Court Opinion

ID: 8765470
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-11-26 12:23:49.169324+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:01:50.750997
License: Public Domain

BURTON, Circuit Judge.
These three appeals have been heard together, as they involve the provability of a number of claims against the bankrupt of like character. In tenor and substance the contracts are alike. That presented by Emily M. Nichols is an example and is as follows:
“$2,500.00 Bellaire, Ohio, Feb. 7, 1905.
“Two years after date, I, we, or either of us promise to pay to the order of Miss Emily M. Nichols twenty-five hundred and no 100 dollars at the office of the Avery-Caldwell Mfg. Co., upon surrender of certificate No. 38 for 2,500 shares of preferred stock of said company, value received interest 7 per cent per annum. J. Brent Harding,
“Theodore Neff.”
Some of these contracts related to the stock of a manufacturing corporation, known as the Avery-Caldwell Company, and others to the stock of the Federal Casket Company. It was agreed, as a fact, that the contract set out and others of like character were made by the persons signing the same as promoters, and to induce sales of the stock of the corporations named, and that in consideration of this agreement the claimants became subscribers to the stock of said com*60pañíes, paying therefor the amount named in each contract, and received therefor the shares of stock mentioned. It was also agreed that both of these corporations were “insolvent” before the bankruptcy of said Neff, and that this stock was of no value. The stock certificates were filed as part of the proof in each case and tendered to the trustee. The contracts are plainly agreements to purchase the shares of stock named at the time and price stated. They rest upon a sufficient consideration, and are written agreements to take and pay for the shares named and signed by the parties' to be charged and delivered to and accepted by the promisees. There is, therefore, nothing in the objection as to the contracts being invalid under the statute of frauds because not signed by claimants also. Thayer v. Luce, 22 Ohio St. 62; Himrod Furnace Co. v. Cleveland, 22 Ohio St. 451; Lee v. Cherry, 85 Tenn. 707, 4 S. W. 835, 4 Am. St. Rep. 800; Brown’s Statute of Frauds, §> 345c. The status of a claim must depend upon its provability at the time the bankrupt petition was filed. At that time it must come within the definition of section 63 of the bankrupt act; it cannot be benefited by its status at a later date. The defense is that these claims were not “fixed liabilities,” “absolutely owing” at the time of the filing of the petition against the bankrupt. This is based upon the fact that the liability of the bankrupt is made dependent upon the surrender of the stock certificate at a date which had not then arrived, and that it was optional with the promisees to surrender or keep the stock until that time, and that the liability of the promisor was undetermined and contingent until such surrender at the time named.
That the promisor might refuse performance until the time named is true. But if, before the time of performance, one absolutely repudiate liability and disavow unequivocally any purpose to perform at any time, the other party may treat such repudiation, at his election, as a breach of the agreement and sue for his damages. This is the rule as settled in Hochster v. De La Tour, 2 El. & Bl. 678, and approved by - the Supreme Court in Roehm v. Horst, 178 U. S. 1, 20 Sup. Ct. 780, 44 L. Ed. 953, and by this court in Foss Brewing Co. v. Bullock, 16 U. S. App. 311, 59 Fed. 83, 8 C. C. A. 14, and Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Alley, 43 U. S. App. 169, 73 Fed. 603, 19 C. C. A. 599; McBath v. Jones Cotton Co., 149 Fed. 383, 79 C. C. A. 203; Michigan Yacht Co. v. Busch, 143 Fed. 939, 75 C. C. A. 109. So, if one of the parties absolutely disabl.es himself from performing the contract by putting performance out of his power, the other party may treat that as a repudiation and bring his action to recover damages then or wait the time of performance at his election. This aspect of the question of an anticipatory breach is well put by Fuller, Chief Justice, in Roehm v. Horst, cited above, when he says:
“It is not disputed that if one party to a contract has destroyed the subject-matter, or disabled himself so as to make performance impossible, his conduct is equivalent to a breach of the contract, although the time of performance has not arrived;'and also that if a contract provides for a series of acts, and actual default is made in the performance of one of them, ao*61eompanied by a refusal to perforin the rest, the other party need not perforin, but may treat the refusal as a breach of the entire contract, and recover accordingly.”
In Lovell v. St. Louis Life Ins. Co., 111 U. S. 264, 274, 4 Sup. Ct., 390, 395, 28 L. Ed. 423, the company had failed and transferred its business to another company. The court held that this authorized one insured to treat the contract as at an end and to sue to recover back premiums paid although the time of performance had not arrived. Mr. Justice Bradley, for the court, said:
“Our third conclusion is that, as the old company totally abandoned the performance of its contract with the complainant by transferring all its assets and obligations to the new company, and as the contract is executory in nature, the complainant had a right to consider it as terminated by the act of the company, and to demand what was justly due to him in that exigency. Of this we think there can be no doubt. Where one party to an executory contract prevents the performance of it, or puts it out of his own power to perform it, the other party may regard it as terminated and demand whatever damage he has sustained thereby. .We had occasion to examine this subject in the recent case of United States v. Behan, 110 U. S. 339, 4 Sup. Ct. 81, 28 L. Ed. 168, to which we refer.”
See, also, Carr v. Hamilton, 129 U. S. 669, 9 Sup. Ct. 295, 32 L. Ed. 669.
Bankruptcy is a complete disablement from performance and the equivalent of an out and out repudiation, subject only to the right of the trustee, at his election, to rehabilitate the contract by performance. In the case styled In re Swift, 112 Fed. 315, 50 C. C. A. 264, this consequence was considered by the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in a very satisfactory opinion by Putnam, C. J. There the obligation of a broker to deliver certain shares of stock on demand was held to be breached by bankruptcy, and that no prior demand was essential, a right of action accruing simultaneously with the bankrupt petition, which was the act of disablement to which the adjudication related. In re Pettingill Co. (D. C.) 137 Fed. 143, 147, Judge Lowell, in a very able and discriminating opinion in which the authorities are considered in the light of the requirements for a provable debt under the present bankrupt law, reached the conclusion that:
“If the bankrupt, at the time of bankruptcy, by disenabling himself from performing the contract in question, and by repudiating its obligation, could give the proving creditor the right to maintain at once a suit in which damages could be assessed' at law or in equity, then the creditor can prove in bankruptcy on the ground that bankruptcy is the equivalent of disenablement and repudiation. For the assessment of damages proceedings may be directed by the court under section 63b, Act July 1, 1898, c. 541 (30 Stat. 562, U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3447).”
In that case it was held that a contract guaranteeing “the redemption” of corporate shares, three years after date of issue, was a provable claim, although the time for “redemption” had not arrived at date of bankruptcy.
It is sufficient that a claim becomes provable as a consequence of bankruptcy. The right to sue for and recover damages then accrues. As Judge Lowell puts it in Re Pettingill Co., cited above:
*62“In admission to proof, however, the cláim need not ¿rise' before bankruptcy, nor need the contract be broken, theretofore. It is sufficient for proof if the breach of contract and bankruptcy are coincident.”
The creditor by offering to file his claim manifests his election to treat the contract as broken. This the court held he might do. The decree in each case is affirmed.