Court Opinion

ID: 9677618
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:56:19.25784+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:57.109896
License: Public Domain

FOSHEIM, Justice
(dissenting).
Appellant’s Fifth Amendment rights, as interpreted by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981), were violated.
The majority states that appellant testified he requested a lawyer and that Officer Smith also testified appellant requested a lawyer. The interrogation, however, did not stop. The majority decision then concludes that based on the testimony of Officers Boschee, McKelvey and Smith, appellant’s Miranda rights were fully effectuated and, confronted with a divergence in testimony, the trial court’s findings on voluntar-iness were not clearly erroneous. The facts *149recited by the majority clearly contradict that conclusion. While Officer Smith’s testimony admittedly is fuzzy, the State has the burden of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant waived his right to counsel. State v. Cody, 293 N.W.2d 440 (S.D.1980). Officer Smith’s testimony corroborates appellant’s testimony that appellant asked for his attorney. And, Officer Smith’s testimony does not refute appellant’s testimony that appellant asked for his attorney at the outset of the interrogation and that after appellant requested his attorney’s presence the interrogation continued in the absence of counsel. The testimony of Officer Smith, coupled with appellant’s testimony, clearly leaves considerable doubt as to whether appellant waived his right to counsel.
Furthermore, the majority fails to discuss whether appellant waived his right to counsel. In Edwards, the United States Supreme Court was not only careful to point out that waiver of counsel must be voluntary and knowing and intelligent but that “additional safeguards are necessary when the accused asks for counsel.” Id. at 484, 101 S.Ct. at 1884. The Edwards decision is an implementation of additional safeguards. It holds that waiver of the right to counsel can only be shown by facts proving no interrogation, that is no “communication, exchanges, or conversations with police” not initiated by the appellant. Id. at 484-85, 101 S.Ct. at 1884-85. Under this standard, and the facts of this case, the State has failed to prove a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel.