Court Opinion

ID: 9578732
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:47:53.373757+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:29:28.835100
License: Public Domain

BIRD, C. J.
I must respectfully dissent from this “By the Court” opinion for two important reasons.
I
The issue before this court is a relatively simple one. The state Constitution provides that if a vacancy occurs in a superior court judgeship in an election year, the Governor is to appoint the replacement who then must run for that position at the next general election. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 16, subd. (c).) The question presented is whether this court should completely rewrite this section to achieve a result that the court deems preferable. I submit this is not our function and the attempt to do so is without legal justification.
The language of the Constitution is clear and unambiguous. “A vacancy shall be filled by election... at the next general election after the January 1 following the vacancy. ...” (Ibid., italics added.) In the *117present case, the incumbent judge retired in June of 1980. Under the clear language of the Constitution, that vacancy must be filled by the exercise of the Governor’s appointment power. The appointee must then stand for election in June of 1982.
Even a cursory review of the decisions issued by this court in the last 10 years reveals that when a vacancy occurs in the same year as the general election, the vacancy must be filled by the Governor consistent with article VI, section 16, subdivision (c). Consider the following language from this court’s decision in Fields v. Eu (1976) 18 Cal.3d 322, at page 326 [134 Cal.Rptr. 367, 556 P.2d 729]. “[I]f the vacancy occurs during a year in which there is no general election, the office will appear on the June primary ballot of the immediately following year; but if the vacancy arises at any time in an election year, the office will not be placed on the ballot until the next election year, i.e., two years later.” Further, in Pollack v. Hamm (1970) 3 Cal.3d 264 [90 Cal.Rptr. 181, 475 P.2d 213], relied on in today’s “By the Court” opinion, this court stated that “only if the vacancy arises in the year of expiration of the elected incumbent’s term, or. . .[if] an unopposed incumbent die[s] in an election year at a time when it is no longer possible to carry out that process, may more than six years elapse between elections or opportunity for election for the office.” (Pollack v. Hamm, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 273, fn. omitted, italics added.) Such language scarcely supports the conclusions reached in the present “By the Court” opinion.
Again in 1975, this court stated in Anderson v. Phillips (1975) 13 Cal.3d 733, at page 739 [119 Cal.Rptr. 879, 532 P.2d 1247], that the revision in 1966 of article VI, section 16, subdivision (c) “was to eliminate the requirement that an election be held during the last year of an incumbent’s term if a vacancy accrues during that year, and to assure that the appointee will not have to stand for election until the general election two years hence." (Fn. omitted, italics added.) The court in that case went on to point out that the obvious purport of the 1966 revision of the Constitution was “to extend [the rule] to all vacancies arising during the closing year of an elected incumbent’s term.” {Id., at p. 740.)
A careful review discloses that stripped of its verbiage, this “By the Court” opinion is essentially bottomed on a letter written 14 years after the fact by a member of the California Constitution Revision Commission. The great deference accorded this nunc pro tunc expression of *118intent represents a new departure for this court in interpreting provisions of the Constitution. Unfortunately, it is a procedure of dubious validity. In the past, this court has been “reticen[t] to rely on statements made by individual members of the Legislature as an expression of the intent of the entire body.” (Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors (1972) 8 Cal.3d 247, 258 [104 Cal.Rptr. 761, 502 P.2d 1049].) Indeed, “In construing a statute we do not consider the motives or understandings of individual legislators who cast their votes in favor of it... . Nor do we carve an exception to this principle simply because the legislator whose motives are preferred actually authored the bill in controversy.” (In re Marriage of Bouquet (1976) 16 Cal.3d 583, 589 [128 Cal.Rptr. 427, 546 P.2d 1371], citations omitted.) Nor is the present case one which gives evidence of more than the personal understanding of the letter’s author. {Id., at p. 590.) Now, we are asked to accept without question the declaration of one member1 of an 80-member commission, 14 years after the event.
There is no contemporaneous expression that supports this particular interpretation. To the contrary, former article VI, section 8, required that “if the term of an incumbent, elective or appointive, is expiring at the close of the year of a general state election and a vacancy accrues after the commencement of that year and prior to the commencement of the ensuing term, the election to fill the office for the ensuing full term shall be held in the closing year of the expiring term in the same manner and with the same effect as though such vacancy had not accrued.” The comment that accompanied the Commission’s proposed constitutional revision indicates that “[t]he Commission deleted that provision because it is only operable during the very early part of an election year.” (Cal. Const. Revision Com., Proposed Revision (1966) p. 94.) As respondent points out, nowhere in any of that language is there any indication that the Constitution Revision Commission intended to say that the office could only be filled by election in the last year of the term regardless of when or whether a vacancy occurred or whether it was filled by the appointment process.
