Court Opinion

ID: 9396246
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-19 21:03:07.961444+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:15.433698
License: Public Domain

Rel: May 19, 2023

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern
Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts,
300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other
errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.

         SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
                             OCTOBER TERM, 2022-2023

                                _________________________

                                      SC-2022-0821
                                _________________________

                               Ammons Properties, LLC

                                                  v.

                              Andrew William Spraggins

                       Appeal from Madison Circuit Court
                                 (CV-20-901102)

MITCHELL, Justice.

       Andrew William Spraggins's driveway crossed a neighboring tract

of land owned by Ammons Properties, LLC ("Ammons"). After a dispute
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arose between Spraggins and Ammons, Spraggins filed a complaint

asking the Madison Circuit Court to enter a judgment declaring that he

had an easement for the portion of his driveway that crossed Ammons's

property. Ammons filed a counterclaim alleging that Spraggins was

liable for several tortious acts. Following a bench trial, the circuit court

ruled that Spraggins had an easement across Ammons's property and

denied Ammons's counterclaims. Ammons appealed.             We affirm the

judgment.

                      Facts and Procedural History

      In 1991, Billy R. Webster ("Billy") acquired 7.51 acres of land ("the

Webster property") on the west side of Bell Factory Road, a public road

in Madison County. The Webster property consisted of three contiguous

tracts: a southern tract, a middle tract, and a northern tract. Four years

later, Billy died.

      In the ensuing years, Billy's estate distributed the tracts to various

members of the Webster family. Charles B. Webster ("Charles") acquired

the middle tract in 2009. He took out a loan secured by a mortgage on

the property that same year. Two years later, Charles's sons acquired

the southern and northern tracts.

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     In 2017, Charles defaulted on the loan for the middle tract, and the

tract was sold to Spraggins at a foreclosure sale. Before purchasing the

middle tract, Spraggins inspected and obtained a survey of the entire

Webster property. The survey included a note stating: "These three

tracts all belonged to [Billy] Webster and the driveways served multiple

houses. [The middle tract] uses the drive that crosses [the northern

tract]." The driveway across the northern tract was paved; the southern

tract contained a gravel driveway that also accessed the house that sat

on the middle tract.

     Two years after the foreclosure sale, Ammons purchased the

southern and northern tracts from members of the Webster family. The

sole member of Ammons, Scott Ammons ("Scott"), testified that, soon

after purchasing the land, he began clearing the southern tract for

development and placed a chain across the gravel driveway located on

the southern tract.     He had the property surveyed and began

construction.

     In August 2020, Spraggins filed a complaint in the Madison Circuit

Court asking the court to "establish and declare the right-of-way

easements over and across the property of the Defendant, Ammons

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Properties, LLC, … as being, alternatively, an easement of necessity or

an easement by implication, having existed and then utilized by parties

occupying the property of the Plaintiff." Ammons counterclaimed for

damages based on theories of trespass, private nuisance, and outrage.

After a bench trial, the circuit court entered a judgment holding that

Spraggins had "an easement for ingress and egress over and across the

property belonging to [Ammons] described as and referred to during trial

as Tract 2, being the northern most property and currently containing an

asphalt driveway." The circuit court denied "[a]ll claims not specifically

addressed" in the judgment, including Ammons's counterclaims.

Ammons filed a "Motion for Reconsideration, and to Alter, Amend, or

Vacate" the judgment, which was deemed denied because the circuit

court did not rule on it within 90 days. See Rules 59(e) and 59.1, Ala. R.

Civ. P. Ammons appealed.

                          Standard of Review

     " ' "When a judge in a nonjury case hears oral testimony, a judgment

based on findings of fact based on that testimony will be presumed correct

and will not be disturbed on appeal except for a plain and palpable

error." ' " Kennedy v. Boles Invs., Inc., 53 So. 3d 60, 67-68 (Ala. 2010)

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(citations omitted).    But " 'that presumption [of correctness] has no

application when the trial court is shown to have improperly applied the

law to the facts.' " Id. at 68 (citation omitted).

