Court Opinion

ID: 9955139
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-27 18:14:00.269515+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:17.031042
License: Public Domain

03/27/2024
                 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
                             AT NASHVILLE
                           Assigned on Briefs November 1, 2023

                                 IN RE KATELYN R. ET AL.

                   Appeal from the Juvenile Court for Overton County
                       No. 21-JV-74       Daryl A. Colson, Judge
                        ___________________________________

                              No. M2023-00354-COA-R3-PT
                          ___________________________________

The Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) removed two children from their parents’
custody in May of 2020. After a long period in which DCS did not hear from the children’s
father, and the father made no progress on his permanency plan, DCS filed a petition to
terminate the father’s parental rights. Following a bench trial, the Juvenile Court for
Overton County (the “juvenile court”) found that DCS proved five statutory grounds for
termination of the father’s parental rights by clear and convincing evidence. The juvenile
court also found, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of the father’s parental
rights was in the children’s best interests. The father appeals and, discerning no error, we
affirm.

  Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Juvenile Court Affirmed

KRISTI M. DAVIS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ANDY D. BENNETT, J.,
and J. STEVEN STAFFORD, P.J, W.S., joined.

Kelly R. Williams, Livingston, Tennessee, for the appellant, Nathaniel R.1

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Andrée Sophia Blumstein, Solicitor
General; Amber L. Barker, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Jessica Krebs, Assistant
General Counsel, for the appellee, Tennessee Department of Children’s Services.

       1
         This Court has a policy of abbreviating the last names of children and other parties in cases
involving termination of parental rights in order to protect their privacy and identities.
                                                OPINION

                                             BACKGROUND

       This is a termination of parental rights case. Nathaniel R. (“Father”) is the father of
Hailey R. and Katelyn R. (the “Children”), both of whom were removed from their
parents’2 custody by DCS in May of 2020. DCS received a referral about the Children on
May 6, 2020, alleging lack of supervision, physical abuse, and psychological harm. A DCS
case worker visited Father’s home the same day and spoke privately with Hailey R. Hailey
R. told the case worker, inter alia, that

        [Father] hit [Mother] in the face and the arm with his fist. [Mother] ran
        outside to get away from [Father]. Hailey tried to run after [Mother] and
        Katelyn grabbed Hailey for [Father], and then [Father] put Hailey in a head
        lock. [Father] pulled Hailey’s arms backwards and Hailey could hardly talk.
        [Father] told Hailey that he was going to stab her. Hailey said that [Father]
        had a knife on his side, but he did not pull it out. Hailey broke loose and ran[]
        to [Mother].

       Hailey R. also reported to the case worker that both parents were using drugs. The
case worker observed that the family’s trailer was “in shambles[,]” smelled of cigarettes,
and had no running water. The property manager also spoke with the case worker on May
6, 2020, claiming that men would come and go from the trailer in the middle of the night.
He also confirmed seeing Father put Hailey R. in a headlock while holding one arm behind
her back. The property manager explained that he served Father with an eviction notice,
but the eviction proceeding was on hold due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Father was
charged with child abuse in the Overton County General Sessions Court on May 6, 2020.

       Based on the foregoing, DCS alleged that the Children were dependent and
neglected in Father’s care. The juvenile court entered a protective custody order bringing
the Children into DCS custody on May 7, 2020. The juvenile court appointed a guardian
ad litem for the Children and ordered that any visitation with the parents be supervised. A
preliminary hearing was held on June 3, 2020, after which the juvenile court entered an
order finding probable cause that the Children’s removal was necessary, that there was no
less drastic alternative to removing the Children from the parents’ custody, and that the
Children would remain in DCS custody. The June 3, 2020 order also required both parents
to pass two unannounced drug screens prior to any visitation being set. The juvenile court
then held an adjudicatory hearing on August 5, 2020, for which Father failed to appear. In
an order entered August 5, 2020, the juvenile court determined, by clear and convincing
evidence, that the Children were dependent and neglected in Father’s care. On the same

        2
          The Children’s mother surrendered her parental rights in the juvenile court and is not participating
in this appeal. The mother is mentioned in this opinion only for context.

                                                    -2-
day, the juvenile court ratified the first Family Permanency Plan. The plan required Father
to pass any drug screens given by DCS; attend an alcohol and drug assessment; undergo a
mental health assessment; secure a safe means of transportation and home; attend four
hours per month of supervised visitation; secure a legal means of income; and attend
parenting classes.3

         Father failed the drug screens administered by DCS in 2020. According to
testimony from trial, Father failed a drug screen on June 1, 2020, testing positive for
methamphetamine, THC, and Suboxone. Father failed another drug screen on July 1, 2020,
again testing positive for methamphetamine and THC. He also incurred new criminal
charges. Father was cited for possessing Subutex4 on August 29, 2020, and was charged
with driving under the influence on November 30, 2020. The arresting officer on the DUI
found Father parked in the middle of the road, and, according to the warrant, Father was in
possession of a “meth pipe” and “snort straw” containing white powder residue. On
December 22, 2020, the Children’s case worker, Ms. Vaughn, contacted Father while he
was incarcerated in Overton County and gave him a case update. The case worker testified
at trial that she gave Father her contact information and instructed him to contact her upon
his release.

