Court Opinion

ID: 9402958
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-19 18:00:33.685214+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:03.685400
License: Public Domain

Case: 20-10059    Document: 00516791350       Page: 1    Date Filed: 06/19/2023

          United States Court of Appeals
               for the Fifth Circuit                             United States Court of Appeals
                                                                          Fifth Circuit
                              ____________                              FILED
                                                                    June 19, 2023
                               No. 20-10059
                              ____________                         Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                        Clerk
   George Anibowei,

                                                        Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                    versus

   Mark A. Morgan, Acting Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border
   Protection, in his official capacity; Merrick Garland, U.S. Attorney
   General; Alejandro Mayorkas, Secretary, U.S. Department of
   Homeland Security; Tae D. Johnson, Acting Director, U.S. Immigration
   and Customs Enforcement; David Pekoske, in his official capacity as
   Administrator of the Transportation Security
   Administration; United States Department of
   Homeland Security; United States Customs and Border
   Protection; United States Immigration and Customs
   Enforcement; Transportation Security
   Administration,

                                          Defendants—Appellees.
                 ______________________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Northern District of Texas
                          USDC No. 3:16-CV-3495
                 ______________________________

   Before Richman, Chief Judge, and King and Engelhardt, Circuit
   Judges.
   Priscilla Richman, Chief Judge:
Case: 20-10059      Document: 00516791350          Page: 2   Date Filed: 06/19/2023

                                    No. 20-10059

          George Anibowei alleges that government agents searched his cell
   phone at the border without a warrant on at least five occasions, and that
   agents copied data from his cell phone at least once. Anibowei sued the U.S.
   Department of Homeland Security (DHS), U.S. Customs and Border
   Protection (CBP), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the
   Transportation Security Administration (TSA), and the respective heads of
   each entity in their official capacity (collectively, the government),
   challenging the searches, as well as ICE and CBP policies regarding border
   searches of electronic devices. In the district court, Anibowei filed a motion
   seeking, among other relief, a preliminary injunction preventing the
   government from searching his cell phone at the border without a warrant.
   The district court denied the preliminary injunction. Because Anibowei
   failed to demonstrate a substantial threat he will suffer irreparable injury if
   the injunction is not granted, we affirm.
                                          I
          George Anibowei is a naturalized citizen of the United States and an
   attorney in Texas. As an attorney, Anibowei primarily represents immigrants
   in removal proceedings adverse to DHS. In October 2016, Anibowei was
   traveling back to the United States from abroad. Upon landing in Dallas, ICE
   agents, along with DHS investigators, searched Anibowei’s cell phone and
   copied data from the phone. The agents did not have a warrant for the search.
   Anibowei believes that the government continues to retain his data.
          In the years following the incident, Anibowei alleges that border
   agents searched his cell phone without a warrant at least four additional
   times. During these searches, Anibowei witnessed border agents view his
   text messages and other communications, and claims that it is possible agents
   viewed his email. Anibowei does not explicitly assert that border agents
   copied data from his cell phone during the additional four searches.

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   However, he claims that it is “virtually certain that [border agents] viewed
   and copied privileged communications between Mr. Anibowei and his
   clients” at least once.
          Anibowei first brought suit against the government defendants in
   2016. Acting pro se, Anibowei argued that the October 2016 search and
   continued retention of his data violated the First and Fourth Amendments.
   The district court granted a motion to dismiss and gave Anibowei leave to
   replead his claims. Following the dismissal, Anibowei retained counsel and
   filed a verified second amended complaint. In his complaint, Anibowei
   challenges the October 2016 search and the four additional searches.
   Anibowei also challenges ICE and CBP policies that govern searches of
   electronic devices at the border. Both policies authorize warrantless cell
   phone searches, including searching and retaining the digital contents of a
   cell phone.1      Anibowei argues that the policies and searches are
   unconstitutional because the Fourth Amendment requires the government
   to obtain a warrant before searching a cell phone at the border, or in the
   alternative, because the Fourth Amendment at least requires reasonable
   suspicion.
          Anibowei filed a motion seeking either partial summary judgment or a
   preliminary injunction. Anibowei argued that the district court should grant
   summary judgment and vacate the ICE and CBP policies because the policies
   authorize cell phone searches at the border without a warrant supported by
   probable cause, or without reasonable suspicion. In the alternative, Anibowei

