Court Opinion

ID: 9750199
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 14:34:13.230566+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:26:04.417861
License: Public Domain

ZEBROWSKI, J.
I concur in the majority opinion, which masterfully and comprehensively reviews the authorities bearing on this important issue. I concur separately simply to note that the course of case law development in this area has unnecessarily complicated the law, and that the detailed contractual analyses presented in the briefs, to which the majority opinion properly responds, should not be necessary in every future case.
Labor Code section 3600.5 appears in chapter 3 of part 1 (“Conditions of Compensation Liability”). It provides that an employee injured out of state during the course of his employment is entitled to compensation under California’s workers’ compensation laws if he “has been hired ... in the state.” (Italics added.) Labor Code section 5305, by contrast, is contained in chapter 1 (“Jurisdiction”) of part 4 (“Compensation Proceedings”). This chapter begins by defining the “exclusive jurisdiction” of the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB). (Lab. Code, § 5300.) Section 5305 complements other sections (see, e.g., Lab. Code, § 3602) to confirm that the exclusive subject matter jurisdiction of the WCAJ3 extends to out-of-state employee injuries “where ... the contract of hire was made in this state.” (Italics added.)
The effect of placing exclusive subject matter jurisdiction in the WCAB is to displace the subject matter jurisdiction of the California superior court. *28(Cf., e.g., City of Moorpark v. Superior Court (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1143 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 445, 959 P.2d 752].) If the “contract of hire” was not “made in this state,” subject matter jurisdiction would not reside in the workers’ compensation system, but would instead remain in the California superior court. (See Cal. Const., art. VI, § 10; art. XIV, § 4.) If that were the situation, a tort claim filed by petitioner against the Marlins in superior court would not be barred by workers’ compensation exclusivity. What theories petitioner might advance and what defenses the Marlins might interpose have not been briefed. (Cf. Wattenbarger v. Cincinnati Reds, Inc. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 746 [33 Cal.Rptr.2d 732] [pitcher could sue for negligent instruction causing injury to arm during tryout; Laeng v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd. (1972) 6 Cal.3d 771 [100 Cal.Rptr. 377, 494 P.2d 1] not cited].) The record in this case does suggest the salient facts that petitioner received no workers’ compensation benefits from either Florida or New York and that petitioner could obtain personal jurisdiction over the Marlins (as opposed to subject matter jurisdiction over the case) in a California superior court. Hence it appears that, if the Marlins are correct that the workers’ compensation laws do not apply, then a petitioner such as this petitioner could advance whatever claims he might have against the Marlins in superior court.
One might expect, in the typical case, that an employer such as the Marlins would argue in favor of workers’ compensation exclusivity in order to avoid the need to defend such lawsuits. Instead, taking what appears to be a narrow view of this case alone, perhaps because the statute of limitations may have run in this particular instance, the Marlins argue that petitioner’s claim does not fall within workers’ compensation jurisdiction. This is quite contrary to the widespread contemporary preference of employers for the workers’ compensation forum rather than the judicial forum, and not likely what the Marlins would be arguing had petitioner returned to California and sued. Were we to accept the Marlins’ view, and establish it as controlling precedent, the likely result would be that in future cases the Marlins (as well as other professional sports teams) would have to defend themselves against tort-claims in superior court instead of against workers’ compensation claims before workers’ compensation judges. (Cf. Wattenbarger v. Cincinnati Reds, Inc., supra, 28 Cal.App.4th 746.) Some of such cases might have merit and many might not, but in any event the courts and not the WCAB would provide the forum.
