Court Opinion

ID: 9390300
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-27 15:05:19.407476+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:33.531518
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: APRIL 27, 2023
                                                           TO BE PUBLISHED

               Supreme Court of Kentucky
                               2022-SC-0138-MR

RUVIEL HERNANDEZ                                                       APPELLANT

V.                 ON APPEAL FROM GREENUP CIRCUIT COURT
                    HONORABLE BRIAN C. MCCLOUD, JUDGE
                               NO. 18-CR-00296

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                                APPELLEE

                OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE BISIG

        AFFIRMING IN PART, VACATING IN PART, AND REMANDING

      A jury of the Greenup Circuit Court found Appellant Ruviel Hernandez

guilty of one count of first-degree rape and four counts of first-degree sexual

abuse for acts perpetrated against his niece D.M. The jury recommended a

sentence of life on the rape conviction and five years on each of the sexual

abuse charges, running consecutively for a total sentence of life plus twenty

years. The trial court sentenced in accordance with that recommendation.

Hernandez now appeals to this Court as a matter of right. KY. CONST. §

110(2)(b).

      After careful review, we discern no error in the trial court’s denial of

Hernandez’s motion to suppress his voluntary interview with law enforcement
or in the trial court’s admission of other bad acts evidence pursuant to KRE1

404(b). We therefore affirm his convictions. However, because we conclude

(and the Commonwealth does not dispute) that Hernandez’s sentence was

unlawful, we vacate that sentence and remand for resentencing.

                  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

      Appellant Hernandez is a native of Mexico who came to the United States

in 2003 when he was approximately twenty-one years old. English is not

Hernandez’s first language. After coming to the United States, Hernandez

married Haley Crum. Haley’s sister Brenda has four children, including D.M.

and L.M. Brenda and her children would visit Haley and Hernandez at their

apartment. The Commonwealth alleged that Haley and Brenda would

sometimes leave the apartment during these visits, leaving Hernandez in

charge of D.M., L.M., and the other children.

      In 2015 D.M. and L.M. alleged that Hernandez touched them

inappropriately during some of these visits between October 2013 and October

2014 when they were approximately 10 and 5 years old, respectively. More

particularly, D.M. alleged that on four separate occasions Hernandez called her

into a separate room in the apartment from the other children, then touched

her breasts and vagina both over and underneath her clothing. L.M. similarly

alleged that Hernandez touched her breasts and vagina on two occasions, once

in a room in the apartment and once between two cars at a park. Trooper

      1   Kentucky Rules of Evidence
                                       2
Nathan Carter opened an investigation and interviewed Hernandez, who denied

the allegations. No arrest or charges were made at that time.

      In 2018, D.M. further alleged that Hernandez had also inserted his penis

in her vagina during an incident in a bathroom during the same time period of

October 2013 to October 2014. After being contacted regarding this new

allegation, Hernandez agreed to voluntarily appear for another interview with

Trooper Carter. The recorded interview took place in a room at the local office

of the Cabinet for Health and Family Services. Hernandez sat unrestrained in

the seat nearest the door of the room, which was left cracked open. Trooper

Carter was the only officer in the room. He sat across the desk, away from the

open door, and informed Hernandez that he could leave at any time and was

not under arrest. Trooper Carter did not touch Hernandez, was wearing a

uniform, and was wearing but did not display a gun.

      Trooper Carter did not provide Hernandez with Miranda warnings before

or during the interview. Though English is not Hernandez’s first language,

Trooper Carter also did not ask him if he wanted the services of an interpreter.

Nor was such an interpreter provided. Trooper Carter told Hernandez on

several occasions during the interview that he knew Hernandez had

inappropriately touched D.M. and that he could indict him and put him in

prison. Near the conclusion of the interview, Hernandez confessed to D.M.’s

allegations and stated D.M. “pushed him” to engage in the alleged acts and

“wanted sex.” However he continued to deny L.M.’s allegations. Trooper Carter

                                       3
then placed Hernandez under arrest. The interview lasted less than forty

minutes.

