Court Opinion

ID: 9918810
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-16 17:17:24.695799+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:05:53.396059
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

City of Lancaster,                  :
                 Petitioner         :
                                    :
            v.                      :                No. 131 C.D. 2023
                                    :                Argued: December 4, 2023
Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, :
                 Respondent         :

BEFORE:          HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
                 HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge
                 HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Senior Judge

OPINION
BY SENIOR JUDGE LEAVITT                                     FILED: January 16, 2024

                 The City of Lancaster (City) petitions for review of an adjudication of
the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board (Labor Board) holding that the City
committed an unfair labor practice by not producing all correspondence between the
City’s Fire Chief and Battalion Chiefs over the course of most of 2021, as requested
by the President of the International Association of Fire Fighters, Local Union
Number 319 (Union). The City contends that the Labor Board erred in holding that
the Union’s request was presumptively relevant even though it lacked any reference
to a particular subject of collective bargaining. The City further contends that its
request for clarification was reasonable and not a refusal to bargain with the Union.
For the reasons that follow, we reverse the Labor Board.
                 On September 21, 2021, the Union filed a charge of unfair labor
practices with the Labor Board asserting that the City violated the Pennsylvania
Labor Relations Act1 by refusing to comply with an information request made by its
president. The City filed an answer to the Union’s complaint asserting that the

1
    Act of June 1, 1937, P.L. 1168, as amended, 43 P.S. §§211.1-211.15.
information request was overbroad and not germane to the City’s collective
bargaining agreement with the Union. On March 17, 2022, the parties entered into
a joint stipulation of facts, and, thereafter, filed briefs in support of their respective
legal positions.
             A summary of the stipulated facts follows.
             The Union is the exclusive bargaining representative for the City’s 74
Fire Bureau employees. The rank of the uniformed personnel in descending order
begins with the Chief and is followed by the Deputy Chief, Battalion Chief, Captain,
Lieutenant, and Fire Fighter. The Chief and Deputy Chief are management positions
excluded from the bargaining unit. At the time period relevant to the Union’s unfair
labor practice charge, the City did not employ a Deputy Chief. The four Battalion
Chiefs, who were members of the bargaining unit, reported directly to the Chief on
a daily basis.
             On September 1, 2021, the Union president, Geoffrey Stone (Stone),
emailed Patrick Hopkins (Hopkins), Business Administrator for the City, and his
message stated as follows:
             Pursuant to my status as the exclusive collective bargaining
             representative [] I’m asking for all correspondence (via text,
             email, letter or otherwise) between the chief and individual
             bargaining unit member[s] from January 1, 2021-To Present.

Reproduced Record at 16a (R.R. __). Stone repeated the request in an email on
September 14, 2021, stating that he would give the City until September 24, 2021,
or “advise our lawyer to file unfair labor practice in harrisburg [sic].” R.R. 15a.
That same day, Hopkins responded as follows:
             I was on vacation when you emailed and just got back in the
             office yesterday. I have reviewed your request and believe it is
             overly broad. You are not entitled to “all correspondence (via
             text, email, letter or otherwise) between the chief and individual

                                            2
            bargaining unit member [sic] from January 1, 2021-To Present.”
            If you care to clarify specifically what documents you are asking
            about, please do so and then we can respond accordingly.

Id. Two days later, Stone emailed a response:
            I dont [sic] want to waste any more time. [S]o are you denying
            my request for the what I asked [sic]? If so i [sic] will be moving
            forward with the [Unfair Labor Practice charge]. Just want to
            know a [sic] your official answer.

R.R. 14a. Later that day, Hopkins replied:

            Correct. The answer I provided previously is the City’s response.

R.R. 13a.

            On September 21, 2021, the Union filed the unfair labor practice
charge. On December 1, 2021, Stone wrote to Hopkins as follows:
            Since my original request was to be too overly broad Ive [sic]
            been advised to narrow it down some by our lawyer. So I am
            asking again for all correspondence between the fire chief and
            battalion chiefs from jan [sic] 1[,] 2021 till present. . [sic]
            Thanks[.]

R.R. 21a. That same day, Hopkins responded:
            Your request remains overly broad. You are not entitled to see
            or be copied on every communication between the fire chief and
            the battalion chiefs. If you are able to clarify specifically what
            documents you are seeking and how they are relevant to fulfilling
            the union’s bargaining duties, please do so and we can respond
            accordingly.

