Court Opinion

ID: 9755029
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 20:21:39.292744+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:01.500850
License: Public Domain

KELLER, Justice,
Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part.
Although I agree with the majority opinion’s conclusion that the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury as to the sentencing option of life imprisonment without the benefit of probation or parole (LWOP) requires us to reverse Appellant’s sentence of death and remand Appellant’s Murder conviction to the trial court for a new capital sentencing phase, I write separately because I disagree with the majority’s resolution of certain other issues. Specifically, I disagree with Part 11(1) of the majority opinion because I believe that the trial court’s limitations on Appellant’s voir dire examination created a substantial risk that Appellant’s death sentence may have been reached by jurors who were unable to consider the full range of penalties and/or unable to consider Appellant’s alleged intoxication as a mitigating circumstance. Accordingly, I do not believe that the trial court permitted a constitutionally adequate voir dire examination. And, I dissent from the majority opinion to the extent that, in addition to the relief granted in the majority opinion, I would direct the trial court upon remand to allow Appellant to investigate prospective jurors’ abilities to consider the full penalty range and the specific mitigating circumstances that Appellant intends to present. In addition, I disagree with the majority’s Part 111(3) analysis of the issues concerning *54Appellant’s oral statements — or lack thereof — to the investigating officers. Rather than dismissing Appellant’s allegations of error out-of-hand with the questionable conclusion that Appellant’s allegation of error raises no cognizable constitutional inquiry because “he did not remain silent, but rather denied any knowledge of the crimes,”1 I would hold that these unpre-served allegations of error are not reviewable by this Court at this time because the record suggests that Appellant’s failure to object to the introduction of this evidence may have been trial strategy.
LIMITATIONS ON YOIR DIRE EXAMINATION
In Lockett v. Ohio,2 the United States Supreme Court recognized that the death penalty is “qualitatively different” from a sentence of imprisonment3 and held that individualized consideration of the circumstances of a capital crime and the character of the defendant who committed that crime were critical to prevent its arbitrary application.4 Although the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution does not require that a jury make the ultimate determination whether to impose the death penalty,5 the United States Supreme Court has held that, when juries are asked to deliberate capital punishment, Fourteenth Amendment due process protections require that those juries be comprised of fair and impartial jurors.6 Two of the most important facets of such impartiality are a knowing and informed ability to consider the full range of punishments 7 and the ability to consider all relevant mitigation evidence.8
*55In Rosales-Lopez v. United States,9 the United States Supreme Court observed that a full and adequate voir dire “plays a critical function in assuring the criminal defendant that his ... right to an impartial jury will be honored.”10 This Court has reached the same conclusion.11 However, “[djespite its importance, the adequacy of voir dire is not easily subject to appellate review.”12 Nonetheless, the United States Supreme Court has conceptualized its review of voir dire adequacy as a situational inquiry and has articulated a standard under which appellate courts should evaluate an examination’s sufficiency:
Questions ... might be helpful in ascertaining whether a juror is impartial. To be constitutionally compelled, however, it is not enough that such questions be helpful. Rather the trial court’s failure to ask these questions must render the defendant’s trial fundamentally unfair.13
The Supreme Court has applied this standard in a number of cases in which trial courts limited the subject matter of voir dire examination and, by way of example, has concluded that voir dire regarding the subject of racial prejudice is required in capital cases when requested by the defense,14 but is required in non-capital cases only when “racial issues were ‘inextricably bound up with the conduct of the trial,’ ” ’15 and that there is no constitutional right to question prospective jurors regarding their opinions about a defendant’s facial hair16 or to permit specific inquiry into the content of pretrial publicity to which potential jurors were exposed.17
The Supreme Court has also cautioned, however, that a voir dire examination which addressed all relevant subject matter might still fail to pass constitutional muster if the trial court relies on vague, “can you follow the law?” questions which leave jurors’ actual preconceptions un-probed.18 The Court has emphasized that *56some degree of deference to trial courts is necessary because “determinations of juror bias cannot be reduced to question- and-answer sessions which obtain results in the matter of catechism.”19 At the same time, however, courts must remain sensitive to the fact that dissonance can exist between the questioner and prospective jurors because of asymmetrical understandings of legal language and concepts.20
