Court Opinion

ID: 9620319
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:40:56.346661+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:29:10.570119
License: Public Domain

RUSSON, Judge
(concurring in part and dissenting in part):
Although I concur that this case must be reversed and remanded, I dissent (1) from the majority’s analysis used in reaching that result and (2) from the majority’s instructions upon remand that the trial court should reanalyze the evidence and issue a revised order on Lopez’s motion to suppress. I would reverse and remand this case for trial in which the evidence in question would be admitted.
On appeal, the State has invited us to reconsider the pretext analysis first set forth in State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (Utah App.1988), disavowed on other grounds, State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 689-92 (Utah 1990). Upon that invitation, I would *1051recommend a return to the basic analysis of the legality of seizures established in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), and Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 50 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979) for most traffic stop cases, limiting the use of Sierra to the narrow group of cases to which pretext analysis properly applies. Accordingly, I would hold that the following is the proper, and more prudent, analysis.
I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND AUTOMOBILE STOPS
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated_” U.S. Const, amend. IV. It follows that “[although a person has a lesser expectation of privacy in a car than in his or her home, one does not lose the protection of the Fourth Amendment while in an automobile.” State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132, 1135 (Utah 1989) (citation omitted). Thus, we have held that the stopping of an automobile and the consequent detention of its occupants constitutes a “seizure” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment “even if the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention brief.” State v. Steward, 806 P.2d 213, 215 (Utah App.1991) (citation omitted).
However, the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit all seizures, but only unreasonable ones. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1873, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Under Terry, the determination of whether a seizure is reasonable involves a two-pronged test: (1) Was the police officer’s action justified at its inception?, and (2) Was the officer’s action reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place? Id., 392 U.S. at 19-20, 88 S.Ct. at 1879; accord State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah App.1990).
As to the first prong, stopping an automobile is constitutionally justified if the stop is (1) incident to a lawful citation for a traffic violation, or (2) based upon a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the defendant has committed or is about to commit a crime. State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489, 491 (Utah App.1990).1
In the case at bar, the first prong, whether the stop was justified at its inception, is easily satisfied since making a turn without signaling is prohibited by Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-69(l)(a) (1988), and driving without a license is prohibited by Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-104 (Supp.1991). “[A]s long as an officer suspects the driver is violating ‘any one of the multitude of applicable traffic and equipment regulations,’ the police officer may legally stop the vehicle.” State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 883 n. 3 (Utah App.), cert. denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990) (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 660, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1400, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979)); accord Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109, 98 S.Ct. 330, 332, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977); Talbot, 792 P.2d at 491. Therefore, Officer Hamner’s stop of Lopez’s vehicle was clearly justified at its inception.
However, Officer Hamner’s actions must also be reasonably related in scope to the stop of Lopez’s vehicle for the aforementioned traffic violations. This determination rests on whether Officer Hamner was justified in running a warrants check on Lopez without further evidence of criminal activity on Lopez’s part, an issue of first impression in Utah. Some guidance is provided by the Supreme Court’s decision in Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 101 S.Ct. 2587, 69 L.Ed.2d 340 (1981). In Summers, the Supreme Court noted that an officer may communicate with others, either police or private citizens, in order to confirm the identification of the individual stopped or to determine whether that individual is “otherwise wanted,” unless such action makes the period of detention un*1052duly long. Id., 452 U.S. at 700-01 n. 12, 101 S.Ct. at 2593 n. 12 (quoting 3 LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.2, pp. 36-37 (1978)). As to the length of such detention, the Supreme Court has held that the detention “must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.” Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1325, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983). Similarly, the Utah Supreme Court has stated that the length and scope of a detention for a traffic violation “must be ‘strictly tied to and justified by’ the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible.” State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761, 763 (Utah 1991) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20, 88 S.Ct. at 1879). Additionally, the Robinson case states that “[a]n officer conducting a routine traffic stop may request a driver’s license and vehicle registration, conduct a computer check, and issue a citation.” Robinson, 797 P.2d at 435 (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1519 (10th Cir.1988)). While Robinson did not specifically address the question of whether running a warrants check exceeds the lawful basis for a traffic stop, conducting a computer check most certainly can be read to include a warrants check.
