Court Opinion

ID: 9381604
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-23 15:05:47.403886+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:33.528706
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: MARCH 23, 2023
                                                          TO BE PUBLISHED

                     Supreme Court of Kentucky
                                    2021-SC-0390-MR

LAZARO POZO-ILLAS                                                   APPELLANT

                  ON APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
V.               HONORABLE ANGELA MCCORMICK BISIG, JUDGE
                              NO. 19-CR-002766

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                              APPELLEE

                 OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE LAMBERT

                                      AFFIRMING

      Lazaro Pozo-Illas (Pozo-Illas) was convicted of wanton murder, first-

degree assault, two counts of first-degree wanton endangerment, operating a

motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, and operating a motor

vehicle without an operator’s license. He was sentenced to thirty years’

imprisonment and now appeals his convictions and sentence to this Court as a

matter of right.1 After review, we affirm.

                I.    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

      On Sunday, August 11, 2019, Chris Shultz (Chris) and Brian Hovekamp

(Brian) went golfing together at Seneca Golf Course in Jefferson County. The

      1   Ky. Const. § 110(2)(b).
golf course is a public course located in Seneca Park, which is also open to the

public. The course has eighteen holes, and its front nine holes are separated

from its back nine holes by a two-lane road. In order to get from the front nine

to the back nine, golfers must cross Pee Wee Reese Road using a marked golf

cart path. During the relevant time in this case, the cart path was marked

with standard, vertical, white crosswalk lines that ran from one side of Pee Wee

Reese Road to the other. The cart path was also marked with a yellow diamond

shaped road sign with a golf cart on it with an arrow pointing to the cart path

beneath it. Beneath the golf cart warning sign was a twenty-five miles per hour

speed limit sign.

      At 3:56 p.m. Chris and Brian finished the front nine holes and were

using the cart path to cross Pee Wee Reese Road to reach the back nine holes.

As they were crossing, their golf cart was t-boned by a 2006 Ford Mustang that

was driven by Pozo-Illas. Brian, the driver of the golf cart, was severely injured

but survived the collision. Chris, the passenger, tragically died due to multiple

blunt force injuries. Surveillance footage of the collision showed that Brian did

not stop before entering the cart path and did not stop at any time while in the

cart path. After striking the golf cart, the Mustang continued moving forward,

veered left off the road, and came to rest in very tall, thick grass.

      There were a number of bystanders that witnessed the collision and its

aftermath. One of the witnesses, Tyler Cissell (Tyler) was in a golf cart directly

behind Chris and Brian when the collision occurred. After the collision, Tyler

went to the Mustang to ensure that its occupants did not leave the scene.

                                         2
Tyler saw the individual in the front passenger seat toss a case of beer out the

window into the tall grass. Police officers would later recover a full twelve pack

of beer out of the grass which was still “cold and sweaty.”

      Several police officers and other first responders arrived on scene soon

after the collision. Officer Aaron Flannery spoke to Pozo-Illas and his two

passengers shortly after arriving. In body camera footage of the interaction

Pozo-Illas made the following statement: “I’m driving over here, I’m driving

through here, I just coming, and he just, I know that this over here they play

golf over here, but he see, he see I coming and he just stop. I can’t stop too

because that’s a standard, it’s a shift [unintelligible].”

      Later, Officers Bassler and Tello conducted a series of field sobriety tests

on Pozo-Illas, which were also captured on body camera footage. The officers

first established that Pozo-Illas preferred to communicate with them in

Spanish. Thereafter, Officer Bassler communicated with Pozo-Illas in English

and Officer Tello translated. To begin, the officers asked Pozo-Illas how much

he had to drink that day. He responded that he drank a “small bottle” of

Hennessy. Officer Bassler then conducted the horizontal gaze nystagmus test,

colloquially known as the “involuntary eye jerk test”; the “walk and turn” test;

and the “stand on one leg” test. Officer Bassler would later testify that these

tests are not “pass/fail,” but rather an officer looks for indicators of

impairment. Officer Bassler believed that Pozo-Illas showed indicators of

impairment on each of the tests. Last, Officer Bassler attempted to determine

Pozo-Illas’ blood alcohol content (BAC) using a portable breathalyzer test.

                                          3
Officer Bassler attempted the test three different times and during the second

attempt, the officer told Pozo-Illas that the device was indicating that he was

trying to block it with his tongue. The results of that portable breathalyzer test

were not submitted to the jury.

      After completing the field sobriety tests, Officer Bassler placed Pozo-Illas

under arrest. He was then transported to jail, where an three additional BAC

tests were performed: an Intoxilyzer breath test and two blood draws. The

Intoxilyzer test was performed at 6:02 p.m., approximately two hours after the

collision. The results of that test showed that Pozo-Illas’ BAC was 0.160. The

first blood draw occurred about ten minutes after the breath test, the results of

which were a BAC of 0.161. The second blood draw was taken exactly one

hour later and showed that Pozo-Illas’ BAC was 0.141. Dr. Greg Davis, a

witness for the Commonwealth, testified that based on a retrograde

extrapolation formula Pozo-Illas’ BAC at the time of the collision would have

been 0.195. Dr. Davis explained that this BAC calculation was only an

approximation and acknowledged that, because of the way the body

metabolizes alcohol, his BAC could have been 0.195 at some point after the

collision rather than at the exact time of the collision.

