Court Opinion

ID: 9684901
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 14:18:22.876785+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:01.032751
License: Public Domain

Adams, J.
(concurring). I concur in the.result reached by Chief Justice T. M. Kavanagh for the following reasons:
The Grand Ledge State Bank and the Loan & Deposit State Bank established that, as a matter of economic necessity, they had to either merge, sell out, or liquidate.
Section 26 of the banking act (CL 1948, § 487.26 [Stat Ann 1957 Rev § 23.754]) requires that in a *496city or township of less than 6,000 there shall be only one bank.
Section 26 was prospective from the date of enactment. It does not apply to 18 cities (including-Grand Ledge) with populations of less than 6,000,. where two banks were in existence at the time section 26 was enacted. There are presently, however, 400 cities or townships in Michigan with less than 6,000 population that have only one bank. Section 26 clearly makes it the public policy of this State, that there bo only one bank in small cities or townships. It would be fully applicable to Grand Ledge upon the dissolution or liquidation of one or both of the banks existing in that community.
The parties to this case agreed that the banking business is very localized and that the relevant market area here involved is the city of Grand Ledge and not to exceed five miles around it. The proposition that banking is a localized business, if controverted, might be. subject to searching- scrutiny;* *497but since it is not, we must accept it for purposes of tbis case.
Once it is established that a local monopoly (due to the nature of the banking business) is authorized by virtue of section 26, and that liquidation of one or both of the Grand Ledge banks was an economic necessity, the question becomes—Who is to be permitted to carry on that local, legally sanctioned monopoly? I agree with Chief Justice T. M. Kavanagh that this was a matter for open, competitive, bidding by any interested party. The Grand Ledge banks had three alternatives—(1) to merge with each other; (2) to sell to the American Bank & Trust Company; (3) to sell to Michigan National Bank. Each alternative was carefully and exhaustively ex*498plored. Only after it was determined by the boards of directors and the stockholders of the Grand Ledge banks that the Michigan National Bank offer was the most attractive was that offer accepted. As a result of this competitive bargaining, the stockholders of the Grand Ledge banks will receive an attractive price for their stock, the employees of both banks will be assured continued employment and other benefits, the officers will receive ' attractive retirement plans in return for continued service and advice, and the community of Grand Ledgfe will be afforded adequate banking services in a modern facility.
The only quid pro quo established to Michigan National Bank for this is a local monopoly permitted under section 26. If this acquisition by Michigan National was in furtherance of an illegal and unlawful monopoly outside of the local area, there was a failure of proof to that effect.
Black, J., did not sit.

 “It is eloar that just as the antimonopoly aet [CL 1948, §§445-.701-445.712; 445.761-445.767 (Stat Ann 1962 Rev §§ 28.31-28.39, 28.61-28.67)] contained no specific exemption as to banking, neither does the Michigan financial institutions aet [CL 1948, § 487.Í et seq. (Stat Ann 1957 Rev §23.711 et seq.)] contain a specific exemption as to monopoly. The addition of such exemption, if consistent with legislative intent, is so simple and so much to be expected, that the omission seems to us of great significance in determination of this issue.
“Nor does our examination of the seope of the Michigan financial institutions act uphold the ‘comprehensive’ argument advanced to us by defendants. Dor example, the power vested in the banking commissioner by sections 99 and 112 of the Michigan financial institutions act (CL 1948, §§ 487.99, 487.112 [Stat Ann 1957 Eev §§ 23.852, 23.865]) appears to be the examination of the proposed liquidation for the purpose of protecting depositors and creditors. If the public is protected from the sort of monopolistic practice in banking demonstrated in this ease, the protection is not to be found in the Michigan financial institutions act.
“Defendants likewise .argue with vehemence that in many other situations under express authority of the banking commissioner and authorization of the Michigan financial institutions aet, 1-bank cities have been created ór are being maintained in Michigan. We have no doubt that the Michigan financial institutions act has established', as a matter of State policy, a concern for the stability and economic *497soundness of the banks in the State. These considerations have in some situations been placed above the maintenance of free and unlimited- competition. We recognize, too, this State poliey must be read in conjunction with any application of the antimonopoly law to banking.
“The purpose, however, is to protect the public against imprudent banking, not ‘to deter competition or foster monopoly.’. Moran v. State Banking Commissioner, 322 Mich 230, 243.
“What prevents the application of this argument to this ease is the fact that Port Huron was supporting, and obviously could continue to support, 2 general banking institutions. This was not a liquidation founded on economic necessity or demanding State approval on grounds of protection of depositors or creditors of any bank.
“Nor do we have before us any fact situation presenting the question of creation of monopoly through voluntary merger of previously competitive banks with banking commission approval under procedures established by the Michigan financial institutions act. While declining to pass on an issue clearly not before us, we note that if there are, or have been, other unrestrained violations of the antimonopoly laws, this fact could be of no benefit to defendants. Society of Good Neighbors v. Mayor of Detroit, 324 Mich 22; Attorney General, ex rel. James, v. National Cash Register Co., 182 Mich 99 (Ann Cas 1916D, 638).
“Repeals by implication are generally not favored. Washtenaw County Road Commissioners v. Public Service Commission, 349 Mich 663; People v. Buckley, 302 Mich 12; Edwards v. Auditor General, 161 Mich 639. And we find nothing in the history or language of these 2 pieces of legislation to support an argument of legislative intention of implied repeal.
“We hold that the Michigan financial institutions act did not either expressly or by implication exempt banking from the operation of the Michigan antimonopoly laws.” Peoples Savings Bank v. Stoddard, 359 Mich 297, 331-333 (83 ALR2d 344).