Court Opinion

ID: 9568850
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:08:02.368406+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:10:17.064475
License: Public Domain

Boyle, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I agree with the lead opinion that §7 of 1993 PA 3 does not violate the Title-Object Clause of the Michigan Constitution1 in its entirety. I also agree with the lead opinion’s result and rationale finding that the act is not violative of a fundamental right protected by the Due Process Clause of the state or federal constitution. In addition, as stated in the observations of Justice Harlan2 quoted approvingly in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v Casey, 505 US 833; 112 S Ct 2791; 120 L Ed 2d 674, 697-698 (1992), and the expansion on those principles that follow, the task of the judiciary is to strike a balance between the respect for the liberty of the individual and the demands of organized society. Such balance should be struck with due respect to history and rationally evolving tradition. Thus, in the present context, the process of rational evolution *498must focus on a determination whether the question of assisted suicide can be left to the political process without intrusion on a protected liberty interest, eschewing either a radical departure from tradition or the moral code of individual judges. I agree that it can.
I do not agree with the lead opinion’s redefinition of the statutory offense of murder to exclude participation in the events leading up to the death, including, without limitation, providing the means and all other acts save that of the final act precipitating death. A person who participates in the death of another may be charged with murder, irrespective of the consent of the deceased. Nor do I agree with the lead opinion’s conclusion or rationale justifying a charge of assisted suicide under the saving clause.3 The saving clause recognizes only unprovided-for common-law crimes; it does not authorize this Court to create new crimes. If assisting a suicide is a common-law crime and not murder under the common-law definition incorporated in our murder statutes, it may be penalized as another crime under the saving clause. The Court, however, cannot simply exclude from the common-law definition of murder that which is murder under our statutes and then hold that the Legislature intended in the saving clause to authorize the Court to say that that which was murder at the common law is now a new crime.
Finally, I disagree with the conclusion that one who provides the means for suicides and participates in the acts leading up to death may not be charged with murder as long as the final act is that of the decedent. In stating this conclusion, the lead opinion has parsed the definition of participation to permit involvement that is dangerously *499overinclusive. Absent standards established to distinguish between those who are in fact terminally ill or suffering in agony and rationally wish to die and those who are not, there is no principled vehicle in the judicial arsenal to protect against abuse, save the jury’s evaluation of a given defendant’s conduct. The acts shown in the Oakland County case establish causation as a matter of law for purposes of bindover. Thus, the trial court erred in quashing the information, and the decision of the Court of Appeals should be affirmed.
i
Criminal homicide has been a statutory offense in Michigan since 1846. The crime is not defined by reference to its elements but by reference to the common law. People v Schmitt, 275 Mich 575, 577; 267 NW 741 (1936). There is no dispute that at the time these offenses were committed, the Legislature had shown no disposition to depart from the common-law definition of murder as including assisted suicide. The lead opinion today would alter the definition of murder by changing the causation requirement in the context of suicide to exclude from liability for criminal homicide those who intentionally participate in the events that directly cause death with the intention that death occur.
However, the intended results of the plaintiff’s acts were the results actually obtained, and the acts were both the cause in fact and the proximate or foreseeable cause of the decedents’ deaths. The lead opinion would thus redefine murder as it is defined in our statutes and has created a special causation standard, unknown in any other jurisdiction.
The detailed account of the preliminary exami*500nation testimony describing the assisted suicides of Ms. Miller and Ms. Wantz, ante at 482-484, belies the notion that the degree of participation by the defendant in these events was insufficient to permit a charge of murder even in those states that have adopted separate penalties for soliciting or assisting suicide. Testimony at the preliminary examination presented evidence that the defendant, inter alia, inserted iv needles into Ms. Wantz’ arm, tied strings to her fingers so she could release chemicals into her bloodstream, and placed a mask over Ms. Miller’s face so that she could breathe carbon monoxide gas. Id. at 483-484. The mask was secured so tightly that without intervention that fact alone would have caused death. It cannot be said, as a matter of law, that these actions did not establish probable cause to believe that the defendant committed murder.
The decedents’ alleged desire in the present case that they die with the defendant’s assistance does not absolve the defendant of criminal liability. People v Potter, 5 Mich 1, 5 (1858). The request by the decedents does not provide justification or excuse. E.g., State v Cobb, 229 Kan 522; 625 P2d 1133 (1981); State v Fuller, 203 Neb 233; 278 NW2d 756 (1979); anno: Criminal liability for death of another as result of accused’s attempt to kill self or assist another’s suicide, 40 ALR4th 702, § 5, pp 709-710. The magistrate’s decision to bind over the defendant for trial should be upheld.
