Court Opinion

ID: 9839251
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-12 17:09:02.632192+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:45:33.279790
License: Public Domain

J-S25017-23

  NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

  SHIVA NOVOBILSKI                               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                                 :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                                 :
                v.                               :
                                                 :
                                                 :
  NORMAN NOVOBILSKI                              :
                                                 :
                        Appellant                :   No. 327 EDA 2023

                Appeal from the Order Entered January 3, 2023
            In the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County
           Domestic Relations at DR-0090619, PASCES: 406117766

BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., MURRAY, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.:                            FILED SEPTEMBER 12, 2023

       Norman        Novobilski   (Father)     appeals   from   the   order   awarding

“$1,401.00 per month[,] allocated $1,274.00 for family support for [Shiva

Novobilski (Mother)] and one (1) child … plus $127.00 per month to apply on

arrears.” Order, 1/3/23, at 1. After careful consideration, we affirm.

       This case began on or about August 25, 2019, when Mother filed a

complaint for spousal and child support. Mother sought child support for the

parties’ adult daughter (Child), who was born in May 2000.1 The trial court

explained:

       There is no dispute [Child] … is severely disabled and resides with
       [Mother]. [Child] is unable to communicate her needs and
       requires assistance with all activities of daily living. [Child] is
       totally dependent on her caretaker and cannot be left alone.
____________________________________________

1 The parties have another child who was born in 1999.            See N.T. (Mother’s
Deposition), 7/18/22, at 4.
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       [Child]’s conditions will not improve, and she needs continuing
       care and treatment from specialists.

Trial Court Opinion, 3/31/23, at 7 (record citations omitted).

       The record indicates neither party has filed for divorce.2 However, the

trial court has issued four support orders in the past four years. On May 1,

2021, Child turned 21. Child had been enrolled in the Northampton School

District, but when she turned 21, she became ineligible for public school

services. Id. at 7 (citing Mother’s 6/18/22 deposition testimony). As a result,

Mother “applied for and received a ‘Community Living Waiver’ for Child

through Medical Assistance.” Id. The waiver provided $85,000 annually for

Child’s care. Id. at 4. The funds are administered by “PALCO, a financial

management service, which provides claims and billing services for

employment of home and community-based support workers and in-home

care services.” Id.

       The trial court summarized the following procedural history:

              On December 1, 2021, [Father] filed a Petition for
       Modification, and a conference was scheduled for January 27,
       2022. On January 31, 2022, the Honorable Paula A. Roscioli
       entered an Order continuing the Petition for Modification, pending
       receipt of documentation regarding [Mother’s] employability and
       verification of expenses related to actual or anticipated daycare
       costs for [C]hild. On March 9, 2022, Judge Roscioli entered an
       Order directing [Father] to pay $2,271.00 per month for support,
       effective November 23, 2021, allocated as $2,065.00 for the basic
____________________________________________

2 According to Mother, “Father left the marital residence in August, 2017.”
Mother’s Brief at 5. Mother states that Father “has not contributed to the care
of [Child] (except for the payment of Child Support), since that time.” Id.
Father agrees the parties “separated in August of 2017.” Father’s Brief at 13.

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      support of one child and spousal support, plus $206.00 for arrears.
      [Father] was directed to be responsible for 75% of unreimbursed
      medical expenses and was required to provide medical insurance.
      Spousal support was set to terminate upon the parties’ divorce or
      other order of court. [Mother] was no longer assessed an income
      as the cost of care for [Child] was not feasible, [Child] was no
      longer eligible to attend high school, and [Mother’s] elderly
      parents were no longer able to sustain the physical demands of
      caring for [Child] regularly.

             On March 28, 2022, [Father] filed a written demand for a de
      novo hearing. The parties appeared before Judge Roscioli on May
      11, 2022, at which time the parties were directed to develop the
      record by way of depositions in lieu of live testimony and a hearing
      was scheduled for the September 12, 2022 de novo hearing list.
      The parties appeared before the [trial court] on September 12,
      2022. On November 7, 2022, [the trial court] entered an Order
      directing [Father] to submit a brief within 21 days and [Mother]
      to submit a brief 14 days thereafter. The parties complied with
      this directive, and the matter was taken under advisement.

