Court Opinion

ID: 9911890
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-20 23:02:40.529122+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:57:52.002951
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/20/23 L.B. v. Alves CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                     (Sacramento)
                                                            ----

 L.B., a Minor, etc.,                                                                          C096244

                    Plaintiff and Appellant,                                        (Super. Ct. No. 34-2018-
                                                                                    00242829-CU-PO-GDS)
           v.

 LORRAINE ALVES,

                    Defendant and Respondent.

         This appeal arises out of an incident in which a dog being walked by defendant
Lorraine Alves jumped on, and allegedly bit, minor plaintiff L.B. after L.B. had stopped
to pet the dog. L.B. sued Lorraine Alves as well as her adult son Joseph Alves, who
owned the dog together with his wife, Laine Alves.1 As relevant here, L.B. alleged that

1 The claims against Joseph Alves are not at issue in this appeal. Because he, Lorraine
Alves, and Laine Alves share a last name, we refer to them individually by their first
names.

                                                             1
Lorraine proximately caused L.B.’s injuries by negligently controlling the dog. The trial
court granted the Lorraine’s motion for summary judgment on the basis that she did not
have a duty to control the dog in the absence of facts making the dog’s attack reasonably
foreseeable. L.B. appeals, contending that the trial court erred by concluding that
Lorraine did not owe L.B. a duty of care.2 We affirm.
                             FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
       Factual Background
       The material facts of this case are largely undisputed. Joseph and his wife Laine
owned Stormy, a German Shepherd/Black Labrador mix. They acquired Stormy from an
animal rescue organization in or around January 2016, when Stormy was 12 weeks old.
Joseph put Stormy though basic puppy training classes when he was around four to six
months old, which consisted of basic commands and leash walking. Joseph subsequently
hired a private trainer, Terra Nicholson, to train Stormy. The training consisted of leash
training and training to not be distracted or flustered around other people and animals.
Laine stated that Nicholson was hired to provide leash training to have Stormy properly

2 L.B. filed a motion to strike, or, in the alternative, requested that we disregard the
respondent’s appendix and references thereto in the respondent’s brief. The respondent’s
appendix includes only one document, which was not in the record before the trial court
at the time of the summary judgment proceedings. Because we only consider those
documents before the trial court during summary judgment (Merrill v. Navegar, Inc.
(2001) 26 Cal.4th 465, 476 [court reviewing grant of motion for summary judgment
considers all evidence offered in connection with the motion, except that which the trial
court properly excluded]), we grant L.B.’s motion to strike, and we will disregard the
respondent’s appendix and all references thereto. (See The Termo Co. v. Luther (2008)
169 Cal.App.4th 394, 404 [granting motion to strike documents included in appendix not
contained in the superior court file]; Emerald Aero, LLC v. Kaplan (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th
1125, 1131, fn. 4 [granting motion to strike portion of respondent’s appendix containing
documents never submitted to the trial court, and references to those documents]; Rules
of Court, rule 8.124(b)(3) [appendix must not contain documents filed in superior court
that are unnecessary for proper consideration of the issues], (g) [court may sanction party
for filing noncompliant appendix].)

                                              2
walk on a leash, and “it was also for in home. Like, to stay on a bed; to not jump on our
screen. So, you know, just normal puppy training.” Nicholson confirmed that she was
hired to provide obedience training and to address behavioral issues, including Stormy’s
“jumping and being overly excitable.” Joseph testified that he hired a trainer not because
Stormy was exhibiting behaviors that he thought needed correcting, but rather because he
wanted to have a very disciplined and well-behaved dog when he took the dog out in
public. He believed Stormy was well-trained and disciplined prior to the incident.
         Beginning in Spring 2017, Joseph paid his mother, Lorraine, to walk Stormy
periodically, which she did up to two to three days per week, until the incident with L.B.3
Lorraine generally took Stormy on the same one- to two-mile loop. She had not observed
Stormy exhibit aggressive behavior prior to the attack, and she did not see any change in
Stormy’s behavior from the time she started walking him until the incident.
         Lorraine was aware that Joseph had obtained training for Stormy, but Joseph never
told her that he had issues with Stormy being around children or that Stormy had
aggressive tendencies toward or around children. Before the incident with L.B., Lorraine
testified that she had not allowed anyone to pet Stormy on their walks because no one had
ever asked. However, she had observed Stormy around her grandchildren at home; he
loved to play with them. Joseph testified that he had seen pictures of his niece and
nephew walking Stormy, that there had been “plenty of kids” at their house without any
issues, and that Lorraine had told him that she had let other children pet him on their
walks.
         The Incident
         On August 8, 2017, when Stormy was about two years old and weighed
approximately 75 pounds, Lorraine testified that she was walking Stormy on her normal

