Court Opinion

ID: 9517630
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 00:24:01.685177+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:03:24.989579
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE JONES, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. The testimony of the plaintiff, standing alone, when considered in the light of In re Marriage of Sappington (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 456, 478 N.E.2d 376, is sufficient to require a finding that the defendant is entitled to relief under section 510(b) of the Act. Such conclusion is not one based upon morals, rather it is a matter of law and of the policy of freeing a husband from being forced to pay maintenance for an ex-wife who chooses to share herself and her life with another without the benefit of wedlock. It is readily apparent that if the plaintiff were to marry Gutjahar their present lifestyle would undergo no change. The picture presented is that of a rather typical family where the husband and wife both work while the mother of one stays at home and does the household chores of cooking, laundry and cleaning. The plaintiff admits to doing some cooking, to eating meals with the Gutjahars, to watching TV with them, to having her own flowerbed, and so on. Most importantly, the plaintiff gave not the slightest intimation that she intended to move from the Gutjahar house or from the arms of her lover. It was her own admission that she had sex with Gutjahar at least twice a week, and sometimes more. Those episodes occur, of course, at the Gutjahar home — where plaintiff lives. Plaintiff goes out to social functions with Gutjahar, plays cards frequently with their friends and otherwise comports with him in public. It is of no consequence whatever that plaintiff has her own friends and her own activities that she enjoys without Gutjahar — it is the same with practically every wife in the country. In fact, there are many husbands and wives who share less of their time with their spouses than do plaintiff and Gutjahar as revealed here. The Taylors testified that upon a visit to plaintiff’s place of residence the plaintiff, in showing them about, described Gutjahar’s bedroom as “our” bedroom and Gutjahar’s house as “our” house. Plaintiff did not deny either of these statements attributed to her. As to “our” house, she stated that she did not “recall” saying it was “our” house but she considered it to be Gutjahar’s house. As to “our” bedroom, she said, “I don’t think I said that because that’s not my bedroom.” The facts before us bring this case well within the ambit of the sentence in section 510(b) of the Act that excuses liability for maintenance where the obligee spouse “cohabits with another person on a resident, continuing conjugal basis.” The facts here also align this case with Sappington, although in a somewhat reverse situation. In Sappington there were no sexual relations because of an impotency. In this case there was an intense sexual relationship coupled with shared living that closely approached that in Sappington. If there is anything immoral about this case, it would be in causing defendant to pay for plaintiff’s sharing of herself with Gutjahar in the circumstances shown here under the guise that some policy of the law is being fulfilled. I would reverse the decision made under section 510(b).