Court Opinion

ID: 9961760
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-19 18:06:18.951347+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:46.965432
License: Public Domain

STATE OF LOUISIANA

                              COURT OF APPEAL

 j!o                           FIRST CIRCUIT

                               2023 KA 0993

                          STATE OF LOUISIANA

                                  VERSUS

                    JUDE EVERETTE BOUDREAUX

                                        JUDGMENT RENDERED:        APR 19 2024

         Appealed from the Thirty -Second Judicial District Court
                    Parish of Terrebonne • State of Louisiana
                       Docket Number 821881 • Division A

         The Honorable Timothy C. Ellender, Jr., Presiding Judge

Jane L. Beebe                                     COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT
Louisiana Appellate Project                       DEFENDANT --- Jude Everette
Addis, Louisiana                                  Boudreaux

Joseph L. Waitz, Jr.                              COUNSEL, FOR APPELLEE
District Attorney                                 State of Louisiana
Joseph S. Soignet
Special Prosecutor

Gary Williams
Assistant District Attorney
Houma, Louisiana

         BEFORE: WELCH, WOLFE, AND STROMBERG, JJ.
WELCH, I

         The defendant, Jude Boudreaux, was charged by bill of information with one

count of molestation of a juvenile ( count one), a violation of La. R. S. 14: 81. 2, one

count of sexual battery ( count two), a violation of La. R.S. 14: 43. 1, one count of

aggravated crime against nature ( count three), a violation of La. R.S.               14: 89. 1( A)(2),

and one count of felony carnal knowledge of a juvenile ( count four), a violation of

La. R.S. 14: 80( A)( 1).        He pled not guilty and, following a jury trial, was found guilty

as charged by unanimous verdict on all four counts.                     The trial court denied the

defendant' s motion for new trial and motion for post -verdict judgment of acquittal,

and sentenced the defendant to fifteen years imprisonment at hard labor on count

one, six years imprisonment at hard labor on count two, fifteen years imprisonment

at hard labor on count three, and six years imprisonment at hard labor on count four,

with each sentence to be served consecutively.'                       The trial court denied the

defendant' s motion to reconsider sentence.              The defendant now appeals, challenging

the admission of hearsay evidence, the sufficiency of the evidence, the denial of his

motion for mistrial, and the excessiveness of the sentences.                     For the following

reasons, we affirm the convictions and sentences.

                                                  FACTS

         On September 17, 2020, fourteen -year- old J.H., the victim in this case,

returned from school to the home she shared with her mother, N.S.,                           and her

stepfather, the defendant, in Houma, Louisiana.2 Later that evening, N.S. received

an anonymous text message advising her that J. H. and the defendant exchanged

1 The record reflects that the trial court failed to state that the sentence was to be served without
benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence on count two, as statutorily mandated. See
La. R. S. 14: 43. 1( C)( 1).   However, when a trial court does not mention the restriction of benefits
provided in the sentencing statute, such conditions are self a
                                                             - ctivating pursuant to La. R. S.
15: 301. 1( A). Accordingly, we need not take corrective action. See State v. Lee, 2023- 0079 ( La.
App. 1st Cir. 6/ 2/ 23), 2023 WL 3861763, * 1 n. 1 ( unpublished).

2 Because these charges involve sex offenses, we reference the victim and her family members by
their initials. See La. R. S. 46: 1844( W).

                                                     2
sexually explicit messages and photographs. N.S. called the police, after which J. H.

disclosed that she and the defendant engaged in multiple sexual acts.                        After the

defendant confessed in his interview with police and provided a DNA sample, he

was subsequently arrested.'

                          SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

        In his second assignment of error, the defendant argues the trial court erred in

denying his motion for new trial and motion for post -verdict judgment of acquittal

because the evidence at trial was insufficient to support his conviction on each of

counts one through four.4

        A conviction based on insufficient evidence cannot stand, as it violates due

process.    See U.S. Const. amend. XIV; La. Const. art. I, § 2. The standard of review

for sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction is whether, viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could

have found that the State proved the essential elements of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789,

61 L.Ed.2d 560 ( 1979); State v. Labee, 2022- 0995 ( La. App. 1 st Cir. 2124123), 361

So. 3d 1072, 1076; see also La. C. O.P. art. 821( B).

        When a conviction is based on both direct and circumstantial evidence, the

reviewing court must resolve any conflict in the direct evidence by viewing that

evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. When the direct evidence is

3 The defendant was advised of his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 86 S. Ct.
1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 ( 1966), prior to giving a statement.

a When issues are raised on appeal contesting the sufficiency of the evidence and alleging one or
more trial errors, the reviewing court should first determine the sufficiency of the evidence. State
v. Hearold, 603 So. 2d 731, 734 ( La. 1992); State v. Calloway, 2018- 1396 ( La. App. 1st Cir.
4/ 12/ 19), 276 So. 3d 133, 141, writ denied, 2019- 00869 ( La. 1/ 20/ 21), 308 So. 3d 1164. Further,
we note that the question of the sufficiency of the evidence is properly raised by a motion for post -
verdict judgment of acquittal. See La.C. Cr.P. art. 821. Appellate courts may review the grant or
denial of a motion for new trial only for errors of law. See La. C. Cr.P. art. 858. Accordingly, the
denial of the defendant' s motion for new trial, in part based on La. C. Cr. P. art. 851( 13)( 1), is not
subject to review on appeal. State v. Anthony, 2023- 0117 ( La. App. 1 st Cir. 1113123),          So. 3d
           2023 WL 7270882, * 1 n. 3.

