Court Opinion

ID: 9486065
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 11:37:09.897449+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:51:30.906766
License: Public Domain

RYAN, Circuit Judge,
dissenting, except in the conclusion reached in Part V of the plurality opinion that the defendant must be resentenced.
Judge Guy’s plurality opinion states that the question before us is
whether a defendant may challenge at sentencing a prior state court conviction not previously ruled invalid which would result in a longer sentence if included within the sentencing guidelines calculus.
Plurality op. at 1038.
The answer, according to the plurality opinion, is that “under certain limited circumstances it is within a sentencing court’s discretion to entertain a challenge to the inclusion of a prior state conviction in a criminal history score.” Plurality op. at 1044. I had thought, and I believe the parties had thought, that we voted to rehear these cases en banc to decide
whether a federal district court has authority under the sentencing guidelines, or otherwise, to invalidate, for federal sentencing purposes, a prior state conviction.
*1050For reasons I shall fully develop, my view is that it does not. Therefore, although I concur in the ultimate result reached by the plurality opinion with respect to McGlocklin’s sentence, I disagree that federal district courts are authorized to invalidate, for federal sentencing purposes, prior state convictions. I must, therefore, respectfully dissent.
The difference in the two formulations of the issue we convened to decide en banc is not, as it turns out, merely a matter of semantics. The rule announced in Judge Guy’s plurality opinion is that whether a defendant may or may not “challenge” the use of a prior conviction, that is, obtain a ruling on its use in the sentence calculus, is within the discretion of the sentencing court. Subsumed in that rule of decision is the conclusion that a federal court has authority to hold invalid, for sentencing purposes, a presumptively valid prior state conviction. Indeed, the opinion so holds. See plurality op. at 1045. Although the plurality opinion’s rule of decision is stated in terms of a threshold procedural question — whether a sentencing court has discretion to consider challenges to the constitutional validity of a prior state conviction — we did not order en banc hearing'in these cases to decide that question. Our vote, as I understand it, was to consider and decide the substantive question whether federal courts have authority, at sentencing, to invalidate presumptively valid prior state convictions. Instead of coming squarely to grips with that difficult and complex problem, and offering a reasoned analysis on the subject, the plurality opinion merely assumes that a federal court has the “inherent power” to invalidate state convictions at sentencing hearings, without, as it turns out, any citation of applicable authority and only passing reference to an analytical basis. The result is a virtual bypass of the critical question we convened en banc to decide and little more than an ipse dixit that the court has the “inherent power” to invalidate such convictions.
The plurality fails to inform us from whence the sentencing court derives its authority to adjudicate the validity of prior state convictions. Rather, the plurality apparently assumes that the power is “inherent.” See plurality op. at 1042 n. 7. No circuit that has addressed the subject agrees with the view implied in the plurality opinion that the court’s “inherent power” is the source of a federal sentencing court’s authority to invalidate a state conviction. At least three circuits have concluded that the sentencing guidelines are the source1 or lack of it,2 a view also expressed by our colleague, Judge Keith, writing separately in this case. A few circuits look to the Constitution as providing the source of such authority.3
I do not believe that the sentencing guidelines either grant or deny federal courts the power to rule on the constitutional validity of prior state convictions, and I am satisfied that sentencing courts do not have “inherent authority” to rule on such matters when applying the enhancement provisions of the sentencing guidelines. Therefore, in this separate opinion, I shall first demonstrate why I believe the plurality opinion is incorrect when it implies that a federal court has the power to do so, and I shall explain why I believe the court’s power has been limited by Congress. Second, I shall explain why I believe that the Supreme Court precedent4 relied upon in the plurality opinion and in the opinions by Judges Kennedy and Martin, and *1051in the decision of at least two other circuits,5 does not determine whether a federal court has authority to invalidate a prior conviction for sentencing purposes. Third, I shall explain that the language of the sentencing guidelines, and the commentary thereto, have been misread, and that the sentencing guidelines do not authorize federal district courts to invalidate, at federal sentencing, prior state convictions. Finally, I shall express the reasons for my strong disagreement with the formula that appears to have been approved by the court today for the exercise of the sentencing court’s discretion in deciding to entertain challenges to the validity of state court convictions.
I.
A.
En route to its conclusion — that whether a defendant may obtain a ruling upon his challenge to the validity of a prior state court conviction is a matter within the sentencing court’s discretion — the plurality opinion assumes that a sentencing federal court has the authority to invalidate a presumptively valid state conviction if the court finds the conviction constitutionally infirm. The plurality fails to identify the source of that authority, and the opinion offers neither reasoned analysis nor applicable citation of law in support of the conclusion that district courts have the authority to evaluate the validity of prior state convictions. The plurality rejects the view that the sentencing guidelines are the source of the court’s authority and instead claims that the guidelines acknowledge that the federal court’s authority comes from the “inherent power of the court.” Plurality op. at 1042 n. 7. No circuit has held, as the plurality opinion seems to, that a federal court has “inherent power” to do what the court authorizes today. The plurality opinion cites to no applicable authority, and I have found none, for the conclusion that the district courts have “inherent power” to entertain constitutional challenges to state court convictions and, in certain cases, invalidate those judgments. Apparently, there is none.
B.
Federal courts do not have such “inherent power.” I recognize that a federal district court has limited “inherent authority” to take appropriate action to protect its jurisdiction from conduct which impairs its ability to carry out its Article III functions. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., — U.S. —, —, 111 S.Ct. 2128, 2132, 115 L.Ed.2d 27 (1991).6 To my knowledge, this is the extent of a federal district court’s “inherent authori*1052ty.” Certainly a federal court does not have “inherent authority” to define or expand its own jurisdiction, and, in particular, it has no “inherent authority” to adjudicate the validity of state court judgments. Only Congress can extend such power to federal courts. See U.S. Const., art. Ill § 1.
The entirety of the power of the federal judiciary is derived from Article III of the United States Constitution.7 Section 2 of Article III “delineates the absolute limits on the federal courts’ jurisdiction,” Anken-brandt v. Richards, — U.S.—,—, 112 S.Ct. 2206, 2211, 119 L.Ed.2d 468 (1992), by setting out “[t]he character of the controversies over which federal judicial authority may extend.... ” Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 701, 102 S.Ct. 2099, 2104, 72 L.Ed.2d 492 (1982). And, section 1 further limits jurisdiction of the lower federal courts
to those subjects encompassed within a statutory grant of jurisdiction. Again, this reflects the constitutional source of federal judicial power: Apart from this Court, that power only exists “in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”
