Court Opinion

ID: 9367672
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-01 16:03:51.907337+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:02.187555
License: Public Domain

NOTICE                  2023 IL App (4th) 220283-U                       FILED
This Order was filed under                                                        January 31, 2023
Supreme Court Rule 23 and is               NO. 4-22-0283                            Carla Bender
not precedent except in the                                                     4th District Appellate
limited circumstances allowed                                                         Court, IL
under Rule 23(e)(1).
                                   IN THE APPELLATE COURT

                                            OF ILLINOIS

                                        FOURTH DISTRICT

  THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,                         )      Appeal from the
             Plaintiff-Appellee,                               )      Circuit Court of
             v.                                                )      Winnebago County
  DEVIN NORMAN BOOSE,                                          )      No. 15CF363
             Defendant-Appellant.                              )
                                                               )      Honorable
                                                               )      Brendan A. Maher,
                                                               )      Judge Presiding.

                  JUSTICE ZENOFF delivered the judgment of the court.
                  Justices Turner and Knecht concurred in the judgment.

                                               ORDER

 ¶1      Held: The appellate court affirmed an order granting the State’s motion to dismiss
               defendant’s second amended postconviction petition where defendant failed to
               make a substantial showing of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

 ¶2               Defendant, Devin Norman Boose, appeals an order dismissing his second

 amended postconviction petition at the second stage of proceedings. He argues that he made a

 substantial showing of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to call certain witnesses at

 trial. We affirm.

 ¶3                                      I. BACKGROUND

 ¶4               Following a bench trial in 2015, defendant was convicted of being an armed

 habitual criminal (720 ILCS 5/24-1.7(a) (West 2014)) and possession of cannabis with intent to

 deliver (720 ILCS 550/5(d) (West 2014)). The trial court sentenced defendant to 13 years in

 prison for being an armed habitual criminal, which was to run concurrently with an 8-year
sentence for the drug charge. On direct appeal, the Second District of the Illinois Appellate Court

held, inter alia, that the evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant’s conviction of being an

armed habitual criminal under a theory that he constructively possessed a shotgun. People v.

Boose, 2018 IL App (2d) 151052-U, ¶¶ 11-18. Defendant subsequently filed a pro se

postconviction petition and an amended petition. The trial court was unable to complete its

review of the amended petition within the time allowed for summary dismissal, so the court

advanced the matter for second-stage proceedings. Appointed counsel then filed a second

amended petition on defendant’s behalf. The court granted the State’s motion to dismiss that

petition, and defendant challenges that order in this appeal.

¶5             To provide context for defendant’s postconviction claim, we will first summarize

the trial evidence.

¶6                                       A. Trial Evidence

¶7             On February 13, 2015, Rockford police officers executed a warrant to search the

premises at 1004 North Winnebago Street for narcotics. Officer William Donato knocked on the

front door of the residence at that address and yelled “ ‘police, search warrant,’ ” several times.

When nobody answered after about 20 to 30 seconds, the officers entered the premises by force.

There were numerous people inside the residence, including defendant and his brother, Thomas

Boose. At some point, Thomas was permitted to leave the house after telling officers that he did

not reside there.

¶8             Officers encountered defendant in the hallway outside an upstairs bedroom at the

southwest part of the house. Donato read a copy of the search warrant to defendant and his

mother, Rosie Boose. Defendant and his mother told Donato that they owned the house.

According to Donato, defendant “told us it was unnecessary to tear up his house, and that we

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were just going to find weed” in his bedroom. The police indeed found cannabis and a digital

scale in an upstairs bedroom at the southwest part of the house. The police also found a sawed-

off shotgun in an upstairs bedroom at the northeast part of the house. The shotgun was located

between the mattress and the box spring of a bed. Officers found shotgun ammunition in the

basement.

¶9             Donato testified that, after the police found the shotgun, defendant said the

shotgun was Thomas’s and that the officers should not have allowed Thomas to leave. According

to Donato, defendant stated that he had already told Donato not to let Thomas leave. Donato

testified that defendant had not told him that. Later, an officer contacted Thomas and told him to

return to 1004 North Winnebago Street.

¶ 10           Thomas testified for the State under a grant of immunity. He testified that, on the

date of the search, he lived at 2208 Wallace Street with his girlfriend. When she evicted him, he

would stay at 1004 North Winnebago Street. On the date of the search, Thomas was visiting

1004 North Winnebago Street, as he often did. The police allowed Thomas to leave the premises,

but he was later called back to the residence. When he returned, Thomas told the police that the

shotgun belonged to defendant and was given to defendant by someone known as “S.B.”

