Court Opinion

ID: 2964537
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:27:08.703631+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:01:52.718899
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                 ____________________

          No. 96-1727

                       TRANSAMERICA PREMIER INSURANCE COMPANY,
                                Plaintiff - Appellee,

                                          v.

                               THOMAS J. OBER, ET AL.,
                               Defendants - Appellees.

                                 ____________________

                        EL/CAP TOWING & TRANSPORTATION, INC.,
                               Defendants - Appellants.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                              FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE

                       [Hon. Gene Carter, U.S. District Judge]
                                          ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                               Torruella, Chief Judge,
                                          ___________

                           Cyr and Boudin, Circuit Judges.
                                           ______________

                                _____________________

               Elizabeth  S.  Morley,   with  whom   William  W.   Willard,
               _____________________                 _____________________
          Bernstein, Shur,  Sawyer & Nelson,  Louis G. Juliano  and Bigham,
          _________________________________   ________________      _______
          Englar, Jones & Houston were on brief for appellant.
          _______________________
               Stephen  M. Martin,  with  whom Dante  Mattioni, Francis  X.
               __________________              _______________  ___________
          Kelly and Mattioni, Mattioni  & Mattioni, Ltd. were on  brief for
          _____     ____________________________________
          appellee C&G Excavating, Inc.

                                 ____________________

                                  February 28, 1997
                                 ____________________

                    TORRUELLA, Chief Judge.  Crossclaim Defendant-Appellant
                    TORRUELLA, Chief Judge. 
                               ___________

          El/Cap Towing and Transportation,  Inc. ("El/Cap") appeals from a

          jury verdict finding it  and co-crossclaim Defendant Henry Marine

          Services,  Inc.   ("Henry   Marine")  liable   to  appellee   C&G

          Excavating, Inc. ("C&G") for negligence in towing various vessels

          and properties belonging to C&G.  Arguing an insufficient showing

          of legal causation, El/Cap contends that the trial court erred by

          denying  its motions for a directed verdict.  In the alternative,

          El/Cap  argues that the district court erred by not providing the

          jury  a  more  specific  special  verdict  form,  and  by denying

          El/Cap's Motion for  a New  Trial or for  Amendment of  Judgment.

          Finding no error, we affirm.

                                      BACKGROUND
                                      BACKGROUND

                      El/Cap and Henry Marine were two of several companies

          that participated in towing  C&G equipment to a dredging  project

          in Saco, Maine.1  C&G claimed that El/Cap and Henry Marine, while

          towing, negligently caused the following damages to C&G property:

          damage to  a dredge (the  AMBER II), loss  of a tender  boat (the

          LITTLE GEORGE), loss of some pipeline,  and loss of a pipe barge.

          C&G's negligence claims were brought before the district court of

                              
          ____________________

          1  This suit initially surfaced against the backdrop of a variety
          of  legal  disputes  between  contractors  and  the  Transamerica
          Premier Insurance Company, which had issued performance bonds for
          the payment of various contractors involved in a dredging project
          in  Saco,  Maine.   C&G  owned  equipment  used  in the  dredging
          project.  All claims were settled before trial with the exception
          of the crossclaims between  C&G and El/Cap and Henry  Marine that
          are before us now.  

                                         -2-

          Maine under both  diversity jurisdiction, 28  U.S.C.   1332,  and

          maritime jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C.   1333. 

                    Many of the facts essential to a finding  of negligence

          were vigorously contested  by the  parties at trial.   Because  a

          jury found El/Cap and Henry Marine liable, we must view the facts

          in  the   light  most  favorable  to  C&G,  draw  all  reasonable

          inferences in C&G's favor, and refrain  from assessing either the

          credibility  of witnesses  or  the relative  weight of  evidence.

          Lama v. Borr s, 16 F.3d 473, 475 (1st Cir. 1994).  As reviewed in
          ____    ______

          this light, the tale proceeds as follows.

                    In November  1992, C&G entered into  a Bareboat Charter

          Agreement with East Coast Marine whereby East Coast Marine leased

          C&G equipment it  needed for the  Saco, Maine, dredging  project.

          Specifically,  East Coast Marine  hired the AMBER  II, the LITTLE

          GEORGE,  the  pipe  barge,  and  some  pipeline  (together,  "the

          equipment") from C&G.   Although East Coast Marine  had initially

          hired  El/Cap to tow the equipment from Lewes, Delaware, to Saco,

          Maine,  Henry Marine  was ultimately  given the  towing job.   In

          their transport arrangements with Henry Marine, East Coast Marine

          and C&G instructed  that the  equipment must be  towed along  the

          intracoastal waterway.   

                    Heading  north  in  the  intracoastal  waterway,  Henry

          Marine met with delays and setbacks in  successfully carrying out

          the tow.  At  Hereford inlet, for example, the Henry Marine boats

          ran  aground and  had difficulty  navigating the  equipment under

          certain bridges.  At  this point, El/Cap agreed to  assist in the

                                         -3-

          tow,  and arranged  to have Henry  Marine leave  the intracoastal

          waterway and meet  El/Cap's tug,  the TOMMY G,  in the open  seas

          outside  of Hereford Inlet.2   None of the  equipment was damaged

          while  towed  by Henry  Marine in  the  period prior  to El/Cap's

          involvement in the tow.   The decision to transfer  the equipment

          during  rough weather and to continue heading in the direction of

          New  York  despite  rough  weather  was  at  the  heart  of  this

          negligence suit.   Although the evidence regarding who  made this

          decision was  conflicting,   there was  enough testimony  for the

          jury to decide that El/Cap made the decision. 

                    At the time El/Cap instructed the Henry Marine boats to

          bring  the equipment  to  meet El/Cap's  tug,  the TOMMY  G,  the

          forecast called for four to six foot seas.  The seas were rougher

          than  forecast when Henry Marine brought the equipment out to the

          TOMMY G,  and the AMBER  II broke away  from a Henry  Marine tug.

          When the TOMMY  G tried to  secure the AMBER  II, both the  Henry

          Marine  tug and the TOMMY G  collided with, and caused damage to,

          the AMBER II.  Further damage was caused to the AMBER II when, in

          the course of transferring pipeline to the TOMMY G's tow, a Henry

                              
          ____________________

          2    The  record  contains  conflicting  evidence  regarding  the
          decision to take the equipment out of the intracoastal waters and
          into  the  ocean.    El/Cap  draws  our  attention  to  testimony
          suggesting that it was forced to rescue the equipment negligently
          towed by Henry Marine, and that Henry Marine and C&G asked El/Cap
          for  assistance and  knowingly  made  a  decision  to  leave  the
          intracoastal waters.  C&G, on  the other hand,  offered testimony
          showing  that El/Cap arranged to  meet the Henry  Marine boats in
          the  open sea.  As discussed infra, there was sufficient evidence
                                       _____
          for a jury to find  El/Cap responsible for the shift to  open sea
          travel. 

                                         -4-

          Marine boat struck the AMBER II again.  The  loss  of the  LITTLE

          GEORGE, which was tied to the AMBER II, occurred later.  

                    Because of the rough weather, one Henry Marine tug, the

          RACHEL MARIE, agreed  to continue  to tow the  pipeline and  pipe

          barge to New  York.  The RACHEL MARIE needed  to refuel, however,

          and El/Cap took control of the line from the pipe barge, tying it

          to the  AMBER II, to allow  the RACHEL MARIE to  return to shore.

          The   RACHEL  MARIE   communicated  that   it  would   return  in

          approximately two hours.  Instead of waiting for the RACHEL MARIE

          to  return, the TOMMY G continued to  head for New York, with all

          of the equipment in tow.  The TOMMY G did not seek shelter during

          its voyage to New York.  In rough waters, the LITTLE GEORGE broke

          loose, collided with the pipe barge, and sank.  The LITTLE GEORGE

          was  not an ocean-going  vessel.  Some pipeline  was also lost en

          route to New York.

                    When the TOMMY  G arrived in New York, it  was towing a

          damaged  dredge  (the AMBER  II) and  a  damaged pipe  barge that

          carried the remaining pipeline.  In New York, El/Cap, through its

          principal,  Dennis Elberth, who was also the captain of the TOMMY

          G, informed C&G  that it would  repair the pipe  barge before  it

          left El/Cap's control.  After several days, the decision was made

          by  East  Coast Marine  to  continue  transporting the  remaining

          equipment  to Maine.    East Coast  Marine  called on  El/Cap  to

          continue towing  the  AMBER  II.    To tow  the  pipe  barge  and

          pipeline, which were not repaired by  El/Cap, East Coast Marine's

          principal  John Szegda hired  two other towing  companies.  Local

                                         -5-

          Towing  carried  out the  tow  between New  York  and Gloucester,

          Massachusetts,  at which  point another  firm, Bay  State Towing,

          took over.  

                    El/Cap  towed  the  AMBER  II to  Saco,  Maine  without

          further incident.  The pipeline  and pipe  barge sank off  of the

          coast of New Hampshire while being towed by Bay State Towing, due

          to a  hole in the barge  initially sustained during  the tow from

          Delaware to  New York.  El/Cap  failed to repair the  hole in the

          pipe barge before it left El/Cap's yard in New York.  

