Court Opinion

ID: 9945056
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-26 22:01:30.750247+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:21.530893
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-11392   Document: 58-1    Date Filed: 02/26/2024   Page: 1 of 12

                                                 [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                 In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                         ____________________

                               No. 23-11392
                         Non-Argument Calendar
                         ____________________

        JEROME VENTO,
                                                    Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
        versus
        JAYKANT R. PATEL,
        AUTO-OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY AND OWNERS
        INSURANCE COMPANY,
        Uninsured Motorist Insurance Carrier,

                                                Defendants-Appellees.
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        2                          Opinion of the Court                       23-11392

                                ____________________

                    Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Northern District of Georgia
                       D.C. Docket No. 1:22-cv-03181-MLB
                             ____________________

        Before JORDAN, LUCK, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
              Jerome Vento was injured when a negligent driver lost
        control and struck him on the road. After settling with the driver,
        Vento filed a complaint against the motorist insurance carrier of
        the underinsured motorist who struck his car. The district court
        dismissed Vento’s case for failure to perfect timely service, which
        he now appeals. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm.
            I.      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
               On December 26, 2019, Jaykant Patel drove negligently and
        lost control of his car, swerving into Vento’s car and causing Vento
        serious injuries. On April 4, 2022, 1 Vento sued Patel in Georgia

        1 Beginning on March 14, 2020, the Georgia Supreme Court entered several

        Judicial Emergency Orders tolling deadlines and statutes of limitations be-
        cause of the COVID-19 pandemic. See Ga. Sup. Ct. Admin. Order of Mar. 14,
        2020. The statute of limitations tolling was lifted on July 14, 2020. See Ga.
        Sup. Ct. Admin. Order of June 12, 2020, at 3. As a result, the applicable statute
        of limitations was extended for 122 days, ultimately lapsing on April 26, 2022.
        See id. at 4 (“The 122 days between March 14 and July 14, 2020, or any portion
        of that period in which a statute of limitations would have run, shall be ex-
        cluded from the calculation of that statute of limitation.”).
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        23-11392                Opinion of the Court                           3

        state court. Vento and Patel had agreed to a settlement, but the
        applicable insurance was insufficient to cover Vento’s injuries, so
        Vento also served (or tried to serve) the complaint on unnamed
        defendant Auto-Owners Insurance Company (“Auto-Owners”),
        which Vento believed to be his underinsured motorist insurance
        carrier.
                Auto-Owners and an affiliate called Owners Insurance
        Company (“Owners Insurance” and collectively, the “Insurance
        Companies”) removed the case to federal court. The Insurance
        Companies then moved to dismiss Vento’s complaint, claiming
        that Owners Insurance (not Auto-Owners) was the correct
        underinsured motorist carrier and advancing the following five
        main arguments. First, Vento failed to properly serve any
        defendant. Second, Vento had not served Patel, a necessary
        antecedent to recovery from the underinsured motorist carrier,
        and any further attempt to serve would be untimely. Third, Vento
        failed to demonstrate reasonable diligence in trying to serve on
        Auto-Owners. Fourth, Vento had not even tried to serve Owners
        Insurance and had therefore failed to exercise reasonable diligence
        as to that entity. And finally, in light of the failure to serve, Vento’s
        claims were barred by the statute of limitations.
               Vento responded to the motion to dismiss, insisting that
        “[d]espite a few hiccups,” he had acted diligently and did, in fact,
        timely serve Auto-Owners. He attached an affidavit from his
        counsel, David Baum (the “Baum Affidavit”), in which Baum
        attested that Vento acted with reasonable diligence in attempting
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        4                     Opinion of the Court                 23-11392

