Court Opinion

ID: 9649785
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 15:09:29.046751+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:15.048094
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Spaeth, J.:
The conduct of appellee in this case would have clearly entitled appellant to a divorce on the ground of indignities if the defense of mental illness had not been raised. The majority finds, however, that appellee’s *105conduct was a “product of mental illness and disorder” (Majority opinion at p. 104), and therefore affirms the lower court’s order dismissing appellant’s complaint in divorce. I cannot agree with this disposition.
First, the testimony of appellee’s expert witness, a psychiatrist, though admissible, was most unsatisfactory. Although the psychiatrist properly relied on the reports of others involved in treatment of appellee, he himself spent no more than one hour with appellee. More important, his testimony was inconclusive. He diagnosed appellee as having a manic-depressive psychosis, based on certain enumerated symptoms, such as wanting to walk rather than ride in a car, inability to sleep, poor money management, and having automobile accidents. Upon cross-examination, however, he admitted that most of these symptoms were compatible with normal behavior.
Second, assuming that appellee’s mental disorder was established, it is not clear that the lower court reached the legally correct result. The court applied the test from Boggs v. Boggs, 221 Pa. Superior Ct. 22, 31, 289 A.2d 479, 483 (1972): if the spouse’s mental disturbance “significantly contributes to her offensive behavior,” her conduct may be excused. Under that test, the court may arguably have reached the correct result. However, had the court applied the test set forth in the later case of Dougherty v. Dougherty, 235 Pa. Superior Ct. 122, 339 A.2d 81 (1975), the result may very well have been different. That case holds that conduct is not excusable “unless legal insanity has intervened ... or recognizable and defined disease has usurped the will. ” Id. at 130, 339 A.2d at 85 (emphasis supplied). The court, it seems to me, would have been hard-pressed to find any evidence that appellee’s will had been usurped.
Justice is not served when the result turns on which of two inconsistent appellate cases the lower court happens to follow. For that and other reasons, I suggest in Steinke v. Steinke, 238 Pa. Superior Ct. 74, 83, 357 *106A.2d 674, 678 (concurring opinion of Spaeth, J.) (1976), that the following uniform standard be used in all indignities cases where mental illness is offered as a defense: whether under all of the circumstances, including the defendant’s mental disorder, it would be just to hold the defendant accountable for his misconduct. Id. at 99-100, 357 A.2d at 687.1 I would therefore remand this case to the lower court to apply this standard.
In making its decision on remand, one circumstance the court would consider is appellee’s ability to care for herself should a divorce be granted. If appellee is able to care for herself, that circumstance would weigh in favor of holding her accountable for her destruction of the marital relationship. If, however, she cannot care for herself, that would not necessarily mean that a divorce should not be granted. The court would then turn to Section 48 of the Divorce Law,2 Act of May 2, 1929, P.L. 1237, §48, added Sept. 22, 1972, P.L. 880, No. 202, §2, 23 P.S. §48, which provides:
“In case of the application of a spouse for divorce from a spouse who is insane or suffering from serious mental disorder, the court, or a judge thereof to whom the application is made, shall have the power before granting the divorce to decree an allowance for the support of the defendant spouse in such amount as it may direct. The allowance herein provided'may be subsequently adjusted to conform to changed conditions.”
If the court determined that appellee is presently *107suffering from a serious mental disorder, the court could grant appellee an adjustable permanent allowance. With appellee’s needs thus met, the court might then consider it just to grant appellant a divorce.3

. This standard was derived from United States v. Brawner, 471 F. 2d 969, 1010 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (dissenting opinion of BAZELON, C.J.), and from Commonwealth v. Woodhouse, 401 Pa. 242, 264, 164 A.2d 98, 109 (1960) (dissenting opinion of BOK, J.). Also see Commonwealth v. Simms, 228 Pa. Superior Ct. 85, 97, 324 A.2d 365, 379 (1974) (concurring opinion of SPAETH, J.).

. This ease, like that of Lyall v. Lyall, 240 Pa. Superior Ct. 649, 361 A.2d 367 (1976), presents the type of situation that Section 48 was specifically designed to alleviate.

. It is interesting to note that the testimony of appellee’s psychiatrist indicates that appellee’s contest of the divorce is related to the issue of financial support.
“Q. Were either of these visits to her made with her appearance at the divorce hearing and your testimony at the hearing in mind?
A. That was when we discussed with her that I received a letter from Mr. Harker regarding her divorce and her contest of the divorce because she does not want to lose any financial support.
Q. She understood at that time it was important to contest the divorce because to lose it would mean the loss of support payments?
A. Yes, she was much concerned about that.
Q. That is a fairly astute understanding by her isn’t it?
A. I think she understood the situation.” (N.T. 60).