Court Opinion

ID: 9889328
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-09 14:09:27.725333+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:38:43.766444
License: Public Domain

Opinion issued October 3, 2023

                                     In The

                             Court of Appeals
                                    For The

                         First District of Texas
                            ————————————
                             NO. 01-23-00301-CV
                           ———————————
                 IN THE INTEREST OF G.A.M., A CHILD

                   On Appeal from the 313th District Court
                           Harris County, Texas
                     Trial Court Case No. 2022-00472J

                         MEMORANDUM OPINION

      In this appeal, O.T.F.C. (Mother) challenges the trial court’s final decree

terminating her parental rights to her minor child, G.A.M. (Gina), based on

findings that Mother failed to comply with provisions of a court-ordered family

service plan pursuant to Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(O) and that Mother

has a mental or emotional illness or mental deficiency that renders her unable to
provide for Gina’s needs pursuant to Family Code section 161.003. In her sole

issue on appeal, Mother contends that the evidence was legally and factually

insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that termination of her parental

rights was in Gina’s best interest.

      We affirm.

                                      Background

      Mother gave birth to Gina on December 24, 2021. Gina came into the care

of the Department of Family and Protective Services (DFPS) in March 2022,

before she was three months old, because of concerns regarding Mother’s ability to

care for her. At the time she was removed, Gina was severely underweight and

unkempt. The affidavit of the DFPS caseworker related concerns regarding the

health and safety of Gina’s living environment with Mother. When DFPS

investigated the initial report, Mother was living with a man who was not Gina’s

father. DFPS encouraged Gina’s maternal grandmother (Grandmother) to

intervene, and Grandmother indicated that she would check in regularly with

Mother and Gina. DFPS observed that Mother was not able to follow feeding

instructions or provide a safe environment for Gina, so Mother agreed to have Gina

placed with Grandmother. However, a family friend subsequently raised concerns

that Grandmother routinely left Gina with inadequate caregivers while she went

“out and about in the streets.”

                                          2
      On March 22, 2022, DFPS obtained temporary conservatorship over Gina

and placed her in a foster family. The trial court ordered a family service plan with

numerous requirements for Mother, such as completing a psychological evaluation,

a psychiatric evaluation, parenting classes, and individual counseling. The family

service plan also ordered that Mother maintain stable housing and employment.

Mother did not complete the family service plan, and DFPS sought to have her

parental-rights to Gina terminated.

      At trial, DFPS presented the testimony of a psychologist, A. Ross, who had

completed Mother’s psychological evaluation. Ross testified that she evaluated

Mother several months before trial, and her expert report was offered into

evidence. Ross testified that one of the assessments she performed measured

Mother’s cognitive ability, which was extremely low. Specifically, Ross testified

that Mother’s comprehension levels were at the level of a kindergartener. Ross

believed that Mother could work at a job with assistance, but her low cognitive

abilities would impact her ability to do things such as determine the correct dose

for medication or mix powdered formula correctly. She further testified that

Mother could not realistically improve her cognitive abilities at this point in her

life. While Mother might be able to learn new vocabulary or acquire new skills

with opportunity for repeated practice, Mother would continue to struggle to adapt

to new situations, ideas, or experiences.

                                            3
      With regard to Mother’s ability to parent, Ross was concerned that Mother

would not understand the developmental needs of a child, nor would she be able to

respond appropriately to new situations that would arise with her child. Ross

believed it was possible that Mother could learn to meet Gina’s basic needs, and

Ross testified that low-functioning parents could nevertheless be capable of

parenting with help and practice.

      Ross further testified that Mother seemed open to having someone help her

parent Gina. However, Ross was not aware of Mother’s living situation, which had

included a history of living with multiple other people. Ross was also concerned

about Grandmother’s decision to leave Mother with an abusive man and about the

fact that Mother had several sexual partners while under Grandmother’s care.

