Court Opinion

ID: 9375918
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-01 15:01:25.961883+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:02.801393
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     GEORGE GWYNN,                                   DOCKET NUMBER
                 Appellant,                          DC-0432-16-0865-I-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY,                     DATE: February 28, 2023
                 Agency.

             THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           George Gwynn, Alexandria, Virginia, pro se.

           Byron D. Smalley, Esquire, and Davina Minnix, Washington, D.C., for the
             agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                 Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                       FINAL ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     affirmed his reduction in grade and pay under 5 U.S.C. chapter 43. Generally, we
     grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedent ial orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                        2

     decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based
     on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous
     application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings
     during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent
     with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting
     error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal
     argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not
     available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations,
     section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in
     this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under
     section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the
     petition for review.   Except as expressly MODIFIED regarding the agency’s
     burden of proof and the appellant’s affirmative defense of retaliation for equal
     employment opportunity (EEO) activity, we AFFIRM the initial decision.

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2        The appellant was an IR-0501-5 Supervisory Individual Taxpayer Specialist
     (ITS) for the agency, a position that he held from about 2006. Initial Appeal File
     (IAF), Tab 1 at 1, Tab 7 at 15, Tab 41 at 67. In this position, the appellant was
     responsible for running the daily operations of Taxpayer Assistance Centers
     (TACs) in Fredericksburg and Bailey’s Crossroads (in Fairfax County), Virginia.
     IAF, Tab 9 at 54, Tab 40 at 4, Tab 41 at 109. He worked under a performance
     plan with six critical elements. IAF, Tab 40 at 95-98. His performance year ran
     from October 1 through September 30. Id. at 95.
¶3        In October 2013, a new Territory Manager became the appellant’s
     first-level supervisor. Id. at 58. Shortly thereafter, beginning in November 2013,
     the appellant was hospitalized and took approximately 2 months of medical leave.
     IAF, Tab 1 at 28, Tab 40 at 66-67. By all accounts, the appellant’s relationship
     with the Territory Manager soon became rocky. On May 20, 2014, the Territory
                                                                                          3

     Manager issued the appellant a memorandum of counseling, criticizing the way
     he was managing his subordinates and recommending that he either change his
     management practices or return to a nonsupervisory position. IAF, Tab 40 at 81.
     The appellant filed an informal EEO complaint in June 2014, seeking rescission
     of the memorandum. IAF, Tab 7 at 29-30. The complaint went to mediation, but
     when no settlement resulted, the appellant elected not to pursue it any further.
     Id. at 29.     The Territory Manager continued to criticize the appellant’s
     performance both formally and informally throughout the year, including issuing
     seven additional memoranda of counseling; the appellant variously attempted to
     address or rebut the Territory Manager’s concerns. IAF, Tab 7 at 29-53, Tab 30
     at 387-97.
¶4        In the spring of 2015, the Territory Manager issued the appellant a poor
     midyear progress review and placed him on a 60-day performance improvement
     plan (PIP).    IAF, Tab 9 at 24-31, 52-58.        The appellant filed another EEO
     complaint     challenging   the   Territory    Manager’s    actions,    and   alleging
     discrimination based on race, color, and sex, and retaliation for his prior informal
     EEO complaint.     IAF, Tab 30 at 369.        In the April 30, 2015 PIP notice, the
     Territory Manager set forth the appellant’s performance standards and explained,
     with examples, how he failed to meet performance expectations during the firs t
     half of the 2014-2015 performance year in the following three critical elements:
     (1) Leadership and Human Capital Management, (2) Customer Service and
     Collaboration, and (3) Program Management.          Id. at 52-56. She informed the
     appellant that he would have 60 days to bring his performance to a minimally
     successful level, and that his failure to do so could result in an adverse
     employment action, including a reduction in grade.         Id. at 58.   The Territory
     Manager listed numerous improvements that the appellant needed to make during
     the PIP period in order to demonstrate acceptable performance, as well as nine
     specific “action items,” i.e., discrete tasks that the appellant needed to
     accomplish during the PIP period. Id. at 56-58. Some of these action items were
                                                                                    4

     to be implemented immediately, with the others to be accomplished by
     May 15 or 30, 2015, as specified. Id.
¶5        However, on June 4, 2015, before the end of the PIP period, the appellant
     underwent emergency surgery and went on extended medical leave until
     November 2, 2015. IAF, Tab 41 at 116. Upon his return, the appellant presented
     the Territory Manager with a letter from his doctor, stating that he was cleared
     for duty but would need frequent bathroom breaks, standing breaks, and an
     opportunity to telecommute, especially after pain-related medical appointments.
     IAF, Tab 40 at 70, Tab 41 at 35. The Territory Manager informed the appellant
     that the standing and bathroom breaks were no problem, but in light of his
     performance issues, she denied his request to telecommute.         IAF, Tab 40
     at 70-71. Instead, she informed the appellant that she would allow him to take
     leave whenever necessary for his medical appointments. Id. at 71. After taking
     some time to transition back to work, the appellant resumed the full range of his
     regular supervisory duties on November 30, 2015. Id. at 70.
¶6        Because the appellant started his leave about half way into his 60 -day PIP,
     the agency afforded him an additional 30 days, from December 1 through 30,
     2015, to demonstrate acceptable performance. IAF, Tab 9 at 32, Tab 30 at 364,
     Tab 40 at 60, Tab 41 at 111. Action items previously due on May 15, 2015, were
     now due on December 15, 2015, and action items previously due on May 30,
     2015, were now due on December 30, 2015. IAF, Tab 9 at 32. At the close of
     the PIP period, the Territory Manager determined that the appellant had
     successfully completed only seven of the 17 PIP tasks that she had assigned him.
     IAF, Tab 30 at 364-67, Tab 40 at 61-69. She therefore recommended that the
     appellant be removed from his position. IAF, Tab 30 at 367.
¶7        On March 25, 2016, the appellant’s second-line supervisor proposed his
     reduction in grade to GS-11 Senior Taxpayer Advisory Specialist based on
     inadequate performance in each of the three critical elements underlying the PIP.
     IAF, Tab 8 at 159-67. The appellant filed a third EEO complaint that same day.
                                                                                               5

