Court Opinion

ID: 9892362
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-23 17:12:00.88747+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:04:46.053163
License: Public Domain

J-S28021-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  TERRY WAYNE ISADORE                          :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 86 WDA 2023

     Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 15, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of McKean County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-42-CR-0000560-2021

BEFORE:      PANELLA, P.J., OLSON, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:                            FILED: OCTOBER 23, 2023

       Appellant, Terry Wayne Isadore, appeals from the December 15, 2022

judgment of sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of McKean

County that imposed an aggregate sentence of 45 to 90 days’ incarceration

and ordered Appellant to pay $1,375.00 in fines and $53.50 in costs of

prosecution.     We affirm Appellant’s convictions but vacate, in part, the

judgment of sentence in accordance with this memorandum and remand this

case for further proceedings.

       The record reveals that, on November 1, 2022, the trial court, at the

conclusion of a non-jury trial, convicted Appellant of: Count 1 – drivers

required to be licensed (summary offense); Count 2 – driving while operating

privilege is suspended or revoked – unrelated to driving under the influence

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S28021-23

of alcohol or a controlled substance (“DUI”); Count 3 – required financial

responsibility – operation of a motor vehicle without required financial

responsibility (summary offense); Count 4 – registration and certificate of title

required – driving unregistered vehicle prohibited (summary offense); Count

5 – operation of vehicle without official certificate of inspection (summary

offense); Count 6 – turning movements and required signals (summary

offense); and Count 8 – driving while operating privilege is suspended or

revoked – DUI related.1       On December 15, 2022, the trial court sentenced

Appellant to an aggregate term of 45 to 90 days’ incarceration and ordered

Appellant to pay $1,375.00 in fines and $53.50 in costs of prosecution.2 This

appeal followed.3

       Appellant raises the followings issues for our review:

       [1.]   Did the trial court err in concluding that [] Appellant violated
              [] 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1543[](b)(1)(i)?

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1 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 1501(a), 1543(a), 1786(f), 1301(a), 4703(a), 3334(a), and

1543(b)(1)(i), respectively. Appellant was charged with habitual offenders,
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6503.1, at Count 7. On May 5, 2022, the trial court granted
the Commonwealth’s motion to withdraw Count 7.

2 On Count 8, the trial court imposed a sentence of 45 to 90 days’ incarceration

and ordered Appellant to pay $500.00 in fines. The trial court further ordered
that Appellant be automatically paroled upon expiration of the minimum
sentence unless the Commonwealth filed a timely objection. At Counts 1 to
6, the trial court ordered Appellant to pay fines in the amounts of $200.00,
$200.00, $300.00, $75.00, $50.00, and $50.00 respectively.

3 Both Appellant and the trial court complied with Pennsylvania Rule of
Appellate Procedure 1925.

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       [2.]   Did the trial court err in finding [] Appellant guilty of both []
              75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1501[] and 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1543[,] and
              [imposing a sentence on] both [convictions]?

       [3.]   Did the trial court err in finding [] Appellant guilty of both []
              75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1543[(a)] and § 1543[(b)(1)(i),] and for
              [imposing a sentence on] both [convictions]?

       [4.]   Did the trial court err in finding [] Appellant guilty of
              violating [] 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3334[(a)]?

Appellant’s Brief at 5 (extraneous capitalization omitted).4

       Appellant’s first issue challenges the constitutionality of Section

1543(b)(1)(i) based upon the United States Supreme Court decision in

Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. 438 (2016).               Appellant’s Brief at

12-13. Appellant asserts that pursuant to Birchfield, Section 1543(b)(1)(i)

is unconstitutional because it “improperly criminalizes his earlier refusal to

submit to a warrantless blood draw.” Id.; see also Appellant’s Rule 1925(b)

Statement, 2/3/23, at ¶4.

       “As the constitutionality of a statute presents a pure question of law,

our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.”