                                  Analysis

      Ammons raises what he says are three grounds for reversal: (1) the

circuit court did not have jurisdiction to grant an easement to Spraggins,

and, if it did, Ammons was owed compensation for the easement; (2) the

evidence at trial did not support an easement in favor of Spraggins; and

(3) the circuit court erred by declining to award damages to Ammons on

its counterclaims against Spraggins.          Because Ammons does not

demonstrate reversible error on any of these grounds, we affirm.

      A. The Circuit Court Had Jurisdiction and Ammons Is Not Due
      Compensation

      Ammons first argues that the judgment of the Madison Circuit

Court is void because Spraggins did not initiate the action in the Madison

Probate Court. Ammons notes that a landowner seeking to condemn a

right-of-way over neighboring land must apply "to the probate court of

the county in which the lands over which such right-of-way is desired." §

18-3-3, Ala. Code 1975. Because § 18-3-3 does not give the circuit court

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jurisdiction to condemn a right-of-way over neighboring property,

Ammons argues, the circuit court's order is void.

     Ammons is correct that, in the absence of an existing right-of-way

to a public road, the owner of a landlocked tract may petition the county

probate court to condemn a right-of-way across a neighboring tract.

§ 18-3-1 and § 18-3-3. But that is not the only way a landowner without

access to a public road can obtain it. Relevant here, an easement by

necessity may be implied when the owner of two tracts of land, one of

which requires the use of an existing right-of-way over the other, conveys

the tract that benefits from the right-of-way. See Burrow v. Miller, 340

So. 2d 779, 780 (Ala. 1976) (explaining that an easement can arise even

when a conveyance is "not an express conveyance of the easement in

question but the deed to the property to be served by the claimed

easement" because a landowner who conveys property " 'also conveys

whatever is necessary to its beneficial use' " (citation omitted)).

     In his complaint, Spraggins asked the circuit court to "establish and

declare the right-of-way easements over and across the property of the

Defendant," either as "an easement by necessity or an easement by

implication, having existed and then utilized by parties occupying the

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property of the Plaintiff." Because Spraggins sought legal recognition of

an existing easement and not the condemnation of a new right-of-way, §

18-3-3 did not restrict jurisdiction over the action to the probate court.

Accordingly, Ammons has not shown that the circuit court's judgment is

void for want of jurisdiction.

     In the alternative, Ammons argues that "[t]he trial court was

additionally in error for awarding such an easement without due

compensation to Ammons." Ammons's brief at 27. Ammons notes that a

person seeking to condemn a " 'right-of-way must pay the owner of the

land across which the right-of-way is taken "the value of the land taken

and compensation for damages to the land." ' " Id. at 24 (quoting Ally

Windsor Howell, Tilley's Alabama Equity § 17:4 (5th ed. 2012)). But, as

explained above, Spraggins asked the circuit court to declare an existing

easement, not to condemn Ammons's property. Therefore, Ammons was

not owed compensation.

     B. Ammons Has Not Shown that Declaring an Easement Was
     Erroneous

     Ammons next argues that there was insufficient evidence for the

circuit court to declare the existence of an easement. An easement is a

nonpossessory interest in land that can be created in several ways,
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including by (1) deed, (2) prescription, (3) adverse use for a statutory

period, (4) express conveyance, (5) reservation or exception, (6)

implication, (7) necessity, (8) contract, or (9) reference to boundaries or

maps.   Cleek v. Povia, 515 So. 2d 1246, 1247 (Ala. 1987).          In his

complaint, Spraggins asked the circuit court to declare an easement by

necessity or by implication. The circuit court issued a judgment declaring

an easement in favor of Spraggins, but it did not specify which type of

easement -- by necessity or by implication -- Spraggins had. Because

Ammons fails to show that the circuit court's judgment implicitly

declaring an easement by necessity was plainly and palpably wrong, we

can affirm on that basis. We address each of Ammons's evidentiary

arguments below.

