Court Opinion

ID: 9940848
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-15 16:07:03.458661+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:45:54.085119
License: Public Domain

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                                             RENDERED: FEBRUARY 15, 2024
                                                    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

               Supreme Court of Kentucky
                               2023-SC-0107-MR

BRENDA PORTER                                                        APPELLANT

               ON APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v.                HONORABLE ANNIE O’CONNELL, JUDGE
                           NO. 18-CR-000220

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                              APPELLEE

                    MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT

                                  AFFIRMING

      A Jefferson County jury found Appellant Brenda Porter (Porter) guilty of

murder, tampering with physical evidence, and abusing a corpse. In

accordance with the jury’s recommendation, the trial court sentenced her to a

total of forty years in prison. Porter brings two unpreserved issues on appeal.

Porter claims that (1) during voir dire, the Commonwealth made improper

comments upon her right to remain silent, and (2) the trial court failed to

confirm Porter’s continued desire to be absent from the courtroom during the

cross-examination of the medical examiner. We conclude palpable error relief

is not warranted.

                FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

      On January 19, 2018, Porter killed David Burch (Burch). Two days later,

police were called to perform a welfare check at the residence shared by Burch
and Porter. The caller informed the police that a “black female named Brenda

may have harmed or killed the owner of the vehicle that she is currently

driving.” The police found Burch’s body outside, wrapped in bedding and

plastic tarp. Porter was pulled over in a traffic stop. She voluntarily went to

the police station and gave a Mirandized 1 statement.

      Porter described her long-term, sometime romantic, relationship with

Burch. She shared details of an on-going argument she and Burch had been

having and the fight that occurred when she returned home from work the

morning of January 19. Porter admitted that she lost control and that she hit

Burch on the head multiple times with a heavy statue. According to the

medical examiner’s testimony, Burch had multiple lacerations on his head from

blunt force trauma, resulting in Burch’s death. Porter explained in her

statement that she did not call 911 after the altercation because she did not

think she would be believed. Porter also stated in her interview that she did

not know Burch was dead until later that evening, and, after discovering his

death, did not know what to do. Porter described wrapping Burch’s body in

blankets, moving his body, and cleaning the room where the fight occurred.

      Porter was indicted for committing murder, tampering with physical

evidence, and abusing a corpse. Porter was tried in a five-day trial. The

Commonwealth called fourteen witnesses. Porter testified on her own behalf,

claiming she acted in self-defense. The jury found Porter guilty of all three

      1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

                                         2
crimes. The trial court imposed the sentence recommended by the jury: forty

(40) years for murder, five (5) years for tampering with physical evidence, and

twelve (12) months for abuse of a corpse, running concurrently. This appeal

followed.

                                    ANALYSIS

      Porter brings two issues on appeal. As noted above, Porter argues that

(1) during voir dire, the Commonwealth made improper comments upon her

right to remain silent, and (2) the trial court failed to confirm Porter’s continued

desire to be absent from the courtroom during the cross-examination of the

medical examiner. Because these issues are unpreserved, Porter requests

palpable error review under Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 10.26.

      RCr 10.26 provides:

             A palpable error which affects the substantial rights of a
      party may be considered by the court on motion for a new trial or
      by an appellate court on appeal, even though insufficiently raised
      or preserved for review, and appropriate relief may be granted
      upon a determination that manifest injustice has resulted from the
      error.
An error is palpable when it is “easily perceptible, plain, obvious and readily

noticeable.” Brewer v. Commonwealth, 206 S.W.3d 343, 349 (Ky. 2006)

(quoting Burns v. Level, 957 S.W.2d 218, 222 (Ky. 1997)). To obtain relief, the

error must be “so manifest, fundamental and unambiguous that it threatens

the integrity of the judicial process.” Martin v. Commonwealth, 207 S.W.3d 1, 5

(Ky. 2006). Manifest injustice may be found to have occurred when, after

consideration of the record, the defect alleged “seriously affect[ed]

                                         3
the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceeding.” Id. at 4 (quoting

United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 631 (2002)).

      Porter’s claims are addressed in turn.

I.    UNDER PALPABLE ERROR REVIEW, THE COMMONWEALTH’S VOIR
      DIRE COMMENTS DO NOT WARRANT RELIEF.

      During voir dire, the Commonwealth asked the venire why the burden of

proof in a criminal case is “beyond a reasonable doubt.” After a juror

responded that the standard is meant to avoid a wrongful conviction, the

following exchange occurred between the Commonwealth and the venire.

      Commonwealth Attorney:
            Yes. Um. So the burden or proof is beyond a reasonable
      doubt and the reason for that, yes, is the last thing we ever want is
      someone being wrongfully convicted. That is my nightmare. I do
      not want that. And with a criminal case, liberties are at stake.
      Right? Ms. Porter’s liberties are at stake. That is why we have
      such a high burden — beyond a reasonable doubt. That is my
      burden, and I accept that. And I want each and every one of you
      to hold me to that burden. Can everyone do that? Yes?

      Venire:      Yes.

