Court Opinion

ID: 9948657
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-07 17:14:05.451283+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:44.898922
License: Public Domain

J-S37013-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA              :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                           :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                           :
              v.                           :
                                           :
                                           :
 QUADEER WISE                              :
                                           :
                    Appellant              :   No. 2747 EDA 2022

       Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 7, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-51-CR-0002701-2020,
                         MC-51-CR-0005925-2020

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., MURRAY, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.:                        FILED MARCH 07, 2024

      Quadeer Wise, Appellant, appeals from the judgment of sentence of life

imprisonment without the possibility of parole, imposed following his

convictions for, among other crimes, first-degree murder. He claims that the

trial court interfered with his choice of counsel by going to trial with only one

of his two attorneys. He also raises two evidentiary challenges, and alleges

that the trial judge should have granted his request to instruct the jury on

third-degree homicide. After careful review, we affirm.

      The trial court cogently summarized the evidence presented at trial as

follows:

      On February 3, 2019, at approximately 10:23 p.m., … [Appellant],
      Quadeer Wise, shot and killed the decedent, Saquan Crawley, in
      front of the Yummy Yummy Asian Restaurant (“Restaurant”)
      located at 4761 Griscom Street. The entire incident was captured
      on surveillance video from multiple cameras located inside and
      outside of the Restaurant.
J-S37013-23

     Earlier that night, the decedent arrived at the Restaurant at about
     8:37 p.m. and remained in the general area around the
     Restaurant for the next hour-and-a-half. At 10:02 p.m., …
     [Appellant] drove his child’s mother’s, Symone Baker’s, 2014
     Chevy Impala to the Restaurant and parked out front on Griscom
     Street. After sitting in the vehicle for about ten minutes, …
     [Appellant] exited the vehicle and walked past the Restaurant
     around the corner onto Foulkrod Street. After returning about five
     minutes later, … [Appellant] began pacing on the sidewalk next to
     the vehicle.

     At 10:20 p.m., … [Appellant] opened the driver’s side door of the
     Chevy Impala and retrieved a handgun, which he then placed in
     the right pocket of his pants. Less than two minutes later, the
     decedent walked past … [Appellant] on Griscom Street and
     entered the Restaurant. As the decedent walked by him into the
     Restaurant, … [Appellant] stared at the decedent and reached for
     his right pocket, but did not pull out the gun. When the decedent
     exited the Restaurant about thirty seconds later, … [Appellant]
     approached the decedent as he stood in front of the Restaurant
     and appeared to say something to him. After the decedent turned
     away from him, … [Appellant] pulled the gun from his pocket,
     walked right up next to the decedent, and began shooting him.
     [Appellant] fired seven shots in quick succession as he moved
     away from the decedent. He then fled the scene on foot, leaving
     the Chevy Impala parked in front of the Restaurant.

                                   ....

     Seven .40 Smith & Wesson fired cartridge casings (“FCCs”) and
     two projectiles were recovered at the scene. Two of the FCCs
     were located on the front steps of the Restaurant, while the other
     five were found on the sidewalk in front of the Restaurant. Each
     of the FCCs and projectiles were fired from the same firearm,
     which was never recovered.

     Deputy Chief Medical Examiner Dr. Albert Chu determined that the
     decedent suffered seven gunshot wounds, two of which were fatal.
     The two fatal gunshot wounds were to the decedent’s back, while
     the remaining gunshot wounds were to his chest, buttocks, hip,
     and right forearm[,] as well as a graze wound to his left index
     finger. N.T.[,] 9/28/2022[,] at 69-74.

Trial Court Opinion (TCO), 3/23/23, at 2-4.

                                    -2-
J-S37013-23

      Appellant did not file post-sentence motions and timely appealed his

judgment of sentence. He complied with the trial court’s order to file a concise

statement and the court prepared an opinion per Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a). We now

address Appellant’s four claims.

      1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying Appellant’s
      request for a continuance of trial because Appellant had retained
      two attorneys for trial and one of the attorneys, Gary S. Silver,
      Esquire, was on trial elsewhere and unavailable and Appellant
      was, therefore, denied his [c]onstitutional right to counsel of his
      choosing and a new trial should be ordered?

