Court Opinion

ID: 9366249
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-26 15:04:24.110948+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:50.328293
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-50541     Document: 00516425678         Page: 1     Date Filed: 08/09/2022

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit                        United States Court of Appeals
                                                                         Fifth Circuit

                                                                       FILED
                                                                  August 9, 2022
                                  No. 21-50541                    Lyle W. Cayce
                                Summary Calendar                       Clerk

   Richard A. Dunsmore, a resident of the Texas Civil Commitment
   Center & Client of the Texas Civil Commitment Office,

                                                           Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                       versus

   Marsha McLane, Executive Director of the Texas Civil Commitment
   Office,

                                                           Defendant—Appellee.

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Western District of Texas
                            USDC No. 1:21-CV-128

   Before Southwick, Graves, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
          Richard Dunsmore filed a Section 1983 suit against the Director of the
   Texas Civil Commitment Office (“TCCO”), which operates the Center
   where Dunmore has been civilly committed. Dunsmore claims various

          *
            Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
   opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
   circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
Case: 21-50541      Document: 00516425678           Page: 2     Date Filed: 08/09/2022

                                     No. 21-50541

   violations of his First Amendment rights. The district court dismissed for
   failure to state a claim. We AFFIRM.
           FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
          Richard Dunsmore was involuntarily consigned to the Texas Civil
   Commitment Center in Littlefield, Texas, as a Sexually Violent Predator. On
   February 5, 2021, he filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against
   the Director of the TCCO, Marsha McLane, and other TCCO employees.
   Dunsmore later amended his complaint to allege that McLane violated his
   First Amendment rights because TCCO’s correspondence policies
   prevented him from contacting his ex-wife, Felicia Richardson. He argues
   this policy interferes with his right to correspond and associate as well as his
   right to access to the courts because Richardson was assisting him with legal
   proceedings. He also claims the TCCO policies violated his correspondence
   rights because they prevented him from contacting TCCO contractors.
   Finally, he alleges TCCO officials, including two identified as K- Jolley and
   Latitia Murff, retaliated against him for making these claims and conspired
   to cover up their interference with his communications. This claim is based
   on an incident report and sanctions he received for sending letters to TCCO
   clinical examiners. Dunsmore is proceeding in forma pauperis.
          His case was referred to a magistrate judge. Pursuant to the Prison
   Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), the magistrate judge issued a report that
   recommended dismissing Dunsmore’s claims with prejudice for failure to
   state a claim. Dunsmore objected. The district court overruled those
   objections, adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation, and dismissed
   Dunsmore’s complaint. Dunsmore timely appealed.
                                  DISCUSSION
          The PLRA requires district courts to dismiss claims brought in forma
   pauperis if those claims are frivolous or if the plaintiff fails to state a claim.
   28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (ii). We review de novo a district court’s

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   dismissal of a prisoner’s claims under the PLRA for failure to state a claim.
   Ruiz v. United States, 160 F.3d 273, 275 (5th Cir. 1998).
           We apply the same standard to dismissals under the PLRA as to
   dismissals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Id. at 275. A
   prisoner’s complaint will survive dismissal only “if it contains ‘sufficient
   factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on
   its face.’” Legate v. Livingston, 822 F.3d 207, 210 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting
   Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). The prisoner must “plead[]
   factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
   defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S.
   at 678).
           We begin with Dunsmore’s claims that TCCO’s communication
   policy violates his First Amendment rights to correspondence, association,1
   and access to the courts. All these claims are based on TCCO’s denial of
   Dunsmore’s request to correspond with Richardson and the TCCO

           1
             Dunsmore’s amended complaint states that he brings a claim for violation of his
   substantive due process right to familial relationships. The magistrate judge and district
   court appear to have construed this claim liberally as one alleging a violation of his First
   Amendment right to association. See Johnson v. Atkins, 999 F.2d 99, 100 (5th Cir. 1993)
   (explaining pro se complaints are liberally construed). We agree with this interpretation of
   Dunsmore’s pleadings. The First Amendment right to “[i]ntimate associations generally
   refer[s] to the kinds of relationships that attend the creation and sustenance of a family,
   such as marital or parental relationships.” Mote v. Walthall, 902 F.3d 500, 506 (5th Cir.
   2018) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The substantive due process right to familial
   relationships, rather, refers to the protection of “family relationships and a parent’s right
   to the care, custody, control, and management of their children.” Wooley v. City of Baton
   Rouge, 211 F.3d 913, 920–21 (5th Cir. 2000). In this context, family is often defined by
   “biological relationships.” Id. at 921. These considerations show Dunsmore’s claims are
   more properly First Amendment association claims rather than substantive due process
   claims, given the basis of his claim is a policy regulating correspondence and the association
   he seeks to protect is best considered marital. Accordingly, we conclude the district court
   properly liberally construed Dunsmore’s complaint as pleading a First Amendment
   association claim.

