Court Opinion

ID: 9770769
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:21:04.088672+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:20.561194
License: Public Domain

KOCH, Judge,
concurring.
The majority has reached the proper result. However, I file this separate opinion because this case should be decided on procedural grounds alone. The common law writ of certiorari should not be used as a vehicle for appealing a general sessions court’s interlocutory decisions when Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-5-108 (1980) provides an adequate appeal procedure. Therefore, I concur with the majority’s conclusion that the writ was “erroneously granted,” but I decline to join in the remainder of the majority’s opinion.
I.
Connie Clark called the police for help on May 26, 1990. Officer Terry Burnette responded to the call and had some sort of altercation with Ms. Clark while he was questioning three men who had apparently been fighting near Ms. Clark’s house trailer. As a result, Officer Burnette issued Ms. Clark a citation for interfering with a police officer in violation of Metropolitan Ordinance No. 34-1-1.
Ms. Clark moved to dismiss the citation in the Metropolitan General Sessions Court, alleging that Metropolitan Ordinance No. 34-1-1 was unconstitutional and that the citation did not make out a violation of the ordinance. On October 3, 1990, the city moved for permission to file a more detailed account of what transpired at Ms. Clark’s home. The general sessions court granted the city’s motion but also granted Ms. Clark’s motion for a continuance to enable her to seek interlocutory review of its decision in the circuit court.
On November 7, 1990, Ms. Clark filed a petition for a common law writ of certiorari in the Circuit Court for Davidson County. The circuit court signed the fiat on November 12, 1990, and the clerk issued the writ of certiorari on November 13, 1990. On January 22, 1991, the circuit court entered an order finding that the general sessions court acted properly when it permitted the city to file an amended account of the offense. The circuit court thereupon remanded the case to be tried on the merits. Ms. Clark has appealed from the circuit court’s decision.
II.
A common law writ of certiorari provides a vehicle for a court to remove a case from a lower tribunal to determine whether there has been a failure to proceed according to the essential requirements of the law. Gatlinburg Beer Regulation Comm. v. Ogle, 185 Tenn. 482, 486, 206 S.W.2d 891, 893 (1948). It is a discretionary writ, Boyce v. Williams, 215 Tenn. 704, 713-14, 389 S.W.2d 272, 277 (1965), and should not be granted if the person seeking it has other adequate appellate remedies. Pack v. Royal-Globe Ins. Cos., 224 Tenn. 452, 465, 457 S.W.2d 19, 24 (1970); Tragle v. Burdette, 222 Tenn. 531, 533, 438 S.W.2d 736, 737 (1969).
Parties dissatisfied with the general sessions court’s decision have a statutory right to another trial in the circuit court. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 27-5-108(a). The trial in circuit court is de novo which means simply that the case is tried anew. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 27-5-108(c); Allen v. Wood, 38 Tenn. (1 Head) 436, 438 (1858). Contrary to the appellant’s disingenuous *318assertions during argument, the parties may assert the same claims and defenses in the circuit court that they asserted in the general sessions court.
The general sessions court was prepared to hear Ms. Clark’s case on the merits in October, 1990. All these later proceedings would have been unnecessary had she prevailed. Had she been dissatisfied with the outcome, she could have obtained a de novo trial in the circuit court where she could have raised all the claims and defenses she seeks to raise in this certiorari proceeding. As things stand now, over sixteen months have elapsed since the issuance of the citation, and this matter is still not resolved.
Interlocutory appeals are intended to prevent needless, expensive, and protracted litigation. This case demonstrates the folly of circumventing Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-5-108. Making the writ available in circumstances such as this one will only provide defendants with the means to delay their trials in general sessions court and will promote rather than prevent protracted litigation. The circuit court should have summarily denied Ms. Clark’s petition for writ of certiorari.