Court Opinion

ID: 9911161
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-19 17:00:43.228945+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:56:13.989455
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 22-3246            Document: 010110971043   Date Filed: 12/19/2023   Page: 1
                                                                                    FILED
                                                                        United States Court of Appeals
                           UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       Tenth Circuit

                                 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                       December 19, 2023
                             _________________________________
                                                                            Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                                Clerk of Court
  DANIELLE DAVIS,

         Plaintiff - Appellant,

  v.                                                            No. 22-3246
                                                       (D.C. No. 2:21-CV-02142-HLT)
  PHK STAFFING LLC, d/b/a Hollywood                               (D. Kan.)
  Casino at Kansas Speedway,

         Defendant - Appellee.

  ------------------------------

  EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
  OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,

         Amici Curiae.
                             _________________________________

                                 ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
                             _________________________________

 Before TYMKOVICH, McHUGH, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges.
                  _________________________________

        For seven months, Danielle Davis worked for PHK Staffing LLC, doing

 business as Hollywood Casino at Kansas Speedway. Davis suffered from severe

 asthma, which at times caused her to arrive late, leave early, or miss work altogether.

 After her employment ended, Davis sued Hollywood Casino under the American with

        *
         This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines
 of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. But it may be cited for its
 persuasive value. See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a); 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A).
Appellate Case: 22-3246    Document: 010110971043        Date Filed: 12/19/2023    Page: 2

 Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213, alleging that it failed to

 accommodate her disability and then terminated her employment because of that

 disability. The district court granted summary judgment to Hollywood Casino on

 both claims, and Davis appeals.

       We affirm. For her failure-to-accommodate claim, Davis cannot establish a

 prima facie case because she never requested a plausibly reasonable accommodation.

 And on her disparate-treatment claim, Davis fails to provide evidence that Hollywood

 Casino’s proffered legitimate reason for terminating her employment—her violation

 of its attendance policy—was a pretext for discrimination.

                                      Background

       Davis began her seven-month stint at Hollywood Casino in July 2019.

 Hollywood Casino operates table games (such as blackjack, roulette, and craps), and

 Davis worked in a dual role as a table-games dealer and supervisor.

       Throughout Davis’s employment, Hollywood Casino maintained a “no-fault

 attendance policy.” App. vol. 2, 6. Under that policy, employees accumulate points

 for attendance “incidents” such as arriving late, leaving early, and being absent. App.

 vol. 1, 92. If an employee accrues more than 12 points in a rolling 12-month period,

 “[t]ermination will result.” Id. at 91. Only certain absences do not count towards this

 limit, including those taken for bereavement or for work-related injuries. Hollywood

 Casino’s no-fault attendance policy “expresses [its] requirement that employees be

 present and ready to work for the entirety of each scheduled shift.” App. vol. 2, 6.

       When Davis began working at Hollywood Casino, she asked Stephanie Beck,

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 who worked in human resources, about the availability of leave under the Family and

 Medical Leave Act (FMLA) for her severe asthma. Beck explained that Davis could

 not obtain FMLA leave until she had worked at Hollywood Casino for one year and

 that she could instead request an accommodation under the casino’s ADA policy.

 Soon after this conversation, Davis informed Beck that she might need an

 accommodation, and Beck gave her documents to request one. But Davis decided not

 to proceed with the request at the time, believing she could comply with the

 attendance policy until she qualified for FMLA leave.

        In October 2019, Davis’s asthma symptoms worsened. On one occasion, she

 suffered an asthma attack at work, causing her to leave early. And a week later, she

 missed work because of an asthma flare-up. Davis received 3.5 points for these two

 attendance incidents.

        The next month, Davis formally requested an accommodation for her

 disability. In particular, she asked Hollywood Casino to (1) not assess any attendance

 points or “h[o]ld [it] against her” if she “call[ed] in or le[ft] early due to [a] severe

 asthma attack” and (2) remove the points she received for the two asthma-related

 attendance incidents in October. App. vol. 1, 101. Davis also submitted a verification

 form completed by her physician, which stated that she had severe asthma and

 recommended leave as an accommodation. Two days after submitting the

 accommodation request and verification form, Davis again missed work because of

 her asthma and received one attendance point. She saw her physician that day and

 later gave Hollywood Casino a doctor’s note confirming as much. The note also

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 reiterated that Davis “may need days off from work in the future due to chronic

 asthma and other flare-ups.” Id. at 110.

