Court Opinion

ID: 9897479
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:14:52.577587+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:24.047808
License: Public Domain

139 Nev., Advance Opinion OR-

                             IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

                      NO•UNE DAVITrAN-KOSTANTAN,                             No. 84086
                      Appellant,
                      vs.
                      VAROUJAN KOSTANIAN,
                                                                               FILED
                      Respondent.                                               AUG 3 1 2023
                                                                               ELI7
                                                                            OLEN
                                                                            BY_
                                                                               CIEFDEPUTY CLERK

                                 Appeal from a district court order denying a motion to modify
                      aliniony and to reinstate child support. Eighth Judicial District Court,
                      Family Division, Clark County; Vincent Ochoa, Judge.
                                 Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

                      .Pecos Law Group and Jack W. Fleeman and Bruce       Shapiro, Henderson.,
                      for Appellant.

                      Smith Jain Stutzman and .Radford J. Smith and Kimberly A. Stutzman,
                      :Henderson,
                      for 'Respondent.

                      BEFORE  T.HE    SUPREME            COURT,      HERNDON,          LEE,       and
                      PARRAGUIRRE, JJ.

                                                      OPINION

                      By the Court, HERNDON, J.:
                                 in this opinion ; we address the district court's jurisdiction to
                  determine and award child support to a handicapped child beyond the age
                  of majority.     Relying .on. NRS 125C.0045(1.)(a), the district court in the
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                      proceedings below found that it lacked jurisdiction t.o award. support for the
                      parties' adult handicapped child because he had reached the age of majority
                      and support payments for him had previously ceased. We conclude that,
                      while NR.S 1.25C.0045(1)(a) generally requires that modifications to child
                      support be made while the child is still a minor, NRS 12513.110 creates a
                      statutory     exception   for    adult   handicapped           children   in   certain

                      circumstances. Thus, we conclude that the district court erred in finding
                      that it did not have jurisdiction to rei.nstate support as to the child.
                                    We conclude, however, that the district court did not abuse its
                      discretion in denying a request to modify alimony. In this, we clarify that
                      while a 20-percent change in monthly income may constitute a change in
                      circumstances under NRS 12.5...1.50(8), it does not compel the district court
                      to make a modification. Rather, it merely permits the court to determine,
                      in. its discretion, whether modifying alimony i.s appropriate. Accordingly,
                      we affirm in. part., reverse in part, and Fe ma nd for further proceedings.
                                         FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
                      Underlying divorce and releuant portions of the divorce decree
                                    After more than 25 years of marriage, appellant Noune
                      .Davitian-Rostanian and respondent Varoujan K.ostanian entered into a
                      stipulated divorce decree in February 2012.           Pursuant to the decree,

