Court Opinion

ID: 9794599
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:08:19.66863+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:02.155255
License: Public Domain

Gunderson, J.,
dissenting:
I most respectfully dissent.
In general, I concur in the views expressed by Justice Springer. I might deem it unnecessary to say, as he asserts, that “the district court would have committed error if the district court had not granted the writ on the two sex charges in this case.” However, as Justice Springer contends, I am satisfied that, at least, the district court did not err in granting the writ as to the two sex charges but holding respondent to trial on the others.
In addition, I feel constrained to tender some observations concerning how I believe invading the legitimate domain of our trial court judges — as I view this court’s decision in this case to do — will necessarily detract from the orderly and economical administration of justice. Justice Springer has pointed out our recent decision in Sheriff v. Provenza, 97 Nev. 346, 630 P.2d 265 (1981). In Provenza, we explicitly recognized that the trial *385court is the most appropriate forum in which to determine factually whether or not probable cause exists. In such cases, we stated, we will not interfere with a district court’s necessarily discretionary ruling “[a]bsent a showing of substantial error.” 97 Nev. at 347. Yet, notwithstanding this declaration, the majority have today elected to overrule the district court in the instant case.
I feel sure no one will seriously contend that the evidence in the record before us comes anywhere close to a quantum sufficient to support a jury verdict on the two sex-related charges, if and when this case is brought to trial. Indeed, the majority' themselves have acknowledged as much. Moreover, even some of the supposed “evidence” now in the record may well prove to be inadmissible. For example, although our colleagues in the majority mention a “clear fluid” on the victim’s leg, the district judge probably perceived that to allow reference to such fluid at trial would be error, if test results are unavailable through fault of the State. See Crockett v. State, 95 Nev. 859, 603 P.2d 1078 (1979).
In pretrial habeas matters, the function of the district courts is to screen out cases in which the proof is so tenuous as not to justify a trial. In some cases, such as the instant one, a district judge’s proper exercise of this function entails the exercise of considerable fortitude. Furthermore, unless district judges continue to show such fortitude, our trial courts will become clogged with accusations which, lacking evidentiary support, either cannot succeed at trial or else cannot be sustained on appeal. To the extent that this court induces district judges to clog our court system in this fashion, scarce resources will be diverted from processing other, more meritorious cases in an expeditious manner.
We therefore should not appear to fault or to exploit the district judge in this case, by declaring his discretionary ruling incorrect. Our Provenza decision articulates not only valid law but also sound policy. The surest way I can think of to discourage district judges from screening out tenuous accusations, through habeas corpus proceedings, is to convey the message that our court will be quick to locate error whenever a district court makes such a judgment call against the prosecution in a case involving ugly facts. Here, the alleged actions of the respondent tend to inflame persons of normal sensibilities. Still, while the record contains much to show a brutal physical assault, there is a paucity of evidence to show that the brutality was sexually related.
The district judge withstood the human temptation to cast *386himself as “hard on crime,” and held that this case should proceed only on those charges for which the prosecution had tendered meaningful proof, unencumbered by charges for which there appears to be dubious if any support. Measured by the substantial-error standard articulated in Provenza, this was a judgment which I am unable to declare unjustified.