Court Opinion

ID: 9655969
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 19:28:29.729509+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:25.031029
License: Public Domain

N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.
¶ 69. (dissenting). The twists and turns the majority opinion engages in to allow Landis to continue her action are many. The statutes governing mediation and the commencement of medical malpractice actions are plain on their faces. *33Had Landis complied with them, her action would have been timely filed. But she did not comply. Consequently, the majority opinion retreats from the position that was strenuously championed just a year ago — that "[statutes of repose are different from statutes of limitations," and "represent legislative policy decisions that dictate when the courthouse doors close for particular litigants." Aicher v. Wisconsin Patients Comp. Fund, 2000 WI 98, ¶¶ 26-27, 237 Wis. 2d 99, 613 N.W.2d 849 (emphasis added).1 Today, per the majority opinion, a " 'statute of repose' is largely a judicial label." Majority op. at ¶ 5. Last year, it was a legislative absolute. See Aicher, 2000 WI 98, ¶ 54. The sad irony of today's decision is that it appears from the result that the majority is more concerned with keeping the door to the courthouse open for an adult who failed to follow the law, than slamming the courthouse door closed for a child with no other recourse.2 See id. at ¶¶ 86-92 *34(Crooks, J., dissenting, joined by Bablitch, J.). I respectfully dissent from such a course of action.
¶ 70. Whether, as Landis argues, Wis. Stat. § 655.44 tolls the statute of repose in § 893.55(l)(b) is, as the majority acknowledges, a question of statutory interpretation. However, contrary to the majority's characterization of § 655.44(4), it is clear and unambiguous. A request for mediation tolls the statute of limitations, not the statute of repose. As the majority repeatedly indicated in Aicher, a statute of limitations is distinct from a statute of repose. See 2000 WI 98, ¶¶ 10, 26, 27, 28, 32, 46, 50, 53, 54, 60, 76, 77, 78, 83, 85. A statute of limitations "establishes the time frame within which a claim must be initiated after a cause of action actually accrues." Id. at ¶ 26. This time frame, also called "period of limitation" and "time limitation," is set by legislative statutes of limitations. Statutes of limitations dictate the time "within which an action may be commenced.. .computed from the time that the cause of action accrues until the action is commenced."3 Wis. Stat. § 893.04; see also majority op. at ¶ 61 n.15. The applicable time frame here, set by § 893.55(l)(b), is one year from accrual, that is, one year from the date the injury was discovered, or should have been discovered. Landis alleges that she discovered the alleged negligence that gave rise to her claim *35in February, 1999. Her claim thus accrued then, and, to comply with the applicable statute of limitations, she would have had to file her action within a year. She did. Her action was filed on July 2,1999.
¶ 71. However, Wis. Stat. § 893.55(l)(b) sets forth a statute of repose, that "an action may not be commenced under this paragraph more than 5 years from the date of the act or omission." This was firmly, and repeatedly, established in Aicher. See, e.g., 2000 WI98, ¶¶ 10,11, 26, 85. The five-year repose provision has nothing to do with when a medical malpractice claim accrues.4 It is not a statute of limitations; it is a statute of repose. "A statute of repose.. .limits the time period within which an action may be brought based on the date of the act or omission. Statutes of repose thus bear no relation to the accrual of a cause of action and can toll before an injury is discovered or even before an injury has occurred." Id. at ¶ 26 (footnote omitted). In short, "[sjtatutes of repose are different from statutes of limitations." Id. Not only are statutes of repose different than statutes of limitations, they are legislative enactments, reflecting "policy considerations better left to the legislative branch of government." Id. at ¶ 54; see. also ¶ 27 ("statutes of repose represent legislative policy decisions that dictate when the courthouse doors close for particular litigants."); ¶ 46 ("The question of what the. . .statute of repose for a particular action should be is a fundamental question of public policy."); ¶ 50 ("This court has concluded many times that the legislature may sever a person's claim by.. .a statute of repose...."). Just last year, a statute of repose was not *36a "judicial label," or a form of "judicial terminology," as the majority states it is today. See majority op. at ¶¶ 5, 61. This should hold true here.
¶ 72. Taking what the majority of the court said in Aicher at face value — that statutes of limitations are different from statutes of repose — a request for mediation under Wis. Stat. § 655.44(4) tolls only the one-year-after-discovery limitation period, but not the five-years-after-act-or-omission period, in § 893.55(l)(b). Let us examine what alleged wrong would result from applying these precepts here.
