Court Opinion

ID: 9772197
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:10:16.675412+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:38:16.432039
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
  UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
                  AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

                                     IN THE
              ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
                                 DIVISION ONE

      POWERS STEEL & WIRE PRODUCTS, INC., Plaintiff/Appellant,

                                         v.

               WILLIAM POWERS, et al., Defendants/Appellees,

                   SUNCOAST, et al., Defendants/Appellees.

                              No. 1 CA-CV 22-0469
                                FILED 8-29-2023

            Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
            No. CV2018-001278, CV2018-053612, CV2018-054762
                  The Honorable M. Scott McCoy, Judge
             The Honorable Roger E. Brodman, Judge (Retired)

                                   AFFIRMED

                                    COUNSEL

The Quinlan Law Firm, LLC, Phoenix
By William J. Quinlan, Eric T. Schmitt
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant
Loren Molever, PLLC, Scottsdale
Co-Counsel for Defendant/Appellee William Powers

Tiffany & Bosco, P.A., Phoenix
By Amy D. Sells
Co-Counsel for Defendant/Appellee William Powers

Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., Phoenix
By Caroline Larsen, Douglas (Trey) Lynn, J. Alexander Dattilo
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee Suncoast

                       MEMORANDUM DECISION

Vice Chief Judge Randall M. Howe delivered the decision of the court, in
which Judge Anni Hill Foster and Judge Cynthia J. Bailey joined.

H O W E, Judge:

¶1             Powers Steel & Wire Products, Inc. (“Powers Steel”) appeals
the trial court’s grant of (1) summary judgment against it on all of its claims,
and (2) attorneys’ fees and costs as sanctions against it. For the foregoing
reasons, we affirm.

                 FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2            This appeal arises out of a lawsuit Powers Steel brought
against its two former managers and the companies they joined or formed.
The following describes the relevant facts in this appeal.

I.     Powers Steel and Its Leadership

¶3            Powers Steel is a steel fabricator and distributor of various
steel products, including rebar. William Powers (“Bill”), a Powers Steel
employee of almost 30 years, served as vice president and was the general
manager of the company’s rebar division. In 2017, Bill informed Powers
Steel that he intended to retire. After retiring in December 2017, Bill
founded Powers Reinforcing Fabricators, LLC (“Fabricators”), which
makes rebar. No contract prevented Bill from competing with Powers Steel
after his departure.

¶4            John Walsh was a Powers Steel employee for more than 20
years and ran the rebar division with Bill. After Bill left, Walsh took over as

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general manager of the rebar division. He oversaw rebar operations and
prepared Powers Steel’s bid proposals. Walsh also had personal
relationships with Powers Steel’s customers and competitors. One such
competitor was Suncoast Post-Tension Ltd. (“Suncoast”), a national
supplier of post-tension materials used with rebar for construction projects.
Suncoast had worked with Walsh to supply post-tension materials for
Powers Steel’s rebar projects. Suncoast also had a small rebar division in
Phoenix.

¶5            After Bill retired, Janet Powers and John Powers III began
overseeing Walsh and the day-to-day operations of Powers Steel’s rebar
division, which they had “limited experience” doing. Janet instructed
Walsh to fire several employees and “trim[] the fat,” which he did. Janet
also told Walsh to cancel every bid without a contract or purchase order
because she believed Bill had underbid the jobs and the projects would not
be profitable. Walsh did so and emailed Powers Steel’s customers,
informing them that the company was “reevaluat[ing] pricing for any . . .
project without a contract or purchase order,” copying Janet on the email.
Janet never objected to or rescinded the email. Janet also instructed Walsh
to bid only on projects of $300,000 or less, a change from the company’s
prior practice of bidding on multi-million-dollar projects. These changes
caused unrest among Powers Steel customers, who voiced their concerns to
Walsh about this change in business practice and Powers Steel’s ability to
pay its debt. These changes also upset Powers Steel employees, some of
whom started looking for new jobs.

¶6           Walsh asked Suncoast if it could perform the jobs Powers
Steel had canceled for the same bid price. Suncoast agreed, and Walsh
provided bid-related documents for those projects. The Suncoast
defendants later returned all documents and information belonging to
Powers Steel, pursuant to a court order.

