Court Opinion

ID: 9672615
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:57:59.273318+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:17.468778
License: Public Domain

MONTGOMERY, Judge
(dissenting).
The very point on which the judgment here is reversed was thoroughly considered by this Court and decided the other way less than thirty days ago. See Newsome v. Commonwealth, Ky., 366 S.W.2d 174. The question was considered by the entire Court in the Newsome case before an opinion affirming was rendered on December 14, 1962. The question was again considered in a most thorough manner on petition for rehearing. It was ably presented by counsel on original brief and in the petition. The petition for rehearing was overruled on April 19, 1963.
*866The present majority opinion does not honor the decision in the Newsome case by distinguishing it or overruling it. It simply ignores it except to. refer to the dissenting opinion therein.
The merits of the M’Naughten rule as embodied in Kentucky criminal law for more than sixty-three years are set forth in the Newsome opinion. Further discussion would appear to be useless. The instruction in its present form has been found to do justice for a long time. 3 Stanley’s Instructions, Sections 901, 906, pages 214, 220; Abbott v. Commonwealth, 107 Ky. 624, 21 Ky.Law Rep. 1372, 55 S.W. 196; Banks v. Commonwealth, 145 Ky. 800, 141 S.W. 380; Lindsay v. Commonwealth, 230 Ky. 718, 20 S.W.2d 738. The difference between the old and the new forms is technical or, as stated by Judge Palmore in his dissent in the Newsome case (quoted in the present majority opinion), the new form is “clearer and better.” A jury could not detect the technical difference and would doubtless .reach the same verdict under either form. This is certainly true under the facts of the present case.
At any rate, this is not such a case as calls for a holding that for all these past years the convictions where there was an insanity instruction were erroneous. In this case, the plea of insanity is not even justified by the evidence because, as stated in the majority opinion, the appellant “had been drinking” and “appeared in a belligerent mood.” The mere fact that the appellant was drunk does not entitle him to an insanity instruction. To authorize an insanity instruction there must be evidence of a diseased mind or something more than a violent uncontrollable desire to kill. Golden v. Commonwealth, 275 Ky. 208, 121 S.W.2d 21. Possibly an instruction under Arnold v. Commonwealth, 194 Ky. 421, 240 S.W. 87, may have been justified.
In this case, the facts are that the appellant was drunk and drunk only. Whether he got himself in such condition as a substitute for courage was a question for the jury. At any rate, he wounded his wife and killed his son without provocation. He has been twice tried and given the death sentence. To reverse the judgment in this case for the reasons given is a gross miscarriage of justice.
However, there is a further serious problem that arises by reason of the majority opinion that should be of great concern to the bench and bar alike. The able judge who tried this case gave the accepted instruction of long standing. Since the New-some opinion has been printed, and presumably has been read by the trial judge, the opinion in this case will come as a shock since no error was found in his trying of the case. This Court has merely changed a technical rule by judicial fiat.
The consternation of the trial judge at such a sudden unjustifiable change in the law will be shared by others of the profession. Rules of law of long standing should not be cast aside lightly but only upon a sound and meritorious basis. Such rules are not flapjacks and should not be tossed about as such. I cannot subscribe to an extension of the theory that has been ascribed to a former member of this Court that the law is what this Court says it is— this week. Such change destroys all of the stability and orderliness that are characteristic of the law. If such is to be the case, to paraphrase the writing of the late Judge Sims, maybe one should merely consider it one of the vicissitudes of life and go on his way rejoicing, comforted by the thought that this week’s erroneous decision may be corrected next week. Jackson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 247 S.W.2d 52.
For these reasons I respectfully dissent.
STEWART, C. J., joins me in this dissent.