Court Opinion

ID: 9410485
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-21 16:00:39.493736+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:58.111995
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
                           For the Eighth Circuit
                       ___________________________

                               No. 22-1449
                       ___________________________

                                 Kelly Martin

                                    Plaintiff - Appellee

                                       v.

            Jordan Turner, Individually and in his official capacity

                                   Defendant - Appellant

 Shawn Stephens, Independence County Sheriff, Individually and in his official
    capacity; Jacob McLaughlin, Individually and in his official capacity;
                 Independence County, Arkansas; John Doe

                                       Defendants
                                ____________

                   Appeal from United States District Court
                for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Northern
                                ____________

                          Submitted: April 12, 2023
                            Filed: July 21, 2023
                               ____________

Before COLLOTON, WOLLMAN, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.
                       ____________
GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.

       Kelly Martin sued Independence County Sheriff’s Deputy Jordan Turner for
his alleged deliberate indifference to her seizure condition after she was arrested for
driving while intoxicated. Deputy Turner asserted qualified immunity in his motion
for summary judgment, which the district court denied. We reverse.

                                          I.

       In the summer of 2017, Deputy Turner responded to a one-car accident near
Batesville, Arkansas. He found a vehicle on the side of the road and its driver, Kelly
Martin. Deputy Turner began investigating and asked Martin several questions
about the accident. Her confused, at times “incoherent,” answers, slurred speech,
and general demeanor indicated to Deputy Turner that she was likely impaired by
drugs. She told him that she was not hurt and had no medical problems. Turner
checked Martin’s driver’s license (which noted no medical restrictions) and searched
her purse and found various pills, including a medication sometimes used to treat
seizure disorders. When asked whether she took any medications, Martin responded
that she had a “patch,” an apparent reference to her pain medication. At this point,
Deputy Turner noticed that Martin’s demeanor was improving. Emergency medical
personnel on the scene observed Martin and told Deputy Turner that Martin had
refused further treatment and transport to the hospital.

       Deputy Turner then arrested Martin for driving while intoxicated. As he
placed Martin in his patrol car, her boyfriend, John Reynolds, arrived. Reynolds
claims that he told Deputy Turner that Martin was driving to a hospital because she
had run out of her pain medicine and that she “might have had a seizure” at the time
of the accident. As it turns out, Martin suffers from an unspecified seizure disorder.
Deputy Turner, however, says that Reynolds mentioned nothing about Martin’s
condition, her medication, or a possible seizure. In the end, Deputy Turner took
Martin (along with her medications) to jail, where she was booked by a jail official

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and detained until the next day. Martin alleges that she suffered multiple seizures
during her detention that caused serious injuries.

       Martin sued Deputy Turner (in his official and individual capacities) and
others under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Arkansas Civil Rights Act, Ark. Code § 16-
123-101 et seq., alleging deliberate indifference to her seizure condition,
specifically, the seizure she claims to have suffered around the time of her arrest.
All defendants moved for summary judgment, and the individual defendants invoked
qualified immunity. The district court granted summary judgment to all defendants
on all claims except the individual-capacity claims against Deputy Turner. The
district court ruled that “[w]hether Deputy Turner was aware of Martin’s seizure
disorder or medication are disputed material facts that must be decided by a jury”
and concluded that Deputy Turner was not entitled to summary judgment based on
qualified immunity. Turner appeals.

                                           II.

       We have jurisdiction to review the district court’s order denying qualified
immunity, which we review de novo. Barton v. Taber, 908 F.3d 1119, 1123 (8th
Cir. 2018) (Barton II). In this interlocutory posture, we take as true the facts that the
district court assumed, or likely assumed, in its denial of summary judgment.
Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 318 (1995). “[W]e determine the facts that it likely
assumed by viewing the record favorably to the plaintiff as in any other summary
judgment motion.” Livers v. Schenck, 700 F.3d 340, 350 (8th Cir. 2012).

       Martin and Deputy Turner agree that, to establish a violation of her rights, she
must show that she suffered from an objectively serious medical need and that
Deputy Turner had actual knowledge of that need but deliberately disregarded it.
See Barton II, 908 F.3d at 1124; Grayson v. Ross, 253 S.W.3d 428, 433 (Ark. 2007).
Because qualified immunity “protects government officials ‘from liability for civil
damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known,’” Martin also

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must show that it was clearly established that Deputy Turner’s conduct violated her
rights. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)); Est. of Walker v. Wallace, 881 F.3d 1056,
1060 (8th Cir. 2018) (“The plaintiffs have the burden of showing that the law was
clearly established.”). Though a court may address these questions in any order, it
may not deny qualified immunity without answering them both in the plaintiff’s
favor. Watson v. Boyd, 2 F.4th 1106, 1112 (8th Cir. 2021).

