Court Opinion

ID: 9386651
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-13 15:00:35.580667+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:07.704785
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-12101    Document: 23-1     Date Filed: 04/13/2023   Page: 1 of 6

                                               [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 22-12101
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiff-Appellee,
       versus
       SANQUEZ DEONTRA QUEZ BIVENS,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Middle District of Alabama
                 D.C. Docket No. 2:14-cr-00432-WKW-KFP-4
                           ____________________
USCA11 Case: 22-12101      Document: 23-1     Date Filed: 04/13/2023     Page: 2 of 6

       2                      Opinion of the Court                 22-12101

       Before ROSENBAUM, JILL PRYOR, and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
               Sanquez Deontra Quez Bivens appeals the district court’s or-
       der revoking his supervised release and imposing a 24-month sen-
       tence. Bivens contends he was denied due process because the dis-
       trict court failed to conduct the proper balancing test under United
       States v. Frazier, 26 F.3d 110 (11th Cir. 1994), before admitting pur-
       ported hearsay evidence during his revocation hearing. After re-
       view, we affirm the district court.
               A defendant’s supervised release may be revoked if the dis-
       trict court finds by a preponderance of the evidence “the defendant
       violated a condition of supervised release.” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3).
       The Sixth Amendment does not apply in hearings for the revoca-
       tion of supervised release, probation, or parole. United States v.
       Reese, 775 F.3d 1327, 1329 (11th Cir. 2015). Similarly, the Federal
       Rules of Evidence do not apply in supervised release revocation
       hearings. Frazier, 26 F.3d at 114. “Although the Federal Rules of
       Evidence do not apply in supervised release revocation hearings,
       the admissibility of hearsay is not automatic. Defendants involved
       in revocation proceedings are entitled to certain minimal due pro-
       cess requirements.” Id. (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471
       (1972) (involving parole revocation) and Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411
       U.S. 778 (1973) (involving probation revocation)). Among these
       minimal requirements is the right to confront and cross-examine
       adverse witnesses, unless the factfinder specifically finds good
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       22-12101               Opinion of the Court                         3

       cause for not allowing confrontation. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489.
       Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1, “which applies to super-
       vised release revocation, incorporates these same minimal due pro-
       cess requirements.” Frazier, 26 F.3d at 114. Rule 32.1(b)(2)(C) pro-
       vides a person is entitled to the opportunity to appear, present evi-
       dence, and question any adverse witness, unless the court deter-
       mines the interest of justice does not require the witness to appear.
       Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(2)(C).
              Hearsay is an out-of-court statement made by a declarant
       that a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter as-
       serted in the statement. Fed. R. Evid. 801(c). “[I]n deciding
       whether or not to admit hearsay testimony, the court must balance
       the defendant’s right to confront adverse witnesses against the
       grounds asserted by the government for denying confrontation.”
       Frazier, 26 F.3d at 114. The hearsay statement must also be relia-
       ble. Id.
              The district court did not abuse its discretion in revoking
       Bivens’ supervised release. See United States v. Cunningham, 607
       F.3d 1264, 1266 (11th Cir. 2010) (reviewing a district court’s revo-
       cation of supervised release for abuse of discretion). First, the dis-
       trict court did not abuse its discretion in finding Bivens’ and
       Tatyana Pringle’s statements were either not hearsay or met a
       hearsay exception, and thus, were not subject to the balancing test
       under Frazier. See United States v. Novaton, 271 F.3d 968, 1005
       (11th Cir. 2001) (reviewing evidentiary decisions only for a clear
       abuse of discretion). As to Bivens’ own statements made on the
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       4                       Opinion of the Court                  22-12101

       recorded jail calls, the court did not abuse its discretion finding his
       statements were not hearsay, as they were statements made by a
       party opponent, Bivens never refuted that he was the one who ini-
       tiated the calls, and Probation Officer Marcus Simmons’ testimony
       identified Bivens as the voice on the call. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(A)
       (providing a statement is not hearsay if the “statement is offered
       against an opposing party and . . . was made by the party in an in-
       dividual or representative capacity”).
               As to Pringle’s statements in the recorded jail calls, the court
       did not abuse its discretion in finding the threats from Bivens to
       Pringle were meant to prevent her from testifying, and thus, her
       statements fit squarely under Rule 804(b)(6). Fed. R. Evid.
       804(b)(6) (providing hearsay may be admitted when the statement
       is being offered against a party that wrongfully caused the declar-
       ant’s unavailability as a witness, and did so intending that result).
       The court heard Simmons’ testimony regarding the calls, listened
       to the phone calls, and then later made a finding that Pringle’s ab-
       sence resulted from Bivens’ threats. On appeal, Bivens argues only
       that it is unclear whether his statements were intended as threats.
       However, we are bound by the district court’s factual finding that
       Bivens’ statements were threats intended to prevent Pringle from
       testifying. See United States v. Almand, 992 F.2d 316, 318 (11th Cir.
       1993) (stating we are bound by the district court’s findings of fact
       unless they are clearly erroneous). Thus, the district court did not
       abuse its discretion in finding Pringle’s statements were admissible
       under Rule 804(b)(6) and were, therefore, not hearsay, such that
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       22-12101                Opinion of the Court                         5

       the Frazier balancing test was not required. See Frazier, 26 F.3d at
       114.
               Further, as to Pringle’s statements to Simmons on the night
       of the shooting, the court did not abuse its discretion in finding her
       statements met the excited utterance exception to Rule 803(2). See
       Fed. R. Evid. 803(2) (providing that, regardless of whether the de-
       clarant is available as a witness, an “excited utterance” is admissible
       as a hearsay exception, as it is “[a] statement relating to a startling
       event or condition, made while the declarant was under the stress
       of excitement that it caused”). Simmons testified he received the
       call from Pringle shortly after the shooting occurred and she
       seemed excited and angry, as she yelled into the phone. Though
       Bivens contends on appeal the startling impact of the incident had
       passed by the time of Pringle’s call to Simmons, and Pringle’s state-
       ments were accusatory and not for the purpose of seeking aid, the
       court found Simmons’ descriptions of that conversation to be cred-
       ible. Because we are bound by that credibility determination, the
       district court did not abuse its discretion in finding Pringle’s state-
       ments met the excited-utterance exception. See Almand, 992 F.3d
       at 318; United States v. Copeland, 20 F.3d 412, 413 (11th Cir. 1994)
       (stating credibility is in the province of the factfinder, and we ordi-
       narily will not review a district court’s credibility determination).
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       6                         Opinion of the Court                    22-12101

              The district court did not abuse its discretion because the
       challenged out-of-court statements either were not hearsay or
       were subject to hearsay exceptions.1
              AFFIRMED.

       1 Even assuming the statements were hearsay, the court engaged in the proper
       balancing test under Frazier by weighing Bivens’ right to confront and cross-
       examine witnesses against the Government’s assertion of good cause for deny-
       ing confrontation. Frazier, 26 F.3d at 114.