Court Opinion

ID: 9407030
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-05 17:07:51.232185+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:34.509664
License: Public Domain

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 1         IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

 2 Opinion Number:

 3 Filing Date: June 26, 2023

 4 No. A-1-CA-39757

 5 MARIE HOVEY-JARAMILLO and
 6 ANGELA JARAMILLO,

 7            Plaintiffs-Appellants,

 8 v.

 9 LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE
10 and UNKNOWN JANE DOE,

11            Defendants-Appellees.

12 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY
13 Daniel E. Ramczyk, District Court Judge

14   Roybal Mack & Cordova, P.C.
15   Antonia Roybal-Mack
16   Amelia P. Nelson
17   Albuquerque, NM

18 for Appellants

19   Allen Law Firm, LLC
20   Meena H. Allen
21   Kerri L. Allensworth
22   Albuquerque, NM

23 for Appellees
 1                                       OPINION

 2 BUSTAMANTE, Judge, retired, sitting by designation.

 3   {1}   This case presents an opportunity to consider whether an insurance company

 4 has any duty in tort to its policyholders apart from its obligation to act honestly and

 5 in good faith in the performance of the contract as described in UJI 13-1701 to -1704

 6 NMRA. Disagreeing with the district court’s conclusion that Defendant Liberty

 7 Mutual Insurance (Liberty Mutual) and its employees “did not owe any legally

 8 cognizable duty to Plaintiffs,” we reverse.

 9 BACKGROUND

10   {2}   The facts are taken from Plaintiffs’ complaint and Defendants’ briefing in

11 support of their motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff Angela Jaramillo

12 (Daughter) was driving when her tire deflated and she was forced to pull to the side

13 of the rode. Daughter could not use her telephone so a bystander let her use their

14 phone to call Plaintiff Marie Hovey-Jaramillo (Mother) to ask for assistance.

15 Daughter was unable to get out of her vehicle because of the fast-paced traffic

16 outside of the driver’s side door. Mother drove to Daughter and got into Daughter’s

17 car to assist her. Daughter’s vehicle was insured by Liberty Mutual, and her coverage

18 included “towing and labor coverage,” which included roadside assistance in the

19 event that Daughter’s vehicle was disabled.
 1   {3}   While in Daughter’s car, Mother called Liberty Mutual on behalf of Daughter

 2 to request roadside assistance. When Mother called, Defendant Jane Doe (the

 3 Operator) took down basic information and asked Mother for Daughter’s license

 4 plate number. In response, Mother informed the Operator that she was unable to

 5 safely obtain the license plate number and said “I don’t have it.” Mother told the

 6 Operator she did not want to go behind the car because it was extremely dangerous

 7 and asked if it was necessary. The Operator demanded that Mother get the license

 8 plate number and stated that she needed the number to proceed.

 9   {4}   Mother then walked slowly to the back of the car. When Mother got to the

10 back of the car, she was hit by another vehicle and sustained physical injuries.

11   {5}   Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Liberty Mutual and the Operator making

12 claims of negligence, respondeat superior, negligent hiring/retention, and loss of

13 consortium all based on the Operator’s negligence in failing to exercise reasonable

14 care with regard to Mother’s safety during the roadside assistance call. Liberty

15 Mutual filed a motion for summary judgment arguing Plaintiffs failed to state a claim

16 upon which relief could be granted. Liberty Mutual advanced two arguments to the

17 district court. First, relying on Ambassador Insurance Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine

18 Insurance Co., 1984-NMSC-107, 102 N.M. 28, 690 P.2d 1022, it asserted broadly

19 that New Mexico does not recognize a cause of action for negligence against an

20 insurer. Second, it argued generally that individuals have no duty to protect another

                                             2
 1 from harm absent a relationship that “legally obligates a defendant to protect a

 2 plaintiff’s interest.”

 3   {6}   After briefing and without a hearing, the district court granted Liberty

 4 Mutual’s motion and dismissed Plaintiffs’ complaint with prejudice. Plaintiffs

 5 appeal.

