Court Opinion

ID: 9590603
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:56:21.657902+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:35:44.998085
License: Public Domain

STEWART, Justice
(dissenting):
I dissent. The trial of this case was, I submit, tainted by the admission of prejudicial battered child syndrome evidence that lacked an adequate foundation, and by the testimony of the prosecution’s chief witness that on its face was at least partly perjurious, if not entirely so. I would reverse and remand for a new trial.
There is no real issue as to the cause of Tawnya Tanner’s death. The unrebutted evidence established that the cause of death was a blow to the head. The defendant made no'claim that she had accidentally or mistakenly caused the death. Her claim was that she had not caused the death in any way. The only real issue is who killed Tawnya Tanner. There are only two realistic possibilities: either Kathy Tanner, the defendant, or Leland Foote, her live-in boyfriend.
The brutal killing of a three-year-old child naturally evokes deep and powerful feelings of revulsion and abhorrence which are common to all. Yet such cases are precisely those in which it is most important to adhere to those rules of evidence which are designed to sift truth from error and to prevent the insinuation of prejudice into the truth-finding processes of the courts. Compliance with those rules is essential to prevent abhorrence for the crime *552committed from tainting the crucial determination of who committed the crime.
Without even defining what battered child syndrome evidence is, the majority holds that it is admissible even though there is no evidence that the defendant was the sole caretaker of the child when the various injuries, including the fatal blow, were inflicted. The majority states with respect to battered child syndrome evidence that “[t]he term should not be applied broadly” but “[t]he expert should be able to testify in detail” and then concludes that “[a]ny deficiencies in the testimony ... go to its weight rather than its admissibility.” The Court’s theory of the admissibility of the battered child syndrome evidence is that it established a “pattern of conduct” by the defendant. Thus, under the Court’s rationale, it appears that the explosive battered child syndrome evidence may be admitted in virtually all cases in which a parent is accused of killing his or her child and the child has been battered, even though, as here, there is another person who may have been responsible for the fatal injury, and perhaps some of the abuse. On the facts of this case, the Court’s ruling represents, I submit, a departure from basic rules of evidence.
The majority opinion states that the “key evidence in this case is the mute testimony of the body of three-year-old Tawnya Tanner.” I disagree. That evidence surely does tend to establish that Tawnya was badly abused; indeed, there was other evidence that the defendant herself had on occasion abused the child. But the key evidence in the trial of the case was the highly inconsistent, and at least partially, but undeniably, perjurious testimony of the State’s key witness, Leland Foote, the defendant’s live-in boyfriend. And truly the key question is whether the defendant or Leland Foote committed the crime. Foote had earlier pleaded guilty to a manslaughter charge for the exact same crime pursuant to a plea bargain, after having been first charged with second degree murder.
Battered child syndrome evidence is circumstantial evidence that the caretaker of a child may be responsible for the fatal injury of a child. However, in this case, Foote was also a caretaker. His testimony pointed the finger of guilt solely at the defendant. It is at best strange that notwithstanding Foote’s plea of guilty to the charge of killing Tawnya, his trial testimony placed the entire blame for the death of Tawnya on the defendant and in no way inculpated him in the crime in the slightest degree. That testimony must have been contrary to the evidence which the prosecution had against Foote, or it would never have filed the second degree murder charge against Foote, nor would Foote have pleaded guilty. Into these extraordinary circumstances, the “battered child syndrome” evidence was interjected along with other evidence of defendant’s prior misconduct.
A key evidentiary question is the proper application of Rule 55, Utah R.Evid., which states:
Subject to Rule 47 evidence that a person committed a crime or civil wrong on a specified occasion, is inadmissible to prove his disposition to commit crime or civil wrong as the basis for an inference that he committed another crime or civil wrong on another specified occasion but, subject to Rules 45 and 48, such evidence is admissible when relevant to prove some other material fact including absence of mistake or accident, motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge or identity. [Emphasis added.]1
The majority reads Rule 55 as if the only inquiry is one of simple relevancy and on that basis allows past bad acts by the defendant, including the battered child syndrome evidence, to be admitted into evidence. I submit that that reading of Rule 55 departs from established rules of law in admitting evidence tending to show that the defendant on occasion abused Tawnya *553for the purpose of proving a pattern of conduct on the part of the defendant.
Such evidence may have probative value as to the identity or intent of the person who committed the crime, if it is established that the child was in the sole care of that person.
The breadth of the majority’s holding, however, opens the door to virtually any child abuse evidence when an infant is killed, without regard for those rules of evidence designed to insure a verdict based on the allegations of the crime charged and not the character of the defendant. In essence, the majority ignores the longstanding rules that restrict the use of prior crime evidence by establishing a high threshold of relevancy and allows the battered child syndrome evidence on the same test of relevancy used for run-of-the-mill evidence. If that were the established law in determining admissibility of prior crime evidence, there would be no need for Rule 55, which should serve to insure fairness and reliability in the truth-seeking function of a trial.
