Court Opinion

ID: 9909029
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-12 15:06:17.4199+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:44.580583
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-2538-21

UNITED STEEL, PAPER AND
FORESTRY, RUBBER,
MANUFACTURING ENERGY,
ENERGY, ALLIED INDUSTRIAL
AND SERVICE WORKERS
INTERNATIONAL UNION,
AFL-CIO-CLC, for itself and for
its LOCAL 4-406,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

OCEAN COUNTY UTILITIES
AUTHORITY,

     Defendant-Appellant.
______________________________

                   Argued October 25, 2023 – Decided December 12, 2023

                   Before Judges Mayer and Paganelli.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Ocean County, Docket No. L-2608-21.

                   Ryan T. Yost argued the cause for appellant (Haines
                   and Yost, attorneys; Ryan T. Yost, on the briefs).
            David Tykulsker argued the cause for respondents
            (David Tykulsker and Associates, attorneys; David
            Tykulsker, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

      Defendant Ocean County Utilities Authority (OCUA) appeals from a

March 5, 2022 order granting plaintiff United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber,

Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and Service Workers International

Union AFL-CIO on behalf of its Local 4-406's (United Steel) order to show

cause (OTSC) confirming an arbitration award and denying OCUA's application

to vacate the arbitration award.

      Since the arbitrator erred by exceeding his scope of authority, as defined

by the Public Employment Relations Commission (PERC) and rendered his

award without evidential support, the judge erred in confirming the arbitrator's

award. Accordingly, we vacate the judge's order, vacate the arbitration award

and remand the matter to arbitration expressly limited to the issue permitted in

PERC's decision of June 24, 2021.

                                         I.

      We glean the procedural and factual history from the records of PERC;

the arbitration; and the OTSC hearing.

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      OCUA is a public employer and United Steel represents "all of [OCUA]'s

full-time and part-time craft employees and production and maintenance

employees." OCUA and United Steel are parties to an Agreement.1

      The Agreement contains a "Grievance Procedure." A grievance "means

any controversy arising over the interpretation, application or alleged violations

of th[e] Agreement, or policies or administrative decisions which affect terms

and conditions of employment, and which may be raised by . . . [United Steel]

on behalf of an individual or a group of individuals."

      The grievance procedure involves a three-step process. If "the grievance

is not resolved to [United Steel's] satisfaction," in steps one and two, and the

grievance "involve[s] the express terms of th[e] Agreement," United Steel may

"submit the grievance for binding arbitration . . . ."

      Under step three:

            [g]rievances must . . . relate solely to subject matter(s)
            within the required scope of negotiations as determined
            by PERC . . .; and by way of remedy do not seek a result
            inconsistent with statute, administrative regulation or
            decisional     law, inconsistent with           [OCUA]'s
            management prerogatives set forth generally and
            specifically in the Management Rights . . ., or which
            would significantly interfere with such management
            prerogatives.

1
  In the records, the Agreement is referred to as a Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA) and a Collective Negotiated Agreement (CNA).
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"The arbitrator expressly has no authority to modify, add to, subtract from, or in

any way whatsoever alter the provisions of th[e] Agreement, and shall be

expressly bound by the considerations . . . above."

      Appendix A to the Agreement is entitled "Registered Apprenticeship

Standards." Under the standards:

            [the OCUA] must conduct, operate, and administer
            th[e] program in accordance with all applicable
            provisions of Title 29 Code of Federal Regulations
            (CFR) parts 29 and 30, and all relevant guidance issued
            by the Office of Apprenticeship (OA). [OCUA] must
            fully comply with the requirements and responsibilities
            listed below and with the requirements outlined in the
            documents "Requirements for Apprenticeship Sponsors
            Reference Guide."

