Court Opinion

ID: 9909935
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-14 17:01:12.546818+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:50:17.515751
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-12732    Document: 17-1     Date Filed: 12/14/2023   Page: 1 of 7

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 23-12732
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       YOLAND PATRICK,
                                                     Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
       versus
       APRIL LOUISE POREE,

                                                   Defendant-Appellee.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                    for the Northern District of Georgia
                    D.C. Docket No. 1:22-cv-04236-VMC
                          ____________________
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       2                     Opinion of the Court                23-12732

       Before WILSON, JORDAN, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Plaintiff-Appellant Yoland Patrick (Yoland) is the former
       manager of April Poree, a musical artist who records as “BOZZ
       Lay’dee.” Yoland is married to Sherman Patrick (Sherman) who
       worked as Poree’s producer. Yoland brought this copyright in-
       fringement lawsuit based on Poree’s performance and use of the
       song “I Do What I Want.” The song’s registration with the United
       States Copyright Office lists Poree and Sherman as authors and Yo-
       land as the holder of “Rights and Permissions.” Yoland appeals
       from the district court’s denial of her motions for default judgment
       and summary judgment. After a careful review of the record, we
       AFFIRM.
                                  I.     Background
              When Yoland worked as Poree’s manager, Poree and Sher-
       man recorded a song titled “I Do What I Want.” The song was
       registered with the United States Copyright Office in July 2019.
       The registration for “I Do What I Want” lists April Poree and Sher-
       man Patrick next to “Authorship on Application.” Both April Poree
       and Sherman Patrick are also listed next to “Copyright Claimant.”
       Yoland Patrick’s name is listed next to “Rights and Permissions” on
       the Copyright Registration form.
              After the copyright was registered, Poree performed “I Do
       What I Want” and made the single available on streaming services.
       Also, “I Do What I Want” was featured on an episode of Lizzo’s
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       23-12732                Opinion of the Court                          3

       television show “Watch Out for the Big Grrrls.” In response, Yo-
       land filed this lawsuit identifying herself as the “exclusive owner”
       of the sound recording and alleging that Poree’s actions constitute
       copyright infringement.
               Poree failed to respond, defend her claims, or appear at any
       district court proceedings, including a preliminary injunction hear-
       ing. As a result, Yoland filed a motion for clerk’s default, which the
       clerk’s office granted and entered “Clerk’s Entry of Default.” Yo-
       land then filed a motion for default judgment, or in the alternative
       summary judgment. The district court denied both motions based
       on a lack of evidence that Yoland held a valid copyright, which pre-
       vented her from stating a claim for copyright infringement. The
       district court then directed the plaintiff to show cause “why her
       Complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim.” Alt-
       hough Yoland responded, the district court dismissed the action al-
       together finding that Yoland “ha[d] not pointed to any additional
       information or evidence that could result in a different outcome.”
       Yoland timely appealed.
                               II.    Standard of Review
               “We review a district court’s decision to deny a motion for
       default judgment for abuse of discretion.” Young v. Grand Canyon
       Univ., Inc., 57 F.4th 861, 876 (11th Cir. 2023). A district court abuses
       its discretion if it “applies an incorrect legal standard or makes find-
       ings of fact that are clearly erroneous.” United States v. Wilk, 572
       F.3d 1229, 1234 (11th Cir. 2009).
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       4                      Opinion of the Court                  23-12732

               Entry of a default is appropriate when a party “failed to plead
       or otherwise defend.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). After a default is en-
       tered, the clerk must enter a default judgment when the claim is for
       a sum certain and the plaintiff requests that amount. Fed. R. Civ.
       P. 55(b)(1). When a plaintiff requests something other than a sum
       certain, it “must apply to the court for a default judgment,” which
       a district court may enter. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). We treat “a
       motion for default judgment . . . like a reverse motion to dismiss
       for failure to state a claim.” Surtain v. Hamlin Terrace Found., 789
       F.3d 1239, 1245 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam). “[A] default judg-
       ment cannot stand on a complaint that fails to state a claim.”
       Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1370 n.41 (11th Cir.
       1997).
                                 III.   Applicable Law
               Principles of copyright ownership and transfer are federal
       law. Copyright interests “vest[] initially in the author or authors of
       the work. The authors of a joint work are coowners of copyright
       in the work.” 17 U.S.C. § 201(a). Copyright ownership is transfer-
       rable. Id. § 201(d). An attempt to transfer copyright ownership is
       only valid if “an instrument of conveyance, or a note or memoran-
       dum of the transfer, is in writing and signed by the owner of the
       rights conveyed or such owner’s duly authorized agent.” Id.
       § 204(a). We have interpreted this to mean that “[t]he Copyright
       Act requires a writing for all exclusive transfers of copyright.” Lat-
       imer v. Roaring Toyz, Inc., 601 F.3d 1224, 1235 (11th Cir. 2010).
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       23-12732               Opinion of the Court                          5

