Court Opinion

ID: 9626016
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:59:26.074447+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:19.584701
License: Public Domain

Toal, Justice:
I respectfully dissent. The overriding purpose of requiring the defendant to produce a bond before releasing the defendant from custody is to insure the defendant’s appearance in court. See State v. Workman, 274 S.C. 341, 263 S.E. (2d) 865 (1980); Town of Mayesville v. McCutcheon, 205 S.C. 241, 31 S.E. (2d) 390 (1944); Saunders v. Hughes, 2 Bailey 504 (1831); see also Annotation, Effect on Surety’s Liability Under Bail Bond of Principals ’s Incarceration in Other Jurisdiction, 33 A.L.R. 4th 663 (1984); 8 Am. Jur. (2d) Bail and Recognizance § 4 (1980); 8 C.J.S. Bail § 5 (1988). Bail is not a revenue measure nor is it to be forfeited to compensate victims. See Paris v. United States, 137 F. (2d) 300 (4th Cir. 1943). A bail bond is a contract; its terms and conditions are controlled by statute and the agreement of the parties. State v. McIntyre, — S.C. — , 415 S.E. (2d) 399 (1992); State v. White, 284 S.C. 69, 325 S.E. (2d) 64 (1985); State v. Bailey, 248 S.C. 438, 151 S.E. (2d) 87 (1966); State v. Simring, 230 S.C. 49, 94 S.E. (2d) (1956). South Carolina has long encouraged “bondsmen to enter into bail contracts, in order to facilitate the release of defendants whose guilt has yet to be determined and to relieve the state of the cost of providing for the defendants while in jail.” Annotation, Effect on Surety’s Liability Under Bail Bond of Principals’s Incarceration in Other Jurisdiction, 33 A.L.R. 4th 663, 667 (1984); see also Ham v. McLeod, 255 S.C. 185, 178 S.E. (2d) 141 (1970); Nichols v. Patterson, 202 S.C. 352, 25 S.E. (2d) 155 (1943); Barton v. Keith, 2 Hill 537 (1835); State v. Hill, 3 Brev. 89, (1812).
While the defendant is released on bail, he is in the con*286structive custody of the bondsman. The bondsman always has the authority to physically remand the defendant to the custody of the jurisdiction holding the bond and relieve himself from the obligation under the bond. State v. Brakefield, 302 S.C. 317, 396 S.E. (2d) 103 (1990); Wilson v. McLeod, 274 S.C. 525, 265 S.E. (2d) 677 (1980); State v. Holloway, 262 S.C. 552, 206 S.E. (2d) 822 (1974); Breeze v. Elmore, 4 Rich. 436 (1951). Conversely, when the defendant does not appear at the appointed time and place, there is a strong presumption that the terms of the bond have been breached. State v. Holloway, 262 S.C. 552, 206 S.E. (2d) 822 (1974). The bond may also be es-treated if the defendant breaches terms or conditions of the bond other than appearance. See e.g. State v. Workman, 274 S.C. 341, 263 S.E. (2d) 865 (1980).
Under South Carolina law, when the terms of the bond are breached, the bond is estreated by a conditional order. S.C. Code Ann. § 17-15-170 (1976); Pride v. Anders, 266 S.C. 338, 223 S.E. (2d) 184 (1976); State v. Holloway, 262 S.C. 552, 206 S.E. (2d) 822 (1974). The bondsman is then entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard to show cause as to why the estreatment order should not become final. S.C. Code Ann. § 17-5-170 (1976). Because the bond has already been es-treated by the conditional order, the second hearing is to determine the amount, if any, to be remitted. S.C. Code Ann. § 17-15-170 (1976); Pride v. Anders, 266 S.C. 338, 223 S.E. (2d) 184 (1976); State v. Holloway, 262 S.C. 552, 206 S.E. (2d) 822 (1974). Implicit in the bondsman’s right to notice and opportunity to be heard is the right to be notified as to the reason for the forfeiture so that he may present any defenses to the es-treatment which may exist.
In Taylor v. Taintor, 83 U.S. (16 Wall) 366, 21 L.Ed. 287 (1872), the Court identified three classes of events which require the estreated bond to be remitted to the bondsman. First, if the defendant is prevented from appearing because of an act of God. An act of God occurs, for example, when the defendant dies before performance of the bond is due. The second ground is that an act of law rendered performance impossible. State v. Davis, 12 S.C. 528 (1879), rev’d sub nom Davis v. South Carolina, 107 U.S. (17 Otto) 597, 2 S.Ct. 636, 27 L.Ed. 574 (1883), was such a case. In Davis, while out on bond, the defendant petitioned the federal court for habeas corpus and *287removal of the case from South Carolina Circuit Court. The federal district court granted Davis’ petition. When Davis failed to appear in Circuit Court, the Circuit Court estreated the bond. The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed. The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that South Carolina no longer had jurisdiction; and, thus, South Carolina could not lawfully estreat the bond. The third ground is that the obligee has prevented the defendant from appearing. The case at bar is within the third category.
There may also be other defenses for breach of the bond contract which required the estreated bond to be remitted in whole or part to the bondsman. See State v. Workman, 274 S.C. 341, 263 S.E. (2d) 865 (1980). In determining whether to remit an estreated bond, the trial judge should at least consider “(1) the purpose of the bond; (2) the nature and wilfulness of the default; (3) any prejudice or additional expense resulting to the State.” Workman, at 343, 263 S.E. (2d) at 866. In Workman, supra, this Court held the trial judge abused his discretion by estreating the bond when the cited factors were considered.
Turning to the case at bar, the conditional order estreated the bond solely for the failure to appear. Thus, the bondsman had notice of only the failure to appear at the onset of the final hearing. The concurrence quotes and relies on the oral bench ruling from the final hearing in which the trial judge noted the additional grounds of bad conduct. First, the final written order adopted the conditional order which relied solely on the failure to appear to support the estreatment. Second, this oral colloquy is irrelevant to the question of whether the bondsman had adequate notice of the alternative grounds for es-treatment. The concurrence completely misses the point which is that the alternative grounds were raised for the first time at the final hearing. Accordingly, the bondsman was not given adequate notice of the alternative grounds relied upon by the majority.
At the final hearing, the bondsman presented a defense to the grounds cited in the conditional order of estreatment which was the fact that South Carolina had extradited the defendant to Georgia five days prior to his required appearance. The state does not dispute this assertion. Thus, the bondsman presented a valid defense to the only grounds he had notice of *288under Taylor, supra. To affirm the final estreatment, based on the alternative grounds raised for the first time at the final hearing, deprives the bondsman of a meaningful right to notice and opportunity to be heard. I would note that since the bondsman received no notice of the breach of good behavior condition of the bond, the Workman factors were neither argued nor considered by the trial judge.
Further, the trial judge committed clear error when he dismissed the charges against the defendant and when he ordered a portion of the bond paid to the victim. The judge was without authority to dismiss the charges against the defendant and order the bond estreated to compensate the victim.
The majority, by its opinion today, contravenes well-settled principles of bail and surety recognized in this State since at least 1812. See State v. Hill, 3 Brev. 89 (1812). Even more troubling, the majority opinion contravenes well-established law as declared in Taylor v. Taintor, 83 U.S. (16 Wall) 366, 21 L.Ed. 287 (1872) by affirming an order estreating a bond for the stated reason of defendant’s failure to appear when the actions of the state made appearance impossible. I would reverse.
Finney, A.J., concurs.