Court Opinion

ID: 9942984
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-22 16:03:44.577758+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:45:48.992481
License: Public Domain

Cite as 2024 Ark. 23
                SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS
                                     No.   CR-23-486

                                                Opinion Delivered:   February 22, 2024

 ROYCE CALKINS                          APPEAL FROM THE STONE
                              APPELLANT COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
                                        [NO. 69CR-21-36]
 V.
                                                HONORABLE TIM WEAVER, JUDGE

 STATE OF ARKANSAS                              AFFIRMED.
                                APPELLEE

                             JOHN DAN KEMP, Chief Justice

       Appellant Royce Calkins appeals a Stone County Circuit Court order convicting

him of two counts of first-degree murder and sentencing him to two consecutive terms of

life imprisonment, plus a fifteen-year sentencing enhancement to each term for using a

firearm. For reversal, Calkins (1) challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his

first-degree-murder convictions, and (2) argues that the circuit court abused its discretion

by denying his proffered jury instructions on justification and kidnapping. We affirm.

                                           I. Facts

       On March 9, 2021, Calkins’s girlfriend, Brandy Patrick, and his father, Ronald “Ron”

Calkins, were shot and killed in a home shared by Calkins and Ron. Brandy’s son, Bradley

Cates, checked on her when he got off work that day, discovered their bodies, and called

911. Chief Deputy Sheriff Dammon McGilton responded to the 911 call and encountered

Cates, who was standing in the front yard, crying. McGilton entered the residence and saw
Brandy’s and Ron’s dead bodies. He also observed that Ron had a gun in his left hand that

“appeared to be posed.” McGilton secured the scene, alerted the Arkansas State Police, and

obtained a search warrant. Once officers obtained a warrant and reentered the house, they

saw that both victims had been shot multiple times and noted significant damage to Ron’s

left wrist. It was later confirmed that Brandy had been shot four times and Ron had been

shot six times. Additionally, Ron’s brother, Steven Calkins, testified that Ron was right-

handed and that he had been unable to use his left index finger since he was a child because

of a gun-loading incident.

       On the day of the murders, Calkins called his stepfather, Donald Milton, from Ron’s

cell phone. Milton asked Calkins what was going on because he knew that something was

not right. Calkins replied that “it’s bad . . . it’s as bad as it gets . . . they were going to take

me or make me go to the doctor or something.” Milton responded, “[T]hey’re just trying

to help you.” Calkins told Milton, “I’m tired of their shit. It don’t matter. They’re gone.”

Calkins refused to keep talking unless Milton purchased a different phone. Milton then

called the sheriff’s office.

       Following the murders, Calkins also went to the home of a family friend, Dale

Daggett. Calkins arrived there in Ron’s truck, holding Ron’s cell phone. Daggett asked

Calkins, “[W]hy don’t you go home[?]” Calkins told him that “it’s really bad over there.”

Daggett then asked if they were breathing, and Calkins “shook his head no.”

       Law enforcement quickly developed Calkins as a suspect, and he was taken into

custody that evening. As he was being arrested, Calkins spontaneously said, “I just said a

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prayer. I’m so sorry for what happened. It was an accident.” Calkins also told an intake

officer at the jail that he had a broken heart because of what he had done.

       In custody, Calkins told a cellmate, Galan Langley, that he had shot his girlfriend and

his father and that he had put the gun in his dad’s hand when he left to make it look like a

murder-suicide. Langley recalled that Calkins spoke openly about the murders during his

first few days in jail but then “clammed up” after another inmate began coaching him about

asserting an insanity defense. Langley wrote a letter to the Van Buren County jail

administrator recounting Calkins’s admission to him about killing his girlfriend and his

father. Calkins further told Langley that the firearm he used to kill his father and his girlfriend

was obtained from a friend that was a border patrol agent. Calkins told Langley that he

panicked after he shot Brandy and Ron and that he gathered up a few thousand dollars and

called a lawyer before he was arrested.

