Court Opinion

ID: 9556120
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-16 06:09:46.426518+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:27.933444
License: Public Domain

AFFIRMED and Opinion Filed August 10, 2023

                                    S  In The
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                               No. 05-22-00020-CV

                         SEAN PAGE, Appellant
                                 V.
                     GUADALUPE DE LA CRUZ, Appellee

                On Appeal from the 401st Judicial District Court
                             Collin County, Texas
                    Trial Court Cause No. 401-05249-2020

                        MEMORANDUM OPINION
                Before Justices Pedersen, III, Goldstein, and Smith
                          Opinion by Justice Goldstein
      Pro se appellant Sean Page appeals the trial court’s grant of summary

judgment in favor of appellee Guadalupe De La Cruz on her claim for partition of

the parties’ jointly owned residence. In four issues, Page contends that (1) the trial

court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to order partition because De La Cruz’s

petition was not served in compliance with Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 21, 21a

and 106; (2) the parol evidence rule deprived De La Cruz of jurisdictional standing

to bring the partition suit; (3) the parties purportedly signed two agreements not to

partition, thus depriving this Court of jurisdiction over the parties’ dispute; and
(4) De La Cruz’s failure to list the mortgage lender as a party of interest in her

petition deprived the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction.1 We affirm in this

memorandum opinion. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(a).

                                          BACKGROUND

        In 2007, the parties jointly purchased a residence in McKinney, Texas,

holding the property as joint tenants. The purchase was funded by a loan from

EquiFirst Corporation, whose interest in the property was secured by a deed of trust

listing both Page and De La Cruz as borrowers. In 2015, Page went to federal prison

for a crime the details of which are not included in our record. Page was apparently

released from prison at some point in or before 2020.2

        On October 9, 2020, De La Cruz filed her original petition for partition of real

property. De La Cruz alleged that Page abandoned the property during his

incarceration and that she moved into and became the sole caretaker of the property,

“including but not limited to, paying the mortgage, taxes, utilities, and expenses

associated with [it].” De La Cruz requested that the court order a partition by sale

and divide the proceeds equally between the parties. Page, proceeding pro se,

answered the lawsuit on October 20, 2020, alleging among other things that he and

    1
      Page fails to cite us to the clerk’s record, and merely references the appendices, which constitutes
briefing waiver. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i); Jackson v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 345 S.W.3d 214 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 2011, no pet.) (“An appendix is not a substitute for a clerk’s record nor are citations to the appendix
a substitute for citations to the record.”). However, due to the limited record required for the determination
of issues presented, we are able to proceed forward with the jurisdictional and merits-based review.
    2
     We deduce from the statements of the parties that Page was released from prison before this lawsuit
was filed.
                                                    –2–
De La Cruz previously signed an agreement entitling him to purchase her interest in

the property. He asserted that he did not want the property to be partitioned and

instead requested that the trial court “enforce the signed Contract Agreement

between” the parties. Page also alleged that De La Cruz had restricted his access to

the property since his release from prison and had disposed of his personal effects

inside the property without his consent. He requested $5,100 as a fair-market rental

value for each month that he was denied access to the property and an additional

$5,000 in total for his personal property.3 On October 23, Page filed a second answer

containing substantially the same allegations and requests as the October 20 answer.4

         On July 28, 2021, De La Cruz filed a traditional motion for summary

judgment on her claim for partition. Page responded and also filed a motion to

dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction on grounds that De La Cruz’s original

petition and motion for summary judgment were not served in accordance with

Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 21, 21a, and 106. The trial court denied De La Cruz’s

motion for summary judgment because she failed to attach any evidence to her

motion. The trial court also denied Page’s motion to dismiss, explaining that Page

“filed two answers to the lawsuit on October 20, 2020 and October 23, 2020, thereby

waiving any issues he might have regarding personal service of process.”

