Court Opinion

ID: 9884152
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 02:40:12.842041+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:35.978386
License: Public Domain

HUSPENI, Judge
(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I agree with the majority that “an order denying a motion to vacate should not be reversed unless the denial constitutes an abuse of discretion” and that the factors set forth in Hinz v. Northland Milk & Ice Cream Co., 237 Minn. 28, 30, 53 N.W.2d 454, 455-56 (1952), are applicable to determine whether vacation is appropriate. However, because I believe there was no abuse of discretion, I would affirm each of the trial court’s determinations.
In reviewing a motion to vacate, this court’s scope of review is narrow:
A probate court’s determination of a factual question is not to be set aside unless clearly erroneous * * * [0]n appeal facts are viewed in a light most favorable to the prevailing party [and] [t]he probate court’s order denying [a] vacation request should not be reversed unless that denial was an abuse of discretion.
Matter of Estate of Weber, 418 N.W.2d 497, 501-02 (Minn.Ct.App.1988), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. April 4, 1988) (citations omitted).
To vacate an order, the moving party must show that he or she:
(a) is possessed of a reasonable defense on the merits, (b) has a reasonable excuse for his failure or neglect to answer, (c) has acted with due diligence after notice of the entry of judgment, and (d) that no substantial prejudice will result to the other party.
Hinz v. Northland Milk & Ice Cream Co., 237 Minn. 28, 30, 53 N.W.2d 454, 456 (1952).
Regarding lack of testamentary capacity and undue influence, the majority concludes that the trial court abused its discretion in not vacating the probate order because it found three of the four Hinz factors. I respectfully dissent from the majority’s determination on the issues of capacity and undue influence.
I. Hinz Application
Dicta from Gelco Corp. v. Crystal Leasing, Inc., 396 N.W.2d 672 (Minn.Ct.App.1986) states:
In evaluating the existence and strength of [the Hinz] factors the relative weakness of one factor should be balanced against the strong showing on the other three.
Id. at 674 (citation omitted). I cannot interpret this dicta as stating that satisfaction of any three of the four Hinz factors re*514quires the granting of a motion to vacate. The Gelco court, in fact, indicated that:
Because the trial court correctly found that appellant did not possess a reasonable defense on the merits, we also find that appellant’s motion to vacate default judgment was properly denied.
Id. at 675 (emphasis added). Additionally, the Gelco court observed that even if the appellant in that case had established the other three factors for vacating a default judgment,
the lack of a reasonable defense on the merits has not been compensated for by evidence on the other three * * *. [AJppellant’s lack of a reasonable defense on the merits to respondent’s claim itself leaves little logical reason to compel vacation of default judgment.
Id. (emphasis added). I submit that under Gelco, while three of the four Hinz factors may be sufficient to grant a vacation, those three should include a reasonable claim on the merits.
II.
A reasonable claim must be more than mere “conelusory allegations in moving papers.” Charson v. Temple Israel, 419 N.W.2d 488, 491 (Minn.1988) (citation omitted). Additionally,
[T]o the end that a defaulting defendant may not trifle with the court, it is required that he shall in some manner, in good faith, make a showing of facts, which if established will constitute a good defense. Sound practice requires, as a showing, something more than * * * [an] unverified statement.
Frontier Lumber & Hardware, Inc. v. Dickey, 289 Minn. 162, 164, 183 N.W.2d 788, 790 (1971) (citation omitted).
A. TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY
On the issue of testamentary capacity, the trial court stated:
Contestants allege no specific instances or facts which support the contention that the testator did not know the extent of his property or that he lacked the ability to make a rational judgment. Affidavits provided on behalf of the proponents specifically indicate that the testator had testamentary capacity at the time of execution and therefore the contestants have failed to show a reasonable claim on the merits concerning their objection for lack of testamentary capacity.
Appellant attempted to support his contention that the decedent lacked testamentary capacity by citing the decedent’s age, physical infirmity, lack of vision and the fact that the decedent had had a major operation shortly before the execution of his will. However, appellant’s allegations are unrelated to the issue of testamentary capacity. The Minnesota Supreme Court has stated:
It is the generally recognized rule that testamentary capacity requires only that the testator have capacity to know and understand the nature and extent of his bounty, as distinguished from the requirement that he have actual knowledge thereof.
