Court Opinion

ID: 9912461
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-22 15:06:40.496431+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:59:27.163679
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-3279-21

ROBERT J. TRIFFIN,

          Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

ONE NJ NEPTUNE 230
MANAGEMENT LLC, and
CHRIS RUSSELL,

          Defendants-Respondents,

and

JUNIOR M. MATHEO,

     Defendant.
__________________________

                   Argued December 5, 2023 – Decided December 22, 2023

                   Before Judges Rose and Perez Friscia.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Monmouth County, Docket No. DC-008989-
                   21.

                   Robert J. Triffin, appellant, argued the cause pro se.
            Shane P. Simon argued the cause for respondents (Saul
            Ewing, LLP, attorneys; Shane P. Simon, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

      Plaintiff Robert J. Triffin appeals from a February 16, 2022 order, which

granted summary judgment and dismissed with prejudice his claims against

defendant One NJ Neptune 230 Management, LLC (NJ Neptune). We affirm.

      We discern the relevant facts from the record. On July 9, 2021, NJ

Neptune issued its employee, co-defendant Junior M. Matheo, a $1,125.43

payroll check from its JPMorgan Chase Bank (Chase) account. The same day,

Matheo deposited the check into his PNC Bank account through a mobile

electronic deposit. Matheo then indorsed1 the check to Cash N Carry LLC, a

check-cashing business, receiving a second payment. Four days later, Cash N

Carry presented the check for payment, but Chase dishonored payment as a

duplicate presentment.

      On July 23, 2021, NJ Neptune issued Matheo a second payroll check for

$838.06 from its Chase account, which he electronically deposited into his PNC

1
   N.J.S.A. 12A:3-204 defines "indorsement" as "a signature, other than that of
a signer as maker, drawer, or acceptor, that alone or accompanied by other words
is made on an instrument for the purpose of negotiating the instrument,
restricting payment of the instrument, or incurring indorser's liability on the
instrument."
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account. Matheo indorsed the check to Cash N Carry, again receiving a second

payment. Chase denied payment to Cash N Carry as a duplicate presentment.

Cash N Carry assigned the denied checks to Triffin.

      In September, Triffin filed an action in the Special Civil Part seeking

recovery of the dishonored check amounts, fees, and costs under N.J.S.A.

12A:3-414(b), obligation of drawer. Triffin attached copies of both dishonored

and returned checks. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted in lieu of an answer under Rule

4:6-2(e), arguing they did not owe any funds because the checks had been paid.

Defendants attached the certification of Michelle Reitan, the Vice President of

Shared Services for Aimbridge Employee Service Corporation, an affiliate of

NJ Neptune, and copies of the cashed electronically-deposited checks. Triffin

opposed the motion.

      Reitan certified she had "firsthand knowledge of the facts and

circumstances . . . having reviewed [the] records maintained in [NJ Neptune]'s

ordinary course of business." Further, she attested that both payroll checks were

deposited through "mobile deposit application[s]" and paid by Chase to PNC

Bank. Thereafter, Chase dishonored the checks Cash N Carry presented for

payment because they had been "previously honored."

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        On February 16, 2022, after hearing argument and issuing an oral

decision, the motion judge entered an order granting summary judgment and

dismissing Triffin's claims against defendants NJ Neptune and managing

member Chris Russell. The judge converted the motion to "one for summary

judgment," based on the submission of "the checks and the documents" outside

of Triffin's complaint. After providing plaintiff "every reasonable inference,"

the judge found summary judgment was warranted because "the checks

appended to the plaintiff's complaint each contained [i]ndorsements" after they

had been previously "electronically deposited."       Relying on Triffin v. SHS

Group, LLC, 446 N.J. Super. 460 (App. Div. 2021), certif. denied, 252 N.J. 191

(2022), the judge found NJ Neptune established the "previously paid defense"

under    N.J.S.A.   12A:3-414(c)     because    the   un-indorsed    checks    were

electronically deposited first. The judge relied on the unrefuted copies of the

electronically-deposited cashed checks, dishonored checks, and Reitan's

certification finding that no material "issues of fact" were in dispute. The judge

reasoned no "reasonable fact finder could find . . . [Triffin was] entitled to . . .

payment on the dishonored check[s]" and "no further discovery would lead to

any other conclusion." Triffin thereafter voluntarily dismissed claims against

defendants Russell and Matheo.

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      On appeal, Triffin argues the judge erred in granting summary judgment

because: Neptune failed to demonstrate through admissible evidence, pursuant

to N.J.R.E. 1001 or the Check Clearing for the 21st Century Act (Check Clearing

Act), 12 U.S.C. § 5001-04, that the checks were "previously paid"; the produced

dishonored checks did not meet the required definition of an accepted check

pursuant to N.J.S.A. 12A:3-414(c); and the Supremacy Clause mandates that 12

U.S.C. § 5003 preempts the holding in SHS Group.

