Court Opinion

ID: 9929334
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-02 15:05:10.794676+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:07:17.893140
License: Public Domain

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                STATE OF FLORIDA
                 _____________________________

                      Case No. 5D23-0750
                  LT Case No. 2020-31188-CICI
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CAROL ANN KULZER,

    Appellant,

    v.

SARAH MARIE WAY and
GREENLEAF TRUST,

    Appellees.
                 _____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Volusia County.
Mary G. Jolley, Judge.

Michael J. Korn, of Korn & Zehmer, P.A., Jacksonville, and
James T. Terrell and Bruce A. Maxwell, of Terrell Hogan,
Jacksonville, for Appellant.

Richard A. Keller, of Hill, Rugh, Keller & Mann, P.L., Orlando,
for Appellee, Greenleaf Trust.

No Appearance for Appellee, Sarah Marie Way.

                        February 2, 2024

PER CURIAM.

     Sarah Marie Way, an employee of Appellee, Greenleaf Trust,
was running errands she said were related to her employment
duties of inspecting and readying a condominium unit and its
contents for sale. After completing two errands, Ms. Way grabbed
a hamburger which she ate in the parking lot of a McDonald’s. She
was then heading back to the condominium for a business meeting
when she negligently collided her car into the car driven by
Appellant, Carol Ann Kulzer, who claimed injuries and damages
in her suit against Ms. Way and Greenleaf. Appellant appeals the
trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of Greenleaf,
absolving it from any vicarious liability to Kulzer. The trial court
found as a matter of law that Ms. Way was not within the course
and scope of her employment at the time of the wreck based upon
application of the coming and going rule. We reverse and remand
for further proceedings.

                        Background Facts

      Ms. Way normally worked for Greenleaf in Kalamazoo,
Michigan, but was temporarily assigned to work in Ormond Beach,
Florida, dealing with a condominium unit left to Greenleaf. She
was involved in inspecting the unit, dealing with some of its
contents, and helping to prepare it for marketing, listing, and sale.
Greenleaf paid all Way’s expenses associated with her travel and
work in Ormond Beach including her meals. On this particular
day, she traveled to the condominium in the morning, left the
premises around noon, and was scheduled to attend a 2:00 p.m.
work-related meeting at the condo.

       According to Ms. Way’s answers to interrogatories, she “had
left the work location for errands related to the inspection.” What
we will refer to as her “mid-day journey” consisted of the following
events. Around noon, Ms. Way drove from the condominium to a
store where she purchased various packing supplies such as boxes,
tape, and bubble wrap. That purchase occurred at 12:14 p.m. The
parties agree that first errand was unquestionably within the
course and scope of her normal duties performed on behalf of
Greenleaf, her employer. She then went to an ABC Fine Wine &
Spirits where she purchased wine, cheese, and salami; the record
says almost nothing about that errand other than that the sale
occurred around an hour later at 1:22 p.m. She next stopped at
McDonald’s to grab a hamburger at the drive through. She ate the
burger in the parking lot, and as she was heading back to the condo

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for the 2:00 p.m. business meeting, she caused the wreck described
above, which was reported at 1:46 p.m.

      Appellant’s suit was against Ms. Way for her negligence in
causing the accident and against Greenleaf on the theory that it
was vicariously responsible for the negligence of its employee
committed during the course and scope of her employment. Ms.
Way admitted fault for the accident. Greenleaf moved for
summary judgment, claiming that Ms. Way was not within the
course and scope of her employment at the time of the wreck.

      An employer is vicariously liable for the tortious conduct of
its employee only if committed within the scope of employment.
Robelo v. United Consumers Club, Inc., 555 So. 2d 395, 396 (Fla.
3d DCA 1989). The parties, the trial court, and we agree that
Greenleaf’s potential vicarious tort liability depends on whether
this wreck occurred in the course and scope of Ms. Way’s
employment. Whether an employee’s negligent act occurred within
the course and scope of employment is generally a question for the
jury. Woods v. City of Miami, 646 So. 2d 836, 836 (Fla. 3d DCA
1994). A widely accepted test of whether an employee, while
driving, was within the scope of employment can be found in
Sussman v. Florida East Coast Properties, Inc., 557 So. 2d 74 (Fla.
3d DCA 1990). The employer’s vicarious liability arises:

      only if (1) the conduct is of the kind the employee is
      hired to perform, (2) the conduct occurs substantially
      within the time and space limits authorized or
      required by the work to be performed, and (3) the
      conduct is activated at least in part by a purpose to
      serve the master.

