Court Opinion

ID: 9523362
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:39:57.886821+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:05:03.854995
License: Public Domain

*680
DISSENTING OPINION

Arterburn, J.
The complaint describes a pit or hole artifically created, not in the category of a pond. The deceased six-year-old child was a trespasser at the time he was drowned. The pit had sides which were steep. It was permitted to fill with water to a depth of about six feet during a period of six weeks during which time it froze over. Mounds of earth around the pit sloped steeply to the ice. The dangerous condition was latent and hidden as to a six-year-old child, but without question would be patent and observable to any mature individual. Another characteristic existed, namely, the attractiveness of any construction work not only to mature individuals, but particularly to children.
The difficulty here is in defining the vague doctrine of attractive nuisance. The attempt to formulate a rule to govern cases of this kind has resulted in a wide variety of hopelessly conflicting cases. Most jurisdictions follow the principle in the turn-table case, Sioux City and Pacific R. R. Co. v. Stout (1874), 84 U. S. 657, 21 L. Ed. 745. This is adopted in the Restatement of Torts, §389 (1934).
As a general proposition, the possessor of land is not liable for harm to trespassers. Like most principles of law there are certain exceptions. An increasing regard for human safety has led to the development of the so-called principle of “attractive nuisances” as concerns trespassing children because of their lack of understanding and appreciation of dangers and the rights of owners of land.
The decisions attempt to compromise between the interest of society in protecting children against their natural inclinations and the interest of landowners to use their land with reasonable freedom.
*681The landowner is not liable for the natural condition of his land or where he merely attempts to duplicate the work of nature. While there was not an unanimity as to the facts in Plotzki v. Standard Oil Co. (1950), 228 Ind. 518, 92 N. E. 2d 632, the principle was correctly stated:
“By the law of Indiana and the overwhelming weight of authority in this country a pond, pool, lake, stream or other body of water does not constitute an attractive nuisance. . . . This rule applies to a pond created artifically provided that it merely duplicates the work of nature without adding any new dangers.” (Our italics.) Plotzki v. Standard Oil Co. of Indiana (1950), 228 Ind. 518, 520, 521, 92 N. E. 2d 632, 633, 634.
Here we have an artificial condition created which does not simulate a natural condition such as a pond.
The allegations in the complaint show the accessability of the location to children in the neighborhood. One of the elements of the attractive nuisance principle is the foreseeability of the attractiveness of the structure for children. The doctrine does not make a landowner an insurer of trespassing children; neither should it place an unusual burden on those engaged in construction work. With that thought in mind, the law looks at the measure of care required and the relatively inexpensive measures which might be used to avoid the risk of danger to children.
The impracticability of guarding the premises against such dangers is a consideration in determining liability in this class of cases. The complaint here alleges that a comparatively small expenditure of the sum of $10.00 could have eliminated the danger by pumping the pit dry. The pleadings further state that the pit was permitted to remain in the condition alleged for approxi*682mately six weeks. The statements in the complaint take the case out of the ordinary construction work. The allegations (which we must assume as true for the purpose of the demurrer) show the construction work was not carried on expeditiously, but a considerable period of time elapsed after the pit was dug. Coupling that allegation with the statement that a small expenditure could have avoided the dangerous condition, (which of course would have to be proved on the trial) we feel this case may be distinguished from the ordinary construction case. 8 A. L. R. 2d 1254 (1949).
The case of Neal, Admr. v. Home Builders, Inc. (1953), 232 Ind. 160, 111 N. E. 2d 280, differs on the ground that it emphasizes the difference between a patent and a latent danger, holding that the conditions in the construction of the house which caused the injury were patent and observable, and therefore did not fall within the requirements of an attractive nuisance. Indiana allows recovery under the Restatement of Torts (Vol. 2, §339) in attractive nuisance cases. 32 Ind. L. J. 75 (1956) ; 26 Ind. L. J. 266, p. 269.
The allegations of the complaint conform to the Restatement. Therefore I feel the complaint states a good cause of action and the judgment of the trial court should be reversed with directions to overrule the demurrer to the complaint.
Landis, C. J., concurs.
Note. — Reported in 175 N. E. 2d 132.