Court Opinion

ID: 9403836
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-21 19:09:53.974766+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:35.350009
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

                                   COA No. 22-514

                                  Filed 20 June 2023

        Wayne County, No. 18CRS52990

        STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

              v.

        KARL DAVID COLT, Defendant.

        Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 26 April 2021 by Judge William

W. Bland in Wayne County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 11 April

2023.

        Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Special Deputy Attorney General Marissa
        K. Jensen, for the State.

        Cooley Law Office, by Craig M. Cooley, for defendant-appellant.

        FLOOD, Judge.

        Karl David Colt (“Defendant”) appeals from the trial court’s Judgment

sentencing him to 80 to 108 months’ imprisonment. Defendant argues the State

failed to satisfy the corpus delicti rule primarily because the minor victim’s body was

never found, and the State did not present sufficient evidence establishing the minor

victim died. Defendant further argues the trial court erred in admitting testimony
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                                    Opinion of the Court

regarding the minor’s mother’s conviction for second-degree murder because, among

other reasons, the testimony was an inadmissible testimonial statement.

          After careful review, we conclude that the corpus delicti rule was satisfied

because substantial independent evidence established the trustworthiness of

Defendant’s confession. We further conclude the trial court did not err in overruling

Defendant’s objections to testimony that the mother was in prison for second-degree

murder.

                          I. Factual and Procedural History

          Defendant was indicted on 8 September 2020 for concealment of the death of a

child who did not die of natural causes. On 26 April 2021, a jury found Defendant

guilty.     Defendant was sentenced to an aggravated range of 80 to 108 months’

imprisonment.

          The evidence presented at trial tended to show Kayla Clements (“Clements”)

gave birth to a baby boy, Kaceyn, on 11 March 2016. In the spring of 2016, shortly

after Kaceyn was born, Clements and Kaceyn moved into the apartment of

Clements’s younger sister, Sandi.       Clements and Kaceyn lived with Sandi until

October 2016.       Sandi testified that, while Clements and Kaceyn lived in her

apartment, Kaceyn spent most of his time in a Graco Pack ‘n Play (the “Pack ‘n Play”).

Sandi further testified that the Pack ‘n Play had a blue frame with a green cover, and

the green cover had animals around the trim.

          Kaceyn’s father, Jose Jimenez (“Jimenez”), had periodic visits with Kaceyn

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after his birth, but Clements stopped allowing Jimenez to see Kaceyn in late 2016.

At trial, testimony confirmed that the last time Jimenez saw Kaceyn was 12

September 2016.    While no exact date was given, trial testimony also revealed

Jimenez allegedly made arrangements with Clements to see Kaceyn in “late 2016,”

but Clements always came up with last minute excuses for why she could not meet

Jimenez.

      In late 2017, Jimenez hired a private investigator and an attorney to help

locate Kaceyn, but they could not find him. Jimenez testified that Clements visited

Florida in 2017 for “about four or five months” and did not bring Kaceyn with her.

      On 8 February 2018, Captain Shawn Harris (“Captain Harris”) of the Wayne

County Sheriff’s Office (the “WCSO”) received a call from an officer of the Goldsboro

Police Department who had spoken with Jimenez about a missing child. Because the

officer believed the case originated outside the jurisdiction of Goldsboro, he

introduced Jimenez to Captain Harris. Jimenez explained to Captain Harris that

Clements had stopped allowing him to see Kaceyn, and Jimenez’s attempts to find

Kaceyn with the help of a private investigator failed. As of 8 February 2018, Jimenez

had not found Kaceyn, but he did know Clements was in the Carteret County Jail, as

confirmed by Captain Harris, who testified she was there on a civil contempt order.

      Based on this meeting with Jimenez, the WCSO opened a case on Kaceyn, and

on 12 February 2018, it requested the help of the State Bureau of Investigation (the

“SBI”) in what was officially considered a missing person investigation. Agent Aaron

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Barnes (“Agent Barnes”) of the SBI was assigned to the case.

      Through the joint investigation of the WCSO and SBI (collectively,

“investigators”), investigators determined the following. On or around 1 October

2016, Clements and Kaceyn moved out of Sandi’s apartment and into a home in

Goldsboro, North Carolina, (the “Home”). Clements and Kaceyn lived in the Home

from approximately October 2016 through November 2016. Jared Greene (“Greene”)

and Phillip Goff (“Goff”) also resided at the Home.       Clements had a romantic

relationship with Goff, and Greene had a romantic relationship with Defendant, who

regularly visited the Home on weekends.

      On 15 February 2018, Agent Barnes and two other detectives involved with

the investigation interviewed Defendant.        Investigators requested to interview

Defendant based on his contacts with Clements, Greene, and Goff. This interview

was audio recorded, and the recording was played at trial in the presence of the jury.

      In the 15 February 2018 interview, Defendant confirmed that he visited

Greene, Clements, and Goff at the Home on weekends from August 2016 until

approximately May 2017.