        In January of 2021, Ms. Vaughn again contacted the jail in which Father had been
held. However, Father had been released. Ms. Vaughn was unable to locate Father after
that point, and there is little to no information in the record about Father’s whereabouts or
activities after December of 2020. The Children remained in foster care, and, on July 26,
2021, DCS filed its petition to terminate Father’s parental rights. As grounds for
termination, DCS alleged 1) abandonment by failure to support; 2) abandonment by failure
to visit; 3) abandonment by failure to establish a suitable home; 4) substantial
noncompliance with permanency plan; 5) persistence of conditions; 6) failure to establish
parentage as to Hailey R.; and 7) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume
custody. DCS also alleged that termination of Father’s parental rights was in both
Children’s best interests. Father did not answer the petition.

         Trial was held on October 19, 2022; November 9, 2022; and January 18, 2023. The
transcript from October 19, 2022 reflects that Father failed to appear at trial but that his
counsel was there. Father called the morning of trial and asked that the matter be continued.
The juvenile court denied this request and proceeded with the hearing. The proof presented
at trial largely centered around the Children’s mother, who had not yet surrendered her

        3
         The juvenile court ratified several permanency plans regarding Father throughout this case;
however, as Father never completed the action steps, the requirements of the various plans remained largely
unchanged.
        4
         It is unclear from the record whether Father had a prescription for the Subutex. See Tenn. Code
Ann. §§ 53-11-311(c); 39-17-410 (categorizing Buprenorphine as a Schedule III controlled substance).

                                                   -3-
rights and was more involved in the case than Father. She ultimately surrendered her rights
on the last day of trial. Ms. Vaughn testified that she had not seen or spoken to Father
since December of 2020 and that she would not recognize Father if she saw him in person.
She testified that while Father began an intensive outpatient program in July of 2020, he
was quickly discharged for failure to comply. Other than the failed attempt at the IOP,
Father had not completed any action steps in the permanency plan by the time of trial.

       The juvenile court entered a final order terminating Father’s parental rights on
February 15, 2023, finding that DCS proved five statutory grounds by clear and convincing
evidence: 1) abandonment by failure to establish a suitable home; 2) persistence of
conditions; 3) failure to establish parentage as to Hailey R. only; 4) substantial
noncompliance with the permanency plan; and 5) failure to manifest an ability and
willingness to assume custody. The juvenile court also found that it was in both Children’s
best interests to terminate Father’s parental rights. Father appealed to this Court.

                                           ISSUES

       Father raises two issues on appeal, which we reorder and slightly restate:

       I. Whether the juvenile court’s final order contains sufficient findings of fact
regarding the statutory grounds for termination.

        II. Whether the juvenile court erred in concluding that terminating Father’s parental
rights is in the children’s best interests.

       While not raised as an issue by Father, we must also review whether the juvenile
court correctly determined that DCS proved the alleged statutory grounds for termination
by clear and convincing evidence. See In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d 507 (Tenn. 2016).

                                  STANDARD OF REVIEW

               A parent’s right to the care and custody of her child is among the
       oldest of the judicially recognized fundamental liberty interests protected by
       the Due Process Clauses of the federal and state constitutions. Troxel v.
       Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000); Stanley
       v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651, 92 S. Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972); In re
       Angela E., 303 S.W.3d 240, 250 (Tenn. 2010); In re Adoption of Female
       Child, 896 S.W.2d 546, 547–48 (Tenn. 1995); Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d
       573, 578–79 (Tenn. 1993). But parental rights, although fundamental and
       constitutionally protected, are not absolute. In re Angela E., 303 S.W.3d at
       250. “‘[T]he [S]tate as parens patriae has a special duty to protect minors....’
       Tennessee law, thus, upholds the [S]tate’s authority as parens patriae when
       interference with parenting is necessary to prevent serious harm to a child.”

                                            -4-
       Hawk, 855 S.W.2d at 580 (quoting In re Hamilton, 657 S.W.2d 425, 429
       (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983)); see also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747, 102
       S. Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982); In re Angela E., 303 S.W.3d at 250.

In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d at 521–22. Tennessee Code Annotated section
36-1-113(g) provides the various statutory grounds for terminating parental rights. “A
person seeking to terminate parental rights must prove both the existence of one of the
statutory grounds for termination and that termination is in the child’s best interest.” In re
Jacobe M.J., 434 S.W.3d 565, 568 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2013) (citing Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 36-1-113(c)).

       Considering the substantial interests at stake in termination proceedings, the
heightened standard of clear and convincing evidence applies. In re Carrington H., 483
S.W.3d at 522 (citing Santosky, 455 U.S. at 769). This heightened burden “minimizes the
risk of unnecessary or erroneous governmental interference with fundamental parental
rights” and “enables the fact-finder to form a firm belief or conviction regarding the truth
of the facts[.]” Id. (citing In re Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d 586, 596 (Tenn. 2010)). “The
clear-and-convincing-evidence standard ensures that the facts are established as highly
probable, rather than as simply more probable than not.” Id. (citing In re Audrey S., 182
S.W.3d 838, 861 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005)). Accordingly, the standard of review in
termination of parental rights cases is as follows:

       An appellate court reviews a trial court’s findings of fact in termination
       proceedings using the standard of review in Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d). In re
       Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d at 596; In re Angela E., 303 S.W.3d at 246. Under
       Rule 13(d), appellate courts review factual findings de novo on the record
       and accord these findings a presumption of correctness unless the evidence
       preponderates otherwise. In re Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d at 596; In re M.L.P.,
       281 S.W.3d 387, 393 (Tenn. 2009); In re Adoption of A.M.H., 215 S.W.3d
       793, 809 (Tenn. 2007). In light of the heightened burden of proof in
       termination proceedings, however, the reviewing court must make its own
       determination as to whether the facts, either as found by the trial court or as
       supported by a preponderance of the evidence, amount to clear and
       convincing evidence of the elements necessary to terminate parental rights.
       In re Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d at 596–97. The trial court’s ruling that the
       evidence sufficiently supports termination of parental rights is a conclusion
       of law, which appellate courts review de novo with no presumption of
       correctness. In re M.L.P., 281 S.W.3d at 393 (quoting In re Adoption of
       A.M.H., 215 S.W.3d at 810). Additionally, all other questions of law in
       parental termination appeals, as in other appeals, are reviewed de novo with
       no presumption of correctness. In re Angela E., 303 S.W.3d at 246.

