under the United States Constitution, however, we will have undermined the floor upon which our system of justice stands. By allowing the State to coerce this limited amount of testimony and review for harm, we will have encouraged the State to repeat this action. Later defendants may be coerced into progressively longer testimony and cross-examination, stopping just short of outright confession, and the courts will analyze for harm. We do not have the prescience to know where this erosion of the foundations would stop. Therefore, it is imperative that we maintain the fifth amendment protection as an absolute safeguard that is effective immediately upon its invocation.
Our own Precedent
Six months ago, this court faced a similar situation in Anderson v. State, 871 S.W.2d 900 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no pet.). In that case, the appellant spontaneously made a statement to the court during the punishment phase, without taking the standing or being sworn, and the State sought to cross-examine him. At that point, with the appellant still unsworn, the appellant’s counsel asserted the fifth amendment *357privilege against self-incrimination. The trial court overruled the claim of privilege and compelled the appellant to the stand to be sworn and testify. Id. at 905-06. We held that the fifth amendment privilege attached at the moment that the appellant’s trial counsel invoked it, and that the trial court erred in compelling the appellant to be sworn and to testify. Id. We reversed and remanded for a new punishment hearing without conducting a harm analysis.
The majority claims that the harm in Anderson was obvious because the appellant testified to his signature on the State’s pen packet, after which the trial court found the enhancement paragraph to be true. Maj. at 351-352; Anderson, 871 S.W.2d at 905. I disagree with the majority’s characterization of Anderson that it contains an implied harm analysis. In Anderson, we did not even mention harm, and we decided it on the fifth amendment violation when we stated: “The trial judge erred in compelling the appellant to testify even though he had invoked the privilege against self-incrimination. We ... reverse....” Id. at 906. Nowhere did we cite to the compelled testimony and then review its content for harm.
I interpret Anderson to be consistent with reversal in this case. Accordingly, I would hold that this case is controlled by both Stringer and Anderson, and I would sustain relator’s fifth amendment complaint.
I agree with Justice Duggan’s analysis on notice, jurisdiction, and the sixth and fourteenth amendments. However, because I would sustain relator’s fifth amendment complaint, I would grant relator habeas corpus relief and order him discharged from custody.

. The majority approaches this when it states, "Relator was not compelled to be a ‘witness against himself,' as stated in U.S. Const. amend. V.” From this, the majority should have concluded that there was no error. Instead, the majority’s next sentence is, “There was no harm.”

. I would still have disagreed with either of these underlying conclusions, i.e., that relator had waived his constitutional rights, or that the trial court’s action was not error.

. Werblud. is silent about whether a harm analysis should be conducted when a relator's fifth amendment rights have been violated. Other cases that I discuss herein have applied the harmless error rule to different fifth amendment violations, but none where the accused was compelled to testify over a proper claim of privilege.

. Contempt proceedings are quasi-criminal, and the party alleged to be in contempt has all the rights and privileges of one accused of a crime, including the privilege against self-incrimination. Ex parte Harris, 581 S.W.2d 545, 547 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1979, orig. proceeding).

. The Chapman Court held that the fifth amendment violations were harmful in that case, and it reversed and remanded for new trial. 386 U.S. at 26, 87 S.Ct. at 829.

. The UPLC, as the criminal contempt movant, assumes the role of the State for purposes of this analysis.

. For these three types of per se harmful constitutional error, the Court cited, respectively, Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 78 S.Ct. 844, 2 L.Ed.2d 975 (1958); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963); and Turney v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 47 S.Ct. 437, 71 L.Ed. 749 (1927).

. In concurring, four Justices called this "trial errors/structural defects” scheme a “meaningless dichotomy” and they acknowledged that some “trial errors,” such as the omission of a reasonable doubt instruction, could, in fact, distort the very structure of the trial. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 291, 111 S.Ct. at 1254-55.

. Henceforth, in Texas, a defendant must sit at the counsel table and wonder when and if he will be forced to testify and to what extent.

. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).