Court Opinion

ID: 9893804
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-30 17:09:20.019534+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:05:50.179316
License: Public Domain

J-S25002-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

 SUSAN MADRAK                            :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                         :        PENNSYLVANIA
                    Appellant            :
                                         :
                                         :
              v.                         :
                                         :
                                         :
 BLINK FITNESS, BLINK HOLDINGS,          :   No. 2260 EDA 2022
 INC., EQUINOX GROUP, INC., AND          :
 JOHN DOE CORPORATION 1-10               :

             Appeal from the Order Entered September 1, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at
                            No(s): 201200809

BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., MURRAY, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.:                      FILED OCTOBER 30, 2023

      Susan Madrak (Appellant) appeals from the order granting summary

judgment in favor of Blink Fitness, Blink Holdings, Inc., Equinox Group, Inc.,

and John Doe Corporations 1-10 (collectively, Appellees). Appellant argues

that the trial court erred or abused its discretion in granting summary

judgment because the exculpatory clause in the membership agreement (the

Agreement) was invalid and did not bar recovery. After review, we affirm.

      The trial court summarized the relevant facts and procedural history of

this case as follows:

      On September 27, 2018, at a kiosk inside the Blink Fitness gym
      located at 5597 Tulip Street Building C 1-4, Philadelphia,
      Pennsylvania 19124, [Appellant] entered into a contract with
      [Appellees]. First, at the kiosk, [Appellant] selected a gray
      membership.      [Appellant] then submitted into the kiosk
      information such as her first name, last name, and address. Next,
J-S25002-23

     [Appellant] slid her credit card into the kiosk. The kiosk camera
     then photographed [Appellant]. Next, [Appellant] verified her
     membership plan, membership information, payment information,
     and photograph on the kiosk’s review screen. On that review
     screen also appeared a terms and condition button which
     presented a clickable link to the full text of the terms and
     conditions of the Membership Agreement. Next to that button was
     a vacate check-mark box stating: “I have read and agree to the
     terms and conditions.” [Appellant] check-marked that box. By
     check-marking that box, [Appellant] indicated that she had “READ
     [THE MEMBERSHIP] AGREEMENT IN FULL.” [Appellant’s] digital
     signature then appeared, among other locations in the
     Membership Agreement, immediately following the exculpatory
     clause. By digitally signing there, [Appellant] “confirmed her
     understanding [of the exculpatory clause].”

     At the next kiosk screen, [Appellant] scanned her Blink
     membership card. Lastly, [Appellant] saw the final “Thank You”
     kiosk screen indicating the creation of her membership.
     [Appellees] then emailed a welcome email to [Appellant]
     containing a link to her signed Membership Agreement.

     The exculpatory clause of the Membership Agreement stated:

       WAIVER OF LIABILITY; ASSUMPTION OF RISK: Member
       acknowledges that the use of the Club, its facilities,
       equipment, services and programs involves an inherent risk
       of personal injury to Member (including, without limitation,
       heart attacks, strokes, heat stress, broken bones, torn or
       damaged muscles, ligaments, or tendons, or even death).
       Member voluntarily agrees to assume all risks of
       personal injury to Member, and waives any and all
       claims or actions that Member may have against
       Blink, any of its subsidiaries or other affiliates and any
       of their respective officers, directors, employees, agents,
       successors, and assigns for any such personal injury,
       including, without limitation (i) injuries arising from
       the use of any exercise equipment or exercise
       machines, (ii) injuries arising from participation in
       supervised or unsupervised activities and programs
       (including, without limitation, participation in a personal
       training session or group fitness class) in any area of the
       Club, (iii) injuries or medical disorders resulting from
       exercising at the Club; and (iv) any other accidental
       injuries sustained within the Club.            Furthermore,

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         Member agrees to indemnify, defend, and hold harmless
         Blink from any and all liability, damages, losses, suits,
         demands, causes of action, or other claims of any nature
         whatsoever, to the extent any of the foregoing arise out of
         or relate in any way to Member’s use of the Club, its
         facilities, equipment, services and/or programs.

      Membership Agreement (emphasis added).

