Court Opinion

ID: 9481753
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 08:30:45.964019+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:48:33.349579
License: Public Domain

BRORBY, Circuit Judge.
Rodney Lee Morgan appeals his conviction by jury trial of the two-count indictment filed against him on September 6, 1989. The indictment charged Defendant with the following offenses: Count 1, armed bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d), and aiding and abetting in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2; and Count 2, possession of a firearm during the commission of a violent crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1).
On appeal Mr. Morgan raises the following issues: (1) “Was it error for the trial court to deny defendant’s motion to suppress?”; (2) “Was it error for the trial court to allow admission of evidence of defendant’s participation in a prior uncharged bank robbery?”; and (3) “Was it error for the trial court to increase defendant’s Sentencing Guidelines offense level for obstruction of justice and for being a leader or organizer of the criminal activity?” Because we find each of the above queries properly answered in the negative, we affirm.
I.
On August 11, 1989, Tulsa Police Officer Michael Eubanks was notified by police dispatch that the Heartland Savings and Loan had been robbed by three black males. Prior to this date, Officer Eubanks had received information from his superiors in the police department notifying him that a Chevrolet El Camino, license plate number “OST 757,” was suspected of being used in recent bank robberies that had occurred in the area. Officer Eubanks was aware that a vehicle matching that description was frequently driven by a resident in the area, Mr. Dwight Reed. Officer Eu-banks was also aware Mr. Morgan was a possible suspect in the recent robberies in the area as Mr. Morgan had been previously tried and acquitted of a bank robbery involving a switch vehicle and a clothes switch by the robbers immediately following the robbery.
*1565After receiving notification of the Heartland robbery from dispatch, Officer Eu-banks called fellow police officer Jay Taylor, and the two officers positioned their cars at two separate locations near the residence of Mr. Reed. Soon after, Officer Eubanks noticed the suspect El Camino pass, carrying three black males, one of whom he knew on sight as Defendant, Rodney Morgan. Officer Eubanks then followed the car with his red lights on for several blocks until it pulled into Reed’s driveway. Officer Eubanks pulled in behind the vehicle.
At this time, Mr. Morgan exited the vehicle on the passenger’s side, carrying a large tan bag, and Mr. Reed exited on the driver’s side.1 Officer Eubanks then told the men to “hold up,” and Mr. Morgan replied, “What do you want?” and began backing away. Officer Eubanks told Mr. Morgan not to run, but Mr. Morgan did so fleeing eastward around the north side of the residence. Officer Eubanks pursued Mr. Morgan to the back of the residence where he observed Mr. Morgan attempting to enter the Reed house through the back door. Unable to gain entry into the house, Mr. Morgan threw the tan bag he was carrying to the south side of the porch and headed back down the porch stairs in the direction of Officer Eubanks. Mr. Morgan then disregarded Officer Eubanks’s order to get down on the ground and attempted to go by him. A struggle ensued, but Officer Eubanks ultimately subdued and handcuffed Mr. Morgan. Officer Taylor arrived to assist Officer Eubanks and handcuffed Mr. Reed near Mr. Morgan. The third male occupant of the vehicle, however, fled the scene and was not found.
After Mr. Morgan and Mr. Reed were secured, Officer Eubanks retrieved the tan bag, and it was taken along with the two men to the Tulsa Police Station where it. was searched without a warrant. The bag contained, among other things, several pairs of blue jeans, several partial pairs of pantyhose, two pistols, and over $6,000 in cash, including bait money from Heartland bank.
Prior to his trial, Defendant brought a motion to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of the warrantless search of the tan bag. Defendant also argued his arrest was illegal as it was not supported by probable cause. The district court held an evidentiary hearing on Defendant’s motion. Following the hearing, the district court denied Defendant’s motion, finding there was probable cause for the warrantless arrest of Mr. Morgan, and that the war-rantless search of the tan bag was lawful.
Mr. Morgan’s case proceeded to trial. During the trial, a hearing was held outside the presence of the jury to determine whether the Government would be allowed to admit evidence relating to Defendant’s involvement in a prior uncharged bank robbery. The court allowed the admission over the objection of Defendant. On December 5, 1989, the jury returned guilty verdicts as to both counts charged in the indictment. Defendant was subsequently sentenced to eighty-seven months on Count I, and sixty months on Count II, to run consecutively.
II.
