Court Opinion

ID: 9762608
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:27:09.000101+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:35.755544
License: Public Domain

Jack Holt, Jr., Chief Justice, dissenting. The majority correctly states that the standard of review in this case is whether the evidence supports the findings made by the Commission, not whether the evidence would support findings contrary to those made by the Commission, Reynolds Mining Co. v. Raper, 245 Ark. 749, 434 S.W.2d 304 (1968), and that even if the decision of the Commission is against the preponderance of the evidence, we will not reverse where its decision is supported by substantial evidence. Hawthorne v. Davis, 268 Ark. 131, 594 S.W.2d 844 (1980). Additionally, they acknowledge that in order to reverse a decision of the Commission, the appellate court must be convinced that fair-minded persons, with the same facts before them, could not have reached the conclusion arrived at by the Commission. St. Michael Hospital v. Wright, 250 Ark. 539, 465 S.W.2d 904 (1971). However, after capably reciting these rules, the majority reverses the Commission’s holding in total disregard of the substantial evidence supporting their decision. In effect, the majority substitutes its interpretation of Dr. Chakales’s deposition testimony in place of the Commission’s findings, thereby controverting the applicable standard of review. The Commission interpreted Dr. Chakales’s testimony as determining that Tuberville’s change in physical condition was caused by the natural course of aging. In analyzing this issue, the Commission stated: The real issue in this case is the cause of the claimant’s subsequent problems. If the problems were caused as a natural probable result of the original injury then the claimant has established a causal connection between his change in physical condition and the original injury. However, if the subsequent problems are caused by the natural process of aging, then they are not compensable. In order for a worker’s disability to be compensable there must be a causal connection between the accident and a risk which is reasonably incident to the employment. Gerber Products v. McDonald, 15 Ark. App. 226, 691 S.W.2d 879 (1985). The process of aging is not a risk reasonably incident to employment; rather, it is an inevitable part of each individual’s life. Therefore, physical problems caused by the natural process of aging are not compensable under the workers’ compensation law of this state. To hold otherwise would literally open the door for any claimant who has ever received an award of workers’ compensation benefits to reopen his case and receive additional benefits based simply upon the process of aging. The majority categorically rejects the Commission’s findings by stating that: . . . fair-minded persons could not conclude he [Dr. Chakales] attributed Tuberville’s condition necessitating the surgery to anything other than the previous condition of his back which was the direct result of the injury he suffered years ago. * * * * It is impossible to read the testimony and conclude that aging alone was the cause of the current need for compensation. However, the portions of Dr. Chakales’s testimony that the majority includes in its opinion clearly indicate that the Commission had substantial evidence upon which to base its finding that Tuberville’s subsequent problems were caused by the natural process of aging. In the emphasized portions of his testimony, Dr. Chakales affirmatively stated three times that the general, gradual, and natural process of aging was the cause of Tuberville’s change in physical condition: Q What would be your opinion as to what would put him in that situation? A General, gradual process of aging, I would say. Q Someone in Mr. Tuberville’s condition, having had the injury he had back in 1970 and having had the removal of the disc back in ’71, would be a real candidate to wake up in the shape he was in, in ’82? A Correct. Q And that would be because, as you say, the aging process? A Correct. * * * * A I assume what had happened between ’71 until ’82, that he had stabilized and he had probably learned to cope with his problem, but then something triggered it off and then he started getting more acute. Q Do you have any idea what would trigger it? A Mother Nature — you know, aging. Thus, it is apparent that the Commission’s decision was based on substantial evidence that supported its position and that Dr. Chakales himself attributed Tuberville’s condition to the aging process, which contradicts the majority’s position that the only cause of Tuberville’s present condition was the previous condition of his back. The majority also criticizes the appellant, International Paper Company (IP), for not asking Dr. Chakales, upon cross-examination, whether the effect of the aging process of which he spoke would have produced Tuberville’s present condition absent the previous injury and resulting surgery. The criticism would be better directed at Tuberville, the appellee, and his failure to clearly ascertain the cause of the condition of which he complains because he had the burden of proving a change in physical condition pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-713(a) (1987). In fact, it is upon cross-examination that IP asked: Q Did he give you any history of a particular incident that would cause the condition you found him in when you did this recent surgery? A No. The majority has cited the most pertinent portions of Dr. Chakales’s testimony, which refer to Tuberville’s preexisting condition and the cause for his present condition. Yet, the evidence relied upon by the Commission is substantial, and fair-minded persons could have reached the conclusion arrived at by the Commission. Consequently, the majority has misapplied the standard applicable to a reversal of the Commission’s decision, and the judgment should be reversed. Hays and Turner, JJ., join in this dissent.