      During the interview, Defendant stated “at one time there was a child [in the

Home], but I do not know what ever happened to the child after that.” Defendant

confirmed the child in the home was Clements’s. Defendant described the Home as

“a small cinder block house.” Defendant described Kaceyn as an “infant,” but guessed

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                                        Opinion of the Court

he was likely younger than a year old. In October 2016,1 when Defendant saw Kaceyn

for the first time, he observed Kaceyn in a playpen and noticed Kaceyn had bruises

on his face that Defendant thought could have been the result of “shaken baby”

syndrome. Defendant further told investigators the next time he saw Kaceyn, Kaceyn

seemed to have trouble breathing, had a severely swollen head, and appeared

braindead. Defendant stated he did not think Kaceyn could have survived without

medical treatment.

       When investigators asked Defendant if he knew where Kaceyn was, Defendant

told investigators he thought it was possible Clements and Goff hid Kaceyn’s body in

a wooded area across the street from the Home where Goff frequently set up a

campsite. Defendant described the campsite as being “a good distance” and not fully

visible from the road, with a beaten down path with cut down branches leading to the

campsite. Defendant drew investigators a map detailing where the campsite was in

comparison to the Home.

       Following the interview, investigators confirmed Defendant’s statements that

the home was a small cinder block residence with a wooded area across the street.

On 16 February 2018, investigators searched the wooded area and found “a dark blue

or purple . . . Graco playpen frame,” a stuffed teddy bear, an inflatable pool toy, and

       1 Defendant told investigators he did not know the exact date, but it was right after Hurricane
Matthew because road closures made it difficult for him to drive to the Home. During the trial, Judge
Bland took judicial notice that Hurricane Matthew passed through North Carolina on 9 October 2016.

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a piece of fabric with a Hello Kitty design on it. Agent Barnes also confirmed that

the wooded area contained a campsite due to the presence of a stone fire pit and logs

for sitting, and the campsite was not visible from the road.

      At trial, the State presented the jury with the Graco playpen frame found in

the wooded area. After the playpen frame was set up, the State asked Sandi if the

playpen frame found in the woods matched the dimensions of the Pack ‘n Play

Clements used for Kaceyn while living with Sandi. Sandi confirmed the frame found

in the woods had the same dimensions as Kaceyn’s Pack ‘n Play. Sandi testified that

Kaceyn’s Pack ‘n Play had a loose end-rail that prevented the Pack ‘n Play from

standing up properly.

      Agent Barnes confirmed Greene had moved to Florida when Agent Barnes

traveled to Florida to interview Greene regarding Kaceyn’s disappearance. During

the interview, Greene showed Barnes texts in which Defendant stated, “[I’m] getting

screwed in this case by [Clements] killing her baby,” “[Clements] killed or abused her

child,” and “[y]ou didn’t report the crime to the cops just like I didn’t[.]” At trial,

Agent Barnes read these text messages to the jury.

      On 27 March 2018, investigators interviewed Defendant a second time. This

interview was also recorded and played at trial in the presence of the jury. Defendant

claimed he overheard Clements tell Goff that Kaceyn had died, and they needed to

“get rid” of Kaceyn. Even though, in his first interview, Defendant stated he thought

Kaceyn may have been buried in the woods across from the home, in this interview,

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Defendant told investigators Clements and Goff made plans to hide the body

somewhere around "Grasshopper’s home.” Grasshopper was a woman who frequently

sold methamphetamine to Defendant, Clements, and Goff.             Defendant claimed

Clements told Goff that Grasshopper’s house would be an excellent place to get rid of

the body.

      According to Defendant, when Clements, Goff, Greene, and Defendant were

preparing to leave the Home, Clements went into her room to, presumably, get herself

and the baby ready. When Clements came out of the room, she had the baby carrier

completely covered with a tan blanket. Defendant drove Clements, Greene, and Goff

to Grasshopper’s house “around midnight.”         While at Grasshopper’s house, Goff

waited in the car while everyone else went inside. About “twenty to thirty minutes

later,” Clements, Greene, and Defendant returned to the car after purchasing

methamphetamine from Grasshopper, and the carrier was empty and the blanket

was wadded up in a ball.

      Defendant hypothesized Goff could have disposed of Kaceyn’s body in a “line of

trees” located on the right side of Grasshopper’s house. Defendant told investigators

that, when Goff, Clements, Defendant and Greene all returned home that night, Goff

and Clements told the other two not to say anything about what took place that night.

Defendant stated in the second interview that he felt bad that he did not call for help,

and one of his biggest mistakes was failing to tell people about Kaceyn’s death or

report it to law enforcement.

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                                  Opinion of the Court

      Agent Barnes testified that through his investigation, he determined

“Grasshopper” was an individual named Sonya Mendez who sold methamphetamine.

Throughout the course of his investigation, Agent Barnes never found anyone who

saw Kaceyn after October 2016. At the time he was last seen, Kaceyn would have

been only eight months old, and by the time the investigation began, he would have

been almost two years old.

      On 13 July 2018 an arrest warrant was issued for Defendant for concealment

of the death of a child. On 8 September 2020, a grand jury indicted Defendant for

concealment of death of a child who did not die of natural causes.

