Court Opinion

ID: 9889711
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-11 13:04:11.263055+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:48:18.223886
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
      Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
      opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
      prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
      official text of the opinion.
      In the Supreme Court of Georgia

                                                 Decided: October 11, 2023

                      S23A0654. PAULDO v. THE STATE.

      LAGRUA, Justice.

      Appellant Raekwon Pauldo was convicted of malice murder in

connection with the shooting death of Jacquel Smith.1 On appeal,

Pauldo contends that his trial counsel provided constitutionally

ineffective assistance by (1) failing to adequately prepare the

defense of accident, (2) failing to limit testimony concerning the

      1 The shooting occurred on October 29, 2017. On December 19, 2017, a

Laurens County grand jury indicted Pauldo for malice murder, felony murder,
and three counts of aggravated assault. Prior to trial, the trial court suppressed
portions of Pauldo’s custodial statement to police, and we reversed that ruling.
See State v. Pauldo, 309 Ga. 130 (844 SE2d 829) (2020). Pauldo was tried in
February 2022, and the jury found him guilty of all counts. The trial court
sentenced Pauldo to serve life in prison without the possibility of parole on the
malice murder count and vacated or merged the remaining counts. Pauldo filed
a timely motion for new trial, which was amended through new counsel. After
holding an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the motion for new trial
on January 18, 2023. Pauldo filed a timely notice of appeal, and his case was
docketed to this Court’s April 2023 term and submitted for a decision on the
briefs.
registration of Pauldo’s gun, and (3) failing to adequately inform him

of the State’s plea offer. For the reasons that follow, these claims

fail, and we affirm Pauldo’s conviction.

     The evidence presented at trial showed that on October 29,

2017, Pauldo, Smith, and Zuri Brown were watching football in the

living room of Brown’s house when Brown’s mother, who was in the

next room, heard “a loud gun pop.” Brown’s mother ran into the room

and saw Smith sitting on the couch, gasping for air. Pauldo told

Brown’s mother that Smith killed himself. Brown drove Smith and

Pauldo to the hospital, where Smith died from the gunshot wound.

     The surveillance video from the front of the emergency room

showed Brown park his car in front of the emergency room, get out

of the car, and yell for help. Hospital personnel removed Smith from

the back seat of the car, placed him on a gurney, and wheeled him

into the hospital. The video showed that Pauldo was not inside

Brown’s car when it arrived at the hospital; the video showed Pauldo

running up to Brown’s car several minutes after Brown parked and

the police had arrived. After watching this surveillance video, police

                                  2
obtained another surveillance video from the hospital’s parking lot,

which showed that, around the time Brown was parking his car in

front of the emergency room, Pauldo was running from the back of

the parking lot toward Brown’s parked car. Police used these videos

to recover a Taurus 9mm semi-automatic handgun in a drainage

ditch in the area from which Pauldo was seen running, and ballistics

testing confirmed that the recovered gun fired the bullet that was

retrieved from Smith’s body.

     Brown and Pauldo both gave statements to police. Brown

stated he was in the bathroom when the shooting occurred, but that

he saw Pauldo with a gun, heard Pauldo and Smith arguing, and

heard Pauldo say, “I’ll shoot your a**.” Brown also admitted that he

let Pauldo out of the car prior to arriving at the hospital so that

Pauldo could dispose of the gun.

     Pauldo initially told police that he had his back turned to Smith

when Pauldo “heard a gunshot go off.” But he eventually admitted

that he and Smith got into an argument, Smith put his hand in

Pauldo’s face, and Pauldo reacted by hitting Smith with Pauldo’s

                                   3
gun, which “went off.” Throughout Pauldo’s interview, he denied

intentionally shooting Smith. Regarding the gun, Pauldo stated it

was registered to him and he hid the gun out of fear prior to arriving

at the hospital.

