Court Opinion

ID: 9906083
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-30 21:03:35.612949+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:05.542276
License: Public Domain

SUPERIOR COURT
                                        OF THE
                                  STATE OF DELAWARE

Sean P. Lugg                                                 Leonard L. Williams Justice Center
         Judge                                               500 North King Street, Suite 10400
                                                             Wilmington, Delaware 19801-3733
                                                                  Telephone: (302) 255-067

                                  November 30, 2023

    Kate Butler, Esq.                       Michelle D. Allen, Esq.
    Kate Butler Law LLC                     Allen & Associates
    1509 Gilpin Avenue, Suite 3             4520 Lancaster Pike, Suite 230
    Wilmington, Delaware 19806              Wilmington, Delaware 19805

        RE: Melissa Sadowski v. Suppi Construction, Inc., and Carl E. Suppi
            C.A. No. N22C-11-149 SPL

Dear Counsel,

        Defendants, Suppi Construction, Inc. (“SCI”) and Carl E. Suppi (“Suppi”),

have moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s, Melissa Sadowski (“Sadowski”), Amended

Complaint alleging violations of the Delaware Discrimination in Employment Act

(“DDEA”), and common law torts of assault, battery, false imprisonment, and

intentional infliction of emotional distress.1 For the reasons that follow, Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.2

1
    Mot. Dism. & Op. Brf. (D.I. 25); Am. Compl. (D.I. 21).
2
  In her Brief in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (“Ans. Brf.”),
Sadowski “concedes that Count 7 (Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress)
should be dismissed and consents to its dismissal.” Ans. Brf. (D.I. 27) at 13.
                   FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

         Sadowski is a construction project manager with more than 20 years of

experience.3 In October 2020, SCI hired her to serve “as a Project Manager

responsible for supervising contractors in the field and related tasks.”4 By August

of 2021, Sadowski was responsible for visiting and overseeing operations at

worksites.5

         Sadowski, a woman, contends that the men working on the sites showed a lack

of respect for her authority as the project manager because of her gender.6 Sadowski

brought her concerns to the attention of SCI management, including Suppi, his son

Carl J. Suppi, his wife Karen Suppi, and the SCI human resources officer, Carol

Leszczynski.7 Sadowski asked Suppi to join her at worksites to “demonstrate to the

men working there that she had the authority to give them orders, and that they must

respect her.”8 But, at a worksite meeting on Friday, August 20, 2021, Suppi

undermined Sadowski’s authority and “exacerbat[ed] the increasing tension between

[Sadowski] and the men on the worksite.”9

3
    Am. Compl. at ¶ 12.
4
    Id. at ¶ 3.
5
    Id. at ¶ 23.
6
    Id. at ¶¶ 24-26.
7
    Id. at ¶¶ 26-29.
8
    Id. at ¶ 32.
9
    Id. at ¶ 33.
                                          2
         On Tuesday, August 24, 2021, Suppi entered Sadowski’s office and yelled at

her for “taking too much time of some of the men in the field.”10 Suppi blocked the

doorway to Sadowski’s office while he yelled insults and threatened her with

physical violence.11 Suppi refused to allow Sadowski to leave her office, and shoved

her twice when she made attempts to get around him to escape.12 After some time,

Suppi allowed Sadowski to leave.13 Carl J. Suppi and Carol Leszczynski witnessed

this interaction.14 Sadowski reported the altercation to the police.15

         Sadowski took leave from work to recover from the incident and requested

that SCI ensure that, going forward, she would not be left alone with Suppi. 16 SCI

responded by reducing Sadowski’s responsibilities which, in her view, further

undermined “her role and authority in front of the other male employees.”17

Nonetheless, Sadowski “agreed to do a site visit” to “clear the air” and demonstrate

that SCI supported her authority.18 This, too, failed and devolved into a shouting

