Court Opinion

ID: 9901318
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-21 17:03:22.529346+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:30.683159
License: Public Domain

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     MARINA P. WALKER v. ARTHUR L. WALKER
                  (AC 45308)
                       Cradle, Suarez and Flynn, Js.

                                  Syllabus

The defendant appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court
    dissolving his marriage to the plaintiff and making certain financial
    orders. Held:
1. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court improperly
    failed to consider each factor set forth in the applicable statute (§ 46b-
    81 (c)) when distributing the marital property: because the trial court
    expressly stated that it had considered all of the statutory criteria for
    marital property distributions in § 46b-81, it is presumed to have per-
    formed its duty unless the contrary appears from the record, and, in
    this case, the court provided a well reasoned analysis for the disparity
    in awards, which was based on the facts, including the origin of the
    assets, the parties’ respective contributions, and their respective needs;
    moreover, it is well established that, in a case in which the court has
    considered all statutory criteria, the court need not make express find-
    ings as to each individual statutory criterion.
2. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court applied
    an unreasonable amount of weight to his fault in the breakdown of the
    marriage in fashioning its orders distributing the marital property and
    awarding alimony: the court stated that it had considered all of the
    statutory factors for distributing marital property in § 46b-81 and for
    awarding alimony pursuant to statute (§ 46b-82), and this court deter-
    mined that the trial court properly considered fault in fashioning its
    financial orders and, in fact, was required to do so because the cause
    for the dissolution of the marriage is a statutory factor that the court
    must consider in distributing marital property and awarding alimony in a
    contested dissolution proceeding; moreover, contrary to the defendant’s
    claim, a finding by the trial court of irretrievable breakdown, rather
    than intolerable cruelty, a ground also alleged by the plaintiff, does not
    preclude it from considering fault in fashioning its financial awards;
    furthermore, although it was not entirely clear from the memorandum
    of decision the precise amount of weight the trial court gave to fault,
    it was not necessary for this court to be able to discern this, as when
    it is evident from the decision that the trial court considered all of the
    relevant statutory criteria, the trial court is given broad discretion in
    determining the weight to be given to each individual factor, no single
    criterion is preferred over others, and the trial court is accorded wide
    latitude in varying the weight placed upon each item under the peculiar
    circumstances of each case, and the trial court’s careful reasoning for
    its financial orders, which had a reasonable basis in the facts, reflected
    no abuse of the court’s broad discretion in assigning the weight to be
    given to each statutory factor.
        Argued September 20—officially released October 31, 2023

                             Procedural History

   Action for the dissolution of a marriage, and for other
relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial dis-
trict of Stamford-Norwalk, where the defendant filed a
cross complaint; thereafter, the case was tried to the
court, Moukawsher, J.; judgment dissolving the mar-
riage and granting certain other relief, from which the
defendant appealed to this court. Affirmed.
   Kevin F. Collins, for the appellant (defendant).
   John H. Harrington, for the appellee (plaintiff).
                          Opinion