Insurance Corp. of Ireland, 456 U.S. at 701-02, 102 S.Ct. at 2104 (quoting U.S. Con start. Ill, § 1). Accordingly, Congress determines the source of jurisdiction of the lower federal courts. Federal Power Comm’n v. Pacific Power & Light Co., 307 U.S. 156, 159, 59 S.Ct. 766, 767-68, 83 L.Ed. 1180 (1939). Although bound by the constitutional limits on jurisdiction, Congress has discretion in dealing with the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts, and it is Congress’s task to allocate judicial power by granting or withholding from the federal courts jurisdiction over specific types of cases. Malamud v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 521 F.2d 1142, 1146-47 (6th Cir.1975). “Unless Congress has granted jurisdiction to the [federal] courts, Article III limits the ability of district courts to act.” In re Allied-Signal, Inc., 915 F.2d 190, 191 (6th Cir.1990). In Federal Labor Relations Auth. v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 962 F.2d 1055, 1058 (D.C.Cir.1992), the court stated that “absent extraordinary circumstances ..., the judiciary is constrained to exercise that jurisdiction which Congress provides.”
Federal courts are not courts of general jurisdiction, for “they have only the power that is authorized by Article III of the Constitution and the statutes enacted by Congress pursuant thereto.” Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541, 106 S.Ct. 1326, 1331, 89 L.Ed.2d 501 (1986). “For that reason, every federal appellate court has a special obligation to ‘satisfy itself not only of its own jurisdiction, but also that of the lower courts in a cause under review’_” Id. (quoting Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U.S. 237, 244, 55 S.Ct. 162, 165, 79 L.Ed. 338 (1934)).
The Full Faith and Credit statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, which implements the Constitution’s Full Faith and Credit Clause, U.S. Const.art. IV, § 1, and codifies the time-honored principles of federalism and comity that limit the authority of federal courts, see Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 84, 104 S.Ct. 892, 897-98, 79 L.Ed.2d 56 (1984), is directly implicated in this matter of invalidating state court convictions. It is clear that, through the Full Faith and Credit statute, Congress has limited the federal courts’ jurisdiction to invalidate state court judgments. The statute provides, in relevant part, that the
judicial proceedings [of any State, Territory, or Possession] ... shall have the same *1053full faith and credit in every court within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken.
28 U.S.C. § 1738 (emphasis added). The Full Faith and Credit statute requires federal courts to give state court judgments “the same preclusive effect as would be given that judgment under the law of the State in which the judgment was rendered.” Migra, 465 U.S. at 81, 104 S.Ct. at 896. The statute “reflects a variety of concerns, including notions of comity, the need to prevent vexatious litigation, and a desire to conserve judicial resources.” Id. at 84, 104 S.Ct. at 898. It applies to state criminal as well as state civil judgments. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 91, 105, 101 S.Ct. 411, 413, 420, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980).
The Supreme Court has held that the requirements of the Full Faith and Credit statute presumptively control unless a coordinate federal statute contains “an express or implied partial repeal” of section 1738. Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 468, 102 S.Ct. 1883, 1890, 72 L.Ed.2d 262 (1982). Moreover, the Court has stressed that courts should find an implied repeal only where it is demonstrated that “Congress intended to override the historic respect that federal courts accord state court judgments.” Id. at 471-72, 102 S.Ct. at 1892. One clear example of such intent is “the authorization for federal courts to reexamine state findings upon a request for a writ of habeas corpus.” Id. at 485 n. 27, 102 S.Ct. at 1899 n. 27.
Congress has not authorized federal courts to do what the plurality sanctions today— that is, reexamine state findings upon request in a federal sentencing proceeding" under the sentencing guidelines. Congress has, however, authorized federal court review of state court findings when the federal court contemplates increasing the mandatory minimum sentence of a defendant convicted of certain drug offenses. See 21 U.S.C. § 851. Thus, in section 851, we find another clear example of Congress’s decision to legislate an exception to the Full Faith and Credit statute. Section 851 operates in tandem with 21 U.S.C. § 841(b). Under section 841(b), the court may increase the mandatory minimum sentence of a defendant convicted of certain drug offenses if the defendant has been convicted of prior drug-related felonies. Section 851 allows a defendant to attack, prior to sentencing, the constitutional validity of certain prior drug-related offenses that are to be the basis of the statutory enhancement under section 841(b), and the sentencing court must entertain that attack.8 In section 851, Congress carved out a limited exception to the Full Faith and Credit statute by specifically authorizing district courts to adjudicate the validity of prior drug convictions when the court contemplates imposing the enhancement of section 841(b). Congress has not created a similar exception for enhancement under the sentencing guidelines.
Federal district court review of the convictions of other courts is properly limited to those proceedings where Congress has demonstrated its “clear intent” to provide for a “partial repeal” of the Full Faith and Credit statute. Congress has limited federal collateral review of state court proceedings because of the strong interest in maintaining comity between state and federal courts. It *1054is this concern for comity that underlies the requirement, for example, that a prisoner exhaust available state remedies before seeking relief from a state conviction by means of habeas corpus review in the federal courts.9 The exhaustion requirement “serves to minimize friction between our federal and state systems of justice by allowing the State an initial opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of prisoners’ federal rights.” Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3, 102 S.Ct. 18, 19, 70 L.Ed.2d 1 (1981) (per curiam). Although the habeas remedy has a long and venerable history and is a core value in the United States Constitution, both Congress and the federal courts have carefully limited its availability for the sake of comity between state and federal courts in order to preserve the principles of finality in litigation. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 127, 102 S.Ct. 1558, 1571, 71 L.Ed.2d 783 (1982). Similarly, Congress has even limited federal collateral review under 21 U.S.C. § 851 by prohibiting a defendant from challenging the validity of a conviction over five years old.10
Nothing in the language of Article III or the Full Faith and Credit statute, or in the decisions interpreting either, suggests the existence of a residual “inherent power” in federal courts to invalidate state convictions for a limited purpose, such as sentencing, free of the constraints imposed upon the habeas corpus or other statutorily created collateral remedies. In fact, any “inherent power” that existed in federal sentencing courts to adjudicate the constitutional validity of a prior state conviction, if it ever existed, was limited by Congress when it enacted the Full Faith and Credit statute. Clearly, Congress knows how to grant collateral review authority to district courts when it desires to do so. The Sentencing Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3551, does not provide for such authority, and nothing in the guidelines, or its commentary, supports a conclusion that Congress intended to carve out another exception to the Full Faith and Credit statute by permitting collateral review of state convictions by a federal sentencing court when sentencing guideline enhancement is contemplated. Nor could the guidelines create such an exception to the Full Faith and Credit statute without the express authority of Congress. See discussion of the sentencing guidelines and Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 109 S.Ct. 647, 102 L.Ed.2d 714 (1989), infra, section III. Absent such an express or implied partial repeal of section 1738, federal courts must give full faith and credit to prior state convictions when determining a federal sentence pursuant to the guidelines.
C.
