Court Opinion

ID: 9850106
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:52:11.437502+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:31.815518
License: Public Domain

BAKES, Justice,
dissenting:
I must dissent from the action taken by the majority in this case. The majority, in its haste to correct what it perceives as a gross violation of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution, the equal protection clause as represented by the “one man, one vote” principle, has committed an equally gross violation of another equally important clause of the same amendment, the due process clause. The extremely rushed procedure followed by the Court in this, the third chapter of this reapportionment controversy, has denied the defendants in this case any opportunity to present evidence in support of the reap^ portionment plan adopted by the legislature in H.B. 746, or to counter the factual showing presented in the affidavits submitted by the petitioners, which facts are wholeheartedly endorsed by the majority. This denial of the opportunity to present evidence in support of H.B. 746, or to defend against factual allegations asserted by the petitioners, is a flagrant breach of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution, and of the due process clause set out in Art. 1, § 13, of the Idaho Constitution.
The events that transpired in this case, Hollar III, took place over a period of less than one week. On Monday, April 2, 1984, at 4:31 p.m., the Governor signed the reapportionment bill, H.B. 746. A petition seeking review of that bill pursuant to our retained jurisdiction, was filed on the same day, apparently immediately thereafter. The next day, Tuesday, April 3, this Court ordered that an oral argument be held on Friday, April 6. On Thursday, April 5, the affidavit of Humberto Fuentes, and on Friday, April 6, two additional affidavits of Tony Stewart and Susan M. Stacy were filed by petitioners in support of their Petition To Review Reapportionment Plan Enacted By H.B. 746, which petition alleged *607that H.B. 746 was unconstitutional.1 On Friday afternoon, April 6, this Court heard oral arguments on the Petition to Review. On Monday morning, April 9, 1984, without an evidentiary hearing having ever been held, this Court issued an order holding that “H.B. 746 AAS reapportioning the Idaho state legislature enacted into law on April 2, 1984, be, and the same is hereby, declared unconstitutional in violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America.” The Court further ordered that the 1984 elections for the Idaho state legislature be held pursuant to Plan 14-B which had previously been approved by the Court’s opinion of January, 1984. The April 9 order of this Court, and the Court’s opinion issued April 16, 1984, one week later, are based primarily upon the facts alleged in the ex parte affidavits submitted by the petitioners in support of their Petition To Review, and additionally upon factual allegations and innuendo stated by plaintiffs’ counsel at oral argument.
The defendants’ due process rights have been doubly violated. First, they have not had an opportunity to have a trial, after a meaningful time for preparation, in order to submit evidence in support of the constitutionality of H.B. 746. Secondly, they have been denied the opportunity to prepare and submit evidence to counter the factual allegations contained in the affidavits submitted in support of the Petition To Review, or to cross examine those affiants. While the record reflects that certain appearing attorneys were personally served with two of the three affidavits at the time of the hearing in Lewiston, Idaho, on April 6, 1984, the Certificate of Service filed by the petitioners indicates that four others were served with two of the three affidavits on April 9, 1984, and then only by mail from Coeur d’Alene, Idaho. The Court’s order finding the statute to be unconstitutional was issued on the same day that those affidavits were placed in the mail in Coeur d’Alene for mailing to those parties or attorneys in southern Idaho. This Court’s order was entered before all of the parties or intervenors had been served, based upon petitioners’ ex parte affidavits, and without giving the defendants a trial after an opportunity to prepare so that they could submit evidence in support of their claim that H.B. 746 is constitutional. It is difficult to imagine a more egregious violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment than has occurred in this case.
