Court Opinion

ID: 9582759
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:31:02.645722+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:38:19.065218
License: Public Domain

OP ALA, Chief Justice,
concurring.
The narrow question to be answered in this original proceeding for a prerogative writ is whether the use of contempt, authorized by the second paragraph in § 8501 to *859punish a debtor’s nonpayment of judicially scheduled installments on a money judgment, violates Oklahoma’s constitutional interdiction of imprisonment for debt.2
The court assumes original cognizance and grants a writ of prohibition. Today’s pronouncement invalidates those provisions in § 850 which sanction contempt power’s use to punish a debtor’s failure to pay installments scheduled in a postjudgment order. I concur in the court’s disposition which (a) declares the contested provisions of § 850 to be violative of the constitutional interdiction of imprisonment for debt and (b) condemns contempt as an impermissible remedial device for enforcing compliance with a general postjudgment order that directs the debtor to pay an adjudicated obligation in installments but does not identify any specific non-exempt assets then in existence and available for application towards the judgment’s satisfaction.
I write separately to explain and to reemphasize the court’s rationale that post-judgment orders directing an obligor (a) to pay from a specified non-exempt fund or account, (b) to deliver described non-exempt property in a person’s possession or under one’s control or (c) to sell a specific nonexempt asset and use the proceeds to pay scheduled installments may be enforced by contempt, while orders that generally call for payment of money adjudged to be owing cannot.
I
KANSAS JURISPRUDENCE BEFORE OKLAHOMA’S STATEHOOD
Oklahoma's statutory procedure in aid of execution came from Kansas.3 A Kansas appellate opinion promulgated before our statehood, which construes a statute later adopted by this State, is by force of law incorporated into the text of our adopted statute.4
Kansas jurisprudence antedating our statehood — Burrows I, Burrows II and O’Connell5 — and extant Oklahoma deci-sional law6 applying the teachings of the binding Kansas authority are consistent with the notion that orders directing delivery of specific non-exempt property to be applied towards the satisfaction of a debt and orders for payment from an identifiable non-exempt fund then in existence and available must be distinguished from general orders for payment of a debt. The former are enforceable by contempt as they call for specific acts facially capable of immediate performance.7 The latter— *860i.e., general orders — command no more and no less than payment of a debt within the meaning of Art. 2, § 13, Okl. Const.,8 which prohibits imprisonment as a remedy for collection of a debt.
These pre-statehood cases from Kansas eloquently teach that the judiciary is not powerless to enforce by imprisonment a disobeyed order, other than one directing generally the payment of money, when the commanded performance by the debtor calls for a specific act that would bring about a non-exempt property’s application towards the satisfaction of a money judgment.9
II
COERCIVE BODY RESTRAINT PROCESS TO COLLECT A DEBT FALLS WITHIN THE CONSTITUTIONAL INTERDICTION OF IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT
Contempt may not be sanctioned as less odious and hence as a permissible variant of the abolished common-law capias.10 *861The ancient creditors’ remedies of body attachment (capias ad respondendum)11 and body execution (capias ad satisfacien-dum )12 have existed in many forms since the earliest days of Roman and English law, where imprisonment was permitted for nearly any type of debt.13 These methods of enforcing debts were initially adopted by American colonies during their early development.14 An eighteenth-century recognition of these remedies’ harshness led to efforts to abolish their use, most notably by state constitutional prohibitions against imprisonment for debt.15 Our fundamental law specifically abrogates capias for debt. Art. 2, § 13, Okl. Const.16 All forms of coercive body restraint process that may lead to imprisonment for debt— whether by body attachment, by some new and cloaked form of resurrected capias or by an ancient writ like that of ne exeat17— must fall under the explicit constitutional axe.18 In short, no coercive body restraint process is constitutionally permissible as a substitute for the writ of execution to enforce a general order for payment of judicially scheduled installments on a money judgment.
SUMMARY
Insofar as § 850 authorizes contempt as a means of compelling payment of money adjudged to be owing either in a judgment or in a postjudgment order scheduling installment payments, it is violative of the absolute and explicit constitutional interdiction of imprisonment for debt. Today’s pronouncement is expressly confined to the effectiveness of the last sentence in 12 O.S.1991 § 850. The use of contempt to enforce orders or awards in matrimonial litigation is not affected by our pronouncement.

