Court Opinion

ID: 9941277
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-16 15:00:34.853554+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:28.722159
License: Public Domain

22-3220
     United States v. Kissi

                              UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                  FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                      SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

 1                 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
 2   held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
 3   New York, on the 16th day of February, two thousand twenty-four.
 4
 5   PRESENT:
 6               AMALYA L. KEARSE,
 7               MICHAEL H. PARK,
 8               BETH ROBINSON,
 9                     Circuit Judges.
10   __________________________________________
11
12   United States of America,
13
14                             Appellee,
15
16                       v.                                         22-3220
17
18   Sadick Edusei Kissi, AKA Sealed Defendant 1,
19
20                     Defendant-Appellant.
21   ___________________________________________
22
23   FOR APPELLEE:                             KATHERINE REILLY (Hagan Scotten and Mitzi
24                                             Steiner, on the brief), Assistant United States
25                                             Attorneys, for Damian Williams, United States
26                                             Attorney for the Southern District of New York, New
27                                             York, NY.
28
29   FOR APPELLANT:                            LUCAS ANDERSON, Rothman, Schneider, Soloway &
30                                             Stern, LLP, New York, NY.
31
 1          Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of

 2   New York (Crotty, J.).

 3          UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

 4   DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

 5          Appellant Sadick Edusei Kissi was indicted on four counts: Count One for conspiracy to

 6   commit wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349; Count Two for conspiracy to commit money

 7   laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h); Count Three for conspiracy to receive stolen

 8   money in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; and Count Four for receiving stolen money in violation of

 9   18 U.S.C. § 2315.

10          A jury acquitted Kissi on Count One but convicted him on the others. The district court

11   sentenced Kissi to a below-Guidelines sentence of 36 months’ imprisonment, imposing a

12   restitution amount of $422,694.53 and forfeiture amount of $101,468.          Kissi now appeals,

13   claiming that the government failed to provide sufficient evidence to find him guilty of Counts

14   Two, Three, and Four. Specifically, Kissi argues that the government failed to prove that he knew

15   that (1) the funds at issue had been “stolen, unlawfully converted, or taken,” 18 U.S.C. § 2315, as

16   required under Counts Three and Four; (2) the funds came from “some form of unlawful activity,”

17   18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1), as required under Count Two; and (3) the purpose of the fund transactions

18   was to “conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or the control of

19   the proceeds of specified unlawful activity,” 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), as required under Count

20   Two. Kissi also claims that the district court erred in its loss and forfeiture calculations. We

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 1   assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and

 2   the issues on appeal.

 3          We “review[] de novo a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence supporting a criminal

 4   conviction, and must affirm if the evidence, when viewed in its totality and in the light most

 5   favorable to the government, would permit any rational jury to find the essential elements of the

 6   crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Geibel, 369 F.3d 682, 689 (2d Cir. 2004)

 7   (citation omitted). But when a defendant’s Rule 29 motion for acquittal “state[s] a ground

 8   different from what he now urges on appeal,” we review for plain error. United States v. Delano,

 9   55 F.3d 720, 726 (2d Cir. 1995). As to the district court’s loss and forfeiture calculations, we

10   review factual findings for clear error and conclusions of law de novo. United States v. Carboni,

11   204 F.3d 39, 46 (2d Cir. 2000) (loss); United States v. Sabhnani, 599 F.3d 215, 261 (2d Cir. 2010)

12   (forfeiture). “Although the district court’s factual findings relating to loss must be established by

13   a preponderance of the evidence, the court need not establish the loss with precision but rather

14   need only make a reasonable estimate of the loss, given the available information.” United States

15   v. Uddin, 551 F.3d 176, 180 (2d Cir. 2009) (cleaned up). We apply this same standard to

16   forfeiture. See United States v. Roberts, 660 F.3d 149, 165-66 (2d Cir. 2011).

17   I.     Sufficiency of Evidence

18   A.     Relevant Circumstantial Evidence

19          Multiple fraud victims testified that they sent funds to Kissi at the behest of purported

20   romantic partners they met online.

