Court Opinion

ID: 9940505
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-14 17:12:34.779411+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:44:56.871320
License: Public Domain

680                   February 14, 2024                 No. 92

         IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                 STATE OF OREGON

                  STATE OF OREGON,
                   Plaintiff-Respondent,
                             v.
               DAVID LLOYD ASHBAUGH,
                   Defendant-Appellant.
              Hood River County Circuit Court
                   20CR63430; A177314

    Karen Ostrye, Judge.
    Argued and submitted June 5, 2023.
    James Brewer, Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause
for appellant. Also on the briefs was Ernest G. Lannet, Chief
Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, Office of Public Defense
Services.
    Shannon T. Reel, Assistant Attorney General, argued the
cause for respondent. Also on the brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum,
Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.
    Before Shorr, Presiding Judge, and Mooney, Judge, and
Pagán, Judge.
    PAGÁN, J.
   Reversed and remanded.
Cite as 330 Or App 680 (2024)                                              681

           PAGÁN, J.
         A jury convicted defendant of the misdemeanor
offense of second-degree theft. ORS 164.045. In his second
assignment of error, defendant argues that the prosecutor’s
statements, in rebuttal closing argument, were so prejudicial
that it was plain error for the trial court not to address them
or declare a mistrial. As explained more fully below, the pros-
ecutor referred to defendant’s exercise of his right to remain
silent. The jury could have interpreted the prosecutor’s
remarks in one of two ways, either as referring to defendant’s
decision not to testify at trial, or as referring to his failure to
provide the same explanation for his conduct at the time of
the incident. But the prosecutor also suggested that an inno-
cent person would not have remained silent, which undoubt-
edly implied to the jury that defendant’s silence was evidence
of his guilt. By doing so, the prosecutor violated defendant’s
rights under the state and federal constitutions. Relying on
State v. Chitwood, 370 Or 305, 312, 518 P3d 903 (2022), we
conclude that the improper comments qualify as plain error,
and we exercise our discretion to correct the error. We there-
fore reverse and remand defendant’s theft conviction.1
                                   FACTS
         On November 3, 2020, at a Safeway store in Hood
River, a loss prevention officer stopped defendant after he
walked out of the store with a full cart of groceries without
paying for them. While exiting the store, defendant held up
a receipt, but he admitted to the loss prevention officer that
it was an old receipt. The store scanned the items in defen-
dant’s cart, and they were valued at $374.
         Officer Eric Foster was called to the store and,
when he arrived, defendant was seated upstairs in an office.
Foster read defendant his Miranda rights, including defen-
dant’s right to remain silent. Defendant acknowledged that
he understood those rights. Defendant claimed to have made
a mistake, that he was in a hurry, and that, when he walked
out of the store with the shopping cart, he was going to his
car to get his credit card and wallet.

    1
      That disposition obviates the need to address defendant’s first, third, and
fourth assignments of error.
682                                           State v. Ashbaugh

         Defendant was charged with one count of second-
degree theft. ORS 164.045. At his jury trial, defendant called
a family friend, who testified that she and defendant regu-
larly shopped for an elderly neighbor who had COVID-19
concerns. The neighbor required them to use coupons, and
she provided them with coupons and old receipts. Although
the family friend was not with defendant on November 3,
2020, she testified that defendant had told her that he was
going to the store that day to shop for the elderly neighbor.
         During the rebuttal portion of the state’s case, the
prosecutor recalled Foster, and the officer testified that, at
the time of the incident, defendant did not mention COVID-
19 concerns or that he was taking care of someone. After the
officer provided additional testimony about the statements
that defendant had made to the officer, the prosecutor asked:
      “Q Did he make any other statements?
      “A   Not that I’m aware of.
      “Q Did you find that odd?
       “A Actually, I did. He didn’t—when I issued him a cita-
   tion, he didn’t argue it. He didn’t seem upset that he was
   receiving a citation. It did seem kind of odd that, you know,
   he was receiving a criminal citation and he wasn’t—didn’t
   seem concerned about it.”
Defendant did not object to that examination of Foster.
         In his closing argument, defendant argued that the
investigation of his conduct was inadequate and that the
state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defen-
dant intended to commit theft. In rebuttal closing argument,
the prosecutor asserted that the family friend’s explanation
of what occurred was speculation, and argued:
       “And yes, [defense counsel] makes a point. [Defendant]
   didn’t say why he was holding the receipt. Why didn’t he
   tell that to the officers then if it’s such a big deal? Why
   didn’t he bring up any of these COVID concerns, his neigh-
   bor[’s] concerns? If that were me—you know how frustrated
   you would be to be falsely accused of theft? Instead, he sits
   there, doesn’t say anything.”
Cite as 330 Or App 680 (2024)                                                 683