In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d at 523–24.

                                            -5-
                                        DISCUSSION

Sufficiency of juvenile court’s final order

       Father contends that the juvenile court’s findings of facts and conclusions of law are
insufficient. A trial court is required to enter written findings of fact and conclusions of
law following a termination of parental rights trial. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(k)
(providing that “[t]he court shall enter an order that makes specific findings of fact and
conclusions of law within thirty (30) days of the conclusion of the hearing”); see also Tenn.
R. Civ. P. 52.01 (“In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury, the court shall find the
facts specially and shall state separately its conclusions of law and direct the entry of the
appropriate judgment.”). As we recently explained, this mandate

       “reflects the General Assembly’s understanding that findings of fact and
       conclusions of law facilitate appellate review and promote the just and
       speedy resolution of appeals.” In re Adoption of Muir, No. M2002-02963-
       COA-R3-CV, 2003 WL 22794524, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2003).
       These written findings allow the court to review the record de novo; yet
       “[w]ithout such findings and conclusions, this court is left to wonder on what
       basis the court reached its ultimate decision.” In re M.E.W., No. M2003-
       01739-COA-R3-PT, 2004 WL 865840, at *19 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 21,
       2004).

In re Jayla S., No. M2022-01492-COA-R3-PT, 2023 WL 5767630, at *11 (Tenn. Ct. App.
Sept. 7, 2023). “There is no bright-line test by which to assess the sufficiency of factual
findings, but the findings of fact must include as much of the subsidiary facts as is
necessary to disclose to the reviewing court the steps by which the trial court reached its
ultimate conclusion on each factual issue.” In re Kayden A., No. W2020-00650-COA-R3-
PT, 2021 WL 408860, at *14 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 5, 2021) (quoting In re O.W., No.
W2019-01127-COA-R3-PT, 2020 WL 97727, at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2020)).

       Here, we take no issue with the juvenile court’s order. The juvenile court’s steps in
reaching its ultimate conclusion are clear. As DCS notes in its brief, the juvenile court
“makes numerous factual findings[,]” and “then makes conclusions of law under the
applicable grounds and best-interest factors, which incorporates its previous factual
findings.” We agree with DCS that In re Jayla S. is persuasive here. In that case, the trial
court “made numerous and specific written findings of fact, which it incorporated in its
analysis. . . .” 2023 WL 5767630, at *11. We determined that the final order was sufficient,
noting that “the grounds [for termination] are cumulative and nonexclusive, so that listing
conditions, acts or omissions in one ground does not prevent them from coming within
another ground. . . .” Id. (quoting Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)).

                                              -6-
        Further, as discussed later in this opinion, Father simply has not participated in this
case. He attempted one of his action steps in the summer of 2020 but lost contact with
DCS shortly thereafter. He did not appear at the adjudicatory hearing, did not file anything
in the termination proceedings, and did not appear at trial. While his counsel appeared and
cross-examined some witnesses, Father essentially put on zero proof at trial. Consequently,
it is unsurprising that the factual findings as to Father are not detailed, as the juvenile court
had little information with which to work. Accordingly, we are unpersuaded that the final
order is insufficient.

Grounds for termination5

       As noted above, the juvenile court’s order starts with factual findings that apply to
the various grounds for termination, which it then lists after the findings of fact. It is thus
prudent to quote those findings of fact before addressing the five statutory grounds:

        The Court finds that [Father] has been represented by competent counsel
        from the inception of this case. However, [Father] has not availed himself of
        counsel’s ability, and in fact, has not made very many appearances in court
        pertaining to these two children.

        Upon the petition, the evidence presented, arguments of counsel, exhibits and
        the entire record, the Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the
        Petition to Terminate Parental Rights of the Respondent, [Father], as filed by
        the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services, is well taken and should
        be GRANTED and relief granted thereunder. The Court found all of the
        State’s witnesses to be credible.

        The Court finds that Katelyn [R.] . . . and Hailey [R.] . . . were brought before
        the Juvenile Court of Overton County on May 7, 2020, and that these children
        were brought into the protective supervision and custody of the Court due to
        issues of domestic violence, substance abuse, and potential lack of housing
        as exhibited by their parents at that time.

        The Court made findings on August 5, 2020, that the children were to be
        adjudicated dependent and neglected children based upon those facts
        outlined in the department’s petition. The Court adopts and incorporates all
        of those findings from the Court’s previous orders in the dependency and
        neglect file, specifically the order dated August 5, 2020, in which the Court
        finds the specific facts that led to the Court to conclude that the children were

        5
          With all statutory grounds for termination, we apply the version of Tennessee Code Annotated
section 36-1-113 in effect on the day the petition for termination was filed, in this case, July 26, 2021. See
In re Braxton M., 531 S.W.3d 708, 732 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2017).

                                                    -7-
in fact dependent and neglected. The Court notes that this Order is a final
order and was not appealed, therefore it is res judicata.