A. Motion to Suppress
“In an appeal of the denial of a defendant’s motion to suppress evidence, our standard of review is to accept the trial court’s findings of fact, unless clearly erroneous, and to consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government.” United States v. McAlpine, 919 F.2d 1461, 1463 (10th Cir.1990). “If or where findings are not made, this court must uphold the ruling if there is any reasonable view of the evidence to support it.” United States v. Neu, 879 F.2d 805, 807 (10th Cir.1989) (citing United States v. Comosona, 848 F.2d 1110, 1111 (10th Cir.1988)). Ultimate determinations of reasonableness concerning Fourth Amendment issues and other questions of law, however, are reviewed de *1566novo. United States v. Butler, 904 F.2d 1482, 1484 (10th Cir.1990).
1. Warrantless Arrest
On appeal, Mr. Morgan contends the trial court erred in determining the warrantless arrest was supported by probable cause, arguing that he was “seized” at the time Officer Eubanks ordered him not to leave; that “it [is] at this time that Eubanks had to have probable cause to arrest”; and that probable cause did not then exist.
This court has previously identified three categories of police/citizen encounters:
“The first is referred to as a police-citizen encounter and is characterized by the voluntary cooperation of a citizen in response to non-coercive questioning. This has been held to raise no constitutional issues because this type of contact is not a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment....
“The second type of encounter is the Terry-type of stop. The standards here are set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Most courts characterize this as a ‘brief, non-intrusive detention during a frisk for weapons or preliminary questioning * * *.’ This is considered a seizure of the person within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, but need not be supported by probable cause. In order to justify an investigatory stop, the officer need have only ‘specific and articulable facts sufficient to give rise to reasonable suspicion that a person has committed or is committing a crime.’
“The final category is an arrest which is characterized by highly intrusive or lengthy search or detention. An arrest is justified only when there is probable cause to believe that a person has committed or is committing a crime.”
United States v. Santillanes, 848 F.2d 1103, 1106 (10th Cir.1988) (quoting United States v. Cooper, 733 F.2d 1360, 1363 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1255, 104 S.Ct. 3543, 82 L.Ed.2d 847 (1984) (citations omitted)).
With these guidelines in mind, we review the encounter at issue in this case. The record reveals Officer Eubanks followed the suspect vehicle, in which Defendant was a passenger, for several blocks with his red lights on. When the vehicle turned into the driveway of the Reed residence, Eubanks pulled into the driveway behind it. Upon Defendant’s exit from the vehicle, Officer Eubanks testified that the following exchange occurred:
[Officer Eubanks:] I told them to hold up, and Rodney [Morgan] says, “What do you want?” And I said, “Just hold it right there.” Rodney started to back up. I said, “Rodney, don’t run.” And he ran around on the north side of the house to the east.
“[N]ot all [encounters] between policemen and citizens involve[] ‘seizures’ of persons. Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a ‘seizure’ has occurred.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n. 16, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879 n. 16, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). For purposes of invoking Fourth Amendment protection, a person is deemed “seized ... ‘only if ... a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.’ ” Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573, 108 S.Ct. 1975, 1979, 100 L.Ed.2d 565 (1988) (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1877, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980) (opinion of Stewart, J.)); see also INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 215, 104 S.Ct. 1758, 1762, 80 L.Ed.2d 247 (1984). This so-called “Mendenhall test” was discussed by the Supreme Court in its recent case, California v. Hodari D., — U.S. —, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 1551, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991), where the court emphasized that the language “only if” employed by the test “states a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for seizure ... effected through a ‘show of authority.’ ” The Court then held that assuming the police officer’s actions constituted a show of authority seeking to enjoin the defendant to halt, “since [the defendant] did not comply with that injunction he was not seized until he was tackled.” Id. at 1552.
*1567Here, the intrusion on Mr. Morgan in regard to the initial attempted questioning by Officer Eubanks and the subsequent exchange between the two was minimal. However, since Officer Eubanks had followed the car in which Defendant was a passenger for several blocks with his red lights flashing; since Officer Eubanks exited from a marked police car, in uniform, and asked the Defendant to hold up; and since Defendant, at least momentarily, yielded to the Officer’s apparent show of authority, we find Mr. Morgan was seized for purposes of the Fourth Amendment during the initial portion of the encounter. Cf. Hodari D., 111 S.Ct. at 1550 (“[On] [t]he narrow question ... [of] whether, with respect to a show of authority ... a seizure occurs even though the subject does not yield. We hold that it does not.” (Emphasis added.)) We further find, however, this initial seizure was brief, nonintrusive, and within the parameters of Terry. Therefore, probable cause was not required and we need not decide whether it then existed. Terry, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868.
