Court Opinion

ID: 9529948
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:55:48.399075+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:57.640648
License: Public Domain

Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE CRAVEN, concurring in part, dissenting in part: I concur in that portion of the opinion affirming the dismissal of the complaint against defendant Reed because he is expressly and contractually precluded from being in charge of the work. As to defendant Spinney, I dissent because the contract on its face at least raises a question of face regarding its control of the construction. In Miller v. DeWitt (1967), 37 Ill. 2d 273, 226 N.E.2d 630, our supreme court said that architects could be found to be in charge of construction so as to come within the liability provisions of the Structural Work Act. In Miller, the contract between the owner and the architects provided that the latter’s duties included: “ ‘[T]he general Administration of the construction contract and supervision of the work’ (par. I); ‘general supervision and direction of the work’ (par. 38); and [gave] them ‘the authority to stop the work whenever such stoppage may be necessary to insure the proper execution of the contract’ (par. 38).” (37 Ill. 2d 273, 284, 226 N.E.2d 630, 638.) The supreme court appeared to retreat from its stand in Miller in the recent case of McGovern v. Standish (1976), 65 Ill. 2d 54, 357 N.E.2d 1134. However, the court retreated from Miller only as applied to the facts in McGovern. “In addition to those factors present in Miller and Voss and absent here, we note that the evidence does not establish that the defendant had any right to control or direct the manner or methods by which the construction would be accomplished.” 65 Ill. 2d 54, 69, 357 N.E.2d 1134, 1142. The contract between the Capital Development Board and the architectural firm was appended to plaintiff’s complaint and made a part thereof. That contract provided as follows: “The Architect shall use his best professional effort to expedite the progress of construction and to protect the Owner and User from deficiencies in the work of the contractor and subcontractor.” This contractual provision appears to place the architect “in charge” of the construction. Even if it cannot be said that on its face the contract does not put Spinney in charge of the construction, for the purposes of a motion to dismiss, at least, a factual question arises as to the architects’ responsibility. The existence of such factual question upon the motion to dismiss precludes a determination that there is no liability as a matter of law. Pedrick v. Peoria & Eastern R.R. Co. (1967), 37 Ill. 2d 494, 229 N.E.2d 504.