Court Opinion

ID: 9946094
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-29 08:12:34.674167+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:25.256148
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS
                                 EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
                                      EL PASO, TEXAS

 TRAVIS JEREMY RUTHERFORD                          §                No. 08-23-00142-CR
 A/K/A TRAVIS JEREMY TUTEN,
                                                   §                  Appeal from the
                                Appellant,
                                                   §            394th Judicial District Court
 v.
                                                   §             of Brewster County, Texas
 THE STATE OF TEXAS,
                                                   §                  (TC# CR04891)
                                Appellee.

                                  MEMORANDUM OPINION

       Appellant Jeremy Rutherford entered an open guilty plea for the first-degree murder of

Jeffrey Todd Williams and was sentenced to 55 years by the trial court. TEX. PEN. CODE

ANN. §19.02(b)(2). In this appeal, his sole complaint is that the length of the sentence violates the

rehabilitation objective of the Texas Penal Code. Id. § 1.02. Finding the trial court did not abuse

its discretion, we affirm.

                        FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

       Appellant and Williams met through a friend and Appellant began purchasing

methamphetamines from him. The two became friends and about six months later, Appellant

moved in with Williams. As explained below, Appellant murdered Williams on March 23, 2021.
Appellant entered an open guilty plea to the murder charge but requested a lenient sentence from

the trial court.

           Before sentencing, the trial court took testimony from five witnesses: a neighbor who

witnessed events on the day of the murder; the Chief of Police who investigated the crime; a special

agent with the FBI who lived next door to Appellant; Appellant’s father; and Appellant himself.

From that testimony, and the more than 30 exhibits admitted at the hearing, we glean the following

information was before the trial court when it passed sentence.

           Appellant recounted years of struggles with mental illness and substance abuse. At age

seven, he was sexually assaulted by an uncle. Shortly afterward, he began receiving treatment and

medication for depression. But his mother did not ensure that he attended his appointments, and

his mental health treatment was inconsistent. As a teenager, Appellant began to swing from

suicidal depressive lows to manic highs. He began using drugs at the age of 16 to self-medicate.

He attempted suicide six times, mostly before the age of 22. After one hospitalization, Appellant

was stable for a period of about eight years. During this time, Appellant complied with his mental

health treatment, remained on medication, maintained employment, and abstained from drugs

other than marijuana. But around 2012 or 2013, after a divorce and a move, he resumed using

illegal drugs. By 2014 or 2015, Appellant was using methamphetamines every day and was

repeatedly discharged from a local mental health facility for failing to keep appointments.

           In early 2021, Appellant began to hallucinate. He regularly heard voices that he believed

were his children calling to him. 1 Twice people contacted law enforcement because of Appellant’s

strange behavior when he was having auditory hallucinations and was looking for his children–

once at a golf course and once at a local school. Law enforcement spoke to him both times but

1
    He believed these hallucinations despite knowing that his children did not live in Texas.

                                                            2
brought him back to his house without taking further action. Along with the auditory

hallucinations, Appellant also believed that he saw his son crossing the street by the high school.

           Appellant moved in with Williams around the time of his onset of psychotic symptoms.

His hallucinations continued and he became suspicious of Williams. Appellant believed that he

saw his children’s belongings in the house, and he accused Williams of having sex with his

daughter. Appellant testified that the day before the murder he could hear his children under the

house. He assumed that there must be as basement under the house and that Williams was keeping

them there. He began to dig outside the house. The next morning, after smoking

methamphetamines, he continued the search for his children. He went into the Williams’ bedroom

and shot at him with a bow and arrow, believing that was the only way Williams would tell him

the truth. 2 Appellant testified that Williams reached under the bed for a gun. Appellant then hit

him with a bat. 3 When Williams still did not give Appellant information about his children,

Appellant shot him in the ankle with the bow and arrow. He testified that he did not intend to kill

Williams, but only to disable him so that he could not interfere with Appellant’s search. Appellant

returned to his bedroom, digging a hole through the floor and about a foot of concrete under the

house. By the time he returned to check on Williams, he had died.

           Appellant was charged with the murder. He pled guilty and requested sentencing by the

court. After extensive questioning by the trial court and Appellant’s attorney, the trial court found

that Appellant was aware of the possibility of the insanity defense and that he did not wish to

pursue it. The trial court, relying on a court-ordered psychiatric evaluation, representations by

2
    He did not think at the time that he hit him with that first shot but concedes that it may have struck Williams’ leg.
3
  Appellant testified that the bat hit Williams across the hands, but the physical evidence showed an unexplained
injury to Williams’ temple.

                                                             3
defense counsel, and its own observations, found Appellant to be competent and accepted his

guilty plea.

        Appellant testified that, while in jail, he had consistent mental health appointments and was

taking his medication. He planned to join AA or NA, taking parenting classes, and pursuing

technical training in a plumbing, electrical, or automotive field. He promised to continue treatment

once released and had arranged for someone else to make mental health decisions if his

hallucinations returned or he refused treatment.

