Court Opinion

ID: 9562463
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:29:44.250259+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:21.856285
License: Public Domain

SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION ON REHEARING
JACOBSON, Acting Presiding Judge.
On October 4, 1979, this court filed its opinion in the above-captioned matter, reversing the defendant-appellant’s conviction on the basis of a fatal variance between the indictment and the proof adduced.
Both parties have filed motions for rehearing. The defendant contends that we improperly determined that the instrument which was the subject matter of this prosecution for drawing a draft on insufficient funds (a violation of former A.R.S. § 13-316), was negotiable and that the introduction of prior bad acts was not reversible error. The state contends in its motion *119that we improperly determined that a fatal variance occurred.
On rehearing, we denied defendant’s motion for rehearing, thereby affirming those portions of our prior opinion dealing with the negotiability of the instrument passed and the propriety of the introduction of prior bad acts.
As to the state’s motion for rehearing, we are now convinced that we were in error in holding that under Arizona law a fatal variance occurred between the indictment and the proof presented.
To briefly reiterate the factual basis for this issue, the defendant was charged by a grand jury indictment with making, drawing, uttering, or delivering to James Geary a check or draft in the amount of $7,636.67. James Geary is a stockbroker employed by Loeb, Rhodes and Company, a brokerage firm, and was the individual with whom the defendant had dealt in connection with bond purchases giving rise to the delivery of the draft in question. The draft delivered by the defendant was made payable to “Loeb, Rhodes & Co.” and was physically delivered to a cashier at Loeb, Rhodes, who in turn gave it to her supervisor, who gave it to James Geary. Based upon our finding that the defendant never made, uttered or delivered the instrument to James Geary, we held that a fatal variance occurred. We reasoned that had the defendant been acquitted, the prohibition against double jeopardy would not have prevented a subsequent prosecution for passing the same draft to Loeb, Rhodes. We relied primarily upon the case of State v. Singh, 4 Ariz.App. 273, 419 P.2d 403 (1966). On reconsideration, we find this case inapplicable.
Rule 13.5(b), Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides:
“(b) The preliminary hearing or grand jury indictment limits the trial to the specific charge or charges stated in the magistrate’s order or grand jury indictment. The charge may be amended only to correct mistakes of fact or remedy formal or technical defects, unless the defendant consents to the amendment. The charging document shall be deemed amended to conform to the evidence adduced at any court proceeding.” [Emphasis added.]
Here, the state did not formally move to amend the indictment. We therefore must consider whether an amendment “deemed ... to conform to the evidence” violated two important rights of the defendant: (1) the defendant must not be prejudiced by an amendment so as not to be put on notice of the charges, thus being unable to defend against them, State v. Harrison, 111 Ariz. 508, 533 P.2d 1143 (1975); State v. Jonas, 26 Ariz.App. 379, 548 P.2d 1191 (1976), and (2) an acquittal of the amended charge must provide a double jeopardy defense to a subsequent prosecution on the original charge. State v. Williams, 108 Ariz. 382, 499 P.2d 97 (1972); State v. Singh, supra.
The exact question is whether an amendment to the indictment to conform to the evidence by substituting the name “Loeb, Rhodes & Co.” for that of “James Geary” would violate these two limitations.
As to the first limitation, it is clear that the defendant was not prejudiced, nor is prejudice claimed, by the substitution. The defendant was fully aware of what draft was involved, the nature of the transaction giving rise to the draft, and the defenses available to the charge involving that draft. See State v. Jonas, supra, allowing substitution of the true name of the employer/victim against which an embezzlement occurred, as the defendant “knew” who his employer was.
Insofar as the defense of double jeopardy is concerned, this defense is not limited to the four corners of the indictment, State v. Mallory, 19 Ariz.App. 15, 504 P.2d 556 (1972), and the entire record is available to bar any subsequent action. State v. Lombardo, 104 Ariz. 598, 457 P.2d 275 (1969).
This brings us to State v. Singh, supra, relied upon in our prior opinion. In Singh, the defendant was charged with uttering forged escrow instructions to a real estate agent. The proof showed that he uttered *120the forged document to a certain escrow officer. Apparently the defendant twice passed the forged instrument. In disallowing an amendment to substitute the name of the escrow officer for that of the real estate agent, the court held that since two different transactions were involved (and thus two crimes), the amendment to the information actually changed the nature of the charge.
In our opinion, the present case is more analogous to State v. Ponds, 4 Ariz.App. 326, 420 P.2d 193 (1966). In Ponds, the defendant was charged with presenting a forged check to the assistant manager of an A. J. Bayless Market. The evidence showed that actually the check was presented to the manager who then showed it to the assistant manager. An amendment was allowed, substituting the name of the manager (O’Dell) for that of the assistant manager (Miller). In upholding this amendment and distinguishing Singh, the court noted:
“In the instant case, we have merely an amendment to the information to allege that the person to whom the forged instrument was published is a person different from that named in the information. The distinction between this case and Singh, supra, lies in the fact that both Mr. O’Dell and Mr. Miller were involved in the same identical transaction or the same identical publishing of the check (both acting as agents of A. J. Bayless Markets, Inc.), and an acquittal as to one would operate as an acquittal to the other. In Singh, supra, an acquittal as to the person first named in the information would not have operated as an acquittal to the second person named for the reason that we were there concerned with two separate and distinct acts of publishing. Substituting O’Dell for Miller did not change the offense and defendant was properly appraised [sic] of the charge against him and the act involved.” 4 Ariz.App. at 327, 420 P.2d at 194.
Similarly here, substituting the name of Loeb, Rhodes & Co. for that of its agent and employee, James Geary, would not change the offense.
We therefore hold that an amendment under Rule 13(b), Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, to conform to the evidence would not have prejudiced the defendant and would not act as a bar to the defense of double jeopardy.
The state’s motion for rehearing is granted. The defendant’s motion for rehearing is denied. The judgment of conviction and sentence are affirmed.
WREN, J., and OGG,* C. J., Division 1, concur.