      DFPS caseworker H. Tate testified that Gina was removed from

Grandmother’s care after Grandmother left Gina with a friend who had no idea

where the Grandmother had gone. DFPS also removed Gina from Mother’s care

because of concerns over how Mother was feeding Gina due to the child being

severely underweight. Tate testified that Mother was not mixing the bottles

correctly. Tate and DFPS colleagues observed other troubling circumstances that

called into question Mother’s ability to feed Gina and keep her safe. Tate testified

about one occasion when Mother left Gina unattended on a changing table and had

to be redirected multiple times before she returned to Gina. Mother could not

                                         4
diaper Gina without significant help. Tate further testified that Grandmother had

been present when Mother left Gina on the changing table but did not intervene.

On another occasion, a service provider observed Mother offer Gina a piece of

cheese that could have posed a choking hazard.

      In addition to being underweight, Gina had a condition affecting her head

and neck when she came into DFPS care. Neither Mother nor Grandmother had

done anything to address the condition. Gina had since received treatment and did

not have any special needs at the time of trial.

      Regarding Mother’s family service plan, Tate testified that Mother had

failed to complete the required psychiatric evaluation and individual counseling.

The service providers were aware of the results of Mother’s psychological

evaluation. Tate also testified that Mother had not maintained stable housing

through the pendency of the case—she moved several times and had moved into a

new apartment a week before trial. Tate did not believe that Grandmother and

Mother had been honest with DFPS about their living situations, saying that they

had their own place but were in fact living with other people and moving multiple

times. Tate further testified that Mother began working with Grandmother cleaning

houses the week before trial, but Tate had not received any documentation

regarding this employment. Tate believed that Mother loved Gina, and Tate knew

                                           5
that Mother wanted Gina to stay with her. Tate had not observed significant

improvement in Mother’s parenting skills despite the family plan of service.

      Tate testified that Mother informed DFPS that her father and his wife would

be willing to help with Gina. Tate testified that the grandfather had a history with

adult protective services and was listed as the perpetrator in the agency’s report.

Tate met with the grandfather the day before trial when he showed up at her office,

but she did not know why he was not identified earlier in the case as a potential

support for Mother and Gina.

      Tate testified that Gina’s current placement was meeting her needs. The

foster family attended her physical therapy and helmet therapy to treat the head and

neck condition. They also addressed other medical needs as they appeared, and

they had an extended family support system. Gina had gained weight and, despite

being developmentally behind when she first came into care, Gina was meeting her

developmental milestones. Tate also believed that Gina was bonded with her foster

family, and the family wanted to adopt her if she became eligible for adoption. The

foster family expressed an intent to allow Gina to have ongoing contact with

Mother if they adopted Gina.

      The guardian ad litem, A. Stromgren, testified that the Child Advocates

organization was recommending termination of parental rights and placement with

the foster family. Stromgren acknowledged that Mother wanted Gina returned to

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her, but Stromgren had serious concerns regarding Mother’s cognitive ability and

its impact on her ability to safely parent Gina. Stromgren did not believe that

Mother could address Gina’s basic feeding and hygiene needs. Stromgren observed

Mother struggle to diaper Gina without assistance and leave Gina unattended on

the sofa multiple times. Stromgren further testified, “There were multiple times at

each visit where the child was left [unattended] usually on the sofa. And Mom nor

grandmother was supporting the child to prevent the child from falling; it was

usually CPS or the transporter.”

      Stromgren also testified that Child Advocates was concerned about both

Mother’s and Grandmother’s stability. Child Advocates received numerous,

inconsistent explanations of where Mother and Grandmother were living

throughout the case. Stromgren testified that the last time she spoke with

Grandmother, “she had found someone on Facebook to move in with on February

21, [2023],” approximately three weeks before the trial. However, she believed that

Mother and Grandmother had moved into a new residence the day of trial. She also

did not believe that Grandmother had shown the ability or interest in protecting

Mother, nor did Grandmother show an ability to help Mother parent Gina.

Stromgren testified that Child Advocates had multiple conversations with

Grandmother about introducing Mother to multiple paramours, but Grandmother

was not appropriately protective of Mother.

                                        7
      Stromgren also testified that Gina was, at the time of trial, walking well and

would be at additional risk if appropriate safety precautions were not taken.

