Court Opinion

ID: 9768077
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 05:41:25.578621+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:36.457799
License: Public Domain

OLIVER, Judge
(dissenting).
As I view it, this record demonstrates prejudicial errors requiring disapproval of the defendant’s conviction.
Notwithstanding the fact that the defendant did not testify, unquestionably the defense evidence raised a question concerning his sanity at the time of the offense. His wife, holding a Bachelor of Science degree from the University of Kentucky and employed in the mental health department of that state as a registered nurse, testified that he had always been extremely *370nervous and easily upset; that when she saw him at the police station early the next morning after his arrest he was very nervous, upset and apprehensive, was very pale and his eyes were red and he cried at different times while she was there; that “He seemed to know then fairly well where he was/’ but questioned her about what had happened and did not fully realize what was going on; that he had been in failing health for about a year and a half; and that on the day of this offense he had attended his father’s funeral.
Dr. A. Sheldon Gelburd, a clinical psychologist holding a Ph.D. in psychology from the University of Tennessee and practicing in Kingsport, detailed his hour-long interview with the defendant in the Sullivan County Jail which apparently occurred on July 22, 1971, more than a year after the offense, and with the defendant’s wife and others, and explained the standard psychological tests administered to him. He testified that the defendant has an Intelligence Quotient of 84, and that “He didn’t try to act crazy at all.” By cross-examination of this witness the District Attorney General brought out that when the defendant was 15 years old he was institutionalized in the Clover Bottom Hospital. The District Attorney General then undertook to neutralize that testimony by repeatedly suggesting that that institution is not a mental hospital and by telling him that he knew better than to say it was in the face of the fact that by T.C.A. § 33-201 that institution is designated as “Clover Bottom Hospital and School, at Donelson, for the mentally retarded.” In sum, Dr. Gelburd’s stated opinion was that the death of the defendant’s father triggered a psychological condition which caused him to lose contact with reality and rendered him temporarily insane so that he did not know what he was doing when he entered the business establishment and did not know the difference between right and wrong.
The applicable principles of law were settled long ago in this State. The presumption of sanity places the burden of showing insanity at the time of commission of a crime upon him who asserts it as a defense. Mullendore v. State, 183 Tenn. 53, 191 S.W.2d 149; Spurlock v. State, 212 Tenn. 132, 368 S.W.2d 299.
While the State is not bound to establish the defendant’s sanity in the first instance, if the defendant’s or the State’s evidence raises a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s sanity, such evidence relieves the defendant of further proof upon that issue and shifts the burden of proof to the State. Stuart v. State, 60 (1 Baxt.) Tenn. 178; King v. State, 91 Tenn. 617, 20 S.W. 169.
Whenever testimony is introduced countervailing the presumption of sanity and raising a question of the accused’s insanity, the State must then establish his sanity to the satisfaction of the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Jordan v. State, 124 Tenn. 81, 135 S.W. 327; Davis v. United States, 165 U.S. 373, 378, 17 S.Ct. 360, 362, 41 L.Ed. 750, 754.
Of course, confronted with the evidence countervailing the presumption of sanity and definitely raising a question of the accused’s insanity, the State then undertook to discharge its obligation of proving his sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. In making that effort, in addition to attempting to discredit Dr. Gelburd by cross-examination, the State relied upon the testimony of four witnesses. The first of these was one of the arresting officers, who testified that he talked with the defendant the same night he was apprehended and placed in jail, and that he knew where he was and what he was doing and what he was charged with and told him about his father being buried that day; that the defendant was limping and walked with a cane and that he told him he ought to be in the hospital instead of there at the motor company building; that he also told the defendant “he was crazy as hell for being down there” and had in mind in making that statement the fact that his father had been buried that morning, that he had been injured and was limping and “then going out and doing this *371burglary” was a case of poor judgment. The other arresting officer testified that the defendant stated he understood his constitutional rights and what he was charged with, and that Meade told him, in response to inquiry, about his father’s death; that the defendant was hidden in the building and obeyed the officers’ command to come out with his hands up, and that in his car they found part of a bottle of whiskey; and that he was with the defendant “not over three to five minutes, at the most” before driving him to the police station.