       At trial, several witnesses testified about their knowledge of Calkins’s relationship

with Ron. Milton testified that he had never seen Ron be physical with, or lift a hand to

hurt, Calkins but that Ron had tried to help him out in life. Daggett testified that Ron “did

everything for [Calkins] that he could” and that Ron “bent over backwards to try and help

him.” Daggett explained that Calkins also frequently had seizures, and Ron had helped him

with that condition as well. Daggett had seen Calkins exhibit aggressive behavior toward

his father, including “kicking at his daddy and punching at him.” But he had never seen

Ron retaliate; he had only seen him try to get away from Calkins. Another family friend,

Theresa Price, testified she had previously heard Calkins threaten to kill his father. She said

that Ron “was terrified of [Calkins.]”

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       Leslie Hodge, Calkins’s ex-girlfriend and the mother of his two children, testified

that she had never seen Ron physically injure or threaten Calkins, but she had seen Calkins

physically injure or threaten Ron four or five times. Hodge never saw Ron fight back during

these attacks. He would typically cower down and “try to either leave the room or dissolve

the situation.” Hodge and Brandy were friends, and she had never observed Brandy exhibit

any violence toward Calkins. Hodge once advised Brandy to leave Calkins because he was

violent. Calkins called Hodge several times from jail following his arrest. In one conversation

that was played for the jury, Calkins stated that “people were coming to take advantage of

[him]” and that “[y]ou fuck with [him] you see where you end up.”

       Prior to trial, Dr. Abigail Taylor, a physician at the Arkansas State Hospital,

performed court-ordered fitness-to-proceed and criminal-responsibility evaluations on

Calkins. She concluded that he did not have a mental disease or defect and had the capacity

to appreciate the criminality of his conduct, to conform his conduct to the requirements of

the law, and to form the culpable mental state required as an element of the offense.

       At trial, Dr. Taylor testified that Calkins recounted to her the events preceding the

murders. Calkins told Dr. Taylor that the night before the murders, he had a seizure around

dinner time. He and Brandy had been arguing, and she had been “telling [him] what to do

all night.” For example, she told him to go lie down in “a bedroom that didn’t have any

windows[.]” He also said that Brandy told Ron to plug a heater into an upstairs outlet that

he believed did not work. Calkins said he thought “there was more going on than [he] was

really understanding.”

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       According to Dr. Taylor, Calkins told her that he continued to have seizures the

next morning and that “Brandy started hassling him.” She told him that she was a secretary

to the KKK. She said that there was a “contract bond” and that he “had 15 minutes to figure

it out,” but he also said that he didn’t know what she meant by that. Calkins told Dr. Taylor

that he had “a lot of nice things. [He] thought they were going to take [his] things.” He

also told Dr. Taylor that his father was being rude and threatened to “make all the decisions

for [him].”

       Calkins told Dr. Taylor that at some point, “[he] freaked out. [He] got scared to

death. He said they were on either side of him. They were messing with him. [He] thought

they were going to hurt [him].” He grabbed a gun and shot Ron first and then Brandy.

When Dr. Taylor asked Calkins whether he knew at the time that shooting them was illegal,

he acknowledged that he did but that he thought he was defending himself. Dr. Taylor also

testified that she had concerns about Calkins’s honesty during the evaluations due to

inconsistencies in his statements to her.

       At the close of the State’s case, Calkins’s trial counsel moved for a directed verdict,

arguing that there was no proof that Calkins “intended to kill anyone.” The circuit court

denied the motion, and the defense rested its case without presenting any evidence. During

the discussion of jury instructions, Calkins’s trial counsel requested that an instruction be

given on justification and on kidnapping, as the underlying felony for the justification

instruction. He claimed that evidence supporting the instructions was introduced through

Dr. Taylor’s testimony. The circuit court declined to give the instructions, and Calkins’s

trial counsel proffered them.

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       Calkins was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder, and the jury found that

he had used a firearm in the commission of the offenses. He was sentenced to two

consecutive terms of life imprisonment for the murders plus a fifteen-year sentencing

enhancement on each life term for using a firearm. He filed a timely notice of appeal.

                                     II. Points on Appeal

                               A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

       Although presented as Calkins’s second point on appeal, double-jeopardy

considerations require this court to review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence

before we review the other issues on appeal. McKee v. State, 2020 Ark. 327, at 5, 608 S.W.3d

584, 589. Calkins argues that the circuit court erred in denying his motion for directed

verdict on the two charges of first-degree murder. He contends that there was no evidence

offered to show purpose—the requisite mental state for the first-degree murders for which

he was charged.

