Court Opinion

ID: 9955688
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-28 23:03:05.436689+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:15.067920
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/28/24 P. v. Nguyen CA2/8
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE,                                                     B322978

         Plaintiff and Respondent,                              Los Angeles County
                                                                Super. Ct. No. BA215889
         v.

TUNG THANH NGUYEN,

         Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, James R. Dabney, Judge. Reversed and
remanded with directions.

     Christopher Lionel Haberman, under appointment by the
Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Marc A. Kohm, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                               _________________________
      A trial court may vacate the criminal conviction of a
noncitizen if a preponderance of the evidence establishes that the
conviction is “legally invalid due to prejudicial error damaging
the moving party’s ability to meaningfully understand, defend
against, or knowingly accept the actual or potential adverse
immigration consequences of a conviction or sentence.” (Pen.
Code,1 § 1473.7, subd. (a)(1).) To establish prejudicial error,
defendants must demonstrate a “reasonable probability that
[they] would have rejected the plea if [they] had correctly
understood its actual or potential immigration consequences.”
(People v. Vivar (2021) 11 Cal.5th 510, 529 (Vivar); People v.
Espinoza (2023) 14 Cal.5th 311, 316 (Espinoza).)
      In 2021, appellant Tung Thanh Nguyen, a permanent
resident of the United States and citizen of Vietnam, filed a
motion to vacate his conviction for assault with a semiautomatic
firearm, alleging his defense counsel gave him no advice as to the
adverse immigration consequences of his no contest plea. He also
asserted he never would have entered into the plea agreement
had he known the charge compelled his deportation. The trial
court denied the motion to vacate.
      After the trial court’s ruling, our Supreme Court clarified
and expounded on the factors to be considered in adjudicating
motions under section 1473.7, disapproving the former standard
used by trial courts around the state. Because the trial court did
not consider some of the now relevant factors, we reverse with
directions to set the matter for a new evidentiary hearing.

1     Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

                                2
      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I.    The Conviction
       On June 15, 2001, appellant was charged with willful,
deliberate and premeditated attempted murder and assault with
a semiautomatic firearm plus several enhancements. He was an
18-year-old high school student. On October 15, 2001, pursuant
to a plea agreement, appellant pled no contest to assault with a
semiautomatic firearm in violation of section 245, subdivision (b).
On October 29, 2001, appellant was sentenced to the mid-term of
six years in prison. The attempted murder charge and
enhancements were dismissed pursuant to the plea agreement.
Deportation proceedings were later initiated against appellant
based on this conviction. He was ordered removed by an
immigration judge on December 10, 2004.2
       During the plea colloquy, the prosecutor advised appellant,
“First of all, if you are not a citizen of this county—I don’t know if
you are or not, but if you are not, you will be deported, denied
naturalization, denied readmission, denied amnesty, denied the
ability to work and other rights pursuant to the laws of the

2     We grant appellant’s request for judicial notice of Item 2,
which shows appellant was ordered removed by an immigration
judge on December 10, 2004. (Evid. Code, § 451, subd. (a).) We
deny the same request for items 1 and 3 as these documents were
not presented to the trial court and may be presented to the trial
court on remand. Item 1 is a Repatriation Agreement between
the United States of America and the Socialist Republic of
Vietnam signed January 22, 2008. Item 3 is an article entitled
“Deporting Vietnamese Refugees: Politics and Policy from Bush
to Biden (Parts 1 and 2).”

