Court Opinion

ID: 9499691
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 17:55:26.405133+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:59:40.337998
License: Public Domain

CLAY, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) held that changed country conditions in the Republic of Congo rebutted any presumption of a well-founded fear of *417persecution on the part of Petitioner. This conclusion is supported by substantial evidence and should be upheld. Nevertheless, in order to find in favor of Petitioner, the majority unreasonably reads our precedents on changed country conditions, ignores the deferential standard of review, and embraces a theory of the evidence not argued by Petitioner or supported by the record. While I am not without sympathy for Petitioner, my review of the record prevents me from joining the majority. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
I.
The material facts of this case are simple and straightforward. The BIA affirmed the judgment of the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) on a single ground: “[E]ven if [Petitioner] testified credibly and established past persecution, the record contains evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption that [Petitioner’s] life or freedom would be threatened in the future.” J.A. at 2 (citing 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.13(b)(1)® and 1208.16(b)(1)®). The BIA reached this conclusion by relying on a report issued by the United States Department of State. See U.S. Dep’t of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for the Republic of Congo (2004), available at http:// www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41598. htm (“2004 State Department Report”). The BIA reasoned that, in the time since Petitioner had left the Republic of Congo, his political party had become a major political party. Furthermore, the BIA stated that opposition party officials willing to cooperate with the ruling Congolese government or oppose it nonviolently have remained in the country. Additionally, the BIA noted that “members of groups that opposed the government during the war have been permitted to return to their former government jobs.” J.A. at 2 (citing 2004 State Department Report). The BIA therefore concluded that Petitioner did not demonstrate error in the IJ’s conclusion that country conditions for members of Petitioner’s political party had changed to the ertent that any presumption of a well-founded fear of persecution stemming from past persecution was rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence.
Petitioner did produce some evidence on the issue of changed country conditions, which can, be briefly summarized. Before the IJ, Petitioner submitted the 2003 State Department Report,1 several articles published by Amnesty International,2 and two letters from persons who reside in the Congo. The first letter, written on August 10, 2003, was signed by Petitioner’s “friend Mavoungou Alain.” J.A. at 186. Alain “urge[d] [Petitioner] not to come back to the Congo” because “Sassou’s group is still looking for you.... [Y]our name is on the wanted list at the Ministry of the Interior, I saw it with my own eyes.” J.A. at 186. The letter continues that “Sassou’s Cobras goes [sic] into people’s homes, they imprison people, and with no judgment, others are condemned and killed.... [T]here is *418no peace in the Congo.” J.A. at 186. The second letter, written on June 6, 2003, from Petitioner’s “brother Van Loye,” states that “rival fractions [sic] of Sassou N’Guesso and those of the former president Pascal Lissouba, up to now keep going into houses to arrest people; especially the ethnics of Larry [sic] which are like us.” J.A. at 190.
II.
The sole question that this Court must resolve is whether, on this record, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that changed country conditions rebutted Petitioner’s presumption of a well-founded fear of persecution.3 Petitioner conceded removability before the IJ, but applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture. In order for an applicant to be granted asylum, the applicant must (1) qualify as a “refugee” as defined in the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (42) (A), and (2) demonstrate that he “merits a favorable exercise of discretion by the Attorney General.” Ouda v. INS, 324 F.3d 445, 451 (6th Cir.2003) (quoting Mikhailevitch v. INS, 146 F.3d 384, 389 (6th Cir.1998)). The Act defines “refugee” as:
[A]ny person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality ... and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.
§ 1101(a)(42)(A); see Mikhailevitch, 146 F.3d at 389. The applicant initially bears the burden of establishing that he qualifies as a refugee under the Act. Ramaj v. Gonzales, 466 F.3d 520, 529 (6th Cir.2006). If the applicant establishes that he suffered past persecution, as the BIA assumed in this case, that finding raises a rebuttable presumption that the applicant has a well-founded fear of future persecution. Id. “This presumption can be rebutted ‘only though establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that since the persecution occurred, conditions in the applicant’s country have changed to such an extent that the applicant no longer has a well-founded fear of being persecuted if he were to return.’ ” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Mikhailevitch, 146 F.3d at 389). It is not enough for the government to merely demonstrate that conditions in the applicant’s country of origin have changed; instead, the changes must be “such that the applicant no longer has a well-founded fear of persecution.” 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(l)(i)(A).
Whether the government has rebutted the presumption of a well-founded fear of persecution by demonstrating changed country conditions is a question of fact that this Court reviews for substantial evidence supporting the BIA’s decision. See Liti v. Gonzales, 411 F.3d 631, 639 (6th Cir.2005). Under the deferential substantial evidence standard, administrative findings of fact are “conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude *419to the contrary.” Yu v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 700, 702 (6th Cir.2004) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)). In this case, the BIA’s factual finding of changed country conditions should be upheld unless Petitioner can “show that the evidence he presented was so compelling that no reasonable fact-finder could fail to find” that the government did not demonstrate changed country conditions by a preponderance of the evidence. See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483-84, 112 S.Ct. 812, 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992). The BIA’s decision should be affirmed if, considering the record as a whole, its decision is “supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence.” Id. at 481, 112 S.Ct. 812.