      A Greenup County grand jury indicted Hernandez on one charge of first-

degree rape and four charges of sexual abuse in the first-degree. These

charges related only to D.M.’s allegations and did not involve any alleged

conduct against L.M. Before trial, the Commonwealth filed a motion to

introduce other bad acts evidence of L.M.’s allegations against Hernandez

pursuant to KRE 404(b), though Hernandez had never been charged regarding

those allegations. Hernandez filed a motion to exclude such evidence as well as

a motion to suppress his interview with Trooper Carter.

      The trial court held a hearing on the suppression motion on November

22, 2021 and ruled that suppression was not warranted because Hernandez

was not in custody during the interview and could understand Trooper Carter.

The trial court did not hold a hearing regarding the KRE 404(b) motion, but

rather ruled orally from the bench at trial prior to L.M.’s testimony that her

allegations were admissible to show motive and lack of mistake.

      The jury convicted Hernandez of one count of first-degree rape and four

counts of first-degree sexual abuse and recommended a sentence of life on the

rape conviction and five years on each of the sexual abuse convictions to run

consecutively for a total sentence of life plus twenty years. On March 17, 2022

the trial court entered a judgment sentencing Hernandez consistent with that

recommendation. Thereafter, the trial court entered a written order on April 7,

                                        4
2022 memorializing its oral grant of the Commonwealth’s KRE 404(b) motion at

trial. Hernandez now appeals as a matter of right.

                                   ANALYSIS

      Hernandez raises three issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court

erred in refusing to suppress his interview given Trooper Carter’s failure to

provide Miranda warnings and an interpreter; (2) whether the trial court erred

in admitting other bad acts evidence regarding L.M.’s allegations against

Hernandez pursuant to KRE 404(b); and (3) whether running Hernandez’s life

sentence for rape consecutive to the twenty-year sentence for sexual abuse was

unlawful. We address each issue in turn, providing additional facts as

necessary.

      I.     The trial court did not err in finding Miranda warnings were
             not required because Hernandez was not in custody at the
             time of his interview with Trooper Carter.

      Hernandez first argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to

suppress his interview with Trooper Carter because Trooper Carter failed to

provide Miranda warnings before the interview. This allegation of error is

preserved by Hernandez’s filing of a motion to suppress before the trial court

raising the issue. Nichols v. Commonwealth, 142 S.W.3d 683, 691 (Ky. 2004).

      When considering a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we

review the trial court’s findings of fact under the clear-error standard and thus

defer to those findings if they are supported by substantial evidence. Cox v.

Commonwealth, 641 S.W.3d 101, 113 (Ky. 2022). We review the trial court’s

application of law to those facts de novo. Id.

                                        5
      It is well-established that under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966),

“statements made by an accused during a custodial interrogation are

inadmissible unless the accused is advised of his rights.” Wise v.

Commonwealth, 422 S.W.3d 262, 270 (Ky. 2013) (emphasis added). In

particular, the suspect “‘must be warned that he has a right to remain silent,

that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and

that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or

appointed.’” Id. at 269-70.

      However, Miranda requires such warnings only “when the suspect being

questioned is in custody.” Cecil v. Commonwealth, 297 S.W.3d 12, 16 (Ky.

2009). A person is not in custody and thus Miranda warnings are not required

if “considering the surrounding circumstances, a reasonable person would

have believed he or she was free to leave.” Id. In applying this test, we

examine the totality of the circumstances, including factors such as:

      1) the location of the interview;

      2) the number of officers present;

      3) the brandishing or display of a weapon by officers;

      4) any physical touching of the suspect by officers;

      5) whether the suspect was handcuffed or otherwise restrained;

      6) any tone or language suggesting that compliance would be compelled;

      7) statements made during the interview;

      8) the duration of the interview; and

      9) whether the suspect was released at the end of the interview.

                                          6
Id.; Wells v. Commonwealth, 512 S.W.3d 720, 723-24 (Ky. 2017). The

Commonwealth bears the burden of demonstrating that the suspect was not in

custody. Taylor v. Commonwealth, 611 S.W.3d 730, 743 (Ky. 2020).

