Court Opinion

ID: 9885789
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 14:06:15.701563+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:24.099931
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 29, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

          Commonwealth of Kentucky
                   Court of Appeals
                    NO. 2022-CA-0077-MR

RANDALL E. BANKS                                     APPELLANT

            APPEAL FROM HART CIRCUIT COURT
v.         HONORABLE JOHN DAVID SEAY, JUDGE
                 ACTION NO. 12-CR-00030

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                              APPELLEE

AND

                    NO. 2022-CA-0079-MR

RANDALL E. BANKS                                     APPELLANT

            APPEAL FROM HART CIRCUIT COURT
v.         HONORABLE JOHN DAVID SEAY, JUDGE
                 ACTION NO. 12-CR-00030

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                              APPELLEE

                        OPINION
                REVERSING AND REMANDING

                        ** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CALDWELL, COMBS, AND KAREM, JUDGES.

CALDWELL, JUDGE: Randall E. Banks (Banks) appeals from the trial court’s

order denying his motion for relief pursuant to Kentucky Rule of Criminal

Procedure (RCr) 11.42. We reverse and remand for lack of jurisdiction and

instruct the trial court to dismiss the RCr 11.42 motion.

                                         FACTS

                In 2012, Banks was indicted on over forty (40) criminal counts

involving the sexual abuse of his young daughter, as well as being a persistent

felony offender in the first degree. Banks insisted he was innocent, and the matter

went to trial. Banks was ultimately found guilty by the jury of all counts with

which they were presented: two counts of first-degree rape; three counts of first-

degree sodomy; three counts of first-degree sexual abuse; and five counts of incest;

and of being a first-degree persistent felony offender. He was sentenced to forty

(40) years’ imprisonment.

                The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed his convictions on direct

appeal.1 In 2018, retained counsel filed a motion pursuant to RCr 11.42 seeking

relief from the judgment and sentence alleging ineffective assistance of trial

counsel. The trial court denied the motion and it is from this order that he appeals.

1
    Banks v. Commonwealth, No. 2014-SC-000176, 2015 WL 1544294 (Ky. Apr. 2, 2015).

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In his brief, he also raises complaints about the performance of post-conviction

counsel who filed the RCr 11.42 motion.

                            STANDARD OF REVIEW

              The denial of an RCr 11.42 motion is reviewed on appeal for an abuse

of the trial court’s discretion. Bowling v. Commonwealth, 981 S.W.2d 545, 548

(Ky. 1998). Abuse of discretion has been defined as being arbitrary, unreasonable,

unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles. Commonwealth v. English, 993

S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999) (citations omitted).

              To succeed on a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, one must

meet the dual prongs of “performance” and “prejudice” provided in Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 697, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984),

and by the Kentucky Supreme Court in Gall v. Commonwealth, 702 S.W.2d 37, 43

(Ky. 1985).

              First, a defendant must put on a showing that counsel’s representation

“fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688,

104 S. Ct. at 2064. Judicial scrutiny “must be highly deferential.” Id. at 689, 104

S. Ct. at 2065. Competent and effective assistance is reflected in differing choices,

especially regarding strategic decisions informed by “reasonable investigations.”

Id. at 690-91, 104 S. Ct. at 2066.

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             Once deficient performance has been established, a defendant must

show prejudice; i.e., “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id.

at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068. In other words, not only must the litigant prove that

counsel was ineffective, but that the ineffectiveness caused an outcome that would

not have occurred but for the ineffectiveness.

                                      ANALYSIS

             We must note that Banks’ RCr 11.42 motion filed in the trial court

was not verified by him and was filed by retained counsel of his choosing.

             RCr 11.42 requires verification of the allegations made therein:

             (2) The motion shall be signed and verified by the
             movant and shall state specifically the grounds on which
             the sentence is being challenged and the facts on which
             the movant relies in support of such grounds. Failure to
             comply with this section shall warrant a summary
             dismissal of the motion.

             We particularly call attention to the last sentence, which requires

dismissal for failure to comply with the dictates of the section. We hold that an

unverified motion cannot be properly addressed by a trial court and dismissal is

required because the failure to comply with the dictates of the section results in a

failure to grant jurisdiction to the trial court, and therefore the trial court has no

authority to even consider the merits of the motion.

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             In Cleaver v. Commonwealth, the Kentucky Supreme Court made it

abundantly clear that compliance is necessary before jurisdiction is conferred once

again on the trial court. 569 S.W.2d 166 (Ky. 1978).

             The procedure for obtaining relief pursuant to the
             provisions of RCr 11.42 must be complied with. The
             motion for relief must be in writing, verified by the
             movant, and state specifically the grounds of challenge
             and the facts in support thereof. In the instant case, there
             being no written motion, there could be no compliance
             with the provisions of RCr 11.42, not even a substantial
             compliance. It is jurisdictional that the terms and
             provisions of RCr 11.42 must be complied with, even
             though a substantial, and not an absolute, compliance is
             adequate. Therefore, even had RCr 11.42 been an
             appropriate remedy in this instance, in the absence of an
             appropriate motion as required by RCr 11.42, the
             Johnson Circuit Court would not have had the authority
             to enter an order granting the appellant any relief.

569 S.W.2d at 169 (emphasis added).

             This Court has allowed for “substantial compliance” to be sufficient to

confer jurisdiction on the trial court, which usually would lose jurisdiction over the

concluded criminal prosecution ten (10) days after the entry of the judgment, when

the criminal accused was acting pro se in filing a RCr 11.42 motion. Bowling v.

Commonwealth, 964 S.W.2d 803, 804 (Ky. 1998). “Substantial compliance” is a

matter of grace allowed for those proceeding without counsel, but pro se pleadings

at least provide that the factual assertions contained in the unverified motion were

                                         -5-
forwarded by a person with personal knowledge of those facts, rather than through

counsel who would not have such personal knowledge.2

              Further, we cannot review Banks’ complaints about his original post-

conviction counsel for two reasons. First, these allegations of error were not first

presented to the trial court. An issue must first be presented to the trial court

before presenting the trial court’s determination as erroneous to an appellate court.

“This issue was not raised in Bowling’s RCr 11.42 motion and, therefore, is not

properly before this Court. See West v. Commonwealth, Ky., 780 S.W.2d 600, 602

(1989), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1027, 116 S. Ct. 2569, 135 L. Ed. 2d 1086 (1996).

The issue will not be considered or discussed further.” Bowling v. Commonwealth,

80 S.W.3d 405, 419 (Ky. 2002).

              Second, even if the complaints about his prior post-conviction counsel

had been presented to the trial court, there has been no recognition of the right to

ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel in Kentucky. We will not do so

now.

                    Notwithstanding the procedural deficiency,
              Appellant’s argument is without merit. In Coleman v.
              Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2566,
              115 L. Ed. 2d 640 (1991), the United States Supreme
              Court held that “[t]here is no constitutional right to an

2
  It is axiomatic that an attorney filing an RCr 11.42 motion for a client would forward
complaints about the performance of former counsel and would not have any personal
knowledge of the performance of counsel as he or she was not involved in the matter at the time
former counsel was acting.

                                              -6-
             attorney in state post-conviction proceedings.
             Consequently, a petitioner cannot claim constitutionally
             ineffective assistance of counsel in such proceedings.”
             (citations omitted); See also Murray v. Giarratano, 492
             U.S. 1, 109 S. Ct. 2765, 106 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1989).

Bowling v. Commonwealth, 981 S.W.2d 545, 552 (Ky. 1998).

                                  CONCLUSION

             In conclusion, the fact that Banks verified no document – no motion,

no memorandum – which contained factual allegations of which he and he alone

would have knowledge (what his former attorney said, discussions concerning

evidence, etc.) such failure to verify is fatal and jurisdiction was not conferred

upon the trial court. Further, we cannot review any allegations of error Banks has

attributed to his prior post-conviction counsel.

             We reverse the trial court’s order denying relief on the merits and

remand this matter back to the trial court to enter an order dismissing the motion

for lack of jurisdiction.

             ALL CONCUR.

 BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:                      BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

 J. Ryan Chailland                          Daniel Cameron
 Frankfort, Kentucky                        Attorney General of Kentucky

                                            Kristin L. Conder
                                            Assistant Attorney General
                                            Frankfort, Kentucky

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