Court Opinion

ID: 9839204
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-12 15:00:31.947172+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:41.846722
License: Public Domain

In the

    United States Court of Appeals
                 For the Seventh Circuit
                     ____________________
No. 22-1950
GRUBHUB INC. and TAKEAWAY.COM CENTRAL CORE B.V.,
                                    Plaintiffs-Appellees,
                                 v.

RELISH LABS LLC and THE KROGER CO.,
                                             Defendants-Appellants.
                     ____________________

         Appeal from the United States District Court for the
           Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
           No. 1:21-cv-5312 — Charles R. Norgle, Judge.
                     ____________________

 ARGUED NOVEMBER 30, 2022 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 12, 2023
               ____________________

   Before WOOD, JACKSON-AKIWUMI, and LEE, Circuit Judges.
    LEE, Circuit Judge. Grubhub Inc. and Takeaway.com Cen-
tral Core B.V. (collectively, “Grubhub”) brought this suit seek-
ing a declaratory judgment that their logo does not infringe
the trademarks of Relish Labs LLC and The Kroger Company
(collectively, “Home Chef”). Roughly one month later, Home
Chef sought a preliminary injunction to enjoin Grubhub from
using the logo. A magistrate judge recommended granting
the injunction, but, upon review of Grubhub’s objections, the
2                                                  No. 22-1950

district court rejected that recommendation and denied the in-
junction. Because we cannot say on this record that the district
court clearly erred in concluding that Home Chef failed to
show that consumers are likely to confuse its marks with
Grubhub’s logo when purchasing Home Chef’s products, we
aﬃrm.
                   I.   BACKGROUND
A. Home Chef
    Since its inception in the basement of a Chicago apartment
in 2013, Home Chef has curated meals and food products for
its customers. According to its owner, Home Chef’s business
has been “creating and delivering meal kits for customers, in-
cluding fresh, pre-portioned ingredients and easy-to-follow
recipes, to help customers prepare and enjoy meals anyone
can cook.” In 2018, Home Chef merged with The Kroger Co.
(“Kroger”). Kroger operates over 2,700 supermarkets under at
least two dozen store names throughout the United States.
The merger with Kroger allowed Home Chef to expand the
availability of its meal kits and products nationwide. It deliv-
ers them directly to customers and oﬀers them for sale in
Kroger stores, through Kroger’s website and mobile app, as
well as through food delivery services such as DoorDash and
Instacart. Today, Home Chef oﬀers more than 500 products
across a variety of categories including meal kits, heat-and-
eat meals, ready-to-eat products, and seasonal meals.
   In 2014, Home Chef began using its “HC Home Mark,”
which is protected by ﬁve federal trademark registrations:
three for the HC Home Mark, alone, and two for the HC
Home Mark accompanied with the “HOME CHEF” trade
No. 22-1950                                                    3

name (the “Home Chef Home Logo”). None of Home Chef’s
marks are limited as to color.

       HC Home Mark                Home Chef Home Logo
    Home Chef has spent more than $450 million on market-
ing and advertising using its marks to promote its products
as convenient, low-cost alternatives to restaurant takeout. In
October 2021, Home Chef reached $1 billion in annual sales.
B. Grubhub
    Grubhub is a leading online food-ordering and delivery
marketplace. Founded in 2004, Grubhub has connected more
than 32 million diners with food from over 300,000 restau-
rants across the United States. In 2020 alone, Grubhub pro-
vided nearly $9 billion in gross food sales to these restaurants,
processing more than 745,000 daily orders through its website
and mobile app. Its services include, for example, on-demand
order management and dispatching, procurement and devel-
opment of restaurant-dedicated products, and onboarding
delivery couriers. Grubhub owns numerous trademark regis-
trations covering the GRUBHUB name and stylized varia-
tions.
   On June 15, 2021, Grubhub was acquired by Netherlands-
based Just Eat Takeaway.com (“JET”). JET owns many food-
delivery brands worldwide and combines its “JET House
4                                                             No. 22-1950

Mark” with local brand names when conducting business in
various countries. JET has used the JET House Mark in con-
nection with its business since 2014.

                            JET House Mark
    In July 2020, roughly one year prior to ﬁnalizing its acqui-
sition of Grubhub, JET ﬁled an international trademark appli-
cation for the JET House Mark, designating the United States
as a country where it sought protection. In early 2021, the
USPTO trademark examiner preliminarily rejected JET’s ap-
plication in a non-ﬁnal oﬃce action, ﬁnding, among other
things, that the JET House Mark is “highly similar” and “con-
fusingly similar” to the HC Home Mark and Home Chef
Home Logo. JET did not respond to the merits of the non-ﬁnal
oﬃce action, and in August 2021, aﬃrmatively withdrew its
U.S. trademark application. The application was deemed
abandoned.
    As part of its acquisition of Grubhub, JET adopted the
“Grubhub House Logo,” which combines the well-known
GRUBHUB word mark with the JET House Mark. Grubhub
also began using the “Seamless House Logo,” which com-
bines the JET House Mark with the SEAMLESS and
GRUBHUB word marks. 1

    1 Seamless is a subsidiary of Grubhub. According to Grubhub, the

Seamless brand is being phased out, but as of today, it still exists.
No. 22-1950                                                 5

 Grubhub House Logo             Seamless House Logo

   Like Home Chef, Grubhub has made signiﬁcant invest-
ments in its branding. Grubhub ﬁrst introduced the Grubhub
House Logo at Chicago’s Lollapalooza music festival in July
2021, with a broader rollout one month later. Grubhub has in-
vested millions of dollars in rebranding its print and elec-
tronic materials across its entire business platform, and tens
of thousands of its restaurant partners use the Grubhub
House Logo. In the time between the July 2021 launch of the
logo and Home Chef’s motion for preliminary injunction,
Grubhub processed over 72 million orders under its new logo.
C. District Court Proceedings
   After receiving a cease-and-desist letter from Home Chef
demanding that Grubhub stop using any form of the JET
House Mark, Grubhub brought suit for a declaratory judg-
ment that the Grubhub House Logo did not infringe any of
Home Chef’s marks. Roughly one month later, in early No-
vember 2021, Home Chef responded with a motion for a pre-
liminary injunction. The case was referred to a magistrate
judge who held a telephonic hearing on Home Chef’s motion.
Although no live testimony was taken, the judge questioned
the parties and heard arguments for nearly three hours. The
magistrate judge subsequently issued his Report and Recom-
mendation (the “R&R”), recommending that the district court
grant Home Chef preliminary injunctive relief.
6                                                    No. 22-1950