      Commonwealth Attorney:
            Okay. Thank you. Um. And so again, it is my burden to
      prove, it is my job to prove my case beyond a reasonable doubt.
      With that said, [the defense attorney] and the defense; they do
      not have to do anything. They can sit here throughout this
      entire trial and not say anything. And that is their right.
      Does everyone understand that? Is anyone going to hold that
      against them, if for some reason [the defense attorney] decides
      he doesn’t want to ask any questions, or throughout this trial
      he may not ask witnesses any questions? He may not put on
      any proof; any defense. He is entitled to that. Because again,
      the burden is on me.

      Based upon the portion of the exchange highlighted in bold font, Porter

argues that the Commonwealth’s statements were an improper comment upon

                                         4
her right to remain silent under the Fifth Amendment and Kentucky’s

procedural rules. Porter contends that the Commonwealth’s election to

comment on her right to remain silent during voir dire, and before defense

counsel had the opportunity to first address the issue, is substantial error.

The Commonwealth, on the other hand, disagrees that it commented upon

Porter’s Fifth Amendment privilege and that Kentucky’s procedural rules

prohibit its comment. The Commonwealth asserts that even if its comments

were in error, they did not meet the standard for granting palpable error relief.

      “It is fundamental that a prosecutor may not comment upon a

defendant’s exercise of his right to remain silent.” Slone v. Commonwealth, 382

S.W.3d 851, 860-61 (Ky. 2012). Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965)

(Stewart, J., joined by White, J., dissenting), and Wilson v. United States, 149

U.S. 60, 60 (1893), preceding Griffin, are the United State Supreme Court cases

from which the principle flows. We review these cases as a backdrop to

Porter’s claim.

      In 1893, in Wilson, the United States Supreme Court was tasked with

interpreting a federal statute to determine whether the United States made

improper comments during closing argument. Id. The statute provided

      that in the trial of all indictments, informations, complaints, and
      other proceedings against persons charged with the commission of
      crimes, offenses, and misdemeanors, in the United States courts, .
      . . in any state or territory, including the District of Columbia, the
      person so charged shall, at his own request, but not otherwise, be
      a competent witness; and his failure to make such request shall
      not create any presumption against him.

                                        5
      Wilson, indicted for violating a statute relating to the use of the mail to

give information where and by what means obscene and lewd publications

might be obtained, did not request to be a witness or offer himself as such at

his trial. Id. In closing argument, the district attorney of the United States

commented upon the fact that Wilson had not appeared on the stand, stating

in part, “[I]f I am ever charged with a crime, I will not stop by putting witnesses

on the stand to testify to my good character, but I will go upon the stand, and

hold up my hand before high heaven, and testify to my innocence of the crime.”

Id. Defense counsel objected. The trial court stated in part, “I suppose the

counsel should not comment upon the defendant not taking the stand,” and

the district attorney replied, “I did not mean to refer to it in that light, and I do

not intend to refer in a single word to the fact that he did not testify in his own

behalf.” Defense counsel again objected. Id. Wilson was found guilty of the

charged crimes and appealed. Id. Wilson complained about the district

attorney’s reference to his failure to appear on the stand as a witness and to

testify to his innocence of the charge against him, and the neglect of the trial

court to forbid and condemn such reference. Id. Because the Supreme Court

was unable to say the error was harmless, it reversed the judgment and

remanded the case for a new trial. Id. at 70.

      Analyzing the statute, and its declaration that a criminal defendant’s

failure to request to be a witness in the case shall not create any presumption

against him, the Supreme Court explained that in Wilson’s case, that provision

                                          6
of the statute was plainly disregarded. Id. at 65-66. The Supreme Court

stated:

            To prevent such presumption being created, comment,
      especially hostile comment, upon such failure must necessarily be
      excluded from the jury. The minds of the jurors can only remain
      unaffected from this circumstance by excluding all reference to it.

                ....

             [While a criminal defendant may choose to testify on his own
      behalf and be successful in establishing his innocence] the act was
      framed with a due regard also to those who might prefer to rely
      upon the presumption of innocence which the law gives to every
      one, and not wish to be witnesses. It is not every one who can
      safely venture on the witness stand, though entirely innocent of
      the charge against him. Excessive timidity, nervousness when
      facing others and attempting to explain transactions of a
      suspicious character, and offenses charged against him, will often
      confuse and embarrass him to such a degree as to increase rather
      than remove prejudices against him. It is not every one, however
      honest, who would therefore willingly be placed on the witness
      stand. The statute, in tenderness to the weakness of those who
      from the causes mentioned might refuse to ask to be witnesses,
      particularly when they may have been in some degree
      compromised by their association with others, declares that the
      failure of a defendant in a criminal action to request to be a
      witness shall not create any presumption against him.

Id. at 65-66.

      The Supreme Court remarked that the trial court, in the face of

comments which plainly intimated to the jury that it was a “circumstance

against the innocence of the defendant that he did not go on the stand and

testify[,]” should have said that the counsel is forbidden by the statute to make

any comment which would create or tend to create a presumption against the

defendant from his failure to take the stand. Id. at 67. The Supreme Court

concluded that the impression was left on the minds of the jury that, if Wilson

                                        7
were an innocent man, he would have gone on the stand as the district

attorney stated he himself would have done. Id.