In rebuttal the State presented the bondsman and the jailer. The bondsman testified that he talked to the defendant a few minutes on June 2, 1970, while making his appearance bond, and that he had never known the defendant before that time; that the defendant did not show any signs of mental illness or that there was anything wrong with his health or sanity. On cross-examination this witness admitted that he paid no attention to the defendant one way or the other and never thought anything about his sanity until he talked with the District Attorney General’s criminal investigator the morning of the trial. The jailer testified that the defendant seemed to know where he was and what he was charged with and exhibited no indication of insanity. The jailer testified on cross-examination that the defendant wanted to know if he would get his belongings back when he got out of jail, “That’s about all he said to me”; and that he put him in a cell and heard nothing out of him the rest of the night and thought nothing about whether he was sane or insane until the day of the trial.
Of course, it is settled beyond question that the weight and value of expert testimony is for the jury and must be received with caution, and that where there is any conflict between expert testimony and non-expert testimony as to determinative facts, the jury is not bound to accept expert testimony in preference to other testimony and must determine the weight and credibility of each in the light of all the facts shown in the case; and that insanity as a defense in a criminal prosecution is a question of fact to be determined by the jury under proper instructions by the court. Sparkman v. State, Tenn.Cr.App., 469 S.W.2d 692.
However, it is implicit in the rules just stated and in the law governing appellate review that the jury’s verdict must be supported by substantial material evidence. A mere wisp or flimsy shred of evidence is not enough to sustain a criminal conviction. The scintilla rule is not recognized in this State. Liakas v. State, 199 Tenn. 298, 286 S.W.2d 856.
Can there be any doubt that the State wholly failed to carry its burden of establishing the sanity of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt ? Its evidence introduced for that purpose, reviewed above, can only be characterized as mere insubstantial surmise wholly lacking in probative value. A non-expert witness offered to establish the sanity of a person must show such acquaintance with that person and such opportunity of observing him as to enable the witness to form a definite opinion. Davis v. State, 161 Tenn. 23, 36-38, 28 S.W.2d 993. Evidence of incapacity by a lay witness must be based upon a predicate of reasonable and substantial facts. Schlickling v. Georgia Conference Association Seventh-Day Adventists, 49 Tenn.App. 412, 480, 355 S.W.2d 469.
“Evidence” does not consist of vague, uncertain, irrelevant matter not carrying the quality of proof to induce conviction. McDonald v. Robertson, 104 F.2d 945 (6th Cir. 1939). By the term “evidence” is meant something of substance and consequence, carrying the quality of proof and having fitness to produce conviction. Pioneer Coal Co. v. Lisenbee, 276 Ky. 308, 124 S.W.2d 94. “Substantial evidence means such pertinent or relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Schlickling v. Georgia Conference Association Seventh-Day Adventists, supra. The *372Court also said in Schlickling: “The mere dogmatic assertion which does not appeal to the reason of the court, which does not have substantial and relevant consequence, which does not have fitness to induce conviction, is not proof even if uncontradicted,
Pertinent and helpful in considering the problem confronting us in this case are the following statements in Wright v. United States, 102 U.S.App.D.C. 36, 250 F.2d 4 (1957):
“. . . But the opinion to which a psychiatrist testifies, need only be ‘the type of clinical opinion he is accustomed to form and to rely upon in the practice of his profession.’ It need not consist of ‘mathematically demonstrable certainties.’ Blunt v. United States, 1957, 100 U.S.App.D.C. 266, 275, 244 F.2d 355, 364.

“Although the testimony of lay witnesses may be competent evidence on the issue of sanity, it does not follow that, in the face of a substantial showing of insanity, the Government may send the issue to the jury simply by having two policemen testify, ‘He looked all right to me.’ The probative value of any opinion on the issue of sanity depends on the facts upon which it is based. This is especially true of a lay opinion. Lay ‘witnesses may testify only upon the basis of facts known to them. They may testify as to their own observations and may then express an opinion based upon those observations. Of course the testimony of a lay witness with training in this or related fields may have more value than the testimony of a witness with no such training. Also obvious upon a moment’s reflection is the fact that, while a lay witness’s observation of abnormal acts by an accused may be of great value as evidence, a statement that the witness never observed an abnormal act on the part of the accused is of value if, but only if, the witness had prolonged and intimate contact with the accused.’ Carter v. United States, 102 U.S.App.D.C. 227, 252 F.2d 608.”
