Court Opinion

ID: 9896700
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 15:00:40.092518+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:12.473572
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-13847    Document: 12-1      Date Filed: 11/14/2023   Page: 1 of 13

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-13847
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        ELBERT WALKER, JR.,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
        versus
        DISMAS CHARITIES, INC.,
        CAROL OATES,
        KIMBERLY JOHNSON,

                                                   Defendants-Appellees.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Middle District of Georgia
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                  22-13847

                       D.C. Docket No. 5:21-cv-00460-MTT
                            ____________________

        Before JILL PRYOR, ABUDU, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               Elbert Walker, Jr., proceeding pro se, appeals the district
        court’s orders denying his motion for a default judgment. He also
        argues that the district court judge should have sua sponte recused
        himself due to a conflict of interest. After careful review, we affirm.
                                          I.
               Walker’s claims in this lawsuit arise out of incidents that oc-
        curred while he was on home confinement as part of a federal crim-
        inal sentence. After Walker was convicted in federal court of con-
        spiracy to commit arson and other crimes, he received a sentence
        that consisted of 121 months’ imprisonment and a three-year term
        of supervised release. In June 2020, Walker was released from
        prison and permitted to serve the remainder of his custodial sen-
        tence in home confinement. His home confinement was overseen
        by Dismas Charities, Inc., a corporation that contracted with the
        Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”).
               While on home confinement, Walker had to obtain permis-
        sion from Dismas to leave his home. In March 2021, he requested
        permission from Dismas to leave his home to work for a construc-
        tion company. Initially, Dismas employee Kimberly Johnson ap-
        proved Walker’s request. But shortly after giving approval, John-
        son told Walker that he could not work for the construction
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        22-13847               Opinion of the Court                         3

        company. Six months later, Johnson apparently changed her mind
        and approved Walker to work at the construction company. But a
        month later she again told Walker that he could not. According to
        Walker, there was no valid reason for Johnson’s decisions that he
        could not work at the construction company.
              In October 2021, while on home confinement, Walker
        sought permission from Dismas to attend religious services at a
        mosque. Dismas employee Carol Oates denied the request, telling
        Walker that it was not allowed under BOP policy.
               Walker filed a complaint in federal district court against Dis-
        mas, Johnson, and Oates. Walker claimed that Johnson’s decisions
        denying him permission to work for the construction company vi-
        olated his due process rights under the Fifth Amendment because
        he did not receive a hearing. And he claimed that Oates’s decision
        denying him permission to attend religious services at the mosque
        violated his First Amendment right to free exercise of religion.
        Walker also alleged that these decisions constituted cruel and unu-
        sual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Walker
        demanded money damages for the mental and physical suffering
        that he experienced, as well as punitive damages. He did not re-
        quest any injunctive or declaratory relief.
               After Walker filed his complaint, he served the three defend-
        ants. The defendants failed to file a responsive pleading or other-
        wise defend the lawsuit, and the clerk entered a default.
              Walker then filed a motion for a default judgment. He ar-
        gued that the allegations in the complaint established that the
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        4                         Opinion of the Court                   22-13847

        defendants had violated his constitutional rights. He requested that
        the district court award him $463,500 in damages.
               The district court denied Walker’s motion for a default judg-
        ment. It explained that after the clerk’s entry of default, the defend-
        ants were deemed to have admitted all the well-pleaded factual al-
        legations in Walker’s complaint. But, the court cautioned, Walker
        was not automatically entitled to a default judgment; the court had
        to consider whether the unchallenged facts in his complaint estab-
        lished a legitimate cause of action.
                 The court concluded that the allegations in Walker’s com-
        plaint failed to state a claim for relief. It liberally construed
        Walker’s complaint as asserting claims under Bivens v. Six Unknown
        Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), for violations of his
        constitutional rights. But the court explained that the Supreme
        Court had recognized that a Bivens remedy was available for a con-
        stitutional violation by a federal official in three specific contexts:
        “under the Fourth Amendment for an unreasonable seizure arising
        from a warrantless arrest of a man in his home,” “under the Fifth
        Amendment for gender discrimination arising from the termina-
        tion of a congressional aide,” and “under the Eighth Amendment
        arising from the failure to provide medical care to a prisoner.” Doc.
        8 at 5. 1
               The district court concluded that no Bivens remedy was
        available for the constitutional violations that Walker alleged.

