Court Opinion

ID: 9847710
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:05:47.091101+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:28.541077
License: Public Domain

Benham, Justice,
concurring.
After reviewing appellant’s assertion that the trial court erred by allowing the victim’s husband to identify her using photos of her body as he found it, addressed in Division 19 of the majority opinion, I am of the opinion that this court should adopt a rule well-established in Florida:
[A] member of the deceased victim’s family may not testify for the purpose of identifying the victim where nonrelated, credible witnesses are available to make such identification. [Welty v. State, 402 S2d 1159, 1162 (Fla. 1981).]
The basis for adoption of such a rule is “to assure the defendant as dispassionate a trial as possible and to prevent interjection of matters not germane to the issue of guilt.” Id. The emotionally-charged atmosphere brought about when a family member views a photograph taken of a dead loved one can result in conduct that has a reasonable probability of interfering with the jury’s verdict and may serve as the basis for reversible error. See Stahl v. State, 749 SW2d 826 (Tx. Cr. App. 1988). As guardians of the law, we must do all we can to insulate jurors from emotional distractions that might result in a verdict based on sympathy rather than on the evidence. Jones v. State, 569 S2d 1234 (Fla. 1990). Adoption of the rule I propose would remove the main source of emotional distraction from every homicide case tried in Georgia. The proposed rule is not applicable to the case at bar, however, because the testimony of the victim’s husband, the person who discovered the victim’s body, was necessary to establish that the scene as depicted in the photos taken sometime later by police photographers was that which he had discovered.