Court Opinion

ID: 9630064
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:59:08.906013+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:32:40.248851
License: Public Domain

LATOURETTE, J.
This is a declaratory judgment proceeding brought by School District No. 1, Multnomah County, et al., against the members of the Tax Supervising and Conservation Commission of Multnomah County and the Attorney General, to obtain a judicial construction of Art XI, § 11 of the constitution which was amended November 4,1952, the applicable part being:
“(1) Unless specifically authorized by a majority of the legal voters voting upon the question, no taxing unit, whether it be the state, any county, municipality, district or body to which the power to levy a tax shall have been delegated, shall in any year so exercise that power as to raise a greater amount of revenue for purposes other than the payment of bonded indebtedness or interest thereon than its tax base, as hereinafter defined. The tax base of each said taxing unit for any given year shall be: (a) The total amount of tax lawfully levied by it in any one of the three years immediately preceding for purposes other than the payment of bonded indebtedness or the interest thereon and exclusive of any levy specifically authorized as aforesaid in excess of the tax base, plus six percentum of said total amount; or, (b) an amount approved by a majority of the legal voters voting upon the question of establishing a tax base.
“(2) The question of establishing a tax base *603shall be submitted at a regular general or primary-election. Every such measure shall specify in dollars and cents the amount of the tax base in effect and the amount of the tax base sought to be established, and the new tax base, if adopted, shall first apply to the levy for the fiscal year next following its adoption.”
On March 4,1954, the board of directors of plaintiff district adopted a resolution calling for an election to increase the tax base from $7,419,476 to $12,704,644. On May 21, 1954, an election was duly held whereby the voters of plaintiff school district increased the tax base of the district to $12,704,644. On June 24, 1954, the school directors levied a tax for the fiscal year, July 1,1954 to June 30,1955, of $11,190,000.
On November 8, 1954, the directors of the district adopted a resolution indicating a need for a levy of $12,704,644 for the fiscal year 1955-1956 and called on the Tax Supervising and Conservation Commission of Multnomah County to declare its position in the premises. Thereupon the said commission by resolution declared its position to be that the district could not legally levy a tax in excess of $11,190,000 plus six per cent of said amount.
The trial court held that the district was constitutionally authorized to levy a tax for the fiscal year 1955-1956 in the amount of $12,704,644, the newly established tax base. Defendants appeal.
Defendants argue that notwithstanding the establishment of a tax base of $12,704,644 by the voters on May 21, 1954, since plaintiffs levied a tax of $11,190,-000 for the fiscal year 1954-1955, that establishes the tax base for the ensuing fiscal year and all that plaintiffs could levy would be that amount plus six per cent. They urge that subsection (2) of § 11, Art XI of the constitution must be read in connection with *604subsection (1) of such section and article and is limited thereby. On the other hand, plaintiffs contend that subsection (1), § 11, Art XI of the constitution is not a limitation on subsection (2) and that when the voters establish a tax base such base remains until removed by the electorate.
It is a fundamental rule that when the language in a constitutional provision or statute is clear and free from ambiguity, it is not permissible to apply well-known canons of construction. This principle is clearly stated in State ex rel. Bell v. Pierce, 118 Or 533, 540, 247 P 812, as follows:
“The rule can be invoked only where the language of the constitution is doubtful, obscure or uncertain. If the language is plain and certain there is no reason for applying rules of construction. The wording of the amendment under consideration requires no construction. In an opinion by Mr. Justice Eand, Article XI-c was held by this court not to admit of construction.
“ ‘The language of the amendment is clear and free from ambiguity. By giving to the words used their usual and ordinary meaning, the intent of the amendment is plain, and nothing is left for construction.’ Moore v. Olcott et al., 105 Or. 269, 209 Pac. 498.”
Before proceeding to a consideration of the amendment we shall trace its history. As § 11 o.f Art XI originally appears in the 1916 amendment to the constitution, a tax levying body was limited in the amount of tax revenue that could be raised in any year to the total amount levied in the “year immediately preceding” plus six per cent. In 1932 § 11 was amended extending this limitation so as to allow a tax levying body to exercise its power of taxation in any year to raise an amount of revenue not in excess of the “total *605amount * * * levied by it in any one of the three years immediately preceding” plus six per cent.
Taxing bodies were authorized to levy special taxes in any one year providing legal voters gave their sanction. However, by the 1916 and 1932 constitutional provisions such special tax levy could not be included in the tax base for future levies.
By reason of constitutional limitations local governing bodies, on account of their growing financial needs, brought about by increased population, inflation and other economic factors, were hamstrung, so to speak, in raising sufficient revenue to meet the needs of government without resorting to annual special elections.
In order to obviate the necessity of holding special elections which added nothing to the tax base, Art XI, § 11, was amended to provide for two methods of determining a tax base. Prom the unambiguous language employed it is clear that the methods for determining a tax base are alternative and independent of each other. By subdivision (a) of subsection (1) of the amendment, it, like the previous constitutional provision, fixes the tax base at the amount of tax lawfully levied by a taxing unit to the highest levy during the preceding triennium plus six per cent. Subdivision (b) of subsection (1) authorizes a majority of the legal voters to establish a tax base. This the voters of the district did at an election in the amount of $12,704,644.
Subsection (2) of the amendment provides that the new tax base “shall first apply to the levy for the fiscal year next following its adoption.” The fact that plaintiffs levied a tax of $11,190,000 for the fiscal year next following the adoption of the new base of $12,-704,644 would not affect the tax base as established by the voters. There is nothing in the law requiring a taxing unit in levying taxes to utilize the full tax base *606voted by tbe people. Such base becomes static until changed by tbe electorate. There is nothing in the language used that in any wise implies that the base established by the voters is later subject to the triennium levy plus six per cent found in subsection (1) of the amendment.
Defendants argue that subsections 3 and 4 of the amendment are indicative of the intent of the legislature to hold to the triennium principal plus six per cent, even though the people vote a tax base. Those subsections have to do with the levying of taxes when there has been a consolidation of municipal bodies, which we do not have in the present case.
Since the language of the amendment evinces a clear and unambiguous intent to authorize legal voters to establish a quiescent tax base, the decree of the learned trial judge will be affirmed.
No costs.
*607Robert Y. Thornton, Attorney General, Salem, and Thomas B. Brand, Deputy District Attorney, Portland, argued the cause for appellants.