Court Opinion

ID: 9705035
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:55:20.577462+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:07.524702
License: Public Domain

*39LARSEN, Justice,
dissenting.
We are called upon in this case to determine whether the “exclusivity” provision of section 303(a) of the Pennsylvania Workmen’s Compensation Act (Act), 77 P.S. § 481(a), precludes a common law action against an employer who creates a hazard in the workplace by intentionally, wilfully and wantonly disregarding governmental safety regulations in conscious disregard of the risk of employee injury, where such injury, in fact, occurs. I believe that the Act does not bar this action. Accordingly, I dissent.
The majority has determined in this case that 1) appelleeemployer’s conduct does not arise to the level of an intentional tort; and 2) even if such conduct were the “legal equivalent” of an intentional tort, the Act precludes a common law action because intentional torts are not excepted from section 303(a) of the Act.
The majority states that the Act does not preserve “the right of an employee to sue in tort where his injury was caused by the employer’s intentional wrongdoing [in that t]here is no such provision in The Pennsylvania Workmen’s Compensation Act.” Maj.Op. at 38. I am not persuaded that the omission of a specific provision to this effect precludes this Court from finding that intentional injury inflicted by the employer is not exclusively compensable under the Act.
Sixty years ago, this Court determined that intentional conduct on the part of employees was a bar to compensation under the Act. Shoffler v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co., 290 Pa. 480, 484, 139 A. 192, 193 (1927) (“course of employment’ does not include ... injuries received in the commission of an act [by an employee] which is in direct violation of the law.”). Twelve years later, the legislature amended the Act to deny compensation when injury or death is “caused by employe’s violation of the law.” 77 P.S. § 431.1
Further, when this Court first considered the constitutionality of the Act, this landmark legislation was properly *40recognized as applying to “actions at law for damages resulting from the negligence of employers.” Anderson v. Carnegie Steel Co., 255 Pa. 33, 37, 99 A. 215, 216 (1916) (emphasis added). As recently as 1983, we reiterated our position that “the purpose of this kind of legislation was to restrict the remedy available to an employee against the employer to compensation, and to close to the employee, and to third parties, any recourse against the employer in tort for negligence.” Kline v. Arden H. Verner Co., 503 Pa. 251, 254-55, 469 A.2d 158, 159-160 (1983) (emphasis added). We also stated in Kline that “workmen’s compensation law does not address losses incurred by intentional injury by employee or employer.” Id., 503 Pa. at 255, 469 A.2d at 160. See also Koslop v. Cabot Corp., 622 F.Supp. 222, 224 (M.D.Pa.1985) (“the weight of authority supports the continued recognition of the intentional tort exception [to the “exclusivity” provision of the Act].”).
I would find, therefore, that injuries caused by employers’ intentional acts are not exclusively compensable under the Act.
The Montana Supreme Court stated in Sitzman v. Schumaker, 718 P.2d 657, 659 (Mont.1986):
There are sound policy reasons for reaching this decision. The purpose of the Workers’ Compensation Act is to protect both the employer and the employee by incorporating a quid pro quo for negligent acts by the employer. The employer is given immunity from suit by an employee who is injured on the job in return for relinquishing his common law defenses. The employee is assured of compensation for his injuries, but foregoes legal recourse against his employer. To allow an employer to [commit an intentional tort] and hide behind the exclusivity clause of the Workers’ Compensation Act is to disregard the purpose of the Act. Other employers would have to pay for his protection. In effect, he would have bought the right to [intentionally harm] his employees. That is not a quid pro quo. The law does not allow a wrongdoer to benefit from his wrongs.
*41With regard to the majority’s contention that appellee-employer did not commit an intentional tort, I would hold that an intentional, wilful disregard of government safety regulations which creates a known hazard in the workplace is an intentional tort as opposed to mere negligence. Intentional, wilful and wanton misconduct carries with it “a conscious choice of a course of action, either with knowledge of the serious danger to others involved in it or with knowledge of facts which would disclose this danger to any reasonable man.” Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 500 comment g. Here, appellee-employer chose to create a risk of injury to its employees.
Accordingly, I would reverse the Order of Superior Court and deny appellee-employer’s motion for judgment on the pleadings.
PAPADAKOS, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.

. Act of 1915, June 2, P.L. 736, art. III, § 301(a), as amended, June 21, 1939, P.L. 520, § 1.