                    At  trial,  the district  court  twice  denied El/Cap's

          motions for directed verdict  and also rejected El/Cap's proposed

          special  verdict  form.    The  jury  awarded  $221,300  to  C&G,

          apportioning liability 88%  to El/Cap and  12% to Henry  Marine.3

          That figure appears to reflect  a finding of liability on all  of

          the  damages claimed by C&G, including the loss of the pipe barge

          and  pipeline.    Henry Marine  did  not  appear  for trial,  but

          evidence regarding its  negligence was presented to the  jury and

          default  judgment was  entered against  it.   El/Cap appeals  the

          denial of motions for directed verdict and for new trial, as well

          as the  denial of  its  proposed special  verdict form.   In  the

          alternative,  El/Cap  argues  that  the damage  award  should  be

          reduced by $96,000 to reflect the fact  that El/Cap is not liable

          for the loss of the pipe barge and pipeline.

                                      DISCUSSION
                                      DISCUSSION

                              
          ____________________

          3  In its  cross claim pleadings, C&G alleged  damages "in excess
          of $258,500."  

                                         -6-

             I.  El/Cap's Motions for Directed Verdict and for New Trial 
             I.  El/Cap's Motions for Directed Verdict and for New Trial

                    El/Cap  argues on  appeal  that the  evidence at  trial

          fails  to demonstrate that El/Cap's actions  were the legal cause

          of any of  the damages  suffered during the  tow and,  therefore,

          that the district court  erred in denying El/Cap's motions  for a

          directed  verdict  and for  a new  trial.   Before  assessing the

          merits of this argument, we note the pertinent standard of review

          -- one that is decisive in shaping the outcome of our assessment.

                    In reviewing the denial  of a motion for judgment  as a

          matter of law  under Rule 50(a), we  conduct a plenary  review of

          the  evidence "viewed  in the  light most  favorable to  the non-

          movant, giving [it] the benefit of every favorable inference that

          may be fairly drawn  therefrom."  Santiago Hodge v. Parke Davis &
                                            ______________    _____________

          Co., 909 F.2d 628, 634 (1st Cir. 1990)  (citations omitted).  "If
          ___

          'fair minded'  persons could draw different  inferences, then the

          matter  is for  the jury."   Id.   We will not  reverse the trial
                                       ___

          court's denial of defendant's Rule 50(a) motion unless the facts,

          seen  in the  light most favorable  to the plaintiff,  as well as

          inferences  reasonably   drawn  therefrom  "'lead   to  but   one

          conclusion -- that there is a total failure of evidence  to prove

          the plaintiff's  case.'"   Guti rrez-Rodr guez v. Cartagena,  882
                                     ___________________    _________

          F.2d 553, 558 (1st  Cir. 1989) (quoting Mayo v.  Schooner Capital
                                                  ____     ________________

          Corp., 825 F.2d  566, 568 (1st Cir. 1987)).  Such is not the case
          _____

          here, as we explain below.  

                    The  appellant's hurdle is no  lower on an  appeal of a

          denial of a Rule 59 motion for  a new trial.  We reverse only  if

                                         -7-

          "'the verdict is  so seriously mistaken,  so clearly against  the

          law or the evidence, as to constitute a miscarriage of justice. .

          . . This strict  standard of review is especially  appropriate if

          the motion for new trial is based on  a claim that the verdict is

          against the  weight of the evidence.'"   Guti rrez-Rodr guez, 882
                                                   ___________________

          F.2d at 558 (quoting  MacQuarrie v. Howard Johnson Co.,  877 F.2d
                                __________    __________________

          126,  128 (1st  Cir. 1989)(citations  omitted)).   Because El/Cap

          does not  argue that the district  court made an error  as to the

          controlling law -- which would merit de novo review -- our review
                                               _______

          is limited  to determining whether the district  court abused its

          discretion when  it evaluated the  verdict against the  weight of

          the evidence and  found no  miscarriage of justice.   Havinga  v.
                                                                _______

          Crowley Towing & Transp. Co., 24 F.3d 1480, 1483 (1st Cir. 1994).
          ____________________________

                    In considering whether the  district court's denial  of

          El/Cap's Rule 50(a)  motion was  proper, we must  view the  facts

          that were vigorously  contested in  this case in  the light  most

          favorable  to C&G.  In  reviewing the district  court's denial of

          the Rule  59 motion, our review  is also limited  because we will

          only reverse  if we find an abuse of discretion.  We thus turn to

          examine  the evidence  before  the jury  on  which a  finding  of

          negligence could be based.