      [Appellant] alleged that on January 2, 2019, the malfunction of a
      rowing machine at that Blink Fitness gym caused [Appellant] to
      fall and sustain injures. On December 15, 2020, [Appellant] filed
      a Complaint against [Appellees] alleging negligence. Thereafter,
      on December 16, 2020, the trial court scheduled the case to have
      an arbitration hearing.

      On April 6, 2021, [Appellant] filed her First Amended Complaint
      against [Appellees] alleging negligence. On August 25, 2021,
      [Appellees] filed Answers to [Appellant’s] First Amended
      Complaint.

      The arbitration hearing was re-scheduled to June 9, 2022. On
      May 3, 2022, [Appellees] filed a Miscellaneous Application
      requesting permission from the trial court to file motions for
      summary judgment within 45 days of the arbitration hearing date,
      which the trial court granted on May 2, 2022, and permitted
      [Appellees] to file motions for summary judgment no later than
      May 5, 2022. On May 4, 2022, [after the close of discovery,
      Appellees] filed motions for summary judgment, which the trial
      court granted on September 1, 2022.

Trial Ct. Op., 2/21/23, at 1-3 (citations omitted and some formatting altered).

      The trial court concluded that Appellees were entitled to summary

judgment because the exculpatory clause in the Agreement was valid and

enforceable, and the exculpatory clause barred Appellant’s claims against

Appellees. See id. at 12.

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     Appellant filed a timely appeal, and both the trial court and Appellant

complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. On appeal, Appellant raises three issues, which

we have renumbered as follows:

     1. Was the Agreement invalid as a matter of law?

     2. Did the conduct of [Appellant] constitute “use” under the terms
        of the Agreement?

     3. Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment?

Appellant’s Brief at 2 (renumbered and formatting altered).

     Our standard of review of an order granting or denying summary

judgment is as follows:

     We view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
     party, and all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of
     material fact must be resolved against the moving party. Only
     where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and it is
     clear that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
     of law will summary judgment be entered. Our scope of review of
     a trial court’s order granting or denying summary judgment is
     plenary, and our standard of review is clear: the trial court’s order
     will be reversed only where it is established that the court
     committed an error of law or abused its discretion.

Matos v. Geisinger Med. Ctr., 291 A.3d 899, 904 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citation

omitted and formatting altered), appeal granted, --- A.3d ---, Nos. 192 MAL

2023, 193 MAL 2023, 2023 WL 6531124 (Pa. filed Oct. 6, 2023).

                          Validity of Agreement

     In her first issue, Appellant argues that the Agreement was invalid as a

matter of law. Appellant’s Brief at 12. Appellant contends that the Agreement

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was unconscionable, and it constituted a contract of adhesion as she had no

choice but to sign the Agreement. Id. at 12-13.

      Appellees respond that the trial court correctly concluded that the

Agreement was a valid contract with an enforceable exculpatory clause, and

the Agreement was not a contract of adhesion.       Appellees’ Brief at 15-16.

Further, Appellees contend that the contract was not unconscionable. Id. at

17.

      The interpretation of a contract is a question of law, and our standard

of review is plenary. Riverview Carpet & Flooring, Inc. v. Presbyterian

Senior Care, 299 A.3d 937, 983 (Pa. Super. 2023).

      [Further, w]hen interpreting the language of a contract, the
      intention of the parties is a paramount consideration.         In
      determining the intent of the parties to a written agreement, the
      court looks to what they have clearly expressed, for the law does
      not assume that the language of the contract was chosen
      carelessly.

      When interpreting agreements containing clear and unambiguous
      terms, we need only examine the writing itself to give effect to
      the parties’ intent. The language of a contract is unambiguous if
      we can determine its meaning without any guide other than a
      knowledge of the simple facts on which, from the nature of the
      language in general, its meaning depends. When terms in a
      contract are not defined, we must construe the words in
      accordance with their natural, plain, and ordinary meaning. As
      the parties have the right to make their own contract, we will not
      modify the plain meaning of the words under the guise of
      interpretation or give the language a construction in conflict with
      the accepted meaning of the language used.

