Court Opinion

ID: 9692187
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 15:46:05.268243+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:32.758014
License: Public Domain

Justice SAYLOR
dissenting.
I respectfully differ with the majority’s reasoning in several material respects. Furthermore, I would award a new penalty hearing relative to Appellant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to adequately investigate and develop mitigation relevant to the capital sentencing determination.
First, I disagree with the majority’s assignment to Appellant’s claim of racial discrimination in jury selection of a deficiency, based on the requirements established in Commonwealth v. Spence, 534 Pa. 233, 627 A.2d 1176 (1993), which interposes as a prerequisite to assertion of a violation under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), the obligation to present a record identifying the race of the venirepersons stricken by the Commonwealth, the race of prospective jurors acceptable to the Commonwealth but stricken by the defense, and the racial composition of the jury finally selected. See id. at 246-47, 627 A.2d at 1182.1 Although those seeking relief from criminal convictions have frequently had difficulty meeting these requirements, perhaps because preservation is frequently dependent on the thoroughness of trial counsel, in this particular case the trial court maintained its own, independent record concerning each of these factors, which it read into the record of the post-conviction proceedings.2 Therefore, Appellant’s assertion that *91the Commonwealth used 14 of 16 peremptory challenges to strike African Americans is not a bald one, as the majority indicates, see Majority Opinion, at 73-75, 863 A.2d at 515, but is an undisputed matter of record in the case as developed and determined by the PCRA/trial judge. For the same reason, all of the other required information is squarely before the Court. See supra note 2.
At least in the context of an contemporaneous challenge to an in-progress jury selection proceeding, it is my position that a prosecutor’s direction of 14 of 16 peremptory challenges (or almost 90 percent of the total strikes employed) toward African American venirepersons, out of a jury pool comprised of less than 40 percent persons having such racial heritage, should be deemed sufficient to make out a prima facie case under Batson, thus implicating an explanation of the race-neutral bases for the challenges (if any) from the prosecutor. See generally Batson, 476 U.S. at 96, 106 S.Ct. at 1723 (explaining that a criminal defendant is entitled to rely upon the fact that “peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection practice that permits ‘those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate.’ ”); id. at 97, 106 S.Ct. at 1723 (observing that “a ‘pattern’ of strikes against black jurors included in the particular venire might give rise to an inference of discrimination”); United States v. Alvarado, 923 F.2d 253, 255-56 (2d Cir.1991) (concluding that “a challenge rate nearly twice the likely minority percentage of the venire strongly supports a prima facie case under Batson”)-, Commonwealth v. Jackson, 386 Pa.Super. 29, 48 n. 5, 49, 562 A.2d 338, 347 n. 5, 348 (1989) (en banc). I concur in the majority’s decision to affirm the denial of relief from the conviction in this case, however, as Batson’s burden-shifting scheme does not readily comport with the post-conviction review process when no contemporaneous objections were asserted at voir dire, see Uderra, 580 Pa. at 510-12, 862 A.2d at 85-86; and, in any *92event, the prosecutor provided race-neutral explanations in the PCRA proceedings to the degree that her memory permitted, as well as her categorical denial of engagement in the pernicious practice of discrimination. See N.T., April 16, 1998, at 648-732. Although it would have been preferable for the PCRA court to render more specific factual findings and conclusions of law on the Batson claim, particularly given the pattern emerging out of the strikes, it is apparent that the court acted in its capacity as fact finder to accept the prosecutor’s testimony on the ultiipate issue concerning her motivations.
A second area of difference involves the review of Appellant’s claim that the aggravating factor in Section 9711(d)(6) of the death penalty statute (killing committed during the perpetration of a felony) was improperly applied to him because he may have been convicted on the basis of the trial court’s instruction as to accomplice liability rather than as the actual killer. See Majority Opinion, op. at 75-76, 863 A.2d at 514-16. What is most troubling about this issue is that the Court’s prior treatment of it on direct appeal, presently relied upon by the majority as a basis for denying further review, is glaringly superficial and incorrect. In this regard, the Court reasoned that Appellant could not have been convicted by the jury as an accomplice, because a first-degree murder conviction necessarily equates with a finding that the defendant struck the fatal blow. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 524 Pa. 218, 233-34, 570 A.2d 75, 83 (1990) (indicating that “[t]his argument [i.e., that Appellant might have been convicted as an accomplice], when raised in the context of the penalty stage, does not even reach the level of speciousness; it is simply ludicrous. The very same jury, less than twenty-four hours before, had just convicted appellant of first degree murder.”). The Court so reasoned despite the fact that the trial court had issued a general accomplice liability instruction at the guilt phase of Appellant’s trial,3 and with no accounting for the established *93law that a defendant can be convicted of first-degree murder based on an accomplice liability theory without the necessity of his direct participation in the actual killing. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Smith, 480 Pa. 524, 528-29, 391 A.2d 1009, 1011 (1978).
