Court Opinion

ID: 9569414
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:13:38.255116+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:57:23.138630
License: Public Domain

Finley, J.
(dissenting)—I dissent. Through a barrage of legalistic rules, and assisted by the unmentioned dead man statute, the majority opinion succeeds in wreaking havoc with a needed legal social device—the contract to make a will. Overlooked or forgotten is the fact of life that contracts to make a will constitute significant devices which answer the needs of many people. As Professor Sparks has noted:
“Among aged men and women of modest means, and the vast majority of the aged are of modest means, there is a strong desire to retain ownership of what property they possess until death. There is also the desire, and it might be said the necessity, to provide care, support, and maintenance, and in many instances companionship and society, for themselves. A contract to make a will is the only legal device through which this purpose can be *764achieved. A trust, even if it could be assumed that the person in need of such care did not object to transferring title to a trustee, would usually not yield a sufficient income to achieve the desired purpose. If a life estate with power to consume is attempted the estate is likely to be entirely consumed before the time arrives when it is most critically needed. The property involved often consists of real estate being used as a home. The only means of obtaining the necessary support and maintenance directly is by converting the property into money, thereby destroying the very thing that is sought to be preserved. By means of a contract to make a will such a property owner may obtain the care or nursing needed and also such intangibles as society and companionship. An agreement whereby some friend or relative moves into the old person’s home and provides board, lodging, or such other services as might be agreed upon in return for a promise by the elderly person to leave the property to the friend or relative concerned can well prove a genuine economic advantage to both parties to the transaction.” Sparks, Contract to Devise or Bequeath as an Estate Planning Device, 20 Mo. L. Rev. 1 (1955).
It is also clear that these people of modest means normally shy away from the thought of seeking advice from the legal profession. Thus, there are many who must utilize some plan for the declining years that will provide security and happiness. As Professor Sparks has pointed out, the best practicable answer is a contract to make a will, and the majority of these contracts will be created without professional help. But turning to the law, how are such people treated, in terms of their rudimentary efforts at estate planning?
As I read the majority opinion, the “law,” as there expressed, requires the surviving contracting party to prove an express contract with evidence that portrays the classic elements of academic classroom discussion of the law of contracts. Superimposed on this is the ultimate in legal abstractions: a test as to clarity requiring that the contract can be said to exist “beyond a legitimate controversy.” The majority does not mention the deep, dark moat that protects all estates—the dead man statute. But the surviving *765party does not avoid or long escape facing this obstacle. To his further surprise, while his lawyer is trying to explain the reasons or the necessity, if any, for the dead man statute, the client-survivor is told that he must prove precisely the creation of his contract, that he must show and recreate the clang and cross of the offer and acceptance beyond a legitimate controversy.
My first disagreement with the majority opinion concerns its resurrection of the Jennings doctrine. Jennings v. D’Hooghe, 25 Wn. (2d) 702, 172 P. (2d) 189 (1946). The requirement that these needed contracts to devise be proved “beyond a legitimate controversy” has been too strict. As a result, the rule has heretofore been side-stepped and. (according to my research) ignored since 1952. The last time Jennings was mentioned by this court was in In re Boundy’s Estate, 40 Wn. (2d) 203, 209, 242 P. (2d) 165 (1952), where the argument was proffered that two lines of authority existed, one branch followed the Jennings rule while the other required proof that was “clear, cogent and convincing.” The court avoided the issue by noting that no error had been assigned to the trial court’s finding of facts, and, therefore, the court could not review the underlying basis that supported the trial court’s findings. This settled the case, but obviously the issue or inconsistency is still with us.
Only three early cases followed Jennings. Two of these recited the Jennings rule, but still held that the contract had been sufficiently proved. Jansen v. Campbell, 37 Wn. (2d) 879, 227 P. (2d) 175 (1951); Southwick v. Southwick, 34 Wn. (2d) 464, 208 P. (2d) 1187 (1949). The other case applied Jennings and found the evidence wanting. Groeneveld v. Dean, 40 Wn. (2d) 109, 241 P. (2d) 443 (1952).
However, other cases have attempted to temper Jennings. In the first case after Jennings, the court recognized the “beyond a legitimate controversy” rule, but the opinion stated that “absolute certainty as to terms is not exacted; reasonable certainty is sufficient.” Ellis v. Wadleigh, 27 Wn. (2d) 941, 949, 182 P. (2d) 49 (1947). In Granquist v. McKean, 29 Wn. (2d) 440, 445, 187 P. (2d) 623 (1947), the *766court cited Jennings, but only required that the “contract be proven by evidence that is clear and unequivocal and which leaves no doubt as to the terms, character, and existence of the contract.” Again, in McLean v. Archer, 32 Wn. (2d) 234, 241, 243, 201 P. (2d) 184 (1948), Jennings was cited, but the court rephrased the rule to require “conclusive, definite, or certain” proof of the contract.
