Court Opinion

ID: 9535729
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:52:19.13762+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:33:19.073069
License: Public Domain

Justice HOBBS
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals that set aside the Industrial Claim Appeals Office (ICAO) order with directions for an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) hearing, but my reasoning differs from that of the court of appeals.
I agree with the majority that the General Assembly has empowered Prehearing Administrative Law Judges (PALJ) to approve final settlement agreements, see §§ 8-43-204, 8-43-207.5(2), 3 C.R.S. (1997); when final, they are not interlocutory orders. However, the settlement agreement in this case contained a provision that made the settlement not binding unless approved by a hearing officer of the Division of Administration, an ALJ. Paragraph 9 of the settlement agreement recites that:
The parties agree that this Final Settlement is not binding unless signed by all the parties and approved by a representative of the Division of Administrative Hearings. The parties agree that should the Division of Administrative Hearings refuse to approve this Final Settlement, the parties shall stand in the same position as if this final settlement had never been prepared, signed or submitted for approval by the Division of Administrative Hearings. Neither the Claimant nor the Respondent shall be deemed to have waived or relinquished any of the rights, claims, privileges, or defenses by having entered into this final settlement unless approved by the Division of Administrative Hearings as is requested in the final Order attached hereto.
Paragraph 11 of the settlement agreement recites that
This Stipulation for Settlement and Final Release of All Claims contains the entire agreement between the parties, and the terms herein are contractual and not a mere recital.
(Emphasis added).
A settlement stipulation between parties is a contract, and we are bound to enforce the plain language of the agreement when its meaning is ascertainable. See USI Properties East, Inc. v. Simpson, 938 P.2d 168, 173 (Colo.1997). Stipulations to settle litigation are an important aspect of the administration of justice; they are enforceable according to their terms. See United States v. Northern Colorado Water Conservancy Dist., 608 F.2d 422, 427 (10th Cir.1979).
The facts of this case are straightforward. The language of the settlement agreement is plain. The attorney for the Southland Corporation (Southland) and Kemper National Insurance Companies (Kemper) prepared the language of the stipulation and chose to include paragraphs 9 and 11. Orth signed the agreement in her pro se capacity. The PALJ approved the settlement agreement on October 21,1996.
*1257Orth then employed an attorney to review the agreement. On November 12, 1996, through her attorney, Orth requested that the agreement be set aside. An ALJ had not acted within those twenty-two days to approve the agreement. Under paragraph 9, the agreement was not binding until so approved. Thus, Orth was free to set aside the agreement and proceed with her claim.
The majority observes that the signature block of the settlement agreement calls for the approval of the Division of Workers’ Compensation, see maj. op. at 1251-1252, thereby creating “confusion or indifference” as to which division should approve it. The majority then holds that the signature of the PALJ is sufficient to make the settlement agreement final and binding, despite the clear language of paragraph 9 to the contrary.
I do not view either the signature block or the PALJ’s execution of the settlement agreement as creating confusion or indifference. Paragraph 9 is a material term of the agreement between the three parties-Orth, Southland, and Kemper-that the PALJ approved along with all the other terms of the contract. The majority correctly interprets the applicable statutes as providing ALJs and PALJs with settlement authority. Surely, the PALJ’s settlement authority included approving an agreement whose terms provided that it would not be final and binding on the parties unless approved by an ALJ.
The majority’s jurisdictional discussion, though correct, misses the point that the PALJ’s jurisdiction was utilized here to approve a settlement agreement that recited it would not be binding unless “signed by all the parties and approved by a representative of the Division of Administrative Hearings.” Apparently, the Division of Workers’ Compensation had a standing policy, expressed by rule, that pro se claimants in specific contradistinction to represented claimants would have a settlement agreement reviewed and approved by an ALJ.1 This salutary policy allowed pro se claimants to seek advice from counsel regarding the agreement after signing it but before it became binding. If the pro se claimant chose to proceed without counsel, or simply could not retain one, the ALJ would provide a review independent of the Division of Workers’ Compensation.
Here, the claimant chose to retain counsel to review the settlement agreement and, upon advice of counsel, chose to proceed with her claim as if the settlement agreement never existed. She was entitled by the contract’s plain language to do so, in the absence of ALJ approval, as were the other two parties to the agreement, Southland and Kemper.
The majority suggests that (1) the parties may have intended to improperly alter the jurisdiction of the PALJ, and, (2) the rules of the Division of Workers’ Compensation regarding pro se agreements may be in conflict with the statute. However, the statute plainly directs the division to “adopt rules and regulations as may be necessary to implement the provisions of this section.” § 8-43-207.5(4), 3 C.R.S. (1997). Section 8-43-207.5(2) empowers PALJs to “approve settlements pursuant to section 8-43-204.” Section 8-43-204 provides that an “injured employee may settle all or any part of any *1258claim.” This section does not dictate that settlements must include specified provisions, nor does it preclude a provision which allows for ALJ review and approval of PALJ-ap-proved settlements. I see no reason why the rules of this agency could not contain a provision making pro se settlement agreements subject to the further review of an ALJ.
Section 8-43-204 does state that, if a settlement agreement contains a non-reopener provision, then the agreement may not be reopened except for “fraud or mutual mistake of fact.”
If such settlement provides by its terms that the employee’s claim or award shall not be reopened, such settlement shall not be subject to being reopened under any provisions of articles 40 to 47 of this title other than on the ground of fraud or mutual mistake of material fact.
§ 8-43-204, 3 C.R.S. (1997).
Paragraph 5.e.2 of the settlement agreement in this case is such a non-reopener provision. However, under paragraph 9 of the settlement agreement, this provision did not become effective until the entire agreement was approved by an ALJ. Orth sought an ALJ hearing, but the ICAO ruled that the settlement agreement was final and should be enforced. Instead, it should have allowed the ALJ hearing on the compensation claim to proceed.
Thus, while I agree with the majority’s jurisdictional analysis, and with the proposition that PALJs now have the power to approve final settlement agreements, the agreement in this case simply was not binding because the contract required an additional step to make it final. This step, approval by the ALJ, never occurred. I would enforce paragraph 9 and hold that Orth is entitled to proceed with her compensation claim before an ALJ and that all parties to the agreement are restored to their rights and remedies as provided by the contract.
The court of appeals correctly reversed the ICAO order with directions for an ALJ hearing. I would affirm its judgment based on the foregoing reasons.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