      In 1965, less than a year after the self-incrimination provision of the

Fifth Amendment was found applicable to state trials by the Fourteenth

Amendment, see Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), the United States

Supreme Court granted certiorari in Griffin, 380 U.S. 609, to address whether a

California constitutional provision violated the Fifth Amendment clause that no

person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against

himself.” Id. at 612; U.S. Const. amend. V. While the California Constitution

stated that “No person shall . . . be compelled, in any criminal case, to be a

witness against himself,” it further provided that “in any criminal case, whether

the defendant testifies or not, his failure to explain or to deny by his testimony

any evidence or facts in the case against him may be commented upon by the

court and by counsel, and may be considered by the court or the jury.” See

People v. Modesto, 398 P.2d 753, 759 n.1 (Cal. 1965) (quoting Cal. Const. art. I,

§ 13), overruled by Griffin, 380 U.S. 609; Griffin, 380 U.S. at 610 n.10, 617.

      The prosecutor’s closing argument in Griffin’s murder trial and the trial

court’s instruction to the jury were in conformity with this provision. In light of

evidence placing Griffin with the victim the evening of her death and evidence

placing him with her in the alley where her body was found, the prosecutor

emphasized Griffin’s failure to testify and deny or explain the evidence against

him. Id. at 610-11. The trial judge instructed the jury as follows:

                                        8
      It is a constitutional right of a defendant in a criminal trial that he
      may not be compelled to testify. Thus, whether or not he does
      testify rests entirely in his own decision. As to any evidence or
      facts against him which the defendant can reasonably be expected
      to deny or explain because of facts within his knowledge, if he does
      not testify, or if, though he does testify, he fails to deny or explain
      such evidence, the jury may take that failure into consideration as
      tending to indicate the truth of such evidence and as indicating
      that among the inferences that may be reasonably drawn
      therefrom those unfavorable to the defendant are the more
      probable. In this connection, however, it should be noted that if a
      defendant does not have the knowledge that he would need to deny
      or to explain any certain evidence against him, it would be
      unreasonable to draw an inference unfavorable to him because of
      his failure to deny or explain such evidence. The failure of a
      defendant to deny or explain evidence against him does not create
      a presumption of guilt or by itself warrant an inference of guilt, nor
      does it relieve the prosecution of its burden of proving every
      essential element of the crime and the guilt of the defendant
      beyond a reasonable doubt.

Id. at 618. The jury found Griffin guilty as charged, and his conviction was

affirmed by the Supreme Court of California. Id.

      The United States Supreme Court framed its analysis around the federal

statute considered in Wilson. The Supreme Court viewed the statute as

reflecting the spirit of the Self-Incrimination Clause, stating, “[f]or comment on

the refusal to testify is a remnant of the ‘inquisitorial system of criminal

justice,’ which the Fifth Amendment outlaws.” Griffin, 380 U.S. at 614 (citation

omitted). The Supreme Court further explained, “[The comment on the

defendant’s silence] is a penalty imposed by courts for exercising a

constitutional privilege. It cuts down on the privilege by making its assertion

costly.” Id. Consequently, the Supreme Court concluded that the California

comment rule violated the Fifth Amendment, describing it in substance, “a rule

                                         9
of evidence that allows the State the privilege of tendering to the jury for its

consideration the failure of the accused to testify. No formal offer of proof is

made as in other situations; but the prosecutor’s comment and the court’s

acquiescence are the equivalent of an offer of evidence and its acceptance.” Id.

at 613. Often cited, the Supreme Court ultimately concluded

that “the Fifth Amendment . . . forbids either comment by the prosecution on

the accused’s silence or instructions by the court that such silence is evidence

of guilt.” Id. at 615.

      While questions of whether a prosecutor’s closing arguments improperly

infringed on the criminal defendant’s right to remain silent are not uncommon

in this Court, 2 like recently rendered, Finch v. Commonwealth, 681 S.W.3d 84

      2 See, for example, Ragland v. Commonwealth, 191 S.W.3d 569, 588-91 (Ky.

2006). In Ragland, the Court considered whether the Commonwealth’s indirect
comment during closing argument about the defendant's failure to testify required
reversal. The Court explained, id. at 589-90, that for indirect comments,

      it is generally accepted that a comment violates a defendant's
      constitutional privilege against compulsory self-incrimination only when
      it was manifestly intended to be, or was of such character that the jury
      would necessarily take it to be, a comment upon the defendant’s failure
      to testify, Butler v. Rose, 686 F.2d 1163, 1170 (6th Cir. 1982); Knowles v.
      United States, 224 F.2d 168, 170 (10th Cir. 1955); Byrd v.
      Commonwealth, 825 S.W.2d 272, 275 (Ky. 1992) (“A prosecutor’s
      comment on the failure of a defendant to testify must be manifestly
      intended to reflect on the accused’s silence or of such a character that
      the jury would naturally and necessarily take it as such to constitute
      prejudice.” (citing Bagby v. Sowders, 894 F.2d 792 (6th Cir. 1990)),
      overruled on other grounds by Shadowen v. Commonwealth, 82 S.W.3d
      896, 897–98 (Ky. 2002)), or invited the jury to draw an adverse inference
      of guilt from that failure. [United States v.] Robinson, 485 U.S. [25,] 33-
      34 [1988] [(parallel citations omitted)]; Moore [v. State], 669 N.E.2d [733,]
      739 [(Ind. 1996)].