The plurality opinion states that the Full Faith and Credit statute, traditional notions of comity and federalism, and considerations of collateral estoppel and res judicata are no obstacle to the invalidation of a prior state conviction for sentencing purposes only, because such “ ‘concerns’ ” are “ ‘inapplicable.’ ” Plurality op. at 1042 (quoting United States v. Guthrie, 931 F.2d 564, 571 (9th Cir.1991)). According to the plurality opinion, a challenge to a presumptively valid state conviction for purposes of sentencing “is not equivalent to a full-blown collateral attack” because the conviction is not vacated. Plurality op. at 1042. “Any determination made by the sentencing court regarding the use of that prior conviction for sentencing purposes would have no preclusive effect on any other court that may in the future have reason to consider that conviction’s validity_” Plurality op. at 1042.
To begin with, it is not at all clear that the sentencing court’s invalidation of a state conviction would have no preclusive effect. As*1055sume in this age of criminal recidivism that a defendant, who last year successfully persuaded a federal district court to exercise its “inherent power” to declare invalid one or more of the defendant’s prior state convictions, now faces sentencing in a second federal court. Assume, as should be expected, that the defendant cites the first federal court’s judgment as authority for his claim that the previously invalidated state convictions “continue” to be constitutionally invalid and not countable for sentencing purposes. Does the first sentencing court’s adjudication have preclusive effect in the second sentencing federal court? Unless federal court adjudications of the constitutional validity of state court judgments are determinations “for this ticket, for this train, for this day only,” the first federal sentencing court’s determination must surely be preclusive upon subsequent courts with respect to the same issue between the same parties. And what of the effect of the first federal sentencing court’s “limited invalidation” on a subsequent federal prosecution under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), when the government wishes to “count” the prior state convictions? And what of the effect of a judgment of invalidity upon a later sentencing state court? The questions suggest then-own answers, and, in all events, suggest the prospect of profound confusion.
But even if the plurality opinion is correct and an adjudication of invalidity of a state conviction for federal sentencing purposes has absolutely no preclusive effect, the solution offered today by the plurality opinion is illogical and unfair. The same prior state conviction 1) may or may not be subject to collateral attack before various subsequent federal judges, depending upon the judges’ “discretion” whether to entertain such an attack, and 2) may be adjudicated constitutionally invalid in some federal courts and valid in others. Such disparity does not comport with either common sense or the guidelines’ overarching goal of enhancing sentence uniformity and predictability.
The plurality opinion also states that even if the Full Faith and Credit statute were to apply, allowing a sentencing court to determine the constitutional validity of a prior conviction does not violate that statute. The reasoning seems to be that since “many states allow collateral attacks to be made at sentencing on prior state convictions,” allowing federal courts to do so “is not violative of Full Faith and Credit Clause principles.” Plurality op. at 1042. The flaw in such reasoning is obvious: Of course, states are free to invalidate their own prior convictions as they deem appropriate, but until such time as a state invalidates its own prior conviction, the Full Faith and Credit statute requires federal courts to fully respect that conviction’s validity.
I recognize that there is a difference between an adjudication of invalidity of a state conviction under the federal Constitution in a habeas corpus proceeding and such a determination for sentencing purposes only. The difference, essentially, is that an adjudication in a habeas proceeding is complete, for all purposes, state and federal. Nevertheless, as Judge Wilkinson of the Fourth Circuit writing in dissent stated, the Full Faith and Credit statute “requires federal courts to
give ‘not some, but full credit’ to state judicial proceedings,” United States v. Jones, 907 F.2d 456, 483 (4th Cir.1990) (Jones I) (Wilkinson, J., dissenting) (quoting Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32, 40, 59 S.Ct. 3, 6, 83 L.Ed. 26 (1938)), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1029, 111 S.Ct. 683, 112 L.Ed.2d 675 (1991), and:
Federal court invalidation of a state conviction — even if it lacks collateral legal consequences within the state — constitutes a major affront to the integrity of the state’s judicial process.
Id. at 479. An adjudication of invalidity for sentencing purposes only, is no less a failure to accord the state judgment full faith and credit, and it is no less an insult to the jurisdiction of the state court:
State convictions are either valid or they are invalid. They are not valid for some purposes, but invalid for others. They are not valid in the eyes of the state judiciary, but invalid in the eyes of the federal system.
Id. To which I would add, nor can they be invalid in one federal sentencing court and valid in another. There is, in my judgment, no such thing as “limited” federal constitu*1056tional invalidity. What the court has approved for this circuit is a violation of the plain language of the Full Faith and Credit statute.
There is yet another disturbing aspect of the formula the court has approved today. Running through the plurality opinion is the notion that when a sentencing court determines that a prior state conviction should not be “counted” in the federal sentence for federal constitutional reasons, there will be no “adjudication” of constitutional invalidity in a judgment recording that conclusion, but merely a “determination” to “disregard” the state conviction. The “disregard[ed] evidence” of the state conviction is to be treated much the same as any other sentencing evidence deemed “untrustworthy or unreliable.” See plurality op. at 1043. Indeed, the plurality opinion argues that I have misconstrued its holding when I declare that it has sanctioned the “invalidation” of state convictions by federal sentencing courts. According to the plurality opinion,., it merely has sanctioned the sentencing court’s authority to exercise its discretion and determine that certain information is not “trustworthy” enough and should not be considered when calculating a defendant’s offense level.11 Plurality op. at 1044.
That a presumptively valid state court judgment cannot be simply “disregard[ed]” as “untrustworthy or unreliable” would seem self-evident. The plurality opinion concludes that a federal sentencing court has the power to deem a prior state conviction “untrustworthy or unreliable” after the court has entertained a collateral attack on the constitutional validity of that prior conviction and after the court has determined that it is “unconstitutional.” To suggest that such reasoning does not result in a conclusion that the “disregarded” prior conviction is “invalidated” suggests semantic game playing. Presumably, federal sentencing courts “disregard” relevant evidence for reasons. When a sentencing court decides that a state conviction is “untrustworthy or unreliable” and will be “disregarded” because it was unconstitutionally obtained, the court has, of necessity, determined that the conviction is “invalid.” The idea that a federal judge who has entertained a challenge to the validity of a state conviction on federal constitutional grounds only, and then “disregards” the conviction because it is “untrustworthy or unreliable,” but not for the reason that it is constitutionally invalid, suggests judicial legerdemain taken to a new level. I am confident most district judges would eschew these linguistic gymnastics and “call it like it is.”
II.
The plurality opinion relies on United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 92 S.Ct. 589, 30 L.Ed.2d 592 (1972) and Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 88 S.Ct. 258, 19 L.Ed.2d 319 (1967), for its conclusion that because a sentencing judge must disregard evidence that is untrustworthy or unreliable, a “sentencing judge must have some discretion to entertain” a defendant’s first-time challenge to a prior conviction. Plurality op. at 1043. The Eleventh Circuit relies on Tucker and Bur-gett to support a different conclusion: that “the Constitution bars federal courts from using certain kinds of convictions at sentencing.” 12 United States v. Roman, 989 F.2d *10571117, 1119 (11th Cir.1993) (en banc). And the Ninth Circuit concludes that these Supreme Court cases require sentencing courts to entertain a defendant’s collateral attacks. United States v. Vea-Gonzales, 986 F.2d 321 (9th Cir.1993). But a careful examination of the facts and holdings of Tucker and Burgett reveals that neither case is applicable to the issue before us, for neither speaks to whether a sentencing court has the power to adjudicate the constitutional validity of a prior conviction.