    Grubhub timely ﬁled its objections to the R&R. After re-
viewing the contested portions of the R&R de novo, see
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the district court sustained each of Grub-
hub’s objections, rejected the magistrate judge’s recommen-
dation, and denied Home Chef’s preliminary injunction mo-
tion. Home Chef appeals.
                II.    LEGAL STANDARD
    A preliminary injunction may be granted where a movant
shows that it is likely to succeed on the merits of its claims
and that traditional legal remedies would be inadequate, such
that it would suﬀer irreparable harm without injunctive relief.
Life Spine, Inc. v. Aegis Spine, Inc., 8 F.4th 531, 539 (7th Cir.
2021). A likelihood of success on the merits must exceed “a
mere possibility of success.” Id. at 540 (quoting Ill. Republican
Party v. Pritzker, 973 F.3d 760, 762 (7th Cir. 2020)). As we made
clear in Pritzker, “an applicant for preliminary relief bears a
signiﬁcant burden, even though the Court recognizes that, at
such a preliminary stage, the applicant need not show that it
deﬁnitely will win the case.” 973 F.3d at 763. Thus, while a
movant need not prove its claims at this stage by a prepon-
derance of the evidence, it must demonstrate at a minimum
how it proposes to prove the key elements of its case. Id. In
the context of trademark law, once the movant establishes a
likelihood of success on the merits, it is statutorily entitled to
a rebuttable presumption of irreparable harm. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1116(a).
    Upon a showing of these threshold issues, the court
weighs the harm of denying an injunction to the movant
against the harm of granting an injunction to the nonmovant.
This is done using a sliding scale—the greater the movant’s
likelihood of success on the merits, the less the harms need be
No. 22-1950                                                     7

in its favor. Life Spine, 8 F.4th at 539. The court also considers
the public interest. Id.
    On appeal, we review a district court’s decision to grant or
deny a preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion. Id. Its
legal conclusions are reviewed de novo, and its factual ﬁndings
for clear error. Id. Absent any such errors, the district court’s
decision is aﬀorded “great deference.” Id. (quoting Speech
First, Inc. v. Killeen, 968 F.3d 628, 638 (7th Cir. 2020)).
                   III.   DISCUSSION
A. Trademark Infringement Generally
    The purpose of trademark law is twofold. Most funda-
mentally, it protects consumers, ensuring they can be conﬁ-
dent in making purchasing decisions based on marks they
know and trust. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S.
763, 782 n.15 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring). But trademark
law also protects trademark owners who have spent the time,
energy, and resources in presenting a product or service, en-
suring that those investments are protected from misappro-
priation by “pirates and cheats.” Id.; see Ameritech, Inc. v. Am.
Info. Techs. Corp., 811 F.2d 960, 964 (6th Cir. 1987).
    The ultimate question underlying trademark infringement
is whether consumers are likely to be confused about the
origin of products or services based on the promotion of those
products or services using a particular mark. See Hesmer Foods,
Inc. v. Campbell Soup Co., 346 F.2d 356, 359 (7th Cir. 1965); see
also New W. Corp. v. NYM Co. of Cal., 595 F.2d 1194, 1201 (9th
Cir. 1979). Accordingly, to succeed on a trademark infringe-
ment claim, the claimant must show that it owns a valid, pro-
tectable trademark and that there is a likelihood of confusion
caused by the alleged infringer’s use of the disputed mark.
8                                                     No. 22-1950

SportFuel, Inc. v. PepsiCo, Inc., 932 F.3d 589, 595 (7th Cir. 2019);
see 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1).
    We recognize two theories of confusion: forward confu-
sion and reverse confusion. Forward confusion—long recog-
nized in trademark law—occurs when consumers mistakenly
believe that a junior (or newer) user’s products or services are
from the same source or somehow connected to a senior (or
prior) user’s products or services. Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v.
Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947, 957 (7th Cir. 1992) (“Quaker
Oats”). A classic example of forward confusion lies where a
consumer mistakenly believes that a counterfeit purse she
buys is from her favorite Parisian fashion house because the
fabric or buckle of the purse features the well-known mark of
that fashion house. In such a scenario, the senior user (the Pa-
risian fashion house) is injured because the junior user (the
counterfeiter) capitalizes on the good will and established
reputation of the fashion house to palm oﬀ a cheap and inau-
thentic product.
    Reverse confusion is a newer theory that we ﬁrst recog-
nized in Quaker Oats. 978 F.2d at 957–58; contra Westward
Coach Mfg. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 388 F.2d 627, 634–35 (7th Cir.
1968) (holding reverse confusion not actionable under Indi-
ana law). Under this theory, confusion occurs when “a large
junior user saturates the market with a trademark similar or
identical to that of a smaller, senior user,” thereby over-
whelming the senior user. Quaker Oats, 978 F.2d at 957. As a
result, consumers mistakenly believe that the products or ser-
vices of the senior user are actually those of the junior user.
Id. Going back to our earlier hypothetical, consider the follow-
ing: a local fashion boutique sells purses and other accesso-
ries, featuring the initials of the store owner, Lewis Vaughn.
No. 22-1950                                                        9

The boutique sells the bags for many years, and the local cli-
entele understands the mark to be associated with the bou-
tique. But then, a dominant, well-known Parisian fashion
house adopts a confusingly similar logo using the same ini-
tials and begins advertising and selling bags under this mark,
inundating the local market. Even though the Parisian fashion
house is not intentionally capitalizing on the good will and
established reputation of the local boutique, the boutique is
nevertheless harmed because its customers now mistakenly
believe it has somehow become connected to or aﬃliated with
the fashion house. As a result, the boutique (the senior user)
“loses the value of its trademark—its product identity, corpo-
rate identity, control over its goodwill and reputation, and
ability to move into new markets.” Id. (quoting Ameritech, Inc.,
811 F.2d at 964).
   Home Chef argues that there is a likelihood of confusion
between its marks and Grubhub’s logo under both theories.
The magistrate judge recommended granting the injunction
based on reverse confusion, acknowledging that the results
were mixed with respect to Home Chef’s forward confusion
theory. But the district court determined that there was an in-
suﬃcient showing of a likelihood of confusion under both
theories and denied the injunction.
    Whether consumers are likely to be confused about the
origin of an alleged infringer’s products or services is a ques-
tion of fact. Rust Env’t & Infrastructure, Inc. v. Teunissen,
131 F.3d 1210, 1216 (7th Cir. 1997). Accordingly, our review is
deferential, evaluating the district court’s conclusions for
clear error. Id.; see Ty, Inc. v. Jones Grp., Inc., 237 F.3d 891, 898
(7th Cir. 2001). A ﬁnding of fact is clearly erroneous only if,
based on the evidence as a whole, we are “left with the
10                                                   No. 22-1950

