Court Opinion

ID: 9476335
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:53:22.46961+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:45:15.524165
License: Public Domain

EDMONDSON, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur in the affirmance of Rogers’ conviction but dissent from the reversal of Noe’s conviction.
The majority today holds that the district court erred by admitting on rebuttal a tape recording refuting Noe’s sole defense— Noe’s alibi that he had been in Costa Rica during the drug transactions. According to the majority, the district court was required to exclude the tape because the government failed to disclose it prior to trial in violation of Fed.Rule Crim.Proc. 16(a)(1)(A). Although I agree with the majority that the government violated Rule 16, I disagree that this violation required exclusion of the undisclosed tape recording from evidence. Exclusion of the tape, I believe, would be contrary to sound judicial policy and is required by neither our precedent nor Rule 16.
Rule 16(a)(1)(A) states that “[u]pon request of a defendant the government shall permit the defendant to inspect and copy ... any relevant ... recorded statements made by the defendant....” Rule 16(d)(2) provides that
If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the attention of the court that a party has failed to comply with this rule, the court may order such party to permit the discovery or inspection, grant a continuance, or prohibit the party from introducing evidence not disclosed, or it may enter any other order it deems just.
As this language indicates, the government’s violation of Fed.Rule Crim.Proc. 16(a)(1)(A) did not automatically prohibit the use of the undisclosed evidence at trial. Rather, relief for this violation lay within the discretion of the trial court. United States v. Rodriguez, 799 F.2d 649, 652 (11th Cir.1986). On appeal, therefore, the trial court’s decision to admit the tape recording despite the Rule 16 violation can be reversed only for abuse of discretion. No such abuse of discretion occurred in this case.
The admission of the tape recording into evidence was necessary to enable the government to rebut the defendant’s apparently perjurious alibi defense. Noe testified in his defense that he was in Costa Rica from November 10, 1985, until November 23, 1985. The government proffered in rebuttal a tape recording of a telephone conversation on November 14, 1985, between DEA Agent Peterson and an interlocutor who was apparently Noe, in which Peterson and the interlocutor planned to meet at a bar in Atlanta, Georgia that night and referred to a meeting “last night” at another Atlanta bar. Over defendant’s objection, the district court admitted the tape recording. The tape was highly probative evidence. It strongly suggested that Noe was in Atlanta during the time of the alleged drug transactions and— *611as Noe concedes — devastated his alibi defense.1
A defendant should not be able to take the stand and to testify and then to rely on Fed.Rule Crim.Proc. 16 to exclude evidence which strongly indicates that his testimony on a crucial issue was perjurious. To have excluded the tape recording from evidence — as the majority today holds was required — would have unjustifiably interfered with the truth-seeking function of Noe’s criminal trial. A felony trial is not some game in which every slip of the prosecutor is a gain for the accused; in fact, felony trials are by their nature not dainty proceedings and ought not be expected to be. The fundamental purpose of a criminal trial is to arrive at a true determination of the defendant’s guilt or innocence. See Rose v. Clark, — U.S. —, 106 S.Ct. 3101, 3105-06, 92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986); Henderson v. United States, 237 F.2d 169, 172 (5th Cir.1956).2 Quite simply, the interest in seeking the truth here — where the rebuttal evidence so directly refuted defendant’s sole defense — overrode the policy considerations which sometimes justify exclusion of evidence for a violation of Fed.Rule Crim.Proc. 16.3 The truth-seeking function of the trial, I believe, in and of itself justified the admission of the tape recording into evidence.
Another reason why I believe that the admission of the tape was not abuse of discretion is that Noe did not suffer prejudice to substantial rights. A showing of prejudice to substantial rights is a prerequisite for reversal of a district court’s exercise of discretion in admitting evidence not disclosed by the government in violation of *612Fed.Rule Crim.Proc. 16. United States v. Rodriguez, 799 F.2d 649, 652 (11th Cir.1986).
Noe stressed in his appellate briefs and in oral argument to this court that his sole defense at trial was alibi and that his sole defense at a new trial, if granted, would be alibi. Moreover, he asserted that the admission of the tape “devastated” his alibi defense at his trial and would do so at a new trial, if granted. 4
