Court Opinion

ID: 9925803
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-23 01:00:42.176771+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:36.622331
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-20098         Document: 00517039994              Page: 1       Date Filed: 01/22/2024

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit
                                      ____________                     United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                Fifth Circuit

                                                                              FILED
                                       No. 23-20098
                                                                        January 22, 2024
                                      ____________
                                                                         Lyle W. Cayce
   Shanetta Guidry Lewis,                                                     Clerk

                                                                        Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                             versus

   Devin Inocencio; Victor Villarreal; Peter Carroll;
   Shaun Houlihan,

                                             Defendants—Appellants.
                     ______________________________

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                         for the Southern District of Texas
                               USDC No. 4:22-CV-844
                     ______________________________

   Before Richman, Chief Judge, Stewart, Circuit Judge, and Scholer,
   District Judge. ∗
   Per Curiam: *
         On February 7, 2022, Houston Police Department officers attempting
   to execute an arrest warrant for aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon fa-
   tally shot Charion Lockett. Lockett’s mother, Plaintiff-Appellee Shanetta
   Guidry Lewis, sued the Houston Police Department police officers involved,
         _____________________
         ∗
             District Judge in the Northern District of Texas, sitting by designation.
         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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                                     No. 23-20098

   alleging that officers used excessive force in violation of Lockett’s Fourth
   Amendment rights. The officers asserted qualified immunity and moved to
   dismiss. The district court denied their motions and allowed the claims
   against the officers to proceed. The officers timely appealed, arguing that
   they are entitled to qualified immunity on the excessive-force claims. We
   AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.
            I.      FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
          The events at issue in this case arise from the Houston Police Depart-
   ment’s investigation of an armed robbery that took place in or around No-
   vember 2021. The robbery victim identified Lockett and an unknown male as
   the perpetrators. Subsequently, the investigating officers secured a warrant
   for Lockett’s arrest. On February 7, 2022, at around 9:30 a.m., an unidenti-
   fied officer called both Lockett and Lewis and informed them of the warrant
   for Lockett’s arrest. Either Lockett or Lewis told the officer that Lockett in-
   tended to retain an attorney and would turn himself in later that day.
          Approximately one hour later, police officers Devin Inocencio, Victor
   Villareal, Peter Carroll, and Shaun Houlihan arrived at Lockett’s residence.
   Inocencio was in plain clothes and was in an unmarked red car. Inocencio
   pulled up near Lockett, opened his car door, and pointed his gun at Lockett
   without saying a word. Lewis alleges that at least one officer, believed to be
   Inocencio, began shooting at Lockett while Lockett sat in his parked vehicle.
   The other officers shot Lockett in the back as he attempted to run. At no
   point did any of the officers identify themselves as police officers or otherwise
   “indicat[e] they were police,” inform Lockett he was under arrest, or tell
   Lockett to put his hands up. According to Lewis, Lockett did not assault an-
   yone. Lewis does not concede that Lockett had a gun but pleads that Lockett
   had a concealed carry license and that if Lockett did point or shoot a gun, he
   did so because he feared for his life. Lockett died at the scene.

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          In March 2022, Lewis filed a wrongful-death lawsuit against the City
   of Houston and the officers involved. Lewis asserted a Fourth Amendment
   excessive-force claim against Inocencio, Villareal, Carroll, and Houlihan
   pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The officers moved to dismiss Lewis’s Fourth
   Amendment claims on qualified-immunity grounds. The district court
   denied the officers’ motions to dismiss as to the excessive-force claims. The
   officers filed an interlocutory appeal.
          On appeal, the officers argue that the district court erred when it
   found that Lewis pleaded sufficient facts to overcome the qualified-immunity
   defense. We conclude that the district court did not err in allowing Lewis’s
   excessive-force claims against the officers to proceed.
                             II.    JURISDICTION
          We have jurisdiction to review the denial of a motion to dismiss based
   on qualified immunity as a collateral order subject to immediate review. Hicks
   v. LeBlanc, 81 F.4th 497, 502 (5th Cir. 2023) (citing Kinney v. Weaver, 367
   F.3d 337, 346 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc)); Waller v. Hanlon, 922 F.3d 590,
   597–98 (5th Cir. 2019) (citing Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S.
   541, 546 (1949)). “We possess . . . jurisdiction to review a district court’s
   determination at the pleadings stage that a plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts
   to overcome a qualified-immunity defense.” Waller, 922 F.3d at 598 (citation
   omitted). We consider whether the district court erred in concluding as a
   matter of law that the officers are not entitled to qualified immunity, but we
   cannot consider “the correctness of the plaintiff’s version of the facts.”
   Hicks, 81 F.4th at 502 (quoting Ramirez v. Escajeda, 921 F.3d 497, 499–500
   (5th Cir. 2019)).
                        III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
          We review the denial of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss de novo. Id.
   (citation omitted). We accept all well-pleaded facts in the complaint as true