deﬁnite and ﬁrm conviction that a mistake has been commit-
ted.” Rust, 131 F.3d at 1216 (quotation marks and citation
omitted). If the district court’s “account of the evidence is
plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety, the court
of appeals may not reverse it even though convinced that had
it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the
evidence diﬀerently.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omit-
ted).
     With this framework in mind, we move to the merits.
B. Accused Mark
    There is no dispute that Home Chef owns valid, protecta-
ble trademarks in the HC Home Mark and Home Chef Home
Logo—the ﬁrst element of a claim for trademark infringe-
ment. Accordingly, the likelihood of success of Home Chef’s
infringement claims depends entirely on whether there is a
likelihood of confusion between its marks and the accused
mark.
    But before we can reach the likelihood of confusion analy-
sis, we must resolve a fundamental dispute between the par-
ties: which of Grubhub’s marks is the accused mark. Home
Chef purports to accuse the JET House Mark. But Grubhub
submits that, because its use of the JET House Mark is always
in combination with the GRUBHUB brand name, the accused
mark is the Grubhub House Logo.
    The district court agreed with Grubhub, and it did not
commit clear error in doing so. Although Home Chef focuses
its analysis on the JET House Mark, Grubhub has not used
this mark absent the GRUBHUB brand name within the
No. 22-1950                                                            11

United States. 2 Home Chef’s arguments to the contrary are
unconvincing. For example, Home Chef points to tailored
screenshots of Grubhub’s website and mobile app where the
JET House Mark appears to be used alone. But Home Chef
fails to acknowledge that, even if the mark does not appear
with the GRUBHUB brand name in these instances,
GRUBHUB is nevertheless prominently displayed elsewhere
on the website and mobile app’s landing page. Trademark
law does not protect “those buyers who do not buy on the ba-
sis of marks and who choose to buy the goods or services at
issue on the basis of some other criteria.” 4 J. Thomas McCar-
thy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 23:94
(5th ed. 2023) (“McCarthy”). 3 Accordingly, in the instances
Home Chef cites, where a consumer has sought out Grub-
hub’s services by visiting www.grubhub.com or by tapping
the mobile app icon marked as “GRUBHUB,” it is diﬃcult to
see how, in this context, she could be confused into thinking
that she was purchasing Home Chef-aﬃliated products solely

    2 We acknowledge a single instance in the record where Grubhub

used the JET House Mark without connection to the GRUBHUB brand
name: a November 1, 2021, screenshot of the Seamless mobile app icon,
which combined the JET House Mark with only the SEAMLESS brand
name (i.e., it did not include the “Powered by GRUBHUB” tag as used in
the Seamless House Logo). But there is insufficient evidence in the record
to support a likelihood of confusion finding for this use. And Home Chef
does not meaningfully engage with this use other than bringing it to the
Court’s attention. Accordingly, as the party charging infringement, Home
Chef did not meet its burden as to this mark. See KP Permanent Make-Up,
Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 117–18 (2004).
    3 Because McCarthy uses consecutive section numbering across vol-

umes, subsequent citations to McCarthy herein are designated by section
number only.
12                                                         No. 22-1950

based on the appearance of the JET House Mark on the plat-
form. That consumer is not choosing Grubhub’s services
based on its mark, rather her decision to use Grubhub was
already made before visiting the website or app. Thus, we are
not convinced that this evidence supports a ﬁnding that the
accused mark is the JET House Mark and agree with the dis-
trict court’s determination that the accused mark at issue is
the Grubhub House Logo.4 And so, we are left with:

      The Accused Mark             Home Chef’s Protected Marks
C. Likelihood of Confusion
   Proceeding to the likelihood of confusion analysis, “we
ask whether consumers who might use either product [or ser-
vice] would likely attribute them to a single source.” Uncom-
mon, LLC v. Spigen, Inc., 926 F.3d 409, 425 (7th Cir. 2019). To
answer this question, we consider seven factors, none of
which is dispositive:
     (1) similarity of the marks in appearance and suggestion;
     (2) similarity of the products;
     (3) the area and manner of concurrent use;

     4 The Seamless House Logo is subject to the same likelihood of confu-

sion analysis because that mark also includes the GRUBHUB brand name.
No. 22-1950                                                             13

    (4) the degree of care likely to be exercised by consumers;
    (5) the strength of the senior user’s mark;
    (6) existence of actual confusion; and
    (7) the intent of the defendant to “palm oﬀ” its product as
    that of another.
See id. “Courts may assign varying weight to each of the fac-
tors depending on the facts presented, though usually the
similarity of the marks, the defendant’s intent, and actual con-
fusion are particularly important.” AutoZone, Inc. v. Strick,
543 F.3d 923, 929 (7th Cir. 2008). Home Chef disputes the dis-
trict court’s determination as to these three “particularly im-
portant” factors, each of which the district court found to
weigh against a ﬁnding of a likelihood of confusion. See id.
     Although Home Chef has advanced both forward and re-
verse theories of confusion, we focus our attention on the lat-
ter. Not only is reverse confusion the dominant theory the
parties present to us, but we agree with the district court that
Home Chef did not make a particularly strong showing that
its forward confusion theory would prevail. Based on the cur-
rent record, we do not see how a consumer interacting with
the Grubhub House Logo could reasonably believe that she
was engaging with Home Chef, particularly where the ac-
cused mark prominently features Grubhub’s own brand
name. 5 Sullivan v. CBS Corp., 385 F.3d 772, 778 (7th Cir. 2004)
(“Although the marks are similar, the prominent display of
diﬀerent names on the marks reduces any likelihood of

    5 We emphasize that this conclusion is based on the record before us

at this preliminary stage. We do not intend to suggest that Home Chef’s
forward confusion theory is necessarily futile to the extent that it can be
supported with sufficient evidence if and when the case proceeds.
14                                                    No. 22-1950