                    A.  Applicable Substantive Law
                    A.  Applicable Substantive Law

                    Under both  Maine  and well-established  maritime  law,

          "the master of a tug is required to exercise 'reasonable care and

          maritime skill' with respect to  the vessel in tow."  DiMillo  v.
                                                                _______

          Sheepscot Pilots,  Inc.,  870  F.2d  746,  748  (1st  Cir.  1989)
          _______________________

                                         -8-

          (quoting Stevens v. White City, 285 U.S. 195, 202 (1932) (holding
                   _______    __________

          tug  not  liable  as an  insurer  or  common  carrier)).4   Thus,

          longstanding maritime  norms required El/Cap and  Henry Marine to

          carry  out the  tow by  using such  reasonable care  and maritime

          skill as prudent navigators employ for the performance of similar

          services.5  A court sitting in admiralty jurisdiction may look to

          the application of basic  proximate cause standards as  they have

          been elaborated by the states.  Exxon Co., U.S.A. v. Sofec, Inc.,
                                          _________________    ___________

          116 S.  Ct. 1813,  1818  (1996).   There is  no conflict  between

          pertinent maritime and  Maine tort law in this case.  Under Maine

          tort  law, the  causation element  of the  tort of  negligence is

          satisfied if: (1) the act or failure to act played a  substantial

          part  in bringing about or actually causing the injury or damage,

          and  (2) the damage was a direct result or reasonably foreseeable
          ___

          result  of the act or  failure to act.  Shaw  v. Bolduc, 658 A.2d
                                                  ____     ______

          229 (Me. 1995).

                              
          ____________________

          4    Our  review of  the  jury  instructions  indicates that  the
          district  court  correctly  outlined  the  relevant  features  of
          applicable maritime tort  law.  The  lack of Maine tort  law that
          either contradicts any  aspect of maritime  tort law or  pertains
          specifically  to   maritime  torts  bolsters  the  trial  court's
          apparent reliance on general maritime law principles.  

          5  Neither  party contends  that maritime law  should not  apply.
          For a tort to  be considered maritime,  "it must meet two  tests:
          the situs  of the tort must  be maritime (the  location test) and
          the  tort must  bear  a significant  relationship to  traditional
          maritime  activity (the  nexus test)."   Carey  v. Bahama  Cruise
                                                   _____     ______________
          Lines, 864 F.2d  201, 207  (1st Cir.  1988) (citations  omitted).
          _____
          Both  tests are plainly satisfied  here.  As  discussed in Carey,
                                                                     _____
          diversity  jurisdiction  does  not  imply that  maritime  law  be
          displaced by state law.  Id. at 206-07.
                                   ___

                                         -9-

                    The following rules of  general maritime law shed ample

          light  on the duty of reasonable care and maritime skill required

          of  El/Cap in this  case, and  this appeal  does not  require any

          further expatiation of the law of the sea.  The degree of caution

          or care  required of the  navigator of  a tug is  related to  the

          nature  of  the tow  -- in  particular,  the tugboat  master must

          consider the  suitability of the tow  for travel in  light of the

          condition of the seas encountered.   The MERCURY, 2 F.2d 325, 326
                                               ___________

          (1st Cir.  1924); see also Howlett v.  The Tug DALZELLIDO, 324 F.
                            ________ _______     __________________

          Supp. 912, 916-17  (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (reviewing general  principles

          of law relating  to towage).   A  tug's duty  of reasonable  care

          includes the  duty to take into  consideration weather conditions

          as  they may affect the tow.   Dimillo, 870 F.2d at 748; Chemical
                                         _______                   ________

          Transporter,  Inc. v. M.  Turecamo, Inc., 290 F.2d  496 (2d  Cir.
          __________________    __________________

          1961).   The captain  of the  tug  is charged  with knowledge  of

          weather  forecasts, whether or not he had actual knowledge of the

          forecasts.  The Tug DALZELLIDO, 324 F. Supp. at 917.  A breach of
                      __________________

          the duty of  care thus can be  found when a  tug captain makes  a

          decision  that is unsafe in  light of the  weather conditions and

          the  particular circumstances  of the  tow that  could reasonably

          have been known.  De  Millo, 870 F.2d at  748.  It is  negligent,
                            _________

          for  example,  to knowingly  brave  weather  conditions that  may

          imperil a flotilla.  Id. at 749.
                               ___

                    C&G presented two sets  of allegedly negligent acts for

          the jury's consideration. First,  C&G claimed that damage  to the

          AMBER II,  and the loss of the LITTLE GEORGE, were caused by: (a)

                                         -10-

          El/Cap's decision to  receive the  tow from Henry  Marine in  the

          open ocean during inclement weather,  and (b) El/Cap's failure to

          seek shelter after the  transfer at Hereford Inlet.   Second, C&G

          claimed that the loss  of the pipe barge and  pipeline was caused

          by El/Cap's failure to repair the pipe barge, as promised, in New

          York.   Noting  that "issues  of proximate cause  and superseding

          cause involve  application of law to  fact, which is  left to the

          factfinder,  subject  to  limited   review,"  we  arrive  at  the

          conclusion that  a rational  jury could  have accepted  C&G's two

          theories  of negligence  as supported by  a preponderance  of the

          evidence.  See Exxon Co., U.S.A., 116 U.S. at 1819.  Assuming the
                     ___ _________________

          jury credited testimony favorable to C&G, we hold that a rational

          jury could have found El/Cap negligent.

