Court Opinion

ID: 9928169
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-30 22:02:23.526357+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:50:31.464216
License: Public Domain

***********************************************
    The “officially released” date that appears near the be-
ginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be pub-
lished in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was
released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the be-
ginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions
and petitions for certification is the “officially released”
date appearing in the opinion.

   All opinions are subject to modification and technical
correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut
Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of
discrepancies between the advance release version of an
opinion and the latest version appearing in the Connecticut
Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports
or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is to
be considered authoritative.

   The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the
opinion as it appears in the Connecticut Law Journal and
bound volumes of official reports are copyrighted by the
Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not
be reproduced and distributed without the express written
permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publica-
tions, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.
***********************************************
                ERIN C. HASSETT v. SECOR’S
                    AUTO CENTER, INC.
                         (SC 20774)
     Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria, Ecker and Dannehy, Js.

                                   Syllabus

Pursuant to the Uniform Commercial Code (§ 42a-2-711 (1)), a buyer who
   ‘‘justifiably revokes acceptance’’ of goods purchased from a seller may
   recover ‘‘so much of the price as has been paid . . . .’’

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendant automobile
   dealership, S Co., in connection with S Co.’s sale of an allegedly defective,
   used motor vehicle. The plaintiff financed the majority of the purchase
   price through a loan with S Co., which agreed to provide a limited
   warranty on the vehicle. Shortly after the purchase, the plaintiff began
   to experience mechanical problems with the vehicle, and, when S Co.
   refused to make the costly, recommended repairs, the plaintiff sent a
   letter to S Co., in which she revoked her acceptance of the vehicle.
   The plaintiff thereafter brought the present action, alleging breach of
   warranty and revocation of acceptance pursuant to statute (§ 42a-2-
   608). Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that she had notified S Co. of her
   intent to revoke acceptance of the vehicle and that S Co. had refused
   to accept its return or to refund to her so much of the purchase price
   as had been paid pursuant to § 42a-2-711 (1). After the presentation of
   evidence and closing argument, the parties’ counsel agreed to the special
   verdict form the trial court would provide to the jury, as well as to the
   court’s jury instructions, which set forth two divergent sets of directions
   as to how to calculate damages, depending on whether the plaintiff had
   proven her revocation of acceptance claim. The jury ultimately returned
   a verdict for the plaintiff, including on her revocation of acceptance
   claim, and awarded her $11,000 in damages, which was roughly equal
   to the amount the plaintiff had made in monthly payments to S Co. at
   the time of trial. The plaintiff subsequently moved for additur, requesting
   that the court order S Co. to remit to her the full purchase price of the
   vehicle, in addition to the $11,000 the jury had awarded. The trial court
   denied the motion for additur, concluding that the jury’s verdict clearly
   set forth the amount of damages due to the plaintiff, and rendered
   judgment in accordance with the verdict. The Appellate Court upheld
   the trial court’s denial of the motion for additur and affirmed the trial
   court’s judgment. On the granting of certification, the plaintiff appealed
   to this court, claiming that she was entitled to the jury’s award of $11,000,
   in addition to a refund of the full purchase price of the vehicle, because
   the jury found in her favor on her revocation of acceptance claim.

Held that the Appellate Court correctly concluded that the trial court had
   not abused its discretion in denying the plaintiff’s motion for additur,
   this court having disagreed with the plaintiff’s argument that the jury’s
   verdict did not include an award of revocation of acceptance damages
   and that, pursuant to § 42a-2-711, those damages were to be decided by
   the trial court, as a matter of law, after the jury returned its verdict:

   The issue of revocation of acceptance damages was submitted to the
   jury as a matter of disputed fact, the court instructed the jury to award
   the plaintiff damages that were due to her on her revocation of accep-
   tance claim, and the parties’ agreement with the jury instructions and
   the verdict form manifested their decision to have the jury decide whether
   the plaintiff had proven her revocation of acceptance claim and, if so,
   the amount of damages to which she was entitled on that claim.

   Moreover, the verdict form indicated that the jury had found in the
   plaintiff’s favor on her revocation of acceptance claim and awarded
   $11,000 as the amount of damages, and, applying the presumptions that
   the jury did not make a mistake, did exactly as it intended, and properly
   followed the court’s instructions, this court concluded that the jury
   intended that its $11,000 award as revocation of acceptance damages
   equal its determination of so much of the purchase price of the vehicle
  as the plaintiff had paid, in accordance with § 42a-2-711 (1).

  Contrary to the plaintiff’s claim that the trial court reserved the issue of
  revocation of acceptance damages as a legal question it would determine
  postverdict because the pleadings demonstrated that S Co. had admitted
  the purchase price of the vehicle, the parties’ pleadings did not defini-
  tively resolve the amount of such damages, insofar as the complaint
  alleged only that the vehicle’s ‘‘purchase price’’ was a certain amount,
  which fell short of conclusively establishing the amount of the ‘‘price
  as has been paid’’ pursuant to § 42a-2-711 (1), and S Co.’s failure to
  contest the vehicle’s purchase price did not relieve the plaintiff of her
  burden of proving at trial the amount of the purchase price she had paid
  in addition to any incidental and consequential damages.