¶ 73. Landis was coming up against the five-year bar when she discovered the alleged negligence in February, 1999. Her husband's surgery was on March 17, 1994 and he died on April 1, 1994. The last possible date that would be five years after an act or omission pertaining to Landis' husband was April 1, 1999, and thus, that would be the last possible date to file an action not barred by the statute of repose.
¶ 74. However, the majority does acknowledge that mediation is required before a medical malpractice claim proceeds. "Except as provided in s. 655.445, no court action may be commenced unless a request for mediation has been filed under this section and until the expiration of the mediation period. . . ." Wis. Stat. § 655.44(5). By the time Landis discovered the alleged negligence in February of 1999, Landis could not have waited until the 90-day mediation period expired to file her complaint. May, 1999, would be too late.
¶ 75. Yet, as the majority points out, Wis. Stat. § 655.44 was not her only option; § 655.445, as a parallel provision, provided a choice. See majority op. at ¶¶ 9, 19. The legislature provided an exception to the requirement that mediation must be completed before an action is commenced in § 655.445, and according to *37that choice, Landis could have filed her action first, and then completed mediation. Wis. Stat. § 655.445(1), (3).5
¶ 76. Landis needed only to have followed the law. No grievous result would have occurred in this case, had the majority held to the position that was espoused in Aicher. Unlike the situation in Aicher, Landis was left with a right, but no remedy. See 2000 WI 98, ¶¶ 86-92 (Crooks, J., dissenting, joined by Bab-litch, J.).
¶ 77. The fact that the legislature specifically provided an exception to mediation-before-litigation indicates that the legislature contemplated that some plaintiffs may be nearing the five-year repose bar, when they contemplate filing a medical malpractice claim. By permitting such plaintiffs to commence their action in conjunction with a request for mediation (pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 655.445), rather than after the mediation period (pursuant to § 655.44), the legislature kept intact the impact of the statute of repose in § 893.55(l)(b). If the legislature intended § 655.44(4) to toll the statute of repose, there would have been no need to provide a statutory exception for plaintiffs approaching the expiration of time to commence their medical malpractice actions. The majority ought not to disregard the language and corresponding self-evident legislative purpose of § 655.44 and § 655.445, in preference to an alternative purpose constructed on sheer speculation. "Such reasoning is tantamount to declar*38ing that all legislative decisions regarding time limitation periods are void unless the legislature agrees with this court's assessment of what constitutes good public policy." Tomczak v. Bailey, 218 Wis. 2d 245, 260, 578 N.W.2d 166 (1998).
¶ 78. The alternative purpose offered by the majority is that the legislature intended to provide medical malpractice claimants with what appears to be a strategic tactic, that is, claimants could either "first fil[e] a mediation request" to "demonstrate a willingness to cooperate with a defendant," or "first commenc[e] an action" "to demonstrate the gravity of a matter." See majority op. at ¶ 58. In enacting legislation, I would not impute to the legislature a motive or purpose of considering alternative approaches which reflect the claimant's attitude toward the defendant or toward his or her claim. Instead, I would assume that the legislature considers foremost sound public policy, e.g., "prompt litigation ensures fairness to the parties."6 Aicher, 2000 WI 98, ¶ 53. Moreover, the majority's strategy-based purpose runs counter to the point of mediation, which is "an informal, nontechnical, inexpensive and expedient.. .process to assist in resolving disputes without litigation." See 1985 Wis. Act 340 (which enacted Wis. Stat. §§ 655.44 and 655.445), Drafting File, Report on Patients Compensation Panels; Mediation, VILA. Nonetheless, the alleged purpose of the legislature that the majority offers does not correspond to the language of the statutes. Section 655.445(3) also requires mediation before the litigation proceeds, even though an action has been filed. The majority's tendered purpose also does not explain the *39exception in § 655.44(5), which allows a claimant to file an action before mediation.
¶ 79. The majority claims that "[ljittle would be gained" by applying the distinction between the statute of repose and the statute of limitations in Wis. Stat. § 893.55(l)(b), which was made plain by this court in Aicher. Majority op. at ¶ 53. If applied, however, § 893.55(l)(b)'s repose provision would remain in full force, undiluted. That is, no action would be commenced more than five years after the underlying act or omission. Apparently, this is just what the legislature intended, according to the Judicial Council Committee's Note accompanying the enactment of § 893.55(1): "Subsection (1) further provides that in no event may a malpractice action be commenced later than 6 [5] years from the time of the alleged act or omission."7 Ch. 323, Laws of 1979.