      We review a motion judge's grant of summary judgment de novo. Branch

v. Cream-O-Land, 244 N.J. 567, 582 (2021). We apply the same standard as the

motion judge and "consider whether the competent evidential materials

presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are

sufficient to permit a rational fact-finder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in

favor of the non-moving party." Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J.

520, 540 (1995). "We therefore must first determine whether, giving the non-

moving party the benefit of all reasonable inferences, the movant has

demonstrated that there are no genuine issues of material fact." Walker v.

Choudhary, 425 N.J. Super. 135, 142 (App. Div. 2012) (quoting Atl. Mut. Ins.

Co. v. Hillside Bottling Co., 397 N.J. Super. 224, 230-31 (App. Div. 2006)). A

dispute of material fact is "genuine only if, considering the burden of persuasion

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at trial, the evidence submitted by the parties on the motion, together with all

legitimate inferences therefrom favoring the non-moving party, would require

submission of the issue to the trier of fact." Grande v. Saint Clare's Health Sys.,

230 N.J. 1, 24 (2017) (quoting Bhagat v. Bhagat, 217 N.J. 22, 38 (2014)).

      A motion to dismiss may be converted to a motion for summary judgment

where the "matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the

court . . . and all parties [are] given reasonable opportunity . . . to present all

material pertinent to such a motion." R. 4:6-2(e). Where "the motion was based

upon evidence, including certifications, outside of the pleadings," the court

applies the summary judgment standard. Roa v. Roa, 200 N.J. 555, 562 (2010).

      Under New Jersey's version of the Uniform Commercial Code, Article 3

governs negotiable instruments, N.J.S.A. 12A:3-101 to -605, and Article 4

governs bank deposits and collections, N.J.S.A. 12A:4-101 to -504. N.J.S.A.

12A:3-414(b) provides, "If an unaccepted draft is dishonored, the drawer is

obligated to pay the draft according to its terms at the time it was issued . . . .

The obligation is owed to a person entitled to enforce the draft or to an indorser

who paid the draft under [N.J.S.A.] 12A:3-415." However, "[i]f a draft is

accepted by a bank, the drawer is discharged, regardless of when or by whom

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                                        6
acceptance was obtained." N.J.S.A. 12A:3-414(c); see also SHS Group, 466

N.J. Super. at 467 ("Previous payment of a draft is a defense to enforcement.").

      Triffin's argument that summary judgment was erroneously granted

because NJ Neptune did not produce "legally admissible evidence" as required

under N.J.R.E. 1002 or the Check Clearing Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5003, to

demonstrate it "previously paid the two dishonored checks," is without merit.

The judge appropriately considered the copies of the checks submitted. Triffin

failed to demonstrate a "genuine question" of "authenticity" regarding the

duplicate copies of the electronically deposited checks. See N.J.R.E. 1003.

Under N.J.R.E. 1001(d) a "duplicate" is defined as: "a counterpart, other than

an original, produced by the same impression as the original . . . or by means of

photography." The judge also permissively relied on Reitan's certification,

which she attested was on personal knowledge of banking records held in the

normal course of business and, based on her review, the checks were deposited

through "mobile deposit applications" and paid by Chase to PNC Bank .

      Further, under the Check Clearing Act, we observe that Congress provided

the Act's purpose was to: "facilitate check truncation by authorizing substitute

checks"; "foster innovation in the check collection system without mandating

receipt of checks in electronic form"; and "improve the overall efficiency of the

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                                       7
Nation's payment system." 12 U.S.C. § 5001(b). Triffin's argument that 12

U.S.C. § 5003(b) requires a "compliant copy" of a cashed check to state "[t]his

is a legal copy of your check. You can use it the same way you would use the

original check" to be admissible is without merit. The legal equivalence of a

substitute check codified under the statute does not require an original check nor

preclude admissibility of a copy of an honored check to establish a previous

payment defense. Triffin's argument that the Check Clearing Act was "enacted"

to provide "an objective mechanical test" to determine "whether a check [w]as

paid" is unsupported by a plain reading of the stated legislative purpose.

      Concluding 12 U.S.C. § 5003(b) is inapplicable, we need not further

address Triffin's additional argument that 12 U.S.C. § 5003 preempts the holding

in SHS Group, 446 N.J. Super. at 470, which elucidated that a previous payment

defense under N.J.S.A. 12A:3-414(c), may be established through the

production of a copy of defendant's check which "referenc[es] the electronic"

deposit.

      In summary, based on our de novo review of the record, we are satisfied

the judge correctly granted summary judgment determining no material issues

of fact disputed NJ Neptune was relieved from payment, under N.J.S.A. 12A:3-

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414(c), as the checks were honored by Chase to PNC upon Matheo's mobile

electronic deposit.

      Triffin's remaining arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant

discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

      Affirmed.

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