Court Opinion

ID: 9491407
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:13:19.698942+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:54:43.379199
License: Public Domain

BEAM, Circuit Judge,
concurring and, in part, dissenting.
I concur in the result reached by the court in Part II and, with qualification,34 Part IV. I disagree, however, with the court’s conclusion in Part III that we have jurisdiction to prosecute Clark and Rawley for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 241. Therefore, I dissent in part.
In asserting subject-matter jurisdiction under this general federal criminal law, the court not only disregards the longstanding federal policy of advancing tribal self-determination, but blatantly fails to apply circuit precedent. We have held that “if a particular Indian right or policy is infringed by a general federal criminal law, that law will be held not to apply to Indians on reservations unless specifically so provided.” United States v. Blue, 722 F.2d 383, 385 (8th Cir.1983) (McMillian, J.). The right of tribal self-government has long been recognized and protected by both the courts, see, e.g., United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381-82, 6 S.Ct. 1109, 30 L.Ed. 228 (1886), and Congress, see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (declaring that “[tjhis section shall not extend to offenses committed by one Indian against the person or property of another Indian”). In my view, the exclusive right to prosecute members for fraud in a tribal election is a necessary and intimate aspect of tribal self-government. Federal prosecution of tribal election crimes will severely interfere with the tribes’ ability, as separate sovereigns, to eradicate such corruption in their own elections and their own government. Until Congress specifically provides for jurisdiction over this type of internal tribal matter, we must avoid the paternalistic temptation to assert jurisdiction based on the subjective belief that federal intervention is the only way to protect the civil rights of tribal members.
Jurisdiction over a dispute arising on an Indian reservation “is governed by a complex patchwork of federal, state, and tribal law.” Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 680 n. 1, 110 S.Ct. 2053, 109 L.Ed.2d 693 (1990). Because Indian tribes pre-existed the Constitution, they “still possess those aspects of sovereignty not withdrawn by treaty or statute, or by implication as a necessary result of their dependent status.” United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323, 98 S.Ct. 1079, 55 L.Ed.2d 303 (1978). One aspect of this retained sovereignty includes the power to *858“control their own internal relations,” Duro, 495 U.S. at 685, 110 S.Ct. 2053, which necessarily includes criminal “jurisdiction of all controversies between” tribal members, e.g., In re Mayfield, 141 U.S. 107, 115-16, 11 S.Ct. 939, 35 L.Ed. 635 (1891). Congress has broad powers to modify this retained sovereignty by conferring federal jurisdiction over crimes committed on Indian reservations. See, e.g., Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384, 16 S.Ct. 986, 41 L.Ed. 196 (1896). Thus, the question is whether Congress has provided jurisdiction for this federal prosecution.
The court correctly finds no basis for jurisdiction in the Indian Country Crimes Act and the Indian Major Crimes Act. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1152 and 1153. Faced with congressional silence, however, the court turns to a general federal law, which by its terms applies to all persons. See 18 U.S.C. § 241. Section 241 provides that it is unlawful for two or more persons to “conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person in any State, Territory, Commonwealth, Possession, or District in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Id.
Assuming that Congress intended to include American Indians within the scope of laws which, by their terms, are applicable to all persons, we have applied general federal laws to tribal crimes. See, e.g., Stone v. United States, 506 F.2d 561, 563 (8th Cir.1974). However, we have refused to extend this source of jurisdiction to purely internal tribal matters because that would intrude upon tribal sovereignty. See, e.g., United States v. White, 508 F.2d 453, 455 (8th Cir.1974) (stating that “areas traditionally left to tribal self-government, those most often the subject of treaties, have enjoyed an exception from the general rule that congressional enactments, in terms applying to all persons, includes Indians and their property interests”); see also Felix S. Cohen, Felix S. Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law, 286 (1982 ed.) (stating that “the Supreme Court has consistently recognized the unique status of tribes, Indians, and their lands, and has required that the congressional purpose of a conflicting law clearly require that it apply to Indians before Indian rights are held implicitly infringed”). Thus, the question is whether prosecution under section 241 for tribal election fraud intrudes upon tribal self-government.