                                           10
(Ky. 2023), this case is another in which the defendant has raised a novel

question — whether the prosecutor’s comments during voir dire infringed upon

the defendant’s right to remain silent. The only Kentucky case cited in the

parties’ briefs as being on point is Lanham v. Commonwealth, 2015-SC-

000388-MR, 2016 WL 2605627 (Ky. May 5, 2016), an unpublished case.

Finch, rendered just prior to the completion of briefing in this case, is not cited.

      Here, Porter cites Florida Supreme Court and Oklahoma Court of

Criminal Appeals cases in support of her argument that in voir dire, the

Commonwealth should be precluded from preemptively initiating comments

about an accused’s right to remain silent. In terms of analysis, Porter

describes parenthetically the principle from each case. A brief review of the

cases reveals that Florida and Oklahoma share a similar view of the

constitutional restraints upon a prosecutor’s comments; 3 while it appears that

any prosecutorial comment during trial about the defendant’s right to remain

silent is considered error, the error is analyzed under the appropriate standard

of review. 4 Porter also cites a United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit

(Texas) case to show that contrary authority exists. Texas, on the other hand,

      3 Porter cites Marston v. State, 136 So. 3d 563, 570-71 (Fla. 2014); Grieve v.

State, 731 So. 2d 84, 84 (Fla. 4th Dist. App. 1999); Varona v. State, 674 So. 2d 823,
825 (Fla. 4th Dist. App. 1996); and Stover v. State, 617 P.2d 898, 900-01 (Okla. Crim.
Cir. 1998).
      4 As reflected in Marston v. State, 136 So. 3d 563 (Fla. 2014), discussed below,

Florida also recognizes the role the state’s criminal procedure rules play in limiting the
prosecutor’s comments.

                                           11
appears to view a prosecutor’s voir dire questions about the defendant not

testifying as not implicating Fifth Amendment concerns.

      Marston v. State, the Florida Supreme Court case and the most recent of

the Florida cases cited by Porter, explains Florida’s approach as follows:

             “[Florida has] a very liberal rule for determining whether a
      comment constitutes a comment on silence.” State v. DiGuilio, 491
      So. 2d 1129, 1135 (Fla. 1986). “[A]ny comment on, or which is
      fairly susceptible of being interpreted as referring to, a defendant's
      failure to testify is error and is strongly discouraged.” Rodriguez v.
      State, 753 So. 2d 29, 37 (Fla. 2000) (quoting State v. Marshall, 476
      So. 2d 150, 153 (Fla. 1985)); see also DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d at 1139
      (“[A]ny comment, direct or indirect, by anyone at trial on the right
      of the defendant not to testify or to remain silent is constitutional
      error and should be avoided.”). “Because of the common belief that
      the innocent have nothing to hide, courts vigilantly protect the
      right to remain silent against devaluation by innuendo or faint
      praise.” Varona [v. State], 674 So. 2d [823,] 825 [(Fla. 4th Dist.
      App. 1996)].

            In addition to [Florida’s] case law, Florida Rule of Criminal
      Procedure 3.250 prohibits the prosecutor from commenting on the
      defendant’s failure to testify:

            In all criminal prosecutions the accused may choose to
            be sworn as a witness in the accused's own behalf and
            shall in that case be subject to examination as other
            witnesses, but no accused person shall be compelled
            to give testimony against himself or herself, nor shall
            any prosecuting attorney be permitted before the jury or
            court to comment on the failure of the accused to testify
            in his or her own behalf.

      Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.250 (emphasis added). Florida Standard Jury
      Instruction 2.1 (criminal), states in pertinent part, “From the
      exercise of a defendant's right to remain silent, a jury is not
      permitted to draw any inference of guilt, and the fact that a
      defendant did not take the witness stand must not influence your
      verdict in any manner whatsoever.” This portion of Standard Jury
      Instruction 2.1 is given only if requested by the defendant.

136 So. 3d 563, 569-70 (Fla. 2014) (footnote omitted).

                                       12
      Hanf v. State, explains Oklahoma’s approach, which was applied to the

prosecutor’s voir dire comments in Stover v. State, 617 P.2d at 900-01:

      This Court [considering Texas law] held in Girdner that:

            ‘(T)he mere oblique reference to the failure of the defendant
      to take the stand was made at a time when the prosecutor could
      not possibly have known whether the defendant would testify or
      not. In such instances, where the comment is made in the
      evidentiary stage of trial, as it arose in this case, the remark could
      not be construed as a comment on the defendant's failure to testify
      in that his failure has not yet become a fact.’ [Girdner v. State, 508
      P.2d 683, 686 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973)].

