Court Opinion

ID: 9784841
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 20:55:42.716745+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:00.219038
License: Public Domain

Justice ORIE MELVIN,
dissenting.
This appeal by allowance was granted to address the propriety of the March 10, 2010 opinion and order of the Superior Court that affirmed the May 27, 2009 decree terminating the parental rights of C.L.F. (“Mother”) to L.J.B. (“Child”). My exhaustive review of the record compels my conclusion that the termination decree is not supported by clear and convincing evidence and must be reversed. The practical effect of that reversal ends this case. In my view, the consideration of matters by the Opinion Announcing the Judgment of the Court (“OAJC”), that occurred subsequent to the entry of the appealed order is unnecessary, improper, and unwise. At this juncture, it is irrelevant whether Stepmother ultimately intends to adopt L.J.B. because the termination decree cannot stand. A remand adds nothing to the proper disposition of this case, serves only to burden the parties and the courts with unnecessary litigation, and fails to properly address the only issue before us.
*243My exhaustive review of the record in this matter compels one conclusion: that the decree terminating Mother’s parental rights must be reversed. Mother and S.M.B. (“Father”), who never married, resided together at the time of Child’s birth on August 27, 2001. They separated during the summer of 2002 when Child was eleven months old; Father then married W.B. (“Stepmother”) in November of that year. Shortly thereafter, Father filed a custody complaint, and the contentious litigation described infra ensued. From the date of separation through March 13, 2006, Child resided primarily with Mother; Father’s partial custody increased from two evenings per week and alternating weekends to a sixty-forty percent split in favor of Mother.
On December 18, 2008, Father and Stepmother filed a petition to adopt Child, who was then seven years old, and sought to involuntarily terminate Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1) and (2). The orphans’ court held a hearing on the termination petition on April 30, 2009, wherein Father and Stepmother testified in support of the petition, and Mother, Child’s four half-siblings, and B.B., the maternal grandmother (“Grandmother”) testified in opposition. The orphans’ court interviewed Child in chambers in the presence of counsel on May 5, 2009, at which time Mother requested a formal bonding evaluation. Folio-wing argument, that request was denied. Child’s guardian ad litem (“GAL”) filed a report on May 26, 2009 opining that it was in Child’s best interest to terminate Mother’s parental rights.
By decree dated May 27, 2009, the orphans’ court terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1) and (b), determining that, while Father obstructed Mother’s contact with Child, Mother failed to take requisite affirmative steps to overcome the obstacles placed by Father. The orphans’ court also ruled that no bond existed between Mother and Child. Accordingly, it concluded that termination of Mother’s parental rights and adoption of Child by Stepmother would best serve Child’s needs and welfare. Mother appealed to the Superior Court.
*244In a memorandum decision, the Superior Court affirmed the termination of parental rights. In re Adoption of L.J.B., No. 1097 MDA 2009, 996 A.2d 562, unpublished memorandum (Pa.Super., filed March 10, 2010). We granted Mother’s petition for allowance of appeal, and, following remand to the orphans’ court for an assessment of whether Mother was entitled to in-forma-pauperis status, the case was submitted to us on the briefs.
The record substantiates the following pertinent facts, which I detail here because they bear on the only relevant issue before us: the propriety of the order terminating Mother’s parental rights. Throughout the custody proceedings1 that preceded the instant action, Father repeatedly reported to Clinton County Children and Youth Services (“CYS”) that Mother sexually abused and neglected Child. Beginning when L.J.B. was two years old, Father requested that Child undergo pelvic examinations, which occurred on “at least eight” occasions. N.T., 2/30/09, at 143; N.T., 2/10/06, at 22. Mother filed two petitions for contempt seeking protective orders preventing Father’s initiation of unnecessary pelvic examinations of L.J.B. N.T., 4/30/09, at 180. During the first contempt proceeding, the custody court told Mother that Father, “as a parent, has every right to ruin [Child’s] life,” and it denied the contempt. Id. The court apparently did not hold Father in contempt pursuant to the second petition either. Instead, it issued a statement in its October 20, 2003 order addressing Father’s cross-petition for modification of custody that “the parties’[2] practice of taking the child to medical practitioners at the end of each custodial period [for the *245purpose of pelvic examinations] must stop.” Order, 11/9/04, at 1-2 (referencing the prior October 20, 2003 order). A November 22, 2004 memorandum to the custody court from CYS caseworker Dennis E. Wilson substantiated the dearth of evidence “to suggest that the child has been sexually or emotionally abused” and advised that “[c]ontinued vaginal examinations of the child without medical necessity are not recommended.” CYS Memorandum, 11/22/04, at 2. Mr. Wilson also read a January 20, 2005 CYS memorandum into the record, which stated in pertinent part:
Clinton County Children and Youth agrees with the medical professionals in this case that the examinations and cleanings of the child’s vagina need to stop. The Agency will open an abuse investigation if [Father and Stepmother] continue to have the child unnecessarily examined or cleaned. The Agency will also request a temporary change in visitation during the course of the investigation.