10
  Mot. Dism. at Exh. B, Amended Charge of Discrimination, January 27, 2022
(“Amended Charge Form”).
11
     Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 34-35.
12
     Id. at ¶¶ 35-36; Amended Charge Form.
13
     Amended Charge Form.
14
     Am. Compl. at ¶ 37.
15
     Id. at ¶ 39.
16
     Id. at ¶¶ 40, 41.
17
     Id. at ¶¶ 42-43.
18
     Id. at ¶ 44.
                                          3
match; Sadowski “left the site in distress.”19 Thereafter, SCI removed Sadowski

from the work schedule.20

         Sadowski agreed to meet with SCI management.21           During a recorded

meeting, Carl J. Suppi threatened to fire Sadowski if she did not drop the criminal

charges against Suppi.22 At this point, Sadowski “felt she could not continue to serve

in her role” with SCI, and contends she was constructively discharged as of

September 28, 2021.23

         On January 14, 2022, Sadowski filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), alleging discrimination based on

sex in 2021.24 Subsequently, on January 27, 2022, Sadowski amended the charge to

include the Delaware Department of Labor (“DDOL”), alleged discrimination based

on sex and retaliation, and narrowed the timeframe within which this conduct

occurred to between August 15, 2021 and August 24, 2021. 25 In both documents,

Suppi alleges:

         On Tuesday August 24, 2021, an incident occurred between Melissa
19
     Id. at ¶ 45.
20
     Id. at ¶ 47.
21
     Id. at ¶ 48.
22
     Id. at ¶¶ 49-50.
23
     Id. at ¶¶ 51-53.
24
   Id. at ¶ 6; Mot. Dism. at Exh. A, Charge of Discrimination, January 14, 2022
(“Initial Charge Form”).
25
     Amended Charge Form.
                                           4
         Sadowski and Carl E. Suppi, one of the Owners of her employer, Suppi
         Construction, Inc. Carl E. Suppi entered the office building and began
         to scream and yell at Ms. Sadowski, accusing her of taking too much
         time of some of the men in the field. Confused by this outburst, as she
         had only left the office once that day to get lunch, Carl Suppi began
         threatening Ms. Sadowski by telling her he was going to “kick her ass”
         and using expletives while launching a verbal attack. Fearing for her
         safety, Ms. Sadowski attempted to exit and asked Carl Suppi to move
         he then shoved her twice and would not let her leave. After a period of
         some time, Ms. Sadowski was able to leave safely. Carol Leszczinksi
         (Office Manager/head of Human Resources) was present during this
         incident in its entirety.26

The EEOC issued Sadowski a Determination of Charge and Notice of Right to Sue

on August 18, 2022,27 and, on February 27, 2023, the DDOL issued Sadowski a Final

Determination and Right to Sue Notice.28

         Sadowski filed a complaint in this Court on November 16, 2022 and an

amended complaint on May 15, 2023 (“Amended Complaint”).29                Sadowski’s

Amended Complaint sets forth seven counts: (1) gender discrimination under the

DDEA, (2) retaliation under the DDEA, (3) assault, (4) battery, (5) false

imprisonment, (6) intentional infliction of emotional distress, and (7) negligent

26
  Initial Charge Form. While there are some typographical differences between the
two forms, the allegations included on the Amended Charge Form are substantively
identical to those made on the Initial Charge Form.
27
     Op. Brf. at Exh. C (“EEOC Right to Sue Letter”).
28
     Ans. Brf. at Exh. A (“DDOL Right to Sue Letter”).
29
     D.I. 1; D.I. 21.
                                           5
infliction of emotional distress.30 Counts 1 and 2 arise under the DDEA, and are

asserted against both Defendants. Count 5 asserts a common law false imprisonment

claim against Suppi directly, and against SCI on a theory of respondeat superior.

The remaining counts, 3, 4, 6, and 7, assert common-law claims against Defendant

Suppi only.

         Defendants moved to dismiss Sadowski’s Amended Complaint and

supplemented their motion with an Opening Brief.31 Sadowski responded and

submitted an Answering Brief in opposition.32 The Court heard oral argument from

the parties and took the matter under advisement.33

                            PARTIES’ CONTENTIONS

         Defendants contend Sadowski: (1) failed to exhaust administrative remedies

under the Delaware Discrimination in Employment Act (“DDEA”) in violation of

19 Del. C. § 714(a);34 (2) failed to state a valid claim for gender discrimination or

retaliation under the DDEA;35 (3) failed to substantiate her claim of constructive

discharge;36 and (4) alleged claims precluded by the Delaware Worker’s

30
     Am. Compl.
31
     D.I. 25.
32
     D.I. 27.
33
     D.I. 29, 30.
34
     Op. Brf. at 4.
35
     Id. at 13.
36
     Id. at 17.
                                          6
Compensation Act (“DWCA”) exclusivity statute, 19 Del. C. § 2304 et seq.37

