Court Opinion

ID: 94905
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2010-04-28 16:37:59+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:49.857592
License: Public Domain

171 U.S. 161 (1898)
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
v.
BAILEY.
BAILEY
v.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.
Nos. 390, 420.
Supreme Court of United States.
Submitted January 10, 1898.
Decided May 31, 1898.
ERROR TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.
*170 Mr. Sidney T. Thomas and Mr. Andrew B. Duvall for the District of Columbia.
Mr. A.S. Worthington for Bailey.
MR. JUSTICE WHITE, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.
The decision of this controversy involves two propositions. Did the Commissioners of the District of Columbia have the power to agree to submit the claim in issue to the award of an arbitrator? And if they did have the power, did they lawfully exercise it? To answer either of these questions it becomes essential to ascertain whether an agreement to submit to arbitration involves the power to contract. Both of the matters above stated depend upon this last inquiry, because both the claim that the District of Columbia did not in valid form exercise the power to submit to arbitration, and the assertion that if they so did they were not authorized to that end, rest on the claim that the submission was not made in *171 the form required by law to constitute a contract, and even if the alleged award was in legal form, nevertheless the District Commissioners were without power to contract for that purpose.
In determining whether an agreement to arbitrate involves the power to contract we eliminate at once from consideration consents to arbitrate made under a rule of court, by consent, in a pending suit, and shall consider only whether an agreement to arbitrate not under rule of court or within the terms of a statute enacted for such purpose is or is not a contract. We do this, because there is no pretence in the case at bar that the submission to arbitration was under a rule of court or equivalent thereto. Indeed, the courts below held that the submission of the claim in question to arbitration was a purely common law one and not made under a statute or rule of court; and in consequence of these views the courts held it to be their duty to make the award executory by rendering a judgment thereon, on the assumption that the parties having agreed to a common law submission were bound by reason thereof to abide by the award of the arbitrator.
The general rule is, "that every one who is capable of making a disposition of his property, or a release of his right, may make a submission to an award; but no one can, who is either under a natural or civil incapacity of contracting." Kyd, p. 35; Russell on Arbitrators, p. 14. And Morse, in the opening paragraph of his treatise on Arbitration and Award (p. 3), says: "A submission is a contract." And again, at p. 50: "The submission is the agreement of the parties to refer. It is, therefore, a contract, and will in general be governed by the law concerning contracts." In Whitcher v. Whitcher, 49 N.H. 176, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire said (p. 180): "A submission is a contract between two or more parties, whereby they agree to refer the subject in dispute to others and to be bound by their award, and the submission itself implies an agreement to abide the result, even if no such agreement were expressed." It was because a submission to arbitration had the force of a contract, that at common law a submission by a corporation aggregate was required to be *172 the act of the corporate body, Russell on Arbitrators, fifth edition, p. 20; which act was of necessity required to be evidenced in a particular manner.
It is true that an executor, at common law, had the power to submit to an award. But this power arose by reason of the full dominion which the law gave the executor or administrator over the assets, and the full discretion which it vested in him for the settlement and liquidation of all claims due to and from the estate. Wheatley v. Martin, 6 Leigh, 62; Wamsley v. Wamsley, 26 W. Va. 45; Wood v. Tunnicliff, 74 N.Y. 38. Whilst, however, the agreement of the executor to a common law submission was binding upon him, such a consent on his part did not protect him from being called to an account by the beneficiaries of the estate, if the submission proved not to be to their advantage, because the submission was the voluntary act of the executor and was not the equivalent of a judicial finding. 3 Williams on Executors, p. 326, and authorities cited. So, also, the power of a municipal corporation to arbitrate arises from its authority to liquidate and settle claims, and the rule on this subject is thus stated by Dillon (Mun. Corp. 4th ed. sec. 478):
"As a general proposition, municipal corporations have, unless specially restricted, the same powers to liquidate claims and indebtedness that natural persons have, and from that source proceeds power to adjust all disputed claims, and when the amount is ascertained to pay the same as other indebtedness. It would seem to follow therefrom that a municipal corporation, unless disabled by positive law, could submit to arbitration all unsettled claims with the same liability to perform the award as would rest upon a natural person, provided, of course, that such power be exercised by ordinance or resolution of the corporate authorities."
In the early case of Brady v. Brooklyn, 1 Barb. 584, 589, the power of a municipal corporation to submit to arbitration was ascribed to the capacity to contract, with a liability to pay, and it was held that corporations have all the powers of ordinary parties as respects their contracts, except when they are restricted expressly, or by necessary implication. In the *173 case of minor public officials or corporations, such as selectmen and school districts, the power to arbitrate has been clearly rested upon the existence of the right to adjust and settle claims of the particular character which had been submitted to arbitration. Dix v. Dummerston, 19 Vermont, 262; Walnut v. Rankin, 70 Iowa, 65. Indeed, the proposition that an independent agreement to submit to an award must depend for its validity upon the existence of the right to contract is so elementary that further citation of authority to support it is unnecessary.