       We treat a motion for directed verdict as a challenge to the sufficiency of the

evidence. McClendon v. State, 2019 Ark. 88, at 3, 570 S.W.3d 450, 452. In reviewing this

challenge, we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the State and consider only the

evidence that supports the conviction. Id., 570 S.W.3d at 452. We will affirm the verdict if

substantial evidence supports it. Id., 570 S.W.3d at 452. Substantial evidence is evidence of

sufficient force and character that it will, with reasonable certainty, compel a conclusion one

way or the other without resorting to speculation or conjecture. Id., 570 S.W.3d at 452. It

is the function of the jury––not the reviewing court––to evaluate the credibility of witnesses

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and to resolve any inconsistencies in the evidence. Breeden v. State, 2013 Ark. 145, at 5, 427

S.W.3d 5, 8–9.

       To sustain a charge of first-degree murder, the State had to prove that with a purpose

of causing the deaths of Brandy and Ron, Calkins did cause their deaths. Ark. Code Ann. §

5-10-102(a)(2) (Supp. 2019). “A person acts purposely with respect to his or her conduct

or a result of his or her conduct when it is the person’s conscious object to engage in conduct

of that nature or to cause the result[.]” Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-202(1) (Repl. 2013). Intent

is seldom capable of proof by direct evidence and must usually be inferred from the

circumstances surrounding the killing. Collins v. State, 2021 Ark. 35, at 5, 617 S.W.3d 701,

704. The intent necessary for first-degree murder may be inferred from the type of weapon

used, the manner of its use, and the nature, extent, and location of the wounds. Id., 617

S.W.3d at 705. It is axiomatic that one is presumed to intend the natural and probable

consequences of one’s actions. Ward v. State, 2023 Ark. 158, at 6, 676 S.W.3d 270, 274. A

jury may properly consider an attempt to cover up one’s connection to a crime as proof of

a purposeful mental state. Leaks v. State, 345 Ark. 182, 186, 45 S.W.3d 363, 366 (2001).

       Here, substantial evidence supports both counts of first-degree murder because

evidence offered at trial demonstrated Calkins’s purpose. Calkins shot Brandy four times,

and he shot Ron six times. Calkins then attempted to conceal his involvement by planting

the gun in Ron’s left hand to make it appear as though it was a murder-suicide, and he fled

the scene. Calkins told multiple people about shooting Brandy and Ron, and he told his

cellmate about his attempt to cover up his connection to the crime by placing the gun in

Ron’s hand. See id., 45 S.W.3d at 366. Given these facts when viewed in the light most

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favorable to the State, the jury could reasonably infer that Calkins acted purposely when he

shot and killed Brandy and Ron. Thus, we hold that the circuit court properly denied his

motion for directed verdict, and we affirm on this point.

                                      B. Jury Instructions

       Next, Calkins argues that the circuit court abused its discretion by rejecting his

proposed jury instructions on justification and kidnapping. He claims that evidence was

presented through Dr. Taylor’s testimony that Calkins thought Ron and Brandy were going

to hurt him, that he was in imminent danger, and that he was defending himself when he

killed them.

       We have stated that there must be a rational basis in the evidence to warrant the

giving of a jury instruction. Bridges v. State, 2023 Ark. 157, at 7, 676 S.W.3d 275, 279.

When the defendant has offered sufficient evidence to raise a question of fact concerning a

defense, the instructions must fully and fairly declare the law applicable to that defense;

however, there is no error in refusing to give a jury instruction when there is no basis in the

evidence to support the giving of the instruction. Id., 676 S.W.3d at 279. This court has

affirmed a circuit court’s refusal to submit a proffered jury instruction when the only basis

for the instruction was the defendant’s self-serving statements or testimony, contradicted by

other witnesses. Id., 676 S.W.3d at 279. We will not reverse the circuit court’s refusal to

submit an instruction to the jury absent an abuse of discretion. Id., 676 S.W.3d at 279. An

abuse of discretion is a high threshold that does not simply require error in the circuit court’s

decision but requires that the circuit court act improvidently, thoughtlessly, or without due

consideration. Collins v. State, 2019 Ark. 110, at 5, 571 S.W.3d 469, 472.

