Court Opinion

ID: 9703148
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:42:51.981898+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:12:37.926875
License: Public Domain

SCHREIBER, J.,
concurring.
The threshold question is whether the statute, N.J.S.A. 26:8-40.1, applies to an adopted child who was not born in the United States. The answer is self-evident from the statutory language. The act relates only to persons “born in the United States.”
The next inquiry necessarily is directed to whether the statute is violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Federal Constitution. Criteria for measuring whether the Equal Protection Clause has been satisfied depend on the nature of the subject matter involved. Ordinarily the rational basis test (a classification rationally related to a legitimate state objective) is used to make this determination. However, when the subject matter is a “fundamental right” or a “suspect class,” the statute may be subject to “strict scrutiny” or to a showing of substantial relationship to governmental objectives. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 97 S.Ct. 451, 50 L.Ed.2d 397, reh. den. 429 U.S. 1124, 97 S.Ct. 1161, 51 L.Ed.2d 574 (1976).
*169Since the classification involved in this case includes all persons born in foreign countries, irrespective of citizenship, no suspect class is implicated and the statutory discrimination must be upheld “if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.” McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961). A rational basis exists, for discovery of facts in a birth record may be necessary to authenticate a right to vote, hold office or be a state employee. See Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 99 S.Ct. 1589, 60 L.Ed.2d 49 (1979). Moreover, the statutory exception is appropriate to avoid conflict with the federal laws governing immigration and naturalization. See ante at 165. The accuracy of the birth record could affect determinations involving establishment of the facts recited therein. Under Evid.R. 63(17) an official record (presumably a birth certificate may be so categorized) is admissible to prove the content of that record. Vanderbilt v. Mitchell, 72 N.J.Eq. 910, 913 (E. & A. 1907). A legitimate state interest is, therefore, furthered by restricting the right to change the place of birth to those born within the United States.
Since the child in the instant case was not born in the United States, it is not necessary to consider whether on this record the plaintiffs have satisfied the statutory requirement that “good cause” be shown. That condition must be met before the court can direct that the certificate be amended. No legislative history illuminates what the Legislature intended by “good cause.” If, as the majority states, a parent’s desire “to exercise control over the circumstances in which an adopted child learns” of the adoption is the type of reason which is sufficient, then “good cause” as a condition precedent becomes almost meaningless. Perhaps that is as it should be, despite the statutory interpretation principle denigrating superfluous language. See In re Revision of Rates Toms River Water Company, 82 N.J. 201, 211 (1980) (statutory construction rendering language superfluous “must be avoided”). In any event the issue need not be addressed in this case.
*170I concur with the majority in affirming the judgment of the Appellate Division.
Justice CLIFFORD joins in this opinion.
CLIFFORD and SCHREIBER, JJ., concurring in the result.
For modification and affirmance — Chief Justice WILENTZ and Justices SULLIVAN, PASHMAN, CLIFFORD, SCHREI-BER, HANDLER and POLLOCK — 7.
For reversal — None.