Court Opinion

ID: 9520810
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:50:38.102154+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:46:58.235407
License: Public Domain

YOUNG, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
I would reverse the judgment of the trial court on the grounds that the statute of limitations bars recovery. The plaintiff, Heyser, issued Rees a check for $15,000 on December 26, 1968, but did not sue on the implied-in-fact promise to repay1 until July 12, 1975, over six yeas later. The majority holds that Rees’ claim did not accrue, thus the statute of limitations did not begin to run, until Heyser had had reasonable time to perform: six months. I do not agree that this principle should apply in the present case.
In L. Simpson, Handbook of the Law of Contracts, ch. 3 § 46 p. 72 (West 1965) it is stated generally that “[i]n the case of contracts to pay money, however, if no date is fixed for payment the standard of a reasonable time is not applied and the promise is to pay immediately. This is not only true of negotiable instruments but also of nonnegotiable contracts.”
That no writing expresses Rees’ obligation makes no difference. The same rule applies when suit is brought on the common law action for money lent. See 58 C.J.S. Money Lent § 3a, p. 878 (1948). Indeed the present suit appears to be one such action.
Indiana law is not entirely barren of precedent on this issue.2 In Wagoner v. Wilson, (1886) 108 Ind. 210, 8 N.E. 925, the plaintiffs brought an action to recover money which they had loaned to the defendants on a certain date and which the defendants had refused to pay. The defendants on appeal alleged error in the trial courts re*1189fusal to grant a demurrer based on the absence of any allegation that the indebtedness sued on was due and unpaid. The court held “the paragraph seeks a recovery of money advanced to and for the use of the defendants in their business. Money so advanced, unless credit is stipulated for, becomes due presently. From the facts stated in the complaint the law implied that the money sued for was due.” 8 N.E. at 926.
On the basis of this authority I would hold that the statute of limitations began to-run from the time Heyser’s money came into Rees’ hands, 51 Am.Jur.2d Limitations of Actions § 134 p. 703 (1970), and that the present suit was filed too late.

. See Stanley v. Walters, (1970) 147 Ind.App. 456, 261 N.E.2d 594, 597; 58 C.J.S. Money Lent § 2b (1948).

. Brown v. Brown, (1885) 103 Ind. 23, 2 N.E. 233, appears to support the majority’s position. On closer inspection it is distinguishable in that it involved the enforcement of an equitable mortgage.