Court Opinion

ID: 9897322
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:10:08.622078+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:05.893455
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                        Aug 08 2023, 9:04 am

                                                                             CLERK
                                                                         Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                            Court of Appeals
                                                                              and Tax Court

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT                                    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Valerie K. Boots                                           Theodore E. Rokita
Casey Farrington                                           Indiana Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
                                                           Evan Matthew Comer
                                                           Deputy Attorney General
                                                           Indianapolis, Indiana

                                            IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Chase Turner,                                              August 8, 2023
Appellant-Defendant,                                       Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                           22A-CR-2404
        v.                                                 Appeal from the Marion Superior
                                                           Court
State of Indiana,                                          The Honorable Sheila A. Carlisle,
Appellee-Plaintiff                                         Judge
                                                           The Honorable Matthew E.
                                                           Symons, Magistrate
                                                           Trial Court Cause No.
                                                           49D29-2107-F5-22234

                                Opinion by Chief Judge Altice
                                Judges Riley and Pyle concur.

Altice, Chief Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2404 | August 8, 2023                               Page 1 of 14
      Case Summary
[1]   Eighteen-year-old Chase Turner was driving a car when two of his passengers,

      one of whom was Chordae Spearman, fired several gunshots at another car that

      had just crashed on I-65 in Indianapolis. Turner acknowledged that his group

      had been following the car, trying to determine whether a particular individual

      was inside whom they wished to confront about a friend’s death, but Turner

      claimed that the shooting was unplanned and surprised him.

[2]   Following a jury trial, Turner was convicted of Level 5 felony criminal

      recklessness based on accomplice liability. On appeal, he claims that Indiana

      State Police (ISP) Sergeant Christopher Hanson launched an evidentiary

      harpoon at trial by testifying that Spearman – an unavailable witness – “gave [a]

      complete confession of everything.” Transcript Vol. 3 at 110. Turner argues, as

      he did below, that this placed him in grave peril and that the trial court abused

      its discretion in not granting his request for a mistrial.

[3]   We reverse and remand for a new trial.

      Facts & Procedural History
[4]   In June 2021, Turner and Spearman’s roommate, Joseph Simmons, was shot

      and killed at a party. They soon came to believe that Malik Shaw had

      committed the shooting and was going around town bragging about it. There

      were rumors that Jaida Sanders was also involved, but Turner did not

      necessarily believe these rumors and reportedly remained on good terms with

      Sanders, who had been romantically involved with Simmons before his death.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2404 | August 8, 2023        Page 2 of 14
[5]   After waking up around noon on July 11, 2021, Turner received word that a

      fight was planned at an apartment complex in Indianapolis between Sanders

      and another female. He and Spearman made their way to that area in

      Spearman’s Ford Fusion, along with their friends Abel Luna and Robert

      Holmes. They circled the area multiple times to make sure that they were not

      being set up by Shaw, and then they parked and watched the fight take place in

      the parking lot. There was a large group present to view the fight, some armed

      with guns.

[6]   After the fight, Sanders, her best friend Dayonna Slaughter, and Slaughter’s

      sister, went inside a nearby apartment. Turner and his friends waited down the

      road in the Ford, which Turner was driving. They followed Sanders in her Kia

      Forte when she eventually left with Slaughter in the front passenger seat and

      Shaw in the back seat.

[7]   Sanders stopped at a red light in the left turn lane, preparing to turn onto I-65,

      and noticed a car with dark tinted windows pull alongside her on the right.

      When she looked over again, the windows were down and she recognized the

      car’s occupants – Turner, Spearman, Luna, and Holmes. Spearman and Luna

      then said to the young women, “Who’s in the car? And don’t lie.” Transcript

      Vol. 2 at 209. Shaw was ducked down in the back seat, as Slaughter shouted

      something back to the other car.

[8]   When the light turned green, Sanders “hit the gas to get on the freeway”

      because she was worried that they were going to “get shot at the light.” Id. at

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2404 | August 8, 2023        Page 3 of 14
       210. Sanders started to lose control on the ramp’s sharp curve and then struck a

       cement barrier shortly after entering I-65.

