Court Opinion

ID: 9451305
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 17:13:24.445011+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:32:39.685541
License: Public Domain

J. JOSEPH SMITH, Circuit Judge
(dissenting):
I dissent.
§ 16 of the FTCA, 15 U.S.C. § 56, imposes a duty on the FTC to certify facts to the Attorney General, and a duty on the Attorney General then to cause appropriate proceedings to be brought. Among the appropriate proceedings are those described in § 5(1) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(1). That is the connection between the two sections, which of course must be read together. But even when read in conjunction with § 5(1), § 16 does not say that the appropriate proceedings may be brought only when certification occurs.
Furthermore, if the Attorney General may exercise discretion after the facts are certified and decline to bring suit, then the FTC’s compliance procedures are vexed as much as they are here. Especially in a case such as this, where the FTC requested that the Attorney General bring suit, the FTC and Attorney General are not working at cross-purposes. The certification procedure is not designed to protect the party who may be liable to penalty, but rather to assure that the FTC and Attorney General will act. As the District Court stated, the purpose of the Wheeler-Lea Act was to “put some teeth” into cease and desist orders.
The general duty of the Attorney General is described in 28 U.S.C. § 507, which in § 507(b) says that it is the duty of the Attorney General to supervise all litigation to which the United States is a party, and which in § 507(a) (2) says that it is the duty of each United States Attorney to “[pjrosecute or defend, for the government, all civil actions, suits or proceedings in which the United States is concerned.” To impose a restriction on this duty there should be a clearer direction from Congress than § 16.
I would affirm the order denying the motion to dismiss.