Court Opinion

ID: 9897999
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:27:41.909542+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:07.398801
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: SLIP OPINION
                      (not the court’s final written decision)

The opinion that begins on the next page is a slip opinion. Slip opinions are the
written opinions that are originally filed by the court.
A slip opinion is not necessarily the court’s final written decision. Slip opinions
can be changed by subsequent court orders. For example, a court may issue an
order making substantive changes to a slip opinion or publishing for precedential
purposes a previously “unpublished” opinion. Additionally, nonsubstantive edits
(for style, grammar, citation, format, punctuation, etc.) are made before the
opinions that have precedential value are published in the official reports of court
decisions: the Washington Reports 2d and the Washington Appellate Reports. An
opinion in the official reports replaces the slip opinion as the official opinion of
the court.
The slip opinion that begins on the next page is for a published opinion, and it
has since been revised for publication in the printed official reports. The official
text of the court’s opinion is found in the advance sheets and the bound volumes
of the official reports. Also, an electronic version (intended to mirror the
language found in the official reports) of the revised opinion can be found, free of
charge, at this website: https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports.
For more information about precedential (published) opinions, nonprecedential
(unpublished) opinions, slip opinions, and the official reports, see
https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions and the information that is linked there.
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.
                                                                                                  Filed
                                                                                            Washington State
                                                                                            Court of Appeals
                                                                                             Division Two

                                                                                             April 25, 2023
           IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

                                                DIVISION II
        DIRK E. CHRISTIANSEN,                                            No. 56691-5-II

                                       Appellant,

               v.

        DEPARTMENT            OF      LABOR         AND             PUBLISHED OPINION
        INDUSTRIES,

                                       Respondent.

              GLASGOW, C.J.— The Department of Labor and Industries allowed Dirk E. Christiansen’s

       occupational disease claim for a heart condition under the firefighter presumption in RCW

       51.32.185 and eventually closed the claim. Christiansen later sought to reopen his claim when

       another heart condition arose. The Department denied the application to reopen and Christiansen

       appealed to the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals.

              In response to the appeal, before the Board took any action, the Department reassumed

       jurisdiction, reopened Christiansen’s claim, and accepted the claim for the new heart condition,

       resulting in payment of benefits.

              Under the attorney fee provision for firefighters, which awards attorney fees when the

       firefighter has appealed to the Board and “the final decision allows the claim for benefits,”

       Christiansen moved for attorney fees and costs for his counsel’s work preparing the appeal

       documents before the Board. RCW 51.32.185(9)(a). The Board denied the motion and

       Christiansen appealed to superior court. The superior court concluded on summary judgment that

       attorney fees were not available under the statute.
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.

       No. 56691-5-II

                We reverse. The language of the attorney fee provision is ambiguous and we must interpret

       any ambiguity in favor of the worker. We remand for the Board to order the Department to pay

       Christiansen’s attorney fees and costs for the work performed before the Board, and we award

       Christiansen attorney fees on appeal in an amount to be determined by a commissioner of this

       court.

                                                      FACTS

                                                  I. INITIAL CLAIM

                Christiansen, a firefighter, initially made a workers’ compensation claim based on a

       myocardial infarction, or heart attack. RCW 51.32.185(1)(a) establishes a rebuttable presumption

       that firefighters who develop certain medical conditions have occupational diseases for which they

       can collect workers’ compensation. The statute presumes that heart problems that arise within a

       certain time after “exposure to smoke, fumes, or toxic substances” or “strenuous physical exertion

       due to firefighting activities” are occupational diseases that entitle the firefighters to compensation.

       RCW 51.32.185(1)(a)(ii). The Department accepted Christiansen’s claim and eventually closed

       the file.

                                        II. APPLICATION TO REOPEN CLAIM

                In January 2021, Christiansen applied to reopen the claim to add a new condition of atrial

       fibrillation, or abnormal heart rhythm. The Department denied the application.

                Christiansen timely appealed the denial. When the Board informed Christiansen it had

       received his notice of appeal, it also explained that the Department had “the right to reconsider or

       change its decision.” Admin. Rec. (AR) at 22. If the Department did so, the Board would “return

                                                          2
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.

       No. 56691-5-II

       the case” to the Department. AR at 22. Otherwise, the Board would “issue an order granting or

       denying” the appeal. AR at 22.

               “In response to [the] appeal to the Board,” the Department reassumed jurisdiction of

       Christiansen’s claim and stated that it was reconsidering its previous order. AR at 21. The same

       day, the Board returned the case to the Department, explaining, “Because of [the Department’s]

       decision, the [Board] no longer has jurisdiction and must deny this appeal.” AR at 20. The

       Department then reversed its prior decision, reopened Christiansen’s claim, and accepted

       Christiansen’s new condition, allowing payment of benefits.