Commonwealth v. Lawrence, 99 A.3d 116, 118 (Pa. Super. 2014), appeal

denied, 114 A.3d 416 (Pa. 2015). “A presumption exists that the General

Assembly does not intend to violate the Constitution of the United States or

of this Commonwealth when promulgating legislation.” Lawrence, 99 A.3d

at 118 (citation, original quotation marks, and brackets omitted). As such,

____________________________________________

4 For purpose of disposition, we reorganized Appellant’s issues.

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“acts passed by the General Assembly are strongly presumed to be

constitutional, including the manner in which they were passed.” Id. “Thus,

a statute will not be found unconstitutional unless it clearly, palpably, and

plainly violates the Constitution.” Id.

       Section 1543(b)(1)(i) of the Vehicle Code states that

       A person who drives a motor vehicle on a highway or trafficway of
       this Commonwealth at a time when the person's operating
       privilege is suspended or revoked as a condition of acceptance of
       Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition for a violation of section
       3802 (relating to [DUI]) or the former section 3731, because of a
       violation of section 1547(b)(1) (relating to suspension for refusal)
       or 3802 or former section 3731 or is suspended under section
       1581 (relating to Driver's License Compact) for an offense
       substantially similar to a violation of section 3802 or former
       section 3731 shall, upon a first conviction, be guilty of a summary
       offense and shall be sentenced to pay a fine of $500[.00] and to
       undergo imprisonment for a period of not less than 60 days nor
       more than 90 days.

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1543(b)(1)(i). Section 1547(b)(1) of the Vehicle Code states

that “[i]f any person placed under arrest for a violation of [S]ection 3802

[(DUI)] is requested to submit to chemical testing and refuses to do so, the

testing shall not be conducted but upon notice by the police officer, the

[Pennsylvania Department of Transportation] shall suspend the operating

privilege of the person” for a period of 12 or 18 months.5         75 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 1547(b)(1)(i) and (ii).
____________________________________________

5 The term “chemical test or testing” is defined by the Vehicle Code as an
“analysis performed on a biological material, including but not limited to
breath, blood[,] or urine, to determine the identity or concentration[,] or

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       Upon review, we discern no error in Appellant’s conviction under Section

1543(b)(1)(i) on the grounds that the statute is constitutionally infirm based

upon Birchfield. Rather, we find Appellant’s reliance on Birchfield, to be

misplaced.

       In Birchfield, the United States Supreme Court addressed whether

implied consent laws, which required a motorist to submit to a chemical test

upon arrest for suspicion of DUI or face criminal punishment, i.e.,

incarceration or fines, violated Fourth Amendment protections against

unlawful searches and seizures under the United States Constitution.6

Birchfield, 579 U.S. at 444. First, the High Court, recognized a difference in

privacy protections afforded to breath tests verses blood tests, explaining that

____________________________________________

both[,] of particular constituents such as alcohol or controlled substances.”
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 102.

6 The Fourth Amendment provides,

       The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
       papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
       shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
       probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
       describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
       be seized.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

The underlying premise of an implied consent law is that a motorist, by virtue
of driving on public roadways, was deemed to have consented to chemical
tests when there was sufficient reason to believe that the motorist was driving
while under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance.            See
Birchfield, 579 U.S. at 444.

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“[b]ecause breath tests are significantly less intrusive than blood tests and[,]

in most cases[,] amply serve law enforcement interests,” a breath test may,

consistent with the Constitution, be “administered as a search incident to a

lawful arrest for [DUI.]” Id. at 476. A warrant was not necessary before

administering a breath test as a search incident to a lawful arrest.        Id.

Conversely, the High Court found blood tests to be “significantly more

intrusive” of a person’s privacy interests and, as such, absent consent or

exigent circumstances, law enforcement was required to first obtain a warrant

before subjecting a motorist to a blood test. Id.