Burgett was a direct appeal from state court proceedings in Texas. The issue before the Supreme Court involved the state court’s evidentiary ruling on the admissibility of certain evidence at trial. The defendant had been charged under Texas’s recidivist statute, which requires the state to specifically plead in the indictment and prove at trial the prior convictions that trigger the enhanced sentence. Under the statute, the jury determines whether the state has proven the prior convictions; however, the jury is not to consider the evidence of prior convictions when it determines the defendant’s guilt on the underlying charge. Prior to Burgett, the Supreme Court, in Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 87 S.Ct. 648, 17 L.Ed.2d 606 (1967), rejected the argument that, because Texas’s recidivist statute allowed information regarding a defendant’s prior convictions to go before the jury through the indictment or proofs, the statute was “fundamentally unfair” and violative of the Fourteenth Amendment. The defendant in Spencer had argued that allowing the jurors to hear this evidence was unduly prejudicial because it tended to -show the probability of guilt based on the prior convictions. The Court found, however, that the defendant’s interest in a fair trial was adequately protected by limiting instructions and by the judge’s discretion to limit or forbid the admission of evidence that is unduly prejudicial. Id. at 561, 87 S.Ct. at 652.
In Burgett, however, the Court found it an abuse of discretion to accept into evidence, as proof of a prior conviction, certified records indicating on their face that Burgett was not represented by counsel when he was convicted of the prior offense. The Supreme Court held:
The admission of a prior criminal conviction which is constitutionally infirm under the standards of Gideon v. Wainwright[, 372 U.S. 335, [83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799] (1963),] is inherently prejudicial and we are unable to say that the instructions to disregard it made the constitutional error “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” within the meaning of Chapmen v. California, 386 U.S. 18 [87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705] [(1967)].
Burgett, 389 U.S. at 115, 88 S.Ct. at 262 (footnote omitted). The Court was concerned with the prejudicial effect the “facially invalid” prior conviction might have on the guilt phase of the trial. Thus, Burgett does not even involve a sentencing issue, least of all a federal sentencing court’s authority to adjudicate the constitutionality of a prior conviction. Rather, it involves an evidentiary holding limiting the admissibility of evidence that would unfairly prejudice the jury’s determination of the defendant’s guilt. I do not understand why the plurality and so many of our sister circuits rely on a Supreme Court decision reviewing a state court’s evi-dentiary ruling as authority for the proposition that federal sentencing courts have the authority to entertain constitutional attacks on presumptively valid prior state convictions.
*1058Tucker does not speak to the issue before us either. Tucker involved Supreme Court review of a denial of a habeas corpus petition to vacate defendant’s sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. In Tucker, the Supreme Court held that section 2255 relief is appropriate if a defendant shows that his sentence was enhanced on the basis of a prior conviction that was later adjudicated constitutionally infirm because of lack of counsel. Tucker demonstrates that if a federal sentence is enhanced under the guidelines on the basis of a prior conviction that is subsequently adjudicated to be invalid, a defendant may seek habeas relief through a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 92 S.Ct. 589, 30 L.Ed.2d 592. The opinion does not, however, stand for the proposition that federal sentencing courts are authorized to adjudicate the validity of prior state convictions for sentencing purposes.
Judge Kennedy reads Tucker and Burgett as holding that “one has a constitutional right not to have a sentence enhanced by reason of an unconstitutional prior conviction.” Separate op. at 1064. She concludes that “[i]f one has such a constitutional right, there must be some forum where it can be enforced.” Id. Even if I were to agree that the dicta in Tucker and Burgett provides that there is a constitutional right to not have a sentence enhanced on the basis of an unconstitutionally obtained prior conviction, it does not necessarily follow that federal sentencing courts have the power to rule on the prior convietion’s validity. While Tucker and Burgett state that “ ‘[t]o permit a conviction obtained in violation of Gideon v. Wainwright to be used against a person either to support guilt or enhance punishment for another offense ... is to erode the principle of that case,’ ” plurality op. at 1043 (quoting Tucker, 404 U.S. at 449, 92 S.Ct. at 592-93), it must be remembered that defendant first must estab-. lish the constitutional invalidity of that prior conviction in an appropriate fomm. Congress has limited the district court’s power to entertain collateral attacks on state convictions and has established limited circumstances under which a district court is the appropriate forum for attacking the constitutional validity of a state court conviction.13 The question before us is whether a federal sentencing court is an appropriate forum to entertain such an attack when it applies the enhancement provisions of the sentencing guidelines. I conclude that it is not. Congress has not extended this power of collateral relief to federal sentencing courts when sentencing enhancement is pursuant to the sentencing guidelines.
III.
Although the plurality opinion claims that it does not locate the federal court’s authority to invalidate state convictions in the sentencing guidelines, the plurality relies upon the decisions of three circuits,14 all of which hold, either explicitly or by clear implication, that the sentencing guidelines are, in fact, the source of the district court’s authority.15 *1059Furthermore, McGlocklin and at least one of my colleagues also locate the federal sentencing court’s authority in the guidelines. Consequently, I shall now address that matter and explain why I believe this view is mistaken.
The United States Sentencing Commission has determined that a defendant’s “past criminal conduct is directly relevant” to sentencing. U.S.S.G. Ch. 4, Pt.A., intro, comment. As a result, the guidelines subject defendants with criminal histories to increased imprisonment terms by requiring federal sentencing courts to count defendants’ “prior sentences” when determining their criminal history category or “career offender” status.16 See U.S.S.G. §§ 4A1.1, 4B1.1. According to section 4A1.2 of the guidelines, a “prior sentence” is “any sentence previously imposed upon adjudication of guilt, whether by guilty plea, trial, or plea of nolo contendere, for conduct not part of the instant offense.” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(l).
Subsection (j) of section 4A1.2 refers to “Expunged Convictions’’ and provides that “[sentences for expunged convictions are not counted, but may be considered under § 4A1.3 (Adequacy of Criminal History Category).” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(j). As the past tense adjective “expunged” indicates, this section precludes a sentencing court from counting sentences for convictions that have been invalidated in previous proceedings. It does not, however, purport to establish any authority for a district court to entertain and resolve collateral challenges to prior convictions during the sentencing proceeding itself.
