Court Opinion

ID: 9928170
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-30 22:02:24.083247+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:50:22.402209
License: Public Domain

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         BRUCE M. FELDER v. COMMISSIONER
                  OF CORRECTION
                     (SC 20576)
     Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria, Mullins and Ecker, Js.

                                  Syllabus

Pursuant to statute (§ 52-470 (d)), when a petitioner files a petition for a
   writ of habeas corpus ‘‘subsequent to a judgment on a prior petition
   challenging the same conviction, there shall be a rebuttable presumption
   that the filing of the subsequent petition has been delayed without good
   cause if such petition is filed after the later of . . . [t]wo years after
   the date on which the judgment in the prior petition is deemed to be a
   final judgment . . . [or] October 1, 2014 . . . .’’
Pursuant further to statute (§ 52-470 (e)), if the petitioner fails to demon-
   strate good cause for the delay, the habeas court shall dismiss the
   petition.

The petitioner, who had been convicted of various larceny offenses, filed
   a petition for a writ of habeas corpus after he had exhausted his direct
   appeals. The habeas court denied the petition, the Appellate Court dis-
   missed the petitioner’s appeal, and the habeas court’s judgment became
   final on May 9, 2012. Approximately nine days before the judgment in
   that habeas action became final, the petitioner filed a petition for a writ
   of habeas corpus in federal court. The federal habeas matter became
   final in June, 2015, when the federal court denied the petition and
   declined to issue a certificate of appealability. On May 18, 2017, the
   petitioner filed a second habeas petition in the Superior Court challeng-
   ing the conviction that was the subject of his first state habeas petition.
   The respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, requested that the
   habeas court issue an order directing the petitioner to show good cause
   why his second state habeas petition should not be dismissed pursuant
   to § 52-470 (e), claiming that it was filed after the applicable deadline
   in § 52-470 (d) of October 1, 2014. The habeas court issued an order to
   show cause for the delay. At an evidentiary hearing on the order to
   show cause, the petitioner’s counsel argued that the term ‘‘prior petition’’
   in § 52-470 (d) was not limited to habeas petitions filed in state court
   and, therefore, that the second state habeas petition was timely because
   it was filed within two years of the final judgment rendered in connection
   with the petitioner’s federal habeas petition. Alternatively, the petition-
   er’s counsel argued that, even if the second state habeas petition had
   been untimely, the petitioner had established good cause for the delay,
   insofar as the petitioner was not aware of § 52-470 (d) or its deadlines,
   and insofar as the petitioner’s former counsel could not have informed
   the petitioner of those deadlines because counsel had terminated their
   representation of the petitioner before the enactment of § 52-470 (d).
   The habeas court rendered judgment dismissing the petition, concluding
   that it was untimely filed and that the petitioner had not established
   good cause to excuse the delay. On the granting of certification, the
   petitioner appealed to the Appellate Court, which affirmed the habeas
   court’s judgment, concluding that the phrase ‘‘prior petition’’ does not
   include federal habeas petitions and that the petitioner’s alleged lack
   of knowledge of the deadlines prescribed by § 52-470 (d), without more,
   was insufficient to establish good cause for the delay in filing his second
   state habeas petition. On the granting of certification, the petitioner
   appealed to this court. Held:

1. The Appellate Court correctly concluded that the phrase ‘‘prior petition’’
    in § 52-470 (d) unambiguously refers solely to prior state habeas petitions
    and does not also include prior federal habeas petitions, and, accord-
    ingly, the petitioner’s second state habeas petition was untimely:

   Although § 52-470 does not explicitly indicate that the term ‘‘prior peti-
   tion’’ refers solely to state habeas petitions, and although the other
   provisions in chapter 915 of the General Statutes do not make it explicit
   that they are referring solely to state habeas applications, proceedings,
   or petitions, the provision (§ 52-466 (a)) in chapter 915 that contains the
   requirements for where a habeas petition must be filed specifies that
   the application must be made to the Connecticut Superior Court, and
   the Superior Court has jurisdiction over only state habeas petitions.

   Moreover, the entire statutory scheme in which § 52-470 is situated deals
   exclusively with state habeas petitions, if the legislature had intended
   any portion of that statute to address federal habeas petitions, it would
   have explicitly stated so, or the context would necessarily imply it, and,
   accordingly, the statute’s silence as to whether a ‘‘prior petition’’ includes
   a federal petition indicates that it does not include a federal petition
   within its scope.

