Court Opinion

ID: 9584141
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:44:53.510187+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:02:38.833613
License: Public Domain

DAVIES, Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. The record includes no evidence of dangerousness other than the charged offense. Additional evidence is required for certification as an adult. In addition, the trial court did not adequately consider the alternative disposition of extended jurisdiction juvenile (EJJ).
Minnesota courts have long required that juveniles not be certified as adults without evidence of dangerousness independent of the offense. See In re Welfare of Dahl, 278 N.W.2d 316, 321 (Minn.1979) (record must contain direct evidence that juvenile is a danger to public safety for statutory reference standard to be satisfied); In re Welfare of S.W.N., 541 N.W.2d 14, 17 (Minn.App. 1995) (applying Dahl non-offense-related evidence of dangerousness requirement to EJJ case), review denied (Minn. Feb. 9,1996); In re Welfare of M.E. P., 523 N.W.2d 913, 925 (Minn.App.1994) (“state must present non-offense-related evidence of dangerousness in support of a reference motion”), review denied (Minn. Mar. 1, 1995). Even in cases in which a juvenile is charged with the most heinous offense, reference cannot be based solely on the juvenile’s age and the seriousness of the crime. In re Welfare of D.F.B., 433 N.W.2d 79, 81-82 (Minn.1988) (juvenile charged with ax murder of four family members).
The trial court here concluded that the lack of other violent behavior by D.T.H. did not weigh against certification. It treated the Dahl element of non-offense-related evidence of dangerousness as only one factor, and not even a weighty factor. But Dahl, D.F.B., and other cases have consistently held other evidence to be a prerequisite to adult certification. The trial court ignored the lack of evidence of other violent behavior, or of any other indicia of dangerousness, and certified D.T.H. solely on the basis of the heinous nature of the double murder he is charged with. The majority contends the record of dangerousness here is similar to that in S.W.N., but the juvenile in S.W.N. had also been diagnosed with explosive intermittent disorder and was under the influence of a violent father. S.W.N., 541 N.W.2d at 17. Moreover, the court in S.W.N. was applying the threshold of proof necessary to sustain an EJJ designation, rather than the higher threshold necessary for adult certification. Id.
I also conclude that the trial court did not properly weigh options available to it under the EJJ statute. That statute allows the court to retain jurisdiction until age 21, Minn.Stat. § 260.181, subd. 4(b) (1996), and then to execute an adult criminal sentence if the juvenile violates the disposition order. Minn.Stat. § 260.126, subds. 4(a)(2), 5 (1996).
Also under EJJ, as part of the disposition order, the court could not only require that D.T.H. spend the five years until he is 21 in a juvenile high-security facility, Minn.Stat. § 260.185, subd. lb (1996), but it could also require that he demonstrate satisfactory progress in treatment. In adult criminal cases, probation has been revoked if the offender fails in a treatment program that has been ordered as a condition of probation, or even if the treatment program ceases to exist or the offender’s participation in it cannot be funded. See State v. Morrow, 492 N.W.2d 539, 543-14 (Minn.App.1992) (revocation for lack of funding); State v. Thompson, 486 N.W.2d 163, 165 (Minn.App.1992) (termination of program); State v. Moot, 398 N.W.2d 21-24 (Minn.App.1986) (offender’s failure in treatment), review denied, (Minn. Feb. 13, 1987). Satisfactory progress in treatment by a certain date can be made an explicit condition of probation. See State v. Sejnoha, 512 N.W.2d 597, 601 (Minn.App.1994) (defendant’s progress in treatment program must be assessed before release from probationary jail term), review denied (Minn. Apr. 22,1994).
The record establishes that, if not certified, D.T.H. would be accepted into a high-securi*747ty juvenile facility and that five years will be an adequate time within which to determine whether it would be safe to return him to the community. Dr. Reidel, the psychologist who evaluated D.T.H., conceded that such a plan would adequately protect public safety.
Although D.T.H. was not diagnosed with any treatable disorder, his compliance with juvenile programming can certainly be measured in the future, and he should not be punished, in effect, for the fact that he has not been diagnosed as suffering from a psychosis. It seems clear that the capacity of this juvenile for a non-violent adaptation to the community can be far better assessed after five years of intensive programming than it can now after a single violent episode (this is a youth without a history of cruelty) and a brief course of psychological interviews.
Moreover, the interviews here — conducted in anticipation of a certification hearing— have little value, for the interviewers confronted — and lamentably failed to break through — a wall of defensive self-denial. That same self-denial seems a likely explanation for what the district court cited as an absence of remorse. In other words, the real child was not revealed in this certification proceeding.
In summary, I would reverse the trial court’s certification order as an abuse of discretion. The Dahl requirement of non-offense-related evidence of dangerousness was not met and the alternative of EJJ programming — with a stringent condition of successful treatment by age 21 — was not adequately considered.
All bridges have now been burned. This 15-year-old has, I expect, no way to avoid decades in prison. And the public authorities, too, with this certification, apparently take from themselves all alternatives to a murder conviction and sentence.