Court Opinion

ID: 9905087
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-28 18:11:15.174892+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:23.811723
License: Public Domain

No. 27                       October 12, 2023                                413

              IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
                    STATE OF OREGON

                   Matthew Daniel INGLE,
                     Petitioner on Review,
                               v.
                    Dolores MATTEUCCI,
            Superintendent, Oregon State Hospital,
                    Respondent on Review.
          (CC 18CV09971) (CA A170009) (SC S069222)

    On review from the Court of Appeals.*
    Argued and submitted September 30, 2022.
   Lindsey Burrows, O’Connor Weber LLC., Portland,
argued the cause and filed the briefs for petitioner on review.
   Jordan R. Silk, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,
argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on
review. Also on the brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney
General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.
  Before Flynn, Chief Justice, and Duncan, Garrett, DeHoog,
and James, Justices, and Balmer and Walters, Senior Judges,
Justices pro tempore.**
    DUNCAN, J.
   The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The
judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is
remanded to that court for further proceedings.
  Garrett, J., dissented and filed an opinion, in which
Balmer, S.J., joined.

______________
   * Appeal from Marion County Circuit Court, Lindsay Partridge, Judge. 315
Or App 416, 501 P3d 23 (2021).
    ** Nelson, J., resigned February 25, 2023, and did not participate in the deci-
sion of this case. Bushong and Masih, JJ., did not participate in the consideration
or decision of this case.
414   Ingle v. Matteucci
Cite as 371 Or 413 (2023)                                                      415

          DUNCAN, J.
          This case concerns the statute of limitations for
petitions for post-conviction relief, ORS 138.510(3). That
statute includes a limitations period and an exception to
that period. It provides that a petition “must be filed within
two years” of the date the challenged conviction became
final unless the ground for relief “could not reasonably have
been raised” within those two years. The exception to the
time limit is commonly known as the “escape clause.” If a
petitioner files their petition after the limitations period,
the petitioner must establish that the escape clause applies.
That is, the petitioner must establish that their ground for
relief could not reasonably have been raised within two
years of the date their conviction became final.
          In the criminal case underlying this post-conviction
case, petitioner waived his right to a jury trial and raised
an insanity defense. The trial court found petitioner “guilty
except for insanity” on all charges and placed him under the
jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security Review Board and
committed him to the Oregon State Hospital.
          More than eight years after his convictions became
final, petitioner initiated this case by filing a pro se petition
for post-conviction relief. Petitioner requested and received
court-appointed counsel, who amended the petition. In the
operative petition, petitioner acknowledged that the lim-
itations period had run but asserted that the escape clause
applied. Specifically, he asserted that the escape clause
applied because, during the limitations period, he was dis-
abled by “diagnosed schizophrenia” and the “forced consump-
tion of extremely powerful psychotropic medications” and that
those conditions “deprived him of the ability” to file a timely
petition. The state1 moved to dismiss the petition, assert-
ing that petitioner’s mental impairments were irrelevant to
     1
       At the trial-court level, a person who brings a post-conviction case is the
“petitioner” and the adverse party is the “defendant.” ORS 138.570; see, e.g., Bogle
v. State of Oregon, 363 Or 455, 467-69, 423 P3d 715 (2018) (discussing the “peti-
tioner” and the “defendant”). If the petitioner is in custody, the defendant is “the
official charged with the confinement” of the petitioner. ORS 138.570. In this
case, because petitioner is in custody at the Oregon State Hospital, the defendant
is the superintendent of the hospital. For ease of reference, we refer to the super-
intendent as “the state.” See, e.g., Richardson v. Belleque, 362 Or 236, 238 n 1, 406
P3d 1074 (2017) (referring to the superintendent as “the state”).
416                                        Ingle v. Matteucci

whether the escape clause applied. The post-conviction court
agreed and granted the state’s motion to dismiss.
          Petitioner appealed, and, in a split decision, the
Court of Appeals affirmed. Ingle v. Matteucci, 315 Or App 416,
501 P3d 23 (2021). We allowed review. On review, the parties
dispute (1) whether a post-conviction court may consider a
petitioner’s mental impairments when determining whether
the statute of limitations’ escape clause applies and, if so,
(2) whether petitioner’s allegations were sufficient to raise a
triable issue regarding the applicability of the escape clause.
         For the reasons explained below, we hold that, in
addition to other circumstances, the escape clause applies
in circumstances where, during the limitations period, the
petitioner had mental impairments that were so severe—
both in degree and duration—that the petitioner was incapa-
ble of raising their ground for relief in a timely petition. We
further hold that the petitioner’s allegations in this case are
sufficient to raise a triable issue regarding the applicabil-
ity of the escape clause. Consequently, we conclude that the
post-conviction court erred in granting the state’s motion to
dismiss on the pleadings, and we reverse and remand to the
post-conviction court for further proceedings.
                    I. BACKGROUND
         When this court reviews a post-conviction court’s
ruling on a motion to dismiss a petition, we assume that the
allegations in the petition and its attachments are true, and
we state the facts consistently with those allegations. Chavez
v. State of Oregon, 364 Or 654, 656, 438 P3d 381 (2019);
Verduzco v. State of Oregon, 357 Or 553, 555 n 1, 355 P3d 902
(2015).
A.    Underlying Criminal Case
         In the underlying criminal case, the state charged
petitioner with two counts of second-degree manslaughter
and one count of driving under the influence of intoxicants.
The charges were based on an incident in which petitioner
was driving, ran a red light, and struck another vehicle,
killing its occupants. After the crash, petitioner was trans-
ported to a hospital, where a blood test revealed the pres-
ence of cannabis, an anti-depressant medication, and two
Cite as 371 Or 413 (2023)                                      417

anti-psychotic medications. When interviewed at the hospi-
tal, petitioner was hallucinating. He said that, during the
crash, he “knew that aliens [were] there and he [thought]
that something else [was] in control of the wheel of the car.”
He attributed the crash to “aliens” or “the Holy Spirit.” The
month before the incident, petitioner, who was 18 years old,
had been self-admitted to three hospital psychiatric wards,
diagnosed with schizophrenia, and prescribed the anti-
psychotic medications that he took on the day of the incident.
         In the trial court, petitioner was represented by a
defense lawyer, McCauley. On McCauley’s recommendation,
petitioner waived his right to a jury trial and proceeded to
a stipulated facts trial, during which he raised an insanity
defense pursuant to ORS 161.295. That statute provides that
“[a] person is guilty except for insanity if, as a result of a qual-
ifying mental disorder at the time of engaging in criminal
conduct, the person lacks substantial capacity either to appre-
ciate the criminality of the conduct or to conform the conduct
to the requirements of the law.” ORS 161.295(1). During the
stipulated facts trial, the prosecutor described a report by
a psychologist who had evaluated petitioner and concluded
that it was likely that petitioner “was unable to conform his
conduct to the requirements of the law” at the time of the
crash “because of [his] underlying psychiatric condition.” The
prosecutor agreed with the psychologist’s conclusion, inform-
ing the trial court that, at the time of the crash, petitioner
had been acting pursuant to a “delusional set of beliefs.” The
court found petitioner “guilty except for insanity” on all three
counts, placed him under the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric
Security Review Board for an indefinite period not to exceed
20 years, and committed him to the Oregon State Hospital.
        The trial court entered the judgment into the
register on November 10, 2009. Petitioner did not appeal.
Consequently, the two-year limitations period for filing for
post-conviction relief expired on November 10, 2011.
B.   Post-Conviction Trial-Level Proceedings
        On March 14, 2018, which was more than eight
years after petitioner’s convictions became final, petitioner,
who was in custody at the state hospital, filed a pro se
418                                        Ingle v. Matteucci

petition for post-conviction relief. Petitioner requested and
received a court-appointed lawyer, Patterson, who amended
the petition twice.
         In the operative petition, petitioner alleged that
his convictions were the result of a substantial denial of
his constitutional right to counsel under both Article I,
section 11, of the Oregon Constitution, and the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
Specifically, he alleged that McCauley’s representation
had been inadequate and ineffective because, even though
McCauley knew or should have known about petitioner’s
mental impairments, he had failed to ensure that petitioner
understood the consequences of being found guilty except
for insanity—including that he would likely spend 20 years
at the state hospital—before encouraging him to waive his
right to a jury trial and raise an insanity defense. Petitioner
further alleged that he did not make—and, given his mental
impairments could not have made—a knowing, voluntary,
and intelligent waiver of his right to a jury trial.
         In addition to alleging his grounds for relief, peti-
tioner addressed the timing of his petition. He acknowledged
that his petition was untimely but asserted that the escape
clause applied because he could not reasonably have raised
his grounds for relief within the two-year limitations period.
In support of that assertion, petitioner alleged that, during
the limitations period, he was “intellectually disabled as a
result of his diagnosed schizophrenia and his forced con-
sumption of extremely powerful psychotropic medications.”
He further alleged that his mental disease and medicated
state “substantially impaired his ability to concentrate, to
reason, to understand the legal remedies available to chal-
lenge his convictions, and to understand the legal proceed-
ings that resulted in his imposed sentence.” In addition, he
alleged that his mental disease “substantially impaired his
ability to read and comprehend legal documents related to
those proceedings and deprived him of the ability to appreci-
ate, identify, allege, and support with the requisite evidence,
the relevant claims for relief.” In a declaration attached to
the petition, he stated that he filed his pro se petition as
Cite as 371 Or 413 (2023)                                      419

soon as he was able to comprehend what had occurred in his
underlying criminal case.
         The state moved to dismiss the petition, assert-
ing that it was barred by the statute of limitations, ORS
138.510(3). See ORCP 21 A(1)(i) (allowing a party to move to
dismiss a claim before filing an answer on the ground that
“the pleading shows that the action has not been commenced
within the time limited by statute”). The state argued
that, under Court of Appeals case law—including Fisher v.
Belleque, 237 Or App 405, 240 P3d 745 (2010), rev den, 349
Or 601 (2011)—petitioner’s mental impairments were irrele-
vant to whether the escape clause applied.
          The post-conviction court granted the state’s motion
to dismiss. The court explained that it believed that cases
decided by the Court of Appeals, including Fisher, precluded
it from considering a petitioner’s mental impairments when
determining whether the escape clause applies. In Fisher,
the petitioner acknowledged that his petition was untimely
but asserted that the escape clause applied because he had
mental illnesses that prevented him from raising his ground
for relief within the limitations period. The Court of Appeals
rejected that argument, holding that whether the escape
clause applies “ ‘turns on whether the information [neces-
sary to raise the ground for relief at issue] existed or was
reasonably available to the petitioner, and not on whether the
petitioner’s failure to seek the information was reasonable.’ ”
Fisher, 237 Or App at 410 (quoting Brown v. Baldwin, 131
Or App 356, 361, 885 P2d 707 (1994) (emphasis in Brown)).
         The post-conviction court told petitioner:
   “The problem in your case is that my reading of what the
   courts that are above me tell me is that * * * just because
   you have a mental illness and that mental illness prevents
   you from being able to access the legal process, that doesn’t
   allow me to apply the exception. * * * So it’s my judgment
   that under the law that I [have] to grant the State’s motion
   to dismiss.
      “Now, you will have an opportunity to have my decision
   challenged and reviewed by the Court of Appeals. And I
   hope you do because there are some concerns I have about
   some of the decisions.”
420                                         Ingle v. Matteucci

