Court Opinion

ID: 9897404
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:11:08.833416+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:37.155478
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                            May 11 2023, 8:52 am

                                                                                 CLERK
                                                                             Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                                Court of Appeals
                                                                                  and Tax Court

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT                                   ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Michael C. Cunningham                                     Theodore E. Rokita
Judson G. McMillin                                        Attorney General of Indiana
Zachary J. Anderson
Mullin, McMillin & McMillin, LLP                          Ian McLean
Brookville, Indiana                                       Supervising Deputy Attorney
                                                          General
                                                          Indianapolis, Indiana

                                            IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Chad E. Hammann,                                          May 11, 2023
Appellant-Defendant,                                      Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                          22A-CR-2210
        v.                                                Appeal from the Dearborn Circuit
                                                          Court
State of Indiana,                                         The Honorable James D.
Appellee-Plaintiff.                                       Humphrey, Judge
                                                          Trial Court Cause No.
                                                          15C01-2005-F4-6

                                  Opinion by Judge Tavitas
                               Judges Vaidik and Foley concur.

Tavitas, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2210 | May 11, 2023                            Page 1 of 17
      Case Summary
[1]   Chad Hammann appeals the trial court’s revocation of his probation.

      Hammann contends that: (1) the trial court erred by denying Hammann’s

      motion to dismiss due to violations of Indiana Code Section 35-38-2-3(d); (2)

      the trial court erred by allowing the State to proceed on the probation violation

      after the State failed to provide Hammann with adequate notice of the charges;

      and (3) the evidence is insufficient to support the revocation of Hammann’s

      probation. We disagree with Hammann’s arguments, and accordingly, we

      affirm.

      Issues
[2]   Hammann raises three issues, which we restate as:

                 I.    Whether the trial court erred by denying Hammann’s
                       motion to dismiss due to violations of Indiana Code
                       Section 35-38-2-3(d).

                II.    Whether the trial court erred by allowing the State to
                       proceed on the probation violation after the State failed to
                       provide Hammann with adequate notice of the charges.

              III.     Whether the evidence is insufficient to support the
                       revocation of Hammann’s probation.

      Facts
[3]   In October 2020, Hammann pleaded guilty to identity deception, a Level 6

      felony; intimidation, a Level 6 felony; and admitted to being an habitual

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2210 | May 11, 2023                Page 2 of 17
      offender. 1 The trial court sentenced Hammann to six years with three years

      suspended to probation. Hammann’s conditions of probation included a

      prohibition on consuming alcohol and illegal controlled substances and a

      prohibition on committing additional criminal offenses.

[4]   When Hammann was released, his probation was transferred to Ohio. On May

      10, 2022, the State filed a notice of probation violation, which alleged that

      Hammann tested positive for amphetamine/methamphetamine on December

      10, 2021; amphetamine/methamphetamine and alcohol on December 17, 2021;

      methamphetamine on January 5, 2022, and April 1, 2022; and cocaine and

      amphetamine/methamphetamine on May 6, 2022. The trial court then issued a

      warrant for Hammann’s arrest.

[5]   On May 21, 2022, Hammann was arrested in Hamilton County, Ohio, for

      receiving stolen property, obstructing official business, and driving under

      suspension. Hammann was released on his own recognizance in Ohio on May

      23, 2022, but he was held on the Indiana warrant until May 25, 2022, when he

      waived extradition. On May 26, 2022, Indiana officers served the warrant upon

      Hammann, and he was returned to Indiana.

      1
       Hammann was originally charged with dealing in methamphetamine, a Level 3 felony; dealing in
      methamphetamine, a Level 4 felony; possession of methamphetamine, a Level 5 felony; possession of
      methamphetamine, a Level 6 felony; possession of a narcotic drug, a Level 5 felony; possession of a narcotic
      drug, a Level 6 felony; possession of a controlled substance, a Level 6 felony; possession of a controlled
      substance, a Class A misdemeanor; possession of child pornography, a Level 5 felony; possession of child
      pornography, a Level 6 felony; intimidation of a law enforcement officer, a Level 6 felony; identity
      deception, a Level 6 felony; theft of a firearm, a Level 6 felony; carrying a handgun without a license, a Class
      A misdemeanor; and resisting law enforcement, a Class A misdemeanor.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2210 | May 11, 2023                                    Page 3 of 17
[6]   On May 27, 2022, the trial court set an initial hearing on the probation

      violation for May 31, 2022. At the initial hearing, Hammann denied violating

      his probation and informed the trial court that he would be obtaining private

      counsel. The trial court appointed “stand by counsel.” Appellant’s App. Vol.

