Court Opinion

ID: 9497868
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 17:02:09.455016+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:58:28.172183
License: Public Domain

concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree with the majority’s ultimate decision to vacate the stay of execution and to deny the certificate of appealability. However, I write separately because I would not rely on the majority’s jurisdictional basis to vacate the stay. I also disagree with the majority’s decision to expand the record on appeal to include the affidavit of the Warden’s expert.
I.
The state relies on Abdur’Rahman v. Bell, 392 F.3d 174 (6th Cir.2004), to show that Smith’s motion should be treated as a second or successive habeas petition, and not as a Rule 60(b) motion. It is true that Smith’s claim does not present the same type of irregularity or procedural defect in the federal habeas court as did Abdur’Rahman’s Rule 60(b) claim. Smith is complaining about his trial counsel’s ineffectiveness in the state court; he does not challenge an event that occurred in the federal habeas court. However, the legal landscape created by Abdur’Rahman is not yet solid terrain. The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in Gonzalez v. Crosby, — U.S. -, 125 S.Ct. 961, 160 L.Ed.2d 896 (2005), to address the issue directly presented in AbdurRahman. The Supreme Court could adopt the reasoning of Abdur’Rahman, or it could set forth a more expansive rule. Such a ruling could greatly impact whether this Court should treat Smith’s claim as a second habeas petition or as a Rule 60(b) motion. Accordingly, I would not rely on this alterable case law as a basis for vacating a stay of execution.
Moreover, the majority’s reliance on Alley v. Bell, 392 F.3d 822, 829 (6th Cir.2004), is misplaced. The rule we set forth in Abdur’Rahman was clearly a functional one which requires case-specific analysis. The grounds for Smith’s Rule 60(b) motion are not at all analogous to Alley’s situation: Alley’s challenge relied on an intervening state court decision and on fraud on the federal habeas court, whereas Smith relies on new evidence to show ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase of his state court proceeding. Therefore, I do not believe that Alley can adequately inform us as to how to handle Smith’s motion.
Nevertheless, I concur in the judgment of the Court regarding the stay of execution, because Smith’s motion for equitable relief from the judgment cannot be regarded as a Rule 60(b)(6) motion. Even if we were to look past the jurisdictional question presented by Abdur’Rahman and evaluate Smith’s motion under Rule 60(b), his motion would fall under Rule 60(b)(2) and would fail under the one-year time bar. Accordingly, I respectfully concur in the judgment of the Court vacating the stay of execution.
II.
I would deny the Warden’s motion to expand the record in this case. The Warden has presented this Court with an affidavit from a neuroradiologist, Dr. Thomas Tomsick, taken on March 3, 2005. The affidavit presents Dr. Tomsick’s expert opinion of Smith’s MRI scan, and concludes that the scan reveals nothing out of the ordinary, and certainly nothing that would suggest an “organic impairment” *729that would diminish Smith’s ability to distinguish right from wrong, or to conform his conduct with the law. This evidence was not presented to the district court when it issued its stay of execution. The Warden is now asking that we act as a trial court and evaluate this medical evidence, without providing Smith, who is scheduled to be executed in a matter of days, an opportunity to truly review and counter this evidence.
The Warden cites to Fed. R.App. P. 10(e)(2), to support his argument that this Court should expand the record to include information that the district court did not consider. Our own precedent prohibits us from doing so. As we held in Inland Bulk Transfer Co. v. Cummins Engine Co., 332 F.3d 1007 (6th Cir.2003), “the purpose of [Fed. R.App. P. 10(e)(2) ] is to allow the court to correct omissions from or misstatements in the record for appeal, not to introduce new evidence in the court of appeals.” Id. at 1012 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). Cf. Sovereign News Co. v. United States, 690 F.2d 569, 571 (6th Cir.1982) (“A party may not by-pass the fact-finding process of the lower court and introduce new facts in its brief on appeal.”). It is therefore inappropriate and inequitable for this Court to rely on the unchallenged opinion of an expert on appeal to support a reversal of a stay of execution.
I therefore respectfully dissent from the Court’s decision to grant the Warden’s motion to expand the record on appeal.