Court Opinion

ID: 9896605
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-13 20:04:28.523444+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:08.639579
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/13/23 In re K.C. CA2/4
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                       DIVISION FOUR

 In re K.C. et al., Persons Coming                               B324134
 Under the Juvenile Court Law.
 ______________________________                                 (Los Angeles County
                                                                Super. Ct. No. 22CCJP02699A-C)
 Los Angeles County Department
 of Children and Family Services,

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.

 R.M.,

           Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Tara L. Newman, Judge. Dismissed as moot.
     Seth F. Gorman, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Veronica Randazzo, Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                   ____________________________

       Father, R.M., appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdiction
and disposition orders finding his children, K.C. (born July 2005),
Ra.M. (born May 2013), and Be.M. (born February 2015)
(collectively, the children) to be persons described by Welfare and
Institutions Code section 300.1 Father argues that the evidence
did not support the jurisdictional findings. His appeal, however,
has been rendered moot by a subsequent petition independently
establishing jurisdiction over the children, which father did not
appeal. We decline to exercise our inherent discretion to reach
the merits. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed as moot.

       FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A.     Original Section 300 Petition
       In May 2022, the Los Angeles County Department of
Children and Family Services (Department) received a referral
indicating father arrived at the family home intoxicated from
alcohol. As the family was preparing to leave the house that
morning, Father and K.C. had an argument. Father punched
K.C.’s face with a closed fist, causing her glasses to fall off,
because he thought she disrespected him. Ra.M. and Be.M. were
in a car about 20 feet away when the incident occurred. After
nonparty mother intervened, father left the home. Mother then

1      All undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.

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went to the police station and obtained an emergency-protective
order against him.
       Mother reported to law enforcement personnel that father
was an alcoholic and she had multiple prior altercations with
him. Mother later told a social worker that “father’s behavior[ ]
changes when he drinks, such as th[at] father can be very
irritable, but he ha[d] never physically assaulted any of the
children.” Mother described his alcohol consumption as
“excessive” and said he was “unable to control his intake.”
       Father admitted to drinking alcohol the night before the
incident. He said he was hungover but not drunk that morning
and had partaken in “five days of partying and drinking.” He
claimed he became defensive with K.C. because he thought, albeit
mistakenly, she called him a “dead ass.”
       The Department found that while the family was
cooperative, the incident and father’s drinking issues were
serious. The Department also noted mother believed an open
case and court order would ensure her family got the help they
needed. The Department filed a section 300 petition on the
children’s behalf.
       At the adjudication hearing in September 2022, the
juvenile court sustained an amended petition pursuant to
section 300, subdivision (b)(1). The court found true allegations
that father physically abused K.C. and that father’s alcohol abuse
rendered him incapable of providing Ra.M. and Be.M. with
regular care and supervision, placing the children at risk of
serious physical harm. The court ordered, “Pursuant to §360(b)
of the Welfare and Institutions Code, minor[s are] person[s]
described under §300 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, and
minor[s] and or parent(s) or guardian(s) are placed under [the

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Department’s] supervision for a period consistent with §301 of
the Welfare and Institutions Code.” The children were released
to the parents, with the parents being ordered to participate in
services. Father timely appealed.

B.     Post-Appeal Proceedings and Subsequent Petition
       In February 2023, the Department filed a section 342
subsequent petition based on new facts alleging the children were
at substantial risk of suffering serious harm under section 300,
subdivisions (a), (b)(1), and (j). The Department concurrently
filed a section 360, subdivision (c) petition alleging the parents
failed to participate in court-ordered services.
       In May 2023, the juvenile court sustained the subsequent
petition, amended by interlineation, based upon events that
happened since the original petition was filed. The subsequent
petition not only included new allegations of the parents
engaging in violent altercations in the children’s presence, but
also allegations concerning more recent incidents where father
repeatedly hit K.C.’s face and was under the influence of alcohol
while the children were under his supervision and care. The
court also sustained the section 360 petition. The children were
removed from father and ordered placed in mother’s home.
Additionally, in July 2023, the court terminated its jurisdiction
over K.C. after the Department recommended the court do so
because she turned 18 years old.2

2      We grant the Department’s request for judicial notice of the
section 342 subsequent petition, the section 360 petition, the last-
minute information report filed with the juvenile court, and the court’s
orders following father’s notice of appeal. (Evid. Code., §§ 452,
subd. (d), 459.)

