Court Opinion

ID: 9377911
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-09 00:02:16.576364+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:17.889980
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/8/23 Matthews v. ResMAE Mortgage Corp. CA2/8
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION EIGHT

 ETHEL MATTHEWS,                                                     B312712

           Plaintiff and Appellant,                                  (Los Angeles County
                                                                     Super. Ct. No. 19STCV35033)
           v.

 RESMAE MORTGAGE
 CORPORATION et al.,

           Defendants and Respondents.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Monica Bachner, Judge. Affirmed.
      Ethel Matthews, in pro. per. for Plaintiff and Appellant.
      Kutak Rock, Steven M. Dailey and Jennifer L. Andrews for
Defendants and Respondents Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc.,
Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., and U.S. Bank
N.A.
      Early Sullivan Wright Gizer & McRae, William A. Wright
and Diane M. Luczon for Defendant and Respondent Stewart
Title Guaranty Company.
     McCarthy & Holthus and Melissa Robbins Coutts for
Respondent Quality Loan Service Corporation.
               _____________________________

       This is an appeal from a Superior Court of Los Angeles
County judgment following an order sustaining, without leave to
amend, the demurrers of Defendants and Respondents Select
Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (SPS), Mortgage Electronic Registration
Systems, Inc. (MERS), and U.S. Bank N.A., as Trustee, on Behalf
of the Holders of the J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Trust
2006-HE3 Asset Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-
HE3 (U.S. Bank), Stewart Title Guaranty Company (STGC), and
Stewart Title of California, Inc. (STCA), to the Second Amended
Complaint (SAC) of Appellant Ethel Matthews (Appellant). In
the same proceeding, the trial court also granted a Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings by Respondent Quality Loan Service
Corporation (QLS) on Appellant’s SAC. We affirm.
                          BACKGROUND
I.     Factual Background
       On June 19, 2006, Appellant purchased the real property
located at 100 East Newby Avenue #1, San Gabriel, CA 91776
(Property) and obtained a $675,000 loan from ResMAE Mortgage
Corporation (ResMAE) that was secured by the Property. The
Deed of Trust was recorded on June 19, 2006. MERS was the
beneficiary of the Deed of Trust as nominee for ResMAE, its
successors and assigns, and the trustee was STCA. In connection
with the purchase, Appellant also obtained an owner’s policy of
title insurance issued by STGC and countersigned by STCA.

                                2
       Appellant alleged that prior to loan origination there were
misrepresentations made to her about the purchase price and the
status of the Property as being classified as a “condominium,”
and she felt pressured to enter into the loan transaction.
Appellant claimed her HUD-1 Settlement Statement had a
“falsified loan amount” and she complained she “never received a
copy of any final or recorded loan documents at the end of
escrow.” Appellant further claimed her title insurance policy was
not the proper one and contained “false statements.”
       Appellant alleged she received notices dated September 11,
2006 and November 22, 2006 stating the servicing rights were
being transferred from ResMAE and Delaware Savings Bank to
JPMorgan Chase Bank (Chase). Appellant alleged that the
original lender ResMAE filed for bankruptcy and liquidated its
assets in February 2007. Appellant alleged that because neither
ResMAE nor Delaware Savings Bank existed in 2006, the
servicing transfers were “ineffective and invalid.”
       On January 4, 2008, a Notice of Default and Election to Sell
Under Deed of Trust was recorded. On February 29, 2008, a
Substitution of Trustee, executed by MERS, was recorded,
appointing First American, f/k/a First American Loanstar
Trustee Services as substitute trustee. A Notice of Trustee’s Sale
was recorded on April 8, 2008. On March 3, 2008, an Assignment
of Deed of Trust was recorded reflecting MERS assigned the Deed
of Trust to “U.S. Bank National Association, as Trustee for
JPMAC 2006-H3, J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, National
Association.”
       On April 27, 2008, Appellant filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy
petition. In her schedules, Appellant identified the Property and
the secured loan at issue here and did not disclose she had any

