Court Opinion

ID: 9382026
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-24 16:06:39.378001+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:36.515946
License: Public Domain

J-A02038-23

                                   2023 PA SUPER 49

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    AJANAY WATSON                              :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1209 WDA 2021

        Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 10, 2021
              In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
                  Criminal Division at CP-02-CR-0012596-2019

BEFORE:      BOWES, J., MURRAY, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

OPINION BY MURRAY, J.:                                FILED: MARCH 24, 2023

        Ajanay Watson (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence

imposed after the trial court found her guilty of robbery of a motor vehicle,

criminal attempt (to commit robbery of a motor vehicle), firearms not to be

carried without a license, theft by unlawful taking, simple assault, and fleeing

or attempting to elude a police officer.1 Appellant claims the trial court erred

in discrediting her defense that she was legally insane when she committed

the crimes. We affirm.

        Appellant stipulated to the facts at her non-jury trial, which the trial

court summarized as follows:

              [O]n October 8, 2019, Dana Wallace [(“Wallace” or “Ms.
        Wallace”)] was sitting in her vehicle in the parking lot of a Sunoco
____________________________________________

*   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3702(a), 901(a), 6106(a)(1), 3921(a), 2701(a)(3); 75
Pa.C.S.A. § 3733(a).
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       gas station when [Appellant, a pedestrian,] opened [Wallace’s]
       passenger door and got into the passenger seat. [Appellant] said
       “you don’t remember me, do you?” [Appellant exited the car]
       when Wallace told [Appellant] to get out of her vehicle. Later[,]
       Kelly Remmy [(Deputy Remmy)], an off-duty Allegheny County
       Deputy Sheriff, was sitting in her vehicle at a traffic light at the
       intersection of Borland Street and East Liberty Boulevard in the
       East Liberty section of the City of Pittsburgh. There was one
       vehicle in front of [Deputy Remmy] at the red light[;] that driver
       was also an off-duty police officer, City of Pittsburgh [Police]
       Officer Christine Mitchell.   … [According to Deputy Remmy,
       Appellant approached her car on foot, while] grabbing at her waist
       in a manner that someone would when trying to conceal a firearm.
       Deputy Remmy attempted to pull away from [Appellant] by pulling
       forward into the intersection, but [Appellant] persisted. Deputy
       [Remmy pointed] her firearm [at Appellant] from inside the
       vehicle. [Appellant] then fled on foot.

              While [police] officers were [at] the scene … [of the]
       attempted carjacking of [Deputy] Remmy’s vehicle[,] they
       received a call about a successful carjacking on Beatty Street.[2]
       James McLaughlin had parked his 2016 Subaru Forester behind
       [the nearby] Obama Academy and was waiting to pick up his
       daughter when [Appellant] jumped into his passenger seat,
       pointed a black handgun [at] his face and told him to “get the fuck
       out.” He left the vehicle and ran inside the Obama Academy to
       call 911. With[in] 10 minutes[,] Officers located [Appellant]
       driving McLaughlin’s 2016 Forester in the Homewood section of
       the [City of Pittsburgh,] and attempted a traffic stop. [Appellant]
       fled [in the vehicle] and led police on a chase into the Penn Hills
       neighborhood[,] where she crashed the vehicle. Police recovered
       a Smith & Wesson M&P 40 caliber pistol on the front driver’s side
       floor of the vehicle. [Appellant] was taken into custody and
       waived her right to remain silent. [Appellant] gave a recorded
       [video] statement to police regarding the incidents that was
       admitted into evidence.

             In [Appellant’s police] statement[,] she told detectives that
       the gun never had a magazine in it. [Appellant claimed she had]
       obtained [the gun] by breaking into a car and [stated] that she
____________________________________________

2Beatty Street runs parallel beside Borland Street. See Affidavit of Probable
Cause, 10/8/19, at 2.

