Court Opinion

ID: 2964507
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:26:41.683048+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:57.028031
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            United States Court of Appeals
                                For the First Circuit
                                 ____________________

        No. 96-1600

                               IN RE: JURAJ J. BAJGAR,

                                       Debtor,

                                _____________________

            CAROL B. MARTIN, ADMINISTRATOR OF ESTATE OF FRANCIS A. MARTIN,
                            Plaintiff/Creditor, Appellant,

                                          v.

                                   JURAJ J. BAJGAR,
                             Defendant/Debtor, Appellee.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                     [Hon. Morris E. Lasker, U.S. District Judge]
                                             ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                Torruella, Chief Judge,
                                           ___________
                            Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                    ____________________
                              and Stahl, Circuit Judge.
                                         _____________

                                 ____________________

            Arthur J. Carakatsane for appellant.
            _____________________
            Richard S. Hackel for appellee.
            _________________

                                 ____________________

                                   January 17, 1997
                                 ____________________

                      STAHL, Circuit Judge.  Creditor-Appellant Carol B.
                      STAHL, Circuit Judge.
                             _____________

            Martin appeals the district court's affirmance of the

            bankruptcy court's decision to grant Debtor-Appellee Juraj J.

            Bajgar a discharge pursuant to 11 U.S.C.   727(a)(2)(A) with

            respect to property that Bajgar fraudulently transferred

            within one year before the filing of his voluntary petition

            for relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code.  We

            reverse. 

                                      Background
                                      Background
                                      __________

                      Bajgar and his wife jointly owned a vacant parcel

            of land in Port St. Lucie, Florida ("the Florida property"). 

            On November 10, 1993, Bajgar conveyed his interest in the

            land to his wife, purportedly as a belated engagement gift,

            delayed twenty-three years.  In return, Bajgar received "love

            and affection."  The conveyance was recorded on December 2,

            1993.  At the time of the conveyance, Bajgar faced a

            collection action and several foreclosures.  He conceded at

            trial that the transfer was fraudulent within the meaning of

            the Bankruptcy Code, admitting that the transfer was

            completed with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud his

            creditors.

                      On May 16, 1994, less than one year after the

            conveyance of the Florida property, Bajgar filed a petition

            for relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code.  In his

            petition, Bajgar disclosed the fraudulent transfer by

                                         -3-
                                          3

            attaching a copy of the deed to the statement of affairs

            filed pursuant to 11 U.S.C.   521(1).  At a June 20, 1994,

            mandatory creditors meeting, Bajgar and his wife volunteered

            to reconvey the Florida property.  

                      On August 19, 1994, Martin, one of Bajgar's

            creditors, filed a Complaint to Object to Discharge, which

            she amended on September 21, 1994.  Martin's amended

            complaint alleged a violation of 11 U.S.C.   727(a)(2)(A),

            which precludes discharge for a debtor who transfers property

            within one year of the filing of a bankruptcy petition if he

            acts with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor. 

            On September 30, 1994, at Bajgar's request and on the advice

            of counsel, Bajgar's wife reconveyed the Florida property to

            herself and Bajgar jointly by quitclaim deed.  Bajgar's wife

            completed the retransfer more than four months after Bajgar

            filed his voluntary bankruptcy petition, more than three

            months after the meeting with creditors, and more than one

            month after Martin first objected to discharge.

                      The bankruptcy court (Hillman, J.) held that the

            conveyance of the Florida property did not constitute grounds

            to deny Bajgar's discharge under Section 727(a)(2)(A). 

            Martin appealed this decision to the United States District

            Court for the District of Massachusetts.  The district court

            (Lasker, J.) affirmed, determining that the re-transfer of

            the Florida property to Bajgar cured Bajgar's admittedly

                                         -4-
                                          4

            fraudulent initial transfer.  This appeal ensued.

