Court Opinion

ID: 9897200
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:08:32.410828+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:39.171572
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                       Oct 31 2023, 10:27 am

                                                            CLERK
                                                        Indiana Supreme Court
                                                           Court of Appeals
                                                             and Tax Court

                           IN THE

   Indiana Supreme Court
              Supreme Court Case No. 23S-CR-72

                      State of Indiana,
                    Appellant (Plaintiff below)

                               –v–

          $2,435 in United States Currency
               and Alucious Q. Kizer,
                   Appellees (Defendants below).

         Argued: May 4, 2023 | Decided: October 31, 2023

               Appeal from the Allen Circuit Court
                      No. 02C01-2109-MI-825
              The Honorable Wendy W. Davis, Judge

     On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals
                         No. 22A-CR-578

                     Opinion by Justice Goff
Chief Justice Rush and Justices Massa, Slaughter, and Molter concur.
Goff, Justice.

   The Indiana Constitution guarantees the same right to a jury trial in a
civil case as existed at common law when the current constitution was
adopted in 1851. The question here is whether this jury-trial right applies
in an action seeking to confiscate money under Indiana’s civil forfeiture
statute. Our historical survey leads us to conclude that it does. We thus
affirm the trial court and remand for trial by jury.

Facts and Procedural History
   Alucious Kizer fled from his car after police stopped him for a traffic
violation. While running, Kizer discarded a veritable pharmacy of
controlled substances—74 grams of methamphetamine, 67 grams of
fentanyl, 12 grams of cocaine, 10 grams of crack cocaine, and 10 grams of
synthetic cannabis. Officers also recovered a total of $2,435 in cash. The
State later filed a complaint to forfeit the money, alleging that it had been
“furnished or intended to be furnished” in exchange for a crime, that it
had been “used to facilitate” a crime, or that it was “traceable as proceeds”
of a crime. App. Vol. II, pp. 14–15. Kizer, pro se, denied the allegations and
requested a jury trial. Id. at 24. The State, in turn, moved to strike Kizer’s
demand for a jury trial, arguing that no such right exists under either the
state or federal constitution. Id. at 28–30. The trial court initially granted
the State’s motion but later vacated its order, concluding that the lack of
guidance from Indiana’s appellate courts warranted erring “on the side of
awarding Defendants more rights and due process by honoring the right
to jury trial in civil forfeiture cases, if timely requested.” Order at 3. The
State sought (and received) permission to bring an interlocutory appeal.

   In a unanimous opinion, the Court of Appeals reversed, concluding
that this Court “has long held” that a complaint for the “forfeiture of
illegal property is ‘not a civil case under the common law when the
Constitution was adopted’” and, so, the “parties are not entitled to trial by
jury.” State v. $2,435 in United States Currency, 194 N.E.3d 1227, 1229 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2022) (quoting Campbell v. State, 171 Ind. 702, 708–09, 87 N.E. 212,
214–15 (1909)). Rather, the panel reasoned, by “‘denying individuals the

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-CR-72 | October 31, 2023        Page 2 of 24
ability to profit from ill-gotten gain, an action for forfeiture resembles an
equitable action for disgourgement or restitution.’” Id. (quoting Caudill v.
State, 613 N.E.2d 433, 437 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993)).

  Kizer, by counsel, petitioned for transfer, which we granted, thus
vacating the Court of Appeals opinion. See Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A).

Standard of Review
    “Whether certain claims are entitled to a trial by jury presents a pure
question of law” to which we apply a de novo standard of review. Lucas v.
U.S. Bank, N.A., 953 N.E.2d 457, 460 (Ind. 2011) (citing Cunningham v. State,
835 N.E.2d 1075, 1076 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005)).

Discussion and Decision
   Article 1, Section 20 of the Indiana Constitution ensures that in “all civil
cases, the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate.” Ind. Const. art. 1, §
20. This fundamental guarantee secures the right to a jury trial “as it
existed at common law” at the time Indiana adopted its current
constitution. Songer v. Civitas Bank, 771 N.E.2d 61, 63 (Ind. 2002) (emphasis
added) (citing City of Crown Point v. Newcomer, 204 Ind. 589, 595, 185 N.E.
440, 443 (1933)). For cases or claims deemed equitable, by contrast, “it is a
well-settled tenet that a party is not entitled to a jury trial.”1 Id. See also
Ind. Trial Rule 38(A). To resolve the question before us, we first ask

1The traditional distinction between law and equity derives from medieval England, where
the Court of Chancery developed a distinct jurisprudence to meet the “inability—and to some
extent the unwillingness—of the common-law courts to entertain and give relief in every case,
and thus meet all the requirements of justice.” 12 Ind. Law Encyc. Equity § 1 (2023). Indiana
has since abolished the distinction “between actions at law and suits in equity.” Id. § 2; see also
Ind. Trial Rule 2 (prescribing a single “form of action”). Yet Indiana courts retain the power to
apply equitable, as well as legal, rules “to administer justice according to fairness.” Doe v.
Shults-Lewis Child & Fam. Servs, Inc., 718 N.E.2d 738, 747 (Ind. 1999).

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whether the cause of action existed in 1851.2 If so, then history settles the
matter. Gates v. City of Indianapolis, 991 N.E.2d 592, 593 (Ind. Ct. App.
2013). But if the cause of action did not exist in 1851, we must decide
whether the claim is analogous to one at law or one in equity, as those
terms were then understood. Id. at 594.

   The question here is whether a claimant in an action brought under
Indiana’s civil forfeiture statute has a constitutional right to trial by jury.3
In defending this right, Kizer traces civil actions to forfeit property “used
in violation of law” to the colonial common-law courts, which drew on the
English in rem procedure with trial by jury. Pet. to Trans. at 12–14.

   The State, for its part, argues that, because in rem civil forfeitures in
Indiana are a purely statutory procedure of relatively modern vintage,
Kizer has no right to a jury trial. Appellant’s Br. at 9. While
acknowledging that some types of forfeiture existed in 1851, the State
insists that civil forfeiture actions like the one here—an action seeking
forfeiture of funds illegally obtained from criminal activity or intended for
future use in criminal activity—never existed at common law when
Indiana adopted its current constitution. Id. at 9 & n. 1. And even if

