Court Opinion

ID: 9531015
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:06:20.805784+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:19.387276
License: Public Domain

Rosenblatt, J.
(dissenting). I agree with Judge Smith’s conclusion but write separately to emphasize my concern over the way in which the concept of depraved indifference murder has been increasingly expanded. By asking us to affirm this conviction, the People would have us extend the concept even further. In my view, any additional enlargement of depraved indifference murder is unwarranted and incompatible with the Legislature’s carefully drawn gradations for homicide.
Depraved indifference murder is characterized by “extremely dangerous and fatal conduct performed without specific homicidal intent but with a depraved kind of wantonness: for example, shooting into a crowd, placing a time bomb in a public place, or opening the door of the lions’ cage in the zoo” (Denzer and McQuillan, Practice Commentary, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 39, Penal Law § 125.25, at 235 [1967]). To be guilty of depraved indifference murder, the defendant must evince more than mere indifference to human life. The indifference must be so extreme — so wicked and mischievous — as to constitute a depraved indifference. That inhuman frame of mind is what equates the crime’s blameworthiness with intentional murder.
In my view Judge Smith correctly points out that an affirmance here would allow depraved indifference murder to serve as a proxy for intentional murder whenever a person shoots and kills another (dissenting op at 393 [Smith, J.]). Put differently, by holding the facts at hand sufficient to establish depraved indifference murder, the majority leaves no. conceivable circumstances under which a charge of intentional murder will not be amenable to a conviction for depraved indifference murder. Undeniably, the two crimes — intentional murder and depraved indifference murder — are now merged, fully and inseparably. Moreover, to the extent it endorses People v Register (60 NY2d 270 [1983], cert denied 466 US 953 [1984]), the majority also conflates depraved indifference murder with reckless manslaughter. These mergers are out of line, with the history of depraved indifference murder, the statute’s purpose and its unique place in the legislative design.
I. The Crime’s Historical Development
Depraved indifference murder goes back to the common law. As recounted in Darry v People (10 NY 120 [1854]), a person *395who took someone’s life while evincing a “general malice or depraved inclination to mischief, fall where it may” was guilty of murder (id. at 143). From the earliest stages of its development, the crime was reserved for those “cases of depraved and reckless conduct, aimed at no one in particular, but endangering indiscriminately the lives of many, and resulting in the death of one or more” (id. at 146). The Darry Court, in noting that its interpretation of the New York homicide statute1 was rooted in these common-law principles (see id. at 141-143), described examples of depravity such as willfully riding an “unruly horse” among a crowd of persons2 or with reckless indifference shooting a gun into a house with people inside (see id. at 146).
Seventy years later, in People v Jernatowski (238 NY 188 [1924]), we interpreted a successor statute (former Penal Law § 1044)3 almost identical to the one in Darry. Jernatowski fired multiple shots into a house knowing that people were inside, and killed one of them. Describing the defendant’s conduct as “barbarous and depraved” (id. at 193), the Court concluded that a jury could properly determine that a person who “fired two or more shots into the house where he knew there were human beings * * * evinced a wicked and depraved mind regardless of human life” (id. at 192). In affirming the conviction for depraved mind murder (as it was then called), the Court focused on the barbaric nature of the defendant’s conduct and his utter disregard for the dangerous consequences of that conduct.
*396In its 1967 recodification, the Legislature replaced Penal Law § 1044 with Penal Law § 125.25 (2).4 The new statute, at issue on this appeal, changed “depraved mind” to “depraved indifference to human life” (Penal Law § 125.25 [2]). The concept, however, remained the same. Indeed, the Temporary State Commission on Revision of the Penal Law and Criminal Code expressly noted that the new statute was “substantially a restatement” of the former statute.5 Thus, contrary to the majority’s assertion that the 1967 recodification left Darry and its progeny “far behind” (majority op at 383), the Legislature’s clear intent was merely to restate the law, not to abrogate this State’s decisional law on the requisite mens rea for depraved indifference murder. In the wake of its 1967 restatement, the Legislature continued to contemplate a mental state so morally perverse, and so indifferent to the consequences to human life, as to be considered depraved.
People v Poplis (30 NY2d 85 [1972]) was our first opportunity to pass on Penal Law § 125.25 (2). The defendant killed a three-year-old child by beating him repeatedly over a five-day period. Arguing that his actions did not fall within the depraved indifference murder statute, Poplis contended that there was no meaningful difference between depraved indifference murder and reckless manslaughter. The Court rejected his argument, pointing out that depraved indifference murder contemplates conduct that is more than reckless: it envisions actions so extreme as to be “brutal, callous and inhuman” (Poplis, 30 NY2d at 87). In reaching this conclusion (and maintaining the depravity standard), we drew on Jernatowski and Darry. Although those cases dealt with the threat of danger to more than one person,6 they stressed the unchanging core requirement that the killer exhibit such utter indifference to human life as to constitute depravity — that the killing, although not intentional, reflects the defendant’s uncommonly evil and morally perverse frame of mind. Often, but not necessarily, this *397state of mind is revealed by the brutal or savage nature of the crime.7
II. People v Register
People v Register (60 NY2d 270) marked a turning point in the Court’s analysis. There we addressed depraved indifference murder but dealt principally with the question whether the trial court erred in refusing to consider intoxication as a defense to depraved indifference murder. In affirming Register’s depraved indifference murder conviction, the Court, for the first time, held that the requisite mens rea for that crime was ordinary recklessness — the exact same mental state required for manslaughter in the second degree.8 Moreover, the Court determined that the statutory phrase “[u]nder circumstances evincing a depraved indifference” referred not to the defendant’s mental state but the objective circumstances surrounding the criminal act. In depraved indifference murder cases, the focus, stated the Court, is on the “assessment of the degree of risk presented by defendant’s reckless conduct” (id. at 277). *398The Court went on to hold that because intoxication evidence should be excluded whenever recklessness is an element of the crime, the trial court’s refusal was proper.
