Court Opinion

ID: 9373258
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:03:46.830203+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:40.638205
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     PHIL SAYRE,                                     DOCKET NUMBER
                         Appellant,                  DC-0752-16-0036-I-1

                  v.

     ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION                        DATE: November 2, 2022
       AGENCY,
                 Agency.

             THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Mark R. Heilbrun, Esquire, Fairfax Station, Virginia, for the appellant.

           David P. Guerrero, Esquire and Rebecca Wulffen, Esquire, Washington,
             D.C., for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                 Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                       FINAL ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     dismissed his involuntary retirement and constructive demotion claims for lack of
     jurisdiction. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only when: the initial

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                         2

     decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based
     on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application
     of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either
     the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required
     procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the
     outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available
     that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record
     closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 ( 5 C.F.R.
     § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that
     the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting
     the petition for review.     Therefore, we DENY the petiti on for review and
     AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R.
     § 1201.113(b).

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2         It is undisputed that, effective August 11, 2013, the appel lant was
     reassigned, with no loss in grade or pay, from a GS-15, step 10 Biologist position
     with the agency’s Risk Assessment Division’s Immediate Office to another
     GS-15, step 10 Biologist position with the agency’s New Chemicals Screening
     and Assessment Branch.      Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 6 at 13.       More than
     16 months later, effective December 31, 2014, the appellant retired under the
     agency’s Voluntary Separation Incentive Program and received a separation
     incentive payment. Id. at 16. On October 12, 2015, he filed the instant appeal
     challenging his reassignment as a constructive demotion and his retirement as
     involuntary based on intolerable working conditions. IAF, Tab 1 at 4, 6. He also
     alleged that the agency discriminated against him on the basis of his age. Id. at 6.
¶3         The administrative judge issued an order informing the appellant that the
     Board lacks jurisdiction over voluntary retirements and explained that to be
     entitled to a jurisdictional hearing he must make a nonfrivolous allegation that his
                                                                                           3

     retirement was involuntarily obtained through coercion, duress, or misinformation
     provided by the agency. IAF, Tab 3 at 2. The order also set forth the criteria for
     establishing jurisdiction over a claim of constructive demotion. Id. at 3-4.
¶4         After considering the parties’ responses to the order, the administrative
     judge issued an initial decision finding that the appellant failed to present
     nonfrivolous allegations that his retirement was involuntary or that he was
     constructively demoted. IAF, Tab 7, Initial Decision (ID) at 3-8. Accordingly,
     the administrative judge dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction without
     holding the requested hearing. 2 ID at 1, 9.
¶5         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, the
     agency has responded in opposition, and the appellant has replied to the agency’s
     response. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tabs 1, 3-4.

                      DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
¶6         An appellant is only entitled to a jurisdictional hearing if he makes a
     nonfrivolous allegation of Board jurisdiction.         Jones v. Department of the
     Treasury, 107 M.S.P.R. 466, ¶ 11 (2007).         Nonfrivolous allegations of Board
     jurisdiction are allegations of fact that, if proven, could establish a prima facie
     case that the Board has jurisdiction over the matter in issue. Id.; see 5 C.F.R.
     § 1201.4(s).
¶7         The appellant alleged that his supervisors oversaw a reorganization in
     which several older employees were reassigned and then subjected “to utterly
     intolerable work conditions” and that his “ultimate decision to retire was
     proximately influenced by the initial illegitimate constructive demotion and
     intervening intolerable work conditions.”       IAF, Tab 5 at 5-6.      Outside of his
     conclusory statement that the reassigned older employees were required to

     2
      Because the administrative judge dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, she did
     not decide whether the appellant demonstrated good cause for the apparent untimeliness
     of the appeal. ID at 8 n.2.
                                                                                      4

     perform duties and accept responsibilities not commensurate with their pay and
     grade, there is no indication as to why he believes that his working conditions
     were intolerable.   Id.   The appellant’s allegations regarding his involuntary
     retirement claim are conclusory because he does not describe what duties he was
     forced to perform that he believes were intolerable or what other actions the
     agency took that made his work environment intolerable.            His pro forma
     allegations are insufficient to obtain Board jurisdiction. See Clark v. U.S. Postal
     Service, 123 M.S.P.R. 466, ¶¶ 6-8 (2016), aff’d per curiam, 679 F. App’x 1006
     (Fed. Cir. 2017), and overruled on other grounds by Cronin v. U.S. Postal
     Service, 2022 MSPB 13, ¶ 20 n. 11..
¶8        We have considered the appellant’s allegations of discrimination and other
     violations of law only insofar as those allegations relate to the issue of the
     voluntariness of his retirement.      Vitale v. Department of Veterans Affairs,
     107 M.S.P.R. 501, ¶ 20 (2007); see Baker v. U.S. Postal Service, 71 M.S.P.R.
     680, 695 (1996). Again, we find his allegations of discrimination to be pro forma
     in nature. IAF, Tabs 1, 5; PFR File, Tab 1, 4; see Clark, 123 M.S.P.R. 466,
     ¶¶ 6-8. Similarly, though he asserted that his supervisors violated the law by
     assigning him “less-than-grade-appropriate assignment[s],” PFR File, Tab 1 at 5,
     such an allegation is conclusory and, even if true, we find would be insufficient
     to establish that his retirement was involuntary, see Brown v. U.S. Postal Service,
     115 M.S.P.R. 609, ¶¶ 13-15 (explaining that unpleasant working conditions or
     dissatisfaction with work assignments generally will not be so intolerable as to
     compel a reasonable person to resign), aff’d, 469 F. App’x 852 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
     Moreover, though he served in his reassignment for over 16 months, he did not
     allege that he attempted to exhaust his remedial avenues. See id., ¶ 15. Nor did
     he allege that he was under any sort of time pressure to resign when he did. See
     Holser v. Department of the Army, 77 M.S.P.R. 92, 95-96 (1997). Because he
     could have remained in his position and contested the validity of the agency’s
     actions but chose not to, we find that he has failed to nonfrivolously allege that
                                                                                           5