¶7           Concerned with the future of Powers Steel’s rebar business,
Walsh contacted Suncoast’s executive vice president, Russell Price, and
asked if Suncoast had an employment opportunity, offering to grow its
rebar division. After speaking with Price and Larry Stadler, Suncoast’s
president, Suncoast offered Walsh a job in its rebar division, which Walsh
accepted. Walsh resigned from Powers Steel soon after and began working
for Suncoast around February 1, 2018. Around that same time, three other
Powers Steel employees—Amit Doshi, Janet Bryson, and Arthur
Robinson—resigned and began working for Suncoast.

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II.   Powers Steel’s Employees

¶8            Doshi had worked at Powers Steel as an estimator for 15
years. After Walsh fired several Powers Steel employees, Doshi feared for
his job and began looking for other jobs. Doshi learned Suncoast was
expanding its rebar division, told Walsh he was looking for a new job, and
asked if Suncoast needed estimators, to which Walsh said it did. Doshi then
contacted Perry McArthur, Suncoast’s Phoenix office branch manager,
about a job and later received a job offer.

¶9             Bryson worked as a secretary in the rebar department. She
also started looking for another job because she worried she would be fired.
She stated that she heard John Powers III say he needed to let some
employees go, and heard Janet instruct employees not to bid on new jobs
and to cancel projects. According to Bryson, someone in the human
resources department told her that the rebar division would close within
six months. Before Walsh left Powers Steel, he and Bryson discussed
Walsh’s plan to work for Suncoast. Bryson told Walsh she was also
interested in leaving. Walsh told her that Suncoast “might have an
opening” for her. She then received a job offer from Suncoast without an
interview.

¶10           Robinson was a detailer at Powers Steel for four years.
Although Robinson was happy at Powers Steel, he became concerned that
the rebar division would shut down after Powers Steel fired several
employees (including Robinson’s supervisor), canceled his two current
projects, and stopped giving him new projects. After an interview, one of
Powers Steel’s competitors offered Robinson a job as a detailer. Robinson
informed Doshi about this job offer and they discussed Suncoast’s need for
more detailers as it expanded its rebar division. Robinson later testified he
never seriously considered accepting the competitor’s job offer but told
Walsh he was considering it. Walsh informed Robinson that he was leaving
Powers Steel for Suncoast and that Powers Steel would shut down its rebar
division. Walsh then told Robinson that he possibly could get a job at
Suncoast. Without going through the normal application process, Robinson
received a written job offer from Suncoast, which he accepted. Later,
Robinson also declared that “Walsh did not solicit me to work for Suncoast
or try to convince me to leave Powers Steel.”

¶11             Walsh and the other employees had been at-will employees
without noncompete agreements with Powers Steel. Powers Steel
eventually closed its rebar division. One Powers Steel employee testified
that the last time the company bid on a rebar job was at the end of 2018.

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III.   The Lawsuit

¶12           In 2018, Powers Steel sued Walsh, Suncoast, Stadler, Price,
and McArthur (collectively “Suncoast Defendants”). Powers Steel brought
claims against (1) Walsh for breach of fiduciary duty; (2) the Suncoast
Defendants, except Walsh, for aiding and abetting Walsh’s alleged breach;
and (3) the Suncoast Defendants for the misappropriation of trade secrets,
tortious interference with business expectancy, and unjust enrichment.
Powers Steel later amended its complaint to add claims against (1) Bill for
replevin, conversion, breaches of fiduciary duty as both an employee and
shareholder; (2) Fabricators for aiding and abetting Bill’s alleged breaches;
and (3) both Fabricators and Bill (collectively “PRF”) for tortious
interference with business expectancies, unfair competition, unjust
enrichment, and trademark infringement.

¶13           Two years later, Powers Steel moved for partial summary
judgment, and the Suncoast Defendants moved for summary judgment on
all of Powers Steel’s claims. After a full briefing and oral argument, the
court denied Powers Steel’s motion and granted the Suncoast Defendants’
motion for summary judgment on all claims. The Suncoast Defendants later
moved for over $974,000 in attorneys’ fees and costs as sanctions against
Powers Steel. The trial court awarded them $172,999.90 in sanctions under
A.R.S. § 12–349.

¶14           In a separate litigation, Powers Steel sued one of its largest
steel suppliers, Vinton Steel LLC, alleging Vinton aided and abetted Bill’s
breach of fiduciary duty and tortious interference. The trial court granted
Vinton summary judgment on all counts and awarded attorneys’ fees and
costs as a sanction against Powers Steel under A.R.S. § 12–349, finding that
Bill did not owe a fiduciary duty as a minority shareholder. This court
affirmed the trial court’s rulings in that case. Powers Steel & Wire Prod., Inc.
v. Vinton Steel, LLC, 1 CA-CV 20-0652, 2021 WL 5495289 (Ariz. App. Nov.
23, 2021) (mem. dec.).

