Court Opinion

ID: 9683756
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:36:21.76825+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:49.758330
License: Public Domain

BARROW, Justice.
Respondents, Dr. Herbert Madalin and wife Sally Madalin, individually and as surviving parents of their eleven-year-old son, Robert, brought this suit against petition-
ers, James Hamilton Bedgood and Robert E. Sorenson, to recover damages under the Texas Wrongful Death Act, Article 4671, et seq.,1 and the Texas Survival Statute, Article 5525. Liability was admitted by petitioners and only damages issues were submitted to the jury.
Judgment was rendered on the jury verdict as follows: respondents jointly recovered the sum of $35,000 for their pecuniary loss sustained as a result of the death of their son; the son’s estate recovered $25,000 for the conscious pain and mental anguish suffered by Robert before his death; Sally Madalin recovered $25,000 for her mental anguish sustained as a result of her son’s death; and Dr. Madalin recovered $20,000 for his mental anguish and $5,000 for his loss of earning capacity sustained as a result of the death of his son. The court of civil appeals ordered a remittitur of the $25,000 awarded to Mrs. Madalin for her mental anguish and, after remittitur, affirmed the trial court judgment.2 589 S.W.2d 797. No complaint has been perfected by respondents as to the remittitur. We affirm in part the judgment of the court of civil appeals and reverse and remand to the trial court for a new trial a severed part of the cause of action.
Petitioners urge that there are no pleadings to support the recovery by Dr. Madalin of damages for his mental anguish sustained as a result of his son’s death and that in any event, recovery may not be had for these damages because the evidence establishes that Dr. Madalin was not in the zone of danger at the time Robert was struck by petitioners’ vehicle.
Respondents alleged in their trial petition only the specific claims for damages authorized by these two statutory causes of action. In Paragraph II of their petition, they alleged:
“Plaintiffs bring this action pursuant to and under the Texas Wrongful Death *775Act, Article 4677, Vernon’s Texas Civil Statutes, and the Texas Survival Statute, Article 5525, Vernon’s Texas Civil Statutes.”
There was no allegation whereby either asserted any cause of action for physical injuries or emotional trauma sustained by them as a result of the death of their son.
It is well settled that under the Texas Wrongful Death Act a surviving parent is entitled to recover as actual damages for the death of a child only the pecuniary value of the child’s services until he reaches his majority, less the cost and expense of the child’s care, support, education and maintenance, and such sums as might be reasonably expected as contributions after the child reached majority. No recovery may be had for mental anguish, grief, bereavement, or loss of companionship. J. A. Robinson Sons, Inc. v. Wigart, 431 S.W.2d 327 (Tex.1968); Jasper County Lumber Co. of Texas v. McMillan, 188 S.W.2d 731 (Tex. Civ.App.—Beaumont 1945, writ ref’d).3 The Texas Survival Statute provides for the survival of a common law action for damages which could have been instituted on behalf of the minor child for the injuries which resulted in his death. This cause of action permits damages for the physical pain and mental anguish suffered by the injured child prior to his death. Landers v. B. F. Goodrich Co., 369 S.W.2d 33 (Tex.1963); Mitchell v. Akers, 401 S.W.2d 907 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1966, writ ref’d n.r. e.).
While we favor a liberal construction of pleadings, and particularly so in the absence of a special exception, respondents’ petition did not give petitioners notice that they were asserting a claim in their own behalf for emotional trauma sustained by them because of the death of their son. Thus, petitioners were denied an opportunity to prepare for such a cause of action. Although the deposition of Dr. Madalin was taken regarding the matters asserted in respondents’ petition, no discovery was had on this phase of the case. Petitioners promptly objected to the introduction of any evidence pertaining to the emotional trauma suffered by respondents and also timely objected to the submission of the damages issues inquiring as to these elements. These objections were overruled by the trial court.
The court of civil appeals held that the trial court by overruling the objections, in effect, allowed a trial amendment in this regard. We disagree. There is nothing in the record to indicate that respondents sought to file a trial amendment. Rather, it was their contention before the trial court that additional pleadings were unnecessary in view of the admission of liability by petitioners. Petitioners’ admission of liability 4 was necessarily predicated on respondents’ petition and could not enlarge the claims asserted therein. Rule 67, Tex.R.Civ.Pro., requires that written pleadings, before the time of submission, shall be necessary to the submission of special issues *776even where issues are tried by implied consent. Since there were no proper pleadings, the trial court erred in overruling petitioners’ objections to the introduction of evidence and the submission of special issues regarding damages sustained by respondents as a result of the death of their minor child. This error requires a reversal of that part of the judgment of the court of civil appeals which affirmed the recovery by Dr. Madalin for the damages sustained by him as a result of his mental anguish caused by the injury and death to his son. We express no opinion as to the merits of this claim.
Petitioners also complain of the admission of testimony from Dr. Madalin, over their objection, of his pecuniary loss by reason of the death of Robert of from $20,-000 to $30,000 per year in medical practice by the loss of potential patient referrals. We agree with petitioners that this evidence is too remote and speculative to have probative force. This answer necessarily assumes that this eleven-year-old boy would maintain his interest in studying to be a doctor, successfully pursue his education and be licensed as such, decide to practice medicine in Corpus Christi, and have the type of practice that he could make referrals of heart patients to his father’s clinic which would still be in operation.
We recognize the difficulties of the parents in making proof in this type case. As a result, the trial court is granted broad discretion in the introduction of evidence of probative force to show the survivors’ pecuniary loss from the death of a small child. However, this testimony exceeds such bounds and it was error to admit same.
A more difficult question is presented as to whether the error in the admission of this evidence was such as to require a new trial. Nearly all the evidence offered at the trial related to the mental anguish and grief suffered by both respondents. The jurors were instructed in the court’s charge not to consider this evidence in connection with the issue on pecuniary loss. Thus, respondents’ evidence to show pecuniary loss related almost entirely to Dr. Madalin’s loss of financial benefits from having a son as a referring doctor. The jury found very substantial damages for the pecuniary loss. We conclude from an examination of the record as a whole that the error in the admission of this evidence was such as was reasonably calculated to cause and probably did cause an improper verdict on this issue. Rule 503, Tex.R.Civ.Pro.
We agree with the holding of the court of civil appeals that there is more than a scintilla of evidence to support the jury finding that Robert suffered conscious pain and mental anguish before his death. We do not have jurisdiction to consider the factual question of excessiveness. Flanigan v. Carswell, 159 Tex. 598, 324 S.W.2d 835 (Tex.1959). We, therefore, affirm that part of the judgment which awarded Robert’s estate damages under the Survival Statute.
The judgment of the court of civil appeals is affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part. We affirm the award of the sum of $25,000 to the Estate of Robert Madalin, Deceased, under the Survival Statute; we reverse, sever and remand for a new trial the claim of respondents under the Texas Wrongful Death Act and the claim of Dr. Madalin for his damages for the mental anguish and loss of earning capacity he sustained as a result of the death of Robert; and we affirm the take-nothing judgment on the claim of Mrs. Sally Mada-lin for damages for her mental anguish sustained as a result of the death of Robert.
SPEARS, J., filed concurring opinion in which STEAKLEY and CAMPBELL, JJ., joined.