Stromgren had observed Gina in the foster home, and she observed that the

placement was safe and meeting Gina’s needs. Stromgren testified that the foster

parents were very involved in obtaining the care Gina needed to treat the condition

with her head and neck. The foster family had also engaged additional therapy

services and provided activities like gymnastics to help Gina catch up and start

meeting developmental milestones.

      Foster Mother testified that Gina had been living in her home for nearly a

year. When Gina first came to Foster Mother’s home, the girl was not quite three

months old and weighed only ten pounds. This meant that Gina was in the third

percentile for her weight, which did not match up with her length and head

circumference. Gina seemed exhausted and struggled to take a bottle. Foster

Mother also testified that Gina was “pretty grimy and dirty”: She “had a lot of dirt

under her fingernails, which were long and not clipped.” Gina also had cradle cap,

“and it looked like it hadn’t really been combed or shampooed because her hair

was kind of glued to her head.” Foster Mother also found “debris” like something

“from either a stuffed animal or a blanket, something fuzzy,” in Gina’s stools

during the first week Gina was under her care. Gina also had a condition called

torticollis that had been untreated, and she had plagiocephaly, or a flat head. Foster

                                          8
Mother participated in treatment for the conditions by having Gina fitted for a

helmet and engaging in physical therapy.

      Foster Mother testified that Gina’s head has improved and she no longer has

on-going medical issues. Her weight was in the eighty-fourth percentile at her last

check-up. Gina was verbal and meeting her developmental milestones regularly.

The foster family would continue providing enrichment activities for Gina, and

Foster Mother testified that Gina liked piano and playing with Foster Mother’s

nine-year-old daughter. Foster Mother was willing to continue visits between Gina

and Mother in a safe way if the court allowed that to occur. Foster Mother testified

that she wanted to care for Gina for the rest of her life and hoped Gina would stay

with her. She hoped that Gina would be able to maintain a relationship with

Mother and Grandmother.

      Grandmother testified that, at the time DFPS removed Gina from Mother’s

care, Grandmother was concerned about the man Mother was living with because

he would “scream really ugly things to [Mother].” Grandmother took Gina to live

with her because she did not believe Gina was safe with him, and then Mother also

came to live with Grandmother. Grandmother believed that Mother needed help to

take care of Gina. Grandmother testified that she currently had a place to live

where Mother and Gina could join her.

                                           9
      Gina was placed with Grandmother after DFPS first removed her, but Gina

was removed from Grandmother’s care. Grandmother testified that this was

because she left Gina to go to a party, although Grandmother testified that she did

not leave Gina alone and she believed Gina was safe while she was out.

Grandmother testified that Mother loved Gina and took care of her.

      Mother testified that she did not want the foster family to adopt Gina. She

wanted her daughter returned to her. When asked whether she fed Gina regularly,

Mother testified answered, “Every day, eat. At 8:00.” Mother testified “yes” when

asked whether she sought medical care for Gina when she was severely

underweight:

      [DFPS]: And what did the pediatrician instruct you to do?

      [Mother]: Milk.

      [DFPS]: How often did you feed her?

      [Mother]: Three times.

Mother further testified that she lived with Grandmother and had help from

Grandmother, her father, and her father’s wife. Mother believed that she had

completed parenting classes and all of the other services that DFPS required.

      The trial court rendered its final decree of termination. It found that Mother

failed to complete the court-ordered family service plan pursuant to Family Code

subsection 161.001(b)(1)(O); that she had a mental deficiency that rendered her

                                        10
unable to care for Gina and that would likely continue through Gina’s 18th

birthday, pursuant to Family Code section 161.003(a); and that termination of the

parent-child relationship was in Gina’s best interest. The trial court further

appointed DFPS as Gina’s sole managing conservator. This appeal followed.

                       Sufficiency of Best Interest Finding

      In her sole appellate issue, Mother contends that the evidence was legally

and factually insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that termination of her

parental rights was in Gina’s best interest. We disagree.

A.    Standard of Review

      A trial court may order termination of the parent-child relationship if it finds

one of the statutorily enumerated predicate grounds for termination and that

termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the child. See TEX. FAM.

