Court Opinion

ID: 9384297
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-03 14:00:37.285807+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:52.560541
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-2216   Document: 44     Page: 1       Filed: 04/03/2023

   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                 ______________________

                  JASON W. RUETER,
                      Petitioner

                            v.

           DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,
                     Respondent
               ______________________

                       2021-2216
                 ______________________

    Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection
 Board in No. AT-0752-18-0388-I-2.
                 ______________________

                 Decided: April 3, 2023
                 ______________________

    JOSEPH DAVID MAGRI, Merkle             &     Magri,   PA,
 Tampa, FL, argued for petitioner.

     GEOFFREY MARTIN LONG, Commercial Litigation
 Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Jus-
 tice, Washington, DC, argued for respondent. Also repre-
 sented by BRIAN M. BOYNTON, CLAUDIA BURKE, PATRICIA M.
 MCCARTHY; CHRISTIANN BUREK, Office of the General
 Counsel, United States Department of Commerce, Wash-
 ington, DC.
                 ______________________

 Before STOLL, BRYSON, and CUNNINGHAM, Circuit Judges.
Case: 21-2216    Document: 44     Page: 2    Filed: 04/03/2023

 2                                      RUETER   v. COMMERCE

 STOLL, Circuit Judge.
     The United States Department of Commerce, National
 Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), re-
 moved Jason Rueter for misconduct. Mr. Rueter appealed
 to the Merit Systems Protection Board, which affirmed his
 removal. Mr. Rueter now appeals to our court, alleging
 that the agency violated his due process rights by engaging
 in ex parte communications about his case. Because we
 conclude that none of the ex parte communications chal-
 lenged by Mr. Rueter deprived him of due process, we af-
 firm.
                         BACKGROUND
     Mr. Rueter worked as a fishery biologist for the
 NOAA’s National Marine Fisheries Service under his su-
 pervisor, Dr. Stephania Bolden. Rueter v. Dep’t of Com-
 merce, No. AT-0752-18-0388-I-2, 2021 MSPB LEXIS 1721,
 at *1–2 (M.S.P.B. May 13, 2021) (Board Decision). In No-
 vember 2014, two female employees of agency contractors
 informed Dr. Bolden of a troubling incident that had oc-
 curred at a Halloween costume party and a second incident
 the following morning. The women explained that on both
 occasions, Mr. Rueter engaged in inappropriate conduct di-
 rected at them. Id. at *2–3. In June 2015, another incident
 occurred involving Mr. Rueter, this time in the workplace.
 On that occasion, Mr. Rueter loudly yelled disrespectful ac-
 cusations at Dr. Bolden in her office. Id. at *3, *26–28.
     In November 2016, David Bernhart, Assistant Re-
 gional Administrator and Mr. Rueter’s second-level super-
 visor, issued a letter to Mr. Rueter proposing that he be
 removed from his position for misconduct. J.A. 426–38. Af-
 ter receiving this letter, Mr. Rueter filed a complaint with
 the Office of Special Counsel (OSC). OSC requested that
 the agency stay Mr. Rueter’s removal action, and the
 agency did so for several months.
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 RUETER   v. COMMERCE                                         3

     In August 2017, Andrew Strelcheck, Deputy Regional
 Administrator and Mr. Rueter’s third-level supervisor, in-
 formed Mr. Rueter that the agency was rescinding the first
 proposed removal letter. In September 2017, Mr. Bernhart
 issued a second notice of proposed removal, which con-
 tained two charges: (1) conduct unbecoming a federal em-
 ployee and (2) disrespectful conduct toward a supervisor.
 J.A. 227–38. The notice explained in detail the specifica-
 tions supporting each charge.
                               A
          Conduct Unbecoming a Federal Employee
     The first specification supporting the charge of conduct
 unbecoming a federal employee related to Mr. Rueter’s con-
 duct at the October 2014 Halloween party. In the proposal
 letter, as background to this first specification, Mr. Bern-
 hart explained to Mr. Rueter:
     During that party, according to the statement of
     [JG], 1 you encountered [her] in a narrow hallway
     outside the bathroom. There, you told her she was
     a gorgeous woman. You cornered her in the hall-
     way, blocking her exit to the rest of the house, while
     all the other party guests were outside and out of
     view. You then placed your hands on her shoul-
     ders, pinning her against the wall, and restraining
     her from leaving, despite her forceful demands to
     let her go. You told her, “I know you want this.” In
     response, she yelled at you, “No, I don’t,” and again
     demanded that you let go of her. [JG] continued to
     try to get your hands off her shoulders and to es-
     cape from you, while telling you, “Jason, let go of
     me or I’m going to scream!” [JG] eventually was
     able to physically push you off of her and run out of

     1   In an effort to protect the identity of involved third
 parties, we refer to them using only their initials.
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 4                                       RUETER   v. COMMERCE

     the house, where she then gathered her friends and
     left the party.
 J.A. 228.
     The second specification supporting this charge related
 to Mr. Rueter’s conduct the morning after the party, when
 he returned to the home of MP, who had hosted the event.
 As background to this second specification, Mr. Bernhart
 stated that:
     [A]ccording to the statement of [MP], you returned
     to her home in the morning. The night before, you
     left your car at [MP]’s house and were driven home
     by a friend. In the morning, [MP] texted you to ask
     you to move your car, which was blocking the car of
     her friend . . . . She subsequently texted you to say
     that [her friend] would borrow her car and it was
     therefore not urgent for you to come move your car.
     After a few minutes, you responded by text that you
     were on your way to [MP]’s house. She then called
     you, frustrated, to tell you verbally that she had al-
     ready made other arrangements for [her friend] to
     use her car, but you insisted on coming over. At the
     end of the phone conversation, you told [MP] play-
     fully that it was chilly outside and you would jump
     in bed with [her] when you got there, and she re-
     sponded, “No, you won’t.” After the call, she texted
     you, “NO,” and you responded, “LOL.” Shortly af-
     terward, you arrived at [MP]’s house, [her friend]
     let you in, and you went directly to [MP]’s bedroom.
     [MP] yelled out that she didn’t have pants on and
     that you were not to come in. You nevertheless en-
     tered [MP]’s bedroom and lay down in the bed next
     to her. [MP] asked [her friend] to stand at the end
     of [MP’s] bed so that you would not be tempted to
     do anything. You remained in [MP]’s bed for sev-
     eral minutes before leaving.
 J.A. 229.
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 RUETER   v. COMMERCE                                        5

