Court Opinion

ID: 9408594
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-13 15:00:57.541233+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:45.010150
License: Public Domain

22-2846-cv
    Jacobs v. Jacobs

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                  SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL
APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY
CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL.

               At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the
    Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40
    Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 13th day of July, two thousand
    twenty-three.

    PRESENT:
               DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,
                     Chief Judge,
               BETH ROBINSON,
               MARIA ARAÚJO KAHN,
                     Circuit Judges.
    _____________________________________

    Samuel O. Jacobs,

                             Plaintiff-Appellant,

                       v.                                        22-2846

    Kent Jacobs, Dutchess County Family
    Court,
                     Defendants-Appellees,

Joseph A. Egitto, Poughkeepsie, NY, Attn:
City Attorney, Charles F. Sanders, NYS Office
of the Attorney General,

                     Defendants. *

_____________________________________

FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT:                                       Samuel O. Jacobs, pro se,
                                                               South Ozone Park, NY.

FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE                                         Kent Jacobs, pro se,
KENT JACOBS:                                                   Hopewell Jct., NY.

FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE                                         Barbara D. Underwood,
DUTCHESS COUNTY FAMILY                                         Solicitor General; Judith
COURT:                                                         N. Vale, Deputy Solicitor
                                                               General; Stephen J.
                                                               Yanni, Assistant
                                                               Solicitor General, Of
                                                               Counsel, for Letitia
                                                               James, Attorney General
                                                               of the State of New
                                                               York, New York, NY.

     *
         The Clerk of the Court is directed to amend the caption as set forth above.
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      Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern

District of New York (Cathy Seibel, Judge).

      UPON        DUE   CONSIDERATION,          IT    IS   HEREBY      ORDERED,

ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

      Samuel Jacobs (“Samuel”), pro se, appeals from the district court’s dismissal

of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against his son Kent Jacobs (“Kent”) and the Dutchess

County Family Court (“DCFC”).        After Kent obtained a seven-year order of

protection against Samuel in DCFC, Samuel filed this suit, alleging that DCFC and

Kent had deprived him of his constitutional rights and caused him physical and

psychological suffering, and that Kent had damaged his reputation.         He also

alleged that the DCFC judge had improperly denied his request to proceed pro se

(while allowing Kent to do so) and issued an arrest warrant against him without

probable cause.

      DCFC and Kent both moved to dismiss, the latter pro se, and the district

court granted the motions and dismissed Samuel’s claims without leave to further

amend.    The district court reasoned that Samuel’s claims against DCFC were

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barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity and his claims against both DCFC and

Kent were brought beyond the statute of limitations.       See Jacobs v. Jacobs, No. 21-

CV-10577 (CS), 2022 WL 10648864, at *4–6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2022).             Samuel

appealed.   We assume the parties’ familiarity with the remaining underlying

facts, the procedural history, and the issues on appeal.

      We review a district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim for relief

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) de novo (without deference to the

district court), accepting all well-pleaded facts as true and drawing all reasonable

inferences in favor of the non-moving party—here, Samuel.          74 Pinehurst LLC v.

New York, 59 F.4th 557, 562 (2d Cir. 2023).    Our review of a denial of leave to

amend is for abuse of discretion, “unless the denial was based on an interpretation

of law, such as futility,” which would also require de novo review. Empire

Merchs., LLC v. Reliable Churchill LLP, 902 F.3d 132, 139 (2d Cir. 2018).       Pro se

submissions receive special solicitude, meaning we interpret them to raise “the

strongest arguments that they suggest.” Triestman v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 470

F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam).

      We agree with the district court that the claims against DCFC are barred by

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Eleventh Amendment immunity.              The Eleventh Amendment precludes suits

against states unless the state expressly waives its immunity or Congress

abrogates (repeals) that immunity.         CSX Transp., Inc. v. N.Y. State Office of Real

Prop. Servs., 306 F.3d 87, 94–95 (2d Cir. 2002).      Eleventh Amendment immunity

“extends beyond the states themselves to state agents and state instrumentalities

that are, effectively, arms of a state.” Gollomp v. Spitzer, 568 F.3d 355, 366 (2d Cir.

2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Unified Court System, of which

DCFC is a part, is “unquestionably an arm of the state” that shares in New York’s

immunity to suit.     Id. at 368 (internal quotation marks omitted).       New York has

not waived its immunity. See Trotman v. Palisades Interstate Park Comm’n, 557 F.2d

35, 38–40 (2d Cir. 1977).    Nor has Congress abrogated immunity via § 1983.           See

Dube v. State Univ. of N.Y., 900 F.2d 587, 594 (2d Cir. 1990).

       Samuel argues that Ex parte Young allows constitutional claims against state

officials in their official capacity.   209 U.S. 123 (1908).   While that is true, Ex parte

Young applies only to claims seeking “prospective relief against state officials.”