This is not the first time that the defendants’ constitutional rights have been violated in this reapportionment dispute. It has happened twice before. In the very beginning, these petitioners, on March 31, 1982, filed an original proceeding in this Court in the form of a verified petition, No. 14545, seeking to have H.B. 830, then in effect, declared unconstitutional, and to enjoin the 1982 primary election from being conducted under H.B. 830. This Court, in an order *608dated April 2, 1982, refused to grant that original proceeding in view of the obvious factual issues which would arise in such a proceeding. Thereafter, the petitioners, on April 9, 1982, filed an action in the District Court of the First Judicial District in Shoshone County. Immediately after that action was filed, the petitioners sought a preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin holding the 1982 primary election under H.B. 830 which was then in effect. After hearing on the plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction on May 17, 1982, the trial court denied the preliminary injunction. However, in the same order it nevertheless issued what purported to be a final judgment declaring H.B. 830 to be unconstitutional, even though the defendants’ time for filing their answer had not yet expired and they had never filed an answer in the action, nor had they been given a trial on the factual issues. The defendants appealed to this Court, and in our opinion in Hellar I, while we agreed that the trial court’s interpretation of Art. Ill, § 5, of the Idaho Constitution prohibiting the joining of only portions of counties in legislative districts was correct and must be complied with in any apportionment of the Idaho legislature, we nevertheless acknowledged the denial of due process to the defendants, noting that:
“At the time of the hearing of the preliminary injunction on May 17, 1982, the time for the defendants to file their answers to the plaintiffs’ second amended complaint had not elapsed, and in fact no answers had been filed on behalf of any of the defendants. Accordingly, on remand, the defendants should be given the opportunity to file their answers asserting any defenses which they may have, and to submit additional evidence on the issue of the constitutionality of H.B. 830 if they deem it appropriate.” Hellar v. Cenarrusa, 104 Idaho 858, 862, 664 P.2d 765, 769 (1983).
By our opinion in Hellar I, this Court recognized that due process requires that a litigant be given a trial, rather than be judged on ex parte affidavits.
After our opinion on remand in Hellar I, a trial was held, and the trial court not only held H.B. 830 to be unconstitutional, but prohibited the defendants and the Idaho legislature from conducting any election in 1984 under any other reapportionment plan except the court’s Plan 14-B. Again on appeal, while this Court affirmed the trial court’s finding that H.B. 830 was unconstitutional because it improperly divided counties under Art. Ill, § 5, of the Idaho Constitution, we nevertheless struck that portion of the trial court’s judgment prohibiting the legislature from passing another reapportionment plan to be effective in 1984, on the obvious grounds that any order of a court which would purport to prohibit the Idaho legislature from carrying out its constitutional function of legislating would be an obvious violation of Art. 2, § 1 of the Idaho Constitution, which provides that, “The powers of the government of this state are divided into three distinct departments, the legislative, executive and judicial; and no person or collection of persons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any powers properly belonging to either of the others, except as in this constitution expressly directed or permitted.” Obviously prompted by our decision in Hellar II which struck the trial court’s prohibition against the legislature attempting further reapportionment efforts, and pursuant to our admonition in that opinion in which we stated that “whenever a court declares an apportionment scheme unconstitutional, it is appropriate to afford a reasonable opportunity for the legislature to adopt a constitutional measure; and legislative bodies should assume that responsibility and not leave their apportionment task to the courts,” the legislature struggled with the reapportionment issue throughout its regular 1984 session. Two reapportionment measures were passed by the legislature, only to be vetoed by the Governor. Finally, on Saturday, March 31, the last day of the regular 1984 legislative session, H.B. 746 AAS was passed by the legislature. On Monday, April 2, it was signed by the Governor. On the morning *609of Monday, April 9, less than one week after it became law, it was struck down by this Court because it allegedly violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution. This Court, in its rush to preserve a perceived violation of these petitioners’ equal protection rights under the fourteenth amendment, has trampled upon the due process rights of the defendants and the legislature, which are, ironically, guaranteed by that same fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution.2
One of the basic requirements of due process is notice and the opportunity to be heard. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950). The notice required before a judgment, which is to be accorded finality, is a notice reasonably calculated to apprise interested parties of the action and give them ample opportunity to present their objections. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 85 S.Ct. 1187, 14 L.Ed.2d 62 (1965); Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 61 S.Ct. 339, 85 L.Ed. 278 (1940). In this case, it is not even clear from this record if all interested parties received notice of the hearing, much less notice calculated to give them an opportunity to logically and coherently present their views. The purpose of notice “is to apprise the affected individual of, and permit adequate preparation for, an impending ‘hearing’.” Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div’n v. Kraft, 436 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 1554, 1563, 56 L.Ed. 30 (1978) (emphasis supplied). It is clear that the litigants on the defendants’ side were never afforded this basic due process right in this case.
