Court Opinion

ID: 9572191
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:39:27.429089+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:31:50.629531
License: Public Domain

*398Smith, Judge,
concurring specially.
Under the facts and circumstances of this case, I agree with the majority that the inventory search of appellant’s automobile was constitutionally permissible. The police had the right to impound the vehicle (see State v. McCranie, 137 Ga. App. 369, 370 (223 SE2d 765) (1976); State v. Goodrich, 256 NW2d 506 (Minn. 1977)) and conduct an inventory search in conjunction with the impoundment.
However, I believe it should be made clear that merely because we uphold the inventory search in the instant case does not mean that every inventory search made pursuant to a police regulation such as the one quoted in the majority opinion will pass constitutional muster. See Highland v. State, 144 Ga. App. 594, 595 (241 SE2d 477) (1978). “[Wjhether a search and seizure is unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case ...” Cooper v. California, 386 U. S. 58, 59 (87 SC 788, 17 LE2d 730) (1967).
Although the arresting officer in the instant case testified that the search of appellant’s vehicle was conducted “pursuant to” the Roswell Police Department regulation, it does not necessarily follow that the search was prompted by an “investigatory police motive” (South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U. S. 364, 376 (96 SC 3092, 49 LE2d 1000) (1976)), or that it would have been made regardless of whether an inventory search was authorized under all of the attendant facts and circumstances. See Ludvicek v. State, 147 Ga. App. 784 (250 SE2d 503) (1978). The search being otherwise valid, I concur with the majority opinion.