Court Opinion

ID: 9958202
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-08 15:02:01.08408+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:06.613073
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-10879    Document: 37-1     Date Filed: 04/08/2024   Page: 1 of 6

                                               [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 23-10879
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
       versus
       PATRICK DEVONE STALLWORTH,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                    for the Northern District of Alabama
                  D.C. Docket No. 2:20-cr-00206-LSC-SGC-1
                          ____________________
USCA11 Case: 23-10879         Document: 37-1         Date Filed: 04/08/2024         Page: 2 of 6

       2                          Opinion of the Court                       23-10879

       Before WILSON, LUCK, and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Patrick Devone Stallworth appeals his conviction for kidnap-
       ping and conspiracy to commit kidnapping, resulting in the death
       of the victim, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) and (c). He as-
       serts the district court erred by denying him funds to hire a DNA
       expert, who he contends was necessary to his defense. Stallworth
       also contends the district court failed to conduct a Daubert 1 hearing
       to determine whether a DNA expert was necessary to his defense
       or to challenge the reliability of the Government’s DNA expert. Fi-
       nally, Stallworth argues the district court erred by admitting hear-
       say evidence under the excited utterance exception. After review, 2
       we affirm the district court.
                                    I. DNA EXPERT
       A. Funds for DNA Expert
              “Counsel for a person who is financially unable to obtain in-
       vestigative, expert, or other services necessary for adequate repre-
       sentation may request them in an ex parte application.” 18 U.S.C.

       1 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
       2 We review a district court’s denial of funds for an abuse of discretion. United

       States v. Brown, 441 F.3d 1330, 1363 (11th Cir. 2006). A district court’s eviden-
       tiary rulings are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Perez-
       Oliveros, 479 F.3d 779, 783 (11th Cir. 2007).
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       23-10879               Opinion of the Court                          3

       § 3006A(e)(1). In certain contexts, due process may also require ap-
       pointment of expert services. See Moore v. Kemp, 809 F.2d 702, 711-
       12 (11th Cir. 1987) (en banc). Still, a defendant “must demonstrate
       something more than a mere possibility of assistance from a re-
       quested expert.” Id. at 712. He must show there is a reasonable
       probability the expert would assist his defense, and denying expert
       assistance would result in a fundamentally unfair trial. Id.
       “[D]efense counsel is obligated to inform himself about the specific
       scientific area in question and to provide the court with as much
       information as possible concerning the usefulness of the requested
       expert to the defense’s case.” Id.
              The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying
       Stallworth the funds to hire a DNA expert. Stallworth’s general
       assertions about the complexity of DNA science, and the need to
       rebut the testimony of the Government’s expert, fall short of his
       obligation to inform the court about how a DNA expert would
       help prove his innocence. See Moore, 809 F.2d at 712. Stallworth’s
       failure is underscored by the significance of the Government ex-
       pert’s testimony, which showed the victim’s DNA was found in
       Stallworth’s apartment. Stallworth’s admission to police, and in
       open court, that he saw the victim in his apartment rendered moot
       any challenge to the Government’s DNA evidence. See id. Thus,
       an unfair trial did not result because the district court denied Stall-
       worth funds to hire a DNA expert to address evidence that he did
       not contest. See id.
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       4                      Opinion of the Court                 23-10879

       B. Daubert hearing
               Stallworth did not request a Daubert hearing to establish the
       reliability of his own expert or challenge the reliability of the Gov-
       ernment’s DNA expert. At trial, Stallworth did not object when
       the Government, after qualifying her as an expert, moved the court
       to recognize the Federal Bureau of Investigation forensic examiner
       as an expert in DNA analysis.
              We review the district court’s failure to hold a Daubert hear-
       ing, when faced with no objection, for plain error. United States v.
       Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1268 n.21 (11th Cir. 2004). A witness who is
       qualified as an expert may offer opinion or other testimony under
       the following conditions:
             (a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other special-
             ized knowledge will help the trier of fact to under-
             stand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;
             (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
             (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles
             and methods; and
             (d) the expert's opinion reflects a reliable application
             of the principles and methods to the facts of the case.
       Fed. R. Evid. 702.
              The district court did not plainly err by failing to conduct a
       Daubert hearing on either the reliability of Stallworth’s own expert
       or the reliability of the Government’s DNA expert. Stallworth did
       not request a Daubert hearing in connection with the request for
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       23-10879                Opinion of the Court                          5

       funds for his expert, and we find no plain error in the district court’s
       failure to hold one. As to the Government’s expert, there was no
       basis to exclude her testimony because she was unqualified or be-
       cause her opinions were unreliable, so the failure to hold a Daubert
       hearing was not plain error. See Frazier, 387 F.3d at 1268 n.21. Ac-
       cordingly, we affirm as to this issue.
                          II. EXCITED UTTERANCE
                Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered as evidence “to
       prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.” Fed. R.
       Evid. 801(c)(2). Hearsay evidence is generally inadmissible unless
       it falls under one of the stated exceptions to the hearsay rule. See
       Fed. R. Evid. 802. Statements “relating to a startling event or con-
       dition, made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement
       that it caused,” are admissible as an exception to hearsay. Fed. R.
       Evid. 803(2). Courts ruling on this hearsay exception should con-
       sider the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the
       declarant was still under the stress or excitement of the startling
       event when the statement was made. United States v. Belfast, 611
       F.3d 783, 817 (11th Cir. 2010).
              The district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting
       Ava’s statement under the excited utterance exception. Although
       the Government did not attempt to show how much time had
       lapsed between Cupcake’s abduction and when Ava made her
       statement, Shenita Long testified her daughter looked “startled,”
       “nervous,” “lost,” and could barely talk when she asked Ava where
       Cupcake was. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(2); see also Belfast, 611 F.3d at
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       6                      Opinion of the Court                 23-10879

       817. Long’s testimony also showed the excitement Ava exhibited
       while jumping in the bouncy house prior to the abduction was dif-
       ferent from the panic Ava exhibited when questioned about Cup-
       cake’s whereabouts. See id. Finally, Stallworth provided no evi-
       dence showing that Ava, who was only 3 at the time, had the mo-
       tive, opportunity, or time to fabricate her story, or that anyone in-
       fluenced her statement to her mother. Thus, when looking at the
       totality of the circumstances, the evidence suggests that Ava’s state-
       ment to her mother was spontaneous, and she made it while still
       under the stress of witnessing her “very close” friend’s abduction.
       See id.
              AFFIRMED.