Court Opinion

ID: 9424946
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:13:16.066507+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:39.476309
License: Public Domain

■ Mr. Justice Powell,
with- whom Mr. Justice Black-mun and Mr. Justice Rehnquist join, dissenting.
The majority opinion today purports to apply the rule laid down in Texas v. New Jersey, 379 .U. S. 674 (1965), to a fact situation not contemplated when that case was decided. In applying that rule to these new facts, it seems to me that the Court exalts the rule but derogates the reasons supporting it.
I
Texas v. New Jersey, a case decided within' the Court’s original jurisdiction, is a unique precedent. Disposition of that case necessarily required á departure from the Court’s usual mode of decisionmaking. Our role in this country’s scheme of government is ordinarily a restricted one, limited in large measure to the resolution of conflicts calling for the interpretation and application either of statutory acts or of provisions of the Federal Constitution. In the performance of this function, an individual Justice’s views as to what he might consider “fair” or “equitable” or “expeditious” are largely immaterial. Infrequently, however, we are called on to resolve disputes arising under the original jurisdiction of the Court (Art. Ill, § 2) in which, our judgment is unaided by statutory or constitutional directives.
In approaching such cases, we may find, as did the *217Court in Texas v. New Jersey, that fairness and expeditiousness provide the guideposts for our decision:
“[T]he issue here is not controlled by statutory or" constitutional provisions or by past decisions, nor is it entirely one of logic. It is fundamentally a question of ease of administration and of equity.” Id., at 683.
The case before us today requires the application of similar principles, and I agree that Mr.-Justice Black’s opinion in Texas v. New Jersey points the way to the most desirable result. In my view, however, the majority’s application of that precedent to the facts of this case . offends both the "fairness” and "ease of administration” . bases of that opinion.
The Court in Texas v. New Jersey was asked to decide which States could take title to escheatable intangible personal property in the form of debts owed by Sun Oil Co. to a large number of individual creditors. After rejecting several alternatives offered by the parties, the Court adopted the rule proposed by the State of Florida and approved by the Special Master. Under that rule the power to escheat the debts in question, in the first instance, was to be accorded “to the State of the creditor’s last known address as shown .by the debtor’s books and records.” Id., at 680-681. In the “infrequent” case in which no record of last address was available or in which the appropriate State’s laws did not provide for the escheat of abandoned intangibles, the property was to go to the State of the debtor’s corporate domicile. Id., at 682.
This, disposition recommended itself to the Court for several reasons. The rule was generally consistent with the common-law maxim “mobilia sequuntur personam”* *218under which intangible personal property may be found to follow the domicile of its owner — here the creditor. Id., at 680 n.. 10. In looking to the residence of the creditor, the rule adopted by the Court recognized that, the Company’s unclaimed debts were assets of the individual creditors rather than" assets of the debtor. Id., at 681. Also, in distributing the property among the creditors’ States, the rule had the advantage of dividing the property in a manner roughly proportionate to the commercial activities of each State’s residents. In using the last-known address as the sole indicator of domicile, the rule would be easy to administer and apply. Thé Court recognized, of course, that this approach might lead to the escheat of property to a State from which the creditor had removed himself in the period since the debt arose. Yet it concluded that these instances would “tend to a large extent to cancel each other out,” and would .not disrupt the basic fairness and expeditiousness of the result. Id., at 681.
Paradoxically, the mechanistic application of the Texas v. New Jersey rule to the present case leads ultimately to the defeat of each of the beneficial justifications for that rule. Unlike the records of the numerous debts owed by Sun Oil, Western Union’s records may reflect the creditors’ addresses for'only a relatively small percentage of the transactions. As a consequence, the greater portion of the entire Western Union fund will go to the State of New York — the State of corporate domicile. Effectively then, the obligation of the debtor will be converted into an asset of the debtor’s State of domicile to the exclusion of the creditors’ States. The Court in Texas v. New Jersey specifically repudiated .this result on" the ground that it was inconsistent with “principles of fairness.” Id., at 680. It would have “exalt [ed] a minor factor to permit escheat of obligations incurred all over the country by the State in which the debtor happened *219to incorporate itself;” Ibid. The fact that the Court was willing to permit this result in the few cases in which no record of address was available or in which no law of escheat governed, does not diminish the clear view of the Court that this result would be impermissible as a basis for disposing of more than a small minority of the debts. Yet the decision today ignores the Court’s urn willingness, to “exalt” the largely coincidental domicile of the corporate debtor. It also disregards the Court’s clearly expressed intent that the eseheatable property be distributed in proportions roughly, comparable to the volume of transactions conducted in each State.
