Court Opinion

ID: 9811651
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 22:26:49.6733+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:20:50.314711
License: Public Domain

BURGESS, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent. This is a fairly simple case. Mr. Wrigley began this action on April 24, 2000, basing it on a April 5, 2000, Utah Small Claims Judgment. Although there were several legal maneuvers, by May 3, 2001, Wrigley had presented the Texas District Court with a April 4, 2001, Utah District Court Judgment which was based on an appeal and trial de novo of the April 5,2000, Small Claims Judgment.
The majority notes: “Although aware of it, the trial court never addressed the issue of whether the April 4, 2001, Utah judgment is entitled to full faith and credit.” Then, in a footnote, they also note: “For purposes of this appeal we will assume that this Utah judgment was properly domesticated.”
In a letter to all parties dated May 17, 2001, the trial court stated:
... The basis of the garnishment entered by this court on June 23, 2000 was two prior default judgments obtained by plaintiff. Subsequently, however, these were vacated and/or dismissed. Apparently, plaintiff, ultimately, obtained an appeal (trial de novo under Utah law) in which the Court ruled favorably for the plaintiff.
Nonetheless, it is clear under Texas law, once the original default judgments were vacated and/or set aside, the original garnishment became a nullity and the subsequent judgment, would do nothing to revive the validity of the writ of garnishment.
In Tom Vincent [sic] Chevrolet Company v. Beall, 567 S.W.2d 857 (Tex.Civ. App-San Antonio 1978, writ ref d n.r.e.), the Court held that a garnishment based on an original default judgment that was set aside, could not be enforced on the basis of a subsequent judgment on that debt. There, the Court stated
“[W]e need not discuss the second judgment as the garnishment was filed prior to the rendition of the second judgment and the Court does not purport to base the garnishment judgment thereon”.
Id. at 859.
The majority acknowledged the trial court based its ruling on Tom Benson Chevrolet Company v. Beall, 567 S.W.2d 857 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio 1978, writ refd n.r.e.) and correctly concludes that case: “... stands for the general proposition that a garnishment judgment, being merely a mode of enforcing the execution of a judgment, must be supported by a valid judgment in the underlying suit.” They also noted: “Tom Benson Chevrolet is not authority for the proposition that a garnishment judgment cannot be based upon a new judgment after the granting of a motion for new trial.”
The majority makes the case for Wrigley and then, without more, simply con-*259eludes: “... and Wrigley did not satisfy the requirements for either a turnover order or a writ of garnishment.” Under the analysis and facts utilized by the majority, at the time the trial court vacated the garnishments and dismissed the suit (May 17, 2001), Wrigley had provided the trial court a properly domesticated judgment (the April 4, 2001 Utah judgment).
The trial court simply misinterpreted the law and applied it incorrectly. The majority acknowledges this, yet, incredibly, still affirms. I dissent.