Trial Court Opinion, 3/31/23, at 2-3 (record citations omitted).

      On January 3, 2023, the trial court issued the order from which Father

appeals. The trial court explained that

      after review of the parties’ submissions and the entirety of the
      record in this matter, the [trial court] entered the Order of Court
      currently on appeal. The January 3, 2023 Order directed [Father]
      to comply with a modified support amount of $1,401.00 per
      month, allocated $1,274.00 per month for the support of [Mother]
      and one child, plus $127.00 for arrears. We noted [Mother] had
      the ability to receive monthly compensation for providing care for
      [C]hild on the Order, and that [C]hild was approved to receive an
      $85,000.00 annual waiver for her care in March 2021, through
      PALCO, a financial management service, which provides claims
      and billing services for employment of home and community-
      based support workers and in-home care services. The Order was
      based on an assessed full time earning capacity for [Mother] of
      $18.00 per hour for 40 hours per week, resulting in an average
      monthly assessed gross income for [Mother] of $3,120.00, and an
      average monthly assessed net income of $2,593.00. We noted
      that this assessment was based on the records received from

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      PALCO indicating that the pay rate for an in-house care giver was
      $18.00 to $20.00 per hour. [Father’s] income was based on his
      paystubs and Veterans Affairs benefits, resulting in an adjusted
      monthly net income for [Father] of $5,553.00.         The Order
      considered [Father’s] $420.00 per month expense for health
      benefits for the three parties on the order.

Trial Court Opinion, 3/31/23, at 3-4 (record citations omitted).

      Father timely filed a notice of appeal and court-ordered concise

statement pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).

                                APPEALABILITY

      On February 27, 2023, this Court issued a rule to show cause upon

Father, because “it is unclear if [the order] is an appealable order.” Order,

2/27/23. We explained:

      [I]t is unclear from the language of the January 3, 2023 order if
      the January 3rd order is an allocated order, as the order states, or
      … is unallocated. Specifically, the … order directs “$1,401.00 per
      month allocated $1,274.00 per month for family support for
      spousal and one (1) child, plus $127.00 per month to appeal to
      apply to arrears.” An allocated support order lists the spousal
      support amount and child support amount separately. Moreover,
      in an allocated support order, the portion of spousal support is
      only appealable if a divorce decree has been entered and all
      economic claims have been resolved.

Id. (bold and underline in original) (citing Capuano v. Capuano, 823 A.2d

995 (Pa. Super. 2003) (the portion of an order attributable to child support is

final and immediately appealable; the portion of an order allocated to spousal

support is interlocutory until a divorce decree has been entered and economic

claims have been resolved)).

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      Father filed a response, after which this Court issued a per curiam order

discharging the rule to show cause. Order, 3/9/23. The per curiam order

stated:

            On March 8, 2023, [Father] filed a response indicating the
      January 3rd order is an allocated support order, as revealed in the
      “guideline worksheets” appended to the January 3, 2023 order.
      [Father] also asserts that only the child support portion of the
      order is appealable since no divorce decree has been entered.

             Accordingly, this appeal shall proceed solely in child support.
      See Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)(1) (a final order is any order that disposes
      of all claims and of all parties); Leister v. Leister, 684 A.2d 192
      (Pa. Super. 1996) (the difference between spousal support and
      alimony pendente lite claims, no matter if filed as part of a divorce
      action or separately, is negligible, and neither is appealable until
      all economic issues have been resolved and a divorce decree has
      been entered); Fried v. Fried, 501 A.2d 211 (Pa. 1985) (issues
      in divorce are reviewable after entry of divorce decree and
      resolution of all economic issues); Hrinkevich v. Hrinkevich,
      676 A.2d 237 (Pa. Super. 1996) (notwithstanding pending divorce
      action[,] child support orders are immediately reviewable). The
      show cause order is discharged.