      Next, the High Court addressed the constitutionality of laws under which

a motorist was deemed to have impliedly consented to a blood test by virtue

of driving on public roadways. Under such statutes, motorists were subject

to compulsory, warrantless blood tests upon arrest and faced criminal

punishment for refusal.    Id. at 476-478.    In reaching its conclusion that

implied consent laws that imposed criminal penalties for refusing a blood test

were unconstitutional, the Birchfield Court reasoned that “motorists cannot

be deemed to have consented to submit to a blood test on pain of committing

a criminal offense.”   Id. at 477.     The High Court limited its holding in

Birchfield, however, to those implied consent laws which imposed criminal

penalties for refusal, noting that its holding in Birchfield should not be read

to cast doubt on its prior opinions which “referred approvingly to the general

concept of implied-consent laws that impose civil penalties and evidentiary

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consequences on motorists who refuse to comply” with requests for blood

tests. Id. at 476-477.

      Here, Appellant violated Section 1543 and was subjected to criminal

punishment pursuant to that provision of the Vehicle Code because he

operated a motor vehicle while his operating privileges were suspended,

revoked, or cancelled, not because he refused to submit to a blood test, either

presently or on a prior occasion. In general, Section 1543 makes it a criminal

offense for a motorist to operate a motor vehicle when the motorist’s

operating privileges have been suspended, revoked, or cancelled. A motorist’s

operating privileges can be suspended or revoked for any number of reasons,

including, inter alia, the refusal to submit to a blood test upon arrest for DUI.

The criminal punishment applicable to a violation of Section 1543 depends on

the reason for the suspension, revocation, or cancellation of the motorist’s

operating privileges. For example, Section 1543(a) imposes a $200.00 fine

when a motorist operates a motor vehicle despite a suspension, revocation,

or cancellation of operating privileges resulting from non-DUI-related matters.

See 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1543(a); compare 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1543(b). On the other

hand, when the motorist operates a motor vehicle despite a suspension,

revocation, or cancellation of operating privileges resulting from DUI-related

matters, the motorist is subject to a punishment of a $500.00 fine and

incarceration of not less than 60 days nor more than 90 days. 75 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 1543(b)(1)(i). Thus, a plain-reading of Section 1543 reveals that operating

a motor vehicle while a motorist’s operating privileges are suspended,

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revoked, or cancelled triggers a violation of Section 1543, and the punishment

for a violation of Section 1543 differs depending upon the cause for the

suspension, revocation, or cancellation.     Stated another way, Appellant’s

conviction of Section 1543 resulted from his operating a motor vehicle while

his operating privileges were suspended, and the punishment he received was

based upon the reason his operating privileges were suspended.

      Birchfield held that implied consent to submit to a blood test was

constitutionally invalid when a motorist faced criminal punishment for refusal

to comply.    Notwithstanding, the High Court in Birchfield expressed its

continued approval of implied consent laws that imposed civil penalties and

evidentiary consequences upon a motorist’s refusal to comply with a request

for blood testing. Appellant has not cited, and we are unaware of, any legal

authority which invalidates an implied consent scheme in which a blood test

refusal leads only to a suspension of operating privileges (but not criminal

punishment) and where, in turn, criminal punishment attaches to the

operation of a motor vehicle by a motorist whose driving privilege has been

suspended pursuant to a valid implied consent law.       If a state can validly

suspend a driver’s operating privilege for refusal to submit to a blood test, it

can certainly punish an individual who refuses to comply with such a lawful

suspension.   Therefore, Appellant’s challenge to his conviction of Section

1543(b)(1)(i) on the grounds the statute was constitutionally invalid pursuant

to Birchfield, is without merit.

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       Appellant’s second and third issues challenge his convictions under

Section 1501, 1543(a), and 1543(b)(1)(i) and the corresponding sentences

that he received for each of these convictions. Appellant’s Brief at 9-12.

