Court Opinion

ID: 9473719
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:37:53.253759+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:43:42.157361
License: Public Domain

ALVIN B. RUBIN, Circuit Judge,
concurring in the result:
The complaint, however liberally read, does not, in my opinion, state a claim for which relief can be granted. A Louisiana police jury is charged only with the responsibility of “providing] ... a good and sufficient jail” 1 and with responsibility for “the physical maintenance of ... parish jails *179and prisons.”2 The administration of the jails, however, is the province of the sheriff.3 As stated by the Louisiana Court of Appeal, the police jury “is responsible for the expenses of establishing, maintaining and operating the jail and for all expenses of feeding, clothing, and providing medical treatment to the prisoners while the sheriff has the duty of operating the jail and seeing to it that the prisoners are properly cared for, fed and clothed.”4
Given the limited scope of the police jury’s duties, O’Quinn’s complaint simply does not seem to me to state a cause of action against this local governmental body. Paragraph 7 of the complaint alleges, in pertinent part:
Plaintiff’s injuries resulted from the willful or negligent acts or omissions of the defendants with respect to the plaintiffs incarceration in failing to provide adequate supervision and protection for plaintiff, knowing of the particular dangers to which plaintiff was being exposed, in failing to administer properly the incarceration of prisoners. (Emphasis supplied.)
Although these allegations adequately state a claim against the sheriff’s department and the individual sheriff’s deputies, they do not seem to me to allege a claim against the police jury. O’Quinn does not intimate that the jail was in any respect physically inadequate, much less that the police jury knew of its inadequacies. Even if O’Quinn conclusively established each and every fact in support of his allegations, he still would not be entitled to relief because he would not have established that the police jury violated any duty it owed to the plaintiff. Under Louisiana law, the Calcasieu Parish Police Jury has no duty, as the opinion suggests, “to provide adequate supervision and protection and to administer properly the incarceration of prisoners.” Opinion at 178.
The opinion states, “[i]n light of the complaint before us, ... appellant must have the opportunity to prove that his injuries resulted from inadequate facilities of which the Police Jury had actual or constructive knowledge and as to which it failed to take curative action. Appellant may or may not be able to prove his allegations. But he has the right to try.” Id. at 178 (citations omitted) (emphasis supplied). O’Quinn’s complaint does not, however, seem to me to make any allegations against the police jury — either that the facilities were inadequate or that the police jury had actual or constructive knowledge of such inadequacies. Moreover, I do not see how the police jury could be responsible for a violation of the 8th amendment by inflicting cruel and unusual punishment. If adequate facts were pleaded and proved, however, the police jury might be responsible for negligence in failing to provide an adequate jail, as we held in Howard v. Fortenberry.5
Although I am sensitive both to the wide latitude allowed by “notice pleading” and to the special consideration accorded civil rights complaints, if it is clear that no claim has been stated, we have an equal duty to dismiss the complaint.6
In such cases, we may, however, remand to permit the plaintiff to amend his complaint to state a claim if he can do so.7 Therefore, I would remand to give the plaintiff this opportunity.
The opinion in effect construes the complaint as if it had been amended. The *180remedy for the police jury is to test the complaint by motion for summary judgment. If there is truly evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact concerning police jury liability, the case should go to trial. If not, it may be decided by summary judgment.

. La.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 33:4715 (West 1966).

. La.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 15:702 (West 1981).

. See La.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 15:704 (West 1981).

. Amiss v. Dumas, 411 So.2d 1137, 1141 (La. App.1982).

. 723 F.2d 1206 (5th Cir.1985).

. See 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1234 (1969); C. Antieau, Federal Civil Rights Acts § 230 (2d ed. 1980).

. See United States v. Hayes International Corp., 456 F.2d 112, 121 (5th Cir.1972); Lone Star Motor Import, Inc. v. Citroen Cars Corp., 288 F.2d 69, 77 (5th Cir.1961). See generally 6 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1489 (1971); 3 Moore’s Federal Practice f 15.11 (2d ed. 1985).