       After reviewing these documents, Beck determined that she needed additional

 information from Davis’s physician to assess whether a reasonable accommodation

 was available. Beck attempted to obtain that information over the next few months,

 but Davis’s physician was unresponsive and eventually just faxed back the

 verification form Davis had originally submitted. Citing insufficient information,

 Hollywood Casino denied Davis’s accommodation request in February 2020.

       Later that month, Davis was late to work due to an asthma attack. Davis

 received 1.5 points for her tardiness, which raised her total points to 13—above the

 12-point limit under Hollywood Casino’s attendance policy. When Davis arrived at

 the casino, she visited Beck in human resources to discuss the situation. The parties

 dispute what happened next: Davis maintains that Hollywood Casino fired her at the

 meeting, and Hollywood Casino asserts that she resigned before it could do so. In

 either event, Davis’s employment ended in February 2020.

       Davis then sued Hollywood Casino under the ADA, alleging that it failed to

 accommodate her disability and terminated her employment because of her

 disability.1 The district court awarded summary judgment to Hollywood Casino on

 both her failure-to-accommodate and disparate-treatment claims.2 Davis appeals.

       1
          Davis also asserted an ADA retaliation claim, but she has abandoned that
 claim on appeal.
        2
          To distinguish it from her failure-to-accommodate claim, the district court
 referred to Davis’s claim that Hollywood Casino discriminated against her by
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                                         Analysis

       Davis argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to

 Hollywood Casino. We review the district court’s summary-judgment order de novo,

 applying the same standard as the district court. Aubrey v. Koppes, 975 F.3d 995,

 1004 (10th Cir. 2020). Under this standard, summary judgment is appropriate if

 “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to

 judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). We address Davis’s failure-to-

 accommodate and disparate-treatment claims in turn.3

 I.    Failure to Accommodate

       To establish a prima facie failure-to-accommodate claim, Davis must “make an

 initial showing that ‘(1) she is disabled; (2) she is “otherwise qualified”; and (3) she

 requested a plausibly reasonable accommodation.’” Herrmann v. Salt Lake City

 terminating her employment because of her disability as the “discrimination claim.”
 App. vol. 2, 157. But an employer’s failure to provide a reasonable accommodation
 to an otherwise qualified employee is also a type of discrimination under the ADA.
 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A); Exby-Stolley v. Bd. of Cnty. Cmm’rs, 979 F.3d 784,
 797 (10th Cir. 2020) (en banc). Because this case involves two different
 discrimination claims, we refer to what the district court called Davis’s
 “discrimination claim” as her “disparate-treatment claim.” See Edmonds-Radford v.
 Sw. Airlines Co., 17 F.4th 975, 989 (10th Cir. 2021).
        3
          Before doing so, we pause to note that the Equal Employment Opportunity
 Commission filed an amicus brief supporting Davis in which it makes several
 arguments that she does not advance on appeal. Because an amicus is not a party,
 “we ordinarily decline to consider arguments raised only by an amicus.” Sierra Club
 v. EPA, 964 F.3d 882, 897 n.15 (10th Cir. 2020). And we take that path here,
 discerning no reason “to stray from the parties’ properly[ ]preserved arguments.”
 Dutcher v. Matheson, 840 F.3d 1183, 1204 (10th Cir. 2016); see also Tyler v. City of
 Manhattan, 118 F.3d 1400, 1404 (10th Cir. 1997) (explaining that although we have
 discretion to reach arguments made solely in amicus brief, “we should exercise that
 discretion only in exceptional circumstances”).
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 Corp., 21 F.4th 666, 674 (10th Cir. 2021) (quoting Punt v. Kelly Servs., 862 F.3d

 1040, 1050 (10th Cir. 2017)). If she does so, the burden shifts to Hollywood Casino

 to present evidence either “conclusively rebutting one or more elements of [Davis]’s

 prima facie case” or “establishing an affirmative defense.” Id. (quoting Punt, 862

 F.3d at 1050).

