Court Opinion

ID: 9839902
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-14 16:08:54.011479+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:41:56.937611
License: Public Domain

J-S18013-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  JASON KOEHLER I                              :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 3007 EDA 2022

             Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered October 28, 2022
                In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County
              Criminal Division at No(s): CP-45-CR-0000447-2004

BEFORE:      PANELLA, P.J., DUBOW, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.:                       FILED SEPTEMBER 14, 2023

       Jason Koehler I appeals from the order dismissing his petition pursuant

to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. The

PCRA court found that Koehler’s petition was untimely and failed to meet one

of the enumerated exceptions to timeliness provided by the PCRA. After

careful review, we affirm, based on our conclusion that Koehler’s petition is

patently untimely and fails to plead and prove an exception to the PCRA’s

timeliness requirement.

       Koehler was found guilty of first-degree murder, third-degree murder,

attempted murder, and related charges. See Trial Court Order, 12/14/2009.

Koehler was sentenced to life in prison on the first-degree murder charge and

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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a consecutive aggregate sentence of thirty-five and a half to seventy-three

years’ incarceration. See id. at ¶ 7.

      On direct appeal, this Court affirmed Koehler’s judgment of sentence.

See Commonwealth v. Koehler, 1763 EDA 2010 (Pa. Super. filed June 27,

2011) (unpublished memorandum). Koehler filed a first, timely PCRA petition

on March 19, 2013. See PCRA Court Opinion, 10/28/2013 at 3. Koehler

claimed many instances of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel

which the PCRA court found to be meritless. See id. at 21. Koehler appealed

and argued PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness in addition to that of trial and

appellate counsel. See Commonwealth v. Koehler, 3059 EDA 2013 (Pa.

Super. filed January 30, 2015) (unpublished memorandum). This Court

affirmed the PCRA court’s order, finding Koehler’s claim against PCRA counsel

waived as it was not raised below, and finding the claims against trial and

appellate counsel meritless. See id. at 6-9.

      Koehler filed the instant PCRA petition on August 17, 2022. See Petition

for Post Conviction Collateral Relief, 8/17/22. The pro se petition sought to

advance claims of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness. See id. at 6-9. The PCRA

court dismissed Koehler’s petition as untimely, noting that he failed to prove

his petition met any of the exceptions to the PCRA’s time-bar. See PCRA Court

Order, 10/28/22, ¶¶ 2-5. This timely appeal followed.

      When we review an order dismissing a PCRA petition we determine

whether the decision is supported by the record and free of legal error. See

Commonwealth v. Jarosz, 152 A.3d 344, 350 (Pa. Super. 2016). Here, the

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PCRA court determined it lacked jurisdiction to consider Koehler’s petition

because the petition was untimely and failed to prove an exception to the

timeliness provision of the PCRA. See PCRA Court Order, 10/28/22, ¶¶ 2-5.

       A PCRA petition must be filed within the one-year period immediately

following the date on which the judgment of sentence becomes final. See

Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 79 A.3d 649, 651 (Pa. Super. 2013). This

time-bar implicates our jurisdiction, and we may not ignore it to assess the

merits of a petition. See id. A judgment of sentence becomes final when the

direct review is complete or the time for seeking direct review expires. See

id.

       Our review of the record reflects that Koehler’s judgment of sentence

was imposed on December 14, 2009. This Court affirmed the judgment of

sentence on June 27, 2011.1 Koehler’s judgment of sentence became final on

July 3, 2012, when his time to file a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of

the United States expired. See U.S.Sup.Ct. Rule 13(1). The instant PCRA

petition was filed on August 17, 2022, making it patently untimely. See

Petition for Post Conviction Collateral Relief, 8/17/22.

       Nevertheless, a petitioner may overcome the time-bar when they allege

in their petition and prove one of three exceptions. See Hernandez, 79 A.3d
____________________________________________

1 There is a discrepancy on the trial court docket, listing this Court’s decision

as being entered on May 24, 2012. A review of our docket shows that the
decision was entered June 27, 2011, and Koehler filed a petition for allowance
of appeal to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania the same day. The petition
for allowance of appeal was denied on April 4, 2012, and on May 23, 2012,
the record was remitted to the trial court.