Moreover, as the majority notes, the Court has separately determined that the in-perpetration-of-a-felony aggravator does not apply to one who is convicted of first-degree murder merely as an accomplice. See Commonwealth v. Lassiter, 554 Pa. 586, 595, 722 A.2d 657, 662 (1998) (“[Section] 9711(d)(6) may not be applied to an accomplice who did not ‘commit’ the killing in the sense of bringing it to completion or finishing it.”).4 Appellant, however, was deprived of the benefit of a determination in this regard in his direct appeal by this Court’s failure to cognize rudimentary aspects of the law of accomplice liability and its potential role in the jurors’ determination of Appellant’s guilt of first-degree, murder. In the face of appellate court error that is so apparent, I have substantial difficulty with application of the bar of previous litigation, as I believe that such application is in tension with the courts’ constitutional obligation to assure that the writ of *94habeas corpus remains unsuspended. See Pa. Const, art. I, § 14.5
Regarding the ineffectiveness claim relative to counsel’s failure to investigate and adduce adequate mitigation in the penalty phase, the governing standards are well established. In general, capital defense counsel are obliged to conduct reasonable investigations or reach reasonable decisions that make a particular investigation unnecessary. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2066, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); Commonwealth v. Basemore, 560 Pa. 258, 289, 744 A.2d 717, 735 (2000). In the context of the penalty phase of a capital case, counsel has a duty to thoroughly investigate a defendant’s background, see Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1515, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000), including the obligation to “discover all reasonably available mitigating evidence and evidence to rebut any aggravating evidence that may be introduced by the prosecutor.’ ” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 525, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 2537, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003) (quoting ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 11.4.1(C), p. 93 (1989)).6 The reasonableness of a particular investigation depends upon evidence known to counsel, as well as evidence that would cause a reasonable attorney to conduct a further investigation, see id. at 526-27, 123 S.Ct. at 2538; however, strategic decisions made on the basis of an inadequate investigation can be deemed reasonable only to the extent that reasonable professional judgment supported the *95limitations on the investigation. See id. at 529, 123 S.Ct. at 2539. Finally, in terms of the reasonable basis and prejudice prongs of the ineffectiveness inquiry, relief is available only in cases in which it can be concluded that an alternative not chosen offered a potential for success substantially greater than the course actually pursued. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 557 Pa. 207, 248, 732 A.2d 1167, 1189 (1999).
Here, the record shows fairly plainly that counsel was remiss in his penalty-phase investigation and preparation. Although it was his first capital penalty proceeding, see N.T., April 24,1987, at 15, counsel apparently failed to meet personally with Appellant until one week prior to trial. See N.T., January 6, 1986, at 25, 31-33; N.T., April 16, 1998, at 755.7 Furthermore, it is undeniable that competent counsel would have reviewed records from Appellant’s other criminal proceedings (particularly since they were in issue in the case in terms of the Commonwealth’s assertion of the significant-history-of-violent-felony-convictions aggravator). See generally ABA Guidelines 1.1, commentary (stating that “if the defendant has any prior criminal history, ... [d]efense counsel accordingly must comprehensively investigate”); id. 10.7, commentary (same). Thus, counsel would have become aware of the prior, pre-sentence investigation in Appellant’s criminal *96record indicating that he had a recent psychotic episode and was a candidate for psychiatric evaluation and treatment. See N.T., April 16, 1998, at 763, Ex. C-2; see also N.T., April 8, 1998, at 81. This, in turn, would trigger an obligation on counsel’s part to undertake a further investigation into his client’s mental health. According to expert testimony adduced by Appellant at the PCRA hearing that was not specifically rejected by the PCRA court (and common sense), a capital defendant’s history of having had a psychotic episode absolutely requires further investigation.8 Instead, what occurred is that counsel apparently, and inappropriately, relied upon his own assessment of Appellant to discount involving a mental health professional, N.T., Jul. 1, 1987, at 60-61.9 Notably, as well, since counsel first observed Appellant immediately before trial, the opportunity to develop mental health evidence upon his observations was severely constrained.10
*97Evidence adduced at Appellant’s post-conviction hearing indicated that, had counsel undertaken such an investigation by exploring Appellant’s life history and having Appellant examined by a defense expert from the mental health field, he would have uncovered a history of emotional and physical trauma, and chronic and major psychiatric illness in place as of the time of Appellant’s offenses. The evidence developed at hearing, if believed (and the PCRA court did not render any findings rejecting it on credibility grounds), revealed that Appellant was reared in a severely dysfunctional family, with members’ relationships characterized by neglect, abandonment,11 and routine violence that was often vicious,12 and *98sometimes public. See N.T., April 9, 1998, at 497-98. The evidence also depicted Appellant’s enlistment by his mother into the pattern of abuse. See N.T., April 9, 1998, at 302-03 (testimony of Appellant’s sister describing incidents in which Appellant and his brother were told by the mother to tie the sister to the bed, in preparation for a beating). Furthermore, there was evidence that Appellant was subject to multiple sexual victimizations (including sodomy) during his childhood, in the local neighborhood and a youth placement facility, and at the hands of a teacher.13 Additionally, it was developed that Appellant, as a child, engaged in acts of self-abuse and mutilation, characteristic of people in distress. See, e.g., N.T., April 8-9,1998, at 204, 332.