Sadowski responds that she exhausted her administrative remedies under the DDEA

and received the requisite DDOL Right to Sue Notice.38 She argues that the tort

claims are not subject to the exclusivity provisions of the DWCA because they allege

acts committed with the specific intent to cause her injury.39 And, Sadowski

contends that her Amended Complaint sets forth sufficient facts in support of each

element of her claims and, thus, satisfies the requirements of Delaware’s pleading

standard.40

                              STANDARD OF REVIEW

         On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted under Superior Court Civil Rule 12(b)(6),41 all well-pleaded allegations in

the complaint must be accepted as true.42 Even vague allegations are considered

well-pleaded if they give the opposing party notice of a claim.43 The Court must

37
     Id. at 19.
38
     Ans. Brf. at 4.
39
     Id. at 10.
40
  Id. at 1, 7-9; Del. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 8(a); see also VLIW Technology v. Hewlett-
Packard Co., 840 A.2d 606, 611 (Del. 2003) (“Such a statement must only give the
defendant fair notice of a claim and is to be liberally construed).
41
     Del. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 12(b)(6).
42
     Spence v. Funk, 396 A.2d 967, 968 (Del. 1978).
43
   In re Gen. Motors (Hughes) S’holder Litig., 897 A.2d 162, 168 (Del. 2006)
(quoting Savor, Inc. v. FMR Corp., 812 A.2d 894, 896–97 (Del. 2002)).
                                           7
draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.44 The Court,

however, will not “accept conclusory allegations unsupported by specific facts,” nor

will it “draw unreasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.”45 “[T]he

governing pleading standard in Delaware to survive a motion to dismiss is

reasonable ‘conceivability.’”46 Dismissal is not appropriate unless the “plaintiff

would not be entitled to recover under any reasonably conceivable set of

circumstances susceptible of proof.”47

                                        ANALYSIS

 I.      SADOWSKI EXHAUSTED HER REMEDIES UNDER THE
         DELAWARE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT
         (“DDEA”)

         The DDEA provides employees protection from unlawful employment

discrimination.48 Under 19 Del. C. § 712(b), the DDEA provides the “sole remedy

for claims alleging a violation of the [DDEA] to the exclusion of all other

remedies.”49 DDEA “claims include discharging an employee or discriminating

44
     In re Gen. Motors (Hughes) S’holder Litig., 897 A.2d at 168 (Del. 2006).
45
  Price v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 26 A.3d 162, 166 (Del. 2011) (citation
omitted).
46
  Cent. Mortg. Co. v. Morgan Stanley Mortg. Cap. Holdings, LLC, 27 A.3d 531,
537 (Del. 2011) (citation omitted).
47
  Windsor I, LLC v. CWCapital Asset Mgmt. LLC, 238 A.3d 863, 871–72 (Del.
2020) (cleaned up).
48
     See 19 Del. C. Ch. 7, Subch. II.
49
     19 Del. C. § 712(b).
                                           8
against an employee as to ‘compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of

employment’ based on gender.”50 The person claiming a DDEA violation must first

“file a charge of discrimination within 300 days of the alleged unlawful employment

practice or its discovery, setting forth a concise statement of facts, in writing, verified

and signed by the charging party.”51 “After investigation, the [DOL] shall issue a

determination of either ‘reasonable cause’ or ‘no reasonable cause’ to believe that a

violation occurred or is occurring . . . All cases resulting in a ‘no cause’

determination will receive a corresponding Delaware Right to Sue Notice.”52 “A

charging party may file a civil action in Superior Court, after exhausting the

administrative remedies provided herein and receipt of a Delaware Right to Sue

Notice acknowledging same.”53

         Because the DDEA is patterned from 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) of the federal Civil

Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), “the language of the DDEA is virtually identical to

its federal counterpart.”54 “Delaware Courts take the ‘interpretive lead’ from District

Court and Third Circuit Court of Appeals decisions regarding interpretations of Title

50
   Sees v. Mackenzie, 2023 WL 5202675, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 14, 2023)
(citing 19 Del. C. § 711(b)(1), 712(b)).
51
     19 Del. C. § 712(c)(1).
52
     19 Del. C. § 712(c)(3).
53
     19 Del. C. § 714(a).
54
  Ennis v. Del. Transit Corp., 2015 WL 1542151, at *5 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 9,
2015) (cleaned up).
                                            9
VII.”55 “Delaware State Courts look to the tests formulated by the McDonnell

