Court Opinion

ID: 9896078
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-09 15:08:33.858873+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:41.191251
License: Public Domain

Corrected Opinion Filed 10/12/23 by Clerk of the Supreme Court              FILED
                                                                               IN THE OFFICE OF THE
             Opinion on Motion for Clarification and                        CLERK OF SUPREME COURT
                                                                                SEPTEMBER 28, 2023
             Motion for Stay Filed October 12, 2023                          STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

                   IN THE SUPREME COURT
                   STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

                                  2023 ND 185

Board of Trustees of The North Dakota Public
Employees Retirement System,                                           Petitioner
      v.
North Dakota Legislative Assembly,                                   Respondent

                                 No. 20230158

Petition for Declaratory Relief and Writ of Injunction.

DECLARATORY JUDGMENT AND WRIT OF INJUNCTION GRANTED,
AND MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT THE RECORD DENIED.

Opinion of the Court by Justice Crothers, in which Justice Tufte joined. Chief
Justice Jensen filed an opinion concurring specially. Justice McEvers filed an
opinion concurring specially in which District Judge Lee joined.

Robert D. Klausner (argued), Plantation, FL, Christopher Rausch (appeared)
and Elizabeth A. Elsberry (appeared), Bismarck, ND, Lindsey M. Garber (on
brief) and Sean M. Sendra (on brief), Plantation, FL, Special Assistant
Attorneys General, for Petitioner.

Philip J. Axt, Solicitor General, Bismarck, ND, for Respondent.
Bd. of. Trustees of The N.D. Public Employees Retirement System v.
                      N.D. Legislative Assembly
                            No. 20230158

Crothers, Justice.

[¶1] The Board of Trustees of the North Dakota Public Employees Retirement
System petitions this Court seeking declaratory relief and a writ of injunction,
challenging N.D.C.C. § 54-52-03 and section 41 of S.B. 2015 (2023), enacted by
the 68th Legislative Assembly, both of which provide for the appointment of
sitting legislators to the Board. The Board claims the law placing legislators
on the Board violates N.D. Const. art. IV, § 6; violates the separation of powers
between branches of government and encroaches on the powers of the
executive branch in violation of articles IV, V and XI of the Constitution;
violates the common-law rule against incompatibility of office; and violates the
single subject rule of N.D. Const. art. IV, § 13. We grant the requested review,
conclude section 41 of S.B. 2015 violated article IV, § 13 of the North Dakota
Constitution, and invalidate S.B. 2015. Because the constitutional “single
subject” rule is dispositive, it is unnecessary to address the Board’s remaining
claims.

[¶2] Subsequent to oral argument, the Board requested leave to supplement
the record with information arising after the initiation of the petition for
declaratory relief and the request for a writ of injunction. The additional
information is not relevant to the dispositive issue and the motion is denied.

                                       I

[¶3] On June 1, 2023, the Board petitioned this Court to exercise its original
jurisdiction under N.D.C.C. § 27-02-04, seeking declaratory relief under
N.D.C.C. § 32-23-01 and a writ of injunction under N.D.C.C. § 32-06-01. The
Board filed a motion for a preliminary injunction before the hearing, which this
Court denied.

[¶4] The Board seeks a declaration that section 41 of S.B. 2015 is void ab
initio and N.D.C.C. § 54-52-03 is invalid, both of which provide for appointment

                                       1
of sitting legislators to the Board, because they violate article IV, § 6 of the
North Dakota Constitution, the separation of powers requirement under
articles IV, V and XI of the Constitution, and the common-law doctrine of
incompatibility of office. The Board also seeks a declaration that S.B. 2015 is
invalid because the joinder of an appropriation bill with an amendment to the
Board’s structure is not germane, constitutes “logrolling,” and is in violation of
article IV, § 13 of the Constitution. The Board requests a writ of injunction
preventing the appointment of additional legislators and the continued service
of sitting legislators on the Board.

[¶5] Section 54-52-03, N.D.C.C., after the recent amendments, provides:

      “1. A state agency is hereby created to constitute the governing
      authority of the system to consist of a board of eleven individuals
      known as the retirement board. No more than one elected member
      of the board may be in the employ of a single department,
      institution, or agency of the state or in the employ of a political
      subdivision. An employee of the public employees retirement
      system or the state retirement and investment office may not serve
      on the board.

      2. Four members of the legislative assembly must be appointed to
      serve on the board. The majority leader of the house of
      representatives shall appoint two members of the house of
      representatives and the majority leader of the senate shall appoint
      two members of the senate. The members appointed under this
      subsection shall serve a term of two years.

      3. Four members of the board must be appointed by the governor
      to serve a term of five years. Each appointee under this subsection
      must be a North Dakota citizen who is not a state or political
      subdivision employee and who is familiar with retirement and
      employee benefit plans. The governor shall appoint one citizen
      member to serve as chairman of the board.

      4. Three board members must be elected by and from among the
      active participating members, members of the retirement plan
      established under chapter 54-52.6, members of the retirement plan

                                        2
      established under chapter 39-03.1, and members of the job service
      North Dakota retirement plan. Employees who have terminated
      their employment for whatever reason are not eligible to serve as
      elected members of the board under this subsection. Board
      members must be elected to a five-year term pursuant to an
      election called by the board. Notice of board elections must be given
      to all active participating members. The time spent in performing
      duties as a board member may not be charged against any
      employee’s accumulated annual or any other type of leave.

      5. The members of the board are entitled to receive one hundred
      forty-eight dollars per day compensation and necessary mileage
      and travel expenses as provided in sections 44-08-04 and 54-06-09.
      This is in addition to any other pay or allowance due the chairman
      or a member, plus an allowance for expenses they may incur
      through service on the board.

      6. A board member shall serve until the board member’s successor
      qualifies. Each board member is entitled to one vote, and six of the
      eleven board members constitute a quorum. Six votes are
      necessary for resolution or action by the board at any meeting.”

(Emphasis added.) Section 41 of S.B. 2015 amended N.D.C.C. § 54-52-03 by
increasing the number of Board members from nine to eleven and changing
the number of appointed legislators from two to four. See N.D.C.C. § 54-52-
03(1), (2) and (6); 2023 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 47, § 41.

                                       II

[¶6] The Board argues this Court should exercise original jurisdiction
because its petition raises issues of “paramount importance to the interests of
the State and the citizens of North Dakota[.]” The Legislative Assembly agrees.
Article VI, § 2 of the North Dakota Constitution and N.D.C.C. § 27-02-04
provide original jurisdiction to the Court for writs of habeas corpus,
mandamus, quo warranto, certiorari, and injunction. “This authority is
discretionary and cannot be invoked as a matter of right.” State ex rel. Peterson
v. Olson, 307 N.W.2d 528, 531 (N.D. 1981). “The Supreme Court will determine
for itself, on an ad hoc basis, whether or not a particular case is within its

                                       3
original jurisdiction.” Id. (citing State ex rel. Link v. Olson, 286 N.W.2d 262
(N.D. 1979); State ex rel. Vogel v. Garaas, 261 N.W.2d 914 (N.D. 1978)).

[¶7] “It is well-settled that [this Court] invoke[s] our original jurisdiction only
in cases publici juris and those affecting the sovereignty of the state, its
franchises and prerogatives, or the liberties of its people.” N.D. Legis. Assembly
v. Burgum, 2018 ND 189, ¶ 4, 916 N.W.2d 83 (cleaned up). “The interests of the
State must not be merely incidental but must be of primary importance, and
the public must have an interest or right which may be affected.” Peterson, 307
N.W.2d at 531. We have exercised original jurisdiction in cases where the
separation of coequal branches of government and their respective authority
have been challenged. See, e.g., Burgum, at ¶ 10; N.D. State Bd. of Higher
Educ. v. Jaeger, 2012 ND 64, ¶ 13, 815 N.W.2d 215; Peterson, 307 N.W.2d at
531; Link, 286 N.W.2d at 266-67.

[¶8] In Burgum, we addressed the vetoing power of the governor and limits
of the legislature’s power over exercise of executive authority. 2018 ND 189,
¶ 10. In exercising original jurisdiction, this Court determined, “[t]hese issues
concern the balance of powers between the legislative and executive branches
. . . . Because our constitution provides for a separation of legislative, executive,
and judicial powers, actions which tend to undermine this separation are of
great public concern.” Id. In Peterson, this Court examined powers of certain
executive branch agency heads, and the legislature’s ability to appropriate
funds to pay for expanded duties imposed on the lieutenant governor. 307
N.W.2d at 530-31. The primary reason for exercising original jurisdiction in
Peterson was “[b]ecause these challenges relate to the very foundation upon
which the executive and legislative branches of government rest[.]” Id. at 531.

[¶9] Similar to Burgum and Peterson, the issues in this case involve the
constitutionality of the legislative branch’s decision to place legislators on an
executive agency governing board. These issues concern the balance of powers
between the legislative and executive branches of government. Because the
legislature’s actions could undermine that balance, the petition presents a
controversy of “significant public interest that justif[ies] exercise of our original

                                         4
jurisdiction.” Burgum, 2018 ND 189, ¶ 10. We choose to exercise original
jurisdiction in this case.

                                      III

[¶10] The Board argues S.B. 2015 violates N.D. Const. art. IV, § 13, by
embracing more than one subject. The Board asserts S.B. 2015 is an
“appropriation bill,” and S.B. 2015, § 41, which also reenacts N.D.C.C. § 54-52-
03 by changing the NDPERS Board’s composition, is not germane to the subject
expressed in the title of the bill. The Board argues section 41 should be declared
invalid. The Legislative Assembly disagrees with the Board’s characterization
of S.B. 2015. It argues S.B. 2015 is “not merely an appropriations bill” and is
instead a “more comprehensive bill pertaining to State government
operations.” We agree with the Board and conclude S.B. 2015 was
unconstitutionally enacted and is void.

