Court Opinion

ID: 9724307
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:52:28.030127+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:59.183881
License: Public Domain

COMPTON, J.
I dissent.
At a time when the entire nation is racked with the problem of drug abuse, especially among its younger people it is shocking to find that a medical doctor would so abuse the powers entrusted to' him and contribute to the drug abuse problem by engaging in activity which is as reprehensible as that of an ordinary street peddler of illicit drugs.
A reasonable interpretation of the various statutes which make up the regulatory scheme dealing with narcotics and dangerous drugs does not lead to the conclusion reached, by the majority concerning the intent of the Legislature. Against the backdrop of the Legislature’s continuing efforts to curb the illicit traffic in narcotics and dangerous drugs, I cannot ascribe to that body any intent to' carve out an exemption from the operation of the Penal statutes for doctors who use their power of prescription to engage in the illicit traffic.
In my opinion the majority errs in three significant ways.
(1) They fail to read into the term “prescription,” as contained in section 11912 of the Health and Safety Code, any of the traditional requirements of a valid prescription;
(2) They find an intent on the part of the Legislature to exempt a doctor from the operation of section 11912 in the fact that Business and Professions Code section 2399.5, condemns as unprofessional conduct the very practice in which this defendant engaged; and
(3) ' They fail to give the proper deference to the powers of the magistrate who, on this evidence, made a factual determination that the “prescription” involved was not a valid one. It is. inappropriate for us on a writ of prohibition to reweigh that evidence.
The term “prescription” is defined in Webster’s Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary as “4 a: a written direction for a therapeutic or corrective agent; specif: one for the preparation and use of a medicine.” The term “prescribe” is defined by Webster “to1 designate or order the use of as a remedy.” “Therapeutic” is defined by Webster as “of or relating to the treatment of disease or disorders. . . .” “Medicine” is defined as “a sub*129stance or preparation used in treating disease.” “Remedy” is defined as “a medicine or application that relieves or cures a disease.” (Italics added.)
Thus it is quite apparent that the term “prescription” not only by Webster’s definition but by commonly accepted usage connotes the action of a doctor in providing narcotics, drugs or other medicinal substances for the treatment of an illness or medical problem based upon a medical diagnosis.
When the Legislature as a part of its very restrictive regulatory scheme authorizes physicians to prescribe narcotics and dangerous drugs, that authorization presupposes that a medical doctor will issue the prescription only on the basis of medical judgment for a medical need.
Clearly the Legislature did not intend to simply create an exempt class of persons who could, with immunity, traffic in narcotics and dangerous drugs for the purpose of catering to the appetites of addicts or drug abusers.
The enactment of Business and Professions Code section 2399.5, contrary to the majority’s conclusion, manifests a clear legislative intent that a prescription, to be valid, must be based on an examination of the patient and a medical indication of a need for the drug. That section can in no way be interpreted as an indication that the Legislature intended that administrative sanctions were the only penalty to be suffered by a doctor who improperly issues prescriptions. It is to be noted that Business and Professions Code section 2391.5 states that “The violation of any of the statutes of this State regulating narcotics and dangerous drugs, constitutes unprofessional conduct within the meaning of this chapter.”
Following the majority’s rationale, this latter statute would indicate an intention of the Legislature to exempt doctors from Penal sanctions for the violation of any statute dealing with narcotics or dangerous drugs. This is obviously not the case.
Section 11162.5 of the Health and Safety Code, enacted prior to the present section 11912, clearly spells out the concept that the term “prescription” as used throughout the code means a bona fide prescription for legitimate medical purposes. It is apparent that the Legislature, in its use of the term “prescription,” had something more in mind than simply a writing on a piece of paper in a particular form.
The majority attaches great significance to the fact that section 11903, which is part of a newly added division 10.5, did not carry into the definition of “prescription” the language of section 11162.5 of the Health and Safety Code. A careful reading of section 11903, subdivision (a) indicates quite clearly that the legislative intent was simply to broaden the term *130prescription to embrace oral as well as written prescriptions. In view of the manifest general legislative intent to increase its control over dangerous drugs that definition cannot possibly be interpreted as meaning that a prescription is valid when it is not for legitimate medical purposes.
Under the circumstances of this case it seems to' be beyond question that if the doctor had sold the pills directly to the undercover operators he would have violated the statute. This would be true if that sale were effected in his office or on the streets. Here the doctor instead sold the undercover operators the keys to' the pharmacist’s medicine cabinet. In sum, the written document which the doctor provided to' the undercover operators was not a prescription but a tool employed by him to make the pharmacist his innocent agent in the illicit traffic of dangerous drugs.
The next question to be answered is did the doctor sell or furnish dangerous drugs so as to come within the purview of section. 11912?
Section 11903, subdivision (j) of the Health and Safety Code and section 4048.5 of the Business and Professions Code state that “furnish” means “to supply by any means, by sale or otherwise.”
I pose two hypothetical questions. If the doctor had written a check drawn on his bank account and had given that check to the undercover operators, could it not be said that he furnished them with money? If he gave them the pink slip and keys to his automobile, could it not be said that he furnished them with an automobile? In my opinion, the conduct of the defendant in this case, based on the evidence now before us, was well within the provisions of section 11912.
It might well be that, on a trial of the matter, the defendant can offer evidence which would lend validity to- the prescription which he purported to write and the jury could be properly instructed as to what constitutes a valid prescription. I feel, however, that it is wrong for this court at this stage of the proceedings to say that as a matter of law a doctor can by the simple device of setting his pen to an official prescription blank, traffic in illicit and dangerous drugs with immunity.
I would deny the writ.
A petition for a rehearing was denied April 13, 1972. Compton, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted. The petition of the real party in interest for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied May 10, 1972.