Douglas Corp. v. Green line of cases for guidance with regard to cases grounded on

an alleged violation of the DDEA.”56 Because it is unlikely that an employer who

discriminates will announce discriminatory intent, the McDonnell Douglas

framework “allow[s] plaintiffs to proceed without direct proof of illegal

discrimination where circumstances are such that common sense and social context

suggest discrimination occurred.”57

         Counts 1 and 2 of Sadowski’s Amended Complaint allege gender

discrimination (Count 1) and retaliation (Count 2) in violation of the DDEA. To

bring these claims in this Court, Sadowski must first comply with the statutorily

established administrative process of the DDEA. The record before the Court

establishes that she has done so.

         Under 19 Del.C. § 712(b), the Delaware Department of Labor has jurisdiction

“over all cases arising under this chapter, affording review and oversight of

employment practices in Delaware.”58           It is not until “termination of the

administrative process by the Department” that a plaintiff may file a civil action in

55
     Id. (cleaned up).
56
     Id. (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)).
57
     Iadimarco v. Runyan, 190 F.3d 151, 157 (3rd Cir. 1999).
58
     19 Del.C. § 712(b).
                                          10
the Superior Court alleging unlawful employment practices.59 “The parameters of a

civil action are defined by the scope of the administrative investigation which can

reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination.”60 And the

claims in the subsequent civil action must be limited to “the scope of the [DDOL]

investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of

discrimination[.]”61 To address Defendant’s challenge, the Court must determine

whether Sadowski complied with the requirements of § 712(b), and, that she did so

with regard to the claims now before the Court.

         A charge of discrimination must be initially filed with the DDOL “within 300

days of the alleged unlawful employment practice or its discovery.”62 Sadowski

filed an Amended Charge of Discrimination on January 27, 2022, alleging

59
     Id.; 19 Del. C. § 711(b)(1).
60
  Floray v. Dargan Extensions, LLC, 2016 WL 4442210, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug.
19, 2016) (citing Webb v. City of Phila., 562 F.3d 256, 263 (3rd Cir. 2009)).
61
   Ostapowicz v. Johnson Bronze Co., 541 F.2d 394, 398-399 (3d Cir. 1976) (“In
order to comply with the spirit of the Act, there must be some limitation on suits in
the district court so that the Commission will have the first opportunity to examine
the allegations of discrimination. Courts have generally determined that the
parameters of the civil action in the district court are defined by the scope of the
EEOC investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of
discrimination, Gamble v. Birmingham Southern R.R. Co., 514 F.2d 678 (5th Cir.
1975); Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1970), including
new acts which occurred during the pendency of proceedings before the
Commission, Oubichon v. North American Rockwell Corp., 482 F.2d 569 (9th Cir.
1973)”).
62
     19 Del. C. §§ 712(b), (c)(1).
                                          11
discriminatory conduct occurring in August of 2021.63 The Amended Charge was

therefore timely filed.

           Defendants argue that the Amended Charge evidences Sadowski’s failure to

present the DDEA allegations to the DDOL.64 They contend that the form lacks a

DDOL case number and a “check” in the box to elect referral to the DDOL. 65 But

the Amended Complaint supports a reasonable inference that Sadowski dually filed

the Amended Charge with the DDOL because it alleges that she received a DDOL

Right to Sue Letter.66 The DDOL provided her notice of her right to sue on February

27, 2023, and she filed her May 15, 2023 Amended Complaint within 90 days of

receipt of that notice. While the path leading to Sadowski’s Amended Complaint

may tread slightly off the beaten track, she ultimately complied with statutory

requirements.

           The Court understands Defendants’ argument that “there is no evidence that

the DDOL had record of the charge before February 2023”67 to challenge both the

existence and timeliness of Sadowski’s charge, but the DDOL did act on Sadowski’s

allegations in February 2023. At this stage, the Court must construe the extant record

63
     See Amended Charge.
64
     Op. Brf. at 4.
65
     Id.
66
     Am. Compl. at ¶ 9.
67
     Op. Brf. at 10.
                                           12
in the light most favorable to Sadowski. The Amended Complaint suggests that the

charge was referred to the DDOL within the 300-day period, and the record is devoid

of facts to the contrary.68 The record shows Sadowski exhausted the administrative

remedies under the DDEA before presenting her claims to this Court.