Section I, paragraph G of the Standards, Ratio of Apprentices to Journeyworkers

– 29 CFR § 29.5(b)(7), provides "[e]very apprenticeship program is required to

provide an apprenticeship ratio of apprentices to journeyworkers for adequate

supervision." Further, Section I, paragraph I 3 – 29 CFR § 30.10, provides

"[e]very sponsor will adopt selection procedures for their apprenticeship

programs consistent with the requirements set forth in 29 CFR § 30.10(b) ."

      The following factual background formed the basis for the parties' dispute:

            [i]n July 2020, OCUA posted for a Vehicle Mechanic.
            On October 19, 2020, HR Manager . . . notified Chief
            Steward . . .that a [journeyman] was starting that day.

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            To ensure the new employee was a . . . journeyman . . .
            Chief Steward . . . requested the credentials of the new
            employee. OCUA provided the Chief Steward with the
            resume and diploma . . . . Upon examination of these
            documents it was determined [the new employee] did
            not have all the required related instruction . . . .
            Additionally, it was difficult to determine from the
            documents . . . if [the new employee] completed the
            necessary 8000 hours . . . in the necessary disciplines
            required to be paid at top rate of the CBA.

            On October 23, 2020, HR Manager . . . emailed . . .
            Chief Steward . . . that OCUA would be putting up a
            posting for journeyman mechanics.

      United Steel filed a grievance alleging:

            The [OCUA] fail[ed] to maintain the agreed to ratio of
            apprentice(s) to journeyworkers.

            The [OCUA] refuse[d] to follow the agreed selection
            procedure to select apprentices.

            The [OCUA] . . . hired new employees as
            journeyworkers who ha[d] not completed a
            D[epartment] O[f] L[abor] [DOL] registered
            apprenticeship program.

As a remedy, United Steel sought "[t]o cancel the current job posting for a

[journeyman], post the position as an apprentice and follow the agreed to

selection procedure."

      The parties, having failed to satisfactorily resolve the grievance,

proceeded to arbitration. During the pendency of the arbitration, OCUA "filed

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a scope of negotiations petition [with PERC], seeking a restraint of binding

arbitration of [the] grievance."

      PERC issued the following ruling:

             The request of the [OCUA] for a restraint of binding
             arbitration is denied to the extent that . . . United
             Steel['s] . . . grievance challenges the [OCUA]'s alleged
             failure to adhere to the procedural DOL Apprenticeship
             Standards incorporated into Appendix A of the CNA.
             The [OCUA]'s request for a restraint of binding
             arbitration is granted to the extent that the [United
             Steel]'s grievance challenges the [OCUA]'s decisions to
             post job openings for journeyworkers and hire
             journey[]workers who have not completed a DOL
             registered apprenticeship program.

      Thereafter, the arbitrator opined that he could:

             still issue an award as long as [his] award d[id] not have
             the effect of establishing a provision of a negotiated
             agreement that is inconsistent with the law and . . . issue
             an award of the grievance issue that deals with
             [OCUA]'s alleged violation to adhere to the procedural
             DOL apprenticeship standards incorporated into
             Appendix A but not the grievance issue concerning the
             Authority's decision to post job openings for
             journeyworkers or if they hire a journeyworker who has
             not completed the DOL apprenticeship program.

The arbitrator requested that the parties "structure . . . post-hearing briefs to the

[OCUA's] alleged violation to adhere to the procedural DOL apprenticeship

standards incorporated into Appendix A in accordance with the PERC ruling."

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      Ultimately, the arbitrator's award ordered OCUA "to cease and desist any

further violations of the Apprenticeship Standards with respect to procedures for

selecting applicants, the agreed ratio of apprentices to journeyworkers and from

placing any employee as journeyworker who had not completed a DOL

Registered Apprenticeship Program."

      United Steel filed an OTSC to confirm the arbitrator's award. N.J.S.A.

2A:24-7. OCUA filed an answer and a counterclaim to vacate the award.

N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8.