Moreover, other jurisdictions which have considered the very question of conducting warrants checks during the course of a traffic stop have held that such action is permissible so long as it does not significantly extend the period of detention. See, e.g., United States v. Contreras-Diaz, 575 F.2d 740, 744-45 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 855, 99 S.Ct. 167, 58 L.Ed.2d 161 (1978); State v. Ybarra, 156 Ariz. 275, 276, 751 P.2d 591, 592 (1987); Storm v. State, 736 P.2d 1000, 1001-02 (Okla.Crim.App.1987); State v. Nelson, 76 Or.App. 67, 708 P.2d 1153, 1155 (1985); State v. Smith, 73 Or.App. 287, 698 P.2d 973, 976 (1985) (citing State v. Perry, 39 Or.App. 37, 42, 591 P.2d 379, 382 (1979); State v. Carter, 34 Or.App. 21, 32, 578 P.2d 790, 796-97 (1978), aff'd, 287 Or. 479, 600 P.2d 873 (1979)); Petty v. State, 696 S.W.2d 635, 638-39 (Tex.App.1985); cf United States v. Luckett, 484 F.2d 89, 90-91 (9th Cir.1973) (evidence inadmissible because running warrants check extended detention beyond scope of original reason for stop). I find this authority persuasive, and would adopt the rule that running a warrants check in the course of a traffic stop is permissible, so long as it does not significantly extend the period of detention beyond that reasonably necessary to effectuate the original purpose of the stop.
Applying this rule to the case at bar, I would hold that since the warrants check was conducted within the course of Officer Hamner’s stop of Lopez for traffic violations, it did not exceed the scope of that stop, and was therefore permissible. Moreover, although Officer Hamner’s attention was initially drawn to Lopez’s car for reasons other than those for which he stopped Lopez, this “does not insulate the defendant from being stopped for a traffic violation.” State v. Smith, 781 P.2d 879, 883 (Utah App.1989) (citing State v. Tucker, 286 Or. 485, 595 P.2d 1364, 1368-70 (1979)). Accordingly, Officer Hamner’s stop of Lopez’s vehicle was proper, and the subsequent seizure was valid.
II. PRETEXT DOCTRINE
However, the majority’s position that the test for pretext established in State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (Utah App.1988), disavowed on other grounds, State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 689-92 (Utah 1990), should be applied to the facts in this case must also be addressed. The Sierra test for pretext in traffic stop cases is based on the following language from Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978): “would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search ‘warrant [an officer] of reasonable caution in the belief’ that the action taken was appropriate?” Sierra, 754 P.2d at 977-78 (quoting Scott, 436 U.S. at 137, 98 S.Ct. at 1723). Thus, the Sierra court reasoned that in traffic stop cases the “focus [is] on whether a hypothetical reasonable officer, in view of the totality of the circumstances confronting him or her, would have stopped [the defendant] to issue a [citation].” Sierra, 754 P.2d at 978 (emphasis in original).
*1053I would decline to apply Sierra to the facts in this case for several reasons. My initial concern centers on the fact that the Scott test focuses on whether an officer’s suspicion of criminal activity is reasonable, a factor which cannot be readily translated to apply in traffic stop cases. The Scott case involved a determination of whether the officer had a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity in light of the facts known to him at that time. Put differently, did the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify the action taken? Scott, 436 U.S. at 137-38, 98 S.Ct. at 1723. In traffic stop cases, however, that question will always be answered in the affirmative since issuance of a citation is always justified when the officer observes a statute being violated. Police officers have a sworn duty to enforce all laws passed by the legislature, including traffic laws. Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-17 (1988) of the Motor Vehicle Act provides:
The commission, and such officers and inspectors of the department as it shall designate, peace officers, state patrolmen, and others duly authorized by the department or by law shall have power and it shall be their duty:
(a) To enforce the provisions of this act and of all other laws regulating the registration or operation of vehicles or the use of the highways.
