Court Opinion

ID: 9954453
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-26 14:08:29.927234+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:12:26.363714
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-1036-22

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

KARIF FORD, a/k/a KARIF
H. KING, KHYRE KING, and
KHY-RE KING,

     Defendant-Appellant.
___________________________

                   Submitted on March 6, 2024 – Decided March 26, 2024

                   Before Judges Firko and Vanek.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Essex County, Indictment No. 14-09-2285.

                   Jennifer Nicole Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for
                   appellant (Brian F. Plunkett, Designated Counsel, on
                   the brief).

                   Theodore N. Stephens II, Essex County Prosecutor,
                   attorney for respondent (Frank J. Ducoat, Special
                   Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor,
                   of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM

        Defendant Karif Ford appeals from an August 8, 2022 Law Division order

denying his pro se petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an

evidentiary hearing.     Defendant is currently serving a twenty-year prison

sentence after pleading guilty to his role in the carjacking at the parking deck of

The Mall at Short Hills in Millburn, which resulted in the death of Dustin

Friedland. Defendant contends he is entitled to PCR because evidence was

improperly withheld from the grand jury, there was an inadequate basis for his

conviction, and he received ineffective assistance of both plea and appellate

counsel. After a careful review of the record and decisional law, we affirm the

denial of defendant's PCR petition for substantially the same reasons set forth

in Judge Michael L. Ravin's 1 thorough, twenty-four-page written decision.

                                             I.

        A full recitation of the facts underlying defendant's plea is delineated in

our prior opinion on the direct appeal, State v. Ford (Ford I), No. A-5095-17

(App. Div. Apr. 21, 2020), where we affirmed defendant's conviction and

sentence. In the interest of brevity, we summarize only the facts pertinent to

defendant's PCR petition.

1
    Judge Ravin handled all of the matters referenced in this opinion.
                                                                             A-1036-22
                                         2
      On December 15, 2013, defendant and three co-defendants, Kevin

Roberts, Hanif Thompson, and Basim Henry, ventured to The Mall at Short Hills

with the intention of stealing a car. The group selected a Range Rover in the

parking deck that was occupied by Friedland and his wife. Thompson and

Roberts approached Friedland and a struggle ensued. Thompson hit Friedland

with a gun and then shot him in the head. Thompson and Roberts forced

Friedman's wife out of the Range Rover and drove the car out of the parking

garage. Defendant and Henry fled in the car they arrived in. Emergency

responders took Friedland to the hospital, where he was pronounced dead.

      That night, defendant recounted the details of the incident to his brother ,

who reported what he learned to the police. On December 19, 2013, defendant

met with detectives who informed him of his rights before proceeding with a

recorded interview. Defendant provided a detailed account of the incident,

including the extent of his involvement.

      On September 19, 2014, a grand jury returned Indictment No. 14-09-2285,

charging defendant, Thompson, Roberts, and Henry with second-degree

conspiracy to commit carjacking, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 and 2C:15-2(a) (count one);

first-degree carjacking by purposely or knowingly putting the occupants in fear

of immediate bodily injury, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-2(a)(2) (count two); first-degree

                                                                            A-1036-22
                                        3
felony murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(3) (count three); first-degree purposeful

and/or knowing murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) (count four); second-degree

unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b) (count five); and second-

degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a)

(count six). Defendant was separately charged in Indictment No. 14-09-2286

with second-degree certain persons not to possess weapons, N.J.S.A.

2C:39-7(b).

      Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence collected during a search

of his residence pursuant to a warrant.    The judge denied the motion on

December 1, 2015.

      On October 10, 2017, defendant pleaded guilty to count two, first-degree

carjacking under N.J.S.A. 2C:15-2(a)(2). Pursuant to the plea agreement, the

State dismissed the remaining charges against defendant and recommended a

custodial sentence not to exceed twenty years. On January 18, 2018, defendant

was sentenced to twenty years in prison with eighty-five percent parole

ineligibility pursuant to the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2,

and the remaining counts were dismissed. The judge entered an amended

judgment of conviction with the parties' consent on April 10, 2018 to properly

include defendant's jail credit.

