Court Opinion

ID: 9943791
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-26 14:37:20.987282+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:44:51.511634
License: Public Domain

I agree with the majority in all respects save for that portion of the opinion which implies that an appearing party forfeits his status as a party litigant when he fails to show up for trial. (See ante, p. 621.) In my view, there may be many reasons why a party, after paying the necessary filing fee to answer a complaint, may prefer to absent himself from the courthouse. The emoluments of a party litigant, i.e., one who has paid the necessary fee to appear in the action or who is excused from the payment of that fee, should include the right to avoid the expense of appearing in court for the sole purpose of rejecting a tendered stipulation for the appointment of a temporary judge.
Sarracino v. Superior Court (1974) 13 Cal.3d 1
[118 Cal.Rptr. 21, 529 P.2d 53], relied upon by the majority, does not involve an appearing party. The holding is limited to a defaulting party who later filed his pleadings. (Id., at pp. 8-9.) Bill Benson Motors, Inc. v. Macmorris Sales Corp.
(1965) 238 Cal.App.2d Supp. 937 [48 Cal.Rptr. 123], is not binding precedent on the issue of forfeiture because it was decided by the appellate department of the superior court on unique facts with its holding resting on alternative grounds. InBenson, frustrated by the court's refusal to continue the case for more than two hours, appellant's counsel said he was leaving the courthouse. The appellate department of the superior court in very careful language said, "We conclude that the phrase `parties litigant or their attorneys of record' does not include parties or attorneys who wilfully remain away from the trial of a case as appellants and their counsel did in this case. This being a civil case, they cannot be held in contempt, but there is no injustice in ruling that they waive their rights to object to the appointment of the Commissioner *Page 626 
as a judge pro tempore in this case by their wilful absence." (Italics supplied.)
"Wilful" in the context of Benson involves more than a voluntary absence. It connotes behavior which is not justifiable under circumstances where the court was unable to hold either counsel or his client in contempt. Accordingly, it concluded a reasonable sanction for this disrespectful behavior was a loss of that party's right to have the case heard by a judge.
The respectful difference of opinion which I may have with the majority on the question of when a party litigant may forfeit his status becomes irrelevant in this case.
Chisholm never became a party litigant in the superior court. Although he paid his appearance fee to file an answer to cross-complain in the municipal court, he did nothing in the superior court. After obtaining an order for transfer in the municipal court, he failed, after repeated requests, to pay the sum necessary to effect the transfer. It is unnecessary to characterize his motive for, in failing to pay the necessary premium, a modest charge which he solicited and obtained through his successful motion, he never became a party litigant in the superior court. Accordingly, because his stipulation to a temporary judge was unnecessary, I agree with the result reached by the majority. *Page 627