Court Opinion

ID: 9893486
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-27 14:07:21.435697+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:16.838255
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: OCTOBER 20, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                            NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                     Commonwealth of Kentucky
                                Court of Appeals
                                   NO. 2022-CA-1041-MR

DARRIS SMITH                                                           APPELLANT

                      APPEAL FROM ROWAN CIRCUIT COURT
v.                  HONORABLE WILLIAM EVANS LANE, JUDGE
                            ACTION NO. 20-CI-90035

ST. CLAIRE REGIONAL MEDICAL                                              APPELLEE
CENTER, ASSUMED NAME OF ST.
CLAIRE MEDICAL CENTER, INC.

                                          OPINION
                                         AFFIRMING

                                        ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: CETRULO, DIXON, AND MCNEILL, JUDGES.

MCNEILL, JUDGE: Darris Smith (“Smith”) appeals from the Rowan Circuit

Court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of St. Claire Regional Medical

Center1 (“St. Claire”) in this premises liability action. Finding no error, we affirm.

1
    Assumed name of St. Claire Medical Center, Inc.
                                      BACKGROUND

               Smith slipped and fell in St. Claire’s parking lot one evening as he

was walking to his car. According to Smith, the fall occurred because the parking

lot had been sealed recently and the sealant2 was wet due to the rain. Smith claims

the surface was “slick as ice,” like someone had poured oil onto it. Smith did not

have any trouble walking before he slipped and did not notice any discoloration on

the asphalt. He also did not notice any substance on his clothes or shoes after the

fall. St. Claire concedes the parking lot was sealed two months before the

accident.3

               In addition to his deposition testimony, Smith filed an affidavit stating

St. Claire was negligent when it sealed the parking lot and applied too much

sealant which prevented it from drying properly. He also opined that applying

sealant in September is not optimal because the temperatures at night slow the

drying process. Smith tendered photographs of the parking lot taken by his

brothers several hours after the incident, allegedly showing a discoloration of the

parking lot caused by the sealant.

2
  Smith refers to the substance as sealer in his deposition but sealant in his affidavit. Although
these are two different products used for different purposes, for simplicity’s sake, we will simply
refer to the substance as sealant in the Opinion.
3
 St. Claire sealed the parking lot on September 21-22, 2019, and the accident occurred on
December 2, 2019.

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             As a result of the fall, Smith suffered a broken hip and later sued St.

Claire, alleging that it was negligent in keeping the parking lot reasonably safe. St.

Claire moved for summary judgment, arguing Smith could not prove it breached

any duty owed to him, because Smith could not prove what caused his fall, citing

Phelps v. Bluegrass Hospitality Management, LLC, 630 S.W.3d 623 (Ky. 2021).

Smith countered that whether St. Claire breached its duty was an issue of fact for

the jury. In a single-paragraph order, the trial court granted the motion and

dismissed the complaint. This appeal followed.

                            STANDARD OF REVIEW

             “The standard of review on appeal of a summary judgment is whether

the circuit judge correctly found that there were no issues as to any material fact

and that the moving party was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Pearson

ex rel. Trent v. National Feeding Systems, Inc., 90 S.W.3d 46, 49 (Ky. 2002).

Because these are legal questions our standard of review is de novo. Shelton v.

Kentucky Easter Seals Soc., Inc., 413 S.W.3d 901, 905 (Ky. 2013), as corrected

(Nov. 25, 2013) (citations omitted).

                                    ANALYSIS

             Smith claims the trial court erred in granting summary judgment and

that genuine issues of material fact exist for trial. Specifically, he argues whether

it was foreseeable that a recently sealed parking lot would be slick when it rained

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and whether such risk is unreasonable are questions for the jury, citing Shelton,

413 S.W.3d at 916.4 St. Claire contends Phelps controls. We agree with St. Claire

that Phelps is the applicable precedent.

               Shelton was an open-and-obvious premises liability case. Smith has

never argued the parking lot was an open-and-obvious hazard. On the contrary, he

testified he was not aware the parking lot was slick until he slipped. Smith instead

claims he encountered a foreign substance – sealant – which caused him to fall.

This case is more analogous to Phelps, a slip and fall case that also involved

allegations of a foreign substance.5

               Turning to our analysis, the relevant question on appeal is “whether

[Smith] produced sufficient evidence of negligence to create a material issue of

fact to submit to a jury.” Phelps, 630 S.W.3d at 627-28. “The basic elements of a

negligence claim are: duty, breach, causation, damages.” Id. at 28 (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). The parties agree that Smith was a business

4
  Although his argument is not well developed, Smith seems to believe Shelton automatically
saves his case from summary judgment. Shelton shifted the foreseeability analysis in open and
obvious premises liability cases from the duty element of a negligence claim, a question of law,
to the breach element, generally a fact question for the jury. As a natural consequence of this
shift, many cases which, previously, might have been decided on summary judgment now
proceed to a jury. Smith’s brief merely summarizes Shelton’s holding and assumes its
applicability to this case.
5
 While Phelps was also about an open-and-obvious condition, this fact was not relevant to the
case’s holding.