                                                                        A-1036-22
                                      4
      Defendant appealed, arguing his motion to suppress evidence should have

been granted and he received a sentence that was disproportionate to his

culpability as compared to co-defendants. On April 21, 2020, we affirmed

defendant's amended judgment of conviction and sentence. Ford I, slip op. at 1.

We stated:

             Defendant's sentence was commensurate with the
             serious nature of this carjacking, in which Friedland
             was not merely put in fear of immediate bodily injury
             but was murdered. Defendant's contention that he
             should be sentenced to the lower end of the sentencing
             range for the carjacking offense is patently without
             merit.

             [Id. at 21.]

The Supreme Court denied defendant's petition for certification. State v. Ford,

243 N.J. 271 (2020).

      On October 16, 2020, defendant filed a pro se PCR petition arguing that

the indictment should have been dismissed because the State's grand jury

presentation was based in large part on hearsay, the State produced an

unqualified witness to testify as to Friedland's cause of death, and the State

failed to produce exculpatory evidence to the grand jury. Defendant further

asserted his conviction should be vacated for prosecutorial misconduct, he is

entitled to withdraw his guilty plea because the factual basis set forth during his

                                                                             A-1036-22
                                        5
plea allocution was insufficient, and there is evidence of his innocence.

Defendant also argued that he only pleaded guilty because of ineffective

assistance of his trial counsel who told him to plead guilty without first obtaining

a report prepared by law enforcement and failed to move to dismiss the

indictment based upon the deficiencies in the State's presentation. Finally,

defendant argued his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to properly

assert errors that should have been raised by counsel on direct appeal.

      On August 8, 2022, Judge Ravin denied defendant's PCR petition in a

comprehensive written decision, finding in part as follows:

            Here, the record reflects, and the parties do not dispute
            that the victim was shot in the head and subsequently
            died. Whether or not the State presented an expert to
            the grand jury about how the victim died would not
            have changed the outcome of the grand jury at all. It
            would not have caused an indictment to not be returned.
            Thus, [defendant] has not shown that barring this issue
            would cause fundamental injustice to him.

            Regarding [defendant's] argument that the State failed
            to present co[-]defendant Roberts'[s] statement wherein
            Roberts states that [defendant] refused to participate in
            the carjacking, the [c]ourt finds that such information
            is not exculpatory. . . .

            ....

            [T]rial counsel was not ineffective for failing to file a
            motion to dismiss the indictment as such a motion
            would have been futile, for all the reasons the [c]ourt

                                                                              A-1036-22
                                         6
explained in the previous section of its opinion. It is
not ineffective assistance of counsel for trial counsel
not to file a meritless motion. State v. O'Neal, 190 N.J.
601, 619 (2007).

....

[Defendant's] prosecutorial misconduct claim could
have been raised on direct appeal or at an earlier
proceeding and thus it is procedurally barred pursuant
to Rule 3:22-4. . . .

....

[Defendant] argues that while the individual errors of
trial counsel may not rise to the level required to
demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, the
cumulative effect of all his errors led to the deprivation
of a fair trial for [defendant]. In analyzing each of
[defendant's] individual arguments, this [c]ourt
explained its reasons for finding that trial counsel did
not err. As the [c]ourt finds that trial counsel did not
err, there is no cumulative effect of such errors so as to
deprive [defendant] of a fair trial.

....

The [c]ourt previously discussed why the deficiency at
the grand jury and prosecutorial misconduct claims
were meritless. Thus, the [c]ourt finds that appellate
counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise these
meritless claims on appeal.

....

Here, there was such overwhelming evidence against
[defendant] implicating him in the offenses for which
he was charged via accomplice and co-conspirator

                                                             A-1036-22
                            7
            liability, even though he was not the shooter and did not
            get out of the car. . . . Therefore, [defendant] fails to
            demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that his claim will
            ultimately succeed on the merits, and this [c]ourt need
            not hold an evidentiary hearing to decide this PCR.

      This appeal follows. Defendant raises the following contentions for our

consideration:

            POINT I

            DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO [PCR] BECAUSE
            THE INDICTMENT AGAINST HIM WAS
            IMPROPERLY OBTAINED WHEN THE STATE
            WITHHELD CRITICAL INFORMATION FROM
            THE GRAND JURY.