                                3
claims against her lender. On March 20, 2009, Chase Home
Finance, LLC, as servicing agent for MERS, filed a motion for
relief from the automatic stay with respect to the Property, and
the court granted relief May 15, 2009. The case was converted to
Chapter 7 and Appellant was discharged on May 3, 2011.
       Further Notices of Trustee’s Sale were recorded on August
7, 2009 and September 22, 2010. Appellant alleged Chase made
promises of a loan modification, but a trial plan was denied.
       On January 10, 2011, a Grant Deed was recorded reflecting
Appellant transferred the Property to herself and John H.
Matthews. On December 23, 2011, a Corporate Assignment of
Deed of Trust was recorded reflecting Assignment of the Deed of
Trust from MERS to U.S. Bank; however, MERS already
assigned the Deed of Trust to U.S. Bank.
       On May 2, 2012, a Notice of Rescission of Declaration of
Default was recorded rescinding the January 4, 2008-recorded
Notice of Default. On March 29, 2013, another Substitution of
Trustee was recorded appointing California Reconveyance
Company as successor trustee. On the same day, a Notice of
Default was also recorded. That Notice of Default was rescinded
on August 1, 2016. On December 17, 2013, a Grant Deed to a
Revocable Trust was recorded reflecting that Appellant and John
J. Matthews transferred the Property to Ethel Matthews, as
Trustee of the Matthews Living Trust.
       Servicing of the loan transferred to SPS in 2013. Appellant
alleges SPS “confirmed” that there was no loan on her property
due to a bankruptcy discharge.
       On October 18, 2016, a Corrective Assignment of Deed of
Trust was recorded to correct the name of the assignee of the
April 16, 2008 Assignment to Respondent U.S. Bank.

                                4
On December 6, 2016, a Substitution of Trustee was recorded
reflecting substitution of QLS as successor trustee under the
Deed of Trust. On December 6, 2016, another Notice of Default
was recorded on the Property reflecting as of December 2, 2016,
Appellant was in default in the amount of $642,088.30.
       Appellant’s bankruptcy case was reopened in February
2017 and Appellant filed a Motion for a Permanent Injunction
claiming that U.S. Bank, MERS, SPS, and others violated the
automatic stay and discharge injunction through their efforts to
enforce the Deed of Trust. On June 29, 2017, the court denied
Appellant’s motion finding no automatic stay violation or
contempt. The court also found Appellant’s attack on
Assignment of the Deed of Trust failed under California law.
The bankruptcy case terminated on July 26, 2017. Notices of
Trustee’s Sale were then recorded on March 9, 2017 and July 19,
2017.
       On October 2, 2017, Appellant filed another Chapter 13
bankruptcy petition. She filed schedules on October 16, 2017.
On schedule A/B, Appellant did not identify any of the claims
asserted here, or relating to the Property in any way. The matter
was dismissed on October 18, 2017 for failure to file schedules,
statements or a plan. Another Notice of Trustee’s Sale was
recorded on April 26, 2018.
       On October 3, 2019, a Grant Deed was recorded reflecting
Appellant, as trustee for the Matthews Living Trust dated
December 10, 2013, transferred title to herself (95 percent
interest), and Phil Matthews (5 percent interest). Another Notice
of Trustee’s Sale was recorded on October 31, 2019.

                                5
II.    Matthews’ Prior Lawsuits
       a.    The 2007 Action
       On November 7, 2007, Appellant filed a prior lawsuit
entitled Ethel Matthews v. Infra + Arch Development, Inc., et al.
(Super. Ct., L.A. County, No. GC039852) (2007 Action). In her
complaint filed in the 2007 Action, Appellant sued STCA, and
several other defendants, for fraud and other claims pertaining to
the same 2006 transaction involving the Property.
       In that complaint, Appellant alleged, among other things,
that she was defrauded in the purchase transaction, the
“purchase numbers” in the transaction had changed, she believed
she was purchasing a single family residence but was advised
during escrow that it was a condominium, she was pressured to
close on the purchase, and that, after the close of escrow, she was
advised in September 2006 by the tax assessor’s office that the
Property was “a single family residence.” Appellant subsequently
dismissed STCA from the 2007 Action on March 10, 2008.
       Appellant thereafter filed a First Amended Complaint
(FAC) in the 2007 Action on May 30, 2008 (against various
defendants, but not STCA or STGC) in which she once again
alleged, among other things, that the lender “overcharged and/or
did not disclose certain fees” in connection with her loan, that the
“purchase numbers” in the transaction were changed, and that
she was misled as to whether the Property was a “detached town
home” or a “single family residence” or a “condominium.”
       b.    The 2010 Action
       On June 23, 2010, Appellant filed a complaint in the Los
Angeles Superior Court against her original lender, ResMAE, and
others, relating to the same secured loan and the same Property
at issue in this case (Matthews I). Appellant alleged, in part, that

