Court Opinion

ID: 9895857
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-08 20:10:37.026698+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:21.752539
License: Public Domain

J-S30013-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                          :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                          :
              v.                          :
                                          :
                                          :
 URIAH O'CARROLL,                         :
                                          :
                     Appellant            :   No. 3047 EDA 2022

         Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered November 10, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-39-CR-0003610-2011

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.:                    FILED NOVEMBER 8, 2023

      Appellant, Uriah O’Carroll, appeals pro se from the post-conviction

court’s November 10, 2022 order denying, as untimely, his petition filed under

the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. After careful

review, we affirm.

      We need not set forth a detailed summary of the facts of Appellant’s

case for purposes of this appeal. We only note that on September 4, 2012,

Appellant entered an open plea to third-degree murder for shooting and killing

Marcus Eggleston, and to attempted homicide for shooting Eggleston’s

mother, Sandy Falwell, in the head.     On October 22, 2012, the trial court

sentenced Appellant to a term of imprisonment of 20 to 40 years on each

conviction. The trial court ordered the sentences to run consecutively, totaling

an aggregate term of 40 to 80 years’ incarceration. On July 18, 2013, this

Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence. See Commonwealth v.
J-S30013-23

O’Carroll, 82 A.3d 1070 (Pa. Super. 2013) (unpublished memorandum). He

did not file a petition for allowance of appeal with our Supreme Court.

        Appellant thereafter filed a timely, pro se PCRA petition on January 27,

2014.    Counsel was appointed, but ultimately withdrew from representing

Appellant. The PCRA court issued an order denying Appellant’s petition on

June 2, 2014. Although Appellant filed a pro se appeal to this Court, he did

not file it until August 27, 2014. Therefore, we quashed his appeal as untimely

on January 7, 2015.

        On August 26, 2022, Appellant filed the pro se PCRA petition underlying

his present appeal. Therein, Appellant claimed that in June of 2022, he was

notified by another inmate that his sentence is illegal pursuant to the rationale

set forth in Commonwealth v. King, 234 A.3d 549, 562 (Pa. 2020) (holding

that when the Commonwealth “intends to seek an enhanced sentence for

attempted murder resulting in serious bodily injury under [18 Pa.C.S. §]

1102(c), the Commonwealth must include a citation to the statutory provision

as well as its language in the charging documents”); see also 18 Pa.C.S. §

1102(c) (“Attempt, solicitation and conspiracy.--Notwithstanding section

1103(1) (relating to sentence of imprisonment for felony), a person who has

been convicted of attempt, solicitation or conspiracy to commit murder,

murder of an unborn child or murder of a law enforcement officer where

serious bodily injury results may be sentenced to a term of imprisonment

which shall be fixed by the court at not more than 40 years. Where serious

bodily injury does not result, the person may be sentenced to a term of

                                      -2-
J-S30013-23

imprisonment which shall be fixed by the court at not more than 20 years.”).

Appellant claimed that his discovery of the “new fact” that his sentence is

purportedly illegal under King triggered the PCRA court’s jurisdiction and

warranted resentencing.

      On October 5, 2022, the PCRA court issued a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of

its intent to dismiss Appellant’s petition without a hearing on the basis that it

was untimely and failed to meet any timeliness exception. Appellant filed a

timely, pro se response, but on November 10, 2022, the PCRA court issued

an order dismissing his petition. He filed a timely, pro se notice of appeal. It

does not appear that the PCRA court ordered Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P.

1925(b) statement.      On February 3, 2023, the court filed a Rule 1925(a)

statement indicating it is relying on the rationale set forth in its Rule 907 notice

to support its dismissal of Appellant’s petition.

      Herein, Appellant states one issue for our review:

      A. Does not a context-specific circumstance where [A]ppellant was
      unaware of the intricate facts of his case and the law which his
      illegal sentence was predicated upon until he was informed of the
      intricate facts constitute newly discovered facts pursuant to 42
      Pa.C.S. § 9545 since he was not able to discover such intricate
      facts with reasonable diligence because he assumed the
      Commonwealth and the courts acted legally and according to its
      constitutional obligations when imposing a 40 year maximum
      sentence on [A]ppellant for his general attempted murder charge?

Appellant’s Brief at 4 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

      This Court’s standard of review regarding an order denying a petition

under the PCRA is whether the determination of the PCRA court is supported

by the evidence of record and is free of legal error.        Commonwealth v.