                                  Standard of Review
                                  Standard of Review
                                  __________________

                      "In an appeal from the district court's review of a

            bankruptcy court order, we independently review the

            bankruptcy court's decision, applying the 'clearly erroneous'

            standard to findings of fact and de novo review to
                                             _______

            conclusions of law."  Grella v. Salem Five Cent Sav. Bank, 42
                                  ______    _________________________

            F.3d 26, 30 (1st Cir. 1994); see also In re G.S.F. Corp., 938
                                         ___ ____ __________________

            F.2d 1467, 1474 (1st Cir. 1991).  The district court's

            determination that the re-transfer justified discharging

            Bajgar pursuant to Section 727(a)(2)(A) constitutes a

            conclusion of law that we subject to plenary review.  See
                                                                  ___

            Century 21 Balfour Real Estate v. Menna (In re Menna), 16
            ______________________________    _____  ___________

            F.3d 7, 10 (1st Cir. 1994); In re Erin Food Servs., Inc., 980
                                        ____________________________

            F.2d 792, 799 (1st Cir. 1992).

                                      Discussion
                                      Discussion
                                      __________

                      This case presents this Circuit with an issue of

            first impression:  whether an admittedly fraudulent transfer

            of a debtor's property within one year before the filing of a

            voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 7 of the

            Bankruptcy Code is cured for purposes of dischargeability

            pursuant to Section 727(a)(2)(A) by its re-transfer to the

            debtor after the debtor files his petition.  We hold that re-

            transfer subsequent to filing a voluntary bankruptcy petition

                                         -5-
                                          5

            does not cure the fraudulent transfer, and, thus, does not

            avail the debtor discharge under Section 727.

                      Title 11, Section 727(a)(2)(A) states in pertinent

            part:

                      (a) The court shall grant the debtor a discharge, 
                      unless--

                           (2) The debtor, with intent to hinder,
                           delay, or defraud a creditor . . . has
                           transferred . . . 

                                (A) property of the debtor within
                                one year before the date of the
                                filing of the petition.

            11 U.S.C.   727(a)(2)(A).  Bajgar urges us to interpret the

            term "transferred" to mean "transferred and remained

            transferred" in the context of a debtor who reconveys

            property subsequent to filing a voluntary bankruptcy

            petition.

                      As we have stated previously, "the task of

            interpretation begins with the text of the statute itself,

            and statutory language must be accorded its ordinary

            meaning."  Telematics Int'l, Inc. v. NEMLC Leasing Corp., 967
                       ______________________    ___________________

            F.2d 703, 706 (1st Cir. 1992).  "Where, as here, the

            statute's language is plain, 'the sole function of the courts

            is to enforce it according to its terms.'"  United States v.
                                                        _____________

            Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989) (quoting
            ______________________

            Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917)).  "The
            _________    _____________

            plain meaning of legislation should be conclusive, except in

            the 'rare cases [in which] the literal application of a

                                         -6-
                                          6

            statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the

            intentions of the drafters.'"  Ron Pair, 489 U.S. at 242
                                           ________

            (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564,
                     _______    _________________________

            571 (1982)).

                      The statutory language of Section 727(a)(2)(A) is

            sufficiently plain.  The statute specifically authorizes

            denial of discharge if the debtor "transferred" property

            within one year prior to the date of filing the bankruptcy

            petition; it does not qualify this provision with a clause to

            the effect that transferred property must remain transferred. 

            See 11 U.S.C.   727(a)(2)(A).
            ___

                      The Bankruptcy Code, moreover, defines the term

            "transfer" broadly as "every mode, direct or indirect,

            absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of

            disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in

            property."  11 U.S.C.   101(54).  Although the legislative

            history offers no guidance in interpreting "transfer" in the

            context of Section 727(a)(2)(A), the legislative history of

            Section 101(54), which defines "transfer," explains that

            "[t]he definition of transfer is as broad as possible."  S.

            Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong. 27 (1978), reprinted in 1978
                                                _________ __

            U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5813; H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong. 314

            (1977).  Limiting the definition of "transferred" to

            "transferred and remained transferred," in fact, would

            contradict the drafters' intent.

