Court Opinion

ID: 9926351
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-24 17:05:05.871676+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:43.813108
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                     No. 22-1284
                               Filed January 24, 2024

RYDER LEE SISCO,
    Applicant-Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF IOWA,
     Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________

      Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Jackson County, Stuart P. Werling,

Judge.

      The applicant appeals the denial of his application for postconviction relief.

AFFIRMED.

      Jennifer Bennett Finn of Pelzer Law Firm, LLC, Estherville, for appellant.

      Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Sheryl Soich, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee State.

      Considered by Tabor, P.J., Chicchelly, J., and Potterfield, S.J.*

      *Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206

(2024).
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POTTERFIELD, Senior Judge.

       After a jury convicted Ryder Sisco of first-degree kidnapping and domestic

abuse assault by impeding airflow or blood circulation in 2016, Sisco applied for

postconviction relief (PCR), which the district court denied. On appeal, Sisco re-

raises some of his claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, asserting he

was prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure to (1) object to testimony from the expert

criminalist regarding DNA evidence, (2) challenge the State’s proof Sisco removed

or confined the complaining witness, and (3) explain the plea offer in a way he

could understand.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

       In April 2015, Sisco was charged with first-degree kidnapping and domestic

abuse assault by impeding airflow or blood circulation of his live-in girlfriend, D.R.

He pled not guilty and, after rejecting a number of plea offers from the State,

elected to be tried by a jury.

       At the 2016 trial, a neighbor testified that while he was standing outside of

his house, he heard a woman screaming for help. When he looked over, a man—

Sisco—was forcing a woman—D.R.—into the home; D.R. clung to a wooden pallet

in an attempt to withstand Sisco’s force, but Sisco was too strong. The neighbor

called 911 and, at the request of the dispatcher, stood outside the home to watch

for further movement until deputies from the sheriff’s office could arrive.

       According to D.R., Sisco was mad that she failed to notice he crashed his

motorbike while he was driving behind her. Sisco had some road rash and minor

injuries, and when D.R. did not immediately comment on them, Sisco told her,

“You’re a fucking cunt” before forcing her into the home. Once they were inside,
                                          3

Sisco told her to get undressed and, when she did not comply, he got on top of her

as she laid on the ground. He punched and slapped the left side of her face,

causing a bruised and swollen lip.        Sisco also bit D.R.’s chest through her

clothing—ultimately leaving a scar. At some point Sisco stopped, and D.R. got up

and bandaged his wounds from the crash. Then Sisco again told D.R. to undress.

After she was naked and lying on the bed, Sisco took one of D.R.’s tank tops and

wrapped it around her neck, pulling with enough force to prevent D.R. from

breathing. Still pulling the tank top around her neck, Sisco verbally berated D.R.

as he used his penis to penetrate her anus. D.R. testified, “I just felt tingling in my

body. I was just gonna let go. I couldn’t take it anymore.”

       Sisco was stopped by the arrival of the deputies, who knocked and

announced themselves multiple times without getting a response. After confirming

with the neighbor that Sisco and D.R. were still in the home, the deputies

announced their intention to force entry. Only then did Sisco come to the door.

The deputies explained they were doing a welfare check on everyone in the home;

Sisco would not let the deputies inside, and he continued to block the doorway with

his body.   D.R. remained in the hallway, nervous, shaking, and worried the

deputies would leave. Sisco told the officers he needed to make a phone call, and

while he was in the kitchen, D.R. was able to make visual contact with the

officers—she pulled down the collar of her shirt to show the bite mark on her chest

and mouthed, “Don’t leave” and “He bit me.” Eventually, D.R. was able to convince

Sisco she should step outside and speak to the deputies on the porch. After she

was outside, the deputies went in and arrested Sisco.
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       D.R. was taken to the local hospital and agreed to submit to a sexual assault

examination; photographs were taken of her injuries. A number of swabs from the

sexual assault exam and the pants Sisco was wearing at the time of his arrest were

later tested for DNA.

       At trial, the defense and the State introduced competing medical experts.

The defense’s expert opined that the physical evidence of D.R.’s injuries was not

consistent with her claims of being strangled; the expert focused on the fact that

the ligature marks on D.R.’s neck were concentrated on the back of her neck—not

the front—and what he thought was a general lack of petechial hemorrhages.1 The

defense expert also testified he would expect to see additional and more severe

injuries to D.R.’s face if she were hit and punched in the manner she described.

The State called an expert in rebuttal, who testified the injuries to D.R. could be

consistent with the actions she described.

       The jury found Sisco guilty as charged; he was later sentenced to life in

prison.

       Sisco appealed, claiming the evidence was insufficient to convict him of

first-degree kidnapping and trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing

to object to the jury instructions defining that crime. We affirmed. See State v.

Sisco, No. 16-1170, 2017 WL 3505294, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 16, 2017).