      On the contrary, the terms of a contract are ambiguous if the
      terms are reasonably or fairly susceptible of different
      constructions and are capable of being understood in more than
      one sense. Additionally, we will determine that the language is
      ambiguous if the language is obscure in meaning through

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      indefiniteness of expression or has a double meaning. Where the
      language of the contract is ambiguous, the provision is to be
      construed against the drafter.

Id. at 983-84 (citation omitted and some formatting altered).

      In general, exculpatory clauses are valid if they satisfy the following

criteria: (1) the clause must not contravene public policy; (2) the agreement

must be between persons relating entirely to their own private affairs; and (3)

each party must be a free bargaining agent to the agreement so that the

contract is not one of adhesion. Milshteyn v. Fitness Int’l, LLC, 271 A.3d

498, 503 (Pa. Super. 2022). “[E]xculpatory provisions violate public policy

only when they involve a matter of interest to the public or the state. Such

matters of interest to the public or the state include the employer-employee

relationship, public service, public utilities, common carriers, and hospitals.”

Vinson v. Fitness & Sports Clubs, LLC, 187 A.3d 253, 257 (Pa. Super.

2018) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

      Our Supreme Court has set a high bar that a party must clear
      before a court may invalidate a contract on public policy grounds:

         It is only when a given policy is so obviously for or against
         the public health, safety, morals or welfare that there is a
         virtual unanimity of opinion in regard to it, that a court may
         constitute itself the voice of the community in so declaring
         [that the contract is against public policy].

Id. (quoting Williams v. GEICO Gov’t Employees Ins. Co., 32 A.3d 1195,

1200 (Pa. 2011)).

      Whether a contract is unconscionable is a matter of law. This
      Court has explained that unconscionability is a defensive
      contractual remedy that relieves a party from an unfair contract

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     or an unfair portion of a contract.         Further, in general,
     unconscionability has been recognized to include an absence of a
     meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with
     contract terms that are unreasonably favorable to the other party.
     Unconscionability does nothing more than reaffirm the most basic
     tenet of the law of contracts—that parties must be free to choose
     the terms to which they will be bound.

Centric Bank v. Sciore, 263 A.3d 31, 39 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citations omitted

and formatting altered).    Moreover, a contract of adhesion is typically a

“standard-form contract prepared by one party, to be signed by the party in

a weaker position, usu[ally] a consumer, who adheres to the contract with

little choice about the terms.” Chepkevich v. Hidden Valley Resort, L.P.,

2 A.3d 1174, 1190 (Pa. 2010) (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 342 (8th

Ed. 2004)).

     However, “an exculpatory agreement involving use of a commercial

facility for voluntary athletic or recreational activities is not considered a

contract of adhesion because the signer is under no compulsion, economic

or otherwise, to participate, much less to sign the exculpatory agreement,

because it does not relate to essential services[.]” Milshteyn, 271 A.3d at

504 (quoting Toro v. Fitness Int’l LLC, 150 A.3d 968, 975 (Pa. Super.

2016)) (emphasis added).

     Here, the trial court addressed Appellant’s challenge to the validity of

the agreement as follows:

     In Vinson[,] the Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s order
     granting summary judgment against a plaintiff and in favor of a
     gym. In that case, a plaintiff had tripped on a wet floor mat at
     the gym, fell, and injured herself. She later filed a complaint
     against the gym. The trial court granted the gym’s motion for

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     summary judgment because the exculpatory clause in the
     membership agreement with the plaintiff precluded the plaintiff’s
     claims against the gym. The Superior Court affirmed the trial
     court’s order because the exculpatory clause was valid. It did not
     violate public policy as it governed a private individual’s use of a
     facility for a recreational activity which the Superior Court affirmed
     is not a matter of public or state interest.

     Here, the trial court properly found that the exculpatory clause did
     not violate public policy. Following Vinson and Toro, the trial
     court properly found that [Appellant’s] use of [Appellees’] facilities
     for the athletic or recreational activity of exercising at the gym
     with equipment was entirely a private affair between [Appellant]
     and [Appellees]. Since the Superior Court has repeatedly found
     such activity not to be a matter of public or state interest, the trial
     court properly found that the exculpatory clause did not violate
     public policy.