C. Post-Conviction Appeal
         Petitioner appealed, arguing that the allegations in
his petition were sufficient to raise a triable issue regarding
whether he “could not reasonably have raised” his grounds
for relief within the two-year limitations period. ORS
138.510(3). The state disagreed, again arguing that, under
Fisher, a post-conviction court may not apply the escape
clause based on an allegation that, as a result of mental
impairments, a petitioner lacked the capacity to file a timely
petition. In reply, petitioner contended that this court’s then-
recent decision in Gutale v. State of Oregon, 364 Or 502, 435
P3d 728 (2019), implicitly overruled Fisher.
         The Court of Appeals concluded that Fisher—which
it described as holding “that a petitioner’s diminished capac-
ity due to mental disorders was not relevant to the escape
clause in ORS 138.510(3)”—was on point. Ingle, 315 Or App
at 424-25. The court also rejected petitioner’s argument that
Gutale implicitly overruled Fisher. Id. at 428. It noted that,
on the same day that this court decided Gutale, it decided
Perez-Rodriguez v. State of Oregon, 364 Or 489, 435 P3d 746
(2019), which expressly left open the question “ ‘whether a
petitioner’s mental illness and intellectual disability may
ever justify applying the escape clause’ ” in ORS 138.510(3).
Ingle, 315 Or App at 428 (quoting Perez-Rodriguez, 364 Or
at 498). It also noted that, in its view, Gutale did not involve
consideration of the petitioner’s personal characteristics.
Ingle, 315 Or App at 429 (noting that, although the court
in Gutale considered the petitioner’s “situation,” it “did not
consider any personal characteristics of the petitioner”).
Applying Fisher, the court held that petitioner’s allega-
tions regarding his mental impairments were irrelevant to
whether petitioner “could not reasonably have raised” his
grounds for relief within the limitations period. Id. at 429-
30. Therefore, the court affirmed the post-conviction court’s
dismissal of the petition for failing to allege facts sufficient
to support application of the escape clause. Id. at 430-31.
         Judge Tookey dissented. Relying on Gutale, he con-
tended that whether an untimely petition qualifies for the
escape clause depends on whether it asserts a ground for
relief that was not “ ‘reasonably available’ ” to the petitioner
Cite as 371 Or 413 (2023)                                                      421

during the limitations period, which calls for a judgment
about what was reasonable “ ‘under the circumstances.’ ” Id.
at 440 (Tookey, J., dissenting) (quoting Gutale, 364 Or at 509,
513 (emphases in Ingle)). Under Gutale, a determination of
what was reasonable is based on the petitioner’s perspective
because the petitioner is the person who must initiate a post-
conviction case. 364 Or at 519. Based on Gutale and the leg-
islative history of ORS 138.510(3), which establishes that the
legislature intended the escape clause to apply in “extraor-
dinary circumstances,” Judge Tookey would have held that,
“in certain circumstances, a petitioner’s mental illness is rel-
evant to—and can justify application of—the escape clause.”
Ingle, 315 Or App at 432 (Tookey, J., dissenting). He would
have further held that, when invoking the escape clause, “a
petitioner must allege not only the existence of a mental ill-
ness but also some additional fact or facts about how, due to
that mental illness, a reasonable person in the petitioner’s
situation would not have thought to investigate the existence
of the asserted ground for relief during the limitation period.”
Id. at 433. Finally, he would have held that petitioner’s
allegations were sufficient. Id. at 452.2
D. Parties’ Arguments on Review
         Petitioner petitioned this court for review, which we
allowed. On review, petitioner argues that mental impair-
ments can justify the application of the escape clause in
ORS 138.510(3), depending on their severity and length.
Petitioner points to the text of the escape clause, which
applies when grounds for relief “could not reasonably have
been raised,” and argues that the legislature’s use of the
words “could” and “raised” indicate that the applicabil-
ity of the escape clause depends on a petitioner’s capacity
to initiate a post-conviction case. Petitioner also relies on
this court’s cases for the proposition that the escape clause
applies when a ground for relief was not “reasonably avail-
able” to a petitioner within the two-year limitations period,

     2
       The majority stated that, if this court were to overrule Fisher and hold
that a petitioner’s mental impairments must be considered when determining
whether the escape clause in ORS 138.510(3) applies, it “would likely agree with
the dissent that petitioner’s allegations in this case would suffice to create a tri-
able issue,” but that it did not need to decide the issue. Ingle, 315 Or App at 431
n 9.
422                                           Ingle v. Matteucci

which depends on the petitioner’s particular circumstances.
Gutale, 364 Or at 509-12 (holding that the escape clause
applied to the petitioner’s immigration-related claim where
the petitioner was not on notice that his plea carried immi-
gration consequences); Perez-Rodriguez, 364 Or at 500
(reaching the opposite conclusion where the petitioner was
on notice that his plea carried immigration consequences).
And petitioner contends that the legislature intended the
escape clause to apply in extraordinary circumstances and
to prevent injustice, which supports its application in sit-
uations where, as a result of mental impairments, a peti-
tioner did not have a reasonable opportunity to initiate a
post-conviction case within the limitations period.
         The state argues that a petitioner’s mental impair-
ments cannot justify the application of the escape clause in
ORS 138.510(3) for untimely petitions. In support of that
argument, the state points out that the wording of the escape
clause in ORS 138.510(3) was imported from the escape
clause in ORS 138.550(3) for successive post-conviction
petitions, which allows for successive petitions that assert
grounds for relief that “could not reasonably have been
raised” in the petitioner’s initial case. Based on the fact that
the wording of the escape clause for untimely petitions was
imported from the escape clause for successive petitions, the
state makes the following multi-step argument:
       (1) the escape clause for successive petitions applies to
   claims that could not have been raised in a petitioner’s ini-
   tial post-conviction case because they had not accrued yet;
      (2) a claim accrues either when a plaintiff discovers
   their legal injury or when they reasonably should have dis-
   covered it, whichever comes first;
      (3) when determining when a plaintiff reasonably
   should have discovered a legal injury, courts employ an
   objective test and do not consider the plaintiff’s personal
   characteristics; and

      (4) because the wording of the escape clause in ORS
   138.550(3) for successive petitions was imported into the
   escape clause in ORS 138.510(3) for untimely petitions, a
   court cannot consider a petitioner’s personal characteristics
   when determining whether to allow an untimely petition.
Cite as 371 Or 413 (2023)                                                    423

                            II. DISCUSSION
         To resolve the parties’ dispute, we must construe
the statute of limitations for post-conviction petitions, ORS
138.510(3). When construing a statute, our goal is to ascer-
tain the legislature’s intent. To do so, we look to the statute’s
text, context, and legislative history, as well as our prior
constructions of the statute. State v. Haley, 371 Or 108, 112,
531 P3d 142 (2023); State v. Gaines, 346 Or 160, 171-72, 206
P3d 1042 (2009). We begin with the text and our prior hold-
ings regarding the text.
A.       Statutory Interpretation
            1.   Text
         In pertinent part, ORS 138.510(3) provides, “A peti-
tion pursuant to ORS 138.510 to 138.680 must be filed within
two years” of the date the challenged conviction becomes
final unless the grounds for relief asserted “could not rea-
sonably have been raised” within the two-year limitations
period.3 Thus, as discussed above, the statute of limitations
includes a two-year limitations period and an escape clause.
The two-year limitations period begins to run on the date
a person’s conviction becomes final, and that date depends

     3
       ORS 138.510(3) provides:
         “A petition pursuant to ORS 138.510 to 138.680 must be filed within two
    years of the following, unless the court on hearing a subsequent petition finds
    grounds for relief asserted which could not reasonably have been raised in
    the original or amended petition:
         “(a) If no appeal is taken, the date the judgment or order on the convic-
    tion was entered in the register.
         “(b) If an appeal is taken, the date the appeal is final in the Oregon
    appellate courts.
         “(c) If a petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court is
    filed, the later of:
         “(A) The date of denial of certiorari, if the petition is denied; or
         “(B) The date of entry of a final state court judgment following remand
    from the United States Supreme Court.”
    As we explain below, 371 Or at 436-37, because the escape clause in ORS
138.510(3) for untimely petitions was imported from the escape clause in ORS
138.550(3) for successive petitions, it refers to grounds for relief “which could
not reasonably have been raised in the original or amended petition.” (Emphasis
added.) Despite the reference to earlier petitions, this court has held that the
escape clause for untimely petitions is not limited to those preceded by timely
petitions. Bartz v. State of Oregon, 314 Or 353, 839 P2d 217 (1992).
424                                        Ingle v. Matteucci

on whether the person appeals the conviction. If, as in this
case, a person does not appeal their conviction, the two-
year period begins when the judgment on the conviction is
entered in the register. ORS 138.510(3)(a).
         A person seeking post-conviction relief must file a
petition within the two-year limitations period unless the
petition qualifies for the escape clause, that is, unless the
petition asserts grounds for relief that “could not reasonably
have been raised” within the two-year limitations period.
The petitioner bears the burden of proving that the escape
clause applies. Perez-Rodriguez, 364 Or at 499. If a peti-
tioner is indigent and wants to be represented by a court-
appointed lawyer, the petitioner must file a pro se petition
and an affidavit stating that they are unable to pay for a
lawyer. ORS 138.590. If the post-conviction court appoints
a lawyer for the petitioner, the lawyer may amend the peti-
tion. ORS 138.590(5). Thus, an indigent person who needs
the assistance of a lawyer to litigate their post-conviction
case must file a pro se petition and a statement of indigence
before they can secure that assistance.
         The escape clause uses the word “could.” It applies
only if the ground for relief at issue “could not reasonably
have been raised” within the limitations period. Stated con-
versely, it does not apply if the ground for relief could rea-
sonably have been raised within that period. As this court
has observed, “could” “connotes capability, as opposed to
obligation.” Verduzco, 357 Or at 566 (so stating regarding
the escape clause in ORS 138.550(3) for successive petitions
(internal quotation marks omitted)). And, as this court has
held, when determining whether a ground for relief could
reasonably have been raised within the limitations period,
courts are to focus on the petitioner. Gutale, 364 Or at 519
(“[T]he inquiry * * * is whether a petitioner reasonably could
have raised a ground for relief before any litigation has
occurred. The focus of the reasonableness inquiry is there-
fore the petitioner, rather than an attorney representing the
petitioner.” (Emphasis in original.)). Thus, the legislature’s
use of the word “could” indicates that the escape clause
applies if the petitioner lacked the capability to reasonably
raise their ground for relief within the limitations period.
Cite as 371 Or 413 (2023)                                  425

