Court Opinion

ID: 9925388
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-19 17:03:30.957174+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:18.845136
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                            Jan 19 2024, 9:18 am

                                                                                 CLERK
                                                                             Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                                Court of Appeals
                                                                                  and Tax Court

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT                                     ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
AMW INVESTMENTS, INC.                                       THE TOWN OF CLARKSVILLE
Matthew J. Hoffer                                           C. Gregory Fifer
Shafer & Associates, P.C.                                   Jeffersonville, Indiana
Lansing, Michigan                                           Scott D. Bergthold
                                                            Law Office of Scott D. Berghold,
Kenneth C. Pierce                                           PLLC
Blanton & Pierce, LLC                                       Chattanooga, Tennessee
Jeffersonville, Indiana

                                             IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

AMW Investments, Inc. et al.,                               January 19, 2024
Appellants,                                                 Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                            23A-PL-508
        v.                                                  Appeal from the Clark Circuit
                                                            Court
The Town of Clarksville, et al.,                            The Honorable Marsha Owens
Appellees.                                                  Howser, Special Judge
                                                            Trial Court Cause No.
                                                            10C04-1905-PL-51

                                Opinion by Judge Bailey
                                  Judge May concurs.
                   Judge Felix concurs in result with separate opinion.

Bailey, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-508 | January 19, 2024                              Page 1 of 20
      Case Summary
[1]   AMW Investments, Inc. (“AMW”) appeals the trial court’s order finding it in

      contempt of an order compelling discovery responses. AMW raises one

      dispositive issue, which we restate as: whether the contempt order must be

      reversed because the trial court abused its discretion when it issued an order

      compelling AMW to respond to the Town of Clarksville’s (“Town”) discovery

      requests without considering objections raised in AMW’s First Supplemental

      Answers.

[2]   We reverse and remand with instructions.

      Facts and Procedural History
[3]   AMW owns real estate located at 4505 Highway 31 East, Clarksville, Indiana,

      and it leases the property to Midwest Entertainment Ventures, Inc. (d/b/a

      Theatre X) (“MEV”),1 an adult entertainment venue. AMW and MEV share

      the same principal business address in Michigan.

[4]   In May 2019, Town revoked Theatre X’s adult business license due to zoning

      ordinance violations. On May 6, 2019, MEV filed a Petition of Appeal of

      Revocation of Adult Entertainment License in the Clark Circuit Court. Town

      filed an Answer to the Petition, as well as counterclaims against MEV and

      1
          MEV is not a party to this appeal, as Town’s contempt motion was filed against AMW only.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-508 | January 19, 2024                            Page 2 of 20
      AMW, seeking, in part, a preliminary injunction enjoining MEV and AMW

      from operating Theatre X in violation of zoning ordinances. MEV and AMW

      then filed motions to dismiss Town’s counterclaims and motion for preliminary

      injunction.

[5]   In November 2019, the trial court denied the motions to dismiss and granted

      Town’s motion for preliminary injunction. The preliminary injunction placed

      specific operating restrictions upon Theatre X, including limiting its hours of

      operation. On December 19, AMW and MEV filed an interlocutory appeal of

      the preliminary injunction order.

[6]   On December 17, 2019, Town filed a motion in which it sought an order

      imposing fines for AMW’s and MEV’s ordinance violations. In February 2020,

      AMW and MEV served discovery documents upon Town. On February 25,

      the trial court issued an order on Town’s motion for fines, stating, in relevant

      part, “[b]ecause the Court’s Order of November 21, 2019, is currently on

      appeal, the Court finds it is without authority to order the relief sought by the

      Town.” Town’s App. v. II at 194. However, because it found “these issues

      may arise again,” the trial court made six pages of findings related to the Town

      having “Satisfied Its Notice Obligations” and AMW being “jointly responsible

      with MEV for the maintenance of Theatre X.” Id. at 194, 198.

[7]   Town provided responses to AMW’s and MEV’s discovery requests. On May

      28, 2020, Town propounded its own discovery requests upon AMW and MEV;

      specifically, interrogatories, requests for production of documents, and requests

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-508 | January 19, 2024       Page 3 of 20
      for admissions. Thereafter, AMW requested and obtained an extension of time

      in which to respond to the discovery requests. On July 15, 2020, AMW

      submitted its responses to discovery, and, for each and every discovery request,

      replied only:

              AMW objects on the basis that discovery is premature and
              inappropriate during the pendency of appeal. AMW has
              consistently challenged the propriety of ‘counterclaims’ in the
              context of an administrative or municipal appeal. That issue is
              currently on appeal in the context of AMW’S appeal of the Order
              Granting Preliminary Injunction on November 21, 2019. The
              Court explicitly noted in its February 25, 2020[,] Order
              Regarding Motion for Imposition of Fines that it presently lacks
              authority during the pendency of the Appeal. This discovery
              request was issued after the divesture of jurisdiction and during
              the period jurisdiction was divested by way of appeal. All further
              and additional objections are reserved.

      August 12, 2021, Appealed Order Granting Motion to Compel at 2-3.

[8]   After complying with the Trial Rule 26(F) requirement to attempt informal

      resolution of the discovery dispute and reaching no such resolution, on August

      28, 2020, Town filed a Motion to Compel discovery responses. In that motion,

      Town noted, “Nor did MEV or AMW raise any substantive objection other

      than ‘jurisdiction was divested’ by their appeal, and that the ‘discovery request

      was issued after the divestiture of jurisdiction.’ … Thus, MEV and AMW have

      waived any objection other than the jurisdictional one.” AMW App. v. II at

      81. On September 4, 2020, AMW filed its response in which it argued only that

      the trial court had been “divested of jurisdiction,” id. at 89, over the case

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-508 | January 19, 2024        Page 4 of 20
       because AMW’s interlocutory appeal was pending, and that “any discovery”

       regarding issues raised on appeal “is foreclosed as this Court currently lacks

       jurisdiction over those issues,” id. at 91. In a docket entry on September 23, the

       trial court stated: “Because this case is on appeal, the trial court will not rule on

       matters until the appeal has been decided.” Id. at 16 (CCS).

[9]    In October 2020, a panel of this Court affirmed the preliminary injunction in

       Town’s favor, and in March 2021, the Supreme Court denied transfer. Midwest

       Ent. Ventures, Inc. v. Town of Clarksville, 158 N.E.3d 787, 789 (Ind. Ct. App.

       2020), trans. denied. On April 29, Town filed a reply brief in support of its

       Motion to Compel Discovery. The reply brief argued that (1) the interlocutory

       appeal had not stayed discovery, and (2) AMW had “waived all other

       objections to the discovery requests” by failing to raise them in any of its

       discovery responses. AMW App. v. II at 107. Town devoted a three-paragraph

       section of its brief to the latter argument.

[10]   On that same date, the trial court held a pretrial conference and scheduled a

       June 21, 2021, hearing on the motion to compel discovery, which was

       subsequently rescheduled to July 8, 2021. Prior to the July 2021 hearing,

       AMW did not file any additional briefing or other documents in response to

       Town’s claims that AMW had waived all objections other than jurisdiction.

       On June 18, 2021, AMW tendered to Town its First Supplemental Responses

       to Discovery, in which it raised multiple objections, including objections related

       to relevance, attorney-client privilege, vagueness, overbreadth, unduly

       burdensome requests, harassment, accountant-client privilege, and attorney

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-508 | January 19, 2024        Page 5 of 20
       work product doctrine. On July 8, 2021, Town filed a supplemental brief in

       support of its motion to compel, arguing again that AMW had waived any

       discovery objection other than the original objection related to the trial court’s

       alleged lack of jurisdiction.

[11]   On July 9, the trial court conducted a hearing on Town’s Motion to Compel

       Discovery. On August 12, 2021, the trial court issued its “Findings and Order

       Granting Respondent[’]s Motion to Compel Discovery.” August 12, 2021,

       Appealed Order at 1. The court order found that MEV’s and AMW’s theory

       that they were not required to respond to discovery because the trial court

       lacked jurisdiction while the interlocutory appeal was pending was without

       merit. In so holding, the trial court cited Indiana Appellate Rule 14(H), which

       states in relevant part, “An interlocutory appeal shall not stay proceedings in

       the trial court unless the trial court or a judge of the Court of Appeals so

       orders.” Id. The trial court noted:

               No judge of the Court of Appeals ordered a stay of proceedings.
               Neither did this Court. The Court did note in its Order
               Regarding Motion for Imposition of Fines that it lacked authority
               to grant the Town’s request for $770,000 in fines during the
               appeal (Feb. 25, 2020, Fines Order at 2), but it never stated it
               lacked jurisdiction over the case or that any proceedings
               (including discovery) were stayed. In fact, this Court ruled on
               several matters in that same February 25, 2020[,] Order as the
               Court found “these issues may arise again.” (Id.)

       Id. at 5-6.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-508 | January 19, 2024        Page 6 of 20
[12]   The trial court also found that AMW and MEV had waived any discovery

       objections that they had “failed to raise in their original responses.” Id. at 6-7.

       In support, the trial court noted that the discovery rules require a party

       responding to discovery to answer the requests or else state an objection and the

       reasons for the objection. The court also cited Marshall v. Woodruff, 631 N.E.2d

       3, 6 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994), as support for its finding that “[a] party that fails to

       timely assert that information is privileged or otherwise undiscoverable in his

       response waives reliance on those objections.” Id. at 6. The trial court ordered

       AMW and MEV to answer Town’s discovery requests within thirty days and

       “withhold nothing on the basis of any objection that they failed to raise in their

       initial responses.” Id. at 7.

[13]   On September 13, 2021, AMW tendered to Town its second supplemental

       discovery responses. On November 8, 2021, Town filed a motion to hold

       AMW2 in contempt of the court’s August order compelling discovery responses.

       On that same date, AMW filed an Affidavit with its Initial, First Supplemental,

       and Second Supplemental discovery responses attached thereto. On January

       18, 2023, AMW filed its response to Town’s motion for contempt, referencing

       the November 8 affidavit and attached supplemental discovery responses.

[14]   The trial court conducted a hearing on the motion for contempt on January 19,

       2023. In its February 7, 2023, order holding AMW in contempt of the August

       2
           The Town did not file a similar motion against MEV.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-508 | January 19, 2024          Page 7 of 20
       12, 2021, order compelling discovery responses, the trial court specifically noted

       that AMW’s first supplemental responses that were tendered on June 18, 2021,

       were “belated.” Appealed February 7, 2023, Order at 4. The court reiterated

       that, in complying with the order compelling discovery responses, AMW was

       “not permitted to raise any objections, or withhold any information, when

       producing discovery.” Id. at 5. The trial court found that AMW had

       “continued to object, and withhold documents, based on relevance and

       privilege[] objections that the Discovery Order held were waived.” Id. at 7.

       The court found that those actions had violated the Discovery Order.

[15]   The trial court imposed upon AMW a $30,000 civil sanction “to coerce

       AMW’s compliance with the Discovery Order,” but noted that “AMW can

       avoid this fine by complying with the Discovery Order—by fully answering the

       Town’s discovery requests, providing the entirety of every responsive

       document, and withholding (including by redaction) nothing therefrom—within

       30 days of this Order.” Id. at 9. The court also found AMW liable for Town’s

       attorney fees and expenses incurred in addressing AMW’s failure to comply

       with the Discovery Order. This appeal ensued.

       Discussion and Decision
       Standard of Review
[16]   AMW appeals the trial court’s order finding it in contempt of the order

       compelling discovery responses and, in so doing, challenges the underlying

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-508 | January 19, 2024       Page 8 of 20
       order compelling discovery responses.3 We review those orders for an abuse of

       discretion.

               Trial courts “stand much closer than an appellate court to the
               currents of litigation pending before them,” so they are better
               positioned to assess and manage discovery matters. Whitaker v.
               Becker, 960 N.E.2d 111, 115 (Ind. 2012). They accordingly have
               “wide discretionary latitude,” Vanway v. State, 541 N.E.2d 523,
               527 (Ind. 1989), and their orders carry “a strong presumption of
               correctness,” Gonzalez v. Evans, 15 N.E.3d 628, 633 (Ind. Ct.
               App. 2014), trans. denied; see McCullough [v. Archbold Ladder Co.],
               605 N.E.2d [175,] 180 [Ind. 1993]. We will not overturn a
               decision absent clear error and resulting prejudice. See Ind. Trial
               Rule 61; Vanway, 541 N.E.2d at 527.

       Care Group Heart Hosp., LLC v. Sawyer, 93 N.E.3d 745, 757 (Ind. 2018).

       Timeliness of AMW’s Discovery Responses
[17]   AMW filed its initial discovery responses on July 15, 2020, and those responses

       objected to the discovery requests solely on the grounds that the trial court

       allegedly lacked jurisdiction to rule upon discovery while the interlocutory

       appeal was pending. AMW admittedly raised no other objections in its initial

       discovery response. However, on June 18, 2021, which was over two weeks

       before the July 9 hearing on Town’s motion to compel discovery, AMW

       supplemented its discovery responses; in its First Supplemental Responses,

       3
         This Court has jurisdiction to review both the underlying order compelling discovery and the contempt
       order. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Scroghan, 851 N.E.2d 317, 322 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-508 | January 19, 2024                            Page 9 of 20
       AMW raised additional discovery response objections, such as relevance and

       attorney-client privilege. In its August 12, 2021, order compelling AMW to

       respond to the discovery requests, the trial court found that AMW was not

       permitted to rely upon any objection other than the one raised in its initial—i.e.,

       July 15, 2020—discovery response. Thus, the trial court refused to consider any

       of the objections AMW raised in its June 18 supplemental discovery response.

       It is that decision which AMW now appeals.4

[18]   Pursuant to Trial Rule 26(B)(1), a party “may obtain discovery regarding any

       matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject-matter involved in the

       pending action whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking

       discovery or the claim or defense of any other party[.]” The purpose of

       Indiana’s discovery rules is “to allow a liberal discovery procedure” for the

       purposes of providing litigants “with information essential to the litigation of all

       relevant issues, eliminat[ing] surprise[,] and … promot[ing] settlement.”

       Canfield v. Sandock, 563 N.E.2d 526, 528 (Ind. 1990).

       4
         AMW argues, in addition, that its jurisdictional objection in its initial discovery response was correct;
       however, we hold that objection was clearly incorrect, as no stay of the proceedings had been issued. See Ind.
       Appellate Rule 14(H) (“An interlocutory appeal shall not stay proceedings in the trial court unless the trial
       court or a judge of the Court of Appeals so orders.”); Battering v. State, 150 N.E.3d 597, 602 (Ind. 2020)
       (emphasis original) (“A plain reading of [Indiana Appellate Rule 14(H)] provides that an interlocutory appeal
       only constitutes a stay if the trial court or the Court of Appeals so orders.”).
       AMW also argues on appeal that the Town waived its claim that AMW waived any objections not contained
       in its original discovery response, e.g., relevance. AMW asserts that Town waived that claim by not
       sufficiently raising it in the trial court. However, that assertion is incorrect, as Town clearly raised the waiver
       argument in both its August 28, 2020, Motion to Compel and its April 29, 2021, Reply Brief in Support of
       Motion to Compel. See AMW’s App. at 81; Town’s App. v. II at 234-238. And AMW had the opportunity
       to—and did—respond to those arguments.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-508 | January 19, 2024                                  Page 10 of 20
[19]   Discovery requests such as interrogatories, requests for production of

       documents, and admissions “shall be answered separately and fully in writing

       under oath, unless [they are] objected to, in which event the reasons for

       objections shall be stated in lieu of an answer.” T.R. 33(B) (regarding

       interrogatories); see also, T.R. 34(B) (requiring a written response to a request for

       production of documents “unless it is objected to… in which event the reasons

       for objection shall be stated”); T.R. 36(A) (providing that, “if objection is

       made” to a request for admission, “the reasons therefore shall be stated”). 5

[20]   Indiana Trial Rule 26(E) not only allows supplementation of discovery

       responses that were not “complete when made[,]” but requires such

       supplementation. T.R. 26(E). Trial Rule 26(E)(a) and (b) states, “A party is

       under a duty seasonably to amend a prior response if he obtains information

       upon the basis of which (a) he knows that the response was incorrect when

       made, or (b) he knows that the response though correct when made is no longer

       true and the circumstances are such that a failure to amend the response is in

       substance a knowing concealment.” See also, e.g., Morse v. Davis, 965 N.E.2d

       148, 160 (Ind. Ct. App.) (citing Johnson v. Wait, 947 N.E.2d 951, 962

       (Ind.Ct.App.2011), trans. denied) (“Indiana Trial Rule 26(E) requires parties to

       supplement discovery responses after the initial response.”), trans. denied; Lucas

       v. Dorsey Corp., 609 N.E.2d 1191, 1196 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (“The duty

       5
         Thus, as indicated by the plain language of our discovery rules, a “response” to discovery is an “answer”
       and/or an “objection.” See, e.g., T.R. 33(B).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-508 | January 19, 2024                             Page 11 of 20
       seasonably to supplement a discovery response is absolute and is not predicated

       on a court order.”), trans. denied.6 Our Supreme Court has indicated that the

       duty to timely supplement a discovery response related to new information can

       continue even up to the eve of, or during, trial. See Outback Steakhouse of Fla.,

       Inc. v. Markley, 856 N.E.2d 65, 78 (Ind. 2006).

[21]   Here, AMW’s timely7 discovery responses in its July 15, 2020, initial response

       addressed only the alleged lack of jurisdiction while the interlocutory appeal

       was pending and did not raise other objections. When the parties received the

       new information that the appeal had ended, it became clear that the objections

       based on jurisdiction, even if they had been correct when made (which they

       were not), were moot. Therefore, AMW supplemented its discovery responses

       with its additional responses, including new objections.8 See T.R. 26(E)(a), (b).

       Trial Rule 26(E) allows such supplementation of discovery responses, and there

       was no deadline imposed in this case, either by the court or agreement of the

       6
         In fact, even responses that were “complete when made” must be supplemented if they become incorrect or
       relate to witnesses and persons with discoverable knowledge. See T.R. 26(E)(1), (2).
       7
         AMW had obtained an extension of time to respond to discovery requests, up to and including July 15,
       2020.
       8
         The concurrence would hold that the rule regarding supplementation of discovery is not even applicable to
       AMW’s June 18, 2021, supplemental answers because there was no “new information” that would allow or
       require supplementation. However, as we note above, the relevant new information in this case was the final
       denial of AMW’s interlocutory appeal. That new information made it clear that AMW’s initial discovery
       responses based on the alleged “divestment” of jurisdiction pending the interlocutory appeal was no longer
       applicable and that supplemental responses were required. Thus, we analyze the timeliness of AMW’s June
       18, 2021, supplemental responses under Trial Rule 26 rather attempting to create a new balancing test for
       “untimely” responses under Rules 33, 34, and 37, as the concurrence suggests.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-508 | January 19, 2024                           Page 12 of 20
       parties, for supplementing discovery responses. See T.R. 16(A), (J) (regarding

       pre-trial conferences and orders). Therefore, AMW’s supplemental responses,

       filed before the hearing and the decision on Town’s motion to compel, were

       “seasonable” and permissible.9 T.R. 26(E). The trial court abused its discretion

       when it refused to consider AMW’s supplemental discovery responses. And

       AMW was prejudiced by that error; not only was it limited to objections that

       had become moot, but it was required to provide full responses to discovery

       without the court’s consideration of any of its supplemental objections.

[22]   Both the trial court and Town pointed to Marshall v. Woodruff, 631 N.E.2d 3, 6

       (Ind. Ct. App. 1994), as support for AMW’s alleged waiver of any discovery

       responses other than its original responses. However, this reliance is misplaced.

       Marshall correctly held that any issue—including discovery responses—not

       raised in the trial court until a motion to correct error or appeal is waived as

       untimely. Id. at 8. However, that is not the situation in the case before us;

       AMW raised its additional objections to the discovery requests before the July

       2021 hearing and August 2021 order compelling discovery and well before the

       February 2023 order finding it in contempt of the discovery order. Marshall is

       inapposite.

       9
         AMW waited approximately three months to file its supplemental discovery responses after it obtained the
       “new information” that its interlocutory appeal had failed. Some may opine that three months is not
       “seasonable” per Rule 26(E), although we note that Town has not made that particular argument. However,
       as the rule does not provide a time limit for what is “seasonable,” there was no discovery deadline in this
       case, and the supplemental response was filed weeks before the hearing on the motion to compel, we
       conclude that the supplemental responses were “seasonably” provided. T.R. 26(E).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-508 | January 19, 2024                           Page 13 of 20
[23]   As additional support for its claim that AMW must be held solely to its original

       discovery objections, Town points to federal procedural rules and caselaw10

       finding discovery objections waived when they were not “timely” asserted. See

       Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(4) (interrogatory rule stating that “any ground not stated

       in a timely objection is waived”);11 see also, e.g., Byrd v. Reno, No. Civ.A.96 2375,

       1998 WL 429676, *4 (D.D.C. Feb. 12, 1998) (“A failure to file a timely

       objection to interrogatories constitutes a waiver of any objection unless good

       cause is shown.”). However, this begs the question of what constitutes a

       “timely” objection. None of the cases—either state or federal—cited by Town

       prohibit consideration of supplemental discovery responses provided prior to a

       hearing and order on a motion to compel, when there was no deadline in place

       for supplementing discovery responses.12

                                                    Conclusion
[24]   AWM’s supplemental discovery responses, including objections, were timely

       submitted, as they were provided before the hearing on Town’s motion to

       compel discovery responses and there was no deadline in this case that required

       an earlier supplementation of discovery responses. The trial court erred when it

       10
          “Where a state trial rule is patterned after a federal rule, we will often look to the authorities on the federal
       rule for aid in construing the state rule[,]” although those authorities are not binding upon us. Cleveland
       Range, LLC v. Lincoln Fort Wayne Assocs., LLC, 43 N.E.3d 622, 624 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).
       11
            We note that Indiana’s Rule 33 regarding interrogatories contains no such waiver language. T.R. 33(B).
       12
          Moreover, we note federal law provides that even untimely responses may be allowed where good cause
       for the delay is shown. See id.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-508 | January 19, 2024                                   Page 14 of 20
       refused to consider the objections contained in AMW’s first supplemental

       discovery responses. We reverse and remand with instructions to consider

       those objections.

[25]   Reversed and remanded with instructions.

       May, J., concurs.

       Felix, J., concurs in result with separate opinion.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-508 | January 19, 2024   Page 15 of 20
       Felix, Judge, concurring in result.

[26]   I concur in the result but respectfully disagree with the majority’s analysis

       decision for three reasons. It appears to me that the majority reaches the

       conclusion that AMW’s objections, raised in its Supplemental Response, were

       not waived because they were not untimely. First, I believe AMW’s objections,

       raised in its Supplemental Response, were late and untimely. However and

       secondly, I believe that a late-raised objection does not necessarily result in a

       waiver of that objection. Finally, I believe Marshall v. Woodruff provides the

       outer boundaries for when a late objection can be deemed waived. Marshall

       does not stand for the proposition that waiver of an objection only occurs when

       a late-raised objection gets raised at the motion-to-correct-error stage. Here, we

       need to determine when the late-raised objections can be found to be waived.

[27]   To start, I believe that the timeliness and waiver of an objection to a discovery

       request are separate questions requiring separate analyses. In other words, I do

       not believe an untimely objection to a discovery request necessarily waives that

       objection.

[28]   In support of its untimeliness-equals-waiver argument, Town references the

       Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Admittedly, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

       33 contains a blanket waiver provision. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(4) (“Any

       ground not stated in a timely objection is waived unless the court, for good

       cause, excuses the failure.”) Federal case law has expanded that waiver

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-508 | January 19, 2024       Page 16 of 20
       provision to Federal Rule Civil Procedure 34. See Boles v. Aramark Correctional

       Svcs., LLC, 2018 WL 3854143 (6th Cir. 2018). However, the Indiana Trial Rules

       do not include an equivalent—or any—waiver provision in Rules 33, 34, or 36.

       The argument that we should look to the federal rules for guidance on whether

       an untimely discovery objection is waived is not persuasive.

[29]   Because our trial rules do not specify that an untimely objection to a discovery

       request is waived, and lacking any relevant guidance from the federal

       counterpart to those rules, I disagree that an untimely objection to a discovery

       request is necessarily waived. This determination of whether a late-submitted

       objection is waived should be decided by the trial court based upon facts and

       circumstances of the case as I will explain below.

[30]   Secondly, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that AMW’s objection was

       timely and with its reasoning that there was no deadline for making such an

       objection. The majority opinion is based on Trial Rule 26(E), which allows for

       supplementing a discovery response. However, Trial Rule 26(E) prescribes the

       duty to supplement a prior response in the event of “information thereafter

       acquired.” T.R. 26(E). There is no indication that the objections here arise

       from or are based on information acquired after AMW filed its initial objection

       on July 15, 2020. As a matter of fact, it appears that AMW knew all along that

       its subsequently (and late-) raised objections could be asserted, they simply

       chose not to do so. As a result, I do not believe Trial Rule 26(E) applies.