                                                   3
thus viewed, the facts established by the direct evidence and the facts reasonably

inferred from the circumstantial evidence must be sufficient for a rational juror to

conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of every essential

element of the crime.     State v. Coleman, 2021- 0870 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 4/ 8/ 22), 342

So. 3d 7, 12, writ denied, 2022- 00759 ( La. 11/ 21123), 373 So. 3d 460. When a case

involves circumstantial evidence and the jury reasonably rejects the hypothesis of

innocence presented by the defense, that hypothesis falls, and the defendant is guilty

unless there is another hypothesis that raises a reasonable doubt. State v. Bessie,

2021- 1117 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 4/ 8/ 22), 342 So. 3d 17, 22, writ denied, 2022- 00846

 La. 9/ 20122), 346 So.3d 802.

         J. H. testified at trial that at the time of the alleged offenses, she lived with her

mother,    N.S., and her stepfather, the defendant.          J. H. stated that she and the

defendant communicated on Snapchat, where she sent him pictures of her breasts

and vagina, and the defendant sent her a picture of his penis.            These photographs

were also shared in a group conversation with an unknown person, who convinced

J. H. to perform sexual acts with the defendant.'              J. H. also testified that the

anonymous person asked her questions about how the defendant performed oral sex

on her.

         One day after N.S. called the police, she brought J. H. to the Children' s

Advocacy Center ( CAC) for an interview.              J. H.' s CAC statement was largely

consistent with her trial testimony. She explained that she sent nude pictures and

videos of herself to the defendant, after which the defendant sent her a picture of his

penis.    She affirmatively stated that on two separate occasions, while her mother was

away from home, she performed oral sex on the defendant. She also stated that the

defendant touched her breasts and vagina, as well as performed oral sex on her.

 It is unclear from the record whether the anonymous individual in the group conversation is the
same anonymous individual who initially contacted N.S.

                                               4
       Detective Monica Odom with the Terrebonne Parish Sheriff' s Office testified

that at around 11: 00 p.m. on September 17, 2020, she responded to J. H.' s father' s

house, where she spoke with N.S. and J. H.        J. H. told Detective Odom that for

approximately two weeks prior, she and the defendant exchanged sexual messages

and photographs, as well as engaged in sexual acts. Detective Odom testified that

she reviewed J.H.' s phone, after which J. H. confirmed that some photographs

depicted her breasts, and N. S.     identified the defendant' s penis in one of the

photographs.    Detective Odom further testified that J. H. stated that when she

returned home from school that day, the defendant touched her breasts and vagina,

and she performed oral sex on him. J. H. further stated that she performed oral sex

on the defendant on a prior date.    Thereafter, Detective Odom instructed N.S. to

bring J.H. to Children' s Hospital, where a sexual assault kit was performed. Swabs

from J. H.' s breasts, neck, and ear were collected and then submitted for DNA

testing.

       Stacy Williams, an expert in forensic DNA analysis, analyzed the DNA

evidence collected in this case.   Williams testified that swabs from J. H.' s breasts

produced a DNA profile consistent with a mixture of two people.           Additionally,

Williams performed a Y- STR analysis wherein a sample is tested for the presence

of paternal DNA specific to one individual. The Y-STR analysis of the breast swabs

produced a partial Y- STR DNA profile consistent with the defendant' s paternal line.

Accordingly, Williams testified that the defendant and all male individuals within

his biological paternal lineage could not be excluded as the contributor for the Y-

STR DNA profile found on J.H.' s breasts.

       The defendant provided an oral statement to police, which was presented to

the jury. In his statement, the defendant stated his date of birth is July 25, 1974, and

he was forty-six years old at the time of the interview.     He further stated he was

injured in a work-related accident and stayed at home most of the time. Within the

                                           5
two weeks immediately preceding his arrest, he received photographs of J.H.' s

breasts and vagina, as well as a video of J.H. performing a sexual act. Additionally,

he admitted to sending a photograph of his penis; however, he stated he did not

remember whether he sent it to J.H. or the anonymous person in the group chat.

According to the defendant, J. H. repeatedly talked to him about sex and messaged

him asking to perform oral sex on him. He further stated he viewed J.H. as having

the body of a woman. While he initially denied participating in sexual activities with

J. H., he eventually confessed that J. H. performed oral sex on him twice but insisted

she initiated each incident. He further admitted he penetrated her vagina with his

fingers but maintained she grabbed his hand and led him to her vagina.