Turning to the evidence in the record, it is clear that the BIA’s decision is supported by substantial evidence. Petitioner’s claim for asylum was based solely on political persecution. Petitioner claims that he was persecuted for supporting the minority Pan-African Union for Social Development party (“UPADS”). The most fundamental change in country conditions was perhaps so obvious that the BIA neglected to specifically mention it: In the period prior to the time Petitioner fled the Republic of Congo, the country became engulfed in a civil war, which has now ended. According to the 2004 State Department Report, politically motivated killings have stopped. See 2004 State Department Report (“There were no reports of political killings by the Government or its agents.”). Moreover, “[t]here were no reports of politically motivated disappearances during the year.” Id. Additionally, “there were no reports that security forces regularly harassed and extorted refugee returnees and residents in outlying areas.” Id. Finally, the 2004 State Department Report supports the three findings relied upon by the BIA: That UPADS is a major political party, that opposition party officials willing to cooperate with the ruling Congolese government or oppose it nonviolently have remained in the country, and that members of groups that opposed the government during the war have been permitted to return to their former government jobs. Id. These facts, taken together, provide substantial evidence supporting the BIA’s finding that changed country conditions rebutted the presumption that Petitioner had a well-founded fear of persecution.
Petitioner makes several arguments that, notwithstanding this evidence, the government has nevertheless failed to rebut the presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution. Petitioner argues that Sassou-Nguesso (the leader who was in power when Petitioner left the Congo) remains in power, and that the judicial branch “continues to be subjected to political influence, bribery, and corruption.”4 Petitioner’s Br. at 28. Petitioner also argues that “there are still reports of unlawful killings by government security forces, as well as documentation of their ability to beat and torture their own civilians with total impunity.” Petitioner’s Br. at 28. Petitioner contends that the Republic of Congo still has a poor human rights record,5 that security forces killed civilians in the southern “Pool” region,6 that the gov*420ernment committed various human rights abuses in the same region,7 and that prison conditions continued to be harsh due to overcrowding. Petitioner also asserts that the government frequently arrested and detained its citizens,8 and that supporters of the government included mostly people from northern ethnic groups.
None of these facts undercut the BIA’s finding, supported by the 2004 State Department Report, that conditions have changed in the Republic of Congo such that a well-founded fear of political persecution is no longer reasonable. The BIA’s factual findings support the conclusion that political persecution in the Republic of Congo has subsided. Although Sassou-Nguesso remains in power, the Republic of Congo experienced elections in 2002 which, while not free of problems, were determined by independent monitors “not to contradict the will of the people.” J.A. at 14. The mere fact that Sassou-Nguesso has been elected to power does not imply that the government of the Republic of Congo will persecute its citizens on account of their political beliefs. The 2004 State Department Report suggests that such persecution is no longer taking place with any appreciable frequency. While Petitioner points to a multitude of unsavory facts about life in the Congo, these facts are insufficient to compel a rejection of the BIA’s factual findings, absent a compelling showing that the government continues to subject its citizens to persecution because of their political beliefs. See Daneshvar v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 615, 625 (6th Cir.2004) (“We understand that many Iranian citizens may live in fear of persecution by the Islamic regime. However, the statute requires them to either be members of a particular race, religion, nationality, or social group, or to have the fear based on a political opinion.”). While Petitioner has produced some evidence of poor country conditions — that is, evidence of corrupt courts, abuses of power by the government security forces, and violations of human rights — he has failed to produce compelling evidence that these abuses have been employed to persecute persons on account of their political beliefs.
This case is similar to Mayela v. Gonzales, 200 Fed.Appx. 582, 585 (6th Cir.2006) (unpublished), where this Court held that the petitioner, Mayela, a citizen of the Republic of Congo, did not qualify for asylum because she could not establish a well-founded fear of persecution. The Court reasoned that Mayela’s political party was a major political party according to the 2002 United States Department of State country report, that opposition parties had been able to campaign openly, hold rallies, and monitor elections, and that many senior political officials from the former government had returned to the Republic of Congo and resumed political activities without incident. Id. The Court concluded that, even though soldiers had allegedly done terrible things to Mayela, she could not show that the alleged abuses “were a political reprisal rather than wanton violence during a civil war.” Id. The evidence relied upon by the BIA here is strikingly similar to the evidence that the Mayela court found persuasive, and it likewise rebuts any well-founded fear of political persecution on the part of Petitioner.
*421The majority does not rely upon Petitioner’s arguments, but instead crafts a new theory of the evidence — a theory not relied upon by Petitioner — as to why the evidence cited by the BIA was insufficient to demonstrate that changed country conditions rebutted the presumption that Petitioner had a well-founded fear of persecution. In the majority’s view, the case must be remanded because the BIA failed to specifically consider the letters sent to Petitioner from persons living in the Republic of Congo. According to the majority, the letters “specifically inform that ethno-political violence continues notwithstanding the Country Reports’ generalized description, and that [Petitioner] is a wanted man in the government’s eyes.” Majority Op. at 413. The majority therefore concludes that a remand is necessary so that the letters can be “carefully weighed against the Country Reports in order for a proper decision to [be] made.” Majority Op. at 413.
