Court Opinion

ID: 9912150
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-21 18:08:28.665134+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:52:23.519099
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Rackley, 2023-Ohio-4656.]

                              COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                             EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO,                                      :

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,                :
                                                             No. 112751
                 v.                                 :

STEVEN RACKLEY,                                     :

                 Defendant-Appellant.               :

                               JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: December 21, 2023

            Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                               Case No. CR-12-563955-A

                                              Appearances:

                 Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
                 Attorney, and Alan F. Dowling, Assistant Prosecuting
                 Attorney, for appellee.

                 Steven Rackley, pro se.

FRANK DANIEL CELEBREZZE, III, P.J.:

                Pro se appellant Steven L. Rackley (“Rackley”) challenges the judgment

of the trial court denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, alternative motion

for new trial, motion to dismiss the indictment, and motion for grand jury minutes.
After a thorough review of the applicable law and facts, we affirm the judgment of

the trial court.

                      I. Factual and Procedural History

             In a prior appeal, this court summarized the procedural history of this

matter as follows:

       In July 2012, Rackley was indicted on six counts, including two counts
       of aggravated murder, two counts of aggravated robbery, one count of
       kidnapping, and one count of tampering with evidence. The date of the
       alleged offenses was November 8, 2006.

       In April 2013, Rackley pleaded guilty to an amended indictment of one
       count of involuntary manslaughter and one count of aggravated
       robbery. The remaining counts were nolled. The trial court sentenced
       him to 19 years in prison. Rackley did not directly appeal his
       convictions or sentence.

       In March 2014, Rackley moved to withdraw his plea, which the trial
       court denied. Rackley did not appeal this denial.

       In June 2014, Rackley moved for leave to file a delayed appeal. This
       court denied his motion, and the Ohio Supreme Court declined to
       accept jurisdiction.

       In July 2014, Rackley filed his first petition for postconviction relief
       (as a motion to vacate or set aside judgment of conviction or sentence).
       The trial court denied his motion. Rackley did not appeal this denial.

       In March 2015, Rackley filed his second petition for postconviction
       relief (as petition to vacate or set aside judgment of conviction or
       sentence). The trial court denied his motion. * * *

State v. Rackley, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102962, 2015-Ohio-4504, ¶ 3-8 (“Rackley

I”).
             In Rackley I, Rackley appealed the denial of his second petition for

postconviction relief and assigned the following errors:

      1. The [appellant] was deprived due process under the Fifth and
      Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article
      1, Section 16 of the Ohio Constitution when he was not afforded
      adequate notice of the charges against him.

      2. [Appellant’s] Sixth Amendment right to counsel in violation of the
      United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 10 of the Ohio
      Constitution, under Criminal Rule 44, when Shaker Hts. Municipal
      Court did not afford defendant with adequate representation, the
      Municipal Court gave defendant two days served for the contempt, but
      never released him, and was not afforded counsel during his critical
      stages of his indictment.

      3. Fourteenth Amendment procedural Due Process was violated when
      the Court of Common Pleas accepted a guilty plea without having
      sufficient evidence to support the plea.

      4. The appellant was denied the effective assistance guaranteed by the
      Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment's to the United States Constitution
      and article 1, section 10 of the Ohio Constitution.

      5. The appellant was denied the effective assistance of counsel
      guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
      for an improper amendment to the indictment.

      6. The right to a speedy trial is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to
      the United States Constitution, counsel was ineffective and showed
      prejudice for not dismissing for speedy trial violation and coerced
      waiver of constitutional right.

      7. Counsel was ineffective for not motioning for an appeal on the
      [appellant’s] behalf, which violated his Procedural Due Process Clause
      of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

Rackley I at ¶ 1.

             We determined that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to hear

Rackley’s petition because it had not been timely filed and Rackley was unable to
demonstrate that he was unavoidably prevented from discovering the facts upon

which he relied in his petition or that the United States Supreme Court had

recognized a new federal or state right that applied retroactively to him. We

therefore affirmed the trial court’s denial of the petition. Id. at ¶ 15-16.

              Rackley has since filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, alternative

motion for a new trial, motion to dismiss indictment, and a motion for grand jury

minutes. The trial court denied all of the motions.