¶ 11           On the evening of the search, Thomas gave a written statement to the police,

indicating as follows. About two months earlier, as Thomas was leaving the house at 1004 North

Winnebago Street, he saw defendant talking outside with S.B. S.B. gave defendant a shotgun.

Thomas heard defendant say that he did not have use for the shotgun. S.B. told defendant to just

take it. Defendant put the shotgun inside his left pant leg and walked back into the house.

¶ 12           Thomas testified at trial that his statements to the police were untrue and that the

shotgun actually belonged to him. Thomas testified that he was intoxicated when he made the

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statements. (A police officer testified that Thomas did not appear intoxicated and that Thomas

expressly denied drinking alcohol before giving his statements.) According to Thomas’s trial

testimony, S.B. gave Thomas the shotgun when defendant was not present. Thomas testified that

he had children and did not want to keep the shotgun at his own home. Thus, he decided the best

place to hide it was at his mother’s house. Thomas likewise claimed ownership of the

ammunition the police found at 1004 North Winnebago Street. On cross-examination, Thomas

acknowledged that he had served a prison sentence for murder. The trial court ruled that

Thomas’s written statement, which was inconsistent with his trial testimony, was admissible as

substantive evidence.

¶ 13           Following his arrest, defendant spoke with the police. When asked if the shotgun

was his, defendant denied any knowledge of it. Defendant also told the police that Thomas had

been sleeping in the living room of the Winnebago Street home for about a week. However,

when informed of Thomas’s statements, defendant claimed that S.B. had given the shotgun to

Thomas at 1004 North Winnebago Street and that Thomas walked into the house with it.

¶ 14           The State introduced evidence that defendant had prior drug-related felony

convictions in 2002 and 2008.

¶ 15           Tamesa Holmes testified for the defense. She had two prior felony convictions.

Holmes testified that defendant was her fiancé, and they had one child together. On February 13,

2015, Holmes lived at 1004 North Winnebago Street with her children, defendant, Rosie, and

Thomas. Thomas lived there “off and on,” and he had stayed there for a couple weeks leading up

to February 13, 2015. Holmes testified that her 15-year-old daughter from a previous relationship

had the upstairs northeast bedroom, where the police found the shotgun. Holmes denied knowing

that there were drugs or a shotgun in the house.

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¶ 16            Tiera Floyd testified for the defense. She had one prior conviction for “aggravated

driving under the influence.” Floyd testified that defendant was the twin brother of her boyfriend,

Kevin Boose. According to Floyd, Thomas stayed at 1004 North Winnebago Street on a regular

basis, including on February 13, 2015. Thomas showed Floyd a shotgun twice in the days before

the police searched defendant’s residence.

¶ 17            Defendant elected not to testify.

¶ 18            Finding that the testimony of Thomas, Holmes, and Floyd was not credible, the

trial court found defendant guilty of being an armed habitual criminal and possession of cannabis

with intent to deliver.

¶ 19                       B. Second Amended Postconviction Petition

¶ 20            In his second amended postconviction petition, defendant maintained that other

available witnesses could have supported his claim that he did not possess the shotgun. To that

end, defendant alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to call three witnesses:

Sabastian Green (S.B.), Erica Holmes, and Mary Ann Suggs.

¶ 21            In his affidavit, defendant averred as follows. Before trial, he “gave information

to [his] attorney to contact” Green, who would support defendant’s argument that Green gave the

shotgun to Thomas. Defendant “repeatedly asked [his] attorney to speak with Green and to have

him testify at trial.” Counsel told defendant that Green was “not needed[,] because Thomas

would testify that the shotgun was his.” Counsel added that defendant “had not paid him enough

money to chase Green down.” Defendant also asked his counsel to interview and call Erica

Holmes and Suggs to testify. Their testimony “would have helped to establish that Thomas

owned the shotgun and that he was not just visiting [defendant’s] home on February 13, [2015],

but in fact had been there for nearly a week and often stayed at [defendant’s] home.” Defendant

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attested that he (1) did not receive the shotgun from Green, (2) did not know that Thomas

brought the gun into defendant’s home and hid it there, and (3) was “innocent of the offense for

which [he] was convicted.”

