Court Opinion

ID: 9695650
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:26:35.770365+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:15.433539
License: Public Domain

PRICE, Judge
(dissenting):
I respectfully dissent. In Commonwealth v. Ray, 240 Pa.Super. 33, 36, 360 A.2d 925 (1976), we pronounced that:
“the lower court should make every effort to dispose of the Commonwealth’s petition [for an extension] prior to the expiration of the prescribed period. Any *156delay past this period must be limited, and will possibly be subject to explanation. Such procedure is mandated by the necessity that all concerned be aware of the status of the case. To require otherwise is unfair to the court, the accused, and the people.”
Here, the instant record reveals that the hearing on the Commonwealth’s petition for an extension of time was not held until February 6, 1975, or 99 days after the petition was filed and 94 days after the expiration of the allowable 270 day period for commencement of trial. Furthermore, the Commonwealth’s petition was not finally determined until February 24, 1975, or 117 days after the petition was filed and 112 days after the expiration of the prescribed period. The Commonwealth offers no explanation as to why the extension petition was not acted upon promptly. Certainly, in light of our instructions in Ray, the great delay between the filing of the Commonwealth’s petition and the hearing on that petition, and its ultimate disposition, cannot be classified as reasonable. The majority, however, excused this delay by stating that a “hearing during the immediately subsequent term of court is proper.” I cannot agree with this rationale. A hearing on a petition for an extension of time must be conducted with reasonable promptness, regardless of whether there is, or is not, a scheduled term of court. To hold otherwise would be to ignore the underlying purpose of Rule 1100 and to reject the recent instructions of our Supreme Court concerning Rule 1100. In Commonwealth v. Mayfield, 469 Pa. 214, 221, 364 A.2d 1345 (1976), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court declared that trial courts, as well as counsel for the defense and the prosecution, must “. . . exercise due diligence in implementing the objectives of rule 1100.” The court further explained in Mayfield, supra at 222, 364 A.2d at 1349, that the exercise of due diligence requires compliance with “the highest standards of professional responsibility.” Certainly, the period of delay present herein *157negates any claim of due diligence by either the prosecution or the trial court. Since the prescribed time for commencement of trial has passed, I would reverse the judgment of sentence and order the appellant discharged.
HOFFMAN and SPAETH, JJ., join in this dissenting opinion.