        1 “Doc.” numbers refer to the district court’s docket entries.
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        22-13847                    Opinion of the Court                                  5

        Regarding Dismas, the district court explained that the Supreme
        Court had held that there was no remedy under Bivens against a
        private business that operated “under contract with the Bureau of
        Prisons.” Id. at 6 (citing Correctional Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S.
        61, 63 (2001)). And as to the claims against Johnson and Oates, the
        district court concluded that Walker’s constitutional claims arose
        in a new context—that is, a context different from one in which the
        Supreme Court had previously recognized a Bivens remedy—and
        that special factors counseled hesitation against implying a Bivens
        remedy for a federal prisoner serving the remainder of his prison
        sentence on home confinement. The district court thus denied
        Walker’s motion for a default judgment. 2 Because Walker’s com-
        plaint failed to state a claim for relief, the district court gave him an
        opportunity to file an amended complaint to address the deficien-
        cies that the court had identified.

        2 The district court liberally construed Walker’s complaint as raising three
        other claims: (1) “a claim for employment discrimination based on religion,”
        (2) a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim arising under Georgia law,
        and (3) an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim arising under Geor-
        gia law. Doc. 8 at 8. With respect to these three claims, the district court con-
        cluded that Walker’s complaint failed to state a claim for relief and thus denied
        his motion for default judgment as to these claims as well. Because Walker’s
        appellate brief, even liberally construed, does not raise any argument related
        to these non-constitutional claims, we discuss them no further. See Timson v.
        Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008) (“While we read briefs filed by pro
        se litigants liberally, issues not briefed on appeal by a pro se litigant are deemed
        abandoned[.]” (citation omitted)).
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        6                       Opinion of the Court                   22-13847

               When Walker failed to file an amended complaint by the
        court’s deadline, it ordered him to show cause why the case should
        not be dismissed. In response, Walker stated he would not amend
        because the allegations in his complaint were sufficient to state a
        claim for relief and established that he was entitled to a default
        judgment. After finding that Walker failed to comply with multiple
        orders, the district court dismissed his complaint without preju-
        dice.
               This is Walker’s appeal.
                                           II.
               We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s denial of
        a motion for a default judgment. Mitchell v. Brown & Williamson
        Tobacco Corp., 294 F.3d 1309, 1316 (11th Cir. 2002). “A district court
        abuses its discretion if it applies an incorrect legal standard, applies
        the law in an unreasonable or incorrect manner, follows improper
        procedures in making a determination, or makes findings of fact
        that are clearly erroneous.” Aycock v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
        769 F.3d 1063, 1068 (11th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks
        omitted).
               Generally, we review for abuse of discretion a district court
        judge’s refusal to recuse. In re Walker, 532 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir.
        2008). But when a party fails to argue for a judge’s recusal before
        the district court, we review the failure of a district court judge to
        sua sponte recuse for plain error. Hamm v. Members of the Bd. of Re-
        gents of Fla., 708 F.2d 647, 651 (11th Cir. 1983). Thus, we will only
        correct an error that the plaintiff failed to raise in the district court
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        22-13847                Opinion of the Court                          7

        if: (1) an error occurred; (2) the error was plain; and (3) the error
        affected substantial rights. See United States v. Berger, 375 F.3d 1223,
        1227 (11th Cir. 2004) (applying the plain error standard to review a
        district court judge’s failure to recuse).
                                          III.
                On appeal, Walker argues that the district court erred when
        it denied his motion for a default judgment because the allegations
        in his complaint were sufficient to state a claim that the defendants
        violated his constitutional rights. He also argues for the first time
        on appeal that the district court judge should have recused himself.
        We address each issue in turn.
                                          A.
               When a defendant has failed to plead or defend, a district
        court may grant a motion for a default judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P.
        55(b)(2). Because of our “strong policy of determining cases on
        their merits,” default judgments are generally disfavored. In re
        Worldwide Web Sys., Inc., 328 F.3d 1291, 1295 (11th Cir. 2003).
                Although “a defaulted defendant is deemed to admit the
        plaintiff’s well-pleaded allegations of fact, he is not held to admit
        facts that are not well-pleaded or to admit conclusions of law.” Cot-
        ton v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 402 F.3d 1267, 1278 (11th Cir. 2005)
        (alteration adopted) (internal quotation marks omitted). A default
        judgment is warranted only “when there is a sufficient basis in the
        pleadings for the judgment entered.” Surtain v. Hamlin Terrace
        Found., 789 F.3d 1239, 1245 (11th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation
        marks omitted); see Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353,
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        8                       Opinion of the Court                    22-13847