I.
The majority’s definition of battered child syndrome evidence and its explanation of why it is admissible is both confusing and inconsistent. In its own language, and sometimes quoting with approval from other courts, the majority states that the evidence is admissible because it states “no opinion regarding a defendant’s culpability,” “does not directly indicate the culpability of any particular defendant,” “only indicates the cause of death,” and “merely describes the nature of the injuries.” Furthermore, the majority states that “[m]edical testimony indicated that Tawnya’s fatal injury was part of a pattern of abusive injuries.”
In justifying the evidence admitted in this case, the majority cites experts who state that the diagnosis is “really descriptive of a pattern of conduct on the part of the parents,” is “concern[ed] with the causative factors outside of the body of the child,” includes a description of the parents’ conduct and characteristics, and allows for an inference that the parent or guardian inflicted the injuries. Thus, on the one hand, the majority asserts that the battered child syndrome evidence is not accusatory and only describes the cause of death (which in fact it does not do), and on the other hand admits that such evidence incriminates the parents. The majority cannot have it both ways.
In the instant case, the testimony included reference to the defendant’s culpability. The expert testified regarding the typical profile of an abusing parent and the inadequate explanation for Tawnya’s injuries. The majority states:
The doctor also testified that abusive disciplinary methods are frequently part of the battered child syndrome, that the parents of such children are typically very young or inexperienced and that they are likely to have a history of prior abusive conduct. Dr. Palmer went on to identify in Tawnya the characteristics of the battered child, emphasizing in particular the inadequate explanation given by the defendant for Tawnya’s injuries.
That testimony goes beyond battered child syndrome evidence which describes the child’s injuries, and falls into the category of battering parent syndrome evidence, which includes a profile of the typical battering parent.
Those courts which have considered the admissibility of battering parent syndrome evidence have warned against the improper use of such evidence. In Sanders v. State, 251 Ga. 70, 303 S.E.2d 13 (1983), which dealt with evidence of the traits of a battering parent, the court stated that such evidence should not be allowed unless the defendant places his character in issue or raises some defense that would make the evidence relevant in rebuttal. In State v. Loebach, Minn., 310 N.W.2d 58 (1981), the court, in addressing a similar issue, stated that such evidence is not admissible unless the defendant raises the issue of character. In both cases, the courts found error in the admission of the evidence, but other *554overwhelming evidence supported the verdicts.
In the present case, the only direct evidence probative of the defendant’s guilt came from a perjured witness — the defendant’s live-in boyfriend — who had already pleaded guilty to having killed the child after striking a bargain with the prosecutor to obtain a reduction in the charge against him from second degree murder to manslaughter. Under the circumstances, that evidence is highly suspect. In State v. Mulder, 29 Wash.App. 513, 629 P.2d 462 (1981), the court allowed child abuse syndrome evidence but stated that other “[ejvidence must still be produced to establish that it was the defendant who caused the injuries in question.” Id. 629 P.2d at 463 (emphasis added). That is not only lacking in this case, but there is evidence quite to the contrary.
One commentator, who favors admissibility of battered child syndrome evidence, agrees that the evidence may be used too broadly: “[I]f the ‘battered child syndrome’ diagnosis were used indiscriminately, a parent might be convicted for a beating administered by another person.” Note, “Evidence — Child Abuse — Expert Medical Testimony Concerning ‘Battered Child Syndrome’ Held Admissible,” 42 Fordham L.Rev. 935, 941 (1974). This comment is particularly appropriate in the instant case. It is not unusual for the male companion of a female who has a child whom he has not fathered to engage in acts of child abuse that may kill a child or result in a battered child syndrome. Even babysitters have been convicted of homicides which could be attributed to a parent or parents who have abused a child.
In my view, the analysis of whether battered child syndrome evidence is admissible must begin with the long-established proposition that a person under our system of law may be tried only for a specific act and not for his character. Unlike some legal systems, our criminal justice system is concerned with whether a defendant committed a particular criminal act, not whether the defendant is an unregenerate person who has failed in the past to adhere to the various customs and laws of our society. Rule 55 of the Utah Rules of Evidence strikes a balance between this proposition and the rules of relevancy by limiting the admissibility of prior acts to instances where they are especially probative.