      In addition to driving while impaired, Pozo-Illas was also speeding at the

time of the collision. Officer Bryan Gillis testified that the crash data retrieval

(CDR) report from the Mustang recorded that for the twenty seconds that the

preceded the collision the vehicle’s speed steadily remained between fifty and

sixty miles per hour, that the brakes were applied 1.4 seconds before the

                                         4
collision, and that at the time the brakes were applied Pozo-Illas was driving at

a rate of fifty-three miles per hour. At impact, the vehicle was travelling at

twenty-nine miles per hour.

      In order to reach the area where the collision occurred, Pozo-Illas had to

turn right at an intersection on Taylorsville Road and go north on Pee Wee

Reese Road. Several videos of the route were played for the jury. At the

beginning of the road there was a twenty-five miles per hour speed limit sign.

After a short distance there was a pedestrian crosswalk with two pedestrian

crosswalk signs. Immediately after the pedestrian crosswalk the road began to

go up a blind hill. Towards the top of the hill there were a single set of rumble

strips in the middle of the driving lane, and at the top of that hill was the cart

path where the collision occurred.

      At trial, Pozo-Illas argued that he did not intend harm anyone that day,

and that his conduct was not wanton but merely negligent. He asserted that

he could not see the cart path until he reached the top of the blind hill, and

that even then all he could see was the golf cart warning sign. Through cross-

examination of one of the police officers involved in the case, defense counsel

established that the golf cart warning sign was neither a stop sign nor a yield

sign but was instead an advisory sign only. Pozo-Illas therefore contended that

he should not be convicted of murder for failing to respond to a “dart out” in

time. Pozo-Illas acknowledged that he was speeding but argued that the CDR

data should only be considered rough estimates, as the Mustang was an older

model and there was no evidence that the CDR was working properly or had

                                         5
been recently calibrated. Similarly, he did not dispute that he had been

drinking but argued that the field sobriety tests could have been skewed if he

had been hit in the head when the airbags deployed during the collision, and,

that he was not as impaired as the Commonwealth asserted.

      The jury ultimately convicted Pozo-Illas of the wanton murder of Chris;

the first-degree assault of Brian; two counts of wanton endangerment, one for

each of his passengers; operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of

alcohol; and operating a motor vehicle without an operator’s license.

      Additional facts are discussed below as necessary.

                               II.   ANALYSIS

      Pozo-Illas asserts several arguments to support his contention that his

convictions should be vacated, we will address each in turn.

A. The trial court did not err by excluding evidence for lack of relevance
   as to additional signage placed in the cart path after the date of the
   collision.

      At some point after the collision, additional signage and safety measures

were implemented at the cart path. Three poles running the length of the cart

path at even intervals were added to each side of it. And, about ten yards away

from the cart path on either side, two poles separated by a white line were

added across the road to indicate where a driver should stop when letting a

cart or pedestrian cross the cart path. Finally, an additional sign was placed in

front of, and in addition to, the golf cart warning sign. The added sign is a

white, square sign with a yield symbol on it that reads “yield here to” with a

pedestrian symbol and an arrow pointing to the cart path.

                                        6
      The Commonwealth filed a motion in limine to exclude any evidence of

these additional safety measures. In support, the Commonwealth cited KRE2

407, which prohibits the admission of evidence of subsequent remedial

measures “which, if taken previously, would have made an injury or harm

allegedly caused by the event less likely to occur” to prove “negligence, culpable

conduct, a defect in a product, a defect in a product's design, or a need for a

warning or instruction.”3 KRE 407 allows the evidence of subsequent remedial

measures if offered for another purpose, “such as proving ownership, control,

or feasibility of precautionary measures, if controverted, or impeachment.”4

The Commonwealth further argued that the evidence was irrelevant and

therefore inadmissible under KRE 402.

      In response, defense counsel asserted that KRE 407 applies only in civil

cases, and even then an exception to prove the feasibility of cautionary

measures exists. The defense argued that “[t]he addition of the yield sign

confirms that it was feasible and demonstrates that the fact that the original

signage did not require car traffic to do anything other than be aware.” The

defense further alleged that preventing the admission of that evidence would

harm Pozo-Illas’ constitutional right to present a defense.

      The circuit court granted the Commonwealth’s motion in limine and

excluded the evidence under both KRE 407 and KRE 402. The court did not

      2   Kentucky Rule of Evidence.
      3   KRE 407.
      4   Id.

                                        7
dispute that the public policy behind the existence of KRE 407 was to

encourage defendants in civil litigation to implement remedial measures

without fear that doing so would be used against them at trial. However, the

court reasoned that nothing in the plain language of KRE 407 explicitly

prohibited its application in criminal cases. The court therefore ruled that its

application was proper, reasoning that the defense was essentially arguing that

there was a “defect” in the way the road was marked that day. The court

further ruled that evidence of warnings and safety measures that were

implemented after the fact were irrelevant to what was in place on the date of

the collision.

      The defense submitted by avowal a video taken by its investigator

demonstrating the added signage and poles. It also submitted testimony from

its investigator regarding the video by avowal. This issue is therefore properly

preserved for our review. A trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence

is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.5 “The test for abuse of discretion is

whether the trial judge's decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or

unsupported by sound legal principles.”6 However, whether KRE 407 is

applicable in criminal cases is a matter of first impression for this Court and is

an issue of law to be reviewed de novo, affording no deference to the trial

court’s ruling.7

      5   See, e.g., Meece v. Commonwealth, 348 S.W.3d 627, 645 (Ky. 2011).
      6   Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999).
      7   See, e.g., Meyers v. Commonwealth, 381 S.W.3d 280, 283 (Ky. 2012).