               Christiansen’s counsel later contacted the Department requesting attorney fees and costs.

       He sought approximately $4,600 in fees and costs from drafting and filing the notice of appeal to

       the Board, as well as for work performed before the Department. RCW 51.32.185(9)(a) provides

       that when a determination involving the presumption of occupational diseases for firefighters “is

       appealed to the [Board] and the final decision allows the claim for benefits, the [Board] shall order

       that all reasonable costs of the appeal, including attorney fees and witness fees, be paid to the

       firefighter.”

               The Department forwarded Christiansen’s request to the Board. It explained that because

       Christiansen argued “the fee was earned for work at the Board,” not the Department, the

       Department was “without jurisdiction to make a decision” on the request. AR at 5.

               The Board denied the motion for attorney fees. It reasoned that because “Christiansen’s

       claim was reopened without a final order from [the Board] allowing the reopening, he is not

       entitled to attorney fees or costs under the statute.” AR at 1.

                                                         3
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.

       No. 56691-5-II

                                               III. SUPERIOR COURT

               Christiansen appealed the Board’s order to superior court. He then moved for summary

       judgment on the question of whether he was entitled to attorney fees for the prior proceedings and

       also sought attorney fees for the appeal to the Board. The Department cross-moved for summary

       judgment, arguing attorney fees were not authorized by the statute. Both parties argued there were

       no genuine issues of material fact.

               The superior court explained that the “undisputed factual record establishes that . . . [t]here

       was no final order from the Board or another court in response to Christiansen’s appeal of the . . .

       Department order because the Department reopened the claim after reconsideration.” Clerk’s

       Papers (CP) at 78. The superior court granted the Department’s motion and denied Christiansen’s.

       Christiansen appeals.

                                                    ANALYSIS

                         I. INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF RCW 51.32.185(9)(A)

               RCW 51.32.185(9)(a) provides that a worker will be awarded attorney fees and costs

       “[w]hen a determination involving the [firefighter] presumption . . . is appealed to the [Board] and

       the final decision allows the claim for benefits.” (emphasis added). RCW 51.32.185(9)(b) contains

       a parallel provision explaining that when a determination involving the firefighter presumption “is

       appealed to any court and the final decision allows the claim for benefits,” the court must order

       costs and attorney fees to be paid to the firefighter.

               Christiansen argues because his application to reopen his claim involved the presumption

       of occupational diseases for firefighters, the Department’s ruling “was appealed to the Board,” and

       “[t]he final decision . . . by the Department . . . allowed Christiansen’s claim for benefits,” he meets

                                                          4
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.

       No. 56691-5-II

       the statutory criteria for collecting attorney fees in RCW 51.32.185(9)(a).1 Appellant’s Opening

       Br. at 14. The Department responds that the recovery of attorney fees Christiansen seeks is not

       available under the plain language of RCW 51.32.185(9)(a) because the Board denied

       Christiansen’s appeal. The denial was required by statute once the Department reassumed

       jurisdiction. Thus, the Department contends that there was no successful appeal to support an

       award of attorney fees and costs under RCW 51.32.185(9)(a). We agree with Christiansen and

       reverse.

       A.     Principles of Statutory Interpretation

              “On an appeal under the Industrial Insurance Act [(the Act)], Title 51 RCW, our review is

       limited to the superior court’s decision, not the Board’s decision.” Masco Corp. v. Suarez, 7 Wn.

       App. 2d 342, 346, 433 P3d. 824 (2019). We review conclusions of law and questions of statutory

       interpretation de novo. Id. at 347.

              “When interpreting a statute, the court’s fundamental objective is to ascertain and give

       effect to the legislature’s intent.” Columbia Riverkeeper v. Port of Vancouver USA, 188 Wn.2d

       421, 435, 395 P.3d 1031 (2017). If a “statute’s meaning is plain on its face,” then we must give

       effect to that plain meaning. Dep’t of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wn.2d 1, 9, 43

       P.3d 4 (2002). We can derive the plain meaning of a statute from the context of the statute in

       question and the statutory scheme as a whole, any amendments or related provisions, and “‘the

       general object to be accomplished and consequences that would result from construing the

       particular statute in one way or another.’” State v. Evergreen Freedom Found., 192 Wn.2d 782,

       1
         Christiansen’s request below included fees for work after the Department reassumed jurisdiction;
       he now requests only “fees and costs incurred before the Board” as well as the fees and costs of
       this appeal. Appellant’s Opening Br. at 26.