                                        A

[¶11] Whether legislation is unconstitutional is a question of law that is fully
reviewable by this Court. Teigen v. State, 2008 ND 88, ¶ 7, 749 N.W.2d 505. We
interpret legislative enactments and constitutional provisions according to the
same principles of statutory construction. Sorum v. State, 2020 ND 175, ¶ 19,
947 N.W.2d 382 (citing State ex rel. Heitkamp v. Hagerty, 1998 ND 122, ¶ 13,
580 N.W.2d 139). Our framework for construing constitutional provisions is
well established:

      “We aim to give effect to the intent and purpose of the people who
      adopted the constitutional provision. [Heitkamp, at ¶ 13]. We
      determine the intent and purpose of a constitutional provision, ‘if
      possible, from the language itself.’ Kelsh v. Jaeger, 2002 ND 53,
      ¶ 7, 641 N.W.2d 100. ‘In interpreting clauses in a constitution we
      must presume that words have been employed in their natural and
      ordinary meaning.’ Cardiff v. Bismarck Pub. Sch. Dist., 263
      N.W.2d 105, 107 (N.D. 1978).
            “A constitution ‘must be construed in the light of
      contemporaneous history—of conditions existing at and prior to its
      adoption. By no other mode of construction can the intent of its

                                        5
      framers be determined and their purpose given force and effect.’
      [Heitkamp, at ¶ 17] (quoting Ex parte Corliss, 16 N.D. 470, 481,
      114 N.W. 962, 967 (1907)). Ultimately, our duty is to ‘reconcile
      statutes with the constitution when that can be done without doing
      violence to the language of either.’ State ex rel. Rausch v. Amerada
      Petroleum Corp., 78 N.D. 247, 256, 49 N.W.2d 14, 20 (1951). Under
      N.D. Const. art. VI, § 4, we ‘shall not declare a legislative
      enactment unconstitutional unless at least four of the members of
      the court so decide.’”

Sorum, at ¶¶ 19-20. When North Dakota adopts a statutory or constitutional
provision from another jurisdiction, we presume the language was adopted
with knowledge of the interpretation given to it by the source jurisdiction. Id.
at ¶ 30 (citing State ex rel. McCue v. Blaisdell, 119 N.W. 360, 365 (N.D. 1909)).

                                        B

[¶12] North Dakota Constitution art. IV, § 13 provides in relevant part:

             “No law may be enacted except by a bill passed by both
      houses, and no bill may be amended on its passage through either
      house in a manner which changes its general subject matter. No
      bill may embrace more than one subject, which must be expressed
      in its title; but a law violating this provision is invalid only to the
      extent the subject is not so expressed.”

This single subject requirement initially was adopted as section 61 of the 1889
Constitution, which provided: “No bill shall embrace more than one subject,
which shall be expressed in its title, but a bill which violates this provision
shall be invalidated thereby only as to so much thereof as shall not be so
expressed.” The original “one subject” rule was renumbered in 1981 as section
33, and the language was modernized to its current form by an amendment
approved on November 6, 1984, effective December 1, 1986. See N.D.C.C. § 46-
03-11.1; 1985 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 707, § 2; 1983 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 730, § 2.
We have found no authority suggesting the modifications from 1889 to the
present were intended to substantively change the single subject provision.
Nor have the parties to this proceeding cited us to authority or suggested the
1980s modifications to the “one-subject” restriction were substantive.

                                        6
[¶13] When North Dakota adopted its original constitution in 1889, a large
majority of states had constitutional provisions limiting legislation to one
subject. See State ex rel. Goodsill v. Woodmanse, 46 N.W. 970, 971 (N.D. 1890);
see also State ex rel. Standish v. Nomland, 57 N.W. 85, 86 (N.D. 1893) (“The
equivalent of this provision is found in the constitution of nearly every state in
the Union, and few provisions have been oftener before the courts for
construction.”); J.G. Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory Construction 83-85
(1891) (listing provisions). Beginning with our earliest decisions interpreting
the single subject rule, we have cited leading treatises and prominent decisions
of other states to explain the purpose of the rule and its appropriate
application. See, e.g., Goodsill, at 971-72 (citing Thomas M. Cooley,
Constitutional Limitations 176 (5th ed. 1883) to explain the purpose of the one-
subject rule is to prevent “log-rolling” and legislation not fully understood by
members of the legislature or surprises to the public). In the early years
following statehood, we expressed agreement with the leading treatises by
Cooley and Sutherland, and the decisions of several states, that our
interpretation of this provision should not be rigid, but we should “construe the
constitutional provision liberally.” Standish, at 86 (invalidating act creating
the State Board of Auditors as violative of the single subject rule).

[¶14] The two requirements in N.D. Const. art. IV, § 13 pertinent to this case
are that “[n]o bill may embrace more than one subject” and that the subject of
the bill “must be expressed in its title.” The title and one subject requirements
of section 13 are distinct, and they serve different purposes. See S.D. Educ.
Assoc. v. Barnett, 582 N.W.2d 386, 393 (S.D. 1998) (interpreting South Dakota’s
nearly identical constitutional provision to “contain two requirements”); see
also Porten Sullivan Corp. v. State, 568 A.2d 1111, 1118 (Md. 1990) (explaining
Maryland’s similar provision has two objectives). Transparency is the reason
for requiring the subject of a bill to be expressed in its title. The title
requirement ensures the public is informed of the matters within a bill, and it
prevents legislators from unknowingly passing legislation “inserted in a bill of
which the title gives no intimation.” S.D. Educ. Assoc., at 393. “It was designed
to give all parties general notice of what the act contained so that the
legislators might protest against unsatisfactory measures and clauses, and the

                                        7
public could in turn protest to their representatives.” State ex rel. Gaulke v.
Turner, 164 N.W. 924, 928 (N.D. 1917).

[¶15] The purpose of prohibiting multiple subjects is to curtail logrolling—“[t]o
prevent the combining into one bill of several diverse measures which have no
common basis except, perhaps, their separate inability to receive a favorable
vote on their own merits[.] S.D. Educ. Assoc., 582 N.W.2d at 393. The rule also
facilitates the balance of power between the executive and legislative branches
by enabling “the governor to consider each piece of legislation separately in
determining whether to exercise veto power.” Parrish v. Lamm, 758 P.2d 1356,
1362 (Colo. 1988); see also N.D. Const. art. V, § 9 (limiting the governor’s item
veto power to appropriation bills); Link, 286 N.W.2d at 268 (stating bills not
concerning appropriation “must be approved or disapproved in total”). Under
the single subject rule, a bill may include matters “naturally and reasonably
connected with the subject of the act as expressed in the title.” Lapland v.
Stearns, 54 N.W.2d 748, 752, (N.D. 1952). We apply the single subject rule
liberally to uphold legislation when its parts are reasonably germane to a
central object or purpose. Great N. Ry. Co. v. Duncan, 176 N.W. 992, 996 (N.D.
1919).

[¶16] This Court has interpreted the constitution’s single subject language as
providing the Legislative Assembly with considerable flexibility in defining the
subject of legislation and in determining what provisions are germane to that
one subject such that they may be included in a single bill. See, e.g., Eaton v.
Guarantee Co. of N.D., 88 N.W. 1029 (N.D. 1902) (“The section of the
constitution relied upon by counsel has uniformly and very properly received a
liberal construction at the hands of the courts; and this court quite recently, as
well as in its earlier decisions, has applied this rule of construction.”). When
determining whether the subject of a bill is expressed in its title, we avoid strict
and technical interpretation and construe the title liberally. Lapland, 54
N.W.2d at 752. The title should be read considering the “evident object and
purpose” of the legislation. State ex rel. Poole v. Peake, 120 N.W. 47, 49 (N.D.
1909). “It is sufficient if the title, either by express words or by necessary or
reasonable implication from the meaning of its terms, includes the subject and

                                         8
purposes of the act . . . .” Id. at 50. This Court has analyzed whether a person
reading the words in a title “will be apprised of and will naturally look for
provisions of the act” relating to those words. Id. at 49. “If the Legislature is
fairly appraised of the general character of an enactment by the subject as
expressed in its title . . . then the requirement of the Constitution is complied
with.” Gaulke, 164 N.W. at 928 (quoting State v. Cassidy, 22 Minn. 312, 324
(1875)). “The title of an act may and does limit and confine the content of the
act itself, but the terms of the act cannot amplify and broaden the title.”
Dornacker v. Strutz, 1 N.W.2d 614, 616 (N.D. 1941) (citing Olson v. Erickson,
217 N.W. 841 (N.D. 1928); 1 Lewis Sutherland, Statutory Construction § 120
(2d ed. 1904)). “If this were not so the constitutional requirement would be
wholly futile.” Dornacker, at 616.

[¶17] This Court has recognized five guides applicable to single subject
challenges to legislation:

      “This section of the Constitution has been construed by this court
      in several cases. In those cases several principles have been laid
      down as guides in the construction of the section that should be
      applied in this case: (1) The law will not be declared
      unconstitutional on account of the defect unless it is clearly so. (2)
      The title should be liberally construed, and not in a strict or
      technical manner. (3) If the provisions of the act are germane to
      the expressions of the title, the law will be upheld. (4) The object
      to be gained by the enactment and enforcement of the
      constitutional provision is to advise the Legislature and the public
      of the substance of the act and to prevent surprise, fraud, and the
      enactment of laws upon incongruous and independent matters
      under one title. (5) The section of the Constitution is mandatory
      upon the Legislature and upon the courts.”

Powers Elevator Co. v. Pottner, 113 N.W. 703, 704 (N.D. 1907).

