Court Opinion

ID: 9925935
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-23 15:07:03.315689+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:50.590172
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-3549-21

K.P.,1

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

E.P.,

          Defendant-Appellant.

                   Argued November 15, 2023 – Decided January 23, 2024

                   Before Judges Currier and Vanek.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
                   Chancery Division, Family Part, Middlesex County,
                   Docket No. FM-12-0560-16.

                   Marc J. Rogoff argued the cause for appellant.

                   K.P., respondent, argued the cause pro se.

PER CURIAM

1
     We use the parties' initials pursuant to Rule 1:38-3(a).
      Defendant appeals from a June 29, 2022 Family Part order vacating a

December 15, 2016 consent order (consent order). Because we are satisfied the

trial court did not abuse its discretion in vacating the parties' consent order, we

affirm.

                                        I.

      The parties divorced on May 23, 2016 and have two children together:

E.R.P., born in February 2005, and M.P., born in February 2008. The parties

share joint physical and legal custody of the children.

      After learning that plaintiff's boyfriend, S.J.L., was a convicted felon,2

defendant filed an order to show cause seeking to prevent S.J.L. from having

any contact with the children.      The parties executed a consent order on

December 15, 2016, which prevented (1) S.J.L. from being present during

plaintiff's parenting time with the children; (2) any form of contact between

2
  In 2010, S.J.L. was convicted of second-degree robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1,
and second-degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1). He was
sentenced to seven years in state prison with a three-year parole disqualification
period. Prior to these charges, S.J.L. was convicted of criminal mischief for
damaging property, N.J.S.A. 2C:17-3(a)(1); third-degree distribution of cocaine
on or near school property, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7; first-degree robbery, N.J.S.A.
2C:15-1; second-degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose,
N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a); fourth-degree rioting, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-1(a)(2); fourth-
degree resisting arrest, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(a); and shoplifting, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-
11(b)(1). He served several prison terms for those convictions.
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S.J.L. and the children; and (3) "S.J.L.[] from being in the vicinity of any

[pickup] or drop[-]off of the children." The children were eleven and eight years

old at the time.

      The consent order stipulated that the restraints were to be enforced "unless

the family counselor opine[d] that it[ was] in the best interest of the children"

for S.J.L. to be present during plaintiff's parenting time. The consent order

required the parties and children to "attend family counseling to address

transition issues, including but not limited to, the impact . . . S.J.L. [was] having

upon the children and any new relationships of the parties."

      In the ensuing years, plaintiff filed three applications to vacate the consent

order. The trial court denied plaintiff's first application in April 2017 and

appointed a Guardian Ad Litem (GAL) for the children. In the GAL's reports to

the court, she requested the court restrict the parties from discussing the "S.J.L.

issue" with the children and recommended the children begin therapy.

      Plaintiff filed a second motion to vacate the consent order in February

2019. At that time, the GAL recommended the appointment of a psychologist

to conduct a best interest evaluation as to what relationship, if any, S.J.L. should

have with the children.      Thereafter, the trial court appointed Mathias R.

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Hagovsky, Ph.D., to determine whether it was in the children's best interest to

continue to restrain S.J.L. from being present during plaintiff's parenting time.

         Dr. Hagovsky issued his report on January 31, 2021, recommending S.J.L.

have contact and a relationship with the children. Plaintiff subsequently filed a

third motion to vacate the consent order based on Dr. Hagovsky's report. The

court denied the motion without prejudice pending a plenary hearing on the

issue.

         The plenary hearing was held on July 21 and September 29, 2021. The

trial court heard testimony from Dr. Hagovsky, the GAL, defendant, and

defendant's witnesses: his nephew, his long-time friend, and plaintiff's sister

who is married to defendant's nephew.

         During the hearing, Dr. Hagovsky testified that he:     interviewed the

children individually, separate from the parties; interviewed the parties;

observed sessions with the children and each parent; conducted collateral

interviews of S.J.L.'s therapist, S.J.L.'s ex-wife and daughter; reviewed the

results of psychological testing and conducted home visits.

