Court Opinion

ID: 9769047
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 14:12:46.929653+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:15:11.787134
License: Public Domain

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

                                       NO. 03-23-00101-CR

                                Jason James Robinson, Appellant

                                                  v.

                                   The State of Texas, Appellee

                   FROM THE 264TH DISTRICT COURT OF BELL COUNTY
              NO. 79219, THE HONORABLE PAUL L. LEPAK, JUDGE PRESIDING

                             MEMORANDUM OPINION

                Appellant Jason James Robinson challenges his conviction for sexual assault of a

child. Tex. Penal Code § 22.011(a)(2). After the jury found him guilty, the trial court assessed

punishment at twelve years’ imprisonment. Id. § 12.33. Robinson contends in his sole issue on

appeal that the trial court erred by not including, on its own initiative, a definition for

“penetration” in the jury charge. We will affirm the trial court’s judgment of conviction.

                                         BACKGROUND 1

                Trisha Rain2 testified that when she was fifteen, she reconnected with Robinson

over social media. Robinson was a childhood friend that Rain thought of like an older sibling.

Robinson was nineteen years old at the time. A couple weeks after Rain reconnected with

       1
           We recite only the relevant facts necessary to resolve the presented issue.
       2
          Because the victim in this case was a minor when the offense was committed, we refer
to her using a pseudonym. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.10(a)(3).
Robinson, Rain’s grandmother drove her to Robinson’s house. Rain believed she would be

helping Robinson with some work around the house and catching up.                 Rain testified that

Robinson took her to a bedroom and alternated between speaking with her and working.

Robinson expressed that he wanted to kiss Rain multiple times.             Rain told him “no,” but

eventually she became “annoyed at the fact that he kept mentioning it,” and “eventually gave in.”

Rain testified that Robinson did not stop at kissing, started touching her hips, and expressed that

he wanted to have sex with her. Rain told him “no.” Rain testified that Robinson removed her

shorts, moved her underwear to the side, and penetrated her vagina with his penis. Rain was in

pain and began to cry. Robinson asked her if she was okay and after Rain told him that she was

not okay, he stopped. Rain called her grandmother to pick her up. Rain testified that she told

two friends about the assault a couple days later. Rain told her grandmother about a week later.

Rain’s grandmother took her for a medical examination. Rain’s grandmother reported the assault

to the police. On cross examination, defense counsel asked Rain about a medical report that

included a note that stated that Rain’s underwear had stayed on and that Rain did “not think there

was any penetration.” Rain explained that the note was in error and that she never told the nurse

there was no penetration. Rain testified that there was penetration and that she told a medical

professional at the clinic that she had experienced pain in her vagina. When asked if the pain

was caused by Robinson’s penis penetrating her vagina, she answered, “yes.”

                During deliberations, the jury sent a note to the trial judge asking for “the

elements that the State must prove” and stating, “Contradition [sic] of Part II in the charge

penetration by ‘Any Means.’” 3 After reaching an agreed answer with the parties, the trial court

       3
           Part II of the charge was titled, “Sexual Assault of a Child,” and instructed that:

                                                   2
responded that it could not answer the question and that the jury had all the evidence and then

referred the jury to the charge. The jury returned a guilty verdict. Following a sentencing

hearing, the trial court imposed a punishment of twelve years’ imprisonment.                    This

appeal followed.

                                           DISCUSSION

               On appeal, Robinson contends that the trial court erred by not including, on its

own initiative, a definition for “penetration” in the jury charge.

               Jury charge error claims are reviewed under a two-pronged test in which the

appellate court must determine: (1) whether the charge was erroneous, and (2) if there was an

error, whether the error was harmful to the defendant. Olivas v. State, 202 S.W.3d 137, 143–44

(Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Almanza v. State, 686 S.W. 2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (op. on

rehearing). A trial court errs if it does not present the jury with “a written charge distinctly

setting forth the law applicable to the case.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 36.14; see also Bell

v. State, 635 S.W.3d 641, 645 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (“A trial judge is obligated to instruct on

the law applicable to the case, for the trial judge is ultimately responsible for the accuracy of the

jury charge and accompanying instructions.” (cleaned up)). A trial court’s charge may not

express any opinion on the weight of the evidence, summarize testimony, discuss the facts, or

use any argument calculated to arouse the sympathy or excite the passions of the jury. Tex.

Code Crim. Proc. art. 36.14. A trial court “must instruct on statutorily defined terms as the law

       A person commits the offense of Sexual Assault of a Child if the person,
       regardless of whether the person knows the age of the child at the time of the
       offense, intentionally or knowingly causes the penetration of the sexual organ of a
       child by any means. “Child” means a person younger than seventeen (17) years
       of age.
                                                  3
applicable to the case.” Celis v. State, 416 S.W.3d 419, 433 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). However,

“it is generally impermissible to instruct on terms not statutorily defined, and the trial court

instead must permit the jury to construe them according to the rules of grammar and common

usage.” Id. “[A]n exception to that general rule exists for terms which have a known and

established legal meaning, or which have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law,

as where the words used have a well-known common law meaning.” Green v. State, 476 S.W.3d

440, 445 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (cleaned up).

               Here, Robinson contends that the term “penetration” falls within the exception to

the rule that a term that is not statutorily defined must not be defined for the jury. Robinson

contends that because there is an established definition for “penetration” used in legal sufficiency

analysis, the definition is also required to be included in the jury charge.

               However, the Court of Criminal Appeals has previously considered and rejected

these arguments and held that defining the term “penetration” in a jury charge is trial court error.

See id. (agreeing with appellate court that “penetration” is common term that has not acquired

technical meaning and should be interpreted by jury according to common usage, and holding

that trial court providing definition was improper comment on weight of evidence). 4 Thus, we

conclude that the trial court did not err by not including a definition of “penetration” in the

jury charge.

       4
           Robinson contends in his reply brief that Henry v. State, 103 S.W.2d 377 (1937),
should control because it predates Green and because Green did not expressly overrule Henry.
See Green, 476 S.W.3d at 440–46. In Henry, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that an
instruction defining an “act of intercourse” as “any degree of penetration, however slight, of the
person of prosecuting witness by defendant,” should have been given to the jury. Henry,
103 S.W.2d at 380. However, the Court’s analysis in Henry did not consider the jury charge
issue under the framework of Article 36.14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Thus, Green,
which analyzed the issue under the requirements of Article 36.14, is the proper controlling
precedent for this case.
                                                  4
                 Because we have concluded there is no trial court error, we do not address the

harm analysis in this case. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1 (“The court of appeals must hand down a

written opinion that is as brief as practicable but that addresses every issue raised and necessary

to final disposition of the appeal.”). We overrule Robinson’s sole issue on appeal.

                                         CONCLUSION

                 Because we overruled Robinson’s sole issue, we affirm the trial court’s judgment

of conviction.

                                              __________________________________________
                                              Darlene Byrne, Chief Justice

Before Chief Justice Byrne, Justices Kelly and Theofanis

Affirmed

Filed: August 29, 2023

Do Not Publish

                                                 5