                    B.  Damage Sustained During the Tow to New York
                    B.  Damage Sustained During the Tow to New York

                    On  this appeal,  El/Cap  does not  deny  that the  C&G

          vessels were ill-suited for  open ocean travel,6 nor  does El/Cap

          deny  that the decision to transfer  the tow and continue in open

          ocean  during poor  weather  conditions was  imprudent.   Rather,

          El/Cap stresses the following two points regarding the damages to

          C&G property  en route to New York:  that  El/Cap did not, in any

          way,  participate  in the  decision to  transfer  the tow  off of

          Hereford Inlet  during stormy weather, and  that the incompetence

          of  Henry   Marine  led  "inevitably  to   the  losses  claimed."

          Appellant's Brief at  14.   According to El/Cap,  it rescued  the
                              
          ____________________

          6  C&G brought forward expert testimony in support of the finding
          that the various  towed vessels were clearly unsuitable  for open
          sea travel.  Testimony of Ronald Campana, Tr. at 226-27. 

                                         -11-

          AMBER II from the  incompetent hands of Henry Marine  and brought

          it  safely to  New York.   There  may be  some merit  to El/Cap's

          argument.   Nevertheless, an appellate  court may  not usurp  the

          function  of the  jury, and thus  we cleave  to the  facts in the

          light most favorable to C&G.   The record indicates that the jury

          could have accepted contrary testimony as to each of these points

          emphasized by El/Cap.

                    With  regard to the decision to transfer a tow that was

          unsuited  for open ocean travel  in rough ocean  waters and foggy

          conditions  --  a decision  that  El/Cap appears  to  concede was

          negligent, see Appellant's  Brief at  15 -- the  jury could  have
                     ___

          found  that   El/Cap  shouldered  responsibility   based  on  the

          deposition  testimony,  read  at  trial,  of  Robert  Henry,  the

          principal  of Henry Marine.   Robert Henry  averred that El/Cap's

          principal knew of  the nature of the tow and  agreed to take over

          the tow off of Hereford Inlet, and that the captain  of the TOMMY

          G instructed  that the tow  be brought  out to open  sea for  the

          purposes of  the transfer.   Exhibit  127 at 56-60;  Tr. at  419.

          Although  the Henry  Marine boats collided  with and  damaged the

          AMBER  II,  this harm  could be  deemed  a foreseeable  result of

          undertaking  an open  ocean  transfer  under  unsuitable  weather

          conditions.  The  jury could have concluded that El/Cap knowingly

          decided  to proceed with the  transfer of towed  vessels that are

          unsuited for open  ocean travel,  during rough weather.   Such  a

          conclusion is a sufficient ground for a finding of tort liability

                                         -12-

          as to the  damage to the  AMBER II, since  the AMBER II  suffered

          damage during the transfer.

                    Additionally, C&G offered  the expert  testimony of  an

          experienced marine captain  who opined that the Henry Marine tugs

          were following the lead of El/Cap's dominant tug, and that El/Cap

          failed to  maintain  professional  standards  by  performing  the

          transfer under the circumstances.  Testimony  of Ron Campana, Tr.

          at 229-31. El/Cap's duty to exercise reasonable care and maritime

          skill   required  that   attention  be   given  to   the  special

          circumstances of this tow, and a reasonable jury could have found

          that they fell short of that duty by undertaking the transfer.

                    Even assuming, as El/Cap argues, that the principals of

          C&G and East  Coast Marine,  eager to speed  the towing  process,

          decided that El/Cap should  relieve Henry Marine of the  AMBER II

          off of  Hartford Inlet, this does  automatically exonerate El/Cap

          from liability.  The jury may even have accepted El/Cap's version

          of  the events surrounding the decision to leave the intracoastal

          waterways and  still found that the  TOMMY G failed  to carry out

          the  tow prudently  by  participating  in  the transfer  in  poor

          weather.   Under  certain circumstances,  the duty  of reasonable

          care and maritime  skill may require that  a tug captain  delay a

          tow,  or otherwise  make  ad hoc  adjustments  to the  course  or

          schedule  that was initially planned by its client.  Cf. DiMillo,
                                                               ___ _______

