Court Opinion

ID: 9541485
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:25:55.643727+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:02:57.689887
License: Public Domain

WOOD, Judge (specially concurring). I agree with the result; I disagree with the basis for that result. The fundamental rule of construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intention ■of the Legislature. State v. Chavez, 77 N. M. 79, 419 P.2d 456 (1966). We are not to •apply rules of construction to override an intent which is clear and plainly appears. State v. Ortega, 77 N.M. 312, 422 P.2d 353 (1966). The first clause of the questioned section (Laws 1968, ch. 63, § 2 — quoted in the majority opinion) plainly provides the deduction may not be applied against taxable income after January 1, 1968. The majority opinion applies that intent. The second clause of this section just as plainly provides the deduction may not be applied against income for taxable years ending after January 1, 1968. The intent is clear. Compare Laws 1965, ch. 202, § 17. The majority opinion disregards the intent expressed by this second clause. The majority opinion finds an ambiguity in the questioned section because “ * * * more than one meaning may properly be ascribed to the language used * * Certainly there is more than one meaning. There are two clauses and each clause expresses a different concept. This, however, does not mean the language is ambiguous. The intent of the Legislature was to enact both concepts. The difficulty arises in relating the clauses to one another. The language used is inept. The first clause limits the elimination of the deduction to taxable income after January 1, 1968. The second clause achieves the same result and to this extent is a duplication. The second clause also eliminates the deduction for fiscal year taxpayers against income earned prior to January 1, 1968. Wooten v. Hall, 442 P.2d 334 (Okl.1968) states: “ * * * An inept or incorrect choice of words will not be construed or applied in such manner as to destroy the real and obvious purpose of a legislative enactment. * * * ” Where the intent is clear it should be carried out even though it may be necessary to strike out words. Parker v. Continental Casualty Co., 191 Kan. 674, 383 P.2d 937 (1963); Pressman v. State Tax Commission, 204 Md. 78, 102 A.2d 821 (1954). Words which are meaningless may be rejected as surplusage. State Board of Education v. Commission of Finance, 122 Utah 164, 247 P.2d 435 (1952). Because the majority opinion disregards the legislative intent and finds a non-existent ambiguity, I disagree with the basis for the majority opinion. Although the Legislature clearly intended to eliminate the deduction for all fiscal years ending after January 1, 1968, it did so in violation of the constitution. The provision violated is that of equal protection of the law. I recognize that absolute equality of tax treatment is not required. Albuquerque Metropolitan Arroyo Flood Control Authority v. Swinburne, 74 N.M. 487, 394 P.2d 998 (1964). Thus, inequality in the incidence (applicability to the taxpayer) of a tax doesn’t, as a general proposition, make the provision unconstitutional. See Lionberger v. United States, 371 F.2d 831, 178 Ct.Cl. 151 (1967); Neuss, Hesslein & Co. v. Edwards, 30 F.2d 620 (2nd Cir. 1929). The statute makes a distinction between calendar year and fiscal year taxpayers. The appeal questions whether this classification is reasonable. See Sunset Package Store, Inc. v. City of Carlsbad, 79 N.M. 260, 442 P.2d 572 (1968). In tax matters, the Legislature possesses the greatest freedom in classification. Michael J. Maloof & Co. v. Bureau of Revenue, 80 N.M. 485, 458 P.2d 89 (1969). Accordingly, I assume the classification between calendar and fiscal year taxpayers is not unconstitutional. However, there must be uniformity of treatment within each class. Community Public Service Co. v. New Mexico Public Service Comn., 76 N.M. 314, 414 P.2d 675 (1966); Burch v. Foy, 62 N.M. 219, 308 P.2d 199 (1957). If fiscal year taxpayers are a class, the second clause of the questioned section is unconstitutional because fiscal year taxpayers are not treated uniformly. Some taxpayers may utilize the deduction for as much as eleven months; others for as little as one month. I would hold the second clause of the questioned section does not accord equal treatment to members of the same class. See Territory v. Pinney, 15 N.M. 625, 114 P. 367 (1910); compare Burch v. Foy, supra. In my opinion a portion of the law (the second clause) is void. However, the first clause can still be given effect. See State v. Ferris, 80 N.M. 663, 459 P.2d 462 (Ct.App.), decided September 19, 1969. On this basis, the appellants are entitled to deduct federal income tax paid on income prior to January 1, 1968. Thus, I agree with the result.