Court Opinion

ID: 9927203
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-26 15:09:58.905959+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:04.790405
License: Public Domain

01/26/2024
                IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
                            AT NASHVILLE
                          Assigned on Briefs October 2, 2023

            PEJHMAN EHSANI v. EUGENIA MICHELLE EHSANI

                 Appeal from the Circuit Court for Davidson County
                      No. 20D588 Phillip R. Robinson, Judge
                     ___________________________________

                            No. M2022-01819-COA-R3-CV
                        ___________________________________

This appeal arises from an order granting, among other discovery sanctions, a default
judgment against Husband in a divorce proceeding. Husband questions whether the trial
court abused its discretion in entering sanctions against him. Because the trial court did not
engage in the necessary analysis regarding its reasoning for granting the discovery
sanctions, we vacate the sanctions order, as well as the subsequent orders that followed,
including the order granting the parties’ divorce. This disposition pretermits inquiry into
issues Husband has raised on appeal with respect to trial court determinations that followed
the sanctions. Moreover, as to a remaining matter raised by Husband on appeal, we
conclude that the issue is waived due to Husband’s failure to comply with applicable
briefing requirements.

 Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Vacated in
                     Part, Affirmed in Part, and Remanded.

ARNOLD B. GOLDIN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ANDY D. BENNETT
and KRISTI M. DAVIS, JJ., joined.

Kenneth James Phillips, Oak Grove, Kentucky, for the appellant, Pejhman Ehsani.

Gere L. Beason, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Eugenia Michelle Ehsani.

                                         OPINION

                  BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

      This case concerns a contested divorce involving two minor children, initiated by
Appellant Pejhman Ehsani (“Husband”) on April 21, 2020. In response, Appellee Eugenia
Ehsani (“Wife”) filed a counterclaim for divorce. The history of this case is characterized
by numerous pre-trial motions filed by both parties concerning failure to comply with
discovery, orders of protection sought by both parties, and scheduling matters.

       Salient to this appeal, Wife eventually filed a motion for sanctions, to strike
Husband’s pleadings, for default, and for attorney’s fees. Following a hearing on Wife’s
motion, the trial court entered an order granting the motion to strike Husband’s pleadings
and for default judgment on May 4, 2022. In support of the sanctions, the trial court’s
order merely states, without setting forth its reasoning, that it “grants Wife’s motion under
Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 37.02 for Husband’s Failure to Comply with Court
Orders.” No other considerations are discussed, nor details given. After a subsequent
hearing on the default judgment, the trial court entered an order, styled “Order on Default
Hearing,” in which it resolved various issues in connection with its grant of a divorce to
Wife. This appeal followed.

                                       ISSUES PRESENTED

       Husband raises several issues in this appeal. He first questions whether the trial
court’s decision to award Wife a default judgment as a discovery sanction was overly
punitive. He next questions whether an extension of an order of protection, which occurred
during the pendency of the divorce proceeding, was untimely entered by the trial court.
Additional issues relate to the trial court’s disposition in the order granting a divorce to
Wife, namely whether Husband was denied the opportunity to be heard on a five-year
extension of the aforementioned order of protection1 and whether the trial court erred in
limiting his parenting time.

       As discussed later in this Opinion, our disposition concerning the sanctions issue
pretermits review of Husband’s concerns related to the subsequent order granting Wife a
divorce. Husband’s remaining issue regarding the extension of Wife’s order of protection
that occurred during the earlier pendency of the divorce proceeding has been waived due
to Husband’s failure to adhere to applicable briefing requirements.

                                    STANDARD OF REVIEW

       Findings of fact made by a trial court are reviewed de novo, with a presumption of
correctness unless the evidence preponderates against them. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d).
Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo and are not accorded any presumption of
correctness. Nelson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 8 S.W.3d 625, 628 (Tenn. 1999). “Appellate
courts review a trial court’s decision to impose sanctions and its determination of the
appropriate sanction under an abuse of discretion standard.” Alexander v. Jackson
Radiology Assocs., P.A., 156 S.W.3d 11, 14 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004). An abuse of discretion

        1
          Although the five-year extension of the order of protection occurred as part of the divorce decree,
another of Husband’s issues on appeal, as noted herein, concerns the timeliness of an earlier extension of
the order of protection that occurred during the pendency of the divorce proceedings.
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occurs if the trial court applies an incorrect legal standard, reaches an illogical decision, or
causes an injustice to a complaining party. Id.

                                       DISCUSSION

                                       Sanctions Order

        We turn first to the trial court’s order granting sanctions against Husband. Rule
37.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure allows trial courts to impose a variety of
sanctions arising from a party’s failure to obey orders related to discovery, and although
trial courts have “broad discretion when sanctioning a party for failing to comply with the
discovery rules or orders of the court,” Gordon v. Chapman, No. W2019-01655-COA-R3-
CV, 2020 WL 7861471, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 22, 2020), trial courts’ decisions to
sanction a party are in no way immunized from appellate review. Indeed, discretionary
decisions such as sanctions

       “are not left to a court’s inclination, but to its judgment; and its judgment is
       to be guided by sound legal principles.” State v. Lewis, 235 S.W.3d 136, 141
       (Tenn. 2007) (quoting Martha S. Davis, Standards of Review: Judicial
       Review of Discretionary Decisionmaking, 2 J. App. Prac. & Process 47, 58
       (2000) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). Thus, an abuse of
       discretion may be found “‘when the trial court has gone outside the
       framework of legal standards or statutory limitations, or when it fails to
       properly consider the factors on that issue given by the higher courts to guide
       the discretionary determination.’” Lewis, 235 S.W.3d at 141 (quoting 2 J.
       App. Prac. & Process at 59).

SpecialtyCare IOM Servs., LLC v. Medsurant Holdings, LLC, No. M2017-00309-COA-
R3-CV, 2018 WL 3323889, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 6, 2018).

       A trial court must consider “whether the sanction is proportional to the failures at
issue,” Adams v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., No. W2020-01290-COA-R3-CV, 2022 WL
170134, at *11 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 19, 2022), and a severe sanction such as the entry of a
default judgment is only appropriate if there is a clear record of delay or contumacious
conduct. Medsurant Holdings, LLC, 2018 WL 3323889, at *18; see also Langlois v.
Energy Automation Sys., Inc., 332 S.W.3d 353, 357 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009) (noting that
dismissal is normally appropriate only where there has been a clear record of delay or
contumacious conduct). When determining which sanction is appropriate for a party’s
abuse or violation of the discovery process, a trial court should consider the following
factors outlined in Mercer v. Vanderbilt University, Inc., 134 S.W.3d 121 (Tenn. 2004):
“(1) the party’s explanation for not providing evidence during discovery; (2) the
importance of the evidence; (3) the other party’s need for time to prepare to meet the
evidence; and (4) the possibility and propriety of granting a continuance.” Adams, 2022
                                           -3-
WL 170134, at *8 (citing to Mercer and discussing the factors).

        This Court has recently discussed the application of these factors in the above-cited
case of Adams v. Illinois Central Railroad Company, where the sanction on appeal
amounted to the dismissal of a party’s claims. Adams concerned a complaint made under
the Federal Employer’s Liability Act. Id. at *1. The trial court in Adams entered its first
scheduling order on January 15, 2020, directing that the plaintiff designate any expert
witnesses by March 18, 2020, and accompany the designation by supplemental
interrogatory answers as well as expert witness information pursuant to Rule 26.02 of the
Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. The plaintiff’s counsel did not designate two
particular expert witnesses until March 27, 2020. Id. Furthermore, the plaintiff’s counsel
did not provide the expert witnesses’ narrative reports as directed by the trial court’s
scheduling order. Id. at *2. In response, the defendant filed its motion to exclude the
plaintiff’s expert witnesses and, in tandem, a motion for summary judgment. Id. at *2-3.

        Following a hearing on the motion for sanctions and for summary judgment, the
Adams court orally granted both the motion to exclude the plaintiff’s experts and for
summary judgment. Id. The trial court’s subsequent order, which incorporated the
transcript from the associated hearing, set forth the plaintiff’s discovery abuses in great
detail in support of its ruling. Id. at 3-4.

        On appeal, we explained that, when discovery sanctions amount to a dismissal, a
heightened review is appropriate. Id. at *8. Furthermore, we found that the exclusion of the
plaintiff’s expert witnesses was tantamount to a dismissal of the plaintiff’s case, and indeed
led to a summary judgment. Id.