Examining, then, the questions we have stated in their inverse order, we proceed to inquire whether the Commissioners of the District of Columbia had the power to enter into a contract of the nature of that under consideration. The solution of this inquiry requires a brief examination of the statutes, from which alone the powers of the Commissioners of the District are derived.
By the act of June 20, 1874, c. 337, "An act for the government of the District of Columbia, and other purposes," 18 Stat. 116, the commission provided for in section 2 was vested with the power and authority of the then governor or board of public works of the District, except as thereinafter limited, and it was provided that "said commission, in the exercise of such power or authority, shall make no contract, nor incur any obligation other than such contracts and obligations as may be necessary to the faithful administration of the valid laws enacted for the government of said District, to the execution of existing legal obligations and contracts, and to the protection or preservation of improvements existing, or commenced and not completed, at the time of the passage of this act."
By the act of June 11, 1878, c. 180, "An act providing a permanent form of government for the District of Columbia," 20 Stat. 102, the District and the property and persons therein were made subject to the provisions of the act, "and also to any existing laws applicable thereto not hereby repealed or inconsistent with the provisions of this act." The Commissioners provided for in the act were, by section 3, vested with *174 all the powers, rights, duties and privileges lawfully exercised by, and all property, estate and effects vested in the Commissioners appointed under the provisions of the act of June 20, 1874, and were given power, subject to the limitations and provisions contained in the act, to apply the taxes or other revenues of the District to the payment of the current expenses thereof, to the support of the public schools, the fire department and the police. It was expressly enacted, however, in the same section, that the Commissioners in the exercise of the duties, powers and authority vested in them "shall make no contract, nor incur any obligation other than such contracts and obligations as are hereinafter provided for and shall be approved by Congress." In the same section it was further provided that the Commissioners should annually submit to the Secretary of the Treasury, for his examination and approval and transmission by him to Congress, a statement "showing in detail the work proposed to be undertaken by the Commissioners during the fiscal year next ensuing, and the estimated cost thereof; also the cost of constructing, repairing and maintaining all bridges authorized by law across the Potomac River within the District of Columbia, and also all other streams in said District; the cost of maintaining all public institutions of charity, reformatories and prisons belonging to or controlled wholly or in part by the District of Columbia, and which are now by law supported wholly or in part by the United States or District of Columbia; and also the expenses of the Washington Aqueduct and its appurtenances; and also an itemized statement and estimate of the amount necessary to defray the expenses of the government of the District of Columbia for the next fiscal year." Of the estimates as finally approved by Congress, the act provided that fifty per cent should be appropriated for by Congress, and the remaining fifty per cent assessed upon the taxable property and privileges in the District other than the property of the United States and of the District of Columbia. In the fifth section of the act provision was made for the letting by contract, after due advertisement, of all work of repair on streets, etc., where the cost would exceed one thousand *175 dollars, and it was also, in said section, stipulated that "all contracts for the construction, improvement, alteration or repairs of the streets, avenues, highways, alleys, gutters, sewers and all work of like nature shall be made and entered into only by and with the official unanimous consent of the Commissioners of the District, and all contracts shall be copied in a book kept for that purpose and be signed by the said Commissioners, and no contract involving an expenditure of more than one hundred dollars shall be valid until recorded and signed as aforesaid."
By section 37 of the act of February 21, 1871, c. 62, 16 Stat. 419, 427, it was provided as follows:
"All contracts made by the said board of public works shall be in writing, and shall be signed by the parties making the same, and a copy thereof shall be filed in the office of the Secretary of the District, and said board of public works shall have no power to make contracts to bind said District to the payment of any sums of money except in pursuance of appropriations made by law, and not until such appropriations shall have been made."
This section is deemed to be applicable to the present Commissioners. (Comp. Stat. Dis. Col. secs. 30 and 31, pp. 201-2.) So, also, by section 15 of the act of 1871, 16 Stat. 423, it was provided that the legislative assembly should not "authorize the payment of any claim, or part thereof, hereafter created against the District under any contract or agreement made, without express authority of law, and all such unauthorized agreements or contracts shall be null and void."
Section 13 of the joint resolution of June 1, 1878, embodies the second section of the joint resolution approved March 14, 1876, 19 Stat. 211, 212, which made it a misdemeanor for any officer or person to increase or aid or abet in increasing the total indebtedness of the District.
