Court Opinion

ID: 9382384
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-27 16:02:45.018627+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:38.975669
License: Public Domain

The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado
                 2 East 14th Avenue • Denver, Colorado 80203

                                   2023 CO 12

                      Supreme Court Case No. 21SC505
                    Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals
                     Court of Appeals Case No. 17CA2058

                                   Petitioner:

                     The People of the State of Colorado,

                                        v.

                                  Respondent:

                            Theodore Israel Madrid.

                              Judgment Affirmed
                                   en banc
                                March 27, 2023

Attorneys for Petitioner:
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General
Erin K. Grundy, Senior Assistant Attorney General
      Denver, Colorado

Attorneys for Respondent:
Megan A. Ring, Public Defender
Lynn Noesner, Deputy Public Defender
      Denver, Colorado
JUSTICE HOOD delivered the Opinion of the Court, in which JUSTICE
MÁRQUEZ, JUSTICE GABRIEL, JUSTICE HART, and JUSTICE
BERKENKOTTER joined.
CHIEF JUSTICE BOATRIGHT dissented.
JUSTICE SAMOUR did not participate.

                                   2
JUSTICE HOOD delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1    Decades ago, the Supreme Court created a three-step test for determining

when a peremptory strike against a prospective juror has been exercised in a

discriminatory manner. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96–98 (1986). The second

step requires the party responding to an accusation of a racially motivated strike

to justify the strike with a race-neutral reason. Id. at 97–98. Sometimes, an appeal

based on Batson prompts a reviewing court to return the case to the trial court for

additional findings. This occurred in the case before us involving Theodore Israel

Madrid.

¶2    Following a second appeal in this case, we agreed to consider whether a

party on remand may raise a new race-neutral reason to justify a peremptory strike

made at trial. Our answer is no. We hold that when a party has been provided

with an adequate opportunity to present its race-neutral justifications at trial, it is

barred from introducing new race-neutral justifications on remand.                Our

application of that holding to the facts here prompts us to affirm the judgment of

the court of appeals, which means that Madrid is entitled to a new trial.

                        I. Facts and Procedural History

                                      A. Trial

¶3    In 2011, Madrid was charged with one count of first degree murder and two

counts of child abuse resulting in death.

                                            3
¶4    In 2012, Madrid went to trial on these charges. During jury selection, the

prosecution excused prospective juror J.T., a Black man who indicated on his juror

questionnaire that he was sixty-eight years old, married with children, and a

retired customer-service specialist.

¶5    The trial court called J.T. into the jury box late in the jury-selection process

after excusing seven jurors. Upon replenishing the pool of prospective jurors

seated in and around the jury box, the court gave each side a total of five minutes

to question the seven new prospective jurors, including J.T.

¶6    The following exchange then occurred:

      [Prosecution]:   So, [J.T.], any issues that you had with anything that
                       either of us had said or anything that the Court has
                       said as far as the instructions of law?

      [J.T.]:          No, not yet.

      [Prosecution]:   Not yet. Okay. Any concerns about having to look
                       at—potentially have to look at autopsy pictures in the
                       case?

      [J.T.]:          No.

      [Prosecution]:   No? Okay. Anything you want to tell us?

      [J.T.]:          No.

      [Prosecution]:   Do you have a good joke?

      [J.T.]:          I’m the joke.

Later, the prosecution used its ninth peremptory challenge to excuse J.T.

¶7    In response, Madrid raised a Batson challenge. Specifically, Madrid argued:

                                          4
      [J.T.] was one of the last people on the jury. According to his
      questionnaire, he’s fact neutral. He was asked a few questions by
      both parties and he gave very short answers and seemed to be
      unbiased. I don’t see any other reason why he would be dismissed at
      this time.

¶8    The prosecution then provided the following justification for its use of a

peremptory strike:

      Judge, first of all, he’s being replaced by another African-American
      juror. So, I don’t think that they can really claim that this is not race
      neutral. But the real problem is we don’t know very much about him.
      He has a hearing issue it appears and he’s sort of completely
      nonresponsive. We have very little information on him from the
      questionnaire and no time to really have a very detailed conversation
      with him. Terribly uncomfortable with him where we have very little
      information.

The trial court confirmed the prosecution’s race-neutral reasons, repeating that the

prosecution was “excusing [J.T.] because of the little information that was

provided in the questionnaire and the brief opportunity you had to question him.”

The court also questioned the prosecution’s offered rationale that J.T. was hard of

hearing, and the prosecution clarified that “[h]e appears to and I could have just

been mumbling, but he appeared to [be hard of hearing] to me.”

¶9    Before rendering its decision on the Batson challenge, the trial court

volunteered its own assessment of J.T. The court offered that J.T. “didn’t seem like

he wanted to be here . . . based on his demeanor” and that he “seemed

disappointed that I called his name when he started walking to the front of the

courtroom.” The court also acknowledged that J.T. was soft-spoken, mumbled,

                                         5
and at times was difficult to understand, though the court expressed doubt as to

“whether that means he has a hearing problem or not.”             Finally, the court

emphasized that J.T. was replaced by another Black juror, that the defendant was

Hispanic (not Black), and that race was not an issue in the underlying case.

¶10   The court then found the defense failed to make a prima facie showing that

the prosecution excluded J.T. because of his race and that the totality of the

relevant facts didn’t give rise to an inference of purposeful discrimination, per step

one of Batson. Because the defense failed to meet its burden at Batson’s first step,

the court denied the challenge.

¶11   The following day, the trial court offered both parties the opportunity to

supplement the record from jury selection. The prosecution offered nothing more

regarding why it had exercised a peremptory strike against J.T.

¶12   After a nine-day trial, the jury convicted Madrid on all counts.

                  B. First Appeal and Remand Proceedings

¶13   Madrid appealed, and a division of the court of appeals determined that the

trial court erred by finding that Madrid had failed to meet his step-one burden of

establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. People v. Madrid, No. 13CA298,

¶ 20 (Jan. 12, 2017) (“Madrid I”).

¶14   The division considered—and rejected—some of the trial court’s stated

reasons for determining that Madrid failed to establish a prima facie case of

                                          6
discrimination.       For example, it rejected the court’s apparent reliance on its

observations that a Black juror replaced J.T. and that Madrid was Hispanic rather

than Black, explaining that prior caselaw rendered those facts irrelevant to a Batson

analysis. Madrid I, ¶¶ 16–17; see also People v. Collins, 187 P.3d 1178, 1184 (Colo.

App. 2008); People v. Burke, 937 P.2d 886, 888 (Colo. App. 1996). The division also

concluded that the trial court improperly relied on the prosecution’s arguments

that it had minimal time to question J.T. and that J.T.’s questionnaire lacked detail,

as other potential jurors with similar circumstances were seated without the lack

of information being an issue. Madrid I, ¶ 18. Thus, the division determined that

the trial court erred when it found that Madrid hadn’t made a prima facie case of

racial discrimination. Id. at ¶ 20.

