Court Opinion

ID: 9375860
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-01 07:07:24.769632+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:02.457147
License: Public Domain

AFFIRMED and Opinion Filed February 27, 2023

                                            S   In The
                                  Court of Appeals
                           Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                       No. 05-21-00970-CV

         TONYA WARREN, EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF IRENE C.
                        WARREN, Appellant
                              V.
                   STATE FARM LLOYDS, Appellee

                     On Appeal from the 68th Judicial District Court
                                 Dallas County, Texas
                          Trial Court Cause No. DC-18-17052

                              MEMORANDUM OPINION
                  Before Justices Partida-Kipness, Nowell, and Rosenberg1
                                 Opinion by Justice Nowell
          This appeal involves an insurance dispute between appellant Tonya Warren,

Executor of the Estate of Irene C. Warren2 and appellee State Farm Lloyds. In her

first two issues, Warren challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence

to support the jury’s findings that State Farm did not breach her insurance contract

and did not violate the Texas Prompt Payment of Claims Act (TPPCA). In a third

    1
        The Hon. Barbara Rosenberg, Justice, Assigned
    2
      Irene Warren was alive at the time the water damage subject to this appeal occurred; however, she
died during the claims process. Unless otherwise indicated, references to “Warren” refer to Tonya Warren.
issue, Warren argues State Farm made incurable, prejudicial jury arguments

requiring reversal of the judgment. We affirm.

                                    Background

      Warren moved back into her childhood home owned by her mother, Irene,

after Irene began suffering from dementia. In January of 2018, Warren noticed a

wet spot and a smell in the dining room near the microwave stand. She called

Discount Drain to find the source of the leak.

      On January 22, 2018, Anthony Burleson, the owner and a plumber with

Discount Drain, inspected and performed moisture level tests on the home. The

moisture meter indicated dwelling damage, and based on his hydrostatic testing of

the sewer line, he told Warren the pipes should be replaced. He believed the

moisture in the dining room originated from a “belly” in the sewer line in a

bathroom. Although Burleson took numerous pictures of the pipes, he did not take

a picture of the “belly,” but instead merely noted it on a sketch he made of the home.

      Despite the distance from the bathroom to the dining room, Burleson believed

a water leak from the toilet surfaced in the corner of the dining room “because it

could surface up anywhere, anywhere in the house.” It did not necessarily have to

surface in the bathtub or shower closest to the leak. However, Warren was unaware

of any past problems with the toilet or bathtub area where Burleson allegedly located

the leak.

                                         –2–
        During Burleson’s inspection, he also determined the garbage disposal needed

to be replaced. Warren paid for the replacement. Burleson pulled up carpet in the

living and dining rooms, which Warren replaced at her own expense. Burleson also

concluded he needed to dig under her home to replace the damaged pipes.

        Warren contacted State Farm, and Mark Ogle received her claim on January

23, 2018. He immediately called Warren and told her to wait until State Farm

completed its investigation before allowing Discount Drain to continue working. He

also called Burleson and told him to stop any further work.

         Ogle inspected the home on February 7, 2018. He observed that a small

section of carpet had been removed near the exterior wall in the dining room, and

the bottom of the cabinet under the kitchen sink had deteriorated from moisture. He

later learned Discount Restoration removed the carpet and placed drying equipment

in the kitchen and dining room to dry those areas.3

        Ogle believed water traveled along the exterior wall under the cabinet into the

corner of the dining room. He noticed the new garbage disposal, which indicated to

him that the source of the water involved the sink. Warren confirmed the sink had

leaked, and Burleson replaced the garbage disposal.

        Ogle also observed the toilet, which Burleson alleged he removed to perform

the hydrostatic test, was grouted to the bathroom floor. The toilet also had a crack,

    3
      Despite the similarities in name, the record does not indicate Discount Drain and Discount Restoration
are related.
                                                   –3–
and Ogle was concerned pulling the toilet out would cause further damage to it and

the grout. He did not notice any damage to the floor, baseboard, wall, or any other

part of the bathroom. Based on Ogle’s inspection, he did not believe Burleson

performed a hydrostatic test by removing the toilet and running a camera down the

pipe.

