Court Opinion

ID: 9397753
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-26 07:09:43.488903+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:27.327485
License: Public Domain

In The

                            Court of Appeals

              Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

                            __________________

                            NO. 09-22-00392-CV
                             __________________

               IN THE INTEREST OF K.R.K.-L.H.
__________________________________________________________________

         On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2
                     Liberty County, Texas
                   Trial Cause No. CV2016063
__________________________________________________________________

                                OPINION

      Mother appeals from an order terminating her parental rights to

Karl (K.R.K.-L.H.), her twenty-three-month-old son. 1 In the same

proceeding, the trial court terminated the parental rights of B.H. Jr.,

Karl’s father, to Karl. 2

      Mother raises two issues in the brief she filed to support her appeal.

In issue one, Mother argues the trial court erred in admitting records into

      1To protect the identity of the minor, we use pseudonyms to refer to
the child and the members of his family. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(b)(2).
      2B.H. Jr. and Mother were married. Unlike Mother, B.H. Jr. didn’t

appeal from the trial court’s order terminating his parental rights.
                                      1
evidence during the trial, which the Department of Family and Protective

Services used to prove Mother tested positive for illicit drugs on several

drug tests proven up with a business records affidavit signed by a records

custodian employed by the Texas Alcohol Drug and Testing Service. In

issue two, Mother argues the evidence is legally and factually insufficient

to support the trial court’s finding that terminating her parent-child

relationship with her child is in Karl’s best interest. Because we conclude

Mother’s issues lack merit, we will affirm.

                              Background

      Karl was born in March 2020. Four days later, Tyiesha Justice, an

investigator employed by the Department of Family and Protective

Services, Child Protective Services Division, received a report that there

was “Neglectful Supervision of [Karl] by his mother[.]” Justice found Karl

in the hospital, but his mother was not there. Justice told the trial court

that under the circumstances, she “took custody of the child and placed

the child in foster care.”

      A few days later, Justice located Mother in Santa Maria, a rehab

facility in Harris County. When Justice met Mother there, she told

Justice that she had been using meth since she had been eighteen-years

                                    2
old. Mother, however, denied having using drugs in the past six months.

But Mother then contradicted herself, as according to Justice, Mother

told her she had eaten “methamphetamines so that she [could be]

accepted into the program. And then she also admitted that she had

taken four opiate pills to relieve some pain, some like back pain issues

that she was having while she was pregnant.”

     Hair samples, which Mother submitted to the Department for

testing on April 6, 2020, tested positive for meth. When the Department

got the results of the test the next day, it sued Mother and B.H. Jr. (Karl’s

father), seeking to protect Karl by establishing a conservatorship and to

terminate the existing parent-child relationships between Karl and his

parents. When the Department filed suit, it already had open cases

against Mother involving two of her other children, Bobby and Lacy. In

September 2020, just five months after launching the formal proceedings

that led to the order terminating Mother’s parental rights to Karl, the

253rd District Court of Liberty County signed a final order terminating

Mother’s parental rights to Bobby and Lacy.

     Turning to the evidence Mother complains about in the trial of the

case at issue here, Mother’s evidentiary objections focus on the trial

                                     3
court’s ruling admitting Exhibit H. Exhibit H contains the results of the

testing done on urine and breath specimens that Mother submitted for

testing at the Department’s request. The following chart, which we have

prepared, summarizes the results of the tests in date order:

      Date                 Specimen            Result

      April 2020           Urine               Neg.

      April 2020           Hair                Pos./Meth.

      June 2020            Urine               Neg.

      June 2020            Hair                Neg.

      December 2020        Hair                Pos./Meth.

      December 2020        Urine               Neg.

      January 2021         Urine               Pos./Barbiturates,
                                               Benzodiazepines

      March 2021           Urine               Neg

     The testimony the trial court heard about Mother’s drug use,

however, was not restricted to the information in Exhibit H. Eleven

witnesses testified in a hearing before an associate judge. That hearing

ended when the associate judge signed an order terminating Mother’s

                                   4
and Father’s parental rights to Karl. The witnesses who testified in the

hearing before the associate judge were: (1) Mother; (2) the investigator

employed by the Department in charge of the investigation the

Department conducted in Karl’s case, Tyiesha Justice; (3) the custodian

of records for the Harris County Hospital District, Jacqueline Jefferson;

(4) Tina, an adoptive parent of another of Mother’s daughters, Ruth; (5)

