Court Opinion

ID: 9729331
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:32:11.541887+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:56.971991
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE THOMAS, dissenting: During defendant’s death penalty hearing, defense counsel for the first time intimated to the death penalty jury that defendant was mentally ill at the time of the shooting, and told the jurors that defense experts would testify concerning the mental illness suffered by defendant. At this point, the trial court granted the State’s motion for a psychiatric examination of defendant. At the second phase of the death penalty hearing, defense counsel presented three expert witnesses to testify on defendant’s behalf. Dr. Markos then testified for the State in rebuttal. Under the circumstances, I believe the trial court acted within its discretion in granting the State’s motion for a psychiatric examination of defendant. The majority notes that neither section 115 — 6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/115 — 6 (West 1996)), nor Supreme Court Rule 413 (134 Ill. 2d R. 413), authorized the psychiatric examination of defendant. The majority states that “the actions of the trial court and the actions of this court must be guided by the supreme court rules as presently written.” 196 Ill. 2d at 382. The majority then concludes that “[a]t the time the trial court ordered defendant to submit to the psychiatric examination, such action was not authorized.” 196 Ill. 2d at 382. I do not agree that the lack of express authorization in section 115 — 6 or in any supreme court rule compels the conclusion that the trial court’s order was improper. Although authorization for the examination at issue cannot be found in section 115 — 6,1 note that the limitation of section 115 — 6 is not applicable at a sentencing hearing. People v. Silagy, 101 Ill. 2d 147, 174 (1984). Likewise, the admissibility of evidence during the aggravation and mitigation phase of a death penalty sentencing hearing is not governed by the restrictive rules of evidence in effect during the guilt phase of a trial. People v. Foster, 119 Ill. 2d 69, 102 (1987). This is because a defendant who has been convicted and is at the sentencing stage is entitled to fewer procedural safeguards than a defendant that has not yet been convicted. Foster, 119 Ill. 2d at 102. The psychiatric examination of defendant took place during defendant’s death penalty sentencing hearing. Section 9—1(e) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/9—1(e) (West 1996)) provides for the introduction of evidence during a death penalty sentencing hearing. That section provides, in relevant part, that: “Any information relevant to any additional aggravating factors or any mitigating factors indicated in subsection (c) may be presented by the State or defendant regardless of its admissibility under the rules governing the admission of evidence at criminal trials. The State and the defendant shall be given fair opportunity to rebut any information received at the hearing.” 720 ILCS 5/9 — 1(e) (West 1996). Section 9 — 1(e) suspends the rules of evidence so that a jury may have all relevant information before it. People v. Del Vecchio, 105 Ill. 2d 414, 438 (1985). Accordingly, section 9 — 1(e) allows the introduction of evidence during a sentencing hearing that ordinarily would not be admissible during the guilt phase of a trial. People v. Williams, 181 Ill. 2d 297, 322 (1998). In fact, section 9 — 1 “is free from any limitation but relevance in sentencing hearings in death penalty cases.” Silagy, 101 Ill. 2d at 174. A sentencing judge, then, has wide discretion concerning the sources and types of evidence used to assist in determining the kind and the extent of punishment to be imposed, within the limits fixed by law. Williams, 181 Ill. 2d at 322. Based upon the foregoing, I believe that the decision to allow Dr. Markos to examine defendant was a matter within the trial court’s discretion. The only limitation on the trial court’s discretion was relevance. Dr. Markos’ examination of defendant and testimony concerning that examination during defendant’s sentencing hearing were relevant to defendant’s claim of mental illness. Because the examination and evidence were relevant, the trial court acted within its discretion in allowing the State a fair opportunity to rebut defendant’s claim of mental illness. To hold otherwise would allow a defendant to “sandbag” the prosecution by waiting until after trial to raise questions concerning his competency. The defendant could then produce numerous expert witnesses to testify concerning his competency, knowing that the State would have no effective means to rebut that evidence. I do not believe our supreme court rules and case law require such a result. Although this court has never addressed the issue of a psychiatric examination similar to the one in this case, I note that prior decisions of this court recognize that where a defendant, at his sentencing hearing, raises the issue of his mental competency when he committed his offense, the State is entitled to rebut the defendant’s claim. See People v. West, 137 Ill. 2d 558, 592 (1990); People v. Ramirez, 98 Ill. 2d 439, 467 (1983). Because defendant raised the issue of his mental competency at the time of the offense during his sentencing hearing, the State was entitled to rebut defendant’s claim. For that reason, I would affirm the trial court’s order requiring defendant to submit to a psychiatric examination by the State’s expert.