Court Opinion

ID: 9482829
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 09:02:08.178671+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:49:14.234922
License: Public Domain

TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
While I am glad to concur in part I of the majority opinion, I disagree with the opinion’s interpretation of § 922(a)(1) in part II, and thus, respectfully dissent.
*1011Title 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20) provides that if a state has restored a defendant’s civil rights, (following conviction), without expressly restricting a defendant’s right to possess firearms, that offense cannot serve as a predicate offense for purposes of § 922(g) — regardless of whether the underlying crime was punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.
It is clear from the language of the provision that when Congress enacted § 921(a)(20) it intended that courts refer to state law, when the predicate conviction is for a state crime, to determine whether an individual should be subject to federal firearms laws by virtue of a criminal conviction. Cf. United States v. Essick, 935 F.2d 28, 30 (4th Cir.1991); United States v. Gómez, 911 F.2d 219, 220 (9th Cir.1990). The majority correctly indicates that Massachusetts does not have a general civil rights restoration statute. Rather, Massachusetts affirmatively restricts the civil rights of a convicted felon, including his/her rights to carry a firearm.9 However, an individual convicted of a crime categorized as a misdemeanor under Massachusetts law, as was Ramos in this case, does not lose any of his/her civil rights, and can legally possess a firearm in the state of Massachusetts even after conviction.
It is apparent from its legislation that Massachusetts has made a clear determination that an individual like Ramos, who stands convicted of a misdemeanor under Massachusetts law, does not pose such a danger to himself or society to merit a suspension of his civil rights, including his right to carry a firearm. In fact, the statement of undisputed facts which accompanied Ramos’ guilty plea established that on May 12, 1988, Ramos was issued a license to carry firearms by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and that at the time of the purchase and receipt of each of the firearms described in Counts I-Y of the indictment, defendant’s license to carry was valid and in effect. To hold that because Ramos never had his civil rights taken away they could not have been restored and therefore he is a “felon in possession,” goes against the clear congressional intent to grant states the discretion to decide who can and cannot carry a firearm within that state. It also flies against all logic and common sense.
If Ramos never lost his civil rights it is beyond my understanding how the majority can say that he had to have his civil rights restored to avoid federal prosecution. This interpretation of “restored” goes against the “ordinary meaning” of the word. “Restored,” as the majority correctly states, is defined by Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1971) as follows; “to give back (as something lost or taken away).” If we assign “restored” its ordinary meaning, then we find that Ramos cannot have his civil rights “restored” because they were never lost or taken away.
As it stands now, this court would grant relief to an individual whose crime was serious enough to merit an initial suspension of civil rights, so that restoration is required, but deny relief to an individual whose crime was not considered serious enough by the particular state to merit a suspension of civil rights. This result is at best unfair, but more importantly it is inconsistent, and in contravention with the clear intent of § 921(a)(20). If, as I think it did, Congress intended the “felon in possession” definition to apply only to those convicted of crimes serious enough to merit an initial suspension of civil rights by the convicting state, then Ramos is beyond the reach of § 922(g).
Congress has afforded states the discretion to decide who should have the privilege of carrying a firearm and who should not. Nowhere in the text of § 921(a)(20) does it say that the action of the state has to be made “affirmatively,” and the majority provides no authority supporting this conclusion other than their own conclusion. If the majority feels that § 921(a)(20) is in any way not clear — a logical position considering the text of § 921(a)(20) — the prop*1012er disposition is to erase Ramos’ conviction for purposes of § 922(g) and make a suggestion to Congress to clarify the provision. Clear precedent from this court mandates that:
[i]f a statute is ambiguous, this court must interpret it in favor of the criminal defendant. The rule is based both on fairness to individuals in providing adequate notice and the belief that legislatures and not courts are the appropriate bodies for defining criminal activity.
United States v. Stoner, 927 F.2d 45, 47 (1st Cir.1991) (citing United States v. Anzalone, 766 F.2d 676, 680-81 (1st Cir.1985)). Just as we cannot manufacture ambiguity in order to defeat the intent of a statute, Stoner, 927 F.2d at 47 (citation omitted), we also cannot ignore vagueness in order to defeat the claim of a defendant.
Clearly in this case Massachusetts meant for Ramos to have this privilege to bear arms. Thus, I believe that the civil rights restoration clause of § 921(a)(20) nullified Ramos’ prior conviction for purposes of § 922(g), and on those grounds his conviction under that statute should be reversed.
I disagree that this conclusion means, as the majority fears, that every convicted felon will have his/her civil rights “restored,” at least in part, when he/she is released from prison, probation or parole, making the exception so broad as to swallow § 922(g) entirely. As the majority itself points out, the state of Massachusetts makes an affirmative distinction between individuals it considers felons, and individuals it considers misdemeanants — in Massachusetts, felons are not entitled to carry firearms, while misdemeanants are. Hence, the exception does not swallow the rule. Simply because Massachusetts has not followed the procedure followed by other states, which means enacting legislation specifically restoring the civil rights of an individual, does not grant this court the authority to curtail, through judicial legislation, the discretion given to states by congressional mandate.
The intent of § 922(g) is made clear by the majority on page 1009 of its opinion— that persons convicted of serious crimes not be allow to carry weapons. However, Congress grants states a significant amount of discretion to say who is a person convicted of so serious a crime that he/she should not be allowed to carry a weapon. Massachusetts’ judgment on this matter is clear — to allow misdemeanants, like Ramos, to carry weapons. The fact that he had a legal license to carry firearms issued by the State of Massachusetts, in addition a legislation clearly stating that felons, and not misdemeanants, lose the right to carry firearms, is about as “focused” an indication as we can get from a state that persons like Ramos, and those similarly situated, may carry firearms.
It is no surprise that several other federal courts of appeals have arrived at outcomes arguably different from the majority’s. See, e.g., Gómez, supra, 911 F.2d 219; United States v. Dahms, 938 F.2d 131 (9th Cir.1991); Essick, supra, 935 F.2d 28. I see no difference from the Massachusetts’ general legislation taking away the right of a convicted felon to carry a firearm, and the more general civil rights restoration statutes by other states.
As Massachusetts intended to permit Ramos to carry a weapon, and it was this intent by the state which Congress sought to protect through § 922(a)(20), we have no authority to undermine it through judicial interpretation or otherwise.
I dissent.

. See Mass.Gen.Laws Ann. ch. 234A, § 4, subsection 7 (West 1991); Mass.Gen.Laws Ann. ch. 279, § 30 (West 1991); Mass.Gen.Laws Ann. ch. 41, § 96A (West 1991); and Mass.Gen.Laws Ann. ch. 140, § 131.