       Instead, I believe the timeliness of an objection to a discovery request is more

       appropriately governed by the trial rules, here, Trial Rule 33, 34, and 36.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-508 | January 19, 2024     Page 17 of 20
[31]   Under our trial rules, the deadline for responding to a discovery request is set in

       the rule regarding the type of discovery at issue. See Ind. Trial Rule 33(B)

       (“Answers or objections to interrogatories shall include the interrogatory . . . to

       which an objection is being made. . . . [R]easons for objections shall be stated in

       lieu of an answer.”); T.R. 33(C) (requiring responding party to serve “answers

       or objections within a period designated by the party submitting the

       interrogatories, not less than thirty [30] days after service”); T.R. 34(B)

       (requiring written response to requests for production of documents, including

       objections, within “a period designated in the request, not less than thirty [30]

       days after the service thereof”); T.R. 36 (deeming admitted any request for

       admission not answered or objected to “within a period designated in the

       request, not less than thirty [30] days after service thereof”). The deadlines for

       discovery responses, including objections, in those rules should be applied in

       this case.

[32]   Here, AMW served its amended objections after the 30-day deadline set in the

       relevant trial rules, beyond any extension granted in a trial court order or

       allowed by Town, and more than 30 days after the Indiana Supreme Court

       denied transfer of the interlocutory appeal. As a result, I believe the objections

       AMW asserted in its June 2021 first supplemental responses were not timely.

[33]   Finally, although I would find AMW’s new objections to be untimely, I do not

       believe that AMW has waived those objections or that Marshall v. Woodruff

       requires a contrary conclusion. Marshall responded to a motion to compel

       discovery on the ground that the requested information was “unavailable.”

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-508 | January 19, 2024       Page 18 of 20
       Marshall v. Woodruff, 631 N.E.2d 3, 6 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994). Ultimately, the trial

       court dismissed Marshall’s complaint for “non-compliance with discovery.” Id.

       at 5. Marshall then filed a motion to correct error, asserting for the first time an

       objection to the discovery requested on the ground that it was privileged or

       otherwise undiscoverable. Id. at 6. “Prior to her motion to correct errors,

       Marshall never contended the information was privileged or otherwise

       undiscoverable as it related to the issue of damages. Marshall cannot now rely

       on these untimely reasons for objection.” Id. In support, the court cited T.R.

       34(B) and Rodgers v. Rodgers, 503 N.E.2d 1255, 1257 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987),

       which held that a party may not raise in a motion to correct error or on appeal

       an issue not raised in the trial court. In sum, Marshall tells us that an untimely

       objection is waived when it is asserted for the first time in a motion to correct

       error or later.

[34]   Here, as the majority explains, AMW’s objections were raised prior to the

       hearing on the Motion to Compel; in other words, much sooner than at the

       motion-to-correct-error stage. This begs the question, when does a late-raised

       objection become waived. I would suggest the following factors are relevant to

       that inquiry. To determine whether an untimely objection to a discovery

       request is waived, I believe courts should consider factors such as these:

               1. the obstreperousness of the party;

               2. the complexity (or lack thereof) of the issues;

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-508 | January 19, 2024       Page 19 of 20
               3. the amount of time that passed between a motion to compel
               and the hearing on that motion;

               4. the amount of time, effort, and/or expense the requesting
               party put into trying to get the issue resolved (e.g., T.R. 26(F)
               efforts); and

               5. good cause.

[35]   Applying such an analysis to this case, I believe that AMW’s supplemental

       responses (the late-raised objections) were late for the reasons explained above,

       but I would hold that those objections are not waived given: (1) the rare and

       unusual circumstances of this case, namely, the confusion created by the

       interlocutory appeal as to whether the trial court retained authority over the

       matter; (2) the lack of evidence that either party was being obstreperous; (3) the

       lack of any real effort by Town to resolve the issue, given that Town only sent a

       single letter to AMW pursuant to T.R. 26(F); (4) the fact that Town’s Motion

       to Compel was filed on August 28, 2020, and the hearing on that motion did

       not occur until July 9, 2021; and (5) the fact that the amended/supplemented

       objections were filed prior to the hearing on the motion to compel.

[36]   For these reasons, I concur and would also reverse the trial court’s decision.

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