       On appeal, the defendant argues the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable

doubt that any crime occurred. Specifically, he contends J.H. initiated all sexual

activities,    and he simply refused her sexual advances.           However, the verdicts

rendered in this case indicate the jury found J.H. credible               and   rejected   the

defendant' s hypothesis of innocence.       We cannot say the jury was unreasonable in

doing so.

       In the absence of internal contradiction or irreconcilable conflict with the

physical      evidence,
                          one witness' s testimony, if believed by the trier of fact, is

sufficient to support a factual conclusion.        State v. Brown, 2020- 0150 (La. App. 1 st

Cir. 2/ 19/ 21), 2021 WL 650816, * 10 ( unpublished), writ denied, 2021- 00458 ( La.

6/ 1/ 21), 316 So. 3d 835.     Further, the testimony of the victim alone is sufficient to

prove the elements of the offense.      It is the fact finder who weighs the credibility of

the witnesses, and this court will generally not second- guess those determinations.

Id

Count One: Molestation ofa Juvenile

       Molestation of a juvenile is defined, in pertinent part, as the commission by

anyone over the age of seventeen of any lewd or lascivious act upon the person or in

                                              31
the presence of any child under the age of seventeen, where there is an age difference

of greater than two years between the two persons, with the intention of arousing or

gratifying the sexual desires of either person, by the use of force, violence, duress,

menace, psychological intimidation, threat of great bodily harm, or by the use of

influence by virtue of a position of control or supervision over the juvenile. La. R.S.

14: 81. 2( A)( 1).   The word " lewd" means lustful or indecent and signifies that form

of immorality that relates to sexual impurity carried on in a wanton manner.          It is

identified with obscenity and measured by community norms for morality.                The

word " lascivious"      means tending to incite lust, indecent, obscene, and tending to

deprave the morals in respect to sexual relations. Brown, 2021 WL 650816 at * 4.

          Molestation of a juvenile is a specific intent crime. Brown, 2021 WL 650816

at * 5.   Specific criminal intent is that state of mind that exists when the circumstances

indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to

follow his act or failure to act. La. R.S. 14: 10( 1).   Specific intent need not be proven

as a fact. It maybe inferred from the circumstances of the transaction and the actions

of the defendant.      Specific intent is an ultimate legal conclusion to be resolved by

the fact finder. Brown, 2021 WL 650816 at * 5.

          The testimony adduced at trial established that at the time of the offenses, the

defendant was forty-six years old, and J. H. was fourteen years old. The defendant,

who met J.H. when she was eight years old and subsequently became her stepfather,

had continuous influence, control, and supervision over her.           The defendant was

home with J.H. every day while N.S. was at work, as the defendant was unemployed

due to a work-related injury. Further, J. H.' s trial testimony and CAC statement

established that the defendant and J.H. exchanged sexually explicit messages and

photographs, as well as exposed their genitals to each other. J. H. stated that on one

occasion, she exposed her breasts to the defendant, who then exposed his penis to

her.      Moreover, in his statement to police, the defendant admitted to receiving

                                              11
photographs and videos of J.H.' s genitals, as well as sending a photograph of his

penis to the group chat, where J. H. could view it. Although the defendant stated he

could not remember whether he sent the photograph directly to J.H., J. H. testified

that he did so.     Finally, the defendant described J. H.' s body as womanly, which

suggests he viewed her in a lustful manner.                 Thus, a rational jury could have

concluded the defendant was guilty of molestation of a juvenile.             See Brown, 2021

WL 650816 at * 10- 11.

Count Two: Sexual Battery

        Sexual battery is defined, in pertinent part, as the intentional touching of the

anus or genitals of the victim by the offender using any instrumentality or any part

of the body of the offender, directly or through clothing, or the touching of the anus

or genitals of the offender by the victim using any instrumentality or any part of the

body of the victim, directly or through clothing, when the victim has not yet attained

fifteen years of age and is at least three years younger than the offender. La. R.S.

14: 43. 1( A)(2).   Sexual battery is a general intent crime.           Thus, the only intent

necessary to sustain a conviction is established by the very doing of the proscribed

act.   See La. R.S. 14: 11; Brown, 2021 VVI, 650816 at * 5. General criminal intent is

present whenever there is specific intent, and also when the circumstances indicate

that the offender, in the ordinary course of human experience, must have adverted

to the prescribed criminal consequences as reasonably certain to result from his act

or failure to act. La. R.S. 14: 10( 2).

        In J. H.' s CAC statement, she recounted how the defendant touched her vagina

with his hands. The defendant also admitted to police that he touched J. H.' s vagina

with    his hands    multiple   times     and,   at   one   point,   digitally penetrated her.

Accordingly, a rational jury could have found the evidence proved beyond a

reasonable doubt the defendant committed sexual battery upon J. H.               See State v.
Lilly, 2012- 0008 ( La. App. 1st Cir, 9121112),      111 So. 3d 45, 63, writ denied, 2012-

2277 ( La. 5131/ 13), 118 So. 3d 386.

