Court Opinion

ID: 9663107
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:27:49.854045+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:45.670969
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.
(concurring). Unless the police entry to the home on November 9 occurred with the defendant’s consent, the entry violated the fourth amendment and the seizure of the evidence must be suppressed. Unless the police were legally on the premises on November 9, the doctrine of plain view is not applicable. Unless the defendant consented to the November 9 entry, the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding his bedroom.
On this review the parties apparently agree that on November 7 the defendant consented to the police entry into his home and that the police entered the home on November 7 pursuant to this consent. The question is whether the defendant’s consent to the police entry given on November 7 included consent to the police entry into the home on November 9. Whether the defendant consented to the November 9 entry is determined by interpreting the scope of the defendant’s consent, that is, determining whether defendant’s consent given on November 7 limited the duration or area of the police entry. A search based on consent may not exceed the limits of the consent. See A Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure, sec. 240.3(1), p. 150, Commentary pp. *27537-38 (1975). Thus this case turns on whether the defendant’s consent carried express or implied limitations regarding such matters as duration or area. In short, the issue is not one of the express or implied nature of the November 7 consent, but the nature of the express or implied or legal limitations — if any — on the scope of that consent. I do not join the majority opinion because I do not understand its use of the terms actual, authorized, express and implied consent.
The trial court found as a matter of fact that the “defendant, by words and conduct, clearly invited police officers to enter his home [on November 7].” The trial court further found as a matter of fact that “at no time did the defendant consent to a search of his bedroom on November 9th.”
Interpretation of the scope of the defendant’s consent, whether consent is given by word or conduct, may be viewed as a question of law or fact, depending on the circumstances of the case. The scope of the appellate court’s review of the trial court’s decision regarding the scope of the defendant’s consent depends on the appellate court’s characterization of the issue.
In this case, whether I characterize the issue of the scope of the defendant’s consent as one of fact, law, constitutional fact, or mixed question of fact and law, I conclude that the trial court reached the correct decision. The defendant’s consent on November 7 to the police entry to all or part of the house, whether viewed as a matter of the defendant’s intent, of the police’s reasonable expectations, or of law, did not extend to the police’s entry approximately forty-five hours after the initial entry and twenty-two and one-half hours after investigative activities in the home had ceased. As is apparent in Kelly v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 303, 313, 249 N.W.2d 800 (1977), consent to enter or search is usually given with the understanding that the entry or search will be conducted promptly and that only a single entry *28or search will be made. See 2 W.R. LaFave, Search and Seizure, sec. 8.1(c), at 632 (1978) and 275-76 (1985 Pocket Part).
Like the majority, I would affirm the decision of the court of appeals.