[¶18] We have applied these guides in a manner that demonstrates legislation
may violate the single subject rule in more than one way. “If it embrace two
subjects, and both are fully expressed in the title, still the provision is clearly
violated.” Richards v. Stark County, 79 N.W. 863, 864 (N.D. 1899). If a bill

                                        9
embraces more than one subject and only one subject is expressed in the title,
the provisions not germane to the subject expressed in the title are invalid.
Divet v. Richland County, 76 N.W. 993, 995 (N.D. 1898) (“In the case at bar the
body of the act is broader than its title, and hence it must be annulled in so far
as it transcends the title and is inconsistent therewith.”). If an act “embraces
but one subject, and that subject be not expressed in the title, the provision is
equally violated.” Richards, at 864. The provision expressly provides the
remedy for a bill embracing multiple subjects, only one of which is expressed
in the title: the provisions relating to the subject expressed in the title are
valid, and the unrelated matters are invalid and severed. Id.; People ex rel. City
of Rochester v. Briggs, 50 N.Y. 553 (1872). The limits of the rule are illustrated
where a bill embraces only one subject but has a title referencing that one
subject as well as one or more other subjects. Eaton, 88 N.W. at 1029.

                                        C

[¶19] The Legislative Assembly argues: (1) “this Court has construed the
single subject rule loosely,” citing cases reflecting a broad approach to what
provisions are “reasonably germane” to the subject of the legislation; (2) the
“broad subject” of S.B. 2015 is “a more comprehensive bill pertaining to State
government operations, and of NDPERS particularly;” (3) the decisions of this
Court invalidating legislation as violative of the one-subject rule are
“antiquated and rare;” and (4) the law has a “presumption of constitutionality”
that would require us to resolve any doubt as to the constitutionality of
legislation in favor of validity.

                                         1

[¶20] We agree with the Legislative Assembly that all statutes enjoy a
presumption of constitutionality. State v. Holbach, 2009 ND 37, ¶ 23, 763
N.W.2d 761. However, that begins rather than resolves the question before us.

[¶21] Many of the Legislative Assembly’s arguments can be read to claim the
single subject limitation has no current viability as a constitutional doctrine or
as a basis for the judiciary acting as a check on the legislative branch. We reject
those arguments as incomplete. First, N.D. Const. art. IV, § 13 is a valid and

                                        10
active part of our fundamental law, the Constitution. Second, construing S.B.
2015 consistent with the guiding principles first announced in Powers Elevator
Co. as described above, and acting within the judicial constraints described by
our sister states, does not mean no judicially enforceable limits exist for the
breadth of a legislative subject or whether a provision is germane to that
subject. As explained by the California Supreme Court:

      “For example, the rule obviously forbids joining disparate
      provisions which appear germane only to topics of excessive
      generality such as ‘government’ or ‘public welfare.’ . . . subjects of
      ‘excessive generality’ would violate the purpose and intent of the
      single subject rule.

      ....

      “‘Fiscal affairs’ as the subject of Bill 1379 and ‘statutory
      adjustments’ to the budget as its object suffer from the same defect.
      They are too broad in scope if, as petitioners appear to claim, they
      encompass any substantive measure which has an effect on the
      budget. The number and scope of topics germane to ‘fiscal affairs’
      in this sense is virtually unlimited. If petitioners’ position were
      accepted, a substantial portion of the many thousand statutes
      adopted during each legislative session could be included in a
      single measure even though their provisions had no relationship
      to one another or to any single object except that they would have
      some effect on the state’s expenditures as reflected in the budget
      bill. This would effectively read the single subject rule out of the
      Constitution.”

Harbor v. Deukmejian, 742 P.2d 1290, 1303-04 (Cal. 1987).

[¶22] The Legislative Assembly cites various cases where this Court has
rejected challenges to legislation under the single subject rule, and it asserts
the cases where we have invalidated legislation “appear to be antiquated and
rare.” It may be true we have not had recent occasion to address N.D. Const.
art. IV, § 13, but that is no justification for us not following its mandate. See
Porten Sullivan Corp., 568 A.2d at 1118 (stating that despite history of
deference to legislative branch, the single subject provision is “still a part of

                                       11
our Constitution” and as such “it is not to be treated as a dead letter”). Many
jurisdictions have similar if not identical provisions in their constitutions that
have “resulted in the invalidation of substantial and important legislation.”
Michael D. Gilbert, Single Subject Rules & the Legislative Process, 67 U. Pitt.
L. Rev. 803, 806 (2006). This issue is not a matter of antiquity. See, e.g., Douglas
v. Cox Retirement Props., Inc., 302 P.3d 789, 794 (Okla. 2013) (holding
legislation violated single subject rule of state constitution); People v. Olender,
854 N.E.2d 593, 605 (Ill. 2005) (same); St. Louis Health Care Network v. State,
968 S.W.2d 145, 149 (Mo. 1998) (same).

                                         2

[¶23] The remaining question is whether the title or the body of S.B. 2015
embraces more than “one subject.” The Legislative Assembly argues that over
20 of S.B. 2015’s 68 sections relate to NDPERS, and asserts that the subject of
the bill as expressed by its title is “State government operations, and of
NDPERS particularly.”

[¶24] Senate Bill 2015 in its original form was introduced on January 3, 2023,
had a title containing 35 words, and related only to the Office of Management
and Budget:

[¶25] The Senate amended S.B. 2015 on February 21, 2023, expanding its title
to 113 words addressing a number of subjects.

                                        12
The first engrossment with House amendments passed the House on April 21,
2023, when the title contained 134 words addressing a number of subjects:

The title of the first engrossment with conference committee amendments
contained 675 words and included substantially more appropriations and areas
of coverage than any of the prior versions.

[¶26] The final version of S.B. 2015 was passed by both bodies on April 29,
2023. The title of the bill consists of one sentence comprised of 630 words filling
a single-spaced page:

                                        13
The length or difficulty in reading the title does not alone tell us whether more
than one subject is expressed. But the length and variety of covered topics
necessarily informs us whether the title or the bill embraces more than one
subject.

[¶27] Inspection of other legislation during the same session included S.B.
2164 and H.B. 1321. Those were stand-alone bills directly addressing the
NDPERS Board related topics in this proceeding. The title of S.B. 2164 was, “A
BILL for an Act to amend and reenact section 54-52-03 of the North Dakota
Century Code, relating to retirement board membership; to provide an
effective date; and to declare an emergency.” That single subject legislation was

                                       14
defeated by the Senate on April 24, 2023. The original title of H.B. 1321 was,
“A BILL for an Act to create and enact section 54-52.1-05.2 of the North Dakota
Century Code, relating to public employees retirement system contracts for
health benefits coverage; and to amend and reenact sections 54-52-03, 54-52.1-
04, and 54-52.1-05 of the North Dakota Century Code, relating to retirement
board membership and public employees retirement system contracts for
health benefits coverage.” That bill was defeated by the Senate on March 28,
2023.

                                        3

[¶28] The Legislative Assembly argues we should construe the title liberally
as expressing the subject of “state government operations.” Doing so would
eviscerate our single subject rule. The topic of state government operations is
a subject of “excessive generality” that “would violate the purpose and intent
of the single subject rule.” Harbor, 742 P.2d at 1303. Nor are we even convinced
a liberal reading of the title describes that impermissibly broad topic. After
reading the bill’s title, we conclude it does not fairly apprise a reader of
anything other than the fact it is a general appropriations bill that also deals
with an assortment of unrelated laws. Contrary to assertions by the Legislative
Assembly, the title of S.B. 2015 as passed begins by stating it is an act to
“provide an appropriation for defraying the expenses” of various state
government branches, divisions, departments, and agencies. The title explains
the bill includes a series of appropriations to the governor, the legislative
assembly, the judicial branch, and several executive agencies. It then lists a
long series of statutory amendments by reference to the North Dakota Century
Code sections amended. The title also covers “loans from the coal development
trust fund, evidence of indebtedness, distribution of illegal drugs, legacy fund
earnings, the flexible transportation fund, the capitol grounds planning
commission spending limit, the state leave sharing program, capitol grounds
rent collections, the retirement board, the public employees retirement system
retirement plan, the public employees retirement system plan for state peace
officers, the clean sustainable energy authority duties, and joint water resource
boards.”

                                       15
[¶29] Like its title, the body of S.B. 2015 embraces multiple distinct subjects
extraneous and not germane to even the impermissibly broad topic of “state
government operations.” Senate Bill 2015 contains some provisions that might
broadly be described as relating to “state government operations.” It
appropriates funds and also contains provisions concerning, for example,
baseline school funding and aid. One provision deals with projects under the
flexible transportation fund and another concerns projects undertaken by the
Capitol Grounds Planning Commission. The connection to “state government
operations” of other provisions ranges from attenuated to nonexistent. The bill
appropriates $1,792,450 for “Prairie public broadcasting grants.” It also
contains a section to create a “fertilizer development incentive program,” and
it provides requirements for a fertilizer production facility, including
ownership of the facility, its development, and specifically that operations in
the facility must be by “hydrogen produced by the electrolysis of water.” S.B.
2015, § 51. Another provides “a rural senior center infrastructure grant to an
organization in Wells County located in a city with a population between 1,500
and 1,800 according to the 2020 census.” Id. at § 18. Section 26 relates to coal
development trust fund loans. Section 65 requires a legislative study of “the
state’s guardianship programs.” Another section with no conceivable relation
to “state government operations” amends the Uniform Controlled Substances
Act, N.D.C.C. ch. 19-03.1, by changing language relating to delivery of
controlled substances resulting in death. S.B. 2015, § 29.

