Court Opinion

ID: 9494257
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:33:09.476318+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:56:18.498464
License: Public Domain

MOORE, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
Because I disagree with the majority’s determination that Williams is not entitled to a writ of habeas corpus because of ineffective assistance of counsel during the sentencing phase of his trial, I respectfully dissent from the corresponding portion of the majority’s opinion. Unlike the majority, I believe that the state courts’ decision on Williams’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim involved an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent, specifically of the legal standards set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).
We review de novo a district court’s decision on a petition for writ of habeas corpus. See Carter v. Bell, 218 F.3d 581, 590 (6th Cir.2000). As we previously noted in Williams v. Coyle, 167 F.3d 1036 (6th Cir.1999), this case is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), and under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), this court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus for any claim adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the adjudication:
(1)resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2)resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
*70928 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2) (2000) (emphasis added); see also Penry v. Johnson, 531 U.S. 1003, 121 S.Ct. 1910, 1918, 150 L.Ed.2d 9 (2001). In Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000), the Supreme Court explained the precise meaning of the language in § 2254(d)(1), which is at issue here. The Supreme Court explained that a state court’s decision is “contrary to” clearly established Supreme Court precedent when it is “opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law” or faces a set of facts that are “materially indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme Court precedent” and arrives at an opposite result. Id. at 405, 120 S.Ct. 1495. The Supreme Court further explained that a state court decision involves an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent when it correctly identifies the governing legal principle in the case but applies that principle to the facts of the defendant’s case in an objectively unreasonable manner. Id. at 407-09, 120 S.Ct. 1495; see also Penry, 531 U.S. 1003, 121 S.Ct. at 1918.
“The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The Supreme Court has recognized that “[a] capital sentencing proceeding like the one involved in this case ... is sufficiently like a trial in its adversarial format and in the existence of standards for decision ... that counsel’s role in the proceeding is comparable to counsel’s role at trial.” Id. at 686-87, 104 S.Ct. 2052. As the majority notes, a defendant must satisfy the well-known, two-part test set forth in Strickland to prove a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel:
First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.
Id. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052.
With regard to the performance prong of the two-part test, a defendant must show that his counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. In reviewing the reasonableness of such counsel’s performance, courts must be highly deferential and must be careful “to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.” Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. “[Strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation.” Id. at 690-91, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (emphasis added). In essence, a “defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy’ ” to satisfy the performance prong of the Strickland test. Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. With regard to the prejudice prong of the two-part Strickland test, a “defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. “It *710is not enough for the defendant to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding.” Id. at 693, 104 S.Ct. 2052.
I. BACKGROUND
In the state courts, Williams argued that he was denied effective assistance of counsel during the sentencing phase of his trial because his counsel failed to investigate possible mitigating factors adequately and failed to develop and present a coherent theory of mitigation to the jury. Specifically, Williams claimed that his attorneys failed to obtain pertinent background information on him by neglecting to interview family members other than his father and his sister Deborah and by neglecting to request school and juvenile facility records relevant to his psycho-social development; that his attorneys failed to prepare witnesses for the testimony they were to give during the sentencing phase of his trial; and that his attorneys failed to request the appointment of a psychological expert who could comment on his psychosocial development and the mitigating circumstances resulting therefrom.
The Eighth Amendment requires that a jury be permitted to consider evidence proffered by the defendant regarding the circumstances of the crime and the defendant’s background and character during the sentencing phase of a capital trial. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978). As the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized, because the adversarial testing process “generally will not function properly unless defense counsel has done some investigation ... ‘counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.’ ” Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 384, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052); see also Williams, 529 U.S. at 397, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (acknowledging that the defendant’s trial counsel had an “obligation to conduct a thorough investigation of the defendant’s background”).1 Therefore, if counsel’s failure to investigate is not due to strategic concerns and is unreasonable considering all the circumstances, such failure to investigate may constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-89, 104 S.Ct. 2052.
Under Ohio’s death penalty statute, a sentencing jury must weigh the aggravating circumstances of a defendant’s capital offense against the “nature and circumstances of the offense, [and] the history, character, and background of the offender” before recommending a death sentence. Ohio Rev.Code § 2929.04(B) (1982). The statutory mitigating factors that may considered by the jury in a capital case include the following:
(1) Whether the victim of the offense induced or facilitated it;
(2) Whether it is unlikely that the offense would have been committed, *711but for the fact that the offender was under duress, coercion, or strong provocation;'
(3) Whether, at the time of committing the offense, the offender, because of a mental disease or defect, lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law;
(4) The youth of the offender;
(5) The offender’s lack of a significant history of prior criminal convictions and delinquency adjudications;
(6) If the offender was a participant in the offense but not the principal offender, the degree of the offender’s participation in the offense and the degree of the offender’s participation in the acts that led to the death of the victim;
(7) Any other factors that are relevant to the issue of whether the offender should be sentenced to death.
