Court Opinion

ID: 9847653
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:04:06.310765+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:25.390107
License: Public Domain

WILLIAMS, V. C. J.
(dissenting).
I do not agree with the majority opinion in so far as it approves the instructions given by the trial court and approves the refusal of the court to give certain requested instructions.
Instruction No. 5 given by the court in effect advised the'jury of the state of facts contended for by plaintiff and that if they found such state of facts to be true they would be warranted in finding a verdict for the plaintiff. Nowhere did the court tell the jury that they must further find that the state of facts contended for by plaintiff constituted negligence before they ‘would be warranted in finding a verdict for plaintiff. Such omission was, of course, error of the most fundamental nature. In Clanton v. Chrisman, 174 Okl. 425, 51 P.2d 748, 749, we said:
“It will be seen from the foregoing that the court gave to the jury the contention of the plaintiff, and instructed that, if the jury believed that state of facts had been sufficiently proved, the verdict should be for the plaintiff. Undoubtedly, the court should have further instructed the jury that it must believe the things enumerated constituted negligence, and that such negligence was the proximate cause of injury to the plaintiff. This rule is so well established in Oklahoma in a long line of decisions, and is so well known, and so elementary in law, that reference to decisions anfl authorities would appear to be futile.”
The effect of such instruction and omission is to advise the jury that the state of facts .contended for by plaintiff constituted negligence on the part of defendants and to withhold from the jury the determination of whether such state of facts did constitute negligence on the part of defendants. The effect of such instruction is further confirmed by the court’s instruction No. 8, which was as follows:
“Should you find from a preponderance of the evidence herein that the defendant Hampton, as agent of defendant Otis Ele*420vator -Company, was guilty of any of the acts of negligence alleged in plaintiff’s petition, and that such negligence was the direct and proximate cause of the injury, if any, to the plaintiff, and plaintiff was not guilty of contributory negligence, then your verdict should. be for the plaintiff and against the defendants;” (emphasis ours).
Here again the court in effect told the jury that the a.cts of defendants alleged by plaintiff constituted negligence. ,It is well settled that what is or what is not negligence in a particular case ordinarily is a question for the jury, and not the court. In this connection see Littlejohn v. Midland Valley Railway Company, 47 Okl. 204, 148 P. 120; Swift v. McMurray, 133 Okl. 104, 271 P. 635; Gypsy Oil Co. v. Green, 82 Okl. 147, 198 P. 851.
In their requested instructions Nos. 8 and '9 defendants requested the trial court to submit to the jury the issue of third party negligence, that is, negligence on the part of the Masonic Building Association and its employees. The court refused to .give these instructions and did not give any others of a comparable nature in lieu thereof. Defendants’ answers in the case consisted of a general denial and pleas of contributory negligence and unavoidable accident. Defendants’ witness Mrs. Williams, an employee of the Masonic Building Association, testified positively that it was she who moved the west elevator immediately prior to the time plaintiff opened the west elevator shaft door and fell into said elevator shaft. Defendants’ evidence further shows that King, the building engineer, an employee, servant or agent of the Masonic Building Association, removed an elevator key from the east elevator shortly after 12:00 noon and placed said key taken fro-m said elevator upon the mailbox; that the elevator key from the east elevator and that from the west elevator were identical in appearance and interchangeable. It was admitted by all parties that under the rules, regulations and practices of the Masonic Building Association and its employees the elevators, when not in use, were to be parked at the main floor level; that the elevator keys were to be placed on the mailbox when the respective elevators were not in use; that one elevator was to be kept in operation at all times’ during the working day and that the elevator shaft doors were to be kept closed at the main floor level even though an elevator was stationed there unused. It was also shown, of course, that plaintiff was an employee of the Masonic Building Association. It was defendants’ theory of the case that plaintiff’s injuries were proximately caused by negligence on the part of the Masonic Building Association and its employees or by plaintiff’s negligence, or a combination of the two. There was ample evidence reasonably tending to support such theory and defendants were therefore entitled to have the jury instructed thereon. It is well settled that in a case tried to a jury it is the duty of the court to submit by appropriate instructions the theory of the defense, where the evidence reasonably tends to support the same, and failure so to do, at the request of defendant, constitutes prejudicial error. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Jamison, 46 Okl. 609, 149 P. 195; Spurrier Lumber Co. v. Dodson, 30 Okl. 412, 120 P. 934. Thompson v. Galion Iron Works & Mfg. Co., 201 Okl. 182, 203 P.2d 438. In the last cited case the plaintiff sued the defendant railroad for damages to a road grader owned by plaintiff but leased to and operated by a third party at the time of the accident. We held that the trial court erred in refusing to give a requested instruction to the effect that if the jury should find that the damage to the grader was caused solely by the negligence of' the third party operator thereof, the verdict should be for defendants.
Plaintiff argues that defendants did not plead- third party negligence and were therefore not entitled to the requested instructions. We have held the contrary to be true, however, in Cabiniss v. Andrews, Okl., 258 P.2d 180. The pleadings in that case were the same as in the case at bar and we held that the issue of a third party’s negligence, which was not tendered directly by the pleadings, but which the evidence tended to support, was properly submitted to the jury, since the trial court must instruct upon every reasonable theory of *421either party finding support in the evidence. In reaching such conclusion we noted the general rule that under a general denial and a plea of unavoidable accident the defendant is entitled to rely upon any state of. facts which tends to disclose lack of negligence upon his part, without the necessity of pleading such matters which are not in the nature of an affirmative defense.
In view of the foregoing errors it is my opinion that the cause should be reversed and remanded with instructions .to grant a new trial, and I therefore respectfully dissent.