Court Opinion

ID: 6737346
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-07-20 23:19:31.500962+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:01:50.214560
License: Public Domain

Burk, D. J.
(dissenting). I reach the same conclusion as Justice Bruce. The issue involved is this: Has the railway company the right of appeal from the action of the Board of Railroad Commissioners in refusing permission to be relieved from the observance of the provisions of § 4789 of the Compiled Laws of 1913 ? The Board of Railroad Commissioners is a part of the executive department of this government; free from the control of the judiciary, unless such control is given by the Constitution and the law. It is true the powers and duties of the Board “shall be as prescribed by law5’ (Const. § 83) ; but this does not presuppose appeal to the courts. The right of appeal must be clearly defined, — there is no presumption in its favor, — and unless jurisdiction to revise these acts is given to the courts, it does not exist. As Justice Bruce has pointed out, the section relied on as granting appeals from orders of the Board is not applicable. In addition to the fact that the matter involved here was not in the contemplation of the legislature when § 4736 was enacted, there is this feature, — the evidence of the action of the Board of Railroad Commissioners is not an order in that sense. The fact that an order is in the negative is hot the question,— *243there is no order here within the meaning contemplated, simply a refusal to grant permission. It is immaterial what it may be called. The Board is not requiring the railway company to do or not to do a certain thing, — the law requires the company to run the passenger trains. It is the duty of the company to do so. The legislature recognized that this may entail expense and loss which could only be compensated by an increase in rates, and made provision whereby one part of the executive department may waive compliance with this section, provided the railway company “makes it appear to the Board” that the business does not justify this expenditure and the said Board shall so order. There is no analogy between the provisions of this section and the control of rates. Primarily the carrier controls the rates. It is its road and its business. Only to prevent injustice does the state interfere. The so-called “Lignite Oases,” in the ITnited.States Supreme Court, show this. But the requirement to run trains is an entirely different matter. It is conceded the state has the right, from the very first, to insist on this action, and has placed with the administrative department the power of waiving compliance. The duties prescribed and orders made pursuant to the provisions of § 4736 have no relation to this matter. This section is part of chap. 115 of the Session Laws of 1897, and is entitled, “An Act to Regulate the Transportation of Passengers and Property by Common Carriers; ... to Provide for the Control thereof, in the Matter of Rates to be Charged for Such Transportation and the Manner thereof, to Define the Powers and Duties of the Commissioners of Railroads.” The right to appeal, as given by the provisions of this chapter, is the right to appeal from any order “regulating or fixing tariffs of rates, fares, charges, or classifications, or from .any other order made by said Commissioners under the provisions of this act.” Section 4789 is part of chapter 200 of the Session Laws of 1907, entitled: “An Act to Regulate the Operation of Passenger and Freight Trains of Railway Lines in This State.” This act in form is not an amendment to chapter 115 of the Session Laws of 1897, nor does it refer to such a chapter or to the act therein stated. It is a separate and distinct act, and so far as the first section is concerned (§ 4789 of the Compiled Laws) it is an entirely different matter. The last paragraph of this new act of 1907 says: “Nothing in this act contained shall in any manner be construed as repealing or in any manner altering any other act, or part of act, hereto*244fore adopted by tbe legislature of this state, but the remedies herein provided shall be cumulative to all other remedies now existing.” It is dear from this § 7 that chapter 2Ó0 is intended to be additional to chapter 115 of the Session Laws of 1907, Comp. Laws 1913, § 8729, and any' control given therein, or declaration made, is additional to chapter 115 of the Session Laws of 1897. Therefore, the provisions of chapter 115 of 1897 Laws, with reference to appeals from the orders of the Commissioners, should not be extended to chapter 200 of Session Laws of 1907, Comp. Laws 1913, §§ 4789-4795, unless the nature of the subject-matter treated is so connected with chapter 115 of the Session Laws of 1907, Comp. Laws 1913, § 8729, as to be construed an amendment. The judicial does not control the other departments of the government, unless the power is given explicitly, — not by implication.
Then again the expression “made to appear to the Board of Railroad Commissioners” is broader than judicial discretion — it is analogous to personal satisfaction. The Board alone can say whether it is made to appear to the Board. The Legislature desired the opinion and judgment of the Board on the question whether it would be better in certain cases to permit a waiver of what the state has a right to insist on, or have the company raise its rates. It is not a question of arbitrary power, although this is always involved, even in the decision of cases. The number of times the question may be reviewed does tend to justice; but the final determination must be somewhere. The legislature has seen fit to confide to the Board the power of saying whether the state will waive its right to insist on running of daily passenger trains. It is a matter of grace on the part of the state, not a matter of right to which the road is entitled when it brings itself within the limit. The railway may present a strong showing why it should be permitted to substitute a mixed train, and I believe it has, but the Board may, in its judgment, think it better to require this service to the public even though it merely suits the convenience of a town of 500 inhabitants. This is a matter which appeals to the legislature, and it is the judgment of the Board the legislature desires. It must be made to appear to the Board, and not to the courts. It may be asked, What is to be done in casé the Board acts arbitrarily? The answer is found in Worman v. Hagan, 78 Md. 152, 21 L.R.A. 720, 27 Atl. 616, where the court says: “It would not be becoming in this court to suppose that such a contingency would *245ever happen. The courtesy clue to fhe executive department forbids us to entertain such conjecture. But if, unhappily, in future times, it ever should occur, assuredly a sufficient remedy will be found. The resources of a free government are ample, and will always be found adequate to punish and redress offenses against its sovereignty.” But the company is not injured in any way. The law does not compel the road to do business at a loss, and the facts and figures set forth appear to be beside the question, except so far as they appeal to the judgment of the Board in determining whether it be better to substitute mixed trains for a time and thus save expense, or háve a readjustment of schedules with all of the attendant trouble and delay. This matter can be adjusted readily. Primarily, the' carrier fixes its own rates. Laws fixing too low rates are frequently declared confiscatory, and therefore this element of hardship and injustice is not involved. As Justice Bruce has pointed out, the state, as an incident to its sovereignty, has a right to require the service, and the company must accede. The company has the right to fix remunerative rates, however, and if the state, in insisting on its rights of adequate service to the public, requires action which increases expense, the' added rate will not be controlled unless it is unreasonable. The legislature has seen fit to place this power with the Board, and, as after noted, did not contemplate appeal therefrom.