2 The date referred to in Trial Rule 38—June 18, 1852—is not the effective date of Indiana’s
current constitution, as some courts have concluded. See, e.g., Hiatt v. Yergin, 152 Ind. App.
497, 514, 284 N.E.2d 834, 843 (1972). The effective date of our constitution was November 1,
1851. See 1 Charles Kettleborough, Constitution Making in Indiana xcii (1916); see also State ex
rel. Weir v. Dawson, 16 Ind. 40, 41 (1861) (referencing the 1851 date). The date referred to in
Trial Rule 38 is the date on which the General Assembly, by constitutional mandate, enacted
legislation designed to “abolish distinct forms of actions at law and to provide for the
administration of justice in a uniform mode of pleading and practice, without distinction
between law and equity.” Act of June 18, 1852, 2 Ind. Rev. Stat. ch. 1; see Ind. Const. art. 7, § 20
(mandating this legislative revision) (repealed 1984). The confusion appears to stem from
comments in the Civil Code Study Commission’s draft of Rule 38. See Indiana Rules of Civil
Procedure: Proposed Final Draft 162 (1968) (concluding that, “[u]nder Indiana law, as
retained by [Trial Rule 38(A)], jury trial is limited to actions where the parties had the right of
jury trial at common law prior to the adoption of the Constitution of Indiana in 1852”). While
the difference in dates is unlikely to make a practical difference, we refer to 1851 as the
operative year for our historical analysis.
3In resolving this case on state constitutional grounds, we need not address Kizer’s claim that
Hoosiers have a right to trial by jury in civil-forfeiture actions under the Seventh Amendment
to the United States Constitution.

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Indiana’s forfeiture statutes reflect a “codification of previously existing
law,” the State contends that “there is still no right to a jury trial because
the essential features of an in rem forfeiture action are equitable” rather
than legal. Id. at 10.

   In resolving this dispute, our opinion proceeds in two parts. In Part I,
we clarify the proper framework for analyzing claims to a jury trial under
Article 1, Section 20. Part II applies this framework to address the merits
of Kizer’s claim.

I. The State’s “special statutory procedure” theory
   takes an “unduly restrictive view” of Article 1,
   Section 20.
   The State insists that Kizer has no right to a jury trial because “[i]n rem
civil forfeitures pursuant to Indiana’s drug forfeiture laws are a special
statutory procedure” intended exclusively for trial by the court. Resp. in
Opp. to Trans. at 13; Appellant’s Br. at 9 (citing I.C. §§ 34-24-1-3, -4). Kizer
disagrees, arguing that the State’s theory would effectively deprive Hoosiers
of a jury trial when filing suit under any modern statutory scheme. Pet. to
Trans. at 16.

   We agree with Kizer.

  In Midwest Security Life Insurance Co. v. Stroup, the beneficiaries of a
health-insurance plan sued the plan’s administrator for breach of contract
and bad faith and sought a jury trial. 730 N.E.2d 163, 165 (Ind. 2000). The
administrator argued that the claims were preempted by ERISA (the federal
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974) and moved to strike the
request for a jury trial. Id. The Court of Appeals agreed, holding that ERISA
preempted the state-law claims and that, because ERISA embodied “a
relatively recent statutory scheme” and “did not exist at common law,” the
plaintiffs “had no right to a jury trial to determine [their] benefits under the
Plan.” Midwest Sec. Life Ins. v. Stroup, 706 N.E.2d 201, 207 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted), vacated. On transfer, this
Court agreed with the Court of Appeals on the preemption issue but
expressly declined to “address whether a jury trial would be allowed for

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-CR-72 | October 31, 2023          Page 5 of 24
either the state law claims or for claims under ERISA.” Stroup, 730 N.E.2d at
168–69.

   In a concurring opinion, Justice Boehm wrote separately to address the
plaintiffs’ claim to a jury-trial right. The Court of Appeals’ conclusion on
that issue, he opined, took “an unduly restrictive view of Article I, Section
20.” Id. at 169 (Boehm, J., concurring). Under such an approach, he
emphasized, “parties filing suit under any statutory scheme that has been
developed since 1852 would not be entitled to a jury trial because the cause
of action did not exist at common law.” Id. at 170. “The crucial inquiry” in
his view was “not, as the Court of Appeals put it, whether a cause of action
existed at common law” but, rather, “whether the cause of action is
essentially legal or equitable, as those terms were used in 1852.” Id. at 169.

   Indiana courts have applied Justice Boehm’s analytical framework in
several cases. In Cunningham v. State, for example, the Court of Appeals
considered whether the defendant was entitled to a jury trial for a traffic
infraction. 835 N.E.2d 1075, 1076, 1077 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). Given the
absence of “1852 statutes governing speed zones,” the court, using the
“alternative path of analysis” urged by Justice Boehm in Stroup, determined
“whether an action for a traffic infraction would have been considered
equitable had it existed in 1852.” Id. at 1078 (emphasis added). Because it
“would not have been an equitable action,” the court held that a jury right
existed. Id. See also Gates, 991 N.E.2d at 595 (quoting Cunningham, 835 N.E.2d
at 1078) (concluding “that the mandatory fines imposed in this case are akin
to claims for money damages, which were ‘exclusively legal actions in
1852’”).

   There are, to be sure, several (older) cases that support the State’s theory.
See, e.g., State ex rel. Boeldt v. Crim. Ct. of Marion Cnty., 236 Ind. 290, 293, 139
N.E.2d 891, 893 (1957) (concluding that a proceeding for restoration of sanity
is “a statutory proceeding, which is civil in nature, and it is not triable by a
jury”); State ex rel. Newkirk v. Sullivan Cir. Ct., 227 Ind. 633, 638, 88 N.E.2d
326, 328 (1949) (whether a party was entitled to a change of judge “is not
triable by jury” as it involved “special statutory proceedings”); Campbell, 171
Ind. at 709, 87 N.E. at 215 (summarily concluding “that in statutory
proceedings parties are not entitled to trial by jury as a constitutional right”);

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-CR-72 | October 31, 2023             Page 6 of 24
Anderson v. Caldwell, 91 Ind. 451, 454 (1883) (eminent-domain claim for
assessing damages to land “is a special statutory proceeding, in which it is
competent for the Legislature to dispense with a jury”).

   But Indiana precedent likewise cuts in the opposite direction. As this
Court held in one late nineteenth-century case, a civil action, even as a
“creature of positive statute,” is “triable by a jury,” so long it “did not come
into existence as a suit of equitable cognizance.” Puterbaugh v. Puterbaugh,
131 Ind. 288, 294–95, 30 N.E. 519, 521 (1892).4 Indiana commentators have
historically reached the same conclusion, emphasizing that the “fact that
[certain common-law] actions have been codified does not alter their
fundamental common-law character.” 2 Bernard C. Gavit, Indiana Pleading
and Practice § 318, at 2030 (1942). Were it otherwise, as other courts have
opined, the legislature could “dispense with jury trials” altogether and “thus
entirely defeat the provision of the Constitution.” People v. One 1941
Chevrolet Coupe, 231 P.2d 832, 843 (Cal. 1951).5

