Court Opinion

ID: 9857323
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 14:30:03.672118+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:38:27.589827
License: Public Domain

OVERSTREET, Judge,
dissenting.
Today, the majority interprets Tex. R.App.P. 40(b)(1) [hereinafter Rule 40(b)(1) ]1 to erect a barrier to a defendant’s right to appeal a nonjurisdictional defect or error (in this case sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s judgment) arising from entry of a plea of guilty or nolo conten-dere pursuant to Article 1.15, Texas Code of Criminal Procedure [hereinafter Art. 1.15].2 I read the majority’s opinion as holding that the interpretation of Rule 40(b)(1) by the Court of Appeals impermissibly enlarges an appellant’s substantive right to appeal a conviction in a negotiated plea bargained case. Op. at 45. I disagree with the majority and agree with the Court of Appeals.
I agree that a general notice of appeal3 from a conviction based on a negotiated plea bargain is insufficient to confer jurisdiction on a Court of Appeals to review a trial court’s ruling on pretrial motions. I also agree that a general notice of appeal is insufficient to raise a nonjurisdictional defect or error that occurs prior to the entry of the plea.4 I disagree that a general notice of appeal is insufficient to raise a nonjurisdic-tional defect or error that occurs after the entry of the plea and thereby deny jurisdiction to a Court of Appeals to review an appellant’s claim in a plea bargained case.
This case simply involves jurisdiction. The ultimate issue is how a defendant may invoke the jurisdiction of a Court of Appeals to consider alleged errors that occurred after the entry of a plea wherein the defendant stands convicted pursuant to a plea bargain agreement.
I.

Appellate Jurisdiction

In the case of an appeal, jurisdiction concerns the power or authority of an appellate court to decide an appeal. Johnson v. State, 747 S.W.2d 568 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no pet.). Once jurisdiction is invoked the exercise of its reviewing function is limited by its own discretion or by a valid statute. Carter v. State, 656 S.W.2d 468, 459 (Tex.Cr.App.1983). The right of a defendant to appeal a conviction in a plea bargained case is governed by Rule 40(b)(1).
Prior to 1977, a defendant in any criminal action had a statutory right to appeal. Tex. Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 44.02.5 In 1977, *52the legislature amended Article 44.02.6 In Morris v. State, 749 S.W.2d 772 (Tex.Cr.App.1986), this court held that Article 44.02 was a valid restrictive statute, limiting jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to “those matters which have been raised by written motion filed prior to trial or those matters that the trial court granted permission to appeal.” Id. at 774. The Court of Appeals correctly noted and I now emphasize, Morris is a pre-rule ease.
Article 44.02 has been repealed in part and replaced by Rule 40(b)(1). Under Rule 40(b)(1), to invoke the jurisdiction of a Court of Appeals to review a nonjurisdietional defect or error which occurred prior to entry of a plea, a defendant in a plea bargained case has to show: (1) a timely written notice of appeal filed with the clerk of the trial court; and (2) the notice of appeal must state either (a) that the trial court granted permission to appeal, or (b) specify that those matters were raised by written motion and ruled on before trial. Thus, appellate jurisdiction is invoked and appeal is perfected by giving notice of appeal pursuant to Article 44.08, V.A.C.C.P. (now Tex.R.App.Pro.Rule 40(b)(1)). Lemmons v. State, 818 S.W.2d 58 (Tex.Cr.App.1991) (citing Carter v. State, 656 S.W.2d 468, 469 (Tex.Cr.App.1983)).
II.