Under the statutes of 1874 and 1878, above referred to, it has been held that the District of Columbia still continued to be a municipal corporation, and that it was subject to the operation of a statute of limitations, Metropolitan Railroad Co. v. District of Columbia, 132 U.S. 1, and was also liable *176 for damages caused by a neglect to repair the streets within the District. District of Columbia v. Woodbury, 136 U.S. 450. But the mere fact that the District is a municipal corporation is not decisive of the question whether or not the Commissioners of the District had power to make a contract to submit to an award, for, as we have seen, it is not the mere existence of a municipal corporate being from which the power to make a submission to arbitration is deduced, but that the municipal corporation by which such an agreement is entered into has power to contract, to settle and adjust debts; in other words, all the general attributes which normally attach to and result from municipal corporate existence. Recurring to the statutes relating to the Commissioners of the District of Columbia, it is clear from their face that these officers are without general power to contract debts, or to adjust and pay the same; that, on the contrary, the statutes expressly deprive them of such power, and limit the scope of their authority to the mere execution of contracts previously sanctioned by Congress or which they are authorized to make by express statutory authority. The necessary operation of these provisions of the statutes is to cause the District Commissioners to be merely administrative officers with ministerial powers only. The sum of the municipal powers of the District of Columbia is neither vested in nor exercised by the District Commissioners. They are, on the contrary, vested in the Congress of the United States, acting pro hac vice as the legislative body of the District, and the Commissioners of the District discharge the functions of administrative officials.
There is no authority for holding that a mere administrative officer of a municipal corporation, simply because of the absence of a statutory inhibition, has the power, without the consent of the corporation speaking through its municipal legislative body, to bind the corporation by a common law submission. And this being true, with how much less reason can it be contended that the administrative officers of the District have such power without the consent of Congress, when the acts defining the powers of the Commissioners, by clear and necessary implication, contain an express prohibition to the contrary?
*177 Nor is it in reason sound to say that because the District Commissioners have the power to sue and be sued, they have therefore the authority to enter into a contract to submit a claim preferred against the District to arbitration, and thus to oust the courts of jurisdiction, when no authority is conferred upon the Commissioners to contract to pay a claim of the character embraced in the arbitration, and no appropriation had been made by Congress for the payment of any such claim. It cannot be said that because Congress had appropriated for the improvement of streets, and therefore authorized a contract for such improvement to the extent of the appropriation, that it had also authorized and appropriated for a claim in damages asserted to have arisen from the fact that work had been stopped because the appropriation made by Congress had been exhausted. The appropriation of money to improve streets was in no sense the appropriation of money to pay a claim for unliquidated damages arising, not for work and labor performed and materials furnished, but from the refusal to permit the performance of work and labor and the furnishing of materials.
Aside from the prohibition imposed on the Commissioners of the District by the acts of Congress against entering into contracts for the payment of money for any claim not specifically appropriated for, an agreement to submit the claim in question to the arbitrament of a single individual was, if valid, a contract binding the District to pay any sum of money which the arbitrator might award. It cannot be doubted that if the District Commissioners themselves had seen fit to pass a resolution reciting that the appropriation by Congress for the improvement of the streets had been exhausted, and that a given sum of money was set aside to pay a claim for damages preferred against the District for having contracted when there was no appropriation, such action would have been, under the statutes, ultra vires. But if the express action of the Commissioners to this end would have been void, how can it be contended that by indirection, that is, by entering into an agreement to submit to an award, the Commissioners had the power to delegate to a third person an authority which *178 they themselves did not possess? Whilst the fundamental want of power in the District Commissioners to agree to a common law submission is decisive, there is another view which is equally so. By the express terms of the statute the Commissioners are forbidden to enter into any contract binding the District for the payment of any sum of money in excess of one hundred dollars, unless the same is reduced to writing and is recorded in a book to be kept for that purpose, and signed by all the Commissioners, the statute declaring, in express terms, that no contract shall be valid unless recorded as aforesaid. This mandatory provision of the statute clearly makes the form in which a contract is embodied of the essence of the contract. In other words, by virtue of the restrictions and inhibitions of the statute a contract calling for an expenditure in excess of one hundred dollars cannot take effect unless made in the form stated. The form, therefore, becomes a matter of fundamental right, and illustrates the application of the maxim forma dat esse rei. That the mere statement of the appointment of a referee on the minutes without the signature of any of the Commissioners did not comply with the requirements referred to, is too clear for discussion. The attempt to give effect to such entry as a contract without regard to the requirements of the law illustrates the wisdom of the statute and the evil of disregarding it, for on the trial two of the three commissioners testified, one on behalf of the plaintiff and the other on behalf of the defendant, and swore to directly opposite views as to whether or not there had been a common law submission by the Commissioners.
We have considered what has been referred to by counsel as the order of the Commissioners, according to its terms, which embraced only the matters contained in the action then pending, and have not regarded the parol evidence which sought to vary and contradict the writing by establishing that it was intended thereby to embrace a claim which had not been asserted in the action. The views we have advanced being decisive against the legality of the alleged award, it follows that the judgment in favor of the administratrix based thereon must be reversed. As, however, the consolidation of *179 the action upon the award with the original action for damages for breach of the contract for the resurfacing, and the trial of such consolidated cause, proceeded upon the hypothesis that a valid agreement to arbitrate had been entered into, the ends of justice will be subserved by also reversing the judgment in favor of the District entered in the original action. It is therefore ordered that the judgments be
Reversed and the cases remanded, with directions to dismiss the action No. 34,564 founded upon the alleged award, and to grant a new trial in action No. 24,279.