Court Opinion

ID: 9892137
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-20 17:11:09.959289+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:17:58.146092
License: Public Domain

J-S20035-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  MARQUIS THOMAS                               :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 2555 EDA 2022

         Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered September 28, 2022
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-23-CR-0001721-2011

BEFORE:      DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and COLINS, J.*

DISSENTING STATEMENT BY DUBOW, J.:                    FILED OCTOBER 20, 2023

       I would affirm the Order dismissing the petition without a hearing as

untimely. Because Appellant failed to plead in his PCRA Petition why he was

unable to obtain the information earlier with the exercise of due diligence, I

conclude he has not satisfied the timeliness exception provided in Section

9545(b)(ii) and the trial court properly dismissed the Petition.

       The PCRA provides, in relevant part, that “Any petition under this

subchapter, including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within

one year of the date the judgment becomes final, unless the petition alleges

and the petitioner proves that         . . . (ii) the facts upon which the claim is

predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been

ascertained by the exercise of due diligence[.]” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(ii). As

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S20035-23

the Majority recognizes, the mere assertion that a petitioner only recently

learned of the existence of the newly-discovered evidence does not satisfy the

Section 9545(b)(1)(ii) timeliness exception.        See MO at 10, citing

Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 204 A.3d 524, 526-27 (Pa. Super., 2019),

Commonwealth v. Pew, 189 A.3d 486, 489-90, Commonwealth v.

Priovolos, 746 A.2d 621, 625-26 (Pa. Super. 2000). In addition, although

the trial court addressed the issue as “after-discovered evidence,” a

determination on that basis occurs only if the petition is deemed timely.1 See

Commonwealth v. Burton, 158 A.3d 618, 629 (Pa. 2017) (recognizing the

distinction between the newly discovered facts exception provided in Section

9545(b)(ii) and the after-discovered evidence basis for relief delineated in

Section 9543).

       Here, Appellant did not allege that the unknown facts could not have

been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence. Rather, Appellant submits

the following statement:
____________________________________________

1 Where a petition is “otherwise timely, to prevail on an after-discovered
evidence claim for relief under subsection 9543(a)(2)(vi), a petitioner must
prove that (1) the exculpatory evidence has been discovered after trial and
could not have been obtained at or prior to trial through reasonable diligence;
(2) the evidence is not cumulative; (3) it is not being used solely to impeach
credibility; and (4) it would likely compel a different verdict.” Burton, 158
A.3d at 630, citing Commonwealth v. D'Amato, 856 A.2d 806, 823 (Pa.
2004). Here, as the Majority notes, without a finding that Appellant’s petition
was timely, the court did not have jurisdiction to address whether the evidence
met the standards required for relief under Section 9543(a)(vi).

                                           -2-
J-S20035-23

      [S]uch evidence could not have been ascertained at the time of
      trial by the exercise of due diligence because the witness’s new
      statement comes forward after revealing the prosecution required
      the witness to violate the judge’s sequestration order [imposed
      during the preliminary hearing] in order to get custody of her
      daughter.

PCRA Petition, filed 9/7/21/ at ¶ 16 (emphasis added).

      Appellant fails to acknowledge the timeliness requirements set forth in

Section 9545(b)(ii). The new evidence here is the witness statement given to

the private investigator in 2021.       The timeliness exception requires a

petitioner to plead why he could not have obtained that statement prior to the

passage of the nine years following his conviction. In this case, Appellant does

not provide an explanation, but rather only makes a bald statement in the

PCRA petition that Appellant learned of the existence of the statement. This

does not satisfy the requirements necessary to establish the applicability of

the Section 9545(b)(ii) exception. Sanchez, 204 A.3d at 526-27.

      Accordingly, I would affirm the PCRA court’s order dismissing the

petition as untimely.

                                     -3-