Court Opinion

ID: 9670181
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:16:24.787143+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:42:24.153866
License: Public Domain

MORGAN, Justice
(dissenting).
I dissent. Although I can sympathize with plaintiff for her distress, under the pleadings and record in this case, I think the trial judge acted properly.
First, he submitted the question of probable cause for the arrest to the jury. Those twelve, tried and true, found for defendant Siedschlaw. I think there was evidence to sustain this verdict.
I believe that the first question, as indicated by the majority opinion, is whether or not MeGillivray was entitled to a directed verdict against Siedschlaw on the issue of probable cause to arrest. The majority, however, picks and chooses every fact and inference in favor of the movant, MeGilliv-ray, whereas the law requires that we view the evidence in the light most favorable to defendant Siedschlaw. Lytle v. Morgan, S.D., 270 N.W.2d 359 (1978). Applying what I consider to be the correct scope of review, the record shows that the trooper was presented with evidence by Larson, McGillivray’s roommate, in the form of a pill containing an unknown substance and information that MeGillivray seemed to be sleepy all the time. Larson also stated that she suspected that MeGillivray was on drugs. This was a report from a supposedly concerned citizen as distinguished from a paid police informer. The trooper’s cohort ran a field test on the pill that came out positive, indicating the possible presence of an amphetamine. It is true that only the first step in a recommended test procedure was taken because apparently the entire pill was used in that procedure. Probable cause, however, does not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt.1 The other roommates in the apartment also apparently added their suspicions to those of Larson’s, thereby furnishing sufficient corroboration. I would say that viewing this in a light most favorable to Siedschlaw, he had probable cause to make the initial arrest and that is all that is before us. We are only concerned with knowledge leading up to the arrest, not the subsequent events. If probable cause existed at the time of the arrest, the arrest was lawful.
While it is true that under some circumstances lawful imprisonment following a proper arrest may become unlawful, as we review the record, this issue was never presented to the trial court by motion or by proposed instruction. Although McGilliv-ray’s counsel stressed it strongly during oral argument, I would hold that, following our long-standing rule, we should not consider issues on appeal that are not properly raised before the trial court and preserved in the record. Stark v. Stark, 79 S.D. 178, 109 N.W.2d 904 (1961).
Finally, with respect to the liability of defendant Larson, I think MeGillivray would have had a good case of malicious prosecution had it been pled and argued. It was not, however, and, counsel having hung his hat on false imprisonment, I think his arguments should fail. They are distinct and separate causes of action. A lawful imprisonment does not become unlawful because of malicious motives; nor does an unlawful detention become lawful because it was actuated by a laudable purpose.
In an action for false imprisonment, motive or malice, not being an element of the *805tort, is usually immaterial on the issue of justification and is an issue only on the question of exemplary damages. The verdict was for general damages only. Therefore, I must assume that the jury found that Larson did not act maliciously.
Nor do I see that Larson instigated the arrest. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, at page 1171, defines “instigate”: “To goad or urge forward; set on; provoke, incite.” From my review of the record, I cannot say that the actions of Larson amounted to instigation. She furnished information by voicing her suspicions and furnishing a pill which she found. She did have subsequent contact with the officers and cleared their path for entry into the apartment without a warrant by obtaining the consent of the other girls; but we should also consider that she was not merely a passerby or distant observer. Rather, she and the other girls were roommates with some apparent apprehension that suspicion could fall on them. Cooperation of private citizens in giving information and tips to the police is an essential part of criminal law enforcement. Many good tips are undoubtedly given by informants with malice in their hearts, but that does not give grounds for action for false imprisonment.
I would affirm the judgments of the trial court.

. As this court said in State v. Hermandson, 84 S.D. 208, 213, 169 N.W.2d 255, 258 (1969): “Officers are not required to know facts sufficient to prove guilt, but only knowledge of facts sufficient to show probable cause for an arrest or search. These are factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.”