       We begin and end with the third element of the prima facie test: whether Davis

 requested a plausibly reasonable accommodation. A reasonable accommodation is

 one that “presently, or in the near future, enable[s] the employee to perform the

 essential functions of h[er] job.” Aubrey, 975 F.3d at 1007 (quoting Lincoln v. BNSF

 Ry. Co., 900 F.3d 1166, 1205 (10th Cir. 2018)). “The determination of whether a

 requested accommodation is reasonable must be made on the facts of each case[,]

 taking into consideration the particular individual’s disability and employment

 position.” Id. (quoting Punt, 862 F.3d at 1050). Davis contends that she requested

 two plausibly reasonable accommodations: (1) unscheduled leave as necessary; and

 (2) removal of the points she accrued for her two asthma-related attendance incidents

 in October 2019.

       A.     Unscheduled Leave

       We first consider Davis’s request that Hollywood Casino allow her to leave

 early, arrive late, and miss work altogether on an unscheduled, as-needed basis. The

 district court determined that this open-ended leave request would require eliminating

 an essential function of Davis’s job: regular and reliable attendance. See Mason v.

 Avaya Commc’ns, Inc., 357 F.3d 1114, 1119 (10th Cir. 2004) (“[P]hysical attendance

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 in the workplace is itself an essential function of most jobs.”). And for that reason,

 the district court concluded, the requested accommodation was unreasonable. See

 Unrein v. PHC-Fort Morgan, Inc., 993 F.3d 873, 878 (10th Cir. 2021) (“[A]n

 employee’s request to be relieved from an essential function of her position is not, as

 a matter of law, a reasonable or even plausible accommodation.” (quoting Punt, 862

 F.3d at 1051)).

       Challenging this conclusion, Davis argues that a genuine dispute exists as to

 whether regular and reliable attendance is an essential job function. But Hollywood

 Casino’s vice president of human resources explained that regular and reliable

 attendance is itself an essential function, and a prerequisite to other essential

 functions, of all positions at the casino. This is particularly true for employees in the

 table-games department, the vice president stated, because they operate table

 games—the core service Hollywood Casino offers its customers—in person at the

 casino. According to the vice president, unscheduled absences by dealers “can result

 in insufficient staffing to [run] the desired number of table games,” making such

 absences especially disruptive. App. vol. 1, 151. And it is undisputed that Hollywood

 Casino’s no-fault attendance policy “expresses [its] requirement that employees be

 present and ready to work for the entirety of each scheduled shift.” App. vol. 2, 6.

       To be sure, regular and reliable attendance does not become an essential

 function simply because Hollywood Casino says so. Davis could rebut that assertion

 with evidence that the attendance requirement was not “job-related, uniformly

 enforced, [or] consistent with business necessity.” Mason, 357 F.3d at 1119. But

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 without such evidence, we generally defer to the employer’s judgment about whether

 a job function is essential. Id.

        Davis offers no rebuttal evidence here. Instead, she simply highlights that

 Hollywood Casino’s attendance policy allows for some unscheduled absences, such

 as when an employee misses work because of a death in the family or a work-related

 injury. But Davis does not explain, and we fail to see, how the mere fact that

 Hollywood Casino excuses unscheduled absences in these limited circumstances

 undermines its judgment about whether regular and reliable attendance is an essential

 job function. See Samper v. Providence St. Vincent Med. Ctr., 675 F.3d 1233, 1239

 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that regular attendance constituted essential function even

 though employer’s attendance policy “allow[ed] for some unplanned absences”);

 Higgins v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 931 F.3d 664, 670 (8th Cir. 2019) (“The fact that the

 attendance policy allows for ‘personal lay-offs’ under certain circumstances does not

 create a material question of fact regarding whether job attendance is an essential

 function.”). Thus, the district court properly concluded that regular and reliable

 attendance is an essential job function.

