Court Opinion

ID: 9709461
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 03:48:19.965951+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:49.125382
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE REINHARD, dissenting: Because the record shows the existence of neither a partnership nor a valid gift, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s affirmance of the trial court’s judgment for plaintiffs. The majority concludes that the parties here were engaged in a joint venture. A joint venture is essentially a partnership carried on for a single enterprise, and joint ventures are governed by partnership principles. (Bachewicz v. American National Bank & Trust Co. (1986), 111 Ill. 2d 444, 448.) Because a partnership is a contractual relationship, the principles of contract law fully apply to it. (In re Estate of Johnson (1984), 129 Ill. App. 3d 22, 25.) Consideration is a basic element for the existence of a contract. (Steinberg v. Chicago Medical School (1977), 69 Ill. 2d 320, 331.) Accordingly, a partnership agreement must be based on valid consideration between the partners. 59A Am. Jur. 2d Partnership §112 (1987). Valid consideration for a contract centering on the purchase of legal lottery tickets has been found where each of the parties contributed tickets (Miller v. Radikopf (1975), 394 Mich. 83, 228 N.W.2d 386) or in the context of a long-standing pattern of joint ticket purchases (Pearsall v. Alexander (D.C. App. 1990), 572 A.2d 113). Here, where it is conceded that defendant alone purchased the lottery tickets, the majority’s only suggestion of what might constitute consideration is the fact that plaintiffs “expended their time and energy and put forth effort to scratch the tickets.” (212 Ill. App. 3d at 228.) However, the consideration supporting a unilateral promise such as the one present here must be that which is bargained for as consideration by the promisor. Bank of Marion v. Robert “Chick” Fritz, Inc. (1974), 57 Ill. 2d 120, 124. The record simply does not support the conclusion that defendant bargained for plaintiffs’ “time and energy” in scratching the tickets as their contribution to a joint venture or partnership. The evidence viewed most favorably to plaintiffs shows that defendant promised to share in the lottery winnings if plaintiffs helped him scratch the tickets. The question, then, is whether the scratching of the tickets was intended to be consideration for a contract or merely a condition upon a gratuitous promise. A promise may propose either a bargain or a gift, and in either case a condition may be imposed using the same words. (L. Simpson, Handbook of the Law of Contracts §53, at 84 (2d ed. 1965).) As a general rule, “if the happening of the condition will not only be of no benefit to the promisor but it is obviously merely for the purpose of enabling the promisee to receive a gift, the happening of the event on which the promise is conditional, though brought about by the promisee in reliance on the promise, will not properly be construed as consideration.” 17A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts §115, at 131 (1991). Here, I believe that defendant’s invitation to plaintiffs to help him scratch the tickets was intended as simply a condition to their receipt of defendant’s gift of lottery winnings. It strains credulity to find that plaintiffs’ scratching of tickets was viewed by the parties as consideration supporting a partnership contract. I note that this conclusion does not contravene the general rule against inquiring into the adequacy of consideration, because that rule operates only where the parties actually intended a bargain. (L. Simpson, Handbook of the Law of Contracts §53, at 85 (2d ed. 1965).) Here, the evidence supports, at most, that defendant’s promise constituted a conditional promise to make a gift of lottery winnings. I further believe, however, that no valid gift has been effectuated. In addition to donative intent, the making of a valid gift requires the donor to part with exclusive dominion and control over the subject of the gift, and there must also be delivery. (Frey v. Wubbena (1962), 26 Ill. 2d 62, 72.) Here, whether the gift is viewed as the lottery ticket itself or the winnings it produced, defendant never parted with exclusive dominion and control. Moreover, even if the promise to share in the future lottery winnings could be construed as an attempt to effectuate a gift of those winnings, a promise to make a future gift is generally unenforceable (Hux v. Woodcock (1985), 130 Ill. App. 3d 721, 724) and is revocable at any time until the gift is executed (Meyer v. Meyer (1942), 379 Ill. 97, 104). Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the trial court.