Court Opinion

ID: 9562449
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:29:18.293572+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:21.498238
License: Public Domain

KAREN NELSON MOORE,
Circuit Judge, dissenting.
I am baffled by the majority opinion’s downplaying of important Supreme Court precedent in this arena. Both long-standing Supreme Court decisions and more recent pronouncements by the Court support a reading of § 704(a) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C2000e-3(a),1 that encompasses Thompson’s claim. Older Supreme Court cases, such as Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 103 S.Ct. 2017, 76 L.Ed.2d 157 (1983), highlight the primacy of statutory purpose, while more recent decisions, such as Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville, — U.S. —, 129 S.Ct. 846, 172 L.Ed.2d 650 (2009), demonstrate the Court’s belief that a broad approach should apply in interpreting statutes meant to protect employees against employer retaliation for protected activity. These cases reinforce the correctness of the panel majority’s approach in this case. Moreover, even under the approach advocated by the concurrence, Thompson may sue under § 704(a). Therefore, and for the reasons stated below, I respectfully dissent.
I. Bob Jones University v. United States and other Long-Standing Supreme Court Precedent
The majority contends that “the text of § 704(a) is plain in its protection of a limited class of persons who are afforded the right to sue for retaliation,” and that we are precluded from considering whether application of the plain language of the statute “would create an ‘absurd’ result.” Majority Op. at 807. As the vacated panel majority opinion properly held, this assertion is incorrect.
“The plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined by reference to the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.” Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341, 117 S.Ct. 843, 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997). Furthermore, whether a statute is plain and unambiguous must be determined “with regard to the particular dispute in the case.” Id. at 340, 117 S.Ct. 843. Moreover, “[i]t is a well-established canon of statutory construction that a court should go beyond the literal language of a statute if reliance on that language would defeat the plain purpose of the statute.” Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 586, 103 S.Ct. 2017.
The Supreme Court has noted that the “ ‘primary purpose’ ” of § 704(a) is “ ‘Maintaining unfettered access to statutory remedial mechanisms.’ ” Burlington *821N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 64, 126 S.Ct. 2405, 165 L.Ed.2d 345 (2006) (quoting Robinson, 519 U.S. at 346, 117 S.Ct. 843). Clearly, the majority’s narrow interpretation of § 704(a) squarely contradicts this purpose. Cf. Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 569 (3d Cir.2002) (“Allowing employers to retaliate via friends and family, therefore, would appear to be in significant tension with the overall purpose of the anti-retaliation provisions, which are intended to promote the reporting, investigation, and correction of discriminatory conduct in the workplace.”). However, rather than analyzing this issue directly, the majority implies that these cases are “ ‘rare, so that not allowing claims to proceed in these few instances would not necessarily defeat the plain purpose of the antidiscrimination laws.’ ” Majority Op. at 812 (second set of internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Fogleman, 283 F.3d at 569). Neither the majority nor Fogleman cites any authority for this sweeping assertion, thus demanding that the reader accept this claim based on nothing more than blind faith. I am not prepared to make such a leap.2
