Court Opinion

ID: 9411522
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-26 21:01:21.523529+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:07.114769
License: Public Domain

USCA4 Appeal: 21-1932      Doc: 46        Filed: 07/25/2023   Pg: 1 of 20

                                             PUBLISHED

                              UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                  FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                              No. 21-1932

        JACOBY L. GARRETT,

                            Plaintiff – Appellee,

                     v.

        HAROLD W. CLARKE, individually and in his official capacity as Director of the
        Virginia Department of Corrections; RICHARD A. DAVIS, individually and in his
        official capacity as Chief Information Officer of the Virginia Department of
        Corrections; FELICIA V. STRETCHER, individually and in her official capacity as
        Information Technology Administrators and Operations Manager for the Virginia
        Department of Corrections,

                            Defendants – Appellants,

                     and

        DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA,

                            Defendant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at
        Richmond. Robert E. Payne, Senior District Judge. (3:19-cv-00835-REP)

        Argued: May 4, 2022                                            Decided: July 25, 2023

        Before WILKINSON, RICHARDSON, and RUSHING, Circuit Judges.

        Reversed by published opinion. Judge Rushing wrote the opinion, in which Judge
        Wilkinson and Judge Richardson joined. Judge Wilkinson wrote a concurring opinion.
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        ARGUED: Graham Keith Bryant, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
        VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellants.                  Robert Jackson Allen,
        THORSENALLEN LLP, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Mark R.
        Herring, Attorney General, Ronald Nicholas Regnery, Senior Assistant Attorney General,
        Ryan S. Hardy, Assistant Attorney General, Kati K. Dean, Assistant Attorney General,
        Michelle S. Kallen, Acting Solicitor General, Brittany M. Jones, Deputy Solicitor General,
        Laura H. Cahill, Assistant Attorney General, Rohiniyurie Tashima, John Marshall Fellow,
        OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for
        Appellants. Jesse A. Roche, THORSENALLEN LLP, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

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        RUSHING, Circuit Judge:

               Jacoby L. Garrett worked as a Telecommunications Network Coordinator for the

        Virginia Department of Corrections (VDOC). After VDOC fired Garrett for declining a

        random drug test, Garrett sued, alleging that VDOC employees violated his Fourth

        Amendment rights by applying VDOC’s drug testing policy to him. The defendants

        asserted qualified immunity and moved to dismiss. The district court denied the motion,

        concluding that general constitutional principles clearly establish Garrett’s right to be free

        from suspicionless drug testing.      We disagree.      Applying the correct standard, the

        defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

                                                      I.

               Because this appeal arises from the resolution of a motion to dismiss, we accept the

        complaint’s allegations as true and draw all reasonable factual inferences in Garrett’s favor.

        Paradise Wire & Cable Defined Benefit Pension Plan v. Weil, 918 F.3d 312, 317–318 (4th

        Cir. 2019). Garrett began working as a VDOC Telecommunications Network Coordinator

        in 2016. About 70 percent of his work consisted of assisting VDOC employees with their

        mobile devices, although he also directed IT projects involving phones, data connections,

        and video streaming and conferencing. Garrett worked primarily at VDOC’s headquarters.

        VDOC did not confine inmates at headquarters, but low-risk offenders worked there, and

        Garrett had “ca[su]al contact” with those offenders who, for example, worked in the

        cafeteria. J.A. 21. Garrett also “occasional[ly]” traveled to prisons to work on IT projects,

        where he had “indirect contact” with inmates. J.A. 20–21. Garrett was not responsible for

        monitoring inmates and did not carry a gun.

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               When he was hired, Garrett acknowledged receipt of VDOC’s Operating Procedure

        135.4, Alcohol and Other Drug Testing (OP 135.4), which subjected all salaried VDOC

        employees to random drug testing. Employees selected for random testing had to report

        by the end of the business day, and failure to complete a required drug test was grounds for

        termination. Oral fluid testing, i.e, a buccal swab, was the typical and preferred method of

        testing.

