Court Opinion

ID: 9634024
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 12:15:33.30446+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:27:53.546292
License: Public Domain

BYE, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I do not believe paragraph D of the Commission’s decision “contain[s] a sufficient explanation of the reasons for the permit denial to allow a reviewing court to evaluate the evidence in the record supporting those reasons.” Sw. Bell Mobile Sys., Inc. v. Todd, 244 F.3d 51, 59 (1st Cir.2001). As a consequence, I disagree with the conclusion that the Commission’s decision satisfies the Telecommunication Act’s “in writing” requirement. I also disagree the Commission’s decision was supported by substantial evidence. I therefore respectfully dissent.
Paragraph D of the Commission’s decision contained several potential reasons for denying the permit, including (1) the location and size of the tower, (2) the nature and intensity of the operation conducted in connection with the tower, and (3) the location of the tower with respect to the streets giving access to it would be such that the tower would dominate the immediate neighborhood so as to prevent development and use of neighboring properties. Notably, paragraph D simply mirrored the first four of seven general standards listed in the Platte County Code for granting or denying special use permits. See App. A123.
Because the Commission’s decision is not specific as to which of the general standards the tower transgressed, a reviewing court is left to speculate as to the real reason or reasons for the Commission’s decision. We cannot determine why, for example, the Commission believed Sprint’s tower would “prevent development and use of neighboring property in accordance with the applicable zoning district regulations.” The record contains evidence that some neighboring property owners objected to the tower due to perceived negative health affects the tower would create. If this were the reason the Commission determined the tower would prevent development of neighboring property, it would be an impermissible basis upon which to deny the permit. See 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iv) (“No State or local government or instrumentality thereof may regulate the placement, construction, and modification of personal wireless service facilities on the basis of the environmental effects of radio frequency emissions to the extent that such facilities comply with the Commission’s regulations concerning such emissions.”). When the rec*735ord contains impermissible grounds for a zoning decision, and the explanation given for the decision is not specific enough to determine whether the decision was based on those grounds or permissible ones, I do not believe a reviewing court can determine whether the decision complies with the Telecommunications Act.
I also do not agree the Commission’s decision was supported by substantial evidence. The district court based its grant of summary judgment on Platte County’s post hoc argument that aesthetic concerns about the tower supported the Commission’s decision. As Sprint notes, however, none of the four reasons given by the Commission for denying the permit specifically refer to aesthetic concerns about the tower as the reason for denying the special use permit. Moreover, the Platte County Code had a section specifically labeled “Aesthetics” setting forth the aesthetic requirements for towers, see App. A117-18, and Sprint complied with those requirements; therefore, the Commission could not base its denial on aesthetic concerns.3 See State ex rel. Union Elec. Co. v. Univ. City, 449 S.W.2d 894, 901 (Mo.Ct.App.1970) (indicating the action of a governing board is illegal when it is not based upon the guidelines set forth under an ordinance meant to guide administrative discretion). A local zoning authority does not have discretion to deny a permit to construct a cellular tower if the proposal meets the relevant standards within the zoning regulations. SBA Commc’ns, Inc. v. Zoning Comm’n of the Town of Brookfield, 112 F.Supp.2d 233, 239-40 (D.Conn.2000). Thus, aesthetic concerns cannot be the basis for denying Sprint’s application, and the other evidence in the record is insufficient to support the Commission’s decision.
I respectfully dissent.

. If the Commission’s decision were truly based on aesthetic concerns, it seems unusual it would rely upon the general statement in paragraph D about “development and use of neighboring property,” rather than indicate how the tower violated the provision of the zoning code specifically addressing aesthetics.