Court Opinion

ID: 9792160
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:24:16.588464+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:40.812904
License: Public Domain

FELDMAN, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I fully agree with the court’s well-reasoned exposition on all points except that of the sanction to be imposed on Respondent. Ordinarily, I would defer to the recommendations of the Disciplinary Commission (“Commission”) and join the majority. I strongly disagree, however, with the sanction on policy grounds and must therefore dissent from that portion of the opinion.
In my view, the censure recommended by a majority of the Commission and approved by the court is far too lenient and fails to accomplish one of the most important objectives of discipline. In addition to preventing repetition by the offender and deterring similar conduct by others — the only objectives expressly considered by the majority — disciplinary action also protects and maintains the legal system’s integrity in the eyes of the public. In re Fioramonti, 176 Ariz. 182, 187, 859 P.2d 1315, 1320 (1993). Imposing discipline proportionate to the misconduct is important to our efforts to instill public confidence and maintain respect. See In re Wade, 174 Ariz. 13, 17-18, 846 P.2d 826, 830-31 (1993). In light of the especially egregious nature of Respondent’s conduct, the court’s lenient action clearly falls short. I would suspend Respondent for no less than six months.
A. Upping the ante
The majority is concerned that by imposing a stiffer sanction after Respondent’s appeal from the Commission’s recommendation, this court would be upping the ante. I understand the danger of discouraging legitimate appeals and agree that only “rarely and *29in the clearest of situations” should we up the ante. Id. But I strongly believe this is one of those situations.
Under the applicable version of Rule 53(e),1 this court is the ultimate trier of fact and law. In re Lincoln, 165 Ariz. 233, 235, 798 P.2d 371, 373 (1990). We have both final authority and responsibility to decide on the appropriate sanction in every bar discipline case. In re Owens, 182 Ariz. 121, 126, 893 P.2d 1284, 1289 (1995); In re Shannon, 179 Ariz. 52, 68, 876 P.2d 548, 564 (1994), modified, 181 Ariz. 307, 890 P.2d 602 (1994). Thus, while we give great deference to the Commission’s recommendation, it is our task to decide on the proper sanction required by facts and law, even when it may exceed the Commission’s recommendation.
The risk that we might up the ante should not surprise Respondent. At every stage, Respondent had notice that the recommended sanction was not set in stone. In fact, the Commission increased the hearing officer’s recommendation of censure without probation to censure with probation. Two Commission members, in a written dissent, concluded that suspension was the only acceptable sanction.2 Because the dissent is part of the Commission’s report, Respondent clearly had notice of the possibility of suspension. Respondent argued the issue of the increased sanction recommendation in his initial brief to this court. After reviewing the record and briefs submitted by Respondent and the State Bar, we requested supplemental briefing and oral argument on the specific issue of whether censure or suspension was the appropriate sanction. Thus, Respondent was given notice and an opportunity to be heard on the issue of suspension.
There is ample authority for this court to increase a recommended sanction. We have increased the sanction in several previous matters, even those, like the present, in which the lawyer appealed and the bar did not cross-appeal. See Wade, 174 Ariz. at 18, 846 P.2d at 831 (suspension increased to disbarment); In re Hohn, 171 Ariz. 539, 544, 832 P.2d 192, 197 (1992) (continuing legal education increased from eight to twenty hours); In re Spear, 160 Ariz. 545, 556-57, 774 P.2d 1335, 1346-47 (1989) (suspension increased from six months to five years); In re Swartz, 141 Ariz. 266, 278, 686 P.2d 1236, 1247 (1984) (suspension increased from thirty days to six months).3
The most recent case is noteworthy. In Wade, the Commission increased the recommended sanction from a thirty-day suspension to a two-year suspension. 174 Ariz. at 14, 846 P.2d at 827. On Wade’s appeal to this court, after noting that the Commission had not been aware of Wade’s prior record at the time it made its recommendation, we held that the offenses warranted the more stringent sanction of disbarment. Id. at 18, 846 P.2d at 831. In both Wade and the present case, the State Bar urged an increased sanction but did not cross-appeal. Wade, like Respondent, claimed that this court’s consideration of the increased sanction violated his due process rights. Nevertheless, we held that Wade’s misconduct “not only violates the confidence vested in him by [his] clients, but brings disrespect upon the legal profession and the justice system as a whole.” Id. at 17-18, 846 P.2d at 830-31 (citation omitted). I believe that comment is equally applicable to the present case, in which the Commission’s recommendation was based on an erroneous factual conclusion rather than a lack of information.
B. Respondent’s conduct
The majority quotes with approval from the Commission’s report: Respondent “vio*30lated the trust that is vital to every lawyer-client relationship.” Disciplinary Commission Report, September 7,1996, at 7. Despite this conclusion, the Commission recommended only censure, largely because it found that Respondent had acted only “negligently” instead of “knowingly.” Id. at 7-8.4 While the majority overlooks this premise, I find myself unable to agree with it or the result it produces. Under the applicable version of Rule 53(e), we make a de novo determination of fact. Even if we were to apply the present, amended version of Rule 53(e) and review only for clear error, I could not accept the negligence finding. There was nothing negligent about Respondent’s conduct. It was obviously intentional and most certainly knowing. Piatt intended his conduct and must have known it was improper.
