Court Opinion

ID: 9669814
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:09:35.782594+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:00.405872
License: Public Domain

Brickley, J.
(concurring). As the majority notes, many state courts have addressed the question of the appropriate standard of care in sports injury cases. Ante at 81-83. Recently, most courts have held that, in order to state a cause of action, the plaintiff is required to allege that the defendant’s actions were either reckless or intentional. Id.) 55 ALR5th 529, 537. Three jurisdictions, Nevada, Wisconsin, and Arizona, explicitly judge sports injury cases according to the “ordinary care” standard. Auckenthaler v Grundmeyer, 110 Nev 682; 877 P2d 1039 (1994); Lestina v West Bend Mut Ins Co, 176 Wis 901; 501 NW2d 28 *96(1993); Estes v Tripson, 188 Ariz 93; 932 P2d 1364 (Ariz App, 1997).
This Court has twice held that the proper standard of care for sports injury cases is ordinary care. Felgner v Anderson, 375 Mich 23, 32, 56; 133 NW2d 136 (1965); Williams v Wood, 260 Mich 322; 244 NW 490 (1932). More recently, after this Court abolished the “assumption of risk” doctrine in Felgner, supra, panels of the Michigan Court of Appeals have held both that ordinary negligence is the proper standard of care, Schmidt v Youngs, 215 Mich App 222; 544 NW2d 743 (1996); Carey v Toles, 7 Mich App 195; 151 NW2d 396 (1967), and that recklessness is the proper standard of care, Higgins v Pfeiffer, 215 Mich App 423; 546 NW2d 645 (1996); Overall v Kadella, 138 Mich App 351; 361 NW2d 352 (1984).1
The majority now holds that the Court of Appeals in Higgins and Overall got it right: A participant in a sporting event owes a coparticipant a duty not to act recklessly. Ante at 89. One of the reasons advanced by the majority is evident in the following passage:
There are myriad ways to describe the legal effect of voluntarily participating in a recreational activity. The act of stepping onto the field of play may be described as “consent to the inherent risks of the activity,” or a participant’s knowledge of the rules of a game may be described as “notice” sufficient to discharge the other participants’ duty of care. Similarly, participants’ mutual agreement to play a game may be described as an “implied contract” between all the participants, or a voluntary participant could be described as “assuming the risks” inherent in the sport. No *97matter what terms are used, the basic premise is the same: When people engage in a recreational activity, they have voluntarily subjected themselves to certain risks inherent in that activity. [Id. at 86-87.]
The majority offers further, more succinct, advantages that it discerns in the recklessness standard:
We believe that this standard most accurately reflects the actual expectations of participants in recreational activities. . . . [W]e believe that participants in recreational activities do not expect to sue or be sued for mere carelessness. A recklessness standard also encourages vigorous participation in recreational activities, while still providing protection from egregious conduct. Finally, this standard lends itself to common-sense application by both judges and juries. [Id. at 89.]
None of the rationales advanced by the majority withstands scrutiny. The first group of reasons, quoted above, states in essence that the recklessness standard is appropriate because participants in recreational activities “assume the risk” of certain injuries. Not only is this a novel use of the assumption of risk doctrine (which was a complete bar to liability in tort), but, more importantly, it overlooks the fact that the assumption of risk doctrine was abrogated by this Court in Felgner. Furthermore, common sense dictates that none of the advantages of the recklessness standard that the majority cites actually support its conclusion.2 I believe that the majority is wrong in *98overruling this aspect of our holdings in Felgner and Wood.
i
I begin with the majority’s assertion that the recklessness standard “encourages vigorous participation in recreational activities.” Ante at 89; see id. at 82-83, quoting Ross v Clouser, 637 SW2d 11, 14 (Mo, 1982); Crawn v Campo, 136 NJ 494, 508; 643 A2d 600 (1994). This observation echoes the reasoning of an earlier case in this area: “the law should not place unreasonable burdens on the free and vigorous participation in sports by our youth,” Nabozny v Barnhill, 31 Ill App 3d 212, 215; 334 NE2d 258 (1975).
The flaw in this reasoning, at least as applied to the state of Michigan, is that this state has observed the more exacting “ordinary care” standard in sporting and recreational events at least since 1932, Williams, supra, and, despite this higher standard of care, there is no sign of any wane in the “vigorousness” of recreational sports in Michigan.3 Perhaps the majority *99would like to see even greater vigorousness in these activities, and plainly believes that the recklessness standard would serve this end. But, without any empirical evidence that participation or vigorousness in the state’s recreational sports and activities would reach even greater heights under the recklessness standard, this Court should not attempt any social engineering in this area by altering long-existing rules of tort law.
