Court Opinion

ID: 9857813
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 16:02:13.126783+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:46:29.861471
License: Public Domain

ON REHEARING George Rose Smith, J., on rehearing. In a petition for rehearing the appellant insists that her statutory interest in the appellee’s real property should not he extinguished by reason of the fact that this issue was not fully developed at the trial. We are of the opinion that this contention is well taken and that the cause should be remanded for further proof on this point. When a divorce is awarded to the wife the statute affirmatively requires that she be granted a third of the husband’s personal property absolutely and a third of his real property for life. Ark. Stats. 1947, § 34-1214. We have uniformly been careful to protect the wife’s rights despite deficiencies either in the pleadings or in the proof. In Hegwood v. Hegwood, 133 Ark. 160, 202 S. W. 35, the husband appealed from a decree of divorce which purported to award the wife an interest in certain town lots that were not described in the pleadings or the proof. Although there was nothing in the record to support the chancellor’s action we affirmed the decree, saying: ‘ ‘ The division of the property is a mere incident to the divorce suit and it is not essential to the jurisdiction of the court that the pleadings should set forth the property. The decree for divorce draws to the court the power to ascertain the description of the property owned by the husband for the purpose of awarding to the divorced wife her share thereof. Of course, there ought to be some evidence of the existence and description of the property upon which the court acts, but appellant is in no attitude to complain, for, if he is not the owner of property he suffers no injury ;,by the award, and if he does own'the property described, the divorced wife is entitled to the share which the court awarded to her.” Similar reasoning was followed in Parrish v. Parrish, 195 Ark. 766, 114 S. W. 2d 29. There, as in the case at bar, the wife asked for a divorce and a division of the property, but there, as here, she failed to prove the extent of her husband’s holdings. “The question as to the ownership and disposition of the property was not developed in the court below, and the court did not pass on this question. ’ ’ The wife was granted a divorce and, despite this deficiency in her proof, appealed from the chancellor’s failure to make an award of property rights. We held that the court should have heard evidence on the question and affirmed the decree without prejudice to the wife’s right to bring suit later for her interest in the property. In the present case the wife’s position is materially stronger than it was in the decisions just cited. Here the chancellor denied the wife’s prayer for a divorce and so had no reason to ascertain the extent of the husband’s property. Our original opinion reversed the chancellor’s decree and awarded a divorce to the wife rather than to the husband. Since it would have been the chancellor’s duty to make a property division if he had granted the divorce to the wife in the first instance, it is similarly our place to protect her rights when the divorce is granted in this court. The defect of proof was considered to be immaterial in the Parrish case, supra, and there is even more reason for disregarding it in the case at bar. The record contains a description of the property that the appellee owned when his fraudulent conveyance was set aside in the First Division of the chancery court. We do not think it appropriate, however, to allow the appellant a life estate in a third of that land, without additional proof. Even though the appellant is entitled to her statutory interest in the appellee’s property, the issue of alimony in turn depends upon the respective financial conditions of the parties after that award has been made. Reed v. Reed, 223 Ark. 292, 265 S. W. 2d 531. Fairness requires that these allied issues be re-examined together. We accordingly exercise onr discretion to remand the canse for further proof upon these issues. Massey v. Tyra, 217 Ark. 970, 234 S. W. 2d 759. To this extent the petition for rehearing is granted. McFaddiN, J., dissents to the court’s action in granting the petition for rehearing.