   We agree with this latter line of authority and now clarify the proper test
for Article 1, Section 20’s jury-trial right, adapting Justice Boehm’s formula
in Stroup: Parties in a civil case have a right to trial by jury in a cause of
action (1) that was triable by jury at the adoption of the current constitution
in 1851; or (2) if no such cause existed at the time, one that is essentially
legal, rather than equitable, as those terms were understood in 1851,

4At issue in Puterbaugh was a statutory action to quiet title and to recover possession, which
the Court deemed “substantially the same as the common-law action of ejectment.” 131 Ind. at
295, 30 N.E. at 521.
5 See also State v. Items of Real Prop. Owned &/or Possessed by Chilinski, 383 P.3d 236, 244 (Mont.
2016) (“The contention that a statutory provision, because it was enacted after ratification of
the Montana Constitution in 1972, precludes the right of a jury trial from attaching to the
statute’s provisions, places too narrow an interpretation upon the issue.”); State v. One 1990
Honda Accord & Four Hundred Twenty Dollars, 712 A.2d 1148, 1150 (N.J. 1998) (“Although
forfeiture depends on a statute for its existence, it remains subject to common-law
principles.”). Cf. United States v. One 1976 Mercedes Benz 280S, 618 F.2d 453, 458 n. 17 (7th Cir.
1980) (quoting Rogers v. Loether, 567 F.2d 1110, 1115–17 (7th Cir. 1972)) (stressing “the
distinction between a ‘statutory proceeding’ and a statutory right enforceable by a proceeding
‘in the nature of’ a suit at common law”).

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considering “the complaint, the rights and interests involved, and the relief
demanded.” Stroup, 730 N.E.2d at 170 (Boehm, J., concurring) (cleaned up).

II. Article 1, Section 20 of the Indiana Constitution
    protects the right to a jury trial for in rem civil
    forfeitures.
  In applying the analytical framework set forth above, we conclude that
Article 1, Section 20 of the Indiana Constitution protects the right to a jury
trial for in rem civil forfeitures. As explained below, the historical record—
consisting of statutes and judicial decisions reflecting contemporary
practice—strongly suggests that Indiana continued the common-law
tradition of trial by jury in actions for the forfeiture of property. See Pt.
II.A. We acknowledge, however, that the in rem procedure was
infrequently used in Indiana during the first half of the nineteenth century
and that the evidence on which we rely is largely circumstantial. We
proceed, then, to the question of whether the forfeiture here is analogous
to an action at law or to an equitable claim. See Pt. II.B. From this line of
inquiry, we have little trouble concluding that the forfeiture here is not, as
the State contends, akin to the equitable disgorgement of illegally obtained
profits.

   A. The historical record strongly suggests that Indiana
      continued the common-law tradition of trial by jury in
      actions for in rem forfeiture of property.
   We begin by examining the origins of civil forfeiture in England and
colonial America. We then trace this history through the laws of the early
United States, the Northwest and Indiana Territorial periods, and early
statehood.

      1. England and Colonial America
   Historically, England recognized three types of forfeiture: deodand,
attainder forfeiture, and statutory forfeiture. At common law, proceeds from

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the sale of an instrument responsible for causing a person’s death—a knife,
club, or some other inanimate object—vested in the Crown as deodand,
whether for charitable purposes or as a source of revenue. Calero-Toledo v.
Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 680–81 (1974). Despite its long-
standing use in England, “[d]eodands did not become part of the common-
law tradition of this country.” Id. at 681 n. 19, 682.

   Under attainder forfeiture, the Crown proceeded against the property
owner in personam. Donald J. Boudreaux & A.C. Pritchard, Innocence Lost:
Bennis v. Michigan and the Forfeiture Tradition, 61 Mo. L. Rev. 593, 602
(1996). Persons convicted of a felony forfeited their personal property to the
Crown, whereas persons convicted of treason forfeited both their personal
and real property. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 682. Conviction likewise resulted
in “corruption of blood,” effectively disqualifying the criminal offender from
passing property to his heirs upon death. Boudreaux & Pritchard, supra, at
602–03 n. 68. Attainder forfeiture took root in some American colonial
jurisdictions, Pennsylvania and Virginia among them. James R. Maxeiner,
Note, Bane of American Forfeiture Law—Banished at Last?, 62 Cornell L. Rev.
768, 776–77 (1977). The practice likewise found its way into the Northwest
Territory during the late eighteenth century. See Act of Sept. 6, 1788, in The
Laws of the Northwest Territory, 1788–1800, at 13 (Theodore Calvin Pease ed.,
1925) (deeming persons found to have committed treason to have
“forfeit[ed] all his, her or their estate, real and personal, to this territory”).
But, given its harsh consequences, attainder forfeiture quickly fell into
disrepute in America. Maxeiner, supra, at 774.6

6 The Framers of the United States Constitution expressly prohibited “Attainder of Treason”
from resulting in “Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person
attainted.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 3, cl. 2. Most states followed suit, either curtailing attainder
forfeiture or abolishing it altogether. Donald J. Boudreaux & A.C. Pritchard, Innocence Lost:
Bennis v. Michigan and the Forfeiture Tradition, 61 Mo. L. Rev. 593, 604–05 (1996). Indiana fell
into the latter category. Under both state constitutions, “no conviction shall work corruption
of blood, nor forfeiture of estate.” Ind. Const. art. 1, § 18 (1816); Ind. Const. art. 1, § 30 (1851)
(virtually the same). See also Ballard v. Bd. of Trs. of Police Pension Fund of City of Evansville, 263
Ind. 79, 85–86, 324 N.E.2d 813, 817 (1975) (discussing the history of attainder forfeiture).

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    English law also imposed “statutory forfeitures of offending objects used
in violation of the customs and revenue laws.” Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 682.
The Navigation Acts of 1660, the most prominent example of this forfeiture
type, mandated the use of English vessels for transporting goods to and
from the American colonies. 12 Car. II, c. 18, § 1 (Eng.). Those ships found in
violation of the law were subject to “Forfeiture and Losse of all the Goods
and Commodityes” they contained, along with the vessel itself and “all its
Guns Furniture Tackle Ammunition and Apparell.” Id.

  The Navigation Acts and other forfeiture statutes vested jurisdiction “in
any Court of Record.” Id. §§ 1, 3, 6, 18; see C.J. Hendry Co. v. Moore, 318 U.S.
133, 138 & n. 3 (1943) (citing statutes). The primary forum of enforcement in
England was the Court of Exchequer. Caleb Nelson, The Constitutionality of
Civil Forfeiture, 125 Yale L.J. 2446, 2460 (2016). Forfeiture suits in the
Exchequer, filed by a Crown attorney or by an individual suing qui tam (or
on behalf of the Crown), proceeded by “civil information,”7 either in
personam or in rem—the latter proceeding naming the property itself as the
guilty party (with no need for a separate prosecution of the property
owner). Maxeiner, supra, at 775, 782. In either case, a jury often tried the
accused. Nelson, supra, at 2464.