Ohio Rev.Code § 2929.04(B)(1)-(7) (1982).
During the sentencing phase of Williams’s trial, his attorneys presented the testimony of three persons: (1) Olivia Smith Packnett, the mother of one of Williams’s childhood friends; (2) Deborah Williams, Williams’s younger sister; and (3) Lewis Williams, Sr., Williams’s birth father. Williams then gave unsworn testimony before the jury on his own behalf.
Ms. Packnett was the first witness to testify during the sentencing phase. She testified that she had known Williams since he was a child; that Williams often stayed at her house when there was no gas at his mother’s house and when his mother put him out; that she had never known Williams to be violent; and that she believed Williams to be a respectful and “excellent fellow.” Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) at 2083-88. On cross-examination, however, Ms. Packnett revealed that she was unaware of Williams’s repeated troubles in juvenile court and his arrests as an adult for grand theft and aggravated robbery. J.A. at 2089-92.
Deborah Williams was the second witness to testify. She testified that her parents separated when Williams was about six years old; that Williams had no stable home; and that he often slept over at friends’ homes or in her car. J.A. at 2093-96. According to Deborah Williams, her brother’s attorneys were derelict in preparing her to give testimony before the jury, having only spoken to her for five minutes immediately before she testified and advising her only to “explain [Williams’s] life” at the hearing. J.A. at 1066.
Lewis Williams, Sr. followed Deborah Williams at the sentencing hearing. He testified that he “wasn’t with the family as much as maybe [he] should have been, but whenever [Williams] called [him] or anything, [he] was there. Whenever [he] could be with [him].” J.A. at 2099. Lewis Williams, Sr. also testified that he felt that Williams “cared more for his mother then[sic] he did himself, but times, as if he was being rejected by his mother for some reason.” J.A. at 2101. According to Lewis Williams, Sr., his son’s attorneys “did not fully explain to [him] the purpose of [his] testimony or to what [he] would be testifying.” J.A. at Í061. On top of that, Lewis Williams, Sr. claimed that the attorneys interviewed him for twenty-five to thirty minutes only and asked him very few questions about Williams’s background. J.A. at 1061.
Williams was the last person to take the stand and gave an unsworn statement to the jury. On the stand, Williams stated that he was twenty-four years old, see J.A. at 2103; that he first became involved with the law at age nine for running away from *712home, see J.A. at 2104-05; that he spent many of his formative years at different boys’ institutions, see J.A. at 2105-09; and that the highest grade he had completed was the ninth grade, see J.A. at 2103. Williams also testified that, although he had the option of going to jail or staying at home when he was arrested for the first time as an adult, he went to jail “to try and hurt [his] family, to see if they really cared.” J.A. at 2112.
The last state court to render a written decision on Williams’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel during the sentencing phase was the Ohio Court of Appeals in a post-conviction proceeding.2 The Ohio Court of Appeals denied this claim, stating that the additional evidence that Williams had presented in his post-conviction petition was merely cumulative to the testimony already given during the sentencing phase of his trial and that it did not demonstrate the required diminished responsibility. It then held that Williams’s counsel performance was not deficient. It explained:
Here, Williams presented a variety of witnesses in the penalty phase. Olivia Packnett, the mother of one of Williams’ friends, testified that Williams has always been well-behaved and respectful at home. Debra Williams, defendant’s sister, testified about the instability of defendant’s home life. Lewis Williams, Sr., defendant’s father, testified that he did not spend much time with defendant and that defendant’s mother rejected him. Defendant himself proffered un-sworn testimony of his criminal conduct that started at the age of nine which was designed to get his family’s attention. He stated that he was blamed for all of the family’s problems and spoke up about his troubled relationship with his mother.
In his petition for post conviction relief, Williams submitted a mass of affidavits. Such affidavits, however, add only additional detail to support his original mitigation theory: that he pursued a life of crime to compensate for a troubled childhood. Such evidence does not demonstrate the diminished responsibility that the legislature considered to be mitigating. Therefore, we do not believe that counsel’s performance was deficient by failing to present certain evidence during the mitigation phase of the trial. The absence of such testimony did not prejudice Williams so as to render the result unreliable.
State v. Williams, 74 Ohio App.3d 686, 600 N.E.2d 298, 304 (Ohio Ct.App.1991) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
The district court also concluded that Williams had not been denied effective assistance of counsel during the sentencing phase of his trial. Specifically, the district court determined that:
the information contained in [the post-conviction] affidavits [of family members, friends, and professionals was] simply additional evidence of Williams’ troubled childhood — a topic that counsel presented at the mitigation hearing.... That [counsel] chose to call as witnesses those persons directly involved in his upbringing (his father and sister) to establish the conditions of his childhood, rather than relying upon the testimony of more extended family and friends, was a reasonable tactical choice.... Even assuming that counsel’s failure to interview more of Williams’ family members and friends was unreasonable, *713there is nothing in the record to suggest that had this additional information been presented to the jury their recommendation would have been different.