         The administrative charge serves as the yardstick against which the Court

measures, or ascertains, administrative exhaustion as a prerequisite to filing an

action at law.69 The administrative pre-suit requirements, which include filing a

charge and receiving a right-to-sue letter from the DDOL, are “essential parts of the

statutory plan, designed to correct discrimination through administrative conciliation

and persuasion if possible, rather than by formal court action.”70 The Supreme Court

has also emphasized that a fundamental aim of the pre-suit requirements is to “give

prompt notice to the employer” and “encourage the prompt processing of all charges

of employment discrimination.”71

68
   Similarly, Defendants’ argument that the Amended Charge is “silent as to any
state law claims” is unavailing because “the language of the DDEA is virtually the
same as its federal counterpart,” Ennis, 2015 WL 1542151, at *5, and a complainant
may file the same charge simultaneously with the EEOC and the DDOL.
69
  Op. Brf. at 12 (citing Simko v. United States Steel Corp., 992 F.3d 198 (3d Cir.
2021) cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 760 (2022)). As explained above, Delaware Courts
follow the guidance provided by District Court and the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals when assessing the provisions of the DDEA. See supra n.53.
70
     Simko, 992 F.3d at 206.
71
  Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 109, 121, 122 S.Ct. 2061,
153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002).
                                         13
           The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has explained that “the ‘relevant test’ for

determining whether a later claim needs to be exhausted despite the filing of a

previous charge is a two-pronged inquiry into whether ‘the acts alleged in the

subsequent . . . suit are fairly within the scope of [1] the prior EEOC complaint, or

[2] the investigation arising therefrom.”72 “The exhaustion inquiry is highly fact

specific.”73 The Court must evaluate the administrative charge and the alleged

unexhausted claim “on a case-by-case basis.”74

           Sadowski’s Amended Charge alleges gender discrimination and retaliation

occurring between August 15, 2021, and August 24, 2021. Sadowski’s claims under

the DDEA (Counts 1 and 2) encompass the events within that timeframe and the

alleged discriminatory or retaliatory acts arising therefrom. Suppi’s alleged site-

visit outburst and subsequent office attack fall squarely within this time frame.

Further, the Amended Complaint alleges that gender discrimination occurred when

SCI ignored “her requests not to have to be in the presence of Defendant [Carl]

Suppi” following the August 24, 2021 incident.75 And the claim more broadly states

that “Suppi’s acts and omissions constituted discrimination on the basis of

72
  Simko, 992 F.3d at 207 (quoting Waiters v. Parsons, 729 F.3d 233, 237 (3d Cir.
1984)).
73
     Simko, 992 F.3d at 207.
74
     Id.
75
     Am. Compl. ¶ 57.
                                             14
[Sadowski’s] gender that is causally related to the adverse employment actions taken

against her.”76 These claims flow from the conduct alleged in the administrative

charge, and the Court finds that they were administratively exhausted and are

properly raised in the Amended Complaint sub judice.

      II.   Sadowski’s Gender Discrimination and Retaliation Claims Survive

         A claim for gender discrimination requires Sadowski to prove: (1) she

belonged to a protected class, (2) she was qualified for the position, (3) she was

terminated, and (4) the circumstances surrounding the termination give rise to an

inference of illegal discriminatory motive.77       Defendants do not contest that

Sadowski, a woman, belonged to a protected class, nor do they challenge her

qualifications; rather, they contend that Sadowski fails to establish (1) that she was

terminated, and (2) that the facts give rise to an inference of illegal discriminatory

motive on behalf of Suppi or SCI.

         To satisfy the element of termination, Sadowski must allege that she was

either terminated or constructively discharged. Constructive discharge includes

threats of discharge, suggestion or encouragement of resignation, a demotion or

reduction of pay or benefits, involuntary transfer to a less desirable position,

76
     Am. Compl. ¶ 58.
77
     Conley v. State, 2011 WL 113201, at *4 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 11, 2011).
                                          15
alteration of job responsibilities, and unsatisfactory job evaluations.78 Here, it is

reasonably conceivable that the combined effect of Suppi yelling at Sadowski for

taking up too much time of the men in the field, SCI reducing her worksite oversight

responsibilities, SCI removing her from the work schedule, and SCI threatening her

termination if she did not drop the charges against Suppi constituted her constructive

discharge – Sadowski reasonably felt she could not return to work. Treating these

well-pleaded allegations as true, Sadowski sufficiently pled constructive discharge.

