Court Opinion

ID: 9931015
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-08 09:14:47.489105+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:18:59.001353
License: Public Domain

In The
                                  Court of Appeals
                         Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

                                          No. 07-23-00334-CR

                              JOHN ELLIS ROBERTS, APPELLANT

                                                    V.

                               THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

                            On Appeal from the 413th District Court
                                   Johnson County, Texas
           Trial Court No. DC-F202000743, Honorable John Wilson Weeks, Presiding

                                          February 5, 2024
                                 MEMORANDUM OPINION1
                         Before QUINN, C.J., and PARKER and DOSS, JJ.

        John Ellis Roberts appeals from his conviction for the unlawful possession of a

firearm by a felon. He challenges his conviction through five issues. We affirm.

        Background

        This prosecution arose from a traffic stop conducted shortly before midnight.

Officers were involved in a drug interdiction investigation and saw a truck leave the area

        1 Because this matter was transferred from the Tenth Court of Appeals, we apply its precedent

when it conflicts with that of the Seventh Court of Appeals. TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.
they were watching. They followed the truck and saw it turn right and cross a double

yellow line separating lanes of traffic. Believing a traffic offense to have occurred, they

initiated a traffic stop.2

        Only one officer approached the vehicle, which truck happened to be registered to

appellant. The officer found a woman driving and appellant in the passenger’s seat.

When asked for her license and insurance, the woman laughed. The officer thought that

an odd response and began to wonder if she were intoxicated given the hour, the nature

of the traffic violation, and response. That led him to question her about their destination.

Appellant responded in her stead.              Appellant also refused to provide the officer

identification after interjecting himself into the exchange. That resulted in the officer’s

asking the driver to exit the truck and walk towards its tailgate area. Appellant followed

without being invited. So too did he attempt to record the events about to transpire with

his cell phone.

        Being the only officer outside the squad car at the time and both occupants having

exited the truck, the officer asked appellant to sit inside the truck. He so asked due to

concerns for his safety at that time and place and because of his being unaware of

appellant’s actual intent.       Appellant refused and continued to approach.                 Additional

directives to return also went unheeded. By that time, an officer who had remained in the

squad car radioed for backup and exited to assist his fellow officer. He arrived after the

first officer had grasped appellant.

        2 See TEXAS TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 545.055(b) (stating that one operating a vehicle “may not drive

on the left side of the roadway in a no-passing zone or on the left side of any pavement striping designed
to mark a no-passing zone”).

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       Appellant struggled and attempted to escape.         That led the officer to force

appellant to the ground and handcuff him. Later, the officer testified he detained appellant

due to safety concerns and appellant’s interference with his investigation into the driver’s

state of intoxication, if any.

       While at the scene, the officers discovered appellant to be a convicted felon.

Moreover, appellant admitted, while conversing with one of the officers, to having alcohol

and firearms within the truck. The firearms purportedly were obtained from his deceased

mother. According to an officer, appellant consented to a search of the truck, which

search uncovered two small caliber pistols. The guns were found within a brown zippered

pouch inside a piece of luggage. The latter also contained male clothing.

       Issues One and Two

       Via his first and second issues, appellant questions the sufficiency of the evidence

underlying his conviction. We address each and overrule them.

       The standard of review is well-known and need not be reiterated. It suffices to cite

the parties to Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) and represent that

we abide by that standard here.

       Appellant first contends that the State failed to prove the date on which he was

released from supervision. Proving such date allegedly was imperative given the manner

of the charge.     The State accused appellant, via the indictment, of intentionally or

knowingly possessing a firearm “after the fifth anniversary of [his] . . . release from

supervision under community supervision, following the conviction of the felony at”

somewhere other than his residence. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.04(a)(2) (stating

that a “person who has been convicted of a felony commits an offense if he possesses a

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firearm . . . after the period described by Subdivision (1), at any location other than the

premises at which the person lives”).

       We find sufficient evidence in the record from which the factfinder could infer that

appellant possessed a firearm at a place other than his home more than five years after

his release from community supervision. That evidence includes a judgment signed May

20, 2009, memorializing his felony conviction for possessing a controlled substance. As

illustrated therein, the trial court sentenced him to imprisonment for two years. In lieu

thereof, the court suspended the sentence and ordered appellant to serve community

supervision for five years. Application of mathematical principles means his community

supervision ended on or about May 2014. Appellant possessed the firearm underlying

the conviction at bar in May 2020. The latter date is more than five years after May 2014.

       Appellant next believes that the State failed to prove he possessed the two

handguns. His admission to the officers that he had firearms within his truck and that he

obtained them from his deceased mother belies that. Simply put, evidence exists of

record upon which a rational factfinder could conclude, beyond reasonable doubt, that

appellant, a felon, possessed a firearm at a location other than his residence more than

five years after being released from community supervision.

