Court Opinion

ID: 9763269
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:39:53.52445+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:40.298278
License: Public Domain

RUDMAN, J.,
with whom ALEXANDER, J., joins, dissenting.
[¶ 10] I respectfully dissent.
[¶ 11] The Vermont Mutual homeowner’s policy contains the following exclusion:
2. Coverage E — Personal Liability and Coverage F — Medical Payments to Others do not apply to “bodily injury” or “property damage”:
b. Arising out of or in connection with a “business” engaged in by an “insured.” This exclusion applies but is not limited to an act or omission, regardless of its nature or circumstance, involving a service or duty rendered, promised, owed or implied to be provided because of the nature of the “business.”
Relying on an intermediate appellate court decision, Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Fitchburg Mut. Ins. Co., 58 Mass.App.Ct. 818, 793 N.E.2d 1252 (2003), the Superior Court gave the term “arising out of or in connection with” an expansive reading and concluded that, even if Rankin was “screwing around” when he started the fire, the exclusion applied because the activity occurred at the workplace. The factual situation involved in this Massachusetts case can be distinguished from the factual situation in the instant case. There, the injured party, a lab assistant, and the alleged tortfeasor, a phlebotomist, *394were employed at the same facility. Id. at 1254. The lab assistant was working at her desk when the phlebotomist arrived to deliver lab specimens for processing. Id. The phlebotomist walked past the lab assistant, who was engrossed in her work. Id. The phlebotomist poked the lab assistant to get her attention and say hello. Id. Startled, the lab assistant fell backwards off her chair and suffered a severe back injury. Id. The phlebotomist was actively engaged in a work-related activity — delivering the lab specimens for processing. Here, Acadia contends that Rankin was “flicking matches, joking and laughing, and generally ‘screwing around’ ” with Weeks just prior to the fire starting. There is a factual issue as to exactly what Rankin was doing immediately prior to the fire. Certainly he was at his employer’s place of business. Whether he was acting, as was the phlebotomist, in the course of his employment, is disputed.
[¶ 12] Several courts have recognized that a “business pursuits” exclusion in a general liability insurance policy requires a factual determination in close cases of coverage. See, e.g., Smith v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 191 W.Va. 563, 447 S.E.2d 255, 258 (1994) (affirming the denial of summary judgment because “the question of whether a particular activity ... comes within this definition of business pursuits must necessarily be determined on a case-by-case basis”) (quotation marks omitted); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Robinson, 103 N.CApp. 794, 407 S.E.2d 294, 296 (1991) (stating that exclusion would not preclude coverage for fire damage if an employee chose to “strike matches for his own amusement”); see also David J. Marchitel-li, Annotation, Construction and Application of “Business Pursuits” Exclusion Provision in General Liability Policy, 35 A.L.R. 5th 375 (1996). Some of the difficulty arises because several comparable exclusions contain different or less expansive language, but the volume of commentary that this and similar provisions have generated demonstrates that the language is, to some extent, ambiguous. See N.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Stox, 330 N.C. 697, 412 S.E.2d 318, 326 (1992) (“[I]n-telligent people for years have differed in their interpretation of the business pursuits clause .... If reasonably intelligent people differ as to the meaning of a policy provision, ambiguity exists.”) (quotation marks omitted).
[¶ 13] Given that we must resolve ambiguous language in favor of the insured, Merrick v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 2004 ME 66, ¶7, 850 A.2d 352, 354, and that we must construe policy exclusions narrowly against the insurer, Gross v. Green Mountain Ins. Co., 506 A.2d 1139, 1141 (Me.1986), we cannot interpret this exclusion so broadly that it includes any activity that takes place in the workplace. Even a phrase as inclusive as “arising out of or in connection with a business” requires some analysis of the relationship between an employee’s activities and his employer’s business. If Rankin was not “screwing around,” and his only responsibility for the fire was in failing to put it out before leaving the room, Vermont Mutual’s exclusion would unquestionably apply.
[¶ 14] In interpreting insurance contracts, like any contract, we look to the language of the contract. See American Prot. Ins. Co. v. Acadia Ins. Co., 2003 ME 6, ¶¶ 12-13, 814 A.2d 989, 993-94. The Vermont Mutual policy excludes coverage for property damage arising out of or in connection with a “business” engaged in by an “insured.” Policy definitions state that “[b]usiness includes trade, profession, or occupation.” Although it is undisputed the property damage occurred when Rankin was at his employer’s place of business, it is disputed whether the damage arises out *395of or in connection with Rankin’s employment as a “clerk/stock person.” Although as part of her normal activities, a phlebo-tomist may deliver specimens to a laboratory, a clerk/stock person does not in the course of his employment play with matches.
[¶ 15] Because, however, a rational fact-finder could find that Rankin’s actions simply occurred at Largay’s, and neither arose out of nor were connected to the store’s business, the disputed facts in this case are material to the outcome of the suit and a summary judgment was improper.
[¶ 16] I would vacate the judgment of the Superior Court.