Court Opinion

ID: 9665034
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:37:11.881374+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:12.394984
License: Public Domain

W. O. MURRAY, Chief Justice
(dissenting) .
It is my opinion this cause should be dismissed for want of jurisdiction and I therefore dissent from the majority opinion.
The final judgment herein was rendered on December 17, 1952, and no motion for a new trial was filed within the ten-day period allowed by Rule 330(k), T.R.C.P., nor was notice of appeal given within this ten-day period, as is required by Rule 353, T.R.C.P. Thus, upon December 27, 1952, appellant had lost her right to appeal from the only final judgment ever entered in this cause. The question then arises, is there anything that a party may do thereafter to breathe the breath of life back into a *620dead appeal and thereby secure a review of such final judgment in an appellate court? Of course, the trial judge had the power for thirty days after December 17, 1952, to set aside his final judgment, or to have modified it, but this he refused to do-. Rule 330(7), T.R.C.P. Appellant herein has taken certain action in this cause and the inquiry here is, has she thereby retrieved her lost right to an appeal?
A motion styled “Motion and Plea to Reopen for Further Evidence,” was filed on December 29, 1952, or twelve days after the final judgment was rendered. The trial court heard evidence on January 2, 1953, and entered an order reciting that he was considering the evidence -heard at that time, as well as that heard on December 17, 1952, and then refused to vacate, set aside or suspend the original judgment. This last order was not a final judgment, nor an order overruling a motion for a new trial, and therefore the notice of appeal given after this order came too late.
If the order entered on January 2, 1953, be regarded as a second final judgment in the case it would be a nullity because the first judgment was not vacated, set aside, suspended or modified. Rule 301, T.R.C.P; Black on Judgments, Vo1. 1, par. 304, p. 380; Whatley v. King, Tex.Civ.App., 245 S.W.2d 337, 339, reversed on other grounds, Tex.Civ.App., 249 S.W.2d 57; Bridgman v. Moore, 143 Tex. 250, 183 S.W.2d 705; Stolpher v. Bowen Motor Coaches, Tex.Civ.App., 190 S.W.2d 376; Mullins v. Thomas, 136 Tex. 215, 150 S.W.2d 83; Kibby v. Leon, Tex.Civ.App., 241 S.W. 1064; Cooksey v. Jordan, 104 Tex. 618, 143 S.W. 141.
In Mullins v. Thomas, 136 Tex. 215, 150 S.W.2d 83, 84, the Court said:
“The Court of Civil Appeals correctly states that the rule is well settled that the entry of a second judgment in the same case is not a vacation of the first, and that if there is nothing to show the first was vacated, the second is a nullity. See authorities cited in the opinion in support of the statement, 127 S.W.2d [559] 561, 562.”
The order entered on January 2, 1953, cannot be regarded as an order overruling a motion for a new trial because no motion for a new trial was filed within the ten-day period allowed by Rule 330(k), T.R. C.P. The filing of a motion for a new trial after the ten-day period is a nullity. In A. F. Jones & Sons v. Republic Supply -Co., Tex.Sup., 246 S.W.2d 853, 855, the Supreme Court of this State, speaking through Mr. Justice Smith, 'had this to say:
“The trial court certainly could not, on its own initiative, make any effective order affirming its former judgment and thereby extend the period for perfecting an appeal. The trial court’s inherent power resides only in the right of altering its former judgment and since it does not have the power on its own initiative to extend the period for appellate procedure, neither does it have the power to grant leave to file and then overrule a tardy motion for new trial, which, in effect and in actuality, goes beyond its inherent jurisdiction and beyond the scope of Rule 320 and Rule 5.” See also Gage v. Dallas Power & Light Co., Tex.Civ.App., 241 S.W.2d 196; Reynolds v. Dallas County, 146 Tex. 372, 207 S.W.2d 362.
Notice of appeal in this case was not given until January 5, 1953, some nineteen days after final judgment had been rendered and therefore came too late to- give this Court jurisdiction of this cause. Rule 353, T.R.C.P; 3A Tex.Jur. 290, § 224; Howe v. Howe, Tex.Civ.App., 223 S.W.2d 944; Cox v. Payne, Tex.Civ.App., 231 S.W.2d 957; Hickman v. Rusk State Hospital, Tex.Civ.App., 242 S.W.2d 913; Backus v. Roper, Tex.Civ.App., 195 S.W.2d 261; Lyell v. Guadaloupe County, 28 Tex. 57; Wright v. Wright, Tex.Civ.App., 101 S.W.2d 655; Richey v. Central Securities Co., Tex.Civ.App., 131 S.W.2d 121; Kirby v. South Texas National Bank of San Antonio, Tex.Civ.App., 127 S.W.2d 955.
The giving or filing of notice of appeal within the ten-day period required by Rule 353, supra, is mandatory and jurisdictional and cannot be waived even by the adverse party. Grant v. Hughes, Tex.Civ.App., 198 S.W.2d 630.
*621Another reason we do not have jurisdiction of this case is that the record was not tendered to the Clerk of this Court within the sixty-day period allowed by Rule 386, T.R.C.P., nor was any motion for an enlargement of time for the filing of such record made in this Court. Compliance with the provisions of Rule 386, supra, is also mandatory and jurisdictional.
The motion filed by appellant to “Reopen for Further Evidence” contained none of the usual and necessary allegations of a “Bill of Review” and cannot be regarded as such. Backus v. Roper, Tex.Civ.App., 195 S.W.2d 261.
The cause should be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.