While Jennings was dying out, a clear line of cases appeared which attempted to balance the need to protect estates with the need to protect people who had given valuable services under informal contracts. These cases required that such contracts be proved with clear, cogent and convincing evidence. Ross v. Raymer, 32 Wn. (2d) 128, 140, 201 P. (2d) 129 (1948); Hardung v. Green, 40 Wn. (2d) 595, 244 P. (2d) 1163 (1952); Johnson v. Nasi, 50 Wn. (2d) 87, 91, 309 P. (2d) 380 (1957); Johnson v. Suddreth’s Estate, 59 Wn. (2d) 517, 520, 368 P. (2d) 907 (1962). This line of cases is supported by the overwhelming majority rule throughout the United States. Professor Sparks has only found three other states that follow rules as strict as those laid down in Jennings. Sparks, Contracts To Make-Wills 24 (1956). Since the test of “clear, cogent, and convincing” evidence will properly balance the opposing considerations in these cases, I would follow the line of cases espousing this rule.
My next difference with the majority is in the area of theory and legal philosophy respecting contract law. It seems to me that the position taken by the majority is an overzealous one respecting the guarding of estates allegedly or ostensibly from plunder and mayhem, and leads to forcing the instant case into the confines of express formal commercial contract law. A realistic recognition of the framework or philosophy of the law of contracts and the law of wills should lead to a realization that crossbreeding will produce difficulties in any resulting product such as the contract to make a will. Note: Contracts to Devise and Bequeath in New England, 39 B.U.L. Rev. 63 (1959). I think it is anachronistic to insist that each new case or problem fit into the mold of a prior set of doctrines. A con*767tract to make a will is an equitable doctrine, designed to overcome the legalistic requirements of the law dealing with commercial contracts and wills. It is not inconceivable to me that the law could formulate a slightly different type of contract, or at least proof of it, to cover this social problem; in fact, I think it is the duty of the law to recognize and give effect to these arrangements.
If we must, this case could be forced into the mold of traditional contract theory. While there was probably an express contract, the evidence of it still waits outside the courthouse door, chaperoned closely by the dead man statute. However, there remains the matter of implied contracts. Their characteristics, of course, have been expounded by experts:
“Contractual duty is imposed by reason of a promissory expression. As to this, there is no difference between an express contract and an implied contract; all contracts are express contracts. But there are different modes of expressing assent. . . . ” 1 Corbin, Contracts § 18, p. 39 (1963).
Professor Shattuck, after remarking that Washington cases often fail to discuss offer and acceptance when they discuss implied contracts, points out that offer and acceptance, or mutual assent, can be shown in the factual context:
“ . . . A request for services is an offer if the circumstances would indicate to the other party as a reasonable man an undertaking to pay for them. A proffer of services is an offer if the circumstances would indicate to the other party as a reasonable man an expectation of payment. Acceptance is evidenced by rendition of the requested services in the one situation and by receipt of the proffered services in the other. The critical issues are invariably factual. The stress must be on the inferences about purpose, reasonably derivable from the setting in which the transaction occurred, rather than on actual purpose. Inferred purpose must often be pieced together from evidence which recreates the context of request or proffer. This evidence supplies the controlling elements, which are, to borrow Judge Steinert’s felicitous phrasing, ‘the ordinary course of dealing and the common understanding of men.’ ”
*768Shattuck, Contracts in Washington, 34 Wash. L. Rev. 24, 28 (1959).
The standard definition of a contract implied in fact is found in Judge Steinert’s opinion, which is partially quoted above:
“A true implied contract, or contract implied in fact, is an agreement which depends for its existence on some act or conduct of the party sought to be charged, and arises by inference or implication from circumstances which, according to the ordinary course of dealing and the common understanding of men, show a mutual intention on the part of the parties to contract with each other.” Ross v. Raymer, 32 Wn. (2d) 128, 137, 201 P. (2d) 129 (1948).
The application of these principles to the facts and circumstances in the record will show that the parties actually became legally bound by a contract that is implied in fact.
The evidence shows that Mrs. Guenther’s husband died on March 31, 1937. The plaintiff had been working as a logger, drawing wages of $5.60 per day. The plaintiff had a conversation with Mrs. Guenther between March 31, 1937, and April 9, 1937, but this conversation was excluded under the cold and foreboding hand of the dead man statute. In any event, the plaintiff moved onto Mrs. Guenther’s farm on April 9, 1937. It is significant that the plaintiff was then 23 years old, and the decedent, Mrs. Guenther, was then 47. The plaintiff, a young man with a good job, left his job and started work for one third of his prior wage. He was paid $45 a month for the first 3 months of April, May, and June, 1937. Then his wages dropped further to $15 a month, and this continued for 5 years, until October of 1942. During this period, a mortgage on the farm was satisfied, and thereafter, the plaintiff’s wages returned to $45 a month.
