Court Opinion

ID: 9712195
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:48:39.167314+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:10.719073
License: Public Domain

Ciparick, J. (dissenting).
Because I believe that Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) certification and subsequent registration and the restriction of contact with one’s children as a condition of probation are direct consequences of a guilty plea of which a defendant must be informed to make that plea knowing, voluntary and intelligent, I respectfully dissent.
To be valid, a defendant’s guilty plea must be knowing, voluntary and intelligent (see People v Catu, 4 NY3d 242, 245 [2005]). In order to constitute a knowing, voluntary and intelligent plea, the trial court has a duty to ensure that a defendant is aware of the direct consequences of such plea (see id. at 244-245; see also People v Boyd, 12 NY3d 390, 393 [2009]; People v Ford, 86 NY2d 397, 403 [1995]). Accordingly, a trial court may permit a *560defendant to plead guilty only after the court first ensures “that a defendant . . . has a full understanding of what the plea connotes and its consequences” (Ford, 86 NY2d at 402-403). However, a trial court has no duty to inform a defendant of collateral consequences of a guilty plea (see Catu, 4 NY3d at 244). We have defined a “collateral consequence” as one which is “peculiar to the individual [defendant] and generally result [s] from the actions taken by agencies the court does not control” (id., quoting Ford, 86 NY2d at 403). On the other hand, a “direct consequence” is “one which has a definite, immediate and largely automatic effect on defendant’s punishment” (id.).
In Catu, we concluded that postrelease supervision (PRS) was a direct consequence of a conviction which must be disclosed to a defendant in order to render a guilty plea knowing, voluntary and intelligent. We explained:
“Postrelease supervision is a direct consequence of a criminal conviction. In eliminating parole for all violent felony offenders in 1998, the Legislature enacted a scheme of determinate sentencing to be followed by periods of mandatory postrelease supervision, and defined each determinate sentence to also include, as a part thereof, an additional period of post-release supervision. Whereas the term of supervision to he imposed may vary depending on the degree of the crime and the defendant’s criminal record, imposition of supervision is mandatory and thus has a definite, immediate and largely automatic effect” (4 NY3d at 244 [citations, internal quotation marks and brackets omitted; emphasis added]).
We also observed that PRS can have onerous terms including, but not limited to, a curfew, travel restrictions, and substance abuse treatment and/or testing. Moreover, we noted that a “violation of a condition of postrelease supervision can result in reincarceration for at least six months and up to the balance of the remaining supervision period” (id. at 245 [citations omitted]).
Under the rubric we set forth in Ford and further explained in Catu, SORA registration is a direct consequence of defendant Gravino’s guilty plea. The majority insists that SORA registration is not a direct consequence because we have held that it is “not part of the punishment imposed by the judge” (see majority op at 556). Moreover, the majority differentiates postrelease supervision from SORA registration on the ground that *561postrelease supervision “is, by statute, a component element of a sentence” (id. at 556, citing People v Sparber, 10 NY3d 457, 469 [2008]). We have never held that a consequence of a criminal conviction must be a component of a defendant’s sentence in order to constitute a direct consequence thereof (see Ford, 86 NY2d at 403; Catu, 4 NY3d at 244-245). Instead, we have held that direct consequences must have an effect on a defendant’s punishment. As a result, the majority’s stance cannot be reconciled with our holdings in Ford and Catu.1
Although the terms of SORA registration will vary depending on the level of classification, the imposition of SORA certification—leading to mandatory compliance with SORA requirements—is, like PRS, mandatory. Significantly, in this regard, Correction Law § 168-d (1) (a) states: “[U]pon conviction . . . the court shall certify that the person is a sex offender and shall include the certification in the order of commitment” (emphasis added). The statute requires that the trial court “shall also advise the sex offender of his or her duties under this article” (emphasis added). Although a SORA risk-level determination has been held to be not part of a sentence, we have concluded that the trial court’s mandatory certification that a *562defendant is a sex offender is an appealable and reviewable part of the judgment of conviction (People v Hernandez, 93 NY2d 261, 267 [1999]). Thus, like postrelease supervision, the certification that a defendant is a sex offender—and, accordingly, subject to the requirements of SORA—is “a definite, immediate and . . . automatic effect” of a defendant’s conviction (Catu, 4 NY3d at 244 [citation and internal quotation marks omitted]).2 While it is true that we have held that the particular risk-level determination made for a specific defendant is a collateral consequence not subject to attack on direct appeal from a judgment of conviction (see People v Windham, 10 NY3d 801, 802 [2008]), here defendant challenges not the specific risk-level determination but the fact that she was certified a sex offender subject to SORA requirements.
Moreover, as the majority recognizes (see majority op at 556), the consequences of SORA registration are “significant” (Catu, 4 NY3d at 245) and can include up to, for a level two or three offender, lifetime registration (see Correction Law § 168-h [2]), verification of address every 90 days (see § 168-h [3] [level three offenders]) with fees to be paid by the sex offender for each change of address (see § 168-b [8]), and the dissemination to the public of the sex offender’s personal information via the Internet (see § 168-q [1]). Even sex offenders posing the lowest risk (level one) are subject to annual registration and residency verification for a period of 20 years (§ 168-h [1]). As with post-release supervision, failure to comply with the requirements of SORA can result in a felony conviction (see § 168-t).
In short, Gravino’s certification as a sex offender was an automatic and immediate consequence of her conviction for rape in the third degree. Thus, I would hold that sex-offender certification is a direct consequence of Gravino’s guilty plea and, without informing Gravino that she would be subject to SORA certification, her guilty plea cannot be said to “represente ] a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative *563courses of action open to” her (North Carolina v Alford, 400 US 25, 31 [1970]).
Similarly, I would hold that a condition of probation that prohibits defendant Ellsworth from living with his children is a most significant and direct consequence of his guilty plea. I agree with the majority that “courts taking guilty pleas cannot be expected to predict any and every potential condition of probation that might be recommended in the presentence report” (majority op at 558). It is hardly unforeseeable, however, that upon a conviction for course of sexual conduct against a child in the second degree, defendant would be forbidden, as a term of his probation, from living with or having contact with children, including his own. Indeed, the record reflects that both the presentence interviewer and the prosecutor believed such a condition to be a mandatory component of defendant’s probation. Thus, it does not appear that the particular condition at issue was “peculiar to the individual” defendant (see Ford, 86 NY2d at 403). Moreover the condition that defendant not live with or have contact with children was “within the control of’ the sentencing court (id.), as that court had it within its discretion to adjust the conditions imposed.
We have repeatedly recognized that parents’ interest in the care and custody of their children is a fundamental right (see Matter of Tammie Z., 66 NY2d 1, 4 [1985], citing Matter of Ella B., 30 NY2d 352, 356 [1972]; see also Santosky v Kramer, 455 US 745, 758-759 [1982]). Accordingly, I would hold that where a defendant, as a direct consequence of his plea, is stripped of that right as a largely automatic condition of a sentence imposed for a sex crime involving children, the defendant must be informed of that direct consequence in order to render the guilty plea knowing, voluntary and intelligent, and County Court’s failure to do so here rendered Ellsworth’s plea invalid.
Accordingly, in both cases, I would reverse the order of the Appellate Division and remit to the sentencing courts for further proceedings.
Judges Graffeo, Smith and Pigott concur with Judge Read; Judge Ciparick dissents and votes to reverse in a separate opinion in which Chief Judge Lippman and Judge Jones concur.
In each case: Order affirmed.

