Court Opinion

ID: 9755368
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 20:35:41.274786+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:06.502113
License: Public Domain

Malone, J.,
concurring: I concur with the result in this case and with the reasoning set forth in the majority opinion. I write separately to express my view that even if the district court had expressly found that Curtis gained knowledge of Racheal’s pregnancy on December 12, 2009, it would still be my position in this case that the petitioners failed to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that Curtis’ parental rights should be terminated under K.S.A. 2009 Supp. 59-2136(h)(l)(D) or (E).
The facts of this case are indeed unusual. We now know, after the fact, that Racheal must have become pregnant sometime around May 2009. But she did not gain much weight, and she did not miss her period until December 2009. In October 2009, Racheal divorced her husband and signed a divorce decree indicating *109she was not pregnant because, according to her own testimony, she did not believe she was pregnant. Considering the evidence in tire light most favorable to tire petitioners, Curtis gained knowledge of the pregnancy on December 12, 2009. Racheal visited her doctor on January 13, 2010, and her doctor concluded from a blood test that she was about 8 weeks pregnant. Racheal was scheduled for a prenatal checkup on February 3,2010, and on that date, apparently to everyone’s surprise, she delivered Baby Girl B. full-term.
Curtis learned of the birth within a day or two, and he requested DNA testing to confirm paternity. Curtis received confirmation that he was the biological father on February 23,2010. On the very next day, he filed a child in need of care petition seeking the care, custody, and control of Baby Girl B. On March 15, 2010, he filed a separate paternity action acknowledging paternity and requesting parenting time. Since then, Curtis has been engaged in a protracted legal battle with Adoption Choices of Kansas, Inc., over the custody of his daughter. After losing in district court, Curtis has taken his fight to the Kansas Court of Appeals.
Under K.S.A. 2009 Supp. 59-2136(h)(l), when a father appears to assert parental rights, the court may order that parental rights be terminated, upon a finding by clear and convincing evidence, of any of the following:
“(A) The father abandoned or neglected the child after having knowledge of the child’s birth;
“(B) the father is unfit as a parent or incapable of giving consent;
“(C) the father has made no reasonable efforts to support or communicate with the child after having knowledge of the child’s birth;
“(D) the father, after having knowledge of the pregnancy, failed without reasonable cause to provide support for the mother during the six months prior to the child’s birth;
“(E) the father abandoned the mother after having knowledge of the pregnancy;
“(F) the birth of the child was the result of rape of the mother; or
“(G) the father has failed or refused to assume the duties of a parent for two consecutive years next proceeding the filing of the petition.”
This statute provides that a district court can terminate a father’s parental rights upon finding by clear and convincing evidence any one of seven factors fisted in the statute. Most of the factors involve the father abandoning or neglecting the child after having knowl*110edge of the child’s birth, failing to provide support for the mother after having knowledge of the pregnancy, or fading to assume the duties of a parent for 2 consecutive years. The gist of the entire statute is that the district court can terminate the father’s parental rights upon finding by clear and convincing evidence that the father has failed to step up to the plate to assume his parental responsibilities within a reasonable amount of time after learning about the responsibilities.
This cases focuses on K.S.A. 2009 Supp. 59~2136(h)(l)(D), which provides that the district court can terminate a father’s parental rights upon finding by clear and convincing evidence that “the father, after having knowledge .of the pregnancy, failed without reasonable cause to provide support for the mother during tire six months prior to the child’s birth.” This subsection provides a somewhat arbitraiy 6-month window of opportunity for the father to act responsibly and provide support for the mother prior to the child’s birth. If the father fails to do so, he can lose his parental rights forever. The biggest problem with applying this statutory test to the case at hand is that at best, Curtis did not gain knowledge of Racheal’s pregnancy until about 7 weeks before Baby Girl B. was bom. And no one, including Racheal, knew on December 12, 2010, that Baby Girl B. was going to arrive within 7 weeks. Under the unique circumstances of this case, it becomes difficult to apply K.S.A. 2009 Supp. 59-2136(h)(l)(D) as an ■ appropriate statutory test to determine whether Curtis’ parental rights should be terminated.
I am not saying that K.S.A. 2009 Supp. 59-2136(h)(l)(D) is unconstitutional. Certain arbitrary time frames need to be drawn by the legislature in order to test parental fitness. Normally, 6 months is a sufficient amount of time for a father to act responsibly and provide support for the mother prior to the child’s birth. And it possibly would not offend my sense of justice to terminate a father’s parental rights if the evidence showed that he failed without reasonable cause to provide support for the mother after learning about the pregnancy 5 months, or even 4. months, prior to the child’s birth. Each case must be judged on its own facts. But as the date the father gains knowledge of the pregnancy gets closer and *111closer to the child’s birth, the sufficiency of the evidence to terminate his parental rights on this ground becomes less and less convincing.
A court is “to consider all of the relevant surrounding circumstances in an action based on K.S.A. 2009 Supp. 59-2136(h)(1)(D).” In re Adoption of Baby Girl P., 291 Kan. 424, 430, 242 P.3d 1168 (2010). Here, it seems to me that the district court failed to consider all the relevant circumstances surrounding this case before terminating Curtis’ parental rights. Racheal herself did not 'realize she was pregnant until a few weeks before giving birth, and the timing of the delivery came as a surprise to eveiyone. Curtis had very little time to provide any meaningful support to Racheal prior to the child’s birth. Perhaps this fact can be considered as “reasonable cause” under the statute, thereby excusing Curtis’ failure to provide support to Racheal. However the evidence is viewed, I conclude the petitioners failed to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that Curtis’ parental rights should be terminated under K.S.A. 2009 Supp. 59-2136(h)(l)(D).
Likewise, there was no evidence that Curtis “abandoned” Racheal after having knowledge of the pregnancy in order to support termination of parental rights under K.S.A. 2009 Supp. 59-2136(h)(1)(E). The term “abandonment?’ is defined in family law as “[t]he act of leaving a spouse or child willfully and without an intent to return.” Black’s Law Dictionary 2 (9th ed. 2009). Racheal voluntarily terminated her relationship with Curtis in June 2009, and the couple did not see each other after July 7, 2009. Even if Curtis gained knowledge of the pregnancy in December 2009, he and Racheal already had separated several months prior to that date. Under the evidence presented, Curtis could not have possibly “abandoned” Racheal after having knowledge of the pregnancy.
My heart goes , out to the prospective adoptive parents in this case who have been taking care of Baby Girl B. since her birth. However, “a natural parent who has assumed his or her parental responsibilities has a fundamental right, protected by the United States Constitution and the Kansas Constitution, to raise his or her child.” In re Adoption of G.L.V., 286 Kan. 1034, 1057, 190 P.3d 245 (2008). Curtis has assumed his parental responsibilities, and *112he has been fighting to gain custody of his daughter since her birth. The petitioners have failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Curtis’ parental rights should be terminated. The order terminating his parental rights must be set aside, and the case should be remanded to district court to resolve the custody issues between Racheal and Curtis in regards to Baby Girl B.
Standridge, J., joins in the foregoing concurring opinion.