Court Opinion

ID: 2963909
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:17:18.762543+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:48.359223
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USCA1 Opinion

	

                            United States Court of Appeals
                            United States Court of Appeals
                                For the First Circuit
                                For the First Circuit
                                 ____________________

        No. 95-1898

                                    UNITED STATES,

                                      Appellee,

                                          v.

                     JOHN LEONARD ECKER, A/K/A LEONARD HOFFECKER,

                                Defendant, Appellant.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                     [Hon. Robert E. Keeton, U.S. District Judge]
                                             ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                 Selya, Circuit Judge,
                                        _____________
                            Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                    ____________________
                              and Stahl, Circuit Judge.
                                         _____________

                                 ____________________

            Robert D. Richman, Assistant Federal Public Defender  (Minnesota),
            _________________
        with  whom   Scott  F.  Tilsen,  Assistant   Federal  Public  Defender
                     _________________
        (Minnesota),   and   Owen   S.   Walker,   Federal   Public   Defender
                             __________________
        (Massachusetts), were on brief for appellant.
            Mary Elizabeth  Carmody,  Assistant United  States Attorney,  with
            _______________________
        whom  Donald  K.  Stern, United  States  Attorney,  was  on brief  for
              _________________
        appellee.

                                 ____________________

                                    March 8, 1996
                                 ____________________

                      STAHL, Circuit Judge.  Appellant John L. Ecker asks
                      STAHL, Circuit Judge.
                             _____________

            us  to rule that the  federal indictment against  him must be

            dismissed  because he  has  been found  incompetent to  stand

            trial and, having been found dangerous, has been indefinitely

            committed  to federal  custody.   The  district court  denied

            Ecker's  motion to  dismiss the  indictment.   Ecker appeals.

            Because neither the relevant statutes nor caselaw require the

            dismissal of the indictment, we affirm.

                                          I.
                                          I.
                                          __

                                      BACKGROUND
                                      BACKGROUND
                                      __________

                      In   November  1989,  Ecker  was  indicted  in  the

            District of  Massachusetts for possession  of a firearm  by a

            felon in violation  of 18 U.S.C.   922(g).   Ecker has  prior

            convictions for  assault with  a weapon, arson,  breaking and

            entering, and burglary, and is therefore subject to the Armed

            Career  Criminal Act,  18 U.S.C.    924(e); if  convicted, he

            faces  a  mandatory minimum  prison  term  of fifteen  years.

            After federal authorities  found that Ecker's  mental illness

            rendered him incompetent to stand trial  and dangerous to the

            public, he  was  committed to  the  custody of  the  Attorney

            General  for hospitalization  under 18  U.S.C.    4246.   Now

            Ecker seeks to dismiss the indictment charging him as a felon

            in possession.

            A.  Ecker's History in Federal Psychiatric Facilities
            _____________________________________________________

                                         -2-
                                          2

                      Ecker's history in  federal psychiatric  facilities

            is  long and twisted;  full detail is  unnecessary to resolve

            the  issue before  us, so  we summarize.   From  January 1990

            through March  1993,  federal  authorities,  pursuant  to  18

            U.S.C.   4241(d), conducted  seven competency evaluations  of

            Ecker.  After five of these, Ecker was found incompetent, and

            on  two occasions he was found competent.  Authorities at one

            point reported that  Ecker "displayed excellent knowledge  of

            the federal mental health statutes," and concerns were raised

            that  his  mental  health  problems were  of  a  questionable

            nature.     In  March  1993,  federal  authorities  concluded

            "finally"  that Ecker was not competent for trial and that it

            was unlikely  that he  would  regain competency  in the  near

            future.

                      The United States  District Court for the  District

            of Massachusetts, where the  indictment was (and is) pending,

            determined that there was no likelihood of  trial and ordered

            the Federal  Medical Center  in  Rochester, Minnesota  ("FMC-

            Rochester"),  to  determine  if   Ecker  was  dangerous   and

            therefore subject to indefinite  commitment under 18 U.S.C.  