Id. (underline in original).

      In his brief, Father claims this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to

“Pa.R.A.P. 341, as the rule applies to a final child support order.” Father’s

Brief at 1. Father states the January 3, 2023 order “is an allocated order of

support awarding spousal support and child support” based on “the guideline

worksheets” appended to the order, which “calculate a specific spousal

support amount and child support.” Id.

      Mother confirms there “is no statement in the Order of January 3, 2023,

as to whether the amount of [s]upport … is allocated or unallocated between

Child Support and Spousal Support.” Mother’s Brief at 2. Mother states that

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although “this Court would have the ability to immediately review the portion

of the Order attributable to Child Support, the Order is unallocated between

Child Support and Spousal Support.” Id. at 14.

       Upon review, we conclude the entire order is appealable. “It is well-

recognized that a spousal support order entered during the pendency of a

divorce action is not appealable until all claims connected with the divorce

action are resolved.” Thomas v. Thomas, 760 A.2d 397, 398 (Pa. Super.

2000). However, in this case, the record indicates neither party has filed a

divorce complaint and there is no divorce pending.     Father states that the

parties “are married … and a divorce action pending.” See Father’s Brief at

13 (citing Reproduced Record at 350a). This statement is not accurate. Page

350a of the Reproduced Record is a copy of page 5 from the transcript of

Mother’s June 18, 2020 deposition.3 Mother never stated that a divorce action

was pending. N.T., 6/18/20, at 5. She stated she was “married for now.” Id.

Mother described her marital status as “separated,” and added that she and

Father had separated “in August of 2017.” Id.

       In Hasson v. Hasson, 696 A.2d 221 (Pa. Super. 1997), wife appealed

from a spousal support order and husband argued the appeal was

interlocutory. This Court disagreed with husband because he did not file for

divorce until after wife appealed the support order.   We stated that if the

____________________________________________

3 The certified record includes notes of testimony from the June 18, 2020
deposition, as well as notes of testimony from Mother’s subsequent deposition
on July 18, 2022.

                                           -6-
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support order been entered after husband filed for divorce, “the appeal would

not have been properly before us and would have been quashed.” Id. We

explained:

     If the [spousal support] order had been entered while a divorce
     action was pending, we would, following Leister [v. Leister, 684
     A.2d 195 (Pa. Super. 1996)], quash the appeal as interlocutory.
     However, when the present order was entered, no divorce action
     was pending. Anything filed after the date Wife filed her appeal
     can have no impact on our jurisdiction to hear this appeal. Albee
     Homes, Inc. v. Caddie Homes, Inc., 417 Pa. 177, 207 A.2d 768
     (1965) (reviewing court must consider only the facts which were
     of record and before the trial court on the date the decision was
     rendered); Kilian v. Allegheny Co. Distributors, 409 Pa. 344,
     185 A.2d 517 (1962) (stipulation … could not be considered; facts
     not in record of the trial court at time of appeal cannot be
     considered by reviewing court). Notably, the record certified to
     this court contains no reference to a divorce complaint; no
     complaint or other pleadings appear in the record and the docket
     entries do not show that a complaint was filed or that any other
     action was taken relating to a divorce action. As we cannot
     consider facts which are not on the record … and the record does
     not reveal either the filing of a divorce action or that the support
     order was entered during the pendency of a companion divorce
     action, we must review this case as a support-only matter. … The
     order is therefore appealable.

Hasson, 696 A.2d at 222 (some citations and footnote omitted).

     Consistent with our review of the record and the holding in Hasson, we

conclude the entire January 3, 2023 support order is appealable. We thus

amend our per curiam order to rescind the provision stating that “this appeal

                                    -7-
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shall proceed solely in child support.”4         Order, 3/9/23 (underline omitted).