We are left with the question, however, of whether the seizure was otherwise proper. In Santillanes, we discussed when a Terry-type stop will be deemed appropriate, stating:
“Terry permits police officers who suspect criminal activity to make limited intrusions on an individual’s personal security based on less than probable cause. In order to justify an investigative stop, an officer need have only a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person has been, is or is about to be engaged in criminal activity. In evaluating the reasonableness of an investigative stop, courts are to examine
‘whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.’
“This assessment of reasonableness is essentially a balancing test [weighing]
‘the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion....’”
Santillanes, 848 F.2d at 1107 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Recalde, 761 F.2d 1448, 1454 (10th Cir.1985) (citations omitted)).
In determining whether Officer Eu-banks had the reasonable, articulable suspicion required to make a Terry-type investigative stop, we look to those facts known to the officer at the time. Several weeks prior to August 11, 1989, Officer Eubanks was notified by one of his superiors, Sergeant Bell, that Mr. Morgan was a suspect in the recent robberies that had occurred in the area, and that Mr. Morgan had been tried and acquitted of a bank robbery charge in 1987. He was also informed that the modus operandi of the bank robbers in the 1987 robbery was that the robbers changed clothes after the robbery and that a car switch was involved. Sergeant Bell later informed Officer Eubanks that the suspected robbers in the Bixby robbery (which had occurred several weeks prior) were seen leaving the bank in an El Camino, bearing license plate “OST 757.” Officer Eubanks had previously stopped that vehicle on an unrelated matter and knew that a resident in the area, Mr. Reed, frequently drove the vehicle. On the day of the Heartland robbery, Officer Eubanks was informed via police dispatch that the suspects in the robbery were three black males. Shortly after hearing the report, Officer Eubanks saw the suspect vehicle with three black males inside, recognizing one of the passengers as Mr. Morgan. Officer Eubanks followed the car with his red lights on for several blocks before pulling in behind it in the Reed driveway. He then saw Mr. Reed and Mr. Morgan exit the vehicle with Mr. Morgan carrying a tan bag.
In United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989), the Supreme Court held determinations of the existence of reasonable suspicion in the context of investigative stops are to be based upon “ ‘the totality of the circumstances — the whole picture.’ ” Id. at 8, 109 S.Ct. at 1585 (quoting United States v. *1568Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690, 694, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981)). We conclude the facts in this case, along with the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, sufficiently gave rise to a “reasonable, articula-ble suspicion that [Mr. Morgan] ha[d] been, is, or [wa]s about to be engaged in criminal activity.” Recalde, 761 F.2d at 1454 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-22, 88 S.Ct. at 1879-80); see also United States v. Henning, 906 F.2d 1392, 1395 (10th Cir.1990), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 111 S.Ct. 789, 112 L.Ed.2d 852 (1991). We therefore find the investigative stop by Officer Eubanks was “justified at its inception”. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20, 88 S.Ct. at 1879.
Next, we consider whether the stop was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances justifying it. As previously discussed, the initial encounter between Officer Eubanks and Mr. Morgan was brief and nonintrusive. Officer Eubanks did not use his siren even when the vehicle did not stop immediately; there was no physical force by the officer when he approached the suspects initially; and there is no indication in the record the officer removed his gun before approaching the vehicle. We hold the scope of the initial stop and detention involved herein was reasonable when balanced with the law enforcement interests at stake. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 2642, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983).
Having found a valid investigative stop and detention occurred during the initial portion of the encounter between Officer Eubanks and Mr. Morgan, we now turn our attention to the latter portion of the encounter. As previously discussed, “ ‘an arrest ... is characterized by highly intrusive or lengthy search or detention.’ ” Santillanes, 848 F.2d at 1106. In the present case, after ignoring Officer Eubanks’s directive not to run, Mr. Morgan fled toward the back of the residence. Officer Eu-banks pursued Mr. Morgan and found him attempting to enter the residence through a back door. Mr. Morgan then threw the bag he was carrying to the south side of the back porch and headed back in the direction of Officer Eubanks. At this point, Mr. Morgan asked, “What do you want, Eubanks?” Officer Eubanks told Mr. Morgan to get down on the ground. This directive was also ignored, and Mr. Morgan attempted to pass by the officer. A struggle ensued, but shortly thereafter the officer successfully subdued Mr. Morgan and handcuffed him to a nearby chain link fence. With the assistance of Officer Taylor, the driver of the vehicle was also handcuffed, and both men were taken to the Tulsa Police Station.