            4246.     The  director  of  FMC-Rochester   did  find  Ecker

            dangerous, and the United States Attorney for the District of

            Minnesota  accordingly  instituted commitment  proceedings in

            the  United  States  District   Court  for  the  District  of

            Minnesota.   In  October 1993,  the Minnesota  district court

                                         -3-
                                          3

            ordered  Ecker  committed  to  the custody  of  the  Attorney

            General  under section 4246, and the Court of Appeals for the

            Eighth Circuit  affirmed.   United States  v. Ecker,  30 F.3d
                                        _____________     _____

            966, 971 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 679 (1994).
                                 _____ ______

                      In October  1994, the staff at  the Federal Medical

            Center  in  Springfield, Missouri  ("FMC-Springfield"), where

            Ecker  is currently  in custody,  filed an  annual  report of

            Ecker's mental condition as required by 18  U.S.C.   4247(e).

            The report  stated that Ecker  was "generally able  to answer

            the  panel's  questions in  a  logical,  coherent, and  goal-

            directed manner."  It went on, however, to conclude that "Mr.

            Ecker  is  currently a  substantial  risk  to others  or  the

            property  of  others  due  to  mental  illness."    The civil

            commitment  statute,  18  U.S.C.     4246,  requires  Federal

            authorities   to   place  Ecker   in  an   appropriate  state

            institution  in his home  state, Massachusetts,  if possible.

            Officials  at  FMC-Springfield,   however,  determined   that

            Massachusetts would  not accept Ecker in  a state institution

            because of the  pendency of  the federal  indictment.   Thus,

            Ecker remains hospitalized at FMC-Springfield.

            B.  The District Court Order on Ecker's Motion to Dismiss
            _________________________________________________________

                      In the district  court, Ecker advanced two  grounds

            for dismissal  of the indictment.   First, he  contended that

            the statute under which  he was committed, 18 U.S.C.    4246,

            requires,  upon commitment, dismissal of pending charges upon

                                         -4-
                                          4

            commitment.  Second,  he asserted  that the  pendency of  the

            indictment interfered  with his purported right  to be placed

            in a state institution, depriving Ecker of his constitutional

            right to due process.  

                      The district court denied Ecker's motion to dismiss

            the indictment,  holding that the commitment  statute did not

            require dismissal  of the indictment, finding  no support for

            Ecker's  statutory  argument in  the statute's  language, its

            legislative history,  or in caselaw.  The court also rejected

            Ecker's due  process argument, concluding  that "the  statute

            cannot be fairly read to confer a liberty interest, protected

            by  the  Due Process  Clause of  the  Fifth Amendment  of the

            United  States Constitution,  in being  committed to  a state

            institution rather  than a `suitable facility'  chosen by the

            Attorney General."

            C.  Ecker's Appeal
            __________________

                      Ecker  appeals the  district court's  order denying

            his  motion to  dismiss  the indictment,  advancing only  the

            statutory argument that  18 U.S.C.     4241 and 4246  require

            dismissal.   Ecker has  abandoned the argument  he made below

            that the pendency of the  indictment violates his due process

            rights.   See United States v.  Zannino, 895 F.2d 1,  17 (1st
                      ___ _____________     _______

            Cir.)  (arguments  not  raised  squarely  are waived),  cert.
                                                                    _____

            denied, 494 U.S. 1082 (1990).
            ______

                                         -5-
                                          5

                                         II.
                                         II.
                                         ___

                                      DISCUSSION
                                      DISCUSSION
                                      __________

                      A  district court's  resolution  of a  question  of

            statutory  interpretation  engenders de  novo  review in  the
                                                 __  ____

            court  of appeals.  Riva v. Massachusetts, 61 F.3d 1003, 1007
                                ____    _____________

            (1st Cir. 1995).