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   and construe all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the
   plaintiff. Allen v. Hays, 65 F.4th 736, 743 (5th Cir. 2023) (citation omitted).
   “But ‘we do not accept as true legal conclusions, conclusory statements, or
   naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.’” Guerra v. Castillo,
   82 F.4th 278, 284 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Anokwuru v. City of Houston, 990
   F.3d 956, 962 (5th Cir. 2021)). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff
   must plead enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
   Id. (quoting Crane v. City of Arlington, 50 F.4th 453, 461 (5th Cir. 2022)).
          When a defendant raises a qualified-immunity defense at the pleading
   stage, the plaintiff must plead facts that “if proved, would defeat [the] claim
   of immunity.” Id. at 285 (alteration in original) (quoting Waller, 922 F.3d at
   599). However, the Rule 12(b)(6) pleading standard remains the same. Id.
   (citation omitted). “The crucial question is whether the complaint pleads
   facts that, if true, would permit the inference that Defendants are liable under
   § 1983[,] and would overcome their qualified immunity defense.” Id.
   (alteration in original) (quoting Terwilliger v. Reyna, 4 F.4th 270, 280 (5th Cir.
   2021)).
                                IV.     ANALYSIS
          “The doctrine of qualified immunity protects public officials from
   liability for civil damages ‘insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
   established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
   would have known.’” Jennings v. Patton, 644 F.3d 297, 300 (5th Cir. 2011)
   (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)). To defeat a qualified-
   immunity defense, the plaintiff must plead facts showing “(1) that [the
   defendants] violated a federal statutory or constitutional right and (2) that
   the unlawfulness of the conduct was ‘clearly established at the time.’” Cloud
   v. Stone, 993 F.3d 379, 383 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Rich v. Palko, 920 F.3d
   288, 294 (5th Cir. 2019)).

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          We begin with the first prong of the qualified-immunity analysis.
   Lewis claims that the officers’ shooting of Lockett violated Lockett’s Fourth
   Amendment right to be free from excessive force during a seizure. To state
   an excessive-force claim, Lewis must show that Lockett “suffer[ed] an injury
   that result[ed] directly and only from a clearly excessive and objectively
   unreasonable use of force.” Allen, 65 F.4th at 744 (alterations in original)
   (quoting Cloud, 993 F.3d at 384). Reasonableness is “judged from the
   perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene,” not “with the 20/20 vision
   of hindsight.” Cloud, 993 F.3d at 384 (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S.
   386, 396 (1989)). And the standard is an objective one, focusing on “the facts
   and circumstances confronting” the officers, “without regard to their
   underlying intent or motivation.” Id. (quoting Poole v. City of Shreveport, 691
   F.3d 624, 628 (5th Cir. 2012)). We consider several factors in determining
   the reasonableness of force, paying “careful attention to the facts and
   circumstances of each particular case”: (1) the severity of the crime at issue;
   (2) whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to the safety of the
   officers or others; and (3) whether the suspect was actively resisting arrest or
   attempting to evade arrest. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (citation omitted).
   Where, as here, deadly force has been deployed, the “threat-of-harm factor
   typically predominates.” Harmon v. City of Arlington, 16 F.4th 1159, 1163 (5th
   Cir. 2021).
          There is no dispute that the crime at issue—armed robbery—is a
   serious felony, and Lewis alleges that Lockett was fleeing when the second
   round of shots was fired. But officers may not shoot a fleeing felony suspect
   if the suspect does not pose an immediate threat. Tennessee v. Garner, 471
   U.S. 1, 11 (1985). Thus, the threat-of-harm factor predominates in this case.
          Accepting all well-pleaded facts as true and construing all reasonable
   inferences in the light most favorable to Lewis, the officers arrived at
   Lockett’s house without identifying themselves or issuing any instructions or

