Court Opinion

ID: 9470553
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:09:05.856512+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:41:58.158438
License: Public Domain

McKAY, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
In resolving Ms. Verniero’s employment discrimination claim, the majority applies a method of analysis that is inconsistent with our recent decision in Mohammed v. Callaway, 698 F.2d 395 (10th Cir.1983). I view Mohammed as the controlling authority and am therefore compelled to dissent.
In Mohammed, a Hispanic civilian employee of the Army applied for a supervisor’s position in response to a posted job vacancy announcement. The announcement listed specific job qualifications that the minority applicant possessed. Following his application, the employer relaxed the job qualifications and hired a non-minority applicant. The non-minority applicant did not have the original job qualifications, but nevertheless was hired over the minority applicant on the basis of “subjective factors.” The minority applicant sued *394under Title VII.1 Following a bench trial, the district court concluded that no illegal discrimination had occurred. On appeal, we determined that the plaintiff had established a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Mohammed, 698 F.2d at 398. In analyzing whether the subjective factors cited by the employer constituted legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for rejecting the minority applicant, we first determined that since the minority applicant had met the stated job qualifications, while the other applicant had not, the minority applicant was more highly qualified under the employer’s own published criteria. 698 F.2d at 399-400. Turning to the use of subjective factors in rejecting the minority applicant, we stated that
the use of subjective factors supports an inference of pretext when an employer justifies rejection' of a minority candidate on the basis of such factors even though the minority is objectively better qualified than the non-minority chosen. Adams [v. Gaudet, 515 F.Supp. 1086, 1097 (W.D.La.1981) ]. The use of such subjective criteria as “dedication” and “enthusiasm” also “may offer a convenient pretext for giving force and effect to racial prejudice,” Thornton [v. Coffey, 618 F.2d 686, 691 (10th Cir.1980) ], and “can create a strong inference of discrimination if there is a showing of significant disparity in the representation of a particular group.” Bauer [v. Bailar, 647 F.2d 1037, 1045 (10th Cir.1981) ]; see also Abrams v. Johnson, 534 F.2d 1226, 1231 (6th Cir.1976); Adams, 515 F.Supp. at 1097.
698 F.2d at 401. We concluded that the use of subjective factors, together with other evidence of pretext, rebutted the employer’s proffered statement of legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for rejecting the minority applicant. We accordingly reversed the district court judgment.
The instant case presents a situation analogous to Mohammed. The record indicates that the school board posted three job requirements for the position of principal: 1) three years experience in public schools; 2) a master’s degree or equivalent; and 3) a Type D Administrative certificate. Ms. Verniero met these three requirements; nevertheless, a male applicant who did not possess a Type D certificate was chosen on the basis of subjective factors.
In reviewing the trial court’s determination that there was no illegal discrimination, we should follow the method of analysis laid out in Mohammed. We should first inquire if the trial court properly examined whether Ms. Verniero was more qualified than the chosen applicant under the specific job qualifications set forth by the school board. We should then ask if, in determining that the employer’s decision was based on legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons, the trial court gave adequate consideration to the employer’s use of subjective factors in rejecting Ms. Verniero and to any other evidence of pretext. It appears from the record that the trial court did not consider either of these inquiries, nor did it make factual findings that enable us to apply the Mohammed test. While it cannot be said as a matter of law whether Ms. Verniero would prevail under the method of analysis provided in Mohammed, there is evidence to support her claim of pretext. I would therefore remand this case to the district court for further proceedings in. light of Mohammed. In any event, this court must recognize Mohammed. In choosing to reach the merits of this case, the majority is required to apply the method of analysis that Mohammed sets forth. Absent an en banc decision overturning Mohammed, it provides the law of this Circuit.
Beyond the issues raised under Mohammed, the decision of the district court is rendered suspect by inappropriate statements from the bench, by the trial judge. The judge prefaced his oral findings of fact and conclusions of law with statements disparaging Congress, Title VII, and litigants in employment discrimination cases.2 His *395statements displayed a clearly hostile attitude toward Title VII, a statute that he is obligated to interpret and enforce. In my view, the judge’s statements provide strong grounds for questioning his impartiality. They are particularly inappropriate in a case where he must make factual findings concerning motivation and intent — issues that are not amenable to objective verification. If courts are to retain public confidence that they can adjudicate these questions fairly, judges must conduct themselves in a manner that casts no doubt on their impartiality.
This court has long recognized the importance of judicial impartiality, holding that appellate courts have an inherent power to assure the absence of bias in the district courts. Texaco, Inc. v. Chandler, 354 F.2d 655, 657 (10th Cir.1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 936, 86 S.Ct. 1066, 15 L.Ed.2d 853 (1966); see United States v. Ritter, 540 F.2d 459 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 951, 97 S.Ct. 370, 50 L.Ed.2d 319 (1976); Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Chandler, 303 F.2d 55 (10th Cir.1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 915, 83 S.Ct. 718, 9 L.Ed.2d 722 (1963); United States v. Ritter, 273 F.2d 30 (10th Cir.1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 950, 80 S.Ct. 863, 4 L.Ed.2d 869 (1960). Recently, Congress has recognized that the appearance of impartiality is as important as actual impartiality in maintaining public confidence in the judiciary. In this regard-, Congress codified the American Bar Association’s standard of judicial conduct, imposing upon the federal judge the affirmative obligation to disqualify himself “in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (Supp. V. 1981) (codifying Canon 3 C of the ABA Code of Judicial Conduct).
I believe that the district court judge’s statements in the instant case are flatly inconsistent with the impartial demeanor required by the statute. Moreover, they express a totally inappropriate hostility toward the law he is charged to apply. Even if no other questions of error were presented, these statements would raise colorable grounds for granting a new trial.
In this case, there exist serious doubts that the correct legal standard for determining employment discrimination was applied. Given these doubts and given the intemperate remarks of the trial judge, I believe we should vacate the judgment and remand the case for a new trial.

. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1976).

. Judge Winner stated as follows:
*395Because it is a trial to the Court, Rule 52 mandates that I do not have the same delightful luxury that a jury has in just finding in favor of one party and against the other. To the exact contrary, in a trial to the Court I must make findings of fact and conclusions of law, albeit they may not be in tremendous detail in this case, but hopefully they will be sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Not as a part of any findings of fact or as any conclusions of law, but purely as a preliminary matter, the courts of the United States of America today, because of the requirements imposed upon the courts by Congress, are for some reason supposed to be experts in everything. And I fear that the judges of the United States of America qualify as experts in very few things. But what Congress has done is that every time Congress gets a difficult problem it passes the buck to the courts. And most assuredly, I am no expert in matters such as this. All I know is that federal courts of this country are totally burdened with discrimination cases of every type, nature and description. And, indeed, if certain provisions of the criminal code were applicable to these cases, I would be tempted to enforce them. The provision I have in mind is in Title XVIII, which is the criminal code, and it’s Section 4244 of the criminal code. That section says that when the Court has reason to question the sanity of a defendant, the Court must order a mental examination.
And I wonder, if that section were applicable, if every, school board member in the United States shouldn’t be ordered examined under Section 4244. I don’t know why anyone would serve on any school board. But the only way that I know that any school board member or employer can absolutely be sure of avoiding discrimination cases is to hire only handicapped females having as grandparents a Black, a Chicano, an American Indian and an Oriental, who is over 50 years of age. I think that takes care of all of the discrimination statutes.
Record, Vol. 3, at 2-3.