Court Opinion

ID: 9638297
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 15:40:01.866318+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:05.374482
License: Public Domain

McDONALD, Chief Justice
(dissenting).

This opinion (other than minor clianges made necessary in transforming it into a dissent) was initially prepared to be the opinion of the court in this easel

This appeal is from a judgment favorable to appellee, as plaintiff, in an action under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 51.
■Appellee, a locomotive engineer employed more than 31 years by appellant Railway Company, was injured on 3 August,' 1951, when he fell backward while crossing the outbound engine house tracks in the Ennis, Texa’s, yards of appellant, striking his back on the steel rail of the track. At the time of his injury appellee was performing his work as an engineer oiling the engine he was to operate that day.
Both appellee and appellant were engaged in interstate commerce as defined by the Federal Employers’ Liability Act.
Appellee brought his suit, alleging that the appellant was negligent in failing to provide a safe place for him to work under the circumstances in that appellant: 1) failed to fill up with gravel or shell the area around the tracks to a safe depth at least covering all of the ties and area between the walkway on either side of the tracks; 2) failed to warn appellee of the existence of oil and grease upon the tracks, ties and surrounding area where he was required to work; 3) failed to keep the ties, rails and tracks of the outbound engine house tracks where plaintiff was required to work free of all grease and other foreign substance; 4) .permitted oil and grease to drop upon the ends of ties on said tracks, when the same would become hidden _ by dust and sand and not discernible to the eye of a person of ordinary prudence .acting in the exercise of ordinary care.
Defendant answered by general denial; a plea of unavoidable accident; specific allegations of contributory negligdnce,;- the exercise of ordinary care on its part; and the lack of knowledge of the existence of oil and grease on the tracks.
*593Trial was to a jury, which found, in response to special issues submitted: 1) that appellee sustained injuries while working' for appellant; 2) that appellant failed to provide a reasonably safe place for ap-pellee to work on the occasion in question; 3) that such failure was negligence and was a proximate cause of appellee’s injuries; 4) that the appellant permitted oil and grease to drop on the ends of ties in and around the outbound engine house tracks prior to August 3, 1951; 5) that such action was negligence and' a proximate cause of appellee’s injuries; 6) that appellant failed to keep the ties and tracks free of all grease and water; 7) that such action was negligence and was a proximate cause of appellee’s injuries; 8) that appellant failed to fill the space between the ties, walkway and tracks to make such place reasonably safe to walk on; 9) that such failure was negligence and a proximate cause of appellee’s injuries. 10) The jury awarded appellee $57,971 for his injuries. All issues on contributory negligence and unavoidable accident were resolved by the jury against the appellant.
Appellant made Motion for New Trial, which was overruled, and now appeals to this court on 32 Points of Error, but which present only five basic contentions for determination by this court, to-wit: 1) that there is no evidence of any negligent act or omission proximately causing appellee’s injuries; 2) that the Special Issues are in the nature of a general charge and are repetitious; 3) that evidence of safety history in the past was improperly refused admission; 4) that evidence of Federal Income tax withholdings on appellee’s salary was improperly refused admission; 5) that the verdict of the jury is excessive.
Points 1 through 25 present appellant’s primary contention that there is no evidence of any negligent -act or omission .proximately Scausing plaintiff’s injuries,
' Appellant contends that the presence 'of oil, water and grease on the outbound tracks at the Ennis yards is a condition which is just incidental to railroading; which is not preventable; and that the law does not require a railway to use more than reasonable care to clean up such condition. There is no eyewitness testimony as to how the particular piece of grease upon which appellee slipped got on the track, but all witnesses agree that it was probably thrown from • an engine which had been greased. The testimony reflected that it is necessary to lubricate the engines and that it is inevitable that some of the grease will -be forced out of the engine, and would drop off during its operation.
Appellant contends that since appellee testified that he slipped on a certain piece of greáse, that the issues submitted and findings made by the jury are too broad and should have been confined to negligence for .permitting this certain piece'of Alemite grease to fall on the track. Appellant contends that the squeezing out of the Alemite grease from locomotives is continuous — is incidental to railroading — and that the appellant could have done nothing short of quitting business as a railway to prevent the piece of grease upon which appellee stepped from falling from some locomotive onto the track. It is further contended that there is no evidence to justify a jury finding that defendant was negligent in allowing the grease to fall upon the end of the tie, and that there is no evidence to show that the Alemite grease had been on the track long enough for appellant to discover and remove the same, in order for it to be guilty of negligence.
