Court Opinion

ID: 9849391
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:39:24.968042+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:21.747283
License: Public Domain

*662Robert W. Hansen, J.
(dissenting). Monroe, Wisconsin is served by two common carriers in truck shipments to and from Madison and Milwaukee. One, Gateway Transportation, provides single-line service operating through its Janesville terminal. The other, Robertson Transportation, provides joint-line service, meaning that it can truck between Monroe and Madison or Monroe and Milwaukee by transferring cargoes for a portion of the trip to trucks of cooperating carriers. The applicant-appellant, Robertson Transportation, seeks by its application to provide single-line service instead of the joint-line service presently authorized. This straightening out of the kinks in the authorized service of Robertson Transportation is described by the Public Service Commission in its decision as a “streamlining” and a “coordination” of routes. That seems to be an accurate description, and it is all that is here involved.
The majority affirms, upholding the commission’s decision that such streamlining and coordination of an existing service would not serve the public interest. I would reverse, relying upon the fact-finding of the commission that “Applicant could provide a more efficient and economical service to the public if its certificate is streamlined and service coordinated between routes,” and finding no substantial evidence in the entire record that such improvement in an existing service is not in the public interest.
The legislature has clearly determined that this type of application is to be granted or denied “. . . as the public interest may require, upon a finding of public convenience and necessity, . . .” taking “. . . into consideration existing transportation facilities in the territory proposed to be served . . . .” (Sec. 194.23, Stats.) The legislature has as clearly provided that the judicial review of a commission decision “. . . shall be confined to the record, . . . The court may affirm the decision of the agency, or may reverse or modify it if the sub*663stantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced as a result of the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions being . . . unsupported by substantial evidence in view of the entire record as submitted; . . .” (Sec. 227.20 (1) (d), Stats.) As the majority opinion points out, the term “substantial evidence” requires only that “. . . upon an examination of the entire record, the evidence including the inferences therefrom, . . .” it is clear that “. . . a reasonable man, acting reasonably, might have reached the decision; but, on the other hand, if a reasonable man, acting reasonably, could not have reached the decision from the evidence and its inferences then the decision is not supported by substantial evidence and it should be set aside.” 1 (Emphasis supplied.)
Our position is that the facts here established do not sustain what the statute calls the “. . . inferences, conclusions or decisions . . .” made by the commission. The “reasonable mind” test applies to the drawing of inferences, the reaching of conclusions and the issuing of a decision as well as to the fact-finding function.
Most of the space in the briefs and most of the time on oral argument dealt, pro and con, with the following paragraph in the public service commission’s decision: “Gateway serves single-line from Madison, Milwaukee, La Crosse, and Eau Claire to Monroe and Janesville. It has generally provided an overnight service, although there were some allegations from public witnesses that such was not the case.” Appellant’s counsel spiritedly contends that the finding of “overnight service” made by the commission is unsupported by the evidence and cites complaints by shippers made at the hearing. In rebuttal, Gateway presented one witness, its terminal manager who produced records of shipments made during four *664selected weeks to corroborate the claim of “overnight service.” As to the disputed issue on whether Gateway service was in fact “overnight service,” the writer would agree that the commission’s finding that it was resolves the issue. However, twenty-one shipper-witnesses who testified complained, not only that the Gateway service often took more than twenty-four hours, but also that deliveries were made at inconvenient times (late in the day), that goods were mishandled, lost and delivered in a wet condition on occasion, that service on complaints and tracing lost shipments was poor. Such complaints were not answered so there is no foundation for any finding that service was “generally satisfactory.” Reasons for dissatisfaction with both the single-line Gateway service and joint-line Robertson service were given by the witnesses who testified at the hearing. From the testimony presented, no reasonable inference can be drawn either that the present service is satisfactory, or that existing services could not be improved. As to the question of satisfactoriness of existing services, the trial court, reviewing this record, stated:
“In conclusion, we feel constrained to add that if we were only dealing with the issue of quality of service as applied to the public interest, we would feel compelled to reverse the commission. Our own feeling is that the quality of service offered to shippers at Monroe would be improved should the requested amendment to Robertson’s authority be granted.”
Actually, either as to the single-line service of Gateway or joint-line service of Robertson, the uncontroverted testimony clearly establishes that the presently existing services are not satisfactory in all regards. While on oral argument, the commission attorney stated that there are always cranks to complain about any service, there is nothing in the record to identify the twenty-one shippers on the Monroe-Madison-Milwaukee run who appeared in support of the application as either cranks *665or unworthy of belief. For what it adds up to, their testimony is the only testimony in the entire record as to quantity and quality of service, except for the sample four weeks of documentary evidence related only to the issue as to “overnight service.” Such documentary evidence standing alone is insufficient to support an inference or the conclusion that the existing services are “generally satisfactory.” Certainly, it was not satisfactory to the users of the service who testified. The documentary evidence of next-day shipments simply did not deal with nor relate to all the areas of shipper complaint.