      At trial, Defendant’s counsel motioned for mistrial numerous times. The first

motion for mistrial was based upon Agent Barnes’s testimony that Clements was in

prison for second-degree murder. During Agent Barnes’s testimony, the State asked

him where Clements presently was, and Agent Barnes testified that she was

“currently in the North Carolina Department of Corrections.” The State then asked,

“[d]o you know why?”       Defendant’s counsel then objected on various grounds,

including the Confrontation Clause, relevancy, unfair prejudice, and a run-around of

the corpus delicti rule.

      The trial court overruled Defendant’s counsel’s objection, allowing the State to

ask why Clements was in the North Carolina Department of Corrections. Upon

questioning by the State, Agent Barnes answered, “[f]or second-degree murder.”

Defendant’s counsel motioned for mistrial due to this testimony, and the trial court

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                                  Opinion of the Court

denied the motion.

      In a renewed motion for mistrial, Defendant’s counsel added as another ground

for mistrial the trial court’s ruling that there was sufficient evidence to satisfy the

corpus delicti rule. The trial court denied the motion.

      At trial, Defendant’s counsel also motioned to dismiss on the basis of

insufficiency of the evidence and failure to satisfy the corpus delicti rule. The trial

court denied the motion, finding Defendant’s confession was supported by substantial

independent evidence tending to establish its trustworthiness, and finding the State

presented substantial evidence of each essential element of the crime charged.

      Defendant did not testify or present evidence at trial.        A jury convicted

Defendant of concealment of the death of a child who did not die of natural causes,

and the trial court sentenced Defendant in the aggravated range of 80 to 108 months’

imprisonment.

                                  II. Jurisdiction

      Appeal lies of right directly to this Court from any final judgment of a superior

court. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-27(b)(1) (2021). “A defendant who has entered a plea of

not guilty to a criminal charge, and who has been found guilty of a crime, is entitled

to appeal as a matter of right when final judgment has been entered.” N.C. Gen. Stat.

§ 15A-1444(a) (2021).

                                     III. Issues

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                                  Opinion of the Court

      The issues before this Court are whether the trial court erred by: (1) denying

Defendant’s corpus delicti challenge and motion to dismiss, and (2) overruling

Defendant’s objections to Agent Barnes’s testimony that Clements was in prison for

second-degree murder. We will address these issues in turn.

                                    IV. Analysis

                           A. Corpus Delicti Challenge

      On appeal, Defendant argues the State failed to satisfy the corpus delicti rule

because it did not present evidence to strongly corroborate Defendant’s extrajudicial

statements to law enforcement. We disagree.

                               1. Standard of Review

      “We review de novo the trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss.” State v.

DeJesus, 265 N.C. App. 279, 284, 827 S.E.2d 744, 748 (2019).            “In making its

determination, the trial court must consider all evidence admitted, whether

competent or incompetent, in the light most favorable to the State, giving the State

the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving any contradictions in its

favor.” State v. Rose, 339 N.C. 172, 192, 451 S.E.2d 211, 223 (1994).

             Circumstantial evidence may withstand a motion to
             dismiss and support a conviction even when the evidence
             does not rule out every hypothesis of innocence. If the
             evidence presented is circumstantial, the court must
             consider whether a reasonable inference of defendant’s
             guilt may be drawn from the circumstances. Once the court
             decides that a reasonable inference of defendant’s guilt
             may be drawn from the circumstances, then it is for the
             jury to decide whether the facts, taken singly or in

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               combination, satisfy [it] beyond a reasonable doubt that
               the defendant is actually guilty.

      State v. Fritsch, 351 N.C. 373, 379, 526 S.E.2d 451, 455 (2000) (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration omitted).

      “Upon a defendant’s motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence, the question

for the court is whether there is substantial evidence (1) of each essential element of

the offense charged and (2) of defendant’s being the perpetrator of such offense.”

DeJesus, 265 N.C. App. at 284, 827 S.E.2d at 748. “Substantial evidence is such

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a

conclusion.”    State v. Smith, 300 N.C. 71, 78–79, 265 S.E.2d 164, 169 (1980).

“Whether a defendant’s extrajudicial confession may survive a motion to dismiss

depends upon the satisfaction of the corpus delicti rule.” DeJesus, 265 N.C. App. at

284, 827 S.E.2d at 749.

                                   2. Relevant Law

      “[A]n extrajudicial confession, standing alone, is not sufficient to sustain a

conviction of a crime.” State v. Parker, 315 N.C. 222, 229, 337 S.E.2d 487, 491 (1985).

When the State substantially relies upon an extrajudicial confession, the reviewing

court applies the corpus delicti rule “which requires some level of independent

corroborative evidence in order to ensure that a person is not convicted of a crime

that was never committed.” DeJesus, 265 N.C. App. at 284, 827 S.E.2d at 749

(internal quotation marks omitted). Corpus delicti, meaning the body of the crime,

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consists of “the injury or harm constituting the crime,” and a showing that “th[e]

injury or harm was caused by someone’s criminal activity.” Parker, 315 N.C. at 231,

337 S.E.2d at 492. A defendant’s confession ordinarily furnishes the proof necessary

to show “the defendant was the perpetrator of the crime.” State v. Trexler, 316 N.C.

