Court Opinion

ID: 9549959
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:26:59.4885+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:21:05.646065
License: Public Domain

*416GILLETTE, J.
This action for damages involves a city employee’s claim that he was wrongfully terminated in retaliation for circulating a petition protesting a work safety policy. The circuit court directed a verdict against the employee. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the circuit court, holding that firing petitioner for circulating the petition would violate petitioner’s right to free speech under the federal constitution.1 Shockey v. City of Portland, 100 Or App 166, 785 P2d 776 (1990). We reverse in part and affirm in part the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Plaintiff was a wastewater mechanic for defendant City of Portland (city). Defendants Lang and Irvin were his supervisors. During 1984, the city considered implementing a policy requiring wastewater mechanics and other employees who could be exposed to chlorine gas to wear respirators. Pursuant to an administrative rule, the policy also included a provision that required bearded employees to shave any facial hair that would he located under the sealing surface of the respirator.
Plaintiff, who has worn a beard for over 25 years, strongly opposed the policy. He circulated within his own city agency a petition that stated:
‘ ‘We, the undersigned, find the proposed rules demanding that beards be shaved before a respirator test can even be taken to be arbitrary and discriminatory. The wearing or not wearing of beards was not a condition of employment and any hazards that exist now existed at that time. Furthermore, if everyone on site is to be available in a chlorine emergency, the questions of fit, maintenance and hygiene of the respirators, the supplying of respirators for those who wear glasses, training of ¿1 employees in their use, hazard pay, and the availability of respirators for office staff, contractors’ employees and visitors must be answered. The aforementioned proposed rules do not take into account the use of respirators by the last three mentioned groups.
*417“It would be far more practical to have a volunteer crew, specially trained and outfitted to deal with chlorine in emergency and non-emergency situations.”
(Emphasis in original.)
In August 1984, the city implemented the policy. Plaintiff refused to shave his beard and sought to be exempted from the policy by providing an evaluation from a social worker that he “is a normally integrated man who has organically integrated his beard into his identity.” Evidence also indicated that plaintiff would develop “a most uncomfortable and distressing facial inflammatory skin eruption” if he shaved. The city refused to make an exception for plaintiff. Plaintiff did not shave off his beard. On June 10, 1985, the city discharged him.
Plaintiff sought review by the city’s Civil Service Board. The board found that, in violation of the city’s charter, the “discharge decision was not made in good faith for the purpose of improving public service” and ordered that plaintiff be reinstated with back pay.
Plaintiff then brought an action for damages based on the common law tort of wrongful discharge.2 He also claimed damages under 42 USC § 1983, on the ground that his employment had been terminated wrongfully because he had exercised his constitutionally protected right of free speech when he circulated the petition. Plaintiff also brought a claim against Lang and Irvin as individuals for intentional interference with economic relations.3
The case was tried to a jury. After plaintiff rested his case, the circuit court granted defendants’ motion for directed verdict on the wrongful discharge and § 1983 claims, finding that there was “no evidence to indicate that [plaintiff] was terminated as a result of the circulation of the petition.” The jury found in favor of plaintiff on the remaining claim against Lang and Irvin for intentional interference with economic relations, but awarded no damages.
*418Plaintiff appealed, contending that the circuit court erred in granting the directed verdict. The Court of Appeals agreed with plaintiff and reversed the circuit court’s entry of the directed verdict on both the wrongful discharge and § 1983 claims. The Court of Appeals held that “there was evidence of a causal link between plaintiffs petition and his termination” and that the petition was constitutionally protected by the free speech guarantee of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.4 Shockey v. City of Portland, 100 Or App 166, 170, 785 P2d 776 (1990). Defendants then petitioned this court for review, which we allowed. 310 Or 195, 795 P2d 554 (1990).
Defendants first contend that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs common law wrongful discharge claim. Defendants reason that plaintiffs common law wrongful discharge claim is, in essence, a complaint alleging an unfair labor practice, “for which the Public Employees Collective Bargaining Act [PECBA], ORS 243.650 to 243.782, provides his exclusive remedy.” Defendants argue in the alternative that, to the extent plaintiffs claim is not foreclosed by PECBA, “plaintiffs exclusive judicial remedy for challenging defendants’ action is by writ of review, under ORS 34.010 to 34.100.”
PECBA defines certain acts as unfair labor practices. Under the Act, the Employment Relations Board (ERB) is responsible for investigating complaints alleging unfair labor practices and, if necessary, conducts a hearing before issuing a final order. ORS 243.676.
