Court Opinion

ID: 9916930
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-10 21:00:35.580389+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:26:11.453229
License: Public Domain

USCA4 Appeal: 22-4512      Doc: 28         Filed: 01/09/2024     Pg: 1 of 7

                                             UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                               No. 22-4512

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                             Plaintiff - Appellee,

                      v.

        UILFRIDO LOPEZ,

                             Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at
        Asheville. Max O. Cogburn, Jr., District Judge. (1:16-cr-00136-MOC-WCM-1)

        Submitted: January 2, 2024                                        Decided: January 9, 2024

        Before GREGORY and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and MOTZ, Senior Circuit Judge.

        Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: Howard W. Anderson, III, TRULUCK THOMASON LLC, Greenville, South
        Carolina, for Appellant. Dena J. King, United States Attorney, Elizabeth M. Greenough,
        Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
        Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
USCA4 Appeal: 22-4512        Doc: 28         Filed: 01/09/2024       Pg: 2 of 7

        PER CURIAM:

               Uilfrido Lopez appeals his conviction, following a bench trial, for operating an

        unlicensed money transmitting business, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1960(a), and two

        counts of money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956. On appeal, Lopez argues

        that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress incriminating statements he

        made to law enforcement officers who did not provide Miranda * warnings and that

        insufficient evidence supports his conviction for operating an unlicensed money

        transmitting business. We affirm.

               First, we need not determine whether the district court erred in denying the motion

        to suppress as untimely because we conclude that the district court’s reasoning in denying

        the motion on the merits is persuasive. Cf. United States v. Swann, 149 F.3d 271, 277 (4th

        Cir. 1998) (holding that this court “may affirm the district court’s judgment for any reason

        supported by the record, even if it is not the basis that the district court used”). “In assessing

        a district court's decision on a motion to suppress, we review the court’s factual findings

        for clear error and its legal determinations de novo.” United States v. Linville, 60 F.4th

        890, 896 (4th Cir. 2023). In doing so, we “construe the evidence in the light most favorable

        to the prevailing party, and give due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by resident

        judges and law enforcement officers.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

               “The Fifth Amendment provides that ‘[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any

        criminal case to be a witness against himself.’” United States v. Azua-Rinconada, 914 F.3d

               *
                   Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

                                                        2
USCA4 Appeal: 22-4512      Doc: 28         Filed: 01/09/2024     Pg: 3 of 7

        319, 325 (4th Cir. 2019) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. V). “And the Supreme Court has

        mandated the use of procedural measures to ensure that defendants, when subjected to

        custodial interrogations, are advised of their Fifth Amendment rights.” Id. (citing Miranda,

        384 U.S. at 444-45). “[U]nless a defendant is advised of his Fifth Amendment rights

        pursuant to Miranda and voluntarily waives those rights, statements he makes during a

        custodial interrogation must be suppressed.” Id. “Coercive police activity is a necessary

        finding for a confession or a Miranda waiver to be considered involuntary.” United States

        v. Giddins, 858 F.3d 870, 881 (4th Cir. 2017).

               “An individual is in custody for Miranda purposes when, under the totality of the

        circumstances, a suspect’s freedom of action is curtailed to a degree associated with formal

        arrest.” United States v. Leggette, 57 F.4th 406, 410 (4th Cir. 2023) (internal quotation

        marks omitted). Courts ask two questions when making this determination. Id. First, we

        determine “whether a reasonable person would have felt he or she was not at liberty to

        terminate the interrogation and leave.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Second, if

        a reasonable person would not have felt at liberty to leave, we ask “whether the relevant

        environment presents the same inherently coercive pressures as the type of station house

        questioning at issue in Miranda.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

               Although a reasonable person in Lopez’s position might not have felt at liberty to

        terminate the encounter with law enforcement officers, Lopez has not established that the

        interaction presented the same coercive pressures as a stationhouse interrogation. The

        entire encounter, which began as a knock and talk, lasted no more than an hour, including

        the ensuing consensual search of Lopez’s residence; further, none of the officers drew a

                                                     3
USCA4 Appeal: 22-4512      Doc: 28          Filed: 01/09/2024     Pg: 4 of 7

        weapon, physically restrained Lopez, threatened him with arrest, or frisked him. Their

        questions were polite and conversational, and no officer ever touched Lopez. See id. at

        411-12. Moreover, Lopez consented to the knock and talk, invited the officers inside his

        residence, answered their questions willingly, and consented to the search of both the

        packages addressed to him and of the apartment. Therefore, we conclude that the district

        court did not err in finding there was no custodial interrogation, and thus Miranda warnings

        were not required. See id. at 413-14. Accordingly, the district court did not err in denying

        the motion to suppress.

