Court Opinion

ID: 9410473
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-21 14:08:21.088064+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:57.762200
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Jose Ignacio Padron,                         :
                            Petitioner       :
                                             :
                     v.                      :    No. 537 C.D. 2022
                                             :    Submitted: May 19, 2023
Unemployment Compensation                    :
Board of Review,                             :
                    Respondent               :

BEFORE:       HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
              HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
              HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY
PRESIDENT JUDGE COHN JUBELIRER                                 FILED: July, 21, 2023

       Jose Ignacio Padron (Claimant) petitions for review of an October 27, 2021
Order of the Unemployment Compensation (UC) Board of Review (Board),
affirming the decision of a Referee that determined Claimant was ineligible for UC
benefits under Section 402(b) of the Unemployment Compensation Law (Law)1 after
he voluntarily left his employment at Belback Services Inc. (Employer). The Board
determined that Claimant left his employment for personal reasons, which were not
necessitous and compelling in nature.            Based upon the factual findings and
credibility determinations of the Board, by which this Court is bound, we affirm.

       1
         Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex. Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended, 43 P.S.
§ 802(b). Section 402(b) states in relevant part, “[a]n employee shall be ineligible for
compensation for any week . . . [i]n which his employment is due to voluntarily leaving work
without cause of a necessitous and compelling nature . . . .” Id.
I.     BACKGROUND
       Claimant began working full time for Employer on January 22, 2018.
(Board’s Decision, Finding of Fact (FOF) ¶ 1.) March 16, 2020, was Claimant’s last
day working for Employer. (Id.) Claimant initially filed a claim for benefits on
August 17, 2020, indicating he was discharged for requesting too much time off for
medical appointments and was forced to sign a resignation letter. (Certified Record
(C.R.) at 17-20.) Employer responded, indicating that Claimant had voluntarily
resigned his employment and signed a resignation letter. (Id. at 22-24.) A UC
Service Center issued a Notice of Determination finding Claimant was “eligible for
benefits under Section 402(e) of the . . . Law,”2 as Employer had discharged
Claimant and not met its burden of establishing Claimant’s actions constituted
willful misconduct. (Id. at 35.) Employer appealed the decision, and a telephone
hearing was scheduled before the Referee. (Id. at 39, 47.)
       At the hearing, Employer’s Office Manager, who was also the daughter of
Employer’s owner (Owner), testified that Claimant missed a day of work and came
into the office to tell her that he was leaving his position with Employer. (Id. at 65.)
At that time, Office Manager asked Claimant to sign a letter of resignation as
Employer had continuing work available.3 (Id.) Office Manager further testified
that she was unaware of Claimant’s alleged recent issues with doctor’s appointments

       2
          Section 402(e) provides, in relevant part, “[a]n employe shall be ineligible for
compensation for any week . . . [i]n which his unemployment is due to his discharge or temporary
suspension from work for willful misconduct connected with his work . . . .” 43 P.S. § 802(e).
        3
          Although the letter of resignation is signed and dated by Claimant as effective on March
16, 2020, it states Claimant was resigning “[a]s per our conversation in your office on Wednesday,
February 12, 2020.” (C.R. at 42.) Office Manager explained she had drafted the resignation letter
in February as that was when Claimant first began talking about his food truck and leaving his
position. (Id. at 68.)

                                                2
until Claimant filed for UC benefits.4 (Id.) Office Manager testified that she was
under the impression that Claimant was resigning because “he started his own
thing.” (Id.) Specifically, Office Manager testified Claimant relayed to her that
Claimant had bought a food truck, which he planned to park on the lot next to a
house he owns and sell tacos. (Id.) Office Manager stated that she had given
Claimant “information on legalities about food handling, [and] getting his license to
operate the food truck” at that time. (Id.) In addition, Office Manager explained
that Claimant was a landlord and provided some taxi or Uber-like services, so “it
sounded like he was going on to bigger and better things.” (Id.)
       Claimant appeared pro se at the hearing and testified that he occasionally
needed to leave work early for doctor’s appointments. (Id. at 66.) Claimant stated
that on Friday, March 13, he was preparing to leave for his appointment, of which
he had previously given Employer notice, when Owner became angry and ordered
Claimant to resign. (Id.) Claimant left work to attend his appointment. (Id.) The
following Monday, Claimant returned to work and was once again prompted by
Owner to sign a letter of resignation, which Claimant testified that he signed to avoid
“trouble.” (Id.)
       The Referee reversed the determination of the UC Service Center and found
that Claimant was ineligible for benefits, having voluntarily quit his employment
without cause of a necessitous and compelling nature. (Referee’s Decision, C.R. at
73, 75.) Claimant appealed the decision of the Referee to the Board. (C.R. at 88-
89.) Upon review, the Board affirmed, finding as follows:

       4
          Office Manager acknowledged there were previous issues where Claimant missed work
or left early. At the beginning, he was reprimanded, but Office Manager explained that because
they needed somebody, they just “let it go.” (C.R. at 65.)