        to serve Auto-Owners in accordance with Georgia law, O.C.G.A. §
        33-11-7. In sum, the Baum Affidavit swore to the following facts:
                      After filing the Complaint, I sent a copy of the
              Summons and Complaint to the Gwinnett County
              Sheriff’s Department, requesting that the department
              serve the Complaint upon Auto Owners. When I
              checked the status of the service, I was told that the
              sheriff was in the process of making service.
                     However, after a few weeks passed, I again
              called the sheriff, and this time I was told that no
              service had been made AND that they could not find
              the check from my office. I was then forced to send a
              new copy of the Complaint and a new check to the
              Gwinnett Sheriff’s Department to effect service upon
              Auto Owners.
                     In the meantime, in order to exercise
              reasonable diligence in light of Gwinnett Sheriff’s
              failure to effect service, I began contacting the usual
              service of process company utilized by counsel, i.e.,
              Atlanta Legal Services. Unfortunately, there was a
              two-week delay [and] I was unable to contact Marc
              Allard, who coordinates service of process for Atlanta
              Legal Services. For two to three weeks, I sent Mr.
              Allard several calls and emails re: serving process on
              Auto Owners, to no avail.
                     However, as soon [as] I was able to reach
              Atlanta Legal Services, I hired the company to effect
              service upon Auto Owners. Several days later, I was
              contacted by Marc Allard, who informed counsel that
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        23-11392              Opinion of the Court                       5

              Atlanta Legal Services was not appointed in Gwinnett
              County.
                     As a result, I immediately filed a Motion to
              Appoint Atlanta Legal Services in the Gwinnett
              County State Court, asking to appoint a process
              server from Atlanta Legal Services. The Judge’s staff
              next contacted me and requested a resume for Atlanta
              Legal Services’ process server. As I was obtaining the
              resume, the Gwinnett County Sheriff successfully
              served Auto Owners with process of this lawsuit.
        All of this, Vento submitted, was evidence of diligence and reason
        to deny the motion to dismiss. Vento also disputed the Insurance
        Companies’ assertion that Owners Insurance, rather than Auto-
        Owners, was the proper defendant. Nevertheless, he requested
        that, should the district court find “that either Auto Owners or
        Owners Insurance must be named as parties, then [it should grant]
        an extension of thirty (30) days to do the same.” Vento likewise
        requested an extension of time to serve Patel, conceding that he
        had not done so and that he was legally barred, by a previous
        settlement agreement, from seeking further recovery from Patel.
        Vento argued that neither Patel nor the Insurance Companies
        would be prejudiced by such an extension because Patel did not
        face any potential liability and Auto-Owners (in Vento’s view) had
        already been served.
               In reply, the Insurance Companies responded that the Baum
        Affidavit amounted to two things: an acknowledgement that
        “there was only one attempt to physically serve Unnamed
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                23-11392

        Defendant Auto-Owners[,] . . . 99 days after filing the Complaint
        and 77 days after the expiration of the statute of limitations,” and
        an admission that, six months after the statute of limitations
        expired, Vento had never even tried to serve Patel.
               After full briefing, the district court entered an order
        dismissing Vento’s case without prejudice, which determined that
        dismissal was required because Vento failed to timely effectuate
        service. Applying Georgia law, which both parties agreed was
        appropriate, the district court explained that “a plaintiff generally
        must effectuate service within the statute of limitations for the
        service to count as timely.” Service outside of the limitations
        period, the district court stated, can only be considered timely
        where the plaintiff filed the complaint within the limitations period
        and either (1) a process server effectuated service within five days
        from the time he received the summons and complaint or (2) the
        plaintiff acted in a reasonable and diligent manner in attempting to
        ensure that proper service was made as quickly as possible.
               Under these rules, the district court found Vento had failed
        to timely serve any defendant. He had filed his complaint within
        the limitations period, which closed on April 26, 2022. But he had
        undisputedly not served anyone by that date. Nor had a process
        server served any defendant within five days of receiving the
        complaint and summons. And the court found that Vento had not
        shown that he diligently sought to perfect service as quickly as
        possible.
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        23-11392               Opinion of the Court                         7

