Court Opinion

ID: 9683210
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:24:36.192949+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:46.244468
License: Public Domain

*1014McCALEB, Justice
(dissenting).
Appellant has been discharged in this case for the stated reason that there was no evidence submitted to show that the violence used by him in striking the public officer or public employee was with the specific intent of influencing the employee’s conduct in relation to his position or duty, as required by Article 122 of the Criminal Code (R.S. 14:122).
In my opinion, this finding of a lack •of proof of specific intent is the determination of an issue of fact, of which we are without jurisdiction under Section 10 of» Article 7 of the Constitution. Obviously, proof of'a general intent or specific intent can rarely be shown by direct evidence and, hence, it is the function of the jury (in this case the judge), as the trier of facts, to determine from all of the other evidence whether the alleged unlawful act was accompanied by that state of mind which exists “when the circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences- to follow his act or failure to act” as provided by R.S. 14:10.
It is not for this Court to say whether the essential element of intent was present as it is not our province to decide the ■question of guilt or innocence. This right is specially conferred on the jury by Section 9 of Article 19 of our Constitution which declares that “The jury in all criminal cases- shall be the judges of the law and of the facts on the question of guilt or innocence, having been charged as to the law applicable to the case by the presiding judge.”
For this reason alone, the common-law authorities cited in the majority opinion are inapplicable. Those authorities, which deal with presumptions of law as to specific intent, are not pertinent here. Indeed, the point presented here is answered contrary to the majority opinion in the portion of its quotation' from Perkins-, Criminal Law (1957) p. 674, which it has not italicized, thus: “The intent with which a harmful act is done is usually not expressed in words, and the jury is permitted to draw such inferences of intent as are warranted under all the circumstances of the particular case, * * * Our statutory law contains similar provisions. Article 445 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (R.S. 15: 445) • declares that “ * * * for though intent is a question of fact, it need not be proven as a fact, it may be inferred from the circumstances of the transaction”. See also State v. Leonard, 162 La. 357, 110 So. 557.
I, of course, acknowledge that the instant majority view is not the first time in which this Court has decided criminal cases on questions which I conceive to be factual issues. It was-done in State v. Harrell, 232 La. 35, 93 So.2d 684 and State v. Sbisa, 232 La. 961, 95 So.2d, 619. State v. Nomey, *1016204 La. 667, 16 So.2d 226 is, in my estimation, a borderline case which probably is in the same category.
On the other hand, State v. La Borde, 234 La. 28, 99 So.2d 11, is clearly distinguishable. In that matter, a prosecution for having .carnal knowledge of an unmarried female over 12 years of age but under the age of 17, the State did not offer any evidence to show that the female was unmarried. This was an element of the crime which the State was required to definitely establish by direct evidence. It could not be inferred, as is true of intent,s from the facts and circumstances of the case.
I respectfully dissent.