Court Opinion

ID: 9529264
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:49:18.75317+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:43.336603
License: Public Domain

BISTLINE, Justice,
specially concurring.
Generally, there is nothing in Justice Johnson’s opinion that gives me any great concern. He correctly observes that there were three votes forming the Deonier1 majority, namely, Chief Justice Shepard and Justices Huntley and Bistline. The opinion was authored by Justice Huntley, and Justice Johnson is correct in the observation that Justice Shepard’s vote showed “concurs in the result.” The result was a decision of the Court that the off-set provisions of I.C. § 72-1414 are unconstitutional, and the cross-appeal was rendered moot. Justice Bakes wrote a substantial dissent wherein he lamented that, “this Court should not lightly reject its own long accepted precedents and the clearly expressed policies of the legislature which have been in place for decades.” 114 Idaho at 729, 760 P.2d at 1145.
When I reread the eight plus pages written by Justice Huntley and then twelve pages written by Justice Bakes, I am unable to subscribe to the notion that the Court’s opinion did not “lightly” arrive at its decision. Moreover, there was much written by Justice Bakes which was very comprehensive and persuasive. It happened that I concluded that the two injured firemen were entitled to be fully compensated. It seemed to me that Justice Huntley’s views would best serve that purpose. So much for that.
Today, only four years later, we ponder over a sequel to Deonier. We have before us a proposed opinion which concedes that Deonier is “somewhat similar” to the instant Osick case. That similarity has given Justice Johnson pause to consider and reflect on the meaning of Justice Shepard’s vote, which was to “concur in the result.” The conclusion reached by Justice Johnson is “that where the third vote necessary to pronounce a decision is by a justice who concurs in the result only, the rationale contained in the opinion is not a decision of the Court and is not controlling in other cases.” At 460, 835 P.2d at 1271. From that statement he concludes that the Court in Deonier did not pronounce a decision, predicated upon Justice Shepard’s “concurring in the result,” which in the view of Justice Johnson precludes the rationale contained in the opinion from being a decision of the Court, and hence not controlling precedent
Turning back to the excerpt of Roy v. Oregon Short Line R.R. Co., which is portrayed in the Court’s opinion, I find that the manner by which that ratio decidendi is reached, “leaves me scratching my bucolic head in uncertainty” as to what the basic issue is in this case. At 459, 835 P.2d 1270; Roy, 55 Idaho at 429, 42 P.2d at 486. I submit that the answer is that the Court must determine what, by definition, is a “decision”?
Decision. A determination arrived at after consideration of facts, and, in legal context, law. A popular rather than technical or legal word; a comprehensive term having no fixed, legal meaning. It may be employed as referring to ministerial acts as well as to those that are judicial or of a judicial character.
A determination of a judicial or quasi judicial nature. A judgment, decree, or order pronounced by a court in settlement of a controversy submitted to it and by way of authoritative answer to the questions raised before it. The term is broad enough to cover both final judg*464mente and interlocutory orders. And though sometimes limited to the sense of judgment, the term is at other times understood as meaning simply the first step leading to a judgment; or as an order for judgment. The word may also include various rulings, as well as orders, including agency and commission orders. U.S. v. Thompson, 251 U.S. 407, 40 S.Ct. 289, 291, 64 L.Ed. 333.
The findings of fact and conclusions of law which must be in writing and filed with the clerk. Wilcox v. Sway, 69 Cal.App.2d 560, 160 P.2d 154, 156.
‘Decision’ is not necessarily synonymous with ‘opinion.’ A decision of the court is its judgment; the opinion is the reasons given for that judgment, or the expression of the views of the judge. But the two words are sometimes used interchangeably.
Black’s Law Dictionary 407 (6th ed. 1991).

. Deonier v. Public Employee Retirement Bd., 114 Idaho 721, 760 P.2d 1137 (1988).