Court Opinion

ID: 9543670
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:47:56.03558+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:10:53.513643
License: Public Domain

YOUNG, Judge,
dissenting.
I dissent.
The City contends that the court erred in admitting evidence of post-accident replacement and relocation of the sign on Sargent Road. The majority recognizes the inherently prejudicial nature of such evidence but says the error was waived by the City introducing evidence on the same subject. I disagree. There is no waiver when a party attempts to explain the improperly admitted evidence to minimize the damage done by the improper admission of that evidence. Leuck v. Goetz, (1972) 151 Ind.App. 528, 280 N.E.2d 847.
Evidence of subsequent signing at a different point was improperly admitted to the City’s prejudice, contrary to the rule we adopted in Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Chapman, (1979) Ind.App., 388 N.E.2d 541. The evidence does not fall within any of the exceptions. Evidence of change subsequent to the date of the accident was simply irrelevant. The City’s responsibility for signing at the place of the accident was admitted. As we stated in Ortho, the damage is that the jury, influenced by hindsight, might apply an artificially higher standard in determining the adequacy of signing. Ortho, supra at 561.
Next, the City contends the court erred in the admission of the Tabor deposition. The majority recognizes that the admission of the Tabor deposition without some showing that he was in fact the managing agent for the City or was unable to testify was error. Ind.Rules of Procedure, Trial Rule 32(A). They find the error harmless. For the reasons stated above, it was error to admit evidence of post-accident signing. That evidence was erroneously admitted and it is no excuse for admitting further evidence of the same magnitude in the form of Tabor’s testimony without a proper foundation. The admonitions upon which the majority relies to find harmless error are of little help. Again the issues for which the jury was instructed to consider the evidence were not disputed.
The City next contends that the admission of a departmental memorandum over objection that it was a privileged communication was error. A notice of claim, a prerequisite to filing suit under Ind.Code 34-4-16.5-7, was made. An investigation of the claim was conducted in order to discern the facts in anticipation of a response to the *1189claim asserted, whether it be to settle the matter or to defend the claim at trial. The memorandum was prepared as part of this investigation. There can be no question that this matter was privileged. “A statement concerning an accident obtained by an employer for the bona fide purpose of being later transmitted to the employer’s attorney for advice, or to be used by the attorney in connection with pending or threatened litigation, is privileged, because it is part of [the] communication from the client to his counsel.” 81 Am.Jur.2d Witnesses, § 206 (1976); Annot., 146 A.L.R. 977 (1943). Once the notice of claim was filed, the City could reasonably expect that suit was forthcoming. The statements near the end of the departmental memorandum also indicate it was prepared with the intent to be sent to employer’s counsel. Statements concerning the difficulty of defending and the feasibility of an out of court settlement would be part of the communication from client to counsel. The memorandum was privileged.
The City also argues the trial court’s admonitions were improper remarks upon questions of fact. Because the evidence concerning the City’s re-signing was improperly admitted, the trial court’s admonition regarding the jury’s consideration of subsequent changes was also improper. Furthermore, this issue was not waived.
Next, the City alleges that it was improperly denied its right to cross examine Swanson as to whether he had been evaluated by a Dr. Mealey and to lay a foundation for discussions with Thomas Breen. The inquiry of Swanson on cross-examination as to whether he had been evaluated by Dr. Mealey was proper and should have been allowed. Had he not been evaluated by Dr. Mealey, he could have said so. If he denied such evaluation and it had in fact occurred, Dr. Mealey could have been called to impeach Swanson.
Counsel for the City, sought to lay a foundation for impeachment of Swanson but was cut off.1 Later when Breen was called *1190by the City his testimony was not permitted. The exclusion of the testimony of Officer Breen by the trial judge was also improper. The fact that Breen’s name as a witness appeared with fifteen others a week before trial is of no moment and no reason to exclude his testimony. The trial court had withdrawn the pretrial order concerning exchange of witness lists. The following offer of proof was made:
“MR. MCCLELLAND: Were Officer Breen permitted to testify, he would testify in substance as follows: On March 16, 1979, he purchased from Richard Swanson marijuana in the amount of thirty five dollars. On March 23,1979, he also purchased marijuana from Richard Swanson in the amount of one hundred dollars. If he again were permitted to testify, Officer Breen would testify that Richard Swanson told him that he took a physical for the Indiana State Highway Commission for the purposes of failing that physical for the purposes of this trial here this week and today. Additionally, he would testify, if he were permitted to, that Mr. Swanson told him he did not suffer from seizures, that he could not take a job until this trial was over and that any cash that he received had to be in cash so that there were no record of any money that he received. Additionally, he indicated to Officer Breen that he sold drugs before, had a supplier and that he .could get him whatever he needed. We think that that goes into to rebut the testimony of Richard Swanson about the nature of the sources of his income and that is relevant. The fact that he chooses to make this money from an illegal transaction does not shield him from our having the opportunity to get in that and show what in fact he does. And, that is our offer to prove.”
Swanson’s income and alleged loss of wages was a relevant issue as was the validity of his claim of injury. Thus his occupation, part or full time, and the source and amount of his income were relevant. Many other lines of work might be personally offensive to jurors, but that would not prevent a recovery for damages or prevent counsel for the defendant from exploring the truth on cross-examination. The “accusatory words” referred to by the majority citing Shepard v. United States, (1933) 290 U.S. 96, 104, 54 S.Ct. 22, 25, 78 L.Ed. 196 included a statement made by the victim in a murder case who said to a nurse that her husband had poisoned her. They were admitted improperly as a dying declaration. That authority is inapplicable here. Also, Breen’s testimony that Swanson admitted he was not really injured, but merely trying to defraud the City was clearly admissible as an admission of a party-opponent. This evidence was probative of a major disputed question of fact and not unduly prejudicial. The probative value of Breen’s testimony outweighed any prejudicial effect. Breen’s testimony should have been permitted.
Later in the trial, the City called Royce Cole, a Marion County Deputy Sheriff, as a witness for the purpose of rebutting the testimony of Mrs. Aloma Karto. Karto testified that when Swanson had an “episode” in her home, he had not been drinking and drugs were not involved. The trial judge ruled that Cole would not be allowed to testify and the defendant made the following offer to prove:
“MR. MCCLELLAND: Thank you. If Officer Cole were permitted to testify here today, he would testify in substance as follows: That he was called to the residence of approximately 7000 South Ratliff Road on 1/29/77, approximately two fifty three A.M., wherein two female subjects were reporting that a man was beating them and threatening them and that the subject did not live there and refused to leave. If Officer Cole were permitted to testify, he would testify that he went into the home and that he pulled Mr. Swanson out of a bed and that Mr. *1191Swanson was — smelled of alcohol, that his speech was impaired and that he walked in a very staggered manner and Officer Cole took him to the Marion County Jail. This is all contrary to what Mrs. Karto had testified to and we think that we can offer that to rebut her testimony and that works no hardship at all upon the plaintiffs and is not prejudicial to them in any way and that it is proper testimony.”
No other foundation was necessary. The testimony of Cole contradicted that of Kar-to and would have left it to the jury to determine who was telling the truth regarding the “episode.” It was not impeachment, but two different versions by two witnesses of a single event.
Next the City argues the trial court erred in giving plaintiff’s instructions no. 2, 3, 6, and 7 (court’s instructions 5, 6, 8, and 9) and not giving its instructions no. 4 and 7. The majority finds no merit in the City’s argument that plaintiff’s instructions were misleading and also holds the City’s instructions were covered by others. I agree with the City that the combination of court’s instructions no. 5, 6, 8, and 9 lead to the inference that the City’s duty of signing and marking Sargent Road was only proper or adequate if done in accordance with the Indiana Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and Highways. This is not so. As we said in Smith v. Cook, (1977) 172 Ind.App. 610, 361 N.E.2d 197 the manual is intended as a guide with flexible qualities for local governments and imposes no absolute duty to sign or mark in accordance with its recommendation. In addition the court’s instruction no. 9 was repetitive of the court’s instruction no. 8. The giving of the instructions in this case was erroneous because of their imposition of a duty on the City to adhere to the manual.
I would reverse and order a new trial.

