Court Opinion

ID: 9574031
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:01:42.028065+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:43:58.537841
License: Public Domain

ORDER ON PETITION FOR REHEARING

Per Curiam:

This matter is before the court upon a petition for rehearing filed by the respondents, Donna R. McDuffie, Marlaina Jean McDuffie, and Donna R. McDuffie as Guardian ad Litem for Melissa Leigh McDuffie. After careful consideration of the petition, we are unable to discover any material fact or principle of law that we overlooked or misapprehended in reaching our decision.
With particular reference to the respondents’ contention that we have used a contradictory standard for resolving an ambiguity in a family court order, i.e., we have used, they argue, the parties’ intention and not the judge’s, we have not done so. See Eddins v. Eddins, 304 S.C. 133, 135, 403 S.E. (2d) 164, 166 (Ct. App. 1991) (“[I]n constru*409ing an ambiguous order or decree [in which the trial judge merged an agreement of the parties], the determinative factor is to ascertain the intent of the judge who wrote the order.”); Mattox v. Cassady, 289 S.C. 57, 60, 344 S.E. (2d) 620, 622 (Ct. App. 1986) (“Like any other agreement, when the language of a settlement agreement [incorporated into a divorce decree] is susceptible of more than one interpretation, it is the duty of the court to ascertain the intentions of the parties.”); see also Elliott v. Elliott, 274 S.C. 224, 226, 262 S.E. (2d) 413, 414 (1980) (“[T]he contractual nature of [the parties’] agreement was, to some extent, lost when it was incorporated into the ... Family Court Order.”). Rather, we have used the intention of both the parties and the judge. Although, as the Supreme Court noted in Elliott, the incorporation of an agreement of the parties into a decree causes the agreement to lose its contractual nature “to some extent,” the incorporation of the agreement does not require the intention of the parties to be totally disregarded. In determining the intention of the judge when construing an order that incorporated an ambiguous settlement agreement, it is not improper for the court to consider the intention of the parties. See Ratchford v. Ratchford, 295 S.C. 297, 368 S.E. (2d) 214 (Ct. App. 1988) (a court should not decide an issue relating to an agreement that has been incorporated into a decree as if there were no agreement); see also Kruse v. Todd, 260 Ga. 63, 67, 389 S.E. (2d) 488, 491 (1990) (“The meaning of a settlement agreement incorporated into a divorce decree should be determined according to the usual rules governing the construction of contracts. The cardinal rule thereof is to ascertain the intention of the parties.”); Fry v. Schwarting, 4 Va. App. 173, 355 S.E. (2d) 342 (1987) (incorporated property settlement and support agreements are subject to the same rules of construction and interpretation applicable to contracts generally). Ordinarily, when incorporating a settlement agreement negotiated by the parties the family court judge cannot be held to intend one thing and the parties another.
With particular reference to the respondents’ contention that we erred in relying on testimony to determine the meaning of the language requiring Mr. Mc-Duffie “to pay all expenses associated with [the children’s] college education[s]” because Mr. McDuffie’s attorney stipulated *410the language is unambiguous, this stipulation concerns a question of law and, therefore, is not binding on this court. See 17A Am. Jur. (2d) Contracts § 339, at 346 (1991) (whether the language of a contract is ambiguous is a question of law for the court); see also 73 Am. Jur. (2d) Stipulations § 5, at 539-40 (1974) (“It has generally been stated that the resolution of questions of law rests upon the court, uninfluenced by stipulations of the parties, and accordingly, virtually all jurisdictions recognize that stipulations as to the law are invalid and ineffective. ... It has thus been held that it is not competent for the parties or their attorneys to determine by stipulation questions as to the . . . effect of a written instrument.”); cf. Morris v. Beacham, 274 S.C. 320, 262 S.E. (2d) 921 (1980) (the creation of a trust depends upon the legal effect of language used in the instrument and, as in the case of the construction of a contract, constitutes an improper subject for stipulation and any attempted stipulation is not binding on the court).
Petition denied.