Court Opinion

ID: 9649849
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 15:11:13.511155+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:22:35.248348
License: Public Domain

Cotter, J.
(concurring). I concur in the result reached by the majority.
I
I agree that, under § 31-127 of the General Statutes, charges in a complaint filed pursuant to our Fair Employment Practices Act “frame the issues to be decided by the hearing tribunal”; Veeder-Root *102Co. v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 165 Conn. 318, 329, 334 A.2d 443, and that favorable relief granted by the hearing tribunal to a complainant “is dictated by the limits of the complaint.” I further agree, as stated in the majority opinion in discussing Veeder-Root, that the commission on human rights and opportunities may, under § 31-127, either amend the complaint to include an attack on department-wide discrimination or issue a new complaint in its own name containing such an allegation, the effect of either of which action being to enlarge the scope of the order of relief which the hearing tribunal might issue.
The commission proceeded in a manner consistent with these requirements. Consequently, so much of the proceedings as involved allegations of violations of § 31-126 (a) affecting persons other than Richardson survived the death of the original complainant. The commission’s “amendment” to Richardson’s amended complaint, signed in its name and filed on September 18, 1968, before Richardson died, alleged not only that article 5, § 1 of Pioneer’s bylaws “when implemented under the facts in the instant case effectively denies to the complainant, Charles M. Richardson, his rights guaranteed by Sec. 31-126 and 53-34,” later changed to read 31-126 (a) and 53-34, but also that article 5, § 1 of those bylaws “sets forth a procedure which is a vehicle of discrimination” and “is an improper standard to be used in the conduct of a public agency.” These two allegations, ordered to be filed and properly in the case, constituted charges of discrimination far-reaching in their impact, affecting not merely Richardson. The tribunal was justified, in a procedural sense at least, in deciding that the complaint of discrimination ultimately before it *103as amended by the commission was broad enough to authorize the issuance of similarly broad relief, viz., the cease and desist orders.
The “net effect” of the amendments filed by the commission was not merely “to allege that Pioneer was an official or quasi-official agency of Croton, and to specify that Richardson was alleging discrimination under subsection (a) of § 31-126.” Rather, their effect was to enlarge the issues to be decided by the hearing tribunal and to serve as the basis for the issuance of relief applicable not only to Richardson but to persons who might be similarly affected by the allegedly discriminatory practices of Pioneer.
It is agreed, however, that the proceedings below were rendered moot with respect to the allegations of violations of §31-126 (a) in the amended complaint affecting Richardson personally. An action may survive in some respects but abate as to others. Booth v. Northrop, 27 Conn. 325, 328. Connecticut’s survival-of-aetions statute provides that “[n]o civil action or proceeding shall abate by reason of the death of any party thereto.” Genera], Statutes § 52-599. To survive the death of a party in such action or proceeding, however, the statute provides for the executor or administrator of the decedent to continue the case on behalf of the decedent. Ibid. The record in this ease does not disclose any administrator or executor of Richardson’s having taken any such action. In addition, the statute further states that its provisions “shall not apply to any . . . civil action or proceeding the purpose or object of which is defeated or rendered useless by the death of any party thereto.” Ibid. To the extent that one of the purposes of the proceeding below as *104indicated in the amended complaint was to afford Richardson specific relief available under the Pair Employment Practices Act, it was rendered useless by his death. Accordingly, the saving provisions of the survival-of-actions statute did not apply to this aspect of the proceedings. Nonetheless, as indicated above, this circumstance had no effect on the continuing vitality of the proceedings with respect to the allegations in the amended complaint of violations of § 31-126 (a) affecting persons other than Richardson.
In addition, that part of the action which involved a claimed violation of General Statutes § 53-34 also abated with the death of Richardson. Section 53-34 states that “[a]ny person who subjects, or causes to be subjected, any other person to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities, secured or protected by the constitution or laws of this state or of the United States, on account of alienage, color or race, shall be fined not more than one thousand dollars or imprisoned not more than one year or both.”1 Although violations of the statute constitute criminal offenses and subject the offender to penal sanctions; Zucker v. Vogt, 329 F.2d 426 (2d Cir.); Waterbury v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 160 Conn. 226, 233, 278 A.2d 771; section 53-36 also provides that, in addition to the penalties provided under § 53-34, any person claiming to be aggrieved by a violation of this section may “make, sign and file with the commission on human rights and opportunities a complaint . . . which shall state the circumstances of such violation and the particulars thereof and shall contain such other information as may be *105required by the commission.” Thereupon, under § 53-36, the commission may proceed upon “such complaint in the same manner and with the same powers as provided in chapter 563 in the case of unfair employment practices.” When this procedure is followed, as it was in this case, the commission is authorized to provide only such nonpenal remedies as are within its powers under the Fair Employment Practices Act, inasmuch as § 53-36 states that the provisions of that act “as to the powers, duties and rights of the commission, the complainant, the court, the attorney general, the counsel for the commission and the respondent shall apply to any proceeding under the provisions of this section.” Essentially, then, § 53-36 confers a right upon a person injured by a criminal offense under the provisions of § 53-34 to the nonpenal remedies available under the Fair Employment Practices Act. The purpose of § 53-36, as its opening words suggest (“In addition to the penalties provided for violation of sections 53-34 . . . [and] 53-35”) was to afford a secondary level of relief—civil relief— to persons injured by Civil Rights Act violations; its purpose was not to amend the Fair Employment