Court Opinion

ID: 9588949
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:39:51.86278+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:15:44.386762
License: Public Domain

Evans, Judge,
dissenting.
Twenty-eight taxpayers in Gordon County appealed *602their assessments made by the board of tax assessors to the board of equalization, where the assessments were sustained. The taxpayers then appealed to the Superior Court of Gordon County, where their cases were tried before a jury, and the jury returned a verdict sustaining the assessments. Motions for new trial were filed and overruled, thus showing the trial judge approved the verdicts of the jury.
According to the United States census of 1970, Gordon County was composed of23,570 residents, and it is fair to assume that among the twenty-eight taxpayers, many of them had friends on the jury, who yet were unwilling to construe the evidence in such fashion that a verdict could be rendered for the twenty-eight taxpayers.
Perhaps it is proper here to set forth several well-recognized principles of law, to wit: (a) When a verdict is approved by the trial judge, the evidence must be construed most favorably towards sustaining that verdict. See Boatright v. Rich’s, 121 Ga. App. 121 (173 SE2d 232), and citations therein, (b) When a verdict is approved by the trial judge, if there is "any” evidence to support that verdict, it should be sustained; in other words, the preponderance of the evidence is completely immaterial, although it is not conceded here that the taxpayers had a preponderance on their side of the case. See Davis v. State, 68 Ga. App. 296 (2) (22 SE2d 762); McBowman v. Merry, 104 Ga. App. 454, 455 (1) (122 SE2d 136).
The system of assessments used in Gordon County, as in many other counties, is to ascertain 100% of the true market value of the property, and then place same on the tax books for taxation at 40% thereof.
It was stipulated that evidence would be offered by only two of the twenty-eight taxpayers, and that this evidence would be applied to the cases of all of the twenty-eight taxpayers.
The taxpayers have not appealed as to the assessments made upon real estate, but appeal only as to personalty. They contend the assessors allowed the realty to be placed on the books at only 30% of its true value, which had the effect of shifting too great a tax burden on the personalty.
*603The thrust of the majority opinion, as we construe it, is as follows: (1) The evidence demanded a finding that the real property was appraised at less than fair market value in the county as a whole, amounting to about 30%, which imposed an unjustifiable burden on personal property valuations. (2) There was no evidence or data that the property was properly appraised.
The twenty-eight taxpayers are in a somewhat strained and awkward position. They assert that the realty was assessed at too low a figure (around 30% of its value), which resulted in a higher figure (around 40%) as to personalty. Not one of them alleges that he owns no real estate, and each is therefore in the position of asserting that he has been helped on the one hand and hurt on the other. Each says he is appealing only as to personalty, but not one of them alleges how he came out over-all. In other words, did the assessment, if made as they contend (which is not admitted) affect their over-all position for better or worse in the long run? Usually realty owned by an individual is more valuable than his personalty, and as they do not say one way or the other here, we may assume that this is the case with these twenty-eight taxpayers. There is a well known rule of law that the burden is on one who appeals to show affirmatively not only error, but also that the error has injured him. Campbell v. Powell, 206 Ga. 768, 770 (3) (58 SE2d 829); Childers v. Ackerman Const. Co., 211 Ga. 350, 356 (86 SE2d 227); Midland Properties v. Kennedy, 100 Ga. App. 37, 38 (110 SE2d 120); Harwell v. People’s Loan &c. Co., 101 Ga. App. 100 (112 SE2d 800).
Actually we may assume that these twenty-eight taxpayers benefited in the over-all plan of taxation, because they do not contend to the contrary.
Under these circumstances, with a jury trial in their home county among their friends, and with the verdict approved by the trial judge, unless a very flagrant error was committed, a new trial should not be granted, and no such error appears in this case.
1. The majority opinion places the taxpayers in a rather difficult position asserting that the evidence demanded a finding that the real property was appraised at less than fair markét value in the county as a whole. In *604other words, it is implied that a directed verdict on this issue was authorized.
