Court Opinion

ID: 9825936
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 14:37:50.41179+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:41:34.307074
License: Public Domain

Stinbss, J.
Upon a previous hearing-in this case, it was held that the second and fifth clauses of the will of William DeWolf gave to his two daughters, Charlotte and Maria, defeasible estates in fee,'which, upon their deaths without issue, passed to the heirs of said William by way of executory devise. The question now arises whether the heirs are to be ascertained as of the date of the death of the testator in 1829, or of the death of the surviving daughter in 1890.
Three claims are made. First, by the complainants, that the estate is to be treated as vested in the heirs of the testator at his death, as in the case of a contingent remainder; second, by the respondent Annie E. Middleton, that the estate vested upon the happening of the contingency in 1890, but that the heirs are to be ascertained under the statute of descent in force at his death; and third, by the other respondents, that the heirs are to be ascertained by the statute in force in 1890, when the devise took effect.
In most, if not all, of the cases cited by the complainants there was a precedent estate supporting a remainder, created from the death of the testator, but contingent upon an event. It would follow from this that the heirs must be ascertained as of the testator’s death, because the interest in' the remainder began then; e. g. Bullock v. Downes, 9 H. L. Cas. 1; Mortimore v. Mortimore, L. R. 4 App. Cas. 448; Stewart’s Estate, 147 Pa. St. 383; Kenyon, Petitioner, 17 R. I. 149. But a marked distinction between a contingent remainder -and an executory devise is that estates of the latter kind arise when their time comes and do not depend for support upon a prior estate., Williams on Eeal Property, *289. They may be limited upon a fee,; as in this case. An executory devise is the devise of a future estate, and if the executory devisee dies before the event happens, the estate goes to the heir at the time of the event and not to the heir at the time of the *815death of such devisee. Goodright v. Searle, 2 Wils. 29; Cain v. Teare, 7 Jur. 567; Fearneon Remainders, [560], and cases cited. The happening of the contingency determines who is to take the estate, and until that time no one has an interest to transmit. Brown v. Williams, 5 R. I. 309. In Doe v. Frost, 3 B. & Ald. 546, where a testator gave an estate to his son in fee, and if he should die without issue to the heir at law of the testator, subject to legacies for the younger branches of the family, it was held that the son took an estate in fee with an executory devise over to the person who, on the happening of the event contemplated by the will, should become the heir of the testator. This case was referred to as a correct decision by Denman, C. J., in Doe v. Spratt, 5 B. & Adol. 731, upon the intention of the will. Doe v. Frost is also cited as an authority in Coltsmann v. Coltsmann, L. R. 3 H. L. 121 (1868). While the general rule is that the heirs of a testator are to be taken from the time of his death, yet the rule gives way to a contrary intent to be found in the will. Assuming, then, that the cases referred to go no further than this, we think that the will in this case shows such an intent. The property given to Charlotte or Maria is to go “on their decease,” in the second clause, and “on both of their decease,” in the fifth clause, to the heirs at law of the testator. In making such a gift his mind would naturally look forward to the time when the estate might vest in possession, and so the words used comport with an intent to point out the time and mode of ascertaining who the heirs will be, by designating a class to take as executory devisees. The agreed facts also point to such an intent. When the will was made the son William was a domiciled resident of Cuba, who, being an alien, was incapable, as our law then stood, of taking by descent./ But that there can be no inference of an intent to exclude him on this account appears by the fact of a devise of real estate to him, and the fact that he, with the other children, was one of the residuary legatees in the.will/ Of course the testator could not foresee changes in our law in regard to alienage, but it is not improbable that he looked forward to a return of *816his son, or his family, to citizenship in this country, when he or they could stand as legatees in the class which he designated. Moreover, the words are that the estate, “ on their decease be divided among my heirs at law.” The division was to be prospective, and we see no reason why the class should not also be taken to be so. For these reasons, as well as those given in the previous opinion, we think that these words were intended to fix the time for the vesting of the estate and for the ascertainment of the persons to take in possession. They are not substantially different from cases where the devise is to those who shall then answer the description. 2 Jarman on Wills, 6th Am. ed. *992, and cases cited ; Swinburne, Petitioner, 16 R. I. 208; Pinkham v. Blair, 57 N. H. 226.
In Sears v. Russell, 8 Gray, 86, the words, “in case of the death of any child of a daughter, without issue, after its mother and before its father, the share of such child shall not go to its father, but to the testator’s heirs at law,” were construed to mean the testator’s heirs then living, and under such construction the devise was held to be void for remoteness.
But it is argued that the words, ‘‘ according to the statutes of descents, ” import a class to be ascertained and traced from testator’s death. We do not think this is so. In Sturge and the Great Western Railway Co., L. R. 19 Ch. Div. 444, it was held that a devise to persons “ who shall by virtue of the statutes for the distribution of the estates of persons dying intestate be my next of kin,” describes a class to be ascertained on the hypothesis that the testator lives up to and dies at the period of distribution. See also Wharton v. Barker, 4 K. & J. 483. It must be admitted that in some of the cases cited the language has been clearer than in the will before us, but, understanding as we do that the testator pointed out a time when his devise was to take effect and the class to whom it was then to be given, this case does not fall within the numerous cases -of a remainder, which is to be traced from the testator’s death. It is a gift to persons who shall be his heirs when the contingency arises, and not to *817those who were his heirs at the time of his decease. We therefore decide that the heirs of William DeWolf, Senior, are to be ascertained as of the date of the déath of Mrs. Rogers, December IT, 1890, “according to the statutes of descents,” as it then was.
James Tillinghast & Theodore F. Tillinghast, for complainants.
Benjamin M. Bosivorth, for respondent Annie E. Middleton.
Francis Coltcell & Walter H. Barney, for respondent the Pirst Congregational Church.
John C. Pegram, George L. Cooke & Darius Baker, for other and different respondents.
By Pub. Stat. R. I. cap. 172, § 6, aliens are admitted to take and transmit title to real estate. It is admitted that by the law of Cuba the marriage of William DeWolf, Junior, to Susanna DuCoudray, in 1822, had the effect to render legitimate the son called Jerome DeWolf, horn in Cuba in 1819. He was therefore an heir of his father according to the law of the father’s domicil, and this determines his status here. Melvin v. Martin, ante, p. 650.