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   warnings, and at least one officer immediately drew his gun and pointed it at
   Lockett. When the officers first used deadly force, Lockett was sitting in a
   parked car and the officers had not identified themselves as police or issued
   any warnings or instructions. As such, it is reasonable to infer that Lockett
   was not resisting arrest or refusing to comply with police commands. Officers
   then continued firing, shooting Lockett in the back as he attempted to run
   away. Lockett “did not assault anyone” as these events unfolded.
          These facts are sufficient to establish that, when he was sitting in his
   car, Lockett did not pose an immediate threat to the officers’ or others’ safety
   to justify the use of deadly force without warning. See Cole v. Carson, 935 F.3d
   444, 453 (5th Cir. 2019) (en banc) (denying qualified immunity where the
   decedent was armed but “posed no threat to the officers or others to support
   firing without warning”). Similarly, Lockett did not pose an immediate threat
   when he was running away, with his back to the officers. See Poole v. City of
   Shreveport, 13 F.4th 420, 425 (5th Cir. 2021) (“Common sense, and the law,
   tells us that a suspect is less of a threat when he is turning or moving away
   from the officer.” (citation omitted)).
          On appeal, the officers raise two principal issues with the district
   court’s recitation of the facts. First, the officers argue that the conclusions
   that Lockett posed no threat to anyone and that the officers fired without
   cause are improper interpretations of Lewis’s allegations. The officers
   contend that Lewis’s actual allegation—that Lockett was sitting in his parked
   vehicle when officers began firing—is insufficient on its own to give rise to
   such inferences. According to the officers, Lewis was required to plead
   additional facts, such as whether Lockett’s hands were in plain sight. This
   argument is unavailing. Even when a defendant puts forth a qualified-
   immunity defense, the pleading standard is not heightened. Allen, 65 F.4th at
   743. At this stage, Lewis has satisfied her burden to plead facts that “if
   proved, would defeat [the] claim of immunity.” Guerra, 82 F.4th at 285

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   (alteration in original) (quoting Waller, 922 F.3d at 599). The factual
   “allegations need ‘not conclusively establish’ the plaintiffs’ theory of the
   case.” Waller, 922 F.3d at 600 (quoting Doe v. Robertson, 751 F.3d 383, 389
   (5th Cir. 2014)). “For now, it suffices that” Lewis’s allegations “are not
   ‘naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.’” Id.
          Second, focusing on the allegation that Lockett had a concealed carry
   license and relying on a single line of speculation in Lewis’s pleadings, the
   officers assert that Lockett was in fact holding a gun or, at least, armed. Lewis
   never alleges that Lockett was armed, pointed a gun, or fired at officers.
   Instead, Lewis provides a hypothetical alternative and contends that if
   Lockett pointed or fired a gun, he did so out of fear for his life. This
   hypothetical statement is permissible under Federal Rule of Civil
   Procedure 8(d)(2). See Banco Cont’l v. Curtiss Nat’l Bank of Mia. Springs, 406
   F.2d 510, 513 (5th Cir. 1969). The alternative to this hypothetical—that
   Lockett did not assault anyone by pointing or firing a gun—suffices at this
   stage. See Tuttle v. Sepolio, 68 F.4th 969, 973–74 (5th Cir. 2023) (per curiam)
   (holding that the plaintiffs’ excessive-force claim overcame qualified
   immunity where the plaintiffs alleged that “[a]ny firing done by [the
   decedent] . . . was done purely in defense of himself and his wife”).
   Construing all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to Lewis, the
   pleadings establish that Lockett was merely sitting in his car and later running
   from gunfire when the officers fatally shot him. Lewis adequately pleaded
   that the shooting was objectively unreasonable and clearly excessive.
          We turn next to the second prong of the qualified-immunity analysis.
   To survive the motions to dismiss, Lewis must “plead enough to allege that
   the constitutional violation was clearly established at the time of the
   shooting.” Allen, 65 F.4th at 745 (citing Waller, 922 F.3d at 599). A right is
   clearly established if “every reasonable official would have understood that
   what he is doing violates that right.” Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015)

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   (per curiam) (quoting Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012)). The
   plaintiff bears the burden to demonstrate that clearly established law
   proscribes the defendant’s conduct. Morrow v. Meachum, 917 F.3d 870, 874
   (5th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted).
          A plaintiff may demonstrate clearly established law by “identify[ing]
   a case” or “body of relevant case law” in which a violation of the
   Constitution was found under factually similar circumstances. Batyukova v.
   Doege, 994 F.3d 717, 726 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Joseph ex rel. Est. of Joseph
   v. Bartlett, 981 F.3d 319, 330 (5th Cir. 2020)). Before analyzing whether the
   law is clearly established, “we must frame the constitutional question with
   specificity and granularity.” Morrow, 917 F.3d at 874–75. Here, the question
   is whether police officers violate the Fourth Amendment when they fire
   without warning upon a non-threatening suspect who is either sitting in a
   stationary car or running away.
          Lewis identifies two excessive-force cases from this circuit that
   demonstrate that this right was clearly established at the time of the alleged
   misconduct. In Baker v. Putnal, we reversed a district court’s grant of
   summary judgment on qualified-immunity grounds where an officer shot and
   killed a man sitting in a parked car. 75 F.3d 190, 198 (5th Cir. 1996). A gun
   was later found in the decedent’s truck, but the parties disagreed about
   whether the decedent was holding it or pointing it at the officer. Id. at 193,
   198. The officer maintained that he issued a warning before shooting and that
   the decedent aimed a pistol at him, while the plaintiff’s witnesses testified
   that the officer did not call out a warning and that the decedent merely
   “[moved] to turn and face” the officer before the officer pulled the trigger.
   Id. at 198. We held that these disputes raised issues of material fact as to
   whether the officer acted reasonably. Id.