       To the extent that Appellant challenges his convictions under Sections

1501, 1543(a), and 1543(b)(1)(i), we find this issue waived for failure to raise

a challenge to his convictions with the trial court.7, 8 See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a)

(stating, “[i]ssues not raised in the trial court are waived and cannot be raised

for the first time on appeal”); see also Commonwealth v. Hill, 238 A.3d

339, 408 (Pa. 2020) (finding waiver of challenges to convictions for failure to

raise the issues with the trial court).

       Inasmuch as Appellant’s second and third issues challenge his judgment

of sentence on grounds that certain convictions should have merged for

sentencing purposes, such a claim implicates the legality of sentence for which

our standard and scope of review are well-settled. When presented with a

____________________________________________

7 Inasmuch as Appellant contends the trial court erred in convicting him of
multiple offenses arising from the same episode, this claim “is patently
frivolous.” Commonwealth v. Laing, 456 A.2d 204, 207 (Pa. Super. 1983)
It is well-established that an individual “may be charged, tried and found guilty
of several offenses for but one criminal act.”          Id. (stating, “[i]ndeed
prosecutors generally offer the [fact-finder] a smorgasbord of offenses” upon
which to convict an accused (citation and original quotation marks omitted)).

8 Following his conviction, Appellant filed pro se a “post conviction motion” on

November 2, 2022. A review of this motion reveals that Appellant raised a
claim sounding in ineffective assistance of trial counsel rather than a challenge
to his convictions. As such, this motion did not preserve a challenge to his
convictions.

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challenge to the legality of a sentence, our standard of review is de novo and

our scope of review is plenary. Commonwealth v. Quintua, 56 A.3d 399,

400 (Pa. Super. 2012), appeal denied, 70 A.3d 810 (Pa. 2013).

     Appellant was convicted of the following pertinent offenses under the

Vehicle Code:

                § 1501. Drivers required to be licensed

     (a) General rule.--No person, except those expressly exempted,
     shall drive any motor vehicle upon a highway or public property
     in this Commonwealth unless the person has a driver's license
     valid under the provisions of this chapter. As used in this
     subsection, the term “public property” includes, but is not limited
     to, driveways and parking lots owned or leased by the
     Commonwealth, a political subdivision or an agency or
     instrumentality of either.

     ...

     (d) Penalty.--Any person violating subsection (a) is guilty of a
     summary offense and shall, upon conviction, be sentenced to pay
     a fine of $200[.00], except that, if the person charged furnishes
     satisfactory proof of having held a driver's license valid on the last
     day of the preceding driver's license period and no more than one
     year has elapsed from the last date for renewal, the fine shall be
     $25[.00]. No person charged with violating subsection (a) [] shall
     be convicted if the person produces at the office of the issuing
     authority within 15 days of the violation:

        (1) a driver's license valid in this Commonwealth at the time
        of the violation; or

        (2) if the driver's license is lost, stolen, destroyed or
        illegible, evidence that the driver was licensed at the time
        of the violation.

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1501(a) and (d).

      § 1543. Driving while operating privilege is suspended or
                              revoked

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     (a) Offense defined.--Except as provided in subsection (b), any
     person who drives a motor vehicle on any highway or trafficway
     of this Commonwealth after the commencement of a suspension,
     revocation[,] or cancellation of the operating privilege and before
     the operating privilege has been restored is guilty of a summary
     offense and shall, upon conviction or adjudication of delinquency,
     be sentenced to pay a fine of $200[.00].

     (b) Certain offenses.--

        (1) The following shall apply:

           (i) A person who drives a motor vehicle on a highway
           or trafficway of this Commonwealth at a time when
           the person's operating privilege is suspended or
           revoked as a condition of acceptance of Accelerated
           Rehabilitative Disposition for a violation of section
           3802 (relating to [DUI]) or the former section 3731,
           because of a violation of section 1547(b)(1) (relating
           to suspension for refusal) or 3802 or former section
           3731 or is suspended under section 1581 (relating to
           Driver's License Compact) for an offense substantially
           similar to a violation of section 3802 or former section
           3731 shall, upon a first conviction, be guilty of a
           summary offense and shall be sentenced to pay a fine
           of $500[.00] and to undergo imprisonment for a
           period of not less than 60 days nor more than 90 days.