. The United States Supreme Court recently considered whether an attorney’s failure to advise a client of a consequence we deemed “collateral” in Ford—deportation—could constitute ineffective assistance of counsel sufficient to warrant the vacatur of a guilty plea (see Padilla v Kentucky, 559 US —, 130 S Ct 1473 [2010]). The Court concluded that a defense attorney does have a duty to advise his or her client that deportation is a possible consequence (see 559 US at —, 130 S Ct at 1482). Significantly, in determining whether the direct/collateral consequence dichotomy was useful to determine whether deportation advice was required, the Court stated
“[although removal proceedings are civil in nature, deportation is nevertheless intimately related to the criminal process. Our law has enmeshed criminal convictions and the penalty of deportation for nearly a century. And, importantly, recent changes in our immigration law have made removal nearly an automatic result for a broad class of noncitizen offenders. Thus, we find it most difficult to divorce the [civil] penalty from the conviction in the deportation context” (559 US at —, 130 S Ct at 1481 [citations and internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis added]).
While it is true that Padilla dealt with the duty of counsel, rather than the duty of the courts, to inform a criminal defendant about deportation, the rationale employed by the Court in rejecting the direct/collateral consequence dichotomy applies with equal force in determining the voluntariness of a guilty plea where the court has failed to advise the defendant of SORA registration, which is also a civil penalty “difficult to divorce . . . from [a] conviction” (559 US at —, 130 S Ct at 1481 [internal quotation marks omitted]).

. Although the majority accuses the dissent of “treat[ing] all consequences of conviction as punishment,” thereby “obliterating the distinction between direct and collateral consequences” (majority op at 557 n 5), I do not intend to “obliterate” any distinction. Rather, I believe that SORA certification and the resulting mandatory compliance with SORA requirements fall squarely within the ambit of “direct consequences” of a judgment of conviction, as we explained that term in Ford and Catu. Other consequences not relevant here may very well remain collateral (cf. Padilla, 559 US at —, 130 S Ct at 1481).