                      Varoujan paid Noun.e alimony from November 1, 2011, through October 1,
                      2021.
                                    At the time of divorce;        the parties' youngest child, Alex
                      Nostanian, \vas still a minor. The decree provided that the parties would
                      share leg-al custody and required them to consult with an autism specialist
                      for "recommendations as related to autism treatment which may be
                      necessary."    The decree also stated that the district court would retain
                      jurisdiction over whether treatment should be implemented and on what
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                 was recommended for Alex until he "reaches the age of majority." As for
                 child support, Varoujan was ordered to pay Noune $1 010 per month for
                 Alex until he turned 18 or, if he was still attending high school at that time,
                 until he graduated high school. or turned 19.
                                Alex turned 18 in 2015, and child support payments ceased..
                 Pursuant to the divorce decree, Varoujan's obligation to pay alimony ended
                 on October 1., 2021.
                 Noune's motion to modify and the distric court's order
                                One clay before Varoujan's alimony payment obligation expired,
                 Noune filed the underlying motion requesting, among other things, to
                 modify the alimony payment schedule and              reinstate child support
                 payments.      After a hearing, the court issued an order denying Noune's
                 motion.      The court determined that it lacked jurisdiction over Noune's
                 request for child support because Alex had already reached the age of
                 majority. The court further found. that it lacked:jurisdiction to con.sider
                 Noune's request because she ciid not bring her motion. while Alex was still
                 receiving child support payments. The court also denied Noune's . request
                 for continued. alimony because it determined that there was not a change in
                 circumstan.ces warranting modification under NRS 125.150(8). This appeal
                 fol lowed.
                                                  DISCUSSION
                 The district court has jurisdiction to award adult child support after the age
                 of majority under NRS .125B.1.10
                                Noune argues that the district court errecl in determining that
                 t lacked jurisdiction to order child support beyond the age of majority.
                 Noun.e contends that the district court had jurisdiction under NRS
                 1.9513.11.0; as the statute authorizes continuing support for handicapped
                 adult children in some circurnsta.nces.
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                               `11he district court's interpretation and construction of a statute
                  presents a question of law that this court reviews de novo. Arguello u.
                  Sunset Station, Inc., 127 Nev. 365, 368, 252 13.3d 206, 208 (2011) (citing City
                  of Reno u. Reno Gazette-Journal, 119. Nev. 55, 58, 63 P.3d 1147, 1148
                  (2003)). "When interpreting a statute, we look first to its plain language."
                  Id. at 370, 252 P.3d at 209.         "If a statute's language is plain and
                  unambiguous, we enforce the statute as written, without resorting to the
                  rules of construction." Smith U. Ziluerberg, 1.37 Nev. 65, 72, 481 P.3d 1222,
                  1230 (2021) (citing Local Gou't Emp.-Mgmt. Relations Bd. u. &lux. SupPort
                  Emps. A.ss'n, :1.34 Nev. 71.6, 718, 429 P.3d 658, 661 (2018)).
                               Generally, a parent's court-ordered child support obligation
                  ends when the child reaches the age of majority. Edgington u. Edgington,
                  1.1.9 Nev. 577, 582, 80 13,3d 1.282, 1286 (2003); see also NRS 125C.0045(9)(b).
                  'However, the Nevada Legislature created an exception with NRS
                  12513.1.10(1):
                               A parent shall support beyond the age of majority
                               his or her child with a handicap until the child is no
                               longer handicapped or until the child becomes self-
                               supporting. The handicap of the child must have
                               occurred before the age of majority for this duty to
                               apply.
                               We conclude that the district court erred wh.en it foun.d it lacked
                  jurisdiction to make a post-majority child support order.          In rejecting
                  Noune's motion, the district court incorrectly determined that it could not
                  consider her request for support pursuant to NRS 1.25a 110(1) because NRS
                  125C.0045(1)(a) requires that any modifications to a child support order be
                  made while the child is still a minor. The district court also incorrectly
                  found that. "once a child reaches the age of majority and support payments
                  cease, a parent cannot then request support payments for a disabled adult
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                child." The plain language of NRS 1.25B.110 explicitly provid.es for child
                support "beyond the age of majority" in certain. circumstances.                   See

                EdgingIon, 11.9 Nev. at 582, 80 P.3d at 1286 (acknowledging that NRS
                1.25B 110 is a statutory exception to the general rule that child support
                obligations cease when th.e child reaches the age of majority). And. while
                the statute explains that the child's handicap "rnust have occurred before
                the age of majority," NRS 125B.110(1) does not place any limits on when
                the district court may order a parent to provide such. support. By enacting
                NRS 1.2513.11.0, the Legislature furthered Nevada's pol.icies "Rio encourage
                parents to share the rights and responsibi.lities of child rearing," NRS
                125(1001(2), and "improve the circumstances of disabled citizens" so that
                an individual's worth is not tied to their physical or mental handicap.
                Edgim.von, 11.9 Nev. at. 586, 80 P.3d at 1289 (quoting McKay u. Bergstedt,
                106 Nev. 808, 825, 801 .P.2d 617, 628 (1990)). When the district court read
                NRS 12513.11.0 as constrained by NRS 1.25C.0045(1)(a), it ignored the plain
                language of the statute and undermined the legislative intent and the
                policies underlying NES 1.251'3.110.
                             The district court also found that because over five years had
                passed since Alex last received child support pay.ments, the court could no
                longer award. child support. However, the time gap itself does not serve as
                a bar; rather, it is simply a factor for the district court to consider, as
                impairments can change over time. See NRS 125B.110(1) (acknowledging
                that a chi.ld can become self-supporting despite being diagnosed with a
                handicap).   The plain language of NRS 125B.110 does not require the
                movant to immediately seek continuing child support when the child
                reaches the age of the majority, nor does it impose a time limit for a parent
                or dependent adult child to seek a support order.                   indeed, courts in

