Court Opinion

ID: 9705629
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:14:25.535416+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:13.093578
License: Public Domain

Bruñe, C. J.,
concurring in the result, filed the following concurring opinion.
I concur in the result in this case because I think that the evidence on behalf of the appellee meets the burden of proof required under decisions of- this Court in such cases as Pocomoke City v. Standard Oil Co., 162 Md. 368, 159 A. 902, and Benner v. Tribbitt, 190 Md. 6, 57 A. 2d 346, to show that the denial of the permit was not a valid exercise of the police power. That is, the appellee met the burden of showing that the denial of the permit was not “reasonably necessary for the adequate protection of the public welfare, safety, health, comfort, or morals.” (See the Pocomoke City case, 162 Md. at 379-380.) I do not think that the evidence proffered by *300the Town and excluded by the trial court would have altered the result.
My first difficulty with the majority opinion is that, although it cites the rules established by our prior decisions-under which the validity of a legislative exercise of the police power in cases such as this is to be tested, it contains some language which seems to imply a limitation upon the exercise of such power which, in my judgment, runs counter to the rules cited. Such an implication is, I think, contained in the statement that “It is difficult to discover from the record in the case at bar how the mayor and council concluded it was-reasonably necessary for the protection of the public health, safety, etc., to discontinue the business that had been carried on in that particular spot for over thirty years.” This statement implies that the legislative body was under an obligation, to establish affirmatively the reasonableness of its action as an exercise of the police power. I think that the majority opinion leaves the way open to drawing such an inference, even though the opinion elsewhere recognizes that the burden of proof rests upon the person attacking the legislative action to establish its invalidity, and I fear that this possible inference may give rise to some confusion in a field where I believe the law to be well settled.
On this matter M. & C. C. of Baltimore v. Biermann, 187 Md. 514, 50 A. 2d 804, seems very much in point. There the Board of Zoning Appeals was acting in the exercise of original, rather than appellate, jurisdiction in passing upon an application to establish a filling station, which had been denied by the Buildings Engineer, who had no discretion to do otherwise. To grant the permit required the affirmative vote of four of the. five members of the Board. Only three voted for it, and the other two, by refusing to do so, exercised a veto power. • This Court, in an opinion by Judge Henderson, held that the question was “not whether there was substantial evidence before the Board to support a minority finding, but whether there was a reasonable basis in fact to support the refusal as an exercise of the police power.” Ellicott v. Baltimore, 180 Md. 176, 23 A. 2d 649, Kramer v. Baltimore, 166 Md. 324, 171 A. 70, and the Pocomoke City case, supra, *301were cited; and Anne Arundel County Com’rs v. Ward, 186 Md. 330, 46 A. 2d 684, was referred to for comparison.
The Court then said: “Considering the action of the Board as an exercise of delegated legislative, or quasi legislative, power, the scope of review is different and in some respects more limited than where the action is quasi judicial; e. g., the court must find that the result of the action is beyond the police power and deprives the applicant of property without due process of law. On this question the property owner has the heavy burden of overcoming the presumption of constitutionality of legislative action, even if the legislative body acted without evidence at all.”
I do not believe that there is actually any difference of opinion between those who joined in the majority opinion and those who concurred in the result as to where the burden of proof lies as to the validity of legislative action such as that attacked in this case. I hope that the fear of confusion here expressed will not materialize, and that this concurring opinion may help to prevent it.
The second difficulty which I find in the majority opinion is that it seems to imply a greater protection for the continuation of a business which may be or become objectionable in a given area than is necessary to a decision of this case or than I believe to be the law. Though this is not a zoning case and though it is conceded that the existing zoning regulations permit a junk yard in the area here involved, the majority opinion seems to adopt an analogy to non-conforming uses under zoning regulations and to imply that such uses and, by analogy, the use here involved are entitled to protection for an indefinite period. A quite different result was reached by this Court in an actual zoning case where the question was squarely presented. Grant v. City of Baltimore, 212 Md. 301, 129 A. 2d 363. In connection with this phase of the case it should also be noted that the extent of the police power here granted to the Town was far greater than the restricted powers of regulation granted to municipalities in such cases as Gaithersburg v. Dosh, 201 Md. 291, 93 A. 2d 747, and Mt. Airy v. Sappington, 195 Md. 259, 73 A. 2d 449. The majority opinion seems to me to cast unneces*302sary shadows over the power of the Town to deal with such problems in the future.
Judge Henderson has authorized me to state that he joins in the views above expressed.