                                         -13-

          870 F.2d at 748-49 (tug should not have set out in bad weather).7

                    With regard  to whether  negligent acts by  El/Cap were

          the legal cause of the damages after the transfer, the jury could

          have  concluded  that  such  damage  flowed  substantially   from

          El/Cap's  decisions  and  was  not  inevitably  caused  by  Henry

          Marine's actions.  Even assuming that  the flotilla was "stranded

          in  the  Intercoastal   Waterway  as  a  direct  result   of  the

          incompetence of Henry Marine," Appellant's  Brief at 14, the jury

          could have found  that El/Cap need not have proceeded to New York

          without   stopping.8    C&G   brought  forward  expert  testimony

          indicating that the TOMMY  G had the opportunity to  seek shelter

          before  the LITTLE GEORGE sank, but instead continued to head for

          New York harbor.  Tr. at 231.  The LITTLE GEORGE, unfit for ocean

          travel,  was lost as it was being towed by the TOMMY G toward New

          York  harbor.  C&G's expert opined not  only that the TOMMY G was

          the dominant tug, responsible for coordinating the actions of the

                              
          ____________________

          7  We also note that a storm did not suddenly arise in the course
          of the  TOMMY G's tow and  that El/Cap was, or  should have been,
          aware  of  the  weather   conditions  prior  to  undertaking  the
          transfer.   Therefore, El/Cap cannot argue that this is a case of
          a tug  captain acting  in extremis.   See, e.g., Boudoin  v. J.R.
                                 ___________    ___  ____  _______     ____
          McDermott  & Co., 281 F.2d 81, 84 (5th Cir. 1960) (distinguishing
          ________________
          in extremis cases -- which require that "something more than mere
          ___________
          mistake  of judgment by the  master" be shown  if, "without prior
          negligence, a vessel  is put  in the very  center of  destructive
          natural  forces" -- from case  where tug captain  knew of weather
          conditions before making decisions). 

          8    We note  as  well that  the  jury could  have  accepted that
          El/Cap's participation  was needed while also  concluding that it
          failed  to  use appropriate  equipment  for  such  a sea  rescue,
          because the TOMMY G was not able to enter shallow coastal waters.

                                         -14-

          Henry Marine tugs, but also that the TOMMY G was responsible  for

          the  sinking of the LITTLE GEORGE.  Tr. at 236.  Thus, a rational

          jury could have found that the  actions of the El/Cap tug, by not

          seeking safety,  proximately  caused the  damages  that  occurred

          between Delaware and New York.

                    C.  Loss of the Pipe Barge and Pipeline 
                    C.  Loss of the Pipe Barge and Pipeline

                    El/Cap promised to repair  the holes in the  pipe barge

          before  allowing it to  leave its yard  in New York.   C&G argued

          that the failure  to make these repairs was a  legal cause of the

          loss of the  pipe barge  and pipeline.   El/Cap, however,  argues

          that no jury could have found it liable for the loss of the  pipe

          barge because, even if  El/Cap promised to repair the  pipe barge

          and failed to  do so,  the principal of  East Coast Marine,  John

          Szegda,   removed  the   pipe  barge   from  El/Cap's   dock  and

          subsequently  assured the  other towing  companies that  the pipe

          barge  was seaworthy.  According  to El/Cap, such  actions on the

          part  of  Szegda  "must  be  viewed  as  breaking  the  chain  of

          causation."  We disagree.  

                    El/Cap does  not deny  on  appeal that  the jury  could

          conclude  that  the pipe  barge ultimately  sank  as a  result of

          damages that El/Cap  had promised to repair.   Thus, it  is legal

          (or  proximate) causation, and not  factual causation, that is at

          issue.  El/Cap's argument regarding legal causation  is that East

          Coast Marine's  assurances to  later towers  that  the barge  was

          seaworthy cuts off  El/Cap's liability.   That East Coast  Marine

          would  try to complete  the tow of  that pipe barge  to Maine was

                                         -15-

          certainly  foreseeable.   And, furthermore,  the jury  could have

          reasonably concluded that Szegda's assurances of seaworthiness to

          the later towers were based on his belief that El/Cap had in fact

          repaired the pipe  barge as  promised.  Although  El/Cap did  not

          affirmatively indicate to  Szegda or  C&G that it  had fixed  the

          pipe  barge  such  that it  was  seaworthy,  it  remained silent.

          El/Cap concedes that Dennis Elberth "acquiesced in the removal of

          the  pipe and barge from [El/Cap's] sea wall."  Appellant's Brief

          at 18.  This acquiescence, in the wake of a promise to repair the

          barge before permitting it to continue  to Maine, may have led  a

          rational jury to conclude  that El/Cap breached its duty  of care

          with regard to the  pipe barge.   Thus, despite the general  rule

          that an owner of  a tow is responsible  for warranting its  basic

          seaworthiness,9 we agree with the following statement made by the

          district court in  the course  of denying El/Cap's  motion for  a

          directed verdict: 

                    [T]here is a basis  upon which the jury could
                    reasonably  conclude  from the  evidence that
                    El/Cap should not have released that pipeline
                    in New  York, especially after it  had made a
                    commitment to  Mr. Todd that it  would not do
                    so until the repairs had been made.  

          Tr. at 318.  It was within the province of the jury as factfinder

          to determine that El/Cap's  acts and omissions proximately caused

          the  sinking of the pipe  barge and pipeline,  even though El/Cap

          was  not towing  the barge  when it  sank.   We note  that El/Cap

          presented its argument regarding  superseding causes of damage at
                              
          ____________________

          9  See, e.g., South, Inc. v. Moran Towing & Transp. Co., 360 F.2d
             ___  ____  ___________    __________________________
          1002, 1005 (2d Cir. 1966) (collecting cases).

