Court Opinion

ID: 9455055
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 19:09:30.904453+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:34:25.951449
License: Public Domain

LUMBARD, Chief Judge
(concurring) :
I concur. My concurrence rests on the grounds that error was commited here, but that it was harmless.
Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 63 S.Ct. 477, 87 L.Ed. 645 (1943), stands for the proposition that the Federal Business Records Act is limited by the common law concept of “trustworthiness” ; in part it requires that those preparing the reports be disinterested in the events they record and that, if there be a motive to falsify, it is checked by safeguards in the normal business procedures involved. Lindheimer argues convincingly.that the minutes of the safety committee, prepared by men interested in displaying a perfect safety record for the voyage, should have been excluded as inherently untrustworthy. The committee members, directly and professionally responsible for conducting the boat drills and maintaining the equipment involved, had ample personal motives for falsifying the report. The Master’s participation does not cure the defect, for, as the majority concedes, he signed the report only in a formal capacity, neither attending the meeting nor having witnessed the event in question. Moreover, his interest was similar to that of the committee members.
The point is not that I believe the safety committee necessarily falsified the report, but only that under such circumstances, hearsay evidence in the form of business records, with no opportunity for cross-examination, is too unreliable for admission. The majority’s observation that the report was not prepared with an eye towards litigation does not answer the objection, for there obviously are other motivations for falsifying reports than to protect against a possible claim.
Hoffman is a very strong case, which some have read as virtually precluding the admission of accident reports. While recent eases in this Circuit have limited its potential sweep, virtually all have involved situations where the report was prepared by a neutral third party. See, e. g., Vaccaro v. Alcoa S..S. Co., 405 F.2d 1133 (2d Cir. 1968) (report by Army, operator of marine terminal); Bowman V. Kaufman, 387 F.2d 582 (2d Cir. 1967) (policeman’s memo of auto accident). With the exception of the recent and contrary case of Gaussen v. United Fruit Co., .412 F.2d 72 (2d Cir. 1969), and *609perhaps also Taylor v. Baltimore & O. R.R., 344 F.2d 281 (2d Cir. 1965),1 this court seems .consistently to have maintained the position expressed in Puggioni v. Luckenbaeh, S.S. Co., 286 F.2d 340, 344 (2d Cir. 1961):
“[Ajccident reports should not be admitted when the party making the report offers it for the purpose of its own exoneration.”
I cannot agree with the majority opinion insofar as it may mark a departure from this salutary principle.
I find, however, that the admission of the safety committee report was merely harmless error, providing only cumulative support for the defendant’s position that no accident involving Lindheimer occurred on the voyage.

. However, United States v. New York Foreign Trade Zone Operators, 304 F.2d 792 (2d Cir. 1962), cited by the majority should be read as involving an accident report prepared by a neutral third party. In that case, a waiter was injured while leaving a Navy ship on which he was employed, and the report was prepared by him on an official government form. The government later sued the terminal operator after it received an assignment of the injured worker’s claim upon paying him compensation under 5 U.S.C. § 751 (1958). At the time the report was made, however, the United States could not foresee that it would become the plaintiff and so was then a neutral, third party. The court noted that the report might well be inadmissible under Hoffman in an action between the injured waiter and the government. 304 F.2d at 797.