Court Opinion

ID: 9877559
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-27 16:08:43.288417+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:39:36.310880
License: Public Domain

J-S24003-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

  DAVID DAVIS                                  :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellant               :
                                               :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  JANICO DELI GROCERY, LLC, D/B/A              :   No. 127 MDA 2023
  JANICO GROCERY                               :

             Appeal from the Judgment Entered January 3, 2023
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Civil Division at No(s):
                                 18-2882

BEFORE:      BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.:                      FILED: SEPTEMBER 27, 2023

       Appellant, David Davis, appeals from the January 3, 2023 judgment

entered against Appellee, Janico Deli Grocery, LLC, d/b/a Janico Grocery

(“Janico”), in the amount of $2,359.55, following a jury trial. We affirm.

       The trial court explained the background of this case as follows:
       On June 9, 2017, [Appellant] had a retail display fall on him when
       he was a business invitee at the store owned by [Janico]. At the
       jury trial, [Appellant] presented evidence that his neck, head,
       spine[,] and shoulder rotator cuff were injured as a result of the
       incident. [Janico] presented evidence that only the injuries
       complained of by [Appellant] and treated at the hospital
       emergency room three days later were caused by the incident.
       The jury limited [Appellant’s] damages to the medical costs
       related to the hospital emergency room treatment in the amount
       of $2,359.55[,] and did not award any non-economic damages.

       [Appellant] filed a [m]otion for [p]ost-[t]rial [r]elief for a new trial
       on the issues concerning damages because[, inter alia,] the jury
____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S24003-23

       did not award any damages for pain and suffering.         After
       consideration of the evidence presented at trial and the
       memoranda filed by counsel, this court denied [Appellant’s]
       motion. [Appellant] filed a timely appeal [from the subsequent
       judgment that was entered].[1]

Trial Court Opinion (“TCO”), 3/6/23, at 1-2.

       On appeal, Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
       [1]. Whether the trial court erred in denying [Appellant’s] motion
       for post-trial relief in the form of a new trial on the issue of
       damages because the jury’s verdict made no award of pain and
       suffering damages[,] despite the fact that [Janico’s] expert
       witness acknowledged that [Appellant] suffered at least a head
       contusion, hematoma, post-concussion syndrome and neck
       strain[,] and it thus was undisputed that [Appellant] had sustained
       at least some painful injuries.

       [2.] Whether the trial court erred in denying [Appellant’s] motion
       for post-trial relief in the form of a new trial on the issue of
       damages because the jury’s award of $2[,]359.55 for past medical
       bills was based on defense counsel’s improper closing argument
       regarding [Appellant’s] emergency room bill, which was not part
       of [Appellant’s] claim for past medical bills and thus not supported
       by the record evidence.

       [3.] Whether the trial court erred in denying [Appellant’s] motion
       for post-trial relief in the form of a new trial on the issue of
       damages because [Appellant’s] claim for loss of earning capacity
       was improperly excluded from the jury’s consideration based on
       defense counsel’s argument that [Appellant] had failed to produce
       his tax returns in discovery.

       [4.] Whether the trial court erred in denying [Appellant’s] motion
       for post-trial relief in the form of a new trial on the issue of
       damages because the fact that [Appellant] had not sustained a
       past earnings loss did not preclude him from a loss of earning
       capacity claim.

____________________________________________

1 Appellant also timely complied with the trial court’s order to file a concise

statement pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and the trial court thereafter issued
a Rule 1925(a) opinion.

                                           -2-
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      [5.] Whether the trial court erred in denying [Appellant’s] motion
      for post-trial relief in the form of a new trial on the issue of
      damages, and also erred in denying [Appellant’s] earlier motion
      for mistrial, because the court’s two-day delay in ruling on the loss
      of earning capacity claim, and the court’s subsequent ruling to
      exclude that claim and corresponding instructions[,] harmed
      [Appellant’s] credibility in the eyes of the jury, causing [Appellant]
      to be severely prejudiced.

Appellant’s Brief at 3-4 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

                                        I.

      In Appellant’s first issue, he argues that the trial court erred in denying

him a new trial on the issue of damages “because the jury’s verdict made no

award of pain and suffering damages despite the fact that [Janico’s] expert

witness acknowledged that [Appellant] suffered at least a head contusion,

hematoma, post-concussion syndrome and neck strain[,] and it thus was

undisputed that [Appellant] had sustained at least some painful injuries.” Id.

at 20 (emphasis omitted). We disagree that the trial court erred on this basis.

      Our Supreme Court has previously recognized that,
      [i]t is well settled that in reviewing an order to grant a new trial
      our standard of review is limited to determining whether the trial
      court abused its discretion or committed an error of law. A trial
      court may only grant a new trial when the jury’s verdict is so
      contrary to the evidence that it shocks one’s sense of justice.

Neison v. Hines, 653 A.2d 634, 636 (Pa. 1995) (cleaned up).

      Here, the trial court explained why it denied Appellant a new trial due

to the jury’s failure to award pain and suffering damages, as follows:
      In the case sub judice, [Appellant] did not seek immediate medical
      treatment for his injuries; instead, he received treatment at a
      hospital’s emergency room three days after the incident. [Janico]
      admitted that the retail display fell onto [Appellant], causing the
      head injury, which was treated at the hospital, but [Janico]

                                      -3-
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      vigorously denied [Appellant’s] claims that his spine and shoulder
      rotator cuff were also injured as a result of the incident. The jury
      evidently found [Appellant’s] arguments valid because it assessed
      negligence and causation but limited [Appellant’s] recovery to the
      amount of the bill for the emergency room services.