There are special features involved here, The railway company is asking a review of the judgment of the Board of Bailroad Commissioners, but the review is based on matters not before the Board, if the contention of appellant be correct. How can it be said that the railroad “makes it to appear to the Board” when the Board denies the request on the showing before it ? The courts may have new evidence regarding rates, — this is a matter where the state cannot interfere unless the railroad is guilty of injustice and the interference is aimed to secure justice. In this situation cited the Board is the first agency, and appeal to the courts is given; but the question at issue in that case is one where the company has the primary right to fix its own rates. In the case at bar we are concerned with a matter where the state has the absolute right to require the service. The company claims conditions have so changed, through the extension of the road, etc., that now the Board should relieve it. This contention comes with very poor grace. The *246law was passed in 1907. Concededly, it has never been complied with. The state has a right to require the service, and it is the duty of the company to obey. The company, without any attempt to comply and after years of violation, at a time when action was being taken to compel its compliance, asked to be excused. The Board of Railroad Commissioners, in its wisdom, denied the request, and now, having extended its line and changed conditions, the appellant says the judgment of the Board should be overruled and permission given because the conditions existing at the time the Board acted have changed.
In Robinson v. Sunderland [1899] 1 Q. B. 751, the question before the court involved the judgment or decision of a local authority in regard to matters where the statute authorized such local authority to do certain things if it appeared to such authority necessary, and in that case, Channell, L, says: “The words, ‘appear to such authority,’ are obviously put in for the purpose of making the local authority the judges on the question. ... It depends upon the opinion of the local authority, not upon the fact of sufficiency or insufficiency. It cannot possibly be a matter for the justices to decide; they can only inquire in this respect whether [or not] in the opinion of the local authority, there is a sufficient. . . . They may also inquire, I think, whether the local authority have taken the proper procedure — whether they have done everything which is made by the statute a condition precedent to the right to enter.”
And in the same case, Lawrence, J., says: “The decision of that question rests with the local authority. When they have arrived at the conclusion that the premises are not in a proper condition, the justices have no power to interfere with it.” It seems to me clear, therefore, that where the personal judgment of the Commission is involved, there can be no appeal therefrom, and this must have been the legislative intention.
The matter is far reaching. If the district courts and the supreme court may review the action of the Board in denying or granting requests to substitute mixed trains for passenger trains for such seasons as may be desired, then the statute involved is rendered practically nugatory. The long process to be used before final determination becomes, in effect, .a bar. Of course, if this be the method prescribed by law, then the courts must give effect to it; but such a construction should not *247be placed on this section unless it clearly appears to be the only proper one. The nature of the acts suggests this. The law contemplates merely a temporary suspension, speedily granted and speedily rescinded as the season of the year may justify, and the suspension must be for a definite time. From time to time the legislature prescribes the duties and powers of the Board, and states whether appeal to the courts lies. In enacting § 4789 the legislature could have readily provided for appeal. The fact that no appeal is provided for in this act is presumptive that none was intended, particularly when we view the nature and scope of the power vested in the Board. Had not power to relieve from the duties been vested in the Board, the company would be compelled to operate the trains in question, and would have no recourse to the courts in this matter. Why there should be appeal, in the absence of express provision, when the state says we will give the Board power to waive our rights when certain conditions are made to appear to the Board, does not appear clear, especially when we view the temporary nature of the permission to be granted. ' The construction given by the majority opinion will greatly cripple the effectiveness of the Board, and as the conditions which would guide the Board in granting or refusing permission are changeable and variable in their nature, by the time the courts have finally determined the judicial discretion of the Board in such requests, the judgment of the Board might vary the action first contemplated, and thus by appeals to the courts such delay may be occasioned that the very conditions justifying the Board in refusing permission may have so changed by the time the courts are through taking testimony that the Board itself, on a new application, may come to a different conclusion. The law recognizes the element of changing conditions, and places finally with the Board the power of adjusting the requirements to the conditions, in order that the public may be served and the company be uninjured. It may be claimed that this is one of the powers of the Board, and the powers are subject to review by virtue of the provisions of § 4736. Section 4789 is not a part of the article included in the language of § 4736, and the language of § 4736 should not be construed so as to control the acts of the administration, unless the legislature has explicitly shown such construction to be intended, and I respectfully suggest that this has not been done. I therefore believe the judgment of the district court should be affirmed.