        In assessing whether the sanction in Adams was ultimately appropriate, we
highlighted the various deficiencies in the trial court’s order granting exclusion of the
plaintiff’s expert witnesses. Although the trial court’s order did assess the plaintiff’s excuse
for his failure to provide discovery information as ordered in the scheduling order and also
detailed the plaintiff’s discovery abuses, it made no “specific finding that [plaintiff’s]
conduct was contumacious, intentional, blatant, or otherwise so egregious as to justify the
harshest sanction available.” Id. at *11. Moreover, the order failed to consider whether
other sanctions were available, or the proportionality of its own sanction. Id. As to
remaining Mercer factors, the order made no mention at all of the importance of the
evidence, the defendant’s need for time to prepare to meet the evidence, or the possibility
and propriety of granting a continuance Id. at *11-13; see generally Mercer, 134 S.W.3d
at 133 (discussing the various factors that should be considered by the trial court).

       In light of the deficiencies in the trial court’s order, the Adams court vacated the
sanctions order and remanded for further proceedings. Id. at *13. In relevant part, we noted
that where the trial court chooses to impose a harsh sanction at its disposal, “it is not too
heavy a burden to require the trial court to consider each relevant factor in a manner that
                                             -4-
affords meaningful appellate review.” Id.

        Returning to the case at hand, we observe that the trial court’s order offers even less
insight than the order in Adams. Indeed, the order granting Wife’s motion for sanctions
contains just a few sentences, only one of which even provides remote insight as to the
basis behind the trial court’s decision. Following its exposition of initial prefatory
information, such as when the motion came to be heard, the trial court’s order simply states
that it grants sanctions against Husband, including a default judgment, “for Husband’s
Failure to Comply with Court Orders.”2

        Although our own review of the record has revealed apparent instances of
Husband’s misconduct in discovery, as well as violations of other pre-trial orders, the trial
court is best positioned to make the specific determinations required to make such a
finding, not the appellate court. See In re Noah J., No. W2014-01778-COA-R3-JV, 2015
WL 1332665 at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 23, 2015) (explaining that trial judges’ ability to
personally observe court proceedings positions them to better understand issues that affect
fact finding, such as witness credibility). Simply stating that Husband failed to comply with
court orders leaves this Court with no insight into the specific incidents that the trial court
found to warrant the harsh sanctions of striking Husband’s pleadings and entering a default
judgment against him.

       In addition to the lack of specific findings, the trial court’s order fails to make use
of, or even mention, the factors outlined in Mercer. See 134 S.W.3d at 133. There is no
discussion of Husband’s excuses, the importance of the evidence, Wife’s need for time to
prepare to meet such evidence, or the possibility or propriety of granting a continuance.
Furthermore, there is no finding as to whether Husband’s behavior was contumacious, and
no discussion of the proportionality of the sanctions entered. Of course, these deficiencies
are compounded by the fact that the order strikingly fails to designate what prior orders are
even at issue. We highlight that the sanctions order at issue in this appeal is, in comparison,
notably sparser than the order at issue in Adams. In sum, the bare-bones nature of this
sanctions order thwarts any kind of meaningful appellate review. Because we are unable
to discern what legal standard, reasoning, or even violations underpin the sanctions order
on appeal, we vacate the order and remand for findings and determinations consistent with
the severity of the sanctions.3

        2
          Both parties on appeal appear to, at times, misconstrue which order actually granted sanctions
against Husband. There is an order, simply titled “Order,” filed on May 4, 2022, and there is a subsequent
order styled “Order on Default Hearing,” filed on July 28, 2022. While both parties seem to refer to both
orders as granting the default judgment, we note that the order of May 4, 2022, is the order granting the
sanctions, including the default judgment, in this case. The July 28, 2022, order operates to grant the divorce
pursuant to the default judgment granted in the earlier order.
        3
          In issuing this Opinion, we are not commenting on the potential of granting a default judgment,
or other sanctions, against Husband. Such sanctions may very well be appropriate in this case. However,
the complete lack of findings or analysis frustrates our review of whether such an order constitutes an abuse
                                                    -5-
       As we noted earlier in this Opinion, Husband has raised additional issues in this
appeal that relate to actions of the trial court post-sanctions, namely rulings of the trial
court that are included in the “Order on Default Hearing” that followed the sanctions order.
Based on our disposition concerning the sanctions issue, which vacates the trial court’s
order awarding a default, we conclude that the ensuing “Order on Default Hearing” which,
among other things, granted the divorce, should also be vacated.4 See Griffith Servs.
Drilling, LLC v. Arrow Gas & Oil, Inc., 448 S.W.3d 376, 381 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2014)
(determining, after vacating a trial court’s order granting sanctions, that orders made in
reliance of said sanctions should also be vacated). Accordingly, we pretermit review of
Husband’s additional issues and concerns that pertain to the “Order on Default Hearing.”