The majority assumes that its decisions regarding tort standards of care are relevant considerations for those deciding whether to participate in recreational activities. I have my doubts regarding this proposition.4 But, even if we accept it as true, the majority’s conclusion does not necessarily follow. Indeed, if participants in recreational activities have the legal foresight with which the majority credits them, it is just *100as likely that many would choose not to participate in these activities because the recklessness standard might encourage dangerous behavior or make it too difficult for participants to recover in the event they are injured. This heightened possibility of injury and unavailability of recovery would discourage vigorous participation, or any participation at all, by those who are less bold, or who might not want to take the financial risks presented by the possibility of injury.
These questions warn us that such policy issues are difficult for courts.5 Should we require that the parties submit statistical analyses of the increased or decreased participation in recreational sports in those jurisdictions that have adopted the negligence and recklessness standards? Should we commission a study on the comparative vigorousness of play in these jurisdictions? Should we compare the per capita incidence of sports injury litigation in different jurisdictions? In the absence of reliable evidence that the negligence standard actually has an effect on the participation in or the vigorousness of recreational activities, this Court should not overrule its precedent on the basis of such a policy judgment, particularly in light of this state’s longstanding policy that, “[w]here there is a person negligently injured by another, normally there is recovery therefor.” Williams v Polgar, 391 Mich 6, 11; 215 NW2d 149 (1974); see Parker v *101Port Huron Hosp, 361 Mich 1, 11; 105 NW2d 1 (1960) (“[N]ot only at the common law but also at the present time the general rule has been that one is liable for his negligence or tortious acts”).6
n
In Feigner, we stated that “[assumption of risk should not again be used in this State as a substitute for, or as a supplement to, or as a corollary of, contributory negligence .... The traditional concepts of contributory negligence are more than ample to present that affirmative defense to established negligent acts.” Id. at 56. Later, we noted that “the doctrine of contributory negligence has caused substantial injustice since it was first invoked in England in *1021809,” and replaced it with comparative negligence. Placek v Sterling Heights, 405 Mich 638, 652; 275 NW2d 511 (1979).7 Thus, juries are responsible for deciding the degree to which a plaintiffs negligence (including the assumption of the risk), contributed to an injury, and reducing the damage award accordingly.
The majority recognizes our abrogation of the doctrine of assumption of risk in Felgner. Ante at 78. More important, the majority properly notes that assumption of risk includes the doctrine of volenti non fit injuria, and that in light of Felgner, “[i]t is questionable whether this maxim retains any meaning in this state . . . .”8 Id. at 79, n 3. Regardless, the majority depends upon the notion of volenti non fit injuria to grant partial immunity to the defendant in this case: “When people engage in a recreational activity, they have voluntarily subjected themselves to certain risks inherent in that activity. When one of those risks results in injury, the participant has no ground for complaint.” Id. at 87. The majority’s statement is simply a paraphrasing of the maxim: “ ‘[T]o a willing person a wrong is not done.’ ” Id. at 79, n 3.9
*103Certainly, there is a sense in which assumption of risk has been recognized as surviving the adoption of contributory negligence schemes. This has been described as “primary assumption of risk,” or the “duty perspective” on assumption of risk. Prosser & Keeton, Torts (5th ed), § 68, pp 480-481.
[W]here the plaintiff voluntarily enters into some relation with the defendant, with knowledge that the defendant will not protect him against one or more future risks that may arise from the relation . . . [h]e may then be regarded as tacitly or impliedly consenting to the negligence, and agreeing to take his own chances. [Id. at 481.]
This is presumably the sense of “assumption of risk” that the majority means to invoke when it discusses “ ‘consent to the inherent risks of the activity,’ ”10 “ ‘notice’ sufficient to discharge the other participants’ duty of care,”11 or the “ ‘implied contract’ between all *104the participants.” Ante at 86-87; see id. at 82, quoting Turcotte v Fell, 68 NY2d 432, 437-439; 510 NYS2d 49; 502 NE2d 964 (1986).