            POINT II

            DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO WITHDRAW HIS
            PLEA OF GUILTY AS A MATTER OF DUE
            PROCESS OF LAW BECAUSE AN INADEQUATE
            FACTUAL BASIS WAS PROVED FOR THE CRIME
            OF CARJACKING.

            POINT III

            THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN DENYING [PCR]
            OR AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING BECAUSE BOTH
            PLEA AND APPELLATE COUNSEL RENDERED
            INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE WHEN TRIAL
            COUNSEL FAILED TO SEEK DISMISSAL OF THE
            INDICTMENT, FAILED TO CONDUCT NEEDED
            INVESTIGATION, FAILED TO DISCUSS TRIAL
            STRATEGY, AND PRESSURED DEFENDANT TO
            PLEAD GUILTY; AND WHEN APPELLATE
            COUNSEL FAILED TO RAISE ISSUES RELATED

                                                                        A-1036-22
                                       8
            TO THE STATE'S PRESENTATION TO THE
            GRAND JURY.

                                            II.

      PCR is New Jersey's response to the federal writ of habeas corpus. State

v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 459 (1992). To succeed in obtaining PCR, a defendant

must "establish, by a preponderance of the credible evidence, that he [or she] is

entitled to the requested relief." State v. Mitchell, 126 N.J. 565, 579 (1992)

(quoting State v. Marshall, 244 N.J. Super. 60, 69 (Law Div. 1990)).

      Where, as in this matter, a PCR court does not conduct an evidentiary

hearing, we review the PCR court's factual findings and legal conclusions de

novo. See State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391, 421 (2004). Determining whether

counsel's performance was ineffective for purposes of the Sixth Amendment to

the United States Constitution requires analysis under the standards formulated

in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984), and adopted by the

Supreme Court in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987). To prevail on a claim

of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must meet the two-prong test of

establishing that: (l) counsel's performance was deficient and counsel made

errors that were so egregious that counsel was not functioning effectively as

guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; and (2) the

defect in performance prejudiced defendant's right to a fair trial such that there

                                                                            A-1036-22
                                        9
exists a "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the

result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694.

      "Ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims are particularly suited for post-

conviction review because they often cannot reasonably be raised in a prior

proceeding." State v. Hess, 207 N.J. 123, 145 (2011) (quoting Preciose, 129

N.J. at 460). To establish a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel,

a defendant must present legally competent evidence rather than "bald

assertions." State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 154, 170 (App. Div. 1999).

For the reasons that follow, we affirm Judge Ravin's conclusion that defendant

has not met this standard.

                                       III.

      We proceed to consider defendant's argument that an evidentiary hearing

should have been held on his PCR petition as to his allegations of ineffective

assistance of counsel at both his plea hearing and on direct appeal. Pursuant to

Rule 3:22-4(a), we consider defendant's contentions regarding plea counsel's

deficiency only if we find his appellate counsel was ineffective since, otherwise,

the issues should have been raised on direct appeal and would be procedurally

barred at this juncture.

                                                                             A-1036-22
                                       10
      We agree with Judge Ravin's well-supported conclusion that defendant's

appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to pursue defendant's contention

that the indictment against him should have been dismissed.          Specifically,

defendant alleges that the State withheld exculpatory evidence from the grand

jury which resulted an overreaching indictment that was non-reflective of the

evidence in totality.

      "Judicial involvement with and review of the grand jury is generally

limited." State v. Shaw, 241 N.J. 223, 239 (2020). "At the grand jury stage, the

State is not required to present enough evidence to sustain a conviction." State

v. Feliciano, 224 N.J. 351, 380 (2016). "As long as the State presents 'some

evidence establishing each element of the crime to make out a prima facie case,'

a trial court should not dismiss an indictment." Ibid. (quoting State v. Saavedra,

222 N.J. 39, 57 (2015)). "An indictment should be disturbed only on the 'clearest

and plainest ground[s],' and 'only when the indictment is manifestly deficient or

palpably defective.'" Shaw, 241 N.J. at 239 (alteration in original) (first quoting

State v. Perry, 124 N.J. 128, 168 (1991); then quoting State v. Hogan, 144 N.J.