        1370 n.41 (11th Cir. 1997) (“[A] default judgment cannot stand on
        a complaint that fails to state a claim.”). “[A] motion for default
        judgment is like a reverse motion to dismiss for failure to state a
        claim,” requiring a court to assess the legal sufficiency of the claims.
        Surtain, 789 F.3d at 1245. We thus ask whether the complaint “con-
        tain[ed] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim
        to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
        678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
                The issue before us is here is whether the allegations in
        Walker’s complaint were sufficient to state a claim against the de-
        fendants for violations of his constitutional rights. At the outset, we
        note that although the complaint stated that the constitutional
        claims were brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, this statute is inappli-
        cable. Section 1983 provides a cause of action for a claim brought
        against a “person acting under color of state law.” Patrick v. Floyd
        Med. Ctr., 201 F.3d 1313, 1315 (11th Cir. 2000). But there is no alle-
        gation that Dismas, Johnson, or Oates were acting under color of
        state law. Instead, the allegations in the complaint reflect the claims
        against the defendants arise out of actions they took while acting
        pursuant to a contract with the federal government. Because Walker
        is a pro se litigant, we liberally construe his complaint as bringing
        claims against the defendants for money damages under Bivens and
        thus ask whether he stated a claim for relief under Bivens.
               In Bivens, the Supreme Court recognized an implied cause of
        action for money damages against the federal officers who alleg-
        edly violated an individual’s Fourth Amendment when arresting
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        22-13847               Opinion of the Court                        9

        him inside his home. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389. After Bivens, the
        Supreme Court recognized implied causes of action under the Con-
        stitution for money damages in two additional contexts: (1) under
        the Fifth Amendment for gender discrimination arising from the
        termination of a congressional aide, Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228,
        230 (1979), and (2) under the Eighth Amendment for failure to pro-
        vide medical care to a prisoner, Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 19–20
        (1980).
               “Since these cases, the [Supreme] Court has not implied ad-
        ditional causes of action under the Constitution.” Egbert v. Boule,
        596 U.S. 482, 491 (2022). Instead, the Court has described “expand-
        ing the Bivens remedy” as “a disfavored judicial activity.” Ziglar v.
        Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120, 135 (2017) (internal quotation marks omitted).
        Recently, the Court clarified that the inquiry into whether a Bivens
        remedy is available “often resolve[s] to a single question: whether
        there is any reason to think that Congress might be better equipped
        to create a damages remedy.” Boule, 596 U.S. at 492. And when a
        case “involves a new category of defendants, . . . a court is not un-
        doubtedly better positioned than Congress to create a damages ac-
        tion.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
               The Supreme Court’s decision in Malesko is particularly in-
        structive here. In that case, a federal inmate was injured while liv-
        ing at a halfway house where he was serving part of his federal
        criminal sentence. See 534 U.S. at 64. A private corporation, acting
        under a contract with the Bureau of Prisons, operated the halfway
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                  22-13847

        house. Id. at 63–64. The inmate later sued the contractor for dam-
        ages. Id. at 64–65.
                The Supreme Court considered whether the inmate had an
        implied cause of action against the contractor. Id. at 63. The Court
        explained that “[t]he purpose of Bivens is to deter individual officers
        from committing constitutional violations” through “the threat of
        litigation and liability.” Id. at 70. The Court stated that the “threat
        of suit against an individual’s employer was not the kind of deter-
        rence contemplated by Bivens.” Id. The Court reasoned that “if a
        corporate defendant is available for suit, claimants will focus their
        collection efforts on it, and not the individual directly responsible
        for the alleged injury.” Id. at 71. The Court refused to “infer[] a
        constitutional tort remedy against a private entity” such as the con-
        tractor. Id. It also noted that the inmate had an adequate alternative
        remedy he could pursue by filing a grievance through the BOP’s
        administrative procedures. Id. at 74.
               Based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Malesko, we con-
        clude that Walker failed to state a claim against Dismas. Just like
        the inmate in Malesko had no implied damages remedy under the
        Constitution against a contractor that operated a halfway house for
        individuals serving federal criminal sentences, we conclude that
        Walker has no implied damages remedy under the Constitution
        against Dismas, a private contractor supervising federal prisoners
        serving their federal criminal sentences on home detention. See id.
        at 70–71; see also Walden v. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention,
        669 F.3d 1277, 1291 (11th Cir. 2012) (holding that Malesko
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        22-13847                    Opinion of the Court                                  11