(b) To make arrests upon view and without warrant for any violation committed in their presence of any of the provisions of this act or other law regulating the operation of vehicles or the use of the highways.
(c) When on duty, upon reasonable belief that any vehicle is being operated in violation of any provision of this act or of any other law regulating the operation of vehicles to require the driver thereof to stop, exhibit his driver’s license and the registration card issued for the vehicles and submit to an inspection of such vehicle, the registration plates and registration card thereon.
Id. (emphasis added). Thus, police officers do not have the discretion to determine which laws would be reasonable to enforce. Such action is appropriate whenever an officer suspects that the driver is violating one of the applicable traffic regulations. State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 883 n. 3 (Utah App.), cert. denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990); State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489, 491 (Utah App.1990); accord State v. Sanders, 154 Ga.App. 305, 267 S.E.2d 906 (1980); Braxton v. State, 234 Md. 1, 197 A.2d 841 (1964); Anderson v. State, 444 P.2d 239 (Okla.Crim.1968).
Also, police officers cannot be expected, every time they observe a violation of law, to make a legal decision whether or not a “reasonable officer” would arrest the violator. In fact, even those cases in which the Sierra test has been successfully met do not establish a standard by which the State can prove that a hypothetical reasonable officer would stop the vehicle. In one case, the fact that the officer at hand often makes such arrests was found to be relevant. See State v. Lovegren, 798 P.2d 767, 771 n. 10 (Utah App.1990). In another, the court determined that the stop was justified based on the fact that other jurisdictions had so held under similar circumstances. See Marshall, 791 P.2d at 883. In a third, the trial court’s decision that the violation in question “is the type of clear cut traffic violation for which officers routinely stop citizens and issue citations” was sufficient. See State v. Smith, 781 P.2d 879, 883 (Utah App.1989). If the courts have not been able to articulate a standard for determining what a hypothetical reasonable officer would do, how can the police be expected to make on-the-spot judgments on this difficult legal question?
Nor can the enforceability of state laws depend upon the diligence by which police officers usually enforce such laws. Otherwise, derelict officers would set the standard by which laws would be enforced and thus limit diligent officers in performing their duty. Although the majority proposes that the pretext doctrine requires that police be consistent in their enforcement of traffic regulations, just the opposite is true. To allow police officers to decide which laws should or should not be enforced would destroy the uniform applica*1054tion of laws throughout the state, since what might appear reasonable to officers in one part of the state might appear different to officers in other parts of the state. Accordingly, while the stopping of a vehicle merely to confirm or deny a “hunch,” see Talbot, 792 P.2d at 491-92 n. 6, cannot be condoned, neither can it be left to police officers to determine which traffic laws it would be reasonable to enforce.
And finally, to hold that the police or the courts can determine what laws are reasonable enough to enforce creates a separation of powers problem. Although it is the judiciary's responsibility to determine the constitutionality of the laws, Dean v. Rampton, 556 P.2d 205, 206-07 (Utah 1976) (citing Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803); State v. Betensen, 14 Utah 2d 121, 378 P.2d 669 (1963)), it is not within the province of the executive branch or judicial branch to say whether those laws are reasonable. Such is clearly an invasion of the legislature’s jurisdiction. “[I]t is not our prerogative to question the wisdom, social desirability, or public policy underlying a given statute. Those are matters left exclusively to the legislature’s judgment and determination.” Condemarin v. University Hosp., 775 P.2d 348, 377 (Utah 1989) (Hall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted); accord Masich v. United States Smelting, Ref. & Mining Co., 113 Utah 101, 126-27, 191 P.2d 612, 625, appeal dismissed, 335 U.S. 866, 69 S.Ct. 138, 93 L.Ed. 411 (1948); Utah Manufacturers’ Ass’n v. Stewart, 82 Utah 198, 23 P.2d 229, 232 (1933) (“fairly debatable questions as to reasonableness, wisdom, or propriety [of legislative action] are not for the courts, but for the Legislature”). Thus, it is violative of the principle of separation of powers to allow the police or the courts to determine whether it is reasonable to enforce any law duly passed by the legislature. Accordingly, Sierra should not be applied to cases such as this.
