Court Opinion

ID: 9578114
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:41:46.414368+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:22:41.565792
License: Public Domain

SUTIN, Judge (dissenting). I dissent. When intermixed with Rules of Appellate Procedure and judicial pronouncements, an attorney fee to be awarded Fitch is on a merry-go-round. A. The trial court’s findings are conclusive on appeal. In the Statement of Proceedings defendant did not challenge any findings of the trial court. Defendant did not object to the amount of the trial court’s award of an attorney fee until questioned by the court during the time the judgment was presented to the trial court. Rule 9(m)(2) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure for civil cases provides in part: ... If any finding is challenged, it must be so indicated by a parenthetical note referring to the appropriate numbered point in the argument, e. g. [Emphasis added.] Statement of the grounds for challenging any finding must be set forth in the argument and not in the statement of the proceedings. This duty is mandatory. It has long been the rule that “[t]he trial court’s findings, not properly attacked, are conclusive on appeal.” Giovannini v. Turrietta, 76 N.M. 344, 347, 414 P.2d 855 (1966); Springer Corporation v. American Leasing Company, 80 N.M. 609, 459 P.2d 135 (1969); American General Companies v. Jaramillo, 88 N.M. 182, 538 P.2d 1204 (Ct.App.1975). This rule may have been modified in State ex rel. Newsome v. Alarid, 90 N.M. 790, 793, 568 P.2d 1236 (1977). The court said: Where there is such a failure the reviewing court may assume the findings are correct and conclusive on appeal. [Emphasis added.] It now appears that the failure to challenge leaves the remedy within the discretion of the reviewing court. Cited as authority is Tafoya v. Tafoya, 84 N.M. 124, 500 P.2d 409 (1972). Tafoya said: [W]e affirm the modification of the decree because of the total failure of appellant to comply with the requirements of Supreme Court Rule ... (16)(b) [now 9(m)(2)] . .. [and other rules]. This language does not indicate a change in the former rule. For uncertainty in which Rule 9(m)(2) is applied, see Rudisaile v. Hawk Aviation, Inc., 92 N.M. 778, 595 P.2d 751, 598 P.2d 641 (Ct.App.1978), Sutin, J., dissenting, rev’d, 92 N.M. 578, 592 P.2d 178 (1979). We are now at the cross-roads of the punishment to be meted out for failure to follow the mandatory duty. Are the findings not attacked conclusive on appeal or are the findings conclusive within the discretion of the reviewing court? The simple answer has often been: “A reviewing court will disregard this rule.” Another classic example is found in Ortiz v. Ortiz & Torres Dri-Wall Company, 83 N.M. 452, 493 P.2d 418 (Ct.App.1972), Sutin, J., dissenting. ■ To avoid any misunderstanding, I favor the rule that leaves the remedy for noncompliance within the discretion of the reviewing court. To deny a party the right to a review on the merits due to an oversight is too harsh. A rule should be adopted that, within the discretion of the reviewing court, a fine may be assessed against the lawyer. See Trujillo v. Beaty Elec. Co., Inc., 91 N.M. 533, 577 P.2d 431 (Ct.App.1978), Sutin, J., specially concurring. This rule may ultimately assist in reducing the repeated violation of appellate rules. To settle the issue at the cross-roads, Giovannini, Springer Corp. and American General Companies should be overruled on the issue of noncompliance. Until the prior rule is overturned, the trial court’s findings in this case are conclusive on appeal. “We need only determine if the trial court’s conclusions and the judgment are correct, based upon the facts found.” Springer Corporation, 80 N.M. 610, 459 P.2d 135. The finding and conclusion set forth in the majority opinion resolves this matter in favor of plaintiff. The judgment entered should be affirmed. B. In the alternative, this case should be remanded for findings by the court. The district court adopted verbatim the findings and conclusions requested by plaintiff. Mora v. Martinez, 80 N.M. 88, 451 P.2d 992 (1969) held that findings of fact requested by a party and adopted by the court, free of the exercise of an independent judgment in making its own findings of fact, should be remanded to the district court with express direction that proper findings and conclusions, together with a judgment thereon be entered for resubmission. My disagreement with Mora is set forth in Pattison Trust v. Bostian, 90 N.M. 54, 559 P.2d 842 (Ct.App.1976), Sutin, J., dissenting, cert. denied, 90 N.M. 254, 561 P.2d 1347 (1977). Pattison Trust went further than Mora. It remanded the case with instructions to prepare and enter proper findings of fact and conclusions of law and enter judgment consistent with the opinion. We have now arrived at that stage of appellate procedure whereby the reviewing court, not the district court, shall exercise its independent judgment in making findings of fact. The solution to this problem rests in the adoption