                                           8
       Before this Court, Pozo-Illas asserts that KRE 407 should not apply to

criminal cases or when the remedial measure is taken by a non-party to the

case. Further, he contends that the remedial signage evidence was relevant to

prove that no obligation to yield existed on the day of the collision. He argues

that a lack of obligation to yield was relevant to prove that he did not act with

extreme indifference to the value of human life and therefore did not commit

wanton murder.8 In the alternative, should this Court hold that KRE 407 is

applicable, Pozo-Illas contends that the exclusion of the remedial signage

violated his right to present a defense. We will address each argument in turn.

       (1) KRE 407 can apply to criminal cases, but it was improperly
           applied in the case at bar.

       “Although denominated ‘rules,’ the elements of the Kentucky Rules of

Evidence were enacted as statutes by the Kentucky General Assembly.”9

       In construing a statute, it is fundamental that our foremost
       objective is to determine the legislature's intent in enacting the
       legislation. To determine legislative intent, we look first to the
       language of the statute, giving the words their plain and ordinary
       meaning. Further, we construe a statute only as written, and the
       intent of the Legislature must be deduced from the language it
       used, when it is plain and unambiguous[.]10

       8 KRS 507.020(1)(b) (“A person is guilty of murder when . . . Including, but not
limited to, the operation of a motor vehicle under circumstances manifesting extreme
indifference to human life, he wantonly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk
of death to another person and thereby causes the death of another person.”).
       9KRE 407, Legislative Research Commission Note (7-1-92). See also Meyers v.
Commonwealth, 381 S.W.3d 280, 283 (Ky. 2012) (“We interpret [KRE] as we would any
statute and turn to traditional tools of statutory construction.”).
       10 Pearce v. Univ. of Louisville, ex rel. Bd. of Trs., 448 S.W.3d 746, 749 (Ky. 2014)

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

                                             9
Moreover, statutes must be read in conjunction with statutes of similar import

and relevance.11 That said, KRE 107 provides that

      [t]he Kentucky Rules of Evidence shall take effect on the first day
      of July, 1992. They shall apply to all civil and criminal actions
      and proceedings originally brought on for trial upon or after that
      date and to pretrial motions or matters originally presented to the
      trial court for decision upon or after that date if a determination of
      such motions or matters requires an application of evidence
      principles[.]12

In turn, KRE 407, states:

      When, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken
      previously, would have made an injury or harm allegedly caused by
      the event less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures
      is not admissible to prove negligence, culpable conduct, a defect in
      a product, a defect in a product's design, or a need for a warning or
      instruction. This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of
      subsequent measures when offered for another purpose, such as
      proving ownership, control, or feasibility of precautionary
      measures, if controverted, or impeachment.

We agree with the trial court that there is nothing in the plain language of KRE

407 that would prohibit its application in a criminal case. However, we

disagree with the trial court’s application of the rule in this particular case. We

leave open the possibility of KRE 407 being properly applied when a criminal

defendant who is a party to the case has taken such subsequent measures.

But given that the purpose of the rule is to further the public policy of

“encouraging potential defendants to take safety precautions without fear they

will be used against them,” “the rule’s exclusion of evidence of subsequent

remedial measures is inapplicable to the actions of persons not party to a

      11   See, e.g., Osborne v. Keeney, 399 S.W.3d 1, 22 (Ky. 2012).
      12   (Emphasis added).

                                            10
case.”13 Accordingly, we hold that while KRE 407 may apply in criminal cases,

it may only apply in circumstances wherein a party defendant has undertaken

the subsequent remedial measures. However, we still affirm the exclusion of

the evidence based on the trial court’s additional finding that it was not

relevant.

        (2) Evidence of the remedial signage was not relevant, and its
            exclusion did not harm Pozo-Illas’ right to present a defense.

        Pozo-Illas also asserts that evidence of the remedial signage was relevant

to demonstrate that he did not have an obligation to yield on the day of the

collision, and that proof that he did not have an obligation to yield was relevant

to prove that he did not act with extreme indifference to the value of human

life.

        Relevant evidence “means evidence having any tendency to make the

existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action

more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”14 We

agree with the trial court’s ruling that the remedial signage evidence was

irrelevant. The primary issue placed before the jury was Pozo-Illas’ mental

state on the day of the collision. Specifically, whether he acted wantonly and

with extreme indifference to the value of human life (wanton murder), or

whether he only acted wantonly (second-degree manslaughter). Evidence that

        13   State v. Martin, 944 A.2d 867, 881 (Vt. 2007).
        14   KRE 401.

                                              11
additional signage was placed at the scene on a later date had no bearing on

this determination.

      Further, exclusion of that evidence did not harm Pozo-Illas’ ability to

present his defense. Through cross-examination of a police officer, defense

counsel established that the golf cart sign at the scene on the date of the

collision was neither a stop sign nor a yield sign. Defense counsel argued the

same during its closing argument. Consequently, the jury was presented with

evidence that Pozo-Illas did not have an obligation to yield under the signage in

place on the date of the collision, which was the purpose for which the defense

contends it would have used evidence of the subsequent remedial signage. We

accordingly find no error and affirm.

B. The trial court did not err by failing to instruct the jury in accordance
   with its order taking judicial notice.

      Pozo-Illas next asserts that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the

jury in accordance with its order taking judicial notice that the golf cart

warning sign posted at the cart path was not a stop sign or a yield sign.

