Court Opinion

ID: 9498545
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 17:20:08.876627+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:58:53.466347
License: Public Domain

POOLER, Circuit Judge,
concurring in the judgment.
I concur in the judgment but, respectfully, cannot join the majority’s reasoning. In determining that the economic deprivations Damko suffered in Albania did not rise to the level of economic persecution, the majority announces a standard that is contrary to a holding of this Court, in tension with Supreme Court and BIA precedent, and unnecessary to decide in this case.
The majority advocates that we apply the economic persecution definition that was originally stated in Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 222 (BIA 1985) (overruled in part by INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 423-24, 107 S.Ct. 1207, 94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987) and Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439, 439 (BIA 1987)). The Acosta definition states, in relevant part, that a petitioner can establish a persecution claim if she has experienced “economic deprivation or restrictions so severe that they constitute a threat to an individual’s life or freedom.” Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 222. In contrast, the appropriate economic persecution standard, which was first set out by the Ninth Circuit in Kovac v. INS, is that a petitioner may establish economic persecution based on a “deliberate imposition of substantial economic disadvantage.” 407 F.2d 102, 107 (9th Cir. 1969).
As an initial matter, I disagree with the majority’s facile determination that the *638BIA has made a clear statement regarding the applicable standard for economic persecution.1 Because — (1) Acosta was not an economic persecution case2; .(2) the BIA has not subsequently used the Acosta definition for economic persecution cases; and (3) the BIA has subsequently applied the Ninth Circuit’s Kovac standard — Chevron deference is inappropriate. See Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 508 U.S. 402, 417, 113 S.Ct. 2151, 124 L.Ed.2d 368 (1993) (stating that “the consistency of an agency’s position is a factor in assessing the weight that position is due”).3 Since the BIA decided Acosta, in 1985, it has never cited Acosta nor its definition in the context of an economic persecution claim. See Li v. Attorney General, 400 F.3d 157, 167 (3d Cir.2005); see also Matter of H-M, 20 I. & N. Dec. 683, 687, 691 (BIA 1993) (illustrating that, although faced with an economic persecution argument based on the Kovac standard, BIA failed to cite Acosta in response). The BIA, however, has cited the Kovac standard approvingly to some extent. See Matter of Barrera, 19 I. & N. Dec. 837, 847 (BIA 1989). In denying an applicant’s claim, the BIA in Bamra cited Kovac and stated that the applicant’s claim failed,- in part, because there were no allegations that similarly situated returnees to Cuba were “denied employment, education, housing, permission to travel, or other benefits of this sort.” Id. The BIA’s citation to Kovac instead of Acosta and its indication that denial of “benefits of this sort” could constitute persecution in some cases undermines the majority’s contention that the BIA has adopted the Acosta “threat to life or freedom” definition for economic persecution claims.
My second difficulty with the majority opinion is its statement that this Court has “tacitly approved” the Acosta economic persecution definition. To the contrary, one of our holdings in Guan Shan Liao v. United States Dep’t of Justice rests on the application of the broader Kovac standard. 293 F.3d 61, 70 (2d Cir.2002). In conjunction with our holding that petitioner did not present sufficient evidence to permit an economic persecution finding, we stated that “an asylum applicant must offer some proof that he suffered a deliberate imposition of substantial economic disadvantage.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The majority reasons that this determination was dictum because we elected to consider an arguably waived issue “for purposes of completeness.” Ante, at n. 11. *639The Liao Court, however, did not make an explicit determination regarding whether the applicant waived the economic persecution issue on appeal to this Court. 293 F.3d at 69. Moreover, this Court’s election to exercise its discretion to consider an issue that is arguably waived on appeal does not make its determination dictum. Once we choose to consider a waived issue, it is before the Court and our determination is binding, unless, of course, it is for some other reason unnecessary to the holding.
The majority also mis-characterizes our decision in Alvarado-Carillo as tacit approval of the Acosta standard, even though we make no mention of Acosta nor its definition in that case. See Alvarado-Carillo v. INS, 251 F.3d 44 (2d Cir.2001). In fact, our Alvarado-Carillo ruling suggests that we applied the broader Kovac standard. The Alvarado-Carillo court remanded, in part, for consideration of whether the petitioner’s blacklisting and resulting demotion rose to the level of persecution. By implicitly acknowledging that a demotion could constitute persecution, Alvarado-Carillo tacitly rejected the Acosta “threat to life or freedom” standard. Id. at 47-48, 55-56.
Third, the majority’s application of Acosta appears to conflict with the Supreme Court’s decision in Cardoza-Fonseca, which based its holding on a determination that Congress intended for the asylum standard to be more generous than the withholding of removal standard. See 480 U.S. at 423-24, 107 S.Ct. 1207. The BIA has subsequently overruled Acosta “insofar as it held that the [asylum and withholding of removal] standards were not meaningfully different and, in practical application, converged.” Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 439.
The Acosta definition, relied on by the majority, establishes no meaningful difference between the asylum and withholding of removal standards for purposes of a past persecution claim. According to the Acosta definition, an asylum applicant cannot establish past persecution unless she has experienced economic deprivation so severe that it constituted a threat to an individual’s life or freedom. Similarly, a withholding of removal applicant relying on a past persecution argument also must establish that she suffered a past threat to life or freedom. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16 (emphasis added). Thus, under the majority’s holding, there would be no meaningful difference between the definitions of past persecution in the two standards, bringing the majority’s holding into conflict with Mogharrabi and into tension with Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 423, 107 S.Ct. 1207 (“Congress did not intend the class of aliens who qualify [for asylum] to be coextensive with the class who qualify for [withholding of removal] relief.”).
Despite my disagreement with the majority’s economic persecution determination, I concur in the judgment. Even if Damko’s past economic persecution is meritorious, she is still barred from relief. The Immigration Judge’s decision was based on two determinations, (1) that the economic deprivations Damko suffered did not rise to the level of past economic persecution and, in the alternative, (2) that, even if Damko had established past economic persecution, the government met its burden of showing that Albania had undergone a significant change in circumstances such that Damko no longer had a well-founded fear of future persecution. While Damko appealed the first ruling to the BIA, she failed to appeal the alternative “changed circumstances” ruling. Accordingly, Dam-ko failed to exhaust her claim to the BIA and thereby could not succeed on appeal to this Court even if we unanimously agreed that she suffered past persecution in Alba*640nia. See Cervantes-Ascencio v. INS, 326 F.3d 83, 87 (2d Cir.2003). I therefore concur only in the judgment.

