Court Opinion

ID: 9777765
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 20:23:44.063104+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:34.716304
License: Public Domain

GUNN, Judge,
dissenting.
On the facts of the case, I would reverse the judgment.
As the majority opinion recites, the second element of a cause for malicious prosecution is the instigation of proceedings by the defendant. To impose liability, the institution of prosecution must be in the form of some affirmative action by way of advice, encouragement, pressure, or otherwise. Palermo v. Cottom, 525 S.W.2d 758, 763 (Mo.App.1975). There is no liability for merely reporting the truth, Rustici v. Weidemeyer, 673 S.W.2d 762, 767 (Mo. banc 1984), or merely giving information which leads to a prosecution. Palermo v. Cottom, supra. That is what happened here.
An examination of the record in the light most favorable to the plaintiff leads to the same conclusion as expressed in Judge Flanigan’s concurring opinion when the case was before the Southern District: “There is nothing in the record to indicate that either Warblow or Heers bore an actual hatred or malice towards Sanders and it is doubtful that even a most charitable view of the evidence would support a finding that either of them intentionally lied to the prosecutor.” There is no evidence that Warblow or Heers acted for any purpose other than that of bringing to justice those responsible for the taking of missing tools. Defendant must necessarily rely on his witness, Prosecuting Attorney Hamilton. Hamilton indicated that he misinterpreted or misunderstood some of the information given him by defendant. The crucial misunderstanding concerned the ability of defendant to provide the prosecutor with an inventory of the specific stolen tools, indicating from which individual tool box each tool was recovered. Hamilton subsequently learned that this was not possible for two reasons. First, a number of the tools could not be identified with any precision. Second, defendant had placed all the tools from each crew member’s tool box into a single large pile, thereby foreclosing the possibility of an inventory from each worker’s tool box. The prosecutor testified that he was not intentionally misled concerning these facts:
Q. Based upon what you were told then and what you later learned through *819the various aspects of the investigation you conducted, were the facts as given you on December 20 by Mr. Warblow and Mr. Heers substantially correct?

A. The facts were substantially correct.
Q. Okay. Now, you don’t feel then, Mr. Hamilton, that you were misled in any way by the facts that were given you?
A. No, I don’t think I was intentionally misled. I think I misinterpreted some things.
Q. Well, any misinterpretation was on your part and not on the basis of what they told you?
A. All I can say is what they told me. And my interpretation was something different than we later found the facts to be.
Q. Well, but that — any misinterpretation of that kind would have been misinterpretation on your part and not on what they told you; —
A. That’s correct.
He testified further as follows:
Q. Were you able to do — did they indicate they wanted something done, if possible?
A. Well, yes, they were concerned about the matter.
Q. What else, then, did you tell them?
A. I indicated that based on what they had told me — the information that they had given me, that charges for attempted stealing — that we did have probable cause for that.

Q. Okay. Now, at any time in this, Mr. Hamilton, was there any urging or pressing or anything of that kind from the Daniel’s people for you to file these charges?
A. No. There was concern, obviously, but it was my decision to file the charges.
Q. You understood they wanted something done?
A. Right.
Q. But did you understand that they wanted it done within the framework of the law?
A. That’s my understanding.
Q. And they didn’t ask you to overreach or go ahead with something that you didn’t feel should be done?
A. No, it’s a good thing that they didn’t.
Q. Okay. Why do you say that?
A. I wouldn’t have done it under those circumstances at all.
The strongest inference possible from all the witnesses is that defendant’s employees may have unintentionally contributed to a misunderstanding on the part of the prosecutor concerning the facts surrounding the theft. Such conduct is insufficient to make a case for malicious prosecution.
The following statement from La Font v. Richardson, 119 S.W.2d 25 (Mo.App.1938), is appropriate: “when it is shown that the prosecuting witnesses consult the prosecuting attorney in good faith, and communicate to him all the ascertainable facts, and acting on his advice institute the criminal proceedings ... they should be exonerated.” Id. at 29. This language pertains to the instant case. Here, it was the prosecutor who suggested that Herrs and War-blow sign the blank complaint. The defendants were not the partrés?who initially suggested the institution of proceedings. They had only sought a search warrant to aid in the solution of the crimes of theft. Their suggestion was rejected by the prosecutor. Thus, there is no issue of probable cause confronting this Court. See Moad v. Pioneer Finance Co., 496 S.W.2d 794 (Mo.1973) in which Judge Higgins gives full explanation to the essential element of probable cause in malicious prosecution and finds, inter alia, that mere dismissal of a complaint does not create “any inference of want of probable cause” nor rebut the prima facie case of probable cause. Id. at 799.
I cannot translate the prosecutor’s suggestion of prosecution and subsequent dismissal of charges into sufficient evidence *820to support an action of malicious prosecution.
The sum and substance of the facts of this case lead to the plain and single conclusion that there is no evidentiary support for a malicious prosecution action.
Additionally, in this case, the definition of “malice” makes no difference. There simply was no malice here by any definition.