216, 229 (1996)).

      Defendant's claim that he is entitled to PCR because the indictment against

him was improperly obtained is both procedurally barred and substantively

                                                                             A-1036-22
                                       11
without merit. Under Rule 3:10-2(c), a defense based on a deficient indictment

must be raised before trial. No such relief was requested here.            However,

defendant asserts it proper for us to consider his argument regarding the grand

jury because the ineffective assistance of both his trial and appellate counsel

would render a fundamental injustice under Rule 3:22-4(a)(2) if we did not.

      We are unpersuaded and find no merit to defendant's argument that his

plea or appellate counsel was ineffective by failing to raise the issue of

exculpatory evidence not being presented to the grand jury.                Defendant

predicates his claims of exculpatory evidence on a December 20, 2013 interview

between detectives and co-defendant Roberts, which set forth:

            ROBERTS: [Co-defendant Henry] parked so we could
            just look right at the truck.

            [DETECTIVE]: Okay. . . . Do you see [Friedland]
            approaching the car?

            ROBERTS: No, I ain't see nobody approaching the car.
            The lights blinked [indicating the car had been
            unlocked].

            [DETECTIVE]: Okay.

                  ....

            ROBERTS: So then I went to go [steal the car], and
            [Thompson's] 1ike, come on, let's go get it. And this
            guy right here is like, [n]ah, I ain't doing that sh[*]t. He

                                                                               A-1036-22
                                       12
            said, [n]ah, f[*]ck that. He's like, [y]ou always scared
            of some sh[*]t, like.

            [DETECTIVE]: So . . . [t]his guy, Karif Ford . . .

             ROBERTS: He –

            [DETECTIVE]: – said he's not doing it.

            ROBERTS: He said, I ain't doing that sh[*]t. And he
            said, f[*]ck that. So then bra is 1ike, [y]o. He's like,
            [y]o, bra, you going to come with me? I'm like, y'all
            just got me all up here. Like, f[*]ck. I said, [w]ell,
            come on, man. I thought we going to take the truck.
            Get the truck. Let's get the f[*]ck out of here. 'Cause
            y'all got me hold – y'all holding me up, like.

                  ....

            [DETECTIVE]: So Mr. Ford said he wasn't doing it[?]

            ROBERTS: He ain't with that sh[*]t.

            [Emphasis added.]

      We agree with Judge Ravin's determination that this exchange does not

constitute exculpatory evidence pursuant to the decisional factors set forth in

Hogan, 144 N.J. at 237-38. A "prosecutor's duty arises only if the evidence

satisfies two requirements: it must directly negate guilt and must also be clearly

exculpatory." Id. at 237. "[U]nless the exculpatory evidence at issue squarely

refutes an element of the crime in question, that evidence is not within the

prosecutorial duty we have set forth." Ibid. (emphasis omitted).

                                                                            A-1036-22
                                       13
            The second requirement, that the evidence in question
            be "clearly exculpatory," requires an evaluation of the
            quality and reliability of the evidence. The exculpatory
            value of the evidence should be analyzed in the context
            of the nature and source of the evidence, and the
            strength of the State's case. For example, if the
            exculpatory evidence in question is eyewitness
            testimony, potential bias on the part of the eyewitness
            may affect the prosecutor's obligation to present the
            witness's testimony to the grand jury. Similarly, the
            exculpatory testimony of one eyewitness is not "clearly
            exculpatory" if contradicted by the incriminating
            testimony of a number of other witnesses. Moreover,
            an accused's self-serving statement denying
            involvement in a crime, although such a statement
            directly negates guilt, ordinarily would not be
            sufficiently credible to be "clearly exculpatory," and
            need not be revealed to the grand jury.

            [Id. at 237-38.]

      Evidence which "requir[es] the grand jury to make a credibility judgment"

is not clearly exculpatory. State v. Scherzer, 301 N.J. Super. 363, 427 (App.