. Because of this disagreement, my analysis is not affected by the Supreme Court’s recent decision that we should accord Chevron deference to an agency interpretation of a statute even where it conflicts with our prior cases unless there is no room for agency discretion. Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n. v. Brand X Internet Servs., - U.S. -, -, 125 S.Ct. 2688, 2700, 162 L.Ed.2d 820 (2005).

. The BIA in Acosta was not faced with an economic persecution claim and merely noted this definition in passing. See Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 222. The majority does not find this to be significant in Acosta, but then argues Matter of Barrera, 19 I. & N. Dec. 837, is inapposite because it only mentions economic persecution in passing. See ante at n. 10.

. My colleagues in the majority accuse me of misstating the appropriate standard by requiring a "super clear” statement by the BIA before we accord Chevron deference, see ante at n. 13, but I merely follow the Supreme Court’s instruction ' in Good Samaritan that conflicting agency interpretations of a statute are " ‘entitled to considerably less deference’ than a consistently held agency view.” 508 U.S. at 417, 113 S.Ct. 2151 (quoting INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 n. 30, 107 S.Ct. 1207, 94 L.Ed.2d 434). Where an agency interprets a statute, in passing, and later interprets the same statute differently, ' even if only again in passing, Chevron does not require that we defer to the earlier interpretation. Id.