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        carries it for protection. [Appellant claimed she could not]
        remember [exactly] where she got [the gun] or how long ago, but
        [] it had not been a very long time. When [police] asked
        [Appellant] about the incident with Ms. Wallace (the [first]
        incident)[, Appellant] stated that she did not know [Ms. Wallace,
        and that Appellant’s] intention was to take [Ms. Wallace’s] car but
        [Ms. Wallace did not] cooperate. After that incident[, Appellant
        told police, she] went into the street trying to stop cars.
        [Appellant] ran up the street to Deputy Re[m]my’s car.
        [Appellant] smiled and even laughed [during the police interview]
        when [Appellant] stated that she did not realize that [Deputy
        Remmy] was a police officer. [Appellant told the police that she]
        then ran down the street to the Obama Academy middle school[,]
        where she pointed the gun at James McLaughlin and stole his
        vehicle. [Appellant] stated that she decided she was going to steal
        a car that day because she couldn’t get a job. She stated that she
        didn’t want to get caught, didn’t plan on getting caught, and was
        tired of being on the street. [Appellant] was cooperative and
        polite during the interview.

Trial Court Opinion, 2/22/22, at 2-3 (footnote added); see also N.T., 8/4/21,

at 17-18 (Appellant stipulating to facts).

        The Commonwealth charged Appellant with the aforementioned crimes,

as well as receiving stolen property3 (RSP) and driving without a license.4

Prior to trial, Appellant’s counsel filed a Notice of Mental Infirmity Defense.

Appellant stated her intention to present at trial expert testimony from Sara

West, M.D. (Dr. West), a board-certified psychiatrist. According to Appellant,

        Dr. West specifically maintains that as a result of [Appellant’s]
        schizophrenia, at the time of the commission of the offenses, she
        did not know the nature and quality of the acts she was doing or,
        if she did know the quality of the acts, that she did not know what
        she was doing was wrong.
____________________________________________

3   18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3925(a).

4   75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1501(a).

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Notice, 3/1/21, at 1-2; see also Stipulation to Supplement Certified Record,

7/19/22, Ex. A (Dr. West’s report).

      The Commonwealth filed a Reciprocal Notice Regarding Mental Health

Defense, notifying Appellant of its intent to present at trial expert testimony

from psychiatrist Bruce Wright, M.D. (Dr. Wright). Reciprocal Notice, 6/30/21,

at ¶¶ 5-7. “Dr. Wright evaluated [Appellant] on May 15, 2021,” and thereafter

issued a report.   Id. at ¶ 8; see also Stipulation to Supplement Certified

Record, 7/19/22, Ex. B (Dr. Wright’s report).

      The trial court convened a stipulated non-jury trial on August 4, 2021.

The defense’s case consisted solely of Dr. West’s expert testimony in support

of Appellant’s legal insanity defense.       The Commonwealth presented Dr.

Wright’s expert testimony. Both Dr. West and Dr. Wright testified to Appellant

being diagnosed with schizophrenia.          N.T., 8/4/21, at 21-22, 36, 71.

However, the experts disagreed as to whether Appellant understood the

wrongfulness of her criminal acts. See id. at 37.

      Prior to issuing its verdict, the trial court stated:

      [T]here’s no doubt [Appellant] is mentally ill, and as the parties
      acknowledge[, Appellant] … understood the nature and quality of
      her actions. The only question is whether or not [Appellant]
      understood the wrongfulness of her actions.

                                      ***

             It’s always difficult when people are suffering from mental
      illness, because it’s kind of … an explanation or a reason for … why
      we’re here …. It … puts you in a position where you’re … struggling

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       to understand why people act in a manner that you just can’t
       explain.

             Particularly in [Appellant’s] case, when [she] was making
       her [recorded] statement to the police, they were repeating over
       and over how cooperative and respectful [Appellant] was with
       them….

                                          ***

              But the one thing that I kept noting to myself was
       [Appellant] was at times tearful. At one point[, the police] handed
       her tissues or paper towels[.] … And I noted … [the police] kept
       trying to specifically ask her … why this occurred. And I noted
       [Appellant] had said that she figured why not? I can’t find a job,
       no one will hire me, and I needed to get to Penn Hills.

             And it struck me, at least in [Appellant’s police] interview,
       that when I was processing the things that both … Dr. West and
       Dr. Wright [testified to], … [Appellant] seemed to understand
       the wrongfulness of her actions when she was being
       interviewed by the police that day.