Because the appeal is properly before us, we consider Father’s issues.

       Father presents two related issues:

       A. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR AS A MATTER OF LAW AND ABUSE
       ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO ASSESS [MOTHER] A FULL-TIME
       EARNING CAPACITY AS A PHARMACIST?

       B. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR AS A MATTER OF LAW AND ABUSE
       ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO ASSESS [MOTHER] A FULL-TIME
       EARNING CAPACITY AT THE CURRENT CAREGIVER RATE PAID
       FOR IN-HOME CAREGIVERS UNDER THE ADULT CHILD’S HOME
       AND COMMUNIT[Y] BASED WAIVER?

Father’s Brief at 7.

       As Father challenges the trial court’s assessment of Mother’s earning

capacity in both issues, we address them together.

                           MOTHER’S EARNING CAPACITY

       Father first asserts the trial court erred by “fail[ing] to assess Mother a

full-time earning capacity as a pharmacist.” Id. at 18. Father states, “Mother

consistently employs family members as caregivers for [Child], at no cost to

her.” Id. at 21 (citation to Reproduced Record omitted). According to Father,

Mother pays caregivers from the “$85,000.00 annual Waiver earmarked” for

Child’s care, and thus has “ample opportunity to work outside the home as a

pharmacist.” Id. Father contends, “Mother has willfully failed to maintain

appropriate employment as a pharmacist despite having in-home care for

____________________________________________

4 The per curiam order also stated it was “not a final determination as to the

propriety of the appeal.” Order, 3/9/23.

                                           -8-
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[Child] at no cost to her.” Id. at 20. In his second issue, Father alternatively

argues the trial court erred “in failing to assess Mother a full-time earning

capacity at the current caregiver rate paid for in-home care” of $20.00 per

hour. Id. at 22-23.

      Mother counters that the trial court “decided this matter in accordance

with law and within the bounds of its discretion.”         Mother’s Brief at 12.

According to Mother, the trial court “considered the entire, voluminous

evidentiary record, which included the testimony of two (2) non-party

witnesses.” Id. at 19. Pertinently, Mother claims the trial court “made no

errant findings of fact.”   Id. at 13.     She asserts the trial court properly

determined that “although Mother had willfully failed to obtain employment,

assessment of Mother’s income as a full-time pharmacist was not appropriate

given the factors set forth in [the support guidelines at] Rule 1910.16-

2(d)(4)(ii).” Id. at 19. Mother concludes Father is attempting “to replace the

discretionary judgment of the [t]rial [c]ourt with that of Father or of this

Honorable Court.” Id. at 13. Upon review, we agree.

      Our standard of review is well-settled:

      When evaluating a support order, this Court may only reverse the
      trial court’s determination where the order cannot be sustained on
      any valid ground. We will not interfere with the broad discretion
      afforded the trial court absent an abuse of the discretion or
      insufficient evidence to sustain the support order. An abuse of
      discretion is not merely an error of judgment; if, in reaching a
      conclusion, the court overrides or misapplies the law, or the
      judgment exercised is shown by the record to be either manifestly
      unreasonable or the product of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will,

                                       -9-
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      discretion has been abused. In addition, we note that the duty to
      support one’s child is absolute, and the purpose of child support
      is to promote the child’s best interests.

Kimock v. Jones, 47 A.3d 850, 854 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations omitted).

      As Mother observed, the Rules of Civil Procedure set forth support

guidelines which specifically address earning capacity. Rule of Civil Procedure

1910.16-2 directs the calculation of a party’s monthly net income.             The

relevant language states:

      Generally, the basic child support, spousal support, or alimony
      pendente lite obligation is based on the parties’ monthly net
      incomes.

      …

      (d) Reduced Income or Fluctuating Earnings.

      (4) Earning Capacity.

      (i)            When a party willfully fails to obtain or maintain
                     appropriate employment, the trier-of-fact may impute to
                     the party an income equal to the party’s earning
                     capacity.