ORS 243.672(l)(g) provides:
“(1) It is an unfair labor practice for a public employer or its designated representative to do any of the following:
ce* * * * *
*419“(g) Violate the provisions of any written contract with respect to employment relations[.]”
The collective bargaining agreement between the city and the union to which plaintiff belonged stated that the city could not discharge any employee “without just cause.” We understand defendants to argue that plaintiffs claim for common law wrongful discharge constitutes an unfair labor practice under ORS 243.672(l)(g), because the discharge would be without just cause in violation of the collective bargaining agreement. We shall assume, for the purposes of this opinion, that firing plaintiff “without just cause” would be an unfair labor practice that ERB could investigate. ORS 243.672(l)(g) and (4); ORS 243.676.
Defendants’ argument requires us to consider whether PECBA deprives the circuit court of subject matter jurisdiction over the wrongful discharge action. ORS 243.676(1) charges ERB with investigating an unfair labor practice complaint. ERB holds a hearing to determine whether the person named in the complaint has engaged in or is engaging in any unfair labor practice. If so, ERB must state its findings of fact, order the person to cease and desist from the unfair labor practice, take “such affirmative action, including but not limited to the reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as necessary to effectuate the purposes of’ PECBA, and award representation costs and attorney fees. ORS 243.676(2).
PECBA, while granting jurisdiction to ERB to investigate and hear unfair labor practice complaints, is silent as to whether the Act was intended to foreclose common law state remedies, such as claims for wrongful discharge, and a review of the legislative history does not provide the answer to this issue.
This court has summarized its methodology in determining whether the legislature intended to foreclose a common-law remedy when it created a statutory one as follows:
“[A]n actionable common law tort [remains actionable] * * * unless the provisions of [the allegedly conflicting legislation] demonstrate the legislature’s intent not only to provide what it considered to be adequate remedies to * * * plaintiff, but by implication show a legislative intent to abrogate or supersede *420any common law remedy for damages. See Brown v. Transcon Lines, 284 Or [597], 611[, 588 P2d 1087 (1978)].”
Holien v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 298 Or 76, 90-91, 689 P2d 1292 (1984).
PECBA expressly states that its purpose is to ensure that public employers and public employees enter into negotiations and collective bargaining agreements. For instance, ORS 243.656(5) states that:
“It is the purpose of [PECBA] to obligate public employers, public employees and their representatives to enter into collective negotiations with willingness to resolve grievances and disputes relating to employment relations and to enter into written and signed contracts evidencing agreements resulting from such negotiations. It is also the purpose of [PECBA] to promote the improvement of employer-employee relations within the various public employers by providing a uniform basis for recognizing the right of public employees to join organizations of their own choice, and to be represented by such organizations in their employment relations with public employers.”
PECBA also declares that the “people of this state have a fundamental interest in the development of harmonious and cooperative relationships between government and its employees,” ORS 243.656(1); that “[recognition by public employers of the right of public employees to organize and full acceptance * * * [of] collective negotiation between public employers and public employee organizations can alleviate various forms of strife and unrest,” ORS 243.656(2); that “[ejxperience in private and public employment has also proved that protection by law of the right of employees to organize and negotiate collectively safeguards employees and the public from injury, impairment and interruptions of necessary services, and removes certain recognized sources of strife and unrest,” ORS 243.656(3); and that “[t]he state has a basic obligation to protect the public by attempting to assure the orderly and uninterrupted operations and functions of government,” ORS 243.656(4).
The purpose and policy underlying PECBA is that public employers and public employees resolve their disputes through resort to collective bargaining when there is a collective bargaining agreement. That approach is consistent with *421this state’s policy that, ordinarily, an employee who is subject to a collective bargaining agreement first must utilize any collective bargaining agreement procedures as the vehicle for redress of disputes before resorting to a court action. See, e.g., Gilstrap v. Mitchell Bros. Truck Lines, 270 Or 599, 606, 529 P2d 370 (1974) cert den 421 US 1011 (1975) (so holding).
