Court Opinion

ID: 9900331
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-18 22:11:06.800557+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:04.384387
License: Public Domain

No. 552              October 18, 2023                   697

          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                  STATE OF OREGON

                  STATE OF OREGON,
                   Plaintiff-Respondent,
                             v.
               CASEY JAY SCHNEIDER,
                  Defendant-Appellant.
             Clackamas County Circuit Court
                   17CR79747; A176556

  Katherine E. Weber, Judge.
  Argued and submitted July 6, 2023.
   Marc D. Brown, Deputy Public Defender, argued the
cause for appellant. Also on the brief was Ernest G. Lannet,
Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, Office of Public
Defense Services.
   Patricia G. Rincon, Assistant Attorney General, argued
the cause for respondent. Also on the brief were Ellen F.
Rosenblum, Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General.
   Before Aoyagi, Presiding Judge, and Joyce, Judge, and
Jacquot, Judge.
  JOYCE, J.
  Reversed and remanded.
698                                       State v. Schneider

        JOYCE, J.
         Defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction
entered after a jury trial for two counts of first-degree sex-
ual abuse, ORS 163.427. Defendant asserts that the pros-
ecutor made certain statements during closing argument
that “improperly shifted the burden of production” onto
defendant, and that the trial court erred in overruling his
objection to the argument. We agree. And because we fur-
ther conclude that the error was not harmless, we reverse
and remand.
                           FACTS
         Although the primary issue is a legal one and the
facts related to that issue largely procedural, the assessment
whether any error was harmless requires a description of
facts that are relevant to that question. The charges against
defendant arose out of alleged sexual-contact between defen-
dant and the two complainants, K and W. At the time of the
alleged abuse, K and W were approximately 10 and 8 years
old, respectively, and defendant was in a relationship with
their mother.
        K and W disclosed the alleged abuse to their mother
and K also disclosed the alleged abuse to her aunt. Both chil-
dren then underwent interviews with a forensic examiner at
the Children’s Center. During these recorded interviews, K
and W described how defendant had allegedly abused them.
Additionally, both K and W disclosed during the interviews
that they knew that their friend had been sexually abused
by a member of her family. K further disclosed that her
mother and her aunt had told her that they too were victims
of sexual abuse. During the interview, K also discussed that
she had seen some movies with her mother that included
sexually explicit content including sexual abuse.
         At defendant’s jury trial, both children testified
that defendant had sexually abused them. Their mother
and their aunt also both testified about the children’s dis-
closures. Defendant testified and denied abusing the chil-
dren. Defendant’s theory—conveyed to the jury during
closing argument—was that K and W must have been influ-
enced to make false disclosures of abuse due to their prior
Cite as 328 Or App 697 (2023)                                   699

sexual knowledge or because they had been influenced by
the knowledge that their mother, aunt, and friend had all
experienced sexual abuse.
        To rebut that theory, during the state’s closing argu-
ment, the prosecutor argued that the jury should disbelieve
the defense’s theory that the abuse was an “implanted mem-
ory from prior sexual knowledge or from influence of other
people or an adopted trauma from one kid to another.” In so
arguing, the prosecutor made several statements that form
the basis of this appeal:
       “[PROSECUTOR]: The Defense wants you to believe
   that [K] made this allegation because of the influences in
   her life. That because she talked to [her friend] about her
   abuse, that it somehow influenced her memory or her dis-
   closure. We don’t have any evidence of that. If it did, how,
   when, why? [The friend] was interviewed, and if there was
   anything relevant or admissible, you would have heard it.
       “[K’s aunt], the Defense wants you to believe that
   because [K’s aunt] asked [K] questions about the abuse and
   told [K] about her own abuse when [K] disclosed, that [K]
   was somehow influenced by that.
      “They also want you to believe that [K’s mother] some-
   how influenced her. [K’s mother] may or may not have asked
   a suggestive question or told [K] that she’d been abused
   herself, and that somehow influenced [K], after the fact.
   That doesn’t make any sense, because [K’s mother] didn’t
   even want this information out.
       “The Defense had the opportunity to cross-examine both
   [the mother and the aunt] and [W] and [K] about those con-
   versations to find out if those things occurred and they didn’t
   take that opportunity.”
(Emphasis added.)
         At that point, defendant objected and argued
that the state was “shifting [its] burden to prove this
case to the defense.” During the course of defendant’s
objection, defendant also expressed his opposition
to text that was apparently being displayed on the
state’s slideshow presentation that referred to an
additional witness that defendant “could have sub-
poenaed as well.”
700                                         State v. Schneider