                                  3
United States. [¶] Do you understand that, sir?” Appellant said,
“Yes.”
II.    2021 Motion to Vacate
      On July 29, 2021, appellant moved to vacate his conviction
pursuant to section 1473.7, subdivision (a)(1) on the ground that
he had not been advised of the immigration consequences of his
plea. Appellant supported the motion with his own declaration
and a declaration by his immigration attorney. He also
submitted documents showing that his three sisters are
American citizens.
III.   Facts Presented in the Motion
      Appellant was born in Vietnam in 1982 and came with his
family to the United States as a lawful permanent resident in
1990 when he was seven years old. He has resided continuously
in the U.S. since his arrival.
      Appellant’s parents died in 2008; the rest of his immediate
family members (a half-brother and three sisters) reside in the
United States and are American citizens. He has no ties to
Vietnam as all his immediate relatives live in this country. He
currently resides with his significant other and her two children
whom he is helping to raise. He is the main breadwinner for his
family and has been self-employed as a handyman since 2018.
He has paid his income taxes since 2005 as required by law.
      At the time of his arrest appellant was an 18-year-old high
school student with no legal knowledge. He had one juvenile
court adjudication and no adult convictions. He had no legal
knowledge. The offense to which he pled no contest arose out of a
shooting involving two cars, each carrying several gang members.
The shooting was prompted by a month-long “feud” between the

                                4
victim and appellant. Earlier on the day of the shooting, the
victim’s car approached the car in which appellant was riding
and someone yelled a threat and pointed a revolver out of the
victim’s car at appellant and the other occupants of his car.
Thereafter, an unidentified man chased appellant around the
high school campus, brandishing a “Club” anti-theft device. The
man later vandalized appellant’s car with the “Club.” Ultimately
the two groups of individuals stalked each other in their cars and
appellant was accused of shooting at the victim’s moving car,
wounding the victim.
IV.   Advice of Counsel
      Appellant was represented in his criminal case by attorney
Michael Bruggeman, who was retained by appellant’s parents. In
support of the 2021 motion, appellant submitted his sworn
declaration that his counsel never advised him of the
immigration consequences of the plea. Appellant stated that the
entire time he was in pretrial detention at the Los Angeles
County Jail his counsel saw him once and did not inquire about
his immigration status or suggest he seek the advice of an
immigration lawyer. Bruggeman did not tell him that a plea
would have immigration consequences. Specifically, he did not
advise appellant that he would lose his lawful permanent
resident status because of the conviction, deportation would be
mandatory, and that once deported he would not be allowed to
return to the U.S. under any circumstances.
      On the day set for trial, Bruggeman visited appellant in the
courthouse lockup and explained that a prosecution witness was
refusing to cooperate and the People were therefore offering him
a plea agreement that was a reasonably good offer. The offer was
a plea of no contest to count 2, assault with a deadly weapon, for

                                5
a nine-year sentence, in exchange for dismissal of the attempted
murder charge. Appellant rejected the offer. Bruggeman later
returned and told appellant the offer had been amended to
include a shorter prison term of six years.
       Appellant believed mistakenly that his status as a legal
permanent resident and his longtime residence in the United
Staes would allow him to apply for a waiver or pardon to avoid
deportation. As it turned out immigration proceedings were
initiated against him based on the conviction and he learned,
after meeting with an immigration attorney, that he had pled no
contest to an aggravated felony, which meant mandatory
deportation and a lifetime bar against returning to the United
States.
       Appellant declared that had he been aware of the actual
immigration consequences, he would have fought the case or pled
to a different immigration-neutral charge, even if it carried a
higher sentence, as he had no ties or family in Vietnam.
       Fabian Serrato, an immigration and criminal defense
attorney, also filed a declaration setting out the consequences of a
plea to an aggravated felony—mandatory deportation, lifetime
exclusion from the United States, disqualification from
naturalization, and cancellation of removal and any other form of
relief from deportation. Had he been involved in the plea
negotiations, he would have attempted a settlement that involved
an immigration-neutral conviction and he would have advised
appellant of the mandatory deportation that flowed from the
proffered plea agreement.
V.    The Trial Court’s Hearing and Decision
      The People’s written opposition to the motion argued that
there was no objective, contemporaneous evidence that appellant