     At the beginning of Pauldo’s interview, which was about five

hours after the shooting, he consented to a gunshot residue test, but

it was not performed until about 20 minutes later. During this 20-

minute period, one officer noticed that “[Pauldo] was continuously

wiping his hands on his pants, with each other, he even took a tissue,

at one point, and wiped his hands with the tissue.” Another officer

took the tissue from Pauldo because she knew that “gunshot residue

. . . c[ould] be wiped off of the hands.” Pauldo’s gunshot residue test

was negative.2

     At trial, Pauldo’s defense theory was that there was no

evidence that Pauldo pulled the trigger and shot Smith and that the

evidence of a recall on Pauldo’s gun for having a faulty safety showed

     2 Police collected the tissue that Pauldo used to wipe his hands, but it

was not tested for gunshot residue.
                                      4
that the gun likely discharged without him pulling the trigger. The

State’s firearms expert testified that, based on her testing, the gun

was functioning properly, but she noted that the cartridge case

remained inside the gun even though “the typical cycle of fire for a

semi-automatic [gun] is that the cartridge case would be extracted

from t[he] chamber and [ejected] out of the [gun].” The firearms

expert referred to this scenario as “a failure to extract and eject” and

said this could be caused by different variables, including how the

gun was held, which could “imped[e] the slide from cycling

correctly,” or by defective ammunition that is “out of spec,” such that

“it’s not generating enough pressure for that slide to cycle.” The

firearms expert acknowledged that there was “a class action lawsuit

against [the gun’s manufacturer]” alleging that “[w]hen the safety

[was] engaged on the [gun]” and the gun “was dropped, [it] would

discharge.” The firearms expert stated that she did not conduct “an

abuse test” on the gun to check for a faulty safety or to determine

whether the gun would fire “if the gun was hit on someone’s head”

because “[a]n abuse test ha[d] to be specifically requested,” and one

                                   5
was not requested.

      Detective Brawner Ashley was asked whether he “check[ed]

the registration of [Pauldo’s] gun,” and Detective Ashley responded:

“Yes, we did. We . . . checked it through [the Georgia Crime

Information Center] to see whether or not it was stolen. And, also,

Sergeant [Lee] Washburn did a trace on the weapon itself.”

Detective Ashley did not elaborate on whether the gun was reported

as stolen, but he said that Sergeant Washburn had the results of the

trace. When Sergeant Washburn testified, he said the trace showed

that the gun was registered to someone other than Pauldo. But

Sergeant Washburn went on to say that if the registered owner “had

sold it to somebody and not put out a trace for it,” the trace would

“not show who it was sold to after he purchased it.”

     The medical examiner testified that the bullet that killed

Smith entered his body through the middle of his chin, exited

underneath his chin, and re-entered in his chest. The bullet had a

downward trajectory from the chin, and Smith had “soot and

stippling” on his chin, meaning his skin was “three to six inches from

                                  6
the end of the barrel” of the gun when it was fired. The medical

examiner also noted an abrasion on the left side of Smith’s forehead.

According to the medical examiner, the abrasion contained “several

parallel lines” and was “very consistent with” having been hit with

Pauldo’s gun.

     1. Pauldo contends his trial counsel provided constitutionally

ineffective assistance by (a) failing to adequately prepare the

defense of accident because counsel failed to present a firearms

expert, (b) failing to adequately prepare the defense of accident in

that counsel failed to introduce “certified documentation” of the

gun’s recall, (c) failing to limit testimony concerning the registration

of Pauldo’s gun, and (d) failing to adequately inform Pauldo of the

State’s plea offer.

     To prevail on these claims, Pauldo must demonstrate both that

his trial counsel’s performance was professionally deficient and that

he was prejudiced by this deficient performance. See Bates v. State,

313 Ga. 57, 62 (2) (867 SE2d 140) (2022) (citing Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (III) (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674)

                                   7
(1984)). To establish deficient performance, Pauldo must show that

trial counsel performed his duties in an objectively unreasonable

way, considering all the circumstances and in the light of prevailing

professional norms. See id. Establishing deficient performance

     is no easy showing, as the law recognizes a strong
     presumption that counsel performed reasonably, and [the
     appellant] bears the burden of overcoming this
     presumption. To carry this burden, he must show that no
     reasonable lawyer would have done what his lawyer did,
     or would have failed to do what his lawyer did not. In
     particular, decisions regarding trial tactics and strategy
     may form the basis for an ineffectiveness claim only if
     they were so patently unreasonable that no competent
     attorney would have followed such a course.

Park v. State, 314 Ga. 733, 740-741 (879 SE2d 400) (2022) (citation

and punctuation omitted). To establish prejudice, Pauldo must prove

that there is a reasonable probability that, but for his trial counsel’s

deficiency, the result of the trial would have been different. See

Bates, 313 Ga. at 62 (2). “A reasonable probability is a probability

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. (citation and

punctuation omitted). “And, this burden is a heavy one.” Id. at 62-

63 (2) (citation and punctuation omitted). “If an appellant fails to

                                   8
meet his or her burden of proving either prong of the Strickland test,

the reviewing court does not have to examine the other prong.”

