Court Opinion

ID: 9794264
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:02:19.978457+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:13:31.515277
License: Public Domain

SCHAUER, J.
I concur both in the judgment and in the opinion of Justice Edmonds. Were it not for the majority *246holding in Bunny’s Waffle Shop v. California Employment Com. (1944), 24 Cal.2d 735 [151 P.2d 224], a different result might consistently be reached. It may be arguable that a simple and literal interpretation and application of section 56 (Unemployment Insurance Act) might be preferable to the volitional test first evolved in Bodinson1 and then expanded in Bunny’s case {supra). But to me the important thing, judicially, is not so much how we interpret section 56 as that, having interpreted it, we shall apply that interpretation fairly and consistently. I am satisfied that unless Bunny’s case is to be squarely overruled no result other than that reached by Justice Edmonds can fairly and consistently be reached.
In Bunny’s ease there was no literal shutdown or lockout. A trade dispute had arisen; the employers, who theretofore had not, as among themselves, bargained collectively with the union (see p. 736 of 24 Cal.2d), demanded collective bargaining with their newly formed association (as stated at p. 737, they “wished to negotiate a single contract”) and, as an alternative, announced that upon continued refusal to negotiate with their association wages would be reduced and certain working conditions changed. The employes refused to accede to either alternative and walked out.2 But their walkout was *247held not to be voluntary and the concerted act of the employers was held (see p. 739 of 24 Cal.2d) to be “tantamount to a lockout.”
As shown more completely in the footnote quotation the commission held that “The economic weapon . . . was created by the employers . . . and it alone, rather than the trade dispute that occasioned it, was the cause of the leaving of work,” and concerning that finding of the commission this court held that “ [I]t rejects the trade dispute as the cause of such leaving and is sufficient to support the award of benefits. ’ ’
Certainly in Bunny’s case we should have been required to hold (on that phase of the case) that the employes had left their work voluntarily because of a trade dispute and, hence, were disqualified from benefits, unless we held, as the majority did, that it was proper to relate responsibility for the work stoppage to the party who created its actual and directly impelling cause. To that end the court looked behind the fact that literally there was no lockout or shutdown and that the employes could have continued at work either at reduced pay and different hours or, by agreeing to collective bargaining, at the old rates and conditions. In literality, the walkout there was, of course, due to a trade dispute, a sparring contest in which employers and employes were exchanging blows. The employers led with the collective bargaining or wage reduction-hour increase blow and the employes retaliated with the walkout punch. The court held that it was proper to examine into the trade dispute and necessary “to distinguish between leaving in the course of a trade dispute and leaving because of a trade dispute . . . There must . . . be a direct causal connection between the trade dispute and the leaving of work”; that there the leaving of work, while occurring during a trade dispute was directly caused by the *248act of the employers. In other words, the court related the leaving of work to the direct or proximately impelling cause, the concerted act of all employers directed against all employes ; the court held accordingly that the employers were responsible and that the employes had not left voluntarily because of the trade dispute.
Here the similarity to Bunny’s ease is patent, but reversed as to parties. In this case, the employes struck the first, the impelling blow. The retaliation by the employers was exactly what the employes expected when they struck and was directly responsive to their action. In Bunny’s case it was, of course, true, in literality, that the employes had a choice in the solution of which they exercised discretion. But it was not a free choice; they had to yield something in either alternative submitted by the employers. Hence, their walkout was not voluntary; the situation requiring the choice and necessitating some concession was created by the employers and their attempt was to force that choice on the employes. Here, it is rationally inescapable, we have exactly the same situation but in reverse.
The employes and the employers, in the case before us, were, and long had been, parties to one master contract which set forth the terms and conditions binding on all employes and all employers. Although only the employes of Butter Cream Baking Company literally walked out, that strike in principle and in its object was directed against all of the employers who were members of the association as much as against Butter Cream. The vote of the employes did not merely authorize a strike against Butter Cream; it authorized the strike against any or all of the employers as the union strategists might from time to time determine was expedient to the end of attaining the master contract modifications demanded by the union and which, if made, would be applicable to all employers; the union knew that a strike against one would be treated as a strike against all and they intended that the strike should be effective in obtaining concessions from all the employers, not just from Butter Cream.
