Court Opinion

ID: 3573069
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2016-07-05 23:26:29.760128+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:43:48.688728
License: Public Domain

It is urged that, in holding that there was substantial evidence to support the court's finding that appellant had no knowledge of the improvement being made, we overlooked important testimony. Prior to the furnishing of the materials in the present case, appellees had been served with process in another suit to establish a lien upon the same premises. That suit reached this court and is reported as Weggs v. Kruegel, 28 N.M. 24,  205 P. 730. The record in that case was in evidence in the present case. According to the complaint in the Weggs Case, the lien was sought under a contract made May 20, 1920, by Kruegel, to alter and repair the building on the premises by installing a new front complete, installing beaver board ceilings, patching floors, and by otherwise repairing and altering the said building, which improvement was completed June 9, 1920. According to the complaint in the present case, the materials were furnished between July 14 and July 23, 1921, to be used, and they were used, in the erection of a dance hall on the westerly end of the premises.
It is argued that it thus conclusively appears that appellees had knowledge in a general way that the premises had been, and were to be, improved. It is also urged that it is not required that knowledge be shown *Page 14 
of each of the steps in the making of improvements, or of each separate contract for labor or materials contributing to them. This may be admitted, without concluding that knowledge of repairs and alterations upon a building on the premises when it was sold necessarily imputed knowledge of intent to erect a new building.
[6] Appellant cites only Raisch et al. v. Helfrich et al.,47 Cal. App. 494, 190 P. 848. This case does not seem to bear upon the question, nor have we found a case in point. On the question of knowledge generally, see 40 C.J. 147. We think that the statute, in requiring disclaimer of liability, has reference to the particular contract or scheme of improvement in progress or contemplation at the time, and that, for instance, knowledge that a vendee intended to erect, or was erecting, a garage on the premises, would not impute knowledge of intention to erect, or erection of, a dance hall on the same premises under a different contract.
[7] It is contended that we were wrong in concluding that appellant acquiesced in the ruling excluding from evidence excerpts from the Albuquerque press relative to the improvement in question. Reconsidering the matter of this evidence, there is perhaps a better reason for overruling the assignment regarding it. We may admit (though not deciding) that these accounts of the improvement appearing in newspapers to which appellees subscribed were competent evidence bearing upon the question of knowledge, and that, if it had been a jury case, it would have been error to exclude them. But this case was tried to the court. Appellees not only testified that they had no knowledge whatever of the improvement being made, but specifically denied having read the newspaper accounts in question. This was no doubt the reason, and the only reason, that the trial judge ruled them out. So long as the court believed the evidence of appellees, the newspaper accounts were entirely unimportant. Whether he ruled them out, or left them in and disregarded *Page 15 
them, had no bearing upon the result. The ruling, if erroneous, was clearly not prejudicial.
It is contended that, even if Kruegel was not, in the first place, the agent of the appellees in purchasing the materials, appellees' subsequent purchase from Kruegel's trustee in bankruptcy of the vendee's interest was a ratification, having the effect of an original authorization. This contention we cannot consider, as no such theory was suggested in the trial court.
[8] Is is again strongly urged that the finding that Kruegel "was the builder and in charge of the construction of said dance hall" is conclusive that he was the agent of the appellees in what he did. To aid understanding of this point, we here insert pertinent sections of the Code:
"Sec. 3319. Every person performing labor upon, or furnishing materials to be used in the construction, alteration or repair of any mining claim, building, wharf, bridge, ditch, flume, tunnel, fence, machinery, railroad, wagon road or aqueduct to create hydraulic power, or any other structure, or who performs labor in any mining claim, has a lien upon the same for the work or labor done or materials furnished by each respectively, whether done or furnished at the instance of the owner of the building or other improvement, or his agent, and every contractor, subcontractor, architect, builder, or other person having charge of any mining, or of the construction, alteration, or repair, either in whole or in part, of any building or other improvement, as aforesaid, shall be held to be the agent of the owner for the purposes of this article."
"Sec. 3321. The land upon which any building, improvement, or structure is constructed, together with a convenient space about the same, or so much as may be required for the convenient use and occupation thereof, to be determined by the court on rendering judgment, is also subject to the lien, if at the commencement of the work, or of the furnishing the materials for the same, the land belonged to the person who caused said building, improvement or structure to be constructed, altered or repaired, but if such person owned less than a fee simple estate in such land, then only his interest therein is subject to such lien."
"Sec. 3327. Every building or other improvement mentioned in the second section of this article [section 3319], constructed upon any lands with the knowledge of the *Page 16 
owner or the person having or claiming any interest therein, shall be held to have been constructed at the instance of such owner or person having or claiming any interest therein, and the interest owned or claimed shall be subject to any lien filed in accordance with the provisions of this article, unless such owner or person having or claiming an interest therein shall, within three days after he shall have obtained knowledge of the construction, alteration or repair, give notice that he will not be responsible for the same, by posting a notice in writing to the effect, in some conspicuous place upon said land, or upon the building or other improvements situated thereon."
While section 3319 provides that the "builder * * * shall be held to be the agent of the owner for the purposes of this article," we cannot admit counsel's point. That the builder is to be deemed the agent of the person causing the building to be constructed seems quite plain. We think that the word "owner," in section 3319, has reference to the person causing the building to be constructed. That section contemplates no division of estates as between lessor and lessee, or vendor and vendee. It is sections 3321 and 3327 which contemplate such a situation. It is plain from the latter section that, if an interest is owned by one who did not cause the construction of the building, his interest is not to be subjected to the lien if, within three days after obtaining knowledge of it, he posts notices disclaiming liability for the improvement. That intention is controlling over any apparent inconsistency with section 3319. There is no such inconsistency, however, when the two sections are properly construed. In finding as the trial court did, we think he meant no more than to find that it was Kruegel who caused the building to be constructed. His refusal to find that Kruegel was appellees' agent for such purpose clearly indicates such meaning. If we were to go with counsel's contention, that where the vendee is the builder he is necesasrily the vendor's agent, we should, in such a case, nullify the plain provision of section 3327.
We think, therefore, that this case was properly disposed *Page 17 
of, and the motion for rehearing will be overruled. The costs of this appeal will be taxed against appellant, and the costs of the cross-appeal will be taxed against appellees and cross-appellants. The costs of this motion will be taxed against appellant; and it is so ordered.
PARKER, C.J., and BICKLEY, J., concur.