We perceive no reason to say that plaintiffs claim for wrongful discharge offends the purpose and policy of PECBA or this court’s requirement that a complaining party first pursue its contractual remedies before seeking help from the court system. The present action does riot interfere with PECBA’s purpose of requiring public employers and employees to enter into negotiations and collective bargaining agreements, nor does it thwart the act’s intent that disputes first be resolved through resort to contract remedies — plaintiff successfully exhausted his contract remedies when he appeared before the Civil Service Board. In this action, plaintiff seeks damages that were not available to him either before the Civil Service Board or before ERB. In short, in the terms of the standards identified in Holien v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., supra, there has been no demonstration of either the legislature’s intent to identify and provide an adequate remedy for all the harm suffered by plaintiff or of a legislative intent to supersede this common law remedy. The circuit court has subject matter jurisdiction to hear plaintiffs claim.5 Cf. Tracy v. Lane County, 305 Or 378, 752 P2d 300 (1988) (ERB’s jurisdiction under PECBA not exclusive, but is primary where the right of a party to seek relief in circuit court depends on defendant’s having committed an unfair labor practice).
Defendants next contend that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs common law wrongful discharge claim because, defendants assert, plaintiffs sole judicial remedy under state law is a writ of review under ORS 34.010 to 34.100. Defendants rely on Koch v. City of Portland, 306 Or 444, 760 P2d 252 (1988), to support that assertion. Defendants’ assertion is incorrect, and their reliance on Koch is misplaced.
*422The sole issue before this court in Koch v. City of Portland, supra, was whether the decision of the Mayor of the City of Portland, acting in his capacity as Commissioner of Public Safety, to suspend a Portland police officer “was made ‘in the exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial functions[.]’ ” Id. at 447. This court held that the suspension decision was a quasi-judicial act and, therefore, was reviewable by writ of review. Id. at 448-49. This court did not hold in Koch, or in any other case that has been brought to our attention, that, because writ of review is available to review a termination decision, the affected employee is precluded from bringing an action for damages based on the common law tort of wrongful discharge.
As previously stated, plaintiff appealed his termination to the City of Portland Civil Service Board pursuant to Portland City Charter Section 4-501. The Civil Service Board found in plaintiffs favor, reinstated plaintiff with back pay and restored seniority and benefits. In Miller v. Schrunk, 232 Or 383, 388, 375 P2d 823 (1962), this court held:
“When any charter or statute sets out a procedure whereby an administrative agency must review its own prior determination, that procedure must be followed. Judicial review [by way of writ of review] is only available after the procedure for relief within the administrative body itself has been followed without success.”
(Emphasis added.) Plaintiffs success before the Civil Service Board made writ of review not only unnecessary, but unavailable. The circuit court has subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs common law wrongful discharge claim. We turn now to a consideration of the evidence on the merits of plaintiffs claims.
Defendants argue that the trial court did not err in directing verdicts as to plaintiffs wrongful discharge and 42 USC § 1983 claims, because there was no evidence of a causal connection between plaintiffs circulation of the petition and his discharge.
In determining whether the trial court erred in entering a directed verdict for defendants, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party — in this case, plaintiff — and extend to that party the benefit of every reasonable inference that may be drawn from the *423evidence. Foster v. Schnell Refrigeration Co., 280 Or 411, 414, 571 P2d 497 (1977).
The evidence would permit a trier of fact to find that Irvin and Lang were hostile toward plaintiffs attempt to receive an exemption from the challenged policy. Other employees testified that management retaliated against employees who spoke out against management practices or on safety issues by firing them.6 Lang admitted that plaintiffs petition made him angry and caused him some anxiety. Irvin admitted that he did not help plaintiff find other comparable city employment before terminating him, although he had assisted other employees who did not comply with the facial hair policy. While plaintiff had no proof to spare, the foregoing evidence, when combined with the reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, was sufficient to allow a trier of fact to conclude that plaintiff was discharged for circulating his petition. The trial court’s ruling to the contrary was error.
The foregoing sufficiency argument is the last argument asserted by defendants against the decision by the Court of Appeals to reinstate plaintiffs wrongful discharge claim.7 Having found no error with respect to any of the claims that defendants make here, we affirm the Court of Appeals’ decision to reinstate plaintiffs wrongful discharge claim. We turn next to defendants’ contentions that deal specifically with plaintiffs claim under 42 USC § 1983.
After obtaining reinstatement through the civil service process, plaintiff brought the present action, claiming that firing him because he wrote the aforementioned petition violated his right to free speech under the federal Constitution and that such a violation was actionable under 42 USC § 1983. No one disputes the latter half of his theory — if the circumstances of plaintiffs firing violated his free speech *424rights under the First Amendment, the firing is actionable. The fight here is over the first half, viz., whether firing plaintiff on account of the petition violated his right to free speech.
