Court Opinion

ID: 9747042
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 14:53:51.364683+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:19.558166
License: Public Domain

NEWSOM, J.,
Concurring. — The majority opinion adopts the following standard for determining whether exposure to a defendant’s product is a substantial factor in causing an asbestos-related disease: “is there a reasonable medical probability based upon competent expert testimony that the defendant’s conduct contributed to plaintiff’s injury.” The phrase, “reasonable medical probability,” derives from a line of medical malpractice cases. *1422As Witkin observes, “In a medical malpractice case, the evidence must be sufficient to allow the jury to infer that, in the absence of the defendant’s negligence, there was a reasonable medical probability that the plaintiff would have obtained a better result.” (6 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (9th ed. 1988) § 967 p. 357; see also Duarte v. Zachariah (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1652, 1658 [28 Cal.Rptr.2d 88]; Bromme v. Pavitt (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1487, 1498 [7 Cal.Rptr.2d 608]; Dumas v. Cooney (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1593, 1603 [1 Cal.Rptr.2d 584].)
Although the standard of “reasonable medical probability” was adopted in one decision involving a carcinogenic pharmaceutical (Jones v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 396, 402 [209 Cal.Rptr. 456]), it represents a new approach to causation in asbestos cases, and one which finds no close precedent in other jurisdictions. The language is poorly suited to this area of litigation, which is marked by formidable problems of proof because of the delayed onset of symptoms and the typical industrial environment involving multiple exposures to various asbestos products over a period of time. An injured plaintiff’s case against a particular supplier commonly rests on vague and fading memories and more or less tenuous circumstantial evidence. A standard requiring “reasonable medical probability” threatens to raise unreasonable practical obstacles to the plaintiff’s prospects of recovery. In the case at bar, I do not think Lineaweaver presented evidence satisfying such a standard.
The majority opinion, however, modifies the standard by requiring only a reasonable medical probability “that the defendant’s conduct contributed to plaintiff’s injury.” This language seems to me confusing and perhaps somewhat circular. One may well ask: does any contribution suffice? will a slight or negligent contribution be enough? The most plausible answer appears to be that the contribution must be a “substantial factor” in causing the disease. In inquiring what is a substantial factor, we are led back to the original formula. The modifying language thus makes the effect of the standard very uncertain. As modified, the medical malpractice standard may, in fact, lead to a more relaxed standard of proof than would apply under traditional formulations relating to causation.
A further reading of the majority opinion suggests that the modifying language may be intended merely to allude to possible allocation of damages. The opinion states: “Plaintiffs are free to demonstrate that asbestos diseases are cumulative in nature, with many separate exposures contributing to their injuries. . . . Defendants would not escape liability simply because the precise contribution of each exposure to the disease cannot be determined, but they would be entitled to limit damages assessed against them if they proved the harm was capable of apportionment among them.”
*1423I do not think, however, that the allocation of damages entirely obviates the need for a meaningful and practical standard of causation in asbestos cases. An unworkable standard may bar meritorious cases or encourage jury verdicts based on miniscule percentages of fault, an outcome tending to involve speculation and a waste of judicial resources. Moreover, the majority assumes that plaintiffs may be able to prove that asbestos disease is “cumulative in nature.” The evidence regarding asbestosis in the present case indeed supports this assumption; the disease was described as resulting from a progressive scarring of the lungs. But cases involving mesothelioma — the fatal cancer which is the other principal asbestos-related disease — will involve quite different testimony. I do not think we can easily assume that this disease reflects the cumulative impact of exposure to asbestos fibers over time, though the odds of contracting it may go up with increased exposure. In any event, the courts should not invoke scientific assumptions of this kind in justifying a rule of general application.