The right to a hearing requires the right to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 92 S.Ct. 1983, 32 L.Ed.2d 556 (1972); see also Paratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981). A hearing cannot be meaningful if the notice and time allowed for preparation are inadequate and the right to present evidence or to conduct cross examination is totally denied. A hearing cannot be meaningful if one is not fully apprised of the facts asserted by the opposition, Gonzales v. United States, 348 U.S. 407, 75 S.Ct. 409, 99 L.Ed. 467 (1955), and allowed an opportunity to refute that evidence, especially where the case particularly turns upon factual issues. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 96 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970). The right to present evidence is essential to the fair hearing required by the due process clause. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 89 S.Ct. 1843, 23 L.Ed.2d 404 (1969).
The denial of due process rights is clear in this case. The majority correctly notes that a legislative reapportionment plan with a deviation of population greater than 10% “creates a prima facie case of discrimination and therefore must be justified by the state. ” Supra at 542, (emphasis supplied). However, although the majority seemingly states the correct rule, it then totally denies the defendants the right to make that justification. This plan is declared a prima facie case of discrimination which, in the words of the majority, “must be justified by the state,” supra at 542, but the “state” is never given the opportunity to so justify the plan. There has never been an evidentiary hearing on the justifications for H.B. 746. In making its hasty ruling, the majority ignores the express provision contained in Hellar II that once a legislative plan was signed into law we would appoint Judge Cogswell as a special master to allow the presentation of evidence on the plan, and allow the special master, as the factfinder, to develop findings of fact and conclusions of law to allow our review as an appellate body, and not as a trial court. Instead, the majority gave the defendants’ counsel in Hellar II three *610days or less notice of an argument to this Court, at which hearing the Court assumed the truth of the petitioners’ ex parte affidavits, the applicability and relevance of all of the evidence in Hellar II, and based its order and opinion on that record.
The majority acknowledges that the state asserts that the plan “can be justified because of Idaho’s terrain, its shape, and its relatively sparse population.” Supra at 542. However, the majority concludes that since both H.B. 746 and 14-B advance the policy of not dividing county lines, H.B. 746 is not necessary to preserve that policy. But the integrity of county lines was not the primary policy being urged by the defendants in support of H.B. 746; rather the defendants were asserting as justification the terrain, shape of the state, and sparse population. The majority cannot know if those stated policies are legitimately supported by H.B. 746, more so than 14-B, and enough so as to justify the deviation, because the defendants were never allowed to justify the plan in an evidentiary hearing. The majority assumes that the same objectives underlie all of these plans without allowing the defendants an opportunity to present their evidence concerning the objectives of H.B. 746.
The acts of the legislative branch of government (which have also received the concurrence of the executive branch in this case) are presumed to be constitutional, and, “A party who assails the constitutionality of a statute bears the burden of showing its invalidity and must overcome a strong presumption of validity.” Leliefeld v. Johnson, 104 Idaho 357, 373, 659 P.2d 111, 127 (1983). Even if the petitioners have made a prima facie showing in their pleadings of a disparity in excess of 10%, the decisions of the United States Supreme Court provide that a state may justify that excessive disparity based upon an “acceptable state policy.” “ ‘De minimis deviations are unavoidable, but variations of 30% among senate districts and 40% among house districts can hardly be deemed de minimis and none of our cases suggests that differences of this magnitude will be accepted, without a satisfactory explanation grounded on acceptable state policy.’ ” Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, —, 103 S.Ct. 2690, 2696, 77 L.Ed.2d 214 (1983).
The state policy is established in part in certain findings set out in Section 1 of the bill:
“Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Idaho:
“SECTION 1. STATEMENT OF LEGISLATIVE FINDINGS. The Legislature recognizes that many factors impact decisions regarding legislative apportionment. In adoption of the provisions of this act, the Legislature was cognizant that apportionment is fundamental to good government. In all decisions implemented in this act, certain principles governed. The most important of these was achievement of one person, one vote, as mandated by the federal constitution and interpretations by federal courts. In addition, recognition of county boundaries, creation of compact and contiguous districts, preservation of historical socioeconomic relationships, and recognition of natural topographical barriers weighed heavily upon these deliberations. The Legislature has been particularly aware of the requirements of Section 5, Article III, of the Constitution of the State of Idaho. The necessary balance between principles of the United States Constitution and guarantees of the Idaho Constitution has been placed squarely before the Idaho Legislature. The resulting apportionment, contained herein, is a balance of these and other special criteria, noted in this statement as applicable. “In certain districts, there exist such unique conditions, that deviation from the ideal of one person, one vote, seems not only warranted, but mandated. In Legislative District No. 1, composed of Bonner and Boundary Counties, these counties are bounded on three sides by other states and a foreign nation. No other combination of counties is possible which accomplishes representation of these populations. Similarly, Kootenai County, in Districts No. 2 and No. 3, has deviations from the ideal which may ex*611ceed the most desirable, but the county is given recognition through two districts entirely within its boundaries. Any combination with other counties would only serve to dilute the representation of Kootenai County as a separate and distinct unit.
