Court Opinion

ID: 2965106
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:35:29.358271+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:43:05.315432
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                                [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

                            United States Court of Appeals
                            United States Court of Appeals
                                for the First Circuit
                                for the First Circuit

                                 ____________________

        No. 97-1729

                                   GEORGE W. DAVID,

                                Plaintiff, Appellant,

                                          v.

                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                 Defendant, Appellee.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                    [Hon. Michael A. Ponsor, U.S. District Judge]
                                             ___________________
                   [Hon. Kenneth P. Neiman, U.S. Magistrate Judge]
                                            _____________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                 Selya, Circuit Judge,
                                        _____________
                            Aldrich, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                     ____________________
                              and Boudin, Circuit Judge.
                                          _____________

                                 ____________________

            Paul M.  Stein with whom Malkasian,  Hicinbothem & Mollica was  on
            ______________           _________________________________
        brief for appellant.
            Bridget M. Rowan with  whom Gilbert S.  Rothenberg, Attorneys, Tax
            ________________            ______________________
        Division,  Department  of  Justice,   Loretta  C.  Argrett,  Assistant
                                              ____________________
        Attorney General, and  Donald K. Stearn, United  States Attorney, were
                               ________________
        on brief for appellee.

                                 ____________________

                                  December 29, 1997
                                 ____________________

                      ALDRICH, Senior Circuit  Judge.  In this  action to
                               _____________________

            recover  funds  advanced  to  the  Internal  Revenue  Service

            ("IRS")  by   George  W.   David,  plaintiff-appellant,   the

            magistrate judge's opinion, confirmed by the district  court,

            acceptably  reduced the dispute to what  was the character of

            David's  remittance, whether a tax  payment or a deposit, and

            whether the  equities overcame a decision  otherwise favoring

            the government.  On summary judgment, it found the remittance

            a payment,  which meant that  the refund claim had  been made

            too late, and denied any equitable extension.  We affirm.

                      Shortly before April 15, 1990, when his 1989 income

            tax return,  and payment, were to fall  due, David's business

            records were taken into federal  custody pursuant to a search

            warrant.   Without them he  could not prepare his  return or,

            allegedly, even reasonably estimate his  tax.  On April 15 he

            filed  a request  on Form  4868 for  an automatic  four month

            extension of time to file his return.  With  this he enclosed

            a  check for  $12,000, which  the IRS  negotiated.   He later

            obtained a second extension to October  15, 1990.  He did not

            file his 1989 return, however, until February 24, 1994.

                      On the return when filed David noted the $12,000 as

            an "Amount paid with Form 4868."  With credits, it turned out

            that all that  had been due was $749,  and the return claimed

            refund of the  $11,251 balance.  The refund  claim was timely

            under I.R.C.   6511(a).  Cf.  Oropallo v. United States,  994
                                     ___  ________    _____________

                                         -2-

            F.2d 25,  27 (1st  Cir. 1993) (per  curiam) (assuming  that a

            late return is  a "return" within the  meaning of   6511(a)),

            cert.  denied, 510  U.S. 1050  (1994).   Unhappily,  however,
            _____________

              6511(b)(2)(A) limited the amount of credit or refund to the

            amount  of tax  paid within  the  three years,  plus the  six

            months extension preceding the refund claim.  Accordingly, as

            a claim  for refund of a tax payment  made on April 15, 1990,

            David's return was some four months too late.  It was not too

            late if the remittance had simply been a deposit.

                      The IRS stood on its position of payment, and David

            brought  this  suit.   In  his  complaint,  doubtless because

            executed pro se, he asserted that he was suing for an  income

            tax refund  of $11,251,  which, inescapably,  was the  unused

            portion  of  his  $12,000 remittance.    Eventually,  when he

            obtained counsel who examined the law, David realized that he

            had intended  the $12,000  to be a  general deposit,  not the

            estimated  tax  payment  (larger  for  safety),  required  to

            accompany his Form 4868.

                      Concededly,  whether a remittance  to the IRS  is a

            payment, or is a general  deposit whose recovery would not be

            statutorily  barred,   may  be   a  matter   of  intent   and

            circumstance.  See  generally Rosenman v. United  States, 323
                           ___  _________ ________    ______________

            U.S. 658,  662 (1945); Moran  v. United States, 63  F.3d 663,
                                   _____     _____________

            668-69 (7th Cir. 1995); Blatt  v. United States, 34 F.3d 252,
                                    _____     _____________

            254-55 (4th Cir. 1994).  But even if the IRS is  incorrect in

                                         -3-

            claiming  that the circumstances  shown warrant finding  of a

            tax payment as matter of law under I.R.C.   6513(b)(1), which

            we do not  decide, but cf. Gabelman v.  Commissioner, 86 F.3d
                               ___ __  ________     ____________

            609,  612 (6th  Cir.  1996) (holding  remittance accompanying

            Form  4868  to  be  a  payment  as  a  matter  of  law  under

              6513(b)(1));  Weigand v. United States, 760 F.2d 1072, 1073
                            _______    _____________

            (10th Cir.  1985) (same), it  is only natural to  assume that

            the  $12,000 check  was the  payment that  the form  said was

            required in the  absence of  any assertion  to the  contrary.