Review of the relevant case law — case law coming from the United States Supreme Court, because the claim arises under federal law — leads us to conclude that one need consider only two pertinent cases to see that plaintiff fails to meet the criteria for obtaining the relief that he seeks. Because those cases are dispositive, we discuss them at some length.
The first important case was Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 US 563, 88 S Ct 1731, 20 L Ed 2d 811 (1968). Pickering, a high school teacher, had written a letter to a newspaper criticizing the local school board and the district superintendent for the way they had handled recent school financing efforts. He was fired. After the firing had been sustained in the state courts, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.
The Court first made it clear that public employees do not forfeit free speech rights by accepting public employment. Id. at 568. The Court recognized that a public employer has a right to expect loyalty on the part of its employees, but that loyalty could not be exacted at the expense of the right of the public employees to voice their views as to certain issues. Just which issues would transcend the rights of the employer to discipline its employees could not be described categorically, the Court admitted. However, the Court said,
“in the course of evaluating the conflicting claims of First Amendment protection and the need for orderly school administration in the context of this case, we shall indicate some of the general lines along which an analysis of the controlling interests should run.”
Id. at 569.
The Court began by noting that nothing in Pickering’s letter implicated a close working relationship between Pickering and any of the persons whom he was criticizing. “Thus,” the Court said, “no question of maintaining either discipline by immediate superiors or harmony among coworkers is presented here.” Id. at 570. Therefore, the *425Court held, a public employee’s “comments on matters of public concern that are substantially correct” could not furnish grounds for dismissal, even if those comments were critical in tone. Id.
The Court then proceeded to examine the false statements that it found in Pickering’s letter. As to those, the Court held, there was no proof of any harm to the district or its interests caused by the letter. (Indeed, the Court noted, “Pickering’s letter was greeted by everyone but its main target, the Board, with massive apathy and total disbelief.” Id.) “More importantly,” the Court noted,
“the question whether a school system requires additional funds is a matter of legitimate public concern on which the judgment of the school administration, including the School Board, cannot, in a society that leaves such questions to popular vote, be taken as conclusive. On such a question free and open debate is vital to informed decision-making by the electorate. Teachers are, as a class, the members of a community most likely to have informed.and definite opinions as to how funds allotted to the operation of the schools should be spent. Accordingly, it is essential that they be able to speak out freely on such questions without fear of retaliatory dismissal.
“What we * * * have before us is a case in which a teacher has made erroneous public statements upon issues then currently the subject of public attention, which are critical of his ultimate employer but which are neither shown nor can be presumed to have in any way either impeded the teacher’s proper performance of his daily duties in the classroom or to have interfered with the regular operation of the schools generally. In these circumstances we conclude that the interest of the school administration in limiting teachers’ opportunities to contribute to public debate is not significantly greater than its interest in limiting a similar contribution by any member of the general public.”
Id. at 571-73. (Footnote omitted.)
The Court’s constant references to issues of “public importance” was no accident. As it summarized its holding:
“In sum, we hold that, in a case such as this, absent proof of false statements knowingly or recklessly made by him, a teacher’s exercise of his right to speak on issues of public *426importance may not furnish the basis for his dismissal from public employment.”
Id. at 574. (Footnote omitted.) It is clear, both from text and context, that Pickering was based on the public’s interest in the subject matter of Pickering’s letter as a whole. It was the lack of that interest that proved fatal in the other pertinent decision of the Court.
In Connick v. Myers, 461 US 138, 103 S Ct 1684, 75 L Ed 2d 708 (1983), the fired public employee, Myers, was an assistant district attorney. She objected to a proposal to transfer her to another section of the office and, when- her protestations did not help, she resorted to circulating a 14-item “questionnaire” to her fellow employees that was not-so-subtly critical of the district attorney and his principal lieutenants. The district attorney determined that the questionnaire was an act of insubordination and fired her. She then brought an action in federal court under 42 USC § 1983, claiming that her free speech rights had been violated. Both the district court and the court of appeals sustained her claim. On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed.
The district attorney maintained before the Court that Myers’ questionnaire concerned only internal office matters and, as such, did not constitute speech of “public concern, ’ ’ as that phrase had been used in Pickering. As a general matter, the Court was inclined to agree:
“Although we do not agree that Myers’ communication in this case was wholly without First Amendment protection, there is much force to [the district attorney’s argument]. The repeated emphasis in Pickering on the right of a public employee ‘as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern,’ was not accidental. This language, reiterated in all of Pickering’s progeny, reflects both the historical evolvement of the rights of public employees, and the commonsense realization that government offices could not function if every employment decision became a constitutional matter.”