In dissent, Judge Jasen (joined by Chief Judge Cooke and Judge Meyer) argued — compellingly to my mind — that the mens rea element of depraved indifference murder is depraved indifference and not, as the majority concluded, mere recklessness. The dissenters pointed out that ever since the crime of depraved indifference murder was codified under the Revised Statutes of 1829, the culpable mental state had been depravity — a mental state far more egregious than ordinary recklessness (see id. at 285-286). In the Register dissenters’ view, there existed no reason to depart from a point of law that had been settled for 130 years, particularly where the Legislature, by its 1967 recodification, intended no such departure (see id. at 281-282).
Register dealt chiefly with the defense of intoxication, but ironically, the case has served as the fulcrum for what has become a steadily growing prosecutorial practice of charging defendants with depraved indifference murder as a companion count to intentional murder. The Register majority brushed aside the dissenters’ prediction that the decision would “result in wholesale depraved mind murder prosecutions for what are essentially intentional murders” (id. at 279). That prediction proved prescient, however, as revealed by the enormous growth in depraved indifference murder companion counts post-Register.
III. The Development of Depraved Indifference Murder in the Aftermath of People v Register
After deciding Register, this Court considered several depraved indifference murder cases. None has gone so far as to justify a conviction for depraved indifference murder in a shooting of the type before us.
In People v Gomez (65 NY2d 9 [1985]), the defendant deliberately drove his automobile at 40 miles per hour down a busy sidewalk, striking several people and killing two. We affirmed the conviction for depraved indifference murder, concluding that “[t]he risks posed by defendant’s conduct in this case and his callous indifference to them entitled the jury to conclude that his conduct placed the crime on the same level as intentional murder” (id. at 12).
In People v Roe (74 NY2d 20 [1989]), the Court affirmed a conviction for depraved indifference murder where the defen*399dant, a 15-year-old high school student, deliberately loaded a mix of “live” and “dummy” shells into the magazine of a 12-gauge shotgun and fired the weapon at the victim, who was standing only 10 feet away. Over a vigorous dissent, the Court concluded that the evidence was legally sufficient to support the conviction (id. at 28).9
We have also affirmed depraved indifference murder convictions in cases where the defendant fired several shots at a number of people (see People v Fenner, 61 NY2d 971 [1984]), where the defendant brutally beat a child (see People v Bryce, 88 NY2d 124 [1996]; People v Cole, 85 NY2d 990 [1995]; People v Best, 85 NY2d 826 [1995]), and where the defendant killed six patients by injecting them with a neuromuscular blocking agent (see People v Angelo, 88 NY2d 217 [1996]). Finally, in People v Russell (91 NY2d 280 [1998]), we affirmed a conviction for depraved indifference murder where the defendant, along with other participants, engaged in a gun battle that resulted in the death of an innocent bystander who was struck by a stray bullet. 10
Even though we have allowed more and more cases to fall within the definition of depraved indifference murder, our language in Russell remains cogent and relevant. “To constitute depraved indifference, conduct must be so wanton, so deficient in a moral sense of concern, so devoid of regard of the life or lives of others, and so blameworthy as to warrant the same criminal liability as that which the law imposes upon a *400person who intentionally causes the death of another” (id. at 287-288 [internal quotation marks omitted] [emphasis added]).
This formulation, which is consistent with the criteria codified in 1829 and articulated in Darry, focuses on the defendant’s depravity — a mental state so appalling that we ascribe to it a moral deficiency tantamount to barbarity. Thus, in centering the analysis on the defendant’s moral deficiency, Russell correctly deals with the mens rea, and not the “objective circumstances.” Russell articulates a mens rea requirement far more culpable than mere recklessness, which simply requires a conscious disregard of a substantial risk. The Russell Court’s formulation of depraved indifference murder requires a state of mind so wanton, so morally deficient and so blameworthy as to place that crime on a par with intentional murder. This obviously goes beyond mere recklessness, which, in the homicide classifications, is two grades lower.11 Indeed, Russell cites People v Fenner (61 NY2d 971), which held that depraved indifference murder is characterized by “conduct, beyond being reckless * * * [which is] so wanton, so deficient in a moral sense of concern, so devoid of regard of the life or lives of others, and so blameworthy as to warrant the same criminal liability as that which the law imposes upon a person who intentionally causes the death of another” (id. at 973 [emphasis added]). Reckless conduct (the Register standard) is obviously not the same as conduct that goes beyond recklessness (the Russell standard). In making that critical distinction, the Court in Russell and Fenner improved on Register by properly identifying the heightened mens rea requirement that characterizes depraved indifference murder.
Until Register was decided, this heightened standard, which forcefully articulates the essence of depravity, had always been the unquestioned law of this state. Interestingly, the New York Criminal Jury Instructions recognize the heightened mens rea standard by providing that “[c]onduct evincing a depraved indifference to human life creates a much more serious threat to human life than conduct which is merely reckless. * * * Under our law, a defendant acts with depraved indifference to human life when, in the judgment of the jury, his conduct, beyond being reckless, is so brutal, callous, dangerous and inhuman, so devoid of regard for human life, as to constitute *401conduct equivalent in law to intentionally causing death” (2 CJI[NY] PL 125.25 [2], at 316-323 [emphasis added and in original] [internal quotation marks omitted]).
Notwithstanding this stringent standard, we have seen a proliferation of depraved indifference murder prosecutions at the trial level and a seemingly growing tolerance for them at the Appellate Division level.12
IV. The Statistical Increase in Depraved Indifference Murder Charges
After having been limited, for decades, to the most horrendous killings, depraved indifference murder counts have become routine escorts to intentional murder counts. While observers have sensed it and criminal lawyers on both sides of the fence would no doubt attest to it anecdotally, the statistics indisputably confirm it. According to the Division of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS),13 in 1989 only 19% of all Penal Law § 125.25 indictments contained a count of depraved indifference murder. By 2001, prosecutors charged depraved indifference murder in 70% of all murder indictments. During that same period, while the number of murder indictments fell by 50% from 1315 to 666 per year, the number of depraved indifference murder charges nearly doubled from 246 to 468 annually (see Division of Criminal Justice Services, Indictment Statistical System, “New York State Indictments Containing at Least One Penal Law Section 125.25 Charge” [Feb. 2002] [reproduced in Appendix, infra]).