Having found the seizure occurring during the initial phase of the encounter was justified as an investigative detention under Terry, we must next look to the portion of the encounter where Officer Eubanks engaged in a struggle with and subdued Mr. Morgan. We find that at this point the encounter exceeded the parameters of an investigative detention and constituted an arrest. Thus, we find the encounter in this case included, at different times, both an investigative detention and an arrest. Santillanes, 848 F.2d at 1106-07; see also Terry, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868. Having so decided, we must determine whether the officer, at the time of the arrest, possessed the requisite probable cause to make the arrest without a warrant.
Probable cause will be found to exist where facts and circumstances within the officer's own knowledge, which the officer has received through reasonably trustworthy information, sufficiently warrant a man of reasonable caution to believe an offense has been or is being committed by the person to be arrested. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208 n. 9, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 2254 n. 9, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979); United States v. Maher, 919 F.2d 1482, 1485 (10th Cir.1990). Probable cause must be evaluated in light of circumstances as they would have appeared to a prudent, cautious, trained police officer. Maher, 919 F.2d at 1485 (citing United States v. Lopez, 777 F.2d 543, 552 (10th Cir.1985), and United States v. McCormick, 468 F.2d 68, 73 (10th Cir.1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 927, 93 S.Ct. 1361, 35 L.Ed.2d 588 (1978)). The determination of whether probable cause exists is primarily a factual *1569question. United States v. Fox, 902 F.2d 1508, 1513 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 111 S.Ct. 199, 112 L.Ed.2d 161 (1990). Therefore, “[ujnless, in construing all evidence in a light most favorable to the government, the trial court’s finding of probable cause is clearly erroneous, it must not be disturbed.” United States v. Alonso, 790 F.2d 1489, 1496 (10th Cir.1986) (citing United States v. Rios, 611 F.2d 1335, 1344 (10th Cir.1979)).
Following an evidentiary hearing on Defendant’s motion to suppress, the district court concluded there was probable cause for the warrantless arrest of Mr. Morgan. Probable cause determinations are properly made using a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2332, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). Mr. Morgan contends he was arrested without probable cause arguing the information relied upon by Officer Eubanks was not shown to be reliable. We find this contention without merit. The facts underlying Officer Eubanks’ initial suspicions were derived from information relayed to him by a supervising officer who received information from a citizen witness and through other reliable police channels. We find the information communicated to Officer Eubanks was reliable, and along with the officer’s personal observations and knowledge, gave clear support to a finding of probable cause to arrest Mr. Morgan. See Easton v. City of Boulder, 776 F.2d 1441, 1449-50 (10th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 816, 107 S.Ct. 71, 93 L.Ed.2d 28 (1986) (discussing the relaxed standard of scrutiny to be applied in cases involving citizen-witness informants, and the lessened standard regarding the competency of evidence upon which probable cause may be based); Karr v. Smith, 774 F.2d 1029, 1032 (10th Cir.1985) (applying the fellow-officer rule and imputing the knowledge of a superior officer to the arresting officers). See generally Gates; 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure, §§ 3.4-3.5 (1987 & 1991 Supp.). Having already held Officer Eubanks possessed the necessary reasonable suspicion to conduct the initial investigative stop and seizure, we now hold that the totality-of-the-circumstances — the facts establishing the officer’s reasonable suspicion combined with the furtive actions and flight of Mr. Morgan— sufficiently support a finding of probable cause to arrest. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 366 n. 4, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1863 n. 4, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“[SJome reactions by individuals to a properly limited Terry encounter, ... such as flight, may often provide the necessary information, in addition to that which the officers already possess, to constitute probable cause”); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 66-67, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 1904-05, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968) (“[DJeliber-ately furtive actions and flight at the approach of strangers or law officers are strong indicia of mens rea, and when coupled with specific knowledge on the part of the officer relating the suspect to the evidence of crime, they are proper factors to be considered in the decision to make an arrest.”); United States v. Bell, 892 F.2d 959, 967 (10th Cir.1989) (after holding the officer had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, finding the defendant’s actions of dropping his bag and running supplied the additional grounds to provide probable cause for his warrantless arrest), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 110 S.Ct. 2618, 110 L.Ed.2d 639 (1990). Accordingly, we hold the warrantless arrest of Mr. Morgan was supported by probable cause, and therefore lawful.