      The jury may have disbelieved [Appellant’s] version of the injuries
      that he received. [Appellant] demonstrated agility that was free
      from any lingering effects of pain when he demonstrated how the
      rack fell on him. Moreover, he embellished the size of the object
      that hit him by bringing into court a piece of wood that was thicker
      and longer than the actual piece of wood that struck him.
      [Appellant] only admitted these discrepancies on cross-
      examination. [Appellant] is a contractor, and the jury may have
      believed that he would have been able to supply a more correct
      replica of the plywood that struck him due to his occupation.
      [Appellant] also testified that he still goes to [Janico] to buy T-
      shirts, the same item he was buying when the accident occurred.
      The jury may have wondered why he would return to the place of
      his injury for the same thing if he had suffered from serious and
      painful injuries in purchasing that item.

      [Appellant] initiated two other lawsuits, and other injuries were
      brought out in the trial. The jury was free to believe that the
      injuries [Appellant] complained about were related to those
      lawsuits.

TCO at 3-4.

      In addition to the credibility concerns pointed out by the trial court,

Janico’s expert — Dr. David Reinhardt, an orthopedic surgeon — provided the

following video testimony, which was played for the jury at trial:
      [Janico’s counsel:] What were the conclusions that you reached
      based upon your physical examination -- medical examination of
      [Appellant]? Your review of the records that you testified to so
      far today. And then, I requested that you actually look at the films
      rather than just the MRI reports…. What are your conclusions or
      what were your conclusions after you did all of that?

      [Dr. Reinhardt:] So, in summary of everything I’ve reviewed and
      saw, [Appellant] had a head injury where plywood fell on his head

                                     -4-
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       -- had hematoma and a head injury.[2]       The records document
       that.

             The records document he had a neck strain potentially,
       based upon the [emergency room] records. But I don’t feel that
       [Appellant’s] neck herniations and the surgery he had to his neck
       are related to any traumatic event based upon the fact that the
       MRI findings are chronic and preexisting.

             And he also had rotator cuff surgery, which again, the first
       MRI did not show any rotator cuff tear. Second one did. I do not
       feel he had any injury to his right shoulder in relation to the
       incident of June 9, 2017. So the only thing I opine to that I
       feel is reasonable, he may have a neck sprain, very mild,
       which we resolved.         And he had a head contusion
       hematoma, which did resolve.

                                           ***

       [Appellant’s counsel:] Now, during your direct testimony, you said
       that as a result of the June 9 [incident], [Appellant] did suffer a
       head hematoma.

              Correct?

       [Dr. Reinhardt:] Yes.

       [Appellant’s counsel:] As well as a neck sprain.

              Correct?

____________________________________________

2 When asked to explain what a ‘hematoma’ is, Dr. Reinhardt stated:

       So a hematoma is a bruise. If you ever had something hit your
       arm and your leg, you get swelling, bruising --- it’s black and blue
       --- so that’s called a bruise or hematoma. And there’s blood
       underneath the skin when that occurs. And hematomas can be of
       different sizes. They could be small like a blood blister, or they
       could be larger.
N.T. Trial, 12/5/22-12/7/22, at 1620 (Janico’s Exhibit 12 - Testimony of Dr.
Reinhardt).

                                           -5-
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     [Dr. Reinhardt:] Yeah, the hematoma was seeing [sic] an
     [emergency room] doctor, and then the doctor also at the time
     diagnos[ed] him with a neck sprain, yes.

     [Appellant’s counsel:] How about a concussion? Did he also have
     a concussion?

     [Dr. Reinhardt:] He may have assumed he had a concussion ---
     he said that. That had to be confirmed neurologically by a
     neurologist or doctor of that such.

     [Appellant’s counsel:] So we agree that the emergency room
     diagnosed him with [a] concussion?

     [Dr. Reinhardt:] He was concerned he may have a concussion.
     Again, if I was there, I may have not said he had a concussion.

     [Appellant’s counsel:] Okay.

           And all these records that you reviewed that you testified to
     direct [sic] --- these are things that you rely upon to create your
     opinions.

           Correct?

     [Dr. Reinhardt:] That’s correct.

     [Appellant’s counsel:] All right.

            Now, you had also mentioned during the history that
     [Appellant] said he fell on his knees, and do you question that? If
     that’s true or not?

     [Dr. Reinhardt:] That’s what he told me, but all the records of his
     treating doctors, there’s no mention that he actually fell to the
     ground. Even Dr. Stempler’s records --- his treating doctor ---
     says when he got hit on the head he staggered, but there’s no
     documentation on four evaluations that he fell to the ground.

     [Appellant’s counsel:] Is that significant to you?

     [Dr. Reinhardt:] It is.

     [Appellant’s counsel:] Why?

     [Dr. Reinhardt:] Because then it would happen [sic] that it was a
     significant blow that would cause him to fall.

N.T. Trial at 1558-60, 1586-88 (emphasis added).