              Rackley filed the instant appeal, raising seven assignments of error for

our review:

      1. The trial court abused its discretion and committed plain error
      pursuant to Crim.R. 7(D), when it allowed the prosecution to amend
      Count One of the indictment to involuntary manslaughter by omitting
      an essential element of the criminal offense charged by the grand jury.

      2. The trial court abused its discretion and committed plain error
      when it failed to properly charge recklessness in Count Five of the
      indictment in violation of appellant’s rights under the Fifth and
      Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and
      Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution.

      3. Appellant was denied the right to effective assistance of counsel and
      a fundamental fair trial when his trial counsel committed plain error
      by waiver of the defect in Count One of the indictment that rendered
      his guilty plea less than knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made,
      in violation of appellant’s rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth
      Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Article I, Section
      10 of the Ohio Constitution.

      4. The trial court abused its discretion and committed plain error
      when the court did not substantially comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)
      prior to accepting appellant’s guilty plea.

      5. Appellant was denied the right to effective assistance of counsel
      when counsel failed to file a motion to dismiss the indictment for
      failure to commence the action in compliance with R.C. 2901.13
      (A)(1)(a), constituting plain error.

      6. The trial court erred and abused its discretion for not granting
      appellant’s motion for grand jury minutes and permitting
      prosecutorial misconduct in violation of appellant’s rights to due
      process and equal protection of law under the Fourteenth Amendment
      to the United States Constitution.

      7. The trial court committed plain error and violated due process of
      law for not stating to appellant that she did not have to follow the
      recommended sentence, and for failing to provide appellant with a PSI
      when providing notice of community control sanctions.

                              II. Law and Analysis

            Rackley did not file a direct appeal of his conviction and sentence. The

state therefore argues that res judicata bars Rackley from raising arguments

relating to his plea and the prior proceedings.

      Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment of conviction bars
      a convicted defendant who was represented by counsel from raising
      and litigating in any proceeding except an appeal from that judgment,
      any defense or any claimed lack of due process that was raised or could
      have been raised by the defendant at trial, which resulted in that
      judgment of conviction, or on an appeal from that judgment * * *.

(Emphasis added.) State v. Perry, 10 Ohio St.2d 175, 226 N.E.2d 104 (1967),

paragraph nine of the syllabus.

             In State v. Henderson, 161 Ohio St.3d 285, 2020-Ohio-4784, 162

N.E.3d 776, the Supreme Court of Ohio returned to its traditional understanding of

void and voidable judgments. “The traditional view is that ‘[a] judgment or

sentence is void only if it is rendered by a court that lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction over the case or personal jurisdiction over the defendant.’” State v.

Schilling, Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-3027, ¶ 22, citing id. at ¶ 43.

             The court further held that if jurisdiction exists over the case and the

person, any error committed by a trial court in exercising its jurisdiction is voidable

and not void. Henderson at ¶ 34. Rackley does not argue that the trial court lacked

jurisdiction in this matter, and thus, the judgment against him could only be

voidable.

              “The failure to timely — at the earliest available opportunity — assert

an error in a voidable judgment, even if that error is constitutional in nature,

amounts to the forfeiture of any objection.” Id. at ¶ 17, citing Tari v. State, 117 Ohio

St. 481, 495, 159 N.E. 594 (1927). Accordingly, when a court has jurisdiction over

the case and the defendant, “any errors in the court’s judgment or sentence are

voidable and subject to res judicata if they are not timely appealed.” State v. Hilton,

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 112282, 2023-Ohio-3876, ¶ 10, citing id. at ¶ 34.

              Rackley could have, but did not, file a direct appeal raising issues of

the validity of his plea or the ineffective assistance of counsel. Further, we note that

the arguments raised in appellant’s assignments of error relating to his guilty plea

and his claimed ineffective assistance of counsel were also asserted and overruled

in Rackley I, where we affirmed the denial of his second petition for postconviction

relief. Thus, these issues are barred by res judicata and we overrule assignments of

error I-V and VII.
              Turning to the remaining assignment of error, Rackley argues that

the trial court erred in denying his motion for grand jury minutes.