                                              3
        1.    [] [C]laimant was last employed as a full-time
        mechanic/inspector by [Employer] from January 22, 2018, and his last
        day of work was March 16, 2020.

        2.    On March 15, 2020, [] [C]laimant did not show up for a
        scheduled shift.

        3.    On March 16, 2020, [] [C]laimant told [] [Office Manager] that
        he was quitting his employment.

        4.     [Office Manager] understood that [] [C]laimant was leaving his
        employment to start his own business because [] [C]laimant stated that
        he bought a food truck and was going to sell tacos from it in the lot next
        to his residence.

        5.    [Office Manager] gave [] [C]laimant information on the legalities
        of food handling and getting a food truck license.

        6.      [Office Manager] asked that [] [C]laimant sign a resignation
        letter that she drafted, and [] [C]laimant voluntarily signed it.

(Board’s Decision, FOF ¶¶ 1-6.) The Board acknowledged Claimant and Office
Manager provided conflicting testimony as to circumstances surrounding Claimant’s
separation from employment and “resolve[d] the conflicts in the testimony, in
relevant part, in favor of [Office Manager] and f[ound] her testimony to be credible
that [] [C]laimant voluntarily quit his employment.” (Board’s Decision at 2.) The
Board further determined that “[s]ince [] [C]laimant voluntarily left his employment,
the burden rests upon him to show a cause of a necessitous and compelling nature
for doing so,” which Claimant did not do. (Id.) Rather, the Board determined
“[C]laimant left his employment for personal reasons,” namely, to operate his own
food truck. (Id.) Accordingly, it denied benefits under Section 402(b) of the Law.
(Id.)

                                            4
       Thereafter, Claimant filed a Petition for Review with this Court.5

II.    PARTIES ARGUMENTS
       On appeal, Claimant maintains he was terminated by Employer, but argues
that should Section 402(b) of the Law apply, he had necessitous and compelling
reasons to leave his employment. Claimant asserts that he had necessitous and
compelling reasons, because he had a medical issue for which Claimant provided
documentation to Employer, which Employer accommodated at first but was no
longer willing to accommodate.             (Claimant’s Brief (Br.) at 13-14.)             Instead,
according to Claimant, Employer demanded Claimant’s resignation on two separate
occasions and gave Claimant a letter of resignation to sign. (Id. at 15.) Claimant
asserts he resigned in lieu of termination, and based on Owner’s demeanor and
previous statements such as “yell[ing], berat[ing], and inform[ing] [Claimant] that
he needed to go and he never wanted to see him again,” termination was imminent
if Claimant did not resign. (Id. at 15-17.)
       Claimant further argues that, alternatively, he should be found eligible for UC
benefits under Section 402(e) of the Law. Claimant asserts that there has been no
evidence on the record that he acted with any type of willful misconduct and that
Employer has not given evidence that rebuts Claimant’s testimony regarding his
treatment by Employer. (Id. at 21.)

       5
          Claimant filed his Petition for Review of the Board’s October 27, 2021 Order on June 2,
2022. By order dated June 16, 2022, this Court directed the parties to address the timeliness of the
Petition for Review “in their principal briefs on the merits or in an appropriate motion.” (See
Order, filed June 17, 2022.) On July 14, 2022, the Board filed an Application for Summary Relief,
challenging the timeliness of the Petition for Review. Claimant subsequently filed a “Motion for
Leave to File Petition for [Review] Nunc Pro Tunc,” which was granted following a hearing, and
the Board’s Application for Summary Relief was dismissed as moot. (See Memorandum and
Order filed Nov. 14, 2022.)

                                                 5
       The Board responds that Claimant voluntarily left his employment, and thus,
Section 402(e) of the Law is not applicable. The Board asserts that Claimant
demonstrated a conscious intention to quit to start his own food truck business,
which is supported by substantial evidence. The Board also argues Claimant did not
prove a necessitous and compelling reason to voluntarily leave his employment and
Claimant cannot rely on his own version of events over the testimony credited by
the Board to show otherwise. Accordingly, the Board asks the Court to affirm its
Order.