N.T., 2/10/06, at 43. Father testified that Child had been under the care of two different pediatricians, Dr. Henry Dietrich and Dr. Thane Turner. N.T., 4/30/09, at 56. Dr. Dietrich sent a letter to the custody court stating, “Dr. Henry Dietrich’s medical opinion concurs with Dr. Thane Turner’s opinion from 11/22/04 that [Father and Stepmother] need to stop. Clinton County Children and Youth agrees with the medical professionals in this case that the examinations of the child’s vagina need to stop.” Id. at 57. Six or more professionals investigated the allegations over the years, and none of them found any evidence of sexual abuse. Undeterred, two days after filing a petition for primary custody, Father and Stepmother once again ignored the October 20, 2003 order and took Child on January 25, 2006 to the Jersey Shore Hospital emergency room where she underwent yet another vaginal examination. N.T., 2/10/06, at 24. During that examination, which likewise revealed no abnormalities or indications of sexual abuse, color photographs of Child’s genitals were taken. Id. at 32. The custody court found as a fact that CYS determined all of Father’s reports of abuse or neglect were *246unfounded. The court clearly was exasperated by Father’s behavior, as evidenced by its comments:
I’m making a specific finding that there was absolutely nothing physical or verbal observed or heard by the people at the Jersey Shore Hospital that would have suggested there was any reason in the world that this child shouldn’t have been in bed in her own home and not at the Jersey Shore Hospital with her legs spread apart taking a picture of her vaginal area. Now don’t go on it anymore. Let’s move onto something else.
N.T., 2/10/06, at 49. Despite the court’s frustration, it failed to enforce its prior order and halt Father’s repeated detestable behavior. See Orphans’ Court Opinion, 5/27/09, at 4.
Mother testified that when Father subjected Child to yet another vaginal examination and photography of her genitals, on January 25, 2006, and the custody court failed to enforce its prior order proscribing such behavior, she felt compelled to protect Child in whatever manner she could. Thus, on March 13, 2006, Mother relocated to Tennessee3 in an effort to eliminate five-year-old L.J.B.’s continued exposure to Father’s sexual exploitation through repeated unnecessary pelvic examinations that lacked any medical foundation. Mother explained that L.J.B. asked, “[W]hy did they do that to me? Why did my daddy let them do that to me?”, to which Mother responded, “[I]t’s not going to happen no [sic] more. I’m not going to let that happen to you any more.” N.T., 4/30/09, at 167. Mother reasoned:
I waited for [the custody judge] to issue an Order stopping the vaginal exams. He did not issue an Order.... Children and Youth had sent a memo and stated specifically that if they had any more exams done to [L.J.B.], that they would stop [Father’s] visitation immediately. And they did not enforce their memo. [The custody judge] did not do anything to stop [L.J.B.] from having any more exams. *247And after they had pictures taken of her privates, I just could never allow that to go on no [sic] more.
N.T., 4/30/09, at 143. Mother explained that “[i]t just ripped out my heart. I couldn’t believe that [Father and Stepmother] would put her through that.... I’m her mom. I’m supposed to protect her.... I thought once [Father and Stepmother] had primary custody and I had just visitation once a month, everything would stop.” Id. at 148-49. Mother stated that she “would do anything to prevent [Child] from having those exams again, if it meant that I could never see her again.” Id. at 182. Mother further represented that as she had anticipated, Child did not undergo any such examinations following Mother’s relocation, a fact substantiated in the record by Stepmother. Id. at 67. After Mother moved, the custody arrangement was modified to give Mother partial custody one weekend per month. Apparently, Father remained dissatisfied with this level of contact with Mother, and he admitted that he wanted “[M]other out of [Child’s] life.” Id. at 21.