             After a careful consideration of all the facts in that case and
      an examination of the facts in the case at bar, this Court is of the
      opinion that the first holding in Girdner cannot stand. It is error
      for the prosecutor to comment—either directly or indirectly—At any
      stage of the jury trial—upon the defendant’s right to remain silent.
      Therefore, we specifically overrule Girdner insofar as it allows the
      prosecutor to comment upon the defendant’s right to testify or
      remain silent ‘in the evidentiary stage of trial . . . in that his failure
      (to testify) has not yet become a fact.’ Id.

560 P.2d 207, 211 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977) (footnotes omitted).

      Green v. Johnson describes a contrasting approach under Texas law.

Green states:

             A prosecutor’s statements regarding a defendant’s failure to
      testify made after the introduction of evidence may violate the Fifth
      Amendment. See United States v. Johnston, 127 F.3d 380, 396
      (5th Cir. 1997). During voir dire, however, before the introduction
      of any evidence, the prosecution may attempt to determine if a
      prospective juror will be prejudiced against the state by the
      absence of live testimony from the defendant. See Campos v. State,
      589 S.W.2d 424, 426 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (stating that because
      the state's counsel had no way of knowing whether the defendant
      would testify, it was not necessarily error to comment on the
      defendant’s potential failure to testify during voir dire); see also
      Sanders v. State, 963 S.W.2d 184, 190 (Tex. App. Corpus Christi
      1998, n.w.h.). This is a valid area of voir dire inquiry under Texas

                                         13
      law as a prospective juror should be told what the law is before
      being excused for bias or prejudice against that law. See Cuevas v.
      State, 742 S.W.2d 331, 343 n. 12 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).

160 F.3d 1029, 1038 (5th Cir. 1998).

      As reflected in these state cases and the United States Supreme Court

cases discussed above, constitutional, statutory and procedural rules may play

a role in determining whether comments at trial infringe upon a defendant’s

right to remain silent and not testify. Here, the parties cite Kentucky Revised

Statute (KRS) 421.225, 5 RCr 9.38, 6 and RCr 9.54(3) 7 as pertinent to deciding

whether the prosecutor may properly comment during voir dire on a

defendant’s right to remain silent.

      Porter advocates for a rule barring the prosecution from initiating

comments about an accused’s right to remain silent during voir dire. She

argues that, in addition to being in agreement with the importance placed on

      5 KRS 421.225 states: “In any criminal or penal prosecution the defendant, on

his own request, shall be allowed to testify in his own behalf, but his failure to do so
shall not be commented upon or create any presumption against him.”
      6 RCr 9.38, pertaining to the examination of jurors, states, in part:

             The court may permit the attorney for the Commonwealth and the
      defendant or the defendant's attorney to conduct the examination of
      prospective jurors or may itself conduct the examination. In the latter
      event the court shall permit the attorney for the Commonwealth and the
      defendant or the defendant's attorney to supplement the examination by
      such further inquiry as it deems proper.
      7 RCr 9.54(3) states:

              The instructions shall not make any reference to a defendant’s
      failure to testify unless so requested by the defendant, in which event the
      court shall give an instruction to the effect that a defendant is not
      compelled to testify and that the jury shall not draw any inference of
      guilt from the defendant’s election not to testify and shall not allow it to
      prejudice the defendant in any way.

                                           14
the constitutional right to remain silent, such a rule would be consistent with

Kentucky’s recognition in RCr 9.54(3) and unpublished Lanham, that, in jury

instructions, comments about the right to remain silent should remain within

the exclusive province of the defendant. 2016 WL 2605627, at *3.

      In Lanham, in addition to complaining about the prosecutor’s voir dire

comments, Lanham complained on appeal that the jury instructions

impermissibly commented on his right not to testify against himself. Id.

Lanham explained that because of the prosecutor’s previous statement during

voir dire concerning Lanham’s decision not to testify, he made a strategic

decision not to draw attention to the prosecutor’s statement and requested that

the trial court not instruct the jury on his Fifth Amendment right against self-

incrimination and that failure to testify cannot be construed as a presumption

of guilt. Id. The trial court denied Lanham’s request and the jury was

presented with the contested instruction. Id.

      Because this Court had previously acknowledged in Thornton v.

Commonwealth, 421 S.W.3d 372, 377 (Ky. 2013), that it can be a valid trial

strategy not to instruct the jury on the defendant’s Fifth Amendment right not

to testify, 8 and unlike in Thornton, Lanham had properly preserved his

      8 Id. at 377 (footnote omitted) states:

      Furthermore, RCr 9.54(3) conditions the entitlement to such an
      instruction upon a specific request by the defendant. We are well aware
      that some defendants in a criminal trial prefer, and therefore request, a
      specific instruction on the right to remain silent; others under the same
      circumstances prefer not to bring to the jury's attention their decision
      not to testify. When the defendant fails to request the instruction
      pursuant to RCr 9.54(3), neither a trial court nor an appellate court can
      know if the decision was a purposeful or a negligent omission.
                                           15
objection, as a matter of first impression, the Court considered whether the

court’s denial of Lanham’s request was error, and whether such error required

reversal. Lanham, 2016 WL 2605627, at *3. The Court concluded that RCr

9.54(3) 9 is unambiguous, and consequently, under its plain language, the trial

court abused its discretion by declining Lanham’s request to omit the contested

instruction. The Court, however, concluded that the error was harmless. Id. at

*3-4.