     These events had negative workplace repercussions for
 both women. As Mr. Bernhart explained to Mr. Rueter in
 the removal notice:
     Both directly-affected women told me personally
     that they had to change their behavior in the work-
     place when they needed to interact with you to en-
     sure that their interactions remained safe and/or
     professional. Your encounter provoked such a
     strong fear reaction in one of your colleagues that
     she requested to work from home, which request
     management agreed to honor but which also neces-
     sitated negotiating a telework clause in a contract
     which previously had none. In addition, one of the
     affected women still avoids encountering you and
     requires other employees to escort her to the park-
     ing lot, out of fear of encountering you. Ultimately,
     both of the directly affected individuals have re-
     signed their positions[.]
 J.A. 230. The notice of proposed removal also attached
 JG’s responses to certain questions the agency had asked
 her. J.A. 336–39. In this attachment, JG stated that as a
 result of Mr. Rueter’s conduct, she “fe[lt] less safe” and had
 “taken steps to protect [her]self,” such as “park[ing] far
 away from” Mr. Rueter and “mak[ing] sure [to] use a differ-
 ent entrance and exit from the building than Mr. Rueter,”
 among other things. J.A. 337. JG also stated that “[t]he
 incident and lack of follow-up ha[d] severely affected [her]
 morale,” and that the “length of time that ha[d] passed”
 since she reported Mr. Rueter’s conduct “contribute[d] to
 [her] perception that voicing [her] concerns was not val-
 ued.” J.A. 338–39.
          Disrespectful Conduct Toward a Supervisor
     The removal letter also included a charge for disre-
 spectful conduct toward a supervisor. The first specifica-
 tion supporting this charge related to Mr. Rueter’s conduct
 on the morning of June 26, 2015. In the proposal letter,
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 6                                       RUETER   v. COMMERCE

 Mr. Bernhart explained to Mr. Rueter that by 9:22 a.m.,
 Dr. Bolden “had not received any communications indicat-
 ing” that Mr. Rueter had started work for the day.
 J.A. 231. Dr. Bolden sent an email to Mr. Rueter asking
 about his whereabouts. Mr. Rueter “arrived at the office
 just before 10 a.m.” and began “exhibit[ing] disrespectful
 commentary and tone towards Dr. Bolden.” Id. Specifi-
 cally, Mr. Bernhart explained in the removal letter to
 Mr. Rueter that:
     When [Dr. Bolden] asked where you had been, in a
     raised voice you indicated that she was being ridic-
     ulous for asking you about these things and that
     you were tired of her hypocrisy as she had been
     AWOL. You expressed more than once that you
     “were tired of it all” and yelled repeatedly for me to
     come and hear what you had to say. Throughout
     this event, Dr. Bolden remained seated behind her
     desk and addressed you in a normal tone of voice.
     I happened to be in the vicinity when these events
     occurred and witnessed your yelling and aggressive
     behavior first-hand. Your apparent degree of hos-
     tility (yelling, flushed skin, bulging veins) was so
     alarming to me that I broke off my work to come
     interpose myself between you and Dr. Bolden.
 Id. In the proposal letter, Mr. Bernhart noted that this
 conduct “was aggressive, hostile, and disrespectful and un-
 dermines management authority.” J.A. 232. 2

     2   The charge of disrespectful conduct was also sup-
 ported by a second specification relating to Mr. Rueter’s
 conduct in response to Dr. Bolden asking him why he was
 late to work. The Board did not sustain this specification.
 Nevertheless, because the Board sustained the first speci-
 fication under this charge, it ultimately sustained the
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 RUETER   v. COMMERCE                                         7

                               B
      Based on these charges, Mr. Bernhart proposed that
 Mr. Rueter be removed from his position. In considering
 the appropriate penalty, Mr. Bernhart considered both
 mitigating and extenuating circumstances. As part of this
 consideration, Mr. Bernhart noted that Mr. Rueter had
 previously been disciplined for (1) “confrontational, loud,
 and embarrassing behavior directed towards a senior []
 management official”; and (2) “contacting a coworker and
 asking her to have sexual relations with [him] and [his]
 girlfriend, while on official travel.” J.A. 235. After the lat-
 ter incident, Mr. Rueter had been placed on a 14-day sus-
 pension. In part because of the repeated, similar nature of
 Mr. Rueter’s conduct, Mr. Bernhart explained that re-
 moval was, in his view, the appropriate penalty.
      In response to the removal letter, Mr. Rueter provided
 both written and oral replies. Mr. Rueter claimed that his
 removal was retaliation for complaints he had made re-
 garding Dr. Bolden, including that she had committed “ter-
 rible management abuse” and created “a hostile work
 environment.” J.A. 216–17. Mr. Strelcheck sustained each
 of the charges in the proposal and agreed that removal was
 the appropriate penalty. Mr. Rueter was accordingly re-
 moved from his position.
     Mr. Rueter appealed to the Board. Before the hearing,
 the Administrative Judge (AJ) made two procedural rul-
 ings that are relevant on appeal. First, the AJ denied
 Mr. Rueter’s motion seeking in camera review of certain
 documents that the agency had partially or wholly with-
 held based on the attorney-client and attorney work prod-
 uct privileges. Second, the AJ denied Mr. Rueter’s request

 charge. The second specification is not at issue on appeal,
 and we do not address it further.
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 8                                      RUETER   v. COMMERCE

