Court Opinion

ID: 9940845
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-15 16:06:59.816672+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:45:56.548243
License: Public Domain

IMPORTANT NOTICE
        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION

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PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, RAP 40(D), THIS
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                                                  RENDERED: FEBRUARY 15, 2024
                                                         NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Supreme Court of Kentucky
                                  2023-SC-0231-MR

CORTES THORNTON                                                            APPELLANT

                   ON APPEAL FROM GRAVES CIRCUIT COURT
V.                  HONORABLE KEVIN D. BISHOP, JUDGE
                              NO. 22-CR-00051

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                                     APPELLEE

                    MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT

                                     AFFIRMING

      Cortes Thornton entered a conditional Alford1 plea to charges of criminal

possession of a forged instrument; possession of a handgun by a convicted

felon; receiving stolen property, firearm; tampering with physical evidence; and

being a second-degree persistent felony offender (PFO). He received a sentence

of twenty years’ imprisonment and appeals to this Court as a matter of right. 2

The sole issue presented in this appeal is whether the trial court erred by

denying Thornton’s motion to suppress evidence obtained following the

      1 A plea pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), allows a

criminal defendant to maintain innocence while conceding that prosecutors have
enough evidence to obtain a conviction. See also Pettiway v. Commonwealth, 860
S.W.2d 766, 767 (Ky. 1993) (“An Alford plea is a ‘plea of guilty,’ regardless of any
denial of underlying facts, and clearly constitutes a criminal conviction.”).
      2 KY. CONST. § 110(2)(b).
execution of a search warrant. 3 After careful review of the record, briefs, and

the law, we affirm.

      Mayfield Police Department Officer Cody Rogers received information that

Thornton was selling crack cocaine out of his residence. Officer Rogers

discovered Thornton had an outstanding arrest warrant on charges of first-

degree burglary and fourth-degree assault. 4 Based upon this information,

Officer Rogers consulted with other officers, the Graves County Sheriff’s

Department, and the Graves County Jail’s canine unit. A plan was established

to serve the arrest warrant.

      The officers arrived at Thornton’s residence shortly before midnight on

December 2, 2021. They quietly set up positions at the front and rear of the

residence. Officer Rogers approached the left side of the front door and

knocked while another officer remained on the front porch. From behind the

closed door, Thornton asked who was there. Officer Rogers replied, “me.”

Thornton again asked who it was, and Officer Rogers repeated, “me.” Thornton

then stated, “Hang on, I’ve got something for you.” Thornton unlocked and

slightly opened the door. Hearing some noise inside the residence, Officer

Rogers raised his firearm, activated his weapon-mounted flashlight, and stated,

“Police.” Almost simultaneously a shot was fired from within the residence

      3 The trial court’s judgment and sentence on Thornton’s Alford plea specifically

preserved Thornton’s right to “appeal the denial of his motion to suppress, his motion
to reconsider the denial of his motion to suppress, and any other rulings related to
Counts 1 & 2 (the charges of attempted murder of a police officer) and the suppression
issue.
      4 It does not appear that this arrest warrant is included in the present record.

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through the door opening. 5 Officer Rogers and the other officer took cover and

were not hit by the gunfire. Shortly thereafter, the back door opened, and a

person fled from the residence. This person was apprehended and identified as

Tario Curtis. Curtis was unarmed but had drugs on his person. After being

informed of his Miranda6 rights, Curtis informed the officers that Thornton was

inside the residence.

      Officer Rogers and the other officers secured the perimeter of the

residence and asked Thornton to come outside unarmed. Approximately 28

minutes elapsed. Thornton called the Kentucky State Police (KSP) dispatch

and stated that he wished to come out of the residence. The KSP relayed this

information to Officer Rogers at the scene. Thornton then came out of the

residence waving a white t-shirt before being arrested. Various officers, not

including Officer Rogers, entered the residence to conduct a protective sweep

for their safety to ensure no other persons were present. A search warrant was

later obtained for the residence. The search revealed a quantity of marijuana,

a small quantity of crack cocaine, scales, a loaded handgun, and two

counterfeit $20 bills.

      Thornton was indicted on charges of attempted murder of a police officer;

first-degree trafficking in cocaine, second offense; criminal possession of a

forged instrument; possession of a handgun by a convicted felon; receiving

      5 Officer Rogers admitted at the suppression hearing that he did not believe

Thornton would have heard him say “police” before the shot was fired.
      6 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

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stolen property, firearm; tampering with physical evidence; possession of

marijuana; possession of drug paraphernalia; and being a second-degree PFO.

He filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the search arguing

that Officer Rogers failed to comply with the Mayfield Police Department’s

knock-and-announce policy and further failed to properly identify himself as a

police officer.

      The trial court denied the motion to suppress, concluding that Officer

Rogers’s alleged failure to properly announce his presence did not negate the

probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant. The trial court further

concluded that Officer Rogers had a duly issued arrest warrant and was shot at

by Thornton before any entry was made into the residence. Additionally, the

trial court determined that probable cause for a search existed at the time

Thornton shot at Officer Rogers and exigent circumstances conceivably existed

at that point to justify the seizure of Thornton’s person. The trial court also

determined any failure to comply with internal knock-and-announce policies

did not taint the probable cause justifying the issuance of the search warrant.

      Thornton subsequently entered a conditional Alford plea to charges of

criminal possession of a forged instrument; possession of a handgun by a

convicted felon; receiving stolen property, firearm; tampering with physical

evidence; and being a second-degree persistent felony offender. The attempted

murder of a police officer and drug charges were dismissed. This appeal

followed.

                                        4
      Thornton argues the trial court erred by denying his suppression motion

because Officer Rogers created the exigency by violating the knock-and-

announce rule to manufacture probable cause to search the residence. We

disagree.

      At the outset, we note Thornton’s argument regarding the police-created

exigency doctrine is misplaced. In Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 461 (2011),

the United States Supreme Court examined the police-created exigency

doctrine and held “the exigent circumstances rule justifies a warrantless

search when the conduct of the police preceding the exigency is reasonable in

the same sense.” Id. at 462 (emphasis added). In other words, “[w]here . . . the

police did not create the exigency by engaging or threatening to engage in

conduct that violates the Fourth Amendment, warrantless entry to prevent the

destruction of evidence is reasonable and thus allowed.” Id. While the initial

interaction between Officer Rogers and Thornton gave rise to the circumstances

that formed the basis of the search warrant, the subsequent search was, in

fact, conducted pursuant to a warrant. Therefore, the King decision is

inapplicable, and we decline to extend its reasoning to the present appeal.

      Additionally, any alleged knock-and-announce violation committed

during the service of the arrest warrant does not justify the exclusion of

evidence obtained after the execution of a subsequent search warrant. Even

assuming for argument that Officer Rogers violated the knock-and-announce

rule as embodied in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and the Mayfield Police

Department’s internal policies, the Supreme Court has directly held the

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exclusionary rule does not apply to knock-and-announce violations. Hudson v.

Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 599 (2006). The Supreme Court explained:

      Until a valid warrant has issued, citizens are entitled to shield
      “their persons, houses, papers, and effects,” U.S. Const., Amdt. 4,
      from the government’s scrutiny. Exclusion of the evidence
      obtained by a warrantless search vindicates that entitlement. The
      interests protected by the knock-and-announce requirement are
      quite different—and do not include the shielding of potential
      evidence from the government’s eyes.

Id. at 593. The knock-and-announce rule serves to protect three interests: (1)

the protection of human life and limb; (2) the protection of property; and (3) the

protection of privacy and dignity. Id. at 594.

      The knock-and-announce rule protects life and limb “because an

unannounced entry may provoke violence in supposed self-defense by the

surprised resident.” Id. It protects property by providing individuals “the

opportunity to comply with the law and to avoid the destruction of property

occasioned by a forcible entry.” Id. (quoting Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S.

385, 393 n.5 (1997). Finally, the knock-and-announce rule protects “those

elements of privacy and dignity that can be destroyed by a sudden entrance” by

giving “residents the ‘opportunity to prepare themselves for’ the entry of the

police.” Id. (quoting Richards, 520 U.S. at 393 n.5). “What the knock-and-

announce rule has never protected, however, is one’s interest in preventing the

government from seeing or taking evidence described in a warrant.” Id. In

other words, “the causal link between a violation of the knock-and-announce

requirement and a later search is too attenuated to allow suppression.” Id. at

603 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).