        Ultimately, Ogle did not find any evidence of water damage caused by a leak

in a sewer line. He disagreed with Burleson’s conclusion that a broken pipe under

the home caused the water damage because the water would have to travel “against

gravity through three feet of soil through the slab foundation” to cause the water

damage in the kitchen and dining room.

        State Farm sent a letter to Warren on February 8, 2018 with a billing estimate

and payment for the carpet and damage to the cabinet; however, State Farm

explained repair to the plumbing system itself was not covered under the policy (“the

accidental direct physical loss to the building is what was covered, which is damage

to the cabinets, the carpeting, so forth”). State Farm also paid for Discount Drain’s

hydrostatic test and the camera inspection. Despite Warren’s belief to the contrary,

State Farm’s policy did not provide coverage for tunneling under her home, only

coverage to tear into that particular part of the home to access the leak.

        State Farm subsequently hired Flow Plumbing to conduct independent testing

of the sewer line. When plumbers arrived on February 9, 2018, Discount Drain was

present and tunneling under the home. State Farm contacted Warren that day and

                                         –4–
advised her Discount Drain needed to stop work so that Flow Plumbing could

proceed with its plumbing testing. State Farm advised Warren that State Farm’s

inability to confirm whether or not there were leaks present under the home prior to

repairs being made would impact coverage. Warren indicated she would stop

Discount Drain from working and allow Flow Plumbing to move forward with

testing. However, when Flow Plumbing returned on February 12, 2018, they

discovered Discount Drain had cut and removed sewer lines. Discount Drain’s

actions prevented Flow Plumbing from completing their tests.

      On February 22, 2018, Ogle sent Warren a status letter regarding the claim.

In the letter, Ogle noted he reviewed the policy with Warren on January 23 and

February 7, 2018. He explained what he discovered in his February 7 inspection.

He stated his attempts to discuss the findings and necessity of the restoration process

conducted by Discount Restoration on January 22, 2018 were unsuccessful. The

letter also detailed Flow Plumbing’s thwarted attempts to test the sewer pipes.

      State Farm sent another letter on February 28, 2018 stating it received the

water mitigation invoice from Discount Restoration, but the invoice did not reflect

an accurate scope of completed work based on Ogle’s inspection; therefore, he

completed an estimate reflecting the mitigation efforts based on his February 7, 2018

inspection. He enclosed a copy for Warren’s review and a $913.20 payment. This

amount represented the replacement cost value estimate ($10,552.31) minus certain

depreciations, her deductible, and a prior claim payment of $2,968.02. Tonya

                                         –5–
testified she only received the $913.20 payment from State Farm. Ogle testified he

never talked to Warren about the estimate and payment, and she never questioned it

prior to filing this lawsuit alleging State Farm unfairly underpaid her insurance

claim.

         The jury entered a take-nothing judgment in favor of State Farm. This appeal

followed.

                              Sufficiency of the Evidence

         In her first issue, Warren argues the evidence is legally and factually

insufficient to support the jury’s finding that State Farm did not breach the insurance

contract. In her second issue, Warren alleges the evidence is legally and factually

insufficient to support the jury’s finding that State Farm did not violate the TPPCA.

State Farm responds the evidence, viewed under the applicable standards of review,

is sufficient to support the jury’s take-nothing judgment in its favor.

         A. Preservation of Error

         When a party fails to preserve error in the trial court or waives an argument

on appeal, an appellate court may not consider the unpreserved or waived issue. See

Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Lenk, 361 S.W.3d 602, 605 (Tex. 2012). Thus, we must

first determine whether Warren properly preserved her sufficiency arguments

despite neither party discussing error preservation.