This doctrine does not, however, support the majority’s result in this case.12 The plaintiff did not consent to any conduct of the defendant or the other participants in the free skate. The plaintiff’s implied consent in entering into this recreational activity is based upon the relationship that she entered into with her coparticipants. Prosser & Keeton, supra, pp 480-481. Since most recreational activities and sporting events have formal or informal rules regarding safety,13 we must assume that the plaintiff entered into this relationship with her coparticipants with *105knowledge of these rales, and the expectation that they would be obeyed. We cannot assume most participants in such activities consent to others’ behavior that is either accidentally or purposefully outside those safety rules.
Indeed, it would likely be a great surprise to the millions of participants in Michigan’s recreational sports and activities that, by participating, they were legally consenting to their coparticipants’ breach of the safety rules of those activities. One must wonder about the effect on the “vigorousness” of these sports, if it became common knowledge that this Count sanctioned breaches of these activities’ safely rules, as long as the breaches did not amount to recklessness.
The fact that such rules exist supplies a ready definition of the legal duties that participants in sporting activities must observe: Participants have a tort-enforceable duty to one another to obey the safety rules of the sport or activity. If a participant engages in conduct outside these rules, that participant has potentially breached her legal duty to her coparticipants, and the factfinder must determine whether her conduct was reasonable under the circumstances. Participants in a sporting or recreational activity consent to actions by their coparticipants that would not satisfy the strictures of “ordinary care” in everyday activity, but they do not consent to behavior unconstrained by the safety rules of the particular activity.
*106By participating in the open skate, the plaintiff in the instant case impliedly consented to the defendant’s backward skating, knowing that this was likely to be more dangerous than behavior that the plaintiff would encounter, for example, on a walk in her neighborhood. Cf. ante at 86-87. The parties agree, however, that one of the safety rules of free skating is that, while skating backward, the skater should periodically look behind her to see if she is going to run into anyone. Thus, the plaintiff consented to the heightened risk of the defendant’s behavior with the knowledge that the defendant would lessen that risk by periodically looking behind her as she was skating backward.
If the defendant was skating backward and obeying the safety rules by looking behind her, and then collided with the plaintiff, she cannot be held liable because she had no duty to behave more cautiously. Prosser & Keeton, supra at 481. If, however, the defendant ran into the plaintiff while she was skating backward and not periodically looking behind her, then she engaged in conduct that the plaintiff had not consented to, and can be held to have breached her duty toward the plaintiff if she did not act with reasonable care.14 Id.
*107Because there is no basis in fact or law for holding that participants impliedly consent to any behavior that is more dangerous than that allowed by the activity’s safety rules, primary assumption of risk is not a basis for holding that coparticipants in sporting activities have only the duty to refrain from acting recklessly. Id. This Court should not dash participants’ expectations by insisting, without reason, that their participation indicates their consent to more dangerous conduct.
m
Despite my disagreement with the majority’s reasoning, I reach its result because the plaintiff in this case submitted no evidence that the defendant breached any safety rules during free skating. The plaintiff has urged that the relevant rule of free skating is that “the skater has the responsibility for looking behind her when skating backward and should not rely upon others.” The only evidence in the record regarding whether the defendant did look behind her while skating backward, is the defendant’s deposition testimony:
Q. Now, when you skate backward are you able or do you attempt to look where you’re going by turning your head from one side to the other?
*108A. Yes.
Q. Do you feel that when you’re skating backward you can see everything behind you or is there some limitation in that?
A. Well, I would look and then the people that were facing me, like I was skating backwards this way and you would be facing me, you would say there’s people behind me.
Q. So you were depending somewhat on the person that was skating forward to let you know if someone was behind you?
A. Yeah, I would check and they told me. [Emphasis supplied.]
While it is clear that the defendant partially relied on those skating with her to warn her about other skaters, she also unambiguously stated that she “looked” or “checked” behind her. Thus, there is no basis on which to say that she violated any safety rales of the free skate, and no basis for finding that she violated any duty that she owed to the plaintiff.15 MCR 2.116(C)(10). The trial court properly granted her motion for summary disposition, and, like the majority, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Cavanagh and Kelly, JJ., concurred with Brickley, J.