The Court further finds that since the entry of that order, that [Father] has
availed himself of very little services offered by the Department of
Children’s Services. The Court finds that the testimony of Jenna Vaughn was
that [Father], as testified to by her, had drug Hailey [R.] through the house
by her hair. The Court finds that, as testified to by Ms. Vaughn, that there
was substance abuse and domestic violence in the home. The Court finds that
one year after the children had been removed from the parents that [Father]
continued to have problems with substances[.]

*      *      *

The Court finds that, as testified to by [Ms.] Vaughn, that [Father] tested
positive for Suboxone, THC, and methamphetamine, and continued to use
those substances. [Father] was discharged from IOP, a substance abuse
treatment program, for noncompliance in July of 2020. [Father] stopped
communicating with the Department around that time.

The Court finds as a fact as testified to by Ms. Vaughn, that [Father] has not
engaged in any parenting classes, has not addressed his housing situation,
and has not successfully completed any drug treatment or domestic violence
counseling or any of the requirements under his foster care permanency plan.
The Court finds that all of these issues that existed at the time of the removal
have been unaddressed by [Father].

The Court finds, as a fact, that [Father] has done nothing to change the
circumstances which led to his children’s removal from his custody. The
Court notes that Ms. Vaughn testified that she is not even certain she could
identify [Father] if he were to be in the courtroom today because of such little
contact that she has had with [Father]. The Court finds that Hailey [R.] is the
biological child of [Father]; however, [Father] has not availed himself or
established paternity, as required by the statutes. The Court finds as a fact
that Hailey [R.] has indicated that she is afraid of [Father] and does not want
to be with [Father]. The Court finds as a fact that Katelyn [R.], likewise, does
not wish to be reunited with [Father].

The Court finds as a fact that [Father] has not shown proof that he has
adequate and sufficient housing or has addressed any of the issues that have
led to the children’s removal. The children have remained in foster care for
975 days as of today.

                                     -8-
      The Court finds as a fact, as was testified to by Ms. Vaughn, that they have
      identified a potential adoptive home for the children; and that placement is
      undergoing training for that process. It is possible that these children will
      have some permanency in their lives.

       Following these findings, the juvenile court listed its conclusions of law as to the
various statutory grounds, beginning with abandonment. We address each ground in turn.

      A. Abandonment by failure to establish a suitable home

      Among other circumstances, abandonment occurs when

      (ii)(a) The child has been removed from the home or the physical or legal
      custody of a parent or parents or guardian or guardians by a court order at
      any stage of proceedings in which a petition has been filed in the juvenile
      court alleging that a child is a dependent and neglected child, and the child
      was placed in the custody of the department or a licensed child-placing
      agency;

      (b) The juvenile court found, or the court where the termination of parental
      rights petition is filed finds, that the department or a licensed child-placing
      agency made reasonable efforts to prevent removal of the child or that the
      circumstances of the child’s situation prevented reasonable efforts from
      being made prior to the child’s removal; and

      (c) For a period of four (4) months following the physical removal, the
      department or agency made reasonable efforts to assist the parent or parents
      or the guardian or guardians to establish a suitable home for the child, but
      that the parent or parents or the guardian or guardians have not made
      reciprocal reasonable efforts to provide a suitable home and have
      demonstrated a lack of concern for the child to such a degree that it appears
      unlikely that they will be able to provide a suitable home for the child at an
      early date. The efforts of the department or agency to assist a parent or
      guardian in establishing a suitable home for the child shall be found to be
      reasonable if such efforts equal or exceed the efforts of the parent or guardian
      toward the same goal, when the parent or guardian is aware that the child is
      in the custody of the department[.]

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(ii).

       With this ground, we “consider[] whether a child has a suitable home to return to
after the child’s court-ordered removal from the parent.” In re Adaleigh M., No.
E2019-01955-COA-R3-PT, 2021 WL 1219818, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2021). A

                                           -9-
suitable home requires “‘more than a proper physical living location.’” In re Daniel B.,
No. E2019-01063-COA-R3-PT, 2020 WL 3955703, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 10, 2020)
(quoting Tenn. Dep’t of Children’s Servs. v. C.W., No. E2007-00561-COA-R3-PT, 2007
WL 4207941, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 29, 2007)). A suitable home entails
“[a]ppropriate care and attention” for the child and “must be free from drugs.” In re
Matthew T., 2016 WL 1621076, at *7 (citing In re Hannah H., No. E2013-01211-COA-
R3-PT, 2014 WL 2587397, at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 10, 2014)). DCS must make
“reasonable efforts” to assist the parent by doing more than merely providing a list of
service providers. Id. DCS “should utilize its superior resources in assisting with the
establishment of a suitable home, but [those] ‘efforts do not need to be Herculean.’” In re
Jamarcus K., No. M2021-01171-COA-R3-PT, 2022 WL 3755383, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App.
Aug. 30, 2022) (quoting In re Hannah H., 2014 WL 2587397, at *9). Sole responsibility
does not lie with DCS, and “[p]arents must also make reasonable efforts towards achieving
the goals established by the permanency plan to remedy the conditions leading to the
removal of the child.” Id.