[9]    Turner was still driving on the ramp when the Kia crashed. Seconds after the

       Kia came to rest in the middle lane facing oncoming traffic, Spearman and

       Luna fired several shots as Turner drove by the crash scene, which was on their

       left. Spearman, from the front passenger seat, fired over the roof of the Ford.

       Two of his shots went through the Ford’s roof, with one bullet passing in front

       of Turner and exiting his closed driver’s side window. Luna fired from the

       open window behind Turner. Neither Turner nor Holmes fired any shots.

       Turner kept driving and left the scene.

[10]   Although Sanders sustained minor injuries from the accident, nobody inside the

       Kia was struck by any of the bullets. The Kia had been hit by four bullets, one

       each in the hood, windshield, driver’s door, and rear door. Shaw fled from the

       scene, while Slaughter remained with Sanders, who was stuck inside the Kia.

       Slaughter and Sanders reported hearing the shots but not seeing them being

       fired.

[11]   Three days later, Turner was interviewed by ISP officers, as was Spearman.

       Turner was cooperative and admitted to following the Kia to determine

       whether the girls were hiding Shaw inside and, if so, to confront Shaw about

       Simmons’s death. Turner repeatedly claimed that the group had no intention of

       shooting at the Kia, though he knew there were firearms in his car. Turner

       stated that he believed the first shot, which hit his window, came from the Kia.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2404 | August 8, 2023      Page 4 of 14
       Turner said he heard Holmes tell the others not to shoot but that Spearman

       fired shots with his arm out the window and over the roof and Luna fired from

       behind as they went past the crash. Turner explained that after the shooting,

       Holmes was mad that it had happened, and Luna said he shot in response to

       the bullet hitting the window. According to Turner, Spearman said nothing

       about the shooting. During the recorded interview, Turner turned over his cell

       phone and provided the passcode to it.

[12]   On July 19, 2021, the State arrested and charged both Turner and Spearman

       with attempted battery by means of a deadly weapon and criminal recklessness,

       both Level 5 felonies. As of Turner’s jury trial, which commenced August 25,

       2022, Spearman had not been tried, and police had been unable to locate Luna.

       The State chose not to charge Holmes.

[13]   The State tried Turner as an accomplice, and the theory of the defense was that

       Turner did not know that his passengers would fire upon the Kia. The State

       presented Turner’s recorded interview at trial, in which he acknowledged being

       the driver of the Ford but denied any intention of being part of the shooting.

       Throughout the interview, an ISP investigating officer, Lieutenant Jeffrey

       Hearon, warned Turner that they would recover all text messages, calls, and

       GPS data from his phone and view all social media activity, which accounts

       had been locked by police. Lieutenant Hearon suggested that such information

       would reveal discussions that occurred between Turner and his friends before

       and after the shooting.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2404 | August 8, 2023      Page 5 of 14
[14]   On cross-examination of Lieutenant Hearon, defense counsel inquired into the

       investigation, or lack thereof, regarding cell and social media evidence.

       Lieutenant Hearon testified that they were “unable to break” the internal

       encryption of the phone. Transcript Vol. 2 at 241. On redirect, Lieutenant

       Hearon explained why he did not access the phone using the passcode provided

       by Turner and indicated that “based on the witnesses and the other

       investigation … we didn’t think it was necessary to go and get the other social

       media because we were able to connect those dots as to what happened.” Id. at

       247-48.

[15]   Sergeant Hanson also testified about the investigation and indicated that he

       believed Spearman and Luna were the shooters and that Turner was the driver.

       He indicated that ISP had interviewed Turner and Spearman but had been

       unable to locate Luna. As for Turner’s phone, Sergeant Hanson testified, “The

       data system that was on that phone could not be processed through our cyber

       unit.” Transcript Vol. 3 at 80.