                                                       5
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.

       No. 56691-5-II

       790, 432 P.3d 805 (2019) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Burns v. City of Seattle, 161

       Wn.2d 129, 146, 164 P.3d 475 (2007)). If “the statute remains susceptible to more than one

       reasonable meaning,” then it is ambiguous and we may apply other tools of statutory construction.

       Campbell & Gwinn, 146 Wn.2d at 12.

              We construe statutes so that “‘no clause, sentence[,] or word shall be superfluous, void, or

       insignificant.’” HomeStreet, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 166 Wn.2d 444, 452, 210 P.3d 297 (2009)

       (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Kasper v. City of Edmonds, 69 Wn.2d 799, 804, 420

       P.2d 346 (1966)). We will not add or subtract words from a statute “‘unless imperatively required

       to make it a rational statute.’” State v. Taylor, 97 Wn.2d 724, 728, 649 P.2d 633 (1982) (quoting

       McKay v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 180 Wash. 191, 194, 39 P.2d 997 (1934)); see also State v.

       Stevens County. Dist. Ct. Judge, 194 Wn.2d 898, 906, 453 P.3d 984 (2019).

              The legislature has made it clear that the Act “shall be liberally construed for the purpose

       of reducing to a minimum the suffering and economic loss arising from injuries and/or death

       occurring in the course of employment.” RCW 51.12.010. The Supreme Court has applied the

       liberal construction requirement by explaining that the Act “is remedial in nature” and we must

       construe any ambiguity “‘liberally . . . in order to achieve its purpose of providing compensation

       to all covered employees injured in their employment, with doubts resolved in favor of the

       worker.’” Spivey v. City of Bellevue, 187 Wn.2d 716, 726, 389 P.3d 504 (2017) (quoting Dennis

       v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 109 Wn.2d 467, 470, 745 P.2d 1295 (1987)).

              In addition, we have acknowledged that an award of attorney fees ensures full

       compensation for the prevailing worker because it prevents diminution of the award in order to

       pay fees. See Johnson v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 16 Wn. App. 2d 254, 263, 480 P.3d 492 (2021).

                                                       6
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.

       No. 56691-5-II

       The Board’s interpretation of the Act is not binding upon courts, but “it is entitled to great

       deference.” Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Tri, 117 Wn.2d 128, 138, 814 P.2d 629 (1991).

       B.     Attorney Fees for Appeals Under the Act

              A Department decision becomes final after 60 days unless the worker moves for

       reconsideration or appeals to the Board. RCW 51.52.050(1). If the worker appeals to the Board,

       the Department may, of its own accord, “[m]odify, reverse, or change any order, decision, or

       award,” or temporarily suspend an order, decision, or award while the Department reconsiders.

       RCW 51.52.060(4)(a), (b)(i). The Department may reconsider a decision “either upon a notice of

       appeal or upon the Department’s own initiative.” Tollycraft Yachts Corp. v. McCoy, 122 Wn.2d

       426, 437, 858 P.2d 503 (1993). If the Department reassumes jurisdiction to reconsider its decision,

       the Board “shall deny the appeal” without prejudice. RCW 51.52.060(4)(b).

               “One purpose of the Department’s reconsideration authority is to alleviate the harm to

       workers and employers that may be caused by potential errors in the adjudication of workers’

       compensation claims.” Tollycraft Yachts, 122 Wn.2d at 434-35. Another purpose is to ensure the

       “‘proper application and disbursement of the accident fund.’” Id. at 435 (quoting Wiles v. Dep’t of

       Lab. & Indus., 34 Wn.2d 714, 720, 209 P.2d 462 (1949)). There is no provision in the Act for

       awarding a worker attorney fees for work performed before the Department on reconsideration.

       See RCW 51.52.120; RCW 51.32.185.

              Generally, if “on appeal to the board,” the Department’s decision “is reversed or modified

       and additional relief is granted to a worker or beneficiary,” or a worker’s “right to relief is

       sustained by the board,” then “the board shall fix a reasonable fee for the services of [the worker’s]

                                                         7
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.

       No. 56691-5-II

       attorney in proceedings before the board.” RCW 51.52.120(2) (emphasis added); see Spohn v.

       Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 17 Wn. App. 2d 805, 810-11, 488 P.3d 889 (2021).

              In contrast, “[i]n an appeal to the board involving the [firefighter] presumption established

       under RCW 51.32.185, the attorney’s fee shall be payable as set forth under RCW 51.32.185.”