Upon Mother’s relocation, she also was entitled to telephone contact with Child every Thursday at 8:00 p.m. Father, however, placed all telephone calls between Mother and Child on speakerphone “to hear what was going on.” Id. at 27, 149. Mother explained that Child, although initially happy when Mother called, “couldn’t freely talk to me.” Id. at 149. Mother testified that Father and Stepmother would comment to Child while Mother attempted to converse with her; Father claimed that L.J.B. eventually stopped wanting to talk to Mother at all. Id. at 27, 149. Father told Mother that Child did not want to speak to her and invariably hung up on Mother. Id. at 153. The orphans’ court found that when Mother attempted to telephone Child on Mother’s Day by having her son place the call, upon Child’s obvious glee at speaking to Mother and revelation that “mommy’s on the phone,” Father hung up the telephone, telling Mother, “Wrong day,” because it was a Sunday, not a Thursday. Id. at 154; Orphans’ Court Opinion, 5/27/09, at 6-7. Additionally, Stepmother threatened Mother with harassment for calling Child *248on her birthday, after hanging up on Mother every time she tried to call. N.T., 4/30/09, at 153-54. Stepmother acknowledged that she “possibly did [threaten her] at one point.” Id. at 88. Mother admitted that after she was threatened with harassment for telephoning, she did not try to call again after August of 2007. Id. at 160. As explained infra, Mother had reason to fear such threats based upon Father’s role in initiating an incident that resulted in Mother being jailed. See In re J.G.J., Jr., 367 Pa.Super. 425, 532 A.2d 1218 (1987) (noncustodial parent’s failure to telephone to inquire about son was understandable following accusation by custodial parent, who was seeking involuntary termination of parental rights, that non-custodial parent was making threatening telephone calls).4
From March through November 2006, Father permitted Child to visit Grandmother on a monthly basis. Unbeknownst to Father, Grandmother permitted Mother to speak to Child on the telephone during those visits and gave Child cards and gifts from Mother. During one of those telephone calls, Child told Mother “that her dad told her she was never, ever going to see me again.” N.T., 4/30/09, at 155. Grandmother held a birthday party for Child in August 2006, and Mother drove from Tennessee so that she could see Child there. When L.J.B. learned that Mother was on her way, Child became upset, telling Grandmother that she was “not allowed to visit with [her] mother,” and “she was going to get in trouble.” Id. at 118, 156. Grandmother became “afraid and took [L.J.B.] back to [Father] and [Stepmother].” Id. Mother testified that she tried to contact Child through Grandmother’s e-mail. She sent Child an e-mail through Grandmother, who printed it, read it to L.J.B., and gave it to her, but Child “stuffed it in the seat” on the way to Father’s home. When Grandmother reminded Child that she forgot her letter, Mother explained that Child “thought she was going to get in trouble if she had *249the letter when she went home.” Id. at 198. Upon learning that Grandmother permitted communication with Mother, Father demanded that Grandmother promise not to allow Child to speak or see Mother during the visits. Grandmother refused and filed a petition for visitation. While the custody court initially permitted Grandmother to have supervised visits, it eventually issued an order ceasing them.5
Mother last visited with Child in December of 2006, nearly a year after she moved from Pennsylvania, when she was forced to seek the custody court’s intervention because Father continued to prohibit all contact with Mother. Despite Mother’s entitlement to unsupervised weekend partial custody, she was relegated to a two-hour visit at a McDonald’s Restaurant where Father and Stepmother remained, observing the visit. Father admitted that the authorization for the two-hour visit “came from [the custody judge].” N.T., 4/30/09, at 215. In 2007, Mother delivered Easter presents to Child through her son and delivered Christmas presents to Child through Grandmother. In August 2008, Grandmother sent Child a birthday card signed by Mother that Father returned.
Mother testified that she provided no gifts to Child after 2007 because Father refused to permit Child to have them. The orphans’ court found as fact that Father and Stepmother “instructed the Child to call Stepmother ‘mother’ and Mother [by her first name].” Orphans’ Court Opinion, 5/27/09, at 7. Mother explained that she did not seek further court intervention because it became clear to her based upon the court’s refusal to enforce even her monthly weekend custody that such efforts on her part would be futile.
Mother also became intimidated by the power of the custody court and the perceived relationship between the custody court and Father. In support, Mother noted that when she moved from the initial relocation address in Tennessee, she apparently had been mailed notice of an order directing payment of a $50.00 fee to Robert Meacham, the court-*250appointed psychologist. While she never received that notice, she subsequently learned that a warrant had been issued due to its nonpayment. Mother, therefore, directed her son to pay the bill following which the court order was rescinded in September 2007. N.T., 4/30/09, at 151. When Mother drove to Pennsylvania in August 2008, she passed Father on a road near his house, and, shortly thereafter, a Lock Haven Police Officer began following her. Father himself testified that he “was told by [the custody judge] to call if I saw her in the area,” and he did so. Id. at 218; see also N.T. Grandmother visitation, 7/11/07, at 8 (“I would suggest the next time you find her in Clinton County you call the Sheriff and they’ll pick her up.”). Despite the fact that the fee had been paid and the order had been rescinded, police stopped Mother’s vehicle, removed her from the car, handcuffed her while her other children watched, and took her to jail, where she was forced to spend the night. N.T., 4/30/09, at 152. Mother concluded from this experience that, if the court would not enforce its order prohibiting pelvic examinations of Child and yet freely advised Father to notify it if Mother appeared in Pennsylvania so that she could be taken into custody, she had no hope of getting court-ordered relief.
Mother explained that Father wrote ex parte letters to the custody court that resulted in court hearings even though no formal petition or motion had been filed. N.T., 4/30/09, at 168. Indeed, a December 1, 2004 order by the custody court substantiates this claim. Order, 12/1/04, at 1 (footnote omitted)(“On November 9, 2004, we received a lengthy unsigned letter from Father raising numerous concerns about [L.J.B.]’s care. We immediately scheduled a hearing.... ”). Moreover, in the proceeding Grandmother instituted seeking visitation, which was heard by the same custody judge, the court opined, “[Father] won’t let [Mother] see [L.J.B.] because her mother ran off and abandoned her.” When Grandmother protested that Mother did not abandon Child, the judge went on, “I’m surprised [Father] hasn’t filed a petition to have [Mother’s] rights terminated.” N.T., 4/30/09, at 169; N.T. Grandmother visitation, 7/11/07, at 11. The court told Grandmother, *251“[Y]ou’re in the situation you’re in because your daughter’s conduct has been absolutely reprehensible for the last ten years,” even though Child was only five years old at the time, and the parties had been before the judge only for the prior three years. Id. at 9. Mother concluded from these comments, “[The custody judge] doesn’t like me. [Father] was in Contempt of Court and took [Child] for a vaginal exam, and nothing was done. But I didn’t pay a $50 psychologist[’]s bill, and I ended up in jail.” N.T., 4/30/09, at 169. Mother indicated that she tried everything she could think of to enforce her rights including attempting to see Child through Grandmother, all to no avail. Id. at 187.