 to have Bob Hoffman, a Department of Commerce em-
 ployee, testify at the hearing.
     The AJ issued an initial decision affirming
 Mr. Rueter’s removal, sustaining both charges and finding
 both that the agency had established a sufficient nexus be-
 tween the charges and the efficiency of the service and that
 removal was a reasonable penalty. In its decision, the AJ
 addressed—and ultimately found unpersuasive—each of
 Mr. Rueter’s affirmative defenses. Among other things,
 Mr. Reuter had alleged that the agency violated his right
 to due process by engaging in improper ex parte communi-
 cations. Mr. Rueter pointed to five communications that
 he asserted were constitutionally improper. The AJ ex-
 plained that these communications did not deprive
 Mr. Rueter of due process because each either contained
 only cumulative information or was not of the type likely to
 result in undue pressure on the deciding official. In other
 words, the AJ determined that each of the communications
 did not rise to the level of an improper ex parte communi-
 cation under the relevant law. No party petitioned the
 Board for review, and the AJ’s initial decision became the
 final Board decision.
    Mr. Rueter appeals.      We have jurisdiction under
 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(A) and 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9).
                        DISCUSSION
     Our review in an appeal from the Board is limited. We
 must affirm a decision of the Board unless it is “(1) arbi-
 trary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not
 in accordance with the law; (2) obtained without proce-
 dures required by law, rule, or regulation having been fol-
 lowed; or (3) unsupported by substantial evidence.”
 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c); see also Hornseth v. Dep’t of the Navy,
 916 F.3d 1369, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2019). We review the
 Board’s factual findings regarding an employee’s affirma-
 tive defenses, e.g., whether the information contained in an
 alleged ex parte communication was already known to the
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 RUETER   v. COMMERCE                                     9

 employee or was cumulative, for substantial evidence.
 Hornseth, 916 F.3d at 1376. Substantial evidence means
 “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
 as adequate to support a conclusion.” Simpson v. Off. of
 Pers. Mgmt., 347 F.3d 1361, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2003). On the
 other hand, “[p]rocedural matters relative to discovery and
 evidentiary issues fall within the sound discretion of the
 [B]oard.” Curtin v. Off. of Pers. Mgmt., 846 F.2d 1373,
 1378 (Fed. Cir. 1988). We “will not overturn the [B]oard on
 such matters unless an abuse of discretion is clear and is
 harmful.” Id.
     On appeal, Mr. Rueter argues, as he did before the
 Board, that the agency engaged in improper ex parte com-
 munications. In addition, Mr. Rueter argues that the
 Board erred by excluding the testimony of Mr. Hoffman
 and by denying Mr. Rueter’s motion requesting in camera
 inspection of certain documents over which the agency as-
 serted privilege. We address each issue in turn.
                              I
     First, we turn to Mr. Rueter’s argument that the
 agency engaged in certain communications that were im-
 proper ex parte communications depriving him of due pro-
 cess.    Appellant’s Br. 15–20.       Although Mr. Rueter
 identified five allegedly improper communications before
 the Board, he identifies only three such communications on
 appeal: (1) a March 9, 2017 email from Dr. Bolden to
 agency managers, including Mr. Strelcheck and Mr. Bern-
 hart, in which she writes that an agency-wide email re-
 garding sexual harassment policies was a “hollow gesture”
 given the lack of action taken at that point regarding
 Mr. Rueter; (2) two emails between Mr. Strelcheck and
 Mr. Bernhart in which they discuss the status of the re-
 moval process and the issuance of the second removal pro-
 posal letter; and (3) a November 10, 2016 email in which
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 10                                      RUETER   v. COMMERCE

 Mr. Bernhart sent a timeline of relevant events to
 Mr. Strelcheck. 3
      The Constitution guarantees that “[n]o person shall . . .
 be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
 of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. V. Accordingly, before a fed-
 eral employee can be lawfully removed from his position,
 due process requires that he be given notice both of the
 charges against him and the agency’s evidence as well as
 an opportunity to respond. Cleveland Bd. of Educ.
 v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985). Thus, “[t]he intro-
 duction of new and material information via ex parte com-
 munication to a deciding official deprives an employee” of

      3    Before the Board, Mr. Rueter identified two addi-
 tional allegedly problematic communications: (1) a Febru-
 ary 2, 2017 email in which Mr. Bernhart reminded
 Mr. Strelcheck of the OSC policy statement regarding
 stays and suggested that Mr. Strelcheck set an expiration
 date for the then-active stay of the first proposed removal
 letter; and (2) in-person meetings in late 2015 and early
 2016 between Mr. Strelcheck and JG and MP, in which the
 women inquired about the status of the proceedings
 against Mr. Rueter. Mr. Rueter did not discuss these com-
 munications in his opening brief or at oral argument. See
 Appellant’s Br. 15–20 (relevant argument section not cit-
 ing directly to either communication and referring once
 only briefly to the latter communication); Oral Arg.
 at 26:28–30:57, https://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/
 default.aspx?fl=21-2216_11022022.mp3 (counsel listing
 each of the challenged communications, which specifically
 do not include either of these). Accordingly, he has for-
 feited any argument regarding these communications. See
 Rodriguez v. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 8 F.4th 1290, 1305
 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (“An issue that is merely alluded to and not
 developed as an argument in a party’s brief is deemed” for-
 feited.).
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 RUETER   v. COMMERCE                                      11

 the guarantee of due process. Hornseth, 916 F.3d at 1375
 (citing Stone v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 179 F.3d 1368, 1376
 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
      In Stone, we explained that while certain ex parte com-
 munications can undermine due process, not every ex parte
 communication is constitutionally impermissible. 179 F.3d
 at 1376–77. Only those “ex parte communications that in-
 troduce new and material information to the deciding offi-
 cial will violate the due process guarantee of notice.” Id.
 at 1377. In considering whether information is “new and
 material” such that it violates due process, we consider the
 facts and circumstances of each case, and the test is an ob-
 jective one.       Id.   Among the factors we weigh
 are: (1) “whether the ex parte communication merely intro-
 duces ‘cumulative’ information or new information”;
 (2) “whether the employee knew of the error and had a
 chance to respond to it”; and (3) “whether the ex parte com-
 munications were of the type likely to result in undue pres-
 sure upon the deciding official to rule in a particular
 manner.” Id. The ultimate “inquiry is ‘whether the ex
 parte communication is so substantial and so likely to
 cause prejudice that no employee can be fairly required to
 be subjected to a deprivation of property under such cir-
 cumstances.’” Hornseth, 916 F.3d at 1375 (quoting Stone,
 179 F.3d at 1377). Said otherwise, “[t]he concept of proce-
 dural fairness is the ultimate focus of the Stone inquiry.”
 Boss v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 908 F.3d 1278, 1282
 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
     For example, we found that ex parte communications
 violated an employee’s right to due process in Sullivan
 v. Department of the Navy, 720 F.2d 1266 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
 The employee in Sullivan accused Captain Westbrock, the
 head of his agency, of violating certain regulations. Id.
 at 1268. In response, Captain Westbrock organized sev-
 eral Naval Investigative Service employees to surveil
 Mr. Sullivan and detect any timekeeping discrepancies.
 Id. When he determined he had collected enough evidence
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 12                                      RUETER   v. COMMERCE