     IAF, Tab 41 at 129.        After the appellant replied to the proposal letter, his
     third-line supervisor issued a decision on August 19, 2016, sustaining all the
     charges and specifications and effecting the proposed reduction in grade. IAF,
     Tab 7 at 22-24. On September 4, 2016, the appellant was reduced in grade and
     pay from IR-05 Supervisory Individual Tax Advisory Specialist, with an adjusted
     salary of $94,453, to GS-11 Individual Taxpayer Advisory Specialist, with an
     adjusted salary of $77,579. Id. at 15.
¶8         The appellant filed a Board appeal and waived his right to a hearing. IAF,
     Tabs 1, 38. He challenged the merits of the agency’s action and r aised several
     affirmative defenses, including disability discrimination and retaliation for EEO
     activity. IAF, Tab 32 at 3-4. After the close of the record, the administrative
     judge issued an initial decision, affirming the agency’s action and finding th at the
     appellant failed to prove his affirmative defenses. IAF, Tab 42, Initial Decision
     (ID). The appellant has filed a petition for review, again contesting the merits of
     the agency’s action, and disputing the administrative judge’s findings on his
     disability discrimination and EEO retaliation claims. 2 Petition for Review (PFR)
     File, Tab 4. The agency has filed a response to the petition for review, PFR File,
     Tab 6, and the appellant has filed a reply to the agency’s response, 3 PFR File,
     Tab 7.

     2
       The initial decision reflects that the appellant also raised affirmative defenses of
     harmful procedural error or violation of due process and discrimination based on race,
     color, and sex. ID at 21-25. Although the record shows that the appellant raised a
     harmful procedural error or due process defense, IAF, Tab 1 at 8, Tab 29 at 6-7, we
     were unable to find any clear indication that he attempted to raise a discrimination
     claim under Title VII. In any event, the administrative judge found that the appellant
     did not prove any of these claims, and the appellant does not contest the administrative
     judge’s findings on review. ID at 21-25; see 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115 (“The Board normally
     will consider only issues raised in a timely filed petition or cross petition for review.”).
     Therefore, we will not address these claims further.
     3
       After the close of the record on review, the appellant submitted a motion for leave to
     file additional evidence in the form of “documents/evidence that refutes several of the
     agency’s reasons for demoting the appellant.” PFR File, Tab 9. The appellant explains
                                                                                             6

                                           ANALYSIS
     The agency has proven its case by substantial evidence.
¶9         Before removing an employee for unacceptable performance under 5 U.S.C.
     chapter 43, an agency must satisfy certain procedural requirements. See 5 C.F.R.
     §§ 432.104-432.105.       Consequently, the agency’s case in chief consists of
     numerous elements, each of which it must prove by substantial evidence.               See
     5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(b)(1)(i).      The Board’s case law has not been particularly
     consistent in describing these elements of proof, and the Board has rendered
     various formulations of them over the years. Compare, e.g., White v. Department
     of Veterans Affairs, 120 M.S.P.R. 405, ¶ 5 (2013), with Muff v. Department of
     Commerce, 117 M.S.P.R. 291, ¶ 5 (2012), and Gonzalez v. Department of
     Transportation, 109 M.S.P.R. 250, ¶ 6 (2008), and Belcher v. Department of the
     Air Force, 82 M.S.P.R. 230, ¶ 4 (1999), and Kadlec v. Department of the Army,
     49 M.S.P.R. 534, 539 (1991).        The administrative judge in this case used yet
     another formulation of the agency’s burden as set forth in Brosseau v.
     Department of Agriculture, 97 M.S.P.R. 637, ¶ 20 (2003), according to which the
     agency must show that (1) the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) has
     approved the agency’s performance appraisal system; (2) the appellant’s
     performance standards were communicated to him; (3) the appellant failed to
     meet one or more critical elements of his position; and (4) he was given a
     reasonable opportunity to improve his performance. ID at 2.

     that he was unable to submit this evidence previously due to medical problems he was
     experiencing, the turmoil associated with relocating for his new job, and the withdrawal
     of his representative shortly before the scheduled hearing. Id. We find that the
     appellant has not described this evidence with sufficient specificity to show that it
     might be material to the outcome of the appeal. Nor has the appellant shown that these
     circumstances persisted 7 months after the close of the record on review, which was
     when he submitted his motion for leave to file. Cf. Blair v. Office of Personnel
     Management, 89 M.S.P.R. 113, ¶ 12 (2001) (holding that, to show good cause for an
     untimely filing, a party must address the entire period of the delay) , aff’d, 31 F. App’x
     646 (Fed. Cir. 2002). For these reasons, we deny the appellant’s motion.
                                                                                       7

  ¶10      After the initial decision in this appeal was issued, the Board issued an
      Opinion and Order in Lee v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 2022 MSPB 11,
      setting forth the elements of the agency’s case in light of recent Federal Circuit
      precedent in Santos v. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 990 F.3d
      1355 (Fed. Cir. 2021).     The Board held that, in an appeal of a chapter 43
      performance-based action, an agency must show by substantial evidence that
      (1) OPM approved its performance appraisal system and any significant changes
      thereto; (2) the agency communicated to the appellant the performance standards
      and critical elements of his position; (3) the appellant’s performance standards
      are valid under 5 U.S.C. § 4302(c)(1); (4) the appellant’s performance during the
      appraisal period was unacceptable in one or more critical elements ; (5) the
      agency warned the appellant of the inadequacies in his performance during the
      appraisal period and gave him an adequate opportunity to demonstrate acceptable
      performance; and (6) after an adequate improvement period, the appellant’s
      performance remained unacceptable in at least one critical element.           Lee,
      2022 MSPB 11, ¶ 15. This standard applies to all pending cases, regardless of
      when the events at issue took place. Id., ¶ 16. We will address each of these
      elements in turn.
¶11        In his initial decision, the administrative judge found that the agency
      submitted substantial evidence that OPM had approved its performance appraisal
      system, and that the matter was not in dispute. ID at 4. The appellant does not
      challenge the administrative judge’s finding on review, and for the reasons stated
      in the initial decision, we agree that the agency proved the first element of its
      case by substantial evidence.
¶12        The administrative judge also found that the agency proved by substantial
      evidence that it communicated to the appellant the performance standards and
      critical elements of his position. ID at 4-6. He found that the agency provided
      the appellant his performance standards and critical elements in writing at the
      beginning of the performance year in December 2014, at his midyear progress
                                                                                         8

