Court Opinion

ID: 9907872
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-07 16:00:24.711829+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:08:03.317780
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     MARY E. CAMPBELL,                               DOCKET NUMBER
                  Appellant,                         CH-1221-16-0284-W-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS                          DATE: December 6, 2023
       AFFAIRS,
                 Agency.

               THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Timothy A. Bridge , Wellston, Michigan, for the appellant.

           Christopher P. McNamee , Hines, Illinois, for the agency.

           Michael J. Klein , Baltimore, Maryland, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member

                                       FINAL ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     denied her request for corrective action in this individual right of action (IRA)
     appeal.   Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following
     circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact;

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                         2

     the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation
     or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative
     judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision
     were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion,
     and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material
     evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due
     diligence, was not available when the record closed.        Title 5 of the Code of
     Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115).             After fully
     considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not
     established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review.
     Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED by
     this Final Order to find that the Follow the Rules Act (FTRA), Pub. L.
     No. 115-40, 131 Stat. 861 (2017), does not apply to this case, we AFFIRM the
     initial decision.

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2         The parties have stipulated to the following facts. The agency employed the
     appellant as a GS-9 Program Specialist, pursuant to a 13-month term appointment,
     not to exceed July 15, 2015. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 53 at 2. She was
     assigned to the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Information Resource
     Center (VIReC), and her duties included providing administrative and program
     support to VIReC personnel, timekeeping for VIReC staff, travel coordination,
     ordering supplies, inventory control, workflow tracking, phone coverage,
     reception, maintaining the calendar, and office operations. Id. Her duties also
     included serving as a Purchase Card Holder for VIReC, subject to the rules and
     regulations of the VA Government Purchase Card Program. Id. The appellant
     successfully completed her probationary period and received fully successful
     performance evaluations for the periods June 16 through September 30, 2014, and
                                                                                         3

     October 1, 2014, through September 30, 2015, and she was not subject to any
     disciplinary action during her employment at VIReC. Id.
¶3           At issue in this appeal is the appellant’s claim that she was terminated from
     her position in retaliation for alleged whistleblowing disclosures and activity.
     IAF, Tab 1. Specifically, on June 22, 2015, her supervisor, D.H., emailed the
     appellant and asked her, in her role as Purchase Card Holder for VIReC, to use
     the purchase card to buy various promotional items for a national conference
     scheduled in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania on July 10, 2015. 2 IAF, Tab 6 at 37-44.
     The appellant responded in an email to D.H. advising her that the VA
     Government Purchase Card Program prohibited a purchase card being used for the
     procurement of “promotional items in conjunction with a conference, such as
     mementos, gifts, keepsakes, prize items, and other VA ‘logo’ or ‘message’ items
     for distribution to VA and other [F]ederal employees.”              IAF, Tab 4.   The
     appellant further advised D.H. to “speak with the budget office” if she still
     wanted to order the promotional items, as it may have funding that allowed for
     the purchase. Id. Within 2 hours, D.H. emailed the appellant asking her to obtain
     the price of the items so that D.H. could purchase them with her personal charge
     card. Id. After an email discussion regarding the items, the appellant advised
     D.H. that, “[s]ince you will be using your credit card, once you decide what you
     want you can enter your credit card information and order at the same time.” Id.
     D.H. notified the appellant on June 25, 2015, that she had confirmed that she was
     permitted to purchase and donate the items to VIReC and she requested help from
     the appellant in finalizing the order. IAF, Tab 6 at 37-44. On June 25, 2015,
     after D.H.’s return to VIReC, she met with the appellant and the Office
     Administrator and allegedly discussed the purchase issue. IAF, Tab 4 at 46. The
     following day, the appellant contacted the VA’s Office of Resolution
     Management (ORM) to file an equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint
     against D.H., alleging discrimination, retaliation, and the creation of a hostile
     2
         D.H. was in Utah, and not at the VIReC, when she emailed the appellant.
                                                                                        4

