Court Opinion

ID: 9907305
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-06 03:02:01.043508+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:58:43.786310
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE,                      )
                                        )
      v.                                )         ID. No. 2005005295
                                        )
JOSHUA D. MCGRIFF,                      )
                                        )
      Defendant.                        )

                         MEMORANDUM OPINION

                        Date Submitted: October 2, 2023
                        Date Decided: December 5, 2023

      Upon Consideration of Defendant’s Motion for Postconviction Relief,
                                 DENIED

           Upon Consideration of Rule 61 Counsel’s Motion to Withdraw,
                                  GRANTED

Kristina G. Bensley, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice,
Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for the State.

Kevin O’Connell, Esquire, Office of Defense Services, Wilmington, DE, Attorney
for the State.

Patrick J. Collins, Esquire, Collins & Associates, Wilmington, Delaware, Rule 61
Counsel for Defendant Joshua D. McGriff.

JURDEN, P.J.
                             I.   INTRODUCTION

       On November 18, 2021, McGriff was found guilty by jury trial of Attempted

Rape First Degree and Assault Third Degree arising from a sexual assault.1 He now

moves for Postconviction Relief under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61

(“Motion”).2   This Memorandum Opinion addresses his Motion and Rule 61

Counsel’s Motion to Withdraw (“Motion to Withdraw”).3 For the reasons set forth

below, McGriff’s Motion is DENEID and Rule 61 Counsel’s Motion to Withdraw

is GRANTED.

1
  D.I. 59.
2
  D.I. 98.
3
  D.I. 110.

                                       2
                                  II.    BACKGROUND

       On May 19, 2020, seventeen-year-old Mitchell Gardner (“Gardner”) was

walking to his job at McDonald’s when he was approached by McGriff who called

him pretty and asked for his phone number.4 When Gardner refused, McGriff

grabbed him and dragged him back into an alleyway where he began punching and

hitting him while ordering him to be quiet.5 In the process of being beaten, Gardner

gave McGriff money and offered to perform a sexual act on McGriff in an attempt

to escape.6 McGriff continued to punch, hit, and kick Gardner until he ended up on

the ground.7 While Gardner was on the ground, McGriff pulled down Gardner’s

pants and underwear and began to touch his rear while Gardner panicked and cried.8

The police arrived shortly thereafter and arrested McGriff.9

       Surveillance video caught the assault on tape.10 Nelson Ghee was a security

guard working at a local business, Fidelitrade, and was reviewing a live feed when

he noticed the assault.11 When he saw McGriff attempting to kiss Gardner, Ghee

called 911.12 He then went out to the scene and observed Gardner crying with his

4
  Mitchell Gardner is a pseudonym assigned by the Court to the minor in this case. A140. The “A”
number refers to Rule 61 Counsel’s submitted exhibits.
5
  A140.
6
  A141.
7
  Id.
8
  Id.
9
  Id.
10
   Id.
11
   A147.
12
   Id.

                                               3
pants pulled down and money scattered about.13 By the time Ghee made it to the

scene, police were already on site.14

       When Officer Akquil Williams arrived at the scene along with another officer,

they saw Gardner crying with his pants pulled down and McGriff on top of him.15

Officer Williams commanded McGriff to the ground and arrested him.16 McGriff

was identified by his own identification card pulled from his pants pocket and his

cellphone was later seized by police.17

       At trial, McGriff denied all accountability, claiming he was at a bus stop

returning from work when he was arrested.18 He denied being the person in the

surveillance video showing the attack and the arrest.19 The video depicts officers

pulling his identification card out of his pocket.20

                        III.   PROCEDURAL HISTORY

       On April 26, 2022, the Court sentenced McGriff as follows: for Rape First

Degree, 50 years at Level V, suspended after 36 years for 2 years Level III; and for

Assault Third Degree, 1 year Level V, suspended for 1 year Level III, effective May

19, 2020.