                                     -6-
J-S24003-23

       In awarding Appellant only the amount of the emergency room bills, the

jury seemed to accept Dr. Reinhardt’s testimony that Appellant only suffered

a mild neck sprain and a head hematoma as a result of the incident.3 This

Court has previously recognized that a jury may award zero dollars for pain

and suffering where the injuries are not significant enough to call for

compensation:
       In Majczyk v. Oesch, 789 A.2d 717 (Pa. Super. 2001), an en
       banc panel of this Court upheld a jury award of zero dollars for
       pain and suffering. The [C]ourt acknowledged that not all injuries
       are serious enough to merit compensation. The [C]ourt held that
       under the facts of that case it was not reversible error to award
       zero damages for pain and suffering. The plaintiff in Majczyk
       claimed she suffered a herniated disc in a minor accident, causing
       ongoing pain and suffering, and requiring surgery. Though both
       sides’ experts conceded that plaintiff suffered some injury in the
       accident, the jury found in favor of the defendant, whose expert
       opined the herniated disc was not caused by the accident, and
       that plaintiff’s accident-related injuries were actually less severe,
       a mere “cervical strain.”

       The Majczyk Court specifically held that the jury may find for the
       defendant despite his obvious negligence when it does not believe
       the plaintiff’s pain and suffering, or that her injury is the sort that
       is compensable. The Court quoted from Boggavarapu v. Ponist,
       … 542 A.2d 516, 518 ([Pa.] 1988), for the proposition that some
       injuries are the sort of “transient rub of life for which
____________________________________________

3 To the extent Appellant claims that he was also diagnosed with a concussion

at the emergency room, we point out that Dr. Reinhardt’s above-stated
testimony suggests that the concussion diagnosis was rendered based on
Appellant’s self-reporting. See also N.T. Trial at 320 (Janico’s counsel arguing
in closing that “when [Appellant] went to the emergency room, the records of
the emergency room say this: Likely post-concussion. Likely. Nauseous.
There are … subjected [sic] complaints from [Appellant]. That a CT scan was
unremarkable and that he had neck strain. That’s all we have from St.
Joseph’s Hospital”). As the trial court observed, the jury may have questioned
Appellant’s credibility and, therefore, the extent and seriousness of his
concussion. See TCO at 3-4.

                                           -7-
J-S24003-23

       compensation is not warranted.” The court further held that “the
       determination of what is a compensable injury is uniquely within
       the purview of the jury.” Majczyk, supra at 726. The court
       confirmed that credibility determinations lie within the province of
       the fact finder, and a jury is always free to believe all, part, some
       or none of the evidence presented. Majczyk, supra at 725–26.
       The court concluded that, based on this record, the jury properly
       found that plaintiff’s accident-related injuries were minor, causing
       only a few days or weeks of discomfort, and not the sort that
       require compensation. See also[] Davis v. Mullen, … 773 A.2d
       764 ([Pa.] 2001) (jury may decide that no pain and suffering
       damages are due, even where medical expenses are awarded).

Marsh v. Hanley, 856 A.2d 138, 139-40 (Pa. Super. 2004).4

       Here, it would have been reasonable for the jury to conclude that

Appellant’s injuries were minor and not compensable in terms of pain and

suffering. Again, Dr. Reinhardt testified that Appellant suffered only a mild

neck strain and head hematoma due to the display’s falling on him, and Dr.

Reinhardt said both injuries resolved. The jury also heard that Appellant did

not seek medical help right away and continued to patronize the store after

the incident. In addition, while Appellant repeatedly emphasizes in his brief

that Janico conceded that the display’s falling on him caused his head injury

and mild neck sprain that were treated at the emergency room, Appellant does

not develop an argument that this head injury and mild neck sprain amounted
____________________________________________

4 The Marsh Court went on to distinguish Majczyk from the facts before it

and reversed the trial court’s order denying a new trial on damages where the
jury had awarded the plaintiff zero damages for pain and suffering. See
Marsh, 856 A.2d at 140 (“[T]he instant case involved more than a minor rear
end collision. [The plaintiff’s] car was struck twice on the driver’s side. An
ambulance transported [the plaintiff] to the hospital; she suffered injuries
which required her to take medications; her symptoms did not ameliorate for
almost six months; and she lost considerable time from work. Unlike the
plaintiff in Majczyk, [the plaintiff] here suffered compensable injury….”).

                                           -8-
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to more than minor injuries, causing more than a few days or weeks of

discomfort, as was the case in Majczyk. In other words, he fails to support

— with citation to the record — his conclusory claim that the mild neck sprain

and   head    hematoma     were    significant,   painful   injuries   warranting

compensation for pain and suffering. We decline to scour the record and craft

this argument for him. See Commonwealth v. Hardy, 918 A.2d 766, 771

(Pa. Super. 2007) (“This Court will not act as counsel and will not develop

arguments on behalf of an appellant.”) (citation omitted). As such, we are

unconvinced that Appellant’s first issue warrants relief.

                                      II.

      In Appellant’s second issue, he says that the trial court denied his

request for a new trial on damages “because the jury’s award of $2[,]359.55

for past medical bills was based on defense counsel’s improper closing

argument regarding [Appellant’s] emergency room bill, which was not part of

[Appellant’s] claim for past medical bills and thus not supported by the

record.” Appellant’s Brief at 28 (emphasis omitted). No relief is due, as we

determine that Appellant has waived this issue by failing to object at trial.