 6 DISCUSSION

 7 Standard of Review

 8   {7}   We start by addressing our standard of review. Plaintiffs appeal the district

 9 court’s decision that was based on Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The

10 district court recognized that there was a factual dispute regarding whether the

11 Operator or another Liberty Mutual employee compelled Mother to act in such a

12 way that resulted in injuries. But the district court concluded that it was “not a

13 material issue of fact insofar as the controlling law of this case is concerned.” It

14 determined that Liberty Mutual “did not owe any legally cognizable duty to

15 Plaintiffs” during the accident in question. Thus, the district court’s decision is more

16 aptly reviewed as a Rule 1-012(C) NMRA judgment on the pleadings. Cf. State v.

17 Roybal, 2006-NMCA-043, ¶ 17, 139 N.M. 341, 132 P.3d 598 (“[I]t is the substance

18 of the motion, and not its form or label, that controls.”).

19   {8}   “We review judgments on the pleadings made pursuant to Rule 1-012(C) . . .

20 according to the same standard as motions for failure to state a claim under Rule 1-

                                              3
 1 012(B)(6).” Vill. of Angel Fire v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 2010-NMCA-038, ¶ 5, 148

 2 N.M. 804, 242 P.3d 371. “In reviewing a district court’s decision to dismiss for

 3 failure to state a claim, we accept all well-pleaded factual allegations in the

 4 complaint as true and resolve all doubts in favor of sufficiency of the complaint.”

 5 Delfino v. Griffo, 2011-NMSC-015, ¶ 9, 150 N.M. 97, 257 P.3d 917 (internal

 6 quotation marks and citation omitted). “Dismissal . . . is appropriate only if the

 7 plaintiff is not entitled to recover under any theory of the facts alleged in [his or her]

 8 complaint.” Id. ¶ 12 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). We

 9 review the district court’s Rule 1-012(C) ruling de novo. See id. ¶ 9.

10 Duty

11   {9}    On appeal, Liberty Mutual makes a slightly different argument than it made

12 to the district court. It relies on Ambassador, 1984-NMSC-107, for the same

13 proposition it did below. But it now argues more generally that Plaintiffs’ failure to

14 cite specific case law or other authority imposing a duty on it in this circumstance is

15 fatal to their argument. We address the meaning and effect of Ambassador first, and

16 then move on to consider the more general question of duty in this circumstance.

17 Ambassador Does Not Preclude Application of Negligence Concepts in All
18 Circumstances Against Insurers

19   {10}   In Ambassador, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

20 certified the question of “[w]hether New Mexico recognizes negligent failure to

21 settle as a cause of action?” to our Supreme Court. Id. ¶ 3. In the case, an excess

                                               4
 1 insurance carrier sued the primary insurance carrier for failing to settle a malpractice

 2 claim within its policy limits despite an offer to do so. Id. ¶ 1. The excess carrier’s

 3 complaint alleged the primary carrier “negligently and in bad faith” failed to settle

 4 the underlying medical malpractice action. Id. The primary carrier moved for

 5 dismissal of the negligence claim. Id. ¶ 2. The district court granted the motion, but

 6 allowed the bad faith claim to be tried. Id. The jury found in favor of the primary

 7 carrier. Id.

 8   {11}   Our Supreme Court determined “that New Mexico does not recognize the

 9 cause of action of negligent failure to settle.” Id. ¶ 7. We, of course, have no quarrel

10 with the holding, but the Court’s dual rationale for its ruling can be misinterpreted.

11 We conclude that Liberty Mutual has done so.

12   {12}   Our Supreme Court first noted that the district court had “interpreted

13 American Employers’ Insurance Co. v. Crawford, [1975-NMSC-020,] 87 N.M. 375,

14 533 P.2d 1203 . . . as holding that a claim for negligent failure to settle is not

15 recognized by New Mexico courts.” Ambassador, 1984-NMSC-107, ¶ 4. The Court

16 disagreed with the district court’s view. Id. ¶¶ 5, 6. It nevertheless chose to quote a

17 sentence from the Crawford opinion—that it conceded was dicta—to support an

18 inference that “New Mexico will interpret the duties between insured and insurer as

19 based in contract rather than tort.” Ambassador, 1984-NMSC-107, ¶ 5. The Court

20 then noted the complications that would ensue if a “normal” negligence standard of

                                              5
 1 conduct was applicable: “the risk to the insured of going to trial would always be

 2 ‘sufficiently serious’ to merit automatic settlement within policy limits.” Id. ¶¶ 8, 9.