21          From July 2015 to February 2020, Kissi opened multiple personal U.S. bank accounts;

22   received criminal proceeds amounting to approximately $1 million of deposits and withdrawals;

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 1   and facilitated numerous deposits of over $2,000 that he would withdraw immediately in cash,

 2   through wire transfers, or through account-to-account transfers. Kissi’s deposits often arrived

 3   with false references. See, e.g., App’x at A483-84, A490, A496 (testifying to deposits labeled as

 4   “building materials,” “purpose paying loan,” “business investment”). When banks suspected

 5   fraudulent activity and closed Kissi’s accounts, he opened new ones and continued to funnel funds

 6   into those accounts. He also used accounts belonging to his co-conspirator, Mubarak Baturi,

 7   some of which were held under false names.

 8          At trial, Baturi testified that Kissi acted as the “agent” or “middleman” between co-

9    conspirators in Ghana and himself. Baturi’s testimony was supported by text messages with

10   Kissi, discussing transactions to bank accounts under false names and negotiations over Kissi and

11   Baturi’s “cuts” of the proceeds with Ghanaian co-conspirators, also known as the “fraud boys.”

12   Baturi also indicated that the terms “fraud boys” and “the boys” were interchangeably used by all

13   co-conspirators, including Kissi.

14   B.     Source of Funds

15          The district court properly determined that the government’s evidence was sufficient to

16   prove that Kissi knew the deposited funds were stolen, satisfying the knowledge requirement of

17   the statutes underlying Counts Three and Four. Because the government’s evidence proved that

18   Kissi knew that the funds came from unlawful activity, the same evidence was sufficient to satisfy

19   the knowledge requirement of the statute underlying Count Two. It is well established that juries

20   may make reasonable inferences based on circumstantial evidence. See United States v. Huezo,

21   546 F.3d 174, 180 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[B]oth the existence of a conspiracy and a given defendant’s

22   participation in it with the requisite knowledge and criminal intent may be established through

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1    circumstantial evidence.”); United States v. Persico, 645 F.3d 85, 104 (2d Cir. 2011) (“The jury

2    may reach its verdict based upon inferences drawn from circumstantial evidence, and the evidence

3    must be viewed in conjunction, not in isolation.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

4           After considering the totality of the circumstantial evidence, the jury reasonably inferred

5    that Kissi understood that the funds were unlawfully taken, and thus necessarily stemmed from

6    unlawful activity. See Huezo, 546 F.3d at 182 (“[J]urors are entitled, and routinely encouraged,

7    to rely on their common sense and experience in drawing inferences.”). We affirm the district

8    court’s judgment convicting Kissi of conspiracy to receive stolen money and receiving stolen

9    money; the jury permissibly found that Kissi had the requisite knowledge of the unlawful source

10   of funds sufficient to support a conviction of conspiracy to commit money laundering.

11   C.     Purpose of Fund Transactions

12          Kissi argues that the government did not prove that the fund transactions were designed to

13   conceal the nature, location, source, ownership, or control of the funds as required to support his

14   conviction of conspiracy to commit money laundering under Count Two. He alleges that the

15   transactions “were needed to advance and complete the charged scams” and that he could not have

16   conspired to conceal anything because there is no evidence to suggest he was attempting to cover

17   up any part of the transactions. Appellant’s Br. at 33, 35. He claims that even if he was

18   attempting to conceal the transactions from authorities, the evidence still does not prove that he

19   knew the purpose of the transactions was to conceal the fraudulent activity. Id. at 36. We

20   disagree. First, Kissi concedes that he did not preserve these new challenges at the district court,

21   so we review for plain error. See United States v. Finley, 245 F.3d 199, 202 (2d Cir. 2001).

22   Second, the government provided sufficient circumstantial evidence for a rational jury to infer that

                                                      5
 1   Kissi knew the transactions were designed to conceal the nature of the funds as fraud proceeds,

 2   the source of the funds as fraud victims, and the ownership and control of the funds by the co-

 3   conspirators in Ghana.