      In Janico’s closing argument, Janico’s counsel stated the following, in

relevant part:
      If you find negligence, if you find notice, how are you ever
      supposed to figure out what part of the $53,000 is related to St.
      Joseph’s hospital[, i.e., where Appellant was treated in the

                                     -9-
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       emergency room]?[5] I’ve got the answer for you. It’s [Janico’s]
       Exhibit No. 2. When we were dealing with a legal issue outside
       the presence of the jury, which happens in every case, we’re
       dealing with the introduction of evidence, what’s objectionable,
       what’s permissible, what isn’t.       And exhibit, which was
       [Appellant’s] Response to [Janico’s] Request for Production of
       Documents, Defense Exhibit 2, was introduced into evidence and
       it says here:

       Falldown Summary of Special Damages. St. Joseph’s Hospital.
       Period: June 13th, 2017. $2,359.55. That’s the amount of the
       medical lien that [Appellant] would be obligated to pay back to
       the medical insurance company if you find that we are responsible,
       that my client is responsible for the damages that occurred as a
       result to the head, the concussion and the contusion. And that
       amount in this exhibit is $2,359.55.

N.T. at 326-27.

       On appeal, Appellant complains that
       the emergency room bills that [Janico’s] counsel urged the jury,
       in his closing, to award exclusively, were never offered in[to]
       evidence to support the medical expense claim nor ever
       mentioned by any witness. Indeed, the emergency room bills
       were not included in [Appellant’s] claim because no subrogation
       lien had been asserted for them. The parties stipulated that the
       medical expense claim was the amount of the UPMC/Equian lien
       statement, and all of the treatment on that statement was for
       [Appellant’s] cervical and rotator cuff injuries. Defense counsel’s
       argument asked the jury to reach a verdict based on facts contrary
       to the evidence, and as a result, the jury rendered a verdict that
       is not supported by the record evidence and must be vacated.
____________________________________________

5 Appellant says that his

       claimed medical bills were paid by UPMC Health Plan, which
       asserted a lien for $53,703.66, administered by Equian. This was
       the only evidence admitted relating to [Appellant’s] claim for past
       medical expenses, and it did not include any bills for [Appellant’s]
       initial treatment at the St. Joseph Hospital Emergency Room, as
       no lien was asserted for those bills by the insurer.

Appellant’s Brief at 7 (emphasis in original; citation omitted).

                                          - 10 -
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Appellant’s Brief at 30.

      Appellant has waived this claim. Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure

227.1(b) provides:

      (b) Except as otherwise provided by Pa.R.E. 103(a)[, relating to
      rulings on evidence], post-trial relief may not be granted unless
      the grounds therefor,

      (1) if then available, were raised in pre-trial proceedings or by
      motion, objection, point for charge, request for findings of fact or
      conclusions of law, offer of proof or other appropriate method at
      trial; and

      (2) are specified in the motion. The motion shall state how the
      grounds were asserted in pre-trial proceedings or at trial.
      Grounds not specified are deemed waived unless leave is granted
      upon cause shown to specify additional grounds.

Pa.R.Civ.P. 227.1(b) (emphasis added).

      While Appellant raised this issue in his post-trial motion, he does not

indicate — and our review of the record does not show — that Appellant made

a timely objection at trial to Jancio’s reference to the $2,359.55 emergency

room bill in its closing argument. Appellant’s lack of objection at trial violates

Rule 227.1(b). Accordingly, this claim is waived.

                                      III.

      In Appellant’s third issue, he avers that the trial court improperly

excluded his claim for loss of earning capacity from the jury’s consideration

based on defense counsel’s argument that he had failed to produce his tax

returns in discovery. Again, we disagree.

      Based on our review of the record, Appellant argued and introduced

evidence on the first day of trial about work that he can no longer do because

                                     - 11 -
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of his injuries from the incident. See, e.g., N.T. Trial at 28-30, 98-100, 130-

34. In response, defense counsel complained that he did not know until trial

started that Appellant was seeking economic damages. Id. at 39-43, 98, 130.

Defense counsel explained that he had sought discovery relating to economic

damages but received nothing in return from Appellant. Id. at 41-42. On the

beginning of the second day of trial, the trial court discussed with counsel the

discovery that had taken place in the case, setting forth the following

chronology:

      THE COURT: Okay. [Janico’s counsel], I believe you showed me
      an interrogatory where you had asked for information, lost
      earnings or wage loss.

      [Appellant’s counsel]: Your Honor, I think I gave them to you
      yesterday. We answered them. They were the exhibits.

      THE COURT: Okay. I want to make sure I have all the papers.

            Okay. I have them. Okay. I just want to get some
      chronology of this. So I guess the first thing that happened is the
      interrogatories, which I’m not sure of the date.

      [Appellant’s counsel]: If you look, Your Honor, it’s sometime in
      2018. There’s a signed verification on the back page which will
      give you the date.

      THE COURT: Okay. And then [Janico] asked: Are you claiming
      impairment of earning capacity as a result of [the] incident? And
      the answer is: Yes. And then --

      [Appellant’s counsel]: Then it follows up the next question.
      Because the next question says: If you answer the above in the
      affirmative, which we did, it then says like tell us why. And there’s
      a whole detail. We give all those answers as well, including his -
      -

      THE COURT: The point is that it is a claim for impairment of
      earning capacity.

