Court Opinion

ID: 9731494
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:47:28.466895+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:18.635370
License: Public Domain

Levin, J.
(dissenting). We agree with the majority that § 5856 of the Revised Judicature Act1 provides for tolling only where an action has been commenced in a court, and that the Legislature did not contemplate that the commencement of a proceeding in an administrative forum would constitute a tolling event.
The majority opinion acknowledges that "there are administrative proceedings that would serve the purpose of the [tolling] statute by giving notice *86to the defendant of the allegations against him in a forum where the remedies available are equivalent to those in a civil action”,2 but states that an •EEOC proceeding does not provide such notice, that a tolling exception where administrative proceedings have been commenced requires legislative action, and that it is not appropriate for a court to make an ad hoc judgment providing for such tolling.
This Court has held, however, that it is empowered to provide by court rule for tolling on terms different from those set forth in § 5856. In Buscaino v Rhodes, 385 Mich 474, 483; 189 NW2d 202 (1971), the Court held on the authority of Perin v Peuler (On Rehearing), 373 Mich 531, 541; 130 NW2d 4 (1964), that GCR 1963, 101, providing that "[a] civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court”, was "controlling in this case” and superseded limitations set forth in § 5856.
This Court might exercise the power relied on in Buscaino to promulgate a court rule providing for tolling where administrative proceedings have been timely commenced. We would not read the Legislature’s failure to provide in § 5856 for tolling following the commencement of an administrative proceeding as a statement of public policy that in such a case there should not be tolling; as the majority observes, § 5856 merely carried forward in somewhat altered form the tolling provisions set forth in the original Judicature Act of 1915.3
Since 1915 and, indeed, since the 1961 enactment of the Revised Judicature Act, there has been a continuing expansion of the role of administrative tribunals. It is, we believe, part of our responsibility, in regulating the practice and pro*87cedure in the courts, as provided for in Const 1963, art 6, § 5,4 to secure reasonable access to the courts where issues in an administrative proceeding are not decided on the merits. The Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board, the Tax Tribunal, the Employment Security Commission, the Civil Rights Commission, among other tribunals, may, after the time provided for filing a law action, dismiss a proceeding on grounds that do not adjudicate the merits. There may be as much need for tolling to avoid injustice where an administrative proceeding is not resolved on the merits as where a law action is dismissed without consideration of the merits. The tolling need not be for the entire time that the proceeding was pending; the former provision of the Judicature Act allowed one additional year to commence another action.5
A distinction could be drawn between an administrative proceeding commenced in a Michigan administrative tribunal and one commenced in the tribunal of another jurisdiction, such as the EEOC; distinctions could also be made based on the nature of the proceeding and the relief available. In the instant case, the defendant was notified of the plaintiffs complaint when proceedings were commenced before the EEOC. The matter was then referred to the Michigan Civil Rights Commission, which declined to accept jurisdiction. Plaintiffs Michigan procedural rights were thus involved in the EEOC proceedings. Plaintiff could not reasonably have been required to commence a circuit court action while a proceeding was pending that sought to dispose of the complaint by conciliation, *88an alternative dispute-resolution mechanism. When the EEOC proceedings were dismissed, plaintiff commenced the instant action within less than three months.
This Court has provided ad hoc relief where proceedings were commenced in the wrong forum, albeit by reading § 5856 expansively. See Wikman v City of Novi, 413 Mich 617, 654; 322 NW2d 103 (1982), where this Court held that the time for commencement of proceedings in the tax tribunal was tolled by the timely commencement of a circuit court action.
We believe that the Court should promulgate a court rule filling the gap in the statute, and that it should provide the plaintiff in the instant case with relief thereunder and remand this case to the circuit court for trial.
Williams, C.J., concurred with Levin, J.
Cavanagh, J., took no part in the decision of this case.

 MCL 600.5856; MSA 27A.5856.

 Ante, pp 83-84.

 Ante, p 81.

 "The supreme court shall by general rules establish, modify, amend and simplify the practice and procedure in all courts of this state. The distinctions between law and equity proceedings shall, as far as practicable, be abolished. The office of master in chancery is prohibited.” Const 1963, art 6, § 5.

 1948 CL 609.19; MSA 27.611.