In light of Noe’s own assertions, the majority’s conclusion that Noe suffered substantial prejudice appears incorrect. For example, suppose that the government had complied with Fed.Rule Crim.Proc. 16 and disclosed the tape to Noe before trial. What could Noe have done differently at trial? Noe asserts that he might have decided not to testify. His sole defense, by his own concession, was and is the alibi that he was in Costa Rica from November 10 to November 23. Usually, the alibi defense, as a practical matter, requires the defendant to testify. Even if he had not taken the stand, he still would have had to attempt to prove the alibi and still would have had to contend with the tape recording that shows him in Atlanta on November 13 and 14. By his own concession, the tape is devastating to the alibi defense.
Noe argues that if the government had disclosed the tape earlier, he would have more time to prepare a challenge to the authenticity of the tape. But when confronted with the tape, Noe requested neither a mistrial nor a continuance. Having failed to request a continuance or mistrial, Noe cannot now complain that he was prejudiced by lack of time to attack more effectively the belatedly disclosed tape recording. See United States v. Scruggs, 583 F.2d 238, 242 (5th Cir.1978) (holding that defendant failed to show prejudice to substantial rights from admission of evidence not disclosed in violation of Fed.Rule Crim. Proc. 16, noting that “significantly, counsel did not ask for a longer recess or a continuance so that he might more effectively meet this evidence.”); see also United States v. James, 495 F.2d 434, 437 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 899, 95 S.Ct. 181, 42 L.Ed.2d 144 (1974); United States v. Bailey, 550 F.2d 1099, 1100-01 (8th Cir. 1977).5
Also, Noe’s counsel argues that if he had known about the tape and realized that Noe was lying, he would have approached plea bargaining differently. But Fed.Rule Crim.Proc. 16 was not designed to enable a criminal defendant to mislead his own counsel and then subsequently claim prejudice because the counsel did not advise him to plea bargain.6
Noe and the majority rely heavily on United States v. Rodriguez, 799 F.2d 649 (11th Cir.1986). Rodriguez, however, is materially different in at least four respects. First, Rodriguez requested a mistrial whereas Noe requested neither a con*613tinuance nor a mistrial to give him time to challenge more effectively the tape recording. Second, the case against Rodriguez was much weaker than the case against Noe.7 Third, Rodriguez demonstrated prejudice to substantial rights while, as has already been discussed, Noe totally fails to demonstrate prejudice to his rights.
Fourth, the prosecutor’s violation of Fed.Rule Crim.Proc. 16(a)(1)(C) in Rodriguez —by failing to disclose documents or tangible items — was more likely to surprise unfairly a defendant than the prosecutor’s violation of Fed.Rule Crim.Proc. 16(a)(1)(A) in the present case by failing to disclose the tape recording. In Rodriguez, the prosecutor surprised the defendant by asking the defendant about certain names and telephone numbers which, the prosecutor hinted, had been found in defendant’s wallet. The defendant was reduced to saying “I don’t know them. They could be people.” The Rodriguez court observed that:
Anyone who has not found in a wallet or purse a name and telephone number that are not readily identifiable, may not understand this decision. The fact is, however, that Rodriguez had no chance to determine whether or not those names and numbers were actually from his wallet or someone else’s, or to think about why the numbers were in his wallet, if indeed they were.
Rodriguez, 799 F.2d at 653. A surprised, ordinary citizen could easily be uncertain whether a document or tangible item was in his wallet, car or house and could easily have difficulty explaining on short notice how or why such an item came to be there.
In contrast, a person knows whether or not he has made a phone call to arrange a meeting in Atlanta concerning drugs. Noe did not need a chance to determine whether or not he had made such a phone call. He knew whether or not he had. Nor did Noe need time to think about why he made such a phone call, if he did.8 For all these reasons, Rodriguez is a materially different case which did not prohibit admission of the tape recording in the present case.9
*614Noe also asserts that the district court committed reversible error by excluding from evidence his passport that allegedly supported his alibi defense. Because the tape recording devastates the alibi defense in any event, any error in the exclusion of the passport must be considered harmless. This argument cannot justify reversal.
By this dissent, I do not condone the prosecutor’s conduct in this case. A prosecutor who deliberately violates Fed.Rule Crim.Proc. 16 should be subject to sanctions against him personally. Personal sanctions against prosecutorial officers would be a more effective deterrent and have less harmful side effects than excluding evidence of critical importance to the factual question of the defendant’s guilt or innocence.
A defendant’s adjudication of guilt should not be reversed because of the prosecutor’s discovery violation where, as here, the defendant suffered no prejudice thereby. The district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the highly probative evidence directly refuting Noe’s alibi defense. The majority’s holding today distorts Fed.Rule Crim.Proc. 16 from an engine for the discovery of truth into an instrument for obfuscation. There is no good reason to do that.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the reversal of Noe’s conviction.

