Court Opinion

ID: 9400635
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-08 18:04:32.87685+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:46.940358
License: Public Domain

Filed 6/8/23 P. v. Knecht CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                         (Glenn)
                                                            ----

 THE PEOPLE,

                    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                                  C096039

           v.                                                                   (Super. Ct. No. 18NCR12843)

 GABRIEL ANDREW KNECHT,

                    Defendant and Appellant.

         In 2018, defendant Gabriel Andrew Knecht pleaded guilty to first degree murder.
The trial court sentenced him to an indeterminate term of 25 years to life in prison. In
2021, defendant filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.6. 1
The trial court denied the petition based on the transcript of defendant’s plea hearing,
which included a factual basis stipulated to by defense counsel that defendant shot and
killed the victim, and also included defendant’s guilty plea to murder with malice

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. Defendant filed his
resentencing petition under former section 1170.95. Effective June 30, 2022,
the Legislature renumbered former section 1170.95 to section 1172.6, with no change
in the text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)

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aforethought committed willfully, deliberately and with premeditation. The trial court
concluded defendant is not eligible for resentencing as a matter of law.
       Defendant now contends his plea did not establish proof beyond a reasonable
doubt that he is guilty of murder under the newly revised statutes. Finding no error, we
will affirm the trial court’s order.
                                       BACKGROUND
       On July 26, 2018, defendant entered his plea to first degree murder with the
understanding that other counts and special allegations would be dismissed and defendant
would serve 25 years to life in prison. Before accepting the plea, the trial court asked the
prosecutor to articulate the factual basis. The prosecutor said that on March 16, 2018,
defendant and two others went to the home of the victim, and while there, defendant, in a
willful, deliberate, and premeditated manner, shot and killed the victim. Defense counsel
stipulated to the articulated factual basis for the plea.
       Thereafter, defendant pleaded guilty to the charge that he “did unlawfully and with
malice aforethought, murder a human being, to wit, [the victim], and did aid and abet in
the same, a violation of [s]ection 187[, subdivision ](a) of the Penal Code, murder in the
first degree, a felony[.]” Defendant further admitted that “this murder was committed
willfully, deliberately, and with [premeditation] and is a serious felony within the
meaning of Penal Code [s]ection 1192.7[, subdivision ](c).”
       The trial court sentenced defendant to 25 years to life in prison. At the sentencing
hearing, the trial court said: “The Court had an opportunity to review the Probation
Department’s [report] -- concerning this case. This case was basically a planned home
invasion robbery that defendants -- or defendant was armed and discharged the weapon
killing the victim in this case. To say -- I can’t find any excuse. It was an act of ripping
off somebody for marijuana. Taking somebody’s life for a number of pounds of
marijuana. There’s nothing that can be said for that. It’s -- it’s a hardened, thoughtless --
and it had been planned. It had been planned.”

                                               2
          On June 3, 2021, defendant filed a petition for resentencing under former
section 1170.95. He declared that (1) a complaint, information, or indictment was filed
against him that allowed the prosecution to proceed under the felony-murder rule or the
natural and probable consequences doctrine; (2) he pleaded guilty or no contest to first
or second degree murder in lieu of going to trial because he believed he would have
been convicted of first or second degree murder under the felony-murder rule or the
natural and probable consequences doctrine; and (3) he could not now be convicted of
first or second degree murder because of changes to sections 188 and 189, effective
January 1, 2019.
          Defendant’s petition and accompanying declaration and exhibits stated that
Alonso Morales Carrillo came up with a plan to steal marijuana from the victim and
Carrillo was the mastermind behind the crime and the actual shooter and killer.
Defendant said he had no idea Carrillo was going to shoot the victim and defendant had
no intention of hurting anyone during the crime. Defendant told an officer that defendant
was just going to point his rifle at the victim, and when Carrillo told defendant to shoot
the victim, defendant froze. According to defendant, Carrillo took the rifle and shot the
victim.
          Defendant asserted in his petition that he pleaded guilty because his defense
attorney advised him to plead guilty in order to avoid a more severe sentence. Defendant
attached as an exhibit to the petition Carrillo’s plea form in which he pleaded guilty or no
contest to voluntary manslaughter and robbery with an enhancement for personal use of a
firearm. Defendant noted that he did not plead guilty to personal use of a firearm.
          On March 11, 2022, the trial court conducted a hearing on defendant’s petition.
It denied the petition based on the transcript of defendant’s plea hearing.
                                        DISCUSSION
          Defendant contends his plea did not establish proof beyond a reasonable doubt that
he is guilty of murder under the newly revised statutes.