Post-conviction testimony was also adduced from expert witnesses from the mental health field to develop the effects of the sort of trauma described in the evidence on a child’s mental and emotional development, in terms of its impact in generating humiliation, shame, depression, and feelings of helplessness, as well as impeding the development of a sense of self-worth, see, e.g., N.T., April 8-9, 1998, at 48, 325, 327, 333-34; N.T., April 13, 1998, at 534; the fostering of repressed and overt anger, see, e.g., id. at 66, 97, 349, facilitation of aggressiveness as a behavior, see, e.g., id. at 49; and yielding the sorts of repressive, disassociative, and impulsive responses and behaviors that are prevalent among abused children. See, e.g., N.T., April 9, 1998, at 388; N.T., April 13, 1998, at 532. See generally N.T., April 13, 1998, at 543 *99(testimony of Ralph Kauffman, M.D., describing the “whole fabric of abusive relationships that have these kind of power dynamics of abuser/abused”). The expert evidence also indicated the role of the abuse in Appellant’s diagnosis as suffering from major mental health disorders as of the commission of the killing underlying his death sentence. See, e.g., N.T., April 8, 1998, at 42-43, 106 (testimony of Dr. Kessel, inter alia, chronic post-traumatic stress disorder and major depression, Axis I diagnoses); N.T., April 9, 1998, at 373 (testimony of Dr. Patricia Fleming, a clinical psychologist experienced in working with abused children); N.T., April 13,1998, at 520-21, 551 (Dr. Kauffman).14
It is my position that the mitigation evidence presented on post-conviction review represented a substantially better case in favor of imposition of a life sentence and against death than reliance solely on the athletie-achievement-and-communityparticipation approach that the majority attributes to trial counsel. This is particularly so, in my view, given trial counsel’s sub-standard, single-paragraph argument to the jury on this latter score.15 Moreover, to the extent that the jurors on their own might have been inclined to view the athletic-*100achievement-and-community-participation evidence as mitigating, the Commonwealth’s response could readily have been anticipated,16 and blunted by the presentation of the fuller perspective concerning Appellant’s life that trial counsel never uncovered.
I also believe that the PCRA court’s approach in rejecting the ineffectiveness claims arising out of counsel’s failure to investigate and present the life-history and mental-health mitigation evidence is a flawed one. The court offered two reasons for rejecting the life-history mitigation: first, that some evidence of the abuse of Appellant at the hands of his stepfather was actually put before the jury at the penalty phase of his trial, and second, that Appellant failed to cooperate in obtaining witnesses. Although the court is correct that testimony was in fact adduced at trial briefly describing abuse by the stepfather, the evidence was not developed by trial counsel for defense purposes. Rather, it was adduced by Commonwealth for its own purposes during its cross-examination of Appellant’s mother, see N.T., Feb. 3, 1986, at 1856-57; moreover, trial counsel did not argue that it should be considered to be mitigating in his exceptionally brief penalty-phase summation. See N.T., Feb. 3, 1986, at 1877-81. Additionally, trial counsel had not offered (and was obviously unprepared to offer) expert testimony from a mental health professional to establish a concrete framework concerning why the evidence that was heard should be considered mitigating.
*101Regarding the PCRA court’s indication that Appellant failed to cooperate with the production of witnesses, trial counsel’s testimony was highly equivocal. Most times, counsel merely highlighted Appellant’s expectation that counsel would defend the guilt-phase vigorously,17 and denied having a specific recollection concerning discussions of mitigation.18 Moreover, counsel substantially qualified his assertions of non-cooperation on Appellant’s part, as follows:
Q: Did Mr. Williams or his mother in any way prevent you from interviewing either those witnesses or other mitigation witnesses?
A: Only to the extent that he had me focus on the guilt phase and that you have a certain amount of time. Remember what I said to you, I had negotiated to, where had he wanted it, he could have had a consecutive life sentence. That’s not what he wanted. He wanted to try the case. Okay?
N.T., April 17, 1998, at 768. Since the evidence indicates that Appellant did not affirmatively impede counsel’s investigation in the relevant regard, I fail to see that counsel’s inability or *102unwillingness to commit the time necessary to develop a defense as to all aspects of a capital case should be accepted as an excuse for his lack of preparation.19 Similarly, Appellant’s failure to identify and raise the strategy on his own, see, e.g., N.T., April 17, 1998, at 765 (trial counsel’s testimony, indicating that Appellant’s history of abuse was “not something he particularly raised with me”),20 can hardly be accepted as a means of avoiding the finding of ineffectiveness. See Commonwealth v. Malloy, 579 Pa. 425, 460-61, 856 A.2d 767, *103788 (2004) (“The onus is not upon a criminal defendant to identify what types of evidence may be relevant and require development and pursuit. Counsel’s duty is to discover such evidence through his own efforts, including pointed questioning of his client.”).