In re Estate ofJenks, 291 Minn. 138, 141, 189 N.W.2d 695, 697 (1971). See also Matter of Estate of Congdon, 309 N.W.2d 261, 266 (Minn.1981). Because appellant did not relate decedent’s.physical condition to his mental acuity, specifically to his ability to “know and understand the nature and extent of his bounty,” appellant stated nothing more than the insufficient “conelusory allegations” warned against in Charson.
Appellant did produce a notation from a doctor who, while examining decedent for an unrelated matter, observed that decedent appeared to be senile. This is in direct contradiction to statements made by decedent’s attorney, John Regan:
During that telephone conference, Willard McCue [decedent] advised me of changes he wanted to make in the Will he had executed December 27, 1983. He clearly understood and explained to me what his present Will provided and why he wanted to change it.
(Emphasis added.) However, assuming senility were an issue, to demonstrate lack of testamentary capacity the senility must affect the decedent’s capacity to “know and understand the nature and extent of his *515bounty.” See Jenks, 291 Minn, at 141, 189 N.W.2d at 697; see also Matter of Estate of Olsen, 357 N.W.2d 407 (Minn.Ct.App.1984) (a woman who was only “relatively lucid” possessed testamentary capacity), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 27, 1985). Here, appellant failed to connect the alleged senility with decedent’s testamentary capacity.
Because we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s determination, see Weber, 418 N.W.2d at 501, and because appellant’s allegations, even if established, do not address decedent’s testamentary capacity, appellant has not made a reasonable claim on the merits. Without such a claim, the trial court did not err in denying the motion to vacate on this ground.
B. UNDUE INFLUENCE
To establish undue influence,
[t]he evidence must go beyond suspicion and conjecture and show, not only that the influence was in fact exerted, but that it was so dominant and controlling of the testator’s mind that, in making the will, he ceased to act of his own free volition and became a mere puppet of the wielder of that influence.
In re Estate of Tourville, 366 N.W.2d 380, 381 (Minn.Ct.App.1985), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. June 27, 1985) (citation omitted). Factors to consider in evaluating undue influence include:
[1] the opportunity to exercise it,
[2] active participation in the preparation of the will by the party exercising it,
[3] a confidential relationship between the person making the will and the party exercising the influence,
[4] disinheritance of those whom the decedent probably would have remembered in [the] will,
[5] singularity of the provisions of the will, and
[6]the exercise of influence or persuasion to induce [the testator] to make the will in question.
Tourville, 366 N.W.2d 381-82 (quoting In re Estate of Wilson, 223 Minn. 409, 413, 27 N.W.2d 429, 432 (1947)). Here, the trial court stated:
The contestants have not offered any evidence to indicate that influence' was, in fact, exerted or that the testator ceased to act of his own free will except suspicion, conjecture and opportunity for the exertion of undue influence, and therefore the contestant has not shown that he has a reasonable defense on the merits concerning the objection based on undue influence.
Concerning undue influence, appellant’s affidavit stated:
2. That on April 9, 1986, Willard S. McCue was unable to leave the nursing home without assistance 1 and that on said date Mark McCue took his father out of the nursing home for a period of approximately 3 hours.
3. That on April 10, 1986, attorney, John E. Regan directed a letter to Willard S. McCue at Delavan, Minnesota, a copy of which is attached to this affidavit and that said letter was picked up by Willard S. McCue’s son, Mark McCue.
4. That the purported Last Will and Testament of Willard S. McCue was purportedly executed on April 10, 1986, the -same day on which the letter was directed to him by John Regan.
* * * * * *
6. That the nursing home telephone records of Cold Springs, Minnesota, indicate that for the months of March and April, 1986, no phone calls were made to Attorney Regan;2that the decedent did not have a phone in his room and if a call was to be made from the nursing home it would have to have been placed from a phone in a public area at the nurse’s station; that the decedent could not have placed a call on April 9,1986, without the *516assistance of others due to his mental and physical condition; that there are no memorandums in the nursing home records indicating such assistance was given.
These statements, even if established, would not give rise to a meritorious claim. An application of the Tourville factors to the appellant’s allegation indicates that:
(1) While Mark had opportunities to exercise undue influence, “opportunity alone will not sustain a finding of undue influence.” Matter of Estate of Rechtzigel, 385 N.W.2d 827, 832 (Minn.Ct.App.1986) (citation omitted). Appellant made no allegation that Mark used any of his opportunities to exercise undue influence.
