Court Opinion

ID: 9380602
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-20 17:06:22.076975+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:26.338930
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Redding v. United States Parachute Assn., Inc., 2023-Ohio-884.]

                 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                           ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                 GEAUGA COUNTY

WESLEY REDDING,                                         CASE NO. 2022-G-0024

                 Plaintiff-Appellant,
                                                        Civil Appeal from the
        - vs -                                          Court of Common Pleas

UNITED STATES PARACHUTE
ASSOCIATION, INC., et al.,                              Trial Court No. 2021 P 000753

                 Defendants-Appellees.

                                              OPINION

                                 Decided: March 20, 2023
                 Judgment: Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded

Wesley Redding, pro se, 338 Irma Drive, Chardon, OH 44024 (Plaintiff-Appellant).

Tyler Tarney and Eric Leist, Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani, LLP, 41 South High
Street, Suite 2495, Columbus, OH 43215 (For Defendants-Appellees).

JAMES A. BROGAN, J., Ret., Second Appellate District, sitting by assignment.
        {¶1}     Appellant, Wesley Redding, has filed the instant pro se appeal from the

judgment of the Geauga County Court of Common Pleas.                        In general, appellant

challenges the trial court’s dismissal of his multi-cause-of-action complaint. For the

reasons discussed in this opinion, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part,

reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.

        {¶2}     The underlying complaint is premised upon appellant’s allegation that he

was wrongfully denied membership in the United States Parachute Association (“USPA”).

The named defendants and appellees herein are as follows: USPA, Sherry Butcher,
Marcie Anne Smith, AerOhio Skydiving Center, and Cleveland Skydiving Center

(collectively “appellees”). In his complaint, appellant asserts he was a member of the

USPA from March 31, 2004 through June 30, 2021. After his membership expired, on

July 2, 2021, he attempted to renew his membership, but was denied.

       {¶3}   Appellant’s complaint generally claims that appellees wrongfully refused to

renew his membership, in violation of USPA’s Governance Manual (“Manual”), in violation

of Ohio law, and in retaliation for filing various complaints with the Federal Aviation

Administration (“FAA”). In particular, the complaint asserts appellees breached a contract

between themselves and appellant; appellees were negligent; they violated R.C. 1729.24;

they violated the Sarbanes-Oxley Act; they intentionally interfered with a business

interest; they breached a duty of good faith and fair dealing; and they violated R.C.

4113.52, Ohio’s Whistleblower statue. Appellant additionally sought injunctive relief.

       {¶4}   Appellees filed a motion to dismiss based upon Civ.R. 12(B)(6). Appellees

specifically broke down each claim in appellant’s complaint and argued that, viewing the

allegations in his favor, no set of facts would entitle him to relief. Appellant duly opposed

the motion. In his memorandum in opposition, appellant simply argued that USPA, by

permitting appellant to participate in an appeal of his membership via the “non-member”

administrative process, appellees were not entitled to argue the Manual was inapplicable

to the parties’ relationship. The trial court converted appellees’ motion into a motion for

judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Civ.R. 12(C). After considering the parties’ relative

arguments, the trial court concluded that no genuine issue of material fact existed that

would entitle him to relief on any of the claims. The complaint was therefore dismissed.

Appellant now appeals and assigns six errors for this court’s review. His first provides:

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Case No. 2022-G-0024
              The trial court abused it’s discretion by committing fraud and
              excusable neglect against plaintiff-appellant in granting defendants-
              appellees’ motion to dismiss, as defendants’ motion is a fraud under
              Civ. R 60(B)(1) - (5), pursuant to R.C § 2913.01(A) - (C), and R.C. §
              2913.43(A) - (B). The trial court specifically state (1) “Nowhere does
              Redding allege that a contract exists between non-members and any
              of the defendants” (T.d 41, p. 3, ¶3) ; (2) “there is no alleged contract
              between Redding and any of the defendants” (T.d 41, p. 4, ¶4); and
              (3) “Redding has not alleged the existence, or submitted evidence of
              a binding contract between the parties” (T. d. 41, p. 9, ¶1).
              Defendants-appellees’ exhibit “A”, the USP A Governance Manual,
              Appendix C Section 1 states “In a membership organization like the
              USPA, disciplinary proceedings and other disputes are best resolved
              within the organization. Accordingly, the USPA’s Board of Directors
              has adopted this policy as part of USPA’s members’ contracts of
              membership with the USPA (including group members’ contracts of
              membership) to encourage resolution within the organization” (T.d.
              18, p. 99, ¶2). The USPA Governance Manual is a contract bound
              by the laws of this state pursuant to R.C 2307.39. Additionally, “Since
              it is not possible for USPA to revoke the membership and ratings of
              a non-current member” (T.d. 18, p. 42, ¶9), plaintiff-appellant was
              indisputably “a member of the USPA from March 31, 2004 through
              June 30, 2021” (T.d. 41, p. 2 ¶3). Therefore, the trial courts
              statements are fraudulent as plaintiff-appellant was “a member” and
              the Governance Manual is a contract between USPA and it’s
              members. Further, the trial court’s fraudulent statements defrauded
              the trial court. Consequently, the trial court committed fraud,
              excusable neglect, or other misconduct under Civ. R. 60(B)(1) - (5)
              pursuant to R.C § 2913.01(A) - (C), and R.C. § 2913.43(A) - (B),
              which deprived plaintiff-appellant’s substantial right to a jury trial
              under R.C § 2505.02(B) and R.C § 2505.02(B)(1) in which a
              pecuniary obligation, the complaint, is incurred. (Sic throughout.)
       {¶5}   Given its rambling nature and arbitrary citation to the civil rules and

