Court Opinion

ID: 9528029
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:36:30.704399+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:26:24.645177
License: Public Domain

FOSHEIM, Justice
(dissenting).
Counsel for appellant conceded in oral argument that the evidence of subsequent accidents was relevant. See also: Wright and Graham, 22 Federal Practice and Procedure § 5170 (1978). This means it was admissible (SDCL 19-12-2) unless its probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence (SDCL 19-12-3). The trial court admitted the evidence. In view of appellant’s motion in limine we can concede this ruling was error. However, in order to disturb that ruling, appellant has the burden of showing not only error, but prejudicial error. To do that, he must establish affirmatively from the record that, under the evidence, the jury might and probably would have returned a different verdict if the alleged error had not occurred. Alberts v. Mutual Service Casualty Insurance Co., 80 S.D. 303,123 N.W.2d 96 (1963); Dwyer v. Christensen, 77 S.D. 381, 92 N.W.2d 199 (1958).
If the evidence was relevant, as appellant concedes, but proved .no independent cause or aggravation of appellant’s injury, as the majority concludes, then it is difficult to see how appellant has affirmatively established prejudicial error, especially since the court properly instructed the jury that to warrant recovery they must find that the defendant’s negligence was the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injury.
*321Plaintiff was a passenger in the vehicle when injured. The accident was not caused by any negligence on his part. Accordingly, evidence of his subsequent accidents could hardly prejudice reasonable minds as to damages unless we are to assume that it caused the jury to conclude that he was so accident-prone as to be the subject of some sort of hex, and that consequently nobody, including the defendant, should be liable for any injury he might sustain. Such a conclusion would not be cognizant of jurors’ rightful measure of intelligence and common sense.
I would affirm.