confusion.”); Packman v. Chi. Trib. Co., 267 F.3d 628, 645 (7th
Cir. 2001) (“All of [accused infringer’s] products … promi-
nently display the well-known [mark], providing a strong in-
dication that there is no likelihood of confusion.”); Ziebart Int’l
Corp. v. After Mkt. Assocs., Inc., 802 F.2d 220, 227 (7th Cir. 1986)
(collecting cases holding that the “[p]rominent display of dif-
ferent names on the marks … reduce[s] the likelihood of con-
fusion”); Pignons S.A. de Mecanique de Precision v. Polaroid
Corp., 657 F.2d 482, 487 (1st Cir. 1981) (same).
       1. Similarity of the Marks
    Focusing then on Home Chef’s claim of reverse confusion,
the ﬁrst factor in the likelihood of confusion analysis looks at
the similarity between the marks. When evaluating a mark,
we must keep in mind that “[t]he commercial impression of a
trade-mark is derived from it as a whole, not from its elements
separated and considered in detail.” Estate of P.D. Beckwith,
Inc. v. Comm’r of Patents, 252 U.S. 538, 545–46 (1920). Accord-
ingly, to determine whether two marks are similar in appear-
ance and suggestion, we “compare the marks in light of what
happens in the marketplace and not merely by looking at the
two marks side-by-side.” AutoZone, 543 F.3d at 930 (quotation
marks and citations omitted); see Meridian Mut. Ins. Co. v. Me-
ridian Ins. Grp., Inc., 128 F.3d 1111, 1115 (7th Cir. 1997) (“it is
inappropriate to focus on minor stylistic diﬀerences to deter-
mine if confusion is likely” when the marks are not usually
encountered together). To that end, “the test is not whether
the public would confuse the marks, but whether the viewer
of [a] mark would be likely to associate the product or service
with which it is connected with the source of products or ser-
vices with which [another] mark is connected.” James
No. 22-1950                                                      15

Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of the Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 275 (7th
Cir. 1976) (emphasis added).
    The district court gave little weight to the USPTO’s deter-
mination and found that the marks were not suﬃciently sim-
ilar, concluding that this factor did not support a likelihood
of confusion ﬁnding. Home Chef argues that the district court
only reached this conclusion after “painstakingly dissect[ing]
the marks” in a side-by-side comparison, which is contrary to
the applicable law. This argument, however, suﬀers from sev-
eral ﬂaws.
    First, Home Chef is correct that a court must do more than
merely compare the competing marks side-by-side; rather, it
must consider how a potential consumer would view them in
the marketplace. See Ty, 237 F.3d at 898. But the district court
did this. In addition to comparing the various attributes of the
two marks, the court also examined how consumers would
consider them as a whole, ﬁnding that because the Grubhub
House Logo combined the house design with the strong
GRUBHUB word mark, the word mark became the more sa-
lient portion of the logo, thereby diﬀerentiating the accused
mark from Home Chef’s marks. See Ty, Inc., 237 F.3d at 898
(“[I]f one word or feature of a composite trademark is the sa-
lient portion of the mark, it may be given greater weight than
the surrounding elements.”) (citation omitted). In other
words, it found Grubhub’s use of its brand name in the Grub-
hub House Logo more likely to mitigate reverse confusion
than to aggravate it, particularly where both parties have
well-established, highly recognizable brands.
   Nevertheless, Home Chef contends that the district court,
when assessing its reverse confusion theory, placed too much
weight on the presence of the GRUBHUB word mark in the
16                                                     No. 22-1950

Grubhub House Logo. Generally, the analysis of the similar-
ity factor is no diﬀerent under reverse or forward confusion;
under either theory a court may assess the similarity of the
sound, sight, or meaning of the marks. See Henri’s Food Prods.
Co., Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 717 F.2d 352, 356 (7th Cir. 1983); see gen-
erally McCarthy § 23:10. But, as the Third Circuit has recog-
nized, “in the reverse confusion context, the presence of
[brand names] must obviously be treated diﬀerently than in
the [forward] confusion context.” A & H Sportswear, 237 F.3d
at 229–30. This makes sense. Home Chef’s reverse confusion
theory is that, when consumers come across products or ser-
vices bearing its HC Home Mark (which, as you may recall,
does not include the Home Chef brand name), they will mis-
takenly believe that the products or services belong to Grub-
hub due to the strength of the GRUBHUB word mark. Thus,
while the presence of the Grubhub name might alleviate for-
ward confusion (that is, believing a Grubhub product is one
made by Home Chef), it plays a lesser role in reverse confu-
sion when the consumer would not see Grubhub’s name
when encountering a Home Chef product.
   This is not the ﬁrst time that we have encountered an ar-
gument by a trademark claimant that the appearance of an
accused infringer’s well-known brand name does not allay
the confusion caused by otherwise similar marks. But, in
those cases, the junior user’s accused marks and products
were “virtually identical” to those of the senior user. Quaker
Oats, 978 F.2d at 959. For example, in Quaker Oats, the large,
junior user began selling an isotonic beverage with the tagline
“Gatorade is Thirst Aid.” Id. at 949–51. The senior user—a
small, Vermont-based company—had three federal trade-
mark registrations for “THIRST-AID,” which it had also used
to market an isotonic beverage. Id. Under those
No. 22-1950                                                    17

circumstances, we concluded that it was “precisely the strong
association between Gatorade and ‘Thirst Aid’ created by
Quaker’s [Gatorade] ads that [was] likely to create confu-
sion.” Id. at 960.
    Similarly, in International Kennel Club of Chicago v. Mighty
Star, Inc., 846 F.2d 1079 (7th Cir. 1988), we held that the ac-
cused infringer’s use of its brand name, “24K Polar Puﬀ,”
along with the phrase “International Kennel Club” was a
“smoke screen” because the phrase was indistinguishable
from the senior user’s name, “International Kennel Club of
Chicago.” Id. at 1088. And, in A.J. Canﬁeld Co. v. Vess Beverages,
Inc., we aﬃrmed the district court’s entry of a preliminary in-
junction against an accused infringer that used its brand name
“VESS” in conjunction with “Chocolate Fudge” to sell car-
bonated diet chocolate sodas. 612 F. Supp. 1081, 1091 (N.D. Ill.
1985), aﬀ’d, 796 F.2d 903 (7th Cir. 1986). There, the senior user
had trademark protection for the use of “Chocolate Fudge,”
which it too used to market chocolate-ﬂavored soft drinks. Id.
at 1083. The district court determined that the infringer’s use
of its brand name was not a defense because “the use of an-
other’s trademark constitutes infringement with or without
the use of the infringer’s housemark.” Id. at 1091.
    On the other end of the spectrum sits Ziebart, where we
determined that there was no likelihood of confusion between
the marks of two competitors who both sold vehicular rust-
prooﬁng compounds under marks each featuring a depiction
of a knight’s helmet. 802 F.2d at 224. In reaching this conclu-
sion, we observed that the marks used diﬀerent colors, but fo-
cused principally on the “[p]rominent display” of each
party’s brand name on its respective mark. Id., 802 F.2d at
226–27.
18                                                    No. 22-1950

