Court Opinion

ID: 9767965
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 05:36:52.392548+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:35.164393
License: Public Domain

McMILLIAN, Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. While the majority opinion recognized that silence of an accused after arrest and while in custody is not admissible against him because such a person is under no duty to speak, the opinion thereafter does violence to the principle.
In deciding that our “plain error” rule has no application, the majority opinion adopts a very mechanistic formula by attempting to measure whether a miscarriage of justice resulted by a mere counting of words.
To put the claimed error in proper context, I have set out in full, relevant parts of the prosecutor’s questions:
“Q. After the defendant was placed under arrest, was he advised by you or anyone in your presence of his constitutional rights?
“A. Yes sir. I gave him his rights.
“Q. Did you tell him he did not have to make a statement?
“A. Yes Sir.
“Q. Did you tell him anything he said could be and would be used against him in court?
“A. Yes Sir.
“Q. After you advised him of those rights was he detained by you or was released?
“A. He was placed under arrest by me and conveyed to the 7th District Station.
“Q. After she viewed the lineup at that point, was this man released by you or detained, booked, and forwarded downtown?
“A. Detained and booked and forwarded.
“Q. Did you again advise the man of his rights that he had a right to remain silent and didn’t have to make a statement?
“A. I’m not sure. We didn’t question him. He refused to make a statement.”
We now know from the transcript of the trial that defendant never made a statement. And we may assume that the prosecutor was aware of this fact. Thus, the question becomes what was the motive, or, to say the least, the relevance of the question, “After the defendant was placed under arrest, was he advised by you or anyone in your presence of his constitutional rights?” And the further question, “Did you tell him he did not have to make a statement?” Obviously, neither question *50has any relevance nor materiality unless defendant had made an admission and the state was laying the foundation for its admission into evidence. Such was not the case, and as the prosecutor well knew defendant had made no statement. In this posture the motives of the prosecutor become suspect.
Not satisfied with the undue advantage gained from this thrust, the prosecutor continues his deadly attack with the question, “Did you tell him anything he said could be and would be used against him in court?” And finally, “Did you again advise the man of his rights that he had a right to remain silent and didn’t have to make a statement?” Answer, “I’m not sure. We didn’t question him. He refused to make a statement.” In my opinion this entire line of questioning by a seasoned prosecutor was an attempt to convict the defendant by his silence, permitting the jury to draw an inference of guilt from his refusal to explain, in violation of the spirit, if not, the letter of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, § 19, Mo.Constitution, Y.A.M.S.
In State v. Dowling, 348 Mo. 589, 154 S.W.2d 749, 755[4, 5] (1941), in a well-reasoned opinion by the late Judge Ellison, where an officer was permitted to state that: (1) the accused “. . . ‘wasn’t going to say anything until he seen an attorney’ . . . ” and (2) the accused “. ‘refused to tell us where he had been’ . ” the court held it cannot be proven that the defendant said he declined to answer on the advice of counsel; or refused to give a statement, People v. Rothe, 358 Ill. 52, 192 N.E. 777, 779(7) (1934); or declared he had nothing to say, Diblee v. State, 202 Ind. 571, 177 N.E. 261, 264(8) (1931).
In support of his conclusion Judge Ellison declared, “Section 22, Art. II of our Constitution [the present Art. I, § 18(a), Mo.Constitution, 1945] provides the accused in a criminal case shall have a right to appear and defend in person and by counsel. This applies also to proceedings before the trial. Section 23 [the present Art. I, § 19, Mo.Constitution, 1945] of the same Article provides no person shall be compelled to testify against himself in a criminal cause. The immunity afforded by this section protects the accused against self-incrimination before any tribunal or in any proceeding. Section 4082, R.S.1939, § 3693 Mo.St.Ann. p. 3247 (now § 546.270, RSMo 1969 [V.A.M.S.]) provides: ‘If the accused shall not avail himself or herself of his or her right to testify, ... it shall not be construed to affect the innocence or guilt of the accused. . .
If these statutory and constitutional rights have any meaning whatsoever their provisions cannot be violated, indirectly or directly, at the trial by a showing that defendant had theretofore been subjected to interrogation and stood on constitutional rights. Here, it is not a question as to whether or not these gratuitous statements were made by the officer inadvertently or were direct answers (as shown here) to inquiries made by the prosecutor, the question is whether or not such comments are constitutionally impermissible. I think so.
In State v. Phelps, 384 S.W.2d 616 (Mo.1965), the accused did not respond to officers’ questions while under arrest for a robbery. The court held that the evidence referred to was not competent, and its admission was error which was prejudicial to the defendant. Evidence that the accused did not respond or make any statement to the police officers while under arrest may well have been considered by the jury in determining his guilt or innocence. In State v. Stuart, 456 S.W.2d 19 (Mo. banc 1970), a juror, without objection, asked a police officer, “Did either one of these guys claim the money?” And the officer answered, “. . . [N]o.” The alleged error was neither preserved at trial nor asserted in the motion for a new trial. Relying on “plain error”, the court held an accused’s failure to volunteer an exculpatory statement is not admissible as an admission, and it may not be shown that by his silence he *51failed to deny or explain, while under arrest, any incriminating facts.
In the instant case, on two occasions, these incriminating admissions were placed before the jury, and by his silence or refusal to make a statement, his very refusal may in the mind of the jury be damaging or, to say the least, construed to affect either his innocence or guilt. Consequently, I would reverse and remand for a new trial.