¶ 22           Green stated the following in his affidavit. He was known as “S.B.” Before the

police searched defendant’s home, Green went to talk to defendant about a shotgun that Green

did not want. Green spoke to defendant outside of defendant’s house. Defendant made it clear to

Green that “he had no use for the shotgun.” However, defendant said that Thomas, who was in

the house, may know someone who wanted the shotgun. Defendant went into the house. Minutes

later, Thomas came out, looked at the shotgun, “and was excited about having it.” Green handed

the shotgun to Thomas. Thomas “put the shotgun in his pants leg, accepted the box of bullets[,]

and went back into the house.” Green indicated that he “was willing to come to Court to testify

about all of this but was never contacted.”

¶ 23           Erica Holmes asserted the following in her affidavit. In early February 2015,

before the police searched defendant’s home, she went there to visit her sister, Tamesa. Thomas

also lived at this home, and he slept in the basement. Erica went into the basement to locate a

coat. As she entered the basement, she saw Thomas “doing something with” a long gun. Erica

expressed anger to Thomas about him having a weapon in the home, and she threatened to tell

Tamesa if he did not get the weapon out of the home. Thomas exited the basement and told Erica

that he would get the weapon out of the home after somebody picked him up. Although Erica

recalled Thomas leaving the home that day, she did not see whether Thomas took the weapon

with him. Erica never saw that weapon again. She told defendant before trial about what she

knew, what she saw, and that she “would be willing to testify about these things.” However,

nobody contacted her.

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¶ 24           Suggs stated as follows in her affidavit. On the evening of February 13, 2015, she

arrived at defendant’s home to give Thomas a ride. She noticed the police in and around the

house. When Thomas came out of the home, he “made it absolutely clear that he was in a rush to

leave.” Suggs drove to her apartment with Thomas. Before entering her apartment, Thomas

received a phone call, and he whispered to her that it was the police. Thomas hung up the phone,

and he told Suggs that the police wanted him to return to defendant’s home. Thomas was

“frantic.” He asked to use Suggs’s phone because his phone had a low battery. Thomas stepped

out of the car to talk. When Thomas got back in the car a few minutes later, he told Suggs that

“they found his gun and that’s why they wanted him to return to the home.” Thomas assured

Suggs that “unless they found his prints on the gun[,] they couldn’t charge him because he’s not

on the lease of the home.” “[A]bout 45 minutes after debating whether he should return,”

Thomas asked Suggs to drive him back to defendant’s house. Suggs waited at defendant’s house

long enough to see Thomas being placed in a police car.

¶ 25                             C. The State’s Motion to Dismiss

¶ 26           The State moved to dismiss defendant’s second amended postconviction petition.

The State contended that the decision not to present testimony from Green, Erica Holmes, and

Suggs was trial strategy. The State noted that some of the facts in the new affidavits were matters

that already came out at trial. The State posited that it would have been risky for the defense to

call additional witnesses to corroborate favorable trial evidence, as doing so could create the risk

that the witnesses might contradict themselves on the stand. Moreover, according to the State,

Suggs’s affidavit contained inadmissible hearsay and the information in Green’s affidavit could

have harmed the defense. Additionally, the State argued, defendant’s postconviction argument

rested on the faulty assumption that he could not have been convicted of being an armed habitual

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criminal had the defense persuaded the trier of fact that Thomas owned the shotgun. To the

contrary, the State maintained it was “entirely conceivable” that the trier of fact could have found

that defendant and Thomas both constructively possessed the shotgun. The State asserted that

defendant did not suffer prejudice from his counsel’s failure to call the three specified witnesses,

as it was speculative whether the trier of fact would have found those witnesses credible.

¶ 27           The court held a hearing with argument from counsel, then took the matter under

advisement. On March 2, 2022, the court granted the State’s motion to dismiss the second

amended postconviction petition. Defendant filed an untimely notice of appeal. We initially

dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. People v. Boose, No. 4-22-0283 (2022)

(unpublished summary order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23(c)). Our supreme court

entered a supervisory order directing us to vacate our judgment and treat defendant’s notice of

appeal as properly perfected. People v. Boose, No. 129195 (Ill. Dec. 23, 2022) (supervisory

order).

¶ 28                                      II. ANALYSIS

¶ 29           Defendant argues that he made a substantial showing of ineffective assistance.