  Furthermore, nothing in the record suggested that the trial court
  reserved, as a legal question, a determination of the amount of revocation
  of acceptance damages pursuant to § 42a-2-711 (1) until after the jury
  returned its verdict, the plaintiff’s reliance on a certain statement by the
  trial court in support of that argument was misplaced, insofar as the
  court was indicating that it was reserving a different question of law
  concerning revocation of acceptance, and the fact that S Co. requested
  a hearing on the value of the vehicle before the court ruled on the motion
  for additur did not amount to a retroactive admission that the plaintiff’s
  revocation of acceptance damages were not at issue during the trial.

  In addition, there was no merit to the plaintiff’s argument that it was
  inequitable for the trial court to decline to award her the vehicle’s full
  purchase price because that decision violated the general principle in
  breach of contract cases that she be returned to the same position she
  would have been in had the contract been performed, as it was within
  the province of the jury to determine the amount of damages that would
  return the plaintiff to the financial position she would have been in had
  the contract been performed, that was what the jury was instructed
  to do, and the plaintiff, having asked the jury to award revocation of
  acceptance damages, could not now request this court to conclude, as
  a matter of statutory interpretation, that the trial court should have
  determined the proper measure of those damages after the jury returned
  its verdict.

  To the extent that the plaintiff did not receive the full amount of her claim
  for damages, the jury might have discredited aspects of her evidence or
  determined that she failed to establish that the full purchase price of
  the vehicle had been paid.
   Argued November 13, 2023—officially released January 30, 2024

                            Procedural History

  Action to recover damages for, inter alia, the defen-
dant’s alleged breach of implied warranties, and for
other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial
district of New London and tried to the jury before S.
Murphy, J.; verdict in part for the plaintiff; thereafter,
the court denied the plaintiff’s motion for additur and
rendered judgment in accordance with the verdict, from
which the plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court,
Cradle, Clark and Harper, Js., which affirmed the trial
court’s judgment, and, the plaintiff, on the granting of
certification, appealed to this court. Affirmed.
  Sergei Lemberg, with whom was Vlad Hirnyk, for
the appellant (plaintiff).
  Sandra R. Stanfield, with whom were Victoria S.
Mueller and Mathew H. Greene, for the appellee (defen-
dant).
                          Opinion