528, 533, 342 S.E.2d 878, 881 (1986).

      The corpus delicti rule itself is rooted in three policy factors:

                    first, the shock which resulted from those rare but
             widely reported cases in which the “victim” returned alive
             after his supposed murderer had been convicted; and
             secondly, the general distrust of extrajudicial confessions
             stemming from the possibilities that a confession may have
             been erroneously reported or construed, involuntarily
             made, mistaken as to law or fact, or falsely volunteered by
             an insane or mentally disturbed individual[;] and, thirdly,
             the realization that sound law enforcement requires police
             investigations which extend beyond the words of the
             accused.

DeJesus, 265 N.C. App. at 285, 827 S.E.2d at 749.

      “[T]o be relied on to prove the corpus delicti . . . the trustworthiness of the

confession” must be “established by corroborative evidence.” Id. at 235, 337 S.E.2d

at 494.   Our Supreme Court expanded the strict rule that always required

independent proof of the corpus delicti and adopted in its place the “trustworthiness

version” of the rule. Id. at 230, 337 S.E.2d at 492. Under this version, “the adequacy

of corroborating proof is measured not by its tendency to establish the corpus

delicti but by the extent to which it supports the trustworthiness of the admissions.”

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                                   Opinion of the Court

Id. at 230, 337 S.E.2d at 492 (quotation marks omitted). This applies especially to

the instant case where the victim’s body cannot be found. See State v. Cox, 367 N.C.

147, 153, 749 S.E.2d 271, 276 (2013) (carefully applying the trustworthiness version

of the corpus delicti rule is especially important in those cases where there is no body

to be found).

      Under the trustworthiness version of the corpus delicti rule, “the State need

not provide independent proof of the corpus delicti so long as there is substantial

independent evidence tending to establish the trustworthiness of the defendant’s

extrajudicial confession.” DeJesus, 265 N.C. App. at 285, 827 S.E.2d at 749 (quotation

marks omitted). “Such substantial independent evidence may includ[e] facts that

tend to show the defendant had the opportunity to commit the crime, as well as other

strong corroboration of essential facts and circumstances embraced in the defendant’s

confession.” DeJesus, 265 N.C. App. at 285, 827 S.E.2d at 749 (emphasis in original)

(quotation marks omitted). We may look to the totality of the circumstances to

determine whether the evidence strongly corroborates a defendant’s confession. State

v. Sweat, 366 N.C. 79, 85, 727 S.E.2d 691, 696 (2012) (“Under the totality of the

circumstances, the State strongly corroborated essential facts and circumstances

embraced in defendant's confession.”); see also DeJesus, 265 N.C. App. at 286, 827

S.E.2d at 750 (“[T]ogether with the [d]efendant’s opportunity to commit the[] crimes

and the circumstances surrounding his statement to detectives provide sufficient

corroboration to engender a belief in the overall truth of [d]efendant’s confession.”)

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                                   Opinion of the Court

(emphasis added). Where there is no contention that a defendant’s “extrajudicial

confession was the product of deception or coercion,” the trustworthiness of a

defendant’s confession is “bolstered.” DeJesus, 265 N.C. App. at 286, 827 S.E.2d at

750 (quotation marks omitted); see also Cox, 367 N.C. at 154, 749 S.E.2d at 277 (“The

trustworthiness of [the] defendant’s confession is thus further bolstered by the

evidence that defendant made a voluntary decision to confess.”).

      It is unnecessary for the State to present “independent evidence of each element

of the crime to show [that the d]efendant’s confession . . . [is] trustworthy. . . . The

State need only show corroborative evidence tending to establish the reliability of the

confession—not the reliability of each part of the confession which incriminates the

defendant.” State v. Messer, 255 N.C. App. 812, 822, 806 S.E.2d 315, 323 (2017)

(emphasis added) (quotations omitted).

                               3. Elements of the Crime

      The elements of the concealment of death charge are: (1) failure to notify law

enforcement of the death of a child; (2) intent to conceal the death of a child; (3) the

victim was a child who is less than sixteen years of age; and (4) knowing or having

reason to know the child did not die of natural causes. See N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 14-

401.22(a1), (e) (2021).

      Here, substantial evidence of the first element exists because Defendant never

discussed Kaceyn’s death with law enforcement until investigators interviewed him,

corroborating Defendant’s confession that one of his biggest mistakes was failing to

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                                  Opinion of the Court

tell people about Kaceyn’s death or report it to law enforcement. See N.C. Gen. Stat.

§§ 14-401.22(a1), (e). Additionally, there is substantial evidence of the third element

because Sandi’s trial testimony that Kaceyn was born on 11 March 2016 corroborates

Defendant’s confession that Kaceyn was an infant likely younger than a year old. See

N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 14-401.22(a1), (e). Accordingly, we must determine whether at

trial, the State presented substantial independent evidence tending to establish the

trustworthiness of Defendant’s confession as it relates to the second element, the

intent to conceal the death of a child, and the fourth element, knowing or having

reason to know the child did not die of natural causes. See DeJesus, 265 N.C. App. at

285, 827 S.E.2d at 749; see also See N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 14-401.22(a1), (e).