The Commission’s finding of a negligent mental state was erroneously based on the conclusion that “while there is no doubt that Piatt should have known that his conduct was improper, it is not as clear that he knew that it created a conflict of interest.” Report, at 7-8. Apparently, the Commission accepted the same faulty argument that Respondent made in this court: the rules do not specifically prohibit the offenses alleged; therefore, it was only debatable whether his behavior violated the Rules of Professional Conduct. He further argued that it would be improper to impose a serious sanction on a post hoc finding that the attempt to extort sexual favors from his clients violated some vague disciplinary rule. Given the facts of this case, however, there was nothing debatable about the impropriety of Respondent’s conduct nor anything ambiguous in the disciplinary rule it .flouted. When he issued an. ultimatum to his client — sexual favors in exchange for continued legal service — Respondent crossed a clear ethical line. Even he fails to assert that his actions were merely negligent, contending only that, lacking an explicit rule, he was not on notice that they were wrong. But Respondent is not less culpable just because this is the first time such patently offensive behavior has come before this court.
The majority agrees that Respondent’s claim is frivolous and disposes of it in correct, clear, and explicit terms: “Piatt’s behavior here is offensive under any standard---This is a case of exploitation and extortion. We thus reject Piatt’s argument and agree with the Commission’s conclusion that he ‘violated the trust that is vital to every lawyer client relationship.’ ” Opinion at 27, 951 P.2d at 892. Putting it more specifically, the majority “eontinue[s] to believe the obvious— that we do not need a specific rule against attempting to extort sexual conduct from a client____ For example, our rules do not say that a lawyer shall not threaten, intimidate, or strike a client. They do not say that a lawyer must not steal from a client. But who would doubt that these are breaches?” Opinion at 26, 951 P.2d at 891. I agree. I would only add that the rules also do not expressly prohibit a lawyer from blackmailing his client into conferring sexual favors, but who would doubt that this was an equally serious breach? Respondent’s argument to the contrary is disingenuous and meritless.
The fact that Respondent would advance this argument shows that the court is mistaken when it concludes “that suspension is not necessary to deal with Piatt’s problems.” Opinion at 27, 951 P.2d at 892. Respondent is obviously still unaware or unwilling to admit that he committed a serious breach. His oral argument in this court made it clear that he has very little regret. We do not require mea culpas or acts of contrition from lawyers accused of ethical impropriety, but when an egregious breach has been established, we should expect the lawyer to demonstrate that he understands his conduct was wrong and intolerable. The entire content of Respondent’s brief (to paraphrase: I didn’t do it; and if I did, I didn’t violate the rules.) and oral argument (dedicated to excoriating *31this court for even considering an increase in sanction) left no room for remorse. In fact, the entire record demonstrates Respondent’s total indifference to the improprieties committed. He is evidently unwilling to recognize the wrongfulness of his conduct. This helps negate any grounds for leniency. See ABA Standards For Imposing Lawyer Discipline, Standard 9.2(g); Wade, 174 Ariz. at 18, 846 P.2d at 831 (continuing refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of lawyer’s conduct is aggravating circumstance).
C. Proportionality
Finally, censure does not accurately reflect this court’s policy of proportionality whereby similar fact patterns are matched to similar sanctions.5 Because this is a case of first impression in Arizona, the majority uses a Colorado case, People v. Bergner, to support the sanction of public censure in response to an attorney’s sexual misconduct with a client. However, the conduct at issue in Bergner was not as egregious as here. Bergner participated in a single, inappropriate conversation with sexual connotations. 873 P.2d 726, 727 (Colo.1994). As a result, the Colorado Supreme Court chose to impose public censure. Id. In contrast, this case involves two separate incidents of misconduct with two clients; Respondent went so far as to threaten withdrawal if one client did not acquiesce to his advances. In a more similar case, the Oklahoma Supreme Court suspended for sixty days an attorney charged with two counts of sexual misconduct involving separate instances of sexually explicit and inappropriate language with women who sought representation in divorce proceedings. State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass’n v. Miskovsky, 938 P.2d 744, 745 (Okla.1997); see also In re Rinella, 175 Ill.2d 504, 222 Ill.Dec. 375, 375, 677 N.E.2d 909, 909 (1997) (three-year suspension warranted for lawyer’s use of his position to gain sexual favors from clients and false testimony to disciplinary commission); In re Feinman, 225 A.D.2d 200, 200-01, 649 N.Y.S.2d 585 (App.Div.1996) (six-month suspension warranted for making unsolicited sexual advances toward client and representing clients with adverse interests); In re Gilbert, 194 A.D.2d 262, 262-63, 606 N.Y.S.2d 478 (App.Div.1993) (one-year suspension warranted for extortion of sexual favors from two clients and sexually inappropriate comments toward co-workers). Looking at this spectrum of sexual misconduct cases, the majority here appears to have made an incorrect proportionality analysis and thus chosen an overly lenient sanction.
To summarize: Because this court has the ultimate responsibility to impose the proper sanction, Respondent has no valid complaint about upping the ante. His argument that his due process rights would be violated is thus without merit. He has been on notice of possible suspension since the Commission issued its report. Further, this court gave him the opportunity to brief and argue the point. In light of Respondent’s knowing conduct, there is no doubt we should suspend him. His argument that he did not act knowingly, because he was unaware that the rules prohibited him from asking his client for sex in exchange for legal services, is completely frivolous. There should be no leniency simply because this is a case of first impression; the picture painted here is no prettier simply because it is the first time we have seen it. By lessening the sanction because this is a case of first impression, we fail to set an appropriate disciplinary standard. In doing so, we give the bar and the public the wrong message. This court should take a strong stand: sexual extortion is as bad as any other form of extortion, if not worse. Here, as in Wade, we should deal severely with a lawyer who attempted to prey on his clients. Such conduct “cannot be condoned.” 174 Ariz. at 18, 846 P.2d at 831.
JONES, V.C.J., concurs.