J.A. at 179-80. With regard to the allegations that Williams’s attorneys failed to prepare witnesses for their testimony, the district court held that “there is no minimum number of meetings between counsel and witnesses necessary to prepare an attorney to provide effective assistance of counsel” and that ‘Williams ‘fail[ed] to explain how the lack of consultation affected the outcome of the [hearing].’ ” J.A. at 181 (citation omitted). The district court also determined that Williams had failed to “identify the information in [his] records [from school and the juvenile and correctional facilities in which he had been incarcerated] that would have convinced a jury to spare his life” and that Williams’s attorneys were not “ineffective for not requesting assistance of ‘a psychological expert’ ” in light of Williams’s refusal to cooperate with psychologists during a pre-trial competency hearing and his refusal “to speak ill of his family” at his sentencing hearing. J.A. at 182-83.
Finally, the district court held that the presentation of mitigating evidence by Williams’s attorneys was not ineffective. In so doing, the district court noted that Williams’s attorneys presented two theories of mitigation, that Williams’s troubled childhood had led him to a life of crime and that the criminal justice system had let Williams down by not rehabilitating him. The district court further stated that “Williams himself thwarted the force of these arguments by refusing to disclose any relevant information.” J.A. at 184. The district court conceded the weaknesses of the pre-hearing investigation and the presentation of mitigating evidence, however, stating:
In the end, the Court agrees that the defense presented little (if any) relevant mitigating evidence to the jury at the hearing. However, this absence resulted more from the lack of such evidence than from the ineffectiveness of Williams’ counsel. To be sure, defense counsel could have been more thorough in the pre-hearing investigation and the presentation of evidence. The defense theories, of-mitigation could have been better developed. Nevertheless in light of the absence of any mitigating evidence, the Court concludes that even if counsel’s performance ‘fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,’ there is not ‘a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the results of the proceeding would have been different.’
J.A. at 185 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052).
II. ANALYSIS
After careful review, I conclude that the Ohio Court of Appeals’ decision on Williams’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel during the sentencing phase constituted an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent. In my opinion, although the Ohio Court of Appeals correctly identified the governing legal principles in this case, it then unreasonably applied them to the facts. In concluding that the performance of Williams’s attorneys was not deficient because the attorneys had a theory of mitigation and presented some (although very little) evidence in support of that theory to the jury, the Ohio Court of Appeals misunderstood the purpose of allowing a capital defendant to present mitigating evidence at his sentencing hearing. In capital cases, the outcome of a sentencing hearing turns upon the weight of the competing evidence presented by the parties. It is a simple matter of weighing aggravating fac*714tors against mitigating factors. Thus, Williams’s attorneys were obligated to do more than simply think of a theory and present sparse evidence in support in order to provide effective assistance of counsel to Williams in his sentencing hearing; they also needed to investigate and gather facts to support that theory and to present the theory in a coherent manner. It was objectively unreasonable for the Ohio Court of Appeals to conclude, without any analysis whether Williams’s attorneys were deficient in collecting readily available evidence of mitigating factors, that Williams’s attorneys provided him effective assistance of counsel during the sentencing phase of his trial. In other words, the Ohio Court of Appeals was objectively unreasonable in failing to recognize that the affidavits introduced in the post-conviction proceedings revealed the failure by Williams’s attorneys adequately to investigate his background for meaningful mitigating factors and to prepare mitigation witnesses for their testimony during the sentencing hearing. As a result, the court also failed to uncover how the attorneys’ failure to conduct a proper investigation prevented them from laying the very foundation for their mitigation theories and effectively left Williams without any theory of mitigation at all.
A. Analysis Of Pre-Hearing Investigation
First, I believe that the Ohio Court of Appeals unreasonably determined that Williams did not demonstrate that his attorneys’ pre-hearing investigation and preparation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. At the outset, I note that the lack of investigatory actions by Williams’s attorneys cannot reasonably be considered a “strategic choice[ ] made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2062 (emphasis added). The investigation by Williams’s attorneys was anything but thorough, consisting solely of one thirty-minute interview with Williams’s father before the sentencing hearing; one five-minute discussion with Williams’s sister Deborah, just immediately before she gave her testimony at the hearing; an interview of unspecified time with the mother of one of Williams’s childhood friends,3 and a request for “a very limited psychiatric evaluation from the Cleveland Court Clinic [in 1983] that did not meet the usual standards of investigation for a mitigation psychiatric/psychological evaluation.” J.A. at 674 (Aff. of Dr. Nancy Schmidt Goessling). To conclude that such investigatory actions were constitutionally adequate is not only completely erroneous but objectively unreasonable. After all, the very core of a capital sentencing hearing is the jury’s balancing of evidence of mitigating and aggravating factors. If only a minimal investigation is completed by defense counsel to gather evidence of mitigating factors, then there is nothing to place in the balance before the jury to the tip the scales in favor of a life sentence.
