Court Opinion

ID: 9915434
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-05 15:09:29.784141+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:14:01.726560
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Four Seasons Logging, LLC,                          :
                       Petitioner                   :
                                                    :
                    v.                              :    No. 347 C.D. 2022
                                                    :    Submitted: February 24, 2023
Department of Labor and Industry,                   :
Office of Unemployment                              :
Compensation Tax Services,                          :
                        Respondent                  :

BEFORE:             HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
                    HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge
                    HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION
BY JUDGE DUMAS                                                          FILED: January 5, 2024

                    Four Seasons Logging, LLC (Four Seasons) petitions for review of the
order entered by the Department of Labor and Industry (Department), which (1)
denied Four Seasons’ petition for reassessment and (2) affirmed the notice of
assessment issued by the Office of Unemployment Compensation Tax Services (Tax
Services).         Four Seasons essentially challenges the sufficiency and weight of
evidence supporting the Department’s reasoning that under the Unemployment
Compensation Law (Law),1 Four Seasons owed unemployment compensation taxes
that were not paid by Four Seasons Forestry Services, LLC (Forestry). We are
constrained to affirm.
                                         I. BACKGROUND2
                    We briefly summarize the background set forth by Tax Services in its

          1
              Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex. Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended, 43 P.S. §§ 751-
919.10.
         Generally, when we state the facts, we view the record in the light most favorable to the
          2

prevailing party, including the benefit of all logical and reasonable inferences, unless we determine
decision. See generally Final Decision & Order of the Dep’t of Lab. & Indus. (Op.),
3/15/22. Edwin Knecht was a majority owner of Forestry, a logging business. Id. at
3, 5. Tammy Knecht (Edwin’s spouse) was Forestry’s secretary shortly before
Forestry ceased operations. Id. at 4. Forestry failed to pay its unemployment
compensation taxes, and the Department unsuccessfully attempted to collect. Id. at
5.
               Similar to Forestry, Four Seasons is also a logging business that was
founded in March 2017. Id. at 5-6. A few months later, Four Seasons purchased
some of Forestry’s equipment, Pet’r’s Ex. 7, and hired the Knechts. Four Seasons
eventually terminated Edwin Knecht’s employment. The Department’s opinion
exhaustively details the transactions involving Four Seasons, Forestry, and the
Knechts. See Op. at 3-19.
               Subsequently, a Department tax agent suggested that Four Seasons may
be a successor-in-interest to Forestry, which prompted a Department investigation.
Id. at 20. The Department concluded that Four Seasons is a successor-in-interest to
Forestry and assessed Four Seasons approximately $175,000, including interest and
penalties. Id. at 21.3 Four Seasons timely filed a petition for reassessment, and the

that material findings of fact are unsupported by substantial evidence of record. Stage Road
Poultry Catchers v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., Off. of Unemployment Comp., Tax Servs., 34 A.3d 876,
885-86 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011) (Stage Rd.).
        The Department made numerous findings of fact resting on its disbelief of uncontradicted
testimony and documents, i.e., negative findings. See Leon E. Wintermyer, Inc. v. Workers’ Comp.
Appeal Bd. (Marlowe), 812 A.2d 478, 486 (Pa. 2002). Nevertheless, we may not review an
agency’s decision “in such a manner as would intrude upon the agency’s fact-finding role and
discretionary decision-making authority.” Id. at 487-88. Further, we are limited to the issues raised
by Four Seasons’ counsel. Gibraltar Rock, Inc. v. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 286 A.3d 713, 724-25 (Pa.
2022) (cautioning this Court from raising issues sua sponte).
        3
          The notice of assessment stated that the Department was authorized to assess Forestry
under Section 304 of the Law, 43 P.S. § 784. Dep’t’s Ex. 6, at 1. Section 304, in turn, is within
Article III of the Law, 43 P.S. §§ 781-795, which governs employer contributions, including, as
needed, an employer’s successor-in-interest. Section 301 of the Law, 43 P.S. § 781.