 3 It then observed that, “The relationship between insurer and insured is a contractual

 4 one. The only duty imposed upon the insurer in the contract is the duty to defend the

 5 suit against the insured. It is left to the judgment of the insurer whether to settle the

 6 case or not.” Id. ¶ 10. Noting that “New Mexico recognizes [the] duty of good faith

 7 between insurer and insured,” id. ¶ 11, the Court ended the analysis by observing

 8 that: “Thus, when failure to settle the claim stems from a failure to properly

 9 investigate the claim or to become familiar with the applicable law, etc., then this is

10 negligence in defending the suit (a duty expressly imposed upon the insurer under

11 the insurance contract) and is strong evidence of bad faith in failing to settle. Here,

12 basic standards of competency can be imposed, and the insurer is charged with

13 knowledge of the duty owed to its insured.” Id. ¶ 12.

14   {13}   Ambassador does not control our inquiry. First, the issue in Ambassador

15 involved the insurer’s duty to settle cases on behalf of its insured. Id. ¶ 11. Thus, the

16 case presented a now-classic insurance bad faith failure to settle scenario. See UJI

17 13-1704. The facts in this case simply do not involve a bad faith issue. The facts here

18 raise issues about the propriety of Liberty Mutual’s initial actions as it responded to

19 a request for its towing service. Factually and conceptually, the issues and concerns

                                               6
 1 inherent in providing such a service are distinct from the concerns addressed by the

 2 covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

 3   {14}   Second, the discussion of negligence in Ambassador was not general or

 4 abstract. Our Supreme Court specifically addressed whether negligence concepts

 5 should be applied to instances of failure to settle. Ambassador, 1984-NMSC-107,

 6 ¶ 3. At the time Ambassador was decided, the implied covenant of good faith and

 7 fair dealing had been recognized and applied in New Mexico. Id. ¶ 11. The contours

 8 of the implied covenant in New Mexico were as yet not clear in 1984, but the Court

 9 recognized that the concept had gained broad acceptance in other states. Id. ¶ 5. As

10 such the issue before the Court was in large measure whether it was necessary or

11 appropriate to add another potential avenue of relief for aggrieved insureds. Id. ¶ 11.

12 The Court appropriately compared and contrasted the way a “normal” negligence

13 action might proceed with the way the implied covenant was already functioning.

14 Id. ¶¶ 8-11. Using an approach that foretold Rodriguez v. Del Sol Shopping Center

15 Associates, L.P., 2014-NMSC-014, ¶¶ 1, 19, 326 P.3d 465, the Court decided that it

16 was unnecessary—and would be unwise—to add a negligence theory on top of the

17 implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Ambassador, 1984-NMSC-107,

18 ¶ 11.

19   {15}   That said, the decision not to allow use of negligence concepts in situations

20 already addressed by the implied covenant implies nothing about the potential

                                              7
 1 applicability of negligence to other aspects of insurance company activities. The

 2 policy reasons set forth in Ambassador are not implicated here. See id. ¶¶ 8-11. And

 3 that portion of opinion regarding a duty to settle did not involve or address any other

 4 issues. Id. ¶¶ 4-13. As such, relying on Ambassador—as Liberty Mutual does—for

 5 the broad proposition that “New Mexico does not recognize a cause of action for

 6 negligence against an insurer” is inaccurate and improper. See Fernandez v. Farmers

 7 Ins. Co. of Ariz., 1993-NMSC-035, ¶ 15, 115 N.M. 622, 857 P.2d 22 (“The general

 8 rule is that cases are not authority for propositions not considered.” (internal

 9 quotation marks and citation omitted)).

10   {16}   Though it is a bit of a stretch, it is possible to be misled by the repeated

11 reference in Ambassador to the contractual foundation of the relationship between

12 insurers and policy holders and the Court’s stated caution about imposing duties “not

13 expressly provided for in the contract of insurance.” 1984-NMSC-107, ¶ 11. Those

14 references—grounded as they are in the dicta from Crawford the Court elected to

15 cite, Ambassador, 1984-NMSC-107, ¶ 5—signal the Court’s caution about blurring

16 the divide between contract and tort law. The contours of insurance bad faith are

17 now well defined, belying the Ambassador Court’s concern.

