Court Opinion

ID: 9738652
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:59:40.956633+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:07.623225
License: Public Domain

DAY, J.
(dissenting). I dissent. When the public prosecutor moves to dismiss a criminal case before jeopardy attaches, a trial court, if it grants the motion, has the inherent power to do so with prejudice. The question is not power, but whether there is an abuse of discretion in such dismissal. It is a matter of balancing the interest of the state against fundamental fairness to a defendant with the added ingredient of the orderly functioning of the court system. When the motion to dismiss becomes abusive of judicial process, as it was here, the court properly exercised its inherent power in granting the district attorney’s motion to dismiss but doing so with prejudice.
*588Sharon Braunsdorf was charged with welfare fraud pursuant to secs. 49.12(6) and 943.20(1) (c), Stats. 1977. She agreed to repay the amounts overpaid to her at the rate of $100 per month, and had repaid $800 before this prosecution was initiated.
She had retained private counsel and was prepared for trial on the scheduled date. By then, however, the assistant district attorney had directed the clerk of courts to discharge the jury panel because he was unprepared to go to trial. This was done without the knowledge of the trial court and without authority.
At the time of trial, the assistant district attorney sought a continuance, which the trial court denied. The prosecutor then moved to dismiss with a view to reinstating prosecution later. The court granted that motion, but made its dismissal with prejudice.
A renewed prosecution, following dismissal without prejudice, would have subjected Braunsdorf to a second arrest, a second bail hearing, a second preliminary hearing, a second plea and finally a trial on these charges. All of this because of the inexcusable unpreparedness of the prosecutor.
Under these circumstances, the trial court’s decision to grant the district attorney’s motion to dismiss but with prejudice was fully justified.
Under Article VII, section 2 of the Wisconsin Constitution, the judicial power of the state is vested in a unified system of courts. This constitutional authority carries with it the inherent power to regulate proceedings to facilitate the administration of justice. 20 Am. Jur. 2d, Courts, sec. 78. See also, Currie, The Separation of Powers: Control Of Courts And Lawyers, 47 Wis. Bar. Bull. 7, 14 (December, 1974).
In Latham v. Casey & King Corp., 23 Wis.2d 311, 314, 127 N.W.2d 225 (1964), this court held:
*589"... a court has the inherent power to resort to a dismissal of an action in the orderly administration of justice. The general control of the orderly judicial business before it is essential to the court if it is to function. ‘Every court has inherent power, exercisable in its sound discretion, consistent within the Constitution and statutes, to control disposition of causes on its docket with economy of time and effort.’ ” (Emphasis added.)
The majority refers to the broad discretion possessed by a prosecutor in instituting prosecutions under the criminal code but then wrongly concludes that when the district attorney moves to dismiss such a prosecution with a view to reprosecution, a trial court has no authority to dismiss such action with prejudice for cause, either sua sponte or on motion of the defendant, unless jeopardy has attached or some constitutional right of the defendant is involved.
Society has a strong interest in punishing criminal conduct. But society also has an interest in protecting the integrity of the judicial process and in ensuring fairness to defendants in judicial proceedings. Where those fundamental interests are threatened, the “discretion” of the prosecutor must be subject to the power and responsibility of the court.
The majority on page 586 states that:
“. . . We believe that the power to dismiss a criminal case with prejudice before the attachment of jeopardy, regardless of how judiciously it is used by trial courts, is too great an intrusion into the realm of prosecutorial discretion.”
But this statement sweeps too broadly. We are not concerned here with whether a trial court can sua sponte or on motion of a defendant dismiss a criminal case with prejudice regardless of any action on the part of the district attorney. Here the issue is much narrower and *590involves the court’s authority to act where it is the district attorney who moves to dismiss with the right to start over.
The majority sees a “broad” discretion on the part of the district attorney as to when to commence a prosecution. But this court has not equated the power to start with the power to stop. On the contrary, this court has held that before the district attorney can stop (nolle prosequi) a prosecution once started, approval must be obtained from the trial court, who is to make such determination “in the public interest.” State v. Kenyon, 85 Wis.2d 36, 45, 270 N.W.2d 160 (1978). The discretion of the district attorney in this area is not absolute.
This was not a prosecution for first-degree murder where the societal interest in prosecution could be found by a trial court to outweigh the issues of fairness to the defendant and the court’s orderly functioning. There was no abuse of discretion by the trial court.
The idea that the trial court has this power is hardly a novel proposition. While it is a question of first impression in this court, the power is widely recognized in federal courts. In United States v. Furey, 514 F.2d 1098 (2d Cir. 1975), the court held the power of a federal court to dismiss with prejudice a part of the inherent powers derived from the common law. The court further stated that:
“. . . this power is independent of Sixth Amendment considerations, being an outgrowth of the court’s supervisory authority with respect to its own jurisdiction. Its exercise has traditionally been within the court’s discretion, United States v. Aberson, 419 F.2d 820 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1066, 90 S. Ct. 1497, 25 L. Ed.2d 687 (1970). It has been used, for instance, . . . to protect the public interest ‘in the prosecution of those accused of crime without the procrastination of which the processes of law are sometimes guilty,’ United States *591v. Mark II Electronics of Louisiana, Inc., 283 F. Supp. 280, 283 (E.D. La. 1968), . . . Dismissal under this power may he without prejudice, ... or with prejudice, White v. United States, 126 U.S. App. D.C. 309, 377, F.2d 948 (1967); District of Columbia v. Weams, supra; 3 Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure §814, at 319 (1969).
“Cases cited by the government for the proposition that dismissal with prejudice is proper only when the Sixth Amendment is invoked are not only distinguishable but do not support such a rule.” 514 F.2d at 1103. (Emphasis added.)
In England, the House of Lords has also recognized this power. In Director Of Public Prosecutions v. Hum-phrys, [1976] 2 All E.R. 497, 527-528, Lord Salmon wrote:
“. . . a judge has not and should not appear to have any responsibility for the institution of prosecutions; nor has he any power to refuse to allow a prosecution to proceed merely because he considers that, as a matter of policy, it ought not to have been brought. It is only if the prosecution amounts to an abuse of the process of the court and is oppressive and vexatious that the judge has the power to intervene.”
Lord Edmund-Davies expressed a concurring view:
“I am now satisfied that, in the words of Lord Parker, C.J. in Mills v. Cooper, ‘every court has undoubtedly a right in its discretion to decline to hear proceedings on the ground that they are oppressive and an abuse of the process of the court.’ ” Humphrys at 533.
I find these cases persuasive, and believe the crucial question is not the existence of the power, but the propriety of its exercise on the facts of a particular case.
The majority recognizes the power of the trial court to deny the motion to dismiss without prejudice, and thus force the unprepared prosecutor to trial. But such a decision on the part of a trial judge is merely the ex*592ercise of discretion and would constitute abuse if not justified under the circumstances. Plainly a prosecutor with no evidence or witnesses will fail to meet his burden of proof, and a dismissal on the merits will follow. The majority defends this hollow exercise because the resulting dismissal will properly place the blame on the shoulders of the prosecutor, who is accountable to the electorate. But will it? Forcing the state to go to “trial” under such circumstances serves to bring discredit on the system of justice.
I would reverse the court of appeals and affirm the order of the trial court.
I am authorized to state that Justice Heffernan and Justice Abrahamson join in this dissent.