Court Opinion

ID: 9858947
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 17:44:29.439802+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:58:39.085736
License: Public Domain

UHLENHOPP, Justice
(dissenting).
I think we should reexamine the rationale of our decisions under rule 236. When the party against whom a default is entered actually desires to prosecute his claim (if a plaintiff) or to present his defense (if a defendant), the default frequently constitutes a windfall for the other party; the latter party might not be able to prevail if the case were heard on the merits. Moreover, with the default set aside, often the latter party is no worse off, on the merits of the case, than if the default had not been entered. The loser, however, is deprived of his claim or defense without trial, irrespective of its merits.
I do not refer to the case in which a party willfully ignores the rules of procedure or defies them. I refer to the cases involving bungles. Rule 236 does not contemplate a blameless party; it contemplates that some fault actually exists; it allows relief for “neglect,” if the neglect is “excusable.” If the neglect is so culpable as to be inexcusable, the guilty party can have no relief.
The federal courts grant relief quite readily in order to get to the merits and avoid harsh results. Laguna Royalty Co. v. Marsh, 350 F.2d 817, 823 & n.11 (5th Cir.1965) (Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(1) allowing relief for mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect should be liberally con*4strued and doubt resolved in favor of setting aside judgment so that case may be tried upon' merits); Tozer v. Charles A. Krause Milling Co., 189 F.2d 242, 244 (3rd Cir.1951); United States v. Berger, 86 F.R.D. 713, 714-15 (W.D.Pa.1980); Iowa v. Union Asphalt & Roadoils, Inc., 281 F.Supp. 391, 398 (S.D.Iowa 1968), aff’d, 409 F.2d 1239, aff’d sub nom. Standard Oil Co. v. Iowa, 408 F.2d 1711 (8th Cir.1969). I would adopt the rationale of decisions of this kind, and grant relief in the present case.1
REYNOLDSON, C. J., and LARSON, J., join in this dissent.

.The text of the rule-236 motion follows; by affidavit Mr. Carlberg swore “that the statements contained therein are true and accurate and are made of the undersigned’s personal knowledge”; the bank did not refute the statements by counter affidavit, cross-examination, or other evidence;
1. That Default Judgment was entered against the Defendants Rex Mullin and Dorothy L. Mullin on or about July 25, 1979.
2. That C. W. Carlberg was retained by the Defendant Rex Mullin; Dorothy L. Mul-lin; Roger S. Claiser; Kenneth Fluckey; Clint Claiser; Kinkade Industries, Inc.; Franklin Kinkade; Evelyn M. Fluckey; Ruby M. Claiser; and Viola Elaine Claiser, to represent them in this cause.
3. That pursuant to said retention of C. W. Carlberg, he did cause to be served on June 25, 1979, and on July 20, 1979, motions in this cause. That said motions inadvertently omitted names of Rex Mullin and Dorothy L. Mullin as Defendants.
4. That on or about August 9, 1979, C. W. Carlberg realized that the Defendants Rex Mullin and Dorothy L. Mullin had been omitted from the Motion served on July 20, 1979, and therefore on August 9, a First Amendment to said Motion to include Rex Mullin and Dorothy L. Mullin as Defendants was served on the Plaintiff.
5. That on the 17th day of August, 1979, C. W. Carlberg for the first time became aware that a Default Judgment had been entered against the Defendants Rex Mullin and Dorothy L. Mullin. That the first Resistance to First Amendment to Combined Motions pursuant to Rule 111 which was served on August 16, 1979, and received by C. W. Carl-berg on August 17, 1979.
6. That Plaintiff failed to serve upon C. W. Carlberg or any other attorney of record the Application for Default Judgment and the Judgment Entry thereon. That at the time said Application and Judgment Entry were filed, said C. W. Carlberg was an attorney of record and service should have been made pursuant to Rule 82 Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure.
7. That had the Plaintiff served the Motion for Default as required by the Rules of Civil Procedure, the Defendants Rex Mullin and Dorothy L. Mullin would heretofore have corrected the inadvertence of omitting their name from the list of Defendants in the motions served June 25 and July 20, 1979.
8. That Plaintiff and the Clerk of Court failed to give notice of default judgment to Defendants Rex Mullin and Dorothy L. Mullin as required by Rule 233 and the Defendants had no knowledge of the said default prior to August 17, 1979.
9. That the Defendants Rex Mullin and Dorothy L. Mullin at all times believed they were doing all things necessary and required to defend this cause of action and the typing error resulting in the inadvertent omission of the Defendants Rex Mullin’s and Dorothy L. Mullin’s names from the Motion served July 20, 1979, was due to mistake, inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect, and unavoidable casualty.
10. That for the above stated reasons, the Court should set aside the default and judgment thereon upon such terms as the Court prescribes.