     work environment. IAF, Tab 56, Hearing Compact Disc 1 (HCD 1) (testimony of
     the appellant).   The appellant placed the order on June 29, 2015, the vendor
     contacted D.H. directly with a price quote, and D.H. purchased the items with her
     personal charge card. Id. On July 27, 2015, the appellant advised the Associate
     Chief of Staff, S.J., that D.H. retaliated against her for refusing to violate
     purchase card restrictions and threatened to fire her for raising her claims of a
     hostile work environment before ORM. Id. S.J. resigned from his position as
     Associate Chief of Staff on August 2, 2015.       IAF, Tab 57, Hearing Compact
     Disc 2 (HCD 2) (testimony of S.J.).
¶4        On September 15, 2015, after D.H. notified the appellant that she would
     extend her term appointment from November 2015 to March 2016, but would
     probably not extend it again after that, the appellant filed a Complaint of Possible
     Prohibited Personnel Practice with the Office of Special Counsel (OSC). IAF,
     Tab 1. The appellant’s “whistleblower disclosure” to OSC alleged the following:

           On 6/25/15 [D.H.], Director, VA Information Resource Center,
           Hines, VA, instructed me to use her VA purchase card to obtain
           various promotional items in direct violation of [VA Government
           Purchase Card Program] regulations . . . .        After refusing this
           directive, I have been subject to harassment, a hostile work
           environment, removal of job responsibilities, and notice of
           termination of my term employment status effective March, 2016. I
           reported to [sic] [D.H.[’s]] unlawful directive to Dr. [S.J.], Chief of
           Staff, on 7/27/15.
     IAF, Tab 1, Exhibit (Ex.) E.      The appellant’s complaint also alleged that her
     disclosure of information evidenced a violation of law, rule, or regulation, gross
     mismanagement, and an abuse of authority.       Id. In addition, she alleged that,
     following her report to S.J., the agency failed to investigate her complaint and
     failed to take remedial measures to stop D.H.’s allegedly “retaliatory and
     harassing conduct.” IAF, Tab 1.
¶5        On September 24, 2015, the appellant filed a formal complaint of
     discrimination with the agency. IAF, Tab 1, Ex. C. By letter dated January 21,
                                                                                        5

     2016, D.H. notified the appellant that her appointment would be terminated
     effective March 31, 2016. IAF, Tab 1, Ex. D. On January 29, 2016, OSC notified
     the appellant that it was closing its file in the matter and that she had a right to
     seek corrective action with the Board. IAF, Tab 1, Ex. F. The appellant then
     filed this Board appeal. IAF, Tab 1.
¶6         Because there was a question on jurisdiction, the administrative judge
     issued an order that directed the parties to submit evidence and argument showing
     that the Board had jurisdiction over this appeal.       IAF, Tab 3.    The parties
     provided several submissions in response to the order and participated in status
     conferences.    IAF, Tabs 4, 6, 9, 16.    As a result of the parties requesting a
     jurisdictional determination, the administrative judge issued a detailed Order on
     Jurisdiction.   IAF, Tab 20.    She found that the appellant had exhausted her
     administrative remedies concerning three alleged disclosures or activities and the
     following personnel actions: failing to extend her term appointment; removing
     her job responsibilities; requesting additional documentation; and subjecting her
     to a hostile work environment.     Id. at 7-8. As to the appellant’s first alleged
     protected disclosure or activity, her communications with D.H., the administrative
     judge found that, under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8), the appellant did not disclose to
     D.H. a violation of a law, rule, or regulation, gross mismanagement, a gross waste
     of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public
     health or safety. Id. Instead, the administrative judge found that the appellant
     advised D.H. of what the regulations stated and then D.H. purchased the items
     with her own funds. Id. at 8-9. The administrative judge found that identifying
     that a requested action would be a potential violation is not the same thing as
     disclosing that one of these violations actually occurred. Id.
¶7         Concerning the appellant’s claim that her disclosure to D.H. was protected
     activity under section 2302(b)(9), the administrative judge found that the
     appellant’s argument was precluded by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
     Circuit’s decision in Rainey v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 824 F.3d 1359,
                                                                                           6