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                             DISCUSSION
A.     Father’s Appeal is Moot
       The Department requests that we dismiss father’s appeal.
It contends the appeal was rendered moot by the juvenile court
finding the children are persons described by section 300 based
on new and independent facts pursuant to the section 342
subsequent petition. Father argues that his appeal is not moot
because if the original jurisdictional findings are reversed, the
order sustaining the subsequent petition necessarily fails. We
disagree.
       “A court is tasked with the duty ‘“to decide actual
controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and
not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions,
or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the
matter in issue in the case before it.”’” (In re D.P. (2023) 14
Cal.5th 266, 276.) “A reviewing court must ‘“decide on a case-by-
case basis whether subsequent events in a juvenile dependency
matter make a case moot and whether [its] decision would affect
the outcome in a subsequent proceeding.”’” (Ibid.) “A case
becomes moot when events ‘“render[ ] it impossible for [a] court, if
it should decide the case in favor of plaintiff, to grant him any
effect[ive] relief.”’ [Citation.] For relief to be ‘effective,’ two
requirements must be met. First, the plaintiff must complain of
an ongoing harm. Second, the harm must be redressable or
capable of being rectified by the outcome the plaintiff seeks.
[Citation.]” (Ibid.) In a dependency case, “relief is effective when
it ‘can have a practical, tangible impact on the parties’ conduct or
legal status.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 277.)
       “In dependency proceedings, the basic pleading device to
assert a child falls within the juvenile court’s jurisdiction is a

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petition. [Citation.] ‘It may be an original petition (§ 332), a
subsequent petition for children who are already dependents
when there are “new facts or circumstances” that bring them
within a category of section 300 “other than those under which
the original petition was sustained” (§ 342), or a supplemental
petition when there are facts which indicate that a previous
disposition is not appropriate. (§ 387.)’” (In re A.B. (2014) 225
Cal.App.4th 1358, 1364.)
       “‘When a dependency petition alleges multiple grounds for
its assertion that a minor comes within the dependency court’s
jurisdiction, a reviewing court can affirm the juvenile court’s
finding of jurisdiction over the minor if any one of the statutory
bases for jurisdiction that are enumerated in the petition is
supported by substantial evidence. In such a case, the reviewing
court need not consider whether any or all of the other alleged
statutory grounds for jurisdiction are supported by the evidence.’”
(In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773; see also In re Ashley B.
(2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 968, 979 [“[a]s long as there is one
unassailable jurisdictional finding, it is immaterial that another
might be inappropriate”].)
       In In re A.B., a parent appealed from orders finding
jurisdiction under an original and subsequent petition. (225
Cal.App.4th at pp. 1363–1364.) No effective relief could be
provided by reversing jurisdiction under the original petition
“because jurisdiction was established independently under the
subsequent petition on entirely new and independent facts.” (Id.
at p. 1364.) The Court of Appeal held, “[a]ll procedures and
hearings required for an original petition are required for a
subsequent petition and are conducted under the same rules.”
(Ibid.) “[S]o long as the jurisdictional finding under the

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subsequent petition is supported by substantial evidence,
reversal of the jurisdictional finding under the original petition
would be futile.” (Ibid.)
       Here, father challenges only the findings made on the
original petition; however, the allegations against father in the
section 342 subsequent petition provide an independent basis for
finding jurisdiction over the children. Father did not appeal from
the subsequent petition, and he does not dispute his time to do so
has expired. Moreover, the findings made under the subsequent
petition were not dependent on the original jurisdiction findings
and orders. Consequently, reversal of the original jurisdictional
findings would not affect whether any of the children are
dependents of the court, and thus, reversal would be futile. (In re
A.B., supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 1364; see also In re Ashley B.,
supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 979.)
       The cases that father relies on in arguing that the findings
made under the subsequent petition must fail are inapposite. In
each case, an initial section 300 petition was found insufficient to
establish juvenile court jurisdiction, but none involved a
section 342 subsequent petition providing an independent basis
for jurisdiction. (See e.g., In re R.M. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 986;
In re Destiny S. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 999; In re Janet T. (2001)
93 Cal.App.4th 377.) They did not affect the juvenile court’s
jurisdiction. (Cf. In re Joshua C. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1544,
1548 [“As the jurisdictional findings are the basis for the
restrictive visitation and custody orders, error in the former
undermines the foundation for the latter”]; In re Travis C. (2017)
13 Cal.App.5th 1219, 1225 [“Section 342 requires the trial court
to determine whether newly[-]alleged facts or circumstances