                                         -16-

          closing argument.   The jury's verdict,  apparently granting full

          damages,  can  therefore  be  regarded as  a  rejection  of  this

          argument.10  

                    All of  these considerations  lead us to  conclude that

          the denials  of  El/Cap's motions  for directed  verdict and  new

          trial are not tantamount to abuses of discretion.   Because we do

          not displace the jury's  finding of liability as to  the pipeline

          and pipe barge, we also decline El/Cap's invitation to adjust the

          jury's damage determination to reflect  no liability for the loss

          of the pipeline and pipe barge.11

                              II.  Special Verdict Form
                              II.  Special Verdict Form

                    Finally, El/Cap  casts the trial  court's rejection  of

          El/Cap's  proposed special verdict form  as reversible error.  If

                              
          ____________________

          10  Furthermore,  at no  time did El/Cap  specifically request  a
          jury  instruction  regarding  whether  certain  factual  findings
          (later acts) would imply a break  in the chain of legal causation
          with regard to the damage to the pipe barge. Hence, under Federal
          Rule  of Civil Procedure 51, El/Cap  may not argue on appeal that
          the jury's attention  should have been drawn more specifically to
          subsequent supervening  causes of  the pipe  barge's loss.   See,
                                                                       ___
          e.g., Parker v. Nashus, 76 F.3d 9, 12 (1st Cir. 1996).
          ____  ______    ______

          11   El/Cap's basic contention is  that it should not  be made to
          pay for lost pipeline; it does not claim that the jury's award is
          otherwise  unreasonable.  That is, El/Cap does not argue that the
          damage award is excessive in the  sense of not being based on the
          jury's findings  of  liability; rather,  El/Cap challenges  those
          findings of liability.  Indeed, the jury award of $221,300 is not
          unreasonable, assuming  the jury found the  defendants liable for
          all of the damages  claimed.  Trial testimony, considered  in the
          light most favorable  to the verdict,  indicated that the  LITTLE
          GEORGE and its  cargo, which  sank, were worth  $102,333, Tr.  at
          283; that the damage  suffered by the AMBER II  totalled $68,300,
          Tr. at 281; and that the value of the lost  pipeline was $76,427,
          Tr. at 284.  Thus, in  light of direct replacement or repair cost
          estimates  put forward by C&G's expert at trial, the jury damages
          award is far from unreasonable.  

                                         -17-

          the claim of error  had been properly preserved, we  would review

          the district court's refusal  to use the verdict form  offered by

          El/Cap, and any challenge  to the wording of the  special verdict

          form  used under Rule 49(a), for abuse of discretion.  See, e.g.,
                                                                 ___  ____

          Bristol Steel & Iron Works v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 41 F.3d 182,
          __________________________    _____________________

          190 (4th Cir. 1994) (collecting cases).  

                    However, our review in  this case is further restricted

          to  "plain error"  review because  El/Cap did  not object  to the

          special verdict  form after the  instructions had been  given and

          before the jury retired. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 51;  Clausen v. SEA-
                                   ___                      _______    ____

          3, Inc., 21 F.3d 1181, 1195-96 (1st  Cir. 1994).  Although El/Cap
          _______

          proposed an  alternative verdict form,  it was required  to renew

          any objections after  the jury  instructions, and did  not do  so

          despite being explicitly  reminded by  the court of  the need  to

          preserve  its objections  for  appeal.   We  therefore limit  our

          review to plain error.

                    We  discern no  error, let  alone  plain error,  in the

          trial  court's rejection of El/Cap's verdict form in favor of its

          own.   The trial court has  broad discretion in crafting,  and in

          deciding to use, special verdict forms.  See  Smith  v. Lightning
                                                   ___  _____     _________

          Bolt Prods., Inc., 861 F.2d 363, 370 (2d Cir. 1988).  The verdict
          _________________

          form used by  the court,  attached as an  appendix, required,  in

          plain  and  unmistakable terms,  the jury  to  make a  finding of

          negligence  and legal  causation  with  regard  to  each  of  the

          defendants, to  determine the  extent of recoverable  damages, to

          assess comparative negligence, and to apportion fault.  Construed

                                         -18-

          against the  background of the jury  instructions, which properly

          set out the duty  of reasonable care and maritime  skill required

          in  the towing context, see  Tr. at 587-95,  and which instructed
                                  ___

          the  jury to make determinations  of liability by a preponderance

          of evidence as "to each particular claim" made by C&G, see Tr. at
                                                                 ___

          597-98,  this verdict  form fully  and fairly  put the  issues of

          negligence raised in the case before the jury.  See, e.g., Putnam
                                                          ___  ____  ______