         The escape clause also uses the word “reasonably.”
As this court has explained regarding the escape clause
in ORS 138.550(3) for successive petitions, “the adverb
‘reasonably’ modifies the phrase, ‘could * * * have raised.’ ”
Verduzco, 357 Or at 566 (omission in original). As a result
of that adverb, the question “is not whether a petitioner con-
ceivably could have raised the grounds for relief,” but rather
“whether the petitioner reasonably could have raised those
grounds.” Id. That question “calls for a judgment about what
was ‘reasonable’ under the circumstances.” Id. Thus, the
word “reasonably” indicates that whether the escape clause
applies depends on the petitioner’s circumstances and what
was reasonable under those circumstances. In other words,
it depends on whether the petitioner “reasonably could have
been expected” to have raised the ground for relief at issue
within the limitations period. Eklof v. Steward, 360 Or 717,
733, 385 P3d 1074 (2016); see also North v. Cupp, 254 Or
451, 456, 461 P2d 271 (1969), cert den, 397 US 1054 (1970)
(holding that ORS 138.550(1) precludes a petitioner from
making a claim in a post-conviction case that the petitioner
did not make in the underlying criminal case, except in cer-
tain circumstances, including where the claim “could con-
ceivably have been made but could not reasonably have been
expected”).
          In addition, the escape clause uses the word
“raised.” Thus, the clause’s applicability depends on a peti-
tioner’s capability to take a specific action: to raise a ground
for relief. The legislature’s use of the word “raised” suggests
that, when assessing whether the escape clause applies,
courts are to consider not only whether a petitioner was on
notice of a possible ground for relief but also whether the
petitioner was able to take the steps necessary to bring the
ground for relief before a court.
        In summary, the text of the escape clause and our
cases construing that text indicate that, when determin-
ing whether the escape clause applies, a court must con-
sider a petitioner’s capabilities under the circumstances
that existed during the limitations period. They also indi-
cate that whether the escape clause applies does not depend
on whether it was conceivably possible for the petitioner to
426                                          Ingle v. Matteucci

raise the ground for relief during the limitations period, but,
rather, whether it was reasonably possible for the petitioner
to do so. And, they indicate that the focus of the inquiry
should be on whether it was reasonably possible for the peti-
tioner to take the steps necessary to bring the ground for
relief before a court. Together, those indications suggest
that whether the escape clause applies depends on whether
it would be reasonable to expect a petitioner to have raised
the ground for relief at issue given the circumstances that
existed during the limitations period; if it would be unrea-
sonable to expect the petitioner to have done so, then the
escape clause applies.
        2. Case law
         For additional guidance regarding when the escape
clause applies, we turn to several of our cases involving the
clause, including our first case construing the clause, Bartz
v. State of Oregon, 314 Or 353, 839 P2d 217 (1992), and our
most recent cases construing it, Gutale, and Perez-Rodriguez.
         In Bartz, the petitioner filed an untimely post-
conviction petition asserting that his constitutional right to
counsel had been violated in the underlying criminal case
because his defense lawyer had failed to inform him of a
statutory defense. In his petition, Bartz asserted that the
escape clause applied because he had been unaware of the
statutory defense during the limitations period, which, at
the time, was 120 days. To determine whether his claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel “could not reasonably
have been raised” within the limitations period, this court
focused on whether the legal basis for the claim was “rea-
sonably available” to Bartz during that period. 314 Or at
359-60. It framed the issue as “whether the extant statutes
pertaining to a particular criminal offense constitute infor-
mation that is reasonably available to a defendant convicted
of that offense.” Id. at 359. It then explained:
   “It is a basic assumption of the legal system that the ordi-
   nary means by which the legislature publishes and makes
   available its enactments are sufficient to inform persons of
   statutes that are relevant to them. See Dungey v. Fairview
   Farms, Inc., 205 Or 615, 621, 290 P2d 181 (1955) (every per-
   son is presumed to know the law). Accordingly, we hold that
Cite as 371 Or 413 (2023)                                      427

   the relevant statutes were reasonably available to Bartz
   when his conviction became final. The failure of Bartz’s
   counsel to advise him of all available statutory defenses
   thus is not a ‘ground[ ] for relief * * * which could not rea-
   sonably have been raised’ timely. * * * The exception to the
   120-day limitation is not available to Bartz under the cir-
   cumstances here.”
Bartz, 314 Or at 359-60 (brackets and first omission in
original; emphases added). Thus, the court concluded
that whether the escape clause applied to Bartz’s petition
depended on whether the information Bartz needed to raise
his ground for relief had been reasonably available to him
during the limitations period, and it further concluded
that, because the information that Bartz needed was a pub-
lished statute, it had been reasonably available to him and,
therefore, the escape clause did not apply under the circum-
stances. Id. Notably, Bartz did not assert that he could not
actually access the statute. He did not, for example, assert
that he was physically or mentally incapable of accessing
the statute. See Gutale, 364 Or at 528 n 4 (Balmer, J., dis-
senting) (distinguishing between a case where a petitioner
failed to access available laws and one where “the petitioner
was denied access to the laws, or where the state’s actions
were responsible for the petitioner’s ignorance”); see also
Canales-Robles v. Laney, 314 Or App 413, 419-20, 498 P3d
343 (2021) (concluding that, if true, the petitioner’s allega-
tion that the state prevented him from bringing a claim by
depriving him of access to all legal materials was sufficient
to establish that the escape clause applied).
         In Gutale, this court provided additional guidance
regarding the scope of the escape clause. In his underlying
criminal case, Gutale pleaded guilty to one charge, a Class A
misdemeanor, and the other charges were dismissed. At his
sentencing hearing, Gutale told the trial court that he was
pleading guilty because he wanted to travel and to obtain
United States citizenship. Neither Gutale’s defense lawyer
nor the trial court said anything that would have indicated
to Gutale that his plea could result in immigration conse-
quences. More than two years after his conviction became
final, immigration agents detained Gutale. Thereafter,
Gutale filed a post-conviction petition. In it, he asserted
428                                           Ingle v. Matteucci

that the escape clause applied because he had been unaware
of the possibility that his plea could result in immigration
consequences until he was detained. On the state’s motion,
the trial court dismissed the petition. The Court of Appeals
affirmed, relying on its decision in Benitez-Chacon v. State
of Oregon, 178 Or App 352, 37 P3d 1035 (2001). Gutale v.
State of Oregon, 285 Or App 39, 44, 395 P3d 942 (2017).
That court explained that in Benitez-Chacon it had relied on
Bartz to hold that “a petitioner is presumed to know immi-
gration laws and, consequently, a petitioner’s subjective lack
of awareness of the legal consequences of a plea will not
delay the time in which a petition must be filed under ORS
138.510(3).” Id. at 41.
        On review, this court reversed, holding that Bartz
was not controlling:
   “[N]otwithstanding the citation to Dungey, this court’s
   analysis in Bartz did not turn on a presumption that peo-
   ple know the law. Instead of presuming that the petitioner
   knew the law, the court in Bartz concluded that the legal
   basis for the petitioner’s claim was reasonably available to
   the petitioner. The court reached that conclusion because,
   if the petitioner had looked, the law could have been found
   in publicly available sources. * * * [T]he court held that,
   because ‘it is a basic assumption of the legal system that
   the ordinary means by which the legislature publishes and
   makes available its enactments are sufficient to inform
   persons of statutes that are relevant to them,’ the statutes
   pertaining to the petitioner’s crime of conviction ‘were rea-
   sonably available to [the petitioner] when his conviction
   became final.’ * * * Thus, consistent with our other deci-
   sions interpreting the escape clause, the court’s analysis in
   Bartz turned on whether the legal basis for the petitioner’s
   claim was reasonably available to him. And the court con-
   cluded that it was.”
Gutale, 364 Or at 510 (quoting Bartz, 314 Or at 359-60
(emphasis and brackets in Gutale)). This court went on to
hold that whether the basis for a ground for relief is rea-
sonably available to a petitioner depends on the petitioner’s
circumstances. Id. at 511-13. Those circumstances include
whether the petitioner would have been on notice of the need
to investigate the existence of the ground for relief. Id. at
510-11 (“Being reasonably available means more than just
Cite as 371 Or 413 (2023)                                   429

that a petitioner could have found the law if he or she had
looked. Instead, a ground for relief is reasonably available
only if there was a reason for the petitioner to look for it.”).
The court then considered the particular circumstances that
Gutale had alleged in his petition, including that he had
told the trial court that he planned to travel and become a
United States citizen and that neither his defense lawyer nor
the trial court told him that his plea could result in immi-
gration consequences. Id. at 513. The court concluded that
those allegations, if true, were sufficient to establish that
the escape clause applied and, therefore, the post-conviction
court had erred in dismissing the petition. Id. at 520.
         The court reached the opposite conclusion in Perez-
Rodriguez, which it issued the same day as Gutale. Like
Gutale, Perez-Rodriguez filed an untimely post-conviction
petition asserting both that his defense lawyer had failed
to inform him of the immigration consequences of his plea
and that the escape clause applied because he had been
unaware of the possibility that his plea could result in immi-
gration consequences until after the limitations period had
run. But, unlike Gutale, Perez-Rodriguez was “on notice of
potential immigration consequences.” Perez-Rodriguez, 364
Or at 497. Although he had not been told that there would be
immigration consequences, he was told that there might be.
Therefore, the court concluded, “it was incumbent on him to
determine what those immigration consequences might be
and whether his trial counsel had failed to accurately com-
municate those consequences to him.” Id. Consequently, the
court rejected Perez-Rodriguez’s argument that the escape
clause applied because he had been unaware of the immi-
gration consequences of his plea until the limitations period
had run. Id.
         In addition to that argument, Perez-Rodriguez
argued that the escape clause applied because he had a men-
tal illness and intellectual disability that prevented him
from knowing that he had a ground for relief within the lim-
itations period. That argument gave rise to two questions:
   “(1) whether a petitioner’s mental illness and intellec-
   tual disability may ever justify applying the escape clause
   and (2) if so, whether the particular mental illness and
430                                             Ingle v. Matteucci

