Court Opinion

ID: 9599590
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:19:54.526733+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:45.729011
License: Public Domain

McMurray, Presiding Judge,
concurring specially.
I am compelled to specially concur because I cannot go along with the majority holding that the case sub judice is not ripe for reconsidering that part of Bone v. State Farm Mut. Ins., 215 Ga. App. 782 (452 SE2d 523), which holds that the OCGA § 33-7-11 (b) (2) corroboration requirement applies to proof of actual physical contact. Because such reasoning was the basis of the trial court’s summary judgment order in the case sub judice, I believe this Court is authorized and obliged to resolve any confusion spawned by the decision in Bone.
The trial court points out in its summary judgment order that defendant Continental Insurance Company’s motion for summary judgment "is based on Plaintiff’s failure to establish physical damage or to present any evidence corroborating his claim that he was hit by an uninsured motorist pursuant to the provisions of O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11 (b) (2).” The trial court then reasons that defendant is entitled to *440summary judgment because (quoting from the trial court’s summary judgment order) “there is nothing in [Horace Stewart’s] affidavit which corroborates actual physical contact between Plaintiff’s vehicle and the John Doe vehicle.” This ruling, in my view, vests this Court with jurisdiction to consider whether corroboration is required with respect to evidence of actual physical contact between the vehicles. No such requirement had been discussed prior to Bone v. State Farm Mut. Ins., 215 Ga. App. 782, supra, which holds that OCGA § 33-7-11 (b) (2)’s corroboration requirement applies to proof of actual physical contact. The majority in Bone reasoned that circumstantial evidence of actual physical contact, the damage to the insured’s car discovered after the incident, did not provide proof that actual physical contact ever occurred because “[s]uch circumstantial evidence will not supply the necessary corroboration to satisfy OCGA § 33-7-11. Murphy [v. Ga. Gen. Ins. Co., 208 Ga. App. 501, 502, supra]. Therefore, Plaintiff has not supplied sufficient corroboration of actual physical contact to allow recovery under OCGA § 33-7-11.” Id. at 783.
I believe the Bone case is mistaken and must be overruled. A reading of OCGA § 33-7-11 (b) (2) shows that the corroboration requirement relates only to the exception which is provided for those circumstances in which there is no physical contact between the vehicles of the unknown uninsured motorist and the insured. Or, in other words, where there has been actual physical contact, there is no corroboration requirement and the proof of the fact of actual physical contact may be provided under general rules of evidence. Accordingly, since no case cited in the Bone opinion holds otherwise, I believe that for purposes of summary judgment, plaintiff’s deposition testimony in the case sub judice is sufficient to establish actual physical contact.
I am authorized to state that Judge Eldridge joins in this special concurrence.