        The court overruled defendant’s objection.
The prosecutor continued:
     “Again, they had the opportunity to cross-examine
  those people and they didn’t on those issues.
     “The Defense is right, the State has the burden of proof.
  We have the burden of proof to put on the evidence and to
  prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt. The Defendant is
  not required to put on any evidence, but they did. They put
  on a case. The Defense has the same subpoena power as the
  State.”
(Emphasis added.)
        The jury convicted defendant of two counts of first-
degree sexual abuse.
         On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court
erred when it overruled his objection to the prosecutor’s
statements during closing argument. More specifically,
defendant contends that the italicized portions of the pros-
ecutor’s statements above “improperly shifted the bur-
den of production because the comments suggested that
the defendant had a burden to disprove an element of the
offense or subpoena witnesses to support his theory of the
case.” The state concedes that the prosecutor’s statements
were improper but argues that the error was harmless. As
explained below, we agree with the parties that the trial
court erred in overruling defendant’s objection to the pros-
ecutor’s statements but disagree with the state that that
error was harmless.
                 STANDARD OF REVIEW
         Generally, “[w]e review a trial court’s decision to
overrule an objection to closing arguments for abuse of dis-
cretion.” State v. Totland, 296 Or App 527, 531, 438 P3d
399, rev den, 365 Or 502 (2019). “However, when the court’s
decision to limit argument is based on a legal determina-
tion, as it was in this case, we review the court’s decision
for legal error.” State v. Sanchez-Cacatzun, 304 Or App 650,
660, 468 P3d 964 (2020), rev den, 367 Or 559 (2021). We view
statements made during argument in context and not in a
vacuum. Totland, 296 Or App at 531. If our review reveals
that “an argument was improper, properly challenged, and
Cite as 328 Or App 697 (2023)                              701

likely to prejudice the jury unfairly,” then we must reverse.
Id. (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).
                    LEGAL ANALYSIS
         Axiomatically, the presumption of innocence is a
cornerstone of our judicial system. Under that presumption,
“the law presumes every defendant upon trial charged with
crime to be innocent[.]” State v. Rosasco, 103 Or 343, 357,
205 P 290 (1922). Accordingly, the burden is thus placed on
the prosecution to “prove by evidence to the satisfaction of
the trial jury beyond a reasonable doubt[ ] that the defen-
dant committed the crime charged in the indictment.” Id.
          Consistent with that bedrock principle, a prosecu-
tor “may attempt to persuade the jury that it should believe
one version of events and not another.” State v. Purrier, 265
Or App 618, 620-21, 336 P3d 574 (2014). However, a prose-
cutor may not “inappropriately characterize the jury’s fact-
finding function in a manner that raises some realistic pos-
sibility of confusing the jurors about the ultimate standard
or burden of proof.” Id. at 621.
         We have thus previously recognized that there are
only “two limited circumstances in which a prosecutor is
permitted to comment on a defendant’s failure to present
or contradict evidence.” State v. Mayo, 303 Or App 525, 531,
465 P3d 267 (2020) (internal quotation marks and brackets
omitted). The first circumstance is when a defendant raises
an affirmative defense, such as an extreme emotional dis-
turbance defense. State v. Skotland, 326 Or App 469, 478,
533 P3d 55 (2023). That is because a defendant bears “both
the burden of production and persuasion on that issue.”
Mayo, 303 Or App at 532. Because a defendant bears those
burdens, when a prosecutor comments on a defendant’s fail-
ure to present evidence in support of an affirmative defense,
there is no realistic possibility of confusing jurors about the
ultimate standard or burden of proof. Id.
         The second exception is when a defendant raises
a defense where the defendant “bears the initial burden of
production, but fails to present any evidence, (e.g., an alibi
defense).” Skotland, 326 Or App at 478 (internal quotation
marks and brackets omitted). In that circumstance, when
702                                       State v. Schneider