                                        6
      Under the reasoning of Hudson, we cannot conclude the trial court erred

by denying the motion to suppress even assuming a knock-and-announce

violation occurred. In the present appeal, the incriminating evidence was not

discovered as a result of the alleged knock-and-announce violation but was

discovered through the execution of a search warrant. Thus, Thornton’s

arguments that the trial court failed to properly construe the knock-and-

announce requirement and that he was deprived of the opportunity to cross-

examine Officer Rogers on the Mayfield Police Department’s knock-and-

announce policies are of no moment.

      The fundamental question before this Court is whether the search

warrant was supported by probable cause. When a defendant moves to

suppress evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant, the trial court must

determine whether probable cause existed to support the issuance of the

warrant, taking into account “the ‘totality of the circumstances’ presented

within the four corners of the affidavit[.]” Commonwealth v. Pride, 302 S.W.3d

43, 49 (Ky. 2010). In Gasaway v. Commonwealth, 671 S.W.3d 298, 317 (Ky.

2023), this Court set forth the standard for probable cause as a

      “commonsense, nontechnical conception[] that deal[s] with the
      factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which
      reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.” The
      Supreme Court described “probable cause to search as existing
      where the known facts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant
      a man of reasonable prudence in the belief that contraband or
      evidence of a crime will be found” in a particular place. In other
      words, “[t]here must be a fair probability that the specific place
      that officers want to search will contain the specific things that
      they are looking for.” Probable cause is a “fluid concept,” rather
      than “a finely-tuned standard comparable to the standards of proof
      beyond a reasonable doubt or of proof by a preponderance of the
                                       7
      evidence.” Direct evidence of probable cause is not strictly
      required and reviewing courts afford “due weight to inferences
      drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law
      enforcement officers.”

(Citations omitted).

      On appellate review, our task is to “determine first if the facts found by

the trial judge are supported by substantial evidence . . . and then to determine

whether the trial judge correctly determined that the issuing judge did or did

not have a ‘substantial basis for . . . conclud[ing]’ that probable cause existed.”

Pride, 302 S.W.3d at 49 (citation omitted).

      Thornton contends the trial court’s finding that Thornton said, “Hang on,

I’ve got something for you” was not supported by substantial evidence because

it was based solely on Officer Rogers’s testimony at the suppression hearing.

Our review of the bodycam footage played at the suppression demonstrates

that Thornton did say “hold on,” while the remainder appeared to be cut off by

defense counsel pausing the footage. Thornton nevertheless points out that

the statement as recounted by Officer Rogers did not appear in his citation,

search warrant affidavit, or prior testimony at the preliminary hearing. Despite

these purported inconsistencies, we cannot conclude the trial court’s finding

was clearly erroneous. A trial court’s decision on a suppression motion is

“based squarely [on] the evidence presented at the suppression hearing.”

Hampton v. Commonwealth, 231 S.W.3d 740, 749 (Ky. 2007). Testimony at a

suppression hearing does not require corroboration. When confronted with

conflicting testimony or inconsistent evidence, the trial court, as factfinder, is

entitled to weigh the evidence and judge the credibility of the witnesses. Id. As
                                         8
a reviewing court, we cannot simply substitute our view of the evidence for that

of the trial court. Payne v. Commonwealth, 681 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Ky. 2023).

      Thornton further disputes the trial court’s finding that Officer Rogers

heard knocking at the back door before he knocked on the front door.

However, a knocking sound is clearly audible on Officer Rogers’s bodycam

footage which was played at the suppression hearing. Based on our review of

the record, we conclude the trial court’s findings were supported by substantial

evidence and turn to whether probable cause supported the issuance of the

search warrant.

      As stated above, the determination of probable cause is limited to the

affidavit supporting the search warrant. Robinson v. Commonwealth, 550

S.W.2d 496, 497 (Ky. 1977). In his affidavit for the search warrant, Officer

Rogers stated:

      On 12/02/2021, I received information that Cortes Thornton . . .
      was selling illegal substances, specifically crack cocaine, from 702
      East South Street, Mayfield, KY 42066. A computer search of
      Cortes Thornton’s identification card revealed he had an active
      warrant for Burglary 2nd degree and Assault 4th degree. The
      address listed on his identification card is 702 East South Street,
      Mayfield, KY 42066.

      ...

