Court Opinion

ID: 9720382
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:28:38.54961+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:16.981732
License: Public Domain

GARDEBRING, Justice
(dissenting in part).
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion on the issue of the admissibility of psychiatric testimony on the issue of intent. I do so for two reasons. First, I believe our decisions allow its admission on the facts of this case. Second, not to admit such evidence would be to create confusion and inconsistency in our rules of evidence, because such evidence is admitted in a variety of other contexts.
In its determination to limit use of the psychiatric testimony, the trial court relied upon its understanding of our ruling in *105State v. Bouwman, 328 N.W.2d 703 (Minn.1982). In Bouwman, we were asked to answer the following certified question:
May the court admit, at the trial of a defendant charged with murder in the first degree, expert psychiatric opinion testimony (not offered to establish a defense under Minn.Stat. § 611.026) that the defendant, at the time of the alleged crime, lacked the mental capacity to premeditate the killings or to form the specific intent to kill?
State v. Bouwman, 328 N.W.2d at 704-05 (emphasis added). We answered no. We based our decision in Bouwman on our conclusion that the only relevant evidence regarding intent is evidence disputing the physical facts which the prosecution has introduced to allow the factfinder to infer intent. Id. I believe our holding in Bouw-man was a narrow one, that expert psychiatric testimony is inadmissible as it relates to the mental capacity to form the requisite intent; but it has been read more broadly to preclude any evidence relating to intent or premeditation in the first phase of a bifurcated trial. See, e.g., State v. Jackman, 396 N.W.2d 24, 28-29 (Minn. 1986); State v. Fratzke, 354 N.W.2d 402, 408-09 (Minn.1984); State v. Brown, 345 N.W.2d 233, 238 (Minn.1984); and State v. Hoffman, 328 N.W.2d 709, 714-17 (Minn. 1982). The result has been that defendants are routinely prevented from introducing competent evidence of their state of mind at the time of the alleged offense. A case-by-case legal analysis of whether the proffered evidence is probative and material generally has been rejected in favor of a blanket application of Bouwman and a rejection of the evidence. I believe that such a result is not in the interests of justice. After Provost’s trial, but prior to his appeal, we again examined this issue in State v. Brom, 463 N.W.2d 758 (Minn. 1990), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 111 S.Ct. 1398, 113 L.Ed.2d 453 (1991). The Brom case presented a slightly different issue, whether a defendant could present expert psychiatric evidence on the issue of premeditation (rather than intent) during the first phase of a bifurcated trial. Brom, 463 N.W.2d at 762. However, in considering the Brom case, we concluded that there was no meaningful distinction between intent and premeditation for purposes of ascertaining whether expert psychiatric testimony on these elements may be prohibited in the first phase of a bifurcated trial. Id. Thus, in Brom, we affirmed the trial court’s refusal to allow defendant to offer expert psychiatric testimony with regard to intent or premeditation during the first phase of a bifurcated trial on the grounds that it is not relevant. Brom, Id. at 762-64.
However, my reading of our general af-firmance of the Bouwman doctrine in Brom is that it left open the possibility that on a different set of facts, expert psychiatric testimony on the elements of intent and premeditation might be relevant and thus admissible. Brom, 463 N.W.2d at 763 n. 9. We identified legal relevance as the key to the admissibility of the expert witness testimony. Therefore, the expert in Brom, who had “difficulty as a psychiatrist getting into the questions of premeditation” simply was not able to offer testimony which was relevant, and thus, admissible. In contrast, appellant’s expert was willing to testify as to how appellant’s mental disease may have affected whether or not he intended to kill his wife. The trial court was willing to allow some testimony by the expert, but ordered that testimony be limited to “factual” observations relevant to intent and premeditation, and a discussion of normal psychological processes involved in intent and premeditation. Thus, appellant’s expert was not allowed to speak to the existence of mental disease or defect and its bearing on the presence or absence of specific intent.
In order to determine whether the trial court’s action in curtailing the scope of the proffered testimony was correct, I would have us look at whether the testimony would have been relevant to the existence of intent. To convict appellant of murder in the first degree, the state must prove that appellant caused the death of his wife, and that he did it with premeditation and intent to effect her death. Minn.Stat. § 609.185(1) (1990). This statute recog*106nizes that a crime is committed only when someone who does an evil act also has an evil mind, or to put it another way, “a crime consists in the concurrence of prohibited conduct and a culpable mental state.” 1 Wharton’s Criminal Law § 27 (14th ed. 1978). This required culpable mental state is called the “mens rea.”
