Court Opinion

ID: 9498266
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 17:12:41.581882+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:58:43.390146
License: Public Domain

RAWLINSON, Circuit Judge,
concurring in the result, dissenting in part:
I concur in the result in this case because, and only because, of the Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Devenpeck v. Alford, — U.S. -, 125 S.Ct. 588, 160 L.Ed.2d 537 (2004). In Devenpeck, the Court rejected our decision that probable cause to arrest must be predicated upon an offense that is “closely related” to the offense invoked by the arresting officer as the basis for arrest. See id. at 593. The Supreme Court reiterated its prior holdings that “a warrantless arrest by a law officer is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment where there is probable cause to believe that a criminal offense has been or is being committed.” Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
In this case, the magistrate judge specifically found that there was probable cause to arrest Dorsey for reckless driving. Because of that fact, the arrest was lawful, and evidence discovered during the search incident to Dorsey’s arrest was admissible. See id., see also United States v. Smith, 389 F.3d 944, 952 (2004) (holding “that as long as there is probable cause to make an arrest, and the search is conducted roughly contemporaneously with the arrest, the *1048search-incident-to-arrest doctrine applies and no warrant is required.”).
I respectfully disagree that there was probable cause to arrest Dorsey for the crime of trespassing. Alaska Stat. 11.46.330(a)(1) defines trespass as “entering] or remaining] unlawfully ... upon premises.” A person has entered or remained unlawfully on public property if he “fail[s] to leave premises ... that [are] open to the public after being lawfully directed to do so personally by the person in charge.” Alaska Stat. 11.45.350(a)(2) (emphasis added). The Alaska Court of Appeals has interpreted Alaska Stat. 11.45.350(a)(2) in the context of public property, as follows:
A person cannot be convicted under AS 11.46.350(a)(2) of “failing to leave ” a public facility “after being lawfully directed to do so ” unless the person fails to heed a reasonably contemporaneous directive to leave, or ... the person heeds the directive to leave but then returns to the public facility after only a short while.
Turney v. State, 922 P.2d 283, 288 (Alaska App.1996) (emphasis added).
Turney involved a courthouse protester who was given a letter by the court administrator informing Turney that he was “prohibited from entering or remaining on court property to engage in protest activities, picketing or pamphleteering.” Id. at 285. Approximately two months later, Turney returned to the courthouse, again engaging in protest activities. Id. A court employee called the Alaska State Troopers, who responded. Id. One of the troopers asked Turney to leave, and Turney complied. Id. Turney was subsequently charged with and convicted of trespass. Id. “[T]he State’s theory of prosecution was that Turney had committed trespass by returning to the courthouse to renew his protect activities after receiving [the court administrator’s] letter.” Id. at 286.
In reaching its decision to reverse Tur-ney’s conviction, id. at 290, the Alaska Court of Appeals started with the premise that
a criminal trespass statute which applies to public property in general, and which proscribes refusing or failing to leave a public building or public grounds upon being requested to do so by an authorized employee, limits the power of public officials to notifying people, in specified circumstances, that they may not remain on the property and does not permit them to bar entry.
Id. at 287 (citation and alterations omitted) (emphasis added).
The Turney decision discussed a Maryland case that is remarkably similar to the case before us. In that case, In re Appeal No. 631, 282 Md. 223, 383 A.2d 684 (1978), the defendant visited a school after being previously told not to return. When discovered, the defendant was taken to the vice-principal to explain his return to the premises. Having failed to give a satisfactory explanation, the defendant was arrested and convicted of trespassing. Id. at 685.
In reversing the conviction, the Maryland Court of Appeals noted that the defendant was never asked to leave the school premises on the day of the arrest. Id. at 687. “No request having been given [on that day], there was none to disobey.” Id. The Maryland Court emphasized that the previous requests to leave could not serve as the predicate for the trespass charge. Id.
State v. Johnson, 381 So.2d 498 (La. 1980), is also a similar case cited in the Alaska Court of Appeals’ decision. In Johnson, the Louisiana Supreme Court, like the Maryland Court of Appeals, focused on the lack of a request to leave on *1049the day of the alleged trespass. Id. at 500. The Louisiana Supreme Court construed the trespass statute as incorporating “a reasonably contemporaneous” request to leave. Id. The Louisiana Supreme Court defined reasonably contemporaneous as “a few hours prior to the arrest, the same day as the arrest, or such other pre-arrest interval reasonable under the ... circumstances.” Id.
Finally, the Alaska Court of Appeals turned to New York cases interpreting that state’s trespass statute. The Alaska court summarized the New York approach as consistent with that of Maryland and Louisiana. See Turney, 922 P.2d at 288. “[Ujnder New York’s general trespass statutes, the supervisor of a public facility has no such power to bar an individual from ever returning to the facility. Even though a person has previously been ordered to leave and not return, this person may not be prosecuted for trespass merely for returning on another occasion.” Id. (citations omitted).
As informed by case precedent from three other states, the Alaska Court of Appeals’ interpretation of the trespass statute poses two major impediments to finding probable cause for a trespass arrest in this case. The first is that Dorsey was not “lawfully directed” to leave the school. The second is that the record does not support the finding that he failed to leave the premises or was directed to leave on the day he was arrested.
Alaska Stat. 11.46.380(a)(1) provides that a direction to leave public premises must be done “personally by the person in charge.” The Anchorage School District developed a written warning to be given to potential trespassers. The warning specifies that it is to be given by an Alaska School District representative, not an Alaska Police Department representative. This distinction was known to the Alaska School District and Alaska Police Department, as evidenced by the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between those two entities, where representatives of each were designated as signees.1
As the Maryland Court of Appeals recognized, if the trespass warning is not given as specified in the statute, no trespass occurs upon re-entry onto the premises. See In Re Appeal No. 631, 383 A.2d at 687. In this case, no authorized representative of the Anchorage School District directed Dorsey to vacate the premises. Consequently, the provisions of the trespass statute were never triggered.
There is also no evidence in the record that Dorsey failed to leave the school premises when directed to do so. The only evidence in the record is that Dorsey was seen on campus later that day, which in no way indicates that he never left.
Further complicating the trespass charges is that, as in Turney, Dorsey was not directed to leave the campus on the day he was arrested for trespass. The Alaska Court of Appeals concluded that under these circumstances, no trespass occurred. Turney, 922 P.2d at 286. The Alaska Court of Appeals noted that the Alaska statute “does not authorize a government official to bar a person from returning to a public building and its surrounding property in perpetuity.” Id. Yet that is exactly what the government officials attempted with Dorsey. I cannot agree that the arrest for trespass was supported by probable cause, and dissent from that portion of the opinion concluding otherwise.

. The MOU was subsequently amended to specifically provide that Alaska Police Department officers were authorized to provide the trespass warning.