Court Opinion

ID: 9428976
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:25:21.443241+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:16.586216
License: Public Domain

*169Justice Powell,
with whom Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor join,
dissenting.
The Court affirms the District Court’s order, concluding that although the 4-2-3 plan ensures proportional representation for the black voting age population, a district court nevertheless is free under §5 — in the exercise of a newly perceived equitable jurisdiction — to require a city to “enhance” the chances of increased minority representation on a city’s governing body. In this case, the perceived enhancement would be that a plurality, rather than a majority election requirement, would give black citizens a better chance of capturing — in addition to the three district seats assured them — the two at-large seats. Ante, at 167-168.1 Because the Court’s decision is irreconcilable with City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U. S. 358 (1975), and authorizes a standardless equitable jurisdiction in district courts, I dissent.
I
In City of Richmond, the city annexed territory reducing the percentage of the city’s black population from 52% to 42%. After the Attorney General refused to preclear submitted election plans, he and the city came to an agreement and jointly submitted a plan for approval to the District Court for the District of Columbia. The District Court rejected this plan, because the city had failed to “minimizfe] the dilution of black voting power to the greatest possible extent.” Id., at 367. This Court, in an opinion by Justice White, vacated the District Court’s order, holding that a district court must accept a new electoral plan for the enlarged municipality as long as it “fairly reflects the strength of the Negro community as it exists after the annexation” and *170“would afford [it] representation reasonably equivalent to [its] political strength in the enlarged community.” Id., at 370-371. See City of Rome v. United States, 446 U. S. 156, 187 (1980), aff’g 472 F. Supp. 221, 245 (DC 1979); City of Rome, supra, at 188 (Blackmun, J., concurring); United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U. S. 144, 160 (1977) (opinion of White, J.); Beer v. United States, 425 U. S. 130, 139, n. 11 (1976). In dissent, Justice Brennan stated that he would find the dilutive effect of an annexation cured only by an election plan “calculated to neutralize to the extent possible any adverse effect upon the political participation of black voters.” 422 U. S., at 389.
In this case, the city expanded its boundaries by annexation and consolidation.2 This resulted in reducing the percentage of its black population from 45.21% to 40.56%. The electoral plan for the enlarged city, submitted to the Attorney General under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, was disapproved both by the Attorney General and then by the District Court for the District of Columbia. Following negotiations, the Attorney General and the city reached agreement *171that the 4-2-3 electoral plan — at issue in this case — complied with the requirements of the Voting Rights Act. Accordingly, the plan was jointly submitted by the Attorney General and the city to the District Court for its approval. Under this plan, the city’s 35% black voting age population was assured of 33% of the City Council positions, i. e., three of nine members.
The District Court rejected the agreed upon plan in a brief order because, in words reminiscent of Justice Brennan’s dissent in City of Richmond, it “insufficiently neutralizes the adverse impact upon minority voting strength.” App. 87a. The court added, however, that it would approve the plan were it modified “so as to provide for the election of the two non-mayoral, at-large representatives by plurality vote,” ibid., a condition to approval that the Attorney General had expressly considered and found not to be required by the Act.
I find the Court’s decision in City of Richmond and in this case fundamentally inconsistent, because the proportional representation assured by the 4-2-3 plan must, by definition, “afford [blacks] representation reasonably equivalent to their political strength in the enlarged community.” 422 U. S., at 370-371. Cf. United Jewish Organizations, supra, at 169 (Brennan, J., concurring in part) (“[T]he very definition of proportional representation precludes either underrepresen-tation or overrepresentation . . .”). Apparently in an effort to justify its decision, the Court states that the agreed 4-2-3 plan “undervalued to some extent the political strength of the black community.” Ante, at 167. No support for this statement is cited, and none is found in the record.3 The District *172Court made no such finding and the Government, in its submission to the District Court, expressly asserted that the city’s plan “would appear to provide the minority community with a fair opportunity to obtain ‘representation reasonably equivalent to their political strength in the enlarged community.’ City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U. S. 358, 370 (1975).” App. 79a-80a. The black intervenors also agreed at the time of the submission that “the plan does approach affording blacks representation reasonably equivalent to their voting strength in the at-large community . . . .” Id., at 83a.
II
Furthermore, the Court’s decision finds no support in any prior decision of this Court. The theory that political *173strength should be enhanced, rather than preserved, is new doctrine. It is a view Congress has never embraced, and indeed one that the 1982 extension of the Voting Rights Act fairly can be viewed as rejecting.4 Moreover, although I do not question the power of a district court to disagree with the Attorney General’s construction of the Act, it does not follow that the District Court was “sitting as a court of equity,” ante, at 167, and had the power to require political enhancement. We are interpreting and applying a statute that vests no such open-ended jurisdiction in any court.
In the first six months of this year, the Department of Justice received approximately 8,709 applications for pre-clearance of voting changes under § 5, an average of 66 per working day.5 Congress, with the approval of the President, has recently reaffirmed the authority of Department of Justice personnel to exercise this extensive control over state and local political decisions. The sheer volume of applications for preclearance makes imperative the prescribing of predictable standards. Proportional representation, whatever its theoretical and practical limitations may be in a nation with populations as diverse and mobile as that of the United States, is at least an objective standard, and when it *174is found to exist in a §5 case — whether deemed necessary under the Act or not — it should be dispositive. The Court’ today, however, finds for the first time a standardless equitable discretion in the District Court for the District of Columbia to impose requirements in addition to proportional representation. This leaves the responsible authorities in the State and communities under the Act — as well as the Attorney General — without guidance as to the requirements of § 5.
H-( HH
The Court’s discussion of discriminatory purpose as providing some support for the District Court’s “effects” determination is disquieting for a number of reasons. First, as the Court notes, the District Court made no finding that the 4-2-3 plan was tainted by an impermissible purpose. Second, the District Court expressly found that no discriminatory motive prompted the city’s annexation of the three jurisdictions involved. 517 F. Supp. 987, 1019-1021 (DC 1981). Third, the factors that led the District Court to conclude that the earlier 8-0-1 and 4-4-1 plans had been adopted for a discriminatory purpose have no bearing on the question whether the city was similarly motivated when it adopted the 4-2-3 plan at a later time and pursuant to good-faith negotiations with the Attorney General. Finally, the Government concedes that purpose is not a factor in this case.6 Indeed, the Court fails to explain — nor can it explain satisfactorily— how a plan negotiated with and acceptable to the Attorney General was adopted for a discriminatory purpose.
*175In my opinion, the city has shown that its 4-2-3 plan has satisfied fully § 5’s effect-and-purpose test and the standard adopted in City of Richmond. We now should demand no more. I would reverse the District Court’s order.

