Court Opinion

ID: 9672827
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:01:00.672692+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:18.594236
License: Public Domain

John A. Fogleman, Justice, dissenting. The majority apparently relies upon the following factors to declare the agreement in this case to be an independent contract and not merged into the decree of divorce: 1. Provision for alimony is for life, or until appellee remarries. 2. Appellant agreed to pay taxes on appellee’s home as long as alimony was due and as long as she owned the home. 3. Support for a daughter could extend beyond her minority. 4. Appellant obligated himself to repay a debt arising from a loan made to him by appellee. 5. The promises, averments and covenants are mutually irrevocable. Facts not mentioned in the majority opinion that seem significant, and which, taken together with the language of the decree and other facts mentioned in that opinion, seem to me to make the conclusion that the agreement was merged in the decree inescapable, include: 1. Appellee filed suit October 28, 1965, and the case was at issue on November 16, 1965. 2. During the pendency of the action appellee made three separate applications to the court for exercise of its contempt powers to enforce its order relating to alimony pendente lite, child support, attorney’s fees and suit money. While pertinent dates appear in the majority opinion, it is also significant that, even though the suit was at issue for two years before the decree of divorce was rendered, the uncontested decree1 was rendered one day after the date of the agreement in question. The decision in Bachus v. Bachus, 216 Ark. 802, 227 S. W. 2d 439, is not helpful here. The written contract for settlement of property rights, alimony and child support there was not further identified or categorized. The court obviously treated it as an independent contract not merged into the decree so that it was not subject to modification as to alimony. I cannot conceive of a situation in which the parties might go to greater lengths to merge an agreement into a decree than they went here. The agreement is recited in the decree. The caption of the agreement is identical to that which would be given to a pleading filed or decree or order entered in the case, viz: IN THE CHANCERY COURT OF PULASKI COUNTY, ARKANSAS MARY NELLE ARMSTRONG PLAINTIFF vs no. 131247 HOWARD M. ARMSTRONG DEFENDANT The parties to the agreement are denominated as plaintiff and defendant, respectively. The agreement covers every issue that might have otherwise been litigated if the wife established grounds for divorce, i. <?., attorney’s fees, costs of suit, property division, alimony, child support, adjustment of tax liabilities and restoration of property. Of course, the issue as to grounds for divorce could not have been eliminated by stipulation. Paragraph five relating to alimony was not binding upon the persorial representatives of appellant. Provision was made for payments to continue until appellee’s remarriage. The enforcement of the contract was not left to the discretion of the court, as in cases where contracts are independent and the court may withhold its extraordinary powers leaving the parties to their other remedies. Any contrary idea is clearly negated by the sentence reading “The terms and provisions of said contract may be enforced by the further orders of this court in the same manner and to like effect as are the judgments and decrees of the court.” (Emphasis mine.) An intention to merge the agreement into the court’s decree with a reliance upon its enforcement powers rather than upon a retained independent cause of action could hardly be more clearly expressed. When all the pertinent factors are considered, this intention could hardly be more clearly demonstrated. This merger is even more effectively expressed in the closing words of the decree, wherein the court said: The court shall retain jurisdiction of the parties of this cause for the purpose of ascertaining and enforcing the rights of the parties according to the terms of this decree. Even though the agreement here is written, the situation in this case is much more nearly like Seaton v. Seaton, 221 Ark. 778, 255 S. W. 2d 954, than Bachus. In Seaton, the contention was made that the alimony allowed by a divorce decree could not be modified because the award was based upon a property settlement made by the parties. Even though the language of the decree there was the simple statement “This agreement has been approved by the court and is hereby made a consent decree,” it was held that the agreement was not made with the intention of conferring upon the wife a separate cause of action, but merely was an agreement upon the amount the court should fix as alimony and, thus, subject to modification.2 It is clear that the agreement here was of the type involved in Seaton when we consider the statement there that such contract may be intended merely as a means of dispensing with proof upon an issue not in dispute, so that by its nature it merges in the divorce decree. The agreement before us certainly dispensed with a lot of proof and its intention so to do is clearly demonstrated, not only by its form and content, but by the record in the case. It should also be noted that in Wilson v. Wilson, 186 Ark. 415, 53 S. W. 2d 990, where the agreement as to alimony was held to be subject to modification, settlement of