Court Opinion

ID: 9703367
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:53:25.421222+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:47.980726
License: Public Domain

TERRY, Associate Judge,
concurring:
I join fully in the court’s opinion, but I would go one step further. I would hold that, as a matter of law, possession is not and can never be a lesser included offense of distribution because there is no overlap between the two offenses.
“A lesser-included offense instruction is only proper where the charged greater offense requires the jury to find a disputed factual element which is not required for conviction of the lesser-included offense.” Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343, 350, 85 S.Ct. 1004, 1009, 13 L.Ed.2d 882 (1965) (citations omitted). More recently, the Supreme Court has refined this test by stating that the elements of the lesser offense must be “a subset of the [greater] charged offense.” Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 716, 109 S.Ct. 1443, 1450, 103 L.Ed.2d 734 (1989). I understand this “subset” language to mean simply that *1189in proving the greater offense, the government must also prove all the elements of the lesser offense. See Rease v. United States, 403 A.2d 322, 328 (D.C.1979).1 I would hold that, under this test, possession (a misdemeanor) is not and cannot be a lesser included offense of distribution (a felony) because all the elements of possession need not be proved in order to convict someone of distribution.
Although the mens rea is the same for both offenses (“knowingly or intentionally”),2 the actus reus is altogether different. Possession is not defined by statute, but case law has established that it consists of either direct physical custody (actual possession) or the ability to exercise dominion and control over the thing possessed (constructive possession). Hack v. United States, 445 A.2d 634, 639 (D.C.1982); see Parker v. United States, 601 A.2d 45, 51-52 (D.C.1991); Bernard v. United States, 575 A.2d 1191, 1195-1196 (D.C.1990). Distribution, on the other hand, is statutorily defined as a change of possession, “the actual, constructive, or attempted transfer” of a drug from one person to another. D.C.Code § 33-501(9) (1988). To sustain a charge of distribution, the government must prove only a knowing or intentional transfer (or attempted transfer) of the drug; the act of possession before or after the transfer need not be proved because it is not part of the act of distribution. Hence, although such possession will be incidentally proved in most distribution cases, such proof is superfluous because possession is not an element — under Schmuck, it is not a “subset” — of distribution.
Minor contends that possession is a lesser included offense of distribution because one must invariably possess the controlled substance in order to distribute it. While that is usually true, this court’s decision in Allen v. United States, 580 A.2d 653 (D.C.1990), makes clear that the possession and the distribution are two distinct acts that occur in sequence, not simultaneously. We said in Allen: “It is self-evident that every distribution of an unlawful drug is immediately preceded by possession of that same drug with intent to distribute it.” Id. at 659 (emphasis added). We characterized the possession of the drug as the “prologue” to the distribution, suggesting that in theory, at least, the possession might even be charged as a separate offense. Id.3 The same analysis defeats Minor’s argument here. Under Allen, the possession ends at the instant the distribution begins, so that the two offenses can never overlap. It follows that possession is not, and cannot logically be, a lesser included offense of distribution, and that Minor’s requested instruction was properly denied.4

. We said in Rease:
A defendant is entitled to a lesser-included offense instruction when (1) all elements of the lesser offense are included within the offense charged, and (2) there is a sufficient evidentiary basis for the lesser charge.
403 A.2d at 328 (citations omitted and emphasis added).

. D.C.Code § 33-541(a) makes it a crime "knowingly or intentionally” to distribute a controlled substance. D.C.Code § 33-541 (d) makes it a crime “knowingly or intentionally” to possess a controlled substance (with certain limited exceptions).

. We cautioned, however, against “subdividpng] such an event into two parts” for the purpose of prosecuting the possession and the distribution as two separate crimes, suggesting that such an approach would amount to "prosecutorial over-kill_” Allen, supra, 580 A.2d at 659.

.Some confusion may have resulted from the fact that an annotation to the standard jury instruction on distribution erroneously identifies simple possession as a lesser included offense. See Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia, No. 4.33 (3d ed. 1978). The instructions contained in this volume, commonly known as the "red book,” are of course “not the law”; the red book itself is "only a resource for jury instructions.” Thomas v. United States, 619 A.2d 20, 27 (D.C.1992). It appears that this is one of those "rare instance[s]” in which "the editors of the red book erred." Tibbs v. United States, 507 A.2d 141, 145 (D.C.1986).