Court Opinion

ID: 9452267
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 17:35:02.909712+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:33:08.596356
License: Public Domain

KILEY, Circuit Judge
(dissenting in part).
I respectfully dissent in part. It is my opinion that Conren did not violate section 8(a)(5) by refusing to accede to the Union’s bargaining demand on March 19, 1964, and that the authorization cards offered by the Union to show majority status were insufficient to put Conren under a duty to bargain because the Union had lost a valid election within the previous year, on June 7, 1963.
I cannot accept the majority view that under sections 8(a) (5) and 9(a) Conren had an obligation to recognize the Union. The view my opinion expresses serves the congressional purpose of the act, is not precluded by sections 9(a) and 9(c), is justified under the Board and court decisions and is within the spirit of the developing statutory law.
The majority relies upon the language and legislative history of section 9 as a clear indication that Congress was aware of alternative means of selection but limited the prohibition in section 9(c) (3) to elections in effectuating the congressional policy of industrial peace. It infers that, Congress having placed a limit on one means, this court is precluded from imposing a limit on additional, different means.
Under section 8(a) (5) an employer may not “refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of section [9(a)], * * Since section 9 (a) speaks of representatives “designated [presumably by the Board after an election] or selected [presumably through less formal means] for the purposes of collective bargaining,” it is evident, as the majority recognizes, that Congress did not intend elections under section 9(c) to be the only means by which a union could become the bargaining representative within the meaning of section 8(a) (5). UMW v. Arkansas Oak Flooring Co., 351 U.S. 62, 71-72, 76 S.Ct. 559, 100 L.Ed. 941 (1956); NLRB v. Larry Faul Oldsmobile Co., 316 F.2d 595, 596-597 (7th Cir. 1963). But it does not follow, as the Board and the majority indicate, that the Company’s refusal to recognize the Union on the basis of authorization cards was an unfair labor practice under section 8(a) (5) where the Union had lost a valid election within the previous year.
*176While section 9(a) is silent as to the appropriateness or relative merits of the various means of choosing a bargaining agent, the Board and the courts have, in certain factual situations, made some distinctions between elections and less formal means of selection for purposes of section 8(a) (5). For example, an employer may be ordered to bargain with a union without an election where he has sought to use the election process to gain time to dissipate the union’s majority status. Joy Silk Mills, Inc. v. NLRB, 87 U.S.App.D.C. 360, 185 F.2d 732 (1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 914, 71 S.Ct. 734, 95 L.Ed. 1350 (1951). On the other hand, where an employer is presented with conflicting representation claims of rival unions, none of which are certified, it may not recognize any of them until an NLRB election has been held. Midwest Piping & Supply Co., 63 N.L.R.B. 1060, 1070 (1945); Barney Wilkerson Constr. Co., 145 N.L.R.B. 704, 705 (1964). The Board has imposed the Midwest Piping doctrine on an employer even where one of the competing unions had a majority of authorization cards. Novak Logging Co., 119 N.L.R.B. 1573, 1574-75 (1958). See also St. Louis Independent Packing Co. v. NLRB, 291 F.2d 700 (7th Cir. 1961).
In a related line of cases the Board and the courts have, after conflicting representation determinations, preferred election results over less formal means or vice versa, depending on the facts of the particular case. Where a union became defunct during its certification year, for instance, the Board has held that a subsequent showing of majority through authorization cards subjected the employer to a duty to bargain, despite the one-year certification rule. Rocky Mountain Phosphates, Inc., 138 N.L.R.B. 292, 295 (1962). In other circumstances, the courts have held that election results prevailed over subsequent less formal determinations of majority status. Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 75 S.Ct. 176, 99 L.Ed. 125 (1954); NLRB v. Blades Mfg. Corp., 344 F.2d 998, 1004 (8th Cir. 1965).
The rule in all of these decisions which have put a gloss on section 9(a) is that under certain circumstances only the most reliable means will be used in order to insure the employees’ freedom of choice. The holdings in the Brooks and Blades cases illustrate the application of this principle in fact situations somewhat analogous to that before us.
In Brooks the Court sustained the union chosen in a valid election against a petition of an employee majority within a year of the election in affirming the Board’s finding of an 8(a) (5) violation. It did not rest its holding upon the express 9(c) (3) limitation on the administrative powers of the Board. Instead the Court relied on the congressional policy of industrial peace reflected in the one-year spacing of 9(c) (3). In Blades the court nullified a second election (choosing the union) within a year of a valid election rejecting the union. This was by virtue of the prohibition in section 9(c) (3). But the holding of no 8 (a) (5) violation was based upon the lack of any duty upon the employer to recognize the union, even though the void election showed a majority favored the union. Presumably, the court recognized. 9(c) (3) as indicating the policy of industrial peace.
In Brooks the Supreme Court discussed the reasoning of the courts and Board with respect to the pre-Taft-Hartley “working rule” of the Board regarding the so-called “certification year.” The Court summarized the reasoning, part of which is: that the binding effect of an election, which provides responsibility in the electorate and needed coherence in administration, is “equally relevant to healthy labor relations”; that the revocation of authority conferred or withheld in a “solemn and costly” election should occur by no less a solemn occasion; and that a petition or a public meeting influenced by mass psychology is not comparable to the privacy and independence of the voting booth.
These considerations are just as important, in my view, in the question be*177fore us, where the “solemn and costly” Board-conducted election resulted in a loss to the Union and in the less “solemn” expression an employee majority within a year demanded recognition on the basis of cards. The Wagner Act provided for certification only if the union won an election. The Taft-Hartley Act requires certification whether the union wins or loses. Thus the converse of the holding in Brooks ought to control this decision.
The decisions and statutory development provide the congressional principle and decisional rule which control my opinion. In this case the Union’s soliciting of cards within a year of the valid election is as disruptive of industrial peace as a second election. In these circumstances, the rule of using the most reliable means (the valid election which the union lost) to insure employee freedom of choice should preclude the finding of an 8(a) (5) violation.
I would set aside the Board’s finding of the 8(a) (5) violation.