                                       -3-
J-S30013-23

Ragan, 923 A.2d 1169, 1170 (Pa. 2007). We must begin by addressing the

timeliness of Appellant’s petition, because the PCRA time limitations implicate

our jurisdiction and may not be altered or disregarded in order to address the

merits of a petition. See Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264, 1267

(Pa. 2007). Under the PCRA, any petition for post-conviction relief, including

a second or subsequent one, must be filed within one year of the date the

judgment of sentence becomes final, unless one of the following exceptions

set forth in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii) applies:

      (b) Time for filing petition.--

         (1) Any petition under this subchapter, including a second
         or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the
         date the judgment becomes final, unless the petition alleges
         and the petitioner proves that:

            (i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the
            result of interference by government officials with the
            presentation of the claim in violation of the
            Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the
            Constitution or laws of the United States;

            (ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were
            unknown to the petitioner and could not have been
            ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or

            (iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was
            recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States
            or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time
            period provided in this section and has been held by
            that court to apply retroactively.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). Additionally, section 9545(b)(2) requires that

any petition attempting to invoke one of these exceptions “be filed within one

                                       -4-
J-S30013-23

year of the date the claim could have been presented.”              42 Pa.C.S. §

9545(b)(2).

      Here, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final in 2013 and, thus,

his petition filed in 2022 is facially untimely. For this Court to have jurisdiction

to review the merits thereof, Appellant must prove that he meets one of the

exceptions to the timeliness requirements set forth in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b).

In this regard, Appellant argues that he meets the newly-discovered-fact

exception of section 9545(b)(1)(ii). According to Appellant, the ‘new fact’ he

discovered was that his sentence is illegal under our Supreme Court’s decision

in King. Appellant maintains the King decision’s impact on the legality of his

sentence was unknown to him, and that he “did not fail to act with due

diligence for not investigating further into the legality of his sentence because

he has every right to assume the state could be taken at its word” and that it

was “acting according to its constitutional obligations.” Appellant’s Brief at 10

(citation omitted).

      Appellant’s argument fails to prove that he meets the newly-discovered-

fact exception. To establish this exception, a PCRA petitioner must allege and

offer to prove that the facts upon which the claim is predicated were not

previously known to him and could not have been ascertained earlier with the

exercise of due diligence.    See Commonwealth v. Burton, 158 A.3d 618,

629 (Pa. 2017). It is well-settled, however, that judicial opinions and case

law do not amount to newly-discovered facts under section 9545(b)(1)(ii) of

the PCRA. See Commonwealth v. Reid, 235 A.3d 1124, 1148 (Pa. 2020);

                                       -5-
J-S30013-23

see also Commonwealth v. Cintora, 69 A.3d 759, 763 (Pa. Super. 2013)

(explaining that judicial decisions are not newly-discovered facts for purposes

of the PCRA’s time bar exception).             Moreover, under section 9454(b)(2),

Appellant was required to raise his claim within one year of the date that it

could have been presented.           Since King was decided on July 21, 2020,

Appellant’s petition filed in August of 2022 clearly fails to meet the one-year

requirement     of   section     9545(b)(2).      Accordingly,   Appellant   has   not

demonstrated that his PCRA petition meets any timeliness exception, and the

court did not err in dismissing it.1
____________________________________________

1 Nevertheless, we note that we agree with the Commonwealth that even if

Appellant’s petition met a timeliness exception, no relief would be due. The
King Court found that while formal notice of section 1102(c)’s applicability
was lacking in that case, that error was harmless, as “King was adequately
apprised through other means of the Commonwealth’s intentions” to seek an
enhanced sentence under that provision. King, 234 A.3d at 563. Likewise,
here, the Commonwealth stresses that Appellant
       was well aware that the Commonwealth sought the serious[-
       ]bodily[-]injury enhancement.         In the Information, the
       Commonwealth charged [Appellant] with Attempted Criminal
       Homicide for shooting Sandy Falwell in the head. It also charged
       [him] with Aggravated Assault for “intentionally, knowingly or
       recklessly caus[ing] serious bodily injury to Sandy Falwell under
       circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of
       human life by shooting Sandy Falwell in the head.
Commonwealth’s Brief at 13 (unnecessary capitalization omitted). The
Commonwealth also points out that at Appellant’s guilty plea proceeding, he
admitted that he shot Ms. Falwell in the head, recognized the severity of her
injuries, and affirmed his understanding that he faced a maximum sentence
of 40 to 80 years’ incarceration for both counts to which he was pleading
guilty. Id. at 13-14 (citing N.T. Guilty Plea, 9/4/12, at 4-5, 8, 11). Given this
record, we would agree with the Commonwealth that Appellant “knew he
inflicted serious bodily injury when he shot Ms. Falwell in the head and that
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

                                           -6-
J-S30013-23

       Order affirmed.

Date: 11/8/2023

____________________________________________

his maximum exposure for this crime alone was twenty (20) to forty (40)
years[’] imprisonment.”     Id. at 14 (footnote omitted).     Thus, even if
Appellant’s petition met a timeliness exception, we would conclude that any
error in the Commonwealth’s failing to give him formal notice of its intent to
seek a sentence under 18 Pa.C.S. § 1102(c) was harmless error.

                                           -7-