Court Opinion

ID: 9891136
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-17 16:10:19.59359+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:39:11.513181
License: Public Domain

J-S28027-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    CHRISTOPHER BARTON                         :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 879 WDA 2022

         Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 19, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at
                       No(s): CP-02-CR-0001241-2020

BEFORE:      PANELLA, P.J., OLSON, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:                            FILED: October 17, 2023

       Appellant, Christopher Barton, appeals from the judgment of sentence

entered on May 19, 2022, following his bench trial convictions for driving

under the influence (DUI) of alcohol (high rate of alcohol), DUI (general

impairment), accident involving damage to unattended vehicles, reckless

driving, and failure to notify police.1 We affirm.

       The trial court summarized the facts of this case as follows:

       On December 20, 2019, [Pittsburgh Police] Officers [Joseph]
       Mangiarelli and [Brett] Maloney responded to a hit-and-run
       accident on Route 51 [near] Saw Mill Run [Boulevard], in front of
       Pittsburgh Auto Dealership. At approximately 2:30 a.m., the
       officers arrived at the scene and observed an unattended vehicle

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3802(b), 3802(a)(1), 3745(a), 3736(a), and 3746(a)(2),
respectively.
J-S28027-23

     that struck a Verizon utility pole and damaged two vehicles in the
     Pittsburgh Auto Dealership lot.

     At the scene, Officer Mangiarelli ran the vehicle’s registration plate
     through the [National Crime Information Center database] and
     learned that the vehicle was registered to [Appellant]. The officers
     looked inside the vehicle and observed a cell[ular telephone] on
     the driver side floor. During the investigation, Officer Maloney
     spoke to witnesses who observed an individual running away from
     the scene. The officer relayed through [police] radio that they
     were looking for an individual of a certain description that had just
     fled the area.

     At 2:50 a.m., the responding officers were notified that Sergeant
     [Michael] Douglas, detained an individual matching [Appellant’s]
     description “staggering” on Library Road [which intersects with
     Route 51]. [] Sergeant [Douglas] testified that [Appellant’s]
     speech was slurred, and his answers were vague. In response to
     questioning, [Appellant stated] he was “just going for a walk.”
     Notably, [Appellant] was walking outside in 20-degree weather,
     wearing a hoodie and jeans, and on a roadway in an industrial
     area without any sidewalks.           [Appellant] was located
     approximately one and a half miles from the accident site.

     Upon contact with [Appellant], the responding officers observed
     that [Appellant’s] person and breath smelled moderately of
     alcohol and that his speech was slurred and mumbled. The
     officers confirmed [Appellant’s] identity verbally and [examined]
     his driver’s license. During questioning[, Appellant] was vague in
     his responses. [Appellant] told the officers that he was walking
     home and when asked where he was coming from, [Appellant]
     responded, “I don’t know.”

     During this time, [Appellant] realized he did not have his cell[ular
     tele]phone on him.        The police called [Appellant’s cellular
     telephone] using a number he provided and discovered
     [Appellant’s] cell[ular tele]phone was [the device located on the
     driver’s side floorboard inside the unattended vehicle discovered
     by responding officers at the automobile dealership]. In addition,
     [Appellant] identified himself on the [] voicemail message, which
     further confirmed that the cell[ular tele]phone left inside the
     vehicle belonged to [Appellant].

     Officers detained [Appellant] and transported him [] for a [blood]
     test[,] the results of which revealed that [Appellant] had a [blood
     alcohol content] of 0.128 %.

                                     -2-
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Trial Court Opinion, 12/7/2022, at *2-3 (unpaginated).

      On August 12, 2021, following a bench trial, Appellant was convicted of

the aforementioned crimes.     After the verdict, counsel for Appellant orally

moved for judgment of acquittal, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence.

Thereafter, Appellant filed a brief in support of his motion for judgment of

acquittal. When Appellant appeared for sentencing on May 19, 2022, the trial

court initially denied Appellant’s motion for judgment of acquittal and then

sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of two to four years of

incarceration. Appellant filed a post-sentence motion on May 31, 2022. The

trial court denied relief by order entered on July 6, 2022. Appellant filed a

timely notice of appeal on August 3, 2022. The trial court issued an opinion

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) on December 7, 2022.