        The juvenile court found that DCS proved this ground for termination by clear and
convincing evidence, and we agree. It is undisputed that DCS removed the Children from
Father’s custody. The juvenile court adjudicated them dependent and neglected and placed
them in DCS custody where they remained at the time of trial. Following the Children’s
removal, Ms. Vaughn assisted Father with getting into an IOP and provided drug screens
to Father. She also contacted Father while he was incarcerated in December of 2020 and
updated him on the case. Ms. Vaughn looked for Father again in January of 2021 and in
June of 2021, but to no avail.6 See In re Matthew T., 2016 WL 1621076, at *9 (“A suitable
home is more than a physical space, but an appropriate physical space is necessary
nonetheless, and it is important for the Department to know the location of that space in
order to determine if it is adequate.”).

       Under the circumstances, DCS’s efforts were at least equal to, if not in excess of,
Father’s efforts at reunification. Further, Father did not establish a suitable home for the
Children because he did not address his substance abuse issues and completed no action
steps in the permanency plan. Consequently, the issues rendering Father’s original home
unsuitable, namely substance abuse and domestic violence, had not been addressed at the
time of trial. And a suitable home is one free from drugs and domestic violence. In re
Navada N., 498 S.W.3d 579, 595 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2016).

      Accordingly, we agree with the juvenile court that DCS proved this ground for
termination by clear and convincing evidence.

        6
          An “Affidavit of Reasonable Efforts” contained in the record provides that Ms. Vaughn conducted
a diligent search for both parents in June of 2021.

                                                 - 10 -
       B. Substantial noncompliance with permanency plan

        The next ground found by the juvenile court was substantial noncompliance with
the permanency plan. Parental rights may be terminated for “substantial noncompliance
by the parent . . . with the statement of responsibilities in a permanency plan.” Tenn. Code
Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(2). This determination entails “more than merely counting up the tasks
in the plan to determine whether a certain number have been completed.” In re Carrington
H., 483 S.W.3d at 537 (citing In re Valentine, 79 S.W.3d 539, 547 (Tenn. 2002)).

        The requirements of a permanency plan must be “reasonable and related to
remedying the conditions that caused the child to be removed from the parent’s custody in
the first place.” In re M.J.B., 140 S.W.3d 643, 656 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) (citing In re
Valentine, 79 S.W.3d at 547; In re L.J.C., 124 S.W.3d 609, 621 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003)).
DCS must establish “that the parent’s noncompliance is substantial in light of the degree
of noncompliance and the importance of the particular requirement that has not been met.”
In re M.J.B., 140 S.W.3d at 656 (citations omitted).

       Here, the juvenile court found that no aspects of the permanency plan were
completed, and the record does not preponderate against that finding. The only action step
Father attempted was to enter the IOP, from which he was quickly discharged for failing
to attend and for noncompliance. Father also continued to incur criminal charges during
the custodial period. See In re Nevaeh K., No. E2023-01106-COA-R3-PT, 2024 WL
837943, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 28, 2024) (terminating mother’s parental rights for
substantial noncompliance where the “[m]other’s drug-related criminal activity did not
cease in response to the permanency plans and eventually led to her incarceration”). Ms.
Vaughn testified at trial that Father never completed any other steps from his plan, and,
given his absence from trial, Father put on no proof otherwise. Thus, the juvenile court
correctly found, by clear and convincing evidence, that Father’s parental rights should be
terminated for substantial noncompliance with his permanency plan.

       C. Persistence of conditions

      Next, the juvenile court terminated Father’s parental rights pursuant to Tennessee
Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(3). Section (g)(3) provides that termination can occur
when

       [t]he child has been removed from the home or the physical or legal custody
       of a parent or guardian for a period of six (6) months by a court order entered
       at any stage of proceedings in which a petition has been filed in the juvenile
       court alleging that a child is a dependent and neglected child, and:

       (i) The conditions that led to the child’s removal still persist, preventing the
       child’s safe return to the care of the parent or guardian, or other conditions

                                            - 11 -
      exist that, in all reasonable probability, would cause the child to be subjected
      to further abuse or neglect, preventing the child’s safe return to the care of
      the parent or guardian;

      (ii) There is little likelihood that these conditions will be remedied at an early
      date so that the child can be safely returned to the parent or guardian in the
      near future; and

      (iii) The continuation of the parent or guardian and child relationship greatly
      diminishes the child’s chances of early integration into a safe, stable, and
      permanent home[.]

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3)(A).

      As we have previously explained:

      “A parent’s continued inability to provide fundamental care to a child, even
      if not willful, . . . constitutes a condition which prevents the safe return of the
      child to the parent’s care.” In re A.R., No. W2008-00558-COA-R3-PT, 2008
      WL 4613576, at *20 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 13, 2008) (citing In re T.S. & M.S.,
      No. M1999-01286-COA-R3-CV, 2000 WL 964775, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App.
      July 13, 2000)). The failure to remedy the conditions which led to the
      removal need not be willful. In re T.S. & M.S., 2000 WL 964775, at
      *6 (citing State Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Smith, 785 S.W.2d 336, 338 (Tenn.
      1990)). “Where . . . efforts to provide help to improve the parenting ability,
      offered over a long period of time, have proved ineffective, the conclusion
      [ ] that there is little likelihood of such improvement as would allow the safe
      return of the child to the parent in the near future is justified.” Id. The purpose
      behind the “persistence of conditions” ground for terminating parental rights
      is “to prevent the child’s lingering in the uncertain status of foster child if a
      parent cannot within a reasonable time demonstrate an ability to provide a
      safe and caring environment for the child.” In re A.R., [2008 WL 4613576,
      at *20] (quoting In re D.C.C., No. M2007-01094-COA-R3-PT, 2008 WL
      588535, at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 3, 2008)).

In re Navada N., 498 S.W.3d at 605–06.