3 Joseph testified that Lorraine was walking Stormy “essentially every day” until the
bite.

                                             3
route when L.B. crossed the street to meet them. She did not know L.B. or expect to see
her; it was uncommon for her to see children on her walks with Stormy. She heard
someone running behind her, and heard L.B. ask to pet Stormy. When she looked up,
L.B. was standing about two to three feet from Stormy. She responded “no,” and “he has
to sit” or “he needs to sit.” She had Stormy sit to her left; she and Stormy were facing
L.B. Stormy sat immediately when she asked him to; he did not seem agitated or startled.
Stormy was on a leash during the entire incident. Lorraine and L.B. talked for a few
minutes because L.B. had run up from behind them, and Lorraine wanted to get to know
L.B. before letting her pet Stormy. L.B. asked again if she could pet the dog, and
Lorraine allowed her to.
       L.B. recalled the conversation slightly differently. She testified that she and
Lorraine said “hi” to one another, L.B. said, “You have a cute dog,” and Lorraine asked
her if she wanted to pet Stormy and said that he was friendly. L.B. said, “Sure” or
“Okay” and petted the dog.
       The parties dispute what happened after L.B. petted Stormy. Because this case
was resolved on summary judgment, we set forth the evidence in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff. (Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 768.)
       L.B. testified that after she finished petting Stormy, she thanked Lorraine and said
she had to go. She turned around to leave, and felt Stormy pull her by her shirt. When
she turned back around, Stormy jumped on her. She fell and blacked out briefly. When
she awoke Stormy was on her; she punched Stormy in the nose and pushed him back by
his neck. Stormy bit her. Lorraine pulled Stormy back. Lorraine asked if L.B. was okay,
L.B. said she was, and they both left.
       Before Stormy jumped on L.B., Lorraine was holding Stormy’s leash, but not
tightly. She acknowledged there was slack in the leash, “about a foot or so” or “a foot or
two.” There was enough slack in the leash for Stormy to knock L.B. down without
Lorraine holding him back.

                                             4
       L.B.’s Complaint
       L.B., by and through her guardian ad litem, filed a complaint against Joseph and
Lorraine. As relevant here, L.B. stated a cause of action against Lorraine for negligence
and negligence per se for the injuries she sustained as a result of Stormy “attacking
and/or biting” her. Lorraine answered the complaint.
       Lorraine’s Motion for Summary Judgment
       Lorraine moved for summary judgment, or, in the alternative, summary
adjudication. The motion argued that Lorraine had no prior knowledge of facts making it
foreseeable that Stormy would attack L.B., L.B. had no evidence and could not
reasonably obtain evidence that Lorraine had prior knowledge of actual facts making it
foreseeable that Stormy would attack L.B., and Lorraine did not own Stormy and
therefore could not be held strictly liable under Civil Code section 3342.
       L.B.’s Opposition to the Summary Judgment Motion
       L.B. opposed the motion for summary judgment. She abandoned her strict
liability claim against Lorraine after learning that Joseph, not Lorraine, owned Stormy.
She contended, however, there were triable issues of material fact regarding whether
Lorraine could be held liable under a general negligence theory for failing to reasonably
control Stormy prior to the attack. She asserted that general negligence does not require
scienter or that a dog have dangerous propensities, but rather only that Lorraine was
negligent in preventing the harm caused by Stormy. (Citing Drake v. Dean (1993) 15
Cal.App.4th 915, 924 (Drake).) She argued that whether Lorraine exercised reasonable
control over Stormy was a question of fact precluding summary judgment. She pointed
to Lorraine’s failure to hold the leash tightly prior to the incident and argued that
Lorraine could have avoided the incident by acting as a reasonable dog walker and
holding tightly to the leash so that Stormy could not jump on L.B.

