Court Opinion

ID: 9385644
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-07 18:00:56.654709+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:03.608276
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-30367         Document: 00516704570             Page: 1      Date Filed: 04/07/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit                                      United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                       Fifth Circuit

                                                                                      FILED
                                                                                  April 7, 2023
                                        No. 22-30367
                                                                                Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                     Clerk
   Hugo Sanchez De La Rosa,

                                                                    Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                             versus

   Elaine K. King; Owners Insurance Company, improperly
   named Auto-Owners Insurance Company,

                                                                 Defendants—Appellees.

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                         for the Eastern District of Louisiana
                                USDC No. 2:21-CV-164

   Before Stewart, Dennis, and Southwick, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
          Hugo Sanchez De La Rosa (“Sanchez De La Rosa”) 1 and Elaine K.
   King (“King”) were involved in a car collision in St. Tammany Parish,
   Louisiana, on January 22, 2020. On January 25, 2021, three days after
   Louisiana state law’s one-year prescriptive period expired, Sanchez De La

          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
          1
            We note that there are variations throughout the record on the way Appellant’s
   name is spelled, and we adopt the form used in his First Amended Complaint.
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                                       No. 22-30367

   Rosa filed a diversity suit in federal district court. King moved to dismiss
   Sanchez De La Rosa’s claim as untimely, and the district court granted her
   motion. Because Sanchez De La Rosa has failed to show that the prescriptive
   period for filing his delictual action was extended by an order of the Governor
   of Louisiana, we AFFIRM.

                             I. Background
          On March 11, 2020, Governor John Bel Edwards signed Proclamation
   Number 25 JBE 2020 (“JBE 2020-25”) to address the disruptions caused by
   the ongoing public health emergency, COVID-19. The Governor’s authority
   to sign the proclamation originated from the Louisiana Homeland Security
   and Emergency Assistance Disaster Act.2 The proclamation did not
   specifically extend liberative prescription deadlines, so on March 16, 2020,
   the Governor supplemented JBE 2020-25 with JBE 2020-30 titled
   “Additional Measures for COVID-19 Public Health Emergency.” JBE 2020-
   30 suspended “[l]egal deadlines, including liberative prescription and
   peremptive periods applicable to legal proceedings in all courts” until April
   13, 2020. The Governor then signed a series of subsequent proclamations
   extending this suspension, and the state legislature eventually passed a
   statute to regulate the suspension of prescriptive periods during the
   pandemic:
        All deadlines in legal proceedings that were suspended by
        Proclamation Number JBE 2020–30 and any extensions thereof
        shall be subject to a limited suspension or extension until July 6,
        2020; however, the suspension or extension of these deadlines shall be
        limited and shall apply only if these deadlines would have otherwise
        expired during the time period of March 17, 2020, through July 5,
        2020. The right to file a pleading or motion to enforce any

          2
              Proclamation Number JBE 2020-30 (Mar. 16, 2020) (citing La. R.S. 29:721, et
   seq.); State v. Spell, 2021-00876, p.4 (La. 5/13/22); 339 So. 3d 1125, 1130.

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         deadline in legal proceedings which would have expired during
         the time period of March 17, 2020, through July 5, 2020, shall
         expire on July 6, 2020.
   La. Stat. Ann. § 9:5830 (emphasis added). Similarly, and specific to
   prescription:
         All prescriptions, including liberative, acquisitive, and the
         prescription of nonuse, abandonment periods, and all
         peremptive periods shall be subject to a limited suspension or
         extension during the time period of March 17, 2020, through July
         5, 2020; however, the suspension or extension of these periods
         shall be limited and shall apply only if these periods would have
         otherwise expired during the time period of March 17, 2020,
         through July 5, 2020. The right to file a pleading or motion to
         enforce any right, claim, or action which would have expired
         during the time period of March 17, 2020, through July 5, 2020,
         shall expire on July 6, 2020.
   La. Stat. Ann. § 9:5829(A). King filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to
   Federal Rule of Procedure 12(b)(6), and Sanchez De La Rosa filed an
   opposition. The district court granted King’s motion and dismissed Sanchez
   De La Rosa’s claim with prejudice. This appeal ensued.
                        II.     Standard of Review
          This court reviews a 12(b)(6) ruling de novo. Frank v. Delta Airlines
   Inc., 314 F.3d 195, 197 (5th Cir. 2002). We must construe the complaint in a
   light most favorable to the appellant and assume the truth of all pleaded facts.
   Id. We may apply state substantive law to adjudicate actions based in
   diversity jurisdiction. See Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
   The parties do not dispute that Louisiana law applies in these proceedings.
                               III.    Discussion
          On appeal, Sanchez De La Rosa argues that his suit in this case was
   timely because the Governor’s proclamations suspended the prescriptive