                                         -7-
                                          7

                      In support of his position, Bajgar recites Justice

            Douglas' admonition that courts "do not read . . . statutory

            words with the ease of a computer.  There is an overriding

            consideration that equitable principles govern the exercise

            of bankruptcy jurisdiction."  Bank of Marin v. England, 385
                                          _____________    _______

            U.S. 99, 103 (1966).  This recitation, however, is misplaced

            in this case.  Bank of Marin addressed the issue of whether
                           _____________

            or not "the payment by the drawee of a drawer bankrupt's

            checks after the date of th[e] filing [in bankruptcy] is a

            `transfer' within the meaning of [repealed 11 U.S.C.  

            110(d)(5)]."  Id. at 102.  The Court determined "it would be
                          ___

            inequitable to hold liable a drawee who pays checks of the

            bankrupt duly drawn but presented after bankruptcy, where no

            actual revocation of its authority has been made and it has

            not notice or knowledge of the bankruptcy."  Id. at 103. 
                                                         ___

            Although Congress "has legislated the exception [that the

            Marin Court articulated with respect to the need for notice]
            _____

            in   542(c)," Poonja v. Charles Schwab & Co. (In re Dominion
                          ______    ____________________  ______________

            Corp.), 199 B.R. 410, 413 (9th Cir. 1996), the legislative
            _____

            history makes plain that Congress, in revising the Bankruptcy

            Code, did not intend to limit the definition of the term

            "transfer."  See S. Rep. No. 989, at 27; H.R. Rep. No 595, at
                         ___

            314; see also Dominion Corp., 199 B.R. at 413 (explaining
                 ___ ____ ______________

            that changes made to the Code following Marin pertained to
                                                    _____

            the definition of "transferee" not "transfer").  In fact,

                                         -8-
                                          8

            "[t]he word 'transfer' has always had a most comprehensive

            meaning under the bankruptcy laws and has been construed to

            include every method of disposing of or parting with property

            or its possession."  4 Collier on Bankruptcy   727.02[5]
                                   _____________________

            (15th ed. 1996).  And, "[w]hatever force the assertion in

            Bank of Marin v. England, that 'equitable principles govern
            _____________    _______

            the exercise of bankruptcy jurisdiction' may have had under

            the 1898 Act, this approach has no place under the Code to

            the extent the statute addresses the question."  Levit v.
                                                             _____

            Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp., 874 F.2d 1186, 1189 (7th Cir.
            _________________________

            1989); see also In re Taubman, 160 B.R. 964, 980 (S.D. Ohio
                   ___ ____ _____________

            1993) ("It must [] be recognized that the exercise of []

            equitable principles     . . . 'cannot contravene specific

            provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.'") (quoting Terex Corp. v.
                                                           ___________

            Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 984 F.2d 170, 173 (6th Cir. 1993)).1
            __________________________

                                
            ____________________

            1.  The district court reasoned that "`the statutory right to
            a discharge should ordinarily be construed liberally in favor
            of  the debtor.'"  Martin v. Bajgar  (In re Bajgar), C.A. No.
                               ______    ______   ____________
            95-12562-MEL,  slip op. at 2-3 (quoting In re Tully, 818 F.2d
                                            _______ ___________
            106, 110 (1st  Cir. 1987)).   Although Tully  did posit  that
                                                   _____
            "`[t]he reasons for denying a discharge to a bankrupt must be
            real and substantial, not merely technical and conjectural,'"
            it also directed that, "[o]n the other hand, the very purpose
            of certain sections of the law, like 11 U.S.C.   727(a)[], is
            to  make certain  that  those who  seek  the shelter  of  the
            bankruptcy  code do not play fast and loose with their assets
            or with the reality  of their affairs."   Tully, 818 F.2d  at
                                                      _____
            110  (quoting Dilworth v. Booth,  69 F.2d 621,  624 (5th Cir.
                  _______ ________    _____
            1934)).  In a  more recent case, moreover, we  explained that
            "[e]xceptions   to  discharge   are  narrowly   construed  in
            furtherance of the Bankruptcy Code's `fresh start' policy and
            the  claimant must show that its  claim comes squarely within
            _____________________________________________________________
            an exception  enumerated in Bankruptcy  Code    [727(a)(2)]."
            ___________________________________________________________
            Menna, 16 F.3d at 9 (emphasis added).  In this case, Martin's
            _____