      review in April 2015, and at the beginning of the PIP period later that month. ID
      at 5-6. He further found that the Territory Manager discussed these standards and
      elements with the appellant on each of these occasions. Id. The appellant does
      not dispute the administrative judge’s findings on review, and for the reasons
      explained in the initial decision, we agree with the administrative judge that the
      agency proved the second element of its case by substantial evidence.
¶13         Regarding the third element of the agency’s case, the Brosseau standard
      that the administrative judge cited does not state that the agency is required to
      prove that its performance standards are valid. ID at 2. Therefore, the standard
      as stated in Brosseau is incomplete. Nevertheless, citing relevant precedent, the
      administrative judge explicitly stated in his initial decision that the agency was
      required to establish performance standards that are valid, i.e. , standards that are
      reasonable, realistic, attainable, and clearly stated in writing, which inform the
      employee of what is necessary to achieve acceptable performance, and which are
      sufficiently specific to provide a firm benchmark toward which the employee
      must aim his performance. ID at 4-5; see Towne v. Department of the Air Force,
      120 M.S.P.R. 239, ¶ 21 (2013); Greer v. Department of the Army, 79 M.S.P.R.
      477, 483 (1998).       Applying this standard to the facts of the case, the
      administrative judge found that the agency proved by substantial evidence that its
      performance standards were valid. ID at 5, 26. The appellant does not contest
      the administrative judge’s finding on review, and we discern no basis to disturb
      it.
¶14         Regarding the fourth element of the agency’s case, the administrative judge
      found that the agency proved by substantial evidence that the appellant’s
      performance prior to the April 30, 2015 PIP was unacceptable, and that the
      agency notified him of this fact.     ID at 6-7.   In support of this finding, the
      administrative judge cited to several performance counseling memoranda that the
      agency issued to the appellant between January and April 2015, as well as the
      appellant’s unfavorable April 23, 2015 midyear progress review and the PIP
                                                                                        9

      notice itself, both of which contained numerous examples of instances in which
      the appellant demonstrated unacceptable performance.       ID at 6 -7; IAF, Tab 9
      at 24-29, 52-58, 68-69, 85-88. On petition for review, the appellant disputes each
      of the 13 examples of allegedly unacceptable performance that the Territory
      Manager used to justify the PIP, as well as the various counseling memoranda
      leading up to it. PFR File, Tab 4 at 5-14, 17-18, 20. We will review each of
      these examples in turn.
¶15          Under example 1, the Territory Manager stated that, every month, the
      appellant was required to complete reviews for all nine of his subordinates , but in
      October 2014, the appellant completed only seven. IAF, Tab 9 at 55. On review,
      the appellant argues that he was unaware that he was required to complete
      reviews for each and every one of his subordinates each month because the
      applicable agency manual only states that this “generally” is the case. PFR File,
      Tab 4 at 6.     However, the term “generally” implies that the rule that each
      subordinate must be reviewed every month would apply absent an exception, and
      the appellant has not identified the presence of any circumstances that would
      have warranted an exception for October 2014. The appellant also argues that he
      exceeded the one review per month requirement in the months follo wing
      October 2014.     Id.   However, even if this is true, this does not make his
      performance in this Leadership and Human Capital Management task acceptable
      for the month of October.
¶16          Under example 2, the Territory Manager alleged that, in December 2014,
      the appellant completed only three out of the seven reviews required for that
      month. IAF, Tab 9 at 55. On petition for review, the appellant disputes this
      allegation, arguing that he completed all seven of the required reviews. PFR File,
      Tab 4 at 6. He states that he informed the Territory Manager of this fact on
      May 15, 2015, in rebuttal to the PIP notice, but the Territory Manager ignored
      him.    Id.   We have considered the appellant’s argument, but we are not
      persuaded.      The specific and detailed information in the PIP notice, as
                                                                                          10

      corroborated by the Territory Manager’s comments in the appellant’s midyear
      progress review, constitutes valid evidence that the appellant, in fact, did not
      complete all of the required reviews in December 2014. 4 IAF, Tab 9 at 25, 55.
      There appears to be no documentary evidence of these reviews, such as receipt
      logs or copies of the reviews themselves, so the agency’s evidence can only be
      weighed against the appellant’s statement that he completed the reviews as
      required. PFR File, Tab 4 at 6. Under these circumstances, we find that the
      agency has presented substantial evidence that the appellant failed to complete all
      of the required reviews for December 2014.
¶17         Under example 3, the Territory Manager stated that the appellant was
      demonstrating unacceptable performance in the area of Customer Service and
      Collaboration, because neither the Fredericksburg nor the Bailey’s Crossroads
      TACs were meeting the area goal of 5% customer satisfaction according to
      customer surveys. IAF, Tab 9 at 55. On petition for review, the appellant argues
      that customer satisfaction surveys cannot reasonably be used to evaluate his
      performance because he has no control over how many people fill them out, and
      the customers who do fill them out do not necessarily constitute a representative
      sample of customers as a whole. PFR File, Tab 4 at 7. He also argues that the
      Territory Manager failed to consider that understaffing at his location contributed
      to dissatisfaction by customers. Id. For the reasons that the appellant explains
      on review, we agree with him that the results of customer satisfaction surveys are
      not entirely within his control. Nevertheless, we find that even if these survey
      results do not paint a complete picture of the appellant’s performance in

      4
       The Federal Circuit has held that specifications in a notice of proposed removal under
      chapter 43 that are corroborated by other evidence of record and are sufficiently
      detailed to be disputed by the appellant may be considered as forming part of the
      agency’s valid proof. DePauw v. U.S. International Trade Commission, 782 F.2d 1564,
      1566-67 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Delancy v. U.S. Postal Service, 88 M.S.P.R. 129, ¶ 8 (2001).
      We find it appropriate to apply the same rule to specifications of inadequate
      performance contained in a PIP notice.
                                                                                        11

      Customer Service and Collaboration, they still show the end results of the
      appellant’s efforts in this area and are therefore probative of the matter. The
      appellant does not dispute the factual accuracy of the Territory Manager’ s
      allegations, which are corroborated by her comments in the appellant’s midyear
      progress review. IAF, Tab 9 at 24, 55. Furthermore, even if some of the reasons
      for low customer satisfaction were attributable to understaffing, the Territory
      Manager explained that the appellant exacerbated the problem by having his
      subordinates specialize in specific tasks so that they were unable to fill in for
      coworkers who specialized in other tasks when those coworkers left the team or
      went on leave. Id. at 24, 26.
¶18        Under example 4, the Territory Manager stated that the appellant had
      demonstrated unacceptable performance in Customer Service and Collaboration
      during the first two quarters of fiscal year 2014, when waiting times at both the
      Fredericksburg and Bailey’s Crossroads TACs exceeded the established
      threshold, with waiting times of more than 30 minutes for 49% of customers and
      41% of customers respectively. 5 IAF, Tab 9 at 55. The appellant again attributes
      these wait times to understaffing, but as explained above, although understaffing
      likely contributed to these excessive wait times, substantial evidence shows that
      the appellant’s management practices contributed to the problem as well. PFR
      File, Tab 4 at 7; IAF, Tab 9 at 24, 26.
¶19        Under example 5, the Territory Manager stated that, on the morning of
      February 2, 2015, she attempted to contact the appellant at the Bailey’s
      Crossroads TAC but was unable to do so. Later, she got through to him at the
      Fredericksburg TAC, to which he had traveled without prior manage ment or
      budget approval. IAF, Tab 9 at 55. According to the Territory Manager, this
      demonstrated a failure in Leadership and Human Capital Management. Id. On