        At the end of the hearing, Appellant asked for a 30-year sentence and the State asked for a

life sentence. The trial court sentenced Appellant to 55 years. He was 39 years old at the time of

sentencing. Appellant did not object or file a motion for new trial.

                      STANDARD OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE LAW

        The Texas Penal Code contains a list of objectives that its provisions are “intended, and

shall be construed, to achieve . . . ” TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 1.02. Among those objectives, and

relevant to this appeal, are “insur[ing] the public safety through . . . the rehabilitation of those

convicted of violations of this code” and “prescrib[ing] penalties that . . . permit recognition of

differences in rehabilitation possibilities among individual offenders.” Id. Appellant argues that

his 55-year sentence for murder violates these statutory objectives.

        A trial court’s sentence is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Jackson v. State, 680 S.W.2d

809, 814 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (en banc). A trial court abuses its discretion only if it acts

“without reference to any guiding rules or principles.” State v. Simpson, 488 S.W.3d 318, 322

(Tex. Crim. App. 2016). So long as a trial court’s decision is within the “zone of reasonable

disagreement,” we must affirm no matter if we may have decided the matter differently. Apolinar

v. State, 155 S.W.3d 184, 186 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Simpson, 488 S.W.3d at 322.

                                                   4
                                                   ANALYSIS

         A. Preservation of complaint

         The State argues that Appellant has not preserved his complaint on appeal because he did

not make a specific objection to his sentence. Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1 requires

preservation of a complaint for appeal by “a timely request, objection, or motion.” TEX. R. APP. P.

33.1(a)(1). Although Appellant did not object to the sentence assessed by the trial court, he did

make a specific request for a lesser sentence (30 years). But for the request to preserve error under

Rule 33.1, Appellant must have “stated the grounds for the ruling that [he] sought from the trial

court with sufficient specificity to make the trial court aware of the complaint, unless the specific

grounds were apparent from the context.” Id. Appellant argues that the nature of his complaint was

apparent from the context because his requests for “leniency” and his “desire to receive mental

health and substance use treatment . . . put the trial court on notice that a lengthy prison term was

objectionable.” 4 We disagree.

         Although Appellant testified that upon his release from prison, he intended to continue

medication, seek help for addiction, and allow others to make mental health decisions, he did not

give these as specific grounds for his request for a lower sentence. In closing, Appellant’s attorney

urged the court to sentence him to only 30 years:

         [Appellant] wants to take responsibility for what he did, but I believe that the
         history of his mental health is an important factor in what ended up happening that
         day . . . . [Appellant] is neither young or old at this point. And I believe that with a

4
  The cases cited by Appellant in support of his argument are inapposite. They all hold that an objection was not
necessary to preserve an issue for appeal based on the nature of the error, and not because the objection was apparent
from the context. Montgomery v. State, 99 S.W.3d 257, 259 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, pet. struck) (to ensure that
pleas are voluntary, evidence of innocence requires a trial court to withdraw a plea of guilty even if no objection is
made); Edwards v. State, 21 S.W.3d 625, 626 n. 1 (Tex. App.—Waco 2000, no pet.) (no objection is necessary to
preserve complaint that the court entered a deadly weapon finding that was not found by the jury); Garza v. State, 841
S.W.2d 19, 23 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1992, no pet.) (objection to the State’s restitution recommendation is not required
to preserve error).

                                                          5
       30 year sentence, he could become parole eligible under supervision, where other
       people who could watch his behavior could make those decisions. That if he was
       not doing well or not able to qualify for parole, that 30–in 30 years he would be old
       and still be able to have some engagement, some ability to heal some relationships.
       Some ability to have a relationship with children that might be able to be repaired
       during his incarceration and be able to come out, if appropriate.

Appellant’s request for a lower sentence was based on the argument that his mental illness reduced

his moral blameworthiness and that the safety of the public could be ensured because other people

could monitor his behavior–not because he could be rehabilitated, or that § 1.02 of the Penal Code

required the trial court to assess rehabilitation. His request and the reasons given for it were not

sufficient to notify the court of a complaint that the sentence violated the rehabilitation objectives

of the Penal Code. Montelongo v. State, No. 08-18-00094-CR, 2020 WL 4034979, at *4

(Tex. App.—El Paso July 17, 2020, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“[W]e

see nothing in this record that would have alerted the trial court to the Section 1.02 complaint

[Appellant] raises here.”); Nieto v. State, No. 11-20-00163-CR, 2022 WL 2252424, at *2

(Tex. App.—Eastland June 23, 2022, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication)

(complaint that sentence violated rehabilitation objectives not preserved because, even though he

requested a lesser sentence, “at no time did Appellant assert that the sentence imposed by the trial

court violated Section 1.02”).