In addition to the seismic increase (in raw numbers) in depraved indifference murder prosecutions, DCJS has documented a burgeoning frequency of coupling depraved indifference murder counts with intentional murder counts. Between 1989 and 1992, prosecutors charged both counts for the same homicide an average of 221 times per year. Since 1993, prosecutors charged both counts an average of 373 times, a 69% *402increase. Even more striking, as a percentage of all murder indictments, these twin-count indictments have steadily increased from 14% in 1989 to nearly 56% in 2001 — a fourfold increase in 13 years. Today, a majority of all murder indictments in New York charge both intentional murder and depraved indifference murder. This is extraordinary. Moreover, the rate of such twin-count indictments has steadily risen at an average rate of 4.3% each year for the last 13 years (see id.). There is no reason to doubt the continued expansion of this now routine practice — having reached the point in which virtually every intentional murder is defined (inaptly, I submit) as an act of depraved indifference. The prediction that we would see a wholesale increase in the number of depraved indifference murder counts — a warning dismissed by the Court in Register (and again in Roe) — has come true.14
The majority’s only response to this startling statistical phenomenon is to suggest that the number of convictions for depraved indifference murder has not risen as exponentially as the number of indictments (see majority op at 385 n 5). Even so, the charge of depraved indifference murder, intended to be a rare indictment for a rare breed of criminal, has undeniably become a tactical weapon of choice that distorts the Penal Law and skews the process of indictment, trial and plea — just as the dissenters in Register and Roe rightly predicted.
V. The Present Case
The facts are fully laid out by the majority and Judge Smith, revealing either an unprovoked shooting or a struggle culminating in a gun shot. Either way, there is not a semblance of depraved indifference murder as we have interpreted it or as the Legislature has defined it.
Undisputedly, defendant shot the gun directly at the victim’s chest at point-blank range. When the defense objected to the trial court submitting depraved indifference murder to the jury, the court responded: “I think some people can conclude from the record that pointing a loaded gun at someone and pulling a trigger at point blank range within 18 inches is depraved, as well as intentional. So I am satisfied that the evidence will support the charge, so that’s denied.” This explica*403tion of the law is simply wrong. It erroneously conflates intentional murder with depraved indifference murder. Moreover, it ignores entirely the level of uncommon mischief and inhumanity necessary to establish the depravity element in depraved indifference murder.15
A. Conflating Depraved Indifference Murder with Intentional Murder
The distinction between depraved indifference murder and intentional murder has been recognized as critical not only by our own Legislature and Practice Commentary authors but by other commentators. In their treatise, LaFave and Scott list types of conduct that various jurisdictions have held to be depraved: firing a bullet into a room of occupants; starting a fire at the front door of an occupied building; shooting into a moving train or automobile; throwing a beer glass at someone carrying a lighted oil lamp; playing “Russian roulette”; and shooting twice from eight feet away, not aiming at the victim, but with the bullets ricocheting in unpredictable directions after hitting hard surfaces (see 2 LaFave and Scott, Substantive Criminal Law § 7.4 [a], at 202-203 [footnotes omitted]). The authors go on to list other examples of extremely risky conduct such as piloting a speedboat through a group of swimmers or swooping an airplane so low over a traveling car as to risk decapitating a motorist (see id. at 203). These illustrations, which could constitute intentional murder given the proper mens rea, epitomize the depravity that we have insisted upon for 150 years in defining depraved indifference murder.
There is, however, a glaring omission from this list. The list does not (and cannot possibly) include intentionally shooting someone in the head (or, as here, in the chest) at point-blank range. The reason is simple: such an act should be prosecuted only as intentional murder under Penal Law § 125.25 (1). Indeed, if intentional murder qualifies as depraved indifference murder, there is nothing left of the depraved indifference murder statute. Any such killing would automatically be both intentional and depraved indifference murder. That result is not only illogical but also discordant both with our decisional *404law and the statutory scheme’s heightened requirements for depraved indifference murder. Moreover, it would equate homicides that should not be equated. The defendant who causes a person’s death by opening a lion’s cage, derailing a train or detonating a bomb in a public area should not be placed in the same classification as the defendant who uses a knife or a gun to kill an antagonist in a bar fight. Lumping these defendants together destroys the foundations of the depraved indifference murder statute and diminishes the severity of the most horrific killings for which the statute is reserved.16
The People nevertheless ask us to adopt the Trial Judge’s erroneous formulation and endorse it as the law of this state. In their summation at trial, the People pressed the same theory they unwaveringly advanced from the inception of the case through this appeal: defendant intended to kill the victim. In arguing before the jury, the prosecutor elaborated in words that could not have been plainer or more emphatic: “defendant is guilty of intentional murder because when he shot the gun at [the decedent] * * * [h]e shot at his heart. You can intend no other result when you shoot a gun at someone’s chest, other than to kill him and he did kill him, and that is why he is guilty of intentional murder” (emphasis added).
Echoing the Trial Judge, the People continue to argue that this very act of shooting the gun at the decedent’s chest at point-blank range is so depraved (and evinces such indifference) that it qualifies as depraved indifference murder. Under the prosecutor’s reasoning, the closer one points the gun to the chest (i.e., the closer one gets to intentional murder) the more indifferent is the actor. This formulation defines indifference and depravity by using intentionality — of all things — as its measure. The more intentional the act, the argument goes, the more it reveals the defendant’s depravity. We are afforded the ultimate incongruity when the prosecution argues that willfully aiming a bullet at the chest is necessarily the most depraved act of all. This reasoning illogically conflates depraved *405indifference with intent, and the depraved indifference murder statute is nullified, utterly.
So too with the indifference component. The more the killer intends to kill the victim (the People’s argument goes), the more indifferent the killer is to the victim’s fate. But this obviously cannot be so. Intent to kill is a world apart from indifference. The two states of mind are incompatible and cannot be held simultaneously (see Gallagher, 69 NY2d at 529). The intentional murderer — who wants the victim dead and makes sure of it — should not be confused with the defendant who acts “come what may” and is indifferent to whether the victim lives or dies or is injured or even exists. The defendant who derails a train or poisons a well “come what may” has no specific intent to kill a particular person. Indeed, such defendants are totally indifferent as to whether their actions might or might not kill someone. It is their indifference to human life — not their intent to take human life — that marks them as the fittest candidates for depraved indifference murder convictions. Conversely, if the defendant poisoned the well knowing that the intended victim was about to drink from it, the act would amount to intentional murder, not depraved indifference murder. By arguing that all intentional murders are depraved because they are intentional, the People reveal the circularity of their position.