         To preserve a legal sufficiency challenge for appeal following a jury trial, an

appellant must: (1) move for an instructed verdict; (2) move for judgment

                                           –6–
notwithstanding the verdict; (3) object to the submission of a jury question; (4) move

to disregard the jury finding; or (5) move for a new trial. Cecil v. Smith, 804 S.W.2d

509, 510–11 (Tex. 1991); Hollingsworth v. Parklane Corp., No. 05-19-01576-CV,

2021 WL 1290735, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 7, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.). To

preserve a factual sufficiency challenge from a jury trial, a party must raise it in a

motion for new trial. TEX. R. CIV. P. 324(b)(2); Hollingsworth, 2021 WL 1290735,

at *3.

         Warren filed a motion for directed verdict and a motion for judgment

notwithstanding the verdict challenging the jury’s rejection of her breach of contract

and TPPCA claims. She also challenged these findings in a motion for new trial

“because the evidence proves conclusively, as a matter of law” she was entitled to

certain damages. Warren did not challenge the factual sufficiency of the evidence

in her motion for new trial as required under rule 324(b)(2); therefore, we may not

consider her argument. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 324(b)(2); see also Lenk, 361 S.W.3d at

605. Accordingly, our review is limited to legal sufficiency of the evidence.

         B. Standard of Review

         When a party attacks the legal sufficiency of an adverse finding on an issue

on which she had the burden of proof, she must demonstrate on appeal the evidence

establishes, as a matter of law, all vital facts in support of the issue. Dow Chem. Co.

v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 241 (Tex. 2001) (per curiam). When reviewing a “matter

of law” challenge, we must first examine the record for evidence that supports the

                                         –7–
finding, while ignoring all evidence to the contrary. Id. Anything more than a

scintilla of evidence is legally sufficient to support the finding. Formosa Plastics

Corp. USA v. Presidio Eng’rs & Contractors, Inc., 960 S.W.2d 41, 48 (Tex. 1998).

If there is no evidence supporting the finding, we then examine the entire record to

determine if the contrary position is established as a matter of law. Dow Chem. Co.,

46 S.W.3d at 241. The point of error is sustained only if the contrary proposition is

conclusively established. Id.

      We remain mindful that the trier of fact is the sole judge of witness credibility

and the weight to be given their testimony. Oncor Elec. Delivery Co. LLC v.

Quintanilla, No. 05-19-01331-CV, 2022 WL 9809712, at *3–4 (Tex. App.—Dallas

Oct. 17, 2022, pet. filed) (mem. op.). The trier of fact may choose to believe one

witness and disbelieve another, and we must not impose our opinion to the contrary,

as long as the trier of fact’s resolution “falls within this zone of reasonable

disagreement.” City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 822 (Tex. 2005).

             1. Breach of Contract

      To establish a breach of contract, a plaintiff must prove (1) the existence of a

valid contract, (2) the plaintiff’s performance or tender of performance, (3) the

defendant’s breach of contract, and (4) the plaintiff’s damages as a result of the

breach. See Old Am. Ins. Co. v. Lincoln Factoring, LLC, 571 S.W.3d 271, 282 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth 2018, no pet.). An insurance policy is a contract. Id. Thus, in

the context of an insurance policy, a plaintiff must prove the existence of a valid

                                         –8–
insurance policy covering the denied claim and entitlement to money damages on

that claim. Davis v. Nat’l Lloyds Ins. Co., 484 S.W.3d 459, 468 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, pet. denied).

      The existence of a valid insurance policy was undisputed; however, Warren

argues State Farm breached the policy’s five-day loss payment provision by failing

to pay at least $2,968.02 in actual cash benefits by March 1, 2018. State Farm

responds the documentary evidence, along with Burleson’s inconsistent testimony,

which the jury could have found not credible, was legally sufficient to support the

jury’s finding that State Farm did not breach the contract.

      Ogle testified he inspected the home and determined a leak from the garbage

disposal caused water damage to the kitchen cabinet and some surrounding carpet.