                                 6
entered into the plea under a mistake or confusion, as required
by Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 518–520.) (This is the standard
rejected in Espinoza.) On June 24, 2022, the trial court held an
evidentiary hearing on the motion to vacate the conviction.
Appellant testified as did his former counsel, Bruggeman.
       Appellant testified that he saw his attorney once at the
county jail and after that he saw him in the courthouse when he
presented the proposed plea agreement. Bruggeman told him
that the original deal of nine years incarceration would allow him
to “see daylight again rather than get 25 [years] to life.”
Bruggeman did not ask about his immigration status or tell him
to see an immigration attorney. He did not tell appellant he
would have immigration consequences because of the plea
agreement. He only told appellant he would not be deported
because Vietnam was not accepting its citizens back.
       At the time of this conversation, appellant was a senior in
high school. Appellant testified Bruggeman told him there was a
70 to 80 percent chance he would lose the case if it went to trial,
so “that’s why I took the deal.” When asked if he would have
made a different decision had he known about the mandatory
deportation, appellant testified, “Yeah. My whole family [is]
here. I came here when I was 7. I live with my parents, my
sisters. I have no ties in Vietnam. I would rather just fight the
case. [¶] . . . [¶] I would have never taken the deal.”
       On cross-examination appellant stated that he knew he
was facing a possible sentence of life in prison on the attempted
murder charge. Appellant stated he felt he did not need an
interpreter at the change of plea hearing as he felt confident
going forward in English. He stated he did not want to take the
6-year deal either and his counsel responded that if he did not

                                7
take it, he was looking at 25 years to life in prison. Appellant
reiterated that if there was a chance of being deported he would
have fought the case because “My family all – there’s no reason
for me to go back over there to a country I don’t know.” He
agreed to “whatever they say” in court because his attorney had
already told him the consequence which was “ ‘Oh yeah, they
won’t deport you. They don’t take many people. You don’t have
to worry about it.’ ” Appellant emphasized it was not a discussion
about getting deported; it was just a statement. Despite the
admonition in court during the plea about immigration
consequences, appellant “assumed whatever my lawyer told me
before that, I listened to what he said. [¶] . . . [¶] I was scared and
I just listened to my lawyer. You know, so whatever he advised
me, you know, me taking the deal, I’m going to get out again. [¶] I
don’t have to worry about anything. Things like that. I wasn’t
thinking straight. You know.”
       Attorney Bruggeman also testified. He represented
appellant 21 years before and did not recognize him in court.
They communicated with each other without problems in
English. He could not recall any specific concerns appellant may
have had or any discussions he had with appellant. He had to
fall back on his “custom and practice.” He stated his practice is
to discuss immigration consequences with every client. He was
aware of the list of crimes called aggravated felonies in federal
court. His practice was to discuss immigration consequences
with clients. He stated he discussed immigration consequences
with appellant, although he could not remember having the
discussion. He said it “would have been my custom and practice
with that kind of offer, that kind of charge— it's clearly an
aggravated felony—that there would be immigration

                                  8
consequences, and that more than likely, either he would be
contacted in state prison, or otherwise, there would be
proceedings to remove him or deport him from the United States
of America. [¶] That was going to happen.” He clarified, “If I can,
my custom and practice at that time—and I cannot recall, those
of us around the 11th of September of 2001, there was a pretty
big event, and anyone who was in any risk of immigration
proceedings was suffering those risks. [¶] So I guess what I’m
saying is if it’s an aggravated felony that there would be
immigration consequences. That is my unschooled opinion as a
criminal defense lawyer, knowing what I know about the
immigrations system at that time.” He understood that after
9/11, immigration was picking up and deporting people very
quickly.
       Bruggeman clarified again that he didn’t “recall any
specific conversations with Mr. Nguyen. “ I do know what my—
and I do know my custom and practice has been the last
24 years—actually, the last 27 years—and I do know my custom
and practice was and still is with regard—with regard to
immigration consequences of serious crimes of which all these
charges were—and that is that there would be immigration
consequences and that that would be something the court would
inquire with him as well. [¶] That also comes up in every
conversation.”
       Bruggeman did not recall if appellant articulated any
concerns about immigration consequences. If he had done so, his
practice was to suggest very highly that he discuss it with an
immigration lawyer. He stated that he never said there would be
no immigration consequences.