In the case at bar, Appellant wished to examine potential jurors to see if they could consider the full range of penalties— including the statutory minimum penalty of twenty (20) years. The trial court, however, would not allow Appellant to ask prospective jurors if they could consider the minimum penalty and instead framed the inquiry regarding the “low end” of the penalty range as whether a jury could consider “a term of imprisonment of not less than twenty years.” Of course, an affirmative answer to this question only meant that the juror could consider sen-fencing Appellant to imprisonment for some term of years — perhaps fifty (50), or a hundred (100) or even a thousand (1000) years — not that the juror could consider the statutory minimum sentence. This Court has consistently held that a defendant “is entitled to a jury that can fairly consider the entire range of punishments for his crimes.”21 And, in Grooms v. Commonwealth,22 we held that “a juror should be excused for cause if he would be unable in any case ... to consider the imposition of the minimum penalty prescribed by law.”23 Recently, in Lawson v. Commonwealth,24 we examined how voir dire regarding the available penalty range should be conducted in non-capital cases and concluded, based on our estimation of the “significant opportunity costs [of] overgeneralizing the inquiry”25 that, “the questioner should define the penalty range in terms of the possible minimum and maximum sentences[.]”26 I can envision no *57reason for a different rule regarding voir dire examination as to the minimum penalty in capital cases where the stakes are far greater. Because the voir dire examination permitted in this case did not allow the trial court or the parties to assess whether the jurors could consider the statutory minimum punishment of twenty (20) years, Appellant was “denied the right to meaningful voir dire on the issue of punishment.” 27
With respect to Appellant’s allegation that the trial court unconstitutionally limited the scope of his voir dire examination by prohibiting him from inquiring whether prospective jurors could consider the fact that Appellant was under the influence of drugs and alcohol as a mitigating circumstance,28 I acknowledge that, in Woodall v. Commonwealth>29 this Court held that “it was not an abuse of discretion by the trial judge to restrict the voir dire ... concerning specific mitigation evidence.”30 However, I did not agree with that holding then,31 and I do not agree with the citation-free, conclusory declaration in today’s majority opinion that “the trial court properly curtailed questions that were not proper and only confused the panel.”32 Although Appellant persuasively argues that evidence of intoxication is a “double-edged sword” that some jurors will interpret as heightening rather than reducing a defendant’s culpability, the trial court would not allow Appellant to seek out those jurors with more specific questioning, and instead merely allowed examination as to whether jurors could consider undefined “mitigating circumstances.” As each juror’s answer to this question would vary according to his or her own conception of what possible “mitigating circumstances” may exist, I have little confidence that this question reached the heart of the relevant inquiry — -whether the jurors could consider a mitigating circumstance specifically authorized by the General Assembly and that Appellant presented in this case. While the basis for the holding in Woodall was that the examination as to the specific mitigating circumstance was designed “to oblige jurors to commit themselves by either accepting a specific mitigator or rejecting it before any evidence was heard,”33 here, Appellant’s proposed question sought only to determine if prospective jurors could consider intoxication as a mitigating circumstance. As Appellant thus sought no more than the United States Constitution guarantees him — fair and impartial jurors who could consider his relevant mitigation evidence34 — I believe the trial court denied Appellant a constitutionally adequate voir dire examination by prohibiting such questioning.
Although I believe the erroneous limitation of Appellant’s voir dire would require reversal of Appellant’s death sentence even if the trial court had not otherwise committed reversible error during the capital sentencing phase, the court’s failure to instruct the jury as to LWOP renders the voir dire error largely moot. Upon remand, however, I would direct the trial court not only to properly instruct the jury *58as to all available sentencing options, but also to permit Appellant to conduct a constitutionally adequate voir dire.
APPELLANT’S STATEMENTS AND SILENCE