Mother revealed that she sought legal advice upon relocating to Tennessee to attempt to enforce her partial custody rights there. She was advised by a Tennessee attorney that while he could assist her in getting a temporary protective order for Child from further vaginal exams, the matter ultimately would be heard again before the same trial judge in Pennsylvania. Id. at 157. Based on her court experience, and in light of Father’s obstruction of her relationship with Child, Mother concluded that Father simply wanted her “out of [Child’s] life completely.” Id. at 204. As noted supra, Father admitted as much. Id. at 21.
Mother asserts, inter alia, that the lower courts6 erred in concluding that Father met his burden of proving that Mother evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing her parental claim to L.J.B. or refused or failed to perform her parental duties, in light of extensive evidence of record that Father obstructed Mother’s efforts to maintain her place in Child’s life. I agree. As I find merit in this issue, it is unnecessary to address Mother’s other contentions regarding section 2511(a).
*252The orphans’ court terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1) and (b), which provide, in relevant part:
§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination
(a) General rule — The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following grounds:
(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or failed to perform parental duties.
(b) Other considerations. — The court in terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child____
Initially, the focus is on the parent’s conduct. In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505 (Pa.Super.2007).
Section 2511 does not require that the parent demonstrate both a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child and refusal or failure to perform parental duties. Baby Boy A. v. Catholic Social Services, 512 Pa. 517, 517 A.2d 1244, 1246 (1986). Accordingly, parental rights may be terminated pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1) if the parent either demonstrates a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child or fails to perform parental duties.
In the Matter of Adoption of Charles E.D.M., 550 Pa. 595, 708 A.2d 88, 92 (1998)(emphasis in original). Only if the court determines that the parent’s conduct satisfies subsection (a) does it then engage in the second part of the analysis pursuant to section 2511(b).7 Id.; see also L.M., supra.
The OAJC has detailed the relevant scope and standard of review. In affirming the decree terminating Mother’s paren*253tal rights, the Superior Court determined that “Mother’s failure to seek court intervention in order to protect her partial custody rights after relocating to Tennessee is fatal to her claim.” In re Adoption of L.J.B., supra (unpublished memorandum at 12). I believe this critical error in the Superior Court’s reasoning compels reversal of this case.
It is not disputed that there was a period in excess of six months wherein Mother and Child had no contact. In concluding that Mother failed to affirmatively exert her parental rights to overcome the obstacles placed by Father, however, the courts below failed to give due consideration to Mother’s situation and her explanations for her responsive actions. The obstacles placed by Father in this case were shameful, systemic, and sustained. Most offensive, to be sure, was his exposure of this young child to repeated vaginal medical examinations. The orphans’ court’s explicit finding that Mother did not affirmatively attempt to overcome the multiple obstacles erected by Father is not supported in the record and ignores the critical fact that Father and Stepmother actively spurned all of Mother’s efforts to remain in Child’s life. Father should not be rewarded for such conduct. See, e.g., In re Adoption of C.M.W., 412 Pa.Super. 360, 603 A.2d 622 (1992) (parent’s reasonable attempts to overcome obstacles created by parent seeking to terminate parental rights were sufficient); In re B.N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 856 (Pa.Super.2004)(court must consider custodial parent’s devious, deliberate creation of barriers “intended to impede free communication and regular association between the non-custodial parent and his or her child”).
The Superior Court’s sole emphasis on the fact' that Mother did not seek court intervention following her relocation to Tennessee as the exclusive basis for affirming the termination decree is clear error. See In re D.J.Y., 487 Pa. 125, 408 A.2d 1387, 1390 (1979) (where a parent makes reasonable attempts to overcome obstacles created by the party seeking termination, the fact that the parent could conceivably have pursued legal action more promptly does not, standing alone, justify termination of parental rights); see also Adoption of M.S., 445 Pa.Super. 177, 664 A.2d 1370, 1374 (1995)(“Where a parent *254makes reasonable attempts to overcome obstacles created by the party seeking to terminate parental right, ‘a mere showing that the parent could conceivably have pursued legal action more promptly cannot justify termination of parental rights’ ” (emphasis in original)(quoting Adoption of C.M.W., 603 A.2d at 625)). Moreover, the few cases from this Court that address the propriety of orders involuntarily terminating parental rights, and the myriad of cases from the Superior Court that do so, all reinforce that:
[i]t is well established that a court must examine the individual circumstances of each and every case and consider all explanations offered by the parent to determine if the evidence in light of the totality of circumstances clearly warrants termination. In re Bowman, 542 Pa. 268, 666 A.2d 274 (1995)(Zappala, J., Opinion in support of Reversal); In re K.C.W., 456 Pa.Super. 1, 689 A.2d 294 (1997); Adoption of Dale A., 453 Pa.Super. 106, 683 A.2d 297 (1996); Adoption of Hamilton, 379 Pa.Super. 274, 549 A.2d 1291 (1988).