      Defendant argues that numerous pieces of evidence the State presented at trial

were either not significant or corroborative, or both.       Defendant grounds this

argument primarily on his assumption that the State did not satisfy what he views

was its threshold burden to prove, independently of Defendant’s statements to

investigators, that Kaceyn was dead. We conclude, however, in view of the totality of

the evidence presented at trial, the State strongly corroborated Defendant’s

statements to investigators. See Sweat, 366 N.C. at 85, 727 S.E.2d at 696.

      a. Intent to Conceal the Death of a Child

      First, we must determine whether substantial independent evidence tends to

establish that Kaceyn was, in fact, dead. See DeJesus, 265 N.C. App. at 285, 827

S.E.2d at 749; see also Messer, 255 N.C. App. at 822, 806 S.E.2d at 323. We determine

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that substantial evidence tends to support Kaceyn’s death, satisfying the first policy

factor justifying the corpus delicti rule: that no one should be convicted of a crime for

a death that did not occur. See DeJesus, 265 N.C. App. at 285, 827 S.E.2d at 749.

      Evidence presented at trial tended to show the following. Jimenez had periodic

visits with Kaceyn after Kaceyn’s birth, but he was unable to see Kaceyn anymore

after Clements made excuses as to why she could not meet with Jimenez, likely

because Clements no longer had Kaceyn. Jimenez’s testimony as to when he last saw

Kaceyn, in late September 2016, matches Defendant’s statements to investigators

that Defendant last saw Kaceyn right after Hurricane Matthew, which passed

through North Carolina on 9 October 2016. Jimenez’s attempts to find Kaceyn with

the help of a private investigator and an attorney failed in late 2017. Clements

traveled to Florida for four or five months in 2017, but she did not have Kaceyn with

her. Jimenez could not find Kaceyn in late 2017, and Clements did not travel to

Florida with Kaceyn, likely because Kaceyn was deceased. Law enforcement failed

to find Kaceyn even after Jimenez’s report of his missing child. These facts clearly

establish that Kaceyn was missing under inherently suspicious circumstances.

      Moreover, the evidence discovered across the road from the Home establishes

the trustworthiness of Defendant’s confession that Kaceyn was dead. See DeJesus,

265 N.C. App. at 285, 827 S.E.2d at 749. Investigators confirmed there was a stone

fire pit and logs, which were invisible from the road, corroborating Defendant’s

statements to investigators that there was a hidden campsite across the road from

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                                   Opinion of the Court

the Home. In the campsite area, law enforcement found a stuffed teddy bear, an

inflatable pool toy, fabric with a Hello Kitty design on it, and a “blue or purple” Graco

playpen frame. The discovery of the children’s items in the woods at a minimum

supports an inference of an attempt to discard a deceased baby’s items at the hidden

campsite.

      Defendant argues that the dark blue or purple playpen discovered at the

campsite does not match the one in which Clements kept Kaceyn at Sandi’s

apartment, but Sandi’s testimony that Kaceyn spent most of his time in a blue

playpen closely aligns with Defendant’s statements to investigators.

      Therefore, in view of the totality of the circumstances and in the light most

favorable to the State, we conclude the discarded children’s items, taken together

with the fact that no one had seen Kaceyn since October 2016 at the latest, constitutes

strong corroboration of Defendant’s confession that Kaceyn was dead. See DeJesus,

265 N.C. App. at 285, 827 S.E.2d at 749; see also Sweat, 366 N.C. at 85, 727 S.E.2d

at 696; see also Rose, 339 N.C. at 192, 451 S.E.2d at 223.

      Second, substantial evidence tends to establish Defendant’s intent to conceal

the death of a child.     See DeJesus, 265 N.C. App. at 285, 827 S.E.2d at 749.

Defendant’s texts to Greene in which Defendant stated, “[Clements] killed or abused

her child” and “[y]ou didn’t report the crime to the cops just like I didn’t” demonstrate

that Defendant knew a crime occurred yet purposely failed to report it to law

enforcement. Defendant argues his texts are not independent evidence, as required

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by Parker, 315 N.C. at 236, 337 S.E.2d at 495, because they are Defendant’s own

words. Defendant’s text messages to Greene, however, are evidence independent of

Defendant’s statements to investigators.

      Accordingly, substantial independent evidence tends to establish Defendant’s

intent to conceal Kaceyn’s death. See DeJesus, 265 N.C. App. at 284–85, 827 S.E.2d

at 748–49.

      b. Death by Unnatural Causes

      Finally, substantial evidence tends to establish that Defendant knew or had

reason to know Kaceyn did not die of natural causes. See DeJesus, 265 N.C. App. at

284–85, 827 S.E.2d at 748–49. Defendant’s text to Greene strongly corroborates

Defendant’s confession because these statements show Kaceyn’s death was not

natural. See N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 14-401.22(a1), (e).