   FLYNN, J. The defendant, Arthur L. Walker, appeals
from the judgment of the trial court dissolving his mar-
riage to the plaintiff, Marina P. Walker, awarding ali-
mony to the plaintiff and dividing the marital property
between the parties. On appeal, the defendant claims
that the court improperly (1) failed to consider all of
the statutory criteria set forth in General Statutes § 46b-
81 (c) in its division of the marital property and (2)
applied an unreasonable amount of weight to the defen-
dant’s fault in the breakdown of the marriage in fashion-
ing its orders distributing the marital property and
awarding alimony.1 We disagree and, accordingly,
affirm the judgment of the trial court.
   The following facts, as found by the trial court, and
procedural history are relevant to this appeal. The plain-
tiff and the defendant married in 1993 and had three
children together.2 The parties resided in a house in
Old Greenwich, which the plaintiff’s father had pur-
chased for her. The plaintiff owned 74.5 percent of the
marital home and the defendant owned 25.5 percent.
The defendant and his sister inherited a building in
Eastchester, New York, that housed the family business,
a custom frame shop. The parties remortgaged the mari-
tal home and with the proceeds purchased the interest
of the defendant’s sister in the Eastchester building and
the custom frame shop, and thus the defendant became
the owner of the custom frame shop. A major cause of
the breakdown of the marriage was the defendant’s
extramarital affairs. The defendant was also repeatedly
violent toward the plaintiff. The plaintiff has no job
skills outside of her work at the custom frame shop
and her limited work in retail. The defendant’s annual
business income is approximately $100,000.
   The court awarded the marital home to the plaintiff,
which was worth $800,000 and was burdened with a
mortgage of approximately $440,000, and awarded to
the defendant the custom frame shop and the Eastches-
ter building, which was worth approximately $600,000,
had no mortgage, and had significant rental income
with potential for more. The court also ordered that the
defendant pay the plaintiff $235,000, which represented
the amount for which the parties had mortgaged the
marital home to purchase the interest of the defendant’s
sister in the Eastchester building and the custom frame
shop. The court determined that the defendant would
receive nothing for his interest in the marital home and
the plaintiff would receive nothing for her claim against
the custom frame shop, her share of claimed back rent,
or any interest on the $235,000 mortgage on the marital
home. The court ordered that the defendant pay the
plaintiff $1000 per month in modifiable alimony for ten
years. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set
forth as necessary.
  We begin by noting our general standard of review
in family matters. A court must fashion its division
of marital property in accordance with the statutory
factors in § 46b-81 (c) and its alimony orders in accor-
dance with the statutory factors in General Statutes
§ 46b-82 (a). See Riccio v. Riccio, 183 Conn. App. 823,
826, 194 A.3d 337 (2018). We will not disturb a trial
court’s financial orders in domestic relations cases
unless the court has abused its discretion or could not
reasonably conclude as it did based on the facts pre-
sented. See Misthopoulos v. Misthopoulos, 297 Conn.
358, 366–67, 999 A.2d 721 (2010).
                              I
   The defendant first claims that the court improperly
failed to consider each statutory factor set forth in
§ 46b-81 (c) when distributing the marital property. We
disagree.
   Section 46b-81 (c) provides that the factors that the
court shall consider in assigning property in a dissolu-
tion case are ‘‘the length of the marriage, the causes
for the . . . dissolution of the marriage . . . the age,
health, station, occupation, amount and sources of
income, earning capacity, vocational skills, education,
employability, estate, liabilities and needs of each of
the parties and the opportunity of each for future acqui-
sition of capital assets and income. The court shall also
consider the contribution of each of the parties in the
acquisition, preservation or appreciation in value of
their respective estates.’’
   The court expressly stated in its memorandum of
decision that it ‘‘considered all’’ of the statutory criteria
for marital property distributions in § 46b-81. Because
the court stated that it had considered all the relevant
statutory factors, it is presumed to have performed its
duty unless the contrary appears from the record. See
Pencheva-Hasse v. Hasse, 221 Conn. App. 113, 130–31,
300 A.3d 1175 (2023). Nothing contrary to that presump-
tion appears in the record. The court found that the
parties were married for twenty-nine years, that the
plaintiff was fifty years of age with limited job skills
and that the defendant was ten years older with an
approximate annual income of $100,000. The court fur-
ther found that the plaintiff’s father purchased the mari-
tal home for her and that the defendant inherited a part
of the Eastchester building and custom frame shop.
The court detailed the amount of interest each party
had in the marital home and the Eastchester building
housing the custom frame shop and the value of the
respective properties, including any outstanding mort-
gages, and noted that the parties took out a $235,000
mortgage on the marital home to purchase the interest
the defendant’s sister had in the Eastchester building
and custom frame shop. The court also made findings
as to the causes of the breakdown of the marriage. It
is well established that in a case in which the court has
considered all statutory criteria, the court need not
make express findings as to each individual statutory
criterion. See, e.g., Riccio v. Riccio, supra, 183 Conn.
App. 826. ‘‘It is sufficient that the memorandum of deci-
sion at least reflect a proper consideration and weighing
of the factors set forth in the statute.’’ (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) Miller v. Miller, 22 Conn. App.
310, 314, 577 A.2d 297 (1990). The court provided a well
reasoned analysis for the disparity in awards, which
was based on the facts, including the origin of the assets,
the parties’ respective contributions and their respec-
tive needs. We conclude that the memorandum of deci-
sion reflects a consideration of the relevant statutory
criteria for the distribution of marital property, and,
accordingly, the court did not abuse its discretion in
that regard.
                            II
   The defendant next claims that the court applied an
unreasonable amount of weight to the defendant’s fault
in the breakdown of the marriage in fashioning its
orders distributing the marital property and awarding
alimony. Specifically, the defendant argues that the fact
that the court dissolved the marriage on the ground of
irretrievable breakdown3 rather than intolerable cru-
elty, which ground was also alleged in the amended
complaint, ‘‘leaves open the question as to whether
