Court Opinion

ID: 9626151
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:03:37.701685+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:22.071785
License: Public Domain

Schroeder, J.,
dissenting: In my opinion Arthur Philip Waters, the father, on the facts in this case has not "failed or refused to assume the duties of a parent for two consecutive years” within the meaning of G. S. 1961 Supp. (now K. S. A.) 59-2102 ( 3). This provision of the statute is before the court for construction for the first time, and I do not think the legislature intended the rights of a natural parent to be so easily severed.
The law in other jurisdictions seems to be fairly well settled that in order to grant an order or decree of adoption in opposition to the wishes and against the consent of the natural parent, the conditions prescribed by statute which make the consent unnecessary must be clearly proved and the statute construed in support of the right of the natural parent. The law is solicitous toward maintaining the integrity of the natural relation of parent and child, and where the absolute severance of the relation is sought without the consent and against the protest of the parent, the inclination of the courts is in favor of maintaining the natural relation. (2 Am. Jur. 2d, Adoption, § 60, p. 909.)
*618A case very similar to the facts in the instant case is Nevelos v. Railston, 65 N. M. 250, 335 P. 2d 573 (1959). There the New Mexico court stated that willful failure to support under a statutory provision dispensing with consent could not be found where custody was given to a divorced wife, and no support requirements were imposed by the divorce decree, and the children were at all times cared for by the wife and her second husband, where the father' kept in touch with the children, brought them Christmas gifts and expressed a willingness to support them.
Again, in Glendinning v. McComas, 188 Ga. 345, 3 S. E. 2d 562 (1939), the court held that a father had not abandoned his child even though he had ceased to contribute to the child’s support in accordance with the divorce decree, after the remarriage of the mother, and failed to exercise his privilege of visitation as granted by the divorce decree. The court held that his conduct may have been attributed to his personal displeasure at the remarriage and a consequent relationship of the stepfather to his son, as much as to any settled purpose on his part to forsake and abandon the legal rights and claims of parenthood, and for the further reason that it appeared he was an officer in the Army stationed a great distance from the domicile of the child. Therefore, although from the wording of the statute and from the acts of the father, it appeared as though his parental rights could be severed, the court looked at the extrinsic circumstances and construed the statute so narrowly that it could not be effective to sever the parent-child relationship.
Is there any evidence in the record on appeal as a matter of law which the Supreme Court can say supports the finding of the trial court that the natural father in this case failed or refused to assume the duties of a parent for two consecutive years within the meaning of that expression in the statute? Upon analysis of the facts presented by the record and for the reasons hereafter assigned, I think not.
First, the divorce decree severing the marriage relationship between the father and the mother in this case does not appear in the record. It was conceded by the testimony of both the father and the mother that the divorce was a Japanese divorce granted while the parties were living in Japan. The only evidence as to what this decree provided is the testimony of the father and the mother. Their testimony tends to establish that they were divorced in Yokohama, Japan, and it became final on August 8, 1957. The *619divorce decree gave custody of the child, Kenji, to the mother. The matter was handled for them by Mr. Oppenhiem, apparently an American attorney stationed in Japan who assisted United States soldiers and their dependents while stationed in Japan. The parties speak of an arrangement or an agreement in conjunction with the divorce in which the father was given unlimited rights of visitation and agreed to pay for the support of the child. The mother testified that the agreement called for payment of $100 per month support. She further concedes “it may possibly be that Mr. Oppenhiem informed Mr. Callahan that the original $100.00 amount had been cancelled and the amount reduced because I had violated the terms of the agreement in failing to allow Mrs. Waters to visit his son. I deliberately and wilfully prevented Mr. Waters from seeing his son.” (Emphasis added.)
The father testified that commencing in August, 1957, until September, 1960, he paid $60 a month for the support of Kenji, and that for an additional period of twelve months he paid $50 per month. These sums were sent to the parents of the mother, Mr.. and Mrs. Herman Brinkhoff, who resided in Idalia, Colorado, and forwarded by them to the child’s mother.