 The Court has recognized that a majority-vote requirement in at-large elections, unless adopted as a change for discriminatory purposes, is a valid and long-accepted practice “that is followed by literally thousands of municipalities and other local governmental units throughout the Nation.” See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S. 55, 60 (1980) (plurality opinion).

 The District Court acknowledged benefits for the entire population from consolidation:
“Port Arthur . . . was extremely interested in maintaining a population in excess of 50,000 so as to remain entitled as a matter of right to funds from federal agencies including the Department of Housing and Urban Development (‘HUD’). Were the population to decrease below the 50,000 level, HUD would diminish the amount of the direct grant by one-third each year; in the fourth year, the City would have to [compete] with other applicants for discretionary awards. Since 1975, . . . there was evidence that the municipal population was [declining towards] the 50,000 mark. . . . Having already annexed all of the adjacent black communities, the City turned to Pear Ridge, Lakeview and Griffing Park.
“. . . Although the City would be required to provide services to the new residents, it was anticipated that the additional cost would be minimal and greatly outweighed by the increased tax revenue. . . . Furthermore, Port Arthur hoped that the increased visibility resulting from consolidation would attract new businesses and thereby create new jobs.” 517 F. Supp. 987, 999 (1981) (footnote omitted).

 In interim elections held in 1981, the city’s electorate chose three black Council members. In fact, the city notes that it is now governed by a Council consisting of four blacks and five whites. Reply Brief for Appellant 6.
The Court seems to rely on two factors for its conclusion: a slight differential between the percentage of black seats and the percentage of black *172voting age population; and a larger differential between the percentage of black seats and the percentage of the black population. There is a preference for voting age population statistics, see United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U. S. 144, 164, n. 23 (1977) (opinion of White, J.), because they are more “probative” of the “electoral potential of the minority community,” City of Rome v. United States, 446 U. S. 156, 186, n. 22 (1980), than population statistics. Even if the Court were to rely on population statistics here, this Court’s formulations reflect the recognition that it would be unreasonable, if not impossible, to require cities to devise voting plans that afford minorities representation ‘precisely proportional to their political strength in the jurisdiction. Indeed, the Court has indicated that proportional representation would be found in circumstances quite similar to those presented here. See Beer v. United States, 425 U. S. 130, 159, n. 19 (1976) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting) (approving representation/voting age population differential of 6%).
Moreover, the Court’s conclusion that the 4-2-3 plan will “permanently foreclose” blacks from being elected to either of the at-large seats, ante, at 167, ignores the dynamics of the region, to which the facts of this case attest. With 35% of the voting age population composed of black citizens, it is politically naive to think that these citizens will not have significant — and indeed often decisive — influence in the election of at-large Council members. The results in numerous state and local elections demonstrate the political power of such a large and cohesive segment of the electorate. See J. Wilkinson, Harry Byrd and the Changing Face of Virginia Politics, 1945-1966, p. 346 (1968) (“By the middle of the 1960's . . . Negroes provided balanee-of-power ballots [in Virginia and] elsewhere in the South . . .”).

 Section 3 of the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131, 42 U. S. C. § 1973b (1982 ed.), states that a violation has been established if it is shown, “based on the totality of circumstances,” that the political processes “are not equally open to [blacks].” The amendment expressly provides that “[t]he extent to which members of a protected class have been elected to office ... is one circumstance which may be considered . . . .” The Senate Committee Report stated:
“Electoral devices, including at-large elections, per se would not be subject to attack under Section 2. They would only be vulnerable if, in the totality of circumstances, they resulted in the denial of equal access to the electoral process. [T]he presence of minority elected officials is a recognized indicator of access to the process . . . .” S. Rep. No. 97-417, p. 16 (1982).

 See U. S. Dept. of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Voting Rights Section, Number of Changes Submitted under Section 5 and Reviewed by the Department of Justice, By State and Year, 1965 — June 30, 1982 (unpublished).

 The following exchange took place at oral argument:
“[The Court]: And may I get clear, is purpose still in this case at this level?
“[The Government]: Not in terms of the submission to this Court, no, Your Honor.
“[The Court]: So we consider only the effect?
“[The Government]: Yes, Your Honor. I don’t believe that the district court’s opinion or order can fairly be read to cast any doubt on the purpose of the plan as adopted.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 30.