Market value has always been proven by opinion evidence. Code § 38-1709. Hearsay evidence is sufficient to fix market value. Gulf Refining Co. v. Smith, 164 Ga. 811 (4) (139 SE 716); Landrum v. Swann, 8 Ga. App. 209 (1) (68 SE 862). A jury is not bound by opinion of experts as to market value. Atlantic & B. R. Co. v. Howard Supply Co., 125 Ga. 478 (2) (54 SE 530); Wilson v. Lattimore & White, 135 Ga. 469 (2) (69 SE 740).
There was no admission on the part of the taxing authorities that they taxed real property at less than 40% of the fair market value. They offered expert witnesses in the real estate field to prove that the property was valued at fair market value and that the assessment thereon was 40% thereof, even though other experts gave it as their opinion that the fair market value of property was different than as testified by the assessors’ expert witnesses.
Besides, there was ample evidence in the case to show the jury had evidence before it as to the valuation of the realty, and they fixed its valuation correctly. The taxpayers’ use of 21 land sales out of some 4,000 land transactions during the period involved in the deeds 1972 and 1973 (T. p. 171), is wholly inadequate to prove that approximately 15,000 taxable parcels of property on the 1973 Tax Digest are under-valued (T. p. 31). The assessment valuations were not imagined figures as that shown in Register v. Langsdale, 226 Ga. 82, 86 (4) (172 SE2d 620). Thus, the jury could have considered and compared the data offered by the taxpayers with that of the taxing authority experts. Further, the transactions offered by the taxpayers were not "absolutely straight cash transactions.” (T. p. 56). In analyzing some of the taxpayers’ sales, they simply were not cash transactions whereby Code Ann. § 92-5702 would control. (T. pp. 281, 309, 152, 58, 304, 172-174, 316).
2. As to the contention by the majority that there was no evidence or data that the property was properly appraised, we differ violently. In some instances, the taxing authorities testified that they refused to accept the deed records showing sales of property as being the fair *605market value of said property due to the speculation of land values in this county in the last few years. One of the expert witnesses testified that he was a real estate broker with five years experience; that there had been considerable speculation as to land; that it increased in value each year including 1968, 1969, through 1973, but was somewhat down in 1974. (T. pp. 142, 143, 145). One of the tax assessors testified that he used the combination of income, cost and sales study in determining fair market value (T. p. 165); that the land was increasing in value due to speculation, but that he tried to keep assessments equal. (T. p. 175). "Market value may be established by either direct or circumstantial evidence. Atlantic C.L.R. Co. v. Harris, 1 Ga. App. 667, 669 (57 SE 1030); Landrum v. Swann, 8 Ga. App. 209 (2) (68 SE 862); Farm Products Co. v. Eubanks, 29 Ga. App. 604, 607 (116 SE 327). On this issue, the jury 'are not absolutely bound even by the uncontradicted testimony of experts, but may consider the nature of the property involved and any other facts or circumstances within their knowledge in arriving at a verdict, provided there are in evidence sufficient facts from which they may draw a legitimate conclusion.’ Grant v. Dannals, 87 Ga. App. 389, 391 (74 SE2d 119). 'Questions of value are peculiarly for the determination of the jury, where there is any data in the evidence upon which the jury may legitimately exercise their "own knowledge and ideas.” ’ Dixon v. Cassels Co., 34 Ga. App. 478 (3) (130 SE 75). See also, Atlantic C. L. R. Co. v. Clements, 92 Ga. App. 451, 455 (88 SE2d 809); Childs v. Logan Motor Co., 103 Ga. App. 633, 639 (120 SE2d 138).” Sun Ins. Co. of New York v. League, 112 Ga. App. 625, 626 (145 SE2d 768); also Georgia Power Co. v. Harwell, 113 Ga. App. 653, 654 (149 SE2d 376).
3. I concur fully in Division 3 of the majority opinion, but I dissent strongly from the judgment of reversal.
These twenty-eight taxpayers have had an assessment in their own county and then they have had two hearings or trials in their own county, and the last one was before a jury of their friends and neighbors. I feel the case has been fairly tried and would affirm the trial court.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge *606Pannell and Judge Stolz and Judge Marshall join in this dissent.