R.R. 20a. To this, Stone replied:
            The request is not overly-broad. In fact, in response to your
            earlier claim of over-breadth, I narrowed the request today to
            only those communications between the Chief and Battalion
            Chiefs within the time limit previously provided.

                                         3
             The information is necessary and relevant to [the Union’s]
             enforcement of the collective bargaining agreement, and
             monitoring for potential breaches of same.
             Given the fact the union has limited its request to a specific time-
             period (since January 1, 2021) and has now further limited its
             request to only those communications between the Chief and
             [Battalion Chiefs], this should be an easy request to fill. As there
             is nothing privileged or confidential in these communications,
             there should be no further problem in providing the requested
             information.

R.R. 19a-20a. Hopkins reiterated his position:
             As I had explained previously, you are only entitled to
             documents to the extent they are relevant to fulfilling the union’s
             bargaining duties. You have not narrowed your request to any
             particular open grievance, subject of bargaining, or other matter
             related to your union responsibilities, and you are not entitled to
             an unfounded fishing expedition. Please be guided accordingly.

R.R. 18a-19a.

             The Union’s unfair labor charge asserted that the City violated the
Pennsylvania Labor Relations Act because the information requested was
“necessary and relevant to the enforcement of the collective bargaining agreement,
and [to] monitor compliance with said agreement.” R.R. 6a, ¶4. In its answer, the
City noted, inter alia, that the request for “all correspondence” is a demand “to be a
party to every communication . . . regardless of whether any specific communication
has anything to do with collective bargaining rights.” R.R. 7a, ¶3.
             Although the unfair labor practices charge was prompted by the
Union’s first document request, both parties briefed the legal issues raised in the
Union’s revised request. The Labor Board’s Hearing Examiner issued a proposed
decision and order holding that the City violated Section 6(1)(a) and (e) of the

                                          4
Pennsylvania Labor Relations Act2 and what is known as the Policemen and Firemen
Collective Bargaining Act (Act 111).3 The proposed order directed the City to
provide the requested information.
                 The Hearing Examiner reasoned that it “cannot be seriously disputed”
that the Union’s request pertained to the working conditions of bargaining unit
members and that “the information must be deemed presumptively relevant under
the [Labor] Board’s case[]law.” Proposed Decision at 5; R.R. 29a. Further, the
Union had “no duty to specify” the request because it was “readily apparent.” Id.
The Hearing Examiner rejected the City’s argument that the Union was not entitled
to confidential correspondence because the City did not raise that issue prior to the

2
    Section 6 of the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Act states, in pertinent part, as follows:
          (1) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer--
                (a) To interfere with, restrain or coerce employes in the exercise of the rights
                guaranteed in this act.
                ***
                (e) To refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his
                employes, subject to the provisions of Section Seven(a) of this act.
43 P.S. §211.6(1)(a), (e).
3
  Act of June 24, 1968, P.L. 237, No. 111, as amended, 43 P.S. §§217.1-217.12. Section 1 of
Act 111 states, in relevant part, as follows:
        Policemen or firemen employed by a political subdivision of the Commonwealth
        or by the Commonwealth shall, through labor organizations or other representatives
        designated by fifty percent or more of such policemen or firemen, have the right to
        bargain collectively with their public employers concerning the terms and
        conditions of their employment, including compensation, hours, working
        conditions, retirement, pensions and other benefits, and shall have the right to an
        adjustment or settlement of their grievances or disputes in accordance with the
        terms of this act.
43 P.S. §217.1.

                                                   5
Union’s filing of an unfair labor practice charge. The Hearing Examiner also found
that the City did not make a reasonable attempt to accommodate the Union’s request.
               The City filed timely exceptions with the Labor Board, to which the
Union responded. On January 24, 2023, the Labor Board issued an adjudication that
dismissed the City’s exceptions and adopted the Hearing Examiner’s proposed
decision and order as “absolute and final.” Labor Board Adjudication at 4; R.R. 40a.
The Labor Board stated that the City “flatly refused” to provide the Union with the
requested documents and did not “propose any means of coopera[tion].” Id. Further,
the City did not raise confidentiality concerns when the Union first made its request.
               The City filed a petition for this Court’s review of the Labor Board’s
adjudication. On appeal,4 the City raises two issues: First, the City argues that the
Labor Board erred when it determined the Union’s request was presumptively
relevant and placed the burden on the City to prove otherwise. Second, the City
argues that the Labor Board erred when it determined the City did not make a good
faith effort to accommodate the Union’s request in light of the City’s concerns about
confidentiality and chain of command issues.
               The Labor Board responds that it did not err when it determined that
the City’s “blanket refusal to provide any documents in its possession” demonstrated
a lack of good faith in violation of Section 6(1)(a) and (e) of the Pennsylvania Labor
Relations Act.5 Labor Board Brief at 3.