      2. Did the trial court err and cause irreparable harm to Appellant
      by allowing testimony and inferences relating to Appellant’s prior
      criminality and police contacts over trial counsel’s objection and a
      should [sic] new trial be ordered?

      3. Did the trial court err and cause irreparable harm to Appellant
      by allowing hearsay and lack of personal knowledge testimony
      from Detective Timothy Bass relating to potential flight by
      Appellant when Detective Bass testified that Detective Thorsten
      Lucke thought that Appellant had fled to Atlanta, Georgia and
      when Appellant was arrested in Philadelphia?

      4. Did the trial court err and deny Appellant his substantive
      [c]onstitutional right to a trial by jury by denying Appellant’s
      request for a third-degree [m]urder charge and thereby
      supplanting the jury’s role in determining whether or not Appellant
      may have acted with specific intent to kill?

Appellant’s Brief at 4.

      Appellant’s first claim alleges that the trial court interfered with his right

to the assistance of counsel of his choosing. We agree with the trial court that

Appellant failed to preserve this issue, although our rationale differs somewhat

from the trial court’s analysis.

                                       -3-
J-S37013-23

      Appellant retained attorneys Richard Giuliani, Esq., and Gary Silver,

Esq., to jointly represent him at trial. On September 26, 2022, right before

the jury was sworn, the trial judge placed the Commonwealth’s plea offer on

the record, which Appellant rejected.    The trial court then remarked, “Mr.

Silver is in another room right now. I have spoken to that judge, and he will

send you [sic] here. But Mr. Giuliani tells me, he has spoken with you, and

Mr. Giuliani is ready to try the case. Is that accurate?” N.T., 9/26/22, at 15.

Appellant replied, “Yes.” The court responded, “Okay. And we’re ready to get

started today?” Appellant again replied, “Yes.” Id. Trial then proceeded with

Attorney Giuliani solely representing Appellant.    On September 28, 2022,

immediately after the Commonwealth rested, the court conducted a colloquy

with Appellant regarding his right to testify. The court then stated, “And it

was my understanding that Mr. Silver was available to come into the

courtroom the last – I think as of yesterday, but you talked with Mr. Giuliani,

and you were just not going to have him come into the courtroom; is that

correct?” N.T., 9/28/22, at 61. Appellant replied, “Yes.” Id. Attorney Giuliani

did not address Attorney Silver’s presence at either juncture.

      The trial court opinion states that “Attorney Silver failed to file any

motion for a continuance or communicate in any way with judicial staff prior

to the scheduled trial date[,]” and that the court “reached out to the judge in

Attorney Silver’s other case and was informed that Attorney Silver would be

sent to this [c]ourt as soon as that case was finished.” TCO at 7. The opinion

then states that the court “conducted a colloquy to confirm that [Appellant]

                                     -4-
J-S37013-23

was choosing to proceed with trial with Attorney Giuliani alone.” Id. The trial

court concluded that Appellant waived any claim concerning Attorney Silver’s

presence by failing to personally ask for his presence or a continuance. Id.

(“[Appellant] exercised his right to counsel of his choosing by deciding to

proceed with Attorney Giuliani.”).

      We add the following to supply context to Appellant’s argument. On

June 22, 2022, Appellant filed a motion which the docket reflects was

captioned “Defense Advance Request for Continuance.” This motion is not

part of the certified record. However, the trial court opinion states that, on

June 10, 2022, “counsel for both parties agreed to continue the trial … rather

than have the case possibly be transferred to another judge, if one was

available to hear the case on June 21, 2022, when this [c]ourt was able to

hear the case a week later on June 27, 2022.” Id. at 6. The opinion further

explains that the June 21, 2022 filing was at Attorney Silver’s request, “since

he was unavailable on June 27, 2022. The next day, both parties agreed to a

trial date of September 26, 2022.” Id.

