Court Opinion

ID: 9964352
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-29 18:12:26.625844+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:20.373047
License: Public Domain

J-A02026-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  IN RE: V.M.T., A MINOR                       :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
  APPEAL OF: ROSA MAAS CAAL                    :      No. 1337 MDA 2023

                 Appeal from the Order Entered August 24, 2023
                  In the Court of Common Pleas of York County
                       Orphans' Court at No(s): 6723-1388

BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., KING, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.:                                  FILED APRIL 29, 2024

       Appellant, Rosa Maas Caal, appeals from the order entered in the York

County Court of Common Pleas, Orphans’ Court, which made certain findings

about her first cousin, V.M.T. (born in September 2005) (“Child”), relative to

Special Immigrant Juvenile Status (“SIJS”).1 We affirm.

       The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. On

June 9, 2023, Appellant filed a “Petition for Appointment of Guardian of a

Minor and Request for Expedited Hearing.” In her petition, Appellant alleged

that, inter alia: (1) she is the paternal first cousin of Child; (2) Child’s parents

reside in Guatemala; (3) Child has resided with Appellant since December

____________________________________________

1 “The SIJ[S] statute, 8 U.S.C.S. § 1101(a)(2)(J), provides that a juvenile who

qualifies [for SIJS] may apply for lawful permanent residency and thus relief
from deportation.” Orozco v. Tecu, 284 A.3d 474, 476 (Pa.Super. 2022).
J-A02026-24

2022; (4) Child’s parents are unable to provide for Child’s basic needs

including food, shelter, and clothing, due to health and financial reasons; and

(5) upon Child’s arrival in the United States, Child came under the jurisdiction

of the United States Office of Refugee Resettlement, Division of Children’s

Services,    who    released     Child    to   Appellant’s   care   upon   Appellant’s

acknowledgement and agreement to the provisions set forth in a Sponsor Care

Agreement pertaining to Child’s care, safety, and well-being. Appellant sought

to be appointed as the guardian of Child and requested an expedited hearing

for the court to make certain judicial findings relevant to SIJS.

       On June 19, 2023, the court scheduled a hearing for July 21, 2023. At

the July 21, 2023 hearing, Appellant testified first. Appellant testified that she

currently resides in York County with her husband, daughter, and Child.

Appellant explained that she is Child’s first cousin. Appellant stated that Child

arrived in the United States on December 22, 2022, at which time Child was

taken into custody by border patrol. Border patrol ultimately released Child

into Appellant’s custody, and Child has been living with Appellant ever since.

Prior to Child’s arrival in the United States, Child lived in Guatemala with her

parents and seven siblings.2 Appellant testified that Child’s father is a farmer,

and he raises food for the family; Child’s mother is a homemaker but also

helps on the farm.

____________________________________________

2 Appellant presented evidence that Child’s parents did not oppose Appellant’s

request to be appointed as Child’s guardian.

                                           -2-
J-A02026-24

      Appellant stated that Child’s parents are not always able to provide

adequate food for Child. Appellant said that Child came to the United States

because she wants to go to school, and her parents are unable to “do anything

else for her.” (N.T. Hearing, 7/21/23, at 10). Appellant claimed that Child

attended school only until ninth grade but “[a]fter she finished ninth grade

she couldn’t go because…her father couldn’t provide more for her.” (Id. at

11). Appellant explained that Child is enrolled in school in York County and is

doing fine in school.   Appellant confirmed that she, her mother, and her

husband work, and that they generate enough income to provide for Child’s

food, shelter, and clothing.    Appellant testified that Child’s parents were

unable to provide for Child’s basic needs.

      Appellant further opined that it would be in Child’s best interest for Child

to remain in the United States with Appellant because Child can continue her

studies, and Appellant and her family can help Child achieve her dream to

become a doctor. Appellant maintained that Child will not be able to achieve

that dream in Guatemala because her parents cannot afford to help Child with

her studies.

      Child testified next. Child confirmed that she was 17 years old at the

time of the hearing and was residing with Appellant and Appellant’s family.

Child testified that she is going to school, and Appellant and her family are

taking good care of her. Child stated that her parents were not able to provide

her with adequate food, shelter, and clothing when she lived with them in

                                      -3-
J-A02026-24

Guatemala. Child said she previously attended school in Guatemala, but if

she returned there, Child would not be in school because “there’s no money

for [her] to go to school.”   (Id. at 20).   Child testified that she wants to

graduate and become a doctor.

