Court Opinion

ID: 9941693
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-16 19:01:46.380542+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:56.175609
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-10864        Document: 00517066698             Page: 1      Date Filed: 02/16/2024

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit
                                     ____________
                                                                               United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                        Fifth Circuit
                                      No. 23-10864
                                    Summary Calendar                                  FILED
                                    ____________                               February 16, 2024
                                                                                 Lyle W. Cayce
   Candace Searcy,                                                                    Clerk

                                                                    Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                            versus

   Keller Independent School District,

                                               Defendant—Appellee.
                     ______________________________

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                         for the Northern District of Texas
                               USDC No. 4:23-CV-493
                     ______________________________

   Before Higginbotham, Stewart, and Southwick, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam: *
         In April 2023, Candace Searcy, proceeding pro se and in forma
   pauperis (IFP), filed a civil complaint against Keller Independent School
   District (KISD) alleging claims of employment discrimination, harassment,
   and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C.
   § 2000e-2(a)). She also alleged that her children were subjected to race-

         _____________________
         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 23-10864      Document: 00517066698           Page: 2    Date Filed: 02/16/2024

                                     No. 23-10864

   based discrimination and harassment. After receiving Searcy’s responses to
   two questionnaires, the magistrate judge (MJ) recommended that Searcy’s
   complaint be dismissed with prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) as
   time barred. The MJ found that Searcy failed to file her federal complaint
   within 90 days of receiving the right-to-sue letter from the Equal
   Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), and the MJ further found
   that Searcy failed to show that equitable tolling was warranted. The district
   court adopted the MJ’s findings as its own and dismissed Searcy’s complaint
   with prejudice. This appeal followed.
          Although the district court’s order and judgment do not expressly
   state the statutory provision under which Searcy’s complaint was being
   dismissed, we may affirm on any basis supported by the record. Berry v.
   Brady, 192 F.3d 504, 507 (5th Cir. 1999). An IFP complaint asserting claims
   that are time barred is properly dismissed as frivolous pursuant to
   § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). See Gonzales v. Wyatt, 157 F.3d 1016, 1019-20 (5th Cir.
   1998). “Title VII . . . provides for private causes of action arising out of
   employment discrimination and gives federal courts subject matter
   jurisdiction to resolve such disputes.” Davis v. Fort Bend Cnty., 893 F.3d
   300, 303 (5th Cir. 2018). However, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) requires that
   a claimant initiate a Title VII civil action within 90 days of receiving a right-
   to-sue notice from the EEOC. See Ringgold v. Nat’l Maint. Corp., 796 F.2d
   769, 770 (5th Cir. 1986). The 90-day filing requirement is akin to a statute of
   limitations and may be equitably tolled. See Harris v. Boyd Tunica, Inc., 628
   F.3d 237, 239 (5th Cir. 2010).
          On appeal, Searcy briefly summarizes her claims that she and her
   children were subjected to race-based discrimination and harassment by
   KISD. She also asks that the appellees be served; she demands that the
   principal and culpable teachers be fired; and she seeks $300,000 for each
   instance that she and her children suffered emotional harm.

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                                    No. 23-10864

          But Searcy does not challenge the basis for the district court’s
   dismissal. She does not dispute that she filed her federal complaint more
   than two years after receiving her right-to-sue letter from the EEOC, nor
   does she raise any argument that could be liberally construed as challenging
   the court’s equitable tolling determination. She also fails to challenge the
   MJ’s treatment or resolution of the claims relating to her children.
          We afford pro se briefs liberal construction, Grant v. Cuellar, 59 F.3d
   523, 524 (5th Cir. 1995), but even pro se litigants must brief arguments to
   maintain them, see Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 224-25 (5th Cir. 1993).
   When, as in this case, an appellant does not identify any error in the district
   court’s analysis, it is the same as if the appellant had not appealed the
   judgment.     Brinkmann v. Abner, 813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1987).
   Accordingly, because Searcy has not identified any error in the district
   court’s analysis and time-bar determination, the district court’s judgment is
   AFFIRMED.
          Searcy has also filed a motion to expedite the hearing and issue a
   permanent protective order and a motion to vacate judgment. The motions
   are not relevant to the district court’s ruling or this appeal, and they are
   DENIED.
          Finally, we note that Searcy has filed—while proceeding pro se and
   IFP—at least one other unsuccessful action alleging similar conduct. See,
   e.g., Searcy v. Crowley Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 23-10776 (5th Cir. Oct. 24, 2023)
   (unpublished). We also dismissed, during the pendency of the instant appeal,
   two appeals in cases unrelated to Searcy’s employment. See Searcy v.
   Progressive Ins., No. 23-10422 (5th Cir. Jan. 25, 2024) (unpublished); Searcy
   v. Orchard Nat’l Title, No. 22-10122 (5th Cir. Jan. 3, 2023) (unpublished).
          Under the circumstances, and in light of the baseless motions Searcy
   has filed in this case while proceeding IFP, Searcy is WARNED that

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                                     No. 23-10864

   frivolous, repetitive, or otherwise abusive filings will invite the imposition of
   sanctions, including possible dismissal, monetary sanctions, and restrictions
   on her ability to file pleadings in this court and any court subject to this
   court’s jurisdiction. See Fed. R. App. P. 38; Coghlan v. Starkey, 852 F.2d
   806, 817 n.21 (5th Cir. 1988).

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