Court Opinion

ID: 9559811
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:35:57.69566+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:11:44.968994
License: Public Domain

KEETON, Justice.
I concur with the opinion of Justice GIVENS disallowing attorney fees. To-hold that Ch. 289, 1951 S.L. would apply to contracts of insurance written prior to-'its enactment, would create a new liability and impose a burden not covered by' the terms of the insurance policy: Further there was no proof submitted that ’an attorney fee was contracted or 'the'Yeás’onableness of the fee allowed by the trial "court.' That an attorney fee'had-been’contracted by the insured, and the-'question of •its reasonableness,, were questions of fact which could not be determined without evidence. Mulvihill v. First National Bank of Arvada, 80 Colo. 72, 249 P. 504; State v. Ganong, 93 Or. 440, 184 P. 233; Holiday Oil Co. v. Smith, 100 Okl. 172, 228 P. 775; England v. Commercial Bank of New Madrid, 8 Cir., 242 F. 813, 155 C.C.A. 401; Power v. City of Breckenfidge, Tex.Civ. App., 290 S.W. 872; Decatur Mineral & Land Co. v. Palm, 113 Ala. 531, 21 So. 315; May v. Robinson, 221 Ala. 570, 130 So. 81.
It is further my opinion that the insured was not house confined within the terms *541of the policy and that the activities in which he engaged for the period for which he claims disability preclude any recovery. A liberal interpretation of the policy favorable to the insured should not be extended to write an entirely new contract. In the instant case, during the period for which recovery was allowed, the insured transacted business, did some work, and frequently went on trips for various and numerous purposes. He was neither actually nor substantially house confined. Without reviewing authorities or extending the discussion, it is my opinion that the judgment should be reversed and plaintiff allowed to recover only the tendered amount.