The PCRA court’s opinion also does not diffuse the import of the mental health mitigation evidence. In this regard, the court’s analysis primarily entailed identification of a few discrete weaknesses in facets of Appellant’s expert testimony, but it failed to squarely confront the overall purport of the testimony. For example, while criticizing one expert for failing to render an ultimate conclusion concerning Appellant’s ability to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law at the time of his offense, the PCRA court merely disregarded the extensive testimony of Appellant’s primary expert witness, a forensic psychiatrist, to the effect that Appellant suffered from extreme mental or emotional disturbance at the time of his offense. See, e.g., N.T., April 8, 1998, at 106. See generally 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(e)(2) (indicating that mitigating circumstances shall include that “the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance”). Indeed, the PCRA court made no mention in its opinion of the testimony of the forensic psychiatrist, Dr. Julie Beth Kessel, or her conclusion implicating the mitigating circumstance at Section 9711(e)(2), which was never presented to Appellant’s capital sentencing jury.
The PCRA court’s position concerning mental health mitigation is punctuated by its categorical statement that evidence that tends to show impulsiveness and anti-social behavior will not be regarded by jurors as mitigating. See, e.g., PCRA Court Opinion, slip op. at 14 (stating that the fact “that Petitioner’s judgment [may have been] impaired and that his response to social judgment questions indicated that he would respond impulsively in stressful situations in a manner without regard for the consequences of his actions and their impact on others ... cannot be characterized as beneficial to petitioner”). This sort of reasoning, in my view, does not constitute fact finding tied to the individual circumstances of the case, *104but rather, represents a philosophical position that is contrary to decisions of the United States Supreme Court that have recognized the potency of life-history and mental-health mitigation in terms of capital sentencing, see, e.g., Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 510, 123 S.Ct. at 2527; Williams, 529 U.S. at 396, 120 S.Ct. at 1495,21 the ABA Guidelines, and the experience of the Defender Association of Philadelphia and other legal service providers in the capital arena which recognize the Guidelines’ approach.
The PCRA court’s position concerning the connotation of impulsivity or anti-social behavior arising out of the evidence is also highly superficial, in that it fails to take into account the reality that, in any capital trial in which guilt has been established, the jurors already are well aware that the defendant has engaged in impulsive, aberrant, and/or anti-social behavior. Indeed, the defendant has at least once perpetrated the ultimate act of this kind, i.e., the unjustified killing of a human being with specific intent and malice. In this case, moreover, the Commonwealth had legitimately put before the jury not only Appellant’s conviction for the present murder, but also a fairly extensive series of other serious violent felonies. Accordingly, there seems to me to have been little danger in an attempt to establish some broader context for Appellant’s behavior in terms of mitigation, which was precisely trial counsel’s role. In this regard, the role of life-history and mental-health mitigation evidence, where it is available, is not to try to excuse that behavior (which in any event will be subject to severe punishment),22 but rather (and only) to *105attempt to convey that there is some factor or factor that militates against the exercise of governmental power to extinguish the defendant’s life.23 Particularly as the General Assembly has recognized the presence of major mental or emotional infirmity as a specific category of mitigation, see 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(e)(2), courts of law should be hard pressed to effectively rule them out categorically in instances in which they have been overlooked by counsel.24
The majority’s reasoning overlaps with that of the PCRA court, and, for that reason, fails to persuade me. In addition, the majority absolves counsel of his failure to conduct further investigation into a documented psychotic episode and associated recommendation of psychiatric treatment, based on the absence of an indication of a previous psychiatric history. See Majority Opinion at 80-83, 863 A.2d at 519-20. In my view, however, neither the absence of any self-recognition or report*106ing on the part of a criminal defendant concerning a mental health diagnosis and/or a prior record of intervention and treatment controls the obligations of counsel who has or should have become aware of psychiatric involvement, particularly since those suffering from mental illness frequently remain untreated and unaware of psychiatrically recognizable illnesses. See supra note 8; accord Averhart v. State, 614 N.E.2d 924, 930 (Ind.1993) (finding capital defense counsel ineffective, inter alia, for naively placing undue emphasis on the contents of a pre-sentence report in terms of the production of his own case for mitigation).
In summary, I believe that the record paints a fairly stark picture of penalty-phase ineffectiveness of counsel, as it reflects an inadequate investigation and the making of strategic decisions and recommendations on an uninformed basis. Moreover, as I am unable to conclude that at least one juror might not have credited the mitigation that should have been presented in favor of life imprisonment and found its weight at least equal to the Commonwealth’s case for death, I would award a new penalty hearing, or, at a minimum, remand for proceedings consistent with Commonwealth v. McGill, 574 Pa. 574, 832 A.2d 1014 (2003), were that to be deemed necessary by the Court.
Finally, on the issue of the availability of an instruction under Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 114 S.Ct. 2187, 129 L.Ed.2d 133 (1994), I agree with the majority that Simmons is not retroactive in its application. See Majority Opinion, at 99 n. 15, 863 A.2d at 530 n. 15. I differ with the majority’s indication that Appellant’s future dangerous was not before the jury in this case, however,25 as it does not appear to be in keeping with recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court. See Kelly v. South Carolina, 534 U.S. 246, 253-54, 122 S.Ct. 726, 731-32, 151 L.Ed.2d 670 (2002).