Interestingly, the circuits that have found that federal sentencing courts have the authority to invalidate state convictions in collateral proceedings do not rely upon the language of guideline section 4A1.2 alone. Instead, these courts rely on Application Note 6 to this section. Application Note 6 provides an explanation of what is meant by “Expunged Convictions.” Before November 1, 1990, this note was entitled “Invalid Convictions” and provided as follows:
Sentences resulting from convictions that have been reversed or vacated because of errors of law, or because of subsequently-discovered evidence exonerating the defendant, are not to be counted. Any other sentence resulting in a valid conviction is to be counted in the criminal history score. Convictions which the defendant shows to have been constitutionally invalid may not be counted in the criminal history score.... Nonetheless, any conviction that is not counted in the criminal history score may be considered pursuant to § 4A1.3 if it provides reliable evidence of past criminal activity.
U.S.S.G, § 4A1.2, comment, (n. 6) (1987) (emphasis added). Strangely, this note, in the first sentence, referred to “reversed or vacated” convictions, but, in the third sentence, referred to convictions “which the defendant shows to have been constitutionally invalid.”
Although the guideline itself refers to “expunged convictions” in the past tense, several courts, including this court, interpreted the third sentence of this Application Note 6 as authorizing federal sentencing courts to entertain collateral attacks on prior convictions and thus to determine, in the first instance, the validity of those convictions. See, e.g., Guthrie, 931 F.2d at 570-71 (9th Cir.); United States v. Bradley, 922 F.2d 1290, 1297 (6th Cir.1991); United States v. Edwards, 911 F.2d 1031, 1035 (5th Cir.1990); Jones I, 907 F.2d at 463 (4th Cir.). Consequently, these courts read “old” Application Note 6 in such a way as to substantially expand the plain meaning of guideline section 4A1.2(j); they read the application note to confer upon Article III courts powers the guideline provision does not address. This reading of the note is simply mistaken.
*1060The application notes are part of the Sentencing Commission’s commentary on the guidelines. As such, they may shed light on how the guidelines should be applied to particular fact situations, but they may not properly be read to alter the very meaning of the guidelines. See United States v. Bogas, 920 F.2d 363, 368 (6th Cir.1990). Section 4A1.2Q) simply'directs courts not to count “expunged convictions” in calculating a defendant’s criminal history category. It says nothing, explicitly or implicitly, about empowering district courts to entertain collateral attacks upon prior convictions at the sentencing hearing itself, and neither did its application note. Old Application Note 6 did nothing more than elaborate on what was meant by “expunged” convictions. It is remarkable, to say the least, that federal appellate courts would rely upon an explanatory background note to the sentencing guidelines as the source of authority for federal courts to adjudicate a state judgment of conviction invalid on federal constitutional grounds, even if only.for sentencing purposes.
Apparently, the Sentencing Commission also thought it remarkable, and in November 1990, amended the guidelines in a way that clearly revealed the error in this reading of old Application Note 6. The amendment eliminated the inconsistency between the past tense language of section 4A1.2(j) of the guidelines and the present tense language of the third sentence of Application Note 6. That note now refers to “Reversed, Vacated, or Invalidated Convictions” and provides, in relevant part, that “sentences resulting from convictions that a defendant shows to have been previously ruled constitutionally invalid are not to be counted.” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2, comment, (n. 6) (1990) (emphasis added).
As the language of the note now makes clear, section 4A1.2(j) precludes district courts from counting only those convictions that have been previously ruled constitutionally invalid. The note may no longer be interpreted, and indeed it never should have been, as authorizing federal sentencing courts to entertain collateral attacks of prior convictions. The Commission emphasized this point by adding the following background commentary to section 4A1.2: “The Commission leaves for court determination the issue of whether a defendant may collaterally attack at sentencing a prior conviction.” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2, comment, (backg’d.). But this corrective effort by the Sentencing Commission, rather than eliminating the problem, spawned an even more peculiar line of cases. A number of circuits have now read the thoroughly neutral statement in the background note — that “[t]he Commission leaves for court determination the issue of whether a defendant may collaterally attack at sentencing a prior conviction” — as a specific conferral of authority upon federal courts to invalidate state convictions. Quite aside from, this misreading of the note, it is surprising, at least to me, that federal courts, including this one, would continue to turn to a background note in the sentencing guidelines, particularly after the 1990 amendments, to locate the source of authority for federal courts to adjudicate the validity of state court convictions at sentencing hearings. A less likely repository of federal court authority to adjudicate a federal constitutional issue would be hard to imagine.
Nevertheless, the Second, Third, and Fifth Circuits, in analyzing the 1990 version of Application Note 6 and the background commentary to section 4A1.2 of the guidelines, have concluded that, under the guidelines, federal sentencing courts have been left the discretion to entertain collateral attacks on prior convictions. See United States v. Brown, 991 F.2d 1162 (3d Cir.1993); United States v. Canales, 960 F.2d 1311 (5th Cir.1992); United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 113 S.Ct. 104, 121 L.Ed.2d 63 (1992). In so doing, these courts made the same error as those courts that interpreted old Application Note 6 as authorizing federal district courts to entertain collateral attacks of prior convictions. They relied on a background comment to the guidelines for a grant of authority to federal courts that the guidelines do not and cannot make. They attributed to the Sentencing Commission authority it does not have and, indeed, never claimed to have.
In Mistretta, 488 U.S. 361, 109 S.Ct. 647 the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional*1061ity of the Sentencing Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3551, et seq., which established the Sentencing Commission and authorized the sentencing guidelines. The Court found the Act constitutional partly because the Act does not grant the Commission excessive legislative discretion in violation of the constitutionally based nondelegation doctrine. The Court found that although Congress granted the Commission substantial discretion in formulating guidelines, Congress nevertheless legislated and delineated “ ‘the general policy, the public agency ..., and the boundaries of [the] delegated [sentencing] authority.’ ” Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 373, 109 S.Ct. at 655 (citation omitted). Congress cannot and has not delegated general legislative duties to the Sentencing Commission. Id. at 372, 109 S.Ct. at 654-55. The Act delegates to the Commission only those sentencing powers that were exercised previously by the judiciary as an aggregate. Id. at 367, 109 S.Ct. at 652.
Under the Sentencing Reform Act, it is appropriate for the Commission to make the policy judgment that it will require federal courts to consider prior convictions and to enhance sentences accordingly. But this does not mean that the Commission also has the power to grant courts the discretion to invalidate presumptively valid prior state convictions. As discussed earlier, the Constitution and Congress limited a federal court’s power to entertain collateral attacks on state convictions. As explained earlier, allowing first-time collateral attacks on prior convictions at federal sentencing hearings does not comport with the Full Faith and Credit statute. If the Commission “authorizes” such attacks, it is attempting a partial repeal of section 1738, and any partial repeal of section 1738 is a legislative act that goes beyond the delegated authority of the Commission.