                                 9
       On cross-examination, Bruggeman stated he did not have
appellant’s file anymore. Before testifying he reviewed the
prosecutor’s file. He clarified that he had no memory of whether
he advised appellant of immigration consequences. He had no
recollection of asking appellant if he was an immigrant, but that
would have been his custom and practice. He again testified that
it would have been his custom and practice to tell appellant that
there would be immigration consequences if he took the plea offer
because the charges were aggravated felonies. It would have
been his custom and practice to tell appellant he could be
deported. “My custom and practice would be to tell him that
these charges are aggravated felonies, and they will trigger
immigration consequences.” It was not his custom and practice
to tell him that he had a possibility of staying in the United
States despite this conviction. His custom and practice would be
to discuss the immigration consequences and if he was interested
in further information, he could consult with an immigration
lawyer. Bruggeman had no specific training or experience in
immigration consequences other than handing a few cases.
Counsel did not recall telling appellant that the unavailability of
a prosecution witness prompted the better deal. He did not
recollect telling appellant that Vietnam was not accepting its
citizens and he believed he would not have known that detail at
the time of the plea because he was not an immigration lawyer.
       Appellant was recalled to testify. He reiterated that his
attorney had told him Vietnam was not accepting its citizens. He
also reiterated that counsel told him he was getting the deal
because a witness was not available, but if the witness was ever
pulled over by police, the witness would then become available to
testify against him. He also said counsel asked him if he would

                                10
like to act as an informant in order to get a better deal.
Appellant declined.
       The trial court made its findings: “I think at the time, his
concern was sitting in county jail and the case that he was
looking at. I guess the—this isn’t like a case where somebody is
looking at the option of getting out today or serving a couple
years in county jail for a theft case. [¶] This is a case where
somebody’s looking at getting out with a determinate sentence of
[six] years at 85 percent or potentially going down on a life case.
[¶] Even if the premeditation allegation hadn’t been proven up,
and there were facts in this particular case that made that a
very, very, very triable issue, but it could have gone either way
based on the confrontation that preceded this and then the
driving pattern that ensued. So it’s—it could have gone either
way. But the bottom line is the 12022.53 [firearm] allegation, all
they have to prove is attempted murder, and they’re done. Then
the 12022.53 would kick in. [¶] He was looking at spending the
rest of his life in prison, which his attorney apparently informed
him of and was honest, you know, about it. It wasn’t that he
had—he wasn’t told he had no chance of victory. [¶] He was told
the chance of losing was 70 to 80 percent, according to your own
client. So he had a 10 to 20 percent chance of prevailing. I don’t
believe that Mr. Bruggeman would have told him that he wasn’t
going to get deported to Vietnam. [¶] I mean, I don’t believe that.
And I think that’s the lynchpin on this. Because otherwise if he
had believed that—because he was a refugee and Vietnam was
not accepting people—he would have—you know—anyway. [¶]
I found him credible when he said he didn’t know what the
ramifications of the fact that it was Vietnam would be in this
particular case. [¶] So I think on balance while I recognize the