inapplicable statutes, it is difficult to discern, from the assigned error alone, the nature of

appellant’s argument. In the body of his argument, however, appellant asserts that the

trial court committed fraud and excusable neglect in granting appellees’ motion to dismiss.

In particular, appellant asserts appellees’ “motion is a ‘fraud’” under Civ.R. 60(B)(1) - (5);

the motion is somehow, by definition, a criminal fraud pursuant to R.C. 2913.01(A); and

the motion amounts to the crime of “securing a writing by fraud,” in violation of R.C.
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Case No. 2022-G-0024
2913.43(A) and (B). Appellant claims that appellees’ motion to dismiss is based upon

fraudulent (criminal or otherwise) statements which deprived him of the substantial right

to a jury trial. In support of this point, he cites R.C. 2505.02(B), the statute governing

final, appealable orders.

       {¶6}   Initially, none of the above arguments were raised in appellant’s

memorandum in opposition to appellees’ motion to dismiss. A party who does not bring

an alleged error to the trial court’s attention forfeits the right to challenge that error on

appeal. See, e.g., Ashmore v. Eversole, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 15672, 1996 WL

685568, *6 (Nov. 29, 1996). Even where the challenge has been forfeited, however, an

appellate court may recognize plain error. Goldfuss v. Davidson, 79 Ohio St.3d 116, 679

N.E.2d 1099 (1997), syllabus. The plain error doctrine, in the context of civil cases, is

only to be used “in the extremely rare case involving exceptional circumstances” where

the error “seriously affects the basic fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial

process, thereby challenging the legitimacy of the underlying judicial process itself.” Id.

Absent plain error, this court can only address arguments specifically passed on by the

trial court. In this matter, we discern no plain error.

       {¶7}   First, Civ.R. 60(B) addresses motions for relief from a final judgment.

Appellant did not file a Civ.R. 60(B) motion. It is therefore inapplicable.

       {¶8}   Further, there were no intimations in appellant’s complaint that appellees

engaged in any criminal conduct or that any criminal investigation vis-à-vis fraud

occurred. Hence, appellant’s reference to Ohio’s criminal code is also inapposite.

       {¶9}   Finally, R.C. 2505.02(B) discusses matters that “affect a substantial right”

in relation to whether an order from a trial court is either final and appealable or

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Case No. 2022-G-0024
interlocutory.   That statute, however, is not germane to the content of appellees’

argumentation in their motion to dismiss. It is therefore irrelevant to the trial court’s

decision granting appellees’ motion to dismiss.

       {¶10} With respect to appellant’s assertion that appellees’ motion to dismiss made

“fraudulent allegations,” appellant cites the following points: (1) “But nowhere in the

manual does it state that it is a binding contract between USPA and members.”; (2)

“Plaintiff contract claims fail because, even if there was a contract he was not a member

at the time the alleged breach occurred”; and (3) “However, the conduct which Plaintiff

alleges constituted a breach occurred after Plaintiff sought to renew his membership on

July 2, 2021.” Appellant fails to argue, let alone demonstrate, how any of the foregoing

statements were false or made with any intent to mislead the court. As a result, his claim

that appellees’ representations were fraudulent is without merit.

       {¶11} Appellant next contends the trial court erred in granting appellees’ motion

to dismiss because it improperly relied upon appellees’ statements that no contractual

relationship existed between appellant and USPA. He asserts (1) he previously had a

membership with USPA; (2) he attempted to renew his membership within 30 days of its

expiration as provided by the Manual, Section 1-1, Art. 1, Section 4; (3) his membership

was revoked pursuant to an administrative process provided by Art. 1, Section 6.4(F)(2)

of the Manual; and (4) as a result, he established a prima facie contractual relationship

between himself and appellees.

