Court Opinion

ID: 9884558
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 03:01:47.548254+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:40:03.309494
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Schaefer, dissenting: The majority opinion holds that sections 109 — 1 and 113 — 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure “must be read in conjunction and when so read it becomes manifest that the legislature intended that an accused receive the benefit of appointed counsel only at that stage in the judicial process when he is to plead to the charge against him. Since an accused is not required to plead to the charge against him at his preliminary hearing, and the defendant herein did not in fact enter any plea at that hearing, any right to counsel claimed under section 109 — 1 is inapplicable to him.” I dissent because in my opinion this is an improper construction of the applicable statutes which unnecessarily raises serious constitutional questions. The Code of Criminal Procedure is explicit in its recognition of the right to counsel, even prior to the preliminary hearing. Section 103 — 3 provides that arrested persons “shall have the right to communicate with an attorney of their choice.” Section 103 — 4 provides: “Any person committed, imprisoned or restrained of his liberty for any cause whatever and whether or not such person is charged with an offense shall, except in cases of imminent danger of escape, be allowed to consult with any licensed attorney at law of this State whom such person may desire to see or consult, alone and in private at the place of custody, as many times and for such period each time as is reasonable.” Section 103 — 7 requires every sheriff or other person in charge of any place where persons under arrest are held in custody to post in conspicuous places a verbatim copy of “the provisions of Sections 103' — 2, 103 — 3, 103 — 4, 109— 1 , * * * and 113 — 3 of this Code.” Section 103 — 8 makes it a criminal offense for any peace officer to intentionally prevent the exercise by an accused of any right conferred by article 103 or to intentionally fail to perform any act required by that article. Section 109 — 1 provides: “(b) The judge shall: (x) Inform the defendant of the charge against him and shall provide him with a copy of the charge. (2) Advise the defendant of his right to counsel and if indigent shall appoint a public defender or licensed attorney at law of this State to represent him in accordance with the provisions of section 113 — 3 of this Code. (3) Hold a preliminary hearing in those cases where the judge is without jurisdiction to try the offense; * * *.” The majority reads section 109 — 1(b)(2) completely out of the statute by construing its reference to the appointment of an attorney to represent the defendant at the preliminary hearing “in accordance with the provisions of Section 113 — 3 of this Code” to refer to the appointment of an attorney to represent the defendant at his arraignment. If that is all that section 109 — 1(b)(2) means, it adds nothing to section 113 — 3. Actually, the reference to section 113 — 3 relates to the kinds of cases — felony or misdemeanor — -in which attorneys are to be appointed, to the attorney to be appointed, — the public defender or other counsel, — and to the fees of appointed attorneys other than the public defender, both in capital and noncapital cases, all of which are dealt with in section 113 — 3. The comments of the committee that drafted the Code of Criminal Procedure make it clear that section 113 — 3, which governs the right to counsel at arraignment, was intended to supplement rather than to swallow up the provisions of the Code that govern the right to counsel at earlier states of the proceedings. In its comment to section 103 — 4, the committee stated: “This section is not deemed to be in conflict with section 113 — 3 of the Code which deals with the problem of counsel for any accused who has not obtained such by the time he is required to plead to the charge on arraignment. Section 103 — 4 says he has a right to consult with counsel at any time after being taken into custody: Section 113 — 3 says that when the time for arraignment arrives he shall be allowed counsel before pleading to the charge and if he has not obtained counsel by that time the court shall give him an opportunity to do so. Further provisions of section 113 — 3 deal with the problem of counsel for indigents. Section 113 — 3 is intended to supplement the basic right afforded by section 103 — 4.” 38 Ill. Stat. Anno, par. 103 — 4, Committee Comment. And in its comment to section 109 — 1 the committee pointed out that subsection (b) of that section attempts to cover all offenses from the most minor to the most serious, and that subsection (b) “and the entire Article 109 should be read with these possible variations in mind.” The committee comment continued: “Subsections (1) and (2) apply in all cases as to informing and advising the accused. The right to appointed counsel if indigent, is restricted by section 113 — 3 to those cases in which the penalty is other than a fine only. * * * Subsection (b) (3) is an attempt to cover the wide variations in regard to specific offenses. * * * Subsection (b)(3) anticipates and is intended to harmonize with the other three subsections to the effect that in every case, regardless of type or location, when an arrested person is first brought before a judicial officer by a peace officer, it is the duty of that judicial officer to advise and inform the arrestee of his rights, and then to determine if there is probable cause to hold him in custody any longer. If not, the arrested person should be discharged. Or the arrestee may admit his guilt immediately. Or he may desire counsel, or an opportunity to bring in witnesses of his own to prove an alibi or other reason why he should not be held in custody. The statute should be flexible, consistent with the rights of the individual and the enforcement of law for the protection of society. Section 109 — 1, and all of Article 109, is designed to afford both.” 38 Ill. Stat. Anno, par. 109 — -i, Committee Comment. These comments make it entirely clear that the reference in section 109 — 1 to the appointment of counsel to represent an indigent defendant “in accordance with the provisions of Section 113 — 3 of this Code” was intended to confine the requirement that attorneys be appointed to represent indigents at preliminary hearings to the class of cases in which attorneys are required to be appointed to represent indigents upon arraignment. And they also make it clear that the right to be represented by appointed attorney exists at the preliminary hearing; that right is not, as the majority holds, deferred until the defendant is arraigned. In my opinion it is unnecessary to consider whether the preliminary hearing is a “critical stage” in the proceedings against the defendant, for the General Assembly has determined that a defendant is entitled to counsel at his preliminary hearing. It has provided that a defendant held on any charge is entitled to be represented by counsel at his preliminary hearing, and that, “except where the penalty is a fine only,” an indigent defendant is entitled to have counsel appointed to represent him at his preliminary hearing. The present case, however, does not immediately involve any question concerning the appointment of counsel to represent an indigent, for the defendant requested that the preliminary hearing be continued so that he could retain counsel, and he has been represented throughout by his retained attorney. If constitutional issues are to be considered, however, the appropriate constitutional referent, in my opinion, is Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 12 L. Ed. 2d 977, in which it was held that the constitutional right to counsel was abrogated when a suspect was denied an opportunity to consult with his retained attorney during his interrogation while in police custody. In the case before us the defendant was in custody and was brought before a judge in a judicial proceeding at which witnesses were sworn and testified against him. The State was represented by an attorney, but the defendant’s request for a continuance to retain an attorney was overridden. That the defendant might have been indicted directly by the grand jury, without any preliminary hearing, is irrelevant. He was not so indicted, and witnesses for the prosecution testified against him in response to leading questions by the prosecutor and by the court. He was not advised that he had a right to testify or to call witnesses in his own behalf. Nor was he advised of his right, under section 109 — 3, to have other witnesses excluded while one witness was testifying, or of his right to have the witnesses kept separate and prevented from communicating with each other until all were examined. That section of the Code emphasizes the importance of the preliminary hearing as a means of perpetuating testimony by its provision that the defendant can not waive preliminary examination, nor can the judge dispense with it, if the prosecuting attorney demands that the witnesses for the State be examined. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1965, chap. 38, par. 109— 3. In their briefs the parties have discussed the consequences that should follow when one who was deprived of his right to be represented by counsel at his preliminary hearing is subsequently indicted and convicted, and they have cited Federal decisions involving violations of Rule 5 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. But since the majority has found no violation of statute or constitution, it is not necessary to discuss them. Mr. Chief Justice Solfisburg joins in this dissent.