         According to Dr. Hagovsky, the results of the psychological tests were

insignificant. Although the testing "suggest[ed] some antisocial and histrionic

features," Dr. Hagovsky stated it "f[e]ll far short from a formal diagnosis of

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anything coming close to a full personality disorder." Dr. Hagovsky testified

that S.J.L. stated in his interview that "he will not be bullied in any way" and

"will always react to someone who attempts to bully him" based on his life

experiences, particularly his time in prison.

      Dr. Hagovsky also testified that S.J.L. said "he had always wanted to be a

gangster" and "always had problems with authority." Dr. Hagovsky agreed with

defense counsel's characterization of S.J.L. as a "career criminal since he's been

a juvenile" and agreed S.J.L. was involved in altercations with defendant, as

well as S.J.L.'s friends and family following his release from prison. Although

Dr. Hagovsky stated he was concerned about S.J.L.'s comments regarding

bullying, he testified he did not have any concerns with S.J.L. having contact

with the children.

      Dr. Hagovsky also testified regarding two interviews he had with M.P. In

the first interview, then eleven-year-old M.P. expressed her difficulty in

accepting her mother had a boyfriend so soon after the divorce was finalized.

She was aware her father did not like S.J.L.. In discussing M.P.'s second

interview—a year later, Dr. Hagovsky testified M.P. "had softened her

position":

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            [S]he still felt that it would be important for her to have
            as much time as possible with her mom, without anyone
            there.

                  But she said that she had gotten to the point that
            she didn't care anymore. And if that was something that
            her mom wanted to do, she would be okay with it.

      According to Dr. Hagovsky, the tenor of his interviews with E.R.P. were

similar. In the first interview, she said she did not like having S.J.L. around

since "it was right after the divorce, and she didn't know him." She too was

aware her father did not like S.J.L.. But, Dr. Hagovsky said, E.R.P. "was okay

with her mother having a boyfriend, and stated that if he ma[de] her mother

happy, then that [was] more important to her than her feelings or her father's

feelings might be. But she didn't want him around all of the time."

      Dr. Hagovsky testified that during the second interview with E.R.P., now

a high school sophomore, she indicated:

            [S]he . . . told her mother that she didn't have a problem
            with her boyfriend. And that all she cares about is her
            mother's happiness. And that she said she is her own
            person. Doesn't let anybody influence her. She said
            that she also talked with her father in the past about his
            girlfriend and her children.

                   Although she said her dad did not have a
            girlfriend at the time I spoke with her. But she said it
            was okay for her mom to have her boyfriend there, just
            as long as it wasn't all the time. And she felt that as

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            long as she had quality time with her mother alone, then
            . . . she would be okay with that.

      Dr. Hagovsky testified there was no indication from the children that

S.J.L. hurt them. He believed the children's objection to S.J.L. was "not what

he was doing or what he was saying, but that he was simply there. And they

weren't ready . . . to have someone introduced to them so early on after the

divorce." When asked if the children would "suffer some kind of psychological

harm" if they were not permitted to be around S.J.L., Dr. Hagovsky testified:

                  It's my opinion that they are already suffering
            something. How much of it is hard to tell. But they are
            already unhappy with the current situation. They told
            me that. They said they're okay. . . . They would like
            things to be more normal, is another way to put it, with
            their mom.

                  ....

                  It's my opinion that children who are put in a
            position of conflict between their parents feel
            responsible for the conflict. It's not that they don't feel
            responsible. They always feel responsible. It's a
            question of how much they feel responsible.

                  So, there's no doubt in my opinion, they didn't tell
            me this, it's my opinion, as a [p]sychologist, who deals
            with people and children in these situations, it's my
            opinion that that is an underlying psychological process
            that happens to children when they are in a position of
            conflict between their parents. Which is what this is.

                  They know that their parents disagree.

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      Regarding his interview with S.J.L.'s ex-wife, Dr. Hagovsky testified:

            [S]he was well aware that . . . S.J.L. ha[s] had his
            problems in the past, but . . . he never put the children
            in harm's way. He has always been a good father. Has
            turned his life around. And that he has had a
            considerable amount of contact, she told me, with her
            children's children, the grandchildren.

                   She said she understood why [defendant] might
            feel as he does. But she said he doesn't know . . . S.J.L.
            certainly like she does. And [she] did not believe that
            it was the right thing for [defendant] to stand in the way
            of [S.J.L.] having access to [plaintiff's] children.

