Court Opinion

ID: 9611294
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:54:44.932634+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:12.320382
License: Public Domain

HOWELL, J.,
dissenting.
Petitioner applied for a permit to place a mobile home on property he owns in Deschutes County. The county ordinance provides that a mobile home is a "conditional use” in the neighborhood where petitioner’s property is located. Petitioner’s application was denied because he failed to satisfy standards beyond those required by the ordinance.1 I do not believe the standards promulgated by the county were proper in light of the language used in the controlling ordinance, and I would therefore reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The controlling ordinance provides as follows:
"SECTION 3.215. Conditional Uses Permitted. In an A-l Zone the following uses and their accessory uses are *333permitted when authorized in accordance with the provisions of Article 7:
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"6. Guest house or mobile home.
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"SECTION 7.010. Authorization to Grant or Deny Conditional Uses. Uses designated in this ordinance as conditional uses may be permitted upon authorization by the Planning Commission in accordance with the standards and procedures established in this article. In permitting a conditional use the Planning Commission may impose, in addition to those standards and requirements expressly specified by this ordinance, any additional conditions which it considers necessary to protect the best interests of the surrounding property or community. These conditions may include increasing the required lot size or yard size, limiting the height of buildings, controlling the location and number of driveways, increasing the street width, increasing the number of off-street parking and loading spaces, limiting the number, size, and location of signs, and requiring diking, fencing, screening, or landscaping to protect nearby property values. In the case of a use existing prior to the effective date of this ordinance and which is classified in this ordinance as a conditional use, any change in use or in lot area or any substantial alteration of the structure shall conform with the requirements dealing with conditional uses.
"SECTION 7.050. Standards Governing Conditional Uses. A conditional use shall comply with the standards of the zone in which it is located except as these standards may have been modified in authorizing the conditional use * *
I agree with the statement by the majority that the county’s discretion cannot be defined solely by reference to the term "conditional use.” As noted by the majority, the term "conditional use” may contemplate the following meanings: (1) that the use is permitted only when certain conditions are satisfied; (2) that the use is permitted, but the county can impose conditions on how the property is adapted to the use; or (3) that the use is permitted solely at the discretion of the *334county. To determine which meaning applies, the court must look to the language used in the ordinance at issue. With respect to the ordinance in the present case, the majority concludes that either of the latter two above interpretations is "tenable,” but that "the county may reasonably act on its view of what authority it meant to reserve in its ordinance.” With all due respect, I disagree with both these assertions.
First, I do not believe a fair reading of the language in the ordinance supports the assertion that the county reserved discretionary power to grant or deny conditional use permits. The ordinance provides that "the following uses and their accessory uses are permitted when authorized in accordance with the provisions of Article 7: * * * 6. Guest house or mobile home.” Section 3.215 (emphasis added). Section 7.010 lists a number of conditions that may be imposed by the Planning Commission. All of these conditions, however, go to the matter of adapting the lot to the special use. They are conditions that assume the issuance of the permit, not conditions to be used in deciding whether to issue the permit. This would seem to indicate that the ordinance contemplates the definition of "conditional use” urged by the petitioner, i.e., a use permitted subject to special conditions attached to the individual permit. Thus, the county could require an owner wishing to place a mobile home on his eligible property to place the home on a certain part of the property, to fence, screen or landscape the home so as to shield it from the view of neighbors, etc. The county could not, however, deny the application outright, as it did in the instant case.2
*335Secondly, even if it is conceded that this interpretation of the ordinance is not compelled by the actual language used, I cannot agree with the majority’s assertion that the problem of construing the ordinance is resolved solely by reference to the interpretation adopted by the county.3 Although the county’s interpretation is entitled to some deference, consideration must also be given to the reasonable expectations of the property owner who purchases his property on the basis of existing use restrictions. In my view, the majority’s approach is not only unfair to the property owner, it also does little to encourage the county to be precise in drafting land use restrictions.
Finally, above and beyond the implications of the majority opinion with respect to judicial review of zoning ordinances generally, I believe the majority has reached an unreasonable result on the facts of this particular case. The ordinance purports to make mobile homes a "conditional use” in petitioner’s neighborhood. One of the "conditions” that petitioner was required to meet was a showing that his proposed use would "conserve and stabilize the value of adjacent property.” It would be difficult to convince some people, however, that a mobile home could ever conserve the value of adjacent property. Consequently, the "condition” imposed by the county on use of property as a mobile home site, as a practical matter, prohibits the use. Not only is this "condition” inconsistent with the county’s decision to make mobile homes a "conditional use,” it also makes the county ordinance at least arguably inconsistent with Goal 10 of the *336State Land Conservation and Development Commission.4
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
Tongue, J., and Lent, J., join in this dissent.

 These standards were stated in the form of the following questions:
(1) Does [the conditional use] comply with the Comprehensive Plan?
(2) Does it meet with the requirements of the A-l zone, including lot size, depth, area and yard requirements?
(3) Will it conserve and stabilize the value of adjacent property?
(4) Is it an encouragement of the most appropriate use of land?
(5) Since the property is located within the Bend urban growth area, will allowance of the conditional use promote orderly and efficient transition from rural to urban use?

The majority focuses on the language “may be permitted” in deciding that the ordinance contemplates the first, "discretionary” definition of conditional use. As noted above, however, Section 3.215 of the ordinance provides that conditional uses "are permitted” when authorized in accordance with the provisions of Article 7. Additionally, the "may/shall” distinction has been recognized by this court as having questionable utility in ascertaining legislative intent, particularly when other language in the statute indicates that it was intended to be mandatory rather than discretionary. Dilger v. School District 24CJ, 222 Or 108, 117, 352 P2d 564 (1960).

 The only authority cited by the majority for the proposition that the county’s interpretation of its own ordinance is controlling is Fifth Avenue Corp. v. Washington Co., 282 Or 591, 599, 581 P2d 50 (1978). In that case, however, we went on to note:
"While the interpretation of the Board cannot supplant our duty, that interpretation is entitled to some weight * * Id. at 599-600 (emphasis added).
In my view, the majority opinion in the present case goes far beyond our holding in Fifth Avenue Corp. and gives the county’s interpretation of its ordinance almost conclusive weight.

 Goal 10 provides:
"Buildable lands for residential use shall be inventoried and plans shall encourage the availability of adequate numbers of housing units at price ranges and rent levels which are commensurate with the financial capabilities of Oregon households * * Oregon Administrative Rules ch. 660 at 53 (1978).
In light of the current cost of traditionally constructed housing, I would interpret this goal as imposing a duty on Oregon counties to make reasonable accommodations for use of property as mobile home sites.