      Here, we conclude that the totality of the circumstances are such that a

reasonable person would have felt free to terminate the interview with Trooper

Carter and leave. Trooper Carter explicitly told Hernandez at the beginning of

the interview that he was not under arrest and was free to leave at any time.

The physical setting of the interview was consistent with that representation,

occurring in a room in the offices of the Cabinet for Health and Family Services

rather than at the police station. The door of the room was, though perhaps

only cracked, nonetheless open rather than closed. Hernandez sat by that

door, while Trooper Carter sat on the opposite side of the desk away from the

door. Trooper Carter, though uniformed, was the only officer in the room. He

did not brandish or display a weapon. He did not physically touch Hernandez,

nor was Hernandez handcuffed or otherwise restrained. In reviewing the

recorded interview, we also discern no threatening tone or language in Trooper

Carter’s statements. To the contrary, it is apparent that Trooper Carter

endeavored to be amicable and develop a rapport with Hernandez. Trooper

Carter told Hernandez he respected him and stated repeatedly throughout the

interview he was not angry with him. The interview was also of short duration,

lasting less than forty minutes. Under such circumstances a reasonable

person would have felt free to terminate the interview and leave.

                                       7
      We acknowledge that during the interview, Trooper Carter referenced

other alleged illegal conduct by Hernandez and also told Hernandez on several

occasions that he had lots of evidence against him, knew he was guilty, and

could indict him and put him in prison.2 Generally, an officer’s undisclosed

suspicions regarding the suspect’s guilt “do not affect the objective

circumstances of an interrogation or interview, and thus cannot affect the

Miranda custody inquiry.” Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 324 (1994).

However where, as here, the officer discloses such suspicions to the suspect,

the disclosure is relevant to a determination of whether the suspect is in

custody, but

      only to the extent [it] would affect how a reasonable person in the
      position of the individual being questioned would gauge the
      breadth of his or her “freedom of action.” Even a clear statement
      from an officer that the person under interrogation is a prime
      suspect is not, in itself, dispositive of the custody issue, for some
      suspects are free to come and go until the police decide to make an
      arrest.

Id. at 325 (citation omitted). Thus, “[t]he weight and pertinence of any

communications regarding the officer’s degree of suspicion will depend upon

the facts and circumstances of the particular case.” Id.

      2 Hernandez also contends the record supports a finding that Trooper Carter
threatened to indict his wife Haley and take away their children. We disagree. Haley
simply testified that her children were removed for two months and that Trooper
Carter told her he would indict her. Haley further testified she was unaware whether
Hernandez knew of that threat because she had been interrogated before him.
Trooper Carter testified he did not recall making any such threats. There was
therefore no substantial evidence of record to support a finding that Trooper Carter
told Hernandez he would indict Haley and take away their children.
                                          8
      Trooper Carter’s statements regarding his belief that Hernandez was

guilty are not, without more, sufficient to support a finding that Hernandez was

in custody for purposes of Miranda. Though Trooper Carter referenced his

suspicions several times throughout the interview, he did so in a friendly rather

than threatening tone. Notably, he also told Hernandez both at the beginning

and partway through the interview that he was not under arrest. See Peacher

v. Commonwealth, 391 S.W.3d 821, 848 (Ky. 2013) (finding suspect was not in

custody even where officer used severe tone in confronting him with statement

inconsistencies, given that officer also assured suspect he was not under

arrest). Quite simply, Trooper Carter’s voicing of his belief as to Hernandez’s

guilt did not rise to a level that would cause a reasonable person to believe they

were unable to terminate the interview and leave or otherwise create a serious

risk of coercion, and thus do not support a conclusion that Hernandez was in

custody for purposes of Miranda. See Wells, 512 S.W.3d at 722 (“‘[C]ustody’ is

a term of art that specifies circumstances that are thought generally to present

a serious danger of coercion.” (quoting Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499 (2012))).