       Sisco filed this PCR action in 2017. After amending his application with the

assistance of counsel, Sisco raised a number of claims of ineffective assistance of

1 “Petechia” is “a minute reddish or purplish spot containing blood that appears in

skin or mucous membrane as a result of localized hemorrhage.” Petechia,
Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/petechia (last
visited Dec. 28, 2023).
                                         5

trial counsel. Following an evidentiary trial in 2022, the district court denied the

application in its entirety.

       Sisco appeals.

II. Standard of Review.

       The Sixth Amendment guarantees defendants the right to effective

assistance of trial counsel. State v. Senn, 882 N.W.2d 1, 16 (Iowa 2016). So when

an applicant asserts they received ineffective assistance from trial counsel, their

PCR claim is constitutional in nature, and we review de novo. Lado v. State, 804

N.W.2d 248, 250 (Iowa 2001).

III. Discussion.

       “[A]ll [PCR] applicants who seek relief as a consequence of ineffective

assistance of counsel must establish counsel breached a duty and prejudice

resulted.” Castro v. State, 795 N.W.2d 789, 794 (Iowa 2011). “We start with the

presumption that the attorney performed competently and proceed to an

individualized fact-based analysis.” Lamasters v. State, 821 N.W.2d 856, 866

(Iowa 2012). Counsel has not breached their duty when “counsel has made a

reasonable decision concerning trial tactics and strategy, even if such judgments

ultimately fail.” State v. Ondayog, 722 N.W.2d 778, 786 (Iowa 2006) (citation

omitted). When evaluating whether a decision was reasonable, we put ourselves

in the shoes of counsel at the time “the decision was made—during the course of

trial.” Id. at 785. To establish prejudice, the applicant “must show that there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of

the proceeding would have been different.” State v. Martin, 704 N.W.2d 665, 670

(Iowa 2005) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)). “We
                                           6

may affirm the district court’s rejection of an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel

claim if either element is lacking.” Lamasters, 821 N.W.2d at 866 (citation omitted).

       A. Testimony about DNA.

       Scott Stocksleger, a criminalist employed by the Iowa Division of Criminal

Investigations (DCI) who specializes in forensic DNA testing, testified on behalf of

the State at the underlying criminal trial. Stocksleger was asked about a number

of items he tested for DNA, including the pants Sisco was wearing at the time he

was arrested and taken to jail. Stocksleger testified that he collected a sample

“from within the inner fly or inner crotch” of the pants and found “a mixture of DNA

from more than one individual.” According to Stocksleger, the “major DNA profile

matched” the known profile of D.R. When asked about information on the other

DNA contributor, Stocksleger initially testified:

              Right. In evaluating that sample, I was unable to report what
       the minor contributor’s DNA profile because—was because it was
       just fairly weakened, and that’s just part of our procedure if the
       sample is not sufficiently strong to make that determination, then I
       can’t place that in my report.

The prosecutor followed up with this question, “But in evaluating the data, the raw

data itself, it appeared to me that a lot of the DNA factors that were present that

were weaker were lining up as being consistent with those of Ryder’s known DNA,

Ryder Lee Sisco?” And Stocksleger answered, “Yes.” Trial counsel did not object.

Then, on cross-examination, the following exchange took place between trial

counsel and Stocksleger:

              Q. When you testified about the DNA profiles you identified
       from the crotch of the pajama pants, you said that there was DNA
       from multiple individuals. A. Correct.
              Q. When [the prosecutor] questioned you, you said that there
       was a contributor from a single major and a minor contributor. Do
                                   7

