Court Opinion

ID: 9847443
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:59:56.491268+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:12.278793
License: Public Domain

*284BAKES, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur in all of the majority opinion except that portion dealing with the trial court’s ruling on the motion for new trial for excessive damages. Regarding that issue, the majority concludes, “Having reviewed the record and having considered all relevant testimony, this Court cannot conclude, as a matter of law, that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion for new trial on the ground that the verdict was excessive.” That conclusion ignores the standard enunciated in our most recent cases.
It is now well established that, in considering a motion for new trial based on allegations that an excessive verdict has been rendered, a trial judge is to act as a “thirteenth juror.” Cheney v. Palos Verdes Investment Corp., 104 Idaho 897, 904, 665 P.2d 661, 668 (1983); Dinneen v. Finch, 100 Idaho 620, 603 P.2d 575 (1979); Blaine v. Byers, 91 Idaho 665, 670, 429 P.2d 397, 402 (1967). In Dinneen v. Finch, supra, we specifically defined the trial judge’s duties:
“Where a motion for new trial is premised on inadequate or excessive damages, the trial court must weigh the evidence and then compare the jury’s award to what he would have given had there been no jury. If the disparity is so great that it appears to the trial court that the award was given under the influence of passion or prejudice, the verdict ought not stand. It need not be proven that there was in fact passion or prejudice nor is it necessary to point to such in the record. The appearance of such is sufficient. A trial court is not restricted to ruling a verdict inadequate or excessive ‘as a matter of law.’ Blaine v. Byers, supra. Additionally, the rule that a verdict will not be set aside when supported by substantial but conflicting evidence has no application to a trial court ruling upon a motion for a new trial.” Dinneen v. Finch, 100 Idaho at 625-26, 603 P.2d at 580-81. (Citations omitted.)
Thus, based on Dinneen, the trial judge’s duty, when considering a motion for a new trial based on allegations that an excessive verdict has been rendered, is to independently weigh the evidence and then compare the jury’s award with what he would have given had there been no jury. The “substantial evidence” standard of review has no application.
Here, the trial judge stated,
“The verdict in this case must stand as rendered. In so deciding, the undersigned has had the opportunity to weigh the demeanor, credibility and testimony of witnesses and the persuasiveness of all the evidence and there is no doubt in the court’s mind that the jury reached its decision on competent evidence of the value of the loss of a 16 year old daughter especially considering the unusual properties of the Indian culture. There is no reason for the court to substitute its judgment for the unanimous verdict of the jury.” (Emphasis added.)
In so ruling, the trial judge failed to apply the Dinneen standard, because he made no independent determination of “what he would have given had there been no jury.” Consequently, he had nothing “to compare the jury’s award to.” Dinneen v. Finch, supra at 625, 603 P.2d at 580. Instead, he used the disapproved “substantial evidence” standard. However, Dinneen clearly indicates that the substantial evidence standard is not to be applied.
I would reverse the trial court’s ruling on the motion for new trial and remand this case to the trial court to reconsider. the motion for new trial for excessive damages. In so doing, the trial court should follow the directives of Dinneen and independently weigh the evidence of damages, as a “thirteenth juror,” and “then compare the jury’s award to what he would have given had there been no jury. If the disparity is so great that it appears to the trial court that the award was given under the influence of passion or prejudice, the verdict ought not stand. It need not be proven that there was in fact passion or prejudice nor is it necessary to point to *285such in the record. The appearance of such is sufficient.” Dinneen v. Finch, 100 Idaho 620, 625-26, 603 P.2d 575, 580-81 (1979) (emphasis supplied).