      Child explained that she lived in a house of ten people in Guatemala.

Child said that her father worked on a farm and grew beans and corn for food.

Child stated that her father did not grow enough food to support everyone in

the house. Child explained that there were times when there was not enough

food to eat, saying “[o]nce or twice a week, there was no food.” (Id. at 23).

“Then my father, if he had any—if he had any money left, he would go to the

country, to the country, to buy corn and beans because they do sell that type

of stuff over there.” (Id.) Child testified that there were also times when her

father did not have enough money to buy food for meals, which happened

“[a]bout three times a week, three days a week, we would have to go hungry,

because if there was no money he couldn’t buy any food.” (Id. at 24). Child

later stated, however, that it was twice a year that her family went without

food. (Id. at 27-28).

      Child testified that she finished ninth grade but could not go back to

school after that in Guatemala because there was not enough money to send

her back to school. When she was not in school, Child helped her family grow

corn and beans, and she helped her mother around the house. Child said that

even when she was helping her family on the farm, there was not enough food

                                     -4-
J-A02026-24

to feed the entire family. Child stated that she cannot return to Guatemala

because her parents are not capable of caring for her.

      At the conclusion of the hearing, the court appointed Appellant as Child’s

guardian and care provider. Regarding the findings relative to SIJS, the court

gave Appellant one week to submit a brief or memorandum of law. Appellant

subsequently filed a post-hearing brief. By order entered August 24, 2023,

the court memorialized its appointment of Appellant as guardian of the estate

and person of Child. Nevertheless, the court found insufficient evidence that

Child’s reunification with her parents was not viable based on abuse,

abandonment or neglect, that would entitle her to SIJS.       Appellant filed a

motion for reconsideration on September 8, 2023. While the motion was still

pending, Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal on September 22, 2023,

along with a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i).

      Appellant raises two issues for our review:

         Whether the Orphans’ Court erred in concluding that the
         evidence of record was insufficient to establish that the
         minor’s reunification with her parents is not viable due to
         abandonment, abuse or neglect as those terms are defined
         under Pennsylvania law?

         Whether the Orphans’ Court erred in relying on Guatemalan
         law when it declined to find that the minor’s reunification
         with her parents is not viable, where the parents required
         the minor to leave school and work on a farm to help provide
         for her own basic needs?

(Appellant’s Brief at 8).

                                     -5-
J-A02026-24

       In her issues combined, Appellant argues that the court erred by

deciding there was insufficient evidence that Child was abandoned, abused,

or neglected as those terms are defined under Pennsylvania law. Appellant

asserts that the Orphans’ Court reached this conclusion despite finding that

Child’s parents removed her from school after ninth grade and required her to

work on a farm to contribute to her own care and maintenance. Appellant

maintains that under Pennsylvania law, abuse and neglect are present when

a parent threatens a child’s well-being or impairs a child’s health,

development, or functioning.         Appellant contends that requiring a child to

leave school to work on a farm to provide for her own support constitutes a

threat to Child’s well-being and, almost certainly, an impairment of Child’s

development.

       Appellant further argues that Pennsylvania has a longstanding and

compelling interest to protect the health and emotional welfare of children

within its borders. Appellant stresses that the laws reflect the public policy in

our Commonwealth regarding child welfare and allow the Commonwealth to

exercise police powers to enforce these laws for the protection of children

when necessary. Appellant submits that the Orphans’ Court has the authority,

pursuant to the Commonwealth’s parens patriae interest,3 to implement the

____________________________________________

3 “Parens patriae refers to the role of the state as sovereign and guardian of

persons under a legal disability to act for themselves such as juveniles.” In
re J’K.M., 191 A.3d 907, 916 n.10 (Pa.Super. 2018).

                                           -6-
J-A02026-24

policies of this Commonwealth by making child welfare determinations in the

context of guardianship proceedings. Appellant emphasizes that the Orphans’

Court’s paramount concern in guardianship proceedings is the well-being of

minors, regardless of whether the child’s parents are subject to enforcement

actions in this Commonwealth for failing to fulfill their parental duty to protect

their child’s health, safety, and welfare.

      Appellant also highlights that children are required to attend school until

the age of 18. Appellant contends that a child who is habitually truant from

school meets the definition of a dependent child under the Juvenile Act. As

well, Appellant maintains that a child who is without education as required by

law meets the definition of a dependent child. Appellant insists that Child’s

truancy and her parents’ violation of child labor laws by requiring her to work

on a farm supports a finding that reunification with her parents is not viable.