   Forfeiture suits in colonial America likewise proceeded by civil
information in rem. Proceedings to enforce the Navigation Acts took place in
the common-law courts, which “‘closely followed the procedure in
Exchequer,’” complete with trial by jury. Id. at 2462 (quoting C.J. Hendry, 318
U.S. at 139–40 & n. 4). By the late seventeenth century, however,
Parliament—prompted by “‘the obstinate resistance of American juries’”—
had vested concurrent jurisdiction over colonial forfeiture proceedings in the
vice-admiralty courts, which conducted proceedings without a jury. Id.

7While a modern “information” denotes a charging instrument in a criminal proceeding, the
English Court of Exchequer used that term to describe the document filed in a civil in rem
proceeding. Caleb Nelson, The Constitutionality of Civil Forfeiture, 125 Yale L.J. 2446, 2460–61
(2016); see also Joseph Chitty, Jr., A Treatise on the Law of the Prerogatives of the Crown 332
(London, Butterworth & Son 1820) (noting that the process of information in the Exchequer
“is wholly different from the criminal proceeding by information in the King’s Bench” and “is
in the nature of a civil action at the suit of the Crown”).

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(quoting C.J. Hendry, 318 U.S. at 141). These courts, in the decades leading to
the American Revolution, would become the primary forum for litigating
forfeiture suits involving any “‘act or acts of parliament relating to the trade
and revenues’” of the colonies. Id. at 2463 (quoting the Revenue Act of 1764).
The jurisdictional expansion of the vice-admiralty courts into cases that had
little to do with maritime commerce would ultimately inspire the colonists—
in their 1776 Declaration of Independence—to bitterly denounced the King
and Parliament for depriving them “‘in many cases of the Benefits of trial by
Jury’” while imposing no such restrictions in the Exchequer courts of
England. Matthew P. Harrington, The Economic Origins of the Seventh
Amendment, 87 Iowa L. Rev. 145, 166–67 (2001) (quoting the Declaration of
Independence para. 19).

      2. Early United States
   With independence from England, the new states continued to rely on
statutory forfeiture (and in rem proceedings) as an effective tool of law
enforcement and revenue generation. Nelson, supra, at 2468. And, with
adoption of the U.S. Constitution in 1788, the federal government followed
suit, enacting statutes that authorized the seizure and forfeiture of property
connected with (among other things) piracy, arms exports, slave trading,
alcohol distilling, sugar and snuff refining, tax evasion, trading with native
peoples, and the violation of neutrality laws. Kevin Arlyck, The Founders’
Forfeiture, 119 Colum. L. Rev. 1449, 1465 (2019) (citing statutes); Rufus
Waples, A Treatise on Proceedings In Rem vi (Chicago, Callaghan & Co. 1882).

   Enforcement of these (and other) statutes proceeded under the Judiciary
Act of 1789, which vested exclusive jurisdiction in the federal district courts
over “all seizures under laws of impost, navigation or trade of the United
States” and “all suits for penalties and forfeitures incurred, under the laws
of the United States.” Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77. To
initiate a suit, the district attorney (sometimes at the behest of a qui tam
informer or customs collector) would file a complaint in the name of the
United States, referred to as a “libel” or an “information” in rem, setting
forth a short and plain statement of the alleged violation and the articles
intended for condemnation. Arlyck, supra, at 1469–70. The presence of a jury

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depended on the type of forfeiture sought: When presented with claims
involving vessels or cargo seized on navigable waters, the district courts sat
as courts of admiralty, without the assistance of a jury.8 See United States v.
La Vengeance, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 297, 301 (1796). When presented with claims
involving property seized on land, by contrast, the district courts sat as
courts of common law with the assistance of a jury. The Sarah, 21 U.S. (8
Wheat.) 391, 394 (1823).

   The decision in Sundry Goods, Wares and Merchandises v. United States
offers an illustrative example of a forfeiture claim involving goods seized on
land. In that case, the government filed a “libel or information” in rem in the
United States District Court for the District of Indiana “against sundry
goods and merchandise,” seeking the forfeiture of certain “ardent spirits”
carried unlawfully by a licensed trader “into the Indian country, lying on the
north or west side of the Tippecanoe river.” 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 358, 362–63
(1829);9 see Act of May 6, 1822, ch. 58, § 2, 3 Stat. 682, 682–83. The case was
tried by jury and resulted in a verdict in favor of the government. 27 U.S. (2
Pet.) at 363. On review, the United States Supreme Court upheld the district
court’s instruction to the jury that all goods and merchandise intended for
sale—whether “mingled with” or kept separate from the contraband—were
liable to forfeiture. Id. at 366–67. But because those instructions contained
ambiguities on where the goods may have been lawfully seized (within the
Indian country or within U.S. jurisdiction), the Court remanded for a retrial,
“with instruction to award a venire de novo”—a writ, that is, calling for a

8 Under the Judiciary Act of 1789, issues of fact were tried by a jury “in all causes except civil
causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.” Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77.
According to one scholar, the framers of the Judiciary Act “seemed to have forgotten most of
the [colonial-era] rhetoric about the evils of trying trade cases in admiralty” without the
benefit of a jury. Matthew P. Harrington, The Legacy of the Colonial Vice-Admiralty Courts (Part
II), 27 J. Mar. L. & Com. 323, 349 (1996). But, as Justice Samuel Chase explained, the “reason of
the legislature for putting seizures of this kind on the admiralty side of the court was the great
danger to the revenue if such cases should be left to the caprice of juries.” United States v. The
Betsey & Charlotte, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 443, 446 n. (1808) (Chase, J.). On the omission of “equity”
from the Judiciary Act of 1789, see One 1976 Mercedes Benz 280S, 618 F.2d at 460 n. 30.
9The syllabus to the Court’s opinion initially refers to the United States District Court for the
District of Ohio. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 358. It’s unclear whether this was a scrivener’s error or
whether it was a consolidated case.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-CR-72 | October 31, 2023                         Page 12 of 24
new jury panel to be summoned. Id. at 369; see Venire Facias, Black’s Law
Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).

   From this brief history, we gather that “the common law as received in
this country at the time of the adoption of the [federal] Constitution gave a
remedy in rem in cases of forfeiture.” C.J. Hendry, 318 U.S. at 153. And both
English and American practice before and after 1791 “recognized jury trial of
in rem actions at common law as the established mode of determining the
propriety of statutory forfeitures on land for breach of statutory
prohibitions.” One 1976 Mercedes Benz 280S, 618 F.2d at 466.

