Court Opinion

ID: 9409091
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-14 21:04:23.238413+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:48.790630
License: Public Domain

Filed 7/14/23 Tadevosyan v. Wolff CA2/3
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
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purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                      SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                  DIVISION THREE

 BORIS TADEVOSYAN,                                                   B317648

          Plaintiff and Appellant,                                   (Los Angeles County
                                                                     Super. Ct. No.19STCV36287)
          v.

 LAWRENCE A. WOLFF et al.,

          Defendants and Respondents.

     APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Audra Mori, Judge. Reversed.
     Beloryan & Manukyan, Haik A. Beloryan and Vahe
Shakhgeldyan for Plaintiff and Appellant.
     Prindle, Goetz, Barnes & Reinholtz, Steven Maslauski and
John Karimi for Defendants and Respondents.
                 ‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
      Boris Tadevosyan sued Lawrence A. Wolff and Lawrence A.
Wolff, DDS, Inc. (collectively Wolff) for dental malpractice, lack of
informed consent, and medical battery. The trial court granted
summary judgment in Wolff’s favor on the ground that the one-
year statute of limitations in Code of Civil Procedure1 section
340.5 barred the action, finding that the limitations period began
to run when Tadevosyan consulted an attorney and the attorney
referred Tadevosyan to an expert for an independent medical
examination. On appeal, Tadevosyan contends that the trial
court improperly relied on privileged matter to reach its
conclusion and that, in any event, Wolff was not entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. We agree that moving party Wolff
did not satisfy its initial burden and therefore summary
judgment was improper.
                         BACKGROUND
I.    History of Tadevosyan’s dental treatment
       Tadevosyan is an Armenian immigrant who can read
English but cannot understand complex conversations in English.
In 2015 and 2016, Tadevosyan consulted A to Z Dental about
getting dentures. A to Z Dental devised a treatment plan for
extraction of four teeth and placement of four implants with an
overdenture and referred him to Wolff to begin the treatment.
       After an initial examination, Wolff performed two surgeries
on Tadevosyan. During the first surgery on March 24, 2017,
Wolff resected Tadevosyan’s maxillary and mandibular cysts,
fixed jaw fractures, closed fistulas and bone fractures, and placed

1    All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Code of Civil Procedure.

                                 2
five stabilizers to support the fractured cortex and to stimulate
bone growth. In June 2017, Wolff noted that Tadevosyan was
“healing well.” During the second, follow-up surgery on August
11, 2017, Wolff performed hardware removal, debridement,
wound closure, and resection of granulomatous neoplasm.
       A month later, on September 8, 2017, Tadevosyan returned
to A to Z Dental. A to Z Dental told Tadevosyan that the work
Wolff had performed was different than the treatment plan
originally requested. Tadevosyan was disappointed that Wolff
had changed the treatment plan and that what had been
estimated to cost $2,000 would now be $12,000.
       On July 3, 2018, Tadevosyan consulted an attorney. That
same day, the attorney referred him to Jay Grossman, DDS, for
an independent medical examination. On July 12, 2018, Dr.
Grossman examined Tadevosyan and reported that the implants
were inappropriately touching each other, causing bone loss, and
that the implants would eventually fail. The doctor advised that
further surgeries would be required to replace bone and to install
new implants. Thereafter, A to Z Dental treated Tadevosyan,
and, in September 2018, gave him overdentures. Since receiving
his overdentures, Tadevosyan has been in constant pain.

                                3
II.   Tadevosyan’s lawsuit and Wolff’s motion for summary
      judgment
       On July 12, 2019, Tadevosyan’s attorney served on Wolff a
90-day notice of intent to sue under section 364.2 Within that 90
days, on October 10, 2019, Tadevosyan filed his complaint and
alleged three causes of action: (1) professional negligence,
(2) lack of informed consent, and (3) medical battery. Tadevosyan
generally alleged that A to Z Dental referred him to Wolff for a
specific treatment plan, but Wolff performed a different
treatment without consulting or informing Tadevosyan. And
after Wolff’s procedure, Tadevosyan began experiencing pain,
discomfort, and difficulty eating. After consulting with an expert,
Tadevosyan learned that Wolff improperly placed the implants,
necessitating a complete overhaul of the implants.
       The parties engaged in discovery, and Wolff asked
Tadevosyan to admit that (1) his attorneys referred him to Dr.
Grossman for examination, (2) he or his attorneys initially
engaged Dr. Grossman on July 3, 2018, and (3) he was referred to
and examined by Dr. Grossman because Tadevosyan was
suspicious that Wolff failed to comply with the community
standard of care. Tadevosyan objected to these requests for
admission on the grounds, among others, that the requests asked
for premature disclosure of expert witnesses and violated the
attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine. After Wolff

2     Section 364 provides that no action for professional
negligence against a health care provider shall be commenced
unless the defendant has been given 90 days’ notice of intent to
sue. If notice is served within the limitations period, the notice
extends the limitations period for 90 days. (§ 364, subd. (d).)