Additionally, I do not believe that the investigatory actions of Williams’s attorneys can reasonably be considered a “strategic choice[ ] made after [a] less than complete investigation ... [such] that reasonable professional judgments supported] the limitations on [their] investigation.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (emphasis added). Indeed, one would be hard-pressed to find any situation in which it would be sound professional judgment for an attorney not to inform a witness in a capital sentencing *715hearing of the very purpose of the hearing. And yet, Williams’s attorneys failed to explain such purpose to two key sentencing witnesses, Williams’s father and his sister Deborah. J.A. at 1061 (Aff. of Lewis Williams, Sr.) (noting that the attorneys “did not fully explain to [him] the purpose of [his] testimony or to what [he] would be testifying”); J.A. at 1066 (Aff. of Deborah Williams) (stating that “[a]lthough [she] was contacted by Lewis’s trial attorney, ... [he] spent only about five minutes interviewing [her]” and “[t]his was just prior to [her] testimony”). Such failure to inform two of Williams’s three witnesses, especially the only two family members to testify during the sentencing hearing, negated the very reason for having these witnesses testify on behalf of Williams in the' first place because it did not allow either witness an opportunity to think of the events or disadvantages in Williams’s life that would have helped to support a life sentence recommendation as opposed to a death sentence.
Furthermore, I do not believe that there is any basis for concluding that the attorneys’ decisions limiting which family members to interview or the attorneys’ failure to request pertinent records concerning Williams’s psycho-social and intellectual development resulted from the exercise of reasonable professional judgment or sound strategy. Cf. Williams, 529 U.S. at 395-96, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (noting the importance of the defendant’s school and juvenile records). Dr. Nancy Schmidt Goessling, a psychologist who was familiar with the type of. preparation required in capital cases, asserted in her affidavit of January 1988 that, according to the standards at the time:
Any preparation for a capital case should involve obtaining extensive background of the defendant including the defendant’s developmental experiences, the family of origin’s functioning and dynamics, the parenting capacities of the defendant’s parents, the defendant’s intellectual .functioning, including but not limited to academic and work performance, the defendant’s work capacities and experiences, the defendant’s ability to relate to others both in intimate and social situations, the defendant’s sexual and marital history, the defendant’s medical history, and the defendant’s psychological functioning across his lifetime.
J.A. at 672-73 (Aff. of Dr. Nancy Schmidt Goessling, ¶ 7). Dr. Schmidt Goessling further explained that such information should be pursued through “extensive interviews of family members, including aunts and uncles, grandparents, cousins, etc. as well as the nuclear family” and that “records should be obtained from schools, treatment sites, courts and employers.” J.A. at 673 (Aff. of Dr. Nancy Schmidt Goessling, ¶ 8). According to Dr. Schmidt Goessling, in this case, defense counsel failed adequately to research Williams’s background for possible mitigating information by failing to (1) make collateral contact with Williams’s family, friends, teachers, employers, and significant others; (2) obtain records of prior treatment sites for Williams and Williams’s school and work records; and (3) obtain an independent psychiatric/psychological evaluation of Williams. J.A. at 673-74; see also J.A. at 697-702 (1988 Aff. of Gerald G. Simmons, Esq.) (noting that the performance of Williams’s attorneys at the sentencing phase constituted ineffective assistance of counsel because the attorneys failed to investigate Williams’s family life and failed to hire a psychological expert to explain Williams’s behavior in light of psycho-social development); J.A. at 1096-1100 (1987 Aff. of Dr. Susan D. Schorr) (asserting that Williams’s attorneys failed to develop a complete life history of Williams *716through interviews, failed to collect necessary records or documentary-evidence, and “further failed to present this to a licensed psychologist and then to develop a cohesive theory of mitigation”).
In light of all this evidence, the attorneys’ preparation was wholly inadequate. Williams’s attorneys not only failed to speak with his core family members, who were willing to testify on his behalf, but also failed to make efforts to obtain records to learn and gather the background information necessary to support their own theories of mitigation. Indeed, the attorneys did not even attempt to contact Williams’s mother, nor did they contact his other sister Pamela, or his mother’s sister and his aunt Shirley Boykin, who had lived with Williams and his family at one point, all of whom asserted that they would have testified on Williams’s behalf if asked.