The proof of causation remains very difficult in asbestos litigation because of the long latency of asbestos-related disease and the industrial setting which commonly involves multiple suppliers of asbestos products. In my view, the difficulties are not resolved by importing a standard used in the very different context of medical malpractice. California law points instead toward an adaption of the burden-shifting rule of Summers v. Tice (1948) 33 Cal.2d 80 [199 P.2d 1, 5 A.L.R.2d 91](hereafter Summers). This approach is favored by the two state precedents most closely in point, Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories (1980) 26 Cal.3d 588, 598-599 [163 Cal.Rptr. 132, 607 P.2d 924, 2 A.L.R.4th 1061] and Pereira v. Dow Chemical Co. (1982) 129 Cal.App.3d 865 [181 Cal.Rptr. 364], and by a persuasive and scholarly federal decision, Menne v. Celotex Corp. (10th Cir. 1988) 861 F.2d 1453.)
Any discussion of burden-shifting must begin with the general principles of causation in products liability cases. California has now definitively adopted the substantial factor test of Restatement Second of Torts section 431. (Mitchell v. Gonzales (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1041, 1052 [1 Cal.Rptr.2d 913, 819 P.2d 872]; Doupnik v. General Motors Corp. (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 849, 860 [275 Cal.Rptr. 715].) For purpose of product liability, “[a] cause of injury is something that is a substantial factor in bringing about an injury.” (BAJI No. 3.76; Endicott v. Nissan Motor Corp. (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 917, 926 [141 Cal.Rptr. 95, 9 A.L.R.4th 481].) A corollary to this principle is that plaintiffs must prove that products supplied by the defendant were a substantial factor in producing their injury. (Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, supra, 26 Cal.3d 588, 597-598; Garcia v. Joseph Vince Co. (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 868 [148 Cal.Rptr. 843].)
The term “substantial factor” is not subject to any useful definition; it may only be contrasted with something that is “a slight, trivial, negligible, or *1424theoretical factor in producing a particular result.” (Com. to BAJI No. 3.76 (1992 rev.).) But in the field of asbestos litigation, judicial precedents suggest an analytical approach to the question whether exposure to a particular product was a substantial factor in producing the plaintiffs injury. We look primarily to federal decisions for guidance since the bulk of litigation has occurred in federal courts. A review of the case law reveals the necessity of first considering the threshold question of whether the plaintiff was subject to a legally significant exposure to asbestos fibers derived from defendant’s product.
To prove the requisite exposure to a defendant’s product, a plaintiff must show “that [the] defendant’s asbestos-containing product was used at the job site and that the plaintiff was in proximity to that product at the time it was being used.” (Odum v. Celotex (11th Cir. 1985) 764 F.2d 1486, 1488.) Where the plaintiff works in a large industrial establishment, such as a shipyard or refinery, it is not enough to show “that the asbestos manufacturer’s product was present somewhere at his place of work.” (Roberts v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. (W.D.Mich. 1989) 726 F.Supp. 172, 174; Robertson v. Allied Signal, Inc. (3d Cir. 1990) 914 F.2d 360, 378; Jackson v. Anchor Packing Co. (8th Cir. 1993) 994 F.2d 1295, 1305-1309.) The plaintiff must present “evidence showing that he worked in the same area as the witnesses who [can] identify the asbestos products.” (Roehling v. Nat. Gypsum Co. Gold Bond Bldg. (4th Cir. 1986) 786 F.2d 1225, 1228.)
Thus, in Blackston v. Shook & Fletcher Insulation Co. (11th Cir. 1985) 764 F.2d 1480, the court affirmed a summary judgment for a contracting company which had installed insulation at a paper mill where the plaintiff worked. The plaintiff, a pipefitter, could show that he worked at the mill at the time the defendant performed some insulating work and that he sometimes worked in proximity to insulators but he could not show whether “those insulators were employed by [the defendant] or whether they were using asbestos.” (Id. at p. 1482.)1
If the plaintiff can make the threshold showing of exposure, other considerations become relevant to the question whether the exposure was a substantial factor in producing the plaintiff’s injuries. These considerations *1425include (a) the frequency and duration of plaintiff’s exposure to the defendant’s product,2 (b) the intensity of exposure to the product,3 (c) the type of asbestos product to which the plaintiff was exposed,4 and (d) the type of injury suffered by the plaintiff.5 “Ultimately, the sufficiency of the evidence of causation will depend on the unique circumstances of each case. Nevertheless, the factors listed above are matters which trial courts should consider when deciding if the evidence is sufficient to take such cases to the jury.” (Lockwood v. AC & S, Inc. (1987) 109 Wn.2d 235 [744 P.2d 605, 613], hereafter Lockwood.)
A few decisions have tended to require particularized proof of injurious exposure to defendant’s products, involving direct identification of the plaintiff as having been exposed to the product of a particular defendant. Blackston v. Shook & Fletcher Insulation Co., supra, 764 F.2d 1480, is often cited for this requirement. (See also Jackson v. Anchor Packing Co., supra, 994 F.2d 1295, 1310; Hyde v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. (D.C.Ariz. 1990) 751 F.Supp. 832.) Although the Blackston decision appears correctly decided on its facts, I would reject this standard of proof. As stated in Roehling v. Nat. Gypsum Co. Gold Bond Bldg., supra, 786 F.2d 1225, “Such burden is unreasonable. Roehling should not be required to remember product names some thirty years later when he had been a pipefitter, breathing the dust, not handling the products. Such requirement would, in essence, destroy an injured bystander’s cause of action for asbestos exposure. Rarely would bystanders take note of names of materials used by others. Moreover, the witnesses should not be required to know Roehling. . . . Bystanders often go unrecognized, but still receive injuries.” (Id. at p. 1228.)
Ordinarily the courts allow a plaintiff to “rely on the testimony of witnesses who identify manufacturers of asbestos products which were then present at his workplace.” (Lockwood, supra, 744 P.2d at p. 612; In re Hawaii Federal Asbestos Cases (9th Cir. 1992) 960 F.2d 806, 817.) We quote *1426again from the Roehling decision: “The evidence, circumstantial as it may be, need only establish that Roehling was in the same vicinity as witnesses who can identify the products causing the asbestos dust that all people in that area, not just the product handlers, inhaled.” (Roehling v. Nat. Gypsum Co. Gold Bond Bldg., supra, 786 F.2d at p. 1228.)
Some cases rely on evidence of “ ‘fiber drift’ ” “to widen the area of probable exposure” to a defendant’s product. (Jackson v. Anchor Packing Co., supra, 994 F.2d 1295, 1303.) Expert testimony has been used to show that asbestos fibers “hang in the air” and drift with “air currents, thus spreading over time throughout a working area.” (Lockwood, supra, 744 P.2d at p. 611; Robertson v. Allied Signal, Inc., supra, 914 F.2d 360, 372-373, 383.) Other cases dispense entirely with evidence of where a product was used by merely requiring proof that it was in general use at an industrial facility. Thus, Martin v. American Petrofina, Inc. (5th Cir. 1985) 779 F.2d 250 upheld a damage award on evidence that a particular product was used “throughout” an oil refinery. Slaughter v. Southern Talc Co. (5th Cir. 1991) 949 F.2d 167 holds that evidence that a product was “all over” pipes at a tire plant was sufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment. Similarly, In re Brooklyn Navy Yard Asbestos Litigation (2d Cir. 1992) 971 F.2d 831, 837, upheld judgments against multiple defendants on evidence that “asbestos-containing products made by the defendants were used interchangeably throughout the shipyard, and that the environment was extremely dusty with asbestos fibers.”
In Slaughter v. Southern Talc Co., supra, 949 F.2d 167, 172, the court explained the justification for such circumstantial proof of exposure: “The essence of plaintiffs’ proof of exposure, like the theories of exposure upheld in the cases summarized above, rests on the common sense idea that, if defendants’ products are likely to be present at a specific location within the workplace, plaintiffs are likely to have been exposed to the products if they worked near those specific locations, even without explicit testimony that the plaintiff worked near the specific product. This is an intuitively plausible theory of exposure, accepted repeatedly by this court and also by other courts.”
But circumstantial evidence does not avoid difficult problems of proof of causation in asbestos litigation. In response to these problems, a few courts have abandoned traditional principles of causation by equating any evidence *1427of exposure to proof of injury.6 I see no justification for this approach under California law. As in other products liability cases, liability should not be based on speculation (Evid. Code, § 600, subd. (b); Traxler v. Thompson (1970) 4 Cal.App.3d 278, 288 [84 Cal.Rptr. 211]), surmise (Anjeski v. Keene Bldg. & Development Co. (E.D.Mich. 1989) 727 F.Supp. 331, 333), or a mere possibility. (Jones v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., supra, 163 Cal.App.3d 396, 402.)
The proof of causation in asbestos litigation can best be handled by an adaptation of the burden-shifting rule of Summers. In this famous case, two quail hunters negligently fired shots, more or less simultaneously, in the plaintiffs direction. A pellet struck his eye, causing serious injury. Under the circumstances, it could not be determined whose shot caused the injury. Quoting from Dean Wigmore on a related issue, the Supreme Court noted ‘ “the practical unfairness of denying the injured person redress simply because he cannot prove how much damage each did, when it is certain that between them they did all . . . (33 Cal.3d at pp. 85-86.) To avoid this unfairness, the court held that the burden of proof shifted to the defendants to prove they did not cause the damage. The court reasoned, “[t]hey are both wrongdoers — both negligent toward plaintiff. They brought about a situation where the negligence of one of them injured the plaintiff, hence it should rest with them each to absolve himself if he can.” (Id. at p. 86.)
Unlike the hunting incident, asbestos litigation involves “a concurrent cause situation where more than one defendant is thought to have caused the harm, i.e., substantially contributed to it.” (Menne v. Celotex Corp., supra, 861 F.2d 1453, 1466.) But the principle enunciated in Summers is equally applicable. In Menne v. Celotex Corp., supra, 861 F.2d at 1466, the court observed, “As the number of wrongdoers mounts ... it becomes increasingly difficult to demonstrate each’s substantial contribution to the whole.” (Id. at p. 1466, fn. 19.) Applying the principles of Summers, the Menne court adopted a rule shifting the burden to the defendant to prove its contribution was not a substantial factor in causing the harm. The court explained, “Shifting the burden seems at least as fair where some, if not all, defendants are shown to have contributed some of the harm as where only one of them is thought to have caused all the harm: in the former situation a liable defendant will be shown at least to have actually caused some harm; in the latter a defendant who is entirely innocent of causing any of the . . . injury can be found liable.” (Id. at p. 1467.)
In Pereira v. Dow Chemical Co., supra, 129 Cal.App.3d 865, 873, this court applied the burden-shifting rule of Summers to facts that cannot be *1428meaningfully distinguished from the present case. There, the plaintiff developed a kidney disorder after experiencing cumulative exposure to solvents supplied by four defendants over a period of five years. The trial court granted summary judgment for failure to establish causation. In reversing the judgment, we stated, “Under the circumstances, it is not plaintiffs’ duty to identify which of the vapors caused or contributed to the chronic renal failure but, rather, it is the duty of the defendants who supplied Midcor with their products to prove the contrary.” (Id. at p. 873, citing Summers, supra, at pp. 85-86.)
Similarly, Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, supra, 26 Cal.3d 588, adapted the Summers rule to a novel situation in which the plaintiff could not prove which manufacturer supplied a drug for prenatal care which caused injuries to her daughter many years later. The court held that “[ejach defendant will be held liable for the proportion of the judgment represented by its share of that market unless it demonstrates that it could not have made the product which caused plaintiff’s injuries.” (Id. at p. 612.) While the Sindell remedy is not directly applicable here, the decision is a precedent for adapting and extending the principle of Summers to resolve the dilemmas of a complex industrial society.