This misconception would not be evident to jurors because they are not acquainted with the Penal Law’s gradations. When exhorted to do so, jurors may irresistibly (and understandably) be tempted to accept the notion that someone who aims a bullet at the victim’s chest (or brain) is acting with depraved indifference to human life. Indeed, the DCJS statistics graphically reveal as much. Legally, however, the notion is all wrong because it thoroughly undoes the statutory scheme and obliterates the crucial distinction between depraved indifference and intentional murder.
In conversational terms, most people would have little difficulty in characterizing as depraved the behavior of someone who selects a victim, points a gun at that victim’s head or chest and pulls the trigger. And yet we know that this act is and should be punishable not as depraved indifference murder but as intentional murder. Of course, we could call it depraved indifference murder, but we would have to scrap the Penal Law.
A finding of depravity in this fashion entails policy implications that are deeply troubling. Primarily, it makes it too easy *406for prosecutors to seize upon depraved indifference murder as a fallback position whenever their proof for intentional murder fails to satisfy the jury. Resultingly, whenever there is insufficient evidence to make a case for intentional murder, the prosecution will inappropriately have a second chance at a murder conviction rather than one for manslaughter in the first degree under Penal Law § 125.20 (1).
Moreover, by diverting the jury to consider depraved indifference murder, trial courts (unwittingly, but palpably nonetheless) will mislead jurors into believing that depraved indifference murder is a milder charge readily available either when intentional murder has not been proved or as a means of extending a measure of leniency. The result is predictable: if and when a trial court in an intentional murder case erroneously authorizes a jury to consider depraved indifference murder, there is the very real possibility that the jury will improperly find the defendant guilty of depraved indifference murder. The jury cannot possibly realize the unfairness in it because they are not familiar with the refinements of the statutory scheme for homicides. They will go home believing (wrongly) that they convicted the defendant of a lesser grade of homicide. Furthermore, by diverting juries to consider depraved indifference murder, the People further enhance the probability of an unfair conviction because the depraved indifference murder statute does not permit an affirmative defense for extreme emotional distress (compare Penal Law § 125.25 [1] [a] with Penal Law § 125.25 [2]; see also Gegan, More Cases of Depraved Mind Murder: The Problem of Mens Rea, 64 St John’s L Rev 429, 438-439 [1990]). Beyond that, there is the prospect of fallback prosecutions and overcharging as described by the dissent in Roe (see n 9, supra).17
B. Conflating Depraved Indifference Murder with Second Degree Manslaughter
To the extent that it endorses Register, the majority also conflates depraved indifference murder with reckless manslaughter. After today, depraved indifference murder can thus be used as a proxy for not one but two separate crimes.
In concluding that depraved indifference murder has a mens rea of ordinary recklessness, the Court in Register essentially *407took the “depraved” out of depraved indifference, so that depraved indifference murder is virtually indistinguishable from reckless manslaughter. According to Register, depraved indifference murder and reckless manslaughter have the identical mens rea element of recklessness. The only difference between the two crimes lies in the so-called “objective circumstances” surrounding the criminal act. If the defendant’s conduct created a “substantial” risk of death, the crime is second degree manslaughter. If, however, the defendant’s conduct created a “grave” risk of death, the crime is depraved indifference murder (Register, 60 NY2d at 276-277).
Register conflates the two crimes not only by giving them the same mens rea, but also by seeking to differentiate them only in terms of “objective circumstances” that are all but indistinguishable. Thus, for the factfinder, everything turns on whether the defendant’s conduct created a “grave” risk of death as opposed to a “substantial” risk of death. I think it is too much to ask of any juror. The difference between reckless manslaughter, which carries a minimum punishment of one year in prison, and depraved indifference murder, which carries a minimum punishment of 15 years in prison, should not turn on the razor-thin distinction between “substantial” and “grave.”18
Indeed, the Register Court’s formulation has the effect of treating defendants with the exact same mental culpability unequally by giving them vastly different sentences even though their moral culpability is identical. This consequence violates a fundamental principle of the criminal law, which seeks to punish defendants in proportion to the blameworthiness of their offense. A person who intentionally kills another is considered more culpable (and deserving of greater punish*408ment) than one who, through mere carelessness, causes the death of another. The Penal Law (as well as the Model Penal Code) recognizes this by creating different levels of culpability, with negligence being the least culpable and intentionality being the most culpable (see Penal Law § 15.05; Model Penal Code § 2.02).19 If depraved indifference murder and reckless manslaughter have the same mens rea (i.e., ordinary recklessness), then two defendants with exactly the same mental culpability can be separately convicted of two different crimes (murder arid reckless manslaughter) and receive vastly different punishments. As one harsh critic of Register has asked, “How can it be just to punish for murder, one offender whose mental culpability is no greater than that of another guilty only of manslaughter — thereby exposing the former to an additional fifteen years of imprisonment?” (Gegan, More Cases of Depraved Mind Murder: The Problem of Mens Rea, 64 St John’s L Rev at 435.)
Although the majority cites the Model Penal Code in support of its analysis, that reliance is misplaced. The Code reinforces the proposition that depraved indifference murder contains a different and much more culpable mens rea requirement than reckless manslaughter. This is clear for several reasons.
To begin with, the Code expressly provides that the “extreme indifference standard states a culpability requirement in addition to those used generally throughout the Model Code” (Model Penal Code, § 210.2, at 22 n 37 [emphasis added]). The culpability requirements “used generally throughout the Model Code” are negligence, recklessness, knowledge, and purpose (id. at § 2.02, at 22 n 37). By declaring that depraved indifference murder has a culpability requirement “in addition” to these four mental states, it follows inexorably that depraved indiffer*409ence murder does not have ordinary recklessness as its mental state. On the contrary, the Code repeatedly describes the requisite mental state for depraved indifference murder as extreme recklessness which “rises to the level of ‘extreme indifference to the value of human life’ ” (id. at § 210.2, at 25).20 By stating that the recklessness must “rise” to another level, the Code leaves no doubt that depraved indifference murder has a graver (i.e., more substantial) mens rea element than reckless manslaughter. Indeed, in discussing the difference between the two crimes, the Code explains that “/oJrdinary recklessness [as defined by section 2.02 (2) (c)] is made sufficient for a conviction of manslaughter * * *. In a prosecution for murder, however, the Code calls for the further judgment whether the actor’s conscious disregard of the risk, under the circumstances, manifests extreme indifference to the value of human life” (id. at 21 [emphasis added]).