Charles E.D.M., 708 A.2d at 91 (emphasis added). Herein, the Superior Court elevated Mother’s failure to continue to seek court intervention above all other considerations despite the fact that it was merely one of a myriad of factors it was required to consider.
We emphatically have held in situations such as this, where the custodial parent has prevented the parent whose rights are subject to termination from performing parental duties, parental performance is to be measured in light of what reasonably would be expected of an individual in similar circumstances, giving due consideration to obstacles encountered. See In re Adoption of J.S.M., Jr., 492 Pa. 313, 424 A.2d 878 (1981); D.J.Y., supra; and In the Matter of the Adoption of David C., 479 Pa. 1, 387 A.2d 804 (1978).
Nearly thirty years ago we addressed the issue of obstructive conduct by a custodial parent in Adoption of B.D.S., supra8 In that case, the child’s mother, who was the custodi*255al parent, obstructed the father’s relationship with their minor child, B.D.S., and sought to terminate the father’s parental rights so that her new husband could adopt the child. Both the mother and her husband testified that the father and his family never contacted them about B.D.S. after 1973 but on cross-examination admitted receiving the father’s request for a visit in November 1973 and an Easter basket for the child in 1974. The father, who was on active duty in the Marine Corps, conversely testified that during the prior three and one-half years, all of his attempts to see his son were thwarted by his ex-wife. The father went to Legal Aid, but, since he did not meet the income guidelines, he did not initiate legal action to enforce his parental rights. Additionally, he was intimidated by a prior incident that resulted in the filing of an action before the district magistrate, which lent credence, in the father’s view, to his former father-in-law’s threats that he not set foot on their property, which is where his son had been residing.
Based upon this testimony, the orphans’ court concluded that the mother’s actions prevented the father from maintaining a parental relationship with B.D.S., and it refused to terminate his parental rights. In affirming the orphans’ court, we examined a similar pattern of barriers in Adoption of S.H., 476 Pa. 608, 383 A.2d 529 (1978), and reaffirmed our admonition in S.H. that a parent will not be found to have refused to perform parental duties or evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child as long as he uses all available resources to preserve the parental relationship and exercises reasonable firmness in declining to yield to obstacles. B.D.S., 431 A.2d at 207 (citing S.H., 383 A.2d at 530). Similarly, we referenced D.J.Y., supra, wherein we determined that the natural mother’s failure to maintain contact with her child “was attributable to the paternal grandparents’ *256deliberate actions designed to thwart her attempts to contact her child.” B.D.S., 431 A.2d at 207.
The cornerstone of B.D.S. I underscore today is that while a parent must make a concerted, deliberate effort to maintain contact with her child, “all circumstances must be considered when analyzing a parent’s performance or non-performance of parental obligations.” Id. (citing In re R.W.B., 485 Pa. 168, 401 A.2d 347 (1979)). Further, where there are allegations that the custodial parent exhibited obstructive conduct, a parent’s performance must be measured in light of “what would be expected of an individual in [similar] circumstances____” B.D.S., 431 A.2d at 207 (citing Adoption of David C., 479 Pa. 1, 387 A.2d 804 (1978)). In B.D.S., we issued “a stern warning” that a non-custodial parent’s responsive behavior to obstructive conduct by a custodial parent would not be utilized as a sound basis for the involuntary termination of parental rights. B.D.S., 431 A.2d at 208.
Assuredly, parents have a primary right to their children. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000) (“[T]he interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court”); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982) (discussing “[t]he fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child”). The power of the court to extinguish this right, however, is statutory. In re Adoption of R.B.F. 569 Pa. 269, 803 A.2d 1195 (2002); 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511; see also In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321 (Pa.Super.2010)(Adoption is strictly a creature of statute with no roots in common law). “The purpose of involuntary termination of parental rights is to dispense with the need for parental consent to an adoption when, by choice or neglect, a parent has failed to meet the continuing needs of the child. See e.g., In re Adoption of Orwick, 464 Pa. 549, 347 A.2d 677 (1975); In re Adoption of McCray, 460 Pa. 210, 331 A.2d 652 (1975).” In re B.E., 474 Pa. 139, 377 A.2d 153, 156 (1977). Absent consent, parental rights may be terminated only upon clear and convincing *257evidence of the statutory criteria. Santosky; In re T.R., 502 Pa. 165, 465 A.2d 642 (983).
