Court Opinion

ID: 9647866
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 13:53:30.181578+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:54.346477
License: Public Domain

Peck, J.,
concurring and dissenting. The majority concedes that a privilege for investigative files exists, at least theoretically, in Vermont, and on that point I am in complete agreement. Presumably, that privilege will be recognized hereafter on a case-by-case basis, with the majority opinion providing the guiding standards under which trial courts will weigh claims of the investigatory files privilege.
Since this matter is before us as a petition for extraordinary relief, raising the central issue of the existence of the privilege, the limited nature of our role would suggest that we provide the answer and then remand the case for appropriate action by the trial court, based on the announcement of our holding and the tests to be applied by the court in determining the validity of *50this particular claim. But the majority, for reasons that are not articulated, goes on to decide the merits of this petitioner’s claim to the privilege, on the basis of an essentially barren factual record, without giving the parties an opportunity to make their threshold showings and without allowing the trial court, on the basis of those showings, to weigh the competing claims of privilege and disclosure and reach a decision — which is what trial courts are supposed to do.
The decision will cloud the roles of this Court and trial courts in future cases in which this privilege is asserted, and will assuredly invite other litigants to look to us to find facts and order dispositions in future cases of all kinds that arrive here for legal guidance only. I therefore dissent.
I.
Let me begin, as I think we must in all cases where a new privilege is asserted, with a review of the specific subject matter before us.
Medical records, including those which derive from a governmental investigatory source, are of a peculiarly sensitive nature to the extent they may relate to doctors, nurses and other technicians on the one hand and patients or former patients on the other, who have no relation whatever to litigation in which one of the parties seeks disclosure. It is difficult to imagine many more frightening situations in which the privacy interests of the latter class may be subject to public exposure, without their knowledge or any opportunity to be heard in protest should they wish to do so.
In State v. Kirchoff, 156 Vt. 1, 587 A.2d 988 (1991), this Court, as it was constituted for purposes of hearing that case, extended the so-called right to privacy to the most vicious of criminals, even where it was necessary to expand the Vermont Constitution to do so, and in a manner not recognized under the United States Constitution, or the constitutions of the great majority of our sister states. Yet in this case, the same majority shows not the slightest concern for the privacy of individuals who are innocent of any possible culpability in the matter sub judice. The opinion pays lip service to this concern, but when it indulges in its own factfindings, a function reserved exclusively to trial courts, postulates hypothetical situations, and draws its *51own conclusions without the benefit of facts from below or requiring a showing of need, the shallowness of the concern is manifest.
II.
Turning to my specific grounds for dissent, the majority writes as if the central issue in this case were the trial court’s reluctance to conduct an in camera inspection, when, in fact, the heart of the case centers on whether there is a privilege for investigatory files, and whether petitioner has met the standards for asserting that privilege.
But I will begin on the majority’s terms, with the in camera inspection. The trial court declined to conduct an in camera inspection because it concluded, contrary to the unanimous views of this Court, that there is no such thing as an investigatory files privilege. The court never considered the Wigmore or Frankenhauser criteria because it never got to them. If the trial court had recognized the existence of an investigatory privilege, the court would have gone on to consider whether or not such a showing had been made, using any appropriate fact-finding process, including an in camera inspection, if necessary, to aid the court in weighing the validity of the privilege claim in light of the dozen or more criteria set forth in the majority opinion.
My main point is that trial courts are uniquely positioned to make initial factual findings, and appellate courts are notoriously bad at doing so. This case is a perfect illustration of the point. The majority does not review a determination as to whether the investigatory privilege should be applied, based on the merits of the parties’ respective showings under the applicable criteria (e.g., Frankenhauser), because there were no showings. There was no factual record. Instead, this Court undertakes the Frankenhauser analysis by itself, without the benefit of a trial record, and, needless to say, without the benefit of its own in camera inspection. The majority states:
We recognize that the showing that petitioner must make to get to an in camera inspection is less than the showing he must make to prevail on his motion to quash. It is important, however, to insist that petitioner meet a reasonable threshold before the court must make the inspection.