. Rule XI(D)(2) of the Workers’ Compensation Rules of Procedure, Department of Labor and Employment, stated that "[w]henever a pro se claimant requests approval of a settlement agreement, ... a settlement agreement shall be scheduled.” Rule XI(D)(3) states that “[a] settlement proceeding shall be scheduled in the Division of Administrative Hearings at least two days in advance.” Moreover, the Instructions for Filing Settlement Documents with the Division of Workers’ Compensation stated:
Claimant must be represented
The Division of Workers’ Compensation reviews and approves settlement documents only for claimants who are represented by an attorney. If the claimant is not represented, settlement documents must be filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings .... If you have any questions about filing documents with the Division of Administrative Hearings, you may call (303) 764-1401.
I perceive no conflict between this rule of the agency practice and the legislature’s grant of jurisdictional authority to a PALJ. The General Assembly did not prohibit PALJs from approving agreements that contained the paragraph 9 proviso for ALJ final approval. Rules adopted by an agency are presumed to be valid and will be set aside only when a challenging party establishes their invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt. See Colorado Ground Water Comm'n v. Eagle Peak Farms, Ltd., 919 P.2d 212, 217 (Colo.1996).

. Paragraph 5.e. recites:
The Claimant stipulates and agrees that this claim will never be reopened under the provisions of Section 8-43-303, C.R.S., except on the grounds of fraud or mutual mistake of material fact.