          Resources v. Pateman, 958 F.2d 448, 455 (1st Cir. 1992) ("[I]t is
          _________    _______

          well  established that verdicts must be construed in light of the

          totality of the surrounding circumstances,  including the court's

          instructions.").  On plain  error review, our task ends  with our

          finding that the wording  of the verdict  form did not hinder  or

          prevent  the jury from making any of  the relevant findings as to

          damages  that they had  been properly instructed  by the district

          court to  make.12    Hence,  there  is  no  threat  of  a  "clear

          miscarriage of justice" or  of an error affecting  the "fairness,

          integrity or  public reputation of judicial  proceedings."  PHAV,
                                                                      ____

          915 F.2d at 769  (quoting Smith v. Massachusetts Inst.  of Tech.,
                                    _____    _____________________________

          877 F.2d 1106, 1109 (1st Cir. 1989)).

                                      CONCLUSION
                                      CONCLUSION

                              
          ____________________

          12  The significant difference between El/Cap's proposed form and
          the form  used by the court  is that El/Cap's  form required that
          the  jury write down a separate finding  of damages for each item
          of C&G property  at issue.  The district court's  decision not to
          list  each  of  the  C&G  properties separately  in  the  damage-
          assessment portion of the verdict form simply does not, as El/Cap
          argues, prevent  the jury  from assessing the  negligence of  the
          parties as to each damaged item.

                                         -19-

                    For the reasons put forward in this opinion, we find no

          error  in any  of the  trial court's  actions challenged  on this

          appeal, and therefore affirm the judgment entered by the district
                                affirm
                                ______

          court pursuant to the jury verdict.

                                         -20-

                                       Appendix
                                       Appendix

          The verdict form used below read as follows::

                    1.  Was Defendant El Cap Towing Company, Inc.
                    negligent and  was  such negligence  a  legal
                    cause  of damages sustained by the Plaintiff,
                    C&G Excavating, Inc.?    YES ____  NO ____ 

                         (Answer Question No. 2)
                         (Answer Question No. 2)

                    2.  Was Defendant Henry  Marine Company, Inc.
                    negligent  and  was such  negligence  a legal
                    cause of damages  sustained by the Plaintiff,
                    C&G Excavating, Inc.?  YES ___  NO___

                         (If the answer  to either  Question
                         (If the answer  to either  Question
                         No. 1  or No.  2  is "Yes,"  answer
                         No. 1  or No.  2  is "Yes,"  answer
                         question  No. 3;  otherwise, answer
                         question  No. 3;  otherwise, answer
                         no further questions.)
                         no further questions.)

                    3.    What is  the  total  amount of  damages
                    sustained by the  Plaintiff, C&G  Excavating,
                    Inc., as a result  of the combined negligence
                    of  Defendants Henry Marine Company, Inc. and
                    El Cap Towing Company, Inc.?
                    _______________________________    $_________
                      (Write out in words)               (Figures)
                      (Write out in words)               (Figures)

                         (Answer Question No. 4)
                         (Answer Question No. 4)

                    4.   Was the Plaintiff, C&G Excavating, Inc.,
                    at  fault and was such fault a legal cause of
                    Plaintiff's damages?  YES ____  NO ____

                         (If you have answered  Question No.
                         (If you have answered  Question No.
                         4 "NO," answer  Question No. 6;  if
                         4 "NO," answer  Question No. 6;  if
                         applicable;  If  you have  answered
                         applicable;  If  you have  answered
                         "YES," answer Question No. 5.)
                         "YES," answer Question No. 5.)

                    5.   To what  amount should the damages to be
                    recovered by Plaintiff, C&G Excavating, Inc.,
                    from  the Defendants  be reduced,  having due
                    regard   for  the   nature   and  extent   of
                    Plaintiff's   fault  legally   causing  those
                    damages?
                    _____________________________      $_________
                      (Write  out in  Words)                     
                      (Write  out in  Words)                     
                    (Figures)
                    (Figures)

                                         -21-

                      (If you have answered both Question No. 1
                      (If you have answered both Question No. 1
                      and No.  2 'YES," answer  Question No. 6;
                      and No.  2 'YES," answer  Question No. 6;
                      otherwise, answer no further questions).
                      otherwise, answer no further questions).
                    6.   Apportionment of Fault:  What portion of
                         Apportionment of Fault
                    the total fault  of all  the parties  legally
                    causing  or   substantially  contributing  to
                    causing the  damages  you have  found  to  be
                    sustained by the  plaintiff, C&G  Excavating,
                    Inc., do  you  attribute (by  percentage)  to
                    each  of  the   defendants,  El  Cap   Towing
                    Company, Inc. and Henry Marine Company, Inc.?
                      (a)      El   Cap   Towing   Company,  Inc.
                    __________%
                      (b)  Henry Marine Company, Inc.  __________%

                                         -22-