Minn.R.Evid. 401 defines relevant evidence as that “having any tendency to make the existence of any fact * * * more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” (Emphasis added.) As noted in the committee comment, the test is one of logic and assessment of probative value, and represents a liberal approach to relevancy, and thus admissibility. Minn.R.Evid. 401, comment, para. 1.
I am convinced that, although not by any means dispositive on questions of intent and premeditation, expert psychiatric testimony can have a bearing, can have a tendency to make their existence “more probable or less probable.” This evidence is appropriately weighed and considered by the jury, along with the physical facts of the incident, in determining whether the state has proved the necessary elements of the crime.
This analysis is also consistent with our cases on the question of when expert opinion testimony is relevant and thus admissible. Expert testimony is generally allowed where the subject matter is of a scientific, technical or specialized nature and the testimony will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue. Minn.R.Evid. 702. Where, on the other hand, the testimony is one within the knowledge and experience of a lay jury, so that the testimony of the expert will not add precision or depth to the jury’s ability to reach a conclusion, the expert testimony is not ordinarily allowed. Dyson v. Schmidt, 260 Minn. 129, 139, 109 N.W.2d 262, 269 (1961); State v. Helterbridle, 301 N.W.2d 545, 547 (Minn.1980). “A reasonable test to be applied is whether the members of the jury, having the knowledge and general experience common to every member of the community, would be aided in the consideration of the issues by the offered testimony.” Clark v. Rental Equip. Co., Inc., 300 Minn. 420, 220 N.W.2d 507, 512 (1974).
As with all other expert testimony, the admissibility of a particular expert’s testimony and opinion on the mens rea elements in the first phase of a bifurcated trial will be governed by the requirements of the Minnesota Rules of Evidence. Expert testimony concerning the defendant’s mental disease or defect and its bearing on the existence of a specific mens rea should be admissible only if it meets the tests of evidence normally applied to offers of expert testimony.
Additionally, a careful reading of Bouw-man indicates that our real concern about the admissibility of psychiatric evidence on the mens rea elements was not only its relevance but also its reliability. There, we justified the exclusion of testimony on mental illness while at the same time allowing admission of testimony on “intoxication, medication, epilepsy, infancy [and] senility.” Bouwman, 328 N.W.2d at 706. We noted that “[t]hese [conditions] are susceptible to quantification and lay understanding.” Id. We supported our conclusion by describing the “esoteries of psychiatry” as “not within the ordinary ken.” Id. (quoting Wahrlich v. State, 479 F.2d 1137, 1138 (9th Cir.1973)). Indeed! However, this analysis supports a conclusion that the testimony at issue here is admissible. Once having crossed the bridge as to basic relevance of mental illness or mental defect on the issue of intent, a conclusion that the subject matter is one requiring specialized knowledge mandates the admissibility of expert testimony.
Further, I question whether the common person really has a better understanding of senility or epilepsy than she has of mental illness? If evidence on the presence of intoxication,1 or medication, or senility is *107admissible as it relates to mens rea, it must surely be equally so as to mental illness.
I am also concerned that exclusion of expert testimony as to a particular state of mind in the first phase of a bifurcated trial is a real anomaly in the law of evidence. “Mental condition” or “state of mind” is put at issue frequently in a variety of lawsuits, and triers of fact are allowed to hear testimony on their existence or non-existence. This kind of criminal case provides perhaps the best example. Expert psychiatric testimony is, under our previous cases, clearly admissible in the second phase of the trial, directed at determining whether the defendant “was laboring under such a defect of reason, * * * as not to know the nature of the act, or that it was wrong.” Minn.Stat. § 611.026 (1990). Psychiatric testimony related to this difficult, almost metaphysical standard, does not appear to be inherently more helpful or reliable or relevant than psychiatric testimony on the presence of intent. If one is allowed to be admitted, logic compels the other’s admissibility, as well.
Outside the context of a bifurcated trial mandated by a defendant’s not guilty by reason of mental illness or mental deficiency plea, expert testimony on “mental condition” and “state of mind” is also admissible in other criminal proceedings. See State v. Linder, 268 N.W.2d 734, 736 (Minn.1978) (expert psychiatric testimony admitted on issue of whether defendant was capable of knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver); and State v. Holm, 322 N.W.2d 353, 354 (Minn.1982) (expert psychiatric testimony admitted on whether defendant competent to stand trial).
Similar issues arise in non-criminal contexts as well.2 For example, the determination of capacity or competency is critical in the context of evaluating the validity of wills, contracts or gifts, and the validity of consent for a variety of things, including medical treatment. See Parrish v. Peoples, 214 Minn. 589, 595, 9 N.W.2d 225, 229 (1943) (mental capacity to make deeds or will); Timm v. Schneider, 203 Minn. 1, 4, 279 N.W. 754, 755 (1938) (capacity to enter into contract); Lindsey v. Lindsey, 369 N.W.2d 26, 28, 30 (Minn.App.1985) (expert psychiatric testimony admitted on capacity to enter into a contract). In these cases, the test as to admissibility of evidence is relevance, and the standard should be the same here.