 4          The district court did not commit error—much less “plain” error—in determining that the

 5   government’s evidence was sufficient. We thus affirm Kissi’s conviction for conspiracy to

 6   money launder.

 7   II.    Loss and Forfeiture Calculations

 8   A.     Loss Calculation

 9          The district court did not procedurally err in its loss calculation.      Record evidence

10   demonstrates that it was more likely than not that all of Kissi’s undeclared income—“[m]uch of

11   [which] was untraceable in cash and was quickly withdrawn with large wire transfers and cash

12   withdrawals,” and was related to “suspicious conduct” that “occurred through several bank

13   accounts”—was from an illegitimate source.          App’x at A941.    Kissi argues that the loss

14   calculation should be limited to the specific victims and specific timeframe supported by direct

15   evidence, but “the court need not establish the loss with precision but rather need only make a

16   reasonable estimate of the loss, given the available information.” Uddin, 551 F.3d at 180 (internal

17   quotation marks omitted). The district court reasonably relied on account transactions from 2015

18   to 2020, including transactions outside of those involving specific victims that exhibited

19   consistently suspicious activity.

20          Kissi alleges that approximately $135,000 of account-to-account transfers and a single

21   $5,614 deposit from his domestic partner were inappropriately included in the court’s $900,000

22   estimate of funds unlawfully deposited into Kissi’s account. Even if the contested amounts were

                                                     6
 1   removed from the calculus, it would not change the Sentencing Guidelines calculation. The total

 2   loss would still fall between $550,000 and $1,500,000, triggering a 14-level increase in Kissi’s

 3   offense level. Kissi’s alternative argument that certain funds could have come from selling cars

 4   or other undeclared employment fails as well. Kissi stipulated to his employment dating back to

 5   2015, and none of it involved selling cars.           Moreover, the testifying forensic accountant

 6   considered all of this information when determining Kissi’s sources of legitimate income.

 7           The district court thus appropriately determined that “[b]etween the money in defendant’s

 8   accounts, approximately $900,000, and the transaction in Mr. Baturi’s accounts, approximately

 9   [$]148[,000], the government has proven a loss between 550[,000] and 1.5 million.” App’x at

10   A942.

11   B.      Forfeiture Calculation

12           The district court properly ordered Kissi to forfeit $101,468. First, Kissi claims the district

13   court should have based the forfeiture amount on the restitution amount, not the loss amount. But

14   he provides no support for that claim; in fact, restitution and forfeiture are separate measures. See

15   United States v. Torres, 703 F.3d 194, 196 (2d Cir. 2012) (“Restitution and forfeiture are

16   authorized by different statutes and serve different purposes—one of remediating a loss, the other

17   of disgorging a gain.”). Second, for the first time on appeal, Kissi objects to the court’s use of 10

18   percent for Kissi’s estimated “cut” of illegal proceeds to calculate the forfeiture penalty. We

19   review this new objection for plain error. Although there is no direct evidence in the record of

20   Kissi’s actual percentage cut, the district court permissibly “use[d] general points of reference”

21   and made “reasonable extrapolations from the evidence” in calculating the forfeiture amount. See

22   United States v. Treacy, 639 F.3d 32, 48 (2d Cir. 2011). Specifically, the district court considered

                                                       7
 1   Baturi’s testimony regarding his typical cut percentage, varying cut percentages based on whose

 2   account was being used and who was taking a higher risk in conducting withdrawals, and cut

3    negotiations with Kissi, in light of the large amount of funds that flowed through Kissi’s own

 4   accounts. Based on this information, the district court reasonably determined that a 10 percent

 5   cut attributed to Kissi was a reasonable estimate. We thus conclude that the district court properly

 6   used the loss amount in its forfeiture calculation and did not commit plain error in determining the

 7   percentage cut in its forfeiture calculation.

8           We have considered all of Kissi’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit.

 9   For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court convicting Kissi of conspiracy to

10   commit money laundering, conspiracy to receive stolen money, and receipt of stolen money is

11   AFFIRMED. Kissi’s motion for bail pending appeal is DENIED as moot.

12
13                                                   FOR THE COURT:
14                                                   Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

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