   intellectual disability that petitioner alleges are sufficient
   allegations to establish, for assessing the state’s motion to
   dismiss, that petitioner could not reasonably have brought
   his claim during the limitations period.”
Id. at 498. The court determined that it did not need to
resolve the first question, explaining that, “even if a petitioner’s
mental illness and intellectual disability could justify apply-
ing the escape clause, petitioner’s specific allegations here
would not justify applying the escape clause in this case.” Id.
at 499 (emphasis in original). The court further explained
that the petitioner’s allegations failed to establish “that he
did not have the capacity to file his petition” within the lim-
itations period. Id. at 500. It noted that petitioner had not
alleged, “for example, that his mental illness led to any—let
alone, prolonged—periods of psychosis during the limita-
tions period.” Id. “Instead,” the court pointed out that
   “the pleadings and record show that petitioner has had
   three psychotic breaks in his life: two before his conviction
   and one after the limitations period expired. Simply having
   schizoaffective disorder is, by itself, insufficient. See United
   States v. Sosa, 364 F3d 507, 513 (4th Cir 2004) (holding
   that schizoaffective disorder does not constitute ‘profound
   mental incapacity’ needed to satisfy one element of equi-
   table tolling for federal habeas claim); Grant v. McDonnell
   Douglas Corp., 163 F3d 1136, 1138 (9th Cir 1998) (hold-
   ing that equitable tolling based on mental condition may
   be appropriate ‘only in exceptional circumstances, such as
   institutionalization or adjudged mental incompetence’).”
Perez-Rodriguez, 364 Or at 500 (emphasis added). Therefore,
the court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the petition.
Id.
         In sum, this court has addressed the scope of the
escape clause in ORS 138.510(3) in several cases. Those cases
establish that the fact that a petitioner was unaware of the
basis for a ground for relief during the limitations period
is insufficient, in and of itself, to trigger the escape clause.
Bartz, 314 Or at 359-60. They also establish that whether
the clause applies does not depend solely on whether the law
or facts on which a ground for relief depends existed during
the limitations period; it also depends on whether the peti-
tioner had a reason to investigate the ground for relief.
Cite as 371 Or 413 (2023)                                     431

Gutale, 364 Or at 512. Whether a petitioner had such a rea-
son depends on the petitioner’s particular circumstances,
which can include what the petitioner was told. Id. at 513;
Perez-Rodriguez, 364 Or at 497. Overall, this court’s cases
construing the escape clause in ORS 138.510(3) are con-
sistent with what the text of the clause indicates: that the
escape clause applies when, given the circumstances that
existed during the limitations period, it would be unreason-
able to expect the petitioner to have filed a timely petition
raising the ground for relief at issue.
         3. Context
         The general context of the statute of limitations
supports that view. As both parties acknowledge, “Oregon
has always had a statute suspending the running of the
statutes of limitation for persons under certain disabilities,
including insanity.” DeLay v. Marathon LeTourneau Sales
& Serv. Co., 291 Or 310, 313, 630 P2d 836 (1981). Oregon’s
original statute providing for tolling stated:
      “If [a] person entitled to bring an action mentioned in
   this title * * * be, at the time the cause of action accrued,
   ***
      “* * * * *
      “Insane; * * *
      “* * * * *
      “The time of such disability shall not be a part of the
   time limited for the commencement of the action[.]”
General Laws of Oregon, Civ Code, ch I, title II, § 17, p 108
(Deady & Lane 1843-1872). With slight modification, that
provision was later included in the Oregon Revised Statutes.
ORS 12.160 (1955). And, at the time that the legislature
enacted the statute of limitations for post-conviction claims,
Oregon law continued to provide for tolling of statutes of
limitations based on insanity:
      “If, at the time the cause of action accrues, any person
   entitled to bring an action mentioned in [other parts of
   ORS chapter 12] is:
      “* * * * *
432                                                         Ingle v. Matteucci

        “Insane; * * *
        “* * * * *
       “The time of such disability shall not be a part of the
    time limited for the commencement of the action[.]”
ORS 12.160 (1987). Oregon’s long history of tolling statutes
of limitations due to a party’s insanity provides context for
what the legislature would have understood to be “extraor-
dinary circumstances” for the purpose of the escape clause.4
            4. Legislative history
         For final guidance regarding the applicability of
the escape clause, we turn to its legislative history. The
Oregon legislature enacted the Post-Conviction Hearing Act
(PCHA) in 1959. Or Laws 1959, ch 636. The PCHA did not
include a statute of limitations. To the contrary, it provided
that “[a] petition * * * may be filed without limit in time.”
    4
      To be sure, the statute of limitations for post-conviction petitions does not
contain a tolling provision; instead, it has an escape clause. Our point is simply
that, when the legislature created the escape clause for “extraordinary circum-
stances,” insanity had long been treated as an extraordinary circumstance that
could be the basis for allowing claims that would otherwise be time-barred to
proceed.
    The state points out that the tolling provision for insanity is limited by a
statute of ultimate repose, but that the escape clause in ORS 138.510(3) is not.
That is true, but it is consistent with how the legislature has treated untimely
post-conviction claims; there is no statute of ultimate repose for such claims.
    The state also points out that, in the statute of limitations context, there is a
difference between “accrual” and “tolling.” It asserts that
    “[a]ccrual is when a statute of limitations begins to run and is governed by a
    ‘discovery rule’ that operates independently of a claimant’s mental condition.
    Tolling, by contrast, pauses a limitations clock from running on an accrued
    claim, and a claimant’s mental condition has long been a basis for tolling the
    time limit on an accrued claim, not an impediment to accrual itself.”
(Emphasis in original.) The state then argues that the escape clause in ORS
138.510(3) is only an “accrual rule.”
     The state’s effort to compare the statute of limitations for post-conviction peti-
tions to other statutes of limitations is understandable, but the statute of lim-
itations for post-conviction petitions is unique. It does not work the same way as
other statutes of limitations, because its limitations period starts to run from a
specific date—when a conviction becomes final—and that date is independent of
when a claim “accrues” in the sense that a plaintiff knows or has reason to know
of a claim. That is, the post-conviction statute does not have an ordinary discovery
accrual rule; instead, it has the escape clause, which is broad enough to cover both
circumstances where a petitioner did not know or have reason to know of their
ground for relief and circumstances where a petitioner was incapable of taking the
steps necessary to raise their ground for relief within the limitations period.
Cite as 371 Or 413 (2023)                                      433

Id. at § 17; ORS 138.510(2) (1959). But the PCHA included
a limit on successive petitions. Section 15(3) of the PCHA
stated:
      “All grounds for relief claimed by petitioner in a petition
      pursuant to [the PCHA] must be asserted in his original
      or amended petition, and any grounds not so asserted are
      deemed waived unless the court on hearing a subsequent
      petition finds grounds for relief asserted therein which
      could not reasonably have been raised in the original or
      amended petition.”
Or Laws 1959, ch 636, § 15(3). Thus, the PCHA included
a section that required a petitioner to raise all their
grounds for relief in their initial post-conviction case, but
that requirement had an exception for grounds for relief
that “could not reasonably have been raised in the origi-
nal or amended petition.” That section was codified as ORS
138.550(3), which has remained substantively unchanged
since its enactment. ORS 138.550(3) “codifies claim preclu-
sion principles.” Gutale, 364 Or at 518.
      “It addresses the question of whether a petitioner who
      already has litigated a petition for post-conviction relief
      may return to court and litigate a second time, and it pro-
      vides that a petitioner may not do so where counsel reason-
      ably could have raised the grounds at issue in that prior
      litigation.”
Id.
         In 1989, 30 years after the enactment of the PCHA,
the legislature established a statute of limitations for post-
conviction petitions. Or Laws 1989, ch 1053, § 18. During
the 1989 legislative session, the legislature considered sev-
eral post-conviction bills, two of which ultimately included
statutes of limitations: House Bill (HB) 2796 (1989) and
Senate Bill (SB) 284 (1989). As explained below, HB 2796
did not become law, but its statute of limitations was added
to SB 284, which did.
         Representative Ray Baum introduced HB 2796,
proposing a 120-day limitations period for filing post-
conviction petitions. Tape Recording, House Floor, HB 2796,
Apr 27, 1989, Tape 17, Side 1. The limitations period was
intended to further the legislature’s goal of reducing the
434                                         Ingle v. Matteucci

costs of the state’s indigent defense programs. Id. (state-
ment by Representative Baum). Representative Baum, a
lawyer who had represented petitioners in post-conviction
cases, explained that the purpose of the limitations period
was to reduce the number of frivolous post-conviction peti-
tions. He stated, “[L]et me just tell you, the reason I did this
bill was, having been court appointed on close to 100 cases,
finding only five percent or less to be meritorious, I found
that as time goes on, you sit there and think about things
you’re going to appeal on and most of those things are friv-
olous.” Tape Recording, House Committee on Judiciary,
Subcommittee on Crime and Corrections, HB 2796, Mar 9,
1989, Tape 45, Side A. Similarly, a representative of the
Oregon Department of Justice, Brenda Peterson, described
petitions filed ten years after a conviction became final as
“[s]omething to do, stir up a little trouble.” Id. In keeping
with those statements, a Staff Measure Summary informed
legislators that, “if a person has a genuine basis for appeal,
the person will seek post-conviction relief soon after convic-
tion” and that “[t]he proposed time limitation may result in
less frivolous suits being filed.” Exhibit C, House Committee
on Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime and Corrections, HB
2796, Mar 9, 1989.
         As originally introduced, the limitations period in
HB 2796 did not have an escape clause. But, after the State
Court Administrator pointed out that ORS 138.550(3), which
limits successive petitions, has an escape clause, the sub-
committee amended HB 2796 to include an escape clause.
Exhibit G, House Committee on Judiciary, Subcommittee on
Crime and Corrections, HB 2796, Mar 9, 1989 (testimony
of State Court Administrator R. William Linden, Jr.); Tape
Recording, House Committee on Judiciary, Subcommittee
on Crime and Corrections, HB 2796, Apr 4, 1989, Tape 60,
Side B (amending bill). To do so, the subcommittee imported
the wording of the escape clause in ORS 138.550(3) for suc-
cessive petitions. Consequently, HB 2796’s escape clause pro-
vided, in part, that a petition for post-conviction relief must
be filed within 120 days of the date the conviction becomes
final, “unless the court on hearing a subsequent petition
finds grounds for relief asserted which could not reason-
ably have been raised in the original or amended petition.”
Cite as 371 Or 413 (2023)                                  435