Carole Karachiwala, a caseworker formerly employed by Child Protective

Services (the caseworker assigned by the Department to work on the

cases that involved Bobby and Lacy); (6) Mary, Tina’s daughter, whom

the trial court named in the order terminating Mother’s parental rights

to be one of Karl’s joint managing conservators; (7) John—Mary’s

husband—whom the trial court named as Karl’s other joint managing

conservator; (8) Karl’s Court Appointed Special Advocate (CASA); (9)

Traci McMurtry, Mother’s recovery coach; (10) Sarah Cross, who testified

she lives in a house near the house where Mother was living when the

hearing before the associate judge occurred, and who testified that

Mother lives with a man named Wade Morgan; and (11) Brenda, Karl’s

maternal grandmother, who testified that she is currently responsible for

taking care of four children in her one-bedroom home and that she knows

                                   5
Wade Morgan, but she doesn’t believe it would be appropriate to have

children in his presence.

      Importantly, we note that in this appeal Mother hasn’t challenged

the   trial   court’s   findings of   condition endangerment, conduct

endangerment, or its finding that her parent-child relationship had been

terminated in a prior proceeding on grounds of endangering a child.3

Instead, Mother argues the evidence is insufficient to support the trial

court’s best-interest finding, pointing to her testimony that she “has been

clean since May 2019.”

      To support her argument that the trial court’s best-interest finding

is not supported by sufficient evidence, Mother points to the parts of her

family service plan that she completed, suggesting the trial court should

have relied on her testimony rather than the evidence presented by the

Department in determining whether allowing her to retain her rights to

Karl would be in Karl’s best interest. As Mother would have it, the trial

court should have believed her testimony that she now has the skills she

needs to “keep going to church and keep going to classes[,] I mean, going

      3See  Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D) (condition
endangerment), (E) (conduct endangerment), (M) (had her parent-child
relationship terminated on an endangerment finding as to another child).
                                  6
to work and just carrying a good lifestyle for me and my son.” In the

Department’s view, however, Mother’s longstanding history with the

Department, a history that involves a prolonged substance abuse history

involving methamphetamines, makes Mother unsuitable to parent a

child.

     At trial, the Department established that Mother’s parental rights

to Ruth, Bobby, and Lacy had been terminated in prior proceedings

through two court orders. Copies of the orders terminating Mother’s

rights in those proceedings were admitted as exhibits in the proceeding

involving Karl. As to Ruth, the order terminating Mother’s rights shows

the court terminated Mother’s parental rights in that proceeding on

predicate findings of abandonment, conduct endangerment, and for

failing to support Ruth. 4 And as to Bobby and Lacy, the order reflects

Mother’s rights were terminated on two predicate grounds, her failure to

comply with her family service plan and a finding that her rights had

     4The   trial court’s order in the suit that involved terminating
Mother’s rights to Ruth, which was admitted into evidence in the trial of
the proceeding that involves Mother’s rights over Karl, shows that
Mother was served with citation in the suit to terminate her parental
rights to Ruth but that she never appeared.
                                   7
been terminated on grounds of endangerment in a prior case that

involved another child.

     As mentioned, Tina was one of the witnesses who testified in the

hearing conducted before the associate judge. Tina explained that she is

Karl’s father’s aunt (Karl’s great aunt). According to Tina, Ruth was

placed in her care after the Department (Child Protective Services)

removed Ruth from Mother’s and Father’s home. Tina added that after

Mother’s rights to Ruth were terminated, she sought to adopt Ruth.

According to Tina, when the adoption case was going to court, Mother

threatened her and made terroristic threats. Tina explained that

currently, Karl is living in the home of her daughter (Mary) based on his

placement. Tina explained that one of the advantages of that placement

is that Karl gets to see Ruth (his sister) at Mary’s home every day. Tina

added that Karl and Ruth appear bonded, “love each other[,] and [t]hey

play hard.”

     Carole Karachiwala, the Department’s caseworker, developed a

family service plan for Mother in Karl’s case. The plan required a drug

and alcohol evaluation. At trial, Mother admitted having used “illegal

drugs” during her pregnancy with Karl, claiming she did so to be

                                   8
admitted into the facility at Santa Maria Hostel so she could be “stable

enough to take care of my son.” Even though Mother testified the Santa

Maria Hostel required a failed drug test as a condition to admission, its

former employee Tracy McMurtry (Mother’s recovery coach at Santa

Maria) testified that “you have to be positive to get into detox services,

but not . . . just to get into treatment.”

      The trial court heard testimony that Mother went into treatment

programs many times but never successfully completed a program.

Mother’s own testimony confirmed she didn’t complete a drug-treatment

program, as she testified in the hearing conducted by the associate judge

that she was kicked out of the facilities she attended. Even so, Mother

also testified in that hearing that she had maintained her sobriety and

been free from drugs from a period of twelve to eighteen months.

      The Department’s caseworker, Karachiwala, testified that in her

time with the Department, Mother failed to comply with requests for

drug screens “twice a month every month, from June of 2019 until April

[2021].” Other witnesses — Tina, Mary, John, and the CASA — told the

trial court that they believed that Mother was still using drugs.

                                      9
     The evidence in the trial also shows that Mother moved often

during the time Karl’s case was pending on the trial court’s docket. In the

eighteen months the case was on the docket, Mother lived at the Santa

Maria Hostel, with her mother Brenda, in several hotels, at the Brazos

Place (another rehab facility), at a Christian-based facility in Hitchcock,

and at a residence on K Street. As to the K Street residence, Mother

testified she leased the residence with money she received on loan from

“an 80-year-old retired CPA,” whom Mother described as a close friend.

     During the hearing before the associate judge, Mother admitted she

was friends with a registered sex offender named Wade Morgan. Mother,

however, denied that she and Wade Morgan were romantically involved,

Mother told the trial court that she could keep Karl away from Morgan.

But there was other testimony in the trial contradicting Mother’s account

about her relationship with Morgan. According to Tina, Karl’s father

(Mother’s husband) told her that Mother and Morgan “were in a romantic

relationship.” And Sara Cross, Mother’s neighbor, testified that Mother

introduced Wade to her as her husband. Cross added that she had seen

children at Mother’s residence when Wade was there.

                                    10
      The evidence before the associate judge included testimony relevant

to Karl’s current placement with his foster parents and his development,

as the associate judge heard evidence that Karl has bonded with Mary

and John. The testimony shows that Karl has been in the placement with

Mary and John for about a year. Mary described Karl as a “very funny,

happy baby. He’s silly, he’s smart, he’s sweet, he’s just great.” According

to Mary, Karl is meeting his developmental milestones. John testified

that Karl is “very much” thriving in their home. Both Mary and John

testified they were bonded with Karl; for instance John described his

bond with Karl as “[l]ike he’s my own.” Mary and John added that they

have the resources, support, and ability to provide Karl a safe, stable

home.

      Mary and John asked the trial court to terminate Mother’s parental

rights. The CASA recommended Mother’s rights should be terminated

too, citing Mother’s instability, lack of support, lack of financial stability,

and association with a registered sex offender. The CASA stated she had

no concerns about Mary’s and John’s ability to meet Karl’s needs.

Karachiwala (the Department’s caseworker) testified that in her opinion,

                                      11
it was in Karl’s best interest for the court to terminate Mother’s parental

rights.

     On the other hand, Mother asked the court to return Karl to her.

She told the court that she has a room for Karl, which is ready for him in

her home. As to her plans for Karl, she plans to put him in daycare or

with Brenda (her mother who is caring for four other children in a one-

bedroom home) when she’s at work. Mother claimed to have family,

friends, and members of a church who would help support her.

     At the end of the trial before the associate judge, the associate judge

signed an order terminating the parent-child relationship between

Mother, Father, and their son Karl. Then, Mother requested a de novo

hearing in the referring court, complaining about that ruling made by the

associate judge. 5 Mother requested the de novo hearing on two issues: (1)

“Termination of [Mother’s] parental rights;” and (2) “the Appointment of

[Mary] and [John] as joint managing conservators.”

     5See id. § 201.15(a). The court that referred the case to the associate
judge was the 253rd District Court of Liberty County, Texas. After
Mother filed her request for a de novo hearing, the case was transferred
from the 253rd District Court to the Liberty County Court at Law
Number 2. No one has challenged the validity of the order signed by
Judge Thomas Chambers on November 16th ordering the case
transferred to the Liberty County Court at Law Number 2.
                                    12
     The County Court at Law Number 2 conducted the de novo hearing

in February 2022. The judge advised the parties that it would consider

the Reporter’s Record from the hearing conducted by the associate judge

in its review. Mother also asked the judge to allow her to call one witness,

Stephanie Cole, in the de novo hearing. The trial court agreed it would

allow Mother to call Cole. While Cole didn’t testify in the hearing before

the associate judge, she is the person who signed the affidavit for the

Texas Alcohol and Drug Testing Service as the custodian of the business

records, the records that were marked and admitted as Exhibit H during

the initial hearing.

     Turning to testimony of the additional witness in the de novo

hearing, Cole testified she works for the Texas Alcohol and Drug Testing

Service (TADTS) as its custodian of records. 6 She explained she is the

person who signed her name to the affidavit attached to the records in

the exhibit marked as Exhibit H. Cole agreed that she could not testify

to the exact chain of custody for the drug test results in the TADTS’s

     6Cole’s
           affidavit reflects the name of the business is Texas Alcohol
& Drug Testing Service, Inc.
                                   13
records, however, because she only keeps track of the records and does

not collect the biological specimens, which TADTS tests.

     According to Cole, the actual testing of the biological samples is

performed by an outside lab, Quest Diagnostics, which is not part of the

TADTS’s facility. The outside lab is responsible for calibrating their

equipment, and Cole agreed that she cannot attest to the machines that

Quest uses or the accuracy of Quest’s machines. Cole agreed that she

could not testify about the qualifications of the persons at Quest who had

performed the tests on Mother’s biological specimens. As the custodian of

TADTS’s records, Cole explained, she was testifying that the records

attached to Exhibit H are the records TADTS’s keeps in the normal

course of its business.

     In closing argument, Mother’s attorney argued that Exhibit H was

inadmissible “as hearsay and there’s a lack of proper foundation . . .

[because Cole] was not qualified to testify as to the standard of testing,

the qualification of these people who administer the test, the type of test.”

Mother’s attorney agreed that Mother was not claiming Exhibit H is not

a business record; instead, she explained she was objecting to Exhibit H

                                     14
because the Department (according to Mother’s lawyer) had not shown

the drug test results in the records are reliable.

     Nine months later and after the trial court overruled Mother’s

objection to Exhibit H, the County Court at Law Number 2 signed a final

order terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to Karl. The

trial court’s final order terminates Mother’s parental rights on the

predicate grounds of condition endangerment, conduct endangerment,

and a finding that she had her parent-child relationship terminated in a

prior case for having endangered another child. 7 The trial court also

found that terminating Mother’s parental rights to Karl is in Karl’s best

interest. 8 In the final order, the trial court appointed Mary and John as

Karl’s joint managing conservators.

                           Standard of Review

     Mother’s first issue challenges the trial court’s ruling admitting

Exhibit H. On appeal, a trial court’s ruling to admit or exclude evidence

     7See   id. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (M). B.H. Jr.’s (Father) rights were
also terminated by the trial court’s final order. But B.H. Jr. neither
appealed from the trial court’s final order, nor did he request a de novo
hearing from the associate judge’s order. Both orders terminate B.H. Jr.’s
parental rights to Karl.
      8Id. § 161.001(b)(2).

                                      15
is reviewed for abuse of discretion. 9 A trial court abuses its discretion

when it acts without regard to the guiding rules or principles governing

the admission of evidence, or if its decision to admit or exclude evidence

is shown to have been arbitrary or unreasonable. 10

     In Mother’s second issue, Mother argues the trial court’s best-

interest finding is not supported by sufficient evidence. In a suit filed by

the Department to terminate the parent-child relationship, the

Department must prove by “clear and convincing evidence” that

terminating the parent-child relationship is in the child’s best interest.11

As defined by the Family Code, clear and convincing evidence “means the

measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of

fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to

be established.” 12 When the parties try a case to the bench, the trial court

is the factfinder and decides which witnesses were credible, how much

weight to give to each witness’s testimony, and it resolves any

     9In  re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 575 (Tex. 2005).
      10See Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Malone, 972 S.W.2d 35, 43

(Tex. 1998); Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-
42 (Tex. 1985).
      11Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 101.007.
      12Id.

                                   16
inconsistencies or conflicts in the evidence admitted before it in the

trial. 13

       Under a legal-sufficiency review, we determine whether “a

reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that

its finding was true.” 14 In reviewing the evidence, we “look at all the

evidence in the light most favorable to the finding,” “assume that the

factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable

factfinder could do so,” and “disregard all evidence that a reasonable

factfinder could have disbelieved or found to have been incredible.”15 In

conducting our review, we will not disregard “undisputed facts that do

not support the finding” a party has challenged in the appeal. 16 When

deciding whether a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief

or conviction that the evidence supports a finding, we defer to the

factfinder’s role as the “sole arbiter of the witnesses’ credibility and

       13Inthe Int. of D.P., No. 09-22-00480-CV, 2022 WL 2975691, at *7
(Tex. App.—Beaumont July 28, 2022, pet. denied).
      14In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002).
      15Id.
      16Id.

                                     17
demeanor” when the inferences it drew from the evidence before it were

reasonable. 17

      In a factual-sufficiency review, we “give due deference” to the

findings that depend on the direct and circumstantial evidence admitted

before the factfinder in the trial. 18 Under a factual sufficiency review, the

question we must decide is not what we would have found from the

evidence in the trial had we been the factfinders in the trial. 19 Instead,

the question is whether from the evidence as a whole the factfinder could

“reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the

[Department’s] allegations.” 20

      To support her argument that the evidence is factually insufficient

to support the trial court’s best-interest finding, Mother needed to

explain why the evidence in the trial did not allow the trial court to infer

that terminating her parental rights to Karl is in his best interest.21

When we review the evidence the trial court considered, we will not find

      17Inre J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d 304, 312 (Tex. 2021); see In re J.W., 645
S.W.3d 726, 741 (Tex. 2022).
     18In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 108 (Tex. 2006) (cleaned up).
     19Id.
     20See In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex. 2002).
     21See In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266.

                                   18
the evidence factually insufficient to support the best-interest finding

Mother has challenged unless “in light of the entire record” and the

evidence the trial court “could not have credited in favor of the finding is

so significant” that the trial court “could not reasonably have formed a

firm belief or conviction” favoring the finding that it made. 22

      In evaluating the factors that a trial court considers in reaching a

best-interest finding, the inquiry is necessarily child-centered and

focuses on the child’s well-being, safety, and development. 23 Generally,

when examining the evidence supporting the finding, we compare the

evidence admitted in a trial against the nonexclusive factors the Texas

Supreme Court identified in Holley v. Adams. 24 Still, the factors

mentioned in Holley aren’t exclusive, and the evidence tied to a

factfinder’s normal decision-making process in determining what’s in a

child’s best interest need not include evidence addressing all eight Holley

factors. 25

      22Id. at 267.
      23See In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624, 631 (Tex. 2018).
      24See Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371-72 (Tex. 1976).
      25In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27 (noting the lack of evidence on some

Holley factors “would not preclude a factfinder from reasonably forming
a strong belief or conviction that termination is in the child’s best
interest”).
                                    19
     As a result, when probative, evidence on one of the more than

twenty-one predicate grounds for terminating a parent’s rights may

reinforce a trial court’s best-interest finding. 26 That’s often the case when

the trial court is acting as the factfinder and has found the parent

endangered the child. 27 As then Chief Justice Jefferson writing for the

Texas Supreme Court explained in In re C.H.: “The absence of evidence

about some of these considerations would not preclude a factfinder from

reasonably forming a strong conviction or belief that termination is in the

child’s best interest, particularly if the evidence were undisputed that the

parental relationship endangered the safety of the child.” 28

                                   Analysis

                         The Ruling to Admit Exhibit H

     On appeal, Mother argues that the trial court abused its discretion

in admitting Exhibit H because the exhibit contains “drug test results

without anyone to testify” about the “qualification[s] of the tester, the

equipment used, and the testing procedures amounted to an abuse of

discretion.”

     26Id.   at 27-28.
     27Id.   at 27.
     28Id.

                                      20
     The lab reports that Quest sent to the TADTS are among the

records in Exhibit H. Some are positive for the presence of meth. Quest’s

reports are tied to specimens that TADTS collected from Mother and then

submitted     and   processed    at   Quest’s    “DHHS      CERTIFIED

LABORATORY,” based on the information found within Quest’s reports

     While Quest’s lab reports do not include a definition of the term

“DHHS Certified Laboratory,” all the Quest reports show that Mother’s

samples were tested in a DHHS Certified Lab. 29 When the trial court

ruled on Mother’s objection to Exhibit H, we assume the trial court

noticed that fact, and that the trial court also would have known that

“DHHS” stood for the Department of Health and Human Services. A

DHHS Certified Lab subject to the Department of Health and Human

Services’ certification program for drug testing involves entities and

individuals engaged in interstate commerce subject to federal law.30 We

presume the trial court knew what the meanings of the terms were in the

     29Cole  was also not asked to address whether she knew what a
DHHS Certified Lab was when she testified in the de novo hearing.
     30See 49 C.F.R. pt. 40 (Procedures for Transportation Workplace

Drug and Alcohol Testing Programs); see also 49 C.F.R. § 49.81 (What
laboratories may be used for DOT drug testing).
                                  21
drug testing records and applied them when deciding whether the

records should be admitted into evidence in the trial. 31

     The evidence that the lab results came from a DHHS certified lab

is circumstantial proof that shows the lab that tested Mother’s drug

samples was certified to test for five classes of drugs, including

amphetamines like meth. 32 DHHS certified labs are also required to run

tests to determine the validity of the tests they perform in their labs. 33

     In addition to the Quest Lab reports, Exhibit H includes reports

signed by Dr. David Nahin interpreting the results of the testing on

Mother’s specimens. Dr. Nahin’s reports reflect that he is a “Certified

Medical Review Officer.” Even though the term Certified Medical Review

Officer (MRO) is not defined in Dr. Nahin’s report, we presume that the

     31Walton   v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 653 (1990) (“Trial judges are
presumed to know the law and to apply it making their decisions.”),
overruled on other grounds by Ring v. Arizona, 536 US. 584, 589 (2002);
Ellis v. Dall. Area Rapid Transit, No. 02-19-00224-CV, 2021 Tex. App.
LEXIS 327, at *14 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2021, pet. denied) (“Absent
conclusions of law to the contrary, we presume the trial court knew and
correctly applied the law to the facts.”); Buckeye Ret. Co., L.L.C. v. Bank
of Am., N.A., 239 S.W.3d 394, 402 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, no pet.)
(“Further, we presume the trial court knew and correctly applied the law
regarding spoliation and determined that if the presumption applied, it
was overcome by the evidence.”).
      3249 C.F.R. § 40.85(c).
      3349 C.F.R. §§ 40.89, .91.

                                    22
trial court would have known that federal law requires an MRO to be a

licensed physician and to have training in collection procedures for urine

specimens, chain of custody, reporting, recordkeeping, interpretation of

drug and validity of test results, and the role and responsibilities of the

MRO in the Department of Transportation drug testing program. 34

     The Department introduced Exhibit H under Texas Rule of

Evidence 902(10) as business records accompanied by a business records

affidavit. Under that rule, records are self authenticating if the original

or copy of the records attached to the affidavit meet the requirements of

the business exceptions rule, Texas Rule of Evidence 803(6). 35 On appeal,

Mother points to no defects in the business records affidavit signed by

Stephanie Cole. Boiled down, Mother’s argument is whether the

Department proved the results of her drug tests, shown in the reports

attached to Cole’s affidavit, are reliable. Mother has not argued or

claimed the reports attached to Cole’s affidavit are not authentic.

     That said, once the Department established the records were

authentic, which Mother doesn’t dispute, the burden of proof shifted to

     3449   C.F.R. § 40.121 (Who is qualified to act as an MRO?).
     35Tex.  R. Evid. 902(10); id. 803(6).
                                     23
Mother under the business records exception to prove the source of the

information, the method the records were prepared, or the circumstances

behind them “indicate[d] a lack of trustworthiness.” 36 Mother didn’t call

any witnesses to meet her burden. She doesn’t point out any problems

with the records themselves, for example by explaining how a drug test

in a given report was internally inconsistent with the other parts of the

report. Instead, what she claims is that after the Department presented

the trial court with authentic certified records of Mother’s drug test

results the Department should have done more to prove the results were

accurate. But Mother’s problem is that once the records are proven to be

authentic, the burden shifted to her to establish the records were

untrustworthy.

     We have no such evidence the records are not trustworthy here. For

example, there is no testimony in the record showing: (1) the testers who

performed the tests were not qualified; (2) the equipment used to perform

the tests provided the individual who performed them with less than

accurate results; (3) the individuals who performed the tests were not

properly trained to perform the tests; or (4) the individuals who

     36Id.   803(6)(D).
                                   24
performed the tests reflected in the reports failed to follow the proper

testing procedures when they performed the tests that are reported.37

Instead, the only evidence before us about the source of the reports comes

from Stephanie Cole, whose testimony shows the records were made,

kept and maintained as business records of the Texas Alcohol and Drug

Testing Service, and there is nothing in Cole’s testimony that shows

Mother’s biological specimens were gathered, sampled, or tested

improperly. As Cole told the trial court in the de novo hearing, “[t]he only

thing I do is I pull records and keep track of records. That’s all I do.”

     Of course, had Mother wanted to understand how the samples were

gathered and the testing performed, she could have taken the deposition

or subpoenaed Dr. David Nahin for the trial. His name is on the reports,

so Mother knew he was the MRO and was on notice that he is the person

who had the training and qualifications required to provide the answers

to her questions about the chain of custody procedures followed by

TADTS. But once the Department met its burden by establishing that

records it wanted to introduce met the business records exception of Rule

     37Id.803(6) (providing that records of regularly conducted activities
—often called business records — are “not excluded by the rule against
hearsay regardless of whether the declarant is available as a witness”).
                                   25
803(6)(A-D), the burden under Rule 803(6)(A-D) shifted to Mother as the

party opposing the admission of the records to show the information in

TADTS’s records was untrustworthy.

     We conclude the Department’s business records affidavit complied

with Rule 803(6)(A-D). We further conclude Mother failed to meet her

burden of introducing evidence rebutting the prima facie evidence

presented by the Department through its records custodian that the

Quest records were authentic, and that they were created and

maintained in the regular course of business.38 Accordingly, Mother

failed to introduce evidence sufficient to demonstrate the source of the

information or the method or circumstances of preparing the reports

indicate a lack of trustworthiness.

     Last, we note we have rejected similar arguments on claims about

similar drug-testing records three times in the past twenty-seven

months. Mother failed to cite or distinguish these cases in her brief.39

Mother’s first issue is overruled.

     38Id.  803(6)(E).
      39In re S.J., No. 09-22-00305-CV, 2023 Tex. App. LEXIS 513, at *39

(Tex. App.—Beaumont Jan. 26, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding trial
court did not abuse its discretion in admitting DHHS Certified lab
reports, which were accompanied by business-records affidavits); In re
                                    26
                        The Best Interest Finding

     In Mother’s second and last issue, Mother seeks to overturn the

trial court’s best-interest finding. That said, Mother hasn’t challenged

the trial court’s predicate findings that she engaged in conduct that

endangered Karl, allowed him to remain in conditions or surroundings

that endangered him, and that she had her parent-child relationship

with another child terminated in another case on a finding that she had

endangered that child. 40 Instead, she argues the evidence is insufficient

O.G.H.D., No. 09-21-00172-CV, 2021 Tex. App. LEXIS 8002, at *21-23
(Tex. App.—Beaumont Sept. 30, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding no
abuse of discretion occurred in admitting DHHS Certified lab report of
drug testing based on business-records affidavit of the Texas Alcohol and
Drug Testing Service); In re J.N.P., No. 09-20-00245-CV, 2021 Tex. App.
LEXIS 1827, at *21-22 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Mar. 11, 2021, no pet.)
(mem. op.) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting drug testing records maintained by the Texas Alcohol and
Drug Testing Service as business records because the trial court “could
have concluded that the affidavit by the custodian of records for the
[business] was sufficient for the business-records exception”).
      We note the attorney who represented Mother on appeal was not
one of the attorneys involved in the above three cases. Still, we would be
remiss were we not to mention that we expect that appellate lawyers,
when briefing their arguments, to “advise the Court of controlling legal
authorities, including those adverse to                their    position[.]”
https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1437423/standards-for-appellate-
conduct.pdf (Texas Supreme Court, Standards for Appellate Conduct,
Lawyers’ Duties to the Court).
      40See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(2); id. 161.001(b)1)(D),(E),

(M).
                                    27
to overcome the presumption under the Family Code that appointing her

child’s joint-managing conservator is in the child’s best interest. 41

     To support her argument that now, she is free from what has been

a repeated historical pattern of drug-use involving meth, Mother relies

on her own testimony that she acquired the skills she needs to overcome

her methamphetamine abuse problem that has plagued her in the past.

Mother suggests the associate judge and the trial court should have

believed her when she testified that “May 20, 2019 was the last time” she

“did any type of drugs[.]” Mother adds that in evaluating her testimony,

the factfinder in the hearing should have believed her testimony when

she said she intends to maintain “a good lifestyle for me and my son[,]”

and when she testified that after Kyle’s birth, she had attended drug and

alcohol assessments, a psychiatric evaluation, drug evaluations,

individual counseling, and a parenting course. Yet the only exhibits

Mother introduced supporting her claim that she completed counseling

consists of a certificate showing she completed a four hour parenting

education and stabilization course and an AA/NA attendance log, a

     41Id. § 153.131(b); see also In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex.
2006) (nothing that a “strong presumption” exists in keeping a child with
its parents).
                                   28
document that Mother claims shows she attended AA/NA meetings in a

four-month period between June and September 2021. 42

     As mentioned, the trial court’s findings that Mother endangered

Karl are undisputed. In her brief, Mother hasn’t explained why the trial

court’s endangerment findings alone aren’t sufficient to support the trial

court’s finding that terminating her parental rights to Karl is in Karl’s

best interest. While we could stop there and affirm the trial court’s order,

we note that in deciding whether it would serve Karl’s best interest to

terminate Mother’s parental rights and appoint Mary and John as Karl’s

joint-managing conservators, the trial court had a right to consider past

conduct toward her other children and toward Karl. 43

     As to Mother’s other children, Mother provided the Court with no

argument to explain why the associate judge and the judge that

conducted the trial de novo could not have reasonably inferred that when

Karl was born, Mother had a ten-year history of using illicit drugs. As to

Karl and based on the drug test results in Exhibit H, the evidence before

     42Even   though Mother testified she attended the AA/NA meetings
between June and September, nothing in the log the AA/NA group kept
for the meetings contains Mother’s name or verifies Mother’s attendance.
      43See In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27-28.

                                    29
us shows that it was reasonable for a factfinder to infer that after Karl

was born and Mother knew her parental rights to him were at stake,

Mother still chose to keep using meth. The tests in the record show that

Mother    tested   positive   for   amphetamines,      methamphetamine,

barbiturates, and benzodiazepines after the Department removed Karl

from Mother’s care. As the factfinder, the trial court also had the right to

conclude that Mother never successfully completed a drug rehabilitation

program since Mother never provided the trial court with any objective

evidence of completing outpatient or inpatient treatment and agreed that

she enrolled in and failed to complete rehab in three programs. Even if

the trial court believed Mother’s conduct had improved after Karl’s birth,

the trial court was not required to weigh the evidence Mother presented

of her recently improved conduct more heavily than the evidence it heard

about her parenting abilities from the time she was eighteen, as that

history shows she had a longstanding and untreated drug problem that

had already led to the termination of her parental rights to three children

before Karl. 44

          Interest of J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 346 (Tex. 2009); In re C.H.,
      44See

89 S.W.3d at 28.
                                   30
      Finally, the trial court was also entitled to consider Mother’s plan—

to have Karl live with her and her mother, who was responsible for the

care of four children in a one bedroom home—as compared to the plans

of the Department, which was to allow Karl to remain in his current

placement in a foster home. The trial court heard testimony that Karl is

living with Mary and John, his foster parents, who are meeting his

physical and emotional needs. The foster parents testified they wanted

to adopt Karl. Karachiwala (the Department’s caseworker), the CASA,

and Mary, offered opinions that terminating Mother’s parental rights

would be in Karl’s best interest. Finally John, describing his bond with

Karl, testified: “Like he’s my own[,]” and that if Mother’s and Father’s

rights to Karl were terminated, he intended “[v]ery soon” to proceed with

the proceedings that were required to adopt Karl as his son.

      To sum it up: Mother’s argument focuses on the presumption

created by the Family Code that allowing a child to remain with its

parent is in the child’s best interest. Yet it is equally presumed that “the

prompt and permanent placement of the child in a safe environment. . .

is in the child’s best interest.” 45 Given Mother’s historical use of an illegal

      45Tex.   Fam. Code Ann. § 263.307(a).
                                    31
substance and the fact the record contains little evidence other than

Mother’s belief that she has gained an awareness that her problem is

serious, the trial court could reasonably infer that even if Mother’s drug

use is now in temporary remission, her addiction creates a condition that

makes terminating her parental rights to Karl so that he may have a

prompt and permanent placement in his best interest.

     Because the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support

the trial court’s best-interest finding, we overrule Mother’s second issue.

                                Conclusion

     First, we hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

admitting records maintained in the regular course of business by the

Texas Alcohol and Drug Testing Service under the business records

exception to the hearsay rule. Next, we hold the evidence is legally and

factually sufficient to support the trial court’s best-interest finding. For

the reasons explained above, the trial court’s Order in Trial Court Cause

Number CV2016063 terminating Mother’s parent-child relationship is

     AFFIRMED.                                _________________________
                                                   HOLLIS HORTON
                                                        Justice
Submitted on March 2, 2023
Opinion Delivered May 25, 2023
Before Golemon, C.J., Horton and Wright, JJ.
                                    32