            David points to  no objective manifestation of  his "deposit"

            intention at the time of remittance.1  To this we add his now

            counsel's  inability, at  oral argument,  even  to suggest  a

            purpose for intending a deposit.

                      We  cannot decide in David's favor.  Undoubtedly he

            had a tax liability on April 15, 1990.  See I.R.C.   6151(a);
                                                    ___

            Manning v. Seeley  Tube & Box Co., 338 U.S.  561, 565 (1950).
            _______    ______________________

            His extension to  file did not postpone this  liability.  See
                                                                      ___

            26  C.F.R.    1.6081-1(a)  and 1.6081-4(b).    His Form  4868

            remittance, required to be an estimate of this liability, was

            made in  recognition thereof.   With no further  showing, the

            presumed  intention  was  to  discharge  the  liability  that

                                
            ____________________

            1.  Neither party was able to produce David's Form 4868.  His
            oft-repeated   characterization   of    his   remittance   as
            "arbitrary" in calculation  is insufficient  in this  regard.
            Similarly  insufficient are his  contentions as to  the IRS's
            accounting  practices,   which  reveal  nothing   of  David's
            supposed deposit intent.

                                         -4-

            renders the remittance a payment.  Cf. Moran, 63 F.3d at 668;
                                               ___ _____

            Blatt, 34  F.3d at 255-57;  Ewing v. United States,  914 F.2d
            _____                       _____    _____________

            499, 504 (4th Cir. 1990),  cert. denied, 500 U.S. 905 (1991);
                                       ____________

            Ameel v. United States, 426  F.2d 1270, 1273 (6th Cir. 1970).
            _____    _____________

            Accordingly,  David's  refund   claim  fails  by   reason  of

              6511(b)(2)(A).

                      David's  equitable   claim,  failing   his  deposit

            argument,  is based  on the  following facts.   His  time for

            filing a claim for refund of a  tax payment made on April 15,

            1990 would expire, given the six months extension allowed for

            filing the return  and claim, on October  15, 1993.  On  that

            date, however, he was in  federal custody.  The total picture

            is  that the  government maintained  its  custody of  David's

            needed records  from April 4,  1990 until February  21, 1992.

            It  then,  pursuant to  an  agreement between  David  and his

            former  employer, released them  to a third  party for making

            copies;  neither principal party  to have access  without the

            presence of the  other until the copying was  completed.  For

            some  undisclosed reason,  David  did  not  finally  get  his

            records until December 31, 1992.

                      Surely  there could be  no per diem  charge against

            the government for the time that the records were lawfully in

            its custody early on; the equity issue would turn on how much

            time was  left, obviously there  was enough.  Nor  should the

            government be  charged for the  possible difficulties imposed

                                         -5-

            by David's  voluntary surrender  thereafter for  copying.   A

            more serious matter,  following a plea (to  unrelated federal

            counts) on December 10, 1992, David himself was in government

            custody; January 8, 1993 to October 4, 1993, in prison; then,

            to January 5, 1994, in  a halfway house.  Reasonably promptly

            thereafter, on  February 24,  1994, he  filed his return  and

            refund claim.

                      In United  States v. Brockamp, 117 S. Ct. 849, 852-
                         ______________    ________

            53  (1997),  the  Court,  seemingly  flatly,  ruled  out  all

            equitable claims that  would supplement the statutorily-given

            reasons for tolling  or extending the time  for filing claims

            for  refund  of   tax  payments.     We  might  consider   it

            particularly rough for  the government to lock  up a taxpayer

            before the time for a claim of refund  would expire, and then

            tell him it was  too late.  At the same  time, we must adhere

            to the Court's recognition that "Congress decided  to pay the

            price  of   occasional   unfairness   in   individual   cases

            (penalizing a taxpayer whose claim is unavoidably delayed) in

            order  to maintain a  more workable tax  enforcement system."

            Id. at 852; cf. Oropallo,  994 F.2d at 28-31.  We do not want
            ___         ___ ________

            to  recognize   a  special  exception  for   taxpayers  whose

            difficulties are due to their criminal convictions.

                      Affirmed.
                      _________

                                         -6-