Court Opinion

ID: 9668780
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 02:25:58.627396+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:48.093692
License: Public Domain

POPE, Justice
(dissenting).
The trial court granted a summary judgment in favor of William Warren Johnson in a suit that he brought to set aside part of a default judgment which the court rendered against him two years earlier.
William Warren Johnson by his suit claimed that the petition in the original action on its face negatived the existence of the cause of action upon which the court granted the judgment against him. I do not agree. Edwards Feed Mill, Inc., during 1949, filed a suit against William Warren Johnson and also against his son, Woodson W. Johnson. The petition asserted a cause of action on a promissory note and also on a sworn account. Both defendants, in that former action, were served with citation. Woodson, the son, filed a general denial only, but William Warren Johnson, the father, made no answer of any kind. After waiting two years, Edwards Feed Mill, Inc., obtained an interlocutory default judgment against William Warren Johnson, both on the promissory note and the sworn account. Two years later a final default judgment was entered. William Warren Johnson in 1955 filed a suit for the purpose of setting aside the judgment against him on the promissory note only.
*159This is'hot a suit by way of an equitable bill of review, but one in which William Warren Johnson claims the judgment is void because the petition on its face negatived any cause of action against him on a promissory note. If he be right about that contention, the summary judgment was correct and should be affirmed. City of Fort Worth v. Gause, Tex.Com.App., 129 Tex. 25, 101 S.W.2d 221; Harrison v. Whiteley, Tex.Com.App., 6 S.W.2d 89; Ferguson v. Ferguson, Tex.Civ.App., 98 S.W.2d 847. In my opinion he is wrong.
■ Whether the petition negatives an action against William Warren Johnson presents a question of partnership law. The first paragraph of the petition in the original suit asserted that defendants, “Woodson W. Johnson and Warren W. Johnson, were * * * partners in the dairy business and were buying animal feed from .plaintiffs.” Both parties admit that “Warren W. Johnson” and “William Warren Johnson” are the same person for purposes of this suit. The petition then asserted that Woodson W. Johnson, the son, executed a promissory note in the amount of $4,000, payable to Edwards Feed Mill, Inc., and that it was signed “W. W. Johnson.” The allegations show that the son, Woodson, actually signed the note. The petition then alleged that Woodson, the son, paid $500 on the note, and that demand was made upon “defendant.” It further alleges, however, that “repeated demands have been made by plaintiff upon defendants to pay such note, interest and attorney’s fees,” and that “defendants have failed and refused, and still fail and refuse to pay the same.” The prayer included these words: “Wherefore, plaintiff prays -that defendants be cited to .appear herein and that on final hearing plaintiff have judgment against defendants, Woodson W. Johnson and Warren W. Johnson, jointly and severally, in . the amount of Thirty-five Hundred Dollars 1'($3500.00), together with ten per Cent -(10%) per annum' interest thereon from November 30, 1948,' and together with ten per cent- (10%) of said amount,' together with interest due thereon as attorney’s fees, ⅜ * The prayer then separately asked for recovery for the amount of the sworn account.
In my opinion, the original judgment is binding upon William Warren Johnson. In the first place, if we assume that the judge in entering the former judgment committed an error of partnership law, the judgment is still binding. In the second place, from the record of the former judgment, the judge did not. commit error in entering judgment against William Warren Johnson, one of the partners. We shall examine the first assumption. William Warren Johnson made no sworn denial of partnership, filed no plea of non est factum, and did not deny under oath his liability in the capacity in which he was sued. Rule 93(f), 93(h), 93 (c), Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. An erroneous judgment is not a void judgment. Appeal is the procedure by which errors are corrected. Error, though reversible, if unappealed, becomes embalmed in a binding judgment. Cases in which the aggrieved party appealed so the appellate court might correct errors are beside the issue in this, case, because William Warren Johnson did not appeal. Errors are not corrected by direct suits, but by appeals. To brief a legal error present in the former trial avails William Warren Johnson nothing. It is for this reason that the cases relied upon by the majority to prove former error are not in point. Those are cases in which the aggrieved party preserved error and perfected an appeal. First State Bank of Reisel v. Dyer, 151 Tex. 650, 254 S.W.2d 92; Griswold v, Carlson, 151 Tex. 246, 249 S.W.2d 58; Farrier v. Hopkins, Tex.Com. App., 131 Tex. 75, 112 SW.2d 182; City of Fort Worth v. Gause, 129 Tex. 25, 101 S.W.2d 221; Atwood v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., Tex.Civ.App., 239 S.W.2d 412; Woodward v. Acme. Lumber Co., Tex.Civ.App.,. 103 S.W.2d 1054, Williams v. Sinclair *160Prairie Oil Co., Tex.Civ.App., 135 S.W.2d 211, held, and correctly so, that a district court had no jurisdiction to usurp the exclusive jurisdiction of a comity court. Jurisdiction, not error, was the point in that case.