. The pertinent terms of 12 O.S.1991 § 850 are:
"The judge after the hearing provided herein may order any property of the judgment *859debtor, not exempt by law, in his possession or under his control to be applied toward the satisfaction of the judgment, and may enforce the same by proceedings for contempt in case of refusal or disobedience.
The judge may further order the judgment debtor to pay to the judgment creditor or apply on the judgment in installments, such portion of his nonexempt income, however or wherever earned or acquired, as the court may deem proper after due regard for any payments required to be made by the judgment debtor by virtue of law or prior order of a court or under wage assignments outstanding. ... A failure or neglect to comply with an order of direction of the court, shall be punished as for contempt." (Emphasis mine.)

. The terms of Art. 2, § 13, Okl. Const., are:
“Imprisonment for debt is prohibited, except for the non-payment of fines and penalties imposed for the violation of law.”

. RL 1910, § 5198. See 12 O.S.1991 § 850, Historical Notes.

. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc. v. Welch, Okl., 764 P.2d 191, 195 n. 14 (1988); Matter of Estate of Speake, Okl., 743 P.2d 648, 650 n. 5 (1987); Atlantic Richfield Co. v. State, Okl., 659 P.2d 930, 934 (1983); Horath v. Pierce, Okl., 506 P.2d 548, 554 (1973).

. State v. Burrows, 33 Kan. 10, 5 P. 449 (1885) (Burrows I); In re Burrows, 33 Kan. 675, 7 P. 148 (1885) (Burrows II); In re O'Connell, 49 Kan. 415, 30 P. 456 (1892).

. Ryland v. Arkansas City Milling, 19 Okl. 435, 92 P. 160, 162-163 (1907).

. A general order in aid of execution which directs a debtor to pay the judgment in installments out of his future earnings (i.e., nonexempt income as defined by 31 O.S.1991 § 1) does not command a specific act facially shown to be capable of immediate performance. Such an order is not enforceable by contempt either under pre-statehood jurisprudence from Kansas (Burrows I, Burrows II, O’Connell, supra note 5 and infra note 9) or under Oklahoma's decisional law (Ryland, supra note 6). Although § 850 indeed serves a salutary purpose in that it facilitates collection of money judgments by affording *860creditors the opportunity to secure a division of the adjudged obligation into small installments and to schedule payments in a convenient timetable, its provisions for enforcement of unpaid installments by contempt cannot pass muster in the face of the fundamental law’s unequivocal prohibition of imprisonment for debt.

.For the provisions of Art. 2, § 13, Okl. Const., see supra note 2. The § 13 prohibition of imprisonment for debt is couched in absolute terms. There is hence no room for according a different treatment to those who willfully refuse to pay a debt and those who are unable to pay it because they lack resources. Insofar as general orders to pay money are affected, both classes of delinquent debtors must be treated alike. Both are clearly protected by the absolute terms of our fundamental law’s command. The dissent appears to make a distinction between an adjudicated debt’s accrued unpaid installments and payments ordered to be made in the future. The dissent concludes that the former may result in one’s willful failure to pay an accrued debt. The distinction drawn by the dissent appears irrelevant. • Unless an order facially shows that there is identified non-exempt property available for a debt's satisfaction, contempt process for the order’s enforcement will necessarily fall under the axe of our constitutional condemnation.
The court correctly concludes here that Freeman v. Heiman, 426 F.2d 1050 (10th Cir.1970), a federal case which holds that the § 850 contempt provisions do not violate our constitutional interdiction of imprisonment for debt, is unpersuasive. Today’s opinion wisely rejects Freeman’s teachings as utterly inconsistent with our State’s constitutional mandate. I concur in the court’s view. A federal court’s pronouncement on a state-law question is never binding on this court. Stewart v. Amerada Hess Corp., Okl., 604 P.2d 854, 857 (1980); McLin v. Trimble, Okl., 795 P.2d 1035, 1044-1045 (1990) (Opala, V.C.J., dissenting). Where there is no controlling U.S.Supreme Court precedent, we often opt as a matter of comity to follow federal-law jurisprudence of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit. See, e.g., Phillips v. Williams, Okl., 608 P.2d 1131, 1135 (1980); McLin, supra at 1047 n. 17 (Opala, V.C.J., dissenting).