        Here, the Children were removed from Father’s custody more than two years prior
to trial and were adjudicated dependent and neglected on August 5, 2020. The first prong
of section 36-1-113(g)(3) is thus satisfied. The major conditions underpinning the
Children’s removal were Father’s substance abuse and domestic violence in the family
home. The juvenile court found that these conditions persisted at the time of trial, and we
agree. The scant information we have about Father shows that he continued to abuse drugs

                                            - 12 -
and incur criminal charges during the custodial period. Moreover, because he stopped
contacting his case worker, she was unable to facilitate Father’s domestic violence classes
or additional drug treatment. Insofar as the Children were in foster care for over two years
by the time of trial, with almost zero effort by Father to remedy these conditions, there is
little likelihood these conditions can be remedied any time soon. On the record before us,
Father has made no effort to even have a relationship with the Children, much less remedy
the persistent conditions necessitating their removal. As such, the continuation of any
involvement by Father diminishes the Children’s opportunity for integration into a safe and
stable home.

      Consequently, the juvenile court correctly concluded that Father’s parental rights
should be terminated due to persistence of conditions.

       D. Failure to establish paternity7

      Next, the juvenile court terminated Father’s parental rights to Hailey R. pursuant to
Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(9)(A)(v), which provides:

       (9)(A) The parental rights of any person who, at the time of the filing of a
       petition to terminate the parental rights of such person, or if no such petition
       is filed, at the time of the filing of a petition to adopt a child, is the putative
       father of the child may also be terminated based upon any one (1) or more of
       the following additional grounds:

       *         *       *

       (v) The person has failed to file a petition to establish paternity of the child
       within thirty (30) days after notice of alleged paternity, or as required
       in § 36-2-318(j), or after making a claim of paternity pursuant
       to § 36-1-117(c)(2)[.]

       At the outset, we note the confusion amongst various panels of this Court regarding
which grounds for termination apply to putative fathers. The dispute stems from our
Supreme Court’s opinion in In re Bernard T., in which the Court held that the grounds for
termination found at section 36-1-113(g)(9) “cannot be used to terminate the rights of a
person who is a child’s biological parent, legal parent, or putative biological father at the
time the termination petition is filed.” 319 S.W.3d 586, 599 (Tenn. 2010). While In re
Bernard T. has never been judicially overturned, our General Assembly later amended
section 36-1-113(g)(9)(A) to provide that the additional grounds in that subsection may
also be applied to terminate the rights of putative fathers. However, In re Bernard T. also
“explicitly held that, where any of the section 36-1-113(g)(9)(A) grounds are applicable,

       7
           This ground applies only to Hailey R.

                                                   - 13 -
the grounds in section 36-1-113(g)(1) through section 36-1-113(g)(8) are inapplicable.” In
re E.C., No. E2016-02582-COA-R3-PT, 2017 WL 2438574, at *10 (Tenn. Ct. App. June
6, 2017) (citing In re Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d at 604); see also In re Jase P., No.
E2016-02519-COA-R3-PT, 2017 WL 2672781, at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 21, 2017)
(“Under In re Bernard T., where any grounds under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(9)(A)
are applicable, grounds from Section 36-1-113(g)(1) through Section 36-1-113(g)(8) are
inapplicable. This holding, of course, was before the recent legislative amendments to the
statutes.”).

        As we explained in In re Jase P., “this Court has not been entirely consistent in our
application of Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(9)(A), whether before or after the March
2016 legislative amendments.” 2017 WL 2672781, at *8. In In re Jase P., for example,
the father’s parental rights were terminated based upon statutory grounds found in
subsection (g)(9)(A), as well as abandonment by wanton disregard, which is not a putative
father ground. 2017 WL 2672781, at *9–10. On the other hand, in “In re Candice H., No.
M2016-02305-COA-R3-PT, 2017 WL 2365008, at *11 n.6 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 31, 2017)
. . . we accepted DCS’s concession that In re Bernard T. was binding precedent and that
the father in that case was a putative biological father not liable to having his parental rights
terminated by Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(9)(A) in keeping with the holding of In re
Bernard T.” Id. at *8.

       Ultimately, we agree with the In re Jase P. court that Father’s parental rights may
be terminated pursuant to statutory grounds found both at section 36-1-113(g)(1)-(8), as
well as section 36-1-113(g)(9)(A). See id. at *9 (“[W]e affirm all of the grounds found for
termination, and so even if we err with respect to finding wanton disregard applicable, the
outcome is the same.”); see also In re Hannah C., No. M2016-02052-COA-R3-PT, 2018
WL 558522 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 24, 2018) (terminating a father’s parental rights pursuant
to both Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(1) and section 36-1-113(g)(9)(A)).
Indeed, the plain language of section 36-1-113(g)(9)(A) provides that these grounds are
“additional” and “may also” be applied to putative fathers. To the extent that the grounds
found in subsections 36-1-113(g)(1)-(8) do not apply at all to putative fathers, the terms
“may also” and “additional” make little sense. Nonetheless, we echo the sentiment
expressed in In re Jase P. that “[t]his issue is another on which our Supreme Court could
provide clarity.” 2017 WL 2672781, at *9.

       Having determined that Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(9)(A)
applies to Father, we turn to the juvenile court’s findings. Pursuant to this ground, the
juvenile court found that Father did not meet the definition of legal parent or guardian as
to Hailey R. and that he failed to establish paternity as to that child.