                      Ecker, at  the outset, concedes that  "[n]either 18

            U.S.C.   42411 nor  18 U.S.C.   42462 addresses  what happens

                                
            ____________________

            1.  Section  4241  provides  procedures for  evaluation  of a
            defendant's competency  to stand trial.   If the  court finds
            the  defendant incompetent  after an  psychiatric examination
            and a hearing, the court commits the defendant to the custody
            of  the   Attorney  General.    The   Attorney  General  then
            hospitalizes  the  defendant  for   up  to  four  months  "to
            determine whether there is  a substantial probability that in
            the foreseeable future he will attain the  capacity to permit
            the  trial  to  proceed."    The  Attorney  General  may also
            hospitalize the defendant for an "additional reasonable time"
            beyond  four   months  if  the  court   finds  a  substantial
            probability  that  competency  will  be  regained.    If  the
            defendant  remains  incompetent  at  the end  of  those  time
            periods,  the  defendant   is  subject   to  commitment   for
            dangerousness  under  18 U.S.C.     4246.   If  not committed
            thereunder, the defendant is released.  
                      Section 4241 makes no  reference to the pendency or
            dismissal of the indictment.

            2.  Section   4246   provides   for   the    commitment   and
            hospitalization  of  a dangerous  person  "whose  sentence is
            about to expire,  or who has been committed to the custody of
            the Attorney  General pursuant to section  4241(d) [i.e., due
            to incompetency to stand trial], or against whom all criminal
            charges have been dismissed solely for reasons related to the
            mental  condition  of the  person."    Upon certification  of
            dangerousness by  the director of the  hospital facility, the
            court  conducts a hearing, and shall commit to the custody of
            the Attorney General a  person "suffering from mental disease
            or  defect as a  result of which  his release  would create a
            substantial  risk  of  bodily  injury to  another  person  or
            serious damage to  property of another."  Such  commitment is
            of indefinite  duration, but  the Attorney General  must make

                                         -6-
                                          6

            to a pending indictment when a  defendant is determined under

            section  4241 to be incompetent to stand trial and is subject

            to indefinite  civil commitment  under section 4246."3   That

            concession  is  virtually dispositive  of  Ecker's appeal  --

            there  is nothing  in  the statute's  language that  requires

            dismissal of a pending indictment.  The statutory  silence is

            not surprising.   Congress, we have little doubt, intended to

            leave the  decision about the disposition  of pending charges

            to the case-by-case discretion of the prosecutors.

            A.  Ecker's Arguments
            _____________________

                      Although  conceding  that  the  statute  is silent,

            Ecker  argues that  the structure  of the  relevant statutes,

            their  legislative  history,  and   the  caselaw  compel  the

            conclusion that  Congress intended to require  dismissal of a

            pending indictment upon commitment.  We disagree, and address

            each of  Ecker's arguments  in turn,  explaining why we  find

            them unpersuasive.

                                
            ____________________

            reasonable  efforts place the person in  the custody and care
            of the state in which the person is domiciled.
                      Although  section  4246  recognizes  that  criminal
            charges  may  be  dismissed  because  of  a  person's  mental
            illness, there  is  nothing in  the language  of the  statute
            requiring such dismissal.

            3.  Nor do the statutes address the  pendency or dismissal of
            an  indictment of  a  defendant  found long-term  incompetent
            under  section 4241,  but not  found dangerous  under section
            4246.

                                         -7-
                                          7

                      First, Ecker asserts that section 4246 applies only
                      

            to individuals "who no longer realistically can be considered

            to be awaiting  trial because there is  little possibility of

            their  regaining  competency,"   quoting  United  States   v.
                                                      ______________

            Charters, 829 F.2d  479, 485 (4th Cir.  1987) (not addressing
            ________

            dismissal  of  indictment), reh'g,  863  F.2d  302 (4th  Cir.
                                        _____

            1988),  cert.  denied, 494  U.S.  1016  (1990).    From  that
                    _____  ______

            premise, Ecker concludes that "Congress plainly intended that

            the liberty of such a person would be  restricted only by the

            requirements  of  section  4246,  not  as  a  result  of  the

            continued pendency of an indictment."