      Substantial evidence also tends to establish that Defendant frequented the

Home at the same time Clements and Kaceyn lived there and likely would have been

aware of the suspicious circumstances surrounding Kaceyn’s disappearance.

Defendant himself related these circumstances to law enforcement, corroborating his

statements to investigators that he did not think Kaceyn could survive without

medical treatment as Kaceyn had bruises, trouble breathing, a severely swollen head,

and appeared braindead.

      Accordingly,   substantial    independent      evidence   regarding   Defendant’s

knowledge of Kaceyn’s unnatural death tends to establish the trustworthiness of

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Defendant’s confession. See DeJesus, 265 N.C. App. at 284–85, 827 S.E.2d at 748–

49.

                          4. Voluntariness of the Confession

      We note that there is no challenge to the voluntariness of Defendant’s

statements to law enforcement. Defendant was not under arrest during either of his

recorded interviews with law enforcement.          Because Defendant’s confession was

voluntary, its trustworthiness is bolstered, and the second factor justifying the corpus

delicti rule—guarding against the untrustworthiness of an involuntary confession—

is satisfied. See DeJesus, 265 N.C. App. at 286, 827 S.E.2d at 750; Parker, 265 N.C.

App. at 285, 827 S.E.2d at 750.

      We, therefore, find the corpus delicti rule is satisfied because there is

substantial independent evidence tending to establish the trustworthiness of

Defendant’s confession. See DeJesus, 265 N.C. App. at 285, 827 S.E.2d at 749; see

also Sweat, 366 N.C. at 85, 727 S.E.2d at 696. Moreover, Defendant’s confession itself

constitutes substantial evidence that he was the perpetrator of the crime. See Parker,

315 N.C. at 231, 337 S.E.2d at 492; see also DeJesus, 265 N.C. App. at 284, 827 S.E.2d

at 748. Because there was substantial evidence of each element of the crime charged

and that Defendant was the perpetrator, the trial court properly denied the motion

to dismiss. See DeJesus, 265 N.C. App. at 284, 827 S.E.2d at 748.

      B. Testimony that Clements Was in Prison for Second-Degree Murder

                                          - 19 -
                                   STATE V. COLT

                                  Opinion of the Court

      Next, Defendant argues the trial court erred by allowing Agent Barnes’s

testimony regarding Clements’s conviction for second-degree murder because it: (1)

was irrelevant because there was no questioning by the prosecutor or testimony by

Agent Barnes connecting Clements’s whereabouts to Kaceyn’s death; (2) was unfairly

prejudicial because it likely would lead jurors to believe that Clements killed Kaceyn

and therefore, Defendant must have concealed Kaceyn’s death; and (3) constituted a

violation of the Confrontation Clause.

                                     1. Rule 401

      Defendant argues the State did not sufficiently connect its questioning about

Clements’s conviction for second-degree murder, and the testimony was therefore

irrelevant pursuant to N.C.R. Evid. 401. We disagree.

      “Although the trial court’s rulings on relevancy technically are not

discretionary and therefore are not reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard[,]

. . . such rulings are given great deference on appeal.” Dunn v. Custer, 162 N.C. App.

259, 266, 591 S.E.2d 11, 17 (2004) (quotation marks omitted).

      “‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence having any tendency to make the

existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more

probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” N.C.R. Evid. 401.

Agent Barnes’s testimony that Clements was in prison for second-degree murder was

directly relevant to the fact that Kaceyn died because at trial, the jury heard

testimony regarding the texts Defendant sent to Greene which stated, “[Clements]

                                         - 20 -
                                      STATE V. COLT

                                   Opinion of the Court

killed or abused her child.” Such evidence was relevant because it made it more

probable that Kaceyn was deceased. See N.C.R. Evid. 401.

      Accordingly, the trial court did not err by allowing such testimony because it

was relevant to whether Kaceyn was dead. See N.C.R. Evid. 401; see also Dunn, 162

N.C. App. at 266, 591 S.E.2d at 17.

                                       2. Rule 403

      Defendant argues evidence of Clements being in prison for second-degree

murder was unfairly prejudicial.

      “We review a trial court’s decision to exclude evidence under Rule 403 for abuse

of discretion. An abuse of discretion results when the court’s ruling is manifestly

unsupported by reason or is so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a

reasoned decision.” State v. Whaley, 362 N.C. 156, 160, 655 S.E.2d 388, 390 (2008)

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

      “Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice[.]” N.C.R. Evid. 403.

      Defendant specifically argues Agent Barnes’s testimony regarding Clements’s

second-degree murder conviction unfairly prejudiced Defendant because it could have

led the jurors to conclude Clements murdered Kaceyn, and Defendant must be guilty

of concealing Kaceyn’s death. This evidence was not unfairly prejudicial because, as

addressed above in Section IV, substantial evidence established that Kaceyn died of

unnatural causes. See N.C.R. Evid. 403.

                                          - 21 -
                                    STATE V. COLT

                                  Opinion of the Court

      Therefore, Agent Barnes’s testimony did not unfairly prejudice Defendant, and

the trial court did not err by overruling Defendant’s objections. See N.C.R. Evid. 403;

see also Whaley, 362 N.C. at 160, 655 S.E.2d at 390.