                                                 2
Department held a hearing.
               At the beginning of the hearing, the parties stipulated that the only issue
was whether Four Seasons was a “mere continuation” of Forestry. Id. at 2. They
also stipulated that although Four Seasons purchased equipment from Forestry, that
purchase was not the basis of the notice of assessment. Id. At the hearing, the parties
presented witnesses and evidence, following which the Department denied relief.
Id.
               The Department reasoned that a de facto merger occurred when Four
Seasons acquired Forestry. Id. at 28-45 (discussing the four factors identified in
Fizzano Bros. Concrete Prods., Inc. v. XLN, Inc., 42 A.3d 951, 962 (Pa. 2012)
(Fizzano), for determining the existence of a de facto merger).4 In the Department’s
view, there was “overwhelming indication” that Forestry and Four Seasons executed
a de facto merger as opposed to a sale of assets. Id. at 46. Per the Department, Four
Seasons was indistinguishable from Forestry, as the Knechts managed and controlled
both entities. Id. at 46-47.5 No post-trial motion was required, and Four Seasons
       4
          For context, we briefly state the four de facto factors as presented in the Department’s
opinion. First, “a cessation of ordinary business and dissolution of the predecessor as soon as
practically and legally possible.” Fizzano, 42 A.3d at 962 (citation omitted). Second, an
“assumption by the successor of the liabilities ordinarily necessary for the uninterrupted
continuation of the business of the predecessor.” Id. Third, “a continuity of management,
personnel, physical location, aspects, and general business operation.” Id. Fourth, “continuity of
ownership.” Id.
        5
          The Department’s opinion did not discuss its statutory authority under the Law.
Specifically, the Department did not address its legal basis for resolving successor liability for
unpaid unemployment compensation tax, including under which prong of Section 301(d)(1)(B) of
the Law, 43 P.S. § 781(d)(1)(B), that Four Seasons was liable for Forestry’s unpaid taxes. See
Section 301(d)(1)(B) of the Law, 43 P.S. § 781(d)(1)(B) (discussed below). The Department also
did not address 15 Pa.C.S. § 1904, which abolished the doctrine of de facto mergers. 15 Pa.C.S. §
1904 (1989) (“The doctrine of de facto mergers, consolidations and other fundamental transactions
is abolished . . . . A transaction that in form satisfies the requirements of this subpart may be
challenged by reason of its substance only to the extent permitted by section 1105 . . . .”); id. § 1904
(2015) (reflecting non-substantive revision). But see Smith v. A.O. Smith Corp., 270 A.3d 1185,

                                                   3
timely appealed.
                                           II. ISSUES
               Four Seasons contends that it was not a “mere continuation” of
Forestry, i.e., there was no de facto merger. Four Seasons’ Br. at 4.
                                      III. DISCUSSION6
               In support, Four Seasons generally contends that the Department, in
concluding that a de facto merger occurred under Fizzano, “made several findings
of fact and conclusions of law [that] were wholly unsupported by the” record. Id. at
8. Four Seasons contends that the record did not establish any continuity of

1192 n.6 (Pa. Super. 2022) (claiming that “no Pennsylvania state court has ever interpreted [Section
1904], let alone found that the statute abolishes the de facto merger or mere continuation exceptions
to the general rule against successor liability”). Finally, the Department did not address 34 Pa.
Code § 63.1a, which provides that evidence of “common ownership, control, management or a
combination thereof that exists at the time of the transfer of organization, trade, business or
workforce will be disregarded” by the Department “if it commences immediately before the
transfer and during a series of nearly contemporaneous business transactions culminating in the
transfer.” 34 Pa. Code § 63.1a (emphasis added).
         It is well settled, however, that this Court is “neither obliged, nor even particularly
equipped, to develop an argument for a party. To do so places the Court in the conflicting roles of
advocate and neutral arbiter.” Martinez v. City of Reading Police Dep’t, 289 A.3d 1136, 1139 n.13
(Pa. Cmwlth. 2023) (cleaned up); accord Gibraltar Rock, 286 A.3d at 724 (reiterating that “even
if the disposition of the trial court was fundamentally wrong,” “an appellate court may not address
the issue” (cleaned up)). Because Four Seasons did not raise these issues, we cannot address them
even if the Department’s decision was unsound. See Gibraltar Rock, 286 A.3d at 724-25.
         6
           Generally, we “must affirm [the agency’s] adjudication unless we determine that: it
violates the appellant’s constitution[al] rights; it is not in accordance with law; it was reached in
violation of applicable administrative procedure; or any fact necessary to the decision is not
supported by substantial evidence.” U.S. Steel Corp. (USX Clairton Works) v. Unemployment
Comp. Bd. of Rev., 858 A.2d 91, 99 (Pa. 2004); 2 Pa.C.S. § 704. We defined “substantial evidence,”
“as relevant evidence upon which a reasonable mind could base a conclusion. . . . The fact that a
party may have produced witnesses who gave a different version of the events, or that the party
might view the testimony differently than the [Department] is not grounds for reversal if substantial
evidence supports the [Department’s] findings.” Stage Rd., 34 A.3d at 885-86 (cleaned up).
“Similarly, even if evidence exists in the record that could support a contrary conclusion, it does
not follow that the findings of fact are not supported by substantial evidence.” Id. (citation
omitted).