 As the msyority notes, the msyority of the Court of Appeals panel in Higgins (and the panel in Overall) “seemed to ignore the fact that this Court had already articulated an ‘ordinary care’ standard in Williams, supra.” Ante at 80, n 4.

 For example, it is not at all apparent why the recklessness standard “lends itself” more to “common-sense application by both judges and juries” than does the ordinary negligence standard, which looks to whether the defendant’s conduct was reasonable under the circumstances. See n 14; cf. ante at 89.

 For example, the state Department of Natural Resources estimates that there are one million hunters and fur harvesters in Michigan, and as many as two million anglers. Michigan Department of Natural Resources, Hunting and Fishing (last modified June 30, 1999) <http://www.dnr.state.mi.us/Dept/HuntFish/huntfish.asp>. Travel Michigan reports “nearly a million sailors, power boaters, and canoeists” on Michigan waters, Travel Michigan, Great Outdoors (visited June 30, 1999) <http://www.micMgan.org/outdoors.htm>, as well as the fact that MicMgan “builds and opens more [golf] courses than any other state.” Travel MicMgan, Golf in Michigan (visited June 30, 1999) <http://www.micMgan.org.golf.htm>.
Furthermore, the fact that MicMgan has observed the “ordMary care” standard in tMs area at least since 1932, Williams, supra, calls mto doubt any concern that, “ ‘[w]hen the number of atMetic events takmg place . . . over the course of a year is considered, there exists the potential for a surfeit of lawsmts when it becomes known that simple negligence, based on an madvertent violation of a contest rule, will suffice as a *99ground for recovery for an athletic injury.’ ” Ante at 85, quoting Jaworski v Kiernan, 241 Conn 399, 409-410; 696 A2d 332 (1997). Given that ordinary negligence has been the rule in Michigan for at least sixty-seven years, and there has not yet been any cry raised over “a surfeit” of sports injury cases, either Michiganders are exceptionally slow in discovering that “simple negligence . . . will suffice as a ground for recovery” in this area, or Michiganders are not nearly as litigious as some might fear. Regardless, we should not alter the ordinary negligence standard of care to stem excessive lawsuits in this area until it appears that such lawsuits are actually a possibility.

 In overturning the doctrine of charitable immunity, for example, this Court noted the observations of a federal court addressing the same issue:
“No statistical evidence has been presented to show that the mortality or crippling of charities has been greater in States which impose full or partial liability than where complete or substantially full immunity is given. Nor is there evidence that deterrence of donation has been greater in the former. Charities seem to survive and increase in both, with little apparent heed to whether they are liable for torts . . . .” [Parker v Port Huron Hosp, 361 Mich 1, 17; 105 NW2d 1 (1960), quoting President & Directors of Georgetown College v Hughes, 76 US App DC 123, 136; 130 F2d 810 (1942).]

 Further warning us is the fact that the Legislature, which has far greater access to the proper studies and statistics, has reinstated the assumption of risk doctrine with respect to sports accidents at roller rinks and ski resorts. MCL 408.342; MSA 18.483(22) (Ski Area Safety Act); MCL 445.1725; MSA 18.485(5) (Roller Skating Safety Act). The Legislature has not, however, reinstated assumption of risk in all sporting activities. This Court should not seek to fill the Legislature’s policy-making role without compelling reasons and sound explanations.

 Another relevant consideration is this Court’s abolition of charitable tort immunity and interfamily tort immunity, though both these rules are supported by more compelling policy rationales than encouraging the vigorousness of sports. In Parker, supra, we noted that Michigan courts have prohibited tort suits against charities since 1894, relying upon “public policy that benevolence should not be impaired by recovery of damages for torts of the employees of the charitable trust.” Id., p 13. The Parker Court held that this policy could not justify “ ‘the injured individual’s having to bear the loss wrongfully inflicted upon him ....’” Id., p 19, quoting President & Directors of Georgetown College v Hughes, n 4 supra, p 137.
We also overturned the rule that members of a family may not sue one another in tort. Plumley v Klein, 388 Mich 1; 199 NW2d 169 (1972). This rule was based on “ ‘the interest of the peace of the family and of society, and [was] supported by sound public policy.’ ” Id., p 5, quoting Elias v Collins, 237 Mich 175, 177; 211 NW 88 (1926). Such policy gave way, however, to the greater concern that those who are injured by negligent conduct be allowed to recover. Id.
In light of the abrogation of these rules, based upon the public policy of encouraging charitable giving and “the peace of the family and of society,” it seems strange to base partial tort immunity in sports injury suits on a desire to encourage vigorous recreational activities. Even if we accept as true that a recklessness standard would encourage vigorous participation in sports (again, a doubtful proposition), we must take note of this Court’s treatment of tort immunities based upon far more compelling rationales than this one.

 The Legislature has recently partially affirmed and partially overturned Placek, replacing “pure” comparative negligence with “hybrid” comparative negligence. MCL 600.2958, 600.2959; MSA 27A.2958, 27A.2959. Under this scheme, a plaintiff’s recovery is limited to economic damages if the degree of fault in causing the injury was greater than the aggregate fault of all others causing the injury. Id.

 A leading treatise on torts states that some courts “have been compelled to invent other names for [assumption of risk], such as ‘incurred risk,’ or ‘volenti non fit injuria.’ This appears to be largely a distinction without a difference; and most courts have made general use of the one term.” Prosser & Keeton, Torts (5th ed), § 68, p 480.

