Court Opinion

ID: 9738537
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:55:49.275044+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:06.791866
License: Public Domain

WILCOX, J.
(concurring). I agree with the majority that "the circumstances surrounding Garcia's Alford plea do not require that he be allowed to withdraw that plea." Majority op. at 867. I also agree with the majority that under the present state of the law in Wisconsin, a trial court may, under the appropriate circumstances, accept an Alford plea. I feel compelled, however, to write separately to express my concerns regarding the use of these seemingly innocuous pleas. Quite simply, I am troubled that a defendant may plead guilty to a charge while continuing to protest his innocence thereto. As noted by the United States Supreme Court, "[t]he dual aim of our criminal justice system is 'that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer.' " United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 230 (1975) (citation omitted). An Alford plea, in my mind, contradicts this very simple proposition.
Further, I believe that the use of Alford pleas in Wisconsin has an adverse effect on the public's perspective regarding justice.1 In our democracy, the *869victim of a crime places his or her trust in the criminal justice system. How then does a victim react when he or she hears the defendant plead guilty while all the while maintaining his innocence to the crime? The sense of finality is clearly missing. And what of the defendant? Having chosen to maintain his innocence to the crime, it is unlikely that he will willingly subject himself to the rehabilitative process.
An Alford plea may, in some instances foster expediency. As noted correctly by the majority, in many instances the plea allows the state to conserve scarce resources in its battle against crime.2 It may also serve to shield a defendant from ridicule and embarrassment in cases such as those involving sexual assault. Even granting these so-called "benefits," I believe that an Alford plea is a troubling way to finalize the criminal judicial process. I recommend that the trial courts in this state act with great reticence when confronted with an Alford plea. "

 0n this ground, Garcia asserted that Alford pleas should be eliminated because they deny the public a "moral foundation" for the conviction. The majority counters this attack by maintaining that "[t]his same problem exists with the nolo con-tendere or no contest plea." Majority op. at 859. While I recognize that the no contest plea and the Alford plea both lack an express admission of guilt, I believe that the Alford plea, with its concomitant protestations of innocence, goes well beyond a plea of no contest. As noted in Wis. JI — Criminal SM-32A1 (1985):
*869The terms "no contest plea" and "Alford plea" are sometimes used interchangeably. However, the Alford case clearly dealt with a guilty plea, not a plea of no contest, so there [sic] probably are two different entities. An Alford plea goes beyond a no contest plea in the sense that the former involves an outright claim of innocence while the later involves something less than an express admission of guilt.

 However, as noted by Judge Charles Schudson in his concurrence at the court of appeals, this case proves that Alford pleas are not always an expedient in the criminal judicial process. From 1988 to 1995, Garcia's two post-conviction motions, two evidentiary hearings, and three appeals have all flowed from the trial court's acceptance of the Alford plea.