                                               -4-
invitee of the hospital. Therefore, to create a rebuttable presumption of negligence

sufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment, Smith had to show:

             (1) he . . . had an encounter with a foreign substance or
             other dangerous condition on the business premises; (2)
             the encounter was a substantial factor in causing the
             accident and the customer’s injuries; and (3) by reason of
             the presence of the substance or condition, the business
             premises were not in a reasonably safe condition for the
             use of business invitees.

Martin v. Mekanhart Corp., 113 S.W.3d 95, 98 (Ky. 2003); see also Lanier v. Wal-

Mart Stores, Inc., 99 S.W.3d 431, 435-36 (Ky. 2003).

             In Phelps, the plaintiff (Phelps) and her co-worker went to lunch and

as they were getting up from the table, Phelps slipped and fell, injuring herself.

She claimed she felt a waxy substance on the floor and that the manager told her

the floor had been waxed the night before and had become slippery due to moisture

in the air. However, Phelps’ co-worker discerned nothing on the floor which might

have caused Phelps’ fall. Phelps sued the restaurant and following discovery, the

restaurant moved for summary judgment. Along with the motion, it filed an

affidavit from the restaurant manager stating no cleaning products or wax had been

applied to the floor prior to the accident. The trial court granted the motion and

dismissed Phelps’ case.

             On appeal, a panel of this Court affirmed the trial court, noting that

Phelps “was unable to produce any evidence, other than her own testimony, to

                                         -5-
support her allegations of negligence[.]” Phelps v. Bluegrass Hosp. Management

LLC, No. 2018-CA-001279-MR, 2019 WL 4565230, at *2 (Ky. App. Sept. 20,

2019), aff’d, 630 S.W.3d 623 (Ky. 2021). She could not identify any substance on

her clothes or shoes, had no photographs of the area where she had fallen, and had

no expert witness. On discretionary review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court

of Appeals, holding that Phelps had “failed to submit proof of a material fact – that

being the presence of a hazardous condition upon BGH’s business premises[,]”

which was fatal to her claim. Phelps, 630 S.W.3d at 630.

             The Court observed that when faced with a premises liabilities claim:

             [n]either courts nor juries are authorized to indulge in
             speculation or guesswork as to the cause of accidents;
             there must be some tangible evidence from which it may
             be fairly said what brought about the accident. It has
             long been the rule in this state that no recovery can be
             had in such cases where the evidence is so unsatisfactory
             as to require surmise or speculation as to how the injury
             occurred, and that there will be no presumption of
             negligence.

Id. at 628. Stated another way, “‘[b]elief’ is not evidence and does not create an

issue of material fact. A plaintiff must present affirmative evidence in order to

defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment.” Humana of Kentucky,

Inc. v. Seitz, 796 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Ky. 1990) (citation omitted).

             While Phelps claimed she slipped on a waxy substance, she produced

no tangible evidence of such and no expert testimony establishing the breach of

                                         -6-
any duty owed to her. Phelps, 630 S.W.3d at 629. As such, “Her case relies[d]

entirely on conjecture. Without some proof or testimony indicating BGH failed to

discover an unreasonably dangerous condition and either correct or warn of it, any

attempt to lay blame for Phelps’ fall [was] an exercise in surmise and speculation.”

Id. Ultimately, the Court ruled that “Phelps’ inability to identify the mechanism

which caused her fall [was] fatal to her premises liability claim.” Id. at 629.

Without proof of an unsafe substance or condition that caused her fall, she could

not prove the restaurant breached any duty owed to her. Id.

             Similarly, here, Smith cannot identify the mechanism which caused

his fall. Therefore, he cannot show he had an encounter with a foreign substance

that was a substantial factor in causing the accident. He alleges the parking lot was

slippery because of a sealant but produced no tangible proof of such a condition.

There was no substance on his clothes or shoes and although he provided pictures

showing a discoloration of the parking lot, the photos are low quality and were

taken several hours after the fall. Further, the source of the discoloration is

unclear, whether rain, sealant, or something else.

             While St. Claire concedes the parking lot was sealed two months prior

to the accident, Smith produced no evidence the sealant ever constituted a hazard,

much less at the time of the fall. Smith asserts St. Claire should have known “a

recently sealed parking lot would become slippery in the rain” and that St. Claire

                                          -7-
was negligent in overapplying the sealant so that it was “mushy and slick.” But

Smith offered no expert testimony to corroborate these claims. It is well-

established that a “party opposing summary judgment cannot rely on their own

claims or arguments without [offering] significant evidence[.]” Wymer v. JH

Props., Inc., 50 S.W.3d 195, 199 (Ky. 2001). “Without some proof or testimony

indicating [St. Claire] failed to discover an unreasonably dangerous condition and

either correct or warn of it, any attempt to lay blame for [Smith’s] fall is an

exercise in surmise and speculation.” Phelps, 630 S.W.3d at 629. Because Smith

failed to produce sufficient evidence of negligence, the trial court did not err in

granting summary judgment.

                                   CONCLUSION

             Therefore, the order of the Rowan Circuit Court is affirmed.

             ALL CONCUR.

 BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:                      BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

 Winter R. Huff                             Cathy L. Stickels
 Somerset, Kentucky                         Olivia C. Keller
                                            Covington, Kentucky
 C. Graham Martin
 Salyersville, Kentucky

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