       When considering whether a right is clearly established, “[w]e do not require
a case directly on point, but existing precedent must have placed the statutory or
constitutional question beyond debate.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741
(2011). “This generally requires a plaintiff to point to existing circuit precedent that
involves sufficiently similar facts to squarely govern the officer[’s] conduct in the
specific circumstances at issue.” Graham v. Barnette, 5 F.4th 872, 887 (8th Cir.
2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The dispositive question is whether the
violative nature of particular conduct is clearly established.” Mullenix v. Luna, 577
U.S. 7, 12 (2015) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). “This inquiry
must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general
proposition,” and we keep in mind that “qualified immunity protects all but the
plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted); see Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. ---, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018)
(per curiam) (“[T]he focus is on whether the officer had fair notice that her conduct
was unlawful . . . .”). These principles apply equally to claims under § 1983 and the
Arkansas Civil Rights Act. Hudson v. Norris, 227 F.3d 1047, 1054 (8th Cir. 2000).

       Martin offers five cases that she argues clearly establish a civil-rights violation
under circumstances sufficiently similar to those presented here: Foulks v. Cole
County, 991 F.2d 454 (8th Cir. 1993); Camberos v. Branstad, 73 F.3d 174 (8th Cir.
1995); Coleman v. Rahija, 114 F.3d 778 (8th Cir. 1997); Phillips v. Jasper County
Jail, 437 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 2006); and Barton v. Taber, 820 F.3d 958 (8th Cir. 2016)
(Barton I). Assuming without deciding that decisions of the Eighth Circuit may
constitute clearly established law for qualified-immunity purposes, cf. City of

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Escondido v. Emmons, 586 U.S. ---, 139 S. Ct. 500, 503 (2019) (per curiam),
Martin’s cases do not involve sufficiently similar facts to “squarely govern” Deputy
Turner’s conduct here, see Graham, 5 F.4th at 887.

       The first four cases have nothing to do with the conduct of an arresting officer.
Foulks affirmed the denial of a motion to dismiss a complaint that alleged jailors had
ignored an inmate’s severe head injury even though the inmate had arrived at the jail
from the hospital with instructions for his care. See 991 F.2d at 457. Camberos is
not a qualified-immunity case, involves no discussion of clearly established rights,
and merely held that certain prison nurses were not deliberately indifferent to an
inmate’s shoulder problems because they referred him to a physician assistant
numerous times. See 73 F.3d at 177. Coleman affirmed a district court’s conclusion
that prison medical staff’s unreasonable delay in treating a pregnant inmate’s
preterm labor constituted deliberate indifference. See 114 F.3d at 786. And Phillips
held that jail staff’s “knowing failure to administer prescribed medicine can itself
constitute deliberate indifference”—a proposition inapplicable here. See 437 F.3d
at 796. These cases are therefore inapposite.

       Barton I, however, did involve a deliberate-indifference claim against an
arresting officer. 820 F.3d at 964. After officers arrived at the scene of Barton’s
single-car accident, all signs pointed to his severe impairment. Id. at 962. He nearly
fell several times and had a blood-alcohol concentration well over the legal limit.
Id. As officers arrested and searched Barton, he fell to the ground unresponsive. Id.
Barton could not stand on his own, so officers lifted him into a patrol car and took
him to jail where he later died from a heart condition. Id. at 962-63. At no point
was Barton evaluated by a medical professional. Id. Under these circumstances, we
held that a reasonable officer would have understood that failing to seek medical
care for a post-car-accident arrestee who exhibited Barton’s severe symptoms
violates the arrestee’s rights. Id. at 966-67.

       The facts of this case are quite different from Barton I. Viewing them in the
light most favorable to Martin, we assume, as the district court likely did, that the

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conversation with Reynolds made Deputy Turner aware of Martin’s seizure disorder
and the reason Martin needed her medications. But unlike in Barton I, Deputy
Turner promptly attended to Martin and asked her whether she was hurt or suffered
from medical problems. She said no and did not advise him of her seizure disorder.
Emergency medical personnel also observed Martin and were content not to take her
to the hospital, advising Deputy Turner that she had refused further treatment. He
then took Martin and her medications to jail. Barton I did not provide Deputy Turner
fair notice that his failure to seek further medical treatment for Martin or to speak
with the jailors about what Reynolds told him constituted deliberate indifference.
See Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1152. Thus, Martin failed to show that clearly established
law prohibited Deputy Turner’s conduct, and Deputy Turner is entitled to qualified
immunity.

                                        III.

       For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court’s denial of Deputy
Turner’s motion for summary judgment and remand for entry of judgment in his
favor.
                       ______________________________

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