      II p. 20. The trial court then addressed the issue of bail. The State requested

      that Hammann be held without bond pending the fact-finding hearing due to

      Hammann’s criminal history, prior escape charge, and positive drug tests. The

      probation officer noted that Hammann had new pending charges in Ohio and

      that Hammann had absconded from a halfway house in Ohio. The trial court

      denied bond due to Hammann’s “extensive criminal history, including an

      escape, six felony convictions, five misdemeanors, five probation violations, a

      history of failure to appear and . . . absconding from a treatment facility.” Id. at

      14. The trial court then set the matter for a fact-finding hearing on June 14,

      2022. Hammann did not object to the date of the fact-finding hearing or raise

      any issue regarding compliance with Indiana Code Section 35-38-2-3(d).

[7]   Hammann’s counsel filed a motion for continuance on June 13 and renewed

      that motion for continuance on June 14 at the scheduled hearing. Hammann’s

      counsel also requested that a reasonable bond be set. The trial court granted the

      motion for a continuance and set the fact-finding hearing for July 5. The trial

      court then took the request for bond under advisement.

[8]   The next day, on June 15, the trial court issued a written order regarding

      Hammann’s bond. The trial court found Hammann to be a “substantial risk of

      danger to self or other persons or to the public” and found that Hammann

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2210 | May 11, 2023           Page 4 of 17
       “presents a substantial risk of non-appearance at future hearings.” Appellant’s

       App. Vol. II p. 70. The trial court then set Hammann’s bond at $150,000 surety

       bond in addition to a cash-only bond of $2,500.

[9]    Hammann subsequently retained new counsel and filed another motion to

       continue the fact-finding hearing on June 30. The trial court granted the

       motion and reset the hearing for July 28.

[10]   On July 7, Hammann filed a motion to dismiss or in the alternative for

       immediate release, and the trial court set a hearing on the motion for July 19.

       At the hearing, Hammann argued that his due process rights and his statutory

       rights as set forth in Indiana Code Section 35-38-2-3(d) were violated when he

       was held in jail for longer than fifteen days without a hearing on the alleged

       probation violation. Hammann argued that “dismissal is the appropriate

       remedy.” Tr. Vol. II p. 30. The State argued that: the due process clause was

       not implicated; Hammann waived any statutory violation; an initial hearing

       was held within fifteen days; and dismissal was not the proper remedy. The

       trial court later issued a written order denying Hammann’s motion to dismiss.

       The trial court found that: (1) Hammann’s due process rights were not

       implicated; (2) the trial court addressed the issue of bail at the initial hearing,

       which was held only eight days after Hammann waived extradition; and (3)

       Hammann’s failure to object to the June 14 hearing resulted in waiver of the

       issue.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2210 | May 11, 2023            Page 5 of 17
[11]   On July 21, the State filed an amended notice of probation violation to allege

       that, in addition to the positive drug tests that formed the basis for the earlier

       notice of probation violation, Hammann committed new criminal offenses in

       Ohio and was charged with receiving stolen property, obstructing official

       business, and driving under suspension.

[12]   On July 25, the State filed a motion to continue because a witness, Officer

       Raymond Seehousen of the Mt. Healthy Police Department in Ohio, was

       unavailable due to National Guard training. The trial court granted the motion

       and reset the hearing for August 17. The trial court held an initial hearing on

       the amended notice of probation violation on July 28. At this initial hearing,

       the following discussion occurred:

               THE COURT: Has a date been given on the State’s motion to
               continue?

               [Deputy Prosecutor]: I don’t believe so, Your Honor. I just note
               in our motion that the officer from - - I believe it’s Mt. Healthy
               police or somewhere in Hamilton County, Ohio - - he’s at
               National Guard training, that’s why he’s unavailable today, but
               he would be available after August 15th.

