Court Opinion

ID: 9610933
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:49:09.103645+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:06.947349
License: Public Domain

Hill, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree entirely with Division 1 of the majority opinion except I would overrule Bauer International Corp. v. Cagles, Inc., 225 Ga. 684 (171 SE2d 314) (1969), insofar as it, in dicta, appeared to say that enactment of a long *236arm service of process statute was substantive (rather than procedural) and hence could not constitutionally be applicable to pre-existing causes of action.
Division 2 of the opinion represents a problem in the administration of justice. The complaint is in one count and names three defendants. Defendant Riggs was alleged to be driving the vehicle which struck plaintiffs car and defendant Butterworth was alleged to be a passenger who had obtained that car from the owner, defendant Pace, with the owner’s permission. Defendant Butterworth, the passenger, was alleged to have permitted defendant Riggs to drive the vehicle, also with the permission of the owner, defendant Pace. The owner and passenger filed motions for summary judgment supported by affidavits setting forth facts negating their liability under the theories of respondeat superior and family purpose car doctrine.
Plaintiff did not file a counter-affidavit. Plaintiffs complaint did not use the words, or allege a theory of, "negligent entrustment.” Insofar as the record in this case discloses, plaintiff did not ever suggest the theory of negligent entrustment to the trial judge before he granted the two motions for summary judgment. Plaintiff first referred to negligent entrustment, insofar as this record shows, in the enumeration of error filed in this court. Unfortunately, Code Ann. § 81A-156 permits the respondent in motion for summary judgment to "sandbag” the trial judge and the movants. However, until such time as Code Ann. § 81A-156 is amended so as to require the respondent to reply to a motion for summary judgment either by affidavit or other response (see Fulton Superior Court rule 21, as amended), the burden of negating each and every possible theory of liability is on the movant-defendant. I therefore must dissent from Division 2 for the reason that movants have not carried their summary judgment burden of showing that there was no negligent entrustment. See Cochran v. Teasley, 239 Ga. 289 (5) (236 SE2d 635) (1977); Holland v. Sanfax Corp., 106 Ga. App. 1 (126 SE2d 442) (1962).