               On the afternoon of June 28, 2018, Garrett was selected for a random drug test and

        reported to Shenda Allen, a VDOC personnel assistant, for testing. While Allen retrieved

        the necessary supplies, Garrett received a phone call indicating that someone—he believed

        his supervisor—was looking for him. When Allen returned, Garrett told her that his

        supervisor was looking for him, and she replied something to the effect of “I’ll get you next

        time.” J.A. 25. Garrett left the testing site and did not return to complete his test that

        workday.

               The next day, Garrett left on a previously approved one-week vacation. The same

        day, Allen reported that Garrett had failed to complete his drug test, and Richard Davis,

        who was VDOC’s Chief Information Officer and tasked with enforcing its operating

        procedures, decided to terminate Garrett. After Garrett returned, his supervisor, Felicia

        Stretcher, informed him that VDOC was placing him on pre-disciplinary leave. Garrett’s

        termination became effective on July 17. 1

               1
                 Garrett challenged his termination in administrative proceedings, which have led
        to considerable state-court litigation.
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               Garrett sued VDOC, Stretcher, Davis, and Harold Clarke, VDOC’s Director of

        Corrections, in federal court. He asserted three claims, but only Count 1—a claim under

        42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Clarke, Davis, and Stretcher (collectively, Defendants) in their

        individual capacities—is before us on appeal. In Count 1, Garrett alleges that Defendants

        violated his Fourth Amendment rights by “subjecting [him] to an unconstitutional drug

        testing policy, OP 135.4, and terminating him for an alleged refusal of an unconstitutional

        search of his person.” 2 J.A. 31. He seeks compensatory and punitive damages as well as

        other relief.

               Defendants asserted qualified immunity and moved to dismiss Count 1. The district

        court denied the motion. See Garrett v. Clarke, 552 F. Supp. 3d 539, 557–562 (E.D. Va.

        2021). The court reasoned that the facts alleged in the complaint did not support a finding

        that VDOC had an important interest in drug testing Garrett and concluded that general

        constitutional principles “clearly establish[] that in the absence of an important government

        interest, the Fourth Amendment forbids suspicionless drug testing of government

        employees.” Id. at 561. Defendants appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to the

        collateral order doctrine, and we review the qualified immunity defense de novo. Adams

        v. Ferguson, 884 F.3d 219, 224, 226 (4th Cir. 2018).

               2
                 Because he did not actually undergo drug testing, Garrett does not claim that he
        was subjected to an unreasonable search. Rather, he asserts that OP 135.4’s drug testing
        requirement was an unconstitutional condition on his government employment. The
        parties do not meaningfully address this distinction.
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                                                     II.

                                                     A.

               “Qualified immunity shields government officials performing discretionary

        functions from personal-capacity liability for civil damages under § 1983, insofar as their

        conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a

        reasonable person would have known.” Davison v. Rose, 19 F.4th 626, 640 (4th Cir. 2021)

        (internal quotation marks omitted).      Therefore, Defendants are entitled to qualified

        immunity unless “(1) they violated a federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the

        unlawfulness of their conduct was ‘clearly established at the time.’” 3 District of Columbia

        v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589 (2018) (quoting Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664

        (2012)). We have discretion to “‘skip ahead to the question whether the law clearly

        established that the officer’s conduct was unlawful in the circumstances of the case,’”

        which we choose to do here. Brown v. Elliott, 876 F.3d 637, 641 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting

        Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009)). In our Circuit, Defendants bear the

        burden of proving that the unlawfulness of their conduct was not clearly established.

        Stanton v. Elliott, 25 F.4th 227, 233 & n.5 (4th Cir. 2022).

               “‘Clearly established’ means that, at the time of the officer’s conduct, the law was

        sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would understand what he is doing is

        unlawful.” Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 589 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Wilson v.

               3
                 The Supreme Court and our Court have extended qualified immunity to
        government officials’ choices in making and enforcing government policies. See, e.g.,
        Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1865–1869 (2017); Davison, 19 F.4th at 640–641.
        Garrett does not contest the applicability of qualified immunity doctrine here.
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        Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614–615 (1999). While “a case directly on point” is not necessary

        for a right to be clearly established, “existing precedent must have placed the statutory or

        constitutional question beyond debate.” White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 551 (2017) (per

        curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). To determine whether a right was clearly

        established, we look to “decisions of the Supreme Court, this court of appeals, and the

        highest court of the state in which the case arose,” and ordinarily need look no further. Hill

        v. Crum, 727 F.3d 312, 322 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). In the

        absence of controlling authority, however, “a robust consensus” of persuasive authority

        may demonstrate the existence of a rule “that every reasonable official would know.”

        Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 589–590 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Ashcroft v. al-Kidd,

        563 U.S. 731, 741–742 (2011); Ray v. Roane, 948 F.3d 222, 229 (4th Cir. 2020). And in

        “the rare ‘obvious case,’” general constitutional standards can clearly establish a right,

        “even though existing precedent does not address similar circumstances.” Wesby, 138 S.

        Ct. at 590 (quoting Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 199 (2004) (per curiam)); see Rivas-

        Villegas v. Cortesluna, 142 S. Ct. 4, 8 (2021) (per curiam).

               The “clearly established” standard also requires that the contours of the legal rule

        be “so well defined that it is clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in

        the situation he confronted.” City of Tahlequah v. Bond, 142 S. Ct. 9, 11 (2021) (per

        curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, “[b]efore deciding if a right was

        clearly established, we must first define the right at issue with specificity.” Knibbs v.

        Momphard, 30 F.4th 200, 223 (4th Cir. 2022). We turn to that task now.

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                                                    B.

               Garrett asserts a right to be free from unreasonable, suspicionless searches in the

        form of random drug tests. See Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 446 (2013) (concluding

        that a buccal swab is a search). Reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment “depends

        on all of the circumstances surrounding the search or seizure and the nature of the search

        or seizure itself.” Skinner v. Ry. Lab. Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989) (internal

        quotation marks omitted). Typically, searches “must be based on individualized suspicion

        of wrongdoing,” Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 313 (1997), unless an exception applies,

        such as “when special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the

        warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable,” Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619 (internal

        quotation marks omitted).

               When evaluating an assertion of special needs, courts balance competing

        governmental and privacy interests. Id. To support a suspicionless search in this context,

        the government’s “proffered special need for drug testing must be substantial—important

        enough to override the individual’s acknowledged privacy interest, sufficiently vital to

        suppress the Fourth Amendment’s normal requirement of individualized suspicion.”

        Chandler, 520 U.S. at 318. In the absence of such a need, “the Fourth Amendment

        precludes the suspicionless search.” Id. at 323.

               Under this framework, we first consider “the nature of [Garrett’s] privacy interest”

        and “the character of the intrusion.” Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654,

        658 (1995). Garrett worked in the corrections industry, which is “highly regulated.” Int’l

        Union v. Winters, 385 F.3d 1003, 1012 (6th Cir. 2004). Employees who choose to

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        participate in such industries often have a reduced expectation of privacy. See Skinner,

        489 U.S. at 627; Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 657. Indeed, Garrett acknowledged the drug testing

        requirement when he was hired. See Carroll v. City of Westminster, 233 F.3d 208, 211–

        212 (4th Cir. 2000) (reasoning that the privacy intrusion caused by any particular drug test

        is “less severe” when the officer knows in advance that he is subject to random drug

        testing). As for the character of the proposed intrusion, a buccal swab is minimally

        invasive. King, 569 U.S. at 446, 463–464.

               Yet even with a diminished expectation of privacy and a minimal intrusion,

        OP 135.4 must still be justified by a special need. See Chandler, 520 U.S. at 318.

        Considering Garrett’s job responsibilities as alleged in the complaint, Defendants assert

        special needs related to prison security—as implicated by Garrett’s contact with inmates

        and the concomitant opportunity for blackmail, bribery, and funneling of contraband—as

        well as public confidence in a law-abiding corrections workforce. 4 See, e.g., Braun v.