of a rule that if an opposing lawyer does not object in the district court to the adopted findings, based upon Mora, the error is waived and the findings adopted by the district court shall be the findings in the appeal, not subject to remand. Under Mora, the alternative remedy is to remand this case to the district court to make independent findings. C. The.trial court did not abuse its discretion in the attorney fee award. For over a quarter century, the amount of an attorney fee to be awarded a workman rested within the discretion of the trial court to be reversed solely on the basis of an abuse of discretion. Hathaway v. New Mexico State Police, 57 N.M. 747, 263 P.2d 690 (1953). Authorities on this subject are too numerous to mention. Absent any standard, the Supreme Court has summarily determined the reasonableness of fees at trial and in appeal. See, Seal v. Blackburn Tank Truck Service, 64 N.M. 282, 327 P.2d 797 (1958); Waymire v. Signal Oil Field Service, Inc., 77 N.M. 297, 422 P.2d 34 (1966); Herndon v. Albuquerque Pub. Schools, 92 N.M. 287, 587 P.2d 434 (1978); Wright v. Schultz, 55 N.M. 261, 231 P.2d 937 (1951); Hamilton v. Doty, 65 N.M. 270, 335 P.2d 1067 (1958); Dickerson v. Farmer’s Electric Coop., Inc., 67 N.M. 23, 350 P.2d 1037 (1960); Genuine Parts Co. v. Garcia, 92 N.M. 57, 582 P.2d 1270 (1978); Ortega v. New Mexico State Highway Department, 77 N.M. 185, 420 P.2d 771 (1966). Fryar v. Johnsen, 93 N.M. 485, 601 P.2d 718 (1979). An abuse of discretion in an award of attorney fees was a label which led to Fryar which adopted standards only for district courts. No standard has been adopted for an award of attorney fees in the appeal. See Clymo v. United Nuclear Corp., 94 N.M. 214, 608 P.2d 526 (Ct.App.1980). Nevertheless, Marez v. Kerr-McGee Nuclear Corp., 93 N.M. 9, 595 P.2d 1204, 597 P.2d 1178 (Ct. App.1978), cert. den., 92 N.M. 532, 591 P.2d 286 (1979) was known to the Supreme Court and not disturbed. The instant case is a replay of Marez. We assume defendant’s lawyers were aware of Marez, decided over 4 months before the answer was filed, and proceeded to trial. In Marez, an award of $11,958.52 plus tax, based upon 15% of the total recovery was not held excessive. It did not constitute an abuse of discretion. Because Fryar has become a career case, the majority opinion summarily reduced plaintiff’s award of attorney fees from $13,-000.00 to $5,000.00, the amount suggested by defendant in a proposed conclusion of law. To accept defendant’s offer without any basis therefor is as arbitrary as holding that an award of $13,000.00 cannot stand. If the award stood erect in Marez, it can stand upright in this case. The issue is whether the trial court acted beyond the realm of reason. To reach this height, an award of $13,000.00 must be shocking in this inflationary period. To me, it is not. The trial court did not abuse its discretion. D. On remand, plaintiff is entitled to present new evidence. The majority opinion concludes that on remand, the trial court shall enter specific findings and conclusions, “but without the receipt or consideration of new evidence on remand.” “New evidence” means any evidence not presented to the trial court and which is not merely cumulative in relation to evidence which was presented at trial. If plaintiff presented no evidence at trial with regard to the value of legal services rendered, then the trial court is ordered to fix an attorney fee based upon insignificant factors. No independent testimony or evidence was presented to form a basis for the amount of an award of attorney fees. Defendant failed and refused to pay plaintiff any compensation or any reasonable and necessary medical expenses. No sum was ever offered plaintiff either before or after an attorney was employed. In addition to depositions of these doctors, it was necessary to conduct conferences with the doctors and prepare for those depositions. Defendant contested almost every issue that can arise in workmen’s compensation cases, including the jurisdiction of the New Mexico Court. Defendant maintained that plaintiff was not in the course and scope of his employment at the time the injury occurred, the amount of compensation to which plaintiff was entitled, the amount of plaintiff’s weekly wage, the applicability of the New Mexico Workmen’s Compensation Act, a conflict of law question based upon plaintiff having received compensation benefits under the law of Missouri, the nature of plaintiff’s injuries and degree of disability, the reasonableness and necessity of expenses for medical treatment and expense statements. Many other factors in Fryar need the presentation of “new evidence.” To deny plaintiff the right to present “new evidence” is unreasonable and unfair. When all pertinent evidence is presented, the trial court may not hesitate to award $13,000.00. In this event, we may be confronted with another appeal to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion. Under the circumstances of this case, the judgment of the court below should be affirmed on appeal.