Exhibit Y, House Committee on Judiciary, Subcommittee on
Crime and Corrections, HB 2796, Apr 4, 1989 (text of the
amendment).
          Representative Kevin Mannix described the escape
clause as “an escape valve for extraordinary circum-
stances.” Tape Recording, House Committee on Judiciary,
Subcommittee on Crime and Corrections, HB 2796, Apr 4,
1989, Tape 60, Side B. Similarly, a Staff Measure Summary
informed legislators that the escape clause is “a ‘safety valve’
for those who had valid reasons for not raising grounds for
relief within the time limit.” Exhibit CC, House Committee
on Judiciary, HB 2796, Apr 18, 1989. The House passed the
bill to the Senate, but the bill did not become law.
         During the same session, the Senate considered
SB 284, which concerned indigent defense expenses. As
originally introduced, SB 284 did not include a limitations
period for post-conviction cases. Exhibit, Senate Committee
on Judiciary, SB 284, Apr 12, 1989 (hand engrossed amend-
ments); Tape Recording, Senate Committee on Judiciary, SB
284, Apr 12, 1989, Tape 111, Side A. However, once the Senate
passed the bill to the House, the House amended the bill to
add the 120-day limitations period and the escape clause from
HB 2796. Tape Recording, House Committee on Judiciary,
Subcommittee on Civil and Judicial Administration, SB
284, June 12, 1989, Tape 123, Side A (amending bill). A
representative of the Oregon Criminal Defense Lawyers
Association, Ross Shepard, testified in support of the addi-
tion of the escape clause, noting that it would “allow filings
outside of the 120 days if extraordinary circumstances could
be shown.” Tape Recording, House Committee on Judiciary,
Subcommittee on Civil and Judicial Administration, SB
284, June 12, 1989, Tape 122, Side A. Shepard described
those circumstances as circumstances where “there was no
reasonable way that a person could have brought up those
grounds for relief within the [limitations] period.” Tape
Recording, House Committee on Judiciary, Subcommittee
on Civil and Judicial Administration, SB 284, June 12,
1989, Tape 123, Side A. As examples, Shepard mentioned
circumstances where evidence is discovered or the law
changes after the limitations period. Tape Recording, House
436                                         Ingle v. Matteucci

Committee on Judiciary, Subcommittee on Civil and Judicial
Administration, SB 284, June 12, 1989, Tape 122, Side A
(describing a hypothetical situation involving late discovery
of evidence of collusion between a prosecutor and a defense
lawyer); Tape Recording, House Committee on Judiciary,
Subcommittee on Civil and Judicial Administration, SB
284, June 12, 1989, Tape 123, Side A (referring to a situ-
ation where the statute that a defendant was convicted of
violating is later declared unconstitutional).
         To recap, the original PCHA, which was enacted in
1959, did not include a statute of limitations. The legislature
did not create one until 30 years later, in 1989. The 1989
statute of limitations included a 120-day limitations period
and an escape clause. The ideas underlying the statute were
that persons with “genuine” claims seek post-conviction
relief “soon after conviction” and that petitions filed long
after a conviction are more likely to be “frivolous.” Exhibit C,
House Committee on Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime
and Corrections, HB 2796, Mar 9, 1989 (staff measure
summary). Notably, the legislature did not bar all claims
filed after the limitations period; it included an escape
clause, which it intended to apply in “extraordinary circum-
stances,” which include circumstances where “there was no
reasonable way” that a person could have raised the ground
for relief within the limitation period. Tape Recording,
House Committee on Judiciary, Subcommittee on Civil and
Judicial Administration, SB 284, June 12, 1989, Tape 123,
Side A (statement by Ross Shepard).
         As mentioned, when creating the statute of lim-
itations’ escape clause, the legislature imported wording
from ORS 138.550(3), which concerns successive petitions.
Because the imported wording concerns grounds for relief
raised in “a subsequent petition” that “could not reasonably
have been raised in the original or amended petition,” it was
unclear whether the statute of limitations’ escape clause
is available to all persons who file late petitions or only
those who previously filed timely petitions. ORS 138.510(3)
(emphases added). This court addressed that issue in Bartz.
         As discussed above, Bartz filed an untimely peti-
tion for post-conviction relief on the ground that his defense
Cite as 371 Or 413 (2023)                                      437

lawyer had failed to advise him of a statutory defense, and
Bartz asserted that the escape clause applied because he had
been unaware of the defense within the limitations period.
This court ultimately rejected that argument, but before the
court could reach that argument, it had to resolve a prelim-
inary issue: whether the escape clause in ORS 138.510(3)
for untimely claims is available for petitioners like Bartz,
whose petition was untimely, but not successive.
          To resolve that issue, the court first looked to the stat-
ute of limitations’ text. It concluded that the text “is ambigu-
ous” as to whether the statute’s escape clause “applies to all
late-filed petitions, or whether it is limited to late-filed peti-
tions filed by persons who filed an earlier, timely petition.”
Bartz, 314 Or at 357. The court then turned to the statute’s
legislative history. It determined that the history “is silent
on the present question.” Id. It pointed out that, although
the wording of the escape clause was “borrowed verbatim
from ORS 138.550(3),” which concerns successive petitions,
“[t]he legislative committees involved did not discuss the
appropriateness of that wording in [the statute of limita-
tions] context.” Id. at 358. Finally, the court considered the
purpose of the statute of limitations’ escape clause. Based
on statements about the escape clause in the legislative his-
tory, the court concluded that the escape clause’s purpose “is
to give persons extra time to file petitions for post-conviction
relief in extraordinary circumstances.” Id. The court then
reasoned that “[t]hat purpose applies equally to persons who
did and persons who did not file an earlier, timely petition.”
Id. Therefore, the court held that the escape clause “does not
require the filing of a timely ‘original or amended’ petition
as a prerequisite to the filing of an untimely petition.” Id.
         The Bartz court’s resolution of that issue shows
that, although the wording of the escape clause for untimely
petitions was “borrowed verbatim” from the escape clause
for successive petitions, the legislature did not intend the
former to apply exactly the same way as the latter. It also
shows that the purpose of the escape clause can provide
guidance regarding the scope of the clause.
        The year after Bartz, the legislature amended the
statute of limitations to increase the limitations period
438                                        Ingle v. Matteucci

from 120 days to two years. Or Laws 1993, ch 517, § 1. As
in 1989, the legislature was concerned about the costs of
post-conviction cases. Tape Recording, House Committee
on Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime and Corrections,
HB 2352, Apr 7, 1993, Tape 70, Side A (statement by Ross
Shepard highlighting concerns about indigent defense
spending). It was also concerned about the amount of time
that could pass between when a criminal case was origi-
nally litigated and when it was relitigated, if post-conviction
relief was granted. Id. (statement by Representative Mannix
reiterating his concerns about litigating 10-year-old cases).
But the legislature had come to the conclusion that the 120-
day limitations period was too short; it barred too many
post-conviction petitions. Tape Recording, House Floor, HB
2352, May 4, 1993, Tape 78, Side B (Representative Peter
Courtney’s third reading of the bill).
         Legislators’ comments about the limitations period
show that they wanted to allow persons a reasonable amount
of time to identify and raise their post-conviction claims and
that they believed two years would be enough time for most
petitioners, including those with lower education levels. Tape
Recording, House Committee on Judiciary, Subcommittee
on Crime and Corrections, HB 2352, Apr 7, 1993, Tape
70, Side A (Representative Kate Brown commenting, “My
concern is the level of folks we’re working with here, that
sixty-seven percent of them don’t have a high school edu-
cation and a lot of them aren’t even able to read, and I just
think two years is a reasonable statute of limitations under
the folks we’re working with.”); see also id. (Representative
Mannix stating that “it doesn’t take you very long to reflect
on your conviction and the trial and the appeals process and
decide whether or not you think you were railroaded.”).
         Although the legislature did not change the text
of the escape clause, commenters shared their thoughts on
its scope. Brenda Peterson stated that the “savings clause”
would “take care of the hard cases” and would apply when
petitioners “present reasons to the court” regarding “why
they * * * didn’t file their petition” within the limitations
period. Id. Representative Mannix described the escape
Cite as 371 Or 413 (2023)                                 439

clause as “a savings clause for unconscionable situations
where the system didn’t work.” Id.
          Thus, the 1993 legislature amended the statute of
limitations to increase the length of the limitations period.
Its goal was to afford people a reasonable opportunity to
determine whether they had a post-conviction claim and, if
they did, to file a petition. They believed a two-year lim-
itation period was sufficient for most petitions, but they
retained the escape clause for petitions that assert grounds
for relief that could not reasonably have been raised within
that period. They assumed that most petitioners, even those
with lower education levels, would be able to reflect on their
convictions and decide whether to challenge them within
the limitations period.
          This court has reviewed the legislative history of
the statute of limitations and its escape clause. Of particular
relevance here, given the state’s argument that the escape
clause in ORS 138.510(3) for untimely petitions should be
construed the same as the escape clause in ORS 138.550(3)
for successive petitions, this court has continued to hold, as
it did in Bartz, that, although the wording of ORS 138.510(3)
was imported from ORS 138.550(3), the two clauses must
be interpreted separately. In Verduzco, the petitioner filed
a petition that was both untimely and successive, and this
court held that whether the escape clause in ORS 138.510(3)
for untimely petitions applied was a separate question from
whether the escape clause in ORS 138.550(3) for succes-
sive petitions applied because, “[a]lthough both clauses are
worded identically, one was enacted in 1959 while the other
was enacted in 1989 and modified in 1993. The contexts
that preceded the two clauses differ, as do their legislative
histories.” 357 Or at 564; see also Gutale, 364 Or at 518-19
(explaining that, given the different purposes of the escape
clauses, the focus of the inquiry into whether a ground for
relief could not reasonably have been raised differs).
          In summary, the statute of limitations for post-
conviction petitions was initially enacted in 1989, and it was
amended in 1993. It was intended to help reduce the costs of
the state’s indigent defense programs by reducing the num-
ber of frivolous petitions. The wording of the statute’s escape
440                                         Ingle v. Matteucci

clause was taken from the escape clause in ORS 138.550(3)
for successive petitions. But, despite their identical wording,
this court has held that, given their different contexts and
legislative histories, the escape clauses must be interpreted
separately. And, since Bartz (this court’s first case constru-
ing the escape clause in ORS 138.510(3) for untimely peti-
tions) and through Gutale and Perez-Rodriguez (this court’s
most recent cases construing that clause), this court has
construed the two clauses differently. When construing the
escape clause in ORS 138.510(3), this court has looked to its
legislative history and purpose. The legislative history shows
that, both in 1989 and 1993, the legislature believed that,
in most cases, persons would have reason to, and be able to,
raise their grounds for relief within the limitations period.
Exhibit C, House Committee on Judiciary, Subcommittee on
Crime and Corrections, HB 2796, Mar 9, 1989 (staff measure
summary stating that most people with a “genuine” ground
for relief will file soon after conviction); Tape Recording,
House Committee on Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime
and Corrections, HB 2352, Apr 7, 1993, Tape 70, Side A
(Representative Mannix explaining that, in general, people
can readily reflect on their trials and convictions and decide
whether they think they were “railroaded”). But the legisla-
ture recognized that that would not always be the case, so
it created the escape clause. It intended the escape clause to
apply in “extraordinary circumstances,” including circum-
stances where there was no “reasonable way” that a peti-
tioner could have raised a ground for relief. Tape Recording,
House Committee on Judiciary, Subcommittee on Civil and
Judicial Administration, SB 284, June 12, 1989, Tape 123,
Side A. In keeping with that legislative history, this court
has held that the escape clause must be construed “nar-
rowly.” Bartz, 314 Or at 359.
B.    Whether a Post-Conviction Court May Consider a
      Petitioner’s Mental Impairments when Determining
      Whether the Escape Clause Applies
         Having reviewed the text, context, and legislative
history of the statute of limitations, as well as our cases con-
struing the statute, we now apply the points we have drawn
from that review to the general legal question presented by
Cite as 371 Or 413 (2023)                                 441