CODE § 161.001(b); see In re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d 796, 803 (Tex. 2012); see also

TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.003(a) (providing that court may terminate parent-child

relationship if it finds, among other things, that parent has “a mental deficiency

that renders the parent unable to provide for the physical, emotional, and mental

needs of the child” and “the termination is in the best interest of the child”). DFPS

must prove both elements—a statutorily prescribed predicate finding and that

termination is in the child’s best interest—by clear and convincing evidence. See In

re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d at 802–03 (stating that federal due process clause and Texas

                                          11
Family Code both mandate “heightened standard of review” of clear and

convincing evidence in parental-rights termination cases); see also TEX. FAM.

CODE § 161.003(a)(2) (requiring clear and convincing evidence to support finding

that mental deficiency will continue to render parent unable to provide for child

until 18th birthday of child). The Family Code defines “clear and convincing

evidence” as “the measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the

trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be

established.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 101.007; In re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d at 802.

      “Evidence is legally sufficient if, viewing all the evidence in the light most

favorable to the fact-finding and considering undisputed contrary evidence, a

reasonable factfinder could form a firm belief or conviction that the finding was

true.” In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624, 631 (Tex. 2018). We assume that any disputed

facts were resolved in favor of the finding if a reasonable factfinder could have

done so. Id. at 630–31. In reviewing the evidence’s factual sufficiency, we

consider the entire record, including disputed evidence. Id. at 631. “Evidence is

factually insufficient if, in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence a

reasonable factfinder could not have credited in favor of a finding is so significant

that the factfinder could not have formed a firm belief or conviction that the

finding was true.” Id.

                                           12
      The Texas Legislature has set out several factors that courts should consider

in determining whether a child’s parent is willing and able to provide the child

with a safe environment, including: (1) the child’s age and physical and mental

vulnerabilities; (2) the frequency and nature of out-of-home placements; (3) the

magnitude and frequency of harm to the child; (4) whether the child has been the

victim of repeated harm after the initial intervention by DFPS; (5) the results of

psychiatric, psychological, or developmental evaluations of the child’s parents,

family members, or other people with access to the home; (6) the willingness of the

child’s family to seek out, accept, and complete counseling services; (7) the

willingness and ability of the child’s family to effect positive environmental and

personal changes within a reasonable period of time; and (8) whether the child’s

family demonstrates adequate parenting skills, including providing minimally

adequate care for the child’s health and nutritional needs, care consistent with the

child’s physical and psychological development, guidance and supervision

consistent with the child’s safety, a safe physical home environment, and an

understanding of the child’s needs and capabilities. TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.307(b).

      The Supreme Court of Texas has also set out several non-exclusive factors

that we should consider when determining whether the termination of a parent’s

rights is in the child’s best interest, including (1) the child’s desires; (2) the child’s

current and future physical and emotional needs; (3) the current and future physical

                                           13
and emotional danger to the child; (4) the parenting abilities of the person seeking

custody; (5) the programs available to assist the person seeking custody in

promoting the child’s best interests; (6) the plans for the child by the person or

agency seeking custody; (7) the stability of the home or proposed placement;

(8) the acts or omissions of the parent that may indicate the parent-child

relationship is not proper; and (9) any excuse for acts or omissions of the parent. In

re J.W., 645 S.W.3d 726, 746 (Tex. 2022) (citing Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d

367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976)); In re A.C., 394 S.W.3d 633, 641–42 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.).

      These factors are not exhaustive, and it is not necessary that DFPS prove all

these factors “as a condition precedent to parental termination.” In re C.H., 89

S.W.3d 17, 27 (Tex. 2002); In re M.A.J., 612 S.W.3d 398, 410 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, pet. denied). The absence of evidence concerning some

of the factors does not preclude a factfinder from forming a firm belief or

conviction that termination is in the children’s best interest. In re A.C., 394 S.W.3d

at 642.

