Court Opinion

ID: 9892356
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-23 17:11:58.044691+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:04:31.922659
License: Public Domain

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 IN RE: ADOPTION OF: K.P.F.               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                          :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                          :
 APPEAL OF: K.F. AND D.F.                 :
                                          :
                                          :
                                          :
                                          :
                                          :   No. 310 WDA 2023

             Appeal from the Order Entered February 13, 2023
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County Orphans' Court at No(s):
                          No. 2021 Adoption 32

 IN RE: ADOPTION OF L.T.B.                :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                          :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                          :
 APPEAL OF: K.F. AND D. F.                :
                                          :
                                          :
                                          :
                                          :
                                          :   No. 311 WDA 2023

             Appeal from the Order Entered February 13, 2023
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County Orphans' Court at No(s):
                          No. 2021 Adoption 32A

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and KUNSELMAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.:                    FILED: OCTOBER 23, 2023

      Appellants, K.F. and D.F., appeal at docket number 310 WDA 2023 from

the orphans’ court’s order denying their petition for involuntary termination of

the parental rights of Appellee, A.B. (“Mother”), to minor, K.P.F., born in
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September of 2014.1 In addition, Appellants appeal at docket number 311

WDA 2023 from the orphans’ court’s order denying their petition for

involuntary termination of the parental rights of Mother to minor, L.T.B., born

in August of 2010.2, 3 Because it is unclear whether Children were appointed

appropriate counsel to represent their legal interests during the involuntary

termination proceedings, we are constrained to vacate the orphans’ court

orders and remand for further proceedings.

       We need not delve deeply into the underlying facts given our disposition.

Instead, we focus our attention on the procedural history of this matter, which

the orphans’ court summarized as follows:
       The interests of the [C]hildren were initially addressed by Blair
       County Children, Youth and Families.          An application for
       emergency protective custody was filed on behalf of [L.T.B.] on
       September 20, 2019. The petition alleged abuse and/or neglect[,]
       and that the child was without proper care or control. An
       application for emergency protective custody was filed on behalf
       of [K.P.F.] on September 20, 2019. The petition alleged abuse
       and/or neglect[,] and that the child was without proper care or
       control. On September 20, 2019, shelter[]care applications were
____________________________________________

1 As discussed infra, the orphans’ court also denied Appellants’ petition for
involuntary termination of the parental rights to K.P.F. of Appellee, N.F.
(“K.P.F.’s Father”).      K.P.F.’s Father had agreed to consent to the
relinquishment of his parental rights to K.P.F., provided that Mother’s rights
were terminated. N.T., 10/18/22, at 2-3. By way of background, Appellant,
K.F., is K.P.F.’s Father’s father, i.e., K.P.F.’s grandfather. Appellant, D.F., is
K.F.’s wife.

2 The biological father of L.T.B. is unknown. Orphans’ Court Opinion (“OCO”),
2/13/23, at 1. However, K.P.F.’s Father “was in the role of father for” L.T.B.
Id. at 6. See also id. at 17 (noting that K.P.F.’s Father “has been the father
role to [L.T.B.] since [L.T.B.] was four years old”).

3 We collectively refer to L.T.B. and K.P.F. herein as “Children.”

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     filed on behalf of the named [C]hildren. The applications stated
     that the [C]hildren were in the protective custody[,] as of
     September 18, 2019[,] of [Appellants] at [Appellants’ home
     address]. The shelter[]care order docket number CP7-DP-00017-
     2019 provided that sufficient evidence was presented to prove
     that continuance or return of the [C]hildren to the home of
     [Mother], [K.P.F’s Father], and[/]or maternal grandmother, [M.B.
     (“Maternal Grandmother”),] was not in the best interest[s] of the
     [C]hildren.

