Court Opinion

ID: 2689740
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2014-08-01 20:22:12.99475+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:51:14.529871
License: Public Domain

The State ex rel. Waldick, Law Dir., Appellee, v. Williams, Safety/Service Dir.,

Appellant.

[Cite as State ex rel. Waldick v. Williams (1995),   Ohio St.3d     .]

Mandamus to compel city of Delphos Safety Service Director to execute a

      waterline engineering contract authorized by an ordinance passed

      by city council -- Writ granted, when.

      (No. 95-1551 -- Submitted December 5, 1995 -- Decided December 14,

1995.)

      Appeal from the Court of Appeals for Van Wert County, No. 15-95-6.

      On March 27, 1995, the Delphos City Council passed Ordinance No. 1995-

15, which “authorized and directed” appellant, G. Roland Williams, the Delphos

Safety/Service Director, “to enter into an agreement with the Poggemeyer Design

Group, Inc. for the Lima Waterline Project.” The ordinance provided that the

“engineering services shall include all the waterline design and corresponding

improvements required by the City of Delphos to obtain potable water from the

City of Lima; and other such conditions or requirements as deemed to be in the

best interest of the City of Delphos,” with the cost of the agreement not to exceed

$150,000. The ordinance was declared an emergency measure by the city council

“for the purpose of the preservation of the public peace, safety and welfare and
because the City of Delphos must comply with the EPA imposed deadlines for the

improvements to its water system.”

      After Delphos Mayor John E. Sheeter vetoed the ordinance, council voted to

override the veto by the statutorily required two-thirds majority on April 21, 1995.

Shortly thereafter, although he received a copy of the engineering contract,

appellant refused to sign it.   While conceding that there were no procedural

defects relating to the enactment of the ordinance, appellant, in part, based his

refusal to comply with the ordinance on his belief that any action affecting the

municipal water system was an administrative decision to be made by him rather

than by council.

      On June 8, appellee, Juergen A. Waldick, the Delphos Law Director,

instituted this action in the Court of Appeals for Van Wert County for a writ of

mandamus compelling Williams to execute the waterline engineering contract

specified in the ordinance. Following the issuance of an alternative writ and the

submission of evidence and briefs, the court of appeals granted the writ.

      The cause is now before the court upon an appeal as of right. We granted a

motion to expedite consideration of this appeal.

                             ____________________

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      Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, C. Craig Woods and Loren L. Braverman, for

appellee.

      Kagay, Albert & Diehl and David K. Lowe, for appellant.

                             ____________________

      Per Curiam. Appellant asserts that the court of appeals erred in granting the

writ of mandamus. In order to be entitled to a writ of mandamus, Waldick had to

establish a clear legal right to have appellant execute the waterline engineering

agreement noted in the ordinance, a corresponding clear legal duty on the part of

appellant to do so, and the lack of a plain and adequate remedy in the ordinary

course of law. State ex rel. Ms. Parsons Constr., Inc. v. Moyer (1995), 72 Ohio

St.3d 404, 405, 650 N.E.2d 472, 473.

      Appellant does not contend that Waldick possesses an adequate legal

remedy to enforce the ordinance. Instead, appellant claims that Waldick failed to

establish either a clear legal right to execution of the contract or a corresponding

clear legal duty on his part to sign the contract. More specifically, appellant

contends that he has no duty to comply with an unlawful ordinance.

      Appellant asserts in his first and second propositions of law that Ordinance

No. 1995-15 illegally usurps his statutory authority and attempts to control his

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administrative discretion.   In general, enactments of a municipal legislative

authority are presumed valid, and the presumption “continues until bad faith or

abuse of legislative discretion *** is clearly proven, or it is manifest that the

legislative authority has exceeded its powers, or if the legislation bears no

reasonable relation to the public health, safety, welfare, or morals.” 1 Gotherman

& Babbit, Ohio Municipal Law (2 Ed.1992) 108, Section T 7.17, citing Benjamin

v. Columbus (1957), 104 Ohio App. 293, 4 O.O.2d 439, 148 N.E.2d 695, affirmed

(1957), 167 Ohio St. 103, 4 O.O.2d 113, 146 N.E.2d 854.

      “All municipal corporations have the general powers mentioned in Sections

715.01 to 715.67, inclusive, of the Revised Code, and the legislative authority of

such municipal corporations may provide by ordinance or resolution for the

exercise and enforcement of such powers.” R.C. 715.03. Among the general

powers are that cities “may provide for a supply of water” and “prevent the

unnecessary waste of water and the pollution thereof.” R.C. 715.08.

      Appellant relies on R.C. 735.02, which provides that the director of public

service of a municipal corporation shall manage and supervise public works of the

city, including municipal water, “except as otherwise provided by law.” Similarly,

R.C. 743.03 states that the “director of public service shall manage, conduct, and

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control the water works of a municipal corporation, furnish supplies of water,

collect water rents, and appoint any necessary officers and agents.”

      Appellant claims that under R.C. 735.02 and 743.03, the issue of whether he

should execute the waterline engineering contract is within his administrative

discretion. However, R.C. 735.05 provides:

      “The director of public service may make any contract, purchase supplies or

material, or provide labor for any work under the supervision of the department of

public service involving not more than ten thousand dollars. When an expenditure

within the department, other than the compensation of persons, employed therein,

exceeds ten thousand dollars, such expenditure shall first be authorized and

directed by ordinance of the city legislative authority.”

      Where it is necessary for the municipal legislative authority to authorize an

expenditure by the safety-service director in an amount over that provided in R.C.

735.05, “such legislative body has the power to incorporate in the authorizing

ordinance specifications and conditions binding on the administrative agency.”

State ex rel. Huddle v. Evans (1961), 172 Ohio St. 144, 145, 15 O.O.2d 282, 174

N.E.2d 94, 95. In Huddle, we granted a writ of mandamus to compel the safety-

service director to advertise for bids and enter into a contract for the purchase of a

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fire truck according to specifications adopted in an ordinance passed by council.

In so holding, we rejected the safety-service director’s argument that the ordinance

constituted “an encroachment on the executive powers given to [his]

administrative office,” stating that “there is no statute giving to the safety-service

director exclusive power to write the detailed specifications of contracts which

must first be authorized by the legislative branch of the municipality.” Id. at 145,

15 O.O.2d at 282, 174 N.E.2d at 95.

      Similarly, in State ex rel. Leach v. Redick (1959), 168 Ohio St. 543, 7

O.O.2d 422, 157 N.E.2d 106, we granted a writ of mandamus compelling a

director of public service to execute a lease where the city council had enacted an

ordinance authorizing and directing its execution. In rejecting the contention of

the director of public service that the city could not compel him to sign the lease,

the court stated:

      “It seems to us that if council has the legislative authority to authorize the

lease and to authorize the respondent to execute it, it must have the authority to

direct the respondent so to do, and that such direction in no way constitutes an

unlawful interference with an administrative function.

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      “Respondent himself has no power to enter into the contract but is simply

the party to complete the contract properly authorized by council.” Id. at 548-549,

7 O.O.2d at 425, 157 N.E.2d at 110.

      Appellant argues that Huddle and Leach are distinguishable because, unlike

the respondents in those cases, he had acted on the waterline problems prior to

council’s enactment of the ordinance. However, as Waldick aptly notes, nothing

in the applicable statutes vests the authority to enter into contracts in the

governmental branch that first exercises it. As in Leach, and pursuant to the

manifest language of R.C. 735.05, appellant has no power to enter into any

waterline engineering contract exceeding ten thousand dollars, and he is merely

the party to complete the contract authorized by the Delphos City Council.

      Appellant further contends in his second proposition of law that the

ordinance does not require him to execute the contract since it gives him discretion

as to “other such conditions or requirements as deemed to be in the best interest of

the City of Delphos.” However, the ordinance clearly mandates him to “enter into

an agreement with the Poggemeyer Design Group, Inc. for the Lima Waterline

project” and that the agreement shall be for engineering services for the “waterline

design” in order to obtain drinkable water from Lima. The discretion accorded

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appellant by the ordinance was only as to other provisions of the contract, not the

execution of the contract itself.

      Therefore, based on the pertinent statutes and Huddle and Leach, Ordinance

No. 1995-15 does not unlawfully usurp appellant’s administrative discretion to

manage, conduct, and control the water system of Delphos pursuant to R.C. 735.02

and 743.03. Appellant’s first and second propositions of law are meritless.

      Appellant asserts in his third proposition of law that Ordinance No. 1995-15

is invalid because it is not an emergency ordinance.        However, as we have

repeatedly held, “‘[w]here an ordinance, passed by the council of a municipality, is

declared to be an emergency in accordance with the municipality’s laws and sets

forth the reasons for the immediate necessity thereof, the legislative determination

of the existence of an emergency is not reviewable by a court.’” State ex rel.

Moore v. Abrams (1991), 62 Ohio St.3d 130, 132, 580 N.E.2d 11, 12, quoting

Jurcisin v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections (1988), 35 Ohio St.3d 137, 519 N.E.2d

347, paragraph three of the syllabus. Although purely conclusory, tautological, or

illusory language in an emergency measure does not meet the requirements for a

valid ordinance under R.C. 731.30, see Huebner v. Miles (1993), 92 Ohio App.3d

493, 497, 636 N.E.2d 348, 351, the language of the ordinance that the measure

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was “for the purpose of the preservation of the public peace, safety and welfare

and because the City of Delphos must comply with the EPA imposed deadlines for

the improvements to its water system” is sufficiently specific. Cf. Youngstown v.

Aiello (1951), 156 Ohio St. 32, 45 O.O. 45, 100 N.E.2d 62 (ordinance prevented

from taking immediate effect where purported emergency clause stated that it was

necessary to preserve the public peace, health, and safety, but gave no specific

reasons for the necessity); see Walsh v. Cincinnati City Council (1977), 54 Ohio

App.2d 107, 8 O.O.3d 208, 375 N.E.2d 811 (ordinance invalid since emergency

clause merely stated that it was an emergency because it was an emergency).

      In that the emergency clause of Ordinance No. 1995-15 sufficiently states

and defines the emergency, the issues of whether an emergency actually existed or

the accuracy of the reasons given by council are not subject to review by this

court. Moore, supra, 62 Ohio St.3d at 133, 580 N.E.2d at 13. Appellant’s third

proposition of law is also meritless.

      Appellant has failed to overcome the presumed validity of the ordinance,

and the court of appeals properly determined that Waldick had established his

entitlement to the requested writ of mandamus. Accordingly, for the foregoing

reasons, the judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed.

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                                           Judgment affirmed.

      MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, WRIGHT, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and

COOK, JJ., concur.

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