      During Dr. Hagovsky's interview with S.J.L.'s daughter, she told him that

"she has never had any difficulty with having her father around [her] kids." Dr.

Hagovsky said the interview

            reinforced [his] impression that when it comes to
            children, as opposed to some of the things that . . . S.J.L.
            may have done in his life, . . . he appears to be able to
            act in an appropriate manner. And [it's] sufficient to . .
            . have someone like his ex-wife and daughter very
            comfortable with . . . having him around them, and the
            grandchildren.

      Dr. Hagovsky told the court he recommended plaintiff discuss with the

children a plan for contact with S.J.L. that "they would be comfortable with"

and is "consistent with their needs and expectations," and that defendant allow

plaintiff to have a relationship with S.J.L. in the children's presence and to not

do anything that would make it more difficult for the children.

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      Dr. Hagovsky testified "[t]his is about being realistic, in my opinion, and

moving on." He elaborated:

                  If . . . S.J.L. has turned his life around, which he
            has appeared to have, if he is no longer involved in
            criminal activity, he's paid his dues, it looks like, from
            my perspective, in terms of his criminal activity. He
            has a full[-]time job. He's maintained a relationship
            with [plaintiff] for several years.

                   I think it's a question of taking into consideration
            the ages of the children, and what their needs are, and
            moving on. That's a challenge for all of them. That's
            not just for [defendant]. That's a challenge for
            everybody. But it is in the children's best interest, if
            that's what they want for their mom, if that's what they
            want for them, they're old enough now. And I think
            they should be given an opportunity to do that.

                   That doesn't mean that, you know, that this is a
            perfect recommendation, or that it's not possible that it
            fails. There's no guarantees. I wrote that in my report.
            . . . I am imploring them to move on. Not to forget.
            But to move on.

      The GAL testified regarding a 2017 incident where defendant, S.J.L., and

plaintiff got into a verbal dispute over FaceTime in the presence of the children,

who were crying in the room with defendant. According to the GAL, defendant

accused plaintiff of driving with the children while drunk, plaintiff accused

defendant of being a liar, and S.J.L. yelled at defendant that he would "scr*w

[defendant's] mother." The GAL described the incident as "terrible" and that

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the adults were "[b]ad adults across the board." The GAL further testified she

had not been involved in any issues between the parties and the children since

2018.

        Defendant's nephew testified that on April 2, 2017, after S.J.L. and

plaintiff drove past his house after midnight and yelled out his name, he called

the police and filed harassment charges.        He testified the parties went to

mediation and agreed to mutual restraints and he has not had contact with S.J.L.

in four years.

        The nephew's wife, who is plaintiff's sister, testified she had a close

relationship with plaintiff prior to the divorce, but they were not on speaking

terms when plaintiff began dating S.J.L. The nephew's wife testified she was

concerned about S.J.L.'s lengthy criminal past and that she did not believe he

had changed since the harassment incident.           In addressing a harassment

complaint that the nephew's wife lodged against S.J.L. on April 5, 2017, she

testified S.J.L. sent her "one or two [texts] . . . . introducing himself[,]" but she

did not want him texting her.

        Defendant's friend also testified. He told the court he was at defendant's

house during the 2017 FaceTime incident, and heard S.J.L. say, "how about I

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f**k your dead mother" and "come see me" in front of the children, causing

E.R.P. to "storm[] out of the room."

      During defendant's testimony, he stated he first learned of S.J.L.'s criminal

history after E.R.P. searched S.J.L.'s name online. Defendant testified that

although there have not been any problems with S.J.L. since they attended

mediation in 2017, he does not believe S.J.L. is rehabilitated.          Defendant

referred to S.J.L.'s comments regarding being a gangster, stating:

            [He said] that he . . . aspired to be a gangster. This was
            his aspiration in life. And then, not only that, he's got
            a problem with authority, and anger issues. Has he been
            cured of this, is there proof of this? Am I willing to
            take a chance with my two little girls? He's a high[-
            ]risk factor to the welfare of my children.

Defendant told the court he would not agree to allow S.J.L. near his children

because of his criminal record.

