Court Opinion

ID: 9855102
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:19:32.537907+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:40.469095
License: Public Domain

Hines, Justice,
concurring specially.
I join the majority opinion in Divisions 1, 3, and 4, and in the judgment, but I do not agree with the majority’s reasoning in Division 2.
The circumstances of Wilson’s interrogation on January 8 cannot credibly be described as Wilson having initiated conversation with police. In an interview on January 7, Wilson invoked his right to remain silent; it went unheeded. It was after that violation that police asked if Wilson wanted them to return and tell him what the autopsy showed and he answered: “You can.” The next day, he was brought into the interrogation room, read his Miranda2 rights, and signed a waiver of those rights. The police then “advised [Wilson] as *61to the information gained during the autopsy” and asked Wilson if he wanted to see the color photographs of the autopsy; he said he did. It was only then that Wilson asked police what had happened to Gibbs’s head. But contrary to the majority’s holding, it was the police who “first displayed a willingness and desire to talk about the investigation by inquiring whether appellant” wished to see the autopsy photographs. Walton v. State, 267 Ga. 713, 717 (3) (482 SE2d 330) (1997). Thus, the violation of Wilson’s right to cut off questioning on January 7 is not “cured” in the manner the majority finds. Nor does the fact that Wilson executed a waiver of his Miranda rights on January 8 after his invocation of those rights was ignored on January 7 “cure” the police violation; if renewed Miranda warnings and a consequent waiver, in and of itself, could repair the police’s failure to honor the invocation of the right to silence, it would not matter whether the elapsed time since the violation was seventeen hours, seventeen months, or seventeen seconds. Rather, the proper analysis is not so simple; the fundamental question is what effect Wilson’s unheeded invocation of the right to silence on January 7 has on the statement of January 8. This requires not only an examination of Miranda and its progeny, but whether the statement of January 8 is itself involuntary under the Fifth Amendment, and whether the earlier statement on which the statement of January 8 was based violated the Fifth Amendment.
On January 7, Wilson signed a form waiving his rights under Miranda. Before signing the form, Wilson read aloud each of his rights and explained each to the officers. During the course of the interview, Wilson asked: “Oh well, what are you going to do with me?” An officer responded: “Are you anxious to get back in a cell?” Wilson then said: “No, but I am through talking, I mean right now.” A different officer asked: “You think you can live with it there?”, and the interview continued. Later in the interview, Wilson told the officers that Gibbs had strangled during “sexual play.” This version of events was later contradicted by the results of the autopsy.
In excluding Wilson’s statement of January 7, the trial court relied on Miranda, supra, and Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U. S. 96 (96 SC 321, 46 LE2d 313) (1975), as well as certain Georgia cases, for the propositions that when a suspect during an interrogation indicates in any manner that he has decided to remain silent, the interrogation must cease, this right must be “scrupulously honored,” and the invocation of the right, while not a permanent bar to police questioning, does bar questioning for a “significant period of time” after the request. See also Hatcher v. State, 259 Ga. 274, 277 (2) (379 SE2d 775) (1989). The trial court correctly concluded that Wilson’s right to end the interview of January 7 was not “scrupulously honored,” and therefore was to be suppressed. See Hatcher, supra.
*62However, it does not automatically follow that the interview of January 8 must also be excluded, even if it was based on the information learned in the interview of January 7. The court found that the January 7 interview violated Miranda and Mosley, but did not find that the statement of January 7 ran afoul of the Fifth Amendment. When a suspect has been advised of his rights, and the suspect invokes his right to counsel which is unheeded by the interrogating officers, the statement that follows is inadmissible as violating the prophylactic rules of Miranda and its progeny, but the statement is not necessarily involuntary under the Fifth Amendment; if the statement is voluntary under the Fifth Amendment, it will not invalidate any “fruit” of that interview. Taylor v. State, 274 Ga. 269, 271-277 (1)-(4) (553 SE2d 598) (2001). See also Moore v. State, 263 Ga. 11, 12 (1) (427 