Court Opinion

ID: 9575184
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:12:19.425042+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:44:54.704518
License: Public Domain

Bell, Justice,
concurring specially.
In Division 1 the majority holds that a modification jury may only concern itself with the current financial circumstances of the parties, and that therefore, in the instant case, the modification jury could not change the time frames established by the original jury. Because the original jury’s initial ten-year award of alimony was scheduled to end on July 15, 1996, I understand the majority opinion as precluding the modification jury from inquiring into the parties’ financial circumstances beyond July 15, 1996. The majority has thus adopted the appellant’s position that the $2,500 per month award of *146the modification jury had to cease on July 15, 1996, at which time the original jury’s reduced alimony award of $800 per month would begin.
Decided March 4, 1992
Reconsideration denied April 2, 1992.
I cannot ascribe such limited effect to the power of a modification jury. In Cabaniss v. Cabaniss, 251 Ga. 177, 178 (1) (304 SE2d 65) (1983), this Court implicitly approved the power of a modification jury to consider the future financial circumstances of the parties and to make an automatic future modification based on a specified future change in the parties’ financial circumstances. The majority’s holding in this case that the modification jury is limited to evidence of the parties’ financial circumstances at the time of modification is inconsistent with Cabaniss. In cases involving an award of permanent periodic alimony, I believe a modification jury should be able to hear evidence regarding the present and future financial circumstances of the parties, and should be able to change any time frames set by the original jury if justified by the changed financial circumstances of the parties, so long as the overall time frame set by the original jury is not exceeded. In this case, the modification jury was in a better position to set the parties’ alimony for 1996 than was the original jury, as the modification jury was operating on more current information regarding the parties’ financial circumstances. It seems illogical to say that the original jury’s award of $800 per month, which was based on information regarding these parties that presumably is now outdated, must control in 1996. Moreover, the majority’s approach encourages future litigation. If on remand the appellee shows that the appellant is able to pay $2,500 per month, instead of $1,000 per month, until the year 1996, the appellee will in all probability file for another modification in 1996, and will in all probability succeed. I see no reason to require such future litigation when the modification jury in this case was equipped to deal with that issue.
Finally, I believe that the majority’s holding in Division 1 — that the modification jury may not extend any award past July 15, 1996 — renders unnecessary Division 2 of the majority opinion, in which the majority holds that the modification jury’s automatic future modification in the year 2000 was not based on a specified change in the financial circumstances of the parties. However, my position concerning Division 1, were it adopted by this Court, would require a ruling on the issue presented by Division 2. In this regard, I agree with the majority that the automatic future modification was not based on a specified change in the parties’ financial circumstances, and was thus invalid. I would reverse the judgment for this reason.
*147Hurt, Richardson, Garner, Todd & Cadenhead, A. Paul Cadenhead, Pamela A. Beverforden, for appellant.
Cheeley & Chandler, Joseph E. Cheeley, Jr., Joseph E. Cheeley III, for appellee.