        Maynard, 652 F.3d 557, 563 (4th Cir. 2011) (discussing the “intractable problems of drug

        smuggling and drug use within prisons” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Carroll, 233

        F.3d at 211 (acknowledging that drug use “‘creates risks of bribery and blackmail against

        which the Government is entitled to guard’” (quoting Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von

        Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 674 (1989))); cf. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979) (according

               4
                 Defendants assert additional special needs based on facts outside the complaint—
        in particular, findings about Garrett’s job responsibilities in a state Hearing Officer decision
        that has since been overturned on appeal. Garrett urges us not to consider those findings.
        We can resolve this appeal even without considering the additional special needs
        Defendants assert based on those findings.
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        “wide-ranging deference” to prison administrators “in the adoption and execution of

        policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and

        discipline and to maintain institutional security”).

               Given Garrett’s diminished privacy interest, the minimal nature of the invasion, and

        VDOC’s proffered special needs in the corrections context, the question is whether

        Defendants could have reasonably believed they acted lawfully in subjecting Garrett—a

        VDOC IT employee who allegedly had casual and occasionally indirect contact with

        prisoners—to random drug testing. See Anderson v . Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638–639

        (1987). Stated differently, was it clearly established in June 2018 that, based on the facts

        as alleged in the complaint, VDOC’s proffered interests in prison security and a law-

        abiding corrections workforce were not substantial enough to override Garrett’s asserted

        privacy interest in avoiding a suspicionless drug test? See Chandler, 520 U.S. at 318. To

        decide this question, we turn to the caselaw.

                                                      C.

               A handful of cases set the legal standard for suspicionless drug testing in this Circuit.

        The Supreme Court has approved suspicionless employee drug testing in two cases—

        Skinner and Von Raab—and rejected it in a third, Chandler. 5 In Skinner, the Court

        considered federal regulations that mandate blood and urine testing of railroad employees

        involved in train accidents and authorize breath and urine tests for railroad employees who

               5
                 The Supreme Court has also approved suspicionless drug testing of students
        involved in athletics and competitive extracurricular activities. See Bd. of Educ. of Indep.
        Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cnty. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 825 (2002); Vernonia, 515
        U.S. at 664–665.
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        violate certain safety rules. 489 U.S. at 606. The Court held that ensuring the safety of the

        traveling public and the railroad employees themselves was a compelling government

        interest that outweighed the employees’ expectations of privacy. Id. at 621, 632–633. In

        Von Raab, the Court evaluated a requirement that Customs Service employees working in

        drug interdiction or who carry firearms must submit to warrantless urine testing. 489 U.S.

        at 659. The Court found it “readily apparent that the Government has a compelling interest

        in ensuring that front-line interdiction personnel are physically fit, and have unimpeachable

        integrity and judgment.” Id. at 670. That interest could be harmed if the employees were,

        “because of their own drug use, unsympathetic to their mission of interdicting narcotics”

        or susceptible to bribes. Id. at 669–670. As for employees who carried firearms, the Court

        reasoned that “the public should not bear the risk that employees who may suffer from

        impaired perception and judgment will be promoted to positions where they may need to

        employ deadly force.” Id. at 670–671. These special needs outweighed the employees’

        privacy expectations. Id. at 677.

               By contrast, in Chandler, the Supreme Court concluded that a state law requiring

        certain political candidates to submit to drug testing was unconstitutional. 520 U.S. at 309–

        310. The State claimed an interest in preventing unlawful drug use by individuals holding

        high state office, which it asserted could call into question their judgment and integrity,

        jeopardize the discharge of public functions and antidrug efforts, and undermine public

        confidence. Id. at 318. The Court rejected the State’s interests as merely “symbolic” and

        lacking “any indication of a concrete danger demanding departure from the Fourth

        Amendment’s main rule.” Id. at 318–319, 322. The State offered “no evidence of a drug

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        problem among the State’s elected officials,” those officials typically did not “perform

        high-risk, safety-sensitive tasks,” and the drug test “aid[ed] no interdiction effort.” Id. at

        321–322. Because “public safety [was] not genuinely in jeopardy,” the Supreme Court

        held that “the Fourth Amendment preclude[d] the suspicionless search.” Id. at 323.