The “By the Court” opinion speaks in lofty terms of the “right of suffrage.” (By the Court opn., ante, at p. 115.) No one disagrees with *119that. However, a closer examination of the opinion illustrates that this decision does not advance “‘the right of the people to exercise the elective process.’” (By the Court opn., ante, at p. 115.) Rather, it encourages manipulation of the election process.
Petitioner, in his amended petition, inadvertently points out the real danger. He admits he “did not desire to challenge an incumbent judge seeking reelection because petitioner’s doing so might damage existing and future professional relationships and because petitioner believed himself more likely to win the election if he ran for an open seat.” It is a generally recognized fact that individuals who run for an open seat have different strategic motivations than those who would run against an incumbent judge. In rewriting the clear intent of article VI, section 16, this court encourages a system which would thwart, not advance, the election process. For example, incumbents, who did not like the Governor and who wished to select their own replacements, could inform only the person of their choice of their intent to resign. The resignation could then be timed so that under the law no one else would have adequate notice to be able to run for the seat.
There is an additional problem that this court recognized in Barton v. Panish (1976) 18 Cal.3d 624, at page 629 [135 Cal.Rptr. 65, 557 P.2d 497], When a judge retires after the election process has started, “[unless the Governor’s power to appoint... is implemented by postponing the election, appointees during that period would be unable to run for the office. It might be very difficult to find qualified attorneys willing to accept appointment, having to give up their law practices to serve for only a half year with no opportunity to be elected to office.” (Fn. omitted.) This principle was applied in a number of cases wherein this court allowed the Governor’s appointee to remain in office even though a vacancy occurred in a general election year and the appointee did not stand for election until the next general election.2 (See Anderson v. Phillips, supra, 13 Cal.3d 733; Zecher v. Cory (1975) 13 Cal.3d 743 [119 Cal.Rptr. 885, 532 P.2d 1253]; French v. Jordan (1946) 28 Cal.2d 765 [172 P.2d 46].)
Far from promoting the right of suffrage, the interpretation advanced in this “By the Court” opinion deprives the public of the opportunity to vote for an experienced judge whose background and qualifications for *120the seat in question have been reviewed by the State Bar. For the several reasons expressed above, the election process will not be enhanced but will suffer as a result of this unfortunate opinion.
II
I dissent as well to the form of this opinion. In In re Perrone C. (1979) 26 Cal.3d 49, at pages 58-59 [160 Cal.Rptr. 704, 603 P.2d 1300], I stated my views on the undesirable results, due to lack of accountability, that the use of “By the Court” opinions breeds. It is sound policy for this court to keep the use of “By the Court” opinions to a minimum.3
The important issues that come before us should not be decided anonymously. The litigants, their counsel, and the public have a right to know whose words they are reading. “By the Court” opinions frustrate the exercise of that right. Further, they run counter to the respected principles of openness in government and personal accountability of public officials. All of these problems are compounded in the instant case since counsel were asked by the court to waive oral argument.
I question whether the parties have been accorded procedural due process when they were not informed prior to their waiver that the opinion would be issued as a per curiam. Ordinarily, I would not raise this issue out of deference to the court, but I firmly believe this procedure to be of questionable fairness. For all of these reasons, I respectfully, but strongly disagree.

This individual also sits on the same superior court bench to which the petitioner in the companion case aspires. The Los Angeles Daily Journal reported on June 26, 1980, that this same individual “had requested the Legislative Counsel’s opinion on the matter through one of his state representatives.” (Election Ruling by Legislative Counsel Backs L.A. Opinion, L.A. Daily Journal (June 26, 1980) p. 1.)

Such a result does not in any way interfere with the right of the electorate to scrutinize the qualifications of an incumbent judge no less often than every six years, as article VI, section 16, subdivision (c) contemplates.

I appreciate that there are valid reasons for issuing “By the Court” opinions in attorney and judicial disciplinary proceedings. However, outside of the disciplinary context, those reasons do not apply.