Certainly here the employers (as did the employes in Bunny’s- case) had a choice which involved the exercise of discretion. They could accede to the demand of the union for the changes in the master contract or they could relinquish the joint participation in collective bargaining which the master contract obviously called for, and permit their plants to be struck one by one or in groups, until separate *249contracts were executed, or they could close all plants on a walkout from one. But this was not a free choice any more than the choice of the employes in Bunny’s case was a free choice. In either alternative submitted by the union the employers were required to yield something. Clearly, if Bunny’s case is to be followed, the employers, already having a master contract, did not have to accept either of the alternatives offered to them. They had a master contract; they had specifically notified the union that a strike against one would be treated as a strike against all; they did exactly that and that, exactly, is what the union expected when the strike was called.
It is asserted in support of respondents’ position that “ [Although the union knew that the employers had an understanding among themselves that ‘they would act as a unit in collective bargaining matters . . .,’ the understanding was entirely unilateral upon the part of the employers, and the union never indicated that it would accept or be bound by it.” It is as difficult for me to square that factual statement with any rational view of the facts depicted by the record as it is to reconcile the legal position of the dissenters with the holding in Bunny’s case. The record shows unequivocally that the employers’ association was organized in 1935 for the express purpose of representing its members and acting as a unit for them in collective bargaining with the employes, that continuously from that time on the association has represented its members in such collective bargaining with the union and that, quite to the contrary of being “entirely unilateral upon the part of the employers” and never recognized by the union, the fact is that from 1935 on the union did accept the employers’ association as the bargaining unit and its contracts were made with that association. In fact the very master contract in question, to secure changes in which the strike was authorized and called, is a collective bargaining contract to which the union and the association were the contracting parties and in which contract the members of the association (likewise the members of the union) acted as a unit.
The position of the dissent of the Chief Justice appears to be grounded upon a few sentences selected from the record and construed as disassociated from their context. If these selected sentences could be said to create a material conflict in evidence then we would have a different situation. But no such case is here. Since we have stipulated facts before us *250I find no justification for ignoring some of those stipulated facts in order to ascribe a meaning to certain statements, which meaning is untenable if the ignored facts are given effect. The statements in the record particularly relied on for the dissenting position are as follows: “The members of the Association (employers) understood among themselves that they would act as a unit in collective bargaining, and that a strike against any one or more members would be treated by them as a strike against all. This position had been known to the union by statements, letters and prior action . . . but the union at no time expressed either agreement or disagreement with this position ... At a meeting at the premises of the struck bakery . . . called within an hour after a picket line was established, a representative of the employers stated to a union representative that the strike against one employer would be treated as a strike against them all, to which the union representative replied that he expected such result. ’ ’
Apparently on the strength of the last quoted language it is asserted that “the understanding [of the employers that “they would act as a unit in collective bargaining matters, and that a strike against any one or more members would be treated by them as a strike against all”] was entirely unilateral'upon the part of the employers.” But it seems to me that a fair representation of the record requires that the foregoing sentences be read and understood in the light of the fact that the stipulation of facts also states that “the individual members of the union . . . authorized its negotiating committee to call a strike against any one or more of the employers in the committee’s discretion . . . and this committee was authorized by the membership to conduct negotiations and do whatever was necessary to advance the progress of negotiations as that committee deemed best, and to call a strike, if that was necessary, at any plant or plants of the employers decided upon by the committee ...” (Italics added.) Furthermore, it seems to me to be established beyond question on this record that the strike was directed against all the employers because admittedly there was but one contract by which all employes and all employers were bound; the demand of the union was for amendments to that one master contract affecting all employers; the strike vote authorized the union’s committee to “do whatever was necessary to advance the progress of negotiations” for the amendments demanded and, to that end, to shut down “any plant *251or plants of the employers decided upon by the committee.”
In my view the designation of the statement, “the members of the Association understood among themselves that they would act as- a unit in collective bargaining” etc., as a “unilateral agreement” is, in the light of the other stipulated facts, unfair and inaccurate. Certainly the members of the association understood “among themselves” that “they would act as a unit in collective bargaining. ’ ’ But so did the union understand that fact. In truth the union’s negotiations were conducted with the employers’ association as a unit and it was concerning a contract which had been executed by the association as a bargaining unit and by the union as a bargaining unit that the negotiations were conducted; and, as stated in the stipulation, “The union’s sole demand was for changes in the contract with the Association. At no time during negotiations were demands made upon the individual employers either before or after the picket line was established.”
