Court Opinion

ID: 9470369
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:04:06.078492+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:41:51.812989
License: Public Domain

KRUPANSKY, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I' agree that Reichert and the Ludlow Education Association (LEA) failed to es*1172tablish a claim of First Amendment deprivation with respect to the initial changes in Reichert’s schedule and teaching assignment. However, because the decision of the district court did not rest entirely on this single issue and, since the district court, in my opinion, erred both factually and in its legal analysis, I am compelled to write separately.
Initially, I would emphasize that Reic-hert’s legitimate advocacy of the positions of the LEA was protected First Amendment activity. See e.g. Columbus Education Association v. Columbus City School District, 623 F.2d 1155 (6th Cir.1980). Compare Anderson v. Evans, 660 F.2d 153 (6th Cir.1981) (interest of school board in maintaining an efficient and regularly functioning school system outweighed teacher’s interest in making racial slurs). Defendants do not seriously contest this proposition.
As Judge Phillips’ opinion clearly and concisely illustrates, the record irrefutably discloses that the initial decision to reassign Reichert’s teaching responsibilities was not the result of her First Amendment activities. Accordingly, she possessed no constitutional claim with respect to that action.
The district court proceeded, however, to find that, following Reichert’s expression of displeasure with her realligned schedule and teaching assignment changes, the defendants would have reinstated her to her previous class schedule and teaching assignments but “the reason they did not do something for her when she let them know how upset she was was because she had been a thorn in their side at these [school board] meetings.” App. 3371 This scenario clearly establishes a claim for relief under Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977).2
It appears that the district court was concerned that “a federal court action could be brought to challenge each and every” school board decision. 511 F.Supp. at 685, and this concern prompted it to add a new requirement to the Mt. Healthy criteria. It concluded “that the proper test to be employed is whether the action or pattern of actions taken with regard to a government employee would, objectively viewed, be likely to chill the exercise of constitutionally protected speech of others in a comparable fashion.” 511 F.Supp. at 686 (footnotes omitted). Thereupon, the district court concluded that there was no “satisfactory proof” that the defendants’ actions “would result in a chilling effect on free speech among teachers in the school system,” and accordingly no constitutional violation had occurred.
In analyzing the lower court’s disposition, it is preliminarily observed that, although Mt. Healthy addressed a situation where a school board refused to renew a teacher’s contract, it is “now established that the same principles apply when retaliation takes place in the form of altered employment conditions rather than termination.” Allaire v. Rogers, 658 F.2d 1055, 1058 n. 2 (5th Cir.1981) cert. denied 456 U.S. 928, 102 S.Ct. 1975, 72 L.Ed.2d 443 (1982), rehearing denied 457 U.S. 1126, 102 S.Ct. 2949, 73 L.Ed.2d 1343 (1982) (reduction of salary). See e.g. Waters v. Chaffin, 684 F.2d 833 (11th Cir.1982) (demotion and transfer); Childers v. Independent School District No. 1, 676 F.2d 1338 (10th Cir.1982) (change in teaching assignments); Bowen v. Watkins, 669 F.2d 979 (5th Cir.1982) (denial of promotion); Columbus Education Association v. Columbus City School District, supra (letter of reprimand); Yoggerst v. Stewart, 623 F.2d 35 (7th Cir.1980) (letter of reprimand); McGill v. Board of Education of Pekin Elementary School District No. 108, 602 F.2d *1173774 (7th Cir.1979) (transfer); Bernasconi v. Tempe Elementary School District No. 3, 548 F.2d 857 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 825, 98 S.Ct. 72, 54 L.Ed.2d 82 (1977) (transfer). Cf. Delong v. United States, 621 F.2d 618 (4th Cir.1980) (transfer or reassignment because of political affiliation actionable, but only where tantamount to dismissal).
In the case at bar the district court relied, in part, on the decision of the Seventh Circuit in McGill v. Board of Education, supra. In McGill a teacher was transferred from one school to another without loss of pay, seniority or other rights. Rejecting the defendants’ contention that such a transfer was not actionable, the Seventh Circuit held that “[t]he test is whether the adverse action taken by the defendants is likely to chill the exercise of constitutionally protected speech.” Id. at 780.3
With due respect to the Seventh Circuit and the trial judge in this action, I believe the test enunciated by the Seventh Circuit is inapplicable to cases, such as the within cause, involving alleged governmental retaliation for an employee’s exercise of free speech. Rather, as the Supreme Court stated in Mt. Healthy City School District v. Doyle, supra, at 284-85, 97 S.Ct. at 574-75, an employee may “establish a claim ... if the decision ... was made by reason of his exercise of constitutionally protected First Amendment freedoms.” Nothing more need be shown.
Certainly, the underlying rationale of Mt. Healthy City School District v. Doyle, is that if the government were permitted to deny employment to a person because of his exercise of First Amendment Rights, then, ultimately “his exercise of those freedoms would in effect be penalized and inhibited.” Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 598, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 2698, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972). It does not follow, however, that actual inhibition of free expression must be demonstrated in order to support a constitutional violation. Any time government action adverse to an employee is taken in direct response to the employee’s exercise of free speech, an unmistakable message is subtly telegraphed to the employee warning that open communication of his views will result in punishment by the government. The warning constitutes a violation regardless of whether it is heeded.