      On appeal, Appellant presents the following issue for our review:

      I.    Whether there was sufficient evidence presented at trial to
            prove that [Appellant] drove, operated, or was in actual
            physical control of the movement of his vehicle the night in
            question when officers did not see [Appellant] driving the
            vehicle and he was apprehended approximately 1.5 miles
            away from the accident scene[?]

Appellant’s Brief at 9.

      Appellant argues that “all the evidence presented at trial was

circumstantial” and “the Commonwealth was unable to produce any direct

evidence that Appellant was ever in physical control of [the] vehicle” involved

in the incident at issue. Id. at 14. Appellant contends that each of his five

convictions required the Commonwealth to prove beyond a reasonable doubt

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that he was, in fact, the driver. Id. at 17. Appellant contends that none of

the investigating officers saw the accident and “the Commonwealth presented

no other witnesses or evidence indicating [Appellant] was anywhere near the

vehicle[.]” Id.

       Additionally, in further support of his sufficiency argument, Appellant

asserts that the Commonwealth failed to disclose video footage from the

accident scene and police body cameras which the Commonwealth’s police

witnesses referred to at trial. Id. at 14. Appellant maintains that he made

both informal and formal requests for discovery of the alleged surveillance

before trial. Id. at 19. Moreover, the trial court granted Appellant relief and

directed the Commonwealth, both before and after trial, to turn over video

surveillance by orders entered on August 31, 2020 and March 2, 2022,

respectively. Id. The Commonwealth never produced the video footage and

never explained its failure to do so. Id.        Appellant, therefore, argues that

“[t]he Commonwealth’s failure to produce this crucial videographic evidence,

or to account for its absence, at the very least, should have raised a concern

that such evidence, if presented, would have been favorable” to Appellant

because “[i]t certainly contained special information material to the issue of

whether [Appellant] was in fact the operator of the incident vehicle.” Id. As

such, citing Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Jury Instruction 3.21B,2

____________________________________________

2 Pursuant to Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Criminal Jury Instruction
3.21B, “[a] jury is allowed to draw a common-sense inference that [an] item
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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Appellant asserts that the trial court “was permitted to, and arguably should

have, drawn a common-sense inference that … the video would have

contradicted the Commonwealth’s case in chief.”       Id. at 19-20. Appellant

suggests "[f]or example, body camera footage might not have shown

[Appellant’s] cell[ular tele]phone was located in the vehicle [or, m]ore

importantly, video of the crash might have shown someone besides

[Appellant] in operation of the vehicle.” Id. at 20-21.

       First, before examining the portion of Appellant’s sufficiency claim

pertaining to discovery, we are mindful that “[i]n conducting our review, we

consider all of the evidence actually admitted at trial and do not review a

diminished record.” Commonwealth v. Dale, 836 A.2d 150, 152 (Pa. Super.

2003) (citation omitted). We have previously determined:

       The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of evidence is
       whether, viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light
       most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence
       to enable the factfinder to find every element of the crime beyond
       a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh
       the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the
       fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances
       established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every
       possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant's guilt
       may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak
       and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may
       be drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth
       may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime
____________________________________________

would have been evidence unfavorable to that party” when “there is no
satisfactory explanation for [that] party's failure to produce an item,” and (1)
“the item is available to that party and not to the other”; (2) “it appears the
item contains or shows special information material to the issue”; and (3) “the
item would not be merely cumulative evidence.” Pa.SSJI (Crim) § 3.21B.

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       beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial
       evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record
       must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be
       considered. Finally, the trier of fact while passing upon the
       credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced,
       is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 833 A.2d 260, 262–263 (Pa. 2003) (case

citations omitted).3

____________________________________________

3    Here, Appellant was also convicted of accidents involving damage to
unattended property which states “[t]he driver of any vehicle which collides
with or is involved in an accident with any vehicle or other property which is
unattended resulting in any damage to the other vehicle or property shall
immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the accident or as close thereto
as possible and shall then and there either locate and notify the operator or
owner of the damaged vehicle or other property of his name, address,
information relating to financial responsibility and the registration number of
the vehicle being driven or shall attach securely in a conspicuous place in or
on the damaged vehicle or other property a written notice giving his name,
address, information relating to financial responsibility and the registration
number of the vehicle being driven and shall without unnecessary delay notify
the nearest office of a duly authorized police department. Every stop shall be
made without obstructing traffic more than is necessary.” 75 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 3745. “Any person who drives any vehicle in willful or wanton disregard
for the safety of persons or property is guilty of reckless driving.”       75
Pa.C.S.A. § 3736. “The driver of a vehicle involved in an accident shall
immediately by the quickest means of communication give notice to the
nearest office of a duly authorized police department…” 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3746.