[¶30] Other jurisdictions have struck down substantive legislation attached to
general appropriations bills as violating constitutional one-subject provisions.
In South Dakota Education Association, the South Dakota Supreme Court
struck down legislation included in an appropriations bill that attempted to
change educators’ collective bargaining rights. 582 N.W.2d at 393. The court
reasoned bargaining rights do not “relate directly” to the subject of
appropriations or “have a natural connection to that subject.” Id. In Planned
Parenthood of St. Louis Region v. Department of Social Services, the Missouri
Supreme Court invalidated a provision in an appropriations bill that
prohibited the expenditure of funds on abortion facilities. 602 S.W.3d 201, 211
(Mo. 2020). The court explained “any bill that purports to combine

                                      16
appropriations with the enactment or amendment of general or substantive
law necessarily contains more than one subject” in violation of Missouri’s
constitutional single subject provision. Id. at 207. The Washington Supreme
Court struck down “a law which could not pass on its own merit” that was
“slipped” into an appropriations bill. Flanders v. Morris, 558 P.2d 769, 772
(Wash. 1977). That court explained: “It is obvious why a legislator would
hesitate to hold up the funding of the entire state government in order to
prevent the enactment of a certain provision, even though he would have voted
against it if it had been presented as independent legislation.” Id.

[¶31] Senate Bill 2015 was introduced by the Appropriations Committee and
originally contained only provisions directly related to the Office of
Management and Budget. After amendments by each legislative body, a
conference committee suggested additional amendments to the bill by adding
various provisions, including section 41 dealing with the NDPERS board. The
NDPERS related amendments were essentially the provisions that failed to
pass as standalone legislation. See H.B. 1321 and S.B. 2164, 68th Leg.
Assembly (N.D. 2023). During the Senate floor debate on final adoption of S.B.
2015, one legislator lamented the resurrection of the NDPERS Board bills as
part of the OMB bill. He said the combined bill went against everything he
believed relating to separation of powers, and that the final bill was “a large
mistake.” Statement of Senator Dever, Senate Floor Session on S.B. 2015, 68th
Leg. Assembly, April 29, 2023.

                                       4

[¶32] We hold both the title and substance of S.B. 2015 violate N.D. Const. art.
IV, § 13. The title of S.B. 2015 does not contain language suggesting it is
anything other than an appropriations bill with other miscellaneous
provisions. The title of S.B. 2015 violates N.D. Const. art. IV, § 13 because it
expressed more than one subject. As to the bill’s substance, S.B. 2015, § 41
amends a law concerning the number of individuals who may sit on the
NDPERS Board, their qualifications, and how they are appointed. Section 41
does not relate to the many other provisions in the bill. The process for
appointing members to the NDPERS Board and the Board’s specific

                                      17
composition is not germane to appropriating funds for state government
operations. Like its title, the body of S.B. 2015 embraces more than one subject
in contravention of N.D. Const. art. IV, § 13. This legislation was originally an
appropriations bill. The non-appropriations additions later added to the bill by
the House may well violate our constitutional mandate that “no bill may be
amended on its passage through either house a manner which changes its
general subject matter.” See N.D. Const. art. IV, § 13. That potential violation
aside, the non-germane changes made by both legislative bodies require the
conclusion S.B. 2015 is unconstitutional.

                                       IV

[¶33] Because S.B. 2015 was adopted in violation of N.D. Const. art. IV, § 13,
we must consider the effect of the violation.

[¶34] Article IV, § 13 provides: “No bill may embrace more than one subject,
which must be expressed in its title; but a law violating this provision is invalid
only to the extent the subject is not so expressed.” See also Fitzmaurice v.
Willis, 127 N.W. 95, 98 (N.D. 1910) (invaliding a portion of a bill under the
single subject clause and leaving the remainder “still in force and effect”).

[¶35] In this case, the title and the substance of the bill’s body match. Both
embrace more than one subject. Therefore, N.D. Const. art. IV, § 13, does not
apply to limit invalidity “only to the extent the subject is not so expressed.”
Rather, S.B. 2015 represents the clearest violation of the single subject rule
because the act embraces multiple subjects, all of which are expressed in the
title. In such a situation, “the whole act is void.” J.G. Sutherland, Statutory
Construction 121 (1891). When legislation includes multiple subjects in both
the body and the title, the whole act is invalid because its formation was
contrary to the constitutional single subject prohibition.

[¶36] Even if this Court was inclined to attempt to determine what legislation
would have resulted without the violation of the constitutional single subject
limitation, our mere attempt would inject the Court into the legislature’s
domain. Cooley’s Treatise emphatically stated: “All the cases recognize this

                                        18
doctrine.” Thomas M. Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 177 n.2 (6th ed. 1890).
The reason derives from the distinct role of the court: “if the title to the act
actually indicates, and the act itself actually embraces, two distinct objects,
when the constitution says it shall embrace but one, the whole act must be
treated as void, from the manifest impossibility in the court choosing between
the two, and holding the act valid as to the one and void as to the other. Id.
(citing City of Antonio v. Gould, 34 Tex. 49 (1870); State v. McCracken, 42 Tex.
383 (1874)).

[¶37] Article IV, § 13, N.D. Const., limits the Legislative Assembly’s power to
craft legislation. The provision also directs this Court’s disposition when a
violation of the section occurs. Standish, 57 N.W. at 86 (“This court should be
careful to destroy no legislation sanctioned by the lawmaking branch of the
state government unless such legislation be a clear violation of the
constitutional requirement. But we have no duty higher or more sacred than
is the duty to preserve in all its integrity every provision in the fundamental
law of the state.”). Declaring all of S.B. 2015 invalid is necessary because
creation of the act violated a requirement imposed by the Constitution. It is
the Court’s duty to uphold the clear requirements of the Constitution when
they are violated, whether inadvertently or not. As discussed above and below,
this is in accord with our decisions since 1889, and with decisions of other
jurisdictions applying a single subject rule to legislation similar to S.B. 2015.

[¶38] In Arizona School Boards Association v. State, the Association
challenged a bill entitled “An Act Amending [Statutes Listed by Number];
Appropriating Monies; Relating to State Budget Procedures.” 501 P.3d 731, 735
(Ariz. 2022). The act included sections relating to election procedures, COVID-
19 mitigation, dog racing permits, the definition of a “newspaper,” and
investigation of social media platforms. Id. The Arizona single subject rule 1 has
been interpreted to prevent “log-rolling” and is “read liberally so as not to

1 “Every act shall embrace but one subject and matters properly connected therewith, which subject

shall be expressed in the title; but if any subject shall be embraced in an act which shall not be
expressed in the title, such act shall be void only as to so much thereof as shall not be embraced in the
title.” Ariz. Const. art. IV, pt. 2, § 13.

                                                  19
impede or embarrass the legislature but not so ‘foolishly liberal’ as to render
the constitutional requirements nugatory.” Id. at 739. “[C]ompliance with the
rule requires that all matters treated should fall under some one general idea,
be so connected with or related to each other, either logically or in popular
understanding, as to be parts of, or germane to, one general subject.” Id.
(cleaned up). The State argued the bill’s various topics were all within a broad
conception of the title’s reference to “budget procedures.” Id. at 740. The court
concluded the bill’s various sections did not fall under “one general idea” and
were not germane to one general subject. Id. “An act that violates the single
subject rule is entirely void because no mechanism is available for courts to
discern the primary subject of the act.” Id.

[¶39] In the course of upholding a capital projects bill against a single subject
challenge, the Illinois Supreme Court explained why a single subject challenge
is directed toward the legislation as a whole: “It is generally held that when an
act contains two or more subjects in violation of the single subject rule, the
reviewing court cannot choose which subject is the ‘right’ one and eliminate the
other. Such a determination would ‘inject[] the courts more deeply than they
should be into the legislative process.’” Wirtz v. Quinn, 953 N.E.2d 899, 920
(Ill. 2011) (quoting Litchfield Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 79 v. Babbitt, 608 P.2d
792, 804 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980)). The court in Wirtz concluded no violation of the
single subject rule occurred because all provisions of the challenged legislation
related to capital projects and financing for those projects. Id. at 913. The court
distinguished three recent decisions where it nullified entire bills for violating
the single subject rule. In the first case, the challenged legislation amended
three criminal statutes, several tax acts, a forest preserve act, a charitable
gaming act, and a communicable disease prevention act. Id. at 909. The court
rejected the State’s argument that the single subject of that legislation was
“governmental regulation” or “revenue,” reasoning the strained connection
between the bill and those broad categories would “render the single subject
clause a nullity.” Id. (quoting Olender, 854 N.E.2d at 604). The court
distinguished a second case where it rejected the State’s argument that the
single subject of “governmental matters” encompassed a bill containing “at
least two unrelated subjects” of criminal justice and hospital liens. Wirtz, at

                                        20
909 (quoting People v. Reedy, 708 N.E.2d 1114, 1118 (Ill. 1999)). The court
distinguished a third case where it declared unconstitutional a 200-page bill
“encompassing such diverse topics as child sex offenders, employer
eavesdropping, and environmental impact fees imposed on the sale of fuel.”
Wirtz, at 909. In that case, the court again rejected the State’s assertion that
the broad subject of the bill was “public safety,” concluding that permitting
reliance on “a tortured connection to a vague notion of public safety” would
“eliminat[e] the single subject rule as a meaningful constitutional check.” Id.
(quoting Johnson v. Edgar, 680 N.E.2d 1372, 1381 (Ill. 1997)); see also Cottrell
v. Faubus, 347 S.W.2d 52, 54 (Ark. 1961) (declaring unconstitutional in its
entirety an act containing “more than a score of distinct appropriations for
miscellaneous and disconnected subjects”).

[¶40] In LS Power Midcontinent, LLC v. State, 988 N.W.2d 316, 325 (Iowa
2023), the court considered a single subject 2 challenge to the final
appropriations bill of the 2020 session. The issue before the court was the
likelihood of success on the merits of the single subject challenge for purposes
of a temporary injunction. Id. at 334. In analyzing the likelihood of success on
the single subject challenge, the court noted the provision “primarily prevents
logrolling” and explained:

        “We are skeptical that any single subject could encompass the
        breathtaking sweep of matters included in H.F. 2643. The title
        itself gives us pause on single-subject grounds: ‘An Act relating to
        state and local finances by making appropriations, providing for
        legal and regulatory responsibilities, providing for other properly
        related matters, and including effective date and retroactive
        applicability provisions.’
               “LSP argues the subjects are so unrelated the only way to fit
        them within a single, common subject is to assert they are all
        ‘laws.’ It observes the bill contained a medley of appropriations

2 “Every act shall embrace but one subject, and matters properly connected therewith; which subject

shall be expressed in the title. But if any subject shall be embraced in an act which shall not be
expressed in the title, such act shall be void only as to so much thereof as shall not be expressed in the
title.” Iowa Const., art. III, § 29.

