Court Opinion

ID: 9483965
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 09:36:38.036496+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:49:56.381570
License: Public Domain

WALLACE, Chief Judge,
dissenting:
It would, in my judgment, be far better not to permit cross-gender searches on men or women prisoners which involve physical contact or unclothed prisoner viewing. I believe this policy is misguided and hope it will be changed. Nevertheless, this determination is for the political branches. Our role, as a separate and independent branch, is to proscribe such actions only when violative of the Constitution. That is not the case here. Judge Trott’s detailed exposition of the record only confirms the panel majority’s conclusion: the inmates cannot establish that the prison officials acted with the wantonness necessary to sustain an Eighth Amendment claim. See Jordan v. Gardner, 953 F.2d 1137, 1142-44 & n. 3 (9th Cir.1992).
I would merely join in Judge Trott’s dissent, but for his tacit acceptance of Judge Reinhardt’s analysis of the Fourth Amendment question. That I cannot do and write separately to explain why.
Judge Reinhardt purports to apply the four factor analysis set forth in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 2261-62, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987) {Turner). Yet he consistently adopts a balancing test approach: weighing the strength of the prison officials’ justifications for the policy against the invasiveness and harmfulness of the searches to the prisoners. See, e.g., Reinhardt Concurrence at 1535 (“we must ask whether the prison’s need to use male guards to conduct the body searches—to the extent that such need exists—outweighs the constitutional injury resulting from the invasiveness of the intrusion”); id. at 1537 (“requiring] a slight adjustment to guards’ work schedules ... is a small price to pay for the preservation of the inmates’ fundamental constitutional rights”); id. (“minor adjustments ... that the use of female guards would require are relatively insignificant, both in themselves and when weighed against the constitutional interests at stake”); id. at 1539 (“While *1567the prison’s penological interest supporting the regulation is minor, the impact of cross-gender searches on the inmates’ constitutional rights is substantial”); id. at 1540 (“the interests that the superintendent has advanced are insubstantial. They are significantly outweighed by the harm the policy inflicts on the inmates and the injury it does to their constitutional rights”).
Turner does not authorize such balancing. None of the four factors justifies a court in evaluating the constitutionality of a prison policy by weighing its effects on prisoners against the institutional interests it serves. Judge Reinhardt’s balancing test is a departure from the deferential analysis prescribed by Turner.
In support of his balancing test approach, Judge Reinhardt relies on Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1884, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) (Bell), which explicitly mandated a balancing test in prison search cases. He justifies this step by declaring: "We derive guidance as to how the Turner factors are to be applied in `unreasonable search’ cases from Bell v. Wolfish." Reinhardt Concurrence at 1540. It is true that Turner cites Bell. However, Turner relies only on that portion of Bell that addressed inmates’ First Amendment claims. Turner does not in any way rely on Bell’s Fourth Amendment balancing approach. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 87-90, 107 S.Ct. at 2260-62, citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 550-51, 99 S.Ct. at 1880 (upholding prison restrictions on receipt of hardback books by inmates as "a rational response by prison officials to an obvious security problem"), but not citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 558-60, 99 S.Ct. at 1884-85 (using balancing test to evaluate Fourth Amendment claims).
Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 224, 110 S.Ct. 1028, 1037, 108 L.Ed.2d 178 (1990), instructed that Turner’s four factor analysis is to be applied whenever “the needs of prison administration implicate constitutional rights.” None of the Turner factors authorizes courts to balance prison officials’ institutional needs against the “subjective intrusion” on prisoners entailed by prison policies. It is clear that Bell’s Fourth Amendment balancing test does not survive Turner and Harper.
Although Turner does not authorize a balancing test, neither does it require us to ignore either the sufficiency of the reason for a prison policy or the effect of that policy on inmates. The first and fourth Turner factors, in particular, require consideration of both the justification for and the effects of a challenged search policy. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90, 107 S.Ct. at 2261-62. A highly invasive search policy that is no more effective than a less invasive one may well not pass muster under Turner. What Turner does not require or permit is for a judge to look at the injury to inmates, on the one hand, and the benefit to prison administration, on the other, and say this one or that one is more important, or weightier, or more worthy of respect, or whatever.
I am also troubled that Judge Trott’s Fourth Amendment analysis only incidentally refers to Turner. Instead, he seems to accept Judge Reinhardt’s balancing approach, only to reach a different result. Judge Trott states that "it is clear that the degree of `subjective intrusion’ these women prisoners experience as a result of being searched by male guards is something to be considered. On balance, and after considerable deliberation, I come down on the side of the prison experts." Trott Dissent at 1565 (citations omitted). He cites United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 558, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 3083, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976), and Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451-55, 110 S.Ct. 2481, 2486-87, 110 L.Ed.2d 412 (1990), in support of this analysis. But both Martinez and Sitz are vehicle search cases. This is a prisoner search case, and under Turner and Harper, prisoner cases are analyzed differently.
Aside from Judge Trott’s momentary lapse in not rejecting Judge Reinhardt’s incorrect Fourth Amendment analysis, I join in his dissent and adhere to the panel majority opinion.