                  3. U.S. Const. amend. VI; N.C. Const. art. I, § 23

      Defendant argues Agent Barnes’s testimony that Clements was in prison for

second-degree murder violated Defendant’s constitutional right to confront witnesses

against him.

      “The standard of review for alleged violations of constitutional rights is de

novo.” State v. Graham, 200 N.C. App. 204, 214, 683 S.E.2d 437, 444 (2009). “Under

a de novo review, the court considers the matter anew and freely substitutes its own

judgment for that of the lower tribunal.” State v. Harris, 242 N.C. App. 162, 164, 775

S.E.2d 31, 33 (2015).

      Under both our Federal and State Constitutions, defendants have the right to

confront witnesses against them. U.S. Const. amend. VI; N.C. Const. art. I, § 23. The

hallmark of a defendant’s right to confront witnesses against him or her is cross-

examination. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 54, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1365,

158 L. Ed. 2d 177, 194 (2004). A witness’s testimonial statements are inadmissible

against a defendant unless at trial the witness “was unavailable to testify, and the

defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.” Id. at 54, 124 S. Ct.

at 1365, 158 L. Ed. 2d. at 183.

                                         - 22 -
                                    STATE V. COLT

                                   Opinion of the Court

      Defendant reasons that Clements’s conviction occurred because of her guilty

plea, so testimony regarding her conviction equates to evidence of her guilty plea and

therefore constitutes testimonial evidence against Defendant.         While no North

Carolina case directly addresses whether a witness’s testimony regarding the murder

conviction of a defendant in a different case constitutes a testimonial statement, we

did find a Fourth Circuit case that is instructive. The guilty plea of a defendant from

a different case does not constitute testimonial evidence. United States v. Kuai Li,

280 F. App’x 267, 269 (4th Cir. 2008) (federal district court did not err when it took

judicial notice of guilty plea entered by a corrupt government official who assisted the

defendant in the crime “because the taking of such notice did not result in the

admission of a testimonial statement”). On appeal, a Confrontation Clause violation

may be found to be a harmless error in light of other evidence inculpating a defendant.

United States v. Banks, 482 F.3d 733, 741 (4th Cir. 2007).

      Here, as an initial matter, Agent Barnes did not testify regarding how

Clements’s conviction for second-degree murder came about. As far as the jury

members knew, it could have resulted from a jury conviction or from a guilty plea.

Even if Agent Barnes’s testimony somehow notified the jury of Clements’s guilty plea,

however, we need not decide whether that constituted a testimonial statement. Any

potential error would be harmless in light of the other evidence establishing that

Kaceyn died of unnatural causes. See Banks, 482 F.3d at 741.

                                          - 23 -
                                   STATE V. COLT

                                 Opinion of the Court

      Accordingly, the trial court did not commit prejudicial error by allowing Agent

Barnes’s testimony regarding Clements’s whereabouts. See Banks, 482 F.3d at 741.

                                  V. Conclusion

      We hold the trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss

because there was sufficient evidence presented at trial, and the State satisfied the

corpus delicti rule. We further hold that even if testimony that Clements was in

prison for second-degree murder constituted testimonial evidence, any potential

Confrontation Clause error was a harmless error in light of other evidence

implicating Defendant in concealing Kaceyn’s death.

      AFFIRMED.

      Judge CARPENTER concurs.

      Chief Judge STROUD concurs in a separate opinion.

                                        - 24 -
    No. COA22-514 – State v. Colt

         STROUD, Chief Judge, concurring.

         While I agree with the majority that the trial court properly denied

Defendant’s motion to dismiss and would ultimately conclude there was no

prejudicial error, I write separately as I do not agree with the analysis in section IV.

B. 1 and 2 regarding Rules of Evidence 401 and 403.

         As noted by the majority, Agent Barnes testified before the jury regarding his

investigation of Kaceyn’s disappearance. The State asked him “Now, through your

investigation, do you know where Kayla Clements is now?” and he answered, “She is

currently in the North Carolina Department of Corrections.” The State then asked,

“Do you know why?” At this point, Defendant objected and asked “to be heard outside

the presence of the jury.” Outside the presence of the jury, Defendant stated grounds

for the objection in detail, including the Confrontation Clause and the Bruton rule,2

as well as the lack of the relevance of the evidence, unfair prejudice under Rule 403,

and due process.

