Court Opinion

ID: 9736139
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 18:45:01.424541+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:27:04.624079
License: Public Domain

SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION ON DENIAL OF REHEARING Mr. JUSTICE DOWNING delivered the opinion of the court: In an order filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 this court affirmed defendant’s conviction for armed robbery.2 (People v. Riley, First District No. 79-1464, filed August 12, 1980.) The order sua sponte noted that the trial court had convicted defendant of both aggravated kidnapping and the lesser-included offense of unlawful restraint but had failed to sentence defendant on the conviction of aggravated kidnapping. We remanded the cause to the circuit court with directions to vacate the conviction for unlawful restraint and to impose sentence on the aggravated kidnapping conviction. Defendant has filed a petition for rehearing contending that this court lacked jurisdiction to remand for sentencing because he had not appealed that conviction. He further contends that People v. Scott (1977), 69 Ill. 2d 85, 370 N.E.2d 540, cited by this court in its ruling, is not authority for the court’s action concerning the issue of imposing the additional sentence. In support of his argument defendant cites People v. Gum (1980), 85 Ill. App. 3d 298, 407 N.E.2d 806, appeal denied (1980), 81 Ill. 2d 595, a recent Fourth District decision. There the appellate court held that a reviewing court does not have jurisdiction to remand a cause to impose sentence on a conviction for which no sentence was originally imposed, where the defendant has not appealed that conviction. Thus, in Gum the court decided that it was without authority to take any action with regard to the two convictions that were not included in the notice of appeal, stating: “[Ejxcept when the defendant appeals the conviction that lacks a sentence — the question Scott specifically decided — the reviewing court lacks jurisdiction over that matter.”-85 Ill. App. 3d 298, 302. In Gum the court rejected the position taken earlier by the Fifth District Appellate Court in People v. Dean (1978), 61 Ill. App. 3d 612,378 N.E.2d 248, appeal denied (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 610. In Dean the court denied an attempt by defendant to distinguish Scott on the basis that defendant did not seek relief from the conviction upon which no sentence had been imposed, and it further stated that the “thrust” of Scott is that .a remanding order is appropriate whenever the reviewing court acts to affirm the incomplete judgment of conviction of the trial court. The court reasoned that, if a trial court lacks authority to impose a sentence less than the statutory minimum on a judgment of conviction, then it follows that it lacks authority to impose any sentence on a properly entered judgment of conviction. “Hence, where the judgment of the reviewing court is an affirmance of a trial court’s judgment of conviction, but that judgment remains incomplete because no sentence had been entered thereon, the reviewing court must order a judgment to be made final by the imposition of sentence.” 61 Ill. App. 3d 612, 619-20. We find the reasoning oiDean more persuasive than Gum, and agree that it was not the intention of the supreme court in Scott to limit the powers of the appellate court by allowing a defendant to prevent a reviewing court from acting to finalize a judgment by carefully avoiding any issue involving an incomplete conviction. See People v. Walsh (1980), 80 Ill. App. 3d 754,769-70,400 N.E.2d 587, appeal denied (1980), 81 Ill. 2d 587. Further, we believe that such an interpretation would be inconsistent with the decision in People v. Lilly (1974), 56 Ill. 2d 493, 309 N.E.2d 1, upon which Scott was predicated. In Lilly, the court acknowledged that the final judgment in a criminal case is a sentence and that in the absence of the imposition of sentence an appeal cannot be entertained. However, it held that the case was properly before the court with regard to defendant’s conviction for rape, and under Supreme Court Rule 366 it had authority to vacate an incomplete judgment entered on a verdict for indecent liberties. In Scott the supreme court cited the powers of reviewing courts in both civil (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 110A, par. 366(a)) and criminal (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 110A, par. 615(b)) appeals, and noted that although Rule 366 was not specifically made applicable to criminal appeals (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 110A, par. 612), the court had ruled in Lilly that it had authority under Rule 366 to vacate an incomplete judgment. Following Lilly, it concluded that the appellate court acted within the scope of its power in remanding the cause for entry of judgment, the effect of which was to complete the circuit court’s order and render the judgment final. We find no basis in Scott to support the distinction urged upon this court by the defendant. Accordingly, the petition for rehearing is denied. Petition for rehearing denied. PERLIN, P. J., and STAMOS, J., concur.   See footnote 1, page 439.