                                     - 12 -
J-S24003-23

     [Appellant’s counsel]: Yes.

                                    ***

     THE COURT: The next notice we have, [Janico’s counsel], is the -
     - seems like there was something else before the deposition.

     [Janico’s counsel]: Court’s indulgence.

            So, Your Honor, there was [Janico’s] First Request for
     Production of Documents addressed to [Appellant,] … served on
     April 6th, 2018, and among those … was a request for No. 8: All
     documents, records and other writings, including Federal and
     State Tax returns filed by [Appellant], which may constitute
     evidence of income for [Appellant] received during 2014 through
     2017, if [Appellant] is claiming lost wages.

     [Appellant’s counsel]: Your Honor, and, again --

     THE COURT: Did you get an answer to that? …

     [Appellant’s counsel]: We did. Well, it said --

     THE COURT: Just let me wrap that up. Those --

     [Appellant’s counsel]: They’re actually, I believe, in front of you
     as well.

     THE COURT: Did you get an answer to that?

     [Janico’s counsel]: Yes, Your Honor.

     THE COURT: What was the answer?

     [Janico’s counsel]: Counsel?

     [Appellant’s counsel]: It said that we are gathering the material.
     I can read it exactly. Can we pull it out so I’m not saying -- hold
     on.

     THE COURT: Okay. And then did you get that material to him?

     [Appellant’s counsel]: We did not. Quite frankly, we forgot about
     it. But, again, that’s why --

     THE COURT: Okay.

     [Appellant’s counsel]: First of all, remember --

                                    - 13 -
J-S24003-23

     THE COURT: But let me finish first and then you can state what
     you need to state. Then --

     [Appellant’s counsel]: Here’s what our answer was. I can read it.

     THE COURT: Go ahead.

     [Appellant’s counsel]: [Appellant] is gathering tax documents and
     will supply same when they are available. [Appellant] reserves
     the right to amend and/or supplement this answer at the time of
     trial.

           We looked for --

     THE COURT: And that’s never been supplemented?

     [Appellant’s counsel]: Yeah, but we --

     THE COURT: Before you go off in other directions, let me just keep
     it --

     [Appellant’s counsel]: We never gave those documents.

     THE COURT: Okay. So then we have the deposition, which is
     2020, July 16th, 2020, where the question is: How are you
     employed?

           Self employed. Right Choice Properties.

           So do you own and manage rental properties?

           Answer: Yes.

           And then [Jancio’s counsel] says: [Appellant’s counsel], is
     there a lost wages claim here?

           And [Appellant’s counsel] says: We don’t know. We were
     discussing that. We haven’t calculated it. I will tell you this, if we
     do, we will give you an expert report and I will give you an
     opportunity to question him again.

          So -- and the bottom line is that these materials that you
     had requested were never provided, and, also, there was never
     an expert report provided. Is that correct, [Janico’s counsel]?

     [Janico’s counsel]: That’s correct, Your Honor.

     THE COURT: Okay. Now, go ahead, [Appellant’s counsel].

                                    - 14 -
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     [Appellant’s counsel]: First of all, he asked is there a lost -- we’re
     not presenting a lost wage claim. This is not a lost wage claim.

     THE COURT: But there’s a lot of evidence about what he has lost.

     [Appellant’s counsel]: Earning capacity.

     THE COURT: Right.

     [Appellant’s counsel]: So if you look at the interrogatories.

     THE COURT: Right.

     [Appellant’s counsel]: [I]t says, you know: Are you presenting a
     loss of economic claim, loss of diminished earning -- we said yes.
     Then the request for production of document says: If you’re
     submitting a lost wage claim, give us -- he didn’t say give us the
     information relating to the loss of -- they never asked us for lost
     and diminished earnings.

           Think about this. First of all, some of those documents are
     corporate documents. Yes, he controls the company. But his
     personal tax returns wouldn’t have even reflected the loss of
     earning capacity. There’s a difference.

            And, you know, words are used … based upon their
     definition. I was asked very specific questions and I answered
     those questions. And even if he thought that we should have
     given him documents that we didn’t give him, because we
     answered -- it’s not like we didn’t answer discovery, we answered
     it -- he had two years to get -- there’s no letter, he said please
     send it to us. There was no motion to follow up. Nothing.

     THE COURT: Right.

     [Appellant’s counsel]: And you can’t kind of sit on your laurels and
     say they didn’t give it to us and now come into trial and say
     preclude it. That’s why we have discovery motions and sanctions.

                                     ***

     THE COURT: Are you finished, [Appellant’s] counsel?

     [Appellant’s counsel]: If you can just -- one more thing -- take a
     look at the interrogatory -- the request for production of
     document. They’re different than the interrogatories. It said, No.
     8, which is what we answered to and said we’re trying to gather
     them.    It says: All documents, records and other writings,

                                    - 15 -
J-S24003-23

     including tax returns filed by [Appellant], which may constitute
     evidence of loss of income for [Appellant] received during 2014
     until ’17, if [Appellant] is claiming lost wages. That’s important.
     Right? Because, what he says is, One, we only want [them] if you
     claim lost wages, which we’re not. Two, evidence of income that
     was received prior to the event, prior to the cause of the injury.
     And, again, that’s where I used the analogy the other day,
     someone who’s in medical school and gets injured and can’t work,
     he can have a big loss of earnings claim --

     THE COURT: I know there’s a difference between lost earnings --
     lost wages and loss of earning capacity.