Because the majority’s plain-language interpretation of the statute defeats the Congressional purpose, it is proper to consider sources beyond the text to determine the correct interpretation of § 704(a). Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 586, 103 S.Ct. 2017. This is the reality that the vacated panel majority opinion recognized, and I fully agree with both the conclusion reached in that opinion and the approach utilized therein. Clearly, the purpose behind the statute provides the best guide as to how the statute should be interpreted. Thus, I believe that § 704(a) should be interpreted broadly to allow for “ unfettered access to statutory remedial mechanisms.’ ” Burlington, 548 U.S. at 64, 126 S.Ct. 2405 (quoting Robinson, 519 U.S. at 346, 117 S.Ct. 843).3 Such a broad interpretation demands that third parties such as Thompson be given the opportunity to bring a § 704(a) retaliation claim for the harm visited upon them in retaliation for protected actions undertaken by close associates.4 If *822Thompson cannot bring this action, then he has no recourse for the harm that North American Stainless has caused him by retaliating through Thompson against Thompson’s then fiancee/now wife Miriam Regalado for Regalado’s protected activity of filing a Title VII discrimination claim.5 Under the majority’s view, employers can use Thompson, and others like him, as swords to keep employees from invoking their statutory rights with no redress for the harms suffered by those individuals. Cf. Fogleman, 283 F.3d at 569 (“To retaliate against a man by hurting a member of his family is an ancient method of revenge, and is not unknown in the field of labor relations.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Clearly, this was not Congress’s intent in passing Title VII, see Burlington, 548 U.S. at 64, 126 S.Ct. 2405, and I cannot support such a construction of § 704(a).6
II. Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Recent Supreme Court Decisions
The Supreme Court has recently emphasized the need to interpret protective statutes, including § 704(a), in a broad manner in order to ensure that the purposes behind these statutes are satisfied. The *823most recent of these pronouncements came in Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville, a case that originated from our circuit and that involves an employee who was fired after she participated in an internal investigation into harassment. Crawford concerns the scope of the “opposition clause” of § 704(a). Crawford, 129 S.Ct. at 850 (“The opposition clause makes it ‘unlawful ... for an employer to discriminate against any ... employe[e] ... because he has opposed any practice made ... unlawful ... by this subchapter.’ § 2000e-3(a).”). A panel of this circuit had held that the opposition clause “ ‘demands active, consistent “opposing” activities to warrant ... protection against retaliation.’ ” Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 211 Fed.Appx. 373, 376 (6th Cir.2006) (unpublished opinion) (omission in original) (quoting Bell v. Safety Grooving & Grinding, LP, 107 Fed.Appx. 607, 610 (6th Cir.2004) (unpublished opinion)). The Supreme Court rejected this narrow definition of “oppose,” calling such an interpretation “freakish,” and embraced a more expansive “ordinary meaning” of “oppose.” Crawford, 129 S.Ct. at 850-51. Such an approach shows the Supreme Court’s diligence in guaranteeing that § 704(a)’s purpose is fulfilled.
Besides demonstrating the Court’s commitment to interpreting § 704(a) consistent with its purpose, Crawford opens the door to § 704(a) claims that are based on a broad definition of “oppose.” Crawford states that the “ordinary meaning” of “oppose” includes the following Random House Dictionary definition: “ ‘to be hostile or adverse to, as in opinion.’ ” Crawford, 129 S.Ct. at 850 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court explained that
“[ojppose” goes beyond “active, consistent” behavior in ordinary discourse, where we would naturally use the word to speak of someone who has taken no action at all to advance a position beyond disclosing it. Countless people were known to “oppose” slavery before Emancipation, or are said to “oppose” capital punishment today, without writing public letters, taking to the streets, or resisting the government.
Id. at 851 (emphasis added).
The vacated panel majority opinion in Thompson did not focus on the definition of “oppose,” because the Supreme Court had not yet issued its opinion in Crawford. However, now that Crawford has expanded the landscape of the opposition clause, it is appropriate to consider whether Thompson has met his burden on summary judgment by raising a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he participated in the type of opposition protected by Crawford. I believe that Thompson has met this burden.