Count Three: Azeravated Crime A ainst Nature

        Aggravated crime against nature            is defined, in pertinent part,    as   the

commission of any enumerated prohibited act with a person who is under eighteen

years of age and who is known to the offender to be related to the offender as a

 biological, step, or adoptive" child.      La. R.S. 14: 89. 1( A)(2)( a).   Prohibited acts

include sexual battery, carnal knowledge of a juvenile, molestation of a juvenile, or

  a] ny lewd fondling or touching of the person of either the child or the offender,

done or submitted to with the intent to arouse or to satisfy the sexual desires of either

the child, the offender, or both." La. R.S. 14: 89. 1 ( A)( 2)( b)( i) and ( ii). Aggravated

crime against nature is a general intent crime.        Thus, the only intent necessary to

sustain a conviction is established by the very doing of the proscribed act. See La.

R.S. 14: 11; Brown, 2021 WL 650816 at * 5.             Consent shall not be a defense to

prosecution for a violation of this provision. La. R.S. 14: 89. 1 ( A)( 2)( c).

        Herein, there is no dispute regarding the relationship between J.H. and the

defendant, In J.H.' s CAC statement, she stated the defendant touched her breasts,

and DNA consistent with the defendant' s was found on her breasts. Thus, while the

defendant denied touching J. H.' s breasts, the evidence clearly established that he

engaged in the prohibited touching of her breasts. As provided in the statute, consent

is not a defense to the crime of aggravated crime against nature.                  La. R. S.

14: 89. 1 ( A)(2)( c).   Accordingly, the jury could have rationally concluded that the

defendant, with full knowledge that J. H. was his fourteen -year- old stepdaughter,

committed aggravated crime against nature.

Count Four: Felony Carnal Knowledge ofa Juvenile

        Felony carnal knowledge of a juvenile is committed when "[ a] person who is

seventeen years of age or older has sexual intercourse, with consent, with a person

                                              0X
who is thirteen years of age or older but less than seventeen years of age ...        when

the difference between the age of the victim and the age of the offender is four years

or greater[.]"   La. R.S.   14: 80( A)( 1).     Sexual intercourse includes anal,   oral,   or

vaginal sexual intercourse.      La. R.S. 14: 80( B).      Penetration, however slight, is

sufficient to complete the crime. La. R.S. 14: 80( 0).       Felony carnal knowledge of a

juvenile is a general intent crime.           Thus, the only intent necessary to sustain a

conviction is established by the very doing of the proscribed act. See La. R.S. 14: 11;

State v. Granter, 99-3511 ( La. 716! 00), 765 So. 2d 998, 1000.

       J.H.' s CAC statement established that J.H. performed oral sex on the

defendant, and he performed oral sex on her. Moreover, in the defendant' s statement

to police, he admitted that J. H. performed oral sex on him.       Accordingly, a rational

jury could have concluded the defendant, who was forty- six years old, engaged in

oral sexual intercourse with J. H., who was fourteen years old, and was, therefore,

guilty of felony carnal knowledge of a juvenile.

       An appellate court errs by substituting its appreciation of the evidence and

credibility of witnesses for that of the fact finder and thereby overturning a verdict

on the basis of an exculpatory hypothesis of innocence presented to, and rationally

rejected by, the fact finder. See State v. Calloway, 2007- 2306 (La. 1121109), 1 So. 3d

417, 418 ( per curiam).     Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, we find that a rational trier of fact could have found the State proved

beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements of molestation of a juvenile, sexual

battery, aggravated crime against nature, and felony carnal knowledge of a juvenile.

       This assignment of error is without merit.

                    ADMISSION OF HEARSAY EVIDENCE

       In his first assignment of error, the defendant argues the trial court erred in

allowing into evidence a screenshot of a text message conversation between N.S.

and the anonymous person who informed N.S. of the offenses herein.           Specifically,

                                                10
the defendant contends the evidence was hearsay and violated his rights of

confrontation and cross- examination, as well as his right to present a defense.

       The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and

Article 1, §     16 of the Louisiana Constitution guarantee a criminal defendant the

meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.             State v. Dressner, 2008-

1366 ( La. 716110), 45 So. 3d 127, 137, cert. denied, 562 U. S. 1271, 131 S. Ct. 1605,

179 L.Ed.2d 500 ( 2011).              The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment

provides that "[ i] n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ...       to

be confronted with the witnesses against him." Crawford v. Washington, 541 U. S.

36, 421 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1359, 158 L.Ed. 2d 177 ( 2004).              The main purpose of

confrontation rights is to secure for the defendant the opportunity to cross- examine.

State v. Alexander, 2021- 1346 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 7/ 13/ 22), 344 So. 3d 705, 719, writ

denied, 2022- 01262 ( La. 1118123), 373 So.3d 62. Cross- examination is the primary

means by which to test the believability and truthfulness of testimony and has

traditionally been used to impeach or discredit witnesses. Id. at 719- 20.

       Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying

at the present trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter

asserted.      La. C. E.   art.   801( C).   Hearsay is not admissible except as otherwise

provided by the Code of Evidence or other legislation.              La. C. E. art. 802.    If a

statement is offered for a purpose other than for the truth of the matter asserted, then

the statement is not hearsay. State v. Patton, 2010- 1841 ( La. App. 1 st Cir. 6/ 10/ 11),

68 So. 3d 1209, 1219- 20.            Under the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule,

statements are not hearsay if they are " events speaking for themselves under the

immediate pressure of the occurrence, through the instructive, impulsive and

spontaneous words and acts of the participants[.]"           La. C. E. art. 801( D)( 4).   This

doctrine includes not only spontaneous utterances and declarations made before and

after commission of a crime, but also includes testimony of witnesses pertaining to

                                                  11
what they heard or observed before, during, or after the commission of the crime if

the continuous chain of events is evident under the circumstances. Patton, 68 So. 3d

at 1220.

       During J. H.' s testimony, the State presented to the jury a photograph

displaying a text message conversation between N.S. and an anonymous individual.

In that particular conversation, the anonymous person sent a sexual image of J. H.

and asked if it was J. H. The individual then told N.S, they would send a screenshot

of a separate conversation with the defendant. After J. H. testified she was involved

in the conversation between N. S. and the third party, defense counsel objected and

argued the messages were hearsay and J. H. could not authenticate them. The trial

court overruled the objection, noting that J. H. identified the conversation as one in

which she participated.

       When the State later attempted to introduce the photograph, defense counsel

again objected on hearsay grounds and argued the evidence violated the defendant' s

right of confrontation because N.S. and the anonymous individual did not testify.'

After the State declined to present any argument on the matter, the trial court

admitted the photograph.

       On appeal,       the defendant asserts the trial court improperly admitted the

photograph into evidence because the text message conversation did not involve J.H.

but, rather, N.S. and an anonymous individual. Because N.S. and the anonymous

individual did not testify at trial, the defendant contends the evidence should have

been excluded as hearsay.

       We find the trial court properly admitted the photograph into evidence

because it was part of the res gestae and, therefore, did not constitute hearsay. See

La. C. E.   art.   801 ( D)( 4).   The photograph at issue consisted of a text message

6 The defendant also filed a motion in limine to prevent the admission of any statements, writings,
messages, or impressions from the anonymous person. The trial court denied the motion.

                                                12
conversation between N.S. and an anonymous individual who alerted N.S. to the

sexually inappropriate messages between J.H. and the defendant. The evidence was

not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, i.e., that J. H. and the defendant

were in a sexually inappropriate relationship. Rather, the evidence was introduced

to explain how N. S.       became aware of the allegation and why law enforcement

became involved. See La. C.E. art. 801( 0), State v. Mitchell, 2016- 0834 ( La. App.

1st Cir. 9121117), 231 So. 3d 710, 726, writ denied, 2017- 1890 ( La. 8131118), 251

So. 3d 410. A review of the photograph reveals the anonymous person merely asked

if the sexual picture was of J. H. and stated he or she would send a separate

conversation which included the defendant.              Notably, N.S. did not confirm the

picture was of J. H., and the anonymous person did not state the separate conversation

included J. H.    Accordingly, we find the photograph was offered to show how N. S.

became aware of the allegation against the defendant and to explain the sequence of

events leading to the defendant' s arrest. See Mitchell, 231 So. 3d at 726.

       Because      the    challenged   photograph      was     not    hearsay,   there   was     no

confrontation     error.   While N.S.     and the anonymous individual did not testify,

neither of them were identified or established as a witness against the defendant, nor

did they make any statements against the defendant. Further, J. H. did not testify

about the contents of the conversation but merely confirmed that it occurred and that

she was in the photograph.         See Mitchell, 231 So. 3d at 724- 25 ( no confrontation

error where officer testimony regarding investigation did not include content of non -

testifying witness' s statements). Therefore, the defendant has failed to demonstrate

how    the   admission      of   such   evidence     violated    his   constitutional     right   of

confrontation.'

       This assignment of error is without merit.

  Because we find the photograph was not hearsay, we pretermit discussion of the admittance of
such evidence as being harmless error. See State v. Ratley, 2023- 0183 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 9115123),
2023 WL 6014498, * 3 n. 3 ( unpublished).

                                                13
                                MOTION FOR MISTRIAL

       In his third assignment of error, the defendant argues the trial court erred in

denying his motion for mistrial after the State made improper comments in its

closing argument.

       Upon motion of a defendant, a mistrial shall be ordered when prejudicial

conduct in or outside the courtroom makes it impossible for the defendant to obtain

a fair trial, or when authorized by La. C. Cr.P. arts. 770 or 771.             See La. C. Cr.P. art.

775. Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 771 provides:

        In the following cases, upon the request of the defendant or the state,
        the court shall promptly admonish the jury to disregard a remark or
        comment made during the trial, or in argument within the hearing of the
       jury, when the remark is irrelevant or immaterial and of such a nature
       that it might create prejudice against the defendant, or the state, in the
       mind of the jury:

         1)When the remark or comment is made by the judge, the district
       attorney, or a court official, and the remark is not within the scope of
        La. C. Cr.P. art.] 770; or

        2) When the remark or comment is made by a witness or person other
       than the judge, district attorney, or a court official, regardless of
       whether the remark or comment is within the scope of [La.C. Cr.P. art.]
       770.

       In such cases, on motion of the defendant, the court may grant a mistrial
       if it is satisfied that an admonition is not sufficient to assure the
       defendant a fair trial.

       Because the statements at issue are governed by La. C.Cr.P. art. 771, further

discussion of La. C. Cr.P. art. 770 is pretermitted.$ State v. Torres, 2023- 0445 ( La.

8 Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 770 provides, in part:

       Upon motion of a defendant, a mistrial shall be ordered when a remark or comment,
       made within the hearing of the jury by the judge, district attorney, or a court official,
       during the trial or in argument, refers directly or indirectly to:

        1) Race, religion, color or national origin, if the remark or comment is not material
       and relevant and might create prejudice against the defendant in the mind of the
       j ury;

        2) Another crime committed or alleged to have been committed by the defendant
       as to which evidence is not admissible;

        3) The failure of the defendant to testify in his own defense; or

                                                  14
App. 1st Cir. 1119123),           So. 3d ,      2023 WL 7409251, * 3.   The proper remedy

for inappropriate remarks under La. C.Cr.P. art. 771 is an admonishment directing

the jury to disregard the remark. Id. at * 4. However, the court may grant a mistrial

where an admonition is insufficient and the prejudicial remark makes it impossible

for the defendant to obtain a fair trial. See La. C. Cr.P. art. 771. A mistrial is a drastic

remedy, which is warranted only if a comment or remark results in substantial

prejudice to the accused.       The determination of whether a mistrial should be granted

is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and the denial of a motion for mistrial

will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.          Torres, 2023 WL

7409251 at * 4.

        Closing statement arguments shall be confined to evidence admitted, to the

lack of evidence,       to conclusions of fact that the State or defendant may draw

therefrom, and to the law applicable to the case. The argument shall not appeal to

prejudice.      La. C. Cr.P. art. 774.    Although they should not misstate the evidence,

prosecutors are allowed wide latitude in choosing closing argument tactics.             See

State v. Draughn, 2005- 1825 ( La. 1117107), 950 So. 2d 583, 614, cert. denied, 552

U. S.   1012,    128 S. Ct. 537, 169 L.Ed. 2d 377 ( 2007).      The trial court has broad

discretion in controlling the scope of closing arguments, and this court will not

reverse a conviction on the basis of improper closing argument unless thoroughly

convinced that the remarks influenced the jury and contributed to the verdict. Bessie,

342 So. 3d at 27.

        In the beginning of its closing remarks, the State argued the following: " I

apologize for what Jude Boudreaux made you sit through today and this week.                I

apologize that, you know —I apologize to [ J. H.] for what happened to her. And no

 fourteen] -year- old girl should ever have to have that happen to her."

         4) The refusal of the judge to direct a verdict.

                                                  15
         Defense counsel objected, arguing the statements were improper, and the trial

court overruled the objection.      The State continued with its closing argument and

discussed the evidence presented to the jury, during which it stated that the defendant

admitted in his statement to sending a photograph of his penis to J. H.        Defense

counsel again objected, and the trial court again overruled the objection. After the

State finished its closing argument, defense counsel moved for a mistrial. Regarding

the prosecutor' s first statement, the defense argued that the State expressed a

personal opinion about the guilt or innocence of the defendant and appealed to

sympathy,      prejudice,   and fear.   Secondly,   the defense argued the statement

concerning the defendant' s admission to sending a photograph was an improper

misstatement of the evidence.       The trial court denied the motion for mistrial and

stated it did not find any comments in the State' s closing argument to be improper

such that the defendant was prejudiced or that a mistrial was necessary.

         On appeal, the defendant argues the trial court erred in denying the motion for

mistrial because the State directly blamed the defendant for exercising his right to a

trial.
         The defendant further claims the State appealed to the sympathy and prejudice

of the jury by stating that J. H. should not have experienced what happened to her,

thereby placing weight on the jury' s verdict. Finally, the defendant asserts the State

misstated the evidence because the defendant did not admit to sending J.H. a nude

photograph.

