Court Opinion

ID: 9376653
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-03 15:04:14.229793+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:08.000632
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: FEBRUARY 24, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                    Commonwealth of Kentucky
                               Court of Appeals

                                   NO. 2021-CA-0774-MR

BENJAMIN DELBERT COFFEY                                                 APPELLANT

                    APPEAL FROM MCCREARY CIRCUIT COURT
v.                    HONORABLE DANIEL BALLOU, JUDGE
                            ACTION NO. 04-CR-00010

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                                  APPELLEE

                                         OPINION
                                        AFFIRMING

                                        ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: DIXON, LAMBERT, AND MCNEILL, JUDGES.

MCNEILL, JUDGE: Benjamin Coffey appeals from the denial of his CR1 60.02

post-conviction motion. We affirm.

                In 2004, Coffey was indicted for rape in the first degree, sodomy in

the first degree, and kidnapping. Soon thereafter, the McCreary Circuit Court

ordered Coffey to undergo a competency evaluation. According to a competency

1
    Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure.
report submitted to the trial court in June 2004, Coffey had intellectual disabilities

but was competent. That same month, Coffey reached a plea agreement with the

Commonwealth which called for him to plead guilty to all three charges in the

indictment and to receive thirty years’ imprisonment (ten years on each charge, to

be served consecutively).2 The trial court sentenced Coffey in accordance with the

plea agreement in August 2004.

                Nearly three years later, Coffey submitted a post-conviction motion

pursuant to RCr3 11.42. The motion tersely asserted without explanation that

Coffey’s counsel had been ineffective. Coffey filed a motion to supplement which

asserted his counsel had coerced him into pleading guilty and his guilty plea was

improper because he was incompetent. Finally, the motion to supplement asserted

that the victim had been “a willing participant to the early morning rendezvous.”

Record (R.) at 96. The trial court denied both the RCr 11.42 and the motion to

supplement without the Commonwealth even having filed a response. Coffey’s

appeal was eventually dismissed.

                The record contains no subsequent activity until November 2016,

when Coffey filed his first CR 60.02 motion. That motion lacks clarity, but it

2
 The record before us does not contain any videotapes or transcripts of any proceedings, so we
cannot know what discussions regarding Coffey’s competency or intellectual disabilities (or any
other pertinent matters) may have occurred.
3
    Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure.

                                              -2-
generally alleges Coffey was coerced by counsel into pleading guilty. The

Commonwealth filed a response asserting, among other things, that the motion was

untimely.4 In December 2019, the trial court granted Coffey’s motion to withdraw

that CR 60.02 motion.

              That same month, Coffey filed the CR 60.02 motion at hand. Coffey

raises various arguments, including sundry allegations his counsel was ineffective

and that there was insufficient evidence to support the rape and sodomy

convictions. The trial court eventually denied Coffey’s CR 60.02 motion in

February 2021. Coffey then filed this appeal.

              “It is within the sound discretion of the trial court whether to grant or

deny relief pursuant to CR 60.02[,]” so our review is pursuant to the abuse of

discretion standard. Priddy v. Commonwealth, 629 S.W.3d 14, 17 (Ky. App.

2021). “The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial judge’s decision was

arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.

Therefore, we will affirm the lower court’s decision unless there is a showing of

some flagrant miscarriage of justice.” Foley v. Commonwealth, 425 S.W.3d 880,

886 (Ky. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

4
  See CR 60.02(f) (requiring a motion brought under that subsection to be “made within a
reasonable time”).

                                              -3-
             Coffey is not entitled to an examination of his arguments on the

merits, much less relief, for three main reasons. First, the entry of a valid guilty

plea waives nearly all issues. See, e.g., Jackson v. Commonwealth, 363 S.W.3d 11,

16 (Ky. 2012). Thus, for example, Coffey has waived his sufficiency of the

evidence arguments. As we have held, “[p]ost-judgment challenges to sufficiency

of the evidence are precluded by unconditional guilty pleas.” Applegate v.

Commonwealth, 577 S.W.3d 83, 89 (Ky. App. 2018). See also Taylor v.

Commonwealth, 724 S.W.2d 223, 225 (Ky. App. 1986) (explaining that “[t]he

reasoning behind such a conclusion is obvious. A defendant who elects to

unconditionally plead guilty admits the factual accuracy of the various elements of

the offenses with which he is charged. By such an admission, a convicted

appellant forfeits the right to protest at some later date that the state could not have

proven that he committed the crimes to which he pled guilty. To permit a

convicted defendant to do so would result in a double benefit in that defendants

who elect to plead guilty would receive the benefit of the plea bargain which

ordinarily precedes such a plea along with the advantage of later challenging the

sentence resulting from the plea on grounds normally arising in the very trial which

defendant elected to forego.”).