      Prior to trial, defense counsel filed a “Motion to Take Judicial Notice of

Facts.” In relevant part, counsel asked that the court take judicial notice that:

      1. The Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and
         Highways [MUTCD] is the exclusive legal and factual standard
         for signs on the public roadways of Kentucky and governs all
         signs and road markings in this case;

      2. That the certain golf cart sign as it appeared in the incident
         involved in the indictment and which appears in the [MUTCD],
         is a warning sign to alert road users to locations where
         unexpected entries into the roadway by golf carts might occur;
         this sign is not a stop sign or yield sign.

                                        12
      In support of its motion, defense counsel tendered 603 KAR15 5:050.

Section 2 of that Regulation states: “The MUTCD published by the Federal

Highway Administration shall be the standard for all traffic control devices

installed on any street, highway, bicycle trail, or private road open to public

travel in Kentucky.” In addition, the defense submitted Section 2C.49 from the

MUTCD which provides that the golf cart sign posted at the cart path on the

date of the collision “may be used to alert road users to locations where

unexpected entries into the roadway by . . . golf carts . . . might occur.”

Defense counsel accordingly argued in its motion that “the law of Kentucky is,

and was at the time of this incident, that the golf cart sign meant but one

thing: to alert road users to a location where unexpected entries by golf carts

might occur.” The trial court entered an order taking judicial notice as

requested by the defense, noting that “legally, from the court’s review, that is a

warning sign.”

      Later, the defense requested that the trial court instruct the jury in

accordance with its order taking judicial notice by tendering a jury instruction

that read: “That the certain golf cart sign as it appeared in the incident involved

in the indictment is a warning sign to alert road users to locations where

unexpected entries into the roadway by golf carts might occur; this sign is not

a stop sign or yield sign.”16 As previously noted, during cross-examination

      15   Kentucky Administrative Regulation.
      16  The defense withdrew its request to have the jury instructed that the MUTCD
is the sole legal authority for traffic signs in Kentucky, as the manual was not
                                          13
defense counsel elicited testimony from a police officer that the golf cart sign

was not a stop or yield sign but was an advisory sign only. The Commonwealth

did not attempt to dispute the sign’s meaning during re-direct examination of

that witness and identified the sign as a “golf cart warning sign” in its closing

arguments. The trial court declined to include the defense’s requested

instruction regarding the legal meaning of the golf cart sign.17 The court

reasoned that evidence was entered at trial regarding the sign’s legal meaning,

and that it was unaware of any case law or model jury instruction that would

allow a jury in a criminal trial to be instructed on the legal meaning of a road

sign.

        This Court reviews a trial court’s refusal to include a jury instruction for

abuse of discretion.18 We may therefore only reverse if the trial court’s ruling

was “was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal

principles.”19

        Pozo-Illas argues to this Court that the trial court’s failure to instruct the

jury in accordance with its order taking judicial notice was reversible error

because it substantially prejudiced defendant in that it was crucial to his

defense that he acted negligently rather than wantonly. He further asserts that

discussed or used to cross-examine any of the Commonwealth’s witnesses during the
trial.
        This issue is therefore properly preserved for our review. Kentucky Rule of
        17

Criminal Procedure (RCr) 9.54(2).
        Sargent v. Shaffer, 467 S.W.3d 198, 203 (Ky. 2015) overruled on other
        18

grounds by Univ. Med. Cntr., Inc. v. Shwab, 628 S.W.3d 112 (Ky. 2021).
        19   English, 993 S.W.2d at 945.

                                           14
the failure was violative of KRE 201, which states in relevant part that “[t]he

court shall instruct the jury to accept as conclusive any fact judicially

noticed.”20 The Commonwealth, relying on Clay v. Commonwealth,21 argues in

response that the legal meaning of a road sign is not an “adjudicative fact” and

that the trial court accordingly did not err in failing to include it in the jury

instructions. We agree and further hold that Pozo-Illas’ right to present a

defense was not prejudiced by the omission.

      In Clay, the defendant was convicted of wanton murder and first-degree

sodomy.22 Part of the Commonwealth’s case against the defendant was that

DNA testing performed by the Kentucky State Police (KSP) forensic laboratory

determined that the defendant’s DNA was on the victim’s fingertips and

jewelry.23 The defendant attempted to rebut KSP’s DNA results by putting on

his own DNA expert who testified that KSP had relatively low standards for

testing DNA evidence.24 During the Commonwealth’s cross-examination of the

defendant’s expert, the Commonwealth attempted to impeach the expert’s

credibility by having him acknowledge that he would not sign off on a DNA

report in his own laboratory without first seeing the raw data.25 The expert

responded that he could still examine the veracity of KSP’s interpretation

      20   KRE 201(g).
      21   291 S.W.3d 210 (Ky. 2008).
      22   Id. at 212.
      23   Id.
      24   Id. at 217-18.
      25   Id. at 218.