74 Pinehurst LLC, 59 F.4th at 570. This means for the Ex parte Young exception to

apply, a plaintiff must name a state official—that is, an individual person—not a

                                              5
state agency, such as the family court.   See Silva v. Farrish, 47 F.4th 78, 84 (2d Cir.

2022).       Although Samuel sought prospective—that is, forward-looking—relief, 1

because Samuel named the family court as a defendant, not an individual state

official, 2 the Ex parte Young exception to immunity does not apply here.

         Samuel also argues that the Eleventh Amendment bar cannot be applied

when a plaintiff alleges other violations of constitutional rights, including

Fourteenth Amendment rights.         But Eleventh Amendment immunity applies

“regardless of the nature of the relief sought.”   74 Pinehurst LLC, 59 F.4th at 570.

Put another way, even where a plaintiff alleges a violation of a Fourteenth

Amendment right, the Eleventh Amendment immunity analysis still has to

consider whether the plaintiff is seeking forward-looking relief against an

         Samuel sought injunctive relief that would require the family court to “set up
         1

guidelines and a review process” to protect due process rights of defendants, provide
supervision and training for judges, and “[a]utomatic review of disputed and
controversial decisions.” Defendant’s App’x at 41.
       2 Charles F. Sanders, an Assistant Attorney General named in the Amended

Complaint, was stricken by the district court after it was determined Samuel named him
in error. See Defendant’s App’x at 5-6.

                                          6
individual state official. 3   Because Samuel’s complaint does not seek forward-

looking relief against an individual state official, the Ex parte Young exception does

not apply.

      Kent, as a private party, is not protected by Eleventh Amendment

immunity, but we further agree with the district court that the claims against him

(as well as any claims against DCFC that would somehow survive Eleventh

Amendment immunity) are time-barred.           “The statute of limitations for § 1983

actions arising in New York is three years.”        Lucente v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 980 F.3d

284, 308 (2d Cir. 2020).   The last act relevant to Samuel’s suit—the order allegedly

denying Samuel’s request to proceed pro se—was on August 6, 2018.             Therefore,

assuming for the sake of argument only that his claims accrued and the statute of

limitations “clock” started ticking at the latest possible date, Samuel had at least

until August 6, 2021, to file a timely complaint.    Instead, he filed his complaint on

December 8, 2021.      He does not persuasively argue that the limitations period

      3
         To the extent that Samuel intended to sue the DCFC judge for actions taken
during the family court proceedings, his claims would be barred by absolute judicial
immunity, which applies unless a judge acts in “complete absence of all jurisdiction.”
Deem v. DiMella-Deem, 941 F.3d 618, 621 (2d Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). Samuel does
not assert that the DCFC judge lacked jurisdiction over the family court case.

                                           7
should be tolled (that is, paused or delayed) or explain why his claims could have

accrued later.   As the district court explained, the statute of limitations clock for

a claim brought under § 1983 for violation of Constitutional rights begins to run at

the moment the plaintiff learns of the injury—it does not restart each time the same

injury recurs.   See Defendant’s App’x at 10.

      Even if Samuel’s claims were timely, they are without merit.         Samuel failed

to plead facts suggesting that Kent, a private citizen, was acting “under color of

state law” for the purposes of § 1983 liability for the alleged constitutional

violations. Giordano v. City of New York, 274 F.3d 740, 750 (2d Cir. 2001) (citation

omitted).    Under our precedents, the fact that Kent sought the protection of

family court does not mean he was acting under color of state law.          See Dahlberg

v. Becker, 748 F.2d 85, 93 (2d Cir. 1984) (“[T]he mere invocation . . . of New York’s

legal procedures does not constitute joint participation so as to satisfy the statutory

requirement under § 1983 that there be a state actor.”); see also Taylor v. Nichols, 558

F.2d 561, 564 (10th Cir. 1977) (“The acts of filing a claim and testifying at trial do

not constitute state action.       These are private acts.”).   Kent therefore cannot be

liable for constitutional torts.

                                              8
       Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Samuel

leave to further amend the complaint. He had already amended once, after a

conference at which DCFC gave notice of the proposed grounds for dismissal. See

Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (observing that pro se plaintiffs

should be granted leave to amend “at least once”). Samuel otherwise identified

no additional facts or legal theories that might enable his claims to survive

dismissal. See Empire Merchs., 902 F.3d at 146. Leave to amend would also have

been futile, as Samuel’s claims are barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity,

absolute judicial immunity, the statute of limitations, and (as to the claims against

Kent) the lack of state action.   See Cuoco, 222 F.3d at 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (“The

problem with [appellant’s] causes of action is substantive; better pleading will not

cure it.”).

       We have considered Samuel’s remaining arguments and do not find them

persuasive. Because Samuel’s claims fail for the legal reasons discussed above

(Eleventh Amendment immunity and the statute of limitations) we have not

considered and take no position on his allegations about the events he has

described and the harms he has suffered.

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Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

                              FOR THE COURT:
                              Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

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