   Furthermore, subsections (b) and (c) of § 52-470 dictate the procedures
   for, and treatment of, a ‘‘petition,’’ and, insofar as the legislature is
   empowered to dictate neither the procedures for federal habeas petitions
   nor when a federal court must dismiss a petition, it could not credibly be
   maintained that these other references to ‘‘petition’’ encompass federal
   habeas petitions.

   In addition, the petitioner’s claim that interpreting ‘‘prior petition’’ as
   limited to state habeas petitions would lead to absurd and unworkable
   results because it would require a petitioner to file simultaneous state
   and federal habeas petitions, resulting in an unnecessary state petition
   should he succeed on his federal habeas petition, was unavailing, as it
   is not uncommon for a petitioner to pursue simultaneous federal and
   state habeas petitions, and this court’s construction of § 52-470, which
   encourages petitioners to consolidate all their claims in their first state
   habeas petition or to bring any additional claims forward promptly once
   they become apparent, rather than waiting to complete litigation on a
   federal habeas claim, was consistent with the legislative intent of ensur-
   ing the expedient resolution of state habeas cases.

2. The habeas court properly exercised its discretion in determining that
    the petitioner had failed to establish good cause for the untimely filing
    of his second state habeas petition and properly dismissed that petition
    pursuant to § 52-470 (d) and (e):

   The petitioner’s claim that good cause existed because he was unaware
   of § 52-470 and its statutory deadlines when he filed the second state
   habeas petition was unavailing, as the petitioner’s lack of knowledge of
   the law, standing alone, was insufficient to excuse his late filing, and
   the petitioner did not present any testimony or argument to establish
   that his lack of knowledge was beyond his control.

   Moreover, the petitioner could not prevail on his claim, raised for the
   first time on appeal, that good cause existed because, even if he had
   known about § 52-470 and its deadlines, he could not have understood
   that the term ‘‘prior petition’’ in that statute encompassed only prior
   state habeas petitions, as this court could not conclude that the habeas
   court abused its discretion on the basis of evidence and arguments that
   were not presented to it.

   Furthermore, any interpretation contrary to this court’s interpretation
   that § 52-470 unambiguously refers solely to state habeas petitions would
   have been unreasonable, and, even if the statutory language was pre-
   viously unclear, the petitioner could not establish that any ambiguity in
   the statutory language established good cause for his late filing, as the
   petitioner testified at the evidentiary hearing that he was unaware of the
   statute prior to filing his second state habeas petition, which necessarily
   meant that he could not establish the necessary nexus between the
   purportedly unclear statutory language and his failure to timely file his
   second state habeas petition.
     Argued September 7, 2023—officially released January 23, 2024

                             Procedural History

   Petition for a writ of habeas corpus, brought to the
Superior Court in the judicial district of Tolland, where
the court, Newson, J., rendered judgment dismissing
the petition, from which the petitioner, on the granting
of certification, appealed to the Appellate Court, Alvord,
Cradle and Alexander, Js., which affirmed the habeas
court’s judgment, and the petitioner, on the granting of
certification, appealed to this court. Affirmed.
  Laila M. G. Haswell, senior assistant public defender,
for the appellant (petitioner).
   Laurie N. Feldman, assistant state’s attorney, with
whom, on the brief, were Sharmese L. Walcott, state’s
attorney, and Helen J. McLellan, senior assistant state’s
attorney, for the appellee (respondent).
                          Opinion