. At the time Piatt initiated his appeal, October 16, 1996, this court was still acting pursuant to pre-amendment Rule 53(e) procedure. The 1996 amendment to Rule 53(e), adopted October 30, 1996, became effective December 1, 1996.

. Disciplinary Commission Report, September 7, 1996, at 10 ("Having considered the Rules, Standards, and the result in People v. Bergner, in this particular case ... we can come to no other conclusion than that Piatt should be suspended.”) (emphasis added).

. Ironically, even the majority in this very case has upped the ante. The probationary terms ordered by the court are more stringent than those recommended by the Commission. Although the change is not significant, it does show that the court recognizes its power to go beyond the Commission’s recommendation.

. When a lawyer violates ER 1.7 (conflicts of interest), as Piatt did here, the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Discipline determine the level of sanction based on the attorney's level of intent. When the attorney acts knowingly, suspension is warranted; when the attorney acts negligently, only public censure is warranted. See Standards 4.32, 4.33. The Standards additionally recommend that a suspension sanctions should not be less than six months. See Standard 2.3; see also In re Miranda, 170 Ariz. 270, 274, 823 P.2d 1278, 1282 (1992).

. Because sanctions against lawyers must have internal consistency to maintain an effective and enforceable system, this court looks to cases that are factually similar to the case before us. In re Pappas, 159 Ariz. 516, 526, 768 P.2d 1161, 1171 (1988). Yet, knowing that perfect uniformity cannot be achieved, this court has long recognized that the discipline in each situation must be tailored for the individual case. In re Wines, 135 Ariz. 203, 207, 660 P.2d 454, 458 (1983).