Had Williams’s attorneys simply discussed Williams’s life with core family members such as his mother, his sister Pamela, and his aunt Shirley, and interviewed Williams’s sister Deborah for more than a mere five minutes, they likely would have discovered the following possible mitigating information: (1) that Williams’s mother often chose abusive partners, including Williams’s stepfather, and that Williams witnessed some of this abuse, including at least one instance in which Williams’s mother was hospitalized, see J.A. at 676 (Schmidt Goessling Aff.), 1064 (Deborah Williams Aff.), 1129 (Shirley Boykin Aff.); (2) that Williams’s father smoked marijuana and sold large quantities of marijuana in his store, see J.A. at 1066 (Deborah Williams Aff.), 1124 (Robert Thomas Aff.), 1129 (Shirley Boykin Aff.); (3) that Williams was using drugs as serious as cocaine by age thirteen, see J.A. at 1065 (Deborah Williams Aff.); (7) that only one of the five Williams children had graduated from high school, see J.A. at 1071(Bonnie Williams Aff.), 1102 (Pamela Williams Aff.); and (8) that, as a child, Williams was whipped as often as three or four times a week by his father, including with a switch, belt, and extension cord, see J.A. at 1104 (Pamela Williams Aff.). The attorneys may have also obtained information from Williams’s relatives that is in direct contradiction to the harmful testimony given by Lewis Williams, Sr., who claimed during the sentencing phase that, although absent from the home, he was there for Williams whenever he could be there. The record is replete with sworn statements from relatives and friends indicating the exact opposite-that Williams’s father was not “there” for any of his children. See, e.g., J.A. at 1063-64 (Deborah Williams Aff.) (“My father wasn’t there for us.... Dad was never there for us.”). Furthermore, his attorneys likely would have discovered additional information that Dr. Schmidt Goessling had learned in the process of reviewing Williams’s life history, such as the fact that Williams was sexually molested by a cousin when he was five or six years old and that Williams had prostituted himself with men for money when he was a teenager. See J.A. at 677 (Schmidt-Goessling Aff.).
Finally, had Williams’s attorney taken the time to obtain Williams’s school, juvenile, and treatment records,4 they would *717have discovered that Williams’s mother had sought psychological treatment for him at the Child Diagnostic Center at the age of ll.5 More importantly, the attorneys may have obtained the very records needed to give a meaningful presentation of one of their mitigation theories (as identified by the district court), that the juvenile justice system had failed Williams. Such records would have detailed exactly how the system had failed Williams, including its failure to meet his psychological and emotional needs. See J.A. at 672-81 (Schmidt-Goessling Aff.) (providing an explanation for why juvenile facilities reinforced Williams’s criminal behavior, rather than rehabilitated him).
In sum, had the attorneys met the minimal standards of investigation necessary to obtain relevant mitigating information, see Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 384, 106 S.Ct. 2674 they could have presented relevant mitigating information to the jury. The attorneys failed, however, to perform an adequate investigation and instead unreasonably limited the number of persons they interviewed and neglected to prepare even those persons for their testimony at the sentencing hearing. Therefore, I would hold that Williams has sufficiently demonstrated that his attorneys’ inadequate investigation and preparation of mitigation evidence constituted deficient performance under the first prong of the Strickland test. See, e.g., Williams, 529 U.S. at 395, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (concluding that the state supreme court’s decision was contrary to and an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent in Strickland where “[t]he record established] that counsel did not begin to prepare for [the sentencing] phase of the proceeding until a week before the trial” and “failed to conduct an investigation that would have uncovered extensive records graphically describing [the defendant’s] nightmarish childhood, not because of any strategic calculation but because they incorrectly thought that state law barred access to such records”).
B. Presentation Of Evidence During Sentencing Phase
I also believe that Williams has sufficiently demonstrated. that his attorneys’ presentation of evidence during the sentencing phase was inadequate under the *718performance prong of the Strickland test. Specifically, I believe that, as a result of their poor investigation and preparation of mitigating evidence, Williams’s attorneys gave an objectively unreasonable presentation of the mitigating evidence during the sentencing phase'of Williams’s trial.6
To begin, the opening statement of Williams’s counsel was at best neutral, consisting in its entirety only of the following three sentences, in which counsel stated:
Ladies and gentlemen, there will be a number of witnesses who will be before you to give some testimony with reference to the background of Lewis Williams, Jr. I will ask you to listen to their testimony carefully. It is our view that it is extremely important that you do and that you weigh it as you do other evidence and follow the instruction that the Court will give you about Lewis Williams, Jr. Thank you.
J.A. at 2080. Inexplicably, counsel did not even begin the sentencing hearing with a request for mercy on Williams.