       {¶12} Initially, it would appear some of the named appellees were likely not

directly involved in revoking appellant’s USPA membership. The Manual speaks to the

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Case No. 2022-G-0024
manner in which the USPA addresses its members and what rights and obligations USPA

and its members might share. Art. 1, Section 4 addresses “Delinquencies,” and provides:

              Notification of failure to pay indebtedness, other than dues, to USPA,
              when due, shall be sent to the delinquent member within thirty (30)
              days following USPA notification of the delinquency. If the said
              indebtedness shall not have been paid within thirty (30) days after
              mailing of the notice, the membership of said individual or group shall
              be terminated.
       {¶13} This provision addresses “indebtedness,” not “dues,” which, according to

the Manual, every member must pay. Art. 1, Section 7. In this respect, appellant’s

attempt to renew his membership after its expiration does not apply. Moreover, Art. 1,

Section 4 concerns itself with USPA’s obligation to notify an indebted (delinquent)

member of the debt within 30 days of its awareness of the delinquency. To the point, the

section does not afford a former or an inactive member 30 days from the date of his or

her membership expiration to pay his or her dues for membership. In short, Art. 1, Section

4 is inapplicable to appellant’s situation.

       {¶14} Additionally, even though USPA did not renew appellant’s membership

pursuant to the Manual, this does not imply he was somehow an imputed “member” of

USPA. To the contrary, Art. 1, Section 6.4(F)(2) sets forth procedural channels for “a

disciplinary investigation” of “Non-Members.”      It would seem, from the face of the

allegations in the complaint, that USPA followed these procedures. See Complaint, ¶28-

29.

       {¶15} The Manual draws a distinction between disciplinary actions for members

and non-members. The Manual, in discussing non-member potential renewals, points

out that “[s]ince it is not possible for USPA to revoke the membership and ratings of a

non-current member, the board would need to examine the situation to determine if it
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Case No. 2022-G-0024
would be deemed reasonable to allow the expired member to renew membership and

ratings.” Art.1, Section 6.4(F)(3). It is undisputed that, at the time appellant sought

renewal, he was not a “current member.” “To have a valid and enforceable contract there

must be an offer by one party and an acceptance of the offer by another.” Huffman v.

Kazak Bros., Inc., 11th Dist. Lake No. 2000-L-152, 2002 WL 549858, *4 (Apr.12, 2002).

By seeking renewal, appellant presented USPA an offer, which was rejected. In light of

the factual allegations, appellant, as a non-member, is not entitled to rely upon USPA’s

compliance with the Manual as a basis for his claim that he and appellees had some

contractual relationship which was breached by USPA’s decision not to renew

membership. He offered to renew his membership and the offer was rejected. As a

matter of law, there was no contract.

      {¶16} Appellant’s first assignment of error lacks merit.

      {¶17} Appellant’s second assigned error reads:

             The trial court abused it’s discretion by committing fraud and
             excusable neglect against plaintiff-appellant in granting defendants-
             appellees' motion to dismiss, as defendants’ motion is a fraud under
             Civ. R 60(B)(1) - (5), pursuant to R.C § 2913.01 (A) - (C), and R.C. §
             2913.43(A) - (B). Defendants-appellees’ statement in their motion to
             dismiss “The USPA made this decision pursuant to the procedures
             applicable to non-members set forth in Section 1-6.4.F of the USPA
             Governance Manual” (T.d. 18, p.2, ¶1). Plaintiff-appellant’s
             response, exhibit “A”, establishes "The Executive Committee has
             declared you ineligible for membership in accordance with USPA
             Membership “By-Laws” (T.d. 29, p. 8, ¶1). Defendants-appellees’
             exhibit “A” establishes “Any member may be censured, suspended,
             or expelled by the USPA Executive Committee, with such action to
             be reviewed by the BOD, for causes but not limited to transgression
             of basic ethical principles as detailed in the Constitution, By-laws,
             and policies of USPA” (T.d. 18, p. 23, ¶1). Therefore, defendants-
             appellees’ statements are fraudulent as USPA Executive Committee
             declared plaintiff-appellant ineligible for USPA membership in
             accordance with USPA membership “by-laws” and not a “disciplinary
             action investigation” under Section 1-6.4.F which constituted a
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Case No. 2022-G-0024
             breach of plaintiff-appellant’s USPA membership. Further
             defendants-appellees' statements are fraudulent, by the use of
             deception, misrepresentation, or any conduct, act, or omission that
             creates, confirms, or perpetuates a false impression in another,
             which defrauded the trial court. Additionally, the trial court relied upon
             defendants-appellees’ fraudulent statements and specifically state
             (1) “Redding was not a member at the time” (T.d 41, p. 4, ¶2); and
             (2) “Redding has not alleged proximate cause” (T.d. 41, p. 7, ¶2).
             Consequently, the trial court committed fraud, excusable neglect,
             misconduct, or any other conduct, act, or omission that creates,
             confirms, or perpetuates a false impression in another, including a
             false impression as to law, under Civ. R. 60(B)(1) - (5) pursuant to
             R.C § 2913.01(A) - (C), and R.C. § 2913.43(A) - (B), which deprived
             plaintiff-appellant’s substantial right to a jury trial under R.C §
             2505.02(B) and R.C § 2505.02(B)(1) in which a pecuniary obligation,
             the complaint, is incurred. (Sic throughout.)
      {¶18} Appellant’s second assignment of error appears to recycle the same

arguments alleged under his first assigned error. Because the allegations are essentially

duplicative of those already addressed, his second assignment of error lacks merit.

