Court Opinion

ID: 9594675
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:31:54.936609+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:00:36.889712
License: Public Domain

Allegrucci, J.,
dissenting: I disagree with the majority that there was ample competent evidence to support the trial court’s finding that the victim-witness was unavailable. I respectfully dissent from that part of the majority opinion.
I agree with the majority that the standards of Warren and Burns are valid in determining unavailability of a witness-victim by reason of an emotional or mental condition. I disagree with the majority conclusion that F.S. was unavailable as a witness. Although the psychological trauma resulting from a crime may be sufficient to constitute unavailability due to mental illness, critical factual support for this conclusion does not exist in the present case. Although Dr. Megibow’s testimony supports a finding of a probability of psychological injury to F.S. if she were to testify, the degree of anticipated injury is by no means deter*235minable with any degree of certainty. Warren and Burns indicate that the psychological trauma existing or anticipated on the part of the witness-victim must substantially exceed that experienced by all victims of violent crimes. The duration of such trauma also must be shown to be of such extent that a continuation of the trial could not be beneficial. In the present case, Dr. Megibow stated that F.S. may experience “disastrous” emotional damage by testifying at trial. However, in other portions of his testimony, Dr. Megibow compares the psychological trauma which F.S. may receive from testifying to the stress that all other victims of sexual assault experience. Moreover, there is absolutely no evidence in the record of the likely duration of F.S.’s mental condition. Dr. Megibow testified that F.S. had testified competently and consistently at the preliminary hearing, and there is no indication in the record as to the time at which the potential for psychological harm to F.S. from further testimony will dissipate.
The trial court’s conclusion that F.S. was out of contact with reality was at variance with the evidence. Rather, Dr. Megibow testified that F.S. was often fully knowledgeable of the difference between reality and fantasy. There were occasions in which it was “more difficult for her” to maintain her contact with reality, but “more often than not” she was in contact with reality and Dr. Megibow had never seen her “in a state where she has totally lost contact with reality.” Dr. Megibow also testified that F.S. had been consistently competent and capable of recalling and reciting information in the past.
Finally, I am compelled to note that the State had two other alternatives available to it. First, pursuant to K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 60-460(c)(2), F.S.’s testimony at the preliminary hearing could have been used at the trial. State v. Mick, 229 Kan. 157, 621 P.2d 1006 (1981). A finding of unavailability would still be required, but the defendant’s right to confront his accuser is not violated. The other alternative would be to videotape her testimony pursuant to K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 22-3434. State v. Johnson, 240 Kan. 326, 729 P.2d 1169 (1986). The State’s reason for not utilizing the former alternative was stated by counsel for the State at oral argument as not wanting certain parts of F.S.’s preliminary hearing cross-examination testimony admitted into evidence at *236the trial. No reason was given for not utilizing the latter alternative, except that counsel felt F.S.’s hearsay testimony was admissible pursuant to K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 60-460(dd).
K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 22-3434 provides, in part:
“Videotape of testimony of child victim admissible in certain cases; limitations; objections, restrictions, (a) On motion of the attorney for any party to a criminal proceeding in which a child less than 13 years of age is alleged to be a victim of the crime, the court may order that the testimony of the child be taken:
“(1) ... by closed-circuit equipment [or
“(2) by audio and video recording.]
“(b) At the taking of testimony under this section:
“(1) Only the attorneys for the defendant, the state and the child, any person whose presence would contr ibute to the welfare and well-being of the child and persons necessary to operate the recording or closed-circuit equipment may be present in the room with the child during the child’s testimony;
“(2) only the attorneys may question the child;
“(3) the persons operating the recording or closed-circuit equipment shall be confined to an adjacent room or behind a screen or mirror that permits them to see and hear the child during the child’s testimony but does not permit the child to see or hear them; and
“(4) the court shall permit the defendant to observe and hear the testimony of the child in person, but shall ensure that the child cannot hear or see the defendant.
“(c) If the testimony of a child is taken as provided by this section, the child shall not be compelled to testify in court during the proceeding.”
I am not suggesting that the admissibility of the out-of-court statements of F.S. should be dependent upon which statutory method the State happens to choose. Nor do I imply that the admissibility of such hearsay testimony is dependent upon the State’s exhausting all such alternatives. However, our rules of evidence express a preference for live testimony in court, and the use of K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 22-3434 is the best alternative to live testimony. In the present case, the issue is not just one of admissibility of hearsay evidence. Also at issue is the defendant’s constitutional right to confrontation as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 10 of the Bill of Rights of the Kansas Constitution. In State v. Myatt, 237 Kan. 17, 697 P.2d 836 (1985), we held out-of-court statements do not violate a defendant’s constitutional right to confrontation if the witness is unavailable and the statements have an “adequate indicia of reliability.” 237 Kan. at 24. By videotaping F.S.’s testimony pursuant to K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 22-*2373434, she need not be “unavailable” as a witness for her videotaped testimony to be admissible, and the right of confrontation is preserved. It does not take any extraordinary degree of intelligence to conclude that the primary, if not the sole, purpose of K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 22-3434 is to substantially reduce, if not remove, the stress to a child-victim, such as F.S., in testifying in a case such as the present one while, at the same time, preserving the defendant’s right to cross-examination. There is nothing in the record to support a finding that F.S. could not have testified by videotape as provided in K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 22-3434. To the contrary, Dr. Megibow testified that F.S. could not handle the stress of testifying in court, and that her adverse reaction to testifying at the preliminary hearing was triggered by stress. The State’s failure to videotape F.S.’s testimony is not critical to the admissibility of her statements, but it is a factor to be considered in determining if F.S. was, in fact, unavailable as a witness. The right to confront one’s accuser is a fundamental constitutional right. The burden of proving the unavailability of the victim as a witness rests upon the State. In my opinion, the State failed to meet that burden. I would reverse the trial court on this issue, and remand to the district court for a new trial.