Id. at 76.

      Over the years, many cases were litigated in the realm of
workers’ compensation and in third-party tort liability situations
where the employee’s wreck occurred as the employee was simply
going to the workplace at the beginning of the workday or as she
was coming home at the end of the normal workday. The “coming
and going rule,” which typically eliminates employers’
responsibility for workers’ compensation benefits, is codified in

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section 440.092, Florida Statutes (2023). It has also been judicially
adopted to absolve employers of vicarious liability in tort cases
when the injured or negligent employee was simply coming from
or going to the workplace at the start or end of the workday. It is
undisputed on the record before us that Ms. Way had come to the
workplace hours before the accident and had not completed her
workday; thus, the traditional coming and going rule was
inapplicable.

       When an employee is on a single-purpose, personal lunch
break, away from the workplace, and not engaged in the
employer’s business in any manner, the employee is not considered
to be within the course and scope of employment for workers’
compensation purposes. See City of Miami v. Dwight, 637 So. 2d
981, 983 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). In essence, that situation has been
treated, for workers’ compensation purposes, as a variant of the
coming and going rule because the employee’s freedom of
movement is so complete. Id. In Western Union Telegraph Co. v.
Michel, the supreme court considered the employer’s liability for a
wreck that occurred as its employee message deliveryman was
returning from lunch at his home, nine miles outside his delivery
zone. 163 So. 86 (Fla. 1935). The supreme court found that the
trial court erred in affirmatively instructing the jury that the
messenger was within the scope of his employment, saying under
those facts it was an invasion of the province of the jury which
should decide whether the employee’s lunch detour was merely a
slight departure from work or an abandonment of the employer’s
business, with vicarious liability attaching only for the former
circumstance. Id. at 87–88. 1 Even where an employee has
temporarily deviated from serving the employer’s business, if an
accident occurs after he returns to the pursuit of the employer’s
interest, vicarious liability may be found. Ford v. Fla. Dep’t of
Transp., 855 So. 2d 264, 265 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003).

      It is undisputed that Ms. Way described her mid-day journey
in her interrogatory answers as running errands related to the

    1 The supreme court ultimately decided that the employer’s

liability rested on an issue other than scope of employment.
Western Union, 163 So. at 89.

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inspection and sale of the condominium. The parties do not
dispute that the first such errand was related to Ms. Way’s job.
The purpose and duration of the second errand, buying
refreshments at the ABC, was not explored during Ms. Way’s
deposition nor explained by any record evidence. 2 The time that
passed following completion of the second errand and the wreck,
which included travel to McDonald’s, eating a burger, driving to
where the wreck occurred, the occurrence of the wreck, and
notifying police was approximately twenty-four minutes. Based on
these facts, the trial court granted Greenleaf’s motion for summary
judgment, concluding that under the coming and going rule, Ms.
Way was not acting within the scope of her employment.

       We engage in a de novo review of the summary judgment
granted in this case. Volusia Cnty. v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach,
760 So. 2d 126, 130 (Fla. 2000). Summary judgment may only be
granted when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the
moving party is entitled, as a matter of law, to judgment in its
favor. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510. As to the first element of the Sussman
test, Ms. Way running the errands was self-described as work-
related, and at least one of the errands was indisputably conduct
of the kind the employee was hired to perform. Facts surrounding
the second Sussman element were poorly developed, but there was
no undisputed evidence that the mid-day journey occurred
substantially outside the time and space limits authorized or
required by the work to be performed. Finally, as to the third
Sussman element, the evidence was undisputed that Ms. Way’s
mid-day journey was motivated at least in part by a purpose to
serve her employer, Greenleaf.

      Thus, the record before us does not establish Greenleaf’s
entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, we
reverse the summary judgment and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

    2 It was included on Way’s reimbursement request as a
personal, rather than client expense; however, that tells us
nothing material to our inquiry.

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    REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings.

EDWARDS, C.J., and LAMBERT and JAY, JJ., concur.

                _____________________________

    Not final until disposition of any timely and
    authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
    9.331.
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