Court Opinion

ID: 9700599
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 21:37:05.55333+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:12.165777
License: Public Domain

SABERS, Justice
(dissenting).
1. Honomichl has established a prima facie case, which raises a' rebuttable presumption of purposeful discrimination. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254, 101 S.Ct. at 1094, 67 L.Ed.2d at 216. When “the requisite showing has been made, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to articulate a race-neutral explanation for striking the jurors in question.” Hernandez, 500 U.S. at -, 111 S.Ct. at 1866, 114 L.Ed.2d at 405 (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 97-98, 106 S.Ct. at 1723-24, 90 L.Ed.2d at 88-89.)
2. The state must rebut this presumption under Batson, by articulating a “ ‘clear and reasonably specific’ ” race neutral explanation of its “ ‘legitimate reasons’ for exercising the challenges.” These reasons must be “related to the particular case to be tried.” Batson, 476 U.S. at 98, and n. 20, 106 S.Ct. at 1724, and n. 20, 90 L.Ed.2d at 88-89, and n. 20 (citation omitted). “[T]he prosecutor’s justification must identify ‘legitimate reasons’ that are ‘related to the particular case to be tried’ and sufficiently persuasive to ‘rebut a defendant’s prima facie case.’ ” Hernandez, 500 U.S. at -, 111 S.Ct. at 1875, 114 L.Ed.2d at 417 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 98, and n. 20, 106 S.Ct. at 1724, and n. 20, 90 L.Ed.2d at 88, and n. 20.)
Under these facts and circumstances, and the Batson test, the state loses. It failed to articulate either a clear or reasonably specific race neutral explanation. The prosecutor may not “rebut the defendant’s case merely by denying that he had a discriminatory motive or affirming his good faith in making individual selections.” Batson, 476 U.S. at 98, 106 S.Ct. at 1723-24, 90 L.Ed.2d.at 88 (citation omitted).
3. Under the more recent United States' Supreme Court case of Hernandez v. New York, however, “the reason offered will be deemed race neutral” “[ujnless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor’s explanation.” 500 U.S. at -, 111 S.Ct. at 1866, 114 L.Ed.2d at 406. But see Hernandez, 500 U.S. at -, 111 S.Ct. at 1876, 114 L.Ed.2d at 417 (Stevens, J., dissenting). (“[A] justification that is frivolous or illegitimate should not suffice to rebut the *645prima facie case.” Id. (citations omitted)). This appears to me to change the test and the burden. As Justice Stevens urged in his Hernandez dissent,
[t]he Court ... errs in focusing the entire inquiry on the subjective state of mind of the prosecutor.
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The Court overlooks ... the fact that the “discriminatory purpose” which characterizes violations of the Equal Protection Clause can sometimes be established by objective evidence that is consistent with a decisionmaker’s honest belief that his motive was entirely benign.
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By requiring that the prosecutor’s explanation itself provide additional, direct evidence of discriminatory motive, the Court has imposed on the defendant the added requirement that he generate evidence of the prosecutor’s actual subjective intent to discriminate. Neither Batson nor our other equal protection holdings demand such a heightened quantum of proof.
Hernandez, 500 U.S. at -, 111 S.Ct. at 1876, 114 L.Ed.2d at 417-18 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
It also seems to change the result. “If any explanation, no matter how insubstantial and no matter how great its disparate impact, could rebut a prima facie inference of discrimination provided only that the explanation itself was not facially discriminatory, the Equal Protection Clause would be but a vain and illusory requirement.” Id. (citation omitted).
4.The Supreme Court held in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989) that, with two exceptions, “new constitutional rules of criminal procedure will not be applicable to those cases which have become final before the new rules are announced.” Teague, 489 U.S. at 310, 109 S.Ct. at 1075, 103 L.Ed.2d at 356. See also Walton v. Caspari, 916 F.2d 1352 (8th Cir.1990), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 1337, 113 L.Ed.2d 268 (1991). “[W]ith two exceptions, ‘new rules’ of constitutional criminal procedure should be applied retroactively to cases on direct review, but generally should not be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review.” Id. at 1358 (citing Teague, 489 U.S. at 304-11, 109 S.Ct. at 1072-75). The same conclusion would be reached through the analysis required by Cowell v. Leapley, 458 N.W.2d 514 (S.D.1990). See McCafferty v. Solem, 449 N.W.2d 590 (S.D.1989) where a 3-2 majority held that judicially created eviden-tiary rule which would not allow expert witnesses to give opinion regarding credibility of child sexual abuse victim did not apply retrospectively.
5. Honomichl’s conviction was affirmed by this court on July 29, 1987. State v. Honomichl, 410 N.W.2d 544 (S.D.1987). Under the Supreme Court rules in effect at that time, Honomichl had sixty days to file a petition for certiorari. See Sup.Ct.R. 20.1 (1980); Walton, 916 F.2d at 1357-58. Honomichl did not file a petition, and his conviction became final on September 27, 1987 when the time for filing a petition for certiorari from the judgement affirming his conviction expired. Graham v. Collins, — U.S. -, -, 113 S.Ct. 892, 898, 122 L.Ed.2d 260, 270 (1993) (citation omitted). See Walton, 916 F.2d at 1357-58. Hernandez was decided May 28, 1991. Therefore, Honomiehl’s conviction became final before Hernandez was decided.
6. “[A] case announces a new rule when it breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government,” or “if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became final.” Teague, 489 U.S. at 301, 109 S.Ct. at 1070, 103 L.Ed.2d at 349 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
While there can be no dispute that a decision announces a new rule if it expressly overrules a prior decision, “it is more difficult ... to determine whether we announce a new rule when a decision extends the reasoning of our prior cases.” Because the leading purpose of federal habeas review is to “ensur[e] that state courts conduct criminal proceedings in accordance with the Constitution as interpreted at the time of th[ose] *646proceedings,” we have held that “[t]he ‘new rule’ principle ... validates reasonable, good-faith interpretations of existing precedents made by state courts.” This principle adheres even if those good-faith interpretations “are shown to be contrary to later decisions.” Thus, unless reasonable jurists hearing petitioner’s claim at the time his conviction became final “would have felt compelled by existing precedent” to rule in his favor, we are barred from doing so now.
Graham, — U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 897-98, 122 L.Ed.2d at 269-70 (citations omitted).
7. I do not agree that the Hernandez test is actually “settled law in this country” as claimed by the majority. See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at -, 111 S.Ct. at 1875, 114 L.Ed.2d at 416 (Stevens, J., dissenting). (“[T]he Court ... errs when it concludes that a defendant’s Batson challenge fails whenever the prosecutor advances a non-pretextual justification that is not facially discriminatory.” Id.) Rather, it seems to have announced a new rule and overruled Batson without even saying so by shifting the burden to the defendant to prove that a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor’s explanation.
Under the facts and circumstances of this case, no discriminatory intent is inherent in this prosecutor’s explanation. If Hernandez is applied retroactively, the reason offered, even if a poor reason, “will be deemed race neutral.” This was not the result dictated by Batson, which was the existing precedent at the time Honomichl’s conviction became final. Therefore, Hernandez is a new rule, which should not be applied to this case on collateral review.
Having found that Hernandez is inapplicable, Batson applies and the state has failed to rebut the presumption of purposeful discrimination which Honomichl established. Therefore, I dissent. I would reverse and remand for a new trial.