Court Opinion

ID: 8960413
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-11-27 09:40:25.211529+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:10:11.878392
License: Public Domain

OAKES, Circuit Judge
(dissenting):
I respectfully dissent.
I agree with the majority of the judges in the Fifth Circuit sitting en banc that, at the very least, the practice of permitting magistrates to conduct jury voir dire in felony cases raises serious constitutional questions. See United States v. Ford, 824 F.2d 1430 (5th Cir.1987) (en banc), cert. denied, — U.S. - 108 S.Ct. 741, 98 L.Ed.2d 776 (1988). Selection of a petit jury to try a felony case has both particular and systemic importance; it implicates not only the defendant’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights and provides the foundation upon which the remainder of the trial is built, but is essential, as Judge Patrick Higginbotham reminded us, “because the impartiality of the adjudicator goes to the very integrity of the legal system.” Id. at 1435 (quoting Gray v. Mississippi, — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 2045, 2056, 95 L.Ed.2d 622 (1987)). The process of voir dire is especially significant; not only is the peremptory challenge a necessary part of trial by jury, Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219, 85 S.Ct. 824, 835, 13 L.Ed.2d 759 (1965), but the prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges may violate other constitutional requirements. For example, a prosecutor’s challenges based on race implicate the Equal Protection clause. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 88-89, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 1718-19, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). And, while double jeopardy does not attach until the jury is sworn, Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 35, 98 S.Ct. 2156, 2160, 57 L.Ed.2d 24 (1978), the Sixth Amendment rights of a defendant to a speedy and public trial, accord Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), to be present while a jury is selected, Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 376, 13 S.Ct. 136, 138, 36 L.Ed.2d 1011 (1892); United States v. Crutcher, 405 F.2d 239, 242-43 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 908, 89 S.Ct. 1018, 22 L.Ed.2d 219 (1969); Fed.R.Crim.P. 43(a), and to the assistance of counsel during jury selection, see Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 399, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 1239, 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977), all attach before or at the time jury selection begins. Since the whole purpose of voir dire is to obtain an impartial jury, one that is “capable and willing to decide the case solely on the evidence before it,” Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217, 102 S.Ct. 940, 946, 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982), it follows that the right to such a jury attaches from the beginning of the selection process.
Are these constitutional concerns met by the district judge’s power to conduct a de novo review of the voir dire process, here specifically reserved but not utilized? Does that power satisfy the constitutional concerns above noted? The answer, I feel, is at best maybe. The district court’s review of a magistrate’s rulings on challenges would surely be difficult, as Judge Higginbotham pointed out in United States v. Ford, 824 F.2d at 1436-37, and would undoubtedly lead to appeals on the issue to circuit courts. Perhaps the district court has the inherent power simply to conduct a voir dire a second time. See United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 100 S.Ct. 2406, 65 L.Ed.2d 424 (1980). But this approach presents serious practical problems; for example, the second interrogation of a potential juror would be likely to put that individual on the defensive, making a reenactment of the original voir dire impossible. See United States v. Ford, 824 F.2d at 1437; but see id. at 1446 (Rubin, J., dissenting). In any event, no clear-cut answer can be forthcoming unless and until the Supreme Court decides the constitutional question.
The practice of delegating jury selection to a magistrate, absent the consent of the defendant and the Government, is to my mind a bad one. Intending no offense toward magistrates, delegation demeans the process, making it appear essentially clerical in nature. At the very least it impedes the judge from personally instilling in the jury at the start of the trial a sense of the importance of the work the jury is about to perform. It is apt to make the jury less attentive to the judge during the trial, and the judge less sensitive to the problems of the individual jurors, as well as to the overall chemistry of the jury itself. For due process also demands, as well as a disinterested jury, “a trial judge ever *1338watchful to prevent prejudicial occurrences and to determine the effect of such occurrences when they happen.” Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. at 217, 102 S.Ct. at 946. Events can occur during the magistrate’s voir dire that would require the judge’s review, but he would be disadvantaged because they occurred outside his presence. In addition, a defendant might feel shortchanged, and left with the impression that he, and his case, are of lesser consequence because the judge himself did not participate. The Constitution instructs us that every criminal defendant, regardless of his status in the community or the nature of the crimes with which he is charged, is important and entitled not only to the best practicable process but also entitled reasonably to feel as if he has received the fairest practicable process.
I cannot think that the practice — at least in a jurisdiction such as the Eastern District of New York where the judge, rather than the attorneys, conducts the voir dire— is one that can save much judicial time. It is a practice that is not followed in the Southern District of New York, and in the districts in which it is used it is exercised without established rules for determining when voir dire should be assigned and without established procedures for review. I would, in the exercise of our supervisory power, prohibit it except, possibly, when the parties consent, and then only pursuant to rules controlling the district court’s review. By so doing, I would incidentally avoid the problems of statutory and constitutional interpretation that my colleagues solve with a sweep that leaves me, as I suggest, unconvinced. I therefore dissent.