Court Opinion

ID: 9352426
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-06 15:00:31.381585+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:02:38.711476
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 21-14398   Document: 21-1      Date Filed: 01/06/2023    Page: 1 of 6

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                         ____________________

                                No. 21-14398
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                         ____________________

       KARLA M. AZMITIA,
                                                               Petitioner,
       versus
       U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,

                                                              Respondent.

                         ____________________

                   Petition for Review of a Decision of the
                        Board of Immigration Appeals
                          Agency No. A076-417-155
                          ____________________
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       2                      Opinion of the Court               21-14398

       Before JILL PRYOR, BRANCH, and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Karla Azmitia (“Petitioner”), a native and citizen of Guate-
       mala, petitions for review of the order of the Board of Immigration
       Appeals (“BIA”) affirming the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ’s”) denial of
       cancellation of removal. No reversible error has been shown; we
       deny the petition.
             Petitioner entered the United States without inspection in
       January 1997. On 2 June 1998, the Immigration and Naturalization
       Service served Petitioner personally with a Notice to Appear
       (“NTA”). The NTA charged Petitioner as removable for being in
       the United States without admission or parole. In writing, the NTA
       ordered Petitioner to appear before an IJ at the Miami Immigration
       Court at 9:00 a.m. on 14 July 1998.
              No hearing was held on 14 July 1998. The hearing was
       moved to a later date. Petitioner’s removal hearing actually took
       place, instead, on 25 August 1998. Petitioner failed to attend the
       hearing; the IJ ordered Petitioner removed in absentia.
              Nearly twenty years later, Petitioner (through counsel)
       moved to rescind her in absentia removal order and to reopen her
       removal proceedings. Petitioner asserted that she never received
       notice of the 25 August 1998 hearing. An IJ granted Petitioner’s
       motion. The IJ noted that the record contained no notice resetting
       the master calendar hearing for 25 August 1998. After Petitioner’s
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       21-14398               Opinion of the Court                         3

       removal proceedings were reopened, Petitioner applied for cancel-
       lation of removal.
              At a merits hearing on Petitioner’s application, the govern-
       ment argued that Petitioner was ineligible for cancellation of re-
       moval because she did not have -- prior to receiving the written
       NTA in 1998 -- ten years of continuous physical presence in the
       United States. Petitioner responded that the NTA was defective
       and, thus, did not trigger the “stop-time rule”: a rule that stops the
       accrual of continuous physical presence upon service of the NTA.
       According to Petitioner -- although the NTA listed a time for a
       hearing -- the NTA did not specify the time of her actual hearing: a
       hearing for which Petitioner was given no written notice.
              The IJ denied Petitioner’s application and ordered Petitioner
       removed. The BIA later affirmed the IJ’s decision and dismissed
       Petitioner’s appeal. The BIA determined that Petitioner’s period of
       continuous physical presence ended on 2 June 1998: the day Peti-
       tioner was served the NTA specifying the time and place set for
       removal hearing. The BIA concluded that Petitioner failed to es-
       tablish ten years of continuous physical presence preceding the ser-
       vice of the NTA and was, thus, statutorily ineligible for cancellation
       of removal. This appeal followed.
              Because the BIA did not adopt expressly the IJ’s decision, we
       review only the BIA’s decision. See Jeune v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 810
       F.3d 792, 799 (11th Cir. 2016). We review de novo the BIA’s con-
       clusions of law. See Kazemzadeh v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 577 F.3d 1341,
       1350 (11th Cir. 2009).
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       4                       Opinion of the Court                  21-14398

              The Attorney General has discretion to cancel the removal
       of a non-citizen under certain circumstances. See 8 U.S.C.
       § 1229b(b)(1). Our jurisdiction to review the BIA’s denial of discre-
       tionary relief -- including cancellation of removal -- is limited to re-
       viewing “constitutional claims or questions of law.” See 8 U.S.C.
       § 1252(a)(2)(B), (D); Patel v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 971 F.3d 1258, 1262
       (11th Cir. 2020) (en banc).
              To demonstrate eligibility for cancellation of removal, a
       non-citizen must show, among other things, that she “has been
       physically present in the United States for a continuous period of
       not less than 10 years immediately preceding the date of [her] ap-
       plication.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(A). Under the so-called
       “stop-time rule,” a non-citizen’s period of continuous physical pres-
       ence is “deemed to end . . . when the alien is served a notice to
       appear under” 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a). See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1); Pe-
       reira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2109 (2018).
              To trigger the stop-time rule, an NTA must contain -- within
       a single document -- the information specified in section 1229(a)(1).
       See Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 141 S. Ct. 1474, 1480-86 (2021); Pereira,
       138 S. Ct. at 2113-14. Pertinent to this appeal, the NTA must in-
       clude “[t]he time and place at which the [removal] proceedings will
       be held.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1)(G); Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2113-
       14 (“A putative notice to appear that fails to designate the specific
       time or place of the noncitizen’s removal proceedings is not a ‘no-
       tice to appear under section 1229(a),’ and so does not trigger the
       stop-time rule.”).
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       21-14398               Opinion of the Court                         5

              The BIA committed no error in concluding that the June
       1998 NTA served on Petitioner was a sufficient event to trigger the
       stop-time rule. The NTA included all the information specified in
       section 1229(a)(1), including the time and place of Petitioner’s then-
       scheduled hearing. Nothing evidences that -- when the NTA issued
       -- the hearing time specified on the NTA was incorrect: it set out
       the then honestly intended time and date (at least, no one claims
       otherwise).
              That the hearing was later postponed and in fact held on a
       date different from the date listed on the NTA does not render the
       NTA non-compliant with section 1229(a)(1). The statute provides
       expressly that a hearing time may be rescheduled. See 8 U.S.C. §
       1229(a)(2)(A) (requiring written notice of “any change or postpone-
       ment in the time and place of [removal] proceedings”). We accept
       that the government erred by failing to notify Petitioner of the re-
       scheduled hearing date, as required under section 1229(a)(2). That
       error, however, has no bearing on whether the NTA -- when issued
       -- contained the information in section 1229(a)(1) necessary to trig-
       ger the stop-time rule. The NTA did contain the triggering infor-
       mation. Moreover, the government’s failure to provide adequate
       notice of the rescheduled hearing was a different issue and was later
       remedied by the rescission of the in-absentia-removal order and the
       reopening of Petitioner’s removal proceedings.
               Because the June 1998 NTA comprised a single document
       listing the required information in section 1229(a)(1), the BIA com-
       mitted no error in concluding that the NTA was sufficient to trigger
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       6                       Opinion of the Court                  21-14398

       the stop-time rule. Under the stop-time rule, Petitioner’s period of
       continuous physical presence in the United States ran from her date
       of entry in January 1997 until she was served with the NTA in June
       1998. Because Petitioner cannot demonstrate at least ten years of
       continuous physical presence in the United States, the BIA con-
       cluded correctly that Petitioner is statutorily ineligible for cancella-
       tion of removal.
              PETITION DENIED.