        The Commonwealth rebuts Porter’s argument with RCr 9.38, 10 the rule

under which voir dire is conducted, and argues that there is no Kentucky

precedent for extending RCr 9.54’s prohibition to the voir dire process. And in

regard to the Florida and Oklahoma cases cited by Porter, without detail, the

Commonwealth argues that those states have a different rule governing

commenting on a defendant’s silence, even during voir dire, and the rules are

distinctly different from KRS 421.225. 11 The Commonwealth, citing Thompson

v. Commonwealth, 147 S.W.3d 22, 51 (Ky. 2004), 12 in support, contends that

        Accordingly, Appellant is not entitled to consideration of the issue on
        appeal under RCr 10.26.
        9 See note 7, supra.

        10 See note 6, supra.

        11 See note 5, supra.

        12 Thompson considered whether the trial court erred by not excusing six jurors

for cause because of their attitudes in favor of the death penalty. It states, “The test
for determining whether a juror should be stricken for cause is “whether, after having
heard all of the evidence, the prospective juror can conform his views to the
requirements of the law and render a fair and impartial verdict.” 147 S.W.3d at 51
(quoting Mabe v. Commonwealth, 884 S.W.2d 668, 671 (Ky. 1994), superseded by
other grounds by statute).

                                            16
any party or the trial court is allowed to voir dire prospective jurors on their

ability to render a fair and impartial verdict in accordance with the facts and

applicable law.

      Beyond arguing that Kentucky’s procedural rules do not support Porter’s

argument that the Commonwealth improperly commented during voir dire

upon her right to remain silent, the Commonwealth views Lanham as

persuasive here because it dealt with a similar issue; however, in Lanham,

unlike here, the issue was preserved. Nevertheless, upon review, we do not

find Lanham as lending analytical support to the voir-dire issue in this case.

Lanham did not develop his argument in his brief and the Court’s analysis of

the voir dire issue does not cite case law. 13

      Lanham alleged his right under the Fifth Amendment and KRS 421.225

not to testify against himself was violated. Id. at *3. Lanham claimed that

during voir dire, the prosecutor impermissibly referenced the possibility that he

may choose not to testify during trial. Id. In Lanham’s case, the prosecutor

informed the venire panel that “if the defendant decides not to testify you can’t

consider it.” Id. The prosecutor then asked the panel if everyone understood

and agreed that “it’s ok if he doesn’t testify.” Id. The trial court denied

Lanham’s motion to discharge the panel. Id. This Court explained that while

      13 Furthermore, Lanham is a multiple issue case.     Lanham raised five issues on
appeal. 2016 WL 2605627, at *1. Without separate opinion, three Justices concurred
only in affirming the trial court’s judgment. Id. at *5. Notably, the Fifth Amendment
jury instruction decision which Porter cites in her favor was described as an issue of
first impression. Id. at *3.

                                          17
the appellant did not develop his argument beyond a facial claim that the

prosecutor’s statements constituted error, no error occurred. Id. The Court

stated: “It is permissible and, in fact, common for defense counsel to ask these

types of question during voir dire. And if defense counsel is permitted to ask

these questions, then so can the Commonwealth.” Id.

      Lastly, although not cited in the parties’ briefs, we consider recently

decided Finch. Like in this case, Finch requested palpable error review of the

prosecutor’s voir dire comments. 14 We viewed the prosecutor’s comments in

context and acknowledged that the prosecutor’s comments about the right to

remain silent during voir dire may be distinguished as statements describing

the law, but we also agreed with the Commonwealth that any error did not

warrant palpable error relief. We stated:

      In order to be prejudicial, “[a] prosecutor’s comment on the failure
      of a defendant to testify must be manifestly intended to reflect on
      the accused’s silence or of such a character that the jury would
      naturally and necessarily take it as such to constitute prejudice.”
      Here, the Commonwealth’s statement that the defendant had a

      14 In Finch, 681 S.W.3d at 91, the defendant complained about the prosecutor’s

statement highlighted in bold font:
      So, I’m sure that [defense counsel] will talk about this a little bit more,
      but on the topic of credibility and your ability to weigh it and just
      testimonial evidence in general, the defendant has the right to remain
      silent. He has the right to choose not to testify in this case, he does
      not have to do that. And you cannot hold it against him if he
      chooses not to testify. Do we all agree with that? Okay. However, if
      the defendant does choose to testify, do we all agree that we have to
      weigh his credibility the same way that you weigh any other
      witness’ credibility? Can we all agree to do that? Whenever a person
      takes the stand the judge is going to have them swear to tell the truth,
      and that's taken very seriously in a court of law. Is there anybody here
      who feels that if the defendant takes the stand he has less of a duty to
      tell the truth simply because he is the one in trouble? No? Again,
      self-preservation, we all do it.