             So I cannot say that the defense is able to establish at least
       that [Appellant] did not understand the wrongfulness of her
       actions on that day, and it seemed she did.

             So I agree with [the Commonwealth] that although
       [Appellant] is clearly severely mentally ill, [she] was not
       legally insane on th[e] date [of the crimes].

N.T., 8/10/21, at 13-16 (emphasis added).

       The trial court found Appellant guilty of the aforementioned crimes, and

acquitted her of RSP.5          Appellant waived her right to a pre-sentence

investigation report, and the court immediately sentenced her to an aggregate

____________________________________________

5 The Commonwealth withdrew the charge of driving without a license. N.T.,
8/10/21, at 23-24 (Commonwealth stating its desire to withdraw the charge
to avoid the imposition of a $200 fine on Appellant, who was indigent).

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seven years of probation. The court imposed as a condition of probation that

Appellant “comply with [her] mental-health treatment and, if deemed

appropriate, have an updated mental-health evaluation and comply with any

recommendations.” N.T., 8/10/21, at 23.

       On August 26, 2021, Appellant filed a counseled “Emergency Petition

Requesting Permission to File Post-Sentence Motion Nunc Pro Tunc.” The trial

court granted relief, and Appellant thereafter filed a motion raising a single

claim challenging the weight of the evidence.          The trial court denied

Appellant’s motion and this timely appeal followed.6 Appellant and the trial

court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

       Appellant presents a single issue for review: “Whether the trial court

erred by finding [A]ppellant failed to prove that she was legally insane at the

time of her illegal acts?” Appellant’s Brief at 3.

       In reviewing this issue,

       we evaluate the record in the light most favorable to the
       Commonwealth as verdict winner, giving it the benefit of all
____________________________________________

6 The filing of a post-sentence motion nunc pro tunc may toll the appeal period
if two conditions are met:

     First, within 30 days of imposition of sentence, a defendant must
     request the trial court to consider a post-sentence motion nunc pro
     tunc. The request for nunc pro tunc relief is separate and distinct
     from the merits of the underlying post-sentence motion. Second, the
     trial court must expressly permit the filing of a post-sentence motion
     nunc pro tunc, also within 30 days of imposition of sentence.

Commonwealth v. Capaldi, 112 A.3d 1242, 1244 (Pa. Super. 2015)
(citations and emphasis omitted). Here, both conditions have been met. Id.

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      reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Evidence
      will be deemed sufficient to support the verdict when it establishes
      each material element of the crime charged and the commission
      thereof by the accused, beyond a reasonable doubt. Any doubt
      about the defendant’s guilt is to be resolved by the fact-finder
      unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that, as a matter
      of law, no probability of fact can be drawn from the
      combined circumstances. Additionally, the Commonwealth may
      sustain its burden solely by means of circumstantial evidence.

Commonwealth v. Lake, 281 A.3d 341, 346 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citations

and quotations omitted).

      The defense of insanity is defined by statute:

      (a) General rule. — The mental soundness of an actor engaged
      in conduct charged to constitute an offense shall only be a defense
      to the charged offense when the actor proves by a preponderance
      of evidence that the actor was legally insane at the time of the
      commission of the offense.

      (b) Definition. — For purposes of this section, the phrase
      “legally insane” means that, at the time of the commission of the
      offense, the actor was laboring under such a defect of reason,
      from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality
      of the act he [or she] was doing or, if the actor did know the
      quality of the act, that [s]he did not know that what [s]he
      was doing was wrong.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 315 (emphasis added).         Our Supreme Court has defined

“preponderance of the evidence” as “tantamount to a more likely than not

inquiry.”   Samuel-Bassett v. Kia Motors Am., Inc., 34 A.3d 1, 35 (Pa.

2011) (citation omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Rabold, 951 A.2d

329, 341 (Pa. 2008) (“the placement of the burden with the defendant to

prove insanity by a preponderance of the evidence does not offend

constitutional norms.”).

