Court Opinion

ID: 9632950
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:28:54.677203+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:08:24.910228
License: Public Domain

ROONEY, Justice,
specially concurring, with whom RAPER, Justice, joins.
I concur in the result reached by the majority opinion, but I am not entirely in accord with the rationale expressed therein.
The issue here presented is whether or not appellant was afforded a due process hearing upon revocation of his probation, specifically in connection with whether or not he was afforded sufficient confrontation with witnesses.
The majority opinion makes reference to a "two-part hearing to determine if (1) there are verified facts proving a violation of the release agreement; and (2) whether in light of a proven violation the probation should be revoked." It then indicates that hearsay evidence from non-confronted witnesses is admissible only during the second part. It suggests that Rule 83(f), W.R. Cr.P.1 pertains only to the second part. It refers to Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972); and Gagnon v. Searpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973) as supportive thereof.
I do not believe that either the two-part hearing referred to by the majority opinion or Rule 388(f) is pertinent to this case. I believe that the confrontation of witnesses requirement enunciated in Morrissey is narrower than established by the majority opinion.
Finally, I find it a very close question as to whether or not the non-hearsay evidence in this case was sufficient to support the discretion exercised by the trial court in its finding of a violation of the probation conditions. I find it was not sufficient, not only because of the loose procedural context in which the matter developed but in hopes that such finding will help avoid the same potentials for error and, thus, for appeal in future revocation proceedings.
I have no quarrel with the fact that Mor-rissey referred to the thought process *1058whereby the violation is first ascertained and then the decision is made as to what to do about it, and that this second step "is not purely factual but also predictive and discretionary." 92 S.Ct. at 2599-2600.
However, the "two important stages in the typical process of * * * revocation" to which the language in Morrissey was primarily addressed are headed therein as "(a) Arrest of Parolee and Preliminary Hearing," and "(b) The Revocation Hearing." The concern in each instance was with the due process requirements in the determination of whether or not the parole agreement had been violated.
In my specially concurring opinion in Weisser v. State, Wyo., 600 P.2d 1320, 1324 (1979), I noted that:
"* * * The Morrissey and Gagnon cases recognized the parole and probation status as 'liberty and property' rights under the constitution, and they held that deprivation thereof could be accomplished only by virtue of due process. In the Morris-sey case the Court noted at page 2600 of 92 S.Ct. that revocation of parole (and in the Gagnon case, of probation).
"'is not part of a criminal prosecution and thus the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such a proceeding does not apply to revocations. * * *'"
After recognizing that "[oJnce it is determined that due process applies, the question remains what process is due" and that "due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands," the court in Morrissey addressed the necessity for a preliminary hearing by a disinterested person near the place of violation or arrest as promptly as convenient.2 Such proceeding was described to be:
"* * * in the nature of a 'preliminary hearing' to determine whether there is probable cause or reasonable ground to believe that the arrested parolee has committed acts that would constitute a violation of parole conditions. [Citation.]" 92 S.Ct. at 2602.
"* * * At the hearing the parolee may appear and speak in his own behalf; he may bring letters, documents, or individuals who can give relevant information to the hearing officer. On request of the parolee, person who has given adverse information on which parole revocation is to be based is to be made available for questioning in his presence. However, if the hearing officer determines that an informant would be subjected to risk or harm if his identity were disclosed, he need not be subjected to confrontation and cross-examination." (Emphasis added.) 92 S.Ct. at 2603.
In addressing the second stage, the revocation hearing itself,3 the following minimum requirements of due process, without creating "an inflexible structure for parole revocation procedures," were set forth in Morrissey at page 2604 of 92 S.Ct.:
"* * * (a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b) disclosure to the parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation); (e) a 'neutral and detached' hearing body such as a traditional parole board, members of which need not be judicial officers or lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking parole. We emphasize there is no thought to equate this second state of parole revocation to a criminal prosecution in any sense. It is a narrow inquiry; the process should be flexible enough to consider *1059evidence including letters, affidavits, and other material that would not be admissible in an adversary criminal trial." (Emphasis added.)
Obviously, the right of confrontation and eross-examination in a revocation hearing is not as positive as it is in a criminal proceeding. The admission of hearsay evidence without confrontation of witnesses does not ipso facto amount to error in revocation proceedings.
Nor do I read Rule 38(f), W.R.Cr.P.4 as having anything to do with hearsay evidence or the right to confront witnesses. It simply requires the presence of the defendant at the revocation hearing and the necessity of notice to him of the ground alleged as a basis for revocation. It does not concern other aspects of the hearing.
In the case before us, testimony in the nature of hearsay was before the court. Not only was there nothing in the record to show good cause for allowing such evidence, but the record indicated the probable availability of the original sources of the evidence. But, this was not a criminal proceeding. The court could properly disregard such evidence and revoke the probation on the basis of non-hearsay evidence placed before it. In this case, the non-hearsay evidence consisted of the following: A burglary of the Casper Senior Citizens Center was reported to the police. Some of the items taken in the burglary were recovered by the police in the press box at the high school stadium. Among the recovered items was a tape recorder with a tape on which a voice was identified by a witness as that of appellant. Appellant was later arrested during the nighttime as he was raising a window to enter the press box. Appellant contended that he was entering the press box to recover a sleeping bag which he loaned to a friend who was using it there.
This evidence would be insufficient to sustain a criminal conviction inasmuch as it did not connect defendant with the burglary itself or even with knowledge of it. However, the standard of proof in a probation or parole revocation case is different.
"The sufficiency of the evidence to sustain an order revoking probation is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court and its action will be reversed only upon a clear showing of abuse of discretion. The court cannot act arbitrarily, however, or according to whim or caprice." 21 Am.Jur.2d, Criminal Law § 568 (1965).
The question as to sufficiency of the evidence necessary to support a finding of violation of parole or probation conditions is aggravated when the condition alleged to have been violated is that which prohibits additional unlawful behavior. In such instances, analysis is influenced by the concept of "innocence until proven guilty." Indeed, the Wyoming Parole Board requires a conviction before it revokes parole on this basis. Such is not usually required in connection with revocation of probation. In holding that the court could proceed "to both preliminary and final revocation hearings" before trial of criminal charges out of which arose the alleged probation violations, one federal district court referred to the required standard of proof as follows:
"In such final hearing, the usual rules of evidence need not be applied, [citation], and it is not required that the evidence have shown beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Mills violated the conditions of his probation, [citation]. If the evidence satisfies the presiding judge that the conduct of the probationer has not measured-up to the terms and conditions of his probation, in its discretion, the Court will revoke the probation. [Citation.] * * *" United States v. Mills, 444 F.Supp. 26, 27 (E.D.Tenn.1977).
When the condition alleged to have been violated is other than that which prohibits additional unlawful behavior, the proof of violation is usually more direct and less involved. Refusing to make reports or contacts with the parole officer, refusing or leaving employment, leaving the state without permission of the parole officer and similar transgressions involve evidence which is not cireumscribed by the safeguards attributed to criminal accusations.
*1060The failure to properly place all of the information before the court pertinent to consideration of appellant's status exemplifies the looseness which I find in the procedure in this case. The court conditioned appellant's probation on obedience of all federal, local and state laws-the condition alleged to have been violated. It also conditioned probation on obedience of the "Department of Probation and Parole's * * * Rules and Regulations." The departmental operation rules have no direct reference to a probationer's conduct. There are no rules and regulations in the record which the probationer has specifically agreed to follow.5
The record reflects the likelihood of violation by appellant of usual probation requirements other than violation of laws. It does not reflect, however, his understanding or agreement relative thereto. He was not notified that he was charged with these other violations and evidence thereof was not received.
This, coupled with the failure to proffer available witnesses able to give non-hearsay testimony which apparently would definitely establish by credible evidence appellant's involvement in the burglary characterizes the procedure as loosely prepared and processed. The court did not have the advantage of all of that which it should have had in gauging appellant's actions and that which should result therefrom.
For this reason, I agree that the case should be reversed and remanded for an additional hearing consistent, insofar as presently possible, with this specially concurring opinion.

