Court Opinion

ID: 9847388
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:58:47.245891+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:08.927899
License: Public Domain

Pannell, Judge,
dissenting. "The abbreviations and letters, 'Treas.,’ and 'V. P.,’ following the names respectively of two indorsers on a promissory note, are mere words of description, and the obligation incurred by such indorsers is personal.” Morris v. Reed, 14 Ga. App. 729 (1) (82 SE 314).
" Signature in ambiguous capacity. Unless the instrument clearly indicates that a signature is made in some other capacity it is an indorsement.” Ga. L. 1962, pp. 156, 257 (Code Ann. § 109A-3 — 402).
In the present case the corporate officials signed on front in their official capacity and there is no contention *333that the corporation is not bound thereby. On the back they signed and their offices were designated.
If they signed, as they contend, making the corporation surety instead of them personally, the question arises: why, when the corporation was bound as principal should it indorse as surety? This would either be a nullity or an absurdity.
The location of signatures — and the designation of signees as "Pres.” and "Sec. Treas.’ — would indicate that the words were descriptio personae only and parol testimony would be permissible to explain ambiguity.
I would reverse the trial judge’s ruling that they signed only in a representative capacity and dismissing suit as to them.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Eberhardt and Judge Evans concur in this dissent.