Therefore, I would conclude that evidence, including expert opinion testimony, concerning the defendant’s mental disease or defect at the time of the alleged offense, is admissible to negate the existence of a necessary specific mens rea. As the majority concedes in its footnote two, this position is consistent with the conclusion reached by the majority of jurisdictions which have considered this issue, and is in conformity with the Model Penal Code and American Bar Association Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards.
This determination is consistent with our traditional approach to admissibility of evidence based on our faith in the jury’s ability to meaningfully assess the weight assigned to particular pieces of testimony. See Lehmann v. Chapel, 70 Minn. 496, 497-99, 73 N.W. 402, 402-03 (1897). Our policy of admitting evidence freely has also previously extended to the admission of evidence in unbifurcated insanity trials. See State v. Rawland, 294 Minn. 17, 46, 199 N.W.2d 774, 790 (1972); and Anderson v. Grasberg, 247 Minn. 538, 555, 78 N.W.2d 450, 461 (1956). In Rawland we stated, “evidence should be received freely so the factfinder can * * * ‘take account of the entire man and his mind as a whole.’ ” Rawland, 294 Minn, at 46, 199 N.W.2d at 790 (quoting Mr. Justice Blackmun in Pope v. United States, 372 F.2d 710, 738 (8th Cir.1967)). That effort, to know the whole man, is as appropriate today as it was in 1972.
While I would conclude that some expert testimony may be relevant to the issues of intent and premeditation in the first part of a bifurcated trial, the content of that testi*108mony must be narrowly tailored to address only the issues of defendant’s actual mens rea, the particular intent and premeditation the defendant possessed at the time of the offense. It may not address any general capacity to intend or premeditate.3 By limiting the evidence in this way, I would adopt what has been called the “strict mens rea” model of the admissibility of evidence to negate the elements of a charged crime.4
Further, I want to stress what I am not advocating today. I do not advocate the adoption of a new affirmative defense. The admissible evidence under this rule would simply go to negating an element of the required prima facie case.
I would not adopt the “diminished capacity” doctrine. No evidence which merely shows a defendant may be merely less capable of entertaining the required mens rea is admissible.
I would not adopt the “diminished responsibility” doctrine. No evidence which is offered to show that a defendant is somehow less responsible for his or her actions because of a mental disease is admissible. Each defendant must take full responsibility for the crime he or she committed.
However, if a defendant charged with murder in the first degree did not possess the required mens rea elements of intent and premeditation, and that lack is proved by relevant evidence, including psychiatric evidence, then he or she is not guilty of that crime, although possibly still guilty of a lesser crime not requiring the proof of those specific mens rea elements. Our decision today emphasizes that
evidence demonstrating a lack of mens rea serves a different purpose from evidence demonstrating that the defendant was insane at the time of the crime and hence not criminally responsible. The first type of evidence is offered to negate an indispensable element of the crime and bears on culpability (i.e., guilt or innocence). The second type is offered to establish insanity and impacts not upon culpability but rather upon the appropriateness vel non of criminal punishment.
Hoey v. State, 311 Md. 473, 536 A.2d 622, 632 (1988). Both types of evidence are relevant and admissible, each for its different purpose.
For these reasons, I would allow the admission of psychiatric evidence on the issue of intent for the limited purpose of negating its presence.

. Evidence of a defendant's intoxication at the time the crime was committed may be considered by the jury and may negate an element requiring a culpable mental state. See State v. Neumann, 262 N.W.2d 426, 431 (Minn.1978).

. For a catalog of legal areas involving mental capacity see Robert R. Mezer & Paul D. Rhein-gold, Mental Capacity and Incompetency: A Psycho-legal Problem, 118 Am.J.Psychiatry 827 (1962).

. In spite of the narrow purpose for which such evidence could be admitted, the majority argues that juries will "inevitably take the testimony as an invitation to consider whether the defendant could or couldn’t have a guilty mind,” and further that a cautionary instruction to the jury "would only cause confusion." This discounts the care with which jurors respond to their instructions, and I believe they are fully capable of understanding that they must consider this evidence for a limited purpose only.

. For an excellent review of the strict mens rea model see Stephen J. Morse, Undiminished Confusion in Diminished Capacity, 75 J. of Crim.L. & Criminology 1 (1984); and Peter Arenella, The Diminished Capacity and Diminished Responsibility Defenses: Two Children of a Doomed Marriage, 77 Colum.L.Rev. 827, 828-29, 836-39, 863 (1977).