               Our Court has applied this constitutional framework in two relevant cases. See

        Carroll, 233 F.3d 208; Thomson v. Marsh, 884 F.2d 113 (4th Cir. 1989) (per curiam). In

        Thomson, we upheld the Army’s random drug testing of civilian employees with access to

        areas where experiments with chemical warfare agents were performed. 884 F.2d at 114–

        115. One of the plaintiffs was a pipefitter who worked on fittings for chemical test

        chambers and toxic waste drains. Even though he did not work directly with the “extremely

        lethal” chemicals, we concluded that the government’s safety interest outweighed his

        privacy expectation because he had access to laboratories where experiments with the

        chemicals were conducted and he might be required to respond to emergencies in those

        laboratories. Id. at 115.

               In Carroll, after receiving tips that a police officer was using drugs, the police chief

        asked a physician to secretly test the officer during an examination. 233 F.3d at 210. We

        found the government’s interests—in preventing armed officers from impairing their

        judgment, ensuring that those engaged in drug interdiction are not themselves drug users,

        and guarding against the risk of bribery and blackmail—compelling. Id. at 211. The officer

        had a reduced expectation of privacy because he consented to suspicionless drug tests at

        the beginning of his employment and worked in a safety-sensitive profession. Id. at 211–

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        212. We concluded that the government’s interests outweighed the officer’s and upheld

        the search. Id. at 212.

               These cases do not clearly establish that applying VDOC’s drug-testing policy to

        Garrett was unconstitutional. None of these cases arose in the prison context or directly

        implicate concerns about prison contraband.       In broad strokes, the relevant binding

        authority establishes that a suspicionless drug test calibrated to address a genuine safety

        risk may be reasonable. See Chandler, 520 U.S. at 323. And the wholly symbolic special

        need asserted in Chandler—the only case to disapprove a suspicionless drug test—bears

        no resemblance to the interests in prison safety and a sober corrections workforce that

        Defendants assert here. Put simply, no controlling authority precluded prison officials in

        this Circuit from reasonably believing that applying OP 135.4 to Garrett was consistent

        with his Fourth Amendment rights. See Anderson, 483 U.S. at 638.

               The parties discuss cases in which other courts of appeals have upheld suspicionless

        drug testing of certain categories of corrections employees. See, e.g., Winters, 385 F.3d at

        1012–1013 (upholding testing of probation and parole officers and field service assistants,

        employees who work within the perimeter of the State’s correctional facilities, and

        employees who provide health care and psychological care to prisoners or other individuals

        in state custody); Taylor v. O’Grady, 888 F.2d 1189, 1196–1201 (7th Cir. 1989) (upholding

        testing of “those employees who come into regular contact with prisoners, or who have

        opportunities to smuggle drugs to prisoners” but rejecting testing of administrative

        personnel with “no regular access to inmate population,” “no reasonable opportunity to

        smuggle drugs” to inmates, and “no access to firearms”); McDonell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d

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        1302, 1308–1309 (8th Cir. 1987) (upholding testing of “employees who have regular

        contact with prisoners on a day-to-day basis in medium or maximum security prisons”);

        Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps. v. Roberts, 9 F.3d 1464, 1466–1468 (9th Cir. 1993) (upholding

        testing of “primary law enforcement officers [who had] the opportunity for contact with

        prisoners”); Washington v. Unified Gov’t of Wyandotte Cnty., 847 F.3d 1192, 1198–1201

        (10th Cir. 2017) (upholding testing of a juvenile corrections officer who primarily

        performed administrative tasks but worked at a housing facility and had contact with

        juvenile inmates). In each case, the employees’ opportunity for contact with prisoners

        played a primary role in sustaining a government need weighty enough to justify the

        testing.

