Court Opinion

ID: 9598518
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:09:35.12697+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:44.425224
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Chief Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I fully concur in Divisions 2 and 3 but respectfully dissent as to Division 1. Since the decision in Tift County v. Smith, 219 Ga. 68 (131 SE2d 527) (1963), the law in Georgia has been that a landowner has a special property right which entitles him to access to a public road *23abutting his property, but that inconvenience of access to other roads and circuity of travel caused by the closure of one end of an abutting road, which closure is a short distance from the landowner’s property, does not violate any special right of the landowner. In this case, the Court holds that such a closure does violate a special right of the landowner if the landowner’s property is unique in the sense that it is the only property which abuts only that road. This holding misapplies the concept of uniqueness and is in conflict with Tift County and its progeny. I therefore respectfully dissent from Division 1 of the majority opinion.
Tift County acknowledged that a landowner has a special property right which entitles him to access to a public road abutting his property. Dept. of Transp. v. Whitehead, 253 Ga. 150 (317 SE2d 542) (1984); Circle K Gen. v. Dept. of Transp., 196 Ga. App. 616 (396 SE2d 522) (1990); and DeKalb County v. Glaze, 189 Ga. App. 1, 2 (1) (375 SE2d 66) (1988), are examples of cases in which a landowner’s right of access to an abutting road was interfered with or impaired.
Conversely, Tift County drew the distinction that inconvenience of access and circuity of travel caused by the closure of one end of an abutting road a short distance from the landowner’s property does not violate any special right of the landowner. The Supreme Court reasoned: “What we deem controlling under the facts here is that access to the [road] upon which the plaintiffs’ property abuts was not interfered with. The fact that farther down this road a dead-end obstruction was created so as to constitute a cul-de-sac, causing inconvenience, does not, in our view, constitute the taking or damaging of private property for a public purpose so as to require compensation.” 219 Ga. at 73-74.
Since the Supreme Court also stated that it was not concerned with the fact that plaintiffs’ property was located without, rather than within, a municipally incorporated area, id. at 73, Tift County renounces the cul-de-sac principle. Accord 16 Mercer L. Rev. 50-51 (1964). In this regard, that principle has not been applied in any case since the Tift County decision, and it is not relied on by plaintiff Bridges.
MARTA v. Fountain, 256 Ga. 732 (352 SE2d 781) (1987), and Hendrix v. Dept. of Transp., 188 Ga. App. 429 (373 SE2d 264) (1988), are examples of cases involving non-compensable injuries. See also Dept. of Transp. v. Taylor, 264 Ga. 18 (440 SE2d 652) (1994). Like the present case, Taylor, Hendrix, and Fountain involved commercial properties.
Bridges’ is one of the four properties which abut Chumley Circle, but Bridges’ is the sole property which does not also abut another public road. Two also abut Canton Road, and one also abuts Hilltop Drive. Bridges regarded Chumley Circle as a driveway which con*24nected his property to a public road (Canton Road), but Chumley Circle is itself a public road. It connects with others in the residential subdivision, so it gave a number of property owners more direct access to Canton Road than they now have since Chumley Circle has been closed at Canton Road. See the appendix hereto. That is, the most direct route to Canton Road for property owners on Kelley Drive also has been cut off by the closure so that they, like Bridges, must access Canton Road by way of Hilltop Drive. (For some, Suholdon Circle would now be more direct.)
It is undisputed that Bridges’ access to the abutting public road (Chumley Circle) was not diminished. Bridges’ access to Canton Road was changed from one lot’s distance to four lots’ distance. The inconvenience caused by the closure is an injury which “falls squarely within the non-compensable category. . . .” Fountain, supra at 734.
In Dept. of Transp. v. Durpo, 220 Ga. App. 458 (469 SE2d 404) (1996), the property owner owned a shopping center abutting Iris Drive. For safety reasons, the DOT closed Iris Drive at its intersection with State Route 138 (the Interstate 20 access road). This resulted in less convenient access from Durpo’s property to State Route 138 and Interstate 20, and in traffic being routed around Durpo’s property, but Durpo’s access to Iris Drive was not altered.
Durpo contended that an immediate and uninterrupted access from Iris Drive to State Route 138 and Interstate 20 was critical to the value and economic success of the shopping center. The trial court ruled that DOT’S closure of Iris Drive at its intersection with State Route 138 was a compensable taking.
This Court reversed. Tift County, relied on in Division 1 of that opinion, is now sought to be distinguished by the majority. The court in Durpo distinguished Circle K, on which the majority places major reliance here. The only distinction between Bridges’ case and Durpo is that Durpo involved economic loss suffered by a property owner who operated an established business, whereas this case involves economic loss suffered by a property owner who has not yet developed the property or established business on it but instead has had it rezoned from residential to commercial property.
“The term ‘uniqueness’ is used in two contexts. One is where the property on which a business is situated constitutes a ‘unique’ location, allowing business losses. The other is where property is ‘unique,’ so that its fair market value does not represent the condemnee’s actual loss. [Cits.]” Raiford v. Dept. of Transp., 206 Ga. App. 114, 119 (2) (424 SE2d 789) (1992). In order for a recovery by the property owner to be sanctioned in either context, there must have been a compensable damaging or taking. See, e.g., Dept. of Transp. v. Sharpe, 213 Ga. App. 549, 550 (1) (445 SE2d 343) (1994); Dept. of Transp. v. Hillside Motors, 192 Ga. App. 637 (385 SE2d 746) (1989).
*25The denial of vehicular access to Canton Road via Chumley Circle, there being other access, did not constitute a compensable taking or damaging of Bridges’ property. The fact that Bridges’ is the sole property with a Chumley Circle address does not qualify it as compensably unique. This fact does not turn otherwise non-compensable damage into a compensable taking. If it did, it would mean that if there is only one tract which abuts only one street, the dead-ending of the street may be compensable; but if there is another tract, it is not.
Moreover, the majority errs when its accepts as true Bridges’ conclusory assertion that access from his property to Canton Road via Chumley Circle is necessary in order for him to develop the property commercially. The DOT did not dispute this assertion because it moved for summary judgment on a theory that makes the assertion immaterial and because Bridges did not move for partial summary judgment on this issue.
I am authorized to state that Judge Andrews joins in this opinion.
APPENDIX
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*26Decided June 28, 1996
Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, George P. Shingler, Deputy Attorney General, Jeffrey J. Davis, Assistant Attorney General, Anne W. Sapp, for appellant.
Moore & Rogers, John H. Moore, G. Phillip Beggs, Bentley, Bentley & Bentley, Fred D. Bentley, Jr., Linda W. Brunt, Maddox, Maddox & Maddox, Lynwood A. Maddox, for appellee.