18   {17}   It is now clear that insurance bad faith claims are treated as torts in New

19 Mexico. The introduction to Chapter 17 of our jury instructions refers to “the tort of

20 bad faith.” Uniform Jury Instructions-Civil, Bad Faith, Intro. ch. 17 NMRA. And

                                              8
 1 our case law makes clear that insurance bad faith claims sound in tort. In Jessen v.

 2 National Excess Insurance Co., 1989-NMSC-040, ¶¶ 7, 8, 108 N.M. 625, 776 P.2d

 3 1244, our Supreme Court reviewed a punitive damage award arising from a trial in

 4 which the jury was instructed on breach of contract and bad faith theories. Our

 5 Supreme Court upheld the punitive damage award, holding that it was appropriate

 6 under either the contract or tort claim. Id. ¶ 8. The Court noted that it had recognized

 7 the tort of bad faith as early as 1974 in State Farm General Insurance Co. v. Clifton,

 8 1974-NMSC-081, ¶ 6, 86 N.M. 757, 527 P.2d 798. Jessen, 1989-NMSC-040, ¶ 8;

 9 see Chavez v. Chenoweth, 1976-NMCA-076, ¶ 31, 89 N.M. 423, 553 P.2d 703

10 (describing the plaintiff’s claim as “a tort claim for unreasonable delay in paying

11 medical expenses”); Sloan v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2004-NMSC-004, ¶ 13,

12 135 N.M. 106, 85 P.3d 230 (referring to the “tort of insurance bad faith” generally).

13 In this regard, our Supreme Court’s caution in Ambassador, 1984-NMSC-107, ¶¶ 8-

14 11, was misplaced, if not unfounded. Thus, the language of Ambassador does not

15 now support the sweeping effect Liberty Mutual ascribes to it. We doubt that it ever

16 did.

17   {18}   Liberty Mutual relies on three unreported cases decided by the federal district

18 court in New Mexico. We first note that we are not bound by federal court decisions

19 purporting to interpret New Mexico state common or statutory law. See In re N.M.

20 Indirect Purchasers Microsoft Corp., 2007-NMCA-007, ¶ 29, 140 N.M. 879, 149

                                               9
 1 P.3d 976 (stating that “[New Mexico Courts] are not bound by federal law when we

 2 interpret state law”). Nevertheless, we accord them the deference they merit based

 3 on our view of the correctness of their analysis of our law.

 4   {19}   We agree with the holding in Fava v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Corp., No.

 5 17cv00456 WJ/LF, 2019 WL 133269, at *6, *7 (D.N.M. Jan. 8, 2019). The dispute

 6 in Fava arose from an unresolved claim for water damage to a home. Id. at *1. The

 7 district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ negligence claims relying on Ambassador. Id.

 8 at *5-7. We agree with the dismissal because the case involved the direct processing

 9 of a claim under an insurance policy. Id. at *1, *6 n.3. The complaints plaintiffs

10 listed concerning the adjustment of the claim were directly related to the fulfillment

11 by the insurer of its obligations under the policy. Id. The claim would fall under the

12 bad faith failure to pay a first party claim as described in UJI 13-1702. But, the case

13 is not relevant here. As we have noted, the facts here do not involve issues related to

14 Liberty Mutual’s obligations to settle, defend, or pay a first party claim.

15   {20}   We disagree with the holding and analysis in Baca v. ACE American

16 Insurance Co., No. 15-0151 KG/KBM, 2016 WL 10538192 (D.N.M. Apr. 15, 2016).

17 The plaintiff in Baca sought to bring a negligence action against a medical case

18 manager for mistakes and misrepresentations he made with regard to the efforts he

19 made and/or said he would make in helping the plaintiff receive care for her work-

20 related injuries. Id. at *1, *2. The case manager was not an employee of the insurer.

                                             10
 1 Id. at *1. Rather, he was a fourth-tier employee of a company hired to provide case

 2 management services. Id. The facts in Baca are thus far afield from the facts in

 3 Ambassador. We do not see any reason why the concepts of insurance bad faith

 4 should be applied in favor of persons or entities simply providing contractual

 5 services to an insurer. Nothing in Ambassador requires its application to someone

 6 who does not have a direct insurer relationship to a plaintiff.

