Court Opinion

ID: 9752465
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 18:09:15.24263+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:42:50.714301
License: Public Domain

Opinion issued August 24, 2023

                                       In The

                               Court of Appeals
                                      For The

                           First District of Texas
                            ————————————
                               NO. 01-22-00323-CV
                            ———————————
                           IN THE MATTER OF D.M.

                    On Appeal from the 315th District Court
                             Harris County, Texas
                       Trial Court Case No. 2021-00598J

                                   OPINION

      The State of Texas filed a juvenile delinquency petition alleging that D.M.

(“Denise”),1 a child, engaged in delinquent conduct, and the State requested an

1
      We refer to the child by a pseudonym because the Juvenile Justice Code prohibits
      identifying a child or her family in an appellate opinion rendered in an appeal of
      juvenile court proceedings. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 56.01(j).
adjudication hearing. Denise filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the petition did

not state her father’s name and address as required by Family Code section

53.04(d)(3). See TEX. FAM. CODE § 53.04(d)(3) (listing information that “petition

must state,” including “the names and residence addresses, if known, of the parent,

guardian, or custodian of the child”). Denise argued that such information was

mandatory and jurisdictional and its omission from the petition required dismissal

of the case. The State did not amend the petition, and the juvenile court granted

Denise’s motion and dismissed the case without prejudice.

      In a single issue on appeal, the State argues that the juvenile court erred by

dismissing the case because the court had jurisdiction despite the omission of the

information listed in the Family Code.2 We agree with the State that the requirements

in section 53.04(d)(3) are mandatory but not jurisdictional. Nevertheless, we hold

that the juvenile court did not err by dismissing the case because Denise challenged

the defective petition for noncompliance with the statutorily mandated petition

2
      The State’s sole issue included several sub-issues, including that the juvenile court
      had personal jurisdiction over Denise. Although Denise did not challenge personal
      jurisdiction in her motion to dismiss, the parties’ dispute evolved to include a
      personal jurisdiction challenge concerning whether the summons and petition must
      be served to both Denise and her father to have personal jurisdiction over Denise.
      See id. § 53.06(a)(1)–(2) (“The juvenile court shall direct issuance of a summons to:
      (1) the child named in the petition; [and] (2) the child’s parent, guardian, or
      custodian[.]”). As noted below, because we modify and affirm the juvenile court’s
      order dismissing the case as modified, we do not separately consider whether the
      court had personal jurisdiction over Denise.

                                            2
requirements and the State did not replead to cure the defect. We modify the

judgment to delete the juvenile court’s determination that it lacked jurisdiction, and

we affirm as modified.

                                    Background

      The State alleges that Denise left her young nephew “unattended in a bathtub

containing water,” and the nephew drowned. The State filed a petition in juvenile

court in April 2021 alleging that Denise, a child, engaged in delinquent conduct by

causing serious bodily injury to another child. The petition was approved by a grand

jury. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 53.035. The State sought an adjudication hearing and

determinate sentence based on the allegations of delinquent conduct. See id.

§§ 54.03(a) (providing that child may be found to have engaged in delinquent

conduct only after adjudication hearing), 54.04(d)(3) (providing for determinate

commitment of child in Texas Juvenile Justice Department for up to forty years with

possible transfer to Texas Department of Criminal Justice). In addition, the State

requested that Denise, her parent, or “other person” be required to pay court costs, a

reasonable sum of support if she was confined in a juvenile detention facility, a

monthly court fee if she was placed on probation, and restitution.

      The petition named only Denise as a party. See id. § 53.04(d)(2). It did not

include the name and address of her parent, guardian, custodian, or other known

adult relative. See id. § 53.04(d)(3), (4) (providing that petition “must state,” among

                                          3
other things, name and address of child’s parent, guardian, custodian, or other known

adult relative).

       In February 2022, Denise filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

She argued that the State’s petition did not comply with section 53.04(d) because it

omitted the name and address of a parent, guardian, custodian, or other known adult

relative. See id. She further argued that the statutory requirement was mandatory and

jurisdictional, and the State’s failure to comply with the provisions entitled her to

dismissal of the case.

       In response, the State did not dispute that the petition omitted the statutorily

required information, but it disputed that the requirement was jurisdictional. The

State acknowledged Denise’s argument that the statute was “both mandatory and

jurisdictional,” but it did not address the argument concerning the mandatory nature

of the requirements except to argue that “[m]andatory statutory duties are not

necessarily jurisdictional.” According to the State, its failure to include the required

information was “a mere defect in the State’s pleading that may be corrected upon

amendment,” but it did not request leave to amend or file an amended petition.