According to his complaint, Thompson maintained a relationship with Miriam Regalado (engagement and then marriage) during the time in which she claims that she was being discriminated against by North American Stainless. Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) at 14 (Comply 13). Moreover, Thompson aided Regalado in preparing and filing her discrimination complaint and participated in an interview with the EEOC regarding the matter. J.A. at 29-30, 35-36 (Thompson Dep. at 56-57, 80, 85).7 When “viewfing] the factual evidence and drawing] all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party,” as we must on summary judgment, it is reasonable to infer that Thompson opposed the discrimination against Regalado. Nat’l Enters., Inc. v. Smith, 114 F.3d 561, 563 (6th Cir.1997). Such an inference not only *824is reasonable, but also is likely the most accurate description of Thompson’s involvement. Moreover, it is reasonable to infer that, given North American Stainless’s knowledge regarding Regalado and Thompson’s intimate relationship, North American Stainless believed that Thompson opposed the discrimination against Regalado and fired Thompson for that opposition. Reading the facts in this light, I conclude that the district court erred in granting summary judgment against Thompson.
The majority insists that Crawford “do[es] not require that [it] alter [its] analysis or change [its] conclusion” in this case, Majority Op. at 812, because “Thompson does not allege in his complaint that he personally engaged in any statutorily protected activity or ‘opposition’ to discrimination,” Majority Op. at 813-14. While it may be true that Thompson’s complaint focuses on North American Stainless’s retaliation against Regalado through Thompson, such an approach is not surprising given the state of the law in this circuit during Thompson’s district court proceedings. Crawford changed that law while Thompson’s direct appeal was pending. Thompson should not be punished now because he relied on our prior erroneous and crabbed position. At the very least, Thompson should be given an opportunity to make a Crawford “opposition” argument before the district court, giving the district court an opportunity to consider fully the effect of Crawford on the actual facts involved in this case. Rather than allow for more consideration of this issue, the majority slams the door on Thompson’s claim while paying mere lip service to Crawford’s expansive holding. In my view, this is an unacceptable manner in which to treat pertinent Supreme Court precedent that is binding on direct appeal in Thompson’s case. Moreover, the Supreme Court’s willingness to embrace such an encompassing meaning of “oppose” illustrates the Court’s commitment to ensuring that § 704(a)’s reach is broad enough to effectuate the pin-pose of Title VII.
Crawford is not the first indication the Court has given that protective statutes such as Title VII should not be read narrowly. Notably, the Supreme Court has recently interpreted several protective statutes broadly to include retaliation claims in order to achieve the purposes of those statutes, even though the texts of those statutes say nothing about retaliation. See Gomez-Perez v. Potter, — U.S. —, 128 S.Ct. 1931, 1936, 170 L.Ed.2d 887 (2008) (holding that the phrase “discrimination based on age” in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 633a(a), includes retaliation claims, even though the statute makes no mention of retaliation); CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, — U.S. —, 128 S.Ct. 1951, 1954-55, 170 L.Ed.2d 864 (2008) (holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 encompasses retaliation claims, even though the statute does not explicitly mention retaliation). Even though these cases do not address § 704(a), they still demonstrate the Supreme Court’s dedication to satisfying the purpose of protective statutes, rather than rigid adherence to the text when doing so would not fulfill the clear legislative purpose. Additionally, in both Crawford and Burlington, the Supreme Court broadly construed language in § 704(a) to increase the number of persons who can bring claims under the statute. Although each of these cases involved slightly different issues than the instant appeal, these decisions further evidence the Supreme Court’s determination that § 704(a) should be interpreted in favor of inclusivity rather than exclusivity. The majority simply brushes these guiding signals aside. I do not believe that these Supreme Court decisions can be so cavaliérly dismissed. Given the majority’s clear disregard for the purpose of § 704(a) and the guiding princi*825pies that the Supreme Court has provided in this area, I must dissent.
III. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 STANDING
The concurrence asserts that § 704(a) “dictates what practices amount to unlawful retaliation, not who may sue.” Concurrence at 18. It contends that the proper inquiry in this case is whether Thompson has standing to sue under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5. As even the majority recognizes, the concurrence’s conclusion that Thompson lacks standing is flawed.
At the outset, the concurrence correctly concedes that North American Stainless committed an unlawful employment act, as defined by the antiretaliation clause, when it fired Thompson.8 However, the concurrence then suggests that Thompson lacks standing to bring this claim under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 because Thompson has not been “sufficiently aggrieved.” Concurrence at 818 n. 1. This latter assertion confuses the harm at issue in the instant case and is in error. Although North American Stainless may have retaliated against Regalado, North American Stainless harmed Thompson in order to effectuate this retaliation. Thompson is thus not asserting Regalado’s harm, but rather is seeking redress for the harm done directly to him by North American Stainless.
“Aggrieved” is not defined by Title VII and thus should be given its ordinary meaning. See Crawford, 129 S.Ct. at 850 (citing Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42, 100 S.Ct. 311, 62 L.Ed.2d 199 (1979)). According to the Oxford English Dictionary, to be “aggrieved” is to be “[i]njured or wronged in one’s rights, relations, or position.” Oxford English Dictionary Online, www.dictionary.oed.com (last visited April 20, 2009) (defining “aggrieved”). Applying this definition and assuming, as the concurrence does, that firing Thompson was an unlawful act, it is obvious that Thompson is “a person claiming to be aggrieved ... alleging that an employer ... has engaged in an unlawful employment practice.” 42 U.S.C.2000e-5(b).
Furthermore, there is no authority to support the concurrence’s attempt to narrow the scope of § 2000e-5 to encompass only “those persons who are' the intended beneficiaries of the protection enacted in the substantive provision” of Title VII, Concurrence at 817, particularly because the case cited in support of that proposition, Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 129, 125 S.Ct. 564, 160 L.Ed.2d 519 (2004), pertains to the issue of third-party standing, which is not the basis of Thompson’s claim. However, even if the concurrence’s restrictive reading of § 2000e-5 were correct, it does not follow that Thompson would not have standing to bring his claim. As explained above, Congress intended for individuals to have “unfettered access to statutory remedial mechanisms,” Burlington, 548 U.S. at 64, 126 S.Ct. 2405, and to honor such intent, Thompson must be counted among the class of individuals protected by the antiretaliation clause. Therefore, it is not at all “obvious[ ] [that] the persons retaliated against, not [the] persons who are incidentally hurt by the retaliation” are the only intended beneficiaries of the antiretaliation clause. Concurrence at 19. To the contrary, for the reasons discussed above, the intended beneficiaries of the antiretaliation clause include employees, such as Thompson, who are fired allegedly because of their intimate relationships with other employees who have filed EEOC charges of discrimination.
*826Moreover, we previously have held that Title VII standing is as broad as Article III standing. See EEOC v. Bailey Co., 563 F.2d 439, 452 (6th Cir.1977); see also Kyles v. J.K. Guardian Sec. Servs., Inc., 222 F.3d 289, 295 (7th Cir.2000) (holding that the language of § 2000e-5 “signals a congressional intent to extend standing to the outermost limits of Article III”). No one has asserted that Thompson lacks Article III standing, nor could they given the fact that Thompson has an injury-in-fact caused by North American Stainless that can be redressed if Thompson is victorious in this action. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). Thus, even approaching this case in the way that the concurrence suggests, I would still conclude that Thompson can sue under Title VII.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons expressed in this opinion, in the panel’s opinion, and in Judge Martin’s dissenting opinion, which I join fully, I would permit Thompson’s retaliation action to proceed.

