Court Opinion

ID: 9751535
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 16:34:21.457306+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:26:50.855019
License: Public Domain

Vanderbilt, C. J.
(dissenting). The error in the trial of this case, which was in no way prejudicial to these defendants but only to their codefendants, was occasioned not by the plaintiff, nor the court, but by questions asked by these very defendants. They are in no position to have error thus occasioned by them rebound to their benefit merely by virtue of their association as codefendants with those prejudiced by it. To order a reversal in these circumstances would be to entourage defendants in other cases to cause error as to their ■codefendants, knowing that it could not operate to their own ■detriment not being prejudicial to the plaintiff, but only to their benefit on appeal in the. event of an adverse judgment.
It is to be noted that only two cases were cited by these defendants in support of their contention that we should exer•cise our discretion in favor of reversal, and in both of these cases there were special circumstances not here present! In the first of these cases, Roberts v. Saunders, 118 N. J. L. 548 (E. & A. 1937), the Court of Errors and Appeals stated:
“A number of grounds of appeal are argued in each case: some of which though meritorious and in our view intrinsically sufficient for ■reversal, are unavailable for technical procedural reasons. We conclude, however, that the judgments should be reversed for other reasons .presently to be stated.'’
'The court then went on to hold that the trial court had erroneously excluded a statement signed by the plaintiff which 'impeached his testimony at the trial' and which tended to inculpate one defendant and exculpate the other. In addition -the trial court had erred in limiting the two defendants to six peremptory challenges between them when they were en'titled to six each because of their conflicting position. This latter error was not objected to by one defendant and so on *268appeal it was not available to him even though prejudicial. The court in the exercise of its discretion reversed the judgment below as to both defendants.
In the second case cited, Drolar v. Pennsylvania R. R. Company, 120 N. J. L. 199 (Sup. Ct. 1938); affirmed, 123 N. J. L. 201 (E. & A. 1939), the court held that the trial court had erred in not granting the railroad company’s motion for a nonsuit on the grounds that it had not been shown that it had notice of the existence of the oily spot on the floor on which the plaintiff slipped and fell. The proof against the other -defendant, a mere janitor, was not lacking in this respect. It may be inferred from the opinion of the court, however, that the railroad company in fact did have the necessary knowledge, for the court states:
“The factual situation was not helped by any testimony received after the motion for nonsuit had been denied, so that the error in refusing to nonsuit as to the company was not cured.”
In this situation it would have been inequitable to permit the judgment to stand against the janitor alone and, as a practical matter, would likely have been of little value to the plaintiff. Thus the court in the exercise of its discretion reversed as to both defendants even though a reversal was required only as to the railroad company. In the instant case ther'e are no such special circumstances and I see no good reason why the plaintiff should be deprived of her judgment against these two defendants who were proven negligent and as to whom there was no error. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the judgment appealed from should be affirmed. This would be in accord with the practice which has generally prevailed in this State since the common law rule requiring a reversal was changed by the Practice Act of 1912 to make an affirmance mandatory, Moersdorf v. New York Telephone Co., 84 N. J. L. 747 (E. & A. 1913); Hagy v. Hafner, 86 N. J. L. 502 (Sup. Ct. 1914), and by Rules 131 and 143 of the former Supreme Court, promulgated thereunder, to make an affirmance discretionary. Seacoast Finance Co. v. Cornell, 104 N. J. L. 24 (Sup. Ct. 1927); Huff v. C. W. Goddard Coal *269and Supply Co., 106 N. J. L. 19 (Sup. Ct. 1930); Felix et al. v. Adelman, 113 N. J. L. 445 (E. & A. 1934).
I am authorized by Mr. Justice Wachenfeld and Mr. Justice Ackerson to state that they join in this dissent.
For reversal — Justices Case, Heher, Olipi-iant and Bur-ling — 4.
For affirmance — Chief Justice Vanderbilt, and Justices Waoi-ieneeld and Ackerson — 3.