     1361-62 (Fed.     Cir.   2016),   which    held   that the   protection   granted in
     section 2302(b)(9) is limited to orders that are contrary to a statute and does not
     encompass orders that are contrary to an agency’s rules or regulations.           IAF,
     Tab 20 at 9. Thus, the administrative judge found that the appellant’s activity
     was not protected under section 2302(b)(9)(D). Id. at 10.
¶8         Regarding the appellant’s second alleged protected disclosure or activity,
     the EEO complaint she filed against D.H. with ORM on June 26, 2015, the
     administrative judge found that the underlying allegations in the appellant’s
     complaint focused on claims of race and age discrimination, and that
     section 2302(b)(9) does not establish jurisdiction over her claim in an IRA appeal.
     Id. at 11.
¶9         Finally, regarding the appellant’s third alleged protected disclosure or
     activity, her communications with S.J., the administrative judge found that the
     appellant made a nonfrivolous allegation that her disclosure to S.J. was protected
     because a disinterested observer could reasonably conclude that, when the
     appellant disclosed D.H.’s conduct to S.J., the appellant believed that D.H.’s
     alleged conduct constituted an abuse of authority.             Id. at 14-15.       The
     administrative judge also found that the appellant nonfrivolously alleged that her
     disclosure was a contributing factor in the agency’s decision not to extend her
     term appointment. Id. The administrative judge thus found that the appellant
     established that the Board has jurisdiction over her IRA appeal and that she was
     entitled to a hearing on the merits. Id. at 16. However, she advised the parties
     that she reserved the right to revisit the jurisdictional issue later, based on further
     development of the record. Id. Although the appellant objected to these rulings,
     the administrative judge issued an order overruling the appellant’s objections to
     her jurisdictional order. 3 IAF, Tabs 21-22.

     3
       The administrative judge also denied the appellant’s motion for certification of an
     interlocutory appeal challenging the administrative judge’s rulings in the Order on
     Jurisdiction and the “Order Overruling Appellant’s Objections to Order on
     Jurisdiction.” IAF, Tabs 26-27.
                                                                                        7

¶10        The administrative judge held a 2-day hearing and thereafter issued an
      initial decision denying the appellant’s request for corrective action.       IAF,
      Tab 59, Initial Decision (ID).   After considering the appellant’s supplemental
      evidence and argument, the administrative judge affirmed her prior rulings
      regarding the first and second alleged protected disclosures and activity,
      concluding that the appellant presented no evidence to show that either was
      protected.    ID at 14-21.    Regarding the appellant’s third alleged protected
      disclosure or activity, the administrative judge found that, although the appellant
      nonfrivolously alleged that she made a protected disclosure of an abuse of
      authority to S.J. in July 2015, she failed to prove it by preponderant evidence. ID
      at 21-24.    The administrative judge thereafter found that, even if she were to
      conclude that the appellant had met her burden as to the July 2015 disclosure to
      S.J., there is no evidence that the disclosure was a contributing factor in any of
      the alleged personnel actions at issue.        ID at 24-26.      Concluding, the
      administrative judge found that, because the appellant had not shown by
      preponderant evidence that she made one or more whistleblowing disclosures that
      were a contributing factor in the personnel actions at issue in this appeal, she
      could not prevail on her whistleblower claim. Consequently, the administrative
      judge did not reach the issue of whether the agency could show by clear and
      convincing evidence it would have taken the personnel actions absent the
      appellant’s whistleblowing. ID at 27.
¶11        The appellant has filed a timely petition for review. Petition for Review
      (PFR) File, Tab 3. The agency has filed a response to the appellant’s petition.
      PFR File, Tab 5.

                       DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
¶12        Under the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, as amended by the
      Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012 (WPEA), in reviewing the
      merits of an IRA appeal in which the appellant alleges retaliation for protected
                                                                                         8

      disclosures or activity, the Board first considers whether the appellant has
      established by a preponderance of the evidence that she made protected
      disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or engaged in protected activity under
      5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D), that were a contributing factor in an
      agency’s personnel actions. Corthell v. Department of Homeland Security, 123
      M.S.P.R. 417, ¶ 8 (2016). When the appellant is able to offer such proof, the
      Board must order corrective action unless the agency can establish by clear and
      convincing evidence that it would have taken the same personnel actions in the
      absence of the disclosure or activity. Id.; see Whitmore v. Department of Labor,
      680 F.3d 1353, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2012).