     [Appellant’s counsel]: Right. So the documents they requested
     were -- they were conditionally requested based upon us
     presenting a lost wage claim.

     THE COURT: I don’t buy that at all. That’s like saying it’s a
     technicality and … because, I mean, it’s described in different
     ways in so many places that he asked in the question for the
     interrogatories, [a]re you claiming impairment of earning
     capacity?

     [Appellant’s counsel]: We said yes. … And remember in the
     definition [sic], which was two years after that, for whatever
     reason [Janico’s counsel] chose not to question that. He could
     have very easily said, [a]re you presenting a claim for loss of
     diminished earning capacity? We would have said yes.

     THE COURT: The deposition, you promised him.

     [Appellant’s counsel]: For lost wages.

     THE COURT: … I can’t let you get away with that.           That’s just
     terrible. I mean --

     [Appellant’s counsel]: It’s not, Your Honor.

     THE COURT: … I’m not happy with that kind of technicality. We’re
     talking about the same thing … whether he’s working, it’s earning
     capacity or it’s lost wages, whatever the case may be. And then
     the bottom line is that at the deposition, which is July 16th, 2020,
     it says: I will tell you this, if we do, we will get you an expert
     report and I will give you an opportunity to question him again.

     [Appellant’s counsel]: Right, if it’s a lost wage claim.

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     THE COURT: And you have not provided any discovery. You have
     not provided any expert report. You have not provided anything
     to [Janico’s counsel]. And he is at a complete loss, a complete
     disadvantage. And now that it’s all been brought to my attention,
     the bottom line is, all this evidence, all this questioning that you
     are doing and want to continue to do[,] is about things that he
     doesn’t know anything about because it was never provided.

     [Appellant’s counsel]: Because he didn’t ask. I mean, … I’ve
     known [Janico’s counsel] for a long time, and we’ve always gotten
     along. I wasn’t doing anything to hide or trick him, okay? And if
     he would have said to me is there a loss of earning … capacity?
     Yes. We answered yes before. But there are no documents that
     we have that would support that. Because, again, the documents
     requested relate to wages.        And there’s a distinction and
     difference. You’ve got to use the words that are appropriate. And
     I answered appropriately.

     THE COURT: [Janico’s counsel]?

     [Janico’s counsel]: Judge, I think it’s a matter of semantics. As
     the [c]ourt has indicated, I walked into this courtroom with
     absolutely no concept that there was anything related to economic
     damage that would ever be presented to this jury.

           When [Appellant’s counsel] got up and gave his opening
     statement to the jury, I have to be quite frank and tell you that I
     was deeply concerned because I … knew nothing about it. I had
     asked about it. I have no documents. And he’s presented this
     evidence. I just, you know, I asked the simple question [d]o you
     have a single piece of paper to substantiate any of these claims,
     which really gets to my point. I have nothing to be able to defend.

     [Appellant’s counsel]: You know what, Your Honor, he has the
     right --

     THE COURT: That’s my point.

     [Appellant’s counsel]: -- to argue in front of a jury that the claims
     are frivolous, they are based because --

     THE COURT: That’s if you provide him the discovery.

     [Appellant’s counsel]: No, no, no.

     THE COURT: Not if you are surprising him or ambushing him. And
     that’s what we have.

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     [Appellant’s counsel]: Your Honor, he can argue that that’s an
     issue.

     THE COURT: We have an ambush or surprise.

                                     ***

     THE COURT: The point is that the purpose of discovery is to
     provide all the information that is necessary in order to prepare
     and, I mean, we talk about experts. If you’re going to have
     presentation of an expert, the defense can have the expert as
     well. But the purpose is so that there can be cross-examination.
     And now we have all this testimony about all these other wages
     so I am --

     [Appellant’s counsel]: There’s no wages.

     THE COURT: … I am constrained, certainly constrained, I am duty
     bound to notify the jury that they should disregard any evidence
     of lost wages.

     [Appellant’s counsel]: Your Honor, in that case, I ask for a mistrial,
     because I’ve spoken at length and that undermines our whole
     case.

     THE COURT: Let me finish. Any evidence of lost wages, earning
     capacity, or impairment of earning capacity. And there won’t be
     any testimony on that for the reasons I’ve stated.

     [Appellant’s counsel]: Your Honor, then that’s fine. You’ve now
     undermined my credibility with the jury and I would ask that we
     just have a mistrial. And then we can go forward, and, again, …
     I understand what you’re saying. You think it’s an ambush. That
     was not my intent. My intent was to listen to what he said and
     respond according to the words that were being used. And, as
     you said, there is a difference and a distinction between wages
     and earning capacity. He asked me about wages in the deposition.
     There are none. Yet you’re precluding us from earning capacity
     when we said in the written discovery that there is and we
     explained why there is. So now you’re not allowing it.

     THE COURT: Did you ever provide any information about … any
     lost earning capacity? You never provided any.

     [Appellant’s counsel]: He didn’t ask him.

     THE COURT: What?

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     [Appellant’s counsel]: Show me where he asked [for] information
     about loss of earning capacity. There is nowhere. The request for
     production of documents don’t [sic] ask for it. They ask for lost
     wages. They don’t ask for loss of earning capacity.

