Court Opinion

ID: 9559480
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:30:04.317118+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:11:11.818561
License: Public Domain

SHEPARD, Justice.
This is an appeal from an order granting a new trial. Following trial, the jury returned special verdict forms relating to negligence and proximate cause which favored the plaintiff. Thereafter the trial judge concluded that the special verdict of the jury relating to proximate cause was erroneous and he made a different finding relating to proximate causation and ordered a new trial in the absence of the plaintiff accepting a remittitur lowering the damages. Upon such refusal of plaintiff, the trial judge ordered a new trial. Plaintiff appeals therefrom and defendant also cross-appeals asserting that the trial judge erred in not granting the new trial upon additional grounds. We reverse the order of the trial court granting a new trial and affirm the trial court’s action as it relates to the cross-appeal.
Plaintiff-appellant Walter B. Ryals is a mechanic, and on June 19, 1974, he was directed by his employer to remove a pump from the boiler room located in the basement of a building owned by defendant-respondent Broadbent Development Company. The sole access to that boiler room is from a rear alley and thence through a door and down a stairway. The platform at the top of the stairway was unstable and the edges of the landing and the stairway steps were badly worn and cupped from long use and lack of repair. Additionally, the platform and stairway had no handrail. Ryals had used that entrance to the boiler room approximately 12 times without any incident and was aware of the above mentioned conditions. Ryals carried his tools down the stairway, disconnected the pump and carried his tools back up the stairway. While on the landing at the top of the stairway, he leaned out of the doorway and placed his tools in the alley. He then straightened, turned to his left and took a step backward to begin his second descent of the stairs. At that moment he fell off the side of the platform, landing on the concrete floor and sustained injuries to his left shoulder, elbow, hand and wrist.
Following trial, the jury returned special verdict forms in which they found defendant Broadbent guilty of negligence and also found that Broadbent’s negligence was the proximate cause of Ryals’ injuries. The jury also found that plaintiff Ryals was negligent, but in addition specifically found on the fourth special interrogatory that Ryals’ negligence was not a proximate cause of the accident or injuries.
Broadbent filed motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or in the alternative, for a new trial and for a remittitur of those damages it claimed were excessive. The trial court denied the motion for judgment N.O.V. The trial judge found, however, contrary to the finding of the jury, that plaintiff Ryals’ negligence was a proximate cause of his injury. The trial judge concluded that plaintiff Ryals’ negligence was a causative factor of his injuries to the extent of 45% of the total damages. The court therefore ordered a new trial unless plaintiff Ryals agreed to accept a reduction of 45% of the $80,000 verdict, i. e., $36,000. See, IRCP 59(a)(6). Plaintiff Ryals appeals from that order granting the new trial and defendant Broadbent cross-appeals arguing that the order granting the new trial should *394have been based on additional grounds, i. e., excessive damages, insufficient evidence to support a finding that the defendant was negligent in any respect and that the court’s instructions were erroneous. Defendant also asserts error in the admission of certain evidence.
Plaintiff’s appeal from the order granting the new trial raises once again the continuing and vexing problem, to wit,
“What function does a trial judge perform after a jury has rendered a verdict on the basis of highly conflicting evidence which will support a verdict for either plaintiff or defendants? May the trial judge, as the majority states, in effect reverse the action of the jury solely because of a ‘gut reaction’ that the verdict did not render ‘substantial justice’ or is ‘contrary to the evidence as a whole?’ Or on the other hand is the jury truly the trier of the facts?” Deshazer v. Tompkins, 93 Idaho 267, 460 P.2d 402 (1969) dissenting opinion.
The instant case is one in which a trial to a jury was sought and obtained. One of the most basic precepts in our system of jurisprudence is that determinations of fact by a jury will not, except in extraordinary circumstances, be overturned by the court, trial or appellate, if there is substantial evidence sustaining those factual findings. In addition, such deference has been the abiding rule in Idaho with respect also to dismissals of complaints, summary judgments, judgment on the pleadings, non-suits, directed verdicts and judgments notwithstanding the verdict. See, IRCP 12(b), (c), 41(b), 50(a), (b), 56; Bank of Commerce v. Baldwin, 12 Idaho 202, 85 P. 497 (1906); Hendrix v. Twin Falls, 54 Idaho 130, 29 P.2d 352 (1934).
