Court Opinion

ID: 9540808
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:19:56.690434+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:01:07.305647
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH, dissenting: I dissent. It is clear under the holding of the Supreme Court in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 32 L. Ed. 2d 530, 92 S. Ct. 2006, and our decisions in People v. Morrissey, 52 Ill. 2d 418, and People v. Coleman, 52 Ill. 2d 470, that a defendant has a right to counsel in any criminal prosecution which might result in actual imprisonment, and I agree with Judge Leighton’s statement, in dissent, that the right “is so important that judges should not engage in nice calculations about when that right should be enjoyed” (36 Ill. App. 3d 304, 314). The majority quotes (68 Ill. 2d at 272) that portion of Argersinger which endows trial courts with a degree of prescience which I doubt exists, that is, that a judge, prior to hearing any evidence, “will have a measure of the seriousness and gravity of the offense and therefore know when to name a lawyer to represent the accused before the trial starts” (407 U.S. 25, 40, 32 L. Ed. 2d 530, 540, 92 S. Ct. 2006, 2014). I have searched Argersinger in vain for the source of this knowledge prior to the time when a judge has heard evidence in the case. The clear and explicit language of section 109 — 1(b)(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 38, par. 109—1(b)(2)) requires that the judge shall advise a defendant of his right to counsel in accordance with the provisions of section 113 — 3 of the Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 38, par. 113—3). Section 113 — 3 provides, without drawing the distinction made by the majority, that every person charged with an offense shall be allowed counsel before pleading to the charge. I must, of course, concede that because of the fortuitous circumstance that this defendant was not sentenced to a period of incarceration, Argersinger does not per se require reversal of the judgment. However, as has been pointed out in numerous decisions, in matters involving the constitutional rights of its citizens, Illinois is free to set higher standards than those imposed by the decisions of the Supreme Court. The General Assembly has seen fit so to do. The adverse effect of failure to be provided with counsel is not limited to the possibility of incarceration. It may well be that had this defendant known of his right to counsel, and elected to have counsel, he might have been acquitted of the charge. The failure to advise him of his right to counsel requires that the judgment be reversed.