Court Opinion

ID: 9494489
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:38:42.315272+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:56:26.033667
License: Public Domain

COLE, Circuit Judge,
concurring in the Order of Remand, in which
JONES, DAUGHTREY, MOORE, and CLAY, Circuit Judges, join.
I concur in the decision of this Court to join the Second and Ninth Circuits in holding that an en banc court’s authority to vacate sua sponte the decision of a three-judge panel is not precluded by the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). See Triestman v. United States, 124 F.3d 361, 367 (2nd Cir.1997)(“[N]otwithstanding the restrictions on appealability in § 2244(b)(3)(E), this court has the authority to order a rehearing sua sponte”); Thompson v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 918, 922 (9th Cir.1998)(en banc)(“the language [of 2244(b)(3)(E)] does not preclude sua sponte review by an en banc court. It merely precludes the parties from seeking a rehearing.”) For the reasons set forth below, this Court’s decision is entirely consistent with the statutory text, legislative aims, and constitutional boundaries of AEDPA.
A.
AEDPA, in its relevant portions, provides that “[t]he grant or denial of an authorization by a court of appeals to file a second or successive application shall not be appealable and shall not be the subject of a petition for rehearing or for a writ of certiorari.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E)(em-phasis added). While this section clearly prohibits a petitioner from requesting rehearing, nothing in its text bars a federal appellate court from rehearing a matter en banc upon its own motion. See Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 554, 118 S.Ct. 1489, 140 L.Ed.2d 728 (1998)(“As a textual matter, § 2244(b) applies only where the court acts pursuant to a prisoner’s ‘appli*592cation’1.”) Thus, the statute bars petitions for rehearing, not rehearing per se. Indeed, the conspicuous absence of any reference to en banc rehearings in this section as opposed to other sections of AEDPA, e.g. 28 U.S.C. § 2266(b)(5)(B)©, provides further support for the notion that rehearing en banc sua sponte is not contemplated by this section. See Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 525, 107 S.Ct. 1391, 94 L.Ed.2d 533 (1987)(“Where Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in its conclusion.”)(internal quotations omitted); See also Liebman and Hertz, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure § 28.3d 1194-5 fn. 119. As a matter of AEDPA’s text, the decision of a federal appellate court to grant a rehearing sua sponte is clearly not prohibited by the statute.
Moreover, en banc review by this Court on its own motion is also consistent with the primary aims of AEDPA. The Supreme Court, in upholding the constitutionality of AEDPA, has construed the requirements of 2244(b) to be a “gatek-eeping” feature, one which prohibits successive, potentially baseless, applications by petitioners. Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 656-57, 116 S.Ct. 2333, 135 L.Ed.2d 827 (1996)(28 U.S.C. § 2244 “con-cernís] second or successive habeas corpus applications by state prisoners.”) The statute thus is directed against the actions of petitioners and assigns this Court the role of gatekeeper against petitioners’ successive petitions. Put simply, we are charged with ensuring that only potentially meritorious petitions are accorded review. By acting on its own motion en banc, this Court has not thwarted this gatekeeping purpose. We have not entertained successive petitions on the part of petitioner in this case and the underlying purposes behind this section remain unscathed.
This Court’s authority to act on its own motion is also not precluded by our decision in In Re King, 190 F.3d 479 (6th Cir.1999)(en banc). There, this Court held that a petitioner’s motion under § 2244(b)(3)(A) for rehearing by an en banc court is barred under § 2244(b)(3)(E). Id. at 482. The Court concluded that petitioner’s motion could not be reheard en banc as a matter of AEDPA’s statutory language and legislative intent, as 2244(b)(3)(E) clearly prohibits a ‘petition for rehearing’ and because the purpose of the statute is to limit requests for review by petitioners. Id. The crux of the King decision, however, was not that the decision of the three-judge panel could not be reheard en banc, but rather that the petitioner was precluded from requesting such a rehearing. Id. Here, there is no petition of this kind before the Court. Instead, we are vacating the panel decision of our own accord.
