Court Opinion

ID: 9656375
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 19:47:20.688944+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:32.095435
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.
(dissenting). I dissent because I conclude that the majority has adopted a tortured interpretation of the statute. The majority should interpret the statute according to the ordinary usage of language and to accomplish the legislative purpose.
This case involves the Uniform Act for the Extradition of Persons of Unsound Mind, secs. 51.81-51.85, Stats. 1979-80. The Uniform Act is very short, consisting of only five sections: a definitional section; the substantive provision setting forth the circumstances under which extradition is authorized; the procedure for extradition ; a statute of limitations; and a direction that the statute be construed to make it uniform with the law of other states.
The statute of limitations of the Uniform Act is in issue here. Sec. 51.84 requires that proceedings under the Uniform. Act “shall be begun within one year after the flight)' The Uniform Act defines the word flight as follows:
“51.81 Definitions. The terms ‘flight’ and ‘fled’ as used in ss. 51.81 to 51.85 shall be construed to mean any voluntary or involuntary departure from the jurisdiction of the court where the proceedings hereinafter mentioned may have been instituted and are still pending with the effect of avoiding, impeding or delaying the action of the court in which such proceedings may have been instituted or be pending, or any such departure from the state where the person demanded then was, if he then was under detention by law as a person of unsound mind and subject to detention.”
*385The legislature defines “flight” and “fled” as a departure, making no reference to the time of discovery of the departure, or to the time of discovery that the person left the state or to the notion that “flight” is not a moment in time but a continuum. The majority nevertheless concludes that flight “references a period of time from departure until the date of discovery of an escaped mental patient in a subsequent state” (supra, p. 879) and that the definition of “flight” in sec. 51.85 “refers to a span of time and distance over which the fugitive travels.” (Supra, p. 380) This is colorful and picturesque language, but it does not comport with the statute. I predicate this conclusion on several factors.
First, the legislature’s definition of flight is in terms of departure. A departure is the act of going away, the setting out. The word “flight” as defined in sec. 51.81 therefore seems to refer to a single moment, not a span of time and distance. Departure from the state need not mean leaving the geographical boundaries of the state as the majority concludes. Departure from the state can mean eluding the authority of the state by being unavailable to the processes of the state.
Second, the statute makes no sense if the majority’s definition is inserted wherever the word flight appears; the court would have to use several meanings of the word flight if the statute is to make sense. For example, in sec. 51.82 the only definition of flight that can be applied readily and consistently is that of a single moment, not a span of time and distance.
Third, the legislative history of the Act supports the interpretation I urge. The purpose of the law is to aid the mentally ill, and therefore the statute must be interpreted for the benefit of the mentally ill person, not for the benefit of the state of California or Wisconsin.
Because secs. 51.81-51.85 were enacted before 1927, no Wisconsin legislative bill records are available. Wis*386consin Legislative Informational Bulletin, 80-1B-6, How Can the L.R.B. Help You?, p. 10 (1980). The majority errs, however, in concluding that “there is no legislative history available to guide us in our interpretation of this statute.” {Supra, p. 380) The legislative history is that of the Uniform Act adopted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1916. Since the Wisconsin law is identical to that passed by the Conference, the notes from the Conference and the experience of other states may assist this court in its interpretation of secs. 51.81-51.85, Stats. 1979-80. I turn to the legislative history of the Uniform Act.
The legislative history of the Uniform Act shows that the purpose of the Act is to protect the interest of the mental patient. In 1915 a special committee of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws reported on its consideration of a uniform law providing for the return, upon a governor’s demand, of a mentally ill person who had fled a state or had been removed from a state. Proceedings of the 25th Annual Meeting of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, p. 225 (1915). The statement of the special committee’s chairman, accompanying the presentation of the committee report to the conference in 1915, demonstrates that the drafters’ concern was with the protection of the interest of the mental patient. Id. at 66-67. Totally absent from the committee’s report is any indication that the objective of the law is to protect the interest of the extraditing state, here California, in maintaining control over the person. Nor was there any indication that the Uniform Act was designed to protect any interest of the state where the mentally ill person is found, here Wisconsin, whether that state viewed its interest as protecting its citizens from any danger that might be posed by the mentally ill person or as protecting its citizens from incurring the costs for the care of the mentally ill person.