                                          -4-
               Second, Coffey did not submit his motion within a reasonable time, as

required by CR 60.02(f).5 Of course, “there is no specific prescribed time within

which claims made pursuant to CR 60.02(e) or (f) must be filed.” Priddy, 629

S.W.3d at 18. But, without adequate explanation, Coffey waited roughly fifteen

years after his sentencing to submit this second CR 60.02 motion. We have

repeatedly held that CR 60.02 motions submitted sooner were untimely. See, e.g.,

Reyna, 217 S.W.3d at 276 (four-year delay unreasonable); Djoric v.

Commonwealth, 487 S.W.3d 908, 910 (Ky. App. 2016) (nearly thirteen-year delay

unreasonable); Graves v. Commonwealth, 283 S.W.3d 252, 257 (Ky. App. 2009)

(seven-year delay unreasonable).

               Third, Coffey’s motion is procedurally improper because it contains

allegations which could, and should, have been raised sooner. It is also successive.

As our Supreme Court explained, “[a]t each stage . . . the defendant is required to

raise all issues then amenable to review, and generally issues that either were or

could have been raised at one stage will not be entertained at any later stage.”

Hollon v. Commonwealth, 334 S.W.3d 431, 437 (Ky. 2010). Thus, “CR 60.02 is

5
  Though the Commonwealth argues in its brief that the motion was not brought in a timely
manner and is successive, the trial court did not explicitly so hold. Nonetheless, we may. Reyna
v. Commonwealth, 217 S.W.3d 274, 276 (Ky. App. 2007) (“Although not stated as reason for the
denial of his CR 60.02(f) [motion], the trial court would certainly have been within its discretion
had it held that the motion was not brought within a reasonable time.”). See also, e.g., McCloud
v. Commonwealth, 286 S.W.3d 780, 786 n. 19 (Ky. 2009) (noting that “it is well-settled that
an appellate court may affirm a lower court for any reason supported by the record”).

                                               -5-
not a separate avenue of appeal to be pursued in addition to other remedies, but is

available only to raise issues which cannot be raised in other proceedings.”

McQueen v. Commonwealth, 948 S.W.2d 415, 416 (Ky. 1997). Coffey’s claims

are procedurally barred because he has not shown that he was unable to raise them

sooner, such as in his RCr 11.42 motion. See, e.g., Sanders v. Commonwealth, 339

S.W.3d 427, 437 (Ky. 2011) (“A review of the grounds for relief listed above

demonstrates that each of the claims, with the exercise of reasonable diligence,

could have been brought either in Appellant’s direct appeal or in his RCr 11.42

proceeding. As such, they do not qualify to be brought in a CR 60.02 proceeding.

Moreover, the claims are of the usual procedural, evidentiary, and ineffective

assistance of counsel variety, and do not implicate the extraordinary sort of claim

contemplated under CR 60.02(f).”).

             For example, our Supreme Court has expressed a strong preference

for ineffective assistance of counsel claims to be raised via RCr 11.42. Furnish v.

Commonwealth, 95 S.W.3d 34, 52 (Ky. 2002) (holding that ineffective assistance

of counsel claims “are not properly raised on direct appeal, but rather must proceed

by way of a post-trial motion under RCr 11.42”). Because Coffey should have

raised his ineffective assistance of counsel claims in his RCr 11.42 motion, he may

not properly do so here. Also, for similar reasons, Coffey may not now raise

                                         -6-
arguments regarding his alleged incompetency. See Owens v. Commonwealth, 512

S.W.3d 1, 14-15 (Ky. App. 2017).

             Finally, this is Coffey’s second CR 60.02 motion. Precedent plainly

holds that “CR 60.02 does not permit successive post-judgment motions . . . .”

Foley, 425 S.W.3d at 884. Coffey has not shown why he could not have raised all

of the issues in this second CR 60.02 motion in his RCr 11.42 motion or his first

CR 60.02 motion. “The courts are not required to entertain a second or successive

motion for similar relief from the same prisoner.” Reado v. Commonwealth, 408

S.W.2d 438, 438 (Ky. 1966). See also, e.g., Cardwell v. Commonwealth, 354

S.W.3d 582, 585 (Ky. App. 2011) (declining to address arguments raised in a

successive CR 60.02 motion because “[o]ur case law has long held that we will not

consider successive motions to vacate a conviction when those motions recite

grounds for relief that have been or should have been raised earlier. The courts

have much more to do than occupy themselves with successive reruns of RCr

11.42 motions stating grounds that have or should have been presented earlier.”)

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

             In short, Coffey waited too long to submit his CR 60.02 motion, it

contains allegations which he could, and should, have raised in earlier proceedings,

and it is an impermissible proverbial second bite at the CR 60.02 apple. Coffey

has offered no compelling arguments to the contrary. Thus, though our reasoning

                                        -7-
is not precisely the same, we affirm the McCreary Circuit Court’s denial of

Benjamin Coffey’s CR 60.02 motion.

            ALL CONCUR.

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:                      BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Benjamin D. Coffey, pro se                Daniel Cameron
La Grange, Kentucky                       Attorney General of Kentucky

                                          Joseph A. Beckett
                                          Assistant Attorney General
                                          Frankfort, Kentucky

                                        -8-