A proper reading of the background note 6 reveals that the Sentencing Commission is well aware of the limits on its authority and has not attempted to “authorize” collateral attacks on prior state convictions. Nothing in the background commentary to guideline section 4A1.2 confers upon district courts the “discretion” to entertain collateral attacks upon prior convictions. The courts that have found that it does, seem to read the sentence, “The Commission leaves for court determination the issue of whether a defendant may collaterally attack at sentencing a prior state conviction,” as meaning “The Commission authorizes district courts, at sentencing, to determine the constitutionality of prior state court judgments.” This reading is not warranted either by the plain language of the guidelines and the note, or by elemental principles of federal jurisdiction.
A plain English reading of the note reveals an acknowledgement that the entire issue is “for court determination.” The Commission’s statement is a neutral observation and adopts no position on the matter in deference to the authority of Article III courts to resolve the issue. It is merely an observation by the Commission that the guidelines, including the background commentary notes, have nothing to say about the courts’ authority in the matter and that, therefore, it is for the courts to define that authority. The background commentary to section 4A1.2 means exactly what it says. The Commission members who amended the background note in 1990 must wonder what more they can do to make it clear that the note does not confer upon federal courts authority that the guideline itself does not purport to confer.17
*1062IV.
Despite the several reasons discussed for concluding that there are insurmountable constitutional and statutory barriers to permitting federal sentencing courts to invalidate state convictions for sentencing purposes, the majority of my colleagues do not agree. Their contrary view now becomes the law of this circuit. For that reason alone, it now becomes appropriate to explain why, even if I were to agree that district courts have authority to adjudicate the validity of state convictions at sentencing hearings, the criteria for exercising this “discretionary authority,” as apparently approved by the plurality opinion, is patently unfair.
Although it is not entirely clear, the plurality opinion seems to approve the criteria set forth by the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Jones, 977 F.2d 105 (4th Cir.1992) (Jones II), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 113 S.Ct. 1335, 122 L.Ed.2d 719 (1993), for determining whether a sentencing court should exercise its discretion to entertain a constitutional challenge to a state conviction. Those criteria are concerned primarily with the method of proof to be employed in presenting such challenges and the time likely to be consumed in considering them. In my judgment, the criteria that comprise the formula are flawed, and their likely effect is unfair.
Although not explicitly adopting the Jones II formulation, the plurality opinion cites repeatedly to Jones II and specifically adopts the Jones II requirement that “[t]o challenge the proposed use of prior conviction for sentencing purposes,” the defendant must state, inter alia:
“[T]he anticipated means by which proof of invalidity will be attempted — whether by documentary evidence, including state court records, testimonial evidence, or combination — with an estimate of the process and the time needed to obtain the required evidence.”
Plurality op. at 1045 (quoting Jones II, 977 F.2d at 110). The plurality opinion then gives an example of “a challenge that a court should entertain,” plurality op, that is comparable to the kind approved in Jones II, one in which the method of proof is documentary evidence. The plurality opinion does not, however, give an example, as Jones II does, of the kind of case in which “a discretionary decision not to entertain the proposed challenge obviously would be justified.” Jones II, 977 F.2d at 110. Still, the plurality’s repeated citation to Jones II, its adoption of specific language from that case requiring the court to focus on the method of proof and the time to be consumed in entertaining the proposed challenge, and its statement that “the types of proof that will be offered,” plurality op (emphasis added), are important, strongly suggest that sentencing courts of this circuit are invited to apply the criteria spelled out in Jones II when determining whether to entertain a challenge to prior convictions.18
In Jones II, two paragraphs after the portion of 977 F.2d at 110 cited in the plurality opinion, the Fourth Circuit stated that a district court should be hesitant to entertain a challenge where it is
identified [as] one dependent upon proof of historical facts likely to be in dispute; the forecast means of proof is by testimonial evidence from witnesses not yet located or verified; the dispositive facts relate to events distant in time and place; and the estimate of time required to obtain proof indicates a protracted delay in imposing sentence....
Jones II, 977 F.2d at 110. Under this formula, a defendant who has a legitimate challenge to the constitutionality of a prior state *1063conviction that could be used to compute his sentencing guidelines base offense level will have no right to obtain an adjudication by the sentencing court. Rather, whether his constitutional challenge is resolved is a matter within the sentencing court’s discretion. And that discretion is to be exercised by the district court by determining not the force and quality of the defendant’s proposed evidence, but whether the issue will be close, the proofs testimonial rather than documentary, the hearing “protracted” instead of brief, and whether the “call” is easy rather than difficult. See id. If the “forecast” of the proofs suggests that the invalidity of the state conviction can be proved quickly and easily through “court records or transcripts ... documenting] the facts,” the challenge “should [be] entertain[ed].” Plurality op. However, the district court will be expected to refuse to hear the matter if: 1) the defendant’s claim is dependent upon “proof of historical facts likely to be in dispute”; 2) the proofs will be testimonial rather than documentary; 3) the facts “relate to events distant in time and place”; or 4) the proposed proofs portend “a protracted delay in imposing sentence.” Jones II, 977 F.2d at 110. The Fourth Circuit’s Jones II opinion, which the plurality has cited with approval, goes so far as to declare that if the proposed proofs of the invalidity of the prior conviction depend solely upon “the self-serving testimony of the defendant,” the district court would be “well within its discretion in declining to allow the challenge to proceed further.” Id. at 111. What an extraordinary commentary by a federal court concerning the status of the sworn testimony of an accused, even a convicted accused awaiting sentence. This, in so far as I know, is the only instance in which a United States district court will have discretion to close the courthouse doors to a federal constitutional challenge for reasons primarily related to the court’s convenience.
It is a hybrid procedure unheard of in federal trial practice prior to Jones II. It is one in which only in the most unusual and extraordinary case will a defendant, challenging the validity of a prior state conviction, be able to prove his claim, or even mount a justiciable challenge, through “court records or transcripts ... documenting] the facts,” without resort to testimonial evidence and do so quickly enough that there will be no “protracted delay in imposing sentence.”
Since the plurality opinion does not explicitly mandate district courts to employ the Jones II formulation, I trust that district judges in this circuit will find more substantial grounds for deciding whether they “should entertain” challenges to the use of prior convictions in determining guidelines sentences.
V.
To summarize, under the Constitution and the Full Faith and Credit statute, as well as elemental notions of comity, federalism, and respect for state courts, a federal court has no “inherent power” to rule on the validity of a presumptively valid state conviction for guideline sentencing purposes. But even if there were such authority, the formula for district courts to determine whether to exercise it, as described and approved in the plurality opinion, is unfair and the relief it offers is illusory.
VI.
Despite my disagreement with most of what my colleagues have decided, I agree, of course, that the district court erred in holding “invalid” McGlocklin’s two state convictions.