 to discipline Mr. Sullivan, Captain Westbrock sent a letter
 to the deciding official recommending Mr. Sullivan’s re-
 moval. Id. at 1268–69. Captain Westbrock then called the
 official’s assistant multiple times asking the official to
 “hurry up” the decision and stating that Mr. Sullivan
 “should be removed.” Id. at 1269–70. He even sent the de-
 ciding official a map showing where the employees he
 asked to surveil Mr. Sullivan were stationed. Id. at 1270.
 We held that these “improper ex parte communications
 were not only unfair, but also denied petitioner his rights
 under the due process clause of the Constitution.” Id.
 at 1274.
      We held similarly in the recent case Johnson v. Depart-
 ment of the Air Force, 50 F.4th 110 (Fed. Cir. 2022). In that
 case, the Air Force fired Mr. Johnson because he failed a
 random drug test. Id. at 113. Mr. Johnson explained that
 he believed “he had accidentally taken one of his mother’s
 pills instead of his own prescribed medication.” Id. During
 the removal proceedings, the deciding officer, Lieutenant
 Colonel Fletcher, mentioned that “he had spoken to two
 family members about Mr. Johnson’s case,” including his
 wife and his brother-in-law. Id. at 114. During these ex
 parte communications, both family members (who were
 medical professionals) informed Lieutenant Colo-
 nel Fletcher that “the possibility that Mr. Johnson acci-
 dentally took his mother’s pill was ‘slim to none.’” Id.
 at 115. Lieutenant Colonel Fletcher “made clear that the
 communications at issue were material, bearing on the cen-
 tral issue of whether to credit Mr. Johnson’s explanation.”
 Id. at 116. We concluded that these communications were
 impermissible under Stone both because they “provid[ed]
 new opinions on the evidence” and because they were ad-
 mittedly material to the deciding official’s determination.
 Id. at 116–17.
     In contrast, we held that ex parte communications did
 not deprive an employee of due process in Blank v. Depart-
 ment of the Army, 247 F.3d 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2001). There,
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 RUETER   v. COMMERCE                                     13

 the deciding official “interviewed a number of agency em-
 ployees” regarding the circumstances of Mr. Blank’s re-
 moval and the validity of his affirmative defenses. Id.
 at 1227. Mr. Blank was not present during these inter-
 views. Id. The Board found that although these interviews
 were ex parte communications, they were not improper un-
 der Stone because, among other things, “the information
 obtained from the interviews was merely cumulative of the
 documentary evidence already assembled” and “the inter-
 views were unlikely to result in undue pressure on the [de-
 ciding official] to rule in any particular manner.” Id.
 at 1229. We affirmed the Board’s findings, stating that
 these interviews were conducted “merely to confirm and
 clarify information that was already contained in the rec-
 ord” and therefore did not deprive Mr. Blank of due pro-
 cess. Id.
     We similarly affirmed the Board’s finding that certain
 ex parte communications were not improper in Hornseth,
 916 F.3d 1369. In Hornseth, the deciding official emailed
 Mr. Hornseth’s Human Resources (HR) department re-
 garding the arguments contained in Mr. Hornseth’s re-
 sponse to his removal letter. Id. at 1371–72. HR then
 ultimately drafted the removal decision letter. Id. at 1372.
 The deciding official testified that although the email hap-
 pened without Mr. Hornseth’s knowledge, he had reached
 out to HR only “to clarify the arguments raised in
 [Mr. Hornseth’s] reply.” Id. at 1375. He further testified
 that HR drafted the removal letter “after he had made his
 decision.” Id. at 1376. We affirmed the Board’s findings
 that these communications did not deprive Mr. Hornseth
 of due process, because the information contained in the
 communication “was already known to [Mr.] Hornseth or
 [was] cumulative.” Id.
     With this legal framework in mind, we now turn to the
 three communications Mr. Rueter challenges on appeal.
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 14                                        RUETER   v. COMMERCE

                                A
      The first allegedly improper ex parte communication
 identified by Mr. Rueter is an email from Dr. Bolden sent
 to Mr. Strelcheck, Mr. Bernhart, and other agency manag-
 ers on March 9, 2017. 4 J.A. 1635. In the email, Dr. Bolden
 responded to an agency-wide announcement regarding sex-
 ual harassment policies, criticizing the announcement as a
 “hollow gesture” in light of “the lack of agency action” re-
 garding Mr. Rueter. Id. Dr. Bolden also encouraged the
 recipients to “follow through and take action on the pend-
 ing harassment matter,” but did not recommend any spe-
 cific action. Id.
      In considering this email, the AJ applied the Stone fac-
 tors and determined that it was not an inappropriate ex
 parte communication. The AJ supported his decision by
 citing to the evidence that (1) Mr. Strelcheck and