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       In the present case, Calkins sought a justification jury instruction based on Arkansas

Code Annotated section 5-2-607, which states:

       (a) A person is justified in using deadly physical force upon another person if the
       person reasonably believes that the other person is:

               (1) Committing or about to commit a felony involving physical force or
                   violence;

               (2) Using or about to use unlawful deadly physical force; or

               (3) Imminently endangering the person’s life or imminently about to victimize
                   the person from the continuation of a pattern of domestic abuse.

Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-607(a)(1)–(3) (Supp. 2019). A reasonable belief is the belief that an

ordinary and prudent person would form under the circumstances, not one that is recklessly

or negligently formed. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-1-102 (Repl. 2013). Calkins also sought an

instruction on kidnapping as the “felony involving physical force or violence” referenced in

the justification instruction. The kidnapping instruction was based on Arkansas Code

Annotated section 5-11-102 (Repl. 2013), which states, in pertinent part, that “[a] person

commits the offense of kidnapping if, without consent, the person restrains another person

so as to interfere substantially with the other person’s liberty with the purpose of” facilitating

the commission of any felony, inflicting physical injury upon the other person, or terrorizing

the other person. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-11-102(a)(3), (4) & (6).

       In rejecting Calkins’s proposed justification instruction, the circuit court found that

       [t]he justification instruction requires that Royce Calkins reasonably believed that
       Ronald Calkins and Brandy Patrick were using or were about to use unlawful deadly
       physical force, which I find there’s no evidence been submitted. . . . There’s nothing
       in this record that the jury could find either one of those things. That he reasonably
       believed that either of the decedents were using or were about to use unlawful deadly

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       physical force. There was this statement they were going to make him go into a room
       with no windows. That maybe a cord—a plugin cord to a heater might have been
       smoking. There’s no evidence before the Court that—unlawful deadly physical force
       or that his life was in imminent danger.

It further found, with respect to kidnapping, that

       to sustain this defense[,] he must show the following things. First, that Ronald
       Calkins and/or Brandy Patrick, did without consent restrain him so as to interfere
       substantially with his liberty. He never says that. He never says that in Ms. Taylor’s
       discussion with him. And that Ronald Calkins and/or Brandy Patrick restrained
       Royce Calkins with the purpose of facilitating the commission of any felony. There’s
       no evidence of that. Or inflicting physical injury upon him. And there’s no testimony
       of that. Or terrorizing him. And there’s no testimony to any of that.

       We see no abuse of discretion in the circuit court’s refusal to instruct the jury on

justification and kidnapping because there was no rational basis in the evidence for those

instructions. Calkins asserts that his own statements, which were introduced through Dr.

Taylor’s testimony, constituted sufficient evidence to warrant giving the instructions.

Specifically, he points to his statements to Dr. Taylor that Brandy told Ron to plug a space

heater into an outlet that Calkins believed did not function, that Brandy told him to go lie

down in a bedroom without windows, and that Brandy told him that she had a “contract

bond” and that he had fifteen minutes to figure it out. However, Calkins told Dr. Taylor

that he did not know what Brandy meant by the term “contract bond.” Calkins also never

indicated to Dr. Taylor that anyone pushed him into a room, and he never said that he was

afraid he was going to be killed. Additionally, although Calkins told Dr. Taylor that he

“thought they were going to hurt [him,]” multiple witnesses testified that they had never

observed any aggression from the victims toward Calkins, but they had seen him become

physically violent toward Ron on several occasions. Theresa Price had even heard Calkins

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threaten to kill Ron. Further, Calkins’s ex-girlfriend testified that she had advised Brandy

to leave Calkins because he was violent, and she was scared for Brandy.

         On the basis of the facts presented at trial, we hold that the circuit court did not

abuse its discretion in rejecting the proffered instructions because there was no evidence that

Calkins reasonably believed the victims were committing or about to commit a felony with

force or violence, including kidnapping, that they were using or about to use unlawful

deadly physical force, or that Calkins’s life was in imminent danger. Thus, we affirm on this

point.

                                          C. Rule 4-3(a)

         Because Calkins received life sentences, this court, in compliance with Arkansas

Supreme Court Rule 4-3(a), has examined the record for all objections, motions, and

requests made by either party that were decided adversely to Calkins. No prejudicial error

has been found. We therefore affirm.

         Affirmed.

         Hogue Corbitt & Ward PLC, by: David R. Hogue, for appellant.

         Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Jacob H. Jones, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.

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