In my opinion, the majority’s conclusion that it need not “engage in a lengthy constitutional analysis of whether Appellant was or was not in custody or whether his Miranda rights were, in fact, violated [because] [a]t no point did Appellant state that he did not wish to talk to the officers or that he desired questioning to cease until he could speak with an attorney”35 is inadequate to address Appellant’s allegations of error concerning his abbreviated statements to the investigating officers. Although the majority opinion’s analysis implicitly assumes that a clear and unequivocal invocation of the right to remain silent is a necessary precondition to each of Appellant’s distinct arguments for relief, this analysis completely overlooks — or is at least unresponsive to: (1) Appellant’s allegation that his admission to stealing jewelry from the victim’s home on a prior occasion occurred during a custodial interrogation in which he did not receive Miranda warnings; and (2) a split of authority that currently exists at the United States Circuit Court level as to whether a state violates a defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination when — as was the case here36 — the state, at trial, utilizes a defendant’s silence, including refusals to discuss a matter prior to arrest, as substantive evidence of the defendant’s guilt.37
I nonetheless concur in the majority’s conclusion that Appellant’s allegations of error in this regard do not justify our reversal of Appellant’s conviction. I note that, in the trial court, Appellant objected to none of the evidence that he now targets on appeal, and, because “it may reasonably be inferred that appellant intentionally failed to object for reasons of trial strategy,”38 these unpreserved allegations *59of “error” are, thus, inappropriate subjects for our review on direct appeal.39 Fact patterns akin to the one presented here— where the Commonwealth seeks to present statements obtained from a defendant during what is arguably a custodial interrogation, and there is an issue of whether the defendant was informed of his Miranda rights prior to the questioning — would usually alert a criminal defense attorney that a suppression issue might exist. However, based upon indications from the record in this case — including: (1) Appellant’s defense counsel’s opening statement, in which she emphasized that, despite extensive questioning by professionals trained in interrogation, Appellant did not confess to the murder; (2) Appellant’s defense counsel’s cross-examination of Detective Denham that resulted in the repetition of Appellant’s brief protestations of his innocence; and (3) defense’s closing argument that emphasized that Appellant told the investigating officers “that he didn’t kill her, Mrs. Williamson” and rationalized Appellant’s failure to further confide in the officers as possibly the result of Appellant’s distrust or Appellant’s belief that the officers would not help him — I believe it is a more-than-reasonable assumption that the failure to object constituted reasonable trial strategy. After all, the small amount of inculpatory information that Appellant gave during the interviews was consistent with the overall defense strategy of admitting to the property crime offenses, but focusing the defense upon the relative dearth of evidence as to the death eligible offense. By allowing the Commonwealth to introduce evidence that Appellant had denied any involvement in the murder, the defense was able to “have its cake and eat it too” by enjoying the benefit of a “no adverse inference” instruction while simultaneously placing Appellant’s words before the jury without subjecting Appellant to cross-examination and impeachment with his prior felony convictions. I also observe that pleadings associated with a motion in limine filed by the Commonwealth that sought to prohibit the defense from introducing evidence that Appellant told family members and friends after he was arrested that he had robbed, but not killed, the victim suggest that the defense team had investigated other bases of making the jury aware of Appellant’s out-of-court denials of his involvement in the victim’s death, but concluded that the hearsay rule stood in the way.
While it is possible that the failure to object was the result of an oversight by counsel rather than trial strategy — and, in fact, the ultimate resolution of that issue may require an evidentiary hearing in a future proceeding — we need not resolve that issue conclusively one way or another at this stage. For the purposes of this Court’s review of Appellant’s unpreserved allegation of error in a capital case, the first “prong”40 of our inquiry is whether “there is a reasonable justification or explanation for defense counsel’s failure to object, e.g., whether the failure might have been a legitimate trial tactic.”41 I believe from the record in this case that Appel*60lant’s trial counsel may very well have concluded that evidence of Appellant’s terse declaration of his innocence would “do more good than harm.” For that reason, I would not address the merits of Appellant’s allegations of error concerning the interview statements.
STUMBO, J., joins. JOHNSTONE, J., joins in part as to Limitations on Voir Dire Examination.