               Garrett makes an argument of degree, claiming that he had less prisoner contact or

        that his position was more attenuated from prison safety than the corrections employees

        whose searches were upheld in these decisions. But Garrett’s argument gets qualified

        immunity backwards. The question is not whether the law clearly authorized Defendants’

        actions; they are protected from personal liability unless the law clearly prohibited their

        conduct. Garrett further likens his position to that of the administrative personnel in

        Taylor, whom the Seventh Circuit held could not be tested because they did not “come into

        regular contact with prisoners” or “have opportunities to smuggle drugs to prisoners.” 888

        F.2d at 1199. Even if we accepted Garrett’s comparison of his allegations to those facts,

        however, one out-of-circuit case is not a “‘robust consensus.’” Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 589–

        590 (quoting al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 742). These nonbinding decisions, even considered

        together, do not reveal the existence of a constitutional rule “clear enough that every

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        reasonable official would interpret it,” id. at 590, to forbid suspicionless drug testing of

        corrections IT employees who have “ca[su]al contact with low-risk offenders” in their

        workplace and “occasional,” “indirect contact” with inmates within prison walls, J.A. 21.

                                                     D.

               The district court found it “clearly establishe[d] that in the absence of an important

        government interest, the Fourth Amendment forbids suspicionless drug testing of

        government employees.” Garrett, 552 F. Supp. 3d at 561. Because the court had

        previously concluded that the government lacked an important interest in drug testing

        Garrett, it denied Defendants qualified immunity. The district court’s analysis went astray

        because its “formulation of the clearly established right was far too general.” City of

        Escondido v. Emmons, 139 S. Ct. 500, 503 (2019) (per curiam).

               The Supreme Court “has repeatedly told courts . . . not to define clearly established

        law at a high level of generality.” Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018) (per

        curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted); see, e.g., Rivas-Villegas, 142 S. Ct. at 7–9;

        Bond, 142 S. Ct. at 11–12; Emmons, 139 S. Ct. at 503–504; White, 137 S. Ct. at 552–553;

        Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12–14 (2015) (per curiam); al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 742;

        Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 198–199; Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639–641. Doing so “avoids the

        crucial question whether the official acted reasonably in the particular circumstances that

        he or she faced.” Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 779 (2014). It is of course true, as

        the district court said, that the State cannot randomly drug test an employee without a

        special need important enough to override the individual’s privacy interest. But that rule

        is too general to eliminate immunity because “the unlawfulness of the [Defendants’]

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        conduct does not follow immediately from the conclusion that the rule was firmly

        established.” Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 590 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).

        The proper question, instead, is whether precedent clearly established that Defendants

        lacked a special need of such importance in these circumstances. As we have explained, it

        did not.

               We recognize there exists “the rare obvious case,” where a general standard can

        clearly establish the answer. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 590 (internal quotation marks omitted);

        see Rivas-Villegas, 142 S. Ct. at 8; see, e.g., Taylor v. Riojas, 141 S. Ct. 52, 53–54 (2020)

        (per curiam) (finding it “obvious” based on “a general constitutional rule” that a prisoner

        cannot be housed for six days in a cell “teeming with human waste” (internal quotation

        marks omitted)). But this is not an obvious case. And “specificity is ‘especially important

        in the Fourth Amendment context,’ where it is ‘sometimes difficult for an officer to

        determine how the relevant legal doctrine . . . will apply to the factual situation the officer

        confronts.’” Bond, 142 S. Ct. at 11–12 (quoting Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 12).

               The district court relied on our decision in Ray v. Roane, 948 F.3d 222 (4th Cir.

        2020), where we denied qualified immunity at the pleading stage to a police officer accused

        of killing the plaintiff’s dog. Although we found no “directly on-point, binding authority”

        establishing that the officer’s actions in these particular circumstances were unreasonable,

        id. at 229 (internal quotation marks omitted), we relied on the general principle, established

        in a prior case, “that the reasonableness of the seizure of a dog depends on whether the

        governmental interest in safety outweighs the private interest in a particular case,” id. at

        230 (citing Altman v. City of High Point, 330 F.3d 194, 203–205 (4th Cir. 2003)). Because

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        the complaint alleged facts indicating that a reasonable officer would not have had “any

        safety rationale at all” for shooting the dog, we concluded that this “broad[] principle[]

        alone” would have made it “manifestly apparent” to a reasonable officer that shooting the

        dog was unlawful. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

               By contrast, based on the facts as alleged in the complaint here, VDOC has some

        degree of government interest in drug testing Garrett. Whether that interest amounts to a

        “special need” within the meaning of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is a debatable legal

        question. By baking into its analysis the absence of a sufficient special need, the district

        court glossed over the central question for immunity purposes: whether every reasonable

        official in Defendants’ position would understand that VDOC’s proffered interests were

        not substantial enough to override Garrett’s privacy interest. In view of existing law, the

        constitutionality of Defendants’ drug testing is simply not “beyond debate.” Wesby, 138

        S. Ct. at 589 (internal quotation marks omitted).

                                                    III.