      The administrative judge properly found that the appellant’s first alleged
      disclosure or activity was not protected.
¶13        On review, the appellant argues that the administrative judge erred in
      finding that her disclosure to D.H. did not constitute a protected disclosure under
      section 2302(b)(8). PFR File, Tab 3 at 7-9. In this regard, the appellant reasserts
      that the administrative judge erroneously excluded this disclosure because of the
      fact that she made it to her immediate supervisor and that the language in
      section 2302(b)(8) specifically recognizes disclosures made to immediate
      supervisors during the normal course of duties. Id. at 8-9.
¶14        However, the administrative judge addressed this argument in the initial
      decision and found that it was a misstatement of her analysis. 4 ID at 16. We
      agree. Specifically, the administrative judge explicitly stated that she was not
      excluding the appellant’s statement simply because it was made to D.H., her
      supervisor. Rather, the administrative judge found that the appellant’s alleged
      disclosure was not a disclosure because she merely advised D.H. of what the
      regulations stated, and not of a violation of the regulations.           Thus, the
      administrative judge found that no disclosure of a violation of a law, rule, or

      4
       The administrative judge also addressed this argument in the “Order Overruling
      Appellant’s Objections to Order on Jurisdiction.” IAF, Tab 22.
                                                                                        9

      regulation, nor a disclosure of a potential violation, actually occurred.        ID
      at 14-15.
¶15         Additionally, the appellant contends that, under the analysis in Reid v. Merit
      Systems Protection Board, 508 F.3d 674 (Fed. Cir. 2007), her disclosure to D.H.
      was protected, whether or not the unauthorized purchase actually occurred, and
      that the administrative judge erred in finding that an actual violation had to have
      occurred before it was deemed a protected disclosure under section 2302(b)(8).
      PFR File Tab 3 at 9-12. The appellant asserts that she had every reason to believe
      that D.H.’s “directive was both ‘real and imminent’ and that she [would be]
      potentially subjected to disciplinary action in the event she followed her
      directives.”   Id. at 9.   Thus, the appellant argues that her disclosure satisfied
      section 2302(b)(8) because she disclosed a potential violation in which she had a
      reasonable belief that potential wrongdoing was real and imminent. Id. at 11.
¶16         However, as the administrative judge correctly found, the overwhelming
      record evidence, including the hearing testimony, reflects that, once the appellant
      told D.H. that VA regulations prohibit the purchase of promotional items using
      the Government purchase card, D.H.’s almost immediate response was to state
      that she would purchase the items on her own personal credit card. ID at 14-16;
      IAF, Tab 7, Ex. 3 at 25-31; HCD 1; HCD 2. Further, while the appellant contends
      that she disclosed an “imminent” potential violation of a law, to the extent that
      she may be implying that this violation also might have involved a substantial or
      specific danger to the public, we would disagree.       The appellant’s disclosure
      merely involved the purchase of mementos for a conference and thus there was no
      imminent, much less a substantial or specific, danger to anyone.      Cf. Miller v.
      Department of Homeland Security, 111 M.S.P.R. 312, ¶¶ 15, 19 (2009) (finding
      that the appellant had a reasonable belief that his disclosures would pose a
      substantial and specific danger to public safety and an imminent threat when his
      disclosures involved proposed changes to airport screening of bags and passenger
      check points).     Moreover, discussions between employees and supervisors
                                                                                      10

      regarding various courses of action are normal, and such communications can
      actually help avoid potential violations of the law. See Reid, 508 F.3d at 678.
      Therefore, we find no support for the appellant’s claim that potential wrongdoing
      was imminent.
¶17        To the extent the appellant asserts for the first time on review that she
      previously had been informed that using the Government purchase card for
      promotional items had become a “past practice” under D.H.’s tenure as VIReC
      Director, the appellant has made no showing as to why this claim was not raised
      below. The Board generally will not consider an argument raised for the first
      time in a petition for review absent a showing that it is based on new and material
      evidence not previously available despite the party’s due diligence.      Banks v.
      Department of the Air Force, 4 M.S.P.R. 268, 271 (1980).
¶18        The appellant also challenges the administrative judge’s credibility
      determinations regarding the finding that her June 2015 refusal to follow the
      directive to purchase promotional items was not a protected disclosure. PFR File,
      Tab 3 at 13.    The Board must defer to an administrative judge’s credibility
      determinations when they are based, explicitly or implicitly, on observing the
      demeanor of witnesses testifying at a hearing; the Board may overturn such
      determinations only when it has “sufficiently sound” reasons for doing so. See
      Haebe v. Department of Justice, 288 F.3d 1288, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2002). We have
      reviewed the record evidence and we discern no basis upon which to disturb the
      administrative judge’s well-explained credibility determinations in this regard.
      ID at 14-18.
¶19        When the appellant filed this appeal, 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(D) made it a
      prohibited personnel practice to take an action against an employee for “refusing
      to obey an order that would require the individual to violate a law.” Here, the
      appellant asserts that she engaged in protected activity when she refused to obey a
      directive that would have required her to violate an agency regulation prohibiting
      the purchase of promotional items with Government charge cards.          PFR File,
                                                                                        11