The body of counsel’s presentation of the witnesses’ testimony during the sentencing hearing was equally deplorable and reflected little preparation. For example, defense counsel’s failure to prepare Deborah Williams for her testimony and to explain the purpose of mitigating evidence to her significantly hurt Williams because it resulted in Deborah’s omission of valuable mitigating evidence (that she included in her post-conviction affidavit) from her testimony, including information concerning Lewis Williams, Sr.’s absence from and lack of involvement in the lives of his children, see J.A. at 1063-64 (Deborah Williams Aff.); Williams’s witnessing the abuse of his mother by his stepfather, including one instance that resulted in his mother’s hospitalization, see J.A. at 1064 (Deborah Williams Aff.); Lewis Williams, Sr.’s use of marijuana, see J.A. at 1065 (Deborah Williams Aff.); and Williams’s early use of cocaine at age 13, see J.A. at 1065 (Deborah Williams Aff.). Likewise, the prosecution’s cross-examination of Ms. Packnett revealed that defense counsel had no knowledge of Ms. Packnett’s familiarity with Williams. As the prosecution’s cross-examination revealed, Ms. Packnett hardly knew any facts regarding Williams’s life after his childhood and was completely unaware of Williams’s criminal history. Ms. Packnett’s lack of familiarity with Williams effectively erased any positive effect of her testimony. For while the jury could clearly see that Ms. Packnett had good intentions in testifying on behalf of Williams, the jury likely discredited her testimony that Williams was an “excellent fellow” because of her complete lack of knowledge regarding Williams’s criminal history. In essence, the jury likely felt that Ms. Packnett’s supportive testimony for Williams was completely negated by the fact that she was not even familiar enough with Williams to know that he had spent time in jail.
More importantly, I believe that, as a result of the attorneys’ failure to investigate Williams’s background properly, they failed to present meaningful evidence to support their two theories of mitigation during the sentencing phase: (1) that Williams’s troubled childhood had led him to a life of crime; and (2) that the criminal justice system had let Williams down by not rehabilitating him. After all, their first theory was meaningless without an actual presentation of the very troubled childhood that led Williams to a life a crime, a childhood that the attorneys failed to support factually because they neglect*719ed to interview Williams’s family members and to obtain his school and psychological records. Likewise, their second theory was meaningless without an investigation and review of Williams’s juvenile and prison records, which would have revealed more information about Williams’s incarceration in state facilities, including details concerning any failed attempts of rehabilitation. In essence, without presenting evidence of a troubled childhood and information on the actual failures of the state criminal justice system, the attorneys’ questioning of Williams and presentation of mitigating evidence, which revealed Williams’s long history of juvenile and then adult crimes, and counsel’s closing argument (spanning no more than three and a half transcript pages), in which counsel reiterated this long history, tended only to support a death sentence recommendation, as they did nothing to shift moral culpability away from Williams. In fact, the district court suggested as much when it stated “that the defense presented little (if any) relevant mitigating evidence to the jury at the hearing.” J.A. at 185 (emphasis added). In conclusion, because of his attorneys’ failure to prepare witnesses and to gather necessary background information to support their mitigation theories, I would also hold that Williams has sufficiently shown that his attorneys’ deficient presentation of evidence during the sentencing phase of his trial satisfies the performance prong of the Strickland test.
C. Prejudice
Finally, I believe that the Ohio Court of Appeals unreasonably applied the legal standards of Strickland when it determined that Williams failed to show that he was prejudiced by his counsel’s performance during the sentencing phase. In my opinion, the performance of Williams’s attorneys during the sentencing phase was so deficient that it undermined confidence in the jury’s recommendation of the death penalty.
As I previously noted, a jury must be permitted to consider mitigating evidence proffered by a defendant during the sentencing phase of a capital trial, and defense counsel must meet minimal standards of investigation to obtain such evidence for the jury. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604, 98 S.Ct. 2954; Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 384, 106 S.Ct. 2574 (relying on Strickland). In this case, Williams’s attorneys failed to meet these minimal standards of investigation by unnecessarily limiting their investigation to two family members, one family friend, and one report from the court clinic. As I explained above, this, in effect, deprived Williams of the opportunity to present any valuable mitigating evidence, all of which was easily accessible, to the jury during the sentencing phase and left nothing for the jury to weigh against the prosecution’s proof of aggravating factors. Given the wealth of information that the attorneys could have presented regarding Williams’s troubled life, see supra, and the ease with which the attorneys could have obtained such information, it is difficult to imagine how the attorneys’ failure to conduct a proper investigation and then present meaningful mitigating evidence did not prejudice Williams. After all, the very reason for allowing a capital defendant to present mitigating evidence to a jury is so that the jury may consider and weigh these factors against the aggravating circumstances of the defendant’s offense to determine whether the defendant’s life should be spared. In this case, although defense counsel had two theories of mitigation, they failed to provide readily available factual support for both of their theories and, as a result, essential*720ly left the jury with no choice but to recommend the death penalty.
