Court Opinion

ID: 9700725
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 21:47:05.941422+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:14.155926
License: Public Domain

*288Dissenting Opinion by
Me. Justice Musmanno :
In this case mineral rights were conferred through the medium of the following language: “All the coal, coal oil, and all other minerals of every kind and character in, under and upon.”
I assert that this phraseology conferred on the grantee the rights to the natural gas in and on the property involved because, (1) “every hind and character”* is expansive enough a phrase to include natural gas; and (2) the grantor intended gas to be included therein. The Majority Opinion finds a way to say that when the grantor said “all other minerals of every kind and character,” he did not intend to include natural gas. Is gas not a mineral? From time immemorial the substantive world has been divided into three kingdoms; the animal, vegetable and mineral. If gas is excluded from the mineral kingdom, where does it go? It cannot move into the animal or vegetable kingdom. Does it float about, a pariah to all kingdoms, or is a new kingdom being founded for its exclusive occupancy? And does this mean that the world must now be re-divided into four kingdoms, instead of three?
In Silver v. Bush, 213 Pa. 195, at 197 (1906) we said: “Of the fact that under the broad division of all matter into the three classes of animal, vegetable and mineral, petroleum and gas are minerals, there has never been any room for question, and even under some more restricted classifications the same result may be reached.” Are we abandoning this solid promontory of logic, reason, and common sense? If we are, I can only say that once you depart from the moorings of good, clear understandable English and embark on the sea of unrestrained interpretive expression, anything is possible — but that is not the way to decide a lawsuit, *289especially wliere property rights are involved — property rights which have been documented by deeds, mortgages, and incontestable court records.
Let us now look at the facts in this lawsuit and endeavor to determine what caused the Majority to move to a conclusion which, as I see it, is entirely illogical and wholly insupportable. On June 25, 1900, N. T. Arnold of Clearfield County obtained title in fee simple from I. F. Richey et al. to four tracts of land comprising 3781.35 acres. On the same day he obtained title from the same Richey et al. to mineral rights in fifteen other tracts of land. The mineral rights in these other fifteen tracts were conveyed in the following language: “All the coal, coal oil, fire clay and other minerals of every kind and character.” The deed also contained this illuminating provision: “It is the intention of the grantors herein to convey to the said N. T. Arnold all the land, coal, coal oil, fire clay, natural gas and other minerals and all rights vested in said grantors.”
Thus, this provision quite clearly established that Arnold obtained title to the natural gas in the fifteen tracts (which are not here at issue). Nor is it questioned that he acquired the gas rights in the four tracts here involved since his title to these tracts was a fee simple one. The question is who now owns the gas rights in those four tracts.
On June 25,1900, that is, the same day that Arnold obtained the four tracts and the fifteen other tracts, he conveyed to John F. Byrne the rights to: “All the coal, fire clay, limestone, iron ore and other minerals in and under” in two of the four tracts.
A month later he conveyed to K. P. Hall and Andrew Kaul “All the coal, coal oil, and all other minerals of every kind and character in, under and upon” the other two parcels of the four mentioned.
Later on, the New Shawmut Mining Company, one of the party contestants in this case, acquired all the *290rights which Byrne and Hall and Haul (hereinafter to be referred to as Hall-Kaul) had in these four tracts. It is admitted by everyone in this lawsuit that New Shawmut got whatever Byrne and Hall-Kaul had.
It is my considered judgment that the New Shawmut Mining Company, under the language already quoted, obtained indefeasible rights to the natural gas underlying the four tracts. But the Majority says that New Shawmut did not get title to the natural gas, arguing that: “Arnold’s omission of natural gas, coupled with the variation in the delineation of the minerals expressly conveyed to Byrne and Hall-Kaul, indicates that Arnold did not intend to convey all the mineral rights he had received from Richey et al. (Emphasis in Majority Opinion).”
In other words, when Arnold said: “all other minerals of every kind and character,” he did not mean all other minerals of every kind and character. Also, that when he enumerated certain minerals and then added “and other minerals in and under,” he did not mean to include natural gas in “other minerals in and under.”
Let us see if Arnold did not intend to include natural gas in the all-embraeive language he used in conveying his mineral rights in the four tracts. We have seen that he made the first conveyance of mineral rights in two of the four parcels of land on June 25, 1900, the same day that he had received the mineral rights in the fifteen tracts. In this conveyance he had accepted the word “gas” as a mineral and had contracted with respect thereto on that basis. Why would not the term “mineral” in the deed from him to Byrne not be given the same meaning it was given in the deed to him? Especially when the latter deed shows that the Byrne deed was already in contemplation of the parties, since it makes specific reference to it as follows: “. . . excepting such interest as was heretofore *291conveyed ... to John Byrne, Trustee as of this date.” In fact, the deed to John Byrne was recorded before the deed to Arnold.
Since these two deeds (the one to Arnold and the one from Arnold) were warp and woof of the same transaction, can the word mineral be given one interpretation in one conveyance and another meaning in its twin conveyance? In Silver v. Bush, supra, cited by the Majority Opinion with enthusiastic approval, this Court said: “The crucial question ... is what was the sense in which the parties used the word.” In what sense could Arnold, Byrne and Hall-Kaul use the word mineral except to include natural gas, in view of the specific language to that effect in the Richey deed conveying the mineral rights to Arnold? Let us see further how Arnold regarded the deeds in which he conveyed mineral rights to Byrne and Hall-Kaul in June and July, 1900. He lived six years after these conveyances. During those years he did not attempt to sell the natural gas rights to anyone nor did he indicate in any manner that he had withheld the rights to natural gas from the grant of “all other minerals.”
Arnold died August 4, 1906, insolvent. His personal representatives petitioned the Orphans’ Court of Clearfield County to sell all his property for payment of debts. A Schedule “C”, listing all Arnold’s properties, was attached to the petition. This schedule described Arnold’s rights in the four tracts as “surface only.” One of Arnold’s personal representatives incidentally was his widow, who had been a co-grantor in the deeds to Byrne and Hall-Kaul. If anyone would know the intention of Arnold when the mineral rights were conveyed to Byrne and Hall-Kaul, it would be she. She recognized that all mineral rights had been conveyed to Byrne and Hall-Kaul, thus leaving to Arnold and herself only the surface rights in the four tracts, Accordingly, the formal document describing *292Arnold’s rights in the four tracts specified “Surface Only.”
And more. The orphans’ court approved the sale of the “surface only” in the four tracts to one B. F. Thompson who naturally could only receive what the court approved, namely, surface only.
If the intention of the parties is to be the touchstone to determine whether gas is to be regarded as a mineral or not in the transaction under consideration, it would be difficult to conceive of more convincing proof that Arnold intended to pass the natural gas rights in the four tracts to his grantees than the fact that his representatives, including his wife, recognized that Arnold had already conveyed “all” the minerals to Byrne and Hall-Haul and that, therefore, “surface only” was left in their title to the four tracts, which is all they listed as their assets, insofar as these four tracts are concerned.
However, not only does the Majority reject this clearest proof of recognition of past conveyance of mineral rights by Arnold, but it goes further and says that although the petition described Arnold’s title as “surface only,” and although the court approved the sale of “surface only”, and although the deed in pursuance of the order of court conveyed “surface only” to B. F. Thompson, the gas rights were nevertheless included in the petition and authorized for sale by order of court and conveyed to B. F. Thompson! This must be known as the theory of inclusion by exclusion.
And how does the Majority explain the phenomenal conclusion indicated? It says: “Even though the descriptions of Parcels 1, 2, 3 and 4 were prefaced as ‘surface only’, yet Arnold’s personal representatives both in their petition and attached schedule, did represent to the court that they had listed all of Arnold’s interest in realty in Clearfield County. . , ,” (Emphasis in original).
*293Thus, the Majority argues that although Arnold’s representatives specifically declared what their rights were in the four tracts, this meant nothing since they said they were going to sell all their property — and someone else decided for them that they still had what they had already conveyed away. Of what use is a schedule in a formal court authentication if, through an ex parte proceeding, the schedule may be altered, mutilated, and nullified?
If we follow the Majority’s reasoning in this phase of the case to its logical conclusion we will find that a dangerous precedent is being established. It will mean that no one, looking over the record of court authenticated sales, can now be certain of what was actually sold because, although a schedule specifically enumerates what has been sold, there is always the possibility that a later court in an entirely different and independent proceeding may declare the schedule added to, subtracted from, or completely nullified.