Id. at 143. (Footnote omitted.) The key to Pickering, the Court explained, was the fact that “Pickering’s subject was ‘a matter of legitimate public concern’ upon which ‘free and open debate is vital to informed decisionmaking by the electorate.’ ” Id. at 145. (Citation omitted.) In fact,
*427“Pickering, its antecedents, and its progeny lead us to conclude that if Myers’ questionnaire cannot be fairly characterized as constituting speech on a matter of public concern, it is unnecessary for us to scrutinize the reasons for her discharge. When employee expression cannot be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community, government officials should enjoy wide latitude in managing their offices, without intrusive oversight by the judiciary in the name of the First Amendment.”
Id. at 146. (Footnote omitted.)
The Court was not drawing a line between employee speech wholly unrelated to any matter of general public concern, on the one hand, and speech that touches in some minor way on matters of public concern, on the other. Even speech that alludes to matters of public concern does not, by virtue of that fact alone, bring the speaker within the ambit of First Amendment protections sufficient to support an action under 42 USC § 1983. The Court explained:
“Whether an employee’s speech addresses a matter of public concern must be determined by the content, form, and context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole record. In this case, with but one exception, the questions posed by Myers to her co-workers do not fall under the rubric of matters of ‘public concern.’ We view the questions [in the questionnaire] pertaining to the confidence and trust that Myers’ co-workers possess in various supervisors, the level of office morale, and the need for a grievance committee as mere extensions of Myers’ dispute over her transfer to another section of the criminal court. * * * [W]e do not believe these questions are of public import in evaluating the performance of the District Attorney as an elected official. Myers did not seek to inform the public that the District Attorney’s Office was not discharging its governmental responsibilities in the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases. Nor did Myers seek to bring to light actual or potential wrongdoing or breach of public trust on the part of [the district attorney] and others. Indeed, the questionnaire, if released to the public, would convey no information at all other than the fact that a single employee is upset with the status quo. While discipline and morale in the workplace are related to an agency’s efficient performance of its duties, the focus of Myers’ questions is not to evaluate the performance of the office but rather to gather ammunition for another round of *428controversy with her superiors. These questions reflect one employee’s dissatisfaction with a transfer and an attempt to turn that displeasure into a cause celebre.
“To presume that all matters which transpire within a government office are of public concern would mean that virtually every remark — and certainly every criticism directed at a public official — would plant the seed of a constitutional case. While as a matter of good judgment, public officials should be receptive to constructive criticism offered by their employees, the First Amendment does not require a public office to be run as a roundtable for employee complaints over internal office affairs.”
Id. at 147-48. (Emphasis supplied.)
Not all cases could be resolved by this analysis, however. Some, including Connick, would require a further step. The Court explained:
“One question in Myers’ questionnaire, however, does touch upon a matter of public concern. Question 11 inquires if assistant district attorneys ‘ever feel pressured to work in political campaigns on behalf of office supported candidates.’ * * *
“Because one of the questions in Myers’ survey touched upon a matter of public concern and contributed to her discharge, we must determine whether [the district attorney] was justified in discharging Myers. * *
Id. at 149. (Footnotes omitted.) In other words, if, when read in context, part of Myers’ questionnaire “touched on a matter of public concern,” it was necessary to proceed to a second step in the analysis. That step involved balancing the interests of management and employee.
The Court then examined the various considerations that, under Pickering, should play a role in such a balancing analysis. A court in striking the balance was required to give “full consideration” to the government’s interest in effective and efficient performance of its public responsibilities. Id. at 150. It was also pertinent that Myers’ distribution of the questionnaire interfered with the necessarily close working relationship required between a deputy prosecutor and her superiors. Id. at 151-52. The time, place, and manner in which the questionnaire was circulated were also relevant. Id. at 152-53.
