Court Opinion

ID: 9776325
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:30:43.783942+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:37.252841
License: Public Domain

Paula Jamell Storeygard, Special Associate Justice, dissenting. This appeal should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Mr. Foster alleges that a Jefferson County sales and use tax ordinance violated various constitutional and statutory provisions. He prays for the following relief: (a) declaration that the election which approved the tax be declared null and void; (b) declaration that the county sales and use taxes be declared an illegal exaction; (c) issuance of an injunction against collection of the taxes; and (d) award of “at least nominal damages.” The Jefferson County Circuit Court did not have jurisdiction to hear the case. The jurisdiction of the trial court in this case was not raised by the parties or determined by the trial court. It is well settled, however, that the question of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised for the first time on appeal and that the Supreme Court can raise it on its own. See Arkansas Department of Human Services v. Estate of Hogan, 314 Ark. 19, 858 S.W.2d 105 (1993); Drainage District No. 1 of Cross County v. Rolfe, 110 Ark. 374, 161 S.W. 1034 (1913). Indeed, it is the duty of the appellate court to determine if it has jurisdiction of the subject matter. Mertz v. States, 318 Ark. 390, 885 S.W.2d 853 (1994). This duty is even more important considering that the Supreme Court does not rule on constitutional questions if the case can otherwise be resolved. Attwood v. Estate of Attwood, 276 Ark. 230, 633 S.W.2d 366 (1982); Searcy County v. Stephenson, 244 Ark. 54, 424 S.W.2d 369 (1968); Road Improvement Dist. No. 1 v. Glover, 86 Ark. 231, 110 S.W. 1031 (1908). If the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction, then the appellate court has no jurisdiction to hear the appeal and should dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction. See The First Pyramid Life Insurance Co. of America v. Reed, 247 Ark. 1003, 449 S.W.2d 178 (1970). Jurisdiction must be determined entirely from the pleadings, and if it is not established by the pleadings, the complaint is fatally deficient and the court is not to proceed further. Vachon v. City of Fort Smith, 308 Ark. 636, 826 S.W.2d 211 (1992). Because subject matter jurisdiction is settled by a review of the pleadings, we must employ the settled rules that (a) a complaint must allege sufficient facts to state a prima facie cause of action over which the trial court has jurisdiction and (b) such a cause cannot be stated by using conclusory language. McKinney v. City of El Dorado, 308 Ark. 284, 824 S.W.2d 826 (1992). In this case, Mr. Foster has failed to allege he is a citizen of the county or that he is a taxpayer, as required in order to state a prima facie cause of action under Ark. Const., art. 16, § 13. See Baker v. The National Surety Corporation, 210 Ark. 731, 197 S.W.2d 752 (1946). For this reason alone, subject matter jurisdiction should fail in any court. McKinney v. City of El Dorado, supra. Jurisdiction in circuit court is particularly lacking, as discussed below. Article 7, Section 28, of the Arkansas Constitution of 1874 provides that “county courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction in all matters relating to county taxes ...” It has been held that: A circuit court could have jurisdiction of a taxation matter such as this, but it would be as a result of Ark. Const., art. 7, § 33, which provides for appeals to be taken from county court to circuit court. Scott County v. Frost, 305 Ark. 358, 359, 807 S.W.2d 469, 470 (1991). In spite of the exclusive jurisdiction provision in the constitution, a well settled body of law has developed over the years which establishes that, in order to prevent multiplicity of litigation, chancery courts have jurisdiction to grant the equitable relief necessary to protect against void or illegal county taxes pursuant to Ark. Const., art. 16, § 13. See Pockrus v. Bella Vista Village Property Owners Ass’n, 316 Ark. 468, 872 S.W.2d 416 (1994); Scott County, supra; McIntosh v. Southwestern Truck Sales, 304 Ark. 224, 800 S.W.2d 431 (1990); Arkansas Ass’n of County Judges v. Green, 232 Ark. 438, 338 S.W.2d 672 (1960); Rose v. Brickhouse, 182 Ark. 1105, 34 S.W.2d 472 (1931). This recognized exception to the exclusive jurisdiction set forth in Ark. Const., art. 7, § 28, has never been extended to include circuit courts. The majority