Defendant did not object to that argument. The jury found
defendant guilty of second-degree theft.
                                 ANALYSIS
         We focus on defendant’s second assignment of error,
in which he argues that the prosecutor’s closing argument
was improper and that the trial court erred by failing to sua
sponte declare a mistrial. Whether a prosecutor improperly
comments on a defendant’s right to remain silent is a ques-
tion of law that we review for legal error. State v. Reineke,
266 Or App 299, 307, 337 P3d 941 (2014).
         A criminal defendant has a right to remain silent
under Article I, section 12, of the Oregon Constitution,
and under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution.2 Reineke, 266 Or App at 308.
“Although Article I, section 12, confers protections inde-
pendently of protections set out in the federal constitution,
Oregon courts generally consider Article I, section 12, and
the Fifth Amendment together when construing the right
against self-incrimination, unless a defendant articulates
an argument that the two constitutions provide different
protections.” State v. Anderson, 285 Or App 355, 356 n 1,
396 P3d 984, rev den, 362 Or 94 (2017) (citing State v. Scott,
343 Or 195, 203, 166 P3d 528 (2007)).
          In State v. Wederski, 230 Or 57, 62, 368 P2d 393
(1962), the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new
trial because the prosecutor commented upon the defen-
dant’s failure to take the stand. The court explained that
“Article I, [section] 12 * * * guarantees the privilege of the
defendant to remain silent. The privilege is meaningless if
the state may refer to the defendant’s silence with impu-
nity.” In State v. Smallwood, 277 Or 503, 505-06, 561 P2d
600, cert den, 434 US 849 (1977), relying on federal cases,
the Supreme Court pointed out that “it is usually reversible
    2
      Article I, section 12, provides, in part, that “[n]o person shall be * * *
compelled in any criminal prosecution to testify against himself.” The Fifth
Amendment provides, in part, that “[n]o person * * * shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself.” The Fourteenth Amendment pro-
vides, in part, that “[n]o State shall * * * deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.” The Fifth Amendment was made applicable
to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. Griffin v. California, 380 US 609,
611, 85 S Ct 1229, 14 L Ed 2d 106 (1965).
684                                        State v. Ashbaugh

error to admit evidence of the exercise by a defendant of the
rights which the constitution gives him if it is done in a con-
text whereupon inferences prejudicial to the defendant are
likely to be drawn by the jury.”
         In State v. White, 303 Or 333, 340-42, 736 P2d 552
(1987), the court applied that rule to a prosecutor’s com-
ments about the defendant’s refusal to testify in another
trial. Citing Griffin v. California, 380 US 609, 85 S Ct
1229, 14 L Ed 2d 106 (1965), the court explained that “the
Constitution of the United States does not permit drawing
to the jury’s attention a defendant’s exercise of the right
to remain silent.” White, 303 Or at 340. The prosecutor’s
comments had “ ‘a presumably harmful effect.’ ” Id. at 342
(quoting Wederski, 230 Or at 60). The court determined that
the trial court’s curative instruction was insufficient, and it
reversed and remanded for a new trial. Id. at 342-44.
          In State v. Veatch, 223 Or App 444, 455-56, 196 P3d
45 (2008), we pointed out that “[a] reference by the prosecutor
* * * to the fact that the defendant exercised a constitutional
right, such as the right to counsel or the right to remain
silent, may prejudice the defendant’s ability to have a fair
trial if the jury is likely to infer that the defendant exer-
cised the right because he or she was guilty of the charged
offense.” In Veatch, we reversed and remanded because an
officer’s testimony about the defendant invoking his right to
counsel likely gave rise to an adverse inference of guilt. Id.
at 460-62. Similarly, in State v. Osorno, 264 Or App 742, 744,
333 P3d 1163 (2014), we reversed and remanded because
the prosecutor elicited testimony regarding the defendant’s
invocation of her right to remain silent.
         In Reineke, 266 Or App at 308, we considered a pros-
ecutor’s use of PowerPoint slides during closing arguments
in which the prosecutor pointed out that the defendant had
refused to speak to the police. We noted that, under both
state and federal law, it is permissible for a prosecutor to
draw attention to evidence of a defendant’s silence when
the defendant opens the door to that evidence. Id. at 308-
09. For example, a prosecutor is permitted to respond to an
argument that a detective’s investigation was inadequate by
telling the jury that it was the defendant who cut short the
Cite as 330 Or App 680 (2024)                             685