                                 6
Defendants made various misrepresentations at loan origination.
Appellant claimed she was fraudulently induced into purchasing
the Property and obtaining the loan. Appellant filed a FAC on
July 12, 2011 alleging claims for quiet title and fraud, and she
added Deed of Trust beneficiary U.S. Bank as a Defendant. She
alleged, in part, that the loan was not property assigned to U.S.
Bank, and it thus lacked authority to foreclose. On September
27, 2011, the court granted U.S. Bank’s Motion to Strike the
Complaint without leave to amend.
      c.     The 2014 Action
      On July 3, 2014, Appellant filed another complaint in Los
Angeles Superior Court relating to the same secured loan and the
same Property at issue in this case (Matthews II). Beneficiary
U.S. Bank, SPS, MERS, were named as defendants in Matthews
II, among others.
      Appellant alleged, in part, that Defendants lacked
“standing to enforce the power of sale or foreclosure” and the
“assignments remain ineffective.” She further claimed
Defendants violated the automatic bankruptcy stay and made
misrepresentations in the loan modification application process.
      Appellant filed her FAC on September 24, 2014 alleging 10
causes of action, continuing to attack authority to foreclose,
claiming an automatic stay violation, and improprieties in the
loan modification negotiation process. On December 19, 2014,
the court sustained the demurrer of U.S. Bank, SPS, and MERS,
to the FAC, without leave to amend, and entered judgment with
prejudice.

                                7
III.   Procedural History of This Case
       Appellant filed her initial complaint on October 1, 2019,
asserting, among other claims, wrongful foreclosure and quiet
title to the Property. Appellant sought a temporary restraining
order to enjoin the foreclosure of the Property and the court
denied the application.
       Appellant filed a FAC on January 10, 2020. On July 27,
2020, the court sustained demurrers to the FAC filed by
defendants SPS, MERS, U.S. Bank as Trustee, and Stewart Title,
with leave to amend. In its written ruling, the court found each
of Appellant’s claims failed to state viable causes of action and
that her claims were barred by res judicata based on prior actions
Appellant had filed against the defendants.
       Appellant filed a SAC on August 27, 2020, asserting causes
of action for: (1) Lack of Standing to Foreclose; (2) Fraud;
(3) Slander of Title; (4) Unfair Competition; (5) Quiet Title to
Real Property; (6) Cancellation of Instruments; and
(7) Declaratory Relief.
       SPS, MERS, and U.S. Bank as Trustee filed a demurrer to
the SAC and a Motion to Strike, and Stewart Title and Stewart
Title of California, Inc. filed a separate demurrer and a Motion to
Strike. Quality Loan Service filed an answer to the SAC on
November 3, 2020, followed by a Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings.
       As with the prior pleading, Appellant alleged “Defendants
have not proven authority or any cause to foreclose upon and sell
[Appellant’s] Property,” as the Assignments were allegedly
invalid, and she “denies a lien ever existed.” Appellant alleged
the Assignment was recorded after the closing date of the
securitized trust. She claimed MERS was not authorized to

                                8
assign the Deed of Trust. Appellant further claimed that the
original lender ResMAE dissolved or filed for bankruptcy,
rendering Assignment to U.S. Bank void. Respondents
demurred.
       On March 16, 2021, the court sustained Respondents’
demurrers, without leave to amend. In addition to finding that
Appellant failed to state a claim for her causes of action, the court
further found that her “causes of action appear to be barred by
the doctrine of res judicata on the face of the SAC and judicially
noticed documents.” Specifically, through Matthews II, Appellant
“ ‘challenged standing to enforce the power of sale or foreclosure
and the assignments,’ and those claims were finally adjudicated
in favor of Defendants or their privies.” The court also found the
SAC was collaterally estopped because Appellant “ ‘did not
disclose her claims against Defendants in the instant action in
her bankruptcy schedules’ in her 2017 and 2018 bankruptcy
actions, despite the fact ‘she was already aware of her claims
challenging the enforceability of the Deed of Trust.’ ”
       The trial court ruled that Appellant’s causes of action
against STGC and STCA were time-barred by the applicable
statutes of limitations. The court found that Appellant knew
about the circumstances that caused the statutes of limitations to
start to run in 2006 (when Appellant purchased the Property) or
in 2007 (when Appellant filed her 2007 Action).
       The court also granted QLS’s Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings without leave to amend. The court held that
Appellant’s tort causes of action were barred by the litigation
privilege under Civil Code section 2924.
       The court entered judgment on April 5, 2021. Appellant
timely appealed on May 14, 2021.