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       This Court has explained:

       To plead the defense of insanity suggests that the defendant
       committed the act, but was not legally culpable. An insanity
       defense focuses upon a defendant’s capacity, at the time of the
       offense, to understand the nature and quality of h[er] actions or
       whether [s]he knew that h[er] actions were wrong. It has long
       been accepted that criminal defendants may be presumed
       sane for purposes of determining their criminal liability.
       Thus, under the clear language of section 315(a), the burden of
       proving insanity by a preponderance of the evidence is upon the
       defendant.       Moreover, we have long stated that the
       Commonwealth can prove an accused’s sanity not only by
       psychiatric testimony but also by lay testimony which shows that
       he or she knew the nature and quality of the act committed and
       knew that what had been done was wrong. Furthermore, it is
       within the factfinder’s right to disbelieve an insanity
       defense and credit the testimony of the eyewitnesses.

Commonwealth v. Yasipour, 957 A.2d 734, 738-39 (Pa. Super. 2008)

(emphasis added; citations and break omitted).

       Appellant argues the trial court erred in rejecting her insanity defense

because she established by a preponderance of the evidence that her mental

health condition made her “unable to distinguish moral right from wrong at

the time of commission of her acts.”             Appellant’s Brief at 27 (emphasis

omitted).7 Appellant contends she was “under the influence of a ‘delusion or

hallucination, controlling [her] will,’ which was ‘so great as [to] entirely []

destroy [her] perception of right [and] wrong.’”            Id. at 32-33 (quoting

Commonwealth v. Mosler, 4 Pa. 264, 266 (1846)). Appellant relies on the

____________________________________________

7As stated above, Appellant does not dispute that she understood the nature
and quality of her actions when she committed the crimes. Appellant’s Brief
at 23; N.T., 8/4/21, at 37; see also 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 315(b), supra.

                                           -8-
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expert report and testimony of Dr. West. Id. at 27-28, 31; see also id. at

33-38 (challenging Dr. Wright’s contrary testimony and expert report).

      According to Appellant, “no Pennsylvania court has expressly held

whether the word ‘wrong’ contained in [18 Pa.C.S.A. §] 315(b) refers to a

moral wrong or a legal wrong.” Id. at 24. Appellant asserts the “statute’s

definition of ‘wrong’ must be an individual’s inability to sort what is morally

right from wrong; not legal literacy but the lack of a conscience.” Id. at 26

(emphasis omitted); see also id. at 33 (complaining the “Commonwealth’s

evidence focused on [Appellant’s] ability to discern legal wrong, ‘trouble,’ and

her ability to connect cause and effect.” (underline in original)). Appellant

claims, “Evidence of [Appellant’s] account of what happened on October 8,

2019, made clear that she was barely acting with any will of her own, let alone

someone with the capacity to make moral judgments.” Id. at 27.

      The Commonwealth defends the trial court’s rejection of the insanity

defense, claiming Appellant failed to meet her burden of proving her mental

illness caused her to be unable to understand the wrongfulness of her acts.

See Commonwealth’s Brief at 9-20. The Commonwealth relies on the report

and testimony of its expert, Dr. Wright. Id. at 12-14. The Commonwealth

challenges Dr. West’s description of Appellant “as acting out of a primal

instinct to survive,” which the Commonwealth claims has “no basis in the

record.” Id. at 14; see also id. (arguing the trial court, as fact-finder, “was

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free to accept the testimony of Dr. Wright and reject the explanations offered

by Dr. West.”).

      The Commonwealth counters, “Instead, the record revealed [A]ppellant

was methodical in achieving her ends by wrongful means and that she was

aware of the consequences of such wrongful actions.”                 Id.   The

Commonwealth      emphasizes    that   when    “faced   with   the    potential

consequences, [A]ppellant decided that she did not want to get in trouble for

her wrongful actions and immediately fled police.”       Id. at 16 (footnote

omitted). Finally, the Commonwealth claims “Appellant makes no argument,

and the Commonwealth submits that she cannot, that she believed she was

morally justified in her actions despite knowing they were contrary to the law

or public morality.” Id. at 16 n.2. Upon review, we agree.

      Dr. West testified for the defense that she conducted a psychiatric

examination of Appellant shortly after her arrest. N.T., 8/4/21, at 19. Dr.