          _____________________
          1
             See generally Customs and Border Control Directive No. 3340-049A (Jan. 4,
   2018),       https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/assets/documents/2018-Jan/CBP-
   Directive-3340-049A-Border-Search-of-Electronic-Media-Compliant.pdf; Immigration
   and     Customs       Enforcement   Directive      No. 7-6.1   (Aug.   18,    2009),
   https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/ice_border_search_electronic_devices.pdf.

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                                    No. 20-10059

   sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the government from enforcing
   the ICE and CBP policies against him, and to force the government to return
   or destroy the data copied from his cell phone.
          Anibowei filed the motion for summary judgment or preliminary
   injunction prior to the government’s deadline to respond to Anibowei’s
   second amended complaint. Accordingly, as the district court noted, the
   government “had no obligation (or opportunity) to deny the allegations of
   the second amended complaint.” The district court noted the “somewhat
   unusual procedural posture” of the case, acknowledging that typically a
   plaintiff would develop the record prior to moving for a preliminary
   injunction or summary judgment. Instead, “only a thin record (i.e., the
   second amended complaint) [was] developed” for Anibowei’s motion.
          The district court denied Anibowei’s motion for summary judgment
   or preliminary injunction.     First, the court denied summary judgment
   because “no decision of the Supreme Court or of the Fifth Circuit imposes”
   a probable cause or warrant requirement for border searches. The district
   court “decline[d] to reach the question whether the [ICE and CBP policies]
   are unconstitutional . . . on the ground that they permit the search and seizure
   of cell phone data at the border without reasonable suspicion,” because the
   court concluded that Anibowei’s counsel “eschewed reliance on a reasonable
   suspicion-based argument” at oral argument.
          The district court also concluded that Anibowei failed to establish that
   he was entitled to a preliminary injunction. The court reasoned that, even if
   it “accept[ed] the allegations of the second amended complaint as evidence,
   the evidence is insufficient to satisfy all four of the essential elements for
   obtaining a preliminary injunction.” Accordingly, the district court denied
   the motion for a preliminary injunction.

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                                            No. 20-10059

           Following the district court’s order, the government filed an answer
   to Anibowei’s second amended complaint. In that answer, the government
   admitted that border agents searched Anibowei’s cell phone without a
   warrant during the October 2016 search. Anibowei then filed this appeal.
                                                   II
           We first address Anibowei’s motion for preliminary injunction. “The
   decision to grant or deny a preliminary injunction lies within the discretion
   of the district court and may be reversed on appeal only by a showing of abuse
   of discretion.”2 “[A] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic
   remedy which should not be granted unless the movant clearly carries the
   burden of persuasion.”3 The movant must establish four elements:
           (1) a substantial likelihood that plaintiff will prevail on the
           merits, (2) a substantial threat that plaintiff will suffer
           irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted, (3) that the
           threatened injury to plaintiff outweighs the threatened harm
           the injunction may do to defendant, and (4) that granting the
           preliminary injunction will not disserve the public interest.4
   “Each element of the injunction analysis typically involves questions of fact
   and of law.”5 We review a district court’s factual findings for clear error.6

           _____________________
           2
               Apple Barrel Prods., Inc. v. Beard, 730 F.2d 384, 386 (5th Cir. 1984).
           3
               Canal Auth. of State of Fla. v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 567, 573 (5th Cir. 1974).
           4
               Id. at 572.
           5
             White v. Carlucci, 862 F.2d 1209, 1211 (5th Cir. 1989) (citing Apple Barrel, 730
   F.2d at 386).
           6
               Apple Barrel, 730 F.2d at 386 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)).