¶15    The division implicitly accepted the trial court’s assertion that it stopped its

analysis before moving onto step two of Batson. Id. at ¶¶ 7, 22. So, the division

remanded the case to the trial court. Id. at ¶¶ 21–22. “Because the trial court did

not complete the three-step Batson analysis,” the division directed the trial court

to “take additional evidence and allow further argument at the request of either

party.” Id. at ¶ 22.

¶16    In 2017, the district court commenced remand proceedings to complete the

fact finding necessary for Batson’s second and third steps, almost five years after

the original trial.

                                           7
¶17   At the outset, Madrid objected to the prosecution offering race-neutral

justifications that hadn’t been stated during the 2012 jury trial. The district court

overruled the objection because the remand order explicitly instructed it to “take

additional evidence and allow further argument at the request of either party” and

because its previous ruling hadn’t extended beyond the first step of the Batson

analysis.

¶18   Because the trial court hadn’t made express findings related to the

prosecution’s stated race-neutral justifications for its strike of J.T. (Batson’s second

step), the prosecutor who conducted voir dire testified at the remand hearing to

complete the record. She acknowledged that she initially didn’t remember who

J.T. was, but her recollection of him gradually improved as she reflected on jury

selection in the case. She described J.T.’s demeanor after being called: “I believe

there was a sigh. He was slow to take his seat. He did not appear to be delighted

to know that he had now been asked to join the people in front of the bar.” She

also acknowledged that he “warm[ed] up slightly,” but not enough to assuage her

concerns that “he really didn’t want to be here for some reason” and that she

lacked information on why that might be.

¶19   The prosecutor explained her initial description of J.T. as “nonresponsive,”

clarifying that she believed that “unengaged is a better word.” She also addressed

                                           8
her comment at trial about J.T.’s hearing, contending that it related to his lack of

engagement:

      [I]t goes to the whole, I don’t want to be here, and I’m not engaging
      with you. It doesn’t matter to me why the person is not engaging with
      me. If it’s because they can’t hear and they’re willing to tell us that,
      then we might be able to make an accommodation. But if it’s because
      they can’t hear and they are unwilling to tell us that, again, they don’t
      want to be here.

When asked directly whether his hearing was the issue, she affirmed, “No,

absolutely not.”

¶20   On cross-examination by defense counsel, the prosecutor acknowledged

that she had spent less than a minute questioning J.T. and never questioned him

about anything on his questionnaire. She also confirmed that she had failed to

make a contemporaneous record that J.T. sighed and was slow to take his seat. She

claimed that while she made no explicit record that J.T. seemed unhappy to be

called forward, she had used the term “nonresponsive” to suggest as much.

¶21   At the end of the remand hearing, the district court determined that the

prosecution met its step-two burden to provide facially race-neutral reasons for

striking J.T. Then, in its step-three analysis, the court rejected Madrid’s claims that

the prosecutor’s explanations were pretextual, concluding instead that Madrid

failed to meet his burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the

prosecution engaged in purposeful discrimination.

                                          9
                                C. Second Appeal

¶22   Madrid appealed again, and a second division of the court of appeals

reversed. People v. Madrid, 2021 COA 70, 494 P.3d 624 (“Madrid II”).

¶23   The division concluded that “it is improper for a trial court to offer its own

race-neutral reason for the prosecution’s use of a peremptory strike.” Id. at ¶ 35,

494 P.3d at 631; see also Valdez v. People, 966 P.2d 587, 592 n.11 (Colo. 1998).

Accordingly, the division determined that the district court’s observation that J.T.

didn’t want to be there—an observation that the prosecution itself never voiced at

trial—was improper. Madrid II, ¶ 30, 494 P.3d at 630.

¶24   More broadly, the division held that “where the prosecution articulates its

race-neutral reason for striking a potential juror during the Batson proceedings at

trial, the district court cannot consider or base its ruling on new justifications

offered on remand.” Id. at ¶ 4, 494 P.3d at 626.

¶25   Next, the division conceded that the remand order required the district

court to “take additional evidence and allow further argument at the request of

either party.” Id. at ¶ 42, 494 P.3d at 632. And it also acknowledged that it reviews

a district court’s final determination at Batson’s third step for clear error. Id. But

it concluded that the remand court’s reliance on the prosecution’s new remand

justification amounted to clear error. Id.

                                         10
¶26     So, the division reversed Madrid’s judgment and remanded for a new trial,

finding it “impossible to . . . separate [the remand court’s] reliance on the

justifications the prosecution articulated at trial from [the remand court’s] reliance

on the impermissible post-remand justifications.” Id. at ¶ 43, 494 P.3d at 632–33.

¶27     The prosecution petitioned for review of the division’s decision, and we

granted certiorari.1

                                    II. Analysis

¶28     We begin our analysis by discussing the three-step Batson framework and

its constitutional underpinnings. We then briefly consider the standard of review

applicable here before turning to the core issue before us today: Whether new race-

neutral justifications, separate from those offered at trial, are admissible on

remand at Batson’s second step.          After concluding that such evidence is

inadmissible, we consider whether the prosecution offered new arguments here,

and, if so, what the appropriate remedy is when the trial court admitted such

arguments in compliance with a remand order from the court of appeals.

1   We granted certiorari to review the following issue:
        Whether a trial court, when conducting remand proceedings under
        Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), and People v. Rodriguez, 2015 CO
        55, 351 P.3d 423, may consider additional evidence necessary to
        complete each step of the Batson analysis.

                                          11
                              A. Batson Framework

¶29     To understand Batson, it’s helpful to know some of the statutory bases for

excusing prospective jurors. For example, under section 16-10-103, C.R.S. (2022),

the legislature requires a trial court, upon a party’s challenge, to remove

prospective jurors who will not be impartial. People v. Abu-Nantambu-El, 2019 CO

106, ¶ 16, 454 P.3d 1044, 1048. Such challenges are dubbed “challenges for cause”

and include situations where a prospective juror “evinc[es] enmity or bias toward

the defendant or the state.” § 16-10-103(1)(j).

¶30     Under section 16-10-104, C.R.S. (2022), the legislature also provides for a

certain number of “peremptory challenges” based on the nature of the case.

Unlike for-cause challenges, peremptory challenges allow “both the prosecution

and the defense to secure a more fair and impartial jury by enabling them to

remove jurors whom they perceive as biased.” Vigil v. People, 2019 CO 105, ¶ 19,

455 P.3d 332, 337 (quoting People v. Lefebre, 5 P.3d 295, 303 (Colo. 2000), overruled

on other grounds by People v. Novotny, 2014 CO 18, ¶ 27, 320 P.3d 1194, 1203). Such

strikes typically can be used to remove prospective jurors without specifying a

reason, though the use of peremptory strikes is necessarily constrained by the

United States and Colorado Constitutions. Abu-Nantambu-El, ¶ 19, 454 P.3d at

1049.

                                         12
¶31   The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids racial

discrimination in jury selection, which includes the use of peremptory strikes to

excuse potential jurors based on race. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Batson, 476 U.S.

at 89; see also Colo. Const. art. II, §§ 16, 25; People v. Wilson, 2015 CO 54M, ¶ 10,

351 P.3d 1126, 1131. To secure this right, the Supreme Court created a three-step

test for determining when a peremptory strike has been exercised in a

discriminatory manner. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96–98.