      Appellant largely focuses on the opinion’s reference to a colloquy. He

asserts that said colloquy was deficient, as “there was nothing approaching a

voluntary waiver of a [c]onstitutional right to counsel.” Appellant’s Brief at

10. Appellant claims that he was therefore deprived of his right to counsel.

Id. at 9 (“[T]here was, in effect, a direction to Appellant that he would have

to proceed to trial without his attorneys.”). He further suggests that the trial

court forced him to proceed due to annoyance with Attorney Silver, as he had

                                     -5-
J-S37013-23

requested the postponement in June, selected the September 26 th trial date,

and then failed to proactively alert the court of his unavailability. Id. at 10

(“In its [o]pinion, the trial court continues to justify the violation of Appellant’s

[c]onstitutional right by blaming Mr. Silver. … The trial court continues to

prioritize its calendar over Appellant’s [c]onstitutional right to counsel.”).

      We agree with Appellant’s very limited point that any purported

“colloquy” was deficient. However, that concession is of no help to Appellant

as the trial court’s disposition of this claim, notwithstanding the reference to

a colloquy, rests on the fact that Appellant did not request to postpone the

case due to Attorney Silver’s unavailability. Our analysis differs from the trial

court in that we determine Attorney Giuliani was Appellant’s counsel of choice,

and he did not seek a continuance due to co-counsel’s unavailability. Thus,

Attorney Giuliani waived the issue by failing to ask for a postponement or any

other type of remedy.

      That Appellant was represented by one of his two retained attorneys

forecloses Appellant’s arguments that he was deprived of his right to counsel

of his choosing. Simultaneously, we do not agree with the trial court that

Appellant in his personal capacity waived the issue. Instead, we conclude that

Attorney Giuliani waived the issue by failing to request any postponement. In

this regard, the trial court did not need to ask on-the-record whether Appellant

wished to continue with Attorney Giuliani. The salient point is that Appellant

was, in fact, represented by the counsel of his choice. Thus, his citation to

Commonwealth v. Rucker, 761 A.2d 541 (Pa. 2000), wherein our Supreme

                                        -6-
J-S37013-23

Court awarded a new trial for depriving a defendant of his counsel of choice,

is inapt. In that case, Rucker was represented by court-appointed counsel,

and “[a]fter four jurors were selected, appointed counsel informed the court

that [Rucker] wanted to switch to counsel that had, earlier that day, been

privately retained by [Rucker’s] family.” Id. at 542. The private attorney was

prepared to try the case as he had worked on it for months in anticipation that

Rucker would be able to pay. The trial court refused to let private counsel

represent Rucker, nor did the court permit that attorney to serve as co-

counsel. Our Supreme Court acknowledged that the Commonwealth—and by

extension the trial court—has an interest in proceeding with trials, which must

be weighed against the accused’s right to counsel of their choosing. The Court

concluded that “the present case is not one where granting [Rucker]’s request

would have caused an unreasonable delay in trial.” Id. at 543. The Court

explicitly noted that “private counsel … was already completely familiar with

the matter[,]” and opined that “[t]he state’s interest in swift and efficient

administration of justice would not, therefore, have been affected in any way

by allowing a change of counsel.” Id.

      This case does not involve a request to substitute counsel. Rather, it

involves retained counsel’s failure to seek the presence of co-counsel.

Presumably, Attorney Giuliani spoke with Appellant about Attorney Silver’s

unavailability and advised him that he was prepared to try the case by himself.

This advice led to the “colloquy” cited by the trial court. We conclude that the

colloquy is irrelevant to this claim. Any deficient advice supplied by Attorney

                                     -7-
J-S37013-23

Giuliani regarding his preparedness to try the case by himself would have to

be addressed in collateral proceedings. That Appellant indicated he did not

personally wish to postpone the case is something that may or may not be

relevant to those proceedings, and we express no opinion on that point.

      The foregoing analysis also resolves Appellant’s suggestion that the

postponement history discussed supra supplied a motive for the trial court to

force him to trial. The trial court may well have taken some action if Attorney

Giuliani had sought a postponement or delay.        For instance, the record

establishes that the trial court spoke with the judge presiding over Attorney

Silver’s other matter. The other judge may or may not have been amenable

to waiting for Attorney Silver to finish that case. Perhaps the judge in the

other matter would have postponed or deferred that proceeding, whatever it

was. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Attorney Giuliani’s failure

to request relief waived the issue.

