Court Opinion

ID: 9445044
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 21:18:52.266147+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:30:06.640603
License: Public Domain

WILBUR K. MILLER, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
The judgment of conviction entered by the District Court here in 1935 on Farnsworth’s plea of guilty to charges of housebreaking and larceny is presumed to be valid. To overcome the presumption that the judgment is correct, Farnsworth had the burden of proving at the coram nobis hearing1 that he had not competently and intelligently waived his right to the assistance of counsel. Johnson v. Zerbst, 1938, 304 U.S. 458, 468-469, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461; Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 1942, 317 U.S. 269, 281, 63 S.Ct. 236, 87 L.Ed. 268; United States v. Morgan, 1954, 346 U.S. 502, 512, 74 S.Ct. 247, 98 L.Ed. 248. In Adams v. McCann, 317 U. S. at page 281, 63 S.Ct. at page 242, the Supreme Court said:
“ * * * The Patton decision [Patton v. United States, 1930, 281 U.S. 276, 50 S.Ct. 253, 74 L.Ed. 854] left no room for doubt that a determination of guilt by a court after waiver of jury trial could not be set aside and a new trial ordered except upon a plain showing that such waiver was not freely and intelligently made. If the result of the adjudicatory process is not to be set at naught, it is not asking too much that the burden of showing essential unfairness be sustained by him who claims such injustice and seeks to have the result set aside, and that it be sustained not as a matter of speculation but as a demonstrable reality * * *»
That the record does not affirmatively show Farnsworth’s waiver of his right to counsel when he pleaded guilty does not destroy the presumption. The Supreme Court said in United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. at page 512, 74 S.Ct. at page 253:
“ * * * Of course, the absence of a showing of waiver from the record does not of itself invalidate the judgment. It is presumed the proceedings were correct and the burden rests on the accused to show otherwise. * * * ”
District Judge McGuire heard the evidence and made findings of fact as follows:
“1. That no statements or admission of guilt were extorted or coerced from James Bufford Farnsworth.
“2. That James Bufford Farnsworth was fully apprised of the nature of the charges against him.
“3. That James Bufford Farnsworth competently and intelligently v/aived the assistance of counsel at the time of his arraignment, his plea of guilty and at the time he was sentenced.”
The question before us on this appeal is whether the trial judge’s finding that Farnsworth competently and intelligently waived the assistance of counsel should be set aside. My view is that the find*66ing should not be disturbed on appeal unless it is clearly erroneous. I do not think it is.
Farnsworth testified that he did not waive the assistance of counsel. He said that, when he pleaded guilty, he was not asked whether he desired to have or desired to waive the aid of counsel, and did not know the court would assign counsel on his request. It is apparent that Judge McGuire did not believe Farnsworth’s testimony, which my brothers of the majority seem to accept at face value. He was in a much better position than we are to-pass on his credibility, as he heard him testify and observed his demeanor.
Moreover, Farnsworth’s testimony was in many respects inherently improbable. When he entered the plea of guilty in 1935 he was about 28 years old and was already an experienced criminal who had appeared in other courts. He was fairly well educated, having practically finished high school. I find it difficult to believe, in view of his education and his criminal court experience, that he did not know counsel would be assigned if he desired to have one. Even in cold print, his testimony does not impress the-reader as being truthful. Added to- that is the fact that, when he testified, he was a confirmed criminal who had spent more than half of his adult life in various prisons for various crimes which run the gamut from uttering worthless checks to deserting from the United States Army. This fact weighed heavily against his credibility.
Aside from Farnsworth’s testimony there was no evidence as to waiver except that one Beach, who was an Assistant United States Attorney in 1935, testified it was not then the custom in the District Court here to ask on a guilty plea whether the defendant wished to have or to waive the aid of counsel. Beach’s testimony was, of course, wholly inadequate to prove that Farnsworth did not waive the assistance of counsel. So, if Farnsworth’s testimony was unworthy of credence, he failed to carry the burden of proving that he did not competently and intelligently make such waiver. My reading of the record convinces me that Judge McGuire was right in rejecting Farnsworth’s story as unbelievable, and in concluding that the presumption of validity which attaches to the judgment had not been overturned. Consequently I would affirm his decision and must therefore dissent from the majority opinion.

. Which was afforded him in 1955 pursuant to United States v. Morgan, 1954, 346 U.S. 502, 74 S.Ct. 247, although he had long since served the sentence imposed pursuant to liis plea of guilty.