Court Opinion

ID: 9931478
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-09 06:04:58.07862+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:17:00.695412
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                   revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                            STATE OF MICHIGAN

                             COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,                                     UNPUBLISHED
                                                                     February 8, 2024
                 Plaintiff-Appellee,

v                                                                    No. 358690
                                                                     Wayne Circuit Court
MAURICE LAMONT VINSON-JACKSON,                                       LC No. 17-010934-01-FC

                 Defendant-Appellant.

                                           ON REMAND

Before: JANSEN, P.J., and O’BRIEN and HOOD, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

       This matter returns to us on remand from the Michigan Supreme Court. People v Vinson-
Jackson, ___ Mich ___, ___; 997 NW2d 180 (2023) (Vinson-Jackson III). Defendant was
convicted of second-degree murder, MCL 750.317; carrying a concealed weapon (CCW), MCL
750.227; and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm), MCL
750.227b, for the fatal shooting of Demarko Randle in November 2017. People v Vinson-Jackson,
unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued July 21, 2022 (Docket
No. 358690), p 1, vacated in part and lv denied in part by 997 NW2d 180 (2023) (Vinson-Jackson
II).

       Defendant was initially sentenced to 35 to 70 years’ imprisonment, he appealed, and this
Court affirmed defendant’s convictions but remanded for resentencing. People v Vinson-Jackson,
unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued March 12, 2020 (Docket
No. 344742), p 1 (Vinson-Jackson I). On remand, the trial court fixed the score for offense variable
(OV) 6, resulting in revised sentencing guidelines of 225 to 375 months’ imprisonment (18.75 to
31.25 years), and sentenced defendant to 30 to 60 years’ imprisonment. Vinson-Jackson II, unpub
op at 1-2.1 Defendant appealed after resentencing, which this Court affirmed under MCL
769.34(10), without addressing defendant’s argument that his sentence was not proportionate. Id.

1
    Defendant does not challenge the sentences he received for his other convictions.

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at 3-5. Defendant’s application for leave to appeal in the Supreme Court was held in abeyance
pending the decisions in People v Posey (Docket No. 162373) and People v Stewart (Docket
No. 162497), which have now been decided, and the Supreme Court vacated this Court’s previous
opinion “to the extent that it is inconsistent with our decision in” People v Posey, 512 Mich 317,
___ NW2d ___ (2023) (Posey II), and remanded for reconsideration in light of Posey, denying
leave to appeal in all other respects. Vinson-Jackson III, ___ Mich at ___.

       MCL 769.34(10) provides:

                If a minimum sentence is within the appropriate guidelines sentence range,
       the court of appeals shall affirm that sentence and shall not remand for resentencing
       absent an error in scoring the sentencing guidelines or inaccurate information relied
       upon in determining the defendant’s sentence. A party shall not raise on appeal an
       issue challenging the scoring of the sentencing guidelines or challenging the
       accuracy of information relied upon in determining a sentence that is within the
       appropriate guidelines sentence range unless the party has raised the issue at
       sentencing, in a proper motion for resentencing, or in a proper motion to remand
       filed in the court of appeals.

Before Posey II, this Court held that, in light of MCL 769.34(10)—and despite People v Lockridge,
498 Mich 358, 365; 870 NW2d 502 (2015) (rendering the sentencing guidelines advisory rather
than mandatory)—“[w]hen a trial court does not depart from the recommended minimum
sentencing range, the minimum sentence must be affirmed unless there was an error in scoring or
the trial court relied on inaccurate information.” People v Schrauben, 314 Mich App 181, 196 &
n 1; 886 NW2d 173 (2016).

       In Posey II, the Supreme Court considered whether this interpretation renders MCL
769.34(10) unconstitutional, and the lead opinion held that “Lockridge require[d] that the portion
of MCL 769.34(10) requiring affirmation of within-guidelines sentences on appeal be struck as
unconstitutional.” Posey II, 512 Mich at 349 (lead opinion by BOLDEN, J.).2 In People v Posey
(On Remand), ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2023) (Docket No. 345491) (Posey III);
slip op at 2, this Court clarified that the Supreme Court declared the first sentence of MCL
769.34(10) unconstitutional, and that the following principles apply:

       within-guidelines sentences are to be reviewed for reasonableness, that
       reasonableness review requires a determination whether a sentence was
       proportionate, that there is a nonbinding presumption of proportionality, meaning
       that a within-guidelines sentence is not binding on the Court of Appeals, that the
       defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that their within-guidelines sentence
       is unreasonable or disproportionate, and that a within-guidelines sentence may

2
 Although no majority consensus was formed by the Supreme Court as to why the first sentence
of MCL 769.34(10) is unconstitutional, the Posey II decision is a plurality decision, at least in part,
and we choose to follow the lead opinion in the interests of judicial economy. See, e.g., People v
Scarborough, 189 Mich App 341, 344; 471 NW2d 567 (1991).