*52No court need, or should, conduct an in camera inspection without a proper showing, but the majority errs in concluding that the degree of showing is always the same. The main point is that the trial court has never had a chance to decide whether petitioner has met his threshold. The majority treats the case as if there had been a full hearing below, with a full evidentiary record. Lacking that record, the majority’s own factfinding smacks of the crystal ball.
Friedman v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc., 738 F.2d 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cited by the majority, is an excellent short treatise on what a party asserting the privilege must do to prevail. In that case a party in a civil lawsuit arising out of dramatic fluctuations in the price of silver subpoenaed investigatory records of the Commodities Future Trading Commission (CFTC). The court of appeals confirmed the privilege claimed by the CFTC.1 But the court went on to conclude that “the existence of a qualified law-enforcement investigatory files privilege as to all of the subpoenaed documents had not been sufficiently established by CFTC so as to support wholesale and final rejection of Friedman’s motion to compel compliance.” Id. at 1341.
Allow me to quote át length — the court’s words could well be mine in this case, mutatis mutandis — from what then followed in Friedman:
CFTC’s attorney in the district court had suggested disclosure would reveal law enforcement techniques and sources: disclose strategy, procedures, and direction of the *53investigation, forewarn suspects, deter witnesses from providing candid testimony, invite others to seek discovery. However, the files had not been examined for this purpose by responsible members or officers of CFTC. No specific documents or classes of documents had been identified.
Until the claim of privilege has been presented to a district court with appropriate deliberation and precision and the duty of the demanding party to show his or her need for disclosure has thus been triggered, and until that duty has then been discharged by the demanding party, the district court is not equipped to engage in the task of identifying and weighing the competing interests. When, as here, the privilege claimed is qualified, not absolute, the process of identification and weighing cannot be avoided.
Id. at 1342 (emphasis supplied). The question always before the trial court is whether the party asserting the privilege has provided “a deliberate and reasonably specific delineation of the claim,” id. at 1343, not whether the party asserting the privilege has met the threshold burden of justifying an in camera inspection. Such inspection is simply one of the factfinding devices the court can undertake in pursuing the “task of identifying and weighing the competing interests.” Id. at 1342.2
*54The “proper showing” required before a court will order an in camera inspection will depend on the circumstances of the case, particularly whether the party asserting the privilege has made the initial demonstration of specificity and inspection is “appropriate.” Id. at 1344. The threshold showing by the asserting party, not the in camera inspection itself, is the issue.3 The judgment call on inspection is initially the trial court’s, as is the initial judgment as to whether the claims of privilege outweigh the need for the information, under the several-pronged test that the majority and I agree should be applied. The process we set forth in Killington as to the closely related executive privilege will, with appropriate modifications, serve to guide courts in weighing the claim of privilege against a discovery demand by a litigant. A trial court should order in camera inspection of the materials sought and should try to balance the interests with an eye to the specific needs of the litigant and the interest in confidentiality attendant to the particular board or body involved. The Supreme Court of California noted some useful principles in Shepherd v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 107, 126, 550 P.2d 161, 171-72, 130 Cal. Rptr. 257, 267-68 (1976):
*55Implicit in each assessment is a consideration of consequences — i. e., the consequences to the litigant of nondisclosure, and the consequences to the public of disclosure. The consideration of consequences to the litigant will involve matters . . . including the importance of the material sought to the fair presentation of the litigant’s case, the availability of the material to the litigant by other means, and the effectiveness and relative difficulty of such other means. The consideration of the consequences of disclosure to the public will involve matters relative to the effect of disclosure upon the integrity of public processes and procedures ....
To this list of principles we might add that the consequences to any confidential informant and the potential effect on the future investigative powers of the governmental agency may be an appropriate matter for consideration by the court in balancing the competing interests.
