Court Opinion

ID: 9692247
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 15:48:29.392593+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:33.500795
License: Public Domain

Messmore, Yeager, and Brower, JJ.,
concurring.
We quite agree that the effect of the majority opinion is to hold that a fit, proper, and suitable parent, who has not forfeited his natural right as a parent, has a right superior to that of the state to control, rear, and educate his own children. It has long been the rule in this state that where the custody of a minor child is involved in a habeas corpus action the custody of the child is to be determined by the best interests of the child with due regard for the superior rights of a fit, proper, and suitable parent. The dissent complains that “due regard” has become “absolute right.” We accept this statement as being correct where the parent is a fit, proper, and suitable person and has done nothing to forfeit his natural right as a parent.
In the case of Norval v. Zinsmaster, 57 Neb. 158, 77 N. W. 373, 73 Am. S. R. 500, this court said: “We are aware that this court has several times asserted that in such controversies as the present the order should be made with sole reference to the best interests of the child. But this has been broad language applied to special cases. The court has never deprived a parent of the custody of a child merely because on financial or other grounds a stranger might better provide. The statute declares and nature demands that the right shall be in the parent, unless the parent be affirmatively unfit. The statute does not make the judges the guardians of all the children in the state, with power to take them from their parents, so long as the latter discharge their duties to the best of their ability, and give them to strangers because such strangers may be better able to provide what is already well provided. If that were the law, it would be soon changed, by revolution if necessary.”
*172In Clarke v. Lyon, 82 Neb. 625, 118 N. W. 472, 20 L. R. A. N. S. 171, this court held: “The unfitness which deprives a parent of the right to the custody of his children must be positive, and not comparative, and the mere fact that the children would be better nurtured or cared for by a stranger is not sufficient to deprive the parent of his right to their custody.”
We are in agreement with the dissent that the present rule of this court has been followed since Gorsuch v. Gorsuch, on rehearing, 143 Neb. 578, 11 N. W. 2d 456, decided in 1943.
The dissent criticises the rigidity of the long-adopted rule of this court. The same could be said of the Ten Commandments and the Bill of Rights. In cases where the rights of a citizen are being protected against the power of the state, a precise and unqualified statement of the rule, labeled as rigidity by the dissent, is most appropriate to insure the maintenance of the right.
Unless the language “with due regard for the superior rights of a fit, proper, and suitable parent” means that such a parent has a superior right to all others, including the state, the words afford the parent no superior right that he can enforce. It is axiomatic that to grant a right and withhold a remedy is tantamount to the existence of no right at all.
The dissenting opinion asserts that the transfer of Lin Dee to her father is an experiment that should not be permitted. If the placing of the child with her own father is to be described as an experiment, it is one that has proved successful over the years irrespective of the fact that a parent occasionally fails in his duties and obligations to his child. On the other hand, the leaving of the child with her aging grandparents, after she lost the love and care of a mother by the latter’s untimely death, is likewise an experiment. The dissent states that Lin Dee should remain with her grandparents and, in the event of a change of circumstances affecting her best interests, a change in her custody can be made. *173The same remedy exists if the father, after obtaining custody of his child, fails in his duties and obligations to his child.
This case, stripped of its nonessentials, raises the issue as to whether or not the power of the state over minor children is superior to that of a parent who has failed in no respect in his duties and obligations to his child. It is the position of the dissenting opinion that the right of the state is superior to the rights of the natural parent, however -fit, proper, and suitable he may be. It. is the position of the majority that a fit, proper, and suitable .father, and not the state, has the primary right to nurture and rear his child.and to direct its training, education, and religious instruction. We assert that the rights of the state, exercised by the powers of a court of equity, are subordinate to thé rights'of a parent éxcept where the parent is not a fit, proper, or suitable person or has forfeited his natural right as a parent. It is our position that such a parent is, as a matter of law, the proper person to determine the best interests of the child until it is affirmatively shown that he has become disqualified from doing so. We submit that the courts are not the guardians of all the children in the state. The right of a court to assume jurisdiction over minor children arises when parents have failed in their responsibilities or forfeited their natural rights as parents, excluding, of course, the determination of which of two contesting parents shall have the care and custody of their minor children.