Court Opinion

ID: 9962169
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-22 21:03:42.190113+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:57.898982
License: Public Domain

2024 IL App (2d) 230146-U
                                         No. 2-23-0146
                                    Order filed April 22, 2024

      NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedent
      except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
______________________________________________________________________________

                                             IN THE

                              APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                              SECOND DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE                ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
OF ILLINOIS,                           ) of Kane County.
                                       )
      Plaintiff-Appellee,              )
                                       )
v.                                     ) No. 21-CM-1580
                                       )
PAOLA SARELLANA,                       ) Honorable
                                       ) Keith A. Johnson,
      Defendant-Appellant.             ) Judge, Presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________

       JUSTICE JORGENSEN delivered the judgment of the court.
       Presiding Justice McLaren and Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment.

                                             ORDER

¶1     Held: The trial court did not commit reversible error by admitting the victim’s written
       statement, defendant forfeited her opportunity to cross-examine the interpreter, and the
       evidence was sufficient to prove defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

¶2     Defendant, Paola Sarellana, appeals her conviction for domestic battery (720 ILCS 5/12-

3.2(a)(2) (West 2020)), contending that (1) the trial court erred in admitting, as substantive

evidence, an out-of-court statement of the victim, her husband, written in Spanish, (2) the court

denied her the right to cross-examine a court-appointed interpreter about the interpreter’s in-court

translation of the statement, and (3) she was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of
2024 IL App (2d) 230146-U

making physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature with her husband. Because the court

did not commit reversible error by admitting the statement, defendant forfeited or procedurally

defaulted her opportunity to cross-examine the interpreter, and the evidence was sufficient to prove

that defendant’s physical contact with Colon was both insulting and provoking, we affirm.

¶3                                        I. BACKGROUND

¶4     The State charged defendant with one count of domestic battery involving physical contact

of an insulting or provoking nature, based on her striking, pushing, or grabbing a family or

household member, namely her husband, Edward Colon 1 (720 ILCS 5/12-3.2(a)(2) (West 2020)).

¶5     The following facts were developed at defendant’s bench trial. 2 Just before the first witness

(Colon) testified, the trial court commented that an interpreter was present and asked the State if

it needed an interpreter. The State responded that it did. The interpreter then offered that, as far

as she knew, she was needed because there was “a statement that just a couple of sentences that

was originally in Spanish” and “[t]here[ ] [was] a translation and it’s accurate in English.” The

court said it would “wait and see how things are presented during this testimony.” The court asked

       1
           Although the amended complaint referred to the victim as Edward Colon-Vega, he

testified at trial that his full name was Edward Colon. Thus, we will refer to him as Edward Colon.
       2
           We note that the State requests that we strike in whole or in part defendant’s statement of

facts for violating Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(6) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020)). Although we may

strike a statement of facts when it violates Rule 341 (Hall v. Naper Gold Hospitality LLC, 2012 IL

App (2d) 111151, ¶ 9), any such improprieties here do not hinder our review (see Mitchell v.

Michael’s Sports Lounge, 2023 IL App (1st) 220011, ¶ 23). Thus, we decline to strike any part of

defendant’s statement of facts.

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2024 IL App (2d) 230146-U

if it was necessary to swear in the interpreter for Colon, and the State said no. The court then

instructed the interpreter to stay in the courtroom in case she was needed later.

¶6     Colon testified that he was married to and lived with defendant. The State asked Colon

where he was on August 22, 2021, at around 9 p.m. (the date and time of the alleged incident).

Colon responded that he did not “remember what happened.” When asked if he or anyone else

was at his home that day, Colon answered that he did not remember. Colon also could not

remember what he had been doing just before 9 p.m. that day. When asked if he and defendant

argued that day, Colon could not remember. Nor could he recall if he and defendant had a physical

altercation that day, if she hit or pushed him, or if she slapped him on the left side of his face. He

denied that defendant knocked over his 3D printer.

¶7     When asked if the police came to his house on August 22, 2021, Colon answered yes.

However, he could not remember providing a written statement to the police. The State showed

Colon a statement, written in Spanish and bearing his purported signature, and asked if he

recognized it. Colon answered no and that he did not recall the statement. However, Colon

admitted that his signature was at the bottom of the document. Nonetheless, he persisted in

claiming he did not remember giving the statement. He added that he was not “say[ing] [that he

did] not make [the statement][,]” but only that he did not remember doing so. Colon further

admitted that the statement was in his handwriting.

