Court Opinion

ID: 9463161
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 22:59:37.993222+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:37:57.465287
License: Public Domain

HASTINGS, Senior Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
In my judgment, the majority errs in framing the issue before us on this appeal, *22viz.: “whether the alleged purpose [of the grand jury investigation] was wholly beyond the grand jury’s authority.” Rather, I suggest that the district court1 was correct in contending that the issue is one of materiality. This is to say, conceding that Jacobs made false declarations before the grand jury, that they were in response to questions which were not material to the grand jury’s investigation and therefore were not proscribed by 18 U.S.C. § 1623.
The key issue, of course, is the interpretation of United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 93 S.Ct. 1007, 35 L.Ed.2d 379 (1973), in which a divided Court held that the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951, which makes it a federal crime to obstruct interstate commerce by robbery or extortion, does not reach the use of violence (which is readily punishable under state law) to achieve legitimate union objectives, such as higher wages in return for genuine services that the employer seeks. Id. 399-411, 93 S.Ct. 1007.
Judge McLaren reasoned that the methods employed by Local 705 Union were immaterial to a Hobbs Act violation, if the end was legitimate. He further found that the end sought by the union, to become the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees of the subject filling station, was legitimate. From this he concluded that the testimony of Jacobs, the labor union’s authorized organizer, concerning the means employed to accomplish that end could not have been material to a Hobbs Act violation. The court filed a memorandum opinion and order on the same date.
If the reach of Enmons is to be further extended, as urged by the majority, I would leave that to the United States Supreme Court in an appropriate case. Indeed, in Enmons, quoting from United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349, 92 S.Ct. 515, 523, 30 L.Ed.2d 488 (1971), the Court said: “[U]nless Congress conveys its purpose clearly, it will not be deemed to have significantly changed the federal-state balance. Congress has traditionally been reluctant to define as a federal crime conduct readily denounced as criminal by the States. . [W]e will not be quick to assume that Congress has meant to effect a significant change in the sensitive relation between federal and state criminal jurisdiction.” 410 U.S. at 411-412, 92 S.Ct. at 523.
Based upon the foregoing, together with the well-considered memorandum opinion of Judge McLaren, I would affirm the judgment of the district court.

. United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, the late Honorable Richard W. McLaren, presiding.