      Appellant’s second issue challenges an evidentiary ruling concerning

references by police officers that Appellant was known to them from prior

encounters. Appellant claims that these references violated Rule of Evidence

404(b), which forbids the introduction of other arrests or convictions to show

a propensity to commit crimes. The rule prohibits introducing this evidence

due to “policy, i.e., because of a fear that such evidence is so powerful that

the jury might misuse the evidence and convict based solely upon criminal

propensity.”   Commonwealth v. Dillon, 925 A.2d 131, 137 (Pa. 2007).

Appellant states: “In the present matter, there was extensive testimony as to

                                      -8-
J-S37013-23

prior police contacts with Appellant.” Appellant’s Brief at 12. He cites three

exchanges. The details of the testimony are critical to our analysis and so we

discuss the offending comments as cited by Appellant.

      The first exchange cited by Appellant occurred at pages 93 through 97

of the first day of trial testimony. We first set forth some of the preceding

testimony as context. Officer Michael Kilroy testified that he graduated from

the police academy in 2012 and was currently assigned to Philadelphia’s 15th

District, having transferred there in 2015 from the 35th District. N.T., 9/26/22,

at 86. He informed the jury that, upon graduation in 2012, he was on foot

patrol over approximately a six-block radius.       He explained that he first

encountered “[Appellant] and a few of the friends that he had back in those

days” while on patrol. Id. at 90. Officer Kilroy said that “they used to hang

out in front of a store … approximately a block away from [a] park.” Id. at

90-91. He stated that he “would see [Appellant] all the time; him and the

same friends most of the time.” Id. at 91. Officer Kilroy explained that the

group “used to always joke” with him because he smoked, and they would say

he “had a smoking problem and stuff like that.” Id. at 92. Officer Kilroy

added that “[i]t wasn’t anything that I would feel like [was] malice or anything

like that. It was a lot of joking, just speaking to one another.” Id.

      In 2015, Officer Kilroy said he transferred to the 15th District, where the

shooting occurred. He testified that, about “five months into my transfer[,] …

I saw [Appellant] and a few of his friends….” Id. Officer Kilroy described that

the two men had a brief exchange, and Officer Kilroy told Appellant that he

                                      -9-
J-S37013-23

had transferred to that district. Afterwards, Officer Kilroy stated that he would

see Appellant while on patrol. The Commonwealth asked, “did you have any

other kind of contact with him that really sticks out in your mind?” Id. at 93.

The officer replied that “Appellant was a victim of a stabbing, and he needed

transportation[,] … to be taken down for court.” Id. at 93-94. The prosecutor

then asked about the shooting. Officer Kilroy stated he went to the Yummy

Yummy store and reviewed the surveillance video “to see if I could see, you

know, who was involved or anything like that….” Id. at 95. When he watched

the video, he stated he saw Appellant. Id. at 97 (“Q. When you watched the

video, did you recognize anybody in the video?          A.   Right away I saw

[Appellant] in the video.”). He testified that he observed Appellant “walk[] up

to the gentleman, who then turns his back, and that’s when [Appellant] pulls

out the firearm and discharges several times into him.” Id. Appellant did not

object to any of this testimony.

      Appellant next cites to page 127 of this transcript, which is the second

page of the Commonwealth’s redirect of Officer Kilroy. We again begin with

some contextual background.        On cross-examination, Appellant confirmed

with Officer Kilroy that the stabbing and subsequent transport had occurred

in 2017, which was “well over a year” before the instant homicide. Id. at 125.

Appellant then asked, “I just want to be clear, you’re not certain[,] prior to

February 3, 2019[,] the last time you had seen [Appellant] before then?” Id.

at 126. Officer Kilroy replied, “I don’t know the exact date.” Id. On re-direct,

the Commonwealth asked, “You don’t know the exact date that you saw

                                     - 10 -
J-S37013-23

[Appellant] prior to February 3rd. Do you know the range of time…?” Id. He

replied, “Probably, like, weeks. Maybe a few days. [H]e was at … Griscom

and Foulkrod … on a daily basis.” Id. at 126-27. The Commonwealth then

asked, “So you would say that, based on that pattern, within what time frame

do you think you would have seen him up to the 3rd of February?” Id. at 127.

