Court Opinion

ID: 9671479
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:37:16.40461+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:10.181037
License: Public Domain

Fitzgerald, P.J.
{concurring). I concur with the majority’s conclusion that consideration of the prior conviction does not offend the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. However, I disagree with the holdings in People v Richert (After Remand), 216 Mich App 186; _ NW2d _ (1996), and the holding of the majority herein, that such consideration does not run afoul of Const 1963, art 1, § 20. Therefore, I concur only because I am required to do so by Administrative Order No. 1996-4.
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides, in relevant part, that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” However, the Supreme Court has given this amendment a rather restricted reading, stating that “where no sentence of imprisonment [is] imposed, a defendant *646charged with a misdemeanor [has] no constitutional right to counsel.” Nichols v United States, 115 US _, _; 114 S Ct 1921; 128 L Ed 2d 752 (1994), citing Scott v Illinois, 440 US 367; 99 S Ct 1158; 59 L Ed 2d 383 (1970).
Here, defendant had been convicted of the misdemeanor of larceny under $100 before the instant prosecution. The sentence imposed was a fine. Thus, under Scott, he had no right to counsel under the federal constitution and, therefore, no right to counsel could have been infringed upon. Considering only the federal constitution, the trial court acted properly in considering the 1981 conviction.
However, the Michigan Constitution has been construed to provide more expansive rights for those accused of crimes. Const 1963, art 1, § 20 provides, in relevant part, that “[i]n every criminal prosecution, the accused shall have the right... to have the assistance of counsel for his or her defense.” Although this language is nearly identical to that appearing in the Sixth Amendment, the Michigan Supreme Court has stated that “[n]o distinction is made between felonies and misdemeanors or types or seriousness of crimes in ... the Constitution of Michigan.” People v Mallory, 378 Mich 538, 556; 147 NW2d 66 (1967).1 This parallel *647treatment of those charged with misdemeanors and felonies is echoed in the court rules, which provide that a defendant must be apprised of the right to counsel when charged with either type of offense. MCR 6.104(E)(3); MCR 6.610(D)(l)(c)(i); see also n 1, supra.
In sum, while under the federal constitution a defendant has no right to counsel where convicted of a misdemeanor and where no incarceration is imposed, under the Michigan Constitution a defendant does have the right to counsel when charged with a misdemeanor regardless of whether incarceration is imposed as a result of the conviction. Therefore, a constitutional infirmity exists where, as. here, a defendant is convicted of a misdemeanor without benefit of counsel and without having waived the right to counsel.2 Hence, I would hold that it was error for the trial court to use defendant’s prior larceny conviction to elevate the present offense from a misdemeanor to a felony. See People v Miller, 179 Mich App 466, 469; 446 NW2d 294 (1989) (a constitutionally infirm conviction cannot be used to enhance punishment). In accordance with established principles, I would reverse defendant’s conviction and remand for entry of a conviction of second-degree retail fraud. See People v Jenkins, 395 Mich 440, 443; 236 NW2d 503 (1975).

 In People v Lewis, 15 Mich App 225, 227; 166 NW2d 491 (1968), the Court attempted to draw a distinction between felonies and misdemeanors as was done in Scott. The Court reasoned that because the then-extant court rules provided that those charged with felonies, but not those charged with misdemeanors, had to be advised of their right to counsel, Const 1963, art 1, § 20 was not offended where a defendant convicted of a misdemeanor had not been advised of his right to counsel. However, the court rules have since been amended to provide that a defendant charged with a misdemeanor must be advised of his right to the assistance of an attorney. MCR 6.610(D)(l)(c)(i). Therefore, the reasoning of Lewis , having been superseded by court rule, is no longer good law.

 Our Supreme Court may wish to align its interpretation of Const 1963, art 1, § 20 with the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the analogous Sixth Amendment of the federal constitution. However, until it does so, this Court is bound by its most recent statement on the matter, that occurring in Mallory, in which misdemeanor and felony prosecutions were expressly grouped together. It is the Supreme Court’s obligation to overrule or modify case law if it becomes obsolete, and, until it takes such action, this Court and all lower courts are bound by that authority. Boyd v W G Wade Shows, 443 Mich 515, 523; 505 NW2d 544 (1993).