¶ 80. Wisconsin Stat. § 655.44 also would remain intact, and in full force. It would be applied to toll the three-year-after-discovery and the one-year-after-discovery-of-injury or concealment or foreign object limitations periods in § 893.55(1), (2), and (3). Similarly, § 655.445 would fulfill one of its self-evident purposes, which is to permit the timely commencement of medical malpractice claims that accrued under the discovery rule in § 893.55(l)(b), and simultaneously promote the laudable goal of mediating those claims before active litigation ensues. The maxims of statutory construction which this court normally adheres to would be complied with, not ignored. A "fundamental rule of statutory construction requires that effect be given, if possible, to every word, clause, and sentence in a statute, and that a construction resulting in any por*40tion of a statute being superfluous should be avoided whenever possible." Blazekovic v. City of Milwaukee, 2000 WI 41, ¶ 30, 234 Wis. 2d 587, 601, 610 N.W.2d 467. Similarly, statutes are examined in pari materia, not in isolation.8 Moreover, the holding in Aicher that statutes of repose are different than statutes of limitations would remain intact.
¶ 81. At the time the legislature enacted Wis. Stat. §§ 655.44 and 655.445 in 1986,9 the term "statute of repose" had been part of the legal lexicon for over 100 years. See Pritchard v. Howell, 1 Wis. 131, 138 (1853).10 The court has, during this time, indicated *41that what distinguishes a statute of repose from a statute of limitations is that the former "limits the time period in which an action can be brought based on the date of an act or omission." Aicher, 2000 WI 98, ¶ 26; see also McMillan v. Wehle, 55 Wis. 685, 694, 13 N.W. 694 (1882); Tomczak v. Bailey, 218 Wis. 2d 245, 252, 578 N.W.2d 166 (1998). Had the legislature intended that § 655.44(4) applied to statutes of repose, as well as statutes of limitations, the legislature would have so stated. Indeed, the majority ignores the fact that the legislature is presumed to enact laws with full knowledge of decisions of this court.11 See Glinski v. Sheldon, 88 Wis. 2d 509, 519-20, 276 N.W.2d 815 (1979). The majority should have acknowledged that the legislature meant what it said when it limited the tolling provision in Wis. Stat. § 655.44(4) to statutes of limitations.12
*42¶ 82. The majority seems to think that extending the repose period 90 days or so — the length of the mediation period — is no big deal for the medical malpractice defendant. See majority op. at ¶ 53. But Wis. Stat. §§ 655.44, 655.445 and 893.55 all reflect the legislature’s "goal of limiting the 'long tail' of liability of those who actually provide health care to patients." Estate of Makos v. Wisconsin Health Care Fund, 211 Wis. 2d 41, 76, 564 N.W.2d 662 (1997) (Bradley, J., dissenting).13 Aicher emphatically reiterated throughout the opinion that the legislature provided medical malpractice claimants a right to pursue their claim only up to five years after the act or omission as evidenced by the statute of repose in § 893.55(l)(b). See, e.g., 2000 WI 98, ¶ 50, 53, 54. Arne Aicher had no right to pursue her claim because "[n]o right to remedy resides here because the legislature expressly chose not to recognize a right based on a claim discovered more than five years after the allegedly negligent act or omission...." *43Id. at ¶ 54. As the majority in Aicher aptly observed, "[w]ere we to extend a right to remedy outside the limits of these recognized rights, we effectively would eviscerate the ability of the legislature to enact any statute of repose." 2000 WI 98, ¶ 54. Yet, this may be exactly the result of what the majority has done here today.
¶ 83. The majority's conclusion that statutes of repose are one and the same as statutes of limitations not only contradicts Aicher, but its conclusion becomes only a matter of "judicial labelling]," so that a difference that existed just last year ceases to exist today. First, the majority regales us with various definitions of "statute of limitations" and "statute of repose" to establish that the term "statute of limitations" in Wis. Stat. § 655.44(4) is ambiguous.14 Plainly, these terms were not ambiguous to the majority in Aicher. See 2000 WI 98, ¶¶ 26-28,46, 50, 54. Aicher recognized that the legislature was scrupulous in its construction of the medical malpractice statutory scheme. Id. at ¶ 21. *44Here, however, the majority usurps the legislature's authority by creating a judicially-manufactured exception, permitting Landis to pursue her claim after the repose period had expired, even though she had an adequate opportunity to commence her action timely.
¶ 84. The majority's opinion also does not interpret Wis. Stat. § 893.55(2) and (3) correctly. These subdivisions are not exceptions which override the five-year repose provision in sub. (l)(b). See majority op. at ¶¶ 38-41. Rather, subdivisions (2) and (3) provide exemptions to the injury or discovery of injury accrual statutes of limitations in sub. (1). See Aicher, 2000 WI 98, ¶ 10 n.4. Instead, the five-year repose provision does not apply to actions arising under sub. (2) and (3), so there is no limit to override. The five-year repose provision appears to apply only to the discovery rule of accrual in sub. (b), even though, arguably, it also applies to the injury rule of accrual in sub. (a). See Paul v. Skemp, 2001 WI 42, ¶ 49, 242 Wis. 2d 507, 625 N.W.2d 860.