¶8     When the State asked Colon if his statement said that defendant yelled “bad words,”

defendant’s counsel objected to using the statement because it was written in Spanish. The State

responded that it could tender defendant a copy of an English translation. Defense counsel further

objected that he had not received the English version of the statement in discovery. The trial court

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then sustained the objection because the State was reading “something in English from a written

statement that [was] in Spanish.”

¶9     The State then asked if Colon was fluent in Spanish. Colon replied that he was and had

spoken Spanish his entire life. When the State asked Colon to read the statement for the record,

defense counsel objected that the statement lacked foundation. The State indicated that it was

seeking to admit the statement as substantive evidence pursuant to section 115-10.1 of the Code

of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/115-10.1 (West 2020)). The court found that,

because Colon had identified his signature on the statement and admitted that it was in his

handwriting, it partially met the requirements for admission under section 115-10.1. The court

said it would allow the State to seek to establish the remaining elements under section 115-10.1.

To that end, the court ruled that the State could have Colon read the statement in Spanish and have

the interpreter translate Colon’s words. The court directed the clerk to swear in the interpreter. At

that point, defense counsel noted that the interpreter was holding a copy of the written statement

and a copy of an English translation. The State then clarified that the latter document was a

“translation that was done by an administrative assistant in our office.” When the court asked if

the translation was ever disclosed to the defense, defense counsel answered no and added that the

“translator already has what the State thinks [the statement] says.”

¶ 10   The trial court then stated that it “really [did not] care what [the interpreter] [had been]

given previously by the State,” that it would be relying on what Colon read in Spanish from the

statement, and that the “interpreter would be under oath to accurately interpret what [Colon] says

in Spanish today.” The court added that, because the English interpretation prepared by the

administrative assistant was not before the court, it did not care what it said. When the court asked

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2024 IL App (2d) 230146-U

defense counsel if he needed a continuance because he believed there was a discovery violation,

counsel responded that a continuance was unnecessary.

¶ 11    However, defense counsel continued to argue that the State violated discovery by failing

to provide the translation to defendant before trial. The State explained that it provided the English

translation to the interpreter “to make sure that [it was] an accurate translation.” The State added

that, by providing the translation to the interpreter, it had merely asked the interpreter what the

Spanish statement said. The State further noted that the interpreter did not work for the State but

was a neutral party with no bias or motivation. Defense counsel responded that, by giving the

interpreter the English translation, the State tainted her perception because she then knew what the

State’s purported translation was.

¶ 12    The trial court—after initially commenting that it was not sure why the translation was

given to the interpreter, who “work[ed] for the [c]ourt”—reiterated that it did not care what the

translation said because it “trust[ed] the competency of the interpreter *** that she will not let any

document that the State gave her in that regard taint her ability to translate accurately here in court.”

The court told defense counsel that it would give him “a lot of latitude on [the] cross-examination”

of Colon but would not allow any cross-examination of the interpreter. Following a brief recess,

the court clarified that (1) it had overruled defendant’s objections regarding the written translation,

(2) it did not believe that the English translation tainted the interpreter in any way, and (3) there

was no discovery violation.

¶ 13    The State then resumed its direct examination of Colon. It asked him if he could read and

write Spanish, and he answered yes. When the State asked Colon if the Spanish statement said

that defendant yelled “bad words” at Colon, Colon responded that he did not want to answer the

question; specifically, he “[did] not feel comfortable” answering because he “[did] not remember

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2024 IL App (2d) 230146-U

when [he wrote] that one down.” When the State repeated the question, Colon said he would not

answer. The State then asked the trial court to admonish Colon to answer. The court directed

Colon to listen carefully and answer the question or tell the court if he did not understand the

question. When the State again asked Colon if his written statement said that defendant yelled bad

words at him, Colon refused to answer that question. When the court asked Colon if he understood

the question, he said yes. When the State asked the question once more, Colon answered no.

When asked if his statement said that defendant threw his “computer” and “3-D printer,” Colon

said no as to “computer” but yes as to “3-D printer.” Colon also admitted that his statement said

that defendant “started to push [him].” Colon denied that his statement said that defendant slapped

him and then left.

¶ 14   Colon testified that he called 911 on the incident date but could not recall when. When the

State sought to admit a recording of the 911 call, the trial court sustained defendant’s objection

that the State lacked foundation for the recording.