   MULLINS, J. As part of a legislative effort to expedite
the resolution of habeas cases, the General Assembly,
in 2012, passed legislation to curb the filing of untimely
habeas petitions. In particular, the legislature amended
General Statutes § 52-470 and created a rebuttable pre-
sumption of delay without good cause, providing that
Superior Court judges must dismiss habeas petitions
that are not filed within certain specified time periods.
See Public Acts 2012, No. 12-115, § 1. The time periods
relevant to this appeal are those related to successive
habeas petitions, which are codified at § 52-470 (d).
That provision provides in relevant part that, ‘‘[i]n the
case of a petition filed subsequent to a judgment on a
prior petition challenging the same conviction, there
shall be a rebuttable presumption that the filing of the
subsequent petition has been delayed without good
cause if such petition is filed after the later of . . .
[t]wo years after the date on which the judgment in the
prior petition is deemed to be a final judgment due to
the conclusion of appellate review or the expiration of
the time for seeking such review . . . [or] October 1,
2014 . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 52-
470 (d). If the petitioner fails to show good cause for
the delay, the habeas court shall dismiss the petition.
See General Statutes § 52-470 (e).
   The petitioner, Bruce M. Felder, appeals, upon our
grant of certification, from the judgment of the Appel-
late Court affirming the judgment of the habeas court,
which dismissed the petitioner’s habeas petition because
it was untimely filed and there was no good cause to
excuse the delay. This certified appeal requires us to
consider whether the Appellate Court correctly deter-
mined that (1) the phrase ‘‘prior petition,’’ as used in
§ 52-470 (d), unambiguously refers to prior state habeas
petitions and does not also include prior federal habeas
petitions, and (2) the habeas court had not abused its
discretion in dismissing the petition because the peti-
tioner did not establish good cause to excuse the
untimely filing of his habeas petition, as required by
§ 52-470 (e).1 We agree with the Appellate Court’s deter-
minations and, therefore, affirm the judgment of the
Appellate Court.
   The following facts and procedural history are rele-
vant to this appeal. In 2004, the petitioner was convicted
of one count each of larceny in the first degree and
larceny in the second degree. See State v. Felder, 95
Conn. App. 248, 250, 897 A.2d 614, cert. denied, 279
Conn. 905, 901 A.2d 1226 (2006). Following the exhaus-
tion of his direct appeals, the petitioner filed a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus in the Superior Court (first
state habeas petition) challenging his conviction, which
the habeas court denied. Felder v. Warden, Docket No.
TSR-CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S, 2011 WL 4583840, *5 (Conn. Super.
September 15, 2011). The Appellate Court dismissed the
petitioner’s appeal from the habeas court’s judgment;
see Felder v. Commissioner of Correction, 133 Conn.
App. 908, 36 A.3d 308 (2012); and the judgment became
final when this court denied his petition for certification
to appeal on May 9, 2012. See Felder v. Commissioner
of Correction, 304 Conn. 932, 43 A.3d 661 (2012). Pursu-
ant to § 52-470 (d), the petitioner had until October 1,
2014, to file a second state habeas petition challenging
the same conviction before the rebuttable presumption
of untimeliness applied.
   On April 30, 2012, approximately nine days before
the judgment on the first state habeas petition became
final, the petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus in the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Connecticut (federal habeas petition) pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his 2004 conviction. See
Felder v. Commissioner of Correction, Docket No. 3:12-
cv-00650 (MPS), 2015 WL 3466724, *1 (D. Conn. June
1, 2015). On June 1, 2015, the federal habeas matter
became final when the District Court denied that peti-
tion and declined to issue a certificate of appealability.
Id., *1, *6.
   On May 18, 2017, the petitioner filed the present peti-
tion for a writ of habeas corpus in the Superior Court
(second state habeas petition), challenging the same
underlying conviction from 2004. See Felder v. Commis-
sioner of Correction, 202 Conn. App. 503, 507, 246 A.3d
63 (2021). The respondent, the Commissioner of Correc-
tion, pursuant to § 52-470,2 requested that the habeas
court issue an order directing the petitioner to show
good cause for why his second state habeas petition
should not be dismissed, arguing that it was filed after
the statutory deadline of October 1, 2014. See id., 508.
   The habeas court issued an order to show cause
for the delay. Id. At the evidentiary hearing, the only
evidence presented was the testimony of the petitioner.
Id. The respondent’s counsel did not cross-examine the
petitioner or present any other evidence. Id. The peti-
tioner testified that, prior to having counsel appointed
to represent him in his second state habeas petition,3
he had never heard of, was not informed of, and thus
was not aware of § 52-470 or the time limitations it
places on filing a habeas petition following a final judg-
ment on a prior petition. See id., 509. He also testified
that, in addition to his first state habeas petition, he
had filed a federal habeas petition that was dismissed
in 2015. See id.
  After the petitioner’s testimony, the parties rested,
and the habeas court heard arguments from the parties’