                                         15
without raw data because he was critiquing the way KSP analyzes its results

once they have been obtained.26 The Commonwealth then asked a series of

questions concerning a defendant’s right under Kentucky law to receive any

raw data in the Commonwealth’s possession.27 The expert responded each

time that he did not know the law of Kentucky.28 The Commonwealth

immediately asked that the court take judicial notice “that that is the law in

Kentucky.”29 The trial court promptly took “judicial notice of the fact that that

is the law in Kentucky; that defendants do have the opportunity and ability to

receive, obtain, and analyze any raw data that is received by the

Commonwealth.”30

      On appeal to this Court, the defendant argued that the trial court erred

by taking “judicial notice of the law regarding discovery of underlying test

data.”31 The Clay Court agreed, holding that “the law regarding availability of

raw data to a testifying expert was not a fact to be determined, and thus it

could not be judicially noticed as it was here.”32 It reasoned:

      KRE 201(a) only allows a court to take “judicial notice of
      adjudicative facts.” Though the Kentucky Rules of Evidence do not
      define “adjudicative fact,” Federal Rule of Evidence 201 is nearly
      identical to KRE 201 and its drafters provide the following
      definition: “When a court or an agency finds facts concerning the

      26   Id.
      27   Id.
      28   Id.
      29   Id.
      30   Id.
      31   Id. at 217.
      32   Id.

                                       16
      immediate parties—who did what, where, when, how, and with
      what motive or intent—the court or agency is performing an
      adjudicative function, and the facts are conveniently called
      adjudicative facts....” Here, the trial court explicitly said that it
      was taking judicial notice of what “is the law in Kentucky.” It did
      not take judicial notice of a fact at all. When the Commonwealth
      asked the question about whether Dr. Acton knew he was entitled
      to “raw data,” it was not trying to prove that the doctor could
      access the raw data, but rather was attempting to attack his
      credibility by suggesting that his criticisms of the state lab report
      weren't valid because he had not seen the underlying data. The
      doctor responded that he did not need the data itself to criticize the
      methods used by the lab, which he did know. Whether he was
      entitled to see the raw data was not a fact at issue in the case, and
      thus was not an adjudicative fact subject to judicial notice.33

Though the Clay Court held that the trial court’s judicial notice of the law was

improper, the alleged error was unpreserved, and the Court declined to hold

that the error was manifestly unjust.34 The Court noted in support that the

defendant was able to contest the reliability of the Commonwealth’s DNA

evidence though his expert, as well as testimony from two of his cellmates that

he confessed to the murder.35

      Similarly, in the case before us, defense counsel explicitly requested in

its motion that the trial court take judicial notice that “the law of Kentucky is .

. . that the golf cart sign meant but one thing: to alert road users to a location

where unexpected entries by golf carts might occur.”36 And, in granting the

motion, the trial court stated that “legally, from the court’s review, that is a

      33   Id. at 218 (internal citation omitted).
      34   Id. at 220.
      35   Id.
      36   Emphasis added.

                                              17
warning sign.” But what was required of Pozo-Illas in accordance with the golf

cart sign was not a factual determination for the jury to make in this case, as

the Commonwealth did not dispute the sign’s legal meaning. It was

accordingly not an “adjudicative fact” subject to judicial notice, and the trial

court’s failure to instruct the jury in accordance with its order taking judicial

notice was not violative of KRE 201.37

       Although we hold that the trial court’s judicial notice of the golf cart

sign’s legal meaning was improper, we further hold that the error was harmless

and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by declining to instruct the

jury in accordance with its order taking judicial notice. Pozo-Illas’ counsel

elicited testimony from a police officer as to what the legal meaning of the golf

cart sign was, and the Commonwealth did not attempt to dispute that

meaning. Moreover, during closing arguments defense counsel argued that the

golf cart sign was not a stop sign or a yield sign but was solely an alert sign.

Pozo-Illas’ ability to present a defense was accordingly not substantially

prejudiced.

C. The trial court did not err by failing to conduct a Daubert hearing
   before denying Pozo-Illas’ motion in limine to exclude the testimony of
   two experts.

       37 To be clear, this holding is not meant to suggest that a trial court can never

take judicial notice of the law. As the Clay Court explained, “a court could still take
judicial notice of a law, if that law constituted an adjudicative fact in a particular case.
An example of this would be proving the legal drinking age if there was a dispute as to
what that age is, or any other time that it might be necessary to prove what the law is
as a question of fact.” Id. at 219-20.

                                            18
      Pozo-Illas’ third assertion of error is that the trial court erred by not

conducting a Daubert38 hearing before allowing: (1) the admission of Dr. Davis’

testimony regarding his retrograde extrapolation of Pozo-Illas’ BAC at the time

of the collision, and (2) Officer Gillis’ testimony regarding the CDR report data.

      It will be useful to begin with a brief discussion of the qualifications and

conclusions of each expert. Dr. Davis’ report began with Dr. Davis’

qualifications, which are ample:

      [he is] a physician licensed to practice medicine in Kentucky,
      Indiana, and North Carolina. [He is] a Professor of Pathology and
      Laboratory Medicine and Professor in the Department of Toxicology
      and Cancer Biology in the University of Kentucky College of

      Medicine as well as pro bono consultant to the Kentucky State
      Medical Examiner’s Office and the Lexington Veterans
      Administration Medical Center. [He is] Director of the UK Forensic
      Consultation Service and [is] formerly Associate Chief Medical
      Examiner of the Commonwealth. [He has] also served as chair of
      the Forensic Pathology Committee of the College of American
      Pathologists and on the Forensic Test Committee of the American
      Board of Pathology. [He is] certified by the American Board of
      Pathology in Anatomic Pathology, Clinical Pathology, and Forensic
      Pathology, and [has] testified as an expert in forensic medicine,
      pathology, and toxicology in numerous State Courts in Kentucky,
      Ohio, Virginia, West Virginia, Tennessee, Missouri, Indiana, North
      Carolina, South Carolina, Alabama, Florida, Michigan, Iowa,
      Maryland, New York, New Jersey, Colorado, and California, as well
      as in United States Federal Court and the Republic of Singapore.