           1. The Driveway

     Ammons first argues that Spraggins could not have an easement by

necessity because "Spraggins had the ability to construct his own

driveway on [the middle tract], but chose not to do so." Ammons's brief

at 32. In making this argument, Ammons contends that, because it built

a driveway over land on the southern tract that was virtually identical to

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an adjacent portion of the middle tract, Spraggins had no real need for a

right-of-way over Ammons's property.

     When a landowner conveys a tract of land, an easement by

necessity arises on the adjacent tract when (1) the conveyor owned both

tracts immediately before the conveyance and (2) a right-of-way over the

adjacent tract is the sole practical means of ingress and egress for the

tract conveyed.   See Burrow, 340 So. 2d at 780.       Consequently, as

Ammons notes, "[i]f there are other reasonably practical ways of ingress

and egress over complainant's property, then no easement over the

defendants' lots may be implied. That it might be more convenient or

less expensive does not serve to raise the implication of such quasi

easement." Crawford v. Tucker, 258 Ala. 658, 661, 64 So. 2d 411, 413-14

(1952).

     At trial, Spraggins's expert testified that, based on his assessment

of two areas of the middle tract, Spraggins could not safely construct a

driveway to Bell Factory Road. But, as Ammons points out, Spraggins's

expert did not assess the portion of the middle tract adjacent to Ammons's

driveway on the southern tract. Nor, Ammons notes, did Spraggins

present evidence of the cost of a driveway. Accordingly, Ammons reasons

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that Spraggins failed to show that he could not reasonably construct his

own driveway for ingress and egress over the middle tract.

         But Spraggins's expert, after viewing a video of Scott driving his

vehicle on the driveway Ammons had built, also testified that Ammons's

driveway was unsafely steep. Therefore, the circuit court could have

reasoned that a similar driveway over the adjacent part of the middle

tract would likewise be unsafe. For that reason, it was not plainly and

palpably wrong for the circuit court to accept the expert's testimony that

there was no safe way for Spraggins to build a driveway over the middle

tract.

              2. The Effect of the Prior Foreclosure on the Middle Tract

         Ammons next argues that any easement benefiting the middle tract

was extinguished when the middle tract was foreclosed on in 2017.

Ammons points out that Charles mortgaged the middle tract in 2009.

Ammons also maintains that, assuming there was an easement by

necessity, such easement could have arisen only when Charles's sons

acquired the southern and northern tracts in 2011. Because Charles

mortgaged the middle tract two years before Ammons says any easement

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could have arisen, Ammons contends that the 2017 foreclosure

necessarily extinguished the easement.

     Ammons supports this argument by citing Alabama Historical

Commission v. City of Birmingham, 769 So. 2d 317, 320 (Ala. Civ. App.

2000). In that case, an easement encumbered a tract of land that had

previously been mortgaged. Id. The Court of Civil Appeals held that

foreclosure of the mortgage extinguished the easement because the

easement was established after the tract had been mortgaged.               Id.

Indeed, "the general rule is that the foreclosure of a mortgage terminates

an easement that is recorded after the mortgage, subject only to the

junior easement holder's right to redeem under § 6-5-248, Ala. Code

1975." Id.

     But an easement encumbers the servient, not the dominant,

tenement. See Oates v. Town of Headland, 154 Ala. 503, 505, 45 So. 910,

911 (1908) (" 'An easement is an interest in land … conferring a right

upon the owner thereof to some profit, benefit, dominion, or lawful use

out of or from the estate of another.' " (citation omitted)). Accordingly, for

a foreclosure to extinguish an easement, the foreclosed property must be

the servient tenement. Here, the easement consisted of a right-of-way

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over the northern tract, which was thus the servient tenement.

Therefore, foreclosure of the mortgage on the middle tract did not

extinguish the easement.

