Court Opinion

ID: 9614932
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:29:41.799471+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:19:20.422969
License: Public Domain

Birdsong, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
As my colleagues in the majority would affirm this judgment, I am compelled to dissent.
The jury in this case returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff for one million dollars, although plaintiff at trial established lost wages through the date of trial of $46,342.97 and medical expenses of $11,694.79. Appellant also testified regarding the scope of pain he continues to suffer, his continued loss of approximately two to three days of work each month for which he is not compensated, and the effect of the injury on his ability to perform his former job in the rail yard and on his ability to enjoy the pleasures of life to the same extent as before injury.
*8621. “Damages recoverable in an FELA action are compensatory only. [Cit.] The FELA plaintiff can recover special damages for past and future lost wages and medical expenses, as well as general damages for pain and suffering. [Cits.] In arriving at its verdict, the jury should take into consideration the plaintiff’s occupational disability and its impairment on his earning power. [Cit.] However, punitive damages are not allowable. [Cit.] Federal courts have held that in determining whether a trial court abuses its discretion in refusing to order a new trial on the issue of damages in an FELA case, ‘the appellate court must make its own “detailed appraisal of the evidence bearing on damages.” [Cit.]’ [Cit.] The jury’s determination of the amount of damages to be awarded in an FELA case has been held to be ‘otherwise inviolate, “absent an award so excessive or inadequate as to shock the judicial conscience and raise an irresistible inference that passion, prejudice or another improper cause invaded the trial” ’ ” Central of Ga. R. Co. v. Swindle, 260 Ga. 685, 686 (398 SE2d 365). Applying this precedent to the facts before it, the Supreme Court in Swindle, supra, concluded that the jury verdict in the case was a verdict that could only be “logically explained as having resulted from a punitive cause, which is an improper cause in FELA cases.” Id. Therefore, it was concluded that the jury impermissibly intended “at least a portion of the verdict to have the effect of punishing the defendant and influencing its conduct rather than compensating the plaintiff for his injuries.” Id.
In arriving at its determination in Swindle, the majority considered CSX Transp. v. Darling, 189 Ga. App. 719 (377 SE2d 217) and rejected it as controlling; notwithstanding the vigorous protest of Justice Benham in dissent who asserted “if the verdict in this case is wrong [which the majority found it was], then the verdict in Darling was wrong.” Id. at 689.
The verdict in Swindle (award of $875,000 where total special damages consisted of $32,218.82 in medical expenses and $27,090 in lost income; also appellant testified to his inability to enjoy life’s pleasures to the same degree as before injury) is similar but not as pronounced as the degree of disparity between amount of award and the established amount of special damages and lost wages to the verdict in the case sub judice. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court did not attempt to support its determination exclusively on this factor. Rather, the court in Swindle stated, “a review of the transcript shows a pervasive and persistent attempt on the part of the plaintiff to establish improper motive and anti-union sentiment on the part of the defendant railroad, ‘suggesting that damages be awarded ... for the purpose of punishing the defendant.’ Based upon our ‘detailed appraisal of the evidence bearing on damages,’ we can only conclude that this ‘improper cause’ permeated the trial and resulted in the *863jury’s rendering a verdict based, at least in part, on punitive damages.” Swindle, supra at 687. This conclusion was expressly stated to be “supported by the pejorative nature of plaintiff’s closing argument,” which the court excerpted for the benefit of lower court guidance. Id. at 687, n. 1.