                                 9
                                DISCUSSION
I.     Standard of Review
       “It is well established that a demurrer tests the legal
sufficiency of the complaint. [Citation.] On appeal from a
dismissal entered after an order sustaining a demurrer, we
review the order de novo, exercising our independent judgment
about whether the petition states a cause of action as a matter of
law. We give the petition a reasonable interpretation, reading it
as a whole and viewing its parts in context. [Citations.] We
deem to be true all material facts that were properly pled.
[Citation.] We must also accept as true those facts that may be
implied or inferred from those expressly alleged. [Citation.] We
may also consider matters that may be judicially noticed, but do
not accept contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.”
(City of Morgan Hill v. Bay Area Air Quality Management Dist.
(2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 861, 869–870.)
       “If the court sustained the demurrer without leave to
amend, as here, we must decide whether there is a reasonable
possibility the plaintiff could cure the defect with an amendment.
[Citation.] If we find that an amendment could cure the defect,
we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion and we
reverse; if not, no abuse of discretion has occurred. [Citation.]
The plaintiff has the burden of proving that an amendment
would cure the defect.” (Schifando v. City of Los Angeles (2003)
31 Cal.4th 1074, 1081.)
       “Because a motion for judgment on the pleadings is similar
to a general demurrer, the standard of review is the same.
[Citation.] We treat the pleadings as admitting all material facts
properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions
of fact or law. . . . [¶] . . . We consider evidence outside the

                                10
pleadings which the trial court considered without objection.
[Citation.]” (Baughman v. State of California (1995) 38
Cal.App.4th 182, 187.)
II.    The Trial Court Correctly Sustained the Demurrers
        and Granted Judgment on the Pleadings
       a.    Demurrer Filed by SPS, MERS, and U.S. Bank
             i. Appellant’s SAC is Barred By Res Judicata
       As Respondents point out, Appellant has essentially left
unchallenged the trial court’s finding that the SAC is barred by
res judicata. While Appellant is in pro per, she is not excused
from sufficiently supporting her arguments in briefing. A self-
represented party on appeal “ ‘is to be treated like any other
party and is entitled to the same, but no greater consideration
than other litigants and attorneys. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] Thus,
as is the case with attorneys, pro. per. litigants must follow
correct rules of procedure.” (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122
Cal.App.4th 1229, 1247 [deficiencies in pro per appellant’s
opening brief resulted in waiver of issues on appeal].) On this
basis alone, we may affirm the trial court. (See Badie v. Bank of
America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779, 784–785 [when an appellant
“fails to support [an issue] with reasoned argument and citations
to authority, we treat the point as waived”].)
       Even considering the merits of the trial court’s analysis, we
conclude that the trial court correctly found that Appellant’s SAC
is barred by res judicata or claim preclusion. “A clear and
predictable res judicata doctrine promotes judicial economy.
Under this doctrine, all claims based on the same cause of action
must be decided in a single suit; if not brought initially, they may
not be raised at a later date. ‘ “Res judicata precludes piecemeal
litigation by splitting a single cause of action or relitigation of the

                                  11
same cause of action on a different legal theory or for different
relief.” ’ [Citation.] A predictable doctrine of res judicata benefits
both the parties and the courts because it ‘seeks to curtail
multiple litigation causing vexation and expense to the parties
and wasted effort and expense in judicial administration.’
[Citation.]” (Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co. (2002) 28 Cal.4th
888, 897; see also Mark v. Spencer (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 219,
229.)
       The elements for claim preclusion are: “ ‘(1) A claim or
issue raised in the present action is identical to a claim or issue
litigated in a prior proceeding; (2) the prior proceeding resulted in
a final judgment on the merits; and (3) the party against whom
the doctrine is being asserted was a party or in privity with a
party to the prior proceeding. [Citations.]’ ” (People v.
Barragan (2004) 32 Cal.4th 236, 253.)
       “To determine whether two proceedings involve identical
causes of action for purposes of claim preclusion, California
courts have ‘consistently applied the “primary rights” theory.’ ”
(Boeken v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. (2010) 48 Cal.4th 788, 797
(Boeken).) Under this theory, “ ‘[A] “cause of action” is comprised
of a “primary right” of the plaintiff, a corresponding “primary
duty” of the defendant, and a wrongful act by the defendant
constituting a breach of that duty. [Citation.]’ ” (Hayes v. County
of San Diego (2013) 57 Cal.4th 622, 630–631.) “The cause of
action is the right to obtain redress for a harm suffered,
regardless of the specific remedy sought or the legal theory
(common law or statutory) advanced.” (Boeken, supra, at p. 798.)
       The case of Gillies v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2017) 7
Cal.App.5th 907, 914 is instructive. In Gillies the court explained
a judgment sustaining a demurrer to a wrongful foreclosure