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                                     No. 21-50541

   contractors.   Whether a prison’s regulation violates a prisoner’s First
   Amendment rights depends on the reasonableness of the regulation.
   Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 409 (1989). We consider four factors
   when assessing the reasonableness of a prison regulation that infringes on
   First Amendment interests:
          (1) whether the regulation is rationally related to a legitimate
          penological goal; (2) whether alternative means of exercising
          First Amendment rights remain open; (3) the impact that
          accommodating the asserted right will have on other prisoners
          and prison employees; and (4) whether there are easy and
          obvious alternative means of accommodating the asserted
          right.
   Prison Legal News v. Livingston, 683 F.3d 201, 214 (5th Cir. 2012) (citation
   omitted). The prisoner bears the burden of demonstrating the regulation is
   not rationally related to a legitimate penological interest.        Stauffer v.
   Gearhart, 741 F.3d 574, 584 (5th Cir. 2014).
          Based on this record, the defendants provided a reasonable process for
   a client to gain approval to correspond with outside contacts. Specifically,
   TCCO policy on approving contacts and chaperones states that for a client
   to be allowed to contact someone, he must submit a request to the TCCO
   Case Manager and Treatment Provider, who in turn will approve that contact
   based on that individual’s treatment requirements. The Case Manager must
   then complete a face-to-face interview with the potential contact or, if that is
   not feasible, interview the contact over the phone.
          This policy is rationally related to the state’s goals for civil
   commitment.      Specifically, the state intends to provide “long-term
   supervision and treatment” through civil commitment to those convicted of
   violent sexual crimes. Brown v. Taylor, 911 F.3d 235, 239 (5th Cir. 2018)
   (quotation marks and citation omitted). Restricting contact according to

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   treatment objectives is rationally related to this goal. Moreover, the policy
   does not completely foreclose clients’ right to correspondence so long as the
   contact is permitted by the client’s treatment considerations, and there are
   also few, if any, less burdensome alternatives to accommodate the right
   without foregoing an approval process altogether. See Thornburgh, 490 U.S.
   at 417–19. The process to submit a request and receive approval therefore is
   reasonable and does not create a constitutional issue.
          Moreover, Dunsmore did not pursue the process fully. TCCO never
   actually denied Dunsmore the ability to correspond with Richardson. Rather,
   Dunsmore submitted a request and then was instructed to comply with
   TCCO policy by submitting a collateral contact request to begin the approval
   process. The magistrate judge and the district court found no evidence he
   ever submitted that request. The procedure was reasonable, and Dunsmore
   did not actually receive a denial of his correspondence request. Therefore,
   Dunsmore did not state a claim for a First Amendment violation.
          Dunsmore also alleges that the TCCO officers retaliated against him
   for his correspondence complaints. A prison official may not retaliate against
   an inmate “for complaining through proper channels about a guard’s
   misconduct.” Morris v. Powell, 449 F.3d 682, 684 (5th Cir. 2006). “To state
   a valid claim for [First Amendment] retaliation under [S]ection 1983, “a
   prisoner must allege (1) a specific constitutional right, (2) the defendant’s
   intent to retaliate against the prisoner for his or her exercise of that right, (3)
   a retaliatory adverse act, and (4) causation.” Brown, 911 F.3d at 245. An act
   of retaliation does not constitute a constitutional violation if it is “so de
   minimis that [it] would not deter the ordinary person from further exercise of
   his rights.” Morris, 449 F.3d at 686.
          Dunsmore alleges acts that even if done with retaliatory motive would
   be too de minimis to be considered a constitutional violation. The only

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   retaliative acts he alleges are related to the officers’ filing an incident report
   that indicated he was “sending harassing correspondence to biennial
   examiners without receiving approval” and was given “verbal warning”
   related to those letters that included a reminder of the rules prohibiting such
   contact with prior approval. The record therefore does not show Dunsmore
   suffered any significant consequences as a result of the allegedly retaliatory
   actions. His allegations therefore are not sufficient to raise a claim of
   retaliation. See Petzold v. Rostollan, 946 F.3d 242, 254 (5th Cir. 2019)
   (concluding allegedly retaliatory actions were de minimis because inmate
   suffered no “serious consequences”).
          Finally, Dunsmore identifies Jolley and Murff as two TCCO officials
   who conspired to interfere with his First Amendment rights. His complaint
   contains no factual allegations to support such allegation. The claim fails.
          AFFIRMED.

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