                      That argument  is unconvincing.  Ecker's liberty is

            not restricted by the pendency of the indictment, but  rather

            by section 4246 (which  authorizes his hospitalization).  The

            only  effect  that  the  pending indictment  has  on  Ecker's

            "liberty"  results  from  a  Massachusetts  state policy4  of

            refusing  to accept  mentally ill  federal detainees  who are

            subject to a pending federal indictment.  We fail to see  how

            that  state policy, or its effect on Ecker, can indicate that

            Congress intended  section 4246  to require dismissal  of any

            pending indictment.

                                
            ____________________

            4.  The  record  and  the  parties' briefs  do  not  indicate
            whether this "policy" is based on statute, regulation, or the
            discretion  of state  officials.   The  district judge  below
            assumed, without so finding,  that state officials refused to
            accept Ecker, but the court based that assumption "on hearsay
            and not on competent evidence."

                                         -8-
                                          8

                      Ecker's  second  argument  is  that   there  is  no

            statutory mechanism to revisit the issue of competency once a

            defendant  is  committed  as  dangerous  under  section 4246.

            While recognizing that  section 4247 requires  annual reports

            on the "mental condition" of a person committed under section

            4246, he asserts that  such reports address dangerousness and
                                                        _____________

            not  competency to  stand trial.   That  argument  finds some
                 __________

            support  in the October  1994 annual  report on  Ecker, which

            concluded that he was  still dangerous without addressing his

            competency for trial on the pending indictment.  Ecker argues

            that nothing in this  statutory scheme suggests that Congress

            envisioned further competency determinations once a defendant

            is indefinitely  committed as  dangerous under  section 4246.

            This "unexplained gap," he  contends, indicates that Congress

            must  have  intended  that  a  pending  indictment  would  be

            dismissed  once   a   defendant  has   been   committed   for

            dangerousness.

                      We  agree  that  the  statute  does  not  expressly

            address the  reevaluation of trial competency  of a defendant

            committed as dangerous under section 4246.  The statute does,

            however, provide for annual  reports by the facility director

            "concerning the mental condition of the person and containing

            recommendations    for   the    need   for    his   continued

            hospitalization."   18  U.S.C.    4247(e)(1)(B).   This broad

            requirement of a report on "mental condition" would seemingly

                                         -9-
                                          9

            allow the facility  director to  report to the  court that  a

            defendant has regained competency.   Moreover, a defendant or

            his  counsel may bring any relevant change in condition, or a

            request  for  release, to  the  court's  attention through  a

            motion for a hearing under section 4247(h).

                      In  any  event,  it is  far  too  great  a leap  to

            conclude  from this  asserted  shortcoming  in the  statutory

            scheme that Congress intended to  require the dismissal of  a

            pending indictment  once a  defendant has been  committed for

            dangerousness.  Congress could plausibly have expected that a

            prosecutor bent  on trying  a committed person  would file  a

            motion   under  section   4241  for   a  new   evaluation  of

            competency.5   On the other hand, the asserted "gap" might be

            the result of simple oversight  or poor draftsmanship, due in

            part,  perhaps,  to  an  expectation  that  prosecutors  will

            usually  exercise their  discretion  to  dismiss  indictments

            against persons committed under section 4246.  An appropriate

            judicial response  to this statutory shortcoming  would be to

            order further competency reevaluations if requested by either

            the  government  or  a  defendant,  rather  than  a  judicial

            rewriting  of   the  statute  to  require   dismissal  of  an

            indictment that the prosecutor seeks to preserve.

                                
            ____________________

            5.  Section  4241 provides  in  relevant part:  "At any  time
            after the commencement  of a prosecution  for an offense  and
            prior to  the sentencing of  the defendant, the  defendant or
            the  attorney  for the  Government may  file  a motion  for a
            hearing to determine the mental competency of the defendant."

