Court Opinion

ID: 9599029
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:13:54.620872+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:43.826633
License: Public Domain

McMurray, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. In my view, however much we sympathize with the plaintiffs, we are not authorized to affirm the judgment enforcing against the defendant County a claim based on a contract which is not spread upon the minutes of the County’s proceedings.
Plaintiffs Sam S. Hause and Bob D. Hause, doing business as Hause Brothers, brought this verified “COMPLAINT ON ACCOUNT” against defendant Cherokee County, Georgia (“the County”), demanding to be paid “for services rendered to the Cherokee County Sheriff’s Department for towing and storage services. . . .” Certain “vehicles [were] in the possession of Plaintiff [sic] under the direction of the Sheriff’s Department for the purpose of impound and storage with expenses accruing thereon daily.” The complaint also alleged the County acted in bad faith in refusing to pay and demanded interest due on a commercial account under OCGA § 7-4-16. By amendment, plaintiffs alleged that the County still refused to pay, after plaintiffs agreed to a 50 percent reduction in the amount claimed as storage, despite a county ordinance authorizing a daily storage rate at $10 per day per item stored. Plaintiffs demanded $153,620 as the principal sum.
The County denied the material allegations, and subsequently moved to dismiss the action because the agreement was not in writing. Meanwhile, plaintiffs moved for summary judgment. After hearing both motions, the trial court ruled that the 12-month limitation period established at OCGA § 36-11-1 barred collection of any amounts accruing before February 3, 1994, but held the County liable despite the absence of a written agreement, reasoning that since the contract for services was completed by plaintiffs, the instant lawsuit “concerns not so much enforcement of a contract, but collection of an acknowledged debt. To hold otherwise would make it impossible for a county to obtain services without providing a written contract in advance.” In a subsequent order, the trial court granted plaintiff judgment in the principal amount of $42,900.
In three related enumerations of error, the County contends the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the action in its entirety, arguing plaintiffs may not attempt to collect on an unwritten contract. The County also contends the trial court erred in ruling the Sheriff could contract on behalf of the County. Plaintiffs reply that the “CHEROKEE COUNTY WRECKER ORDINANCE, . . . CHAPTER 3-25, ARTICLE II, OF THE CODE OF CHEROKEE COUNTY,” amounts to just such a writing, spread upon the minutes of the County Commission. I agree with the County in this case and would reverse the trial court’s money judgment.
*583“All contracts entered into by the county governing authority with other persons in behalf of the county shall be in writing and entered on its minutes.” OCGA § 36-10-1. “Oral contracts on behalf of a county have repeatedly been held to be void[.]” City of Warrenton v. Johnson, 235 Ga. 665, 666 (221 SE2d 249). “A mere oral agreement is unenforceable even though it be embodied or recited in a resolution adopted by the county commissioners and entered on the minutes.” Murray County v. Pickering, 42 Ga. App. 739 (1) (157 SE 343).
The Cherokee County Wrecker ordinance defines an approved wrecker service as: “Any wrecker service which submits a successful application . . . and which otherwise [qualifies] for the privilege of engagement by the Sheriff’s Office for the removal or storage of vehicles.” Cherokee County Code, Section 3-25-21. “Whenever any vehicle is removed by a wrecker service at the direction of the Sheriffs Office, the police officer shall make a thorough inventory of all equipment, accessories, personal articles and other items either attached to or located within the vehicle. . . . Upon acceptance of the vehicle and prior to its removal, the agent or employee of the wrecker service . . . shall sign the inventory form.” Cherokee County Code, Section 3-25-29 (a). ‘Whenever specifically directed to do so by the Sheriffs Office, the wrecker service shall hold vehicles for evidence, confiscation or any other purpose permitted by law.” Cherokee County Code, Section 3-25-30. The County Code also prescribes detailed security requirements for impound lots and directs each approved wrecker service to submit “an inventory every two (2) weeks of all vehicles remaining in its possession and unclaimed by the owner.” Cherokee County Code, Section 3-25-34 (d). The County Code also establishes a schedule of permitted fees and requires each approved wrecker service to “post in a conspicuous place on its premises a sign stating . . . : Note: The maximum fees which may be charged by wrecker services for removal and/or storage have been established by a county ordinance. You are entitled to a copy of the fee schedule upon request. Inquiries and complaints concerning any fees charged should be made to the Cherokee County Sheriffs Office.” Cherokee County Code, Section 3-25-37 (c).
An approved wrecker service “shall confine its operations to the zone assigned to it. : . .” Cherokee County Code, Section 3-25-31. “Zone assignments shall be valid for four (4) year periods. . . .” Cherokee County Code, Section 3-25-39 (a).
In my view, this ordinance, by which the county commission agreed to enter into a series of requirement contracts with each approved wrecker service, is not itself a sufficient writing entered upon the minutes of the county commission. Murray County v. Pickering, 42 Ga. App. 739 (1), supra. Consequently, I would hold that the trial court erred in failing to dismiss this action to collect for towing *584and storage services previously rendered on the ground there was no writing to comply with OCGA § 36-10-1. I express no opinion on the commission’s authority to specify the County’s requirements for law enforcement-related towing and storage services.
Decided November 5, 1997
Reconsideration denied December 2, 1997
Robert M. Mahler, for appellant.
Ted B. Herbert, John R. Earl, for appellees.
I am authorized to state that Judge Eldridge joins in this dissent.