. As the Court has recently observed, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has deemed the Spence requirements to be an unreasonable application of federal law, at least as applied in some circumstances. See Commonwealth v. Uderra, 580 Pa. 492, 508-12, 862 A.2d 74, 84-86, 2004 WL 2363725, at *6-7 (2004) (citing Holloway v. Horn, Holloway v. Horn, 355 F.3d 707, 728-29 (3d Cir.2004), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 125 S.Ct. 410, 160 L.Ed.2d 352 (2004)).

. The record thus reflects that the total composition of the jury panel was 111 jurors, 68 of whom were Caucasian and 43 of whom were African American. The composition of the jury was seven Caucasian members, five African Americans. Total peremptory challenges assert*91ed were 35, 16 of which were utilized by the Commonwealth to challenge two Caucasian and 14 African American venirepersons, and 19 of which were utilized by the defense to challenge 16 Caucasian venirepersons and three African Americans. See N.T., April 16, 1998, at 643.

. See N.T., February 3, 1986, at 1750 ("It will be your duty in this case to determine whether Amos Norwood died as a result of injuries inflicted upon him by this defendant or whether this defendant was an accomplice of the person who actually inflicted the injuries, and if so, whether such killing amounted to murder of the first degree[.]”), id. at *931768-70 (general accomplice liability instruction). The accomplice liability charge presumably was issued at the Commonwealth’s instance precisely to account for the possibility that one or more jurors might give some credence to the defense evidence to the effect that Appellant left the company of the victim at a time when he was unharmed but under restraint by Michael Hopkins and Marc Draper. See, e.g., N.T., January 27, 1986, at 1182-84.

. Although Lassiter is a plurality opinion, six Justices agreed that a prosecution for murder based on accomplice liability will not support the use of the aggravating circumstance set forth in Section 9711(d)(6). See Lassiter, 554 Pa. at 595, 722 A.2d at 661; id. at 599-600, 722 A.2d at 664 (Saylor, J., dissenting) ("I agree with the majority that a prosecution for murder based on accomplice liability will not support the use of the aggravating circumstance set forth in Section 9711(d)(6) of the Judicial Code.”). Additionally, I do not believe that there is any retroactivity concern regarding Lassiter, since it merely represents a plain-text reading of a substantive provision of statutory law that was in place at the time of Appellant’s trial. See Lassiter, 554 Pa. at 593, 722 A.2d at 660-61 (stating that "we believe that this matter can and must be resolved by reference to the text and plain meaning of the statute itself”).