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moved to compel responses and the parties met and conferred,
Tadevosyan, subject to a reservation of objections, answered the
requests, admitting his attorneys referred him to Dr. Grossman
and that they engaged him on July 3, 2018 but denying that the
referral was due to his suspicion that Wolff had been negligent.
Tadevosyan also produced an engagement agreement with Dr.
Grossman for expert testimony. Dr. Grossman’s engagement
agreement asked for a “[b]rief description of allegation,” and
Tadevosyan’s attorney wrote, “Failed dental implant surgery(ies)
[¶] Facts previously provided in email back on 9/3/18.”3
      Wolff then moved for summary judgment on the ground
that the one-year statute of limitations in section 340.5 barred
the complaint.4 Wolff argued that Tadevosyan had notice of his
claim on or by July 3, 2018, and therefore the one-year statute of
limitations expired on July 3, 2019. To establish that
Tadevosyan had notice of his claim as of July 3, 2018, Wolff relied
on these material facts: (1) on September 8, 2017, Tadevosyan
was seen at A to Z Dental and was disappointed to learn that
Wolff had changed his treatment plan, (2) Tadevosyan’s attorney
referred him to Dr. Grossman on July 3, 2018; and (3)

3     The engagement agreement stated that Dr. Grossman was
engaged on July 3, 2018, but Tadevosyan’s attorney signed the
agreement in November 2019. Based on the date the agreement
was signed and on the references to “failed dental” surgeries and
that the facts were “previously provided in [an] email back on
9/3/18,” it therefore appears that the attorney filled out the
engagement agreement after July 3, 2018.
4      Wolff also filed a second motion for summary judgment on
the ground that he met the standard of care. That motion is not
at issue on appeal.

                                5
Tadevosyan or his attorney engaged Dr. Grossman that day and
the engagement agreement referred to “failed dental” surgeries.
Based on these facts, Wolff argued that Tadevosyan suspected he
had been injured by Wolff as of the date he engaged counsel.
      Tadevosyan opposed the motion. Although Tadevosyan did
not dispute Wolff’s material facts, Tadevosyan objected that they
were based on inadmissible evidence. Thus, in written
evidentiary objections, Tadevosyan objected that the engagement
agreement with Dr. Grossman and that his attorney referred him
to Dr. Grossman were subject to the attorney-client privilege and
the work product doctrine. But even if admissible, Tadevosyan
argued that the mere fact his attorney referred him to Dr.
Grossman did not establish when Tadevosyan discovered the
negligent cause of his injury. Further, in his declaration,
Tadevosyan said he was shocked to learn on September 8, 2017
that the treatment Dr. Wolff performed was different than
requested. He has been in constant pain since September 2018,
when he got his overdentures from A to Z Dental.
III.   The trial court grants the motion for summary judgment
       The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment,
finding that Tadevosyan was on notice of his claims against Wolff
no later than July 3, 2018. Overruling the evidentiary objections
because Tadevosyan had not shown how any privilege applied,
the trial court relied on Tadevosyan’s admissions that he engaged
Dr. Grossman on July 3, 2018 and that the engagement
agreement referred to “failed dental” surgeries. Based on this
evidence, the trial court found that Tadevosyan had discovered
his injuries and its negligent cause on or by July 3, 2018.

                                6
                          DISCUSSION
I.    Summary judgment and standard of review
       Summary judgment provides courts with a mechanism to
cut through the parties’ pleadings to determine whether trial is
necessary to resolve the dispute. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield
Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) The moving party bears the
burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact
and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (§ 437c,
subd. (c); Aguilar, at p. 845.) A defendant moving for summary
judgment can meet its burden by showing there is a complete
defense to the cause of action. (§ 437c, subd. (p)(2); Castellon v.
U.S. Bancorp (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 994, 997.) A moving
defendant therefore has the initial burden to show that
undisputed facts support summary judgment based on an
affirmative defense such as the statute of limitations. (Drexler v.
Petersen (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 1181, 1188–1189 (Drexler).)
       On appeal from a summary judgment ruling, we review the
record de novo and independently determine whether triable
issues of material fact exist. (Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 767.) We resolve any evidentiary doubts
or ambiguities in favor of the party opposing summary judgment.
(Id. at p. 768.)
II.   Statute of limitations
      The trial court here found that Tadevosyan did not comply
with the one-year limitations period in section 340.5.
Tadevosyan counters that the trial court relied on inadmissible
evidence in reaching that conclusion and, in any event, the
evidence did not establish Wolff was entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. As we now explain, we agree with Tadevosyan.