¶ 85. The majority opinion also claims that there is nothing in the legislative history of Wis. Stat. § 655.44 and § 655.445 which supports the conclusion that I find self-evident; namely, that § 655.44(4) tolls only the statute of limitations, and not the statute of repose, in § 893.55. However, the same law that enacted §§ 655.44 and 655.445, also amended § 893.55. See 1985 Wis. Act 340, §§ 72, 72b (created subs. (4) and (5) of § 893.55). It is reasonable to infer that the legislature created §§ 655.44(5) and 655.445, in part, to accommodate the statute of repose in § 893.55(l)(b) that was also before the legislature at the same time.
¶ 86. It is also important to consider information from the Legislative Reference Bureau's drafting file for the 1985 Wis. Act 340, which established the media*45tion scheme now in force. The legislature enacted a number of nonstatutory provisions to ensure "an orderly and equitable transfer of pending patients compensation panel controversies to courts." 1985 Wis. Act 340, § 73. One of these provisions required that any pending claim before the panel had to be filed with a court within 60 days, "[i]f the claimant wishes to proceed with the malpractice claim." Id. at § 73(2)(c)a. The tolling provision then in effect would extend only through that 60-day period: "Any applicable statute of limitations tolled under section 655.04(6), 1983 stats., shall remain tolled until the expiration of the 60-day period." Id. Evidently, whatever effect the tolling provision in § 655.04(6) had, if any, upon the statute of repose in § 893.55(l)(b),15 that effect was to end shortly after the mediation scheme became effective. 1985 Wis. Act 340 wiped the slate clean. Pending claims, which may have run afoul of the five-year statute of repose, had to be filed before mediation was requested. 1985 Wis. Act 340, § 73(2)(c)b. "Beginning September 1, 1986," new claims had to follow the procedure provided *46in §§655.44 and 655.445. Wis. Stat. §655.44(1), § 655.445(1). In other words, new claims had to comply with the statute of repose in § 893.55(l)(b). Regardless of how Wis. Stat. § 655.04 may have operated on the statute of repose in § 893.55(l)(b) — and we do not know since we were never confronted with that issue — § 655.04 is not before us today. Instead, before us are §§ 655.44 and 655.445, wherein the legislature provided the means to require claimants to engage in mediation and comply with statutes of repose simultaneously.
¶ 87. Ironically, Landis did not need the majority to engage in the twists and turns it does here to preserve her claim. She just had to follow the law. There are a number of statutory schemes that require litigants to navigate various time periods, one of which is chapter 655. See Tamminen v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 109 Wis. 2d 536, 546, 327 N.W.2d 55 (1982). Here, "each statute may be complied with without violating the other." Id. Aicher warned practitioners to "take cautious note of the potential impact of [statutes of repose] for their clients." 2000 WI 98, ¶ 31 n.9. Had Landis' counsel carefully reviewed and interpreted the interplay among the applicable statutes, Landis may have timely commenced her action, in accord with legislative dictates.
¶ 88. It is especially difficult for me to accept the majority's device of characterizing a statute of repose as only a "judicial label" now, when the statute of repose was championed as a legislative mandate just last year to foreclose a child's opportunity for redress. See Aicher, 2000 WI 98. Extinguishing a plaintiffs claim where the plaintiff had no opportunity to discover her injury prior to the running of the five-year statute of repose is problematic. More problematic is *47saving a plaintiff who discovers her injury before the end of the five-year period and yet chooses to postpone commencing her action. By circumventing the law as legislated and devising a way for Landis' claim to proceed, this court adds to the injustice it allowed to occur in Aicher.
¶ 89. Even though the majority opinion ostensibly withdraws from Aicher, it fails to acknowledge that, last year, the constitutionality of the statute of repose in Wis. Stat. § 893.55(l)(b) depended upon the fact that that statute was enacted by the legislature, not that § 895.55(l)(b) was determined to be a statute of repose by means of "judicial terminology." See Aicher, 2000 WI 98, ¶¶ 41-84; see also majority op. at ¶ 63. Granted, the constitutionality of the statute of repose in § 893.55(l)(b) is not at issue here, because Landis discovered the alleged injury before the statute of repose had foreclosed her remedy.16 Nonetheless, the only principled way for the majority to reach the result it does today is to confront, not ignore, the underlying *48basis for the constitutionality of § 893.55(l)(b)'s statute of repose. For the reasons herein, I respectfully dissent.
¶ 90. I am authorized to state that Justice WILLIAM A. BABLITCH and Justice JON P. WILCOX join this opinion.

