Court Opinion

ID: 9840420
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-18 15:00:44.364451+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:46:26.148147
License: Public Domain

21-6216
     Figueroa v. Garland
                                                                                   BIA
                                                                          O’Sullivan, IJ
                                                                          A214 700 882

                           UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                               FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION
TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS
GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S
LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH
THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY
CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT
REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

 1         At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
 2   Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley
 3   Square, in the City of New York, on the 18th day of September, two thousand
 4   twenty-three.
 5
 6   PRESENT:
 7              REENA RAGGI,
 8              RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,
 9              SUSAN L. CARNEY,
10                    Circuit Judges.
11   _____________________________________
12
13   METODIO GUZMAN FIGUEROA,
14            Petitioner,
15
16                    v.                                        21-6216
17
18   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
19   STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
20              Respondent.
21   _____________________________________
22
 1   FOR PETITIONER:                        Erin O’Neil-Baker, O’Neil Baker Law, LLC,
 2                                          Hartford, CT
 3
 4   FOR RESPONDENT:                        Brian Boynton, Principal Assistant Attorney
 5                                          General, Civil Division; Justin R. Markel,
 6                                          Senior Litigation Counsel; Brooke M. Maurer,
 7                                          Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration
 8                                          Litigation, United States Department of
 9                                          Justice, Washington, DC

10         UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of

11   Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

12   DECREED that the petition for review is DISMISSED.

13         Petitioner Metodio Guzman Figueroa, a native and citizen of Mexico, seeks

14   review of a March 25, 2021 decision of the BIA denying his application for

15   cancellation of removal. In re Metodio Guzman Figueroa, No. A 214 700 882 (B.I.A.

16   Mar. 25, 2021), rev’g No. A 214 700 882 (Immig. Ct. Boston May 28, 2020). 1 In

17   particular, Figueroa challenges the BIA’s decision reversing the determination of

18   an Immigration Judge granting his application for would cause his wife, a United

     1 The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit is the proper venue for this
     case because proceedings were completed in Boston. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2). We
     have retained Figueroa’s case, however, “in the interest of justice,” Sarr v. Garland, 50
     F.4th 326, 333–34 (2d Cir. 2022), because the proceedings before us have been extensive
     and because the parties have not challenged venue, see Moreno-Bravo v. Gonzalez, 463
     F.3d 253, 262 (2d Cir. 2006) (8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2) “is a venue provision, not a
     jurisdictional one. We therefore are not compelled to dismiss or transfer the petition,
     and in the circumstances here presented, we decline to do so.”).
                                                 2
 1   States citizen, “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.” See In re Metodio

 2   Guzman Figueroa, No. A 214 700 882 (B.I.A. Mar. 25, 2021). We assume the parties’

 3   familiarity with the underlying facts and the record of prior proceedings, to which

 4   we refer only as necessary to explain our decision to dismiss.

 5         We review the BIA’s decision as the final agency determination. See Chen

 6   v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 2005). To be eligible for cancellation of

 7   removal, Figueroa had the burden of establishing that his removal would cause

 8   his wife, a United States citizen, “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.”

 9   8 U.S.C. §§ 1229a(c)(4)(A)(i) (placing burden on applicant for relief), 1229b(b)(1)(D)

10   (hardship requirement).      To meet this standard, Figueroa was required to

11   “establish that his qualifying relative[] would suffer hardship that is substantially

12   different from, or beyond, that which would normally be expected from the

13   deportation of an alien with close family members here.” In re Monreal-Aguinaga,

14   23 I. & N. Dec. 56, 65 (B.I.A. 2001). The agency considers hardship factors in the

15   aggregate, including “the ages, health, and circumstances of qualifying . . .

16   relatives.” Id. at 63. “A lower standard of living or adverse country conditions

17   in the country of return are factors to consider only insofar as they may affect a

18   qualifying relative, but generally will be insufficient in themselves to support a

                                               3
 1   finding of exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.” Id. at 63–64.

 2         More generally, however, our jurisdiction to review the BIA’s denial of

 3   cancellation of removal on any basis is limited to “constitutional claims or

 4   questions of law.” 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(2)(D), (a)(2)(B)(i); Patel v. Garland, 142 S. Ct.