               THE COURT: How much time do we need to set aside,
               counsel?

               [Deputy Prosecutor]: Your Honor, I wouldn’t anticipate his
               testimony would be lengthy. From the State’s perspective - -

               THE COURT: Do you think half an hour would be sufficient
               time?
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2210 | May 11, 2023            Page 6 of 17
               [Defense Counsel]: I believe so, Your Honor.

               [Deputy Prosecutor]: Yes.

               [Defense Counsel]: The only reason it’s difficult for me to
               answer is I don’t know what allegations specifically the State
               intends to proceed on. I can’t imagine it’s going to be a lengthy
               hearing.

               [Deputy Prosecutor]: It would be to the new offense from
               Hamilton County.

               [Defense Counsel]: That should be sufficient, Your Honor.

       Tr. Vol. II pp. 90-91.

[13]   At the August 17 fact-finding hearing, Officer Seehousen testified that he

       received an alert from the license plate reader system that a vehicle was

       traveling through the city with a stolen license plate. Officer Seehousen located

       the vehicle, which was driven by Hammann. Hammann provided Officer

       Seehousen with an incorrect social security number, first name, and last name.

       Hammann eventually provided the officer with his correct name, and Officer

       Seehousen learned that Hammann had a warrant. Hammann told the officer

       that “he was trying to buy himself time due to having a sick family member.”

       Tr. Vol. II p. 53.

[14]   During the testimony of Jennifer Benson, Hammann’s probation officer,

       regarding the failed drug tests, Hammann objected, in part, as follows:

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2210 | May 11, 2023            Page 7 of 17
               [A]t the initial hearing in this amended petition for probation
               violation I confirmed with the State that we would only be
               proceeding - - they were only proceeding today on the new
               violation out of Ohio and they orally confirmed that on the
               record at that hearing. And so we are now getting into issues
               that the State has represented that they would not be pursuing
               today.

       Id. at 83. The hearing was continued to the next day, at which time the above

       portions of the July 28 initial hearing were entered into evidence. The trial

       court found that the State’s comment at the initial hearing was insufficient to

       demonstrate the State was dismissing or removing the other allegations from

       the petition; rather, the conversation was related to Officer Seehousen’s

       testimony and the time needed for his testimony. Thus, the trial court allowed

       evidence of the failed drug tests. Probation Officer Benson then testified

       regarding Hammann’s positive drug screens, and documents detailing the

       positive drug screens were admitted over Hammann’s objection.

[15]   The trial court found that the State proved by a preponderance of the evidence

       that Hammann violated his probation by consuming amphetamine/

       methamphetamine, cocaine, and alcohol and by committing the new criminal

       acts of obstructing official business and receiving stolen property. The trial

       court then ordered Hammann to serve his three-year suspended sentence in the

       Department of Correction. Hammann now appeals.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2210 | May 11, 2023          Page 8 of 17
       Discussion and Decision
       I. Denial of Motion to Dismiss

[16]   Hammann argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss the

       probation revocation proceedings. We review a trial court’s denial of a motion

       to dismiss for an abuse of discretion. Murphy v. State, 113 N.E.3d 776, 779 (Ind.

       Ct. App. 2018). We will reverse only where the trial court’s decision is clearly

       against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Id.

[17]   According to Hammann, because he was being held in jail, the trial court was

       required to hold an evidentiary hearing on the probation violation within fifteen

       days pursuant to Indiana Code Section 35-38-2-3(d). Hammann contends that

       the trial court violated this provision and that he was entitled to a dismissal of

       the probation revocation proceedings as a result.

[18]   Hammann’s argument requires that we interpret Indiana Code Section 35-38-2-

       3(d). We review a matter of statutory interpretation de novo. Utley v. State, 167

       N.E.3d 777, 782 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied. When faced with a

       question of statutory interpretation, we first examine whether the language of

       the statute is clear and unambiguous. Id. If it is, we give its words their plain,

       ordinary, and usual meanings. Id. Our primary goal in interpreting a statute is

       to ascertain and give effect to the legislature’s intent, and the best evidence of

       that intent is the statute itself. Id. We presume “‘the legislature intended for the

       statutory language to be applied in a logical manner consistent with the statute’s

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2210 | May 11, 2023           Page 9 of 17
       underlying policy and goals.’” Id. (quoting Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 186

       (Ind. 2007)).