   3
      The trial court has not yet disposed of Page’s rental-value and personal-property claims, or any
assertions of monies expended on the property between 2007 and 2014 and they are thus not before us in
this appeal or in the record.
   4
       The only discernible difference between the October 20 and October 23 answers is the font size.
                                                   –3–
       On November 15, 2021, De La Cruz filed a second motion for summary

judgment. In support, De La Cruz attached her own unsworn declaration, in which

she testified in relevant part that (1) the parties agreed to and secured a mortgage to

purchase the property in 2007; (2) Page was incarcerated in 2015, at which time Page

“abandoned the property and corresponding financial obligations”; (3) during Page’s

incarceration, De La Cruz made multiple attempts to acquire his consent to sell the

property or secure financing to purchase her share of the interest, neither of which

Page did; (4) Page refuses to participate in an equitable sale of the property, and

(5) the property is a single family residence that cannot be subdivided into parts. De

La Cruz requested that the trial court grant the motion and order a partition by sale.

De La Cruz scheduled her motion to be heard by submission on December 10, 2021.

       On November 19, Page filed a document titled “Defendant’s Motion for

Declaratory Judgment and Dismissal of Plaintiff’s Summary Judgment” supported

by Page’s unsworn declaration and several exhibits, including the purported

agreement signed by the parties in 2014 (2014 Agreement). The 2014 Agreement

states, in full:

                            CONTRACT AGREEMENT

                                      2/11/2014

       This contract agreement is made between Sean Page (buyer) and
       Guadalupe De La Cruz (seller) owners of the Real Property located at
       [McKinney, Texas address]. Guadalupe (seller) shall voluntarily
       relinquish her rights, and transfer deed trust (quick claim deed) for sole
       ownership and transfer the title to Sean Page. The terms of this contract

                                          –4–
      agreement will commence once a final payment is delivered to the seller
      in the amount of $5,000.00. Seller wishes to move forward with her
      life, after leaving the keys and garage door openers on the kitchen
      counter.

      Furthermore, any modifications to the contract agreement must be in
      writing and signed by each owner. This will alleviate and prevent any
      party from later claiming that the contract agreement does not contain
      what the parties agreed to.

      The aforesaid contract agreement shall be interpreted in accordance
      with the laws of Texas. Thus, both Sean and Guadalupe accept the offer
      by signing this agreement that were mutually agreed to the terms listed
      above. Sean and Guadalupe are over the age of 18 and have not taken
      any mind altering drugs, or not under duress.

Page requested that the trial court deny De La Cruz’s motion for summary judgment

and enforce the 2014 Agreement by ordering De La Cruz to sell her interest in the

property to Page for $5,000. On December 8, 2021, De La Cruz filed a reply arguing

that the 2014 Agreement (1) is inadmissible because Page failed to authenticate it,

(2) was not signed by De La Cruz, and (3) cannot be enforced because the statute of

limitations for a breach-of-contract claim had expired.

      On December 9, Page filed a “Motion for Partial Dismissal Pursuant to Tex.

R. Civ. P. 91a,” arguing that, pursuant to the parol evidence rule, De La Cruz’s

motion for summary judgment “should be dismissed in part and granted only to the

extent that she be compelled to perform the financial terms of her now breached

contract in which she agreed to sell [Page] all her interest, rights, and title to the

property at issue for $5,000.” On December 10, Page filed his “Defendant’s Reply

to Plaintiff’s Summary Judgment.” In this document, Page reiterated his prior

                                         –5–
arguments that De La Cruz’s motion for summary judgment should be denied due

to the parties’ prior agreement, the parol evidence rule, and Texas Rules of Civil

Procedure 21, 21a, and 106. Page also argued in the December 10 filing that De La

Cruz’s limitations argument fails because she was in continuous breach of the 2014

Agreement by refusing to sell her interest in the property to him for $5,000.