Moreover, in discussing the role of the jury in a prosecution for depraved indifference murder, the Code cautions that a trial court should provide “instructions which make it clear that recklessness that can fairly be assimilated to purpose or knowledge should be treated as [depraved indifference] murder and that less extreme recklessness should be punished as manslaughter” (id. at 22 [emphasis added]). Given the Code’s meticulous gradations of culpability into four neat categories (negligence, recklessness, knowledge and purpose), it is notable that the Code describes the requisite mens rea for reckless manslaughter as “less extreme recklessness” than the mens rea for depraved indifference murder. For the latter, the mens rea is closer to intent. As the Code Commentary notes, depraved indifference murder “reflects the judgment that there is a kind of reckless homicide that cannot fairly he distinguished in grading terms from homicides committed purposely or knowingly” (id. at 21 [emphasis added]). If depraved indifference murder had a mens rea of simple recklessness, the crime would be less blameworthy than intentional murder and would “fairly be distinguished in grading terms from homicides committed purposely or knowingly” (id.).
Second, the Code states that its formulation for depraved indifference murder “reflects both the common law and much *410pre-existing statutory treatment usually cast in terms of conduct evidencing a ‘depraved heart regardless of human life’ or some similar words” (id. at 22). This statement is revealing because under the common law, the crime’s mens rea was marked by the defendant’s “malignant heart” or “depraved mind.” The mens rea was not (and except in the Register rationale has never been) ordinary recklessness. Indeed, even under New York’s predecessor statutes to Penal Law § 125.25, the requisite mens rea was a “depraved mind” (Register, 60 NY2d at 277). Thus, by construing its depraved indifference murder provision in accord with the common law, the Code clearly contemplates that depraved indifference murder has a mens rea not of ordinary recklessness but of a depraved indifference that exceeds recklessness.
Third, the Code uses precisely the same examples of acts constituting depraved indifference murder as have been described elsewhere in this opinion and, indeed, as this Court itself described 150 years ago in Darry. The familiar examples cited by the Code are “shooting into a crowd or into an occupied house or automobile” (id. at 22). These illustrations epitomize a mental depravity and indifferent frame of mind considerably more heinous than mere recklessness.
The distinction between ordinary recklessness and depravity is important because it differentiates depraved indifference murder from manslaughter in the second degree (mere recklessness) and consigns depraved indifference murder to a very narrow class of inordinately horrific homicides. Indeed, the 1967 Commentaries to Penal Law § 125.25 highlight this distinction, emphasizing that the mens rea element of depraved indifference murder is extreme recklessness (see Denzer and McQuillan, Practice Commentary, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 39, Penal Law § 125.25, at 235 [1967]).21 It is this inhuman level of depravity — this “depraved kind of wantonness” — that defines depraved indifference murder (see id.).
If we are to be faithful to the meaning and rationale of the depraved indifference murder statute — and thus require *411extreme recklessness evincing depraved indifference as the mens rea — the People’s case must fail. Never did the People argue to the jury that defendant’s conduct was reckless in any degree. They never deviated from their contention that defendant intended to kill the decedent. Accordingly, in my view, defendant’s conviction for depraved indifference murder cannot stand.22
C. The Majority’s Writing
In addressing the majority’s writing, it is useful to discuss where we agree. Astutely, the Court recognizes the need to “differentiate [ ] between the reckless state of mind sufficient to establish the mental culpability of manslaughter and the extreme recklessness of murder under [the depraved indifference murder provision]” (majority op at 380 [emphasis added]). I agree entirely. I disagree with the majority’s assertion, however, that Register recognizes this difference.
It is true, as the majority points out, that the Court in Register once used the phrase “egregiously reckless” (Register, 60 NY2d at 279). However, no court has ever interpreted these words, as today’s majority does, to require a “significantly heightened recklessness” for depraved indifference murder (majority op at 380). Nor, I submit, did Register itself. Indeed, the Register Court plainly stated that “ ‘recklessness’ is the mens rea, and the only mens rea,” for depraved indifference murder (Register, 60 NY2d at 278 [emphasis added]; see also id. at 277 [“recklessness is the element of mental culpability required”]). “Recklessness,” the Court explained, merely “refers to defendant’s conscious disregard of a substantial risk” (id. at *412276) . This definition, of course, is the one found in Penal Law § 15.05 (3), which defines ordinary recklessness.
The Register Court repeatedly emphasized that, in its view, the only element that elevates reckless manslaughter to depraved indifference murder is the entirely objective circumstance of whether the degree of risk created by the defendant’s conduct is “grave” as opposed to “substantial” (see id. at 276-277) . The majority now asserts that the degree of risk somehow elevates the defendant’s culpable mental state to a “heightened recklessness” (majority op at 380). Register, however, did not say this. On the contrary, the Register Court expressly stated that “the depraved mind murder statute requires * * * not only that the conduct which results in death present a grave risk of death but that it also occur ‘[u]nder circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life.’ This additional requirement refers to neither the mens rea nor the actus reus” (id. at 276 [emphasis added]).
Plainly, the Register Court refused (improperly, I submit) to consider depraved indifference as an element, and referred only to the “factual setting in which the risk creating conduct must occur — [i.e., the] objective circumstances * * *” (id.). Accordingly, Register cannot be read to hold that the factual setting somehow elevates the requisite mens rea to a “heightened recklessness.”
Register has stood steadfastly for the proposition that depraved indifference murder and reckless manslaughter contain the exact same mens rea: ordinary recklessness. This Court has made that same observation time and time again, expressly confirming that Register stands for that proposition. Six years after deciding Register, this Court said unequivocally: “The only culpable mental state required for murder under subdivision (2) of Penal Law § 125.25 (depraved indifference murder), we have made clear, is recklessness — the same mental state required for manslaughter, second degree, under subdivision (1) of Penal Law § 125.15” (People v Roe, 74 NY2d 20, 24 [1989] [emphasis added]; see also People v McManus, 67 NY2d 541, 548 [1986] [“depraved indifference * * * involves the same mens rea” as reckless manslaughter]; People v Gomez, 65 NY2d 9, 11 [1985] [same]).
