Court Opinion

ID: 9902737
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-27 15:22:44.5661+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:58.295257
License: Public Domain

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                STATE OF FLORIDA
                 _____________________________

                      Case No. 5D21-2957
                  LT Case No. 2019-CF-001073-A
                 _____________________________

JUSTICE MICHAEL GUROLLA,

    Appellant,

    v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

    Appellee.
                 _____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Citrus County.
Richard A. Howard, Judge.

Rick A. Sichta and Susanne K. Sichta, of The Sichta Firm, LLC,
Jacksonville, for Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Roberts J.
Bradford, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for
Appellee.

                        September 8, 2023

WALLIS, J.

      Justice Michael Gurolla (Appellant) appeals the judgment
and sentence entered after he was convicted of attempted second-
degree murder and discharging a firearm in public from a vehicle.
Appellant alleges that the trial court erred when it found that the

                                1
State did not commit a discovery violation by failing to disclose
that its lead investigator would testify as an expert and in failing
to conduct a Richardson1 hearing on the matter. We find that the
investigator provided expert opinion testimony when he opined
that the victim’s injuries were not consistent with Appellant’s
claim that he shot at the ground instead of at the victim. Because
the State failed to disclose this expert testimony before trial, the
trial court should have held a Richardson hearing on the discovery
violation. Therefore, we reverse and remand for a new trial.

                              Facts

      This case stems from an altercation between Appellant and
the victim. Appellant ultimately fired his gun from his vehicle and
the victim received gunshot wounds in both of his legs. As a result
of these events, the State charged Appellant with one count of
attempted first-degree murder with a firearm and discharging a
firearm in public from a vehicle. Appellant’s defense at trial was
that he fired the gun while aiming at the ground and lacked
premeditation or an intent to kill the victim.

      Approximately three weeks before trial, Appellant filed a
motion in limine, seeking to exclude opinion testimony from the
lead investigator, Sergeant Michael Laborda, or others regarding
the “would be” trajectory of the projectiles that were fired from
Appellant’s vehicle toward the victim. The motion in limine
argued that this testimony should be prohibited because the
witnesses did not know the location of the victim and Appellant
when the gun was fired and the testimony would lack any
foundation because there was no reconstruction of the crime scene.
Noticeably absent from the motion was any mention of medical
opinion testimony as to how the gun or its ammunition caused the
victim’s specific injuries. The trial court denied the motion in
limine.

       At trial, Sergeant Laborda provided opinion testimony about
different aspects of firearms and ammunition, including hollow-
point bullets. He also testified that the injuries sustained by the
victim were not consistent with Appellant’s theory that he aimed

1 Richardson v. State, 246 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 1971).

                                 2
the gun straight at the ground when he fired. During Sergeant
Laborda’s testimony, the following relevant exchanges occurred:

        PROSECUTOR: Okay. And where—sorry. Can
        you go show your arm where he was again?

        SGT. LABORDA: He said he was like this
        pointing down like this.

        PROSECUTOR: Straight down to the ground?

        SGT. LABORDA: Yeah.

        PROSECUTOR: Okay. Based on your
        knowledge of—of firearms—you said you've
        been on SWAT for—for three years—is that
        consistent with the injuries sustained by the
        victim?

           ....

        SGT. LABORDA: No, that is not consistent.

           ....

        PROSECUTOR: Sorry. I almost forgot.
        Typically, when you have fired rounds of hollow-
        point ammunition in the past, when it hits the
        ground, what happens to the projectile?

        SGT. LABORDA: It fragments into multiple
        pieces.

        PROSECUTOR: Okay. So are the wounds
        sustained by the victim, which you saw,
        consistent with a wound that would have come
        from a fragmented bullet like that?

        SGT. LABORDA: No.

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         PROSECUTOR: Okay. Why do you say that?

         SGT. LABORDA: Fragmented bullet typically
         leaves more of a slicing or a cutting type of a
         wound because the jacket and the round comes
         apart.

            ....

         SGT. LABORDA: The—the lead and the jacket
         and the round comes apart and becomes small
         little sharp objects. So they create more of a
         slicing wound where an impact round creates
         more of a punch hole.

       During cross-examination, defense counsel asked Sergeant
Laborda if it was more likely that Appellant shot at the ground and
the bullet ricocheted off of the driveway and hit the victim.
Sergeant Laborda answered that he did not see any evidence
supporting that version of events because there were no marks on
the ground and there was no evidence that the bullet was
fragmented when it struck the victim. Sergeant Laborda further
testified that he had never seen a bullet hit concrete and not
fragment.
      After the State rested, Appellant testified that the victim
was aggressive during their encounter. Appellant admitted that
he shot his firearm from his vehicle, but he claimed that he shot at
the ground and he denied shooting at the victim.

                             Analysis

      “Florida law allows an expert witness to testify if specialized
knowledge will assist the jury in understanding the evidence or in
determining a fact in issue, provided the testimony can be applied
to the evidence at trial.” Gamble v. State, 644 So. 2d 1376, 1377
(Fla. 5th DCA 1994). A witness who is “qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify
about it in the form of an opinion or otherwise,” if certain
requirements are met. § 90.702, Fla. Stat. (2021).

                                 4
       The Florida Supreme Court has explained that a “witness
may be qualified as an expert through specialized knowledge,
training, or education, which is not limited to academic, scientific,
or technical knowledge. An expert witness may acquire this
specialized knowledge through an occupation or business or
frequent interaction with the subject matter.” Chavez v. State, 12
So. 3d 199, 205 (Fla. 2009). Thus, courts have found that law
enforcement officers may testify as experts when the “opinion is
based on specialized knowledge derived from training or
experience and beyond the understanding or experience of the
average juror.” Jackson v. State, 89 So. 3d 1011, 1020 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2012); see Smith v. State, 7 So. 3d 473, 497 (Fla. 2009)
(explaining that “police officers have testified as expert witnesses
regarding the street language in the drug culture and explained to
the jury their interpretation of the words used, which occurred in
contexts in which their normal lexicographical meanings would be
illogical and meaningless”); Roberts v. State, 313 So. 3d 138, 139
(Fla. 4th DCA 2021) (concluding detective’s testimony regarding
the definition of the term “peter roll” was expert testimony).

       In contrast to expert witnesses, lay witnesses generally “may
not testify in terms of an inference or opinion, because it usurps
the function of the jury.” Floyd v. State, 569 So. 2d 1225, 1231–32
(Fla. 1990). However,

         [i]f a witness is not testifying as an expert, the
         witness's testimony about what he or she
         perceived may be in the form of inference and
         opinion when:

         (1) The witness cannot readily, and with equal
         accuracy and adequacy, communicate what he
         or she has perceived to the trier of fact without
         testifying in terms of inferences or opinions and
         the witness's use of inferences or opinions will
         not mislead the trier of fact to the prejudice of
         the objecting party; and

         (2) The opinions and inferences do not require a
         special knowledge, skill, experience, or training.

                                 5
§ 90.701, Fla. Stat. (2021). “Lay witness opinion testimony is
admissible if it is within the ken of an intelligent person with a
degree of experience.” Floyd, 569 So. 2d at 1232. Furthermore,
opinion testimony of a lay witness is only allowed “if it is based on
what the witness has personally perceived.” Fino v. Nodine, 646
So. 2d 746, 748 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). Therefore, “lay opinion
testimony typically involves matters such as distance, time, size,
weight, form and identity.” Id. at 748–49.

      Finally, the State is required to disclose to the defense
“expert witnesses who have not provided a written report and a
curriculum vitae or who are going to testify.” Fla. R. Crim. P.
3.220(b)(1)(A)(i). The failure to designate a witness in discovery as
an expert witness constitutes a discovery violation. Luis v. State,
851 So. 2d 773, 776 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). When the State commits
a discovery violation, the trial court must conduct a Richardson
hearing to determine whether the State’s failure to comply with
the discovery rules prejudiced the defendant. Bess v. State, 208 So.
3d 1213, 1214 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017).

      We conclude that Sergeant Laborda’s testimony that: (1)
hollow point bullets fragment into pieces when they ricochet off the
ground; (2) bullet fragments cause more slicing or cutting type
wounds than whole bullets; and (3) the victim’s wounds were
inconsistent with being caused by bullet fragments, was expert
opinion testimony rather than lay opinion testimony because it
was not “within the ken” of the average juror. Instead, it was
presumably based on Sergeant Laborda’s specialized experience as
a police officer. See Floyd, 569 So. 2d at 1232 (concluding that
police officers’ testimony that the victim’s injuries appeared to
have occurred at the same time and that the wound to the top of
the victim’s hand was a defensive wound required “special
knowledge, skill, experience, or training” and, therefore, it was
error to allow that opinion testimony without requiring the State
to establish that officers were experts); Fittipaldi USA, Inc. v.
Castroneves, 905 So. 2d 182, 185 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (explaining
that witness’s legal conclusions depended on the use of his legal
experience and specialized training and, therefore, it should have
only been admitted as expert testimony under section 90.702).

                                 6
      In addition, Sergeant Laborda’s testimony was not based on
his perception of the shooting and, therefore, it was not
appropriate lay opinion testimony. See Kolp v. State, 932 So. 2d
1283 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (concluding that trial court erred in
allowing lay witness to offer testimony about purpose of hollow-
point bullets where that testimony was not related to witness’s
perception).

      Because Sergeant Laborda offered expert testimony on the
subject of the victim’s injuries and whether they were consistent
with Appellant shooting at the ground, the State was required to
disclose him during discovery as an expert witness. See Fla. R.
Crim. P. 3.220(b)(1)(A)(i); Luis, 851 So. 2d at 776. The State’s
failure to do so was a discovery violation and the trial court should
have held a Richardson hearing on the matter. See Bess, 208 So.
3d at 1214; Luis, 851 So. 2d at 776.

      While the trial court’s failure to hold a Richardson hearing
is not per se reversible error, “harmful error is presumed.” M.H.
v. State, 151 So. 3d 32, 37 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014). An appellate court
will only find that the failure to hold a Richardson hearing is
harmless error if it “can ascertain, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
there is no reasonable possibility that the defendant’s trial
preparation or strategy would have been materially different had
the violation not occurred.” Bess, 208 So. 3d at 1214; see Scipio v.
State, 928 So. 2d 1138, 1148–49 (Fla. 2006) (explaining that
harmless error analysis in discovery violation cases does not focus
on substantive prejudice, i.e. whether the discovery violation
would have made a difference in the verdict).

       Although the State claims that any error was harmless, it
erroneously focuses on substantive prejudice rather than whether
Appellant was procedurally prejudiced by the discovery violation.
See Scipio, 928 So. 2d at 1148–49. And, after a review of the
record, we cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that
Appellant’s trial preparation or strategy would not have been
different had the discovery violation not occurred. If Appellant had
been given advance notice that Sergeant Laborda would offer
opinions regarding the victim’s injuries and whether they were
consistent with Appellant shooting at the ground, he might have
retained medical or ballistics experts to counter the State’s

                                 7
 evidence.2 Therefore, because we cannot determine whether
 Appellant was procedurally prejudiced by the State’s discovery
 violation, it is impossible to conclude that the trial court’s failure
 to hold a Richardson hearing was harmless error. Accordingly, we
 reverse and remand for a new trial.3

       REVERSED and REMANDED for a new trial.

HARRIS and PRATT, JJ., concur.

                   _____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion
under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331.
                  _____________________________

       2 The fact that Sergeant Laborda was deposed before trial

 does not alter our analysis. The record on appeal does not contain
 a transcript of Sergeant Laborda’s deposition and, therefore, we
 cannot determine whether Appellant was aware that Sergeant
 Laborda would offer expert testimony on these subjects. See Kipp
 v. State, 128 So. 3d 879, 884 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (concluding that
 state failed to establish that appellant was not procedurally
 prejudiced by discovery violation, even though witness had been
 deposed before trial; deposition was not included in record and,
 therefore, it was unclear whether appellant knew about the expert
 testimony before trial).

       3 Given our decision to reverse and remand for a new trial,

 we decline to address Appellant’s claim that the trial court
 committed fundamental error during the sentencing hearing.
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