                                11
result is really typical for Mr. Nguyen, now, 21 years later, but I
don’t think at the time by a preponderance of the evidence that
he would not have pled had he been advised in a different
manner as to the immigration consequences of the plea. [¶] And
the court’s going to take note that, I mean, if that was really a
concern at the top of his mind, the prosecutor’s telling him that
he will be deported, and this admonition went well beyond what’s
required by [section] 1016.5, that would have been the time to
speak up. [¶] That’s part of the record. Custom and practice. I’m
not convinced that you have carried your burden, so the motion is
denied. [¶] I don’t know what’s happening with immigration with
Mr. Nguyen. I, personally, if I had the power, I would say that
somebody who has redeemed themselves should be able to stay,
and they should leave it alone. [¶] At 18, people do some
incredibly stupid things, and they’re not necessarily the same
people when they’re 29.”
                         DISCUSSION
I.    Applicable Law
      Mandatory deportation from the United States is an
immigration consequence where a defendant is convicted of a
crime deemed an aggravated felony under federal immigration
law. (Moncrieffe v. Holder (2013) 569 U.S. 184, 187–188; 8 U.S.C.
§ 1228(c) [aggravated felony is conclusively presumed
deportable].) Assault with a deadly weapon, combined with a
sentence of more than one year, is an aggravated felony.
(8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F).)
      Section 1473.7 authorizes a person to file a motion to
vacate a conviction or sentence for any of the following reasons:
“The conviction or sentence is legally invalid due to prejudicial

                                12
error damaging the moving party’s ability to meaningfully
understand, defend against, or knowingly accept the actual or
potential adverse immigration consequences of a conviction or
sentence.” (§ 1473.7, subd. (a)(1).)
      Effective January 1, 2019, legislative amendments to
section 1473.7 afforded a defendant relief under the statute
without a showing of ineffective assistance of counsel per the
Strickland3 standard. (People v. Camacho (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th
998, 1005; Stats. 2020, ch. 317, §5.) To establish prejudice,
defendants must show by a preponderance of the evidence that
they did not meaningfully understand or knowingly accept the
actual or potential adverse immigration consequences of the plea.
(Camacho, at pp. 1010–1011; see People v. Mejia (2019)
36 Cal.App.5th 859, 862 (Mejia); see People v. Martinez (2013)
57 Cal.4th 555, 565 [defendants may show prejudice by
convincing the court that a reasonable probability exists they
“would have chosen to lose the benefits of the plea bargain
despite the possibility or probability deportation would
nonetheless follow”]; People v. Rodriguez (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th
995, 1003.)
      The advisement that a defendant may face certain adverse
immigration consequences is insufficient to inform a defendant
that the conviction would subject him to mandatory deportation
and permanent exclusion from the United States. (People v.
Lopez (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 698, 712 (Lopez); Vivar, supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 521 [to warn merely that a plea might have
immigration consequences in circumstances where the
consequences were certain is constitutionally deficient]; People v.

3     Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668.

                                13
Superior Court (Zamudio) (2000) 23 Cal.4th 183, 204 [same].)
Apart from a trial court’s advisement, defense counsel has an
independent obligation to explain to clients the adverse
immigration consequences of a criminal plea. (People v.
Manzanilla (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 891, 905 (Manzanilla).)
       The importance of counsel’s responsibility to give a client a
complete advisement of all material adverse immigration
consequences cannot be overstated – and it is not excused by
official admonitions given during plea colloquy. As our Supreme
Court has stated: “That defendants have a right to counsel when
they undertake the plea evaluation and negotiation specifically
provided for in section 1016.5, subdivisions (b) and (d) is not
disputed. . . . ‘[I]t is the attorney, not the client, who is
particularly qualified to make an informed evaluation of a
proffered plea bargain.’ [Citation.] Thus, whether or not the
court faithfully delivers section 1016.5’s mandated advisements,
‘[t]he defendant can be expected to rely on counsel’s independent
evaluation of the charges, applicable law, and evidence, and of
the risks and probable outcome of trial.’ ” (In re Resendiz (2001)
25 Cal.4th 230, 240–241, abrogated on other grounds by Padilla
v. Kentucky (2010) 559 U.S. 356, 370.)
       The key to section 1473.7 is “the mindset of the defendant
and what he or she understood—or didn’t understand—at the
time the plea was taken.” (Mejia, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at
p. 866.) Showing prejudicial error under section 1473.7,
subdivision (a)(1) means “demonstrating a reasonable probability
that the defendant would have rejected the plea if the defendant
had correctly understood its actual or potential immigration
consequences. When courts assess whether a petitioner has
shown that reasonable probability, they consider the totality of