                                          18
      right not to testify and that the jury could not hold his decision not
      to testify against him was just an accurate statement of the law.
      Moreover, as the statement occurred during voir dire, it could not
      have been a comment on Finch’s failure to testify as the
      opportunity to testify had not yet presented itself. The remainder
      of the complained of language seems to be meant to assess
      whether anyone in the venire would view a defendant’s credibility
      differently than any other witness. This served the fundamental
      purpose of voir dire: “to obtain a fair and impartial jury whose
      minds are free and clear from all interest, bias, or prejudice that
      might prevent their finding a just and true verdict.” Finally, given
      the strength of the evidence against Finch, there is no substantial
      possibility that, absent this fleeting statement made during voir
      dire, the outcome of the trial would have been different.

681 S.W.3d at 91 (internal citations omitted).

      In Finch, the appellant urged the Court to adopt a rule that categorically

precludes the Commonwealth during voir dire from making comments about a

defendant’s right to remain silent. Id. Here, in contrast to Finch, Porter

requests a tempered rule: during voir dire, the Commonwealth is precluded

from commenting on a defendant’s right to remain silent until defense counsel

first addresses the issue. However, if a rule specific to voir dire is to be

pronounced, it is better left to another day when counsels’ arguments are more

developed, perhaps as a result of preserved challenge, and fully briefed to the

Court. Accordingly, here, as in Finch, we conclude that under palpable error

review, even if the voir dire comments were improper, they do not justify relief.

Porter does not present any arguments to show that manifest injustice resulted

from the comments; there was more than sufficient evidence to induce a

reasonable juror to believe that Porter was guilty of murder, tampering with

physical evidence and abuse of a corpse.

                                         19
II.   UNDER PALPABLE ERROR REVIEW, PORTER’S ABSENCE FROM THE
      COURTROOM DURING THE MEDICAL EXAMINER’S CROSS-
      EXAMINATION DOES NOT WARRANT RELIEF.

      The Commonwealth called the medical examiner to testify about the

autopsy conducted on Burch. The medical examiner testified that Burch

suffered multiple blunt and sharp force injuries, and that he recommended to

the coroner that the cause of death be ruled a homicide. Porter started crying

when the medical examiner described photos, projected for the jury to view,

showing receipt of Burch’s body wrapped in layers of covering and showing

stages of Burch’s body being unwrapped. The trial court excused the jury and

took a recess to allow defense counsel to speak with Porter. After the recess, at

a bench conference, the trial court stated that it was understandable that

Porter was upset. The trial court explained that it could not allow disruption

during the testimony and indicated the desire for Porter to maintain composure

during the rest of the testimony. The trial court then explained to Porter that

she had the right to waive her presence during that part of the trial, and if she

chose to do so, she could wait in a conference room while the medical examiner

testified. The trial court stated:

      You do have the right to waive your presence in the courtroom
      during this portion of the trial if you want, and if you would prefer
      to sit outside in a conference room and during this testimony, you
      could do that. I suggest that you talk to [your attorney] about
      whether or not he thinks that would be a good idea for your
      defense at this stage. But I will permit you to sit in a conference
      room during this testimony. Do you want to talk to [your attorney]
      about it and see whether that’s a good idea?

      After defense counsel spoke with Porter, on the record, defense counsel

relayed that against his advice, Porter chose to wait in the conference room.
                                       20
The trial court stated: “Okay, I will permit her to sit in the conference room

during this particular testimony, and we will proceed.”

      After the Commonwealth completed its direct examination of the medical

examiner, there was no break in the proceedings before defense counsel

conducted the cross-examination which lasted less than two minutes. Porter’s

counsel did not request that Porter return to the courtroom before the cross-

examination.

      Porter argues on appeal that the failure of the trial court to confirm with

her a continued desire to be absent from the proceedings during cross-

examination of the Commonwealth’s witness warrants reversal. She argues

that her absence during the medical examiner’s cross-examination deprived

her of the ability to consult with her counsel about areas of cross-examination

regarding the nature and extent of Burch’s injuries that would have been

crucial to her self-defense theory, and that the cross-examination of the

medical examiner was a critical stage of the criminal proceedings and the

record does not establish a knowing waiver of her right to be present for the

cross-examination of that witness. The Commonwealth argues that Porter

voluntarily waiver her presence at trial and that even if error occurred, it did

not rise to the level of palpable error. 15

      RCr 8.28(1) provides:

      15 The Commonwealth argues first, citing Graves v. Commonwealth, 384

S.W.3d 144 (Ky. 2012), that Porter’s claim of error should not be reviewed
because of invited error, i.e., Porter knowingly relinquished the right to be
present and is “splitting hairs” as to whether she waived her absence for all of
the medical examiner’s testimony. We do not find that argument persuasive
here.