this case: whether a post-conviction court may consider a
petitioner’s mental impairments when determining whether
the statute of limitations’ escape clause applies. The text
indicates that a court may do so. The escape clause applies
when a ground for relief “could not reasonably have been
raised” and “could” connotes “capability.” Verduzco, 357 Or
at 566. And, when determining whether the escape clause
applies, the proper focus is on the petitioner. Gutale, 364 Or
at 519. Thus, the petitioner’s capabilities matter. That under-
standing is in keeping with Bartz, in which this court held
that whether the escape clause applies depends on whether a
ground for relief was “reasonably available” to the petitioner
during the limitations period; if a petitioner is incapable of
taking the steps necessary to investigate whether a ground
for relief exists, the ground is not reasonably available to
the petitioner. That understanding is also in keeping with
Gutale, where this court held that the escape clause applied
because the petitioner did not have reason to investigate the
ground for relief at issue during the limitations period; if
the clause applies when a petitioner did not have a reason
to investigate a ground for relief, it should apply when the
petitioner did not have the capability to investigate a ground
for relief.
        Consider, for example, a situation where a person
is in a comatose state throughout the limitations period.
Such a person could not reasonably raise a ground for relief
within the limitations period. We believe the same would
be true for a person suffering from mental impairments
during the limitations period if the mental impairments
are so severe—both in terms of degree and duration—that
it would be unreasonable to expect the person to take the
steps necessary to bring the ground for relief before a court
during the limitations period. Those steps may be minimal,
and it may be reasonable to expect the person to seek out
help in taking them. But, if the person cannot reasonably
take those necessary steps, even with available assistance,
then the escape clause applies.
         That conclusion is consistent with the general con-
text of the escape clause, specifically, Oregon’s long history
442                                                        Ingle v. Matteucci

of recognizing insanity as a reason for allowing untimely
claims.
         Finally, that conclusion is consistent with the legis-
lative history and purpose of the escape clause. As discussed,
the legislature created a statute of limitations that contains
both a limitations period and an escape clause. It based the
limitations period on an assumption that persons would be
able to reflect on their convictions and take the necessary
steps to challenge them within the limitations period, and
it created the escape clause to cover extraordinary circum-
stances. Given the assumption underlying the limitations
period, we conclude that the extraordinary circumstances
include circumstances where a person, for reasons beyond
their control, lacks the capability to take the minimal steps
that the legislature believed that a person would be able to
take during the limitations period.5
         In arguing against that conclusion, the state asserts
that, because wording of the escape clause in ORS 138.510
for untimely petitions was imported from the escape clause
in ORS 138.550 for successive petitions, (1) the former should
be construed the same as the latter and (2) the latter does
not allow for consideration of a petitioner’s mental condition.
Specifically, the state argues:
    “The 1989 legislature borrowed the escape clause from
    existing law intended to codify the doctrine of claim preclu-
    sion and inserted it into ORS 138.510(3) without modifica-
    tion. The scope of claim preclusion is governed by the same
    ‘discovery’ accrual rule that also ordinarily sets statutes
    of limitations in motion, and the law has long held that
     5
       As an example, consider the following hypothetical: A court enters judg-
ment against two defendants on the same day. Neither appeals. Both defendants
had solid alibi defenses against the crime of conviction, but their lawyers failed to
investigate or raise the defenses. Defendant One files a petition for post-conviction
relief within the limitations period and prevails. See Lichau v. Baldwin, 333 Or
350, 39 P3d 851 (2002) (granting post-conviction relief for inadequate assistance
of counsel based on the failure to investigate an alibi defense and its prejudicial
effect). Defendant Two falls into a coma on the day that the court entered the
judgment and remains that way for two years. Defendant Two has a valid claim
that was immediately available and did not depend on newly discovered informa-
tion. We do not believe that the legislature intended Defendant Two’s claim to be
time-barred. The legislature was concerned with reducing frivolous claims and
reducing costs, but it also included the escape clause as an exception for extraor-
dinary situations. Application of the escape clause to Defendant Two’s claim is
consistent with the legislative discussions.
Cite as 371 Or 413 (2023)                                  443

   that discovery rule operates independently of the particu-
   lar claimant’s mental condition.”
          According to the state, “[i]t follows that,” when the
1989 legislature enacted the statute of limitations for post-
conviction claims, it intended the statute’s escape clause “to
operate as an accrual rule,” more specifically, a “discovery
accrual rule” under which a claim accrues “either when
the plaintiff actually discovers their legal injury or when
they reasonably should have discovered it, whichever occurs
first.” (Emphasis in original.) The state further argues that
the discovery accrual rule “focuses on an abstraction—the
‘objectively reasonable person’—rather than on the specific
claimant at issue,” and, therefore, does not allow for consid-
eration of “the characteristics of the particular claimant,”
including “mental illness.”
         The state’s argument, which the dissent echoes, is
unavailing. First, and most importantly, the state’s primary
premise—that because the escape clause in ORS 138.510 for
untimely petitions was imported from the escape clause in
ORS 138.550 for successive petitions, the two clauses should
be construed the same—is inconsistent with our case law.
As explained above, this court has expressly, repeatedly,
and consistently held that the two clauses must be con-
strued separately given their different contexts, histories,
and purposes. And, as Gutale and Perez-Rodriguez illus-
trate, whether the escape clause applies can depend on a
petitioner’s particular situation, including whether, based
on the particular information the petitioner received, the
petitioner would have had a reason to investigate a ground
for relief. Compare Gutale, 364 Or at 512-13, with Perez-
Rodriguez, 364 Or at 497.
          Given that the primary premise of the state’s argu-
ment is inconsistent with our case law, we need not deter-
mine whether its other premises—that the escape clause
in ORS 138.550 is a discovery accrual rule and that, as a
result, a plaintiff’s personal characteristics are irrelevant to
whether it applies—are correct. But we pause to note that,
even assuming that the escape clause in ORS 138.550 is a
discovery accrual rule, the state’s assertion that a plain-
tiff’s personal characteristics are irrelevant is too sweeping.
444                                        Ingle v. Matteucci

We have considered personal characteristics—specifically,
age—when applying discovery accrual rules. Doe v. Lake
Oswego Sch. Dist., 353 Or 321, 333, 297 P3d 1287 (2013)
(“[A] court must consider the facts from the perspective of
a reasonable person in the circumstances of the plaintiff.
Those circumstances include, but are not limited to, plain-
tiff’s status as a minor, the relationship between the parties,
and the nature of the harm suffered.” (Citations omitted.));
T.R. v. Boy Scouts of America, 344 Or 282, 297, 181 P3d 758
(2008) (considering the plaintiff’s age when applying a dis-
covery accrual rule). And, in other contexts when applying a
“reasonable person” or “reasonable care” test, we have stated
that age and disability are relevant. See Thomas v. Inman,
282 Or 279, 285-86, 578 P2d 399 (1978) (concluding that a
minor’s age and intelligence are relevant to the “reasonable
person” standard for negligence); Biddle v. Mazzocco, 204 Or
547, 556, 284 P2d 364 (1955) (stating that “[w]hether a child
playing in the street, for example, is guilty of contributory
negligence is determined from the standpoint of a child of
like age and experience; and the conduct of a blind person
on the street is tested by that of a reasonably prudent blind
person in like or similar circumstances”).
          The state also argues that allowing post-conviction
courts to consider a petitioner’s mental impairments is
inconsistent with the legislature’s intent in enacting the
statute of limitations, because the legislature intended to
reduce the number of post-conviction cases. We agree with
the state that the legislature intended to reduce the number
of post-conviction cases, but for the reasons explained above,
we believe that the existence of severe mental impairments
constitutes the type of extraordinary circumstance that the
legislature intended the escape clause to cover and, there-
fore, litigation regarding the existence of such impairments
is consistent with the legislature’s intent.
         Moreover, the amount of litigation will be limited
by the fact that the bar for establishing that the escape
clause applies is high. The escape clause is narrow, and the
petitioner bears the burden of alleging facts sufficient to
establish that it applies. In other contexts, courts already
consider mental impairments when determining whether
Cite as 371 Or 413 (2023)                                  445

an untimely case can proceed, and the approaches used in
those cases can guide litigants and courts as they determine
whether the escape clause applies. For example, federal
courts have held that a person’s mental impairments can
justify equitable tolling of the limitations period for habeas
corpus claims and have set out requirements for such toll-
ing. See, e.g., Bills v. Clark, 628 F3d 1092, 1097 (9th Cir
2010) (holding that the threshold for triggering equitable
tolling is “very high” and setting out requirements); see also
Milam v. Harrington, 953 F3d 1128, 1130-33 (9th Cir 2020)
(holding that the district court erred in refusing to consider
whether a federal habeas petitioner’s mental impairment
caused the untimely filing of his petition). In Bills, the Ninth
Circuit held that, to trigger equitable tolling, a petitioner
must prove that “his mental impairment was an ‘extraor-
dinary circumstance’ beyond his control.” 628 F3d at 1099.
To do so, the petitioner must prove that his “impairment
was so severe” that it rendered him “unable rationally or
factually to personally understand the need to timely file” or
“unable personally to prepare a habeas petition and effectu-
ate its filing.” Id. at 1100. In addition, the petitioner “must
show diligence in pursuing the claims to the extent he could
understand them, but that the mental impairment made it
impossible to meet the filing deadline under the totality of
the circumstances, including reasonably available access to
assistance.” Id.
C. Whether Petitioner’s Allegations Are Sufficient to Support
   Application of the Escape Clause
         Having concluded that a post-conviction court can
consider a petitioner’s mental impairments when determin-
ing whether the escape clause in ORS 138.510(3) applies
to an untimely petition, we now turn to the question of
whether petitioner’s allegations in this case are sufficient to
support application of the clause. Because the state moved
to dismiss petitioner’s case on the pleadings, we assume the
truth of petitioner’s allegations. As described above, peti-
tioner alleged that, during the limitations period, he was
“intellectually disabled as a result of his diagnosed schizo-
phrenia and his forced consumption of extremely power-
ful psychotropic medications.” He further alleged that his
446                                                   Ingle v. Matteucci

