Court Opinion

ID: 9688253
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 17:41:45.166311+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:36.905665
License: Public Domain

MESCHKE, Justice,
dissenting.
Because the trial court believed that there was no evidentiary basis to find sufficient circumstances for a change of custody, while believing that “perhaps the best interests of the boys might be with their father,” I would reverse and remand for reconsideration. There is evidence that, if credited, would authorize the trial court to find a significant change in order to reevaluate custody.
The trial court felt constrained to conclude that the circumstances had not changed since the divorce:
Two of the psychologists recommended that custody remain with the Plaintiff, Joli, and one of the psychologists and the Guardian Ad Litem recommended that custody be changed to Terry, the father. All of their opinions/recommendations are based on primarily the best interests of the children and the Court concurs that perhaps the best interests of the boys might be with their father, but the Court also realizes, by our guidelines set down by the Supreme Court, that it must first find significant change of circumstances before it can change custody of the children.
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*440For the purposes of finality, a prior decree should not be modified without a showing of a significant need for doing so.
The trial court then discussed, at some length, prior decisions about what is a significant change of circumstances and, only then, concluded that Terry had “failed to sustain the burden of proof.” This tells me that the court thought that the evidence did not permit a finding that a significant change existed to justify reevaluation of the best interests of the children.
Dr. Greenspan was the court-appointed psychologist. After his initial evaluation of both parents and the children, Dr. Greenspan “reservedly” recommended that “[cjustody remain with ... Joli ... at least for the time being.” He explained his reservation:
I believe Jeremiah [h]as been systematically set-up, used, and programmed by his mother to act-out her angry feelings toward Mr. Johnson. Jeremiah has been dealt with in such a way by his mother that I am concerned about his mental health, growth, and emotional development. She is teaching him to lie, be deceitful, and dishonest, which is a gross interference with conscience formation which could conceivably lead to characte-rological personality traits and behaviors, such as criminality. The relationship between son and father (which I observed to be meaningful to Jeremiah) has been deliberately and systematically saba-toged [sic] by Jeremiah’s mother, Ms. Joli Johnson.
Dr. Greenspan was apprehensive about the extent of psychological harm to Jeremiah from Job’s conduct while caring for Jeremiah. Soon after this tentative recommendation by Dr. Greenspan, in May 1990, Terry stipulated that Joli continue with primary custody of the children.
After Terry moved to change custody, Joli retained James Wahlberg, a licensed and certified social worker, who recommended that custody remain with Joli and that her move to Minnesota be permitted, but that the parents and Jeremiah should each receive counseling “to deal with any unresolved issues stemming from the divorce.” This evidences guarded concern over Jeremiah’s psychological health.
Joli also retained Dr. Brandt, who was even more guarded about Jeremiah’s emotional health in Job’s care. Dr. Brandt diagnosed Job with a “[pjossible delusional (persecutory type) disorder,” and recommended that she "should engage in some counseling,” although “Job will not see this as relevant since she feels that all the difficulties are on her husband’s side.” Dr. Brandt recommended that “Jeremiah engage in some long-term therapy” because “[t]he situation has placed Jeremiah in a difficult position, with which he needs help.” Dr. Brandt stressed that “Jeremiah needs the opportunity to be a normal young man without having to worry about the difficulties that are occurring between his parents.” Dr. Brandt suggested that “long-term therapy should be considered” for the smaller child, Jacob, as well. Thus, Dr. Brandt, too, was uneasy with the psychological health of the children while in Job’s care. Still, Dr. Brandt suggested that custody remain with Job because they “have spent more time with the mother.”
Before the trial on change of custody, Dr. Greenspan updated his provisional report. He opined that Job’s “proposed move is intended to create a separation between father and children ...,” declared that “[significant psychological harm would most likely develop in Jeremiah if he moved out of state with restricted visitation with his father,” and recommended that “[i]t is appropriate and acceptable for the children to change custody to that of the father.” Dr. Greenspan explained:
Jeremiah is a youngster at risk, psychologically speaking. I believe his mother has truly interfered with his healthy development of a working conscience. I worry about his future ability to distinguish reality from fantasy, the ways in which his anger could manifest itself, and how his guilt feelings will interfere with his emotional growth and development, e.g., interferences in concentration and learning; unconsciously setting him*441self up to get punished, restricted, or controlled by others.
Jeremiah will do fine living with his father, although he will undoubtedly tell mother the opposite to please her. If Mr. Terry Johnson is denied custody at this juncture, Jeremiah will learn that deceit, deception, and neurosis rule the day. As long as Ms. Joli Johnson is convinced of her previous allegations about Mr. Johnson, she will attempt to do whatever she can to interfere with the father/sons relationship. Hopefully, ongoing individual psychotherapy will be of benefit. Also, Jeremiah needs treatment on a regular basis to understand, and subsequently deal with, his neurotic conflicts around guilt, aggression, untruthfulness, and his feelings about both parents.
Dr. Greenspan testified that Joli’s “paranoid, pathological, disturbed thinking and feeling pattern” has “sabotaged the relationship between father and son.” According to Greenspan, “Mrs. Johnson has been unfit in her role of how she has dealt with the boy’s father in relation to the boy which has caused him, I think, difficulties in his subsequent emotional development.”
If the trial court credits Dr. Greenspan’s conclusions, the continuing psychological harm to Jeremiah is a serious change. Wenzel v. Wenzel, 469 N.W.2d 156, 157 (N.D.1991) (“The serious relationship which has developed between [the custodial parent] and a man her child understandably fears [whom the child heard severely beat his mother] is a significant change of circumstance.”); Wright v. Wright, 463 N.W.2d 654, 656 (N.D.1990) (“The trial court erroneously determined that [the custodial parent’s] ... inappropriate physical discipline, improper care, and inadequate supervision of [children] did not constitute a significant change of circumstances.”) Harm to a child while in the care of one parent is a significant change of circumstances that authorizes a trial court to reevaluate the best interests of the child.
Emotional or psychological harm, no less than physical harm, resulting from a parent’s conduct justifies consideration anew of the best interests of the child. Von Bank v. Von Bank, 443 N.W.2d 618, 620 (N.D.1989) (“[T]he changes found by the trial court [including child’s ‘social isolation and depression’] sufficiently affected the well-being of [the child] to merit reevaluation of her custody.”) See also, Unif. Marriage and Divorce Act § 409, 9A U.L.A. 628 (1987) (In applying standards for modification of a custody decree, “the court shall retain the custodian appointed pursuant to the prior decree unless: ... (3) the child’s present environment endangers seriously his physical, mental, moral, or emotional health, and the harm likely to be caused by a change of environment is outweighed by its advantages to” the child.) Compare Pitsenbarger v. Pitsenbarger, 382 N.W.2d 662 (N.D.1986). Because the trial court mistakenly felt constrained in its view of the evidence here, I would reverse and remand for reconsideration of the sufficiency of the evidence to merit implementation of the trial court’s conclusion about the best interests of the children.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.