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                               jurisdictions with analogous laws have made similar observations. See, e.g.,
                               Hastings u. Hastings, 841 So. 2d 484, 486 (Fl.a. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)
                               ()roviding that a dependent adult child h.as standing to seek support from
                               his parents "at any time [because] the parents remain responsible for
                               support throughout the depend.ency, and throughout their lives"); Stern v.
                               Stern., 473 A.2d 56, 62-63 (Md. Ct. Spec. A.pp. 1984) (rejecting the contention.
                               that an emancipated child could not become dependent again due to a
                               mental or physical infirmity). Thus, we conclude that the district court
                               erred in finding that it lacked jurisdiction to order adult child support for
                               Alex. l
                                         The district court failed to Inake the necessary itndiii,gs under NRS
                                         125B.110
                                              "Th.is court reviews the distri.ct court's decisions regarding child
                               support for an abuse of discretion." Rivero v. Rivero, 125 Nev. 410, 438, 216
                               .P.3d 21;3, 232 (2009), overruled on other grounds by Romano v. Romano, 138
                               Nev. 1, 501 P.3d 980 (2022).         "An abuse of discretion occurs when no
                               reasonable judge could. reach a similar conclusion under the same
                               circumstances." Leavitt u. Siems, 130 Nev. 503, 509, 330 P.3d 1, 5 (2014).

                                      1This result is also consistent with cases from oth.er jurisdictions. See,
                               e.g., Miller u. Ark. Office of Child Support Enf't, 458 S.W.3d 733, 738-39
                               (Ark. Ct. App. 2015) (holding that child support did not automatically
                               terminate for a disabled adult child even though three years had pa.ssed
                               since he reached the age of majority); Koltay v. Koltay, 667 P.2d 1374, 1377
                               (Colo. 1983) (compiling cases and 'holding that the district court has
                               "continuing jurisdiction to order post-minority support for a disabled child"
                               even after the original support obligation ended); cf. Fernandez v.
                               Fernandez, 306 So. 3d 101.3, 1016-1.7 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2020) (concluding
                               that the court has jurisdiction to consider an adult child's request for
                               support made after the parent's support obligation pu.rsuant to the divorce
                               decree concluded).
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                            When evaluating a request for adult child support, NRS
                1.25B.11.0 requires the district court to make several findings. First, the
                d.istrict court must find whether th.e adult child is handicapped from an
                impairment that occurred as a child. See NRS 125B.110(1) ("The handi.cap
                of the child must have occurred before the age of majority."); Edgington, 119
                Nev. at 586, 80 P.3d at 1289 (defining an "impairment" as "any physical or
                mental...limitation that can be determined by medically accepted
                diagnostic techniques"). Then, the 'district court must find whether the
                child is unable to be financially self-supporting. 2   Edgington, 119 Nev. at
                585-86, 80 P.3d at 1288-89. Finally, the district court must find whether
                there is a causal relationship between the child's impairment and the child.
                being incapable of engaging in substantial gainful activity. id. at 585-87,
                80 P.3d at 1288-89 (defining "substantial gainful activity" as "work activity
                that results i.n the child being financially self-supporting"); see also NRS
                12513.11.0(4) (explainin.g that a "handicap" for purposes of the statute
                requires that the adult child be unable "to engage i.n any substantial gainful
                activity by reason or their impairment (emphasis added)).
                            Since the district court here determined that it tacked
                jurisdiction. to consider any request for adult child support, it did not mak.e
                the requisite findings as to whether Alex is entitled to continuing support
                pursuant to NRS 1.2513.110.     Without such factual findings, this court's
                ability to conduct "meaningful appellate review, even a deferential one, is
                hampered because we are left to mere speculation." Jitnan v. Oliver, 127

                      20ther sources of income, such as public assistance, may make the
                child self-supporting. NRS 125B.110(2).
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                 Nev. 424, 433, 254 .P.3d 623, 629 (2011); see also Ryan's Express Transp.
                 S;erus.,      U. .Amador Stage Lins, Inc., 1.28 Nev. 289, 299, 279 P.3d 166,

