Court Opinion

ID: 9909198
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-12 18:02:24.269547+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:50:15.232206
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/12/23 P. v. Chacon CA4/3

                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                     FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                DIVISION THREE

 THE PEOPLE,

      Plaintiff and Respondent,                                        G062142

           v.                                                          (Super. Ct. No. 13NF1721)

 RUBEN CHACON, SR.,                                                    OPINION

      Defendant and Appellant.

                   Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Scott Steiner, Judge. Affirmed.
                   So’Hum Law Center of Richard Jay Moller and Richard Jay Moller, under
appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
                   No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
             Ruben Chacon, Sr., challenges the summary denial of his petition for
resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6.1 His court-appointed counsel filed a brief
pursuant to People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 221–222. This court notified
Chacon that he had 30 days to file any supplemental brief deemed necessary, or the
matter may be dismissed as abandoned. (Ibid.) None was filed. In the interests of
justice, we have examined the record on appeal and find no arguable error that could
result in a disposition more favorable to Chacon. (Id. at p. 232.) We thus affirm the
postjudgment order.
                                         FACTS
             In 2017, an information charged Chacon and Jonathan Galvan with two
counts of murder (§ 187, subd. (a)) and various enhancements.
             In March 2022, the People amended the information by interlineation,
adding two counts of voluntary manslaughter with gun enhancements (§§ 192, subd. (a);
12022.5, subd. (a)) and dismissing both murder counts and their enhancements. That
same day, Chacon pleaded guilty to the two counts of voluntary manslaughter with gun
enhancements. The Tahl2 form he signed under penalty of perjury stated the factual basis
for his plea: “In Orange County California, on Jan. 26, 2012, I willfully and unlawfully
shot and killed Nick Barresch, a human being. I also aided and abetted the killing of
Phillip Renig, a human being. I committed both offenses with the intent to kill, but
without malice aforethought. I personally used a firearm in the commission of both
offenses.” The trial court imposed a total prison sentence of 30 years and 4 months.

1              Effective June 30, 2022, the Legislature renumbered Penal Code section
1170.95 to section 1172.6 without substantive change. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) For
clarity, we refer to the statute as section 1172.6 throughout the opinion. All further
statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2           See In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122, overruled on other grounds by Mills v.
Municipal Court (1973) 10 Cal.3d 288, 291.

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              In September 2022, Chacon filed a petition for resentencing under
section 1172.6 and counsel was appointed for him. The trial court summarily denied the
petition, finding Chacon statutorily ineligible for relief. The court reasoned that the
statute “applies to those convicted prior to January 1, 2022. Inasmuch as [Chacon]
pleaded guilty subsequent to that date, its provisions do not apply to him.”
                                      DISCUSSION
              Where a court summarily denies a petition under section 1172.6, our review
is de novo. (People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 52.)
              The initial version of section 1172.6 was enacted by Senate Bill No. 1437
(2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) and took effect on January 1, 2019. (People v. Lewis (2021) 11
Cal.5th 952, 959 (Lewis).) The purpose of the bill was “to amend the felony murder rule
and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that
murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with
the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with
reckless indifference to human life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).) Thus, the
initial version of the statute permitted “a person with an existing conviction for felony
murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine to petition the
sentencing court to have the murder conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any
remaining counts if he or she could not have been convicted of murder as a result of the
other legislative changes implemented by Senate Bill No. 1437.” (People v. Flores
(2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 985, 992.) Effective January 1, 2022, the statute was amended to
extend the same relief to “‘persons who were convicted of attempted murder or
manslaughter under a theory of felony murder and the natural [and] probable
consequences doctrine.’” (People v. Birdsall (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 859, 865, fn. 18.)
              To be eligible for resentencing relief under section 1172.6, a petitioner
convicted of manslaughter must allege three conditions, the first of which is that the
charging document “allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder,

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murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory under
which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a
crime.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(1); People v. Estrada (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 941, 945.) At
the prima facie stage, “‘“the court takes petitioner’s factual allegations as true and makes
a preliminary assessment regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled to relief if
his or her factual allegations were proved.”’” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.) But if
the facts in the record of conviction refute the allegations in the petition, “‘‘the court is
justified in making a credibility determination adverse to the petitioner.”’” (Ibid.)
              Here, Chacon cannot meet the first condition of eligibility. (§ 1172.6,
subd. (a)(1).) When Chacon pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter in 2022, those
theories of murder liability had been eliminated and the prosecution could not have
proceeded under any of those invalid theories. Accordingly, Chacon was not eligible for
resentencing under section 1172.6 as a matter of law, and the court correctly denied his
petition at the prima facie stage.
              After independently reviewing the entire appellate record, we find no
arguable issue.
                                       DISPOSITION
              The postjudgment order is affirmed.

                                                   DELANEY, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’LEARY, P. J.

GOETHALS, J.

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