                                         -9-
                                          9

                      Without delving into the murky realm of legislative

            purpose and equitable principles, the Eleventh Circuit, one

            of the two other courts of appeals to address this issue,

            reached the same conclusion we reach today.  See Davis v.
                                                         ___ _____

            Davis (In re Davis), 911 F.2d 560 (11th Cir. 1990) (per
            _____  ___________

            curiam).  In Davis, the Eleventh Circuit considered the case
                         _____

            of a debtor ("Davis") who transferred a one-half interest in

            his home to his wife.  See id. at 561.  Upon the advice of a
                                   ___ ___

            bankruptcy lawyer, Davis re-transferred the property.  The

            day following recordation of the deed formalizing this

            retransfer, and less than one year after the initial

            transfer, Davis filed for bankruptcy protection under Chapter

            7.  Despite the fact that Davis disclosed the existence of

            the fraudulent transfers, a creditor filed an adversary

            proceeding to deny discharge under Section 727(a)(2)(A).  

                      Like Bajgar, Davis argued that "the word

            'transferred' should be read to mean 'transferred and

            remained transferred' at the time a debtor files his

            bankruptcy petition."  Id. at 562.  Refusing to discharge
                                   ___

            Davis, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned:

                      Normally, a court should interpret a
                      statute in a manner consistent with the

                                
            ____________________

            claim that  Bajgar should be denied  discharge because Bajgar
            fraudulently transferred  property within one year before the
            filing of  the bankruptcy petition falls  squarely within the
            exception  that  Section  727(a)(2)(A) enumerates.    See  11
                                                                  ___
            U.S.C.     727(a)(2)(A).    The  Tully  court's  instruction,
                                             _____
            therefore, does not control this case.

                                         -10-
                                          10

                      plain meaning of the language used in the
                      statute.  The statutory language of
                      section 727(a)(2)(A) is plain and
                      unambiguous.  Congress certainly was
                      capable of drafting a statute which would
                      deny a discharge only when assets were
                      fraudulently transferred and remained
                      transferred at the time of filing of
                      bankruptcy proceedings, but it did not. 
                      We are a court and not a legislative
                      body; therefore, we are not free to
                      create by interpretation an exception in
                      a statute which is plain on its face.

            Id. (citations omitted).  According to the Eleventh Circuit,
            ___

            therefore, if a debtor fraudulently transfers property within

            one year before the filing of a bankruptcy petition, he will

            not receive a discharge.  See Najjar v. Kablaoui (In re
                                      ___ ______    ________  _____

            Kablaoui), 196 B.R. 705, 709 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) ("[T]he Eleventh
            ________

            Circuit wholly rejects the debtor's subsequent reconveyance

            of the fraudulently transferred property as a defense to a

            section 727(a)(2)(A) action.").

                      While the plain language of Section 727(a)(2)(A)

            and the applicable legislative history point to the

            conclusion that, upon proper objection, any debtor who

            fraudulently transfers property within one year before the

            filing of a bankruptcy petition is not entitled to receive a

            discharge pursuant to Section 727, irrespective of the timing

            of a reconveyance, this case presents us with a debtor who

            reconveyed property several months subsequent to filing a

            voluntary bankruptcy petition.  We need not decide now either

            the effect of a reconveyance made prior to the filing of a

                                         -11-
                                          11

            voluntary bankruptcy petition or the question of a re-

            transfer effected immediately following the filing of an

            involuntary petition.

                      Despite Section 727(a)(2)(A)'s plain language and

            the Davis court's interpretation, Bajgar seeks solace in a
                _____

            Ninth Circuit case, First Beverly Bank v. Adeeb (In re
                                __________________    _____  _____

            Adeeb), 787 F.2d 1339, 1344 (9th Cir. 1986), which
            _____

            interpreted the term "transferred" to mean "transferred and

            remained transferred" in the context of Section 727(a)(2)(A). 