¶32   Step one requires the objecting party to make a prima facie showing that the

challenged peremptory strike was based on the prospective juror’s race. People v.

Ojeda, 2022 CO 7, ¶ 22, 503 P.3d 856, 862. The standard the objecting party must

meet in this first step is “not a high one,” Valdez, 966 P.2d at 590, and is “easily

satisfied,” Craig v. Carlson, 161 P.3d 648, 655 (Colo. 2007). On the contrary, “[a]s

long as the totality of the circumstances raises an inference of racial motivation,

the defendant has satisfied his step-one burden.” People v. Rodriguez, 2015 CO 55,

¶ 10, 351 P.3d 423, 428–29. The objecting party need not show a “pattern” of

strikes; even a single strike can be sufficient to give rise to a prima facie showing

under this step. Id., 351 P.3d at 428.

                                         13
¶33   In step two, the burden of production shifts to the prosecution, which must

offer a race-neutral explanation for the challenged peremptory strike. 2 Batson,

476 U.S. at 97–98. A race-neutral explanation is one “based on something other

than the race of the juror.” Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360 (1991). The

explanation “need not rise to the level justifying exercise of a challenge for cause.”

Batson, 476 U.S. at 97. Rather, the prosecution must simply provide “any race-

neutral justification for the strike, regardless of implausibility or persuasiveness.”

Ojeda, ¶ 24, 503 P.3d at 862. The step-two analysis “turns on the facial validity of

the proponent’s explanation.” Id.

¶34   During step three, the defendant may rebut the prosecution’s race-neutral

explanations. The court then considers “the persuasiveness of the prosecutor’s

justification for his peremptory strike” in light of any such rebuttal. Miller-El v.

Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 338–39 (2003) (“Miller-El I”); see also Wilson, ¶ 14, 351 P.3d at

1132. This includes consideration of “all of the circumstances that bear upon the

issue of” purposeful discrimination, People v. Beauvais, 2017 CO 34, ¶ 23, 393 P.3d

509, 517 (quoting Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 478 (2008)), such as the striking

2 Here, we refer to the responding party as the prosecution for simplicity’s sake
because the responding party was the prosecutor in this case. However, the same
framework applies when a prosecutor is the objecting party during step one of
Batson. See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992).

                                           14
party’s demeanor, the reasonableness of the proffered race-neutral explanations,

and whether the rationales are rooted in accepted trial strategy, Miller-El I, 537 U.S.

at 339. The third step also requires the court to assess whether the prosecution’s

explanations are pretextual, which the court may infer if the prosecution’s

justifications shift over time or “reek[] of afterthought.”        Miller-El v. Dretke,

545 U.S. 231, 246 (2005) (“Miller-El II”); see also Foster v. Chatman, 578 U.S. 488, 514

(2016).

¶35   Step three culminates with the court determining whether the objecting

party has established purposeful discrimination. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98; Valdez,

966 P.2d at 590.    The resolution of this question requires courts to apply a

substantial-motivating-factor test; that is, if the court determines that a

peremptory strike was “motivated in substantial part by discriminatory intent,”

the court may conclude that the strike was purposefully discriminatory under

Batson. Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2244 (2019) (quoting Foster, 578 U.S.

at 513); see also Ojeda, ¶ 27, 503 P.3d at 863. Thus, because the burden of persuasion

stays with the objecting party, the court should sustain a Batson challenge only if

the objecting party proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the strike was

                                          15
substantially motivated by discriminatory intent.3 Ojeda, ¶ 28, 503 P.3d at 863;

Beauvais, ¶ 24, 393 P.3d at 517.

¶36   Finally, if an appellate court determines that the trial court’s Batson findings

are insufficient or incomplete, the proper remedy “is to remand the case to the trial

court with directions to conduct the three-part Batson analysis and make the

required factual findings.” Rodriguez, ¶ 2, 351 P.3d at 426.

                             B. Standard of Review

¶37   This court has long distinguished between questions of law, which we

review de novo, and questions of fact, which trigger deference to the trial court’s

judgments. E.g., People v. Allison, 86 P.3d 421, 426 (Colo. 2004). Hence, we review

a trial court’s factual determination as to the admissibility of evidence for an abuse

of discretion, but the broader question of whether a type of evidence is ever

admissible constitutes a legal question that we review de novo. See People v.

Johnson, 2021 CO 35, ¶¶ 15–16, 486 P.3d 1154, 1158. Similarly, “[i]nterpretation of

an appellate court mandate and the determination of whether the district court

complied with it on remand are both questions of law subject to de novo review.”

3As we emphasized in Ojeda, ¶¶ 50–52, 503 P.3d at 866, the court’s ultimate finding
at step three is distinct from a conclusion that the prosecution is racist or harbored
a racial bias. A successful Batson challenge “is not a determination that the
prosecutor . . . harbored ill will or animosity” toward a prospective juror, a
defendant, or a racial group more broadly. Id. at ¶ 50, 503 P.3d at 866.

                                         16
Thompson v. Catlin Ins. Co. (UK), 2018 CO 95, ¶ 22, 431 P.3d 224, 229 (quoting

Gannon v. State, 368 P.3d 1024, 1039 (Kan. 2016)). So here, we review the propriety

and scope of the division’s remand order de novo.4 See id.

            C. Prohibition of New Race-Neutral Justifications on
                                 Remand

¶38    Courts have long recognized that shifting explanations for a peremptory

strike signal pretext, e.g., Foster, 578 U.S. at 507, and pretextual explanations

“indicat[e] the very discrimination the explanations were meant to deny,”

Miller-El II, 545 U.S. at 265.

¶39    In Miller-El II, the Supreme Court considered a prosecutor’s shifting

explanations for a challenged peremptory strike. Id. at 245–46. There, a prosecutor

mischaracterized a prospective Black juror’s answer to a question about his

willingness to impose the death penalty. Id. at 244. When defense counsel pointed

out this misstatement, the prosecutor “neither defended what he said nor

4 We recognize that “[o]n appeal, each step of the trial court’s Batson analysis is
subject to a separate standard of review.” Rodriguez, ¶ 13, 351 P.3d at 429. The
trial court’s determinations at steps one and two receive de novo review, while the
final determination of whether the objecting party has successfully met its step-
three burden is reviewed for clear error. Valdez, 966 P.2d at 590–91. Because we
focus on the remand order and the evidence admissible under it, we need not
wade into these Batson-specific standards of review applicable to the trial court’s
decision-making.

                                        17
withdrew the strike.” Id. at 246. Instead, the prosecutor changed his explanation,

offering a new race-neutral justification to support his strike. Id. The Supreme

Court concluded that the prosecution’s new explanation was improper, noting

that it was “difficult to credit” and “reek[ed] of afterthought.” Id. The Court also

recognized that the state court’s ready acceptance of this new explanation was

improper, both because of its implausibility and “its pretextual timing.” Id.

¶40   While Miller-El II doesn’t directly address Batson remands, its broader

skepticism of a prosecutor’s changing race-neutral justifications remains

instructive:

      [W]hen illegitimate grounds like race are in issue, a prosecutor simply
      has got to state his reasons as best he can and stand or fall on the plausibility
      of the reasons he gives. A Batson challenge does not call for a mere
      exercise in thinking up any rational basis. If the stated reason does
      not hold up, its pretextual significance does not fade because a trial
      judge, or an appeals court, can imagine a reason that might not have
      been shown up as false.

Id. at 252 (emphasis added).

¶41   Several other jurisdictions have also found this passage illuminating. For

example, the Seventh Circuit, relying on this passage, determined that “Miller-El II

instructs that when ruling on a Batson challenge, the trial court should consider

only the reasons initially given to support the challenged strike, not additional

reasons offered after the fact.” United States v. Taylor, 636 F.3d 901, 905 (7th Cir.

2011). And the Third, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have all reached similar

                                             18
conclusions. See Holloway v. Horn, 355 F.3d 707, 725 (3d Cir. 2004) (“[W]here a

prosecutor makes his explanation for a strike a matter of record, our review is

focused solely upon the reasons given.”); Love v. Cate, 449 F. App’x 570, 572 (9th

Cir. 2011) (rejecting a prosecutor’s post-trial explanation because “the prosecutor

never stated to the state trial court that he relied on these characteristics, even

though Batson required him to articulate his reasons”); McGahee v. Ala. Dep’t of

Corr., 560 F.3d 1252, 1269 (11th Cir. 2009) (rejecting state appellate court’s

acceptance of a prosecutor’s later explanation for a strike because the “State never

offered such a full explanation” at trial); see also Chamberlin v. Fisher, 885 F.3d 832,

856 (5th Cir. 2018) (en banc) (Costa, J., dissenting) (“[N]o other court applying

Miller-El II has relied on reasons beyond those given at trial when comparing

jurors . . . .”).

¶42     Even so, the prosecution emphasizes that this court has authorized a trial

court handling a Batson remand to conduct “further proceedings as it deems

necessary,” see Rodriguez, ¶ 20, 351 P.3d at 431, which endows remand courts with

substantial discretion in ferreting out purposeful discrimination or the absence of

it. While that may be true, such discretion is not unbounded. First, post hoc

arguments for a peremptory challenge aren’t “necessary” when the prosecution

has already stated its reasons for the strike at trial. Second, in Rodriguez, the word

“necessary” modifies “proceedings.” See id. While a court has broad discretion to

                                          19
conduct proceedings under this rule, Rodriguez doesn’t allow a court to avoid its

obligation to obey other relevant evidentiary or constitutional constraints. Thus,

we find unpersuasive the assertion that Rodriguez should be read as essentially

giving remand courts carte blanche to admit evidence without limitation.

¶43   The prosecution also analogizes Batson remands to suppression-hearing

remands, arguing that People v. Morehead, 2019 CO 48, ¶ 13, 442 P.3d 413, 418, and

People v. Tallent, 2021 CO 68, ¶ 18, 495 P.3d 944, 950, require deference to a remand

court’s determination of what evidence to hear. But these areas of the law are

fundamentally different. First, Batson requires an analysis under its strict three-

step framework, which inherently constrains a court’s discretion in conducting a

related hearing. Second, unlike suppression hearings, Batson remand hearings

involve fact finding related to events that occurred on the record and in front of

the court. Thus, Morehead and Tallent are inapposite.

¶44   With these points of law in mind, we return to the facts at hand.

                                 D. Application

¶45   At trial, the prosecution received an adequate opportunity to share its race-

neutral reasons for striking J.T., despite the court’s declaration that it stopped its

Batson analysis at step one. After Madrid challenged the prosecution’s strike of

J.T., the prosecution immediately offered its race-neutral justifications for the

strike, and the court even clarified and confirmed the prosecution’s asserted race-

                                         20
neutral justifications in addition to improperly adding its own justifications for the

strike. Further, the following day, the court offered both parties the opportunity

to supplement the previous day’s record.          Because the prosecution had an

adequate opportunity to state its race-neutral reasons for striking J.T., we turn to

whether the prosecution’s justifications shifted between jury selection and the

remand hearing.

¶46   At trial, the prosecution offered three justifications for striking J.T.: (1) the

prosecution lacked information about J.T.; (2) J.T. was “sort of completely

nonresponsive”; and (3) J.T. appeared to have a hearing issue. However, the trial

court summarized the prosecution’s stated race-neutral justifications as: (1) the

lack of information about J.T. from his questionnaire; (2) the lack of information

about J.T. due to the prosecution’s brief opportunity for questioning; and (3) J.T.

potentially being hard of hearing. The prosecution did nothing to correct the trial

court’s perception of its race-neutral justifications except to explain that “[J.T.]

appears to and I could have just been mumbling, but he appeared to [have a

hearing issue] to me.”

¶47   On remand, a division of the court of appeals instructed the district court to

“take additional evidence and allow further argument at the request of either

party.” Thus, the remand court did not limit the prosecution to its previously

offered trial justifications. As the remand court explained:

                                         21
      I don’t know if the court [of appeals] could be any clearer than that:
      “at the request of either party.” The court didn’t say only the Defense
      gets to present additional evidence or make argument or the People
      are limited to whatever evidence they presented before or whatever
      arguments they advanced before. It says, “The Court shall take
      additional evidence and allow further argument at the request of
      either party.”

¶48   Perhaps recognizing the legal peril that it could invite if it sought to plow

new ground, the prosecution offered race-neutral justifications that, it argued,

“expand[ed] upon the record” and served as “a clarification of what we had

previously said” at trial. The district court summarized the prosecution’s race-

neutral justifications on remand as falling into three overarching categories: (1) J.T.

was “nonresponsive, nonparticipatory, and fail[ed] to engage and connect”;

(2) there was “not enough information about [J.T.]”; and (3) “[J.T.] did not want to

be here.”

¶49   To be sure, there is some overlap between the prosecution’s justifications at

trial and on remand. Both times the prosecution justified its strike by stating that

it lacked adequate information about J.T. And the evidence used to support this

facially race-neutral justification—namely, that J.T.’s questionnaire was thin and

the prosecution had little time to question him—remained consistent. However,

the prosecution also offered a new race-neutral justification on remand.

¶50   The prosecution for the first time justified striking J.T. because it appeared

as though he “simply did not want to be here.” Indeed, at the remand hearing, the

                                          22
prosecution reiterated this as a primary reason for the strike, mentioning some

variation on that theme almost a dozen times. But at trial, the prosecutor asserted

that “the real problem is we don’t know very much about [J.T.]” The prosecutor

mentioned J.T.’s hearing and unresponsiveness before reiterating that “[w]e have

very little information on him . . . . Terribly uncomfortable with him where we

have very little information.”      This constituted a shift in rationales for the

peremptory strike that happened to track the trial court’s independent

observations about J.T.

¶51   The prosecution supported its new justification—that J.T. didn’t want to be

there—by suddenly explaining for the first time (five years after trial) that “[w]hen

[J.T.’s] name was called, I believe there was a sigh. He was slow to take his seat.

