Court Opinion

ID: 9763738
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:54:20.180056+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:57:43.223432
License: Public Domain

CLINTON, Judge,
concurring.
The offense is possession with intent to deliver amphetamine in an amount alleged to be 28 grams or more but less than 400 grams, which turned out to be an assortment of materials and things weighing 340.44 grams when and as received at the DPS laboratory.
The aggregate weight is derived from combining respective weights of seven “exhibits” loosely described in note 3 of the majority opinion; at least three of which are kinds of containers capable of holding liquid.1 Those *139“exhibits” were seized from premises of appellants in rural area in Falls County on March 19, 1987. There is no claim that a “speed laboratory” was then on the premises; indeed, we are informed by the opinion below that a “dismantled drug laboratory” was seized in a miniwarehouse in Reisel, McLen-nan County, on April 8, 1987, leased by appellants on February 23, 1987. Slip opinion, at 14.
In short, this is not a “manufacturing” case. It does involve manufactured products and putative remnants of the manufacturing process, the latter being at least the three “exhibits” weighing in aggregate 309.88 grams of the overall weight of 340.44 grams. The difference of 30.56 grams is 2.56 grams more than 28, and that relatively slight margin between a felony of the second degree and an aggravated offense punishment is enough, in my judgment, to insist that to edify the factfinder in deliberating on pertinent requirements of law, testimony from chemists and other “experts” must “properly present and prove a criminal violation of the Act.” McGlothlin v. State, 749 S.W.2d 856, at 859 (Tex.Cr.App.1988).
One significant statutory factor in determining the amount of any controlled substance possessed with intent to deliver is the aggregate weight “including any adulterants or dilutants.” §§ 4.03, 4.031 and 4.032. Here the court of appeals recognized the chemist did not testify regarding “the purity or concentration of the amphetamine,” but concluded that “uge of the phrase ‘including adulterants and dilutants’ in the indictment is not necessary, nor is proof of the specific amount of adulterants and dilutants in the quantity of the controlled substance seized.” Slip opinion, at 6-7.2 Reserving my position on whether “adulterants or dilutants” must *140be alleged, for the reasons developed in the margin I am convinced that the evidence in this cause is insufficient, and that the court of appeals came to its conclusions mainly on the bases of its premature reliance on Reeves v. State, supra, and of its acceptance of testimony and exhibits that failed to illuminate relevant evidentiary matters that must be examined under applicable provisions of the Act to determine sufficiency of the evidence in order for a jury to convict an accused of possession with intent to deliver twenty-eight grams or more of amphetamine. See and compare Dowling v. State, 885 S.W.2d 103 (Tex.Cr.App.1992); Blackmon v. State, 786 S.W.2d 467, at 470-473 (Tex.App —Houston [1st] 1990) PDR refused; Herndon v. State, 767 S.W.2d 510, at 512-513 (Tex.App. — Fort Worth 1989), PDR refused. Accordingly, I join the judgment of the court.

. To supplement descriptions of the "exhibits” listed in note 3, we may glean more information from the manner each was identified by the court reporter, viz:
No. 6: Kerr pint jar with amber colored residue
No. 29: 2 plastic bags containing crystal substance
No. 118: Three vials
No. 107: White bowl containing brown sticky substance
No. 43: Two containers with suspected brown substance
No. 28: Black film container
No. 11: Brown vial containing white powder
The court of appeals also mentioned testimony of the chemist that , "almost nine pounds of the aggregate weight of the above-listed substances was phenylacetic acid;” related exhibits are sim*139ilarly treated, with quoted comment by the chemist, viz:
No. 4 Glass 1-gal. jug containing white powder; "three pounds, four and a quarter ounces of a powder which contains phenol acetic acid [sic]”
No. 5. Plastic 1-gal. jug containing white powder; "one pound, eleven and three quarter ounces of a powder which contains phenol acetic acid [sic]”
No. 80 Plastic jar containing white powder; "three pounds, fifteen and a half ounces of a powder which contains phenol acetic acid [sic]"