There are several problems with the majority’s theory. The first problem is that the majority simply assumes that the BIA failed to consider the letters. The majority most likely makes this assumption because the BIA’s opinion does not specifically mention the letters.9 Of course, the majority does not and cannot point to any legal requirement that the BIA explicitly consider and reject on the record every piece of evidence adverse to its conclusion. Moreover, Petitioner did not mention the letters in his closing argument before the IJ, and he makes only passing reference to them in his brief before this Court.10 While the record on appeal does not contain Petitioner’s brief to the BIA, his failure to highlight the letters throughout the course of these proceedings strongly suggests that Petitioner did not argue before the BIA that the letters were his key evidence. In light of these facts, the BIA’s failure to analyze their significance on the record is wholly unremarkable.
The second problem with the majority’s theory is that, as evidence, the letters are not terribly persuasive. Between the two letters, the only statement which arguably supports an individualized fear on the part of Petitioner on account of his political beliefs is Alain’s statement that “Sassou’s group is still looking for you ... your name is on the wanted list at the Ministry of the Interior, I saw it with my own eyes.” J.A. at 186. This statement is devoid of any corroborating detail, (e.g., how it is that Alain saw “the wanted list,” or what the people on the “wanted list” are wanted for), it was written several months after removal proceedings were initiated against Petitioner, and it does not state that Petitioner was wanted for his political beliefs. Moreover, Alain’s statement is undercut by the 2004 State Department Report’s unrebutted assertion that “[t]here were no reports of politically motivated disappearances” in the previous year. While these statements are not logically inconsistent, if low-level political supporters such as Petitioner were in fact on a “wanted list,” it would be reasonable to expect that some politically motivated disappearances would have occurred and would have been re*422ported. The fact that such disappearances reportedly have not occurred undermines Petitioner’s evidence. In short, even reading the letters for all they are worth, the record at most contains evidence that points in opposite directions. “[W]e may not reverse the Board simply because we disagree with its understanding of the facts.” Hana v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 472, 475 (6th Cir.2005) (citing Koliada v. INS, 259 F.3d 482, 486 (6th Cir.2001)). Petitioner’s challenge to the BIA’s factual finding of changed country conditions is particularly unpersuasive because the letters conflict with a State Department report, which is “generally the best source of information on conditions in [a] foreign nation[ ].” Sterkaj v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 273, 276 (6th Cir.2006) (quoting Mullai v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 635, 639 (6th Cir.2004)) (holding that the IJ’s finding that the petitioner lacked credibility was supported by substantial evidence where the petitioner’s account of political persecution was inconsistent with a State Department report). The letters do not compel a factfinder to reject the conclusion that changed country conditions rebut Petitioner’s presumed fear of future persecution. Yu, 364 F.3d at 702.
The third problem with the majority’s theory is that it is not supported by our case law. The majority primarily relies on Liti v. Gonzales, 411 F.3d 631 (6th Cir.2005), but this case fails to support the majority’s conclusion. Liti involved citizens of Albania who were seeking asylum. 411 F.3d at 635. The government conceded past persecution, but argued that the collapse of the communist regime constituted changed country conditions rebutting the Litis’ presumably well-founded fear of persecution. See id. at 639. The Liti court upheld the finding of changed country conditions on evidence analogous to the evidence produced by the government in this case; that is, although the Litis submitted evidence of “general civil disorder and lawlessness,” the relevant State Department report stated that there were no confirmed cases of political killings or disappearances. Id. To contest this finding, the Litis presented evidence, in the form of their own testimony, that a fellow anti-communist protester was killed upon his return to Albania. Id. at 640. The IJ discounted this evidence because it was not corroborated, and the Liti court upheld this determination. Id.
The majority considers Liti support for its conclusion, reasoning that Petitioner “presented corroborating evidence not from his own mouth, but from two independent sources in Africa, and that corroborating evidence shows an individualized threat of harm to [Petitioner].” Majority Op. at 413. This reading of Liti does not fit the facts of this case. Nothing in the letter from Van Loye speaks to an individualized fear on the part of Petitioner on account of Petitioner’s political beliefs; thus, the letter is immaterial to the issue considered in Liti. Furthermore, the problem with the evidence in Liti was not that it came from the Litis themselves. Instead, the evidence was problematic because no other facts in the record bolstered the veracity of the Litis’ statements. See Liti, 411 F.3d at 640 (noting that the Litis failed to provide affidavits, newspaper articles, or a reasonable explanation for the absence of such corroborating evidence). In this case, the evidence is equally uncorroborated: The sole evidence that Petitioner is on a “wanted list” is the unsupported and undetailed statement of an individual whose background is unknown, who is not “independent” of Petitioner (he is instead Petitioner’s friend), and who wrote the letter shortly after the initiation of removal proceedings. Finally, Liti did not consider whether sub*423stantial evidence would have nevertheless supported the IJ’s conclusion in the event that the Litis’ evidence was credible, and therefore Liti does not justify the conclusion that substantial evidence fails to support the BIA’s conclusion in the instant case.
In sum, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s factual findings. Neither Petitioner nor the majority point to evidence in the record that undermines this conclusion. I would affirm the judgment of the BIA.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.