¶ 30           The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2020))

“provides a tool for criminal defendants to assert that their convictions were the result of a

substantial denial of their rights under the United States Constitution or the Illinois Constitution

or both.” People v. House, 2021 IL 125124, ¶ 15. There are three stages of postconviction

proceedings. At the first stage, the court reviews the petition independently to “determine

whether it is ‘frivolous or *** patently without merit.’ ” House, 2021 IL 125124, ¶ 16 (quoting

725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 2008)). If the court does not summarily dismiss the petition, the

matter proceeds to the second stage. House, 2021 IL 125124, ¶ 16. At the second stage, the court

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may appoint counsel for the petitioner, and the State may file a responsive pleading. House, 2021

IL 125124, ¶ 17. If the defendant does not make a substantial showing of a constitutional

violation at the second stage, the court dismisses the petition. House, 2021 IL 125124, ¶ 17.

However, if the defendant makes such a showing, the matter proceeds to a third-stage evidentiary

hearing. House, 2021 IL 125124, ¶ 17.

¶ 31            In determining whether a defendant made a substantial showing of a

constitutional violation at the second stage, the court must take as true all well-pleaded facts in

the petition, unless such allegations are “affirmatively refuted by the record.” People v.

Domagala, 2013 IL 113688, ¶ 35. A court may not make credibility determinations until the

third stage. Domagala, 2013 IL 113688, ¶ 35. We review de novo an order dismissing a petition

at the second stage. People v. Sanders, 2016 IL 118123, ¶ 31.

¶ 32            Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are governed by the standard set forth

in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Generally, to sustain a claim of ineffective

assistance, a defendant must show that his counsel’s performance was deficient and that such

deficiency prejudiced the defense. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. An attorney’s performance is

deficient where he or she made errors that were so serious that he or she “was not functioning as

the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. A

defendant establishes prejudice where “counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the

defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. In that

respect, a defendant “must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466

U.S. at 694. “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the

outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

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¶ 33           On appeal, defendant focuses on his counsel’s failure to call Green and Suggs as

witnesses; defendant seems to abandon his claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to call

Erica Holmes. Defendant outlines how Green and Suggs could have supported the defense and

why the result of the trial might have been different had they testified. Defendant contends it

would be premature to consider the admissibility of Suggs’s testimony about Thomas’s

out-of-court statements. The State’s response largely echoes what it argued below in its motion

to dismiss. We determine that defendant has not made a substantial showing that his counsel was

ineffective for failing to call Green or Suggs as witnesses.

¶ 34           In evaluating whether an attorney performed deficiently, “a court must indulge a

strong presumption” that the attorney pursued a sound trial strategy. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.

Courts are particularly deferential to attorneys when it comes to determining whether to call

specific witnesses. To that end, “[d]ecisions concerning which witnesses to call at trial and what

evidence to present on defendant’s behalf ultimately rest with trial counsel,” and such matters are

“generally immune from claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.” People v. West, 187 Ill. 2d

418, 432 (1999). “The only exception to this rule is when counsel’s chosen trial strategy is so

unsound that ‘counsel entirely fails to conduct any meaningful adversarial testing.’ ” West, 187

Ill. 2d at 432-33 (quoting People v. Guest, 166 Ill. 2d 381, 394 (1995)).

¶ 35           We cannot say that defense counsel failed to conduct any meaningful adversarial

testing. Counsel’s strategy was to tie the shotgun found at 1004 North Winnebago Street to

Thomas rather than defendant. In the State’s case-in-chief, Thomas provided testimony favorable

to the defense by claiming the shotgun was his and disavowing his prior statements to the police.

Defense counsel then called Tamesa Holmes, who testified that Thomas lived at 1004 North

Winnebago Street “off and on,” including on February 13, 2015. Defense counsel also called

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Floyd, who testified that Thomas stayed at 1004 North Winnebago Street regularly, including on

February 13, 2015. According to Floyd, Thomas showed her a shotgun twice before February 13,

2015. Despite defense counsel’s efforts to link the shotgun to Thomas, the trier of fact did not

believe the testimony offered by Thomas, Tamesa Holmes, or Floyd.

¶ 36           Defendant now asserts that his counsel should have called two additional

witnesses, Green and Suggs, to attempt to convince the trier of fact that the shotgun belonged to

Thomas. In his affidavit, defendant attested that his counsel determined Green was “not needed”

as a trial witness, as Thomas would claim ownership of the shotgun. Defendant did not explain in

his affidavit why his counsel failed to call Suggs as a witness. Suggs did not specify in her

affidavit whether defense counsel contacted her before trial.

