Court Opinion

ID: 9765520
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:04:48.999324+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:10.767879
License: Public Domain

COVINGTON, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
Section 188.130.2, RSMo 1986, provides: “No person shall maintain a cause of action or receive an award of damages based on the claim that but for the negligent conduct of another, a child would have been aborted.” Plaintiff’s petition asserts:
“As a direct and proximate result of the negligence and carelessness of the defendants, as aforesaid, this plaintiff was damaged in the following respects, to-wit: plaintiff was denied the right to choose whether or not to terminate her pregnancy; and as a result thereof plaintiff has incurred extraordinary expenses for medical care and treatment, special education, nursing care, physical therapy, medications, special equipment, devises (sic) and artificial limbs, all in the approximate sum of $25,000 and will for the life of her daughter, Letisha Shelton, incur in the future similar sums in an amount not presently ascertainable; plaintiff has suffered losses including loss of consortium, the right to lead a normal life; plaintiff has also suffered and will continue to suffer from emotional distress, anxiety and depression.” (emphasis added)
The petition clearly claims that, but for the negligent conduct of another, the plaintiff was denied the right to choose to abort her child. The substantial portion of damages claimed relate to the care of the child.
The principal opinion urges that plaintiffs claims of loss of consortium and loss of the right to lead a normal life may be .interpreted to allege some damage occurring after the birth, and, thus, are not prohibited by § 188.130.2. I cannot concur. It is indisputable that plaintiff suffered greatly at the birth of her child, but plaintiff does not allege, absent the implication that she would have elected to abort, that her life would be different today had she been informed fourteen weeks into her pregnancy that the fetus was deformed. Absent the implication that she would have chosen to abort, plaintiff does not suggest that she would not have suffered loss of consortium nor that she would now have a “normal” life had the ultrasound reading been accurate. Because of the statute, plaintiff alleges no cognizable claim for damages for loss of consortium and loss of the right to lead a normal life.
The principal opinion also finds damages arising from emotional distress. The principal opinion’s position on the question rests on the fact that, at oral argument in this Court, plaintiffs counsel suggested that, had plaintiff been advised of the *52child’s deformities prior to birth, plaintiff would have had time to obtain counseling to prepare her for the birth of a deformed child. Plaintiff’s petition, however, does not allege such damage, and whether such an allegation would state a cause of action is not now before this Court. In sum, plaintiff's petition alleges a claim for damages all of which flow from the allegation that, but for the negligent conduct of another, a child would have been aborted. The legislature has specifically precluded this cause of action. I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.