Lastly, it is noted that the dissent of the Chief Justice places reliance on a quotation from Bunny’s case (p. 741 of 24 Cal.2d) : “A strike against a single member of an employers’ collective bargaining unit involves economic action against that employer only and subjects to disqualification under the Unemployment Insurance Act those employees only who leave their work because of the dispute. If the other employers thereupon choose to close their establishments and lock out their employees, such employees cannot be charged with leaving their work because of a trade dispute. The threat of possible economic action involved in a strike upon one of a group of employers . . . bears no analogy to the employers’ act in the present case, for the latter culminated in actual economic action against the employees that caused them to leave their work.”
The fallacy of such reliance is obvious. The statement quoted must be either a dictum which is grossly contrary to the actual holding of Bunny’s case, or it is distinguishable and, in implication, supportive of Justice Edmonds’ conclusions. Surely, it was not intended to suggest a “heads I win-tails you lose” application of the rule dependent on an interchange of the positions of the parties to the dispute. Examining the quotation for its true significance I think this appears: At the very outset its language is that “A strike against a single member of an employers’ collective bargaining unit,” etc. But here we do not have a strike against a *252single member-, the strike was directed against all the members—“to advance the progress of negotiations” for amendments to the one master contract—although at the moment a walkout had been called in one plant only. That call was but a matter of strategy, deemed most expeditious to attain the end against all. Thus the major premise of the entire statement falls as to this ease.
Secondly, the quotation reads, “The threat of possible economic action involved in a strike upon one of a group of employers . . . bears no analogy to the employers’ act in the present [Bunny’s] case, for the latter culminated in actual economic action against the employees that caused them to leave their work.” Here it was the “actual economic action” of the employes against the employers which “caused them” (the employers) to shut down the plants.
Since we have in Bodinson, and as expanded in Bunny’s ease, declared the volitional-direct cause test, and since the undisputed facts here do not disclose any material distinguishing feature, adherence to sound judicial process requires that we apply that test. If in Bunny’s ease the walkout was involuntary and directly caused by the concerted act of the employers it is at least equally clear that here the shutdown by the employers was involuntary and the work stoppage was directly caused by the strike vote and action of the employes. Their strike vote and call were voluntary and directly resulted, as was expected, in the shutdown. The free choice here was that of the employes, not of the employers. The writ must issue, as directed.
Shenk, J., concurred.

Bodinson Mfg. Co. v. California Emp. Com. (1941), 17 Cal.2d 321, 327 [109 P.2d 935].

As stated at page 738 of 24 Cal.2d, “ [T]he employers submitted a proposed collective bargaining agreement to the Joint Board and offered to continue operations on the old terms pending negotiations. The unions rejected this proposal, reiterating their demand for individual agreements for more favorable conditions of work, and on that day directed employees of one of the restaurants to strike if the owner refused to sign such an agreement. The following day the restaurant owners’ policy committee met and formulated a plan of action, and on July 3, 1941, the employers posted notices in their establishments that until the Joint Board and the unions agreed to negotiate collectively, wages would be reduced to 75 per cent of the previous rate, a six day week would replace the prevailing five day week, and split shifts instead of straight shifts would apply to all culinary workers. . . . [The commission] held that the employers’ imposition of a split shift, a six-day week, a twenty-five per cent cut in wages, and a uniform pay-day, for the sole purpose of compelling the employees [p. 739] to bargain collectively with this group of employers was tantamount to a lockout, that the employees consequently left work as the result of the employers ’ acts and not voluntarily and that they were therefore not disqualified under section 56(a) of the act. . . . The commission’s decision apparently is based upon the conclusion that the leaving of work was not voluntary, but [p. 740] it also found that the leaving was attributable to the employers’ changes in wages and conditions of work, to continue in effect until the unions would negotiate with them. Petitioners do not question this finding but contend that their acts were but an additional step in a trade dispute, and that when claimants left their work *247because of such acts, they left because of a trade dispute and are therefore not eligible for benefits. This reasoning fails to distinguish between leaving in the course of a trade dispute and leaving because of a trade dispute. The act does not disqualify an employee from receiving benefits in all cases where his unemployment results directly or indirectly from a labor dispute, but makes him ineligible only if he left his work because of the dispute. There must therefore be a direct causal connection between the trade dispute and the leaving of work . . . [p. 742] The economic weapon . . . was created by the employers and directed against their employees, and it alone, rather than the trade dispute that occasioned it, was the cause of the leaving of work . . . The finding of the commission as to the cause of claimant’s leaving of work . . . was one that it was entitled to make under the facts. [Citation.] This finding rejects the trade dispute as the cause of such leaving and is sufficient to support the award of benefits.”