                                 14
the circumstances.” (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 529.) Factors
relevant to this inquiry include appellant’s ties to the United
States, the importance appellant placed on avoiding deportation,
appellant’s priorities in seeking a plea bargain, and whether
appellant had reason to believe an immigration-neutral
negotiated disposition was possible. (Id. at pp. 529–530;
Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 320.) Also relevant are the
defendant’s probability of obtaining a more favorable outcome if
he had rejected the plea, as well as the difference between the
bargained-for term and the likely term if he were convicted at
trial. These factors are not exhaustive and no single type of
evidence is a prerequisite to relief. (Espinoza, at pp. 320–321.)
       Ties to the United States are an important factor in
evaluating prejudicial error under section 1473.7 because they
shed light on a defendant’s immigration priorities. (Vivar, supra,
11 Cal.5th at pp. 529–530.) When long-standing noncitizen
residents of this county are accused of committing a crime, “the
most devasting consequence may not be a prison sentence, but
their removal and exclusion from the United States.” (Id. at
p. 516; Lopez, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 703; Mejia, supra,
36 Cal.App.5th at p. 872 [compelling evidence of prejudice where
the defendant lived in the United States since he was 14 years
old, and his wife and child lived here, as well as his mother and
siblings].)
II.   Standard of Review
       In Vivar, the California Supreme Court determined the
standard of review for section 1473.7 proceedings and endorsed
the independent standard of review. (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 524.) Under independent review, an appellate court exercises
its independent judgment to determine whether the facts satisfy

                                15
the rule of law. (Id. at p. 527.) Independent review is not the
equivalent of de novo review. (Ibid.) An appellate court may not
simply second-guess factual findings that are based on the trial
court’s own observations. (Ibid.) Factual determinations by the
trial court are given particular deference, even though courts
reviewing such claims generally may reach a different conclusion
from the trial court on an independent examination of the
evidence even where the evidence is conflicting. (Ibid.) Where
the facts derive entirely from written declarations and other
documents, however, there is no reason to conclude the trial court
has the same special purchase on the question at issue; as a
practical matter, the trial court and the appellate courts are in
the same position in interpreting written declarations when
reviewing a cold record in a section 1473.7 proceeding. (Vivar, at
p. 528.) It is for the appellate court to ultimately decide, based on
its independent judgment, whether the facts establish prejudice
under section 1473.7. (Vivar, at p. 528.)
III.   Analysis
      We conclude that when the trial court made its ruling on
June 24, 2022, it did not have the benefit of significant caselaw
that changed the analytical framework used in adjudicating
motions to vacate under section 1373.7. Specifically, Manzanilla
came down one week before the hearing. It held that counsel
must advise the defendant that deportation is mandatory when,
as here, that is the case.
      With respect to prejudice, after the proceedings in the trial
court, our Supreme Court in Espinoza clarified the inquiry
process under section 1473.7 and emphasized that the inquiry
requires consideration of the totality of the circumstances, which
necessarily involves a case-by-case examination for the record.

                                 16
The Court rejected the language in Vivar that objective,
contemporaneous evidence is necessary to corroborate a
defendant’s statements. (This was the standard the People cited
to the trial court in their opposition to the motion.) Instead, “no
specific kind of evidence is a prerequisite to relief.” (Espinoza,
supra, 14 Cal.5th. at p. 325.)
       “[S]howing prejudicial error under section 1473.7,
subdivision (a)(1) means demonstrating a reasonable probability
that the defendant would have rejected the plea if the defendant
had correctly understood its actual or potential immigration
consequences.” (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 529.) “Reasonable
probability” does not mean more likely than not, but merely a
reasonable chance, more than an abstract possibility. (People v.
Soto (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 602, 610; People v. Rodriguez (2021)
68 Cal.App.5th 301, 324.) Indeed, reasonable probability
requires reversal when there exists at least such an equal
balance of reasonable probabilities as to leave the court in serious
doubt as to whether the error affected the result. (Soto, at p. 610;
Rodriguez, at p. 324.)
       Lengthy ties to the United States are an important factor
in evaluating prejudicial error because they shed light on a
defendant immigration priorities. (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at
p. 321.) As our high court has stated, appellant’s longstanding
ties “weigh in favor of finding that he would have considered
immigration consequences to be of paramount concern in deciding
whether to accept a plea agreement.” (Id. at p. 322; see also
Lopez, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 716; Manzanilla, supra,
80 Cal.App.5th at p. 912 [courts noting lack of ties to country of
birth as factor supporting finding of prejudice].)