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   period for filing his delictual action for ten days during the relevant period of
   time. In support of his position, he reasons that JBE 2020–25 differs from
   and supersedes the Louisiana State Legislature’s statute. He argues that
   when the Governor issued a revised emergency order asserting that liberative
   prescriptive deadlines would be suspended for ten days through July 5, 2020,
   the order also suspended all prescriptive periods—including those applicable
   to his claim—and his filing was therefore timely.
          Sanchez De La Rosa also relies on Louisiana Civil Code article 3472
   for support asserting that “[t]he period of suspension is not counted toward
   [the] accrual of prescription. Prescription commences to run again upon the
   termination of the period of suspension.” See La. Civ. Code art. 3472.
   According to Sanchez De La Rosa, even though his claim falls outside the
   clearly defined timeframe of the original proclamation, JBE 2020-30, codified
   as La. Stat. Ann. §§ 9:5828-5830., the ten-day extension should have
   equally applied to his claim. We disagree.
          In interpreting a Louisiana state statute, “[w]hen a law is clear and
   unambiguous, and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, the
   law shall be applied as written.” La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 9. The
   Louisiana Supreme Court “has repeatedly [held] that, as a general rule of
   statutory interpretation, a specific statute controls over a broader, more
   general statute.” Catahoula Par. Sch. Bd. v. La. Mach. Rentals, LLC, 2012-
   2504, p. 3 (La. 10/15/13); 124 So. 3d 1065, 1079. Moreover, in LeBreton, the
   Louisiana Supreme Court clarified that courts faced with a “specific
   statutory provision [that provides] for the suspension of prescription” in a
   specific context, must apply that statute “alone, [and] not complementary to
   the more general codal article which addresses interruption of prescription.”
   LeBreton v. Rabito, 97-2221, p. 2 (La. 7/8/98); 714 So. 2d 1226, 1227
   (overruling precedent in the medical malpractice context that permitted
   courts to rely on the general principles of suspension and interruption in

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   articles 3472 and 3466 in place of the specific suspension provisions in the
   Medical Malpractice Act.); see also La. Civ. Code art. 3472. In addition,
   statutory guidance from the Louisiana State Legislature prevails over the
   Governor’s COVID-19 proclamations when the two conflict. See La. Stat.
   Ann. § 9:5828(B) (emphasis added) (“The action of the governor of this
   state in issuing Proclamation Number JBE 2020-30 and any extensions
   thereof are hereby approved, ratified, and confirmed subject to the provisions
   of this Part.”); cf. Rizzo v. La. Off. of Alcohol & Tobacco Control, 21-304, pp.
   12-17 (La. App. 5 Cir. 8/5/22), 347 So. 3d 1131, 1141-44 (holding the
   governor’s proclamations could not establish criminal penalties beyond those
   established by the Legislature).
          Here, to the extent that the Governor’s order—which was derived
   from the generalized emergency powers found in the Louisiana Homeland
   Security and Emergency Assistance Disaster Act—may conflict with a more
   specific statute passed to administer prescriptive periods during the COVID-
   19 emergency, such as JBE 2020–30 codified as La. Stat. Ann. §§ 9:5828-
   5830, the statute governs. See LeBreton, 97-2221, at pp. 5-7; 714 So. 2d at
   1228–29 (reasoning that statutes dealing with the same subject matter
   “should be harmonized if possible; however, if there is a conflict, the statute
   specifically directed to the matter at issue must prevail as an exception to the
   statute more general in character”). Because the Governor’s order could not
   have displaced the statute to suspend the prescriptive period for Sanchez De
   La Rosa’s claim, we hold that his suit filed after Louisiana’s one-year
   deadline is untimely, and his claims are prescribed. See Id; see also Simon v.
   Kan. City S. Ry. Co., No. 21-03800, 2022 WL 2421121, at *3 (W.D. La. Mar.
   10, 2022) (granting motion to dismiss for untimely filing on grounds that
   “the plain language of the statute makes it clear that only prescriptive periods
   that expired between March 17 and July 5, 2020, were suspended or
   extended”).

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                        IV.    Conclusion
         The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

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