III.   DISCUSSION
       Initially, we note that the scope of “[t]his Court’s review is limited to
determining whether the findings of fact were supported by substantial evidence,
whether constitutional rights were violated, or whether errors of law were
committed.” Showers v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 64 A.3d 1143, 1146 n.4
(Pa. Cmwlth. 2013). On appeal, “[t]he Board’s findings of fact are conclusive” as
“long as the record taken as a whole contains substantial evidence to support them.”
Henderson v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 77 A.3d 699, 718 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2013).   “Substantial evidence is defined as relevant evidence upon which a
reasonable mind could base a conclusion.” Id. Furthermore, “[i]t is irrelevant
whether the record contains evidence to support findings other than those made by
the fact finder; the critical inquiry is whether there is substantial evidence in the
record to support the findings actually made.” Wise v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of
Rev., 111 A.3d 1256, 1262 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015). This Court must view the testimony
in a light that is most favorable to the party that prevailed before the Board, in this
case, Employer. Henderson, 77 A.3d at 718. The fact “[t]hat the court might have

                                          6
a different opinion or judgment in regard to the action of an agency is not a sufficient
ground for interference; judicial discretion may not be substituted for administrative
discretion.” Bowman v. Dep’t of Env’t. Res., 700 A.2d 427, 428 (Pa. 1997) (quoting
Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n., 413 A.2d 1037, 1047 (Pa. 1980)).
That is because “[t]he Board is the ultimate fact finder and has exclusive power to
resolve conflicts in the evidence and to decide witness credibility and the weight to
be accorded the evidence.” Wise, 111 A.3d at 1261-62.
      With these principles in mind, we turn to Claimant’s arguments. Claimant
first argues that under Section 402(b) of the Law, he had necessitous and compelling
reasons for leaving his employment. Claimant argues that these reasons include a
medical issue, which Employer was unwilling to accommodate any longer, such that
Claimant was forced to quit in lieu of termination. However, Claimant’s arguments
as to his reasons for leaving his employment rely solely on his own testimony, which
the Board did not credit. Instead, the Board credited Office Manager’s testimony
and found Claimant quit to start his own business operating a food truck, to which
Claimant provided no response. (Board’s Decision at 2.) Because Claimant did not
specifically challenge any of the Board’s findings of fact, those findings of fact are
conclusive on appeal. Hessou v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 942 A.2d 194,
198-99 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008). Even if Claimant had challenged the Board’s findings,
we are bound by those findings, which are supported by Office Manager’s testimony
of her conversation with Claimant referencing his purchase of a food truck, plans to
sell tacos, and voluntary signing of a resignation letter. (C.R. at 65.) The Court
would exceed its scope of review if it were to reweigh the findings of fact once it
determined the findings were supported by substantial evidence.            Stringent v.
Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 703 A.2d 1084, 1090 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997).

                                           7
      Case law supports the conclusion that when an employee voluntarily leaves
his employment to become self-employed, he has not left his employment for “good
cause” for the purpose of the Law.        Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v.
Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 56 A.2d 254, 236 (Pa. 1948). See Dennis v.
Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 137 A.2d 811, 812 (Pa. Super. 1958) (holding
“[t]he appellant voluntarily terminated his employment to go into a private venture
of his own and such a termination of employment is without cause of a necessitous
and compelling nature”).
      Next, Claimant argues that because his termination was not voluntary, it
should be assessed under Section 402(e) of the Law, and not Section 402(b). If
assessed under Section 402(e), Claimant asserts that Employer has not provided
evidence to prove willful misconduct. Similar to the first issue, because the Board
found that Claimant voluntarily left his employment, and this finding is supported
by substantial evidence, we are bound by this finding as discussed above. Therefore,
Claimant’s separation was correctly assessed under Section 402(b) of the Law.
      For the foregoing reasons we conclude that Claimant did not prove he had
necessitous and compelling reasons to voluntarily leave his employment and the
Board did not err in finding Claimant ineligible for UC benefits pursuant to Section
402(b) of the Law. Accordingly, we affirm the Board’s Order.

                                      __________________________________________
                                      RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge

                                         8
       IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Jose Ignacio Padron,                   :
                       Petitioner      :
                                       :
                  v.                   :   No. 537 C.D. 2022
                                       :
Unemployment Compensation              :
Board of Review,                       :
                    Respondent         :

                                    ORDER

      NOW, July 21, 2023, the Order of the Unemployment Compensation Board
of Review, dated October 27, 2021, is AFFIRMED.

                                     __________________________________________
                                     RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge