Court Opinion

ID: 9548383
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:02:37.250542+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:18:52.625459
License: Public Domain

Dolliver, J.
(dissenting) — The issue is whether jury instruction 5 was susceptible to misinterpretation by a reasonable juror as an unconstitutional irrebuttable presumption. The objective evidence shows such a misinterpretation is not reasonable. Therefore, I dissent.
Instruction 5 reads as follows:
To convict the defendant of the crime of Driving While Under the Influence, each of the following elements of the crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt:
(1) That the defendant drove a motor vehicle on or about May 18, 1984;
(2) That (a) at that time he had 0.10 percent or more by weight of alcohol in his blood as shown by chemical *65analysis of his breath; or (b) at that time the defendant was under the influence of or affected by the use of intoxicating liquor or any drug; and
(3) That the act occurred in The City of Seattle.
If you find from the evidence that each of these elements has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then it will be your duty to return a verdict of guilty. Subsections (a) and (b) of element (2) are alternative modes of committing the offense and only one need be proved. In addition, you do not need to be unanimous as to which method is proved; only unanimous that he is guilty of one of the modes.
On the other hand, if, after weighing all of the evidence, you have a reasonable doubt as to any one of these elements, then it will be your duty to return a verdict of not guilty.
The entire argument of defendant rests on the words "as shown by chemical analysis of his breath" contained in instruction 5. He asserts this language is susceptible to interpretation as a mandatory presumption, thus violating his constitutional rights of due process. Even though this phrase, taken from SMC 11.56.020, is identical to statutory language found constitutional in State v. Franco, 96 Wn.2d 816, 639 P.2d 1320 (1982), defendant urges it be held invalid as instructional language. In support of this position defendant calls attention to both Washington and United States Supreme Court cases, most particularly State v. Shipp, 93 Wn.2d 510, 610 P.2d 1322 (1980) and Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 85 L. Ed. 2d 344, 105 S. Ct. 1965 (1985). The problem, as seen from the perspective of the defendant, is that if a reading of 0.10 or more is shown by the Breathalyzer — the predicate fact — there is then a conclusive and irrebuttable presumption the blood alcohol level was at 0.10 or above. Defendant correctly states this would be a violation of due process as illustrated in both State v. Shipp, supra, and Francis v. Franklin, supra.
In all relevant particulars the language of instruction 5 was found to be proper in State v. Franco, supra. As the court stated, ”[t]he statute does not presume, it defines." Franco, at 823. In approving the language of the statute *66contained in the instruction, however, the Franco court did not directly face or discuss the instructional issue raised in this case.
The real question is whether a reasonable jury could misinterpret the instruction as creating an irrebuttable presumption whereby the mere introduction of evidence by the State that the Breathalyzer read 0.16 percent created a presumption of a blood alcohol reading of 0.10 percent or more by weight of alcohol. That the elements of the case had to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt is clear from the instructions. " [A] single instruction to a jury may not be judged in artificial isolation, but must be viewed in the context of the overall charge." Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146-47, 38 L. Ed. 2d 368, 94 S. Ct. 396 (1973); see State v. Foster, 91 Wn.2d 466, 589 P.2d 789 (1979). As the entire instruction indicates, the blood alcohol content, as shown by the chemical analysis, had to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Percentage of blood alcohol must be shown by some form of chemical analysis, including blood samples or Breathalyzer tests. The phrase "as shown by chemical analysis" does not create a presumption, rather it provides the State must prove the reading of a 0.10 percent blood alcohol was accurate and reliable beyond a reasonable doubt.
While there may have been some confusion on the part of the jury, it surely was not that it was to find an irrebuttable presumption of 0.10 percent or more of blood alcohol simply from the fact of the reading of the Breathalyzer. Far from it. There was extensive testimony on the part of both prosecution and defense witnesses as to the validity of the Breathalyzer and the Breathalyzer sample. As this court has previously noted:
The breath sample must be analyzed, the machine must be proved to be in proper working order beyond a reasonable doubt by the State, the officer who gives the test must be certified and must be proved to be competent at trial. The ampules must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt at trial to have been properly tested and the State *67always has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt to the jury that the 0.10 percent reading was a correct one.
State v. Franco, supra at 828.
All of these matters were contested at trial as the State attempted to meet its burden of proof as to the validity of the chemical analysis of the breath sample. The defense was in no way hampered or precluded from presenting and arguing its theory of the case, part of which included the invalidity of the Breathalyzer and the Breathalyzer reading. The City had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the chemical analysis of defendant's breath was correct. State v. Baker, 56 Wn.2d 846, 355 P.2d 806 (1960). There is no claim by the defendant the burden of proof was not met, only that the jury was confused as to whether the reading on the Breathalyzer in and of itself created a presumption of 0.10 percent blood alcohol.
I do not agree the jury was so confused. The issue of the accuracy and the fallibility of the Breathalyzer was a major issue in the defendant's case. A fair review of the record can leave no doubt that whether the reading of 0.16 was accurate and whether it accurately measured the blood alcohol of defendant was a major issue in the case of both the State and the defendant. Indeed, a substantial amount of the testimony in the case revolved around an expert witness of the defendant who attempted to demonstrate the fallibility of the Breathalyzer.
The issue is not whether the jury was confused, but whether the jury instructions, taken as a whole, were the objective source of its confusion. The majority assumes that because the jury claimed to be confused the jury instruction was the source of this confusion. Contrary to the majority's assertion, however, we do not know the jury misunderstood the instruction.
It is unfounded speculation to conclude the jury in this case, a reasonable jury, misinterpreted the instruction. With more logic, it could be argued any confusion resulted from a belief the judge could decide a pivotal factual issue *68which the jury was required to decide, upon which testimony had been taken, about which a vigorous argument had ensued at trial, and which the jury had been unequivocally instructed to decide.
The first sentence of instruction 5 expressly states "each of the following elements of the crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt ..." Necessarily, element (2)(a), "[t]hat... at that time he had 0.10 percent or more by weight of alcohol in his blood as shown by chemical analysis of his breath" must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant's interpretation of this instruction cannot be arrived at without ignoring the first sentence of the instruction. Reasonable jurors would not interpret instructions by ignoring parts of the instruction and then claim confusion. If the court allows such a claim, few instructions would be free from this kind of attack.
The objective evidence shows instruction 5 was not erroneous. I would affirm the courts below.
Callow, C.J., concurs with Dolliver, J.
After modification, further reconsideration denied June 14, 1989.