¶15           In 2020, PRF moved for summary judgment on all counts,
which the court granted. The trial court found that the rulings in the Vinton
litigation bound Powers Steel based on issue preclusion. Following this
ruling, PRF requested over $1,100,000 in attorneys’ fees and costs as
sanctions against Powers Steel. The trial court awarded PRF $169,732.26 in
sanctions under A.R.S. § 12–349.

¶16         On appeal, Powers Steel challenges the trial court’s grant of
(1) summary judgment on all claims for the Suncoast Defendants, and (2)

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the Suncoast Defendants’ motion for attorneys’ fees and costs as a sanction
against Powers Steel. As to PRF, Powers Steel challenges only the trial
court’s sanction of attorneys’ fees and costs. This court has jurisdiction
under Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S.
§§ 12–120.21(A)(1) and –2101(A)(1).

                                DISCUSSION

I.     Summary Judgment

¶17             This court reviews the entry of a summary judgment order de
novo, “viewing the evidence and reasonable inferences in the light most
favorable to the party opposing the motion,” Andrews v. Blake, 205 Ariz. 236,
240 ¶ 12 (2003), to determine “whether any genuine issues of material fact
exist,” Brookover v. Roberts Enters., Inc., 215 Ariz. 52, 55 ¶ 8 (App. 2007). To
obtain summary judgment, the moving party must show an absence of any
genuine issue of material fact. See Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Thruston, 218 Ariz.
112, 115 ¶ 14 (App. 2008). When the moving party meets its initial burden
of “production by showing that the non-moving party does not have
enough evidence to carry its ultimate burden of proof at trial, the burden
then shifts to the non-moving party to present sufficient evidence
demonstrating the existence of a genuine factual dispute as to a material
fact.” Id. at 119 ¶ 26. “The non-moving party may not rest on its pleadings
. . . . To defeat the motion, the non-moving party must call the court’s
attention to evidence overlooked or ignored by the moving party or must
explain why the motion should otherwise be denied.” Id.

A.     Misappropriation of Trade Secrets Claim

¶18            Powers Steel argues that disputed questions of fact exist
whether the Suncoast Defendants misappropriated Powers Steel’s trade
secrets. To prove a claim for misappropriation of a trade secret, the claimant
must first show that a legally protectable trade secret exists. Calisi v. Unified
Fin. Servs., LLC, 232 Ariz. 103, 106 ¶ 14 (App. 2013). A party must also show
that the alleged misappropriation of the trade secret damaged it. See A.R.S.
§ 44–403; see also W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. GI Dynamics, Inc., 872 F. Supp.
2d 883, 888 (D. Ariz. 2012) (“Damages are an essential element of a
misappropriation of trade secret claim [under A.R.S. § 44-401], and a claim
fails as a matter of law without a cognizable theory of proximately caused

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damages.”) (quotations omitted).1 Damages may include “both the actual
loss caused by misappropriation and the unjust enrichment caused by
misappropriation that is not taken into account in computing actual loss.”
A.R.S. § 44–403(A); see also W.L. Gore, 872 F. Supp. 2d at 888 (“Damages [for
misappropriation] are typically measured by any direct injury which a
plaintiff can prove, as well as any lost profits which the plaintiff would have
earned but for the infringement.”).“[D]amages that are speculative, remote
or uncertain may not form the basis of a judgment.” Lewin v. Miller Wagner
& Co., 151 Ariz. 29, 34 (App. 1986) (citation omitted). Summary judgment is
appropriate if no reasonable juror could conclude that the damages were
proximately caused by the defendant’s conduct. Gipson v. Kasey, 214 Ariz.
141, 143 ¶ 9 n.1 (2007).