      Tab 3 at 16-17. As the administrative judge properly explained, our reviewing
      court held in Rainey that the protection in section 2309(b)(9)(D) extended only to
      orders that would require the individual to take an action barred by statute.
      Rainey, 824 F.3d 1359, 1361-62, 1364-65. Thus, under the law in effect at the
      time this appeal was filed, the appellant’s claim—that she refused to follow a
      directive that would have required her to violate an agency regulation—fell
      outside the scope of section 2302(b)(9)(D). Id.
¶20         On June 14, 2017, while this petition for review was pending before the
      Board,    the   President    signed   into   law   the   FTRA,    which    amended
      section 2302(b)(9)(D) by inserting after the word “law” the words “rule or
      regulation.” 131 Stat. at 861. Therefore, if the FTRA were to apply to pending
      cases, the appellant’s claim that she disobeyed an order that would have required
      her to violate an agency regulation would have fallen within the scope of
      section 2302(b)(9)(D).      The Board analyzed the retroactivity of the FTRA in
      Fisher v. Department of the Interior, 2023 MSPB 11, ¶¶ 13-19, and found,
      applying the test set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in Landgraf v. USI Film
      Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994), that the FTRA did not apply to cases filed before
      its enactment. Accordingly, we find that the appellant’s claim that the agency
      retaliated against her for refusing to obey a directive that would have required her
      to violate an agency regulation is outside the scope of section 2302(b)(9)(D) and
      that, therefore, she failed to establish that she engaged in protected activity under
      that section.

      The administrative judge properly found that the appellant’s second alleged
      disclosure or activity was not protected.
¶21         Reprisal for exercising a grievance or complaint right is a prohibited
      personnel practice under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9). Specifically, section 2302(b)(9)
      prohibits the taking or failing to take, or threatening to take or fail to take, “any
      personnel action against any employee or applicant for employment because of—
      (A) the exercise of any appeal, complaint, or grievance right granted by any law,
                                                                                           12

      rule, or regulation—(i) with regard to remedying a violation of paragraph [(b)](8);
      or (ii) other than with regard to remedying a violation of paragraph [(b)](8).”
      Hooker v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 120 M.S.P.R. 629, ¶ 9 (2014).
      However, the WPEA did not extend the Board’s jurisdiction to include retaliation
      for an appellant’s filing of an EEO complaint that did not seek to remedy a
      violation of (b)(8). See Young v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 961 F.3d 1323,
      1329 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (explaining that the Board lacks jurisdiction in an IRA
      appeal      over   claims   of   reprisal   for    EEO    activity   protected    under
      section 2302(b)(9)(A)(ii)); Mudd v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 120 M.S.P.R.
      365, ¶ 7 (2013). Therefore, insofar as the appellant alleged that the agency took
      personnel actions in reprisal for her having filed an EEO complaint with ORM,
      the administrative judge correctly determined that the Board lacks jurisdiction to
      consider such allegations in the context of this IRA appeal. Mudd, 120 M.S.P.R.
      365, ¶ 7.
¶22         The appellant argues on review that the administrative judge misconstrued
      the type of retaliation protected under section 2302(b)(9)(A)(i) and erred in
      finding that she only asserted claims of race and age discrimination in her EEO
      complaint. PFR File, Tab 3 at 15. Specifically, the appellant contends that her
      EEO complaint was not limited to discrimination based on age and race and that
      she also alleged that she was subjected to a hostile work environment based upon
      “reprisal” for objecting to a violation of law, rule, or regulation. Id.
¶23         However, the record reflects that the appellant did not specifically state in
      her ORM complaint that her claim was based upon reprisal for objecting to a
      violation of a law, rule, or regulation.          IAF, Tab 1, Ex. C.       Although her
      complaint identifies the bases as race, age, and “reprisal (oppositional),” her
      specific claims involve being shouted at by her supervisor, referred to as having
      “act[ed] ghetto,” and being “isolated from her co-workers.” Id. Therefore, the
      administrative judge properly found that the appellant’s allegations of EEO
      reprisal failed to establish the Board’s jurisdiction over this alleged disclosure.
                                                                                         13