                                                   21
      provisions . . . corrective provisions . . . and grants of substantive
      rights . . . .”

Id. at 336. The court granted a temporary injunction staying enforcement of
the provision of the act challenged by LS Power Midcontinent.

[¶41] In reaching the conclusion that all of S.B. 2015 must be invalidated, we
are mindful of some decisions by other state courts that have not invalidated
an entire bill following a conclusion there was a single subject violation. The
Oklahoma Supreme Court has more than once issued prospective-only
decisions. See Fent v. State ex rel. Office of State Fin., 184 P.3d 467, 477 (Okla.
2008) (prospective only); Campbell v. White, 856 P.2d 255, 260 (Okla. 1993)
(prospective ruling only).

[¶42] The Iowa Supreme Court holds a single subject rule violation “generally
requires that an act incorporating more than one subject must be wholly
invalidated,” but explains the “rule is inapplicable where one of the subjects of
the act is its main focus, while another is only secondary.” W. Int’l v.
Kirkpatrick, 396 N.W.2d 359, 366 (Iowa 1986). “When we can ascertain which
of the two provisions the legislature would have enacted, we can uphold the
legislative intent by striking only the secondary subject.” Id. (concluding only
four sections of a bill not related to “the focus of the Act” were invalid under
the single subject rule); see also S.D. Educ. Assoc., 582 N.W.2d at 394 (severing
only the challenged provision after determining “the Legislature would have
intended the appropriation for salary increases for Regents’ employees to take
effect even without the unconstitutional clause in section 31 on collective
bargaining”).

[¶43] The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has declared legislation invalid due to
a single subject rule violation, but ordered a delayed effective date for its
decision:

      “[O]ur Court must examine the various subjects contained within
      a legislative enactment and determine whether they have a nexus
      to a common purpose. Stated another way, our task is to ascertain

                                        22
Filed by Clerk of Supreme Court 10/12/23
without intrusion on the legislative process beyond determining its
constitutionality.

                                        V

[¶45] We conclude S.B. 2015 violates N.D. Const. art. IV, § 13 and is void. The
Board’s petition seeking declaratory relief and a writ of injunction prohibiting
execution or enforcement of S.B. 2015 is granted. The Board’s motion to
supplement the record is denied. Because the constitutional “single subject”
rule is dispositive, it is unnecessary to address the Board’s remaining claims.

[¶46] Daniel J. Crothers
      Jerod E. Tufte

Jensen, Chief Justice, concurring specially.

[¶47] I concur in the majority opinion concluding the legislation was enacted
in violation of the single subject rule of article IV, § 13 of the North Dakota
Constitution. The majority reaches this conclusion without reaching an opinion
on whether the legislation, but for being enacted in violation of the single
subject rule, would otherwise have been a permissible action of the legislature.
Because I believe the action would otherwise have been permissible, the
invalidation of the legislation has far-reaching consequences, and in light of
our prior expressed deference to legislative action, I write separately to express
my opinion that our judgment in this case should be stayed for a period of thirty
days. Ordinarily, a mandate must be issued twenty-one days after the entry of
judgment, which is issued simultaneously with this Court’s opinion.
N.D.R.App.P. 41(b). Rule 41(b) provides this Court with discretion to stay its
mandate following the issuance of an opinion. A stay of thirty days would allow
the legislature an opportunity to call a special session and enact all of the
effected legislation in a manner consistent with the single subject rule of article
IV, § 13 of the Constitution.

[¶48] The Board of Trustees of the North Dakota Public Employees Retirement
System (“Board”) petitions this Court seeking declaratory relief and a writ of

                                        24
injunction, challenging N.D.C.C. § 54-52-03 and section 41 of S.B. 2015 (2023),
enacted by the 68th Legislative Assembly, both of which provide for the
appointment of sitting legislators to the Board. The Board asserts legislators
holding office on the Board violates article IV, § 6 of the North Dakota
Constitution; violates the separation of powers between coequal branches of
government and encroaches upon the powers of the executive branch in
violation of articles IV, V, and XI of the Constitution; violates the common-law
rule against incompatibility of office; and violates the single subject rule of
article IV, § 13 of the Constitution. As noted above, the majority concludes the
legislation violates article IV, § 13 of the Constitution, but does not exercise its
authority to stay the mandate pursuant to N.D.R.App.P. 41(b).

[¶49] The majority opinion has ramifications far beyond the issue raised by the
Board, and invalidates all of the legislation included within S.B. 2015 (2023).
The legislation includes appropriations to several branches, agencies, and
offices including the office of management and budget, the office of the
governor, legislative assembly, adjutant general, legislative council,
department of environmental quality, department of labor and human rights,
department of public instruction, department of commerce, department of
health and human services, department of career and technical education, and
the judicial branch. The legislation also creates and enacts new laws, and
reenacts existing laws—most of which pertain to state government operations.

[¶50] If we reached the substantive arguments of the Board, I would conclude
N.D.C.C. § 54-52-03 and section 41 of S.B. 2015, which provide for the
appointment of four sitting legislators to the Board, do not violate article IV, §
6 of the North Dakota Constitution; articles IV, V, and XI of the Constitution,
the common-law rule against incompatibility of office, or the separation of
powers doctrine. Because of the far-reaching impact of invalidating the entire
bill, and the likelihood the legislation would survive the other challenges raised
by NDPERS (assuming each individual subject commands a majority), I would
stay the mandate in this case for a period of thirty days pursuant to
N.D.R.App.P. 41(b).

                                        25
                                        I

[¶51] On June 1, 2023, the Board petitioned this Court to exercise its original
jurisdiction under N.D.C.C. § 27-02-04, seeking declaratory relief under
N.D.C.C. § 32-23-01 and a writ of injunction under N.D.C.C. § 32-06-01. The
Board filed a motion for a preliminary injunction before the hearing, which this
Court denied.

[¶52] Specifically, the Board seeks a declaration that section 41 of S.B. 2015 is
void ab initio and N.D.C.C. § 54-52-03 is invalid, both of which provide for
appointment of sitting legislators to the Board, because they violate article IV,
§ 6 of the North Dakota Constitution, the separation of powers under articles
IV, V, and XI of the Constitution, and the common-law doctrine of
incompatibility. The Board also seeks a declaration that S.B. 2015 is invalid
because the joinder of an appropriation bill with an amendment to the Board’s
structure is not germane, constitutes “logrolling,” and is in violation of article
IV, § 13 of the Constitution.

[¶53] The Board requests a writ of injunction preventing the appointment of
additional legislators and the continued service of sitting legislators on the
Board. The Board argues irreparable harm results when legislators—who have
a duty to their constituents and the state at large—must also hold a fiduciary
duty to advance the interests of PERS members and beneficiaries. The Board
argues these dual duties are inherently contradictory.

[¶54] Section 54-52-03, N.D.C.C., after the recent amendments, provides:

      1. A state agency is hereby created to constitute the governing
      authority of the system to consist of a board of eleven individuals
      known as the retirement board. No more than one elected member
      of the board may be in the employ of a single department,
      institution, or agency of the state or in the employ of a political
      subdivision. An employee of the public employees retirement
      system or the state retirement and investment office may not serve
      on the board.

                                       26
2. Four members of the legislative assembly must be appointed to
serve on the board. The majority leader of the house of
representatives shall appoint two members of the house of
representatives and the majority leader of the senate shall appoint
two members of the senate. The members appointed under this
subsection shall serve a term of two years.

3. Four members of the board must be appointed by the governor
to serve a term of five years. Each appointee under this subsection
must be a North Dakota citizen who is not a state or political
subdivision employee and who is familiar with retirement and
employee benefit plans. The governor shall appoint one citizen
member to serve as chairman of the board.

4. Three board members must be elected by and from among the
active participating members, members of the retirement plan
established under chapter 54-52.6, members of the retirement plan
established under chapter 39-03.1, and members of the job service
North Dakota retirement plan. Employees who have terminated
their employment for whatever reason are not eligible to serve as
elected members of the board under this subsection. Board
members must be elected to a five-year term pursuant to an
election called by the board. Notice of board elections must be given
to all active participating members. The time spent in performing
duties as a board member may not be charged against any
employee’s accumulated annual or any other type of leave.

5. The members of the board are entitled to receive one hundred
forty-eight dollars per day compensation and necessary mileage
and travel expenses as provided in sections 44-08-04 and 54-06-09.
This is in addition to any other pay or allowance due the chairman
or a member, plus an allowance for expenses they may incur
through service on the board.

6. A board member shall serve until the board member’s successor
qualifies. Each board member is entitled to one vote, and six of the
eleven board members constitute a quorum. Six votes are
necessary for resolution or action by the board at any meeting.

                                 27
(Emphasis added.) Section 41 of S.B. 2015 amended N.D.C.C. § 54-52-03,
increasing the number of Board members from nine to eleven and changing
the number of appointed legislators from two legislators to four legislators. See
N.D.C.C. § 54-52-03(1), (2), and (6); 2023 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 47, § 41.

                                       II

[¶55] The Board argues legislators holding the office of Board member violates
article IV, § 6 of the North Dakota Constitution. This section provides:

      While serving in the legislative assembly, no member may hold any
      full-time appointive state office established by this constitution or
      designated by law. During the term for which elected, no member
      of the legislative assembly may be appointed to any full-time office
      that has been created by the legislative assembly. During the term
      for which elected, no member of the legislative assembly may be
      appointed to any full-time office for which the legislative assembly
      has increased the compensation in an amount greater than the
      general rate of increase provided to full-time state employees.