       The juvenile court held a hearing on the motion to dismiss on March 9, 2022.

The State conceded that omission of the statutorily required information in its

pleading was a defect, but it maintained that the defect did not implicate the court’s

                                           4
jurisdiction. The State argued that it had “the right to amend up until adjudication or

until this case is resolved . . . .”

       At the end of the hearing, the juvenile court invited the parties to submit

additional briefing. Both parties filed additional briefing.

       On March 31, the juvenile court held a second hearing on the motion to

dismiss. After the brief hearing, the court noted that the State had not filed an

amended petition, and it orally rendered a ruling granting the motion to dismiss for

lack of jurisdiction. The same day, the court signed a written order granting the

motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The order stated that the court

“determine[d] that it lacks jurisdiction” over the case. This appeal followed. See id.

§ 56.03(b)(1) (authorizing State to appeal order dismissing petition in juvenile case

in which grand jury approved petition).

                            Statutory Petition Requirements

       On appeal, the State primarily contends that the juvenile court erred by

dismissing the case because the statutory pleading requirements are not jurisdictional

and therefore do not require dismissal.

A.     Standard of Review

       Generally, appellate courts review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss

for an abuse of discretion. City of Webster v. Myers, 360 S.W.3d 51, 56 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. denied). However, the proper standard of review is

                                           5
determined by the substance of the issue to be reviewed, not necessarily by the type

of motion to which the order relates. Id.

         In this case, the issues presented relate to subject-matter jurisdiction and

require the Court to interpret statutory text. Issues of subject-matter jurisdiction

present a question of law that we review de novo. Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v.

Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 225–26 (Tex. 2004); Myers, 360 S.W.3d at 56. Likewise,

statutory interpretation is a question of law that we review de novo. Crosstex Energy

Servs., L.P. v. Pro Plus, Inc., 430 S.W.3d 384, 389 (Tex. 2014); Myers, 360 S.W.3d

at 56.

B.       Governing Law

         To issue a valid and binding judgment or order, a court must have subject-

matter jurisdiction over a case. In re Guardianship of Fairley, 650 S.W.3d 372, 379

(Tex. 2022); Luciano v. SprayFoamPolymers.com, LLC, 625 S.W.3d 1, 7–8 (Tex.

2021). Subject-matter jurisdiction refers to a court’s authority to adjudicate a case.

In re Guardianship of Fairley, 650 S.W.3d at 379. Texas courts derive subject-

matter jurisdiction solely from the Texas Constitution and state statutes. Id. Subject-

matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred on a court by consent or waiver, and a

judgment issued by a court without subject-matter jurisdiction is never considered

final. Id.; Dubai Petroleum Co. v. Kazi, 12 S.W.3d 71, 76 (Tex. 2000).

                                            6
      We apply ordinary principles of statutory interpretation to determine whether

a statutory requirement is jurisdictional. Tex. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Chicas, 593 S.W.3d

284, 287 (Tex. 2019); City of DeSoto v. White, 288 S.W.3d 389, 394 (Tex. 2009).

Our primary purpose in construing a statute is to determine and give effect to the

Legislature’s intent. White, 288 S.W.3d at 394.

      We first look to the plain language of the statute because “it is a fair

assumption that the Legislature tries to say what it means, and therefore the words it

chooses should be the surest guide to legislative intent.” Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v.

Shaikh, 445 S.W.3d 183, 186 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.)

(quoting Fitzgerald v. Advanced Spine Fixation Sys., Inc., 996 S.W.2d 864, 866

(Tex. 1999)). We read every word, phrase, and expression in a statute as if they were

deliberately chosen and presume that words excluded from a statute were excluded

purposefully. Id.

      We do not examine a term or provision in isolation, but rather we read the

particular statute as a whole. Id. Words and phrases “shall be read in context and

construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage.” Crosstex Energy

Servs., 430 S.W.3d at 390 (quoting TEX. GOV’T CODE § 311.011). If the statute is

clear and unambiguous, we interpret its language according to its common meaning

without considering rules of construction or extrinsic aids. Id. at 389. We rely on the

plain meaning unless a different meaning is apparent from the context or the plain

                                          7
meaning leads to absurd results. Id. at 389–90. Courts must avoid an interpretation

that renders any part of the statute meaningless or superfluous. Id. at 390.

