Court Opinion

ID: 9731531
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:49:13.802478+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:19.281271
License: Public Domain

RATTIGAN, J.
I dissent.
I
I agree with the conclusion in part I of the majority opinion that the statements made to Sergeant Demkowski were obtained by him in violation of appellant’s Miranda rights because appellant did not waive them. (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 473-476 [16 L.Ed.2d 694, 722-724, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 10 A.L.R.3d 974].) I also agree with the conclusion in part I that “the *504trial court’s determination that there was no Miranda violation was indeed palpably erroneous.”
It is next held in part I that the trial court committed “state law error under Disbrow” in permitting the prosecution evidence of the “unlawfully obtained statements of appellant” for the purpose of impeachment (see People v. Disbrow (1976) 16 Cal.3d 101, 111-113 [127 Cal.Rptr. 360, 545 P.2d 272]), but that the error was harmless. I agree that there was Disbrow error. Given the conceded “closeness of this case” (the majority’s description), I do not agree that the error was harmless. I return to this point below.
n
I disagree with the conclusions in part II of the majority opinion relative to Rollo error. (See People v. Rollo (1977) 20 Cal.3d 109, 115-120 [141 Cal.Rptr. 177, 569 P.2d 771]; see also People v. Beagle (1972) 6 Cal.3d 441, 451-454 [99 Cal.Rptr. 313, 492 P.2d 1].) Specifically, I find Rollo error in the trial court’s ruling which was made against an objection based on Evidence Code section 352, and which permitted appellant to be impeached with the nine-year-old robbery conviction as well as with the three-year-old conviction of burglary. The evidence of the burglary conviction impeached his credibility for all the purposes legitimately contemplated by Evidence Code section 788. The permitted use of the robbery conviction was unnecessarily cumulative for those purposes. The probative value of that conviction was diminished by its remoteness in time, as the majority opinion properly concedes, and its use inevitably prejudiced appellant because of the similarity which exists between robbery and the crime charged (murder) by reason of the assaultive character common to both. (See People v. Anjell (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 189, 197 [160 Cal.Rptr. 669].)
In Rollo, the Supreme Court admonished all lower courts as follows: “By now it should be clear to all that when a defendant makes a timely objection to the introduction of evidence of a prior felony conviction for the purpose of impeaching his testimony, the trial court is under a duty (1) to determine the probative value of that evidence on the issue of the defendant’s credibility as a witness, (2) to appraise the degree of prejudice which the defendant would suffer from the admission of the evidence, and (3) to weigh the foregoing two factors against each other and exclude the evidence ‘if its probative value [on the issue of credibility] is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will . . . create substantial danger of undue prejudice, . . .’ (Evid. Code, § 352).” (People v. Rollo, supra, 20 Cal.3d 109 at p. 116; see also People v. Rist (1976) 16 Cal.3d 211, 218-223 [127 Cal.Rptr. 457, 545 P.2d 833]; People v. Antick (1975) 15 Cal.3d 79, 96-99 [123 Cal.Rptr. 475, 539 P.2d 43]; People v. Jardine (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 907, 915-916 [172 Cal.Rptr. 408].)
*505The probative value of a prior conviction which has been diminished for remoteness is clearly outweighed by the probability of prejudice where the evidence of the conviction is unnecessarily cumulative. “ ‘[T]he prosecution has no right to present cumulative evidence which creates a substantial danger of undue prejudice to the defendant.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Cardenas (1982) 31 Cal.3d 897, 905 [184 Cal.Rptr. 165, 647 P.2d 569] [italics added].) This is essentially what the Jardine court recognized when it found Rollo error in a ruling which permitted the use of multiple priors for impeachment. (See People v. Jardine, supra, 116 Cal.App.3d 907 at p. 916.) Contrary to the statement in the majority opinion here, the Jardine court did not indulge in the “implicit assumption that one prior felony is the limit when the issue is credibility”: it held in effect that the use of one prior is enough when the use of another operates to prejudice the defendant unnecessarily, which occurred in the present case.
I therefore conclude that the trial court’s ruling which permitted the remote and similar robbery conviction to be used for impeachment was an abuse of discretion according to Rollo, Jardine, and the other authorities I have cited above. In this regard, there was no waiver in defense counsel’s silence when the prosecutor used the 1977 conviction for impeachment without mentioning that it was for burglary. The episode had nothing to do with the trial court’s abuse of discretion in permitting impeachment with the 1971 conviction of robbery.
m
I also disagree with the majority’s disposition of appellant’s contention, based on Brasfield v. United States (1926) 272 U.S. 448 [71 L.Ed. 345, 47 S.Ct. 135], that the verdict of guilt was effectively coerced when the trial court requested and received a report of numerical division of the jurors when the foreman reported that they were apparently deadlocked. The court did not ask how many jurors were for conviction or acquittal. The request having been thus limited, the majority holds that it was proper on the authority of a statement in People v. Carter (1968) 68 Cal.2d 810 [69 Cal.Rptr. 297, 442 P.2d 353]. (See id., at p. 815.) The statement is contrary to the federal rule pronounced in Brasfield (see my fn. 1, post), and the majority is correct in observing that “the Brasfield rule ... has not been followed in the California courts.”
After the Carter court made the statement approving a limited request for a deadlocked jury’s “numerical division,” it reversed a criminal conviction on the ground that the jury had been coerced in fact. (See People v. Carter, supra, 68 Cal.2d 810 at pp. 815-821.) The statement itself is thus dictum which is not binding on this court. (6 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1971) Appeal, § 676, p. 4589.) We might feel constrained to follow it if it were persuasive, but I *506question its validity because the decisions cited for it were People v. Lammers (1951) 108 Cal.App.2d 279, 280 [236 P.2d 667], and People v. Curtis (1939) 36 Cal.App.2d 306, 325 [98 P.2d 228], (See People v. Carter, supra, at p. 815.)
In Curtis, the court approved the trial court’s limited request for the numerical division of the jury on the authority of People v. Talkington (1935) 8 Cal.App.2d 75 [47 P.2d 368] and People v. Von Badenthal (1935) 8 Cal.App.2d 404 [48 P.2d 82]. (See People v. Curtis, supra, 36 Cal.App.2d 306 at pp. 324-326.) The court in Von Badenthal had reached that result on the sole authority of Talkington. (See People v. Von Badenthal, supra, at p. 410.) In Lammers, the court reached the same result on the authority of Talkington and Curtis. (See People v. Lammers, supra, 108 Cal.App.2d 279 at pp. 281-282.) The Carter dictum thus originates in Talkington, which was the first California decision analyzing Brasfield v. United States. (See People v. Talkington, supra, at p. 84.) The Talkington court egregiously misinterpreted the Brasfield rule in the process. (See ibid.)1 The misinterpretation in effect pervades the holdings in Curtis and Lammers, and through them it pervades the dictum in Carter.
I believe that Brasfield should be followed in California, particularly in light of recent decisions by our Supreme Court prohibiting trial court conduct conducive to the coercion of minority members of deadlocked juries. (See People v. Gainer (1977) 19 Cal.3d 835, 847-851 [139 Cal.Rptr. 861, 566 P.2d 992]; see also People v. Cook (1983) 33 Cal.3d 400, 411 [189 Cal.Rptr. 159, 658 P.2d 86] [quoting Gainer and citing the necessity of preserving “values identified in that decision”].) Lacking persuasive precedent requiring that the *507Brasfield rule be ignored in this state, I would apply it in the present case and find reversible error as claimed.