¶ 15   On cross-examination, Colon testified that he could not remember providing the written

statement and denied having any recollection of a confrontation between him and defendant.

¶ 16   Officer Thurman 3 of the Aurora police department testified that on August 22, 2021, at

around 9 p.m., he was on routine patrol when he responded “to a domestic.” When he arrived at

the scene, he initially encountered only Colon inside the residence. Thurman described Colon as

seeming “upset and a little elevated from what had happened.” Thurman observed a “little bit of

reddening on the left side of [Colon’s] face.” Thurman also spoke to defendant at the scene.

According to Thurman, defendant said that she had been arguing with Colon and that “she got

       3
           The officer’s first name does not appear in the record.

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2024 IL App (2d) 230146-U

upset with him and slapped him in the face.” She also told Thurman that, as she was leaving the

residence to calm down, she knocked over either defendant’s computer or his 3D printer.

¶ 17   After finishing with its witnesses, the State moved to admit Colon’s written statement, and

defendant objected based on a lack of foundation. The trial court, having found that the statement

was written and signed by Colon and was inconsistent with Colon’s testimony, admitted the

statement under section 115-10.1.

¶ 18   The State then asked to publish Colon’s statement in English via the interpreter. When

defense counsel asked if the interpreter would be a witness, the trial court answered that she would

be placed under oath to accurately translate but it would not be “live testimony from a witness”

but, rather, a “translat[ion] [of] the written word off the page.” The court added that, because she

was not a witness, the interpreter would not be subject to direct examination by the State or cross-

examination by defendant. Counsel did not object nor did he make an offer of proof regarding

what he believed his cross-examination would entail or what evidence would be elicited through

cross-examination.

¶ 19   The trial court then had the interpreter sworn in. The interpreter did not sit on the witness

stand but stood in the “well of the courtroom.” Before the State proceeded, defense counsel noted

that the interpreter still possessed a copy of the State’s English translation. The interpreter then

gave both Colon’s Spanish statement and the translation to the prosecutor. When the State asked

the interpreter to interpret Colon’s Spanish statement, she answered, “[Defendant] started

screaming bad words and threw the computer and my 3-D printer, and started to push me and

slapped me and she left after.” When the court asked the interpreter if that was the entirety of

Colon’s statement and if she had accurately interpreted it, she answered yes.

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2024 IL App (2d) 230146-U

¶ 20   The trial court denied defendant’s motion for a directed finding. Defendant offered no

evidence.

¶ 21   In finding defendant guilty, the trial court found “much of *** Colon’s trial testimony to

be not credible in the sense that he testified that he did not remember anything from the date in

question.” “Instead of denying that any altercation happened or denying that it happened the way

the State claimed, [Colon] essentially just went limp and claimed he did not remember anything.”

The court added that its finding that Colon was not credible was bolstered by his demeanor on the

stand and how he sometimes avoided answering questions.

¶ 22   The trial court found that Colon testified credibly as to calling 911 and that it was

reasonable to infer that Colon called 911 because defendant slapped him in the face during a heated

argument. The court also found that Colon acknowledged that the Spanish statement was in his

handwriting and contained his signature. The court further noted that Colon admitted that his

statement mentioned the 3D printer and that defendant pushed him. Thus, the court found that the

statement supported its finding that defendant made physical contact with Colon during the

argument.

¶ 23   The trial court further found that Officer Thurman testified credibly that he responded to

the altercation between defendant and Colon. The court noted Thurman’s testimony that Colon

seemed upset and had a little reddening on the left side of his face, which the court found to be

consistent with his having been slapped. The court also pointed to Thurman’s testimony that

defendant admitted at the scene that she had argued with Colon and slapped him in the face.

¶ 24   The trial court next addressed whether the physical contact was of an insulting or provoking

nature. In finding that it was, the court relied on the evidence that Colon called 911, the police

responded to the scene, Colon appeared upset, and Colon gave a statement regarding defendant’s

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2024 IL App (2d) 230146-U

physical conduct. Based on the totality of that evidence, the court inferred that defendant

knowingly made contact of an insulting or provoking nature. Thus, the court found defendant

guilty of domestic battery.

¶ 25   The trial court denied defendant’s motion for a new trial and sentenced her to six months’

conditional discharge. Defendant, in turn, filed this timely appeal.