¶19           Here, summary judgment was appropriate because Powers
Steel did not show with reasonable certainty that it lost profits because of
Suncoast Defendants’ alleged conduct. See Cnty. of La Paz v. Yakima Compost
Co., 224 Ariz. 590, 607 ¶ 53 (App. 2010). First, the evidence shows that
Powers Steel canceled every bid without a contract or purchase order
because it believed the projects would not be profitable. Second, to show
damages, Powers Steel produced a report by its expert, David
Schwickerath. The trial court found that Schwickerath calculated that the
Suncoast Defendants caused Powers Steel between $5.8 to $10 million in
damages based on what “should have been,” seemingly based on the
assumption that Walsh would work for Powers Steel indefinitely. It also
found that Schwickerath never considered any other potential causes of
Powers Steel’s decline, such as mismanagement of the rebar division.
Instead, he assumed both liability and causation. Thus, the trial court
concluded that, “[t]he problems with Schwickerath’s analysis as used by
[Powers Steel] are legion[,]” and his conclusion that all of Suncoast’s growth
was because of the solicitation of three at-will employees and several
Powers Steel’s bids was “preposterous.” With mere speculation as the only
basis for damages, Powers Steel failed to show that a genuine factual
dispute existed. On the record presented, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in finding that Powers Steel failed to show that the Suncoast
Defendants’ alleged conduct damaged the company.

1      Although decisions from the United States District Court for the
District of Arizona do not bind this court, this court may look to decisions
of other jurisdictions as persuasive authority, particularly when the court’s
analysis applies the same rules as Arizona precedent. See Hodai v. City of
Tucson, 239 Ariz. 34, 42 ¶ 25 n.8 (App. 2016).

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¶20            Similarly, Janet’s inconsistent self-serving assertions did not
create a genuine factual dispute about damages. Janet instructed Walsh to
cancel all bids that did not have a contract or purchase order because she
did not think the projects would be profitable. She never objected to or
rescinded Walsh’s email canceling these projects. During her deposition,
Janet testified she could not recall which projects Powers Steel had
canceled. Janet later testified about one project—the Toscana project—that
she “could have sworn” Powers Steel “had that job but maybe we didn’t. I
don’t recall,” before eventually declaring “we had that project.” But Powers
Steel did not support Janet’s testimony with any evidence that it had this
project. Self-serving assertions without factual support in the record will
not defeat a motion for summary judgment. Florez v. Sargeant, 185 Ariz. 521,
526 (1996) (citation omitted).

¶21           The Suncoast Defendants’ position that it only did the work
Powers Steel had canceled is strengthened by the undisputed fact it
performed work at the same price as Powers Steel’s bid amount. Powers
Steel did not explain why its customers would accept a bid from Suncoast
at the same price after awarding the project to Powers Steel unless Powers
Steel had withdrawn from the project. Powers Steel failed to identify a
single job for which Suncoast competed against Powers Steel and won,
further supporting Suncoast’s position that it took the work Powers Steel
canceled.

¶22           Because Powers Steel failed to present evidence that it was
damaged, we need not—and therefore do not—decide whether Powers
Steel’s information was trade secret. Thus, the trial court did not err in
granting summary judgment on the misappropriation of trade secrets
claim.

B.    Breach of Fiduciary Duty and Aiding and Abetting Breach of
Fiduciary Duty Claims

¶23             Powers Steel argues that disputed issues of fact exist whether
Walsh breached his fiduciary duty as an employee by soliciting Powers
Steel employees. Employees owe their employers a fiduciary duty,
including the duty of loyalty. Sec. Title Agency, Inc. v. Pope, 219 Ariz. 480,
492 ¶ 53 (App. 2008). An employee violates this duty by soliciting
co-workers to join a competing business. Id. at 492 ¶ 55 (citation omitted).
When deciding whether an employee impermissibly solicited co-workers,
the trier of fact “should consider the nature of the employment relationship,
the impact or potential impact of the employee’s actions on the employer’s
operations, and the extent of any benefits promised or inducements made

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               POWERS STEEL v. WILLIAM POWERS, et al.
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to co-workers to obtain their services for the . . . competing enterprise.” Id.
at 493 ¶ 55 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). At-will
employees may properly plan to compete with the employer and have no
general duty to disclose such plans to the employer. Taser Int’l, Inc. v. Ward,
224 Ariz. 389, 399–400 ¶ 39 (App. 2010) (citation omitted).