            Both the bankruptcy court, see Bajgar, 186 B.R. at 8, and the
                                       ___ ______

            district court, see Martin v. Bajgar (In re Bajgar), C.A. No.
                            ___ ______    ______  ____________

            95-12562-MEL, slip op. at 2 (D. Mass. March 19, 1996), found

            Adeeb persuasive in this case.  We do not.
            _____

                      In Adeeb, the court considered whether or not to
                         _____

            discharge an individual ("Adeeb") who transferred property

            "with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor" within

            one year of the filing of a petition.  See 787 F.2d at 1342,
                                                   ___

            1344.  Faced with demands from his creditors, Adeeb consulted

            with an attorney who had little bankruptcy experience. 

            Acting upon his attorney's advice, Adeeb transferred several

            properties to third parties.  Adeeb then retained an

            experienced bankruptcy attorney, who advised him to re-

            transfer the properties and to disclose the initial transfers

            to his creditors.  Adeeb followed this advice and immediately

            began to reverse the transfers while notifying his creditors

                                         -12-
                                          12

            of his actions.  Before Adeeb could complete the re-transfers

            and within one year of the initial fraudulent transfers,

            several of his creditors filed an involuntary bankruptcy

            petition against him.  Determining not to contest this

            petition, several days later Adeeb filed a voluntary

            petition, "seeking a discharge of his indebtedness."  Id. at
                                                                  ___

            1342.

                      The Adeeb court determined that "reading
                          _____

            `transferred' . . . to mean 'transferred and remained

            transferred' is most consistent with the legislative purpose

            of [Section 727(a)(2)(A)]."  Id. at 1344.  The Adeeb court
                                         ___               _____

            reasoned:

                      First, this reading encourages honest
                      debtors to recover property they have
                      transferred during the year preceding
                      bankruptcy.  Encouraging debtors to
                      recover improperly transferred property
                      facilitates the equitable distribution of
                      assets among creditors by ensuring that
                      the trustee has possession of all of the
                      debtor's assets.  Second, this reading
                      permits the honest debtor to undo his 
                      mistakes and receive his discharge.

            Id. at 1345.  Treating Adeeb as the subject of an involuntary
            ___

            petition because "[t]he involuntary petition in this case

            began the bankruptcy process," id. at 1346 n.4, the court
                                           ___

            discharged Adeeb.  The court held that "a debtor who has

            disclosed his previous transfers to his creditors and is

            making a good faith effort to recover the property

            transferred at the time an involuntary bankruptcy petition is
                                       ___________

                                         -13-
                                          13

            filed is entitled to a discharge of his debts if he is

            otherwise qualified."  Id. at 1346 (emphasis added).
                                   ___

                      The Adeeb court, however, enunciated a different
                          _____

            rule with respect to a debtor who files a voluntary
                                                      _________

            bankruptcy petition:  "[A] debtor who transfers property

            within one year of bankruptcy with the intent penalized by

            section 727(a)(2)(A) may not be denied discharge of his debts

            if he reveals the transfers to his creditors, recovers
                                                          ________

            substantially all of the property before he files his
            _____________________________________________________

            bankruptcy petition, and is otherwise qualified for a
            ___________________

            discharge."  Id. at 1345 (emphasis added).  As the Adeeb
                         ___                                   _____

            court explained, this rule demanding recovery prior to the

            filing of a petition "assumes the filing of a voluntary

            petition by the debtor.  In that situation, the debtor

            controls the time of filing the petition.  He is therefore

            able to time the filing to allow recovery of substantially

            all of his property."  Id. at 1346.  Adeeb thus makes clear
                                   ___           _____

            that the test applicable to a debtor subject to an

            involuntary bankruptcy petition differs substantially from

            the test the court would apply to a debtor filing a voluntary

            bankruptcy petition.