. U.S. Dep’t of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for the Republic of Congo (2003), available at http://www.state. gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27722.htm ("2003 State Department Report”).

. Petitioner submitted the following documents: Continuing Cycle of Violence in the Republic of Congo, The Wire-April 2003 Congo Amnesty International (2003), http://web. amnesty.org/web/wire.nsi/April2003print/ CongoPOpenDocument; Republic of the Congo, Amnesty International Report 2003 (2003); Congo Brazzaville: Impunity Perpetuates Human Rights Abuses and Instability, Amnesty International Press Release (Apr. 9, 2003), http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/ ENGAFR220022003; Republic of Congo: A Past that Haunts the Future (2003), http:// web. amnesty. org/library/print/EN GAFR 220012003.

. If Petitioner could not demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution, he could also not demonstrate the "clear probability of persecution” required for a grant of withholding of removal, "which is a stricter standard than the 'well-founded fear’ standard.” Ramaj v. Gonzales, 466 F.3d 520, 531-32 (6th Cir.2006) (quoting Ali v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 407, 411 (6th Cir.2004)). Petitioner also cannot demonstrate that "he would more likely than not be subjected to torture after being deported,” and therefore he cannot obtain relief under the Convention Against Torture. Id. (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2)).

. See 2004 State Department Report (“The judiciary continued to be overburdened, underfunded, and subject to political influence, bribery, and corruption.”).

. See, e.g., 2003 State Department Report ("The Government’s human rights record remained poor.”).

.See 2003 State Department Report ("There were no reports of political killings; however, there were press reports that government forces killed civilians in the Pool region prior to the March signing of the Peace Accord between the Government and anti-government Ninja rebels.”).

. See, e.g., 2003 Slate Department Report (“Until March, there were reports that undisciplined government forces committed abuses such as summary executions, rape, looting, and other violent acts, primarily in the Pool region.”).

. See 2003 State Department Report (“The Constitution prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention; however, security forces frequently committed such acts.”).

. The BIA’s opinion does not specifically mention any of Petitioner’s evidence; it instead asserts that "[Petitioner] has not demonstrated error in the Immigration Judge’s conclusion that country conditions for members of [Petitioner's] political party have materially changed.” J.A. at 2.

. In fact, Petitioner does not mention the letters in the section of his brief devoted to changed country conditions; he instead only cites the letters to challenge the IJ’s finding that he did not meet his burden of proof because his corroborative evidence was insufficient.