a defendant decides to raise a defense, such as an alibi,
and when a prosecutor comments on a defendant’s failure
to present evidence in support of that defense, there is no
realistic possibility of confusing jurors about the ultimate
standard or burden of proof because “the defendant has vol-
untarily assumed some burden of production by raising a
‘defense,’ under ORS 161.055(3).” Mayo, 303 Or App at 533.
         We recently revisited the question of burden shift-
ing in Skotland, describing the circumstances in which a
prosecutor can and cannot comment on a defendant’s failure
to present corroborating evidence. In that case, the defen-
dant was convicted of a variety of crimes, including unlaw-
ful purchase of a firearm, after he attempted to purchase
a firearm despite having prior felony convictions. Skotland,
326 Or App at 470. Part of the defendant’s defense was
that, because he had been working with an attorney to get
his record expunged, he lacked the requisite knowledge of
whether he had a felony conviction that precluded him from
purchasing a firearm (an element of establishing unlawful
purchase of a firearm). Id. at 471-72. However, during cross-
examination, the defendant would not identify the attorney
who had assisted him and testified that he did not have cop-
ies of the expungement paperwork. Id. at 472.
         Before closing arguments, the defense attorney
made a preemptive objection to prevent the state from mak-
ing a burden-shifting argument. Id. In response, the trial
court ruled that it would be permissible for the prosecutor to
argue that the defendant “could have” presented certain evi-
dence “if [the defendant] wanted to * * * because [the defen-
dant] was asked about that” evidence. Id. at 479-80. During
closing argument, the prosecutor made statements insinu-
ating that “defendant ‘could have’ presented corroborating
evidence by answering [particular] questions on cross[ ]
examination.” Id. at 480.
        On appeal, we held that the trial court erred
because that line of argument permitted the prosecutor to
improperly shift the burden of proof to the defendant. Id.
at 480. More specifically, we explained that “[b]y suggest-
ing that defendant ‘could have’ presented corroborating evi-
dence by answering the prosecutor’s questions on cross[ ]
Cite as 328 Or App 697 (2023)                              703

examination, the trial court allowed the state to ‘suggest
that defendant had the burden’ to produce that corroborat-
ing evidence ‘to prove that his version of events was true,
to create reasonable doubt about his knowledge’ of his felon
status.” Id. (quoting Mayo, 303 Or App at 537 (brackets omit-
ted)). We further explained that it was error for the trial
court to allow the state to make this suggestion because the
defendant “had no burden” to present any evidence on that
issue. Id.
        Here, as in Skotland, the prosecutor’s statements
pointing out that defendant “didn’t take [the] opportunity” to
cross-examine witnesses or to subpoena certain individuals
allowed the prosecutor to argue that defendant “could have,”
but did not, present certain evidence to support his theory
of defense. In doing so, the trial court permitted the state
to suggest that defendant had the burden to prove that his
version of events was true, to create reasonable doubt about
whether he had subjected the children to sexual contact.
Thus, the prosecutor’s statements during closing argument
resulted in shifting the burden of proof onto defendant.
         Furthermore, and again as in Skotland, defendant’s
theory of defense did not trigger either of the two limited cir-
cumstances in which a prosecutor is permitted to comment
on a defendant’s failure to present or contradict evidence.
In arguing that the children had been influenced by oth-
ers to make erroneous disclosures of abuse, defendant was
challenging whether the state could establish that he had
subjected the children to sexual contact at all—an element
of proving that he had committed first-degree sexual abuse.
ORS 163.427.
         In sum, given the presumption of innocence, the
state is the only party who has the burden to prove the
elements of the crime for which a defendant is charged.
Therefore, when a defendant has a theory of defense based
on challenging whether the state can prove an element
of the charged crime, comments from a prosecutor about
a defendant’s failure to present evidence to support that
defense theory carry a risk of confusing jurors and caus-
ing them to misapprehend and misallocate the burden of
proof. Given defendant’s theory here—that the state could
704                                        State v. Schneider