*413The lower courts have similarly understood (and have uniformly applied) Register’s holding that the two crimes share precisely the same mens rea of ordinary recklessness (see People v Shabaz, 173 AD2d 498, 499 [1991] [holding that depraved indifference murder has a mens rea of recklessness, “the same mental state required for manslaughter, second degree”]; People v Kalwasinski, 160 AD2d 732, 732 [1990] [holding that “(t)he only culpable mental state required for depraved indifference murder, * * * like reckless manslaughter, * * * is ‘recklessness’ ”]; People v Zebrowski, 198 AD2d 716, 718 [1993] [holding that, like reckless manslaughter, the mental state for depraved indifference murder is recklessness]; People v Moquin, 142 AD2d 347, 353 [1988] [holding that “the culpable mental state for both manslaughter in the second degree and murder in the second degree under Penal Law § 125.25 (2) is the same”]). Under any analysis, “objective circumstances” have nothing to do with the defendant’s mental culpability and, contrary to the majority’s contention, those circumstances cannot possibly “elevate! ] and magnif[y] the degree of recklessness” (majority op at 381).
In my view, the majority’s analysis is inapt because in defining the mens rea requirement of depraved indifference murder, it continues to focus almost entirely on the “objective circumstances” and improperly fails to recognize the defendant’s depraved indifference to the value of human life as the central mens rea element. Nearly two centuries of decisional law and statutory enactments clearly require that to prove depraved indifference, the People must show far more than mere recklessness (i.e., mere disregard of a substantial risk). The defendant must evince a wicked and mischievous disregard (i.e., utter indifference) for the nearly certain consequences of his or her irresponsible act. It is this extreme wickedness — this abject moral deficiency — that, in the final analysis, places the defendant’s culpability on an even plane with the intentional murderer.
In now recognizing a “heightened recklessness” standard for depraved indifference murder, the Court vitiates one of Register’s principal thrusts. I applaud the majority for doing so because I think it is a step in the right direction. But it does not go far enough. The Register problem, and the unpalatable result which it has produced in this case, will never be alleviated until the logically inescapable final step is taken and depraved indifference is restored as the imperative mens rea.
*414VI. The Remedy
There are four possible resolutions to this appeal based on a number of theories. The People seek affirmance; the majority affirms on a somewhat different theory; Judge Ciparick and defendant would reverse and dismiss; and Judge Smith and I would reduce the conviction to manslaughter in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.15 [1]). Having discussed both the People’s arguments and the majority’s grounds for affirmance, I think it important to consider the other possible resolutions.
Defendant claims — and Judges Ciparick, Smith and I agree— that a conviction for depraved indifference murder should be foreclosed. Judge Ciparick agrees with defendant, however, in his contention that because there is no evidence of recklessness, the conviction cannot be reduced to manslaughter in the second degree, and the case must therefore be dismissed. While I agree that the facts rule out a conviction for depraved indifference murder, a reduction to manslaughter in the second degree is appropriate.
Recklessness is, of course, lesser-included within depraved indifference murder. It is impossible for someone to be so reckless as to be guilty of depraved indifference murder, and not at the same time be “merely” reckless. On the facts before us, I am not prepared to say that defendant’s conduct was in any way reckless. But that is not the end of the matter. Defendant himself agreed to a lesser-included instruction on manslaughter in the second degree, and the court charged it to the jury. Under these circumstances, defendant has waived any argument as to the insufficiency of proof as to recklessness and may not now be heard to say that he deserves an outright dismissal (see CPL 300.50 [1]; People v Ford, 62 NY2d 275, 283 [1984]; see also People v Richardson, 88 NY2d 1049, 1051 [1996]; People v Heath, 269 AD2d 701 [2000]; People v Dennis, 263 AD2d 618 [1999]; People v Green, 205 AD2d 637, 638 [1994]; People v Maldonado, 196 AD2d 778 [1993]).
The jury, after all, found that defendant engaged in highly culpable conduct. It is extremely unlikely — almost inconceivable — that they would have acquitted defendant entirely if depraved indifference murder were taken out of the case. In all likelihood, they would have convicted defendant of manslaughter in the first degree (Penal Law § 125.20 [1]) or manslaughter in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.15 [1]). First degree manslaughter is inapt. Unlike second degree manslaughter, it *415is not a lesser included offense of the crime for which defendant was found guilty. Manslaughter in the first degree is possible only if the case were to be remanded for a new trial on the theory that the jury was misdirected, and therefore had no opportunity to consider it the first time around. Such a remand, however, would raise serious double jeopardy questions (see CPL 40.20). Moreover, the possibility of a remand for a new trial for first degree manslaughter was not briefed in the appeal before us.
Reduction to second degree manslaughter is authorized by statute (see CPL 470.15 [2] [a]; 470.40 [1]; 470.20 [4]) and amply supported by decisional law (see People v Asaro, 182 AD2d 823, 824 [1992] [reducing the conviction from depraved indifference murder to reckless manslaughter where the defendant beat the victim with a baseball bat in a barroom brawl]; People v Magliato, 110 AD2d 266, 270-271 [1985], affd 68 NY2d 24 [1986] [reducing the conviction from depraved indifference murder to reckless manslaughter where the defendant shot the victim]; see also People v Thacker, 166 AD2d 102 [1991] [reducing the defendant’s conviction from depraved indifference murder to reckless manslaughter]; People v Sika, 138 AD2d 935, 935, lv denied 72 NY2d 866 [1988] [same]; People v France, 57 AD2d 432 [1977] [same]; see generally People v Stewart, 40 NY2d 692, 699 [1976]). Even though I cannot say that defendant’s conduct was reckless, I note that the majority concludes that it was. If we take that as a premise, a reduction to second degree manslaughter is appropriate because the additional component of depravity (which is necessary for a depraved indifference murder conviction) was not and could not have been proven. Concededly, there is something to be said for outright dismissal. Had defendant objected to the lesser included charge of reckless manslaughter, dismissal might well be warranted.
The Court, of course, has the power to overrule Register expressly and restore depraved indifference as the key mens rea element. This, I suggest, would be the appropriate way to remedy the logical bind that Register presents when pushed to its limits. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
*416[[Image here]]

. Revised Statutes of New York (part IV, ch I, tit I, §§ 4, 5 [2] [1829]) provided:
“§ 4. The killing of a human being, without the authority of law, by poison, shooting, stabbing, or any other means, or in any other manner, is either murder, manslaughter, or excusable or justifiable homicide, according to the facts and circumstances of each case.
“§ 5. Such killing, unless it be manslaughter, or excusable or justifiable homicide, as hereinafter provided, shall be murder in the following cases: * * *
“2. When perpetrated by any act imminently dangerous to others, and evincing a depraved mind, regardless of human life, although without any premeditated design to effect the death of any particular individual.”

. In 1854 (and before that), it was unruly horses; today, driving automobiles at high speeds into crowds (see e.g. People v Gomez, 65 NY2d 9 [1985]). The crime is the same.

. Former Penal Law § 1044 provided: “The killing of a human being, unless it is excusable or justifiable, is murder in the first degree, when committed * * * 2. By an act imminently dangerous to others, and evincing a depraved mind, regardless of human life, although without a premeditated design to effect the death of any individual.”

. The Penal Law (L 1965, ch 1030) became effective September 1, 1967. Section 125.25 (2) states that a person is guilty of murder when “[u]nder circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life, he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another person, and thereby causes the death of another person.”

. See Temp St Commn on Revision of Penal Law and Criminal Code, Commn Staff Notes, Proposed NY Penal Law § 130.25 (1964).

. I agree with the majority that this circumstance (i.e., more than one victim) is not required under the present statute.

. See People v Lynch, 95 NY2d 243, 247 (2000) (“brutal and sustained”); People v Bryce, 88 NY2d 124, 126 (1996) (involving the killing of a seven-week-old baby by fracturing his skull); People v Best, 85 NY2d 826 (1995), affg on op below 202 AD2d 1015 (1994) (involving the killing, by repeated beatings, of a nine-year-old child); People v Roe, 74 NY2d 20, 27 (1989) (“macabre game of chance” resulting in the victim’s death); People v Gomez, 65 NY2d 9, 11 (1985) (“wanton indifference to human life or depravity of mind” where the defendant struck a child with his car, accelerated, and then struck and killed another child); People v Poplis, 30 NY2d 85, 88 (1972) (“continued brutality’ in beating a three-year-old child); People v Rios, 230 AD2d 87, 88 (1997) (“brutal”); People v Gonsa, 220 AD2d 27, 29 (1996) (“brutal”); People v Tinning, 142 AD2d 402 (1988) (involving the smothering death of a three-month-old infant); People v Swartz, 130 AD2d 288 (1987) (involving the beating death of a two-year-old child); People v Brensic, 119 AD2d 281, 284 (1986), revd on evidentiary grounds 70 NY2d 9 (1987) (“brutal” killing by beating the victim and shoving rocks down his throat); People v Knapp, 113 AD2d 154, 164 (1985) (“barbaric”); People v Millson, 93 AD2d 899 (1983) (involving the beating death of a two-year-old child); People v McNeeley, 77 AD2d 205, 212-213 (1980) (involving the beating death of a two-year-old child); People v Lilly, 71 AD2d 393, 396 (1979) (“cruelty and hardness of heart”).

. “Recklessly” is defined under Penal Law § 15.05 (3). That section provides: “A person acts recklessly with respect to a result or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when he is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such result will occur or that such circumstance exists. The risk must be of such nature and degree that disregard thereof constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation. A person who creates such a risk but is unaware thereof solely by reason of voluntary intoxication also acts recklessly with respect thereto.”

. In dissent, and echoing the warning of the three dissenters in Register, Judge Bellacosa argued that by sustaining depraved indifference murder indictments against defendants whose actions were merely reckless, the Roe Court unduly expanded the scope of depraved indifference murder. “Prosecutors will find the temptation legally and strategically irresistible, and overcharging traditional reckless manslaughter conduct as the more serious murderous conduct will become standard operating procedure. * * * That devastating advantage, among others, given to the prosecution provides an unjust double opportunity for a top count murder conviction and an almost certain fallback for conviction on the lesser included crime of manslaughter” (Roe, 74 NY2d at 35-36). A review of the case law shows that after Register there was a substantial increase in depraved indifference murder charges (see n 14, infra). The dissenters’ prediction in Register that the Court’s decision would make it too easy for prosecutors to obtain murder convictions (see Register, 60 NY2d at 287) was reiterated by the dissenter six years later in Roe. The further increase in depraved indifference murder counts since Roe is striking (as shown by the figures cited at Part IV, infra) and illustrates the accuracy of the dissenters’ predictions in both cases.