                                              5
       Lorraine’s Reply
       Lorraine responded that dogs are presumptively not considered abnormally
dangerous unless there is notice of dangerous behavior, and that there must be a showing
that a defendant knew of the dog’s dangerous propensities to hold them liable for failing
to control the dog. She further argued that no evidence demonstrated a reasonable person
would have handled Stormy differently or how a reasonable person would have
intervened to prevent the attack once it began but before injury.
       Trial Court Ruling
       The trial court issued a tentative ruling granting Lorraine’s motion. The court
observed that a person who is keeping a dog, but is not the dog’s owner, “ ‘must have
scienter or knowledge of the vicious propensities of the animal before liability for injuries
inflicted by such animal shall attach to him’ ” (quoting Buffington v. Nicholson (1947) 78
Cal.App.2d 37, 42), and “[a]ctual knowledge of facts which render an attack by a dog
foreseeable may give rise to a duty to protect a third person from the dog” (citing Salinas
v. Martin (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 404, 415-416). The court determined that Lorraine’s
evidence showed that she did not have knowledge of any aggressive behavior or
dangerous propensities of Stormy prior to the incident, and thus the burden shifted to
L.B. to show the existence of a triable issue of fact.
       The court recognized, “A keeper of a dog may be held liable for ordinary
negligence where there is proof that the dog posed a reasonably foreseeable risk of harm
to others and the keeper failed to exercise ordinary care to avoid the risk.” (Citing Drake,
supra, 15 Cal.App.4th at p. 931.) It noted L.B.’s argument that Lorraine failed to
properly control Stormy but found no evidence of a foreseeable risk of harm in the
absence of evidence that Stormy had ever jumped on anyone or exhibited dangerous
propensities. In the absence of a foreseeable risk of harm of which Lorraine was aware
and failed to protect against, Lorraine had no duty to protect L.B. from Stormy. The

                                              6
court further concluded that there was no evidence that Lorraine breached a general duty
of care, “for example, by causing Stormy to attack [L.B.].”
       At the hearing on Lorraine’s motion, L.B.’s counsel emphasized that her
negligence claim was based on Lorraine’s mishandling of the dog or not effectively
controlling the dog, and that a cause of action for negligence did not require a showing of
knowledge of dangerous propensities. Following the hearing, the trial court affirmed its
tentative ruling.
       Judgment was entered on March 7, 2022. L.B. timely filed a notice of appeal.
The case was fully briefed and assigned to the current panel in August 2023.
                                        DISCUSSION
                                               I
                                     Standard of Review
       “The motion for summary judgment shall be granted if all the papers submitted
show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) A
defendant meets her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if she shows
that one or more of the elements of the cause of action cannot be established, or that there
is a complete defense. (Id., subd. (p)(2).) Once the defendant has met that burden, the
burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of material fact exists. (Ibid.)
       We review the trial court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. (State of
California v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1008, 1017.) We consider all the
evidence offered in connection with the motion, except that which the trial court properly
excluded. (Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 476.) In conducting our de
novo review, we must view the evidence in a light favorable to plaintiff, liberally
construing her evidentiary submission while strictly scrutinizing defendant’s showing and
resolving any evidentiary doubts or ambiguities in plaintiff’s favor. (Saelzler v.
Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 768.)

                                               7
       In reviewing the grant of summary judgment, we employ the same three-step
analysis as the trial court. “ ‘ “First, we identify the issues raised by the pleadings, since
it is these allegations to which the motion must respond; secondly, we determine whether
the moving party’s showing has established facts which negate the opponent’s claims and
justify a judgment in movant’s favor; when a summary judgment motion prima facie
justifies a judgment, the third and final step is to determine whether the opposition
demonstrates the existence of a triable, material factual issue.” ’ ” (Claudio v. Regents of
University of California (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 224, 229.)
       “On review of a summary judgment, the appellant has the burden of showing
error, even if [s]he did not bear the burden in the trial court. [Citation.] ‘The fact that we
review de novo a grant of summary judgment does not mean that the trial court is a
potted plant in that process.’ [Citation.] ‘[D]e novo review does not obligate us to cull
the record for the benefit of the appellant in order to attempt to uncover the requisite
triable issues. As with an appeal from any judgment, it is the appellant’s responsibility to
affirmatively demonstrate error and, therefore, to point out the triable issues the appellant
claims are present by citation to the record and any supporting authority. In other words,
review is limited to issues which have been adequately raised and briefed.’ ” (Claudio v.
Regents of the University of California, supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at p. 230.)
                                              II
                                        Duty of Care
       L.B. contends Lorraine owed her a duty of care to prevent foreseeable injuries,
even where Stormy had never exhibited dangerous propensities, and to take reasonable
measures to ensure that Stormy did not jump on or bite her. We agree with L.B.’s
formulation of the applicable duty, but we disagree that Stormy’s attack on L.B. was
reasonably foreseeable.

