Court Opinion

ID: 9780837
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 02:59:46.637789+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:34:14.297650
License: Public Domain

MCFADDEN, Judge,
concurring specially.
I concur fully in Divisions 1 and 2 of the majority opinion but in the judgment only as to Division 3. As to Division 3,1 agree that the trial court is due to be upheld in his decision to exclude evidence that the victim bore a tattoo apparently reading, “Crippin’ ain’t easy but it’s fun.” But I do not agree that this ruling can be upheld on the basis that the trial court “did not abuse his discretion in excluding the evidence.” The trial court had no discretion as to that evidence; he was required as a matter of law to exclude it because it does not come within the exception to the general rule against admission of evidence of the victim’s character.
As noted by the majority, it is settled law that, “the general character of the [victim] for turbulence and violence may be shown, where there is evidence tending to establish that at the time of the homicide [the victim] was making an assault, or was attempting to commit violence upon the accused, or was in some way the aggressor.” Smithwick v. State, 199 Ga. 292, 295 (1) (34 SE2d 28) (1945); see also Haynes v. State, 17 Ga. 465 (6) (1855).
The exception set out in Smithwick has evolved. Smithwick was overruled in 1980 “to the extent that [it] might be considered as establishing an exclusionary rule denying the defendant the opportunity to establish by his own sworn testimony a prima facie case for the introduction of evidence of prior difficulties between him and the deceased.” Milton v. State, 245 Ga. 20, 25 (262 SE2d 789) (1980).
In a 1989 special concurrence, then-Justice Weltner urged that another exclusionary rule be overturned: “in the past we have *128restricted evidence of specific acts of violence to those committed by the victim against the defendant. Yet, logic dictates no such distinction.” Lolley v. State, 259 Ga. 605, 609 (385 SE2d 285) (1989) (Weltner, J., concurring). Justice Weltner’s view was adopted by the Supreme Court in Chandler v. State, 261 Ga. 402, 407 (3) (b) (405 SE2d 669) (1991).
Decided February 28, 2011
Reconsideration denied April 5, 2011
Randall S. Estes, for appellant.
Both Milton and the Lolley concurrence quote language from Chief Justice Lumpkin’s opinion in Haynes, supra: “This Court stands pledged by its past history, for the abolition, to the extent of its power, of all exclusionary rules, which shut out facts from the Jury which may serve, directly or remotely, to reflect light upon the transaction upon which they are called upon to pass.” Lolley, supra at 610; Milton, supra at 25.
Subsequently, however, the Supreme Court upheld the exclusion of evidence that a murder victim “was a hitman nicknamed the ‘Enforcer,’ ” holding that such “evidence consists of neither general reputation nor specific acts of violence and, thus, does not come within the exception to the general rule against admission of evidence of the victim’s character.” Quillian v. State, 279 Ga. 698, 699-700 (2) (a) (620 SE2d 376) (2005). And this court has held, citing Kolokouris v. State, 271 Ga. 597, 600 (4) (523 SE2d 311) (1999):
Evidence of a defendant’s gang affiliation has been held relevant and admissible to show motive despite the fact that it incidentally places the defendant’s character in evidence. However, on reviewing the question of whether a victim’s gang affiliation is admissible at trial, our Supreme Court has held that although evidence of the victim’s specific acts of violence against third persons when the defendant is claiming justification is admissible, “[m]ere membership in a gang is not a specific act of violence.” Therefore, such evidence is not admissible or relevant.
(Footnotes omitted.) Harris v. State, 298 Ga. App. 708, 710-711 (680 SE2d 693) (2009).
The trial court was therefore required as a matter of law, by the rule set out in Quillian and Harris, to exclude evidence of the victim’s gang membership.
*129Daniel J. Porter, District Attorney, Jon W. Setzer, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.