Article 1.15

Rule 40(b)(1) governs how to perfect appeal in a criminal case. Rule 40(b)(1) details how to perfect a notice of appeal in the case of a conviction arising from a negotiated plea bargained, and specifically implicates and embraces Art. 1.15. Among the requirements of Art. 1.15 is that evidence has to be presented that is sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused and support the judgment. See supra note 2. This Court surely must recognize and accept that sufficiency of evidence is always an issue that arises after entry of the plea. In Ex parte Williams, 703 S.W.2d 674, 678 (Tex.Cr.App.1986), this Court found that sufficient evidence was necessary under Art. 1.15 and that the evidence is received to support the judgment, not to accept the plea of guilty or nolo contendere. Thornton v. State, 601 S.W.2d 340, 347 (Tex.Cr.App.1980) (opinion on rehearing), overruled on other grounds, Bender v. State, 758 S.W.2d 278 (Tex.Cr.App.1988). This Court also said in denying habeas relief in Williams, supra at 678, “While the sufficiency of the evidence to support a judgment of conviction under Article 1.15, supra, and its requirements may be challenged on appeal, such conviction may not be subject to challenge on collateral attack by habeas corpus.”
The Court of Appeals correctly interpreted the prerequisites that must be met under Rule 40(b)(1) to appeal (1) a nonjurisdietional defect or error that occurs prior to entry of the plea, and (2) pre-trial rulings. I maintain that they also correctly interpreted that there are no prerequisites to be met other than a timely notice of appeal to appeal nonjurisdietional defects or errors that occur after entry of the plea such as sufficiency of the evidence. Davis v. State, 773 S.W.2d 404, 406 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1989, pet. granted).
I remain convinced that the Court of Appeals’ interpretation of Rule 40(b)(1) is not an expansion of a defendant’s right to appeal from what was allowed under Article 44.02 because a defendant has always under Art. 1.15 been able to compel the State to present sufficient evidence to support the judgment. If one can compel compliance, one ought to be able to complain about non-compliance. Article 1.15 and Article 44.02 have always appeared to be in conflict — a conflict which the legislature failed to address, even though compliance with both was mandatory. The *53authors of Rule 40(b)(1) recognized the conflict and correctly drafted Rule 40(b)(1) to require compliance with Art. 1.15. Unfortunately, the majority finds it appropriate to rewrite Rule 40(b)(1) in an opinion. Op. at 46. It is my belief that an opinion is designed to dispose of matters by interpreting applicable laws and/or rules. It is not an appropriate forum to rewrite a rule.
The majority, relying heavily on Moms, supra, reasons that the Court of Appeals misinterpreted the “but” clause of Rule 40(b)(1). Under the majority’s reasoning, our opinion in Morris forecloses review of the sufficiency of evidence unless the defendant obtains the trial court’s permission or raises the issue pretrial. Such reasoning is flawed. The majority fails to recognize that Morris is a pre-Rule 40(b)(1) case and that the appellant failed to argue Art. 1.15. Therefore, their reliance on Morris is misplaced. The majority also fails to recognize that the State under Art. 1.15 has always been required to present evidence sufficient to support the trial court’s judgment.
The Court of Appeals in this case correctly noted that Rule 40(b)(1) alleviated any confusion between its predecessor and Art. 1.15 by making explicit reference to Art. 1.15 and held that there are no prerequisites (other than filing a timely notice of appeal) to appeal nonjurisdictional defects or errors that occur after entry of the plea.
III.

Conclusion

For the reasons hereinbefore stated, I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals. Because the majority decides otherwise, I dissent.
BAIRD, J., joins.

. Rule 40(b)(1) provides in relevant part:
[Notice of appeal] shall be sufficient if it shows the desire of the defendant to appeal from the judgment or other appealable order; but if the judgment was rendered upon his plea of guilty or nolo contendere pursuant to Article 1.15. Code of Criminal Procedure, and the punishment assessed does not exceed the punishment recommended by the prosecutor and agreed to by the defendant and his attorney, in order to prosecute an appeal for a nonjurisdictional defect or error that occurred prior to entry of the plea the notice shall state that the trial court granted permission to appeal or shall specify that those matters were raised by written motion and ruled on before trial.

. Art. 1.15 provides in part:
No person can be convicted of a felony except upon the verdict of a juiy duly rendered and recorded, unless the defendant, upon entering a plea, has in open court in person waived his right of trial by jury in writing in accordance with Articles 1.13 and 1.14; provided, however, that it shall be necessary for the state to introduce evidence into the record showing the guilt of the defendant and said evidence shall be accepted by the court as the basis for its judgment and in no event shall a person charged be convicted upon his plea without sufficient evidence to support the same.

. See Op. at 45.

. All emphases are mine unless otherwise indicated.

. Art. 44.02 provided:
A defendant in any criminal action has the right of appeal under the rules hereinafter prescribed.

. Acts 1977, 65th Leg. p. 940, ch. 351, § 1, eff. August 29, 1977. As amended Art. 44.02 provides:
A defendant in any criminal action has the right of appeal under the rules hereinafter prescribed, provided, however, before the defendant who has been convicted upon either his plea of guilty or plea of nolo contendere before the court and the.court, upon the election of the defendant, assesses punishment and the punishment does not exceed the punishment recommended by the prosecutor and agreed to by the defendant and his attorney may prosecute his appeal, he must have permission of the trial court, except on those matters which have been raised by written motion filed prior to trial. This article in no way affects appeals pursuant to Article 44.17 of this chapter.