In coming to his final opinion, Dr. Davis relied upon Pozo-Illas’ arrest citation,

the uniform traffic collision report; the LMPD39 arrest report; multiple LMPD

videos; the Intoxilyzer report; and the results of both blood draw BAC tests.

      38   Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
      39   Louisville Metro Police Department.

                                            19
      Dr. Davis’ report then explained that most non-heavy drinkers

metabolize alcohol at a rate of (0.015 - 0.02 g/100mL/hr40). Pozo-Illas’ first

blood draw showed a BAC of (0.161 g/100mL). The second blood draw taken

one hour later showed a BAC of (0.141 g/100mL). Dr. Davis opined that this

put Pozo-Illas’ within the average person’s elimination rate at (0.02

g/100mL/hr).41 He then multiplied Pozo-Illas’ elimination rate by the time

between the collision and the first blood draw, two hours and thirteen minutes

(2.2 hours):

                    0.02 g/100mL/hr x 2.2 hr = 0.044 g/100mL.

He then added that result to Pozo-Illas’ BAC at the time of the first blood draw.

However, because the lab results from the first blood draw provide that the test

has a margin of error of (+/- 0.010 g/100mL), Dr. Davis gave Pozo-Illas “the

benefit of the doubt” and started from the presumption that Pozo-Illas’ BAC

was (0.151 g/100mL)42 at the time of the first blood draw for the purposes of

his final calculation:

                0.044 g/100mL + 0.151 g/100mL = 0.195 g/100mL

In order to use the elimination rate of 0.02g/100mL/hr, Dr. Davis further

assumed for the purposes of the equation that Pozo-Illas had taken his last

drink about forty-five minutes or more before the collision.

      40   Grams of alcohol per 100mL of blood per hour.
      41   (0.161 g/100mL – 0.141 g/100mL = 0.02 g/100mL).
      42   (0.161 g/100mL – 0.010 g/100mL = 0.151 g/100mL).

                                          20
      Officer Gillis’ report provides that he took a “Crash Data Retrieval

Technician” online course administered by the Institute of Police Technology

and Management, as well as an in-person training course in “Event Data

Recorder Use in Traffic Crash Reconstruction.” The report states that he

reviewed, in relevant part, a CDR report captured by retired Officer Don

Hargadon. In relevant part, the CDR report includes a graphical representation

of the collision that was created by the CDR unit in the Mustang. The CDR

unit is essentially the vehicle’s “black box” which recorded the vehicle’s speed,

anti-lock braking system, the pressure applied to accelerator pedal, revolutions

per minute, and brake switch. The report states that once the vehicle’s airbags

deployed, all the data was “locked” into place.

      The graph provided in relevant part that it covered “20 seconds prior to

the collision and 5 seconds after the collision.” Then it states that between

twenty seconds before the collision to 1.8 seconds before the collision, the

vehicle’s speed fluctuated between 54 mph to 60 mph and back to 53 mph. At

the point of impact, the CDR recorded that the vehicle’s speed was 29 mph.

The graph depicts that the brakes were applied between 1.4 seconds before to

0.2 seconds before impact.

      Both Dr. Davis and Officer Gillis’ testimony at trial was consistent with

their respective reports, and each expert was thoroughly cross-examined by

defense counsel.

      Prior to trial, defense counsel filed a motion to hold a Daubert hearing

regarding the admissibility of the foregoing expert testimony. Counsel’s

                                       21
complaint against Dr. Davis’ conclusion regarding Pozo-Illas’ BAC at the time of

the collision was that the retrograde extrapolation equation used assumed a

constant alcohol elimination rate of 0.02 g/100 mL/hr. Counsel argued that

“[w]hile the undersigned is not a scientist, it appears that this specific question

about the constancy of the elimination rate is open.” As for Officer Gillis’

report, the defense argued that “the report is little more than the conclusions of

a machine,” and that there was no way to determine the accuracy of the CDR

report. The defense offered no evidence to rebut the experts’ respective reports,

but merely requested a Daubert hearing based on the defense’s conclusory

statements that their conclusions were unreliable.

      The trial court denied Pozo-Illas’ request for a Daubert hearing for either

of the expert witnesses’ testimony. The court noted that the defense had

received curriculum vitae for both experts, as well as their reports which

provided the materials and facts upon which they based their conclusions. The

court found that Dr. Davis is a medical doctor, clinical pathologist, and

forensic pathologist. And, regarding Officer Gillis’ proffered evidence, that

“[c]omputer data downloads from motor vehicles have been used for many

years.” The court found that “both experts have the requisite knowledge, skill,

and experience to testify as to the subject matter in their individual reports,”

that the court “[believed] their testimony will assist the trier of fact in

understanding the evidence in this case,” and that it “[did] not find sufficient

information that either expert [relied] on faulty science or unreliable methods

in reaching their conclusions.”

                                         22
      This Court reviews a trial court’s denial of a request for a Daubert

hearing for abuse of discretion.43 A trial court abuses its discretion if its

refusal to hold a Daubert hearing was “was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or

unsupported by sound legal principles.”44 We hold that the trial court did not

abuse its discretion by denying the defense’s request for Daubert hearings on

the expert testimony at issue, and that Florence v. Commonwealth,45 is

dispositive.

