Court Opinion

ID: 9665063
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:38:23.393003+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:12.532871
License: Public Domain

JOHN CAYCE, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The majority’s interpretation of section 37.09 of the Texas Penal Code fails to give the language of the statute its plain meaning and is in conflict with a prior recent opinion of this court defining “conceals” in a different section of the penal code.
The pertinent language of section 37.09(a)(1) defines the offense of “Tampering With or Fabricating Physical Evidence” as follows:
(a) A person commits an offense if, knowing that an investigation or official proceeding is pending or in progress, he:
(1) alters, destroys, or conceals any ... thing with intent to impair its ... availability as evidence in the investigation or official proceeding.1
Section 37.09 does not, however, define “conceals.”
In construing a statute, our primary responsibility is to give effect to the legislature’s intent as expressed in the language of the statute.2 When the language of the statute is unambiguous, we must give effect to the plain, ordinary, common meaning of the words unless doing so would lead to absurd results.3 ‘Words and phrases shall be read in context and construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage.”4 When statutory words are not defined, we give words their plain meaning without regard to distinction between construction of penal laws and laws on other subjects, unless the act *590clearly shows that they were used in some other sense.5
In Chase v. State, Justice Gardner, writing for another panel of this court, defined the word “conceals” in section 32.33 of the penal code as to “keep from the knowledge and observation of others,” “refrain from disclosing or divulging,” and “hide, secrete, or withhold from the knowledge of others.” 6 Based on this definition, the court held that evidence showing that “[ajppel-lants kept the vehicle’s location from the knowledge of the Credit Union” and “refrained from disclosing or divulging its location to the Credit Union,” was legally sufficient to prove that the appellants concealed the vehicle under section 32.33(b) of the penal code.7
The majority acknowledges the same universally recognized definition of “conceals” that we adopted in Chase, but it holds that the word means something different here. According to the majority, the legislature intended that the word be given a much narrower definition when used in section 37.09 because the caption of section 37.09 (“Tampering With or Fabricating Physical Evidence”) is different than the caption of section 32.33 (“Hindering Secured Creditors”). Thus, the majority suggests that when construing section 32.33 of the penal code we must give “conceals” its plain meaning, but when construing section 37.09 of the code we may disregard its plain meaning in favor of a definition that we think better fits the statute’s caption. This “double standard” of statutory construction is without precedent and results in the majority’s rewriting section 37.09 by giving “conceals” a narrowly circumscribed definition that the legislature itself did not give it.
When called upon to interpret a statute, it is not our function as a court to give a statute a meaning that the legislature did not clearly intend simply because we disagree with the operation of the statute as written. Yet, this is what the majority has done here. If the legislature had intended that the definition of “conceals” in section 37.09 exclude “the act of refraining from disclosure” — conduct that the majority concedes is reasonably included within the definition of “conceals” as used in section 37.09 — the legislature could have easily said so. Nothing in section 37.09 or its caption, however, evidences such an intent.
The word “conceals” in section 37.09 of the penal code has the same plain meaning as the word “conceals” in section 32.33 of the code. This meaning has not changed since Chase was decided, and nothing in section 37.09 or any other part of the penal code “clearly shows” that the word was intended by the legislature to be used in some other sense than we held it was to be used in section 32.33.8 As we recognized in Chase, because “conceals” is not specifically defined, the jury was free to read it *591to have “any meaning which is acceptable in common parlance.”9 This is what the jury did in this case.
Because the evidence was sufficient to show that appellant withheld information regarding the location of Cunningham’s body with intent to prevent it from being available as evidence in a criminal investigation, the jury properly found him guilty under section 37.09 of the penal code. We should, therefore, affirm the judgment of the trial court.
For all of these reasons, I dissent.

. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 37.09(a)(1) (Vernon 2003) (emphasis added).

. R.R.E. v. Glenn, 884 S.W.2d 189, 192 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1994, writ denied).

. State v. Hardy, 963 S.W.2d 516, 519 (Tex.Crim.App.1997).

. Tex Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.011(a) (Vernon 2005).

. Daniels v. State, 754 S.W.2d 214, 219 (Tex.Crim.App.1988); Oler v. State, 998 S.W.2d 363, 368 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1999, pet. ref'd, untimely filed).

. Chase v. State, Nos. 02-06-00063-CR, 02-06-00064-CR, 2007 WL 866221, at ⅜2 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth Mar. 22, 2007, pet. ref’d); see Plummer v. State, No. 05-99-01826-CR, 2000 WL 1690194, at *4 (Tex.App.-Dallas Nov.13, 2000, no pet.); see also Anzaldua v. State, 696 S.W.2d 911, 912 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) (op. on reh'g) (defining “conceal” as "to hide, secrete, withhold from the knowledge of others; to withdraw from observation”). A person commits an offense under section 32.33 "if, with intent to hinder enforcement of that interest or lien, he destroys, removes, conceals, encumbers, or otherwise harms or reduces the value of the property.” Tex Penal Code Ann. § 32.33(b) (Vernon 2003) (emphasis added).

. Chase, 2007 WL 866221, at *2-3.

. See Daniels, 754 S.W.2d at 219.

. Chase, 2007 WL 866221, at *2; see Denton v. State, 911 S.W.2d 388, 390 (Tex.Crim.App. 1995); Oler, 998 S.W.2d at 368; Urbanski v. State, 993 S.W.2d 789, 793 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1999, no pet.).