     By correspondence dated September 9, 2019, counsel for
     [Appellants] communicated with Blair County Children, Youth and
     Families and requested the placement of the subject [C]hildren
     with them in their home. A Permanency Review Order and
     Permanency Review Plan was entered on October 23, 2019[,] for
     the subject minor [C]hildren which provided that:

       Reasonable efforts have been made by the county children
       and youth services agency to finalize the [C]hildren’s
       permanency plan in that the goal of return home has been
       ruled out, and [Children] have been placed with [Appellants]
       who are permanent legal custodians (relative) for the
       [C]hildren. Services have been offered to the parents,
       grandparents, and the children. The parties have agreed to
       a goal of permanent legal custodianship (relative) and a
       custody order is being entered consistent with the
       agreement of the parties.

     Orders for termination of court supervision were entered on
     October 23, 2019, which provided that [C]hildren had been placed
     in the custody of a permanent legal custodian. The [C]hildren had
     been placed in the physical and legal custody of a fit and willing
     relative[,] and services from the county agency were no longer
     needed. By Order of Court dated October 23, 2019, physical and
     legal custody of the [C]hildren … were vested in [Appellants].
     [Appellants] were identified as the paternal grandparents of
     [K.P.F]. The father of [L.T.B.] was reported as unknown. The
     custody order further provided that [Mother] was permitted to
     have fully supervised visits with [Children] as mutually arranged
     with [Appellants]. The periods of visitation were to occur in
     [Appellants’] home or another location approved by [Appellants].
     [K.P.F.’s Father] was permitted to have fully supervised visits as
     mutually arranged with [Appellants]. The periods of visitation
     were to occur in [Appellants’] home or another location approved
     by [Appellants].

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       The Petitions for Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights in the
       above matters were filed [by Appellants] on November 18, 2021.
       A Consent to Accept Custody of [Children] was filed by [K.F.] on
       October 26, 2021. A Consent to Accept Custody of [Children] was
       filed by [D.F.] on October 26, 2021. On November 3, 2021,
       Maryann Joyce Bistline, Esquire was appointed as counsel for
       [Children].[4] A Report of Intention to Adopt was filed on behalf
       of [Appellants] on November 18, 2021.            A preplacement
       investigation was conducted in connection with the permanency
       plan placement of the minor [C]hildren through Blair County
       Children and Youth docketed at CP7-DP-0016-2019. The matter
       was scheduled for a hearing on February 2, 2022[,] and
       subsequently continued on April 4, 2022[,] followed by a
       continuance to May 16, 2022.

       By Order of Court dated July 5, 2022, Mark. S. Zearfaus,
       Esquire[,] was appointed to represent [K.P.F.’s Father]. Traci L.
       Naugle, Esquire[,] was appointed to represent [Mother]. The
       hearing on the Petition for Involuntary Termination of Parental
       Rights was scheduled for August 9, 2022. The matter was
       continued to October 6, 2022[,] and subsequently rescheduled to
       October 18, 2022.

       A hearing on the Petition for Termination of Parental Rights was
       held on October 18, 2022. [K.F.] was subject to direct and cross
       examination. [D.F.] was subject to direct and cross examination.
       The [C]hildren were interviewed on December 14, 2022. The
       second day of the hearing was held on December 22, 2022.
       [Mother] was subject to direct and cross examination. [Maternal
       Grandmother] was subject t[o] direct and cross examination.
       [K.P.F.’s Father] was subject to direct examination. The third day
       of the hearing was held February 8, 2023. [K.P.F.’s Father] was
       subject to cross examination. [D.F.] was subject to continued
       direct and cross examination.

OCO at 1-6 (internal citations omitted).

____________________________________________

4  There is no entry of a November 3, 2021 order on either orphans’ court
docket. However, as will be discussed infra, the orphans’ court entered orders
on January 18, 2022, in which it appointed Attorney Bistline as guardian ad
litem for Children.

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       As mentioned supra, on February 13, 2023, the orphans’ court entered

an opinion and order at each orphans’ court’s docket, wherein it denied

Appellants’ petitions for involuntary termination of parental rights of Mother

to K.P.F. and L.T.B., as well as K.P.F.’s Father to K.P.F. Appellants then filed

timely notices of appeal and concise statements pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.