        Davis next contends that even if regular and reliable attendance is an essential

 job function, she could have performed this function had Hollywood Casino allowed

 her to take unscheduled absences as needed. To be sure, as Davis emphasizes, leave

 can constitute a reasonable accommodation even when attendance is an essential job

 function—it “may allow an employee sufficient time to recover from an injury or

 illness such that the employee can perform the essential functions of the job (i.e.,

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 attend work) in the future.” Punt, 862 F.3d at 1051 (quoting Cisneros v. Wilson, 226

 F.3d 1113, 1129 (10th Cir. 2000), overruled on other grounds by Bd. of Trs. of Univ.

 of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001)). But “the term ‘reasonable accommodation’

 refers to those accommodations which presently, or in the near future, enable the

 employee to perform the essential functions of his job.” Id. (quoting Cisneros, 226

 F.3d at 1129). So “a request for indefinite leave is not reasonable as a matter of law.”

 Herrmann, 21 F.4th at 676.

       And Davis’s request was just that: a request for an open-ended, indefinite

 amount of time off from work. Indeed, she asked that Hollywood Casino allow her to

 “call[] in or leave[] early” as needed, on an unscheduled basis, without accumulating

 any attendance points. App. vol. 1, 101. This proposed accommodation would have

 permitted Davis to work an open-ended schedule with the freedom to arrive late,

 leave early, or stay home as often as she felt she needed to, for an indefinite length of

 time. We agree with the district court that such an open-ended leave request—which

 effectively sought an exemption from the essential job function of regularly and

 reliably attending work—was unreasonable. See Unrein, 993 F.3d at 878 (holding

 that employee’s request for flexible schedule sought “unreasonable accommodation

 as a matter of law” where “physical presence . . . on a set and predictable schedule”

 constituted essential job function).

       Resisting this conclusion, Davis attempts to dispute the open-endedness of her

 leave request. She contends that a reasonable jury could find she intended to use

 intermittent leave under the ADA only until she became eligible for FMLA leave. As

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  support, Davis notes that she requested this accommodation after asking Beck about

  the availability of FMLA leave and learning that she did not yet qualify for it. But no

  record evidence suggests that Davis ever informed Hollywood Casino she needed the

  accommodation only until she could obtain FMLA leave or that Hollywood Casino

  understood as much; nor is there any evidence that Davis estimated how often she

  would need to miss work until she had access to FMLA leave. Davis therefore failed

  to establish a genuine dispute about the open-endedness of her leave request. Cf.

  Dansie v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 42 F.4th 1184, 1195 (10th Cir. 2022) (holding that

  employee established genuine dispute over leave request’s open-endedness by

  providing evidence that “he requested up to five days off per month for a specific

  period of time—until he could obtain FMLA leave”). For these reasons, no

  reasonable jury could find that Davis’s leave request was plausibly reasonable.

        B.     Removal of Attendance Points

        We next consider Davis’s request that Hollywood Casino remove the points

  she received for her two October 2019 asthma-related attendance incidents. In the

  district court’s view, this point-removal request merely asked Hollywood Casino to

  excuse past misconduct and was therefore unreasonable. See DeWitt v. Sw. Bell Tel.

  Co., 845 F.3d 1299, 1316 (10th Cir. 2017) (holding that ADA “does not require

  employers to reasonably accommodate an employee’s disability by overlooking past

  misconduct,” even if such “misconduct resulted from the employee’s disability”).

        On appeal, Davis argues that she never sought forgiveness for any misconduct.

  Contrary to the district court’s view, Davis says, missing work “does not necessarily

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  amount to ‘misconduct’ when considering the plain meaning of the word.” Aplt. Br.

  28. But even if we agreed with Davis, it would not render her point-removal request

  plausibly reasonable. “An employer may impose disciplinary action, consistent with

  its policies as applied to other employees, for attendance problems that occurred prior

  to a request for reasonable accommodation,” and the ADA does not require it to

  rescind such discipline when asked to do so. U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n,

  The Americans with Disabilities Act: Applying Performance and Conduct Standards

  to Employees with Disabilities, 2008 WL 4786697, at *23 (2008); see also DeWitt,

  845 F.3d at 1318 (“[A] denied request for retroactive leniency cannot support an

  accommodation claim . . . .”). Here, the October 2019 attendance incidents occurred

  before Davis made her accommodation request, so Hollywood Casino had no

  obligation to withdraw the points it gave her for those incidents. Moreover, Davis

  fails to show that granting her point-removal request would have equipped her to

  attend work regularly and reliably moving forward. Indeed, as her open-ended leave

  request and attendance incidents illustrate, Davis needed more flexibility and time off

  from work than this accommodation would have given her. See Aubrey, 975 F.3d at

  1007 (explaining that for accommodation to be reasonable, it must “presently, or in

  the near future, enable the employee to perform the essential functions of h[er] job”).