        On December 31, 2021, the trial court entered an order granting De La Cruz’s

second motion for summary judgment. On the same day, the trial court entered its

Interlocutory Judgment of Partition, in which it found that: (1) the parties each held

a fifty-percent ownership interest in the property, (2) the property was encumbered

by a mortgage lien in favor of Community Loan Servicing (Community), and

(3) sale of the property and division of the net proceeds was more equitable than

division of the property in kind. The trial court ordered that the property be listed for

sale and all proceeds from the sale be placed in the registry of the court, the equitable

division of which the court reserved for a future determination. This appeal

followed.5

                                            DISCUSSION

        Page raises four issues on appeal, contending that the trial court lacked

jurisdiction because: (1) De La Cruz violated Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 21,

    5
      We initially questioned our jurisdiction over an interlocutory order and determined prior to proceeding
that the Court has jurisdiction over this appeal. See Long v. Spencer, 137 S.W.3d 923, 925-26 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 2004, no pet.) (issues determined by partition order must be challenged following its entry and cannot
be attacked collaterally after the entry of later order or judgment).
                                                    –6–
21a, and 106; (2) De La Cruz violated the parol evidence rule; (3) the 2014

Agreement estops De La Cruz from seeking partition; and (4) De La Cruz failed to

join Community as a party.6 Although Page’s issues are couched in terms of subject-

matter jurisdiction, Page’s brief also asserts various reasons why the trial court’s

grant of summary judgment was erroneous. The crux of Page’s arguments relates to

the impact, if any, of the 2014 purported partition agreement. We will therefore

address Page’s jurisdictional arguments and, where necessary, also address his

merits-based arguments as to the trial court’s grant of summary judgment. See TEX.

R. CIV. P. 38.1(f) (“The statement of an issue or point will be treated as covering

every subsidiary question that is fairly included.”); see also Perry v. Cohen, 272

S.W.3d 585, 587 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam) (“Appellate briefs are to be construed

reasonably, yet liberally, so that the right to appellate review is not lost by waiver[,

and] appellate courts should reach the merits of an appeal whenever reasonably

possible.”).

    6
      On appeal, Page also filed a form, available on this Court’s website, titled “Challenge to
Constitutionality of a State Statute.” See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 402.010(a-1). In the space provided to
summarize his constitutional argument, Page appears to have merely reiterated his issues stated herein:
        Texas Property Code Section 23.001. Texas Rule Civil Procedure Civil Rule 756 et seq.
        Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Partition is precluded by a parol evidence
        rule/perpetual contract voluntarily signed by Plaintiiff [sic]. Plaintiff is committing Fruad
        [sic] upon the Court with her Partition lawsuit. See Exhibit (A), Plaintiffs Perpetual
        Contract. Also Plaintiff intiating [sic] suit never served Defendant to suit in accordance
        with Tex.R.Civ.P. 21., Tex.R.Civ.P. 106.
Out an abundance of caution, this Court notified the Attorney General of the filing. See id. § 402.010(a).
However, Page’s briefing presents no constitutional argument for consideration.
                                                    –7–
I.    STANDARD OF REVIEW

      A.     Jurisdiction

      Subject-matter jurisdiction refers to a court’s power to decide a case. City of

Houston v. Rhule, 417 S.W.3d 440, 442 (Tex. 2013). A court has subject-matter

jurisdiction over a case when the parties have standing and a ripe, justiciable

controversy between them. Sw. Elec. Power Co. v. Lynch, 595 S.W.3d 678, 685

(Tex. 2020). Standing is a component of subject-matter jurisdiction and a

constitutional prerequisite to suit. Heckman v. Williamson Cnty., 369 S.W.3d 137,

150 (Tex. 2012). “A trial court has no jurisdiction over a claim made by a plaintiff

who lacks standing to assert it.” Id. If a plaintiff lacks standing, the trial court must

dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction. Id.

      Whether a court has subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law that we

review de novo. Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226

(Tex. 2004). In determining whether jurisdiction exists, we look not to the merits of

the pleader’s claims, but to the allegations in the pleadings. County of Cameron v.

Brown, 80 S.W.3d 549, 555 (Tex. 2002). We accept the factual allegations as true

and construe them in the pleader’s favor. Id. If the pleadings affirmatively negate

the existence of jurisdiction, the case must be dismissed. Id.