                                  *    *    *

     Pennsylvania law considers exercising at a gym with equipment a
     voluntary athletic or recreational activity. Hinkal v. Pardoe,
     133 A.3d 738, 742 ([Pa. Super.] 2016) [(en banc)] (emphasis
     added).      Therefore, Pennsylvania law generally considers
     contracts containing exculpatory clauses governing the use of
     commercial facilities for voluntary athletic and recreational
     activities (even inherently dangerous recreational activities) not
     contracts of adhesion. Chepkevich[,] 2 A.3d [at] 1190. This is
     because (1) the signer is under no compulsion, economic or
     otherwise, to participate in the activity much less sign the
     agreement since the agreement relates to non-essential services;
     and (2) the signer is free to refuse to sign or participate. [Id.];
     Milshteyn[,] 271 A.3d [at] 504[.]

     In Milshteyn[,] the Superior Court affirmed a trial court’s order
     granting summary judgment against a plaintiff and in favor of [the
     defendant gym]. In that case, a plaintiff had slipped, [fallen], and
     injured himself on the stairs leading from the pool to the locker
     room during a power outage when the stairwell was dark at the
     gym. He later filed a complaint against the [defendant gym]. The
     trial court granted the . . . motion for summary judgment because
     the exculpatory clause in the membership agreement with the
     plaintiff precluded the plaintiff’s claims against the [defendant
     gym]. The Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s order because
     the exculpatory clause was valid. The Superior Court found that

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     it was not part of a contract of adhesion because (1) using a
     commercial facility for a voluntary athletic or recreational activity
     such as exercising at the gym with equipment was a non-essential
     service; and (2) the plaintiff was under no compulsion, economic
     or otherwise, to sign the membership agreement and/or
     participate in that voluntary athletic or recreational activity at that
     facility.

     Here, like in Milshteyn and Toro, the trial court properly found
     that [the] Agreement was not a contract of adhesion. [The]
     Agreement] governed a non-essential service, namely
     [Appellant’s] use of [Appellees’] commercial facility for voluntary
     athletic and recreational activity (i.e. exercising at the gym).
     Additionally, [Appellant] was under no compulsion, economic or
     otherwise, to sign the . . . Agreement and/or participate in that
     voluntary athletic and recreational activity at that facility.
     [Appellant] specifically testified that no one forced her to become
     a member of this gym. [Appellant] was free to become a member
     of [Appellees’] gym or a member of another gym if [Appellant]
     wished.    As such, the trial court properly found that [the]
     Agreement was not a contract of adhesion.

                                  *    *    *

     [The Milshteyn Court also] found that a gym’s exculpatory clause
     was not unconscionable because (1) using a commercial facility
     for athletic or recreational activity such as exercising at the gym
     with equipment was a non-essential service; and (2) the plaintiff
     was under no compulsion, economic or otherwise, to sign the
     membership agreement and/or participate in that voluntary
     athletic or recreational activity at that facility.

     Here, like in Milshteyn, the trial court properly found that the
     exculpatory clause in [the] Agreement was not unconscionable.
     The exculpatory clause was not unconscionable because (1) using
     a commercial facility for athletic or recreational activity such as
     exercising at the gym with equipment was a non-essential service;
     and (2) [Appellant] was under no compulsion, economic or
     otherwise, to sign [the] Agreement and/or participate in that
     voluntary athletic or recreational activity at [Appellees’] facility.
     [Appellant] specifically testified that no one forced her to become
     a member of this gym. [Appellant] was free to become a member
     of [Appellees’] gym or a member of another gym if [Appellant]
     wished. . . .

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Trial Ct. Op., 2/21/23, at 7-12 (some citations omitted and formatting

altered).

