Court Opinion

ID: 9523516
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:43:27.12739+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:06:20.056641
License: Public Domain

SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION UPON REHEARING Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE STAMOS delivered the opinion of the court: Defendant has filed a Petition for Rehearing, alleging four errors in the foregoing opinion. We believe that only one of the allegations of error merits supplementary discussion. In concluding that plaintiff made a prima facie showing of damages resulting from defendant’s failure to discharge its paving obligations (Count III), we considered, in addition to other evidence, expert testimony which had been erroneously excluded by the trial court. We did so on the authority of the following cases: Gundich v. Emerson-Comstock Co., 24 Ill.App.2d 138, 143, 164 N.E.2d 512; Belorodker Loan & Investment Co. v. Goldenberg, 253 Ill.App. 416; Gustin for use of Atwood v. Bryden, 205 Ill.App. 204. Defendant contends that our consideration of the erroneously excluded testimony deprived it of any opportunity to meaningfully cross-examine the expert witness and to offer evidence in rebuttal. It is suggested that, under the circumstances, the proper disposition would be a remand for a new trial or for a limited hearing upon the special issues involved in the admitted proof.  Defendant has not attempted to distinguish the cited cases; nor do we think they can be distinguished from tire case at bar. Nonetheless, after reconsidering the policy arguments supporting and opposing the right of a court of review to weigh evidence wrongfully excluded by the trial court and then to proceed to a factual determination without remand, we conclude that such a practice does raise substantial questions of fairness and due process of law. We also note that an early Illinois Appellate Court case, Traders Ins. Co. v. Catlin, 71 Ill.App. 569, which has been neither overruled nor distinguished by subsequent cases, held that a court of review cannot make determinations of fact based on testimony rejected at trial. We now question the correctness of the Illinois cases to the contrary. However, this position does not necessarily require that we remand for a new trial or special hearing, but merely that, in evaluating the weight of the evidence, we assess only that evidence admitted by the trial court.  It was noted in our original opinion that plaintiff’s expert witness was allowed to testify that two factors determining the success of a shopping center are accessibility and attractiveness. He further testified that the sharp population increases in the area surrounding the subject shopping center would continue during the 1970’s and 1980’s. Also admitted into evidence were photographs of the shopping center, reflecting the strategic benefits to be accrued from a rear access road and paving in accordance with the plat of survey. We believe that this evidence alone was sufficient proof that plaintiff incurred damages as a result of defendant’s failure to complete its undertakings. The trial judge made a similar observation prior to affording plaintiff an opportunity to submit an offer of proof. He stated: “I will tell you, so far as I’m concerned, I assume that it is beneficial to Goldblatt’s generally to have the whole area paved rather than be unimproved and vacant. I assume that that is a fact. I don’t know that it need be proved.” Therefore, we reaffirm our statement in the original opinion that plaintiff made a prima facie showing of damages, that defendant’s evidence was not to the contrary, and that the trial court’s decree, insofar as it refused to order specific performance of the paving obligation as per the plat of survey, was not justified by the evidence. Affirmed in part, reversed and remanded in part with directions. SCHWARTZ and LEIGHTON, JJ., concur.