      Courts are generally “reluctant to conclude that a statutory requirement affects

a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction absent clear legislative intent to that effect.” In

re Guardianship of Fairley, 650 S.W.3d at 379; White, 288 S.W.3d at 393. As such,

we begin with the presumption that the Legislature did not intend to make statutory

requirements jurisdictional. Chicas, 593 S.W.3d at 287. Only “clear contrary

legislative intent” will overcome this presumption. Id. In determining whether a

statutory requirement is jurisdictional, the Texas Supreme Court has set out four

factors for courts to consider: (1) the plain meaning of the statute; (2) whether the

statute contains specific consequences for noncompliance; (3) the purpose of the

statute; and (4) the consequences that would result from each possible construction.

Id.; Crosstex Energy Servs., 430 S.W.3d at 392.

C.    Analysis

      1.     Section 53.04(d)(3) is not a jurisdictional requirement

      Juvenile Justice Code section 53.04(d) provides in relevant part:

      The petition [for an adjudication or transfer hearing of allegations that
      a child engaged in delinquent conduct] must state:

      (1)    with reasonable particularity the time, place, and manner of the
             acts alleged and the penal law or standard of conduct allegedly
             violated by the acts;

                                           8
      (2)    the name, age, and residence address, if known, of the child who
             is the subject of the petition;

      (3)    the names and residence addresses, if known, of the parent,
             guardian, or custodian of the child . . . ; [and]

      (4)    if the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian does not reside or
             cannot be found in the state, or if their places of residence are
             unknown, the name and residence address of any known adult
             relative residing in the county or, if there is none, the name and
             residence address of the known adult relative residing nearest to
             the location of the court . . . .

TEX. FAM. CODE § 53.04(d). Although the motion to dismiss challenged the omission

of information in both subsections (d)(3) and (d)(4), the parties have narrowed their

dispute to focus on whether Denise’s father’s name and address should have been

included in the petition. See id. § 53.04(d)(3).

             a.     Plain Meaning

      Section 53.04(d) does not expressly mention jurisdiction or state that the

petition requirements are jurisdictional prerequisites to maintaining suit. See id.

§ 53.04(d); Chicas, 593 S.W.3d at 288 (noting lack of “explicit language” in statute

indicating Legislature “clearly intended” statute to be jurisdictional). By contrast,

several other provisions in a separate chapter of the Juvenile Justice Code expressly

address the jurisdiction of juvenile courts over juvenile delinquency proceedings.

See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE §§ 51.04(a) (providing that, with limited exceptions not

applicable here, “the juvenile court has exclusive original jurisdiction over

proceedings” involving delinquent conduct by child), 51.0412 (providing that

                                           9
juvenile court retains jurisdiction over incomplete proceeding after child turns

eighteen or nineteen years old in some circumstances), 53.07(b) (“The juvenile court

has jurisdiction of the case if after reasonable effort a person other than the child

cannot be found nor his post-office address ascertained, whether he is in or outside

this state.”). None of these sections addressing jurisdiction states that the petition

requirements must be met to confer jurisdiction on the juvenile court. Consequently,

the presumption remains that the petition requirements are not jurisdictional. See

Chicas, 593 S.W.3d at 288–89; see also S.C. v. M.B., 650 S.W.3d 428, 436 (Tex.

2022) (“To satisfy the clear-statement rule, the jurisdictional condition must be just

that: clear.”) (quoting Boechler, P.C. v. Comm’r, 142 S. Ct. 1493, 1499 (2022)).

      Denise responds that the statute’s use of the term “must” makes the statute

mandatory and jurisdictional. We disagree. As Denise points out, the term “must”

when used in a statute “creates or recognizes a condition precedent.” TEX. GOV’T

CODE § 311.016(3). The Texas Supreme Court has acknowledged that use of the

term “must” in a statute “at least suggest[s] that a requirement could be

jurisdictional.” Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. at Dallas v. Loutzenhiser, 140 S.W.3d

351, 359 (Tex. 2004). But nothing in the remainder of section 53.04 indicates that

the statute is jurisdictional, as discussed above. The Texas Supreme Court has “held

that the petition and notice requirements of section 53.04 of the Family Code must

be satisfied,” L.G.R. v. State, 724 S.W.2d 775, 776 (Tex. 1987), but the parties cite

