Court Opinion

ID: 9762540
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:26:01.347048+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:35.339641
License: Public Domain

ZAPPALA, Justice,
concurring.
The misdemeanor offense of desecration of the flag is defined to include conduct that “publicly or privately mutilates, defaces, defiles, or tramples upon, or casts contempt in any manner upon any flag,” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2102(a)(4), with an exception for patriotic or political demonstration or decorations, 18 Pa.C.S. § 2102(b)(4). The majority concludes that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to the Appellee, but not as written. The majority finds that “our statute leaves open the possibility that a person engaging in non-expressive conduct could be prosecuted for flag desecration,” for example when the flag is used for a utilitarian purpose such as a knapsack. I agree with the majority that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to the Appellee, but write separately because I would hold that 18 Pa.C.S. § 2102(a)(4) is unconstitutional on its face.1
In United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 110 S.Ct. 2404, 110 L.Ed.2d 287 (1990), the United States Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of the Flag Protection Act of 1989 which was enacted by the United States Congress after the Court’s decision in Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 109 S.Ct. 2533, 105 L.Ed.2d 342 (1989) invalidating a Texas statute criminalizing desecration of the United States flag. The Flag Protection Act of 1989 provided that “whoever knowingly mutilates, defaces, physically defiles, burns, maintains on the floor or ground, or tramples upon any flag of the United States shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for not more than one year.” 18 U.S.C.A. § 700. The Government argued that the Flag Protection Act was constitutional because it did not target expressive conduct on the basis of the *248content of its message, unlike the Texas statute which expressly prohibited only acts of physical flag desecration that the individual knew would seriously offend onlookers.
The Government asserted an interest in protecting the physical integrity of the flag in order to safeguard its identity as a national symbol. The Court stated in response,
Although the Flag Protection Act contains no explicit content-based limitation on the scope of prohibited conduct, it is nevertheless clear that the Government’s asserted interest is “related ‘to the suppression of free expression,’ ”... and concerned with the content of such expression. The Government’s interest in protecting the “physical integrity” of a privately owned flag rests upon a perceived need to preserve the flag’s status as a symbol of our Nation and certain national ideals. But the mere destruction or disfigurement of a particular physical manifestation of the symbol, without more, does not diminish or otherwise affect the symbol itself in any way.
Eichman, 496 U.S. at 315-16, 110 S.Ct. at 2408 (footnote omitted).
The purpose of any flag desecration statute is to punish conduct that does not venerate the flag. The Court recognized that the Government’s interest in protecting the symbolic value of the flag by prohibiting flag desecration necessarily resulted in suppression of expression, stating
Moreover, the precise language of the Act’s prohibitions confirms Congress’ interest in the communicative impact of flag destruction. The Act criminalizes the conduct of anyone who “knowingly mutilates, defaces, physically defiles, burns, maintains on the floor or ground, or tramples upon any flag.” 18 U.S.C.A. § 700(a)(1) (Supp.1990). Each of the specified terms — with the possible exception of “bums”— unmistakably connotes disrespectful treatment of the flag and suggests a focus on those acts likely to damage the flag’s symbolic value.
Id., 496 U.S. at 317, 110 S.Ct. at 2409 (emphasis added).
The protection of the physical integrity of the flag is inseparable from advancement of the ideology of liberty, equality, *249and tolerance that the flag represents. It is for this reason that flag desecration is offensive — indeed, it compels the majority to emphasize that “We in no way endorse the shoddy and disrespectful treatment of the American flag by Ms. Bricker. We are mindful of the fact that the flag is an important symbol to millions of Pennsylvanians, particularly those who fought for it in our nation’s armed forces.” It matters not whether a political or artistic statement accompanies the disrespectful treatment of the flag, for the message conveyed, even in the absence thereof, is that what the flag symbolizes is not revered by the individual. This is expression and its punishment is suppression of expression.
FLAHERTY, J., joins this concurring opinion.

. I leave resolution of the issue of the constitutionality of the remaining subsections of the statute until it is squarely before us.