   D’AURIA, J. In this certified appeal, we consider the
propriety of a jury’s damages award for a consumer’s
revocation of acceptance of a motor vehicle pursuant
to the Uniform Commercial Code and, in particular,
General Statutes § 42a-2-711. The plaintiff, Erin C. Has-
sett, appeals, upon our grant of her petition for certifica-
tion, from the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming
the trial court’s denial of her motion for additur and
rendering judgment in accordance with the verdict
against the defendant, Secor’s Auto Center, Inc. On appeal,
the plaintiff claims that the Appellate Court incorrectly
concluded that the trial court had not abused its discre-
tion in denying her motion for additur. We disagree and,
accordingly, affirm the Appellate Court’s judgment.
   The jury reasonably could have found the following
facts. The plaintiff purchased a used 2010 BMW xDrive
50i (vehicle) from the defendant for a ‘‘[t]otal [s]ale
[p]rice’’ of $28,848.40. To accomplish the purchase, the
parties entered into a retail installment contract as well
as a purchase agreement. Pursuant to the purchase agree-
ment, the defendant provided a limited warranty on the
vehicle for a term of sixty days or 3000 miles, whichever
happened first. The plaintiff’s down payment of $2500
reflected the value of the car that she traded in, and
she financed the remainder of the price through a loan
with the defendant. The plaintiff agreed to repay the
loan on a monthly basis over the course of sixty months.
The defendant, upon executing the retail installment con-
tract, simultaneously assigned the right to collect pay-
ments to Volvo Car Financial Services U.S., LLC (Volvo).
Volvo secured its interest with a lien on the title to the
vehicle. Neither party made Volvo a party to this action.
See General Statutes § 52-572g.
   Shortly afterward, the plaintiff began experiencing
mechanical problems with the vehicle. After noticing
that the vehicle’s warning light indicating a low oil level
had turned on, the plaintiff brought the vehicle to the
defendant to remedy the issue. The defendant’s service
technicians tightened the oil drain plug, removed the
residual oil, and returned the vehicle to the plaintiff.
One week later, the plaintiff brought the vehicle to the
defendant because the oil light had turned on again.
The defendant could not ascertain the source of the oil
leak and referred the plaintiff to New Country Motor
Cars (New Country) in Hartford to diagnosis the issue.
New Country’s inspection revealed that the vehicle
‘‘smoke[d] excessively after idling for a couple minutes,’’
and New Country determined that it was necessary to
replace the valve seals to rectify the oil problem. New
Country quoted $9200 as the cost of the repair. The
plaintiff presented New Country’s diagnosis and quote
to the defendant, and requested that the defendant
make the necessary repairs to the vehicle.
   The defendant refused to fix the vehicle because it
deemed the repairs unnecessary and not covered by
the limited warranty. After retaining counsel, the plain-
tiff sent a demand letter to the defendant in which,
among other things, she revoked her acceptance of the
vehicle. In the letter, the plaintiff’s counsel alleged that
the defendant had violated the limited warranty by fail-
ing to repair the vehicle and requested that the defen-
dant ‘‘return . . . all money paid so far, including the
down payment, [the] amount of payments thus far,
finance charges, other fees, incidental and consequen-
tial damages, costs, and attorney’s fees.’’ The defen-
dant’s counsel responded with a letter denying the plain-
tiff’s allegations and stating that the defendant properly
had responded to the plaintiff’s oil leak concerns.
Despite having revoked her acceptance, the plaintiff
continued to drive the vehicle and, on the advice of her
counsel, to make her monthly loan payments for fear
that her failure to do so would negatively impact her
credit rating.
   The plaintiff then filed the present action against the
defendant, a six count complaint primarily alleging a
myriad of breach of warranty claims.1 The plaintiff also
asserted a revocation of acceptance claim, pursuant to
General Statutes § 42a-2-608,2 in which she alleged that
she previously had notified the defendant of her intent
to revoke acceptance but that the defendant had refused
to accept the return of the vehicle or to refund the
plaintiff’s purchase price. In her prayer for relief as to
all six counts, the plaintiff requested, in pertinent part,
an order approving revocation of acceptance of the
vehicle, as well as damages in the form of a refund of
the full contract price, including trade-in allowance,
taxes, fees, insurance premiums, interest, costs, a refund
of all payments she had made, and incidental and conse-
quential damages. The defendant’s answer admitted
certain underlying facts, including that the plaintiff had
purchased the vehicle from the defendant and that ‘‘[t]he
purchase price of the vehicle was $28,848.40, including
options, fees, taxes, and finance charges.’’ The defen-
dant otherwise left the plaintiff to her proof with respect
to her claims and asserted as a special defense that she
had failed to mitigate her damages.
   The parties tried the case before a jury over the
course of three days. The plaintiff testified that she still
had possession of the vehicle, that it had been parked
in her driveway for one year because it no longer ran,
and that she was still making the monthly payments on
the vehicle at the time of trial. The plaintiff introduced
numerous documents into evidence, including the pur-
chase agreement and the retail installment contract.
During closing arguments, the plaintiff’s counsel did not
request that the jury award a specific amount of damages
but, instead, highlighted various monetary aspects of
the case. Particularly, the plaintiff’s counsel recounted for
the jury that ‘‘[t]he vehicle was purchased for $25,471.79,’’
and stated that, during deliberations, the jury should
refer to the purchase agreement, which was in evidence.
The plaintiff’s counsel also maintained that the plaintiff
had to pay $2000 in interest as part of her continuing
monthly payments for the vehicle, $1000 for insurance,
$400 for property taxes, and $400 for a new battery.
   Following closing arguments, the court provided the
jury with a general instruction on the purpose of dam-
ages awards in contract cases3 and then two divergent
instructions as to how to calculate damages, depending
on whether the plaintiff had proven her revocation of
acceptance claim. First, tracking the language of § 42a-
2-711, the court instructed the jury: ‘‘If you find that
the plaintiff has met her burden of proof on a revocation
of acceptance claim, then [the] plaintiff is entitled to a
refund of so much of the purchase price as has been
paid as well as damages for incidental and consequen-
tial expenses. Incidental damages include expenses rea-
sonably incurred in inspection, receipt, transportation,
and care and custody of the vehicle rightfully rejected,
and any other reasonable expense incident to the defen-
dant’s breach. Consequential damages resulting from
the defendant’s breach include any loss resulting from
general or particular requirements and needs of which
the defendant at the time had reason to know and which
could not reasonably be prevented by cover or other-
wise an injury to person or property proximately
resulting from any breach of warranty. Consequential
damages include any loss that may fairly and reasonably
be considered as arising naturally according to the usual
course of things from such breach.’’ (Emphasis added.)
Second, the court instructed the jury: ‘‘If you find that
[the] plaintiff did not prove her revocation of accep-
tance claim but proved one or all of her breach of
warranty claims, either express or implied warranty of
merchantability, then [the] plaintiff is entitled to the
difference in the value of the subject vehicle with its
nonconformity and the amount the subject vehicle
would be worth if it did not have the nonconformity.
[The] plaintiff is also entitled to recover incidental, [con-
sequential] damages reasonably incurred as a result of
the breach.’’ After an off-the-record discussion between
the court and counsel as to the precise language to be
used in the revocation of acceptance damages instruc-
tion,4 both counsel agreed with all of the jury instruc-
tions.
   Counsel for both parties also agreed on the special
verdict form the court would provide to the jury, which
was divided into liability and damages sections. The
liability section contained thirteen interrogatories cor-
responding to each substantive element across all six
of the plaintiff’s legal claims. The damages section con-
tained five interrogatories that the jury had to answer:
(1) ‘‘What amount of damages (compensatory, inciden-
tal and/or consequential, as applicable), if any, do you
award the plaintiff against [the] defendant?’’ (2) whether
punitive damages were warranted, (3) whether the defen-
dant proved its special defense that the plaintiff had
failed to mitigate her damages, (4) the amount of dam-
ages attributable to the plaintiff’s failure to mitigate,
and (5) the ‘‘total award of damages to the plaintiff, if
any, as against the defendant after the reduction of
damages for failure to mitigate, if any?’’
   Later that day, the jury returned a verdict in the plain-
tiff’s favor in the amount of $11,000. The jury found
in the defendant’s favor on the plaintiff’s unfair trade
practices claim and in the plaintiff’s favor on her five
other claims, including her revocation of acceptance
claim. See footnote 1 of this opinion. Of the thirteen
interrogatories in the liability section of the verdict
form, four related to the substantive elements of the
plaintiff’s revocation of acceptance claim. The jury
answered each in the affirmative, and none involved
the issue of damages. In the damages section, the jury
stated that the defendant had not proven its failure to
mitigate special defense and found that the plaintiff
was not entitled to punitive damages. In response to
both interrogatories (numbers 1 and 5) asking the jury
for its total award of damages, the jury foreperson wrote
$11,000.
   The plaintiff then moved for judgment in accordance
with the verdict and for additur,5 requesting that the
court order the defendant to ‘‘retake’’ title to the vehicle
and remit to her ‘‘the purchase price paid of $25,471.79’’
in addition to the jury’s award of damages. The plaintiff
relied on § 42a-2-711 (1), which provides in relevant
part that a buyer who ‘‘justifiably revokes acceptance’’
may recover ‘‘so much of the price as has been paid
. . . .’’ The plaintiff acknowledged that the court had
provided the jury with a damages instruction directing
it to award her ‘‘so much of the purchase price as
has been paid as well as damages for incidental and
consequential expenses’’ and that the jury had awarded
her $11,000 in damages. Nevertheless, the plaintiff con-
tended that, because the jury found that she had justifi-
ably revoked her acceptance of the vehicle, § 42a-2-711
entitled her to ‘‘the vehicle purchase price’’ of $25,471.79
in addition to the jury’s damages award.
   The defendant filed an initial objection to the plain-
tiff’s motion for additur and requested that the court
conduct a hearing to determine the vehicle’s present
value. This objection did not directly contest that the
plaintiff might be entitled to an amount of damages
different from what the jury had awarded. The defen-
dant later supplemented its objection to the plaintiff’s
motion, arguing that the jury’s $11,000 damages award
was adequate as a matter of law.6 The defendant argued
that it was within the jury’s province, consistent with
the court’s instruction, to calculate and award the plain-
tiff ‘‘so much of the price as has been paid’’ pursuant
to § 42a-2-711 (1), and that was precisely what the jury
did. The defendant also contended that there was ample
support for the jury’s award of $11,000 because it
roughly equaled the twenty-five monthly payments that
the plaintiff had made at the time of trial. In her reply
memoranda, the plaintiff argued that the ‘‘defendant
must repurchase the vehicle from the plaintiff in accor-
dance with [§ 42a-2-711 (1), which] calls for the refund
of ‘so much of the price as has been paid’ ’’ and that
‘‘the jury need not calculate the amount [that the] plain-
tiff gets back in a revocation of acceptance claim’’
because § 42a-2-711 ‘‘clearly states [that the] plaintiff
gets the purchase price paid and title revests’’ in the
defendant. (Emphasis altered.)
  After hearing argument, the court denied the motion
for additur and rendered judgment in accordance with
the verdict. The plaintiff sought clarification, and the
court explained that ‘‘[t]he jury’s verdict clearly sets
forth the amount of damages due [to] the plaintiff. Fur-
ther, title to the subject vehicle is appropriately addressed
by way of operation of law, in accordance with [the]
Connecticut General Statutes.’’7
  The plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court, chal-
lenging the trial court’s decision on her motion for addi-
tur and renewing her argument that, because the jury
had found in her favor on her revocation of acceptance
claim, § 42a-2-711 (1) entitled her to a refund of ‘‘so
much of the price as has been paid,’’ and that amount
