Court Opinion

ID: 9667979
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:59:32.100188+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:42.109974
License: Public Domain

Krivosha, C.J.,
dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion in this case. I do so because, in my view, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-104.02 (Reissue 1984) violates both U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1, and Neb. Const, art. I, § 3.
While I concede that the cases decided by the U.S. Supreme Court on this issue have not always been consistent, I believe, nevertheless, that a common thread does run throughout the cases. In my view, pulling out that common thread unravels the validity of the statute in question.
The majority opinion argues that the purpose of the act is to facilitate the adoption of children born out of wedlock. In order to facilitate adoptions the act treats fathers of children born out of wedlock differently than mothers. I believe the U.S. Supreme Court, in its various decisions, has held that *581objectionable. In Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 99 S. Ct. 1760, 60 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1979), the U.S. Supreme Court, in striking down a New York statute which granted an unwed mother the authority to block the adoption of her child simply by withholding her consent but did not give an unwed father a similar right, said at 388: “Gender-based distinctions ‘must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives’ in order to withstand judicial scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.” The Court went on further to say at 389: “Contrary to appellees’ argument and to the apparent presumption underlying § 111, maternal and paternal roles are not invariably different in importance.” The State of New York in Caban, supra, as is true in the instant case, argued that this cutting off of rights-was critical in order to assist in bringing about adoptions. In rejecting that argument the U.S. Supreme Court said in Caban at 391:
The State’s interest in providing for the well-being of illegitimate children is an important one. We do not question that the best interests of such children often may require their adoption into new families who will give them the stability of a normal, two-parent home. Moreover, adoption will remove the stigma under which illegitimate children suffer. But the unquestioned right of the State to further these desirable ends by legislation is not in itself sufficient to justify the gender-based distinction of § 111. Rather, under the relevant cases applying the Equal Protection Clause it must be shown that the distinction is structured reasonably to further these ends. As we repeated in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S., at 76, such a statutory “classification ‘must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.’ [Citation omitted.]”
The Caban Court went on to say at 391-92:
We find that the distinction in § 111 between unmarried mothers and unmarried fathers, as illustrated by this case, does not bear a substantial relation to the State’s interest in *582providing adoptive homes for its illegitimate children. It may be that, given the opportunity, some unwed fathers would prevent the adoption of their illegitimate children. This impediment to adoption usually is the result of a natural parental interest shared by both genders alike; it is not a manifestation of any profound difference between the affection and concern of mothers and fathers for their children. Neither the State nor the appellees have argued that unwed fathers are more likely to object to the adoption of their children than are unwed mothers; nor is there any self-evident reason why as a class they would be.
Similarly, in Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 92 S. Ct. 1208, 31 L. Ed. 2d 551 (1972), the U.S. Supreme Court declared unconstitutional an Illinois statute under which an unwed father is not included in the statutory definition of “parent” and thus is subject to being deprived of the custody of his illegitimate children by dependency proceedings in which he is not entitled to a hearing as to his fitness as a parent, but, in effect, is presumed to be unfit. In declaring the act unconstitutional the U.S. Supreme Court said in Stanley, supra at 656:
Despite Bell and Carrington, it may be argued that unmarried fathers are so seldom fit that Illinois need not undergo the administrative inconvenience of inquiry in any case, including Stanley’s. The establishment of prompt efficacious procedures to achieve legitimate state ends is a proper state interest worthy of cognizance in constitutional adjudication. But the Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency. Indeed, one might fairly say of the Bill of Rights in general, and the Due Process Clause in particular, that they were designed to protect the fragile values of a vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing concern for efficiency and efficacy that may characterize praiseworthy government officials no less, and perhaps more, than mediocre ones.
And, further, in Stanley at 658 the Court said:
The State of Illinois assumes custody of the children of married parents, divorced parents, and unmarried *583mothers only after a hearing and proof of neglect. The children of unmarried fathers, however, are declared dependent children without a hearing on parental fitness and without proof of neglect. Stanley’s claim in the state courts and here is that failure to afford him a hearing on his parental qualifications while extending it to other parents denied him equal protection of the laws. We have concluded that all Illinois parents are constitutionally entitled to a hearing on their fitness before their children are removed from their custody. It follows that denying such a hearing to Stanley and those like him while granting it to other Illinois parents is inescapably contrary to the Equal Protection Clause.
