Court Opinion

ID: 9672040
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:47:47.052395+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:13.835910
License: Public Domain

HARVEY A. HOLTAN, Judge,
dissenting.
The Act permits recovery for a “spouse, child, parent, guardian, employer, or other person injured in person, property, or means of support, or who incurs other pecuniary loss.” Minn.Stat. § 340A.801, subd. 1. Because I believe the legislature never intended to provide protection under the Act to people with no legal relationship to those injured under the Act, I dissent.
I recognize that, as the majority notes, courts apply the plain meaning of statutes when the statutory language is unambiguous. I disagree, however, with the majority’s conclusion that the Act is unambiguous. The “or other person” appears at first blush to apply to any person. But if the legislature had intended the “or other person” language to encompass any person injured within the meaning of the Act, I see no reason why the legislature would not have written the Act to cover “any person injured * * *,” without reference to other, specific classes of individuals. Because the “or other person” language is ambiguous, the court should apply the doctrine of ejusdem generis to determine whether respondents fall within the scope of the Act.
*751Under the rule of ejusdem generis, “[general words are construed to be restricted in their meaning by preceding particular words.” Minn.Stat. § 645.08(3) (1996). Because the individuals preceding the “or other person” language in the Act all have a legal relationship with the injured person, recovery under the Act in connection with Mr. Lefto’s accident is limited to those having a legal relationship with Mr. Lefto.
Respondents had no such relationship. They had no rights vis á vis Mr. Lefto. They had no legal right to support from him. See Minn.Stat. § 513.076 (1996) (providing that a court shall dismiss any claim by an extramarital cohabitant to the earnings or property of another as contrary to public policy, absent a valid contract concerning the parties’ property and financial relations). Because respondents lacked the requisite relationship with Mr. Lefto at the time of the accident, they do not come within the protection of the Act.
This court recently addressed the scope of the Act’s “or other person” language in Line Constr. Benefit Fund v. Skeates, 563 N.W.2d 757 (Minn.App.1997). In that case, an insurer sought to recover under the Act for injuries sustained by a policyholder, arguing that the insurer came within the “or other person” language of the Act. Id. at 759. In rejecting the insurer’s argument, the court cited Empire Fire & Marine Ins. v. Williams, 265 Minn. 333, 335, 121 N.W.2d 580, 582 (1963), in which the court stated that the
principle of ejusdem generis precludes extension of the term “other person” beyond the class or classes specifically enumerated. There is no indication that the Legislature intended “other person” to include an insurance carrier as coming within the same general classification as “husband, wife, child, parent, guardian, employer. ”
Id. at 760 (emphasis added); see also Ford v. Wagner, 153 Mich.App. 466, 395 N.W.2d 72, 74 (1986), review denied (Mich. Nov. 26, 1986) (holding doctrine of ejusdem generis applicable and denying recovery to fiancé on ground that he had no legal relationship to the injured person). But see Rodríguez v. Solar of Michigan, Inc., 191 Mich.App. 483, 478 N.W.2d 914, 921 (1991) (noting that “the words ‘or other person’ * * * have been given a broad interpretation, and were intended to cover all persons so injured”), review denied (Mich. July 14,1992). Similarly, nothing in the record indicates that the legislature intended “other person” to include a fiancé and her child within the same general classification as husband, wife, child, parent, guardian, and employer.
In Village of Brooten v. Cudahy Packing Co., 291 F.2d 284, 298 (8th Cir.1961), the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals declined to apply the rule of ejusdem generis in interpreting the “or other person” language in the Act, stating:
While the first five beneficiaries named * * * do have blood or marriage relationship in common and thus could be said to constitute a class, the succeeding term “employer” is different, destroys any category of that kind, and opens the way to a broader interpretation of “other person.”
See also Wendelin v. Russell, 259 Iowa 1152, 147 N.W.2d 188, 192 (1966) (declining to apply rule of ejusdem generis in interpreting local dram shop statute and holding that “every other person injured in person or property or means of support * * * shall have a right of action”), overruled on other grounds by Lewis v. State, 256 N.W.2d 181 (Iowa 1977).
As the decision of a federal court applying state law, Brooten is not binding on this court. Brooten is not even persuasive, because the Brooten court erred when it concluded that the beneficiaries specifically enumerated in the Act could not be said to constitute a class and that the court could not, therefore, properly apply the rule of ejusdem generis in interpreting the Act. All of the individuals specifically enumerated in the Act have historically-recognized legal relationships with persons injured due to illegal sales of alcohol. These relationships have traditionally imposed significant reciprocal obligations on those involved. Spouses, children, and parents have long been held responsible for the care of each other. Guardians have historically taken the place of family members when necessary to take care of persons unable to care for themselves. The employer-employee relationship has tradi*752tionally given rise to special, reciprocal duties between employers and employees. Accordingly, I would reject the Brooten court’s holding that the “or other person” language encompasses any person injured within the meaning of the Act, regardless of their familial or legal relationship with the person directly injured.
Because I would hold that respondents may not recover under the Act, I would not address the remaining issues concerning damages. I note in passing that to the extent that Mr. Lefto has already recovered for his loss of income, the result I suggest would not deprive respondents of their means of support.