                                               8
       A. Legal Background
       “The common law recognizes negligence as a distinct [from strict liability] legal
theory of recovery for harm caused by domestic animals that are not abnormally
dangerous.” (Drake, supra, 15 Cal.App.4th at p. 924; see ibid., quoting Rest.2d Torts,
§ 518 [“ ‘Except for animal trespass, one who possesses or harbors a domestic animal
that he does not know or have reason to know to be abnormally dangerous, is subject to
liability for harm done by the animal if, but only if, . . . (b) he is negligent in failing to
prevent the harm’ ”].)
       “To establish a cause of action for negligence, the plaintiff must show that the
‘defendant had a duty to use due care, that he breached that duty, and that the breach was
the proximate or legal cause of the resulting injury.’ [Citation.] Recovery for negligence
depends as a threshold matter on the existence of a legal duty of care. [Citation.] [¶]
Duty is not universal; not every defendant owes every plaintiff a duty of care. A duty
exists only if ‘ “the plaintiff’s interests are entitled to legal protection against the
defendant’s conduct.” ’ ” (Brown v. USA Taekwondo (2021) 11 Cal.5th 204, 213.)
“ ‘Duty is a question of law for the court, to be reviewed de novo on appeal.’ ”
(Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1142, quoting Cabral v. Ralphs
Grocery Co. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 764, 770.)
       “ ‘California law establishes the general duty of each person to exercise, in his or
her activities, reasonable care for the safety of others. (Civ. Code, § 1714, subd. (a).)’ ”
(Kesner v. Superior Court, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 1142.) “ ‘[I]n the absence of a statutory
provision establishing an exception to the general rule of Civil Code section 1714, courts
should create one only where “clearly supported by public policy.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 1143.)
       The issue we must answer as a matter of law in this case is whether Lorraine owed
the 11-year-old L.B. a duty of care to protect her from Stormy. Both parties analyze the
existence or nonexistence of Lorraine’s duty here under the factors promulgated in
Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108. The Rowland factors are not “a freestanding

                                                9
means of establishing duty, but instead . . . a means for deciding whether to limit a duty
derived from other sources.” (Brown v. USA Taekwondo, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 217.)
Stated differently, it is “a guide for determining whether to recognize an ‘exception’ to
the general duty of care under [Civil Code] section 1714,” or an exception to a duty
derived from some other source. (Id. at p. 218; see Golick v. State of California (2022)
82 Cal.App.5th 1127, 1151 [“the ‘purpose of the Rowland factors is to determine whether
the relevant circumstances warrant limiting a duty already established’ ”].)
         The Rowland factors include “ ‘ “the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the
degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection
between the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the
defendant’s conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the
defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with
resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for
the risk involved.” ’ ” (Castaneda v. Olsher (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1205, 1213, quoting
Rowland, supra, 69 Cal.2d at p. 113.) “Foreseeability and the extent of the burden to the
defendant are ordinarily the crucial considerations, but in a given case one or more of the
other Rowland factors may be determinative of the duty analysis.” (Castaneda, at p.
1213.)
         B. Foreseeability
         In assessing foreseeability, “[o]ur task ‘ “is not to decide whether a particular
plaintiff’s injury was reasonably foreseeable in light of a particular defendant’s conduct,
but rather to evaluate more generally whether the category of negligent conduct at issue is
sufficiently likely to result in the kind of harm experienced that liability may
appropriately be imposed.” ’ ” (Colonial Van & Storage, Inc. v. Superior Court (2022)
76 Cal.App.5th 487, 502.) What is “sufficiently likely” means what is “ ‘likely enough in
the setting of modern life that a reasonably thoughtful [person] would take account of it

                                               10
in guiding practical conduct.’ ” (Bigbee v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 49,
57.)
       In Drake, the court discussed the foreseeability of harm that will give rise to a duty
to protect third persons from a dog. A keeper of a dog will be liable for negligence where
there is proof that the dog posed a reasonably foreseeable risk of harm to others, and the
keeper failed to exercise ordinary care to avert that risk. (Drake, supra, 15 Cal.App.4th
at p. 931, see id. at p. 925 [“In determining the keeper’s liability for negligence for
injuries inflicted by a domestic animal, the criterion usually adopted is one of reasonable
anticipation of the occurrence, i.e., foreseeability”].) The court recognized that
“negligence may be predicated on the characteristics of the animal which, although not
abnormal to its class, create a foreseeable risk of harm. As to those characteristics, the
owner has a duty to anticipate the harm and to exercise ordinary care to prevent the harm.
[Citation.] ‘The common law [] provided that the owner of an animal which was not
vicious . . . but which was prone to some other potentially harmful behavior, could be
held liable under a theory of negligence for any injury proximately caused by such
behavior. In such cases the owner was only liable if, having knowledge of the particular
propensities which created a foreseeable risk of harm, he failed to exercise reasonable
care in control of the animal.’ ” (Id. at p. 929.) Similarly, a person who keeps a dog “is
required to know its normal habits and tendencies,” and therefore is “required to realize
that even ordinarily gentle animals are likely to be dangerous under particular
circumstances and to exercise reasonable care to prevent foreseeable harm.’ ” (Id. at p.
925, quoting Rest.2d Torts, § 518, com. h.)
       The Drake court recognized that “it is not unknown for dogs to jump on people,”
and therefore “it may reasonably be anticipated that a dog which has jumped on people
before will do it again.” (Drake, supra, 15 Cal.App.4th at p. 931.) In Drake, because the
plaintiff had presented evidence that the defendant knew the dog “ ‘had a habit of