While it is true that in the instant case the statute does not automatically deny the father the right to notice and hearing, nevertheless it does seek to accomplish a similar end. The statute requires that the father must, within 5 days after birth, acknowledge paternity in a narrow, limited manner, to wit, by filling out a form provided by the Department of Social Services. The father must also file the form with the Department of Social Services. In my view this statutory scheme unconstitutionally discriminates against the father.
This 5-day filing requirement is, in my view, a denial of equal protection. For a host of reasons, one may intend to acknowledge paternity, pay the hospital bills, hand out cigars, and tell the world of the birth of a child, and yet, unless the individual can find the form specifically prescribed by the Department of Social Services and cause that form to be filed, presumably in Lincoln, within 5 days after birth, if the mother unilaterally chooses to place the child for adoption, the father is forever precluded from making any claim to the child. Moreover, should the unilateral decision to permit adoption to take place occur at some later time, the father is forever barred from receiving any notice or other due process. In the instant case the putative father filed the proper document with the proper agency 9 days after birth. Yet, we forever bar his rights because the filing was 4 days late.
I recognize that attempting to chart a course that will place a marker on an appropriate cutoff date is extremely dangerous. *584Nevertheless, I believe that setting a 5-day limit should be recognized by anyone as being too short. We even permit certain buyers of goods 3 days in which to rescind a purchase order. See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 69-1603 (Reissue 1981).
Furthermore, the provisions of § 43-104.02 are wholly inconsistent with other provisions of the law still in full force and effect in Nebraska. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 13-109 (Reissue 1983) provides:
A person may state in writing that he is the father of a child or perform acts, such as furnishing of support, which reasonably indicate that he considers himself to be the father of such child, and in such case he shall be considered to have acknowledged the paternity of such child.
And Neb. Rev. Stat. § 13-102 (Reissue 1983) provides that the father of a child whose paternity is established either by judicial proceedings or by acknowledgment shall be liable for its support to the same extent and in the same manner as the father of a child born in lawful wedlock is liable for his child’s support. The net effect is to say that even though the father may acknowledge in writing that he is in fact the father and thereby remain liable for the child’s support, he nevertheless is not entitled to any rights insofar as the adoption of his child is concerned unless he has, within 5 days of the child’s birth, made that writing on a form prescribed by the Nebraska Department of Social Services. Even then the inconsistencies do not end. While the father has but 5 days under § 43-104.02 to establish his paternity, the mother has 4 years. See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 13-111 (Reissue 1983). Even though the mother may determine not to relinquish the child for a period of 4 years and even though the father may acknowledge in writing, though not on the proper form, that he is the father, and even though he may provide support, nevertheless if the magic writing has not occurred on the prescribed form and been properly filed within 5 days of birth, all of the mother’s rights continue, but the father’s rights are terminated.
Even after the father’s rights are so quickly terminated, the adoption may not, under Nebraska law, proceed. Before a child may be adopted, the child must reside with the adoptive parents *585for at least 6 months. See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-109 (Reissue 1984). While, indeed, it can be argued that most adoptive parents who take a child into their home believe that, at the completion of 6 months, the adoption will become final, nevertheless the statute makes no such assurances.
It is difficult to conceive why, if the parties first married and the father then immediately left, a period of 6 months must expire before abandonment can be established, but if the parties failed to marry before the child was born and the father did not leave, after 5 days he could be denied any right.
The act under attack does not require that the father provide any support, either financially or emotionally, in order to acquire rights. All he need do is file a prescribed form within 5 days. That strikes me as being unreasonable.
The majority opinion observes that the appellee father in this case exhibited no financial responsibility for the child or the mother prior to birth. The majority observes:
This is not a case where he lived with the child and nurtured and supported it and the mother. Thus, his rights, as Justice Marshall observed in Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 256, 98 S. Ct. 549, 54 L. Ed. 2d 511 (1978), “are readily distinguishable from those of a separated or divorced father, and [we] accordingly believe that the State could permissibly give appellant less veto authority than it provides to a married father.”
But how can this father, or any father, under § 43-104.02, live with the child, nurture it, and support it if his rights to the child can be terminated during the time that the mother and child are in the hospital and before he is afforded any opportunity to establish those necessary ties?
In my view the provisions of § 43-104.02 do not withstand strict scrutiny. I would have affirmed the decision of the district court which found the act unconstitutional.