Court Opinion

ID: 9564672
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:05:23.112922+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:36.578517
License: Public Domain

WARREN, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in
part.
I concur in the majority opinion with one exception. 1 Because I believe that plaintiffs’ original complaint was sufficient to state a claim against District under 42 USC § 1983, I dissent from the affirmance of the trial court’s dismissal of that claim.
Plaintiffs did not label any claim in their original complaint as being a claim under section 1983. However, the Fourth Claim for Relief, which they labeled “Negligence,” contains sufficient allegations to state a section 1983 claim. It therefore does state such a claim. In Oregon, a pleader does not expressly plead a legal theory; rather, the pleader alleges facts. ORCP 18; Gabel v. Armstrong, 88 Or 84, 90, 171 P 190 (1918); Hanna v. Hope, 86 Or 303, 308-09, 168 P 618 (1917). *166The court evaluates those facts to determine whether they entitle the pleader to relief. “While a claim for relief may fail to plead a specific theory, it should not be dismissed if it pleads a claim for relief under some theory, even if it was not the one the plaintiff intended.” Sheets v. Knight, 308 Or 220, 232, 779 P2d 1000 (1989). (Emphasis supplied.) Indeed, a pleading may allege two theories at the same time. See Rogue River Management Co. v. Shaw, 243 Or 54, 61, 411 P2d 440 (1966) (“the allegations [of the second affirmative defense] supported two theories but the evidence supported only one of them”). Stating two legal theories in one claim may make the complaint subject to a motion to strike, see ORCP 21 E(l), but in the absence of such a motion the pleading is sufficient to state a claim under both theories.
In the Fourth Claim for Relief, plaintiffs alleged that their daughter was a student, that Bransom was her teacher, that Bransom encouraged a more intimate relationship than that between student and teacher and that he sexually abused her. They then alleged that District knew of several incidents between Bransom and their daughter and between Bransom and other students but failed to tell the parents about those incidents. Finally, they alleged that District was negligent in (1) failing to tell them about the suspected physical interaction between Bransom and their daughter and between Bransom and other students; (2) in failing to tell Bransom immediately to stop that excessive physical interaction; (3) in failing to warn their daughter of Bransom’s behavior after it was known to District; and (4) in failing to provide counseling to their daughter to help her deal with Bransom’s behavior.
The allegations of plaintiffs’ negligence claim were sufficient to state a section 1983 claim against a supervisor of a sexually abusive teacher under the test established in Doe v. Taylor Independent School Dist., 15 F3d 443, 450-54 (5th Cir), cert den 513 US 815 (1994), a test that the District Court for Oregon has applied in at least one case, Plumeau v. Yamhill Cty. Sch. Dist., 907 F Supp 1423 (D Or 1995). The criteria for finding a school district liable for a teacher’s conduct appear to be the same, see Monell v. New York City Dept. of Soc. Serv., 436 US 658, 98 S Ct 2018, 56 L Ed 2d 611 (1978); Doe, 15 F3d at 452 (majority), 463 (Higginbotham, J., concurring).
*167In their original complaint, plaintiffs alleged facts that could support findings in their favor on each of the Doe tests: (1) that District learned of facts or a pattern of inappropriate sexual behavior by Bransom that pointed plainly to the conclusion that he was sexually abusing plaintiffs’ daughter; (2) that District demonstrated deliberate indifference to plaintiffs’ daughter’s constitutional rights by failing to take action that was obviously necessary to stop the abuse; and (3) that the failure caused a constitutional injury to plaintiffs’ daughter. See Doe, 15 F3d at 454. In their proposed amended complaint, plaintiffs simply clarified and extended the allegations of the section 1983 claim that was already implicit in the original negligence claim. Because plaintiffs stated a section 1983 claim against District in their original complaint, the trial court erred in dismissing that claim whether or not it abused its discretion in denying them leave to file an amended complaint.2 Because the majority affirms that dismissal, I dissent.

 I note that ORS 342.175(2), which requires revocation of a teacher’s license upon conviction of any one of a number of sexual offences, supports the majority’s conclusion that, as a matter of law, Bransom’s alleged misconduct could not have been within the course and scope of his employment.

 The majority states that plaintiffs did not make this argument to the trial court or to us. Although the lack of a transcript limits our knowledge of what they argued to the trial court, the record is sufficient to show that they preserved the issue. In their memorandum to the trial court, they pointed out that notice under the Tort Claims Act is unnecessary before referring to their attempt to amend their complaint. They then discussed the appropriateness of a section 1983 claim in a separate section after discussing their proposed amended complaint. While they may have focussed on the amended complaint in arguing for a section 1983 claim, they did not limit the claim to the proposed amendment. Similarly, in this court they stated that the “facts which plaintiffs are asserting in their complaint and in their amended complaint are certainly sufficient for a claim under 42 USCA § 1983.” (Emphasis supplied.) That is an express argument that their original complaint stated a section 1983 claim.