Court Opinion

ID: 9732134
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 16:09:18.127604+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:22:20.882528
License: Public Domain

Gehl, J.
(concurring). Counsel for plaintiff concede that while the violation of a penal statute constitutes negligence as a matter of law recovery does not necessarily follow, and that to establish liability causal connection between the violation and the injury must be established; it is for that reason no doubt that the cases on the subject are not discussed in the opinion of the majority.
We said in Smith v. Taylor-Button Co. (1923), 179 Wis. 232, 236, 190 N. W. 999:
“It is well settled that although the violation of a penal statute constitutes negligence, nevertheless, in order to constitute liability, there must be a causal relation between the violation and the injury.”
And we cited Steinkrause v. Eckstein (1920), 170 Wis. 487, 175 N. W. 988; Benesch v. Pagel (1920), 171 Wis. 620, 177 N. W. 861; Westgard v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. (1922), 176 Wis. 636, 187 N. W. 658. To these citations might have been added Stacy v. Knickerbocker Ice Co. (1893), 84 Wis. 614, 54 N. W. 1091; Derouso v. International Harvester Co. (1914), 157 Wis. 32, 145 N. W. 771; Schmidt v. Wisconsin Sugar Co. (1922), 175 Wis. 613, 186 N. W. 222.
Among those since decided and in which we have adhered to the rule are Edler v. Algoma F. & M. Co. (1930), 200 Wis. 471, 227 N. W. 944, 229 N. W. 64, and McNamer v. American Ins. Co. (1954), 267 Wis. 494, 66 N. W. (2d) *207342. In each of these cases as well as in Derouso v. International Harvester Co., supra, and Westgard v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., supra, there was involved, as there is in the instant case, the very injury which it was intended by the applicable statute to prevent, and still we held that to establish liability there must be a causal relation between the violation and the injury. It seems to me that if we were to reject this rule and adopt the contrary, it would follow that in every case involving the violation of a safety statute and a finding of negligence in that respect and, regardless of the fact that there might be an absolute lack of proof on the issue, it would be required that there be submitted to the jury the relative causal question. The enormous effect of such a ruling will be seen when it is considered that in a great majority of automobile cases the negligence charged constitutes a violation of a safety statute and an injury which is intended to be prevented by the statute.
Language is used in Umnus v. Wisconsin Public Service Corp. (1952), 260 Wis. 433, 51 N. W. (2d) 42, and Van Pool v. Industrial Comm. (1954), 267 Wis. 292, 64 N. W. (2d) 813, to the effect that in those cases there existed a presumption that the damage resulting from the violation of a statute in the former and an order of the industrial commission in the latter was caused by the nonobservance of the law or the order. It must not be overlooked, however, that the former involved a violation of the safe-place statute, which imposes a duty beyond that imposed by common law, Bunce v. Grand & Sixth Building, Inc. (1931), 206 Wis. 100, 238 N. W. 867, and Mullen v. Larson-Morgan Co. (1933), 212 Wis. 52, 249 N. W. 67, and that in the latter there was found to have been a violation of a safety order in an action brought under the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act regarding which this court has said:
“An injury is caused by the failure of an employer to guard a machine where it appears as a fact that the particular injury *208from which the employee suffered would not have been sustained by the employee if the machine had been guarded as required by law, and the employer is liable therefor unless it is caused by a want of ordinary care on the part of the employee which is wilful. The chain of physical causation is complete, and whether or not the failure to guard is the proximate cause of the injury in the sense in which that term is used in the law of negligence is immaterial." (Italics ours.) Manitowoc Boiler Works v. Industrial Comm. (1917), 165 Wis. 592, 595, 163 N. W. 172.
There is no testimony whatever as to the conduct of Gil-bertson and the effect which the absence of taillights and reflectors had upon him and upon the manner in which he operated his car at and just immediately prior to the collision. There is no room for inference. There is no showing of a causal connection between the absence of the lights and the injury.