Court Opinion

ID: 9538743
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:41:01.940862+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:58:07.889231
License: Public Domain

GIBSON, J.
(dissenting). Statements in the majority opinion to the contrary notwithstanding, the deed involved herein does convey a strip of land by definite description. The deed granted and conveyed “the right of way for a railroad, telegraph and telephone line, over, through and across the lands claimed by the undersigned as a grantor hereinafter, lying and being situated in the county of Oklahoma in the Territory of Oklahoma, and described as follows, to wit:
“The east half of the Northwest Quarter and the west half of the Northeast Quarter of Section Twelve, Township Twelve North of Range Two West of the Indian Meridian.
“Said right of way to include a strip of land One Hundred Feet in width, the same to extend fifty feet on each side of the center of the railroad bed, or track of the said railroad, when located and constructed, and said company shall have the right to use such additional ground where there are heavy cuts or fills, as may be necessary for the construction and maintenance of the road bed, not exceéding one hundred feet in width on each side of said right of way, or as much thereof as may be included in said cut or fill, and with the right to take and use a strip of land one hundred feet in width, with a length of two thousand feet, adjoining to and in addition to said right of way for a depot and station and side-track grounds. The field notes, plats and surveys, and maps of the said strip of land as made, or to be made, by the said St. Louis & Oklahoma City Railroad Company are hereby referred to and adopted as a part of this deed, for greater certainty of the description of the land conveyed: * *
There are no express words of limitation upon the grant contained in the deed, so under 16 O. S. 1951 §29, the estate conveyed is deemed an estate in fee simple. The cited statute reads-:
“Every estate in land which shall be granted, conveyed or demised by deed or will shall be deemed an estate in fee simple and of inheritance, unless limited by express words.”
The extent and nature of the estate conveyed where words were used similar to those employed in the deed involved here was determined by us in Marland v. Gillespie, 168 Okla. 376, 33 P. 2d 207. Therein we held:
“A deed from a grantor to a railway company containing the sentence ‘The same being for a right of way for a railroad track as the survey thereof is now located and said grantee agrees to construct two grade crossings over its tracks for the use of the grantor, and proper water ways under its track where there is heavy fills,’ but not otherwise limited, conveys a fee-simple title; such sentence not being a limitation upon the quality of the estate conveyed.”
Again, in Higgins v. Oklahoma City. 191 Okla. 16, 127 P. 2d 845, wherein a deed conveying a strip of ground for railroad right of way was involved, and the quantity, nature and extent of the estate conveyed was in question, we said:
“But when the deed was executed, section 30, ch. 8, S. L. 1897 (sec. *5429698, O. S. 1931), was in force. That section provides that ‘every estate in land which shall be granted, conveyed or demised by deed or will, shall be deemed an estate in fee-simple and of inheritance, unless limited by express words.’ And a quitclaim deed made in substantial compliance with the chapter on conveyances conveys all the right, title, and interest of the maker thereof in and to the premises therein described. Section 17, ch. 8, S. L. 1897, (sec. 9679, O. S. 1931). Under section 42, ch. 8, S. L. 1897 (sec. 9680, O. S. 1931) the granting clause of a quitclaim -deed may contain the words ‘do hereby quitclaim grant, bargain, sell and convey,’ but a substantial compliance with that section is sufficient; the section is directory and not mandatory. Mosier v. Momsen, 13 Okla. 41, 74 P. 905. Words of a similar import, showing an intention to convey á present interest, are sufficient. Id.
“The deed granted to the second party the lands therein described ‘for a right of way for its railroad, telegraph and telephone lines, and for railroads or station purposes.’ Defendant says that a right-of-way grant conveys a limited estate with reverter always to the grantor or his heirs. This argument, as applied to a railway company, is refuted by the decisions in Oklahoma Ry. Co. v. Severns Paving Co., 67 Okla. 206, 170 P. 216; Marland v. Gillespie, 168 Okla. 376, 33 P. 2d 207. In the former case this court held that by reason of section 1382, R. L. 1910 (same as section 1022, Stat. 1903, now section 11913, O. S. 1931, supra), which confers on railway corporations power to take a fee title to land purchased for right-of-way purposes, a voluntary grant or donation of land to a railway company vests it with an estate in fee, although the dedication was for railway purposes only. In the Marland Case, supra, we held that a deed to a railway company for right-of-way purposes, not otherwise limited, conveyed a fee-simple title.”
The majority opinion attempts to distinguish Marland v. Gillespie, supra, and Higgins v. Oklahoma City, supra, from the case at bar by stating that in those cases .a specific tract was conveyed whereas in the deed here it “grants the right of way over, through and across the entire tract of land owned by the grantor.” The statement is inaccurate and incorrect as reference to the various deeds will disclose.
The majority opinion in effect overrules the Marland and Higgins cases. I think we should follow them and affirm the judgment of the trial court.