         To establish discriminatory motive, Sadowski need only present “sufficient

evidence to allow a fact finder to conclude that the employer is treating some people

less favorably than others based on a trait that is protected.”79 Here, Sadowski, a

woman, was charged with supervising a group comprised predominantly, if not

exclusively, of men. Suppi and SCI favored Sadowski’s male subordinates and

refused to support Sadowski in her role. The Amended Complaint asserts Sadowski

had the authority and responsibility to direct her male subordinates to perform the

work as she saw fit but lacked the support and backing of her employer when she

attempted to do her job.80 Rather, her male subordinates ignored her direction

because SCI and Suppi were loath to act. As this Court has recognized, “a plaintiff

78
     Clowes v. Allegheny Valley Hosp., 991 F.2d 1159, 1161 (3d Cir. 1993).
79
     Ennis, 2015 WL 1542151, at *5.
80
     Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 23-33.
                                         16
is almost exclusively confined to proving [her] case with indirect evidence [because]

‘. . . an employer who discriminates will almost never announce a discriminatory

animus or provide employees or courts with direct evidence of discriminatory

intent.’”81 The Amended Complaint alleges sufficient facts to support a reasonable

inference that SCI and Suppi engaged in gender discrimination by condoning

employee disobedience because Sadowski is a woman.

        A claim for retaliation discrimination requires Sadowski to prove: (1) she

engaged in a protected activity; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and

(3) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse

action.82   Sadowski reported her gender discrimination to her supervisors and

suffered a near immediate adverse employment action when Suppi, SCI’s owner,

allegedly assaulted her.83 Then, in the wake of that incident, and while Sadowski

attempted to recover, SCI reduced her work. The Court finds that the Amended

Complaint sufficiently alleges claims for relief under the DDEA for gender and

retaliation discrimination to survive a motion to dismiss.

81
  Ennis, 2015 WL 1542151, at *5 (quoting Iadimarco v. Runyan, 190 F.3d 151, 157
(3d Cir. 1999)).
82
     Ennis, 2015 WL 1542151, at *5.
83
     Am. Compl. ¶¶ 26-33.
                                         17
 III.     SADOWSKI SUFFICIENTLY PLEADS CONSTRUCTIVE
          DISCHARGE

         As explained above, Sadowski has sufficiently pled constructive discharge to

satisfy that element of her DDEA claims.84

 IV.      SADOWSKI’S INTENTIONAL TORT CLAIMS ARE NOT
          BARRED BY WORKER’S COMPENSATION EXCLUSIVITY

         Defendants argue that Sadowski’s tort claims are barred because the Delaware

Worker’s Compensation Act (“DWCA”) provides the sole remedy for work-related

injury claims.85 The DWCA provides that “every employer and employee, adult and

minor, shall be bound by this chapter respectively to pay and to accept compensation

for personal injury or death by accident arising out of and in the course of

employment, regardless of the question of negligence and to the exclusion of all

other rights and remedies.”86 But the Delaware Supreme Court has determined that

allegations involving “a true intent by the employer to injure the employee” fall

outside of the DWCA and remain actionable as common law tort claims.87 To avoid

“the exclusivity provision of 19 Del. C. § 2304, a party, therefore, must allege

84
     See supra pp. 15-16.
85
   Op. Brf. at 19. Sadowski concedes that her claim of Negligent Infliction of
Emotional Distress (Count 7) must be dismissed (Ans. Brf. at 13); the Court,
therefore, assesses the application of the DWCA to Sadowski’s intentional tort
claims.
86
     19 Del. C. § 2304.
87
     Rafferty v. Hartman Walsh Painting Co., 760 A.2d 157, 159 (Del. 2000).
                                          18
specific, intentional tortious conduct.”88      Sadowski does so here; therefore, her

claims of assault, battery, and false imprisonment are not barred by the DWCA.