Appellant objected, citing no specific ground.    The trial court immediately

overruled the objection, stating: “No. You raised it. You challenged it. She

can clarify.” Id.

      The third and final set of references cited by Appellant occurs at pages

9 through 12 of the transcript from the second day of trial, during the

testimony of Officer Sean Quinn, who conducted bike patrol in the 15th District

during the preceding eight years.     The Commonwealth asked, “Can you

explain to the jurors when and how is it that you first came in contact with

[Appellant?]” N.T., 9/27/22, at 9. Officer Quinn explained that his patrol area

encompasses about a dozen blocks, and includes “generally passing by,

clearing corners where people may be hanging out, selling drugs, or just, you

know, loitering themselves.” Id. He said he “would pass by [Appellant] on

the corner of Griscom and Foulkrod.” Id. He testified that he could not put a

timeline on when he first met Appellant, but his general practice was to

“engage with just about everybody; whether it be someone walking down the

street[,] … anybody who I may have arrested who may be involved with corner

drug sales or other crimes.” Id. at 10. He continued:

                                    - 11 -
J-S37013-23

      And if I do know [the person], it can be as simple as, “Hey, how
      are things? You know, I heard you had an open case. How is that
      going? How is your probation? How is your family? Did you watch
      the Eagles game?” Pretty much any – any which way I could to
      engage with people to … help me gauge what kind of person they
      were.

Id. at 10-11.

      Addressing his interactions with Appellant, Officer Quinn remarked that

he tended to see him “multiple times throughout the week.” Id. at 11. He

then stated:

      It would be multiple times throughout the week. Tend[ed] to be
      more so in the evening hours.         When I would engage in
      conversation with him, he, at times, told me he was working for
      sanitation. He would be in a sanitation jumpsuit similar to what
      the trash guys wear. You know, not knowing him very well
      personally, I just took him for his word, and he was maybe just
      hanging with friends after work, kind of just talking a bit. My
      interactions with him were never anything violent or hostile. They
      always seemed fairly cordial. And that tends to be how most of
      the conversations go with -- between me and people on the street
      out there.

Id.

      Appellant submits that, contrary to the trial court’s ruling, he “did not

open the door to anything. The door was extensively already [sic] opened by

the Commonwealth.” Appellant’s Brief at 13. He claims that the jury “could

only infer guilt and criminal propensity based upon Appellant’s extensive

contacts with and surveillance by police.” Id.

      We conclude that Appellant has waived this argument by failing to lodge

an objection at trial to the admission of testimony. We agree with Appellant’s

argument that his cross-examination did not “open the door” to the

                                    - 12 -
J-S37013-23

Commonwealth’s eliciting evidence             concerning      prior    contacts, as    the

Commonwealth had already probed those matters on direct examination.

Thus, the scope of Appellant’s cross-examination properly included that topic.

Appellant, however, failed to object to the Commonwealth’s discussing Officer

Kilroy’s past interactions with Appellant. He could have objected to that line

of testimony if he believed that it was inappropriate. Having failed to do so,

the issue has been waived. Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised in the trial

court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”).

        Alternatively, even if Appellant had preserved a challenge to the

admission of this testimony by raising a single, late objection during the

Commonwealth’s redirect examination, Appellant would not prevail because

none of these references suggested to the jury that the prior interactions were

related to criminal behavior. Appellant quotes, inter alia, Commonwealth v.

Johnson, 838 A.2d 663, 680 (Pa. 2003), for the general proposition that “no

reference may be made at trial in a criminal case to a defendant’s arrest or

incarceration for a previous crime….” Johnson does not, however, stand for

the principle that a police officer’s testifying that he or she knows a defendant

from working the beat implicitly suggests that the person has been arrested

or incarcerated.       The clause immediately preceding that quotation states,

“With    regard   to    the   revelation    by      the   remarks     that   Johnson   was

incarcerated….” Id. Nothing in the foregoing testimony directly informed the

jury that Appellant had ever been arrested, convicted, or incarcerated. Thus,

                                           - 13 -
J-S37013-23

this case does not implicate Rule 404(b), as the testimony did not amount to

the introduction of prior crimes, convictions, or arrests.

