Court Opinion

ID: 9805617
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 18:05:16.982281+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:45:52.347147
License: Public Domain

Filed 8/31/23 P. v. Singh CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                     (Sacramento)
                                                            ----

 THE PEOPLE,                                                                                   C097142

                    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                    (Super. Ct. No. 16FE018212)

           v.

 HARPREET SINGH,

                    Defendant and Appellant.

         A jury found defendant Harpreet Singh guilty of assault with the intent to commit
sexual penetration by force, conspiracy to dissuade a witness, dissuading a witness, and
aggravated kidnapping, with on-bail enhancements; defendant admitted a serious felony
and strike allegations as well. (People v. Singh (Oct. 28, 2021, C088997) [nonpub.
opn.].) Defendant was sentenced to prison for life plus a determinate term and appealed;
we modified the aggravated kidnapping conviction to simple kidnapping and remanded
the matter for resentencing. (Ibid.) At resentencing, the trial court declined defendant’s

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request to strike his strike prior and resentenced defendant to an aggregate term of 16
years in prison.
       Defendant appeals a second time arguing recent amendments to Penal Code1
section 1385, subdivision (c) enacted by Senate Bill No. 81 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.)
(Stats. 2021, ch. 721, § 1) (Senate Bill 81) apply to prior strike convictions and that the
trial court erred by declining to strike his prior strike under the new law. Because we
conclude that a prior strike does not constitute an “enhancement” within the plain
meaning of Senate Bill 81’s amendments to section 1385 (Stats. 2021, ch. 721, § 1), we
find the new legislation does not apply to defendant’s prior strike conviction. We affirm.
                   FACTUAL AND PROCEDUREAL BACKGROUND
       The facts underlying defendant’s convictions are not relevant to the issue on
appeal. We recount below the relevant procedural history following issuance of the
remittitur in People v. Singh, supra, C088997.
       Prior to the September 2022 resentencing hearing, defense counsel filed a
resentencing memorandum requesting a full resentencing on all previous sentencing
choices. Counsel also urged the trial court to apply recent legislative changes to the
sentencing statutes, including, as relevant here, Senate Bill 81, which added
subdivision (c) to section 1385 to provide guidance to the trial courts for when to strike
an enhancement. (Stats. 2021, ch. 721, § 1.) Defendant argued that under Senate Bill 81
the trial court should strike his prior strike conviction as an “enhancement” that was older
than five years (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(H), added by Stats. 2021, ch.721, § 1), or, at a
minimum, that the court should dismiss his prior strike in the interest of justice under
People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497.

1      Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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       The People objected to striking or dismissing defendant’s prior strike conviction,
arguing that Senate Bill 81 did not apply to the strike prior because it was an alternative
sentencing scheme under the Three Strikes Law and not an enhancement. The People
further argued that the trial court should decline to exercise its discretion to dismiss the
prior serious felony and on-bail enhancements because doing so would endanger public
safety and be contrary to the interests of justice.
       At the resentencing hearing, the trial court declined defendant’s request to strike
his prior strike conviction, finding that Senate Bill 81 did not apply because the strike
was not an enhancement, and that defendant was not outside the spirit of the Three
Strikes law. The trial court resentenced defendant to an aggregate term of 16 years in
prison, including the middle term of five years for simple kidnapping, doubled to 10
years for the strike prior, the low term of two years for assault with the intent to commit
sexual penetration by force, doubled to four years for the strike prior, and two years for
the on-bail enhancement attached to the kidnapping count. The trial court struck the five
year prior serious felony enhancement and imposed and stayed under section 654 doubled
midterm sentences for conspiracy to dissuade a witness and dissuading a witness.
Defendant timely appealed.
                                        DISCUSSION
       Defendant contends Senate Bill 81’s amendments to section 1385 apply to prior
strike convictions and that the legislative history supports this interpretation. To the
extent it is unclear whether the Legislature intended that a prior strike qualify as an
enhancement within the meaning of added section 1385, subdivision (c), defendant
argues the rule of lenity compels such a conclusion. And because the trial court was
unaware of its discretion to strike the prior strike conviction under Senate Bill 81,
defendant asserts remand for resentencing is required.
       The People contend the plain language of the statute unambiguously applies only
to enhancements, and the Three Strikes law is not an enhancement. We review this

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statutory interpretation question de novo (People v. Burke (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 237,
242 and conclude that the People’s interpretation is more persuasive.
       We recently reviewed the statutory language of amended section 1385 and
concluded in Burke that the statute’s plain language was clear and unambiguous and
applied only to an “enhancement,” which did not include the Three Strikes law.
(People v. Burke, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at pp. 243-244.) We reasoned as follows:
Section 1385, subdivision (c) “expressly applies to the dismissal of an ‘enhancement’ ”
(§ 1385, subd. (c)(1)), and that term “has a well-established technical meaning in
California law” of which the Legislature was presumed to be aware (Burke, at p. 243).
Because it is well settled that “ ‘[a] sentence enhancement is “an additional term of
imprisonment added to the base term” ’ ” and “the Three Strikes law is not an
enhancement[ but rather] an alternative sentencing scheme for the current offense”
(ibid.), the plain language the Legislature employed in adding subdivision (c) to section
1385 does not apply to a prior strike conviction under the Three Strikes law.
       We see no reason to depart from Burke. The fact that Burke involved a Wende2
appeal or that the parties filed supplemental briefs on the present issue at the court’s
request is of no moment. Like in Burke, we need not resort to the legislative history cited
by defendant given the statute’s plain and unambiguous language. (See Burke, supra,
89 Cal.App.5th at p. 243 & fn. 3.) Nor does the rule of lenity apply. (People v. Cornett
(2012) 53 Cal.4th 1261, 1271 [“ ‘ “[the rule of lenity] applies ‘only if two reasonable
interpretations of the statute stand in relative equipoise’ ” ’ ”].)

2      People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.

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                                 DISPOSITION
     The judgment is affirmed.

                                          /s/
                                          ROBIE, Acting P. J.

We concur:

/s/
MAURO, J.

/s/
BOULWARE EURIE, J.

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