                                                Waiver

       Finally, we turn to the remaining issue on appeal concerning the trial court’s
extension of an order of protection during the pendency of the divorce proceedings. As to
that issue, we observe that Husband lacks appropriate references to the record in the
argument section of his appellate brief. This omission amounts to noncompliance with the
Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure as well as the rules of this Court. Indeed, Rule 27
of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure mandates that appellate briefs contain,
among other things, the following:

        (a)     Brief of the Appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain under
                appropriate headings and in the order here indicated:

                ....

                (7)     An argument, which may be preceded by a summary of
                        argument, setting forth:

                        (A)     the contentions of the appellant with respect to the
                                issues presented, and the reasons therefor, including the
                                reasons why the contentions require appellate relief,
                                with citations to the authorities and appropriate
                                references to the record (which may be quoted
                                verbatim) relied on[.]

Tenn. R. App. P. 27(a)(7)(A) (emphasis added). Moreover, Rule 6 of the Rules of the Court
of Appeals of Tennessee states:

of discretion.
         4
           As signaled in the summary preceding the beginning of our Opinion, our decision to vacate the
sanctions order also results in the vacation of the subsequent orders that followed the entry of the trial
court’s sanctions.
                                                  -6-
        No complaint of or reliance upon action by the trial court will be considered
        on appeal unless the argument contains a specific reference to the page or
        pages of the record where such action is recorded. No assertion of fact will
        be considered on appeal unless the argument contains a reference to the
        page or pages of the record where evidence of such fact is recorded.

Tenn. Ct. App. R. 6(b) (emphasis added).

      We have previously stated that a party’s “failure to comply with the Rules of
Appellate Procedure and the rules of this Court waives the issues for review.” Bean v. Bean,
40 S.W.3d 52, 55 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).

        Here, although Husband’s argument concerning this issue contains citations to the
record, we cannot discern how the included references actually support his assertions.
Husband’s issue asserts that Wife’s order of protection ended on December 15, 2020, and
that a subsequently entered order purporting to extend the order of protection was untimely.
Although Husband’s argument appears to hinge on the assertion that the order of protection
was dissolved as of December 15, 2020, he fails to provide a reference to the record
supporting his contention that the order of protection, in fact, terminated on December 15,
2020.5 In keeping with the dictates of Rule 6 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals of
Tennessee, we will not consider an assertion of fact that is not supported by a reference to
the record. In light of Husband’s failure to comply with briefing requirements, this
remaining issue is waived. 6

                                           CONCLUSION

       In light of the foregoing discussion, the trial court’s judgment is vacated in part and
affirmed in part. In pertinent part, the order granting a default judgment and other sanctions
against Husband is vacated, as are the ensuing orders that followed the court’s sanctions
order including the order granting a divorce to Wife. Although we pretermit the issues
Husband raises concerning the divorce, the sole remaining issue in this appeal regarding
the extension of Wife’s order of protection, occurring during the earlier pendency of the
proceeding, has been waived due to Husband’s noncompliance with Rule 27 of the

        5
          In relation to this issue, Husband specifically cites to an “Order Extending Order of Protection”
entered nunc pro tunc to December 18, 2020, as support for his contention. Of course, this reference
demonstrates that the order of protection was extended. However, Husband cites to this same document for
the proposition that, barring an extension, the order was to end on December 15, 2020. There is no language
in the document cited that supports his assertion concerning the termination date. Because the validity of
his argument hinges on the veracity of this termination date, we deem the issue to be waived due to
Husband’s failure to provide an actual record reference that substantiates his contention.
        6
          Wife has requested attorney’s fees incurred in connection with her defense of this appeal, arguing
that Husband’s appeal was frivolous. Due to our disposition in this Opinion and our discretion pursuant to
Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-1-122, we respectfully decline Wife’s request for attorney’s fees.
                                                   -7-
Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure and Rule 6 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals
of Tennessee. The case is hereby remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
Opinion. Although the order granting Wife a divorce is presently vacated, the parenting
plan incorporated therein shall remain in effect for the stability of the children pending the
trial court’s actions on remand.

                                                        s/ Arnold B. Goldin
                                                     ARNOLD B. GOLDIN, JUDGE

                                            -8-