Court Opinion

ID: 9564766
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:06:46.771599+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:39.462340
License: Public Domain

Kennedy, A.C.J., concurs.
Ellington, J.
(concurring in part, dissenting in part) — While I concur with most of the majority opinion and concur in the result, I cannot agree that the activities of the defendant amount to "a high degree of sophistication or planning.”
If the legislative determination of the standard range is *683to mean anything, it must be respected unless a particular crime has characteristics not usually associated with the offense in question. Vaughn’s terrible crime has such characteristics, in that he committed multiple penetrations, thereby both perpetrating a more serious offense against the child and increasing the trauma and degradation she experienced. Vaughn’s exceptional sentence should be sustained on this basis, and I would not reverse. But sophistication or planning is not a valid ground for this exceptional sentence, and I must demur from that portion of the majority’s analysis.
Originally, the sophistication or planning aggravating factor was included in the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 to account for the "extremely wide range of conduct” not otherwise statutorily accounted for in major economic and drug crimes. David Boerner, Sentencing in Washington §§ 9.13(c), 9.13(d) (1984); ROW 9.94A.390(2)(c)(iii) and (2)(d)(v). For economic crimes, the rationale was that since first degree theft is proven by the unlawful acquisition of property having more than $1,500 in value, a single presumptive sentence range could not adequately account for thefts of significantly greater amounts. Boerner, supra, at 9-39.3 For drug crimes, a single presumptive sentence range was similarly deemed inadequate because the statutory classifications did not make distinctions based on the quantity of drugs involved. Boerner, supra at 9-42.4
Since passage of the Act, case law has sanctioned application of the sophistication or planning aggravating factor to support exceptional sentences for other crimes as well. See State v. Nguyen, 68 Wn. App. 906, 919, 847 P.2d 936, review denied, 122 Wn.2d 1008, 859 P.2d 603 (1993); State v. Wood, 57 Wn. App. 792, 801, 790 P.2d 220, review denied, 115 Wn.2d 1015, 797 P.2d 514 (1990).
*684To sustain an exceptional sentence, sophistication or planning must be qualitatively and quantitatively greater than that necessary to meet the elements inherent in the crime, must evince an elevated degree of sophistication, and must be of a high degree and of a kind not usually associated with the offense. See State v. Ross, 71 Wn. App. 556, 564, 861 P.2d 473, opinion amended, 883 P.2d 329 (1993) (citing Wood, 57 Wn. App. at 801), review denied, 123 Wn.2d 1019, 875 P.2d 636 (1994); State v. Dunaway, 109 Wn.2d 207, 219, 743 P.2d 1237 (1987), order supplemented, 749 P.2d 160 (1988); State v. Solberg, 122 Wn.2d 688, 704, 707, 861 P.2d 460 (1993); RCW 9.94A.390(2)(c)(iii); RCW 9.94A. 120(2).
Webster defines "high” as being of relatively great degree, size or amount; intense, extreme; elevated in quality or character, and that which is not of the ordinary or routine sort. Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 1067 (1981). Oxford defines "high” as being great or above average, intense; strong; greater than that regarded as normal. The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary 1232 (4th ed. 1993). "Degree” is a comparative measurement of intensity. Webster’s, 594; Oxford, 621. "Sophistication” is defined as being highly complicated or complex; supremely cultured; finely experienced and aware. Webster’s, 2174. "Planning” is to devise procedures in accordance with a comprehensive plan; to prearrange the details of a project, as opposed to improvising them, Webster’s, 1730, to design an organized and especially detailed method according to which something is to be done; to arrange in advance, Oxford, 2233-34, 2236. Thus, sophistication anticipates something that is highly complicated, while planning contemplates some comprehensive arrangement of details. But since the Legislature authorized an exceptional sentence only where sophistication or planning is present to "a high degree,” the amount of sophistication must be more than merely highly complicated and the amount of planning must be more than the existence of a comprehensive plan. The sophistication must be *685exceptionally high and the planning must be exceptionally comprehensive.
The facts of this case do not meet these definitions. Some degree of planning is inherent in most kidnappings, and the planning here certainly is not striking. Vaughn denied spending a protracted period watching the children in C’s neighborhood. The trial court found only that he "returned to the apartment area and the street where he used to live[.]” Because the crimes here unfortunately involve the abduction and rape of a young child (which is recognized in the standard sentence range), the fact that Vaughn returned to an area where he knew children were living does not present a compelling reason to depart from the standard range. Since he frequently went into the woods to camp or shoot, it is hardly remarkable that he knew of a secluded place to take the child and had camping gear in his truck. Nor is it remarkable or sophisticated that he lied to the victim about his name and address.
The finding that Vaughn knew the names of C’s mother and siblings suggests that the victim was preselected. But this suggestion also cannot support the exceptional sentence because the planning must be that which was not necessarily considered by the Legislature in setting the presumptive range. See State v. Nordby, 106 Wn.2d 514, 518, 723 P.2d 1117 (1986). Holding a victim for ransom or reward is an alternative method of committing first degree kidnapping, RCW 9A.40.020(l)(a), indicating that the Legislature contemplated preselection when setting the presumptive range.
