Court Opinion

ID: 9809229
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 21:04:39.756502+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:25:38.643027
License: Public Domain

Filed 8/31/23 P. v. Montervelazquez CA2/8
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE,                                                     B322446

         Plaintiff and Respondent,                              Los Angeles County
                                                                Super. Ct. No. TA156193
         v.

MARVICK DANIEL
MONTERVELAZQUEZ,

         Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Kelvin D. Filer, Judge. Remanded with
directions.

     William Paul Melcher, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Gary A. Lieberman,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                               _________________________
      Everyone acknowledges appellant Marvick Daniel
Montervelazquez did not take the breakup with his girlfriend
well. Two weeks after they broke up, appellant waited outside
his ex-girlfriend’s home for her to return from work. After she
parked her car, he grabbed her from behind in bear hug fashion.
She screamed, kicked, pushed him to escape, and fell to the
ground, while appellant held on and pushed her against her will
into a car which carried her away with him.
      This appeal presents the primary question: Was
restraining, struggling with, and pushing and forcing the victim
into the car against her will an indivisible course of conduct? Or
were they separate acts for which the trial court could impose
and execute separate sentences? The trial court concluded they
were separate divisible criminal acts for which it imposed
consecutive sentences. We disagree and remand to the trial court
to stay one of the terms pursuant to Penal Code1 section 654.
      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I.    The Events
       After a six-month dating relationship, Rubi S. and
appellant became engaged in January 2021. But throughout the
rest of 2021, Rubi broke up and reunited with him several times.
Towards the end of November 2021, she was done with him. She
ended the relationship. Rubi then blocked appellant’s calls after
he kept “blowing up” her phone with constant contact.
       On December 3, 2021, Rubi left work in Bellflower and
drove home to Compton where she lived with her parents and
siblings. She parked her car in front of her neighbor’s house and

1     Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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when she started walking towards her house, she was grabbed
from behind by appellant. Rubi said appellant “kind of like
hugged me from behind.” Rubi told him to let her go and said she
did not want to be with him. She started screaming and fighting
back. He held onto her. She fell to the ground two times as she
struggled.
      Rubi pushed and kicked to fight back as appellant forced
her into the front passenger seat of a black Honda Civic.
Appellant then sat next to her. An unknown male was driving.
Rubi told appellant she wanted to go home. He told her, “I’m not
trying to hurt you.”
      One of Rubi’s neighbors saw her park her car in front of his
house, heard her screaming, and called Rubi’s mother,
Guadalupe Z. Guadalupe had heard random yelling outside the
house. After the neighbor called her, Guadalupe went outside
and saw Rubi’s parked car, but no Rubi.
      Guadalupe called Rubi’s phone several times. She received
no answer. Then Rubi answered and said, “Ma, Ma.” Rubi was
crying and sounded in pain. Guadalupe heard struggling.
Guadalupe kept calling her back, but no one picked up. About
two hours later appellant answered Rubi’s phone. Guadalupe
threatened to call the police unless appellant brought Rubi home.
Appellant said he would do so. He gave the phone to Rubi and
told her to tell her mother she was okay. Rubi did so. Appellant
hung up and kept Rubi’s phone.
      After a brief stop at appellant’s place of employment and a
while driving around Wilmington and Long Beach, appellant,
Rubi, and the other man drove to the Marriott Hotel in Long
Beach. Rubi estimated two hours had passed. A scared Rubi and
appellant walked into the hotel together. There was another call

                                3
between appellant and Guadalupe. Appellant asked whether
Guadalupe planned to call the police.
      Rubi called her mother briefly and told her she was at the
hotel. Rubi tried unsuccessfully to leave the hotel room twice.
Each time appellant grabbed her and brought her back. At
around 5:00 a.m. after they had consensual sex and appellant fell
asleep, Rubi left the room. She called her family. Guadalupe and
Rubi’s brother Kevin picked Rubi up in the Marriott Hotel
parking lot. Rubi was crying a lot.
      Around 8:00 a.m., Rubi, Guadalupe, and Kevin went to the
police station to report what happened. Rubi suffered a scratch
on her neck and bruises on her arms. Appellant was arrested the
same day near Rubi’s home.
II.   The Charges and Convictions
      On April 6, 2022, the People filed an amended information
in the Los Angeles Superior Court charging appellant with
kidnaping in violation of section 207, subdivision (a); and
domestic violence in violation of section 273.5, subdivision (a).
Also alleged were several aggravating sentencing factors
pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 4.421. The kidnaping
count referred to appellant’s act of forcing Rubi into the car
against her will; the domestic violence count referred to their
physical struggle as she was forced into the car. (Appellant was
also charged with felony false imprisonment in violation of
sections 236 and 237 for events at the hotel, but the jury
acquitted him of that count, so we do not discuss it.)
      On June 3, 2022, a jury found appellant not guilty of
kidnaping and instead found him guilty of felony false
imprisonment with violence in violation of section 237,
subdivision (a), a lesser included offense of kidnaping. The jury