. Section 704(a) states in pertinent part that: It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees ... because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter. ...
42 U.S.C.2000e-3(a).

. In fact, not even the Fogleman panel found this rationale persuasive. Fogleman, 283 F.3d at 569 (noting that it did not find this asserted reason to restrict § 704(a) "particularly convincing”).

. I am not the first in our circuit to take such an approach to interpreting antiretaliation provisions.
In EEOC v. Ohio Edison Co., 7 F.3d 541 (6th Cir.1993), a panel of this court noted that courts have routinely adopted interpretations of retaliation provisions in employment statutes that might be viewed as outside the literal terms of the statute in order to effectuate Congress's clear purpose in proscribing retaliatory activity. Contrary to defendant's assertions, courts have frequently applied the retaliation provisions of employment statutes to matters not expressly covered by the literal terms of these statutes where the policy behind the statute supports a non-exclusive reading of the statutory language.
Id. at 545.

. Further support for this position is found in the EEOC Compliance Manual, which states that “ 'Title VII ... prohibits] retaliation against someone so closely related to or associated with the person exercising his or her statutory rights that it would discourage that person from pursuing those rights.' ” 2 EEOC Compliance Manual § 8.11(B)(3)(c), 614:0005 (BNA 2003); Johnson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 580 (6th Cir.2000). The Supreme Court has relied on the EEOC Manual in several decisions interpreting § 704(a). See Burlington, 548 U.S. at 65-66, 126 S.Ct. 2405; Robinson, 519 U.S. at 345-46, 117 S.Ct. 843; see also Crawford, 129 S.Ct. at 851 (referencing the EEOC Compliance Manual). Although not controlling, this manual "do[esj constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance.” Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Crawford, 129 S.Ct. at 851 (same).
*822The Compliance Manual further notes that "[Retaliation against a close relative of an individual who opposed discrimination can be challenged by both the individual who engaged in protected activity and the relative, where both are employees.” 2 EEOC Compliance Manual § 8.11(B)(3)(c). This statement suggests that the EEOC may view North American Stainless's action of firing Thompson as retaliation against Thompson for Regalado's filing of a discrimination charge. Thus, the Compliance Manual provides yet another light in which to view Thompson’s claim that renders the claim meritorious. See also 2 EEOC Compliance Manual § 8.11(C)(3) ("The retaliation provision[ ] of Title VII ... prohibit[s] retaliation against someone so closely related to or associated with the person exercising his or her statutory rights that it would discourage or prevent the person from pursuing those rights. For example, it would be unlawful for a respondent to retaliate against an employee because his or her spouse, who is also an employee, filed an EEOC charge. Both spouses, in such circumstances, could bring retaliation claims.” (footnote omitted citing Ohio Edison Co., 7 F.3d at 544)).

. The majority attempts to alleviate this concern by noting that “if Miriam Regalado believed that she was the intended target of retaliation for engaging in her protected activity, she could have filed a retaliation action pursuant to § 704(a).” Majority Op. at 816 & n. 10. However, Regalado's ability to sue in this matter does not solve the instant problem because the relief Regalado would be able to seek would appear to differ substantially from the relief that Thompson can seek. Specifically, it is unclear whether Regalado would be able to sue to have Thompson reinstated. Thus, Regalado's suit might not completely remedy Thompson's harm. Therefore, contrary to the majority’s assertion, the fact that Regalado can sue does not prevent the majority's interpretation from undermining the purpose behind the antiretaliation provision.

. Contrary to the majority's assertion that "no circuit court of appeals has held that Title VII creates a claim for third-party retaliation,” Majority Op. at 811, two other circuits have recognized the need to interpret § 704(a) broadly to include third-party retaliation claims, see Wu v. Thomas, 863 F.2d 1543, 1547-48 (11th Cir.1989) (allowing a husband's claim — that the university employing a couple engaged in retaliatory conduct towards the husband in retaliation for his wife's filing of an EEOC sex-discrimination charge — to proceed as a "wrongful retaliatory conduct” claim); McDonnell v. Cisneros, 84 F.3d 256, 262 (7th Cir.1996) (citing Wu with approval and noting the need to read § 704(a) broadly to ensure that its purpose is satisfied) (Posner, C.J.). Moreover, we have previously noted, albeit in dicta, that “a plaintiff's allegation of reprisal for a relative's antidiscrimination activities states a claim upon which relief can be granted under Title VII.” Ohio Edison Co., 7 F.3d at 544 (adopting the view espoused in DeMedina v. Reinhardt, 444 F.Supp. 573 (D.D.C.1978), aff’d in part and remanded in part, 686 F.2d 997 (D.C.Cir.1982)).

. It does not appear that Thompson himself informed any of his supervisors that he aided Regalado with filing her complaint; however, other coworkers were aware of his assistance. J.A. at 29, 35-37 (Thompson Dep. at 56, 80, 85, 118).

. As the concurrence correctly notes, such a concession is implicit in the majority’s assertion that Regalado could bring a retaliation claim against North American Stainless based on Thompson’s firing. Concurrence at 816; see also Majority Op. at 816 & n. 10.