Court Opinion

ID: 9685383
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 14:35:26.207183+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:05.312989
License: Public Domain

SABERS, Justice
(dissenting).
The majority holds that the “good faith” exception in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984) should be adopted under our South Dakota Constitution. The majority claims to adopt the reasoning and limits of the Leon decision. In fact, the majority has created a lesser standard of protection under the South Dakota Constitution than Leon creates under the United States Constitution. This clearly is impermissible under the United States Constitution. Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 95 S.Ct. 1215, 43 L.Ed.2d 570 (1975).
While I have some concerns with the adoption of the Leon “good faith” exception under the South Dakota Constitution, I am more concerned with the majority’s application of the exception in this case. The majority opinion is repugnant not only to the South Dakota Constitution, but the federal constitution and the Leon decision. Under the “good faith” exception, Leon requires that deference be given to a magistrate’s decision to issue a warrant in doubtful cases where reasonable minds could differ. However, Leon makes it clear that this deference is not boundless and the “good faith” exception will not apply in several instances. One instance, relevant to this case, is where a police officer’s affidavit is so “facially deficient” that it cannot give rise to probable cause.
The affidavits in this case fit within this exception as being so defective that it could not “provide the magistrate with a substantial basis for determining the existence of probable cause[.]” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 239, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2332, 76 L.Ed.2d 527, 549 (1983). The affidavits of the sheriff and states attorney, in support of the warrant, are nearly identical to the *832defective affidavit presented in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964). In Aguilar, the affidavit recited in part:
“Affiants have received reliable information from a credible person and do believe that heroin, marijuana, barbiturates and other narcotics and narcotic paraphernalia are being kept at the above described premises for the purpose of sale and use contrary to the provisions of the law.”
Id., 378 U.S. at 109, 84 S.Ct. at 1511.
The Aguilar court concluded that the affiant must present facts upon which the magistrate can make a determination of probable cause. The Court stated that “mere affirmance of belief or suspicion is not enough.” Id., 378 U.S. at 112, 84 S.Ct. at 1512 (citing Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41, 47, 54 S.Ct. 11, 13, 78 L.Ed. 159, 161 (1933)). The Court noted that this danger is particularly likely where the affiant presents a mere conclusion from an unidentified informant and the affiant has no personal knowledge of the information.
This court has favorably cited Aguilar for the proposition that warrants must be issued on more than mere conclusory affidavits:
[T]he magistrate must be informed of some of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that the narcotics were where he claimed they were, and some of the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that the informant, whose identity need not be disclosed, was “credible” or his information “reliable”. Otherwise, “the inferences from the facts which lead to the complaint” will be drawn not “by a neutral and detached magistrate,” as the Constitution requires, but instead, by a police officer “engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime,” or, as in this case, by an unidentified informant. (Citations omitted).
State v. Iverson, 364 N.W.2d 518, 521 (S.D.1985), quoting Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 114, 84 S.Ct. at 1514.
In setting forth the “good faith” exception the Leon Court reaffirmed Aguilar. The Leon Court was careful to state that the decision neither affected the probable cause standard, nor any other Fourth Amendment protection. The Court noted that the “good faith” exception applies only in close cases where an officer could have a reasonable good-faith basis that the warrant issued by the magistrate was based upon probable cause. Citing Aguilar, the Leon Court stated:
“Sufficient information must be presented to the magistrate to allow that official to determine probable cause; his action cannot be a mere ratification of the bare conclusions of others.” (emphasis added).
Leon, 468 U.S. at 915, 104 S.Ct. at 3416. In such situations, the Leon Court held that the “good faith” exception was inapplicable.
Like Aguilar, the affidavit here did not present any of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded the drugs were where he claimed. There was clearly insufficient factual information upon which the magistrate could find that probable cause existed. The trial court so held. Both the majority and the State seem to rely on the fact that the sheriff and states attorney believed there was probable cause to issue a warrant. This subjective belief is irrelevant to whether there was a good-faith belief on the part of the officers. The decision in Leon makes it clear that good faith must be based on an objective standard. Under Leon, and the long line of authority preceding Leon, there could not be a reasonable belief that the affidavit established probable cause to issue a warrant. Therefore, these facts are insufficient for the application of the Leon “good faith” exception.
I would hold the trial court’s finding that the law enforcement officials acted in good faith under Leon to be clearly erroneous. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.