. Indeed, at one point during oral argument before this court, Noe’s counsel conceded that the tape recording demonstrated that Noe had lied. In response to direct questions from this court, Noe’s counsel answered:
Court: [I]s there any way to prove alibi with that tape recording in evidence?
Noe’s Counsel: Well sir, I think it’s a fair statement to say that that tape recording pretty well devastated—
Court: I understand that because they found out that he’d been lying.
Noe's Counsel: In essence, I think that’s a fair statement____”
Later in the oral argument, Noe’s counsel was more equivocal on this issue, stating that he did not know whether Noe had lied.
In any event, this dissent is not based on a determination that Noe in fact lied. Rather, it is based on my conclusion that the truth-seeking function of a criminal trial justified the admission of highly probative evidence that tends to refute directly defendant’s testimony on a critical issue.

. In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir.1981) (en banc), this court adopted ás precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decided prior to October 1, 1981.

. In many contexts, courts permit the government to impeach or rebut a criminal defendant’s testimony with evidence that would otherwise be inadmissible. See, e.g., Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 74 S.Ct. 354, 98 L.Ed. 503 (1954) (evidence obtained in violation of fourth amendment admissible to impeach defendant’s testimony); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971) (statement obtained in violation of Miranda admissible to impeach defendant’s testimony, provided statement is otherwise trustworthy); accord Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 154, 78 S.Ct. 622, 626, 2 L.Ed.2d 589 (1958) (by taking stand and testifying in his own defense, defendant waives fifth amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination; scope of waiver is determined by scope of relevant cross-examination). Such cases recognize that powerful considerations favoring exclusion of evidence must sometimes be overridden to enable the government to rebut a defendant’s testimony. As the Supreme Court reasoned in Walder,
It is one thing to say that the Government cannot make an affirmative use of evidence unlawfully obtained. It is quite another to say that the defendant can turn the illegal method by which evidence in the Government’s possession was obtained to his own advantage, and provide himself with a shield against contradictions of his untruths. Such [a result] would be a perversion of the Fourth Amendment____[T]here is hardly justification for letting the defendant affirmatively resort to perjurious testimony in reliance on the Government's disability to challenge his credibility.
Walder, 347 U.S. at 65, 74 S.Ct. at 356.
The majority today takes an approach diametrically opposed to the above cases — it concludes that the need to exclude government evidence is particularly strong after a defendant testifies. I believe that the majority’s approach is mistaken. Certainly, the majority's approach is not required by Supreme Court precedent. I would decline to follow the non-binding dicta of this circuit or non-binding decisions of other circuits to the extent that they suggest such an approach.

. Noe’s original brief on appeal argued that, once the government revealed the tape recording, his "strategy and entire defense were devastated” and that "the jury had no choice but to convict." Appellant’s Brief, p. 18, see abo id., p. 20. Noe further argued in his brief that
the prosecutor has ruined Appellant’s chance at a fair trial even if this court should order a new trial. All of Appellant’s well laid defense strategy ... is rendered useless at a new trial. He has lost the element of surprise. The Government now knows his entire defense. He cannot change his testimony or his defense. His one chance for acquittal was cruelly and maliciously taken away from him____
Appellant’s Brief, pp. 29-30.

. The majority cites Saunders v. Chatham County Board of Commbsioners, 728 F.2d 1367 (11th Cir. 1984), for the proposition that an objection at trial preserves an evidentiary issue for review on appeal. I thoroughly agree with this general proposition, but neither Saunders nor this general proposition addresses the particular problem in this case: Noe is complaining of lack of time to prepare a challenge to the authenticity of the tape recording, but he requested neither a mistrial nor a continuance that would have corrected this lack of time.

. In United States v. Lewis, 511 F.2d 798 (D.C. Cir.1975), the court suggested that admission of evidence not disclosed in violation of Fed.Rule Crim.Proc. 16 may prejudice a defendant because "not every ... defendant chooses to tell his attorney what he remembers” and the defense attorney therefore lacks full information when approaching plea bargaining. Id., 511 F.2d at 802. I think the D.C. Circuit’s approach in Lewb is mistaken and decline to follow it.