. See generally Donnino, New York Court of Appeals on Criminal Law § 35:28, at 35-21 through 35-29 (2d ed 1997).

. Reckless manslaughter is a class C felony (see Penal Law § 125.15 [1]) whereas intentional murder and depraved indifference murder are class A-I felonies (see Penal Law § 125.25 [1], [2]).

. See e.g. People v Lyons (280 AD2d 926 [2001] [affirming the depraved indifference murder conviction of a man who shot his lover’s husband in the chest and head during a struggle]); People v Sawyer (274 AD2d 603, 607 [2000] [affirming the defendant’s depraved indifference murder conviction where the “defendant deliberately thrust a steak knife into (the victim’s) chest with significant force”]).

. We may properly take judicial notice of facts appearing in the public records of this State (see People ex rel. Nichols v Board of Canvassers, 129 NY 395, 420 [1891]; see also Matter of Siwek v Mahoney, 39 NY2d 159, 163 n 2 [1976] [“Data culled from public records is, of course, a proper subject of judicial notice”]).

. From People v Natal (102 AD2d 496 [1984]) to People v Crawford (295 AD2d 361 [2002]), the Appellate Divisions have considered over 100 convictions stemming from twin-count indictments, the vast majority in the last 10 years. I need not list them all.

. It is also wrong in suggesting that the act is at once both depraved and intentional. Under the law, it cannot simultaneously be both (see People v Gallagher, 69 NY2d 525, 529 [1987]). The trial court corrected this error only insofar as it allowed the jury to consider intentional murder and depraved indifference murder in the alternative. Depraved indifference murder should not have been charged at all.

. I am not suggesting that prosecutions for killings such as the one before us be the least bit relaxed. On the contrary, when a person shoots another in the chest at point-blank range, it deserves the most rigorous prosecutorial response. Defendant was appropriately charged with intentional murder and the question was put to the jury. The jury, however, acquitted defendant of that crime. They should have been directed to then consider manslaughter in the first degree. When a jury acquits a defendant of intentional murder, it should not be an automatic signal or invitation to consider depraved indifference murder as an alternative. In rare cases it would be proper; in most it would be unfair.

. Moreover, merely reciting an accusation of this kind to the jury— when it does not belong in the case — exacerbates the unfairness of the practice. Indeed, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, in State v Lagasse (410 A2d 537, 540 [1980]), cautioned prosecutors on this point.

. Courts and commentators alike have severely criticized Register and its progeny (see Jones v Keane, US Dist Ct, SD NY, Brieant, J., 02 Civ 1804 [describing the Register Court’s attempt to distinguish depraved indifference murder from reckless manslaughter as circular and unsuccessful]; Gegan, More Cases of Depraved Mind Murder: The Problem of Mens Rea, 64 St John’s L Rev 429, 436 [opining that “(s)o tenuous is the [Register] court’s rationale for refusing to recognize depraved indifference as a mens rea element, and so superfluous did its interpretation render the statutory language, that one can speculate that the court was simply reaching a desirable result on the precise issue before it: whether evidence of intoxication can negate the necessary mental element of depraved mind murder”]; 8 Zett, NY Crim Prac ¶ 69.2 [2] [c], at 69-37 [2002] [opining that “(i)f the distinction between that recklessness which will render the actor liable for manslaughter and that which will render him liable for murder is to be a meaningful one, the courts must strive and have sought to refine the tests necessary to make such a distinction”]).

. There is no reason why the list of mental states outlined in Penal Law § 15.05 should be considered exhaustive (i.e., should preclude a mens rea of “depraved indifference”). As one commentator notes, “While the legislature may reasonably be understood to gather into one place uniform definitions of standardized terms that can then be used throughout the rest of the statute, it is not sensible to suppose that the standardized terms necessarily suffice for the statement of all specific crimes. If the legislature wants to create some non-standard, culpable mental state ad hoc in a particular crime, it should not be hobbled in doing so. To interpret the definitional section in an exclusive manner converts it from a tool for the legislative drafter into his master” (Gegan, More Cases of Depraved Mind Murder: The Problem of Mens Rea, 64 St John’s L Rev at 434). The Model Penal Code supports this argument. Although the Code has four culpáble mental states, it expressly provides that the mental state for depraved indifference is “in addition” to those four (Model Penal Code, § 210.2, at 22 n 37).

. The Code emphasizes this point on several occasions, stating that the depraved indifference murder provision “includes within the murder category cases of homicide caused by extreme recklessness * * *” and also that “[w]hether recklessness is so extreme that it demonstrates similar indifference [as would a purposeful killing] is not a question, it is submitted, that can be further clarified” (Model Penal Code § 210.2, at 22 [emphasis added]).

. Although the language of the depraved indifference murder provision has changed slightly over time, the distinction between that crime and reckless manslaughter continues. Depraved indifference murder, unlike reckless manslaughter, contains the far more culpable mens rea requirement of depraved indifference. Indeed, section 125.25 (2) of the Penal Law is “substantially a restatement” of former Penal Law § 1044 (2) — which, as the Register majority conceded, defined the requisite mens rea as “a depraved mind” (see Temp St Commn on Revision of Penal Law and Criminal Code, Commn Staff Notes, Proposed NY Penal Law § 130.25 [1964]).

. Register does not compel affirmance, even applying its ordinary recklessness standard which the majority seemingly disavows. Register concluded that the defendant committed depraved indifference murder by shooting three people in a “packed” barroom. Register had entered the bar with a loaded gun, saying he was “going to kill somebody tonight” (Register, 60 NY2d at 275). After having been told to put the gun away, he fired three times, killing one person and wounding two others. By having no particular victim in mind when he entered the bar and then shooting three people, Register’s actions approximated the depravity of defendants like Jematowski and others who fired multiple shots into a house knowing there were people inside. Here, defendant’s actions did not evince (or even approach) the level of depravity or indifference contemplated by the statute or described in our case law.