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                                              No. 20-10059

   “The court’s conclusions of law, however, ‘are subject to broad review and
   will be reversed if incorrect.’”7
             We conclude that Anibowei failed to establish a substantial threat that
   he will suffer irreparable injury if an injunction is not granted. A plaintiff
   seeking a preliminary injunction must “demonstrate that irreparable injury is
   likely in the absence of an injunction.”8 Irreparable injury is “harm for which
   there is no adequate remedy at law.”9 “[I]t is not necessary to demonstrate
   that harm is inevitable and irreparable[;] [t]he plaintiff need show only a
   significant threat of injury from the impending action, that the injury is
   imminent, and that money damages would not fully repair the harm.”10
             Anibowei argues that he “faces two distinct irreparable harms.”
   First, he argues that “he is suffering ongoing irreparable injury because his
   private information and his confidential attorney-client communications are
   currently in the government’s possession as the result of an unconstitutional
   search and seizure.” Second, Anibowei argues that he faces “irreparable
   injury each time he travels internationally by being subject to warrantless
   searches of his cell phone.” Anibowei’s evidence, consisting solely of his
   verified second amended complaint, is insufficient to demonstrate that either
   alleged harm justifies a preliminary injunction.

             _____________________
             7
                  Id. (quoting Commonwealth Life Ins. Co. v. Neal, 669 F.2d 300, 304 (5th Cir.
   1982)).
             8
                 Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008).
             9
            Daniels Health Scis., L.L.C. v. Vascular Health Scis., L.L.C., 710 F.3d 579, 585 (5th
   Cir. 2013).
             10
             Humana, Inc. v. Avram A. Jacobson, M.D., P.A., 804 F.2d 1390, 1394 (5th Cir.
   1986) (footnotes omitted).

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                                          No. 20-10059

                                               A
           Anibowei has not offered sufficient evidence to establish that the
   government’s alleged retention of his data causes him irreparable injury.
   Anibowei argues that he is suffering ongoing irreparable harm because
   “during its warrantless October 2016 search of his cell phone the
   [g]overnment copied and retained highly sensitive personal information from
   Mr. Anibowei’s cell phone, including attorney-client privileged information.”
   The government admits “that an advanced search was performed of
   Anibowei’s cell phone on one occasion, and that information from
   Anibowei’s cell phone was downloaded and eventually retained as a result of
   the advanced search.”             Still, Anibowei fails to establish that the
   government’s retention of his information constitutes irreparable harm.
           Government retention of unlawfully seized property is not sufficient,
   standing alone, to establish irreparable injury. In a related context, Federal
   Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g) provides that “[a] person aggrieved by an
   unlawful search and seizure of property or by the deprivation of property may
   move for the property’s return.”11 In addition to showing that the property
   was seized unlawfully, this court requires “a substantial showing of
   irreparable harm” before a court can order the suppression of seized
   evidence.12        The irreparable-harm requirement would be rendered
   meaningless if retention of unlawfully seized property was per se an
   irreparable injury. To establish irreparable injury, Anibowei cannot solely
   rely on the fact that the government retained his information. Instead,

           _____________________
           11
                Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(g).
           12
             United States v. Search of L. Off., Residence & Storage Unit Alan Brown, 341 F.3d
   404, 413-14 (5th Cir. 2003).