[16]   On cross-examination, defense counsel first asked about Holmes, and Sergeant

       Hanson said that Holmes had been briefly interviewed and denied hearing or

       seeing anything while in the car. Because it had not been disclosed to the

       defense that Holmes had been located and interviewed, Turner moved for a

       mistrial. The trial court reprimanded the State but ultimately denied the request

       for a mistrial. Later, on cross-examination, Sergeant Hanson testified that

       although he believed “there was a plan among these kids in the car to do a

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2404 | August 8, 2023          Page 6 of 14
       shooting,” he did not believe there was enough evidence to charge Holmes with

       anything. Id. at 101.

[17]   Defense counsel eventually turned to questioning Sergeant Hanson about

       digital forensics of cell phones and social media accounts. Sergeant Hanson

       testified that he could not recall whether any of the suspects’ social media

       accounts were preserved by police and that Turner’s phone was not accessed

       despite having the passcode.

[18]   On redirect, the following occurred between the State and Sergeant Hanson:

               Q. You were asked on cross about social media accounts. Why
               didn’t you go into that in your investigation?

               A. After C.J. Spearman gave the complete confession of everything, we
               did not feel that we had a need to go pursue social media
               accounts any further at that point.

       Id. at 110 (emphasis supplied). At a sidebar, Turner promptly objected that this

       was “an incredibly bad evidentiary harpoon” and requested a mistrial, noting

       that the defense had no opportunity to cross-examine Spearman on his

       statement. Id. at 111. Before taking a recess at the request of the State, the

       court stated, “I’ll also note the State has been put on notice on a previous case

       in this court regarding these types of situations, so the State needs to be

       prepared to answer to that as well.” Id. at 112.

[19]   After the recess, the State argued that Sergeant Hanson’s statement that

       Spearman gave a full confession was consistent with the defense’s theory that

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2404 | August 8, 2023            Page 7 of 14
       Spearman was the shooter, not Turner. In other words, while the State did not

       dispute the impropriety of the testimony, it urged that the reference to

       Spearman’s confession did not “alone implicate[ Turner].” Id. at 114. The

       State also acknowledged that Sergeant Hanson had been warned before trial not

       to reference Spearman’s statement.

[20]   Turner, by counsel, responded by arguing that there was no satisfactory cure to

       the improper testimony, which violated his confrontation rights. He continued:

       “The State’s theory is that there was a plan among these people, that there was

       some – some kind of coordination. A full confession on its face means that

       there was a confession to that plan.” Id. at 115.

[21]   The trial court denied the mistrial based on its conclusion that Sergeant

       Hanson’s evidentiary harpoon did not rise to the level of grave peril.

       Particularly, the court noted that there was “other evidence tending to prove the

       same facts.” Id. It went on to explain:

               I don’t believe the word “full” in the confession imputes as much
               as [defense counsel does]. I believe that the way that [it] comes
               across is that … Spearman confessed to his involvement of it. I
               don’t believe that’s something that’s been in doubt….

               The question in this case comes down to, in my mind, what’s
               been presented I believe on both sides is whether or not [Turner]
               had knowledge and participated in some type of actions that
               contributed to [the] shooting. And so while I understand your
               argument, I do believe this is a close call, I don’t believe that we
               have gotten to the point of a mistrial.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2404 | August 8, 2023             Page 8 of 14
                That being said, Sergeant Hanson … this is absolutely a violation
                of the Rules of Evidence. As a sergeant in the State Police, you
                have a duty to understand those, especially when you’re
                instructed by the State on what you can and can’t get into. It’s
                very difficult and very costly for us to do two-day jury trials that
                are mistried at the reason of an experienced police officer saying
                something they shouldn’t say. So you’re put on notice in regards
                to that.

       Id. at 115-16.

[22]   The parties and the court then engaged in a lengthy discussion regarding how to

       try to cure the error. Turner reiterated his argument that “when the State’s

       allegation is that there’s a plan, and [Spearman’s] role is part of that plan, a full

       confession … definitely implies that that plan is part of the confession, and that

       – that is prejudicial here, horribly prejudicial.” Id. at 120-21. The court

       disagreed that “it’s gotten to grave peril,” and again directed the parties to come

       up with a cure either through an admonishment or questioning. Id. at 121.