13
   A148.
14
   Id.
15
   Id.
16
   Id.
17
   A154.
18
   A171.
19
   Id.
20
   A173.

                                           4
       On May 13, 2022, McGriff filed a motion for sentence modification,21 and

then subsequently filed a direct appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court.22 The Court

informed McGriff that his appeal to the Supreme Court divested the Superior Court

of its jurisdiction over the case on June 13, 2022.23

       On February 14, 2023, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s

sentence.24

       On March 27, 2023, McGriff filed a renewed motion for sentence

modification which the Court denied on April 18, 2023.25

       On February 21, 2023, McGriff filed the instant Motion.26 A week later, on

February 28, 2023, McGriff filed a motion for the appointment of counsel27 which

was granted on March 14, 2023.28

       On July 5, 2023, Mr. Patrick Collins, Esq. was appointed to be Rule 61

counsel,29 and on October 2, 2023, he filed a Motion to Withdraw as Rule 61 Counsel

after he found McGriff had no meritorious postconviction claims.30

       McGriff was given the ability to respond to his Rule 61 Counsel’s Motion to

21
   D.I. 81. The Court is unable to locate McGriff’s Rule 35(b) Motion. See D.I. 102.
22
   D.I. 82.
23
   D.I. 86.
24
   D.I. 97.
25
   D.I. 104.
26
   D.I. 98.
27
   D.I. 100.
28
   D.I. 101.
29
   D.I. 107.
30
   D.I. 109.

                                               5
Withdraw which he did not do.

          In his Motion, McGriff lays out nine separate grounds for postconviction

relief.     His claims are as follows: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel (Trial

Counsel), (2) double jeopardy, (3) denial to subpoena witnesses, (4) suppression of

favorable evidence, (5) violation of the right to a speedy trial, (6) illegal search and

seizure, (7) illegal arrest (8) newly discovered evidence, and (9) ineffective

assistance of counsel (Appellate Counsel).

          This is McGriff’s first postconviction motion and it is timely.

                            IV.    STANARDS OF REVIEW

     A. Rule 61: Procedural Bars to Relief

          Rule 61 governs postconviction relief.31 Under Rule 61, an incarcerated

individual may seek to dismiss his conviction by establishing a lack of jurisdiction,

or alternative ground, that sufficiently establishes a factual and legal basis for a

collateral attack upon the conviction.32 While “Rule 61 is intended to correct errors

in the trial process, [it does] not allow defendants unlimited opportunities to

relitigate their convictions.”33

          Before considering the merits of any postconviction relief claims, the Court

must first consider whether any procedural bars exist.34 Rule 61(i) establishes four

31
   Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(a)(1).
32
   Id.
33
   Ploof v. State, 75 A.3d 811, 820 (Del. 2013).
34
   Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990).

                                               6
procedural bars to postconviction relief.35 Rule 61(i)(1) requires a motion for

postconviction relief must be filed within one year of a final judgement or

conviction.36 Rule 61(i)(2) bars successive motions for postconviction relief unless

certain conditions are met.37 Pursuant to Rule 61(i)(3) and (4), any ground for relief

not previously raised is deemed waived and any claims formerly adjudicated are

thereafter barred.38

       There is an exception to the Rule 61(i)(3) procedural bar to relief. Procedural

default may be overcome if the movant shows “(A) cause for relief from the

procedural default and (B) prejudice from violation of the movant’s rights.” 39 A

“cause” for procedural default can be shown through IAC.40 However, “[a]ttorney

error short of ineffective assistance of counsel does not constitute ‘cause’ for a

procedural default even when that default occurs on appeal rather than trial.” 41

35
   Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1)-(4).
36
   Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1).
37
   Rule 61(i)(2) bars successive or subsequent motions for postconviction relief unless the movant
is able to “pled with particularity” that (i) “new evidence exists that creates a strong inference that
the movant is actually innocent in fact of the acts underlying the charges of which he was
convicted” or (ii) “a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review
by the United States Supreme Court or the Delaware Supreme Court, applies to the movant’s case
and renders the conviction or death sentence invalid.” Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(2).
38
    This includes proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction, in an appeal, in a
postconviction proceeding, or in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. See Super. Ct. Crim. R.
61(i)(5), (d)(2)(i), (ii).
39
   Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3)A, B.
40
   Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 556 (Del. 1990).
41
   Id.

