Court Opinion

ID: 9850222
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:53:40.731695+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:33.309334
License: Public Domain

MEYERSON, Judge,
dissenting:
I dissent because the majority opinion ignores the unambiguous language of A.R.S. § 33-1413.G. Although this section does not preclude the landlord from increasing or decreasing rent upon the expiration or renewal of a rental agreement, the Act unequivocally provides for good faith negotiations with respect to establishing the initial terms of a rental agreement, including the rent itself.
The Act’s legislative history bears out this conclusion. As originally enacted, A.R.S. § 33-1413.A. provided as follows:
The landlord and tenant may include in a rental agreement terms and conditions not prohibited by this chapter or other rule of law including rent, term of the agreement and other provisions governing the rights and obligations of the parties.
1975 Laws, ch. 142, § 1. In 1979, the Act was amended to reflect its current language containing the express provision that the rental agreement shall be negotiated in good faith. 1979 Laws, ch. 36, § 2. Subsection (G) was also added in 1979.
Both the current law and the former law contain an identical section stating that “[ejvery duty under this chapter and every act which must be performed as a condition precedent to the exercise of a right or remedy under this chapter imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement.” A.R.S. § 33-1410. Given the 1979 amendment and the overriding duty with respect to good faith contained in A.R.S. § 33-1410, the majority’s refusal to adhere to the clear and unambiguous limitation in A.R.S. § 33-1413.G. contradicts basic principles of statutory construction.
The only restrictive language of A.R.S. § 33-1413.G. clearly provides that the duty of good faith negotiation is not obligatory “upon the expiration or renewal of any rental agreement.” The landlord in this case makes no contention that a prior written rental agreement existed. Thus the increase to be effective on February 1, 1982, could therefore not be an increase upon the “expiration or renewal” of a previously existing rental agreement and therefore subsection (G) has no applicability in the present case.