Court Opinion

ID: 9686284
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 15:39:02.846259+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:17.222342
License: Public Domain

Boyle, J.
([concurring). I join in the analysis of Justice Brickley and hence the result reached by Justices Cavanagh and Brickley for the reason that steps 1 through 4 of the grievance procedure were mandatory and required exhaustion before suit could be filed. I agree that the statute should be tolled because the agreement between these parties can fairly be said to contemplate exhaustion before resort to common-law remedies. In so concluding I recognize that this case does not involve a breach of the duty of fair representation. Goolsby v Detroit, 419 Mich 651, 660, n 5; 358 NW2d 856 (1984), and that case law analyzing principles applicable to employee grievances may not be applicable here. However, the parties’ submissions have not persuasively distinguished between a case brought by the union against the employer and one brought by an employee against both the union and employer. Nor have the parties addressed whether the public employment relations act, MCL 423.201 et seq.) MSA 17.455(1) et seq., has any implications for the applicable resolution of this question. Thus, I agree that plaintiff’s claims fell within the six-year period of limitation and would affirm the Court of Appeals and remand this case for a determination whether defendant breached the collective bargaining agreement.