Court Opinion

ID: 6424677
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-06-25 12:02:55.185215+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:51:55.964378
License: Public Domain

Mouton, J.
The first question is whether the contract is, as thé defendant contends, illegal on its face. The words relied on to show that it is are as follows: “ The party of the first part agrees to accept full responsibility of all matter contained in said work, and to defend at his own cost any suits which may be brought against the party of the second part for publishing any statements contained in said work, and to pay all costs and damages arising from said suits.” The presiding justice found that the contract “ was made without illegal intent, unless and except so far as the words used import one as matter of law.” We think that the contract does not import one as matter of law. The parties were contracting respecting a book which was not in existence, but was to be written. There was nothing in the character of the proposed work which naturally or necessarily involved the publication of scandalous or libellous matter, as was the case, for instance, in Shackell v. Rosier, 2 Bing. N. C. 634, referred to by the defendant. At the same time it was not impossible that in spite of due care and good faith, on the part of the author and publisher the proposed book might contain matter which others perhaps would deem libellous. In such a case it would be no more unlawful for the parties to provide that the author should save the publisher harmless from all costs and damages to which he might be subjected by reason of the publication of the book, than it would be for a patentee to agree with his licensee that he would protect him against all costs and damages to which he might be subjected in consequence of using the patent to which the license applied. The case stands on grounds entirely different from those on which it would stand if it appeared that the parties intended to publish or contemplated the publication of libellous matter. There is nothing in the agreement fairly to show that such was their purpose. The most that can be said is, that though there was no intention to write or publish, nor any contemplation of writing or publishing, libellous matter on the part of the author or publisher, it might turn out after *520the book was published that it did contain libellous matter. But that is very far from saying that the parties had in view an illegal purpose in publishing the book. We see nothing unlawful in a contract which provides, without anything more, that the author shall indemnify the - publisher for costs and damages to which he may be subjected by reason of the publication of a book to be written by the author.
Moreover, it was possible in this case that the book might not contain libellous matter, although libel suits against the publisher might grow out of it. It would be hard to say in such event that the publisher who might have published the book without any libellous purpose, and in the full belief that it contained nothing libellous, could not recover of the author under this clause in the contract the costs and damages to which he had been put by such suits. In order, we think, to render the contract unlawful, it should appear that there was an intention on the part of the author and publisher to write and publish libellous matter, or that the author proposed, with the knowledge and acquiescence of the publisher, to write libellous matter, or that the contract on its face provided for or promoted an illegal act. We do not think the clause in question is fairly susceptible of either construction. Fletcher v. Harcot, Hutton, 55. Battersey’s case, Winch, 48. Betts v. Gibbins, 2 Ad. & El. 57. Adamson v. Jarvis, 4 Bing. 66. Waugh v. Morris, L. R. 8 Q. B. 202. Pearce v. Brooks, L. R. 1 Ex. 213. Cannan v. Bryce, 3 B. & Ald. 179. Graves v. Johnson, 156 Mass. 211.
The defendant contends, in the next place, that he was justified in his refusal to go on with the contract, because of his doubts as to the solvency of the plaintiff corporation, and because of the disgrace attaching to its name in consequence of the conduct of Jewett.
The first ground thus taken would seem to be disposed of by the recent eases of Hobbs v. Columbia Falls Brick Co. 157 Mass. 109, and need not therefore be further considered.
Regarding the second ground, it is to be observed that the contract was not made with Jewett personally, but with the corporation which bore his name. Moreover, Jewett has 'fled, and it fairly may be presumed that his place as president and *521manager has been filled by the election of another person, so that the defendant cannot and will not be obliged to come into further association with him. It is well known that corporations are frequently organized which bear as part of their corporate name the name of some individual. The contention of the defendant would require us to hold that in all such cases a party making a contract with such a corporation would be justified in refusing to go on with it if the person whose name the corporation bore committed an act rendering him liable to punishment as a criminal, or bringing him into disgrace and rendering further association with him unprofitable and injurious to the other party to the contract. But a corporation does not in such a case impliedly guarantee, as an element of the contract entered into with it, that the person whose name it bears shall continue to be a reputable member of society. The corporation is distinct from the person whose name it bears. Its interests and those of its stockholders in contracts made by it with other parties are not to be affected by the disgraceful or criminal conduct of the person whose name it bears, and for which it is in no way responsible. A majority of the court think the entry should be judgment for plaintiff for $2,500, and interest from J une 9, 1890, and it is So ordered.