At the outset, we note that during his opening statement plaintiff’s counsel informed the jury that he had worked for a railroad (Central and not Seaboard). Subsequently, as in Swindle, plaintiff’s counsel during closing argument made repeated, express or implicit, pejorative statements in the presence of the jury, as follows: “And bless his old heart, he’s got thirteen men to cover two hundred miles of track. Now, that ain’t my fault. That’s not my fault when they [the railroad] come running through these towns with these carloads of gas, and it rocking back and forth, because they got thirteen men to cover two hundred miles of track. Your skin’s on the line. And if you don’t think your skin’s valuable, you wait until you have to sit down at one of these tables, man, and sue them, and then they hand the file over to some lawyer, and say, ‘Here, Mr. Young, you go down there and beat them down just as hard as you can beat them down. . .• .’ We was talking about they give it to a lawyer to come down hear to beat it down. That’s the way they operate. They’re not going to put nobody to do — to keeping up these tracks or anything else as long as you people don’t come down here and halfway compensate somebody. If all you do is give them halfway compensation, and you don’t fully compensate them, you can bet they ain’t going to never keep it up. . . . And I felt sorry for Mr. Tucker, because Mr. Tucker’s doing the best with what he can do, with what the railroad’s giving him. . . . And you know what he’s trying to do? Again they’ve given him this file and told him to come to the courthouse and get out of this case just as cheap as he can. But they really don’t care about [appellee¡plaintiff]. . . . And I thought it was — I almost puked. I mean I almost threw up on Ray Allison over there when that man stood up and said . . . [h]e’s working all out there. . . . [Appellee/plaintiff ] is one of the finest people I’ve ever come to this courthouse for, and if he don’t go out of here with a sackful of money today, it won’t be because I have not expended myself to show you what kind of injury this man’s got. ... I remember the time whenever I used to go to work at the railroad, I made $12.80 a day. . . . We have no healing remedies. And the fact that you give him a million dollars or thereabout — when you give him that kind of money, just say five years from today it’s gone to nothing, at least you’ve done what you could today. I don’t know what the next year’s going to bring, because, man, our society is living in such a . . . terrible time economically. . . . But whatever you do, do not let this company throw this man away. Don’t let them throw him away. [Appel*864lee Levant] is a good man. . . . He’s a friend of mine. I don’t mind calling [appellee] a friend because he is a friend. . . . But what I want you to do is you’re going to have a verdict form out with you, and I hope you’ll put that figure right there. . . . ‘We, the jury, find in favor of the plaintiff’ — or you can just say Lee Levant — ‘in the amount of $943,904.55, of which the amount of $11,694.79 is included for medical bills.’ ‘This’ — and I hope it’s today — ‘7th day of August, 1989. . . .’ Because it’ll be something that you’ll always be proud of. . . . [L]et your voice speak in unison, that we’re going to see that he gets his money, and we’re going to stand with the Lee Levants, that we stamp out the rest, those who would cause us to try to deviate because he’s a labor man. Stand firm for what’s right. . . .” (Emphasis supplied.)
Viewing the above excerpts it is apparent that in addition to arguing for legitimate damages, appellee’s counsel informed the jury that the railroad was maintaining its tracks with an inadequate number of people and would continue to do so unless the jury made them pay; that the railroad did not care about appellee; that the jury should do right by appellee whom counsel considered to be a good man and his friend; and, that the jury should stamp out those (the corporate appellant) who would try to have the jury not give appellee an award of adequate damages because appellee is a “labor man.” Inherent within appellee’s closing argument is the message that the big railroad needed to be punished for these transgressions. This is precisely the danger condemned in Swindle and which provided the primary support for the court’s conclusion therein. Compare the above excerpts with the excerpts of the closing argument in Swindle, supra at 687, n. 1.
The attempt of the majority to distinguish Swindle pales, in my view, when the text of appellee’s closing argument is compared with that in Swindle, and considering the relatively short deliberation time of the jury in this approximately week-long trial and their award of approximately $56,000 more than the figure specifically requested by appellant’s counsel when he suggested to the jury how to fill out the verdict form. Moreover, the punitive references contained in the closing argument in this case were exacerbated by appellee’s counsel’s claim, both in his opening statement and closing argument, that he had worked for a railroad and by his personal references of appellant as his friend. These statements by clear implication conveyed to the jury that counsel was in a preferred position to understand the operating philosophy of a railroad company and to assert counsel’s personal opinion of appellee’s character.