 The majority quotes at length from Chief Judge Cardozo’s oft-cited opinion in Murphy v Steeplechase Amusement Co, 250 NY 479, 482-483; 166 NE 173 (1929). Ante at 87. But this opinion is based upon the doc*103trine of assumption of risk, which, as the majority recognizes, has been abolished in Michigan. Felgner, supra. Indeed, immediately preceding the section quoted by the majority is the phrase “volenti non fit injuria,” Murphy, supra at 482, which, as already noted, the majority sees as probably not “retain[ing] any meaning” after Felgner. Ante at 79, n 3.

 Restatement Torts, 2d, § 50, comment b, p 86, is frequently cited as authority for the proposition that consent is an appropriate basis for heightening the standard of care in sports injury cases. See ante at 79. But consent, in this sense, is a privilege only to intentional invasions of person or property. See Restatement Torts, 2d, § 50, p 85 (“The rule stated in § 892[2] as to apparent consent to the invasion of an interest applies to the intentional invasion of interests of personality” [emphasis supplied]); 4 Restatement Torts, 2d, § 892A(1), p 364 (“One who consents to conduct of another intended to invade his interests cannot recover” [emphasis supplied]); Prosser & Keeton, supra, § 18, p 112 (“The problem discussed here is the meaning and effect of consent in relation to intentional interferences with person or property” [emphasis supplied]).

 The majority’s quotation of Feigner at this point, ante at 86, n 8, is the Feigner Court’s paraphrasing of the holding of an earlier English case that refused to impose liability for injuries inflicted by a spring gun that the plaintiff knew was on the premises. Id. at 36, citing Ilott v Wilkes, 3 B & Ald 304; 106 Eng Rep 674 (KB 1820). The Feigner Court did not rely on *104or approve this case, however. Indeed, it observed that the case had not been cited by earlier Michigan cases, and “assumefd] either that the Justices [in earlier decisions] did not approve of its principles or they thought it not pertinent.” Id. at 39. Despite this treatment by the Felgner Court, Ilott might be an early example of “primary” assumption of risk.

 Our analysis of “consent” is hampered by the fact that this word has been used to describe a number of different legal concepts. For example, consent is a defense to an action alleging an intentional tort, but such consent cannot be a defense to a tort sounding in negligence. See n 10. Indeed, the nearest thing to “consenting” to negligence is the doctrine of assumption of the risk, which was abrogated in Feigner as a defense in negligence actions.
The “consent” that I refer to is the only variety of consent that is viable under the facts of the instant case, and that is “primary assumption of risk,” as discussed above. Prosser & Keeton, supra at 481. The effect of primary assumption of the risk is to relieve the defendant of a legal duty to protect the plaintiff from the consented-to conduct; here, conduct that is within the safety rules of the particular sport. Id. at 496 (“[Assumption of risk in this form is really a principle of no duty, or no negligence, and so denies the existence of any underlying cause of action”).

 A formal safety rule would be a safety rule that is written into the rule books of a particular sport or activity, while an informal safety rule would be one that is widely recognized by participants in the absence of a formal rule. The parties in the instant case agree that the relevant safety rule of free skating is that a skater looks behind her when skating backward. This would presumably be an “informal” rule, as no rule book has been presented by the parties.
*105A “safety” rule, as opposed to a non-safety rule, is a rule that increases the safety of the sport or activity, rather than merely increasing the fairness or competitiveness of the activity. The parties to the instant case have agreed that the relevant safety rule of free skating is that a backward-skating participant should look behind her while skating backward; there is no basis for questioning whether this is a safety rule or not.

 It might be argued that this conduct would be reckless behavior under the circumstances. But there is far more room for disagreement about whether this behavior is “reckless” or “negligent,” than there is for disagreement about whether this behavior is outside the agreed-upon safety rules of the activity. Where the parties agree upon the applicable safety rule of a sport, or where the rule is written into a rule book, this determination will be particularly straightforward. Wdiere the parties disagree about the relevant safety rule, and reasonable minds could differ, a factual determination will be necessary. MCR 2.116(C)(10). Such a determination is certainly not beyond the capabilities of trial courts and juries in Michigan.
*107If the factfinder determines that the defendant’s conduct was within these rules, the case ends because the defendant had no legal duty to the plaintiff. If the trial judge or jury finds that the defendant’s conduct was outside the rules, an actionable duty exists. The trial would then continue to determine whether the defendant breached this duty by failing to use reasonable care under the circumstances. Thus, in contrast to the majority, I believe that the “ordinary care” standard that I propose is at least as susceptible to “common-sense application by both judges and juries” as is the recklessness standard. Cf. ante at 89.

 It is immaterial, for these purposes, that the defendant stipulated that questions of fact remain regarding whether she was negligent. As the above discussion makes clear, the plaintiff has not presented facts sufficient to maintain that the defendant owed her a tort-enforceable duty, and therefore summary judgment is appropriate.