Court Opinion

ID: 9568831
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:07:51.46521+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:09:36.540304
License: Public Domain

CROCKETT, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
The purpose of the statute of concern here, Sec. 77-65-l(a), U.C.A.1953, is to give the defendant a trial with reasonable expedition when he desires and requests it. *364That is salutary and I have no disagreement with it. But the statute was not intended and should not be used as a device of trickery to defeat justice. It is my impression that that is what has resulted here.
Defendant’s position is that under the circumstances, after the 90-day period had elapsed following his demand, the court was without jurisdiction to proceed further, and that it was mandatory that the case be dismissed. The statute itself clearly indicates that it was not intended to be so absolute and mandatory as defendant contends. The language immediately following the assurance of trial within 90 days continues, “provided, that for a good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance.” (Emphasis added.)
It is thus obvious that the trial court has power to extend the period in proper circumstances. Those proper circumstances existed here. The following facts are significant: the record indicates and defendant’s counsel freely admits that at the time of the hearing on April 10, when the trial date of June 6 was set, he knew each of these facts: that the demand had been filed asking for a trial within 90 days; that the court calendar was full up until June 6; that the June 6 date would be a few days beyond the 90-day period; and that the court made its order upon the assumption that the June 6 date was satisfactory to both parties. In regard to the setting of a trial date the following exchange took place:
PROSECUTOR: May we have the second place setting on June the 6th?
DEFENDANT’S COUNSEL: I show that date open.
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THE COURT: All right, we’ll set it up for number two on June the 6th.
I think the only fair and reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the defendant’s response to the request for the June 6 trial date is that he agreed to it. In any event, if we assume that the defendant and counsel sat silently by, with a secret mental reservation that they were not so agreeing, they should by such silence, when they should have spoken, be deemed to have waived any right to object thereto. To permit him to take advantage of such a situation is in my mind outside the boundary of the standard of ordinary decency and good conscience which should be expected of an attorney and officer of the court, although from the defendant’s point of view, quite in keeping with the modern trend to*365ward giving all advantages and protections to those accused of crime and holding them to practically no responsibilities.
It is further pertinent to observe that the question of whether there was in fact a consent to the June 6 trial date and/or a voluntary waiver of a known right at the April 10 hearing is one of fact which the trial court heard and ruled upon on the motion to dismiss. (As to waiver see 21 Am.Jur.2d Criminal Law, Sec. 219; as to waiver by acquiescence in delay see People v. White, 2 N.Y.2d 220, 159 N.Y.S.2d 168, 140 N.E.2d 258 (1957), and cases therein cited.) The issues were determined adversely to the defendant and under traditional rules should not be disturbed.
In addition to and supporting what I have said above, there is a separate ground upon which the trial court’s judgment should be affirmed. The essence of what the trial court did, in open court with the defendant and his counsel present, was to grant a reasonable continuance for good cause shown exactly as is authorized by Sec. 77-65-l(a), U.C.A.1953.
For these reasons I dissent and would affirm the judgment entered upon tne defendant’s plea of guilty instead of nullifying it as is done by the court’s decision.
HENRI'OD, J., does not participate