Court Opinion

ID: 9585034
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:55:23.751182+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:26:46.428511
License: Public Domain

RUFFIN, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
Because I believe that the majority is disregarding Supreme Court precedent, I dissent.
As both this court and the United States Supreme Court have made clear, “[o]ccupied motel rooms are afforded the same considerations under the Fourth Amendment as private homes.”7 Thus, law enforcement cannot search a motel guest’s room, even with the consent of motel management, absent a warrant or exigent circumstances.8 Here, the trial court found that Officer Ford went to Johnson’s motel room at the request of the desk clerk while she evicted Johnson, which she was authorized to do.9 And, while *755standing at the motel room door — a place where he was authorized to stand — Ford both smelled burnt marijuana and saw what he believed to be marijuana pipes in plain view. However, these facts do not justify Ford’s decision to enter the motel room. And I am unpersuaded by the majority’s contention that he was entitled to do so simply because the motel clerk was concerned for her safety. Rather, I believe that, in order to enter the room, Ford needed a warrant, valid consent, or exigent circumstances.10 And none of these conditions exists in the case before us.11
Even if Ford could have seen the pipes and the marijuana from his vantage point at the door of the motel room, he is not automatically authorized to seize the contraband under the “plain view” doctrine. “[W]hile the characterization of an observation as a non-search plain view situation settles the lawfulness of the observation itself, it does not determine whether a seizure of the observed object would likewise be lawful.”12 As the United States Supreme Court has noted, “not only must the officer be lawfully located in a place from which the object can be plainly seen, but he or she must also have a lawful right of access to the object itself.”13 Here, by virtue of seeing the pipes in plain view, Ford almost certainly would have had probable cause to seek a warrant in order to search the room. But, merely seeing the pipes did not permit his warrantless intrusion into the motel room absent consent or a showing of exigent circumstances.14 Similarly, Ford was not authorized to seize the marijuana, which he saw on his way to the bathroom.
The majority, however, disregards the United States Supreme Court’s language regarding lawful access to the contraband. As our courts have noted multiple times, however, “physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.”15 Given that a motel room is afforded the *756same privacy rights as a private home,16 it appears that the majority’s position that there is no bar to an officer entering a motel room is unfounded.
Decided July 16, 2008
Sean A. Black, for appellant.
Robert W. Lavender, District Attorney, Samuel C. Small, Adam C. Schroeder, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee.
I further note that there are at least two cases from this Court from which it may be inferred that an officer who sees contraband in plain view may then seize the contraband even if it requires entry into an area otherwise protected by the Fourth Amendment. Specifically, in both Pickens v. State17 and Willis v. State,18 we found that a police officer was entitled to seize contraband located inside a motel room that he saw from his vantage point at the door. We failed to analyze whether the law enforcement officers also had lawful right of access to the contraband.19 In view of the great weight of authority that such warrantless entry into a motel room is improper, I believe these cases should be reversed.20
I am authorized to state that Judge Phipps and Judge Adams, join in this dissent.

 Elliot v. State, 274 Ga. App. 73, 76 (2) (616 SE2d 844) (2005); see also Hoffa v. United States, 385 U. S. 293, 301 (87 SC 408, 17 LE2d 374) (1966) (“A hotel room can clearly be the object of Fourth Amendment protection as much as a home or an office.”).

 See Stoner v. California, 376 U. S. 483, 487-489 (84 SC 889, 11 LE2d 856) (1964); Teal v. State, 282 Ga. 319, 322 (2) (647 SE2d 15) (2007).

 See OCGA § 43-21-3.1 (b) (permitting innkeepers to terminate occupancy without notice).

 See Snider v. State, 292 Ga. App. 180 (663 SE2d 805) (2008).

 Indeed, there is no suggestion that Johnson consented to the search, and the State makes no effort to demonstrate the existence of exigent circumstances. Our Supreme Court has held that “the ‘presence of contraband without more does not give rise to exigent circumstances.’ ” Davis v. State, 262 Ga. 578, 582 (3) (422 SE2d 546) (1992).

 (Punctuation omitted.) Gates v. State, 229 Ga. App. 766, 768 (a) (495 SE2d 113) (1997).

 Horton v. California, 496 U. S. 128, 137 (110 SC 2301, 110 LE2d 112) (1990).

 See Carranza v. State, 266 Ga. 263, 264-265 (1) (467 SE2d 315) (1996) (“even where probable cause exists, warrantless intrusion of a person’s home is prohibited by the Fourth Amendment, absent consent or a showing of exigent circumstances”); Boldin v. State, 282 Ga. App. 492, 495 (3) (639 SE2d 522) (2006); Leon-Velazquez v. State, 269 Ga. App. 760, 762-763 (1) (605 SE2d 400) (2004); Pledger v. State, 257 Ga. App. 794, 798, n. 3 (572 SE2d 348) (2002); Welchel v. State, 255 Ga. App. 556, 558 (565 SE2d 870) (2002).

 (Punctuation omitted.) Carranza, supra at 264; see also Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U. S. 740, 748 (104 SC 2091, 80 LE2d 732) (1984); State v. Goodman, 290 Ga. App. 196, 197 (660 *756SE2d 21) (2008); Morse v. State, 288 Ga. App. 725, 727, n. 5 (655 SE2d 217) (2007); Smithson v. State, 275 Ga. App. 591, 594 (1) (621 SE2d 783) (2005); Curry v. State, 271 Ga. App. 672, 675 (2) (610 SE2d 635) (2005).

 See Elliot, supra.

 225 Ga. App. 792 (484 SE2d 731) (1997).

 234 Ga. App. 135 (505 SE2d 570) (1998).

 See Pickens, supra at 795 (1) (b); Willis, supra at 136-137 (2).

 Although the majority contends that we need not reach this issue, the State relied upon these two cases in arguing that Ford’s search of the motel room was permissible. Under these circumstances, the issue is squarely before us and should be addressed. To hold otherwise would perpetuate the incorrect notion that the entry and search of the motel room were permissible.