Thus, according to the Majority, although Thompson’s deed gives him the “surface only” to the four tracts, he in fact received the subterranean rights as well. Of course, this reasoning on the part of the Majority is all ex post facto, because no one, while the property rights were being transferred, could have foreseen or imagined what this Court is now deciding.*
Some nine months later, on February 23, 1910, Thompson sold his rights to the Penfield Coal and *294Coke Company. Obviously, Penfield could not receive more than Thompson had to sell, and Thompson could not have had more than he obtained from Arnold’s representatives, and the representatives could only have inherited what Arnold had left to them, namely, surface rights only.
A-year or so after Penfield became owner of the surface rights only in the four tracts, an error was discovered in the deed from Thompson, and a correcting deed, referred to also as a quitclaim deed, was made up by the Arnold trustees, directly to Penfield. Although the Majority regards this quitclaim deed as assuring to Penfield the gas rights underlying the four tracts, Penfield itself acted all the time on the assumption and belief that it had only surface rights to the land. On March 1, 1910, in a mortgage to the Guarantee Title and Trust Company, by which it expressly undertook to place in trust all of its property, real, personal and mixed and all rights, privileges and franchises of the Company, in order to secure $700,000, Penfield described its rights in the four tracts only as “surface.” Nor did it make any changes in this mortgage after the correcting deed had been executed. Even Penfield’s own map of its holdings, introduced in evidence in this litigation, and dated 1920, showing the acreage here involved, marked its rights in the acreage as “surface” alone.
In 1926 Penfield found itself in serious financial difficulties and the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania appointed one L. W. Smith as receiver to handle its affairs. Smith petitioned the court to sell the four tracts of land here involved. He described Penfield’s property rights in these lands as “wild surface lands in fee but without mineral rights.” Along the whole lengthening chain of title to these lands, after the Byrne and Hall-Kaul deeds, we find continuous and constant reference to *295rights in the lands as “surface” only. The interpretation placed upon all the conveyances by the parties themselves speak louder than the strained construction adopted by the Majority which not only defies the expressed intention of the parties but construes the terms to mean the exact opposite of what they say.
When Smith, the receiver of the Penfield properties, petitioned the United States District Court for authority to sell Penfield’s interests, he specifically and expressly limited Penfield’s ownership to the wild surface land only. In the clearest of language he said:
“14. That among the real estate owned by the Pen-field Coal & Coke Company there are about 3784.35 acres of wild surface land without mineral rights which the company owns in fee, subject to the above recited liens.
“15. That the said surface lands are of a rough and mountainous character, are not now productive and never were productive to the company. That the said surface lands were never used by the Penfield Coal & Coke Company and are not either useful or necessary to carry on coal mining operations on these properties, if at any time such operations should be resumed. The annual local taxes assessed against the said surface lands amount to about $500.
“16. That the department of Forests and Waters of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania is desirous of acquiring the said surface lands.....
“17. That the said surface lands referred to in the said contract with the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania are bounded and described as follows. . . .”
Throughout Paragraphs 18, 19 and 20, Smith’s reference to the Penfield’s land was always “surface lands.” In his prayer he requested to be authorized to sell “3784.35 acres of wild surface land in fee but without mineral rights, as hereinbefore described. . .”. The court granted the prayer in the petition.
*296And then, after the sale had been consummated, the receiver filed his report and return of sale, in which he said: “2. That by order of your honorable court entered June 2, 1931 the Receiver was authorized to offer at public sale to the highest bidder four certain tracts of wild surface land . . .”
In Paragraph 4 of the report, the receiver states that the highest bid received for the “wild surface land” was that of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Forests and Waters, and that, therefore, the “surface land” was sold to the Commonwealth, the sale having been conducted strictly in accordance with the order of the court.
The court then confirmed the sale of 3784.35 acres of “surface lands” to the Commonwealth, authorizing the receiver to deliver a deed “for the said surface lands” upon payment of the purchase money. And thus the fateful four tracts of land without mineral rights became the property of the Commonwealth. And upon this showing, the Majority comes to the conclusion that the Commonwealth received the rights to the natural gas in the land! In arriving at this astonishing conclusion, the Majority makes no effort to explain Iioav it is that in all of the 57 years Avhich elapsed between the granting of the mineral rights to Byrne and Hall-Haul (which rights now belong to the New ShaAVmut Mining Company) and the initiation of this laAVsuit, the only ones who paid taxes on the minerals were Byrne and Hall-Haul and the NeAV Shawmut Mining Company.
