Court Opinion

ID: 9565577
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:23:53.060811+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:45.692949
License: Public Domain

BAKES, Justice.
This is an appeal by the State of Idaho from an “order granting [defendant] Alan-is’ motion to suppress all statements made by Alanis the day after the initial arrest,” and the “entering [of] a judgment that Alanis is acquitted, entered in the above entitled action on the 11th day of January, 1984____” Notice of Appeal, Clerk’s Tr., p. 229. There are two issues on appeal; first, whether either of these two actions of the trial court are appealable under I.A.R. 11(c), and secondly, if either is appealable, whether the trial court erred in either order. A brief chronology of events leading up to the challenged order follows.
I
On the evening of June 1, 1983, defendant respondent Linda Mae Alanis was taken into custody by Pocatello police following a fatal shooting in a trailer home at a local used car sales lot. Ms. Alanis was detained for the remainder of that evening and into the morning of June 2, 1983. During this period of detention, Ms. Alanis was interrogated by detectives concerning the shooting. These interrogation sessions were taped. On the morning of June 2, 1983, the detectives, presumably based on the results of their interrogation of respondent, sought and obtained a complaint and warrant for her arrest on charges of first degree murder. The warrant was executed and respondent remained in custody.
On June 6, 1983, respondent moved to have the complaint and warrant dismissed on grounds that the affidavit accompanying the request for the complaint failed to allege premeditation, and therefore the warrant was issued without probable cause. The motion was granted on June 16, 1983. However, on that same date a second complaint and warrant were issued charging respondent with second degree murder. Respondent was re-arrested on that day. A preliminary hearing on this last charge was held on July 5, 1983, at which time the magistrate reduced the charge to involuntary manslaughter and bound respondent over for trial on October 26, 1983.
The trial was continued twice on motions of the state until January 9, 1984. The basis for these continuances was the state’s inability to procure the attendance of a key witness (one of the interrogating detectives) who was hospitalized with an extended illness. When it was determined that the officer would not recover so as to be able to attend trial on the 9th, the state deposed the officer on January 5, 1984.
On January 6, 1984, the Friday before the Monday trial, respondent, through court-appointed counsel, filed a motion to suppress the taped interrogations conducted by the police during her initial detention. Defense counsel argued that the contents of these interrogations were the fruit of an illegal arrest (i.e., the arrest was without probable cause) and therefore were inadmissible. The hearing on the motion to *887suppress was scheduled for 9:00 a.m., January 9, 1984. Trial was scheduled to start that same day at 1:30 p.m.
At the hearing the state objected to the motion on grounds that it was untimely under Rule 12(d) of Idaho Criminal Rules. Although refusing the state’s request for additional time in the form of another continuance, the trial court did delay further argument until the following day at trial. In the meantime, however, the court proceeded with trial on the 9th, having the jury selected and sworn. On January 10, 1984, after further oral argument outside the hearing of the jury, the court granted the motion to suppress. The jury was recalled into the courtroom and, when asked to proceed, the state replied that it could not continue with the presentation of its case without the suppressed evidence. Instead, the state explained that it would pursue an appeal of the court’s order granting the' motion to suppress pursuant to I.A.R. 11(c)(4). At that point, defense counsel moved for dismissal with prejudice. The court granted the motion, dismissed the case with prejudice, and acquitted respondent of all charges. The state has appealed.
II
The first issue which we must decide is whether the order suppressing the evidence or the order granting a judgment of acquittal is appealable. While we conclude that the order of acquittal is not appealable under I.A.R. 11(c), the order suppressing the statements made by Alanis is expressly made appealable by I.A.R. 11(c), which provides that “an appeal as a matter of right may be taken to the supreme court from ... an order granting a motion to suppress evidence.” I.A.R. 11(c)(4). The rule does not qualify or condition this right of appeal upon a subsequent entry of final judgment of conviction, nor does it state that such an appeal must be taken immediately upon entry of the order granting the motion. Accordingly, the state’s appeal is properly taken as to the order suppressing the evidence. I.A.R. 11(c)(4).
Ill
Having concluded that the order suppressing the evidence is appealable, we now address the merits of the state’s argument that the trial court erred in considering and granting the motion. Idaho Criminal Rule 12 governs the filing of motions to suppress evidence and provides:
“(b) Pretrial motions. Any defense objection or request which is capable of determination without trial of the general issue may be raised before the trial by motion. The following must be raised prior to trial:
“(3) Motions to suppress evidence on the ground that it was illegally obtained; ...
“(d) Motion date. Motions pursuant to Rule 12(b) must be filed fourteen (14) days after the entry of a plea of not guilty or seven (7) days before trial whichever is earlier. Such motions must be brought on for hearing within fourteen (14) days after filing or forty-eight (48) hours before trial whichever is earlier. The court in its discretion may shorten or enlarge the time provided herein, and for good cause shown, or for excusable neglect, may relieve a party of failure to comply with this rule.
“(f) Effect of failure to raise defenses or objections. Failure by the defendant to raise defenses or objections or to make requests which must be made prior to trial, or at the time set by the court pursuant to subsection (d), or prior to any extension thereof made by the court, shall constitute waiver thereof, but the court for cause shown may grant relief from the waiver.” I.C.R. 12 (emphasis added).
In the case at bar, it is abundantly clear that none of the requirements for exemption from the rule’s filing requirements have been met.
*888The rule permits a trial court to extend or shorten the required time and thus relieve a party from failure to comply with the deadlines. However, this discretionary power may be exercised only “for good cause shown, or for excusable neglect.” In the instant case, neither exempting factor was established. When specifically asked whether there was good cause for the delayed filing of the motion, defense counsel admitted there was none. The colloquy between the trial judge and defense counsel at the time of hearing the motion to suppress was as follows:
“THE COURT: Was there any reason why it was not filed before now, though?
“[Defense Counsel]: Well, your Honor, we could have filed it before now — no, I guess there’s no reason why it wasn’t filed before now.”
A court may not arbitrarily enlarge or shorten the filing requirements of the rule. To permit a court to do so without the required exempting factors would emasculate the intent of the rule. Pretrial motions are just that, motions to be disposed of prior to trial. Bringing such motions at the last minute unfairly deprives the responding party opportunity to gather evidence to meet the merits of the movant’s arguments.
It can in no way be said in the present case that the state acquiesced in or consented to defendant’s delayed filing of the motion to suppress, or to the trial court’s decision to hear the motion. To the contrary, here the state objected to the untimely motion, and only when it was apparent that the motion would be considered anyway did the state request the trial court to enlarge the time required under the rule by way of a continuance in order that it might have adequate opportunity to prepare to respond to the merits of the defendant’s motion. Delaying arguments on the motion merely to the next morning cannot be said to have given the state adequate time to prepare.
Clearly, the trial court abused its discretion in considering the motion which, for no good reason, was not timely filed. As a result, the trial court erred in granting the motion. Therefore, we reverse the order of the trial court granting the motion to suppress, recognizing that the acquittal and double jeopardy will no doubt prevent retrial of this matter.
The order of suppression is reversed.
SHEPARD, J., concurs.