      The best-interest analysis may consider circumstantial evidence, subjective

factors, and the totality of the evidence as well as the direct evidence. In re Y.G.,

No. 01-22-00181-CV, 2022 WL 3362953, at *13 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

Aug. 16, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing In re B.R., 456 S.W.3d 612, 616

                                         14
(Tex. App.—San Antonio 2015, no pet.)). “A trier of fact may measure a parent’s

future conduct by his past conduct and determine whether termination of parental

rights is in the child’s best interest.” In re B.R., 456 S.W.3d at 616; see In re C.H.,

89 S.W.3d at 28 (stating that past performance as parent “could certainly have a

bearing on [parent’s] fitness to provide for” child, and courts should consider prior

history of child neglect in best-interest analysis).

B.    Analysis

      Here, sufficient evidence of numerous factors supports the trial court’s

determination that termination of Mother’s parental rights to Gina was in the

child’s best interest. Regarding Gina’s age and physical and mental vulnerabilities,

the evidence at trial indicated that Gina was still very young—just a little over a

year old at the time of trial—and so she needed an environment where she could be

fed safely and regularly. Foster Mother testified that Gina was starting to walk and

talk, and Gina’s guardian ad litem Stromgren testified that she needed a safer

environment than Mother could provide.

      Regarding the frequency and nature of Gina’s out-of-home placements,

DFPS presented evidence that it first attempted to place Gina in Grandmother’s

care when Gina was three months old. However, Grandmother was unable to

provide adequate care because she would leave Gina with inappropriate people or

would leave without telling the caregiver how to get in touch with her. Gina was

                                           15
placed with her current foster family just before she was three months old, and

they were hoping to adopt her.

      The evidence also demonstrated that Mother had been unable to care for

Gina. Gina was severely underweight when she was removed by DFPS because

Mother did not understand how to feed her. Gina’s basic hygiene needs were not

being met, and she had untreated medical conditions. Mother was unable to

understand these concerns, nor was she able to address them. Ross testified

regarding Mother’s psychological evaluation, which demonstrated that Mother’s

cognitive ability was very low and was not likely to improve. Mother could learn

new tasks, but she could not react appropriately to new situations. Stromgren and

Tate both testified that they observed Mother throughout the pendency of the case,

and she struggled to keep Gina safe. She could not mix bottles correctly or change

diapers. Despite parenting classes and other efforts, Tate did not see an

improvement in Mother’s parenting abilities. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.307(b)

(best-interest factors include parent’s willingness to seek out services and

demonstrate ability to provide adequate parenting skills).

      Furthermore, Mother was not able to complete her family service plan, and

evidence at trial indicated that her living and working situations remained unstable

during the pendency of the case. See In re M.R., 243 S.W.3d 807, 821 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth 2007, no pet.) (holding that parent’s inability to provide stable

                                         16
home and failure to comply with family plan of service supported finding that

termination was in child’s best interest). Mother needed significant help to meet

her own needs.

      While it was clear that Mother loved Gina and wanted to care for her, there

was no evidence introduced at trial that Mother herself was capable of providing

the care that a growing child like Gina would need. The foster family, on the other

hand, was able to meet Gina’s medical and developmental needs. They wanted to

adopt Gina and were willing to see that she maintained a relationship with Mother

and Grandmother to the extent they could do so safely. See TEX. FAM. CODE

§ 263.307(b); Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 372 (holding that future plans for child are

relevant to best-interest determination). The evidence also showed that Gina had

bonded with her foster family and was well-cared for. See In re J.M., 156 S.W.3d

696, 706 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.) (considering that child was bonded to

foster family when child was too young to express desires). Foster Mother testified

that she wanted to adopt Gina and that Gina enjoyed playing with her foster sister.

When children are too young to express their desires, the factfinder may consider

whether the children have bonded with the foster family, are well-cared for by

them, and have spent minimal time with a parent. See In re J.D., 436 S.W.3d 105,

118 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.).

                                        17
      Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the fact-finding, we

conclude that the trial court could form a firm belief or conviction that termination

of Mother’s parental rights was in Gina’s best interest. See In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d

at 631.

      Mother argues that termination of her parental rights “because of her

cognitive limitations is unnecessary and unwarranted under” the facts of the case,

where it was demonstrated that Mother loved Gina and where “opinions as to what

Mother can or cannot do at present are debatable.” Mother also argued that

“opinions as to what she can or cannot do in the future remain speculative.”