interview by invoking his right to remain silent. Id. at 309
(citing State v. Guritz, 134 Or App 262, 270, 894 P2d 1235,
rev den, 321 Or 560 (1995)). However, “even if a defendant
opens the door to evidence of the defendant’s silence, a pros-
ecutor cannot argue that the defendant is guilty because
he or she invoked the right to remain silent.” Reineke, 266
Or App at 309. We concluded that the PowerPoint slides
were improper because they suggested to the jury that the
defendant’s silence was evidence of his guilt. Id. at 309-10.
We reversed and remanded for a new trial. Id. at 310-11.
         Similarly, in State v. Ragland, 210 Or App 182, 190,
149 P3d 1254 (2006), we concluded that the trial court erred
in overruling defendant’s objections to a prosecutor’s com-
ments which suggested to the jury that no “reasonable per-
son” would have remained silent while being questioned by
the police.
         We turn to the present case. Here, during rebuttal
closing argument, the prosecutor argued that the explana-
tion for defendant’s conduct offered at trial—namely, that
defendant was shopping for an elderly neighbor with COVID-
19 concerns—is not one that defendant provided at the time
of the incident. As the prosecutor put it, “Why didn’t he bring
up any of these COVID concerns, his neighbor[’s] concerns?”
And then the prosecutor suggested that an innocent person
would not have remained silent: “If that were me – you know
how frustrated you would be to be falsely accused of theft?
Instead, he sits there, doesn’t say anything.”
         It is not entirely clear what the prosecutor meant
by those comments because defendant did not remain silent
when questioned by Foster; instead, defendant stated that
he made a mistake, that he was in a hurry, and that he
was going to his car to get his credit card and wallet. Thus,
the prosecutor may have meant that, at the time of the inci-
dent, defendant was silent regarding the explanation for his
conduct provided at trial, or the prosecutor may have been
referring to defendant’s failure to testify at trial.
         Regardless of which of those two inferences the pros-
ecutor intended for the jury to draw, however, the prosecu-
tor contrasted the defendant’s silence with how an innocent
686                                        State v. Ashbaugh

person would have acted. Thus, the prosecutor invited the
jury to view defendant’s silence as evidence of his guilt.
Those remarks violated defendant’s rights under Article 1,
section 12, because “the Oregon Constitution does not per-
mit a prosecutor to draw the jury’s attention to a defendant’s
exercise of the right to remain silent.” State v. Larson, 325
Or 15, 22, 933 P2d 958 (1997). Put simply, a prosecutor may
not refer to a defendant’s silence with impunity and we pre-
sume that reference was harmful. Wederski, 230 Or at 62;
White, 303 Or at 342.
         By suggesting that defendant’s silence was evi-
dence of his guilt, the prosecutor also violated defendant’s
rights under the federal constitution. In Griffin, 380 US at
615, the United State Supreme Court held that “the Fifth
Amendment * * * forbids either comment by the prosecution
on the accused’s silence or instructions by the court that
such silence is evidence of guilt.” Griffin is on point because
the prosecutor commented on defendant’s silence when he
contrasted defendant’s conduct with how an innocent person
would have acted.
         In Doyle v. Ohio, 426 US 610, 619, 96 S Ct 2240,
49 L Ed 2d 91 (1976), the Court held that it is a violation of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments for a prosecutor to
use a defendant’s post-Miranda silence to impeach a defen-
dant’s subsequent explanation provided at trial. However,
the Court limited the reach of Doyle in Anderson v. Charles,
447 US 404, 408, 100 S Ct 2180, 65 L Ed 2d 222 (1980),
explaining that Doyle does not apply to cross-examination
regarding prior inconsistent statements. In Anderson, the
prosecutor’s questions were permissible because they “were
not designed to draw meaning from silence, but to elicit an
explanation for a prior inconsistent statement.” Id. at 409.
Similarly, under Oregon law, a prosecutor may impeach a
defendant’s explanation provided at trial with prior incon-
sistent statements made by the defendant. State v. House,
282 Or App 371, 378, 385 P3d 1099 (2016); Ragland, 210
Or App at 189-90.
        Here, defendant did not remain silent after the offi-
cer Mirandized him. However, the prosecutor did not sim-
ply seek to impeach an explanation for defendant’s conduct
Cite as 330 Or App 680 (2024)                             687

