Court Opinion

ID: 9836699
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-02 03:14:51.378681+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:22:34.683921
License: Public Domain

EFFRON, Judge
(concurring in part and dissenting in part):
I agree with the principal opinion on Issue II (concerning the reference to the polygraph examination), Issue III (concerning the seizure of the document prepared by appellant), and Issues V and VI (pretrial confinement). I dissent on Issue IV (consideration of an uncharged incident occurring 30 years in the past). In light of my views on Issue IV, I also dissent on Issue I (sufficiency of the evidence as to the charge pertinent to Issue IV).
With respect to Issue IV, I would hold that J’s testimony does not meet the second prong of the test for consideration of uncharged misconduct under United States v. Reynolds, 29 MJ 105 (CMA 1989), and was not admissible under Mil.R.Evid. 404(b) to prove the intent element of the indecent liberties charge.
The charge pertinent to Issue IV alleged that appellant took indecent liberties with a child by showering with his 6-year-old daughter, P, and “exposing his genitals to her and requiring her to expose her genitals to him” during the course of the shower. To prove the element that appellant committed this act to gratify his sexual desire, trial counsel offered evidence of events from 30 years earlier in the form of testimony by J, appellant’s adult daughter from an earlier marriage. J claimed that appellant had digitally penetrated her when she was a young child while bathing her in the family bathtub. The military judge admitted this testimony under Mil.R.Evid. 404(b).
Evidence offered under Mil.R.Evid. 404(b) is considered under a three-part test. Under the second part of the test, the proffered evidence must make a fact of consequence more or less probable. Reynolds, supra at 109. The Government asserts that the 30-year-old events involving J demonstrated that appellant took a shower with P to gratify his sexual desires. The Government’s the*179ory is that appellant had “conditioned” J for later sexual acts with the abuse during bathing and that the cycle was beginning anew with P.
To the extent that our Court has permitted “conditioning” as a basis for admission of evidence, we have viewed it as involving planned acts or behavior implemented to achieve a desired end. In the context of 404(b) evidence, we have held that uncharged acts “must be almost identical to the charged acts” to be admissible as evidence of a plan or scheme. United States v. Morrison, 52 MJ 117, 122 (1999); United States v. Brannan, 18 MJ 181, 188 (CMA 1984).
In the present case, there is a degree of similarity between the charged acts and the acts from 30 years in the past in terms of the age of the alleged victims and their relationship to appellant. There are significant differences, however, in terms of the nature of the acts and the surrounding circumstances. With respect to the 30-year-old events, J testified that appellant washed her in the bathtub and digitally penetrated her. There is nothing in the record to suggest similarity to the key aspects of the charged offense. There is no evidence that appellant was nude when he bathed J, that he bathed with her, that he exposed himself to her, or that others were aware of his actions. In contrast to the 30-year-old allegation, which involved only appellant and his daughter, the circumstances of the charged offense were not kept secret from the family. P was directed by her mother, in front of other family members in a relative’s home, to take a shower with her father, to dry her father,1 and to respond to her father when he later asked her who loved her. In further contrast to the earlier event, there was no evidence of any improper physical contact.
The Government’s theory would require us to hold that when this father took a shower with his 6-year-old daughter, he did so to gratify his sexual desire because he physically abused a different daughter 30 years earlier. As the majority opinion states, “a pattern of lustful intent” can be used by the factfinder to infer lustful intent for a separate charge. The key, however, is finding a pattern, which the evidence does not establish in this ease. The acts upon which the Government’s theory is based are not sufficiently similar to constitute a “plan” of conditioning and, therefore, are not admissible under Mil.R.Evid. 404(b).
I note that under current law — which was not in effect at the time of trial — evidence similar to J’s testimony may be admitted in courts-martial under Mil.R.Evid. 414, which applies to certain sexual offenses. Such evidence, however, is not admissible under Mil.R.Evid. 404(b), which still applies to nonsexual offenses outside the scope of Mil.R.Evid. 414. It is important that we maintain the standard set forth in Reynolds for cases arising under Mil.R.Evid. 404(b) that involve evidence of a non-sexual nature.
The Government presented no other evidence to prove the intent element of the indecent liberties charge. As a result, appellant was prejudiced as to findings and the charge should be dismissed under Issue I.
With respect to the sentence, I note that appellant was also convicted of violating a lawful general regulation, five specifications of false official statements, and endeavoring to impede an investigation and intimidate witnesses. The maximum confinement possible for appellant for all offenses, including the indecent liberties charge, was 42 years. Without the indecent liberties charge, the maximum was 35 years. Appellant received a sentence of dismissal, confinement for 38 months, and forfeitures. It is noteworthy that J’s testimony regarding abuse was admissible independently on the merits for one of the false official statements specifications, so the specter of crimes of sexual perversion was already before the members when they *180considered appellant’s sentence on the other charges. Because the indecent liberties charge was not the only crime that involved evidence of aberrant sexual behavior in this case, added to the fact that the appellant received a relatively brief period of confinement in the context of the allowable maximum, I would conclude that the error was not prejudicial as to sentence.

. The lead opinion states that P’s mother instructing P to dry off her naked father was an "act which in and of itself could constitute indecent liberties with a child.” 54 MJ at 174. I disagree with this proposition, for the Government must prove that appellant, the father, engaged in the exposure and contact with the requisite intent (to gratify his sexual desire). This formulation of the crime, and the issue of intent, is further clouded when one considers that it was the mother, and not appellant, who instructed P to dry off her father.