West stated Appellant has “a long history of mental illness,” “had multiple

[involuntary] hospitalizations brought about by her family members,” and

“has been treated with appropriate medications for the diagnosis of

schizophrenia.” Id. at 21, 22. Dr. West testified: “I am of the opinion that

[Appellant], because of her mental illness, did not know the

wrongfulness of her actions on the date of … October 8th, 2019.” Id. at

29 (emphasis added). Dr. West expounded on her reasons for this conclusion:

      [O]n the day of the incident, … [Appellant] was experiencing
      multiple symptoms that would have been associated with

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     schizophrenia.      She describe[d] hallucinations that were
     consistent with schizophrenia, she noted that she was hearing
     stuff, quote, unquote, and that she had command auditory
     hallucinations to take vehicles, noting [the hallucinations] were
     quite powerful, to the point where they were overwhelming.

           [Appellant] also had visual hallucinations. When she was
     looking at a vehicle, she described it as being sparkly. That
     suggests that her perception of reality was altered at that time.

           [Appellant] also described delusional thinking. Delusions
     are a primary symptom of schizophrenia. She felt that she was
     indestructible or invincible, that she could do whatever she wanted
     that day.

                                   ***

           [Appellant] also demonstrated disorganization, another
     hallmark of schizophrenia, on this date. The evidence to suggest
     [disorganization] was [that Appellant] attempted to take multiple
     vehicles in a disorganized fashion. By that I mean that she did
     this without a plan, without the cover of darkness. There were
     multiple things that she could have done to [accomplish her goal]
     in a much more organized plan or fashion.

           [Appellant] also made some nonsensical statements to the
     police, such as going to her mother’s house for Wi-Fi, which in
     retrospect[, Appellant] said made no sense to her. And, further,
     in [Appellant’s] video[-]recorded [statement,] when she was
     discussing the matter with the police, she acknowledged that she
     had been answering to the wrong name the entire time. They
     called [Appellant] Nicole, [which] happens to be her middle name,
     but [Appellant] did not correct them until much later in her
     interactions with them.

            [Appellant] also noted that her psychiatric medications,
     while she was compliant with them at the time of this event, were
     not working and that her care providers were actually attempting
     to find the right medication.

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Id. at 22-24; see also id. at 26 (Dr. West stating Appellant’s behavior in the

videotaped      interview   was   “associated   with   schizophrenia,”   including

Appellant’s “poor eye contact, a flat affect, [and] odd emotional responses”).

      Dr. West further disagreed with Dr. Wright’s expert opinion as to

Appellant’s awareness of the “wrongfulness” of her actions:

      We disagree. So Dr. Wright puts forth the idea that simply fleeing
      from the police would suggest knowledge of wrongfulness. My take
      on that is that one is going to flee when one feels one’s life is in
      danger. That is simply self-preservation, not a higher level of
      acknowledging and … considering wrongfulness….

                                      ***

            The police noted [Appellant’s] confusion [during the
      interview], and I really think in this complete fog of schizophrenia
      and symptoms that [Appellant] was confused and did not have the
      opportunity to even consider wrongfulness when she was
      responding to so much internal stimulation.

            [Appellant] did continue these attempts even despite being
      confronted with a weapon by an off-duty police … officer.
      [Appellant] had no rational motive for attempting any of these
      things. She had a ride that day. She didn’t need a ride anywhere.
      … She doesn’t have a driver’s license to drive a car. And she really
      had no logical destination where she was headed.

            [Appellant] didn’t make any great effort to avoid detection in
      that she did this in broad daylight, [and] she cooperated with the
      police upon arrest….

Id. at 30-31.

      On cross-examination, Dr. West opined flight by an accused “is not

exclusively an indication that someone knows what they are doing is wrong.”

Id. at 45; see also id. at 46 (Dr. West stating Appellant “did know that she

was fleeing” police before her arrest); cf. Commonwealth v. Perez, 220

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A.3d 1069, 1078 (Pa. Super. 2019) (en banc) (flight from the scene of a crime

can constitute circumstantial evidence of consciousness of guilt). Dr. West

further conceded “a well-orchestrated plan is not a requirement” for an

accused to be aware of the wrongfulness of her actions. N.T., 8/4/21, at 55.