This result does not follow, however, because the statutes cannot be construed to leave cases such as this one within the jurisdiction of the superior court, although some of the case law is misleading. For example, the Court of Appeal decision in Ledbetter Erection Corp. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1984) 156 Cal.App.3d 1097 [203 Cal. Rptr. 396], was decided *29after the Supreme Court decision in Laeng v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd., supra, 6 Cal.3d 771, but Ledbetter does not cite or follow Laeng. Instead, Ledbetter relies on the earlier Supreme Court opinion in Reynolds Elec. etc. Co. v. Workmen’s Comp. App. Bd. (1966) 65 Cal.2d 429 [55 Cal.Rptr. 248, 421 P.2d 96]. Reynolds, by contrast to the later decision in Laeng, stated that “[a] contract of employment is governed by the same rules applicable to other types of contracts, including the requirements of offer and acceptance.” (Reynolds, supra, 65 Cal.2d at p. 433.) Reynolds then applied these common law contract rules to the workers’ compensation issue before it. Ledbetter, following Reynolds, also applied common law contract principles to a workers’ compensation issue. More recently Janzen v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1997) 61 Cal.App.4th 109 [71 Cal.Rptr.2d 260] also discussed common law contract formation principles in the course of determining jurisdiction pursuant to Labor Code section 5305, although leavened by citation to Labor Code section 3202’s direction that the workers’ compensation laws are to be construed liberally in favor of coverage. In Laeng, however, the Supreme Court departed from the view stated in Reynolds, and belatedly followed in Ledbetter, that common law contract principles govern workers’ compensation issues. Instead, the Supreme Court ruled in Laeng that “an ‘employment’ relationship sufficient to bring the [workers’ compensation statutes] into play cannot be determined simply from technical contractual or common law conceptions of employment but must instead be resolved by reference to the history and fundamental purposes underlying the [workers’ compensation statutes] . . . .” (Laeng, supra, 6 Cal.3d 771, 777.) According to Laeng, the issue is one of statutory interpretation rather than common law contract. This holding from Laeng was recently cited with approval by the Supreme Court in Arriaga v. County of Alameda (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1055, 1061 [40 Cal.Rptr.2d 116, 892 P.2d 150]. In the future, therefore, it should be possible to disregard the approach of cases such as Reynolds and Ledbetter, and to jettison the lengthy technical analyses of common law concepts of offer and acceptance, conditions precedent and conditions subsequent, qualified offers, who is offeror and who is offeree, the effect of specific contractual terms, etc., that characterize the briefing in this case. Instead, the focus can be placed on whether a relationship was formed in California which was intended by the Legislature to be within the jurisdiction of the workers’ compensation system rather than within the jurisdiction of the courts.
Whether petitioner’s “contract of hire” was “made in this state” within the meaning and intent of Labor Code section 5305 determines which forum has subject matter jurisdiction. If the workers’ compensation system (rather than the court system) has subject matter jurisdiction, then whether petitioner was “hired” in California within the meaning and intent of Labor Code section 3600.5 determines his entitlement to benefits. Although these two questions *30of “hired” and “contract for hire” may not be distinguishable from each other, both are collectively distinguishable from the question of whether a common law contract was formed, where it was formed, when it was formed, what its terms were, etc. (Cf. Laeng v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd., supra, 6 Cal.3d 771 [common law principles do not necessarily control statutory interpretation of worker’s compensation law].) For the remedial purposes of workers’ compensation law, the Legislature has expressly directed that terms such as “hired” and “contract of hire” be liberally construed to extend benefits to persons injured during the course of their employment. (Lab. Code, § 3202.) Hence “ ‘[i]f a provision in [the workers’ compensation statutes] may be reasonably construed to provide coverage or payments, that construction should usually be adopted even if another reasonable construction is possible.’ . . . The rule of liberal construction . . . requires that we liberally construe [the workers’ compensation statutes] ‘in favor of awarding workers’] compensation, not in permitting civil litigation. . . .’” (Arriaga v. County of Alameda, supra, 9 Cal.4th 1055, 1065.) Petitioner was scouted and recruited in California and signed his several contract documents in California. The language of the workers’ compensation statutes can reasonably be construed as intended to cover this situation. Hence petitioner is entitled to workers’ compensation benefits, rather than entitled to sue.