Practices Act by placing at the disposal of the commission on civil rights an entirely new substantive cause of action. That this is so is confirmed by the fact that under § 53-36 the commission “may issue a complaint” on its own behalf only when it has reason to believe that § 53-35 or § 53-35a has been or is being violated, not when it has reason to believe that § 53-34 has been or is being violated. Significantly, the survival-of-actions statute specifically states that its provisions allowing proceedings to remain unaffected by the death of a party “shall not apply to any cause or right of action or to any *106civil action or proceeding the purpose or object of which is defeated or rendered useless by the death of any party thereto.” General Statutes § 52-599. The remedies which the commission is empowered to provide under § 31-127—for example, the issuance of a cease and desist order, and the ordering of affirmative action, including, but not limited to, the hiring or reinstatement of complaining employees—would have benefited Richardson personally only while he was alive, so that the “purpose” of any proceeding undertaken pursuant to § 53-36 was rendered “useless” by his death, within the contemplation of our survival-of-actions statute. In the absence of any other statutory provision or rule of law authorizing the survival of proceedings conducted by the commission upon the death of the individual claimed to have been aggrieved by an alleged violation of § 53-34, such proceeding must be deemed to have abated with that individual’s death. See 1 C.J.S., Abatement and Revival, §§ 132, 133, 134; 1 Am. Jur. 2d, Abatement, Survival, and Revival, §§ 51 et seq.; note, 88 A.L.R.2d 1153, 1156.
II
The filing of the complaint on January 10, 1968, against Pioneer did not constitute a filing against Groton at that time. The provisions of the Pair Employment Practices Act governing procedure thereunder are precise and unambiguous in specifying that a complaint arising under the act must state “the name and address of the person, employer, labor organization or employment agency alleged to have committed the unfair employment practice” and must “set forth the particulars thereof and contain such other information as may
*107be required by the commission.” General Statutes § 31-127. The complaint filed on January 10, 1968, mentioned the name and address of Pioneer only, and did not contain the name and address of Groton. Furthermore, even if, as the defendant argues, an “agency” relationship existed between Groton and Pioneer, the latter implementing the former’s statutory duty of providing fire protection, Groton was still an entity distinguishable from Pioneer under the relevant definitional terms in the act for purposes of being named in a complaint arising thereunder.2 Thus, the filing of the amended complaint on April 24, 1968, containing the name and address of Groton, represented, with respect to the city, the filing of an altogether new complaint which did not “relate back” to the filing of the complaint against Pioneer on January 10. Kelsall v. Kelsall, 139 Conn. 163, 165, 90 A.2d 878. However, under General Statutes § 31-127, complaints alleging violations of § 31-126 must be filed “within ninety days after the alleged act of discrimination.” Even if, as the defendant argues, the limitation period commenced on October 19, 1967, the date on which Richardson received the letter returning his application, the filing of the complaint against Groton took place well beyond the statutory period. Accordingly, the commission lacked jurisdiction to hear the complaint against Groton. Scovill Mfg. Co. v. Commission on Civil Rights, 153 Conn. 170, 175-76, 215 A.2d 130,
*108III
The complaint filed against Pioneer, as amended, failed to allege an “unfair employment practice” engaged in by Pioneer within the contemplation of General Statutes § 31-126 (a), contrary to what the commission has argued. The statute states, in pertinent part, that “[i]t shall be an unfair employment practice . . . for an employer, by himself or his agent, . . . because of the race ... of any individual, to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to discharge from employment such individual or to discriminate against him in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment.” The terms “hire,” “employ,” and “employment” are not specifically defined in the statute. In the absence of such specificity, the common understanding of those terms appropriately should be applied when construing provisions of the statute affected by those terms. See, e.g., Fruco Construction Co. v. McClelland, 192 F.2d 241, 244-45 (8th Cir.) (construing undefined term “employer” in the federal Fair Labor Standards Act according to common usage). The terms “hire,” “employ,” and “employment” all generally refer to a relationship, involving compensation, between a person who has the authority to hire and fire and a person who performs the services. State v. Kenyon, Inc., 153 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex. Civ. App.) (“hire”); Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 597-98, 64 S. Ct. 698, 88 L. Ed. 949; Slocum Straw Works v. Industrial Commission, 232 Wis. 71, 76, 286 N.W. 593 (“employ”); State v. Foster, 37 Iowa 404; State v. Deck, 108 Mo. App. 292, 293-94, 83 S.W. 314 (“employment”); McCluskey v. Cromwell, 11 N.Y. 593; see also *109Black, Law Dictionary (Rev. 4th Ed.) 863 (“hire”), 617 (“employ”), 618 (“employment”). In this case, however, the complaint against Pioneer alleged not the refusal of any employment within the meaning of § 31-126 (a) but the denial of an “application” for “membership” in what is a “voluntary association.” See, in this connection, Going v. Cromwell Fire District, 159 Conn. 53, 60, 267 A.2d 428, where we referred to the relationship between “employer” and “employee,” created by statute for volunteer firemen for purposes of applicability of this state’s workmen’s compensation laws, to be a “fictitious” relationship. The complainant, in this sense, then, failed to meet its burden of alleging facts sufficient to bring this proceeding within the requirements of § 31-126 (a). See Senior v. Hope, 156 Conn. 92, 98, 239 A.2d 486.
For the foregoing reasons, I concur in the result.

 The statute has since been amended to include a prohibition on deprivation of rights on account of sex. Public Act No. 74-80.

 Under the act, “person” means “the state and all political subdivisions and agencAes thereof”; “employment agency” means “any person undertaking with or without compensation to procure employees or opportunities to work”; “employer” includes the state and all political subdivisions thereof and means “any person or employer with three or more persons in his employ.” General Statutes $ 31-122 (b), (e), (f). (Emphasis added.)