           3. Whether Spraggins Knew of an Easement

     Ammons further contends that an easement by necessity could not

have arisen because "Spraggins knew an easement did not exist based on

his inspection and his survey." Ammons's brief at 29; cf. Crawford, 258

Ala. at 661, 64 So. 2d at 414 (holding that a landowner did not have an

easement over his neighbor's land when "[t]he driveway was open and

visible when complainant purchased his property; he knew his

conveyance did not grant any right of way or easement over the

remainder of the property, and accepted it without any reservation or

grant of an easement"). Ammons points to several pieces of evidence to

support its position.

     First, Spraggins inspected the Webster property and had it

surveyed. Ammons contends that a note in the survey containing the

statement that "[t]hese three tracts all belonged to [Billy] Webster and

the driveways served multiple houses" put "Spraggins on notice that the

driveways existed for the sole owner of the [Webster property], not him."

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Ammons's brief at 31. But, after the excerpt quoted by Ammons, the

survey note continues: "[The middle tract] uses the drive that crosses [the

northern tract]." The full note, therefore, could reasonably indicate that

the driveway over the northern tract was for the benefit of the middle

tract regardless of who its owner was. Thus, the circuit court could

properly have found that the survey note supports the existence of an

easement for the benefit of the middle tract.

     Second, Ammons argues that Spraggins was on notice that there

was no easement because, though he knew of the driveway over the

northern tract, he "never raised any questions about how he was going to

get to the property when he bought it." Id. But Ammons points to no

authority showing that the existence of an easement by necessity

depends on an inquiry by the purchaser of the dominant tenement.

Indeed, Spraggins's failure to ask this question could indicate that

Spraggins had no reason to doubt that an easement existed. Accordingly,

this fact does not establish a lack of knowledge on Spraggins's part.

     Nor do the other pieces of evidence highlighted by Ammons, many

of which show only that Spraggins did not have an express easement.

For instance, Ammons points to (1) the lack of a "grant in the deed from

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the adjacent property of use of the driveway"; (2) testimony that the

owners of the northern tract never offered or issued Spraggins an

easement; (3) Spraggins's failure to offer to buy an easement; and (4)

testimony that Spraggins's use of the driveway crossing the northern

tract would have been without permission. Id. at 31-32. None of this

evidence indicates that the circuit court was plainly and palpably wrong

about the existence of an easement by necessity -- which is implied, not

express. Ammons thus does not prevail on this issue.

           4. Landlocked Property

     Ammons also disputes the circuit court's judgment on the ground

that "an owner who has a way of access through his own land cannot

impose a way of necessity across the lands of a neighbor unless his own

way is not reasonably adequate, or the use of it is prohibitively costly."

Ammons's brief at 24 (citing 1 Jesse P. Evans III, Alabama Property

Rights and Remedies § 40.12, at 795 (2d ed. 1999)). Ammons notes that

" 'a landlocked owner is not entitled to condemn a right-of-way across

adjoining land, if the landlocked landowner has an existing, reasonably

adequate means of access to his land, or if he could construct such an

access without prohibitive expense.' " Id. (quoting Tilly's Alabama Equity

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§ 17.4) (emphasis omitted).      Because the middle tract abutted Bell

Factory Road, Ammons argues that the middle tract was not landlocked

and, thus, that Spraggins had reasonably adequate access to his

property.

       But, in making this argument, Ammons again confuses an action to

declare an existing easement with an action to condemn a new right-of-

way. Spraggins sought neither to impose nor to condemn a new right-of-

way;    yet   Ammons    relies   on    treatises   addressing   only   those

circumstances. Because Ammons fails to demonstrate that an easement

by necessity can arise only when the dominant tenement is landlocked,

Ammons has not shown that the circuit court erred by holding that

Spraggins had that type of easement.         Therefore, the circuit court's

judgment is not due to be reversed on this issue.

       C. Ammons Did Not Prove Its Counterclaims

       Ammons finally argues that the circuit court erred by denying its

counterclaims alleging trespass, private nuisance, and outrage.         We

disagree.