      The judge confirmed the arbitrator's award finding:

            . . . the body of the [A]greement, when you talk about
            reasonably debatable, I think . . . its clear that the
            [OCUA] has a right to hire whoever they want.
            However, the [Agreement] determines how that person
            is to be paid and also, how he is to be trained after he is
            hired. [The arbitrator] ordered that . . . – this hire . . .
            be as an apprentice to be placed in the appropriate hour
            rate. And I find that the arbitrator's award should be
            upheld and I'm going to enter an [o]rder in accordance
            with that.

                                        II.

      "Judicial review of an arbitration award is very limited." Strickland v.

Foulke Mgmt. Corp., 475 N.J. Super. 27, 38 (App. Div. 2023) (quoting Bound

Brook Bd. of Educ. v. Ciripompa, 228 N.J. 4, 11 (2017)). We defer to arbitration

awards and vacate them "only when it has been shown that a statutory basis

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justifies that action." Kearny PBA Loc. #21 v. Kearny, 81 N.J. 208, 221 (1979).

However, "we owe no special deference to the trial court's interpretation of the

law and the legal consequences that flow from the established facts."

Yarborough v. State Operated Sch. Dist. of City of Newark, 455 N.J. Super. 136,

139 (App. Div. 2018). Thus, "we review the court's decision on a motion to

vacate an arbitration award de novo." Ibid.

      N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8 states the grounds for vacating an arbitration award. In

relevant part, subsection (d) of the statute provides, "[t]he court shall vacate the

award . . . [w]here the arbitrator[] exceeded or so imperfectly executed their

powers that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted

was not made."

      OCUA bears the burden to establish the statutory grounds. See Twp. of

Wyckoff v. PBA Local 261, 409 N.J. Super. 344, 354 (2009).

                                        A.

      Our review is guided by well-established legal principles.          "[P]ublic

employees have the right to engage in collective negotiation[s] . . . ." Council

of N.J. State Coll. Locals v. State Bd. of Higher Educ., 91 N.J. 18, 26 (1982).

"However, 'the scope of negotiations in the public sector is more limited than in

the private sector' due to the government's 'special responsibilities to the public'

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to 'make and implement public policy.'" In re Cnty. of Atl., 445 N.J. Super. 1,

21 (App. Div. 2016), aff'd. on other grounds, 230 N.J. 237 (2017) (quoting In re

IFPTE Local 195 v. State, 88 N.J. 393, 401-02 (1982)).

        PERC is charged with administering the New Jersey Employer-Employee

Relations Act, N.J.S.A. 34:13A-1 to -39, and has "primary jurisdiction to

. . . determin[e] . . . whether the subject matter of a particular dispute is within

the scope of collective negotiations." Cnty. of Atl., 445 N.J. Super. at 20

(quoting Ridgefield Park Educ. Ass'n. v. Ridgefield Park Bd. of Educ., 78 N.J.

144, 154 (1978)). To that end, N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.4(d) provides, in pertinent

part:

             The commission shall at all times have the power and
             duty, upon the request of any public employer or
             majority representative, to make a determination as to
             whether a matter in dispute is within the scope of
             collective negotiations.

        In Ridgefield Park, the Court explained the primacy of PERC's

jurisdiction over the issues of negotiability and arbitrability:

             If PERC concludes that the dispute is within the legal
             scope of negotiability and agreement between the
             employer and employees, the matter may proceed to
             arbitration. Where PERC concludes that a particular
             dispute is not within the scope of collective
             negotiations and thus not arbitrable, it must issue an
             injunction permanently restraining arbitration.

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             [Ridgefield Park, 78 N.J. at 154.]

      Here, OCUA argues that the judge erred because he "neglected to

appreciate . . . [that] the arbitrator exceed[ed] the powers granted to him by the

parties'" Agreement and he "neglected PERC's jurisdiction." We agree.

      PERC restrained arbitration "to the extent that the [United Steel]'s

grievance challenges the [OCUA]'s decisions to post job openings for

journeyworkers and hire journeyworkers who have not completed a DOL

registered apprenticeship program."