    This case falls somewhere in the middle. On the one hand,
unlike Quaker Oats, Mighty Star, and A.J. Canﬁeld, this case in-
volves more than mere word marks, and the house design in
the Grubhub House Logo is neither “virtually identical” to
the Home Chef house design nor used to promote “virtually
identical” products and services. That is, Grubhub did not
take the exact HC Home Mark and simply add “GRUBHUB”
underneath it, and it does not use its mark to sell meal kits,
heat-and-eat meals, ready-to-eat products, and seasonal
meals, like Home Chef. But this case is not directly analogous
to Ziebart either, because the two marks—though not identi-
cal—are conceptually similar, and Home Chef does not al-
ways use the Home Chef brand name with its mark. The mag-
istrate judge found this case to be closer to Quaker Oats, while
the district court found it to be closer to Ziebart. Short of attor-
ney argument, evidence in the record that Grubhub has or
will so overwhelm the market such that consumers will begin
associating the HC Home Mark with Grubhub is sparse, at
best. Because the available facts are in rough equipoise, we
cannot say that the district court clearly erred in determining
that Home Chef failed to show that the similarity of the marks
favored a ﬁnding of a likelihood of confusion.
    Second, Home Chef also faults the district court for not
giving substantial weight to the USPTO’s determination. But
the district court did not clearly err in according it little
weight. The non-ﬁnal oﬃce action was only a preliminary de-
termination as to the registrability of the JET House Mark. It
says little about the similarity of the Grubhub House Logo
and Home Chef’s marks. Moreover, there was no conclusive
determination as to the registrability of the mark. JET chose
to abandon its application shortly after the USPTO issued its
oﬃce action. Home Chef points to no case law, and we are
No. 22-1950                                                      19

aware of none, that imposes an adverse inference or presump-
tion of similarity where a party voluntarily abandons its
trademark application following an unfavorable preliminary
USPTO determination. And, as several of our sister circuits
have noted, USPTO determinations are often of limited value
in the infringement analysis when they lack the beneﬁt of the
fuller record developed before the district court, such as evi-
dence about the way marks are actually used in the market-
place. See Progressive Distrib. Servs., Inc. v. United Parcel Serv.,
Inc., 856 F.3d 416, 427 (6th Cir. 2017); A & H Sportswear, Inc. v.
Victoria’s Secret Stores, Inc., 237 F.3d 198, 220–21 (3d Cir. 2000);
Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 434 F.2d 794, 802
(9th Cir. 1970). This is not to say that USPTO preliminary de-
terminations are never useful, but the district court’s decision
to accord it little weight in this case was not clearly erroneous.
       2. Strength of Grubhub’s Mark
    The parties do not separately brief the strength of Grub-
hub’s mark on appeal because Grubhub did not object to the
magistrate judge’s conclusion that the strength-of-the-mark
factor supported a likelihood of reverse confusion. As a gen-
eral rule, in such a case, we typically would not review that
conclusion on appeal. See Johnson v. Zema Sys. Corp., 170 F.3d
734, 739 (7th Cir. 1999) (“If a party objects [to an R&R] in the
district court on some issues and not others, he waives appel-
late review of the issues to which he has not objected.”). But
because Home Chef has discussed the strength of the
GRUBHUB word mark at all levels of review—albeit not ex-
pressly in connection with this particular factor—we con-
clude that addressing the issue “cause[s] no one … any harm
of which the law ought to take note.” Allen v. City of Chicago,
865 F.3d 936, 944 (7th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). This is
20                                                            No. 22-1950

especially true given that the strength-of-the-mark factor is so
intricately connected to the similarity-of-marks factor, as
noted above.
    This factor requires consideration of both the commercial
and conceptual strength of the mark. See McCarthy § 11:80. 6
In Quaker Oats, we stated that, in a reverse confusion case, “it
may make more sense to consider the strength of the mark in
terms of its association with the junior user’s goods.” 978 F.2d
at 959. Put another way, we do not consider the strength of
the junior user’s mark in isolation, but in its ability to over-
power the senior user’s mark. See McCarthy § 23:10. Indeed,
implicit in Home Chef’s arguments is that the Grubhub
House Logo—which uses the GRUBHUB word mark—is
stronger than its marks; that Grubhub’s saturation of (or abil-
ity to saturate) the market with its logo is likely to lead con-
sumers to believe the HC Home Mark connotes a Grubhub
service.
    Because a consumer who ﬁrst encounters a particular
mark used in connection with a set of goods is likely to con-
tinue associating that mark with those goods, see A & H
Sportswear, 237 F.3d at 230, the relative prevalence of those
marks in the marketplace typically will determine whether
the confusion a consumer experiences is forward or reverse.
Id. As the Third Circuit aptly explained:

     6 Because the parties focused on the economic and marketing strength

of the marks—i.e., the commercial strength—when briefing this factor in
the district court, so will we. See AutoZone, 543 F.3d at 933 (7th Cir. 2008)
(“The strength of a mark usually corresponds to its economic and market-
ing strength.”) (citation omitted).
No. 22-1950                                                      21

       [I]f one manufacturer—junior or senior—ex-
       pends tremendous sums in advertising while
       the other does not, consumers will be more
       likely to encounter the heavily advertised mark
       ﬁrst. Where the greater advertising originates
       from the senior user, we are more likely to see a
       case of direct confusion; if the greater advertis-
       ing originates from the junior user, reverse con-
       fusion is more likely.
Id. In a prototypical reverse confusion case, a senior user with
a commercially weaker mark is pitted against a junior user
with a far stronger mark. Accordingly, instead of considering
the commercial strength of the junior’s mark in isolation, we
look to its relative strength as compared to that of the senior,
“because it is the strength of the larger, junior user’s mark
which results in reverse confusion.” Id. at 231 (quoting Com.
Nat’l Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Com. Ins. Agency, Inc., 214 F.3d 432, 444
(3d Cir. 2000)).
    This is not such a prototypical case. Home Chef has spent
over $450 million on advertising and has sold billions of dol-
lars of products under its marks, which it has used to market
products to millions of customers nationwide since 2014. It
has received signiﬁcant press coverage and accolades for its
top customer service, and in 2021, Home Chef reached $1 bil-
lion in annual sales. It is hard to see how the HC Home Mark
(let alone the HC Home Logo which prominently features the
HOME CHEF brand name) is at risk of being so overwhelmed
by Grubhub’s use of the Grubhub House Logo that consum-
ers are likely to begin associating Home Chef’s products with
Grubhub. Home Chef’s own arguments as to the notable
22                                                           No. 22-1950

strength of its marks to support its forward confusion theory
only underscore this point.
    To be sure, Grubhub is not a weak junior user. Grubhub
too has invested millions of dollars in its Grubhub House
Logo and reached $1.8 billion in sales revenue in 2020. As
such, Grubhub is in a position where it could overwhelm a
senior user’s mark. But it is not our role to weigh the evidence
anew. Based on this record, we are not convinced that the dis-
trict court clearly erred when ﬁnding that Home Chef failed
to present suﬃcient evidence that consumers do or will be-
lieve that products sold using a mark in which Home Chef
has invested hundreds of millions of advertising dollars are
associated with Grubhub. See, e.g., Procter & Gamble Co. v. Col-
gate-Palmolive Co., No. 96 Civ. 9123 (RPP), 1998 WL 788802, at
*65 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 1998), aﬀ’d, 199 F.3d 74 (2d Cir. 1999)
(“Given the size, ﬁnancial strength and presence of P & G in
the region, the relative spending levels for CREST and
COLGATE advertising in China, the high consumer aware-
ness of the CREST brand and of P & G generally, and the min-
imal evidence of direct confusion between CREST and
COLGATE, reverse confusion also is not found.”). 7