If anything in this record can be characterized as supported by clear and convincing evidence, it is that Father, who bore the burden of proof, engaged in a persistent pattern of conduct designed to erase Mother from Child’s life and substitute Stepmother for Mother in Child’s eyes. The sole basis highlighted by the Superior Court in refusing to give credence to all of Mother’s continued efforts to perform parental duties rested upon Mother’s failure to pursue court intervention after 2007. Indeed, Mother acknowledged that she did not continue legal intervention after the custody court failed to enforce its orders prohibiting Child’s repeated pelvic examinations and permitting Mother’s weekend partial custody following her relocation from Pennsylvania. No one — not Father, the GAL, the orphans’ court, or the Superior Court — has explained how Mother was to maintain contact with Child, let alone assert prominence in her life, in the face of Father’s unfounded allegations of sexual abuse, heinous exposure of this young child to multiple vaginal examinations, and abhorrent interference in the mother-child relationship. A parent is not required to perform the impossible. In re G.P.-R., 851 A.2d 967 (Pa.Super.2004) (citing In re Burns, supra). The instant case is not one involving a meager, minimal effort by Mother to resist Father’s significant obstacles; rather, the record reveals Mother’s genuine, sincere efforts to maintain a place of importance in L.J.B.’s life. Could Mother have successfully continued to initiate legal proceedings despite the custody court’s refusal to enforce its prior orders? Possibly. See Adoption of C.M.W., 603 A.2d at 625 (focus of 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1) is not whether person is model parent but whether parent has shown clear intent to relinquish his parental rights). Our case law, however, compels that we examine the reasonableness of Mother’s actions in light of the totality of the circumstances. It is this aspect of reasonableness that the Superior Court ignored. As this Court made clear in 1982, obstructive behavior by the custodial parent “aimed at thwarting the other parent’s maintenance of a parental relationship will not be *258tolerated, and certainly will not provide a sound basis for the involuntary termination of parental rights.” B.D.S., 431 A.2d at 208.
Reversal of this unsupported decree ends this matter. The OAJC’s remand is supererogatory and is based upon two letters espousing mere possibilities that were written to the orphans’ court after entry of the final decree.9 On November 25, 2009, six months after the orphans’ court terminated Mother’s parental rights, the orphans’ court observed that it received a letter from the guardian ad litem indicating that Father and Stepmother “split up and currently intend on divorcing,” and it forwarded that letter to the Superior Court. The letter indicated that Father “would like [Stepmother] to proceed with the adoption[,]” but Stepmother “appears to have some concerns in this regard.” Letter from David I. Lindsay, Esquire, to Hon. Craig P. Miller, 11/16/09. Similarly, two months later on January 29, 2010, the orphans’ court forwarded a letter it received from Stepmother dated January 22, 2010, in which Stepmother communicated uncertainty concerning her ability to proceed with her adoption of Child.
In relying upon the GAL’s and Stepmother’s post-decree letters to the orphans’ court, the OAJC suggests that “the factual circumstances of this case certainly reflect the drastic change in circumstances.” OAJC at 1108. I observe there truly are not any “drastic change[s] in circumstance” that prevent our review of the propriety of the decree terminating Mother’s parental rights, which is the only matter before us. Indeed, the OAJC acknowledges that “neither the docket nor the certified record reflects a formal praecipe or petition on Stepmother’s behalf withdrawing her petition for adoption[,]” and the record displays an “absence of a formal praecipe or discontinuance.” Id at 1108, 1109. The OAJC’s suggestion that “the petition for termination of Mother’s rights is potentially moot” is a tacit acknowledgment that it presently is not *259moot. OAJC at 1109 (emphasis added). While it is true that a legal question can become moot as a result of changes in the facts of the case or in the law, “such changes must finally and conclusively dispose of the controversy, and where they do not, the case is not moot.” Kane, Rachel, 2 Standard Pennsylvania Practice 2d § 6:49 (2011); National Development Corp. v. Planning Commission of Harrison Twp., 64 Pa. Cmwlth. 246, 439 A.2d 1308, 1310 (1982) (citing In re Gross, 476 Pa. 203, 382 A.2d 116 (1978)).
The OAJC cites In re B.E., 474 Pa. 139, 377 A.2d 153, 155 (1977), In re T.R., 502 Pa. 165, 465 A.2d 642 (1983), and 23 Pa.C.S. § 2512 in support of the proposition that a parent may file a petition for termination of parental rights against the other parent only when adoption is contemplated and, presumably, as authority for its remand decision. OAJC at 1107-08, 1109. While I have no disagreement with the first proposition, I discern no authority from those cases for the instant remand. It is important to note the procedural and substantive differences in each of these cases. In B.E., unlike here, the petition did not contain an “averment that adoption proceedings with respect to the Child were contemplated.” Id. at 154. In fact, the petitioning mother admitted that she had “no plans to have the child adopted by a stepparent or any other person.” Id. Consequently, the trial court, in the first instance based upon evidence of record, properly rejected her petition. In T.R., the trial court in reaching its decision to terminate applied the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof. On appeal, this Court determined that the proper standard of proof, in accord with Santosky v. Kramer, supra, was clear and convincing evidence. Thus, we vacated the termination decree and remanded for a new termination hearing applying the proper standard.