      4  In his reply brief and at oral argument, Mr. Rueter
 also appeared to identify hearing testimony by Dr. Bolden
 that she met with Mr. Strelcheck multiple times through-
 out her employment. See Appellant’s Reply Br. 3–4 (citing
 J.A. 2086); Oral Arg. at 26:28–30:27 (listing, as a chal-
 lenged communication, Dr. Bolden’s testimony at
 J.A. 2086). To the extent Mr. Rueter intends to separately
 challenge these meetings as improper ex parte communica-
 tions, he has forfeited this argument by not raising it before
 the Board. See Board Decision, 2021 MSPB LEXIS 1721,
 at *88–104 (discussing each challenged communication);
 Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120 (1976) (“It is the gen-
 eral rule . . . that a federal appellate court does not consider
 an issue not passed on below.”). Furthermore, Mr. Rueter
 has doubly forfeited it by not raising it until his reply brief.
 McIntosh v. Dep’t of Defense, 53 F.4th 630, 641 (Fed. Cir.
 2022) (“Our law is well established that arguments not
 raised in the opening brief are forfeited.”) (cleaned up). We
 thus do not separately discuss this testimony.
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 RUETER   v. COMMERCE                                       15

 Mr. Bernhart both testified that they agreed with Dr. Bol-
 den that the matter had been pending for too long;
 (2) Mr. Strelcheck further testified that the email had no
 effect on his decision to sustain the proposal to remove
 Mr. Rueter; and (3) the relationship between Dr. Bolden
 and Mr. Strelcheck and Mr. Bernhart was such that the
 email from Dr. Bolden could not have exerted undue pres-
 sure on either individual. Board Decision, 2021 MSPB
 LEXIS 1721, at *89–93. In other words, the AJ found that
 although this email occurred without notice to Mr. Rueter,
 it did not communicate new and material information—
 Mr. Strelcheck and Mr. Bernhart already knew of the
 lengthy pending investigation against Mr. Rueter and
 agreed with Dr. Bolden that proceedings were dragging on.
 And, the AJ found, the email did not exert undue pressure
 upon the deciding officials, in large part because those offi-
 cials were Dr. Bolden’s supervisors, not her subordinates.
 Id. at *93. Based on these findings, the AJ determined that
 this email did not violate Mr. Rueter’s due process rights.
     We conclude that the Board properly relied on the fac-
 tors set forth in Stone, and that its findings are supported
 by substantial evidence. Unlike the supervisor in Sullivan
 whose conduct deprived the employee of due process, here,
 Dr. Bolden did not specifically request that Mr. Rueter be
 removed, nor did she repeatedly contact the deciding offi-
 cials to push them to decide. Instead, this email from
 Dr. Bolden recommended only that some action be taken
 on the long-pending investigation against Mr. Rueter, a
 statement that confirmed what Mr. Strelcheck and
 Mr. Bernhart already knew. Said otherwise, Dr. Bolden’s
 email did not provide any new and material information to
 the deciding officials. Accordingly, like the email in
 Hornseth and the interviews in Blank, both of which pro-
 vided only confirmatory, cumulative information, Dr. Bol-
 den’s email similarly did not deprive Mr. Rueter of due
 process.
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 16                                    RUETER   v. COMMERCE

      Further, as the AJ properly noted, Dr. Bolden was
 Mr. Strelcheck’s and Mr. Bernhart’s subordinate, not their
 supervisor. The AJ accordingly reasonably found that it
 was unlikely “that either Mr. Strelcheck or Mr. Bernhart
 sought to appease [Dr.] Bolden, who . . . had no authority
 over them.” Board Decision, 2021 MSPB LEXIS 1721,
 at *93. This relationship between Dr. Bolden and the de-
 ciding official stands in contrast to the circumstances in
 Johnson, where we determined the ex parte communica-
 tions were improper. In Johnson, the deciding official tes-
 tified that his wife, with whom he communicated without
 notice to Mr. Johnson, was his “number one advisor.”
 50 F.4th at 115–16. Likewise, in Sullivan, Captain West-
 brock, the head of the agency, applied consistent pressure
 on the deciding official to remove Mr. Sullivan. 720 F.2d
 at 1269–71. The circumstances are fundamentally differ-
 ent here, where Dr. Bolden, a subordinate, sent an email to
 her supervisors requesting only that some non-specified ac-
 tion be taken and providing no new or material infor-
 mation.
     Because substantial evidence demonstrates that this
 communication neither provided new or material infor-
 mation nor was of the type likely to exert undue pressure
 on the deciding official, we affirm the AJ’s determination
 that this communication did not deprive Mr. Rueter of due
 process. 5

      5  At oral argument, when asked what Mr. Rueter
 would have done differently had he been aware of Dr. Bol-
 den’s email, Mr. Rueter’s counsel responded that
 Mr. Rueter would have “litigate[d] the propriety of”
 Dr. Bolden’s claim that she was “the victim of sexual har-
 assment.” Oral Arg. at 11:52–13:10. The record does not
 indicate that Dr. Bolden ever claimed she was the victim of
 sexual harassment; instead, the specifications related to
 Dr. Bolden concern Mr. Rueter’s disrespectful workplace
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 RUETER   v. COMMERCE                                     17

                              B
      We turn now to the second communication that
 Mr. Rueter alleges deprived him of due process: two
 emails between Mr. Strelcheck and Mr. Bernhart in which
 they discuss the status of the removal process and the is-
 suance of the second removal proposal letter. J.A. 1868. In
 the first email, Mr. Bernhart told Mr. Strelcheck that he
 was attaching Dr. Bolden’s comments on a performance
 plan. Id. Mr. Bernhart wrote that Dr. Bolden’s comments
 reflect that she perceives herself to be “the victim in the
 narrative” and that he expected there to be “some risk of
 further complaints from” Dr. Bolden regarding the pending
 action against Mr. Rueter. Id. Mr. Bernhart then asked
 for Mr. Strelcheck’s advice regarding whether further doc-
 umentation should be prepared and proposed a discussion
 regarding “next steps on resolving things with OSC,” refer-
 encing the then-pending investigation started in response
 to Mr. Rueter’s letter. Id. In reply, Mr. Strelcheck advised
 Mr. Bernhart to contact HR regarding Dr. Bolden’s poten-
 tially biased comments. He also stated generally that he
 had contacted OSC regarding the pending investigation
 and would continue to do so “to move this forward.” Id.
     Before the Board, Mr. Rueter alleged that these emails
 reflected that Mr. Strelcheck and Mr. Bernhart “collabo-
 rated on the drafting of the new proposal or attempted to
 ‘carve out’ certain allegations in order to avoid an allega-
 tion of whistleblowing.” Board Decision, 2021 MSPB
 LEXIS 1721, at *93–94. The AJ found that the record did