Appellant suggests that reunifying Child with her parents will defeat one of

this Commonwealth’s primary goals in educating children and will harm Child’s

well-being.

      Appellant acknowledges the court’s remarks that truancy would not be

an issue for much longer as Child was approaching her eighteenth birthday at

the time of the evidentiary hearing. Appellant claims, however, that “[t]he

fact that the past harm might end in the near future due to the minor’s age is

irrelevant.   The issue is whether such harm was present at the time of

adjudication.”   (Appellant’s Brief at 22).   Appellant submits that the court

                                      -7-
J-A02026-24

recognized that the harm to Child would continue even after she turned

eighteen because she would likely be deprived of the opportunity of attaining

her educational goals in the future. Appellant insists that the court should

have applied Pennsylvania law and not Guatemalan law in its reunification

viability analysis. Appellant concludes the court erred in its factual findings

regarding Child’s eligibility for SIJS, and this Court must reverse.        We

disagree.

      SIJS is an immigration status that may be awarded to:

         (J) an immigrant who is present in the United States—

            (i)   who has been declared dependent on a juvenile
         court located in the United States or whom such a court has
         legally committed to, or placed under the custody of, an
         agency or department of a State, or an individual or entity
         appointed by a State or juvenile court located in the United
         States, and whose reunification with 1 or both of the
         immigrant’s parents is not viable due to abuse,
         neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis found under
         State law;

             (ii) for whom it has been determined in administrative
         or judicial proceedings that it would not be in the alien’s best
         interest to be returned to the alien’s or parent’s previous
         country of nationality or country of last habitual residence;
         and

            (iii) in whose case the Secretary of Homeland Security
         consents to the grant of special immigrant juvenile status,
         except that—

                   (I) no juvenile court has jurisdiction to
         determine the custody status or placement of an alien in the
         custody of the Secretary of Health and Human Services
         unless the Secretary of Health and Human Services
         specifically consents to such jurisdiction; and

                                      -8-
J-A02026-24

                 (II) no natural parent or prior adoptive parent of
        any alien provided special immigrant status under this
        subparagraph shall thereafter, by virtue to such parentage,
        be accorded any right, privilege, or status under this
        chapter[.]

8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(27)(J) (emphasis added).

     Additionally, the Code of Federal Regulations provides:

        § 204.11 Special immigrant juvenile classification.

                                  *    *     *

        (b) Eligibility. A petitioner is eligible for classification as a
        special immigrant juvenile under section 203(b)(4) of the
        Act as described at section 101(a)(27)(J) of the Act, if they
        meet all of the following requirements:

           (1) Is under 21 years of age at the time of filing the
        petition;

           (2) Is unmarried at the time of filing and adjudication;

           (3) Is physically present in the United States;

          (4) Is the subject of a juvenile court order(s) that
        meets the requirements under paragraph (c) of this
        section; and

           (5) Obtains consent from the Secretary of Homeland
        Security to classification as a special immigrant juvenile.
        For [United States Citizenship and Immigration Services
        (“USCIS”)] to consent, the request for SIJ classification
        must be bona fide, which requires the petitioner to establish
        that a primary reason the required juvenile court
        determinations were sought was to obtain relief from
        parental abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis
        under State law. USCIS may withhold consent if evidence
        materially conflicts with the eligibility requirements in
        paragraph (b) of this section such that the record reflects
        that the request for SIJ classification was not bona fide.
        USCIS approval of the petition constitutes the granting of
        consent.

                                      -9-
J-A02026-24

       (c) Juvenile court order(s).

          (1) Court-ordered dependency or custody and
       parental reunification determination. The juvenile
       court must have made certain judicial determinations
       related to the petitioner’s custody or dependency and
       determined that the petitioner cannot reunify with
       their parent(s) due to abuse, neglect, abandonment,
       or a similar basis under State law.

          (i) The juvenile court must have made at least one of the
          following judicial determinations related to the
          petitioner’s custodial placement or dependency in
          accordance      with    State   law   governing     such
          determinations:

          (A) Declared the petitioner dependent upon the juvenile
          court; or

          (B) Legally committed to or placed the petitioner under
          the custody of an agency or department of a State, or an
          individual or entity appointed by a State or juvenile court.