      {¶19} Appellant’s third assigned error reads:

             The defendants-appellees’ committed extrinsic fraud and excusable
             neglect by the use of deception and misrepresentation in their motion
             to dismiss under Civ. R. 60(B)(l) - (5), pursuant to R.C § 2913.01(A)
             - (C), and R.C. § 2913.43(A)-(B). Defendants-appellees’ "knowingly"
             state (1) “the Governance manual did not create any contractual
             rights”; (2) “nor any contract on Defendants” (T.d 18, p. 3, ¶2); and
             (3) “nowhere in the Manual does it state that it is a binding contract
             between the USPA and members” (T.d. 18, p. 5, ¶2). Despite
             defendants-appellees' exhibit “A”, the USPA Governance Manual,
             Appendix C Section 1 states “In a membership organization like the
             USPA, disciplinary proceedings and other disputes are best resolved
             within the organization. Accordingly, the USPA’s Board of Directors
             has adopted this policy as part of USPA’s members’ contracts of
             membership with the USPA (including group members’ contracts of
             membership) to encourage resolution within the organization” (T.d.
             18, p. 99, ¶2). The USPA Governance Manual is a contract bound
             by the laws of this state pursuant to R.C 2307.39. Further, “Since it
             is not possible for USPA to revoke the membership and ratings of a
             non-current member” (T.d. 18, p. 42, ¶9), plaintiff-appellant was
             indisputably “a member of the USPA from March 31, 2004 through
             June 30, 2021” (T.d. 41, p. 2, ¶3). Therefore, defendants-appellees’
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Case No. 2022-G-0024
              statements are fraudulent as the Governance Manual is a contract
              between USPA and it’s members. Additionally, defendants-
              appellees knowingly made fraudulent statements, or any conduct,
              act, or omission that creates, confirms, or perpetuates a false
              impression in another, including a false impression as to law under
              Civ. R. 60(B)(1)-(5) pursuant to R.C § 2913.01(A)-(C). Consequently,
              defendants-appellees’ obtained, by deception, some benefit for
              oneself or defendants’, or to “knowingly” cause, by deception, some
              detriment to plaintiff-appellant and caused the trial court to execute
              an order on their motion to dismiss, which is any writing obtained by
              deception under R.C § 2913.43(A) - (B). Furthermore, defendants-
              appellees’ deprived Redding’s substantial right to a jury trial under
              R.C § 2505.02(B) and R.C § 2505.02(B)(1) in which a pecuniary
              obligation, the complaint, is incurred. (Sic throughout.)
       {¶20} Similar to his second assignment of error, appellant reiterates many of the

same points as he did in his first assignment of error under his third assigned error. He

points, however, to Appendix C, Section 1 of the Manual as providing some indicia of a

contractual relationship between himself and USPA. That Section, entitled “Internal

Resolution Policy,” provides, in relevant part:

              In a membership organization like the USPA, disciplinary
              proceedings and other disputes are best resolved within the
              organization, if possible, through simple procedures administered
              promptly and fairly. Accordingly, the USPA’s Board of Directors has
              adopted this Policy as part of the USPA members’ contracts of
              membership with the USPA (including group members’ contracts of
              membership), to encourage resolution within the organization.
       {¶21} While the above clause indicates that membership with the USPA

constitutes a contract, we previously concluded that, under these facts, appellant, at the

relevant time, was a non-member. As a result, he was not a member of the organization

when his membership was not renewed. His point is therefore without merit.

       {¶22} Appellant’s third assignment of error lacks merit.

       {¶23} Appellant’s fourth assigned error reads:

              The defendants-appellees committed extrinsic fraud and excusable
              neglect, by the use of deception and misrepresentation, or any
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Case No. 2022-G-0024
             conduct, act, or omission that creates, confirms, or perpetuates a
             false impression in another, including a false impression as to law in
             their motion to dismiss under Civ. R. 60(B)(1) - (5), pursuant to R.C
             § 2913.01(A)-(C), and R.C. § 2913.43(A)-(B). Defendants-appellees’
             statement in their motion to dismiss.” The USPA made this decision
             pursuant to the procedures applicable to non-members set forth in
             Section 1-6.4.F of the USPA Governance Manual” {T.d. 18, p.2, ¶1).
             Plaintiff-appellant’s response, exhibit “A”, establishes “The Executive
             Committee has declared you ineligible for membership in
             accordance with USPA Membership “By-Laws” (T.d. 29, p. 8, ¶1).
             Defendants-appellees’ exhibit “A” establishes “Any member may be
             censured, suspended, or expelled by the USPA Executive
             Committee, with such action to be reviewed by the BOD, for causes
             but not limited to transgression of basic ethical principles as detailed
             in the Constitution, By-laws, and policies of USPA” (T.d. 18, p. 23,
             ¶1). Additionally, defendants-appellees’ state “During all times
             alleged in the Complaint, USPA had a Governance Manual, it also
             contains guidelines for disciplinary actions against both members
             and nonmembers, including denying membership” (T.d 18, p. 5, ¶2).
             Therefore, defendants-appellees’ admit in their own words the USPA
             breached plaintiff-appellant’s USPA membership in accordance with
             Section 1-6.4.F of the USPA Governance Manual (T.d. 41, p. 42,
             ¶¶7-9). Further, defendants-appellees admit the Governance
             Manual contains guidelines for disciplinary actions against both
             members and nonmembers, and USPA denied plaintiff-appellant’s
             USPA membership. The USPA Governance Manual is a contract
             and/or agreement bound by the laws of this state pursuant to R.C
             2307.39.      Consequently,        defendants-appellees       fraudulent
             statements committed fraud, excusable neglect, or other misconduct
             under Civ. R. 60(B)(1) - (5) pursuant to R.C § 2913.01(A) - (C), and
             R.C. § 2913.43(A)-(B), which deprived plaintiff-appellant's
             substantial right to a jury trial under R.C § 2505.02(B) and R.C. §
             2505.02(B)(1) in which a pecuniary obligation, the complaint, is
             incurred. (Sic throughout.)
      {¶24} Appellant’s assertions under this assignment of error mirror those

previously asserted. Thus, the assigned error lacks merit.

      {¶25} Appellant’s fifth assigned error reads:

             The trial court abused it’s discretion and committed prejudicial
             erroneous error by citing a non-party in reference to plaintiff-
             appellant’s claims, under Civ. R. 71. The trial court cited a non-party
             USPS to Redding's Intentional Interference with a Business claim
             stating: “Moreover, the USPS is not alleged to have known about any
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Case No. 2022-G-0024
               prospective contract for future employment (T.d. 41, p. 8, f.n. 8).
               Defendants-appellees’ exhibit “A”, the USPA Governance Manual,
               Appendix C Section 1 states. “In a membership organization like the
               USPA, disciplinary proceedings and other disputes are best resolved
               within the organization. Accordingly, the USPA’s Board of Directors
               has adopted this policy as part of USPA’s members’ contracts of
               membership with the USP A (including group members’ contracts of
               membership) to encourage resolution within the organization” (T.d.
               18, p. 99, ¶2). The USPA Governance Manual is a contract bound
               by the laws of this state pursuant to R.C 2307.39. Therefore, plaintiff-
               appellant did have a USPA membership contract of membership with
               the USPA. Further, when an order is made in favor of a person who
               is not a party to the action, Redding may enforce obedience to the
               order; and, when obedience to an order may be lawfully enforced
               against a person who is not a party, the trial court is liable for
               enforcing obedience to the order. Consequently, the trial court
               committed fraud, excusable neglect, or other misconduct under Civ.
               R. 60(B)(1) - (5) pursuant to R.C § 2913.01(A) - (C), and R.C. §
               2913.43(A) - (B), which deprived appellant’s ("Redding") substantial
               right to a jury trial under R.C § 2505.02(B) and R.C § 2505.02(B)(1)
               in which a pecuniary obligation, the complaint, is incurred. (Sic
               throughout.)
       {¶26} Appellant takes issue with a purported clerical error in the trial court’s

judgment where, he claims, the court denoted “USPA” and “USPS.” Appellant asserts

this error occurred in the trial court’s analysis of his “intentional interference with a

business interest” claim.     A review of the judgment does not support appellant’s

accusation. Regardless, even if the court wrongfully designated USPA as USPS at one

point in the judgment, it is apparent from the manner in which the trial court addressed

the issues any such misidentification was an accident. We therefore conclude, when

viewed in relation to the entirety of the judgment, this error was inadvertent and non-

prejudicial.

       {¶27} Any remaining point advanced under this assigned error has been

addressed supra.

       {¶28} Appellant’s fifth assignment of error lacks merit.
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Case No. 2022-G-0024
      {¶29} Appellant’s sixth assigned error reads:

             The trial court abused it’s discretion by not considering the manifest
             weight of the evidence against plaintiff-appellant as defendants-
             appellees' exhibits “A” (T.d. 18, pp. 16- 100) and exhibit “B” (T.d. 18,
             pp. 101-148) establishes plaintiff-appellant's complaint in it’s entirety,
             which effected his substantial right to a jury trial under R.C §
             2505.02(B), R.C § 2505(B)(l) and ruling on the pleadings under Civ.
             R. 12(C), pursuant to Civ.R 12(B)(6). (Sic throughout.)
      {¶30} Under his final assignment of error, appellant claims the trial court erred in

failing to consider the manifest weight of the evidence (namely, the Manual) in dismissing

his complaint. We do not agree.

