Court Opinion

ID: 9917057
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-11 16:03:08.564827+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:55:09.222482
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
 UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
                 AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

                                    IN THE
             ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
                                DIVISION ONE

                            IN RE: MS2008-000007

                          No. 1 CA-MH 23-0073 SP
                               FILED 01-11-2024

           Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
                          No. MS2008-000007
           The Honorable Thomas A. Kaipio, Judge Pro Tempore

                                  AFFIRMED

                                   COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Aubrey Joy Corcoran
Counsel for Appellee

Maricopa County Legal Defender’s Office, Phoenix
By Cynthia D. Beck
Counsel for Appellant
                          IN RE: MS 2008-000007
                           Decision of the Court

                      MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge David D. Weinzweig delivered the decision of the Court,
in which Judge Michael S. Catlett and Judge Maria Elena Cruz joined.

W E I N Z W E I G, Judge:

¶1           Keith Winfield Ramsdell appeals the conditions imposed by
the superior court on his release to Less Restrictive Alternative (“LRA”)
Level 6. We affirm.

           FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2             Ramsdell was committed in March 2010 to the Arizona
Community Protection and Treatment Center (“Center”) as a “sexually
violent person” (SVP), which is defined as an individual who is convicted
of a sexually violent offense and who has “a mental disorder that makes the
person likely to engage in acts of sexual violence.” A.R.S. § 36-3701(7). At
that time, Ramsdell signed an agreement titled Conditions for Residents on
LRA Status (“2010 Agreement”). General Condition 10 of that agreement
read:

      I understand and agree that only professional therapeutic
      relationships with [Center] staff and residents are allowed. I
      will not have direct or third party contact with former
      [Center] staff or contractors. I will limit my interaction with
      [Center] staff to that which is specifically required by my
      treatment and supervision.

¶3            Thirteen years later, in 2023, the Center examined Ramsdell
under A.R.S. § 36-3708(A), and recommended his release to LRA Level 6,
which permits an SVP to independently live in the community while
remaining under the superior court’s jurisdiction and continuing to receive
services and treatment from the Center.

¶4            As a result, Ramsdell petitioned the superior court for his
conditional release. The State agreed not to oppose his conditional release
as long as the court imposed additional terms outlined in the Additional
Terms and Conditions for the Conditional Release of Keith Ramsdell (“2023
Conditions”), including Condition 1:

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                           IN RE: MS 2008-000007
                            Decision of the Court

       With exception of authorized therapeutic activities, resident
       is not permitted to have any phone, electronic, mail, or third
       party contact with . . . former [Center] staff.

¶5            Ramsdell objected to this condition. The superior court
overruled Ramsdell’s objections, implemented the proposed conditions
and granted Ramsdell’s conditional release. Ramsdell timely appealed. We
have jurisdiction. A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(10).

                               DISCUSSION

¶6             Ramsdell argues Condition 1 of his 2023 Conditions violates
his constitutional rights to free speech and association.

¶7             This court has an independent duty to examine its
jurisdiction. Desert Palm Surgical Grp., P.L.C. v. Petta, 236 Ariz. 568, ¶ 15
(App. 2015). “Because our state constitution does not contain a ‘case or
controversy’ provision analogous to that of the federal constitution, we are
not constitutionally constrained to decline jurisdiction based on lack of
standing. However, Arizona courts consistently have required as a matter
of judicial restraint that a party possess standing to maintain an action.”
Sears v. Hull, 192 Ariz. 65, 71, ¶ 24 (1998). “Waiver of the standing
requirement is the exception, not the rule.” Bennett v. Brownlow, 211 Ariz.
193, 196, ¶ 16 (2005) (dismissing claims based on lack of standing when
issue was not raised). We review questions of standing de novo. Brush &
Nib Studio, LC v. City of Phoenix, 247 Ariz. 269, 279, ¶ 34 (2019).

¶8            Arizona courts require “prudential” standing to ensure that
they “refrain from issuing advisory opinions, that cases be ripe for decision
and not moot, and that issues be fully developed between true adversaries.”
Bennett, 211 Ariz. at 196, ¶ 16. An injury is required for prudential standing,
Sears, 192 Ariz. at 71,¶ 23, and the injury must be redressable to avoid
issuing advisory opinions, Arizonans for Second Chances, Rehab., & Pub. Safety
v. Hobbs, 249 Ariz. 396, 406 (2020) (“Specifically, a party must show that
their requested relief would alleviate their alleged injury.”).

¶9           On appeal, Ramsdell argues that Condition 1 of the 2023
Conditions violates his constitutional rights to free speech and association,
but Ramsdell agreed to the same condition in the 2010 Agreement. He is
still bound by that agreement, which has not been challenged on appeal.
Therefore, any potential injury caused by Condition 1 is not redressable,
and Ramsdell lacks standing. And because he lacks standing, we do not
address the merits of this claim.

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                   IN RE: MS 2008-000007
                    Decision of the Court

                       CONCLUSION

¶10   We affirm.

                   AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
                   FILED: TM

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