Court Opinion

ID: 9804618
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 17:00:49.325121+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:17:09.095971
License: Public Domain

Skoglund, J.,
¶ 34. concurring. I write separately to urge caution in allowing third parties to intervene in divorce cases. This *41is the first time this Court has approved an intervenor seeking to protect her property interests in a divorce proceeding. The only other time we dealt with a third party so situated, Stearns v. Steams, 10 Vt. 540 (1838), we denied creditors’ request to intervene without discussion. Courts in other states have limited intervention in divorce cases, and given our repeated instruction that the family division is a court of limited jurisdiction, we ought to do the same.
¶ 35. To strike a balance between “[considerations of finality and judicial economy,” ante, ¶ 18, on one hand, and preventing banks, distant cousins, and a host of other intervening strangers from protracting often tense divorce proceedings and undermining the privacy and dignity of spouses engaged in such litigation, on the other hand, we should limit who may intervene in divorce cases and the circumstances under which they may do so. Indeed, I believe 4 V.S.A. §33, which outlines the family division’s jurisdiction, and 15 V.S.A. § 751, which governs the division of marital assets, compel these limitations. See Luthen v. Luthen, 596 N.W.2d 278, 281 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999) (denying intervention of husband’s general creditors based in part on reasoning that Minnesota’s marital property division statute, similar to 15 V.S.A. § 751, “makes no mention of third-party creditors . . . having a vested interest in the marital property of either the husband or the wife”). The following restrictions would, in my opinion, strike that balance: (1) that the third party’s interest be in the form of a direct proprietary claim as to a particular asset, rather than an unvested future interest or general, unsecured debt interest against one or both spouses; (2) that the intervenor show prima facie proof of her purported interest and that such interest will be directly affected by disposition of the matter in which intervention is sought; (3) that the amount or share of the particular property be in dispute; (4) that the intervention be sought only to directly challenge distribution of property to which the third party claims an interest, not to address any other ancillary matters; and (5) that the intervenor’s interest not be adequately represented by one of the party-spouses.
¶ 36. Strong public policy dictates that the rights of spouses to their own divorce proceeding, where they can present their individual respective claims to marital property, maintenance, and child support, cannot be clouded by intervenors outside the marriage who speculate that they have a financial stake in one *42spouse getting more money than the other. “A third party seeking intervention in a divorce proceeding for the purpose of protecting a property interest assumes the burden of demonstrating an interest which will outweigh the substantial privacy interests of the divorcing parties.” Boyle v. Boyle, 459 S.E.2d 401, 404 (W. Va. 1995) (interpreting a rule virtually identical to V.R.C.P. 24 and holding that courts must balance the parties’ substantial privacy interests against considerations relating to potential intervenor’s interests). We should be especially mindful of the limiting language of Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 24 in divorce proceedings in light of the emotional and private nature of such cases and the circumscribed jurisdiction of that tribunal. See Golden v. Cooper-Ellis, 2007 VT 15, ¶¶ 35, 43-46, 181 Vt. 359, 924 A.2d 19 (holding that family court had no jurisdiction to determine husband’s brother’s rights, allegedly created by oral agreement between husband and brother, with respect to marital real property, and that court properly determined husband’s interest based on record title); see also Wade v. Wade, 2005 VT 72, ¶ 12, 178 Vt. 189, 878 A.2d 303 (family court could not analyze ownership of an account titled in child’s name for purposes of equitable property distribution in á divorce proceeding because divorce court had no jurisdiction over Uniform Gifts to Minors Act issues); Ward v. Ward, 155 Vt. 242, 247-48, 583 A.2d 577, 581 (1990) (denying joinder of tort claims between parties in a divorce action and noting that joining potentially adversarial civil claims to a divorce action undermines the “ ‘amicable settlement of disputes that have arisen between parties to a marriage’ ” (quoting Simmons v. Simmons, 773 P.2d 602, 604-05 (Colo. App. 1988)).