       Without acknowledging that it would cure the error, Turner agreed to

       additional questioning of Sergeant Hanson. When the cross-examination

       resumed, Sergeant Hanson clarified that when he said Spearman gave a full

       confession, he “meant to communicate” only that Spearman confessed to firing

       shots not “to a plan necessarily.” 1 Id. at 127.

       1
        The State incorrectly characterizes Sergeant Hanson’s testimony following the trial court’s denial of the
       mistrial. He did not, as the State represents, testify that Spearman confessed only to his own role in the
       shooting or that Spearman did not admit to having a plan with Turner. Indeed, the trial court expressly

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2404 | August 8, 2023                                Page 9 of 14
[23]   The jury found Turner not guilty of attempted battery but guilty of criminal

       recklessness. The trial court subsequently sentenced him to a fully suspended

       sentence of five years in prison, with four years of probation and the first year of

       probation to be served on home detention.

[24]   Turner now appeals. Additional information will be provided below as needed.

       Standard of Review
[25]   We review a trial court’s decision whether to grant or deny a mistrial only for

       an abuse of discretion, as the trial court is in the best position to judge the

       surrounding circumstances of the event and its impact on the jury. Knapp v.

       State, 9 N.E.3d 1274, 1283-84 (Ind. 2014). A mistrial is an extreme remedy that

       should be granted only where other remedies cannot satisfactorily rectify the

       error. Id. at 1284. “To prevail on appeal from the denial of a motion for

       mistrial, the appellant must demonstrate the statement or conduct in question

       was so prejudicial and inflammatory that he was placed in a position of grave

       peril to which he should not have been subjected.” Agilera v. State, 862 N.E.2d

       298, 307 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. Gravity of peril is determined by

       the probable persuasive effect of the misconduct on the jury’s decision rather

       than the degree of impropriety of the conduct.” Id. at 307-08.

       indicated that it would not allow such testimony. See id. at 119-20 (trial court explaining that the questioning
       could not get into the content of Spearman’s confession, particularly regarding whether there was a plan).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2404 | August 8, 2023                                Page 10 of 14
       Discussion & Decision
[26]   Turner argues that Sergeant Hanson willfully jabbed an evidentiary harpoon

       into the trial when he testified that Turner’s co-defendant had made a complete

       confession of everything, placing him in grave peril to which he should not have

       been subjected. Thus, Turner contends that the only proper remedy was a

       mistrial and that we should remand for a new trial.

[27]   An evidentiary harpoon occurs when the State deliberately places inadmissible

       evidence before the jury to prejudice the jurors against the defendant. Perez v.

       State, 728 N.E.2d 234, 237 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied. The harpoon

       may also be launched by a police officer witness. Id. (noting that the detective

       understood the significance of his improper testimony yet deliberately injected

       inadmissible evidence). Error alone, however, is not sufficient for reversal, as it

       must result in grave peril to the defendant. Id.

[28]   Where an evidentiary harpoon has been introduced at trial, we “require a high

       level of assurance that the irregularity did not affect the verdict before we will

       affirm the judgment.” Smith v. State, 471 N.E.2d 733, 736 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984)

       (quoting Hightower v. State, 296 N.E.2d 654, 659 (Ind. 1973)). It is not enough

       that the verdict is supported by sufficient evidence; we must be able to say with

       certainty that the improper testimony did not influence the verdict. See White v.