. This issue is also more significant to my analysis than it is to the majority's, given my position, developed below, concerning counsel's stewardship in connection with the jury’s finding of no mitigation.

. I make substantial reference herein to the ABA Guidelines, realizing that this Court has not endorsed or adopted them on a wholesale basis. The United States Supreme Court, however, has referenced these Guidelines in terms of articulating prevailing norms for effective counsel. See, e.g., Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 524-25, 123 S.Ct. at 2536-37. In any event, in my view, the drafters' claim that the Guidelines “embody the current consensus about what is required to provide effective defense representation in capital cases," ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases 1.1, commentary (rev. ed. Feb. 2004) [hereinafter, ABA Guidelines], is not an exaggerated one.

. Counsel's primary excuse in this regard centered on his practice of using associates. See, e.g., N.T., January 6, 1986, at 22. There is little in the record, however, to suggest that there was actual, meaningful pre-trial preparation undertaken by Appellant's associates. Moreover, I have difficulty with the proposition that lead capital counsel can expect to develop the kind of trust relationship with his client that is essential to effective representation without meeting his client substantially in advance of trial. The ABA Guidelines' commentary explains:
Establishing a relationship of trust with the client is essential both to overcome the client's natural resistance to disclosing the often personal and painful facts necessary to present an effective penalty phase defense, and to ensure that the client will listen to counsel's advice on important matters such as whether to testify and the advisability of a plea. Client contact must be ongoing, and include sufficient time spent at the prison to develop a rapport between attorney and client. An occasional hurried interview with the client will not reveal to counsel all the facts needed to prepare for trial____Even if counsel manages to ask the right questions, a client will not—with good reason—trust a lawyer who visits only a few times before trial....
ABA Guidelines, 11.4.1(C), commentary.

. See N.T., April 8, 1998, at 87-88 (testimony from a psychiatrist that a psychotic episode “absolutely" would have required further investigation); N.T., April 9, 1998, at 373 (psychologist describing the event as a “red flag" and "alerting signal”); N.T., April 13, 1998, at 549 (psychiatrist indicating that the report showed that “something [was] grossly wrong”); cf. Commonwealth v. Fears, 575 Pa. 281, 836 A.2d 52, 72-73 (2003) (finding that an ineffectiveness claim had arguable merit where trial counsel failed to investigate potential psychiatric evidence). See generally ABA Guidelines 4.1, commentary (observing that "mental health issues are so ubiquitous in capital representation that the provision of resources in that area should be routine”); id. 4.1, commentary (“In particular, mental health experts are essential to defending capital cases. Neurological and psychiatric impairment, combined with a histoiy of physical and sexual abuse, are common among persons convicted of violent offenses on death row.”); id. (observing that “the defendant's psychological and social history and his emotional and mental health are often of vital importance to the jury’s decision at the punishment phase[;] ... [c]ounsel must compile extensive historical data, as well as obtain a thbrough physical and neurological examination.”).

. Cf. Austin v. Bell, 126 F.3d 843, 849 (6th Cir.1997) (finding deficient stewardship arising from capital trial counsel’s failure to investigate and present mitigating evidence at the penalty phase "because he did not think that it would do any good”); accord ABA Guidelines, 4.1 ("Counsel’s own observations of the client's mental status, while necessary, can hardly be expected to be sufficient to detect the array of conditions (e.g., post-traumatic stress disorder, fetal alcohol syndrome, pesticide poisoning, lead poisoning, schizophrenia, mental retardation) that could be of critical importance.” (footnote omitted)).

. Trial counsel also did not seem to be versed in the use of psychiatric evidence as mitigation, as reflected in the following interchange from the PCRA hearing;
*97Q: Do you know what it means to have a paranoid delusional system?
A: Uhm, today I can't give you a working definition, no.
Q: Do you know what psychosis is?
A: Today vis-á-vis this case, no.
Q: I’m sorry.
A: No.
# & &
Q: Do you know the interaction between impulsivity and post-traumatic stress disorder?
[PROSECUTOR]: Objection.
Q: (continued) If any.
THE COURT: I'm going to sustain it. That’s enough. That’s enough.
[THE COURT]: Your basic position is, reading the report, without knowing what all the things are, it was your strategy then not to proceed with psychiatric testimony; is that correct?
A: That's absolutely correct.
Q: Would your strategy be any different today?
A: No, not at all.
[PCRA counsel]: But you don’t know what any of this means?
[THE COURT]: You can argue that.
N.T., April 13, 1998, at 801-02.

. See, e.g., N.T., April 8, 1998, at 269-70 (testimony of Appellant's brother observing that, in interactions between Appellant and a stepfather, the stepfather "acted like [Appellant] wasn’t there”).