      Likewise, the mere fact that Hernandez was arrested at the end of the

interview after confessing does not support a finding that he was in custody at

the time of the interview. See id. at 723-24 (finding that suspect was not in

custody simply because he was arrested at the conclusion of the interview after

making incriminating statements). Thus, in considering the totality of the

circumstances we conclude the trial court correctly determined that a

reasonable person would have felt at liberty to terminate the interrogation and

                                        9
leave. As such, Hernandez was not in custody and Miranda warnings were not

required. The trial court therefore did not err in denying Hernandez’s motion

to suppress the statements.

      II.    The trial court did not err in finding that Hernandez
             sufficiently understood the English language and the American
             legal system such that an interpreter was not required during
             the interview.

      We also find no error in the trial court’s conclusion that neither Trooper

Carter’s failure to provide Hernandez with an interpreter nor Hernandez’s

alleged lack of familiarity with the American legal system warranted

suppression of the interview. After closely scrutinizing the recorded interview,

we agree with the trial court that Hernandez’s English language skills were

sufficient that an interpreter was not necessary during the interview.3

Hernandez provided appropriate and articulate English responses to the

questions posed by Trooper Carter. The responses were not merely “yes” or

“no” but also included lengthier responses that utilized more than an

elementary level of English vocabulary. For example, Hernandez stated during

the interview that D.M. “pushed” him to engage in the acts at issue, using

“push” not in the concrete physical sense but rather in the more abstract sense

      3  Hernandez points out that he was provided an interpreter and translation at
all other phases of the legal proceedings. However, court proceedings involve technical
legal terms and ideas that are generally unlikely to be used in the course of a typical
police interview. Thus, interpreters may be warranted for court proceedings even for a
defendant with a fairly strong command of the English language, while the same
defendant nonetheless may also have the necessary English skills to fully participate
in a police interview without the assistance of an interpreter. We therefore do not find
the provision of an interpreter to Hernandez for other phases of the legal proceedings
dispositive as to whether an interpreter was necessary for his interview with Trooper
Carter.
                                          10
of encouraging or compelling someone to do something. It is clear that

Hernandez understood the purpose of the interview, the statements and

questions posed by Trooper Carter, and the meaning of his responses. We

therefore find no error in the trial court’s conclusion Hernandez had sufficient

command of the English language such that an interpreter was not necessary

for his complete, meaningful, knowing and uncoerced participation in the

interview.4

      Finally, we also find no merit in Hernandez’s contention that his

statement should have been suppressed due to alleged lack of familiarity with

the American legal system. Hernandez had lived in the United States for

thirteen or fourteen years before the interview occurred. In addition, he had

participated in a police interview in 2015 which he left without being further

arrested or detained. Moreover, Trooper Carter explicitly told Hernandez he

could leave at any time and informed him at least twice that he was not under

arrest. On these facts, we cannot find that Hernandez was so unfamiliar with

the American legal system that his participation in the interview presented a

serious risk of coercion. Accordingly, the trial court properly denied

Hernandez’s motion to suppress the interview.

      4  While we do not find that the lack of an interpreter here resulted in a serious
risk of coercion or unknowing or involuntary statements by Hernandez, we nonetheless
pause to note that a non-English speaker’s interactions with law enforcement may
present such a risk depending on the suspect’s familiarity and sophistication with the
English language. Moreover, it may be difficult for officers to accurately determine the
level of the suspect’s familiarity with English. Thus, while not always required, it is
often better practice for law enforcement officers interacting with suspects whose first
language is not English to, at a minimum, inquire whether the suspect desires to have
an interpreter present.
                                          11
      III.    The trial court properly determined L.M.’s allegations against
              Hernandez were admissible pursuant to KRE 404(b).

      Hernandez next argues the trial court erred in admitting other bad acts

evidence of L.M.’s allegations against him in violation of KRE 404(b).