ii
The lead opinion invites the circuit court on remand to draw a distinction between acts of participation that are merely "the events leading up to” the deaths of the decedents and "the final overt act that causes death” that, as a matter of law, will constitute probable cause for the charge *501of murder. Such a "test” transfers the responsibility for the outcome from the shoulders of this Court to the trial court and effectively converts every criminal homicide accomplished by participation into assisting suicide.
It could be argued that this solution does no more than what the assisted suicide law does. But the assisted suicide law is still only a temporary measure, and the Legislature has never indicated that it would not follow the model of other states and continue to apply the law of criminal homicide despite the existence of statutes specifically directed to suicide.
The lead opinion’s "solution” is in fact an invitation to continue participation until the level of participation assumes a level of proof for bindover suggesting that the defendant intended to kill a decedent for impure reasons. In pragmatic terms, the force of the law is to discourage conduct on the margins. What the lead opinion would do in setting new margins is permit a new range of activity and thus increase the potential for abuse of the vulnerable by the active participant.
As the Canadian Supreme Court recently and aptly observed in upholding a blanket prohibition against assisted suicide:
The basis for this refusal is twofold it seems— first, the active participation by one individual in the death of another is intrinsically morally and legally wrong, and secondly, there is no certainty that abuses can be prevented by anything less than a complete prohibition. [Rodriguez v British Columbia, 107 DLR4th 342, 401 (1993).]
A
People v Roberts, 211 Mich 187; 178 NW 690 *502(1920), correctly held that the homicide statute had incorporated the common-law definition of assisted suicide as murder. The question presented is whether we have the authority to modify that definition and, granting that we have the power to do so, whether we should. People v Couch, 436 Mich 414; 461 NW2d 683 (1990). The latter question involves the issue whether the judiciary can devise an acceptable formula advancing the autonomy of those who deem their lives not worthy to be lived, without jeopardizing the lives of those whose further existence society might deem not worthy of protection. That the Court is unable to do so is illustrated by today’s decision that alters the law of causation in all suicide settings, not just those of the terminally ill or acutely suffering.
As Justice Jackson observed in a famous dissent, a judicial decision has a force all its own. "The principle then lies about like a loaded weapon .... Every repetition imbeds that principle more deeply in our law and thinking and expands it to new purposes.” Korematsu v United States, 323 US 214, 246; 65 S Ct 193; 89 L Ed 194 (1944).
The fact that an active participant in the death of another risks jury determination that the circumstances are not so compelling as to benefit from their mercy-dispensing power tests the situation and the actions by the only repository of authority within the judicial reach. Whether death has been caused for good, bad, or mixed reasons, or whether the person is in fact presently incurable or suffering intolerable and unmanageable pain, and has a fixed and rational desire to die, are issues that should be addressed by a jury or the Legislature, not by this Court as a matter of law.
Today the Court purports to approve only a mild deviation from the common law by moving the line of protection the murder statute affords from *503participation to pulling the trigger. But the law that condemns such killings as murder has a substantially greater deterrent effect, imposing a substantially greater responsibility on those who would violate it than the penalty for assisted suicide.
While the Court’s redefinition of causation is presumably correctable, the lead opinion would reduce the deterrent potential without any assurance that the line it draws will not marginally increase the risk of death for those who would have a reason to live had society and the participant in their demise valued their continued existence.
The lead opinion recognizes that the state’s interest in guarding against potential abuses does not require it to stand neutral. The state’s interest in protecting the lives of those who wish to live under any circumstances also justifies the most severe sanction for those who would cause such deaths. The lead opinion nonetheless sends the message that it assesses the quality of particular human life and judges as a matter of law that it is less culpable to destroy some lives than others.4 In a society that draws a line that dictates that it is better that many go free than that one innocent person should be convicted, something approaching the principles protecting against error that are extended to the criminally accused should be extended to the victims of those who are willing to participate in suicide and to cause death, as long as they do not pull the final trigger. Kamisar, Some non-religious views against proposed "mercy-killing” legislation, 42 Minn L R 969, 1041 (1958).