*429It was clear, however, that the context in which the questionnaire was circulated was, even in the balancing phase of the analysis, the most important factor to the Court. The Court reviewed that consideration and then announced its conclusions, as follows:
“Finally, the context in which the dispute arose is also significant. This is not a case where an employee, out of purely academic interest, circulated a questionnaire so as to obtain useful research. Myers acknowledges that it is no coincidence that the questionnaire followed upon the heels of the transfer notice. When employee speech concerning office policy arises from an employment dispute concerning the very application of that policy to the speaker, additional weight must be given to the supervisor’s view that the employee has threatened the authority of the employer to run the office. * * *
“Myers’ questionnaire touched upon matters of public concern in only a most limited sense; her survey, in our view, is most accurately characterized as an employee grievance concerning internal office policy. The limited First Amendment interest involved here does not require that [the district attorney] tolerate action which he reasonably believed would disrupt the office, undermine his authority, and destroy close working relationships. Myers’ discharge therefore did not offend the First Amendment. * * *
“ * * * [I]t would indeed be a Pyrrhic victory for the great principles of free expression if the [First] Amendment’s safeguarding of a public employee’s right, as a citizen, to participate in discussions concerning public affairs were confused with the attempt to constitutionalize the employee grievance that we see presented here.”
Id. at 153-54. Thus, it will be seen that “context” is a pertinent consideration in both the first and second steps of the Connick analysis.
It will be clear from the foregoing that we do not disagree with the dissent as to the appropriate analytical framework. The difference between our view and that of the dissent is simple: We do not find the wording of plaintiffs petition, in context, to require us to proceed beyond the first step in the Connick analysis. As to that first step, the parallels between this case and Connick are great and, where there are *430differences, the differences do not favor plaintiff. The similarities:
1. Both cases arose out of an employee’s dissatisfaction with a management decision that affected that particular employee in a way that the employee disliked.
2. Both employees attempted to enlist the views of fellow workers in support of their positions.
3. The principal thrust of each employee’s message concerned the employee’s particular grievance.
4. There is no suggestion that either employee raised any issue beyond the employee’s immediate personal grievance other than for the purpose of gathering ammunition for the principal, personal fight that the employee already was waging.
5. Each employee confined the dispute to the workplace and to pertinent supervisory personnel.
The differences:
1. Plaintiff here chose a more direct form of challenge even than that employed in Connick. The questionnaire there at least purported to be intended for employees, not for management. The petition here was a direct challenge to management.
2. Unlike Myers’ attitude in the Connick case, plaintiffs attitude here made him a less fit employee than others who complied with the shaving policy, because plaintiff could not assist in circumstances requiring use of a respirator.
3. Perhaps most importantly, there truly is no matter raised by plaintiffs petition that is of “public concern,” at least in the Pickering and Connick sense of that term. Plaintiff here was not challenging any act of his supervisors as illegal. He was not speaking to any matter that either had been or would be put to a public vote. And he was not protesting, even indirectly, office policy that was requiring other employees to give up or compromise one or another of their rights as citizens. In other words, this employee cared *431about his beard, period. To elevate that concern to a constitutional case merely because the employee mustered an argument related to public policy in pursuit of his personal goal would so trivialize the “public concern” requirement of Pickering, Connick, and other cases, as to read the requirement virtually out of existence.
Although its stated ground for its decision was incorrect, the circuit court did not err in dismissing plaintiffs claim under 42 USC § 1983. The Court of Appeals decision to the contrary was error.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed in part and affirmed in part. The judgment of the circuit court is reversed as to the wrongful discharge claim; otherwise affirmed.

 The First Amendment to the United States Constitution, provides:
“Congress shall make no law * * * abridging the freedom of speech * *

 The common law tort of wrongful discharge was recognized by this court in Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or 210, 536 P2d 512 (1975).

 Before trial, plaintiff voluntarily dismissed a separate claim that is not relevant to this appeal.

 The Court of Appeals also held that the trial court erred in striking plaintiffs request for attorney fees under 42 USC § 1988 and in granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs claim for punitive damages under 42 USC § 1983. Shockey v. City of Portland, 100 Or App 166, 170, 785 P2d 776 (1990). The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court in striking plaintiffs request in his intentional interference claim for attorney fees incurred in reinstatement proceedings before the Civil Service Board. Id. at 171. Defendants do not challenge those holdings before this court.

 Our decision today speaks only to whether PECBA forecloses a particular form of tort action. We do not decide whether other types of claims likewise would be available in spite of the fact that PECBA was implicated.

 Contrary to defendants’ position taken in their petition to this court, defendants did not object to all of the testimony supporting the foregoing summary, and the evidence was not excluded by the trial court.

 We do not intimate that the evidence to which we have referred necessarily makes out a case of wrongful discharge. But, because the only challenge that defendants make in this court is to the sufficiency of the evidence of wrongful discharge, we have not considered and do not address the other elements of that tort or whether evidence of the other elements was present in this case.