1925(a)(2)(i) at each orphans’ court’s docket.5 The orphans’ court did not file

a Rule 1925(a) opinion, but instead issued a letter stating that it was relying

on its February 13, 2023 opinion and order.

       Presently, Appellants raise six issues for our review:
       I. Whether the [orphans’] court erred and/or grossly abused its
       discretion in finding that [Appellants] have failed to prove by clear
       and convincing evidence that their petition for involuntary
       termination of Mother’s parental rights should be granted
       pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.[] § 2511(a)(1)[,] as the evidence of record
       supports termination.

       II. Whether the [orphans’] court erred and/or grossly abused its
       discretion in finding that [Appellants] have failed to prove by clear
       and convincing evidence that their petition for involuntary
       termination of Mother’s parental rights should be granted
       pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.[] § 2511(a)(2)[,] as the court failed to
       consider this section in [its] opinion and order, and the record
       supports termination.

       III. Whether the [orphans’] court erred and/or grossly abused its
       discretion in both considering, and permitting evidence to be
       presented over objection, Mother’s efforts to remedy the
       conditions described in the petition for involuntary termination
       when they were initiated subsequent to the notice of filing the
       petition.

       IV. Whether the [orphans’] court erred and/or grossly abused its
       discretion in finding that while Mother did not provide essential

____________________________________________

5 We consolidated the appeals sua sponte.

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      parental care, control, or subsistence, the causes of incapacity can
      and will be remedied.

      V. Whether the [orphans’] court erred and/or grossly abused its
      discretion in denying the petition for involuntary termination of
      Mother’s parental rights due to finding a bond between the
      [C]hildren and Mother but failing to then consider:

         a. Whether the bond indicates a beneficial relationship that
         should be preserved;

         b. Whether the bond with [Appellants] is stronger than the
         bond with Mother;

         c. The substantial damage done to the [C]hildren by a
         prolonged, unhealthy, pathological bond with Mother as it
         affects [Appellants’] ability to provide the necessary love,
         care, and stability that the [C]hildren have needed;

         d. Whether termination was still appropriate when a bond
         was found as termination provides the [C]hildren with
         permanency necessary for the fulfillment of their potential
         in a permanent, healthy, safe environment.

      VI. Whether the [orphans’] court erred and/or grossly abused its
      discretion in finding that a denial of the petition for involuntary
      termination of Mother’s parental rights will allow the [C]hildren to
      remain in their home where they have formed a loving bond, and
      are provided a safe, stable, and structured environment when the
      denial prevents the same.

Appellants’ Brief at 4-6 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

      Before delving into the merits of Appellants’ issues, we must initially

consider, sua sponte, whether Children were appointed legal counsel to

represent their legal interests pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2313(a).       Section

2313(a) provides that:

      (a) Child.--The court shall appoint counsel to represent the child
      in an involuntary termination proceeding when the proceeding is
      being contested by one or both of the parents. The court may
      appoint counsel or a guardian ad litem to represent any child who
      has not reached the age of 18 years and is subject to any other

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       proceeding under this part whenever it is in the best interests of
       the child. No attorney or law firm shall represent both the child
       and the adopting parent or parents.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2313(a).

       Our Supreme Court “has interpreted this section as requiring that the

common pleas court appoint an attorney to represent the child’s legal

interests, i.e., the child’s preferred outcome.” In re Adoption of K.M.G.,

240 A.3d 1218, 1235 (Pa. 2020) (cleaned up).6            The Court has further

instructed that “a single attorney cannot represent a child’s best interests and

legal interests if those interests conflict[,]” and “the orphans’ court must

determine whether counsel can represent the dual interests before appointing

an individual to serve as [guardian ad litem]/[c]ounsel for a child.” Id. at

1236. In addition, “the failure to appoint a separate attorney to represent the

child’s legal interests constitutes structural error, meaning it is not subject to