Hernandez stated objections to the admission of such evidence at trial, which

the trial court overruled. His allegation of error is therefore preserved. KRE

103(a)(1); RCr5 9.22; Daniel v. Commonwealth, 607 S.W.3d 626, 632 (Ky. 2020)

(noting that alleged error “was properly preserved for our review by [appellant’s]

objection to the evidence on . . . KRE 404(b) grounds.”).

      KRE 404(b) governs the admissibility of evidence of other crimes, wrongs,

or acts. It provides that such evidence is “not admissible to prove the

character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.”

However, the Rule also provides that such evidence may be admissible if

“offered for some other purpose, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,

preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.”

KRE 404(b)(1).

      In determining whether to admit evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or

acts under KRE 404(b), a trial court must consider the three factors of

relevance, probativeness, and prejudice as set forth in Bell v. Commonwealth,

875 S.W.2d 882 (Ky. 1994). That is, the trial court must consider 1) whether

the proffered evidence is relevant for some purpose other than to prove the

defendant’s criminal disposition, 2) whether evidence of the other crime, wrong,

      5   Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure
                                         12
or act is sufficiently probative of its commission by the defendant, and

3) whether the potential prejudice from admission of the proffered evidence

substantially outweighs its probative value. Bell, 875 S.W.2d at 889-91. In

considering these factors, the trial court “must apply [KRE 404(b)] cautiously,

with an eye towards eliminating evidence which is relevant only as proof of an

accused’s propensity to commit a certain type of crime.” Id. at 889. We review

a trial court’s decision to admit evidence under KRE 404(b) for abuse of

discretion. Anderson v. Commonwealth, 231 S.W.3d 117, 119 (Ky. 2007). That

is, we consider whether the trial court’s ruling was “arbitrary, unreasonable,

unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.” Commonwealth v. English,

993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999).

      Here, evidence of L.M.’s allegations against Hernandez was relevant to

the issues of mistake, motive, intent, opportunity, preparation, and plan, all of

which are permissible purposes for the admission of other bad acts evidence

under KRE 404(b). As to opportunity, Hernandez’s defense to D.M.’s

allegations involved his claim that he lacked opportunity because he was never

left alone with the children. L.M.’s allegations countered that defense by

demonstrating that Hernandez had an opportunity to engage in the conduct

charged. Further establishing motive, intent, and lack of mistake, D.M. alleged

that Hernandez had touched her breasts and vagina both above and beneath

her clothing when she was a young girl. L.M. alleged similar conduct, asserting

that Hernandez had also touched her breasts and vagina both above and

beneath her clothing when she was also very young. Relevant to preparation

                                       13
and plan, both girls alleged incidents that had occurred in Hernandez’s

apartment when Hernandez separated the victim from the other children in the

home. Both also alleged Hernandez engaged in the abuse when Haley and

Brenda would leave the children alone with him. Both girls were Hernandez’s

nieces and thus also had the same relationship with him which established

motive and intent. Given these significant similarities, L.M.’s allegations were

relevant to demonstrate that Hernandez’s abuse of D.M. was not mistaken or

accidental touching, but rather intentional. L.M.’s allegations were also

relevant to motive insofar as they demonstrated his sexual interest in young

girls. L.M.’s allegations were thus relevant for permissible purposes under KRE

404(b).

      L.M.’s allegations were also sufficiently probative that Hernandez had in

fact abused her. L.M. first made the allegations in 2015, and then made the

same allegations three years later in 2018. Her maintenance of the same

allegations over a three-year period of time, particularly given her young age of

between approximately 8 and 11 years old during that time, lends sufficient

credibility to her statements that a jury could reasonably conclude the acts

occurred and that Hernandez was the perpetrator. While Hernandez contends

L.M.’s testimony lacked credibility because the prosecutor asked her leading

questions, our review of that testimony reveals many questions were

appropriate, with at most minimal leading by the prosecutor. Certainly there

was no leading sufficient to find the trial court abused its broad discretion to

allow leading questions during this testimony by a thirteen-year-old child. See

                                        14
Hardy v. Commonwealth, 719 S.W.2d 727, 729 (Ky. 1986) (“The trial judge has

broad discretion in permitting leading questions to a child of tender years

. . . .”). Thus L.M.’s allegations were also sufficiently probative to satisfy the

second Bell factor.