. “Q. On March 16, 1979 at the International Harvester Bar did you represent to Thomas Breen—
“MR. HOLLAND: Your Honor, I am going to object and then we have just got to have some rules on this—
“THE COURT: Mr. McClelland, we are going to get into some reprimands here.
“MR. HOLLAND: May we approach the bench, Your Honor?
“THE COURT: I’m going to let the Jury out of here for a minute.
“THE COURT ADMONISHES THE JURY
“THE JURY LEAVES THE COURTROOM
“THE COURT: Mr. McClelland, we have been walking into a mistrial here for three days and you’re right on the brink of it and Tom Breen, as I know, (this is on the record) is a narcotic man. I’ve signed many search warrants for him and if you’ve got any arrests and convictions of narcotics they are not even admissible. Now let’s get that straight. We’ve been skating on thin ice for three days here. Now if you want to go down the tube, that’s entirely up to you. But, stay off of it and that’s it.
“THE COURT: Mr. McClelland, I want to apologize for getting a little shook up there but just a few moments before that you said that you weren’t going to get into this. I happen to know who Tom Breen is. I happen to know the purpose for which you were bringing it up and as I said yesterday morning prior to starting this trial if you guys want to try a criminal case go down to Criminal One, Two, Three or Four.
“MR. MCCLELLAND: It was not my intention to bring up any statements with respect to the things we talked about. I had other—
“THE COURT: I haven’t sat here for almost three days to go into a mistrial at this stage of the game. I thought we’d be in one before noon yesterday and I’m not going to tolerate that.
“MR. MCCLELLAND: I understand.
“THE COURT: You just stood up here a few minutes before and said that you weren’t going to do that.
“MR. MCCLELLAND: And I wasn’t—
“THE COURT: But you did it. When we had our little conference here, you said that you weren’t going to do it and then you started out with this watering hole business and the International Bar out there and Tom Breen. I happen to know who Tom Breen is. I’ve signed many search warrants for him on narcotics. So we’re going to try a civil suit here and I’m not going to tell you how to try it but we’re going to try a civil suit here. We’re not going to try a criminal case. If you want to try a controlled substance case why [sic] you go down to Criminal Court and do it. I’m not going to have to sit all day long and admonish this Jury and get placed in the trick bag and I think that’s what you’re trying to do to me. All right bring the Jury in.
“JURY COMES INTO OPEN COURT.
*1190“THE COURT: Be seated. Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury the last question the objection to which has been sustained and you are not to consider that question or any other questions or evidence that has been not admitted into evidence in reaching or arriving at your verdict in this case. Allright, next question.”