       RCW 51.52.120(4). Thus, RCW 51.32.185(9)(a) controls fees and costs when a firefighter appeals

       a Department ruling:

              When a determination involving the [firefighter] presumption . . . is appealed to the
              [Board] and the final decision allows the claim for benefits, the [Board] shall order
              that all reasonable costs of the appeal, including attorney fees and witness fees, be
              paid to the firefighter . . . or [their] beneficiary by the opposing party.

        (emphasis added). “Attorney fees and costs are awarded in [firefighter presumption] cases to

       guarantee the injured worker adequate legal representation in presenting [their] claim on appeal

       without a diminution of any award.” Johnson, 16 Wn. App. 2d at 263.

              Johnson featured a request to reopen a claim involving the firefighter presumption. Id. at

       257-58. The Department declined to reopen the claim and Johnson appealed to the Board. Id. at

       258. The Board reversed the Department and remanded, instructing the Department to reopen the

       claim, but the Board denied Johnson’s motion for attorney fees. Id. at 258-59.

              We held that Johnson was entitled to attorney fees for the appeal to the Board. Id. at 263-

       64. In doing so, we explained that “a firefighter is entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs

       when (1) a ‘determination involving the presumption’ has been appealed and (2) the Board has

       issued a ‘final decision [that] allows [Johnson’s] claim for benefits.’” Id. at 261 (emphasis added)

       (quoting RCW 51.32.185(9)(a)) (first alteration in original). Despite this language describing the

       attorney fee statute, the Johnson decision did not address what constitutes an appeal to the Board

       under RCW 51.32.185(9)(a). Nor did the Johnson court have before it the issue presented here:

                                                        8
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.

       No. 56691-5-II

       whether the “final decision” referenced in RCW 51.32.185(9)(a) could be a final decision made

       by the Department in response to an appeal to the Board. Put another way, the Johnson court found

       that there had been a “final Board decision” allowing Johnson’s claim for benefits, but the court

       did not address whether fees could be awarded where the final decision is the result of an appeal

       to the Board, but is made by the Department. See id. at 263.

       C.     Application of the Attorney Fee Provision in This Case

              Here, the Department denied Christiansen’s request to reopen his claim and he appealed to

       the Board. Before any hearings, motions, or other activity occurred before the Board, the

       Department reassumed jurisdiction under RCW 51.52.060(4)(b)(i). Under that statute, the Board

       had to deny the appeal without prejudice. On reconsideration, the Department’s final decision then

       allowed Christiansen to reopen his claim and allowed payment of benefits.

              Under RCW 51.32.185(9)(a), in order for a prevailing firefighter to be entitled to attorney

       fees for work performed before the Board, the firefighter must have appealed a Department ruling

       to the Board and there must have been a “final decision” to allow the claim for benefits. Unlike

       the more precise language that the legislature used to discuss attorney fees applying to all workers

       in RCW 51.52.120(2), the legislature did not expressly limit who had to issue the “final decision”

       in RCW 51.32.185(9)(a) allowing the firefighter’s claim for benefits, even though the legislature

       could have done so. And we must not read additional words into the Act, such as reading “the final

       decision” to mean only “the final decision of the Board.” See Taylor, 97 Wn.2d at 728.

              Nevertheless, the Department contends that reading the entire attorney fee provision in

       context, we should conclude the legislature intended “the final decision” to mean only the final

       decision of the Board. The Department asserts that the use of the word “and” in the first sentence

                                                        9
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.

       No. 56691-5-II

       of RCW 51.32.185 (9)(a), “when a determination involving the [firefighter] presumption . . . is

       appealed to the [Board] and the final decision allows the claim for benefits,” associates the “final

       decision” in (9)(a) exclusively with the Board. Br. of Resp’t at 13-15.

              But even if we accept that RCW 51.32.185(9)(a) can be read in the way the Department

       argues, Christiansen presents an equally reasonable plain language reading of the statute: so long

       as there was a final decision allowing benefits that ultimately resulted from the appeal to the Board,

       the firefighter is entitled to attorney fees. Thus, the phrasing of the statute is at least ambiguous,

       and we must resolve any ambiguity in the Act in favor of the worker. RCW 51.12.010; Spivey, 187

       Wn.2d at 726.

              Here, the Department acknowledged that it reassumed jurisdiction over Christiansen’s

       application “in response to” Christiansen’s appeal. AR at 21. There was a final decision, albeit

       from the Department, allowing the claim for benefits, similar to Johnson where the Board

       remanded to the Department with instructions to reopen the claim. 16 Wn. App. 2d at 258. Thus,

       Christiansen satisfied the statute’s bare requirements when he made an appeal to the Board and

       the resulting final decision allowed his claim.