. Majority Opinion at 95 S.W.3d 34, 47 (2002).

. 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978).

. Id. 438 U.S. at 604, 98 S.Ct. at 2964, 57 L.Ed.2d at 989.

. Id. 438 U.S. at 605, 98 S.Ct. at 2965, 57 L.Ed.2d at 990.

. See Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 252, 96 S.Ct. 2960, 2966, 49 L.Ed.2d 913, 923 (1976) (plurality opinion) ("It has never [been] suggested that jury sentencing is constitutionally required.”). But see Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002) (holding that Sixth Amendment requires jury finding as to aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of the death penalty).

. Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 726-7, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 2228-2229, 119 L.Ed.2d 492, 501-2 (1992).

. See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522 n. 21, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 1777 n. 21, 20 L.Ed.2d 776, 785 n. 21 (1968) ("The most that can be demanded of a venire[person] in this regard is that he [or she] be willing to consider all of the penalties provided by state law[.]"); Grooms v. Commonwealth, Ky., 756 S.W.2d 131, 138 (1988) ("In a capital case ... it is especially important that the jury not be comprised of people unwilling to consider the entire range of punishment in the event of a guilty verdict.”).

.Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 328, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 2951-2, 106 L.Ed.2d 256, 284 (1989) ("In order to ensure 'reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case,’ the jury must be able to consider and give effect to any mitigating evidence relevant to a defendant’s background and character or the circumstances of the crime.” (citations omitted)). See also Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113-15, 102 S.Ct. 869, 876-77, 71 L.Ed.2d 1, 10-11 (1982):
Just as the State may not by statute preclude the sentencer from considering any mitigating factor, neither may the sentencer refuse to consider, as a matter of law, any relevant mitigating evidence.... The sen-tencer ... may determine the weight to be given relevant mitigating evidence. But they may not give it no weight by excluding such evidence from their consideration.
Id. 455 U.S. at 115 n. 10, 71 L.Ed.2nd at 11 n. 10 ("[T]he Oklahoma death penalty statute permits the defendant to present evidence 'as *55to any mitigating circumstances.' Lockett requires the sentencer to listen.”); Morgan v. Illinois, supra note 6 at 504 U.S. at 739, 112 S.Ct. at 2235, 119 L.Ed.2d at 509 ("Any juror to whom mitigating factors are likewise irrelevant should be disqualified for cause, for that juror has formed an opinion concerning the merits of the case without basis in the evidence developed at trial.”); Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4, 106 S.Ct. 1669, 1671, 90 L.Ed.2d 1, 6 (1986) ("Equally clear is the corollary rule that the sentencer may not refuse to consider or be precluded from considering 'any relevant mitigating evidence.' ”).

. 451 U.S. 182, 101 S.Ct. 1629, 68 L.Ed.2d 22 (1981).

. Id. 451 U.S. at 188, 101 S.Ct. at 1634, 68 L.Ed.2d at 28.

. See Thomas v. Commonwealth, Ky., 864 S.W.2d 252, 259 (1993).

. Rosales-Lopez v. United States, supra note 9 at 451 U.S. at 188, 101 S.Ct. at 1634, 68 L.Ed.2d at 28.

. Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 425-6, 111 S.Ct 1899, 1905, 114 L.Ed.2d 493, 506 (1991). See also Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 33, 106 S.Ct. 1683, 1687, 90 L.Ed.2d 27, 34—5 (1986) (describing the "broad inquiry” in an allegation of inadequate voir dire as "whether under all of the circumstances presented there was a constitutionally significant likelihood that, absent [this] questioning ... the jurors would not be indifferent.”).

. See Turner v. Murray, supra note 13.

. Rosales-Lopez v. United States, supra note 9. See also Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 96 S.Ct. 1017, 47 L.Ed.2d 258 (1976); Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 93 S.Ct. 848, 35 L.Ed.2d 46 (1973).

. Ham v. South Carolina, supra note 15.

. Mu’Min v. Virginia, supra note 13.

. Morgan v. Illinois, supra note 6 at 504 U.S. at 735-6, 112 S.Ct. at 2232-2233, 119 L.Ed.2d at 506-7 (“It may be that a juror could, in good conscience, swear to uphold *56the law and yet be unaware that maintaining such dogmatic beliefs .. . would prevent him or her from doing so. A defendant on trial for his life must be permitted on voir dire to ascertain whether his prospective jurors function under such misconception.”).

. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S.Ct. 844, 852, 83 L.Ed.2d 841, 852 (1985). See also Morgan v. Illinois, supra note 6 at 504 U.S. at 729, 112 S.Ct. at 2230, 119 L.Ed.2d at 503 ("The Constitution, after all, does not dictate a catechism for voir dire ....”).