 7   {21}   We also disagree with the holding in Grasshopper Natural Medicine, LLC v.

 8 Hartford Casualty Insurance Co., No. CIV 15-0338 JB/CEG, 2016 WL 4009834

 9 (D.N.M. July 7, 2016). Grasshopper presented a complicated factual situation

10 involving a workers compensation claim that the insurer refused to accept because

11 the insured’s coverage had lapsed before the incident in which the worker was

12 injured. Id. at *2-4. There is no need to detail the convoluted factual and litigation

13 posture of the case. Most relevant to this case, the plaintiffs in Grasshopper asserted

14 that the insurer was negligent in that it: (1) sent the renewal notice to the wrong

15 address, (2) failed to follow up with a telephone call or letter concerning the need to

16 renew the policy, (3) failed to advise the plaintiff of the need to buy workers

17 compensation insurance when the cancellation was discussed, (4) failed to defend

18 the plaintiffs in the suit brought by the worker, and (5) provided help to the worker

19 during the adjustment of her claim. Id. at *37. The court dismissed all of the claims

20 based on Ambassador. Grasshopper, 2016 WL 4009834, at *33-39. We conclude

                                             11
 1 that it erred in dismissing the first three claims. There is nothing in Ambassador’s

 2 concerns or analysis that precludes them. The result also seems contrary to Stock v.

 3 ADCO General Corp., 1981-NMCA-075, ¶ 18, 96 N.M. 544, 632 P.2d 1182, in

 4 which this Court upheld a judgment against an insurer and an insurance broker for

 5 negligence in issuing a policy that deviated from the one applied for, and in failing

 6 to follow the insurer’s practice of attaching a red-flag notification of a restrictive

 7 endorsement.

 8 Liberty Mutual Had a Duty of Care as a Service Provider

 9   {22}   We start our analysis with the statement of duty present in our jury instructions

10 since at least 1984. “Every person has a duty to exercise ordinary care for the safety

11 of the person and the property of others.” UJI 13-1604 NMRA. Though UJI 13-1604

12 fits well within the definition of duty in Section 7 of the Restatement (Third) of

13 Torts, the perceived movement in New Mexico “towards a public policy that defines

14 duty under a universal standard of ordinary care,” Yount v. Johnson, 1996-NMCA-

15 046, ¶ 4, 121 N.M. 585, 915 P.2d 341, did not take hold immediately. See

16 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 7(a)

17 (2010) (“An actor ordinarily has a duty to exercise reasonable care when the actor’s

18 conduct creates a risk of physical harm.”). Foreseeability continued to be a factor in

19 defining duty, forcing the analysis into the framework described in footnote 1 of

20 Calkins v. Cox Estates, 1990-NMSC-044, ¶ 8 n.1, 110 N.M. 59, 792 P.2d 36.

                                               12
 1   {23}   In Rodriguez, our Supreme Court fully adopted Section 7 of the Restatement

 2 (Third) of Torts and declared that foreseeability is not a factor when courts assess

 3 the existence or scope of a duty. Rodriguez, 2014-NMSC-014, ¶¶ 1, 4. “The duty of

 4 ordinary care applies unless the owner/occupier can establish a policy reason,

 5 unrelated to foreseeability considerations, that compels a limitation on the duty or

 6 an exemption from the duty to exercise ordinary care.” Id. ¶ 5; see Morris v. Giant

 7 Four Corners, Inc., 2021-NMSC-028, ¶¶ 12, 47, 498 P.3d 238 (extending the tort of

 8 negligent entrustment to include sales of gasoline to intoxicated drivers); Lopez v.

 9 Devon Energy Prod. Co., 2020-NMCA-033, ¶¶ 19, 22, 23, 31, 33, 468 P.3d 887

10 (holding that framing the duty of hirers of independent contractors as exceptions to

11 a general rule of non-liability was improper because the hirer had direct duties of

12 general care under premises liability principles and under the theory of negligent

13 selection/retention of contractors).