      5
       It appears that the standard is that no more than 30% of customers should be waiting
      more than 30 minutes for service. IAF, Tab 9 at 45.
                                                                                      12

      petition for review, the appellant argues, among other things, that his practice
      was to work out of both TACs because the previous Territory Manager had
      encouraged him to do so and he was unaware, prior to March 2015, that he
      needed prior approval to work out of the Fredericksburg TAC. PFR File, Tab 4
      at 8-9. Although the Territory Manager subsequently made clear to the appellant
      that he would need to obtain prior approval before traveling to , and working at,
      the Fredericksburg TAC, IAF, Tab 9 at 58, we find no evidence in the record that
      the appellant was aware of this requirement prior to Februa ry 2, 2015. Nor do we
      find that this requirement should have been obvious to the appellant, given that
      he was responsible for managing both TACs and they are within commuting
      distance of one another.    In the absence of some sort of evidence that the
      appellant had previously been instructed to obtain permission before working at
      the Fredericksburg TAC, we find that the agency has failed to present substantial
      evidence that the appellant’s actions on this day amounted to unacceptable
      performance.
¶20        Under example 6, the Territory Manager stated that, on March 10, 2015, the
      appellant demonstrated deficiency in Leadership and Human Capital Management
      when he worked from a “remote site” without her prior knowledge or approval.
      Id. at 55.   On review, the appellant asserts that this “remote site” was the
      Fredericksburg TAC, and March 10, 2015 was the first time that the Territory
      Manager raised this concern with him. PFR File, Tab 1 at 9. However, we find
      substantial evidence that the appellant should have known, b ased on his
      interaction with the Territory Manager in connection with example 5, that she
      expected the appellant to inform her when he was working out of the
      Fredericksburg TAC. Supra ¶ 19; IAF, Tab 9 at 55. We therefore find that the
      agency has shown by substantial evidence that the appellant’s failure to notify the
      Territory Manager of his work location on March 10, 2015, constituted
      unacceptable performance.
                                                                                           13

¶21         Under example 7, the Territory Manager stated that, on March 31, 2015, the
      appellant exhibited a deficiency in Program Management Responsibility when he
      attempted to improve wait time statistics by having his subordinates take
      customers out of order. IAF, Tab 9 at 55. She stated that only managers are
      allowed to search for and select customer tickets in this way, and when the
      appellant refused her counseling about this, she reset the workstations and
      changed the passwords to prevent it from happening again. Id. The Territory
      Manager’s statements are corroborated by other evidence in the record.             IAF,
      Tab 9 at 69-71.    On petition for review, the appellant argues that there is no
      agency manual that prohibits this practice and that he should have been praised
      for his initiative rather than placed on a PIP because of it. PFR File, Tab 4 at 9.
      However, we find substantial evidence that the appellant knew or should have
      known that this practice was improper; although it might work to improve his
      TACs’ statistics by reducing median wait times, it would also necessarily result
      in inordinately long wait times for some customers.             Indeed, the Territory
      Manager stated in the appellant’s April 23, 2015 midyear progress review that the
      agency’s computer system showed that some of his customers were experiencing
      wait times in excess of 5 hours. 6 IAF, Tab 9 at 24, 26.
¶22         Under example 8, the Territory Manager stated that the appellant was
      exhibiting unacceptable performance in Program Management Responsibility by
      not having the two Senior ITSs under his supervision conduct non -evaluative
      reviews of junior-level ITSs.      IAF, Tab 9 at 55.      According to the Territory
      Manager, each Senior ITS is required to conduct two non -evaluative reviews
      every month, but the Senior ITSs under the appellant’s supervision had never
      done so, even though they had both been in the job for more than 2 years. Id.

      6
        Although not mentioned in the PIP notice, the record also contains substantial
      evidence that the appellant attempted to manipulate the wait time statistics by having
      certain customers wait without a ticket so their wait times would not be captured by the
      system. IAF, Tab 9 at 41, 63.
                                                                                        14

      at 55, 68. On petition for review, the appellant argues that this requirement is not
      located in the agency’s Internal Revenue Manual, and although nonevaluative
      reviews are permitted, they are not mandatory.         PFR File, Tab 1 a t 10-11.
      However, we find that the agency has provided substantial evidence of Field
      Assistance expectations under which such reviews are, in fact, required. IAF,
      Tab 9 at 26, 30.
¶23        Under example 9, the Territory Manager stated that, between August 2014
      and February 2015, the appellant had failed to ensure that one of his subordinates
      had obtained a proper identification badge. IAF, Tab 9 at 56, 85. On petition for
      review, the appellant argues that he timely sent an email to the relevant Security
      Officer requesting that this employee be issued a badge, but the badge was never
      issued. PFR File, Tab 4 at 11. The appellant states that he did not become aware
      of the situation until January 2016, when he received an untimely email from the
      Territory Manager’s office regarding this employee’s travel request for the
      previous month. Id. We are not persuaded by the appellant’s attempt to blame
      the Territory Manager for this state of affairs.        Furthermore, although the
      Security Officer and the employee herself ma y be partly to blame, we find
      substantial evidence that the appellant also failed to carry out his responsibilities
      by following up to ensure that the credentialing he requested had been completed.
¶24        Under example 10, the Territory Manager stated that one of the appellant’s
      subordinates engaged in travel card abuse, and on January 7, 2015, the appellant
      was presented with “overwhelming evidence” of this abuse, including the
      subordinate’s admission of misconduct. IAF, Tab 9 at 56. She stated that she
      forwarded the appellant a disciplinary recommendation to sign and return, with
      any additional comments, but the appellant refused to do so. Id. According to
      the Territory Manager, this represented a failure in the Leadership and Human
      Capital Management element because the appellant failed to accept his
      managerial responsibilities and failed to follow her instructions on the matter. Id.
      at 88.   On petition for review, the appellant alleges that the disciplinary
                                                                                         15

