Court Opinion

ID: 9824626
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 11:01:24.56243+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:09:20.752822
License: Public Domain

SAMFÓRD, Judge.
This case was submitted to the court upon count 5 of the complaint, as amended. In this count plaintiff sought to recover of the defendant the sum of $281.12, the amount paid by the industrial department of the Home Insurance Company to the City of Birmingham for a license or privilege tax for the tax year 1936; said taxes being paid upon the amount of premiums of industrial insurance written by the appellant in the City of Birmingham.
This tax was paid to the City of Birmingham under an ordinance which levied a tax on each fire insurance company of 2% per cent, of the gross premiums, less returned premiums, received during the year immediately preceding on policies issued during that preceding year, etc. Copy of the ordinance conforms to the foregoing statement.
Part of the tax claimed is also for sums paid .for the benefit of the Fireman’s Pension and Relief Fund under the provisions of the General Laws of Alabama.
Said taxes were paid on the 30th day of January, 1936.
A claim for the return of the payment v was filed with the City of Birmingham, within the time allowed by law, and the City of Birmingham declined to repay said sum.
Appellee demurred to the complaint, and the demurrers were sustained upon the ground that under the law the plaintiff was required to pay said taxes to the City of Birmingham if the City of Birmingham exceeded the population of 100,000, and that the statute of Alabama only exempted industrial insurance from municipal taxation in cities having a population of less than 100,000.
On account of the adverse ruling of the court, the plaintiff was compelled to take, a nonsuit which was allowed by the court, and the appeal is prosecuted from this ruling of the trial court.
The above, and foregoing, is a statement of the case from the record as made by the appellant’s counsel and acceded to by appellee’s counsel in his brief.
This raises the one question as to the effect of the last sentence in section 2156 of the Code of 1923, which reads as follows: “No license or privilege tax, or other charge, for the privilege of doing business, shall be imposed by any municipal corporation on any fire insurance company writing industrial insurance.”
We are asked by appellee’s counsel to limit the foregoing quotation to cities and municipalities having less than 100,000 population. On this question, we have read with interest the exhaustive briefs filed both by the appellant and by the appellee, but under the established rules as laid down by the Supreme Court of this *146state, throughout its entire history, we see no occasion for a discussion of the various decisions cited by counsel.
Section 2156 of the Code of 1923, supra, is plain and unambiguous. The first part of the section is a clear limitation upon all municipalities in the state of Alabama having less than 100,000 population according to the last preceding state census, and the clause following makes a clear exemption in favor of fire insurance companies writing industrial insurance in all of the municipalities of the state, including such municipalities as may have more than 100,000 in population.
There is just no room for construction in a statute from which the intention of the Legislature can be so clearly drawn as to eliminate any uncertainty of its meaning.
There are so many cases holding to this view it would seem to be unnecessary to cite authority, but if authority should be required reference is made to 18 Alabama Digest, under the head of Statutes, ^^O et seq.
For and on account of the above views; the judgment of the lower court is • reversed and the cause is remanded.
Reversed and remanded.