He did not appear to be delighted to know that he had now been asked to join the

people in front” in the prospective jury panel. But again, the prosecution said

nothing about this behavior at trial.       So, as the court of appeals correctly

acknowledged, “Such observations may have been accurate, but they were not the

reasons the prosecutor stated for excusing [J.T.]” Madrid II, ¶ 39, 494 P.3d at 632.

¶52   Thus, we conclude that the prosecution offered a new justification for the

strike on remand, separate from the justifications it offered at trial.

                                          23
¶53   Furthermore, the prosecution’s new remand arguments simply echoed the

trial court’s own impermissible observations about J.T.’s behavior. At trial, the

court observed:

      I also note that my read of [J.T.], when I first called his name was that
      he didn’t seem like he wanted to be here. . . . [I]t seemed to me that
      based on his demeanor, he doesn’t want to be here, or at least when I
      called his name he didn’t want to be here. He seemed disappointed
      that I called his name when he started walking to the front of the
      courtroom.

¶54   These observations directly track the prosecution’s new remand justification

that J.T. didn’t want to be there and that he “did not appear to be delighted to

know that he had now been asked to join the people in front of the bar.” In our

eyes, the prosecution’s later adoption of the trial court’s observations is particularly

problematic, given that the court was likely to accept as valid its own justifications

that it had previously, and erroneously, offered at trial.

¶55   We aren’t persuaded otherwise by the prosecution’s argument that on

remand it merely elucidated the race-neutral justifications it had offered at trial.

On remand, the prosecution explained that its initial justification that J.T. possibly

suffered from a hearing issue “goes to the whole, I don’t want to be here, and I’m

not engaging with you.” However, even the prosecution explicitly affirmed later

that hearing was not the issue.

¶56   The prosecution similarly asserts that its trial statement that J.T. was “sort

of completely nonresponsive” was really an attempt to articulate that J.T. appeared

                                          24
as though he didn’t want to be there. But the prosecution’s only mention of J.T.’s

nonresponsiveness at trial was in asserting that J.T. had a hearing issue—a

justification that it discarded on remand. Notably, the prosecution didn’t correct

the trial court when it failed to include J.T.’s lack of engagement in its summary of

the prosecution’s race-neutral justifications. So, while J.T.’s nonresponsiveness

may be a plausible explanation for the strike, we still conclude that the prosecution

shifted its justification on remand, offering a new reason rather than merely

explaining what it had said at trial.

¶57   The prosecution offered—and the remand court allowed—these new

arguments because of the division’s improper remand order, which broadly

instructed the remand court to “take additional evidence and allow further

argument at the request of either party” without limitation. By instructing the

court to take additional evidence “at the request of either party,” this order

extended beyond the requirements of Rodriguez, which merely directs trial courts

to “conduct further proceedings as it deems necessary on remand” to complete a

Batson analysis. Rodriguez, ¶ 20, 351 P.3d at 431. Thus, we conclude that the

                                         25
remand order was erroneous, and we must now determine whether the error

warrants reversal and a new trial.5

                                      E. Remedy

¶58   “Ordinarily, when a trial court has not adequately conducted the Batson

analysis, the appropriate procedure is to remand the case for more detailed

findings by the trial court.” Rodriguez, ¶ 19, 351 P.3d at 431 (quoting Craig,

161 P.3d at 654). Of course, that is what the Madrid I division did in this very case.

And, we have noted, practical problems created by the passage of time are not

necessarily a legal barrier to remand. Id. at ¶ 20, 351 P.3d at 431 (“The passage of

time may create challenges for the trial court on remand, but those challenges do

5 We recognize that differentiating between elaboration of an initial race-neutral
justification and the development of a new justification on remand can be
difficult. In other contexts, we give trial courts broad discretion to make difficult
evidentiary determinations. See, e.g., People v. Melillo, 25 P.3d 769, 773 (Colo. 2001)
(relating to evidentiary determinations under CRE 401 and CRE 403). We do so
here, too. As with other evidentiary rulings, appellate courts should review a
remand court’s determination of what arguments are barred as a new justification
for an abuse of discretion. See People v. Moore, 2021 CO 26, ¶ 26, 485 P.3d 1088,
1095. An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s ruling is manifestly
arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or based on an erroneous understanding of the
law. People v. Gutierrez, 2018 CO 75, ¶ 11, 432 P.3d 579, 581. To the extent that the
district court on remand made a finding that the prosecution’s race-neutral
justification for striking J.T. was not new, we conclude that its finding was
manifestly unreasonable.

                                          26
not alter the structure of the Batson analysis or relieve Rodriguez of his burden.”).

This much is settled law.

¶59   The remedy question before us now, however, is different. The problem is

not a lack of findings; it’s that error is baked into the remand court’s otherwise

thorough three-part Batson analysis. Plus, extraordinary factors contribute to the

issues surrounding this case, including that twelve years have passed since the

initial jury selection at issue and that the prosecution has already received two

opportunities to offer its step-two justifications. Therefore, we must evaluate what

remedy to use in the unusual circumstances with which we’re now confronted.

¶60   There are two standards of reversal potentially applicable here: structural

error and constitutional harmless error. A structural error is one that “require[s]

automatic reversal without individualized analysis of how the error impairs the

reliability of the judgment of conviction.” Hagos v. People, 2012 CO 63, ¶ 10,

288 P.3d 116, 119. Constitutional harmless error analysis involves an error of a

constitutional dimension that is preserved by objection. Id. at ¶ 11, 288 P.3d at 119.

These errors “require reversal unless the review court is ‘able to declare a belief

that [the error] was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id. (alteration in

original) (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)). Under the standard

for constitutional harmless error, the prosecution bears the burden of proving that

the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

                                         27
¶61   Today, we need not decide whether the erroneous Batson analysis that

followed the improper remand order should prompt structural or constitutional

harmless error review because reversal is warranted under either standard.

Madrid preserved the issue through his objection to new arguments on remand,

which implicates his constitutional right to a jury selected without the taint of

racial discrimination. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 85. This triggers, at the very least,

constitutional harmless error analysis. See Johnson, ¶ 17, 486 P.3d at 1158. Thus,

we consider whether “there is a reasonable possibility that the [error] might have

contributed to the conviction.” Hagos, ¶ 11, 288 P.3d at 119 (alteration in original)

(quoting Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24).

¶62   Like the Madrid II division, we find it impossible to retroactively disentangle

how the error affected the subsequent remand proceedings. We have no way of

determining how the prosecution’s testimony would have unfolded if properly

restricted to the justifications previously offered at trial. Further, the district court

itself recognized that the prosecution’s stated reasons for striking J.T. “are all really

interrelated,” which leaves us simply to speculate how the court might have ruled

on Madrid’s Batson challenge without factoring in the impermissible argument.

On the unusual record before us, we find it impossible to determine whether a

Batson violation occurred. Given the exceptional circumstances with which we’re

                                           28
confronted and considering the importance of the constitutional rights at stake, we

conclude that we must reverse.

¶63    Because we cannot confidently declare that the error injected by the remand

order into the proceedings was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, Madrid is

entitled to a new trial.

