Court Opinion

ID: 9729875
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:51:13.026673+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:01.886133
License: Public Domain

ZENOVICH, Acting P. J.
I concur in affirming the judgment of conviction but respectfully dissent from that portion of the opinion dealing with the gun-use enhancement. While I recognize the Legislature’s admirable goal in seeking to deter the use of firearms by imposing greater penalties for the use of firearms in the commission of felonies, I do not think that appellant’s sentence was properly enhanced in the instant case.
First, pursuant to Penal Code section 12022.5, additional punishment may not be imposed if “use of a firearm is an element of the offense of which he was convicted.” I would hold the use of a firearm is an element of the offense of misdemeanor manslaughter, with the underlying misdemeanor being brandishing a firearm within the meaning of Penal Code section 417. The majority holds that firearm use is not an element of the instant offense because Penal Code section 417 includes both “firearm” and “weapon” in its proscriptions. The majority quickly concludes that “it is evident that use of a firearm is not an essential element of involuntary manslaughter based on the inherently dangerous misdemeanor of brandishing a weapon. ” However, as stated above, former Penal Code section 417 proscribes brandishing a “firearm ... or any other deadly weapon.” (Italics added.) Just because section 417 mentions other weapons as well as firearms does not mean that firearm use would not be an element of a Penal Code section 417 violation. I would therefore hold that firearm use is an element of Penal Code section 417 and consequently an element of misdemeanor manslaughter, with the underlying misdemeanor being brandishing a firearm in violation of Penal Code section 417.
Second, the majority relies on People v. Quesada (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 533 [169 Cal.Rptr. 881], which resolved the instant issue without analysis. I find no cases citing Quesada and do not feel compelled to follow it.
Third, at the very least, the question of whether the Legislature has expressed an intent to apply the firearm enhancement penalty to the instant situation is “close and subtle.” (People v. Harvey (1979) 25 Cal.3d 754, 761 [159 Cal.Rptr. 696, 602 P.2d 396].) Under well-settled principles of statutory construction, appellant is entitled to the benefit of any doubt. “It is the policy of *908this state to construe a penal statute as favorably to the defendant as its language and the circumstances of its application may reasonably permit; just as in the case of a question of fact, the defendant is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable doubt as to the true interpretation of words or the construction of language used in a statute.” (Keeler v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 619, 631 [87 Cal.Rptr. 481, 470 P.2d 617, 40 A.L.R.3d 420].)
Accordingly, I would hold that the judgment should be modified to strike appellant’s gun-use enhancement. I would affirm in all other respects.