a harmless-error analysis[,]” and the issue is “non-waivable, because the right

belonged to the child who, given that he or she was unrepresented, could not

have challenged the lack of counsel.” Id. at 1235 (cleaned up). Accordingly,

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6 A child’s legal interests are distinct from his or her best interests.See In
re T.S., 192 A.3d 1080, 1082 n.2 (Pa. 2018) (“‘Legal interests’ denotes that
an attorney is to express the child’s wishes to the court regardless of whether
the attorney agrees with the child’s recommendation. ‘Best interests’ denotes
that a guardian ad litem is to express what the guardian ad litem believes is
best for the child’s care, protection, safety, and wholesome physical and
mental development regardless of whether the child agrees.”) (citations
omitted); In re Adoption of L.B.M., 161 A.3d 172, 174 (Pa. 2017) (“In cases
involving children, the law acknowledges two separate and distinct categories
of interest: a child’s legal interests, which are synonymous with the child’s
preferred outcome, and a child’s best interests, which the trial court must
determine.”) (footnotes omitted).

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our Supreme Court has granted appellate courts sua sponte review to assess

“(1) whether the orphans’ court appointed counsel to represent the legal

interests of the children and (2) if the appointed counsel also serves as

[guardian ad litem], whether the orphans’ court determined that the child’s

best interests and legal interests did not conflict.” Id. at 1236.

       Here, it is unclear to us what role Attorney Bistline played in the

proceedings below. On January 18, 2022, the orphans’ court entered an order

pertaining to K.P.F., which stated in relevant part:
       Maryann Bistline, Esquire is hereby appointed the Guardian Ad
       Litem for [K.P.F.] to represent his interest in the above captioned
       adoption action. Any fees due to the Guardian Ad Litem shall be
       paid at a rate of $ ___ per hour.

Order, 1/18/22 (blank space in original).7

       Similarly, with respect to L.T.B, the court filed the following order on

January 18, 2022, which provided in relevant part:
       Maryann Bistline, Esquire is hereby appointed the Guardian Ad
       Litem for [L.T.B.] to represent his interest in the above captioned
       adoption action. Any fees due to the Guardian Ad Litem shall be
       paid at a rate of $ ___ per hour.

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7 Though not filed until January 18, 2022, this order was dated November 23,

2021, and pertains to the petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights to
K.P.F. A nearly identical order — filed on January 18, 2022 and mistakenly
dated January 10, 2021 — also appears in the record and pertains to the
petition to terminate K.P.F.’s Father’s parental rights. It likewise appoints
Attorney Bistline as K.P.F.’s guardian ad litem.

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Order, 1/18/22 (blank space in original).8 Thus, although the orders do not

specify what interests Attorney Bistline is to represent, she is identified in the

appointment orders as Children’s guardian ad litem, not specifically as their

legal counsel.

       Our review of the transcripts also reveals that Attorney Bistline was

identified as Children’s guardian ad litem during the proceedings. See N.T.,

10/18/22, at 1 (orphans’ court’s stating, “Present in the courtroom is Maryann

Joyce Bistline. She is guardian ad litem for the minor [C]hildren.”); id. at 92

(orphans’ court’s conveying, “Attorney Bistline has been appointed as

guardian ad litem for the [C]hildren. So I would like her input on [whether

the Children should be interviewed], if you don’t mind placing it. If you don’t

have input[,] that’s fine[,] but I do ask for your input on the record as guardian

ad litem for the [C]hildren and you may have to get near a microphone.”); id.

at 93 (orphans’ court’s saying that, with respect to the Children’s interviews,

“I would prefer that the attorneys are present and … I am agreeable to the

attorneys asking the questions or talking to the [C]hildren, unless that is not

preferred. I’ll leave that to the guardian ad litem. Why don’t we do it this

way. Why don’t we have the attorneys provide areas of discussion and I will

handle the direct communications with the [C]hildren, with the attorneys
____________________________________________

8 This order was also dated November 23, 2021, and pertains to the petition

to terminate Mother’s parental rights to L.T.B. There is another order — dated
November 23 ,2021, and entered on January 18, 2022 — which pertains to
L.T.B.’s unknown father and states that “Maryann Joyce Bistline, Esquire, is
hereby appointed to represent the child listed in paragraph 6 of the petition[,
i.e., L.T.B.]”. Order, 1/18/22.