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1543(a) and (b)(1)(i).

     Whether offenses merge for sentencing purposes turns on Section 9765

of our Sentencing Code, which provides,

                      § 9765. Merger of sentences

     No crimes shall merge for sentencing purposes unless the crimes
     arise from a single criminal act and all of the statutory elements
     of one offense are included in the statutory elements of the other
     offense. Where crimes merge for sentencing purposes, the [trial]
     court may sentence the defendant only on the higher graded
     offense.

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42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9765. Thus, Section 9765 “prohibits merger unless two distinct

facts are present: 1) the crimes arise from a single criminal act; and 2) all of

the statutory elements of one of the offenses are included in the statutory

elements of the other.” Commonwealth v. Baldwin, 985 A.2d 830, 833

(Pa. 2009). “If both crimes require proof of at least one element that the

other does not, then the sentences do not merge.” Commonwealth v. Allen,

856 A.2d 1251, 1253 (Pa. Super. 2004) (stating, the operative consideration

in a merger analysis is “whether the elements of the offenses are the same or

different”), relying on Commonwealth v. Anderson, 650 A.2d 20 (Pa.

1994).

       Here, Appellant claims that the trial court erred in sentencing him

separately for his convictions under Section 1501 and Section 1543. We find

this claim to be without merit. Section 1501 requires the Commonwealth to

prove, inter alia, that Appellant operated his motor vehicle without a valid

driver’s license.9 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1501. To convict Appellant under Section

1543(a), the Commonwealth was required to prove that Appellant operated

his motor vehicle “after the commencement of a suspension, revocation[,] or

cancellation of [his] operating privilege and before [his] operating privilege

____________________________________________

9 Section 102 of the Vehicle Code defines “driver’s license” as “[a] license or

permit to drive a motor vehicle issued under this title.” 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 102.

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[was restored.]”10       75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1543(a) (emphasis added).          Section

1543(b)(1)(i) required the Commonwealth to prove that Appellant operated

his motor vehicle “at a time when [his] operating privilege [was] suspended

or revoked[.]”       75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1543(b)(1)(i) (emphasis added).         Thus,

Sections 1501 and 1543(a) and (b)(1)(i) draw a distinction between driving

without a driver’s license and driving without operating privileges. Section

1501 proscribes driving without a valid credential, but at a time when the

operator has the right to seek one.            Sections 1543(a) and 1543(b)(1)(i),

however, proscribe driving when the operator lacks both a privilege to drive

and the right to apply for or obtain a valid credential to operate a vehicle. As

such, Section 1501 requires an element (driving without a driver’s license) not

included in the elements necessary to support a conviction under Section

1543. Similarly, Section 1543 requires an element (driving without operating

privileges) not included in the elements necessary to support a conviction

under Section 1501.         Therefore, we discern no error in the trial court’s

imposition of a separate sentence under Section 1501.

       In addressing Appellant’s claim that the trial court erred in imposing

separate sentences for his convictions under Section 1543(a) and Section

1543(b)(1)(i), we agree. A conviction under Section 1543(a) is “indisputably

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10 Section 102 of the Vehicle Code defines “operating privilege” as “[t]he
privilege to apply for and obtain a license to use as well as the privilege to use
a vehicle on a highway as authorized in this title, but not a contract, property
right[,] or civil right.” 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 102.

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a lesser included offense of [Section 1543(b)(1)(i)].” See Commonwealth

v. Ball, 146 A.3d 755, 757 (Pa. 2016); see also Commonwealth v.