                                                  7
Because IAC claims cannot be raised at any earlier stage in the proceedings, they

are properly presented by way of a motion for postconviction relief.42

     B.    Rule 61: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel (“IAC”)

       To succeed on IAC claims, a defendant must meet the test set out in Strickland

v. Washington.43 That is, the defendant must demonstrate that: (1) trial counsel’s

performance was objectively unreasonable,44 and (2) if counsel was deficient, there

was a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result

of the proceeding would have been different.”45

       Although not insurmountable, the Strickland standard is highly demanding

and leads to a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct fell within a wide range of

reasonably professional assistance.46 Mere allegations of ineffectiveness are not

enough.47 Counsel “may not be faulted for reasonable miscalculation or lack of

foresight or for failing to prepare for what appear to be remote possibilities.”48 There

is a strong presumption that a defense counsel’s conduct constituted sound trial

42
   Sabb v. State, 2021 WL 2229631, at *1 (Del. May 28, 2021); Green v. State, 238 A.3d 160, 187-
188 (Del. 2020); Whittle v. State, 2016 WL 2585904, at *3 (Del. Apr. 28, 2016); State v. Evan-
Mayes, 2016 WL 4502303, at *2 (Del. Super. Aug. 25, 2016).
43
   Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984).
44
   Sykes v. State, 147 A.3d 201, 211 (Del. 2015) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).
45
   Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
46
   Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53, 59 (Del. 1988); Salih v. State, 2008 WL 4762323, at *1 (Del. Oct.
31, 2008).
47
   Younger, 580 A.2d at 556.
48
   State v. Finn, 2012 WL 1980566, at *4 (Del. Super. May 23, 2012) (citing Harrington v. Richter,
562 U.S. 86, 102-110 (2011)).

                                                8
strategy,49 and a defendant must make and substantiate concrete allegations that

overcome this presumption.50 When reviewing a defendant’s allegations of deficient

counsel, the reviewing court must “avoid peering through the lens of hindsight.”51

The “[b]enchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether

counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process

that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.”52

       The Court also utilizes the Strickland test when reviewing the performance of

appellate counsel.53       “A defendant can only show that his appellate counsel

ineffectively represented him where the attorney omits issues that are clearly

stronger than those the attorney presented” on appeal.54 Even where a defendant is

successful in demonstrating the foregoing, he must then establish a reasonable

probability that, but for appellate counsel’s failure to raise the issue, the defendant

would have prevailed on appeal.55

     C.    Motion to Withdraw

       Rule 61 Counsel’s Motion to Withdraw is governed by Superior Court

Criminal Rule 61(e)(7). Under Rule 61, counsel may move to withdraw if they find

49
   Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
50
   See Salih, 962 A.2d at 257; see also Albury, 551 A.2d at 59.
51
   State v. Wright, 653 A.2d 288, 295 (Del. Super. 1994).
52
   Cooke v. State, 977 A.2d 803, 840 (Del. 2009) (internal quotations omitted).
53
   Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 753 (Del. 1990).
54
   Ploof, 75 A.3d at 832.
55
   Neal, 80 A.3d. at 947.

                                                9
the movant’s claim to be “so lacking in merit that counsel cannot ethically advocate

it, and counsel is not aware of any other substantial ground for relief available to the

movant.”56 When evaluating a motion to withdraw, the Court must determine if its

satisfied that moving counsel made conscientious examinations of the record and the

law for any claims that could arguably support the Rule 61 motion.57 The Court

should also undertake its own review of the relevant claims to determine whether

the Rule 61 motion would be devoid of “any, at least, arguable postconviction

claims.”58

                                    V.    DISCUSSION

                  i. Ground two: double jeopardy

       McGriff claims his two rape charges constitute double jeopardy.59 Before

addressing the merits of this argument, the Court determines whether any procedural

bars apply. Under Rule 61(i)(4), a claim will be procedurally barred if it was

previously adjudicated.60 McGriff previously raised this argument in his appeal to

the Delaware Supreme Court, and it was rejected.61 Therefore, this claim is formerly

adjudicated and thus procedurally barred.