Evidence of criminal acts having a particular probative value that goes beyond the usual test for relevancy may be admissible despite the greater likelihood of prejudice. McCormick on Evidence 447 (2nd ed. 1972) states:
The disfavor for receiving proof of the character of a person as evidence that on a particular occasion he acted in keeping with his disposition is strongly felt when the state seeks to show that the accused is a bad man and thus more likely to have committed the crime. The long-established rule, accordingly, forbids the prosecution, unless and until the accused gives evidence of his good character, to introduce initially evidence of the bad character of the accused. It is not irrelevant, but in the setting of a jury trial the danger of prejudice outweighs the probative value.
This danger is at its highest when character is shown by other criminal acts, and the rule about the proof of other crimes is but an application of the wider prohibition against the initial introduction by the prosecution of evidence of bad character. The rule is that the prosecution may not introduce evidence of other criminal acts of the accused unless the evidence is substantially relevant for some other purpose than to show a probability that he committed the crime on trial because he is a man of criminal character. [Footnotes omitted.]
In State v. Nemier, 106 Utah 307, 312, 148 P.2d 327, 329 (1944), Justice Wade stated, “It is universally recognized that the state may not prove other similar offenses committed by [the] accused merely to show his bad character and propensity to commit similar crimes and infer therefrom that he probably committed the crime charged.” There can be no blinking the fact that such *555evidence is relevant. It is the effect of such evidence on the truth-seeking processes of the courts that demands that such evidence be treated with great caution. See State v. Kappas, 100 Utah 274, 114 P.2d 205 (1941); State v. Anderton, 81 Utah 320, 17 P.2d 917 (1933); State v. McGowan, 66 Utah 223, 241 P. 314 (1925).
It is not enough that a person of the defendant’s particular character is more likely to have committed the crime than someone else — although that proposition may be empirically true and therefore meet the general test of relevance. Thus, a charge of driving under the influence of alcohol may not be proved by showing that the defendant is an alcoholic; a crime of larceny may not be proved by showing that the defendant is a cleptomaniac or has a sociopathic personality; perjury may not be proved by showing that the defendant is a pathological liar.
Thus, for reasons wholly apart from relevancy, the courts generally bar evidence of other wrongs, with few exceptions, for reasons based upon fundamental principles of justice and the concept that man is an autonomous agent invested with free will whose actions are not governed by forces beyond his control.
The purpose behind not allowing evidence of past wrongs is not to exclude relevant evidence, although that may occur, but to protect defendants from irrational decisions. Dean Wigmore has explained this policy in a discussion of admissibility of past crimes to prove character:
It is objectionable, not because it has no appreciable probative value, but because it has too much. The natural and inevitable tendency of the tribunal — whether judge or jury — is to give excessive weight to the vicious record of crime thus exhibited, and either to allow it to bear too strongly on the present charge, or to take the proof of it as justifying a condemnation irrespective of guilt of the present charge.
J. Wigmore, Evidence, § 194 at 646 (1940). Dean Wigmore enumerates three reasons why evidence of past crimes should not be admitted absent special circumstances:
(1) The over-strong tendency to believe the defendant guilty of the charge merely because he is a likely person to do such acts; (2) the tendency to condemn, not because he is believed guilty of the present charge, but because he has escaped unpunished from other offences; ... (3) The injustice of attacking one necessarily unprepared to demonstrate that the attacking evidence is fabricated
Id. at 650.
All these reasons apply to battered child syndrome evidence, and the rules of evidence should be applied to prevent the defendant from being found guilty because he or she had previously committed numerous wrongs. Even if a parent has abused a child, the parent should not be subjected to the risk of conviction for homicide solely on the basis of his or her prior acts. This is not to excuse wrongs, past or present, but to protect the innocent:
[I]t is to be noted, the judicial exposition of these reasons shows the fallacy of supposing, as some do, that the object of the rule is merely to show mercy to the guilty one, to give him a final chance for life and liberty by artificially handicapping the prosecution _ On the contrary, the object is to prevent a person not guilty of the present charge from being improperly found guilty of it. If it be said that nevertheless this is still a spirit of kindness to the guilty, seeking to prevent his being punished now for what he has formerly done, the answer is that we are nevertheless protecting a person who is theoretically innocent of the present charge from being now found guilty of a past crime which he was not aware would be charged against him and which he has no opportunity to show to be fabricated. There is quite enough maudlin pity for criminals in our law in other respects; and we ought not to give support to that tendency by claiming on such grounds the doctrine here involved, — a doctrine which is in *556truth mainly designed to protect the innocent and not the guilty.
Id. at 651.
This Court applied Rule 55 to exclude evidence of past bad acts in State v. Goodliffe, Utah, 578 P.2d 1288 (1978), in which evidence of past bad acts was used to convict the defendant of forcible sexual abuse of a six-year-old girl. The prosecution argued that the evidence was admissible to rebut the defendant’s claim of veracity and truthfulness, but on appeal, the Court reversed the conviction holding that the evidence was inadmissible under Rules 47 and 55:
Bare, unproven allegations or “ ‘complaints” of prior incidents of similar conduct have no relevancy to the issue of defendant’s truthfulness or veracity. The admission of such evidence without further explanation could only have caused the jury to speculate about defendant’s propensities to commit such crimes and confuse the issues, all to the prejudice of defendant, which necessitates a new trial.
Id. at 1290. The crime in Goodliffe —sexual abuse of a child — is certainly outrageous, but the Court did not throw out the rules of evidence because of the outra-geousness of the crime charged.
II.
The majority also sustains the admission of additional evidence of past criminal acts other than that evidence admitted under the battered child syndrome theory. The majority indicates that the evidence of past bad acts should be admitted under Rule 55 if the evidence is corroborated by battered child syndrome evidence.
I agree with the majority’s opinion that the list of exclusions in Rule 55 is not exhaustive; however, as stated in the concurring opinion (to which the majority adhered) in State v. Forsyth, Utah, 641 P.2d 1172 (1982) (Stewart, J.), mere relevancy alone is not the test for admitting evidence under Rule 55. If Rule 55 were interpreted to allow any relevant evidence of past bad acts, the rule would be wholly emasculated and rendered complete surplusage because it is swallowed up by the general relevancy provision of Rule 7(f).
For Rule 55 to protect the fundamental philosophical values upon which our criminal justice system is based, it must be interpreted to exclude evidence of past acts unless the evidence is highly and specifically relevant to a particular issue that is contested in the case. It is not sufficient that it merely have some relevance. As stated in the concurring opinion in State v. Forsyth, Utah, 641 P.2d 1172, 1177-78 (1982):
[Allowing the admissibility of evidence to turn “on whether that evidence is ‘relevant to prove some ... material fact’ ” and relying on “the basic rule that all evidence having probative value is admissible,” fails to take into account the fundamental, time-honored rule that a person should be held criminally accountable only for the particular act charged, and not his character. The law has long recognized the danger that a finder of fact may be unduly influenced by prior criminal acts and has sought to preclude such acts from influencing the outcome.
The rule excluding evidence of prior misconduct to show the character or disposition of a defendant was established not because such evidence was irrelevant, but because of the likelihood that it would skew the fact-finding process.
Even though the evidence need not fall into one of the specific categories listed in the rule, the language of the rule still requires that the evidence prove some material fact other than the disposition to commit a wrong. The majority seeks to justify the admissibility of evidence of past bad acts on the ground that it was relevant to establish the cause of death, even though the evidence of past bad acts added nothing to the unrebutted medical testimony which established the cause of death. That justification is simply not adequate.
The majority also justifies the admissibility of defendant’s prior bad acts and the battered child syndrome evidence on the ground that they show “a specific pattern *557of behavior by the defendant.” But that is precisely what Rule 55 is aimed at preventing — character evidence that shows a propensity to commit a crime. The majority’s stated rationale thus contradicts Rule 55 which states that “evidence that a person committed a crime or civil wrong on a specified occasion, is inadmissible to prove his disposition to commit crime or civil wrong .... ”
The evidence might, however, have been admissible, in my view, on other theories, such as identity, intent, or to rebut a claim of accident. But the evidence of battered child syndrome had no probative value on any issue in this case, except that which was really not in controversy, since the defendant was not shown to have been the sole caretaker at the time of the abusive acts and of the homicide. The prosecution failed to prove that critical point in this case, and without that foundation the evidence should not have been admitted.
III.
I think this case should be remanded to the trial court for a hearing as to what evidence the prosecutors had which provoked them to file a second degree murder charge against Leland Foote. It is clear beyond question that he perjured himself during his testimony at the trial in this matter and that the testimony he gave which inculpated the defendant was exculpatory as to him. In fact, his testimony was so glaringly untrustworthy that the trial judge specifically admonished the defendant as to the potential consequences of perjury and discontinued taking evidence until Foote could be represented by independent counsel because of the risk he was running in telling different stories.
It may be true that both Foote and the defendant were mutually guilty in causing the death of the deceased, but there is nothing in this record which would support a conviction of Foote even as an accomplice. On the other hand, there was polygraph evidence submitted by the defendant, confirmed by a polygraph expert from the police department, and admitted by the trial court yrhich indicated that the defendant was not guilty of the crime.
Given the highly unusual circumstances of this case, including Foote’s plea bargain and perjurious testimony and the admission of the evidence of defendant’s prior past wrongs and of the battered child syndrome evidence without a proper foundation, I cannot avoid the conclusion that the defendant did not receive a fair trial. I think the case should be reversed and retried.

. This rule has since been revised and recodi-fied as Utah R.Evid., Rule 404(b) (1983).