This is a “Master and Servant” case brought under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act. A review of- the evidence reflects that on 3 August 1951 appellee was readying appellant’s engine for a run. In order to oil the engine he had to cross the tracks to the rear of the engine. He picked his way across a tie, stepping on the dry places that. were free of oil and grease. When he stepped on the end of a .tie his feet went out from under him and he fell, striking his back on the steel rail. The tracks were covered with oil, water and grease, mud and slush. ' Employees jh'ad to pick their way across the track by walking on what appeared to be dry spots. The ..appellant, through its Superintendent -and *594Master Mechanic, had known of the condition long prior to appellee’s injury. Oil got on the tracks by discharge of oil in engines being readied, and by fuel oil tank overflow when they were being filled. Grease was put on the tracks and ties by dropping off engines that had been greased with pressure guns at the round house. Defendant’s employees would put too much grease in the fittings, causing grease to squirt out of the joints which later dropped off. The excess grease could have been wiped off before the engines left the round house, which was not done. The space between the ties was seldom cleaned up. Only one man did any work on this track and he only filled holes along with doing his other work of walking 20 or 30 miles of track daily. The area between the walkway and between the ties could have been concreted to give better footing. The area could have been improved by placing fresh sand and gravel on the tracks. This was done infrequently. Grease that fell from the engines could have been removed after each engine departed. Several years previously a man had been assigned to constantly clean up the area. It was much better then.
Section 51, Title 45 of the United States Code, as amended 11 August 1939, 45 U.S. C.A. § 51, provides: “Every common carrier by railroad while engaging in commerce between any of the several States, * * * shall be liable in damages to any person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier in such commerce * * * for such injury * * * resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees of such carrier, or by reason of any defect or insufficiency, due to its negligence in its * * * track, roadbed, * * * or other equipment.”
Appellee comes squarely within this statute which places the duty on the appellant to furnish appellee a safe place to work with respect to its tracks and right of way, where performance of duty necessitates his use thereof.
Owing appellee the duty of providing it safe place to work required appellant to exercise ordinary care to see that the oil, water and grease would not remain as a hazard. It required appellant to keep the space between the ties filled up so that it could be walked on safely. To fail to do so would be negligence. If the area had been in good condition appellee would not have been required to walk on the ties and would not have fallen on the grease. The evidence clearly showed that the ties and track could have been kept free of oil and grease. It had previously been so kept during the time when a Mr. Prince was round house foreman. The engines could have been wiped to prevent dropping of grease; additional sand spread; and steam and water washes employed. I believe that the jury’s findings are more than amply supported by the evidence, and more especially in view of the written warnings that had been sent to appellant’s Superintendent and Master Mechanic.
In an appeal from a judgment favorable to an injured employee under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, if the employee’s allegations of negligence are supported by any substantial evidence when considered in the light most favorable to the employee — and together with all inferences which may reasonably be drawn therefrom —then an appellate court should not reverse the case. See Waddell v. Chicago & E. I. R. Co., 7 Cir., 142 F.2d 309.
The Waddell case, supra, affirmed recovery for an injured employee of the railway under Federal Employers’ Liability Act where the injuries were sustained when a motor car was derailed at a crossing because the space between the planking and the rails at a highway crossing became filled up with rocks, dirt, etc. The 7th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals held that the above facts constituted a failure to provide the employee a safe place to work as required by the Act.
In an action by an injured employee brought under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, the 8th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals held in determining the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding of negligence, that since the jury in the trial court *595found for the plaintiff, all conflicts in the evidence must be resolved against the defendant — and that the plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of such favorable inferences as the jury might reasonably have drawn therefrom. In that case the court held that a railway crossing plank which protruded above the ground, and over which a switchman tripped and fell, causing injuries, constituted a “defect” in the railway premises within the meaning of the Act which required the railway to provide a safe place for switchman to perform his duties. Chicago, Great Western Ry. Co. v. Peeler, 140 F.2d 865.
The 3rd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, in a case brought under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, wherein an employee was injured as the result of tripping on a protruding metal plate placed over the track to make a solid crossing, held that it was the duty of the railroad under the Act to maintain its tracks in a safe condition where employees were required to cross the tracks. The court reversed a directed verdict for defendant, and said that under the facts, it was a question for the jury as to whether defendant be guilty of negligence and liable for the employee’s injuries. Shiffler v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 176 F.2d 368.