. See Witherspoon v. Illinois, supra note 7 at 391 U.S. at 510 n. 9, 88 S.Ct. at 1773, 20 L.Ed.2d at 781 n. 9 ("The critical question, of course, is not how the phrases employed in this area have been construed by courts and commentators. What matters is how they might be understood — or misunderstood — by prospective jurors.”); Wainwright v. Witt, supra note 19 at 469 U.S. at 424-5, 105 S.Ct. at 852, 83 L.Ed.2d at 852 ("[Mjany venire[per-sons] ... may not know how they will react when faced with imposing the death sentence, or may be unable to articulate ... their true feelings.”).

. Woodall v. Commonwealth, Ky., 63 S.W.3d 104, 117 (2002) (emphasis added). See also Lawson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 53 S.W.3d 534, 541 (2001) ("We remain convinced that, in all criminal cases, the right to a fair and impartial jury requires the jury to possess the ability to consider the full range of penalties[.]” (emphasis added)); Shields v. Commonwealth, Ky., 812 S.W.2d 152, 153 (1991) ("In order to sit as a juror in a criminal case, a member of the venire must be able to consider any permissible punishment.” (emphasis added)).

. Supra note 7.

. Id. at 137.

. Supra note 21.

. Id. at 543.

. Id. at 544. See, e.g., Stopher v. Commonwealth, Ky., 57 S.W.3d 787, 808-812 (2001) (Keller, J., dissenting) (quoting portions of individual voir dire in which trial court al*57lowed defense counsel to examine juror regarding his ability to consider the minimum penalty).

. Anderson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 864 S.W.2d 909, 911 (1993).

. See KRS 532.025(2)(b)(7).

. Supra note 21.

. Mat 116.

. Id. at 135 (Stmribo, J., dissenting).

. Majority Opinion, supra at 44.

. Woodall v. Commonwealth, supra note 21 at 116.

. See supra note 8 and surrounding text.

. Majority Opinion, supra at 47.

. Specifically, the Commonwealth introduced evidence that: (1) Appellant "made no comment whatsoever” at the time he was handcuffed; (2) during both the second and third times that Appellant was interviewed by Detective Denham and Officer Embiy, Appellant denied any knowledge of the murder and stated that he had "nothing else to say”; and (3) that, although the investigating officers gave Appellant "the opportunity to describe what happened,” Appellant never acknowledged the fact that he had been at the victim’s residence and never made mention of a second individual (a defense initially employed by Appellant at trial) during the interview. During its culpability phase closing argument, the Commonwealth specifically commented on Appellant's tight lips in a manner that affirmatively disparaged Appellant’s constitutional right not to incriminate himself:
[Appellant] is attempting at every turn, by virtue of how he acts, to minimize his risks. If you recall during the course of the interview that he gave to the police, his standard was "I don't know what you're talking about” or “I ain't got nothing to say.” In all honesty, ladies and gentlemen, what he was saying was this, "I’m not going to say anything that I killed her because I'm going to make you prove it. I’m going to make you go out and prove that I did it because I, in light of the fact that I did the act of killing, in order to reduce the risk of my high risk crime of burglary and robbery, I'm not going to cop out to it now.” And he, in essence, dared the police to go out and prove him wrong.

. See Combs v. Coyle, 205 F.3d 269, 282-283 (6th Cir.2000) (collecting cases). The Sixth Circuit holds that "the use of a defendant’s prearrest silence as substantive evidence of guilt violates the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination.” Id. at 283.

. Ice v. Commonwealth, Ky., 667 S.W.2d 671, 674 (1984). See also Cosby v. Commonwealth, Ky., 776 S.W.2d 367, 369 (1989) {"Ice specifies only that 'prejudicial error' must be reviewed regardless of contemporaneous objection, and we hasten to reaffirm that this *59means errors where there is no reasonable justification or explanation for defense counsel's failure to object, tactical or otherwise

. See Sanders v. Commonwealth, Ky., 801 S.W.2d 665, 668-9 n. 1 (1991) ("Generally, once a judgment has become final, such issues constitute a collateral attack on the judgment imposing sentence, and must be presented to the trial court pursuant to RCr 11.42.”).

. See Perdue v. Commonwealth, Ky., 916 S.W.2d 148, 154 (1996).

. Sanders v. Commonwealth, supra note 39 at 668 (emphasis added).