[19]   When a probation violation allegation is filed, an initial hearing is typically

       held, and the probationer may “admit to a violation of probation and waive the

       right to a probation violation hearing . . . .” Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(e). If the

       probationer denies the violation of probation, Indiana Code Section 35-38-2-

       3(d) 2 provides:

               Except as provided in subsection (e), the court shall conduct a
               hearing concerning the alleged violation. The court may admit
               the person to bail pending the hearing. A person who is not
               admitted to bail pending the hearing may not be held in jail for
               more than fifteen (15) days without a hearing on the alleged
               violation of probation.

[20]   Here, the State contends that the “most favorable and plausible date of arrest to

       use for the statute’s calculations is May 23, 20[2]2, when Ohio released

       [Hammann] on his own recognizance . . . .” Appellee’s Br. p. 22. Thus, the

       State concedes that “Hammann was entitled to be admitted to bail or released

       on his own recognizance if a fact-finding hearing was not held by June 7,

       2022.” Id. The trial court did not set Hammann’s bond until June 15, 2022.

       2
        This subsection of Indiana Code Section 35-38-2-3 was amended in 2012. The subsection previously read:
       “The court shall conduct a hearing concerning the alleged violation. The court may admit the person to bail
       pending the hearing.”

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2210 | May 11, 2023                               Page 10 of 17
[21]   Hammann argues that this statutory violation entitles him to discharge of the

       probation violation allegation. 3 Hammann, however, misinterprets Indiana

       Code Section 35-38-2-3(d). The plain language of the statute requires that, if a

       hearing is not held within the fifteen days of incarceration, then the probationer

       must be either admitted to bail or released on his own recognizance. If a

       hearing is not held within fifteen days, the probationer is entitled to either

       admittance to bail or release on recognizance. The purpose of this provision is

       to prevent probationers from languishing in jail for minor probation violations

       while awaiting a fact-finding hearing, which could occur months later. Nothing

       in the statutory provision requires the discharge of the notice of probation

       violation if the probationer is neither admitted to bail nor released on his own

       recognizance after the fifteen-day period. 4

[22]   Indiana Code Section 35-38-2-3(d) is comparable to Indiana Criminal Rule

       4(A), which provides:

                No defendant shall be detained in jail on a charge, without a
                trial, for a period in aggregate embracing more than six (6)
                months from the date the criminal charge against such defendant
                is filed, or from the date of his arrest on such charge (whichever
                is later); . . . . Any defendant so detained shall be released on his

       3
         Hammann also argues that the statutory violation amounts to a violation of his due process rights. We held
       in Utley, 167 N.E.3d at 781, that “due process is not implicated” by a violation of Indiana Code Section 35-
       38-2-3(d). We decline Hammann’s invitation to “reconsider” the holding in Utley. Appellant’s Br. p. 27.
       4
         Hammann relies upon Sharp v. State, 807 N.E.2d 765 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004); Clark v. State, 958 N.E.2d 488
       (Ind. Ct. App. 2011); and Murphy v. State, 113 N.E.3d 776 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). These cases, however,
       pertain to the time limitations upon filing the notice of probation violation itself, see Indiana Code Section 35-
       38-2-3(a), not time limitations for bail and recognizance. Accordingly, these cases are inapplicable here.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2210 | May 11, 2023                                    Page 11 of 17
               own recognizance at the conclusion of the six-month period
               aforesaid and may be held to answer a criminal charge against
               him within the limitations provided for in subsection (C) of this
               rule.

[23]   A defendant held in jail for more than six months is not entitled to discharge

       from prosecution or dismissal of charges under Criminal Rule 4(A); rather, the

       defendant is merely entitled to prompt release on his own recognizance. See,

       e.g., S.L. v. Elkhart Superior Ct. No. 3, 969 N.E.2d 590, 591 (Ind. 2012) (granting

       “relief in part by ordering that Relator be promptly released on his own

       recognizance, though he still may be held to answer for the criminal charge

       against him”). Similarly, under Indiana Code Section 35-38-2-3(d), a

       probationer is not entitled to dismissal of the alleged probation violation if he is

       held longer than fifteen days without a fact-finding hearing, admittance to bail,

       or release on recognizance. The probationer would merely be entitled to

       admittance to bail or release on his own recognizance.