The 4th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, in passing on the case of an injured brakeman, brought under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, said that liability is not dependent upon a prevision of the precise event, and that it is sufficient if some injury may be reasonably expected unless precaution is taken. The court then stated that it was proper for the trial judge to submit to the jury the question whether the defendant railway had performed the duty of exercising reasonable care to furnish the plaintiff employee a reasonably safe place to work. Virginian Ry. Co. v. Staton, 84 F.2d 133.
Applying the rules announced by the authorities cited to the evidence in the case at bar, I come to the inescapable conclusion that there is not only ample, but abundant evidence of negligence supporting each of the findings of the jury; and it is submitted that appellant’s Points of Error 1 through 25 should be overruled.
In Points of Error 26 through 29 appellant complains of Special Issues 2 through 13 submitted by the Trial Court, and contends that they were all in the nature of a general charge, did not confine- the jury to the time, place, and circumstances of plaintiff’s, accident, allowed the jury to speculate, and that all four basic issues actually constituted one ground of recovery.
With appellant’s contentions I cannot agree. Appellant failed to raise the matters complained of in the above Points in its Motion for New Trial in the Trial Court. Further, the only issue submitted that could possibly be in the nature of a general charge is No. 2. Should that be true, the same is rendered harmless in view of the other and distinct separate findings of negligence on which the Trial Court correctly rendered judgment. See Rule 434, T.R.C.P.; Dofner v. Branard, Tex.Civ.App., 236 S.W.2d 544. Special Issues 5, 8 and 11 were pleaded by appellee and each is supported by ample evidence. I do not believe that appellee has cast his whole cause of action on the failure of defendant to remove one piece of Alemite grease. However, if that position be taken — which I think it cannot — the findings of the jury and the evidence still are ample and sufficient to uphold the judgment. The piece of Alemite grease was only one of many circumstances that led to appellee’s fall and injuries, which were pleaded as specific elements of negligence and separately .submitted.
The majority opinion, 263 S.W.2d on page 586 et seq., cites J. R. Watkins Co. v. King, Tex.Civ.App., 83 S.W.2d 405, and other cases to the effect that a litigant having admitted positive facts which, if true, would defeat his right to recover, is conclusively bound by such admission.
Mr. Pool didn’t testify to something which would defeat his right of recovery. He testified, as best he could, as to how the - accident happened. He said that he slipped. *596He said that after he had slipped, when he looked around he discovered the thing upon which he slipped, which was a piece of grease three inches long, etc.,' covered by dust. ■ It would follow that this testimony supports the findings of the jury.
Why, certainly Mr. Pool slipped on one certain piece of grease. For him to have slipped at all he had to slip on some specific something. In this case it was one piece of grease. If there were many pieces of grease in and about the area and Mr. Pool slipped, he had to slip on some certain one, unless they were close enough together that his foot could cover more than one piece of grease. He had to slip on one piece of grease, and that is just what he did. He slipped on the one he testified about. The fact that he slipped on one piece of grease certainly cannot be said to not be one of the pieces of grease found by the jury in answer to the special issues to have been permitted by the railroad to be on the track.
The majority opinion in this case cites Hopson v. Gulf Oil Corporation, 150 Tex. 1, 237 S.W.2d 352, 353, as authority for reversing this case. It seems to rely on the Hopson case as authority for the proposition that the court should have charged on the specific piece of grease that Pool slipped on, and then given an issue inquiring as to whether or not this specific grease had been on the track long enough for the railroad, in the exercise of reasonable care, to have discovered and removed it. The majority opinion, of course, ties Mr. Pool down to this one piece of grease, by holding that under J. R. Watkins Co. v. King, supra, since he testified that he slipped on a certain piece of grease, that he was conclusively bound for all purposes to this one particular piece of grease.
On careful reading of the Hopson case it is evident that it does not support the majority opinion, but to the contrary, actually supports the view set forth in this dissent.
The Hopson case does require the submission of an issue inquiring whether or not the specific piece of grease that Hopson slipped on had been on the deck for a-sufficient length of time to have been, in the exercise of ordinary care, discovered and removed; but there are two important differences ¡between the Hopson case and the case at bar, as pointed out by the court in the Hopson case on pages 357 and 358 ■of 237 S.W.2d, viz.: 1) In the Hopson case there was no evidence whatsoever that the defendant knew that the grease was on the deck. In the case at bar the-defendant railroad knew that oil and grease were on the ends of the ties because the evidence reflects that there were at least 4 letters written to the railroad telling them of this condition. Knowing of the existence of the hazard involved, it was certainly not necessary that a special issue be submitted inquiring as to whether or not the grease had been on the tie ends long enough to have been discovered and removed. 2) Further, in the Hopson case there was no evidence whatsoever of the unsafe condition, other than the specific piece of grease upon which Hopson slipped. In the case at bar, taking away the specific grease upon which Pool slipped, there is abundant evidence to the effect that the premises were not a safe place in which to work.