counsel. The petitioner’s counsel argued that § 52-470
(d) does not expressly limit ‘‘prior petition challenging
the same conviction’’ to state habeas petitions, and,
therefore, the phrase includes both prior state habeas
petitions and prior federal habeas petitions challenging
the same conviction. See Felder v. Commissioner of
Correction, supra, 202 Conn. App. 509. Thus, counsel
maintained, the second state habeas petition was timely
because it was filed within two years of the final judg-
ment on the petitioner’s federal habeas petition in 2015.4
See id.
   Alternatively, the petitioner’s counsel argued that,
even if the second state habeas petition had been
untimely, the petitioner had established good cause for
the delay. Id. Specifically, counsel contended that the
petitioner was not aware of the statute or the statutory
deadlines and that the petitioner’s former counsel, who
represented him in connection with his first state habeas
petition, could not have informed the petitioner of the
deadlines because they had terminated their representa-
tion in early 2012, before the enactment of § 52-470 (d).
See id.
   The habeas court dismissed the second state habeas
petition, concluding that the presumption of unreason-
able delay applied because the petitioner’s interpreta-
tion of § 52-470 was inconsistent with the plain and
unambiguous language of the statute. The court also
found that the petitioner had not established good cause
to excuse the untimely second state habeas petition.
The court rejected the petitioner’s contention that his
lack of knowledge constituted good cause for the delay
because, the court reasoned, ‘‘ignorance of the law
excuses no one . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.)
   The petitioner, upon the granting of certification,
appealed to the Appellate Court, which affirmed the
judgment of the habeas court. Felder v. Commissioner
of Correction, supra, 202 Conn. App. 519. The Appellate
Court concluded that the phrase ‘‘prior petition’’ does
not include federal habeas petitions and that the peti-
tioner’s alleged lack of knowledge of the deadlines con-
tained in § 52-470, without more, was insufficient to
satisfy good cause for the delay in filing his second state
habeas petition. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.,
514–16, 519. On appeal to this court, the petitioner
claims that the Appellate Court erred in concluding that
(1) a federal habeas petition is not a ‘‘prior petition’’
as contemplated by § 52-470 (d), and (2) the habeas
court had not abused its discretion in determining that
the petitioner did not establish good cause for his delay.
We address each claim in turn.
                             I
   We first address the petitioner’s claim that the phrase
‘‘prior petition,’’ as used in § 52-470 (d), is intended to
include both state and federal habeas petitions. According
to the petitioner, the unambiguous language of the stat-
ute supports such a reading because, if the legislature
had intended to refer only to state habeas petitions, it
would have more precisely stated so. The petitioner
further argues that restricting the term ‘‘prior petition’’
to state habeas petitions would lead to absurd and
unworkable results because it would either require that
petitioners file simultaneous state and federal habeas
petitions, resulting in unnecessary habeas petitions, or
preclude them from filing subsequent state habeas peti-
tions, thus preventing courts from hearing meritorious
claims.5 For the reasons that follow, we disagree and
conclude that ‘‘prior petition’’ unambiguously refers
only to prior state habeas petitions.
   In addressing the issue of whether the phrase ‘‘prior
petition,’’ as used in § 52-470 (d), refers solely to prior
state habeas petitions or also includes federal habeas
petitions, we must interpret the statute in accordance
with General Statutes § 1-2z. In doing so, we exercise
plenary review. See, e.g., Kasica v. Columbia, 309 Conn.
85, 93, 70 A.3d 1 (2013). ‘‘[Section] 1-2z directs us first
to consider the text of the statute itself and its relation-
ship to other statutes. If . . . the meaning of such text
is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or
unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the mean-
ing of the statute shall not be considered.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Id. ‘‘The test to determine
ambiguity is whether the statute, when read in context,
is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpreta-
tion.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gonzalez v.
O & G Industries, Inc., 322 Conn. 291, 303, 140 A.3d
950 (2016).
   We thus begin with the text of the statute, which
provides in relevant part: ‘‘In the case of a petition filed
subsequent to a judgment on a prior petition challenging
the same conviction, there shall be a rebuttable pre-
sumption that the filing of the subsequent petition has
been delayed without good cause if such petition is
filed after the later of . . . [t]wo years after the date
on which the judgment in the prior petition is deemed
to be a final judgment due to the conclusion of appellate
review or the expiration of the time for seeking such
review . . . [or] October 1, 2014 . . . .’’ General Stat-
utes § 52-470 (d).
   Looking just at the words of the statute, we acknowl-
edge that it does not explicitly state that ‘‘prior petition’’
refers solely to state habeas petitions. ‘‘It is well settled,
however, that silence does not necessarily equate to
ambiguity.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State