Not only did Williams’s attorneys fail to present any meaningful mitigating evidence at the sentencing phase, they also placed harmful and damaging evidence before the jury. For example, because the attorneys failed to explain the purpose of mitigating evidence to Williams’s father, Lewis Sr. gave damaging testimony during the sentencing hearing when he faded to acknowledge his absence from Williams’s life and how such absence contributed to Williams’s troubled childhood and life of crime. Lewis Sr. stated that “whenever [Williams] called [him] or anything, [he] was there.” J.A. at 2099. He also claimed, “Well as his father, I spent as much time as I possibly could, as I said. When he was away or wasn’t home, I would go over to visit him and keep a close contact with him as much as I possibly could, when it was possible.” J.A. at 2101. Additionally, without the mitigating factual support to show why Williams was led to a life of crime or how the criminal justice system had failed Williams, the attorneys’ presentation of Williams’s criminal track record as a juvenile and an adult was similarly damaging, as it suggested that Williams was incapable of rehabilitation.
It was an objectively unreasonable conclusion to hold that the presentation of such theories of mitigation by defense counsel without any adequate investigation into, preparation of, and development of the factual foundation for the theories constituted effective assistance of counsel. As the Supreme Court noted in Strickland, “[t]hat a person who happens to be a lawyer is present at trial alongside the accused, however, is not enough to satisfy the constitutional command.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 685, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The lawyer must assist the defendant in his trial and be an advocate for his cause. Id. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052.
In essence, in this case where counsel neglected to perform an adequate investigation of Williams’s background to identify mitigating evidence and prepare witnesses, and, as a result, essentially presented no mitigating evidence to the jury for Williams, it was an unreasonable application of the law established in Strickland to hold that there was no reasonable probability that the jury would have arrived at a different outcome had counsel’s performance not been deficient. In fact, I believe that this case is strikingly similar to Williams v. Taylor, in which the Supreme Court concluded that the Virginia Supreme Court’s decision regarding defense counsel’s performance during the sentencing phase and the prejudice resulting therefrom was both contrary to and an unreasonable application of its precedent.
In Williams v. Taylor, Justice Stevens, writing for six Justices in Part IV of his opinion, held that the defendant Terry Williams had been prejudiced by his counsel’s failure to investigate and uncover “extensive records graphically describing [Terry] Williams’ nightmarish childhood,” including the facts that “that [Terry] Williams was ‘borderline mentally retarded’ and did not advance beyond the sixth grade;” that “[Terry] Williams’ parents had been imprisoned for the criminal neglect of [Terry] Williams and his siblings, that [Terry] Williams had been severely beaten by his father, that he had been committed to the custody of the social services bureau for two years during his parents’ incarceration (including one stint in an abusive foster home), and then, after his parents were released from prison, had been returned to his parents’ custody”; that Terry Williams was commended for helping to crack a prison drug ring and for returning a guard’s missing wallet; and *721that Terry Williams was considered by prison officials as the inmate “ ‘least likely to act in a violent, dangerous or provocative way.’ ” Williams, 529 U.S. at 395-96, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (citation omitted). Justice Stevens further wrote that such failure to investigate was not because of any strategic calculation and that the state supreme court unreasonably applied clearly established Supreme Court precedent to the facts of the case by failing to “evaluate the totality of the available mitigation evidence — both that adduced at trial, and the evidence adduced in the habeas proceeding — in reweighing it against the evidence in aggravation.” Id. at 397-98, 120 S.Ct. 1495. Finally, Justice Stevens concluded that “the graphic description of [Terry] Williams’ childhood, filled with abuse and privation, or the reality that he was ‘borderline mentally retarded,’ might well have influenced the jury’s appraisal of his moral culpability.” Id. at 398, 120 S.Ct. 1495. Likewise, Justice O’Connor, who concurred on the Strickland analysis just described and who was also joined by Justice Kennedy in Part III of her opinion, also concluded that counsel for Terry Williams was constitutionally ineffective on similar grounds and that state supreme court’s determination that Terry Williams had not been prejudiced by such performance was an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent. After noting several accounts of the undiscovered mitigation evidence, Justice O’Connor asserted that “[t]he consequence of counsel’s failure to conduct the requisite, diligent investigation into his client’s troubling background and unique personal circumstances manifested itself during his generic, unapologetic closing argument, which provided the jury with no reasons to spare petitioner’s life.” Id. at 415, 120 S.Ct. 1495. Justice O’Connor then explained that the Virginia Supreme Court’s decision involved an unreasonable application of clearly established law because it “reveal[ed] an obvious failure to consider the totality of the omitted mitigation evidence.” Id. at 416, 120 S.Ct. 1495.