            (A) Earning Capacity Limitation. The trier-of-fact:

              (I)        shall not impute to the party an earning
                         capacity that exceeds the amount the party
                         could earn from one full-time position; and

              (II)       shall determine a reasonable work
                         regimen based upon the party’s relevant
                         circumstances, including the jobs available
                         within a particular occupation, working hours
                         and conditions, and whether a party has

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                      exerted substantial good faith efforts to find
                      employment.

        (B) The trier-of-fact shall base the party’s earning capacity
        on the subdivision (d)(4)(ii) factors.

        (C) After assessing a party’s earning capacity, the trier-of-
        fact shall state the reasons for the assessment in writing or
        on the record.

        (D) When the trier-of-fact imputes an earning capacity to a
        party who would incur childcare expenses if the party were
        employed, the trier-of-fact shall consider reasonable
        childcare responsibilities and expenses.

     (ii)         Factors. In determining a party’s earning capacity, the
                  trier-of-fact shall consider the party’s:

            (A)     childcare responsibilities and expenses;
            (B)     assets;
            (C)     residence;
            (D)     employment and earnings history;
            (E)     job skills;
            (F)     educational attainment;
            (G)     literacy;
            (H)     age;
            (I)     health;
            (J)     criminal record and other employment barriers;
            (K)     record of seeking work;
            (L)     local job market, including the availability        of
                    employers who are willing to hire the party;

            (M)     local community prevailing earnings level; and
            (N)     other relevant factors.

Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-2(d)(4) (bold emphasis added).

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      “A person’s earning capacity is defined not as an amount which the

person could theoretically earn, but as that amount which the person could

realistically earn under the circumstances, considering his or her age, health,

mental and physical condition and training.” Gephart v. Gephart, 764 A.2d

613, 615 (Pa. Super 2000). Past earnings alone are not sufficient to support

a determination of earning capacity without corroborating evidence that the

party still has the capacity to earn that amount. Conner v. Conner, 217 A.3d

301, 314 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citing D.H. v. R.H., 900 A.2d 922 (Pa. Super.

2006) (holding trial court erred in determining earning capacity based solely

on party’s most recent tax return)).

      Instantly, the support order states:

            Per Depositions submitted, [Mother] does have the ability to
      receive monetary compensation for providing care for [C]hild [].
      [C]hild was approved to receive an $85,000.00 annual waiver for
      her care in March of 2021 through PALCO, a Financial Management
      Service, which provides claims and billing services for employment
      of Home and Community Based support workers and in-home care
      services.

            As [Mother] does have an available source of income, she is
      assessed a full-time earning capacity based on $18.00 per hour at
      40 hours per week. This is an average monthly assessed gross of
      $3,120.00, with an adjusted monthly assessed net of $2,593.00.
      Assessment is based on PALCO records indicating the pay rate for
      an in-house care giver is $18.00 to $20.00 per hour.

Order, 1/3/23, at 1.

      The trial court explained that it imputed income to Mother after

determining Mother “willfully failed to obtain or maintain” employment. Trial

Court Opinion, 3/31/23, at 11. However, the trial court concluded “it would

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not be appropriate to assess [Mother] full-time income as a pharmacist.” Id.

The trial court reasoned:

      Initially, the record was clear that [Mother] had not worked as a
      pharmacist on a full-time basis since [Child] was born. [Father’s]
      arguments regarding [Mother’s] prior hours worked were not
      convincing, as circumstances have changed since [Mother] last
      worked close to full-time hours, as the family has separated and
      [Child] has aged out of the educational system.

Id.

      The trial court did not abuse its discretion. Mother has not worked full-

time since Child’s birth in 2000. See N.T. (Mother’s Deposition), 7/18/22, at

27. Father concedes that before Child turned 21 and became ineligible for

public school services, “Mother’s income was based upon her actual earnings

as a per diem staff pharmacist.” Father’s Brief at 8.

