Court Opinion

ID: 9545449
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:12:47.950416+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:14:49.740727
License: Public Domain

SCHULZ, Superior Court Judge,
dissenting.
It is necessary to set out the facts surrounding Love’s guilty plea in further detail in order to understand the error which I perceive in the court’s decision.
It seems undisputed that the “deal” which led to Love’s guilty plea was struck the morning of the day of trial and communicated to Love by a handwritten note from counsel around the noon hour. Love did not accept the offer at that time, but he had a brief opportunity to discuss it further with counsel before court convened that afternoon.
*26The trial judge, after being advised of a possible change of plea, conducted a very careful and complete inquiry of Love to determine that he understood his rights, understood the consequences of his change of plea, and was changing his plea voluntarily.1
Love has claimed that the attorney/client relationship had completely broken down, that he did not fully understand his right to go to trial, and that he thought the sentence he would get would be entirely concurrent with the sentence on the federal charge (his trial counsel disagrees).
I have no quarrel with the majority’s interpretation of the rule concerning a pre-sentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea, but I am convinced that “fair and just reason” means at least a reason, and I fail to perceive one here.
First, Judge Rowland conducted as complete and fair a change of plea proceedings as can be imagined. The judge was sensitive to Love’s position throughout, and was careful in the extreme to make sure that Love understood all of his rights, giving Love every opportunity to explain his understanding of the “deal.” Love never mentioned concurrent sentences.
Love’s position is that he did not fully understand his right to have a trial, but we should bear in mind that Love had that right explained to him thoroughly by the trial judge, and he had only just recently finished a federal conspiracy trial.
Love states that he thought he had a deal for concurrent sentences,2 but we should bear in mind that that is totally unsupported and, in fact, contradicted by everything else in the record, including the fact that Love never mentioned it to the trial judge at the time he entered his plea, although he was given ample opportunity to do so by the trial judge.
When Love tells us that he changed his plea because he could no longer rely on his attorney to give him a good defense, we need to remember that he did not, and never has, controverted even one statement in the state’s review of the evidence in support of the charge at the time Love entered his plea. And the record is devoid of any evidence of pressure on Love to agree to facts that were not true or to waive rights against his will.
In short, while it appears undisputed that Love and his attorney had suffered a complete breakdown of the attorney/client relationship, there appears no connection between that breakdown and Love’s decision to plead guilty. He made that decision himself after being fully and completely advised of all of his rights by Judge Rowland. I do not believe that we should allow this admittedly articulate and intelligent young man to manipulate us so easily.
Having concluded that the order denying the motion to withdraw the plea should be affirmed, I would also affirm the sentence. The trial judge gave careful consideration to the Chaney3 goals, and I cannot say that his balancing of those goals in this case was clearly mistaken.

.As the majority points out, the plea was to a charge of robbery, reduced from robbery while armed. In addition, the state advised the court that it would not “waste the court’s time” in pursuing an additional assault with intent to commit robbery count. All of this, however, was not a plea bargain or charge bargain. The state had reviewed the facts and Love’s background and concluded that “simple” robbery was the proper charge. The facts outlined in the presentence report and by the state at the time of the plea show that Love used a firearm in committing the robbery and, in fact, struck one of the victims with the gun. These facts were not contested by Love. In addition to the employees who were present, there were also a number of customers in the store. The potential for harm was severe. The state’s position in the trial court, that “simple” robbery was the proper charge, flies in the face of facts which Love never contested.
What this case demonstrates is a not very well disguised plea bargain with none of the protections of Alaska R.Crim.P. 11.

. The sentence, in fact, was concurrent. What Love is apparently saying is that he was not going to have to serve any time in addition to the time on the federal conviction.

. State v. Chaney, 477 P.2d 441, 444 (Alaska 1970).