Court Opinion

ID: 9785288
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 21:14:08.118137+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:14.905841
License: Public Domain

Chief Judge Lippman. (dissenting).
The majority conflates the end result of the work with the manner and method of its performance and it is the supervision over the latter that is the touchstone in this case. Labor Law § 240 (1) was enacted to protect workers from the hazards involved in elevation-related work. It imposes absolute liability upon owners and general contractors who fail to furnish proper protective devices, but provides an exception for “owners of one and two-family *597dwellings who contract for but do not direct or control the work” (Labor Law § 240 [1]). We have noted, however, that the homeowner’s exemption
“is an exception to the clear legislative intent to protect[ ] workers by placing ultimate responsibility for safety practices at building construction jobs where such responsibility actually belongs, on the owner[,] and as such, may properly be extended only so far as [the] language [of the exception] fairly warrants [. Therefore,] doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provision rather than the exception” (Van Amerogen v Donnini, 78 NY2d 880, 882 [1991] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]).
The question presented here is whether plaintiff raised an issue of fact as to whether defendants directed and controlled his work, sufficient to defeat defendants’ summary judgment dismissal motion. Case law from this Court provides little guidance for determining the limits of the homeowner’s exemption. However, we have observed that “for one person to be ‘directed’ by another, there must be supervision of the manner and method of the work to be performed” (Duda v Rouse Constr. Corp., 32 NY2d 405, 409 [1973]). At the other end of the spectrum, the Appellate Division has held that general supervision that is “no more extensive than would be expected of the typical homeowner who hired a contractor to renovate his or her home” (Orellana v Dutcher Ave. Bldrs., Inc., 58 AD3d 612, 614 [2d Dept 2009], Iv dismissed 12 NY3d 804 [2009]) or decisions involving merely aesthetic choices will not suffice to establish direction and control.
Under the circumstances presented here, I would find that plaintiff has at the very least raised an issue of fact as to whether defendants were directing and controlling his work. Defendants’ conduct could be found to be more extensive than expected of the typical homeowners renovating their home inasmuch as their activity involved changing the fundamental or structural nature of the work. For example, plaintiff asserts that when he told Mr. Basch that in order to move a sink to Basch’s preferred location he would need to cut a beam that supported the house, defendant instructed him to cut the beam. Basch told plaintiff to place the washer-dryer vent through the roof, rather than through the window, after plaintiff expressed reservations about the safety of that procedure—a significant *598alteration changing the fundamental nature of the work. That Basch may have been able to induce plaintiff to perform the work on the roof, even though plaintiff was afraid for his safety, would also support a finding that Basch directed or controlled plaintiffs work.
The majority states that plaintiffs affidavit “is insufficient to raise an issue of fact” (majority op at 596). It is not clear why that is so or what more should be required from plaintiff at this stage. Affri was the sole witness to the accident and his affidavit is largely consistent with the testimony he gave at his examination before trial.
The homeowner’s exemption does not provide blanket immunity for all homeowners—only for those who do not direct or control the nature of the work. This is not a situation where it can be said as a matter of law that the homeowner left the method and manner of performance to the worker’s expertise such that the homeowner cannot be held responsible. If a homeowner directs the manner and means of the work, it is immaterial that the end result was an aesthetic change. Here, there is a genuine question of fact whether defendants crossed the line from general supervision to exercising direction and control over plaintiffs work.
Therefore, I would reverse and reinstate plaintiffs Labor Law § 240 (1) claim. For the same reasons, I would reinstate plaintiffs claims under Labor Law § 241 (6) and § 200 and his claim based on common-law negligence.
Judges Graffeo, Read and Smith concur with Judge Pigott; Chief Judge Lippman dissents and votes to reverse in a separate opinion in which Judges Ciparick and Jones concur.
Order affirmed, with costs.