Taylor v. State, 315 Ga. 630, 647 (5) (b) (884 SE2d 346) (2023)

(citation and punctuation omitted).

      (a) Pauldo contends his trial counsel provided constitutionally

ineffective assistance by failing to adequately prepare the defense of

accident because counsel failed to present a firearms expert.3

Assuming without deciding that counsel was deficient, we agree

with the trial court that Pauldo failed to establish prejudice.

      It is well established that a defendant fails to establish

      3 Regarding the defense of accident, we note that Pauldo requested that

the trial court give Georgia Pattern Jury Instructions § 3.00.00: Affirmative
Defense; Definition; Burden of Proof and § 3.40.10: Accident. The trial court,
citing Kellam v. State, 298 Ga. 520 (783 SE2d 117) (2016), denied this request,
concluding “accident is just not applicable here.” See id. at 523 (2) (holding that
in order to claim the defense of accident, “it must be established a defendant
acted without criminal intent, was not engaged in a criminal scheme, and was
not criminally negligent, i.e., did not act in a manner showing an utter
disregard for the safety of others who might reasonably be expected to be
injured thereby.” (citation and punctuation omitted)), overruled on other
grounds by Mitchell v. State, ___ Ga. ___ (2) (___ SE2d ___) (Case No.
S23A0599, decided August 21, 2023). See also Allaben v. State, 315 Ga. 789,
793 (1) n.3 (885 SE2d 1) (2023). On appeal, Pauldo does not raise any
contentions regarding the failure to instruct on affirmative defense and
accident.
                                        9
prejudice under Strickland when he merely contends that trial

counsel was deficient for failing to present an expert, without also

presenting evidence at the motion-for-new-trial hearing about what

the potential expert would have testified to at trial. See, e.g., Coley

v. State, 305 Ga. 658, 665 (6) (b) (827 SE2d 241) (2019) (concluding

that the appellant failed to show prejudice when he “presented no

evidence [at the motion-for-new trial hearing] that he has had the

firearm or the magazine tested”); Howard v. State, 298 Ga. 396, 399

(2) (782 SE2d 255) (2016) (concluding that the appellant failed to

show prejudice when he “did not have the blood tested post-trial”

and thus “has not shown that [blood testing] would have been

favorable to his defense”); Geiger v. State, 295 Ga. 648, 653-54 (5) (b)

(763 SE2d 453) (2014) (concluding that the appellant failed to show

prejudice when he “did not present any evidence at the motion[-]for[-

]new[-]trial hearing that additional testing of the shell casing would

have produced evidence that would have been favorable to him at

his trial”). This is because “mere speculation about what the

evidence would have shown had it actually been obtained does not

                                  10
satisfy the requirement of showing prejudice.” Coley, 305 Ga. at 666

(6) (b).

         Here, Pauldo failed to present any evidence at the motion-for-

new-trial hearing about what evidence could have been elicited from

a potential firearms expert that would have been different from

what the State’s firearm expert testified to at trial. Pauldo therefore

has not shown that a reasonable probability exists that the result of

the trial would have been different had this potential evidence—

whatever it may have been—been presented at trial. See Coley, 305

Ga. at 665 (6) (b). As a result, this claim of ineffective assistance

fails.

         (b) Pauldo contends his trial counsel provided constitutionally

ineffective assistance by failing to adequately prepare the defense of

accident in that counsel failed to introduce “certified documentation”

of the gun’s recall. We conclude that counsel was not deficient.

         Here, trial counsel elicited testimony from the State’s firearm

expert that Pauldo’s gun was subject to a manufacturer’s recall due

a faulty design with the safety and that an “abuse test” was not

                                    11
conducted. Trial counsel also cross-examined the expert on the

difference between a “check function test”—which was conducted

and resulted in a finding that the gun’s safety was working as

expected—and an abuse test, which was not conducted. In closing

argument, trial counsel argued the State had not carried its burden

to prove Pauldo’s guilt in part because no “abuse test” was conducted

on the gun even though it had a known manufacturer’s defect

causing it to discharge without a trigger pull.

     “[A]n attorney’s decisions as to what witnesses and other

evidence to present are a matter of trial strategy,” Evans v. State,

315 Ga. 607, 611 (2) (c) (884 SE2d 334) (2023) (citation and

punctuation omitted), and in the absence of evidence to the contrary,

counsel’s decisions are presumed to be strategic. See Holland v.