     The question we turn to now is whether Indiana practice recognized the
same right to a jury trial of in rem actions at common law in 1851.10

       3.        Indiana
   As with their counterparts along the eastern seaboard, the Northwest
and Indiana Territorial governments passed several statutes governing the
forfeiture of property. For example, a law enacted in 1790 (akin to the
federal statute at issue in Sundry Goods) prohibited certain persons from
trading any “articles of commerce” with the native tribes. Act of July 19,
1790, § 2, in Laws of the Northwest Territory, 1788–1800, at 27. Persons found
to have engaged in unlawful trade were to “forfeit to the use of th[e]
territory, all his or her goods and chattels personal.” Id. A similar law,

10In theory, we could trace Indiana’s jury-trial right back to the Northwest Ordinance of 1787,
which (following its readoption by Congress in 1789) subjected the territory to the federal
Judiciary Act of 1789. The Ordinance guaranteed to the territorial inhabitants the “benefits” of
trial by jury “and of judicial proceedings according to the course of the common law.” Act of
Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50, art. II (readopting Ordinance of July 13, 1787), reprinted in 1
U.S.C. LVII (2018). That charting document likewise subjected the territory to “all the acts and
ordinances of the United States in Congress assembled.” Id. at art. IV. When Indiana joined
the Union in 1816, the right to trial by jury under the state’s new constitution was a “pre-
existing right” from the territorial period, i.e., as it existed under the Northwest Ordinance,
“according to the course of the common law.” Reynolds v. State ex rel. Titus, 61 Ind. 392, 407
(1878). And when Indiana adopted the Constitution of 1851, the jury-trial right “continue[d]
as it was” under the 1816 constitution. Id. at 408 (citation and quotation marks omitted). In
practice, however, the states differed in their approach to forfeitures. See Maxeiner, supra, at
776; Nelson, supra, at 2472–75. So, we proceed with an analysis of Indiana’s historical record.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-CR-72 | October 31, 2023                      Page 13 of 24
enacted in 1799, prohibited any person from selling, bartering, or offering
liquor in any “town or settlement of Indians within the territory” under
pain of “forfeit[ing] the same.” Act of Dec. 6, 1799, § 2, in id. at 415–16.
Under an act to suppress gaming, any person found to have held a lottery
or raffle for purposes of raising money or other property was to “forfeit to
the use of the Territory the whole sum of money or property proposed to
be so raised or gained.” Act of July 16, 1795, § VI, in id. at 276, 277; see also
Act of Sept. 17, 1807, §§ 7, 16, in The Laws of Indiana Territory, 1801–1809, at
371, 375 (Francis S. Philbrick ed., 1930) (same). And, by a statute of 1805,
any person who failed to properly register a slave within the Territory
would “forfeit all claim and right whatever, to the service and labour” of
the slave. Act of Aug. 26, 1805, § 4, in Laws of Indiana Territory, 1801–1809,
at 137.

   In the decades following the transition to statehood, Indiana lawmakers
expanded on the territorial forfeiture laws. In 1838, for example, the
General Assembly enacted a measure “for the protection of Canals
belonging to the State” and “the collection of tolls thereon.” Act of Feb. 19,
1838, ch. 17, 1838 Ind. Acts 124.11 This law imposed exhaustive regulations
on the material construction and naming of boats, the speed at which they
travelled, the navigation of canal locks, and the maintenance and
presentation of documentation (e.g., certificates of registration and
clearance and bills of lading). Id. §§ 8–21, 31–37, 1838 Ind. Acts at 126–30.
For every violation of these regulations, the statute imposed a penalty or
forfeiture “for which any master, owner, boatman or other person may be

11Just two years before this statute, Indiana lawmakers passed the Internal Improvement Act,
which called for the construction of canals, turnpikes, and railroads within the state. N.
Indiana Bank & Tr. Co. v. State Bd. of Fin. of Indiana, 457 N.E.2d 527, 529 (Ind. 1983). With
approximately $13 million in appropriations, the measure—designed to stimulate Indiana’s
sluggish economy—was a mammoth investment in the state’s infrastructure. Justin E. Walsh,
The Centennial History of the Indiana General Assembly, 1816–1978, at 31–32 (1987). But with
appropriations far exceeding the state’s average annual revenues (which hovered around
$75,000), the project was also a huge economic risk. Id. at 33. And within a year the state lost
millions, prompting concerns over bankruptcy. Id. The 1838 Act was likely intended (at least
in part) as a means to recoup some of the state’s financial losses.

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liable.” Id. §§ 22, 23, 33, 37–39, 1838 Ind. Acts at 128, 130.12 In suits initiated
“for any such forfeiture,” the statute—using language reminiscent of the
English Navigation Acts of 1660—expressly permitted the seizure and
attachment of the boat, “together [with] the horses and furniture
belonging thereto.” Id. § 23, 1838 Ind. Acts at 128 (brackets in original); see
12 Car. II, c. 18, § 1 (subjecting to forfeiture the offending vessel and its
“Guns Furniture Tackle Ammunition and Apparell”). And a writ of
attachment could be issued against the boat itself in an in rem proceeding.
Cf. The Steam-Boat Tom Bowling v. Hough, 5 Blackf. 188, 188, 189 (1839)
(action against an indebted boat rather than a “guilty” boat).

    In 1849, state lawmakers adopted legislation authorizing town trustees to
prohibit or regulate gaming, spirituous liquors, slaughterhouses, firearms,
horse racing, and stray animals, among other things. Act of Jan. 17, 1849, ch.
143, § 8, 1849 Ind. Acts 211, 212–14 (legislating powers for the Town of
Laporte). To enforce these regulations, the law permitted town officials to
summarily “abate and remove” those things deemed public “nuisances.” Id.
§ 8, 1849 Ind. Acts at 214. Other sections allowed town officials to sue for the
forfeiture of goods or chattels. To “restrain, regulate, or prohibit the running
at large of horses” and other livestock, for example, the statute authorized
the “distraining, impounding, and sale of the same for the penalty incurred
and costs of proceedings.”13 Id. § 8, 1849 Ind. Acts at 213. Forfeitures of this
type were generally enforced through in rem proceedings. See Am. Furniture
Co. v. Town of Batesville, 139 Ind. 77, 78, 38 N.E. 408, 408 (1894) (describing
the abatement of nuisances as a “proceeding in rem, and not in personam”);

12The law also called for certain criminal penalties—including fines and imprisonment—for
intentional damage to or interference with canal operations. Act of Feb. 19, 1838, ch. 17, §§ 1–
6, 1838 Ind. Acts at 124–25.
13By authorizing local officials to impose forfeiture penalties, the General Assembly followed
the common-law rule that “no municipal corporation could, without express authority,
conferred by Parliament, enforce its by-laws . . . by forfeiture of goods.” Christopher
Tiedeman, A Treatise on the Law of Municipal Corporations § 154, at 271 (New York, Banks &
Bros. 1894); see also James Grant, A Practical Treatise on the Law of Corporations in General 85
(London, Butterworths 1850) (forfeitures “levied by distress and sale of goods” required an
act of parliament). Absent “such statutory authority municipal corporations are at common
law limited to the imposition of pecuniary penalties or fines.” Tiedeman, supra, § 154, at 271.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-CR-72 | October 31, 2023                       Page 15 of 24
McKee v. McKee, 47 Ky. 433, 434 (1848) (describing the forfeiture of animals
at large as “virtually a proceeding in rem”); see also Act of June 16, 1852, ch.
36, 1852 Ind. Acts 276 (describing procedures for the forfeiture and sale of
“estray” property).