                                 III. Conclusion

¶64   We affirm the judgment of the court of appeals, reverse Madrid’s judgment

of conviction, and remand for a new trial.

CHIEF JUSTICE BOATRIGHT dissented.

                                        29
CHIEF JUSTICE BOATRIGHT, dissenting.

¶65   The majority concludes that when a trial court conducts remand

proceedings under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), it cannot consider race-

neutral explanations for a peremptory strike that weren’t articulated at trial. Maj.

op. ¶¶ 2, 28. The majority purports to base this conclusion on Miller-El v. Dretke,

545 U.S. 231 (2005). Maj. op. ¶¶ 38–41. But Miller-El didn’t go nearly that far; it

simply recognized the practical reality that, in many cases, these explanations may

be less credible because they “reek[] of afterthought.” Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 246. In

so doing, it recognized that Batson trusts the trial court to consider each

explanation (whether offered at trial or not), assess each for pretext, and make the

right call, subject to clear error review. The majority departs from this framework

by finding an evidentiary bar where none exists. In effect, it declares that any

additional justifications, no matter what the circumstances, are irrelevant as a

matter of law. It does so needlessly; parties are already well equipped to respond

when a striking party offers new justifications for a strike. And the majority does

so despite the pivotal role that trial courts play in assessing peremptory challenges

for racial discrimination. As such, I respectfully dissent.

¶66   The exclusion of citizens from jury service on account of race is “a primary

example of the evil the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to cure.” People v.

Rodriguez, 2015 CO 55, ¶ 9, 351 P.3d 423, 428 (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 85).

                                          1
Accordingly, the Supreme Court designed the three-step Batson test “to ferret out

the unconstitutional use of race in jury selection.” Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 266 (Breyer,

J., concurring). At Batson’s first step, the objecting party must make a prima facie

showing that a peremptory strike was based on the juror’s race. Rodriguez, ¶ 10,

351 P.3d at 428. At step two, the proponent of the strike must offer “a race-neutral

explanation [for the strike] ‘related to the particular case to be tried.’” Id. at ¶ 11,

351 P.3d at 429 (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 98). “[T]he bar at step two is not high.”

Id. An explanation doesn’t need to be “persuasive, or even plausible”—it must

only be race neutral. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995). At step three, the

trial court must determine whether the objecting party has established purposeful

discrimination “in light of all the evidence.” Rodriguez, ¶ 12, 351 P.3d at 429.

¶67   Each step of Batson is subject to a distinct standard of appellate review. Id.

at ¶ 13, 351 P.3d at 429. Step one is subject to de novo review, though the

reviewing court should defer to the trial court’s underlying factual findings. Id.

Likewise, step two is subject to de novo review. Id. But step three—the ultimate

question of whether the opponent of the strike has established purposeful

discrimination—is subject to clear error review. Id. The clear error standard

reflects that Batson step three turns on determinations of credibility; because only

the trial court can evaluate the parties’ and prospective jurors’ demeanor,

appellate courts should ordinarily give “great deference” to the trial court’s

                                           2
step-three findings. Id. (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.21). In other words, step

three findings are highly factual, requiring the trial court to use its discretion.

Thus, the clear error standard applies on appeal.

¶68   In my view, the majority errs by stepping outside of the Batson framework.

Instead, it opts to import the de novo standard of review from other contexts,

including cases involving the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule and the

mandate rule. Maj. op. ¶ 37 & n.4 (first citing People v. Johnson, 2021 CO 35,

¶¶ 15–16, 486 P.3d 1154, 1158; and then citing Thompson v. Catlin Ins. Co. (UK),

2018 CO 95, ¶ 22, 431 P.3d 224, 229). Nobody asked the court to do this, and for

good reason: This case isn’t about what the court of appeals mandated; it’s about

what the remand court considered when assessing Batson’s third step. Tellingly, the

parties cite only the Batson standards of review in their briefs, and the division

applied the appropriate Batson step-three standard (clear error) in its opinion. See

People v. Madrid, 2021 COA 70, ¶¶ 10, 42, 494 P.3d 624, 627, 632. It’s particularly

difficult to square the majority’s reliance on Johnson—a Fourth Amendment

suppression case—with its later acknowledgment that Batson proceedings are

“fundamentally different” than suppression proceedings because “Batson requires

an analysis under its strict three-step framework.” Maj. op. ¶ 43.

¶69   Respectfully, standards of review aren’t fungible.       It isn’t prudent to

transplant a standard from a different context, involving a different constitutional

                                         3
right, and decide that it fits closely enough. Furthermore, it certainly isn’t prudent

to do so on our own initiative. See Galvan v. People, 2020 CO 82, ¶ 45, 476 P.3d 746,

757 (“[W]e adhere to the party presentation principle, which relies on the parties

to frame the issues to be decided and assigns to courts the role of neutral arbiters

of the matters raised.”). The applicable standards of review here are the Batson

standards, which account for the distinct issues involved in each step of the Batson

analysis. Rodriguez, ¶ 13, 351 P.3d at 429. By putting these standards to one side,

the majority not only risks sowing confusion in future Batson appeals—it also

indirectly modifies the Batson case law we and the Supreme Court have built.

¶70   As the division below recognized, this is a Batson step-three case. See

Madrid, ¶¶ 10, 42, 494 P.3d at 627, 632. Whatever one may think of the prosecutor’s

explanations for striking prospective juror J.T., each was race neutral; that is all

Batson’s second step requires. Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768. The remand court therefore

properly proceeded to step three of Batson. There, the remand court had to

determine if the prosecutor’s race-neutral reasons were credible. Madrid only

appealed the court’s step-three findings, framing the issue in his opening brief to

the division as: “Whether the court erred in reaffirming its Batson ruling and

denying Mr. Madrid a new trial on remand, despite evidence establishing

pretext.” The division then proceeded to review the remand court’s step-three

                                          4
findings for clear error.1 Madrid, ¶ 42, 494 P.3d at 632. The division held that the

remand court’s “acceptance of and reliance on the new reasons to deny the Batson

challenge amounts to clear error.” Id. The People appealed this holding, arguing

that the division impermissibly restricted the fact-finding function of remand

courts in Batson proceedings. And though the People argue that the remand court

acted consistently with controlling law and the remand order, they didn’t

challenge the remand order itself.

¶71   Accordingly, I treat this issue for what it is: an assessment of the remand

court’s step-three Batson ruling, which we review for clear error. Rodriguez, ¶ 13,

351 P.3d at 429. Step three requires courts to decide “the ultimate question” of the

Batson inquiry—whether the proponent of a strike engaged in purposeful

discrimination. Id. at ¶ 12, 351 P.3d at 429. At the outset, it is important to

recognize that ferreting out racial discrimination is easier said than done—it’s a

complicated, fact-bound process that requires the trial court to assess not only the

plausibility of arguments, but also the credibility of the people advancing them.