you know how many different contributors there were to the DNA
sample from the lining of the pajama pants. A. Right. I do not know
for certain. I just know that the major DNA profile that I developed,
again, matched that of the known DNA profile of [D.R.], but I could
tell there were DNA factors in addition to those.
        Q. You mentioned that you looked at the minor profile and you
said parts of it were consistent with Mr. Sisco. Is that correct?
A. Right. If I did look at those additional factors, he would have been
present in those minor contributions to the mixture as well.
        ....
        Q. . . . You said that the minor contributor was consistent with
Ryder Sisco. You also said you could not put that in your report.
Why couldn’t you put that in your report? A. Right. With the DNA
report, there’s a certain level that those peaks should be at to actually
declare this is the minor DNA contributor to this mixture, and those
peaks were not at that level where I could just say there was only
one minor contributor present, and this is matching or consistent with
this individual. Those factors were just insufficient.
        Q. Why don’t you put in your report that the minor contractor
is consistent with Ryder Sisco? A. Again, that’s—those peaks were
not at a level that was sufficient to make that evaluation.
        Q. I guess my question then would be if the data wasn’t strong
enough for you to put in a report that the minor contributor was
consistent with Ryder Sisco, why are you testifying that in your
opinion it was consistent with Ryder Sisco? A. Right. Because I was
asked if those factors were consistent, and if I look at the data, that’s
what I would say. I would say they’re there. I wouldn’t necessarily
say that he could be the only person there because they were weak.
        Q. Maybe I should reverse the question then. If you can testify
that the minor contributor is consistent with Ryder Sisco, why can’t
you put that in a report in writing? A. Because that’s the protocol.
        Q. What protocol are you referring to? A. As far as reporting.
        Q. Are you saying there’s policies within the DCI crime lab
about how you do reporting? A. Right.
        Q. So under the DCI policy, you should not be saying that
Ryder Sisco is consistent with a minor contributor? A. In the report
because the peaks were not at a level that I could declare a minor
contractor’s profile. That’s correct.
        Q. Is your testimony that Ryder Sisco is consistent with the
minor contributor something that would be outside what the protocol
for your laboratory directs? A. As far as reporting, I wouldn’t—I
wasn’t able to put that in the report. That’s correct.
        Q. All right. When you say consistent, can you give us
statistical figure, a probability as to whether Ryder Sisco was the
minor contributor like you could with, say, [D.R.] would be 1 in 100
billion unrelated random individuals, have you had that. . . . Could
you give a probability like you could with someone matching [D.R.’s]
                                         8

       DNA profile? A. I cannot give a statistical probability to that. Again,
       I didn’t put it in the report. This item we can say as far as intimate
       items when we do report on occasion we can say assuming, you
       know, because they were the owner of the item, they may be present
       on an item.
               Q. Obviously if the pajama pants belonged to Mr. Sisco and
       he was wearing them, there would be an obvious explanation to why
       he would be a contributor to the DNA found on the interior of that
       item? A. It would seem reasonable that their DNA may be found on
       that item. Yes.

Sisco maintains trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to

the prosecutor’s question and Stocksleger’s answer.

       At the PCR trial, trial counsel was asked whether he considered objecting

to the prosecutor’s question about Sisco’s DNA being consistent with that of the

minor contributor found in the swab of Sisco’s pants. Trial counsel testified he did

not object because he did not think the suggestion that Sisco’s DNA was found on

his own pants was incriminating.       Instead, trial counsel used Stocksleger’s

statement

       to attack the witness’s credibility in general and point out that he is
       rendering opinions that are inconsistent with the DCI Lab protocol.
       It’s not that I was afraid of the DNA potential match from Mr. Sisco’s
       pants, that didn’t matter at all, but the fact that [Stocksleger was]
       willing to give opinions that are outside the protocols for his lab
       suggested his credibility in general on other stuff was—I wanted to
       attack his credibility on those things indirectly.

       We agree with trial counsel; the suggestion that Sisco’s DNA was consistent

with DNA found on the pants he was known to be wearing at the time of his arrest

was not incriminating evidence—that his DNA was on his own clothes was not

evidence that supported the State’s claim Sisco kidnapped, sexually assaulted, or

assaulted D.R. by strangling her. Allowing the jury to hear that suggestion from

the criminalist was not likely to adversely affect Sisco, and trial counsel made the
                                           9

strategic decision to instead use the criminalist’s testimony to attack his credibility

on cross-examination. This was a reasonable trial strategy, so trial counsel did not

breach a duty. See Ondayog, 722 N.W.2d at 786.

         B. “Confined or Removed” Element.

         For the jury to find Sisco guilty of first-degree kidnapping, the State had to

prove:

                1. On or about the 15th day of April, 2015, [Sisco] confined
         [D.R.] or removed [D.R.] from outside to inside the home.
                2. [Sisco] did so with the specific intent to:
                a. subject [D.R.] to sexual abuse or
                b. inflict serious injury on [D.R.]
                3. [Sisco] knew he did not have the consent of [D.R.] to do so.
                4. As a result of the confinement or removal, [D.R.] was
         sexually abused or suffered serious injury.

         As part of his closing argument at the underlying criminal trial, counsel

conceded that “[Sisco] pulled [D.R.] into the trailer, no dispute about that. He pulled

her in there against her will.” Later, when going through the individual elements of

first-degree kidnapping, counsel said, “[S]ome of this is not contested. Element 1,

on or about the 15th day of April 2015 the defendant confined [D.R.] or removed

her from outside to inside the home. That’s not contested. He absolutely did it.”

Sisco claims this strategy amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel.

         At the PCR trial, counsel explained that he considered that an uninterested

witness—the neighbor—testified that he saw Sisco forcibly pull D.R. into the home

and that D.R. had scrape or scratch marks on her wrists from clinging to the pallet

while Sisco pulled her. He also considered Sisco’s delay in coming to the door

when the deputies knocked and that, even after opening the door, he continued to
                                         10

use his body to block D.R. from speaking with the deputies or exiting the home.