. This court stressed in Rodriguez that the government’s case was weak. The evidence against Rodriguez consisted of a co-defendant’s actions in leading agents to Rodriguez — subsequently repudiated by the co-defendant as a false setup; an alleged statement — “uno por uno” — made by Rodriguez; a beeper found on Rodriguez; and evidence that Rodriguez’s assets did not correlate with his income. Rodriguez, 799 F.2d at 652. In contrast, the prosecutor’s case against Noe — even excluding the tape recording — was considerably stronger. Two DEA agents testified that they had repeatedly spoken in person and over the phone with Noe over a several day period concerning drug transactions. Agent Marsh positively identified Noe. Agent Peterson at first was not one "hundred percent" sure that Noe was the person with whom he had dealt, but later testified that after having observed Noe for a few days at trial he was “positive” that Noe was the person. Apparently, Agent Peterson’s initial failure to identify Noe definitively at trial was caused by the fact that Noe significantly altered his appearance before trial.

. The government introduced the taped phone conversation in its rebuttal case. On surrebuttal, Noe testified that he did not make the telephone call that was recorded and that he was in Costa Rica at the time.

. The majority contends that the following excerpt from Rodriguez represents a holding of that case and requires reversal of Noe’s conviction:
We believe that noncompliance with an order to furnish a copy of a statement made by the defendant is so serious a detriment to the preparation for trial and defense of serious criminal charges that where it is apparent, as here, that his defense strategy may have been determined by the failure to comply, there should be a new trial.
Rodriguez, 799 F.2d at 654 (quoting United States v. Padrone, 406 F.2d 560 (2d Cir.1969)). Moreover, the majority asserts that this dissent mischaracterizes the above excerpt from Rodriguez as well as binding holdings of other cases as mere dicta.
First, the above excerpt from Rodriguez does not constitute the holding of that case. The excerpt is part of the Rodriguez court’s description of the Second Circuit’s opinion in Padrone and is actually a quotation from Padrone. By describing and quoting from another circuit’s holding, without more, this court does not necessarily adopt that other circuit’s opinion as its own.
I believe that the holding in Rodriguez is that when the government’s case against a defendant is weak, the government surprises defendant by referring to documents or tangible items (not admitted in evidence) as to which an ordinary citizen could easily be uncertain and have difficulty explaining on short notice, and the government violated Rule 16 by failing earlier to dis*614close such documents or tangible items, defendant suffers such prejudice that reversal of his conviction and remand for a new trial is required. Of course, this holding is binding where applicable. But, as I have explained in the text of this dissent, the facts of Rodriguez are materially different from the facts of the present case. The holding of Rodriguez is simply not applicable to the present case.
Second, contrary to the majority’s assertion, this dissent properly characterizes as "non-binding dicta” all previous suggestions by this circuit that "the need to exclude government evidence is particularly strong after a defendant testifies." See supra, footnote 3 of this dissent (emphasis in original). Certainly, the above quotation from Rodriguez does not say that the need to exclude government testimony becomes stronger once a defendant testifies. Nor does United States v. Pascual, 606 F.2d 561 (5th Cir.1979), which the majority cites. In Pascual, the government introduced in its case-in-chief evidence which it had failed to disclose prior to trial in violation of Rule 16. Pascual neither involves nor discusses in any way the need to exclude government evidence after a defendant testifies.
The majority cites two cases from this circuit which do suggest that the need to exclude government evidence is greater after a defendant testifies. United States v. Martinez, 763 F.2d 1297, 1314-15 (11th Cir.1985); United States v. Arcentales, 532 F.2d 1046, 1050 (5th Cir.1976). But these suggestions — which were not determinations in respect to an issue actually litigated and necessary to be decided in the cases — are mere dicta. In Martinez, the government did not violate Rule 16 at all and introduced the disputed evidence in its case-in-chief. In Arcentales, the government disclosed the evidence several days before the defense put on its case. Neither Pascual, Martinez nor Arcentales involve the issue in this case: whether it is abuse of discretion to permit the government to introduce highly probative evidence to rebut defendant’s testimony on a critical issue.
Because the facts of this case are substantially different from earlier cases, none of the decisions cited by the majority actually bind this panel to reach the outcome that the majority has selected for this case.