                                17
      Appellant’s ties to the United States were lifelong. He
arrived here when he was seven years old. At the time of the
plea, he had been in this country 11 formative years and was still
in high school. He has no known familial ties to Vietnam, the
country of his birth and he has never returned to Vietnam since
his departure. Appellant’s three sisters and a half-brother as
well as his significant other and her two children are United
States citizens residing in this country.
      Another consideration is whether alternative, immigration-
safe dispositions were available at the time of the plea. Factors
relevant to this inquiry include defendant’s criminal record, the
strength of the prosecution’s case, the seriousness of the charges
or whether the crimes involved sophistication, the district
attorney’s charging policies with respect to immigration
consequences and the existence of comparable offenses without
immigration consequences. (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at
p. 323; Mejia, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 873.)
      There is no evidence that appellant has a criminal record
apart from the instant conviction and a juvenile adjudication
predating the instant conviction. That fact is relevant because a
defendant without an extensive criminal record may persuasively
contend that the prosecutor might have been willing to offer an
alternative plea without immigration consequences. (Espinoza,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 324.) Also relevant is the prosecutor’s
willingness to deviate so far from a virtual life sentence to a six-
year term in state prison. This most likely represented the
prosecutor’s assessment of problems of proof due to the missing
prosecution witness; however, it could have been due to a
willingness to give appellant a break given no prior adult
criminal record, or more focus on getting a conviction rather than

                                18
on the length of the sentence. Whatever the reason, that the
prosecutor was willing to deviate significantly from a life term to
six years indicates there may have been room to negotiate an
immigration-neutral disposition that may have satisfied the
prosecutor’s priorities, which on the day of the plea plainly did
not include a life term. (Ibid.) Of course, because appellant’s
counsel did not advise him of the mandatory deportation
consequence of pleading no contest, it is improbable appellant, or
anyone else for that matter, focused on the notion of an
alternative plea disposition.
       That the offense involved little sophistication is more than
obvious from the court’s recall of the facts of the case. Rival gang
members driving in two vehicles, vandalizing cars, chasing each
other around a high school campus, yelling threats, and pointing
and shooting guns indicate, as the trial court observed,
”incredibly stupid” things some people do when they are 18. It
was apparent that not a lot of deliberation inspired the conduct of
any of these actors, including appellant.
       The Espinoza Court’s clarification of how to adjudicate
section 1473.7 motions set out specific factors that neither the
trial court nor counsel for the parties raised or considered. The
Espinoza Court acknowledged the possibility of remands in
future appeals (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 325–326 [“a
remand for reconsideration and the development of the record
may be advisable in other cases”]) as do the People and appellant
in their respective briefs. The Espinoza framework requires the
trial court to consider the totality of the circumstances “which
necessarily involves case-by-case examination of the record
[citation], and no specific kind of evidence is a prerequisite to
relief.” (Id. at p. 325.) We therefore remand the matter to the

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trial court to set another evidentiary hearing, using the
analytical framework provided by the Espinoza Court.
                          DISPOSITION
      The order denying appellant’s motion to vacate his
conviction is reversed. The matter is remanded to the superior
court with directions to set the matter for a new evidentiary
hearing to adjudicate the issues of error and prejudice.

      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                           STRATTON, P. J.

We concur:

             GRIMES, J.

             VIRAMONTES, J.

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