. See, e.g., N.T., April 8, 1998, at 195 (testimony of Appellant's mother that she beat his head against a wall, "picked him up and threw him down the flight of steps and I beat him like Muhammad Ali”); id. at 196 ("I would beat [Appellant] very often ....”); id. at 197-200 (description of interspousal violence, including blackjacking witnessed by Appellant); id. at 216 (testimony of a school teacher concerning uncontrolled rages on the part of Appellant's mother and "huge explosions” between her and Appellant's stepfather); id. at 256 (testimony of *98Appellant's older brother that the mother beat the children with "a belt, a board, a stick, a brick, a switch, whatever she got in her hand ....”); id. at 255-56 (testimony of the brother concerning his having assumed the role of abuser with respect to the younger children in the household); N.T., April 9, 1998, at 298 (testimony of Appellant's sister to beatings “with brooms, sticks, belts, pots and pans, knives, shoes, chairs”); id. at 298 (describing the intentional scalding of Appellant’s sister by his mother); id. at 492-95 (testimony of a friend concerning the “raging” behavior of Appellant's stepfather, describing the violence as a “family ritual”); N.T., April 13, 1998, at 620-32 (testimony of a neighborhood resident and family friend concerning the family history of violence).

. See, e.g., N.T., April 8, 1998, at 193 (testimony of Appellant’s mother describing his sodomization).

. Notably, the Commonwealth presented no contrary testimony from an expert witness examining Appellant for purposes of rebutting the case of psychiatric mitigation. Compare Commonwealth v. Lopez, 578 Pa. 545, 557-58, 854 A.2d 465, 472 (2004) (Saylor, J„ concurring) (concurring in the denial of post-conviction relief in a case in which the Commonwealth presented testimony of an expert psychiatrist, credited by the PCRA court, to the effect that the appellant suffered from no mental health deficits).

. Oddly, this was put to the jury, not for the reasons that the majority suggests (to show some other side to Appellant), but rather, as follows:
[Appellant’s] athletic ability, his physical ability will now work to his detriment. If you ever heard of a book, The Belly of the Beast, it vividly describes prison life. There is no impediment, because of his physical stature, to living all of the evils, all of the detriments, all of the brutalities that are associated with prison life. He will have them to the fullest.
N.T., February 3, 1986, at 1880-81. The entire penalty-phase closing argument for the defense consists of only four pages of transcript. See id. at 1877-81; cf. Douglas v. Woodford, 316 F.3d 1079, 1087-89 (9th Cir.2003) (finding counsel ineffective, inter alia, for failing to adequately present the material that he did have "to the jury in a sufficiently detailed and sympathetic manner’’).

. The district attorney argued:
Now, I dare say, ladies and gentlemen ... that everyone was shocked and dismayed that their hero, their quarterback, their athletic star, was guilty of such a horrible crime ... the defendant presents an image of a person who had all kinds of advantages. Such a person would be able to essentially make the best possible life for himself and for the people that have loved him and cared for him.... He had a girlfriend and a child and friends and supportive teachers and people who I suggest to you looked up to him because he was gifted. He had the gift of an athletic ability that would have permitted him to do whatever he wanted with his life. He had the opportunity to not only finish high school but to go on to college. He could have made whatever he wanted out of his life but what did he do instead?
N.T.. Feb. 3. 1986. at 1874-76.

. Contrary to counsel’s frequent suggestions on the PCRA record, a capital defendant's insistence on defending against conviction is not an excuse to omit penalty-phase preparations. Compare N.T., April 17, 1998, at 760 (trial counsel’s testimony that ”[u]hm, I would just continue to urge you to what I—that [Appellant’s] focus was that he was not guilty, uhm, and that was the general direction that we went in”); id. at 779 ("[Appellant] was very interested in being found not guilty. That was his—that was the focus ...."); id. at 771 ("See, I'm a very busy person.”); id. at 760 ("I’m going to say this one more time. I could have saved this man’s life. We had negotiated a plea to where he could have gotten a life sentence.”), -with ABA Guidelines 10.7 ("Counsel at every stage have an obligation to conduct thorough and independent investigations relating to the issues of both guilt and penalty.”). Notably, in the face of such expressions by counsel at trial, the trial court reminded counsel of Appellant’s constitutional right to be tried by a jury, and the continuing obligations of counsel to adequately prepare and perform. See N.T., January 6, 1986, at 19, 25.

