Court Opinion

ID: 9490805
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 13:55:19.705493+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:54:19.833766
License: Public Domain

KRAVITCH, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I.
The majority holds that the law of the case doctrine governs the qualified immunity issue raised in this case because a prior panel of this court implicitly ruled that the defendants in this ease were not entitled to qualified immunity. I concur separately in order further to justify application of the law of the ease doctrine in this context.1
First, it should be noted that several of this circuit’s cases involving interlocutory appeals from summary judgment qualified immunity determinations have stated in dictum that qualified immunity can be raised at trial even if initially denied at the summary judgment stage. See Swint v. City of Wadley, 51 F.3d 988, 992 (11th Cir.1995) (“Any qualified immunity defenses that do not result in summary judgment before trial may be renewed at trial, where the actual facts will be established.”); Kelly v. Curtis, 21 F.3d 1544, 1546 (11th Cir.1994) (qualified immunity defense may be raised anew at trial); see also Sims v. Metropolitan Dade County, 972 F.2d 1230, 1233 (11th Cir.1992) (where district court determines no qualified immunity due under plaintiffs version of facts, court will have to revisit issue on motion for directed verdict); Adams v. St. Lucie County Sheriff’s Dept., 962 F.2d 1563, 1579 n. 8 (11th Cir.1992) (Edmondson, J. dissenting) (same), vacated, 962 F.2d 1563, dissenting opinion adopted, 998 F.2d 923, 923 (11th Cir.1993) (en banc). Implicit in this view is the proposition that district courts can revisit the qualified immunity question even where a circuit court has *981ruled on the issue.2 These directives, however, are not inconsistent with the application of law of the case doctrine.
Although the law of the case doctrine is not binding on a subsequent appellate court in the same way res judicata would be (i.e., it is not a limitation on the court’s power), applying the law of the case doctrine serves several important purposes. It protects against the agitation of settled issues by promoting finality, assures the adherence of trial courts to the decisions of appellate courts, and avoids waste of judicial resources. See IB Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 0.404[1].
The law of the case doctrine requires that a prior appellate decision govern the district court or subsequent appeals court unless an exception to the doctrine applies. An exception applies when (1) the subsequent trial produced substantially different evidence, (2) controlling authority of law applicable to the issue has changed, or (3) the prior panel was .clearly erroneous such that following its ruling would work a manifest injustice. In addition, the subsequent panel must determine that the prior panel decided the issue “by necessary implication.”3 Where an earlier panel has explicitly stated the basis for its holding, applying the law of the case is simple. The doctrine applies not only to issues explicitly decided, however, but also to the issues decided’ “by necessary implication.” Id.
Making these determinations after a defendant seeking qualified immunity has moved for judgment as a matter of law will not be unduly’ cumbersome upon the district court or appellate panel. Any disadvantage is easily offset by the benefits of applying law of the ease doctrine which promotes both finality and efficiency and insures respect for appellate opinions without sacrificing defendants’ abilities to raise the prior qualified immunity defense anew. In fact, determining whether the subsequent trial produces substantially different evidence is a question the district court must visit in any case upon entertaining a motion for judgment as a matter of law on qualified immunity grounds after having denied summary judgment on qualified immunity. Our cases have established that the question central to the trial court in revisiting the qualified immunity question on a motion for directed verdict is whether the facts as developed at trial differ from those taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs at the summary judgment stage. See Kelly, 21 F.3d at 1546 (defendants may raise qualified immunity anew at *982trial in motions for judgment as a matter of law because, “ ‘rulings on summary judgment motions’ are ‘the facts for present purposes,’ but they ‘may not be the actual facts.’ ”); see also Sims, 972 F.2d at 1233. If, as here, the facts presented by the plaintiffs at the summary judgment stage become, without notable exception, the “actual facts” as developed at trial, there is no need to revisit the qualified immunity determination made by the prior appellate panel. This simple inquiry preserves the defendant’s right to raise qualified immunity at trial while also safeguarding the interests of finality, judicial economy, and the superiority of appellate court rulings.
It also makes sense to determine whether the other exceptions to the application of law of the case doctrine apply in deciding whether to follow the prior panel opinion. Determining whether intervening changes in the law overrule the prior panel’s holding is necessary before following the panel’s opinion. Where, as in this ease, the law applicable to the qualified immunity issue has not changed since the prior panel opinion, the prior panel decision should be followed whether other exceptions do not apply.4 And, it would not be logical to follow a prior panel ruling without making sure that the prior panel decided the qualified immunity at least “by necessary implication.” In this case, the panel, in order to have jurisdiction over the case, had to reach the qualified immunity issue. Thus, in upholding the district court’s denial of summary judgment, albeit by summary affir-mance, the panel implicitly held that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity.5
I would add as a final note, however, that only in the rarest of cases will a subsequent panel be forced to conclude that a prior panel was clearly erroneous such that its ruling would result in manifest injustice. This circuit follows a strict policy of following prior panel opinions unless such are overruled by the court sitting en banc. There is little reason to reject the precedential value of a case simply because subsequent litigation has brought previously appealed issues before a new panel.6
*983II.
Although I concur in the portion of the opinion affirming the liability judgment, I dissent from that portion affirming the damages award. I would reverse and vacate the portion of the judgment awarding the plaintiff punitive damages. Federal law allows for the imposition of punitive damages in § 1983 actions only “if ‘the defendant was motivated by an evil motive or intent, or [if the defendant acted with] reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.’” Davis v. Locke, 936 F.2d 1208, 1214 (11th Cir.1991) (citing Anderson v. City of Atlanta, 778 F.2d 678, 688 (11th Cir.1985)) (finding jury award of punitive damages proper where evidence showed defendants’ actions motivated by racial animus and desire to punish); Wright v. Sheppard, 919 F.2d 665, 670 (11th Cir.1990) (case “erie[d] out for punitive damages” where policeman at night under cover of uniform invaded home and injured resident); Washington v. Kirksey, 811 F.2d 561, 565 (11th Cir.) (finding punitive damages proper where defendant callously refused to comply with settlement agreement regarding pre-termination hearing), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 827, 108 S.Ct. 96, 98 L.Ed.2d 56 (1987).
The majority contends that the jury’s verdict supports the award of punitive damages because the jury in its verdict on special interrogatories (entered before the damages verdict in this bifurcated proceeding) found that Camp and Winkler acted with “ ‘gross negligence, deliberate indifference, or specific intent.’” Although the jury might have found gross negligence under the facts of this case, I do not believe that the evidence would support a finding of callous or reckless indifference -or evil motive sufficient to justify punitive damages. See Anderson v. City of Atlanta, 778 F.2d 678 (11th Cir.1985) (reversing jury verdict awarding punitive damages); Walters v. City of Atlanta, 803 F.2d 1135, 1147 (punitive damages in § 1983 case unavailable where defendants did not act with ill will or callous disregard).
Thus, respectfully, I dissent from that portion of the majority’s opinion affirming the award of punitive damages.

