Court Opinion

ID: 9652398
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 17:23:18.546429+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:51.011782
License: Public Domain

BILL VANCE, Justice,
dissenting.
No matter how Choctaw casts its pleadings in this case, it can be seeking one of only three possible remedies: (1) it may be asking that the court redraw two school districts’ boundaries if the Cunningham’s residence is actually outside AISD; (2) it may be asking the court to resolve a disputed fact to find that the Cunningham’s residence is actually inside AISD’s boundaries, or (3) it may be asking that the court order that the Cunningham’s children be transferred from Granbury I.S.D. to AISD. The Education Code provides an administrative remedy to process each of these requests. Thus, I believe that Choctaw was required to exhaust its administrative remedies before turning to the courts for relief. Its failure to exhaust the available administrative remedies prevents the district court from assuming jurisdiction over AISD and AISD’s plea to the jurisdiction should have been granted. Because the majority holds otherwise, I respectfully dissent.
The underlying controversy fundamentally involves where the Cunninghanfs children will attend school. Which school district a child attends is specifically addressed in the Education Code. Tex. Educ. Code Ann. §§ 13.051, 25.001, 25;035, 25.036 (Vernon 1996 & Supp.2000). If by its request that the court “declare[] that the [Cunningham’s residence] is within AISD’s boundaries and the school age children residing at the [Cunningham’s residence] shall attend AISD schools,” Choctaw is asking that the court redraw the boundaries of AISD, then it is presenting a request that the court usurp the authority granted to the boards of trustees of AISD and Granbury I.S.D. by section 13.051 of the Education Code. Id. § 13.051(a). If by this request Choctaw is asking the court to find as a factual matter that the AISD school board has improperly denied admission to a student who resides within its boundaries, then Choctaw is claiming that AISD is violating section 25.001(b) of the Education Code. Id. § 25.001(b). In both instances, the original decision is assigned to the boards of trustees by the Education Code. Id. §§ 13.051(a), 25.001(b). And under either, Choctaw’s relief from an adverse decision lies through the Commissioner of Education under section 7.057 of *267the Education Code. Id. §§ 7.057(a)(2)(A), 13.051©; Gibson v. Waco Indep. Sch. Dist., 971 S.W.2d 199, 200-01 (Tex.App.— Waco 1998, pet. granted); De Leon v. Harlingen Consol. Indep. Sch. Dish, 552 S.W.2d 922, 927-28 (Tex.Civ.App. — Corpus Christi 1977, no writ).
Choctaw’s request that the court declare that “the school age children residing at the [Cunningham’s residence] shall attend AISD schools” could be granted without affecting the school district boundaries. If by this request Choctaw is asking that the court order the Cunningham’s children transferred to AISD from Granbury I.S.D., it has again presented a request that the trial court usurp the authority of the two school boards. Tex. Educ.Code Ann. § 25.035. If, on the other hand, Choctaw claims that AISD is estopped from voluntarily accepting the Cunningham’s children into its schools, it is claiming that AISD has violated section 25.036. Id. § 25.036; see Palmer v. District Trustees of Dist. No. 21, 289 S.W.2d 344, 347 (Tex.Civ-App. — Texarkana 1956, writ refd n.r.e.). Whether review is available in the first instance when transfer is denied is open to question,1 but it is clear that Choctaw’s petition does not allege the facts necessary to confer jurisdiction on the district court for an appeal of an adverse decision under section 25.035. Tex. Educ. Code Ann. §§ 25.034(f)(2), 25.035. Here, a claim that AISD is violating section 25.036 must be presented to the Commissioner of Education because whether AISD is es-topped to deny consent is a question of fact. Id. § 7.057; Upchurch v. Albear, 5 S.W.3d 274, 277 (Tex.App. — Amarillo 1999, no pet.); Gibson, 971 S.W.2d at 200-01; Donaldson v. Lake Vista Community Improv. Ass’n, 718 S.W.2d 815, 818 (Tex.App. — Corpus Christi 1986, writ refd n.r.e.).
Subject to certain exceptions not relevant here, a party must exhaust its administrative remedies before turning to the courts. Gibson, 971 S.W.2d at 201. The failure to exhaust administrative remedies is a jurisdictional defect in a proceeding. Essenburg v. Dallas County, 988 S.W.2d 188, 189 (Tex.1998); Garcia-Marroquin v. Nueces County Bail Bond Bd., 1 S.W.3d 366, 375 (Tex.App. — Corpus Christi 1999, no pet.). We are responsible for ensuring that we have jurisdiction over a given proceeding, even if we must do so sua sponte. Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 928 (Tex.1998); McLendon v. Texas Dept. of Public Safety, 985 S.W.2d 571, 573 (Tex.App. — Waco 1998, pet. filed).
I conclude that Choctaw was required to pursue its administrative remedies before turning to the courts for relief and that its failure to do so in this proceeding deprives the courts of subject matter jurisdiction. Thus, I believe we should reverse the order denying AISD’s plea to the jurisdiction and remand the cause with instructions to dismiss AISD as a party. Because the majority fails to do so, I dissent.

. Section 25.035 refers to sections 25.032, 25.033 and 25.034 for the procedure governing a request for a transfer between school districts. Tex. Educ.Code. Ann. § 25.035 (Vernon 1996). Section 25.034 provides that "the decision of the board ... is final unless the student ... files exception to the decision of the board as constituting a denial of any right of the student guaranteed under the United States Constitution.” Id. § 25.034(e). There is no allegation in the record that the refusal of AISD to admit the Cunningham’s children implicates their constitutional rights. Thus, to the extent that Choctaw claims that the children should be transferred under section 25.035, the board’s decision may be "final.”