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                                            No. 20-10059

   Anibowei must specifically show how the government’s retention of his
   seized information causes him harm.
            To that end, Anibowei argues that the government’s retention of
   attorney–client privileged information causes “serious harm to him
   personally and to his clients.” However, even if the retention of attorney–
   client privileged information constitutes irreparable harm, Anibowei’s scant
   and circumstantial evidence is insufficient to establish that the government
   copied and retained attorney–client privileged information from his cell
   phone.
            This court’s decision in United States v. Search of Law Office, Residence
   & Storage Unit Alan Brown13 is instructive. In Brown, the federal government
   seized documents from an attorney’s law offices.14 The attorney requested
   that the court order the seized property returned under Federal Rule of
   Criminal Procedure 41(e), the predecessor to Rule 41(g), alleging that the
   documents were illegally seized.15 The district court concluded that the
   attorney was entitled to all of the seized property and the government should
   not be allowed to retain copies or make any use of the evidence.16 In order to
   establish that he was irreparably harmed by the government’s retention of
   the documents, the attorney argued that the government seized attorney–
   client privileged documents.17 This court noted that the government had
   given the attorney “constant access to the records since their seizure.”18

            _____________________
            13
                 341 F.3d 404 (5th Cir. 2003).
            14
                 Id. at 407.
            15
                 Id.
            16
                 Id. at 408.
            17
                 Id. at 414.
            18
                 Id.

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                                  No. 20-10059

   Despite this access, the attorney failed to “ma[k]e any effort to identify
   specific privileged documents in the hands of the government or provide a
   legal basis for asserting a particular privilege.”19 Nor did the attorney
   “indicate the amount of privileged documents the government” seized.20
   Instead, this court concluded that the attorney’s argument “consisted of
   vague allegations that the government viewed extensive amounts of
   privileged information during the search of his law office and after the
   documents’ seizure.”21 Without “proof substantiating these assertions,”
   this court held that the attorney’s claims were insufficient “to prove
   irreparable injury warranting the drastic relief granted by the district
   court.”22
         Anibowei’s allegations are similarly insufficient.       Anibowei’s
   allegations are conclusory. He generally argues that because the government
   copied some information from his work phone during the October 2016
   search, “it is virtually certain that [border agents] viewed and copied
   privileged” information. Anibowei’s phone was returned to him after the
   October 2016 search. Anibowei has knowledge and access to the information
   that could have been copied by the government. As the government correctly
   observes, “[i]f there was some specific information present, the copying of
   which resulted in irreparable harm, Anibowei could have provided evidence
   to the district court of what this information was and how its copying and
   retention by the government specifically harmed him.” Anibowei has not
   done so. Without any evidence regarding what information was seized from

         _____________________
         19
              Id.
         20
              Id.
         21
              Id.
         22
              Id.

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                                        No. 20-10059

   Anibowei’s cell phone, or evidence addressing whether the allegedly seized
   information is subject to attorney–client privilege, Anibowei cannot establish
   that he is suffering irreparable injury due to the government’s retention of
   information from his cell phone.
                                              B
           Anibowei’s evidence is similarly insufficient to establish that he is
   likely to suffer irreparable injury in the form of an unlawful search of his cell
   phone at the border in the future. Anibowei argues that he faces “irreparable
   injury each time he travels internationally by being subject to warrantless
   searches of his cell phone.” He contends that his constitutional rights will
   likely be violated in the future “[b]ecause government agents have searched
   him nearly every time he has traveled internationally since 2017.”
           Anibowei’s argument is reliant on his contention that a warrantless
   search of a cell phone at the border is unconstitutional. This circuit has never
   recognized a warrant requirement for any border search.23 Nevertheless,
   assuming arguendo that a warrantless search of Anibowei’s cell phone at the
   border would violate his constitutional rights, the district court did not abuse
   its discretion in determining that Anibowei’s evidence is insufficient to
   establish it is likely that he will be subject to a warrantless search in the future.
           Anibowei has demonstrated that the ICE and CBP policies authorize
   warrantless searches.        Further, the allegations in Anibowei’s verified
   complaint are evidence of a pattern of warrantless searches of Anibowei’s cell
   phone. However, Anibowei has no additional evidence to establish that he
   will be stopped by border agents in the future and that the agents will search
   his cell phone without a warrant. Given that the only evidence before the
           _____________________
           23
              United States v. Molina-Isidoro, 884 F.3d 287, 294 (5th Cir. 2018) (Costa, J.,
   specially concurring).