          (ii) The juvenile court must have made a judicial
          determination that parental reunification with one or
          both parents is not viable due to abuse, abandonment,
          neglect, or a similar basis under State law. The court is
          not required to terminate parental rights to determine
          that parental reunification is not viable.

          (2) Best interest determination.

          (i) A determination must be made in judicial or
          administrative proceedings by a court or agency
          recognized by the juvenile court and authorized by law
          to make such decisions that it would not be in the
          petitioner’s best interest to be returned to the petitioner’s
          or their parent’s country of nationality or last habitual
          residence.

          (ii) Nothing in this part should be construed as altering
          the standards for best interest determinations that
          juvenile court judges routinely apply under relevant

                                   - 10 -
J-A02026-24

            State law.

            (3) Qualifying juvenile court order(s).

            (i) The juvenile court must have exercised its
            authority over the petitioner as a juvenile and
            made the requisite judicial determinations in this
            paragraph under applicable State law to establish
            eligibility.

            (ii) The juvenile court order(s) must be in effect on the
            date the petitioner files the petition and continue through
            the time of adjudication of the petition, except when the
            juvenile court’s jurisdiction over the petitioner
            terminated solely because:

            (A) The petitioner was adopted, placed in a permanent
            guardianship, or another child welfare permanency goal
            was reached, other than reunification with a parent or
            parents with whom the court previously found that
            reunification was not viable; or

            (B) The petitioner was the subject of a qualifying juvenile
            court order that was terminated based on age, provided
            the petitioner was under 21 years of age at the time of
            filing the petition.

8 C.F.R. § 204.11(b), (c) (emphasis added).

      To summarize, SIJS is a federal immigration status available to foreign

children in the United States who have been abused, abandoned, or neglected.

See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(27)(J). To obtain SIJS, a child must first apply to

a state court for an order finding that he or she meets the statutory and

regulatory requirements. See id. (SIJS statutory requirements). See also 8

C.F.R. § 204.11 (SIJS regulatory requirements). See also Osorio-Martinez

v. Attorney General United States of America, 893 F.3d 153, 163 (3d.

Cir. 2018) (stating: “Alien children may receive SIJ[S] only after satisfying a

                                    - 11 -
J-A02026-24

set of rigorous, congressionally defined eligibility criteria, including that a

juvenile court find it would not be in the child’s best interest to return to her

country of last habitual residence and that the child is dependent on the court

or placed in the custody of the state or someone appointed by the state”).

      The Third Circuit Court of Appeals set forth the eligibility criteria for SIJS

in Osorio-Martinez as follows:

         We begin with the requirements for SIJ[S] that show a
         congressional intent to assist a limited group of abused
         children to remain safely in the country with a means to
         apply for [legal permanent resident] status, and that, in
         effect, establish a successful applicant as a ward of the
         United States with the approval of both state and federal
         authorities[.]

         This understanding of SIJ[S] is reflected in the very
         definition of a Special Immigrant Juvenile, i.e., a child “who
         has been declared dependent on a juvenile court located in
         the United States or whom such a court has legally
         committed to, or placed under the custody of, an agency or
         department of a State, or an individual or entity appointed
         by a State or juvenile court located in the United States, and
         whose reunification with 1 or both of the immigrant’s
         parents is not viable due to abuse, neglect, abandonment,
         or a similar basis found under State law.” 8 U.S.C. §
         1101(a)(27)(J)(i). It is also compelled not only by the
         statute’s purpose and history, … but also by [the
         Department of Homeland Security’s] own characterization
         of SIJ[S] as a classification to provide humanitarian
         protection for abused, neglected, or abandoned child
         immigrants eligible for long-term foster care[.] And the
         SIJ[S] statute’s implementing regulations indicate that, to
         remain eligible for adjustment of status pending visa
         availability, SIJ[S] designees must remain in the custody of
         the state court or state agency to which they have been
         committed. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c)(5) (noting that to be
         eligible for SIJ[S], an alien must “continue to be dependent
         upon the juvenile court and eligible for long-term foster
         care” (emphasis added)); see also Special Immigrant

                                      - 12 -
J-A02026-24

       Juvenile Petitions, 76 Fed. Reg. 54978-01, 54980 (proposed
       Sept. 6, 2011) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R pts. 204-05, 245)
       (noting that “dependency,” for purposes of SIJ status,
       “encompasses dependency, commitment, or custody”).