 conduct. See Board Decision, 2021 MSPB LEXIS 1721,
 at *25–44. Accordingly, it is unclear to us what Mr. Rueter
 could or would have done differently had he been aware of
 Dr. Bolden’s email. In any event, for the reasons explained
 in this decision, we affirm the Board’s determination that
 this communication did not deprive Mr. Rueter of due pro-
 cess.
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 18                                    RUETER   v. COMMERCE

 not support those allegations, finding instead that
 Mr. Rueter “has not identified specific communications in
 which the two engaged in a conversation about specific
 charges and specifications that were to be included in the
 proposal.” Id. at *94. The AJ also noted that both
 Mr. Strelcheck and Mr. Bernhart testified that they did not
 engage in any such collaboration regarding the second pro-
 posal notice. Id. Because Mr. Rueter did not demonstrate
 how these emails improperly impacted his case, the AJ
 thus determined that they did not deprive Mr. Rueter of
 due process.
     On appeal, Mr. Rueter phrases his argument regarding
 these emails somewhat differently, asserting instead more
 generally that all communications between Mr. Bernhart
 and Mr. Strelcheck, including both these emails and an-
 other email discussed further below, show that Mr. Bern-
 hart “attempted to influence [Mr.] Strelcheck . . . into
 taking action against” Mr. Rueter. Appellant’s Br. 17–18;
 see also id. at 6 (citing J.A. 1868) (describing these two
 emails as being “about [Mr. Rueter], the proposed discipli-
 nary action, and the OSC stay”). We disagree.
     Application of the Stone factors to the communications
 between Mr. Bernhart and Mr. Strelcheck confirms the
 Board’s conclusion that these are not improper ex parte
 communications. First, as the AJ reasonably found, these
 emails “merely introduce[d] ‘cumulative’ information.”
 Stone, 179 F.3d at 1377. Indeed, a fair reading of these
 emails reflects that they appear to be perfunctory, admin-
 istrative messages, asking about next steps and the status
 of the proceedings against Mr. Rueter. For example,
 Mr. Bernhart notes that Dr. Bolden’s notes regarding
 Mr. Rueter may be biased due to their strained relation-
 ship and the lengthy investigation. Neither the fact that
 Dr. Bolden’s relationship with Mr. Rueter had soured, nor
 the length of time the investigation was pending, were new
 facts provided to Mr. Strelcheck. The remainder of the
 emails’ contents are Mr. Bernhart seeking, and
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 RUETER   v. COMMERCE                                        19

 Mr. Strelcheck providing, general advice regarding the sta-
 tus of the OSC investigation. Again, no new or material
 information was provided to (or, indeed, from) the deciding
 official. For example, Mr. Strelcheck counseled Mr. Bern-
 hart to reach out to HR for advice regarding the OSC in-
 vestigation. Such a suggestion is not an improper ex parte
 communication, just as the email to HR seeking advice re-
 garding an employee’s arguments was not improper in
 Hornseth. See 916 F.3d at 1375–76.
      Second, these emails are not “of the type likely to result
 in undue pressure upon the deciding official to rule in a
 particular manner.” Stone, 179 F.3d at 1377. These emails
 do not contain, for example, a demand from Mr. Bernhart
 to remove Mr. Rueter or any indication from
 Mr. Strelcheck that he felt undue pressure to do so. In-
 stead, Mr. Bernhart notes only that there was “some risk
 of further complaints from” Dr. Bolden. J.A. 1868. But in
 view of the evidence, that statement cannot reasonably be
 interpreted to have caused undue pressure on
 Mr. Strelcheck. There are no details regarding this “risk,”
 Mr. Strelcheck does not express any concern in his re-
 sponse, and, as we mentioned above, Dr. Bolden was
 Mr. Strelcheck’s and Mr. Bernhart’s subordinate and had
 no authority over them. Cf. Johnson, 50 F.4th at 115–16
 (determining ex parte communications were improper
 where the deciding official received admittedly material in-
 formation from his wife, whom he referred to as his “num-
 ber one advisor”); see also Sullivan, 720 F.2d at 1269–71
 (concluding ex parte communications were impermissible
 where the head of the agency repeatedly pressured the de-
 ciding official to remove the employee). In this case,
 Mr. Rueter has not identified any portion of these commu-
 nications suggesting that undue pressure was exerted on
 Mr. Strelcheck to rule in a particular manner, and we do
 not see any. In other words, these are not the “unfair” ex
 parte communications in Sullivan, 720 F.2d at 1274, nor
 the material communications from close family members
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 20                                      RUETER   v. COMMERCE

 in Johnson, 50 F.4th at 115. Instead, these are merely ad-
 ministrative    emails    between    Mr. Bernhart     and
 Mr. Strelcheck regarding the status of and documentation
 regarding the proceedings involving Mr. Rueter.
     Because these communications do not provide any new
 and material evidence nor apply undue pressure on the de-
 ciding official to remove Mr. Rueter, we accordingly affirm
 the Board’s determination that these communications do
 not deprive Mr. Rueter of due process.
                               C
      Next, we address the third allegedly impermissible ex
 parte communication, an email in which Mr. Bernhart sent
 a timeline of events bearing on Mr. Rueter’s case to
 Mr. Strelcheck. J.A. 1671. In this email, sent Novem-
 ber 10, 2016—a few days after he presented Mr. Rueter
 with the first removal proposal letter—Mr. Bernhart pro-
 vided Mr. Strelcheck with a “boiled down version” of the
 major details of events regarding Mr. Rueter’s removal pro-
 ceedings and his filing of a letter with the OSC. Id. The
 email lists the dates that certain events happened, e.g.,
 when Dr. Bolden initially reported Mr. Rueter’s conduct,
 when the first removal letter was drafted, when certain
 contacts were made with the OSC, and when Mr. Bernhart
 presented the proposed removal package to Mr. Rueter,
 among many other dates. Mr. Bernhart offered to send an
 even further detailed outline, noting that he did not “think
 there’s anything in there that you haven’t been aware of or
 isn’t included in the full discipline package you now have.”
 Id.
     On appeal, Mr. Rueter argues that this email shows
 that Dr. Bolden and Mr. Bernhart “attempted to influence
 [Mr.] Strelcheck . . . into taking action against” Mr. Rueter.
 Appellant’s Br. 17–18. We do not agree and determine that
 substantial evidence supports the Board’s finding to the
 contrary.
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 RUETER   v. COMMERCE                                       21

