Court Opinion

ID: 9394554
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-15 19:11:28.463423+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:00.925443
License: Public Domain

STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
                         SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS                                  FILED
                                                                                 May 15, 2023
Jean Shannon Lane, Alec J. Cable,                                              EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK
And Noah D. Cable,                                                             SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS

Petitioners, Respondents below,                                                    OF WEST VIRGINIA

vs.) No. 22-0146 (Kanawha County 18-C-424)

Rossana Cable,
Respondent, Respondent below.

                             MEMORANDUM DECISION

        The Petitioners, Jean Shannon Lane, Alec J. Cable, and Noah D. Cable, appeal the
final order of the Circuit Court of Kanawha County entered January 21, 2021, granting the
Respondent, Rossana Cable, summary judgment and finding that administration of the
estate of decedent Scott M. Cable (Mr. Cable) is not proper in West Virginia and that such
administration is proper in California. 1

       After considering the parties’ written and oral arguments, as well as the record on
appeal and the applicable legal authorities, this Court finds no substantial question of law
and no prejudicial error. For these reasons, a memorandum decision affirming the circuit
court’s order is appropriate under Rule 21 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

         By a last will and testament signed by Mr. Cable on December 16, 2011, Mr. Cable
left all his property to his wife, Rossana Cable (Ms. Cable), who was also named in the
will as executor of Mr. Cable’s estate. Mr. Cable died in Mexico on June 21, 2017, as the
result injuries sustained in an automobile accident that had occurred in that country in late
2015.

        On September 18, 2017, Julia Barnhart-Cable (Ms. Barnhart-Cable), a former wife
of Mr. Cable, filed for probate of Mr. Cable’s estate in Kanawha County, West Virginia.
Ms. Barnhart-Cable represented to the Kanawha County Commission that Mr. Cable died
intestate as a resident of Mexico. The Kanawha County Commission admitted the estate to
probate on September 28, 2017.

       J. Mark Adkins, Esquire, represents the Petitioners and Mark W. Kelley, Esquire
       1

and John J. Brewster, Esquire, represent the Respondent.

                                             1
       Subsequently, in the Golden State, Ms. Cable asked the Superior Court of Riverside
County, California, on October 5, 2017, to admit Mr. Cable’s will to probate. The Superior
Court granted Ms. Cable’s request on November 17, 2017. In granting Ms. Cable’s request,
the Superior Court found that Mr. Cable died a resident of California and further appointed
Ms. Cable as executor of his estate. 2

       On March 26, 2018, Ms. Barnhart-Cable filed a “Petition for Declaratory Judgment
and Associated Relief” in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County requesting a declaration
that Mr. Cable was a resident of Kanawha County when he died and seeking to have Mr.
Cable’s estate probated in that county. Among others named as Respondents in the Petition
were the Petitioners herein: Ms. Lane, another ex-wife of Mr. Cable who had filed a claim
against Mr. Cable’s estate before the Kanawha County Commission, and Alec J. Cable and
Noah D. Cable, both sons of Mr. Cable.

        After discovery, Ms. Cable filed a summary judgment motion and an accompanying
memorandum of law asserting that the Kanawha County Commission lacked jurisdiction
to probate Mr. Cable’s estate because the terms of West Virginia Code § 41-5-4 (1923)
(which defines the jurisdiction of a county commission sitting to probate wills) were not
satisfied. The only parties filing a response were the Petitioners herein. 3 A hearing on the
summary judgment motion was held on October 14, 2021. At the end of that hearing, the
circuit court granted summary judgment to Ms. Cable. The circuit court entered a written
order on January 21, 2022, memorializing its bench ruling. It is from this order that the
Petitioners herein now appeal. 4