       Issues Three and Four

       Through the next two issues, appellant complains of the trial court’s alleged

decision to become “a prosecutor involved in the fray.” This occurred when it initially

overruled the defendant’s objection to evidence of a prior judgment, reconsidered and

sustained the objection after the State rested its case in chief, and granted the State’s

request to reopen its case. That supposedly illustrated bias on the part of the court, which

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bias warranted a mistrial. So, in allowing the State to reopen and denying mistrial, the

trial court allegedly evinced bias and fundamental unfairness favoring the State. We

overrule the issues.

        The judgment alluded to was that allegedly proving appellant to be a previously

convicted felon. What appellant complains of is the trial court’s explanation to the State

about why it decided to reconsider the earlier ruling and thereafter sustain appellant’s

objection.     The trial court’s reasoning consisted of the failure of the witness’s

authenticating the document to actually prove appellant was the individual named therein.

The State questioned that reasoning at the time. The court replied by informing the State

why the witness testimony fell short. Eventually, the State asked to reopen the evidence

to correct the deficiency. Appellant objected, uttering that the trial court provided the State

with “a roadmap” illustrating how to correct the deficiency while it should have “merely

[said] objection sustained.”3

        No doubt, a trial judge must remain impartial and unbiased. Yet, none of the

authority cited us by appellant require him or her to rule on an objection without comment

to maintain that impartiality. None expressly obligates the judge to forego revealing the

basis for the decision. Indeed, in ultimately sustaining appellant’s objection, the trial judge

hardly disfavored appellant. Assuming that the better course of action would be to say

less, we hold that a court explaining its decision does not alone illustrate judicial bias or

fundamental unfairness. Indeed, if telling a prosecutor that he neglected to ask a witness

to identify the accused is not improper bias, then explaining why a court ruled as it did

        3 In objecting below, appellant said:
                                            “you [the judge] explained to the -- to the DA’s office -- to the
State exactly why you sustained my objection, giving them a roadmap to correct their mistake.”

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certainly is not. See Cruz v. State, No. 08-08-00213-CR, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 5971, at

*26 (Tex. App.—El Paso July 28, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication)

(holding that though “it was improper for the trial judge to remind the prosecutor, even

outside of the jury's hearing, that she had not asked a witness to identify the defendant

but the error does not demonstrate judicial bias nor does it rise to the level of fundamental

error”).

       As for granting the State’s motion to reopen the evidence, such lay in the trial

court’s discretion. Houston v. State, No. 03-05-00188-CR, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 1521,

at *9 (Tex. App.—Austin Feb. 24, 2006, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for

publication). With that in mind, we note authority holding that the trial court did not abuse

its discretion when granting such leave so the State could prove-up judgments needed to

enhance the level of a crime. Id. at *2-3. This was held so despite the trial court’s 1)

inquiring “‘about the evidence of the other convictions’”; 2) asking, “‘[y]ou aren’t going to

put those in evidence?”; and 3) suggesting that the State reopen to “put on any evidence

of any of these other convictions . . . .” Id. Here, the trial court merely explained the basis

for sustaining appellant’s objection while responding to the State’s arguments. It did not

broach the matter of reopening the evidence. Our circumstances are far less suspect

than those in Houston. So, if those in Houston evince no error, neither do ours. And, the

trial court’s having committed no error viz-a-viz the ruling, we cannot fault it for refusing

to order a mistrial.

       Issue Five

       Lastly, appellant argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress

evidence. We overrule the issue.

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       Our analysis begins with observing that the standard of review is abused

discretion. State v. Hodges, 595 S.W.3d 303, 305 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Jan. 8, 2020,

pet. ref’d). Under it, the appellant must illustrate that none of the grounds upon which the

trial court could have relied were meritorious. See In the Interest of T. M., 33 S.W.3d 341,

348 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2000 no pet.); accord, State v. Aviles, No. 10-07-00371-CR,

2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 2577, at *3-4 (Tex. App.—Waco April 9, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.,

not designated for publication) (noting same when rejecting a claim that the trial court

erred in denying a motion to suppress). One such ground here was consent. See Ruiz

v. State, No. 07-14-00272-CR, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 4717, at *8 (Tex. App.—Amarillo

May 7, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (stating that “[s]ufficiently

attenuated consent to search may render irrelevant a prior violation of the Fourth

Amendment to the United States Constitution”). That is, the trial court heard an officer

testify that appellant consented to the search of his vehicle. Yet, appellant said nothing

about that ground while attempting to illustrate that the court abused its discretion.

Instead, he discussed the propriety of the initial stop, the delay resulting thereafter, and

the basis for his seizure. Thus, he failed to satisfy his appellate burden to show error.

       Having overrule each issue, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                         Brian Quinn
                                                         Chief Justice

Do not publish.

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