      Finally, we also find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s

determination that the prejudicial impact of L.M.’s allegations did not

substantially outweigh their probativeness. Certainly L.M.’s testimony was

highly prejudicial to Hernandez given that she testified he sexually abused her

on multiple occasions when she was less than ten years old. However, her

testimony was also highly probative as to mistake, motive, intent, opportunity,

preparation, and plan, particularly given the significant and substantial

similarities between her allegations and those made by D.M. Moreover, while

L.M.’s allegations were referenced in the prosecution’s opening and closing

statements and in Trooper Carter’s testimony, those references were not so

repetitive as to become unduly prejudicial. In addition, L.M.’s testimony itself

only lasted twelve minutes of the two-day trial. Thus, the third Bell factor as to

prejudice was also satisfied and there was no error in the trial court’s

admission of L.M.’s allegations pursuant to KRE 404(b).

      IV.    The trial court did not err in failing to hold a hearing and rule
             before trial regarding Hernandez’s motion to exclude evidence
             pursuant to KRE 404(b).

      Hernandez also argues that his pre-trial motion to exclude L.M.’s

allegations pursuant to KRE 404(b) was a motion to suppress evidence and

that the trial court therefore violated RCr 8.27 by failing to hold an evidentiary

                                         15
hearing and rule before trial regarding that motion. RCr 8.27(2) provides that a

trial court “shall conduct a hearing on the record and before trial on issues

raised by a motion to suppress evidence.” (Emphasis added). The Rule is

mandatory, requiring trial courts to hold hearings before trial on motions to

suppress evidence.

      Notably, however, the Rule is limited to motions to suppress and thus

does not address other types of pre-trial motions. Here, Hernandez contends

his motion to exclude evidence under KRE 404(b) was a “motion to suppress

evidence” for purpose of RCr 8.27. We disagree. While neither RCr 8.27 itself

nor RCr 1.06’s provision of general definitions for the Rules of Criminal

Procedure define a “motion to suppress,” it is plain that the term as used in

RCr 8.27 refers only to motions seeking to exclude the introduction of evidence

on grounds that the evidence was obtained unlawfully.

      First, as used elsewhere in the Rules of Criminal Procedure, the term

“motion to suppress” refers to a motion raising an objection “to evidence on the

ground that it was acquired by unlawful means.” RCr 3.14(3). Second, this

usage of the term in our Rules of Criminal Procedure also comports with the

common legal understanding of a motion to suppress as a “request that the

court prohibit the introduction of illegally obtained evidence at a criminal trial.”

Motion to Suppress, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). Third, the

maintenance of a legal distinction between motions to suppress and KRE

404(b) motions is also evident in the separate standards applicable to appellate

review regarding such motions. Compare Cox, 641 S.W.3d at 113 (noting that

                                        16
rulings on motions to suppress are reviewed for clear error as to facts and de

novo as to application of law) with Anderson, 231 S.W.3d at 119 (noting that

rulings regarding KRE 404(b) motions are reviewed for abuse of discretion).

Accordingly, we hold that RCr 8.27 governs only motions to suppress, i.e. only

requests for an exclusion of evidence on grounds it was acquired by unlawful

means. Hernandez’s motion to exclude evidence under KRE 404(b) was not

such a motion, and thus did not fall within the scope of RCr 8.27. The trial

court therefore did not violate RCr 8.27 by failing to hold a hearing regarding

the motion.

      Though the trial court did not violate RCr 8.27 by failing to hold a

hearing regarding Hernandez’s KRE 404(b) motion, we have previously noted

“best practice . . . dictates that a trial court conduct a hearing and make an

affirmative ruling before trial” regarding motions made pursuant to KRE 404(b).

