Court Opinion

ID: 9653701
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 17:52:13.746362+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:52.787814
License: Public Domain

ONION, Judge
(dissenting).
I remain convinced that this cause was properly disposed of on original submission.
On re-hearing the majority takes the position that what transpired after both sides closed, consisting mainly of a colloquy at the bench, constituted a waiver by appellant’s counsel as to the proper predicate for reproduction of the testimony from the former trial. I had thought it had been made clear on original submission that these claims need not be evaluated since Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 88 S.Ct. 1318, 20 L.Ed.2d 255, controlled the disposition of this cause.
The question presented by this appeal is whether the State, in light of Barber, laid a sufficient predicate to authorize the introduction of an absent witness’ testimony given at a former trial as an exception to the constitutional right of confrontation.-
The majority misreads Barber. They confuse the issue and apparently view it as a problem as to whether there is a sufficient distinction between testimony elicited at an examining trial or preliminary hearing and testimony elicited at a former trial on the merits to cause a reversal of this conviction on the basis that appellant was denied his constitutional right of confrontation of the witness. They apparently hold that the “good faith” effort required by Barber is a necessary part of the predicate only when the testimony sought to be reproduced was given at an examining trial and has no application when the reproduced testimony comes from a former trial. This is clearly wrong.
In Barber, after discussing the fact that the right of confrontation and cross-examination is an essential and fundamental requirement for the kind of fair trial which is this country’s constitutional goal, the Supreme Court said:
“It is true that there has traditionally been an exception to the confrontation requirement where a witness is unavailable and has given testimony at previous judicial proceedings against the same defendant which was subject to cross-examination by that defendant. E. g., Mattox v. United States, supra (witnesses who testified in original trial died prior to the second trial). This exception has been explained as arising from necessity and justified on the ground that the right of cross-examination initally afforded provides substantial compliance with the purposes behind the confrontation requirement. See 5 Wigmore, Evidence §§ 1395-1396, 1402 (3d ed 1940); McCormick, Evidence §§ 231, 234 (1954).”
In Barber, much like the case at bar, the State argued that the transcript used was within the foregoing exception on the grounds that the witness was outside the jurisdiction and therefore “unavailable” at the time of the trial and right of cross-examination was afforded the accused at the former judicial proceeding or had been waived.
Assuming that Barber had waived his right to cross examine at the former judicial proceeding, the Court held that none*78theless “a witness is not ‘unavailable’ for the purposes of the foregoing exception to the confrontation requirement unless the prosecutorial authorities have made a good-faith effort to obtain his presence at trial.” Therefore, the transcript in Barber was improperly used.
In Pointer v. State of Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923, the Court did not concern itself with the unavailability of the absent witness. They simply mentioned that it had been shown by the State that the witness had moved to California and did not intend to return to Texas. What the Court held in Pointer was that the constitutional right of an accused to be confronted with the witnesses against him is denied at a state criminal trial where the examining trial transcript of a witness’ testimony was admitted into evidence and this testimony was taken at a time and under circumstances affording the accused no adequate opportunity to cross examine the witness through counsel.
As I read Barber and Pointer, the State, to bring itself within the exception to the confrontation requirement, must show that the witness is still “unavailable” after a good faith effort to obtain his presence and further must show that the transcript offered was taken at a former judicial proceeding at a time and under circumstances affording the accused an adequate opportunity to cross examine the witness through counsel. If the predicate is deficient in either respect the exception is not applicable. These cases can by no means be limited to the use of examining trial testimony. Cf. Holman v. Washington, 364 F.2d 618 (CA5th Cir., 1966) (involving use of testimony from former trial). Therefore, I still remain convinced that the State, having made no good faith effort to obtain the witness Porter in the case at bar, has not brought itself within the exception.
Where the majority misses the turn in the road is that after the court had reached its decision in Barber upon the assumption that Barber had waived his right of cross-examination at the preliminary hearing, it turned aside to answer the State’s contention that Barber had entirely waived his right of confrontation at the trial by not cross examining the witness at the preliminary hearing.
The Court quickly found such contention untenable and no affirmative waiver, in fact, of the constitutional right of confrontation.
Then the Court added:
“Moreover, we would reach the same result on the facts of this case had petitioner’s counsel actually cross-examined Woods at the preliminary hearing. See Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458, 20 S.Ct. 993, 44 L.Ed. 1150 (1900). The right to confrontation is basically a trial right. It includes both the opportunity to cross-examine and the occasion for the jury to weigh the demeanor of the witness. A preliminary hearing is ordinarily a much less searching exploration into the merits of a case than a trial, simply because its function is the more limited one of determining whether probable cause exists to hold the accused for trial. While there may be some justification for holding that the opportunity for cross-examination of testimony at a preliminary hearing satisfies the demands of the confrontation clause where the witness is shown to he actually unavailable, this is not, as we have pointed out, such a case.” (Emphasis Supplied)