In this case, the Ohio Court of Appeals displayed its failure to consider the totality of the mitigating evidence. Had Lewis Williams’s attorneys conducted a proper investigation, they would have uncovered mitigating evidence that is quite similar to that noted in Williams v. Taylor, including molestation at five or six years old; Williams’s witnessing the serious, physical abuse of his mother by his stepfather; the use of cocaine as early as thirteen years old; the regular sale of marijuana by Williams’s father; frequent beatings of Williams with objects such as extension cords; Williams’s failure to complete schooling higher than the ninth grade; and Williams’s low IQ.7 Like the six-justice majority in Williams v. Taylor, I believe that a description of Lewis Williams’s childhood, filled with sexual abuse and drug use and exposure to drugs at a young age, and parental neglect might well have influenced the jury’s appraisal of Williams’s moral culpability. In sum, I would hold that Williams was prejudiced by his counsel’s deficient performance during the sentencing phase and that it was objectively unreasonable for the Ohio Court of Appeals to conclude under Strickland that there was no reasonable probability that the jury would have recommended a life sentence had Williams’s counsel properly investigated his background, prepared his witnesses, and provided the jury a more detailed look into Williams’s background.
III. CONCLUSION
I believe that the Ohio Court of Appeals unreasonably applied clearly established *722Supreme Court precedent when it held that Williams had not satisfied either the performance or the prejudice prongs of the two-part Strickland test. In my opinion, Williams satisfied these two prongs by demonstrating that his attorneys neglected to conduct a proper investigation into his background, failed to inform mitigation witnesses of the purpose of presenting mitigating evidence during the sentencing phase and to prepare such witnesses for their testimony, and gave a counterproductive presentation of mitigation theories at trial. Therefore, I would reverse the district court’s decision to deny habeas corpus relief and would issue a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that Williams was denied effective assistance of counsel at the sentencing phase of his trial. I respectfully dissent.

. Although Williams v. Taylor was decided after Lewis Williams’s conviction became final and thus cannot serve as direct support of my analysis, it is still highly relevant to this case. Like this case, Williams v. Taylor concerns the habeas review of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in a case in which the defendant's conviction became final in 1988. See Williams v. Virginia, 234 Va. 168, 360 S.E.2d 361 (Va.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1020, 108 S.Ct. 733, 98 L.Ed.2d 681 (1988). Therefore, the Supreme Court's analysis under Strickland of the defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim in Williams v. Taylor sheds light not only on what may be considered reasonable professional norms at the relevant time but also on what conduct by counsel should withstand scrutiny under Strickland.

. On November 20, 1991, the Supreme Court of Ohio dismissed the appeal without opinion. As did the majority, I assume the dismissal was based upon the rationale of the Ohio Court of Appeals.

. This witness, Ms. Packnett, did not prepare and sign an affidavit for Williams's state post-conviction proceedings or for the district court.

. The majority contends that Williams presented no evidence that his counsel did not meet the professional standards of the time. See maj. op. ante at 705. As noted above, however, Williams presented a 1988 affidavit from Dr. Schmidt Goessling, which indicated that, according to the standards of the time, “records should [have been] obtained from schools, treatment sites, courts, and employers” to prepare for Williams’ sentencing hearing. J.A. at 673 (Schmidt Goessling Aff.) (emphasis added). See also Williams, 529 U.S. at 395-96, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (noting in the review of a conviction that became final in 1988 that *717the defendant’s school records contained mitigating evidence).
The majority also notes that there is no evidence that Williams’s attorneys failed to obtain Williams’s school and juvenile records. However, even if Williams's attorneys had these records in their possession, there is no strategic reason for electing not to present at least Williams's school records, which consisted of information on his low IQ of 76, even in light of Williams’s lack of cooperation and especially since such evidence may have been relevant to showing a mental defect or disease, one of the mitigating factors under Ohio Rev.Code § 2929.04(B).

. As I previously indicated, Williams's school records also revealed that Williams scored a 76 on an IQ test at age 11 and that Williams was on the borderline level of human intelligence, operating at approximately the sixth lowest measurable percentile. See Dep. of Dr. Eisenberg, p. 30-32; District Court Hearing Tr., p. 67-68. The Ohio Court of Appeals was not presented with this information. The district court held that this information was simply more of the same type of evidence which the Ohio Supreme Court already held does not mitigate the aggravating circumstance of a 'senselessly cruel aggravated murder in the course of an aggravated robbery.’ J.A. at 185 (quoting State v. Williams, 74 Ohio App.3d 686, 600 N.E.2d 298, 303 (Ohio Ct. App.1991)). Under Ohio's death penalty statute, however, this may have been relevant evidence of a mental defect or disease. See Ohio Rev.Code 2929.04(B)(3) (1982). See also Williams, 529 U.S. at 398, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (noting that borderline mental retardation is valuable mitigating evidence when viewed together with a horrific childhood).

. Even the district court conceded that “the defense at Williams's mitigation hearing was sparse and of questionable value.” J.A. at 174.

. Only the district court was aware of Williams's low IQ.