Furthermore, the rule today, is incompatible with the Court’s view in Texas v. New Jersey that an easily and inexpensively discernible mode of allocation be utilized. The majority’s rule will require the examination.of every available money order application to determine whether the applicant filled out the address blank for his own address, .or in the case of money order drafts received but not cashed, whether the holder’s address had been preserved. Western Union estimated in the stipulated statement of facts that such an item-by-item examination could be undertaken at a cost of. approximately $175,000. Report of the Special Master 16.
In stun, the invocation of the Texas v. New Jersey rule in the manner contemplated by the majority will lead to a result that is neither expeditious nor equitable.
II
The reasons underlying Texas v. New Jersey could best be effectuated by a relatively, minor but logical deviation in the manner in which that rule is implemented in this case. Rather than embarking upon a potentially fruitless search for the creditor’s last-known address as a rough indicator of domicile, reliance should be placed upon the State where the debtor-creditor relationship was *220established. In most cases that State is likely also to be the site of the creditor’s domicile. In other words, in the case of money orders sent and then returned to the initiating Western Union office because the sendee failed to claim the money, the State in which the money order was purchased may be presumed to be the State of the purchaser-creditor's domicile. And, where the draft has been received by either the initiating party or by the recipient but not negotiated, the State in which the draft was issued may be assumed to be the State of that creditor’s domicile.-
This modification is preferable, first, because it preserves the equitable foundation of the Texas v. New Jersey rule. The State of the corporate debtor’s domicile is denied a “windfall”; the fund is divided in a proportion approximating the volume of transactions occurring in each State; and the integrity of the notion that these amounts represent assets of the individual purchasers or recipients of money orders is maintained. Secondly, the relevant information would be more easily obtainable. The place of purchase and the office of destination are reflected in Western Union’s ledger books and it would, therefore, be unnecessary to examine the innumerable application. forms themselves. Since the ledgers are more readily available, the allocation of the fund would be effected at less expense than would be required by the majority’s resolution.
Despite these advantages, the Special Master rejected this alternative. He reasoned that an undetermined number of these transactions must have taken place outside the creditors’ State of domicile. Specifically, he cited the cases in which a New. Jersey or Connecticut resident might purchase a money order in. New York, or' cases in which a resident of Virginia or Maryland might piake his purchase in the District of Columbia. Report of the Special Master T8. While such cases *221certainly exist, they are merely exceptions to a generally reliable rule that money order purchases are likely to' have occurred within the~State of the purchaser’s domicile. That perfection is not achieved is no reason to reject this alternative. The Texas v. New Jersey Court recognized that absolute fairness was not obtainable and that the most that could be expected was a rule providing a reasonable approximation. Id., at 681 n. 11. Certainly this objection should not be allowed to frustrate the better alternative in favor of one that is less fair and more difficult to administer.
Ill
The majority opinion intimates, as I think it must, that the. ultimate consequence of its decision today is inconsistent {ante, at 214)' -with the result in Texas v. New Jersey. While the opinion appears to recognize that New York will reap the very “windfall’’ that Texas v. New Jersey sought to avoid, its refusal to bend in the face of this consequence goes largely unexplained. Apparently, the basis for its decision is the conviction that the Court’s prior precedent was designed to settle the question of escheat of intangible personal property “once and for all.” Id., at 678. The majority adheres to the existing rule because of some apprehension that flexibility in this case will deprive the. Court of a satisfactory test for the resolution of future cases. The opinion anticipates that departure from Texas v. New Jersey will leave other cases to be decided on an ad hoc basis, depending in each case on the “adequacy of the debtor’s records.” Ante, at 215. Although the factual ’circumstances of future cases cannot be predicted, it is likely that most of such- cases can be resolved within the principles of Texas v. New Jersey. The factual' range is limited. The' debtor either will or will not maintain creditors’ addresses in the ordinary course of business. *222In some categories of transactions, such as those involving money orders and traveler’s checks, adequate address records may not be available. In the case of ordinary corporate debts, however, it is more likely that records will be available. Moreover, as the majority points out, any State is free to require corporations doing business in that State to maintain records of their creditors’ addresses. Ante, at 215.
In short, the threat of frequent and complicated cases in this area seems remote. It provides little justification for -the majority’s Cinderella-like compulsion to accommodate this ill-fitting precedential “slipper.” From a result that seems both inflexible and inequitable, I dissent.

See Blodgett v. Silberman, 277 U. S. 1, 9-10 (1928).