Since, in the case at bar, we have the two important elements not present in the Hopson case, to-wit: 1) that the defendant knew of the existence of the hazard which caused the injury; and 2) there was much evidence of an unsafe condition in the area other than the specific piece of grease upon which Pool slipped, it is submitted that the Hopson case supports the 'contentions of this dissenting opinion.
The case at bar arose from a condition and situation of long standing — about which there is no controversy whatsoever as to notice to the appellant of the existence thereof. According to the reasoning of the majority opinion — a defendant in a criminal case charged with murder by shooting the deceased with a shotgun, should be acquitted, if the State could not prove which pellet from the blast of the shotgun hit the deceased. Of course that is nonsense. It is hypertechnical to say that under the record in the case at bar *597that Pool should be required to prove notice as to a specific piece of grease. Under the record in this case the appellant had abundant notice of the condition (including the. specific piece of grease) which caused the appellee’s injury.
It is submitted that Points of Error 26 through 29 should be overruled.
Point of Error 30 is levelled at the refusal of the Trial Court to admit testimony that a witness had observed activities around the scene of the accident for more than 20 years, and had never seen or heard of any person getting injured.
It is my view that evidence of lack of previous accidents to show absence of negligence, or to prove a safe condition, is inadmissible. See Texas & N. O. Ry. Co. v. McNeill, Tex.Civ.App., 270 S.W. 1038. It is submitted that Point of Error 30 should be overruled.
Point of Error 31 complains of the refusal of the Trial Court to permit appellant railway to introduce evidence of Federal Income Tax deductions withheld from ap-pellee’s salary, in rebuttal to appellee’s evidence of gross salary, on the issue of damages.
It is my view that as withholdings do not reflect the actual tax an employee must pay; since refunds are obtained because of differing numbers of dependents, losses incurred, contributions made and expenses allowed; that the evidence is too speculative and conjectural to be admissible. See Southern Pacific Co. v. Guthrie, 9 Cir., 186 F.2d 926; Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Curl, 8 Cir., 178 F.2d 497; Stokes v. United States, 2 Cir., 144 F.2d 82. Further, there is no more reason to admit evidence of tax withholdings than there would be to admit evidence that the employee was a tither and paid out 10% of his salary to his Church — or that he had certain other fixed expenses which would render his net or take home salary much lower.
The justice of the rule is, that damages wrought by a wrongdoer are measured by the whole loss. The party injured is entitled to recover for all the loss inflicted, and the wrongdoer may not take advantage of income tax withholdings, Church tithes, or any other relation that may exist between the injured party and some third party. See Majestic v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 6 Cir., 147 F.2d 621. It is submitted that Point of Error 31 should be overruled.
Appellant’s 32d and last Point of Error complains that the sum of $57,971 awarded as fair compensation for injuries sustained by the appellee is so manifestly excessive as to indicate improper motive on the part of the jury.
It is my view that appellant’s Point is too general and does not specify on what . basis the jury engaged in improper motives , in .rendering the award that it did, and for such .reason should .be overruled. See Collins v. Smith, 142 Tex. 36, 175 S.W.2d 407; Texas Interurban Ry. v. Hughes, Tex.Com.App., 53 S.W.2d 448.
Further to the above, however, I feel that the evidence amply supports the award. The evidence, briefly, reflects that appellee earned $5,493.85 in 1950; the injury occurred 3 August 1951 and for the first 7 months of 1951 he earned $4,299.05. Because of seniority and the introduction of Diesel locomotives, his future earnings would be more. He cannot work as an engineer in the future. Taking his loss of earnings at $600 per month for the 12 expected remaining years of his life and discounting same at 3%, his loss of earnings alone would be $64,577.12. The jury was instructed that pain and mental anguish were proper elements for them to consider in answering the damage issue. In view of the evidence, I cannot say that the award is excessive or that it indicates improper motives. See Thompson v. Brown, Tex.Civ.App., 222 S.W.2d 442, and cases there cited.
■ It is submitted that Point 32 should be overruled.
Finding no reversible error, it is my earnest conviction that the judgment of the Trial Court should be affirmed, for which reason I respectfully dissent.