Div. 1997). We agree with Judge Ravin's conclusion that the "[s]tatements of

witnesses or co[-]defendants frequently change, are frequently recanted, and

may be unreliable; therefore, they are not clearly exculpatory." We add only

that given (1) defendant's admission in his first interview with detectives he

learned of his co-defendants' plan to steal a vehicle when they entered the

parking garage for the second time and (2) the overwhelming evidence

connecting defendant to the location of the shooting and to his co-defendants,

                                                                         A-1036-22
                                      14
we see sufficient indication of contradictory information. As a result, the

singular interview from co-defendant Roberts does not amount to clearly

exculpatory evidence under our decisional law.

      We decline to disturb Judge Ravin's finding that defendant has not

established a prima facie case under Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, since even if

appellate counsel had raised all of the arguments defendant now deems worthy,

there is no showing the result would have been different in order to warrant an

evidentiary hearing. An evidentiary hearing is only required where the PCR

petition has a reasonable probability of being meritorious. State v. Jones, 219

N.J. 298, 311 (2014) (explaining that when "view[ing] the facts in the light most

favorable to the defendant," the court should hold an evidentiary hearing if "the

PCR claim has a reasonable probability of being meritorious"). Judge Ravin

properly concluded that defendant's PCR petition did not have "a reasonable

probability of being meritorious" and, therefore, no evidentiary hearing was

necessary. Ibid.

      The "mandate" that PCR counsel advance all arguments proffered by a

defendant regardless of their likelihood of success "does not apply to appellate

counsel." State v. Gaither, 396 N.J. Super. 508, 515 (App. Div. 2007). "[A]

defendant does not have a constitutional right to have appellate counsel raise

                                                                           A-1036-22
                                      15
every non-frivolous issue that defendant requests on appeal." Ibid. Therefore,

we affirm Judge Ravin's reasoned conclusion that defendant's argument is both

procedurally barred and substantively without merit, so appellate cou nsel was

not ineffective for failing to raise it. As this is the only substantive argument

defendant presents in his merits brief as to the ineffectiveness of his appellate

counsel, we concur with Judge Ravin that defendant has shown no

ineffectiveness on the part of his appellate counsel.

      In light of this analysis, we similarly find no merit to defendant's assertion

that plea counsel should have moved to dismiss the indictment against him based

on the same argument that the grand jury improperly returned the indictment

charging him with carjacking because the State withheld exculpatory evidence.

Just as appellate counsel was not ineffective for declining to bring this argument,

we see no deficiency in plea counsel declining to assert a losing argument

because there was no clearly exculpatory evidence withheld from the grand jury.

"[C]ounsel is not obligated to raise issues or advance arguments which are

obviously frivolous or specious." State v. Hughes, 128 N.J. Super. 363, 369

(App. Div. 1974).

      Based on the above analysis, we further conclude that there has been no

fundamental injustice inflicted on defendant pursuant to Rule 3:22-4(a)(2) such

                                                                              A-1036-22
                                       16
that this court should grant PCR. Accordingly, we affirm Judge Ravin's decision

not to grant defendant relief based on his assertion that the State withheld

evidence from the grand jury or that either his plea or appellate counsel was

deficient for not previously raising this argument.

                                            IV.

         Since we have affirmed Judge Ravin's conclusion that defendant's

appellate counsel was not ineffective, defendant's remaining arguments as to the

ineffectiveness of his plea counsel are procedurally barred under Rule 3:22-4 as

issues that could have been raised on direct appeal. Defendant asserts that

preclusion of our consideration of these claims, however, amounts to a

fundamental injustice under Rule 3:22-4(a)(2). We disagree. Nevertheless, we

will briefly address each of defendant's arguments regarding plea counsel's

effectiveness in turn.

         Aside from the claims related to proofs presented to the grand jury,

defendant sets forth three allegations of ineffectiveness of his plea counsel: (1)

counsel failed to conduct required evidentiary investigations before defendant

accepted the State's plea offer; (2) counsel did not discuss trial strategy with

defendant; and (3) counsel pressured defendant into accepting the State's plea

offer.

                                                                            A-1036-22
                                       17
      As to defendant's assertion that plea counsel conducted insufficient

investigation by failing to seek a report from law enforcement, we substantially

agree with the analysis set forth by Judge Ravin. There is ample evidence in the

record that plea counsel did seek out the report, including through motion

practice. Furthermore, defendant's own certification in support of his PCR

petition sets forth that his plea counsel made "repeated request[s] for this

report." We fail to see how this admission lends itself to defendant's claim for

ineffectiveness and see no further merit in this assertion.

      The analysis set forth in defendant's merits brief intertwines his remaining

arguments by asserting that failing to discuss trial strategy was part of how plea

counsel pressured him into pleading guilty. Specifically, defendant asserts that

but for counsel's undue pressure, he would not have pleaded guilty.

      Our "scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential."

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 669. "An attorney is entitled to 'a strong presumption'

that he or she provided reasonably effective assistance, and a 'defendant must

overcome the presumption that' the attorney's decisions followed a sound

strategic approach to the case." State v. Pierre, 223 N.J. 560, 578-79 (2015)

(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689).

                                                                            A-1036-22
                                         18
      Aside from the assertions that we have already discussed and found

unconvincing, defendant's merits brief lacks any specific reference to how he

was pressured by counsel to plead guilty. Without facts to support the argument,

we conclude there was insufficient evidence to overcome the presumption of

effectiveness afforded to counsel. In this regard, defendant has not met his

burden, and we are unable to consider this argument further. We see no error in

Judge Ravin's determination that defendant has not established a prima facie

showing of ineffective assistance as to his plea counsel.

                                            V.

      We next consider defendant's assertion that he is entitled to withdraw his

guilty plea because there was an inadequate factual basis to establish he was

guilty of carjacking. First, defendant is procedurally barred from raising this

argument on this PCR appeal.       Defendant does not argue in his brief that

appellate counsel was ineffective by failing to raise this issue on direct appeal.

Thus, defendant’s argument of inadequate factual basis for the crime of

carjacking is barred under Rule 3:22-4(a)(1) as an issue that could have been

brought up on direct appeal and was not.

      Even if we were to consider defendant's belated argument, we are

unconvinced that withdrawal of the guilty plea is supported by the record and

                                                                            A-1036-22
                                       19
prevailing law.   "A trial judge's finding that a plea was voluntarily and

knowingly entered is entitled to appellate deference so long as that

determination is supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record." State

v. Lipa, 219 N.J. 323, 332 (2014). A presumption of reasonableness attaches to

the sentence where, as in this matter, a defendant receives the exact sentence

agreed upon. State v. S.C., 289 N.J. Super. 61, 71 (App. Div. 1996).

      "An appellate court is in the same position as the trial court in assessing

whether the factual admissions during a plea colloquy satisfy the essential

elements of an offense."     State v. Tate, 220 N.J. 393, 404 (2015). 2       We

unequivocally disagree with defendant's assertion that his plea colloquy lacked

2
  Where, as is the case in defendant's PCR appeal, "the issue is solely whether
an adequate factual basis supports a guilty plea, a Slater analysis is
unnecessary." Tate, 220 N.J. at 404 (citing State v. Slater, 198 N.J. 145, 157-
58 (2009)).

            [T]rial judges are to consider and balance four factors
            in evaluating motions to withdraw a guilty plea: (1)
            whether the defendant has asserted a colorable claim of
            innocence; (2) the nature and strength of defendant's
            reasons for withdrawal; (3) the existence of a plea
            bargain; and (4) whether withdrawal would result in
            unfair prejudice to the State or unfair advantage to the
            accused.

            [Slater, 198 N.J. at 157-58 (2009).]

                                                                           A-1036-22
                                      20
the factual basis to support his conviction.       Defendant pleaded guilty to

carjacking under N.J.S.A. 2C:15-2(a)(2), which sets forth:

            A person is guilty of carjacking if in the course of
            committing an unlawful taking of a motor vehicle . . .
            or in an attempt to commit an unlawful taking of a
            motor vehicle he [or she]:

            ....

            (2) threatens an occupant or person in control with, or
            purposely or knowingly puts an occupant or person in
            control of the motor vehicle in fear of, immediate
            bodily injury . . . .

            [N.J.S.A. 2C:15-2(a)(2).]