              The appeal of a trial court’s decision regarding the disclosure of grand

jury transcripts is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Coley, 93 Ohio St.3d

253, 261, 754 N.E.2d 1129 (2001), citing State v. Brown, 38 Ohio St.3d 305, 308,

528 N.E.2d 523 (1988).

              Grand jury proceedings are generally secretive in nature. “‘[A]n

accused is not entitled to inspect grand jury transcripts either before or during trial

unless the ends of justice require it and there is a showing by the defense that a

particularized need for disclosure exists which outweighs the need for secrecy.’”

State v. Short, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 83492, 2004-Ohio-2695, ¶ 7, quoting State

v. Greer, 66 Ohio St.2d 139, 420 N.E.2d 982 (1981), paragraph two of the syllabus.

A particularized need exists when consideration of the surrounding circumstances

shows “it is probable that the failure to disclose the testimony will deprive the

defendant of a fair adjudication of the allegations placed in issue by the witness’

trial testimony.” Greer at paragraph three of the syllabus. The determination of

whether a particularized need exists is a question of fact. Id.

              In his motion seeking grand jury minutes, Rackley articulated his

“particularized need” as follows:

      (1) [T]he Shaker Hts. Police department did not have probable cause to
      arrest him for any criminal charges instead they arrested him for a two
      year old traffic citation; (2) defendant was detained for two days
      without any criminal charges, he was then question[ed] by the
      detectives without counsel, the officers did not mention to the
      defendant that he would later be transported to the county jail without
      any means of a bind over to the grand jury; (3) the trial court obtain[ed]
      personal jurisdiction through illegal detention; (4) County Prosecutor
      William D. Mason sent a Synopsis direct to the grand jury; (5) the
      record is unclear of any summoning of the grand jury or [sic] nor is it
      clear that anyone was summon[ed] to testify before the grand jury; (6)
      defendant was charged by the grand jury of two counts of aggravated
      murder and two counts of aggravated robbery, one count of kidnapping
      and one count of tampering with evidence, defendant was not
      summon[ed] to give his testimony, the record is unclear of any eye
      witnesses testifying to the grand jury, no sheriff served defendant with
      an indictment, defendant received the indictment from the jail officer;
      (7) the indictment was signed by the foreman and Bill [M]ason is the
      name on the indictment a legal document that should bare [sic] the
      prosecutor[’]s legal name not what his peers refer to him by.

              The majority of Rackley’s assertions do not relate to information that

would be found in the grand jury minutes. Rackley asserts in his brief that the

prosecutor knowingly used false evidence at trial and “violated his procedural due

process by using information from Shaker [H]eights police report, and sent an

unsworn synopsis direct to the Cuyahoga County Grand Jury.” He alleges that this

claimed “misconduct prejudice[d] [his] rights to a fair trial and [e]qual [p]rotection

of the law, by not having a sworn complaint and affidavit from the detectives for a

determination of probable cause.”

              We do not find that Rackley has advanced a credible argument that

the grand jury minutes would reveal prosecutorial misconduct. A motion for the

disclosure of grand jury minutes may not be used to conduct a “fishing expedition”

into potential avenues for relief. See State v. Kelly, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 85662,

2006-Ohio-5902, ¶ 39; State v. Carr, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28193, 2019-Ohio-

3802, ¶ 33; State v. Boehm, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 16335, 1997 WL 856285, 2
(Dec. 31, 1997); State v. Burroughs, 165 Ohio App.3d 172, 2005-Ohio-6411, 845

N.E.2d 540, ¶ 14 (3d Dist.); State v. Davis, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-940026, 1994

Ohio App. LEXIS 3787 (Aug. 31, 1994); State v. Pierce, 4th Dist. Vinton No. 474,

1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 5103, 3 (Oct. 6, 1992).

              Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied

Rackley’s motion for grand jury minutes. Rackley’s sixth assignment of error is

overruled.

                                 III. Conclusion

             Because Rackley did not file a direct appeal, his arguments in

assignments of I-V and VII are barred by res judicata. Further, the trial court did

not abuse its discretion in denying Rackley’s motion for grand jury minutes. All of

Rackley’s assignments of error are overruled, and the judgment of the trial court is

affirmed.

      It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule

27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

_________________________________________
FRANK DANIEL CELEBREZZE, III, PRESIDING JUDGE

MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, J., and
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR