Court Opinion

ID: 9693388
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 16:39:11.928121+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:07:54.910547
License: Public Domain

M. J. Kelly, P.J.
(dissenting). I must dissent.
If the prosecution can establish that the missing testimony of a res gestae witness would have been of no assistance to the defendant, constitutes merely cumulative evidence, or that its absence was harmless error there is no ground for reversal. *298People v Pearson, 404 Mich 698, 725; 273 NW2d 856 (1979). The first missing witness, Claude Lawrence, testified at the hearing on the motion for a new trial that he did not see the scuffle. A wall was blocking his view. Indeed, he testified:
"I didn’t see who punched or who made the aggressive move.”
The failure to produce this witness was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
The second missing witness, Lawrence Kimble, had a much better view of the scuffle. His testimony was indeed favorable to the defendant:
"Q. And, then, who initiated the physical contact?
"A. Well, he went to grab Norwood and Norwood went back, started backing up, and that’s when he swung all [sic] at him.
"Q. Who swung at who?
"A. The officer swung at Norwood.
"Q. When Norwood backed up?
"A. Yeah.
”Q. Norwood had not thrown the first punch?
"A. No.
”Q. Where did the officer punch for?
"A. From the neck up, you know, his face.
”Q. A facial shot?
"A. Yes.
"Q. Okay. And that’s when the scuffle began?
"A. Yes.
"Q. And that’s exactly what you saw that took place?
"A. Yes.”
At trial, however, testimony was admitted that was substantially the same as that of Lawrence Kimble. Roy Coleman, Edward Lamar Harrell, and the defendant each testified that it was the officer *299who entered the defendant’s cell, backed the defendant to the wall, and threw the first punch. Thus, Lawrence Kimble’s testimony proves to be cumulative. It is not reversible error for the people to fail to produce such testimony. Pearson, supra. Testimony that is merely cumulative need not, under ordinary circumstances, be offered. People v Bartlett, 312 Mich 648, 654; 20 NW2d 758 (1945).
The majority opinion cites People v Harrison, 44 Mich App 578; 205 NW2d 900 (1973), for the proposition that "merely cumulative” means cumulative only to the prosecution’s case and not to the defendant’s. A careful reading of Harrison, however, does not reveal any such broad rule.
Contrary to the majority’s interpretation of Harrison, missing testimony which would have favored a defendant may be found to be merely cumulative and, as such, not essential for the prosecutor to produce. See People v Cooper, 326 Mich 514, 523; 40 NW2d 708 (1950). Until the Supreme Court adopts a rule limiting the use of the merely cumulative rule to testimony which would favor the prosecution, I do not subscribe to precluding application of the rule in this case. I find no error in the trial court’s ruling that though Lawrence and Kimble were res gestae witnesses the failure of the prosecution to exercise reasonable diligence to produce them did not constitute reversible error because their testimony was merely cumulative. This Court should not reverse absent a showing of abuse of discretion, and there was no abuse here.
As I do not join the majority in their reversal of defendant’s conviction on the above issue, I address an issue which the majority found unnecessary to decide. In my view, the failure of the trial court to instruct the jury that it must find that defendant acted with specific intent in order to *300convict him of assault was not reversible error. The ruling in People v Joeseype Johnson, 407 Mich 196; 284 NW2d 718 (1979), does not apply retroactively to defendant’s case. See People v Starghill, 99 Mich App 790, 792; 298 NW2d 641 (1980).
I agree with the majority’s disposition of the remaining issues. I would affirm.