         We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court' s denial of the defendant' s

motion for mistrial. With respect to the first portion of the closing argument wherein

the State apologized to the jury and to J. H., we find the comments were based on the

evidence presented at trial and a conclusion of fact the State drew therefrom. The

State made the comments at the beginning of its closing argument, after which it

explained how the evidence admitted established the elements of the offenses. Thus,

the State did not blame the defendant for exercising his right to a trial or due process

                                            16
but, rather, impressed upon the jury its view of the evidence.     Moreover, the State

did not appeal to the prejudice or sympathy of the jury, as the comments did not

suggest the jury' s responsibility to render a guilty verdict.   Further, the trial court

specifically instructed the jury they were not to be influenced by sympathy, passion,

prejudice, or public opinion. Considering the substantial evidence of the defendant' s

guilt, including his own confession, we find the argument was based on the evidence

adduced at trial and did not exceed the proper scope of closing arguments. See State

v. Martin, 93- 0285 ( La. 10117194), 645 So. 2d 190, 199- 200, cert. denied, 515 U.S.

1105, 115 S. Ct. 2252, 132 L.Ed.2d 260 ( 1995) ( prosecutor' s comment alluding to

suffering of victim and victim' s family did not appeal to passion or prejudice, as it

was based on evidence presented at trial).

      With respect to the second remark at issue concerning the defendant' s

admission to sending a photograph to J.H., we find the remark represented the State' s

view of the evidence and was proper. In both her CAC statement and trial testimony,

J. H. stated the defendant sent her a photograph of his penis. While the defendant in

his statement stated he could not remember whether he sent the photograph to J.H.

or the anonymous person in the group chat in which J.H. was a party, he did not deny

sending it. Thus, he admitted to sending a photograph of his penis to J.H. or the

group chat, where J.H., as a member of the group chat, could view the photograph.

Therefore, the State' s remark was not a misstatement of the evidence.

      Moreover, the defendant has failed to demonstrate that the State' s comments

were prejudicial to the extent he was deprived of a fair trial or a mistrial was

necessary. See La. C. Cr.P. arts. 771 and 921.   The trial court instructed the jury that

the opening and closing arguments and statements by attorneys are not evidence and

that they must only consider the evidence or lack of evidence which was admitted at

trial. Much credit should be accorded to the good sense and fairmindedness ofjurors

who have seen the evidence and heard the argument and have been instructed by the

                                          17
trial court that arguments of counsel are not evidence,         Bessie, 342 So. 3d at 28.

Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant' s

motion for mistrial.

       This assignment of error is without merit.

                              EXCESSIVE SENTENCE

       In his fourth assignment of error, the defendant argues the trial court erred in

imposing consecutive sentences on all four counts, resulting in an excessive

sentence.

       The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, §          20,

of the   Louisiana Constitution prohibit the imposition           of cruel   or excessive

punishment.
                 Although a sentence is within statutory limits, it may violate a

defendant' s constitutional right against excessive punishment and is subject to

appellate review.      State v. Kimble, 2023- 0176 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 9/ 21/ 23), 376

So. 3d 869, 874.   A sentence is considered excessive if it is grossly disproportionate

to the severity of the offense or is nothing more than the needless imposition of pain

and suffering.   A sentence is considered grossly disproportionate if,when the crime

and punishment are considered in light of the harm done to society, it shocks one' s

sense of justice. A trial court is given wide discretion in the imposition of sentences

within statutory limits, and an appellate court should not set aside the sentence in the

absence of an abuse of that discretion. Id. at 874- 875,

       Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 894. 1 sets forth factors the trial

court must consider before imposing a sentence. The trial court need not recite the

entire checklist of La. C. Cr.P. art. 894. 1, but the record must reflect that it adequately

considered the criteria.   In light of the criteria expressed by La. C. Cr.P. art. 894. 1,

an appellate court' s review for individual excessiveness should consider the

circumstances of the crime and the trial court' s stated reasons and factual basis for

its sentencing decision. Remand for full compliance with La. C. Cr.P. art. 894. 1 is
unnecessary when a sufficient factual basis for the sentence is shown. Kimble, 376

So. 3d at 874.

         If the defendant is convicted of two or more offenses based on the same act

or transaction, or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan, the terms of

imprisonment shall be served concurrently unless the court expressly directs that

some or all be served consecutively. La. C. Cr.P. art. 883. Thus, La. C.Cr.P. art.

883 specifically excludes from its scope sentences which the court expressly directs

to be served consecutively.        Alexander, 344 So. 3d at 725.    A trial judge retains

discretion to impose consecutive penalties based on the offender' s past criminality,

violence in the charged crimes, or the risk he or she poses to the general safety of

the community.          Although the imposition of consecutive sentences requires

particular justification when the crimes arise from a single course of conduct,

consecutive sentences are not necessarily excessive. The failure to articulate specific

reasons for imposing consecutive sentences does not require remand if the record

provides an adequate factual basis to support the consecutive sentences. Id. at 725-

001

         As to count one, molestation of a juvenile, the defendant was sentenced to

fifteen years imprisonment at hard labor. See La. R.S. 14: 81. 2( B)( 2).     As to count

two, sexual battery, the defendant was sentenced to six years imprisonment at hard

labor.    See La. R.S. 14: 43. 1( C)( 1).   As to count three, aggravated crime against

nature, the defendant was sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment at hard labor. See

La. R.S. 14: 89. 1( C)( 1).   As to count four, felony carnal knowledge of a juvenile, the

defendant was sentenced to six years imprisonment at hard labor.            See La. R.S.