Respondents argue finally that the trial court has already performed a weighing analysis “based on the types of material the Secretary of State represented were contained in the file and, in fact, ruled a portion of the file to be privileged.” The trial court record does not support this contention. The court did not conduct an in camera inspection and in fact specifically stated that “[t]he ‘investigative files’ privilege does not exist in the State of Vermont,” thereby rendering an inspection unnecessary.
The majority, for reasons that are not apparent, does not choose to remand this case for the proper application of the balancing of interests, as was done in Friedman. I am unaware of any case where an appellate court, upholding the existence of a particular privilege, and concluding that the trial court either misunderstood or misapplied the privilege, goes on to balance the interests of the parties before the trial court has had a chance on remand to evaluate whether a threshold assertion of the privilege has been made, and if so, whether, or to what extent, the claim is justified, given the other party’s interests in disclosure.
The majority does all of that for itself, on the basis that the Secretary of State has not made any showing, when in fact the court below preempted any showing by either side (with or *56without an in camera review) by declaring that no investigative files privilege exists in Vermont. Some of the majority’s “findings” are clothed as broad, judicially noticeable truths:
Particularly misdirected is the claim that nurses will not speak candidly if they know that disclosure to litigants is possible. We find no specific support for the generalization that nurses, whose profession is dedicated to patient care, will conceal or distort information to prevent injured parties from seeking redress from their employers.
There was no evidence of anything below because there was a ruling that there was no privilege to address. If petitioner had the opportunity to make a showing, he might be able to address the privilege relevant to the nurses concerned with the impact of this disclosure, rather than to theoretical nurses in a hypothetical time and place.
The Court continues with more appellate findings:
Nor do we find weighty the broad and general claim that investigatory techniques may be disclosed. While the privilege has been held to be broad enough to protect against the disclosure of “newly developed investigative techniques,” [citation], there is no specific claim here that disclosure of Board investigatory methods will be compromised so that nurses engaging in disciplinary violations will use the information to prevent disclosure of their actions or to prevent investigation.
I have no idea what petitioner would be able to demonstrate if asked to make a detailed showing by the trial court, as is the universal custom in these cases. The majority might be correct. Maybe not. The point is that the trial court should make the determination, based upon that part of the holding over which we have no differences — the existence of the privilege and the kinds of criteria that must be considered by the court in deciding the matter.
I will not trace out all of the majority’s findings under the rest of the Frankenhauser criteria. But it is important to note that the majority refers to petitioner’s failure “to provide us specific information,” as if the trial court had recognized a privilege but failed to weigh competing interests appropriately.
I should also add that the majority feels as free to find crucial facts about the needs of respondents for discovery as it does to *57find facts about petitioner’s lack of a showing of support for the privilege:
The need for discovery materials of this kind, based in part on the unavailability of alternatives, is particularly strong where plaintiffs have sued an employer of the individual who committed the alleged tortious acts.
The Court even concludes, before the fact, that:
[PJetitioner has failed in any way to accommodate the legitimate needs of the plaintiffs____With the lack of even minimal cooperation from petitioner, the paths available to gather the necessary information are simply too tortuous to be reasonable alternatives to the disclosure of petitioner’s records.
At this stage of the proceeding, with a scant record below, I am unwilling to pass judgment on what is feasible or necessary for respondents or reasonable for petitioners. Even more importantly, the trial court can, and in difficult or complex cases definitely should, frame detailed orders that deal with the parties’ impasse and reach a result that is as fair as possible to both sides. As the court said in King v. Conde:
The parties and the court should consider carefully the benefits and costs of a properly designed protective order. “Routinely” issuing protective orders . . . will not necessarily promote justice or the proper balance of interests; in particular cases, the court may find them an effective way to permit discovery without undermining law enforcement.