The court mischaracterizes this inquiry by looking to whether there is a tribal right to use the election system fraudulently in order to maintain a position of power. Ante at 846. Obviously, no such right exists. What the court fails to appreciate, however, is that the tribal right at issue is the exclusive right to prosecute tribal election offenses, which is necessary to maintain political integrity. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566, 101 S.Ct. 1245, 67 L.Ed.2d 493 (1981) (discussing the inherent tribal power to regulate activities that “threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity ... of the tribe”). Intently focused on abating the corrupt actions of a few individuals, the court overlooks the important interest of the tribe in abating corruption within its own government. Monitoring tribal elections is an area traditionally left to tribal government and any contrary holding would violate the federal policy of respecting tribal sovereignty in the absence of express congressional authority-
Of course, Congress could remove this aspect of sovereignty and interject federal election policies and remedies into tribal elections. The wisdom of such a decision is best left to Congress, which is obviously better positioned to determine its potential impact. Rather than deferring to Congress, the court recklessly adopts a newly minted balancing test, not fairly supported as near as I can find anywhere within the recorded annals of American Indian litigation, weighing federal interests against tribal interests. See ante at 842. The result is a vague and incoherent test for jurisdiction. We should simply limit our inquiry to whether, on a case-by-case basis, the application of a general criminal law would infringe on tribal sovereignty. See Blue, 722 F.2d at 385.
I recognize that the oppression of tribal voting rights constitutes a fundamental assault on a democratic society and a serious violation of the civil rights of tribal members. Nonetheless, only Congress can remove this *859aspect of sovereignty. Because Congress has not so acted, I would decline to assert jurisdiction over the election conspiracy offenses.
Even if we did have jurisdiction, I would disagree with the court’s unprecedented extension of a federal election statute (18 U.S.C. § 241) to a tribal election. Although the Supreme Court has applied section 241 to a hybrid local and federal election, it did so because the conspirators used a voting machine to cast votes for both federal and local candidates. See Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 225, 94 S.Ct. 2253, 41 L.Ed.2d 20 (1974). The Court expressly declined to address whether section 241 would apply to a conspiracy to east false votes in a local election that did not include any federal candidates. Id. at 228, 94 S.Ct. 2253.
Similarly, we have applied section 241 to a local election, but only where the conspirators destroyed absentee ballots that also included votes that had been cast for federal candidates. See United States v. Townsley, 843 F.2d 1070, 1080 (8th Cir.1988). Contrary to the court’s reading of Townsley, see ante at 844-45, we have never endorsed the application of section 241 to purely local, much less tribal, elections. We cautioned that “we do not reach the question left undecided by the Supreme Court — whether 18 U.S.C. § 241 extends to conspiracies to cast votes in purely local elections in which no federal candidate is on the ballot.” Townsley, 843 F.2d at 1080 n. 10. If we were required to reach this issue, which I submit we are not, due to our lack of jurisdiction in the first instance, I would not extend section 241 to a tribal election. See Bathgate v. United States, 246 U.S. 220, 226, 38 S.Ct. 269, 62 L.Ed. 676 (1918) (discussing the congressional policy “not to interfere with elections within a State except by clear and specific provisions”).
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from Part III of the court’s decision.

. The court boldly cites United States v. Bledsoe, 674 F.2d 647, 655 (8th Cir.1982), for the proposition that "[a]n indictment must reveal on its face a proper basis for joinder.” Ante at 848-49. Notwithstanding the court's unfettered confidence in Bledsoe, this issue equally divided the court in United States v. Grey Bear, 863 F.2d 572 (8th Cir.1988) (en banc) (5-5 decision) (stating that an indictment must reveal on its face a proper basis for joinder) (Lay, C.J., Heaney, McMillian, Richard S. Arnold, and Wollman, JJ., joining) (stating that propriety of joinder is not limited to the face of the indictment) (John R. Gibson, Fagg, Bowman, Magill, and Beam, JJ., joining). I agree with the court's conclusion here that any joinder error was harmless, but I do not agree with the unnecessary citation to Bledsoe, particularly when unaccompanied by an explanation.