v. Ramos, 306 Conn. 125, 136, 49 A.3d 197 (2012). Sec-
tion 1-2z directs us to examine challenged statutory
language, not in isolation, but in relation to the text and
statutes surrounding it. See, e.g., Kasica v. Columbia,
supra, 309 Conn. 93.
  The meaning of the term ‘‘prior petition’’ is elucidated
by examining the text of § 52-470 generally, as well as
the statute’s placement within the General Statutes. The
statute is contained within title 52, which governs civil
actions brought in state court, and specifically within
chapter 915, which establishes the procedural frame-
work that applies to habeas petitions in our state courts.
Chapter 915 contains the requirements a petitioner must
follow when filing a state habeas petition, including
where it must be filed and what it must include. See,
e.g., General Statutes § 52-466 (a) (2) (‘‘[a]n application
for a writ of habeas corpus claiming illegal confinement
or deprivation of liberty, made by or on behalf of an
inmate or prisoner confined in a correctional facility
as a result of a conviction of a crime, shall be made to
the superior court, or to a judge thereof, for the judicial
district of Tolland’’ (emphasis added)); General Statutes
§ 52-466 (b) (‘‘[t]he application shall be verified by the
affidavit of the applicant for the writ alleging that he
truly believes that the person on whose account the
writ is sought is illegally confined or deprived of his
liberty’’). This chapter also mandates the procedures
for Superior Court judges to follow when certifying
habeas petitions. See General Statutes § 52-466 (e) (‘‘[i]f
the application is made to a judge, the judge may certify
the proceedings into court’’). Finally, the chapter defines
the circumstances that demand the summary disposal
of a habeas petition and the procedures that our courts
must employ to do so. See General Statutes § 52-470.
    In each section of chapter 915, the legislature does
not make explicit that it is referring solely to state
habeas applications, proceedings, or petitions. Because
state legislatures regulate state processes, we presume,
particularly within a statutory scheme that governs how
courts of this state handle habeas procedures, that,
when the legislature refers to certain procedures, it
is speaking about state procedures. Indeed, when the
legislature intends to reference a federal procedure, it
does so explicitly, or the context would necessarily
imply it. See, e.g., General Statutes § 3-10b (a) (‘‘[t]he
Governor is authorized to request the head of any fed-
eral department administering a grant-in-aid program
under any federal law’’ (emphasis added)); General Stat-
utes § 17b-3 (b) (‘‘[t]he commissioner may enter into
contracts with the federal government concerning the
use and repayment of such funds under any such federal
act’’ (emphasis added)); General Statutes § 17b-105f (a)
(‘‘[t]he program shall provide for the receipt of federal
matching funds . . . for employment and training
activities that qualify for such matching funds under
federal law and regulations’’ (emphasis added)). Thus,
the statutory reference to ‘‘application,’’ ‘‘proceedings,’’
or ‘‘petition’’ is a reference to a state habeas application,
state habeas proceedings, or a state habeas petition.
   This is underscored by the language of § 52-466,
which specifies that the application must be made to
the Connecticut Superior Court. See General Statutes
§ 52-466 (a). Superior courts have jurisdiction over only
state habeas petitions, whereas federal courts have
jurisdiction over federal habeas petitions involving state
judgments. See 28 U.S.C. 2254 (a) (2018) (‘‘[t]he Supreme
Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district
court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas
corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the
judgment of a State court only on the ground that he
is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws
or treaties of the United States’’). Additionally, in the
provisions of chapter 915, the legislature provides the
process by which judges of the Superior Court must
handle habeas petitions filed in our state courts. The
entire statutory scheme in which § 52-470 is placed
deals exclusively with state habeas petitions. If the leg-
islature had intended any portion of that statute to
address federal habeas petitions, it would have specifi-
cally stated so, or the context would necessarily imply
it. As the Appellate Court pointed out, ‘‘the statute’s
silence as to whether a ‘prior petition’ includes a federal
petition therefore indicates that it does not [include a
federal petition within its scope].’’ Felder v. Commis-
sioner of Correction, supra, 202 Conn. App. 515.
   In addition to its relationship with the general statu-
tory scheme, it is also helpful to look to other subsec-
tions of § 52-470. It is a fundamental principle of our
jurisprudence that ‘‘[a]n identical term used in [statu-
tory provisions] pertaining to the same subject matter
should not be read to have differing meanings unless
there is some indication from the legislature that it
intended such a result.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) State v. Reynolds, 264 Conn. 1, 78, 836 A.2d 224
(2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 908, 124 S. Ct. 1614, 158
L. Ed. 2d 254 (2004). We, thus, turn to other references
to ‘‘petition’’ within § 52-470.
   Section 52-470 contains several other references to
‘‘petition,’’ each time indisputably referencing only state
habeas petitions. See, e.g., General Statutes § 52-470 (b)
(1) (‘‘[a]fter the close of all pleadings in a habeas corpus
