Court Opinion

ID: 9791100
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:05:22.672725+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:34.025472
License: Public Domain

RICHARD N. ROYLSTON, Superior Court Judge
(dissenting) :
I dissent. I do not believe the child knew the wrongfulness of the acts; certainly there is no “clear proof”, as required by statute, that she knew the acts were wrongful.
The majority feels that clear proof of the knowledge of the wrongfulness of the acts is established by the child’s testimony that she feared she would get in trouble with the police if she told anyone. Even this knowledge was limited, as shown by the evidence, since she did not know what sort of trouble she would have with the police, nor did she fear arrest.
The problem of determining whether a child knows an act is wrong is a broad problem. It is much too complex to be solved by answering the question of whether the child feared trouble from the police.
It is proper to consider several questions in determining whether a child knows the wrongfulness of an act constituting a crime. Does the child understand the nature and effect of the act? Does the child know that the act is forbidden? Does the child know that if he or she commits the act he or she will be punished, either legally .or morally, or both? And from these questions, and other questions that are raised by any particular facts of the case, it must be determined whether the child knew the .wrongfulness of the act, keeping in mind that the law requires clear proof. If the proof is such that reasonable persons would agree that it fails to clearly show knowledge of wrongfulness, then the trial judge has the duty of ruling on the question as a matter of law; if reasonable persons could differ as to the clarity of proof of knowledge of wrongfulness, then it becomes a matter for the jury to decide in their deliberations.
The quoted testimony does not show that the child understood either the nature or the effect of the act. It does not show in any manner that the child understood the moral quality of the act, or that the child knows the act is forbidden or that she would be punished if she commits the act. The only fact the testimony affirmatively shows is that she was scared of trouble from the police.
One of the important factors in the testimony, which bears on the -question of whether the child knew of the • wrongfulness of the act, is the fact that the appellant had induced the child to perform such acts since the child was six years of age. The transcript shows that the child lived in the same house as appellant. Under *345such continuing influence, it would be very difficult for any child, by the time it was twelve years of age, to learn or understand the nature and effect and moral qualities of the act.
The evidence further shows that the child’s mother had complained to police officers many times that the appellant had struck and kicked the child’s mother; that on such occasions the child had heard her mother “yelling” and had seen the marks and bruises on the mother’s face and body; that the child had seen the appellant, while he was drunk, break down the doors and break out the windows of the house where they lived; that because of the appellant’s cruelty to the child’s mother, he had been arrested four or five times. Living in such a fear-provoking environment, it is likely that the child never questioned herself or anyone else concerning the wrongfulness of the acts.
Two factors should be pointed out in connection with the statement by the majority, that “Normally, intelligent twelve-year-old children are aware that the police exist for the purpose of suppression of crime and to arrest and see that those who have committed wrongs are punished.” First, the factors in this case do not create a normal situation. Second, there is nothing in the record from which we are able to determine the intelligence of this twelve-year-old child. The trial judge was in a far better position to determine her intelligence. He had the advantage of hearing her testify, to note her demeanor and manner while in court, and to note the ease or difficulty with which she could form thoughts. These qualities do not appear in a printed transcript.
I feel that the evidence, viewed in a reasonable light, shows that the girl did not know the wrongfulness of the acts. I feel that no reasonable person could say that the above constitutes clear proof that she knew its wrongfulness. Therefore we should hold that this girl was not capable of committing the crimes at the time of the commission of the offenses with which appellant was charged, and that she could not have been an accomplice. The trial court was correct in refusing to direct a verdict in favor of the appellant, in refusing to give an instruction as to the necessity for corroboration, and in instructing the jury that there need not be any corroborating evidence.1
*346I feel the trial court should be affirmed as to all three counts.

. That part of the trial court’s instruction herein referred to is as follows:
“You are further instructed that it is not essential to a conviction in this case that the testimony of (name deleted) be corroborated by other evidence provided that from all the evidence you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt and to a moral certainty of the defendant’s guilt.
“However, a charge such as that made against the defendant in this case is one which, generally speaking, is usually made and once made difficult to disprove, even if the defendant is innocent.
*346“From the nature of a case such as this, the child and the person accused usually are the only witnesses.
“Therefore, I charge you that the law requires that you examine the testimony of the child who is the prosecuting witness with caution.
“In giving these instructions, I do not mean to imply an opinion of my own as to the credibility of any witness.
“The fact that the charge here made is one difficult to disprove should not deter you from rendering a verdict of guilty if you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty as charged.”