4
  This Court reviews a final order of the Labor Board to determine whether all necessary findings
of fact are supported by substantial evidence, whether an error of law was committed, or whether
a party’s constitutional rights were violated. Rozek v. Bristol Borough, 613 A.2d 165, 167-68 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 1992).
5
  Although the Union is an intervenor in this matter, it did not file a brief. Instead, it noted, in a
September 13, 2023, letter to this Court, that it joins in the brief filed by the Labor Board.

                                                  6
             In its first issue, the City argues that the Labor Board erred in holding
that the Union’s request was presumptively relevant.           The City argues that
presumptively relevant document requests are those that relate specifically to the
terms and conditions of employment within the bargaining unit. By contrast, the
Union’s request was so broad that it is impossible to say that it related to mandatory
subjects of bargaining. The Labor Board improperly invoked the presumption on
the Union’s “bare assertion” of entitlement, without any explanation.
             The City relies upon federal decisional law, noting that this Court has
recognized “that when there is no meaningful difference between [state law] and the
National Labor Relations Act [, 29 U.S.C. §§151-169],” it is appropriate to “look to
federal case law for guidance.” Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations
Board, 527 A.2d 1097, 1099 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1987).
             The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently
established that in a union’s request for information, “the threshold question is
whether the requested information is relevant to fulfilling the [u]nion’s bargaining
duties.” Crozer-Chester Medical Center v. National Labor Relations Board, 976
F.3d 276, 285 (3d Cir. 2020) (holding that union request for asset purchase
agreement detailing how jobs in the bargaining unit would change after acquisition
was presumptively relevant). The union bears the initial burden of showing that the
information it is requesting is relevant, unless it is “presumptively relevant.” Id. at
286-87. If the information is presumptively relevant, the burden is on the employer
to produce the requested information or to rebut the presumption. A request for
“wage and related information” is considered “presumptively relevant” because it
“concerns the core of the employer-employee relationship[.]”           Curtiss-Wright
Corporation, Wright Aeronautical Division v. National Labor Relations Board, 347

                                          7
F.2d 61, 69 (3d Cir. 1965) (requests for a list of job descriptions and wage rates for
80 specified administrative positions held to be presumptively relevant as “wage and
related information”). Where the employer rebuts the presumption of relevance,
then the union must demonstrate relevance. Id.
             Pennsylvania precedent provides additional guidance on what
information will be considered presumptively relevant as relating to the core of the
employer-employee relationship.       In Commonwealth, 527 A.2d at 1099, for
example, a request for information on four pending grievances was held
presumptively relevant. Likewise, a request for a list of witnesses to be called for a
suspension hearing was held presumptively relevant. Pennsylvania Department of
Corrections v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, 541 A.2d 1168 (Pa. Cmwlth.
1988).   Adjudications from the Labor Board have held requests for “wage
information” are presumptively relevant, as are requests for policies on promotion,
employee handbooks, and information about employee health insurance.              See
Pennsylvania Nurses Association v. Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare, 17
PPER ¶17125 (Final Order 1986); United Mine Workers of America District 2 v.
Fayette County, 36 PPER ¶72 (Proposed Decision and Order 2005); AFSCME
District Council 85 v. Erie County, 37 PPER ¶171 (Proposed Decision and Order
2006).   By contrast, Labor Board precedent has established that requests for
confidential employee information, managerial prerogatives, and witness statements
obtained during an employment-related misconduct investigation are not
presumptively relevant. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 19 PPER ¶19138 (Final
Order 1988); Pennsylvania Department of Agriculture, 18 PPER ¶18003 (Final
Order 1986); AFSCME, Council 13, AFL-CIO v. Pennsylvania Department of
Corrections, 19 PPER ¶19039 (Final Order 1988).