See People v. Wilson, 2015 CO 54M, ¶ 14, 351 P.3d 1126, 1132; Valdez v. People,

1 So too did several of the federal cases cited by the majority. See Maj. op. ¶ 41;
United States v. Taylor, 636 F.3d 901, 906 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Accepting new, unrelated
reasons . . . amounts to clear error[.]”); Love v. Cate, 449 F. App’x 570, 572 (9th Cir.
2011) (“[W]e afford [the remand court] deference and review for clear error.”).

                                           5
966 P.2d 587, 599 (Colo. 1998) (Kourlis, J., dissenting) (“Discrimination is as sly as

it is insidious. It lives in inference, tone, and gesture as much as in action.”).

¶72   So, we’ve cautioned that “the trial court must evaluate all relevant facts” to

guide it through Batson’s third step and, ultimately, determine whether racial

discrimination is at play. Wilson, ¶ 14, 351 P.3d at 1132; see also Rodriguez, ¶ 12,

351 P.3d at 429 (“If the trial court is convinced, in light of all the evidence, that the

proffered reason was pretextual and that the prosecutor actually based his

peremptory strike on the prospective juror’s race, then it must uphold the Batson

challenge.”).

¶73   At bottom, Miller-El (a Batson step-three case) stands for this exact

proposition. The Supreme Court itself has told us as much: “In Miller-El v. Dretke,

the Court made it clear that in considering a Batson objection, or in reviewing a

ruling claimed to be Batson error, all of the circumstances that bear upon the issue

of racial animosity must be consulted.” Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 478 (2008)

(emphases added).

¶74   Indeed, it’s clear that the Miller-El Court considered all of the circumstances

involved in that case—including a prosecutor’s shifting justifications for one

strike—when determining that the prosecutor struck Black venire members on

account of their race. In Miller-El, the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to

dismiss 91% of the qualified Black venire members. 545 U.S. at 241. When

                                           6
explaining these strikes, the prosecutor “simply mischaracterized” the testimony

of a Black venire member, falsely claiming that the juror in question would only

vote in favor of the death penalty if rehabilitation were impossible. Id. at 244. The

defense pointed out this mischaracterization, and the prosecutor immediately

offered a new explanation—that the juror’s brother was previously convicted of a

crime. Id. at 245–46.

¶75   Rather than ignoring the prosecution’s new explanation or treating it as

irrelevant as a matter of law, the Supreme Court addressed its plausibility head-

on. See id. at 246. The Court noted, first, that the prosecutor’s timing was

suspicious. Id. But it then proceeded to address “other reasons rendering [the new

explanation] implausible” on the merits. Id. Namely, the juror’s “testimony

indicated he was not close to his brother,” and the prosecution didn’t ask follow-

up questions about the influence of his brother’s conviction, “as it probably would

have done if the family history had actually mattered.” Id. So when the Court said

that “[i]t would be difficult to credit the State’s new explanation, which reeks of

afterthought,” id., it was describing one reason among several that the explanation

was suspect, not limiting the information that courts can consider when assessing

a Batson challenge.

¶76   Separately, the Court discussed the strike of another Black venire member.

Id. at 247. The prosecutor explained that it struck this juror because his responses

                                         7
to questions about the death penalty “were inconsistent.” Id. at 248. The Fifth

Circuit, in upholding the strike, came up with a new explanation that the

prosecutor never articulated: that the second juror was ambivalent about his

ability to impose the death penalty. Id. at 250. The Court chastised the Fifth Circuit

for “thinking up any rational basis” for the strike on the prosecutor’s behalf; in so

doing, the Court stated that “when illegitimate grounds like race are in issue, a

prosecutor simply has got to state his reasons as best he can and stand or fall on

the plausibility of the reasons he gives.” Id. at 252.

¶77   Madrid argues that, by making this statement, the Court meant to say that

prosecutors are held to the justifications that they originally offered at trial and

pretext is inferred whenever the prosecution shifts from those justifications. But

this reading of the “stand or fall” language in Miller-El overlooks the context in

which it was made. The Court made this statement while warning appellate courts

not to invent their own race-neutral justifications for a strike, as the Fifth Circuit

had done when assessing the strike of the second juror; it had little to do with the

prosecutor’s post hoc explanation for striking the first juror. And this statement

doesn’t undercut the fact that the Court did evaluate the prosecutor’s post hoc

explanation for striking the first juror. See id. at 246. It would make no sense for

the Court to consider the post hoc explanation for striking the first juror on the

                                          8
merits if it intended to say, mere paragraphs later, that post hoc explanations for a

strike are per se invalid.

¶78   Since Miller-El, the Court has recognized that shifting explanations “may be

pretextual” while nonetheless continuing to consider those explanations on the

merits. See Foster v. Chatman, 578 U.S. 488, 507–08 (2016). In Foster, for instance, a

prosecutor initially justified a strike by arguing that the juror had a son who was

the defendant’s age; later, the prosecutor relied on the juror’s membership in the

Church of Christ, claiming that the Church’s members were reluctant to vote for

the death penalty. Id.

¶79   The Court noted, “[a]s an initial matter,” that “the prosecution’s principal

reasons for the strike shifted over time, suggesting that those reasons may be

pretextual.” Id. at 507. But the Court proceeded to reject both explanations on the

merits. Id. at 508–11. The prosecutor’s initial explanation didn’t hold up because

the state accepted white jurors who had sons near the defendant’s age. Id. at

508–09.    And the prosecutor’s new explanation fell flat because the juror

repeatedly swore that he could impose the death penalty, the prosecutor

erroneously claimed that other venire members were struck for their membership

in the Church, and the prosecutor’s notes indicated that the Church took no

position on the death penalty and also stated: “NO Black Church.” Id. at 510–11.

So while the Court ultimately concluded that the second explanation was pretext,

                                          9
the Court didn’t stop its analysis once it had determined that the second

explanation was “new.” See id.; see also Grant v. Royal, 886 F.3d 874, 951 (10th Cir.

2018) (analyzing Foster and noting that the Court considered comparative juror

evidence “[i]n addition to” other evidence of pretext, including the prosecutor’s

shifting explanations for striking Black jurors).

¶80   Thus, the Supreme Court has not barred trial courts from considering post

hoc explanations for a strike.     To the contrary, the Court has evaluated all

explanations to determine whether they are pretextual, using the fact that a party

switched explanations as one possible indicator of pretext. This treatment aligns

with the Court’s guidance that “all of the circumstances that bear upon the issue

of racial animosity must be consulted.” Snyder, 552 U.S. at 478. All means all,

including explanations that a party failed to immediately offer and including

whether that timing is suspect.

¶81   In its opinion, the court of appeals went where the Supreme Court has never

gone. The division contravened the Court’s guidance by holding that the trial

court “cannot consider or base its ruling on new justifications offered on remand.”

Madrid, ¶ 4, 494 P.3d at 626. On this appeal, Madrid characterizes the division’s

holding as merely recognizing “the specter of pretext” associated with shifting

justifications. See id. at ¶ 42, 494 P.3d at 632 (quoting United States v. Taylor,

636 F.3d 901, 906 (7th Cir. 2011)). But the division did far more than that; it held

                                         10
that “the reversible error in this case was the district court’s consideration of and

reliance on different justifications for the strike than the ones the prosecutor

articulated at trial.” Id. at ¶ 37, 494 P.3d at 631 (emphasis added).