We note, however, that aside from arguing that the Commonwealth failed to
prove he was driving, Appellant does not challenge any of the other elements
of the offenses for which he was convicted. Appellant does not refute that he
was intoxicated or otherwise challenge the results of his blood alcohol content
test. He does not dispute that there was damage to unattended vehicles, that
the vehicle in question was driven in willful or wanton disregard for the safety
of persons or property, and/or that the police were not called following the
accident. As such, we confine our analysis to whether the Commonwealth
introduced sufficient evidence that Appellant drove, operated, or was in actual
physical control of the motor vehicle discovered in the dealership lot.

                                           -6-
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      The DUI-general impairment statute provides that “[a]n individual may

not drive, operate or be in actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle

after imbibing a sufficient amount of alcohol such that the individual is

rendered incapable of safely driving, operating or being in actual physical

control of the movement of the vehicle.” 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(a)(1).

      The statute providing for the crime of DUI (high rate of alcohol) states,

“[a]n individual may not drive, operate or be in actual physical control of the

movement of a vehicle after imbibing a sufficient amount of alcohol such that

the alcohol concentration in the individual's blood or breath is at least 0.10%

but less than 0.16% within two hours after the individual has driven, operated

or been in actual physical control of the movement of the vehicle.”          75

Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(b).

      This Court has previously determined:

      The term ‘operate’ requires evidence of actual physical control of
      either the machinery of the motor vehicle or the management of
      the vehicle's movement, but not evidence that the vehicle was in
      motion.     The Commonwealth can establish through wholly
      circumstantial evidence that a defendant was driving, operating
      or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle. Courts review a
      combination of the following factors to determine whether a
      person had ‘actual physical control’ of an automobile: the motor
      running, the location of the vehicle, and additional evidence
      showing that the defendant had driven the vehicle.                A
      determination of actual physical control of a vehicle is based upon
      the totality of the circumstances.

Commonwealth v. Fallon, 275 A.3d 1099, 1105 (Pa. Super. 2022) (internal

citations and most quotations omitted). “Under the applicable standards, to

sustain a [DUI] conviction, the facts and circumstances established by the

                                     -7-
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Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of innocence.” Johnson,

833 A.2d at 264 (citation omitted).       “Further, the Commonwealth [is] not

required to establish [an a]ppellant's guilt to a mathematical certainty.” Id.

(citation omitted). Instead,

      the Commonwealth may establish, by the totality of the
      circumstances, that a defendant was driving, operating or in
      actual physical control of a motor vehicle. It is not necessary that
      the vehicle itself must be in motion but that it is sufficient if the
      operator is in actual physical control of either the machinery of
      the motor vehicle or of the management of the movement of the
      vehicle itself. As we [previously] noted[,] it seems illogical and
      unreasonable to permit the operator of a vehicle to be exonerated
      from the responsibility and liability for his actions simply because
      there were no witnesses except the appellant who saw the
      accident or the driving appellant.

Id. at 266 (case citations, quotations, and original brackets omitted). “Under

Pennsylvania law, an eyewitness is not required to establish that a defendant

was driving, operating, or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle.”

Id. at 263. Finally, the Johnson Court recognized that

      [t]aken to its ultimate conclusion, [Johnson’s] argument is that
      when a driver involved in a motor vehicle accident gets out of the
      vehicle before the police arrives and before anyone else could see
      him, the driver cannot be convicted of any crimes associated with,
      or resulting from the accident. This proposition has no basis in
      Pennsylvania law and does not comport with the standards which
      our courts utilize in reviewing sufficiency of the evidence claims.

Id. at 264.