In the cases of Baldwin v. Ewing, 69 Idaho 176, 204 P.2d 430 (1949); National Produce Distributors v. Grube, 78 Idaho 33, 297 P.2d 284 (1956); Checketts v. Bowman, 70 Idaho 463, 220 P.2d 682 (1950), and the dissenting opinions in Sanchotena v. Tower Co., 74 Idaho 541, 264 P.2d 1021 (1953) and Deshazer v. Tompkins, supra, it is indicated that the jury is to determine the weight of the evidence, assign credibility or non-credibility to the testimony of witnesses, thereupon reach a verdict and that the trial court, acting upon motions for new trials, should not substitute their judgment for that of a jury.
On the other hand, another line of cases indicates that in Idaho the trial judge is possessed of extremely broad discretion in acting as a “thirteenth juror” who is entitled to override the verdict of the other jurors if he conceives that justice has not been done. See, Grimm v. Harper, 84 Idaho 220, 370 P.2d 197 (1962); Say v. Hodgin, 20 Idaho 64, 116 P. 410 (1911); Hall v. Johnson, 70 Idaho 190, 214 P.2d 467 (1950); Warren v. Eshelman, 88 Idaho 496, 401 P.2d 539 (1965); Rosenberg v. Toetly, 93 Idaho 135, 456 P.2d 779 (1969); Deshazer v. Tompkins, supra.
In the case at bar we find no necessity to resolve the above conflict in philosophy which is indicated by the parallel lines of cases. All such cases have arisen in the context of a general jury verdict and the need or lack thereof for a trial judge to act as a thirteenth juror and exercise his discretion and grant a motion for a new trial when the judge feels the clear weight of admissible evidence is against the general jury verdict albeit there may be substantial conflicting evidence to support the jury’s general verdict. We find, however, no Idaho case specifically dealing with the discretion of a trial judge to grant a new trial where, as is the situation here, the jury has delivered its verdict by special interrogatories under the provisions of IRCP 49(a) and (b).
In the case at bar as a result of the jury’s special interrogatories the focus is extremely narrow and points only to questions of negligence and proximate cause. Indeed, this Court has repeatedly laid down the rule that such clear factual questions are to be resolved by the jury. Lundy v. Hazen, 90 Idaho 323, 411 P.2d 768 (1966); Schaefer v. Elswood Trailer Sales, 95 Idaho 654, 516 P.2d 1168 (1973); Ebert v. Newton, 97 Idaho 418, 546 P.2d 64 (1976). The questions posed by the special interrogatories *395under the provisions of our comparative negligence statute (I.C. § 6-801) further narrow and focus the factual determination by requiring a finding as to the quantum of the respective negligence of the plaintiff and the defendant. The jury found, as did the trial judge, negligence on behalf of the plaintiff. The jury and the trial judge found negligence on the part of the defendant. It is only as to the quantum of plaintiff's negligence as being a proximate cause of the injuries where a variance exists between the finding of the jury and the finding of the trial judge. The jury found that the negligence of the plaintiff was not a causative factor in any degree. The trial judge purporting to act on the basis of the same evidence as did the jury and presumably under the same principles of law which he had announced to the jury in his instructions assigned a causative factor of 45% to the negligence of the plaintiff.
While there is substantial evidence which supports that determination by the trial judge, equally there is substantial evidence which supports the jury’s special interrogatory assigning no degree of causative factor to plaintiff’s negligence. It could be concluded that the plaintiff’s negligence in stepping backward on the platform away from the alley door was a causative factor of the fall which resulted in his injuries. It, however, could just as logically be concluded that although the plaintiff was negligent in so stepping backward on that particular platform, the defects of which he was aware, nevertheless the injury would have been prevented by the installation of a simple handrail and that the failure to install a handrail was negligence on the part of the defendant and hence, the defendant’s negligence was the entire causative factor precipitating the fall and the subsequent injuries.