                As evidence of diligence, the district court stated, Vento
        proffered only “a vague, two-page affidavit describing his efforts to
        serve Auto-Owners. . . . But this affidavit says nothing about
        Defendant [Patel] or Owners [Insurance], and lacks the kind of
        ‘specific dates and details’ required to show diligence.” The district
        court highlighted the flaws in greater detail, noting that the Baum
        Affidavit “does not include a single concrete date and its timeline is
        littered with generalized references to ‘few weeks,’ ‘[s]everal days,’
        ‘two to three weeks,’ ‘[i]n the meantime,’ and the like.” This
        limited information, the district court concluded—even if it were
        sufficiently specific—suggested that Vento did not act diligently.
                 The district court also found that Vento had still not
        attempted to serve Patel or Owners Insurance, even though eleven
        months had passed since he filed his complaint and seven months
        had passed since the Insurance Companies first raised the issue in
        their motion to dismiss. The district court also determined that
        Vento’s claimed ignorance of the law requiring him to serve Patel
        was no excuse and, again, suggested a lack of diligence. The district
        court also noted Vento’s confusion about which of the Insurance
        Companies held his underinsured motorist policy but explained
        that it was his obligation to investigate and that “[n]othing suggests
        this happened. Nothing with the requisite specificity, anyway.”
        For all these reasons, the district court dismissed Vento’s complaint
        without prejudice for insufficient service of process under Georgia
        law. In a footnote, the district court made two more observations.
        First, it observed that dismissal would be similarly warranted under
        federal law, since Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m) requires
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        8                         Opinion of the Court                23-11392

        service within 90 days. Second, “given the untimely service here,”
        the district court noted that Vento’s “complaint is almost certainly
        barred by the statute of limitations as well.”
               This timely appeal ensued.
                         II.      STANDARD OF REVIEW
               We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s dismissal
        without prejudice of a plaintiff’s complaint for failure to timely
        serve a defendant. Lepone-Dempsey v. Carroll Cnty. Comm’rs, 476
        F.3d 1277, 1280 (11th Cir. 2007). We also review for abuse of
        discretion a court’s decision about whether to grant an extension
        of time to serve. Id.
                When, as in this case, “a plaintiff fails to show good cause for
        failing to effect timely service pursuant to Rule 4(m)," the district
        court must still consider whether any other circumstances warrant
        an extension of time based on the facts of the case.” Id. at 1282. A
        district court must consider, for example, whether the running of
        the statute of limitations would bar the plaintiff from refiling his
        claims. See id. As long as the district court considers the statute of
        limitations, the expiration of the statute of limitations “does not
        require that the district court extend time for service of process
        under Rule 4(m).” Id.
                                    III.   ANALYSIS
               Although Georgia law requires a process server to effect
        service within five days of receipt of the complaint and summons,
        see O.C.G.A. § 9–11–4(c)(5), “it states no time limit within which a
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        23-11392               Opinion of the Court                         9

        plaintiff must seek service,” Arias v. Cameron, 776 F.3d 1262, 1269
        (11th Cir. 2015) (citing Ga. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Kilgore, 462
        S.E.2d 713, 715 (Ga. 1995)). So as long as service is perfected before
        the statute of limitations expires, “‘the mere time lapse’ between
        the date of filing and the date of service is not a valid basis for
        dismissal.” Ga. Farm Bureau., 462 S.E.2d at 715 (quoting Childs v.
        Catlin, 216 S.E.2d 360, 363 (Ga. Ct. App. 1975)).
               “Where service is made after the statute of limitation
        expires, ‘the timely filing of the complaint tolls the statute only if
        the plaintiff shows that he acted in a reasonable and diligent
        manner in attempting to [e]nsure that a proper service was made
        as quickly as possible.’” Lipscomb v. Davis, 783 S.E.2d 398, 399 (Ga.
        Ct. App. 2016) (alteration in original) (quoting Slater v. Blount, 408
        S.E.2d 398, 433 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991)). Additionally, “when the
        statute of limitation has expired, and a defendant raises the issue of
        defective service, the plaintiff must act with ‘the greatest possible
        diligence’ from that point forward in order to serve the defendant
        or risk dismissal of his case.” Id. (quoting Ingraham v. Marr, 540
        S.E.2d 652, 655 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000)).
               We conclude that the district court did not abuse its
        discretion in finding that Vento failed to timely serve. Vento was
        injured on December 26, 2019, and his statute of limitations lapsed
        on April 26, 2022 (including the 122-day extension because of
        Georgia’s COVID-19 Administrative Orders). He admittedly
        served no one—neither Patel nor the Insurance Companies—by
        that date. To save his case from dismissal, therefore, Vento needed
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                  23-11392