      Our review discloses that Mother provided the majority of Child’s care

in the six months after Child was born, including “tube feeding,” “doctor

appointments all week long,” and overall “around-the-clock” care.          N.T.

(Mother’s Deposition), 7/18/22, at 28.       In November 2000, Mother began

working on weekends and holidays as a per diem pharmacist for Omnicare.

Id. at 28-29. Mother worked for Omnicare for nine years. Id. at 29. She

then “transfer[red] to a sister company,” Heartland Health Care. Id. Mother

continued to work per diem, 20 hours per week, “but not work the weekend

… hours, but work after [Father] got home until midnight or after. It was a

different shift.” Id. Mother worked at Heartland Health Care for almost five

years. Id.

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       In 2015, Mother began working as a per diem pharmacist for Easton

Hospital and Pharmerica. Id. at 30. At that point, Child was in school, so

Mother could work during the day, and both employers accommodated her

schedule. Id. Mother worked “maybe 20 hours a week,” consisting of every

other weekend at Easton Hospital, and at Pharmerica, “whenever they …

needed me they would put me in the schedule[,] so it was not standard hours.”

Id.   Mother’s employment with Pharmerica terminated “after two or three

years,” because the company relocated. Id. at 30-31.

       Around 2020, Easton Hospital was bought by St. Luke’s Hospital. Id. at

31. Mother worked at St. Luke’s until December 2021. Id. Mother was part-

time at St. Luke’s, but her hours were “variable,” and she was required to

work “multiple shifts that you had to rotate through.” Id. at 32. Mother left

St. Luke’s shortly after Child turned 21, because she “wasn't able to take care

of [Child] working the hours that I had to work there.” Id.

       Keri Kresge, who is employed by Service Access Management, explained

that she locates, coordinates, and monitors “waiver services” for disabled

individuals, including Child. N.T. (Ms. Kresge’s Deposition), 7/18/22, at 5-7,

10-11. Ms. Kresge stated there are “no institutions” for someone with Child’s

disabilities.5 She explained that Child’s services “have to fit within the waiver

____________________________________________

5 Ms. Kresge clarified, “There is White Haven, but you[,] I believe[,] have to

be criminally insane to be in White Haven. Other than that, no, there are
institutions.” N.T. (Ms. Kresge’s Deposition) 7/18/22, at 66.

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amount of $85,000.”     Id. at 67.    Ms. Kresge also explained that in her

experience, caregivers are “mostly” family members, and it is “not

uncommon” for waiver funds to be paid to family members who care for a

disabled relative. Id. at 68-69. According to Ms. Kresge, compensation of

“$18 to $20 an hour is typical.” Id. at 68. Ms. Kresge confirmed that although

Mother was eligible, she opted not to be a paid caregiver. Id. at 70-71.

     Consistent with this evidence, the trial court explained:

     The record clearly reflects that [C]hild … is severely disabled and
     requires one-to-one constant care. [Child] resides with [Mother],
     has aged out of the educational system, and the cost of day care
     services for [Child], to allow [Mother] to work full-time,
     would exceed the $85,000.00 Waiver available for [Child]’s
     care. [Mother] is a licensed pharmacist, having attained a
     Bachelor of Science degree in pharmacy from Temple University
     in 1994. Deposition of [Mother] at p. 13, 18, Father’s Exhibit 4.
     However, it is not feasible for her to work a full-time job as
     a pharmacist, as she has not done so since [Child]’s birth
     and the cost to allow [Mother] to do so is cost prohibitive.
     [Father’s] arguments regarding [Mother’s] prior employment, and
     ability to currently be employed fail, given the changed
     circumstances since May 2021. The record reflects that [Child]
     had been able to attend the Northampton School District and
     received extensive services during the day, including one-to-one
     aid and special transportation. Once [Child] aged out of the public
     school system, the potential cost of care for [Child] increased
     dramatically, from essentially $0.00 at school to $73,000.00 or
     more. Therefore, it would not be appropriate to assess
     [Mother] an income as a full-time pharmacist, her prior area
     of employment.