      {¶31} Initially, we do not review a trial court’s judgment dismissing a complaint

using a manifest-weight standard. Civ.R. 12(C) motions are specifically for resolving

questions of law. State ex rel. Midwest Pride IV, Inc. v. Pontious, 75 Ohio St.3d 565, 570,

664 N.E.2d 931 (1996). In ruling on a Civ.R. 12(C) motion, the court is permitted to

consider both the complaint and answer. Id. at 569. “A court must construe as true all of

the material allegations in the complaint, with all reasonable inferences to be drawn

therefrom, in favor of the nonmoving party.” (Citation omitted.) State ex rel. Montgomery

v. Purchase Plus Buyer’s Group, Inc. 10th Dist. Franklin No. 01AP-1073, 2002 WL

723707 (Apr. 25, 2002). To grant the motion, the court must find beyond doubt that the

plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to

relief. Pontious at 570. Our review of the appropriateness of judgment on the pleadings

is de novo. Fontbank, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 138 Ohio App.3d 801, 742 N.E.2d 674

(10th Dist.2000).

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Case No. 2022-G-0024
       {¶32} As discussed under appellant’s first assignment of error, there was no

contract between appellees and appellant at the time appellant alleged a breach. Thus,

the trial court did not err in dismissing that claim.

       {¶33} Next, appellant alleged appellees were negligent. To assert a claim for

negligence, a party must allege a duty owed by defendants, a breach of that duty,

causation, and damages. Mussivand v. David, 45 Ohio St.3d 314, 318, 544 N.E.2d 265

(1989). The existence of a duty in a negligence action is a question of law for the court to

determine. See Wheeling & L.E.R. Co. v. Harvey, 77 Ohio St. 235, 240, 83 N.E.66

(1907). “There is no formula for ascertaining whether a duty exists.” Mussivand at 318.

“Duty ‘* * * is the court’s “expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy

which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection.”’ (Prosser,

Law of Torts (4th ed. 1971) pp. 325-326.)” Mussivand at 318, quoting Weirum v. RKO

General, Inc., 15 Cal.3d 40, 46, 123 Cal.Rptr. 468, 471, 539 P.2d 36, 39 (1975).

       {¶34} In his complaint, appellant alleged the Manual imposed a legal duty to treat

him “in the same manner as all other individual and Group Members.” As previously

noted, he was not a member at the time he alleged he was harmed. Moreover, as also

discussed above, USPA followed the manual for denying appellant’s requested renewal.

In this regard, he was actually treated, pursuant to the manual, as any other non-member

might be treated. The trial court therefore did not err in dismissing the negligence claim.

       {¶35} Next, appellant alleged a “self-dealing” claim pursuant to R.C. 1729.24.

Appellant claims that certain appellees sought to exact revenge against him for filing

complaints with the FAA.        R.C. 1729.24, however, addresses voiding contracts or

transactions between a business association and other individuals under certain

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Case No. 2022-G-0024
circumstances. As appellant has no contract with any of the named parties, it is unclear

how R.C. 1729.24 is in any way applicable to these facts. The trial court did not err in

dismissing this claim.

       {¶36} Appellant also asserted violation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. This claim is

based upon appellant’s allegation that his purported status as a “whistleblower” caused

the USPA (no other named appellees are addressed in the complaint) to unlawfully

retaliate against him via conspiring to deny him USPA membership.

       {¶37} To set forth a whistleblower claim under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, a plaintiff

must first establish a prima facie case by proving, by a preponderance of the evidence,

“that: (1) [he or] she engaged in protected activity; (2) the employer knew that [he or] she

engaged in the protected activity; (3) [he or] she suffered an unfavorable personnel action;

and (4) the protected activity was a contributing factor in the unfavorable action.” (Internal

citations and footnotes omitted.) Allen v. Admin. Review Bd., 514 F.3d 468, 475-76 (5th

Cir.2008). In order to set forth a cognizable claim under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, an

employer/employee relationship is necessary. See, e.g., Feldman v. Law Enforcement

Associates Corp., 752 F.3d 339, 344 (4th Cir.2014). Appellant does not allege he was

engaged in a protected activity when he filed complaints with the FAA or when he was

denied membership.       More importantly, however, he does not allege he was ever

employed by the USPA. And appellant cites to the USPA’s whistleblower policy in the

manual, which states “[n]o adverse employment action may be taken and retaliation is

strictly prohibited * * * against any Covered Person who in good faith reports any Concern

* * *. A “Covered Person,” pursuant to the manual is an employee of or contractor with

the organization. The trial court therefore did not err in denying this claim.

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Case No. 2022-G-0024
       {¶38} Next, appellant argues the trial court erred in dismissing his intentional

interference with a business interest claim. “The elements of tortious interference with a

business relationship are (1) a business relationship, (2) the tortfeasor’s knowledge

thereof, (3) an intentional interference causing a breach or termination of the relationship,

and, (4) damages resulting therefrom.” (Citation omitted.) Diamond Wine & Spirits, Inc. v.

