Court Opinion

ID: 9596494
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:50:24.632193+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:22.411131
License: Public Domain

TERRIE LIVINGSTON, Justice,
dissenting.
“The expressed public policy of the Alcoholic Beverage Code is the protection of the welfare, health, peace, temperance, and safety of the people of the state.” El Chico Corp. v. Poole, 732 S.W.2d 306, 312 (Tex.1987); see also Tex. Alco. Bev.Code Ann. § 1.03 (Vernon 1995). “The enactment of the Texas Alcoholic Beverage Code and the statutes relating to driving while intoxicated are clear evidence of the Legislature’s explicit recognition of the dangers associated with intoxication and the need to protect the public.” El Chico, 732 S.W.2d at 312-13. Today, this court slaps a strict limitation on the causes of action created by the Texas Legislature by eliminating the right of an injured party to collect punitive damages from a provider of beverages simply because the statute fails to affirmatively state punitive damages are recoverable. I respectfully disagree with this conclusion for several reasons.
First, the Dram Shop Act was passed by the state legislature on June 1, 1987. It became effective on June 11, 1987. In the interim, on June 3, 1987, the Texas Supreme Court issued its landmark decision, El Chico Corp. The El Chico decision was this state’s first opinion recognizing a common-law cause of action for negligence and, therefore, liability against a provider who “negligently” serves or continues to serve an intoxicated patron. Historically, our state had failed to impose a duty on a provider because of the patron’s intervening intoxication and negligence in driving while intoxicated. The patron’s consumption was viewed as the sole proximate cause of the patron’s intoxication and resulting injury to a third party. Id. at 309. Also, even if providing the liquor could be the proximate cause of the intoxication, the *912injury to the third person was deemed unforeseeable. Id.
In creating this new, civil duty, the court relied heavily on the legislature’s previous enactment of section 101.63(a) of the alcoholic beverage code, which imposed criminal liability on any person who knowingly sold an alcoholic beverage to an intoxicated person. Tex. Aloo. Bev.Code ANN. § 101.63(a) (Vernon 1995). The court determined that this code provision established the standard of care for providers and consequently created civil negligence as a matter of law. In other words, this provision created strict liability for persons who violated the standard of care. El Chico Corp., 732 S.W.2d at 313. The court further determined that the new dram shop provisions in the alcoholic beverage code, enacted two days before its decision, were not applicable to the El Chico case because the cause of action accrued before the dram shop provisions’ effective date, June 11, 1987. Of importance was the court’s observation that although the addition of the dram shop provisions created statutory civil liability, the Act also created a “much more onerous burden of proof for an injured plaintiff than we have in this opinion.” Id. at 314. The court observed that the dram shop provisions imposed liability only when it was “apparent to the provider that the individual being ... served ... [was] obviously intoxicated to the extent he presented a clear danger to himself and others.” Id.
Here, the majority has concluded that the legislature did not intend to allow for punitive damages in a dram shop cause of action. The majority’s conclusion is based primarily on the “silence on the issue of exemplary damages [that must be read] in conjunction with the Act’s exclusivity provisions.” However, this is not the approach our supreme court has used in deciding other issues related to the scope of the Act’s provisions.
For example, in Smith v. Sewell, the supreme court had to determine whether the comparative responsibility provisions of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code applied to the Dram Shop Act. Smith v. Sewell, 858 S.W.2d 350 (Tex.1993). Specifically, the court had to decide whether the liability of providers extended to the recipient of the alcohol when that person’s own intoxication resulted in injuries to the recipient as opposed to third parties. Id. at 354. The court stated it must follow the rule that statutes in derogation of the common law are not to be strictly construed, noting however that when a statute creates a liability unknown to the common law, or deprives a person of a common law right, the statute will be strictly construed so as not to extend beyond its plain meaning. Id. (citing Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 312.006(b) (Vernon 1998) and Butcher v. Owens, 647 S.W.2d 948, 951 (Tex.1983)).1 In assessing whether the comparative responsibility statute should limit the potential recovery, the court decided it should because the Dram Shop Act was grounded in negligence and because a dram shop cause of action was not excluded from the comparative responsibility statute as were other specifically listed causes of action. Id. at 355; see also Tex. Civ. PRac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 33.002 (Vernon 1997). Thus, the court concluded the comparative negligence of others should be considered in the award of damages for liability under the Dram Shop Act. This court has followed Sewell. See Lewis v. Skippy’s Mis*913take Bar, 944 S.W.2d 1, 5 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1996), rev’d on other grounds, Southland Corp. v. Lewis, 940 S.W.2d 83 (Tex.1997); I-Gotcha, Inc. v. McInnis, 903 S.W.2d 829, 830 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1995, writ denied).
Likewise, the exemplary damages statute has also listed the causes of action to which it is inapplicable. Section 41.002 of the civil practice and remedies code, which addresses the availability of exemplary damages and imposes caps on them, does not include dram shop actions in its list of causes of action that are exempt from exemplary damages claims. Tex Civ. PRAC. & Rem.Code Ann. § 41.002(d) (Vernon Supp. 2001).
And interestingly, this statute includes the following mandate:
Except as provided by Subsections (b) and (d) [inapplicable here], in an action to which this chapter applies, the provisions of this chapter prevail over all other law to the extent of any conflict.
Id. § 41.002(c). Additionally, the exemplary damages statute also includes its own definition of exemplary damages: any damages awarded as a penalty or by way of punishment, including punitive damages. Id. § 41.001(5) (Vernon 1997). Thus, the majority’s search for the true meaning of the word “damages” under the Dram Shop Act is unnecessary because the exemplary damages statute itself defines the term.
Because the Dram Shop Act is silent concerning the recovery of punitive damages, and section 41.002 does not exclude the recovery of punitive damages in dram shop cases, we should hold that punitive damages may be recovered. See, e.g., Smith, 858 S.W.2d at 356. When the exemplary damages’ statutory definition is read in conjunction with the expressed public policy purpose of the alcoholic beverage code to protect the welfare, health, peace, temperance, and safety of the people of the state, we should conclude that the legislature did not intend to eliminate exemplary damages in dram shop causes of action.
For these reasons, I would overrule appellant’s point eight that challenges appel-lee’s right to recover exemplary damages and address the legal sufficiency challenge to the jury’s findings of gross negligence and exemplary damages.

. Section 312.006(a) instructs us to liberally construe the revised statutes in order "to achieve their purpose and to promote justice.” Section 312.006(b) dictates that the common-law rule requiring strict construction of statutes in derogation of the common law does not apply to the revised statutes. Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 312.006(a), (b).