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       Section 340.5 provides that an action for negligence against
a health care provider shall be commenced either three years
after the date of injury or “one year after the plaintiff discovers,
or through the use of reasonable diligence should have
discovered, the injury, whichever occurs first.” As used in section
340.5, “injury” means a person’s physical condition and its
negligent cause. (Gutierrez v. Mofid (1985) 39 Cal.3d 892, 896.)
The injury is not necessarily the ultimate harm suffered but
instead occurs when appreciable harm is first manifested.
(Brewer v. Remington (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 14, 24.) Whether
there has been a belated discovery of the cause of action in
malpractice cases essentially is a question of fact, and only where
reasonable minds can draw but one conclusion from the evidence
does the question become a matter of law. (Drexler, supra, 4
Cal.App.5th at p. 1189.)
       Section 340.5’s discovery rule “sets forth two alternate tests
for triggering the limitations period: (1) a subjective test
requiring actual suspicion by the plaintiff that the injury was
caused by wrongdoing; and (2) an objective test requiring a
showing that a reasonable person would have suspected the
injury was caused by wrongdoing. [Citation.] The first to occur
under these two tests begins the limitations period.” (Kitzig v.
Nordquist (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1384, 1391.) Under the first
test, the plaintiff need only suspect someone has done something
wrong, which does not require the plaintiff to know the specific
facts (e.g., medical cause, diagnosis) necessary to establish a
medical negligence claim. (Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21
Cal.4th 383, 397–398; Knowles v. Superior Court (2004) 118
Cal.App.4th 1290, 1295.) A plaintiff has presumptive knowledge
of the negligent injury once he has “ ‘notice or information of

                                  8
circumstances to put a reasonable person on inquiry, or has the
opportunity to obtain knowledge from sources open to his
investigation.’ ” (Gutierrez v. Mofid, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 896;
accord, Kitzig v. Nordquist, supra, 81 Cal.App.4th at p. 1391 [one-
year statute of limitations begins to run when plaintiff suspects
or should suspect wrongdoing caused injury].)
       Here, the trial court found that Tadevosyan suspected on or
by July 3, 2018 that Wolff had injured him because that is when
Tadevosyan consulted an attorney and his attorney referred him
to Dr. Grossman due to allegedly “failed dental” surgeries. We
will assume without deciding that this evidence was admissible.
Even so, it did not entitle Wolff to judgment as a matter of law.
       To be sure, a malpractice plaintiff’s consultation with an
attorney is a material fact relevant to show a suspicion of
wrongdoing. But it is not necessarily sufficient by itself to trigger
the statute of limitations. In Dolan v. Borelli (1993) 13
Cal.App.4th 816, 820, for example, the plaintiff had surgery in
April 1985 to correct carpal tunnel syndrome. After the surgery,
the plaintiff’s pain was worse and continued to be so 60 days
later, causing the plaintiff to believe something had gone wrong.
(Ibid.) The plaintiff consulted an attorney in February 1986, and
in June 1986, had another surgery with a different doctor.
During that surgery, it was discovered that the original doctor
had not “release[d]” the carpal tunnel ligament. (Ibid.) The court
found that the statute of limitations began to run no later than
February 1986 because the plaintiff said she suspected by then
that her doctor had improperly treated her and worsened her
condition and had reported those suspicions to her attorney.
(Id. at p. 823.) Thus, the plaintiff’s admission she suspected

                                 9
wrongdoing, which she then reported to an attorney, triggered
the statute of limitations.
       In Drexler, supra, 4 Cal.App.5th 1181, from December 2006
to January 2011, the plaintiff Drexler consulted two doctors
about headaches he was having, and the doctors continually told
him they were tension headaches or due to carpal tunnel
syndrome. (Id. at pp. 1186–1187.) At no time was Drexler
satisfied with what the doctors were telling him, but he
nonetheless trusted them. Finally, in January 2011, Drexler
consulted an attorney, who told him he did not have a case.
Thereafter, Drexler’s condition worsened, and, in January 2013,
an MRI revealed he had a large brain tumor that accounted for
his headaches. The trial court found, in part, that the one-year
statute of limitations began to run when Drexler consulted the
attorney. The appellate court reversed, noting that while
Drexler’s consultation with an attorney was strong evidence he
then suspected wrongdoing, there was a factual dispute when
Drexler became aware of the appreciable harm caused by the
doctors. It was, therefore, a factual question when the
appreciable harm (failure to diagnose a brain tumor) manifested
to trigger the statute of limitations. (Id. at pp. 1197–1198.)
       Similarly here, Tadevosyan’s consultation with an attorney
on July 3, 2018 is a material fact relevant to determine when the
limitations period began to run, but it is not a dispositive one.
Rather, the evidence established only that as of July 3, 2018
Tadevosyan knew Wolff had performed a procedure to which
Tadevosyan had not consented. That is, on September 8, 2017,
Tadevosyan returned to A to Z Dental so that A to Z Dental could
complete the treatment. Tadevosyan was disappointed then to
learn Wolff had deviated from the original treatment plan and