      B.     Summary Judgment

      We review summary judgments de novo. Riner v. Neumann, 353 S.W.3d 312,

314 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.). A plaintiff seeking to recover on a claim

                                          –8–
may, at any time after the defendant answers, move for summary judgment on all or

part of the claim. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a. When a party moves for summary judgment

on her own claim, she must conclusively establish every necessary element in her

favor. Riner, 353 S.W.3d at 314. A matter is conclusively established by the

evidence if ordinary minds could not differ as to the conclusion to be drawn from

the evidence. Id. We must take the evidence favorable to the nonmovant as true and

draw every reasonable inference from the evidence in favor of the nonmovant. Id.

      Once the movant establishes her right to summary judgment as a matter of

law, the burden shifts to the non-movant to present evidence raising a genuine issue

of material fact, thereby precluding summary judgment. Roberts v. Roper, 373

S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.). A party relying on an

affirmative defense to defeat a motion for summary judgment must raise a genuine

issue of fact as to each element of the defense. Id.

II.   ANALYSIS

      A.     Defects in Service

      In his first issue, Page contends that the trial court lacked subject-matter

jurisdiction because De La Cruz failed to comply with Texas Rules of Civil

Procedure 21, 21a and 106. Specifically, Page complains that De La Cruz’s original

petition for partition did not indicate whether he was served by registered or certified

mail, did not certify compliance with Texas Rule of Procedure 21, and was not

served via registered or certified mail. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 21(d), 106. Page further

                                          –9–
complains that the trial court never authorized substituted service by email as

required by Rule 106(b).

        Complaints regarding defects in service of citation implicate the trial court’s

personal jurisdiction, not its subject-matter jurisdiction. See Guardianship of

Fairley, 650 S.W.3d 372, 385 (Tex. 2022). Unlike subject-matter jurisdiction, which

concerns a court’s jurisdiction to hear a case and cannot be waived, personal

jurisdiction concerns a court’s jurisdiction over a particular party and can be waived.

Reata Const. Corp. v. City of Dallas, 197 S.W.3d 371, 379 (Tex.2006). A party

waives the absence of personal jurisdiction by making a general appearance in the

case or by failing to timely object to the court’s jurisdiction. Id. The filing of an

answer by a defendant constitutes a general appearance. Phillips v. Dallas Cnty.

Child Protective Servs. Unit, 197 S.W.3d 862, 865 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, pet.

denied). As the trial court recognized when it denied Page’s motion to dismiss, Page

filed two answers to De La Cruz’s petition and thereby made a general appearance.

The trial court was therefore correct in concluding that Page waived any complaints

regarding personal jurisdiction.7

        We overrule Page’s first issue.

    7
      Page also appears to argue that De La Cruz, in serving her motion for summary judgment, was required
to comply with the rules governing service of the citation. That is incorrect. Once the defendant has been
served with the citation, all subsequent pleadings and motions must be served in accordance with Rule 21
and 21a. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 21, 21a. Thus, to the extent Page argues that Rule 106 requires a party to obtain
the trial court’s approval before serving a motion via email, we reject the argument.
                                                   –10–
       B.      The Parol Evidence Rule

       In his second issue, Page asserts that “the parol evidence rule precluded

appellee of jurisdictional standing to bring her partition suit and summary

judgment.” Page does not explain what parol evidence the trial court was barred

from considering, how that evidence “precludes” De La Cruz’s standing, or even

which rule about parol evidence he relies on. Page’s brief quotes several authorities

discussing two separate rules relating to parol evidence8 but fails to include any

argument about how either rule was violated in this case. Page’s brief then cites the

Texas Constitution’s Open Courts provision and, without any analysis or record

citations, concludes that De La Cruz lacked standing to bring her partition action.

       Under our rules, a party’s brief must “contain a clear and concise argument

for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record.”

TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i). An appellate court has no duty to brief issues for an appellant.

