Court Opinion

ID: 9578097
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:41:27.315828+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:22:37.361692
License: Public Domain

TYSON, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion affirming the trial court’s termination of respondent’s parental rights. The trial court concluded that respondent had abandoned and neglected the child, and grounded its decision to terminate pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(7) and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1). I do not find clear, cogent, and convincing evidence in the record to support the trial court’s findings of fact and its conclusions of law. I would remand to the trial court for further findings of fact.
The “parental liberty interest ‘is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests’ the United States Supreme Court has recognized.” Owenby v. Young, 357 N.C. 142, 144, 264 S.E.2d 264, 266 (2003) (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65, 147 L. Ed. 2d 49, 56 (2000)). The clear, cogent, and convincing evidence standard is *207“greater than the preponderance of the evidence standard required in most civil cases” and safeguards this liberty interest. In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 109-10, 316 S.E.2d 246, 252 (1984). This standard has been defined as evidence “which should fully convince.” Williams v. Building & Loan Asso., 207 N.C. 362, 364, 177 S.E. 176, 177 (1934).
I find substantial evidence supports respondent’s contention that petitioner, who waived her parental visits with respect to the minor child before the hearing, interfered in the respondent’s relationship with his daughter. Petitioner kept written records of the times respondent called and visited his daughter. These records show respondent communicated with petitioner at least twenty times during a period of nine months prior to his incarceration. Respondent also visited with his daughter four or five times during the year between her birth and his incarceration. Respondent and his mother called petitioner at her mother’s home to schedule times to visit his daughter. They were informed on numerous occasions by petitioner or her mother not to visit or were discouraged from visiting. Petitioner secreted the child by sending her to live with her brother in Texas for six months during respondent’s incarceration. After petitioner moved out of her mother’s home and during respondent’s incarceration, respondent’s mother traveled to petitioner’s home to visit her granddaughter several times, visiting once and leaving notes for petitioner the other times.
There is no dispute that respondent and his mother brought clothes and blankets for his daughter. Record evidence shows respondent and his mother offered petitioner money and other items to support the daughter that were refused by petitioner. Petitioner’s behavior evidences an intent to shut respondent out of his daughter’s life. Neither the trial court’s order nor the majority’s opinion accounts for either this interference or its effect on respondent’s ability for parental involvement. The trial court’s order makes no findings of fact in this regard.
The statute requires a finding of existing neglect at the time of the hearing to terminate parental rights on that ground. In re Ballard, 311 N.C. 708, 716, 319 S.E.2d 227, 232 (1984). The trial court failed to make a finding of existing neglect at the time of its order. The trial court relied upon its findings that while incarcerated respondent had not written his daughter, arranged for her to receive Christmas gifts through the prison’s Angel Program, or paid any child support to petitioner. Incarceration, standing alone, is neither a sword nor a shield *208in a termination of parental rights decision. See In re Maynor, 38 N.C. App. 724, 248 S.E.2d 875 (1978). Respondent’s severely limited income prevented him from providing support to his daughter. After reviewing all competent evidence in the record, I fail to find clear, cogent, and convincing evidence to support the finding of neglect existing as of the date of the hearing.
Respondent’s mother has been certified as a foster parent with the Department of Social Services for five years and is willing to provide a home for the child. The trial court failed to consider any placement possibility with the child’s natural family. I would vacate the trial court’s termination of respondent’s parental rights and remand this case for further findings of fact based upon the clear, cogent, and convincing evidence in the record. I respectfully dissent.