¶82   Unlike the Supreme Court, the division stopped once it determined that the

prosecutor here articulated additional explanations on remand. See id. at ¶ 30,

494 P.3d at 630. The division relied upon a case from the Seventh Circuit for this

proposition. Id. at ¶ 37, 494 P.3d at 631 (“[Miller-El] instructs that when ruling on

a Batson challenge, the trial court should consider only the reasons initially given

to support the challenged strike, not additional reasons offered after the fact.”

(quoting Taylor, 636 F.3d at 905)). But Miller-El never said as much, and Seventh

Circuit precedent isn’t binding on Colorado courts. On the other hand, Supreme

Court precedent is binding, and the Court has instructed us to consider all

circumstances relevant to the issue of racial discrimination. Snyder, 552 U.S. at 478.

The division erred by creating an evidentiary bar instead. In my view, the majority

follows the court of appeals into uncharted territory and concludes that “new”

race-neutral justifications are wholly inadmissible on remand. Maj. op. ¶ 28.

¶83   Beyond being contrary to Supreme Court precedent, this evidentiary bar is

unnecessary. Parties are already well equipped to counter an opposing party’s

shifting justifications for a strike. When a striking party offers new justifications

for a strike on remand, the challenging party’s rebuttal strikes me as obvious and

                                         11
compelling: Any new explanations are less credible because they “reek[] of

afterthought,” Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 246, and likely indicate that the abandoned

explanations are less credible, too. With this ready-made response, striking parties

would offer new explanations at their own peril. Thus, barring lower courts from

even considering post hoc justifications for a strike deprives trial courts of

potentially powerful evidence that the strike was, in fact, racially motivated. In

effect, the majority’s automatic evidentiary bar ultimately harms the truth-seeking

process that Batson was designed to effectuate.

¶84   Moreover, imposing this bar diminishes the “‘pivotal role’ of the trial court”

in the Batson regime. See Wilson, ¶ 18, 351 P.3d at 1133 (quoting Snyder, 552 U.S. at

477). Trial courts have a “duty to distinguish between sham excuses that violate

the Equal Protection Clause and bona fide, race-neutral explanations for a

peremptory strike.” Id. (first citing Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 365 (1991);

and then citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.21). And trial courts are best positioned to

fulfill that duty; only the trial court can assess the nonverbal demeanor of the

parties and prospective jurors. Id. Recognizing this, we’ve invalidated judicially

created presumptions at Batson’s third step, warning that such presumptions

“arrogate[] the trial court’s step-three duty” to sort legitimate conduct from

discrimination.   Id.   (invalidating a judicially created presumption that “any

justification unsupported by the record” is pretext). Simply said, presumptions

                                         12
like these are inappropriate because they put a thumb on the scale of decisions best

left for trial courts to decide in the first instance. See id.

¶85    We should recognize this same principle today—a presumption that any

post hoc explanation is invalid, merely due to its timing, commandeers the trial

court’s duty to separate legitimate strikes from discriminatory ones. Undeterred,

the majority puts its thumb on the scale: The mere fact that an explanation is

“new,” the majority concludes, means that courts cannot even consider it. Maj.

op. ¶ 28.

¶86    But the line between a “new” explanation and an “old” explanation is not

always crystal clear. This case provides an excellent example. The prosecutor here

explained at trial that she struck J.T., in part, because he was “completely

nonresponsive.” On remand, she explained that she hadn’t meant J.T. was literally

nonresponsive (i.e., he hadn’t refused to answer questions), but that “unengaged

is a better word.” The prosecutor then explained that she had been “concerned

that he really didn’t want to be here for some reason,” that he wasn’t “engaging

with [her],” and that he sighed and was slow to take his seat when his number was

called. It’s unclear what else the prosecutor could have done to explain what

“completely nonresponsive” meant, short of repeating herself verbatim. Could

she have introduced written notes she contemporaneously made at trial reflecting

her concerns? Could her trial co-counsel have testified that she also thought J.T.

                                            13
was unengaged, or that she noticed any of the above behaviors?              In these

circumstances, the line between “completely nonresponsive” and “unengaged” is

not immediately apparent. But under the majority’s holding, the two justifications

are so distinct that the latter is categorically forbidden. Maj. op. ¶ 52. Because a

trial court’s failure to precisely draw the line between “new” and “old” evidence

now amounts to reversible error, see Maj. op. ¶ 63, confusion on this issue seems

inevitable.

¶87   In an attempt to provide some guidance, the majority explains that a remand

court’s decision as to whether evidence is “new” should be reviewed for an abuse

of discretion. Maj. op. ¶ 57 n.5; see also People v. Moore, 2021 CO 26, ¶ 26, 485 P.3d

1088, 1095 (“A trial court abuses its discretion when its ruling is manifestly

arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair.”). But if that’s so, this case is over. The remand

court here decided that the explanation the People offered on remand was

“generally consistent with the race-neutral reason—or reasons that they advanced

during jury selection.” Following the prosecutor’s testimony, the remand court

“found [her] to be credible”; noted that “[t]he People’s race-neutral reasons are,

number one, that [J.T.] was nonresponsive, a term they say they used as a synonym

to unengaged or nonparticipatory”; and observed that when the prosecutor said

J.T. was nonresponsive, the court had “understood the People to be concerned

about [J.T.’s] responsiveness to [the prosecutor],” including “his attitude about the

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prospect of being selected to serve on the jury.” Those findings are supported by

the record. Therefore, I see no reason to conclude that this determination was

manifestly arbitrary—it was, after all, based on the remand court’s first-hand

observations and credibility determinations.2 So even if the majority’s test applies,

we shouldn’t grant a new trial here.

¶88   In sum, Batson’s third step requires trial courts to consult “all of the

circumstances that bear upon the issue of racial animosity.” Snyder, 552 U.S. at

478. As the Supreme Court’s own analyses demonstrate, this includes any post

hoc explanations for the strike, in addition to the possibly pretextual timing of

those explanations. See Foster, 578 U.S. at 507–11; Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 245–46. By

creating an evidentiary bar instead, the majority departs from that framework.

This is unnecessary because parties are well equipped to point out the pretextual

timing of an opponent’s shifting explanations, and the trial court is equally well

equipped to recognize racial discrimination. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

¶89   Because I would not find a blanket prohibition on new explanations, this

case is not fully resolved in my view. The division below concluded that the

remand court erred by accepting new race-neutral justifications, so it did not need

2The majority concludes that this determination was “manifestly unreasonable”
without further analysis. See Maj. op. ¶ 57 n.5. In my view, that’s insufficient.

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to address Madrid’s remaining arguments; for instance, that the remand court

erred by concluding there were no similarly situated jurors as J.T.         Madrid,

¶¶ 29–30, 44, 494 P.3d at 630, 633. I would therefore remand this case to the

division to address those claims under the clear error standard imposed by

Batson’s third step, bearing in mind that it should consult all of the circumstances

that pertain to the issue of racial discrimination.

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