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                                           No. 20-10059

   district court was Anibowei’s verified complaint, the district court did not
   abuse its discretion in determining that Anibowei failed to demonstrate it was
   likely he would suffer future violations of his Fourth Amendment rights.
           This court affirms the denial of a preliminary injunction if “the
   movant has failed sufficiently to establish any one of the four criteria.”24
   Because Anibowei failed to demonstrate that it is likely he would suffer
   irreparable injury absent an injunction, we affirm the district court’s denial
   of the preliminary injunction. Accordingly, we need not separately address
   whether Anibowei established the other criteria.
                                                III
           In addition to challenging the denial of a preliminary injunction,
   Anibowei asks this court to review the district court’s denial of summary
   judgment. Although Anibowei’s notice of appeal includes the summary
   judgment issue,25 this court does not automatically have jurisdiction over that
   issue. Unlike the denial of a preliminary injunction, the denial of a summary
   judgment motion is not an appealable interlocutory order.26 Instead, this
   court has “discretion to exercise pendent [appellate] jurisdiction.”27 As this
   court has explained,
           Beyond the limited right to an interlocutory appeal, the ability
           to enjoy pendent appellate jurisdiction is carefully

           _____________________
           24
             Black Fire Fighters Ass’n of Dall. v. City of Dall., 905 F.2d 63, 65 (5th Cir. 1990)
   (per curiam).
           25
              See Finch v. Fort Bend Indep. Sch. Dist., 333 F.3d 555, 565 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding
   that a notice appealing from an order included issues resolved in the order that were not
   expressly referenced in the notice of appeal).
           26
             Byrum v. Landreth, 566 F.3d 442, 449 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Meza v. Livingston,
   537 F.3d 364, 366 (5th Cir. 2008)).
           27
                Finch, 333 F.3d at 565.

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          circumscribed. The Supreme Court has recognized two
          exceptions to the bar on court-created interlocutory appeals:
          (1) If the pendent decision is “inextricably intertwined” with
          the decision over which the appellate court otherwise has
          jurisdiction, pendent appellate jurisdiction may lie, or (2) if
          “review of the former decision [is] necessary to ensure
          meaningful review of the latter.”28
          Anibowei argues that this court should exercise pendent appellate
   jurisdiction because the preliminary injunction and summary judgment
   rulings concern the same merits question—namely, “whether a warrant is
   generally required for border agents to search an individual’s cell phone.”
   However, this court does not have pendent appellate jurisdiction over a
   denial of summary judgment merely “[b]ecause the summary judgment
   ruling, like the preliminary injunction test for success on the merits, turns on
   the [same legal issue].”29
          In Byrum v. Landreth,30 this court considered whether it had pendent
   appellate jurisdiction over a motion for summary judgment when a motion
   for preliminary injunction was also before the court.31 Although the summary
   judgment motion involved the same underlying merits issue as the
   preliminary injunction, the court declined to exercise pendent appellate
   jurisdiction.32       The court reasoned that exercising pendent appellate
   jurisdiction was inappropriate because the court was able to “review[] the

          _____________________
          28
             Escobar v. Montee, 895 F.3d 387, 391 (5th Cir. 2018) (alteration in original)
   (quoting Swint v. Chambers Cnty. Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, 51 (1995)).
          29
               Byrum, 566 F.3d at 450.
          30
               566 F.3d 442 (5th Cir. 2009).
          31
               Id. at 449.
          32
               Id. at 449-51.

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   injunctive order without reaching a dispositive ruling on the [shared merits]
   claim.”33
          Because we can review the district court’s denial of preliminary
   injunction without reaching a dispositive ruling on Anibowei’s underlying
   Fourth Amendment claim, this court does not have pendent appellate
   jurisdiction over the district court’s denial of summary judgment.
                                    *        *         *
          For these reasons, the district court’s denial of Anibowei’s motion for
   preliminary injunction is AFFIRMED.

          _____________________
          33
               Id. at 450.

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