. Rule 33(f), W.R.Cr.P. provides:
"The court shall not revoke probation except after a hearing at which the defendant shall be present and apprised of the grounds on which such action is proposed. The defendant may be admitted to bail pending such hearing."

. The preliminary hearing can be before a justice of the peace, county judge, or other designated official in this or another state.

. A preliminary hearing is not required if the revocation hearing itself is held "as promptly as convenient after arrest" and "reasonably near the place of the alleged * * * violation or arrest," or if the probationer or parolee has already been convicted of another crime. Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 97 S.Ct. 274, 278, n. 7, 50 L.Ed.2d 236 (1976), Mack v. McCune, 551 F.2d 251 (10th Cir.1977); Coronado v. United States Board of Parole, 551 F.2d 275 (10th Cir. 1977).

. See footnote 1.

. The specific conditions of probation should be made a matter of record, either through enumeration at the time of sentencing, or by use of a form with the information thereon acknowledged by the probationer. In addition to listed special conditions, the Parole Agreement and Parole Grant form used by the Parole Board specifies the following general conditions:
"If parole is granted to me by the Board of Parole of the State of Wyoming, I hereby agree to the following terms and conditions thereof:
"1. I shall make written monthly reports to my supervising officer promptly at the time designated by him and upon the form provided, and I shall furnish the full information requested on said form.
"2. Additionally, I shall make personal reports and contacts to and with my supervising officer as directed by him.
"3. I shall not violate any laws or ordinances (including the use or possession of controlled substances as defined by Wyoming law).
"4. I shall not incur any debts or obligations or execute any contracts without permission of my supervising officer.
"5. I shall not marry, file for divorce, withdraw from school, change residence, change employment, purchase an automobile, purchase real property, or purchase any item exceeding the cost of $200.00 without permission of my supervising officer.
"6. I shall not possess or use a firearm.
"7. I shall not leave the state of Wyoming without permission of my supervising officer.
"8. I shall make every reasonable effort to comply with the advice and directions of my Parole Officer relative to my business, social and recreational activities, when the same are given to me for the purpose of avoiding disputes, conflicts, or activities which, in turn, are likely to result in violation of one or more of the other conditions of this agreement."