       The California court has stayed litigation in that state pending the outcome of the
       2

proceeding currently pending in West Virginia.
       3
        During oral argument in the circuit court, Ms. Barnhart-Cable’s counsel stated that
Ms. Barnhart-Cable’s position on whether summary judgment was appropriate was
generally the same as that argued in Ms. Lane’s response.
       4
        The posturing of the parties in this appeal is somewhat confusing since Ms. Cable
and the Petitioners herein were all respondents in the declaratory judgment proceeding in
the circuit court. It became clear during the circuit court proceedings that the Petitioners’
position aligned with that of Ms. Barnhart-Cable and not Ms. Cable. See supra n.3. We
point out that West Virginia Rule of Civil Procedure 21 authorizes circuit courts to realign
parties according to their true interests. Louis J. Palmer, Jr. and Robin Jean Davis,
Litigation Handbook on West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure 610 (5th ed. 2017); see also
In-Tech Mktg. Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc., 685 F. Supp. 436, 442 n.19 (D.N.J. 1988) (emphasis
deleted) (“[S]hould facts be presented to [a] [trial] court which suggest some reason for
change, Rule 21 permits [a] [trial] [c]ourt, sua sponte to re-align any party at any time.”).

                                             2
      Our standard of review in an appeal where the circuit court has granted summary
judgment is de novo. Syl. Pt. 1, Painter v. Peavy, 192 W. Va. 189, 451 S.E.2d 755 (1994).
“In undertaking a de novo review, we apply the same standard for granting summary
judgment that is applied by the circuit court.” Horizon Ventures of W. Va. Inc. v. Am.
Bituminous Power Partners, L.P., 245 W. Va. 1, 6, 857 S.E.2d 33, 38 (2021).

        We have recognized that “[s]ummary judgment is appropriate where ‘there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as
a matter of law.’” Chafin v. Gibson, 213 W. Va. 167, 171, 578 S.E.2d 361, 365 (2003) (per
curiam) (quoting W. Va. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). Once a moving party has made a properly
supported motion for summary judgment, the opposing party “must set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” W. Va. R. Civ. P. 56(e). “[T]he party
opposing summary judgment must satisfy the burden of proof by offering more than a mere
‘scintilla of evidence’ and must produce evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to find in
a nonmoving party’s favor.” Williams v. Precision Coil, Inc., 194 W. Va. 52, 60, 459
S.E.2d 329, 337 (1995) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 252, 254
(1986)). “[W]hile the underlying facts and all inferences are viewed in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party, the nonmoving party must nonetheless offer some
‘“concrete evidence from which a reasonable . . . [finder of fact] could return a verdict in .
. . [its] favor”’ or other ‘“significant probative evidence tending to support the
complaint.”’” Painter, 192 W. Va. at 193, 451 S.E.2d at 759 (citations omitted). “[I]n
making a ruling, ‘the judge must view the evidence presented through the prism of the
substantive evidentiary burden.’” Williams, 194 W. Va. at 62, 459 S.E.2d at 339 (quoting
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 254). We turn to examining whether that burden was satisfied.

       West Virginia Code § 41-5-4 grants jurisdiction to county commissions to probate
wills. Under West Virginia Code § 41-5-4:

              The county court shall have jurisdiction of the probate of wills
       according to the following rules:

             (a) In the county wherein the testator, at the time of his death, had a
       mansion house or known place of residence; or

             (b) If he had no such house or place of residence, then in the county
       wherein any real estate devised thereby is situated; or

Such a power to realign parties also exists by virtue of a trial court’s inherent authority to
manage and conduct trials. Branham v. Ford Motor Co., 701 S.E.2d 5, 26 (S.C. 2010).

                                              3
             (c) If there be no real estate devised thereby, and the testator had no
       such house or place of residence, then in the county wherein he died, or in
       any county wherein he had any property at the time of his death; or

              (d) If he died out of this State, his will or an authenticated copy
       thereof, may be admitted to probate in any county in this State, wherein there
       is property devised or bequeathed thereby.

West Virginia Code § 44-1-4(a) (2019) grants county commissions jurisdiction to probate
intestate estates as if they were testate estates.

