Court Opinion

ID: 9609438
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:27:04.47571+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:50.612814
License: Public Domain

Dore, J.
(dissenting) — Because the results from lie detector tests have not been shown to be reliable, and possess a high potential for prejudice, they are generally inadmissible. See Annot., 53 A.L.R.3d 1005 (1973). Stipulations neither make the process more accurate nor eliminate the danger of the usurpation of the jury's fact-finding role. I would, therefore, hold that the court erred in admitting the polygraph evidence over the defendant's objection. Furthermore, the error was magnified by the court's failure to protect the defendant's right to a fair trial by properly cautioning the jury as to the potential imperfections of such polygraph tests.
Polygraph test results are uncertain. State v. Young, 87 Wn.2d 129, 131-32, 550 P.2d 1 (1976); State v. Woo, 84 Wn.2d 472, 527 P.2d 271 (1974); State v. Pleasant, 21 Wn. App. 177, 188-92, 583 P.2d 680 (1978), review denied, 91 Wn.2d 1011, cert. denied, 441 U.S. 935, 60 L. Ed. 2d 664, 99 S. Ct. 2058 (1979); People v. Leone, 25 N.Y.2d 511, 255 N.E.2d 696, 307 N.Y.S.2d 430 (1969). The Oklahoma Criminal Court of Appeals identified five factors responsible for error in these examinations: (1) emotional tension, (2) physiological abnormalities, (3) mental abnormalities, (4) unresponsiveness in a lying or guilty subject, and (5) unob*911served muscular movements which produce ambiguities or misleading indicators in the blood pressure tracing. Henderson v. State, 94 Okla. Crim. 45, 230 P.2d 495, 501-02, 23 A.L.R.2d 1292 (1951). See also Romero v. State, 493 S.W.2d 206, 210 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973). Polygraph experts concede that there is no way of precisely measuring the accuracy of the "lie detector". J. Reid & F. Inbau, Truth and Deception 303-04 (2d ed. 1977). Additionally, the competency of the examiner is a potential source of error. State v. Tavernier, 27 Or. App. 115, 555 P.2d 481 (1976); United States v. Lanza, 356 F. Supp. 27 (M.D. Fla. 1972). See Highleyman, The Deceptive Certainty of the "Lie Detector", 10 Hastings L. J. 47, 57-61 (1958).
Triers of fact also tend to view polygraph evidence as conclusive on the issue of the guilt of the accused. Romero v. State, supra at 211; People v. Davis, 343 Mich. 348, 373, 72 N.W.2d 269 (1955); United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161, 169-70 (8th Cir. 1975). See J. Richardson, Modern Scientific Evidence (1961).
Yet, despite the polygraph's uncertain reliability and the potential danger incident to its use, the majority holds that upon stipulation by the parties, prior to administration of the polygraph tests, test results may be admitted into criminal trials as evidence. This holding smacks of Russian roulette. The defendant is betting he will pass the test while the prosecution is hoping that the test will show defendant is lying. The stipulation has little or nothing to do with the guilt or innocence of the defendant.
A better view was expressed by the Ohio Court of Appeals in the case of State v. Hill, 40 Ohio App. 2d 16, 23, 317 N.E.2d 233, 238 (1974).
We do not consider it logical and reasonable to hold . . . that [polygraph] evidence has probative value when offered under a stipulation . . . but that it has no probative value without such stipulation.
Courts with this outlook have consistently refused to admit polygraph evidence over a defendant's objection, without regard to the parties' stipulation. Romero v. State, supra; *912Lewis v. State, 500 S.W.2d 167 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); Pulakis v. State, 476 P.2d 474 (Alaska 1970); Conley v. Commonwealth, 382 S.W.2d 865 (Ky. Ct. App. 1964); Stone v. Earp, 331 Mich. 606, 50 N.W.2d 172 (1951); State v. Hill, 40 Ohio App. 2d 16, 317 N.E.2d 233 (1974); LeFevre v. State, 242 Wis. 416, 8 N.W.2d 288 (1943); State v. Corbin, 285 So. 2d 234 (La. 1973); United States v. Sadrzadeh, 440 F.2d 389 (9th Cir. 1971); Chambers v. State, 141 Ga. App. 438, 233 S.E.2d 818 (1977); People v. Monigan, 72 Ill. App. 3d 87, 390 N.E.2d 562 (1979); Akonom v. State, 40 Md. App. 676, 394 A.2d 1213 (1978); State v. Biddle, 599 S.W.2d 182 (Mo. 1980); State v. Frazier, 252 S.E.2d 39 (W. Va. 1979).
Because polygraphs are sensitive to changes in muscular tension and blood pressure, the very act of stipulating the admission of the test results could increase the defendant's tension level, which reduces the machine's accuracy. Truth and Deception, supra at 37-38. Furthermore, we do not know that the defendant understood the many variables inherent in the administration and interpretation of the test when he entered the stipulation.
I agree with the statement of the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois in People v. Zazzetta, 27 Ill. 2d 302, 309, 189 N.E.2d 260 (1963):
While a defendant may understandingly stipulate to much in a criminal trial, and may waive many objections, we think it manifestly unfair to bind him by a stipulation regarding the trustworthiness of scientific opinion far beyond his expected ken.
It is inconsistent and unfair for courts to affirm the unreliability of lie detector tests and simultaneously admit into evidence the results of a stipulated test. In doing so, I would hold that the trial court erred.1
*913The trial court magnified its error by failing to caution the jury that the examiner's testimony does not tend to prove or disprove any element of the crime with which a defendant is charged but at most tends only to indicate that at the time of the examination defendant was not telling the truth. Further, the jury members should be instructed that it is for them to determine what corroborative weight and effect such testimony should be given. State v. Valdez, 91 Ariz. 274, 284, 371 P.2d 894 (1962). That message is embodied in the fourth of the Valdez requirements which were adopted by the majority. Because a mystique of credibility surrounds the "lie-detector" test, juries tend to abdicate their role as fact finder in favor of test results. This strikes at the heart of the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury. The very court which drafted the Valdez standards has ruled that failure to give the cautionary instruction sua sponte was error. State v. Trotter, 110 Ariz. 61, 514 P.2d 1249 (1973). See also State v. McDavitt, 62 N.J. 36, 297 A.2d 849 (1972). I heartily agree.2
*914The majority denies the trial court's responsibility to instruct the jury as to the limitations on the evidence and justifies the omission as the product of defense attorney's trial strategy. Counsel tried to explain the test results in a way which would corroborate the defendant's story. But the test results are of uncertain reliability regardless of the chosen trial strategy, just as they are of uncertain reliability regardless of the parties' stipulations.
Whether the polygraph evidence is used to help the defense or the prosecution, it is still of limited probative value. The court had a duty to point this out. In failing to give the necessary Valdez cautionary instruction, the court aggravated its earlier error.
I would admit results of a polygraph test on stipulation of the parties only if the results were known at the time of the stipulation, and upon a cautionary instruction by the trial judge as to the test's limitations.
For the reasons outlined above, I dissent.
Rosellini, J., concurs with Dore, J.
Reconsideration denied March 3, 1982.