proceeding, the court . . . shall determine whether
there is good cause for . . . the petition’’); General
Statutes § 52-470 (b) (3) (identifying what ‘‘petition’’
must contain to establish good cause and further provid-
ing that, ‘‘[i]f, after considering any evidence or argu-
ment . . . the court finds there is not good cause for
trial, the court shall dismiss all or part of the petition’’);
General Statutes § 52-470 (c) (governing when ‘‘a peti-
tion challenging a judgment of conviction’’ is filed out-
side statutory time limitations). In each of these
examples, the legislature has dictated the procedures
for, and the treatment of, a ‘‘petition’’ filed and adjudi-
cated in the Superior Court. Because the legislature is
empowered to dictate neither the procedures for federal
habeas petitions nor when a federal court must dismiss
a petition, it cannot be credibly maintained that these
other references to ‘‘petition’’ encompass federal
habeas petitions. Reading the statute within the context
of chapter 915 of the General Statutes and giving identi-
cal meaning to identical terms, we thus understand
‘‘prior petition’’ in § 52-470 (d) to unambiguously refer
only to state habeas petitions.
   The petitioner asserts that interpreting ‘‘prior peti-
tion’’ as limited to state habeas petitions would lead to
absurd and unworkable results because it would require
a petitioner to file simultaneous state and federal habeas
petitions, resulting in an unnecessary state petition
should he succeed on his federal habeas petition. The
petitioner further contends that waiting for the resolu-
tion of the federal habeas petition to file a subsequent
state habeas petition would present timeliness issues
because federal courts typically take more than two
years to render a final judgment on a federal habeas
petition. This, the petitioner argues, would contravene
the legislative purpose to expedite the resolution of
habeas cases in the state. We disagree.
   We have recently recognized that, when amending
§ 52-470 in 2012 to include the rebuttable presumption
of delay without good cause, the legislature intended
to ensure the expedient resolution of state habeas
cases. See Kelsey v. Commissioner of Correction, 329
Conn. 711, 717, 189 A.3d 578 (2018) (‘‘[t]he 2012 amend-
ments are significant . . . because they provide tools
to effectuate the original purpose of ensuring expedient
resolution of habeas cases’’). Our construction of the
statute is consistent with this legislative intent, as it
encourages petitioners to consolidate all their claims in
their first state habeas petition or to bring any additional
claims forward promptly once they become apparent,
rather than waiting to complete litigation on a federal
habeas claim.
   The fact that our interpretation of the statute may
require a petitioner to file simultaneous state and fed-
eral habeas petitions in order to preserve the opportu-
nity to pursue a subsequent state habeas petition does
not impair the legislative purpose of promoting the
expedient resolution of state habeas claims. It is not
uncommon for a petitioner to pursue simultaneous fed-
eral and state habeas petitions, and doing so does not
impede the progression of the state habeas action. See,
e.g., Abrams v. Commissioner of Correction, Docket
No. 3:17cv1732 (MPS), 2019 WL 919581, *6 (D. Conn.
February 25, 2019) (petitioner filed federal habeas peti-
tion while state habeas action was pending); Ham v.
Brighthaupt, Docket No. 3:11cv1705 (JBA), 2012 WL
5880668, *2 (D. Conn. November 21, 2012) (same). Our
reading of the statute simply requires petitioners to
pursue their state claims without unreasonable delay,
which the legislature has deemed to be two years from
the final judgment on a prior state habeas petition. See
General Statutes § 52-470 (d).
   We also reject the petitioner’s contention that this
construction, which precludes consideration of federal
habeas petitions, will mean that any subsequent state
habeas petition would likely be time barred if it is filed
after the resolution of a petitioner’s federal habeas peti-
tion because the adjudication of a federal habeas peti-
tion usually takes more than two years. Importantly,
the statute itself does not categorically preclude subse-
quent petitions filed beyond the two year mark; it simply
establishes a rebuttable presumption of delay. It is clear
to us that, as a result of a comprehensive habeas reform
initiative to expedite the resolution of state habeas peti-
tions, our legislature limited the inquiry regarding delay
to the time period between final judgment on a prior
state habeas petition and the filing of a subsequent state
habeas petition. We find nothing absurd or unworkable
in its considered decision to do so.
                            II
   Having concluded that the term ‘‘prior petition’’ in
§ 52-470 (d) unambiguously refers only to prior state
habeas petitions, we now turn to the petitioner’s alter-
native ground for reversal. Because the petitioner’s first
state habeas petition reached final judgment on May 9,
2012, he could have filed his second state habeas peti-
tion on or before October 1, 2014, without having to
show good cause for any delay. See General Statutes
§ 52-470 (d). The petitioner, however, did not file his
second state habeas petition until nearly three years
after that deadline. Nevertheless, the petitioner con-
tends that, even if this court finds that his petition was
untimely, the habeas court erred in concluding that he
failed to establish good cause necessary to excuse his
delay. He argues that good cause exists because he was