¶ 26                                         II. ANALYSIS

¶ 27   On appeal, defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred in admitting Colon’s written

statement where the State failed to confront Colon with the inconsistencies between his statement

and his testimony and therefore failed to lay a proper foundation for admission of the statement

under section 115-10.1 of the Code; (2) she was denied her sixth amendment right of confrontation

where she was not allowed to cross-examine the interpreter even though the State provided the

interpreter with an English translation of defendant’s statement and the State used the interpreter’s

in-court translation of Colon’s statement to impeach Colon; and (3) the State failed to prove

beyond a reasonable doubt that Colon was insulted or provoked by her conduct.

¶ 28                          A. Admission of Colon’s Written Statement

¶ 29   We first address defendant’s assertion that the trial court erred in admitting Colon’s written

statement under section 115-10.1 of the Code. Section 115-10.1(a)(b)(c)(2)(A) provides, in

pertinent part:

       “In all criminal cases, evidence of a statement made by a witness is not made inadmissible

       by the hearsay rule if

                  (a) the statement is inconsistent with his testimony at the hearing or trial, and

                  (b) the witness is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and

                  (c) the statement—

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2024 IL App (2d) 230146-U

                       ***

                       (2) narrates, describes, or explains an event or condition of which the

                witness had personal knowledge, and

                               (A) the statement is proved to have been written or signed by the

                       witness.” 725 ILCS 5/115-10.1(a)(b)(c)(2)(A) (West 2020).

¶ 30   Unlike the rule allowing the use of a prior inconsistent statement merely to impeach a

witness, section 115-10.1 provides for the substantive admission of a prior inconsistent statement.

People v. Guerrero, 2021 IL App (2d) 190364, ¶ 46. A prior inconsistent statement is admissible

as substantive evidence if the requirements of section 115-10.1 are met. Guerrero, 2021 IL App

(2d) 190364, ¶ 49. To be admissible, the statement must be inconsistent with the witness’s

testimony and the witness must be subject to cross-examination. Guerrero, 2021 IL App (2d)

190364, ¶ 52.

¶ 31   A witness’s prior statement need not directly contradict his trial testimony to be considered

inconsistent within the meaning of section 115-10.1. People v. Flores, 128 Ill. 2d 66, 87 (1989).

Where a witness claims that he cannot recollect a matter, his former affirmation of it should be

admitted as a contradiction. Flores, 128 Ill. 2d at 87. Accordingly, the prior statement of a witness

who professes at trial a memory loss may be admitted under section 115-10.1. Flores, 128 Ill 2d

at 87. Further, inconsistencies may be found in evasive answers or a witness’s silence. People v.

Leonard, 391 Ill. App. 3d 926, 934 (2009).

¶ 32   The foundational requirements for admission of a prior inconsistent statement as

substantive evidence under section 115-10.1 are the same as those for admission of a prior

inconsistent statement merely to impeach a witness. Guerrero, 2021 IL App (2d) 190364, ¶ 55.

That procedure requires the questioner to (1) direct the witness to the time, place, and

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2024 IL App (2d) 230146-U

circumstances of the statement, (2) use pointed questions to confront the witness with the content

of the prior statement, and (3) give the witness an opportunity to explain the inconsistency.

Guerrero, 2021 IL App (2d) 190364, ¶ 45.          Once the impeaching party lays the required

foundation, he must complete the impeachment. Guerrero, 2021 IL App (2d) 190364, ¶ 45. If the

witness denies making the statement, the impeaching party offers extrinsic evidence showing the

witness made the statement. Guerrero, 2021 IL App (2d) 190364, ¶ 45. If the witness admits

making the statement, that completes the impeachment, and no extrinsic evidence is required.

Guerrero, 2021 IL App (2d) 190364, ¶ 45.

¶ 33   A trial court’s determination of whether a statement is inconsistent for purposes of section

115-10.1 is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Leonard, 391 Ill. App. 3d at 934.

¶ 34   Here, defendant contends that the State failed to lay the proper foundation for admission

under section 115-10.1 because it did not properly confront Colon with the inconsistencies

between his prior written statement and his trial testimony.4 We disagree.

¶ 35   When the State asked about the incident involving defendant and him, Colon persisted in

claiming that he could not recall anything about the incident. When asked specifically if he could

recall whether (1) he and defendant argued, (2) they had a physical altercation, (3) she slapped him

in the face, or (4) she pushed him, Colon claimed he could not recall.