Nor do sophistication and planning of the rape justify the exceptional sentence. Here, the record does demonstrate a certain degree of fantasizing and planning. But the CCO testified that in evaluating more than 100 sex crimes, he had never come across a perpetrator who had not fantasized about the crime, so this aspect of Vaughn’s behavior is typical of his crime; and the CCO could categorize Vaughn’s planning here as only "a little bit uncommon.” There is considerable difference between planning *686that is "a little bit uncommon” and that which is so sophisticated that it warrants an exceptional sentence.
While the Defendant agreed that his effort to create an alibi was sophisticated (he apparently altered the clock on his computer to make it appear he had been using the computer at the time of this crime and also erased pornography, believing it to be incriminating, but foolishly saved it to a backup tape), we are not — as the majority notes — required to accept erroneous concessions of the parties, see State v. Knighten, 109 Wn.2d 896, 902, 748 P.2d 1118 (1988), and to the extent that the term "sophistication” in finding of fact eight purports to be a legal conclusion, we should not accept it. Certainly not everyone is conversant with computers, but changing the time of a computer clock can hardly be considered highly sophisticated — millions of computer users do this each year to account for daylight savings time changes. Moreover, the fact that Vaughn’s hidden computer files were easily discovered on his backup disks suggests that his planning was not at all sophisticated.
The majority also contends that some sort of enhanced sophistication and planning is demonstrated by the fact that Vaughn cleaned out his truck. But like his attempt to hide his computer materials, Vaughn’s attempt to hide his belongings was certainly not sophisticated. Vaughn simply moved the materials from his truck to his apartment, leaving them for the officers to discover. And while I agree with the majority’s discussion of State v. Crutchfield, 53 Wn. App. 916, 771 P.2d 748 (1989), lies and attempted concealment should not be ordinarily used to support an exceptional sentence because they are characteristic of most crimes.
Previous cases upholding exceptional sentences on sophistication or planning grounds have involved markedly different facts. For example, in State v. Vermillion, 66 Wn. App. 332, 345-47, 832 P.2d 95 (1992), review denied, 120 Wn.2d 1030, 847 P.2d 481 (1993), the defendant posed as a physician looking for a new home. He took elaborate *687steps to perpetuate his deception, including terminating a meeting with the female real estate agent under the guise of having to check on a patient. To present the appearance of a serious home buyer, he inspected four houses on two consecutive days, and even took a series of room measurements. He then molested the agent while inspecting the fourth house for the second time. More than one year later, the defendant was still engaging in the same scheme, which was finally thwarted when the prospective victim conversed with the agent victimized a year earlier. Vermillion, 66 Wn. App. at 336-39.
In State v. Lough, 70 Wn. App. 302, 336-37, 853 P.2d 920 (1993), affirmed, 125 Wn.2d 847, 889 P.2d 347 (1995), the defendant drugged his victim to render her unconscious before sexually assaulting her. As in Vermillion, there was evidence that Lough used this scheme frequently; testimony of four other women who claimed that Lough had drugged and raped them was admitted to show a common scheme or plan under ER 404(b). Lough, 70 Wn. App. at 306-10, 336.
In State v. Nguyen, 68 Wn. App. 906, 919, 847 P.2d 936, review denied, 122 Wn.2d 1008, 859 P.2d 603 (1993), a group of robbers acted in concert in strike force style. They arrived from out-of-state, identified their victims in downtown Seattle, then followed them home. The robbers systematically "herded,” guarded, bound and threatened their victims, and searched and ransacked their house. Nguyen, 68 Wn. App. at 910-12.
A high degree of sophistication and planning was also held to justify an exceptional sentence for first degree murder and conspiracy to commit murder in State v. Wood, 57 Wn. App. 792, 801, 790 P.2d 220, review denied, 115 Wn.2d 1015, 797 P.2d 514 (1990). There the defendant had plotted her husband’s murder with at least five individuals for nearly one year. Moreover, she had manipulated others into committing the crime for her. In upholding the exceptional sentence, the court noted that this level of planning surpassed the premeditation require*688ment of first degree murder. Wood, 57 Wn. App. at 794-95, 801.
Unlike Vermillion, Lough, Nguyen, and Wood, Vaughn’s crime does not demonstrate an elaborate scheme or comprehensive plan. On the contrary, Vaughn’s activities were amateurish and improvised. I can locate no case upholding an exceptional sentence on this ground on facts similar to these.
Sophistication and planning will support an exceptional sentence in appropriate cases. But courts must respect the legislative purpose. While Vaughn’s terrible crime was exceptional in its deliberate cruelty, he did not demonstrate a high degree of sophistication or planning in committing it. The danger of saying he did, and the reason I write separately, is simple. Courts must reserve the application of grounds for exceptional sentences to those cases where they are truly supported, lest the aggravating factors acquire an elasticity that defies all limits, thereby rendering the Legislature’s determination meaningless.
I therefore must respectfully disagree with the majority’s reasoning on this issue.
Reconsideration denied November 13, 1996.
Review denied at 131 Wn.2d 1018 (1997).

See, e.g., State v. Argo, 81 Wn. App. 552, 570, 915 P.2d 1103 (1996), where the defendant had stolen and defrauded investors of more than $2.5 million.

See, e.g., State v. Valdobinos, 122 Wn.2d 270, 287, 858 P.2d 199 (1993), where the defendant possessed nearly 1,700 times the standard street level dosage of cocaine.