                                              11
jumping on people,’ ” the court concluded that “an inference could be drawn that such
conduct was reasonably foreseeable.” (Ibid.)
       The source of the parties’ dispute here is not whether the keeper of a dog has the
duty to prevent reasonably foreseeable injuries, but rather whether Stormy’s attack on
L.B. was reasonably foreseeable in light of the evidence regarding Stormy’s behavior.
L.B. contends it was foreseeable that Stormy would jump on and harm her because he
had exhibited jumping behavior in the past.4 However, no evidence in the record
indicates that Stormy had ever jumped on people. The only evidence regarding the
nature of Stormy’s jumping behavior was Laine’s testimony that the family hired a
trainer to help Stormy stop jumping on the family’s screen. We recognize that the trainer
stated in her declaration that she was hired to stop Stormy’s excitable and jumping
behavior, but that statement does not provide evidence that Stormy had ever jumped on
people.
       Instead, the evidence in the record shows that Lorraine had never observed Stormy
exhibit aggressive behavior, had never been told that Stormy had exhibited aggressive
tendencies or behavior toward children, and had observed Stormy playing with Lorraine’s
grandchildren without incident. Joseph testified that Stormy had been around “plenty of
kids” at his house without incident. Thus, the facts here are distinguishable from those in
Drake, where there was evidence the dog tended to jump on people, making future jumps
on people foreseeable. (Drake, supra, 15 Cal.App.4th at p. 931.)
       L.B. contends that Drake should not be construed so narrowly, but the
Restatement is in accord: “Knowledge, or reason to know, that an animal has a tendency

4 Lorraine contends L.B.’s complaint alleged only that she was injured by Stormy’s bite,
not his jump, and therefore the only relevant inquiry here is whether it was foreseeable
that Stormy would bite L.B. But L.B.’s complaint alleged that Stormy caused injuries by
“attacking and/or biting” her, which reasonably includes “lunging at” or “jumping on.”

                                            12
to attack or fight with other animals is not necessarily knowledge or reason to know that
it will attack human beings.” (Rest.2d Torts, § 509, cmt. i.) Additionally, knowledge
that the dog’s possessor knows the dog has the playful habit of jumping up on visitors
will not support liability if the dog unexpectedly bites a postman, when he never has
shown any inclination to do so before. (Ibid.) Similarly, here, Stormy’s behavior of
jumping on a screen was not sufficient to make it foreseeable that Stormy would jump on
a person, where there was no evidence that Stormy had ever exhibited that behavior, or
any other aggressive behavior toward children, in the past.
       L.B. argues it is reasonably foreseeable that Lorraine would or should have known
about Stormy’s jumping behavior, and that it was reasonable for Lorraine to infer that
training was needed due to Stormy’s jumping or excitable behavior. But there is no
evidence that Lorraine was aware of Stormy’s jumping behavior. Lorraine acknowledged
that she was aware the family had hired a trainer, but testified to her understanding that
Stormy underwent “[o]bedience training.” Again, Lorraine had walked Stormy on a
regular basis and had observed Stormy interact with children in the home, and there is no
evidence she had ever witnessed a jumping incident. Additionally, as we have discussed,
even if Lorraine had been aware of Stormy’s jumping behavior, the only evidence in the
record was that Stormy had jumped on screens, not on people. There was no reason for
Lorraine to know or to infer that the family sent Stormy to obedience classes to correct a
behavior she had never observed.
       L.B. next argues it was reasonably foreseeable that Stormy would jump on her
because Lorraine allowed L.B. to pet him and told her he was friendly, when in fact she
had never allowed anyone to pet Stormy before on their walks. But Lorraine testified that
she had not let anyone else pet Stormy because no one had asked, not because she had a
reason to believe Stormy would jump on someone. Lorraine had no reason to believe that
Stormy would jump on L.B. when he had never jumped on anyone before.