     7 Home Chef argues that this conclusion will encourage large junior

users to expropriate small senior users’ lesser known trademarks. While
this is a reasonable point, evaluation of such an argument is more appro-
priately addressed when considering the intent factor in the likelihood of
confusion analysis. And, as we will see below, there is little evidence that
Grubhub sought to divert any business from Home Chef or otherwise
overwhelm Home Chef’s position in the marketplace through its adoption
of the Grubhub House Logo.
No. 22-1950                                                   23

       3. Actual Confusion
    Evidence of actual confusion, which can be presented as
either direct or survey evidence, is not essential to a ﬁnding
of a likelihood of confusion, but where present it “is entitled
to substantial weight.” CAE, Inc. v. Clean Air Eng’g, Inc.,
267 F.3d 660, 685 (7th Cir. 2001). That said, depending on the
factual circumstances, isolated incidents of actual confusion
may be disregarded as de minimis. Packman, 267 F.3d at 645
(7th Cir. 2001) (collecting cases). As the factﬁnder at the pre-
liminary injunction stage, it is within the district court’s pur-
view to weigh the evidence submitted by the parties on this
issue. We may not reverse so long as “the district court’s ac-
count of the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed
in its entirety.” Rust, 131 F.3d at 1216.
    Home Chef relies on two instances of actual confusion.
First, it points to an anonymous tweet featuring a side-by-side
screenshot of the parties’ mobile app icons that reads: “So uh
why did grubhub make their app icon look like a stylized or-
ange version of home chef..? Even the utensils are almost ex-
actly the same..” We agree with the district court that this ev-
idence carries little, if any, weight. As an initial matter, Home
Chef does not allege that the author was a Home Chef or
Grubhub customer. See Packman, 267 F.3d at 645 (instances of
confusion that are not attributable to the applicable consumer
group are entitled to less weight); CAE, Inc., 267 F.3d at 686
(same). But more fundamentally, as the district court ob-
served, the author of the tweet was not actually confused by
the marks. Recognizing that the corporations were distinct,
the author merely noted the bare similarities between the two
marks. This does little to demonstrate actual confusion.
24                                                   No. 22-1950

   Home Chef also cites to a Facebook message it received
from one of its customers. The customer asked: “Did you and
Grub Hub merge or come to some sort of mutual deal, be-
cause I had to take a double take today when my Grub Hub
app updated,” sharing a screenshot of the Grubhub and
Home Chef mobile apps:

This message certainly warrants more scrutiny than the pre-
vious tweet. But the district court’s decision not to give it sig-
niﬁcant weight was not unreasonable.
    First, as the district court noted, the Facebook message
represented just one of millions of customers who would have
been exposed to Grubhub’s new logo following its expansive
rebranding in 2021. Second, a customer inquiry is markedly
diﬀerent from evidence that a customer had ordered a meal
from Home Chef thinking it was Grubhub and, on its own,
falls short of proving actual confusion. See McCarthy § 23:16
(“[W]hile enquiry evidence is admissible and relevant, stand-
ing alone with no other evidence it is insuﬃcient proof of ac-
tual confusion.”); see also Restatement (Third) of Unfair Com-
petition § 23 (1995) (“Evidence of inquiries by customers as to
whether the plaintiﬀ and the defendant are associated … may
not establish the existence of actual confusion if the nature of
the inquiries indicates that consumers perceive a diﬀerence
between the designations and are skeptical of the existence of
a connection between the users.”).
No. 22-1950                                                                25

    On the other side of the ledger, the district court had Grub-
hub’s two consumer surveys. Employing the Eveready for-
mat, 8 one survey evaluated the risk of forward confusion, and
the other of reverse confusion. Relevant for our purposes, the
reverse confusion survey exposed 300 actual or prospective
consumers of home-delivered meal kits or ready-to-eat meals
to Home Chef’s marks as they appeared on its mobile app or
its website for a minimum of ten and thirty seconds, respec-
tively. Respondents viewing either platform were exposed to
both the Home Chef Home Logo and the HC Home Mark, alt-
hough the latter was in close proximity to the “Home Chef”
word mark, as shown in the example images below.

    8 Named after the survey used in Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready

Inc., 531 F.2d 366 (7th Cir. 1976), the survey format tests the association
consumers have with the trademarks in question without showing them
the trademarks side-by-side. “In cases involving strong marks, the Ever-
eady test should be considered the gold standard for fundamental cogni-
tive and marketing reasons.” McCarthy § 32:174 (quoting J.B. Swann, Like-
lihood of Confusion Studies and the Straightened Scope of Squirt, 98 Trademark
Rep. 739, 746 (2008)).
26                                           No. 22-1950

                Home Chef Mobile App

                  Home Chef Website
None of the images used in the survey exhibited the Home
Chef Home Logo or the HC Home Mark in isolation without
No. 22-1950                                                          27

the context of the other content on the platform. See McCarthy
§ 32:163 (“The closer the survey methods mirror the situation
in which the ordinary person would encounter the trademark,
the greater the evidentiary weight of the survey results.”).
    Following exposure to the images, the respondents were
asked an open-ended question: “What company do you think
oﬀers the app/service we just showed you, if you have an
opinion?” Of the 300 respondents, 204 (or 68%) responded,
“Home Chef.” Zero respondents answered with “Grubhub.” 9
Respondents then were asked the open-ended question: “Do
you think the app/service we showed you is aﬃliated with, or
sponsored or approved by, any other company?” Of the 300
respondents, 53 (or 18%) answered in the aﬃrmative, but zero
identiﬁed Grubhub as the aﬃliated company. 10 Based on
these data, Grubhub’s expert concluded that “[t]he fact that
no respondents out of 300 identiﬁed Grubhub in response to
any question powerfully demonstrates that Grubhub’s use of
the allegedly infringing logo does not create a likelihood of
reverse confusion.” The district court agreed, ﬁnding that
Home Chef had failed to meet its burden to show actual con-
fusion.
    Home Chef argues that this ﬁnding was clearly erroneous
for three reasons. First, according to Home Chef, the district
court mistook the time period during which the two marks

