Court Opinion

ID: 9718851
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:36:21.315419+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:10:02.040743
License: Public Domain

KLINE, P. J., Concurring.
For me the closest question in this case is whether, when he received the letter from the certified law clerk working in the prisoner service division of the sheriff’s office, Judge Stern should have reconsidered his prior grant of Leever’s Faretta motion and held a hearing on the issue of Leever’s competency to waive counsel. In my view, that letter provides indicia of Leever’s incompetence to waive counsel and conduct his own defense which, if it were standing alone, would require further judicial inquiry into the issue.
The letter did not stand alone, however, and it is for this reason that I concur in the judgment.
First, prior to the time the letter was submitted to him, Judge Stern had conducted a substantial inquiry into Leever’s mental competency with the assistance of, among others, a physician, Dr. David Kessler, and a psychologist, Dr. Linda Carson, who under appointment examined Leever and reported to the trial court.
Second, during the several court proceedings prior to the court’s receipt of the letter, Deputy Public Defender Michael N. Burt, who was then representing Leever, and who was familiar with the psychiatric reports submitted to the court, including that of Dr. Nievod,1 never indicated a belief Leever lacked the competence to waive counsel.
*882Third, in vigorously pursuing his right to waive counsel and proceed in propria persona, Leever himself implicitly asserted his competence to do so and, in fact, by his behavior and the nature and quality of his oral presentation, demonstrated that he “was literate, competent and understanding, and that he was voluntarily exercising his informed free will.” (Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806, 835 [45 L.Ed.2d 562, 582, 95 S.Ct. 2525].)
In short, Judge Stern’s failure to reconsider the question of Leever’s competence to waive counsel is primarily justified by the depth of his earlier inquiry into Leever’s competence to stand trial. Even indulging the assumption that an inquiry into a defendant’s competence to stand trial can be distinguished from an inquiry into his competence to waive counsel (see People v. Wolozon (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 456 [188 Cal.Rptr. 35]; Felthous, Competency to Waive Counsel: A Step Beyond Competency to Stand Trial (1979) 7 J. Psychiatry & L. 471), both inquiries obviously focus upon the defendant’s ability to act rationally in connection with his own defense. This is a matter that had been more than adequately investigated by Judge Stern prior to the time he received the PSD letter. It bears mentioning, as well, that the PSD letter did not identify any evidence of Leever’s mental competence not previously available to and therefore presumably considered by the court.
Finally, the transcript of the trial before Judge Dossee confirms the judgment that Leever was competent to dispense with counsel and represent himself. Without citing specific examples, with which the transcript is replete, suffice it to note that Leever advanced a tenable defense theory, made intelligent tactical decisions, indicated familiarity with the rules of evidence and pertinent constitutional principles, conducted articulate and reasonably effective direct and cross-examination of witnesses, and, insofar as a cold record permits one to judge, tried his case skillfully. The fact that the jury rejected his theory shows only that the jury believed the evidence showed guilt. The trial record does not indicate defendant was mentally incompetent to waive counsel and conduct his own defense; indeed, it shows he was competent to do so.

The reports of Dr. Kessler dated November 2, 1982 and from Dr. Carson dated November 4, 1982, both adverted to Dr. Nievod’s evaluation of Leever.