¶24            The record supports the trial court’s ruling that Powers Steel
did not present sufficient evidence of a genuine factual dispute whether
Walsh impermissibly solicited Doshi, Bryson, or Robinson to leave Powers
Steel. Doshi, Bryson, and Robinson were concerned for the future of Powers
Steel’s rebar division after Janet directed Walsh to fire five or six employees,
cancel certain projects, and limit the size of future projects. As at-will
employees, Doshi, Bryson, and Robinson were free to terminate their
employment at any time. See Taser, 224 Ariz. at 399 ¶ 36. Doshi was already
looking for a new job when Walsh told Doshi he was leaving for Suncoast.
Without more, an employee does not breach a fiduciary duty by informing
his co-worker before his own resignation that he plans to resign. See
McCallister Co. v. Kastella, 170 Ariz. 455, 458–60 (App. 1992). Powers Steel
thus failed to show that Walsh impermissibly solicited Doshi.

¶25           Nor does the evidence show that Walsh improperly solicited
Bryson. Given the changes at Powers Steel and the rumors of the rebar
division closing, Bryson was concerned about her job. She was looking for
a new job before speaking with Walsh, and Walsh told her that Suncoast
“might have an opening” for her only after she told Walsh of her job search.
Without more, an employee does not breach any fiduciary duty by
informing a coworker before his own resignation that a competitor might
have a job opening. See McCallister, 170 Ariz. at 458–60.

¶26            Finally, the evidence does not show that Walsh impermissibly
solicited Robinson to leave Powers Steel. Robinson was concerned about
the future of Powers Steel’s rebar division and interviewed with at least one
competitor for a job. He was already aware that Suncoast was expanding
its rebar division and that it would need detailers. He declared that “Walsh
did not solicit me to work for Suncoast or try to convince me to leave
Powers Steel.” Thus, the trial court did not err in granting summary
judgment for Walsh on the breach of fiduciary duty claim.

¶27           Powers Steel also argues that Walsh breached his duty by
diverting Powers Steel’s corporate opportunities to Suncoast and providing
Suncoast with confidential information. But Powers Steel canceled its bids
for the projects that Walsh provided to Suncoast, so Walsh did not divert
any corporate opportunities. And as discussed above, Powers Steel failed

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to show that Walsh’s giving Suncoast information damaged Powers Steel.
Therefore, Powers Steel’s arguments fail.

¶28           Next, Powers Steel argues that the remaining Suncoast
Defendants aided and abetted Walsh’s breach of fiduciary duty. A claim for
aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty requires proof that the
primary tortfeasor committed a breach of fiduciary duty. See Pope, 219 Ariz.
at 491 ¶ 44. Because Walsh, the alleged primary tortfeasor, did not breach
his fiduciary duty, Powers Steel’s argument necessarily fails.

C.     Tortious Interference Claim

¶29          Powers Steel argues that the trial court erred in granting
summary judgment on its claim of tortious interference with a business
expectancy. Specifically, Powers Steel argues it “submitted evidence of two
different business expectancies which the Suncoast [D]efendants
improperly interfered: the continued employment of its employees Doshi,
Robinson, and Bryson” and the Toscana project “which had been awarded
to [Powers Steel], but which Walsh subsequently helped send to the
Suncoast [D]efendants.”

¶30            A plaintiff claiming tortious interference must show, among
other things, “intentional interference inducing or causing a breach or
termination of relationship or expectancy.” Dube v. Likins, 216 Ariz. 406, 411
¶ 8 (App. 2007) (internal quotations marks and citation omitted). Because
Powers Steel failed to show Suncoast Defendants improperly induced
Doshi, Robinson, or Bryson to leave their jobs, supra ¶¶ 24–28, this claim for
tortious interference fails. See Ulan v. Vend-A-Coin, Inc., 27 Ariz. App. 713,
718 (1976); see also Motorola, Inc. v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 366
F. Supp. 1173, 1180 (D. Ariz. 1973) (“A competitor is privileged to hire away
an employee whose employment is terminable at will.”).

¶31            Powers Steel also argues that it had a business expectancy in
the Toscana project, one of the projects it claims it had before Walsh sent it
to the Suncoast Defendants. Powers Steel cites no authority to support this
claim in either its opening brief or reply brief. Powers Steel’s failure to
meaningfully develop this point constitutes abandonment and it therefore
waives the argument. See MacMillan v. Schwartz, 226 Ariz. 584, 591 ¶ 33
(App. 2011) (“Merely mentioning an argument in an appellate opening brief
is insufficient.”).

