Court Opinion

ID: 9594006
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:26:13.215341+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:05:20.716078
License: Public Domain

THOMAS, Justice,
dissenting, with whom BROWN, Justice, Retired, joins.
I disagree with the reversal of this conviction, and I join in the perceptive dissenting opinion of Justice Brown, Retired. I would embellish that dissenting opinion, briefly, in this way.
*1154It also has become a favorite technique of defense in a criminal case to place the law enforcement officials on trial. Even though the majority conceded that this proffered testimony was not admissible, pursuant to Rule 608(b), W.R.E., its conclusion is that the testimony had independent relevance. If that view is correct, it should not be necessary to take the testimony out of context in order to justify it. Yet, several times, the majority opinion uses only a part of the same answer in order to justify its argument and, contrary to authority which is quoted, it then uses a response on cross-examination in a further effort to establish the validity of the majority position.
At page 5 of the slip opinion, the majority quotes extensively from 3 Louisell & Mueller, Federal Evidence § 307 at 126-128 (1988 Supp.). In that quotation, is this critical language:
“ * * * Incidentally, the effect of this restriction is to foreclose extrinsic evidence of misconduct which might have the effect of contradicting a denial by the witness elicited on cross-examination, and in this narrow sense Rule 608(b) does indeed affect the quite separate mechanism of impeachment by contradiction.”
In context, the answer which the majority relies upon to justify the independent relevance of the proffered testimony is simply a definitional explanation of two words.
“Q. You say — you stated simulated use; what do you mean by that?
“A. I give the suspects the appearance that I would be using the drugs, but I don’t use the drugs.”
Contrary to the abstraction quoted by the majority opinion, this hardly is a pure statement that the witness does not use drugs. I submit that the first purpose suggested in the majority opinion for admitting this evidence is not justified by the authority relied upon by the majority. As to the second purpose, I think it is a leap in logic to claim that a demonstration by independent testimony that the agent used drugs on prior occasions shows that he used them on the date in question, but the contention that this testimony would show that “his perception was impaired at the time of the transaction,” ante, at 5, truly is a non-se-quitur. In my judgment, the attempts at rationalization found in the majority opinion would be true only if the party on trial was the law officer rather than Gist. Since that is not a correct interpretation of the situation, the relevance is lost.
I support the exercise of the trial court’s discretion in excluding this evidence pursuant to Rule 403, W.R.E. Its only purpose was to confuse the issues and mislead the jury. Furthermore, I do not believe that any panel of jurors could be so gullible as to accept as credible the testimony of Gist’s friends in this case. Consequently, the exclusion of the evidence simply did not make any difference.
When each of these defense witnesses testifies, proper impeachment relative to their misconduct and motive of revenge against the officer whose efforts culminated in their respective convictions will be necessary. The result then of the majority approach will be a swearing match in which the real issue will be lost in the introduction of a confusing and misleading mess of information unrelated to Gist’s crime. I would affirm.