Court Opinion

ID: 9767151
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 05:11:28.590064+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:28.990963
License: Public Domain

Morse, J.,
concurring. I concur in the result, but do not agree that all the expert’s opinions were admissible. I do not question the *273admissibility of the opinion that plaintiff suffered what is commonly known as post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). The expert made this determination based on plaintiff’s symptoms of anxiety attacks, exaggerated startle response, low self-esteem, fatigue, depression, suicidal ideation, nightmares, and flashbacks. The fact that plaintiff suffered from PTSD was all that was relevant or necessary to decide the issues ‘this Court finds important - plaintiff’s emotional health, counseling needs, and employability.
I do question, however, the admissibility of the opinion that plaintiff suffered from a subcategory of PTSD known as battered-woman’s syndrome (BWS). That opinion was based solely on the history plaintiff gave the expert that she had been battered by her husband. A diagnosis of BWS was relevant only to the issue of defendant’s fault - who and what caused plaintiff’s mental disorder. The expert’s opinion, was nothing more than a disguise for placing plaintiff’s prior consistent statements about being abused by her husband before the court, this time with the expert’s imprimatur upon them.
This type of credibility bolstering is inadmissible. Diagnosis by an expert witness that a person suffers a particular syndrome disorder that must have been caused by a particular person or in a particular way encroaches on the fact-finder’s province of determining credibility. The science of truth detection is not sufficiently rehable to warrant admissibility of an expert’s acceptance of a victim’s story under V.R.E. 702. See State v. Wetherbee, 156 Vt. 425, 431, 594 A.2d 390, 393 (1991) (expert may not assume role of “truth detector” because no expertise in determining truth). Simply put, an expert has no more reliable method of determining credibility than an average person and, therefore, does not “assist” the fact-finder under V.R.E. 702.
The rationale used to exclude expert diagnosis of child abuse syndrome in criminal cases applies equally, in my opinion, to limit expert diagnosis of battered-woman’s syndrome in divorce proceedings. See V.R.E. 1101 (V.R.E. 702 applicable to all proceedings); see also In re Gina D., 645 A.2d 61, 63-65 (N.H. 1994) (court’s reliance on experts,testimony that father sexually abused daughter reversible error in civil abuse proceeding because expert’s testimony not sufficiently reliable).
In the context of this case, however, the error was harmless. The record demonstrates that the trial court recognized that the expert could not simply be a conduit for plaintiff’s complaints. Moreover, the overwhelming evidence given defendant’s admissions demonstrates *274the family court would have reached the same result. Similarly, although evidence is not made admissible simply because the fact-finder is a judge and not a jury, the prejudice caused by the admission, if any, is easier to detect and weigh on appeal because the court makes findings of fact and conclusions of law. The court made five pages of findings detailing the abuse as told by the parties before even considering the expert’s testimony.