equaled the vehicle’s full purchase price of $25,471.79.
Hassett v. Secor’s Auto Center, Inc., 215 Conn. App.
463, 473, 284 A.3d 31 (2022). The Appellate Court agreed
with the defendant that the trial court properly had
exercised its discretion in denying the plaintiff’s motion
for additur and in rejecting her claim under § 42a-2-711
as ‘‘without any support in our jurisprudence.’’ Id., 475.
The Appellate Court further concluded that the plaintiff
had failed to establish—by way of evidence at trial or
an admission in the pleadings—that she had in fact paid
the vehicle’s total purchase price. Id., 475–77.
   On appeal to this court, the plaintiff does not chal-
lenge the trial court’s jury instructions, the verdict form,
or even the amount of the jury’s verdict. Instead, the
plaintiff claims that she is entitled to the jury’s award
of $11,000 plus a refund of the vehicle’s full purchase
price, $25,471.79, because the jury found in her favor
on her revocation of acceptance claim. To support her
position, the plaintiff contends that the issue of revoca-
tion of acceptance damages, pursuant to § 42a-2-711,
was to be decided as a matter of law by the court after
trial and was not a disputed issue of fact for the jury.
She argues that the court’s failure to award her the
full purchase price of the vehicle violated the general
principle of damages awards in breach of contract
actions, providing that she be returned to the financial
position she would have been in had the defendant
performed the contract, and the direction of Barco Auto
Leasing Corp. v. House, 202 Conn. 106, 520 A.2d 162
(1987), that §§ 42a-2-711 and 42a-2-608 require that a
seller return the ‘‘purchase price in toto . . . .’’ Id., 115.
   We review a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a
motion for additur for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g.,
Maldonado v. Flannery, 343 Conn. 150, 168, 272 A.3d
1089 (2022); Childs v. Bainer, 235 Conn. 107, 113, 663
A.2d 398 (1995). It is well settled that the ‘‘amount of
a damage[s] award is a matter peculiarly within the
province of the trier of fact . . . .’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Commission on Human Rights & Oppor-
tunities v. Cantillon, 347 Conn. 58, 69, 295 A.3d 919 (2023);
Saleh v. Ribeiro Trucking, LLC, 303 Conn. 276, 280,
32 A.3d 318 (2011). ‘‘We are, therefore, constrained to
accord substantial deference to the fact finder on the
issue of damages.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Gianetti v. Norwalk Hospital, 304 Conn. 754, 780, 43 A.3d
567 (2012).
   ‘‘The reason for such a deferential standard is clear.
Litigants have a constitutional right to have factual
issues resolved by the jury. . . . This right embraces
the determination of damages when there is room for
a reasonable difference of opinion among fair-minded
persons as to the amount that should be awarded. . . .
This right is one obviously immovable limitation on the
legal discretion of the court to set aside a verdict,’’ or
in the present case, to add to the jury’s damages award.
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Munn v. Hotchkiss
School, 326 Conn. 540, 575, 165 A.3d 1167 (2017); see
also Presidential Capital Corp. v. Reale, 231 Conn. 500,
510, 652 A.2d 489 (1994). ‘‘[When], as here, a trial court
and a jury have concurred in their determination that
a particular damages award is appropriate, that circum-
stance provides a persuasive argument for sustaining
the action of the court on the motion’’ for additur. (Inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.) Munn v. Hotchkiss School,
supra, 574–75. ‘‘[I]f, on the evidence, the jury could reason-
ably have decided as [it] did, [the reviewing court] will
not find error in the trial court’s acceptance of the
verdict . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Wichers v. Hatch, 252 Conn. 174, 183, 745 A.2d 789
(2000). The decision whether to order an additur
‘‘should be made, not on the assumption that the jury
made a mistake, but, rather, on the supposition that
the jury did exactly what it intended to do.’’ Id., 189.
‘‘Our jurisprudence is clear . . . that unless there is a
clear indication to the contrary, a jury is presumed to
follow the court’s instructions.’’ PSE Consulting, Inc.
v. Frank Mercede & Sons, Inc., 267 Conn. 279, 335, 838
A.2d 135 (2004).
  We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by denying the plaintiff’s motion for additur
precisely for the reason the court articulated: ‘‘[t]he
jury’s verdict clearly sets forth the amount of damages
due [to] the plaintiff.’’ As we will explain, we disagree
with the predicate of the plaintiff’s argument, which is
that the jury’s verdict did not include an award of dam-
ages flowing from the plaintiff’s effective revocation of
acceptance of the vehicle, pursuant to § 42a-2-711 but,
instead, that the court was to award those damages as
a matter of law after trial. Our review of the record
reveals that the jury was asked to award those damages
and did so. The plaintiff has not challenged that award,
and her claim that the trial court should have added to
it lacks merit. As a consequence of the particular way
that the parties tried this case, we need not determine
whether there is a singular meaning to the phrase ‘‘so
much of the price as has been paid’’ in § 42a-2-711 (1).8
   As the defendant aptly contends, the issue of revoca-
tion of acceptance damages pursuant to § 42a-2-711 was
submitted to the jury as a matter of disputed fact. The
court instructed the jury to award the plaintiff damages
due to her on her revocation of acceptance claim.
   Specifically, the court’s instructions provided the jury
with a choice between two exclusive methods for calcu-
lating damages. Which route the jury chose hinged on
whether the plaintiff had proved her revocation of
acceptance claim. First, the court instructed the jury
that, if the plaintiff had proved her revocation of accep-
tance claim, she was, among other things, ‘‘entitled to
a refund of so much of the purchase price as has been
paid,’’ consistent with the language of § 42a-2-711 (1). If
the plaintiff did not prove her revocation of acceptance
claim but prevailed on one or all of her breach of war-
ranty claims, then, the jury was instructed, the plaintiff
was ‘‘entitled to the difference in the value of the subject
vehicle with its nonconformity and the amount the sub-
ject vehicle would be worth if it did not have the noncon-
formity.’’ The parties’ agreement with the court’s instruc-
tions and the verdict form submitted to the jury manifests
the parties’ decision to have the jury decide whether
the plaintiff had proved her revocation of acceptance
claim and, if so, the amount of damages to which she