Although appellate courts should exercise great restraint before setting aside a damage award as excessive, when at least a portion thereof can only logically be explained as having resulted from a pu*865nitive award, it must be set aside. Swindle, supra at 687. Although “[t]he jury are the best doctors of doubt that we know” (Central R. Co. v. Ferguson & Melson, 63 Ga. 84, 85), they can be lulled, as here, into rendering an inaccurate diagnostic award when presented with misleading symptoms. It then becomes the duty of an appellate court to intervene with a correct judicial prescription. Accordingly, I would not affirm the million dollar judgment rendered in this case after a deliberation of approximately 17 minutes in duration.
2. In my opinion the trial court erred in declining to grant a motion for new trial on the grounds that improper and prejudicial statements about the railroad and its counsel throughout trial were calculated to lead to a verdict that, at least in part, was intended to punish the railroad.
In addition to raising the general grounds in its amended motion for new trial, appellants asserted that the trial court erred in overruling its motion for mistrial made after numerous improper and prejudicial remarks had been made by appellee’s counsel, and that the court erred in allowing appellee to argue over objection about trains with “carloads of gas” and by asking the jury to put themselves in the place of the plaintiff. See generally Doe v. Moss, 120 Ga. App. 762, 767 (172 SE2d 321).
At the beginning of trial, prior to the presentation of any evidence, appellant’s counsel requested the trial court to instruct appellee’s counsel not to make comments, statements or suggestions that the railroad and its counsel are “bad and evil people.” Using its inherent power to ensure the proper conduct of judicial proceedings, the court in effect granted a broad application of the motion in limine, and informed plaintiff’s counsel “not to make derogatory remarks” about the railroad or its counsel. (Emphasis supplied.)
A major purpose of filing a motion in limine is “to prevent the asking of prejudicial questions and the making of prejudicial statements in the presence of the jury with respect to matters which have no proper bearing on the issues in the case or on the rights of the parties to the suit.” (Emphasis supplied.) Harley-Davidson &c. Co. v. Daniel, 244 Ga. 284, 285, n. 1 (260 SE2d 20). The order granting a motion in limine, “like a pretrial order, ‘controls the subsequent course of the action, unless modified at trial to prevent manifest injustice. . . . All the purposes of an objection have already been fulfilled by the proceedings on the motion in limine. . . . [A]nd the record has been perfected for appeal purposes. Therefore, we see no reason for another objection at trial in order to preserve the denial of the motion on appeal.” Id. at 286. In Division 1, above, numerous instances of improper and prejudicial statements by appellant are recounted, and that in one instance where appellant’s counsel objected, his objection was in effect overruled.
*866As the record does not reflect that the oral order granting the motion in limine was ever modified in the case at bar, appellant was not required to pose any additional objections regarding violations thereof, even when such violations occurred during closing argument of opposing counsel. See Harley-Davidson, supra at 286.
The trial court’s ruling notwithstanding, the record reflects the following comments inter alia made in the presence of the jury by appellee’s/plaintiff’s counsel: (a) during the course of objecting to repetitious or cumulative testimony and to the asserted badgering of a witness, implied that appellant’s counsel was dragging the trial out with “silly questions”; (b) asserted appellant’s counsel was knowingly engaging in “sneaky stuff”; (c) read a portion of a slip opinion in the presence of a jury, purporting to concern the issue of calling an agent of either party for purposes of cross-examination, which contained a holding that “[e]mployees of the defendant railroad company were found to be subject to all the pressures and possible prejudice in favor of the defendant employer if that relationship (unintelligible)” (emphasis supplied); (d) during the course of posing a sustained objection to a question asked of a local chairman representing switch-men stated, “If he [appellant’s counsel] wants to put me on the stand, I was a general chairman for ten years and can testify expertly about that matter, because I know both about the law and about where he’s at” (emphasis supplied); (e) during the course of arguing against an objection which was thereafter overruled stated, “That’s not my question at all, Judge. He [appellant’s counsel] must have been asleep”; (f) during the course of posing an objection that was overruled regarding referring a witness to his medical notes stated: “He didn’t want the jury