Court Opinion

ID: 9494606
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:41:54.213019+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:56:30.388723
License: Public Domain

WARDLAW, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. The majority’s erroneous conclusion is predicated on its application of the de novo standard of review. This standard of review is dictated, the majority asserts, because the affidavit did not set forth a. “full and complete statement as to whether or not other investigative procedures have been tried and failed,” would not be likely to succeed, or are too dangerous. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c). Yet each statement characterized by the majority as “untrue” is in fact neither false nor misleading. Both statements are well supported by the Blackmon application itself, as well as the remainder of the record. Moreover, the majority fails to identify any information regarding these statements that was actually withheld from the issuing court. Nearly every fact the majority cites as contradicting the Blackmon application was actually included in that application. Therefore, I conclude that the correct standard of review is for abuse of discretion, United States v. Bennett, 219 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir.2000) (‘We review for abuse of discretion an issuing judge’s decision that a wiretap was necessary.”), and would hold that the issuing court (District Judge George King) did not abuse its discretion in granting the application for a wiretap. Nor did District Judge Rea err in denying the motion to suppress the evidence generated by the wiretap or in denying a Franks hearing.
The majority first concludes that the government’s statement that “[o]n several occasions, law enforcement surveillance teams have been compromised in an attempt to conduct surveillance on Blackmon and associates” is false and misleading. The Blackmon affidavit, however, describes a specific example of such compromised surveillance. It states that an FBI surveillance van was compromised during a controlled purchase of cocaine from an associate of Blackmon’s, Dwight Lee Palmer. Moreover, as the government stated during the suppression hearing, “there are other instances in which ... agents who approach the area are noticed, and have to leave right away.” The fact that these “other instances” were not included in the *1212Blackmon affidavit does not make the “compromised surveillance” statement false.
The second statement that the majority identifies as false, that cooperating sources “only had limited knowledge concerning the scope of the criminal enterprise,” is similarly supported by the record. The only evidence in the record that could contradict this statement is that one informant saw Blackmon “cooking up” cocaine and knew the location of some narcotics. This information, however, was disclosed to the district court in the Blackmon affidavit itself. And the fact that one informant saw Blackmon cook cocaine or knew the location of some narcotics does not mean that this informant had any more than “limited knowledge of the scope of the criminal enterprise.”
Because the Blackmon affidavit does not contain the false or misleading statements that would trigger a de novo review, applying the correct standard of review, I would hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding necessity for the Blackmon wiretap. In addition to providing a specific example of failed surveillance of Blackmon’s associate, the Blackmon affidavit more than adequately demonstrates that traditional surveillance of Blackmon was extremely difficult, if not impossible. The affidavit notes that Blackmon’s apartment was deep within the Jordan Downs Housing Project (“JDHP”) and thus was essentially immune from FBI street-based surveillance. Similarly, the affidavit states that members of Blackmon’s street gang used “lookouts,” mostly younger gang members on bicycles using “walkie talkies,” to alert drug dealers to the FBI’s presence. Indeed, the affidavit even notes that an FBI van involved in a different drug investigation just outside the JDHP was approached by subjects of that investigation, who “shook and hit the van, and then threw objects at the van.”
The Blackmon affidavit further describes the limitations of the government’s four confidential informants. Although these informants provided the FBI with some useful information, the affidavit states that they did not have complete knowledge of Blackmon’s “out-of-state customers, sources of supply, or how [he] dispose[s] of proceeds.” We have consistently found that such limitations merit the granting of a wiretap. See Bennett, 219 F.3d at 1121 (“[Law enforcement officials] were unable, however, to obtain information about the extended organization, such as other members, couriers, buyers, and suppliers.”); United States v. Torres, 908 F.2d 1417, 1422 (9th Cir.1990) (approving of affidavit that intended to “identify, investigate, and prosecute ... the sources of supply, co-distributors and major customers of [defendants’] cocaine distribution organization”) (emphasis omitted).
The Blackmon affidavit also details the ineffectiveness of other investigative techniques. The affidavit reviews the information regarding Blackmon derived from wiretaps on other suspects and reaches the reasonable conclusion that those wiretaps would not produce sufficient evidence to incriminate Blackmon. It notes that search warrants and grand jury proceedings would simply alert Blackmon and his associates to the presence of an ongoing investigation, and thus would be unproductive. See Torres, 908 F.2d at 1422 (upholding necessity finding in part because “the use of a search warrant or grand jury proceeding would alert appellants of an ongoing investigation.”). And, consistent with numerous of our decisions, the affidavit discusses the useful information that was obtained from pen registers, and then points out the technology’s obvious limitations. See Bennett, 219 F.3d at 1121-22 (“[Telephone records ... did not reveal the details of [the defendants’] transac*1213tions.”); United States v. Brown, 761 F.2d 1272, 1276 (9th Cir.1985) (“[Telephone records, though raising suspicion that illegal activity was occurring, failed to identify specific users or reveal the substance of the conversations.”); United States v. Brone, 792 F.2d 1504, 1506 (9th Cir.1986) (“[P]en registers and toll records did not disclose the nature of the business being transacted by telephone.”).
In light of this detailed and accurate statement of necessity, our decision in United States v. Carneiro, 861 F.2d 1171 (9th Cir.1988), is distinguishable. In Car-neiro, as here, the government incorporated verbatim portions of a previous wiretap application into application for wiretaps on several defendants. Although we found the duplicated wiretap applications to be insufficient, we did so because they “failed to tell the issuing court that the DEA did not conduct a traditional investigation of Harty’s criminal activities before applying for the wiretap on his telephone line,” and resulted in other misleading statements. Id. at 1180. As discussed, the Blackmon affidavit contained no false statements and the record overwhelmingly demonstrates that the government employed traditional investigative techniques — pen registers, informants, and surveillance — in its investigation of Blackmon. Carneiro is thus in-apposite.
Because the Blackmon affidavit, in a full and complete statement, demonstrated that “ordinary investigative techniques employing a normal amount of resources have failed to make the case within a reasonable amount of time,” Bennett, 219 F.3d at 1122, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding necessity for the wiretap. Accordingly, I would affirm the district court.