 The only time polygraph test results might be properly admitted would be when offered under certain circumstances by the defendant. Due process requires that an accused be allowed to present evidence in his own behalf which is critical to his defense. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 35 L. Ed. 2d 297, 93 S. Ct. 1038 (1973). In Chambers, the court held that even though the testimonies of *913three persons offered as witnesses for the defense were based upon "hearsay," since the hearsay statements were of "considerable reliability" and very critical to the defendant's defense, due process mandated the admissibility of the testimony insofar as it was favorable to the defense.
The Court of Appeals for New Mexico interpreted Chambers as entitling a criminal defendant to admit polygraph test results on his behalf. State v. Dorsey, 87 N.M. 323, 532 P.2d 912 (Ct. App. 1975). "[W]here constitutional rights directly affecting the ascertainment of guilt are implicated", the due process right to a fair opportunity to defend against the State's accusations, Chambers, at 302, could justify the introduction of polygraph evidence. The New Mexico Supreme Court agreed that the defendant's due process rights provide a special basis for the admission of such evidence. State v. Dorsey, 88 N.M. 184, 539 P.2d 204 (1975). I would adopt this rule in Washington.
Allowing the defendant to introduce polygraph evidence under these circumstances while denying the opportunity to the prosecution is consistent with our criminal justice system's presumption of the accused's innocence. If the traditional rules of evidence are to be compromised in the name of due process, they should be compromised only for those for whom this constitutional right is due.

 The official comment to ER 403 specifies that "[i]n deciding whether to exclude evidence on grounds of unfair prejudice, consideration should be given to the probable effectiveness or lack of effectiveness of a limiting instruction". *914Implicit in this statement is the recognition that proper instructions can reduce the potential for prejudice. It could be argued that the admission of the polygraph evidence without contemplating a cautionary instruction for the jury constituted an abuse of discretion.