      recommendation that the Territory Manager forwarded him was for a 3 -day
      suspension, and that he refused to sign it because it contained factual
      inaccuracies about the investigation and should have been is sued by the Territory
      Manager herself. PFR File, Tab 4 at 12-13. However, to the extent that this
      document contained factual inaccuracies, the appellant could have worked with
      the Territory Manager and Human Resources personnel to correct them, or he
      could have pointed them out in the additional comments that he was authorized to
      make. Furthermore, it does not appear to us that the appellant had a good faith
      belief that he was not authorized to sign the document, both because his Territory
      Manager   gave   him    explicit   authorization   and   because   his   duties   and
      responsibilities specifically provide that he “[d]ecides and enforces minor
      disciplinary measures, such as warnings and reprimands, [and] recommends other
      action in more serious cases.” IAF, Tab 9 at 54 . We find substantial evidence
      that the acts described in example 10 represent unacceptable performance.
¶25        Under Example 11, the Territory Manager alleged that, on the afternoon of
      Friday, January 30, 2015, at approximately 4:00 p.m., she was alerted to “an
      incident” involving two of the appellant’s subordinates. Id. at 56. Although she
      “immediately and repeatedly” attempted to contact the appellant by telephone,
      email, and Office Communications Server about the situation, she was unable to
      reach him until the following Monday. Id. According to the Territory Manager,
      this represented unacceptable performance in Leadership and Human Capital
      Management. Id. On petition for review, the appellant argues that he handled
      the situation appropriately. PFR File, Tab 4 at 13. He states that both he and the
      Territory Manager were alerted to the problem by the same email, and so he went
      to the parking garage at around 4:30 p.m. to ensure that both employees left for
      the day without incident.    Id.   When the appellant returned to his desk after
      5:00 p.m. and saw the Territory Manager’s messages, her Office Communications
      Server indicator light showed that she had already left for the day, so the
      appellant waited until Monday to follow up with her. Id. Even accepting the
                                                                                          16

      appellant’s explanation, we find substantial evidence that his failure to
      communicate with the Territory Manager in a timely manner represented
      unacceptable performance. The appellant knew as soon as he received the email
      in question that the Territory Manager had been alerted to this incident, so he
      should have notified her at that time that he was handling it, or failing that, he
      should have at least replied to her email or attempted to call her after he returned
      to his desk and before he left for the day.
¶26        Under example 12, the Territory Manager alleged that, on October 3, 2014,
      the appellant directed two Individual Taxpayer Assistance Specialists (ITAS s) to
      do the work of an Initial Assistance Representative (IAR) until further notice.
      IAF, Tab 9 at 56. She stated that the appellant instituted this directive to avoid
      addressing the performance and conduct issues of the IAR and that he should not
      have assigned lower-level work to higher-level employees for an indefinite period
      of time. She therefore asked that the appellant rescind his directive. 7 Id. On
      petition for review, the appellant explains that this was a short-term solution to
      an interpersonal conflict that had erupted between the IAR and another employee
      and was intended to separate these two employees physically until they had both
      calmed down. PFR File, Tab 4 at 13-14. He states that he assigned one ITAS to
      this role because her computer access had been restricted pending investigation,
      and she was unable to perform the full range of her proper duties anyway. He
      assigned the second ITAS only to fill in for the first ITAS when she was on break
      or otherwise away from the desk.         Id. at 14.    Although we understand the
      appellant’s rationale, we still find substantial evidence that his act ions constituted
      unacceptable performance in the area of Program Management. Specifically, we
      agree with the Territory Manager that the appellant was attempting to avoid

      7
        According to the appellant, ITASs perform a technical role in addressing substantive
      tax issues, whereas IARs are clerical employees who manage the front desk of the TAC.
      PFR File, Tab 4 at 13.
                                                                                     17

      taking disciplinary action against the IAR in question by hoping that his behavior
      would improve and shifting office resources in the meantime. IAF, Tab 9 at 56.
¶27          Under example 13, the Territory Manager alleged that, during an April 9,
      2015 operational review of the Bailey’s Crossroads TAC, she discovered that the
      appellant had not had a regular workgroup meeting with his subordinates for at
      least a month. Id. She stated, “I understand if a weekly meeting is cancelled due
      to unforeseen circumstances and even then a manager should prepare an email
      containing information sharing items, but going a month without communicating
      to your workgroup results in uninformed employees producing poor operational
      performance.” Id. On petition for review, the appellant argues that he normally
      conducted regular group meetings but had not done so in the m onth preceding
      April 9, 2015, because it was tax season and everyone was very busy. PFR File,
      Tab 4 at 14. Nevertheless, the appellant did walk around to each employee, have
      brief discussions with them, and send informative emails during this time period.
      Id. We find that the agency has failed to provide substantial evidence that the
      appellant’s failure to hold a group meeting between March 9 and April 9, 2015,
      constituted unsatisfactory performance.    As an initial matter, there does not
      appear to be any evidence of a rule or policy that requires TACs to have weekly
      meetings for their employees. The appellant’s Leadership and Human Capital
      Management performance standard requires that he “[p]romote[] open and honest
      exchange of information, taking employee perspective into account,” but even the
      Territory Manager admitted that this can sometimes be accomplished through
      email or other means, especially when circumstances prevent a formal group
      meeting. IAF, Tab 9 at 21, 56. Her assertion that the appellant had “gon[e] a
      month without communicating to [his] workgroup” is not supported by the
      record.   The appellant’s failure to communicate to his workgroup through a
      formal meeting does not equate to a failure to communicate to his workgroup at
      all.   Moreover, the agency does not contest the appellant’s assertion that he
                                                                                      18