       Importantly, that close, dependency relationship with the
       United States is also borne out by the statutory criteria for
       SIJ[S] eligibility. To qualify for SIJ[S], applicants not only
       must be physically present in the United States, unmarried,
       and under the age of twenty-one, but also, … they must
       obtain an order of dependency from a state juvenile court.
       8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c). That
       order requires the state court to find: (1) that the applicant
       is “dependent on a juvenile court ... or placed under the
       custody” of a state agency or someone appointed by the
       state; (2) that “it would not be in the alien’s best interest to
       be returned to the alien’s or parent’s previous country of
       nationality or ... habitual residence,”; and (3) that
       “reunification with 1 or both of the immigrant’s parents is
       not viable due to abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar
       basis found under State law.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(i),
       (ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(a), (c). Moreover, these
       determinations must be “in accordance with state law
       governing such declarations of dependency,” 8 C.F.R. §
       204.11(c)(3), which, depending on the state, may also
       entail specific residency requirements, e.g., [Pa.R.C.P.]
       1915.2(a)(ii) (providing that the dependency action must be
       brought in the child’s home county or a county “which had
       been the child’s home county within six months before
       commencement of the proceeding”). …

       With that order in hand, applicants must then file an
       application with USCIS, along with “sufficient evidence to
       establish ... eligibility” and the associated filing fee. The
       Secretary of Homeland Security must also consent to the
       grant of SIJ[S], which functions as an acknowledgement
       that the request for SIJ classification is bona fide—that is,
       that the benefit is sought primarily ... for the purpose of
       obtaining relief from abuse or neglect or abandonment.

       All of these requirements attest to SIJ[S] designees’
       dependency and close ties with state and federal authorities,
       the risk to their well-being in being removed to their
       countries of origin, and a relationship to the United States

                                   - 13 -
J-A02026-24

          that far exceeds that of aliens on the threshold of initial
          entry or apprehended within hours of surreptitiously
          entering the United States.

Id. at 168-70 (some internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

       Instantly, the court explained its reasons for its findings relative to SIJS

as follows:

          5. There is insufficient evidence of record for the [c]ourt to
          find that [Child] is a “special immigrant,” entitling her to
          [SIJS], or her reunification with her parents is not viable due
          to abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis found
          under State law. The record is devoid of any evidence of
          abuse. The record does establish that [Child’s] family lives
          by subsistence farming and has little income, but there is a
          lack of proof that hunger was prevalent, that family was
          living below the poverty line, or they did not have enough
          income for food, shelter, and clothing to constitute neglect,
          inadvertent or otherwise. To the contrary, no medical
          evidence of malnourishment was produced, and [Child]
          testified that when the family did not produce enough food
          for themselves, her father would buy food from external
          sources, and she only recalled going without for one or two
          days a year. We further find that [Appellant] has failed to
          meet her burden to prove neglect under State law as, based
          upon the record before us, we are also constrained to find
          that [Child’s] parents have been providing her with
          adequate essentials of life, including food, shelter, and
          medical care, to preclude us from making a finding of
          physical neglect as required under Section 6303 of the
          Domestic Relations [Code]. 23 Pa.C.S. § 6303.[4] Likewise,
____________________________________________

4 See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6303(b.1) (defining “child abuse” as intentionally,
knowingly or recklessly, inter alia, (7) causing serious physical neglect of a
child). See also 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6303(a) (defining “serious physical neglect”
as any of following when committed by perpetrator that endangers child’s life
or health, threatens child’s well-being, causes bodily injury or impairs child’s
health, development or functioning: (1) repeated, prolonged or egregious
failure to supervise child in manner that is appropriate considering child’s
developmental age and abilities; (2) failure to provide child with adequate
essentials of life, including food, shelter or medical care).

                                          - 14 -
J-A02026-24

       the record does not establish abandonment. [Child] decided
       on her own to relocate to the United States.