                                         -10-
                                          10

                      The  third  argument  advanced  by  Ecker  is  more

            difficult to  decipher than  the preceding two.   He  asserts

            that section  4246 was "clearly  designed" to deal  only with

            persons  about  to  be  released from  the  federal  criminal

            justice  system, and  therefore Congress  must  have intended

            that  charges be dropped when a  defendant is committed under

            section  4246.   Ecker  demonstrates this  "clear design"  by

            pointing out  that  two of  the three  categories of  persons

            covered  by section  4246 (those  whose sentence is  about to

            expire and those against whom all charges have been dismissed

            because  of   mental  illness)  are  no   longer  subject  to

            punishment and  would be released  but for the  provisions of

            section 4246.  Then  Ecker states that "it would  be strange,

            indeed, to  include in the same  statute, without explanation

            or separate  procedures, a group  of people still  subject to

            indictment and trial."  It is more plausible, he argues, that

            those defendants  subject to  section 4246 after  being found

            incompetent  under section  4241  "would also  be subject  to

            release due to the dismissal of the charges."  

                      While  it is  perhaps  odd that  the statute  lacks

            express  procedures  for  reevaluating the  competency  of  a

            person  committed under  section 4246, it  would be  far more

            "strange"   for  Congress  to   have  intended   a  statutory

            requirement that an indictment be dismissed automatically  on

            commitment,   yet  never  mention  that  requirement  in  the

                                         -11-
                                          11

            statute.   Again, all that  Ecker has done  is point  to some

            ambiguities  in certain procedural  aspects of  section 4246,

            and  then  attempt to  bootstrap  those  ambiguities into  an

            implied   requirement  that  a  pending  indictment  must  be

            dismissedwhenever thatstatute isinvoked. We arenot persuaded.

                      As further support for  his third argument (that it

            would  be  "strange" if  the  statute  did  not  require  the

            dismissal  of  an  indictment),   Ecker  directs  us  to  the

            statute's legislative history.  We are reluctant to take that

            direction,  because a  court  "should resort  to  legislative

            history . . . [only] when the words of a statute give rise to

            ambiguity   or    when   they   lead   to   an   unreasonable

            interpretation."   United States v. O'Neil, 11  F.3d 292, 297
                               _____________    ______

            (1st Cir.  1993).  The words of the statutes at issue here do

            neither.   In  an  abundance  of caution,  however,  we  have

            reviewed  the legislative history cited  by Ecker and find it

            to  contain  nothing  that  would lead  us  to  conclude that

            Congress intended  the statute to require,  sub silentio, the
                                                        ___ ________

            dismissal of pending charges.   See S. Rep. 225,  98th Cong.,
                                            ___

            2d Sess.  (1984), reprinted in 1984  U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3404-
                              _________ __

            36.   As the Supreme Court remarked in construing the federal

            civil commitment statute  that preceded  the current  section

            4246,  "this is a case for applying the canon of construction

            of  the  wag  who  said,  when  the  legislative  history  is

                                         -12-
                                          12

            doubtful, go to  the statute."   Greenwood v. United  States,
                                             _________    ______________

            350 U.S. 366, 374 (1956).

                      As a fourth argument, and  as support for the first

            three,  Ecker  quotes the  Eighth  Circuit's  opinion in  his

            earlier  appeal  of his  commitment.    In rejecting  Ecker's

            argument that it was unreasonable to hold him for nearly four

            years before  committing him  under section 4246,  the Eighth

            Circuit stated that: "At all times, Ecker remained subject to

            criminal process calling for  a mandatory minimum sentence of

            fifteen years imprisonment.   He remained subject to possible
                                          _______________________________

            trial  until the final judicial determination of incompetency
            _____________________________________________________________

            on April 16, 1993."  Ecker, 30 F.3d at  969 (emphasis added).
                                 _____

            The  Eighth  Circuit, however,  was  not  concerned with  the

            dismissal or validity of the indictment after Ecker's section

            4246  commitment; the  issue  it faced  was  the duration  of

            Ecker's  detention  for  determination  of  competency  under

            section 4241, and whether that lengthy confinement  was a due

            process  violation.   The  Eighth Circuit  had  no reason  to

            consider whether  the indictment  remained valid after  Ecker

            was  committed under  section 4246;  if the  quoted statement

            addresses that question at all, it is mere dictum.

