Court Opinion

ID: 9633337
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:43:45.921537+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:08:33.314761
License: Public Domain

Shearing, J.,
dissenting,
with whom Rose, J., concurs:
I would affirm the judgment of the district court.
In March 1993, the mother filed a motion for modification of joint custody. The motion requested, inter alia, that the mother “be awarded sole legal and physical custody of the minor child.” After a hearing on the matter, the district judge ordered that joint legal custody continue with virtually equal physical custody. On September 13, 1993, the mother filed a motion to amend the court order.
A period of acrimonious court proceedings involving visitation and other issues followed. On May 31, 1994, the father filed an opposition to the mother’s motions for relief and in his prayer for relief requested “[tjhat both Respondent and Petitioner be Ordered to have psychiatric evaluations by the same psychiatrist selected by this court.” Both parties had previously agreed to be subjected to home studies and psychological evaluations, but *70apparently no such studies or evaluations had been made. A hearing was held on June 3, 1994, at which numerous witnesses testified. After the hearing, the district judge ordered that Dr. Linda W. Peterson, a psychologist, conduct an evaluation of the home environment, the parties and the child. The district judge ordered that Dr. Peterson report to the court with her findings and recommendations, after which another hearing would be held. The district court also ordered that “[f] olio wing the conclusion of the hearing and a report to the Court from Dr. Peterson, this Court will make a determination as to custody.” A further hearing with additional testimony was conducted on September 9, 1994. Both mother and father participated fully in all the proceedings with no objection.
Neither party on appeal has raised the issue of whether child custody was properly at issue before the district court and it is clear from the pleadings and the history of the proceedings that both parties wanted to litigate the custody issue. Yet the majority would hold that a procedural defect is fatal. NRCP 15(b) provides:
When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the result of the trial of these issues.
The custody of Michael was appropriately tried by the district court with the parties’ consent.
After the hearings, the district court made extensive findings of fact and concluded that Michael’s best interests would be served by vesting sole legal custody in the mother. The court found the following:
Testimony given to this Court presents two people who are extremely hostile and distrustful towards one another. . . . The parents focus this venom towards one another, under no uncertain terms, and in virtually every place the two meet. They cannot affect even a custodial exchange of the child, Michael, without major disputes, even though both profess to love him. . . .
There is no chance, based on the evidence produced in both days of testimony, that the parties can agree on anything to do with their child, let alone attempt to resolve their differences themselves, even with professional help.
*71The Court went on to make detailed findings regarding the parties and their interaction with Michael which justify overcoming the presumption in favor of joint custody. Based on these findings, the court concluded “that Michael would be safer, more warmly loved and more daily nurtured with the mother, in the mother’s home.” The court specified visitation and child support, which neither party appealed. The court also denied attorney fees to both parties, which the parties did appeal.
In a child custody case, the district court’s foremost concern is the welfare of the child. Culbertson v. Culbertson, 91 Nev. 230, 233, 533 P.2d 768, 770 (1975). It is presumed that the district court properly exercised its judicial discretion in determining the best interests of the child. Id. The determination will not be overturned absent a clear abuse of discretion. Id. There is absolutely no indication that the court abused its discretion. On the contrary, the court made extensive findings which fully justify its conclusion and order, both as to child custody and attorney fees. Therefore, I would affirm the order of the district court.