Court Opinion

ID: 9966067
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-04 01:00:38.834725+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:07.571283
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-11109            Document: 38-1         Page: 1      Date Filed: 05/03/2024

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit
                                   ____________
                                                                             United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                      Fifth Circuit
                                    No. 23-11109
                                  Summary Calendar                                  FILED
                                  ____________                                     May 3, 2024
                                                                               Lyle W. Cayce
Lonnie Kade Welsh,                                                                  Clerk

                                                                  Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                          versus

Stephen Thorne, Ph.D.,

                                             Defendant—Appellee.
                   ______________________________

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Northern District of Texas
                             USDC No. 5:21-CV-156
                   ______________________________

Before Smith, Southwick, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam: *
       Lonnie Kade Welsh, formerly Texas prisoner # 2201624, moves for
leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) on appeal from the dismissal of his
42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted. Through his complaint and responses to a court questionnaire,
Welsh alleged that Dr. Stephen Thorne’s report regarding his psychological

      _____________________
       *
           This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 23-11109       Document: 38-1       Page: 2    Date Filed: 05/03/2024

                                 No. 23-11109

examination of Welsh, which was submitted to the state court as part of a
biennial examination of Welsh’s civil commitment as a sexually violent
predator, violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable
seizures and his Fourteenth Amendment right to substantive due process.
Welsh’s motion for consideration of his appellate brief is GRANTED.
       Welsh’s IFP motion constitutes a challenge to the district court’s
certification that his appeal was not taken in good faith. See Baugh v. Taylor,
117 F.3d 197, 202 (5th Cir. 1997); see also Fed. R. App. P. 24(a). The
inquiry into an IFP movant’s good faith is “limited to whether the appeal
involves ‘legal points arguable on their merits (and therefore not
frivolous).’” Howard v. King, 707 F.2d 215, 220 (5th Cir. 1983) (citation
omitted). Our review of the district court’s dismissal of Welsh’s complaint
is de novo. See DeMoss v. Crain, 636 F.3d 145, 152 (5th Cir. 2011).
       In his IFP motion and briefs, Welsh challenges the district court’s
dismissal of his Fourth Amendment claim as barred under Heck v. Humphrey,
512 U.S. 477 (1994), and, alternatively, as lacking merit. He argues that his
claim was not barred under Heck because state law does not require the
presiding judge to have any evidence to deny a biennial review and because a
civil rights violation would at most institute further proceedings and would
not authorize his release. He also contends that Thorne manipulated the
proceedings through his allegedly false report, and thus Thorne caused the
deprivation of his rights. However, Welsh has not raised a nonfrivolous
argument because (1) if Thorne’s report directly caused Welsh’s continued
confinement, it was barred under Heck because a judgment in Welsh’s favor
would necessarily imply that the October 2020 biennial review or the
commitment order was invalid; and (2) if Thorne’s report did not directly
result in his continued confinement, Welsh has not alleged a viable Fourth
Amendment unreasonable seizure claim against Thorne. See Heck, 512 U.S.
at 487; Thompson v. Steele, 709 F.2d 381, 382 (5th Cir. 1983).

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 Case: 23-11109          Document: 38-1          Page: 3       Date Filed: 05/03/2024

                                       No. 23-11109

        Welsh also renews his argument that Thorne’s report violated his
right to substantive due process on several grounds. Moreover, he argues
that this claim should be evaluated under the standard set out in Youngberg v.
Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982), rather than the standard set out in County of
Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847 (1998). He contends that Thorne’s
report was fraudulent and violates his right to substantive due process under
either standard, and that the “sham hearing” conducted using Thorne’s
report also violated his right to procedural due process. However, Welsh
failed to allege facts demonstrating a substantive due process violation under
either standard. See Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 321; Lewis, 523 U.S. at 847.
Welsh’s disagreement with his initial diagnosis without flagging any change
in his behavior for purposes of the biennial review does not raise a
nonfrivolous issue indicating that Thorne’s thorough analysis—which was
presumptively valid under Youngberg and which included an examination of
his criminal history, his other relevant behavior, mitigating factors, and his
current scores on psychological and actuarial assessments—deviated from
accepted professional judgment or shocked the contemporary consciousness.
See Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 321, 323; Lewis, 523 U.S. at 847. Further, Welsh
does not identify any error in, and thus abandons any challenge to, the district
court’s rejection of his allegation that Thorne, through his report, violated
Welsh’s right to procedural due process. See Brinkmann v. Dallas Cnty.
Deputy Sheriff Abner, 813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1987).
        Finally, Welsh argues that the Rooker-Feldman 1 doctrine does not
deprive the district court of jurisdiction. However, although the magistrate

        _____________________
        1
         See D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263
U.S. 413 (1923).

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                                   No. 23-11109

judge made an alternative determination that Welsh’s claims were barred
under this doctrine, the district court declined to address the issue.
       Because Welsh fails to show that his appeal raises a nonfrivolous issue,
his motion to proceed IFP is DENIED, and the appeal is DISMISSED as
frivolous. See Baugh, 117 F.3d at 202 n.24; Howard, 707 F.2d at 220; 5th
Cir. R. 42.2.
       We have previously warned Welsh that he would face sanctions if he
continued to file frivolous or repetitive pleadings. See Welsh v. McLane,
No. 23-50912, 2024 WL 1008593, at *1 (5th Cir. Mar. 8, 2024)
(unpublished); Welsh v. Abbott, No. 23-50492, 2023 WL 8804578, at *1 (5th
Cir. Dec. 20, 2023) (unpublished); Welsh v. McLane, No. 20-10412, 2021 WL
5313626, at *1-2 (5th Cir. Nov. 15, 2021) (unpublished). In our most recent
opinion, we also imposed a $100 sanction and directed Welsh to review all
pending matters and to move to dismiss any that are frivolous, repetitive, or
otherwise abusive. Welsh, 2024 WL 1008593, at *1. Because Welsh has
ignored our warnings, IT IS ORDERED that a SANCTION IS
IMPOSED. Welsh is ORDERED to remit a sanction in the amount of
$100, payable to the clerk of this court. Welsh is also BARRED from filing
any pleading in this court, or in any court subject to this court’s jurisdiction,
until that sanction is paid in full, unless he first obtains leave of the court in
which he seeks to file such pleading. Welsh is further CAUTIONED that
any future frivolous or repetitive filings in this court, or any court subject to
this court’s jurisdiction, will subject him to additional sanctions. He is again
DIRECTED to review all pending matters and to move to dismiss any that
are frivolous, repetitive, or otherwise abusive.

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