Court Opinion

ID: 9782841
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 19:24:02.287979+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:35:15.134972
License: Public Domain

BAILEY, Judge,
concurring in part and concurring in result in part.
The majority affirms the trial court’s grant of D C Marshall Jeep’s (“Marshall”) motion for summary judgment. I concur as to the negligent marketing claim. But I concur in result on Warriner’s strict products liability claim and write separately because I would affirm the trial court on different grounds. I would affirm the trial court because Warriner voluntarily dismissed Old Chrysler from the case before the effective date of the liquidation of Old Chrysler by the bankruptcy court. Thus, he cannot seek recovery from Marshall on his products liability claim. Further, while I disagree with the majority’s interpretation of the Indiana Products Liability Act (“IPLA”), I also do not think we need to reach that issue to decide this case, and would not do so.
On March 19, 2010, Warriner filed his motion to amend the complaint and his amended complaint. In his motion, Warri-ner stated:
1. Chrysler, LLC and D.C. Marshall by virtue of its Memorandum Relating to Bankruptcy Proceedings of Chrysler and its response to Plaintiffs Complaint has stated that Chrysler, LLC n/k/a Old CarCo, LLC, is Daimler Chrysler Corporation, the entity named in Plaintiffs Complaint.
2. Pursuant to Indiana Code 34-20-2-4 if a Court is unable to hold jurisdiction over a manufacturer of a product, then that manufacturer’s seller shall be considered the manufacturer. See also Kennedy v. Guess, 806 N.E.2d 776 (Ind.2004).
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5. In this case justice requires amendment of the pleading. Since Daimler Chrysler Corporation has filed bankruptcy the Plaintiff in the interest of justice is entitled to amend his Complaint.
(Appellant’s App. 485-486.) Warriner’s amended complaint named only Marshall as a defendant. On March 26, 2010, the trial court granted Warriner’s motion and amended his complaint. (Appellant’s App. *1270515.) The trial court’s CCS reflects dismissal of all defendants but Marshall from the case. On April 23, 2010 — nearly a month after the trial court granted Warri-ner’s motion — the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York approved Old Chrysler’s liquidation plan and gave it an effective date of April 30, 2010.
Warriner dismissed Old Chrysler from the case before the bankruptcy court’s approval of Old Chrysler’s liquidation plan and the plan’s effective date. That is, Warriner dismissed Old Chrysler as a party after the trial court exercised jurisdiction over the business but before the final liquidation order. The trial court relinquished jurisdiction over Old Chrysler on Warriner’s motion, and he cannot now claim the trial court could not “hold” jurisdiction and thus deprived him of an opportunity to hold the seller liable under the section 34-20-2^4 of the IPLA.
For this reason, I do not think we need to reach the question of whether the trial court’s entry of summary judgment was erroneous under the IPLA. Nevertheless, I disagree with the majority’s interpretation of the Act, and therefore address the issue here.
The majority affirms the trial court’s entry of summary judgment based upon a resolution of an issue of apparent first impression: whether the phrase “unable to hold jurisdiction,” I.C. § 34-20-2-4, works to preclude Warriner from pursuing his strict products liability claim against Marshall as a principal distributor or seller of a vehicle that a now-bankrupt business manufactured. On the majority’s reading of the statute, this scenario would preclude an injured plaintiff from seeking any remedy under the IPLA’s strict products liability provisions, because our courts could maintain control — “hold jurisdiction”— over the dispute just long enough to dismiss the manufacturer and preclude any other remedy. I cannot agree that, in giving full effect to the IPLA, this is what the legislature intended when it allowed an injured party to pursue a remedy against a principal distributor or seller where the court is “unable to hold jurisdiction” over the manufacturer.
Indiana Code section 34-20-2^4 provides:
If a court is unable to hold jurisdiction over a particular manufacturer of a product or part of a product alleged to be defective, then that manufacturer’s principal distributor or seller over whom a court may hold jurisdiction shall be considered, for the purposes of this chapter, the manufacturer of the product.
This provision protects sellers and distributors from strict products liability except where the court “is unable to hold jurisdiction” over the manufacturer. Our supreme court referred to this provision as the “ ‘domestic distributor’ exception” to the IPLA. Kennedy v. Guess, Inc., 806 N.E.2d 776, 781 (Ind.2004). To be held liable under the domestic distributor exception, the alleged distributor or seller must 1) be the “principal distributor or seller over whom the court can hold jurisdiction; and 2) the court must be unable to hold jurisdiction” over the manufacturer. Id.
The IPLA leaves undefined the phrase “hold jurisdiction.” This phrase troubled the federal Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which reversed a district court’s entry of summary judgment that relied on the phrase but where the parties provided little argument to aid the court in its interpretation of the statute. Williams v. REP Corp., 302 F.3d 660, 664-65 (7th Cir.2002) (citing I.C. § 33 — 1—1.5—3(d), the predecessor statute to I.C. § 34-20-2-4).
*1271Here, the parties place this provision directly into play and provide argument on its meaning. The majority concludes that a court “hold[s] jurisdiction” where, as here, a federal bankruptcy court has discharged claims against a defendant manufacturer. The majority provides two rationales. First, the permanent injunction against pursuing a discharged claim would not be necessary if the effect of a discharge in bankruptcy were to divest state courts of jurisdiction over the claim. Second, the discharge of a claim in bankruptcy may serve as an affirmative defense in other courts. This, the majority concludes, shows that a non-bankruptcy court can “hold jurisdiction” over the enjoined action.
I do not think this result conforms to our standard for statutory interpretation.