B.
Any reading of AEDPA that precludes this Court’s ability to review en banc decisions of a three-judge panel would unduly encroach upon the internal procedures of this Court. The power of an en banc court *593to review its own panel decisions sua sponte is inherent to its function as a reviewing court. See Irving v. U.S., 162 F.3d 154, 161 (1st. Cir.1998)(“The authority to overrule the decision of a prior panel in the same case flows logically from the error-correcting function of the full court.”) In granting federal appellate courts the ability to review their own decisions en banc, Congress was deliberately broad. The operative statute, 28 U.S.C. § 46(c), requires only that “rehearing before the court in banc [sic] is ordered by a majority of the circuit judges of the circuit who are in regular active service.” The Supreme Court has interpreted § 46(c) to accord federal appellate courts extensive rule-making authority with regards to reviewing matters en banc. See Western Pacific R. Corp. v. Western Pacific R. Co., 345 U.S. 247, 260, 73 S.Ct. 656, 97 L.Ed. 986 (1953)(“[28 U.S.C. § 46(c) ] vests in the court the power to order rehearings en banc. It goes no further. It neither forbids nor requires each active member of a Court of Appeals to entertain each petition for a hearing or rehearing en banc. The court is left free to devise its own administrative machinery to provide the means whereby a majority may order such a hearing.”)(emph&sis added). Furthermore, the Supreme Court has determined that the process by which a federal appellate court decides to rehear a matter en banc is inherently internal, beyond the review of litigants or even the Supreme Court itself. See Shenker v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company, 374 U.S. 1, 5, 83 S.Ct. 1667, 10 L.Ed.2d 709 (1963)(“the rights of the litigant go no farther than the right to know the administrative machinery that will be followed.. .for this Court to hold otherwise would involve it unnecessarily in the internal administration of the Courts of Appeal.”) Moreover, Congress has in particular avoided interfering with an en banc court’s power to rehear matters sua sponte. See Advisory Committee Notes to F.R.A.P. Rule 35 (Rule that delineates standards for determining when a rehearing en banc may be ordered “does not affect the power of a court of appeals to initiate in banc [sic] hearings sua sponte.”)
Given the extent of power granted to this Court in determining whether to review a decision of a panel en banc, any attempt by Congress to abrogate this authority would likely run afoul of the Separation of Powers Doctrine. See Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 341, 120 S.Ct. 2246, 147 L.Ed.2d 326 (2000)(“the Constitution prohibits one branch from encroaching on the central prerogatives of another.”) This Court avoids this issue by properly according § 2244(b)(3)(E) sufficiently narrow construction so as to preclude any “serious doubts of [its] [ Constitutionality.” International Association of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 749, 81 S.Ct. 1784, 6 L.Ed.2d 1141 (1961). See also Hadix v. Johnson, 144 F.3d 925, 938 (6th Cir.1998)(rev’d on other grounds)(statutes should be construed “in a manner that renders the statute constitutionally valid.”)
Even assuming arguendo that Congress may, within its Article I powers, alter this Court’s power to review its own decisions upon its own motion, it must do so explicitly. In the absence of express language removing federal court review, a statute presumptively permits such review. See Henderson v. INS, 157 F.3d 106, 119 (2nd. Cir.1998)(discussing “the well-accepted rule of statutory construction that repeals by implication of jurisdictional statutes (and particularly of the habeas statutes) are disfavored ... [and] the presumption [is] in favor of judicial review.”) See also Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 660, 116 S.Ct. 2333, 135 L.Ed.2d 827 (1996)(Con-gress may not remove the Court’s habeas power implicitly); Ex Parte Yerger, 8 *594Wall. 85, 75 U.S. 85, 105, 19 L.Ed. 332 (1868)(same). Here, Congress has not explicitly removed the ability of a federal appellate court to review en banc a panel decision sua sponte. This power thus is to remain unfettered, and has been properly exercised by this Court.
For the foregoing reasons, I concur in the en banc order of this Court.