Court Opinion

ID: 9528155
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:37:48.315638+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:19:50.329015
License: Public Domain

BIRD, C. J.
I concur in the judgment of the court and its opinion. However, I would overrule People v. Collins (1960) 54 Cal.2d 57 [4 Cal.Rptr. 158, 351 P.2d 326]. The rationale of Collins, even when read narrowly (ante, at pp. 371-372), does not satisfy the due process requirement of adequate notice to an accused. (People v. West (1970) 3 Cal.3d 595, 612 [91 Cal.Rptr. 385, 477 P.2d 409].)
The rationale articulated in Collins subordinates elementary principles of due process to the vagaries of statutory organization. Under that decision, a person charged with begging (Pen. Code, § 647, subd. (c)) *374could be convicted of prostitution (Pen. Code, § 647, subd. (b)), on the theory that the various subdivisions of Penal Code section 647 do not state different offenses, but merely define the different circumstances in which one may commit the misdemeanor of disorderly conduct.1
Since I am unwilling to reaffirm in even a limited fashion a legal rationale that makes fundamental due process rights dependent upon accidents of criminal law codification, I would overrule Collins.
Respondent’s petition for a rehearing was denied June 17, 1981.

Penal Code section 647 provides in pertinent part: “Every person who commits any of the following acts is guilty of disorderly conduct, a misdemeanor:
“(b) Who solicits or who engages in any act of prostitution. As used in this subdivision, ‘prostitution’ includes any lewd act between persons for money or other consideration.
“(c) Who accosts other persons in any public place or in any place open to the public for the purpose of begging or soliciting alms.”