      Nonetheless, the arbitrator ordered OCUA "to cease and desist any further

violations of the Apprenticeship Standards with respect to procedures for

selecting applicants . . . and from placing any employee as journeyworker who

had not completed a DOL Registered Apprenticeship Program."

      United Steel argues that the arbitrator's award "tracks" PERC's holding.

We disagree.

      The arbitrator exceeded the scope of his authority by arbitrating, and

ordering relief, regarding issues that pertained to "procedures for selecting

applicants" and requiring the completion of "a DOL Registered Apprenticeship

Program" before the OCUA could place an employee as journeyworker. PERC

specifically restrained arbitration of these issues.

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      In confirming the award, the judge mistakenly believed the arbitrator's

decision was within the scope as defined by PERC. With this misunderstanding,

the judge then analyzed whether the arbitrator's interpretation of the parties'

agreement was "reasonably debatable." A court shall accept an arbitrator's

award as long as it is "reasonably debatable." Middletown Tp. PBA Local 124

v. Township of Middletown, 193 N.J. 1, 11 (2007) (quoting N.J. Tpke. Auth. v.

Local 196, 190 N.J. 283 (2007)). According to the "reasonably debatable"

standard, a court reviewing an arbitration decision "may not substitute its own

judgment for that of the arbitrator, regardless of the court's view of the

correctness of the arbitrator's position." Borough of E. Rutherford PBA Local

275, 213 N.J. 190, 201-02 (2013) (quoting Middletown Twp. PBS Local 124,

193 N.J. at 11).

      However, the "reasonably debatable" standard is inapplicable where

PERC finds a "particular dispute is not within the scope of collective

negotiations and thus not arbitrable." Ridgefield Park, 78 N.J. at 154.

      Here, the judge should have denied United Steel's application to confirm

the arbitrator's award as to "procedures for selecting applicants," requiring the

completion of "a DOL Registered Apprenticeship Program" before the OCUA

could place an employee as journeyworker and granted OCUA's application to

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vacate the award because PERC determined these issues were not arbitrable. In

other words, the arbitrator, "exceeded or so imperfectly executed their powers

that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was

not made." N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8(d).

                                         B.

      The arbitrator ordered OCUA to "cease and desist any further violations

of the Apprenticeship Standards with respect to . . . the agreed to ratio of

apprentices to journeyworkers." OCUA argues the arbitrator's "award does not

discuss its rationale for this determination whatsoever, and the [judge]'s findings

of fact are similarly silent . . . ." We agree.

      Aside from the absence of factual findings by the arbitrator or the judge,

OCUA avers that United Steel "implicitly acknowledges that the [arbitrator's]

determination on the ratio of apprentices to journey workers is inaccurate."

Indeed, United Steel offers that OCUA "has sufficient journeyworkers to comply

with [the Agreement]'s 1-1 apprentice to journeyworker ratio."

      Under N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8(d), "where there is no evidence in the record to

support an arbitration award, it should be vacated on the ground that the

arbitrator[] 'exceeded or so imperfectly executed their powers that a mutual,

final and definite award upon the subject matter was not made.'" McHugh, Inc.

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v. Soldo Const. Co., Inc., 238 N.J. Super. 141, 148 (App. Div. 1990) (quoting

N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8(d)). Here, there is no evidence to support an arbitration

decision that OCUA violated the journeyman-to-apprentice ratio.

      We further vacate the portion of the order confirming the arbitrator's

decision directing OCUA to "cease and desist" violating the journeyman-to-

apprentice ratio. That part of the award was not supported by the factual record.

We remand this aspect of the award, to the extent the issue remains disputed, to

arbitration as permitted in PERC's decision of June 24, 2021.

      To the extent we have not addressed the parties' other arguments we deem

them without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R.

2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

      Vacated and remanded for the judge to enter an order consistent with this

decision. We do not retain jurisdiction.

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