This damage was covered under the policy. However, Ogle explained there was no

coverage for tunneling to access pipe leaks under a slab. In his February 22, 2018

letter, Ogle stated, “There is no coverage for the plumbing repairs Discount Drain is

billing you for since we were unable to confirm the existence of any leaks under the

home prior to the repairs being done.” Ogle testified he advised Warren and

Discount Drain not to proceed with any repairs until State Farm completed its

independent inspection. Despite the warning, Warren conceded Discount Drain

continued working. That work, which included pulling out and removing pipes,

prevented Flow Plumbing from conducting its tests.

                                          –9–
      The “Loss Payment” clause in the policy stated, in relevant part, “If we notify

you that we will pay your claim, or part of your claim, we must pay within 5 business

days after we notify you.” After State Farm’s inspection on February 7, 2018, Ogle

determined the “Summary for Coverage A” replacement cost value for the water

damage was $10,552.31. After depreciation, applying Warren’s deductible, and

“less prior claim payment” of $2,968.02, the net actual cash value payment totaled

$913.20. It is undisputed Warren received $913.20. Although Warren testified she

never received any other payment from State Farm, the documentary evidence

indicates State Farm paid $2,968.02 toward the claim some time before February 28,

2018. Moreover, Ogle testified State Farm reimbursed Warren for that amount.

      After examining the record for evidence supporting the jury’s finding, while

ignoring evidence to the contrary, we conclude more than a scintilla of evidence

exists to support the jury’s finding that State Farm did not breach Warren’s insurance

contract. See Dow Chem. Co., 46 S.W.3d at 241; Formosa Plastics Corp. USA, 960

S.W.2d at 48. We overrule Warren’s first issue.

             2. Violations of the TPPCA

      In her second issue, Warren argues the evidence is legally insufficient to

support the jury’s finding that State Farm did not violate the TPPCA (section 542 of

the Texas Insurance Code). Specifically, she contends State Farm received all items,

statements, and forms required to secure final proof of loss by February 8, 2018, but

                                        –10–
failed to timely pay $913.20 by the required statutory deadline of February 26, 2018,

and State Farm failed to pay $2,968.02.

      The TPPCA establishes a number of deadlines for insurance companies to

process claims and penalizes its failure to meet the deadlines by assessing interest

on the claim at the rate of eighteen percent per annum and ordering payment of the

insured’s attorney’s fees. See Crayton v. Homeowners of Am. Ins. Co., No. 02-20-

00037-CV, 2020 WL 7639582, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec. 23, 2020, no

pet.) (mem. op.) (citing TEX. INS. CODE ANN. §§ 542.051–.061). To successfully

maintain a TPPCA claim, a party must establish (1) a claim under an insurance

policy; (2) the insurer’s liability for the claim; and (3) the insurer’s failure to follow

one or more sections of the insurance code with respect to the claim. See Allstate

Ins. Co. v. Bonner, 51 S.W.3d 289, 291 (Tex. 2001).

      Warren first asserts State Farm violated section 542.055(a)(3), which provides

that “not later than the 15th day . . . after the date an insurer receives notice of a

claim, the insurer shall request from the claimant all items, statements, and forms

that the insurer reasonably believes, at the time, will be required from the claimant.”

TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 542.055(a)(3). Warren reported the plumbing leak on

January 18, 2018; therefore, the deadline for State Farm to request information it

reasonably believed would be required from her was February 2, 2018. She alleges

State Farm did not request anything from her until Ogle’s inspection on February 7,

2018; therefore, State Farm violated section 542.055(a)(3). We disagree.

                                          –11–
      Ogle testified State Farm received the claim on January 18, 2018 and received

information from Discount Drain on January 22, 2019. The information included a

diagnostic report, an estimate to dig an eighteen-foot tunnel for approximately

$9,500, and a diagram showing where Discount Drain believed repairs were needed.