with prior inconsistent statements; instead, the prosecutor
sought to “draw meaning from silence” when the prose-
cutor stated, “If that were me – you know how frustrated
you would be to be falsely accused of theft? Instead, he sits
there, doesn’t say anything.” As already explained, those
remarks violated defendant’s rights under Article 1, section
12. See Larson, 325 Or at 22 (“[T]he Oregon Constitution
does not permit a prosecutor to draw the jury’s attention to
a defendant’s exercise of the right to remain silent.”). Those
comments also violated defendant’s rights under the federal
constitution. See Hendrix v. Palmer, 893 F3d 906, 925 (6th
Cir 2018) (“Under Anderson, the crucial question is whether
the prosecutor’s comments at trial were designed to draw
meaning from silence, which is constitutionally prohibited,
or whether they sought to elicit an explanation for the prior
inconsistent statement, which is permissible.” (Internal quo-
tation marks omitted.)).
          In sum, if the prosecutor was referring to defen-
dant’s failure to testify at trial, then the comments violated
defendant’s rights under the state and federal constitutions.
See, e.g., White, 303 Or at 342 (explaining that state and fed-
eral cases teach us that “informing the jury that a defendant
has exercised the right to remain silent is likely to prejudice
the defendant’s right to a fair trial”). Alternatively, if the
prosecutor was referring to defendant’s failure to provide
the same explanation at the time of the incident, then the
prosecutor’s comments were also impermissible because the
prosecutor suggested that defendant’s prior silence regard-
ing that explanation was evidence of his guilt. See Ragland,
210 Or App at 191 (prosecutor may not invite the jury to
draw a prejudicial inference from a defendant’s silence);
Reineke, 266 Or App at 309-10 (same); Hendrix, 893 F3d
at 925 (under the federal constitution, a prosecutor is pro-
hibited from making comments that are designed to draw
meaning from silence). Whichever inference the prosecutor
intended for the jury to draw, the comments violated defen-
dant’s rights under Article 1, section 12, and under the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments.
        Next, we consider a potential obstacle to our review
of the prosecutor’s error. Defendant did not object to the
688                                           State v. Ashbaugh

prosecutor’s improper remarks during rebuttal closing argu-
ment or request a mistrial. Accordingly, defendant seeks
plain-error review, and he argues that the trial court should
have sua sponte intervened or declared a mistrial. The first
step in a plain-error analysis is to determine whether the
claimed error is plain, which involves examining the follow-
ing three factors: (1) whether the claimed error is one of law;
(2) whether the claimed error is obvious and not reasonably
in dispute; and (3) whether the claimed error appears on
the record. State v. Vanornum, 354 Or 614, 629, 317 P3d
889 (2013). As part of our plain-error review, when allega-
tions of prosecutorial misconduct are at issue, we consider
whether the prosecutor’s statements “were so prejudicial
that an instruction to disregard them would not have been
sufficiently curative to assure the court, in its consideration
of all the circumstances, that the defendant received a fair
trial.” Chitwood, 370 Or at 312. We conclude that they were.
         In Chitwood, the Supreme Court indicated that
the prosecutor’s impermissible argument was cognizable
as plain error because it concerned a fundamental require-
ment of our justice system; namely, that the state must prove
every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
at 317. The prosecutor’s comments gave “the jury permission
to ignore defendant’s fundamental right to proof beyond a
reasonable doubt—a right that is every bit as fundamental
and longstanding as the right to remain silent.” Id. at 321.
         Similarly, here, the prosecutor’s improper comments
concerned a fundamental aspect of our justice system: a defen-
dant’s right to remain silent. As we explained in Osorno, 264
Or App at 748, “[a] reference by a prosecutor * * * to the fact
that a defendant exercised a constitutional right, such as the
right to remain silent, may prejudice the defendant’s ability
to have a fair trial if the jury is likely to infer that the defen-
dant exercised the right because he or she was guilty of the
charged offense.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
         In Chitwood, the Supreme Court determined that
“the timing of the prosecutor’s remark * * * exacerbated the
risk that it would be prejudicial.” 370 Or at 317. The prose-
cutor’s comment in that case came at the end of the rebuttal
closing argument. Id. It was the last thing the jury heard
Cite as 330 Or App 680 (2024)                                             689