      See, e.g., Horton v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 106 M.S.P.R. 234, ¶ 7 (2007)
      (finding that the test of the sufficiency of an appellant’s charges of
      whistleblowing to OSC is the statement that she makes in the complaint
      requesting corrective action, not her post hoc characterization of those statements
      before the Board).

      The administrative judge properly found that the appellant’s third alleged
      disclosure or activity was not protected.
¶24        At the outset, we note that the appellant has not challenged the
      administrative judge’s determinations that she did not make a protected disclosure
      to S.J. We have reviewed the administrative judge’s findings and discern no error
      in this regard. Therefore, we affirm the administrative judge’s finding that the
      appellant failed to show that her disclosure to S.J. was protected. ID at 21-24.
¶25        On review, it appears that the appellant may be arguing that the personnel
      actions at issue in this appeal were proximate in time to her disclosure to S.J. and
      that, thus, she established that her disclosure to S.J. was a contributing factor in
      these personnel actions. PFR File, Tab 1 at 16-17. The appellant also appears to
      argue that the administrative judge failed to address each of the alleged personnel
      actions at issue. Id. However, because we find that the appellant did not show
      that she made a protected disclosure under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or engaged in
      protected activity under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D), we need not
      address either whether she showed that the personnel actions at issue constituted
      personnel actions under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A) or whether she showed that her
      disclosures or activity were a contributing factor in those personnel actions. See,
      e.g., Corthell, 123 M.S.P.R. 417, ¶ 8.
¶26        Similarly, it appears that the appellant may be arguing that the
      administrative judge erred by failing to make a clear and convincing analysis.
      PFR File, Tab 3 at 19-20. However, because the appellant failed to establish a
      prima facie case of reprisal for whistleblowing, the burden did not shift to the
      agency to prove by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the
                                                                                           14

      same personnel actions absent her whistleblowing. Scoggins v. Department of the
      Army, 123 M.S.P.R. 592, ¶ 26 (2016). Therefore, we discern no error by the
      administrative judge in not providing a clear and convincing analysis.

      The appellant did not argue below that she was perceived as a whistleblower.
¶27         Finally, the appellant argues on review that the administrative judge failed
      to address whether she was “perceived” as a whistleblower by the responsible
      management officials. PFR File, Tab 3 at 17-19. However, the appellant failed to
      raise this argument below, even after the administrative judge explicitly advised
      her how to raise such a claim. IAF, Tab 3 at 5, Tab 4, Tab 12 at 4. Because the
      appellant has not shown that her argument is based on new and material evidence
      that she was unable to provide below despite her due diligence, we have not
      considered it for the first time on review. Banks, 4 M.S.P.R. at 271.

                               NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 5
            The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the
      Board’s final decision in this matter.      5 C.F.R. § 1201.113. You may obtain
      review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of
      your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate
      forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following
      summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not
      provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation and
      the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule
      regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of
      this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your
      claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file
      within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your
      chosen forum.
      5
        Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
      the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
      Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                       15

      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general . As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.                5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit   your   petition    to   the   court    at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or    EEOC    review    of   cases      involving   a   claim      of
discrimination . This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
                                                                                16

were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims —by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.    5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative
receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be
entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any
requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security.        See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx .
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues . 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                                                                                     17

                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                  P.O. Box 77960
                             Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant     to   the    Whistleblower      Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012 . This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section
2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),
(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of
competent jurisdiction. 6   The court of appeals must receive your petition for
review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.               5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(B).

6
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                                18

      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                             U.S. Court of Appeals
                             for the Federal Circuit
                            717 Madison Place, N.W.
                            Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx .

FOR THE BOARD:                        ______________________________
                                      Jennifer Everling
                                      Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.