                                                 4
ownership with Forestry. Id. at 10-11. Relatedly, Four Seasons emphasizes that it
did not assume any of Forestry’s debts and only purchased some of Forestry’s
equipment.       Id. at 11-14.     Finally, Four Seasons asserts that the Department
improperly weighed facts demonstrating a continuity of management and control.
Id. at 14-18.
                Briefly, under Section 301(d)(1)(B) of the Law, when a predecessor
employer partially or wholly transfers its business or workforce to a “successor-in-
interest,” the Department must transfer any debts owed by that employer to the
successor-in-interest if the Department finds one of two prongs. Section 301(d)(1)(B)
of the Law, 43 P.S. § 781(d)(1)(B).7 The first prong is that the Department could find
that the predecessor employer “was owned, controlled or managed by or owned,
controlled or managed the successor-in-interest either directly or indirectly, by
legally [enforceable] means or otherwise.” Id. The second prong is that the
Department could find that “both such [predecessor] employer and successor-in-
interest were owned, controlled or managed either directly or indirectly, by legally

       7
          The relevant statutory language follows: “with respect to any transfer by an employer
subject to the contribution provisions of this act of its organization, trade, business or work force,
in whole or in part, whether such transfer was by merger, consolidation, sale or transfer, descent
or otherwise, the department shall transfer the experience record and reserve account balance
(whether positive or negative) of such employer to its successor-in-interest if it finds” one of two
prongs. Section 301(d)(1)(B) of the Law, 43 P.S. § 781(d)(1)(B); see also Section 402.5(d) of the
Law, added by the Act of July 1, 1985, P.L. 96, 43 P.S. § 802.5(d) (addressing benefits for workers
of a successor to a seasonal employer). This Court has interpreted Section 301(d)(1)(B) of the Law,
43 P.S. § 781(d)(1)(B), in resolving whether a successor-in-interest, i.e., successor business, was
owned or controlled by the predecessor employer, i.e., predecessor business. See, e.g., Zotis
Enters., Inc. v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 635 A.2d 698 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993); Reese Teleservices, Inc.
v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., Off. of Unemployment Comp. Tax Servs., 975 A.2d 600 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2009). There does not appear to be any other statutory basis permitting the Department to pursue
a successor-in-interest for unpaid unemployment compensation taxes. See also Op. at 20
(explaining that the Department identified Four Seasons as a potential successor-in-interest to
Forestry).

                                                  5
[enforceable] means or otherwise, by the same interest or interests.” Id.; see also 34
Pa. Code § 63.1a.8         Our jurisprudence apparently does not reflect when the
Department began invoking the de facto merger doctrine to establish liability under
Section 301(d)(1)(B) of the Law, 43 P.S. § 781(d)(1)(B).9
               Because Four Seasons did not challenge the Department’s invocation
of the de facto merger doctrine, we briefly state the doctrine. With “respect to
successor liability in this Commonwealth, it is well-established that when one
company sells or transfers all of its assets to another company, the purchasing or
receiving company is not responsible for the debts and liabilities of the selling
company simply because it acquired the seller’s property.” Continental Ins. Co. v.
Schneider, Inc., 873 A.2d 1286, 1291 (Pa. 2005) (cleaned up). “This general rule of
non-liability can be overcome, however, if it is established that” “the asset sale
amounted to a consolidation or a de facto merger.” Id. (cleaned up); Fizzano, 42
A.3d at 954 (cleaned up).
               A merger is the “uniting of two or more corporations by the transfer of
property to one of them, which continues in existence, the others being merged into

       8
          Section 63.1a of the Department’s regulations was promulgated in 2011. Prior to 2011,
because the Law was “silent as to the time duration of common ownership that is necessary to
trigger a transfer[,] the Department . . . interpreted [Section 301(d)(1)(B) of the Law, 43 P.S. §
781(d)(1)(B)] by looking at the situation of the parties at the time of transfer.” Armco, Inc. v. Pa.
Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 713 A.2d 1208, 1209 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998).
        9
          Cf. Br. for Department at 9 n.2, Youth Servs. Agency v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., Off. of
Unemployment Comp. Tax Servs. (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 423 C.D. 2021, filed Mar. 7, 2022) (arguing
that under Section 301(d)(1)(B) of the Law, 43 P.S. § 781(d)(1)(B), “a business can be deemed a
successor-in-interest” for unpaid unemployment compensation tax charges); Armco, 713 A.2d at
1209-10 (interpreting Section 301(d)(1)(B) of the Law, 43 P.S. § 781(d)(1)(B), in affirming the
Department’s holding that “there was common ownership or control between the two
corporations” that actually merged). Cf. also, e.g., Stratigos v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., Off. of
Unemployment Comp. Tax Servs., 57 A.3d 217, 220-21 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012) (noting account balance
could be transferred upon establishing “a commonality of ownership, control, or management of
the” business at issue).

