Court Opinion

ID: 9688911
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 18:12:07.278097+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:07:02.354322
License: Public Domain

PAGE, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. Although this case concerns entitlement to unemployment benefits, the court’s resolution undercuts the provisions of the Minnesota Workers’ Compensation Act, see Minn. Stat. § 176.141 (2000). Section 176.141 provides:
If the notice is given or the knowledge obtained within 30 days from the occurrence of the injury, no want, failure, or inaccuracy of a notice shall be a bar to obtaining compensation [under the Workers’ Compensation Act] unless the employer shows prejudice by such want, defect, or inaccuracy, and then only to the extent of the prejudice.
In essence, section 176.141 gives employees 30 days to report workplace injuries.
“Rights, remedies and obligations of employers, their insurers and employees concerning compensation for work-related injuries are governed by legislative enactment.” McClish v. Pan-O-Gold Baking Co., 336 N.W.2d 538, 544 (Minn.1983). By requiring employees to report injuries during their shifts, FilmTee has effectively eviscerated section 176.141. The fact that FilmTee may have a laudable reason for a shorter reporting period does not permit it to ignore section 176.141 and establish an inconsistent reporting requirement. See In re Estate of Karger, 253 Minn. 542, 548, 93 N.W.2d 137, 142 (1958) (“What the law ought to be is for the legislature * * *.”). By its decision today, the court condones that evisceration.1
While the policy behind FilmTec’s shortened reporting period for work-related injuries mhy be reasonable, neither the employer nor this court have the authority to change or interfere with the legislature’s duly enacted timeframe for reporting work-related injuries. Whether that time-frame should be shortened is a policy question best left to the legislature. If the legislature desires to shorten the time-frame, it certainly may do so. See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 469, 101 S.Ct. 715, 66 L.Ed.2d 659 (1981) (“ ‘[I]t is up to legislatures, not *808courts, to decide on the wisdom and utility of legislation.’ ”) (quoting Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729, 88 S.Ct. 1028, 10 L.Ed.2d 93 (1963)). But it has not.
In addition to being in conflict with the protections the legislature set out in section 176.141, FilmTec’s policy of terminating employees for failing to timely report work-related injuries under its policy appears to violate Minn.Stat. § 176.82 (2000). Section 176.82 provides:
Any person discharging or threatening to discharge an employee for seeking workers’ compensation benefits or in any manner intentionally obstmcting an employee seeking workers’ compensation benefits is liable in a civil action for damages incurred by the employee
(Emphasis added.) In this case, Schmid-gall’s employment was terminated for engaging in conduct expressly permitted by section 176.141. The chilling effect this decision will have on employees exercising their rights under the Workers’ Compensation Act will be substantial.
Because Schmidgall reported her work-related injuries to her employer, consistent with the timeframe permitted under section 176.141, I conclude that she is not disqualified from receiving unemployment compensation for misconduct as that term is used in Minn.Stat. § 268.095, subd. 6(a) (2000).

. The court concedes that FilmTec’s policy may not be reasonable in every circumstance. Thus, under the court's view, it is permissible to violate the statute under some circumstances, but not permissible under others.