N.D. Const. art. IV, § 6 (emphasis added). The Board argues its members are
appointed state officers and their position meets the definition for “full-time.”
The Legislative Assembly asserts members are compensated on a per diem
basis, serve only once per month, and during the last fiscal year, were
reimbursed by the State only 12 times. The Legislative Assembly also asserts
the meaning of “full-time” is approximately 40 hours of work per week on a
sustained basis.

[¶56] This Court uses        the   following   framework    when    interpreting
constitutional provisions:

             In interpreting constitutional provisions, we apply general
      principles of statutory construction. Our overriding objective is to
      give effect to the intent and purpose of the people adopting the
      constitutional provision. The intent and purpose of constitutional
      provisions are to be determined, if possible, from the language
      itself. In construing constitutional provisions, we ascribe to the

                                       28
      words the meaning the framers understood the provisions to have
      when adopted.

Wrigley v. Romanick, 2023 ND 50, ¶ 17, 988 N.W.2d 231 (cleaned up).
Constitutional provisions are generally given their plain, ordinary, and
commonly understood meaning. Thompson v. Jaeger, 2010 ND 174, ¶ 7, 788
N.W.2d 586. The North Dakota Constitution must also be read in the light of
history. Wrigley, at ¶ 17.

[¶57] In 1984, the people of North Dakota amended the provision at issue,
presently found at N.D. Const. art. IV, § 6, replacing and revising a provision
that had used the phrase “[n]o member . . . [shall] be appointed or elected to
any civil office,” with the phrase “no member may hold any full-time appointive
state office[.]” Compare N.D. Const. art. IV, § 17 (1981), with 1984 amendments
to N.D. Const. art. IV (H.C.R. 3028, 1985 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 706, § 6)
(emphasis added). In 2012, article IV, § 6 was again amended to add, “During
the term for which elected, no member of the legislative assembly may be
appointed to any full-time office for which the legislative assembly has
increased the compensation in an amount greater than the general rate of
increase provided to full-time state employees.” See H.C.R. 3047, 2013 N.D.
Sess. Laws ch. 515, § 1 (emphasis added).

[¶58] This Court interpreted the phrase “civil office” in Baird v. Lefor, 201 N.W.
997, 999 (N.D. 1924). In Baird, this Court held that a state senator was allowed
to hold the title of receiver during judicial liquidation proceedings because in
the senator’s role as a court-appointed receiver, he exercised “none of the
powers of civil government.” Id. That phrase is juxtaposed against the newer
phrase in N.D. Const. art. IV, § 6, “full-time appointive state office[,]” and when
compared means the new phrase prohibits the exercising of “full-time” powers
of civil government. The new phrase permits legislators to hold non-full-time
offices that exercise some limited powers of civil government. A plain reading
of the phrase provides for this interpretation as does the historical context of
the change. See State v. Hagerty, 1998 ND 122, ¶ 17, 580 N.W.2d 139 (when
interpreting constitutional amendments, this Court “look[s] first to the
historical context” including “what it displaced”).

                                        29
[¶59] The compensation scheme provided in N.D.C.C. § 54-52-03(5) also gives
context to the meaning of “full-time.” It provides that Board members are paid
on a per diem basis. This coupled with evidence that Board members sought
reimbursement only 12 times in 2022, and that Board meetings occur only once
per month supports a finding that legislators serving as members on the Board
are not “full-time.” An ordinary and common understanding of the term “full-
time” requires more than per diem compensation and a once-monthly time
commitment. The Board argues its members serve on a regular and continuing
basis as managing fiduciaries of NDPERS. I determine this argument
unpersuasive because article IV, § 6 of the North Dakota Constitution does not
prohibit service of legislators to appointive state offices who serve regularly or
continuously, but rather prohibits service in appointive state offices that are
“full-time.” If we were to reach this issue, I would conclude legislative
membership on the Board is not a “full-time appointive state office” and a
legislator may be appointed to the Board without violating article IV, § 6.

                                         III

[¶60] The Board argues a statute permitting a legislator to simultaneously
hold the office of Board member violates the tenets of separation of powers
between coequal branches of government, and unlawfully encroaches upon the
duties and powers of an executive branch agency in violation of articles IV, V,
and XI of the North Dakota Constitution. The Legislative Assembly responds
that neither N.D.C.C. § 54-52-03 nor section 41 of S.B. 2015 violates separation
of powers under the state constitution because the appointment power resides
in the legislature unless expressly assigned elsewhere, because legislators
assigned to the Board constitute a minority in voting power, cannot direct or
halt actions unsupported by other Board members, and because the
legislature’s intent was not one of usurpation, but rather cooperation.

                                        A

[¶61] I first address the Board’s challenge that the state constitution prohibits
legislators from appointing themselves to executive boards. In article V, § 8 of
the North Dakota Constitution, the Governor is given appointment power for

                                       30
state offices “if no other method is provided by this constitution or by law.”
While the Governor is given authority to appoint executive offices, N.D.C.C. §
54-52-03 and S.B. 2015 are “other” methods provided by law, and as such, do
not violate article V of the Constitution.

[¶62] This Court has also previously addressed this issue and found
appointment powers are vested in the legislative branch. See State v. Frazier,
182 N.W. 545, 548 (N.D. 1921). In the Frazier decision, this Court stated:

      This court has heretofore held, in construction of constitutional
      powers, that the power of appointment to office (and this includes
      power of removal) is vested neither in the executive nor judicial
      department of the government, excepting as the Constitution has
      expressly granted such power; that this power resides in the
      Legislature; that all governmental sovereign power is vested in the
      Legislature, except such as granted to other departments of the
      government, or expressly withheld from the Legislature by
      constitutional restrictions.

Id. Had we reached this issue, I would conclude the legislature’s authority to
appoint members to an executive agency falls within the powers vested to it by
the state constitution. I would reject the Board’s assertion that N.D.C.C. §
54-52-03 and S.B. 2015 violate article V of the North Dakota Constitution.

                                      B

[¶63] The Board further asserts that N.D.C.C. § 54-52-03 and section 41 of S.B.
2015 violate the separation of powers between coequal branches of government
as established by article XI, § 26 of the North Dakota Constitution. States
maintain the authority to decide the extent to which powers will be kept
separate:

      The separation-of-powers doctrine which is embodied in the
      United States Constitution is not mandatory in state governments
      and is not enforceable against the states as a matter of
      constitutional law. It is for the State to determine whether and to
      what extent its powers will be kept separate between the three
      branches of government or whether persons belonging to one

                                      31
      department may exert powers which, strictly speaking, pertain to
      another department of government. A state’s determination one
      way or the other cannot be an element in the inquiry whether due
      process of law has been respected by the state or its
      representatives.

16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 276 (May 2023 Update) (footnotes omitted).
Moreover, the doctrine allows for some degree of functional overlap between
the branches. See 16A Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law § 242 (May 2023 Update)
(“[O]ne branch of government may engage in functions that intervene in or
overlap with the functions of another branch so long as it does not undermine
the operation of that other branch or undermine the rule of law that all
branches are committed to maintain.” (footnote omitted)).

[¶64] This Court has made similar conclusions regarding our three branches
of government:

            The essential structural division of power into three
      branches created by our Constitution parallels that of our sister
      states and also that of the U.S. Constitution. Accordingly, we may
      find the decisions from the U.S. Supreme Court and the highest
      courts of our sister states persuasive, but ultimately we are
      charged with interpreting the North Dakota Constitution and its
      distinct provisions. We have sometimes navigated our own path in
      defining the contours of separation of powers[.]

N.D. Legis. Assembly v. Burgum, 2018 ND 189, ¶ 42, 916 N.W.2d 83. We have
also explained that “[u]nder our constitutional system, the Legislature may not
delegate to itself, or to a subset of its members, executive or judicial functions.”
Id. at ¶ 59 (quoting Kelsh v. Jaeger, 2002 ND 53, ¶ 21, 641 N.W.2d 100); see
also N.D. Const. art. XI, § 26 (“The legislative, executive, and judicial branches
are coequal branches of government.”). See also State v. Hanson, 558 N.W.2d
611, 614 (N.D. 1996) (finding article XI, § 26 of the North Dakota Constitution
formalizes a separation of powers).

[¶65] We have not adopted a bright-line analysis for what degree of overlap
between the branches is tenable before concluding one branch has undermined

                                        32
the rule of another. We have considered approaches taken by sister states in
navigating our own rule of law in this area. In Burgum, this Court relied on
State ex rel. McLeod v. McInnis, 295 S.E.2d 633, 637 (S.C. 1982), a South
Carolina case, as persuasive authority, when it determined the legislative
assembly usurped the executive branch’s power by retaining for itself budget
approval requirements for funds spent by the water commission. 2018 ND 189,
¶¶ 55, 60. McInnis also provides relevant assistance for determining legislative
encroachment when it found the “separation of powers doctrine does not in all
cases prevent individual members of the legislature from serving on
administrative boards or commissions . . . where such services falls in the
realm of cooperation . . . and there is no attempt to usurp functions of the
executive department[.]” 295 S.E.2d at 636.

[¶66] Another South Carolina case established a bright-line test for analyzing
the issue by holding that legislative appointment to executive boards do not
violate the separation of powers doctrine where, “(1) the legislators [are] a
numerical minority, and (2) the body [] represent(s) a cooperative effort to make
available to the executive department the special knowledge and expertise of
designated legislators[.]” S.C. Pub. Int. Found. v. S.C. Transp. Infrastructure
Bank, 744 S.E.2d 521, 527 (S.C. 2013) (quoting Tall Tower, Inc. v. S.C.
Procurement Rev. Panel, 363 S.E.2d 683, 685-86 (S.C. 1987)).