Nonetheless, there are cases in which pretext is relevant and must be considered. These cases differ from the case at bar in one significant aspect: a finding by the trial court that actually no violation occurred or that the stop was admittedly made for reasons other than the traffic violation. Thus, in cases such as State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 688 (Utah 1990), where no violation occurred, pretext can be thereby established by the absence of a legitimate cause to stop the vehicle. Here, however, the undisputed testimony of Officer Hamner is that Lopez made a left turn without signaling and was driving without a license. Compare id.; see also Talbot, 792 P.2d at 491-92 (pretext analysis used when no indication that defendants were stopped for any traffic violation and where stop was in fact made for other reasons); State v. Baird, 763 P.2d 1214, 1217 (Utah App.1988) (pretext analysis used where facts demonstrate that the driver did not commit a traffic violation); Sierra, 754 P.2d at 979 (pretext analysis used when no indication in record that defendant had violated any traffic statutes).2
Furthermore, Arroyo does not approve the Sierra “reasonable officer” test, in the broad sense that the majority believes. While the Utah Supreme Court did approve the court of appeals’s determination that *1055the stop in that case was an unconstitutional pretext, it did so on the basis of the following facts:
8. As a result [of] Trooper Mangel-son’s training at [a] seminar, he admitted that whenever he observed an Hispanic individual driving a vehicle he wanted to stop the vehicle. The Trooper also admitted that once he stopped an Hispanic driver, 80% of the time he requested permission to search the vehicle.
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14. Under cross-examination, the Trooper denied that it was his normal procedure when issuing a citation to an individual for “Following too Close” to record the license plate of the front car. However, the Trooper’s denial on this point was contradicted by tape recorded testimony from the Trooper at the preliminary hearing held in this matter. The Trooper admitted that he had not recorded the license plate number of the front car in this case.
15. The Defendant testified that he was at least 85 to 95 feet or nine car lengths, behind the vehicle immediately in front of his own. The Court finds this testimony to be credible.
16. In contrast, the Court is unpersuaded that Trooper Mangelson rightfully determined that the Defendant was “Following too Close” or that any other attested facts preponderated to the level necessary to permit a constitutional stop of the Defendant’s vehicle. Moreover, the Court finds that the Trooper’s own testimony established the probability that no violation of law occurred, and that the alleged violation was only a pretext asserted by the Trooper to justify his stop of a vehicle with out of state license plates and with occupants of Latin origin.
Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 688 n. 3. Thus, it is clear that the Utah Supreme Court did not adopt the Sierra “reasonable officer” test, but merely found that the evidence, including the trooper’s admissions, indicated that no traffic violation had occurred, and based its conclusion that the stop was an unconstitutional pretext on that indication.
Additionally, the majority’s argument that the pretext doctrine is beneficial because it restricts police discretion when used unconstitutionally is also without merit. As noted above, Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-17 (1988) of the Motor Vehicle Act explicitly provides that whenever a police officer witnesses a violation of any of the laws regulating the registration or operation of vehicles or the use of the highways, he or she has an affirmative duty to enforce that law. No police discretion is provided for, and none can be read into the statute. Accordingly, it makes little sense to argue that discretion is being restricted where none, in fact, exists.