property rights constituted a part of the agreement. We said that, pursuant to this settlement of property rights, the court decreed that the wife be given the household goods and be paid the sum of $60 per month and that she release and relinquish all her right, title and interest in and to any property of the husband. Not long ago we held that an order to make weekly payments of alimony was decreed by a chancery court’s divorce decree reading, in pertinent part: It is, therefore, by the Court considered, ordered, adjudged and decreed that * * * the Property and Support Agreement entered into by the parties, which is filed herein, be, and the same is hereby, specifically approved by the Court and is adopted and incorporated herein as a part and parcel of this Decree in settlement of the respective rights, liabilities, and obligations of the parties hereto; * * * It is so ordered. See Thomas v. Thomas (June 2, 1969), 443 S. W. 2d 534. There the agreement was made to settle, compromise and determine the parties’ respective rights, duties and obligations with regard, to support, property and financial matters. We relied upon Solomon v. Solomon, 149 Fla. 174, 5 So. 2d 265 (1942). A part of the opinion in that case quoted in Thomas reads:’ “It seems to be the rule that where such an agreement is merely ratified and not made a part of the final decree, the husband is not responsible in contempt proceedings for default on his part, but if the agreement is embodied in the decree and contemplates when executed that it shall become a part of the court’s order, a failure of the husband is punishable by contempt.” The fact that child support is involved in the agreement is not really significant. The power of the court to modify a decree for child support cannot be defeated by an agreement between the parents, even though the court adopts that agreement. Lively v. Lively, 222 Ark. 501, 261 S. W. 2d 409; Collie v. Collie, 242 Ark. 297, 413 S. W. 2d 42, Johnston v. Johnston, 241 Ark. 551, 408 S. W. 2d 885. Furthermore, we have recognized that a divorced parent’s obligation to his child is not necessarily limited to the child’s minority. Matthews v. Matthews, 245 Ark. 1, 430 S. W. 2d 864; Jerry v. Jerry, 235 Ark. 589, 361 S. W. 2d 92. We do not know what circumstances prompted the particular provision as to support and education of this daughter. The provision for alimony for life should not be a significant factor in determining the question involved here. Alimony is normally to be paid during the joint lives of the parties or until the remarriage of the wife, just as the agreement between the parties provides. Birnstill v. Birnstill, 218 Ark. 130, 234 S W. 2d 757; Wear v. Boydstone, 230 Ark. 580, 324 S. W. 2d 337. It was said by this court when the rules to be observed by chancellors in these matters were first fixed that alimony should not be allowed for the life of the wife, but only during the joint lives of the parties. Kurtz v. Kurtz. 38 Ark. 119. Soon thereafter it was said that alimony continues only during the joint lives of the parties or until the wife remarries. Brown v. Brown, 38 Ark. 324. After another brief interval it was said that a decree for alimony, where no definite time is fixed during which it is to continue, will cease with the death of either party, or upon relief by the court on the application of the husband after remarriage of the wife. Casteel v. Casteel, 38 Ark. 477. I find no deviation from these declarations in our later cases. The clause making the agreement mutually irrevocable also seems insignificant to me. The very words indicate that the parties cannot retract the agreements made in that stipulation. This does not mean that they were binding on the court. Bachus v. Bachus, 216 Ark. 802, 227 S. W. 2d 439; Pryor v. Pryor, 88 Ark. 302, 114 S. W. 700. I do not see how irrevocability of the stipulation by act of the parties could be said to make the payments the subject of enforcement by independent cause of action, or to limit the court’s power of modification. I cannot see how my position would in anywise hamper parties desiring to enter into an independent settlement contract in contemplation of divorce so that the wife retains an independent cause of action thereon making it enforceable even if the equity court should withhold its extraordinary power. I am disturbed about the reverse of that proposition, in view of the decision here. My question is, how can a husband and wife enter into a valid and binding stipulation resolving all litigable issues in a divorce case, except the one they are theoretically forbidden to resolve, so that enforcement of the decree and its modification to meet changed conditions will be vested in the court in which the cause is pending, eliminating any possible independent cause of action? Of course, I would reverse the decree.  While the general denial filed by appellant was not withdrawn, no evidence was offered in his behalf. The only witnesses were appellee and her corroborating witness.   The authority relied upon was Holmes v. Holmes, 186 Ark. 251, 53 S. W. 2d 226. In McCue v. McCue, 210 Ark. 826, 197 S. W. 2d 938, it was aptly pointed out that the wording of the Holmes decree on the critical .point was “It will be seen * * * that the agreement of the parties was ‘merely one as to the amount the court by its decree should fix as alimony’ and was not intended as an independent agreement for the payment of alimony.”