. In Burrows I, supra note 5, the judgment debt- or in a proceeding in aid of execution was found to have nonexempt property "in his possession and under his control” which should be applied toward the satisfaction of an adjudicated debt. The debtor was later held in contempt for willfully refusing to comply with the court’s order. The appellate opinion viewed the order not as one to pay a debt, but rather as "a direction to apply certain property, discovered upon the examination to be in the possession of the appellant, to the satisfaction of the judgment against him." Id. 5 P. at 452. In Burrows II, supra note 5, a related habeas corpus proceeding, the court opined that a debtor could be imprisoned only when he "has property which he unjustly refuses to apply towards the satisfaction of a judgment, after being afforded the opportunity so to do.” Id. 7 P. at 150 (emphasis supplied).
O’Connell, supra note 5, held fatally infirm an order imprisoning a judgment debtor based on "a general finding that the petitioner had money and property in his possession and under his control which he unjustly refused to apply to the payment of his debts_" The order’s infirmity was said to consist of its failure to specify "the kind of property, or state the amount of money the petitioner had in his possession ... [and to] describe the property under his control.” Id. 30 P. at 456 (emphasis added). Citing Burrows II, the court stated that "[i]n proceedings in aid of execution, where an examination has resulted in the disclosure that the debtor unjustly refused to apply money or property which he has in his possession or under his control to the satisfaction of a judgment rendered against him, the practice is for the court or judge to order the judgment debtor to deliver over a sufficient sum of money or turn out property enough to satisfy such judgment and costs; and then, if he willfully disobeys such order, the same may be enforced by proceedings for contempt_” Id. at 456.

. Capias is the “general name for several species of writs, the common characteristic of *861which is that they require the officer to take the body of the defendant into custody.” Black’s Law Dictionary 188 (5th Ed.1979).

. Capias ad respondendum (ca. resp.) is a “judicial writ ... by which actions at law were frequently commenced; and which commands the sheriff to take the defendant, and him safely keep, so that he may have his body before the court on a certain day, to answer the plaintiff in the action_” Black’s Law Dictionary, supra note 10 at 188.

. Capias ad satisfaciendum (ca.sa.) is a "writ of execution ... ■ which commands the sheriff to take the party named, and keep him safely, so that he may have his body before the court on a certain day, to satisfy the damages or debt and damages in certain actions. It deprives the party taken of his liberty until he makes the satisfaction awarded_” Black’s Law Dictionary, supra note 10 at 188. The executory process of imprisonment by means of ca.sa. originally lay at common law only in trespass vz' et armis and later came to be extended by statute to other cases. See Forsythe v. Washtenaw Circuit Judge, 180 Mich. 633, 147 N.W. 549, 550 (1914); Potter v. Wilson, Okl., 609 P.2d 1278, 1280 (1980).

. Ford, Imprisonment for Debt, 25 Mich.L.Rev. 24 (1926).

. Notes, Body Attachment and Body Execution: Forgotten, But Not Gone, 17 Wm. & Mary L.Rev. 543-550 (1976).

. Notes, supra note 14 at 548-550.

. For the terms of Art. 2, § 13, Okl. Const., supra note 2.

. Ne exeat is a "writ which forbids the person to whom it is addressed to leave the country, the state, or the jurisdiction of the court....” Black’s Law Dictionary, supra note 10 at 929.

. Only those who fail to pay statutorily imposed fines or penalties are expressly excluded from the purview of Art. 2, § 13, Okl. Const., supra note 2; Potter, supra note 12 at 1280-1281.
The dissent appears to attach some significance to a perceived distinction between common-law capias and the contempt process because only the latter but not the former affords the debtor a pre-commitment hearing. The constitution’s absolute interdiction admits of no legal difference between imprisonment for debt after a hearing and one that occurs sans hearing. Our fundamental law prohibits more than mere commitment to debtors’ prison without an anterior judicial hearing; it absolutely and explicitly protects from all forms of imprisonment for debt.