Court Opinion

ID: 9735539
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 18:22:14.772406+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:59.716447
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Kelleher,
concurring. In concurring, I am constrained to set forth my reasons for so doing. Although I would prefer the result achieved in the dissent, I am unable to accept the fundamental premises upon which it is based.
In his dissent, Brother Joslin declares that there is no clear and definite statement by a New York court as to how the clause1 of the policy in issue should be interpreted ; second, he asserts that in the absence of “a clear New York mandate,” or when in his opinion the law of New York is “in doubt,” he is at liberty to decide what the law of New York should be on this matter, regardless of how he surmises the “New York courts may ultimately decide,” by *648referring to our own decisions and the decisions of other jurisdictions. I disagree with him on both points.
Whenever there is a case, such as this one, in which it is undisputed and agreed that the law of a sister state applies, the trial court was, and we on appeal are required to take judicial notice of all statutes and judicial decisions of that state relevant to the issue presented under our Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign Law Act, (G. L. 1956) §§9-19-2 to 9-19-8; Virginia Ave. Coal Co. v. Bailey, 185 Tenn. 242, 205 S.W.2d 11.2
I believe that we have in Pape v. Red Cab Mut. Casualty Co., supra, a decisive and definite statement from a New York court as to how the clause in question here should be interpreted. The supreme court of New York in Pape spoke clearly as to the interpretation it would give to an insurance policy clause virtually identical with the clause we are asked to construe on this appeal.
It is true that Pape was decided by an intermediate court of appeals and not the state’s highest appellate tribunal, but I feel that we should accept the decision of the intermediate court of review as expressing the law of New York in the absence of any conflicting decision by a higher court or a court of coordinate jurisdiction of that state. Moscov v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 387 Ill. 378, 56 N.E.2d 399, at 404.3 Further I am not persuaded that Dean v. Marschall, 90 Hun 335, 35 N.Y.S. 724, Weiss v. New Jersey Fidelity & Plate Glass Co., supra, and Materazzi v. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co., supra, dilute the Pape opinion to a degree that it cannot be described as decisive and cogent authority upon which the majority could base its findings. Like the majority, I feel the Dean, Weiss and Materazzi cases are distinguishable on the language of the clauses sought to *649be construed, and in my opinion are not equatable with the present policy clause under examination; accordingly these cases do not represent, as Brother Joslin suggests, conflicting decisions in New York on the issue before us. My consideration of this case leads me to the conclusion that the Pape decision, never having been overruled in New York, is a precedent which we should follow here.
As to Brother Joslin’s second point, I likewise disagree. If we are to concede for argument purposes that Pape does not represent a decisive and precise exposition of a New York court’s construction of the clause before us, I am unable to subscribe to the principle of conflicts expounded in his dissent.
As I understand my Brother Joslin in his dissenting opinion, if the courts of a sister state, whose law is to control, have not decided the particular issue in question with sufficient lucidity and decisiveness, we are at liberty to construe the meaning of the contested policy clause as we believe the law ought to be, relying primarily on the law contained in our own decisions and secondarily on the law found in decisions of other jurisdictions, regardless of whatever inclinations we may entertain as to how the courts of the sister jurisdiction may ultimately rule on the matter. Even if we had no decision by the courts of the locus on the precise issue in dispute, I believe a better approach to the problem would be for us to exert every effort to discover any indicia as to how the courts of that foreign jurisdiction would rule and thereafter decide the issue as we believe it would be resolved by the courts of the locus.
I believe the principle enunciated by Brother Joslin in his dissent is neither sound in theory or practice. When we are presented with an issue to be governed by foreign law, we are serving as a forum of convenience for the parties, and should have for our purpose the giving of just effectuation to the rights and obligations created by the *650laws of the appropriate locus, as well as ensuring them of an orderly, fair and expeditious hearing of their case. Our aim should be to incorporate the law of the locus into our decision so as to homologize fairly any and all claims and defenses which each party would enjoy under the laws of the governing jurisdiction. In short, we should examine the laws of the locus and, using them as a model, seek to achieve the same result as would likely be reached by its courts, provided of course the application of the locus law would not contravene any strong public policy of the forum or “* * * interfere with the efficient operation of the forum’s judicial system.”4 In so doing, we are recognizing and satisfying, whenever possible, the expectancies of the parties as well as protecting innocent litigants from having their legal rights and claims, valid under the laws of one forum, from being disfranchised by the deft or fortuitous selection of an alternate forum by an adversary litigant.
In my opinion, the litigant’s goal of uniformity of treatment should similarly motivate us regardless of whether we can perceive a clear mandate from the courts of the locus. When we are confronted with the situation of having to decide an issue by reference to law from another jurisdiction, I believe we should strive to determine, through a diligent and serious analysis of the law of the locus as it is expressed in its statutes and judicial decisions, the result that would be attained by the courts of that place and then decide our case in accordance with our findings relevant to the foreign law. In effect, I am suggesting that in conflict cases, we adopt essentially the same process as the federal courts do when their jurisdiction is invoked to rule on a *651question of law unsettled by the courts of the state in which they preside. Just as under the mandate of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. 1188,5 federal courts examine, interpret, and if necessary extrapolate the law of a state as to questions never before precisely answered by state courts, we should similarly act in our efforts to discover the law of other jurisdictions in conflict cases.6
To adopt the criteria of Erie herein is to preserve the purposes and be consistent with the objectives which embrace the entire law of conflicts. We should not grant to ourselves freedom to decide what the law of a foreign jurisdiction should be on a particular issue but should, instead, take cognizance of any apparent indication as to how the judiciary of another state would rule if given the opportunity to do so.7 While I do not advocate that we should engage in making judicial hunches, it is my opinion that a discernible trend or policy which a court in another state may follow should be recognized and given effect. Under Mr. Justice Joslin's rule, I do not believe this would be possible.

“*** the insured’s obligation to pay shall have been finally determined either by judgment against the insured after actual trial or by written agreement of the insured, the claimant and the company.” (italics ours)

For a comprehensive compilation of authorities interpreting this Uniform Act in other jurisdictions see 9A U.L.A. p. 550, and 23 A.L.R.2d 1437.

See also West v. American Tel. & Tel. Co.. 311 U. S. 223, 61 S. Ct. 179, 85 L.Ed. 139.

See Morgan, Edmund M., “Choice Of Law Governing Proof,” 58 Harv. L. Rev. 153 at 194, “No one doubts the validity of the general objective of modern enlightened courts in the field of conflict, of laws, namely, the attainment through the courts of the forum of the same result which would have been secured through the courts of the locus.” See also, Morgan, ■ Edmund M., “Rules of Evidence-Substantive Or Procedural,” 10 Vand. ■L.Rev. 467, at 470, for a similar expression of this principle of conflicts law.

See Wyzanski, Jr., Judge Charles E., “A Trial Judge’s Freedom and Responsibility,” 65 Harv. L. Rev. 1281, 1299-1301. See also Brewster v. Boston Herald-Traveler Corp., 188 F. Supp. 565 at 569, decided by Judge Wyzanski for an illustration as to the approach taken by federal judges when examining state law under the Erie rule.

See Sedler, Robert Allen, “The Erie Outcome Test As A Guide To Substance And Procedure In The Conflict of Laws,” 37 N.Y.U.L. Rey. 813.

See also H. & J. Gross, Inc. v. Fraser, 140 Mont. 95, 99, 368 P.2d 163, 165, where it was held that the forum will make an “independent determination as to what is the correct foreign law.”