Court Opinion

ID: 9768744
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 13:46:44.74543+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:44.160421
License: Public Domain

John A. Fogleman, Justice, dissenting. Venue means the place, i. e., the county or district wherein a cause of action is to be tried. Gland-O-Lac v. Franklin County Circuit Court, 230 Ark. 919, 327 S. W. 2d 558. Where the court has jurisdiction of the subject matter in a transitory action, such as this case, and venue is determined by the domicile or residence of the defendant, venue may be waived. Arkansas Association of County Judges v. Green, 232 Ark. 438, 338 S. W. 2d 672; Gland-O-Lac v. Franklin County Circuit Court, supra; Crutchfield v. McLain, 230 Ark. 147, 321 S. W. 2d 217. This waiver can be accomplished by a failure of a defendant to make objection at the first opportunity and before taking some step indicating satisfaction with the venue or constituting an entry of appearance. Barnes v. Balz, 173 Ark. 417, 292 S. W. 391; Howe v. Hatley, 186 Ark. 366, 54 S. W. 2d 64; Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass’n v. Moore, 196 Ark. 667, 119 S. W. 2d 499; Arkansas State Racing Commission v. Southland Racing Corp., 226 Ark. 995, 295 S. W. 2d 617; Crutchfield v. McClain, supra; Gland-O-Lac v. Franklin County Circuit Court, supra; Arkansas Ass’n of County Judges v. Green, supra. I have not been able to find any case, however, either in Arkansas or other jurisdictions that holds that the venue is waived by any act of the defendant when, as here, the objection is timely made and preserved. As I see it, the real error in the majority opinion is in equating venue with jurisdiction of the person. Jurisdiction of the person is the power of the court to hear and determine the subject matter of a controversy between the parties to a suit, i. e., to adjudicate or exercise judicial power over them. Lamb & Rhodes v. Howton, 131 Ark. 211, 198 S. W. 521. It is the power to render a personal judgment in a particular case or to subject the parties to the court’s decisions and rulings. 21 C. J. S. Courts § 15, p. 32; Black’s Law Dictionary, 4th Ed., p. 992. It is based upon appearance of the person or the issuance and service of proper process upon him in the manner required by law. Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, Rawles 3rd Ed., p. 1761; Stevenson v. Christie, 64 Ark. 72, 42 S. W. 418; Federal Land Bank of St. Louis v. Gladish, 176 Ark. 267, 2 S. W. 2d 696; Healey & Roth v. Huie, 220 Ark. 16, 245 S. W. 2d 813; 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts § 106, p. 465. Equating “venue” in this case with “jurisdiction of the person” is not consistent with prior actions of this court. In cases involving venue, rather than question of service of process, it is said that a motion to dismiss for want of venue might he treated as a motion for change of venue and where well taken, the cause should be removed to the proper venue. Terminal Oil Co. v. Gautney, Judge, 202 Ark. 748, 152 S. W. 2d 309; Ft. Smith Gas Co. v. Kincannon, 202 Ark. 216, 150 S. W. 2d 968 (on rehearing). Had those cases been treated as if the question was one involving jurisdiction of the person, the only proper action would have been to dismiss them. We would be more consistent if we followed the precedent in cases wherein venue was based on the residence of, or place where summons was served on, a codefendant. In these circumstances, it has been held that by filing a counterclaim (not then compulsory) a defendant, whose timely motion questioning venue had been overruled, did not.make the court his own forum so that he could not further question the judgment against him. Seelbinder v. Witherspoon, 124 Ark. 331, 187 S. W. 325. While this case is discussed as not having been applicable to the facts in Federal Land Bank v. Gladish, 176 Ark. 267, 2 S. W. 2d 696, cited by the majority, because the venue there was governed by a statute which specifically exempted a nonresident defendant from judgment where no judgment was rendered against a resident defendant, it is quite clear that venue was involved in the Seelbinder case and jurisdiction of the person in the Federal Lmid Bank case. That jurisdiction of the person was the governing principle in the Federal Land Bank case is made quite clear by these words in the opinion: ‘ ‘ The appellant in this case, by filing a counterclaim and asking for affirmative relief asking the court to give it judgment, thereby enters its appearance, and waives any defense there might be m the service or any failure to get proper service, if there was such failure. In other words, the defendant, by filing a 'counterclaim and asking 'affirmative relief in the court, thereby subjected itself to the jurisdiction of the court whether it had been served at all or not.” [Emphasis ours] This statement clearly recognizes that the case was governed only by rules pertaining to appearance or proper service, the basis of jurisdiction of the person. It seems to me that the rule pronounced here by the majority will lead to some undesirable results. Suppose, for instance, that because of the pendency of an action involving corpus personalty brought by a cestui que trust in the wrong venue, as this one was, it became advisable for the trustee to seek injunctive relief against the plaintiff in order to protect the trust property after his objection to the venue had been overruled.1 He could then be said to have submitted the trust to the trial of a proceeding in a county remote from the trust property, the records of the trust or witnesses who might be readily available at the proper venue but not at the improper one. I respectfully submit that the precedent is a bad one. Siich a result seems to me to be just as vicious as the rejected rule that one who appealed from an adverse ruling on a motion to quash for want of jurisdiction of the person thereby entered his appearance. See Anheuser-Busch Company v. Manion, 193 Ark. 405, 100 S. W. 2d 672. It is strongly indicated in Barger v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., 195 Ark. 107, 111 S. W. 2d 485, that where objection was made and preserved, such actions as .motions for continuance, requests for additional time to plead, contest of ¡motions and motions to transfer from law to equity should no longer be considered as voluntary appearances. While I would not reach the other points treated by the majority, I would concur in the result reached on them. I would reverse and dismiss. I am authorized to state that Byrd, J., joins in this dissent.   Such a situation could well arise under conditions which would make the filing of an independent action impossible or impractical.