      Here, the trial court determined:

      [T]he evidence presented at trial was credible and sufficient to
      establish that [Appellant] drove or was in actual physical control
      of a motor vehicle. The vehicle involved was registered to

                                      -8-
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      [Appellant] and his cell[ular tele]phone was located inside.
      Moreover, [Appellant’s] description matched identically to the one
      provided by [a] witness who observed the individual exit the
      vehicle and proceed to run away from the accident and the police
      located [Appellant] in the direction the witness indicated the
      individual departed. Hence, the fact [Appellant] did not have his
      [cellular tele]phone on him, was walking down Library [Road]
      where there are no sidewalks in approximately 20-degree
      temperatures around 3:00 a.m. in just a hoodie and jeans allows
      for the reasonable inference that [Appellant] had recently been
      driving his vehicle that night, crashed, and abandoned the scene
      forgetting his cell[ular tele]phone inside the vehicle.

      [Appellant’s] proximity to the accident scene, in which a vehicle
      registered in his name was involved, and the short amount of time
      that passed between the accident and [Appellant’s] apprehension
      allows for the reasonable inference that [Appellant] was driving
      his vehicle while intoxicated, crashed his vehicle and abandoned
      the scene.

Trial Court Opinion, 12/7/2022, at *3-4 (unpaginated). Accordingly, the trial

court determined “that there was sufficient evidence presented to establish

that [Appellant] drove, operated, or was in actual physical control of his motor

vehicle[.]” Id. at *4 (unpaginated).

      Upon our review, we agree with the trial court that Appellant’s challenge

to the sufficiency of the evidence should be rejected.     The Commonwealth

presented overwhelming circumstantial evidence that Appellant drove,

operated, and/or was in actual control of the vehicle when he crashed his

vehicle into a utility pole and two unattended vehicles. Appellant does not

challenge the trial court’s reliance on evidence that an eyewitness observed a

single individual, matching Appellant’s description, flee from the vehicle and

scene following the accident.   The eyewitness told police the direction the

individual fled and what he was wearing. Police apprehended Appellant a short

                                       -9-
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time later in the general area specified by the eyewitness, wearing clothing

that matched the witness’s description.           As such, we reject Appellant’s

assertion that no one saw him operating the vehicle.                  Moreover, the

Commonwealth presented sufficient, circumstantial corroborating evidence

confirming Appellant’s identity as the driver including his ownership of the

vehicle   in   question,   his   implausible    excuse   for   walking   in   freezing

temperatures late at night in an industrial area with no sidewalks in close

proximity to the accident scene, and his hasty exit from the vehicle wherein

he left his cellular telephone on the floor of the driver’s side of the vehicle.

Accordingly, we reject Appellant’s suggestion that because he was not

discovered in or near the vehicle the Commonwealth failed to prove that he

was driving, operating, and/or in actual control of his vehicle. Considering the

totality of the evidence actually presented at trial, we conclude that Appellant

is not entitled to relief on his sufficiency of the evidence claim.

      Next, we examine the portion of Appellant’s sufficiency claim that rests

upon the Commonwealth’s alleged discovery violation. Initially, we note that

Appellant relies exclusively upon the standard suggested missing evidence

jury instruction, Pa.SSJI (Crim) § 3.21B.        Because Appellant has not cited

relevant legal authority nor developed any meaningful analysis in his appellate

brief, his contention is subject to waiver.              See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a);

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 985 A.2d 915, 924 (Pa. 2009) (“[W]here an

appellate brief fails to provide any discussion of a claim with citation to

relevant authority or fails to develop the issue in any other meaningful fashion

                                       - 10 -
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capable of review, that claim is waived.”). Additionally, Appellant’s reliance

on Pa.SSJI (Crim) § 3.21B is misplaced because this case proceeded to a

bench trial and was not heard before a jury. Proposed jury instructions in this

case, therefore, were wholly irrelevant.     However, the trial court was well

aware of the ongoing dispute over the surveillance videos, with counsel for

Appellant raising the issue again during closing arguments and, therefore, we

presume that the trial court considered the alleged missing evidence during

its deliberation.   See Commonwealth v. Harvey, 526 A.2d 330, 333 (Pa.

1987) (“[W]here a criminal case is tried before a judge sitting without a jury,

there is a presumption that [her] knowledge, experience and training will

enable [her] to disregard inadmissible evidence and other improper

elements.”).

