Court Opinion

ID: 9711923
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:42:05.784803+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:08.384762
License: Public Domain

CLIFFORD, Justice,
dissenting.
Because in my judgment the Court in its construction of the divorce judgment reaches a result not intended by the divorce court, I respectfully dissent.
The Court construes Mary’s share as being limited to one-half of the actual value of the pension as of the date of the divorce. George, however, was not required to pay that value to Mary at the time of the divorce, a requirement that would be more consistent with the Court’s construction of paragraph (g). Paragraph (g) grants Mary *211a share of the pension benefits but provides that payment of those benefits be deferred until after George’s actual retirement. Moreover, there is no lump sum provision for paying Mary’s share. Rather, she is to receive half of what George “shall be entitled to.” (Emphasis added.) George did not retire until 1986, seven years after the divorce. The retirement benefits available to George include upward adjustments from the 1979 value due to interest and investments as well as higher salaries subsequent to 1979. Rather than evidencing any intent to deprive Mary of the benefit of those increases in the value of the property awarded to her in 1979, the language of paragraph (g) contemplates her sharing the actual benefits payable to George upon his retirement. In reaching what I consider to be an unfair result, the Court ignores not only the plain language of paragraph (g), but also the overall intent of the divorce judgment to treat both parties fairly. I agree with the District Court that by the wording of paragraph (g), the divorce court intended to grant to Mary a fifty percent share of the full pension benefits limited by the ratio that the period of the marriage bears to the total value of the pension.
I would vacate the judgment of the Superior Court and remand for affirmance of the District Court’s judgment.