        “foreclosed inferring a constitutional tort remedy against a private
        entity” (internal quotation marks omitted)), abrogated on other
        grounds by EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 575 U.S. 768
        (2015).
               We also conclude that Walker failed to state a claim against
        Johnson or Oates. In effect, Walker’s complaint seeks to extend the
        implied remedy against federal officials first recognized in Bivens to
        a new class of defendants: individual employees of government
        contractors. On top of that, he asks us to recognize an implied
        cause of action under the Constitution to claims brought by a per-
        son in home confinement as part of a federal criminal sentence al-
        leging violations of his right to free exercise of religion under the
        First Amendment, his right to procedural due process under the
        Fifth Amendment, and his right to be free from cruel and unusual
        punishment under the Eighth Amendment. Because “a court is not
        undoubtedly better positioned than Congress to create” such a
        damages remedy, we conclude that Walker does not have an im-
        plied cause of action under the Constitution for his constitutional
        claims against Johnson or Oates. Boule, 596 U.S. at 492.
               Because Walker’s complaint failed to state a claim for relief,
        we cannot say that the district court erred when it denied his mo-
        tion for a default judgment. 3

        3 In his appellate brief, Walker states in passing that the district court also erred
        in dismissing his complaint. Even assuming that Walker adequately raised a
        challenge to the district court’s dismissal of his complaint for failure to comply
        with court orders, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion.
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        12                           Opinion of the Court                          22-13847

                                                  B.
                We now consider Walker’s argument that the district court
        judge should have recused himself. A judge is to recuse “himself in
        any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be ques-
        tioned.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). The standard for recusal under § 455(a)
        is “whether an objective, disinterested, lay observer fully informed
        of the facts underlying the grounds on which recusal was sought
        would entertain a significant doubt about the judge’s impartiality.”
        United States v. Patti, 337 F.3d 1317, 1321 (11th Cir. 2003) (internal
        quotation marks omitted). In general, “bias sufficient to disqualify
        a judge must stem from extrajudicial sources” unless a “judge’s re-
        marks in a judicial context demonstrate such pervasive bias and
        prejudice that it constitutes bias against a party.” Thomas v. Tenneco
        Packaging Co., 293 F.3d 1306, 1329 (11th Cir. 2002) (internal quota-
        tion marks omitted). The Supreme Court has recognized that

        We treat the district court’s dismissal in this case as a dismissal without preju-
        dice. It’s true that when the statute of limitation bars a plaintiff from refiling,
        we will review a dismissal without prejudice as though it was a dismissal with
        prejudice. See Mickles v. Country Club, Inc., 887 F.3d 1270, 1280 (11th Cir. 2018).
        But we treat the dismissal here as being without prejudice because the district
        court dismissed the action well before the limitations period for any of
        Walker’s claims had expired. And “because the case was dismissed without
        prejudice, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion” when it
        dismissed the action for failure to comply with court orders. Dynes v. Army Air
        Force Exch. Serv., 720 F.2d 1495, 1499 (11th Cir. 1983). In addition, we also may
        affirm on the alternative ground that the complaint failed to state a claim for
        relief. See James River Ins. Co. v. Ultratec Special Effects, Inc., 22 F.4th 1246, 1256
        (11th Cir. 2022) (explaining that we can affirm a district court’s “ruling on any
        ground that is supported by the record”).
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        22-13847                Opinion of the Court                         13

        “judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a
        bias or partiality motion.” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555
        (1994).
               Because Walker raises the recusal issue for the first time on
        appeal, we review the district court’s failure to recuse himself sua
        sponte for plain error only. See Hamm, 708 F.2d at 651. Walker says
        that the district court should have recused himself because his rul-
        ings in this case show that he was biased against Walker. But we
        cannot say that the district court’s judicial rulings demonstrated
        any bias. Thus, the district court did not plainly err in failing to sua
        sponte recuse himself. See Thomas, 293 F.3d at 1329.
                                          IV.
               For the reasons set forth above, we affirm.
               AFFIRMED.