Court Opinion

ID: 9953977
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-25 14:00:39.884669+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:12:57.699026
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 23-6051     Document: 010111021091       Date Filed: 03/25/2024     Page: 1
                                                                                   FILED
                                                                       United States Court of Appeals
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                          Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                           March 25, 2024
                          _________________________________
                                                                          Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                              Clerk of Court
  UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

        Plaintiff - Appellee,

  v.                                                           No. 23-6051
                                                     (D.C. No. 5:22-CR-00345-HE-1)
  CORY O’NEAL JONES, a/k/a Cory                               (W.D. Okla.)
  O’Neil Jones, a/k/a Cory O’Nell Jones,
  a/k/a Coryo Jones, a/k/a Cory O. Cooper,
  a/k/a Corey Cooper,

        Defendant - Appellant.
                       _________________________________

                              ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
                          _________________________________

 Before TYMKOVICH, PHILLIPS, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges.
                  _________________________________

       Cory Jones was convicted after pleading guilty to possession of a firearm by a

 felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He now appeals his sentence. Exercising

 jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.

       *
         After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
 unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
 argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
 submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent,
 except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It
 may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellate Case: 23-6051     Document: 010111021091        Date Filed: 03/25/2024      Page: 2

                                              I

        Mr. Jones’s plea agreement reserved his “right to appeal the substantive

 reasonableness of [his] sentence” if the sentence exceeded the advisory range under

 the United States Sentencing Guidelines. R. vol. 1 at 73.

        Before sentencing, Probation prepared a presentence investigation report and

 calculated an advisory Guidelines range of 57 to 71 months’ imprisonment. This

 recommendation included an adjustment for Mr. Jones’s acceptance of responsibility.

        The government argued for an upward variance to 120 months’

 imprisonment—the statutory maximum, see § 924(a)(2). Mr. Jones argued for a

 downward variance to 30 months’ imprisonment. The district court sentenced

 Mr. Jones to the statutory maximum.

        The court discussed as factors contributing to its sentencing decision, among

 others, that

            Mr. Jones possessed AR-15s with high-capacity clips, which the court

                concluded “increase[d] the seriousness of the offense.” R. vol. 3 at

                25:17.

            Although the district court stated it was “not going to draw any hard and

                fast conclusions here about whether he’s ultimately guilty of domestic

                abuse as charged” in a separate proceeding, it was “persuaded by a

                preponderance of the evidence that it did involve a situation where

                [Mr. Jones] was making threats to and choking and bruising and so on

                the victim at the time of that incident. So . . . the guns were possessed

                                              2
Appellate Case: 23-6051    Document: 010111021091         Date Filed: 03/25/2024      Page: 3

              under circumstances which are more serious than might otherwise be the

              case.” Id. at 25:25–26:9.

            Mr. Jones’s criminal history included twenty-eight previous criminal

              convictions, two of which were for unlawful possession of a firearm by

              a felon. See id. at 26–27.

            The offense conduct and Mr. Jones’s criminal history indicated

              “a significant history of violence and physical abuse that he threatens or

              accomplishes with women.” Id. at 28:8–9.

            In connection with his arrest for the offense of conviction, Mr. Jones

              “prepar[ed] . . . false affidavits to try to manipulate the process as it

              related to his detention” and “ma[de] false charges against the jailer at

              the Cleveland County facility in an effort to manipulate the system” in

              an attempt to minimize his own criminal exposure. Id. at 30:4–8.

 This timely appeal followed.

                                             II

       “We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of

 discretion.” United States v. Kaspereit, 994 F.3d 1202, 1207 (10th Cir. 2021).

 Under this standard of review, “we will give substantial deference to the district

 court’s determination and overturn a sentence as substantively unreasonable only if it

 is arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or manifestly unjust.” Id. But, “[a] district court

 abuses its discretion when it . . . commits an error of law, such as applying an

 incorrect legal standard or misapplying the correct legal standard.”

                                             3
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 United States v. Akers, 76 F.4th 982, 991 (10th Cir. 2023) (internal quotation marks

 omitted). Where, as here, “the district court decides that an outside-Guidelines

 sentence is warranted, the court must consider the extent of the deviation and ensure

 that the justification is sufficiently compelling to support the degree of the variance.”

 United States v. Peña, 963 F.3d 1016, 1028–29 (10th Cir. 2020) (internal brackets

 and quotation marks omitted).1

       Applying this standard of review, Mr. Jones’s arguments on appeal are

 unpersuasive. He argues the district court unduly emphasized the number of events

 in his criminal history—which already factored into his applicable Guideline range—

 and mistakenly relied on the (unproven) charges of domestic abuse from the night of

 the incident. But although the court did consider the number of prior criminal

 convictions, it also looked at the nature of those convictions—including two

 involving conduct similar to the offense conduct. And the court clarified that it was

 aware the allegations of domestic violence were just that—allegations. It nonetheless

 found based on the record before it that the allegations were persuasive by a

 preponderance of the evidence. Further, “in arguing that the district court did not

 appropriately weigh” his prior charged and uncharged domestic abuse conduct,

 Mr. Jones “simply asks us to re-weigh factors already presented to the district

 court—something we cannot and will not do.” United States v. Budder,

       1
        To this end, we reject the government’s reference to a “presumption of
 reasonableness of [an] above-[G]uideline sentence.” Resp. Br. at 16. The
 government cites no authority creating such a presumption, and we do not apply one
 here.

                                             4
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 76 F.4th 1007, 1017 (10th Cir. 2023) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted),

 cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 144 S. Ct. 620 (U.S. Jan. 8, 2024) (No. 23-6205).

        The court also considered other factors counseling in favor of its upward

 variance to the statutory maximum sentence that Mr. Jones does not address

 on appeal, including the specific firearm he possessed (an AR-15) and his

 obstructive-of-justice conduct in connection with the instant offense. Considering

 the record as a whole under the applicable standard of review, we cannot say the

 district court abused its discretion.

                                            Entered for the Court

                                            Veronica S. Rossman
                                            Circuit Judge

                                           5