                                         10
no legal authority stating that the requirements are jurisdictional. In this

circumstance, the plain meaning of “must” indicates that the statute is mandatory but

not necessarily jurisdictional. See Chicas, 593 S.W.3d at 286 (stating that “just

because a statutory requirement is mandatory does not mean that compliance with it

is jurisdictional”) (quoting White, 288 S.W.3d at 395); Crosstex Energy Servs., 430

S.W.3d at 391 (“[M]andatory statutory duties are not necessarily jurisdictional.”).

             b.     Specific Consequences for Noncompliance

      The parties agree that section 53.04(d) does not specify any consequences for

noncompliance with the petition requirements. “[W]hen a statute does not require

dismissal for failure to comply, this weighs in favor of a finding that it is not

jurisdictional.” See Chicas, 593 S.W.3d at 289.

             c.     Purpose

      The State contends that the notice and petition provisions in section 53.04(d)

serve merely to initiate and maintain a civil suit and give fair notice of the State’s

claims under Texas’s fair-notice pleading standard. But the State does not explain

why inclusion of a parent’s information in a juvenile delinquency petition serves

either a suit-initiation or notice purpose.

      The Rules of Civil Procedure, which govern juvenile delinquency

proceedings, see TEX. FAM. CODE § 51.17(a), already require the filing of a petition

to commence a civil lawsuit and require the petition to provide fair notice of the

                                              11
claims asserted. TEX. R. CIV. P. 22 (requiring filing of petition to commence civil

suit); TEX. R. CIV. P. 47(a) (requiring pleading setting forth claim for relief to contain

“a short statement of the cause of action sufficient to give fair notice of the claim

involved”). Under the State’s interpretation, section 53.04(d) would be superfluous

of Rules 22 and 47(a). See Crosstex Energy Servs., 430 S.W.3d at 390 (prohibiting

courts from interpreting statute in manner that renders any part superfluous).

      Moreover, this argument focuses only on the petition requirements rather than

considering the purpose of the statute as a whole. See Chicas, 593 S.W.3d at 289

(considering statute as whole rather than challenged provision in isolation); Shaikh,

445 S.W.3d at 186 (stating that courts construe statute in context as whole, not in

isolation). The requirement at issue—providing the name and address of the subject

child’s parent—indicates that inclusion of this information serves some additional

purpose beyond simply suit initiation and notice of claims.

      Denise advances several arguments concerning the purpose of the statute. She

argues that one purpose of the statute is to provide a simple procedure to hold

children accountable for criminal acts while safeguarding their constitutional and

other legal rights. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 51.01(6). She also argues that a child has a

right to a parent’s assistance in supporting and guiding the child through juvenile

delinquency proceedings. Denise argues that a parent or other appropriate adult is a

party to the juvenile delinquency proceedings, must be served with a summons and

                                           12
the petition, and has express rights under the Juvenile Justice Code. She argues that

requiring identification of a parent in the petition is consistent with the principle that

minor children are non sui juris and must sue or be sued through a guardian or next

friend.

       The Code provides a comprehensive, exclusive scheme for holding children

accountable for engaging in criminal activity. Id. § 51.04(a) (providing that Juvenile

Justice Code governs all juvenile delinquency proceedings and juvenile court has

exclusive original jurisdiction over such proceedings). At the outset, the Code lists

six express purposes. Id. § 51.01. For example, delinquency proceedings should

strive “to provide treatment, training, and rehabilitation that emphasizes the

accountability and responsibility of both the parent and the child for the child’s

conduct” and should proceed “in a family environment whenever possible,

separating the child from the child’s parents only when necessary for the child’s

welfare or in the interest of public safety.” Id. § 51.01(2)(C), (5).

       Other provisions of the Code indicate that the Legislature intended parents or

another appropriate adult to be significantly involved in the proceedings. For

example, a summons and a copy of the petition must be served on both the child and

the parent, and the summons must require them both to appear before the court at a

set time to answer the allegations in the petition. Id. §§ 53.06(a)(1), (2), (b), 53.07(a).

Parents must also be served with notice of other important events under the Code,

                                            13
including when a child is issued a warning notice for delinquent conduct or detained

for such conduct. E.g., id. §§ 52.01(c)(5), 52.02(b)(1), 54.01(b). A parent or other

appropriate adult is required to attend specified hearings affecting the child in the

juvenile delinquency proceeding, and the parent is entitled to notice of these

hearings. Id. § 51.115(a), (c).