       6. [Child] has the altruistic goal of becoming a doctor.
       [Child’s] parents do not have the financial resources to pay
       for [Child’s] continuing education in Guatemala. If she
       returns to Guatemala and resumes living with her family,
       she will be expected to assist her father with farming to
       provide for the family instead of continuing her educational
       pursuits. Based upon the foregoing, [Appellant] also argues
       that the parents’ inability or failure to provide [Child] with
       an education commensurate with Pennsylvania compulsory
       school law requirements should constitute a “similar basis
       under State law” to find that [Child] qualifies for [SIJS],
       noting that the definition of a dependent child includes a
       child who is without proper education by law, but without
       citation to any other authority. We decline the invitation.
       Under Pennsylvania law, if a student is of “compulsory
       school age,” and does not attend school, she can be subject
       to Pennsylvania’s truancy laws. No evidence was adduced
       that [Child] was “without proper education as required by
       law” in Guatemala or her parents violated any truancy laws
       of that country due to their daughter not attending school.
       Likewise, no evidence has been nor does the [c]ourt believe
       can be adduced that [Child] was of “compulsory school age”
       in Guatemala when she stopped attending school. Given
       that [Child] is not of compulsory school age in Guatemala
       and is about to turn age eighteen next month, we cannot
       find that [Child’s] reunification with her parents is not viable
       due to truancy, as no possible truancy issue will exist upon
       reunification.

       7. The foregoing notwithstanding, the [c]ourt does
       acknowledge that while reunification of [Child] with her
       parents is viable, it likely will result in lost educational
       opportunity and [Child’s] continuing education, which is
       unlikely should she return to Guatemala, is in her best
       interest. Accordingly, the [c]ourt does conclude that it is
       not in the best interest of [Child] to be removed from the
       United States and returned to Guatemala, her country of
       nationality and last habitual residence for her and her birth
       parents, but we do not make such conclusion based upon a
       finding that [Child] has met the statutory requirements
       entitling her to [SIJS].

                                   - 15 -
J-A02026-24

(Order, filed 8/24/23, at 2-4) (internal citations and footnotes omitted).

       The court elaborated on its rationale in its Rule 1925(a) opinion as

follows:

           The [Orphans’ Court] takes issue with Appellant’s seeming
           attempt to characterize Paragraph 6 of our Order as
           constituting a finding that [Child] was subject to illegal or
           inhuman[e] child labor as defined by the Pennsylvania Child
           Labor Act.      We made no such finding.            Importantly,
           Pennsylvania and US child labor laws themselves generally
           permit farm work by minors where it occurs on a farm
           owned and operated by their parent or parents. See
           Exclusions to the Child Labor Act, 2012 P.L. 1209, 151,
           Section 13(b) (Agricultural employment which is exempt
           from coverage of the child labor provision of the Fair Labor
           Standards Act shall be exempt from coverage of this act);
           See also 29 U.S.C. 213(c)(1)-(2) (“the provisions of section
           212 of this title relating to child labor shall not apply to any
           employee employed in agriculture outside of school hours
           for the school district where such employee is living while
           he is so employed…” even if the work is deemed hazardous
           for children under sixteen, as long as the minor is “employed
           by his parent on a farm owned or operated[5] by such
           parent”); See also 29 U.S.C. 213(a)(6) (exempts minimum
           wage and maximum hour requirements related to any
           employee employed in agriculture). In reality, Paragraph
           6’s main findings were: (1) that [Child], if returned home,
           would be “expected to assist her father with farming to
           provide for the family instead of continuing her educational
           pursuits”; and (2) that “no evidence was adduced that
           [Child] was ‘without proper education as required by law’ in
           Guatemala or her parents violated any truancy laws of that
           country.” We would further note that no evidence was
           adduced before us that the child was working on her
           parents’ farm in Guatemala during school hours while she
           was matriculated to school.

____________________________________________

5 Child testified at the hearing that her father operated the farm, but he did

not own it.

                                          - 16 -
J-A02026-24

         Additionally, the [Orphans’ Court] believes our reliance on
         and analysis of the conduct of [Child’s p]arents relative to
         Guatemalan law, as noted in our finding of Paragraph 6, is
         well founded. Pennsylvania’s Education Statutes, regarding
         compulsory attendance, only apply to individuals under
         eighteen (18) years of age, who are legal residents of the
         Commonwealth, who reside with a legal resident, or who are
         temporarily domiciled in a school district in which their
         parent is so domiciled for seasonal employment. Based on
         this standard, it is unclear to the [Orphans’ Court] how
         [Appellant] believes Pennsylvania’s Education statutes
         would apply, prior to [Child’s] placement with [Appellant].
         Therefore, it is this [c]ourt’s opinion that it would be
         inappropriate and unfair to retroactively apply US law to
         individuals who did not live in or had no connection to
         Pennsylvania or the US at the time of their actions and who
         continue to reside outside of the US. Furthermore, it is this
         [c]ourt’s belief that the record shows [Child’s] parents
         supported, cared, and protected the child as best as they
         could given their circumstances. Moreover, as also outlined
         in Paragraph 6 of the Order, [Child] recently became an
         adult having achieved eighteen years of age, so “no possible
         truancy issue will exist upon reunification,” making
         [Appellant’s] argument moot.2

            2 Since [Child] is now eighteen years of age, she can

            no longer be       required   to   attend   school   in
            Pennsylvania.