Huey v. Huey, 200 S.W.3d 851, 854 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.). In the

absence of appropriate record citations or a substantive analysis, Page does not

present an adequate appellate issue for our review. See Cruz v. Deutche Bank Nat’l

Tr., No. 05-14-01358-CV, 2016 WL 6087680, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Oct. 18,

2016, no pet.). When a party fails to adequately brief a complaint, he waives the

   8
     For a discussion of the difference between the two rules, see West v. Quintanilla, 573 S.W.3d 237,
243 n.11 (Tex. 2019).
                                                –11–
issue on appeal. In re Interest of N.E.B., 251 S.W.3d 211, 212 (Tex. App.—Dallas

2008, no pet.).

         We overrule Page’s second issue.

         C.     Anti-Partition

         In his third issue, Page contends that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over

this case because the parties previously entered into “two separate contracts

expressly and impliedly agreeing not to partition the property,” referencing the 2014

Agreement9 and a “Planned Unit Development Rider” to the deed of trust signed by

the parties in 2007.10

         A partition suit seeks to resolve issues of possession between co-owners of

real property. See Yoast v. Yoast, 649 S.W.2d 289, 292 (Tex. 1983) (“A partition suit

is based on the theory of common title, rather than disputed ownership.”); James v.

Hitchcock, 309 S.W.2d 909, 913 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1958, writ ref’d n.r.e.)

(partition concerns possession, not title). “Texas law will not force a reluctant joint

owner of real property to maintain joint ownership.” Wood v. Wiggins, 650 S.W.3d

533, 548 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2021, pet. denied). Instead, a joint owner

of real property may “compel a partition of the interest or the property among the

    9
      We note that De La Cruz denied in the trial court, and on appeal continues to deny, that she ever
signed the 2014 Agreement. She also complains that the 2014 Agreement was not authenticated. Given our
disposition of this issue, we do not reach these arguments. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1. For the purposes of
this appeal, we will presume that De La Cruz was a party to the 2014 Agreement.
    10
       Although Page does not use the term, we refer to his identified agreements or clauses not to partition
as “anti-partition” agreements. See Shipley v. Biscamp, 580 S.W.2d 52, 54 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 1979, no writ) (considering an “anti-partition clause” of a contract).
                                                   –12–
joint owners . . . under [Chapter 23 of the Property Code] and the Texas Rules of

Civil Procedure.” Id. (quoting TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 23.001). This right to

partition is considered absolute. Id. (citing Moseley v. Hearrell, 171 S.W.2d 337,

338 (Tex. 1943)). The purpose of partition is “enable one holding or entitled to hold

with others an undivided possession, to sever that possession and right, and

thenceforth to hold and exclusive possession of a specific part of the property, which

before partition all the co-owners had the equal right to possess.” Irons v. Fort Worth

Sand & Gravel Co., 284 S.W.2d 215, 219 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1955, writ ref’d

n.r.e.).

       To establish her right to partition, De La Cruz was required to plead and prove

that she had a common interest in the property and equal right to present partition.

Savell v. Savell, 837 S.W.2d 836, 838 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ

denied). In her petition, De La Cruz pleaded a joint, equal-undivided ownership of

the property, as reflected in the Warranty Deed, that she “no longer wish[ed] to co-

own the Property with [Page]” and that her efforts “for a buy-out and re-finance of

the mortgage” were unsuccessful. We conclude that De La Cruz’s allegations were

sufficient to invoke the trial court’s jurisdiction. We therefore overrule Page’s third

issue to the extent he complains that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction

over De La Cruz’s claim.

       We now turn to the merits of Page’s third issue. It is undisputed that the parties

jointly purchased the property, secured by a mortgage loan signed by both. The

                                         –13–
summary-judgment evidence consisted of both the deed of trust and the warranty

deed from the previous owners. De La Cruz also testified in her declaration that

despite her efforts, Page “refuse[d] to participate in an equitable sell [sic] of the

property.” De La Cruz therefore established her right to partition. In his response to

De La Cruz’s second motion for summary judgment, Page argued that the 2014

Agreement was an anti-partition agreement and De La Cruz was therefore estopped

from asserting her right to partition.