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                                              A
       Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437), which became
effective on January 1, 2019, amended sections 188 and 189 to restrict the application of
the felony-murder rule and eliminate natural and probable consequences liability as it
applied to aiding and abetting murder. (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957
(Lewis).) Amended section 188 provides that “[e]xcept as stated in subdivision (e) of
[s]ection 189 [the felony-murder rule], in order to be convicted of murder, a principal in a
crime shall act with malice aforethought. Malice shall not be imputed to a person based
solely on his or her participation in a crime.” (§ 188, subd. (a)(3); Stats. 2018, ch. 1015,
§ 2.) Section 189, subdivision (e) was added to provide that “[a] participant in the
perpetration or attempted perpetration of a felony listed in [section 189,] subdivision (a)
in which a death occurs is liable for murder only if one of the following is proven: [¶] (1)
The person was the actual killer. [¶] (2) The person was not the actual killer, but, with
the intent to kill, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or
assisted the actual killer in the commission of murder in the first degree. [¶] (3) The
person was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless
indifference to human life, as described in subdivision (d) of [s]ection 190.2.” (Stats.
2018, ch. 1015, § 3.)
       Senate Bill 1437 also added what is now section 1172.6 to provide a procedure to
petition the trial court to vacate a conviction and for resentencing if the petitioner could
not have been convicted of murder under sections 188 and 189 as amended by Senate
Bill 1437. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4.) Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 775
(2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) expanded the class of persons who may petition for relief under
section 1172.6 to include not only defendants convicted of murder under the felony-
murder rule or the natural and probable consequences doctrine, but also defendants
convicted of murder under a “theory under which malice is imputed to a person based
solely on that person’s participation in a crime, attempted murder under the natural and

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probable consequences doctrine, or manslaughter . . . .” (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2.)
       When a petitioner files a facially sufficient petition, the trial court must determine
whether the petitioner has made a prima facie showing that he or she is entitled to relief
under section 1172.6. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c); People v. Flores (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 974,
986 (Flores).) The California Supreme Court has explained that “the prima facie inquiry
under [section 1172.6,] subdivision (c) is limited. Like the analogous prima facie inquiry
in habeas corpus proceedings, ‘ “the court takes petitioner’s factual allegations as true
and makes a preliminary assessment regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled to
relief if his or her factual allegations were proved. If so, the court must issue an order to
show cause.” ’ [Citations.] ‘[A] court should not reject the petitioner’s factual
allegations on credibility grounds without first conducting an evidentiary hearing.’ ”
(Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.) At this stage, the trial court should also not engage
in factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion. (Id. at
p. 972.) “ ‘However, if the record, including the court’s own documents, “contain[s]
facts refuting the allegations made in the petition,” then “the court is justified in making a
credibility determination adverse to the petitioner.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 971.)
       As amended by Senate Bill No. 775, a petitioner must demonstrate the following
to make a prima facie showing that he or she falls within the provisions of section
1172.6: “(1) A complaint, information, or indictment was filed against the petitioner that
allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder, murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is
imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime, or attempted
murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. [¶] (2) The petitioner was
convicted of murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter following a trial or accepted a
plea offer in lieu of a trial at which the petitioner could have been convicted of murder or
attempted murder. [And] [¶] (3) The petitioner could not presently be convicted of
murder or attempted murder because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective

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January 1, 2019.” (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2; see People v. Duchine (2021)
60 Cal.App.5th 798, 815 [holding that the prima facie showing the petitioner must make
is that he or she did not, in fact, engage in the act(s) or have the mental state required for
a murder conviction under current law].) A trial court must issue an order to show cause
if the petitioner has made a prima facie showing that he or she is entitled to relief under
section 1172.6. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).)
                                               B
       A trial court may rely on the record of conviction to determine whether the
petitioner has made the requisite prima facie showing. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
pp. 970-971.) The record of conviction includes the transcript of the plea hearing.
(Flores, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 989; People v. Eynon (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 967,
976-979 (Eynon); see People v. Davenport (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 476, 481-484
(Davenport).) “In the plea context, a petitioner convicted of murder is ineligible for
resentencing if the record establishes, as a matter of law, that . . . the petitioner could
presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder under the law as amended by
Senate Bill No. 1437.” (Flores, at p. 987.)
       In denying defendant’s section 1172.6 petition, the trial court relied on the
reporter’s transcript of the plea hearing. The transcript showed that defendant entered a
plea of guilty to first degree murder based on a stipulated factual basis that he, in a
willful, deliberate, premeditated manner, shot and killed the victim. Regardless of any
conflicting evidence presented at the preliminary hearing, defendant’s plea and his
stipulation to the factual basis conclusively refuted the allegation in his petition that he
could not presently be convicted of murder because of changes made to sections 188 and
189 effective January l, 2019. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4; see People v. Rivera (2021)
62 Cal.App.5th 217, 232-235; People v. Verdugo (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 320, 330,
disapproved on another ground in Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 961-963; cf. Davenport,
supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at pp. 480-484; Eynon, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at pp. 976-979;

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People v. Cooper (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 106, 109-110, 111-112, 123-126.)
       Defendant argues the stipulated factual basis that he shot and killed the victim did
not render him ineligible for relief under section 1172.6 because his counsel’s stipulation
did not constitute his own personal admission of facts establishing ineligibility.
Defendant relies on Eynon and Rivera, but they do not hold that a defendant has not
admitted being the actual killer unless the defendant personally articulates the factual
basis for a plea.
       Here defendant admitted particular facts beyond the murder charge. In the
stipulated factual basis for the plea, defendant admitted that he shot and killed the victim,
i.e., that he was the actual killer. Contrary to defendant’s arguments, the trial court’s
consideration of defendant’s plea and admissions did not involve the weighing of
evidence or the exercise of discretion and did not violate due process.
       Defendant is not eligible for relief under section 1172.6 as a matter of law.
The trial court did not err in denying his petition.
                                       DISPOSITION
       The trial court’s order denying the petition for resentencing is affirmed.

                                                      /S/
                                                   MAURO, J.

We concur:

    /S/
ROBIE, Acting P. J.

    /S/
RENNER, J.

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