      In February 2022, the court sua sponte ordered in camera interviews of

the children, advising the interviews were necessary to assist the court in

deciding the children's best interests. Prior to conducting the interviews, the

court invited both parties to submit questions to be posed to the children .

      The in camera interviews were conducted on February 17, 2022. At the

time, M.P. was fourteen and E.R.P. was about to turn seventeen years old. M.P.

told the judge that she did not like sharing her mother so soon after the divorce,

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and that S.J.L.'s immaturity made it uncomfortable to be around him at that time.

While she did not think the restriction against S.J.L. had to be so strict, she had

told plaintiff she does not want S.J.L. around. M.P. said she did not know what

she wanted the court to do.

      E.R.P. told the judge that when she was younger, S.J.L. told her she

needed to grow up and accept he was going to be in her life which "didn't sit

right with [her]." She said she learned about S.J.L.'s criminal background when

she searched his name online and came upon his mugshot and criminal record.

However, she said she was not bothered being around someone with a criminal

record.

      E.R.P. told the judge that if S.J.L. was permitted to see her, she would

want a limit on the amount of time. She told the judge she has stopped caring

as much as she did earlier because the issue has "been going on for too long,"

she did not want to deal with it, and she wants her mother to be happy.

      Following the interviews, the court provided both parties with the

interview transcripts and invited them to submit supplemental responses, which

they did.

                                        II.

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      On June 27, 2022, the trial judge issued an oral decision, vacating the

consent order. The judge discussed the 2017 harassment incidents. But because

there were no criminal charges and the participants agreed to mutual restraints,

the judge did not categorize these events as new criminal behavior. The judge

also explained it was appropriate for her to interview the children post-trial

because a year and a half had passed since the last interviews, and under the

court's parens patriae role it "had an obligation . . . to hear for [it]self what these

two now much older children had to say."

      The judge found the children's responses to her questions were similar to

their discussions with Dr. Hagovsky. The children did not want to prevent their

mother from being in a relationship with S.J.L. nor did they want to prevent

S.J.L. from having a role in their lives. The court found E.R.P. was "fine with

it" and M.P. was "still concerned and worried about what's going on, but

indicated to the [c]ourt that she would not be adverse, should the [c]ourt permit

. . . S.J.L. to be around the children."

      The trial judge reasoned:

                   . . . S.J.L. was released from prison in 2015. He
             was released from his conditions of probation or parole
             by 2018. He has had no relapse since that time. His
             family members, . . . an ex-wife, a daughter, express
             support for him in his relationship with children. His
             counselor said he's been doing fine, and on board. Dr.

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                                           13
            Hagovsky administered three particular tests, one
            including the child abuse, a standardized test to . . . look
            at child abuse and the propensity for the same. His, all
            of those testing were within normal range. There is
            nothing in the record to indicate that at this point in
            time, the restriction prohibiting [plaintiff] from having
            . . . S.J.L. in the presence of the now [fourteen] and
            [seventeen] year old daughters would be inimical to
            their best interests.

                  . . . [T]he [c]ourt finds, based on looking at the
            case law, the facts that were presented, its own
            interviews with the children, its consideration of what
            the [GAL] had found a number of years ago, and what
            Dr. Hagovsky found in his report, and his very, very
            credible testimony at the time of trial, that it is
            appropriate for the [c]ourt to vacate the consent order
            of December of 2016.

                                        III.

      On appeal, defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in

vacating the consent order because plaintiff did not show it was in the children's

best interest for them to have contact with S.J.L. In addition, defendant asserts

the court further abused its discretion in conducting in camera interviews of the

children five months after the close of the trial.

      "We review the Family Part judge's findings in accordance with a

deferential standard of review, recognizing the court's 'special jurisdiction and

expertise in family matters.'" Thieme v. Aucoin-Thieme, 227 N.J. 269, 282-83

(2016) (quoting Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998)). "[F]indings by the

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                                        14
trial court are binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial,

credible evidence." Id. at 283 (quoting Cesare, 154 N.J. at 411-12).

      Deference is accorded because of the family courts' "specialized

knowledge and experience in matters involving parental relationships and the

best interests of children." N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. F.M., 211 N.J.

420, 427 (2012). A "[c]ourt finds an abuse of discretion when a decision is

'made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established

policies, or rested on an impermissible basis.'"      U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v.