         “The tort of assault requires that the actor act with the intent of causing a

harmful or offensive contact with the persona of another, or an imminent

apprehension of such contact, and the person is thereby put in imminent

apprehension of such contact.”89 Sadowski alleges that Suppi intentionally caused

her to fear for her safety when he approached her, blocked her from exiting her office

and yelled that he was going to “kick her ass.” These allegations are sufficient to

state a claim for Suppi’s intentional assault upon Sadowski.

         “[T]he tort of battery is the intentional, unpermitted contact on the person of

another which is harmful or offensive.”90 Sadowski alleges that Suppi shoved her

twice while yelling at her and intending to prevent her from leaving her office. These

allegations are sufficient to support a claim for Suppi’s intentional battery of

Sadowski.

          “The elements of a claim for false imprisonment are: (a) a restraint which is

both (b) unlawful and (c) against one's will.”91 “The restraint may be accomplished

88
     Id. at 161.
89
  Tilghman v. Delaware State University, 2012 WL 3860825, at *5 (citing
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 21 (1965)).
90
  Tilghman, 2012 WL 3860825, at *5 (quoting Brzoska v. Olson, 665 A.2d 1355,
1360 (Del. 1995)).
91
     Hunt ex rel. DeSombre v. State, 69 A.3d 360, 368 (Del. 2013) (cleaned up).
                                           19
by physical force, by threats of force or intimidation or by assertion of legal

authority.”92 Sadowski alleges that Suppi restrained her from leaving her office

through force, that his restraint was unlawful, and that he ignored her multiple

requests to leave the office. Because Suppi intentionally deprived Sadowski of her

freedom of movement, her claim is not barred by the exclusivity provision of the

DWCA.93

           To state a claim for IIED, a plaintiff must allege “extreme and outrageous

conduct” that “intentionally or recklessly” causes severe emotional distress.94 Even

if the alleged conduct constitutes “tortious or even criminal” acts toward the

plaintiff, it does not necessarily, by itself, rise to the level of “extreme and outrageous

conduct.”95 The conduct must be “so outrageous in character, and so extreme in

degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as

atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community."96 Mere insults or

indignities, even by persons abusing their positions of authority over the subject, do

92
     Id.
93
 See Lynch v. Mellon Bank of Delaware, 1992 WL 51880, at *4 (Del. Super. Ct.
Mar. 12, 1992).
94
  Root v. MaidPro Wilmington, 2022 WL 17039161, at *3 (Del. Super. Nov. 17,
2022).
95
   Id. (discussing the “Restatement’s comment as to what conduct might be
sufficiently extreme and outrageous to warrant IIED liability.”)
96
     Id.
                                            20
not give rise to liability.97 It is “extremely rare to find conduct in the employment

context that will rise to the level of outrageousness necessary [for IIED]." 98 In

Tolliver, the Court found that “no reasonable jury could find that Defendants

engaged in conduct that was so severe that a reasonable person could not be expected

to endure it.”99 Here, Sadowski alleges she suffered discrimination in employment,

insults, assault, battery, and false imprisonment at the hands of Suppi.            This

recitation of facts “to an average member of the community [could] arouse his

resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim ‘Outrageous!’”100 At this

stage, viewing the record in the light most favorable to Sadowski, she presents a

conceivable claim of IIED which is not precluded by DWCA exclusivity.

                                    CONCLUSION

         The Court, as it must in considering a motion to dismiss, has accepted all well-

pleaded allegations in the complaint as true, and has drawn all reasonable inferences

in favor of Sadowski, the non-moving party. Sadowski presents facts upon which

recovery is conceivable. In reaching this conclusion, the Court does not, because it

must not, assess the relative strength of these allegations. Applying these well-

97
     Restatement 2nd Torts, Comment (e) § 46.
98
   Tolliver v. Trinity Parish Foundation, 2017 WL 3288119 (D. Del. Aug. 2, 2017)
(citing Cox v. Keystone Carbon Co., 861 F.2d 390, 395 (3d Cir. 1988)).
99
     Id. at *15.
100
      Root, 2022 WL 17039161, at *3 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46(d)).
                                            21
established principles to the limited facts presently before the Court, and accepting

Sadowski’s concession as to Count 7,          Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is

GRANTED as to Count 7 and DENIED as to the balance of the Amended

Complaint.

                                              IT IS SO ORDERED.

                                              _______________ _________
                                              Sean P. Lugg, Judge

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