Ogle did not testify he was missing any information he reasonably believed he

needed at that time from Warren to proceed with her claim, and Warren has not

indicated otherwise. After examining the record for evidence supporting the jury’s

finding, while ignoring evidence to the contrary, we conclude more than a scintilla

of evidence exists to support the jury’s finding State Farm did not violate section

542.055(a) of the insurance code. See Dow Chem. Co., 46 S.W.3d at 241; Formosa

Plastics Corp. USA, 960 S.W.2d at 48.

      Warren next contends State Farm violated section 542.056 by waiting until

February 28, 2018 to pay $913.20 because the statutory deadline was February 26,

2018. We reject Warren’s argument for two reasons.

      First, section 542.056 provides “an insurer shall notify a claimant in writing

of the acceptance or rejection of a claim not later than the 15th business day after the

date the insurer receives all items, statements, and forms by the insurer to secure

final proof of loss.” TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 542.056(a) (emphasis added). Warren’s

calculation of the February 26, 2018 deadline appears to be premised on State Farm

receiving all necessary information by February 8, 2018 and then counting forward

fifteen days, excluding Sundays. However, the insurance code defines “business

                                         –12–
day” as “a day other than Saturday, Sunday, or holiday recognized by this state.” Id.

§542.051(1). Assuming State Farm received all information by February 8, 2018,

and excluding Saturdays, Sundays, President’s Day (February 19, 2018) and Texas

Independence Day (March 2, 2018), State Farm’s deadline to secure final proof of

loss and pay $913.20 was March 5, 2018. State Farm sent a letter and enclosed

payment for $913.20 on February 28, 2018.

      Second, the record indicates State Farm had not received all necessary

information by February 8, 2018.       Ogle learned during his February 7, 2018

inspection that Discount Restoration had already removed a portion of the carpet and

pad in the dining room. His attempts to discuss the findings and necessity of the

work done by Discount Restoration were not successful at that time. Ogle also

explained he arranged for Flow Plumbing to conduct its testing on February 9 and

February 12 but on both occasions, the company was unable to perform testing

because of Discount Drain. This is more than a scintilla of evidence supporting a

finding that State Farm did not have all the required information to secure final proof

of loss until February 12, 2018, thereby making State Farm’s deadline March 7,

2018. Warren received payment on February 28, 2018. After examining the record

for evidence supporting the jury’s finding, while ignoring evidence to the contrary,

we conclude more than a scintilla of evidence exists to support the jury’s finding

State Farm did not violate insurance code section 542.056. See Dow Chem. Co., 46

S.W.3d at 241; Formosa Plastics Corp. USA, 960 S.W.2d at 48.

                                        –13–
      Finally, Warren argues State Farm violated section 542.057 because it never

paid $2,968.02. Section 542.057 states, in relevant part, “if an insurer notifies a

claimant under section 542.056 that the insurer will pay a claim or part of a claim,

the insurer shall pay the claim not later than the fifth business day after the date

notice is made.” TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 542.057(a). Ogle testified State Farm

reimbursed Warren for $2,968.02, and the February 28, 2018 letter also references

this payment in the “Summary for Coverage A” as “Less Prior Claim Payment.”

Although Warren testified she never received this payment, the statute does not

require the insured receive payment. The statute requires the insurer pay the claim.

See id. (stating insurer “shall pay claim”). The jury was entitled to resolve conflicts

in the testimony based on its evaluation of the witnesses’ credibility. The record

contains more than a scintilla of evidence to support a finding that State Farm paid

$2,968.02, and therefore, did not violate insurance code section 542.057(a).

      Having considered and rejected each of Warren’s TPPCA challenges, we

overrule her second issue.

                                  Jury Argument

      In Warren’s third issue, she argues State Farm’s counsel made incurable,

prejudicial jury arguments. State Farm responds Warren failed to preserve her issue

for review; however, even if she preserved the issue, there is no evidence the jury

based its verdict on an improper argument.