¶ 37. “ ‘Because equity seeks always to do complete justice, [however,] third parties are properly joined in a divorce action so as to facilitate resolution of the spouses’ marital claims.’ ” 1. B. Turner, Equitable Distribution of Property § 3:6, at 112-13 (3d ed. 2005) (quoting Brown v. Brown, 525 S.E.2d 359, 360 (Ga. 2000)). In a divorce proceeding where the family division’s ruling on ownership of a particular asset will directly affect a third party’s vested interest in that asset, the intrusion caused by allowing intervention will be outweighed by considerations of finality and judicial economy. See, e.g., Baker v. Baker, 128 N.E.2d 616, 617-18 (Ill. App. Ct. 1955) (approving intervention of husband’s siblings where wife’s complaint sought partition of real estate jointly owned by spouses, and siblings claimed they loaned money to *43purchase house in exchange for execution of mortgage). There, a second court action to resolve the third party’s interest would be inevitable and imminent. Indeed, where a third party’s interest is direct and substantial, that third party may be indispensable to the property-distribution proceeding. See In re Marriage of Zabel, 565 N.W.2d 240, 243-44 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997) (husband’s mother was properly joined, even against her will, where wife alleged that husband fraudulently conveyed marital home to mother).
¶ 38. The scales would tip the other way, however, where a third party’s interest is inchoate or general as to one or both spouses, rather than tied to particular property. In those situations, a second court action may not even be necessary and the family division’s distribution of property would not prejudice that third party. See, e.g., Luthen, 596 N.W.2d at 281-84 (denying intervention of social services agency and mother of husband’s out-of-wedlock child, who sought to ensure that husband was left with sufficient assets from which to pay child support, because they were essentially general unsecured creditors); Poteat v. Poteat, 632 S.W.2d 511, 512 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (reversing trial court’s grant of insurance company’s motion to intervene because insurance company’s claim as judgment creditor of husband “d[id] not originate in anything appearing in the dissolution action pleadings, nor w[ould] it gain or lose by the direct operation of any property disposition made in the dissolution decree.”). Therefore, intervention by general unsecured creditors or third parties with inchoate interests in marital property would seem to be rarely necessary.
¶ 39. A third party’s direct, vested claim to a particular asset subject to distribution is not enough, though, to guarantee him intervenor status. Where the proportion of ownership of an asset as between a party-spouse and the potential intervenor is undisputed, distribution of only the spouse’s share does not directly affect the third party’s share. See Turner, supra, § 3:6, at 116 & n.16 (citing cases). Intervention there is not necessary to protect the third party’s interest. See Marks v. Marks, 609 So. 2d 710, 710 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (per curiam) (holding that trial court should have divided majority shares of corporation between spouses without joining minority third-party shareholders). On the other hand, where a party-spouse and the third party do not agree as to their proportion of ownership, the family division can properly resolve the third party’s claim as part of its obligation to identify the parties’ property. Turner, supra, § 3:6, at 116.
*44¶ 40. Finally, intervention should be limited to the smallest intrusion necessary to resolve the property dispute. See, e.g., Aarestrup v. Harwood-Aarestrup, 868 A.2d 817, 820 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2005) (granting motion to intervene in divorce action for limited purpose of holding a hearing to determine ownership of the property in question). Courts should consider whether the potential intervenor could enforce any alleged rights in a separate action and the extent to which the third party’s interest would be adequately represented by one of the spouses, “thereby avoiding their inappropriate insinuation into the private affairs of a married couple.” In re Marriage of Gonzalez, 2000 UT 28, ¶ 40, 1 P.3d 1074. See also, e.g., Fisher v. Fisher, 546 N.W.2d 354, 358 (N.D. 1996) (denying intervention of minority shareholders of closely held corporation owned by divorcing spouses, noting minority shareholders’ “many [other] routes to relief’ and speculative, complicated process of valuing minority shares); Ex parte Kirkley, 418 So. 2d 118, 120 (Ala. 1982) (finding intervention of first wife in divorce action between husband and second wife inappropriate because first wife had no “right or title” to marital property and could seek to obtain money owed to her under prior divorce decree through separate contempt suit).
¶ 41. In consideration of the above factors, husband’s mother in this case was properly joined as an intervenor, but I stress the narrow grounds upon which I agree with the result.