The Majority Opinion, I am sorry to say, is an aggregation of contradictions. Although it says, not once, but many times, that the test in determining whether gas is included in the term mineral is to be decided by the intention of the parties expressed and implied, it has completely ignored the expression of *297the parties expressed in countless ways, as only briefly enumerated by me in this Dissenting Opinion.
It is a melancholy fact in history that many a tribunal, having once concluded that it has reached a correct result, becomes unconcerned about the manner in which it justifies its decision. In such attempted justification inconsistency does not worry, illogical conclusions do not distress, unfounded premises are treated as of no consequence. Since it assumes that the capstone is correct, it does not matter hoiv much straw is stuffed into the pyramid to support the apex.
For instance, the Majority here argues that Byrne and Hall-Kaul could not have obtained or even wanted the natural gas rights in the four tracts. It says that: “The mining of coal, not the recovery of natural gas, was the principal objective of the Byrne and Hall-Kaul conveyances; in fact, John Byrne’s principal duties as trustee were in connection with the recovery of coal.” But I respectfully suggest that the test of principal objective is no test at all in arriving at the proper decision in this case. If we would apply this principal objective test to the other conveyances we have encountered in the chronology of title we would have to ask: Was it the principal objective of N. T. Arnold to recover gas, yet no one questions that he received the gas rights in the original conveyances. Was it the principal objective of Penfield Coal and Coke Company, which was in the coal and coke business, to recover gas, yet the Majority held that Penfield obtained title to the gas in the property. Was it the principal objective of the Commonwealth’s Department of Forests and Waters to gather up gas? What does the Department of Forests and Waters have to do with the recovery of natural gas? And yet the Majority has given title to the gas to the Department of Forests and Waters.
In order to arrive at the conclusion reached by the Majority, one must find that practically everyone in*298volved in writing conveyances, drafting court orders, preparing documents and presenting exhibits desired to mock the English language, make sport of rules of grammar, distort the meaning of the simplest words, and ignore the sequence of cause and effect. Thus, if the Majority conclusion is to be accepted as law, we must find that when Arnold said “minerals of every hind and description,” he did not mean every kind and description. We must find that when Arnold’s personal representatives said “surface rights alone” they really meant surface and sub-surface rights. We must find that when the orphans’ court used the words “surface rights,” they did not mean only the surface, on which there is no gas but the inner strata as well where there is gas. We must find that when Thompson conveyed “all of the surface” to Penfield, he really meant all of surface and all of the subterranean terrain as well. We must find that when Penfield described its rights in the tracts as “wild surface lands,” it meant not only the wild land above the surface, but the wild natural gas beneath. We must find that when the receiver of Penfield petitioned the United States District Court to sell the “wild surface lands but without mineral rights,” he really meant wild surface lands but with mineral rights. We must find that the United States District Court in granting the petition in the words of the receiver intended to go beyond what was requested, what was intended, and what was legal. We must find that when the receiver sold the land to the Commonwealth, Department of Forests and Waters, and reported to the court that he had sold only the wild surface land that he really did not mean what he said, that he was misrepresenting matters to the court, and that he really sold the wild surface land and the wild, uncontrolled natural gas beneath. And we must find that although the Commonwealth’s Department of Forests and Waters was only interested in buying the *299wild surface land it was forced to accept the natural gas for winch it has no use and with which as a Department of the Commonwealth’s government it is not required to cope.
We must do all these things, which deride the purpose of language, are cynical of the dictionary, do violence to logic, upset court decisions, and, worst of all, establish a precedent which will puzzle the learned, confuse the unlearned, and introduce into the law of real estate a quality of instability as fugacious as the natural gas which is the subject of this lawsuit.
Since I am not prepared to go along with such plethora of parados, I must, and do, dissent.

 Italics throughout, mine.

 The fact that between the descriptive and habendum clauses of the deed to Thompson there appeared: “Together with the right and privilege of entering upon such lands as are not conveyed and being described herein and taking away said coal, coal oil, natural gas, fire clay and other minerals of every kind and character,” cannot enlarge the interest conveyed in the body of the deed, namely, “Surface only.” Such clauses are merely used for the purpose of granting easements appurtenant to the rights already granted, that is, to give rights of egress, regress and ingress to secure the minerals already granted.