                                 12
complaint in a prior action is not a “mere suggestion[] which
allow[s a party] to perpetually file new lawsuits on new theories”
(id. at p. 915) or based on newly enacted laws. Rather, the
judgment precludes all actions involving the same “ ‘ “particular
injury, regardless of the legal theory on which the injury is
based.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 914.) “Somewhere along the line, litigation
must cease.” (Ibid.) “It matters not that appellant has a new
theory of wrongful foreclosure. It is the same primary right
which appellant has always claimed,” the right to be free from
foreclosure. (Ibid.)
       As detailed above, on July 3, 2013, Appellant filed a
complaint against Respondents US Bank, SPS, MERS, ResMae,
and other named defendants in Matthews II. As the trial court
properly found in that case, Appellant’s causes of action, like
those in the instant action, challenged Respondents’ “standing to
enforce the power of sale or foreclosure,” and asserted the
“assignments remain ineffective.” Appellant further claimed
Respondents violated the automatic bankruptcy stay through
enforcing the Deed of Trust, and made misrepresentations in the
loan modification application process. Accordingly, Appellant is
attempting to seek redress of the same harm or primary right—
that the foreclosure process is improper based on invalid
underlying Deeds of Trusts and Assignments.
       On December 19, 2014, the court in Matthews II sustained
the demurrer of U.S. Bank, SPS, and MERS to the FAC, without
leave to amend, and entered judgment, with prejudice. “[F]or
purposes of applying the doctrine of res judicata . . . , a dismissal
with prejudice is the equivalent of a final judgment on the
merits . . . . ‘The statutory term “with prejudice” clearly means
the plaintiff’s right of action is terminated and may not be

                                 13
revived. . . . [A] dismissal with prejudice . . . bars any future
action on the same subject matter.’ ” (Boeken, supra, 48 Cal.4th
at p. 793.) It is the equivalent of a judgment on the merits.
(Torrey Pines Bank v. Superior Court (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 813,
820–821.) As such, the trial court in the instant case properly
sustained Respondents’ demurrer on the basis of res judicata.
We therefore need not address the parties’ other contentions, and
affirm the judgment.
       b.     Demurrer by STGC and STCA
       As with her arguments against U.S. Bank, SPS, and
MERS, Appellant fails to offer any cogent legal argument or
authority as to STGC or STCA. As STGC and STGC point out,
Appellant’s opening brief hardly mentions STGC or STCA and
fails to explain how any of the allegations in Appellant’s SAC
state a valid claim for relief against STGC or STCA. On this
basis alone, we may affirm the trial court’s order. (See Cahill v.
San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 939, 956
[“ ‘We are not bound to develop appellants’ arguments for them.
[Citation.] The absence of cogent legal argument or citation to
authority allows this court to treat the contention as waived.’ ”].)
       Nonetheless, we address the merits of the trial court’s
conclusion that the SAC is time barred against STGC and STCA.
As the trial court properly found, the only factual allegations
relating to STGC are STGC’s unspecified role in recording a
purported backdated unsecure lien, or the recorded Assignment,
dated November 14, 2011. Appellant attached to her SAC an
assignment of the beneficial interest under the original June 13,
2006 Deed of Trust, dated November 14, 2011 and recorded
December 23, 2011.

                                 14
        We “interpret discovery in this context to mean not when
the plaintiff became aware of the specific wrong alleged, but
when the plaintiff suspected or should have suspected that an
injury was caused by wrongdoing.” (Kline v. Turner (2001)
87 Cal.App.4th 1369, 1374.) “ ‘Under this rule constructive and
presumed notice or knowledge are equivalent to knowledge.
So, when the plaintiff has notice or information of circumstances
to put a reasonable person on inquiry, or has the opportunity to
obtain knowledge from sources open to [him or her] . . . the
statute commences to run.’ ” (Parsons v. Tickner (1995) 31
Cal.App.4th 1513, 1525; see also Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co. (1988)
44 Cal.3d 1103, 1111 (Jolly) [“Once the plaintiff has a suspicion of
wrongdoing, and therefore an incentive to sue, she must decide
whether to file suit or sit on her rights.”]) As a general matter,
“it is the discovery of facts, not their legal significance, that starts
the statute.” (Jolly, at p. 1113.)
        As the trial court found, Appellant was aware of the
underlying November 14, 2011 transaction, at the latest, in 2014
given that her complaint in Matthews II, filed in July 2014,
contained the Assignment and Appellant alleged she discovered
the Assignment in July 2014. Further, Appellant was aware of
the circumstances that caused the statute of limitations to run
since at least 2007 when she commenced an action against STGC
and STCA. As such, the trial court was correct to hold that
Appellant’s SAC is time-barred on the face of the pleading.1

1     The statute of limitations for fraud is three years.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 338, subd. (d).) The statute of limitations for
Business and Professions section 17200 is four years. (Bus. &
Prof. Code, § 17208 [“Any action to enforce any cause of action
pursuant to this chapter shall be commenced within four years

                                  15
       c.    Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings by QLS
       As QLS points out, although Appellant’s SAC raised seven
causes of action, her opening brief focuses on lack of standing to
foreclose and slander of title. For the reasons discussed below, as
to both of these causes of action, and Plaintiff’s remaining tort
claims, the trial court correctly concluded that Appellant could
not state any claim against QLS because QLS, as trustee of the
Deed of Trust, is subject to statutory privileges.
       A nonjudicial foreclosure sale is a creature of statute.
(Kachlon v. Markowitz (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 316, 334
(Kachlon) [“The Civil Code contains a comprehensive statutory
scheme regulating nonjudicial foreclosure.”]) The trustee’s role in
preparing for and conducting the sale is set forth in detail in Civil
Code section 2924 et. seq. “The trustee in nonjudicial foreclosure
is not a true trustee with fiduciary duties, but rather a common
agent for the trustor and beneficiary.” [Citation.] The scope and
nature of the trustee’s duties are exclusively defined by the deed
of trust and the governing statutes. No other common law duties
exist. [Citations.]” (Kachlon, supra, at p. 335.) In short, the
trustee does not contract with the purchaser for the sale of the

after the cause of action accrued”].) The statute of limitations for
quiet title and the cancellation of instruments, both of which are
premised on allegations of fraud, are also three years. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 338, subd. (d); see also Walters v. Boosinger (2016) 2
Cal.App.5th 421, 428 [on a quiet title claim, “ ‘courts refer to the
underlying theory of relief to determine the applicable period of
limitations’ ”].) The statute of limitations for “lack of standing to
foreclose,” which we construe as a wrongful foreclosure claim
premised on fraud, is three years. (Code Civ. Proc., § 338, subd.
(d).)

                                 16
foreclosed property, but performs ministerial acts which, when
properly executed, result in the transfer of title to the purchaser.
       In enacting the comprehensive statutory scheme, the
Legislature chose to vest trustees performing the statutory
foreclosure procedures with a qualified privilege precluding them
from liability for actions undertaken within the scope of their
statutory duties. To that end, Civil Code section 2924,
subdivision (b) provides: “In performing acts required by this
article, the trustee shall incur no liability for any good faith error
resulting from reliance on information provided in good faith by
the beneficiary regarding the nature and the amount of the
default under the secured obligation, deed of trust, or mortgage.”
(Italics added.) Thus, when a trustee such as QLS records a
Notice of Default or Notice of Trustee’s Sale at the direction of
the beneficiary, the trustee incurs no tort liability for doing so.
       The recording of a notice of sale and notice of default are
also privileged. Civil Code section 2924, subdivision (d)(1),
provides that “[t]he mailing, publication, and delivery of notices
as required” by section 2924 “constitute privileged
communications pursuant to Section 47.” Section 2924 mandates
the recording of both a notice of default and a notice of sale.
(Civ. Code, § 2924, subds. (a)(1) & (a)(3).)
       Appellant’s SAC does not allege that QLS had any role with
regard to her loan or property aside from issuing foreclosure
notices in its capacity as trustee of the Deed of Trust. Her first
cause of action for “lack of standing to foreclose” does not mention
QLS by name, and instead generally contends that “Defendants”
did not have the power to foreclose. Her second cause of action
for fraud takes issue with the content of foreclosure notices
issued by QLS. Her third cause of action for slander of title again

