Court Opinion

ID: 9748833
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 16:14:48.982447+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:39.867673
License: Public Domain

LARSEN, Justice,
dissenting.
The majority states that this case became racially sensitive only when a prospective juror admitted during group voir dire that he was racially biased. The majority concludes that “[a]t that point the racial issue existed, and it was necessary for the trial court to allow counsel to examine the remaining jurors individually----” I dissent.
As I stated in my concurring opinion in Commonwealth v. Richardson, 504 Pa. 358, 473 A.2d 1361 (1984):
I believe that the prosecution of a member of one race on charges of the rape of a victim of another race necessarily presents a race sensitive situation. In such situations, the trial court should permit the questioning of prospective jurors to expose any racial inclinations or biases which *581might cause a juror to disregard his or her obligation to apply the law impartially to the facts of the case.
(Emphasis added).
The Rules of Criminal Procedure specifically provide that, in all non-capital cases, the trial judge shall select the method of voir dire — either individual voir dire or, in the alternative, group voir dire. Pa.R.Crim.P. 1106(e). In my view, group voir dire was sufficient to expose any racial inclinations or biases of the jury in the case herein. The fact that a prospective juror admitted during group voir dire that he was racially biased demonstrates that group voir dire was effective in ensuring a fair and impartial jury in this case.
The propriety of a trial court’s exercise of discretion “may be assessed by the appellate process when it is apparent there was a gross and palpable abuse of that discretion.” Commonwealth v. Powell, 527 Pa. 288, 297, 590 A.2d 1240, 1244 (1991) (emphasis added). Given the effectiveness of group voir dire in this case, there was no “gross and palpable” abuse here. Thus, the refusal of the trial court to allow individual voir dire, under the circumstances presented in this case, was not an abuse of its discretion in selecting between alternative methods of voir dire.
By holding that the trial court abused its discretion, the majority opinion creates an anomalous situation. In effect, the majority holds that, if group voir dire is effective in achieving its goal of ferreting out racial biases or inclinations, then group voir dire is not appropriate and the alternative method, individual voir dire, must be utilized. Whereas, if there is no evidence that group voir dire was effective (e.g., if none of the prospective jurors admitted racial bias), then group voir dire is proper.
The Rules of Criminal Procedure provide for alternative methods of voir dire at the discretion of the trial court. If the desired result is to remove that discretion from the trial judge and abolish group voir dire, the proper method to reach that result is to amend the Rules of Criminal Procedure — not to manipulate the facts in order to create situations, such as this, in which the trial court really has no choice. Because the *582Rules specifically provide for either group or individual voir dire at the trial court’s discretion and because I believe that group voir dire was sufficient to expose racial biases and inclinations in this case, I would affirm.