           Remember, he had those written -- he had the
     interrogatories before the deposition. For whatever reason he
     chose not to say, tell me about your answer to the request to our
     interrogatories. Says, you know, do you suffer loss of earning
     capacity? He didn’t ask any questions. It’s not my fault. You’re
     not [sic] penalizing me. We said yes[,] there is a claim for earning
     capacity. He never followed it up. Two years later[,] his
     deposition[,] all he asked was wages. He didn’t ask in the
     interrogatories are there lost wages, because we would have said
     no.

     THE COURT: [Janico’s counsel]?

     [Janico’s counsel]: I stand on my argument, Your Honor.

     THE COURT: All right.

           And I’ll deny your request for a mistrial. … I don’t know
     about the credibility, but the point is, there’s oftentimes rulings
     that prevent any further testimony regarding that. And I can
     inform them that that is not an issue before the jury at this time.

           So how would you like me to tell them?

     [Appellant’s counsel]: I wouldn’t like you to tell them at all
     because I don’t think it’s appropriate.

     THE COURT: [Janico’s counsel]?

     [Janico’s counsel]: Your Honor, I would do it just the way you said,
     that there was testimony yesterday regarding these issues to be
     disregarded.

     THE COURT: Okay.

N.T. at 137-49.

     Appellant claims that Janico had long been on notice of his lost earning

capacity claim, citing his August 2018 responses to Janico’s interrogatories.

Appellant’s Brief at 34. Moreover, he insists that — even if he had failed to

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disclose the claim in discovery — the preclusion of such evidence was an

unwarranted, drastic sanction. Id. He also maintains that Janico should have

filed a motion to compel, seeking the outstanding tax documents requested

by Janico in 2018 in its First Request for Production of Documents, but failed

to do so. Id. at 36.

      This Court has stated that “[t]he decision whether to sanction a party

for a discovery violation and the severity of such a sanction are matters vested

in the sound discretion of the trial court. We will not reverse a trial court’s

order imposing such a sanction unless the trial court abused its discretion.”

Jahanshahi v. Centura Development Co., Inc., 816 A.2d 1179, 1184 (Pa.

Super. 2003) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

      In Jahanshahi, the appellants’ damages claim included the cost of

equipment, but they failed to provide the appellee with the evidentiary basis

for this claim even though it had been requested in discovery. Id. at 1183.

As a result, the trial court excluded this evidence, and the appellants

challenged that ruling on appeal. Id. Upon review, this Court acknowledged

that the appellee had requested such discovery and opined that the appellee

needed to know the basis of the equipment costs to defend against the

appellants’ claim. Id. at 1184. As the trial court found that the appellee’s

defense was substantially prejudiced by the appellants’ failure to provide such

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discovery, we discerned no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to

exclude such evidence. Id.6

       We similarly discern no abuse of discretion here.        The trial court

reasonably found that Janico’s counsel was misled when it asked at Appellant’s

deposition in 2020 if there was a claim for lost wages, and Appellant’s counsel

represented that they did not know but, if they decided to pursue such a claim,

they would supply an expert report and permit Janico to question Appellant

again.    Appellant never supplied any further documentation, nor did his

counsel clarify that — while Appellant may not be pursuing a claim for lost

wages — he was pursuing a lost earning capacity claim.           As such, after

____________________________________________

6  Appellant cites to Anthony Biddle Contractors, Inc. v. Preet Allied
American Street, LP, 28 A.3d 916 (Pa. Super. 2011), stating that it contains
five factors courts are to consider when imposing a discovery sanction. Id. at
926 (“Mindful, of course, that each factor represents a necessary
consideration and not a necessary prerequisite, this Court has outlined the
following factors: (1) the nature and severity of the discovery violation; (2)
the defaulting party’s willfulness or bad faith; (3) prejudice to the opposing
party; (4) the ability to cure the prejudice; and (5) the importance of the
precluded evidence in light of the failure to comply.”) (citation omitted).
However, our reading of that case suggests that those factors are to be
considered when the sanction ultimately results in the termination of the
action. Id. at 926-27 (“Because the denial of Biddle’s motion for extraordinary
relief was the functional equivalent of a sanction that ultimately resulted in
the termination of the underlying action, the trial court was required to
consider the five factors…, and to balance those factors against the necessity
of the sanction.”) (citation omitted); see also id. at 926 (“[W]here a
discovery sanction either terminates the action directly or would result in its
termination by operation of law, the court must consider multiple factors
balanced against the necessity of the sanction.”) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). Here, the trial court’s exclusion of the evidence
relating to lost earning capacity did not terminate Appellant’s action and, thus,
we deem the analysis in Jahanshahi more on point.

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receiving no documentation relating to an economic claim during discovery,

the trial court determined that Janico was “ambushed” at trial when Appellant

sought to present such evidence. TCO at 7. The record supports the trial

court’s findings and, pursuant to Jahanshahi, the exclusion of such evidence

was an appropriate sanction given the substantial prejudice that would have

resulted to Janico if such evidence were introduced.

      As for Appellant’s assertion that Janico should have filed a motion to

compel Appellant to produce the tax returns that were requested in 2018, we

reject this suggestion. Appellant indicated at the deposition in 2020 that he

would provide documentation if he was pursuing a claim for lost wages.