¶ 37           Again, we must indulge the strong presumption that defense counsel pursued a

sound trial strategy by determining which potential witnesses to present. Strickland, 466 U.S. at

689. Calling additional witnesses to try to tie the shotgun to Thomas could have been risky. With

more witnesses would come more opportunities for the witnesses to contradict one another or to

contradict what defendant told the police. One contradiction is obvious from the record. In his

affidavit, Green stated that defendant was inside the house when Thomas accepted the shotgun

from Green outside the house. However, defendant told the police that Thomas “took the gun

and walked inside the house with it,” suggesting that defendant saw Thomas accept the shotgun

and take it inside. It would have been a reasonable strategy for defense counsel to avoid

introducing testimony that contradicted defendant’s own statement.

¶ 38           Defendant cites cases where courts remanded for third-stage evidentiary hearings

to consider postconviction claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The most relevant of these

cases establish that a defense attorney may be ineffective for “failure to present exculpatory

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evidence of which he is aware, including the failure to call witnesses whose testimony would

support an otherwise uncorroborated defense.” (Emphasis added.) People v. Tate, 305 Ill. App.

3d 607, 612 (1999); see also People v. Willingham, 2020 IL App (1st) 162250, ¶ 48 (“Mr.

Willingham’s trial counsel did not call witnesses who claim they would have supported Mr.

Willingham’s self-defense narrative, and the record does not reflect any rationale for this

failure.”); People v. Johnson, 2019 IL App (1st) 153204, ¶¶ 45-46 (noting that defense counsel

cross-examined the State’s witnesses but did not investigate a potential defense witness who

would testify that defendant was not the shooter); People v. Morris, 335 Ill. App. 3d 70, 81

(2002) (“During trial, the only evidence offered by the defense was the defendant’s own

testimony as to his alibi.”). However, none of the cases defendant cites involved claims akin to

what he argues here: i.e., that even though his counsel presented some witnesses to corroborate

an available defense, and even though the trier of fact deemed those witnesses not credible,

counsel should have called more witnesses. Defendant has not made a substantial showing that

his counsel performed deficiently.

¶ 39           For similar reasons, defendant has not made a substantial showing that he was

prejudiced by counsel’s failure to call Green and Suggs as witnesses. Defendant’s postconviction

claim presumes the trier of fact would have credited the testimony of Thomas, Tamesa Holmes,

and Floyd had Green and Suggs testified, too. We acknowledge that we cannot consider at this

stage whether Green or Suggs would have been credible witnesses. However, the record does not

give rise to a “reasonable probability” (Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694) that Green or Suggs would

have compelled the trier of fact to evaluate the credibility of other witnesses differently.

¶ 40           Even if defendant could convince a trier of fact that Green gave the shotgun to

Thomas, there is strong evidence in the record that defendant knew the shotgun was stored in his

                                                - 12 -
house. Such evidence could support a finding that Thomas and defendant jointly possessed the

shotgun. See People v. Denton, 264 Ill. App. 3d 793, 798 (1994) (“When two or more people

share immediate and exclusive control or share the intention and power to exercise control, the

result is not vindication of the defendant, but rather a situation of joint possession.”). The

evidence at trial showed that when officers arrived at 1004 N. Winnebago Street to execute a

search warrant, nobody answered the door even though there were numerous people inside.

When police officers forced their way inside, defendant told the officers that it was unnecessary

to tear up the house, as they would only find “weed.” Considering defendant admitted the

officers would find weed, a reasonable inference is that defendant avoided answering the door

and/or discouraged the police from searching the house because he knew they would find the

shotgun. Furthermore, when a police officer found the shotgun, defendant immediately said it

was Thomas’s, which likewise suggests that defendant knew the shotgun was in the house. As

mentioned above, defendant also gave a statement to the police suggesting that he saw Thomas

walk inside defendant’s home with the shotgun after meeting with Green. Accordingly, even if a

trier of fact heard and believed the statements contained in Green’s and Suggs’s affidavits, there

is still a strong basis in the record to conclude that defendant jointly possessed the shotgun with

Thomas. In other words, showing that Thomas owned the shotgun would not necessarily defeat

defendant’s charge of being an armed habitual criminal.

¶ 41           Defendant must make a substantial showing that his constitutional rights were

violated (Domagala, 2013 IL 113688, ¶ 33) by overcoming the strong presumption that his

counsel pursued a sound trial strategy (Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). Defendant has failed to meet

that burden. Accordingly, the trial court properly granted the State’s motion to dismiss

defendant’s second amended postconviction petition.

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¶ 42                           III. CONCLUSION

¶ 43   For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 44   Affirmed.

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