As the Supreme Court remarked in the context of invalidating certain aspects of a patronage system on First Amendment grounds:
Rights are infringed where the government fines a person a penny for being a Republican and where it withholds the grant of a penny for the same reason.
Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 360 n. 13, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 2683 n. 13, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976) (plurality opinion). The loss of the penny may not induce a single person to forego his or her right to belong to a political party, but a constitutional violation has nonetheless occurred.
Furthermore, the district court’s test appears to indicate that in the event a plaintiff could demonstrate that the exercise of his or her First Amendment rights was, in fact, restrained by the government’s action, the plaintiff could not recover unless the government’s action “would be likely, as a practical matter, to chill the exercise of First Amendment rights of co-workers.” 511 F.Supp. at 687 (emphasis added). Implicitly, the lower court’s standard could permit the government to suppress the voices of the timid and the meek so long as its actions would not silence the “reasonable man.” Surely, the First Amendment is not so limited.
I sympathize with the lower court’s concern regarding the intrusion of federal courts into the evolution of day-to-day decisions of state and local agencies. The government however is free to make decisions for any number of reasons or no reason at all as long as those decisions are not made “on a basis that infringes [a person’s] constitutionally protected interests — espe-*1174dally, his interest in free speech.” Perry v. Sindermann, supra, 408 U.S. at 598, 92 S.Ct. at 2698.
For the foregoing reasons, the district court erred in employing a “chilling effect” test in the instant matter.
As indicated, ante, at 1169, the defendants have cross-appealed challenging the lower court’s finding of fact. Confronting that aspect of this case, it appears that the crucial finding in issue reads as follows:
[T]he court does find that the intent of the administration in not changing [Reic-hert’s schedule] back when she let them know how much it meant to her, and how upset she was, considering that she had 17 years of seniority, was because of the controversy. When somebody comes in who is one of your best teachers, who has 17 years seniority and says, “I am awfully upset about this schedule change,” ordinarily you would try to do something for them. The court finds that the reason they did not do something for her when she let them know how upset she was was because she had been a thorn in their side at these meetings.
(App. 337).
It should again be emphasized that, as Judge Phillips’ opinion clearly articulates, Reichert’s initial schedule change resulted from evaluations and policy decisions entirely independent of her protected activity. Her schedule and teaching assignment changes were but one of several changes initiated, in part, because of budgetary constraints. Furthermore, Reichert’s schedule and teaching changes involved replacing a teaching assignment in psychology, a subject she was not certified to teach, with a teaching assignment in English, a subject in which she was certified.
Thus, the evidence with respect to the initial schedule and teaching assignment changes not only establishes that they were free of improper motive, but, moreover, that the schedule and teaching assignment changes were prompted by legitimate concerns over the budget and adherence to proper certification practices and procedures. While these facts do not preclude a finding that improper motive arose subsequent to the initial decision on the schedule and teaching assignment changes, the facts are weighty evidence to the contrary.
Of greater significance, the district court’s finding, as it relates to the school board’s refusal to reassign Reichert to her former responsibilities and teaching assignment in psychology, in essence, simply represents the district court’s perception of what the defendants could have gratuitiously done to accommodate a longtime employee. However, there is no evidence that other longtime employees who objected to teaching assignments and schedule changes were successful in arranging personally more desirable assignments.
In fact, nothing in the record supports the lower court’s conclusion that Reichert’s schedule was not reinstated “because” of her First Amendment activity. The defendants, at most, may have considered this activity in refusing her request for reassignment to her previous schedule and teaching duties, but the evidence conclusively demonstrates that they “would have reached the same decision . . . even in the absence of the protected conduct.” Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle, supra, 429 U.S. at 288, 97 S.Ct. at 576.
I am thus constrained to conclude that the lower court’s finding that Reichert’s schedule and teaching assignments were not reinstated because of her exercise of free speech is clearly erroneous. Hence, she has failed to support, as a matter of fact, a constitutional violation.
Accordingly, I concur in affirmance of the judgment for defendants.

. The district court opinion is published. 511 F.Supp. 679. However, not all the-findings of fact of the lower court, including the above-quoted finding, are reprinted in the published opinion. Where possible, reference will be made to the published text.

. The district court did not bifurcate the factual inquiry as directed by Mt. Healthy. See ante at 1170. Nevertheless, the lower court, essentially, made the crucial finding that “but for” the exercise of her First Amendment rights, Reic-hert’s previous teaching schedule would have been reinstated.

. The district court acknowledged that its test would be even stricter than the Seventh Circuit’s because the district court would require proof of an “objective” rather than “subjective chill”. 511 F.Supp. at 686 n. 27.