      In addition, our Supreme Court has previously recognized:

      In Brady [v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194 (1963)], the
      United States Supreme Court declared that due process is
      offended when the prosecution withholds evidence favorable to
      the accused.... The Brady court established the obligation of the
      prosecution to respond affirmatively to a request for production of
      exculpatory evidence with all evidence material to the guilt or
      punishment of the accused. Where evidence material to the guilt
      or punishment of the accused is withheld, irrespective of the good
      or bad faith of the prosecutor, a violation of due process has
      occurred.

Commonwealth v. Weiss, 986 A.2d 808, 814 (Pa. 2009) (citation omitted).

      Whether the trial court erred when ruling on an alleged Brady violation

presents a question of law, for which our standard of review is de novo and

                                    - 11 -
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our scope of review is plenary.        See Commonwealth v. Bagnall, 235 A.3d

1075, 1084 (Pa. 2020).

       Moreover, our Supreme Court has stated:

       The [United States] Supreme Court subsequently held that the
       duty to disclose such evidence is applicable even if there has been
       no request by the accused and that the duty encompasses
       impeachment evidence as well as directly exculpatory evidence.
       On the question of materiality, the [United States Supreme] Court
       has noted that such evidence is material if there is a reasonable
       probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense,
       the result of the proceeding would have been different. The
       materiality inquiry is not just a matter of determining whether,
       after discounting the inculpatory evidence in light of the
       undisclosed evidence, the remaining evidence is sufficient to
       support the jury's conclusions. Rather, the question is whether
       the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole
       case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the
       verdict.[4] Thus, there are three necessary components that
____________________________________________

4 More specifically, our Supreme Court in Weiss stated:

       In determining whether a reasonable probability of a different
       outcome has been demonstrated, the question is not whether the
       defendant would more likely than not have received a different
       verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received
       a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of
       confidence. A “reasonable probability” of a different result is
       shown when the government's suppression of evidence
       undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial. The United
       States Supreme Court has made clear that [such] materiality
       standard is not a sufficiency of the evidence test. A Brady
       violation is established by showing that the favorable evidence
       could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different
       light as to undermine confidence in the verdict. Importantly, the
       mere possibility that an item of undisclosed information might
       have helped the defense, or might have affected the outcome of
       the trial, does not establish materiality in the constitutional sense.
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

                                          - 12 -
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       demonstrate a violation of the Brady strictures: the evidence was
       favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory or
       because it impeaches; the evidence was suppressed by the
       prosecution, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice
       ensued.

       [Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure] 305 was promulgated
       in response to the dictates of Brady. The rule provides, in
       pertinent part, as follows:

           (B) Disclosure by the Commonwealth

           (1) Mandatory. In all court cases, on request by the
           defendant, and subject to any protective order which the
           Commonwealth might obtain under this rule, the
           Commonwealth shall disclose to the defendant's attorney all
           of the following requested items or information, provided
           they are material to the instant case. The Commonwealth
           shall, when applicable, permit the defendant's attorney to
           inspect and copy or photograph such items.

           (a) Any evidence favorable to the accused which is material
           either to guilt or to punishment, and which is within the
           possession or control of the attorney for the
           Commonwealth.

       Pa.R.Crim.P. 305(B)(1)(a). In the event of a violation of Rule 305,
       the trial court may order the offending party to permit discovery
       or inspection, may grant a continuance, or may prohibit the
       offending party from introducing evidence not disclosed, other
       than testimony of the defendant, or it may enter such other order
       as it deems just under the circumstances.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 305(E).

____________________________________________

       In order to be entitled to a new trial for failure to disclose evidence
       affecting a witness's credibility, the defendant must demonstrate
       that the reliability of the witness may well be determinative of his
       guilt or innocence. In assessing the significance of the evidence
       withheld, a reviewing court must bear in mind that not every item
       of the prosecution's case would necessarily have been directly
       undercut had the Brady evidence been disclosed.

Weiss, 986 A.2d at 815 (internal citations, quotations and original brackets

omitted)

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Commonwealth v. Burke, 781 A.2d 1136, 1141 (Pa. 2001) (internal case

citations, quotations, and original brackets omitted).