                                 17
attempts to state a claim against QLS solely for its recording of a
Notice of Default and Notice of Trustee’s Sale.
       Each of the above actions fall within the scope of QLS’s
statutory privilege. Civil Code section 47 creates two privileges:
(1) an absolute privilege, commonly called the litigation privilege,
that applies irrespective of the speaker’s motive; and (2) a
qualified privilege that “applies only to communications made
without malice.” (Hagberg v. California Federal Bank (2004) 32
Cal.4th 350, 360, superseded by statute on other grounds.) Civil
Code section 2924, subdivision (d), refers only to “Section 47”
without specifying which of the two privileges applies. The
courts have split on this question. (Compare Kachlon, supra, 168
Cal.App.4th at pp. 335–341 [Civ. Code, § 2924 incorporates § 47’s
qualified privilege] with Garretson v. Post (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th
1508, 1517 [§ 2924 incorporates § 47’s absolute privilege].) We
need not take a position on this issue because the publication of
documents at issue in this case is privileged even under section
47’s narrower qualified privilege.
       For the purposes of section 47’s qualified privilege, “malice”
means that the defendant (1) “ ‘was motivated by hatred or ill
will towards the plaintiff,’ ” or (2) “ ‘lacked reasonable grounds for
[its] belief in the truth of the publication and therefore acted in
reckless disregard of the plaintiff’s rights.’ ” (Sanborn v.
Chronicle Publishing Co. (1976) 18 Cal.3d 406, 413; Taus v.
Loftus (2007) 40 Cal.4th 683, 721; Civ. Code, § 48a, subd. (d)(4)
[defining “actual malice” as “hatred or ill will toward the
plaintiff”].)
       The purpose of this privilege is to bar any tort action based
on a protected communication when the publication was made
without malice. (Kachlon, supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 336.)

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Malice requires that the publication be motivated by hatred or ill
will toward the plaintiff or lack of reasonable belief in the truth of
the publication. (Ibid.)
       As the trial court found, Appellant’s SAC contains no facts
to suggest that QLS recorded the Notices of Default and Sale out
of hatred toward Appellant or that QLS had reason to believe
that Appellant’s loan was not in default. Appellant’s conclusory
allegation that QLS acted with malice when it “colluded” or
“conspired” with SPS to foreclose on the property falls short of
this standard.
       In her opening brief, Appellant again states in a conclusory
fashion that Defendants acted with malice, but she fails to allege
facts supporting that contention as to QLS. Appellant’s
conclusory assertions lacking any factual support cannot support
a cause of action that would survive a motion for judgment on the
pleadings or demurrer. (See Curcini v. County of Alameda (2008)
164 Cal.App.4th 629, 650 [conclusory allegations of malice are
insufficient to survive demurrer].) Accordingly, we affirm the
judgment granting QLS’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.
                           DISPOSITION
       The court has read and considered the motion for judicial
notice. It is ordered that the motion is granted, and the court
takes judicial notice of the following documents: (1) The
complaint filed on November 7, 2007, entitled Ethel Matthews v.
Infra + Arch Development, Inc., et al. (Super. Ct, L.A. County No.
GC039852) (2007 Action). (2) The request for dismissal filed and
entered on March 10, 2008 in the 2007 Action. (3) The FAC filed
on May 30, 2008 in the 2007 Action. (4) The complaint filed on
June 23, 2010, entitled Ethel Matthews v. ResMAE Mortgage
Corporation, et al. (Super. Ct., L.A. County, No. GC045473).

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(5) The complaint filed on July 3, 2014, entitled Ethel Matthews
v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, et al. (Super. Ct., L.A. County,
No. EC062589).
      The judgment sustaining the demurrers and granting
judgment on the pleadings is affirmed. Costs are awarded to
Respondents.

                                      HARUTUNIAN, J.*
We Concur:

             STRATTON, P. J.

             WILEY, J.

*     Judge of the San Diego Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.

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