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649, 651 (Pa. Super. 2013). These exceptions include: that the claim was not

raised previously due to interference by government officials; that the

petitioner previously did not know, and could not have known through due

diligence, the facts of the claim earlier; and that the petitioner is asserting a

right which has been recognized since the judgment of sentence became final

and has been held to apply retroactively. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545 (b)(1)(i)-

(iii). In order to successfully avail oneself of an exception to the time-bar, the

petitioner must show that he raised his claim within sixty days of discovering

the claim. See Hernandez, 79 A.3d 649, 652 (Pa. Super. 2013).

      Here, Koehler failed to specifically plead an exception to the time bar in

his PCRA petition. However he briefly cites to Commonwealth v. Bradley,

261 A.3d 381 (Pa. 2021), and makes a claim that it applies retroactively to

preserve his claims of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness, which we construe as

an attempt to invoke the newly recognized constitutional right exception at 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(iii). See Petition for Post Conviction Collateral Relief,

8/17/22, at 6-7. In Koehler’s response to the PCRA court’s notice of intent to

dismiss his petition he further argued that the court should take guidance from

Bradley and address the merits of his petition in the interest of justice. See

Petitioner’s Reply to the Court’s Notice of Disposition without Hearing,

10/4/22, at 2-3.

      Koehler argues that his claims spring from his first PCRA petition and he

would have raised them with the PCRA court if he was prompted to at his

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Grazier2 hearing. See id. at 3. On appeal, Koehler amends his argument to

include that PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness should be considered a new fact

capable of meeting the newly discovered fact exception at 42 Pa.C.S.A.§

9545(b)(1)(ii). See Appellant’s Brief at 10. Koehler acknowledges that

Bradley does not implicate a constitutional right but argues that the case

should be applied retroactively. See id. at 11-14.

       First, we note that the Bradley court held that a PCRA petitioner may

raise claims of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness for the first time on appeal. See

Bradley, 261 A.3d 381, 401. Further, Bradley acknowledged that a PCRA

petitioner has a rule-based right to effective assistance of counsel. See id. at

391. This Court has specifically interpreted our Supreme Court’s ruling in

Bradley to not recognize a constitutional right to file PCRA petitions outside

of the one-year timeliness requirement as a means of addressing PCRA

counsel’s ineffectiveness. See Commonwealth v. Stahl, 292 A.3d 1130,

1136 (Pa. Super. 2023). The Bradley court did not hold that its ruling should

apply retroactively as required by 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(iii). Therefore,

Koehler’s attempt to use Bradley to satisfy the newly recognized constitutional

right exception is misplaced. See Commonwealth v. Murphy, 180 A.3d 402,

405-406 (Pa. Super. 2018) (explaining that this Court cannot conclude that a

new right can be applied retroactively unless either the Supreme Court of the

____________________________________________

2 Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998) (requiring on-the-
record inquiry to determine whether criminal defendant’s waiver of counsel is
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary).

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United States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has explicitly declared it

to be retroactive).

      Next, we will address Koehler’s assertion that PCRA counsel’s

ineffectiveness constitutes a newly discovered fact. The Bradley court noted

that its holding did not extend to allowing a PCRA petitioner to claim discovery

of ineffectiveness as a new fact that will overcome the time-bar. See Bradley,

261 A.3d 381, 404, n.18 (Pa. 2021). Further, in order to avail oneself of the

newly discovered fact exception successfully, a petitioner must show that he

did not know and could not have known through due diligence, the facts which

he relies on in his petition. See Commonwealth v. Reeves, 296 A.3d 1228,

1232 (Pa. Super. 2023). Here, Koehler was aware of and raised PCRA

counsel’s ineffectiveness in his appeal of the denial of his first PCRA, in 2013.

See Commonwealth v. Koehler, 3059 EDA 2013 (Pa. Super. filed January

30, 2015) (unpublished memorandum). For both of these reasons, Koehler

may not rely on the newly discovered fact exception to subvert the time-bar.

      As Koehler failed to successfully plead the existence of any exception to

the PCRA’s time-bar, the PCRA court correctly determined it lacked jurisdiction

over Koehler’s petition. See Commonwealth v. Taylor, 65 A.3d 462, 468

(Pa. Super. 2013).

      Order affirmed.

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 9/14/2023

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