                                          8
             The City argues that the Union’s request for “all correspondence,” in
both the first and revised request, did not meet the presumptively relevant standard.
It did not relate to “wage and related information,” as did the request for a list of job
descriptions and wages for administrative positions in Curtiss-Wright, 347 F.2d 61.
It did not seek information on how jobs would change after the sale of the employer’s
assets, as in Crozer-Chester Medical Center, 976 F.3d 276. Because the Union’s
request was not on its face relevant, it had the burden of showing that the information
requested was relevant to fulfilling its bargaining duties. Id. at 285. The Union did
not make that demonstration.
             The Union did not attempt to explain how all communication between
the Fire Chief and the Battalion Chiefs would pertain to, or be relevant to, fulfillment
of the Union’s bargaining duties. It simply made the “bare assertion” that the
president’s “status as the exclusive collective bargaining representative” authorized
the information request, R.R. 16a, and that it was relevant to “enforcement of the
collective bargaining agreement.”       R.R. 19a.     Notably, the Labor Board has
recognized that a union’s “bare assertion” that it needs information is not sufficient
to require the employer to supply that information. See Pennsylvania Nurses
Association, 17 PPER ¶ 17125 (Final Order 1986) (citing Detroit Edison Company
v. National Labor Relations Board, 440 U.S. 301 (1979)). Further, a union is not
entitled to a fishing expedition. Crozer-Chester Medical Center, 976 F.3d at 285
(quoting Detroit Edison Company, 440 U.S. at 318).
             The Union requested “all correspondence” between the Fire Chief and
the Battalion Chiefs over an 11-month period of 2021, and the initial request was
even broader, seeking all written communications between the Chief and all 74
bargaining unit members over a 9-month period. The Union, itself, acknowledged

                                           9
that its initial request was overbroad. The City responded with a request for
clarification about what documents were sought so that it could “respond
accordingly.” R.R. 15a.
              Here, the Labor Board got it backwards. Instead of requiring the Union
to explain why or how its request was relevant to its collective bargaining
responsibilities, it burdened the City with identifying all documents that might be
responsive and then explaining why certain information could not be provided.6 The
Labor Board placed the burden on the City to demonstrate “the information is not
relevant or [that it] cannot reasonably be provided.” Proposed Decision at 5; R.R.
29a (emphasis added). The Labor Board would have the City prove a negative.
However, “[i]t is settled beyond dispute in this Commonwealth that the party
defending in an action is not required to prove a negative in order to prevail.” In re
Property Along Pine Road in Earl Township, 743 A.2d 990, 994 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999).
              With respect to a public employer’s duty to respond to a union’s request
for information, this Court has explained as follows:
              [A]n employer has a duty to furnish a union information relevant
              and necessary to enable it to intelligently carry out its statutory
              obligations and that under the standard of relevancy, it is
              sufficient that the union’s request for information be supported
              by a showing of probable or potential relevance.

6
  The Labor Board directs the Court to Commonwealth, 527 A.2d at 1100. There, this Court held
that “there is an obligation for an employer to make a diligent effort to obtain presumptively
relevant information sought by the union.” Labor Board Brief at 10. The Labor Board argues that
the standard of “reasonable diligence” cannot be satisfied by “a blanket denial.” Id. (citing
National Labor Relations Board v. John S. Swift Company, 277 F.2d 641, 645 (7th Cir. 1960)). It
was incumbent upon the City to respond with a list of the documents it can and will provide and
to specify any information being withheld and the reason therefor. The Labor Board contends that
an employer’s “flat” refusal of a document request, without explanation or discussion, is not an
acceptable response to a union’s request for information.

                                              10
Department of Corrections, 541 A.2d at 1171 (emphasis added). Here, the City was
left in the dark. The Union did not support its request “by a showing of the probable
or potential relevance” of the information. Id. Even when the City asked it to offer
such support, the Union refused. In sum, a union must disclose enough about the
information it seeks so that the employer can determine whether the requested
information is presumptively relevant, or relevant at all, to the union’s fulfillment of
its bargaining duties.
             There is neither statutory authority, nor precedent, to support the Labor
Board’s conclusion that the Union’s request for “all correspondence” between the
City’s Fire Chief and Battalion Chiefs was presumptively relevant and disclosable.
The Labor Board erred in holding that such a request was presumptively relevant on
its face.
             In its second issue, the City argues that even if it had an obligation to
produce the documents requested by the Union, it was error for the Labor Board to
hold that the City did not engage with the Union in good faith or attempt to raise its
confidentiality and chain of command concerns. The City notes that “[t]he Tenth
Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals has held that an employer can request
clarification under the [National Labor Relations Act] when faced with an
ambiguous or overbroad information request.” City Brief at 32 (citing Norris, a
Dover Resources Company v. National Labor Relations Board, 417 F.3d 1161, 1169
(10th Cir. 2005)). This is what the City did in the matter sub judice.
             The City argues that the Union’s need for information must be balanced
against the “legitimate and substantial confidentiality interests asserted by the
employer.” City Brief at 35 (citing Crozer-Chester Medical Center, 976 F.3d at
293). The City contends that it has no authority to waive the confidentiality rights

