Court Opinion

ID: 9496205
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 16:20:13.080156+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:57:25.257632
License: Public Domain

BERZON, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I concur in the majority’s result. I agree that Padilla was inadmissible at the time her order of removal was reinstated. The denial of her application for adjustment of status correctly stated that Padilla was “inadmissible in that, following deportation, [she] re-entered the United States without the permission of the Attorney General.”1 See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii) (“Any alien not described in clause (i) [‘Arriving aliens’] who ... has been ordered removed under section 240 or any other provision of law ... is inadmissible.”). A request for permission to reapply for entry, see 8 C.F.R. §§ 212.2(a); 212.2(e),2 might have cured Padilla’s inadmissibility premised on her illegal reentry, but no such request was ever filed with the district director. As a result, Padilla has not shown that she was prejudiced by the failure to afford her a hearing prior to the reinstatement, because she does not identify a plausible claim for opposing removal pursuant to reinstatement.
I disagree, however, with the majority’s (and the agency’s) reliance on the bar to
relief contained in 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) as an alternative ground for denying the petition. That provision, enacted as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRI-RA”), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (Sept. 30, 1996), must be read in harmony with the subsequently amended 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i), see Pub. L. No. 105-119 § 111, 111 Stat. 2440, 2458 (Nov. 26, 1997), under which Padilla applied for adjustment of status. In an appropriate case I would permit the agency a first opportunity to consider the intersection of these two statutory provisions. Absent such agency guidance, my interpretation is that the later-enacted section 1255(i) should be given effect alongside section 1231(a)(5), not obliterated by it. Padilla applied for adjustment of status under the former provision before her removal order was reinstated pursuant to the latter. She was therefore not applying for relief barred by section 1231(a)(5), as removal had not been ordered at the time she applied.
The reinstatement provision is silent about how prior applications for adjustment of status are to be treated. The legislative history of IIRIRA suggests a concern with applications filed after, not before, a prior order of removal is reinstated:
*927If an aben reenters the United States illegally after having been removed or departed voluntarily under an order of removal, the prior order of removal is reinstated and the alien shall be removed under the prior order, which shall not be subject to review. The ahen is not eligible to apply for any rehef under the INA.
Conference Report H.R. 104-828 (Sept. 24, 1996), 142 Cong. Rec. H10,897 (1996) (emphasis added).
I therefore find persuasive the analysis on this question in Prado Hernandez v. Reno, 86 F.Supp.2d 1037 (W.D.Wash.1999). Prado Hernandez held that the INS can and should consider on its merits a fully-perfected apphcation for adjustment of status filed before reinstatement proceedings are instigated.
Prado Hernandez, like Padilla, was detained after making an apphcation for adjustment of status. The court stated:
Prado Hernandez’s request for adjudication of his apphcation for adjustment of status [...] does not constitute a challenge to his deportability under INA § 241(a)(5) [8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5)] or a collateral attack on the prior order of deportation. Nor can the apphcation be deemed a request for rehef from deportation; Prado Hernandez applied for adjustment of status before any deportation proceedings had commenced. [... ] Here, the INS did not move to reinstate the prior deportation order until after Prado Hernandez had apphed for adjustment of status. The language of Section 241(a)(5), therefore, is no bar to considering the apphcation.
Id. at 1041 (emphasis added). Further, “[t]he absence, in Section 245(i) [8 U.S.C. § 1255®], of a cross-reference to Section 241(a)(5) or other language barring adjustment to aliens who illegally reentered after deportation is significant in light of the numerous other limitations and statutory cross-references in INA § 245 in general and Section 245® in particular.” Id. at 1041 n. 4.
The government argues against this reading of 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) on the ground that the wording of amendments to the Legal Immigration Family Equity (“LIFE”) Act demonstrates that Congress intended section 1231(a)(5) to cut off rehef to an individual who has filed an apphcation for adjustment of status prior to reinstatement. These amendments, see P.L. No. 106-554 §§ 1503(c)(2); 1505(a)(1)(B); 1505(b)(1)(B), 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A325; 2763A326; 2763A327 (Dec. 21, 2000), made exceptions for Nicaraguans, Haitians, and members of two class action groups as follows: “Section 241(a)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act [8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5)] shah not apply with respect to an alien who is applying for adjustment of status under this section.”
This language precludes removal under section 1231(a)(5) of the covered groups of aliens while applications for adjustment of status are pending. It does not address the availability of adjustment of status vel non, or the INS’s authority to refrain from reinstatement and removal while a potentially meritorious apphcation for adjustment of status is pending, should the agency choose to do so. These LIFE Act amendments therefore fail to answer the statutory interpretation question before us.
My conclusion that proper adjustment of status applications should not be cast aside by a subsequent reinstatement order does not apply in this case, however. Padilla failed to submit a cognizable apphcation for adjustment of status because she never requested the necessary permission to reapply for entry. And, due to her inadmissibility, she has not demonstrated any *928prejudice. I therefore concur in the denial of the petition.

. The INS argues that Padilla, due to her initial attempt at a fraudulent entry, is inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i). Fraudulent entry was not a reason given by the agency for denying Padilla's application for adjustment of status.

. 8 C.F.R. § 212.2(e) states: “An applicant for adjustment of status under section 245 of the Act and part 245 of this chapter must request permission to reapply for entry in conjunction with his or her application for adjustment of status. This request is made by filing an application for permission to reapply, Form 1-212, with the district director having jurisdiction over the place where the alien resides. If the application under section 245 of the Act has been initiated, renewed, or is pending in a proceeding before an immigration judge, the district director must refer the Form 1-212 to the immigration judge for adjudication.” (Emphasis added.)