                                             13
       In the absence of any prior incidents of jumping on people, L.B. asserts that it is
common knowledge that puppies and young dogs will exhibit puppy-like behavior,
including jumping behavior. Courts have rejected similar attempts to generalize based on
breed. (See Yuzon v. Collins (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 149, 168 [“it would be improper to
take judicial notice that all adult male pit bulls are dangerous”]; Chee v. Amanda Goldt
Property Management (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1360, 1371-1372 [“evidence that the
breed of dog has certain characteristics,[ ] by itself, is insufficient to support an inference
that [the defendant] had actual knowledge that his tenant’s dog had any dangerous
propensities”].) The fact that many puppies or young dogs have the tendency to jump did
not make it foreseeable that Stormy would jump on L.B. where there was no evidence
that he had exhibited that behavior in the past. A person who keeps a dog “is required to
know its normal habits and tendencies” and to realize “that even ordinarily gentle animals
are likely to be dangerous under particular circumstances and to exercise reasonable care
to prevent foreseeable harm.’ ” (Drake, at p. 925, quoting Rest.2d Torts, § 518, com. h.)
Thus, Lorraine was charged with knowing Stormy’s normal habits and tendencies, and
there was no evidence that suggested his normal habits and tendencies included jumping
on people or biting.
       We do not dispute L.B.’s contention that Stormy--a 75-pound, two-year-old,
German Shepard/Black Labrador mix--was capable of injuring 11-year-old L.B.5 But the
issue before us is not whether Stormy could possibly injure L.B. Rather, the issue before
us is whether it was foreseeable that Stormy would injure L.B. The undisputed evidence
failed to show any indication that Stormy had jumped on or bitten a person in the past.
Thus, while we recognize the existence of a duty to protect against reasonably

5 Lorraine observes that L.B.’s weight was not in evidence as a comparison to Stormy’s,
but we fail to envision any 11-year-old girl whom a dog similar to Stormy would be
incapable of injuring.

                                              14
foreseeable injuries, here there was no such foreseeability. The lack of foreseeable harm
weighs strongly in favor of finding no duty here.
         C. Burden
         L.B. argues that the burden of imposing a duty weighs in her favor because the
burden on Lorraine was minimal and only required that Lorraine properly control Stormy
to prevent him from jumping on her. She argues that Lorraine could have easily held
Stormy tightly while he “had access to” L.B. and not allow up to two feet of slack in the
leash.
         We disagree. The imposition of negligence liability in cases like the one before us
would obligate every dogwalker to hold the leash tightly enough to prevent the dog from
reaching any person the dog was even capable of injuring, even where the dog had never
exhibited aggressive behavior toward anyone. Imposing that burden in the absence of a
foreseeable risk of harm is unworkable and unjustified.
         D. Other Factors
         We next consider the other Rowland factors to see whether they are “determinative
of the duty analysis.” (Castaneda v. Olsher, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1213.) The
remaining factors are “the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the
closeness of the connection between the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered, the
moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct, the policy of preventing future
harm . . . , and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.”
(Rowland v. Christian, supra, 69 Cal.2d at p. 113.)
         It is undisputed that L.B. was injured. As to the closeness of connection between
Lorraine’s conduct and L.B.’s injury, it does appear that had Lorraine more tightly
leashed Stormy, it is likely he would not have been able to injure L.B. But because
Lorraine had no reason to believe Stormy would jump at and bite L.B., neither party was
morally blameworthy. Regarding the policy of preventing future harm, we conclude
future harm is not so likely in the absence of a foreseeable risk to justify imposing a duty

                                              15
here. Finally, while insurance may be available for dog bites, that factor is not sufficient
to impose a duty in light of the other factors we have discussed.
       In sum, we have considered all the Rowland factors, and they weigh strongly
against imposing a duty of care on a dogwalker to protect a third party from a dog in the
absence of a reasonable foreseeability of injury. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment in
favor of Lorraine.
                                      DISPOSITION
       The judgment is affirmed. Lorraine shall recover her costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules
of Court, rule 8.278(a).)

                                                        /s/
                                                  Duarte, J.

We concur:

      /s/
Hull, Acting P. J.

      /s/
Keithley, J.*

*Judge of the Butte County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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