Luna v. Commonwealth, 460 S.W.3d 851, 877 (Ky. 2015). However, a pre-trial

hearing is not mandatory. Moreover, any failure of the trial court here to hold

a hearing before trial was at most harmless error given our conclusion that

L.M.’s allegations against Hernandez were in any event admissible under KRE

404(b). See supra Part III. Finally, while Hernandez points out that the trial

judge stated after trial that he should have held a hearing and would have

excluded L.M.’s testimony if he had done so, such Monday morning

quarterbacking by the trial court alone is not a legal basis to reverse a

conviction, particularly where—as here—we determine in any event that the

trial court’s decision was correct.

                                        17
      Hernandez also argues that the trial court’s failure to rule on his KRE

404(b) motion was a violation of RCr 8.20. That Rule generally requires a trial

court to rule before trial on all pretrial motions. RCr 8.20(2). However, the

Rule also provides that a trial court may defer ruling where it finds good cause

to do so. Here the record is silent as to whether the trial court determined

there was good cause to wait until trial to rule on the KRE 404(b) motion.

However, even if its failure to rule was not supported by a finding of good

cause, any violation of RCr 8.20 was at most harmless error. The trial court

ruled orally from the bench regarding the KRE 404(b) motion before L.M. was

allowed to testify, and Hernandez points to no prejudice flowing from this

allegedly belated ruling. Further, because we have concluded L.M.’s allegations

were admissible under KRE 404(b) in any event, we find any such error

harmless as there is no basis to conclude it substantially impacted the ultimate

outcome at trial. See Mason v. Commonwealth, 559 S.W.3d 337, 339-40 (Ky.

2018) (noting non-constitutional evidentiary errors “‘may be deemed harmless

if the reviewing court can say with fair assurance that the judgment was not

substantially swayed by the error.’” (quoting Murray v. Commonwealth, 399

S.W.3d 398, 404 (Ky. 2013))).

      V.    The sentence imposed by the trial court is unlawful and the
            matter therefore must be remanded for resentencing.

      Finally, Hernandez argues his sentence of life plus twenty years is

unlawful because no sentence may run consecutive to a life sentence pursuant

to our holding in Bedell v. Commonwealth, 870 S.W.2d 779 (Ky. 1993). The

Commonwealth concedes the sentence violates Bedell, though it asserts
                                       18
Hernandez’s allegation of error is unpreserved. We nonetheless proceed to

consider the merits of Hernandez’s argument given that “[s]entencing is

jurisdictional,” “all defendants have the right to be sentenced after due

consideration of all applicable law[,]” Cummings v. Commonwealth, 226 S.W.3d

62, 66 (Ky. 2007) (quoting Hughes v. Commonwealth, 875 S.W.2d 99, 100 (Ky.

1994)), and thus “sentencing issues may be raised for the first time on appeal

. . . .” Id.

       In Bedell, we held that “no sentence can be ordered to run consecutively

with . . . a life sentence in any case.” Bedell, 870 S.W.2d at 783. Here, the

judgment entered by the trial court sentenced Hernandez to a sentence of life

plus twenty years. The sentence therefore violates our holding in Bedell.

Accordingly, we vacate and remand with direction to the trial court for

resentencing that runs the twenty-year sentence concurrent with the life

sentence. See Winstead v. Commonwealth, 327 S.W.3d 386, 409 (Ky. 2010)

(vacating consecutive sentences of life plus twenty years and remanding to trial

court for “resentencing that runs the term of years concurrent with [the life

sentence]”).

                                       19
                                  CONCLUSION

       For the foregoing reasons we affirm Hernandez’s convictions, vacate his

sentence, and remand to the Greenup Circuit Court with directions to

resentence Hernandez to concurrent sentences and enter a new judgment

consistent with this opinion.

      Vanmeter, C.J.; Bisig, Keller, Lambert, Nickell, and Thompson, JJ.,

sitting. All concur. Conley, J., not sitting.

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:

Karen Shuff Maurer
Assistant Public Advocate

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Daniel Cameron
Attorney General of Kentucky

Jenny Lynn Sanders
Assistant Attorney General

                                        20