Court Opinion

ID: 9753674
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 19:22:16.646677+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:40.057901
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Spaulding, J.:
I respectfully dissent.
I cannot agree with the majority that the error of allowing a police officer to sit as a juror was cured merely because in the instant case appellants were acquitted of the charge of attempts with intent to kill the arresting officers. Their holding assumes that the police officer’s bias could only have had an effect upon that charge. It ignores the possibility that a dispute among the jurors over that charge may have been compromised by reaching verdicts of guilt on the other charges. It also disregards the effect a policeman’s presence on the jury may have had on the other jurors’ deliberations. Moreover, there is a real possibility that the bias of the police commissioner on the attempts charge, the existence of which the majority concedes, influenced the consideration of the other charges.
The police commissioner’s answers to questions posed on voir dire concerning his ability to objectively *210evaluate the testimony of police officers were uncertain.1 This failure to assert his objectivity leaves some doubt concerning this juror’s lack of prosecutorial bias which when added to the fact that the testimony of six police officers2 was to be evaluated, clearly indicates the potential for prejudice.
I agree with the majority that the categories of relationships calling for automatic disqualification of a juror should be limited for the laudable purpose of having juries comprised of persons from a broad variety of backgrounds. This purpose should not, however, be so exalted as to endanger the minimal due process guarantee of a fair trial by a panel of impartial jurors indifferent to the result of the case. See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961); Commonwealth v. Stewart, 449 Pa. 50, 295 A. 2d 303 (1972). The majority holds that the likelihood of bias on the part of police officers is not so great that an officer must be removed from, the jury. As their opinion points out, cases from other jurisdictions support this view. See Anno., 140 A.L.R. 1183, and cases listed therein. But, there are a number of cases to the contrary. See, e.g., State v. Jackson, 275 Minn. 462, 147 N.W. 2d 689 (1967); Tate v. People, 125 Colo. 527, 247 P. 2d 665 (1952); State v. Rowe, 238 Iowa 237, 26 N.W. 2d 422 (1947); State v. Langley, 342 Mo. 447, 116 S.W. 2d 38 (1938); and Wallis v. State, supra at n. 2. As the majority indicates, all of these cases, except Wallis, are distinguishable as involv*211ing more than the fact of occupational status as the grounds for disqualification. But the cases do recognize the problems of credibility and prosecutorial bias presented when police officers serve as jurors.3
There has been then, at the very least, judicial recognition of the problem of prosecutorial bias present when policemen serve as jurors in criminal cases. Because of his view of expertise, the officer is likely to feel that his functions are performed with administrative regularity and that the arrest of a suspect therefore indicates his guilt. His predisposition is contrary to the presumption of innocence. See J. Skolnick, Justice Without Trial, at .192-96, 240-41 (1966).
Our Supreme Court recently held in Commonwealth v. Stewart, supra, that where the potential for prejudice is present, actual prejudice will be presumed for the sake of insured fairness. Given the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of an impartial jury and Stewart’s clear indication that the potentialities, rather than actualities, or prejudice in jury selection should be focused upon, I cannot approve of police officers serving as jurors in criminal cases, where, as here, a substantial part of the Commonwealth’s evidence is police testimony. The possibility of prejudice exists and if the police officer is challenged and is less than certain in *212his assertion of objectivity, the proper course is to disqualify Mm as a juror. The failure to disqualify the challenged juror in the instant case requires reversal despite the acquittal of the attempts charge.
I would reverse the judgments of sentence and grant appellants a new trial.

 E.g., when asked whether a policeman is more worthy of belief than a layman, he stated that “it depends on the individual.”

 See Wallis v. State, 38 Ala. App. 359, 84 So. 2d 788 (1955), where the occupational bias of a law enforcement officer, alone, was held to be a sufficient basis for challenge. The Court stated: “In the instant case, the state’s evidence was based solely on the testimony of two law enforcement officers. This being true, we think that a deputy sheriff would stand less indifferent than a layman free from professional influence.” 84 So. 2d at 790.

 “A police officer should in no ease serve as a juror. ... It seems incompatible with justice that a defendant who has been apprehended by the police, and against whom police officers are going to testify should be tried by a jury made up of police officers.” State v. Butts, 349 Mo. 213, 220, 159 S.W. 2d 790, 794 (1942). “Where other law enforcement officials, including- the sheriff, were material witnesses in the case, the disqualification of this juror (a deputy) was not even a debatable question.” Tate v. People, supra, at 540, 247 P. 2d at 671. “It may be a justifiable assumption that a former deputy sheriff would be more inclined to believe police officers with whom he had worked in the past than witnesses for the accused.” State v. Jackson, supra, at 468, 147 N.W. 2d at 693.