   Beyond these statutes, Indiana law imposed monetary “forfeitures”
(which we would today call fines) for certain violations, either for a specific
sum or for an amount proportioned to the value of the goods involved.
Legislation enacted in 1825, for example, subjected persons unlicensed to
practice law to forfeiture of “three-fold the amount or value” of money or
“other species of property” received for services rendered. Act of Jan. 31,
1825, ch. 8, § 9, 1825 Ind. Acts 83, 85.14

   As with traditional Exchequer procedure, these legislative acts authorized
the proper official (whether the prosecutor or the customs collector) to
recover forfeitures in “any court of record” or “in any court of competent
jurisdiction.” See Act of Jan. 31, 1825, ch. 8, § 9, 1825 Ind. Acts at 85; Act of
Feb. 19, 1838, ch. 17, § 50, 1838 Ind. Acts at 132. Likewise consistent with
English practice was the statutory recognition of a right to trial by jury.
See, e.g., Act of Jan. 17, 1849, ch. 143, § 11, 1849 Ind. Acts at 215 (expressly
recognizing the use of juries in any forfeiture “action or proceeding in which
the said town is a party”); see also James Grant, A Practical Treatise on the Law
of Corporations in General 85 (London, Butterworths 1850) (recognizing that
“no man is to be dispossessed of his property” by forfeiture “but per legale
judicium parium suorum,” or by the legal judgment of his peers); John F.
Dillon, Treatise on the Law of Municipal Corporations § 282, at 295–96 (Chicago,
Cockcroft & Co. 1872) (citing caselaw for the same proposition).

   Rather than direct the government to file an information or libel in rem
against the goods themselves, many (if not most) early nineteenth-century
statutes in Indiana authorized the designated official to recover forfeitures

14The Indiana Territorial government imposed similar monetary penalties or “forfeitures.”
See, e.g., Act of Dec. 5, 1806, § 1, in The Laws of Indiana Territory, 1801–1809, at 210 (Francis S.
Philbrick ed., 1930) (subjecting persons found to have misbranded another person’s cattle to
forfeiture of five dollars “over and above the value of such” cattle).

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by “action of debt” against the offending party directly, “in the name of the
state of Indiana.” See, e.g., Act of Feb. 19, 1838, ch. 17, § 50, 1838 Ind. Acts at
132. A procedure long used in England’s Court of Exchequer, an action of
debt, like the information in rem, was a civil action for recovering fines and
forfeitures under the “penal” statutes. Nelson, supra, at 2498; see also Davis v.
State ex rel. Long, 119 Ind. 555, 556, 22 N.E. 9, 9 (1889).15 Because of their civil,
remedial nature, forfeitures by action of debt differed little “in purpose and
effect [from] the in rem forfeitures of the goods to whose value they were
proportioned.” United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 342–43 & n. 18 (1998).

     This practice, of course, departed from the personification fiction of the
“guilty” res. But the option of proceeding in personam by action of debt did
not preclude the state from recovering forfeitures through the in rem
procedure. To the contrary, many Indiana statutes offered prosecutors a
choice of procedures. During the territorial period, for example, the
government might recover “by action of debt or information” in “any court
of record.” See, e.g., Act of Sept. 4, 1803, § 24, in Laws of Indiana Territory,
1801–1809, at 60 (emphasis added); Act of Nov. 29, 1806, § 1, in id. at 190
(same).16 And, when presented with statutes reflecting these enforcement
options, courts understood the word “information” to broadly encompass
“proceedings in rem, for forfeitures.” The Bolina, 3 F. Cas. 811, 812 (Story,
Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Mass. 1812).

   Statutes enacted during the first decades of statehood offered government
lawyers similarly broad discretion in the method of enforcement. Officials
could recover “any penalty or forfeiture” by “action of debt or any other
form of action, in any court of competent jurisdiction.” Act of Jan. 17, 1849,

15In England, an action of debt was a proper means of collecting a “forfeiture” due under “all
penal statutes, that is, such acts of parliament whereby a forfeiture is inflicted for
transgressing the provisions therein enacted.” 3 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the
Laws of England 159 (London, John Murray 1857). Given the “implied original contract to
submit to the rules of the community,” Blackstone explained, a forfeiture was deemed to have
“immediately create[d] a debt in the eye of the law.” Id.
16Published forms during this period embodied this flexibility in enforcement procedure. See,
e.g., Act of Sept. 9, 1814, in The Laws of Indiana Territory, 1809–1816, at 550 (Louis Ewbank &
Dorothy Riker eds., 1934) (form for action of debt “or as the case may be”).

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-CR-72 | October 31, 2023                      Page 17 of 24
ch. 143, §§ 8, 10, 1849 Ind. Acts 211, 214, 215 (emphasis added); see also, e.g.,
Act of Jan. 31, 1843, ch. 156, § 3, 1843 Ind. Acts 146, 146–47 (using similar
language). To be sure, in rem proceedings are largely absent from early-
nineteenth-century published case reports in Indiana.17 But the option to
proceed in personam (by action of debt) did “not prevent the [government]
from pursuing such other remedies as [it] might have had by reason of the
forfeiture,” including an in rem proceeding. United States v. Grundy &
Thornburgh, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 337, 346, 348 (1806). Indeed, when seeking to
forfeit property used “for an unlawful purpose,” the prosecutor enjoyed the
“ancient prerogative,” to “proceed not only against the individual
responsible” but also “against the thing itself” when “the public is
interested.” Steward v. State, 180 Ind. 397, 408, 103 N.E. 316, 320 (1913).

