Court Opinion

ID: 9385404
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-06 17:02:30.736652+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:01.335290
License: Public Domain

IN THE

    SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA

                      IN THE MATTER OF A MEMBER
                     OF THE STATE BAR OF ARIZONA,

                           TORI S. BRYANT
                          ATTORNEY NO. 20391
                              Respondent.

                           No. SB-22-0062-AP
                           Filed April 6, 2023

                    Appeal of Order of Disbarment
                    Based on Reciprocal Discipline
           from the Office of the Presiding Disciplinary Judge
          The Honorable Margaret H. Downie, Presiding Judge
                            No. PDJ20229058

                                  AFFIRMED

COUNSEL:

Tori S. Bryant, Chula Vista, CA

Maret Vessella, Chief Bar Counsel, State Bar of Arizona, Phoenix, Attorney
for State Bar of Arizona

PER CURIAM:

¶1            Before the Court is an appeal of the Presiding Disciplinary
Judge’s Order of Disbarment Based on Reciprocal Discipline. Respondent
Tori S. Bryant contends that the Presiding Disciplinary Judge (“PDJ”) erred
by suspending her pursuant to Arizona Supreme Court Rule 57(b) and
argues that, although she was disbarred in another jurisdiction, disbarment
in Arizona was unwarranted. Based on the record, the PDJ did not err.
                         IN RE: TORI S. BRYANT
                           Opinion of the Court

¶2            Respondent was previously suspended from the practice of
law in Arizona for multiple Ethical Rule violations. Based on her prior
Arizona suspension, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (“Ninth
Circuit”) issued a reciprocal order of suspension. After Respondent was
reinstated in the Ninth Circuit (and Arizona), she continued to miss
deadlines and failed to respond to court orders.

¶3           The Ninth Circuit disbarred Respondent for repeated failures
to comply with the court’s rules and orders, and for conduct unbecoming a
member of the court’s bar.

¶4            Pursuant to Rule 57(b), once the PDJ receives notice that an
attorney has been disciplined in another jurisdiction, the PDJ shall impose
the identical or substantially similar discipline, unless bar counsel or
respondent establishes by the preponderance of the evidence that one of the
grounds set forth in Rule 57(b)(3)(A)–(D) applies. Unless one of the
grounds is established, “a final adjudication in another jurisdiction that a
lawyer has been found guilty of misconduct shall establish conclusively the
misconduct for purposes of a discipline proceeding in this state.” Ariz. R.
Sup. Ct. 57(b)(5).    “In reciprocal proceedings, we generally accord
significant weight to the sanction imposed by the jurisdiction where the
misconduct occurred because the foreign jurisdiction has the greatest
interest in fashioning sanctions for misconduct perpetrated therein.
Therefore, when the sanction prescribed by the foreign jurisdiction is not
inconsistent with the sanction for similar misconduct in this jurisdiction,
this Court will impose the very same sanction.” In re Sirkin, 928 N.Y.S.2d
680, 683–84 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011) (internal citations omitted).

¶5             Respondent may not re-litigate the merits of the federal
disbarment orders in this forum. See In re Zdravkovich, 831 A.2d 964, 969
(D.C. 2003) (“Put simply, reciprocal discipline proceedings are not a forum
to reargue the foreign discipline.”). The PDJ’s role in reciprocal discipline
proceedings is not “to sit in appellate review of the foreign disciplinary
proceedings, in order to determine whether they conformed in every
respect to local procedural and substantive law.” In re Chaganti, 144 A.3d
20, 24 (D.C. 2016) (quoting In re Morrissey, 648 A.2d 185, 190 (D.C.1994)).
Rather, the PDJ’s “function is to determine whether any serious defects
were present in the foreign proceedings . . . such that it would be wrong to
impose reciprocal discipline here.” Id. (quoting In re Morrissey, 648 A.2d
at 190) (alteration in original).

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                         IN RE: TORI S. BRYANT
                           Opinion of the Court

¶6             Respondent was given a full and fair opportunity to respond
to the allegations of misconduct before she was disbarred by the Ninth
Circuit. And under the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions
(“ABA Standards”), the misconduct found by the Ninth Circuit would
warrant disbarment in Arizona. See ABA Standard 4.41(b) (“Disbarment
is generally appropriate when[] a lawyer knowingly fails to perform
services for a client and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a
client[.]”); ABA Standard 4.51 (“Disbarment is generally appropriate when
a lawyer’s course of conduct demonstrates that the lawyer does not
understand the most fundamental legal doctrines or procedures and causes
injury or potential injury to a client[.]”); ABA Standard 8.1(b) (“Disbarment
is generally appropriate when a lawyer[] has been suspended for the same
or similar misconduct, and intentionally or knowingly engages in further
similar acts of misconduct that cause injury or potential injury to a client,
the public, the legal system, or the profession.”).

¶7             Respondent offered to the PDJ and this Court reasons she
believes disbarment is an overly harsh sanction. However, the time and
place to offer such evidence was in the Ninth Circuit, which directed her to
“file a statement in writing explaining why she should not be suspended or
disbarred.” She failed to do so.

¶8           We find that Respondent did not establish by the
preponderance of the evidence any exceptions set forth in Rule 57(b)(3).
We therefore affirm the decision and sanction of the Presiding Disciplinary
Judge.

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