                                                 6
it.” Fizzano, 42 A.3d at 967 n.20 (citations omitted). “In a merger, one or more
constituent corporations (each a disappearing corporation) merge into and become
part of another constituent corporation that continues to exist after the merger has
been consummated.” Id. (citations omitted); accord 15 Pa.C.S. § 331.10
               A de facto merger occurs when one or more of the following non-
exclusive factors are demonstrated. See Fizzano, 42 A.3d at 962, 969. Those
elements include “(1) continuity of ownership; (2) a cessation of ordinary business
and dissolution of the predecessor as soon as practically and legally possible; (3)
assumption by the successor of the liabilities ordinarily necessary for the
uninterrupted continuation of the business of the predecessor[;] and (4) a continuity
of management, personnel, physical location, aspects, and general business
operation.” Id. at 962 (citation omitted). Our Supreme Court emphasized that these
elements are guideposts and that a reviewing court should not construe these
elements as a mechanical checklist. Id. at 969. The Fizzano Court also noted that
“in a cause of action that invokes important public policy goals, the continuity of
ownership prong may be relaxed.” Id. at 967.
               Instantly, we are constrained by the parties’ arguments and the record,
including the Department’s credibility determinations and extensive findings of fact.
See Marlowe, 812 A.2d at 487-88. For example, the Department correctly noted that
under Fizzano, evidence of continuity of ownership may not be required, but
nonetheless discussed evidence that in the Department’s view established continuity
of ownership. See Op. at 42-43. The Department highlighted the similarities

       10
          Following Fizzano, in 2015, the General Assembly repealed 15 Pa.C.S. §§ 1921-1929,
which addressed statutory merger, and “modernized” “the law on corporations” by enacting, inter
alia, 15 Pa.C.S. §§ 331-336, which similarly authorizes mergers. See H.B. 2234, 198th Gen.
Assemb. (Pa. 2013). Section 331(a)(1) authorizes mergers of, inter alia, two domestic entities “into
a surviving association.” See 15 Pa.C.S. § 331(a)(1).

                                                 7
between the entities’ names and the Knechts’ roles in both entities. See, e.g., id. at
40-41, 43-44. In sum, the Department reviewed each of the four Fizzano factors,
identified the testimony and evidence, rendered credibility determinations and
findings of fact, and held that a de facto merger occurred. Id. at 35-47. After
reviewing the record and the parties’ briefs, and because we are constrained by the
relevant law, we reluctantly agree with the Department’s reasoning. See Four
Seasons Logging, LLC v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., Off. of Unemployment Comp. Tax
Servs. (Office of Unemp. Comp. Tax. Servs., No. 18-R-0109-4, filed Mar. 15, 2022).
                                IV. CONCLUSION
             Initially, as a general matter, all decisions are to be construed against
their facts. Maloney v. Valley Med. Facilities, Inc., 984 A.2d 478, 485-86 (Pa. 2009).
We are also limited by the issues raised by counsel. See Gibraltar Rock, 286 A.3d
at 724-25. Because Four Seasons challenged only the evidence supporting the
Department’s application of the de facto merger doctrine, we may not address any
other issues, “even if the disposition of the [agency] was fundamentally wrong.” See
id. Accordingly, constrained by well settled law, we affirm.

                                              LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

                                          8
         IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Four Seasons Logging, LLC,             :
                       Petitioner      :
                                       :
            v.                         :   No. 347 C.D. 2022
                                       :
Department of Labor and Industry,      :
Office of Unemployment                 :
Compensation Tax Services,             :
                        Respondent     :

                                    ORDER

            AND NOW, this 5th day of January, 2024, we AFFIRM the March 15,
2022 final decision and order by the Department of Labor and Industry, Office of
Unemployment Compensation Tax Services, adverse to Four Seasons Logging,
LLC.

                                           LORI A. DUMAS, Judge