has cited no decision, and I can find no decision, which holds that a circuit court may hear (except on appeal from county court) an illegal exaction case regarding county taxes. The majority relies upon Ark. Code Ann. § 26-35-902 (Supp. 1993) to hold that subject matter jurisdiction of illegal exaction suits is concurrent between circuit and chancery courts. I would agree with that holding except to the extent that the constitution dictates otherwise with respect to county matters; a statute cannot alter the jurisdiction granted or withheld by the constitution. See Young v. Jamison, 309 Ark. 187, 828 S.W.2d 831 (1992). Where county matters are at issue, the forum of the lawsuit is not merely a matter of “propriety,” as held by the majority, but a matter of subject matter jurisdiction which cannot be waived or conferred by the parties. As discussed below, the circuit court was without subject matter jurisdiction to grant even one of the four prayers for relief sought by Mr. Foster. Because the circuit court was wholly lacking in jurisdiction, the question of “propriety” is not present in this case. See Liles v. Liles, 289 Ark. 159, 711 S.W.2d 447 (1986). In his first prayer for relief, Mr. Foster asked that the election which approved the tax be declared “null and void.” In his amended complaint, he asks that “the challenge of the election be upheld.” He did not make any allegations regarding the actual conduct of the election nor the validity of the election results. If the complaint is sufficient to state a cause of action regarding the election (and I do not believe that it is sufficient under the reasoning set forth in Curry v. Dawson, 238 Ark. 310, 379 S.W.2d 287 (1964)), the action would not lie in circuit court. Ark. Code Ann. § 26-74-209(c) requires that any challenge to this particular type of county sales and use tax election be filed in chancery court. It is not necessary for us to determine whether Ark. Code Ann. § 26-74-209(c) is valid under Ark. Const., art. 7, § 28, because, under either law, the circuit court is without subject matter jurisdiction. Although the majority cited many election cases, it has not cited any decision finding that circuit court has jurisdiction over a county tax election challenge. That is because circuit courts have no such jurisdiction. Mr. Foster next prays that the county tax be declared an illegal exaction. As discussed above, chancery courts have been granted the only exception to the jurisdictional constraints set forth in Ark. Const., art. 7, § 28, to hear such a case. Even if Mr. Poster has stated a cause of action under Ark. Const., art. 16, § 13, the circuit court does not have jurisdiction to hear this county tax case. Mr. Foster also prays for an injunction against collection of an illegal exaction. Clearly, this is equitable relief over which original jurisdiction lies solely with the chancery court pursuant to Ark. Const., art. 7, § 15. See Monette Road Improvement Dist. v. Dudley, 144 Ark. 169, 222 S.W. 59 (1920). See also Ark. Code Ann. §§ 16-13-304(a); 16-113-306. It is not necessary to determine whether the two statutes are valid with respect to county matters in light of Ark. Const., art. 7, § 28, because, under either analysis, circuit court would not have original jurisdiction. The majority has cited several decisions in which circuit court jurisdiction over illegal exaction cases was upheld. However, none of these cases involved county taxes so the court did not have to apply the jurisdictional limitations set forth in Ark. Const., art. 7, § 28. Finally, Mr. Foster prays for “at least nominal damages.” Mr. Foster has failed to allege that he has suffered damages or is entitled to a monetary judgment against a county government under any legal theory. Because he has failed to state any facts to support a claim for damages, he has again failed to establish a basis for jurisdiction in circuit court. McKinney v. City of El Dorado, supra. As well stated by the majority, the circuit courts have jurisdiction only over these cases for which jurisdiction is not vested exclusively in another court. As shown above, jurisdiction of this county tax case is vested exclusively in county court except to the extent that equity may be sought in chancery court. The majority should not have reached the merits in this case. Since the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to hear the case, the Supreme Court does not have jurisdiction, and the appeal should be dismissed. I respectfully dissent. Corbin, J., joins in this dissent.