      To the contrary, Dr. Wright testified for the Commonwealth, stating: “It

is my opinion [Appellant] did know the wrongfulness of her actions at the time

of this offense.”   Id. at 74.   In response to the prosecutor asking, “What

specifically stands out to you in … forming your opinion?”, Dr. Wright

answered:

            That opinion is based on a number of factors. [Appellant]
      told me … after the second attempted … carjacking, [Appellant]
      didn’t want to get in trouble, she was trying to get away
      from the police, and she said during her police interview
      that she did not want to go to jail and did not dispose of
      [her handgun] because she did not think she would get
      caught.

            To me, those [statements] all indicate [Appellant] knew that
      what she was doing was wrong. People who don’t do something
      wrong don’t go to jail. People who don’t do something wrong don’t
      think they’re going to get caught. That is what that is based on.

             So in contrast to Dr. West, who felt it was for [Appellant’s]
      self-preservation [that Appellant fled police], … it’s my opinion
      based on the information I reviewed that [Appellant] was trying
      to flee because she knew she would get in trouble, as she told me.

Id. at 74-75 (emphasis added); see also id. at 76 (Dr. Wright stating, “it’s

my opinion [Appellant] was fleeing because she had done something

wrong, despite psychiatric factors.” (emphasis added)).             Dr. Wright

expressed his disagreement with Dr. West “on the ultimate opinion.           [Dr.

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West] thinks this was disorganized behavior. I think it was behavior that was

a result of [Appellant’s] desire not to get caught because she knew she was

wrong.” Id. at 77.

      In rejecting Appellant’s insanity defense, the trial court stated:

      This court[, as fact-finder,] carefully considered the testimony of
      both doctors, their expert reports, and all of the evidence
      submitted at trial. The Commonwealth established beyond a
      reasonable doubt that [Appellant] committed the crimes with
      which she was charged. I was also convinced [Appellant] had the
      capacity to conform her conduct to the requirements of the law.
      I further found [Appellant] not only had the capacity to
      understand the wrongfulness of her conduct, but that she did
      understand the wrongfulness of her conduct despite the fact that
      she suffers from schizophrenia.

Trial Court Opinion, 2/22/22, at 5.

      The trial court’s reasoning is supported by the record and prevailing law.

We thus discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court in finding Appellant

failed to prove her insanity defense by a preponderance of the evidence. See

id.; see also Yasipour, 957 A.2d at 739 (fact-finders are free to reject or

accept an insanity defense), and Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 262 A.3d

1283, 1288-89 (Pa. Super. 2021) (“it is not the function of the appellate court

to substitute its judgment based on a cold record for that of the trial court.

The weight to be accorded conflicting evidence is exclusively for the

fact finder, whose findings will not be disturbed on appeal if they are

supported by the record.” (emphasis added; citations omitted)).

      Further, we are persuaded by the Commonwealth’s argument that,

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      to the extent [A]ppellant acknowledges that she knew her acts
      were illegal, such knowledge supports the logical inference of
      awareness that society also deems that act to be immoral. In
      Commonwealth v. Banks, 521 A.2d 1 (Pa. 1987), our Supreme
      Court found no error in the following jury instructions by the trial
      court:

          An individual is unable to tell right from wrong with
          reference to the particular act charged if, at the time of
          the commission of the offense, he is unable to tell that
          his act is one which he ought not to do. If the accused
          knew his act was wrong, either legally or morally,
          then he cannot be excused for his crime … [under]
          the test for insanity.

                Morality here would reflect societal standards and
          not those of a particular individual. An accused’s
          knowledge that an act is illegal will permit the
          inference of knowledge that the act is wrong,
          according to generally accepted moral standards of
          a community.

      Banks, supra, 521 A.2d at 22-23[] (Emphasis added)
      [(superseded by statute on other grounds, as stated in
      Commonwealth v. Jermyn, 709 A.2d 849, 855 (Pa. 1998)).]

Commonwealth Brief at 17; see also id. (citing Commonwealth v. Bruno,

407 A.2d 413, 416 (Pa. Super. 1979) (stating the standard for insanity “is a

legal test, not a medical or theological one.”)).

      Accordingly, the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in rejecting

Appellant’s insanity defense and her claim to the contrary lacks merit.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 3/24/2023

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