Court Opinion

ID: 9681890
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 08:00:34.684974+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:36.384974
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Griffin,
joined by Justice Calvert, dissenting.
I cannot agree that respondent should inherit under Article 2571, Vernon’s Annotated Civil Statutes, upon the death of L. L. McConnell. There can be no question but that the separation agreement is valid and binding on all parties, and its validity is so recognized without any question. The majority opinion says the rights of inheritance of Lucille McConnell were not disposed of by virtue of the separation agreement. I think this separation agreement definitely disposed of the property rights which each party had as a result of the marriage. The agreement recites: “NOW THEREFORE, The parties hereto mutually agree as to the partition of their community property and as to the separate property of each as foliotes: * * This clearly places the separate property of each under the separation agreement. With regard to L. L. McConnell’s separate property, Lucille agrees “that all real estate vested in L. L. McConnell was owned and acquired by him prior to his marriage to her and is his separate property and that she has and claims no interest therein by reason of payment of any indebtedness thereon or otherwise.” (Emphasis *55ours.) The use of these words shows that the parties recognized she had an interest in the separate property which (as they stated it) was: first, the right to be reimbursed for any community funds used to pay debts against the separate property, and, second, “or otherwise.” These last two words were inserted in the agreement for some purpose, and to cover all interests which Lucille had in the separate property as distinguished from the right of reimbursement. This language could only mean that Lucille consciously and specifically relinquished any, all, and every right, interest or claim of every kind and character, (including the right to inherit) in all property, both community and separate, for and in consideration of the recitals set forth in paragrah I of the contract.
I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Opinion delivered December 16, 1953.
Rehearing overruled January 13, 1954.