     This email simply provided a timeline of events to
 Mr. Strelcheck. Mr. Rueter does not identify on appeal any
 information provided in the timeline that Mr. Strelcheck
 would not have already known. In other words, although
 the timeline conveniently streamlines the dates on which
 relevant events occurred, the timeline does not provide new
 and material information to Mr. Strelcheck. Indeed,
 Mr. Bernhart confirmed as much in the email itself, writ-
 ing that even a more detailed timeline of events that he of-
 fered to send to Mr. Strelcheck would not have included
 any facts that “you haven’t been aware of or isn’t included
 in the full discipline package you now have.” J.A. 1671. We
 have repeatedly held that the provision of merely confirm-
 atory or cumulative information does not violate due pro-
 cess. See Blank, 247 F.3d at 1229 (holding that interviews
 conducted “merely to confirm and clarify information that
 was already contained in the record” did not deprive the
 employee of due process); Hornseth, 916 F.3d at 1376 (hold-
 ing that communications containing information that “was
 already known to [Mr.] Hornseth or [was] cumulative” was
 not constitutionally impermissible). Just as with the con-
 firmatory communications in Blank and Hornseth, the
 timeline at issue here merely repeated known information
 in a different format. That is not a violation of due process.
    Accordingly, we affirm the Board’s conclusion that this
 communication did not deprive Mr. Rueter of due process.
                           *   *   *
     In sum, none of the communications challenged by
 Mr. Rueter rise to the level of a due process violation. A
 thorough consideration of the record in view of the Stone
 factors reveals that for each challenged communication,
 the Board reasonably found either no new and material in-
 formation was provided to the deciding officer, or the com-
 munications were not of the type likely to result in undue
 pressure on that officer, or both. See Stone, 179 F.3d
 at 1377. We thus affirm the Board’s decision on this issue.
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 22                                      RUETER   v. COMMERCE

                              II
     Having determined that none of the challenged com-
 munications are constitutionally impermissible, we turn
 now to Mr. Rueter’s remaining arguments.             First,
 Mr. Rueter contends that the Board improperly denied his
 request to have Mr. Hoffman testify at the removal hearing
 on his behalf.     Appellant’s Br. 20–22.     Specifically,
 Mr. Rueter argues that he should have been allowed to pre-
 sent testimony from Mr. Hoffman, who would have testi-
 fied that he was willing to hire Mr. Rueter to work in his
 own branch of the NOAA but Mr. Bernhart declined the re-
 assignment. Id. at 21 (citing J.A. 1940–42, 1949).
     Procedural matters regarding discovery and eviden-
 tiary issues “fall within the sound discretion of the [B]oard
 and its officials.” Curtin, 846 F.2d at 1378 (citing Spez-
 zaferro v. FAA, 807 F.2d 169, 173 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). We will
 not overturn the Board’s determinations on such issues
 “unless an abuse of discretion is clear and is harmful.” Id.
 If a petitioner alleges an abuse of discretion occurred, in
 order to prevail, “he must prove that the error caused sub-
 stantial harm or prejudice to his rights which could have
 affected the outcome of the case.” Id. at 1379; see also
 5 U.S.C. § 7701(c)(2)(A).
     Before the Board, Mr. Rueter argued that Mr. Hoff-
 man’s testimony was relevant only to his affirmative de-
 fenses, specifically his whistleblower defense.          See
 J.A. 948–49, 1941–42. The AJ ultimately excluded that
 testimony on the basis of relevance. J.A. 1928. On appeal,
 Mr. Rueter now argues that the testimony would somehow
 have been relevant to the AJ’s Stone factor analysis regard-
 ing the ex parte communications. See Appellant’s Br. 22.
 As an initial matter, we note that Mr. Rueter never made
 this relevance argument to the Board. Instead, Mr. Rueter
 proffered this testimony only as relevant to his affirmative
 defenses and as character evidence regarding Mr. Bern-
 hart.     See J.A. 1942 (Mr. Rueter arguing that the
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 RUETER   v. COMMERCE                                         23

 “testimony . . . is clearly relevant to the issue of [Mr.] Bern-
 hart’s intent and his hostility toward [Mr. Rueter’s alleged
 protected] activity”).
      Even if not forfeited, Mr. Rueter’s arguments regard-
 ing this issue are unconvincing. Specifically, Mr. Rueter
 argues that because the Board discussed Mr. Strelcheck’s
 “self-serving testimony and subjective opinion,” Mr. Rueter
 “was entitled to introduce witness testimony calling into
 question [Mr.] Strelcheck’s credibility and bias.” Appel-
 lant’s Br. 22. First, we note that there is nothing improper
 about the Board considering the subjective testimony of
 Mr. Strelcheck and Mr. Bernhart. See, e.g., Hornseth,
 916 F.3d at 1375–76 (affirming the Board where it, as part
 of its Stone analysis, “credited Combs’s testimony that his
 ex parte contacts were to clarify the arguments raised”); cf.
 Johnson, 50 F.4th at 116 (noting, as part of the Stone anal-
 ysis, Lieutenant Colonel Fletcher’s subjective perception
 that “the communications at issue were material” and his
 testimony that his wife was his “number one advisor”).
     Second, Mr. Rueter has not explained why Mr. Hoff-
 man’s testimony—that he would have hired Mr. Rueter but
 Mr. Bernhart declined the reassignment—would have
 been relevant to the issue of ex parte communications and,
 specifically, Mr. Strelcheck’s credibility.      Mr. Rueter
 states, without evidentiary support or further argument,
 that Mr. Hoffman’s “testimony would support the inference
 that [Mr.] Bernhart’s actions stemmed from his hostility
 toward” Mr. Rueter and that it is relevant “to the issue of
 [Mr.] Bernhart’s        attempted        influence     over
 [Mr.] Strelcheck’s decision-making processes.” Appellant’s
 Br. 22. Although such inferences and testimony may have
 been relevant to Mr. Rueter’s whistleblower defense,
 Mr. Rueter has not demonstrated why the Board abused its
 discretion in determining this testimony would not be rel-
 evant to the issue of whether Mr. Strelcheck engaged in im-
 proper ex parte communications. Furthermore, Mr. Rueter
 does not even address whether and how he was harmed or
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 24                                       RUETER   v. COMMERCE