   While the in rem procedure had long been available to Indiana lawyers,
see, e.g., The Steam-Boat Rover v. Stiles, 5 Blackf. 483, 483 (Ind. 1840), the
practice assumed a more prominent role by mid-century with the state’s
effort to criminalize certain forms of property that had traditionally enjoyed
some degree of legal protection. In 1855, the General Assembly enacted a
law prohibiting the manufacture and sale of spirituous and intoxicating
liquors. Act of Feb. 16, 1855, ch. 105, 1855 Ind. Acts 209. With exceptions for
alcohol used for “sacramental” or “medicinal” purposes, the Act specified
that all liquors “sold in violation of the law, and the vessels containing the
same, shall be deemed a nuisance, and shall be forfeited and be disposed of”
in accordance with specific procedures. Id. § 2, 5, 14, 1855 Ind. Acts at 211,

17An exception involved actions against things indebted. Under an 1838 statute, for example,
all “boats and vessels” in the state were “liable for all debts contracted” for construction and
repair. Act of Feb. 17, 1838, ch. 14, § 1, 1838 Ind. Acts 120, 120. The statute permitted any
claimant with a lien against the vessel to request from a court a warrant “authorizing and
directing the seizure and detention of the same.” Id. § 2, 1838 Ind. Acts at 121. And these liens
were enforceable as an “action in rem” against the vessel itself “in the Courts of common law.”
The Steam-Boat Rover v. Stiles, 5 Blackf. 483, 483, 484 (Ind. 1840).

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-CR-72 | October 31, 2023                       Page 18 of 24
215.18 The Act also called for the issuance of a notice “to all persons
concerned,” a copy of which was to be posted “in some conspicuous place
on the premises where the liquor was seized.” Id. § 16, 1855 Ind. Acts at 216.
Any person claiming an interest in the liquor seized could appear before the
court to show cause for “why the liquor seized should not be forfeited.” Id. §
17, 1855 Ind. Acts at 216–17. Following trial, a “[j]udgment of forfeiture
against any spirituous or intoxicating liquor” was treated “as a judgment, in
rem,” the validity of which could “not be contested or questioned in any
action, in any court,” or “by any person,” except in cases of appeal. Id. § 31,
1855 Ind. Acts at 220–21.19 Consistent with long-settled practice, the Liquor
Act specified that any party to the proceedings could “demand a jury” trial.
Id. § 17, 1855 Ind. Acts at 217.20 And whether the property seized amounted
to a nuisance in fact (i.e., whether it fell into one of the statutory exceptions)

18The Act also called for certain criminal penalties for those persons found in unlawful
possession of the offending contraband. Act of Feb. 16, 1855, ch. 105, §§ 9–13, 1855 Ind. Acts at
214–15. The fact that a statute allowed for personal penalties against a violator did not
preclude the state from proceeding in rem when seeking a forfeiture. To the contrary, the
longstanding practice under statutes that authorized “both a forfeiture in rem and a personal
penalty” was that “the proceeding in rem stands independent of, and wholly unaffected by
any criminal proceeding in personam.” The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 14–15 (1827).
19This section of the Act embodied the traditional principle that a court’s decree in rem could
not be collaterally attacked “in another forum.” Gelston v. Hoyt, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 246, 312
(1818). Such other forums included state courts. See Knœfel v. Williams, 30 Ind. 1, 6, 7 (1868)
(recognizing the prohibition on collateral attacks on a forfeiture judgment in a proceeding in
rem).
20The Act prohibited habitual drunkards and persons “engaged in the unlawful manufacture
or sale of intoxicating liquor” from serving as jurors. Act of Feb. 16, 1855, ch. 105, § 24, 1855
Ind. Acts at 219.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-CR-72 | October 31, 2023                        Page 19 of 24
was a question for the jury to decide (if one was elected by either party).21
Id. § 20, 1855 Ind. Acts at 218.

   Published caselaw, regretfully, reveals little use of civil in rem forfeiture in
Indiana during the latter half of the nineteenth century, whether to enforce
the liquor laws or other penal statutes. Instead, criminal forfeiture seems to
have been the preferred means of dispossessing offenders of their guilty
property. See Loesch v. Koehler, 144 Ind. 278, 281, 41 N.E. 326, 327 (1895)
(noting that statutes authorized the destruction of “gambling devices,
intoxicating liquors, fish nets, traps, etc.” upon “a judgment of guilt and of
forfeiture”).

   Nevertheless, the in rem procedure surfaces periodically in the historical
record from this period. Loesch, for example, decided by this Court in 1895,
involved the “forfeiture and destruction” of horses “injured or diseased
beyond recovery,” not as a criminal “penalty for the violation of the law”
but, rather, as a civil proceeding in the state’s exercise of its police power. Id.
at 280, 281–82, 41 N.E. at 327. While the constitutional guarantees applicable
to “criminal proceedings” may not have applied, the Court held that “some
notice, and a hearing before some tribunal, must be provided.” Id. at 284, 41
N.E. at 328. Notably, the case was tried to a jury. Id. Only in 1909 do we find
this Court deciding, for the first time (and apparently without argument by
counsel), that an action for in rem forfeiture (brought under a 1907 liquor
statute) was a “statutory proceeding” rather than “a civil case under the

21In forfeiture proceedings, courts have long distinguished contraband per se from derivative
contraband. Contraband per se encompasses “articles which cannot be kept, exhibited, or used
for any lawful or innocent purpose.” State v. Robbins, 124 Ind. 308, 312, 24 N.E. 978, 979 (1890).
Examples include such things as “spurious coin or bills, obscene pictures, books, or prints,”
id., as well as “adulterated food, sawed-off shotguns, narcotics, and smuggled goods,” Bennis
v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 459 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Derivative contraband, on the
other hand, includes automobiles, tools, gaming apparatus, and limitless other things “which
are not in and of themselves nuisances” but “which may be used for an illegal or immoral
purpose.” Robbins, 124 Ind. at 313, 24 N.E. at 980. When things are capable of two uses, one
lawful and the other unlawful, courts cannot “upon mere view deprive them of their
characteristics as property, and put them under legal condemnation.” State v. Derry, 171 Ind.
18, 23, 85 N.E. 765, 767–68 (1908). Instead, the question has traditionally been left for the jury
to decide. See, e.g., People v. One 1941 Chevrolet Coupe, 231 P.2d 832, 843 (Cal. 1951); Keeter v.
State, 198 P. 866, 870 (Okla. 1921); cf. State v. Intoxicating Liquor & Smith, 55 Vt. 82, 83 (1883).

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-CR-72 | October 31, 2023                          Page 20 of 24
common law when the Constitution was adopted,” and, therefore, falling
outside the guarantee of trial by jury. Campbell, 171 Ind. at 708–09, 87 N.E. at
214–15.

   We conclude from this historical survey that, while infrequently used,
actions for in rem forfeiture of property implicated the right to trial by jury in
Indiana, both before and after 1851.