              Owners of copyrights have “exclusive rights to do and to au-
       thorize” specific actions under 17 U.S.C. § 106, and the scope of ex-
       clusive rights in sound recordings is outlined in 17 U.S.C. § 114.
       Registration of a copyright is a permissive action, and copyright
       protection does not require registration. 17 U.S.C. § 408(a). An
       applicant for copyright registration may, but does not need to, list
       the name and contact information for a person or organization to
       contact for permission to use the work. U.S. Copyright Office,
       Compendium of U.S. Copyright Office Practices § 622.1 Rights and
       Permissions Information (3d ed. 2021).
               To establish a prima facie case for copyright infringement, a
       plaintiff must prove two things: “(1) ownership of a valid copy-
       right, and (2) copying of constituent elements of the work that are
       original.” Latimer, 601 F.3d at 1232–33 (quoting Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v.
       Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991)).
                                     IV.    Analysis
              We find that the district court did not abuse its discretion by
       choosing to not enter a default judgment. The entry of clerk’s de-
       fault does not automatically necessitate entering a default judgment.
       Poree’s lack of response or defense made entering the clerk’s de-
       fault appropriate. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). Because Yoland did not
       seek a sum certain, she had to move for default judgment. When
       deciding whether to enter a default judgment, the district court
       needed to determine whether Yoland had a valid copyright claim.
       Therefore, the court properly considered the elements of a prima
       facie copyright infringement claim. Bringing a copyright
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       6                      Opinion of the Court                23-12732

       infringement claim requires a plaintiff to own a valid copyright. See
       Latimer, 601 F.3d at 1232–33. Yoland failed to establish copyright
       ownership for “I Do What I Want.” Copyright ownership initially
       vests in the authors or coauthors of a work. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a).
       Here, copyright ownership initially vested in Poree and Sherman
       as cocreators of “I Do What I Want.”
               Nothing in the record establishes that Yoland subsequently
       acquired copyright ownership. Copyright registration is not nec-
       essary for copyright interests to vest. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 201(a),
       408(a). Poree and Sherman’s rights as authors vested before the reg-
       istration rather than coming from the registration. Listing Yoland
       under “Rights and Permissions” on the registration did not provide
       her with the rights of copyright ownership. Rather, listing Yoland
       there made her the person to contact for permission to use “I Do
       What I Want.”
              Further, Yoland did not receive copyright ownership via
       transfer. An exclusive transfer of federal copyright requires a writ-
       ten conveyance. 17 U.S.C. § 204; Latimer, 601 F.3d at 1235. Yo-
       land’s affidavit references a “verbal agreement” with Poree that Yo-
       land “would hold the exclusive rights and permissions for the Work
       to direct the licenses and permissions for the Work.” The affidavit
       from Sherman states that Poree “agreed to the transfer of her intel-
       lectual property interest in the work.” Neither affidavit identifies
       the statutorily required written transfer of copyright ownership.
              By failing to prove ownership of a copyright, Yoland did not
       establish a prima facie case for copyright infringement. Without a
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       23-12732                  Opinion of the Court                                7

       prima facie case, Yoland failed on her claim. We consider a com-
       plaint without a claim as insufficient to support entering a default
       judgment. See Chudasama, 123 F.3d at 1370 n.41. Even when a dis-
       trict court has entered a default, it must ensure that there is a valid
       claim before entering a default judgment. Thus, the district court
       did not abuse its discretion by not granting Yoland’s motion for de-
       fault judgment. 1
              For the reasons discussed above, the decision of the district
       court is AFFIRMED. 2

       1 Yoland’s brief mentions summary judgment in the alternative.        Summary
       judgment is appropriate when the movant has shown “that there is no genuine
       dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
       matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Here, Yoland has failed to meet the
       prima facie case of copyright infringement and therefore cannot show she is
       entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The district court did not err in deny-
       ing her motion for summary judgment.
       2 By affirming the dismissal of Yoland’s claims, we do not reach the district

       court’s earlier denial of her motion for preliminary injunction mentioned in
       her brief.