Like the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, I do not read such language or decision as precluding at this time the use of such preliminary hearing or examining trial testimony taken under proper circumstances where there is also a showing that the witness is actually unavailable after a good faith effort to secure his presence at the trial. See In Re Bishop, 443 P.2d 768. I do interpret such language as showing the court’s concern as to the disparity between the goals which motivate *79the production of direct evidence by the prosecution and cross-examination by the accused at the preliminary hearing and the goals which motivate the production of evidence by both sides at the trial on the merits when the court is called upon to determine if the exception to confrontation requirement may be utilized.
It is noted that the court cited the opinion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Government of the Virgin Islands v. Aguino, 378 F.2d 540, where this subject is discussed at length at page 549.
Nothing in these cases, however, can be interpreted as meaning that a diligent and good faith effort to secure the witness’ presence at the trial need not be shown merely because the testimony he sought to reproduce was elicited at a former trial as opposed to a preliminary hearing.
It is further observed tht the majority raises the question of the retroactivity of Barber, but does not attempt to answer it. If it be the position of the majority that Barber is not to be applied retroactively, I disagree.
The Supreme Court has accepted the principle that today in criminal litigation concerning constitutional claims the Court may in the interest of justice make the rule prospective where the exigencies of the situation require such an application.1 Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 85 S.Ct. 1731, 14 L.Ed.2d 601; Tehan v. U. S. ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 86 S.Ct. 459, 15 L.Ed.2d 453; Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 86 S.Ct. 1772, 16 L.Ed.2d 882; Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199. In short, the Court has held that the Constitution neither prohibits nor requires retrospective effect of a new constitutional rule.
Since the petitioners’ attack in Barber was by collateral proceedings, the very nature of the Court’s decision indicates a retroactive application. A ruling that is purely prospective does not even apply to the parties before the court, Linkletter v. Walker, supra, and nothing in Barber indicates that the petitioners were to be given the benefit of such ruling as “an unavoidable consequence of the necessity that constitutional adjudications not stand as mere dictum.” Stovall v. Denno, supra.
The principle of Barber goes to the very integrity of the truth-determining process at the trial. This is not unlike Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed. 891, and Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799; Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 82 S.Ct. 157, 7 L.Ed.2d 114; Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 83 S.Ct. 814, 9 L.Ed.2d 811, which for the same reason have all been given full retroactive application. See also McConnell v. Rhay, Stilner v. Rhay, 4 Cr.L. 4040; Crawford v. State, 435 S.W.2d 148; concurring opinion in Ex parte Thomas, Tex. Cr.App., 429 S.W.2d 151.
Further, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals has granted habeas corpus relief to a codefendant of Barber, who was tried separately citing and relying upon Barber v. Page. In Re Bishop, 443 P.2d 768; Cf. also Evans v. Dutton, 400 F.2d 826 (CA5th Cir.).
It is most important to observe that in Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 467, the Supreme Court overruled Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232, 77 S.Ct. 294, 1 L.Ed.2d 278, and held that, despite instructions to the jury to disregard the implicating statements in determining the codefend-ant’s guilt or innocence, admission at a joint trial of a defendant’s extrajudicial confession implicating a codefendant vio*80lated the codefendant’s right of cross-examination secured by the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. In so holding, the Court relied upon Pointer v. State of Texas, supra.
Then subsequently, the Supreme Court in Robert v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293, 88 S.Ct. 1921, 20 L.Ed.2d 1100, held Bruton to be retroactive and applicable to state criminal proceedings. There the Court said:
“ ‘We have * * * retroactively applied rules of criminal procedure fashioned to correct serious flaws in the fact-finding process at trial.’ ” Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 298, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199, 1204. See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908, 1 A.L.R.3d 1205; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799, 93 A.L.R.2d 733; Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 81 S.Ct. 1541, 6 L.Ed.2d 948; Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 639, n. 20, 85 S.Ct. 1731, 14 L.Ed.2d 601, 614; Johnson v. State of New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 727-728, 86 S.Ct. 1772, 16 L.Ed.2d 882, 888, 889; compare Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 86 S.Ct. 1245, 16 L.Ed.2d 314. Despite the cautionary instruction, the admission of a defendant’s confession which implicates a codefendant results in such a ‘serious flaw.’ The retroactivity of the holding in Bruton is therefore required; the error ‘went to the basis of fair hearing and trial because the procedural apparatus never assured the [petitioner] a fair determination’ of his guilt or innocence. Linkletter v. Walker, supra, at 639, n. 20, 85 S.Ct. at 1743, 14 L.Ed.2d at 614.”
For these reasons this writer concludes that neither the reliance of the law enforcement officials, Cf. Tehan v. U. S. ex rel. Shott, supra, and Johnson v. New Jersey, supra, nor the impact of a retroactive holding on the administration of justice, Cf. Stovall v. Denno, supra, warrants a decision against the fully retroactive application of Barber. See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, footnote 22, 20 L.Ed.2d 776.
I, therefore, cannot reach any other satisfactory conclusion in my own mind except that Barber must be applied retroactively.
By their opinion on re-hearing the majority has only muddied the water, and the bench and bar are left to wonder about the true application of Barber v. Page, supra. This I truly regret.
I vigorously dissent.
ON STATE’S MOTION FOR REHEARING

. “The criteria guiding resolution of the question implicates (a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards.” Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199.