   9 The remaining 96 respondents answered with variations of the term

“Home Chef” (e.g., “Green Chef,” “Home Fresh,” other “Chef,” etc.), with
other meal delivery companies (e.g., Hello Fresh, Blue Apron, etc.), or
stated that they did not know.
   10 The companies the respondents identified included, for example,

Amazon, Blue Apron, “Green Chef,” Hello Fresh, Apple, Google, Kroger,
Meijer, etc. Of those 53 respondents, 27 stated that they did not know.
28                                                           No. 22-1950

coexisted in the marketplace, which tainted the weight the
court assigned to its evidence. Second, Home Chef challenges
the substance of the survey, characterizing it as a memory test,
nothing more. And third, Home Chef believes that the district
court improperly applied an adverse inference against Home
Chef because it did not produce its own survey evidence. 11
None are suﬃcient to show clear error.
    First, we acknowledge that the district court misunder-
stood the amount of time both marks were in the marketplace
by the time Home Chef had ﬁled its preliminary injunction
motion. The district court believed it was a year, when in ac-
tuality it was only a few months. But the period of mutual
market presence in an actual confusion analysis generally
serves as a proxy for the relative number of consumers who
were exposed to the marks; the assumption is that the longer
two marks coexist in the market, the more consumers encoun-
ter them. Such an inference, however, has limited utility here,
where both parties are national, billion-dollar corporations
that have each expended millions (if not hundreds of mil-
lions) of dollars advertising under their respective marks to
the public. Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude
that the district court’s decision to attribute little weight to
Home Chef’s isolated examples of actual confusion was
clearly erroneous.

     11 Home Chef also argues that the surveys (1) did not use the proper

universe of consumers; (2) failed to accurately reflect the marketplace con-
ditions; and (3) failed to use a control group. Despite raising these pur-
ported methodological flaws, Home Chef does not meaningfully engage
with them and asks us merely to adopt the findings of the magistrate
judge. Given the sparsity of its argument, we decline to do so.
No. 22-1950                                                  29

    Next, Home Chef complains that the survey amounted to
nothing more than a memory test that failed to account for the
potential risk of confusion between the HC Home Mark and
the Grubhub House Logo. For example, Home Chef points
out that it is diﬃcult to see how a respondent, who looks at
Home Chef’s website or mobile app, could answer the ﬁrst
question (i.e., what company oﬀers the app/service shown in
the photos?) with an answer other than “Home Chef.” But re-
member that the relevant audience for the survey is Home
Chef’s current or prospective customers—not just any person
selected at random. See McCarthy § 32:174; see also Sterling
Drug, Inc. v. Bayer AG, 14 F.3d 733, 741 (2d Cir. 1994) (“Where,
as here, the relevant issue is whether consumers mistakenly
believe that the senior user’s products actually originate with
the junior user, it is appropriate to survey the senior user’s
customers.”). And Grubhub’s reverse confusion survey was
properly limited to that audience.
    Moreover, contrary to Home Chef’s contention, the dis-
trict court did acknowledge the survey’s failure to assess
whether consumers would be confused based on use of the
HC Home Mark alone, noting that the magistrate judge’s crit-
icism of the survey on this basis was “not erroneous.” Grub-
hub, 2022 WL 2774986, at *3. But the district court was not con-
vinced that this error warranted discounting the survey in
toto, given that a consumer will rarely encounter the HC
Home Mark without also encountering the “Home Chef”
brand name in some form, be it on the mobile app, the web-
site, or in a grocery store. Id. And, while Home Chef has sub-
mitted instances of its use of the HC Home Mark alone, it has
not presented any evidence of actual confusion based on
those instances. Thus, we cannot conclude the district court
30                                                            No. 22-1950

clearly erred in its assessment of the survey results at this nas-
cent stage of the case.
     We easily dispatch Home Chef’s ﬁnal argument that the
district court drew an adverse inference against it because it
did not present its own survey evidence. Of course, Home
Chef is correct that it need not perform a survey to prevail on
its claim at this, or any other, stage of litigation. 12 See Sullivan,
385 F.3d at 779 (noting, on appeal from summary judgment,
that the senior user “was not required to conduct his own sur-
vey”). But it still must provide enough evidence from which
a district court can ﬁnd that it is likely to succeed on its claim.
Here, the district court did not impose an adverse inference
against Home Chef, but only weighed what evidence it had
presented against the evidence produced by Grubhub. While
Grubhub’s survey is not without its weaknesses, the district
court’s weighing of the competing evidence was plausible. In
sum, the district court did not clearly err in ﬁnding that the
actual confusion factor does not support a likelihood of con-
fusion ﬁnding.
         4. Grubhub’s Intent
   Turning to the ﬁnal factor, intent. We have stated previ-
ously that, in a reverse confusion case, intent is “largely irrel-
evant” because the alleged infringer is not palming oﬀ or

     12 We note, however, that the cases on which Home Chef relies for this

proposition, e.g., Meridian, 128 F.3d at 1119; Int’l Kennel Club, 846 F.2d at
1086; and A.J. Canfield, 796 F.2d at 908, were decided under our since-ab-
rogated preliminary injunction standard wherein a party seeking the in-
junction need only show a “better than negligible chance” of succeeding
on the merits. It is undisputed that, after Pritzker, an applicant for prelim-
inary relief bears a “significant burden” and must establish more than a
mere possibility of success. 973 F.3d at 762–63.
No. 22-1950                                                               31

otherwise attempting to create confusion as to the source of
its products or services. SportFuel, Inc., 932 F.3d at 602; Quaker
Oats, 978 F.2d at 961 (intent is “essentially irrelevant in a re-
verse confusion case”). While this is correct, we use this op-
portunity to further explain the role of intent in reverse con-
fusion cases.
    At the outset, we note that “[a] ﬁnding of fraudulent intent
or bad faith is not essential to prove infringement where like-
lihood of confusion already exists.” Henri’s Food Prods.,
717 F.2d at 359. This is true in both forward and reverse con-
fusion contexts. That said, a junior user’s intent may support
a ﬁnding of likelihood of confusion where there is evidence
that it adopted its mark to confuse consumers into thinking
its own products were those of the senior user. Therefore, in
a typical forward confusion case, we evaluate whether there
is any evidence from which a factﬁnder could reasonably in-
fer that the junior user purposefully adopted its mark to
“palm oﬀ” its products or services as those of the senior. See,
e.g., AutoZone, 543 F.3d at 934. Where such evidence exists,
this factor favors the senior user because it tends to show that
a consumer would be likely to confuse the source of the
goods. See Daddy’s Junky Music Stores, Inc. v. Big Daddy’s Fam-
ily Music Ctr., 109 F.3d 275, 286 (6th Cir. 1997) (“Intent is rele-
vant because purposeful copying indicates that the alleged in-
fringer, who has at least as much knowledge as the trier of fact
regarding the likelihood of confusion, believes that his copy-
ing may divert some business from the senior user.”). 13