                                          21
      The defendant shall be present at the arraignment, at every critical
      stage of the trial including the empaneling of the jury and the
      return of the verdict, and at the imposition of the sentence. The
      defendant's voluntary absence after the trial has been commenced
      in his or her presence shall not prevent proceeding with the trial
      up to and including the verdict. The defendant may be permitted
      to remain on bail during the trial. Upon a hearing and finding by
      the trial court, that a defendant in custody on any charge,
      including a felony, intentionally refuses to appear for any
      proceeding, including trial, short of physical force, such refusal
      shall be deemed a waiver of the defendant's right to appear at that
      proceeding.

      The parties do not dispute that the medical examiner’s cross-

examination was a critical stage of the trial. While acknowledging, citing

Fugate v. Commonwealth, 62 S.W.3d 15, 19 (Ky. 2001), that even the

most basic rights of criminal defendants, including the right to be

present at a critical stage of trial, are subject to waiver, Porter cites

Powell v. Commonwealth, 346 S.W.2d 731, 734 (Ky. 1961), for the

premise that the “waiver should be so clear and unequivocal as to

indicate a conscious intent.” Porter contends that the fact she waived

her presence for that portion of the direct examination is insufficient, as

a matter of law, to constitute a waiver of her presence during her

counsel’s cross-examination of the medical examiner and that the record

does not adequately establish that she intended to do so for that portion

of the witness’s testimony. Porter views the trial court’s grant of Porter’s

absence “during this particular testimony,” without clarifying that Porter

also wished to remain absent if the testimony no longer involved autopsy

                                          22
photos, as depriving her of her ability to consult with counsel and

constituting palpable error.

      To support its argument that Porter voluntarily waived her right to be

present during the testimony of the medical examiner, the Commonwealth

primarily relies on Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 344 (1970). In Allen, the

defendant was removed from the courtroom during voir dire due to his

disruptive and disrespectful behavior. Id. at 340. During a noon recess, Allen

complained to the trial court about the fairness of the trial and said he wanted

to be present during his trial. Id. The trial court told Allen he could remain in

the courtroom if he behaved himself and did not interfere with the introduction

of the case. Id. When Allen disrupted the proceedings, he was again removed

from the courtroom. Id. at 340-41. During the prosecution’s case-in-chief,

Allen was brought in on several occasions for the purposes of identification. Id.

at 341. After the prosecution ended its presentation of evidence, the trial court

again informed Allen that he could return to the courtroom whenever he agreed

to conduct himself properly. Id. Allen remained in the courtroom for the rest

of the trial. Id. The United States Supreme Court concluded that under the

circumstances of the case, the trial court acted within its discretion when

removing Allen from his trial. Id. at 346-47.

      The Commonwealth views the cause of Porter’s absence as similar

to the defendant in Allen in that her behavior led to her voluntary

absence from the trial. Therefore, Porter cannot now claim that her

absence constituted palpable error.

                                        23
      We are not inclined to view Allen and its application to this case in

the light described by the Commonwealth. Porter apparently did not

purposefully engage in behavior designed to disrupt the proceedings,

generally, or to disrupt the medical examiner’s testimony, specifically.

Porter was present and non-disruptive during the medical examiner’s

testimony before the autopsy photos were displayed and she was not

disruptive after she returned to the courtroom.

      Porter, citing Commonwealth v. Jackson, 529 S.W.3d 739, 746-47

(Ky. 2017), contends that the because the record here is, at best,

ambiguous with respect to the adequacy of the knowing relinquishment

of a constitutionally protected right, waiver of that right should not be

presumed. Porter further argues, citing Grady v. Commonwealth, 325

S.W.3d 333, 342 (Ky. 2010); State v. Ui, 418 P.3d 628, 634 (Haw. 2018);

State v. Tribble, 67 A.3d 210, 222 (Vt. 2012); and State v. Larraco, 93

P.3d 725, 728 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004), that the fact that defense counsel

did not request that Porter return to the courtroom prior to the beginning

of the cross-examination is not determinative because it is or should be

incumbent upon the trial court to establish Porter’s knowing waiver of

that fundamental constitutional right on the record.

      We assume for analysis that the trial court’s advisement to Porter that

she needed to maintain composure during the rest of the testimony and that

she could waive her presence “during this particular testimony,” advisement

which Porter complains did not contain clarification that Porter’s absence

                                        24
would extend beyond the prosecution’s direct examination, was an easily

perceptible, plain, obvious and readily noticeable error. Even so, upon

consideration of the record, we conclude that manifest injustice did not result

from the alleged error. While Porter alleges that her presence in the courtroom

during the medical examiner’s cross-examination would have allowed her to

consult with her counsel about areas critical to her self-defense theory, that

allegation does not detail how her self-defense theory would have changed and

influenced the outcome of the trial. We conclude the alleged error did not

seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the trial. Martin,

207 S.W.3d at 4.

                                   CONCLUSION

      For the foregoing reasons, the Jefferson Circuit Court’s judgment is

affirmed.

      All sitting. All concur.

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:

William Ellis Sharp
Louisville Metro Public Defender’s Office

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:

Russell M. Coleman
Attorney General of Kentucky

Thomas Allen Van De Rostyne
Assistant Attorney General

                                         25