 The majority opinion, attempts to distinguish Aicher v. Wisconsin Patients Compensation Fund, 2000 WI 98, 237 Wis. 2d 99, 613 N.W.2d 849, on the basis that Aicher pertained solely to the constitutionality of a statute of repose, where this case is about legislative intent. See majority op. at ¶ 60 n.13. However, the constitutionality of the statute of repose in Aicher was wholly dependent upon legislative intent. See, e.g., Aicher, 2000 WI 98, ¶¶ 46, 50, 53, 54. If there is any distinction between the source for the majority's conclusions both here and in Aicher — namely, the legislature — it is a distinction without a difference.

 In Aicher, Arne Aicher was blinded in one eye as a result of an eye condition that was found, but not treated, during her newborn examination. Aicher v. Wisconsin Patients Comp. Fund, 2000 WI 98, ¶ 8, 237 Wis. 2d 99, 613 N.W.2d 849. The injury occurred within six months of the alleged negligent act. Id. at ¶ 7. However, the injury was not discovered until Arne was 13 years old. By that time, according to the majority of the *34court, the applicable statutes of repose operated as a complete bar to any action, even though the doors to the courthouse had closed even before Arne realized that she had been injured. The majority repeatedly invoked the idea that it was solely within the purview of the legislature to enact statutes of repose, which, as the legislature knew according to the majority, were significantly different than statutes of limitations.