From these facts, and testing these facts “according to the ordinary course of dealing and the common understanding of men,” and only requiring proof of the contract by “clear, cogent, and convincing evidence,” I believe that a contract was shown to have been created just before the plaintiff moved on the farm. While the contract was un*769doubtedly express—that is, the offer and acceptance rang through the air—the critical requirement, mutual assent, can be implied from the surrounding facts. There can be no doubt that an agreement was reached during those critical days for the widow. She was faced with the bleak prospect of managing an encumbered farm, and a young neighbor was willing to support her and manage the farm in return for her promise to will him the farm. It is as simple as that, and the facts, even though limited by the dead man statute, prove the existence of the contract. The majority complains because it cannot find any time at which the required offer and acceptance leaped between the parties. The facts show that this requirement transpired in the short period between the widowhood of the decedent and the time the plaintiff moved on her farm and assumed the burdens of his contract. The reduction in wages was only a modification of the contract by the parties, probably in face of economic reality. This action only strengthens the conclusion that the parties had contracted. Why else would a mere neighbor, with a good job, and youth, suddenly allow his earnings to drop to nil? Here, again, the work performed by the plaintiff was certainly “beyond the scope of neighborly concern and helpfulness.” Johnson v. Suddreth’s Estate, supra.
Other events, while not proving the actual making of the contract, give support to the conclusion that one existed. First of all, Mrs. Guenther filled out a will that left the farm and all the farm equipment to the plaintiff. Unfortunately, this will was never signed, even though it was written in her handwriting. The will was not dated, but it mentioned people who passed away a considerable time before Mrs. Guenther died. This will adds weight to the conclusion that a contract existed. This principle has long been recognized in this state, even though the cases all involve revoked wills rather than incomplete wills. McCullough v. McCullough, 153 Wash. 625, 280 Pac. 70 (1929); Perkins v. Allen, 133 Wash. 455, 234 Pac. 25 (1925); Olsen v. Hoag, 128 Wash. 8, 221 Pac. 984 (1924); Swingley v. *770Daniels, 123 Wash. 409, 212 Pac. 729 (1923). However, the principle from these cases still applies; i.e., a contract to devise can be inferred when a legally defective will includes or spells out the provisions of the contract, especially when the disposition coincides precisely with the performance alleged under the claimed contract.
Yet another fact supports the conclusion that there was a contract to devise. A neighbor contacted Mrs. Guenther to secure a right of way across a portion of her land. Mrs. Guenther told the neighbor that she would have to talk with the plaintiff first to see if he would agree to the arrangement. This clearly shows that Mrs. Guenther regarded the plaintiff as having a legal right in and to the farm. Why else would she consult a mere underpaid farm hand, if that is all he was, as the majority pretends?
Finally, and I believe very convincingly, the evidence shows that in 1949 the plaintiff built his machine shop on Mrs. Guenther’s farm, and in 1958, he also constructed a new barn on her land instead of on his adjoining farm. Several witnesses testified that Mrs. Guenther had repeatedly stated that the plaintiff constructed the capital improvements on her farm because the farm was to be his when she died. This indicates that there was a contract. A man simply does not construct buildings on land in the hopes of a gratuity. Naivete claims too much to cover the obvious.
The majority opinion, in construing the facts to negate the existence of a contract, stresses the point that the plaintiff filed a small claim with the administrator for his unpaid wages in a timely fashion, but waited 13 months before he asserted the existence of a contract to devise. However, I read and construe the facts differently. The plaintiff testified that Mrs. Guenther died on June 4, 1961, and he continued to occupy the farm until July 6, 1962. On this latter date, he left the farm after he received “legal papers” from the defendant herein. On the same day, the plaintiff commenced this lawsuit against the defendant. The logical conclusion is that the plaintiff failed to bring suit during these 13 months simply because he thought *771he owned the farm. He testified that he knew nothing about probate matters, and apparently he had no contrary knowledge that would refute his natural conclusion until he was evicted. The filing of a modest claim for wages is not inconsistent with this conclusion; in fact, it supports the conclusion that the plaintiff thought he owned the farm on the death of Mrs. Guenther.
Thus, to conclude, viewing the evidence with the attitude born of the “ordinary course of dealing and the common understanding of men,” and requiring proof that is “clear, cogent and convincing,” I would hold that a contract to devise can be implied from the facts of this case. The contract was created between March 31, 1937, and April 9, 1937; the plaintiff agreed to work the farm and support the widow, and the widow agreed to devise all of her property to the plaintiff in return for his desperately needed services. Justice demands the recognition of so simple an arrangement, which the plaintiff, schooled in the science of agriculture, failed to reduce to a readily provable, documented, evidentiary picture.
Hunter, J., concurs with Finley, J.