121 F.R.D. at 190. Respondents may or may not be able to demonstrate that the files in petitioner’s control are the sole source of the names of witnesses or of relevant evidence, in which case petitioner’s prima facie showing of the need for confidentiality might prevail. If petitioner’s concern is over opinions or conclusions within the file, it may be possible to include only some parts of the file and even to redact documents in question to eliminate materials that might encroach on a demonstrated need for confidentiality. By acting as trial court here, the majority cuts off an important trial court function and stanches the flexibility and practicality that should accompany court orders resulting from claims of privilege.
*58III.
I would remand this matter to the trial court for proper consideration and disposition. The majority recognizes the privilege, but goes on to decide the case here, leaving little practical guidance to judges considering this privilege beyond stating the Frankenhauser standards. I too am concerned about the possible misuse of this privilege, and though I dissent from the majority’s decision, I must go further than the majority has done in stating the limited nature of this very narrow privilege.
First, the propensity to justify the unqualified closure of government files by the style of the label on the front of the file is particularly troublesome. Bristol-Myers v. FTC, 424 F.2d at 939. A board or body may consider much of its routine business to be “investigatory,” and I would warn that we do not intend that the files be considered automatically privileged by self-serving labelling. But when “the inquiry departs from the routine and focuses with special intensity upon a particular party, an investigation is under way.” Center for National Policy Review on Race & Urban Issues v. Weinberger, 502 F.2d at 373.
I think we ought to make much clearer that we reject the rationale adopted in some cases that the “invasion of the administrative process” alone necessarily gives rise to the nondisclosure privilege. Farrell v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 50 F.R.D. 385, 386 (W.D.N.C. 1969). The notion that an agency may resist a claim to information, based solely on the fact that its administrative process would be inconvenienced or simply because some aspect of its functioning is exposed to public view, should have vanished long ago.
Thus, I would add to our holding that the qualified privilege for administrative investigatory files or reports prevails over a litigant’s discovery request only when a true need for the requested information has not been demonstrated and the interest of the litigant is less than the government interest in secrecy.
Respondents are correct that exceptions within the Vermont Access to Public Records statute, 1 V.S.A. ch. 5, subch. 3, specifically the exception in 1 V.S.A. § 317(b)(5) for “records . . . compiled in the course of a criminal or disciplinary investigation by any police or professional licensing agency,” do not control the outcome of a discovery request under V.R.C.P. 26. See *59Friedman, 738 F.2d at 1344; Toran, Information Disclosure in Civil Actions: The Freedom of Information Act and the Federal Discovery Rules, 49 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 843, 849 (1981). As the Friedman court stated:
In the discovery context, when qualified privilege is properly raised, the litigant’s need is a key factor. Whether the information is disclosed depends on the relative weight of the claimant’s need and the government’s interest in confidentiality. It is unsound to equate the FOIA [federal Freedom of Information Act] exemptions and similar discovery privileges.
738 F.2d at 1344 (citations omitted). However, exceptions within the Access to Public Records statute can guide the court in appraising public policy concerns and weighing those concerns together with the needs of litigants in the discovery process, which concerns are no less a vital aspect of public policy. Statutory exemptions may be based on “values entitled to weighty consideration.” Note, Discovery of Government Documents and the Official Information Privilege, 76 Colum. L. Rev. 142, 153 (1976); see McClain v. College Hospital, 99 N.J. at 357, 492 A.2d at 996; see also Advisory Committee Notes, Rule 509, Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, Revised 1971 Draft, 56 F.R.D. 183, 253 (1972) (“[T]he exceptions [to the Freedom of Information Act] are based on values obviously entitled to weighty consideration in formulating rules of evidentiary privilege.”).
As with any like privilege, the important determination is not that it exists, but rather in the careful balancing of the interests of government and those of the litigant seeking discovery. Like all privileges, this privilege may sometimes result in the suppression of truth. Grodjesk v. Faghani, 104 N.J. 89, 96, 514 A.2d 1328, 1331 (1986). Consequently, the most careful balancing of competing interests is required on a case-by-case basis.