      Although the right to partition is absolute, it was never intended to interfere

with contracts between co-tenants modifying or limiting this otherwise incidental

right, nor to render it impossible for parties to make contracts expressly providing

against partitioning. Lichtenstein v. Lichtenstein Bldg. Corp., 442 S.W.2d 765, 769

(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1969, no writ). Parties can waive the right to partition

by express or implied agreement. Wood, 650 S.W.3d at 548; see also Lichtenstein,

442 S.W.2d at 769 (“An express agreement not to partition will be honored by the

courts and an agreement against partitioning will be implied, when the granting of

such relief would destroy the estate sought to be partitioned.”). If the parties did enter

into an expressed or implied anti-partition agreement, the party seeking partition will

be estopped from asserting that right. Wood, 650 S.W.3d at 548 “Consequently, the

relinquishment of the right to partition has been characterized as an estoppel or

                                          –14–
waiver.” Id. Estoppel and waiver are affirmative defenses that need to be pleaded

and proved.11 Id. at 549; see TEX. R. CIV. P. 94 (listing affirmative defenses).

         Because Page relied on an affirmative defense to defeat De La Cruz’s motion

for summary judgment, he would ordinarily need to raise a genuine issue of material

fact as to each element of the defense. See Roberts, 373 S.W.3d at 232. However,

the dispositive question here is whether the 2014 Agreement constitutes an anti-

partition agreement. To make that determination, we must “examine the particular

contract involved and from the provisions thereof determine whether or not the

parties impliedly contracted against partition.” See Lichtenstein, 442 S.W.2d at 769–

70 (quoting Warner v. Winn, 191 S.W.2d 747, 751 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1945,

writ ref’d n.r.e.)). The interpretation of a contract is a question of law that we review

de novo. Kachina Pipeline Co., Inc. v. Lillis, 471 S.W.3d 445, 449 (Tex. 2015).

         Page relies on the following provisions of the 2014 Agreement to support his

contention that it is an anti-partition agreement:

         [De La Cruz] shall voluntarily relinquish her rights, and transfer deed
         trust (quick claim deed) for sole ownership and transfer the title to
         [Page]. The terms of this contract agreement will commence once a
         final payment is delivered to the seller in the amount of $5,000.00.

    11
       We conclude Page adequately pleaded estoppel as an affirmative defense to De La Cruz’s partition
claim. When construing pleadings, we look to their substance, as opposed to any labels, to determine the
nature of the relief sought. State Bar of Tex. v. Heard, 603 S.W.2d 829, 833 (Tex. 1980). In his October 23,
2020 answer, Page alleged that he and De La Cruz had signed a “Contract Agreement of the buy-out,
regarding [Page’s] purchasing interest in the subject property.” He stated that he “does not seek partition
by sale” and requested that the trial court “enforce the signed Contract Agreement between [the parties], as
this should be considered ‘Breach of Contract.’” It is clear from Page’s answer that he was relying on the
2014 Agreement as a reason why De La Cruz was precluded from seeking a partition.
                                                  –15–
Our determination turns on the distinction between bilateral and unilateral contracts.

“A bilateral contract is one in which there are mutual promises between two parties

to the contract, each party being both a promisor and a promisee.” Vanegas v. Am.

Energy Servs., 302 S.W.3d 299, 302 (Tex. 2009). A unilateral contract, on the other

hand, is “created by the promisor promising a benefit if the promisee performs. The

contract becomes enforceable when the promisee performs.” Id. In Vanegas, the

Court explained the enforceability of unilateral contracts using this hypothetical:

      Almost all unilateral contracts begin as illusory promises. Take, for
      instance, the classic textbook example of a unilateral contract: “I will
      pay you $50 if you paint my house.” The offer to pay the individual to
      paint the house can be withdrawn at any point prior to performance. But
      once the individual accepts the offer by performing, the promise to pay
      the $50 becomes binding.