was entitled on that claim. See footnote 3 of this opin-
ion.
   The verdict form stated that the jury had found in
the plaintiff’s favor on her revocation of acceptance
claim and awarded $11,000 as the ‘‘amount of damages
(compensatory, incidental and/or consequential, as
applicable) . . . .’’ Applying the presumptions that the
jury did not make a mistake, did exactly as it intended;
Wichers v. Hatch, supra, 252 Conn. 189; and properly
followed the court’s instructions; PSE Consulting, Inc.
v. Frank Mercede & Sons, Inc., supra, 267 Conn. 335;
we must conclude, on this record, that the jury intended
its $11,000 award as revocation of acceptance damages
equal to its determination of ‘‘so much of the price as
has been paid’’ in accordance with § 42a-2-711 (1).
  The plaintiff appears to argue that the jury’s $11,000
award represented the incidental and consequential
damages she sustained, not the amount of the ‘‘purchase
price as has been paid . . . .’’9 This position is belied
by the instructions provided to the jury, as well as
the interrogatory the jury was asked to answer, which
directed the jury to determine the amount of the pur-
chase price that had been paid as well as consequential
and incidental damages.
   To support her argument that the trial court reserved
the issue of revocation of acceptance damages as a
legal question it would determine after trial, the plaintiff
contends that (1) a ‘‘textual interpretation of the plead-
ings’’ demonstrates that the defendant admitted the pur-
chase price for the vehicle was $25,471.79, (2) the court,
during its charging conference, deemed this an issue
of law, and (3) the defendant admitted in its initial
objection to the plaintiff’s motion for additur that the
purchase price was not in dispute and had not been
submitted to the jury. Our careful review of the record
fails to reveal any indication that the parties operated
under the assumption that the amount of the ‘‘purchase
price as has been paid’’ was not in dispute at trial, that
the plaintiff was therefore relieved of her obligation to
prove it, or that the trial court would determine and
award those damages postverdict.10
   First, the parties’ pleadings do not definitively resolve
the amount of revocation of acceptance damages.11
Although, arguably, the defendant did not contest the
vehicle’s purchase price—as manifested by its answer
to the plaintiff’s complaint and its lack of objection to
the introduction into evidence of the purchase agree-
ment and the retail installment contract—that fact in
no way relieved the plaintiff of her burden of proving
at trial the amount of ‘‘the [purchase] price as has been
paid,’’ pursuant to § 42a-2-711 (1), in addition to any
incidental or consequential damages, pursuant to Gen-
eral Statutes §§ 42a-2-714 and 42a-2-715. In her com-
plaint, the plaintiff alleged that ‘‘the purchase price of
the vehicle was $28,848.40, including options, fees,
taxes, and finance charges.’’ Although the defendant
admitted this allegation in its answer, this admission falls
short of conclusively establishing that $28,848.40 was
the amount of the ‘‘price as has been paid . . . .’’ Gen-
eral Statutes § 42a-2-711 (1). The defendant merely
admitted that this was the ‘‘purchase price’’ for the
vehicle, not that it was amount of that purchase price
‘‘as has been paid.’’12 Moreover, the jury was not informed
of this factual admission because neither the plaintiff’s
complaint nor the defendant’s answer was introduced
into evidence at trial, and the court did not instruct
the jury that it should consider the plaintiff to have
conclusively proven the amount of the purchase price
because the defendant had admitted it in the pleadings.
  Second, the court did not reserve the question of
revocation of acceptance damages for determination
postverdict, as the plaintiff contends. It is true that, at
the charging conference, the court reserved a question
of law regarding revocation of acceptance until after
the verdict. Contrary to the plaintiff’s argument, how-
ever, that question concerned the transfer of the vehi-
cle’s title if the jury found that the plaintiff had prevailed
on her revocation of acceptance claim. Particularly, the
court stated, ‘‘just for the record, I know that counsel
also had a concern as to any confusion with respect to
the actual vehicle if there was a finding relative to the
revocation of acceptance claim in favor of the plaintiff.
I did want to, on the record, provide this particular
section to you: [General Statutes §] 42[a]-2-401 (4),
which states, rejection or other refusal or a justified
revocation of acceptance revests title to the goods in
the seller. Such revesting occurs by operation of law
and is not a sale. . . . I know there was an inquiry
about that, so the court is not going to address that in
a particular charge. I think we’ll leave that out of the
charge, and that happens by way of operation of law.’’
(Emphasis added.) We find no suggestion in the record
that the court reserved until after the jury returned its
verdict, as a legal question, the determination of the
amount of the purchase price that had been paid pursu-
ant to § 42a-2-711 (1).
   Third, in its initial objection to the motion for additur,
the defendant did not admit that the amount of the
purchase price ‘‘as has been paid’’ was not submitted to
the jury. Rather, to permit the parties to submit evidence
on the present condition of the vehicle, the defendant
requested ‘‘that a hearing should be had regarding the
value of the vehicle which is the subject of this litigation
before the court enters an award on the purchase price,
as is requested by the plaintiff.’’ We acknowledge the
confusing nature of this request, as it was inconsistent
with the jury’s award of revocation of acceptance dam-
ages, the plaintiff’s additur request seeking the full pur-
chase price, as well as the jury’s finding that the defen-
dant did not prove its failure to mitigate special defense.
Nevertheless, the defendant’s hearing request did not
amount to a retroactive admission that the plaintiff’s
§ 42a-2-711 revocation of acceptance damages were not
at issue during trial. In its supplemental objection and
other written submissions to the trial court, the defen-
dant made clear its position that the jury already had
decided this issue and had awarded the plaintiff revoca-
tion of acceptance damages. In short, the record makes
evident that the parties submitted the question of revo-
cation of acceptance damages to the jury and that the
jury awarded those damages.
   Despite having asked the jury to award revocation
of acceptance damages in the first instance, the plaintiff
now asks this court, as a matter of statutory interpreta-