      his resignation was involuntary.       See Brown, 115 M.S.P.R. 609, ¶ 15; cf.
      Heining v. General Services Administration, 68 M.S.P.R. 513, 523 (1995)
      (finding an involuntary resignation after the appellant offered overwhelming
      evidence supporting an intolerable working environment and did not resign until
      she pursued many grievances and two complaints, receiving an adverse decision
      on her grievances just prior to her resignation).
¶9          Regarding his constructive demotion claim, the appellant does not allege
      that the former position from which he was reassigned was upgraded following
      his reassignment, but instead argues that the position was misclassified and was
      worth a higher grade. IAF, Tab 5 at 5, 9. Because the Board lacks jurisdiction
      over appeals concerning a position’s proper classification 3 and may exercise
      jurisdiction in a constructive demotion appeal only when a n appellant’s former
      position actually has been reclassified upward, the appellant has failed to raise a
      nonfrivolous allegation of Board jurisdiction under a constructive demotion
      theory.   See Marcheggiani v. Department of Defense, 90 M.S.P.R. 212, ¶ 8
      (2001).
¶10         On review, the appellant alleges that the administrative judge appeared
      biased because, essentially, she decided in favor of the agency. PFR File, Tab 1
      at 10-11. In making a claim of bias or prejudice against an administrative judge ,
      a party must overcome the presumption of honesty and integrity that accompanies
      administrative adjudicators. Oliver v. Department of Transportation, 1 M.S.P.R.
      382, 386 (1980).     Furthermore, an administrative judge’s conduct during the
      course of a Board proceeding warrants a new adjudication only if his or her
      comments or actions evince “a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would
      make fair judgment impossible.” Bieber v. Department of the Army, 287 F.3d
      1358, 1362-63 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540,

      3
        Federal employees may request a decision from the Office of Personnel Management
      as to the appropriate occupational series or grade of their official position. 5 C.F.R.
      § 511.603(a)(1).
                                                                                            6

      555 (1994)). Here, the appellant has not identified any evidence of prejudice,
      favoritism, or antagonism in the proceedings below. Accordingly, we find no
      merit to the appellant’s allegations of bias.
¶11         The appellant also referenced an erroneous statement in the initial decision
      that he was reassigned to a GS-14 position rather than a GS-15 position. PFR
      File, Tab 1 at 4 n.2, 10; ID at 2. This typographical error does not aff ect the legal
      analysis in the initial decision, and we find it is of no legal consequence. See
      Goetz v. Office of Personnel Management, 56 M.S.P.R. 298, 300 n.2 (1993).
      Similarly, despite the appellant’s contentions to the contrary, PFR File, Tab 1
      at 7, the administrative judge’s election not to cite each of his unsupported and
      irrelevant allegations in the initial decision does not show that she failed to
      consider them or otherwise erred.         See Kirkpatrick v. U.S. Postal Service,
      74 M.S.P.R. 583, 589 (1997).
¶12         After full consideration of the appellant’s arguments on review, we deny his
      petition for review and affirm the initial decision dismissing his appeal for lack of
      jurisdiction.

                               NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 4
            You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By
      statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such
      review and the appropriate forum with which to file.              5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).
      Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit
      Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most
      appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a
      statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their
      jurisdiction.   If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should

      4
        Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
      the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
      Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                        7

immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow a ll
filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time
limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.
      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.               5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit   your   petition   to   the   court    at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
                                                                                  8

      (2) Judicial   or   EEOC     review   of   cases   involving    a   claim   of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court (not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.     5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017).            If you have a
representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before
you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days
after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling
condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and
to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must fil e
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                                                                                      9

                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                  P.O. Box 77960
                             Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial    review    pursuant     to   the   Whistleblower       Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in
section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or
2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial
review either with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court
of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 5 The court of appeals must receive your
petition for review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.
5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).

5
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115 -195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                                10

      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                             U.S. Court of Appeals
                             for the Federal Circuit
                            717 Madison Place, N.W.
                            Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                                    /s/ for
                                          Jennifer Everling
                                          Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.