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D.     Unjust Enrichment Claim

¶32            Powers Steel argues that the court erred in granting summary
judgment on its unjust enrichment claim because a finder of fact could
conclude “the Suncoast [D]efendants’ actions in misappropriating [Powers
Steel’s] trade secrets, soliciting its employees, and provided competitive
assistance to Suncoast resulted in [the Suncoast Defendants’] enrichment.”
A plaintiff claiming unjust enrichment must show, among other things, the
absence of a justification for the defendant’s enrichment and his or her
impoverishment. Sun Valley Ranch 308 Ltd. P’ship v. Robson, 231 Ariz. 287,
293 ¶ 22 (App. 2012). “Unjust enrichment occurs when one party has and
retains money or benefits that in justice and equity belong to another.”
Trustmark Ins. Co. v. Bank One, Arizona, NA, 202 Ariz. 535, 541 ¶ 31 (App.
2002).

¶33           The record supports the trial court’s ruling that Powers Steel
failed to show the absence of justification for the enrichment of the Suncoast
Defendants and the impoverishment of Powers Steel. Powers Steel
withdrew from certain bids because Janet did not think they would be
profitable. Walsh and Walsh’s successor testified it was not an uncommon
practice to give bid-related documents for unwanted work to competitors.
Thus, if Powers Steel was impoverished and Suncoast Defendants enriched,
Powers Steel’s decision to cancel these bids was the justification.

¶34           Powers Steel also argues that the Suncoast Defendants were
unjustly enriched by soliciting its employees. Because the Suncoast
Defendants did not improperly solicit Powers Steel’s at-will employees,
supra ¶¶ 24–28, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment
on the unjust enrichment claim.

II.    Attorneys’ Fees at Trial

¶35           Powers Steel argues that the trial court erred in awarding (1)
the Suncoast Defendants attorneys’ fees under A.R.S. § 12–349(A)(3), and
(2) PRF attorneys’ fees under A.R.S. § 12–349(A)(3) and (4). Powers Steel
contends that the court erred in awarding fees because it cannot find any
authority that “a party unreasonably delays proceedings when it fails to
engage in reasonable efforts to settle a claim.”2 This court reviews the trial
court’s application of A.R.S. § 12–349 de novo but views “the evidence in a
manner most favorable to sustaining the award and will affirm unless the

2      Because the trial court’s reasoning when awarding fees was
essentially the same for both parties, we address the awards together.

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[trial] court’s findings are ‘clearly erroneous.’” Takieh v. O’Meara, 252 Ariz.
51, 61–62 ¶ 39 (App. 2021) (citation omitted).

¶36             Under A.R.S. § 12–349(A)(3), a court may award reasonable
attorneys’ fees and costs if a party unreasonably expands or delays the
proceeding. The trial court must specify the reasons for an award under
A.R.S. § 12–349, but “the findings need only be specific enough to allow an
appellate court to test the validity of the judgment.” Id. at 61 ¶ 38 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). This court will affirm an award of
fees if it is “correct for any reason apparent in the record.” Id. at 62 ¶ 39
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

¶37             The record supports the trial court’s award of attorneys’ fees
and costs to the Suncoast Defendants and PRF. Contrary to Powers Steel’s
belief, the trial court awarded attorneys’ fees not only because Powers Steel
did not settle its claims but also because of Powers Steel’s overall behavior
during this lawsuit, such as failing to reassess the validity of its claims or
providing the court with proof of nonspeculative damages. Moreover, the
trial court awarded only a fraction of the requested fees. The trial court
therefore did not err in awarding the Suncoast Defendants and PRF
attorneys’ fees and costs. Because of this conclusion, we need not—and
therefore do not—address whether awarding PRF fees under A.R.S.
§ 12–349(A)(4) would have also been justified.

III.   Attorneys’ Fees on Appeal

¶38           PRF seeks attorneys’ fees under A.R.S. § 12–349. The Suncoast
Defendants seek fees under A.R.S. §§ 12–341, 12–342, and 12–349. Powers
Steel’s claims at the trial court were groundless and brought in bad faith.
See supra ¶ 37. Powers Steel raises the same arguments on appeal; thus, the
issues on appeal were also groundless and brought in bad faith. Powers
Steel therefore brought this appeal without substantial justification. See
A.R.S. § 12–349(A)(1), (F). PRF and the Suncoast Defendants may
consequently recover reasonable attorneys’ fees and taxable costs upon
compliance with Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 21.

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      POWERS STEEL v. WILLIAM POWERS, et al.
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                      CONCLUSION

¶39   For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

                 AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
                 FILED: AA

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