      actually held regular workgroup meetings outside of the spring tax season. PFR
      File, Tab 4 at 14.
¶28        Regarding the performance counseling memoranda, the Territory Manager
      sent the appellant six of these between January and April 2015.         IAF, Tab 9
      at 68-69, 85-88. The subjects of these memoranda correspond to examples 5 and
      7-11 of the PIP notice, discussed above.     The appellant states on petition for
      review that, on April 8, 2015, he submitted a rebuttal to each memorandum,
      which he states is located at “Exhibit A.” PFR File, Tab 4 at 18.         We have
      carefully reviewed the extensive record in this appeal, and we have located two
      different documents labeled “Exhibit A,” but neither of them is the rebuttal
      memorandum to which the appellant is referring, IAF, Tab 29 at 10 -13, Tab 41
      at 28-31. Nor have we otherwise been able to locate this memorandum in the
      record. In any event, for the reasons explained above, we find that, with the
      exception of examples 5 and 13, the agency has provided substantial evidence
      that the appellant exhibited performance deficiencies leading up to the PIP, as
      alleged in the PIP notice. Even if some of the details contained in the counseling
      memoranda are inaccurate, we still find, based on the record as a whole, that the
      agency proved the fourth element of its case by substantial evidence.
¶29        Regarding the fifth and final element of the agency’s case in chief, the
      administrative judge found that the agency proved by substa ntial evidence that
      the PIP period provided the appellant a reasonable opportunity to demonstrate
      acceptable performance, but the appellant’s performance during that period
      remained unacceptable. ID at 7-12. Specifically, she found that the appellant
      failed to achieve numerous PIP requirements, as set forth in the notice of
      proposed removal, despite being given a reasonable amount of time to do so and
      biweekly coaching sessions to assist him. IAF, Tab 8 at 159 -67; ID at 10-12.
      The appellant disputes these findings on review.
¶30        Between December 11 and 17, 2015, the Bailey’s Crossroads TAC moved to
      a new office in Vienna, Virginia. IAF, Tab 41 at 109, 124. The appellant argues
                                                                                       19

      on review that this move caused a major disruption in operations and that it was
      unreasonable to expect him to fulfill the PIP expectations during that time. PFR
      File, Tab 4 at 35-36.     In particular, he disputes charge 1, specification 2,
      charge 2, specifications 3 and 4, and charge 3, specification 2 of the proposed
      reduction in grade. Id. at 36; IAF, Tab 8 at 160, 163, 166. He characterizes these
      specifications as concerning failure to respond to one email within an hour,
      failure to respond to another email within 3 hours, failure to complete all monthly
      employee reviews for December, and “lost equipment” that was merely misplaced
      by the movers. PFR File, Tab 4 at 36. We agree with the appellant that the
      office move was an extenuating circumstance that might excuse some lapses in
      performance during the relevant time period. We f ind, however, that it does not
      entirely excuse these particular lapses. First, regarding the emails, the disruption
      surrounding the office move might explain the appellant’s failure to respond
      promptly to the two “High Priority” emails, but it does not ex plain his failure to
      request extensions or his failure to give reasons for the late responses as charged.
      IAF, Tab 8 at 163.      Likewise, although it might be understandable or even
      expected that some items will be misplaced during an office move, this does not
      excuse the appellant’s failure to take appropriate steps to locate the equipment
      prior to ordering new equipment, as specified. Id. at 166. Finally, even if the
      office move might have interfered with the appellant’s ability to submit quality
      reviews for his subordinates in December 2015, it appears that this was the
      appellant’s second chance to do so–the first one being in May 2015, which was
      the first half of the PIP period before he went on medical leave. IAF, Tab 8
      at 160, Tab 9 at 57.    The December 2015 office move does not explain the
      appellant’s failure to submit the quality reviews during the May 2015 time
      period.
¶31        Again, regarding charge 1, specification 3, the appellant asserts that the
      notice of proposed removal is inaccurate because he did submit the quality
      reviews as directed. PFR File, Tab 4 at 36. However, the only evidence in the
                                                                                      20

      record regarding these reviews appears to be the Territory Manager’s declaration
      stating that they were never submitted, and the appellant’s admission during his
      response to the proposed reduction in grade that he did not complete them. IAF,
      Tab 8 at 11, Tab 40 at 61-62. We find that the agency has provided substantial
      evidence that the appellant did not complete this action item as directed.
¶32        The appellant also challenges charge 2, specification 1, which states that he
      failed to complete one of the PIP action items by not taking a particular training
      course as directed by the Territory Manager. PFR File, Tab 4 at 36; IAF, Tab 8
      at 162, Tab 9 at 57. The appellant argues on review, as he did below, that he
      attempted to take the course, but it was not available, and the training officials
      did not offer him any alternatives when he brought this to their attention. PFR
      File, Tab 4 at IAF, Tab 8 at 25. However, the appellant admitted below that he
      failed to contact the Territory Manager about the matter so that she could locate
      an alternative course for him or otherwise provide him assistance in completing
      this task. IAF, Tab 8 at 25. The appellant’s difficult working relationship with
      the Territory Manager does not excuse his failure to attempt to work with her in
      resolving this matter. We find that the agency has proven by substantial evidence
      that the appellant did not complete this PIP action item as direct ed.
¶33        The appellant also challenges charge 3, specification 4, which states that, in
      May 2015, the Territory Manager found a stale check at the Bailey’s Crossroads
      TAC that had been mishandled. PFR File, Tab 4 at 36; IAF, Tab 8 at 165-66.
      The agency alleged that when the Territory Manager instructed the appellant to
      give one of his subordinates an evaluative review to provide guidance on
      processing stale checks, the appellant refused, challenging the Territory
      Manager’s determination. IAF, Tab 8 at 166. On review, the appellant argues
      that the check was, in fact, processed, and that he had never been informed of any
      bright-line rule for when a check is considered stale. PFR File, Tab 4 at 36. We
      find, however, that the specification did not state that th e check had not been
      processed–only that it had not been processed correctly. IAF, Tab 8 at 165-66.
                                                                                            21

      We also find that the check at issue here was dated exactly 1 year before the date
      it was processed, and even in the absence of a bright-line rule for identifying
      stale checks, the appellant should have known that this particular check was at
      risk of not being honored by the bank. IAF, Tab 30 at 71, Tab 40 at 20. We
      note, however, that the record shows the appellant did not refuse to issue the
      evaluative review as alleged. IAF, Tab 8 at 60-61, Tab 9 at 64-65. We therefore
      find that the agency did not provide substantial evidence to support this portion
      of the specification. Nevertheless, the agency provided substantial evidence to
      show that the stale check was processed incorrectly and that the appellant failed
      to take initiative to address the matter, even after the Territory Manager brought
      it to his attention. IAF, Tab 40 at 45.
¶34         Finally, the appellant disputes charge 1, specification 5 and charge 2,
      specification 2. 8 PFR File, Tab 4 at 36; IAF, Tab 8 at 161-63. However, these
      matters pertain to incidents that occurred after the PIP period ended. IAF, Tab 8
      at 161-63.   We therefore find that they are immaterial to the central issue of
      whether the appellant demonstrated acceptable performance during the PIP
      period.
¶35         As a general matter, the appellant challenges the credibility of the Territory
      Manager’s declaration.       PFR File, Tab 4 at 15; IAF, Tab 40 at 56 -74.
      Specifically, he argues that the Territory Manager’s statement that his previous
      supervisor communicated some performance concerns to her is not believable in
      light of his prior performance accolades, and that this should cast doubt on the
      veracity of the remainder of the Territory Manager’s declaration.             PFR File,
      Tab 4 at 15.      However, we do not find it inherently improbable that the
      appellant’s former supervisor harbored some concerns about the appellant’s
      performance, even if these did not figure prominently in the appellant’s prior