      Further, our statutory framework for co-conspirator liability sets forth that

defendant is unable to deflect culpability simply because he was not the one to

pull the trigger or drive the Range Rover away from the scene.

            a. A person is guilty of an offense if it is committed by
               his own conduct or by the conduct of another person
               for which he is legally accountable, or both.

            b. A person is legally accountable for the conduct of
               another person when:

            ....

                   (3) He is an accomplice of such other person in
                   the commission of an offense; or

                   (4) He is engaged in a conspiracy with such other
                    person.

                                                                             A-1036-22
                                        21
                     [N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6.]

      On October 10, 2017, defendant testified in part as follows at his plea

allocution:

              [DEFENDANT]: On December 15th, 2013, I went to
              Short Hills Mall in Millburn to steal a car and it turned
              into a carjacking.

              ....

              [DEFENDANT]: I was part of the agreement to the
              carjacking, where they threatened the occupants of the
              car with force.

              ....

              [DEFENDANT]: When we went to steal the car, then
              there was – it turned into a carjacking.

              ....

              [DEFENDANT]: My understanding we was going to
              steal a car, not to use force to take the car but that's what
              happened in the process.

              ....

              [DEFENDANT'S TRIAL COUNSEL]: Did certain of
              the occupants of . . . the car that you went [to the mall]
              in, leave the car?

              [DEFENDANT]: What do mean, leave the –

              [DEFENDANT'S TRIAL COUNSEL]: Leave the car
              that you four went to the mall in?

                                                                              A-1036-22
                                          22
[DEFENDANT]: Yes.

[DEFENDANT'S TRIAL COUNSEL]: And . . . are
they the ones that approached the [Range Rover and
Friedland]?

[DEFENDANT]: Yes.

[DEFENDANT'S TRIAL COUNSEL]: And was that
done as part of your plan to steal that car?

[DEFENDANT]: Yes.

[DEFENDANT'S TRIAL COUNSEL]: And did these
people get into a confrontation or a conflict or a fight
with the person that they approached who was the
occupant of the [Range Rover]?

[DEFENDANT]: Yes. For sure.

[DEFENDANT'S TRIAL COUNSEL]: And was that
part of your plan to steal this car?

[DEFENDANT]: Yes.

[DEFENDANT'S TRIAL COUNSEL]: And during the
course of that was Mr. Friedland shot?

[DEFENDANT]: I believe yes.

....

THE COURT: Has anyone threatened you or pressured
or coerced you to get you to plead guilty?

[DEFENDANT]: No.

....

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            THE COURT: Well, is your plea of guilty entirely
            voluntary and of your own free will?

            [DEFENDANT]: Yes.

            ....

            THE COURT: Are you yourself guilty of the crime to
            which you're pleading guilty to? You yourself. Are
            you guilty of the crime to which you are pleading
            guilty?

            [DEFENDANT]: Yes.

            THE COURT:          Has [defendant's trial counsel]
            represented you during these proceedings, met with
            you, explained everything to you, and answered every
            single one of your questions?

            [DEFENDANT]: Yes.

            THE COURT: Are you absolutely satisfied with his
            services?

            [DEFENDANT]: Yes.

      We reject defendant's argument that there was an insufficient factual basis

to support his guilty plea to carjacking. The plea allocution which set forth a

factual basis for defendant's participation in the plan to carjack by force

complies with prevailing law. N.J.S.A. 2C:15-2(a)(2); Rule 3:9-2; see also State

v. Gregory, 220 N.J. 413, 419 (2015) ("The factual basis for a guilty plea can be

established by a defendant's explicit admission of guilt or by a defendant's

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acknowledgment of the underlying facts constituting essential elements of the

crime."). Defendant testified he had a plan with co-defendants to steal a vehicle.

Although defendant asserted he did not think force was part of the plan

originally, it was his intention that the group steal a car and the resulting

altercation with Friedland was part of that plan. Ultimately, the plan to obtain

the vehicle by force through the confrontation was successful and led to the

death of Dustin Friedland.

      To the extent we have not addressed defendant's remaining arguments, we

are satisfied they lack sufficient merit to warrant further discussion in this

written opinion, Rule 2:11-3(e)(2).

      Affirmed.

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