Court Opinion

ID: 9686584
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 15:56:32.404834+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:20.473892
License: Public Domain

LAY, Circuit Judge
(concurring):
The literal interpretation of Section 1 (14) (a) of the Interstate Commerce Act (49 U.S.C. § 1(14) (a)) seems to require the Commission to consider the incentive rates along with the per diem rates and simultaneously in the same proceeding to make a deliberate choice between the two, based upon car supply factors. I have difficulty in rationalizing that the Commission has in fact made a deliberate choice as directed. I nevertheless think that the Commission has substantially complied with the mandate of the statute in temporarily applying the per diem rate and deferring “judgment” as to the quantum of incentive rates necessary. I say this for several reasons:
First, a remand would not accomplish any meaningful purpose. It would simply delay the effective date of the new per diem rates. Yet we today approve these rates and in doing so, we have deferred to the Commission’s judgment that they constitute the best and wisest policy of compensation over any other method available. Further delay would only result in the continued use of the older and inferior method of per diem charges without utilization of mileage factors.
Secondly, the postponement by the Commission of the determination of incentive rates arose because there was not satisfactory evidence available on which to base incentive rates necessary to accomplish the desired end of the statute. Under Section 1(14) (a), incentive rates are subject to the Commission’s judgment. Thus, there exists an area of discretion as to the specific applicability of incentive rates in any given ease. Certainly, if the Commission concludes that a certain incentive rate for any particular car will not “contribute to sound car service practices * * * and encourage the acquisition and maintenance of a car supply adequate to meet the needs of commerce and the national defense,” it would be arbitrary to apply the same. Cf. Palmer v. United States, 75 F.Supp. 63, 75 (D.D.C.1947).
Thirdly, to urge a remand for the sole reason that the incentive rates hearing was not carried on in the same proceeding as the hearing for per diem rates would be to stress procedural formalism without just reason. The statute makes no such specific requirement. It only commands that ear supply factors guide the Commission’s determination of what rates should be applicable.
Fourth, to say the statute requires the delay of the new per diem rates until the incentive rates are to be applied is unrealistic. If so, the quick solution might be to continue the new per diem rates and then to apply the incentive factors retroactively. However, this would not be consistent with the spirit of the statute, since the primary purpose of the incentive rates is to induce future action, not merely to compensate the owners for past usage.
I conclude that the Commission must act, as soon as practicable, to set incentive rates on the basis of inadequacy of car supply. It has the affirmative duty to do so. It cannot totally refuse to do so, even if it has second thoughts and now feels the legislation is unwise or impractical. Passing upon wisdom of congressional policy is not the proper role of the Commission. However, I do not read the Commission’s proceedings as announcing abdication of their responsibility. I sense only, at this time, a dedication to study in order to competently . and effectively reach the desired effect Congress has set forth.