Court Opinion

ID: 9533971
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:35:59.214825+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:29:14.963100
License: Public Domain

Owsley, J.,
dissenting: I respectfully dissent. K. S. A. 68-419 provides:
“(a) Any person who shall without negligence on his part sustain damage by reason of ... or defect in a state highway, . . . may recover such damages from the state. . . .”
K. S. A. 8-511 provides:
“(a) The state highway commission shall place and maintain such traffic control devices, conforming to its manual and specifications, upon all state highways as it shall deem necessary to indicate and to carry out the provisions of this act or to regulate, warn, or guide traffic.”
The State Highway Commission adopted a Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and Highways in 1962 which contains the following provision:
“In addition to markings, a guardrail should be placed in advance of solid obstructions such as bridge supports, overhead sign supports, and end posts of *889bridges. The purpose of the guardrail is to deflect vehicles and reduce the severity of impact. Guardrails should be painted white and may be reflectorized.” (p. 147.)
The manual so adopted has the force and effect of law (Brown v. State Highway Commission, 202 Kan. 1, 444 P. 2d 882); therefore, the law of this state on the date of the tragic accident in this case required guardrails at this location. The obligation of the state to provide guardrails was recognized by the state in entering into a contract for the construction of guardrails several months before this accident.
In Earnest v. State Highway Commission, 182 Kan. 357, 320 P. 2d 847, we said:
“. . . The policy of courts is to handle each case separately and either to include it in or exclude it from the operation of the statute. Where circumstances are such that an alleged defect cannot be excluded from the operation of the statute as a matter of law, it presents a proper case for a jury to determine. Without any legal foot rule by which to measure an alleged defective condition, it must be compared with general conditions and surrounding circumstances, and, in one sense of the word, the question whether a given condition constitutes a defect within the meaning of the statute is relative.” (pp. 359, 360.)
Applying the relative rule to the facts in this case does not justify the conclusion of the majority of this court. I realize the wide discretionary power the rule implies, but its application must not be arbitrarily exercised. If the law of this state requires guardrails at a highway location, absence of such guardrails may constitute a defect in the highway. The majority opinion that no defect existed in this highway as a matter of law is a result of arbitrary exercise of a discretionary power.
The amount of the verdict was not questioned by the State Highway Commission and, even though substantial, it has no bearing on the issue of law before the court.
Prager, J., joins in the foregoing dissenting opinion.