. Along the way the court of appeals reasoned: "... Although the chemist did not testify regarding the purity or concentration of the amphetamine, his testimony reflects that almost nine pounds of the aggregate weight of [substances listed in note 3 of the majority opinion, ante ] was phenylacetic acid, an ingredient used to make phenylacetone, ‘the direct precursor to amphetamine and methamphetamine.’ Thus, this testimony could have been considered by the jury in determining the aggregate weight of the amphetamine, including adulterants and dilutants.” Slip opinion, at 6.
But, of course, a precursor, such as phenylacetic acid, to an “immediate precursor" will not alone produce a controlled substance for it is not “an immediate chemical intermediary,” § 1.02(20), and would not survive the reflux process of making the "immediate precursor;” similarly, phe-nylacetone would be "used up” in the manufacturing process, thus not only losing its separate identity but also being incorporated into and becoming an integral part of the final product— pure amphetamine — never as an adulterant or dilutant then or thereafter "used in cutting" amphetamine. See § 1.02(15)(F). Moreover, the particular "nine pounds” of phenylacetic acid the court of appeals would allow the jury to consider in determining the aggregate weight of this amphetamine had not yet been used to make phenylacetone. See Exhibits Nos. 4, 5 and 80, described in note 1, ante. Furthermore, contrary to the position restated by the majority opinion in this cause at 4, the weight of “an immediate precursor” such as phenylacetone is not includa-ble in the “aggregate weight” of a controlled substance. See Dowling v. State, 885 S.W.2d 103 (Tex.Cr.App.) (Clinton, J., concurring opinion at 129-130).
With respect to adulterants and dilutants, the court first noted:
"Though not statutorily defined, the terms adulterants and dilutants have been defined by the court of criminal appeals as compounds, substances, or solutions added to the controlled substance to increase the bulk or quantity of the product, as in the present case. See McGlothin v. State, 749 S.W.2d 856, 857-58 (Tex.Crim.App.1988). * * ' ⅞” Id., at 131— 132.
During the course of its discussion in McGlothin, however, this Court undertook to determine the "scope” and “meaning” of those terms by taking guidance from the Code Construction Act and ultimately concluding that they "must be read in context of the entire Act and construed according to the particular meaning for which each is intended." Id., at 858-859. Accordingly it began with the definition of "drug paraphernalia” in § 1.02(15)(F), viz:
“(15) ‘Drug paraphernalia’ means ... a product, or a material of any kind that is used or intended for use in ... compounding, converting, producing, processing, preparing ... a controlled substance [including] but is not limited to: * * * *
*140(F) a diluent or adulterant, such as quinine hydrochloride, mannitol, mannite, dextrose, or lactose, used or intended for use in cutting a controlled substance!.]”
Contrary to the contention of the State that subsection (15)(F) did not attempt to define either “diluent” or "adulterant,” we found that every product mentioned shares the common characteristic of being a "cutting agent,” and thus indicative of the meaning of "diluent” [or its synonym "dilutant”] and “adulterant,” both being similar "in the sense that either can 'cut’ a controlled substance;” therefore, "the definition given those terms remains probative as to the Legislature's use of the terms elsewhere in the Act.” Id., at 859. After resorting to other defining sources, the Court declared those definitions coupled with § 1.02(15)(F) formed its own definition, id., at 860, which "comports with legislative intent,” id., at 861, viz: matter added to the controlled substance with the intent to increase the bulk or increase the quantity of the product without affecting its activity. Id., at 860. Thus the essence of our definition in McGlothlin is substantially the same as that statutorily provided by the Legislature in § 1.02(15)(F).
Finally, the court of appeals opined;
"Moreover, since the phrase ‘controlled substance' includes adulterants and dilutants by definition in the context of the Controlled Substances Act, no variation exists between the indictments and proof presented at trial. A plain reading of the statute reveals that the use of the phrase “controlled substance" in the indictment includes adulterants and dilutants. See ... Reeves v. State, 743 S.W.2d 362, 364 (Tex.App. — Fort Worth 1987, pet. granted on rehearing)." Id., at-.
To the contrary, "controlled substance” means a "substance" listed in Penalty Groups 1 through 4 of the Act, § 1.02(4); Penalty Group 2 lists amphetamine in § 4.02(c)(3), contained in "any material, compound, mixture, or preparation.” Those two sections serve to identify "amphetamine” as a "controlled substance," yet neither mentions “adulterants and dilutants.” As germane here, the terms do not even appear in sections defining basic offenses by reference to penalty groups, i.e.', §§ 4.03(a) through 4.044(a); e.g.:
“[A] person commits an offense if he knowingly or intentionally manufactures, delivers, or possesses with intent to manufacture or deliver a controlled substance listed in Penalty Group 2."
Indeed, only in fixing respective punishments for basic offenses and in defining and fixing punishments for respective aggravated offenses according to "the amount of the controlled substance ... by aggregate weight,” did the Legislature allude to “including any adulterants or dilu-tants” — meaning, of course, that there may not be “any” of either included — and in the case of "pure amphetamine” intentionally and knowingly there-will not be "any.” See XVIII S.F. 40.
Therefore, the definition of "controlled substance” does not include "adulterants and dilu-tants;" whether there are "any” relates primarily to determining applicable range of punishments according the amount of the particular controlled substance with or without "adulterants or dilutants.” To make that determination requires forthright comprehensive "expert testimony to properly present and prove a criminal violation of the Act." McGlothin v. State, supra, at 859; cf. Reeves v. State, 806 S.W.2d 540, at 543-545 (Tex.Cr.App.1990) (absent facts showing remainder of material consisted of substance intended to increase bulk or quantity of final product, amphetamine, cannot be said remainder was adulterant or dilutant).
All emphasis here and throughout this opinion is mine unless otherwise indicated.