Court Opinion

ID: 9858573
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 16:30:47.183911+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:54:52.026442
License: Public Domain

ALLBEE, Justice
(concurring in division I and dissenting from division II and the result).
While I concur in division I relating to the issuance of the search warrant, I dissent from division II. I would reverse defendant’s conviction on the ground that the search warrant was unlawfully executed in violation of section 808.6, The Code 1979.
Some factual background will aid in understanding this case. In February 1980, Steven Farber, defendant’s estranged husband, entered defendant’s Waterloo apartment through the use of a duplicate key. This entry, in violation of a restraining order issued after defendant had filed a petition for dissolution of the marriage, was made without defendant’s knowledge or consent. Steven Farber allegedly observed various drugs and drug paraphernalia in the apartment. He reported this observation to a detective in the Black Hawk County Sheriff’s Department. As a result, a search warrant was issued for defendant’s apartment.
Shortly thereafter, three officers from the sheriff’s department went to defendant’s apartment to conduct the search. At that time, defendant was at her place of employment, also in Waterloo. Two other members of the department were dispatched to defendant’s place of employment, where they read her the warrant and then transported her to the apartment. When they arrived with defendant at her apartment, the other officers had already entered and completed the search. A small quantity of marijuana, and other items later determined to be non-narcotic, had been discovered and confiscated. Defendant was subsequently placed under arrest and charged with possession of a controlled substance.
Forcible entry in the execution of search warrants is expressly authorized by section 808.6, which states in pertinent part:
The officer may break into any structure or vehicle where reasonably necessary to execute the warrant if, after notice of *371this [sic] authority and purpose the officer’s admittance has not been immediately authorized. The officer may use reasonable force to enter a structure or vehicle to execute a search warrant without notice of the officer’s authority and purpose in the case of vacated or abandoned structures or vehicles.
(Emphasis added.) I do not believe that defendant’s apartment, which she had left only temporarily to go to work, was either “vacated” or “abandoned” within the meaning of this section. According to their ordinary dictionary meanings, neither of those words denotes a temporary absence. Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary 1, 1290 (1976). “Vacate” means “to move out; . . . to cease from occupancy.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1388 (5th ed. 1979). “Abandon” means “[t]o desert, surrender, forsake . .. [t]o relinquish or give up with intent of never again resuming one’s right or interest.” Id. at 2. Defendant had neither moved out of her apartment nor abandoned it. See also 1 J. Varon, Searches, Seizures and Immunities 555 (2d ed. 1974) (using phrase “abandoned, vacated or deserted” to refer to permanent absence of occupants, in discussion of forcible entry statutes).
Because defendant’s apartment was neither “vacated” nor “abandoned,” the first sentence of section 808.6 is applicable here. Forcible entry is authorized by the first sentence only “where reasonably necessary to execute the warrant.” § 808.6. This language was not present in the pre-1978 version of Iowa’s forcible entry statute. See § 751.9, The Code 1977. I believe the addition of the “reasonably necessary” language signifies that the legislature did not intend to give peace officers a carte blanche to forcibly enter premises in every circumstance where admittance has not been immediately authorized by an occupant. Rather, there must be a reasonable degree of necessity shown to justify such entry.
Section 808.6 says that an officer “may break into any structure or vehicle where reasonably necessary to execute the warrant.” The majority concludes that the phrase “where reasonably necessary to execute the warrant” refers only to the necessity of using actual force, and is aimed at situations where it would not be necessary to “break in” because a door is unlocked or a key is available to the police. It is well settled, however, that the word “break” in a forcible entry statute refers not only to situations involving violent force, but also to the mere opening of a closed but unlocked door, or of a locked door with the use of a key. Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585, 589-90, 88 S.Ct. 1755, 1758, 20 L.Ed.2d 828, 833-34 (1968); W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.8(b) at 125-26 (1978); 1 J. Varon, supra, at 553. Therefore, it follows that the “reasonably necessary” language of section 808.6 refers to the necessity of any entry unauthorized by the occupant of the premises, not just to the necessity of using potentially property-damaging force. Had the latter construction been intended by the legislature, I believe it would have used the phrase “reasonable force,” as it did in the second sentence of section 808.6 relating to vacated or abandoned premises, or, alternatively, would have said that officers “may break into any structure or vehicle, using actual force where reasonably necessary to execute the warrant.”
The question before us, then, is whether it was “reasonably necessary” under the facts of this case for the officers to “break into” defendant’s apartment in order to execute the warrant. I would hold that it was not. From the circumstances shown, it can be inferred that the officers knew exactly where defendant was at the time they began the search. Moreover, they knew she was at work, at a fixed location in the same community as the premises to be searched. The distance was not great, and there was no other obstacle to bringing defendant promptly to her apartment. Furthermore, enough officers were on hand so that some could watch the premises while others went to get defendant. Finally, there were no circumstances indicating the success of the search might be endangered by waiting for defendant’s arrival.