[24]   Hammann failed to raise an objection when his fact-finding hearing was set

       outside the fifteen-day window without admitting him to bond or releasing him

       on his own recognizance. In fact, Hammann did not raise the issue of Indiana

       Code Section 35-38-2-3(d) until he filed his motion to dismiss on July 7.

[25]   The State argues that Hammann had a duty to bring the delay to the trial

       court’s attention and that Hammann waived the issue by failing to object at the

       first opportunity. In support of its argument, the State relies upon cases

       addressing Criminal Rule 4(B) and 4(C). Our Supreme Court, however, has

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2210 | May 11, 2023            Page 12 of 17
       held: “While the scheduling of a trial date beyond the time limits in Criminal

       Rule 4(B) and 4(C) may be inconsistent with those rules and result in

       ‘acquiescence’ when the defendant does not object at the first opportunity, there

       is nothing about the scheduling of a trial for a date beyond the six-month period

       in Criminal Rule 4(A) that is inconsistent with a defendant’s assertion of his

       right to release on his own recognizance once the six months pass.” State ex rel.

       Bramley v. Tipton Cir. Ct., 835 N.E.2d 479, 481 (Ind. 2005). In other words, a

       defendant does not waive his right to release by failing to timely object when a

       trial is scheduled for a date outside the six-month period of Criminal Rule 4(A).

       Id. Similarly, a probationer may raise the issue of Indiana Code Section 35-38-

       2-3(d) even after the fifteen days have passed. 5 The remedy is admittance to

       bail or release on recognizance, not discharge or dismissal of the probation

       violation allegation. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by

       denying Hammann’s motion to dismiss.

       II. Adequate Notice of the Alleged Violation

[26]   Hammann argues that he did not have adequate notice that the State would

       raise the issue of his failed drug tests as an alleged probation violation. The

       Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides certain protections

       5
         “The denial of bail is deemed a final judgment appealable immediately, without waiting for the final
       judgment following trial.” Bradley v. State, 649 N.E.2d 100, 106 (Ind. 1995). Where, however, the defendant
       does not appeal the issue until after conviction, “the issue is moot and not available as an appealable issue.”
       Music v. State, 489 N.E.2d 949, 951 (Ind. 1986); see also Carter v. State, 451 N.E.2d 639, 642 (Ind. 1983)
       (holding that defendant’s argument regarding the denial of his right to reasonable bail pending trial was
       “moot” and would “not be considered as grounds for reversal in this appeal”).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2210 | May 11, 2023                                  Page 13 of 17
       to an individual at a probation violation hearing. Bovie v. State, 760 N.E.2d

       1195, 1199 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). One of the minimum requirements of due

       process inured to a probationer at a revocation hearing is “written notice of the

       claimed violations of probation.” Utley, 167 N.E.3d at 781 (citing Woods v.

       State, 892 N.E.2d 637, 640 (Ind. 2008)). The written notice of the claimed

       violations of probation must be “sufficiently detailed to allow the probationer to

       prepare an adequate defense.” Bovie, 760 N.E.2d at 1199. “It is error for a

       probation revocation to be based upon a violation for which the defendant did

       not receive notice.” Id.

[27]   The first notice of probation violation alleged that Hammann tested positive

       multiple times for illegal substances. The State later amended the notice of

       probation violation to allege, along with the positive drug tests that formed the

       basis for the earlier notice of probation violation, that, in Ohio, Hammann

       committed the new criminal offenses of receiving stolen property, obstructing

       official business, and driving under suspension. The State never removed the

       failed drug tests from the amended petition.

[28]   Hammann contends that the State stated at the initial hearing that it was not

       pursuing the failed drug tests as a probation violation. During the July 28

       initial hearing, the parties had a discussion regarding the time necessary for

       Officer Seehousen’s testimony, and the State agreed that thirty minutes would

       be sufficient. Hamman’s counsel then said: “The only reason it’s difficult for

       me to answer is I don’t know what allegations specifically the State intends to

       proceed on. I can’t imagine it’s going to be a lengthy hearing.” Tr. Vol. II p.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2210 | May 11, 2023        Page 14 of 17
       90. The State answered: “It would be to the new offense from Hamilton

       County.” Id. at 90-91.