        to show that “he acted in a reasonable and diligent manner” to
        ensure proper service “as quickly as possible.” See id. And because
        the Insurance Defendants raised this service problem in their
        motion to dismiss back in September 2022, the bar was set even
        higher, requiring Vento to display “‘the greatest possible
        diligence’” from that point forward.” Id. (quoting Ingraham, 540
        S.E.2d at 644).
                Here, Vento showed the district court little evidence of
        diligence at all, let alone “the greatest possible diligence.” We
        agree with the district court’s finding that the Baum Affidavit is
        vague and superficial and lacking in the “dates or other specifics
        sufficient to gauge his effort.” Brown v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
        Co., 529 S.E. 2d 439, 441 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000). The Baum Affidavit
        is thin on details and replete with generalities like “there was a two-
        week delay,” “a few weeks passed,” and “for two to three weeks,”
        all undercutting Vento’s claim that he acted with reasonable
        diligence to effectuate service.
                We also conclude that the district court did not abuse its
        discretion in dismissing Vento’s complaint for failure to serve Patel
        and Owners Insurance. Vento does not dispute that he failed to
        serve Patel, evidenced by his request for an extension of time to do
        so. That alone is a dispositive issue because “absent sufficient
        service on the tortfeasor, a claimant cannot recover from his or her
        UM carrier.” Hayward v. Retention Alts. Ltd., 661 S.E.2d 862, 865
        (Ga. Ct. App. 2008), aff’d, 678 S.E.2d 877 (Ga. 2009); accord Barabont
        v. Villanueva, 584 S.E.2d 74, 77 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) (“[S]ervice on
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        23-11392                Opinion of the Court                         11

        the tortfeasor is a condition precedent for recovery against the
        uninsured motorist carrier.”).
                Nor are we persuaded that the district court erred in its
        treatment of Vento’s request for an extension of time to serve.
        First, we note a procedural misstep: Federal Rule of Civil
        Procedure 7(b) requires that any “request for a court order must be
        made by motion.” Vento, instead, imbedded his request for an
        extension of time to serve in his response to the Insurance
        Companies’ motion to dismiss. The request was, therefore, not
        properly before the district court in the first instance. See Herederos
        De Roberto Gomez Cabrera, LLC v. Teck Res. Ltd., 43 F.4th 1303, 1312
        n.4 (11th Cir. 2022) (“Herederos concedes that it ‘did not file a
        distinct and entirely independent motion to take jurisdictional
        discovery as it was required to’ [under Rule 7(b)].”), cert. denied, 143
        S. Ct. 736 (2023).
               In any event, the district court did acknowledge the request,
        specifically noting how Vento “claim[ed] he did not realize he
        needed to serve [Patel].” The district court also recognized that,
        given Vento’s failure to serve, his “complaint is almost certainly
        barred by the statute of limitations as well.” In other words, we
        cannot conclude that the district court failed to consider whether
        “any other circumstances warrant an extension of time based on
        the facts of the case.” Lepone-Dempsey, 476 F.3d at 1282. On the
        contrary, the district court expressly considered that the statute of
        limitations would “almost certainly” bar Vento’s claims and found
        no reason to grant him reprieve from that outcome.
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        12                    Opinion of the Court                 23-11392

               In summary, more than seven months lapsed between the
        time the Insurance Companies made Vento aware of the need to
        serve Patel and the time the district court dismissed the case, and
        the docket is devoid of any motion for extension of time or any
        other indication that Vento tried to serve Patel in the interim. Nor
        has Vento suggested any such efforts to us. Given the lack of
        diligence displayed in attempting to serve any party and Vento’s
        failure to proffer any reason why the time to serve Patel should be
        extended, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its
        discretion in granting an extension of time to serve.
                              IV.    CONCLUSION
               Because we hold that the district court did not abuse its
        discretion in dismissing Vento’s complaint for failure to timely
        perfect service, we affirm.
              AFFIRMED.