It seems obvious, however, that, in reaching its decision to deny the applicant’s request to improve its service, the commission was not basing its rejection on enthusiasm for the adequacy of existing services. Its action rests on its consideration of the interests of one of the two common carriers authorized by it to serve the Monroe area. In the commission brief, it is stated: “In this case we are dealing with transportation between points where the traffic is ‘thin.’ No responsible person would advocate that there be further dilution of traffic that is already described as ‘thin,’ absent some unusual circumstances, which is not present here.”
The “thinness” of the shipping traffic using either Gateway or the Eobertson service is overwhelmingly established by the record. As the commission brief points out: “The Wisconsin intrastate traffic to and from Monroe is very light . . . The Gateway witness testified on the eastbound movement that ‘we are very lucky to fill a trailer a week ....’” At the hearing before the commission, it was undisputed that Monroe shipments were very light, the traffic out of Monroe being about one trailer per week. The commission concluded that so miniscule a pie was too small to further divide. This knife cuts two ways. In its decision, the commission correctly states: “There is merit in removing restrictions wherever pos*666sible without damaging the competitive situation in the common carrier field . . . However, restrictions should be lifted as to each individual route only in those cases where doing so would not materially affect major operations of objecting carriers . . . .” Gateway is a giant in the common-carrier field in the United States. The record in this case includes the company’s annual report for the year preceding the calendar year in which this application was filed. With gross operating revenues for the year of over forty-one million dollars, and a net operating revenue of over three and one-half million dollars, Gateway is no dwarf in the transportation industry. Can the Monroe-bound traffic here involved of less than a trailer a day and the Monroe-originating shipments of less than one trailer per week be said to have a material effect upon major operations of Gateway? Can the marginal and peripheral interest of a nationwide shipper in a city from which it transferred its terminal building be reason for withholding approval of an application that would otherwise be in the public interest?
Consideration of existing facilities is related directly to the impact, favorable or unfavorable, upon the totality of service to the area, present and future, of granting or denying an application. Here the commission itself has found that an existing transportation facility “could provide a more efficient and economical service to the public” if “its certificate is streamlined and service coordinated between routes.”
We deal here with no question of establishing a competing common carrier service ab initio. The classic confrontation of monopoly versus competition in the transportation field is not present here. By commission action and policies, there are two common carriers, not only authorized but actually transporting freight between Monroe and Madison, between Monroe and Milwaukee. The question of whether there should be one or two common carriers serving Monroe has been answered. Not only is Robertson, as well as *667Gateway, franchised to serve the Monroe area, hut, on the strength of such commission authorization, Robertson has established a terminal in Monroe. The relevant statute includes all existing facilities when it authorizes the commission to take into consideration “. . . existing transportation facilities in the territory proposed to be served . . .” Both Robertson and Gateway are such existing transportation facilities, already serving the territory. Monroe is not a territory proposed to be served by a new carrier. It is a territory proposed to be better served by an existing facility that the commission has found could provide “. . . a more efficient and economical service to the public . . .” if its application were to be granted. In this situation, with the fact of improvement of service found to be a consequence of granting the application, there appears to be a compelling reason for putting first and foremost the predictable overall improvement of the existing services. To do otherwise is to dilute the test of serving the “public interest, upon a finding of public convenience and necessity” to a pale, pale shadow.
We would not quarrel with this statement in the commission’s brief: “It is also well known that if the traffic on any tranportation operation is too ‘thin’ and hence of marginal profitability at best, the service tends to drop off, which drop-off is accentuated with a further drop in traffic.” This is what has been happening to Monroe shipments to and from Madison and Milwaukee. This could be called “The Case of the Descending Spiral.” The present shipping setup is, it is conceded, improvable. The present volume of business is, everybody admits, not very great. Regardless of whether the chicken or the egg came first, the two factors will continue to interact. Several shippers testified that, dissatisfied with the existing common carrier service, they are using their own trucks and even buses for shipments between Monroe and Madison-Milwaukee. The service “tends to drop off” as the traffic declines. The traffic declines as the service “tends to *668drop off.” The status quo predictably will deteriorate. If the streamlining and coordinating of applicant’s service could, as the commission found, “. . . provide a more efficient and economical service to the public . . .” is that not in the public interest considering both the public convenience and necessity and the slender impact of so “thin” an operation of the common carriers involved? I think so and would hold that the Public Service Commission has in fact issued a certificate of public inconvenience, drawing inferences and reaching a conclusion not warranted by the facts established at its hearing. The foundation of facts does not support the superstructure of the conclusions reached.
The legislative mandate to the Public Service Commission is to promote the public interest, considering all existing facilities in determining what will best serve the public convenience and necessity. Where the commission has found that the service to the public provided by an existing facility would be improved by granting an application to streamline operations and coordinate routes, the application should have been granted.

 Muskego-Norway Consolidated Schools Joint School Dist. No. 9 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board (1967), 35 Wis. 2d 540, 558, 151 N. W. 2d 617.