Court Opinion

ID: 9584015
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:43:49.952162+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:06:28.719840
License: Public Domain

*368On Motion for Rehearing.
1. Contrary to movant’s assertions the issue of whether the question of probable cause should be determined by the court or by the jury was discussed in our original opinion. See McMillan v. Day Realty Assoc., 156 Ga. App. 660, 661 (275 SE2d 352). Nevertheless, we reiterate the well established principle: “The question of probable cause is a mixed question of law and fact. Whether the circumstances alleged to show probable cause existed is a matter of fact, to be determined by the jury, but whether they amount to probable cause is a question of law for the court.” Hearn v. Batchelor, 47 Ga. App. 213, 214 (3) (170 SE 203) and cases therein cited. Accord, South Ga. Grocery Co. v. Banks, 52 Ga. App. 1, 7 (182 SE 61); Tanner-Brice Co. v. Barrs, 55 Ga. App. 453, 454 (4) (190 SE 676); American Plan Corp. v. Beckham, 125 Ga. App. 416 (4) (188 SE2d 151); S. S. Kresge Co. v. Kicklighter, 135 Ga. App. 114 (2) (217 SE2d 418); Williamson v. Alderman, 148 Ga. App. 297 (1) (251 SE2d 153); Hicks v. Brantley, 102 Ga. 264, 272 (29 SE 459). Moreover, “where it is clear from the evidence that the prosecutor did have probable cause for the prosecution of the plaintiff, a verdict for the defendant is demanded.” Morgan v. Mize, 118 Ga. App. 534 (2b) (164 SE2d 565).
2. Statutory authority for our decisions, such as Brown v. Scott, 151 Ga. App. 366, 368 (259 SE2d 642), is found in Code § 105-804 which provides: “A total want of probable cause is a circumstance from which malice may be inferred . . .” Thus, we find no basis, as suggested by movant, to repudiate the holding of Brown v. Scott, 151 Ga. App. 366, 368, supra, that malice can be inferred only where there is a total want of probable cause. “And where there is no evidence of malice other than such inference as may be drawn from proof of the want of probable cause, and that proof shows some circumstances pointing to the guilt of the accused, although insufficient to exclude every other reasonable hypothesis, the essential ingredient of malice is not so established as to entitle the plaintiff in an action for malicious prosecution to recover . . .”

Judgment adhered to.