Dayton Heidelberg Distrib. Co., 148 Ohio App.3d 596, 2002-Ohio-3932, 774 N.E.2d 775,

¶23 (3d Dist.)

       {¶39} In    his    complaint,    appellant     alleged   that    he    was    a    past

employee/independent contractor at various parachute drop zones, including with

Cleveland Skydiving Center. He then claimed that his USPA membership was terminated

due to the wrongful actions of appellees.           He claimed that he is unable to seek

employment in the industry without a USPA membership. Appellant failed to allege that

any appellee had any knowledge of any business relationship he possessed with area

drop zones; moreover, although he claimed his membership was terminated by appellees’

“wrongful” actions, he does not specifically assert appellees’ intentional actions caused a

breach of any business relationship of which appellees were, or in particular, USPA was

aware. In sum, appellant failed to sufficiently plead the tort of intentional interference with

a business relationship. The trial court did not err in dismissing this claim.

       {¶40} Appellant next claims that appellees breached a duty of good faith and fair

dealing. In the complaint, he points out that “[e]very contract imposes upon each party a

promise and duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and enforcement.” As

discussed previously, however, appellant failed to establish the existence of a contract.

“Courts in Ohio have therefore recognized that there is no independent cause of action

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for breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing apart from a breach of the

underlying contract.” (Citations omitted.) Lucarell v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 152 Ohio

St.3d 453, 2018-Ohio-15, 97 N.E.2d 458, ¶44. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in

dismissing this claim.

       {¶41} Appellant next asserted an Ohio Whistleblower claim pursuant to R.C.

4113.52. To have a statutory cause of action, appellant must have been an employee.

Appellant only alleged he had been an employee of one of the listed appellees, Cleveland

Skydiving Center. Appellant asserted his employment relationship was severed due to

the termination of his USPA membership. Appellant additionally alleged that each of the

named appellees retaliated against him for filing complaints with the FAA by banning him

from their jump zones and working together to prevent him from renewing his USPA

membership.

       {¶42} The Supreme Court of Ohio has observed:

               R.C. 4113.52(A)(1) protects an employee for reporting certain
               information to outside authorities only if the following requirements
               have first been satisfied: (1) the employee provided the required oral
               notification to the employee’s supervisor or other responsible officer
               of the employer, (2) the employee filed a written report with the
               supervisor or other responsible officer, and (3) the employer failed
               to correct the violation or to make a reasonable and good faith effort
               to correct the violation.” (Emphasis original.) Contreras v. Ferro
               Corp., 73 Ohio St.3d 244, 248, 652 N.E.2d 940 (1995).
       {¶43} The complaint alleged certain named appellees were notified of potential

violations. “The statute mandates that the employer be informed of the violation both

orally and in writing. An employee who fails to provide the employer with the required oral

notification and written report is not entitled to statutory protection for reporting the

information to outside authorities.” Id.

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Case No. 2022-G-0024
       {¶44} It is unclear whether appellant both orally notified his alleged employer,

Cleveland Skydiving Center and filed a written report. Still, reviewing the complaint in

appellant’s favor, his allegation is sufficient to overcome a motion to dismiss. And, to the

extent discovery is, at best, incomplete, we cannot say that appellant’s complaint with the

FAA lacked substantive merit or was otherwise frivolous.             Hence, it would be

inappropriate to dispose of his R.C. 4113.52 count at the dismissal stage. As a result,

the judgment, as it relates to the claim against defendant/appellee Cleveland Skydiving

Center, must be reversed and remanded for further proceedings. As it relates to all other

defendants/appellees, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

       {¶45} Moreover, Courts interpreting the above statute have found that, “[t]o prove

a claim under § 4113.52, a plaintiff must show that: (1) he is entitled to protection under

the [Whistleblower] act; (2) he was subject to an adverse employment action; and (3)

there is a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment

action.” (Citations omitted.) Dobrski v. Ford Motor Co., 698 F.Supp.2d 966, 978 (N.D.Ohio

2010), citing Klepsky v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 489 F.3d 264, 271 (6th Cir.2007).

              With regard to the first of these elements, [Section] 4113.52 sets
              forth three circumstances in which an employee is protected for
              whistleblowing activity: Section (A)(1) addresses reports of violations
              of law ‘that the employee’s employer has authority to correct;’
              Section (A)(2) deals with the reporting of criminal violations of the
              State’s environmental laws; and Section (A)(3) addresses an
              employee’s complaints of ‘violations by a fellow employee.’
Ehrlich v. Kovack, 135 F.Supp.3d 638, 651-652 (N.D. Ohio 2015), quoting

R.C.4113.52(A).

       {¶46} If appellant was an employee of Cleveland Skydiving Center, he may be

entitled to protection. If his employment was severed due to legitimate complaints he

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filed with the FAA, there was an arguable connection between an alleged protected

activity and the purported adverse employment action. In this respect, we conclude

appellant sufficiently pleaded the R.C. 4113.52 action such that it, as a matter of law,

should withstand appellees’ motion to dismiss.