                 172 (20.12) CAn appellate court is not particularly well-suited to make
                 factual determinations in the first instance."). Accordingly, on remand the
                 district court must consider Noune-s motion and make appropriate factual
                 findings.
                 Noune did not demonstrate that there was a change in circtrinstances to
                 warrant modifying the parties' alimony agreement
                               Noune argues that, when considering her alimony request
                 pursuant to NRS 125.150, the district court in-iproperly considered only
                 whether VaToujan's income had changed by 20 percent or more and did not
                 cmisicler whether her obligation to care for Alex, coupled with the realities
                 of hey losing alimony payments, constituted a change in circumstances
                 warranting modification.. Varoujan argues that Noune did not address any
                 factors set forth in NRS '125.150 to warrant extending alimony and that her
                 request was deficient on its face.
                               "This court reviews district court decisions concerning divorce
                 proceedings," such as spousal support, "for an abuse of discretion."
                             u. willia.ms, 1.20 Nev. 559, 566, 97 P.3d 1124, 1.129 (2004); Gilman
                 u. Gíb..     1.14 Nev. 416, 422, 956 P.2d 761., 764 (1998) (reviewing a district
                 court ruling on a motion to modify alimony for an abuse of' discretion).
                 Furthermore. this court will not disturb the district court's rulings if they
                 are supported by substantial evidence, which is "that which a sensible
                 person may accept as adequate to sustain a judgment." Williams, 120 Nev.
                 at 566, 97 P.3d at 1129.

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                             NRS 1.25.150(8) provides that unaccrued alimony payments
                "may be modified upon. a showing of changed. circumstances." (Emphasis
                added.) The statute further directs the court to analyze any factors "the
                court considers relevant," including changes to "the income of the spouse
                who is ordered to pay alimony," specifying that "a change of 20 percent or
                more .in the gross monthly income of [the paying spouse] shall be deemed to
                constitute changed circumstances requiring a review for modification of the
                payments of alimony." NRS 125.150(8), (12) (enlphasis added); see also
                Siragusa v. Siragusa, 108 Nev..987, 994-96, 843 P.2d 807., 812-13 (1992)
                (conchiding that a      paying spouse's discharged property settlement
                obligation, which affected the finances of both spouses, was a "changed
                circumstance" for purposes of modifying alimony).
                             We conclude that the district court d.id not abuse its discretion.
                in denying Noune's motion to rnodify alimony. Noune s only arguments for
                a change of circumstances are that Varoujan's income has :increased
                significantly an.d that she now needs to care for Alex as a disabled adult
                child without receiving child support from Varoujan. Yet, the record shows
                that Noune failed to provide adequate evidentiary support for her claims.3
                Even. assuming that Noune demonstrated a change in circumstances, the
                plain language of the statute only requires the district court to review" an

                      3The  record also shows that Noune did not demonstrate that there
                was "mistake, fraud, collusion, accident, or some other ground of like
                nature," to warrant changing the parties' stipulated alimony award. See
                Citicorp Servs., Inc. v. Lee, 99 Nev. 511, 513, 665 P.M 265, 266 (1983) ("A
                stipulation may 'be set aside upon a showing that it was entered into
                through mistake, frau.d, collusion, acci.dent or some ground of like nature.").
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                existing alimony payment schedule upon such a showing.                 See NRS

                125.150(12); Zi.luerberg, 137 Nev. at 72, 481 P.3d at 1.230 (providing that
                this court will generally enforce a statute's plain language). Indeed, the
                statute ultimately commits the matter to the district court's discretion.,
                providing that the court "may" modify spousal support upon a s.howing of
                changed circumstances. NRS 125.150(8).
                               The record supports the court's finding that Noune failed to
                show a change in circumstances warranting modification. Moreover, the
                record otherwise demonstrates that the court properly considered multiple
                .factors in making its decision. Thus, we conclude that the court did not
                abuse its discretion in denying Noune's request to modify spousal support.
                                                CONCL LISTON
                               Nevada's handicapped child support statute, NRS 125B.1.10,
                creates    a   statutory   exception   to   the    general   rule   under   NRS

                1.25C.0045(1)(a)'s requirement that modification to child support orders
                may be made only while the child is still a minor. t.Phus, WO conclude that
                the district court erred in determining that it lacked jurisdiction to consider
                Noune's request for adult child support.          Moreover, while a change in
                monthly income may constitute a change in circumstances under NRS
                125.150(8) that authorizes the district court to review a request to modify
                alimony, it does not require modification.         Here, we conclude that the
                district court acted within. its discretion in denying' the request to modify
                alimony.

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                                    Accord.ingly, we reverse and remand the district court's order
                    denying adult child support and. affirm its denial of the request to .modify
                    alimony.

                                                                                         J.
                                                             Herndon

                    We concur:

                    :Lee

                                                         J
                    flarragui.rre

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