tion, to conclude that the trial court should have deter-
mined the proper measure of revocation of acceptance
damages postverdict, but she provides no authority for
us to do so. To support her claim, she relies on the
‘‘general rule in breach of contract cases’’ that the dam-
ages due to her are designed to place her ‘‘in the same
position as that which [she] would have been in had the
contract been performed.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Meribear Productions, Inc. v. Frank, 340
Conn. 711, 754, 265 A.3d 870 (2021). She also relies on
a sentence from Barco Auto Leasing Corp. v. House,
supra, 202 Conn. 106, in which this court stated that
§§ 42a-2-711 and 42a-2-608, ‘‘read in conjunction, envi-
sion a rule that requires a seller to return the buyer’s
purchase price in toto when he has delivered noncon-
forming goods under circumstances that afford a buyer
a right to reject or to revoke acceptance.’’ Id., 115.
   We agree with the plaintiff that these general legal
principles serve as the lodestar for measuring damages
in revocation of acceptance actions such as the present
one. These general principles do not entitle the plaintiff
to the total sum that she claims she was entitled to as
a matter of law, however. If the case is tried to a jury,
then a plaintiff must prove damages to the jury’s satis-
faction, subject to the trial court’s postverdict review
on a motion for additur pursuant to General Statutes
§§ 52-216a and 52-228b. The plaintiff provides us with
no authority, and we are aware of none, that requires
a court to award the plaintiff her full damages claim
under the present circumstances. A party cannot ask
the jury for an award of a certain type of damages
and then, dissatisfied with the verdict, repackage its
damages claim as a question of statutory interpretation
and ask the trial court to award that same type of
damages in a higher amount as a matter of law.
   The crux of the plaintiff’s argument is that it was
inequitable for the trial court to decline to award her
the vehicle’s full purchase price (including the amount
she had financed) because that decision violated the
principle that she be returned to the same position she
would have been in had the contract been performed.
The plaintiff’s grievance is misplaced. As we stated, it
was peculiarly within the jury’s province to determine
the amount of damages that would return the plaintiff
to the financial position she would have been in had
the contract been performed. That is exactly what the
jury was instructed to do, and the plaintiff has not
challenged the verdict itself. See footnote 5 of this opin-
ion. We acknowledge that the plaintiff did not receive
the full amount of her damages claim, but that is not
uncommon in jury cases. The jury might have discred-
ited aspects of the plaintiff’s evidence with respect to
damages or determined that the plaintiff had failed to
establish to its satisfaction that the vehicle’s full pur-
chase price had been paid. In closing argument, the
plaintiff’s counsel directed the jury to the purchase
contract in evidence containing the purchase price for
the vehicle but did not expressly ask the jury for
$25,471.79—or any other figure—as damages for revo-
cation of acceptance. Without specific interrogatories
asking for the jury’s damages calculus, we cannot know
for certain how the jury reached its $11,000 award. But,
as the Appellate Court aptly recognized, it is plausible
that, without further guidance, the jury reasoned that
$11,000 was the amount ‘‘ ‘of the purchase price as
has been paid as well as damages for incidental and
consequential expenses’ ’’ because that amount roughly
equaled the cumulative number of monthly payments
the plaintiff had made between the date of purchase
and trial. See Hassett v. Secor’s Auto Center, Inc., supra,
215 Conn. App. 476, 478. It is up to the jury to weigh
the parties’ evidence, and ‘‘[j]uries may differ widely in
the conclusions . . . they reach in what may be appar-
ently similar cases, and, in fact, in any given case one
jury may arrive at a result substantially different from
that of another jury.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Munn v. Hotchkiss School, supra, 326 Conn. 579.
   The plaintiff could have filed a motion to set aside
the verdict and moved for additur, challenging the jury’s
damages award as inadequate. See, e.g., Childs v.
Bainer, supra, 235 Conn. 114–15; see also footnote 5
of this opinion. Alternatively, in pursuit of the full pur-
chase price of the vehicle, instead of presenting the
question of revocation of acceptance damages to the
jury in the first instance, the plaintiff could have
attempted to reserve the issue until after the verdict
on the basis of a stipulation to the exact amount of
those damages should the jury find in her favor on her
revocation of acceptance claim. See, e.g., Salamone v.
Douglas Marine Corp., United States District Court,
Docket No. 1:19-CV-01213 (MAD/DJS), 2021 WL 3723105,
*7 (N.D.N.Y. August 23, 2021) (parties stipulated prior
to trial amount ‘‘paid’’ in connection with revocation
of acceptance claim).13 The plaintiff did neither. Instead,
she moved for judgment in accordance with the verdict,
making no challenge to the propriety of the jury’s award
of $11,000. Under these circumstances, we cannot con-
clude that the trial court abused its discretion in denying
the plaintiff’s motion for additur.
      The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.
      In this opinion the other justices concurred.
  1
     The six counts of the complaint alleged (1) breach of implied warranties
under General Statutes § 42a-2-314; (2) breach of written warranties under
General Statutes §§ 42a-2-313 and 42a-2-318; (3) breach of written and
implied warranties under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty—Federal Trade
Commission Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301 et seq. (2012); (4) revocation
of acceptance under General Statutes § 42a-2-608; (5) breach of the obliga-
tion of good faith and fair dealing under General Statutes § 42a-1-304; and
(6) violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, General Statutes
§ 42-110a et seq.
   2
     Although the plaintiff’s complaint cited the implied warranty statute,
General Statutes § 42a-2-314, to support her revocation of acceptance claim,
it was clear at trial that her claim actually was founded on § 42a-2-608. The
defendant makes no claim otherwise.
   3
     The general damages instruction provided: ‘‘In deciding damages, you
must attempt to restore the plaintiff to her original position prior to the
purchase as nearly as possible. [The] plaintiff is not entitled to recover more