State, 314 Ga. 181, 190 (3) (875 SE2d 800) (2022). A strategic

decision “will not form the basis for an ineffectiveness claim unless

it is so unreasonable that no competent attorney would have made

that decision under the circumstances.” Davis v. State, 315 Ga. 252,

262 (4) (a) (882 SE2d 210) (2022) (citation and punctuation omitted).

                                 12
     Pauldo contends his trial counsel performed deficiently by

failing to introduce “certified documentation” surrounding the gun’s

recall because Pauldo’s “sole defense” was that the gun discharged

without a trigger pull. But counsel’s strategic decision to elicit

testimony from the State’s firearms expert to explain the lawsuit

concerning the gun, the manufacturer’s recall of the gun, and the

gun’s faulty safety that led to the lawsuit and recall—instead of

introducing certified documents supporting this testimony—was not

so unreasonable that no competent attorney would have made that

decision under the circumstances. Moreover, Pauldo did not

introduce any evidence at the motion-for-new-trial hearing as to

what the “certified documentation” of the gun’s recall would have

proven, so he has not shown that trial counsel performed deficiently

by deciding not to introduce that evidence at trial and to instead

elicit testimony about the recall from the State’s firearms expert.

See Bates, 313 Ga. at 67 (2) (d) (concluding trial counsel’s strategy

to use the State’s expert to explain PTSD and how it affected the

defendant’s conduct was reasonable). Accordingly, we conclude

                                 13
Pauldo failed to demonstrate that his counsel performed deficiently,

and this claim fails.

      (c) Pauldo appears to contend his trial counsel provided

constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to either “move to

exclude any testimony concerning the registry of the [gun]” or

present evidence that Pauldo purchased the gun. At the motion-for-

new trial hearing, trial counsel testified that, prior to trial, she was

under the impression that Pauldo was the gun’s registered owner.

Trial counsel said that, after Sergeant Washburn testified at trial, a

member of Pauldo’s family gave her a bill of sale, evidencing the

gun’s sale from the registered owner to Pauldo. Trial counsel further

testified that the registered owner “was not being cooperative as far

as just coming to court” and she did not seek to subpoena him to

testify at trial. Pauldo contends that the evidence concerning the

gun’s registration was “bad character” evidence that prejudiced him

at trial.

      Assuming without deciding that Pauldo’s counsel was

deficient, we conclude that Pauldo has not established prejudice

                                  14
because he has not shown a reasonable probability of a better result

had his trial counsel either moved to exclude any testimony

concerning the registry of the gun or presented evidence that Pauldo

purchased the gun. See Hughes v. State, 312 Ga. 149, 154 (2) (a) (861

SE2d 94) (2021) (weighing the strength of the evidence of the

defendant’s guilt against the evidence that trial counsel failed to

elicit at trial).

      The testimony about the registry of the gun, particularly in the

absence of evidence that Pauldo purchased the gun, could have led

the jury to infer that Pauldo stole the gun because he wrongly stated

that it was registered to him. But this inference is weakened by the

fact that there was no direct evidence that the gun was stolen and

Sergeant Washburn acknowledged that the registered owner could

“ha[ve] sold it to somebody and not put out a trace for it.” Although

the prosecutor mentioned during closing argument that Pauldo

“lied” about the gun being registered to him, this was not

emphasized. Rather, the prosecutor identified this as one of Pauldo’s

“lies”; these “lies” included Pauldo telling Brown’s mother that

                                  15
Smith killed himself and Pauldo initially telling police that he never

saw a gun and did not know how Smith was shot. Thus, any

prejudice from the prosecutor mentioning this “lie” in closing

argument was reduced because it was mentioned in the context of

much more incriminating statements made by Pauldo.

     And the evidence against Pauldo was very strong. During

Pauldo’s interview with police, he confessed to hitting Smith in the

face with a loaded gun, claiming it “went off,” and Pauldo’s

confession was corroborated by the medical examiner’s testimony

concerning the abrasion on Smith’s head. Additionally, Brown heard

Pauldo threaten to shoot Smith right before Smith was shot.