      In Florence, the defendant was convicted of one count of criminal

possession of a forged instrument and two counts of theft by deception over

$300.46 Prior to trial, the defendant objected to any testimony from the

Commonwealth’s proposed handwriting expert regarding the science of

handwriting analysis without first having a Daubert hearing, and the trial court

overruled the objection.47 On appeal, the defendant argued “that failure of the

trial court to hold a Daubert hearing to determine the admissibility of the

proposed expert testimony regarding handwriting analysis was an abuse of

discretion.”48 The Florence Court disagreed. The Court began by noting that

      [i]n Johnson v. Commonwealth,49 we clarified when a Daubert
      hearing is required. This Court followed the [Eighth] Circuit

      43   See, e.g., Robbins v. Commonwealth, 336 S.W.3d 60, 65 (Ky. 2011).
      44   English, 993 S.W.2d at 945.
      45   120 S.W.3d 699 (Ky. 2003).
      46   Id. at 700.
      47   Id. at 701.
      48   Id.
      49   12 S.W.3d 258 (Ky. 1999).

                                           23
      decision in United States v. Martinez50 where “it was held that once
      an appropriate appellate court holds that the Daubert test of
      reliability is satisfied, lower courts can take judicial notice of
      reliability and validity of the scientific method, technique or theory
      at issue.” In Johnson, we held that microscopic examination of
      hair has sufficiently met the scientific reliability standard and that
      a Daubert hearing was no longer required. This Court identified
      other types of scientific evidence that had been recognized as
      reliable (breath testing for determination of blood alcohol content,
      HLA blood typing for paternity determination, fiber analysis,
      ballistics analysis, and fingerprint analysis), and “[o]n the basis of
      those decisions, trial judges in Kentucky can take judicial notice
      that those methods or techniques have achieved the status of
      scientific reliability.”51

The Court then noted that there were no Kentucky cases directly holding that

handwriting analysis evidence is scientifically reliable.52 However, the Court

found it significant that in at least two cases, Marcum v. Gallup53 and Jones v.

Sutton,54 “the lower courts allowed such expert testimony and were affirmed on

appeal. In those cases, it seems to have been assumed that the testimony was

admissible.” Accordingly, the Court held, “the state of the law with respect to

handwriting analysis is similar to Johnson v. Commonwealth, supra, wherein

various fields of scientific inquiry were recognized to have achieved acceptance

in Kentucky law, and are thus acceptable for judicial notice.”55 Further, the

      50   3 F.3d 1191 (8th Cir. 1993).
      51   Florence, 120 S.W.3d at 702.
      52   Id. at 702-03.
      53   237 S.W.2d 862 (Ky. 1951).
      54   255 S.W.2d 658 (Ky. 1953).
      55   Florence, 120 S.W.3d at 703.

                                          24
Court held that the defense did not satisfy its burden to compel a Daubert

hearing, reasoning that under Johnson

      there is a burden shift from the party offering expert testimony to
      the party opposing the testimony. The opposing party, when it so
      requests, has a right to present evidence that the scientific
      evidence at issue is not or is no longer scientifically reliable. In the
      present case, Appellant did not challenge the reliability of the
      expert handwriting analysis with evidence to the contrary. Rather
      he sought only a Daubert hearing, and under Johnson v.
      Commonwealth and relying on the general acceptance of
      handwriting analysis as demonstrated by Marcum v. Gallup and
      Jones v. Sutton, a preliminary hearing was not required without a
      proffer of evidence challenging the reliability of the discipline at
      issue.56

      Unlike in Florence, this Court has made a definitive statement that while

“extrapolation evidence is not required for the Commonwealth to make a prima

facie case of a violation of KRS 189A.010(1)(a),” nothing “precludes the

Commonwealth, or the defendant, from using extrapolation evidence to assist

the trier of fact in its determinations.”57 And, at any rate, retrograde

extrapolation has been used in previous criminal cases.58 And, while there has

been no definitive statement from this Court regarding the use of CDR reports,

      56   Id.
      57  Love v. Commonwealth, 55 S.W.3d 816, 820 (Ky. 2001). In addition, we note
that this is not a situation like Thomas v. Commonwealth, 170 S.W.3d 343 (Ky. 2005),
wherein the expert was asked in front of the jury to assume the defendant had a
history of alcohol abuse when there was no evidence to that the defendant had a
history of alcohol abuse. Id. at 352. Under those circumstances, we held that “the
unsubstantiated ‘hypothetical fact’ could not be used to support [the expert’s]
retrograde extrapolation, [as] it served no purpose other than to insinuate that
Appellant was a person of bad character in contravention of KRE 404(a)(1).” Id.
      58See, e.g., Cook v. Commonwealth, 129 S.W.3d 351, 356 (Ky. 2004) (“The
Commonwealth's expert, Dr. Greg Davis, estimated by back-extrapolation that
Appellant's blood alcohol concentration at the time of the collision would have been
between 0.16 and 0.185 grams per 100 milliliters.”).

                                          25
evidence of that kind has been used in very recent cases without objection from

this Court in Haney v. Commonwealth,59 and Welsh v. Commonwealth.60

Finally, as in Florence, Pozo-Illas did not “did not challenge the reliability of the

expert [retrograde extrapolation or CDR data] with evidence to the contrary,”61

and instead sought only a Daubert hearing.