[¶67] I conclude most persuasive a test from Oklahoma, enumerated in In re
Oklahoma Department of Transportation, 64 P.3d 546, 550 (Okla. 2002), that
establishes a framework for determining whether members from a legislature
serving on an administrative board or commission is a usurpation of power of
the executive branch. The court determined that “[r]ather than focusing
exclusively on how a function might be conceptually classified . . . a usurpation
occurs when one department is . . . subjected directly or indirectly to the
coercive influences of another, and when there is a significant interference by
one department with the operations of another department.” Id. (cleaned up).
The court went on to discuss a non-exclusive set of four criteria in deciding
separation of powers issues. The court considered the following: (1) the
“essential nature of the power being exercised. Is the power exclusively

                                       33
executive or legislative or is it a blend of the two?” (2) the “degree of control”
the legislature was attempting to exercise; “Is the influence coercive or
cooperative?” (3) the legislature’s objective or intent either to “cooperate with
the executive by furnishing some special expertise of one or more of its
members” or to establish “its superiority over the executive department in an
area essentially executive in nature”; and (4) the “practical result of the
blending of powers as shown by actual experience over a period of time where
such evidence is available.” Id. (quoting State ex rel. Schneider v. Bennett, 547
P.2d 786, 792 (Kan. 1976)). I would adopt this test and apply the four criteria
to the instant case.

                                        1

[¶68] In examining the first factor—whether the nature of the power being
exercised is executive or legislative, or a blend of the two—it is important to
note the Board “constitute[s] the governing authority of the system[.]”
N.D.C.C. § 54-52-03(1). The Board is responsible for managing the NDPERS
system, has all the privileges of a corporation, appoints an executive director,
and creates staff positions necessary for the “sound and economical
administration of the system.” N.D.C.C. § 54-52-04(1)-(3). The Board must also
arrange for an actuarial expert to “make an annual valuation of the liabilities
and reserves of the system” and determine “the contributions required by the
system to discharge its liabilities and pay the administrative costs under this
chapter, and to recommend to the board rates of employer and employee
contributions required, based upon the entry age normal cost method, to
maintain the system on an actuarial reserve basis[.]” N.D.C.C. § 54-52-04(4).

[¶69] The nature of the Board’s tasks are a blend of legislative and executive.
While the Board is responsible for overall management of the system—which
is more executive in nature—much of the day-to-day operations are facilitated
by hired director(s), staff, and actuarial experts in the field—who make daily
decisions on how the system is to be run. I would determine this factor weighs
neither in favor of usurpation, nor against usurpation, but is neutral given the
dual nature of the Board’s authority.

                                       34
                                        2

[¶70] The second factor considers whether the legislature is attempting to
maintain control over executive functions. This factor weighs in favor of the
Legislative Assembly’s argument that four appointed legislators to the Board
do not exercise a coercive degree of control over the executive functions of the
agency. The four appointed legislators constitute a minority of the Board; the
chairman of the Board is appointed by the Governor; and individual
legislators—either together or alone—cannot bring the Board’s directives to a
halt or initiate actions on their own. While it may be true the legislature
appears to have diluted the elected Board members’ power, that issue was not
raised by the Board. This factor weighs in favor of finding legislative
appointments to the Board do not equal a usurpation of the executive branch’s
power.

                                        3

[¶71] The third factor considers whether it is the legislature’s intent to
cooperate with an executive board by providing legislator expertise on a
specific area, or instead, to establish superiority over the executive board. The
third factor does not weigh in favor of usurpation. Appointing four of eleven
Board members from the legislature in no way establishes superiority over the
executive board or its functions. Furthermore, the Board has provided no
legislative history that suggests it was the legislature’s intent to establish
superiority over the direction of the Board. The Board asserts that “[t]he
motivation is obvious[,]” because Board members are “responsible for adopting
the actuarial assumptions and standards necessary to assure proper funding
of NDPERS.” However, the Board and its composition—both before, and as
modified by section 41 of S.B. 2015—will ensure that the four assigned
legislators cannot reign supreme over the direction and decisions of the Board.
The legislators can merely provide input in cooperation with other Board
members. This factor weighs against a determination of usurpation by the
legislative branch against the executive branch.

                                       35
                                          4

[¶72] The fourth factor considers the practical results of blending power over
time. Here, two members of the legislature have previously been appointed to
serve on the Board, and under the modification, four members serve in that
capacity. The Board, as Petitioner, provides no “practical results” showing the
Board was unable to practically fulfill their duties with two legislators
appointed to it. An individual breach of fiduciary duty, should it occur, can be
addressed with action taken against individual legislators who may be alleged
to have breached their fiduciary duty as a member of the Board.

[¶73] I conclude no direct or indirect coercive influences in the appointment of
four legislators to the Board, and conclude no significant interference in the
operations of the Board or the NDPERS system considering that the
composition of the Board does not allow the legislators to exercise coercive
control over the Board’s action, establish superiority over the Board’s direction,
or practically alter the Board’s functions despite a limited blending of power.
These conclusions are in accordance with the test established in In re Okla.
Dep’t of Transp. I would conclude that N.D.C.C. § 54-52-03 and section 41 of
S.B. 2015 do not violate the separation-of-powers doctrine found in article XI,
§ 26 of the North Dakota Constitution.

                                           IV

[¶74] The Board argues that a legislator simultaneously holding the office of
NDPERS trustee violates the common-law rule against incompatibility
because as a trustee, a Board member’s fiduciary responsibility for adopting
actuarial assumptions necessary to assure proper funding of NDPERS is
“hopelessly in conflict” with a legislator’s duty to implement the state budget.
The Board asserts a fiduciary must be concerned with the participants’ best
interest, not the best interest of the state budget or their constituents. Given
these fiduciary responsibilities, the Board contends a legislator cannot perform
the duties of his or her elected office and also fulfill an undivided duty of loyalty
to NDPERS.

                                         36
[¶75] The Board relies on Tarpo v. Bowman Public School District #1, which
states, “it is a well settled rule of the common law that a person may not, at
one and the same time, rightfully hold two offices which are incompatible.” 232
N.W.2d 67, 70 (N.D. 1975) (quoting State v. Lee, 50 N.W.2d 124, 126 (N.D.
1951)). This Court has explained “the common law is adopted as the law in this
state where there is no express constitutional or statutory law on the subject.”
Trosen v. Trosen, 2022 ND 216, ¶ 21, 982 N.W.2d 527; see also N.D.C.C. §
1-01-03(4), (5), and (7); Reese v. Reese-Young, 2020 ND 35, ¶ 20, 938 N.W.2d
405. “The common law, which is based on reason and public policy, can best be
determined by studying the decisions of our federal and state courts and the
writings of past and present students of our country’s law over all the years of
American judicial history.” Trosen, at ¶ 21 (quoting Reese, at ¶ 21). However,
under N.D.C.C. § 1-01-06, “there is no common law in any case in which the
law is declared by the code.”

[¶76] Section 54-52-03, N.D.C.C., has been declared by the code. The
legislator appointments to the NDPERS Board, as provided under N.D.C.C. §
54-52-03 and increased in S.B. 2015, are the product of the legislative process
resulting in statutory law passed by the legislature. To the extent the
appointments provided by the code—both previously and as amended by S.B.
2015—are in conflict with the common-law rule, the code must prevail. I would
conclude the Board’s argument regarding the common-law doctrine of
incompatibility of office to be without merit.

                                         V

[¶77] The Board argues S.B. 2015 violates the single subject rule, found in
article IV, § 13 of the North Dakota Constitution, by embracing more than a
single subject because section 41, which amends and reenacts N.D.C.C. § 54-
52-03 by changing the NDPERS Board’s inherent composition, is not germane
to the subject expressed in the title of the bill, which the Board argues is an
“appropriation bill.” As noted above, I agree with the conclusion in the majority
opinion. However, when considering whether to stay our mandate in this case
pursuant to N.D.R.App.P. 41(b), I believe our prior caselaw and deference to
legislative action compels a stay.

                                       37
[¶78] North Dakota Constitution article IV, § 13 provides that “[n]o bill may
embrace more than one subject, which must be expressed in its title; but a law
violating this provision is invalid only to the extent the subject is not so
expressed.” This Court has interpreted the one-subject requirement broadly
“as requiring that all matters treated by one piece of legislation be reasonably
germane to one general subject or purpose.” SunBehm Gas, Inc. v. Conrad, 310
N.W.2d 766, 772 (N.D. 1981). “Such an act is not invalidated simply because
the title may enumerate a plurality of subjects, when all of these subjects taken
together are but one subject.” State ex rel. Sandaker v. Olson, 260 N.W. 586,
592 (N.D. 1935). Stated another way:

      [T]his rule means that legislation may include any matter
      naturally and reasonably connected with the subject of the act as
      expressed in the title. It is also the law of this state that the title
      to an act will be construed liberally and not in a strict and technical
      manner.

Lapland v. Stearns, 54 N.W.2d 748, 752 (N.D. 1952) (citations omitted); State
v. Colohan, 286 N.W. 888, 893 (N.D. 1939); City of Mandan v. Nichols, 243 N.W.
740, 742-43 (N.D. 1932); State v. Steen, 236 N.W. 251, 253-54 (N.D. 1931); Great
N. Ry. Co. v. Duncan, 176 N.W. 992, 997 (N.D. 1919); State ex rel. Gaulke v.
Turner, 164 N.W. 924 (N.D. 1917); Eaton v. Guarantee Co., 88 N.W. 1029, 1029-
30 (N.D. 1902). “Whether a law is unconstitutional is a question of law, which
is fully reviewable on appeal.” City of Fargo v. Roehrich, 2021 ND 145, ¶ 5, 963
N.W.2d 248. “We construe statutes and municipal ordinances to avoid
constitutional infirmities, and we resolve any doubt in favor of the
constitutionality of the statute or ordinance.” Id.