2. Warrantless Search of Bag
Defendant’s second claim of error regarding the trial court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress involves the war-rantless search of the tan bag. Defendant argues the warrantless search was illegal as it was “not incident to an arrest,” nor was it properly “an inventory search” as the trial court found. The Government argues “[t]he district court correctly upheld the search of the nylon gym bag” on the grounds stated. The Government also argues, as it did before the trial court, that “Morgan abandoned the gym bag and his right to challenge the search” by throwing the bag prior to his arrest.
*1570We first reiterate that in reviewing a trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress, we must accept the trial court’s findings of fact unless clearly erroneous, and must consider all evidence in a light most favorable to the Government. McAlpine, 919 F.2d at 1463; Neu, 879 F.2d at 807. And where findings are not made, this court must uphold the ruling of the trial court if there exists any reasonable view of the evidence to support it. Neu, 879 F.2d at 807.
Included in the trial court’s factual findings were the following findings relating to the tan bag: (1) that Mr. Morgan “threw the bag to the south side of the porch;” and (2) that “[t]he bag carried, and then thrown by the Defendant, was taken to the Tulsa Police Station and there searched.” Upon review of the record, and viewing all evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, we find these factual findings of the trial court were not clearly erroneous.
We also conclude Mr. Morgan abandoned the gym bag and any privacy interests he had in it. In Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 241, 80 S.Ct. 683, 698, 4 L.Ed.2d 668 (1960), the Supreme Court held the warrantless seizure of abandoned property did not violate the Fourth Amendment. See also United States v. Jones, 707 F.2d 1169, 1172 (10th Cir.) (“[A] warrantless search or seizure of abandoned property is not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 859, 104 S.Ct. 184, 78 L.Ed.2d 163 (1983). Although the trial court neglected to make findings on this issue, we find the record reveals an abandonment. Under Neu, 879 F.2d at 807, we must uphold the denial of the motion to suppress “if there is any reasonable view of the evidence to support it.” Id. (emphasis added).
In Jones, this court acknowledged that “[w]hen individuals voluntarily abandon property, they forfeit any expectation of privacy in it that they might have had.” 707 F.2d at 1172. Thus, determinations of abandonment are based on whether the individual has retained any reasonable expectation of privacy in the object. Id. The existence of such an expectation is a question of intent requiring us to examine words spoken, actions taken, and other objective facts involved. Id.
Here, we have the trial court’s finding that Mr. Morgan “threw” the bag to the south side of the porch and then came back in the direction of Officer Eu-banks. The record indicates Mr. Morgan then attempted to go by Officer Eubanks, disregarding the Officer’s order to get down on the ground. No attempt was made by the Defendant to retrieve the bag nor did he request the officers or anyone else to retrieve it for him.2 While an abandonment must be voluntary, “[tjhe existence of police pursuit or investigation at the time of abandonment does not of itself render the abandonment involuntary.” Jones, 707 F.2d at 1172. See also Smith v. Ohio, 494 U.S. 541, —, 110 S.Ct. 1288, 1290, 108 L.Ed.2d 464 (1990) (finding “a citizen who attempts to protect his private property from inspection, after throwing it on a car to respond to a police officer’s inquiry, clearly has not abandoned that property.” (Emphasis added.)) In the instant case, no attempt was made to protect the bag or its contents from inspection, nor did we find any manifestations by Mr. Morgan, verbal or otherwise, to indicate he retained a reasonable privacy interest in the bag. The fact that Mr. Morgan was in the backyard of someone he knew or was acquainted with, at the time he threw the bag, is of little significance. The record reveals we do not have before us a case where the item was left to the care or responsibility of another, or where there is a delayed indication of an intent to retain *1571an expectation of privacy in the item. See United States v. Burnette, 698 F.2d 1038, 1048 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 936, 103 S.Ct. 2106, 77 L.Ed.2d 312 (1983). Mr. Morgan discarded the bag while he was in the backyard of the Reed residence. Dwight Reed, who resided on the premises, was handcuffed and taken to the police station along with Mr. Morgan. There is no indication that Mr. Morgan requested the assistance of anyone to help recover or protect the bag, and the record discloses no one else was present who could have provided such assistance. Moreover, the record indicates that the backyard of the Reed residence abutted an open field and wooded area. Thus, the bag would have been plainly visible to those passing by the yard via those open areas. As we noted in Jones:
When Jones discarded the satchel, he may have hoped that the police would not find it and that he could later retrieve it. However, his ability to recover the satchel depended entirely upon fate and the absence of inquisitive (and acquisitive) passers-by.
