Court Opinion

ID: 9695521
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:21:38.713888+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:13.794660
License: Public Domain

Dooley, J.,
dissenting. I agree with Justice Johnson’s dissent and write separately to address the additional rationale cited by the Board for its decision. Appellee defended his conduct by stating that he had read in Corpus Juris Secundum some 5 or 10 years earlier that under circumstances like those present in this case his client had the implied agency to forge her husband’s signature. He could not later, however, produce this reference. The Board accepted this defense and found that, even though there is no support in C.J.S. for the advice given by appellee, and as a result, he may have violated a requirement of adequate preparation, he thought he was giving proper advice and did not act dishonestly or fraudulently.
I am very troubled by the “I once read it in a book” defense, and the Board’s acceptance of it. I recognize that one can find many broad legal propositions in legal treatises, some in direct conflict with others. But, if the public is to have any confidence in the integrity of the enforcement of ethical standards, there must be a limit to a claim that ethical misconduct is excused because the lawyer remembers once reading somewhere that the misconduct is legally acceptable.
This case lies beyond any reasonable limit. The whole purpose of forging a signature is to misrepresent that the signator has agreed to be bound to the legal document involved. By definition, a forged signature is a fraud on the person whose signature is forged, as well as any person who acts in reliance upon the signature. A claim that something in C.J.S. would say that such a forgery is lawful is patently incredible and unacceptable for a profession that promises the public knowledge, competency, and judgment.
I am sensitive to Justice Morse’s point that we must employ a standard of review that gives deference to the Board’s application of the Code of Professional Conduct. I also believe, however, that this Court must be accountable to the citizens of Vermont in enforcing *325ethical norms to ensure public trust and confidence in the legal profession. Reluctantly, I conclude that the Board’s decision in this case cannot be squared with our duty to the public.
I respectfully dissent from the dismissal of the complaint and would remand for the Board to impose an appropriate sanction. I am authorized to say that Justice Johnson joins in this dissent.