56
   Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(e)(7).
57
   State v. Coston, 2017 WL 6054944, at *2 (Del. Super. Dec. 7, 2017).
58
   Id.
59
   D.I. 98.
60
   Super. Ct. Crim. R 61(i)(4).
61
   State v. McGriff, 291 A.3d 1088 (TABLE) (Del. 2023).

                                              10
                 ii. Ground three: failure to subpoena witnesses

       McGriff claims witnesses should have been subpoenaed to establish his

alibi.62 However, McGriff does not name what witnesses he believes should have

been subpoenaed or what testimony they would have provided that could have

changed the jury verdict.63 So, McGriff cannot show he has been prejudiced.

Because this claim is wholly conclusory, the Court find this argument meritless.

                iii. Ground four: suppression of favorable evidence

       McGriff claims the outcome of his trial would have been different had the

cellphone evidence and cellphone warrant been suppressed.64 No evidence from

McGriff’s cellphone was admitted into evidence at trial, so the suppression of the

cellphone evidence and cellphone warrant could not have prejudiced McGriff.65

This claim is meritless.

                iv. Ground five: violation of his right to a speedy trial

       McGriff claims that because his trial did not take place until twenty-seven

months after indictment, his right to a speedy trial was violated. This claim, like his

double jeopardy claim, was previously presented to, and adjudicated by, the

Delaware Supreme Court and is therefore procedurally barred.66

62
   D.I. 98.
63
   Id.
64
   Id.
65
   See generally, A115-227.
66
   State v. McGriff, 291 A.3d 1088 (TABLE) (Del. 2023).

                                             11
                   v. Ground six: illegal search and seizure

       McGriff claims the police lacked probable cause to seize his cellphone.67 As

previously discussed, the cellphone was not admitted into evidence during the trial,

so any alleged illegal seizure of his cellphone could not have prejudiced him.68

Therefore, this claim is meritless.

                  vi. Ground seven: illegal arrest

       McGriff claims he was unlawfully arrested without a positive identification

of him as the perpetrator.69 He argues that he did not commit crimes in front of the

police, and he did not fit the description of the perpetrator. Video evidence properly

admitted at trial of the crime proves otherwise. In the video, McGriff can be seen

committing the crimes when police arrive on scene, and the question of whether

McGriff’s arrest was lawful was previously argued at a preliminary hearing, making

this claim formerly adjudicated.70              Thus, this claim is meritless and barred

procedurally.

                  vii. Ground eight: newly discovered evidence

       McGriff claims there is newly discovered evidence entitling him to a review

on the merits pursuant to Rule 61(d)(ii).71                 McGriff’s “new evidence” is his

67
   D.I. 98.
68
   See generally, A115-227.
69
   D.I. 98.
70
   A25-36.
71
   Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(2)(i) (barring successive or subsequent motions for postconviction
relief unless the movant is able to “pled with particularity” that (i) “new evidence exists that creates

                                                  12
allegation that Officer DeBonaventura72 planted evidence in a separate case and that

McGriff’s property receipt from prison shows that he did not have a hoodie, coat, or

do-rag which eyewitnesses and police say the perpetrator was wearing when he

committed the crimes.73

       This “new evidence” fails. The surveillance video and eyewitnesses caught

McGriff red-handed. In light of the mountain of evidence against McGriff, he is

unable to meet his burden of showing his “new evidence” creates a strong inference

he is “actually innocent in fact of the acts underlying the charges” that he was

convicted of.74 Therefore, McGriff’s proffered “new evidence” provides no basis

for postconviction relief and is meritless.

