Court Opinion

ID: 9381311
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-22 17:03:56.321181+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:31.538969
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE                                      )
                                                       )
               v.                                      )      I.D. #1602015453A/B
                                                       )
                                                       )
RONALD B. JACKSON,                                     )
                                                       )
Defendant.                                             )

                                 Date Submitted: March 10, 2023
                                  Date Decided: March 17, 2023

                    ORDER DENYING RONALD B. JACKSON’S MOTION
                        TO CORRECT AN ILLEGAL SENTENCE

       This 17th day of March, 2023, upon consideration of the Motion for Correction of an

Illegal Sentence (the “Rule 35 Motion”) filed by Ronald B. Jackson; the letter, dated March 10,

2023, from Samuel B. Kenney to the Honorable Eric M. Davis (the “Response”); Rule 35(a) of

the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure (“Criminal Rule 35(a)”); the facts, arguments

and legal authorities set forth in the Rule 35 Motion; and, the entire record in this case:

       1.      On February 13, 2016, Mr. Jackson was at the apartment of Tyrone Roberts. The

two had a dispute. Mr. Roberts called 911 and reported that Mr. Jackson threatened to kill him

and fired a gun at him inside the apartment. Mr. Jackson did not dispute that he was at the

apartment, but claimed the apartment already had a bullet hole in a window, a shot occurred

outside, Mr. Roberts was high on PCP and accused Mr. Jackson of trying to kill him. Around

this same time, WPD officers wearing body cameras were on patrol nearby and heard a shot. The

officers saw Mr. Jackson in the area gave chase. Mr. Jackson ran back toward the apartment

where he was eventually apprehended on the exterior stairway. While pursuing Mr. Jackson,

the officers observed Mr. Jackson throw something that appeared to be a gun and they later

recovered a handgun in that area. Mr. Jackson testified that he was not the man they saw
running. The State did not recover fingerprints, DNA or gunshot residue from the gun. They

also did not recover discharged bullets or spent shell casings in the apartment.

        2.       The State charged Mr. Jackson with Possession of a Firearm by a Person

Prohibited (PFBPP), Possession of Ammunition by a Person Prohibited (PABPP), Carrying a

Concealed Deadly Weapon (CCDW), Receiving a Stolen Firearm, Aggravated Menacing,

Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony (PFDCF) (2 counts), Reckless

Endangering First Degree, Offensive Touching, Criminal Mischief, Resisting Arrest and

Criminal Impersonation. The Court granted a motion to sever the PFBPP and PABPP charges

and the remaining case proceeded to a jury trial.1

        3.       On or about November 17, 2016, the jury found Mr. Jackson guilty of all

remaining charges. After a bench trial, the Court found Mr. Jackson guilty of the “person

prohibited” charges. The Court then ordered a pre-sentence investigation and set a sentencing

date. On February 17, 2017, the Court granted the State’s Motion to Declare Mr. Jackson an

Habitual Offender. The Court then sentenced Mr. Jackson to a total of 60 years at Level V,

suspended after 35 years. Mr. Jackson appealed, and the Supreme Court affirmed his

conviction.2

        4.       Thereafter, Mr. Jackson sought post-conviction relief under Criminal Rule 61.

Mr. Jackson contended that his trial counsel was ineffective by: (i) failing to properly investigate

the scene; (ii) failing to effectively discredit the victim; (iii) failing to effectively challenge the

1
  The State entered a nolle prosequi on the Receiving Stolen Firearm charge and the Court dismissed the Offensive
Touching charge.
2
  Jackson v. State, 2018 WL 936845 (Del. Feb. 16, 2018).