               Turning to Lopez’s sufficiency challenge, “[a] defendant who challenges the

        sufficiency of the evidence faces a heavy burden.” United States v. Small, 944 F.3d 490,

        499 (4th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Although we review challenges

        to the sufficiency of evidence de novo, our role is limited to considering whether there is

        substantial evidence, taking the view most favorable to the Government, to support the

        conviction.” United States v. Ziegler, 1 F.4th 219, 232 (4th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation

        marks omitted). “Substantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable finder of fact could

        accept as adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond a

        reasonable doubt.” Id. (cleaned up). The relevant question is “whether, after viewing the

        evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have

        found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Musacchio v. United

        States, 577 U.S. 237, 243 (2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[A]ppellate reversal

        on grounds of insufficient evidence is confined to cases where the prosecution’s failure is

                                                      4
USCA4 Appeal: 22-4512      Doc: 28         Filed: 01/09/2024     Pg: 5 of 7

        clear.” United States v. Savage, 885 F.3d 212, 219 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation

        marks omitted).

               It is a crime to knowingly conduct, control, manage, supervise, direct, or own all or

        part of an unlicensed money transmitting business. 18 U.S.C. § 1960(a). An unlicensed

        money transmitting business is “a money transmitting business which affects interstate or

        foreign commerce in any manner or degree” and either “is operated without an appropriate

        money transmitting license in a State where such operation is punishable as a misdemeanor

        or a felony under State law,” “fails to comply with the money transmitting business

        registration requirements under section 5330 of title 31, United States Code, or regulations

        prescribed under such section,” or “otherwise involves the transportation or transmission

        of funds that are known to the defendant to have been derived from a criminal offense or

        are intended to be used to promote or support unlawful activity.” 18 U.S.C. § 1960(b)(1).

               Lopez argues that his conviction is unsupported by any evidence beyond his

        uncorroborated confession, thus rendering the evidence insufficient as a matter of law.

        Although a criminal conviction “cannot rest entirely on an uncorroborated extrajudicial

        confession,” United States v. Riley, 920 F.3d 200, 208 (4th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation

        marks omitted), “extrinsic proof is sufficient which merely fortifies the truth of the

        confession, without independently establishing the crime charged,” United States v.

        Stephens, 482 F.3d 669, 672 (4th Cir. 2007) (cleaned up). Thus, “it is sufficient if the

        corroboration supports—not establishes—the essential facts admitted, and that

        corroboration need only tend to establish—not establish—the trustworthiness of the

        confession.” United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 237 (4th Cir. 2008) (cleaned up).

                                                     5
USCA4 Appeal: 22-4512      Doc: 28         Filed: 01/09/2024      Pg: 6 of 7

               Here, Lopez’s confession was not the only evidence linking him to criminal

        conduct. See id. Between his two encounters with law enforcement, Lopez was connected

        to money that was both shipped to him and transported in his checked baggage between

        North Carolina and California, and which appeared packaged to avoid drug detection.

        Moreover, a drug canine alerted to both the shipped money and the money in Lopez’s

        baggage, indicating the presence of the odor of narcotics. The money in the checked

        baggage also tested positive for the presence of methamphetamine and cocaine. The two

        shipped parcels were from an individual known to investigators as a significant

        methamphetamine distributor in the Western District of North Carolina; further, an

        informant explained that Lopez was the “money man” who transported the drug proceeds

        from North Carolina to California. Officers also discovered a safe, bundles of cash, a scale,

        and two rolls of plastic wrap in Lopez’s apartment. We therefore conclude that ample

        evidence supports Lopez’s conviction.

               Finally, we reject Lopez’s arguments that the Government failed to prove the

        existence of a “money transmitting business,” see United States v. Singh, 995 F.3d 1069,

        1077-78 (9th Cir. 2021), or that the business was unlicensed, see 18 U.S.C. § 1960(b)(1)(C)

        (clarifying that an unlicensed money transmitting business is one that “involves the

        transportation or transmission of funds that are known to the defendant to have been

        derived from a criminal offense or are intended to be used to promote or support unlawful

        activity”).

                                                     6
USCA4 Appeal: 22-4512      Doc: 28         Filed: 01/09/2024      Pg: 7 of 7

               Accordingly, we affirm the criminal judgment. We dispense with oral argument

        because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this

        court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

                                                                                        AFFIRMED

                                                     7