. See United States v. Brown, 991 F.2d 1162 (3d Cir.1993); United States v. Canales, 960 F.2d 1311 (5th Cir.1992); United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S.-, 113 S.Ct. 104, 121 L.Ed.2d 63 (1992).

. The Eighth Circuit initially concluded that Application Note 6 "forbids collateral attacks on prior convictions used to compute a defendant's criminal history score under the Guidelines.” United States v. Day, 949 F.2d 973, 980 (8th Cir.1991) (emphasis added). Recently, the Eighth Circuit added the following exception: "except when the Constitution requires that a collateral attack at sentencing be permitted.” United States v. Elliott, 992 F.2d 853, 856 (8th Cir.1993).

. See United States v. Roman, 989 F.2d 1117 (11th Cir.1993) (en banc); United States v. Vea-Gonzales, 986 F.2d 321 (9th Cir.1993).

. Specifically, United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 92 S.Ct. 589, 30 L.Ed.2d 592 (1972) and Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 88 S.Ct. 258, 19 L.Ed.2d 319 (1967).

. Relying on Burgett, the First Circuit recently held that "the Constitution requires a review of the constitutionality of prior convictions at sentencing only where the prior convictions are 'presumptively void.’" United States v. Isaacs, No. 92-2129, 1993 WL 210537 (1st Cir. June 22, 1993). The Ninth Circuit relied on Burgett and Tucker to hold that the United States Constitution requires that federal sentencing courts give defendants an opportunity to collaterally attack pri- or convictions that will be used against them at sentencing, a view adopted by my colleague Judge Martin. United States v. Vea-Gonzates, 986 F.2d 321 (9th Cir.1993). I am relieved to note that the plurality opinion rejects this "approach.” Plurality op. at 1041. As discussed in section II, the plurality opinion relies on Burgett and Tucker to support a different conclusion.

. In Chambers, the Supreme Court outlined the scope of the district court's limited "inherent authority,” noting that "inherent powers must be exercised with restraint and discretion”:
It has long been understood that “[cjertain implied powers must necessarily result to our Courts of justice from the nature of their institution,” powers "which cannot be dispensed with in a Court, because they are necessary to the exercise of all others.” For this reason, "Courts of justice are universally acknowledged to be vested, by their very creation, with power to impose silence, respect, and decorum, in their presence, and submission to their lawful mandates.” These powers are "governed not by rule or statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.”
Id. (citations omitted). Thus, a district court has "inherent power” "to control admission to its bar and to discipline attorneys who appear before it”; to punish for contempt; “to vacate its own judgment upon proof that a fraud has been perpetrated upon the court”; to "bar from the courtroom a criminal defendant who disrupts a trial”; to dismiss a suit for forum non conve-niens; or to dismiss sua sponte an action on the basis of failure to prosecute. Id. (citations omitted).

. Article III states in pertinent part:
Section 1. The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. ...
Section 2. The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority; — to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls; — to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; — to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party; — to Controversies between two or more States;— between a State and Citizens of another State; — between Citizens of different States;— between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
U.S. Const., art. Ill, §§ 1, 2.