the proportional ‘fault’ assignment to the defendant/
husband was given unreasonable weight . . . .’’ He
also argues that, because the court did not state that
it had considered all of the statutory criteria set forth
in § 46b-81 (c) for distributing marital property, it is
‘‘impossible to assess whether the court assigned an
unreasonable amount of weight to ‘fault.’ ’’ We disagree.
   We begin our analysis by noting that the court did,
in fact, state that it had considered all the statutory
factors for distributing marital property in § 46b-81 and
awarding alimony in § 46b-82.4 In distributing the mari-
tal property, the court reasoned that the plaintiff had
a strong claim to the marital home her father purchased
for her and the defendant had a strong claim to the
building and business his father left him. The court
stated that the disparity between the monetary value
of the properties distributed reflected: the plaintiff’s
interest in and contributions to the success of the cus-
tom frame shop; the origin of the marital assets; that
the defendant was awarded the Eastchester building
and custom frame shop with which he can support
himself; that the plaintiff has little chance to acquire
property in the future and is in need of money on which
to live; and the court’s findings of fault.
   In fashioning the alimony award of $1000 per month
from the defendant to the plaintiff for ten years, the
court noted that the financial circumstances of the par-
ties were ‘‘critical.’’ The court reasoned that, because
the defendant received the custom frame shop, the
plaintiff ‘‘will be left with no skills and no job. She
sacrificed them to maintain a home and raise three
children during a marriage that lasted nearly thirty
years. She will need time to get a decent job and money
to survive until she can recover from her economic
dependence on family and family enterprise. Given that
[the defendant] will likely struggle to keep his business
together and find a new home after paying [the plaintiff]
the property settlement, [the plaintiff] will have to
accept a sum calculated as best [as] the court can to
keep both parties’ heads above water.’’ The court fur-
ther stated that, given that the plaintiff reports no cur-
rent income, the defendant, who received the custom
frame shop, would be left with almost all of the parties’
joint income. The court additionally reasoned that,
although the plaintiff was unfaithful and there was evi-
dence that she was also violent, the defendant ‘‘was
both repeatedly unfaithful to her and—especially
[because] he admits it—violent. The degree to which
he was unfaithful and the degree to which he was violent
outstrips any claims he makes on these same subjects
against [the plaintiff].’’5
   The court properly considered fault in fashioning its
financial orders. In fact, it was required to do so because
the causes for the dissolution of the marriage is a statu-
tory factor that the court must consider in distributing
marital property and awarding alimony in a contested
dissolution proceeding. See Sweet v. Sweet, 190 Conn.
657, 660, 462 A.2d 1031 (1983); see also General Statutes
§§ 46b-81 (c) and 46b-82 (a). Additionally, a finding by
the trial court of irretrievable breakdown does not pre-
clude it from considering fault in fashioning its financial
awards. Sweet v. Sweet, supra, 660.
   Although it is not entirely clear from the memoran-
dum of decision the precise amount of weight the court
gave to fault—other than that fault was one factor
among many that it considered in distributing the mari-
tal property and that the critical consideration in award-
ing alimony was the parties’ respective financial circum-
stances—it is not necessary for us to be able to discern
this. Because it is evident from the decision that the
court considered all of the relevant statutory criteria
in §§ 46b-81 and 46b-82, it is given broad discretion in
determining the weight to be given to each individual
factor. See, e.g., Coleman v. Coleman, 151 Conn. App.
613, 617, 95 A.3d 569 (2014); McMellon v. McMellon, 116
Conn. App. 393, 395–96, 976 A.2d 1, cert. denied, 293
Conn. 926, 980 A.2d 911 (2009). Although a trial court
must consider the statutorily delineated criteria, no sin-
gle criterion is preferred over others and ‘‘the court is
accorded wide latitude in varying the weight placed
upon each item under the peculiar circumstances of
each case.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Pen-
cheva-Hasse v. Hasse, supra, 221 Conn. App. 130. The
court’s careful reasoning for its financial orders, which
has a reasonable basis in the facts, reflects no abuse
of the court’s broad discretion in assigning the weight
to be given to each statutory factor.
      The judgment is affirmed.
      In this opinion the other judges concurred.
  1
     In the body of his main appellate brief, the defendant expressly declined
to pursue on appeal the following three additional claims, which had been
included in his statement of issues: the court erred in providing for an
inequitable double-dipping in the plaintiff’s favor; the court erred in its
weighing of the testimony of a third-party witness in assigning the marital
estate; and the court unreasonably limited the amount of time allocated for
trial, resulting in the defendant not having an adequate opportunity to present
his case. Accordingly, we do not review these expressly abandoned claims.
See, e.g., Citibank, N.A. v. Lindland, 310 Conn. 147, 165, 75 A.3d 651 (2013).
   2
     It is undisputed that the parties’ three children were adults by the time
of the dissolution proceedings.
   3
     See General Statutes § 46b-40.
   4
     ‘‘The statutory factors for determining alimony in . . . § 46b-82 are
almost identical to the factors used to distribute property in . . . § 46b-
81(c). . . . They include: the length of the marriage, the causes for the . . .
dissolution of the marriage . . . the age, health, station, occupation, amount
and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate and needs
of each of the parties and the award, if any, which the court may make
pursuant to section 46b-81 . . . .’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Dombrowski v. Noyes-Dombrowski, 273 Conn. 127, 137,
869 A.2d 164 (2005). In 2013, the legislature added as additional factors
‘‘education’’ and ‘‘earning capacity.’’ See Public Acts 2013, No. 13-213; see
also General Statutes § 46b-82 (a).
   5
     To the extent that the defendant also contends that it was clearly errone-
ous for the court to find that the degree to which the defendant was unfaithful
and violent outstrips any claims he made on those subjects against the
plaintiff, we disagree. The court found that both parties were unfaithful and
violent but determined that the defendant had admitted his violence and
further concluded that it found the plaintiff to be a more credible witness
than the defendant. It was within the province of the court to assess credibil-
ity, and we will not disturb such determinations on appeal. See Zilkha v.
Zilkha, 167 Conn. App. 480, 487–88, 144 A.3d 447 (2016).