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          In Cole, we affirmed a district court’s denial of summary judgment on
   qualified-immunity grounds where officers shot and killed a suicidal teenager
   who was holding a gun to his head. 935 F.3d at 453, 455. Because the district
   court found that, among other things, the decedent had not been facing the
   officers or pointing a gun at them, we concluded that the facts did not
   “support firing without warning.” Id. at 453. We held that Baker clearly
   established that using deadly force without provocation and without warning
   constitutes excessive force. 1 Id. at 453–54.
          The above-cited precedent provided the officers with fair notice that
   using deadly force without warning on a non-threatening suspect who was, at
   different times, sitting in a car and running away was a constitutional
   violation. Both cases establish that even where a suspect may have a gun,
   there must still be a threat before use of deadly force is justified. Further, both
   cases recognize that a failure to warn before firing can influence the threat
   posed by a suspect and, thus, the reasonableness of the officer’s use of deadly
   force. Baker, 75 F.3d at 198; Cole, 935 F.3d at 453.
          As for the shots fired after the initial round, we also consider the fact
   that “[i]t has long been clearly established that, absent any other justification
   for the use of force, it is unreasonable for a police officer to use deadly force
   against a fleeing felon who does not pose a sufficient threat of harm to the
   officer or others.” Crane, 50 F.4th at 466 (quoting Lytle v. Bexar County, 560
   F.3d 404, 417 (5th Cir. 2009)). This conclusion applies both to a felon fleeing
   on foot and to one fleeing in a vehicle. Id. (citations omitted).

          _____________________
          1
            We also stated that the officers’ alleged conduct was prohibited under the
   “obvious case” approach, which is available where “the unlawfulness of the officer’s
   conduct is sufficiently clear even though existing precedent does not address similar
   circumstances.” Cole, 935 F.3d at 453; Batyukova, 994 F.3d at 726 (quoting District of
   Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 64 (2018)).

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          The officers cite several cases upholding the use of deadly force
   against individuals who were unarmed or facing away from officers. But none
   of these cases involve the use of deadly force without warning or provocation.
   For instance, in Salazar-Limon v. City of Houston, our decision to affirm the
   district court’s grant of summary judgment on qualified-immunity grounds
   was based on “the totality of the circumstances,” including the plaintiff’s
   resistance to the officer’s attempt to handcuff him, “disregard for [the
   officer’s] orders,” and sudden reach toward his waistband. 826 F.3d 272,
   275, 279 (5th Cir. 2016). Such circumstances are not present here, where the
   officers did not issue any orders and Lockett was first sitting in his vehicle
   and then running away.
          In Cloud, we affirmed the district court’s grant of qualified immunity
   to a police officer who tased and then fatally shot an individual during a traffic
   stop. 993 F.3d at 381. The circumstances in that case “warranted a reasonable
   belief that [the decedent] threatened serious physical harm” where the
   officer fired only after the decedent’s revolver discharged into the officer’s
   chest, the officer “had to wrest it from [the decedent’s] hands and toss it
   away,” and, thereafter, the decedent still made “a sudden move in the gun’s
   direction.” Id. at 387.
          And in Manis v. Lawson, we held that “the act that led [the officer] to
   discharge his weapon” was the decedent, “in defiance of the officers’
   contrary orders, reach[ing] under the seat of his vehicle and appear[ing] to
   retrieve an object that [the officer] reasonably believed to be a weapon.” 585
   F.3d 839, 845 (5th Cir. 2009). In contrast, Lewis alleges that the officers
   drove up with one of the officers already pointing a gun at Lockett and,
   without any verbal warnings or words indicating it was an arrest, shot him as
   he sat in his parked vehicle and then continued shooting at him as he
   attempted to flee.

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          Because Lewis sufficiently pleaded facts that, if true, show that the
   officers violated Lockett’s Fourth Amendment rights and because the
   unlawfulness of the officers’ conduct was clearly established at the time of
   the shooting, the officers are not entitled to qualified immunity at this stage.
                             V.     CONCLUSION
          For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is
   AFFIRMED.

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