14   {24}   A similar dynamic is at work here. In this context Liberty Mutual is offering

15 a service to the travelling public: towing and roadside assistance. The issue in this

16 case is whether an insurance company offering such a service has a duty to render

17 those services with reasonable care. Though this specific factual context has not been

18 dealt with before in New Mexico, we conclude that such a duty fits squarely within

19 the law expressed in UJI 13-1604 and the common law duty of service providers.

20 We explain.

                                              13
 1   {25}   New Mexico recognizes the general common law rule that persons providing

 2 services owe a duty that “arises both from a common-law duty to exercise ordinary

 3 care for the safety of the person of others and from an implied term of the contract

 4 to render services with reasonable skill and care.” Flores v. Baca, 1994-NMSC-021,

 5 ¶¶ 9, 10, 117 N.M. 306, 871 P.2d 962; id. (holding that the funeral home owed tort

 6 and contract duties to the surviving children as a result of its improper embalming

 7 of their father’s body). Without explicitly acknowledging the rule, New Mexico has

 8 already applied it in the insurance field. See Stock, 1981-NMCA-075, ¶ 18; Talbot

 9 v. Country Life Ins. Co., 291 N.E.2d 830, 832 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973) (“It has been

10 suggested that the duty of an agent to use care in dealing with the application may

11 be based on the principle, familiar in negligence cases, that one who enters upon an

12 affirmative undertaking, to perform a service for another, is required to exercise

13 reasonable care in performing it, to avoid injury to the beneficiary of the undertaking.

14 Insurance agents who take applications, particularly where they receive premiums,

15 may be said to have entered definitely upon a course of affirmative conduct, and be

16 liable for misfeasance if they unreasonably delay.”); see also Cleveland Indians

17 Baseball Co. v. N.H. Ins. Co., 727 F. 3d 633, 638-39 (6th Cir. 2013) (holding that

18 under Michigan law a contracting party has a separate duty of care to those who

19 might be harmed by its negligent acts or omissions even if not in privity with the

20 actor); Davis v. New England Pest Control Co., 576 A.2d 1240, 1242-43 (R.I. 1990);

                                              14
 1 Reed v. Dupuis, 920 A.2d 861, 865-67 (Pa. 2007) (holding that the tenant had a cause

 2 of action in tort for injuries suffered as a result of the landlord not completing repairs

 3 to home as promised).

 4   {26}   The responsibility to exercise reasonable care in providing services is

 5 normally imposed as a tort when a failure results in physical harm to the plaintiff.

 6 See generally W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 92,

 7 at 655-59 (5th ed. 1984).

 8   {27}   Under Rodriguez and Section 7 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts, our task

 9 now is to explore whether there are policy reasons to refuse to recognize the duty

10 here. Rodriguez, 2014-NMSC-014, ¶ 1. We have already determined there is nothing

11 in the law of insurer liability as expressed in Ambassador that precludes imposition

12 of a duty in this context. 1984-NMSC-107, ¶¶ 4-13. Our last inquiry then is whether

13 there is anything about the general common law rule that argues against its

14 application here. Rodriguez, 2014-NMSC-014, ¶ 1. We conclude that there is none.

15   {28}   Apart from its reliance on Ambassador, Liberty Mutual’s only argument is

16 that Plaintiffs fail to identify any “controlling case law” that would impose a duty or

17 any “policy considerations for why New Mexico should recognize that an insurer

18 has a duty under the circumstances presented in this case.” We disagree. As we have

19 noted, there is a general concept of tort liability for physical harm caused by service

20 providers even though the relationship between the parties emerges from a

                                               15
 1 contractual arrangement. See UJI 13-1604. That is all that is necessary to impose a

 2 duty of reasonable care. Like the plaintiffs in Rodriguez, Plaintiffs here “are not

 3 seeking a broadened standard of care; they simply contend that [Liberty Mutual]

 4 breached the duty of ordinary care.” See 2014-NMSC-014, ¶ 15.

 5 CONCLUSION

 6   {29}   For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court and remand this matter

 7 for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

 8
 9                                    MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge, retired,
10                                    sitting by designation

11 WE CONCUR:

12 ________________________________
13 KRISTINA BOGARDUS, Judge

14 ________________________________
15 JANE B. YOHALEM, Judge

                                              16