                viii. Grounds one and seven: ineffective assistance of counsel

       McGriff brings two separate ineffective assistance of counsel claims: one

against Trial Counsel and one against Appellate Counsel.75 Rule 61 Counsel

summarized McGriff’s pro se Rule 61 claims of Trial Counsel’s deficiencies as

follows:

           •   Failed to obtain facts from defendant
           •   Failed to pursue obvious leads provided by defendant
           •   Failed to gather corroborating evidence
           •   Failed to obtain evidence from defendant
a strong inference that the movant is actually innocent in fact of the acts underlying the charges of
which he was convicted . . .”).
72
   DeBonaventura was one of the detectives involved in McGriff’s case.
73
   D.I. 98.
74
   Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(2).
75
   D.I. 98.

                                                13
           •   Failed to impeach any of the State witnesses
           •   Failed to object to the admission of evidence
           •   Failed to file any pretrial motions
           •   Failed to move to suppress cellphone evidence
           •   Refused to file motion for judgment of acquittal on the rape and assault
               charges
           •   Failed to visit the crime scene
           •   Failed to locate witnesses corroborating defendant’s alibi
           •   Failed to object to prosecutorial misconduct
           •   Failed to move to acquit due to lack of positive identification of
               defendant by victim or eyewitness

       Trial Counsel’s conduct is reviewed under a Strickland standard which

requires both (1) the counsel’s conduct to be objectively unreasonable and (2) a

showing that but for, the counsel’s conduct, defendant’s result could have been

different.76 This means that the defendant must have been prejudiced by the

decisions trial counsel made in representation. In Ploof v. State, the Supreme Court

held there is no need to assess the Strickland objective unreasonableness prong if

there was no prejudice to the defendant.77 The defendant must make “concrete

allegations of actual prejudice and substantiate them or risk summary dismissal.”78

If the defendant is unable to show this prejudice, his IAC claim will be denied.79

       McGriff is unable to show actual prejudice. Not only was he identified by

multiple eyewitnesses as the perpetrator but there was also video evidence showing

76
   Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
77
   75 A.3d 811, 825 (Del. 2013).
78
   Outten v. State, 720 A.2d 547, 557 (Del. 1998).
79
   Ploof, 75 A.3d at 825.

                                               14
McGriff committing the crimes.80 None of the grievances McGriff has with his Trial

Counsel would have negated the video evidence or the eyewitness testimony. The

evidence at trial was overwhelming. McGriff is unable to show that a different result

would have been produced had Trial Counsel done anything differently. Trial

Counsel was not required to investigate frivolous claims or perform every action the

defendant wanted.81 As such, McGriff fails to establish that Trial Counsel conduct

was unreasonable and that he was prejudiced by it.

       McGriff claims his Appellate Counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve

claims for appeal and to appeal those claims for him. The record demonstrates

otherwise.82 McGriff’s Appellate Counsel did appeal,83 and McGriff cannot show

that Appellate Counsel omitted “issues that [were] clearly stronger than those []

presented” on appeal.84        The fact that the Supreme Court rejected Appellate

Counsel’s arguments does not mean Appellate Counsel was ineffective. The Court

is unable to find an instance of unreasonable conduct by Appellate Counsel or

prejudice to McGriff. Therefore, McGriff’s IAC claims are meritless.

                                 VI.     CONCLUSION

       For these reasons, McGriff’s Motion for Postconviction Relief is DENIED

80
   See generally A115-227.
81
   Cooke v. State, 977 A.2d 803, 840 (Del. 2009) (trial counsel decides “if and when to object,
what witnesses, if any to call, and what defenses to develop.”).
82
   D.I. 110.
83
   State v. McGriff, 291 A.3d 1088 (TABLE) (Del. 2023).
84
   Ploof, 75 A.3d at 832.

                                              15
and Rule 61 Counsel’s Motion to Withdraw is GRANTED.

                                        /s/ Jan R. Jurden
                                  Jan R. Jurden, President Judge

Original to Prothonotary

cc:   Joshua McGriff, Defendant
      Patrick J. Collins, Esq.

                                   16