Court Opinion

ID: 7815315
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-09-07 17:34:02.321582+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:30:35.072760
License: Public Domain

Carleton Harris, C. J. (dissenting). While I agree with the majority that Rose is entitled to a hearing, I do not agree that the order should be reversed. These exact contentions were made to the Court in the case of Barbee v. Kolb, Supt., 207 Ark. 227, 179 S. W. 2d 701. There, Barbee, through habeas corpus proceedings, sought to obtain his discharge from the State Hospital for Nervous Diseases, setting out that the proceedings of the Probate Court committing him to the hospital were void for the following reasons: ‘ ‘ a. Such proceedings were conducted in the absence of appellant and without his knowledge because he was not given notice of the institution and pendency of such proceedings or the nature of the charge, or the time when and the place where the hearing thereof would be had; * * * * sfc # # * c. No competent evidence was introduced tending to establish appellant’s insanity.” The proof showed that the commitment was issued by the Probate Judge, following the filing of the affidavit and interrogatories of the doctors. Barbee was not present and was not notified in any way of the proceedings thereto. This Court, in passing upon appellant’s contentions, stated: “For the purpose of this opinion we may, and do, assume, without deciding, that such proceedings were not in conformity to then existing law. It is not contended that the warrant for commitment was void on its face. On the contrary, such warrant was introduced in evidence by appellant’s attorney, and the copy thereof set out in the record before us discloses that the same was, on its face, in all things regular. Since appellant, indubitably an insane person, was delivered to appellee Kolb under a warrant of commitment regular on its face, such appellee acquired rightful custody of appellant, and became charged with certain duties and responsibilities with respect to him regardless of whether the inquisition for determination of his sanity was entirely regular. At 28 Am. Jur. 679, it is said: * * if the evidence indicates that one committed to an institution for the insane is actually insane, the court should not order his discharge, regardless of the invalidity of the proceedings under which he was committed, but should direct his continued restraint until such time as proper proceedings can be had for a formal adjudication of insanity.’ * * *” In Payne v. Arkebauer, 190 Ark. 614, 80 S. W. 2d 76, it was held that, while a person charged with insanity must be present in a proceeding for appointment of a guardian, such presence is not necessary in a proceeding solely for a commitment.to the state hospital. In the instant case, the order was valid on its face, and recited evidence by physicians to establish the incompetence of Rose, including the oral testimony of one physician. The other, Dr. Kolb, in his certificate, stated: “My diagnosis is maniac depressive reaction, maniac type, and he is incompetent. I feel this man can be potentially dangerous to himself and others. In view of the above pattern of behavior, it is evident that prolonged psychiatric care will be needed for a recovery. If he will not submit to hospitalization voluntarily, then I recommend commitment.” There is nothing to prevent Rose from instituting habeas corpus proceedings for a hearing on his sanity here in Pulaski County, and, in my view, this would be the proper step. While the majority hold that the Court was without jurisdiction, and reverse the order, they state that Rose “* * * should remain in protective custody while a hearing is had in compliance with the applicable .statute, supra.” This, to me, is inconsistent, for I see no authority for the hospital authorities to hold Rose if the order of commitment is invalid. It is true that the superintendent himself can still apply for an order of commitment under the provisions of Section 59-234, Ark. Stats. (1947) Anno., (and, for that matter, under Section 59-236, no liability is incurred by the superintendent or staff for the detention of any person until 30 days after such patient has made demand in writing for his release). But I see no reason to impose this duty upon the superintendent in the instant case. Under the Barbee case, supra, Rose could obtain his hearing, but would remain in custody until his sanity was determined. For the reasons herein set out, I respectfully dissent.