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       indeed be disproportionate or unreasonable. [Quotation marks and citations
       omitted.]

       The Posey III Court also set forth the basic caselaw governing the reasonableness and
proportionality inquiry as follows:

              In People v Steanhouse, 500 Mich 453, 459-460; 902 NW2d 327 (2017),
       the Michigan Supreme Court observed:

                       [T]he proper inquiry when reviewing a sentence for
               reasonableness is whether the trial court abused its discretion by
               violating the “principle of proportionality” set forth in People v
               Milbourn, 435 Mich 630, 636; 461 NW2d 1 (1990), “which requires
               sentences imposed by the trial court to be proportionate to the
               seriousness of the circumstances surrounding the offense and the
               offender.”

                “An appropriate sentence should give consideration to the reformation of
       the offender, the protection of society, the discipline of the offender, and the
       deterrence of others from committing the same offense.” People v Boykin, 510
       Mich 171, 183; 987 NW2d 58 (2022). With respect to sentencing and the
       guidelines, the key test is not whether a sentence departs from or adheres to the
       guidelines range. Steanhouse, 500 Mich at 472. The key test is whether the
       sentence is proportionate to the seriousness of the matter. Id. In regard to
       proportionality, the Milbourn Court “observed that the Legislature has determined
       to visit the stiffest punishment against persons who have demonstrated an
       unwillingness to obey the law after prior encounters with the criminal justice
       system.” Milbourn, 435 Mich at 668. “The premise of our system of criminal
       justice is that, everything else being equal, the more egregious the offense, and the
       more recidivist the criminal, the greater the punishment.” People v Babcock, 469
       Mich 247, 263; 666 NW2d 231 (2003). [Posey III, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op
       at 2-3.]

       The question now before us is whether the trial court abused its discretion in resentencing
defendant to 30 to 60 years’ imprisonment for second-degree murder in light of Posey II.
Defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion in imposing this sentence because it is not
proportionate because defendant has no prior criminal history. We disagree.

        Defendant was convicted of second-degree murder, CCW, and felony-firearm, but only
challenges his sentence for second-degree murder. Videotape evidence was presented at trial
showing a person approach the victim, Randle, and shoot him as he sat in his car at a gas station.
Although the shooter’s face could not be seen in the video, Randle’s mother identified defendant
in surveillance video from inside the gas station close in time to the shooting. Other evidence
established a previous altercation between defendant and Randle, in which Randle fired a gun at
defendant and his brother, striking defendant’s brother. Defendant’s only argument regarding
proportionality is that his original sentence of 35 to 70 years was in the middle of the original
sentencing guidelines range of 270 to 450 months, and he has no criminal history, so he should

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have received a sentence in the middle of his new sentencing guidelines on remand, 225 to 375
months. “There is no supporting legal authority for the proposition that if a guidelines range is
lowered, a trial court is mandated to also lower the minimum sentence on resentencing to render
the sentence reasonable. The guidelines are advisory only.” Posey III, ___ Mich App at ___; slip
op at 3, citing Lockridge, 498 Mich at 399. The trial court did lower defendant’s sentence on
remand by five years to fall within the new guidelines. Moreover, defendant’s argument that he
lacks a criminal history is disingenuous. His presentence investigation report (PSIR) indicates he
had five prior misdemeanor convictions, which the trial court reviewed before resentencing. The
trial court acknowledged the lower guidelines range on remand, but decided to sentence defendant
within the new guidelines based on all of the evidence presented at trial. Although defendant’s
new sentence lies at the top of the new sentencing guidelines range, he has not met his burden to
prove that his sentence was not proportionate. He was convicted of second-degree murder, and
had a criminal history. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

       Affirmed.

                                                            /s/ Kathleen Jansen
                                                            /s/ Colleen A. O’Brien
                                                            /s/ Noah P. Hood

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