      Appellant fails to cite a single case in which testimony that an officer is

familiar with an individual from their police work was treated as unmistakably

conveying to the jury that this is somehow code for prior arrests. We will not

presume that jurors make the speculative leap that an officer’s familiarity with

an individual is necessarily due to criminal investigation as opposed to

innocuous explanations. Moreover, the risk of that conclusion was lessened

in this case because Officer Kilroy told the jury that he regularly spoke to

people in his patrol area.     N.T., 9/26/22, at 95 (“I would get to know

everybody that was out there all the time; more community-based policing

type of stuff.”).    In fairness, Officer Quinn did testify that he spoke to

individuals who were on probation, which could suggest that his interactions

with Appellant were of the same type. However, Officer Quinn’s comments

were simply explaining his practice of speaking to basically anyone in the

neighborhood.       With respect to Appellant specifically, he stated, “My

interactions with him were never anything violent or hostile.      They always

seemed fairly cordial.” N.T., 9/27/22, at 11. He did not state that any of

these interactions were related to the criminal justice system. Accordingly,

Appellant is not entitled to relief, even if this claim had been preserved.

      Appellant’s third issue also concerns an evidentiary ruling, issued during

the testimony of Detective Timothy Bass, a member of the Fugitive Task Force.

An arrest warrant for Appellant was issued the day after the homicide on

                                     - 14 -
J-S37013-23

February 4, 2019, but he was not arrested until March 4, 2020.             The

Commonwealth called Detective Bass to discuss the efforts made by the task

force to arrest Appellant. As to Appellant’s claim, Detective Bass obtained a

variety of phone numbers potentially associated with Appellant or his

associates, which he turned over to Detective Lucke. N.T., 9/28/22, at 26.

Over Appellant’s objection, the Commonwealth elicited from Detective Bass

that Detective Lucke believed, based on his analysis of phone records, that

Appellant was located in another state. Id. at 32-33 (“As a result of Detective

Lucke’s analysis, he did believe that [Appellant] was in the Atlanta, Georgia

area or, possibly, North Carolina.”). Detective Bass related that this opinion

was relayed to him on August 29, 2019, and he again met with Detective

Lucke on September 4, 2019, at which time they surveilled an address in

Philadelphia.

      We agree with the trial court that the Commonwealth did not introduce

this statement to prove that Appellant was in Atlanta or North Carolina.

Therefore, the statement was not hearsay, which is defined as a statement

that “a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in

the statement.”     Pa.R.E. 801(c)(2).       As the trial court explained, the

Commonwealth did not offer the statement to establish Appellant’s actual

whereabouts on August 29, 2019, but rather to explain the efforts made to

locate Appellant:

      This [c]ourt properly permitted Detective Bass’ testimony about
      the fact that Detective Lucke believed [Appellant] had fled to
      Atlanta, Georgia. Detective Bass provided details about the

                                    - 15 -
J-S37013-23

      efforts he and his fellow officers made to locate and arrest
      [Appellant] following the shooting. After an arrest warrant was
      issued and [Appellant] could not be located in Philadelphia,
      Detective Lucke, upon analyzing cell phone data, offered a
      possible lead that [Appellant] was located in Atlanta, Georgia.

                                     ....

      [A]n out-of-court statement offered, not for its truth, but to
      explain the witness’s course of conduct, is not hearsay.

      Detective Bass’ testimony that Detective Lucke believed
      [Appellant] to be in Atlanta, Georgia was not offered to prove that
      [Appellant] was, in fact, in Atlanta, Georgia at that time, but to
      detail the attempts made by Detective Bass and his fellow officers
      to locate [Appellant] and explain why it took more than a year to
      arrest [Appellant]. Furthermore, this [c]ourt made certain to
      inform defense counsel that Detective Lucke was available to be
      recalled to testify if he wanted to question him about this issue.
      As Detective Bass’ testimony was appropriately admitted,
      [Appellant]’s claim fails.

TCO at 9-10 (citations omitted).