*504The lead opinion’s distrust of the jury and its dislike for the severity of the punishment imposed by the law of criminal homicide has caused it to draw a line that crosses a dangerous threshold. The risk of irreversible mistake, however "minimal,” should not be borne by those no longer able to protest—it should rest on those who assume the authority and wisdom to extinguish human life.
B
To the extent that this Court reduces culpability for those who actively participate in acts that produce death, we do so at the risk of the most vulnerable members of our society—the elderly, the ill, the chronically depressed, those suffering from a panoply of stressful situations: adolescence, loss of employment, the death of a child or spouse, divorce, alcoholism, the abuse of other mind-altering substances, and the burden of social stigmatization.
The lead opinion’s solution assumes the actor is a sufficient buffer between the patient and the family, that the actor knows enough about the disease to assure its terminal course and enough about the sanity of the deceased to evaluate the rationality of suicide. The lead opinion thus ignores the distinction between a voluntary act carried out if the victim is sane, and the inquiry into whether the victim’s mental state is compromised by disease, depression, or medication.
c
The Model Penal Code recognizes the inherent difficulty of objective management of an assisted suicide law to separate proper from improper motivations of a participant. The code classifies pur*505posely causing, that is, engaging in conduct "but for which the result in question would not have occurred,” Model Penal Code, § 210.5, comment 4, p 98, suicide by force, duress, or deception as criminal homicide. Aiding or assisting another to commit suicide is a felony at the level of manslaughter if the defendant’s conduct causes, that is, was a "significantly contributing factor” to a suicide or attempted suicide. Id., comment 5, p 103. The same distinctions are drawn in statutory schemes. States that have enacted assisted suicide statutes continue to permit prosecutions for criminal homicides out of recognition that underinclusive line drawing by the judiciary may, as here, permit dangerously overinclusive activity.
In fact, as the excerpts from the cases cited by the lead opinion indicate, it has not aligned itself with other states. Thus, in People v Cleaves, 229 Cal App 3d 367, 375; 280 Cal Rptr 146 (1991), the court found that a defendant who held the decedent’s back so the decedent could strangle himself was not merely a passive participant in a suicide, stating that the murder statute applies "where a person actively assists in performing the Overt act resulting in death . . . .” Likewise, State v Sexson, 117 NM 113; 869 P2d 301 (NM App, 1994), does not support the lead opinion’s revisionist view of causation. In Sexson, the court found that defendant could be charged with murder on evidence that he merely held a gun in place because "[t]hat action transcends merely providing the Victim a means to kill herself and becomes active participation in the death of another.” Id., 869 P2d 305.
The factual setting and issue decided in In re Joseph G, 34 Cal 3d 429; 194 Cal Rptr 163; 667 P2d 1176; 40 ALR4th 690 (1983), are markedly dissimilar from those in the present case. Unlike defendant Kevorkian, who was not a party to any *506similar agreement, but rather an aider in accomplishing the deaths of two other persons, the defendant in Joseph G was a participant in a mutual suicide pact, intending at the time of his actions to kill both himself and his partner.5
In finding that a defendant who simultaneously undertook completion of the agreed to suicides with his deceased partner by a single instrumentality could only be found guilty of assisting suicide, and not murder, the California court "decline[d] to ritualistically apply the active/passive distinction” between murder and suicide assistance employed by earlier precedent to the unique facts before it. Id. at 440.
The Joseph G court did analyze precedent regarding the distinction between murder and the statutory crime of assisting suicide, but did not hold, as the lead opinion suggests, that a charge of murder against a suicide assistor is unavailable unless the assistor participated in the final overt act. Instead, the court concluded that "the key to distinguishing between the crimes of murder and of assisting suicide is the active or passive role of the defendant in the suicide. If the defendant merely furnishes the means, he is guilty of aiding a suicide; if he actively participates in the death of the suicide victim,, he is guilty of murder.” Id. at 436. The court made no clear distinction between where such passive assistance ends and active participation begins.6_
*507Although these distinctions are irrelevant in this context because we did not have an assisted suicide statute at the time of the deaths of Ms. Wantz and Ms. Miller, the referenced discussion establishes that, in these states, participation in the overt acts causing death is chargeable as murder. Thus, the cases cited do not support the lead opinion’s conclusion that if the defendant did not participate "in the act that . . . directly cause[s] death,” ante at 494, n 69 (emphasis added), he cannot be bound over on a charge of murder.7 Sexson did not pull the trigger, he held up the gun, and Cleaves did not strangle the decedent, he assisted the decedent in completing the act. Likewise, defendant Kevorkian did not pull the trigger for Ms. Miller, but he assisted Ms. Miller in completing the act. In Ms. Wantz’ case, his involvement was even more direct. Defendant inserted the needle and Ms. Wantz sedated herself. When her hand dropped involuntarily, the trigger was pulled and the needle inserted by defendant was .activated carrying potassium chloride in sufficient quantities to cause death._