[29]   Officer Seehousen arrested Hammann in Ohio on the new criminal charges,

       and his testimony did not pertain to the failed drug tests. In answering

       Hammann’s counsel, the State was merely stating the topic of Officer

       Seehousen’s testimony. The failed drug tests were never mentioned during this

       discussion, and we agree with the trial court that the State’s comment was

       insufficient to remove the failed drug tests from the written notice of probation

       violations. We conclude that Hammann was not deprived of his due process

       right to written notice of the claimed violations of probation.

       III. Sufficiency of the Evidence to Support Revocation

[30]   Next, Hammann challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the

       revocation of his probation. “‘A probation hearing is civil in nature, and the

       State must prove an alleged probation violation by a preponderance of the

       evidence.’” Brown v. State, 162 N.E.3d 1179, 1182 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021)

       (quoting Murdock v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1265, 1267 (Ind. 2014)); see also Ind. Code

       § 35-38-2-3(f). “‘When the sufficiency of evidence is at issue, we consider only

       the evidence most favorable to the judgment—without regard to weight or

       credibility—and will affirm if ‘there is substantial evidence of probative value to

       support the trial court’s conclusion that a probationer has violated any

       condition of probation.’” Brown, 162 N.E.3d at 1182 (quoting Murdock, 10

       N.E.3d at 1267). “In appeals from trial court probation violation

       determinations and sanctions, we review for abuse of discretion.” Heaton v.
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2210 | May 11, 2023           Page 15 of 17
       State, 984 N.E.2d 614, 616 (Ind. 2013) (citing Prewitt, 878 N.E.2d at

       188). “An abuse of discretion occurs where the decision is clearly against the

       logic and effect of the facts and circumstances,” id. (citing Prewitt, 878 N.E.2d at

       188), “or when the trial court misinterprets the law,” id. (citing State v.

       Cozart, 897 N.E.2d 478, 483 (Ind. 2008)).

[31]   “Proof of a single violation is sufficient to permit a trial court to revoke

       probation.” Killebrew v. State, 165 N.E.3d 578, 582 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (citing

       Beeler v. State, 959 N.E.2d 828, 830 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied), trans.

       denied. “The requirement that a probationer obey federal, state, and local laws

       is automatically a condition of probation by operation of law.” Luke v. State, 51

       N.E.3d 401, 421 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (citing Williams v. State, 695 N.E.2d 1017,

       1019 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998); Ind. Code § 35-38-2-1(b)), trans. denied. “‘[W]hen

       the State alleges that the defendant violated probation by committing

       a new criminal offense, the State is required to prove—by a preponderance of

       the evidence—that the defendant committed the offense.’” Brown, 162 N.E.3d

       at 1183 (citing Heaton, 984 N.E.2d at 617).

[32]   Hammann argues that the State failed to prove he committed a new criminal

       offense because: (1) Officer Seehousen could not remember the name that

       Hammann gave to him; (2) the State should have presented the officer’s body

       camera video; and (3) no evidence was presented that Hammann knew the

       license plate was stolen. The State presented evidence that, when Officer

       Seehousen stopped Hammann’s vehicle due to a stolen license plate, Hammann

       gave an incorrect social security number, first name, and last name. Hammann
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2210 | May 11, 2023              Page 16 of 17
       could have questioned Officer Seehousen on cross-examination regarding the

       body camera video or admitted the video, but chose not to do so. Hammann’s

       argument is merely a request that we reweigh the evidence, which we cannot

       do.

[33]   We conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate that

       Hammann violated his probation by committing new offenses and failing

       multiple drug tests. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by

       revoking Hammann’s probation.

       Conclusion
[34]   The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Hammann’s motion to

       dismiss or by revoking Hammann’s probation. Accordingly, we affirm.

[35]   Affirmed.

       Vaidik, J., and Foley, J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2210 | May 11, 2023         Page 17 of 17