Court Opinion

ID: 9855669
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:29:02.843259+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:36:19.022643
License: Public Domain

Miller, Judge.
The question on appeal is whether the defendant’s numerous continuances and leaves of absence, which left only a seven-day window for trying the case during the second term, and his consenting to a notice resetting the case over to the next term, waived his speedy trial demand. We hold such actions did waive the demand and therefore affirm the trial court’s decision not to discharge the defendant on these grounds.
On February 28, 2000, within the January through March 2000 term of the DeKalb County State Court, the solicitor-general filed a formal accusation charging Brad Jones with driving under the influence of alcohol and disregarding a red light. Although Jones filed a request for a speedy trial pursuant to OCGA § 17-7-170, the case was not tried during either that term or the subsequent April through June term of court. Jones appeals the denial of his motion for discharge and acquittal on that ground.
The facts show that the case was scheduled for arraignment on March 6, 2000. On March 2, Jones, through his attorney, waived arraignment and signed notice for the April 7, 2000 trial calendar call. On March 9, the same counsel filed an entry of appearance, several motions (including a motion to suppress), discovery requests, and a demand for a “trial by jury pursuant to . . . OCGA § 17-7-170.” On that same day, counsel also filed a notice of leave of absence covering the periods of March 20-31, April 3-7, May 29-June 2, and June 19-30.
On March 16, the court scheduled Jones’s case for a motions hearing on April 4. Jones’s counsel filed a conflict letter covering the April 4 hearing, in which he requested that the matter be rescheduled if he could not appear. On April 4, Jones appeared personally and signed a notice to reschedule his motions hearing to May 2. On April 26, Jones’s counsel filed another conflict letter covering the May 2 motions hearing, in which he again requested that the matter be rescheduled if he could not appear. Meanwhile, on May 1, counsel *830filed an amended motion to suppress that challenged the constitutionality of the implied consent warning.1 On May 2, Jones again appeared personally and signed another notice that the motions hearing would be rescheduled, this time to July 5, with the trial scheduled for July 7. These dates fell outside of the April through June 2000 term of the DeKalb State Court. There is no dispute that jurors were impaneled during both the January and April terms of court.
At the July 5 motions hearing, counsel appeared and withdrew all motions. On July 7, at the trial calendar call, counsel announced the filing of the motion for discharge and acquittal for failure to provide a speedy trial. After a hearing, the court denied the motion. The court held that “[t]he continuances by virtue of the conflict letters coupled with the notice of leaves filed when Defendant’s Counsel first entered the case made Defendant’s Counsel unavailable for hearings and trial during a substantial portion of both terms. . . . The entire course of conduct of delay was caused by defendant’s Counsel.” Jones appeals this order.
“If a defendant who filed a demand for trial under OCGA § 17-7-170 (a) is not tried during the term in which the demand was filed or the next succeeding regular term of court and jurors were impaneled and qualified to try the defendant in both terms, the defendant must be absolutely discharged and acquitted. OCGA § 17-7-170 (b).”2 “A defendant may waive his right to automatic discharge under OCGA § 17-7-170 by any affirmative action on his part or on the part of his counsel which results in a continuance of the case to a time outside the period of the demand.”3 The State bears the burden of showing waiver.4
The following chart shows the trial court’s criminal schedule for March, April, May, and June 2000:
March — Arraignment 3/6; Motions 3/7; Calendar Call 3/10; Trials 3/20-31.
April — Arraignment 4/3; Motions 4/4; Calendar Call 4/7; Trials 4/17-28.
May — Arraignment 5/1; Motions 5/2; Calendar Call 5/5; Trials 5/22-6/2.
June — Arraignment 6/5; Motions 6/6; Calendar Call 6/9; Trials 6/19-30.
*831The State argues that by their actions, Jones and his counsel waived Jones’s right to automatic discharge. The issue of when requested continuances and leaves of absence by the defense waive the speedy trial demand and the automatic discharge is of utmost importance in an ordered constitutional system of providing timely justice to defendants while preserving the trial court’s control over its docket. We must guard against manipulations that would allow defense counsel the power to force the trial court to try the case during a short window between defense leaves of absence and continuances.5 On the other hand, we do not hold that any leave of absence request waives the speedy trial demand, for such is too harsh and would ignore the problem of forcing defense counsel to forgo even a single short leave of absence request or else face the forfeiture of the client’s right to a speedy trial.
Two independent reasons mandate the holding that Jones’s actions waived the speedy trial demand. First, Jackson v. State6 held that a six-week continuance granted to defense counsel so he could try a separate federal case waived the speedy trial demand where the continuance effectively foreclosed the State’s opportunity to try the defendant until the last impaneled jury. “If such continuances did not constitute a waiver of a speedy trial demand, defendants would be in the position to manipulate the trial courts’ calendars.”7 Here, the defense continuances and leaves of absence resulted in only a short window being available to try the case during the second term. Specifically, one leave of absence covered the entire period during which jury trials were scheduled in June 2000, and another covered all but seven days during which jury trials were scheduled in May 2000. On May 2, 2000, as the end of the second term approached and while these two defense leaves of absence were yet to take place, Jones appeared before the trial court at a scheduled motions hearing. Because his attorney was not present (having earlier informed the court of a conflict), and in light of the impending leaves of absence, the court reset the motions hearing to July 5, 2000, and the trial to the July 7, 2000 trial calendar. In our view, defense actions waived the speedy trial demand and the right to automatic discharge.
Second, Jones consented to the resetting of his trial outside the second term. Beyond obtaining the continuances and leaves of absence during the first and second terms of court, Jones on May 2 *832consented to the court’s resetting the case to a time outside the period allowed by the demand. State v. Davis8 held that “counsel’s request for a continuance and consent to reset the trial to a time outside the period allowed by the demand for speedy trial waived defendant’s right to automatic discharge and acquittal under OCGA § 17-7-170 (b).” Jones’s consent waived his right to automatic discharge. Accordingly, we affirm.

Judgment affirmed.

Andrews, P. J., Johnson, P. J., and Mikell, J., concur. Blackburn, C. J., and Eldridge, J., concur and concur specially. Pope, P. J., dissents.

 See Klink v. State, 272 Ga. 605 (533 SE2d 92) (2000).

 Sykes v. State, 236 Ga. App. 518, 519-520 (2) (511 SE2d 566) (1999).

 Fletcher v. State, 213 Ga. App. 401, 402 (1) (445 SE2d 279) (1994).

 Birts v. State, 192 Ga. App. 476, 477 (385 SE2d 120) (1989).

 See Jackson v. State, 222 Ga. App. 700, 701 (475 SE2d 717) (1996) (defense continuances which foreclose State’s opportunity to try defendant until last impaneled jury waived speedy trial demand). Cf. Fisher v. State, 273 Ga. 721, 723 (545 SE2d 895) (2001) (citing Jackson for the proposition that Georgia courts have sought to guard against manipulation of the trial calendar by defendants seeking automatic acquittal).

 Supra, 222 Ga. App. at 701.

 Id.

 243 Ga. App. 867, 868 (534 SE2d 159) (2000).