      Mayfield Police Officers, Graves County Sheriff’s Office Deputies
      and a Graves County Jail Deputy K9 arrived at 702 East South
      Street at approximately 23:58 hours. As I stood on the front porch
      I could hear a male inside the residence talking. A Sheriff’s Deputy
      knocked on the rear door multiple times but no one answered.
      After a few minutes, I knocked on the front door and a male asked
      who it was. I responded with “me.” After a few seconds, a male
      unlocked the door and cracked the door opened. I simultaneously
      raised my firearm, activated the weapon mounted flashlight and
      announced myself as Police. At that time, I saw a muzzle flash and
                                        9
      heard the sound of a gunshot. The door closed and Officer[s] took
      cover.

      Officer[s] called Thornton out of the residence and Thornton was
      taken into custody. Thornton was not in possession of a firearm at
      the time he was taken into custody. The residence was cleared for
      any other occupants and was secured on the perimeter of the
      property after no other occupants were located.

      Upon these facts as stated in the affidavit, we conclude the search

warrant was supported by probable cause. Officer Rogers had a valid felony

warrant for Thornton’s arrest. Certainly, an arrest warrant, taken alone, does

not justify the wholesale search of a residence beyond that necessary to locate

the suspect. See Barrett v. Commonwealth, 470 S.W.3d 337, 344 (Ky. 2015).

But again, the search of the residence was not conducted pursuant to the

arrest warrant. Moreover, without evidence of the arrest warrant and the

circumstances surroundings its issuance in the present record, we cannot

indulge Thornton’s presumption that the execution of the warrant violated

KRS 7 455.180, which only authorizes entry without notice pursuant to a

warrant in various listed conditions. Neither can we accept Thornton’s claim

that he was privileged to fire in self-defense pursuant to KRS 503.085 when the

self-defense issue was not presented in his motion to suppress and he has

otherwise failed to indicate whether the issue was properly preserved for

review. See Gasaway, 671 S.W.3d at 314.

      Further, Thornton’s contention that the service of the arrest warrant was

merely a pretext for the subsequent search is without merit because the

      7 Kentucky Revised Statutes.

                                       10
Supreme Court has held that the reasonableness of a search does not depend

“on the actual motivations of the individual officers involved.” Whren v. United

States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). In other words, “[s]ubjective intentions play

no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.” Id. Indeed,

      Police do not violate the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of
      unreasonable searches and seizures by using probable cause
      derived from evidence related to one crime as a pretext for
      investigating another crime for which probable cause to search or
      arrest does not exist. Though the scope of the actual investigation
      must be limited to investigatory activity that is justified by the
      probable cause that has been established, the police need not limit
      their investigation to any particular crime.

William E. Ringel, Searches & Seizures, Arrests & Confessions § 4:6 (2d ed.

2023).

      Here, Officer Rogers received an anonymous tip that Thornton was

selling crack cocaine from his residence. While this anonymous tip alone

would not have provided probable cause for a search, it led Officer Rogers to

discover Thornton had an outstanding felony arrest warrant. Thereafter,

Thornton discharged a firearm during the attempted execution of the arrest

warrant, though he was later arrested without the weapon. We need not

speculate on what may have transpired had Thornton simply not answered the

door instead of firing at Officer Rogers.

      Under these circumstances, we conclude probable cause existed to

search the residence for the discharged firearm without the need to pass upon

the wisdom or efficacy of Officer Rogers’s tactical decision-making. Once

probable cause was established to search for the firearm, it is immaterial that

Officer Rogers subjectively expected that illegal drugs and other contraband
                                        11
would also be present because the nexus “between the item to be seized and

criminal behavior” is “automatically provided in the case of fruits,

instrumentalities or contraband[.]” Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 307

(1967).

      We continue to adhere to the principle that “reasonableness is the

touchstone of any Fourth Amendment analysis[.]” Commonwealth v. Bembury,

677 S.W.3d 385, 408 (Ky. 2023) (Nickell, J., concurring). While the manner in

which the arrest warrant was served is certainly open to question, we cannot

conclude Thornton’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated or the trial court

otherwise erred by denying the motion to suppress.

      Accordingly, the judgment of the Graves Circuit Court is affirmed.

      All sitting. VanMeter, C.J.; Bisig, Conley, Keller, Lambert and Nickell,

JJ., concur. Thompson, J., concurs in result only.

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:

Russell M. Coleman
Attorney General of Kentucky

Courtney J. Hightower
Assistant Attorney General

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:

Kathleen K. Schmidt
Assistant Public Advocate

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