Moreover, immediately after the shooting, Pauldo told Brown’s

mother that Smith killed himself, and Pauldo hid the gun on his way

to the hospital. See Davenport v. State, 309 Ga. 385, 389 (2) (846

SE2d    83)   (2020)   (concluding    that   the   evidence   “though

circumstantial, was very strong” because the forensic evidence

indicated that the defendant shot the victim, attempted to cover up

the crime, and then fabricated a story to the police that the victim

                                 16
killed herself).

     We conclude that, given the very strong evidence of Pauldo’s

guilt, he has not shown that evidence that the gun was registered to

someone else had any impact on the outcome of his trial. Thus,

Pauldo has failed to demonstrate that there is a reasonable

probability that, but for his counsel’s alleged deficiency, the result of

the trial would have been different, and this claim fails. See

Davenport, 309 Ga. at 389 (2) (concluding the defendant could not

demonstrate prejudice due to very strong evidence of guilt).

     (d) Pauldo contends his trial counsel provided constitutionally

ineffective assistance by failing to adequately inform him of the

State’s plea offer of 20 years to serve in prison on the reduced charge

of voluntary manslaughter. Assuming without deciding that

Pauldo’s trial counsel performed deficiently, we conclude that

Pauldo has not established prejudice. To prevail on his claim, Pauldo

must demonstrate that, but for his counsel’s deficient performance,

there is a reasonable probability that “he would have accepted the

State’s plea offer (and that the trial court would have accepted its

                                   17
terms).” Calhoun v. State, 308 Ga. 146, 154 (2) (d) (839 SE2d 612)

(2020). See also Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 164 (II) (B) (132 SCt

1376, 182 LE2d 398) (2012).

     Pauldo argues that “a reasonable person in Pauldo[’]s place

would have accepted the plea had” counsel properly advised Pauldo

of the plea offer, but that is not the standard for establishing

prejudice “where ineffective assistance results in a rejection of the

plea offer and the defendant is convicted at the ensuing trial.” Lafler,

566 U.S. at 163 (II) (A). See id. at 164 (II) (B) (holding that a

defendant must show “that the defendant would have accepted the

plea” (emphasis supplied)). See also Washington v. Atty Gen. of State

of Alabama, 75 F4th 1164, 1173 (III) (A) (11th Cir. 2023) (holding

that, in determining whether “the petitioner would have accepted a

plea offer,” courts should consider “protestations of innocence . . .

along with other facts, such as why the petitioner chose to reject

other offers and the discussions that petitioner had with his counsel

about those offers”).

     In the order denying the motion for new trial, the trial court

                                  18
found that “[Pauldo] NEVER testified that he would have

accepted the plea” and concluded that Pauldo failed to establish

prejudice. (Emphasis in original). The trial court’s factual finding is

supported by the record and was not clearly erroneous. See Bonner

v. State, 314 Ga. 472, 474 (1) (877 SE2d 588) (2022) (explaining that

this Court accepts a trial court’s factual findings unless they are

clearly erroneous). And there was no other evidence presented that

showed Pauldo would have accepted the plea offer.

     Thus, Pauldo has failed to show that, but for his counsel’s

deficient performance, there is a reasonable probability that he

would have accepted the State’s plea offer. Accordingly, this claim

fails. See Yarn v. State, 305 Ga. 421, 427 (4) (826 SE2d 1) (2019)

(concluding the defendant “has not satisfied the Lafler test for

prejudice because he has failed to show that he would have accepted

the plea offer but for his counsel’s allegedly deficient advice”).

2. Lastly, we consider the cumulative effect of prejudice resulting

from any assumed deficiencies in trial counsel’s performance at

trial. See Schofield v. Holsey, 281 Ga. 809, 811 (II) n.1 (642 SE2d 56)

                                  19
(2007) (“[I]t is the prejudice arising from counsel’s errors that is

constitutionally relevant, not that each individual error by counsel

should be considered in a vacuum.”) (citation and punctuation

omitted), overruled on other grounds, State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 23

(1) (838 SE2d 808) (2020). Pauldo makes no argument that any

prejudice stemming from the assumed deficiencies in subdivisions 1

(a) and (c) can be combined with any prejudice from the assumed

deficiency in subdivision 1 (d). He also makes no argument as to how

he was prejudiced by any cumulative effect of the assumed

deficiencies in subdivisions 1 (a), (c), and (d). In sum, Pauldo has

failed to carry his burden of establishing cumulative error. See Reed

v. State, 314 Ga. 534, 554 (8) n.18 (878 SE2d 217) (2022).

     Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

                                 20