               For these reasons, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from personal

        liability for the civil damages sought under Count 1.

                                                                                       REVERSED

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        WILKINSON, Circuit Judge, concurring:

               The majority opinion is correct that this claim can be dismissed on qualified

        immunity grounds. I readily concur in its opinion with appreciation for its fine analysis.

               I add the additional thought that the defendant’s random drug testing policy is also

        quite reasonable on its merits. Drugs are the single greatest problem in many penal

        institutions today. The drug culture of the streets is all too easily replicated in the

        institutional setting. It is not surprising that the indicia of street trafficking are present in

        many a prison: the turf jealousy, the formation of gang hierarchies, the retaliation for

        dubious loyalty and unpaid drug debts, are all too readily transferred from the “outside” to

        within the prison walls.

               Prison administrators know this. Courts are likewise very well aware of it. Tensions

        over drugs can flare at any moment. Thus, as the majority opinion recognizes, prison itself

        often supplies the special need that justifies random drug testing. See Neumeyer v. Beard,

        421 F.3d 210, 214 (3d Cir. 2005) (noting the “ready applicability of the special needs

        doctrine to the prison context”).

               It is natural to view the drug culture primarily as a serious problem for prison

        administrators. But the harm to the inmates themselves is every bit as real. Drugs not only

        retard rehabilitation efforts. Their presence also ensures that oppressive measures will be

        visited upon those lower-rung inmates least able to fend for themselves. A closed

        environment meant to provide supervision often only intensifies the harms.

               It is true that the plaintiff himself is an employee, not an inmate. But employees are

        not exempt from the payoffs and blackmail that are often part and parcel of a prison drug

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        trade. Nonetheless, the need for drug testing may fairly be seen by corrections officials as

        less urgent for employees. The more intrusive blood and urine samples may be less fitting

        for those employees than for prisoners themselves. The assessment of the need for various

        testing methodologies for various classes in the prison environment is best made by

        authorities who work in that setting day in and day out and who have an overall sense of

        an institution’s problems and challenges that judges are hard pressed to match.

               The corrections administrators here did in fact adopt the least intrusive method of

        testing by requiring the plaintiff to submit merely to a cheek swab. This can hardly be a

        Fourth Amendment violation. Such a test amounts to no more than an inconvenient blip in

        the business of the day.

               A focus on the unobtrusive methodology of this particular test makes good sense. It

        spares courts the need to examine this or that particular feature of this or that particular job.

        It relieves courts of the need to make fine-tuned and obscure distinctions which will leave

        corrections officials puzzled over what is permissible for whom and what is not. Courts

        should seek ways to avoid micromanaging prisons, and at least in this case, the focus on a

        common testing methodology for employees helps us keep our distance.

               Finely grained rulings, grounded on finely spun distinctions, are quite inconsistent

        with the way our federal system is supposed to work. The incorporation of the Bill of Rights

        against the states has had a unifying and often beneficial effect in instilling respect for basic

        rights and liberties throughout the land. I had not supposed, however, that this

        incorporation was meant to erode all remaining vestiges of state sovereignty.

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               State sovereignty is often at its peak where institutional governance of state

        institutions such as prisons and schools is concerned. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215,

        229 (1976) (prisons); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 565–66 (1995) (schools). If

        state courts wish to rule this or that drug testing policy to be violative of state law, that is

        one thing. But federal courts should resist the temptation to plaster some uniform rule on

        multiple states via a circuit court ruling or throughout the country via a decision of the

        Supreme Court.

               I find no problem with this prison policy under the Fourth Amendment. Whether

        the states wish to rule the policy unlawful or adopt some alternative is their prerogative,

        not ours. With that said, I happily join the fine qualified immunity analysis requiring

        dismissal of the claim.

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