                      Even were we to adopt Adeeb, its application to the
                                            _____

            instant case would result in denial of discharge.  Bajgar did

            not recover any of the transferred property until well after

            he filed his voluntary bankruptcy petition.  Although the

                                         -14-
                                          14

            bankruptcy court noted the fact that Bajgar did not complete

            reconveyance of the property "until several months after the

            filing of the petition," Bajgar, 186 B.R. at 9, it determined
                                     ______

            that because Bajgar revealed the transfer at the time of his

            filing, "those facts satisfy the Adeeb test that the recovery
                                             _____

            be 'prior to the time the bankruptcy petition was filed or

            within a reasonable time after it was filed.'"  Id. (quoting
                                                            ___

            Adeeb, 787 F.2d at 1346).  Contrary to the bankruptcy court's
            _____

            assertion, disclosure constitutes only one component of the

            activity necessary to secure discharge under Adeeb.  See
                                                         _____   ___

            Adeeb, 787 F.2d at 1345-46.  Furthermore, the language that
            _____

            the bankruptcy court relies on from Adeeb applies to an
                                                _____

            involuntary petition, rather than a voluntary petition:  "We

            emphasize that the debtor [subject] . . . to the filing of

            the involuntary petition . . . must actually recover the

            property within a reasonable time after the filing of the
                                                                  ___

            involuntary petition."  Adeeb, 787 F.2d at 1346 (emphasis
            ____________________    _____

            added).  In the case of a voluntary bankruptcy petition, such

            as Bajgar filed, however, "[t]he Ninth Circuit requires

            actual reconveyance of the fraudulently transferred property
            ____________________________________________________________

            before the bankruptcy filing."  Kablaoui, 196 B.R. at 709
            ____________________________    ________

            (explaining Adeeb) (emphasis added); see also Adeeb, 787 F.2d
                        _____                    ___ ____ _____

            at 1345-46; March v. Sanders (In re Sanders), 128 B.R. 963,
                        _____    _______  _____________

            971 (W.D. La. 1991) ("Court of Appeals decisions . . . have

            taken the position that mere disclosure of actions prohibited

                                         -15-
                                          15

            by Sec. 727(a)(2)(A) will not prevent denial of discharge. 

            What may allow discharge is disclosure accompanied by

            voluntary prepetition reversal of the prohibited activities .
                      ____________________

            . . .") (emphasis added).  As the Kablaoui court concluded,
                                              ________

            "[h]ere the Debtor did not attempt to recover any of the

            transferred property before filing for bankruptcy.  Thus,

            these transfers were not 'undone' under the Ninth Circuit's

            definition of 'transfer.'"  Kablaoui, 196 B.R. at 709.
                                        ________

                      The bankruptcy court, again relying on Adeeb,
                                                             _____

            endeavored to buttress its construction of Section

            727(a)(2)(A) by insisting that construing "transferred" to

            mean "transferred and remained transferred" furthers the

            general purpose of the Bankruptcy Code.  See Bajgar, 186 B.R.
                                                     ___ ______

            at 7-8.  We recognize that reading the term "transferred" to

            mean "transferred and remained transferred," could be

            construed, in certain instances, to advance the "purpose of

            the Bankruptcy Act to [distribute] the assets of the bankrupt

            . . . among creditors and then to relieve the honest debtor

            from the weight of oppressive indebtedness and permit him to

            start afresh free from the obligations and responsibilities

            consequent upon business misfortunes."  Williams v. United
                                                    ________    ______

            States Fidelity & Guarantee Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554-55 (1915);
            _______________________________

            Adeeb, 787 F.2d at 1345.  This purpose affords the "honest
            _____

            but unfortunate debtor who surrenders for distribution the

            property which he owns at the time of bankruptcy, a new
                                   _________________________

                                         -16-
                                          16

            opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort,

            unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting

            debt."  Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934).
                    ______________    ____

                      In this case, however, Bajgar did not reveal his

            initial fraudulent transfer until he filed his bankruptcy

            petition.  In addition, Bajgar consulted with an experienced

            bankruptcy attorney at the time he executed the initial

            fraudulent transfer.  It was not until he faced the prospect

            of being denied discharge pursuant to Section 727(a)(2)(A)

            that Bajgar actually reconveyed the property.  