      Based on the foregoing, we cannot hold that the trial court’s decision to

decline a Daubert hearing on the retrograde extrapolation and the CDR data

was an abuse of discretion.

D. The trial court did not err by declining to instruct the jury on reckless
   homicide.

      Pozo-Illas’ final argument is that the trial court erred by failing to

instruct the jury on reckless homicide.

      Pozo-Illas included a reckless homicide instruction in his tendered jury

instructions.62 After discussion, the trial court declined to instruct the jury on

reckless homicide, and instead instructed the jury on wanton murder and

second-degree manslaughter, both of which require that a defendant acted

wantonly. The trial court acknowledged that it was a “close call” solely because

reckless homicide is a lesser-included offense to wanton murder and second-

degree manslaughter, and it was the court’s general practice to instruct its

juries on lesser-included offenses. However, the court reasoned that reckless

      59   653 S.W.3d 559, 562 (Ky. 2022).
      60   641 S.W.3d 132, 135 (Ky. 2022).
      61   Florence, 120 S.W.3d at 703.
      62   This error is therefore properly preserved for our review. RCr 9.54(2).

                                             26
homicide is an offense that would require the jury to find that Pozo-Illas acted

recklessly, i.e., that he failed to perceive the substantial and unjustifiable risk

that his conduct created.63 The court found that an individual would

essentially have to be completely shut off from the outside world to not be

aware of deaths caused by drunk driving and deaths caused by speeding. And

there was no evidence of record that Pozo-Illas was unaware of the inherent

risks of driving while under the influence of alcohol and speeding.

      When a defendant argues on appeal that a trial court failed to give a jury

instruction required by the evidence presented at trial, this Court reviews the

alleged error for abuse of discretion.64 A trial court abuses its discretion if its

decision “was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal

principles.”65 Additionally, while it is the duty of the trial court to prepare and

give instructions on the whole law of the case,66 a lesser-included offense

instruction is not proper simply because a defendant requests it.67 “[A]n

instruction on a lesser included offense is required only if, considering the

totality of the evidence, the jury might have a reasonable doubt as to the

defendant's guilt of the greater offense, and yet believe beyond a reasonable

doubt that the defendant is guilty of the lesser offense.”68

      63   KRS 201.020(4).
      64   Sargent, 467 S.W.3d at 203.
      65   English, 993 S.W.2d at 945.
      66Rogers   v. Commonwealth, 86 S.W.3d 29, 43 (Ky. 2002).
      67   Swan v. Commonwealth, 384 S.W.3d 77, 99 (Ky. 2012).
      68   Id.

                                         27
      As noted by the trial court, for a reckless homicide instruction to be part

of the jury instructions as a lesser included offense in this case, the evidence

would have to be such that a reasonable juror could find Pozo-Illas guilty of

reckless homicide beyond a reasonable doubt while entertaining reasonable

doubt as to the defendant’s guilt as to wanton murder or second-degree

manslaughter.

      The primary difference between wanton murder and second-degree

manslaughter and reckless homicide is the mental state required to prove

them: wanton murder requires that a defendant acted wantonly and with

extreme indifference to human life, second-degree manslaughter requires that

a defendant acted wantonly, and reckless homicide requires that a defendant

acted recklessly. “A person acts wantonly with respect to a result or to a

circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when he is aware of

and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the result

will occur or that the circumstance exists.”69 In contrast, “[a] person acts

recklessly with respect to a result or to a circumstance described by a statute

defining an offense when he fails to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable

risk that the result will occur or that the circumstance exists.”70 Accordingly,

in this case, the jury would have to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that

Pozo-Illas failed to perceive the substantial and unjustifiable risk of death that

      69   KRS 201.020(3).
      70   KRS 201.020(4).

                                        28
his conduct created while having reasonable doubt that he was aware of that

risk and consciously disregarded it.

      The evidence at trial showed that Pozo-Illas was speeding and driving

while intoxicated through a public park on a sunny Sunday afternoon. While

driving through the park he drove past, and disregarded, a twenty-five miles

per hour speed limit sign and a pedestrian cross walk. While climbing the

blind hill leading to the cart path, he passed over rumble strips placed in the

middle of his driving lane, which are a universal indicator to motorists to slow

down and be aware that there may be changes ahead that may not be

anticipated by an inattentive driver. Furthermore, Pozo-Illas stated during his

initial interaction with police that he knew there was a golf course in the area

where the collision occurred. Pozo-Illas did not testify on his own behalf that

he did not know the inherent risk of death concomitant with drinking and

driving and speeding, nor was there any other evidence presented by the

defense to that effect.

       Based on the foregoing, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in finding that no reasonable juror could have found beyond a

reasonable doubt that Pozo-Illas acted recklessly, while having reasonable

doubt that he acted wantonly. It therefore did not err by declining to instruct

the jury on reckless homicide.

                            III.   CONCLUSION

      Based on the foregoing, we affirm.

                                       29
      VanMeter, C.J.; Conley, Keller, Lambert, Nickell, and Thompson, JJ.;

sitting. VanMeter, C.J.; Conley, Keller, and Lambert, JJ.; concur. Thompson,

J., concurs in result only. Bisig, J., not sitting.

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:

Jennifer Elizabeth Hubbard
Louisville Metro Public Defender’s Office

Jazmin Paige Smith
Louisville Metro Public Defender’s Office

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:

Daniel Jay Cameron
Attorney General of Kentucky

Mark Daniel Barry
Assistant Attorney General

                                         30