      The Burke Court further recognized:

      As a Rule 305 matter, the trial court has discretion in framing an
      appropriate remedy for a discovery violation. The “remedy”
      provision in the Rule lists numerous appropriate courses of
      remedial action, such as permitting discovery or inspection,
      granting a continuance, or prohibiting introduction of evidence. It
      is notable, however, that the Rule does not authorize an outright
      dismissal of charges, except to the extent that the residual phrase,
      “or ... such other order as [] deem[ed] just under the
      circumstances,” could be said to encompass the extreme remedy
      of discharge. It is equally notable that [Pennsylvania Supreme
      Court] research has revealed [no line of cases] that approve or
      require a discharge as a remedy for a discovery violation. In fact,
      [] precedent[] support[s] the view that [] discharge [is] too
      severe.

      Thus, while it is undoubtedly true that the trial court possesses
      some discretion in fashioning an appropriate remedy for a Brady
      violation, that discretion is not unfettered. It must be exercised
      in light of the competing values weighed in the Brady analysis,
      and in light of the teachings in prior cases involving similar
      concerns.

                          *            *           *

      Because of the compelling societal interest in prosecuting criminal
      defendants to conclusion, [our Supreme] Court has recognized
      that dismissal of charges is an extreme sanction that should be
      imposed sparingly and [] only in cases of blatant prosecutorial
      misconduct. As [] Justice Cappy, in his Opinion Announcing the
      Judgment of the Court in Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 712 A.2d
      749, 752 (Pa. 1998), explained:

         Dismissal of criminal charges punishes not only the
         prosecutor ... but also the public at large, since the public
         has a reasonable expectation that those who have been
         charged with crimes will be fairly prosecuted to the full
         extent of the law. Thus, the sanction of dismissal of criminal
         charges should be utilized only in the most blatant cases.

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         Given the public policy goal of protecting the public from
         criminal conduct, a trial court should consider dismissal of
         charges where the actions of the Commonwealth are
         egregious and where demonstrable prejudice will be
         suffered by the defendant if the charges are not dismissed.

      Id. [] at 752; see also Commonwealth v. McElligott, 432 A.2d
      587, 589 (Pa. 1981) (“The remedy of discharge without a fair and
      complete fact-finding procedure is extreme and will not be invoked
      absent deliberate bad faith prosecutorial misconduct”);
      Commonwealth v. Smith, 615 A.2d 321, 325 (Pa. 1992)
      (dismissal of charges is appropriate only where “prosecutorial
      misconduct is intended to provoke the defendant into moving for
      a mistrial, or where the conduct of the prosecutor is intentionally
      undertaken to prejudice the defendant to the point of the denial
      of a fair trial”).

Id. at 1143–1144 (original brackets and some case citations and quotations

omitted).     “While [the Burke] Court [did] not minimize the ethical and legal

obligations of the prosecution to comply with lawful discovery requirements,

[the Court ultimately held that] where there is no evidence of deliberate, bad

faith overreaching by the prosecutor intended to provoke the defendant into

seeking a mistrial or to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, the proper remedy

for the Commonwealth's failure to disclose exculpatory materials should be

less severe than dismissal.” Id. at 1146.

      Here,    the   trial   court   twice   directed,   by   order   of   court,    the

Commonwealth to produce the requested videotaped surveillance.                      Such

actions were proper under Rule 305. At trial, Appellant averred that he still

had not received the videotaped surveillance but did not request a

continuance.     Instead, Appellant argued that the trial court should draw a

common-sense inference that the withheld evidence was favorable to him.

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Appellant makes no showing that the missing video footage was material,

much less exculpatory or likely to undermine our confidence in the credibility

of the Commonwealth’s witnesses or the outcome of this case.             Hence,

Appellant failed to meet the burden needed to prove his entitlement to a

discovery sanction. Moreover, even if an inference favorable to Appellant were

drawn, Appellant cannot overcome the overwhelming circumstantial evidence

that identified him as the driver and placed him in control of the abandoned

vehicle discovered by police. From our review of the record, there is simply

no evidence of deliberate, bad faith overreaching by the Commonwealth

intended to provoke Appellant into seeking a mistrial or intentionally deprive

him of a fair trial. Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not err and the

second portion of Appellant’s sole appellate claim fails.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

DATE: 10/17/2023

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