Court Opinion

ID: 9891188
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-17 19:00:34.951835+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:39:39.181568
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       OCT 17 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

KOFI OBENG-AMPONSAH,                            No. 21-55851

                Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 5:16-cv-01054-PA-AFM

 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM *
DON MIGUEL APARTMENTS; FDC
MANAGEMENT, INC.; TIM GENOVESE,
as an individual; MARIA OLIVA; DOES, 1-
10,

                Defendants-Appellees.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Central District of California
                    Percy Anderson, District Judge, Presiding

                           Submitted October 10, 2023**

Before:      S.R. THOMAS, McKEOWN, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.

      Kofi Obeng-Amponsah appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment

dismissing as a discovery sanction his action alleging federal and state law claims.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
discretion. Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1022 (9th

Cir. 2002). We affirm.

      The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Obeng-

Amponsah’s action after Obeng-Amponsah failed to comply with the district’s

orders to produce written discovery and appear for his deposition and finding that

Obeng-Amponsah’s behavior was willful and in bad faith. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

37(b)(2); In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Prods. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217,

1233 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Rule 37 sanctions, including dismissal, may be imposed

where the violation is due to willfulness, bad faith, or fault of the party.” (citation,

emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted)); Rio Props., 284 F.3d at 1022

(discussing five factors courts must weigh in determining whether to dismiss a case

for failure to comply with a court order).

      The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Obeng-Amponsah’s

post-judgment motion because Obeng-Amponsah failed to demonstrate any basis

for relief. See Lemoge v. United States, 587 F.3d 1188, 1191-92 (9th Cir. 2009)

(setting forth standard of review and discussing factors for excusable neglect under

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1)); Zimmerman v. City of Oakland, 255 F.3d 734, 740 (9th

Cir. 2001) (setting forth standard of review and discussing factors for granting a

motion for reconsideration under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e)).

      In light of our disposition affirming the dismissal of Obeng-Amponsah’s

                                             2                                    21-55851
action as a sanction, we do not reach the merits of Obeng-Amponsah’s challenge to

the district court’s interlocutory orders.

      We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued

in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on

appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

      AFFIRMED.

                                             3                                    21-55851