707 F.2d at 1172. We believe Mr. Morgan’s ability to recover the bag, if left where it was thrown, was equally dependent upon fate. Indeed, the facts before us make the possibility of recovery of the bag even more attenuated since here, unlike Jones, no other person was present at the scene to provide protection of the bag or assist in its recovery. Therefore, we hold Mr. Morgan voluntarily abandoned the bag, forfeiting his claim to object to its warrant-less search.3
We also find the actions of Officer Eu-banks regarding the bag and its contents, which included preparation of an indiscriminate and documented inventory list, and acquisition of a property receipt for the items, to be strong evidence that the inventory was conducted pursuant to “standardized criteria” or an “established routine.” Florida v. Wells, — U.S.—, 110 S.Ct. 1632,1635,109 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990). However, in light of our holding that Mr. Morgan abandoned his right to object to the search of the bag, we will not decide whether the record sufficiently supports the trial court’s conclusion that the search of the bag was a proper inventory search.
B. Admission of 404(b) Evidence
Defendant contends the testimony of Dwight Reed relating to Defendant’s alleged participation in an earlier bank robbery was improperly admitted as Rule 404(b) evidence.4 In support of this contention, Mr. Morgan argues: (1) that the “evidence was not relevant to a proper purpose under rule 404(b);” (2) that “[t]he probative value of this evidence, if any, was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues and misleading the jury;” and (3) that “[t]he court’s limiting instructions failed to limit the purpose of the evidence to a relevant purpose, confused and misled the jury, and prejudiced the defendant.”
Determinations of whether to allow the admission of evidence lies within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent a clear showing of an abuse of discretion. United States v. Record, 873 F.2d 1363, 1373 (10th Cir.1989); United States v. Cuch, 842 F.2d 1173, 1175 (10th Cir.1988).
*1572Prior to admitting the 404(b) evidence, the court held a separate hearing, outside the presence of the jury, to determine whether the testimony should be admitted. The court heard from the Government’s witness, Dwight Reed, who offered testimony including detailed accounts of Mr. Morgan’s participation in an uncharged bank robbery that occurred several weeks before the Heartland robbery prior at the Brookside Bank in Bixby, Oklahoma. The two robberies involved many similarities: both times a stolen car was used to drive to the banks; both involved robbers who wore masks made out of sweat pants; weapons were used in both; and the maroon-colored El Camino, which Mr. Morgan was in just prior to his arrest, was seen in the Bixby area following the robbery. At the end of the hearing, Defendant objected to the admission of the testimony as improper under Rule 404(b). The court then noted:
[its] inclination is to think that it would be proper 404(B), along with his denial, and then the proximity in time of just a couple of weeks, and the method and scheme employed seem to be quite similar with the stolen vehicle and the use of the masks....
... I am inclined with the denial because of the issue of identification and absence of mistake and similarity of the schemes and the planning that went into the matter, that it has 404(B) significance here, and that the prejudice might well be outweighed by the relevance. And I will give some further thought to that.
After considering the objection overnight, the court deemed the testimony to be appropriate 404(b) material and admissible on that basis, stating:
[UJnder the Record case and the case out of the Supreme Court of the United States [Huddleston ] mentioned therein, the Court thinks under the facts and circumstances here that the Bixby bank incident, as explained by [Mr. Reed] ... would be appropriate 404(B) material and the Court thinks its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect.
In Record, 873 F.2d at 1373-76, this court reevaluated the proper application of Rule 404(b) in light of the inclusive approach toward the admission of 404(b) evidence vindicated by the Supreme Court case, Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 108 S.Ct. 1496, 99 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988). We therefore review the district court’s decision to admit the 404(b) evidence by applying to the facts of this case the guidelines set forth in Huddleston and Record.
Huddleston provides four requirements in allowing the admission of 404(b) evidence: (1) the evidence must be offered for a proper purpose; (2) the evidence must meet the relevancy requirement of Rule 402 — as enforced through Rule 104(b); (3) the trial court must assess whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice; and (4) the trial court shall, upon request, instruct the jury that the similar acts evidence is to be considered only for the proper purpose for which it was admitted. Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 691-92, 108 S.Ct. at 1502.