  For these reasons, Davis’s point-removal request was not plausibly reasonable.

        Because neither accommodation she requested was plausibly reasonable, Davis

  failed to establish a prima facie case for failure to accommodate. See Herrmann, 21

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  F.4th at 674. The district court therefore properly granted summary judgment to

  Hollywood Casino on Davis’s failure-to-accommodate claim.

  II.   Disparate Treatment

        As for her disparate-treatment claim, Davis proceeds under the familiar

  burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411

  U.S. 792 (1973). See Edmonds-Radford, 17 F.4th at 989. At the first step of this

  framework, Davis must establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Id. This

  requires Davis to show that “(1) she is disabled within the meaning of the ADA,

  (2) she is qualified to perform the essential functions of the job with or without

  accommodation, and (3) she suffered an adverse employment action because of her

  disability.” Id. at 989–90. At the second step, the burden shifts to Hollywood Casino

  to “offer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for termination.” Id. at 990. If

  Hollywood Casino does so, the burden returns to Davis at the third step “to show a

  genuine issue as to whether [that] reason was pretextual.” Id.

        For our purposes, we will assume that Davis established a prima facie case of

  discrimination. And we agree with the district court that Hollywood Casino offered a

  legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating her employment: Davis accrued

  more than 12 points in a rolling 12-month period, in violation of the attendance

  policy. We therefore focus our analysis on pretext.

        To show pretext, Davis “must come forward with evidence that [Hollywood

  Casino] didn’t really believe its proffered reason[] for action and thus may have been

  pursuing a hidden discriminatory agenda.” DeWitt, 845 F.3d at 1307. She can do so

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  by exposing “such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherences, or

  contradictions in [Hollywood Casino]’s proffered legitimate reason[] for its action

  that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find [that reason] unworthy of credence.”

  Id. (quoting Morgan v. Hilti, Inc., 108 F.3d 1319, 1323 (10th Cir. 1997)). Typically,

  a plaintiff establishes pretext with evidence that: (1) “the defendant’s stated reason

  for the adverse employment action was false”; (2) “the defendant acted contrary to a

  written company policy prescribing the action to be taken by the defendant under the

  circumstances”; or (3) the defendant treated the plaintiff “differently from other

  similarly[ ]situated employees who violated work rules of comparable seriousness.”

  Id. (quoting Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Servs., Inc., 220 F.3d 1220, 1230 (10th Cir.

  2000)).

        Davis asserts that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to pretext. Yet she

  points to no evidence suggesting that Hollywood Casino’s reason for terminating her

  employment was false or contrary to a written policy; she does not dispute that she

  accumulated 13 points in a rolling 12-month period and that Hollywood Casino’s

  attendance policy requires termination in this situation. Nor does Davis point to

  evidence that Hollywood Casino treated her differently from other similarly situated

  employees. Indeed, she identifies no employee who received leniency under the

  attendance policy for arriving late, leaving early, or missing work altogether on an

  unscheduled basis for medical reasons. In short, Davis offers no evidence that would

  allow a reasonable jury to find Hollywood Casino’s stated reason for terminating her

  employment “unworthy of credence.” Id. (quoting Morgan, 108 F.3d at 1323). Davis

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  therefore failed to establish a genuine dispute of material fact as to pretext, and the

  district court correctly granted summary judgment for Hollywood Casino on her

  disparate-treatment claim.

                                        Conclusion

        Davis failed to establish a genuine dispute of material fact on her ADA

  disability claims. As to her failure-to-accommodate claim, Davis cannot establish a

  prima facie case because neither her open-ended leave request nor her point-removal

  request was plausibly reasonable. And as to her disparate-treatment claim, Davis

  failed to present evidence that Hollywood Casino’s legitimate reason for terminating

  her employment—her attendance-policy violation—was a pretext for discrimination.

  We therefore affirm the district court’s order granting summary judgment to

  Hollywood Casino.

                                               Entered for the Court

                                               Nancy L. Moritz
                                               Circuit Judge

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