*372Under the particular facts of this case, I believe the officer? should have obtained defendant’s presence before beginning the search, thus giving her an opportunity to grant peaceable entry. The ready availability of this simple measure obviated any necessity for breaking into defendant’s apartment.
The holding I propose is a narrow one. I do not mean to suggest that officers may never enter a dwelling in the absence of its occupants in order to execute a search warrant. In fact, prompt entry without an attempt to locate an occupant is probably “reasonably necessary” in the great majority of cases. When the officers do not know where the occupant is, when it would be impracticable or unduly time-consuming to obtain the occupant’s presence, or when the search may be jeopardized by even a short postponement, officers with a valid search warrant should be free to enter the premises without delay. Section 808.6 does not require strict necessity or even exigent circumstances, but only reasonable necessity.
The majority further states that section 808.6 has been complied with here because the statute merely codifies the common law, and there is no case which holds that officers must attempt to bring an absent owner to the premises before executing a search warrant. Even if one were to assume, however, that the “reasonable] necessity]” standard recently added to the statute by our legislature imposes no requirement not imposed at common law, I could not agree that the holding I propose would be contrary to the common law. While it does appear that no case has ever held execution of a search warrant to be invalid under circumstances similar to those in the case at bar, this is because the factual situation involved here has virtually never presented itself in the reported decisions. Research has disclosed only one case in which it appears that an officer executing a search warrant in the absence of the occupant of the premises was aware of the occupant’s whereabouts at the time of the entry. In that case, State v. Gutierrez, 91 N.M. 542, 577 P.2d 440 (Ct.App.1978), partially overruled on other grounds, State v. Cervantes, 92 N.M. 643, 648-49, 593 P.2d 478, 483-84 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 92 N.M. 621, 593 P.2d 62 (1979), the defendant had been arrested and was being transported to her home when an officer with a search warrant broke into her temporarily unoccupied home and then awaited her arrival before conducting the search. 91 N.M. at 544, 577 P.2d at 442. The New Mexico court of appeals held that the search warrant was validly executed. Id. at 549-50, 577 P.2d at 447-48. I do not find Gutierrez persuasive; furthermore, a single case decided by one state’s lower appellate court does not provide adequate authority for the majority’s proposition that the common law would mandate an affirmance on the facts before us.
It is true that two federal courts of appeals have held that a search conducted pursuant to a valid warrant in the absence of the occupant of the premises is not per se “unreasonable” under the fourth amendment. Payne v. United States, 508 F.2d 1391, 1394 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 933, 96 S.Ct. 287, 46 L.Ed.2d 263 (1975); United States v. Gervato, 474 F.2d 40, 44 (3rd Cir.1973), vacating 340 F.Supp. 454 (E.D.Pa.1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864, 94 S.Ct. 39, 38 L.Ed.2d 84 (1973). However, the federal cases recognize that whether any particular search of vacated premises is “unreasonable” depends on the totality of the circumstances of each case. See Payne, 508 F.2d at 1394; United States v. Agrusa, 541 F.2d 690, 697-98 (8th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1045, 97 S.Ct. 751, 50 L.Ed.2d 759 (1977) (“What authority there is holds that unannounced and forcible entries into vacant premises ... are constitutional in the absence of exigent circumstances, provided that the search and seizure is pursuant to warrant and reasonable under the circumstances.”) (citing Payne and Gervato) (emphasis added) (other emphasis deleted from original). While the searches in Payne and Gervato were found to be reasonable under the totality of circumstances, those cases are factually distinguishable from the case before us. In neither Payne nor Gervato is there any indica*373tion that the officers knew where the occupant was when they began their search.
This court has articulated a similar standard for judging whether a particular search and seizure is unreasonable. The test is “whether the thing done, in the sum of its form, scope, nature, incidents and effect, impresses as being fundamentally unfair or unreasonable in the specific situation when the immediate end sought is considered against the private right affected.” State v. Davis, 228 N.W.2d 67, 70 (Iowa 1975). I believe this standard has been met under the facts of this case.
I would also note that the United States Supreme Court has recently stated: “It is well established that law officers constitutionally may break and enter to execute a search warrant where such entry is the only means by which the warrant effectively may be executed." Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 247, 99 S.Ct. 1682, 1688, 60 L.Ed.2d 177, 186 (1979) (citing Payne) (emphasis added). Thus, the result I would reach in the case at bar may well be mandated by the fourth amendment, because the officers had a readily available means to effectively execute the search warrant without breaking into defendant’s apartment.
There being no reasonable necessity for the forcible entry of defendant’s apartment under the particular facts of this case, I would hold that the search warrant was unlawfully executed in violation of section 808.6, and that trial court should have sustained defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained in the illegal search.
LeGRAND and McGIVERIN, JJ., join this dissent.