Court Opinion

ID: 9657100
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 20:14:10.234468+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:40.843401
License: Public Domain

Otis, Justice
(dissenting).
1. Recognizing that the convictions in this case cannot be sustained unless the facts bring it within one of the exceptions set forth in Redrup v. New York, 386 U. S. 767, 87 S. Ct. 1414, 18 L. ed. 2d 515 (1967), the majority holds that there was evidence of pandering which sets the material aside from that protected under the Redrup rule. It states that the selection of material placed in the windows together with the signs “YOU CANNOT BE ARRESTED while Shopping our Store” and “ADULTS ONLY, You must be 18 to Enter Store” constitute pandering as a matter of law.
The majority raises for the first time an issue of law and fact which it holds to be decisive notwithstanding it was not charged in the complaint, not submitted to the jury, not mentioned in the court’s sentence, not raised in the appellate briefs, and not argued either to the trial court or this court. It seems too elementary to require discussion that appellate courts will not consider for the first time on appeal issues in a criminal case which were not submitted to the trial court. Here, without citing any authority, an appellate court takes the unprecedented step of acting as a factfinder to provide an essential element of the offense which defendants were denied their constitutional right to have a jury determine. It hardly seems necessary to debate the question of whether in a criminal case the defendant is entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard with respect to an accusation involving critical facts on which his guilt or innocence de*382pends. Nevertheless, wé now hold that the appellate court may sua sponte dispose of a criminal matter and sustain a conviction where the issue on which the decision turns was not charged, litigated, submitted to the court or jury, or raised on appeal. This, in my opinion, is a denial of due process.
2. Even if the question had been litigated, it is clear from a reading of the Eedrup case and its progeny that the facts in the case before us do not warrant a conviction based on pandering.1
The majority bases its decision on the fact that some 70 paperback novels dealing with sex and an assortment of “girlie” magazines were displayed in the front window next to the sidewalk. None of the 29 films found to be obscene were thus displayed. The officer testified he seized 19 reels from the storeroom, 29 from a wall shelf in the front of the store, and 6 from a window-ledge shelf. However, the latter apparently could not be observed from the street.
The Ginzburg case held that the circumstances of presentation and dissemination of material are relevant to a finding of obscenity and. that “in close cases evidence of pandering may be probative.” 383 U. S. 463, 474, 86 S. Ct. 942, 949, 16 L. ed. 2d 31, 40. It is significant, however, that in Ginzburg the court was *383dealing with a publisher who widely and indiscriminately solicited sales of obscene matter with several million circulars in advertisements permeated by “the leer of the sensualist.” 383 U. S. 468, 86 S. Ct. 946, 16 L. ed. 2d 37. We are not here dealing with mailed material and defendants are retailers.
Redr up reversed three obscenity convictions because (386 U. S. 769, 87 S. Ct. 1415, 18 L. ed. 2d 517) none of them involved sales to juveniles; the publications were not obtrusive to the point of assault upon individual privacy; and there was no evidence of the sort of “pandering” which the court found significant in Ginzburg v. United States, supra. The United States Supreme Court has made it clear that the rules applied in Ginzburg are now subject to the limitations set forth in Redrup.
The United States Court of Appeals in United States v. Baranov, 418 F. 2d 1051 (9 Cir. 1969), reversed an obscenity conviction based on pandering and in so doing thoroughly considered all of the Supreme Court opinions which have dealt with that subject since the Ginzburg decision. Felton v. City of Pensacola, 200 So. 2d 842 (Fla. App. 1967), brought to the United States Supreme Court for review an obscenity conviction where nudist magazines were seized from the defendant’s news stand. The Florida Court of Appeals held the defendant guilty of pandering, and the United States Supreme Court reversed. Felton v. City of Pensacola, 390 U. S. 340, 88 S. Ct. 1098, 19 L. ed. 2d 1220 (1968). In an appeal in a proceeding for the confiscation of certain books, the Supreme Court of Kansas sustained a determination the books were obscene. State ex rel. Londerholm v. A Quantity of Copies of Books, 197 Kan. 306, 416 P. 2d 703 (1966). Relying on the manner of presentation as evidence of the obscenity of the books, the Kansas court referred to “lurid illustrated covers * * * blatantly pointing up the strong sex. * * * Here that packaging strongly emphasizes the prurient interest as well as affrontery to accepted standards in sexual matters * * *; * * * [The books] brazenly proclaim the motive in their creation and exploitation.” 197 Kan. 313, 416 P. 2d *384709. The judgment was reversed summarily by the United States Supreme Court on the authority of Redrup in A Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas, 388 U. S. 452, 87 S. Ct. 2104, 18 L. ed. 2d 1314 (1967).
Two subsequent decisions are significant. Bloss v. Dykema, 398 U. S. 278, 90 S. Ct. 1727, 26 L. ed. 2d 230 (1970); and Childs v. Oregon, 401 U. S. 1006, 91 S. Ct. 1248, 28 L. ed. 2d 542 (1971). Both deal with pandering and both reverse state court decisions by reliance on Redrup only. The Michigan Court of Appeals, with two judges dissenting in part, held in Grand Rapids City Attorney v. Bloss, 17 Mich. App. 318, 169 N. W. 2d 367 (1969), that evidence of pandering justified seizure and destruction of certain magazines. There, some of the material found to be obscene was displayed in a theater lobby and some could be seen from the outside of a bookstore. The trial court found, among other things, that theater patrons were subjected to “trailers” or commercial advertising on the screen. Merchandise portraying nude men and women was prominently displayed on three walls of the bookstore. “* * * [T]he cover of each magazine portrays sex in some lurid, morbid, or enticing manner so as to invite further examination of its contents.” 17 Mich. App. 333, 169 N. W. 2d 373. The trial court then concluded that the material was advertised and sold in a manner which constituted pandering. The two dissenters expressly took issue with the finding of pandering. The United States Supreme Court reversed. Bloss v. Dykema, supra.
In the Childs case the defendant was convicted of selling obscene material, a book, openly displayed on its racks, dealing with lesbians. The Supreme Court of Oregon affirmed the conviction in State v. Childs, 252 Ore. 91, 96, 447 P. 2d 304, 306 (1968). Having exhausted state remedies, the defendant secured a writ of habeas corpus in the Federal court. There, citing Redrup, the trial court held the display did not constitute evidence of pandering and ordered the defendant discharged. Childs v. State of Oregon, 300 F. Supp. 649 (D. Ore. 1969). The United *385States Court of Appeals in Childs v. State of Oregon, 431 F. 2d 272 (.9 Cir. 1970), reversed. That Court held that Ginzburg applied, that the book was deliberately represented as erotically arousing, and was openly exhibited as a part of defendant’s stock of “dirtier books.” One of the three judges dissented. The United States Supreme Court reversed, citing only Redrup. Childs v. Oregon, 401 U. S. 1006, 91 S. Ct. 1248, 28 L. ed. 2d 542 (1971).
The majority opinion cites no case permitting a jury to find pandering in the context of this matter. The authorities cited reach a contrary conclusion. We are bound by the decisions of the United States Supreme Court on constitutional matters and may not blind ourselves to the rules which have emerged from their opinions. However revolting we may find the material before us, we have a duty to reverse.

 At the time State v. Hoyt, 286 Minn. 92, 174 N. W. 2d 700 (1970), was released, 20 convictions for obscenity had been summarily reversed on authority of the Redrup decision. To that list may now be added the following: Cain v. Commonwealth, 437 S. W. 2d 769 (Ky. 1969), reversed sub nom. Cain v. Kentucky, 397 U. S. 319, 90 S. Ct. 1110, 25 L. ed. 2d 334 (1970); Grand Rapids City Attorney v. Bloss, 17 Mich. App. 318, 169 N. W. 2d 367 (1968), reversed sub nom. Bloss v. Dykema, 398 U. S. 278, 90 S. Ct. 1727, 26 L. ed. 2d 230 (1970); Walker v. Ohio (Ohio Supreme Court), 398 U. S. 434, 90 S. Ct. 1884, 26 L. ed. 2d 385 (1970); State v. Hoyt, supra, reversed sub nom. Hoyt v. Minnesota, 399 U. S. 524, 90 S. Ct. 2241, 26 L. ed. 2d 782 (1970); Childs v. State of Oregon, 300 F. Supp. 649 (D. Ore. 1969), 401 U. S. 1006, 91 S. Ct. 1248, 28 L. ed. 2d 542 (1971); People v. Bloss, 18 Mich. App. 410, 171 N. W. 2d 455 (1969), reversed sub nom. Bloss v. Michigan, 402 U. S. 938, 91 S. Ct. 1615, 29 L. ed. 2d 106 (1971).