(2) Mark participated in the preparation of the will. He told his father’s attorney, Jack Regan, that his father wished to change his will, and the next day, Mark brought the revised will to his father for his signature. However, for participation to be evidence of undue influence, it must be “active.” See Tourville, 366 N.W.2d at 381. Where one sibling arranged the meetings between her father and her father’s attorney, who was not chosen by the sibling, and where there was no evidence that the sibling told her father what to put in the codicil, the court held that there was no “active participation.” Matter of Estate of Anderson, 379 N.W.2d 197, 200 (Minn.Ct.App.1985), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 19, 1986). This is very similar to Mark’s level of participation in the preparation of the will. Mark acted as decedent’s courier or information conduit, but there is no allegation that he participated in the actual drafting of the new will.
(3) There may have been a confidential relationship between the father and son, but appellant makes no claim that decedent was in any way dependent on Mark, much less dependent to an extent that would make decedent a “mere puppet” in Mark’s hands. Further, Regan stated in an affidavit that “[i]n my experience, he [decedent] was a very strong-willed individual whose opinions were firmly held.” Finally, “any evidence of affection or intimacy between blood relatives negatives rather than proves undue influence.” Anderson, 379 N.W.2d at 201 (citation omitted).
(4) The fourth factor examines whether there has been a disinheritance of those whom the decedent probably would have remembered in his will. This court has observed that “it is not uncommon for a farmer’s will to favor the child who carries on the family farming operation.” In re Estate of Larson, 394 N.W.2d 617, 619 (Minn.Ct.App.1986), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 12, 1986). Regan’s letter, which was delivered to decedent with the revised will, stated:
This letter will also serve to confirm our telephone discussion of yesterday, wherein you told me about your concerns and the primary reasons for your wanting to change the Will at this time. I understand that you are right now very concerned about your son John, his second marriage, and the possibility that, under your previous Will, John would receive the 80 acre farm and the 40 acre farm and substantial cash and that, in the event of John’s untimely death or dissolution of marriage, that property could pass to his second wife and/or her children rather than staying in the McCue family. I do recall from several discussions with you over the years that you have a strong desire to retain your estate, especially the land, in the McCue family name to the extent reasonably possible.
By affidavit Regan also stated:
Historically, [decedent] made no changes in his estate plan without first discussing them with me at some length. * * * It was the activities of certain members of his immediate family which caused him to make changes in his estate plan from time to time.
Given the above facts, the idea that appellant is one “whom the decedent probably would have remembered in the will” is con-clusory. Under the revised will, decedent’s church, his daughter, and his grandchildren each receive the same amount of money as they would have under the superseded will. The only person whose share of the estate has been diminished is appellant, and for this Regan’s letter provides an explanation.
*517(5) The fifth factor examines the singularity of the revised will’s provisions. The revised will devises most of the estate to Mark.
(6) Appellant lacks any evidence of a specific instance in which Mark exercised undue influence. The evidence presented in the record supports the proposition that Mark did not exercise any undue influence. Mark was not with the decedent when the decedent talked to Regan.3
In evaluating the six factors, appellant offers evidence establishing only the singularity of the provisions of the will. A meritorious claim of undue influence is not supported simply by noting that the will left a larger share of the estate to one sibling than the others. I submit that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that appellant failed to offer evidence that would constitute a viable claim of undue influence.
CONCLUSION
Vacation of a default judgment is ultimately a matter largely within the trial court’s discretion and should not be reversed on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion. I find no abuse of discretion in any of the trial court’s determinations and would affirm that court’s opinion in its entirety.

. This allegation is directly contrary to the affidavit of Eileen Froehle, who stated that "Willard [the decedent] would not have needed assistance to leave the [nursing home].”

. It is apparent from the phone bill attached to Regan’s affidavit that the phone call was made from Regan’s office to the nursing home.

. Regan talked to decedent about twenty minutes after meeting with Mark; the distance from Mankato to Cold Spring, where the decedent was at that time, is about 120 miles.