“Benewah and Shoshone Counties are combined in a district without other counties based upon their traditional ties of economic and social interests.
“Four Legislative Districts, No. 5, No. 6, No. 7 and No. 8, illustrate legislative efforts to minimize deviations when it was possible without diluting representation. A floterial district concept is utilized in this area to achieve the representation to which the population total is entitled. The size of the floterial district is limited, however, to five counties, because inclusion of the ten counties north of the southern Idaho County boundary would create a district so large and cumbersome as to be difficult to represent. The diversity of interests thrown into a single district merely for the achievement of minimal deviation would then negate the legitimate representation of these interests.
“District No. 9, which is well below the ideal district size, nevertheless consists of four large and sparsely populated counties. While mathematical purity might be achieved by a combination of these and some northern counties, representation of like interests would be diluted.
“District No. 22 is well above the ideal district size, but represents a combination of counties very large in size, and without responsible alternatives. Bounded as it is by two states, Owyhee County with its sparsely populated expanse, warrants special consideration. Any combination of Owyhee County with another county than Elmore, would result in unnecessary and unwarranted dilution of the representation of the other county. “District No. 23, composed of five counties of Butte, Clark, Custer, Jefferson and Lemhi, once again illustrates the problems of size and population density. These counties have natural similarities of economic and social interests. They are bounded by another state on one side and by the natural topographical limitation of a large wilderness area and imposing mountain range on the other. While their interests are similar enough to be amenable to good representation, further division or other combinations would only dilute good representation. “Use of two floterial districts in the southeastern corner of the state achieves better representation because the counties included are similar in their socioeconomic traditions. The size of the resulting districts is not excessive and the similarities of interests would make good representation a reasonable expectation. Further, floterial districts used here make it possible to represent individual counties, thereby maximizing county representation in the Legislature. Only through the use of a floterial district is Bingham County assured the representation to which its population would entitle it.
“While the concept of one person, one vote, has been preeminent in the accomplishment of this apportionment, another important factor has also been considered, and that is achievement of access to good representation. Each case of deviation from the ideal population size has been considered in light of the special circumstances which might warrant that deviation from the first principle, and the resulting enactment herein contained is a merger of these diverse interests and principles.”
The majority ignores this stated policy and assumes that the real motive for the enactment of H.B. 746 was gerrymandering. The majority refers to “unrefuted” evidence of gerrymandering. Evidence will always necessarily be unrefuted when only one side is allowed the opportunity to submit its factual allegations at an appellate argument, while the other side is not allowed that opportunity. The majority relies upon innuendo of plaintiffs’ counsel (that District 15 was “a fish” or “a sports *612car heading out of town”), just as though reapportionment adjudication was some sort of judicial “Rorschack test.” It is the purposes sought to be achieved by the legislature, not the resultant forms which the district boundaries assume, which should guide our consideration. The final decision should be based upon evidence presented at a trial, and not upon innuendo of counsel.
The majority also relies upon an affidavit of Susan Stacy, stating:
“The affidavit of Susan Stacy (Director of Planning and Community Development for the City of Boise) compares the division of Ada County under Plan 14-B and H.B. 746 and provides some of the factual basis of the gerrymandering charge. It is noteworthy that either by pure chance or by design the scheme of H.B. 746 does not put one incumbent legislator against another in either Ada, Canyon or Twin Falls counties, the three counties as to which evidence of gerrymandering was presented. The Stacy affidavit states:
‘The H.B. 746 plan shows the typical characteristics of political gerrymandering: shoe string connections, odd-shaped long narrow districts, dispersion of urban populations into larger rural areas, and the unnecessary splitting of established neighborhoods.’ ” Supra at 543-544.