Our Supreme Court said in State v. Holt, 222 Tenn. 721, 440 S.W.2d 591, reversing and remanding because the trial judge declined to permit a psychiatrist to testify about the sanity of the defendant based on examination some five or six months after the offense was committed:
“In 31 Am.Jur.2d, Expert and Opinion Evidence, Section 86, the following statements are made:
Probably in no class of cases is the use of expert testimony so general and almost indispensible as in that where the issue is sanity or insanity. Unless a person is a raving maniac or complete imbecile, it is evident that a jury can hardly be deemed competent to reach a satisfactory decision on the question of his mental condition without being instructed by expert witnesses as to the manifestations of mental derangement or disease and the significance of symptoms which are in evidence.”
Considered in the light of all the foregoing, surely it cannot be said that the State sustained its burden of proving the defendant’s sanity beyond a reasonable doubt by the essentially negative testimony of the four laymen presented, who manifestly had no knowledge about such matters and whose testimony as already noted could not be considered as “evidence” upon that issue at all.
Moreover, although the defendant makes no complaints here about the trial court’s charge, it cannot be overlooked that the court only instructed the jury concerning the presumption of sanity and that when insanity is interposed as a defense to a criminal charge the burden of proof is upon the party alleging it. But the court did not instruct the jury, as he was required to do, that if the defendant or the State introduces any evidence fairly raising doubt upon the issue of the accused’s sanity at the *373time of the offense, the presumption sanity ceases to exist and the State then has the burden to establish his sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. Jordan v. State, supra; Davis v. United States, supra. Thus, the jury was never instructed that any burden of proof rests upon the State whenever evidence countervailing the presumption of sanity and raising a question of the accused’s insanity is introduced. of
In my view the defendant’s second Assignment of Error is meritorious. He contends that the trial court erroneously admitted the testimony of Mrs. Marjorie Stansbury and Miss Imogene Webb. The events referred to in their testimony occurred before the trial while he was free on bail. Mrs. Stansbury testified that the defendant forced her at knife point to drive him to a remote area where he tied her up and took her automobile and her purse containing her Esso credit card and about $30. Miss Webb testified that she and the defendant went to Miami, Florida in the Stansbury vehicle and that she used Mrs. Stansbury's credit card to buy gasoline; that after arriving in Miami the defendant visited his brother for approximately 10 minutes and they then started back to Tennessee; and that the entire trip lasted about two and a half days. The record makes it plain that the purpose in introducing the testimony of Mrs. Stansbury and Miss Webb was to bolster the State’s contention that the defendant fled from the State of Tennessee to avoid prosecution, by showing that he kidnapped Mrs. Stansbury and robbed her by the use of a deadly weapon. This record completely refutes the contention of flight by the defendant. He was back in Sullivan County within two and a half days after he started the trip to Florida, and there is no evidence that he concealed himself from the time he returned until the date of his trial. There was no basis for the introduction of evidence of other crimes under any exception to the rule prohibiting such proof. Even in the District Attorney General’s cross-examination of Dr. Gelburd he elicited and brought out that the defendant was in prison seven years, one month and 18 days, and the court overruled defense objection to that testimony. And the District Attorney General then asked Dr. Gelburd if he examined the defendant’s psychological record at the Tennessee Penitentiary, “The work up that was done there by the Psychologist.” Again defense objection was overruled. And all of this was during the first phase of the trial upon the burglary count of the indictment.
Furthermore, the defendant’s Assignment of Error complaining of the arguments of the District Attorney General is eminently well taken, in my opinion. If the District Attorney General’s arguments, both with respect to the first phase of the trial and later with respect to the second phase in which the defendant was charged and convicted as an habitual criminal, especially as to the latter, were not grossly improper and prejudicial, it is difficult to conceive of arguments that could properly be classified as inflammatory and calculated to incite and prejudice the jury against the defendant. The plain total effect of the State’s arguments was to brand the defendant as a vicious criminal who should be put away. Convictions so obtained cannot be permitted to stand.
For these reasons, it is my opinion that the defendant did not have a fair trial and that we have no alternative but to reverse and remand this case for a new trial. Almost a hundred years ago, in Stokes v. State, 64 (5 Baxt.) Tenn. 619, the Supreme Court of this State said:
“Although we might be satisfied of the prisoner’s guilt, yet it is our duty to see that he has a fair and impartial trial, and this he must have though costs may accumulate and punishment be long delayed.”