      8
        The appellant mistakenly refers to charge 2, specification 2 as charge 2, specification
      1. PFR File, Tab 4 at 36.
                                                                                        22

      performance evaluations. In any event, in a chapter 43 appeal, an agency is only
      required to present substantial evidence in support of its action; it is not required
      to present evidence which is more persuasive than that presented by the
      appellant. Shuman v. Department of the Treasury, 23 M.S.P.R. 620, 624 (1984).
¶36        The appellant also argues that the notice of proposed removal was based
      partly on performance issues that preceded the PIP. PFR File, Tab 4 at 18, 20.
      However, as long as the appellant failed to demonstrate acceptable performance
      during the PIP period, there is nothing to prevent the agency from relying on
      performance deficiencies that occurred at any time during the year preceding the
      notice of proposed removal. See Brown v. Veterans Administration, 44 M.S.P.R.
      635, 640 (1990). For these reasons, we find that the appellant has provided no
      basis to disturb the administrative judge’s finding that the agency proved by
      substantial evidence all the elements of its case as set forth in Lee, 2022 MSPB
      11, ¶ 15. ID at 4-12.

      The appellant has not proven his affirmative defenses of disability discrimination.
¶37        The appellant raised affirmative defenses of disability discrimination under
      both reasonable accommodation and status-based treatment theories. ID at 14-23.
      The administrative judge considered both of these affirmative defe nses, but found
      that the appellant failed to prove them.       Id.   The appellant challenges the
      administrative judge’s findings on review. PFR File, Tab 4 at 5 -6, 15-17, 19-20.
¶38        To prove a disability discrimination claim based on failure to accommodate,
      the appellant must show that: (1) he is an individual with a disability, as defined
      by 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g); (2) he is a qualified individual with a disability, as
      defined by 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m); and (3) the agency failed to provide a
      reasonable accommodation.      Miller v. Department of the Army, 121 M.S.P.R.
      189, ¶ 13 (2014). In this case, the administrative judge found that the appellant is
      an individual with a disability, but that he is not a qualified individual with a
      disability, and in any event, the agency did not refuse him any reasonable
      accommodation. ID at 14-21.
                                                                                       23

¶39        On petition for review, the appellant argues that the Territory Manager
      ignored his request for reasonable accommodation, i.e., that he needed frequent
      bathroom breaks and an option to telework. PFR File, Tab 4 at 20; IAF, Tab 41
      at 35. However, the record shows that the Territory Manager did not ignore the
      appellant’s request for accommodation. She did respond to it, even though she
      offered the appellant leave as needed in lieu of the telework he requested. IAF,
      Tab 8 at 121-22, Tab 40 at 70-71; Tab 41 at 51. An employee is not entitled to
      the accommodation of his choice, but is only entitled to a reasonable and
      effective accommodation.     Miller, 121 M.S.P.R. 189, ¶ 21. The appellant has
      provided no basis to disturb the administrative judge’s finding that the agency
      provided him reasonable accommodations for his disability. ID at 20-21. In any
      event, the appellant does not contest the administrative judge’s finding that he
      was not a “qualified individual” with a disability, i.e., one who is able to perform
      the essential functions of the position he holds or desires with or without
      reasonable accommodation. ID at 16-18; 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (defining the term
      “qualified individual”). We see no basis to disturb the administrative judge’s
      finding on this issue, which is itself dispositive.   See Haas v. Department of
      Transportation, 2022 MSPB 36, ¶¶ 28-30.
¶40        To prove a status-based disability discrimination claim, the appellant must
      prove, at a minimum, that he is a qualified individual with a disability, and that
      his disability was a motivating factor in the challenged personnel action. See id.;
      Pridgen v. Office of Management and Budget, 2022 MSPB 31, ¶¶ 21-22, 40. In
      this case, the administrative judge found that the appellant provided insufficient
      evidence to show that his disability was a motivating factor in the agency’s
      action. ID at 21-23.
¶41        On petition for review, the appellant asserts several times that the Territory
      Manager knew of his disability, that she treated him more harshly that other
      non-disabled Supervisory ITASs, and that her actions were motivated by
      disability discrimination. PFR File, Tab 4 at 5-6, 9, 14-17, 19-20. We have
                                                                                          24

      considered the appellant’s arguments, but we find that they provide no basis to
      disturb the initial decision. The administrative judge found that, although the
      Territory Manager was aware of the appellant’s disability, she had a legitimate
      reason for treating him differently than the other Supervisory ITASs because
      none of them were exhibiting the same performance issues as the appellant. ID
      at 22; IAF, Tab 40 at 73; see Alford v. Department of Defense, 118 M.S.P.R. 556,
      ¶ 10 n.6 (2012). The appellant’s arguments on review are based on little more
      than the fact of his disability and the Territory Manager’s knowledge of it. We
      find that this is insufficient to show that discrimination was a motivating factor in
      his reduction in grade, and that his arguments constitute mere disagreement with
      the initial decision.   See Weaver v. Department of the Navy, 2 M.S.P.R. 129,
      133-34 (1980). Moreover, as explained above, the appellant has not shown that
      he is a “qualified individual” with a disability. Supra ¶ 39. Therefore, even if
      his disability were a motivating factor in his removal, he would not be able to
      prove this affirmative defense. See Haas, 2022 MSPB 36, ¶¶ 28-30.