A question of statutory interpretation is a matter of law. In such interpretation, the express language of the statute and the rules of statutory interpretation apply. We will examine the statute as a whole, and avoid excessive reliance on a strict literal meaning or the selective reading of words. Where the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, there is nothing to construe. However, where the language is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, the statute must be construed to give effect to the legislature’s intent. The legislature is presumed to have intended the language used in the statute to be applied logically and not to bring about an absurd or unjust result. Thus, we must keep in mind the objective and purpose of the law as well as the effect and repercussions of such a construction.
In re J.J., 912 N.E.2d 909, 910 (Ind.Ct.App.2009). Where non-technical terms are used in a statute and go undefined, we give definition to those terms through “ ‘their ordinary and accepted dictionary meaning.’ ” Bd. of Dirs. of Bass Lake Conservancy Dist. v. Brewer, 839 N.E.2d 699, 702 (Ind.2005) (quoting Johnson County Farm Bur. Coop. Ass’n v. Ind. Dep’t of State Rev., 568 N.E.2d 578, 581 (Ind. Tax Ct.1991), trans. denied). Where a word is used differently from its common dictionary definition, however, we disregard the common definition. Id.
Here, the statute’s use of the phrase “hold jurisdiction” goes undefined. The statute uses “hold” in an unusual way. We frequently discuss whether a court “has” jurisdiction, see, e.g., Stewart v. Stewart, 708 N.E.2d 903, 907 (Ind.Ct.App.1999) (noting that “North Carolina has home state jurisdiction”), or may “obtain” jurisdiction, see, e.g., Horlander v. Horlander, 579 N.E.2d 91, 93 (Ind.Ct.App.1991) (noting that a court “obtains [personal] jurisdiction” where minimum contacts exist between the state and the party), trans. denied. “Hold” is commonly understood not only to indicate possession but also retention. See Webster’s Third New International Dictionary Unabridged 1078 (2002) (including among the most common definitions of “hold,” “to retain in one’s keeping: maintain possession of: not give up or relinquish,” and listing among synonyms not only “possess” or “have” but also “detain” and “reserve”).
Applied here, then, I do not think a court “holds” jurisdiction when it exercises jurisdiction only to conclude that it cannot legally act, as in the case of a bankruptcy stay or discharge enjoining the claim. As our supreme court explained:
Subject matter jurisdiction is the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which any particular proceeding belongs. Personal jurisdiction requires that appropriate process be effected over the parties.
*1272Where these two exist, a court’s decision may be set aside for legal error only through direct appeal and not through collateral attack. Other phrases recently common to Indiana practice, like “jurisdiction over a particular ease,” confuse actual jurisdiction with legal error, and we will be better off ceasing such characterizations.
K.S. v. State, 849 N.E.2d 538, 540 (Ind.2006).
Thus, in Packard, our supreme court held that the use of the phrase, “the tax court does not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal,” I.C. § 33-26-6-2, referred to this less precise meaning. The phrase meant not personal or subject matter jurisdiction, but instead referred to the imprecise formulation, “jurisdiction over a particular case” — that is, the failure to meet the statutory requirements to perfect an appeal to the Indiana Tax Court. Packard, 852 N.E.2d at 929.
The better reading of section 34-20-2-4 — one that I think gives greater effect to the legislature’s enactment of the IPLA by providing injured parties with a path toward recovery from distributors or sellers — understands “hold jurisdiction” as the court in Packard understood the statute at issue there. A court cannot hold (in the sense discussed above) jurisdiction in the manner best indicated by the language of the statute not because the court lacks jurisdiction, but because there is a legal impediment to the court’s exercise of subject matter and/or personal jurisdiction. Thus, the effect of pursuing a claim that has been discharged in bankruptcy is much the same as an attempt to pursue an appeal that has not been perfected: it is an act that subjects the claimant to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court to enforce the injunction and requires Indiana courts to relinquish control over resolution of the claim.
To be sure, being “unable to hold jurisdiction” in the IPLA implicates the true jurisdictional concepts discussed in K.S. and Packard. It also, as the majority notes, incorporates such things as “a ‘matter constituting an avoidance, matter of abatement or affirmative defense.’ ” Packard, 852 N.E.2d at 932 (quoting Ind. Trial Rule 8(C)). But I cannot agree with the majority’s approach that those are the only requirements envisioned by the IPLA, because it forecloses remedies where, for example, an injury could only be reasonably discovered after a manufacturer has been discharged of its debts in bankruptcy related to a particular product. Strictly speaking, jurisdiction over the manufacturer might still exist: a claim under the IPLA is within the subject matter jurisdiction of Indiana courts, and service could be obtained to establish personal jurisdiction over the manufacturer. But the bankruptcy discharge would serve as a legal impediment to preclude an Indiana court from “holding] jurisdiction,” that is, from resolving the dispute on its merits through the exercise of subject matter and personal jurisdiction over the liability claim and the discharged manufacturer.
This reading of the statute does not preclude a court from determining that a plaintiff failed to meet a prerequisite to maintaining an action under the IPLA against a manufacturer and thus is precluded from pursuing the distributor or seller. Indeed, such is the case here, where Warriner voluntarily dismissed Old Chrysler from the action.
Thus, my reading of the statute does not afford Warriner relief from summary judgment on his strict products liability claim. For while I would conclude that the trial court here could not hold jurisdiction over Old Chrysler, Warriner voluntarily dismissed Old Chrysler from the suit well before the trial court’s entry of summary *1273judgment, and indeed before the bankruptcy court’s liquidation plan was given full effect. It was thus by Warriner’s own actions that the court was left without jurisdiction over Old Chrysler.
In light of the foregoing, I concur in part, and concur in result in part.