IV

Whether the jury’s verdict was coerced or not, the sequence in which it was finally reached is highly relevant to the question of harmless error. The jurors had deliberated for three full days before their apparent deadlock was reported to the trial court. During the long deliberations, they requested and received a rereading of the testimony given by two witnesses who had been near the scene of the fatal stabbing but who had not seen it. The jurors also requested and received a rereading of the testimony given by appellant, who was the only living eyewitness to the stabbing (and who claimed self-defense). After three days, the jurors stood at “twelve to nothing” on the “charge of murder,” which meant in legal effect that they were on the brink of acquitting appellant of murder in any degree. They also stood at “[o]ne to eleven” on voluntary manslaughter and at “[z]ero” on involuntary manslaughter. I cannot guess what prompted them to find appellant guilty of murder in the second degree after that, but the pattern of indecision dramatically demonstrates the “closeness of this case.” (I again use the majority’s description.)
In this state of the record, I perceive a reasonable probability that a result more favorable to appellant—specifically, a verdict finding him guilty of voluntary manslaughter at worst—would have occurred in the absence of the several errors I have defined above. I am also of the opinion that the errors have produced a miscarriage of justice. I would reverse the judgment of conviction on these grounds.2 (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 834-838 [299 P.2d 243]; see also Witkin, Cal. Criminal Procedure (1963) § 755, p. 728 [standards of appellate review in a “close case”]; Witkin, op. cit. (1978 supp.) § 755, pp. 1060-1061 [same].)
A petition for a rehearing was denied March 22, 1983. Rattigan, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted. Appellant’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied June 2, 1983.

The question before the United States Supreme Court in Brasfield was whether the trial court in a criminal case had committed reversible error by asking the jury “how it was divided numerically, . . . although a response indicating the vote in favor of or against conviction was neither sought nor obtained.” (See Brasfield v. Unites States, supra, 272 U.S. 448 at p. 449 [71 L.Ed. 345 at p. 346].) The court found reversible error, stating: “We deem it essential to the fair and impartial conduct of the trial, that the inquiry itself should be regarded as ground for reversal. Such procedure serves no useful purpose that cannot be attained by questions not requiring the jury to reveal the nature or extent of its division. Its effect upon a divided jury will often depend upon circumstances which cannot properly be known to the trial judge or to the appellate courts and may vary widely in different situations, but in general its tendency is coercive. It can rarely be resorted to without bringing to bear in some degree, serious although not measurable, an improper influence upon the jury, from whose deliberations every consideration other than that of the evidence and the law as expounded in a proper charge, should be excluded. Such a practice, which is never useful and is generally harmful, is not to be sanctioned. ” (272 U.S. at p. 450 [71 L.Ed. at p. 346].)
The Talkington court cited this holding for the following statement: “While a number of cases might be cited to the effect that reversible error was not committed when the trial court simply asked as to the numerical division of a jury, the great weight of authority is to the effect, however, that reversible error is committed if the trial court, in addition to asking the numerical division of the jury, also asks as to how they have voted with reference to the guilt or innocence of the defendant.” (People v. Talkington, supra, 8 Cal.App.2d 75 at p. 84 [italics added].) I have shown above that the “also” question was not asked of the jurors in Brasfield.

I should acknowledge at this point that my conclusions with regard to Disbrow and Rollo error raise questions concerning the effect of “Proposition 8” (i.e., Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subds. (d) and (f)), which was adopted by the voters after the present case was tried and the appeal was taken. According to my reading of the majority opinion, it does not reach these questions because of its holdings that the Disbrow error was harmless and that there was no Rollo error at all. (See maj. opn., fns. 1 and 3.) As I have just stated in the text, I have found a miscarriage of justice. The basis of my finding includes the Disbrow and Rollo errors, as I see them, but it is not limited to them. There is nothing in Proposition 8 which requires a miscarriage of justice to stand, and I know of no authority to the effect that it operates retroactively for purposes of an appeal which was taken before its adoption. For these reasons, I also find it unnecessary to consider Proposition 8 or its effect.