disability prevented him from understanding both what
had happened in his underlying criminal case and what he
could do to challenge his convictions. And he alleged that
his mental impairments “deprived him of the ability to
appreciate, identify, allege, and support with the requisite
evidence, the relevant claims for relief.” Those allegations,
if true, are sufficient to establish that, as a result of mental
impairments that existed throughout the limitations period
and were beyond his control, petitioner lacked the ability to
take the necessary steps to initiate a post-conviction case.
As such, they are sufficient to trigger the escape clause.
Therefore, the post-conviction court erred in granting the
state’s motion to dismiss on the pleadings.6
                         III.    CONCLUSION
          To recap, when the legislature created the statute
of limitations for post-conviction petitions, ORS 138.510(3),
it included both a limitations period and an escape clause.
The legislature believed that, in most circumstances, peti-
tioners would be able to take the steps necessary to raise
their grounds for relief within the limitations period, but
it created the escape clause to cover extraordinary circum-
stances. The escape clause applies when a ground for relief
“could not reasonably have been raised” within the limita-
tions period. The words used in the clause and our cases
construing them indicate that whether the clause applies
depends on the petitioner’s capabilities under the circum-
stances that existed during the limitations period. When
assessing those capabilities, the question is not whether the
petitioner conceivably could have raised the ground for relief,
but whether the petitioner reasonably could have done so.
Stated differently, the question is whether it would be rea-
sonable to expect the petitioner to have raised the ground
for relief. A petitioner’s mental impairments are relevant to
that question. If a petitioner’s mental impairments are so
severe—both in terms of degree and duration—that it would
be unreasonable to expect the petitioner to have taken the
steps necessary to raise a ground for relief, even with avail-
able assistance, then the escape clause applies. But, because

    6
      Whether petitioner will be able to present sufficient evidence to support
those allegations at later stages of the case is a separate matter.
Cite as 371 Or 413 (2023)                                447

the escape clause is narrow, the bar for establishing that
level of impairment is high. Here, petitioner’s allegations,
if true, are sufficient to support application of the escape
clause. Therefore, the post-conviction court erred in grant-
ing the state’s motion to dismiss on the pleadings.
        The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case
is remanded to that court for further proceedings.
        GARRETT, J., dissenting.
         I would affirm the judgment below. As this court
has long described it, the “escape clause” in ORS 138.510(3)
reflects the legislature’s intent that, in “extraordinary cir-
cumstances,” post-conviction petitioners should be able
to bring claims after the expiration of the statute of lim-
itations. Bartz v. State of Oregon, 314 Or 353, 358-59, 839
P2d 217 (1992) (the provision is “meant to be construed
narrowly”). Adhering carefully to this court’s case law, the
Court of Appeals held that the escape-clause analysis uses a
“reasonable person” test that does not turn on a petitioner’s
personal characteristics. Ingle v. Matteucci, 315 Or App 416,
501 P3d 23 (2021). The majority today rejects that view,
holding that petitioner may invoke the escape clause based
on a showing that, because of his serious mental illness, he
could not reasonably have raised his post-conviction claim
earlier than he did.
          The majority’s holding has significant implications
for the frequency with which petitioners will be able to raise
late claims. The question before us is how the legislature,
which added the escape clause in 1989 and addressed it
again in 1993, intended for the statute to work. Based on
the statutory text in context, as previously construed by this
court, along with the legislative history, I am not persuaded
that the legislature intended the escape clause to be as
expansive as the majority’s reasoning would have it. Rather,
the legislature intended for a post-conviction court to ask
whether the information necessary to assert a claim was
available within the statute of limitations—viewed from the
perspective of a reasonable person. Personal characteristics
such as mental illness are not the sort of “extraordinary”
448                                          Ingle v. Matteucci

circumstance that the legislature anticipated would justify
an untimely claim.
        Beginning with the text, ORS 138.510(3) provides:
       “A petition pursuant to ORS 138.510 * * * must be filed
   within two years of [certain identified events], unless the
   court on hearing a subsequent petition finds grounds for
   relief asserted which could not reasonably have been raised
   in the original or amended petition[.]”
(Emphasis added.) The majority interprets that wording to
ask whether a particular petitioner could have asserted a
claim. That is not the most natural reading of the text, how-
ever, which refers to whether “grounds for relief” could “rea-
sonably” have been raised and not whether a specific per-
son had the ability to raise them. This is in contrast with,
for example, the statute that tolls certain statutes of lim-
itations for persons with mental disability, ORS 12.160(3).
That statute provides that, if a person is suffering from a
mental disability at the time a cause of action accrues, “the
statute of limitation for commencing [an] action is tolled for
so long as the person has a disabling mental condition that
bars the person from comprehending rights that the person is
otherwise bound to know.” ORS 12.160(3) (emphases added).
ORS 12.160(3) asks what “the person” could “comprehend,”
showing that the legislature knows how to draft a statute
that places the focus on whether a particular claimant, for
personal reasons, was capable of asserting a claim. It did
not do that in ORS 138.510(3).
          Context for understanding ORS 138.510(3) includes
related provisions and this court’s case law, and our cases
have consistently applied a “reasonable person” standard.
See, e.g., Bartz, 314 Or at 359 (explaining that claims per-
missible under the escape clause involve “information that
did not exist or was not reasonably available to a defendant”
within the statute of limitation period, such as newly dis-
covered evidence). In Bartz, the court declined to apply the
escape clause to the petitioner’s claim that his trial coun-
sel had not advised him of a statutory defense, reasoning
that the information needed to assert that claim—the stat-
ute providing for the defense, and trial counsel’s failure to
mention it—was available at the time of conviction. Id. at
Cite as 371 Or 413 (2023)                                449

359-60. The resolution of the case was guided by the pre-
sumption that “the ordinary means by which the legislature
publishes and makes available its enactments are sufficient
to inform persons of statutes that are relevant to them.” Id.
The degree to which the petitioner had the actual capacity
to understand the information available to him did not fig-
ure into this court’s analysis.
         More recently, in Gutale v. State of Oregon, 364 Or
502, 435 P3d 728 (2019), this court adhered to the holding in
Bartz but clarified that ORS 138.510(3) “requires assessing
both whether the petitioner reasonably could have accessed
the ground for relief and whether a reasonable person in
the petitioner’s situation would have thought to investigate
the existence of that ground for relief.” Id. at 512 (emphasis
added). In Gutale, the petitioner alleged that his trial coun-
sel failed to advise him of the immigration consequences of
pleading guilty. Id. at 506. At the time of that alleged omis-
sion, the United States Supreme Court had held that trial
counsel is required to give such advice. Id. at 505 (discuss-
ing Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 US 356, 130 S Ct 1473, 176 L Ed
2d 284 (2010)). Consequently, the information supporting a
post-conviction claim for inadequate assistance of counsel
was available at the time of the petitioner’s conviction. This
court determined, however, that the petitioner had had no
reason to investigate whether his guilty plea would have
“immigration consequences” prior to his detention by fed-
eral immigration authorities, which occurred after the stat-
ute of limitations in ORS 138.510(3) had expired. Id. at 514.
         This court’s reference in Gutale to “the petitioner’s
situation” could, at first glance, appear to call for an indi-
vidualized inquiry into a petitioner’s capacity to assert his
or her rights. But the context of that statement in Gutale
shows otherwise. In referring to the “petitioner’s situation,”
the court was distinguishing the escape clause in ORS
138.510(3) from the similarly worded escape clause in ORS
138.550(3). The latter, the “successive petition” bar, pre-
cludes a petitioner from asserting a claim in a successive
post-conviction petition that could have been raised in the
original petition; only a claim “[which] could not reasonably
have been raised” in the original petition may be asserted
450                                            Ingle v. Matteucci

in a successive petition. Gutale, 364 Or at 518. As this court
explained in Verduzco v. State of Oregon, 357 Or 553, 563-
64, 355 P3d 902 (2015), the untimely-petition escape clause
in ORS 138.510(3) was copied from the successive-petition
escape clause in ORS 138.550(3). See id. at 564 n 9 (“The * * *
legislature borrowed the escape clause from the bar against
successive petitions and inserted it, without modification, in
the bar against untimely petitions.”). We have described the
escape clause in ORS 138.550(3) as codifying “claim preclu-
sion” principles, precluding a claim in a successive petition
that a petitioner’s counsel could reasonably have raised in
the original petition. Id. at 565 (citing Johnson v. Premo, 355
Or 866, 874-75, 333 P3d 288 (2014), as explaining that ORS
138.550(3) “codifies claim preclusion principles”).
         Although the escape clause in ORS 138.510(3) was
taken from ORS 138.550(3), the court in Gutale distin-
guished the two in an important respect. We reasoned that,
although our case law has approached the successive-peti-
tion escape clause from the perspective of what a petitioner’s
counsel could reasonably have raised in the original peti-
tion, the untimely-petition escape clause applies in situa-
tions where a petitioner may not have been represented:
       “ORS 138.550(3) codifies claim preclusion principles: It
   addresses the question of whether a petitioner who already
   has litigated a petition for post-conviction relief may return
   to court and litigate a second time, and it provides that a
   petitioner may not do so where counsel reasonably could
   have raised the grounds at issue in that prior litigation.
   By contrast, when the bar on successive petitions does not
   apply, the inquiry under [ORS 138.510(3)] is whether a
   petitioner reasonably could have raised a ground for relief
   before any litigation has occurred. The focus of the reason-
   ableness inquiry is therefore the petitioner, rather than an
   attorney representing the petitioner.”
Gutale, 364 Or at 518-19 (footnotes and emphasis omitted).
         In reaching that conclusion, the court in Gutale did
not abandon the “reasonable person” test; it simply clarified
that, for the untimely-petition escape clause, the focus must
be on a reasonable unrepresented petitioner. That the court
did not intend to move away from a “reasonable person”
Cite as 371 Or 413 (2023)                                       451