      It was not disputed that Mother loves Gina, but we observe that the best-

interest inquiry is “child-centered and focuses on the child’s well-being, safety, and

development.” Id. The evidence demonstrated more than the mere fact that Mother

had severe cognitive limitations. DFPS presented evidence that Mother’s

limitations resulted in problems with feeding Gina that resulted in her being very

underweight by the time she was three months old. Mother’s testimony regarding

her feeding of Gina demonstrated that Mother was unable to understand or follow

the feeding advice of the pediatrician. Both Tate and Stromgren testified that

Mother continued to struggle with basic tasks like diapering Gina or supervising

her properly. Tate observed Mother attempt to feed Gina a piece of cheese that

would have posed a choking hazard to an infant like Gina. See In re J.P.-L., 592

                                         18
S.W.3d 559, 582–83 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2019, pet. denied) (holding that

parent’s mental capacity is probative of best interest because mental issues are

relevant to ability to care for child’s physical and emotional needs); see also In re

B.J.C., 495 S.W.3d 29, 36 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.)

(holding that evidence of mental deficiency, by itself, is not ground to termination

parent-child relationship, but evidence that parent’s mental deficiency prevents her

from providing for child now and in future supports termination).

      Even if we agreed that the evidence of Mother’s ability was “debatable,” we

observe that the trial court, as the fact-finder, was entitled to resolve any

inconsistencies or discrepancies in the evidence. See In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d at

630–31 (holding that court’s assume that any disputed facts were resolved in favor

of finding if reasonable factfinder could have done so). We also observe that the

evidence regarding Mother’s ability to care for Gina in the future was not

“speculative.” Ross testified that, while Mother could learn some tasks through

repetition, she would not understand the developmental needs of a child, nor would

she be able to respond appropriately to new situations that would arise with her

child. Ross did not believe that Mother would be able to improve her cognitive

ability, and her mental condition meant that she would struggle with things like

determining the correct dose of medication or how to mix formula to feed Gina.

Tate testified that she did not see any improvement in Mother’s parenting ability

                                         19
over the course of the case, despite efforts by DFPS and parenting classes. Cf.

Salas v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 71 S.W.3d 783, 790 (Tex.

App.—El Paso 2022, no pet.) (“Section 161.003 does not require scientific

certainty that [a parent’s] mental illness [or deficiency] will continue until the

children are eighteen; it only requires reasonable probability.”).

      Mother further argues that she can raise her daughter with assistance, citing

the fact that she lives with Grandmother. However, the evidence at trial indicated

that Grandmother was not sufficiently protective of either Mother or Gina. DFPS

originally placed Gina with Grandmother after she was removed from Mother’s

care, but Gina was unable to stay with Grandmother because Grandmother did not

provide adequate supervision. Tate and Stromgren both testified that they had

concerns regarding Grandmother’s ability to provide a safe, stable environment.

Grandmother moved several times through the pendency of the case. Stromgren

testified that on at least one occasion, Mother left Gina on the sofa and

Grandmother did not intervene to keep Gina safe.

      Stromgren further testified that Child Advocates were concerned about the

fact that Grandmother introduced numerous sexual partners to Mother, and

Grandmother left Mother and Gina living with a man who was potentially unsafe.

Mother further argues that her father and his wife could have provided support to

her and Gina. However, Mother’s father was not available to DFPS during the year

                                          20
this case was pending. Tate testified that he showed up at her office the day before

trial, so DFPS could not establish whether he was an appropriate care giver. Tate

testified that he had been named as the perpetrator in a report made to adult

protective services. There is no evidence that he provided any protection or support

to either Mother or Gina. Thus, the trial court could have concluded that Mother

would not have sufficient support from Grandmother or any other family member.

      Thus, considering the entire record, including disputed evidence, we

conclude that the disputed evidence is not so significant that the trial court could

not have formed a firm belief or conviction that termination of Mother’s parental

rights was in Gina’s best interest. See In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d at 631.

      We overrule Mother’s sole issue.

                                    Conclusion

      We affirm the final decree of the trial court.

                                               Richard Hightower
                                               Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams and Justices Hightower and Countiss.

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