Court Opinion

ID: 9843175
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 02:29:38.864257+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:40.019853
License: Public Domain

MURNAGHAN, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
The question before the Court is whether a six-year statute of limitations applies to claims brought by an assignee of a promissory note held by. the RTC. Since I believe that *51Virginia law clearly holds that the six-year statute of limitations period applies to assignees, I would not reach the issue of whether the conclusion would be the same under FIR-REA absent clearly established state law.
In the instant case, Hall asserts that the plain language of the statute indicates that Congress took no position on whether assignees should receive the six-year statute of limitations period provided to the RTC, and the Court should therefore look to state law to determine the statute of limitations period. FFC argues that 1) the statute grants a six year statute of limitations to assignees of the RTC; * 2) common law principles generally establish that the six-year statute of limitations applies to assignees; and 3) applying Virginia law, the six-year statute of limitations applies. Union Recovery Ltd. Partnership v. Horton, 252 Va. 418, 477 S.E.2d 521 (1996).
As noted in the majority opinion, the overwhelming majority of state and federal decisions have interpreted the federal statute to grant to the assignee a six-year statute of limitations. See e.g. FDIC v. Bledsoe, 989 F.2d 805 (5th Cir.1993); Mountain States Fin. Resources Corp. v. Agrawal, 777 F.Supp. 1550 (W.D.Okla.1991); N.S.Q. Associates v. Beychok, 659 So.2d 729 (La.1995); Tivoli Ventures, Inc. v. Bumann, 870 P.2d 1244 (Colo.1994) (en bane); Investment Co. of the Southwest v. Reese, 117 N.M. 655, 875 P.2d 1086 (1994); Jackson v. Thweatt, 883 S.W.2d 171 (Tex.1994); Cadle Co. II, Inc. v. Lewis, 254 Kan. 158, 864 P.2d 718 (1993). However, in the instant case, there is no need to interpret the federal statute. Virginia law clearly holds that an assignee stands in the shoes of the assignor, and that the assignee of a note from the RTC is entitled to the longer six-year statute of limitations.
Since I believe it is unnecessary for the Court to determine whether the federal statute applies, I concur as to Part IV of the opinion and concur in the result.

 FFC concedes that the statute is silent regarding this matter. However, they argue that the statute must be read as to effectuate the legislative intent. They argue that Congress is presumed to enact legislation with knowledge of the law and that a “newly-enacted or revised statute is presumed to be harmonious with existing law and its judicial construct.” United States v. Langley, 62 F.3d 602, 605 (4th Cir.1995) (en banc) (quoting Johnson v. First Nat’l Bank of Montevideo, 719 F.2d 270, 277 (8th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1012, 104 S.Ct. 1015, 79 L.Ed.2d 245 (1984)). FFC argued that the statute must be read in the context of Congress’s understanding that an assignee stands in the shoes of an assign- or.