Court Opinion

ID: 9960425
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-16 14:06:46.311171+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:26.627917
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound
volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us

SJC-13550

              HALIENDREW FLORES   vs.   COMMONWEALTH.

                         April 16, 2024.

Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts,
     Appeal from order of single justice. Practice, Criminal,
     Disclosure of identity of informer.

     Haliendrew Flores (petitioner) appeals from a judgment of
the county court denying, without a hearing, his petition for
relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3, from an interlocutory ruling of
a judge in the Superior Court. We affirm.

     Along with a codefendant,1 the petitioner has been charged
with murder in the first degree and other offenses. He filed a
motion for disclosure of the identity of a confidential
informant to whom a third party allegedly confessed to the
killing. At first, the judge attempted to facilitate an
interview between defense counsel and the informant under
conditions that would protect the informant's anonymity. The
informant, however, declined to participate, and so the
petitioner renewed his motion for disclosure of the informant's
identity. The judge denied the motion, and the petitioner
sought relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3.

     The petitioner has filed a memorandum pursuant to S.J.C.
Rule 2:21 (2), as amended, 434 Mass. 1301 (2001), which requires
him to "set forth the reasons why review of the trial court
decision cannot adequately be obtained on appeal from any final

     1 The codefendant did not participate in the county court
proceedings or in this appeal.
                                                                  2

adverse judgment in the trial court or by other available
means."2 The petitioner cannot make this showing, as he has a
remedy in the ordinary appellate process. The denial of the
petitioner's motion was an ordinary pretrial ruling, reviewable
(and, if warranted, remediable) on direct appeal from any
conviction. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bonnett, 472 Mass. 827,
846-851 (2015), S.C., 482 Mass. 838 (2019) (reviewing denial of
motion for disclosure of informant's identity and remanding for
further proceedings on that issue). It is well established that
G. L. c. 211, § 3, is not a substitute for the ordinary
appellate process. E.g., Pinney v. Commonwealth, 487 Mass.
1029, 1030 (2021). The petitioner argues that in his case, the
ordinary appellate process is inadequate due to his young age
(nineteen), the lengthy duration of the process, and the
likelihood that he would be imprisoned pending appeal during a
developmentally crucial time. "The fact that . . . [the
ordinary appellate] process might be time-consuming and the
outcome uncertain does not render the remedy inadequate."
Gonsalves v. Commonwealth, 480 Mass. 1025, 1026 (2018), quoting
Calzado v. Commonwealth, 479 Mass. 1033, 1034 (2018).
Similarly, the ordinary process is not inadequate merely because
the petitioner might be imprisoned during that time, as this is
a prospect faced by any young person accused of a serious
offense.3 Cf. Brea v. Commonwealth, 473 Mass. 1012, 1013 (2015),
quoting Rosencranz v. Commonwealth, 472 Mass. 1011, 1012 (2015)
("collateral consequences attendant to the pendency of criminal
proceedings . . . do not necessarily render the regular
appellate process inadequate"). Accordingly, the petitioner is
not entitled to extraordinary relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3.

                                   Judgment affirmed.

     The case was submitted on the papers filed, accompanied by
a memorandum of law.
     Eva G. Jellison for the petitioner.

     2 The petitioner was obligated to file, and properly did
file, such a memorandum even though the single justice denied
relief on the merits without addressing the threshold question
whether the petitioner lacked an adequate alternative remedy.
We express no view as to whether the motion for disclosure of
the informant's identity was properly denied.

     3 Moreover, nothing prevents the petitioner, if he is
convicted, from seeking a stay of execution of sentence pending
appeal.