       (A) “Legal parent” means:

       (i) The biological mother of a child;

                                             - 14 -
       (ii) A man who is or has been married to the biological mother of the child if
       the child was born during the marriage or within three hundred (300) days
       after the marriage was terminated for any reason, or if the child was born
       after a decree of separation was entered by a court;

       (iii) A man who attempted to marry the biological mother of the child before
       the child’s birth by a marriage apparently in compliance with the law, even
       if the marriage is declared invalid, if the child was born during the attempted
       marriage or within three hundred (300) days after the termination of the
       attempted marriage for any reason;

       (iv) A man who has been adjudicated to be the legal father of the child by
       any court or administrative body of this state or any other state or territory or
       foreign country or who has signed, pursuant to § 24-7-113, § 68-3-203(g),
       § 68-3-302, or § 68-3-305(b), an unrevoked and sworn acknowledgment of
       paternity under Tennessee law, or who has signed such a sworn
       acknowledgment pursuant to the law of any other state, territory, or foreign
       country; or

       (v) An adoptive parent of a child or adult[.]

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(29)(A). Among other things, a “guardian” is “a person or
entity appointed by a court to provide care, custody, control, supervision, and protection
for a child, and authorized by the court to adopt or consent to the adoption of the child as
a result of a surrender, parental consent, or termination of parental rights[.]” Tenn. Code
Ann. § 36-1-102(25)(A).

        Father does not dispute that he does not meet the definition of a legal parent as to
Hailey R., as he was not married to Hailey R.’s mother during the relevant periods. Nor
has he ever claimed to be her “guardian.” Rather, it is undisputed that Father is the putative
father of Hailey R., as he lived with her for years and held himself out as her father. Father
also entered into a permanency plan with DCS regarding Hailey R. See Tenn. Code Ann.
§§ 36-1-102(44); 36-1-117(c)(4), (5). Nonetheless, on the record before us, Father has
never taken steps to establish his parentage as to Hailey R. Accordingly, the ground of
failure to establish paternity as to Hailey R. is proven by clear and convincing evidence.

       E. Failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody

       The final ground for termination found by the juvenile court was failure to manifest
an ability and willingness to assume custody of the Children. This ground applies when:

                                            - 15 -
       [a] parent . . . has failed to manifest, by act or omission, an ability and
       willingness to personally assume legal and physical custody or financial
       responsibility of the child, and placing the child in the person’s legal and
       physical custody would pose a risk of substantial harm to the physical or
       psychological welfare of the child[.]

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(14). This ground requires clear and convincing proof of
two elements. In re Neveah M., 614 S.W.3d 659, 674 (Tenn. 2020). The petitioner must
first prove that the parent has failed to manifest an ability and willingness to personally
assume legal and physical custody or financial responsibility of the child. Id. The
petitioner must then prove that placing the child in the custody of the parent poses “a risk
of substantial harm to the physical or psychological welfare of the child.” Id. The statute
requires “a parent or guardian to manifest both an ability and willingness” to personally
assume legal and physical custody or financial responsibility for the child. Id. at 677.
Therefore, if a party seeking termination of parental rights establishes that a parent or
guardian “failed to manifest either ability or willingness, then the first prong of the statute
is satisfied.” Id.

       Regarding the second prong of section 36-1-113(g)(14),

       [t]he courts have not undertaken to define the circumstances that pose a risk
       of substantial harm to a child. These circumstances are not amenable to
       precise definition because of the variability of human conduct. However, the
       use of the modifier “substantial” indicates two things. First, it connotes a real
       hazard or danger that is not minor, trivial, or insignificant. Second, it
       indicates that the harm must be more than a theoretical possibility. While the
       harm need not be inevitable, it must be sufficiently probable to prompt a
       reasonable person to believe that the harm will occur more likely than not.

In re Jamarcus K., 2022 WL 3755383, at *14 (quoting In re Virgil W., No. E2018-00091-
COA-R3-PT, 2018 WL 4931470, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 11, 2018)).

        The juvenile court found that Father failed to manifest both the ability and
willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility for the Children. We agree.
Simply put, Father has put forth no effort to reunite with his Children. Aside from calling
to ask for a continuance the first day of trial, Father has not been involved in his Children’s
case since December of 2020. His substance abuse had not been addressed by the time of
trial, and, as far as his case worker knew, neither had any of the other issues underpinning
the Children’s removal. Consequently, we agree with the juvenile court that placing the
Children in Father’s custody poses a risk of substantial harm to the physical or
psychological welfare of the Children. This is particularly true for Hailey R., who bore the
brunt of Father’s physical abuse. According to Ms. Vaughn’s trial testimony, Hailey R.’s
relationship with Father “was very volatile[,]” and “Hailey is still dealing with the grief

                                            - 16 -
that that caused her and the trauma.” At different times, both Children have expressed to
providers that they do not wish to be placed back in Father’s custody. Under the
circumstances, particularly the absence of any countervailing proof offered by Father, there
is a risk of substantial harm to the Children’s physical and psychological welfare should
they be returned to Father’s custody. The juvenile court correctly determined that Father’s
parental rights should be terminated pursuant to section 36-1-113(g)(14).

Best Interests

       In addition to proving at least one statutory ground for termination, DCS must prove
by clear and convincing evidence that the Children’s best interests are served by
terminating Father’s parental rights. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(c). Indeed, “a finding
of unfitness does not necessarily require that the parent’s rights be terminated.” In re Marr,
194 S.W.3d 490, 498 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (citing White v. Moody, 171 S.W.3d 187
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2004)). Our termination statutes recognize that “[n]ot all parental
misconduct is irredeemable[,]” and that “terminating an unfit parent’s parental rights is not
always in the child’s best interests.” Id. As such, the focus of the best interests analysis is
not the parent but rather the child. Id.; see also White, 171 S.W.3d at 194 (“[A] child’s
best interests must be viewed from the child’s, rather than the parent’s, perspective.”).

