Court Opinion

ID: 9677419
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:51:50.369962+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:55.896912
License: Public Domain

Black, J.
(dissenting). It requires no legally clued sleuth to discern, upon the face of the Court’s instant opinion for affirmance, that several issues of fact are presented which, if tried according to historic practice and constitutional right, would control one way or the other most if not all of the legal questions decided this day; the question of jurisdiction under RJA § 705 (1) (2) (3)  specifically included. That new and insidious qualifier “genuine,” manifestly now, has greased the way to encouragement and then affirmance of accelerated or summary judgments on strength of judicial determination that a given issue of fact just isn’t “genuine” — sort of spurious, I apprehend — and that *315judgment may be entered on the basis of such a determination regardless of the actual presence of such an issue.2
Sure, the presented issue of fact may be unbelievable to the scrutinizing trial or appellate judge. But to say so on summary motion just isn’t his function if Const 1963, art 1, § 14 is to be upheld by the primary guardians thereof. The judge may not, even in the Federal system from whence came the aforesaid qualifier, decide questions of credibility. See discussion of this point in the two Durant Cases (Durant v. Stahlin [Appeal in re King, Bashara, Merrell, and Waldron], 374 Mich 82, 88-90; Durant v. Stahlin [Appeal in re Van Dusen, Elliott, Romney], 375 Mich 628, 644-656), citing Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. (1962), 368 US 464 (82 S Ct 486, 7 L ed 2d 458); Sartor v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corporation (1944), 321 US 620 (64 S Ct 724, 88 L ed 967); and Sonnentheil v. Christian Moerlein Brewing Company (1899), 172 US 401 (19 S Ct 233, 43 L ed 492).
Two sentences, italicized within this complete paragraph of the Court’s opinion for affirmance, prove the point (ante at 309):
“On the basis of the pleadings, affidavits, counter-affidavits, depositions, interrogatories and the answers thereto, the trial court found there was not that measure of part performance which would' take the case out of the statute. Effectuating the purpose of the rule authorizing summary judgment often presents a difficult and delicate exercise of judicial *316acuity. The judge must assiduously avoid making a finding on controverted fact issues. At the same time he must analyze everything properly before him to determine whether any genuine issue of material fact is raised. The line of demarcation is one of the most elusive in procedural law. In this case the trial judge located it and observed it punctiliously.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Just before the theretofore adopted General Court Rules of 1963 went into effect five members of this Court contributed grimly their view that summary disposition of cases on summary motion should never be permitted to trench upon one’s supposedly steadfast and constantly assured right to a full day in court and upon one’s constitutionally provided right of trial by jury. Romero v. King, 368 Mich 45, 49, 50:
“With the arrival of this appeal there remains but little doubt that our fancy new rules of peremptory practice are being regularly employed — subtly and effectively — to circumvent the revered and hitherto guaranteed right to have presented issues of fact tried to and decided by juries. For attestation of such right, as it was in the beginning, is now, but — -if current sly schemers do have their way — • will never hence be, see United States Const, Am 7; Mich Const (1850), art 6, § 27; Mich Const (1908), art 2, § 13 (duplicating the 1850 guaranty); Underwood v. People, 32 Mich 1 (20 Am Rep 633); Swart v. Kimball, 43 Mich 443; Paul v. Detroit, 32 Mich 108; Risser v. Hoyt, 53 Mich 185.”
I would reverse and remand for entry of order denying the respective summary motions that were granted below, and would award plaintiff costs of both appellate courts.
T. M. Kavanagh and Souris, JJ., concurred with Black, J.

 Note that the word “genuine,” appearing now in GCR 1963, 117, was present nowhere in. any previous summary judgment rule of this Court. See the official Revision of 1931 Michigan Court Rules, Rule 30, pp 55-59, and 1945 Court Rule 30, Honigman, Michigan Court Rules Annotated, pp 299, 300, 301. It is noteworthy that the jurisprudence of Michigan got along very well without these extreme new methods of fast and easy judgment, from the very beginning 117 years ago (Const 1850, art 6, § 5) and up to January 1, 1963.