Court Opinion

ID: 9614978
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:30:01.669895+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:41.040183
License: Public Domain

SUTIN, Judge (dissenting). I dissent. (A) Defendant cannot claim inadequacy of counsel. The majority opinion states: . . . The issue is whether under the foregoing undisputed facts, defendant had effective assistance of counsel. “Before defendant can be heard to complain of inadequacy of counsel he must show that the proceedings leading to his [plea of guilty] amount to a sham, a farce, or a mockery.” State v. Wright, 84 N.M. 3, 5, 498 P.2d 695, 697 (Ct.App.1972). “The failure of an attorney to advise a defendant of all possible defenses is no basis for a claim of incompetency of counsel.” Burton v. State, 82 N.M. 328, 331, 481 P.2d 407, 410 (1971). Defendant executed an affidavit concerning his election to enter a plea of guilty. In this affidavit, he stated the following: 1) his attorney discussed with him, and explained to him the nature of the criminal charges and the statutory penalties that he faced; 2) he fully understood these charges and penalties; 3) his attorney had advised him of his constitutional rights, each of which had been satisfactorily explained to him; 4) with this full understanding of the charges and his constitutional rights, defendant voluntarily entered a plea of guilty to battery upon a police officer; and 5) this plea was not induced by promises, threats or coercion of any kind. At defendant’s hearing on withdrawal of his “not guilty” plea, the trial court, carefully and with scrutiny, examined the defendant. This examination included the plea bargain to drop the charge of aggravated assault. Defendant said: . I was guilty of the charge of this [battery], and I feel like there is no use in fighting this. ****** THE COURT: And, it is your statement to me, that you are in fact guilty to that second count in the Information. MR. KINCHELOE: Yes, sir. As a result, aggravated assault upon a police officer, a third degree felony, was dropped. The sentence for this offense is two to ten years in the penitentiary. Defendant was sentenced on the fourth degree felony for a term of one to five years. All but 90 days of the penitentiary sentence was suspended. The 90 days were to be served , in the Chaves County jail. Prior to sentence, defendant filed a motion to withdraw his plea of guilty and set up the defense of “not guilty by reason of insanity at the time of the commission of the offense.” The motion claimed “that the defense afforded Defendant [by his attorney] was a sham, a farce and a mockery . . . .” At the hearing on this motion, the court asked defendant if he had ever been under psychiatric care or in a mental institution. The answer was “No.” In State v. Dominquez, 80 N.M. 328, 330, 455 P.2d 194, 196 (Ct.App.1969), this court said: Defendant may be asserting that, upon advice of counsel, he pled guilty to one charge in order to obtain a dismissal of the other charge. If this is his contention, it provides no support for the claim of inadequate counsel .... This is confirmed by the Supreme Court in State v. Pavlich, 80 N.M. 747, 461 P.2d 229 (1969). The defendant had a choice between two alternatives. He made a voluntary plea of guilty to a lesser charge. He has no basis for complaint. State v. French, 82 N.M. 209, 478 P.2d 537 (1970). The assistance afforded defendant by his counsel in this case did not make the proceedings “a sham, a farce, or a mockery.” (B) What is “manifest error” ? The majority opinion states: . [We hold that] manifest error was committed by the trial court in not permitting defendant to withdraw his plea of guilty .... Unfortunately, this portion of the majority opinion is contrary to State v. Madrigal, 85 N.M. 496, 513 P.2d 1278 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 85 N.M. 483, 513 P.2d 1265 (1973). Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has not adopted a rule on “plea withdrawal.” See § 2.1 A.B.A. Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty which has been adopted and followed in many states. I discussed the A.B.A. Standards in my dissent in Madrigal, 85 N.M. at 504, 513 P.2d 1278. The defendant now urges this court to accept the provisions of § 2.1. I agree. Under § 2.1, defendant must prove that withdrawal of a plea of guilty “is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.” Since this provision has not yet been accepted in New Mexico, it will not be discussed. Disputes on “plea withdrawal” will continue because judicial discretion has been defined in many ways. What does “manifest error” mean as used in the majority opinion? “Manifest” is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary, Rev. 4th ed., at 1115 (1968): Evident to the senses, especially to the sight, obvious to the understanding, evident to the mind, not obscure or hidden, and is synonymous with open, clear, visible, unmistakable, indubitable, indisputable, evident, and self-evident. State v. Fischer, 38 N.J. 40, 183 A.2d 11, 14 (1962) gives the same definition and applies it to the doctrine of “manifest injustice” under § 2.1. The trial court did not commit “open, clear, visible, unmistakable, indubitable, indisputable, evident, and self-evident” error. Its denial of the motion to withdraw the guilty plea was “not a mere whim or caprice, but an honest attempt, in the exercise of power and duty, to see that justice is done.” Madrigal (85 N.M. at 501, 513 P.2d at 1283). “Manifest error” did not occur. (C) What is meant by “judicial discretion” ? “Any attempt to define the phrase ‘judicial discretion’ is generally regarded as a difficult and dangerous undertaking. But we venture that such a discretion as the law sanctions is not arbitrary, vague, or fanciful, nor is it to be controlled by humor or caprice, but is to be governed by principle and regular procedure for the accomplishment of the ends of right and justice.” Pankey v. Hot Springs Nat. Bank, 42 N.M. 674, 680-681, 84 P.2d 649, 653 (1938). The trial judge sat in judgment upon defendant, his attorney and the record. We know, or can presume, that this judge is one who arrived at a decision with reason, impartiality, conscience and with a calm spirit, to accomplish the ends of right and justice. Nothing in the record indicates the contrary and this constitutes the exercise of judicial discretion. “When invoked as a guide to judicial action [judicial discretion] means a sound discretion . exercised . . . with regard to what is right and equitable under the circumstances and the law, and directed by the reason and conscience of the judge to a just result.” Langnes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531, 541, 51 S.Ct. 243, 247, 75 L.Ed. 520 (1931). (D) What is meant by "abuse of discretion” ? To define “abuse of discretion” is as difficult as defining “discretion.” In People v. Hill, 21 Mich.App. 178, 175 N.W.2d 305, 306 (1970), the following is quoted with approval: In order to have an ‘abuse’ in reaching . . . [a] determination [made between competing considerations], the result must be so palpably and grossly violative of fact and logic that it evidences not the exercise of will but perversity of will, not the exercise of judgment but the defiance thereof, not the exercise of reason but rather of passion or bias. [People v. Wolschon, 2 Mich.App. 186, 139 N.W.2d 123, 124 (1966)]. People ex rel. Ball v. Johnson, 341 Ill.App. 423, 94 N.E.2d 444, 447 (1950) phrased it this way: . . . “[A]buse of discretion” implies not only an erroneous conclusion but that such conclusion was brought about by temper, humor, caprice, passion, prejudice, perversity of will, discrimination, or partiality. Certainly the exercise of honest judgment based upon facts and conditions carefully considered and innately reasonable cannot be said to constitute an abuse of discretion. State v. Kicak, 168 N.E.2d 768, 771 (Ohio App.1959) states that an abuse of discretion means “ ‘a view or action “that no conscientious judge acting intelligently could honestly have taken.” ’ ” [quoting from Steiner v. Custer et al., 137 Ohio St. 448, 31 N.E.2d 855]. On the record before us, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. The judgment below should be affirmed.