In contrast, when Father and Stepmother filed the instant termination petition, adoption by Stepmother was contemplated. When the case was decided by the trial court (under the proper standard) and appealed to the Superior Court, the record establishes that adoption by Stepmother was contemplated. When this Court granted Mother’s petition for allow*260anee of appeal, the record substantiates that adoption by Stepmother was contemplated. Currently, the record confirms that adoption by Stepmother was contemplated, as neither Stepmother nor Father has filed any formal documents averring otherwise. Indeed, the OAJC acknowledges that a “final decision regarding mootness cannot be made by this Court upon this record.” OAJC at 1109. Hence, I submit that the mere assertion of changed circumstances is an insufficient basis to invoke this prudential rule, which requires the changes to “finally and conclusively dispose of the controversy.” National Development Corp., 439 A.2d at 1310.
“Notwithstanding the absence of a formal praecipe or discontinuance,” OAJC at 1109, the OAJC suggests that it is imprudent to render a decision on the merits, despite implying the propriety of such a result. Instead, it “vacate[s] the order of the Superior Court and remand[s] ... to the court of common pleas for an immediate evidentiary hearing to determine if the instant action is now moot,” based upon mere assertions made in ex parte letters that were subsequently made part of the record, and directs the court to dismiss this matter if it determines that Stepmother has changed her mind about adopting L.J.B. OAJC at 1101, 1113. If not based on the merits of these mere assertions, on what basis does the OAJC vacate the Superior Court order? The OAJC has envisioned only one resolution herein, and it unnecessarily leaves Mother and Child in a state of flux if Father’s and Stepmother’s intentions have not changed. The OAJC is deafeningly silent concerning where this case stands if Father and Stepmother intend to proceed with adoption, which, as I have established, is in accord with the formal record as it exists today. Mother has proceeded through her direct appeal, and this Court has wisely chosen to grant discretionary review. The briefs have been filed, considered, and the matter is ripe. If, as the OAJC contemplates, Father does not intend to seek adoption by Stepmother, the orphans’ court is directed to dismiss the case. Hypothetically, Father could now be divorced from Stepmother, remarried to someone else, and still seek to terminate Mother’s rights so that his subse*261quent spouse can adopt L.J.B. There would be no disposition on the merits of the decree before us detailing Father’s shameful treatment of his child solely to eliminate Mother from L.J.B.’s life, despite the fact that the instant record, in my view, compels such a result. Due to the OAJC’s refusal to address the issue before us and instead, remand, at least five years will have passed since Mother’s last contact with L.J.B. The OAJC’s mandate is neither necessary nor legally compelled.10
The record is clear that the order appealed to us is unsupported by clear and convincing evidence and must be reversed. Stepmother’s ex parte letter to the court — written six months after the orphans’ court entered the decree terminating parental rights — lacks the force and effect of a document filed on the docket. Indeed, if on remand, the orphans’ court determines that Father contemplates Stepmother’s adoption of L.J.B., the matter will then return to this Court. While under consideration by this Court, should Stepmother once again send a letter suggesting that her misgivings have returned, would we remand the case once more because it has again become “potentially” moot?
The OAJC opines that “the petition for termination of Mother’s rights is potentially moot, as it cannot be effected without Stepmother’s attendant adoption of L.J.B.” OAJC at 16 (citing 23 Pa.C.S. § 2512; B.E., 377 A.2d at 155-56; T.R., 465 A.2d at 644 n. 10; J.D.S., 763 A.2d at 871). By this statement, the OAJC appears to assert that an order terminating parental rights is conditioned upon the subsequent adoption. As the OAJC recognizes earlier in its opinion, however, termination occurs prior to adoption. See OAJC at 15 (noting that “[termination of the natural parent’s rights *262prior to adoption and allowance of stepparent adoption is for purposes of protecting the integrity and stability of the new family unit” (emphasis added)(quoting Adoption of J.D.S., 763 A.2d at 871)). This two-step process necessarily engenders potential for changed circumstances. Therefore, it follows that whether Stepmother ultimately adopts the child is relevant going forward; however, it is irrelevant for purposes of disposing of the instant appeal.
Moreover, given that courts have the power to enter termination orders regardless of whether a subsequent adoption actually occurs, it seems to me that the propriety of the order is not mooted simply because the stepparent expresses reservation about proceeding with the adoption. We have stated,
[C]ases presenting mootness problems involve litigants who clearly had standing to sue at the outset of the litigation. The problems arise from events occurring after the lawsuit has gotten under way — changes in the facts or in the law— which allegedly deprive the litigant of the necessary stake in the outcome. The mootness doctrine requires that “an actual controversy must be extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed.”
In re Gross, 476 Pa. 203, 382 A.2d 116, 119 (1978) (quoting Gerald Gunther, Constitutional Law 1578 (9th ed.1975)); see also In re Cain, 527 Pa. 260, 590 A.2d 291 (1991). In other words, a court must inquire whether “[a] determination ... of the legal issues tendered by the parties is no longer necessary to compel [a] result, and could not serve to prevent it.” DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 317, 94 S.Ct. 1704, 40 L.Ed.2d 164 (1974).