       We look at twenty non-exhaustive factors when determining whether termination is
in a child’s best interests:

       (A) The effect a termination of parental rights will have on the child’s critical
       need for stability and continuity of placement throughout the child’s
       minority;

       (B) The effect a change of caretakers and physical environment is likely to
       have on the child’s emotional, psychological, and medical condition;

       (C) Whether the parent has demonstrated continuity and stability in meeting
       the child’s basic material, educational, housing, and safety needs;

       (D) Whether the parent and child have a secure and healthy parental
       attachment, and if not, whether there is a reasonable expectation that the
       parent can create such attachment;

       (E) Whether the parent has maintained regular visitation or other contact with
       the child and used the visitation or other contact to cultivate a positive
       relationship with the child;

       (F) Whether the child is fearful of living in the parent’s home;

                                            - 17 -
(G) Whether the parent, parent’s home, or others in the parent’s household
trigger or exacerbate the child’s experience of trauma or post-traumatic
symptoms;

(H) Whether the child has created a healthy parental attachment with another
person or persons in the absence of the parent;

(I) Whether the child has emotionally significant relationships with persons
other than parents and caregivers, including biological or foster siblings, and
the likely impact of various available outcomes on these relationships and
the child’s access to information about the child’s heritage;

(J) Whether the parent has demonstrated such a lasting adjustment of
circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it safe and beneficial for the
child to be in the home of the parent, including consideration of whether there
is criminal activity in the home or by the parent, or the use of alcohol,
controlled substances, or controlled substance analogues which may render
the parent unable to consistently care for the child in a safe and stable
manner;

(K) Whether the parent has taken advantage of available programs, services,
or community resources to assist in making a lasting adjustment of
circumstances, conduct, or conditions;

(L) Whether the department has made reasonable efforts to assist the parent
in making a lasting adjustment in cases where the child is in the custody of
the department;

(M) Whether the parent has demonstrated a sense of urgency in establishing
paternity of the child, seeking custody of the child, or addressing the
circumstance, conduct, or conditions that made an award of custody unsafe
and not in the child’s best interest;

(N) Whether the parent, or other person residing with or frequenting the
home of the parent, has shown brutality or physical, sexual, emotional, or
psychological abuse or neglect toward the child or any other child or adult;

(O) Whether the parent has ever provided safe and stable care for the child
or any other child;

(P) Whether the parent has demonstrated an understanding of the basic and
specific needs required for the child to thrive;

                                    - 18 -
       (Q) Whether the parent has demonstrated the ability and commitment to
       creating and maintaining a home that meets the child’s basic and specific
       needs and in which the child can thrive;

       (R) Whether the physical environment of the parent’s home is healthy and
       safe for the child;

       (S) Whether the parent has consistently provided more than token financial
       support for the child; and

       (T) Whether the mental or emotional fitness of the parent would be
       detrimental to the child or prevent the parent from consistently and
       effectively providing safe and stable care and supervision of the child.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i)(1)(A)-(T). “The relevancy and weight to be given each
factor depends on the unique facts of each case.” In re Marr, 194 S.W.3d at 499. In some
circumstances, one factor may prove dispositive. In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 878.
Nevertheless, we must still consider “all the factors and all the proof” before concluding
termination is in a child’s best interests. In re Gabriella D., 531 S.W.3d 662, 682 (Tenn.
2017).

         After considering all relevant factors, we agree with the juvenile court that
terminating Father’s parental rights is in the Children’s best interests. Father made no
progress on his permanency plan during the custodial period and did not bother to appear
at trial. There is no suggestion in the record that Father has made adjustments to his
circumstances, much less lasting adjustments that would make it safe for the Children to
be in Father’s care. What the record establishes about Father is that he continued to use
illegal substances and incur criminal charges during the custodial period and stopped
attempting to contact his Children altogether. Inasmuch as Father essentially did not
participate in this case in the juvenile court, Father has acted with no urgency in reuniting
with the Children. Moreover, the Children, particularly Hailey R., have expressed on more
than one occasion that they do not want to live with Father and are afraid of him. The proof
at trial showed that the Children were still working through the trauma caused by Father’s
abuse, and they do not have a significant bond with Father. Under all of these
circumstances, the evidence is clear and convincing that termination of Father’s parental
rights is in the Children’s best interests.

        Father takes issue with the juvenile court’s findings regarding the best interest
factors, noting that after several of the factors, the juvenile court states only that “[t]he
Court finds that this factor bodes in favor of termination based upon the same findings
outlined by the Court’s Order listed above in this ruling.” Again, we take no issue with the
juvenile court’s order. Its reasoning is clear, and there are several best interest factors listed
in the order under which the juvenile court makes more specific statements.

                                              - 19 -
        In sum, DCS proved both the statutory grounds for termination and that termination
is in the Children’s best interests, by clear and convincing evidence. Thus, we affirm the
juvenile court’s ruling that Father’s parental rights should be terminated as to both
Children.

                                     CONCLUSION

       We affirm the judgment of the Juvenile Court for Overton County, and the case is
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Costs on appeal are
assessed to the appellant, Nathaniel R., for which execution may issue if necessary.

                                                   _________________________________
                                                   KRISTI M. DAVIS, JUDGE

                                          - 20 -