Court Opinion

ID: 9769726
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 15:00:06.699512+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:44:47.934744
License: Public Domain

LAMBERT, Justice,
dissenting.
Notwithstanding the admonition of KRS 446.080 that “[a]ll statutes of this state shall be liberally construed with a view to promote their objects and carry out the intent of the legislature ...,” the majority has technically construed the term “employees” in a manner which substantially defeats the purpose of KRS 338.011, et seq.
As shown by the majority opinion, appel-lee, Dunaway Timber Company, Inc., refused to comply with the regulations designed to promote safety in the unloading of logs. It adopted a policy which required loggers to unchain their own loads before Dunaway would unload the logs with a front-end loader. At trial, Dunaway produced evidence that it observed the typical practice of timber companies in the area to refuse to assist in the process of unloading until the logs had been unchained. The effect of the such refusal by Dunaway and others was to force loggers to release chains and binders without any bracing, a practice which is absolutely contrary to the regulation which provides that “[bjinders on logs shall not be released prior to securing with unloading lines or other unloading ' device.” 29 C.F.R. § 1910.265(d)(l)(i)(b) as incorporated by 803 KAR 2:317.
The majority concedes that the regulation was designed to prevent accidents of the type which occurred here. It denies relief on grounds that appellant’s decedent, Lewis Carman, was not a member of the class of persons intended to be protected.
No person would have had greater need of the protection afforded by the regulation than Lewis Carman. He was precisely in the class of persons for whose benefit the regulation existed, those who would be foreseeably injured by a violation of the regulation.
Careful examination of the statutory language upon which the majority depends reveals no compulsion to so narrowly construe *572the statutes. KRS 338.011 is a broad statement of public policy and purpose with respect to occupational accidents and diseases “by preventing any detriment to the safety and health of all employees, both public and private, covered by this chapter, arising out of exposure to harmful conditions and practices at places of work.... ” This provision hardly demands a conclusion that an absolute employer-employee relationship be found to exist before the law applies. Indeed, the language suggests a liberal construction per KRS 446.080. The next provisions, KRS 338.015(1) and (2) define employer to “mean any entity for whom a person is employed” and define employee to “mean any person employed.” As with the prior statute, these provisions do not compel a strict construction of the statutory language. Under these definitions, Dunaway was an employer and Car-man was an employee, albeit not Dunaway’s employee. KRS 338.031(l)(a) requires an employer to “furnish to each of his employees employment and a place of employment which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his employees.” While this statute appears to be limited to employers and employees, it does not eliminate any duty which would devolve upon Dunaway to otherwise comply with the law.
In my view, Lomayestewa v. Our Lady of Mercy Hospital, Ky., 589 S.W.2d 885 (1979), and Teal v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Company, 728 F.2d 799 (6th Cir.1984), should be applied to this case. The reality of what transpired here and what transpires thousands of times each year across Kentucky is that a logger working alone or with only a helper brings a load of logs to a mill. The load is transported on a truck but the logger has no unloading equipment. Under the practice observed by Dunaway and apparently observed widely in the industry, the logger must himself loosen the chains and binders, taking all the risk associated therewith, before the mill will participate. It would be vastly more reasonable to comply with the regulation by bracing the load with a front-end loader before the chains are unfastened. Those who engage in the business of buying logs from independent loggers should be required to observe applicable safety regulations and not be absolved from that duty solely because no traditional employer-employee relationship exists.
GRAVES and STUMBO, JJ., join this dissenting opinion.