Court Opinion

ID: 9453536
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 18:16:29.27565+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:33:41.669853
License: Public Domain

VAN OOSTERHOÜT,
Chief Judge (dissenting).
I would affirm the judgment of dismissal upon the basis of the well-considered opinion of Chief Judge Harris reported at D.C., 264 F.Supp. 610. Social Security benefits are created by and dependent upon federal statutes. Coverage must have a statutory basis. It is undisputed that the appellant-claimants must rely upon a portion of Mr. Taylor’s period of naval service to establish coverage. Mr. Taylor’s twenty years of active naval service ending on May 7, 1948, qualifies him as a World War II and a post-World War II veteran within the meaning of 42 U.S.C.A. § 417(a) (1) and (e) (1) and permits the use of naval service as a basis for Social Security coverage subject to the conditions imposed.
Each of said subsections by subdivision (B) expressly provides that such coverage is not applicable if “a benefit * * * which is based, in whole or in part, upon the active military or naval service of such veteran during World War II is determined by any agency * * * of the United States (other than the Veterans’ Administration) to be payable by it under any other law of the United States * * * ”
The exception just set out is clear and unambiguous and specifically excludes the use of the period of naval service to establish coverage for Social Security benefits under the facts here presented. The trial court’s holding to such effect is supported by consistent administrative rulings and court decisions passing upon the issue. See Moncrief v. Hobby, D.Md., 133 F.Supp. 152, aff’d, Moncrief v. Folsom, 4 Cir., 233 F.2d 471; Sutherland v. Flemming, N.D.Ala., 189 F.Supp. 712.
*265Upon retirement from active service, Mr. Taylor was transferred to the Fleet Reserve. The trial court determined upon the basis of substantial evidence, which has not been controverted, that Mr. Taylor upon transferring to the Fleet Reserve received retirement pay, the amount of which was based in part upon the periods of naval service upon which reliance is based for Social Security coverage. Retirement pay on transfer to the Fleet Reserve is determined in the same way as retirement pay upon complete retirement. The statutory provisions applicable to the consequences of Mr. Taylor’s transfer to the Fleet Reserve are found in the Naval Reserve Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 1175 et seq. Section 202 of such Act provides in part:
“That all transfers from the Regular Navy * * * to the Fleet Reserve * * * by the Secretary of the Navy, shall be conclusive for all purposes, and all members so transferred shall, from the date of transfer, be entitled to pay and allowances, in accordance with their ranks or ratings and length of service as determined by the Secretary of the Navy.”
Exhibit 24 in evidence, certified by a naval officer, specifically states that active service after September 15, 1940, and before July 25, 1947, and that active service after July 24, 1947, was used to establish eligibility to receive retirement or retainer pay.
The allowance and payment of retirement compensation to Mr. Taylor under the Naval Reserve Act of 1938, based upon his entire naval service, by the terms of the statutes upon which the appellant relies precludes the use of any part of Mr. Taylor’s naval service as a basis for Social Security Coverage.
The trial court correctly determined that the issue of Mr. Taylor’s competency at the time of his transfer to the Fleet Reserve has no bearing upon the result. Thus there is no need to treat the competency issue dealt with in the majority opinion. In my view, incompetency of Mr. Taylor at the critical time has not been so conclusively established as to warrant a determination by this court that incompetency existed as a matter of law.