Court Opinion

ID: 9846972
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:51:31.921658+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:58.099201
License: Public Domain

*670GREENE, Judge,
dissenting.
I disagree with the majority’s conclusions that: (I) there was no final judgment on any of plaintiffs’ claims; and (II) the partial denial of defendants’ summary judgment motion did not affect their First Amendment rights.
I
A trial court’s certification of an interlocutory order for appeal is proper if the order is a final judgment as to one or more claims and there is no just reason for delay. See N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 54(b) (2001). A claim is defined as a “cause of action.” Black’s Law Dictionary 247 (6th ed. 1990) [hereinafter Black’s]. A cause of action is defined as “[t]he fact or facts which give a person a right to judicial redress or relief against another.” Black’s at 221; see also Brown v. Glade Valley Sch. Inc., 77 N.C. App. 83, 86, 334 S.E.2d 404, 406 (1985) (the facts alleged in a complaint determine the validity of a claim, not the legal theories asserted).
In this case, plaintiffs alleged defamation under three different legal theories based on a series of statements published in two union newsletters. While the trial court did not render final judgment on any of plaintiffs’ legal theories, the trial court did render summary judgment on all of plaintiffs’ factual claims, except for those “based on the limited assertion that defendant. . . maliciously published that it was plaintiffs who stood by when Ms. Jones was hired, when [defendant] knew he had approved the hire himself.” Thus, there was a final judgment as to one or more of plaintiffs’ claims, and the trial court properly certified the interlocutory order for appeal under Rule 54(b). Accordingly, this Court should address the question raised in plaintiffs’ appeal of whether the New York Times v. Sullivan “actual malice” standard applies to the facts of this case.
II
I also disagree with the majority’s conclusion that partial denial of defendants’ summary judgment motion did not affect a substantial right. Defendants contend the trial court misapplied the New York Times v. Sullivan “actual malice” standard, infringing on their First Amendment right to free speech. Because misapplication of the actual malice standard, detrimental to defendants, would have a chilling effect on their rights of free speech, the trial court’s order does affect a substantial right. See Sherrill v. Amerada Hess Corp., 130 N.C. App. 711, 719, 504 S.E.2d 802, 807 (1998) (order implicating First *671Amendment rights affects a substantial right). Accordingly, this Court should also address the merits of defendants’ appeal.