Court Opinion

ID: 9571808
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:35:20.70355+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:31:02.393190
License: Public Domain

Justice Frye
dissenting in part.
I respectfully dissent from that part of the Court’s opinion which concludes that the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of Counts I and II of Chatham and Wake Counties’ complaint and Counts I, II, and IV of Richmond County’s complaint based solely on our decision in Granville Co. Bd. of Comrs. v. N.C. Haz. Waste Mgmt. Comm., 329 N.C. 615, 407 S.E.2d 785, reh’g denied, 409 S.E.2d 593 (1991) [hereinafter Granville County]. For essentially the same reasons stated by Judge Cozort in his dissenting opinion in the Court of Appeals, I do not believe that our decision in Granville County requires the dismissal of the complaints at this stage of the proceedings.
It should be emphasized that the issue before this Court is not whether the declaratory and injunctive relief sought by plaintiffs should be granted, but whether the actions should be maintained at all, that is, whether a justiciable issue exists.
“A justiciable issue has been defined as an issue that is ‘real and present as opposed to imagined or fanciful.’ In re Williamson, 91 N.C. App. 668, 373 S.E.2d 317 (1988) (citing [Sprouse v. North River Ins. Co., 81 N.C. App. 311, 344 S.E.2d 55, disc. rev. denied, 318 N.C. 284, 348 S.E.2d 344 (1986)], . . .). In order to find complete absence of a justiciable issue it must conclusively appear that such issues are absent even *89giving the pleadings the indulgent treatment they receive on motions for summary judgment or to dismiss. [Sprouse, 81 N.C. App.] at 682-3, 373 S.E.2d at 325. (Citation omitted.)”
Sunamerica Financial Corp. v. Bonham, 328 N.C. 254, 257, 400 S.E.2d 435, 437 (1991) (quoting K & K Development Corp. v. Columbia Banking Fed. Savings & Loan, 96 N.C. App. 474, 479, 386 S.E.2d 226, 229 (1989)). Giving the pleadings in this case the indulgent treatment they are entitled to receive on a motion to dismiss, I conclude that the issues are real and present and not imagined or fanciful. Thus, dismissal on the basis of nonjusticiability is improper.
Unlike the majority which reads Granville County as “bar[ring] all site-selection-related litigation until site selection has been completed,” I read Granville County as providing “guidance to the lower courts as to their proper and timely role” in cases such as these, within the context of the facts, as they occurred in that particular case. Granville County, 329 N.C. at 623, 407 S.E.2d at 790. Proceeding from this construction of Granville County, I find the claims in question to be justiciable, that is, ripe for decision.
In Granville County, the Granville County Board of Commissioners initiated an action against the North Carolina Hazardous Waste Management Commission [hereinafter the Commission], seeking a temporary restraining order, a preliminary order and a permanent injunction to enjoin the Commission from siting a hazardous waste treatment facility on a specific parcel of land in Granville County, alleging that the Commission had violated statutory and administrative rules prohibiting the siting of a hazardous waste facility within twenty-five miles of a polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB) landfill facility. The Commission’s process included selection of “suitable” sites for further study, designation of a “preferred” site for the permit application, and issuance of a permit. At the time the action was brought, the parcel of land in Granville County had been selected as a “suitable” site but had not been designated a “preferred” site.
The agency decision at issue in Granville County was the Commission’s choice of a particular site which would not have been final until several additional steps occurred. In the present case, plaintiffs’ claims attack defects in the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Authority’s [hereinafter the Authority] selection process which will remain defects no matter what site is ultimately *90chosen. Plaintiffs alleged the following: that the Authority had failed to comply with applicable law in its evaluation of potential suitable sites for placement of a low-level radioactive waste disposal facility; that the process of site selection as it had been undertaken by defendants was flawed, primarily due to defendants’ reliance upon incorrect, incomplete, or outdated information, and because of substantive errors in the precharacterization report; and that the Authority’s vice-chairman had failed to disclose that her husband owned stock in the grandparent company of Chem-Nuclear and in various low-level radioactive waste generators which would use the proposed facility.
The factual differences between Granville County and the present case are more than “illusory” as the majority asserts in its opinion but instead are critical to a determination of whether the case at hand is premature. Contrary to the majority’s opinion, this Court in Granville County did not set a broad rule of ripeness but used the specific facts as they occurred in that case in analyzing whether the suit was justiciable.
The majority sets forth numerous public policy considerations which undoubtedly deserve great attention from this Court; however, they do not justify shutting down the courts to any and all site-related litigation “until the permitting process has been completed and the final site selection has been made.” As Judge Cozort stated in his dissent:
To hold otherwise runs perilously close to violating Article I, Section 18 of the Constitution of North Carolina, which mandates that “(a)ll courts shall be open; every person for an injury done to him in his lands, goods, person or reputation shall have remedy by due course of law; and right and justice shall be administered without favor, denial, or delay.”
Richmond Co. v. N.C. Low-Level Radioactive Waste Mgmt. Auth., 108 N.C. App. 700, 710, 425 S.E.2d 468, 474 (1993) (Cozort, J., dissenting in part) [hereinafter Richmond County]. The majority’s decision could delay the correction of obvious and apparent defects in the proceedings for years. Equally as important as the public policy considerations discussed at length by the majority are concerns involving the ramifications of a lengthy, elaborate and complicated process of evaluation, study and final selection of a site which could be reversed by litigation that, absent the majority’s decision, could have addressed the problem early on.
*91Our decision in Granville County should not serve as a complete bar to the courts, irrespective of the facts and circumstances, in cases where genuine controversies exist between parties such as the ones at hand. As Judge Cozort observed:
[Allowing plaintiffs’ claims regarding adherence to statutes and rules would not create a risk that the administrative process would be improperly delayed by frivolous claims for injunctive relief. No plaintiff would be entitled to preliminary injunctive relief unless evidence was presented which demonstrated probable cause plaintiff will be able to establish the rights asserted and a reasonable apprehension of irreparable loss unless immediate relief is granted.
Richmond County, 108 N.C. App. at 710-11, 425 S.E.2d at 474-75 (quoting Williams v. Greene, 36 N.C. App. 80, 85, 243 S.E.2d 156, 159, rev. denied, 295 N.C. 471, 246 S.E.2d 12 (1978)).
Thus, I respectfully dissent from that part of the majority opinion which holds that Granville County compels dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims on the grounds that such claims do not present justiciable issues and that no genuine controversy exists between the parties.