standard is confirmed by the court’s comparison of ORS
138.510(3) to a “discovery rule”:
      “The resulting standard, therefore, requires assessing
   both whether the petitioner reasonably could have accessed
   the ground for relief and whether a reasonable person in
   the petitioner’s situation would have thought to investigate
   the existence of that ground for relief. That standard is
   very similar to the standard for a discovery rule, which is
   used in other contexts. In negligence cases, for example,
   the statute of limitations does not begin until at least the
   earlier of two possible events: (1) the date of the plaintiff’s
   actual discovery of injury; or (2) the date when a person
   exercising reasonable care should have discovered the
   injury, including learning facts that an inquiry would have
   disclosed.”
Id. at 512 (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted);
see also Doe v. Lake Oswego School District, 353 Or 321, 332,
297 P3d 1287 (2013) (“The discovery rule applies an objec-
tive standard—how a reasonable person of ordinary pru-
dence would have acted in the same or a similar situation.”).
In a case decided the same day as Gutale, this court reiter-
ated the general understanding that, although individual
characteristics such as mental disability typically allow for
a statute of limitations to be tolled, the commencement of a
statute of limitations, under a discovery rule, turns on an
objective reasonableness standard. Perez-Rodriguez v. State
of Oregon, 364 Or 489, 498, 435 P3d 746 (2019) (“[I]n apply-
ing statutes of limitations, courts frequently consider men-
tal illness or intellectual capacity as part of a statutory or
common-law tolling rule that is separate from the discovery
rule’s reasonableness inquiry. See, e.g., ORS 12.160(3) (con-
sidering whether a ‘person has a disabling mental condition’
at the time a cause of action accrues).”).
         By analogizing ORS 138.510(3) to a “discovery rule”
even as it held that a petitioner’s “situation” must be consid-
ered, Gutale made clear that the escape-clause inquiry con-
tinues to be what a “reasonable person” could have timely
asserted. The Court of Appeals below correctly understood
that. Ingle, 315 Or App at 429 (“[T]he court in Gutale itself
considered the petitioner’s ‘situation’ only insofar as it con-
sidered what the petitioner had been told (or not told) about
452                                                       Ingle v. Matteucci

immigration consequences when he entered his guilty plea
and what a ‘reasonable person’ would have understood as a
result. The court did not consider any personal characteris-
tics of the petitioner.” (Citation omitted.)).
          The court in Gutale was careful to point out that its
holding had limited implications and did not threaten to let
the escape clause “exception” swallow the “rule”:
    “[P]etitioners who were unaware of the immigration conse-
    quences of their convictions are a narrow class of petition-
    ers. Allowing petitioner’s claim in this case to fall within
    the escape clause does not run the risk of having the escape
    clause swallow the statute of limitations.”
364 Or at 514.
         In holding today that petitioner’s mental illness may
qualify him for relief under the escape clause, the majority
departs from our precedent by displacing the objective “rea-
sonable person” inquiry with an individualized one: whether
petitioner could have asserted a claim in light of his men-
tal impairments. Unlike the “narrow” class of petitioners
that Gutale envisioned might benefit from its holding, the
class of petitioners who will be affected by today’s decision is
potentially large. According to October 2022 data from the
Department of Corrections, for example, 44 percent of adults
in custody were identified as having at least a “moderate”
need for mental health treatment. Nearly 30 percent have
mental health needs that are “severe” or worse.1 Although
that figure does not necessarily mean that 30 percent of
convicted felons will qualify for the escape clause under the
court’s new rule, it is a clue to the potential implications.
And it reveals the unfortunate fact that severe mental ill-
ness is not an “extraordinary” circumstance when it comes
to those convicted of crimes, as the legislature surely would
have understood. The majority states that, even after today,
“the amount of litigation will be limited by the fact that the
bar for establishing that the escape clause applies is high.”
371 Or at 444. Even if the bar for success remains high,
    1
      See Oregon Department of Corrections, Quick Facts, October 2022, available at:
https://www.oregon.gov/DOC/documents/agency-quick-facts.pdf (accessed Oct 9,
2023). The document states that 1,252 adults in custody, or 10.2 percent of the
prison population, have the “Highest Treatment Need,” while another 2,366, or
19.2 percent, have “Severe Mental Health Problems.”
Cite as 371 Or 413 (2023)                                  453

however—and that remains to be seen—it seems inevitable
that today’s decision will increase the amount of litigation,
perhaps substantially, by claimants seeking relief under the
escape clause based on their mental impairments.
         Nor should one assume that the beneficiaries of
today’s decision will be limited to those with mental illness.
The majority’s rationale is that a person’s mental illness
should be sufficient to trigger the escape clause if it prevents
that person from being able to access, process, and act upon
information in a timely fashion. It is difficult to see why the
same rationale should not apply to other personal character-
istics that have the same effect. Post-conviction courts will
either extend this rule to other mental and physical impair-
ments, disabilities, and disorders or be faced with drawing
elusive and unsatisfactory lines.
         Without question, an escape clause so expansive in
scope could be a reasonable policy choice. But it does not
appear to be the policy choice that the legislature made. As
already noted, the text of the statute, as interpreted con-
sistently by this court up through Gutale, contemplates a
“reasonable person” standard, not an inquiry into personal
traits.
         The majority’s contextual reasons for concluding
otherwise are not, in my view, persuasive. As already noted,
ORS 138.510(3) was drawn from ORS 138.550(3), which
this court has described as incorporating claim-preclusion
principles. Therefore, as the state argues, both statutes
are worded in a manner typical of discovery accrual rules,
under which statutes of limitations are commenced based
on a standard of objective reasonableness, as opposed to
tolling provisions, which allow those statutes of limitations
to be put on hold for reasons particular to the individual
claimant (such as disability). The majority’s response to that
is that this court has already rejected the view that ORS
138.510(3) should necessarily be interpreted in lockstep with
ORS 138.550(3). That point, while correct, does not help us
understand how ORS 138.510(3) ought to be interpreted. The
central question remains whether the legislature intended
for that statute’s escape clause to turn on an individualized
inquiry rather than an objective reasonableness standard.
454                                        Ingle v. Matteucci

Rejecting the premise that ORS 138.510(3) should be inter-
preted similarly to ORS 138.550(3) can only show, at most,
that the legislature could have intended for the former to be
an individualized inquiry even though the latter is not. It
does not establish what the legislature actually did intend.
         The majority also points out that discovery accrual
rules sometimes do account for personal characteristics—
namely, a claimant’s age. It is true that, in applying a “rea-
sonable person” standard, this court has stated that a claim-
ant’s “status as a minor” is relevant. Doe, 353 Or at 333. But
that is a very different proposition from the one the majority
advances today. The distinction between what juveniles and
adults should be expected to know is objective, pervasive
throughout civil and criminal law, and can be applied with-
out any fact-intensive investigation into a claimant’s per-
sonal capabilities. One can differentiate between a “reason-
able minor” and a “reasonable adult” and still be applying
a “reasonable person” standard. The rule that the majority
announces today, which makes the escape clause an indi-
vidualized inquiry into a claimant’s mental condition and
abilities, severs any link to a “reasonable person” standard,
and I do not understand the majority to contend otherwise.
         The majority also suggests that legislators address-
ing the escape clause in 1989 and 1993 would have been
aware of ORS 12.160(3), and therefore would have had in
mind that mental illness is a basis for tolling in other con-
texts. But, as noted earlier, ORS 12.160(3), which is phrased
in terms of what “a person” could “comprehend,” makes
it more significant that ORS 138.510(3) is not similarly
phrased. In addition, ORS 12.160(4) caps the period of tolling
under ORS 12.160(3) at a maximum of five years. Because
the escape clause in ORS 138.510(3) has no temporal limita-
tion, the majority’s reasoning supposes that the legislature
intended to provide a far more liberal allowance for mental
disability in the post-conviction context than it has done for
other civil claims. Given that the legislature in 1989 and
1993 was concerned primarily with reducing the number of
post-conviction filings, it seems unlikely that the legislature
simultaneously intended for the Post-Conviction Hearing
Act to be uniquely generous in accounting for mental illness.
Cite as 371 Or 413 (2023)                                 455

         For the reasons that I have explained, I think the
better interpretation of the text and context is that the leg-
islature intended for the escape clause in ORS 138.510(3) to
incorporate a “reasonable person” standard. The legislative
history that the majority recounts is consistent with that
understanding. The statute of limitations in ORS 138.510(3)
was first added in 1989, when the legislature inserted a
120-day filing requirement, along with an escape clause
to cover “extraordinary circumstances.” Tape Recording,
House Committee on Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime
and Corrections, HB 2796, Apr 4, 1989, Tape 60, Side B
(comments of Representative Kevin Mannix). During the
1989 deliberations, a representative of the Oregon Criminal
Defense Lawyers Association informed legislators that the
escape clause would be “severely limit[ed].” Tape Recording,
House Committee on Judiciary, Subcommittee on Civil
and Judicial Administration, SB 284, June 12, 1989, Tape
123, Side A (statement of Ross Shepard describing escape
clause as a “severely limit[ed]” exception). Shepard both con-
firmed that the escape clause would be confined to “extraor-
dinary circumstances” and, notably, offered examples of
what would qualify: newly discovered evidence, intervening
changes to the law, or actions by third parties that actively
interfered with a petitioner’s ability to bring a claim. Tape
Recording, House Committee on Judiciary, Subcommittee
on Civil and Judicial Administration, SB 284, June 12,
1989, Tape 122, Side A (describing a hypothetical situation
involving late discovery of evidence of collusion between a
prosecutor and a defense lawyer); Tape Recording, House
Committee on Judiciary, Subcommittee on Civil and Judicial
Administration, SB 284, June 12, 1989, Tape 123, Side A
(referring to a situation where the statute that a defendant
was convicted of violating is later declared unconstitutional).
         In 1993, the legislature increased the statute of
limitations period from 120 days to two years. As the major-
ity explains, legislators were concerned that the 120-day
period was too strict. Tape Recording, House Committee
on Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime and Corrections, HB
2352, Apr 7, 1993, Tape 70, Side A (Representative Kate
Brown commenting, “My concern is the level of folks we’re
working with here, that sixty-seven percent of them don’t
456                                        Ingle v. Matteucci

have a high school education and a lot of them aren’t even able
to read, and I just think two years is a reasonable statute of
limitations under the folks we’re working with.”). The legis-
lature did not alter the escape clause, which Representative
Mannix described as “a savings clause for unconscionable
situations where the system didn’t work.” Id.
         Although it is evident from then-Representative
Brown’s comments that legislators had personal character-
istics in mind in 1993 as a reason to sextuple the statute
of limitations, any reference to personal characteristics is
conspicuously absent from the legislative discussion of the
escape clause in both 1989 and 1993. In those discussions,
legislators contemplated the types of events that might
qualify for relief under ORS 138.510(3) and identified only
extrinsic facts like newly discovered evidence or changes to
the law—matters that are consistent with a standard that
asks what a “reasonable person” could have been expected
to know. Considering the variety of attributes, conditions,
disorders, and characteristics that might affect a person’s
ability to assimilate and act upon available information,
it seems implausible that the legislature intended for such
personal factors to suffice under an escape clause that was
described variously as “severely limited,” meant for nar-
row and “extraordinary” circumstances, and designed for
“unconscionable” situations where “the system failed.”
         Because I am not persuaded that the legislature
intended for personal characteristics to inform the ques-
tion of when grounds for relief could “reasonably have been
raised” for purposes of ORS 138.510(3), I respectfully dissent.
        Balmer, S. J., joins in this dissenting opinion.