Court Opinion

ID: 9456389
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 19:50:58.048277+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:34:57.233432
License: Public Domain

On Petition for Rehearing
NEVILLE, District Judge.
In a petition for rehearing filed by defendant-appellant he assets that the court “either overlooked or misapprehended the single issue presented” namely the question of whether the 1960 amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 3568 is or was unconstitutional. In Noorlander v. United States, 404 F.2d 603 (8th Cir. 1968), we said:
“For the purpose of this appeal, it is not necessary for us to reach the statutory interpretation or constitutional issues raised by the defendant. Where, as here, no minimum sentence is required and the sentence imposed is less than the maximum, courts have presumed that the sentencing court in imposing sentence took into consideration the pre-sentence time served. Lee v. United States, 9 Cir., 400 F.2d 185, 188; Ashworth v. United States, 6 Cir., 391 F.2d 245; Huber v. United States, 5 Cir., 390 F.2d 544; Stapf v. United States, 125 U.S.App.D.C. 100, 367 F.2d 326.” [Emphasis added]
This court is therefore committed to the view that since there exists a presumption that defendant-appellant received credit for presentence incarceration, no challenge to constitutionality can be sustained. Though the 1960 amendment to § 3568 provides credit for presentence custody only where there exists a statutory minimum mandatory sentence, it would seem that only those sentenced under some other type of statute where such credit was not given would have standing to challenge the constitutionality of the statute. Here defendant-appellant was sentenced for but one-*393half of the maximum provided for bank robbery and thus was given credit for his presentence jail time by virtue of the aforementioned presumption. Therefore he cannot urge that the statute discriminates or is constitutionally infirm as to him. If a statute treats classes of persons in different ways, but a particular person receives the most favorable treatment the statute provides in any event, he cannot contest constitutionality on the theory that someone else might be discriminated against if he himself has not been. Defendant-appellant has not been so discriminated against and thus as to him the application of the statute (by virtue of the presumption of credit) did not embody a denial of equal protection nor due process.
Appellant’s petition for rehearing is denied.