unaware of § 52-470 and its statutory deadlines when
he filed the second state habeas petition. In addition,
the petitioner contends, for the first time on appeal,
that, even if he had known about the statute, he could
not have known that the statute may be interpreted to
require that he file a state habeas petition before the
completion of his federal habeas petition. We conclude
that the habeas court properly exercised its discretion
in determining that the petitioner failed to establish
good cause for the untimely filing of his second state
habeas petition.
   As we have recently concluded, ‘‘a habeas court’s
determination regarding good cause under § 52-470 (e)
is reviewed on appeal only for abuse of discretion. Thus,
[w]e will make every reasonable presumption in favor
of upholding the [habeas] court’s ruling[s] . . . . In
determining whether there has been an abuse of discre-
tion, the ultimate issue is whether the court . . . rea-
sonably [could have] conclude[d] as it did.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Kelsey v. Commissioner of
Correction, 343 Conn. 424, 440, 274 A.3d 85 (2022).
   In making a good cause determination, courts must
consider the totality of the circumstances in light of
several factors, none of which alone is dispositive,
including ‘‘(1) whether external forces outside the con-
trol of the petitioner had any bearing on the delay; (2)
whether and to what extent the petitioner or his counsel
bears any personal responsibility for any excuse prof-
fered for the untimely filing; (3) whether the reasons
proffered by the petitioner in support of a finding of
good cause are credible and are supported by evidence
in the record; and (4) how long after the expiration of
the filing deadline did the petitioner file the petition.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 438. ‘‘[T]o rebut
successfully the presumption of unreasonable delay in
§ 52-470, a petitioner generally will be required to dem-
onstrate that something outside of the control of the
petitioner or habeas counsel caused or contributed to
the delay.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.,
441–42.
   Before the habeas court, the petitioner’s only asserted
basis to establish good cause for his delay in filing the
second state habeas petition was that he was unaware
of the existence of § 52-470. Although a petitioner’s lack
of knowledge of § 52-470 is ‘‘potentially sufficient to
establish good cause for an untimely filing, the legisla-
ture did not intend for a petitioner’s lack of knowledge
of the law, standing alone, to establish that a petitioner
has met his evidentiary burden of establishing good
cause. As with any excuse for a delay in filing, the
ultimate determination is subject to the same factors
previously discussed . . . [such as] whether external
forces outside the control of the petitioner had any
bearing on his lack of knowledge . . . .’’ (Footnote
omitted.) Id., 444–45.
   Accordingly, we turn to the habeas court’s determina-
tion and the extent to which it considered factors
beyond the petitioner’s control. The court acknowledged
the petitioner’s testimony and noted that, although the
petitioner was unaware of the existence of § 52-470, he
‘‘failed to present any ‘good cause’ in the present case
for filing this petition nearly three years beyond the
. . . deadline.’’ The petitioner did not present any testi-
mony or argument to establish that his lack of knowl-
edge was beyond his control. He made no claim, for
example, that his ignorance of the statutory deadline
was the result of ineffective assistance of counsel. See
Rose v. Commissioner of Correction, 348 Conn. 333,
349, 304 A.3d 431 (2023) (‘‘ineffective assistance of
counsel is an external, objective factor that may consti-
tute good cause to excuse the delayed filing of a habeas
petition’’). Thus, considering the testimony in the
record, we conclude that the habeas court did not abuse
its discretion in finding that good cause was not estab-
lished.
   For the first time on appeal, the petitioner contends
that good cause exists because a lay reading of the
statute suggests that both state and federal habeas peti-
tions delay the statutory time limitations, and, there-
fore, even if he had read or been familiar with the
statute, he could not have understood that the term
‘‘prior petition’’ in § 52-470 (d) meant only prior state
habeas petitions. The petitioner neither testified to this
nor did he present this argument before the habeas
court. Thus, we cannot conclude that the habeas court
abused its discretion on the basis of evidence and argu-
ments that were not presented to it.
   In any event, in part I of this opinion, we concluded
that the statute unambiguously refers solely to state
petitions, and, therefore, any contrary interpretation by
the petitioner would have been unreasonable. More-
over, even if the statutory language was unclear prior
to our decision today, the petitioner’s argument fails
because he testified at the evidentiary hearing that he
was unaware of the statute prior to filing his second
state habeas petition, which necessarily means that he
cannot establish a nexus between the purportedly
unclear statutory language and his failure to timely file.
Without such a showing, he cannot establish that any
ambiguity in the statutory language was good cause
for his late filing. See, e.g., Ortiz v. Commissioner of
Correction, 211 Conn. App. 378, 388–89, 272 A.3d 692
(when petitioner presented evidence of mental health
deficiencies without showing how deficiencies affected
filing, habeas court was not required to infer connection
