Court Opinion

ID: 9552643
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:14:30.536323+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:28:30.846358
License: Public Domain

BAKES, Justice,
concurring specially:
In O’Neal v. Employment Security Agency, 89 Idaho 313, 404 P.2d 600 (1965), this Court reversed the Industrial Commission and determined that a postal employee who had pleaded guilty to a-felony charge of lewd and lascivious conduct was, as a matter of law, in violation of a postal regulation providing for removal of an employee who exhibited immoral conduct. Interpreting the employee’s dismissal as “dismissal for misconduct,” we recognized a circumstance “where the conduct [of an employee off the working premises] is so closely connected with the business interests of the employer as to warrant disqualification for unemployment benefits.” O’Neal v. Employment Security Agency, supra at 319, 404 P.2d at 606. The holding in O’Neal is equally applicable here. After pleading guilty to a felony charge,1 Beaty was in violation of the City of Idaho Falls Employee Code of Conduct, which specifically states that commission of a felony may be grounds for discharge. Accordingly, Beaty was discharged for misconduct.
Attempts to distinguish this case from O’Neal are unpersuasive. As in O’Neal, Beaty’s conduct off the working premises could seriously impact his job performance and interfere with the employer’s interests. Sanitation workers, who have an implied license to enter the property of others to remove trash and garbage, are in an advantageous position to commit burglaries or theft. Accordingly, the city is entirely justified in discharging for misconduct any sanitation worker who is guilty of such a crime. As S. Craig Lords, the city’s representative, stated in the hearing before the appeals examiner,
*895“Mr. Beaty being a sanitation worker or running a garbage truck, whether it be in the commercial or residential area, has an opportunity to know the habits of a business, whether people are home, whether they’re not home, whether a home is occupied, whether the owner’s gone South for the winter or whatever the case might be. We felt that with the type of conviction, with the type of crime Mr. Beaty pled guilty to, the type of felony that it was, that it lended itself to, you know, give the City some concern in regards to Mr. Beaty and his knowledge of businesses or homes or whatever else, I guess basically.”
Thus, the majority’s suggestion that no reasonable relationship exists between the city's rule and the city’s interest in this case is simply mistaken.
Although I remain unconvinced by the majority’s attempt to distinguish O’Neal, I nevertheless concur in the result here. The record reflects that Beaty was told by a supervisor that the guilty plea would not cause him to lose his job. Thus, although the city was justified in setting the policy expressed in its code of conduct, the city, through the actions of its representatives, modified this policy in this case. Accordingly, on the peculiar facts of this case, I agree with the majority that the Industrial Commission’s order should be affirmed.

. Beaty’s explanation of his reason for entering his guilty plea is irrelevant. Beaty stands convicted of a felony, and it is not this Court’s or the Industrial Commission’s responsibility to retry the issue of his guilt in this proceeding. Beaty should not be permitted to collaterally attack his conviction in this proceeding.