The record is uncontradicted that the mother at all times after the divorce concealed her whereabouts and that of her child from the father. She testified that immediately after the divorce in Japan she left the apartment in which they were living prior to the time she returned to the United States and took her son with her; that by doing so she deprived the father of the opportunity to see his son before she left Japan; that she never informed the father that she and her son arrived safely hack in the United States and has. never written to him since her return from Japan, either on her own behalf or on behalf of her son, Kenji.
Mrs. Nelson Waters, the paternal grandmother of Kenji, testified that she wrote the mother (apparently addressed to her parents) asking for her address and the child’s clothing sizes and things of that nature, hut received a reply from the mother saying “if she wanted me to know where she lived and her address, she would let me know.”
The mother, to further assist her concealment of the child from the father, made special arrangements to deposit the checks in a bank in Colorado at a place other than where she resided. (After her remarriage she lived in Kansas.) On this point she testified:
*620“These payments continued to come for more than a year after I was married to Mr. Zweygardt and I never did inform Mr. Waters of the remarriage or the change in my name and continued to endorse the checks ‘Mrs. Loretta M. Waters’ for over a year after my re-marriage.
“For approximately a year after I was married to Mr. Zweygardt I retained a bank account at Burlington, Colorado, in which I deposited the checks from Mr. Waters on those occasions when I did not cash them to use for Kenji’s purposes. I cannot recall any check I received from Mr. Waters for Kenji’s support that was not cashed or deposited in Burlington, Colorado. . .
Both the mother and the father testified that the father sent gifts and letters to Kenji, through the mothers parents, on Christmas, birthdays, Valentine’s Day, and on special occasions. The mother, however, testified that she did not think the value of any one of the gifts sent to Kenji was more than $10.
The father testified that he did not make any effort to ask where the child was from the mother’s parents because he knew what Mrs. Brinkhoff’s attitude was toward him during their marriage.
The father stopped making payments for the support of Kenji after July, 1961, because, according to him, he was convinced he would never get to see his child without some court action, and felt by stopping the payments the mother would commence a court action which would result in an opportunity for him to visit his son.
Whether the trial court believed the father’s testimony as to the reason why he stopped payments for the support of Kenji is, in my opinion, immaterial.
The father’s failure to pay money through the mother’s parents for the support of Kenji for a period of two years cannot be legally excused. But this is the only thread of evidence upon which the court can rely to sustain the finding of the trial court, unless it can be said that the failure of the father to search for the child and resort to court action was required. This, however, in my opinion, would be an unwarranted requirement under the circumstances here presented, where the mother is guilty of deliberately concealing the child from the father, and where the issue presented is whether the father has failed to assume the duties of a parent for two consecutive years.
On this point, in my opinion, the failure of the father to send money for the support of his child, through the mother’s parents, for two consecutive years is mitigated by the deliberate concealment of the child by the mother, and by the further concealment of her *621whereabouts from the father, in violation of his rights as a natural parent. Under these circumstances, I do not think it can be said the father failed or refused to assume the duty of a parent for two consecutive years. If so, the mother is permitted to take advantage of the child’s father and the natural parent of Kenji by her own misconduct and contempt for the law.
Perhaps in a situation such as this the child should have a father present in the home where he resides, such as the stepfather in this case, and this may have prompted the probate court and the district court to permit the adoption to stand; but this approach entirely ignores the legal proposition presented and establishes a bad precedent.
It appears to me the decision of the court herein holds that where the parties to a marriage are divorced and the father—the natural parent of the child—fails to pay money for the support of his child for a period of two consecutive years to the mother, he has failed or refused to assume the duties of a parent for two consecutive years within the meaning of K. S. A. 59-2102, even though the mother of such child deliberately conceals the child from the father and also conceals her whereabouts from the father, thereby denying his rights of visitation in violation of the law.
It is respectfully submitted the judgment of the lower court should be reversed on the ground there is no evidence as a matter of law to support the trial court’s finding that the father has “failed or refused to assume the duties of a parent for two consecutive years.” The reasoning applied in Nevelos, v. Railston, supra, and Glendinning v. McComas, supra, is to be commended and should be applied in the determination of this case.
Fontron, J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion.