Court Opinion

ID: 9770080
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 15:37:58.967549+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:12.801813
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION BY
Senior Judge FRIEDMAN.
I respectfully dissent. The majority holds that the deposition testimony of Thomas Mulvehill, an employee of the Greater Johnstown School District (District), did not create a question of fact for the jury as to whether the District owed a duty to Tel-Power, Inc., or Samuel L. Wombacher to warn them not to use a metal bracket on a brick column to install cable in the District’s administration building. Therefore, the majority affirms the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County (trial court) granting summary judgment to the District. For the following reasons, I cannot agree.
A landowner “ ‘is subject to liability for physical harm caused to his invitees by a condition on the land, if ... by the exercise of reasonable care [the landowner] would discover the condition, and should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk to such invitees....’” Neve v. Insalaco’s, 771 A.2d 786, 790 (Pa.Super.2001)(quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343). Thus, an owner cannot escape liability to a contractor when a defect is not obvious to the contractor and the owner can discover it upon reasonable inspection. Gutteridge v. A.P. Green Services, Inc., 804 A.2d 643, 656 (Pa.Super.2002).
Here, Wombacher attempted to install cable by attaching it to a metal bracket on a brick column. When Wombacher tightened the cable, the column gave way, which caused Wombacher to fall and sustain various injuries. Mulvehill testified that, “[i]f [he had known] there was work going to be done on that,” he would have inspected the building. (Mulvehill Dep., 10/17/07, at 43.) Mulvehill further testified that, if he had inspected the building, he would have known that the columns were unattached, and he “would have never advised [Wombacher] to use those columns.” (Id., at 54, 61.) I submit that a jury could reasonably infer from Mulvehill’s testimony that, upon reasonable inspection, the District would have discovered that the column was not attached to the building, and, thus, the District had a duty to warn Wombacher not to use the column to install the cable.
The majority states that Mulvehill’s testimony is irrelevant because the defective condition in this case was not the column, but the “force exerted” by Wombacher on *1245the column after he attached the cable to it. (Majority Op. at 1243.) However, I fail to see how a “force exerted” on a defective condition of a building can be the defective condition of the building. Assuming that were possible, whether the defective condition was the column or the “force exerted” by Wombacher on the column is a disputed question of material fact for the jury that precludes summary judgment in this case.1
The majority also states that Wombacher “no doubt had significant experience in this area,” and, thus, “the alleged defect should have been at least as obvious to Mr. Wombacher.” (Majority Op. at 1243.) The words “no doubt” indicate actual knowledge, but the majority merely assumes that Wombacher had sufficient experience to detect the defective condition in this case. Indeed, if the record supported such a statement, the majority would have indicated as much. To the extent the record is unclear about Wombacher’s experience, in reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we must read the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, i.e., in the light most favorable to Wom-bacher. See Manley v. Fitzgerald, 997 A.2d 1235, 1238 n. 2 (Pa.Cmwlth.2010). Here, the record definitely shows that Wombacher did not realize that the column was unattached to the building. Moreover, to the extent that Wombacher’s experience is relevant, it is another disputed question of material fact for the jury that precludes summary judgment in this case.
Because there are disputed questions of material fact that should go to a jury, I submit that summary judgment was not warranted in this case. Thus, unlike the majority, I would reverse.

. Summary judgment is only proper when, after examining the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the record clearly demonstrates that there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Manley v. Fitzgerald, 997 A.2d 1235, 1238 n. 2 (Pa.Cmwlth.2010).