Court Opinion

ID: 9940528
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-14 18:01:01.944434+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:44:58.164919
License: Public Domain

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

                        UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                             FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                                 _______________

                                      No. 23-1956
                                    _______________

                            UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

                                             v.

                                  JOSEPH M. GREENE,
                                              Appellant
                                    _______________

                     On Appeal from the United States District Court
                         for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
                              (D.C. No. 2:15-cr-00124-001)
                     Chief District Judge: Honorable Juan R. Sanchez
                                     _______________

                      Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
                                 on February 2, 2023

               Before: KRAUSE, PORTER, and CHUNG, Circuit Judges

                                (Filed: February 14, 2024)

                                    _______________

                                       OPINION*
                                    _______________

*
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, under I.O.P. 5.7, is not binding
precedent.
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge.

       Joseph Greene violated the conditions of his supervised release and was sentenced

to 24 months’ imprisonment, followed by two additional years of supervision. Having

appealed the validity of this sentence, Greene’s counsel has moved to withdraw under

Third Circuit Local Appellate Rule (L.A.R.) 109.2 and Anders v. California, 386 U.S.

738 (1967), asserting that there are no non-frivolous grounds for appeal. The

Government agrees, and Greene, for his part, declined to submit a pro se brief. Because

we agree there are no non-frivolous issues for appeal with regard to Greene’s sentence,

we will grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the District Court’s judgment.

I.     DISCUSSION1

       When defense counsel files an Anders motion, we first evaluate the adequacy of

counsel’s briefing and then conduct a full examination of the proceedings to determine

whether an appeal would be wholly frivolous. United States v. Langley, 52 F.4th 564,

568 (3d Cir. 2022). Counsel’s briefing is adequate if it satisfies L.A.R. 109.2(a), which

requires counsel to “(1) demonstrate[] to this Court that [he] has thoroughly examined the

record in search of appealable issues, and (2) explain[] why those issues are frivolous.”

Id. at 569. Counsel need not “raise every possible appealable issue to meet this

standard,” but she must “adequately attempt to uncover the best arguments” and explain

       1
         The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3231 and 3583(e). We
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742. We review the District
Court’s sentence for reasonableness under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v.
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007); United States v. Woronowicz, 744 F.3d 848, 851
(3d Cir. 2014).
                                             2
their faults. Id. at 569–70 (citations omitted). We next conduct our own review of the

record, and if we are satisfied there are no non-frivolous issues for appeal, we will grant

counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm. Id. at 568. We discuss both steps below.

       A. Defense Counsel’s Anders Brief

       In the circumstances of this case, defense counsel’s filing, on the whole, is

sufficient to satisfy L.A.R. 109.2(a).

       In the text of his Anders brief, counsel argues that there are no non-frivolous

issues for appeal because the District Court’s sentence was procedurally correct.

Specifically, counsel notes the District Court properly considered the sentencing factors

under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), explained its reasoning, and informed Greene of his appellate

rights and the conditions of his sentence. Counsel also notes that the sentence was

“properly imposed and calculated under the [U.S. Sentencing Guidelines].”2 Anders Br.

3.

       In addition, counsel submitted a detailed “Anders Checklist” that includes his

analysis of approximately thirteen potential sentencing defects. This reflects that counsel

reviewed the entire record to ensure that the District Court satisfied all procedural

requirements. Finally, the Government conducted its own review confirming there are no

non-frivolous issues for appeal.

       2
           While counsel “need not raise every frivolous issue,” United States v. Langley,
52 F.4th 564, 566 (3d Cir. 2022), we note that counsel’s brief here is unusually short and
cites little caselaw. Given the review reflected by the checklist and the fact that the
record is straightforward, however, we find that counsel has satisfied L.A.R. 109.2(a).
                                              3
       B. Greene’s Sentence

       Our independent review of the proceedings also demonstrates that Greene’s

sentence was procedurally and substantively reasonable. We must first “ensure that the

district court committed no significant procedural error” when reviewing a sentencing

challenge. Langley, 52 F.4th at 576 (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51

(2007)). If there is no such error, we next determine whether the sentence was

substantively reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. Id.

       Here, the District Court did not commit any procedural errors at sentencing. The

parties agreed prior to Greene’s hearing that the applicable Guidelines range was 18–24

months’ imprisonment, and, even in the absence of such agreement, that range was

correct.3 The Court discussed the factors outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), analyzing

Greene’s criminal history and behavior, the serious nature of the violation at issue, the

need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, and whether the sentence was

“sufficient and not greater than necessary” to curb Greene’s recidivism. App. 38-42; 18

U.S.C. § 3553(a). It also considered Greene’s motion for a downward departure,

permitted Greene to speak at length, and explained why it selected the given sentence.

       3
         Greene committed a Grade A violation of supervised release because he engaged
in conduct constituting a state or local offense punishable by a term of imprisonment
exceeding one year that involved possession of a firearm. See U.S. Sent’g Guidelines
Manual § 7B1.1(a)(1) (U.S. Sent’g Comm’n 2023). Greene’s underlying convictions
were Class B felonies under 18 U.S.C. § 1014. See 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)(2). And at the
time Greene was originally sentenced to supervision, the District Court determined he
had a criminal history category of III. As such, the Guidelines range of 18–24 months
was the appropriate range for revocation of release, see U.S. Sent’g Guidelines Manual §
7B1.4, and 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h) authorized an additional term of supervised release after
he served his revocation sentence.
                                             4
The Court even went so far as to ask the parties whether there were any “procedural

irregularities” that needed to be addressed and whether “there [was] an adequate

discussion based on the 3553(a) factors to justify the extent of the sentence.” App. 46.

None were identified by the parties.

       Greene’s sentence of 24 additional months of imprisonment and two years of

supervised release was also substantively reasonable. A sentence is substantively

reasonable unless “no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same

sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons the district court provided.” United

States v. Shah, 43 F.4th 356, 367 (3d Cir. 2022) (quoting United States v. Tomko, 562

F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir. 2009)). Greene’s sentence was imposed for his second violation

of the conditions of his supervised release, and it was a serious violation: Greene fired a

weapon in a public square, resulting in six separate charges. Notably, his conduct

violated multiple terms of supervised release that were running concurrently, for which

the District Court could have imposed multiple, consecutive revocation sentences, United

States v. Dees, 467 F.3d 847, 851–52 (3d Cir. 2006), but the District Court declined to do

so, and the sentence it did impose fell within the Guidelines range. See United States v.

Woronowicz, 744 F.3d 848, 852 (3d Cir. 2014) (explaining that sentences within the

correct Guidelines range are more likely to be reasonable than those outside the range).

In addition, the District Court was permitted to impose up to 30 months’ additional

supervised release, see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b)(1), (h), but it opted to impose only 24

months. Accordingly, it was reasonable—if not lenient—for the District Court to

sentence Greene as it did.

                                             5
II.    CONCLUSION

       For the foregoing reasons, we will grant defense counsel’s motion to withdraw and

affirm the District Court’s judgment.4

       4
        In accordance with L.A.R. 109.2(b) we state that the issues presented here lack
legal merit, and so Greene’s counsel is not required to file a petition for writ of certiorari
with the Supreme Court.
                                               6