              The Department is correct that the Board had a statutory obligation to deny Christiansen’s

       appeal once the Department reassumed jurisdiction. But Christiansen’s claim would not have

       ultimately been reopened but for the appeal that his attorney filed at the Board explaining the

       reasons why the Department erred. Christiansen had to hire an attorney to research, draft, and file

       the notice of appeal that prompted the Department to review its decision and reassume jurisdiction.

       And Christiansen now seeks only the fees incurred bringing that appeal at the Board.

                                                         10
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.

       No. 56691-5-II

              In general, the Act disfavors an outcome that would “result in an inadequate recovery” for

       an injured worker, and appellate courts have specifically recognized that bearing their own

       attorney fees reduces the ultimate recovery for a worker. Id. at 263; see also Evergreen Freedom

       Found., 192 Wn.2d at 789-90. We have emphasized that awarding attorney fees to workers in

       firefighter presumption cases avoids diminishing the worker’s award by forcing them to pay for

       the cost of litigating their successful appeal. Johnson, 16 Wn. App. 2d at 263. As such, the fact

       that Christiansen did not need to fully litigate his appeal is unpersuasive. The Department’s

       decision to reconsider Christiansen’s claim may have reduced its liability for attorney fees, but it

       did not eliminate such liability. Under Christiansen’s reading of the statute’s plain language,

       nothing in the attorney fee provision requires more than an “appeal[] to the [B]oard” and a “final

       decision,” which could come from either the Board or the Department, that “allows the claim for

       benefits.” RCW 51.32.185(9)(a). Where there is ambiguity in the Act, we must construe the Act

       in Christiansen’s favor. RCW 51.12.010. We conclude that Christiansen is entitled to attorney fees

       under RCW 51.32.185(9)(a) for the fees incurred for work preparing the appeal to the Board.

                     II. THE DEPARTMENT’S REASSUMPTION OF JURISDICTION ARGUMENT

              The Department claims that it was no longer an “opposing party” that could be liable for

       fees under RCW 51.32.185(9)(a) once it reassumed jurisdiction and reopened Christiansen’s

       claim. Br. of Resp’t at 15. The Department also asserts that because the Board transferred

       jurisdiction back to the Department, the Board cannot award attorney fees. It reasons that, once

       the Department reassumed jurisdiction, the Board had no authority to enter a final order and

       consequently no authority to award attorney fees. But here, after its final decision reopening the

       claim, the Department transferred the request for attorney fees to the Board to resolve. Nothing

                                                       11
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.

       No. 56691-5-II

       would have prevented the Board from awarding attorney fees to Christiansen at that stage in the

       proceedings.

              We acknowledge that our reasoning may incentivize workers to immediately appeal denied

       claims to the Board rather than first petitioning for reconsideration with the Department. But it

       will also incentivize the Department to avoid decisions that will require workers to bring appeals

       and to reconsider decisions on its own initiative to avoid unnecessary appeals to the Board. And

       the Department will still have incentive to reexamine decisions even after an appeal is filed because

       the Department can minimize fee payouts if it reassumes jurisdiction rather than requiring an

       appeal to the Board to go to a full hearing. On balance, incentives created by our reading of the

       statute are consistent with the primary purpose of the Act, to ensure workers are provided the

       compensation they are entitled to. RCW 51.12.010.

              RCW 51.32.185(9)(a) entitles Christiansen to fees and costs for work his attorney

       performed before the Board.

                                       APPELLATE ATTORNEY FEES

              Christiansen also seeks appellate attorney fees under RAP 18.1, RCW 51.52.130, and RCW

       51.32.185(9)(b).

              RAP 18.1(a) allows the award of appellate attorney fees as permitted by “applicable law.”

       Christiansen has prevailed on appeal and applicable law authorizes his request. See Johnson, 16

       Wn. App. 2d at 264. We grant Christiansen’s request and award him reasonable appellate attorney

       fees for his counsel’s work before the superior court and this court, with the amount to be

       determined by a commissioner of this court.

                                                        12
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.

       No. 56691-5-II

                                                CONCLUSION

               We reverse. We remand for the Board to order the Department to pay Christiansen’s

       attorney fees and costs for the work performed before the Board, and we grant Christiansen’s

       request for appellate attorney fees, in an amount to be determined by a commissioner of this court.

                                                            Glasgow, C.J.
        We concur:

        Veljacic, J.

        Price, J.

                                                       13