before beginning deliberations and its impact was likely
to have been significant. Id. at 317-18. Similarly, here, the
prosecutor’s comments regarding defendant’s silence were
also made during the state’s closing argument in rebuttal.
Like in Chitwood, the timing of the remarks exacerbated
the risk of prejudice.
         As part of our plain-error review, we also address
whether a curative instruction would have sufficed to correct
the error. Chitwood, 370 Or at 319. Here too, that consider-
ation weighs in defendant’s favor. In White, 303 Or at 336,
the prosecutor remarked that the defendant had refused to
testify in his codefendant’s trial. The court determined that
the curative instruction provided was not sufficient because
it did no more than tell the jury that defendant’s refusal to
testify in another trial was irrelevant, which the court com-
pared to instructing the jury “to forget that it has just seen
a white bear.” Id. at 343.
         By contrast, in Larson, 325 Or at 24, the Supreme
Court reached a different conclusion. It determined that a
prosecutor’s comment about the defendant’s failure to testify
was improper, but that the jury was not likely to have drawn
inferences prejudicial to the defendant. Id. The Supreme
Court explained that the prosecutor made only a single ref-
erence to the defendant’s ability to testify, the comment was
directed to the judge, not the jury, and the prosecutor made
the comment in frustration in the context of objecting to the
defendant’s repeated attempts to introduce inadmissible
hearsay. Id. at 24-25. The trial court also provided a cura-
tive instruction, which pointed out that the defendant had
“ ‘an absolute constitutional right not to testify.’ ” Id. at 21.
         The instant case is more like White than Larson.
Here, the prosecutor’s remarks were likely to have been espe-
cially harmful because, during the prosecutor’s examination
of Foster, the prosecutor had already elicited testimony from
the officer suggesting that it was “odd” that defendant had
not made additional statements to the officer.3 As a result,

    3
      We offer no opinion as to whether the prosecutor’s examination of Foster
constituted plain error. Given our conclusion that the prosecutor’s remarks
during rebuttal closing argument constituted plain error, we need not reach that
question, which defendant raises in his first assignment of error.
690                                         State v. Ashbaugh

the remarks in rebuttal closing argument likely reinforced a
suggestion already made to the jury that an innocent person
would have been more forthcoming when questioned by the
police, even though defendant had been Mirandized at that
time. Unlike in Larson, the prosecutor’s comments were
directed to the jury, not the judge, and they were among
the last comments the jury heard before beginning delib-
erations. The trial court did not intervene with a curative
instruction. Even if it had, “ ‘the connection between silence
and guilt is often too direct and too natural to be resisted.’ ”
White, 303 Or at 342 n 7 (quoting Lakeside v. Oregon, 435
US 333, 345, 98 S Ct 1091, 55 L Ed 2d 319 (1978) (Stevens,
J., dissenting)).
          Considering the improper remarks made by the
prosecutor, the fundamental nature of the right to remain
silent, the timing of the remarks, and the likely insufficiency
of a curative instruction, we conclude that the prosecutor’s
argument rose to the level of a legal error that was so prej-
udicial that it deprived defendant of a fair trial. That error
is obvious and not reasonably in dispute, and it appears on
the face of the record. Therefore, the error was a plain one.
Chitwood, 370 Or at 321-22.
         We turn to whether we should exercise our discre-
tion to correct the error. “That discretion entails making a
prudential call that takes into account an array of consid-
erations, such as the competing interests of the parties, the
nature of the case, the gravity of the error, and the ends of
justice in the particular case.” Vanornum, 354 Or at 630.
         We recognize that defendant’s jury trial was short
and relatively straightforward. Defendant was charged with
one count of second-degree theft and the jury heard testi-
mony from only three witnesses. But, of course, even in a
misdemeanor case like this one, defendant was entitled to
a fair trial. As already explained, the prosecutor’s remarks
deprived defendant of a fair trial because those remarks
invited the jury to view defendant’s silence as evidence of
his guilt. “The reasoning that supports our finding of plain
error also urges our intervention to correct it.” Chitwood, 370
Or at 322. Considering the nature of the case, the gravity of
the error, and the ends of justice, we exercise our discretion
Cite as 330 Or App 680 (2024)                       691

to correct the plain error. We reverse and remand defen-
dant’s conviction for second-degree theft.
       Reversed and remanded.