Court Opinion

ID: 9592317
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:13:01.20659+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:03.976609
License: Public Domain

STEWART, Associate Chief Justice,
dissenting:
To convict a defendant of capital homicide, a jury must find that the defendant committed an intentional homicide under at least one of a number of aggravating circumstances. On the first appeal in this case, this Court held that the trial court erred in giving an instruction to the effect that the jury could convict defendant of capital homicide under the aggravating factor stated in Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(l)(q) (Supp.1994), i.e., that “the homicide was committed in an especially heinous, atrocious, cruel, or exceptionally depraved manner, any of which must be demonstrated by physical torture, serious physical abuse, or serious bodily injury of the victim before death.” The Court in Carter I held that the instruction did not meet constitutional standards. Nevertheless, the Court affirmed the conviction on other grounds but vacated the sentence and remanded for a new penalty hearing.
On remand, the trial court instructed the jury in the penalty proceeding under the language of § 76 — 5—202(l)(q) to the effect that the jury could take into account the heinousness of the murder in deciding whether the penalty should be life or death. The Court now holds that an instruction based on the language of § 76-5-202(l)(q) may be given in the penalty phase, even though no court has addressed the issue of whether the facts of the case meet constitutional requirements for an instruction of that type to be given. I think that is indefensible.
On several occasions, we have recognized that all murders are “heinous, atrocious, cruel, or exceptionally depraved” as those terms are generally used. But the aggravating circumstances set out in the criminal code must serve to distinguish those intentional murders that qualify for capital punishment from those that do not. Simply put, not all intentional murders can give rise to a death sentence. An aggravating circumstance that describes all murders does not discriminate rationally between murders and therefore is unconstitutional. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 431-33, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 1766-67, 64 L.Ed.2d 398 (1980); State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 77 (Utah 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 988, 103 S.Ct. 341, 74 L.Ed.2d 383 (1982); State v. Tuttle, 780 P.2d 1203, 1217 (Utah 1989).
In my view, it is a circumvention and subversion of the spirit of the underlying principle in Godfrey, Wood, and Tuttle for a trial *659court to instruct the jury in the penalty phase that it may consider the heinousness, atrociousness, and cruelty of the homicide as a factor justifying a death sentence instead of a life sentence when guilt was established on the basis of different aggravating circumstances.
In short, the jury is told that it may impose the death penalty on the basis of its understanding of the heinousness and cruelty language in § 76-5-202(l)(q) that will likely not meet the constitutional requirement.1 That the instruction is given in the penalty phase does not make the error harmless. I recognize that State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327, 352 (Utah 1993), states the contrary, but I do not think that it is possible to square the ruling in Young with the rulings in Godfrey, Wood, and Tuttle.
In short, there was no reason for the trial judge to throw the weight of his position behind a prosecution argument in the penalty phase instructing the jury on the language of a statutory provision that was intended to serve an entirely different purpose.
I would vacate the sentence and remand for a new penalty hearing.
HALL, J., acted on this case prior to his retirement but did not participate in this amended opinion.

. In 1990, the Legislature modified § 76-5-202(l)(q) to try to define the terms "heinous, atrocious, cruel, or exceptionally depraved” to meet the constitutional standard by adding the requirement that those factors "must be demonstrated by physical torture, serious physical abuse, or serious bodily injury of the victim before death.” I think it doubtful that the language the Legislature added fully complies with the constitutional requirements set out in Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 64 L.Ed.2d 398 (1980). Godfrey made clear that "serious physical abuse” had to reflect "a consciousness materially more 'depraved' than that of [other persons] guilty of murder." Id. at 433, 100 S.Ct. at 1767. As this Court pointed out in State v. Tuttle, 780 P.2d 1203, 1216 (Utah 1989), defining the terms heinous, atrocious, and cruel was a matter of great difficulty. The Legislature’s use of the terms "serious physical abuse” or "serious bodily injury of the victim before death” may raise significant issues as to whether they are sufficient to meet the constitutional standard.