. N.T., April 17, 1998, at 752 ("I don't have a specific recollection of having an independent thought process relative to guilt or penalty.”); id. at 756 ("if you ask me a question relative to when we discussed mitigation and things, I don't really have a recollection”); id. at 766 (“No, you asked me if I have a recollection of [my thought process], I don’t.”).

. Notably, the ABA Guidelines also add the following perspective concerning the sort of representation that was afforded here:
Often, so-called "difficult clients" are the consequence of bad lawyering—either in the past or present.
Some clients will initially insist that they want to be executed—as punishment or because they believe they would rather die than spend the rest of their lives in prison; some clients will want to contest their guilt but not present mitigation. It is ineffective assistance for counsel to simply acquiesce to such wishes, which usually reflect the distorting effects of overwhelming feelings of guilt and dispair rather than a rational decision in favor of a state-assisted suicide.
ABA Guidelines 10.5, commentary; cf. ABA Guidelines 10.7A(2) ("The investigation regarding penalty should be conducted regardless of any statement by the client that evidence bearing upon penalty is not to be collected or presented."); id., commentary ("Counsel cannot responsibly advise a client about the merits of different courses of action, the client cannot make informed decisions, and counsel cannot be sure of the client's competency to make such decisions, unless counsel has first conducted a thorough investigation with respect to both phases of the case.”); accord Blanco v. Singletary, 943 F.2d 1477, 1501-02 (11th Cir.1991) (finding trial counsel ineffective where "the ultimate decision that was reached not to call witnesses [in mitigation] was not a result of investigation and evaluation, but was instead primarily a result of counsels' eagerness to latch onto defendant’s statements that he did not want any witnesses called”).

. The following interchange between post-conviction and trial counsel is also representative:
Q: Did you explore or investigate whether there was any question of in Mr. Williams' background in regards to childhood abuse or family dysfunction?
A: He never, ever discussed anything like that with me.
Q: Did you ask?
A: Did I ask?
Q: Did you ask?
A: I honestly don't recall, but I’m sure I would have had discussion, is there anything you want me to bring out?
N.T., April 13, 1998, at 761-62.

. The majority distinguishes the United States Supreme Court's decision in Williams on the basis that the familial abuse present in Williams was substantially greater based on the fact that the parents had been incarcerated for it. See Majority Opinion at 97 n. 12, 863 A.2d at 521 n. 12. It cannot reasonably be disputed, however, that the type of conduct described in the evidence here was equally deserving of punishment (and/or treatment if the requisite culpability on the part of the perpetrators was not present), had intervention occurred. Moreover, it does not seem to me that the presence or absence of governmental detection and/or intervention should be deemed controlling.

. Accord ABA Guidelines 10.11, commentary ("None of this evidence should be offered as a counterweight to the gravity of the crime, but *105ralher to show that the person who committed the crime is a flawed but real individual rather than a generic evildoer[.]”).

. Accord Simmons v. Luebbers, 299 F.3d 929, 938-39 (8th Cir.2002) ("By the time the state was finished with its case, the jury’s perception of Simmons could not have been more unpleasant. Mitigating evidence was essential to provide some sort of explanation for Simmons’s abhorrent behavior. Despite the availability of such evidence, however, none was presented. Simmons's attorneys’ representation was ineffective.”), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 923, 123 S.Ct. 1582, 155 L.Ed.2d 314 (2003); Ainsworth v. Woodford, 268 F.3d 868, 876 (9th Cir.2001) (indicating that the introduction of expert testimony in mitigation would also have been important to explain the effects that serious physical and psychological abuse and neglect as a child had on the defendant); ABA Guidelines 10.11, commentary (noting that expert testimony may explain the effects of mental impairments on the defendant's judgment and impulse control).

. The PCRA court and the Commonwealth certainly are not incorrect in their assertion that some jurors may not view a pattern of violent and impulsive behavior arising from disassociation, repressed anger, and mental health infirmity as mitigating, no matter what the source or degree of the impairment. But it is equally undeniable, as experience has shown in capital cases, that some jurors will in some situations view this as mitigating, and, in our system of justice, it takes a single juror of twelve to avoid the imposition of a capital sentence. See Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 536-37, 123 S.Ct. at 2543 (explaining that the context in which courts are to review the prejudice prong of the ineffectiveness inquiry is in terms of whether "there is a reasonable probability that at least one juror would have struck a different balance”).

. See, e.g., N.T., Feb. 3, 1986, at 1876-77 (penalty-phase summation of the district attorney arguing that Appellant "terrorized, he robbed, he [pllundered, and he killed, and he continued to kill.... I am asking you, ladies and gentlemen, to impose the death penalty because our system of justice must stop him. He must be stopped.”).