Based on this evidence, trial counsel concluded:

       [A]ll of that was supportive of a claim that she had been removed or
       confined. And I believe that that was a fact beyond change. Meaning
       no matter what evidence we put up trying to contradict it, the jury
       would never believe that it wasn’t true. I don’t see a way a jury thinks
       that she wasn’t removed or confined with the evidence as it was. I
       can either fight that and lose credibility, or we concede that and fight
       on other issues where maybe we can make some progress.

Here, trial counsel conceded Sisco removed D.R. from outside to inside the home;

he also conceded that Sisco bit D.R. once inside—again matching the physical

evidence. Then he used those admissions to argue that while Sisco was guilty of

lesser-included crimes of false imprisonment and domestic abuse, he did not

sexually abuse, seriously injure, or strangle D.R. (and so was not guilty of the class

“A” felony of first-degree kidnapping or the aggravated misdemeanor of domestic

abuse assault by impeding airflow or blood circulation). Counsel argued:

               She was probably terrified, humiliated, and she was certainly
       angry, and that leads us to the second reason we’re here because
       [D.R.] was angry and hurt and upset when she talked to law
       enforcement. When she talked to the medical providers, she started
       telling stories about [Sisco] and she accused him of doing things he
       didn’t do. She accused him of doing horrible things that he did not
       do.

Then, relying on the testimony of his expert and the other physical evidence,

counsel argued that D.R.’s claims of sexual abuse and strangulation were not

credible.

       This strategy was not ultimately successful; the jury found Sisco guilty as

charged. But the lack of success does not make a strategy unreasonable. See

Hinkle v. State, 290 N.W.2d 28, 30 (Iowa 1980) (“The required examination [of

counsel’s representation] should proceed while resisting, in the light of hindsight,
                                         11

the temptation to Monday morning quarterback the lawyer in the arena. Nor should

the inquiry degenerate into a postmortem, microscopic dissection of each

desperate effort of counsel to save a terminal case.”). And admitting to some

amount of guilt as part of a larger strategy can be a reasonable decision that falls

within the range of normal competency. See, e.g., Pettes v. State, 418 N.W.2d 53,

56 (Iowa 1988) (ruling counsel’s conduct fell within the range of normal

competency when counsel “testified that his statement to the jury about [the

defendant] being guilty of ‘something’ was necessary to maintain credibility with

the jury” because the defendant had “severely beaten his wife with a gun in the

presence of several witnesses, and it would be difficult to convince a jury that there

was not a crime in there somewhere.           [Counsel] testified he was hoping to

persuade the jury that a lesser included offense would be appropriate under the

circumstances”); Brown v. State, No. 14-1646, 2016 WL 351459, at *3–10 (Iowa

Ct. App. Jan. 27, 2016) (finding no breach of duty where counsel admitted

defendant was guilty of some lesser-included crimes as part of trial strategy to gain

acquittal on charge of first-degree kidnapping).

         Trial counsel made a reasonable strategic decision to admit to the lesser-

included crimes for which there was overwhelming evidence as part of a strategy

to defend against the more serious crimes. We find no breach of duty, so this claim

fails.

         C. Plea Offer.

         Sisco claims trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to

explain the State’s plea-agreement offers in a way he could understand. To

establish prejudice in this context, Sisco “must show that, but for counsel’s advice,
                                          12

he would have accepted the plea.” Kirchner v. State, 756 N.W.2d 202, 205 (Iowa

2008) (citation omitted).      “The applicant ‘must present some credible, non-

conclusory evidence that he would have pled guilty had he been properly advised.’”

Id. (citation omitted).

       Here, Sisco had only his own testimony that he would have accepted a plea

deal—after he was already convicted of kidnapping and sentenced to life in

prison—to establish that he would have accepted the State’s plea offer, which

included pleading guilty to a sexual-abuse crime (and would require him to register

as a sex offender), but involved a maximum prison sentence of twenty-five years.

This is not enough to prove that, but-for counsel’s alleged errors, Sisco would have

accepted the plea. See Dempsey v. State, 860 N.W.2d 860, 869 (Iowa 2015) (“In

establishing a reasonable probability a claimant would have accepted the earlier

plea offer had he or she received effective assistance of counsel, a claimant must

proffer more than his or her own subjective, self-serving testimony.”). And we think

this conclusion is buttressed by the fact that at his PCR trial, when he was asked

whether he wanted “the court to either reinstate [his] final plea offer or to give [him]

a new trial,” Sisco testified unequivocally that what he wanted was a new trial.

       Because Sisco has not established that he would have accepted the State’s

offered plea agreement if it was explained to him differently, he failed to prove

prejudice. This claim fails.

IV. Conclusion.

       Sisco failed to establish any of his claims of ineffective assistance of trial

counsel. We affirm the district court’s denial of his application for PCR.

       AFFIRMED.