 5   1614, 1622 (2022) (holding that the jurisdictional limitation in § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i)

 6   applies to the ultimate determination of whether to grant relief and any

 7   underlying judgments relating to that determination).              Thus, a hardship

 8   determination is a “discretionary judgment” that we lack jurisdiction to review

 9   absent a “colorable” constitutional claim or question of law. Barco-Sandoval v.

10   Gonzales, 516 F.3d 35, 39–40 (2d Cir. 2007); De La Vega v. Gonzales, 436 F.3d 141, 145–

11   46 (2d Cir. 2006).

12         A colorable question of law might arise where the agency’s discretionary

13   decision is “argued to be an abuse of discretion because it was made without

14   rational justification or based on a legally erroneous standard,” Barco-Sandoval, 516

15   F.3d at 39, or where the agency has “totally overlooked” evidence or “seriously

16   mischaracterized” facts, Mendez v. Holder, 566 F.3d 316, 323 (2d Cir. 2009). A

17   challenge to the IJ’s assessment of the weight of the evidence or balancing of

18   factors, by contrast, will not raise a question of law that we can review. See

                                                4
 1   Argueta v. Holder, 617 F.3d 109, 113 (2d Cir. 2010); Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Just.,

 2   471 F.3d 315, 330–32, 342 (2d Cir. 2006).

 3         We conclude that Figueroa has failed to identify a colorable question of law

4    arising from the agency’s discretionary decision to deny cancellation of removal.

5    The BIA reviewed Figueroa’s testimony that his wife had earned a degree in voice

6    performance and wanted to pursue a career in musical performance in the United

7    States. The BIA concluded, however, that her difficulty pursuing such a career in

8    Mexico did not rise to the level of “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship”

9    that is “substantially different from, or beyond, that which would normally be

10   expected from the deportation of an alien with close family members here.” In re

11   Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 65. In making its determination, the BIA

12   applied the correct standard, namely, that difficulty finding employment in a

13   “trade or profession . . . is not sufficient to justify a grant of relief in the absence of

14   other substantial equities,” especially where, as here, “[t]he additional factors

15   needed to combine with economic detriment . . . are missing.” In re Pilch, 21 I. &

16   N. Dec. 627, 631 (B.I.A. 1996); see In re Andazola-Rivas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 319, 323 (B.I.A.

17   2002) (“[I]t has long been settled that economic detriment alone is insufficient to

18   support even a finding of extreme hardship.”).

                                                 5
 1         Figueroa also argued that he was entitled to cancellation of removal

 2   because, if forced to move to Mexico, he and his wife would have to live in his

 3   father’s small home. But “it has long been settled that economic detriment alone

 4   is insufficient” to support a finding of the requisite hardship. In re Andazola-Rivas,

 5   23 I. & N. Dec. 319, 323 (B.I.A. 2002).

 6         Finally, in determining that Figueroa was ineligible for cancellation of

 7   removal, the BIA also considered a number of other relevant factors, including

 8   country conditions in Mexico, the limited Spanish language skills of Figueroa’s

 9   wife (including her ability to communicate with Figueroa even though he testified

10   he speaks only “a little” English), the fact that she attended therapy following

11   Figueroa’s detention, and her age and ability to work.             Citing applicable

12   authority, the BIA concluded that the cumulative harm alleged did not rise to the

13   level of “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.” See In re Andazola-Rivas,

14   23 I. & N. Dec. at 324 (finding that an unmarried mother’s difficulty finding work

15   would not cause her accompanying children hardship because she was young and

16   able to work).

17         Focusing on the BIA’s consideration of country conditions in Mexico,

18   Figueroa argues that the BIA minimized the danger his wife will face on account

                                               6
 1   of crime in Mexico. Such an argument poses a challenge to the weight that the

 2   agency accorded to evidence of general country conditions in Mexico and does not

 3   raise a reviewable question of law. See Barco–Sandoval, 516 F.3d at 39 (“[W]e

 4   remain deprived of jurisdiction to review decisions under the INA when the

 5   petition for review essentially disputes the correctness of an IJ’s fact-finding.”).

 6         In sum, under the circumstances of this case, the BIA’s conclusion that the

 7   aggregate hardships faced by Figueroa’s wife should she move to Mexico would

 8   not pose a “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” does not raise a question

 9   of law that we have jurisdiction to review.

10         For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DISMISSED. All

11   pending motions and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED.

12                                           FOR THE COURT:
13
14                                           Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
15                                           Clerk of Court

                                               7