Court Opinion

ID: 9666576
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:20:29.801195+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:30.536643
License: Public Domain

CARROLL, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I believe that the challenged evidence was admissible as a statement against interest under Rule 803(24) of the Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence, and in any event, was harmless under Rule 81(b)(2) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure.
According to the majority, “[ejvidence of sexual preference and a prior prison record can easily cast a negative light on an accused, so that a weak case looks much stronger in the eyes of a jury.” I agree. However, I would not call the case on appeal “a weak case,” and I also believe we should consider the source of the evidence in question.
Appellant was interviewed by a deputy sheriff. Before a single question was asked, the investigating officer “read him his rights,” and expressly advised him that he had “the right to remain silent” and that *518“any statement you make may be used against you.” See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1630, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
In the course of the interview, and in the face of these warnings, appellant volunteered, that he was bisexual/homosexual and that he had been in prison before. He claimed that the little boy had grabbed his penis and that the little boy had disrobed in front of him. Finally, he claimed that the child was at fault because “he was forward.” The mere recitation of this story was apparently so exciting to him that he became physically aroused while relating it to a deputy sheriff.
Under these unique facts, I would affirm the judgment of conviction.