Court Opinion

ID: 9587755
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:25:53.470419+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:34:32.736961
License: Public Domain

Ruffin, Judge,
dissenting.
Because I believe that the stop of Garmon’s vehicle was improper, I respectfully dissent.
Neither Michigan v. Summers, 452 U. S. 692 (101 SC 2587, 69 LE2d 340) (1981), nor Fritzius v. State, 225 Ga. App. 642 (484 SE2d 743) (1997), cited by the majority, supports the stop in this case. In Summers, police officers were about to execute a search warrant on a house when they encountered and detained its resident, Summers, leaving the premises. The officers detained Summers during the search and, after finding contraband in the house, arrested him. During a search of Summers’ person, the officers found additional contraband. Summers moved to suppress evidence of the contraband found on his person because it resulted from a detention which violated bis Fourth Amendment rights. Although the trial court agreed and suppressed the evidence, the United States Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the officers were permitted to detain Summers while they searched his home.
In addressing the propriety of the detention, the Supreme Court found that the resulting intrusion on Summers’ privacy and restraint on his liberty were less severe than that caused by the search of his home. Summers, supra at 701. In this regard, the Court reasoned that the premises search was a “substantial invasion of the privacy of the persons who resided there . . . [and that most citizens] would elect to remain in order to observe the search of their possessions.” (Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 701. In addition, the Court found the detention justified because law enforcement officials have a legitimate interest in preventing flight if contraband is found during the search. Id. at 702. The Court further justified the detention on the ground that “the orderly completion of the search may be facilitated *681if the occupants of the premises are present. Their self-interest may induce them to open locked doors or locked containers to avoid the use of force that is not only damaging to property but may also delay the completion of the task at hand.” (Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 703.
It is clear from Summers that, in approving the detention of Summers, the Court relied exclusively on reasons dependent upon his residence in the home. Because Summers lived in the home that was being searched, the intrusions on his privacy and liberty interests were less objectionable, the officers could prevent his flight if contraband was found and he could facilitate the officers’ search and minimize any unnecessary intrusion.
We recently applied these same factors in approving a vehicle stop in Fritzius, supra. In Fritzius, police were about to execute a search warrant on a mobile home occupied by a man named Henry Fallaw when an officer observed two men leave the home, enter a vehicle and drive away. An officer was instructed to stop the vehicle and “find out if Fallaw, who was named in the warrant, was in the car.” Id. at 644. In accordance with these instructions, an officer stopped the vehicle approximately two miles away from the home and subsequently discovered contraband in the car. Fritzius, the vehicle owner, moved to suppress evidence of the contraband on the ground that it was the fruit of an unlawful stop. The trial court denied Fritzius’ motion to suppress the evidence, and on appeal, this Court affirmed.
The Fritzius majority reasoned that if the Court in Summers allowed police to detain the resident at the premises, then police could similarly stop a car two miles away from the premises and determine if the owner was present in the vehicle. The Fritzius majority reasoned that: “It would appear reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments for a police officer, knowing that certain persons and premises were the subject of the immediate execution of a search warrant, to detain temporarily a vehicle containing occupants who had just departed the premises to be searched in order to identify the occupants and to see if one of them was a person named in the warrant. Under such circumstances, the detention would be minimally intrusive and neither an arbitrary nor capricious exercise of police power.” (Emphasis supplied and omitted.) Id. at 646.
Neither Summers nor Fritzius authorized the stop of Garmon’s vehicle in the present case. The evidence is clear that Garmon neither resided in the premises being searched nor was he stopped immediately outside the premises as was the defendant in Summers. And, unlike Fritzius, where the officer stopped the car for the sole and specific purpose of identifying the occupants to see if one of them was named in the warrant, the evidence in this case clearly estab*682lished that Deputy Bearden was instructed to stop the vehicle and detain its occupants, without regard to whether one of the occupants was the homeowner, Wilson.
Decided December 4, 1998
Mark J. Radish, Rhonda L. Byers, for appellant.
David McDade, District Attorney, William H. McClain, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
Because Garmon did not reside in the premises being searched, his detention resulted in a substantial intrusion into his privacy and liberty interests. Indeed, Garmon was not named in the warrant, there is no evidence he had any interest in the contents of the home being searched and there appears no reason why he would elect to be present during the search of the home. See Summers, supra at 701. Furthermore, assuming contraband was found in the home, Garmon’s previous mere presence in the residence would have been insufficient to attribute possession of the contraband to him and the risk of his flight would thus not have been a factor. See Williams v. State, 207 Ga. App. 782, 784 (4) (429 SE2d 153) (1993); Summers, supra at 702. Finally, because Garmon did not reside there, he could not facilitate the officers’ search, and accordingly had no interest in assisting the officers in this regard. See id. at 703. Because there existed no valid justification for stopping Garmon’s automobile, I would find the stop unreasonable and reverse his conviction.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge McMurray joins in this dissent.