      Moreover, the Code expressly defines “party” to include “the child’s parent,

spouse, guardian, or guardian ad litem,” as well as the State and the child. Id.

§ 51.02(10). Another provision provides that a “party, other than the child, may

waive service of summons” under certain circumstances. Id. § 53.06(e).

      The Code devotes an entire chapter to the rights and responsibilities of parents

and other eligible persons. Id. §§ 61.001–.107. Among other rights, the parent is

entitled to “communicate in person privately with the child” if the child is taken into

custody and to be informed about “the methods by which the parent can assist the

child with the legal process.” Id. §§ 61.102(a)(13), 61.103(a).

      Furthermore, a juvenile court can issue orders against a parent of a child. Id.

§ 61.003. Upon notice to the parent, the court can order the parent to pay restitution,

reasonable attorney’s fees for representation of the child, probation and deferred

prosecution fees, and the cost of attending an educational program. Id.

§ 61.002(a)(1), (2), (7), (9), (13). The court can also enjoin a parent from injuring

the child’s welfare or from contacting the child. Id. § 61.002(a)(4), (5). The court

                                          14
can also order a parent to participate in counseling. Id. §61.002(6). Indeed, in this

case, the State’s petition requested that Denise, her parent, or other person pay costs

of court, a reasonable sum for support if Denise was incarcerated, a monthly fee if

Denise was sentenced to probation, and costs of any necessary counseling.

       Thus, the Code contemplates that parents or another appropriate adult should

be significantly involved in the juvenile delinquency proceedings along with the

subject child. Requiring the petition to identify the parent by name and address thus

serves additional purposes beyond just initiation of suit and notice of claims. It

serves to join the parent as a party to the proceedings, identify the parent’s name and

address for issuance of summons, and impress upon the parent the serious nature of

the proceedings that could result in a child being committed to a juvenile detention

facility for up to forty years with a possible transfer to the Texas Department of

Criminal Justice. Id. § 54.04(d)(3). We agree with Denise that by ensuring

significant parental involvement, the statute serves to provide children with the

assistance and guidance of an adult in proceedings that can result in a significant loss

of the child’s liberty.

       Nevertheless, Denise does not explain why these purposes are achieved by a

jurisdictional requirement that a petition include a parent’s name and address.

Jurisdictional requirements are not waivable. Crosstex Energy Servs., 430 S.W.3d at

391 (stating that parties may not waive jurisdictional statutory duties, but parties

                                          15
may waive mandatory, non-jurisdictional statutory duties). Yet “any right” enjoyed

by the child, including constitutional rights, “may be waived” voluntarily in juvenile

delinquency proceedings under certain circumstances. TEX. FAM. CODE § 51.09.

Denise’s position would elevate the petition requirements at issue to a non-waivable

jurisdictional status without justification. The statute’s purpose does not indicate that

the Legislature intended the petition requirements to be non-waivable jurisdictional

prerequisites to maintaining suit.

             d.     Consequences Resulting from Each Construction

      Finally, we consider the consequences that would result from each party’s

construction. See Chicas, 593 S.W.3d at 286, 289–90. The State contends that if the

petition requirements were jurisdictional, it “would weaken the finality of juvenile

judgments and make them more vulnerable to later attack, which is contrary to”

precedent. Denise does not dispute this proposition, but she maintains that a child

could be deprived of constitutional and other legal rights if the statutory requirement

of identifying a parent in the petition is not jurisdictional. We have already rejected

this argument.

      The parties do not dispute that the petition requirement is at least mandatory.

A party’s failure to comply with mandatory, non-jurisdictional statutory

requirements can have consequences—even if the statute is silent on such

consequences—as required to effectuate the purpose of the statute. See White, 288

                                           16
S.W.3d at 398. As we discuss below, the State’s failure to comply with the

mandatory petition requirement in section 53.04(d)(3) is a pleading defect which, if

not cured, can result in dismissal. But the defect is also waivable if not raised by the

juvenile defendant.

      After considering the factors, we hold that the petition requirement in section

53.04(d)(3) is mandatory but not jurisdictional.

      2.     Remedy for noncompliance with section 53.04(d)(3)

      In her motion to dismiss, Denise argued that the statutory petition requirement

was both mandatory and jurisdictional. On appeal, the State does not dispute that the

requirement is mandatory. The State does not address whether the juvenile court

erred by dismissing the case based on the State’s failure to comply with a mandatory,

non-jurisdictional statutory requirement. The State does argue, however, that there

are no consequences for its failure to comply with the mandatory statutory

requirements.

