Court Opinion

ID: 9632169
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:05:28.45866+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:08:10.021990
License: Public Domain

*435CROCKETT, Justice.
I concur, but note a problem which arises under the statute1 in question.
It has long been established that whether one rendering service for another is covered by the unemployment compensation does not depend upon any common law concept of master and servant or independent contractor relationship, —the law defines classes of individuals covered and it is only to the definitions in the act that we look to determine who is included.2 The purpose of the Act was to stabilize the economy and decrease the burdens of unemployment.3 These matters are well settled and are effectively covered in the main opinion.
The right to coverage by unemployment compensation presumably is based upon the relationship existing between the individual who hires and the one rendering service; their mutual rights and duties being measured by the contract between them. But under test “C” upon which the main opinion is based, coverage is made to depend upon a circumstance entirely extraneous to the contract of service: that is, it depends upon what the “employee” does at other times, which seems to be entirely unrelated to, and has nothing whatsoever to do with the contractual obligations or the manner in which the service is rendered.
It appears to me that the foregoing gives rise to a question as to whether the application of the statute results in unjust discrimination as between employees which fall into different classes solely because of (C) of (J) (5) *436referred to in the main opinion which specified that a person hired who is
“customarily engaged in an independently established trade * * * of the same nature as that involved in the contract of service. * * * >f
is not covered.
Illustration: Suppose A and B work for Leach under the identical contract; that A is also employed by X Company in other type of work; that B has an independently established business as an “installer,” builder, or contractor. Under this statute A would be covered while B would not.
There are these separate facets of discrimination:
1. In case of layoff A gets paid unemployment compensation benefits, while B does not.
2. A will suffer disadvantage in getting hired on the job because the employer will more readily hire B for whom such contributions need not be made.
There is also a limitation upon the employer’s freedom to choose between A and B upon their merits because of the economic advantage to be gained by hiring B instead of A.
It is appreciated that there may be a discrimination between classes of individuals if there is some reasonable basis for differentiation between them which is related to the purposes sought to be accomplished by the act and it applies uniformly to all persons within the class.4 I am not sure that I see that the differentiation brought about by paragraph (C) above referred to can be said to fulfill that requirement. Sparing the detail here, it seems that there are as good reasons why B should be paid as there *437are that A should, and that A should be as able to get hired as B, consistent with the purpose of relieving the hardship of unemployment and stabilizing the economy.
So far as I have discovered, this problem has not been considered by this court in any of the cases dealing with this statute; it is not raised, nor passed upon in this case. I therefore concur in the opinion of Chief Justice WOLFE.
HENRIOD, J., dissents.

 35-4-1 et seq., U.C.A. 1953.

 Singer Sewing Mach. Co. v. Industrial Comm., 104 Utah 175, 134 P. 2d 479. Auth. there cited.

 Ibid.

 State v. Mason, 94 Utah 501, 78 P. 2d 920, 117 A.L.R. 330; Hansen v. Public Employees Retirement System, 122 Utah 44, 246 P 2d 591.