Neither the record in Hellar I nor in Hellar II support such a claim. The majority suggests that the legislature’s motives were less than “pure” by noting that “H.B. 746 does not put one incumbent legislator against another” in support of its decision that gerry-mandering has occurred. On what “record” does the majority make that statement? The reapportionment trial conducted below concerned only H.B. 830, passed by the legislature in 1982. At the time of that trial, several legislators testified concerning their views of the motivations of the legislature in working on reapportionment. This included testimony by Vernon Brassey that at least the 1982 legislature used as one of its guiding principles the rule “don’t run against an incumbent,” i.e., create districts in such a way as to prevent two incumbent legislators from having to run against each other. Other legislators, testifying about the 1982 legislature, referred to the pressures on the legislature to preserve the seats of incumbents. However, at the time those legislators testified, H.B. 746 was not even contemplated. It did not even exist. H.B. 746 was passed by an entirely different legislature, the 1984 legislature. Many of the legislators who testified at the trial on H.B. 830, including witness Brassey, were not even members of the 1984 legislature. No one from the 1984 legislature has ever been allowed to testify as to the concerns of that legislature in forming H.B. 746. H.B. 746 is being declared unconstitutional in part based upon allegations taken from a record generated in support of or in opposition to an entirely different bill, passed by an entirely different legislature.
The only other “record” cited to support the majority’s gerry-mandering conclusion is the Stacy affidavit. It bears repeating that this conclusory affidavit was filed on Friday, April 6, 1984, the day of the hearing in this Court, and served on some counsel that day, and on others by mailing to them on Monday, April 9, 1984, the day that this Court entered its order holding H.B. 746 to be unconstitutional under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. For this Court to base its opinion on that affidavit denies these defendants the right to cross examine the declarant Susan Stacy; the right to counter her allegations; and the right to present evidence in support of the legislature’s stated reasons for enacting H.B. 746.
This Court’s rush to judgment does little to advance the fundamental goals of our judicial system — those of judicial order, of fundamental justice, and of basic fairness for all litigants. “The Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency.” Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972). The fourteenth amendment imposes upon the states requirements that “ensure that judicial procedures are fundamentally fair.” *613Lassiter v. Dept. of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 101 S.Ct. 2153, 68 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981).
If this Court does not rehear and reverse the precipitous action which it has taken in this case and give these defendants the procedural due process guaranteed them by the United States Constitution, then it would certainly be appropriate for them to commence an action in federal district court seeking injunctive and other relief under 42 U.S.C.A.1983, including perhaps damages, costs and attorney fees under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988. Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of U.S., 446 U.S. 719, 100 S.Ct. 1967, 64 L.Ed.2d 641 (1980).

. The affidavits submitted by the plaintiffs can be summarized as follows: (a) Humberto Fuentes, representing certain Hispanic intervenors, asserted that the division of Canyon County, rather than having legislators run at large, served to effectively disenfranchise the Hispanic vote, and that H.B. 746 was "drawn to protect incumbency”; (b) Tony Stewart, a plaintiff witness at the trial on H.B. 830 and a professor of political science at North Idaho College, asserts that H.B. 746 is substantially similar to the unconstitutional H.B. 830, and includes calculations of the alleged deviation in population, asserting the deviation in H.B. 746 to be 32.94%; and (c) Susan Stacy, the Boise City Director of Planning and Community Development, asserts that H.B. 746 violates several principles that should be used in reapportionment, including the differentiation of rural and urban areas, and large and small cities, and the lack of use of natural and obvious boundaries and neighborhood coherence.
The defendants filed two affidavits on April 6, 1984, the date of the hearing. One was the affidavit of Ben Ysursa, Chief Deputy Secretary of State, in charge of elections, who stated that if the Court declared H.B. 746 unconstitutional, there would not be sufficient time to conduct an election under any other plan under the existing statutory deadlines. The other was the affidavit of Susan Bennion, who stated that “the average deviation of the reapportionment plan embodied in H.B. 746 AAS, as modified by H.B. 750, is . 7.22% according to the aggregate method, and 36.55% according to the component method, explaining which districts caused the deviation. The majority makes no mention of the Bennion affidavit.

. “§ 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law— Equal protection.] — All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”