In Record, this court reaffirmed that prior uncharged acts evidence used to demonstrate motive, intent, knowledge, or plan does have probative value, particularly when “the uncharged misconduct is close in time and similar in method to the charged scheme.” Record, 873 F.2d at 1375 (citation omitted). In this case, the uncharged act evidence related to a recent bank robbery involving many similarities to the charged robbery. Thus, we find the proffered testimony sufficiently meets the first two requirements of Huddleston — its offering was for a proper and relevant purpose. The third requirement of Huddleston has also been satisfied. The trial court specifically found the “probative value [of the evidence] outweigh[ed] its prejudicial effect.” We give broad discretion to the trial court in making this determination. Record, 873 F.2d at 1375 (citing United States v. Esch, 832 F.2d 531, 535 (10th Cir.1987), certs. denied, 485 U.S. 908, 108 S.Ct. 1084, 99 L.Ed.2d 242, 485 U.S. 991, 108 S.Ct. 1299, 99 L.Ed.2d 509 (1988)). *1573Moreover, we find the evidence was highly probative on the issues of identity, absence of mistake or accident, and similarity in the charged plan or scheme. We also find the testimony’s prejudicial effect was properly limited by the court’s instruction to the jury immediately following the testimony.5 Thus, the court did not abuse its discretion on this point. The final Huddleston requirement was similarly satisfied as the court gave, in addition to the limiting instruction immediately following the testimony, a similar instruction in its final charge to the jury.
We note that Defendant correctly asserts that the proper purpose and relevancy of the offered testimony was not precisely articulated by either the Government or the trial court in that the focus could have been further narrowed. In United States v. Kendall, 766 F.2d 1426, 1436 (10th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1081, 106 S.Ct. 848, 88 L.Ed.2d 889 (1986), the requirement was imposed on the profferor of 404(b) evidence to “articulate precisely the eviden-tiary hypothesis by which a fact of consequence may be inferred from the evidence of other acts.” However, since Huddle-ston, we have held that any failure to adhere to the requirements of Kendall will be deemed harmless if “ ‘the purpose for admitting the other acts testimony is apparent from the record, and the district court’s decision to admit was correct.’ ” Record, 873 F.2d at 1375 n. 7 (quoting United States v. Orr, 864 F.2d 1505, 1511 (10th Cir.1988)). As our review of the record convinces us the court’s decision was correct and in compliance with the Huddleston requirements, we find any failure in adherence to Kendall harmless. See Orr, 864 F.2d at 1511.
Accordingly, we hold the admission of the testimony of Dwight Reed was proper and not an abuse of the trial court’s discretion.
C. Increase of Defendant’s Offense Level
Defendant’s final contention is that the trial court erred in increasing his offense level. Defendant challenges “the sufficiency of the evidence for sentencing purposes that the defendant was an organizer or leader of criminal activity and that the defendant obstructed justice when he testified at trial.”
We review factual findings by the sentencing court under a “clearly erroneous” standard. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (West Supp.1991). Such findings will not be reversed unless they are without factual support in the record, or unless after reviewing all the evidence, we are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. United States v. Beaulieu, 893 F.2d 1177, 1182 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 110 S.Ct. 3302, 111 L.Ed.2d 811 (1990). Where a question involves a mixture of both law and fact, but turns primarily on consideration of legal principles, a de novo review is appropriate. United States v. Roberts, 898 F.2d 1465, 1468-69 (10th Cir.1990) (citations omitted).
In this case, since Defendant is challenging the sufficiency of evidence, a primarily factual question, the clearly erroneous standard applies. See id.; United States v. Backas, 901 F.2d 1528, 1529 (10th Cir.), *1574cert. denied, — U.S. —, 111 S.Ct. 190, 112 L.Ed.2d 152 (1990).
1. Organizer or Leader of the Criminal Activity
 Sentencing courts may consider any reliable information, including hearsay, in sentencing a defendant. United States v. Rutter, 897 F.2d 1558, 1563 (10th Cir.) (citing Beaulieu, 893 F.2d at 1180-81), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 111 S.Ct. 88, 112 L.Ed.2d 60 (1990). This includes determination of a defendant’s role in the criminal activity. Id. Prior to imposing sentence, the court increased Defendant’s offense level pursuant to § 3Bl.l(c) of the United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual (“U.S.S.G.”). U.S.S.G. § 3Bl.l(c) directs the sentencing court, “[i]f the defendant was an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor in any criminal activity other than described in (a) or (b), increase by 2 levels.”6 In making the increase, the court stated it was a “very reasonable inference from th[e] evidence” that Mr. Morgan was “calling the shots and making the decisions and telling them how to go about it.” The court also found Mr. Morgan had “recruited a bunch of juveniles, young juveniles” and was “merely using these minors as his minions and had influenced them to assist in carrying out the robbery.”