. This court has held that the mandatory protections of 21 U.S.C. § 851 apply only to the statutory enhancement provisions of 21 U.S.C. § 841 and not to the enhancement provisions of the sentencing guidelines. United States v. Meyers, 952 F.2d 914, 919 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1695, 118 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992).
Section 851 provides in pertinent part:
(c)(1) If the [defendant] denies any allegation ... of prior conviction, or claims that any conviction alleged is invalid, he shall file a written response.... The court shall hold a hearing to determine any issues raised by the response which would except the person from increased punishment.... The hearing shall be before the court ... and either party may introduce evidence....
(2) A person claiming that a conviction alleged in the information was obtained in violation of the Constitution of the United States shall set forth his claim, and the factual basis therefor, with particularity in his response....
(d)(2) If the court determines ... that a conviction alleged in the indictment is invalid ..., the court shall, at the request of the United States attorney, postpone sentence to allow an appeal from that determination.
21 U.S.C. § 851.

. This exhaustion of remedies requirement is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b):
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, or that there is either an absence of available State corrective process or the existence of circumstances rendering such process ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner.

. "No person who stands convicted of an offense under this part may challenge the validity of any prior conviction alleged under this section which occurred more than five years before the date of the information alleging such prior conviction.” 21 U.S.C. § 851(e).

. Judge Martin’s opinion observes that district courts have always had the discretion to determine the validity of prior state convictions, even prior to the enactment of the Sentencing Reform Act. I disagree. Prior to the guidelines, sentences were, for the most part, unreviewable, and district courts were not required and usually did not identify what evidence was influential in the sentence calculus. Nevertheless, if a district court determined that a sentence should not be determined by taking into account a prior state conviction because the court decided the prior conviction was unconstitutional, this constituted a violation of the Full Faith and Credit statute. However, because the district courts did not ordinarily specify on the record that this was the reason for not increasing the sentence, such a determination would not have been subject to review.
Although, prior to the guidelines, a district court had the discretion to "disregard” a prior conviction, that does not mean that the district court had authority to adjudicate the constitutional validity of that prior conviction. Even before the guidelines, federal courts had the power to rule on the constitutional validity of prior state convictions only when Congress specifically authorized it.

. The Eleventh Circuit sitting era banc held that the 1990 version of note 6 does not authorize collateral review of prior convictions at federal *1057sentencing hearings; rather, it recognizes that the Constitution prohibits federal courts from using "presumptively void” convictions to enhance a defendant’s sentence. United States v. Roman, 989 F.2d 1117 (11th Cir.1993) (en banc). Recently, the First Circuit adopted this view. See Isaacs, 1993 WL 210537.
Although it is not entirely clear what "presumptively void" means, none of the cases before this en banc court involve convictions that are "presumptively void” or “facially invalid.” Therefore, I would leave for another day the determination whether a district court must disregard a prior conviction that is "invalid on its face." One should not be too quick to conclude that it can be determined from the face of court documents alone that a conviction is invalid. For example, even if the court documents indicate on their face that the defendant was not represented by counsel, it may be that counsel was waived, and that evidence outside the court documents would establish that the conviction is valid.

. E.g., habeas corpus and other forms of collateral relief that have been specifically-legislated. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 851 discussed supra at I-B.

. United States v. Brown, 991 F.2d 1162 (3d Cir.1993); United States v. Canales, 960 F.2d 1311 (5th Cir.1992); United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 113 S.Ct. 104, 121 L.Ed.2d 63 (1992).

. In United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786, 805 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 104, 121 L.Ed.2d 63 (1992), the Second Circuit stated:
[T]he newly revised version of the guidelines clarifies the commission’s position on defendants’ direct challenges to the validity of prior convictions at sentencing: while defendants may always present the sentencing court with evidence that another court has ruled their prior convictions invalid and hence unsuitable for consideration ..., the court also retains discretion to determine whether a defendant may mount an initial challenge to the validity of such convictions.
(Emphasis added.) Similarly, in United States v. Canales, 960 F.2d 1311, 1315 (5th Cir.1992), the Fifth Circuit determined "that the sentencing guidelines authorize a district court, in its discretion, to hear constitutional challenges to prior convictions ... not previously ... ruled invalid" and stated:
We now hold, in accord with the interpretation taken by the Second ... Circuit[ ], that application note 6 allows a district court, in its discretion, to inquire into the validity of prior convictions at sentencing hearings.
(Emphasis added.) Most recently, in United States v. Brown, 991 F.2d 1162, 1166 (3d Cir. *10591993), the Third Circuit held that "the background note was meant to say that the courts should work out their own procedural rules regarding efforts by defendants to challenge convictions not previously held unconstitutional.” Thus, the Brown court adopted the view of other circuits that “have reached the conclusion that [the guideline] provisions give sentencing courts the discretion to consider or to refuse to consider attacks on prior convictions not previously ruled unconstitutional." Id. (emphasis added).

. Section 4A1.1 of the sentencing guidelines provides for the calculation of a defendant's criminal history category based on "prior sentences” imposed on the defendant, and section 4B1.1 provides enhanced sentences for a defendant who qualifies as a "career offender."

. In yet another attempt to clarify its intent with regard to the issue before us, the Sentencing Commission recently submitted to Congress a proposed amendment to section 4A1.2's commentary. See 58 Fed.Reg. 27148-27160 (May 6, 1993) (Amendment 20). Amendments intended to clarify an existing guideline "should be given substantial weight in determining the meaning of the existing guideline.” United States v. Luster, 889 F.2d 1523, 1529 (6th Cir.1989).
The amendment to the commentary deletes that portion of the background note indicating that the "Commission leaves for court determination the issue” whether a first-time collateral attack on a prior conviction is permitted at sentencing. The amendment also changes the language of Application Note 6 to read:
Sentences resulting from convictions that (A) have been reversed or vacated because of errors of law or because of subsequently-discovered evidence exonerating the defendant, or (B) have been ruled constitutionally invalid in a prior case, are not to be counted. Nonetheless, the criminal conduct underlying any conviction that is not counted in the criminal history *1062score may be considered pursuant to § 4A1.3 (Adequacy of Criminal History Category).
With respect to the current sentencing proceeding, this guideline or commentary does not confer upon the defendant any right to attack collaterally a prior conviction or sentence beyond any such rights otherwise recognized in law (e.g., 21 U.S.C. 851 expressly provides that a defendant may collaterally attack certain pri- or convictions).
Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the amendment supports my reading of the current commentary.

. The plurality opinion recognizes, as I do, that Jones II appears to have been modified by United States v. Byrd, 995 F.2d 536 (4th Cir.1993), as to the bases of these collateral challenges, but not as to the procedural and evidentiary criteria to be applied in deciding whether to entertain them.