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establish jurisdiction independent of facts alleged in the
section 300 petition”].)
      Accordingly, father’s challenge as to the jurisdictional
findings under the original petition was rendered moot by the
court’s findings under the section 342 subsequent petition, as
“jurisdiction was established independently under the
subsequent petition on entirely new and independent facts.”3 (In
re A.B., supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 1364.)

B.     Discretionary Review of Father’s Moot Appeal is Not
       Warranted
       Father asserts we should exercise our discretion to reach
the merits of the moot appeal. We conclude exercise of our
discretion is not warranted.
       “Even when a case is moot, courts may exercise their
‘inherent discretion’ to reach the merits of the dispute.
[Citation.]” (In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 282.) “As a rule,
courts will generally exercise their discretion to review a moot
case when ‘the case presents an issue of broad public interest
that is likely to recur,’ ‘when there may be a recurrence of the
controversy between the parties,’ or ‘when a material question
remains for the court’s determination.’ [Citations.]” (Ibid.)

3      Regarding K.C., she is now 18 years old, and the juvenile court
has terminated its jurisdiction over her. The termination of
dependency jurisdiction generally renders an appeal of previous orders
moot. (In re C.C. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1481, 1488.) While mootness
for this reason should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, father has
not identified any relief we could grant him as to K.C. now that she
has reached the age of majority. (See In re Jessica K. (2000) 79
Cal.App.4th 1313, 1316.)

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       The Supreme Court has provided a non-exhaustive list of
factors to be considered when deciding “whether a court should
exercise discretionary review of a moot appeal.” (In re D.P.,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 286.) First, a court deciding whether to
exercise discretionary review may consider “whether the
challenged jurisdiction finding ‘could be prejudicial to the
appellant or could potentially impact the current or future
dependency proceedings,’ or ‘“could have other consequences for
[the appellant] beyond jurisdiction.”’” (Id. at p. 285.) Second, the
exercise of discretionary review “may also be informed by
whether the jurisdictional finding is based on particularly
pernicious or stigmatizing conduct.” (Id. at pp. 285–286.) Third,
a court may consider whether the case became moot due to
prompt compliance by parents with their case plan. (Id. at
p. 286.) “[N]o single factor is necessarily dispositive of whether a
court should exercise discretionary review of a moot appeal.”
(Ibid.)
       Although father generally contends the adverse jurisdiction
findings may affect future family law or dependency proceedings,
or that they could impact the children’s placement and his
finances, father does not identify specific consequences or
prejudice he could suffer. Further, the challenged findings were
based on father’s alcohol abuse and physical abuse of K.C. While
these issues are serious, the juvenile court made new
jurisdictional findings as to the children, and regardless of our
ruling, these findings again involving father’s alcohol abuse and
his physical abuse of K.C. will remain. This is also not a case
that became moot due to prompt compliance with a case plan.
       No other factor supports reaching the merits. While In re
D.P. stated it may serve the interest of justice to review a moot

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appeal “[w]here a case is moot because one parent appealed and
not the other,” this is not an appeal that became moot because
only one parent appealed. (In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at
p. 286.) Although father asserts this case involves issues of broad
public interest, as the question of what constitutes “substance
abuse” for purposes of dependency jurisdiction is pending before
the Supreme Court (In re N.R. (April 29, 2022, B312001)
[nonpub. opn.], review granted Aug. 24, 2022, S274943), father
does not assert it is necessary to clarify the law to resolve his
appeal. Father’s appeal is fact-specific as to the findings against
him, and he does not show that a material question remains
between the parties. On balance, the factors identified in In re
D.P. do not warrant discretionary review of the moot appeal.

                        DISPOSITION
      The appeal is dismissed as moot.

                                          MORI, J.
      We concur:

            COLLINS, Acting P. J.

            ZUKIN, J.

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