Court Opinion

ID: 9470792
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:16:02.478583+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:42:06.429195
License: Public Domain

SWYGERT, Senior Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
Although I find greater merit than does the majority in Schwartz’s evidentiary objections, this dissent discusses only the manner in which misuse was presented to the jury-
Like other courts, Illinois courts have struggled to draw a coherent line between negligence and products liability. One area in which this struggle has occurred is defining the types of plaintiffs’ conduct which bar recovery. It is clear that a greater degree of culpability than simple contributory negligence is required to bar a plaintiff’s recovery in a products liability case. Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 Ill.2d 418, 425, 261 N.E.2d 305, 309 (Ill.Sup.Ct.1970). One type of recovery-barring behavior is called “misuse,” and it has a different meaning than that which a layman would ascribe to it. In fact, the definition of misuse
is materially different from the common or ordinary understanding of the term. Webster’s Third International Dictionary defines “misuse” as follows: “to use incorrectly or carelessly” or “to use for a wrong or improper purpose.” The jury may have believed that Herbig operated the roller incorrectly, improperly or even carelessly, but unless the manner of operation was not reasonably foreseeable by the defendants, the alleged misuse is not a bar to recovery.
Lancaster v. Jeffrey Galion, Inc., 77 Ill. App.3d 819, 823, 33 IIl.Dec. 259, 263, 396 N.E.2d 648, 652 (Ill.App.Ct. 2d Dist.1979). “If the use of a product is abnormal, but nonetheless one that may be anticipated, it may be foreseeable. There is a distinction between the intended use and the foreseeable use, and ... where a particular use *385should be known to the reasonably prudent manufacturer such use cannot be labelled unforeseeable.” Kerns v. Engelke, 76 Ill.2d 154, 165, 28 Ill.Dec. 500, 505, 390 N.E.2d 859, 864 (Ill.Sup.Ct.1979) (citations omitted). See also Kuziw v. Lake Engineering Co., 586 F.2d 33, 35 (7th Cir.1978) (“In Illinois, product liability is predicated on injuries caused by products which are unreasonably dangerous when used in a foreseeable manner; the manner of use intended by the manufacturer is irrelevant.”).
Misuse can arise in two contexts in a products liability case: was the plaintiff’s use reasonably foreseeable and was the plaintiff’s misuse the sole proximate cause of the injury. Sanchez v. Black Bros. Co., 98 Ill.App.3d 264, 269, 53 Ill.Dec. 505, 504, 423 N.E.2d 1309, 1313 (Ill.App.Ct. 1st Dist.1981). Because of this ambiguity and because a special instruction results in undue attention to a plaintiff’s conduct, the Illinois Supreme Court Committee on Jury Instructions (“Committee”) recommends that no instruction on misuse be given. I.P.I.2d Civil 400.08, at 29-30 (Supp.1977); I.P.I.2d Civil vi-vii (1971). See Sanchez, supra, 98 Ill.App.3d at 267-70, 53 Ill.Dec. at 503-05, 423 N.E.2d at 1312-14 (discussion of Committee’s reasons for deciding that a misuse instruction should not be given).
Schwartz offered all the relevant Illinois pattern jury instructions and called the district court’s attention to the Committee’s reasons for excluding an instruction on misuse. He also called the district court’s attention to Civil Rule 21 of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois which provides that Illinois pattern jury instructions are to be used whenever available unless they misstate Illinois law. Although the district court did not find that the instructions misstated Illinois law, the district court adopted defendant’s instructions which explicitly instructed the jury on misuse.
The instruction given was:
The defendant contends that the plaintiff’s injury occurred as a proximate re-suit of his misuse of the motorcycle. A manufacturer or seller is entitled to expect a normal use of his motorcycle. If plaintiff’s injury occurred because of his use of the motorcycle, in a manner for which the motorcycle is not adapted and not reasonably foreseeable to the defendant, then the plaintiff cannot recover. You must determine whether the plaintiff was using the motorcycle at the time of the accident in a manner for which the motorcycle was adapted and which was reasonably foreseeable to the defendant.
Unless the jury was also informed that a “misuse” may be reasonably foreseeable or that a “misuse” may not be the sole proximate cause of an injury, see Buehler v. Whalen, 70 Ill.2d 51, 58-61, 15 Ill.Dec. 852, 856-57, 374 N.E.2d 460, 464-65 (Ill.Sup.Ct. 1978), the jury would have understood this instruction to mean that Schwartz’s conduct, viewed in the layman’s sense as contributory negligence, was a complete bar to his recovery.
Schwartz attempted to cure the error by offering two instructions:1
A manufacturer or seller of a two-wheeled motor vehicle, such as the Honda Express, can reasonably anticipate that at some time during the useful life of the product it will be involved in an accident or collision.
It is not a defense to plaintiff’s claim that the initial accident or overturn of the vehicle was not caused or contributed to by the claimed design defect of the Honda Express two-wheeled motor vehicle.
While these instructions are not well-drafted and do not fully inform the jury, to plaintiff’s disadvantage, that a misuse can be reasonably foreseeable, they are indisputably correct statements of Illinois law. See Buehler, supra. See also Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Williams Machine & Tool Co., 62 Ill.2d 77, 85, 338 N.E.2d 857, 861 (Ill.Sup. Ct.1975) (“An instruction was given that the negligence of plaintiff or its employees *386would not be a defense, and that instruction, in light of our earlier statements herein, was correct. The jury was further instructed that the ‘fact that the Skywitch may have been misused is no defense so long as the misuse was foreseeable.’ While this instruction is poorly drafted and did not adequately instruct the jury on the defense of misuse, we find no prejudicial error occurred.”).
The jury instructions in Schwartz’s trial did not inform the jury of the uncommon and special meaning of misuse. The jury, therefore, would have believed the case was one in simple negligence, in contravention of the Illinois Supreme Court’s efforts to distinguish negligence from products liability, and to distinguish the types of plaintiffs’ conduct which bar recovery. As such, the jury instructions misstated Illinois products liability law and Schwartz is entitled to a new trial.2

. Defendants argue that Schwartz failed to preserve these instructions. Reading the transcript, however, it is clear that Schwartz made repeated objections to the court’s decisions concerning the misuse instructions. Only a very technical reading of the transcript would permit the conclusion that Schwartz had failed to preserve his objections.

. The majority argues that Schwartz “at no time on appeal argues that the misuse instruction misstated Illinois law,” and, therefore, it does “not reach the issue addressed by the dissent.” Maj. op., supra, at 382 n. 3. Although I agree that Schwartz’s counsel has not argued his position in its best light, I believe the issue should be addressed. First, it is not unusual for this court to consider and decide issues raised inartfully or not at all by the parties. See, e.g., Liberles v. County of Cook, 709 F.2d 1122, 1136 (7th Cir.1983). TAs is especially true where, as here, an important error of law taints the jury’s verdict in appellant’s trial. Second, Schwartz’s objection concerning the curing instructions he offered raises the question whether the misuse instruction misstated Illinois law. The misuse instruction given was more negligence-oriented, and, therefore, more defendant-oriented than Illinois law permits. This is the gist of Schwartz’s admittedly inartful plea.