Cunningham, 551 A.2d 288, 290 (Pa. Super. 1988), appeal denied, 562 A.2d

318 (Pa. 1989). In other words, all of the elements necessary to establish a

conviction of Section 1543(a) are included in the elements necessary to prove

a conviction under Section 1543(b)(1)(i).            See 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1543(a);

compare 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1543(b)(1)(i).              As such, pursuant Section 9765,

Appellant’s conviction under Section 1543(a) should have merged with his

conviction     under     Section     1543(b)(1)(i)     for     sentencing   purposes.

Consequently, the trial court erred in ordering Appellant to pay a fine of

$200.00 for his conviction of Section 1543(a).               See Trial Court Opinion,

2/8/23, at 2 (acknowledging that Appellant’s conviction under Section 1543(a)

does merge for sentencing purposes and that the $200.00 fine should be

vacated).

       Appellant’s final issue challenges his conviction under Section 3334(a)

of the Vehicle Code. It is unclear, upon review of Appellant’s Rule 1925(b)

statement, the grounds upon which Appellant lodges this challenge to his

conviction under Section 3334(a).11 To the extent that Appellant attacks the

sufficiency of the evidence, we concur with the trial court, and the record

supports, that Appellant waived a sufficiency claim for failure to specify the
____________________________________________

11 Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) frames the issue simply as: “The [trial c]ourt erred

in concluding that [Appellant] was guilty of violating [Section 3334(a)] (Count
6).” Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) Statement, 2/3/23, at ¶2.

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element or elements of the crime upon which the evidence was insufficient.

See Trial Court Opinion, 2/8/23, at 2; see also Commonwealth v. Rivera,

238 A.3d 482, 496 (Pa. Super. 2020) (stating, “in order to preserve a

challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, an appellant's Rule

1925(b) statement must state with specificity the element or elements upon

which the appellant alleges that the evidence was insufficient” or the

sufficiency issue is waived (citation and brackets omitted)), appeal denied,

250 A.3d 1158 (Pa. 2021).

      In his appellate brief, Appellant asserts “that he gave an appropriate

signal of his intention to turn – and the trial [c]ourt abused its discretion in

simply disregarding that evidence.” Appellant’s Brief at 10. Inasmuch as this

assertion raises a challenge that his conviction under Section 3334(a) is

contrary to the weight of the evidence, we find this issue waived for failure to

comply with Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 607(A).                See

Pa.R.Crim.P. 607(A) (stating that, “[a] claim that the verdict was against the

weight of the evidence shall be raised with the trial [court] in a motion for a

new trial [] orally, on the record, at any time before sentencing; [] by written

motion at any time before sentencing; or [] in a post-sentence motion”

(formatting modified)); see also Commonwealth v. Washington, 825 A.2d

1264, 1266 (Pa. Super. 2003) (stating that, a weight of the evidence claim is

waived when it is first raised on appeal rather than in compliance with Rule

607(A)).

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       For the reasons expressed herein, we affirm Appellant’s convictions. We

vacate in part Appellant’s judgment of sentence to the extent that the trial

court ordered Appellant to pay a fine in the amount of $200.00 for his

conviction under Section 1543(a). Furthermore, we are constrained to vacate

in part Appellant’s judgment of sentence to the extent that the trial court

sentenced Appellant to a term of incarceration of 45 to 90 days, as this

sentence is illegal pursuant to Section 1543(b)(1)(i).12 Pursuant to Section

1543(b)(1)(i), a trial court is required to sentence a defendant for a conviction

thereunder “to undergo imprisonment for a period of not less than 60 days

nor more than 90 days.” 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 43(b)(1)(i). Because the trial court

in the case sub judice imposed a minimum term of incarceration that was less

than 60 days, Appellant’s sentence is illegal.

       Convictions affirmed.       Judgment of sentence affirmed, in part, and

vacated, in part, in accordance with this memorandum.          Case remanded.

Jurisdiction relinquished.

Date: 10/23/2023

____________________________________________

12 This Court may raise and address sua sponte issues concerning an illegal

sentence. Commonwealth v. Hill, 238 A.3d 399, 407 (Pa. 2020.

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