      We agree with this analysis and add the following to address Appellant’s

argument on appeal. In concluding that this testimony was properly admitted

as course-of-conduct evidence, we acknowledge that an unfettered view of

the theory is not consistent with basic notions of fairness.      For example,

imagine an officer’s testifying that he was sent to a woman’s home because

she called 911 and said “my boyfriend beat me tonight, just like he did last

week.” The Commonwealth could argue that the statement was used not for

the truth of the accusations but to explain why the officer went to the home

in the first place. However, there is a clear danger that the jury would consider

the statement for its truth regardless. Appellant makes a similar argument:

that Detective Bass’ belief that Detective Lucke’s opinion was correct is

                                     - 16 -
J-S37013-23

indistinguishable from telling the jury that Appellant was, in fact, in Atlanta

and therefore avoiding arrest.    In other words, viewing this testimony as

course-of-conduct testimony permitted the Commonwealth to introduce

Detective Lucke’s opinion, i.e., that Appellant was on the run, without calling

Detective Lucke.

      As our Supreme Court explained in Commonwealth v. Palsa, 555 A.2d

808 (Pa. 1989), courts should be cautious in admitting out-of-court

statements under the course-of-conduct theory. It stated:

      Nevertheless, it cannot be said that every out-of-court statement
      having bearing upon subsequent police conduct is to be admitted,
      for there is great risk that, despite cautionary jury instructions,
      certain types of statements will be considered by the jury as
      substantive evidence of guilt. Further, the police conduct rule
      does not open the door to unbounded admission of testimony, for
      such would nullify an accused’s right to cross-examine and
      confront the witnesses against him.

                                     ....

      Clearly, there is need for a balance to be struck between avoiding
      the dangers of hearsay testimony and the need for evidence that
      explains why police pursued a given course of action. This
      balancing process is governed by the sound discretion of the trial
      court, and, as with other evidentiary decisions, the trial court’s
      decision will be upheld on appeal unless there has been an abuse
      of that discretion.

Id. at 811.

      The Palsa Court found that the balancing tipped in favor of the

defendant because the course-of-conduct evidence was highly incriminating.

It observed that “[t]he challenged statements in the present case were of a

most highly incriminating sort. They contained specific assertions of criminal

                                    - 17 -
J-S37013-23

conduct by a named accused, and, indeed, were likely understood by the jury

as providing proof as to necessary elements of the crime for which [the

defendant] was being tried.” Id. at 811. The Court also examined whether

the Commonwealth had an alternative to introducing the statements, stating

that “the police easily could have explained the course of their conduct

pertaining to the investigation and arrest of [the defendant] … without

resorting to the full and explicit statements given by [the witness]. It is the

prosecutor’s duty to avoid the introduction of out-of-court statements that go

beyond what is reasonably necessary to explain police conduct.” Id.

      Applying these principles, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse

its discretion. First, Detective Lucke’s opinion was not a “highly incriminating”

statement, as it had no bearing on any issue in the case beyond whether

Appellant was attempting to avoid arrest, which is relevant to consciousness

of guilt. In this regard, Appellant does not dispute the other evidence showing

that he was avoiding the police and, thus, whether Appellant was in Atlanta,

North Carolina, or some other location is not particularly damaging.         The

essential point is that Detective Bass and his colleagues were following all

leads in their efforts to arrest Appellant.

      Second, with respect to whether the Commonwealth needed to offer the

statements, we agree that the trial court’s invitation to let Appellant recall

Detective Lucke to explore that issue if he desired constituted an adequate

alternative. N.T., 9/28/22, at 32 (trial court’s overruling objection; “We can

always – we can call [Detective Lucke] back, and you can question him about

                                      - 18 -
J-S37013-23

it.”). To the extent that the jury would naturally consider the statement for

its truth without an instruction, this is not a case where the defendant was

deprived of his ability to confront the declarant. See Palsa, supra at 811

(“[A]n adequate explanation for police conduct could have been provided,

while minimizing the introduction of statements made by a person who was

not under oath and who was not available for cross-examination.”).

