Court Opinion

ID: 9690069
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 18:52:48.663492+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:53.437046
License: Public Domain

PAGE, Justice
(concurring specially).
Today the court concludes that DNA random match probability statistics may be admitted in criminal prosecutions. I concur in that result. I am uncomfortable, however, with the court’s analysis. I write separately to address the court’s specific concern as set out in Kim1 and to express my frustration with the climate in which our decision is made. The real issue before the court, despite all of the hysteria surrounding the admission of DNA random match probability statistics, is simple. The reason for excluding DNA random match probability statistics was clearly stated in Kim, which analyzed the problem under Minn.R.Evid. 403: “[t]he danger we recognized in Boyd is that statistics on the frequency with which certain blood type combinations occur in a population will be understood by the jury to be a quantification of the likelihood that the defendant, who shares that unique combination of blood characteristics, is guilty.” State v. Joon Kyu Kim, 398 N.W.2d 544, 548 (Minn.1987).
If the jury can be prevented from misusing DNA random match probability statistics, then such evidence should, unless barred by another Rule of Evidence, be admitted. Kim, and the related cases discussed in the opinion, did not carve out a special exception to the Rules of Evidence for statistical evidence. Rather, those cases wrestled with the difficult matter of considering whether the probative value of certain evidence was substantially outweighed by the evidence’s capacity to mislead the jury. DNA random match probability statistics should be admissible provided the information is relevant, provided its probative value is not substantially outweighed by its capacity to mislead thé jury, and provided no other Rule of Evidence bars its admission. The Rules also envision that cross.-examination of expert witnesses and challenges to the foundation supporting the evidence will assist the jury in deciding what weight the evidence should be given.
Trial courts control the information presented to the jury by applying the Rules of Evidence. They also have the tool of the jury instruction to ensure, as best as humanly possible, that the jury uses the evidence presented in the correct manner. With the complex issues posed by DNA random match probability statistics, this court should provide guidance to trial judges in drafting jury instructions, not simply forecast that such *171instructions will develop on a ease-by-case basis.
At a minimum, the jury should be provided with cautionary instructions that clarify what random match probability statistics prove and what further conclusions only can be reached by inference.2 Jurors must, understand the very precise and limited meaning of DNA statistics. They also must understand which conclusions represent inferences that go beyond the statistics themselves. At the very least, jurors should know:
(1) A given DNA profile may be shared by two or more people;
(2) The random match probability statistic is not the equivalent of a statistic that tells the jury the likelihood of whether the defendant committed the crime;
(3) The random match probability statistic is the likelihood that a random person in the population would match the characteristics that were found in the crime scene evidence and also in defendant’s DNA;
(4) Where the known DNA sample from the defendant matches the unknown sample obtained from the crime scene, it does not necessarily mean the defendant is the source of the sample found at the crime scene; and
(5) That jurors alone have the final responsibility to decide the weight to be given to DNA random match probability statistics.
My final comments concern the clamor surrounding the issue of admitting DNA statistical evidence. In Bloom, the key issue to be decided by the court is whether the concerns expressed in Kim could be adequately addressed. Unfortunately, the parties chose not to respond directly to that issue — how to avoid misleading the jury. The parties instead focussed on the reliability of DNA evidence; that is, whether the evidence was too strong to be inadmissible or too weak to be admissible. While such concerns are significant, the single-minded focus on the issue of reliability alone did not assist the court in responding to the central issue of this case.
This court relies heavily on the information parties present to us in their briefs and oral arguments. When it is apparent that our decision will have repercussions extending far beyond the fate of this particular defendant, counsel best serve the administration of justice when they argue how the law, the facts, and sound public policy support their position. Exaggeration, hyperbole, and misinformation disserve the court. This court cannot play to the media’s penchant for drama or the legislature’s perceived need for immediate action. We have the responsibility to apply the law to facts established as firmly as possible, on the basis of dispassionate reason.
At oral argument, we were told that only Minnesota and one other state prohibited the introduction of population genetics statistics. When asked for case citations, counsel for the state referred the court to a footnote in a law review article,3 to recent Illinois and New York eases, and later provided a list of citations to 44 cases4 from other jurisdictions. These references were not helpful. It would have been preferable to have had some analysis of the reasoning of other courts on the concerns we raised in Kim.
Review of several of the cases on the list suggests the claim advanced at oral argu*172ment as to the admission of DNA random match probability statistics by other courts was misleading. In State v. Bible, 175 Ariz. 549, 858 P.2d 1152 (1993), the court stated: “We simply hold that statistical evidence of the random match probabilities was inadmissible and, thus, should not have been admitted.” Id. 858 P.2d at 1190. In Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 413 Mass. 154, 596 N.E.2d 311 (1992), the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision to exclude DNA random match probability evidence because the judge found the scientific community was divided on the validity of the comparison databases. Id. 596 N.E.2d at 314-16. The court in Lanigan followed Commonwealth v. Curnin, 409 Mass. 218, 565 N.E.2d 440 (1991). Cumin held it was prejudicial error to admit random match probability statistical evidence. Id. 565 N.E.2d at 445. Perhaps a reading of all the cases on the list would prove the list as a whole was not substantially misleading, ignoring that many cases were from intermediate and not final appellate courts. More helpful to this court than a simplistic effort to “count noses” from opinions which deal with different parts of a very broad set of problems would have been careful analysis of these cases on the precise issue before us in Bloom.
The cases referenced at oral argument concerned the issue of the reliability of DNA statistical evidence. The Illinois case, People v. Watson, 257 Ill.App.3d 915, 196 Ill.Dec. 89, 629 N.E.2d 634 (1994), is from an intermediate court and so does not represent Illinois’ final position. The New York case was People v. Wesley, 83 N.Y.2d 417, 611 N.Y.S.2d 97, 633 N.E.2d 451 (1994). The use made of DNA evidence in Wesley was very different than in Bloom: DNA profiling was used to match blood found on the defendant’s clothing with the victim’s blood, not, as in this ease, to compare a specimen taken from the victim with a database containing thousands of DNA profiles. In short, Wesley, in terms of its factual setting, its focus on reliability, and its analysis, is not at all similar to Bloom.
The court’s decision today does not close the book on the issues involved in the admissibility of DNA evidence. At most, it represents but one small chapter, one which comes quite early in the story.