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also found appellant not guilty of domestic violence and instead
found him guilty of misdemeanor spousal battery in violation of
section 243, subdivision (e)(1), a lesser included offense of
domestic violence.
III.   The Sentencing
       On July 19, 2022, the trial court sentenced appellant to the
high term of three years on the felony false imprisonment charge.
It also ordered him to serve one consecutive year in the county
jail on the misdemeanor spousal battery. A 10-year stay away
order was also imposed. Appellant asked the court to stay the
sentence on the battery because it was part of the indivisible
course of conduct in forcing Rubi into the car. The court declined
to do so, stating: “And I note that the defense did ask that that
time either run concurrent or that it be stayed pursuant to Penal
Code section 654. [¶] However, the court’s position is that that
one year should be consecutive, because, as I recall, the physical
contact which resulted in the battery conviction preceded and
was before any of the asportation which warrants the false
imprisonment or the movement to the vehicle which warranted
the false imprisonment. So it was separate conduct, a separate
time. [¶] I think, as [it] relates to those two charges, the
defendant had an opportunity to think about the consequences of
each one of the acts. [¶] And so, therefore, the court is not going
to find that the time should be stayed pursuant to Penal Code
section 654.” This timely appeal followed.

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                          DISCUSSION
The Trial Court Erred When It Declined to Stay One of the
Sentences Pursuant to Section 654.
I.    Applicable Law
       Section 654 provides in part, “An act or omission that is
punishable in different ways by different provisions of law may
be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case shall
the act or omission be punished under more than one provision.”
(§ 654, subd. (a).) Section 654 thus bars multiple punishments
for a single act that violates more than one criminal statute, and
for multiple acts where those acts comprise an indivisible course
of conduct incidental to a single criminal objective and intent.
(People v. Williams (2013) 57 Cal.4th 776, 780–781.) Whether a
course of criminal conduct is divisible and therefore gives rise to
more than one act within the meaning of section 654 depends on
the intent and objective of the actor. If all of the offenses were
incident to one objective, the defendant may be punished for any
one of such offenses but not for more than one. (Neal v. State of
California (1960) 55 Cal.2d 11, 19.)
      On the other hand, if the defendant entertained multiple
criminal objectives that were independent and not incidental to
each other, he “may be punished for each statutory violation
committed in pursuit of each objective,” even though the
violations were otherwise part of an indivisible course of conduct.
(People v. Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 335 (Harrison).)
II.   Standard of Review
     Errors in the application of section 654 are corrected on
appeal regardless of whether the point was raised by objection in

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the trial court or assigned as error on appeal. (People v. Perez
(1979) 23 Cal.3d 545, 459, fn. 3.)
       Whether the facts and circumstances reveal a single intent
and objective within the meaning of section 654 is generally a
factual matter; nevertheless, the applicability of the statute to
conceded facts is a question of law. (Harrison, supra, 48 Cal.3d
at p. 335; People v. Corpening (2016) 2 Cal.5th 307, 312.) Put
another way, if many offenses were incident to one objective, an
individual may be punished for any of the offenses but not for
more than one. People v. Goode (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 484, 492;
People v. Barrios (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 176, 178 (Barrios).) The
trial court’s findings on the question of whether section 654
applies in a given case must be upheld on appeal “if there is any
substantial evidence to support them.” (People v. Jones (2002)
103 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1143; accord People v. Brents (2012)
53 Cal.4th 599, 618.) The trial court’s determination is viewed in
the light most favorable to the judgment and the existence of
every fact the trial court could reasonably have deduced from the
evidence is presumed. (Jones, at p. 1143.)
III.   Analysis
       Whether appellant can be imprisoned for both false
imprisonment by violence and battery calls for an interpretation
of section 654, which says an “act” punishable in different way by
different legal provisions shall be punished but in no event shall
the “act” be punished under more than one provision. We must
interpret the statutory word “act.” Within the meaning of section
654, was this course of conduct but a single “act?” This question
of statutory interpretation is a question of law. (Barrios, supra,
61 Cal.App.5th at p. 179.)