      Appellant’s fourth and final issue claims that the trial court erred in

failing to grant his request to have the jury instructed on the elements of

third-degree murder.    “Pennsylvania retains the common law definition of

murder,   which    is   a   killing   conducted   with   malice   aforethought.”

Commonwealth v. Packer, 168 A.3d 161, 168 (Pa. 2017) (quotation marks

and citation omitted). “Third-degree murder is defined as ‘all other kinds of

murder,’ i.e., those committed with malice that are not intentional (first-

degree) or committed during the perpetration of a felony (second-degree).”

Id. (citing 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(a)-(c)). “Murder of the third degree is a killing

done with legal malice but without specific intent to kill.” Commonwealth v.

Pitts, 404 A.2d 1305, 1308 (Pa. 1979). The trial court opined on-the-record

“that there was no evidence presented that would suggest that the murder

was committed with anything other than the specific intent to kill.”       N.T.,

9/28/22, at 171. The court noted that the video surveillance footage showed

that the victim was “shot numerous times at what would be relatively close

range.” Id. Moreover, “the defense here is he wasn’t the doer; not that it

was a third-degree case.” Id.

                                       - 19 -
J-S37013-23

      Appellant suggests that a third-degree murder instruction is required in

most circumstances when the Commonwealth seeks a first-degree homicide

conviction, as a contrary rule of law would usurp the jury’s role. Appellant’s

Brief at 21 (“While it was Appellant’s position that he did not do the underlying

murder, it was the jury’s role to convict on every element beyond a reasonable

doubt.”). Appellant suggests that the only exception is for cases “involving

close range shots to the head.” Id. Because the victim was killed by gunshots

to the torso, Appellant claims that the jury should have decided whether the

shooter acted with malice that fell short of a specific intent to kill. Appellant’s

position is essentially that it was exclusively for the jury to determine whether

the intentional acts of pointing the firearm and firing multiple times constituted

the specific intent to kill. See Commonwealth. v. Fisher, 80 A.3d 1186,

1191 (Pa. 2013) (explaining that the “absence of specific intent to kill is not

an element of third[-]degree murder; rather, such crime is an intentional act,

characterized by malice, that results in death, intended or not”).

      The trial court’s opinion cited Commonwealth v. Solano, 906 A.2d

1180 (Pa. 2006), which affirmed the trial court’s denial of Solano’s request to

charge the jury on third-degree murder. There, our Supreme Court said:

      [T]he law is clear that a trial court should not instruct a jury on
      legal principles which bear no relationship to the evidence
      presented at trial. See also Commonwealth v. Browdie, ...
      671 A.2d 668 ([Pa.] 1996). In the instant case, the evidence
      unequivocally established that the victim was intentionally killed
      after being shot several times at close range. [Solano], himself,
      raised no claim that the killing was anything other than
      intentional; rather, he asserted that he was not the shooter,
      claiming he was in Connecticut at the relevant time.

                                      - 20 -
J-S37013-23

Id. at 1190.

      We agree with the trial court that Solano is largely on point. As there,

Appellant here argued that he was not the shooter.         While in Solano the

evidence admitted to show that the killing was intentional was stronger, as

the “assailant stood over [the victim] and shot him several more times” after

the victim fell to the ground following an initial volley of gunfire, id. at 1184,

the surveillance video in this case objectively established that the shooter

pulled a gun from his pocket, walked right up to the victim, and then rapidly

fired seven bullets. Of the seven wounds inflicted, two were deemed fatal by

the medical examiner. We agree with the trial court that this is not a case

where the evidence leaves room to determine that the shooter was reckless

or lacked the specific intent to kill. Cf. Commonwealth v. Rodgers, 456

A.2d 1352, 1354 (Pa. 1983) (concluding that evidence was sufficient to

establish specific intent to kill; “The nature of the killing, a shotgun blast to

the head at short range, establishes the specific intent to take life.”).

Moreover, that Appellant defended this case based on mistaken identity

further supports the trial court’s ruling. Because the legal principles applicable

to third-degree homicide have no bearing on this case, Solano, supra, we

agree that the trial court properly declined to instruct the jury on third-degree

murder.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

                                     - 21 -
J-S37013-23

Date: 3/7/2024

                 - 22 -