*508Ill
Finally, the lead opinion finds that one who has only participated in a suicide but has not done the final act causing death may be prosecuted under the saving clause. MCL 750.505; MSA 28.773. The statute is applicable only when two conditions obtain: the conduct is not otherwise punishable by statute and the conduct was indictable at common law. However, at common law, one who does the deed, even through an innocent agent, is a principle in the first degree. Perkins & Boyce, Criminal Law (3d ed), p 737. If suicide is not criminal,8 the lead opinion has attempted by judicial fiat to create a new crime of assisting suicide. Culpability for persons assisting in suicide at common law was based on participation as parties to the crime of suicide.9 The saving clause furnishes no basis for the Court’s creation of a new crime. The usurpation of legislative authority in the lead opinion’s approach is evident if one considers the reach of its rationale. The lead opinion suggests an ability to exclude certain factual settings from the reach.# of the homicide statutes and then, as it were, find legislative authorization of a free-standing authority to recognize newly evolving crimes punishable under the saving clause. If such conduct were permissible, the Court could simply reorder the punishment for any felony by concluding that conduct falls outside a given statute but within the saving clause. Contrary to the lead opinion’s conclusion, the saving clause is not a delegation of legislative authority to this Court to create new crimes. The Legislature intended to save only what had not otherwise been covered in 1846.
*509CONCLUSION
The lead opinion would hold that where one "only” plans and participates in a death the actor can claim was "suicide,” he may not be charged as a matter of law with criminal homicide. No jurisdiction in the history of this country has so held and for obvious reasons. We have no way of assuring that redefining the line that constitutes causation will distinguish between terminally ill or desperately suffering people and those who think they are, no way of deciding in advance that the act of suicide is that of a rational person who chose death with dignity or that of a severely depressed person who- would not have chosen death had help been available. Most significantly, the lead opinion’s unwillingness to allow a jury to dispense mercy by determining the degree of culpability for a result clearly intended and caused in fact by a defendant is a sea change in the fundamental value we have assigned to the preservation of human life as one of the last great faiths that unites us.
The question whether the definition of murder should be changed so as to exclude one who participates in all events leading up to the death, save for the final act, is a matter of compelling public interest, demanding a balancing of legitimate interests that this Court is institutionally unsuited to perform. Although the Legislature passed a temporary assisted suicide law that included participation, it has not indicated that it intends to redefine murder, and every jurisdiction that has adopted a specific law covering assisted suicide has permitted prosecution for murder where the participation goes "too far.” No issue is more deserving of continued legislative debate and public study regarding whether, when, and how persons *510can maximize personal autonomy without running the risk of creating a societal quicksand for irreversible error.
The decision to stay our hand in this matter is not simply a matter of adhering to the rule of law.10 It reflects the wisdom in recognizing that if we choose not to intervene, we have left the pressure for change in this rapidly developing and exceedingly complex field in the forum where it is best addressed. To choose to intervene is to remove the pressure to decide that assisting suicide can be found by a jury to be murder, and to add the Court’s imprimatur to the voices of those who argue for an expansive right to self-determination that would decriminalize assisted suicide.
As Professor Tribe observed in the context of constitutional principles regarding these issues:
[T]he judiciary’s silence regarding such constitutional principles probably reflects a concern that, once recognized, rights to die might be uncontainable and might prove susceptible to grave abuse, more than it suggests that courts cannot be persuaded that self-determination and personhood may include a right to dictate the circumstances under which life is to be ended. In any event, whatever the reason for the absence in the courts of expansive notions about self-determination, the resulting deference to legislatures may prove wise in light of the complex character of the rights at stake and the significant potential that, without careful statutory guidelines and gradually evolved procedural controls, legalizing euthanasia, rather than respecting people, may endanger personhood. [Tribe, Constitutional Law (2d ed), pp 1370-1371.]
The profound questions that must be debated *511and the regulatory decisions that must be made are uniquely suited for legislative resolution. There is no principled method by which the Court can amend the common-law definition of murder, included in the statutes of this state. People v Utter, 217 Mich 74, 86; 185 NW 830 (1921).
[I]t is proper, in fact the oath we took requires nothing less, to rely on the Legislature to devise, should it choose to do so, a means to avoid the harsh penalty that is imposed when assisting a suicide is treated as murder pursuant to a literal application of MCL 750.316; MSA 28.548. [People v Kevorkian No 1, 205 Mich App 180, 191; 517 NW2d 293 (1994).]
Riley, J., concurred with Boyle, J.

