Court Opinion

ID: 9699691
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 20:46:34.327468+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:55.726985
License: Public Domain

CAVANAUGH, Judge,
dissenting:
I dissent because the result reached by the majority is not warranted by the law and will result in a needless burden to our already overburdened trial courts.
The appellant, Alastair Boyd Kyle, was convicted of a summary offense before a district justice for failing to stop at a stop sign. A fine of fifteen dollars was imposed. Mr. Kyle appealed his conviction to the Court of Common Pleas. A hearing was scheduled in the court below for October 3, 1980 and the appellant appeared in court. He filed a Motion to Dismiss the appeal and a Motion for Continuance.1 The *451court below continued the case until November 21, 1980 and the appellant, the defendant in the court below, did not appear for the scheduled hearing. The court below thereupon dismissed the appeal and Mr. Kyle appealed to this court.
The majority reverses on the basis that the court below erred in not taking testimony in the court below and further in not entering a judgment of guilty or not guilty following the taking of testimony. The majority relies on Commonwealth v. Carter, 230 Pa.Super. 401, 326 A.2d 530 (1974) which held that where an appeal is taken from a summary conviction after a hearing de novo, it is error to merely dismiss the appeal rather than entering a judgment of guilty or not guilty. The majority also relies on Commonwealth v. Gula, 300 Pa.Super. 445, 446 A.2d 938 (1982).2 In that case an appeal was taken from a summary conviction for violation of the Vehicle Code. Again, after a hearing de novo, the court merely dismissed the appeal. This court held that an order dismissing the appeal is not enough. “Furthermore, an order adjudicating guilt must be entered, even though it is implicit in the lower court’s actions and opinion that the court considered the evidence supportive of a finding of guilt.” See Gula, supra, slip opinion. This court remanded the case and directed the court below to enter a finding of guilty or not guilty.
In both Carter and Gula the court below heard the appeal de novo and proceeded to hear evidence pertaining to the defendant’s guilt or innocence and after doing so should have entered a judgment of guilty or not guilty. The instant case was not heard de novo. The appellant did not appear in court when his case was called and after the *452continuance was granted at his request did nothing to pursue his right on appeal. Since he did not see fit to appear at trial there is no obligation on the court to proceed to trial in the defendant’s absence. The majority opinion overlooks the fact that the appellant stands convicted of a summary offense. In the absence of pursuing his appeal his conviction stands. In both Carter and Gula, at the end of the trial de novo a verdict should have been’entered.
The majority would require the totally futile act of having a trial following a summary conviction, in every case where the defendant appeals to the courts of common pleas but does not deign to attend his trial, notwithstanding his demand for a trial implicit in his appeal. This would require a blatant waste of judicial manpower.
The majority cites Pa.R.Crim.P. 1117 which grants the defendant the right to be present at any stage of the proceedings. The rule further states:
a) The defendant shall be present at the arraignment, at every stage of the trial including the impanelling of the jury and the return of the verdict, and at the imposition of sentence, except as otherwise provided by this rule. The defendant's absence without cause shall not preclude proceeding with the trial including the return of the verdict. (Emphasis added).
The majority erroneously interprets this rule to read that in an appeal from a summary conviction by the defendant that the court shall proceed with a trial even where the defendant does not appear at the trial. The majority opinion ignores Commonwealth v. Smith, 237 Pa.Super. 506, 352 A.2d 90 (1975) which directly controls .this case. In Smith the defendant was summarily convicted of a violation of the Vehicle Code and appealed to the court of common pleas. She requested that the case be continued and it was. She then failed to appear at the postponed hearing and the appeal was dismissed. On appeal to this court the appellant contended that the Commonwealth should have presented its case notwithstanding the failure of the defendant to appear. This contention was rejected. The court also quoted Pa.R. *453Crim.P. 1117, relied on by the majority in our case, and stated at 237 Pa.Super. 509, 352 A.2d 91:
While this Rule does not preclude proceeding with trial in the Defendant’s absence, it does not require it and when as in this case the Defendant absents herself without cause the Court in its discretion is warranted in dismissing the appeal. (Emphasis added)
The majority states in footnote 3: “The dissent relies on Commonwealth v. Smith, 237 Pa.Super. 506, 352 A.2d 90 (1975).... Admittedly, the facts in Smith, supra, and in the instant case are the same. However, we believe that the interpretation placed upon Rule 1117 in the Smith case, as applied to summary offenses, has been effectively overruled by this court’s en banc decision in Commonwealth v. Koch, supra.”
Commonwealth v. Koch, supra (opinion by Cercone, P.J., concurring opinion by Price, J., in which Cavanaugh, J. joined) involved a trial de novo in the court of common pleas following an appeal from a summary conviction. The main issue in Koch dealt with Pa.R.Crim.P. 1123 which provides that written motions for new trial and in arrest of judgment shall be filed within ten days after a finding of guilty, and whether the rule applies to appeals from summary convictions.3
I do not believe that this court in Commonwealth v. Koch, even though sitting en banc, has “effectively overruled” the decision in Commonwealth v. Smith, which it did not discuss and which did not involve the same issues. The en banc court in Commonwealth v. Koch apparently did not perceive any conflict with Commonwealth v. Smith and as far as I am concerned, none exists.
I would affirm the order of the court below.

. Appellant’s motion to dismiss in the lower court was based on the fact that his time was too valuable to spend in court as he earned $650 per day which would be lost if he had to appear in court in connection with a $15.00 traffic fine. He raises the same issue on *451appeal. This argument is patently without merit as it was the appellant who decided to appeal his conviction to the court of common pleas and it was he who desired “his day in court”. He cannot now complain that his day in court requires that he be present in court.

. Commonwealth v. Gula, supra, cites Commonwealth v. Gamarino, 299 Pa.Super. 144, 445 A.2d 189 (1980) where the trial court sustained an appeal following a de novo trial in the court of common pleas.

. In Commonwealth v. Koch the Court stated at 288 Pa.Super. 295, 431 A.2d 1055: “The purpose of such motions [new trial and in arrest of judgment] is two-fold: (1) to afford the trial court, in the first instance, the opportunity to correct asserted trial errors; and (2) to clearly and narrowly frame issues for appellate review... With respect to this policy, there is no basis from which to draw a distinction between and among appeals taken to our court from felony, misdemeanor or summary convictions.” (Emphasis added)