Appellant did not take further action on this front and, therefore, Janico

reasonably assumed that there were no economic claims at issue. As such,

Janico did not need to file a motion to compel.

                                       IV.

      In Appellant’s fourth issue, he advances that the trial court erred in

denying him a new trial on the issue of damages because “the fact that

[Appellant] had not sustained a past earnings loss did not preclude him from

a loss of earning capacity claim.” Appellant’s Brief at 37 (emphasis omitted).

Appellant goes on to explain that “[t]he test for impaired earning capacity is

whether the economic horizon of the disabled person has been shortened

because of the injuries sustained as a result of the tortfeasor’s negligence[,]”

and he insists that “[a]n injured plaintiff may recover for loss of future earning

capacity whether the loss in capacity actually reduces his earnings or not.”

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Id. at 37, 37-38 (citations omitted). Here, he maintains that his “inability to

perform the strenuous physical work that he could do before his injury, and

the need to hire others to perform those duties, clearly shortened his economic

horizons, and his claim for loss of earning capacity should not have been

excluded.” Id. at 38-39.

      We are confused by this issue.           As detailed supra, the trial court

excluded Appellant’s loss of earning capacity claim due to his failure to provide

documentation relating to it during discovery, not because he had not

sustained a past earnings loss. As such, no relief is due on this basis.

                                        V.

      In Appellant’s fifth and final issue, he claims that the trial court erred in

denying his motion for a mistrial and post-trial motion because “the [c]ourt’s

two-day delay in ruling on the loss of earning capacity claim, and the [c]ourt’s

subsequent ruling to exclude that claim and corresponding instructions

harmed [Appellant’s] credibility in the eyes of the jury, causing [Appellant] to

be severely prejudiced.”    Appellant’s Brief at 39 (emphasis omitted).        His

entire argument on this issue consists of the following:
      The [t]rial [c]ourt ruled to exclude the loss of earning capacity
      claim after delaying a decision on same and allowing the jury to
      hear evidence relating to that claim during the first two days of
      trial. [Appellant] was severely prejudiced by this ruling and thus
      made an oral motion for mistrial, which the [t]rial [c]ourt denied.
      The motion for mistrial should have been granted, rather than the
      jury being instructed to disregard the evidence of lost earning
      capacity that had already been presented to them over the first
      two days of trial.

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      A trial court should grant a mistrial whenever prejudicial conduct
      or remarks deprive a party of a fair and impartial trial. Gregury
      v. Greguras, … 196 A.3d 619, 627 [(Pa. Super. 2018)].

      For the same reason, [Appellant’s] subsequent [m]otion for
      [p]ost-[t]rial [r]elief in the form of a [n]ew [t]rial on the issue of
      damages should have been granted. The jury’s verdict reflected
      the prejudice to [Appellant] caused by the [c]ourt’s two-day delay
      in ruling on the lost earning capacity claim, and its repeated,
      confusing instructions to the jury relating to that claim. A new
      trial is warranted when a [c]ourt’s error results in prejudice to a
      party. Potochnick v. Perry, 861 A.2d 277, 281 [(Pa. Super.
      2004)].

Appellant’s Brief at 39-40 (internal citations to reproduced record omitted).

See also Appellant’s Reply Brief at 7 (arguing that the trial court’s confusing

instructions following two days of testimony on the earning capacity claim

“damaged [Appellant’s] credibility in the eyes of the jury and undoubtedly

influenced the verdict”).

      No relief is due. Initially, our review of the record shows that the trial

court ruled to exclude the evidence on the beginning of the second day of trial.

Thus, we consider Appellant’s argument that the jury heard evidence relating

to earning capacity during the first two-days of trial to be inaccurate.

Moreover, Appellant’s cursory argument fails to convince us that the trial

court’s instructions to the jury to disregard such evidence were inappropriate.

See N.T. Trial at 157 (the trial court’s instructing the jury: “You recall

yesterday we went back and forth on what was labeled as economic damages.

And I said, well, that has to be looked at and this has to be looked at. So

everything has been looked at now and so my instructions to you is [sic] to

disregard any evidence of lost wages, earning capacity, impairment of earning

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capacity. That is not an issue in this case, in [Appellant’s] case.”); id. at 336

(the trial court’s instructing the jury: “Members of the jury, reference was

made to the loss of earnings, lost income, that it was exaggerated. … I made

the ruling not because of it being exaggerated, I made a ruling for my reasons,

which you don’t need to know that, but it was not because it was exaggerated

or not exaggerated. So you should disregard that. And how I feel about lost

earnings or lost income has nothing at all to do with this. I made a ruling

based on what has happened so far as the proceedings in this case [sic] and

as far as the law is concerned. So -- and you’ll still have an opportunity to,

of course, address that and you’ll do that now.”); id. at 370 (the trial court’s

instructing the jury: “[J]ust to remind you again that the example of a … job

description, applying for a job for 35 years, whatever, just so you’re not

thinking that economic damages compensation for lost wages or earning

capacity is an issue in the case. It’s not an issue in the case, so I’ll just say it

one more time--”). Appellant complains about the trial court’s instructions

but does not provide a reasoned analysis on why they were insufficient,

confusing, or undermining of his credibility.       We, once again, decline to

develop this argument for him. See Hardy, supra.

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     Judgment affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 9/27/2023

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