2 The Bruton rule stems from Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968). “In
Bruton[,] the United States Supreme Court held that at a joint trial, admission of a statement by a
nontestifying codefendant that incriminated the other defendant violated that defendant’s right of
cross-examination secured by the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.” State v. Evans, 346
N.C. 221, 231, 485 S.E.2d 271, 277 (1997) (citing Bruton, 391 U.S. at 126, 20 L.Ed.2d at 479), cert.
denied, 522 U.S. 1057, 139 L.Ed.2d 653 (1998). Furthermore, “[t]he principles set out in Bruton apply
only to the extrajudicial statements of a declarant who is unavailable at trial for full and effective
cross-examination. Nelson v. O’Neil, 402 U.S. 622, 91 S.Ct. 1723, 29 L.Ed.2d 222 (1971). Where the
declarant takes the stand and is subject to full and effective cross-examination, a codefendant
implicated by extrajudicial statements has not been deprived of his right to confrontation.” Evans,
346 N.C. at 232, 485 S.E.2d at 277; see State v. Hardy, 293 N.C. 105, 118, 235 S.E.2d 828, 836 (1977)
(summarizing the North Carolina Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Bruton rule).
                                   STATE V. COLT

                                Stroud, CJ., concurring

      Defendant argued,

             They’re trying to take an admission from a codefendant
             and use it to prove something here. Now that admission by
             Ms. Clements is admissible against her, but it is not
             admissible against my client. Now the State had every
             ability to issue a writ and have Ms. Clements come and
             testify here at this trial. They chose not to do so and they
             chose not to put her on the list, so this absolutely would
             violate the rules in Bruton and the confrontation clause,
             and therefore it is inadmissible testimony.

      The discussion and voir dire regarding these objections continued at length, for

18 pages of transcript. Ultimately, based on the State’s representation it would limit

the question to Clements’s imprisonment for second-degree murder; the trial court

then overruled Defendant’s objection. The State then asked Agent Barnes again in

the presence of the jury why Clements was incarcerated, and Agent Barnes testified

she was incarcerated for second-degree murder. Defendant then renewed his prior

objections and moved to strike Agent Barnes’s testimony, which the trial court

overruled.

      It is entirely reasonable to expect the jury would assume the victim was

Kaceyn, but the identity of the victim was the primary reason for Defendant’s

objection to the question and the trial court’s ruling on the objection.      At oral

argument of this case before this Court, the State could not articulate any reason the

evidence that Clements was incarcerated for second-degree murder could be relevant

except that it would tend to show Kaceyn was deceased. Clements was not there to

testify as a witness. Nor did the State present a certified record of Clements’s

                                         -2-
                                    STATE V. COLT

                                 Stroud, CJ., concurring

conviction. Instead, the State sought to rely upon the jury’s logical assumption of a

fact – that Clements was imprisoned for Kaceyn’s murder – when the trial court had

already ruled Agent Barnes could not testify to this fact. Defendant objected to the

evidence of the identity of the victim of Clements’s second-degree murder conviction

for several reasons and the trial court did not allow this evidence to be presented, and

yet the majority opinion still finds the evidence of the second-degree murder

conviction relevant and admissible because the jury would likely infer Kaceyn must

have been the victim of the murder.

      The majority opinion is correct that the only way the second-degree murder

conviction could possibly be relevant in this case was if Kaceyn was the victim. The

fact that Clements was imprisoned for murdering someone would not have “any

tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination

of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 401 (2021). In other words, the fact that Clements

murdered someone does not aid the jury in determining if Kaceyn was actually

deceased or if Defendant concealed the death of Kaceyn. This unrelated crime would

not “make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination . . .

more probable or less probable.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 401. “While our law no

longer strictly forbids stacking inferences upon each other, in this case the link

between the circumstances proved by direct evidence and the inferences drawn from

these circumstances stretches too far” because there was no evidence presented that

                                          -3-
                                        STATE V. COLT

                                  Stroud, CJ., concurring

Clements was imprisoned for Kaceyn’s murder, and the State did not question Agent

Barnes on the identity of the victim of the second-degree murder, as it represented to

the trial court. State v. Lamp, 383 N.C. 562, 571, 884 S.E.2d 623, 629 (2022) (citation

omitted).

       The testimony regarding Clements’s imprisonment for second-degree murder

was not relevant, but even worse, the only way it could be relevant is that the jury’s

logical assumption would be that Kaceyn was the victim. And this was the very

reason for Defendant’s objections and the State’s tacit acknowledgement at trial of

the merit of Defendant’s objections based upon the Confrontation Clause and the

Bruton case by the State’s agreement not to elicit testimony as to the identity of the

victim. The trial court should have sustained Defendant’s objection to this testimony

under Rule 401. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 401. Therefore, there would be no

need to engage in a Rule 403 analysis regarding prejudicial versus probative value.

See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 403 (2021) (“Although relevant, evidence may be

excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair

prejudice . . . .” (emphasis added)).

       But although this evidence should have been excluded, I agree the error was

not prejudicial in this case.     This one sentence of testimony did not prejudice

Defendant considering the substantial amount of evidence tending to show Kaceyn

was deceased and regarding the circumstances of his death, and therefore the trial

court properly denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss. See generally State v. Milby,

                                            -4-
                                     STATE V. COLT

                                  Stroud, CJ., concurring

302 N.C. 137, 142, 273 S.E.2d 716, 720 (1981) (“It is well-established that the burden

is on the appellant not only to show error but also to show that he suffered prejudice

as a result of the error. The test for prejudicial error is whether there is a reasonable

possibility that the evidence complained of contributed to the conviction[.]” (citation

omitted)). Therefore, there was no prejudicial error.

      Thus, I write separately to concur in result only.

                                           -5-