Court Opinion

ID: 9754058
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 19:41:27.53441+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:55:32.592661
License: Public Domain

Ryan, J.
(dissenting). I am unable to agree with the majority opinion. I construe the 1967 amendment to § 8-8 of the General Statutes to be procedural in its character rather than one affecting substantive rights. “It is a rule of construction that legislation is not to be applied retroactively unless the legislature clearly expresses such an intent. *338Michaud v. Fitzryk, 148 Conn. 447, 448, 171 A.2d 397; E. M. Loew’s Enterprises, Inc. v. International Alliance, 127 Conn. 415, 418, 17 A.2d 525; Massa v. Nastri, 125 Conn. 144, 146, 3 A.2d 839; Skinner v. Watson, 35 Conn. 124, 126. The rule is not applied, however, to legislation which is general in its terms and affects only matters of procedure. Such legislation is presumed to have been intended to be applicable to all actions, whether pending or not, in the absence of any expressed intention to the contrary. E. M. Loew’s Enterprises, Inc. v. International Alliance, supra; Neilson v. Perkins, 86 Conn. 425, 428, 85 A. 686.” Lavieri v. Ulysses, 149 Conn. 396, 401, 180 A.2d 632; Schurgast v. Schumann, 156 Conn. 471, 487, 242 A.2d 695.
The instant case involves the standing of the plaintiffs to take an appeal. If standing is not established, the Court of Common Pleas would be without jurisdiction. Hughes v. Town Planning & Zoning Commission, 156 Conn. 505, 508, 242 A.2d 705. At the time of the application to the defendant board, § 8-8 provided, in pertinent part, that “[a]ny person . . . aggrieved by any decision of said board” may take an appeal to the Court of Common Pleas within fifteen days from the date when notice of the decision was published in a newspaper. The plaintiffs’ appeal was timely and adequately alleged aggrievement. An amendment to § 8-8 became effective October 1, 1967, after the appeal was taken and before trial. By its terms the act gave the right of appeal to any person “aggrieved” by any decision of the board “or any person owning land which abuts the land involved in any decision of said board.” The purpose of the statute was remedial and provided an additional method of establishing standing in the trial court. It made no change in the substantive *339law, which requires the plaintiff in such an appeal to prove that the action of the board was illegal. Nor did it alter in any way any substantive rights of the defendants. The plaintiffs were still required to establish standing by proving either aggrievement or that they were abutting owners within the meaning of the statute. The amendment merely provides an additional method of proving standing. It contains nothing to indicate any legislative intent that the statute shall not operate retroactively under the circumstances of the present case. It is general in its terms and purely procedural. Its purpose and effect “is not to affect substantive rights but to govern a detail of procedure, merely. As such, it applies to all trials alike, irrespective of whether the cause of action accrued or the suit was brought before or after the taking effect of the Act. Hubbard v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co,, 70 Conn. 563, 565, 40 Atl. 533; Zalewski v. Waterbury Mfg. Co., 89 Conn. 46, 48, 92 Atl. 682.” Baker v. Paradiso, 117 Conn. 539, 545, 169 A. 272. The amendment upon its face applies to all appeals, does not exclude pending appeals, and, being procedural in its nature, is applicable to the instant appeal, which was pending when the amendment became effective. Toletti v. Bidizcki, 118 Conn. 531, 537, 173 A. 223. It is of course true that the search for legislative intent as to retroactive application may not in all instances stop with the determination that a statute concerns procedure alone. Even if the statute is procedural, it will not be applied retroactively if considerations of good sense and justice dictate that it should not be so applied. Carvette v. Marion Power Shovel Co., 157 Conn. 92, 96, 249 A.2d 58. Not only is there no injustice in the retroactive application of this procedural statute but to hold otherwise would result in *340an injustice. The determination of standing to take an appeal takes place in the trial court. One does not normally become aggrieved until the action complained of has been taken. Fox v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 146 Conn. 665, 666, 154 A.2d 520. In any case, the question of standing by virtue of aggrievement or by ownership of abutting property is one of fact to be determined by the court on the appeal. Hughes v. Town Planning & Zoning Commission, 156 Conn. 505, 508, 242 A.2d 705.
The plaintiffs at the time of trial were entitled to elect whether to establish standing by proof of aggrievement or by showing that they were abutting owners. No evidence of aggrievement was offered, but it was stipulated by the parties that the named plaintiff owned real property located directly across the street from the subject property owned by the defendant Helen W. MacIntyre, and the court so found. It concluded that the properties of the named plaintiff and Mrs. MacIntyre were abutting properties. The instant case is clearly distinguishable from one wherein no right of appeal existed at the time the application was made, as in Demarest v. Zoning Commission, 134 Conn. 572, 59 A.2d 293. The plaintiffs had an existing right of appeal under General Statutes § 8-8, and it was timely exercised. The amendment to § 8-8 was nothing more than a reasonable modification of a form of remedy for enforcing rights. O’Brien v. Flint, 74 Conn. 502, 509, 51 A. 547. All that the statute has 'done is to make available two methods of establishing standing when formerly there was one. See Matter of Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlberg, Inc., 230 N.Y. 261, 271, 130 N.E. 288 (Cardozo, J.).
“An abutting owner is presumed under the law of this state, no evidence having been offered to the *341contrary, to own the fee of the land to the center of the highway.” Antenucci v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corporation, 142 Conn. 349, 355, 114 A.2d 216. Since no snch evidence was offered, the conclusion of the trial court that the plaintiff was an abutting owner within the meaning of the statute cannot be disturbed.
The action of the defendant board in granting a waiver to the defendant Helen W. MacIntyre to divide a 2.4-acre parcel of land in a two-acre zone into two parcels consisting of one acre and 1.4 acres and in granting a waiver of the requirements of the regulations as to setback in a residence AAA district to “legalize the location of existing buildings” on the 1.4-acre plot thereby created was, on the facts of this case, a clear abuse of discretion and completely illegal. It does not merit discussion by this court.
I believe the action of the trial court in sustaining the appeal was correct.