¶ 36   When the State asked Colon if he had provided a written statement about the incident, he

replied that he could not remember. When shown the statement and asked if he recognized it,

Colon answered no and did not recall giving it. Although he acknowledged that the statement was

       4
           We note that defendant does not dispute that Colon’s statement was in fact inconsistent

with his trial testimony.

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2024 IL App (2d) 230146-U

in his handwriting and his signature was at the bottom, he maintained that he did not remember

giving the statement. He clarified that he was not saying that he did not make the statement but

only that he did not remember doing so. By showing Colon the statement, the State directed Colon

to the time, place, and circumstances of the statement. Further, the State clearly asked pointed

questions about the statement’s content.      Finally, the State allowed Colon to explain the

inconsistency between the statement and his testimony that he did not recall the events recounted

in the statement. Thus, the State laid a proper foundation for the substantive admission of the

statement under section 115-10.1.

¶ 37   Defendant’s assertion that Colon was not confronted with the statement because it was in

Spanish and he testified in English is meritless. Colon testified that he was fluent in both reading

and writing Spanish. Because he was allowed to read the Spanish statement and would certainly

have understood what it said, he was confronted with the statement and given a proper opportunity

to explain the inconsistencies between the statement and his testimony.

¶ 38   Even if the trial court erred in admitting Colon’s statement under section 115-10.1, such

error was harmless. See People v. Wilson, 2012 IL App (1st) 101038, ¶¶ 37, 55. The improper

admission of evidence is harmless where there is no reasonable probability that, if the evidence

had been excluded, the outcome would have been different. People v. Brown, 2014 IL App (2d)

121167, ¶ 28. When deciding whether an error is harmless, a reviewing court may (1) focus on

the error to determine whether it might have contributed to the conviction, (2) examine the other

properly admitted evidence to determine whether it overwhelmingly supports the conviction, or

(3) determine whether the improperly admitted evidence is merely cumulative or duplicates

properly admitted evidence. Brown, 2014 IL App (2d) 121167, ¶ 28.

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¶ 39   Here, there is no reasonable probability that, if Colon’s statement had been excluded, the

result of the trial would have been different. Defendant was charged with domestic battery for

making physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature with a family member (Colon). 720

ILCS 5/12-3.2(a)(2) (West 2020). To prove a defendant guilty of domestic battery under section

12-3.2(a)(2) of the Criminal Code of 2012 (Criminal Code) (id. § 12-3.2(a)(2)), the State must

prove that the defendant (1) intentionally or knowingly, (2) without legal justification, (3) made

physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature, (4) with a family or household member. The

question of whether contact is insulting or provoking is an objective inquiry. People v. Davidson,

2023 IL 127538, ¶ 16. “Put another way, it is the nature of the contact, not the actual impact on

the victim, that must be established.” Davidson, 2023 IL 127538, ¶ 16. Therefore, whether the

victim subjectively found the contact insulting or provoking is not necessary to establish that the

defendant committed this form of battery. Davidson, 2023 IL 127538, ¶ 17.

¶ 40   Even apart from Colon’s written statement, the evidence overwhelmingly established that

defendant committed domestic battery against Colon, her husband. When Thurman arrived at the

scene, he learned that defendant and Colon had had an argument and that defendant had left the

house to calm down. Defendant admitted that she slapped Colon in the face during the argument.

Thurman observed some reddening of the left side of Colon’s face. The redness certainly

corroborated defendant’s admission that she slapped Colon. Being slapped by one’s domestic

partner during an argument is certainly insulting. Also, a slap hard enough to leave a mark was

likely to provoke a reasonable person in Colon’s position to retaliate. Accordingly, even if Colon’s

written statement had been excluded, there would have been overwhelming evidence that

defendant committed domestic battery. Thus, any error in admitting the statement was harmless.

¶ 41                          B. Defendant’s Right of Confrontation

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¶ 42    We next consider whether defendant was denied her sixth amendment right to confront a

witness against her. In making this contention, she first asserts she was denied her sixth amendment

right to confront the interpreter regarding the English translation that the State provided to her

before trial. Second, she posits that the confrontation clause was violated when the State was

allowed to use the interpreter to impeach Colon without being subject to cross-examination. The

State responds that the confrontation clause did not apply because the interpreter was not a

testimonial witness. Alternatively, the State asserts that, even if defendant was denied her sixth

amendment right of confrontation, any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

¶ 43    The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution provides that, in all criminal

prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to be confronted with the witnesses against her.