       The parties (as did the circuit court below) analyze this case under West Virginia
Code § 41-5-4(a). We begin by observing that West Virginia Code § 41-5-4(a) employs
the term “residence.” “[I]n probate matters the term ‘residence’ is commonly interpreted
as signifying ‘domicile[.]’” Kemp v. Kemp, 16 N.Y.S.2d 26, 34 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1939). Like
a number of other courts, this Court too “has used the terms ‘residence’ and ‘domicile’
interchangeably in the probate . . . context[].” White v. Manchin, 173 W. Va. 526, 538, 318
S.E.2d 470, 482 (1984); State ex rel. Linger v. Cnty. Ct. of Upshur Cnty., 150 W. Va. 207,
228, 144 S.E.2d 689, 703 (1965) (citing White v. Tennant, 31 W. Va. 790, 8 S.E. 596
(1888)) (“Though there are instances in which residence and domicile have different
meanings, this Court has indicated . . . in a case involving the settlement and distribution
of the personal estate of a decedent, that domicile and residence are regarded as
synonymous.”); see, e.g., Bowring v. Bowers, 24 F.2d 918, 921 (2d Cir. 1928); Krakow v.
Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 95 N.E.2d 184, 185-86 (Mass. 1950); State ex rel. Brisbin v. Frater,
95 P.2d 27, 28 (Wash. 1939); In re Davis’ Estate, 43 P.2d 115, 116 (Okla. 1935); In re
Daggett’s Will, 174 N.E. 641, 642 (N.Y. 1931); Sch. Dist. No. 1 Fractional of Mancelona
Twp. v. Sch. Dist. No. 1 of Custer Twp., 211 N.W. 60, 62 (Mich. 1926); Allgood v. Williams,
8 So. 722, 722–23 (Ala. 1891). Thus, when West Virginia Code § 41-5-4(a) uses the term
“residence,” we understand residence to mean domicile.

      The Petitioners herein assert that there exists a genuine issue of material fact as to
Mr. Cable’s domicile when he died. Ms. Cable responds that there is no genuine question
that Mr. Cable was not domiciled in West Virginia upon his passing. We agree with Ms.
Cable and, therefore, conclude that the circuit court did not err in granting summary
judgment to her.

       “Domicile is a place a person intends to retain as a permanent residence and go back
to ultimately after moving away.” Syl. Pt. 2, in part, Shaw v. Shaw, 155 W. Va. 712, 187
S.E.2d 124 (1972). We have explained that “[d]omicile is a combination of residence (or
presence) and an intention of remaining. If domicile has once existed, mere temporary
absence will not destroy it, however long continued.” Syl. Pt. 2, Lotz v. Atamaniuk, 172 W.
Va. 116, 304 S.E.2d 20 (1983). Nevertheless, there exists a rebuttable presumption that
one’s residence is his or her domicile. Syl. Pt. 3, First Nat. Bank v. Tate, 116 W. Va. 138,

                                             4
178 S.E. 807 (1935) (“Domicile is presumed to follow residence.”); District of Columbia
v. Murphy, 314 U.S. 441, 455 (1941) (“The place where a man lives is properly taken to
be his domicile until facts adduced establish the contrary.”).

       In the instant case, the following facts are undisputed. Mr. and Ms. Cable left West
Virginia in the spring of 2015. After that departure, Mr. Cable had no real property in West
Virginia. Mr. and Ms. Cable then physically lived in California. Mr. Cable secured a
California mailing address and obtained a California State identification card. 5 Mr. Cable
also changed his business address from West Virginia to California. In early 2016, Mr.
Cable e-mailed the Circuit Clerk of Pocahontas County that “I now have my own address
in Chula Vista, CA[.]” Moreover, on April 17, 2017, Mr. Cable filed a “California Resident
Income Tax Return” for Tax Year 2016.

       The Petitioners herein counter that there is evidence supporting a finding that West
Virginia was Mr. Cable’s domicile when he died. We have thoroughly reviewed that
evidence. The evidence the Petitioners herein point to predominantly relates to documents
predating (or documents relating to documents predating) Mr. Cable’s 2015 move from
West Virginia to California. Considering the evidence as a whole, the evidence of the
Petitioners herein at best rises only to the level of a “mere scintilla,” which simply is not
enough for them to defeat summary judgment. The circuit court did not err in granting
summary judgment concluding probate of Mr. Cable’s will was inappropriate in West
Virginia.

       For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

                                                                                  Affirmed.

ISSUED: May 15, 2023

CONCURRED IN BY:

Chief Justice Elizabeth D. Walker
Justice Tim Armstead
Justice John A. Hutchison
Justice William R. Wooton
Justice C. Haley Bunn

       A California state identification card may only be issued to a California resident.
       5

Cal. Veh. Code § 12801.5(c) (West 2016).

                                               5