We hold therefore that the action of the trial judge in overruling the verdict of the jury on the clear and narrow factual issue of causation and substituting his own judgment on the quantum of causation improperly invaded the province of the jury. In so holding, we do not, at least in the case at bar, abolish the judicial oversight function where a jury has returned a general verdict. Nor do we intend to limit the verdict discretion of a trial court in ruling on a motion for new trial based on any of the other grounds for a new trial specified in IRCP 59.
We now turn to the issues raised by defendant’s cross-appeal. He argues that the trial court should have granted the motion for new trial on additional grounds. He asserts first that the $80,000 verdict rendered by the jury was excessive as a matter of law in that the award is greater than any other reported verdict in the entire United States involving injury to the wrist and/or elbow. Be that as it may, the sole question on appeal is whether the amount of damages is supported by the evidence and we hold that it is. The evidence suggests the incurring of $2,700 in medical expenses and also suggests out-of-pocket loss of wages for ten years at $6,000 per year. There is also substantial evidence regarding plaintiff’s pain and suffering, the anxiety of having a nearly useless hand and substantial continuing arthritic pain. Thus we do not find that the jury award was excessive as a matter of law in that it was not supported by the evidence.
Defendant next asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that the defendant was negligent in any degree. Such argument is based largely on the fact that the plaintiff admitted at trial that he did not know exactly and precisely what had caused him to fall and thus the jury could have only based its finding of defendant’s negligence on speculation. We disagree. The circumstantial evidence provides a substantial base from which the jury could draw its factual conclusions of negligence and proximate cause. Dent v. Hardware Mutual Cas. Co., 86 Idaho 427, 388 P.2d 89 (1963); Splinter v. City of Nampa, 74 Idaho 1, 256 P.2d 215 (1953).
Defendant also asserts that the court’s instructions regarding the duty of defendant regarding obvious hazards on its premises was erroneous. The argument assumes two forms. First, defendant argues that he *396had no duty whatsoever to inspect, forewarn of or correct any obvious hazard which should be apparent to any business invitee. Instruction No. 27 provides as follows:
“The owner or operator of premises may be liable for physical injuries to an invitee proximately caused by the unsafe or dangerous condition of his premises even though the danger is obvious and known to such invitee if the owner or operator of the premises had reason to expect that the invitee would proceed to encounter the obvious danger because to a reasonable man in his position the advantages of doing so (or the disadvantage of not doing so) would outweigh the apparent risk.”
That instruction was taken almost verbatim from Restatement of Torts, 2d ed. § 343A, and has been widely accepted since its adoption, Annot. 35 A.L.R.3d 230 (1971), and we find no error therein. Although defendant argues that Otts v. Brough, 90 Idaho 124, 409 P.2d 95 (1965) and Mann v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 95 Idaho 732, 518 P.2d 1194 (1974) mandate a contrary result, we do not agree. Both cases are distinguishable in that there is no indication therein the invitees were aware of the dangers or that in any event the owner of the premises should have expected an invitee to encounter the danger.
Defendant further argues that the instructions regarding the defendant’s duty toward plaintiff were overly repetitious and unduly emphasized plaintiff’s theory of the case. While it is true that there is some overlap and repetition between and among the instructions, each of them performed a different legitimate function and while the instructions are perhaps not models of concise wording, they do not provide grounds for reversal nor do they overemphasize plaintiff’s theory of the case. As stated in Stuchbery v. Harper, 87 Idaho 12, 20, 390 P.2d 303, 307 (1964).
“In his instructions the trial judge should avoid unnecessary repetition and make the instructions as brief and concise as possible. However, clarity is of paramount importance and is not to be sacrificed to brevity.”
We have examined defendant-cross-appellant’s remaining assignments of error and find them to be without merit. The order of the district court granting a new trial is reversed with instructions that the verdict of the jury be reinstated. The action of the trial court in refusing defendant and cross-appellant’s additional grounds for a new trial is affirmed. Costs to appellant.
BISTLINE, J., concurs.
DONALDSON, J., concurs in result.