and find good cause for delay), cert. denied, 343 Conn.
927, 281 A.3d 1186 (2022); Velez v. Commissioner of
Correction, 203 Conn. App. 141, 148–49, 153–54, 247
A.3d 579 (habeas court did not abuse its discretion in
determining that petitioner had failed to establish good
cause for delay in filing his successive habeas petition
when petitioner established only that he had ‘‘ ‘signifi-
cant’ ’’ mental deficiencies but failed to establish causal
connection between those deficiencies and his failure
to timely file), cert. denied, 336 Conn. 942, 250 A.3d
40 (2021).
   Although the petitioner argued before the habeas
court that his second state habeas petition was not
untimely because it was filed within two years of the
final judgment rendered in connection with his federal
habeas petition, he never argued that an ambiguity in
the statute caused him to file his petition in an untimely
manner. Rather, before the habeas court, the petitioner
testified that he had not been informed of, and was
unaware of, § 52-470 and its time limitations. Having
testified that he never read the statute, the petitioner
did not and could not establish that any ambiguity in
the statute caused him to file his petition in an untimely
manner. He presented the habeas court only with his
lack of knowledge of the statutory time limitations.
That, standing alone, we have already determined, is
insufficient to establish good cause. See Kelsey v. Com-
missioner of Correction, supra, 343 Conn. 444.
  Therefore, we agree with the Appellate Court that the
habeas court did not abuse its discretion in determining
that the petitioner had failed to demonstrate good cause
for the delay in filing the second state habeas petition
and that the habeas court properly dismissed the peti-
tion in accordance with § 52-470 (d) and (e).
      The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.
      In this opinion the other justices concurred.
  1
     We granted certification, limited to the following issues: ‘‘Did the Appel-
late Court correctly determine that the meaning of ‘a prior petition challeng-
ing the same conviction’ in . . . § 52-470 (d) plainly and unambiguously
refers only to prior state habeas petitions?’’ And ‘‘[d]id the Appellate Court
correctly determine that the habeas court did not abuse its discretion in
rejecting the petitioner’s claim that his ignorance of the statutory deadlines
was good cause necessary to overcome the rebuttable presumption of unrea-
sonable delay as set forth in § 52-470 (d) and (e)?’’ (Emphasis omitted.)
Felder v. Commissioner of Correction, 336 Conn. 924, 924–25, 246 A.3d
985 (2021).
   We also granted certification on a third issue: ‘‘Did the Appellate Court
correctly apply the ‘abuse of discretion’ standard of review to the habeas
court’s determination that the petitioner had failed to show good cause for
delay pursuant to § 52-470 (d) and (e) in filing his habeas petition?’’ Id., 925.
After we granted certification but before the parties filed their briefs in this
case, this court decided Kelsey v. Commissioner of Correction, 343 Conn.
424, 274 A.3d 85 (2022), which concluded that such determinations are
properly reviewed on appeal for abuse of discretion. See id., 432, 440. Both
parties concede, and we agree, that Kelsey resolves this issue.
   2
     General Statutes § 52-470 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(d) In the case of
a petition filed subsequent to a judgment on a prior petition challenging the
same conviction, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that the filing of
the subsequent petition has been delayed without good cause if such petition
is filed after the later of the following: (1) Two years after the date on which
the judgment in the prior petition is deemed to be a final judgment due to
the conclusion of appellate review or the expiration of the time for seeking
such review; [or] (2) October 1, 2014 . . . . For the purposes of this section,
the withdrawal of a prior petition challenging the same conviction shall not
constitute a judgment. The time periods set forth in this subsection shall
not be tolled during the pendency of any other petition challenging the same
conviction. . . .
   ‘‘(e) In a case in which the rebuttable presumption of delay under subsec-
tion . . . (d) of this section applies, the court, upon the request of the
respondent, shall issue an order to show cause why the petition should be
permitted to proceed. The petitioner . . . shall have a meaningful opportu-
nity to investigate the basis for the delay and respond to the order. If . . .
the court finds that the petitioner has not demonstrated good cause for the
delay, the court shall dismiss the petition. . . .’’
   3
     After the petitioner filed his second state habeas petition as a self-
represented party, the habeas court ‘‘granted the petitioner’s request that
counsel be appointed for him.’’ Felder v. Commissioner of Correction, supra,
202 Conn. App. 509 n.7.
   4
     If, as habeas counsel argued, and the petitioner contends on appeal,
‘‘prior petition,’’ as used in § 52-470 (d), includes federal habeas petitions,
the petitioner would have had until June 1, 2017, two years after the final
disposition of his federal habeas petition, to file his second state habeas
petition without having to show good cause for any delay.
   5
     The petitioner contends that, because federal habeas petitions usually
take more than two years to resolve, most petitioners would be time barred
from filing a state habeas petition after the completion of their federal
habeas action.