not establish that he had subjected the children to sexual
contact (an element of the charged crime)—any suggestion
that defendant had a burden to produce evidence in support
of that theory goes against the fact that the state is the only
party who had a burden to submit evidence on that issue.
The prosecutor’s statements stating that defendant “could
have” presented certain evidence to support his theory of
defense—that he had never sexually contacted the children
and that the children had been influenced to make errone-
ous disclosures of abuse—suggested that defendant had the
burden to prove that his version of events was true to cre-
ate reasonable doubt about whether the sexual contact had
occurred. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court erred
when it overruled defendant’s objection to the prosecutor’s
argument.
         That said, we must determine whether, despite the
error, there is “little likelihood that the particular error
affected the verdict[.]” State v. Davis, 336 Or 19, 32, 77 P3d
1111 (2003). To be sure, as the state observes, the trial court
provided a number of instructions to the jurors regarding the
burden of proof. Prior to voir dire, the trial court informed
the prospective jurors of the presumption of innocence and
explained that “the burden [was] on the State to prove the
Defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Then, during
the trial court’s preliminary instructions to the jury, the
trial court told the jury that “[a]ny defendant is innocent of
any crime unless and until the State proves his or her guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.” Before closing arguments, the
court further instructed the jury that, “The Defendant is
innocent unless and until the Defendant is proven guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt. The burden is on the State, and
the State alone, to prove the guilt of the Defendant beyond a
reasonable doubt.”
         But we have previously concluded that instructions,
like those above, do not go far enough to correct the partic-
ular harm that results from an argument that improperly
shifts the burden of proof. See Mayo, 303 Or App at 538-
39 (explaining that “the court’s generic instructions, while
clarifying that the state bore the ultimate burden of proof,
failed to specifically inform the jury that defendant need not
Cite as 328 Or App 697 (2023)                             705

present witnesses to corroborate his testimony to create a
reasonable doubt as to whether he had knowledge of the drugs
in his backpack”); Skotland, 326 Or App at 482 (noting that
the court’s generic instructions did not cure possible harm
resulting from improper burden-shifting argument because
the instructions “did not clarify that defendant did not need
to corroborate his testimony to create reasonable doubt as to
whether he knew he was a felon”); State v. Solis, 326 Or App
60, 63, 530 P3d 537 (2023) (stating that “[t]he court’s generic
instructions did not cure the misrepresentation”).
         Here, the trial court’s instructions are virtually
indistinguishable from those in Skotland, Mayo, and Solis,
inasmuch as the instructions failed to specifically inform
the jury that defendant need not cross-examine witnesses or
subpoena individuals to corroborate his theory of defense to
create reasonable doubt as to whether he had made sexual
contact with the children. As such, those instructions were
insufficient to cure the potential harm that the improper
argument created.
         Furthermore, the harm was also not cured by the
prosecutor correctly articulating the proper allocation of
the burden of proof while the prosecutor was in the midst of
making the challenged statements. Although the prosecutor
accurately explained that the state has “the burden of proof
to put on the evidence and to prove the case beyond a rea-
sonable doubt” and that “the [d]efendant is not required to
put on any evidence,” any curative value those remarks had
was undermined because they were sandwiched between
statements that improperly shifted the burden of proof to
defendant. Therefore, the prosecutor’s explanation of the
burden of proof during closing argument was also insuffi-
cient to cure the harm that the improper argument created.
         Lastly, we disagree with the state that the error
was harmless because, given “the strength of the state’s evi-
dence[,] * * * there was little risk that the jury would have
found defendant guilty based on the evidence he failed to
introduce.” The prosecutor’s argument “did not pertain to an
incidental or a collateral matter.” Mayo, 303 Or App at 539.
To the contrary, the crux of defendant’s defense was that
the alleged sexual contact had never occurred and that the
706                                         State v. Schneider

children had been influenced to make erroneous disclosures
of abuse. When the prosecutor was permitted to argue that
defendant “didn’t take [the] opportunity” to cross-examine
or subpoena certain individuals in support of his theory of
defense, the state “improperly undercut defendant’s credi-
bility in a case in which credibility was key[.]” Id. Therefore,
the prosecutor’s improper arguments were harmful to
defendant’s main theory of defense and, in our view, had
some likelihood of affecting the jury’s verdict. Accordingly,
we conclude that the trial court’s error in overruling defen-
dant’s objection to the prosecutor’s improper argument was
not harmless.
        Reversed and remanded.