Court Opinion

ID: 9744348
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 22:01:14.518313+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:48.681643
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE SIMKINS, dissenting: In People v. Dailey, 15 Ill. App. 3d 214, 304 N.E.2d 156, this court approved a (with Justice Craven dissenting) 4- to 7-year sentence made to run consecutive to a 1- to 3-year sentence previously imposed and from which defendant had been paroled at the time of the commission of the second offense, saying that “There is nothing in the record to warrant a change in the consecutive nature of the sentence.” In People v. Nicks (4th Dist. 1974), 23 Ill. App. 3d 435,319 N.E.2d531, the trial judge imposed a 10- to 30-year sentence for armed robbery and made the sentence consecutive to another armed robbery sentence. This court affirmed, saying, “The record, however, does not indicate that the trial judge abused his discretion in imposing a consecutive sentence.” This case relies on this court’s opinion in People v. Dawson, 30 Ill. App. 3d 147, 332 N.E.2d 58. In Dawson defendant was admitted to probation upon conviction of burglary. Following conviction and sentence for a subsequent burglary probation was revoked and sentence imposed to run consecutively to that imposed for the second offense. This court, on appeal, modified the sentence to run concurrently with the first sentence of imprisonment. In so doing no reference was made to People v. Dailey or People v. Nicks, both of which appear to be inconsistent with Dawson. I interpret Dawson and the instant case to hold that the language of section 5 — 8—4(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, par. 1005 — 8—4(b) prohibits a trial judge from imposing a consecutive sentence if the resulting aggregate maximum sentence is less than the permissible maximum sentence which could have been imposed in the sentence which is made consecutive to a prior sentence. This interpretation of the statute deprives the trial judge of authority to impose a consecutive sentence unless the above circumstance prevails. Having determined to impose a sentence of imprisonment, the trial judge must then determine the duration of the period of incarceration. It seems to me that the formula utilized in prescribing that period should not concern this court. What difference does it make whether the trial judge adopts the formula required under the circumstances present in this case and elevates the limits of the second sentence, or arrives at the same period of imprisonment by use of the consecutive sentence? Under the statute I believe that it is within his discretion to adopt the latter method. The only concern of this court should be whether the sentence imposed is excessive. I would affirm.