The Menne decision adopts a cautious approach to the threshold issue of exposure. Before the burden of proof will shift to the defendant, the plaintiff must establish a “threshold level of factual connection” with defendant’s product and his injury. (Menne v. Celotex Corp., supra, 861 F.2d 1453, 1466.) The defendants must “be shown to have each contributed some harm at a possibly substantial level . . . .” (Ibid., italics added.) The court explained, “Where ... a defendant can be shown actually to have exposed a plaintiff to visible, and hence unsafe, levels of asbestos dust, some harm has occurred .... And where frequent or extended exposure cannot be ruled out, the harm may have been substantial.” (Ibid.)
Applying Nebraska law, the Menne court holds that “proof of actual exposure ... to visible asbestos dust from a defendant’s products, within a time period relevant to the acquisition of the injury, and under circumstances where the exposure could have been extensive enough to produce substantial harm, establishes a prima facie case of substantial causation against that defendant. Under these conditions . . . Nebraska law would then require that defendant to prove the exposure was unlikely to have been frequent or long enough to be a substantial factor in causing [the plaintiff’s injury].” (861 F.2d at p. 1468, italics added.)
The Summers rule, as applied in Menne v. Celotex Corp., supra, 861 F.2d 1453, offers a means of resolving the dilemmas of proving causation in *1429asbestos litigation in a manner consistent with California precedents. The threshold issue of whether exposure has contributed harm at a possibly substantial level should be determined in light of the medical evidence before the court. The shifting of the burden of proof does not have the effect of attenuating the standard of legal cause, as in cases such as Ingram v. Acands, Inc., supra, 977 F.2d 1332, and Lockwood. The question for the jury remains whether exposure to asbestos derived from defendant’s product was a substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiff’s injury. The question should be determined in the ordinary sense of the term “substantial factor,” taking into account the considerations discussed above relating to frequency of exposure, intensity of exposure, the type of product, and the nature of the injury.
Turning to the issue on appeal — whether the trial court erred in ordering the judgments of nonsuit — I would in the end reach the same results as the majority opinion and therefore find it unnecessary to burden this concurring opinion with a separate discussion of the facts.

The opinion does not mention the sort of circumstantial evidence that often may establish a likelihood that a defendant’s product was present at a plaintiff’s work site. Apparently there was no such circumstantial evidence. In this respect, the facts can be distinguished from those presented by Lineaweaver’s case.

Though it applies a standard, in my view, that is unduly strict, the much-cited decision, Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp. (4th Cir. 1986) 782 F.2d 1156, 1162-1163, properly addresses the issue of frequency of exposure.

The significance of the intensity of exposure is often recognized implicitly in the statement of facts. (See Johnson v. Celotex Corp. (2d Cir. 1990) 899 F.2d 1281, 1284.) Conversely, in Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. (5th Cir. 1985) 761 F.2d 1129, 1144, the court reversed a judgment against a defendant because the plaintiff could prove “only slight contact” with its product.

See Lockwood, supra, 744 P.2d at page 613.

A potentially injurious level of exposure may not be the same for cases of mesothelioma and asbestosis. Accordingly, decisions finding evidence of causation in suits of mesothelioma victims (e.g., O’Brien v. National Gypsum Co. (2d Cir. 1991) 944 F.2d 69; Hoffman v. Allied Corp. (11th Cir. 1990) 912 F.2d 1379) should be viewed with caution as precedents in asbestosis cases.

E.g., Ingram v. Acands, Inc. (9th Cir. 1992) 977 F.2d 1332. While Lockwood provides an insightful analysis of factors relevant to causation, the actual holding also comes close to equating evidence of any exposure to proof of causation.