                                          11
of individual employees and that responding to the Union’s request could have led
to inappropriate (perhaps, even illegal) disclosure of an employee’s disability status
or medical diagnosis.
             The City argues that the Union’s request also raised a chain-of-
command issue within the Fire Bureau. The Union president is a fire fighter, the
lowest ranking employee within the department, and the Battalion Chiefs are three
levels higher in rank. The City argues that if this Court were to affirm the Labor
Board, it would effectively require the Fire Chief to copy a fire fighter on all emails
to the Battalion Chiefs, which would be disruptive to the Fire Bureau’s chain of
command. A fire fighter is not entitled to participate in the operational decisions of
the Fire Chief and Battalion Chiefs.
             The Labor Board asserts that the City “flatly refused to comply with the
information request,” rather than discussing its concerns with the Union. Labor
Board Brief at 11-12. Citing Pennsylvania State Corrections Officers Association
v. Department of Corrections (SCI Dallas), 37 PPER 24 (Proposed Decision and
Order, 2006) (PSCOA), the Labor Board states that “an employer does not have an
absolute right to deny an information request even when it has legitimate
confidentiality concerns.” Labor Board Brief at 12 (emphasis in original). In
PSCOA, the hearing examiner determined that an employer’s blanket refusal,
without explanation or discussion, was not an acceptable response to a request for
information from the union.
             In response to the City’s contention that sorting through hundreds or
thousands of emails constitutes an undue burden, the Labor Board maintains that this
is irrelevant because “[i]nformation must be turned over unless it plainly appears
irrelevant.” Labor Board Brief at 15. Any other rule, it contends, would “greatly

                                          12
hamper the bargaining process [because] it is virtually impossible to tell in advance
whether the requested data will be relevant except in those infrequent instances in
which the inquiry is patently outside the bargaining issue.” Id. (quoting Robinson
Township Police Association v. Robinson Township, 31 PPER ¶ 31025 (Proposed
Decision and Order, 1999)).
             The Labor Board found that the City did not attempt to engage with the
Union, but the record does not support this conclusion. The email chain between the
Union president and the City administrator demonstrates that when the City sought
clarification of the request, the Union abruptly threatened to file an unfair labor
practice charge. The City did not announce a “flat refusal” of the Union’s request
but, rather, a willingness to “respond accordingly.” R.R. 15a. The email exchange
belies the Labor Board’s conclusion that the City did not attempt to accommodate
the Union’s request. While willing to produce the relevant documents, the City
needed to know what documents would, in fact, be responsive to the Union’s request
and whether they were the kind of documents to which the Union was even entitled.
             In PSCOA, on which the Labor Board relies, it was noted that if an
employer has a confidentiality interest at stake, it should propose a means for
accommodating that interest together with the interests of the union. In other words,
the parties should negotiate. Had the Union been more specific in its request for
information, the required negotiation and accommodation could have occurred. In
his December 1, 2021, email, the Union president asserted that “there is nothing
privileged or confidential in these communications.”          R.R. 19a-20a.      Made
approximately three months after the Union had already filed its unfair labor practice
charge, this conclusory assertion neither substantiated, nor shed light on, the Union’s
belief that the request did not implicate confidentiality.

                                          13
            In sum, the record established that the City was attempting to work with
the Union, by seeking clarification of the information request, so that it could
respond in a meaningful way. The City never stated it would refuse to provide any
and all information to the Union. The Labor Board erred in holding that the City
refused to bargain with the Union.
            For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the Labor Board’s order.

                           ____________________________________________
                           MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge Emerita

                                        14
         IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

City of Lancaster,                  :
                 Petitioner         :
                                    :
            v.                      :     No. 131 C.D. 2023
                                    :
Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, :
                 Respondent         :

                                  ORDER

            AND NOW, this 16th day of January, 2024, the order of the
Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, in the above-captioned matter, is REVERSED.

                         ____________________________________________
                         MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge Emerita