. All statutory references are to Texas Revised Civil Statutes Annotated.

. Although the evidence showed that Mrs. Ma-dalin had suffered the same emotional trauma from the accident as Dr. Madalin, the court of civil appeals agreed with the admission of respondents during oral argument that she could not recover because she was at a nearby shopping center at the time of the accident.

. Respondent did not object and made no complaint on this appeal to the instruction given by the trial court as a part of the issue inquiring as to respondent’s pecuniary loss that the jury not allow any amount by way of consolation for the death of Robert, or for any sorrow, anguish or grief suffered as a result of his death, or for the loss of society, affection, or companionship of Robert.
A bill was introduced in the '66th Legislature to amend the Wrongful Death Act to permit recovery by a parent for the wrongful death of an unmarried child under 21 years of age, in addition to actual damages, damages for mental anguish, emotional pain and suffering, and loss of companionship, comfort, protection, attention, advice, counsel, love and affection. House Bill 175.
This bill was not passed by the Legislature. Somewhat similar bills have been introduced in prior sessions, but none were passed. Since we are bound by the consistent legislative inaction on this matter, we continue to follow our prior decisions in this area although the pecuniary loss concept seems outmoded. See McClung, The Value of a Child, 25 Baylor L.Rev. 118 (1973).

. “Now come James Hamilton Bedgood and , Robert E. Sorenson, Defendants, and file this their Admission of Liability for such damages as the jury may determine resulted to Plaintiffs from the accident of September 14, 1974, described in Plaintiffs’ petition.”