   In reaching this conclusion, we find no need to distinguish money from
other property traditionally subject to in rem forfeiture, as the State would
have us do. See Appellant’s Br. at 9 & n. 1. We acknowledge that “the use
of in rem process against property that was itself involved in illegal
conduct has a far stronger historical pedigree than the use of in rem
process against property that was merely acquired as a result of such
conduct.” Nelson, supra, at 2476; see also United States v. Parcel of Land,
Bldgs., Appurtenances & Improvements, Known as 92 Buena Vista Ave.,
Rumson, N.J., 507 U.S. 111, 121–22 (1993) (suggesting that the “seizure and
forfeiture of proceeds of illegal drug transactions” was a novel concept
under the 1978 amendments to the Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control Act of 1970). But we reject the State’s argument
that the forfeiture of funds illegally obtained from or intended for criminal
activity never existed in Indiana before 1851. In 1795, for example, the
Northwest Territorial Government passed an act to suppress gaming,
under which any person found to have held a lottery or raffle for purposes
of raising money or other property was to “forfeit to the use of the
Territory the whole sum of money or property proposed to be so raised or
gained.” Act of July 16, 1795, § VI, in Laws of the Northwest Territory, 1788–
1800, at 276–77. The Indiana Territorial Government enacted a virtually
identical law in 1807. See Act of Sept. 17, 1807, §§ 7, 16, in Laws of Indiana
Territory, 1801–1809, at 375.

    This historical precedent notwithstanding, we emphasize that the State
didn’t seek relief solely on the theory that the money seized was
“proceeds” of a crime. Rather, the complaint also alleged that, whatever
its provenance, the property should forfeit to the state because it was
“intended” for crime or “used to facilitate” crime. App. Vol. II, pp. 14–15.
In other words, the State charges that the money was used or intended for

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-CR-72 | October 31, 2023          Page 21 of 24
use as the instrument of crime. The allegation that the money is
“proceeds,” as we understand it, means that it was received in exchange
for drugs, rendering it an instrumentality of a criminal drug deal. See
Nelson, supra, at 2480 (money used in a drug sale “is as much a part of the
illegal transaction as the drugs themselves”). And the forfeiture of the
instrumentality of a crime falls squarely within the historical tradition of
in rem forfeiture.22

     B. Even if no cause of action existed in 1851, the forfeiture
        here is akin to an action at law.
   While the historical record strongly suggests that Indiana continued the
common-law tradition of jury trials for in rem forfeitures, we acknowledge
that the evidence is largely circumstantial. But, even if no cause of action
existed in 1851, we have little trouble concluding that the forfeiture here is
not, as the State contends, akin to the equitable disgorgement of illegally
obtained profits.

   Disgorgement is a form of restitution in which a defendant is ordered
to surrender gains unjustly obtained, even if the plaintiff suffered no loss.
See Wenzel v. Hopper & Galliher, P.C., 830 N.E.2d 996, 1001 (Ind. Ct. App.
2005) (explaining that an agent who breached a fiduciary duty must
disgorge their compensation “without a requirement for the principal to
demonstrate financial loss”). As other courts have pointed out, a “key
distinction between restitution and forfeiture is the recipient of payments
made to satisfy those orders.” Zambarano v. Ret. Bd. of Emps. Ret. Sys. of
State, 61 A.3d 432, 439 (R.I. 2013). Restitution of ill-gotten gains is made
“to the individual at whose expense the defendant was unjustly
enriched.” Id. So, while “equity practice” has “long authorized courts to
strip wrongdoers of their ill-gotten gains,” courts have “restricted the

22A different analysis may have been necessary were the State seeking forfeiture of money
alleged to be “proceeds of proceeds” traceable through a series of bargains. But, here, the
State’s appellate brief indicates that it believes the money was both “an instrumentality and
proceeds from Kizer’s illegal drug trade.” Appellant’s Br. at 13 (emphasis added). We
therefore leave the question of remote proceeds for another day.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-CR-72 | October 31, 2023                      Page 22 of 24
remedy to an individual wrongdoer’s net profits to be awarded for
victims.” Liu v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 140 S. Ct. 1936, 1942 (2020). Under
Indiana’s statute, by contrast, forfeited money first pays for the attorney’s
fees, with the remainder distributed to the prosecuting attorney (to offset
expenses), law enforcement, and various funds administered by the state.
I.C. § 34-24-1-4(d)(3).

   Second, equitable restitution remedies developed on a distinctly in
personam theory, rather than the in rem theory on which civil forfeiture
proceeds. Before abolition of the distinction between actions at law and
suits in equity, the common-law courts traditionally decided disputes over
the ownership of property simply by determining which party held “good
title at law.” 1 Dan B. Dobbs, Law of Remedies § 4.3(1), at 586 (2d ed.
1993). This limited the relief available to a plaintiff who, for example, had
been unjustly induced to give away title. In the face of such injustices, the
courts of equity sidestepped legal formalities by acting “upon the person
of the defendant” rather than deciding the question of title. Id. § 4.3(1), at
587. While the law “declared rights in things,” equity “commanded the
defendant’s conscience to act” by ordering them, for example, to reconvey
the property they had inequitably acquired. Id. § 2.2, at 74. Civil
forfeiture’s in rem mode of procedure, by contrast, acts directly “against
inanimate objects for participation in alleged criminal activity, regardless
of whether the property owner is proven guilty of a crime—or even
charged with a crime.” Serrano v. State, 946 N.E.2d 1139, 1140 (Ind. 2011).
It’s clear, then, that civil forfeiture is not traceable to the roots of equitable
restitution.

   Finally, it’s worth reciting the long-held “general rule” that “a court of
equity will not interfere to give relief against a statutory forfeiture” like
the one we’re presented with here. See Tiedeman, supra, § 155, at 277; see
also Dillon, supra, § 286, at 297–98 (observing that a statutory forfeiture
“cannot be relieved against in equity”); Liu, 140 S. Ct. at 1941 (quoting
Marshall v. City of Vicksburg, 82 U.S. 146, 149 (1872)) (reciting the principle
that “equity never ‘lends its aid to enforce a forfeiture or penalty’”). A
contrary rule, after all, would stand in clear “contravention of the direct
expression of the legislative will.” Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 457 (1883).

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-CR-72 | October 31, 2023           Page 23 of 24
   In sum, we conclude that the present action for in rem forfeiture of
money as the instrument and proceeds of crime is readily analogous to the
traditional common-law forfeiture of property used in violation of the
law—not to equitable disgorgement. And, in keeping with Indiana’s
constitutional guarantee, this is an essentially legal action that triggers the
right to trial by jury.

Conclusion
   For the reasons above, we hold that a claimant in an action brought
under Indiana’s civil forfeiture statute has a constitutional right to trial by
jury. We thus affirm the trial court and remand for trial by jury.

Rush, C.J., and Massa, Slaughter, and Molter, JJ., concur.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
Theodore E. Rokita
Attorney General of Indiana

Justin F. Roebel
Supervising Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana

Andrew A. Kobe
Section Chief, Criminal Appeals
Office of the Indiana Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES
Marie Miller
Samuel B. Gedge
Institute for Justice
Arlington, Virginia

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-CR-72 | October 31, 2023        Page 24 of 24