 An action is commenced once it is filed with the court. Wis. Stat. § 893.02.

 Under Wis. Stat. § 893.55, a claim accrues when there has been an injury (sub. (l)(a)), the discovery of an injury (sub. (l)(b)), the discovery of a concealed act or omission (sub. (2)), or the discovery of a foreign object left in the body (sub. (3)).

 Contrary to the majority's conclusion, this option does not mean that mediation is foreclosed, nor does it favor litigation over mediation. See majority op. at ¶ 53, 54. Rather, mediation still precedes active litigation. "[N]o discovery may be made and no trial, pretrial conference or scheduling conference may be held until the expiration of the mediation period...." Wis. Stat. § 655.445(3).

 I would also impute to the legislature a motive or purpose that, by its statutory enactments, it demonstrates "the gravity" that it attaches to every medical malpractice claim.

 An amendment to the original bill changed the repose period from six to five years.

 "In construing a statute, the entire section and related sections are to be considered in its construction or interpretation. .. .Sections of statutes relating to the same subject matter must be construed in pari materia." State v. Clausen, 105 Wis. 2d 231, 244, 313 N.W.2d 819 (1982) (internal citations omitted).

 See 1985 Wis. Act 340, from May, 1986 Special Session.

 In the first volume of Wisconsin Reports, this court first examined a statute of repose and stated that "[i]ts enactment is held by all to be within the constitutional power of the legislature." Pritchard v. Howell, 1 Wis. 131, 138 (1853). Since then, according to my research, this court has referred to statutes of repose in 45 decisions from Pritchard in 1853 up through the present. See, e.g., McMillan v. Wehle, 55 Wis. 685, 687, 694, 13 N.W. 694 (1882); Bekkedal v. Viroqua, 183 Wis. 176, 185, 196 N.W. 879 (1924); Gamma Tau Educational Foundation v. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co., 41 Wis. 2d 675, 684, 165 N.W.2d 135 (1969); Paul v. Skemp, 2001 WI 42, ¶ 49, 242 Wis. 2d 507, 625 N.W.2d 860. My research has also found that the court of appeals has referred to statutes of repose in 26 decisions, some unpublished. A sampling of the published cases are: Kohnke v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 140 Wis. 2d 80, 85, 410 N.W.2d 585 (1987); Miller v. Kretz, 191 Wis. 2d 573, 583, 531 N.W.2d 93 (1995); and Guzman v. St. Francis Hosp., Inc., 2001 WI App 21, ¶ 18, 240 Wis. 2d 559, 623 N.W.2d 776 (followingAicher).

 The majority opinion counters this long-held assumption with the argument that there is no evidence that "legislative lingo" has included the term "statute of repose." See majority op. at ¶ 61. Apparently, that fact, if true, was immaterial to the majority in Aicher — much to Ame Aicher's detriment. Nonetheless, the majority opinion refers to two bills "that were unquestionably intended to create statutes of repose," but did not include that phrase. Majority op. at ¶ 61 n.14. However, neither of these bills, 1993 Assembly Bill 531 and 1991 Senate Bill 408, were enacted into law, so we have no way of knowing, clearly and unquestionably, what the legislature intended.

 Notably, Aicher is seen as one of the most important decisions from this court's 2000 term. See Daniel W. Hildebrand, 2000 Significant Court Decisions, Wisconsin Lawyer 18, 20 (June 2001). However, what seemed clear to the majority in Aicher — the difference between statutes of repose and statutes of limitations — is not so clear after the majority's opinion here today. This leaves the bench and bar, and legislature, at sea as *42to the distinction between statutes of repose and statutes of limitations.

