Court Opinion

ID: 9603750
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:09:28.855579+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:01.842929
License: Public Domain

Young, J.,
with whom Springer, J., joins,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the State did not act in a consciously indifferent manner toward Roylance’s procedural rights. In my opinion, there is sufficient evidence in the record for this court to defer to the fact-finding of the district court.
The record indicates that Roylance objected to a continuance of the preliminary hearing due to the officer’s illness. Roylance was told she would have the opportunity to challenge the continuance *339at the next hearing. However, that hearing never took place because the State chose to put the case to the grand jury. Consequently, Roylance never had the opportunity to challenge the continuance as promised. For this reason, I disagree with the majority that what occurred at the second hearing was irrelevant. The second hearing was Roylance’s first opportunity to challenge the State’s actions, and in that sense was a continuation of the first hearing despite the fact that an indictment had already been obtained. However, at this second hearing, the State failed to fully justify its actions in the first hearing. The district court judge properly took this into account, as well as the fact that the officer failed to show up a second time. Indeed, the State did not provide an affidavit from the absent officer as to his illness during the first hearing until it submitted a motion for rehearing after the writ of habeas corpus was granted. In my opinion, the totality of the circumstances indicates conscious indifference on the part of the State.
In addition, I question the sufficiency of the evidence proffered by the State at the first hearing as reason for the continuance. The evidence consisted of the prosecutor hearing from the bailiff who heard from the officer that the officer was sick and unable to attend. This was clearly hearsay. It is doubtful that this evidence alone was sufficient evidence to establish good cause required to justify a continuance. Therefore, Roylance had every right to challenge the propriety of the continuance at a second hearing.
Because I conclude that the record contains sufficient evidence to find that the State behaved in a consciously indifferent manner towards Roylance’s procedural rights, I would affirm the decision of the district court.