       Appellant alternatively argues that specific grounds for his request or objection were not

required because the error was fundamental and not waivable. Some sentencing errors are

fundamental. For example, in Hernandez v. State, cited by Appellant, the court held that a trial

court’s practice of doubling a repeat offender’s prior sentence displayed judicial bias because the

trial judge refused to consider the full range of punishment. Hernandez v. State, 268 S.W.3d 176,

184 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2008, no pet.). Because “the right to an impartial judge

                                                  6
is an absolute requirement,” the defendant could complain about the sentence for the first time on

appeal. Id. at 184; see also Ex parte Brown, 158 S.W.3d 449, 456–57 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (en

banc) (granting habeas corpus because the court imposed the maximum sentence upon revocation

of probation without considering the evidence). But the reasoning of Hernandez does not apply

here. “[I]n the absence of a clear showing to the contrary, we will presume the trial judge was a

neutral and detached officer.” Id. at 182. Unlike Hernandez, nothing in the record shows that the

trial court prejudged the sentence and refused to consider the evidence or the full range of

punishment. Jaenicke v. State, 109 S.W.3d 793, 796–97 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003,

pet. ref’d) (even though court considered jury verdicts in other cases, the presumption of

impartiality was not rebutted because the record reflected that the court considered the evidence).

Because the fundamental right to an impartial judge was not implicated and Appellant has not

argued the violation of any other fundamental right, his complaint cannot be raised for the first

time on appeal.

       B. Rehabilitation purposes of the penal code

       Even if Appellant had preserved his complaint, our record does not show that the trial court

abused its discretion. The general rule is that a sentence that falls within the statutory range of

punishment is not an abuse of discretion. Jackson v. State, 680 S.W.2d at 814; Foster v. State, 525

S.W.3d 898, 911 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2017, pet. ref’d). “Subject only to a very limited, exceedingly

rare, and somewhat amorphous Eighth Amendment gross-disproportionality review, a punishment

that falls within the legislatively prescribed range, and that is based upon the sentencer’s informed

normative judgment, is unassailable on appeal.” Ex parte Chavez, 213 S.W.3d 320, 323–24

(Tex. Crim. App. 2006), quoting Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70 (2003). The range of

                                                 7
punishment for first-degree murder is 5 to 99 years. TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. §§ 12.32(a); 19.02(d).

Appellant’s sentence of 55 years is within that range.

        Nor does anything in our record show that the trial court did not consider the goals of

rehabilitation when assessing punishment. See Lambert v. State, No. 03-17-00538-CR, 2018 WL

988778, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin Feb. 21, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for

publication) (“nothing in the record before this Court indicates that the district court failed to

consider the full range of punishment or failed to consider any potentially mitigating evidence

when assessing its punishment”). As courts confronted with this same issue have recognized,

“incarceration does not . . . mean [Appellant] will be denied the opportunity for rehabilitation.”

Foster, 525 S.W.3d at 911. Appellant acknowledged that while in jail, he is receiving mental health

treatment, plans to join AA or NA, take parenting classes, and further his education in a technical

field. Nunnally v. State, No. 03-19-00807-CR, 2021 WL 4995502, at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin Oct.

28, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (the fact that defendant participated

in services only once incarcerated was evidence that incarceration served a rehabilitative purpose).

        Rehabilitation is also not the only objective of the Penal Code. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.

§ 1.02 (stating the Code serves several objectives, including deterrence, rehabilitation, and

preventing recidivism); see also Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 25 (2003) (“A sentence can

have a variety of justifications, such as incapacitation, deterrence, retribution, or rehabilitation.”).

Given Appellant’s extensive history of drug use and non-compliance with past mental health

treatment, the trial court may have believed that a longer sentence was necessary to protect the

public by deterring and preventing the recurrence of offenses. See, e.g., Foster, 525 S.W.3d at 911

(finding that incarceration served objective of preventing recurrence of criminal offenses based on

evidence of the defendant’s offense); Nieto, 2022 WL 2252424, at *3 (“Based on the crime charged

                                                   8
and Appellant’s own admissions, we cannot say that the sentence violates the objectives of the

Penal Code to prevent the reoccurrence of criminal behavior to ensure the public safety.”); Nelson

v. State, No. 05-19-00290-CR, 2020 WL 1512488, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 30, 2020, no

pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (considering the other punishment objectives of

the Penal Code when finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion).

       Based on this record, we hold that a sentence of 55 years was not outside the zone of

reasonable disagreement and that the court did not abuse its discretion.

                                            CONCLUSION

       Appellant failed to preserve his complaint for appeal by making an objection or request for

a lower sentence grounded specifically on the rehabilitation objectives of § 1.02 of the Penal Code.

Even had such an objection been made, the record does not support that the trial court ignored

those objectives or otherwise abused its discretion in imposing a 55-year sentence. The judgment

below is affirmed.

                                              JEFF ALLEY, Chief Justice

February 23, 2024

Before Alley, C.J., Palafox and Soto, JJ.

(Do Not Publish)

                                                 9