Court Opinion

ID: 9848619
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:23:42.859858+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:30.857571
License: Public Domain

R. M. Ryan, J.
(dissenting). I find I must dissent.
I cannot agree that the action commenced by the plaintiff in Wayne County Circuit Court tolled the statute of limitations. MCLA 600.5856; MSA 27A.5856. This is true because the circuit court lacked the requisite personal as well as subject matter jurisdiction to entertain the instant claim.
The enabling statute for the Michigan Court of Claims, MCLA 600.6419; MSA 27A.6419, confers upon the Court of Claims exclusive jurisdiction "over claims and demands against the state or any of its departments, commissions, boards, institutions, arms or agencies”. Wayne State University, needless to say, qualifies as a state institution. Furthermore, the enabling statute for the Michigan Circuit Courts, MCLA 600.605; MSA 27A.605, specifically denied the circuit courts jurisdiction "where exclusive jurisdiction is given '* * * by statute to some other court”.
Neither enabling statute limits the jurisdiction conferred or denied to only subject matter jurisdiction. Both statutes utilize the term exclusive. Yet the majority maintains that where a plaintiff improperly brings suit against a state institution in a circuit court, the circuit court acquires the requisite in personam jurisdiction for the purposes of the Michigan tolling statute, MCLA 600.5856; MSA 27A.5856.
This interpretation contradicts the clear wording of the Michigan Court of. Claims enabling statute and the policy behind that statute. Ford Motor Co *454v State Tax Commission, 63 Mich App 577; 234 NW2d 711 (1975). Exclusive jurisdiction plainly means "sole” as to both personal and subject matter jurisdiction. Not "sole” as to subject matter but "concurrent” as to personal, as the majority asserts.
The majority cites the committee comments to the tolling statute as authority for its holding. The statute itself sheds no light on the instant problem. I would only point out that those comments are rather ambiguous when read in their full context. Furthermore, those comments have never been specifically adopted in any Michigan decision; therefore this Court is not bound by those comments. Buscaino v Rhodes, 385 Mich 474; 189 NW2d 202 (1971).
I submit it would make better sense, as a rule of construction, to decide the case at bar on the plain meaning of the enabling statute rather than on an ambiguous tolling statute and its gratuitous comments. Peters v Department of State Highways, 66 Mich App 560; 239 NW2d 662 (1976).
I also must disagree with the majority’s interpretation of Fox v Board of Regents of the University of Michigan, 375 Mich 238; 134 NW2d 146 (1965). The majority reads that case as only applying to a circuit court’s subject matter jurisdiction.
While it is true that the Fox case was a subject matter jurisdiction case, there is additional decisional language at the end of that case which makes it clear that its holding also would apply to a circuit court’s lack of personal jurisdiction:
"Where a court is without jurisdiction in the particular case, its acts and proceedings can be of no force or validity, and are a mere nullity and void.
"A court which has determined that it has no juris*455diction should not proceed further except to dismiss the action.” Fox, supra, at 242-243.
In conclusion, I think that the majority decision might engender serious policy problems. We are indirectly sanctioning misfiled suits and encouraging remiss procedural practice by members of the bar.
I would affirm the decision of the Court of Claims.