. The term “law of the case” as used here describes how an appellate court opinion rendered in a case should be treated by the district court on remand and by a subsequent appellate panel in the same case. It does not refer to the treatment a district court should afford its own previous rulings in a case.

. In a somewhat analogous circumstance, the Supreme Court recently held that defendants can appeal from a denial of qualified immunity at both the motion to dismiss stage as well as the summary judgment stage because "resolution of the immunity question may ‘require more than one judiciously timed appeal,' because the legally relevant factors bearing upon the Harlow question will be different on summary judgment than on an earlier motion to dismiss.” Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 116 S.Ct. 834, 133 L.Ed.2d 773 (1996). That case did not address the merits of applying law of the case doctrine to subsequent appeals. However, implicit in the language of the case is the notion that a decision at the pleadings stage where no record exists will often involve substantially different evidence than an appellate decision rendered at the summary judgment stage where the record has been developed. Thus, the law of the case doctrine would not normally bar revisiting the qualified immunity issue at summary judgment where an appellate court previously had ruled on an appeal from the motion to dismiss.

. In Wheeler v. City of Pleasant Grove, 746 F.2d 1437 (11th Cir.1984), we delineated the general contours of law of the case doctrine as follows:
Under the law of the case doctrine, both the district court and the court of appeals generally are bound by findings of fact and conclusions of law made by the court of appeals in a prior appeal of the same case.... However, the law of the case doctrine does not apply to bar reconsideration of an issue when (1) a subsequent trial produces substantially different evidence, (2) controlling authority has since made a contrary decision of law applicable to the issue, or (3) the prior decision was clearly erroneous and would work manifest injustice.
[United States v. Robinson, 690 F.2d 869, 872 (11th Cir.1982) (citations omitted).]
.... Further, while the doctrine encompasses only those issues previously determined ... the law is clear that it " 'comprehends things decided by necessary implication as well as those decided explicitly.'".'... The doctrine's purpose is to bring an end to litigation ... It also "protects against the agitation of settled issues and assures obedience of lower courts to the decisions of appellate courts.'”....
Wheeler, 746 F.2d at 1440.

. Since the prior panel opinion this circuit has attempted to clarify its qualified immunity law and has made some changes in the areas of substantive and procedural due process analysis. See, e.g., Lassiter v. Alabama A & M University, Bd. of Trustees, 28 F.3d 1146 (11th Cir.1994) (en banc) (qualified immunity); McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550 (11th Cir.1994) (setting out differences between procedural and substantive due process rights; holding only procedural due process right of action to protect state law property right in employment), cert. denied sub nom., McKinney v. Osceola County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 513 U.S. 1110, 115 S.Ct. 898, 130 L.Ed.2d 783 (1995). Neither of these developments, however, can be described as "a contrary decision of law applicable to this case.” Lassiter only sought to clarify pre-existing precedent, and this circuit had before the prior panel’s 1993 decision made the substantive/procedural due process rights distinction for the purposes of rights of action against foster care agencies in Bendiburg v. Dempsey, 909 F.2d 463, 468 (11th Cir.1990) ("[sjubstantive due process prohibits the government from engaging in certain activities regardless of procedure" provided), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 932, 111 S.Ct. 2053, 114 L.Ed.2d 459 (1991), and Taylor By and Through Walker v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 795, 799 (11th Cir.1987) (substantive due process claim in child's liberty interest in safety in his environment and procedural due process claim based on Georgia statutory foster care scheme), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065, 109 S.Ct. 1337, 103 L.Ed.2d 808 (1989).

. I agree with the majority in its conclusion that in order to have jurisdiction over the prior appeal, even under then-existing precedent, the panel would have had to have reached the qualified immunity issue. Some cases in this circuit have indicated that in circumstances where a district judge denied summary judgment because genuine issues of material fact existed, a circuit court panel could not reach the qualified immunity issue. See Howell v. Evans, 922 F.2d 712, 717-18 (11th Cir.1991) (discussing such cases), vacated, 931 F.2d 711 (11th Cir.1991), reinstated in unpublished order as noted, 12 F.3d 190, 191 n. *. Had the prior panel relied on the premise that the district court's opinion holding that the existence of a genuine issue of material fact precluded appellate review of the qualified immunity issue, the panel could not have taken jurisdiction but would have had to dismiss the appeal. See, e.g., Goddard v. Urrea, 847 F.2d 765, 769 (11th Cir.1988). Thus, the prior panel reached the issue "by necessary implication.”

. "The doctrine of law of the case is, then, a heavy deterrent to vacillation on arguable issues, but not designed to prevent the correction of plain error or injustice.” IB Moore's Federal Practice P 0.404 [4.-1]. But see IB Moore's Federal Practice P 0.404 [4.-5] n. 11 ("Surely the court of appeals should not hesitate to correct a patent error in a still live case, but conceivably such errors occur infrequently enough so that they can be taken care of by in banc proceedings.”).