Court Opinion

ID: 9590607
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:56:33.429877+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:37:12.893979
License: Public Domain

Smith, Judge,
dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent. In doing so, I do not express an opinion regarding whether Raiford in fact resided at 4197 Henderson Road at the home of his father. Rather, my dissent is based upon my conclusion that the trial court, as the trier of fact regarding this matter, was faced with strong evidence on both sides of this fact question. Required to resolve that fact question, the trial court did so within its sound discretion. This Court, in my view, may not now decide that question differently based upon that evidence, unless the trial court abused its discretion. I do not agree that the trial court abused its discretion, because the record is replete with evidence that supports the trial court’s conclusion, although that evidence was in conflict.
The majority lists in great detail the evidence supporting its own conclusion; it fails to mention that equally strong evidence was presented supporting the opposite conclusion: that Raiford did not “reside” at his father’s home. For example, no dispute exists that at the time Raiford was served with the summons and complaint he was not living with his father on Henderson Road in Hephzibah, but on Battle Road in Augusta. When he first moved out of his father’s home, approximately ten months prior to service, he took all his furniture and clothing even though he had to store his bed elsewhere because there was no room in his new residence for the bed. One of the reasons he moved from his father’s home was that his father needed the room for Raiford’s brother; Raiford could not have lived there had he wished to. The house next door was being occupied by other relatives. Raiford made sworn statements that he had no intention of returning to his father’s home, that he did not consider it his residence, and that in fact he has not resided at 4197 Henderson Road, either temporarily or permanently, since January 1993. These *789sworn statements were unrebutted by any evidence presented by Cushman.
Decided June 20, 1996
Christopher G. Nicholson, for appellant.
Allgood & Daniel, Robert L. Allgood, Robert J. Lowe, Jr., Charles C. Mayers, for appellee.
Our case law holds that the issue of whether this evidence was sufficient to overcome the facts reflected in the return of service is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court. Webb v. Tatum, 202 Ga. App. 89, 91 (413 SE2d 263) (1991). The strong evidence presented by both parties created a question of fact to be resolved by the trial court as the trier of fact on this issue. Terrell v. Porter, 189 Ga. App. 778, 779 (1) (377 SE2d 540) (1989). In such a situation, the law is simple, straightforward, and unambiguous regarding the duty of this Court: if evidence exists to support the trial court’s ruling, it should not be disturbed. Id. at 779 (1). In my view, that is clearly so here. Therefore, whatever this Court’s own conclusion might be as to the weight of the evidence, I would affirm the trial court.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Birdsong and Judge Andrews join in this dissent.