      After review, we discern no error of law in the trial court’s conclusion

that the Agreement did not violate public policy, did not constitute a contract

of adhesion, and was not unconscionable. See Milshteyn, 271 A.3d at 504;

Centric Bank, 263 A.3d at 39; Vinson, 187 A.3d at 257. Appellees’ gym

provided a non-essential service, and Appellant’s membership and use of

Appellees’ gym was a voluntary and recreational activity. See Chepkevich,

2 A.3d at 1190; Milshteyn, 271 A.3d at 504; Toro, 150 A.3d at 975. On this

record, we agree with the trial court’s conclusion that Appellant was under no

compulsion to join Appellees’ gym, and that she was free to join Appellees’

gym or any other gym, which she admitted in her deposition testimony. Trial

Ct. Op., 2/21/23, at 10-12 (citing Appellant’s Dep., 3/14/22, at 34); see also

Milshteyn, 271 A.3d at 504. Accordingly, Appellant is not entitled to relief

on this claim.

                              Bar to Recovery

      In her second issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in

concluding that she was not entitled to recovery for her injuries under the

Agreement. In support, Appellant argues that although the Agreement barred

relief from injuries involving the “use” of Appellees’ gym equipment, Appellant

was not “using” the equipment at the time she was injured because the rowing

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machine she used was broken. See Appellant’s Brief at 10-11.1 Specifically,

Appellant asserts that “it is difficult to see how sitting on a piece of broken

equipment and having it tip over due to the fact that it was not welded is

considered ‘use’” and that “the injuries did not result from exercise, they

resulted from a defective machine.” Id. at 11. Therefore, Appellant argues

that her claims are not barred by the exculpatory clause in the Agreement.

See id. at 10-12.

       Appellees respond that Appellant’s argument is meritless, as the record

reflects that Appellant repeatedly stated that she was “using” the machine

when she was injured. Appellees’ Brief at 13 (citing Appellant’s Am. Compl.;

Appellant’s Mem. of Law in Response to Appellees’ Mot. for Summ. Jud.).

Moreover, Appellees note that contract interpretation is a question of law,2

and the trial court correctly concluded that, as a matter of law, Appellant was

using the rowing machine when she was injured, and therefore her claimed

injuries are barred by the exculpatory clause in the Agreement. See id. at

____________________________________________

1 In her Rule 1925(b) statement, Appellant did not assert that the term “use”

or any other portion of the Agreement were ambiguous. Accordingly,
Appellant waived any claim concerning ambiguity for failing to raise it in her
Rule 1925(b) statement. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii) (providing that any
issue not included in a Rule 1925(b) statement will be deemed waived on
appeal); see also Greater Erie Indus. Dev. Corp. v. Presque Isle Downs,
Inc., 88 A.3d 222, 224 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc) (stating that an
appellant’s failure to include an issue in a Rule 1925(b) statement results in
waiver).

2 We reiterate that Appellant has not claimed that any terms of the Agreement

were ambiguous.

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14. Further, the exculpatory clause includes injuries “arising from the use of

any exercise equipment or exercise machines,” and it “does not distinguish

between broken or unbroken exercise machines, and [it] encompasses the

use of any exercise machines.” Id. (emphasis in original).

      The trial court addressed this issue as follows:

      Here, the trial court properly found that the term “use” in
      subsection (i) of the exculpatory clause as well as other
      subsections in [the] Agreement covered the cause of [Appellant’s]
      injury. In particular, the following sections of the exculpatory
      clause applied:

         Member voluntarily agrees to assume all risks of personal
         injury to Member, and waives any and all claims or actions
         that Member may have against Blink, any of its subsidiaries
         or other affiliates . . . for any such personal injury, including,
         without limitation (i) injuries arising from the use of any
         exercise equipment or exercise machines, . . . (iii) injuries
         . . . resulting from exercising at the Club; and (iv) any other
         accidental injuries sustained within the Club.

      Membership Agreement (emphasis added).

      [Appellant] argues that the term “use” in subsection (i) of the
      exculpatory clause does not cover [Appellant’s] injury because the
      cause of [Appellant’s] injury was not [Appellant’s] use of an
      unbroken and intact rowing machine, but a broken rowing
      machine. The exculpatory clause, however, makes no distinction
      between the use of an unbroken and intact exercise machine and
      a broken exercise machine. Subsection (i) of the exculpatory
      clause states “ the use of any . . . exercise machines.”
      Membership Agreement (emphasis added).