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present but the attorneys can give me their areas that they would like me to

address with the [C]hildren and they can be specific questions or areas, either

way.”), but see N.T., 12/22/22, at 1 (“And Counsel for the minor [C]hildren,

Maryann Joyce Bistline[,] is in the courtroom.”); N.T., 2/8/23, at 1 (orphans’

court’s stating, “Present in the courtroom, Maryanne Joyce Bistline, counsel

for the minor [C]hildren.”). Separate interviews of K.P.F. and L.T.B. took place

on December 14, 2022, where both the orphans’ court and Attorney Bistline

asked them questions. See generally N.T., 12/14/22.

      Based on the foregoing, we are unable to verify whether the orphans’

court appointed counsel to represent K.P.F. and L.T.B.’s respective legal

interests, as it appears from the face of the record that Attorney Bistline was

appointed to be their guardian ad litem.       Further, if Attorney Bistline was

appointed to be Children’s guardian ad litem and legal counsel, we are unable

to find anything in the record showing that the orphans’ court determined that

Children’s best interests and legal interests did not conflict.       See In re

Adoption of K.M.G., supra.

      As a result, we are compelled to vacate the orphans’ court’s orders and

remand for further proceedings.        On remand, the orphans’ court must

determine whether, pursuant to Section 2313(a), Attorney Bistline is able to

represent, without conflict, both the best interests and legal interests of each

child. If the orphans’ court ascertains that no conflict exists between each

child’s best interests and legal interests, then the court shall re-enter its order

denying Appellants’ petitions for involuntary termination of parental rights at

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each orphans’ court docket.9, 10 However, if the court concludes that there is

a conflict between K.P.F.’s legal and best interests or L.T.B.’s legal and best

interests, then the court shall appoint separate legal counsel for that child and

conduct a new termination hearing so that legal counsel has an opportunity

to advocate for that child’s legal interests. See Interest of A.J.R.O., 270

A.3d at 571 (giving similar remand instructions).

       Orders vacated. Cases remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.

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9 Such an order would constitute a new, final, appealable order to this Court.

See Interest of A.J.R.O., 270 A.3d 563, 571 n.11 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citing
In re H.S.W.C.-B., 836 A.2d 908, 911 (Pa. 2003) (holding that “an order
terminating or preserving parental rights ... shall be deemed final when
entered”)).

10 We also ask the orphans’ court to ensure that it has adequately addressed

the errors raised by Appellants in their concise statements. See Pa.R.A.P.
1925(a)(1) (providing that “the judge who entered the order giving rise to the
notice of appeal, if the reasons for the order do not already appear of record,
shall within the period set forth in Pa.R.A.P. 1931(a)(1) file of record at least
a brief opinion of the reasons for the order, or for the rulings or other errors
complained of, or shall specify in writing the place in the record where such
reasons may be found”); Commonwealth v. Widger, 237 A.3d 1151, 1158
n.5 (Pa. Super. 2020) (“It is incumbent upon a trial court to provide this Court
with its Rule 1925(a) opinion addressing an appellant’s issues, with citation to
the record, to permit a meaningful and effective review of the issues raised
and efficient use of judicial resources.”); see also Appellants’ Brief at 21-22
(claiming that the orphans’ court did not analyze termination under Section
2511(a)(2) in its February 13, 2023 opinion); Mother’s Brief at 7
(acknowledging that the orphans’ court’s opinion “does not specifically state
that the … court found that there was not sufficient evidence to terminate
Mother’s parental rights under [S]ection 2511(a)(2)”).

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Date: 10/23/2023

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