                      Finally Ecker points out that  the executive branch

            of the federal government is in a "peculiar position" because

            section  4246  requires the  Attorney  General  to "make  all

            reasonable efforts"  to place  Ecker in a  state institution,

                                         -13-
                                          13

            but the United States Attorney in Massachusetts is preventing

            that  placement by not  dropping the indictment.   Ecker adds

            that  "the continued  validity  of the  indictment interferes

            with defendant's  statutory right to state  placement."  This

            argument invites a number of  obvious rejoinders.  First, the

            government  has  the  discretion  to  solve  the  dilemma  by

            dismissing the charges.  Second, the Attorney General is only

            required to make "reasonable efforts" to place Ecker in state

            care.  The Massachusetts  policy denying placement of persons

            under federal  indictment prevents Ecker's  placement, and we

            would  not  conclude  (nor  does  Ecker  argue)  that  it  is

            "unreasonable" not to drop the charges in order to facilitate

            placement.   Third, while the  statute imposes a  duty on the

            Attorney General to attempt to place Ecker with the state, we

            do not conclude that it endows Ecker with a "right"  to state

            placement.

                      None of  Ecker's  statutory arguments  persuade  us

            that Congress  intended sections 4241 and 4246 to require sub
                                                                      ___

            silentio the dismissal of a pending indictment.
            ________

            B.  Caselaw
            ___________

                      Our conclusion  is not  altered by our  analysis of

            the few  relevant cases.  The district  court's order denying

            Ecker's motion  to dismiss the indictment  is consistent with

            the Supreme  Court's decision in Greenwood  v. United States,
                                             _________     _____________

            350 U.S. 366 (1956).  The Court in Greenwood stated that "the
                                               _________

                                         -14-
                                          14

            pending  indictment  persists" even  after the  defendant has

            been  found  unlikely  to  recover competency  and  has  been

            committed as dangerous.  Id. at 375.
                                     ___

                      Although   Greenwood  was  not  decided  under  the
                                 _________

            current  statutory scheme,  we  believe that  the holding  is

            equally  valid under the new scheme.  The prior statutes were

            strikingly  similar  to  the   current  ones.    The  primary

            difference  relevant to this  appeal is  that the  old scheme

            authorized detention  of an incompetent  indefinitely, "until

            the accused shall be mentally competent to stand trial."  Law

            of  Sept. 7,  1949,  ch. 535,    4246,  63  Stat. 686  (1949)

            (current version at 18  U.S.C.   4246).  The  present statute

            authorizes  detention of  an incompetent  defendant only  for

            four months,  and then for  an additional reasonable  time if

            there  is  a  substantial  possibility that  he  will  regain

            competency.  This limitation  on the detention of incompetent

            defendants was dictated by Jackson v. Indiana,  406 U.S. 715,
                                       _______    _______

            738 (1972), which  struck down Indiana's  statute authorizing

            indefinite commitment  of incompetent defendants who were not

            dangerous as violative of due process.  See S. Rep. 225, 98th
                                                    ___

            Cong., 2d Sess. (1984),  reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182,
                                     _________ __

            3418.   Thus, under the new scheme,  an incompetent defendant

            must be released  after four months if  recovery is unlikely,

            18 U.S.C.   4241(d), or else committed indefinitely  if found

            dangerous,  18 U.S.C.     4246.   We  see nothing  about  the

                                         -15-
                                          15

            statutory changes  required by Jackson v.  Indiana,6 406 U.S.
                                           _______     _______

            at  738, nor any other  change in the  statutory scheme, that

            casts  doubt  on  Greenwood's  holding  that  the  indictment
                              _________

            survives  commitment, 350 U.S. at 375.  Nor does the pendency

            of the  indictment beyond Ecker's commitment offend Jackson's
                                                                _______

            mandate  that a  permanently  incompetent  defendant must  be

            released or else civilly committed.  See Jackson, 406 U.S. at
                                                 ___ _______

            738.