      As such, the trial court properly found the term “use” in subsection
      (i) of the exculpatory clause as well as other subsections in [the]
      Agreement covered the cause of [Appellant’s] injury.

Trial Ct. Op., 2/21/23, at 5-6.

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      The Agreement expressly provides that Appellant waived damages for

“injuries arising from the use of any exercise equipment or exercise

machines, . . . injuries . . . resulting from exercising at the Club; and . . .

any other accidental injuries sustained within the Club.”           Agreement,

8/24/17, at 4 (emphases added).        Appellant alleged that “[o]n or about

January 2, 2019, [she] used a rowing machine located at [Appellees’] gym.

Appellant’s Am. Compl., 4/6/21, at ¶10 (emphasis added). Additionally, the

record further reflects that in her response to Appellees’ motion for summary

judgment, Appellant stated that she “went to the gym on January 2, 2019.

She checked in, then went to use a rowing machine. Seeing one open, she

sat on it, and began rowing.         Without warning, the machine fell over,

causing her to fall to the ground.” Appellant’s Mem. of Law in Response to

Appellees’ Mot. for Summ. Jud., 6/3/22, at ¶III (emphases added). By her

own declaration, Appellant was engaged in the “use” of the machine in

Appellees’ gym when she sustained an injury. Accordingly, we agree with the

trial court’s conclusion that Appellant’s injury arose while she was using

Appellees’ equipment and that the clear terms of the Agreement precluded

recovery. See Riverview Carpet & Flooring, Inc., 299 A.3d at 983-84;

Milshteyn, 271 A.3d at 504.

                              Reckless Conduct

      In her third issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in granting

summary judgment because, although the Agreement released Appellees

from claims of ordinary negligence, it was against public policy for the

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Agreement to bar recovery from injuries caused by Appellees’ recklessness.

Appellant’s Brief at 8-10.

       Appellees respond that Appellant waived this claim because she failed

to include it in her Rule 1925(b) statement or raise it in her response in

opposition to Appellees’ motion for summary judgment. Appellees’ Brief at 9,

10-11.

       Here, the record confirms that Appellant failed to include this issue in

her Rule 1925(b) statement.3            See Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) Statement,

10/17/22.       Accordingly, Appellant waived this issue.        See Pa.R.A.P.

1925(b)(4)(vii); Greater Erie Indus. Dev. Corp., 88 A.3d at 224. In any

event, even if Appellant had included the claim concerning recklessness in the

Rule 1925(b) statement, we would agree with Appellees that Appellant waived

the issue by failing to include it in her response to Appellees’ motion for

summary judgment.          Our review confirms that although Appellant alleged

recklessness in her amended complaint, she did not raise it in her Pa.R.C.P.

1035.3 response to Appellees’ motion for summary judgment. See McHugh

____________________________________________

3 To the extent that Appellant alleges on appeal that her injuries may have

been caused by Appellees’ gross negligence, we conclude that claim is waived
because Appellant did not plead gross negligence in the amended complaint.
See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (stating “[i]ssues not raised in the trial court are waived
and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal”); Milshteyn, 271 A.3d at
505 (providing that where an exculpatory clause bars claims for negligence,
gross negligence is a distinct cause of action from negligence that must be
pleaded separately); see also Monroe v. CBH20, LP, 286 A.3d 785, 799 n.5
(Pa. Super. 2022) (en banc) (explaining that pleading a claim of negligence
does not include the separate claim of gross negligence).

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v. Proctor & Gamble, 875 A.2d 1148, 1151 (Pa. Super. 2005) (explaining

that the failure to raise an argument in opposition to a motion for summary

judgment waives that claim, and it may not be raised for the first time on

appeal); see also Pa.R.C.P. 1035.3(a) (providing that when a motion for

summary judgment is filed, the responding party may not rest upon the

allegations or denials in the pleadings).

      On this record, for the reasons set forth herein, we discern no error of

law nor abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision granting Appellees’

motion for summary judgment. See Matos, 291 A.3d at 904. Accordingly,

we affirm.

      Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Date: 10/30/2023

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