 prejudiced by the exclusion of Mr. Hoffman’s testimony,
 nor how such exclusion affected the outcome of the case, as
 is required to show an abuse of discretion regarding discov-
 ery matters. See Curtin, 846 F.2d at 1379; 5 U.S.C.
 § 7701(c)(2)(A). Based on this record, we decline to con-
 clude that the Board abused its discretion in resolving this
 evidentiary matter.
      Finally, we address Mr. Rueter’s argument that the
 Board erred in denying his motion for in camera inspection
 of certain documents the agency alleged were privileged.
 Appellant’s Br. 22–23. Specifically, Mr. Rueter argues that
 the agency improperly asserted the attorney-client privi-
 lege and attorney work product protection over certain doc-
 uments sent between two non-attorneys, namely several
 emails sent between Mr. Bernhart and Mr. Strelcheck. Id.
 Mr. Rueter does not set forth his argument in his appellate
 briefing, instead noting that the “basis for the motion is
 laid out” in the appendix “and will not be repeated here.”
 Id. at 22. His brief argumentation on the issue then merely
 summarizes the objections contained in his filings before
 the Board.
     Accordingly, Mr. Rueter has forfeited his argument re-
 garding this issue by not properly presenting it on appeal.
 We have explained that, “[u]nder the Federal Rules of Ap-
 pellate Procedure, arguments may not be properly raised
 by incorporating them by reference from the appendix ra-
 ther than discussing them in the brief.” Graphic Controls
 Corp. v. Utah Med. Prods., Inc., 149 F.3d 1382, 1385
 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (citing FED. R. APP. P. 28(a)(8)(A)); see also
 Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328, 1335 (Fed. Cir.
 2006) (holding that arguments “incorporate[d] by refer-
 ence” are “a violation” of the Federal Rules of Appellate
 Procedure and are deemed forfeited). In this case, by at-
 tempting to incorporate his appellate arguments by refer-
 encing portions of the appendix, Mr. Rueter has forfeited
 those arguments.
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 RUETER   v. COMMERCE                                       25

      In any event, even were this argument not forfeited, we
 do not see how the Board abused its discretion by denying
 Mr. Rueter’s discovery motion. As we explained above,
 “procedural matters relative to discovery and evidentiary
 issues fall within the sound discretion of the [B]oard and
 its officials.” Curtin, 846 F.2d at 1378. Here, Mr. Rueter
 argues that the Board should have undertaken an in cam-
 era review of certain documents withheld by the agency on
 the basis of either the attorney-client privilege or attorney
 work product protection. Mr. Rueter does not identify
 which documents he specifically challenges, but there are
 several entries in the agency’s privilege log identifying
 communications between Mr. Bernhart and Mr. Strelcheck
 as privileged. See J.A. 594–610 (identifying five documents
 as communications between only those two individuals).
     We are not convinced that the Board abused its discre-
 tion by denying Mr. Rueter’s request to undertake an in
 camera review of these documents to confirm whether they
 were properly withheld. It is well established that commu-
 nications between non-attorneys within an agency may be
 protected by the attorney-client privilege provided those
 communications transmit legal advice provided by an at-
 torney. See, e.g., PAUL R. RICE, ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVI-
 LEGE IN THE UNITED STATES § 5:7 (2022) (collecting cases);
 see also, e.g., Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d
 596, 611 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. ChevronTexaco
 Corp., 241 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1077 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (stating
 the attorney-client privilege attaches to communications
 between nonlawyer employees where “the employees dis-
 cuss or transmit legal advice given by counsel”); Evans
 v. Atwood, 177 F.R.D. 1, 6 (D.D.C. 1997) (“[C]irculating
 truly confidential information among concerned officials
 does not defeat the privilege since all the recipients shared
 the attorney-client privilege with each other.”).
     In this case, each communication listed between
 Mr. Bernhart and Mr. Strelcheck without including an at-
 torney is described as containing legal advice. See J.A. 601
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 26                                      RUETER   v. COMMERCE

 (DOC 32186 described as “discussing OGC’s legal advice
 regarding discipline issue”); J.A. 603 (DOC 32288 de-
 scribed as “containing OGC’s legal advice” and DOC 32316
 described as “containing OGC’s legal advice regarding dis-
 ciplinary proposal”); J.A. 608 (DOC 33019 described as
 “containing OGC’s legal advice regarding [performance im-
 provement plan] and disciplinary action” and “confidential
 settlement discussions”); J.A. 610 (DOC 33204 described
 as “containing legal advice regarding telework”). Accord-
 ingly, it appears, at least on the face of the privilege log,
 that the agency did not inappropriately assert privilege
 over these documents. Mr. Rueter’s limited argument on
 this issue does not explain how the Board abused its sound
 discretion in determining that in camera review of these
 documents was unnecessary. We decline to conclude that
 the Board abused its discretion under these circumstances.
                        CONCLUSION
      We have considered the parties’ remaining arguments
 and find them unpersuasive. The Board appropriately de-
 termined that none of the challenged ex parte communica-
 tions deprived Mr. Rueter of due process. We also see no
 error in the Board’s denial of Mr. Rueter’s motions to allow
 Mr. Hoffman to testify and for in camera inspection of cer-
 tain privileged documents. For the above reasons, we thus
 affirm the Board’s decision.
                        AFFIRMED