Court Opinion

ID: 9770526
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:08:17.59317+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:18.094718
License: Public Domain

HEDGES, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
I agree with the dissent to an opinion recently issued by this court, State v. Romero, 907 S.W.2d 858 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.], 1995, no pet. h.) (Taft, J., dissenting). I do not believe that appellant established that the forfeiture proceeding barred subsequent prosecution of appellant for illegal investment on the basis of double jeopardy. See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932).1
Requirements for Forfeiture
Article 59.02 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Vernon Supp.1995) provides that “[pjroperty that is contraband is subject to seizure and forfeiture under this chapter.” “Contraband” is defined as “property of any nature, including real, personal, tangible, or intangible” (1) that is used in the commission of a first or second degree felony; or (2) that is used or intended to be used in the commission of felonies under Chapters 481 or 483 of the Health and Safety Code (Vernon Supp. 1995) or Tex.Rev.Civ.StatAnn. art. 350 (Vernon Supp.1995); or (3) that is the proceeds gained from the commission of one of the enumerated felonies, or (4) that is acquired with the proceeds gained from the commission of one of the enumerated felonies. Tex. Code CRTm.ProoANn. art. 59.01(2) (Vernon Supp.1995). The “offense” under this article is owning or holding an interest in contraband; the punishment for the offense is that the contraband may be seized.
Illegal Investment
The offense of illegal investment is defined in the Health and Safety Code:
A person commits [the offense of illegal investment] if the person knowingly or intentionally:
(1) expends funds the person knows are derived from the commission of an [enumerated] offense; or
(2) finances or invests funds the person knows or believes are intended to further the commission of an [enumerated] offense.
Tex.Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.126 (Vernon Supp.1995).
Evidence
Unless the evidence at the hearing on motion for habeas corpus relief established that appellant’s prosecution for illegal investment would represent a second prosecution for the same offense as that for which he was punished at the forfeiture proceeding, the trial court abused its discretion in granting the motion. It was appellant’s burden to meet. Anderson v. State, 635 S.W.2d 722, 725 (Tex.Crim.App.1982). I believe that he failed to do so.
In order to show that the forfeiture proceeding and prosecution for illegal investment represent punishment for the same offense, appellant was required to introduce evidence that the $75,000, the cellular telephone, and the automobile were property used in the commission of illegal investment. No place in this record does such evidence appear. On request for admissions, appellant denied possession and ownership of the cellular phone and the automobile, although in his answers to interrogatories he acknowledged his ownership in the seized property. He denied that at the time of seizure he was *65using the cellular phone and the automobile to farther the felony offense of illegal investment.
While appellant admitted ownership of the $75,000, he denied that the money was derived from the illegal sale, distribution, or delivery of a controlled substance. He further denied that the money was used to purchase four kilograms of cocaine and that the money constituted proceeds from the commission of an offense. In response to interrogatories, he stated that the source of the money was business investment. In the agreed stipulations admitted at the forfeiture proceeding, appellant made no reference to the source or the use of the money, the cellular phone, or the automobile.
On the state of this record, there is no evidence that appellant was punished by the seizure and forfeiture of property used or intended to be used in the commission of the felony of illegal investment. I hasten to point out that appellant has not challenged the adequacy of proof introduced by the State in the forfeiture proceeding. He chose instead to enter into an agreed judgment. Tying the forfeited property to the offense of illegal investment, would require impermissible presumptions based on this record.
The majority reads the agreed judgment as some evidence that the forfeiture and the illegal investment indictment emanate from the same offense. I disagree with the majority’s generalized interpretation of the judgment. All the judgment recites is that the State and appellant “reached an agreement” about the property; I cannot know the substance of that agreement from this record. The majority infers that “the parties agreed that the property, which was owned and possessed by Garza, would be forfeited because it was contraband” based on the fact that Garza agreed to the entry of this judgment. I believe that double jeopardy requires a higher standard of proof of “same offense” than the mere agreement of Garza to the entry of an agreed judgment in which he carefully avoids implicating himself in any criminal activity. Even if the citation in the court’s order of forfeiture to Chapter 59 of the Code of Criminal Procedure could be contorted into some sort of admission on Garza’s part, the reference is too general to link the forfeiture to illegal investment.
I would hold that appellant’s prosecution for illegal investment was not barred on the basis of double jeopardy by the forfeiture proceeding. Consequently, the trial court abused its discretion by granting appellant’s motion for habeas corpus relief.
I would reverse the order of the trial court and remand this case for trial.

. The Blockburger test is satisfied if each statutory offense requires the proof of a fact that the other does not. Ex parte McWilliams, 634 S.W.2d 815, 822 (Tex.Crim.App.1980) (opinion on reh’g).