. I also have serious concerns with respect to the underlying science and technology used to develop the DNA random match probability statistics. These concerns include the fact that a given DNA profile can be shared by two or more people; the potential for human error; the fact that we can, with some degree of mathematical certainty, expect a certain number of false positives for each 100 samples tested; the lack of uniform minimum quality control standards and procedures for laboratories conducting DNA tests; and, as noted by counsel for the state, if a sample of my blood were taken and tested 100 times on the same day, the result would not be the same every time. Having concluded some time ago that DNA evidence may be admissible subject to the proper foundation, most of these concerns may presumably be addressed on a case-by-case basis through challenges to the foundation of the DNA evidence. With respect to quality control standards and procedures for testing laboratories, I believe that, at a minimum, laboratories conducting DNA testing should be required to comply with the standards and procedures required of laboratories conducting drug and alcohol testing under Minn.Stat. §§ 181.950 — .957 (1992).

. By ''inference,” is meant "the act of passing from one or more propositions, statements, or judgments considered as true to another the truth of which is believed to follow from that of the former.” Webster’s 3rd New International Dictionary Unabridged 1158 (1993).

. There are law review articles suggesting the contrary. See e.g., Christopher G. Shank, DNA Evidence in Criminal Trials: Modifying the Law's Approach to Protect the Accused from Prejudicial Genetic Evidence, 34 Ariz.L.Rev. 829, 854-56 (1992); William C. Thompson, Evaluating the Admissibility of New Genetic Identification Tests: Lessons from the "DNA War," 84 J.Crim.L. & Criminology 22, 23, n. 5, 81 (1993) (noting nine appellate and ten trial court decisions holding DNA evidence inadmissible and citing FBI Director William Sessions' observation that "since the release of the NRC Report, eleven of thirty appellate decisions on the admissibility of DNA evidence have ruled it inadmissible”). The sources do not specify whether DNA evidence was found to be generally inadmissible or inadmissible under the particular facts of the case.

.The list was received eleven days after oral argument and four days before this opinion was filed.