SE2d 766) (1993). The same analysis applies when an invocation of the right to remain silent goes unheeded. See Martin v. Wainwright, 770 F2d 918, 924 (11th Cir. 1985) (equating an equivocal request for counsel with an equivocal invocation of the right to silence). See also Livingston v. State, 264 Ga. 402, 408 (6) (444 SE2d 748) (1994) (determining that when one statement is made without benefit of Miranda warnings, it will not taint a subsequent statement unless the initial statement violated the Fifth Amendment). Wilson’s statement of January 8 was based in part on what he told the police on January 7, after invoking his right to remain silent. Thus, the issue of whether Wilson’s statement of January 8 is admissible depends in part on whether his statement of January 7 violated the Fifth Amendment.
In that context, “[i]f a suspect’s statements [were] obtained by Techniques and methods offensive to due process,’ [cits.], or under circumstances in which the suspect clearly had no opportunity to exercise a ‘free and unconstrained will,’ [cit.], the statements would not be admitted.” Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U. S. 298, 304 (105 SC 1285, 84 LE2d 222) (1985). Although the interview of January 7 was lengthy, there is no evidence that Wilson was fatigued and there is evidence that he had several breaks. The officers did not apply any force, made no threats, and did not offer any inducements or promises. Further, at no time did Wilson explicitly refuse to answer questions; while such a refusal was not necessary to invoke his Miranda rights, it is probative evidence that his statement of January 7 comported with the Fifth Amendment. Martin, supra at 927, n. 12. As the statement of January 7 was voluntary under the Fifth Amendment, the statement of January 8 is not inadmissible as the “fruit” of the earlier statement.
Although Wilson argues that the trial court failed to evaluate the statement of January 8 in light of the totality of the circumstances, considering only whether “a significant period of time” had *63passed between Wilson’s invocation of his right to remain silent on January 7 and the interview on January 8, see Hatcher, supra at 277 (2), the court order is not so limited. It is clear that the court considered more than merely the passage of time; the court noted that Wilson had been re-advised of his Miranda rights, that the police made no threats, coercions, acts of force, or promises of leniency, and extended no hope of reward or benefit. The court also found, correctly, that the sixteen or seventeen hours that had passed since the end of the prior interview was a “significant period of time” within, the meaning of Hatcher, supra.
Decided March 29, 2002.
Jon W. McClure, J. Michael Bass, for appellant.
J. David Miller, District Attorney, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney *64General, Madonna M. Heinemeyer, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
*63The court also considered a variety of factors regarding the statement of January 7, that to some extent remained on January 8, and it is clear that the court considered the totality of the circumstances surrounding the statement of January 8 and concluded that those circumstances did not show that Wilson’s statement of January 8 was inadmissible. Wilson argues that several specific factors compel a finding that the statement of January 8 should have been suppressed, but they do not. He was 29 years of age. Although he stated he could read and write poorly, he had a tenth grade education, and demonstrated in the interview on January 7 that he could read, understand, and explain, his rights. During the execution of the waiver form on January 7, Wilson asked about telephone calls, and was told that the sheriff’s office was having telephone trouble, but that he should “keep on track” while the form was completed. After the form was completed, Wilson specifically asked whether he could refuse to answer further questions at any time, and was twice assured that he could. Although he was being held for probation violations, Wilson knew that the officers were investigating first the disappearance of Gibbs, then her murder.
Inasmuch as the January 7 statement, though violative of Miranda and Mosley, was not involuntary under the Fifth Amendment, a significant period of time passed between the invocation of the right to remain silent and the statement of January 8, and the statement of January 8 was shown to be voluntary, the trial court properly admitted evidence of Wilson’s statement on January 8.
I am authorized to state that Justice Benham and Justice Carley join in this special concurrence.

 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (86 SC 1602, 16 LE2d 694) (1966).