Nor does it follow that limiting the use of the pretext doctrine will result in selective and arbitrary enforcement of the traffic laws. If evidence of selective enforcement exists, then the remedy, as in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886), is to hold that the statute, while facially constitutional, was unconstitutionally applied. The solution is not, as the majority suggests, to apply the pretext doctrine in the name of restricting a nonexistent police discretion, but instead to limit unconstitutional police action by returning to the sound principles of Terry v. Ohio and Delaware v. Prouse.
III. CONCLUSION
The majority expresses its concern that the police will ride roughshod over the citizenry if the Sierra doctrine is not applied to cases such as this. I disagree. Sufficient protection against unwarranted searches and seizures of defendants can be achieved by the application of the two-pronged Terry test, which simply requires the answering of two questions: (1) Was the police officer’s action justified at its inception?, and (2) Was the officer’s action reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place? Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). The1 Terry test sufficiently limits the police officer’s actions in such cases to those within the scope and duration of the original stop, in this case, to running a *1056computer check, which may include a driver’s license check and/or warrants search, and issuing a citation. Thus, the officer will not be able to use the traffic stop as a springboard into further investigation unless in the course of such a stop, a reasonable suspicion, based on articulable facts, of criminal activity arises, or the computer check reveals an arrest warrant. If the computer check or other circumstances do not reveal a reason to further detain the individual, the officer must simply issue the citation and allow the individual to leave.
Thus, in the case at bar, I would conclude that Officer Hamner’s stop of Lopez for the traffic violation was proper, as was the warrants check made within the duration of such stop, as was the arrest based on the warrants, and that the subsequent inventory search of Lopez’s vehicle during impoundment and seizure of the cocaine found therein was valid. Accordingly, the trial court’s order granting suppression of the evidence should be reversed and remanded for trial in which the evidence should be included.3

. Since Officer Hamner’s stop of Lopez was based upon traffic violations, whether Officer Hamner had reasonable suspicion to believe that a more serious crime had been or was about to be committed need not be examined. State v. Smith, 781 P.2d 879, 882 (Utah App.1989).

. Similarly, a number of the pretext cases from other jurisdictions that are cited by the majority involve situations in which no traffic violation had occurred or where the stop was admittedly made for reasons other than a traffic violation. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704, 706 (11th Cir.1986) (officer admitted that he did not stop the vehicle because it "weaved," but because of his reliance on a "drug courier profile’’); Kehoe v. State, 521 So.2d 1094, 1095 (Fla. 1988) (officer admitted that he stopped the vehicle primarily because he was told by another officer to do so, not because of a traffic violation); Tarwid v. State, 184 Ga.App. 853, 363 S.E.2d 63, 64-65 (1987) (officer admitted that at the time of the stop, defendants were not committing any traffic violations). Others involve stops which would have to be invalidated as exceeding the scope under the two-prong Terry test analysis proposed herein. See, e.g., United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1514 (10th Cir.1988) (rather than issuing a warning or citation, officer conducted a further investigation admittedly to determine whether defendants were "hauling contraband in the vehicle’’); People v. Camarre, 171 A.D.2d 1002, 569 N.Y.S.2d 223, 224, appeal denied, 78 N.Y.2d 952, 573 N.Y.S.2d 649, 578 N.E.2d 447 (1991) ("What occurred was not a traffic arrest, but a full-blown arrest based on suspicion of drug activity, as evidenced by the fact that the defendant was frisked and placed in handcuffs.’’).

. Lastly, I feel compelled to respond to footnote eight of the majority’s opinion, wherein it states that all of the other judges of the Utah Court of Appeals have cited the Sierra doctrine with approval. Much of present-day law is based on the wisdom of lone dissenters. Otherwise, the law would never progressively improve. If such were not the case, Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393, 19 How. 393, 15 L.Ed. 691 (1857), would still be good law, and Brown v. Board of Educ. of Topeka, Kan., 349 U.S. 294, 75 S.Ct. 753, 99 L.Ed. 1083 (1955) might never have changed the "separate but equal” doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 16 S.Ct. 1138, 41 L.Ed. 256 (1896).