       State, 272 N.E.2d 312, 319 (Ind. 1971) (“[W]e cannot say with certainty that

       with such a difficult decision to make in the face of such conflicting testimony

       the jury was not influenced by the improper testimony of Officer Estes

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2404 | August 8, 2023        Page 11 of 14
       deliberately induced by the prosecutor, notwithstanding the admonition by the

       trial judge to disregard it.”); Smith, 471 N.E.2d at 736 (“[T]he evidence at trial,

       while sufficient to sustain Smith’s conviction, was not so free from conflict as to

       persuade us that Officer Gersey’s disputed testimony had no effect on the jury’s

       verdict.”). Our Supreme Court explained in White:

                The State apparently labors under the erroneous belief that in
                such cases as these, the burden is upon the party claiming error to
                conclusively demonstrate that the error caused the verdict to be
                what it was and that it would have been otherwise had the error
                not occurred. True, the burden is upon him to show that he was
                harmed; but this is done when it is made, by all the
                circumstances, to appear that the error placed him in a position
                of grave peril to which he should not have been subjected.

       272 N.E.2d at 319-20. “Where there are serious conflicts in the evidence

       entitling the jury to go either way upon the issue of guilt or innocence, it is

       especially important that they not be subjected to improper influences.” Id. at

       319.

[29]   Here, the trial court determined that the State, through Sergeant Hanson, had

       launched an evidentiary harpoon against Turner, and the State did not argue

       otherwise below. 2 That said, the trial court denied a mistrial on the basis that

       the error did not rise to the level of grave peril because there was other, properly

       2
         On appeal, the State argues for the first time that the challenged testimony did not constitute an evidentiary
       harpoon because Sergeant Hanson did not act deliberately to prejudice Turner nor was the challenged
       evidence inadmissible. The trial court clearly found otherwise, and the State has not preserved these grounds
       for appeal. Therefore, we do not address them.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2404 | August 8, 2023                                Page 12 of 14
       admitted evidence, tending to prove the same facts – that Spearman fired shots

       toward the Kia while Turner drove past the crash scene. The court expressly

       disagreed with Turner’s argument that Sergeant Hanson’s improper testimony

       that Spearman gave a compete confession of everything implied more than

       Spearman’s own involvement in the shooting. The trial court also believed that

       the error could be cured through either an admonishment or additional

       questioning of Sergeant Hanson, with Turner choosing the latter.

[30]   Turner argues that this case presented a close call for the jury regarding whether

       he knowingly or intentionally aided, induced, or caused Spearman to shoot at

       the Kia. He claims that Sergeant Hanson’s testimony that Spearman gave a

       complete confession of everything was “an improper shortcut to making that

       showing,” one likely to influence the verdict. Appellant’s Brief at 13. Turner also

       notes that the testimony was elicited by the State in response to cross-

       examination that highlighted the lack of digital evidence of planning or

       coordination between himself and Spearman or the other occupants of the

       Ford. Indeed, Sergeant Hanson testified that police did not need to investigate

       the suspects’ social media accounts because Spearman gave a complete

       confession of everything. In sum, Turner argues that even with the follow-up

       questioning, it was “impossible to cabin the confession to exclude Turner,” as

       “[r]easonable jurors may have been left with the impression that Spearman

       really did implicate Turner in his confession, but Sergeant Hanson was not

       supposed to talk about it.” Appellant’s Reply Brief at 11, 12.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2404 | August 8, 2023         Page 13 of 14
[31]   We agree with Turner. While there was sufficient evidence here to support the

       verdict, as Turner concedes, the evidence of his knowledge that Spearman and

       Luna planned to shoot at the Kia was too weak for us to say with certainty that

       the improper testimony did not influence the verdict. The prejudicial impact of

       testimony that Turner’s codefendant gave a complete confession of everything

       cannot be denied; it placed him in grave peril to which he should not have been

       subjected. And the peril was not eliminated by Sergeant Hanson’s subsequent

       clarification that, by said testimony, he meant only to communicate that

       Spearman confessed to firing the shots. The jury was still left to wonder to

       what extent Spearman’s confession implicated Turner, especially given that ISP

       stopped investigating Turner’s social media accounts after obtaining the

       confession. The trial court abused its discretion in denying Turner’s motion for

       a mistrial.

[32]   Judgment reversed and cause remanded for a new trial.

       Riley, J. and Pyle, J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2404 | August 8, 2023     Page 14 of 14