         The [Orphans’ Court], however, continues to acknowledge
         the likelihood of lost educational opportunity if [Child] is
         returned to Guatemala, and believes it is in [Child’s] best
         interest to remain in the United States. We made this
         determination pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c)(2). We
         specifically  declined,   nevertheless,   to   make     the
         determination as contemplated in 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c)(1)
         that [Child] cannot reunify with her parents due to abuse,
         neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis under State law.

(Rule 1925(a) Opinion, filed 9/29/23, at 2-4) (some internal citations omitted)

(original numbering format omitted) (emphasis in original).

      The record supports the court’s analysis. To be eligible for SIJS, the

                                    - 17 -
J-A02026-24

court was required to find, inter alia, that Child could not reunify with her

parents due to abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis under State

law. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c)(1). As the Orphans’ Court noted, there was

no evidence that Child’s parents abandoned her. Rather, Child admitted that

she reached out to Appellant about coming to the United States to better her

life.   Appellant alleges that Child’s parents either abused or neglected her

based on the lack of food available to Child and/or their requirement that Child

work on the farm while Child was still a minor instead of continuing with her

education.     Regarding the former, the court expressly found insufficient

evidence that there was inadequate food for Child. Although Child initially

testified at the hearing that her family went hungry two or three times a week,

the court stated that “[Child’s] testimony is that when the question was asked

pointedly and without prompting that they went hungry twice a year. So she

certainly can’t meet it on that standard, because that’s my finding. That’s my

factual finding.” (N.T. Hearing at 32). The court acknowledged Child’s earlier

testimony but stated: “I’m finding as a fact that the family went hungry twice

a year.” (Id.) The record demonstrates that the court believed Child may

have been prompted or coached regarding certain testimony. (See id. at 26-

27, 32).6

____________________________________________

6 Although this is not a traditional dependency case, we observe that our
standard of review in dependency cases (in which this Court routinely
evaluates claims of abuse and neglect), requires this Court to accept the trial
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

                                          - 18 -
J-A02026-24

       Regarding the latter claim concerning Child’s alleged lack of education,7

Appellant did not introduce evidence regarding the compulsory school age in

Guatemala or evidence to support the testimony that Child’s parents could not

afford to send her to school past ninth grade. Although Appellant attacks the

court’s decision not to apply Pennsylvania’s laws concerning the compulsory

school age, the Orphans’ Court noted that any issue concerning compulsory

education would become moot in any event under Pennsylvania law after Child

turned eighteen. Significantly, Appellant cites no law to support her claim that

the “issue is whether such harm was present at the time of adjudication.”

(Appellant’s Brief at 18). In other words, Appellant cites no law to challenge

the court’s finding of mootness, and she does not assert that any exceptions

to the mootness doctrine would apply here.8 Based upon the foregoing, we

____________________________________________

court’s findings of fact and credibility determinations if the record supports
them, but we are not required to accept the trial court’s inferences or
conclusions of law. See In re L.Z., 631 Pa. 343, 111 A.3d 1164 (2015).

7 Regarding the alleged lack of education, Appellant relies on the definition of

a dependent child, which includes a child who is without proper parental care
or control, subsistence, education as required by law, or other care or control
necessary for her physical, mental, or emotional health, or morals. See 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 6302.

8 See In re D.A., 801 A.2d 614, 616 (Pa.Super. 2002) (en banc) (explaining

general rule that actual case or controversy must exist at all stages of judicial
process; issue can become moot during pendency of appeal due to intervening
change in facts of case or intervening change in law; exceptions to mootness
doctrine occur when case involves question of great public importance,
question presented is capable of repetition and apt to elude appellate review,
or party to controversy will suffer some detriment due to decision of trial
court).

                                          - 19 -
J-A02026-24

see no reason to disturb the court’s factual findings concerning Child’s

eligibility for SIJS. Accordingly, we affirm.

      Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 04/29/2024

                                     - 20 -