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           1. Trespass

     "[T]o be liable to another for trespass, the person must intentionally

enter upon land in the possession of another or the person must

intentionally cause some 'substance' or 'thing' to enter upon another's

land." Born v. Exxon Corp., 388 So. 2d 933, 934 (Ala. 1980). A plaintiff

may recover compensatory damages by showing harm " 'caused by any

act alone, activity carried on, or condition created by the trespasser,

irrespective of whether his conduct is such as would subject him to

liability were he not a trespasser.' " Rushing v. Hooper-McDonald, Inc.,

293 Ala. 56, 62, 300 So. 2d 94, 100 (1974) (citation omitted).

     Ammons first argues that the circuit court should have awarded it

damages because "Spraggins admitted to breaking a chain so Spraggins

could drive through [the southern tract] to his house" and because

"Spraggins also admitted to pulling up construction survey stakes so that

he could freely cross [Ammons's] property as he pleased." Ammons's brief

at 36. Ammons states that the circuit court "heard testimony from [Scott]

that the home construction surveyors had to come to the property on

three (3) occasions." Id. Scott testified that the additional surveys cost

"about six hundred dollars."

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     But, in its opening brief, Ammons never states which alleged act of

trespass -- breaking the chain or pulling up the stakes -- required the

survey to be repeated. Indeed, additional surveying could have been

required for a host of reasons that would not impose legal liability on

Spraggins -- for instance, survey errors or lost documentation. And the

sole evidence Ammons presented to support its claim for trespass

damages was Scott's testimony, which the judge as fact-finder need not

have credited. Cf. Tutor v. Sines, [Ms. 1210037, Feb. 17, 2023] ___ So. 3d

___, ___ (Ala. 2023) ("[T]he jury would have been justified in discounting

Tutor's testimony as self-serving.").   Consequently, Ammons has not

shown that its alleged injury was caused by trespass.

     Ammons also argues that the circuit court should have awarded

damages for trespass because "Spraggins admitted that his actions broke

the windshield of [Ammons's] 1989 Buick, which was a custom

windshield which cannot be replaced." Ammons's brief at 40. Although

Ammons acknowledges that proving trespass requires showing that the

defendant " 'intentionally entered' " another's property without the

owner's consent, he fails to point to any evidence showing that Spraggins

intentionally entered Ammons's property when he broke Scott's

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windshield. Id. at 35 (quoting 2 Alabama Pattern Jury Instructions --

Civil, Instruction 31A.00 (3d ed. 2019)). To the contrary, Spraggins gave

unrebutted testimony that he broke the windshield unintentionally

when, while he was "turning [his] long van in that driveway," the van

kicked up a loose rock that hit the windshield of Scott's vehicle, which

was parked on the northern tract.         The circuit court could have

reasonably found that Spraggins's reference to "that driveway" was to the

asphalt driveway over which Spraggins had an easement because the

asphalt driveway crossed the northern tract. Therefore, Ammons has

failed to demonstrate reversible error on its counterclaim for trespass.

           2. Private Nuisance and Outrage

     Ammons faces a similar causation issue with its claims of private

nuisance and outrage.     Ammons argues that several of Spraggins's

actions "constituted a nuisance" and were an "outrage," including (1)

"engag[ing] in confrontational acts" with Scott; (2) parking "numerous

vehicles on [the southern tract] to prevent [Scott] from accessing the

property"; and (3) "threaten[ing Scott] should he not be able to trespass

across [the northern tract] and use Ammons's asphalt driveway."

Ammons's brief at 38-39. Ammons asserts that these actions "caused

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considerable construction delays to Ammons," during which time the

price of lumber rose "from $4,000 to $28,000." Id. at 39-40. But Ammons

does not point to any evidence showing a causal link between the alleged

acts and the construction delays. Therefore, Ammons has failed to show

that the circuit court made a reversible error when it denied Ammons's

claims of private nuisance and outrage.

                              Conclusion

     Because Ammons has not demonstrated that the circuit court erred

by granting Spraggins an easement or denying Ammons's counterclaims,

we affirm.

     AFFIRMED.

     Parker, C.J., and Shaw, Bryan, and Mendheim, JJ., concur.

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