Court Opinion

ID: 9707850
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 02:23:15.394191+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:38.887080
License: Public Domain

SCHUDSON, J.
(dissenting). With effective hyperbole ("the cruising ordinances are no different than any other traffic ordinance"), and sardonic sarcasm (" 'right to cruise' cannot be found in any of the constitutional provisions raised by Brandmiller") the majority ridicules the appellants' challenge. See majority op. at 227. How utterly convincing! How could one possibly disagree?
One small problem: the majority has neglected to address the issue in this case.
The issue is not whether cruising ordinances can be constitutional. The issue is whether these specific cruising ordinances are constitutional under the standards specified by Wisconsin law.
In Scheunemann v. City of West Bend, 179 Wis. 2d 469, 507 N.W.2d 163 (Ct. App. 1993), this court concluded that the cruising ordinance of the City of West Bend was constitutional. Id. at 478-481, 507 N.W.2d at 166-168. Just as certainly, however, the Scheunemann analysis set standards that are violated by these specific ordinances.
In Scheunemann, this court did allow an over-breadth challenge to a cruising ordinance.1 Upholding *234the constitutionality of the ordinance, we noted the important features that prevented it from being "so sweeping that its sanctions may be applied to constitutionally protected conduct which the state is not permitted to regulate." Id. at 476-477, 507 N.W.2d at 166. Among the features we specified:
[T]he ordinance requires attendant circumstances which manifest a purpose to cruise.. . . Also, the ordinance requires that the offender harbor a specific intent to cruise. And finally, the ordinance requires that the officer give the suspected violator an opportunity to explain the driving conduct. If such explanation falls outside the reach of the ordinance, the officer is instructed not to arrest the suspect.
Id. at 477, 507 N.W.2d at 166. We then went on to note, "Even if an arrest occurs, the ordinance provides that the suspect shall not be convicted if the explanation offered to the officer was true and disclosed a lawful purpose for the driving conduct." Id. at n.3. We concluded, "Given these limitations,. . . the cruising ordinance is not unconstitutionally overbroad." Id. at 477-478, 507 N.W.2d at 166 (emphasis added).
Later in Scheunemann, this court was even more emphatic. We reiterated that the ordinance "allows for an 'on the scene' explanation by the suspect to the officer which, if accepted, will allow the citizen to be on his or her way." We then declared, "With these limitations built into the ordinance, we conclude that the city has carefully narrowed the application of the ordinance to the safety and congestion problems identified," and, *235therefore, that it was constitutional. Id. at 480-481, 507 N.W.2d at 167-168 (emphasis added).
Thus, Scheunemann twice rests its holding on the "limitations" absent from the ordinances challenged in this case. The ordinances challenged here do not require an intent to cruise and do not provide any opportunity for explanation. Merely "[p]assing a designated control point a third time [in any two (2) hour period between the hours of 8:00 p.m. and 5:00 a.m.] shall constitute unnecessary repetitive driving and cruising and, therefore, a violation." Hales Corners Ordinance No. 90-16 § 2.22(2)(a) (emphasis added).
Unable to reconcile its holding with Scheunemann, the majority attempts to ignore Scheunemann's clear standards. Thus, the majority relegates Scheunemann to a footnote stating that "we consider the overbreadth discussion in Scheunemann to constitute dictum that is not binding on the decision presently before the court." Majority op. at 230 n.7. The majority's apparent effort to avoid this court's clear precedent, however, is dubious to say the least. See In re Court of Appeals of Wis., 82 Wis. 2d 369, 371, 263 N.W.2d 149, 149-150 (1978) (a published decision of one district of the Court of Appeals is binding on all other districts).
The Scheunemann standards are not dicta. The "limitations" were inextricably connected to the conclusion that the West Bend ordinance was constitutional. "[M]atters taken up and decided by the court which are germane to [the primary issue] 'are not dictum, and are ... judicial act[s] of the court which it will recognize as . . . binding decision[s].'" Professional Office Bldgs., Inc. v. Royal Indemnity Co., 145 Wis. 2d 573, 587-588, 427 N.W.2d 427, 432 (Ct. App. 1988); see also State v. Kruse, 101 Wis. 2d 387, 392, 305 N.W.2d 85, 88 (1981). Thus, the corresponding conclusion is inevitable: had *236the West Bend ordinance not satisfied those standards, Scheunemann would have found it unconstitutional.
The Scheunemann standards make sense. Without Scheunemann's "limitations," the shopper who returns to a store, the parent who circles the block to pick up a child, and countless other citizens would be subject to arrest. Their intentions and explanations would make no difference because their conduct "shall constitute... a violation."
Avoiding the Scheunemann standards, the majority has attempted to salvage these cruising ordinances despite their constitutional deficiencies. Claiming that those standards are dicta, the majority has misstated the law. I would address the issue, respect our precedent, and conclude that the specific cruising ordinances in this case violate Scheunemann and, therefore, are unconstitutional. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

 The majority states that this dissent "misunderstands the purpose of the overbreadth doctrine." Majority op. at 230 n.6.1 understand the majority's apparent displeasure with the fact that Scheunemann utilized overbreadth analysis. The fact that Scheunemann did so, however, completes that debate until the *234supreme court says otherwise. Thus, overbreadth analysis does apply in this case.