      Because the State did not comply with a mandatory statutory requirement, we

must determine whether dismissal was appropriate. See id. (“Having determined that

the notice provision is not jurisdictional, we must determine the proper remedy, if

any, for the City’s failure to comply.”). “When the statute is silent as to the

consequences for noncompliance, we look to the statute’s purpose in determining

the proper remedy.” Id. (citation omitted).

                                          17
      As discussed above, one purpose of the Juvenile Justice Code is to ensure

significant parental involvement in juvenile delinquency proceedings. The statute

requires that a parent be named as a party in the proceedings, be served with a

summons and the petition, be served with notice of hearings, and attend hearings.

Parents have express rights under the Code, and they can be liable for certain relief

in the proceedings. Because the statute contemplates significant parental

involvement in the proceedings, the statutory scheme indicates that the Legislature

intended some consequence to result from omitting a known parent’s name and

address in the petition.

      The failure to include this information in the petition amounts to a pleading

defect. The Rules of Civil Procedure provide a method for challenging pleading

defects. Under Rule 90, a party waives “[e]very defect, omission or fault in a

pleading either of form or of substance, which is not specifically pointed out by

exception in writing and brought to the attention of the judge . . . .” TEX. R. CIV. P.

90; see TEX. R. CIV. P. 91 (providing requirements for specially excepting to

pleading defect or other insufficiency). A party who fails to timely object can waive

noncompliance with a mandatory, non-jurisdictional statutory requirement. Crosstex

Energy Servs., 430 S.W.3d at 391; see also TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1).

      When the defect is curable, a party may challenge the defect by special

exceptions that specify the challenged pleading and the defect or omission

                                          18
“intelligibly and with particularity[.]” TEX. R. CIV. P. 91; see Crosstex Energy Servs.,

430 S.W.3d at 395 (stating that special exception is unnecessary when pleading

defect is incurable). Special exceptions permit the pleader to amend the challenged

pleading to cure the defect before the case is subject to dismissal. Friesenhahn v.

Ryan, 960 S.W.2d 656, 658 (Tex. 1998); Pro Plus, Inc. v. Crosstex Energy Servs.,

L.P., 388 S.W.3d 689, 705 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012), aff’d, 430 S.W.3d

384 (Tex. 2014).

      If the court sustains the exceptions, the pleader must be given a reasonable

opportunity to cure the defect by repleading. Parker v. Barefield, 206 S.W.3d 119,

120 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam); Friesenhahn, 960 S.W.2d at 658; In re Shire PLC,

633 S.W.3d 1, 13 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2021, orig. proceeding). The pleader may

refuse to replead and choose instead to stand on the pleadings and test the decision

on appeal. Friesenhahn, 960 S.W.2d at 658; In re Shire PLC, 633 S.W.3d at 13.

After a reasonable opportunity to amend, the court may dismiss the case if the defect

affects the entire case. Friesenhahn, 960 S.W.2d at 658 (stating that summary

judgment may be granted if party refuses to amend or amended pleading remains

defective); In re Shire PLC, 633 S.W.3d at 13. If the defect is not curable by

amendment, a trial court need not provide an opportunity to replead before

dismissing the case. Mowbray v. Avery, 76 S.W.3d 663, 680 (Tex. App.—Corpus

                                          19
Christi–Edinburg 2002, pet. denied); Albright v. Tex. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 859

S.W.2d 575, 582 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ).

      We conclude that this procedure for challenging pleading defects is the

remedy intended by the Legislature for failure to comply with the mandatory

pleading requirement in Juvenile Justice Code section 53.04(d)(3). This procedure

incentivizes the State to comply with the requirement by utilizing a familiar

procedure that is used in other civil cases for challenging pleading defects. Indeed,

the State conceded in the juvenile court that the omission of Denise’s father’s name

and address in the petition was “a defect” and the State “ha[s] the right to amend”

its pleadings to cure the defect. The burden to replead is slight, especially

considering that the child has the burden to specifically raise the issue and seek

dismissal or waive it. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 90 (stating that party waives every pleading

defect which is not specifically pointed out in writing); TEX. R. CIV. P. 91 (stating

that party must point out challenged pleading and point out “intelligibly and with

particularity the defect”); TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1) (stating that record must show

party made timely complaint “with sufficient specificity” as prerequisite to appellate

review of complaint); Crosstex Energy Servs., 430 S.W.3d at 391 (stating that “party

may waive a mandatory, non-jurisdictional requirement by failing to object timely”).