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ShotSpotter evidence; and (iv) making cumulative errors. No claims were made as to trial

counsel and sentencing. The Court denied that relief on June 22, 2020.3

        5.       Pursuant to Criminal Rule 35(a), the Court may “correct an illegal sentence at any

time and may correct a sentence imposed in an illegal manner within [90 days after the sentence

is imposed.]”4 While the rule permits the Court to correct an illegal sentence at “any time,” the

Court may only correct a sentence imposed in an illegal manner within the time provided for

reduction of sentence under Criminal Rule 35(b) – i.e., 90 days after the sentence is imposed.5

The intent of Criminal Rule 35(b) has historically been to provide a reasonable period for the

Court to consider alteration of its sentencing judgments.6 A sentence is illegal when it exceeds

the maximum sentence authorized by law, violates double jeopardy, is ambiguous with respect to

the time and place to be served, is internally inconsistent, omits a term required by statute, is

uncertain as to its substance or is not authorized by the judgment of conviction.7

        6.       Mr. Jackson contends his sentence is illegal because the Court applied, as Mr.

Jackson defines 11 Del. C. § 4214 (“Section 4214”), the “new habitual” statute as opposed to the

“old habitual” statute. The “old habitual” statute was in effect from July 3, 2013 until July 18,

2016. The “new habitual” statute became effective on July 19, 2016. Mr. Jackson’s criminal

acts occurred on February 23, 2016.

        7.       Mr. Jackson argues the Court’s application of the “new habitual” Section 4214

makes his sentence illegal. Mr. Jackson claims that the Court should have used the “old

habitual” Section 4214 that applied on February 23, 2016.

3 State v. Jackson, 2020 WL 3428971 (Del. Super. June 22, 2020).
4
  Super. Ct. Crim. R. 35(a).
5
  Winn v. State, 716 A.2d 975 (Del. 1998) (Table).
6
  Johnson v. State, 234 A.2d 447, 448 (Del. 1967)(per curiam).
7
  See, e.g., Monroe v. State, 843 A.2d 696 (Del. 2004) (Table); Johnson v. State, 758 A.2d 933 (Del. 2000) (Table).

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        8.       The Court has reviewed the Rule 35 Motion and the Response. In the Response,

the State argues that Mr. Jackson’s sentence is not illegal whether the “new habitual” statute is

applied or the “old habitual” statute is applied. The Court agrees.

        9.       The Court found that Mr. Jackson qualified as a habitual offender because he was:

(i) twice convicted of felonies, (ii) once convicted of a violent felony and (iii) recently convicted

for the violent felony of Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony. The

Court then held that Mr. Jackson’s sentencing fell within the provisions of 11 Del C. § 4214(c).

Clearly, the Court sentenced Mr. Jackson under the “new habitual” statute.8

        10.      The result would be no different under the “old habitual” statute. Under the “old

habitual” statute, the Court would have to find that Mr. Jackson qualifies as a habitual offender

because he was: (i) three times convicted of felonies, and (ii) recently convicted for the violent

felony of Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony.9 Under the “old

habitual” statute, the Court would then have to sentence Mr. Jackson to no less than 25 years at

Level V—i.e., “a minimum sentence which shall not be less than the statutory maximum penalty

provided for elsewhere in this title for the fourth or subsequent felony which forms the basis of

the State’s petition….”10

        11.      No additional information has been provided to the Court that would warrant a

reduction or modification of this sentence. As such, the sentence is appropriate for all the

reasons stated at the time of sentencing. In addition, the Court finds that the sentence is not an

illegal sentence as the sentence would be the same under pre-July 18, 2018 version of Section

4214 or the post-July 18, 2016 version of Section 4214.

8
   See Rule 35 Motion, Ex. 5.
9
   See Ayala v. State, 204 A.3d 829, 840 (Del. 2019); Rule 35 Motion, Ex. 3 (§4214(a)).
10
    Ayala, 204 A.3d at 840.

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       12.    Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, this Court finds that Mr. Jackson has

not demonstrated cause for the relief sought in the Rule 35 Motion.

       IT IS ORDERED that Ronald B. Jackson’s Motion for Correction of Illegal Sentence is

DENIED.

                                                           /s/ Eric M. Davis
                                                           Eric M. Davis, Judge

Original to Prothonotary:
cc:    Ronald B. Jackson (SBI#00275415)
       Samuel B. Kenney, Esq., DAG
       Investigative Services

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