The task of evaluation of the materials in the present case should not be a complicated one. The fact that the investigation by the Board was not criminal in nature may impact on the need of the petitioner not to reveal its investigative methodology. Cf. Reinstein v. Police Commissioner of Boston, 378 Mass. 281, 291, 391 N.E.2d 881, 887 (1979) (“Although ‘[t]here is no clear distinction between investigative reports and material that, de*60spite occasionally alerting the administrator to violations of the law, is acquired essentially as a matter of routine,’ still the distinction is taken lest the [investigative] exemption ‘swallow[] up the Act.’”) (citations omitted).
In sum, I believe the majority is correct in acknowledging the existence of a privilege for investigatory records, but this Court ought to remand and allow the trial court to do its work.
I am authorized to say that Justice Gibson joins in this opinion, except for Part I.

 The court said on this point:
There surely is such a thing as a qualified common-law privilege, within the meaning of Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b), for law-enforcement investigatory files.
738 F.2d at 1341. Other federal and state courts have recognized a similar qualified privilege for investigations conducted by boards and bodies, even though possible criminal prosecution may not be the reason for the investigation. See, e.g., Center for National Policy Review on Race & Urban Issues v. Weinberger, 502 F.2d 370, 373 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935, 939 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970); Reinstein v. Police Commissioner of Boston, 378 Mass. 281, 290, 391 N.E.2d 881, 886 (1979); McClain v. College Hospital, 99 N.J. 346, 357, 492 A.2d 991, 996 (1985); Beck v. Bluestein, 194 N.J. Super. 247, 257, 262-63, 476 A.2d 842, 849, 851 (1984).

 One of my main concerns is that the majority establishes a separate threshold showing required to justify conducting in camera inspections, when, in fact, the showing should focus on the need for the privilege, with the in camera inspection serving merely as a tool which the court may or may not use.
The majority’s citation of United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554 (1989), to support the propostion that in camera inspections are “extraordinary events” is misleading at best. The issue in that ease was not whether the court should cooperate with one asserting a privilege and seeking in camera inspection to help persuade the court, but whether, on the contrary, such review in certain eases would be detrimental to the rights of a party asserting a privilege and opposing in camera review. Speaking of the attorney-client privilege, the Court said:
A blanket rule allowing in camera review as a tool for determining the applicability of the crime-fraud exception, as [United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953)] suggests, would place the policy of protecting open and legitimate dislosure between attorneys and clients at undue risk. . . .
There is no reason to permit opponents of the privilege to engage in groundless fishing expeditions, with the district courts as their unwitting (and perhaps unwilling) agents.
*54Id. at 571; see also Kerr v. United States District Court, 426 U.S. 394, 406 (1976) (stating that “in camera review is a highly appropriate and useful means of dealing with claims of governmental privilege”).

 This point is well stated in King v. Conde, 121 F.R.D. 180, 189 (E.D.N.Y. 1988), which was cited by the majority. The editor’s precis of the case at the beginning of the report suggests that a “showing of need must be made by police before placing burden of in camera inspection on magistrate.” Id. at 181. What the case actually holds is that accompanying the assertion of a privilege must be “a declaration or affidavit, under oath,” stating “how the materials at issue have been generated or collected; how they have been kept confidential; what specific interests (e.g. of the police officers, of law enforcement, or of public concern) would be injured by disclosure . . . and the projected severity of each such injury.” Id. at 189. Without an initial showing, of course, the court would simply order disclosure. But once the formal threshold is met — if the assertion is not frivolous — the trial court’s real work begins:
If the court finds the defendant has not satisfied its threshold burdens, direct disclosure is in order. If the threshold burdens are met, the court may then review the materials at issue in camera and decide which, if any, to withhold from disclosure.
Id. at 190. The court goes on to discuss the value of redaction by the judge in balancing the interests of privilege and disclosure. Id.