            However, the record in this matter also indicates [Mother]
     is eligible to be employed under the terms of the Waiver, as the
     caregiver for [Child]. See Deposition of Kresge at 71; Deposition
     of [Mother] at p. 84. Therefore, while [Mother] cannot work full-
     time outside of the home as a pharmacist, it is inappropriate for
     [Mother] to remain on unemployment compensation and/or
     remain unemployed to care for [Child] when she can be

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      compensated through the Waiver for caring for [Child]. [Father]
      obtained records from PALCO related to services provided for
      [Child]. Those records indicate that both [the parties’ older
      daughter] and [Mother’s mother] received payment for services
      provided for [Child]. See Father’s Exhibit 8. Those records also
      reflected a rate of pay of $18.00 to $20.00 per hour. Based upon
      these records, procured and submitted by [Father], we
      determined that it was appropriate to assess [Mother] a full-time
      income based upon $18.00 per hour, 40 hours per week.

Trial Court Opinion, 3/31/23, at 12-13 (emphasis added).

      The record supports the trial court’s reasoning and refutes Father’s claim

that the trial court erred by failing to assess Mother a full-time earning

capacity as a pharmacist.

      Father’s second issue is also unavailing. Father claims the trial court

“erred as a matter of law and abused its discretion in failing to assess Mother

a full-time earning capacity at the current caregiver rate paid for in-home care

as evidenced in the PALCO records.” Father’s Brief at 32. Father argues the

trial court “should have assessed Mother at $20 per hour effective [April 26,

2022].” Id. (citation to Reproduced Record omitted).

      Father cites no legal authority to support his argument.              The

Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently repeated that the “rules of appellate

procedure are explicit that the argument contained within a brief must contain

‘such discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent.’”

Commonwealth v. Armolt, 294 A.3d 364, 376 (Pa. 2023) (citations

omitted).

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      Unlike Father, Mother cites the support guidelines and case law in

asserting, “Father’s argument is, in essence, that he disagrees with the [t]rial

[c]ourt’s conclusion.” Mother’s Brief at 20; see id. at 18-22. Mother claims

Father is “attempting to utilize the availability of the Community Living Waiver

funds to offset his [s]upport [o]bligation.”   Id. at 22.    Mother states the

“records from PALCO indicate that the rate of pay ranged from $18.00 to

$20.00 per hour and that the majority of payments made were at the $18.00

[hourly] rate.”   Id.   Mother emphasizes, “Father is asking this Court to

overrule the [t]rial [c]ourt’s discretionary judgment and substitute its own.”

Id. We agree.

      The trial court explained:

      Given that [Mother] could choose to be employed as an in-home
      caregiver for [Child] and be paid out of the Waiver funds instead
      of employing in-home caregivers or utilizing day care services, we
      found it appropriate to assess [Mother] an income in accordance
      with that opportunity. Upon review of the documents obtained
      from PALCO via subpoena and submitted as Father’s Exhibit 8, the
      documents include pay rates of both $18.00 and $20.00. Under
      the circumstances of this matter, and given the documentation
      and testimony provided, we determined that it was appropriate to
      assess [Mother] at the rate of $18.00 per hour, 40 hours per week.
      …

      … The hourly rate at which [Mother] was assess[ed] was clearly
      reflected in the PALCO records and is therefore fully supported by
      the record in this matter.

Trial Court Opinion, 3/31/23, at 13-14.

      We discern no error. This Court has stated repeatedly that we “will not

interfere with the broad discretion afforded the trial court” unless there is

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“insufficient evidence to sustain the support order.”        Sichelstiel v.

Sichelstiel, 272 A.3d 530, 537–38 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citation omitted); see

also Kimock, 47 A.3d at 854. The record contains ample evidence to sustain

the trial court’s assessment of Mother’s earning capacity.   Accordingly, we

affirm the January 3, 2023 support order.

     Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 9/12/2023

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