       {¶47} Finally, appellant sought injunctive relief. In the complaint, he alleged:

              Without just cause, legal justification or due process, Defendant
              USPA has revoked Plaintiff’s membership and by such action has
              caused and will continue to cause Plaintiff immediate and irrevocable
              harm in that: a. Plaintiff will suffer a loss and diversion of his
              opportunities and ability to jump; b. Plaintiff will continue to suffer a
              loss of employment in the industry; c. Plaintiff will suffer damage to
              his position.
Appellant asked the trial court to “immediately and permanently enjoin Defendants from

decertifying Plaintiff and to restore Plaintiff’s status as a good standing member of the

USPA.”

       {¶48} Initially, the USPA did not “revoke” appellant’s membership. It simply did

not accept his membership renewal. Appellant’s characterization of the USPA’s decision

not to accept his renewal application is therefore inaccurate. Moreover, it is unclear what

appellant means by “decertifying.” He alleges, unless he is a member of the USPA, he

will not have the opportunity to skydive in the future.        Still, membership does not

necessarily imply a form of certification.

       {¶49} A prohibitory injunction preserves the status quo by enjoining a defendant

from performing the challenged acts in the future. State ex rel. Leslie v. Ohio Hous. Fin.

Agency, 105 Ohio St.3d 261, 2005-Ohio-1508, 824 N.E.2d 990, ¶50. A mandatory

injunction, however, is an extraordinary remedy that compels the defendant to restore a

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Case No. 2022-G-0024
party’s rights through an affirmative action. Gratz v. Lake Erie & W.R. Co., 76 Ohio St.

230, 233, 81 N.E. 239 (1907).

              To state a claim for injunctive relief, a litigant must show that (1) it is
              likely to succeed on the merits of the case, (2) the issuance of the
              injunction will prevent irreparable harm, (3) the potential injury that
              may be suffered [if the injunction is granted] will not outweigh the
              potential injury suffered * * * if the injunction is not granted, and (4)
              the public interest will be served by the granting of the injunction.
Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 115 Ohio App.3d 1, 12, 684 N.E.2d 343

(8th Dist.1996).

       {¶50} “It is well-established that in order to obtain an injunction, the moving party

must show by clear and convincing evidence that immediate and irreparable injury, loss

or damage will result to the applicant and that no adequate remedy at law exists. Actual

irreparable harm usually may not be presumed but must be proved.” (Internal citation

omitted.) Middletown v. Butler Cty. Bd. of Cty. Commrs., 12th Dist. Butler No. CA94-03-

084, 1995 WL 55320, *2 (Feb. 13, 1995). Injunctive relief may also be available “to the

extent that irreparable harm is actually threatened.” Id. Irreparable injury or harm has

been defined as “an injury ‘for the redress of which, after its occurrence, there could be

no plain, adequate and complete remedy at law, and for which restitution in specie

(money) would be impossible, difficult or incomplete.’” (Citations omitted.) Connor Group

v. Raney, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26653, 2016-Ohio-2959, ¶21, quoting Dimension

Serv. Corp. v. First Colonial Ins. Co., 10th Dist. Franklin, No. 14 AP-368, 2014-Ohio-5108,

¶12.

       {¶51} The trial court, in dismissing appellant’s claim, stated appellant had not

established any of the elements necessary for injunctive relief. At the dismissal stage,

however, a party does not have to specifically show each element of his or her cause of
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Case No. 2022-G-0024
action.     With this in mind, it is unclear whether appellant has a “right” to have his

membership reinstated or whether the trial court would have authority to “permanently”

prevent appellees from “decertifying” him.

          {¶52} Appellant’s R.C. 4113.52 claim was sufficiently pleaded against the

Cleveland Skydiving Center only. It does not appear from the complaint that Cleveland

Skydiving Center controls or has a material voice in the USPA’s decision to renew or

reject a membership request. Moreover, appellant’s complaint alleges he cannot skydive

anywhere without a USPA membership and, as such, it does not appear from the face of

the complaint that Cleveland Skydiving Center has any authority to “certify” or “decertify”

him. And, in appellant’s prayer for relief, he seeks a “[t]emporary and [p]ermanent

[i]njunction restoring [his] USPA membership immediately * * *.” As a result, we conclude

the trial court did not err in dismissing appellant’s claim against Cleveland Skydiving

Center (or any of the remaining appellees) for injunctive relief.

          {¶53} Appellant’s sixth assignment of error is without merit.

          {¶54} For the reasons discussed in this opinion, the trial court’s judgment is

affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. To wit, in light

of the manner in which appellant’s complaint was pleaded, Count VII, his R.C. 4113.52

claim remains viable. Counts I through VI, as well as Count VIII, however, were properly

dismissed.

JOHN J. EKLUND, P.J.,

MARY JANE TRAPP, J.,

concur.

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