Court Opinion

ID: 9722861
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 09:53:19.780575+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:40.997676
License: Public Domain

BECKER, Justice.
I dissent.
The nature of the crime of which petitioner was charged and convicted and the long lapse of time both militate toward the majority’s result. But the problem is one of procedural constitutionality. Under the circumstances here petitioner should have been afforded a lawyer to help him process his appeal. This is all we need decide at this time.
The majority now concedes the rule laid down in Waldon v. District Court, 256 Iowa 1311, 130 N.W.2d 728 (which was understandably interpreted by the trial court to prohibit appointment of counsel for indigent habeas corpus petitioners) must be modified. It is now modified “only by vesting in the trial court the discretion of appointing counsel when the facts in a particular case make such an appointment desirable.” In part at least, this result seems to turn on our denomination of the proceedings as a civil action. We have already been clearly told by the United States Supreme Court in Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 712, 81 S.Ct. 895, 897, 6 L.Ed.2d 39: “In Iowa, the writ is a post-conviction remedy available to all prisoners who have $4. We shall not quibble as to whether in this context it be called a civil or criminal action for, as Selden has said, it is ‘the highest remedy in law, for any man that is imprisoned.’ 3 Howell’s State Trials 95 (1628). The availability of a procedure to regain liberty lost through criminal process cannot be made contingent upon a choice of labels.” (emphasis added)
The mandatory requirement of Amendment 6 of the United States Constitution to be represented by counsel has not been applied to indigent applicants in habeas corpus. But where the difficulties involved in presenting the matter are such that a fair and meaningful hearing cannot be had without the aid of counsel, compliance with the due process clause of Amendment 5 of the United States Constitution requires such appointment. This seems to be the conclusion of Judge Browning in Dillon v. United States (9th Cir. 1962), 307 F.2d 445, 447, and Judge Lumbard in United States ex rel. Wissenfeld v. Wilkins, (2nd Cir. 1960), 281 F.2d 707, 715. Amendment 14 of the United States Constitution requires the same result in state cases.
The rationale and necessary results are clearly stated by Traynor, J., in People v. Shipman, 62 Cal.2d 226, 42 Cal.Rptr. 1, 4, 397 P.2d 993, 996, 997: “In habeas corpus *310cases we require a convicted defendant to allege with particularity the facts upon which he would have a final judgment overturned and to disclose fully his reasons for any. delay in the presentation of those facts. (In re Swain, 34 Cal.2d 300, 304, 209 P.2d 793.) We then examine his allegations in the light of any matter of record pertaining to his case (see California Rules of Court, rule 60) to determine whether a hearing should be ordered. We recognize that these rules, applicable as well to petitions for coram nobis, place indigent petitioners in a less advantageous position than those with, funds to retain counsel and employ investigators. It bears emphasis, however, that the ordinary processes of trial and appeal are presumed to result in valid adjudications. Unless we make the filing of adequately detailed factual allegations stating a prima facie case a condition to appointing counsel, there would be no alternative but to require the state to appoint counsel for every prisoner who asserts that there may be some possible ground for challenging his conviction. Neither the United States Constitution nor the California Constitution compels that alternative. Accordingly, in the absence of adequate factual allegations stating a prima facie case, counsel need not be appointed either in the trial court or on appeal from a summary denial of relief in that court.
"When, however, an indigent petitioner has stated facts sufficient to satisfy the court that a hearing is required, his claim can no longer be treated as frivolous and he is entitled to have counsel appointed to represent him.” (emphasis supplied)
Justice Traynor’s conclusion is reasonable. It differs from the conclusions in the cited cases in that it recognizes that seldom, if ever, can an evidentiary hearing at the district court level be considered fair and meaningful if one side is represented by counsel and the other is not. A meaningful evidentiary hearing requires the expertise of lawyers on both sides. Courtesy and patience on the part of the trial judge is no substitute for trained advocacy. It would seem the United States Supreme Court has so indicated several times. Powell v. State of Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799. While Powell and Gideon turned on the 6th and 14th Amendments, the reasoning as applied to the efficacy of an evidentiary hearing without counsel is fully applicable here.
The tension in this field is between the government’s right to protect its judicial system, its financial expenditures and its cadre of available legal talent against frivolous and unjustified collateral attacks on the one hand, and the requirement that the individual receive as near to equal treatment under the law as is possible (independent of the individual’s financial ability) on the other hand. As noted in People v. Shipman, supra; Douglas v. People of State of California, 372 U.S. 353, 83 S.Ct. 814, 9 L.Ed.2d 811, does not prohibit all discrimination, it only proscribes “invidious discrimination.” Absolute equality of treatment is not required.
Disposal of the case may well occur on the pro se application. In such case appointment of counsel is not necessarily required. Our habeas corpus chapter commencing with section 663.1, Code, 1966, outlines our procedure. After providing for allegations alleging restraint, by whom, and on what cause or pretense, section 663.1 provides for allegations:
“3. That the restraint is illegal, and wherein.
“4. That the legality of the imprisonment has not already been adjudged upon a prior proceeding of the same character, to the best knowledge and belief of the applicant.
“5. Whether application for the writ has been before made and refused by any court or judge, and if so, a copy of the petition in that case must be attached, with the reasons for the refusal, or satisfactory reasons given for the failure to do so.”
*311Section 663.6 states: “Writ refused. If, from the showing of the petitioner, the plaintiff would not he entitled to any relief, the court or judge must refuse to allow the writ.”
Safeguards are provided in the above sections to protect the state from frivolous or repetitious applications for a writ of habeas corpus. It may be conceded that the first application will usually require evidentiary hearing because most petitions will allege facts which the state will dispute. But this procedure is afforded to prisoners in all cases. Thus it cannot be denied on grounds of indigency.
If post conviction remedies are to be afforded to convicted defendants, both logic and the history of our criminal procedures would seem to require appointment of counsel when an evidentiary hearing is granted.
The process of eliminating frivolous applications before appointment of counsel must occur at the level of consideration of the sufficiency of the petition. Arguably, this can be done without counsel. Thus the petitioner’s ability to afford a lawyer is not controlling. But where a hearing is required, with all of its attendant evidentiary and trial rules, a lawyer on both sides is indispensable to make the hearing meaningful.
Here the petition for writ of habeas corpus alleges petitioner’s federal constitutional rights were violated in several respects. These allegations include an attack on the admissions of the two confessions and competency of trial counsel. Sufficient factual material was recited in the petition to cause the trial judge to order an evidentiary hearing. The state’s statement of the issues at the hearing was: “Mr. Story: Well, just very briefly, Your Honor, the only thing that we’re aware of as grounds here might be possibly the incompetence of counsel or else the introduction of statements at the trial which were involuntarily made. Now, this, we are prepared to rebut, and this is all I care to state at this time.”
Regardless of the merits of petitioner’s contentions and the efforts of the trial court to conduct a fair hearing, it is apparent from the record that petitioner lacked the technical skill to present his evidence. This will inevitably be the case where evidentiary hearings are conducted in this one sided manner. Hence the observations in the federal and California cases cited.
Of course the trial court should also have discretion to appoint counsel where desirable, even though such appointment is not mandated by the facts and the constitution. Where the facts mandate the appointment the discretion disappears. It is then not a matter of desirability but of right. This was the case here.
I would reverse and remand with instruction to appoint counsel and conduct a new evidentiary hearing.
MASON, RAWLINGS and LeGRAND, JJ., join in this dissent.