than once for harm growing out of the same transaction, occurrence, or
event. In other words, [the] plaintiff may recover fair, just, and reasonable
damages for the same loss only once. The evidence must give you a sufficient
basis upon which to estimate the amount of damages claimed by the plaintiff.
Although damages may be based on reasonable and probable estimates,
you may not award damages on the basis of a guess, speculation, or conjec-
ture. The law does not require [the] plaintiff to prove her damages with
mathematical precision, but only with as much definiteness as the circum-
stances permit to give you a sufficient basis upon which to estimate those
damages.’’
   4
     To recount these off-the-record discussions for the record, the court
stated: ‘‘Revocation of acceptance claim proved. I know there was a discus-
sion, informally, about some deletion of material that had been produced
or requested of the court to insert regarding the damages. The court did
take note of that. I have inserted the required language pursuant to the
statutory elements of damages relevant to that claim. Counsel, have you
had time to review that, and do you have any comments, questions, or
concerns you’d like to put on the record?’’ After further discussion off the
record, both counsel responded that the charge was ‘‘fine . . . .’’ The record
does not indicate what changes the parties requested or the trial court made
to this instruction.
   5
     Ordinarily, additur is sought in conjunction with a motion to set aside
the verdict and challenges the propriety of the jury’s verdict as being (1)
so inadequate that it shocks the court’s sense of justice, (2) inadequate
because the plaintiff proved substantial damages, or (3) inherently ambigu-
ous. See, e.g., Maldonado v. Flannery, 343 Conn. 150, 166, 272 A.3d 1089
(2022); Childs v. Bainer, 235 Conn. 107, 114–15, 663 A.2d 398 (1995).
   Here, the plaintiff does not challenge the jury’s verdict. Instead, she asked
the trial court to uphold the verdict and award her additional damages equal
to the vehicle’s purchase price. The defendant, recognizing the irregularity
of the method the plaintiff used, contended in its supplemental objection
to the motion for additur that ‘‘the plaintiff ha[d] procedurally waived [her]
right to request an additur’’ by failing to move to set aside the verdict.
Because the defendant does not renew this procedural argument on appeal,
we need not address it.
   6
     In one sentence in her opening brief to this court and another in her
reply brief, the plaintiff contends that the defendant should be judicially
estopped from changing the position it took in its initial objection. We
decline to consider this argument because it is raised for the first time on
appeal and is inadequately briefed. See, e.g., JPMorgan Chase Bank,
National Assn. v. Lakner, 347 Conn. 476, 496 n.9, 298 A.3d 249 (2023); Cohen
v. Rossi, 346 Conn. 642, 689–90, 295 A.3d 75 (2023).
   7
     The aspect of the court’s decision concerning the passage of title to the
vehicle is not at issue on appeal.
   8
     The focus of the parties’ submissions to this court concerned the con-
struction of § 42a-2-711, consistent with the language of the question we
certified for review: ‘‘Did the Appellate Court properly construe and apply
. . . § 42a-2-711 (1) in concluding that the trial court had not abused its
discretion in denying the plaintiff’s motion for additur with respect to the
damages awarded to the plaintiff for her revocation of acceptance claim?’’
Hassett v. Secor’s Auto Center, Inc., 345 Conn. 965, 965–66, 285 A.3d 389
(2022). Because the parties agreed to submit the issue of revocation of
acceptance damages to the jury, however, we cannot resolve the statutory
interpretation aspect of the certified question in this appeal. To the extent
that the Appellate Court discussed the meaning of § 42a-2-711, including its
potential interplay with § 52-572g (a) when the consumer has financed her
purchase, we must view the precedential value of this analysis to be confined
to the distinct factual scenario at issue. See Hassett v. Secor’s Auto Center,
Inc., supra, 215 Conn. App. 475–76, 477 n.7.
   9
     The plaintiff has neither attempted to offer her point of view as to how
the jury reached its $11,000 damages award nor explained what aspects of
incidental and consequential damages would have supported that award.
   10
      In her reply brief, the plaintiff faults the defendant for failing in its
appellee brief to respond to her contention that the award of the purchase
price for the vehicle was undisputed and not submitted to the jury. It is
true that the bulk of the defendant’s appellee brief answers the statutory
interpretation aspect of the certified question. See footnote 8 of this opinion.
Nevertheless, the defendant’s brief is replete with various arguments sup-
porting its long-standing position that the jury decided the issue of revocation
of acceptance damages in the first instance.
   11
      To the extent that we are required to interpret the parties’ pleadings,
our review is plenary. See, e.g., Carpenter v. Daar, 346 Conn. 80, 128, 287
A.3d 1027 (2023).
   12
      Additionally, the amount that the plaintiff alleged was the purchase
price in her complaint, $28,848.40, was different from the amount that she
claimed was the purchase price of the vehicle in her motion for additur,
$25,471.79. The difference between those purchase prices is equal to the
$3376.61 finance charge, but the plaintiff never has explained why that
amount, under her theory of the case, should or should not have been
included in the amount of the ‘‘price as has been paid’’ pursuant to § 42a-
2-711 (1). Indeed, the retail installment contract and the purchase agreement
also contain disparate amounts that arguably could have been used as the
‘‘purchase price.’’ The retail installment contract provides that the ‘‘[t]otal
[s]ale [p]rice’’ was $28,848.40, and the ‘‘[c]ash [p]rice’’ was $24,774.79,
whereas the purchase agreement provides that the ‘‘cash price’’ was $23,415,
the ‘‘total cash price delivered’’ was $25,471.79, and the ‘‘total time price’’
was $28,848.40. Regardless, the amount of the purchase price the plaintiff
requested in her motion for additur was not undisputed because it was not
the amount to which the defendant admitted.
   13
      We do not decide whether the issue of revocation of acceptance damages
pursuant to § 42a-2-711 must be decided by the jury as a matter of fact in
every case. Our decision in this regard is limited to the facts presented, and
we do not limit the ability of the parties in a prospective case to argue that
a court, as a matter of law, can award revocation of acceptance damages
pursuant to § 42a-2-711 after trial.