 Aicher "adopt[ed] much of Justice Bradley's dissent in Makos" to overrule Estate of Makos v. Wisconsin Health Care Fund, 211 Wis. 2d 41, 564 N.W.2d 662 (1997) just three years after that decision. See Aicher, 2000 WI 98, ¶ 40. Regardless of what the concurrence may think that Aicher did to Makos (see concurring op. at ¶ 66), at least the majority in Aicher agreed that "our decision. . .expressly overrules Makos." Id. at ¶ 68. Indeed, the concurring opinion here presents the classic red herring. This case, and this dissent, are not Makos revisited. Rather, they are about a majority saying that statutes of repose and statutes of limitations are different one year, and then saying the next year, no, they are not. A metaphor, even a mixed one, cannot make a dissenting opinion something it is not. The debate in regard to Article I, Section 9 of the Wisconsin Constitution is left for another day.

 The majority claims that it examines Black’s Law Dictionary because the court of appeals relied upon it. Majority op. at ¶ 27. However, the court of appeals refers to Black's in an introductory footnote. See Landis v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Wis., 2000 WI App 164, ¶ 5 n.4, 238 N.W.2d 190, 616 N.W.2d 910. It does not rely upon Black's for its analysis. Nonetheless, the distinction that the court of appeals makes between statutes of repose and statutes of limitations, is the same as the distinction this court made in Aicher .See Landis, 2000 WI App 164, ¶¶ 5,6. Perhaps, if Aicher had been decided prior to the court of appeals decision below, the court of appeals would have relied upon it. It is also noteworthy that here, as well as before the court of appeals, the parties did not assert that the term "statute of limitations" in Wis. Stat. § 655.44(4) was ambiguous. Landis, 2000 WI App 164, ¶ 8. Only the majority, using subtle differences in various editions of Black's, finds the term ambiguous.

 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.55(l)(b) was enacted in 1979, effective July 1, 1980. Ch. 323, Laws of 1979. Section 655.04 was enacted earlier, in 1975. Ch. 37, Laws of 1975 (see majority op. at ¶ 47.) The statute of limitations that § 655.04 would have tolled was § 893.205. (The same law that enacted § 893.55(l)(b) amended and renumbered § 893.205 as § 893.54. Ch. 323, Laws of 1979.) Section 893.205 provided that "[a]n action to recover damages for injuries to the person for such injuries sustained on and after July 1,1955...." must be brought within three years after the cause of action accrued. Rod v. Farrell, 96 Wis. 2d 349, 350 — 51, 291 N.W.2d 568 (1980) (overruled in part by Hansen v. A.H. Robins, Inc., 113 Wis. 2d 550,335 N.W.2d 578 (1983)). This statute of limitations was tied to the accrual of the cause of action (see id. at 351, n.3), and did not include a statute of repose, like § 893.55(l)(b) does.

 The author of this dissent has previously called into question the constitutionality of the statute of repose in Wis. Stat. § 893.55(l)(b) where the statute foreclosed a remedy for an injury before that injury had even been discovered. See, e.g., Aicher, 2000 WI 98, ¶¶ 86-92 (Crooks, J., dissenting, joined by Bablitch, J.); see also Makos, 211 Wis. 2d at 59-68 (the application of the statute of repose in § 893.55(l)(b) violates Article I, Section 9 of the Wisconsin Constitution insofar as it deprives one of the right to a remedy) (Crooks, J., concurring with the lead opinion by J. Steinmetz as to Article I, Section 9). Justice Bablitch, joined by Justice Wilcox, concurred with the majority in Makos based upon the language in Wis. Stat. § 893.55. 211 Wis. 2d at 55-59. Justice Wilcox also joined the majority in Aicher. However, Justice Wilcox joins this dissent because the real error here is the misapplication of Aicher, not the foreclosure of a remedy before the injury is discovered.