 Const 1963, art 4, § 24.

 Poe v Ullman, 367 US 497, 542; 81 S Ct 1752; 6 L Ed 2d 989 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting from dismissal on jurisdictional grounds).

 MCL 750.505; MSA 28.773.

 The line drawn today is a far less merciful one than recognizing that there is much that could and should be done for those who are truly suffering, or who, for a variety of reasons, have come to see themselves as irrelevant in this brave new world.

 In addition, the court in Joseph G was concerned with the interpretation of a statutory proscription against assisting suicide, rather than the propriety of charging common-law murder as is present in the instant case.

 We do not reach the question whether People v Roberts, supra, should be reconsidered insofar as it might apply to one who is absent when the means furnished is consumed by the deceased. Roberts is factually dissimilar from the instant cases. The question whether the acts in this case constituted a common-law crime not incorporated by *507our criminal statutes is likewise not before us. We note, however, that the Court in Roberts did not find it necessary to determine if suicide was a crime (although unpunishable) in Michigan. The Court’s exclusive reliance on Blackburn v State, 23 Ohio St 146 (1872), may have obscured the fact that, unlike the Michigan statutory scheme, the Ohio statutes did not contain a saving clause. See State v Carney, 69 NJL 478, 480; 55 A 44 (1903). The Roberts definition of murder correctly states the common law embodied in our homicide statutes.

 The lead opinion is willing, ante at 494, n 70, to recognize that one who negligently furnishes the means by which another commits suicide could be found guilty of manslaughter. Thus, one who is only criminally careless and does not participate at all may be found guilty of a fifteen-year felony, while one who is present and participates in the events leading up to the act that directly caused death with the intent to cause death can only be charged with assisted suicide, punishable by a maximum penalty of five years. Moreover, since an act of suicide is innocent, it would follow that one who attempts and fails but kills others in the process may not be charged with any offense.

 Ante at 495, n 71.

 See, generally, id. at 735-751 (describing the common-law distinctions between principals and accessories), pp 756-757 (applying the distinctions in suicide cases).

 Const 1963, art 3, § 7. "The common law and the statute law now in force, not repugnant to this constitution, shall remain in force until they expire by their own limitations, or are changed, amended or repealed.”