Id. at 303.

      Here, the 2014 Agreement is akin to the “classic textbook example” of a

unilateral contract. Because the parties agreed that the terms of the 2014 Agreement

would “commence once a final payment is delivered to the seller in the amount of

$5,000.00,” De La Cruz’s obligation to transfer her interest in the property to Page

would only be triggered in the event Page made that payment. There is neither

evidence in the record, nor any affirmative declaration, that Page made such a

payment. Therefore, De La Cruz was free to withdraw her offer, which she did by

filing this partition suit. We conclude that the 2014 Agreement did not constitute an

anti-partition agreement.

                                        –16–
         Regarding the Planned Unit Development Rider, we discern that Page argues,

for the first time on appeal, that De La Cruz is not entitled to partition because the

rider provides that the parties “shall not, except after notice to [EquiFirst] and with

[EquiFirst’s] written consent, either partition or subdivide the Property[.]”12 To

preserve an issue for appeal, a party must first present the issue to the trial court. See

TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a). Because Page did not raise this issue in the trial court, it is

not preserved for our review.

         We overrule Page’s third issue.13

         D.     Joinder

         In his fourth issue, Page contends that the trial court lacked jurisdiction

because De La Cruz failed to join Community as a party. Failure to join necessary

parties to a partition suit deprives the trial court of jurisdiction to enter a partition

order. See Mapco, Inc. v. Carter, 817 S.W.2d 686, 687 (Tex. 1991). However,

“Texas courts have repeatedly and consistently held that only parties with possessory

interests in real property are necessary parties to partition suits.” Carter v. Harvey,

525 S.W.3d 420, 436 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2017, no pet.) (listing cases). A

    12
      The trial court’s interlocutory judgment of partition contains a finding that “[a] mortgage lien exists
with Community Loan Servicing.” However, the deed of trust in our record lists the mortgagee as EquiFirst
Corporation, while Community is listed on invoices as the loan servicer.
    13
       In his response to De La Cruz’s second motion for summary judgment, Page also appeared to argue
in the trial court that De La Cruz was not entitled to partition because she allegedly paid at most $5,000
toward the mortgage, while Page paid tens of thousands of dollars. This is at best a claim for equitable
contribution and does not affect De La Cruz’s entitlement to partition as a remedy. The trial court, in its
partition judgment, expressly reserved questions of equitable division of the proceeds for a later date. The
record does not reflect the court-ordered sale, or the anticipated partition; therefore, the issue of the
equitable division of the proceeds is not before us and addressing it would otherwise be advisory.
                                                   –17–
mortgage lender has no present possessory interest in the property is therefore not a

necessary party to a partition suit. Richardson v. Milner, 345 S.W.2d 449, 451 (Tex.

App.—Amarillo 1961, writ ref’d n.r.e).

         We overrule Page’s fourth issue.14

                                          CONCLUSION

         Having overruled Page’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s Interlocutory

Judgment of Partition.

                                                      /Bonnie Lee Goldstein/
                                                      BONNIE LEE GOLDSTEIN
                                                      JUSTICE

220020F.P05

    14
     As the issue is not before us, we also do not opine on what notice to and/or consent of the lienholder
may be required.
                                                  –18–
                                    S
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                   JUDGMENT

SEAN PAGE, Appellant                           On Appeal from the 401st Judicial
                                               District Court, Collin County, Texas
No. 05-22-00020-CV           V.                Trial Court Cause No. 401-05249-
                                               2020.
GUADALUPE DE LA CRUZ,                          Opinion delivered by Justice
Appellee                                       Goldstein. Justices Pedersen, III and
                                               Smith participating.

       In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial
court is AFFIRMED.

       It is ORDERED that appellee GUADALUPE DE LA CRUZ recover her
costs of this appeal from appellant SEAN PAGE.

Judgment entered this 10th day of August 2023.

                                        –19–