      The appellant has not proven his affirmative defense of retaliation for equal
      employment opportunity activity.
¶42         It is a prohibited personnel practice to take a personnel action in retaliation
      for EEO activity.       See 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(1), (b)(9)(A)(ii). 9     To prove an
      affirmative defense of retaliation for engaging in activity protected by Title VII,
      the appellant must show that retaliation was a motivating factor in the agency’s

      9
        During the pendency of this appeal, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
      Year 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-91, 131 Stat. 1283, was signed into law on December 12,
      2017. It expanded the activities protected under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(C) to include
      cooperating or disclosing information to “any . . . component responsible for internal
      investigations or review.” Pub. L. No. 115-91, § 1097(c)(1)(A), 131 Stat. 1283, 1618.
      We need not consider whether that expansion would affect the outcome of this appeal
      because all of the relevant events occurred prior to December 12, 2017. Edwards v.
      Department of Labor, 2022 MSPB 9, ¶¶ 29-34 (finding that the changes to section
      2302(b)(9)(C) do not apply retroactively).
                                                                                     25

action. 10 Id., ¶ 49. If the appellant can carry this burden, the agency may limit
relief by showing that it would have taken the same action notwithstanding the
protected activity. Id., ¶¶ 49-51. In this case, the administrative judge found it
undisputed that the appellant engaged in EEO activity, and that the Territory
Manager knew about the activity.         ID at 25.        However, he found that the
appellant’s claim failed because neither the proposing official nor the deciding
official was aware of his protected activity.       Id.    On petition for review, the
appellant argues that the Territory Manager’s actions were retaliatory because
they intensified after he filed his first EEO complaint in May 2014. PFR File,
Tab 4 at 17, 20. In the face of the agency’s evidence regardin g his performance
issues, we find that the appellant’s argument is insufficient to establish that his
reduction in grade was retaliatory.          Nevertheless, we disagree with the
administrative judge’s finding that:
      [T]he appellant’s claim must fail because [the Territory Manager]
      did not propose the appellant’s demotion, and was not the deciding
      official. [The Territory Manager] stated she had “no input” into the
      appellant’s proposal letter, and there is no evidence to demonstrate
      that she had any influence in the final decision to demote the
      appellant.
ID at 25. Even assuming that the Territory Manager was not directly involved in
drafting the proposal or decision letters and did not discuss this case directly with
the proposing or deciding officials, we find that her actions are nevertheless

10
   After the initial decision was issued, the Board issued its decision in Pridgen,
2022 MSPB 31, ¶¶ 35, 44-47, adopting a “but-for” causation standard for claims of
retaliation for activity protected under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation
Act).     Both requesting a reasonable accommodation and opposing disability
discrimination are activities protected by the Rehabilitation Act. Id., ¶ 44. Although
not entirely clear, the appellant’s June 2014 informal EEO complaint may have raised
an alleged denial of accommodation. IAF, Tab 29 at 6. To the extent it did, we find
that the application of the higher “but-for” causation standard to the appellant’s claim
of retaliation for that complaint would not result in a different finding here . See
Pridgen, 2022 MSPB 31, ¶ 48 (recognizing that “motivating factor” is a lower standard
for causation than “but-for”).
                                                                                     26

      sufficient to show her involvement in the reduction-in-grade decision. She was
      the person who placed the appellant on a PIP, determined that he did not
      complete the PIP successfully, and initially recommended that he be removed
      from his position. IAF, Tab 9 at 52-58, Tab 30 at 364-67. We find that these
      actions were the proximate cause of the reduction-in-grade action, and that the
      Territory Manager’s role in the decision-making process leading up to the
      adverse action could be enough to show that the adverse action itself was tainted
      by retaliatory animus. See Naval Station Norfolk-Hearing 2 v. Department of the
      Navy, 123 M.S.P.R. 144, ¶ 30 (2016).
¶43        Nevertheless, considering all of the relevant evidence together, we still
      agree with the administrative judge that the appellant’s EEO activity was not a
      motivating factor in the agency’s decision. See Sabio v. Department of Veterans
      Affairs, 124 M.S.P.R. 161, ¶ 36 (2017) (holding that the Board will consider all
      of the relevant evidence as a whole when determining whether an appellant has
      proven an affirmative defense under Title VII).      We find that the Territory
      Manager was aware of the appellant’s first two EEO complaints during the
      relevant time period. 11 IAF, Tab 7 at 29-30, Tab 30 at 369, Tab 40 at 71-72. We
      also find that, as the official accused of discrimination, she would have had some
      motive to retaliate against the appellant. See Dorsey v. Department of the Air
      Force, 78 M.S.P.R. 439, 450 (1998).       However, neither of these complaints
      appears to have resulted in a finding of discrimination, and the Territory Manager
      does not seem to have faced any discipline or other adverse consequences as a
      result of these complaints, apart from having to take the time to respond to them.
      We therefore find that the Territory Manager’s retaliatory motive was not
      particularly strong.   See Simien v. U.S. Postal Service, 99 M.S.P.R. 237, ¶ 30

      11
        The appellant filed his third EEO complaint against the Territory Manager on
      March 25, 2016, after her involvement in the performance-based action had ended.
      IAF, Tab 41 at 129.
                                                                                           27

      (2005). In addition, the Territory Manager began expressing her concerns about
      the appellant’s performance before his EEO activity began, and she expressly
      denied retaliating against the appellant for his EEO activity. IAF, Tab 40 at 73,
      81. Considering on the one hand, the Territory Manager’s motive to retaliate,
      and on the other hand, the substantial evidence that the agency presented of the
      appellant’s performance deficiencies and the lack of any retaliatory motive by the
      proposing and deciding officials, we agree with the administrative judge that the
      appellant has not established that his EEO activity was a motivating factor in his
      reduction in grade and pay. ID at 25; see Sabio, 124 M.S.P.R. 161, ¶¶ 36-44.
¶44         Accordingly, we affirm the initial decision as modified by this Final Order.

                               NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 12
            The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the
      Board’s final decision in this matter.      5 C.F.R. § 1201.113.      You may obtain
      review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of
      your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate
      forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following
      summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not
      provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation and
      the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule
      regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of
      this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your
      claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file
      within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your
      chosen forum.

      12
        Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
      the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
      Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                      28

      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S .
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.               5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit   your   petition   to   the   court    at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
                                                                                  29

      (2) Judicial   or   EEOC     review   of   cases   involving    a   claim   of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.     5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017).            If you have a
representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before
you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days
after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling
condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and
to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
                                                                                     30

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                  P.O. Box 77960
                             Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant     to   the   Whistleblower       Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section
2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),
(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of
competent jurisdiction. 13   The court of appeals must receive your petition for

13
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                                31

review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.          5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                             U.S. Court of Appeals
                             for the Federal Circuit
                            717 Madison Place, N.W.
                            Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit , you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor war rants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                                    /s/ for
                                          Jennifer Everling
                                          Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.