                      We are not presented with an "honest but

            unfortunate debtor" that the Bankruptcy Code envisions as the

            deserving recipient of a fresh start.  Cf. Huckfeldt v.
                                                   ___ _________

            Huckfeldt (In re Huckfeldt), 39 F.3d 829, 832-33 (8th Cir.
            _________  _______________

            1994) (describing individual who did not constitute "honest

            but unfortunate debtor"); Barclays/American Business Credit,
                                      __________________________________

            Inc. v. Adams (In re Adams), 31 F.3d 389, 393-94 (6th Cir.
            ____    _____  ___________

            1994) (refusing to discharge a debtor pursuant to Section

            727(a)(2)(A)), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 903 (1995).2 
                           _____ ______

                                
            ____________________

            2.  Adeeb,  by contrast,  did present  such  a picture.   The
            Adeeb court explained:  
            _____

                      We  are  .  . .  persuaded  by  practical
                      considerations  that  a discharge  should
                      not be  denied in the  present situation.
                      It is  not uncommon for an uncounseled or
                      poorly   counseled   debtor  faced   with
                      mounting  debts  and  pressure  from  his
                      creditors  to  attempt  to   protect  his
                      property  by  transferring it  to others.

                                         -17-
                                          17

            Contrary to the bankruptcy court's determination, therefore,

            denying Bajgar discharge actually comports with the "purpose"

            of the Bankruptcy Act.  See Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S 279,
                                    ___ ______    ______

            286-87 (1991) ("[I]n the same breath that we have invoked

            th[e] 'fresh start' policy, we have been careful to explain

            that the [Bankruptcy] Act limits the opportunity for a

            completely unencumbered new beginning to the 'honest but

            unfortunate debtor.'"); Citibank, N.A. v. Eashai (In re
                                    ______________    ______  _____

            Eashai), 87 F.3d 1082, 1088 (9th Cir. 1996) ("This exception
            ______

            to discharge furthers the policy that an honest but

            unfortunate debtor obtains a fresh start while a dishonest

            debtor does not benefit from his wrongdoing."); Mayer v.
                                                            _____

            Spanel Int'l Ltd., 51 F.3d 670, 674 (7th Cir.) ("Congress
            _________________

            concluded that preventing fraud is more important than

            letting defrauders start over with a clean slate, and we must

            respect that judgment."), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 563 (1995).3
                                      _____ ______

                                
            ____________________

                      Upon later reflection  or upon  obtaining
                      advice   from   experienced    bankruptcy
                      counsel,  the  debtor  may   realize  his
                      original  transfer  of  property   was  a
                      mistake.

            Adeeb, 787  F.2d at 1345.   At  oral argument in  the instant
            _____
            case, however, Bajgar's attorney  informed us that Bajgar was
            well-counseled by an experienced bankruptcy lawyer throughout
            the  period in question,  including the time  he executed the
            initial fraudulent transfer.

            3.  As for  the Bankruptcy  Code's objective of  guaranteeing
            the equitable distribution of a petitioner's estate among his
            creditors,  it  is  likely  that  our  decision,  by  denying
            discharge,   will  facilitate   this  outcome   by  deterring
            petitioners  from  fraudulently transferring  property within

                                         -18-
                                          18

                                      Conclusion
                                      Conclusion
                                      __________

                      Martin's claim "comes squarely within" Section

            727(a)(2)(A)'s exception for property fraudulently

            transferred within one year of the filing of a bankruptcy

            petition.  See Menna, 16 F.3d at 9.  It is for Congress to
                       ___ _____

            determine whether or not this exception should be recast.  We

            REVERSE and REMAND to the district court with instructions to

            remand to the bankruptcy court for proceedings consistent

            with this opinion.

                                
            ____________________

            one year  of filing  a voluntary bankruptcy  petition in  the
            first place.  

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                                          19