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       False imprisonment is the unlawful violation of the
personal liberty of another. (§ 236.) If the false imprisonment is
effected by violence, menace, fraud, or deceit, it shall be
punishable by imprisonment in the state prison. This is felony
false imprisonment. (§ 237, subd. (a).)
       Force is an element of both felony and misdemeanor false
imprisonment. Misdemeanor false imprisonment becomes a
felony only where the force used is greater than that reasonably
necessary to effect the restraint. In such circumstances, the force
is defined as “violence.” (People v. Hendrix (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th
1458, 1462; People v. Ghipriel (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 828, 833.)
The additional force required for felony false imprisonment, as
opposed to misdemeanor false imprisonment, may come in the
form of simply pulling a victim toward a location when the
victim’s liberty has already been violated. (Ghipriel, at p. 834.)
       Battery is any willful and unlawful use of force or violence
upon the person of another. (§ 242.) Here, we find the battery
was incident to appellant’s false imprisonment by violence.
Because the false imprisonment became false imprisonment by
violence due to the physical fight and pushing between appellant
and Rubi, which also constituted the battery, appellant could only
be punished for one of the offenses.
       People v. Beamon (1973) 8 Cal.3d 625, 637) is on point.
There, victim truck driver Ashcraft got out of his truck to make a
delivery. When he returned, Beamon entered the passenger side
with a gun. The two drove a distance and then began to fight.
Ashcraft fled. The episode lasted about 20 minutes and covered
15 blocks. (Id. at pp. 630–631.) The jury convicted Beamon of
kidnaping “for the purpose of robbery and for the commission of
that very robbery. We are compelled to the conclusion as a

                                8
matter of law that on the record here both crimes were committed
pursuant to a single intent and objective, i.e., to rob Ashcraft of
the truck or its contents.” (Id. at p. 639.) The court concluded
that Beamon could be punished for only one of the two crimes.
(Id. at pp. 639–640.)
       We, too, are compelled to conclude that as a matter of law
both crimes were committed pursuant to a single intent and
objective, i.e., to physically control Rubi in order to take her away
against her will. The jury found that appellant intended to
falsely imprison Rubi by violence so the battery inflicted on her
(whether it be the physical scuffle between them, or appellant’s
pushing Rubi into the car) is part and parcel of the false
imprisonment. The course of conduct cannot be divided into
separate and distinct events where, as here, there was no event
or occurrence or time lapse that, midstream, marked a transition
and redirected appellant to embark on a new criminal objective.
(Barrios, supra, 61 Cal.App.5th at pp. 179–180.) Appellant
intended to physically restrain Rubi’s liberty and he did. This
was an indivisible course of conduct for which he can be punished
only once.
       We disagree with the trial court’s conclusion that after the
initial bear hug, appellant had the opportunity to reflect upon his
conduct and release Rubi, thereby morphing their physical
fighting and pushing into an act separate from the false
imprisonment. It is axiomatic that anyone can always change
their mind during the commission of an offense. Having time to
withdraw is not a factor in the analysis. Discerning one intent
and one objective is the test. Even if time to reflect were in the
analysis, the testimony here shows there was no transition,
demarcation, or time lapse in the confrontation that turned this

                                 9
chain of events into two separate and distinct criminal episodes
with two separate intents and objectives. There was no
testimony that when Rubi fell down during the fight, their
struggle against each other paused until she got up, thus giving
appellant time to reflect. He restrained Rubi against her will
from the very start with the bear hug grab and continued to
restrain her physically as she struggled against him. The
sequence of events establishes that appellant had one objective –
to force Rubi to go with him, even if it meant physically battering
and pushing her into the car. There is no evidence appellant
started with one objective and switched to another objective
midstream or even that he started with two objectives. Because
we conclude this was one indivisible course of conduct, one of the
sentences should have been stayed. We therefore remand for a
new sentencing hearing.
       Effective January 1, 2022, Assembly Bill No. 518 (2021–
2022 Reg. Sess.) modified section 654 and gave trial courts
discretion to choose which sentence to execute and which
sentence to stay. Former section 654 mandated execution of the
longest sentence. (People v. Mani (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th
343, 379.)
       Appellant was sentenced on July 19, 2022. Because the
trial court has the discretion to decide which sentence to stay, we
remand to the trial court to make that decision. When part of a
sentence is stricken on review, on remand for resentencing a full
resentencing as to all counts is appropriate, so the trial court can
exercise its sentencing discretion in light of changed
circumstances. (People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893.) On
remand, the trial court may revisit all its sentencing choices.
(Ibid.)

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      As appellant will be resentenced, we do not decide his
second contention that the trial court erred in imposing the
aggravated term for false imprisonment by violence without first
determining whether he was entitled to the low term
presumption under section 1170, subdivision (b). We also decline
to address appellant’s contention that his counsel provided
ineffective assistance of counsel in not asking for imposition of
the low term. On remand, the trial court may address these
issues as may be appropriate.
                         DISPOSITION
     The matter is remanded for a new sentencing hearing.

     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                         STRATTON, P. J.

We concur:

             WILEY, J.

             VIRAMONTES, J.

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