                      Ecker attempts to advance his cause by misleadingly

            quoting  a  recent  Ninth Circuit  case:  "The  fact that  an

            indictment is  no  longer  in  place  is  irrelevant  to  the

            governmental interests at stake:  `the control and  treatment

            of  dangerous persons  within  the  federal criminal  justice

            system who are  incompetent to stand trial.'"   United States
                                                            _____________

            v. Sahhar, 56 F.3d  1026, 1029 (9th Cir.), cert.  denied, 116
               ______                                  _____  ______

            S. Ct.  400  (1995).   Ecker  argues  that  the  governmental

            interests  in his case, as in Sahhar, are fully vindicated by
                                          ______

                                
            ____________________

            6.  The Court stated in  Jackson v. Indiana that "[d]ismissal
                                     _______    _______
            of charges  against an  incompetent accused has  usually been
            thought  to be  justified on  grounds not  squarely presented
            here: particularly, the Sixth-Fourteenth Amendment right to a
            speedy  trial,  or the  denial  of  due  process inherent  in
            holding pending  criminal charges indefinitely over  the head
            of one who will never have a chance to  prove his innocence."
            406  U.S. at 740 (citing  as support only  one state decision
            and two federal district court decisions).  The Jackson Court
                                                            _______
            did  not reach  the issue  of dismissal of  charges, however.
            Id.    Ecker has  not advanced  either  of these  grounds for
            ___
            dismissal of his  indictment.  Moreover,  we will not,  based
            solely on the quoted dictum in Jackson, attribute to Congress
                                           _______
            an  unspoken intent to  require that a  pending indictment be
            dismissed.

                                         -16-
                                          16

            section 4246,  rendering the  indictment irrelevant.   But in

            Sahhar, the indictment was dismissed before the appellant was
            ______                               ______

            committed; the  issue was whether it  was unconstitutional to

            commit a person  under section 4246  after detaining him  for

            longer than  the maximum term  of imprisonment for  the crime

            charged.  Id.  at 1028.   The  Ninth Circuit  held that  such
                      ___

            commitment was  constitutional given the federal  interest in

            "control  and  treatment  of  dangerous  persons  within  the

            federal criminal justice system"; the fact that an indictment

            was no longer  in place  was "irrelevant"  to that  interest.

            Id. at  1029.   The district  court had  erred in  "tying the
            ___

            continuing validity of  appellant's non-punitive section 4246

            commitment  to  the  punitive   objectives  of  the  original

            criminal charge."  Id.   In other words, once  the indictment
                               ___

            was  dismissed,  the only  remaining government  interest was

            public safety, not the punishment of the offender.  In no way

            did Sahhar involve the question whether an indictment must be
                ______

            dismissed when a person is committed under section 4246.  

                      Because  the  prosecutor  wishes  to  keep  Ecker's

            indictment pending, the government  has a continuing punitive
                                                                 ________

            interest in Ecker.  That interest is not addressed by section

            4246   commitment,  which  terminates  if  Ecker's  condition

            improves.   Ecker's  out-of-context quotation  of  Sahhar  is
                                                               ______

            disingenuous and does not enlighten.

                                         III.
                                         III.
                                         ____

                                         -17-
                                          17

                                      CONCLUSION
                                      CONCLUSION
                                      __________

                      The relevant statutes are silent as to dismissal of

            a pending indictment upon commitment for dangerousness.  None

            of Ecker's arguments persuade  us that Congress intended that

            upon  commitment under  section 4246  any  pending indictment

            must  be  dismissed.    The district  court's  order  denying

            Ecker's motion to dismiss the indictment is affirmed.
                                                        ________

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