This procedure ensures a fair proceeding by appropriately involving the parent from

the outset of the proceedings.

                                          20
      Applying this remedy to this case, the State was required to include Denise’s

father’s name and address in the petition, and there is no dispute that it did not

comply with this requirement. Denise timely challenged the defect in the State’s

pleadings.3

      Generally, this type of defect is curable if the parent’s name and address is

known because the State may amend its pleadings in juvenile delinquency cases. See

TEX. R. CIV. P. 63 (allowing parties to amend pleadings in civil cases); Carrillo v.

State, 480 S.W.2d 612, 615 (Tex. 1972) (holding that pleadings may be amended in

juvenile delinquency proceedings); see also In re B.R.H., 426 S.W.3d 163, 167 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, orig. proceeding). The State does not dispute that

it knew Denise’s father’s name and address. Assuming without deciding that the

defect was curable by amendment to add Denise’s father’s name and address to the

petition, the State was entitled to a reasonable opportunity to cure the defect by

3
      As stated above, Denise contended in the juvenile court that the pleadings were not
      curable, and she therefore filed a motion to dismiss the pleadings rather than special
      exceptions. See Crosstex Energy Servs., L.P. v. Pro Plus, Inc., 430 S.W.3d 384, 395
      (Tex. 2014) (“If a defect in the pleadings is incurable by amendment, a special
      exception is unnecessary.”). Nevertheless, courts construe motions according to
      their substance, not their titles. TEX. R. CIV. P. 71 (providing that courts are to give
      effect to substance of pleading rather than title or form); In re J.Z.P., 484 S.W.3d
      924, 925 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam) (stating same for motions). Denise timely
      challenged the pleading and the defect in writing, and thus she satisfied the
      requirement for challenging pleading defects. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 90, 91.

                                            21
repleading.4 See Friesenhahn, 960 S.W.2d at 658; In re Shire PLC, 633 S.W.3d at

13.

      Although the State argued in the juvenile court that it could replead to cure

the defect, the State did not replead or request an opportunity to do so. Nor did the

State object that it was not provided an opportunity to replead when the court

dismissed the case. And the State does not contend on appeal that the juvenile court

erred by not allowing it to replead. To preserve a complaint for appellate review, a

party must have presented the complaint to the trial court by timely request,

objection, or motion stating the specific grounds for the requested ruling, and the

party must have obtained a ruling on the complaint. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); see

Inglish v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 928 S.W.2d 702, 705 (Tex. App.—Houston

[1st Dist.] 1996, writ denied) (“Specifically, before a party may complain that it was

denied the opportunity to amend after special exceptions were sustained, it must

demonstrate that such an opportunity was requested and denied,” which request may

be made in motion for new trial if denial does not otherwise appear in record).

Because the State did not preserve error in the juvenile court or raise the issue on

appeal, the State has waived any error concerning an opportunity to replead to cure

4
      In the juvenile court, the parties disputed whether the State could amend the petition
      at all after Denise turned eighteen years old. The State does not raise this issue on
      appeal, thus we assume without deciding that the petition could be amended to
      attempt to cure the defect.

                                            22
the defect. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); Parker, 206 S.W.3d at 120 (stating that if

trial court does not provide opportunity to amend pleading to cure defect, “the

aggrieved party must prove that the opportunity to replead was requested and denied

to preserve the error for review”).

      The case was therefore subject to dismissal without prejudice because the

State did not replead to cure the defect. Accordingly, we hold that the juvenile court

did not err in granting the motion to dismiss and dismissing the case without

prejudice.5 See Crosstex Energy Servs., 430 S.W.3d at 389 (stating that de novo

standard of review applies to issues of statutory interpretation). We overrule the

State’s issues.

5
      Based on our conclusion that the juvenile court did not err in dismissing the case,
      we do not consider the State’s alternative issue concerning whether the juvenile
      court had personal jurisdiction over Denise. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.

                                          23
                                   Conclusion

      We modify the judgment of the juvenile court to delete the statement that the

court “determine[d] that it lacks jurisdiction over the instant proceedings,” and we

affirm as modified.

                                             April L. Farris
                                             Justice

Panel consists of Justices Hightower, Rivas-Molloy, and Farris.

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