People v. Palomera, 2022 IL App (2d) 200631, ¶ 31 (citing U.S. Const., amend. VI). The right of

confrontation includes the opportunity to cross-examine to demonstrate bias, and that right is

satisfied when the defendant is permitted to expose to the jury the facts from which they, as triers

of fact and credibility, could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.

Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 318 (1974).

¶ 44    Generally, when evidence is excluded or a line of questioning is denied by the court, the

defendant must ordinarily set forth an offer of proof to provide the trial court, an opposing party,

and the appellate court an adequate opportunity to review the nature and substance of the excluded

evidence. People v. Burgess, 2015 IL App (1st) 130657, ¶ 147. Offers of proof are essential in

cases where evidence will not otherwise come before the court, as it allows the reviewing court

the opportunity to determine if the exclusion was proper. Id. It is well-settled that a defendant’s

failure to make an adequate offer of proof results in forfeiture of the issue on appeal. People v.

Staake, 2017 IL 121755, ¶ 51.

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¶ 45   The record reflects that defense counsel failed to object to the trial court’s decision that the

court-appointed interpreter would be placed under oath but would not be subject to cross-

examination regarding her translation of Colon’s written statement. Counsel also, importantly,

failed to make an offer of proof regarding the nature and substance of the testimony that would

have been elicited through the cross-examination of the interpreter. If defense counsel had

concerns about bias of the court-appointed translator, counsel had the opportunity to present an

alternative translation or to call his own interpreter to testify as to the proper translation through

an offer of proof. See People v. Carmona-Olvera, 363 Ill. App. 3d 162, 167-68 (2005) (holding

that a defendant has the right to offer a competing translation of his statement). Because counsel

failed to make such an offer, we cannot determine if the failure to allow cross-examination of the

court-appointed interpreter was improper. Thus, without deciding whether the court-appointed

interpreter was a witness subject to cross-examination, we conclude that defendant has forfeited

or procedurally defaulted this issue.

¶ 46   Forfeiture aside, we agree with the State that even if there was a denial of the right to cross-

examine, any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 5 A confrontation clause violation is

subject to harmless error analysis. People v. Stechly, 225 Ill. 2d 246, 304 (2007). The test is

       5
           We note that, although we have already held that any error in the admission of the

statement under section 115-10.1 was harmless, the harmless-error standard is “somewhat higher”

for constitutional error than for mere “evidentiary error” (In re E.H., 224 Ill. 2d 172, 180 (2006)).

“Because of the different standards of review, there could theoretically exist a narrow set of cases

in which admission of the same evidence is harmless if considered as an evidentiary error, but not

harmless if evaluated pursuant to the constitutional error standard.” E.H., 224 Ill. 2d at 181.

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whether it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error at issue did not contribute to the verdict.

In re Rolandis G., 232 Ill. 2d 13, 43 (2008). To determine if an error is harmless for constitutional

purposes, we may (1) focus on the error to determine whether it might have contributed to the

conviction, (2) examine the other properly admitted evidence to determine whether it

overwhelmingly supported the conviction, or (3) determine whether the improperly admitted

evidence was merely cumulative or duplicated properly admitted evidence. Rolandis G., 232 Ill.

2d at 43.

¶ 47   Here, in focusing on whether any error in denying defendant an opportunity to cross-

examine the interpreter might have contributed to the conviction, we find no indication in the

record that the translation was not accurate. Nor is there any indication in the record that the

interpreter violated her statutory and ethical obligations to translate Colon’s statement accurately. 6

       6
           Being court certified, the interpreter was subject to both statutory requirements as well as

a code of ethics. People v. Castellano, 2020 IL App (1st) 170543, ¶ 70; People v. Resendiz, 2020

IL App (1st) 180821, ¶ 45. As for statutory requirements, section 2 of the Criminal Proceeding

Interpreter Act (725 ILCS 140/2 (West 2020)) provides that a court-appointed interpreter “shall be

sworn to truly interpret or translate all questions propounded or answers given as directed by the

court.” As for ethical obligations, the Illinois Supreme Court has set forth a Code of Interpreter

Ethics for all interpreters working in the Illinois courts. Resendiz, 2020 IL App (1st) 180821, ¶ 46.

Canon I provides, in pertinent part, that an interpreter “shall render a complete and accurate

interpretation *** without altering, omitting, or adding anything to the meaning of what is stated

or written, and without explanation.” Ill. S. Ct. Code of Interpreter Ethics, canon 1, at 4 (eff. Nov.

