Court Opinion

ID: 9699240
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 20:14:30.352374+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:47.176482
License: Public Domain

Shepherd, J.
(dissenting). I dissent and would remand the case for determination of when the loss occurred.
Plaintiffs filed this action on August 17, 1983. The trial court found that plaintiffs’ policy covers damage resulting from "collapse of the house, but excludes settling, cracking, shrinking, among other things.” The trial court also noted that the word "collapse” does not require a total collapse, relying on Vormelker v Oleksinski, 40 Mich App 618, 631; 199 NW2d 287 (1972), which apparently interpreted a similar policy. MCL 500.2832; MSA 24.12832 requires this action to have been brought within twelve months after "inception of the loss.” The trial court noted that the one-year period did not begin to run until plaintiffs had knowledge of the loss. The question then was when such knowledge existed.
This Court accepted the following definition of "collapse” in Vormelker, supra at 630:
"Collapse, as used in this policy, means a sinking, bulging, cracking, pulling away of the wall so as to impair its function of supporting the superstructure and destroying its efficiency as a habitation.”
The majority in the instant case ignores this definition and attempts to avoid "getting into an interpretation of 'inception of the loss,’ ” apparently with regard to whether knowledge of the loss *490is required. The majority then determines, however, using knowledge of the cause of the loss as the meaning of "inception of the loss,” that plaintiffs had knowledge of the loss no later than one year from the time Troxel first evaluated their house. I do not believe such a determination is proper for this Court. While that may ultimately prove to be the time when the limitations period began running, I believe the trial court must make that determination.
The trial court found only that plaintiffs’ knowledge of the loss occurred in August, 1981, after talking to Troxel, when plaintiffs knew "that they had a severe problem, although they were unaware of the real nature of it.” This does not satisfy the Vormelker definition of collapse or knowledge of collapse. The court’s finding admits that the cause of the damages was still unknown at that time. It is clear that plaintiffs knew their house was collapsing in December, 1982, when they sent a claim to both insurers, knowledge that was confirmed on June 28, 1983, when they received the engineer’s report. Plaintiffs’ suit was filed within one year of sending those claims. The question remains, however, whether plaintiffs should have known that their house was collapsing within the meaning of Vormelker earlier than one year before they filed suit.
I believe the record is devoid of sufficient findings with regard to that fact. Merely knowing of a "severe problem” is not enough to meet the definition, and Troxel’s statements do not appear to be enough on the record before us. I would remand for the trial court to determine at what point plaintiffs should have known that their house was collapsing under the Vormelker definition.