Court Opinion

ID: 9542320
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:33:06.759462+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:07:35.472867
License: Public Domain

HENRIOD, Chief Justice
(concurring).
I concur in the result for two reasons.
In this action for removal for dereliction in office, Jones 1) denies any such offense in connection with the operation of his office 1 and 2) that the limitations statutes are applicable in any event.2
As to 1) : His default in failing to file a tax return had nothing to do with the operation of his office as auditor, and such default is not a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude. Such failure has the status of any of many misdemeanors, such as traffic offenses, smoking in certain places, failing to report accidents, failing to have a driver’s license on the person, failing to get license plates on time and driving thereafter before obtaining them, — none of which, per se, reflect any dishonesty in carrjdng out statutory duties of an elective office, or of gross inattention to any such duties.
*197As to 2) : The three limitations statutes mentioned were in each case a bar to an action unless it be decided that there was a continuing offense and the statutes became operative only after discovery of the offense, as the State contended was the case here. Under such contention, if it is a continuing offense, discovery of it makes it no less a continuing offense, so that discovery would have no significance, and the offense could be charged at any time irrespective of discovery.
Limitations statutes are legislation of repose. Any penitent person, who as a young man of 22 burglarized a place of business would be somewhat surprised to learn, at 42, he could be convicted of his nocturnal second-story soiree, because one discovered the event 20 years later. The prosecutor as well would be startled. Besides, one wonders who must do the discovering, — the prosecutor, the Governor, the accused’s wife, or someone else.
The main opinion says the limitations statute is moot. This may he true in a sense, in light of our decision here, but I am of the opinion that the matter having been presented to us with considerable conviction, that it would not be amiss to decide this case on both, not one of the issues raised, in order to resolve the question based on the facts of this case, should the problem recur.

. Title 77-7-1, U.C.A.1953: “All officers not subject to impeachment shall be subject to removal for high crimes, misdemeanors or malfeasance in office * *

. 77-9-3; 78-12-25, U.C.A.1953; 26 U.S.C.A., Sec. 6531.