Guillaume, 209 N.J. 449, 467-68 (2012) (quoting Iliadis v. Wal-Mart Stores,

Inc., 191 N.J. 88, 123 (2007)).

      In contrast, "all legal issues are reviewed de novo." Ricci v. Ricci, 448

N.J. Super. 546, 565 (App. Div. 2017) (citing Reese v. Weis, 430 N.J. Super.

552, 568 (App. Div. 2013)).

                                       A.

      We begin by addressing defendant's contention that the trial court abused

its discretion in vacating the consent order and allowing S.J.L. to be around the

children. Defendant asserts there is no evidence S.J.L.'s presence benefits the

children's lives. He contends that Dr. Hagovsky did not consider that issue and

instead focused on plaintiff's happiness. Defendant further contends that S.J.L.'s

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long violent criminal background "poses inherent risks to the children," there is

no evidence the risks have subsided, and the trial court erred in finding

defendant had not relapsed into criminal activity since his release from prison

in 2015.

         After reviewing the record, we discern no reason to disturb the trial judge's

June 29, 2022 order vacating the parties' consent order. Both Dr. Hagovsky and

the GAL recommended to the court that S.J.L. could have a role in the children's

lives. Dr. Hagovsky specifically testified that he found it was in the children's

best interest for the parties to move forward in their lives and for defendant to

stop being a barrier regarding S.J.L.. The GAL concluded in her report to the

court that S.J.L.'s criminal past alone was not enough to uphold the consent

order.

         We note that defendant's initial concerns regarding S.J.L.'s behavior in

2016 and 2017 are supported by the parties' family members' testimony, the

children's accounts, and in some of the findings of the psychological tests

conducted by Dr. Hagovsky. S.J.L. said some vulgar and inappropriate things

in front of the children. Harassment charges were filed, though ultimately

resolved in mediation.

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        However, those events were over five years ago and there have been no

new reported incidents.      In their most recent interviews, neither daughter

expressed any concern for harm or danger regarding S.J.L..

        In light of the change in circumstances, the court did not abuse its

discretion in vacating the consent order. The court carefully considered the

testimony of numerous witnesses, including the expert opinion of a

psychologist, who the court found credible, and determined that it was

appropriate and in the children's best interest to vacate the consent order and

permit plaintiff, with the input of the children, to arrange a plan for contact with,

and inclusion of, S.J.L. in the children's lives. The daughters are older and less

opposed to S.J.L.'s presence, and plaintiff and S.J.L. have had a long and stable

relationship.3 Therefore, the trial court's decision to vacate the consent order

was supported by the evidence in the record.

                                         B.

        We briefly address defendant's contention that the trial court abused its

discretion when it conducted an in camera interview of the children five months

after the close of the plenary hearing. Defendant asserts the court's interviews

were inappropriate because there was no legal basis to support them, an expert

3
    Plaintiff states in her brief that she and S.J.L. became engaged in April 2022.
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evaluation of the children had been conducted, the parties had "already

submitted proposed findings of fact and . . . law" to the court, and the court had

no special expertise in interviewing children.

      Although this was not a custody determination, we find Rule 5:8-6 helpful

here as it provides the proper procedure for the trial court to follow when

conducting an in camera interview:

            As part of the custody hearing, the court may on its own
            motion or at the request of a litigant conduct an in
            camera interview with the child(ren). In the absence of
            good cause, the decision to conduct an interview shall
            be made before trial. . . . . If the court elects to conduct
            an interview, it shall afford counsel the opportunity to
            submit questions for the court's use during the interview
            and shall place on the record its reasons for not asking
            any question thus submitted.

      Here, the trial judge determined she had good cause to conduct the post-

trial interviews with the children because it would assist her in determining the

children's best interest. She noted more than a year had elapsed since the last

interview. The judge invited both parties to submit questions prior to the

interviews. Afterwards, the court provided the parties with transcripts of the

interviews and invited them to submit supplemental responses.

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      The trial court's decision to conduct an in camera interview of the children

was within its discretion and the court conducted the interview in accordance

with Rule 5:8-6. Therefore, we discern no reason to disturb the court's decision.

      Affirmed.

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