    13 By contrast, while a junior user’s intent to infringe can support a

likelihood of confusion finding, the reverse is not true. A junior user’s in-
nocent adoption of a mark does little to further its defense, because inno-
cent infringement is still infringement. See Thomas L. Casagrande, A
32                                                          No. 22-1950

    But in a reverse confusion case, by deﬁnition, the junior
user is not attempting to capitalize on the senior user’s good
will and reputation; thus, it makes less sense to inquire
whether the junior user adopted its mark with the intent to
“palm oﬀ” its product as that of another. See Quaker Oats,
978 F.2d at 961. In this regard, we have remarked that the jun-
ior user’s intent (to palm oﬀ) in a reverse confusion case is
“essentially irrelevant.” Id. That said, where it can be shown
that the junior user culpably disregarded the known rights of
the senior user when adopting its own mark, such evidence
can support an inference of consumer confusion. See Ironhawk
Techs., Inc. v. Dropbox, Inc., 2 F.4th 1150, 1168 (9th Cir. 2021)
(“Intent can be shown … by evidence that, for example, the
junior knew of the mark, should have known of the mark, in-
tended to copy the senior, failed to conduct a reasonably ade-
quate trademark search, or otherwise culpably disregarded
the risk of reverse confusion.”) (cleaned up). And of course,
where there is evidence that the junior user “deliberate[ly] in-
ten[ded] to push the senior user out of the market,” that too
would support a ﬁnding of a likelihood of confusion. Freedom
Card, Inc. v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 432 F.3d 463, 479 (3d Cir.
2005) (citation omitted); see also Humanly Possible, Inc. v. Man-
power, Inc., No. 11 C 4977, 2013 WL 633332, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Feb.
19, 2013) (inquiring whether there was evidence that the jun-
ior user “acted intentionally to overwhelm [the senior user]’s
mark”).

Verdict for Your Thoughts? Why an Accused Trademark Infringer’s Intent Has
No Place in Likelihood of Confusion Analysis, 101 Trademark Rep. 1447, 1460
n.58 (2011) (collecting cases); id. at 1470 (“intent provides a one-way
ratchet that helps trademark plaintiffs only.”).
No. 22-1950                                                    33

   Here, we see no evidence that Grubhub adopted the Grub-
hub House Logo with any culpable or deliberate disregard for
Home Chef’s marks. Grubhub created the Grubhub House
Logo—combining its long-recognized GRUBHUB word mark
with the JET House Mark—as part of its acquisition by JET.
And JET had been using its JET House Mark internationally
since approximately June 2014. Admittedly, the USPTO non-
ﬁnal oﬃce action put Grubhub on notice of Home Chef’s
rights in the HC Home Mark and the Home Chef Home Logo.
But Grubhub did not disregard those rights. Instead, it agreed
to only use the JET House Mark in connection with the
GRUBHUB brand name in an attempt to strike a balance be-
tween the two parties’ commercial interests.
    Because this factor can only bolster a likelihood of confu-
sion ﬁnding or be neutral, we agree with Home Chef that the
district court erred in determining that this factor weighed
against a likelihood of confusion. However, even so, this factor
is at best neutral and, therefore, of minimal value in the like-
lihood of confusion analysis.
       5. Weighing the Likelihood of Confusion Factors
    Taking stock, we conclude that the district court did not
clearly err in determining that neither the similarity-of-the-
mark factor nor the actual-confusion factor supports a likeli-
hood of confusion. Furthermore, based on this preliminary
record, the strength of Grubhub’s mark does not pose a sig-
niﬁcant threat of overwhelming the undisputed strength of
Home Chef’s marks. Finally, the intent factor is, at best, neu-
tral and provides little value in the analysis. As for the remain-
ing three factors—the similarity of the products, the area and
manner of concurrent use, and the degree of care likely to be
exercised by consumers—the parties do not dispute that they
34                                                   No. 22-1950

weigh in favor of a ﬁnding of a likelihood of confusion. Given
this, we turn to the district court’s determination that Home
Chef failed to make a strong showing of a likelihood of suc-
cess on the merits.
    Home Chef argues that, because all seven factors are “in-
terconnected,” the district court clearly erred by focusing only
on the factors in dispute without addressing the undisputed
factors. To the contrary, the district court did address the un-
disputed factors, concluding that the magistrate judge’s de-
terminations as to these factors were not clearly erroneous.
Grubhub, 2022 WL 2774986, at *6 n.2. This was a correct appli-
cation of law. Johnson, 170 F.3d at 739 (“If no objection or only
partial objection [to an R&R] is made, the district court judge
reviews those unobjected portions for clear error.”). Further-
more, the district court held that, even if there had been any
error, the weight assigned to those factors would not have af-
fected its conclusion that Home Chef failed to meet its burden
of showing a strong likelihood of success on the merits.
    Home Chef’s argument boils down to mere disagreement
with the district court’s weighing of the factors. As Home
Chef correctly recognized, there is “no hard and fast require-
ment” that any particular factor or factors be decisive of a like-
lihood of confusion analysis. See Ty, Inc., 237 F.3d at 902. Here,
the district court, faced with competing evidence, reviewed
the record and used its discretion to give weight to the factors
it found most salient and signiﬁcant. See id. at 901–02. And
given our own analysis of these factors, we cannot say on this
record that the district court’s determination that Home Chef
No. 22-1950                                                          35

did not satisfy its burden to establish a likelihood of success
on the merits was clearly erroneous. 14
                    IV.     CONCLUSION
    Because the district court did not clearly err in ﬁnding that
Home Chef failed to meet its burden to show a likelihood of
success on the merits of its trademark infringement claim, it
did not abuse its discretion in denying Home Chef’s motion
for a preliminary injunction. We therefore AFFIRM the dis-
trict court’s decision.

   14 None of our conclusions should be interpreted to apply to the JET

House Mark alone. Because we understand that Grubhub only uses the
JET House Mark locked up with or in close proximity to the GRUBHUB
brand name, our conclusions are limited to such uses. Any use of the JET
House Mark alone is a separate inquiry not presently before us.