As stated in Rice v. Mercantile Bank & Trust Co. of Texas, Tex.Civ.App., 86 S.W.2d 54, 55:
“The decision of what is error on attack by separate suit and the decision of what is error on appeal are not equivalent. In the latter case, the petition may be subject to general demurrer and would be reversed upon appeal from an adverse ruling of the trial court, yet be sufficient to prevent a judgment by default from being void. * * * But, where the nature of the suit invokes the actual jurisdiction of the court rendering the judgment and the petition is merely lacking in allegations as to the fullness of facts, it presents a matter for determination by the trial judge, thus any error committed in rendering the judgment upon the insufficient facts alleged would not render the judgment void.
“ * * * The presumption must prevail that facts were in evidence before the trial court to authorize the judgment, not inconsistent with or contradicted by the record.”
Similar holdings are, Kelley v. First National Bank of Ft. Worth, Tex.Civ.App., 270 S.W.2d 644; Odom v. Pinkston, Tex. Civ.App., 193 S.W.2d 888, 890; Ritch v. Jarvis, Tex.Civ.App., 64 S.W.2d 831. William Warren Johnson by the present action is under the onerous burden of proving that the face of the record affirmatively reveals that the former judgment is a void judgment. The petition was not so faulty that it conclusively negatived the existence of a cause of action. 49 C.J.S. Judgments § 40, p. 99, § 277, p. 498.
The petition in the original suit asserted a valid action against William Warren Johnson as a partner who was liable for the note signed by his partner. The fact that Article 5932, § 18, Vernon’s Ann.Civ. St., provides that no person is liable on an instrument when his signature does not appear on it, does not defeat the action. The Supreme Court, with full recognition of that rule, states that there are several instances in which the non-signing partner may be liable upon a note signed by another partner. One instance exists when the name used to sign the obligation has been “adopted as the firm name.” Another example exists when “the partners have consented to the use of his name in partnership matters.” First State Bank of Riesel v. Dyer, 151 Tex. 650, 254 S.W.2d 92; Person v. Katz, Tex.Civ.App., 47 S.W.2d 657; Bolan v. Wrather, Tex.Civ.App., 239 S.W. 279; 68 C.J.S. Partnership § 147b. In 68 C.J.S. Partnership § 161c(4), it is stated: “It has been held that, where no firm name has been adopted, a note in the name of one of the partners will bind the firm, where it is for a firm purpose and on the credit of the firm, and such is the understanding of the parties to the transaction, although the firm received no benefit from the transaction.” Accord, Dockery v. Faulkner, Tex.Civ.App., 101 S.W. 501; Caraway v. Citizens’ Nat. Bank, Tex.Civ.App., 29 S.W. 506. It is also stated in 40 Am.Jur., Partnership, § 153: “The general rule appears to be that a promissory note made in the name of one partner, whose name is not that of the firm, is prima facie the individual obligation of such partner, and ordinarily is not binding upon the partnership. But a partnership may be made liable on a note executed in the name of a single partner where it is shown that the business of the partnership was carried on in the name of that partner, and that the signature of the note was intended as a partnership signature.”
The petition in the former suit asserted that William Warren Johnson was a part*161ner and stated who his partner was, it asserted that they were in the dairy business together, that William Warren Johnson’s partner signed a note by signing it “W. W. Johnson,” that demand for payment of the balance due on that note was made upon William Warren Johnson, and that he refused to pay it, for which plaintiff prayed for damages upon the note against William Warren Johnson, the non-signing partner. These pleadings gave sufficient notice that it was a suit against the non-signing partner upon a note signed by the other partner. 2 McDonald, Texas Civil Practice, § 5.05, p. 484. See, Winslow v. Boyd, Tex.Civ.App., 195 S.W.2d 384.
The petition, therefore, asserted a valid action against William Warren Johnson, the non-signing partner. “All acts are presumed to have been rightly done until the contrary appears. This includes every judgment and order entered at any stage of the proceeding. Thus, it is said that every reasonable presumption will be indulged to sustain a judgment and nothing will be presumed against it. All prior requisites to the rendition of a judgment will he presumed to have been fulfilled and the recitals in a judgment or order will be presumed to state the truth.” McCormick and Ray, Texas Law of Evidence, § 57. Smith v. Pegram, Tex.Civ.App., 80 S.W.2d 354, 357. To hold that the former default judgment is void is to ignore the presumption that the court acted properly, and the record does not affirmatively show the court acted beyond its potential and active jurisdiction. In 1949, an interlocutory judgment by default was taken against William Warren Johnson, and in 1951 the final judgment was taken. It would be presumed that on each of those hearings the trial court acted properly and satisfied itself about liability.
I, therefore, respectfully dissent. I would reverse the judgment of the trial court and render judgment that the former default judgment is valid and binding.