*387The 1915 Conference requested the committee to consider the proposed Act further and to report it at the next meeting of the Conference. When the commissioners met again, in 1916, the spokesman presented the proposed Act and stated, “There is no change in principle of any kind.” Proceedings of the 26th Annual Meeting of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, p. 91 (1916). Following the Conference’s approval, the Uniform Act was referred to the state legislatures for adoption.
The Uniform Act for the Extradition of Persons of Unsound Mind was subsequently adopted by the legislatures of eleven states, including Wisconsin’s in 1919. One state did not enact the one-year statute of limitations.
The patient’s interest to be protected by the Uniform Act is the interest to receive treatment in the least restrictive setting and only as long as necessary, and the cardinal rule in interpreting a statute is to achieve a reasonable construction which will effect the statute’s purpose.
This Uniform Act, unlike the usual extradition statute, establishes a time limitation within which to commence the extradition proceedings. A period of repose is granted to a fugitive mental patient but not to a fugitive criminal. There is a simple explanation for granting repose to the mental patient. A significant aspect of all statutes relating to commitment to a mental institution is that the person committed is entitled to periodic reevaluation to determine whether he or she has made sufficient progress to warrant discharge.
When the Wisconsin legislature adopted the Uniform Act in 1919, sec. 51.11, Stats. 1919, provided for reevaluation, and sec. 51.13, Stats. 1919, provided that if the superintendent of an institution permitted the mental patient “to go at large,” upon the expiration of two years after granting such leave of absence, the superintendent *388lost authority to require the person to return to the institution, and the person “shall be presumed sane the same as though his sanity had been established by a judicial determination.”
The theory in the mental health laws (as early as 1919) is that the person’s condition can change. The underlying assumption in the laws is that the person will regain his or her sanity over time, and that care must be taken to free the person as soon as he or she is sane.
Given the rarity of a statute of limitations in extradition and given the recurring theme in the mental health laws that the mentally ill person gets better, the statute of limitations in sec. 51.84 should be construed to cut off promptly the extraditing state’s power to force the person to return. The only reasonable interpretation of the statute of limitations is that the drafters of the Uniform Act determined that if the return of the fugitive was not begun within one year of his or her departure, that is, within one year from the time that he or she escaped from the control of the state, he or she should not be returned involuntarily.
The majority says that the statute of limitations should be liberally construed to effectuate the purpose of the Act which is the “return of those in the need of treatment to the place of original commitment where they were receiving such treatment.” (Emphasis supplied). (Supra, p. 381) The majority does not explain how Wisconsin is to determine under the Uniform Act that the person is in need of treatment. There is no provision allowing Wisconsin to make this determination. I believe that the statute of limitations in the Uniform Act, in effect, sets up a presumption that if the person has been out of the control of the extraditing state for more than a year, the person can no longer be viewed as needing treatment and should not be extradited. The Uniform Act recognizes the changing conditions of mentally *389ill persons and has a built-in fail-safe device easily applied.
The interpretation of the Uniform Act which I set forth is consistent with the only reported case interpreting a statute similar to ours. Apparently the Uniform Act is so infrequently used that it has been interpreted only once in 66 years.