                               10
that the cost of the new treatment would be $12,000 instead of
the originally estimated $2,000. This evidence might establish at
most that Tadevosyan knew on September 8, 2017 that Wolff had
performed a procedure without his informed consent.5
       However, it did not establish Tadevosyan knew that the
treatment Wolff actually provided was negligently performed.
Indeed, in moving for summary judgment, Wolff cited no evidence
that by July 3, 2018 Tadevosyan was, for example, in
extraordinary pain or had some reason to suspect Wolff had
negligently performed the procedure. (Compare Dolan v. Borelli,
supra, 13 Cal.App.4th at p. 820 [plaintiff in worse pain after
treatment, and told attorney she suspected negligent treatment].)
Instead, Tadevosyan said in his declaration opposing summary
judgment that he has been in constant pain and discomfort since
September 2018, when he received his overdentures from A to Z
Dental. Thus, it is unclear that Tadevosyan consulted an
attorney on July 3, 2018 because he suspected that Wolff had
negligently performed the implant procedure, as opposed to
consulting the attorney for advice about informed consent. (See,
e.g., Kitzig v. Nordquist, supra, 81 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1392–1393
[plaintiff’s consultation with second doctor didn’t pertain to
injury for which she later sought recovery and therefore didn’t
necessarily trigger statute of limitations].) Stated otherwise, it is
not clear that Tadevosyan knew as of July 3, 2018 that Wolff had
performed the wrong procedure incorrectly, which is the subject

5     Wolff did not move for summary adjudication of any
individual cause of action and instead moved only for summary
judgment. We therefore have no occasion to decide whether any
individual cause of action is time-barred.

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of his negligence cause of action, as opposed to merely knowing
that Wolff had performed the wrong procedure.
       Nor does Tadevosyan’s attorney’s notation in the
engagement agreement that the allegation was “failed dental”
surgeries persuade us to the contrary. That notation could mean
any number of things. It could suggest, as Wolff asserts, that
Tadevosyan suspected the implant procedure was incorrectly
done. Or it could mean Tadevosyan thought Wolff’s surgery was
a failure only because he had not consented to it. In the absence
of clarifying evidence, we cannot find that this vague notation
established what Tadevosyan knew at that time. Moreover, it is
unclear when the attorney made the notation. The attorney
signed the engagement agreement in November 2019, by which
time the independent medical examination had revealed that the
implants were improperly done. Therefore, if the attorney made
the notation about “failed dental” surgeries in November 2019,
the notation has no clear relevance to what Tadevosyan
suspected in July 2018, when he was referred to Dr. Grossman.
       Finally, Tadevosyan’s attorney’s referral to Dr. Grossman
for an independent medical examination does not establish that
Tadevosyan knew Wolff had injured him. On this record, nothing
more can be said about that referral other than that it was part
of the attorney’s due diligence. (See, e.g., Enfield v. Hunt (1979)
91 Cal.App.3d 417, 424 [requiring attorney to file malpractice
action before available evidence indicates action has merit would
contradict public policy]; see Kitzig v. Nordquist, supra, 81
Cal.App.4th at p. 1393 [“Holding that seeking a second opinion
necessarily triggers a malpractice statute of limitations whenever
a patient is motivated by a possible suspicion—however,

                                12
momentary—that her doctor was ‘doing something wrong’ would
hinder a patient’s ability to obtain the best medical care.”].)
      We conclude that Tadevosyan’s consultation with an
attorney and referral to an expert for an independent medical
examination did not trigger the running of the statute of
limitations as a matter of law. Because Wolff therefore did not
sustain its burden as the moving party, the judgment must be
reversed.
                         DISPOSITION
      The judgment is reversed. Plaintiff Boris Tadevosyan shall
recover his costs on appeal.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

                              EDMON, P. J.

We concur:

      EGERTON, J.                          HEIDEL, J.*

*     Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.

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