In the instant case, the result sought by Father was termination of Mother’s parental rights. Father obtained this result, the Superior Court affirmed, and Mother sought this Court’s review. The fact that Stepmother has indicated she may not proceed with the adoption changes nothing. Indeed, all that was necessary for termination of Mother’s parental rights was that Stepmother contemplated adoption throughout the termination proceedings. See B.E., 377 A.2d at 155 (stating that section 312, the predecessor to section 2512, “indi*263cates that a parent may bring a petition for termination of the parental rights of the other parent only when adoption is contemplated”). The record amply supports that this occurred. Accordingly, I fail to see how a determination of the legal issue presented is no longer necessary to compel or prevent the result sought, and obtained, by Father.
This Court should not act upon potentialities set forth in post-appeal “letters” from the parties. There are no jurisdictional impediments to our review of the entry of the decree forming the basis for this appeal, the certified record is not so encumbered, and we have a complete record upon which to conduct our requisite inquiry. A remand for the purpose embraced by the OAJC is unnecessary, fraught with uncertainties, and only serves to stall this appeal in its tracks. Stepmother’s musings regarding Father’s post-decree treatment of her, while lending credence to reversal of this case on the merits in light of their startling similarity to Father’s treatment of Mother, should not serve to postpone what clearly would be accomplished by reversal of the instant decree. Based upon the instant facts, a remand need not and should not occur as it only serves to delay this already protracted litigation.11

. The orphans’ court incorporated testimony from portions of the custody proceedings, on November 24, 2004, February 10, 2006, March 2, 2006, and July 11, 2007, into the instant record. N.T., 4/30/09, at 137, 224. The complete custody record, however, was not admitted in the termination proceedings, and the complete record has not been certified to us on appeal. As represented by the OAJC, I recite only "that which is in the record presently before us.” OAJC at 1102 n. 2.

. It appears the court directed the prohibition to the parties rather than Father individually because Mother had taken Child to the doctor in 2003, albeit upon Father’s demand and insistence that Child had a yeast infection, and Child underwent a pelvic examination at that time. N.T., 4/30/09, at 144.

. Mother testified that she previously had moved forty minutes away from the area, "and it didn't stop [Father].” She maintained that she "could have probably moved to Timbuktu.... It didn't matter where I lived if he had primary custody, I thought [the vaginal examinations] would stop.” N.T., 4/30/09, at 193.

. Both Mother and her seventeen-year-old son testified that Father carried a loaded handgun during the custody exchanges of L.J.B. and insisted on taking Child to Mother’s home, despite a court order mandating drop-off and pick-up in a public location. N.T., 3/2/06, at 38; N.T., 11/24/04, at 19. Father admitted carrying a "loaded .357 handgun on his front seat.” N.T., 4/30/09, at 46.

. The custody court’s hostility toward Mother and Grandmother is apparent in the record. B.J.B. v. S.M.B., No. 818-07; N.T., 7/11/07 ("Grandmother visitation”), at 9-11.

. Neither opinion below mentions Mother’s payment of support for Child, but there was some discussion about it at the termination hearing. Mother stated that she voluntarily attempted to pay Father outright, but ”[h]e wouldn't accept it. He laughed at me, and he wouldn't let me see her.” Id. at 184. Ultimately, child support for L.J.B. was deducted from Mother's wages. Id. at 183. While payment of support, alone, is not sufficient to establish that one is performing parental duties, it certainly is a factor to consider. See In re Burns, 474 Pa. 615, 379 A.2d 535 (1977).

. Since the lower courts erred in determining that Mother’s conduct, in light of the totality of the circumstances, satisfied 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a), it is not necessary to evaluate subsection (b). Charles E.D.M., supra.

. While B.D.S. proceeded under the prior Adoption Act of 1970 and predated our requirement of proof by clear and convincing evidence, *255instead utilizing a standard of preponderance of the evidence, see In re Adoption of J.J., 511 Pa. 590, 515 A.2d 883 (1986), this Court's analysis and admonition therein are undiluted by those variations and remain vital and relevant today. Moreover, the obstructive conduct displayed in B.D.S. pales in comparison to the pattern of behavior exhibited by Father herein.

. Contrary to the OAJC’s suggestion, I do not assail consideration of the post-decree letters. See OAJC at 1110 n. 12. It is the OAJC's reliance upon them to remand, in the absence of any formally-filed document, with which I take issue, in light of the completeness of the instant record to decide the issue before us.

. I do not suggest that termination of parental rights may be upheld in the absence of a ready stepparent. Rather, I submit that remanding for further fact-finding at this juncture simply is unnecessary, and it defeats our policy of advancing appeals involving children on a “fast track" basis. Even assuming that merits review would result in an affirmance of the termination decree, there is no impediment to Mother filing a petition with the trial court based upon changed circumstances and obtaining relief upon a proper showing that the prospective adoptive parents are no longer an intact family unit.

. It goes without saying that if reversal of the decree concludes the matter, there is neither need nor reason to criticize the orphans’ court or order its recusal sua sponte. Stepmother’s post-appeal wishes will be relevant only if a new petition is forthcoming. Moreover, there is no custody dispute before us presently. If and when such proceedings occur, the parties are free to assert any recusal requests they believe are compelled at that time.