Court Opinion

ID: 9487309
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:13:26.232467+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:11.932100
License: Public Domain

NOONAN, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
The government concedes the error in seating Stout once the jury had begun its deliberations. The error was of a character described as “forfeited” — that is, an error to which counsel failed to object. There was, of course, no waiver because only the defendant in person could waive Rule 24(c). United States v. Ullah, 976 F.2d 509, 511 (9th Cir.1992). The error was plain — an obvious violation of Rule 24(c). United States v. Olano, — U.S. -, -, 113 S.Ct. 1776, 1779 (1993). The error resulted in an unauthorized person being in the jury room while the jury deliberated. The error affected substantial rights of the defendant: the stranger in the jury room voted for his conviction. Consequently, the plain error was correctable on appeal. Id. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 1778.
We are authorized to correct plain error in our discretion as Federal Rule 52(b) provides:
PLAIN ERROR. Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court.
We exercise this discretion to reverse a conviction only when the error “ ‘seriously affects] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’ ” Olano, — U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 1779, quoting United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160, 56 S.Ct. 391, 392, 80 L.Ed. 555 (1936).
The unauthorized person in the jury room — unlike the alternates in Olano — was not instructed to refrain from participation in the deliberations. To the contrary, the district court instructed the jury to begin its deliberations over again when Stout was added to its number. It is a fair inference that in some immeasurable degree Stout did play a part in the deliberations. And the fundamental fact is that she voted for the verdict.
Certainly, Stout’s presence did not affect the fairness of the proceedings. The evidence against McFarland was compelling. *1516The question we have to resolve is whether Stout’s presence and vote seriously affected the integrity of the proceedings or their public reputation.
If it were known that an unauthorized person took part in a jury’s deliberations and voted for the verdict, the public reputation of the proceedings would be affected. By the same token, it is an impairment of the integrity of the proceedings for an unauthorized person to participate in them and vote for the verdict. Accordingly, McFarland’s conviction must be reversed.
Five arguments are raised against this conclusion. First, the concern expressed in Olano is distinguished by noting that Olano dealt with a fourteen-person jury — always unconstitutional — while here there was a twelve-person jury, illegal only because of the violation of Rule 24(c). This distinction is not persuasive. Olano focused on the presence of nonjurors in the jury room; the same problem is presented here — according to the law, Stout was not a juror but a stranger.
Secondly, it is suggested that Stout’s presence affected neither the integrity of the proceeding nor its public reputation. Stout was, after all, a duly-picked alternate and was sworn; her only drawback was her irregular status. In the public eye nothing seemed improper in her participation — after all, even McFarland’s trial counsel saw nothing wrong in her role. But, to the contrary, Stout was by law a nonjuror. By necessary inference she took part in the deliberations of the jury, and she voted for the verdict. The jury’s integrity was impaired; and once the law and facts are known the public reputation of the proceedings is tainted.
Thirdly, it may be said that the standard set for reversal — injury to fairness, integrity or public reputation — is not to be read in the disjunctive but as a single criterion centered on fairness: if the trial was fair, then the public reputation of the proceedings was uninjured and their integrity unimpaired. But this argument dissolves the disjunctive that “or” creates, and this argument ignores the real differences that exist between fairness of result and the integrity of the process and the public reputation of the process.
Fourthly, it may be said that the integrity and reputation of the proceedings were affected but not “seriously;” therefore, we should exercise over discretion not to reverse. The question is close. On balance, it is appropriate to find seriously affecting both integrity and reputation of the proceedings any participation in a jury deliberation by a person not part of the lawful jury; and the stranger’s vote for the verdict fatally destroys the integrity of the process.
Finally, it is the law that normally “the defendant must make a specific showing of prejudice to satisfy the ‘affecting substantial rights’ prong of Rule 52b.” Olano, — U.S. at-, 113 S.Ct. at 1778. It is difficult to imagine greater prejudice than to have a nonjuror vote for one’s conviction. It would be impossible for McFarland to demonstrate further prejudice without the trial court conducting a hearing at which the jurors were questioned about their deliberations.
The line must be kept sharp and bright, firm and fixed, between a jury that is lawfully composed and a jury that has a stranger as a participant in its verdict. Of course in a casual, popular sense Stout was not a total stranger: she had been sworn in as an alternative, she had heard the testimony. But according to the law, once the jury had begun to deliberate, her role was over, her status was terminated, and by law she had no standing as a juror. For her to participate actively in the jury, for her to vote, was to destroy the jury’s integrity. In terms of the distinctions drawn by Brecht v. Abrahamson, — U.S.-, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993), “structural error” was committed. The structure of the jury was radically altered; it was no longer the body that the law had created; it became incapable of deciding the case as the specially set apart body of lay persons designated by proper procedure to determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant. I would reverse McFarland’s conviction.