In In re Chaffee, 211 Tenn. 88, 362 S.W.2d 467 (1962), Mrs. Chaffee had been adjudged non compos by a Florida court on October 4, 1960, had been discharged from a Florida hospital on March 31, 1961, and had moved to Tennessee. Florida had made no express judicial or administrative determination of her sanity upon her discharge. On August 13, 1962, Mrs. Chaffee petitioned a Tennessee tria] court for a decree finding that she had been restored to sanity. The trial court held that it did not have jurisdiction because a person adjudged a non compos mentis was a ward of the court making that determination and that Mrs. Chaffee remained within the sole jurisdiction of the Florida court. In deciding the jurisdictional issue, the Tennessee Supreme Court considered the effect of the one-year statute of limitations in the Uniform Act for the Extradition of Persons of Unsound Mind which Tennessee had adopted. As the Tennessee court noted, the one-year statute of limitations was not enacted merely to be ignored. The Tennessee Supreme Court reasoned that the proceedings for the return of the person must be begun within one year after the person left the state; that during the one year in which the demanding state has the right to demand the return of the mental patient, the court in the demanding state is the only court with jurisdiction over the person and the only state with power to enter a decree restoring the adjudged non compos to sanity; and that after that year ends, the demanding state loses jurisdiction over the person. The Tennessee Supreme *390Court reasoned that the Uniform Act was an enactment for the benefit of the adjudged non compos and that if the person is required to return to the state of commitment after the one year ends the Act is not being applied for the mental patient’s benefit.
The second aspect of the legislative history of the Uniform Act which has bearing on our interpretation of the statute of limitations is that the Uniform Act was withdrawn in 1954 as obsolete by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, the drafters and proponents of the Act. Proceedings of the 63rd Annual Meeting of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, p. 279 (1954). There is no explanation in the Conference’s proceedings for the withdrawal of the Act and there is no explanation in the records in the national office of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws as to the reasons for the withdrawal (telephone conference on June 25, 1982). The parties were able to cite to the court only one case involving the Uniform Act, and our research has found no additional cases. In all probability, the minimal use of the Act, as evidenced by the lack of reported cases, as well as the adoption of the Interstate Compact on Mental Health, and other statutes similar to Wisconsin’s Mental Health Act (ch. 51, Stats. 1979-80) which seek to assure treatment and rehabilitation of the mentally ill in the least restrictive treatment environments, resulted in the withdrawal of the Uniform Act as obsolete.
Although I do not suggest that “the long desuetude of any law amounts to its repeal,” James v. Commonwealth, 12 Serg. & R. 220, 228 (Pa. 1824), quoted in 1A Sutherland, Statutory Construction, sec. 23.25, p. 267 (1973), I do suggest that the declaration of obsolescence by the Commissioners should influence this court to adopt an interpretation of the Act which limits, not *391extends, the application of the Act. The reasonable and less expansive interpretation of the Act is to construe “flight” to mean the moment of departure from the authority of the state and to treat the one-year statute of limitations in this case as beginning to run from the moment the person left the state institution.
While the concerns the majority expresses for the welfare of Mr. Melentowich and those similarly situated may be genuine, Mr. Melentowich may very well feel that with friends like the majority, who needs enemies. Mr. Melentowich is presently living with his mother in Wisconsin, and as a result of a prior determination of the Waukesha county circuit court (which determination was not appealed) and the determination of Wisconsin physicians, Mr. Melentowich is receiving outpatient treatment at Northview Hospital in this state. On the basis of the record before this court, the interest of Mr. Melentowich appears to be that he remain in this state. Mr. Melentowich’s remaining in the state is in harmony with sec. 51.001, the legislative statement of the mental health policy of this state. The legislature of this state has stated that it intends to provide a unified system of mental health care to assure “all people in need of care access to the least restrictive treatment alternative appropriate to their needs,” sec. 51.001(1), and to protect the personal liberties of persons with mental illness so that if a person can be treated outside of an institution, that person should not be treated involuntarily in an institution. Sec. 51.001 (2).
Because the majority’s interpretation and holding do not comport with either the Uniform Act or the legislative policy of this state, I dissent.
I am authorized to state that Justice Nathan S. Hef-FEENAN joins this dissent.