[¶79] We have historically provided great deference to the legislature with
regard to the application of the single subject rule. This case goes far beyond
our prior deference and the majority opinion rightly concludes the legislation
violates the single subject rule. However, in light of my belief the underlying
legislation directly at issue in this case would survive the other challenges
raised by NDPERS, the far-reaching impact of invalidating the legislation as
having been enacted in violation of the single subject rule, and our prior

                                        38
caselaw reflecting great deference to the legislature, I would exercise our
discretion to stay the mandate in this case for thirty days.

                                       VI

[¶80] I concur in the majority opinion the legislation violates the single subject
rule as expressed in article IV, § 13 of the North Dakota Constitution. Had we
reached the merits of the underlying legislation at issue in this case, I would
conclude N.D.C.C. § 54-52-03 and section 41 of S.B. 2015, which provide for the
appointment of four sitting legislators to the NDPERS Board, do not violate
article IV, § 6; articles IV, V, and XI of the Constitution. Furthermore, I would
conclude N.D.C.C. § 54-52-03 and section 41 of S.B. 2015 do not violate the
separation of powers between coequal branches of government, and do not
violate the common-law rule against incompatibility of office. I would also
recognize the far-reaching implication of our decision and our prior deference
with regard to the single subject rule and stay the mandate of our decision for
a period of thirty days to provide the legislature an opportunity to call a special
session and enact all of the impacted legislation in compliance with article IV,
§ 13 of the Constitution.

[¶81] Jon J. Jensen, C.J.

McEvers, Justice, concurring specially.

[¶82] I agree with the majority opinion concluding the legislation enacted is in
violation of the single subject rule of article IV, § 13 of the North Dakota
Constitution and is unconstitutional and, therefore, not valid. I also agree with
that portion of Chief Justice Jensen’s concurring opinion that our judgment
should not be issued and the mandate in this case should be stayed for a period
of time to allow the legislative assembly an opportunity to convene a special
session to consider whether all the sections previously approved will continue
to gather sufficient support when they are presented and voted on in a
constitutional manner.

                                        39
[¶83] As noted in the Chief Justice’s separate, N.D.R.App.P. 41(b) provides this
Court with discretion to stay its mandate following the issuance of an opinion.
See also Datz v. Dosch, 2014 ND 102, ¶ 9, 846 N.W.2d 724 (noting N.D.R.App.P.
41(b) provides the Court with discretion to extend the time to issue the
mandate). While granting a stay when no stay has yet been requested is an
unusual act by this Court, a stay is within the Court’s authority. I agree with
the Chief Justice that not granting a stay may have unintended and far-
reaching effects. The funding for much of state government is called into
question by declaring the legislation invalid—including funds that have
already been spent. Nonetheless, I do not care to speculate on the likelihood of
which legislation may survive additional consideration by the legislative
assembly, so I do not fully join the Chief Justice in his separate.

[¶84] Lisa Fair McEvers
      Gary H. Lee, D.J.

[¶85] The Honorable Gary H. Lee, D.J., sitting in place of Bahr, J., disqualified.

                                       40
                                                                        20230158
                                                                 FILED OCTOBER 12, 2023
                                                              CLERK OF THE SUPREME COURT
                                                                STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

            On Motion for Clarification and Motion for Stay
                        Filed October 12, 2023
                             No. 20230158

Per Curiam.

[¶86] The Legislative Assembly moved “for clarification as to whether, and for
what duration, the issuance of the Court’s judgment and mandate have been
stayed,” and further moved for a stay of our decision until December 18, 2023.
The Board responded that no clarification is needed, that no stay had been
issued, and that N.D.R.App.P. 41 provides no basis for issuing a stay in this
matter. We now clarify that we grant no stay of the judgment, we deny the
Legislative Assembly’s motion for a stay of judgment, and we direct the clerk
of the Supreme Court to issue judgment without further delay.

[¶87] Neither the briefs of the parties nor the opinions previously issued by
this Court identify authority for this Court to stay its judgment under these
circumstances. Justice Crothers’ opinion, joined by Justice Tufte, at ¶ 44 left
open the possibility that a stay or other procedural delay “may be available”
but declined to grant a stay of the decision absent a request. Justice Crothers
cited N.D.R.App.P. 41 as supporting that proposition by inference (using a see
signal) and a citation to a Pennsylvania case reversing a trial court decision
and staying the mandate for 90 days before returning jurisdiction to the trial
court. Commonwealth v. Neiman, 624 Pa. 53, 75, 84 A.3d 603, 616 (2013) (citing
City of Philadelphia v. Com., 575 Pa. 542, 587, 838 A.2d 566, 594 (2003)). Chief
Justice Jensen, at ¶ 47, cited only N.D.R.App.P. 41 for the proposition that the
Court has authority to stay a decision and, at ¶ 50, stated that he “would stay
the mandate in this case for a period of thirty days.” See also ¶¶ 77, 79, 80.
Justice McEvers, at ¶ 83, joined by Judge Lee, also relied solely on Rule 41 as
providing authority to grant a stay. A majority of the Court thus granted a stay
until October 28. On motion and full briefing by the parties, the Court has
reconsidered the applicability of Rule 41 and now rescinds the previously
granted stay.

[¶88] Rule 41 does not apply here because this is a case arising under our
original jurisdiction. In an original jurisdiction proceeding, we do not issue a
                                      41
mandate returning jurisdiction to the district court because the matter did not
originate there. Disciplinary Board v. Larson, 485 N.W.2d 345, 348 n.2 (N.D.
1992) (explaining “[a] mandate is the official mode of communicating the
judgment of an appellate court to a lower court” and therefore Rule 41 does not
apply). No other rule even suggests we have discretion to delay the effect of a
decision after issuance of an opinion. See N.D.R.App.P. 36 (“The clerk of the
supreme court must prepare, sign and enter the judgment: (1) after receiving
the court’s opinion.”). Section 27-02-05, N.D.C.C., recognizes the supreme court
has “full power and authority to carry into complete execution all its
judgments.” Neither party argues this statute provides authority to stay a
judgment in these circumstances, and it is not clear the power to carry a
judgment into complete execution necessarily includes the opposite power—to
delay carrying into effect a judgment—especially where that judgment
declares a coordinate branch exceeded its constitutional limits and a stay
allows that violation to continue. We have declared S.B. 2015 was
unconstitutionally enacted and thus void from the beginning. A stay of that
declaration would allow the State to proceed as if the legislation had been
lawfully enacted for the duration of the stay.

[¶89] Absent statutory authority to grant a stay, a court may have inherent
power to grant a stay. The Legislative Assembly relies on authority discussing
the inherent power of courts of general jurisdiction to vacate, grant relief from,
or temporarily stay execution of judgments. See Hamilton v. Hamilton, 410
N.W.2d 508, 515 (N.D. 1987); Wassung v. Wassung, 286 N.W. 340, 342 (Neb.
1939). These cases are distinguishable in that this Court is not a court of
general jurisdiction and we are not considering a motion to vacate or grant
relief from judgment of the type discussed in these cases. Such motions are
routinely considered by district courts under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60. A motion to
temporarily stay execution of a judgment requiring payment of money, as in
Wassung and similar cases, is within the trial court’s inherent power of
supervision over its process. That supervisory power is distinctly different from
the motion before us to stay entry of a declaratory judgment. A court’s “power
to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to control
the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for

                                       42
itself, for counsel, and for litigants.” Landis v. North American Co., 299 U.S.
248, 254 (1936). The rationale for that inherent power to stay proceedings is
entirely absent when the court has decided a matter and seeks to delay the
effective date of a decision that is final and from which no appeal may be taken.

[¶90] A pause to consider the source of authority reveals a more fundamental
defect in granting a stay of judgment here. This Court has only the authority
granted to it by the people of this state through its constitution. Likewise, the
Legislative Assembly has only the authority granted to it by the people of this
state through its constitution. We concluded, at ¶ 32, that the Legislative
Assembly has exceeded the limits imposed on its authority by the single-
subject rule and that the constitutional remedy is that the bill is invalid. See
¶ 44.

[¶91] After declaring a constitutional violation, it would be a novel assertion
of authority by this Court to countenance a continuation of that violation by
delaying the effective date of our judgment. We concluded the Legislative
Assembly legislated outside constitutional limits when it enacted S.B. 2015.
We have repeatedly said in such circumstances the enactment is void ab initio.
Hoff v. Berg, 1999 ND 115, ¶ 19, 595 N.W.2d 285; see also Interest of J.B., 2021
ND 90, ¶ 4, 959 N.W.2d 869 (“When a court concludes a statute violates the
constitution, the remedy the judicial branch may grant is to declare that the
‘unconstitutional legislation is void and is to be treated as if it never were
enacted.’” (citing Berg, at ¶ 19)); Sorum v. State, 2020 ND 175, ¶ 21, 947
N.W.2d 382 (same); see Nw. Landowners Ass’n v. State, 2022 ND 150, ¶ 12, 978
N.W.2d 679 (same); State v. Anderson, 2022 ND 144, ¶ 7, 977 N.W.2d 736
(same). A stay of judgment after issuance of an opinion declaring legislation
unconstitutional would be an assertion of power by the Court that it may
declare legislation void but deem it to be valid during the pendency of the stay.
This Court, itself limited by the constitution, will not claim for itself the power
to grant to the Legislative Assembly authority that the Constitution does not
give either the Court or the Assembly.

[¶92] The motion for a stay is denied, and the clerk of the Supreme Court is
directed to enter judgment without further delay.
                                        43
[¶93] Jon J. Jensen, C.J
      Daniel J. Crothers
      Lisa Fair McEvers
      Jerod E. Tufte
      Gary H. Lee, D.J.

[¶94] The Honorable Gary H. Lee, District Judge, sitting in place of Bahr, J.,
disqualified.

                                     44