20, 2020). Further, the commentary to Canon 1 adds that interpreters are “obligated to apply their

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See United States v. Perez, 651 F.2d 268, 273 (5th Cir. 1981) (court-appointed interpreters are

“court functionaries [who] stand somewhere between an expert witness called by the court and the

court reporter”; “[a]s to such persons, the fundamental question is normally one of qualification,

not of veracity or fidelity,” and the latter two qualities are assumed absent “special

circumstances”). More importantly, defendant never made an offer of proof as to how she would

have cross-examined the interpreter and what such inquiry could be expected to show regarding

the accuracy of the in-court translation. Thus, we cannot say that the trial court’s refusal to allow

defendant to cross-examine the interpreter regarding the accuracy of her translation somehow

contributed to defendant’s conviction.

¶ 48   Additionally, the evidence apart from Colon’s statement overwhelmingly supported

defendant’s conviction. As discussed, Thurman testified that defendant admitted slapping Colon

during a domestic argument. Further, Thurman testified that the left side of Colon’s face had some

reddening. Defendant also told Thurman that she had to leave the house to calm down. This

evidence clearly supported the trial court’s finding that defendant had slapped Colon during a

domestic altercation. Thus, any constitutional error in denying defendant the opportunity to cross-

examine the interpreter was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

¶ 49                              C. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶ 50   Lastly, we turn to defendant’s contention that the evidence was insufficient to prove an

essential element of domestic battery as charged—that Colon was insulted or provoked by being

slapped. We disagree with defendant.

best skills and judgment to faithfully preserve the meaning of what is said in court.” Ill. S. Ct.

Code of Interpreter Ethics, canon 1, Commentary, at 5 (eff. Nov. 20, 2020).

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¶ 51    A reviewing court will not set aside a criminal conviction unless the evidence is so

improbable or unsatisfactory that it creates a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt. People v.

Moore, 2023 IL App (2d) 220289, ¶ 43. When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the

evidence, the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable

to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime

beyond a reasonable doubt. Moore, 2023 IL App (2d) 220289, ¶ 43.

¶ 52    As discussed, to prove a defendant guilty of domestic battery under section 12-3.2(a)(2) of

the Criminal Code (720 ILCS 5/12-3.2(a)(2) (West 2020)), the State must prove that the defendant

(1) intentionally or knowingly, (2) without legal justification, (3) made physical contact of an

insulting or provoking nature (4) with a family or household member. Here, defendant contends

solely that the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Colon was insulted or provoked

by being slapped.

¶ 53    Our supreme court has recently addressed the proof needed under the battery statute,

section 12-3(a) of the Criminal Code (id. § 12-3(a)), to satisfy the element that the physical contact

was of an insulting or provoking nature. Davidson, 2023 IL 127538, ¶ 13. In doing so, the supreme

court held that the clear and unambiguous language of section 12-3(a) demonstrated that the

question of whether contact was insulting or provoking is an objective one. Id., ¶ 16. Put another

way, it is the nature of the contact, not the actual impact on the victim, that must be established.

Id.    Thus, the trier of fact is asked to determine whether a reasonable person under the

circumstances would have found the physical contact insulting or provoking. Id. Davidson’s

holding, of course, applies to the identical insulting-or-provoking-contact element of domestic

battery under section 12-3.2(a)(2) of the Criminal Code (720 ILCS 5/12-3.2(a)(2) (West 2020)).

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Thus, the State was required to prove that a reasonable person in Colon’s position would have

found the slap insulting or provoking.

¶ 54   The evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, clearly established that

element. The slap occurred during a heated domestic argument and prompted Colon to call 911.

When Thurman arrived, he could see that Colon seemed very upset. Further, Thurman observed

reddening on Colon’s face, consistent with his having been slapped. Being slapped by one’s

domestic partner during an argument is certainly insulting. Further, a slap hard enough to leave a

mark was also likely to provoke a reasonable person in Colon’s position to retaliate. The evidence

proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the slap was both insulting and provoking to someone in

Colon’s position. 7 Thus, defendant was proved guilty of domestic battery as charged.

¶ 55                                     III. CONCLUSION

¶ 56   For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Kane County.

¶ 57   Affirmed.

       7
           Even were the State required to prove that Colon himself subjectively felt insulted or

provoked by the slap, the evidence was sufficient to show that he was.

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