to have the notes that he had, and he reads him only part of it, and we offered them all into the record” (emphasis supplied) (Note: Appellant’s subsequent request to the judge to instruct appellee’s counsel not to make speeches while objecting was overruled); (g) during the course of posing an objection that was overruled stated, “This is absolutely insane. . . . [A]nd this guy’s [appellant’s counsel] going to drag out secondary gain, and this kind of stuff which has no bearing on this thing” [Note: Appellant’s counsel again objected to the making of speeches during objections by appellee’s counsel]; (h) during the course of posing an objection stated, “now see this guy [appellant’s counsel] staggers all over the place, and suggests all kinds of things, and I object to it” [Note: At this point the trial court rebuked counsel and sent the jury out so that discussion could be held on the objection outside the jury’s presence]; (i) while cross-examining a railroad witness asked who a man dressed in “gray” was in the back of the room, and argued that he wanted to know who the man was because he worked with the witness (Note: After the jury left, appellant’s counsel requested the court to instruct appellee’s counsel *867“not to have comments in front of this jury about what he thinks,” and to instruct and reprimand him in front of the jury. At this point appellant’s counsel asserted that if appellee’s counsel’s conduct continued he would have to move for a mistrial). At this point, the trial court inquired as to what appellant’s counsel was complaining about, and appellant’s counsel stated that as the jury was leaving appellee’s counsel had said, “Bring them on. I sure do love those kind of witnesses. That’s some good witnesses for us. Bring them on.” Appellee’s counsel admitted he had said “Bring them on,” but asserted it was in the context of a conversation where “John” (his co-counsel) had said the witness had been good. Thereupon the trial judge instructed appellee’s counsel not to make “those editorial comments.” Appellant’s counsel reiterated that the remarks were prejudicing his client to which appellee’s counsel responded, “The jury was going out, man.” At this point appellant’s counsel made a motion for mistrial. Appellee’s counsel asserted that the jury could not have heard the remarks, but appellant’s co-counsel stated without contradiction in the record that: “They stopped. The jury stopped.” At the judge’s suggestion, appellant’s counsel stated for the record that, as the jury was being excused, appellee’s co-counsel made a comment to the effect: “Boy, that sure was a good witness for us.” Appellee’s counsel then “got up, clapped his hands, walked back, the jury was still in the room . . . [a]nd not only what he said but how he said it, and the voice — ‘Just bring them on boy. We just want some more of these kinds of witnesses.” Appellant’s counsel could not recall the exact words thereafter used, but stated “but the point is what he’s doing is belittling my client.” Thereafter neither appellee’s counsel or co-counsel took exception to the characterization of the incident as placed on the record by appellant’s counsel.
The trial court denied the motion, and upon the jury’s return cautioned them that what lawyers say is not evidence, that the case has been aggressively and hotly contested, and not to let things lawyers say in their presence affect the jury as their job is to decide the case based on the evidence presented. But compare, Knowles v. Dayries Rice Co., 10 Ga. App. 567 (1) (73 SE 856). Pretermitting the question of whether the trial court abused its discretion in failing to grant the mistrial motion, at this point in the trial, is that the continued improper comments of appellee’s counsel, as recited in Division 1, above, coupled with the comments herein discussed, are blatant and sufficient to raise a reasonable probability that appellant has been denied its right to a fair trial. Accordingly, I would also reverse this holding on this ground even though appellant did not renew his mistrial motion following closing argument. Where in unusual circumstances, such as in this case, it is apparent that a new trial is essential to the preservation of the right of a fair trial, this court will act to *868preserve fair trial rights. See Menningmann v. Independent Fire Ins. Co., 187 Ga. App. 118, 120 (369 SE2d 295); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Rowland, 181 Ga. App. 213, 218 (351 SE2d 650); compare Pelham &c. R. Co. v. Elliott, 11 Ga. App. 621 (5) (75 SE 1062); see also Foskey v. Foskey, 257 Ga. 736 (2) (363 SE2d 547).
Decided July 16, 1991
Reconsideration denied July 31, 1991
Hunter, MacLean, Exley & Dunn, Arnold C. Young, Wade W. Herring II, Alston & Bird, Jack H. Senterfitt, for appellant.
Billy E. Moore, Paul R. Bennett, John W. Jones, for appellee.
I respectfully dissent. I am authorized to state that Chief Judge Sognier joins in this dissent.