In Bachos, we held that a defendant may be deemed a “supervisor” for purposes of U.S.S.G. § 3Bl.l(c) upon a showing that the defendant exercised any degree of direction or control over a subordinate in the criminal scheme. 901 F.2d at 1530. Our review of the record fully supports the trial court’s determination that Mr. Morgan was deserving of the two level increase provided in U.S.S.G. § 3Bl.l(c). The increase was justified and supported by sufficient evidence in the record, thus, we do not find the court was clearly erroneous in adjusting Mr. Morgan’s offense level on this basis.
2. Obstruction of Justice
Defendant also argues the court’s two level increase for obstruction of justice pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 was error. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 provides: “[i]f the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice during the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense, increase the offense level by 2 levels.”
“[T]he district court’s application of the Sentencing Guidelines to the facts of a particular case is entitled to due deference and its factual findings will not be reversed unless clearly erroneous.” United States v. Urbanek, 930 F.2d 1512, 1514 (10th Cir.1991) (citing United States v. Keys, 899 F.2d 983, 988 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 111 S.Ct. 160, 112 L.Ed.2d 125 (1990)).
The trial court made the following findings regarding Defendant’s obstruction of justice: “the Court thinks that the defendant engaged in significant conduct [by giving] ... his fabricated version of what took place and his lack of involvement;” the Defendant “maintained all the way along that he wasn’t involved in this bank robbery;” and “the defendant was very much involved, and the fact that he said he wasn’t is a fabrication and an untruth ... he lied about it.”
As we have previously held, merely denying guilt or exercising one’s constitutional right to testify is not a proper basis for an enhancement under § 3C1.1. Keys, 899 F.2d at 988. However, an enhancement is justified where a defendant goes further and testifies falsely. We find the record amply supports the trial court’s finding that the Defendant testified untruthfully, and therefore the enhancement *1575of his sentence pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 was proper. United States v. Beaulieu, 900 F.2d 1531, 1535-37 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 110 S.Ct. 3252, 111 L.Ed.2d 762 (1990).
Accordingly, we find the district court’s findings regarding Defendant’s role in the offense were supported in the record, and not clearly erroneous. Therefore, the court properly imposed sentence based on a total adjusted offense level of 23, and criminal history category of IV.
III.
For the above reasons, we AFFIRM the decision of the district court.

. A third passenger also exited the vehicle along with Mr. Morgan and Mr. Reed. He was later identified as Orlando Douglas.

. The cross-examination of Officer Eubanks included the following colloquy regarding the tan bag:
Q. Did anyone say to you anything about that bag on August 11th while you were still at the arrest scene? Did Rodney [Morgan] say to you anything about the bag?
A. [Officer Eubanks:] No.
Q. How about Dwight Reed? Did he say anything about the bag?
A. No.

. We find our holding on this issue bolstered by the recent Supreme Court case Hodari D., where the Court held that even "assuming [the] pursuit constituted a 'show of authority’ enjoining Ho-dari to halt, Hodari did not comply with that injunction and therefore was not seized until he was tackled. Thus, the cocaine [which he was carrying when spotted by police but threw during the chase] abandoned while he was running was not the fruit of a seizure, and his motion to exclude evidence of it was properly denied." Id., Ill S.Ct. at 1548 (emphasis added and citations omitted).

. Fed.R.Evid. 404(b) provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.

. Included in the court’s admonition to the jury was the following statement:
Now I want you to understand that I have ruled that the Government may offer this evidence involving this prior bank robbery of the Bixby bank, but only for the very limited purpose here that I state to you at this time.
Evidence of such a prior transaction or previous incident may be considered as relevant by the jury only insofar as it constitutes a similar act. Evidence that the Defendant may have committed an act similar to the acts alleged in this indictment may not be considered by the jury as any evidence whatsoever determining whether the Defendant in fact committed the acts charged in the indictment. Obviously the acts charged in the indictment is a separate incident in and of itself. However, you as the jury may consider evidence of the similar act, that is, the prior Bixby bank matter, in determining the state of mind or the intent with which the Defendant, Mr. Morgan, did the acts that are charged here in the indictment.
If you first find that the acts charged in the indictment are established by proper evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, and where proof of the similar act is established by the evidence the jury may then, but is not obliged to, draw the inference....

. Subsections (a) and (b) of U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 provide:
(a) If the defendant was an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive, increase by 4 levels.
(b) If the defendant was a manager or supervisor (but not an organizer or leader) and the criminal activity involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive, increase by 3 levels.