                                        –14–
        Appellate complaints of improper jury argument must ordinarily be preserved

by a timely objection and request for an instruction to disregard the improper remark.

See Phillips v. Bramlett, 288 S.W.3d 876, 883 (Tex. 2009); see also TEX. R. APP. P.

33.1.    However, an incurable jury argument complaint may be asserted and

preserved in a motion for new trial, even without a complaint and ruling during the

trial. Phillips, 288 S.W.3d at 883; DeWolf v. Kohler, 452 S.W.3d 373, 396–97 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist. 2014, no pet.) (concluding improper jury arguments not

preserved when party failed to ask for an instruction to disregard and failed to

include them in motion for new trial); TEX. R. CIV. P. 324(b)(5).

        Warren cites five separate instances of incurable, prejudicial jury arguments

during State Farm’s closing argument. She did not object to four of these statements,

and the trial court did not rule on the one objection she made to a fifth statement.

See TEX. R. CIV. P. 33.1. Therefore, for this Court to consider her arguments on

appeal, Warren must have raised them in her motion for new trial. TEX. R. CIV. P.

324(b)(5); Phillips, 288 S.W.3d at 883. In addition, her complaint raised on appeal

must comport with the objection made to the trial court in her motion for new trial.

Bonds v. Mayes, No. 05-01-01593-CV, 2002 WL 1981375, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas

Aug. 29, 2002, no pet.).

        Warren broadly referenced two “incurable” arguments in her motion for new

trial. These included statements in which State Farm’s counsel intimated that “you”

(meaning the jury) should not have to pay “for what Burleson of Discount Drain did

                                        –15–
to Ms. Warren.” Warren raised these “incurable” statements in her appellant’s brief,

but argued they show State Farm “intentionally invok[ed] bias based on Anthony

Burleson of Discount Drain’s race or ethnicity.” She further argued in her brief the

“discriminatory improper” jury argument “strikes at the heart of the adversarial

process or appeals to deep-seated and universally execrated prejudice” because

Burleson is a black plumber working in underserved communities. Warren did not

argue in her motion for new trial that State Farm made incurable arguments based

on Burleson’s race. Thus, her argument raised on appeal does not comport with her

argument to the trial court. Because Warren’s complaint does not comport with

those raised in her motion for new trial, it is waived. Bond, 2002 WL 1981375, at

*2.

      Even assuming Warren preserved her issue, the record is devoid of any

reference to race other than Burleson testifying he learned the plumbing trade from

his father, the first Black master plumber in Texas. State Farm neither mentioned

race during its closing argument nor implied Burleson’s race played any role in its

handling of Warren’s insurance claim.

      To the extent State Farm’s counsel indicated the jury should not have to pay

for Burleson’s actions, the statement was curable, meaning it was not “so

inflammatory and prejudicial that its harmfulness could not be eliminated by

instructing the jury to disregard it.” Hopkins v. Phillips, No. 05-18-01143-CV, 2019

                                        –16–
WL 5558585, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Oct. 29, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.). We

overrule Warren’s third issue.

                                   Conclusion

      The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

                                          /Erin A. Nowell/
                                          ERIN A. NOWELL
                                          JUSTICE

210970F.P05

                                       –17–
                                    S
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                   JUDGMENT

TONYA WARREN, EXECUTOR                         On Appeal from the 68th Judicial
OF THE ESTATE OF IRENE C.                      District Court, Dallas County, Texas
WARREN, Appellant                              Trial Court Cause No. DC-18-17052.
                                               Opinion delivered by Justice Nowell.
No. 05-21-00970-CV           V.                Justices Partida-Kipness and
                                               Rosenberg participating.
STATE FARM LLOYDS, Appellee

       In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial
court is AFFIRMED.

       It is ORDERED that appellee STATE FARM LLOYDS recover its costs of
this appeal from appellant TONYA WARREN, EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE
OF IRENE C. WARREN.

Judgment entered this 27th day of February 2023.

                                        –18–