Court Opinion

ID: 9944392
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-26 16:56:24.745229+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:58:34.361727
License: Public Domain

It is with reluctance and the utmost deference that I presume to project my views in opposition to those of my learned brethren of the Court. I am constrained to *Page 625 
do so only because of a firm conviction that the decision of the majority usurps the judicial discretion which properly belongs to the trial court.
As I construe the majority opinion of this Court rendered on the former appearance of this cause as reported in 92 So.2d 670, wherein the appellant was granted leave to file in the trial court a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, the Court did not hold that the claimed newly discovered evidence if true was of sufficient probative effect to entitle the appellant to a new trial. The Court held that the claimed newly discovered evidence presented a question of such gravity with respect to the guilt or innocence of the appellant as to warrant a judicial inquiry to determine whether the judgment of conviction should be vacated and a new trial granted. The scope of such judicial inquiry was not limited merely to the truth of the alleged newly discovered evidence, but extended as well to the probative effect of such evidence to produce a different result on a new trial. This Court admonished the trial court that the newly discovered evidence should be "of such nature that it would be practically conclusive that it would cause a different result." The Court then held that the matter of determining whether a new trial should be granted was a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court. The Court said:
"The trial court should hear the proof offered by the parties and, in the exercise of his sound discretion, determine whether a new trial should be granted."
In thus committing the determination of the question to the discretion of the trial court as to the truth of the new evidence and the probative effect thereof, this Court acted in accordance with its prior pronouncements and the authorities generally. In the case of Townsel v. State, 87 So.2d 481, the Court said:
"The circuit court overruled the motion for a new trial. The issue here is whether we are warranted in *Page 626 
saying that the trial court abused its discretion in so doing, or whether it was manifestly wrong. These are the tests to be applied in this type of review. Bryant v. State (1934), 172 Miss. 210, 216, 157 So. 346; Thornton v. State (1936), 178 Miss. 304, 307, 170 So. 541. . . . . . The trial court was warranted in concluding that it was not probable that a different result would be obtained in another trial. Moreover, `a dispute as to whether the new evidence has this probative effect is to be determined primarily by the trial court in its discretion.' 39 Am. Jur., New Trial, Sec. 165."
Can it be said that the trial court in the case at bar abused its discretion in denying the appellant's motion for a new trial? I think not. It may be said that this Court went too far in saying that the new evidence should be "of such nature that it would be practically conclusive that it would cause a different result", nevertheless, this was the yardstick which this Court furnished the trial court for measuring the probative effect of the new evidence. However, if it be conceded that the true rule is that the new evidence must be of such decisive and conclusive character as to render a different result reasonably certain, I submit, with deference, that the trial court was amply warranted in denying the motion for a new trial and that it cannot be said that in so doing it abused its discretion.
The State did not controvert the truth of the claimed newly discovered evidence, but contended that the probative effect thereof was not such as to render a different result reasonably certain. The trial court, in the exercise of its sound discretion, sustained this contention of the State. The majority would now substitute this Court's discretion for that which properly belonged to the trial court. This, I think, is not warranted either by the facts or the law of this case. The trial court, in my humble opinion, was amply warranted in holding that the probative effect of the newly discovered evidence *Page 627 
was not such as to render a different result reasonably certain. The items of newly discovered evidence upon which the appellant mainly relies are the discovery subsequent to the trial that the fingerprints lifted from the window ledge of the victim's room were not those of the appellant but were those of Leroy Moody, and the discovery subsequent to the trial of the victim's ring in the possession of Leroy Moody's wife. This evidence, however, does not exculpate the appellant and fix guilt of the infamous crime upon Leroy Moody. It merely establishes the presence of Leroy Moody in the victim's home at the time of the commission of the crime. It does not preclude the presence of the appellant, whom Mrs. Dreding, the victim, positively identified as the perpetrator of the crime by size, color, voice, slump in walk, and a sweetish odor about his person. The evidence merely corroborates the testimony of Mrs. Dreding that the appellant told her at the time that he had a "buddy" with him who was holding her baby in the living room, and that if she did not submit to him he would kill both her and her baby. The evidence merely shows that this "buddy" was Leroy Moody. It was the province of the trial court in its discretion to evaluate this testimony. The Court, in affirming the appellant's conviction as reported in 87 So.2d 265, has already placed its evaluation upon the fingerprint evidence and has held that "the jury was well warranted in finding that the fingerprint evidence was of no value whatever." The Court said:
"The failure of the defendant's fingerprints to conform to those prints which were taken from the window did not necessarily create a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. The assailant had represented to his victim that he had a `buddy' with him. It is not unreasonable that the original motive was burglary or rape, or both, in which he actually had an accomplice. Mrs. Dreding's billfold was taken from the house, and was later found *Page 628 
under a truck near the Masonite plant. The prints, which were lifted from the window, could be those of such accomplice, in which event they obviously would not have matched those of the defendant. It is also not unreasonable that the accomplice, if there was one, effected an entrace into the apartment through the window, and then let the assailant in through the door. In that event, of course, no prints of the assailant would have been left on the window. It is apparent that the jury was well warranted in finding that the fingerprint evidence was of no actual value whatever."
The finding of the wedding ring in the possession of Leroy Moody's wife is in the same category as the fingerprint evidence and serves only as a circumstance to establish the presence of Leroy Moody in the victim's home and does not preclude the presence of the appellant. The probative effect of this evidence should be no greater than the evaluation heretofore placed by this Court upon the fingerprint evidence. The trial court, on the hearing of the motion for a new trial, was therefore well warranted in finding that the newly discovered evidence was of no probative effect to render a different result reasonably certain.
It must be borne in mind that the matter of granting appellant's motion for a new trial was a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court. This Court cannot substitute its discretion for that of the trial court. Even though this Court may have rendered a different decision on the motion for a new trial, it cannot disturb the decision of the trial court unless such decision is manifestly wrong. I submit, with deference, that under the law and facts of this case this Court is not warranted in holding that the decision of the trial court is manifestly wrong. The judgment of the trial court, in my opinion, should therefore be affirmed. *Page 629