14: 80( D)( 1).   The trial court ordered the sentences to be served consecutively. Thus,

the defendant was sentenced to a total of forty-two years imprisonment at hard labor.

         Prior to sentencing the defendant, the trial court heard a victim impact

statement from J.H.' s mother, N.S., detailing how the incident affected J.H. and their

                                              19
family. The defense then presented a written statement from the defendant, wherein

he expressed his regret over what happened.          In its reasons for sentencing the

defendant, the trial court noted that it considered the factors set forth in La. C. Cr.P.

art. 894. 1.   The trial court specifically noted the defendant' s refusal to accept any

culpability for his actions and the seriousness of     offenses.   The trial court further

found that the defendant, as J.H.' s stepfather, should have known J.H.              was

particularly vulnerable due to her age and her trust in the defendant. Finally, the trial

court found that this case fell outside the parameters of La. C. Cr.P. art. 883, which

allows for concurrent sentences.

        A thorough review of the record reveals the trial court adequately considered

the criteria of La. C. Cr.P. art. 894. 1 and did not manifestly abuse its discretion in

imposing the sentences herein, Further, the sentences imposed were not grossly

disproportionate to the severity of the offenses and thus were not unconstitutionally

excessive.

        We also find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing

consecutive sentences. Although the trial court did not provide as detailed reasoning

for imposing consecutive sentences, the record provides an adequate factual basis to

support the consecutive sentences. See Alexander, 344 So. 3d at 726. The trial court

specifically found there was an undue risk that the defendant would commit another

crime while on probation and that a lesser sentence than the one imposed would

diminish the seriousness of the offenses. See La. CEO, art. 894. 1( A)( 1) and ( 3).

The trial court noted the defendant' s failure to take accountability and to recognize

his actions as criminal in nature.   Moreover, the trial court specifically rejected the

defendant' s assertion that J. H.    initiated the sexual relationship, noting the age

difference and relationship between J. H. and the defendant.       We note as a result of

these offenses,    J.H. continues to deal with long-term effects, such as attending

counseling, experiencing panic and anxiety attacks, and being afraid to go out in

                                            20
public or be in large crowds. Finally, the instant offenses did not arise from the same

course of conduct, nor were they part of a common scheme or plan. See La. C. Cr.P.

art. 883.    Rather, they were four separate and distinct acts over the course of two

weeks.      Therefore, the consecutive sentences imposed by the trial court were not

excessive.    See State v. Young, 2018- 790 ( La. App. 3d Cir. 5/ 1/ 19), 270 So.3d 770,

780 ( no abuse of discretion in trial court' s imposition of consecutive sentences for

first-time sexual offender, where defendant' s actions were not part of a single

occurrence, defendant violated position of trust over victim, and victim had to attend

counseling).

       This assignment of error is without merit.

                                   PATENT ERROR

       Pursuant to La. C. Cr.P. art. 920( 2), this court routinely conducts a review of

all appeals for error discoverable by mere inspection of the pleadings and

proceedings and without inspection of the evidence. State v. Anthony, 2023- 0117

 La. App. 1st Cir. 11/ 3/ 23),     So. 3d ,        2023 WL 7270882, * 5.   After a careful

review of the record, we have found one patent error.

       The record reflects that after the trial court imposed the sentences herein, it

advised the defendant that he had " two years to file post -conviction relief."         A

defendant generally has two years " after the judgment of conviction and sentence

has become final" to seek post -conviction relief La. C. Cr.P. art. 930. 8( A). Thus,

the trial court failed to adequately advise the defendant of the prescriptive period for

seeking post -conviction relief. However, the trial court' s failure to properly advise

the defendant has no bearing on the sentence and is not grounds to reverse the

sentence or remand for resentencing.      State v. LeBoeuf, 2006- 0153 ( La. App. 1 st

Cir. 9/ 15/ 06), 943 So. 2d 1134, 1142- 43, writ denied, 2006- 2621 ( La. 8115/ 07), 961

So.2d 1158.     Accordingly, this error is not reversible, and we decline to remand for

resentencing.

                                              21
      Out of an abundance of caution and in the interest of judicial economy, we

instead note for the record and advise the defendant that La. C. Cr.P. art. 930. 8

generally   provides   that   no   application   for   postconviction   relief,   including

applications which seek an out -of t-ime appeal, shall be considered if it is filed more

than two years after the judgment of conviction and sentence have become final

under the provisions of La. C. Cr.P. arts. 914 or 922. LeBoeuf, 943 So. 2d at 1143.

                                    CONCLUSION

      For all of the above and foregoing reasons, the defendant' s convictions and

sentences are affirmed.

      CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES AFFIRMED.

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