Court Opinion

ID: 9519753
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:24:22.562824+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:43:49.307735
License: Public Domain

SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION ON DENIAL OF REHEARING JUSTICE BARRY delivered the opinion of the court: Peoria County Belwood Nursing Home has filed a petition for rehearing, praying for reversal and, in the alternative, requesting a statement under Supreme Court Rule 315(a) that the instant case involves a substantial question which warrants consideration by the Supreme Court (94 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)). Belwood contends that this court’s decision is erroneous as to the issues of whether the claimant’s decision is erroneous as to the issues of whether the claimant sustained an accidental injury and whether the claim was filed under the Act within the appropriate statutory time limit.  We initially deny Belwood’s petition for rehearing. This court acknowledged in its opinion that it was redefining the statutory language “accidental” as found in the Act. We redefined “accidental” to encompass injury resulting from repetitive trauma in order to fulfill the statutory purpose of the Act. The failure to recast the meaning of the language of the Act would continue to leave such injured employees facing an intolerable dilemma: whether to forego compensation for injuries unquestionably work related, or to “create” single, identifiable moments of collapse and dysfunction in order to receive compensation. We prefer to redefine “accidental” to reflect the realities of the present work environment. The adversarial nature of the claim process and the necessary evidence of work relationship demanded ensures that claimants will be forced to meet their burden of proof when seeking compensation under the Act, as we have emphasized in our opinion.  Having established that the claimant in the cause at bar suffered an accidental injury, we reaffirm our finding that her claim was filed within the statutory time limit. Under our interpretation of “accidental,” the fact that the claimant experienced symptoms prior to the date of her “accident” does not place her claim outside the statutory time limit. October 4, 1976, was the last day the claimant worked before she became aware of both the fact of her injury and the causal connection with her employment. Nothing presented by Belwood in its petition for rehearing persuades us that our decision was erroneous, either on the law, as stated in our opinion, or on the facts.  Finally, we grant Belwood’s request for a statement under Supreme Court Rule 315(a) and declare that the instant case involves a substantial question which warrants consideration by the Supreme Court. Petition for rehearing is denied; request for a statement under Supreme Court Rule 315(a) is granted. McNAMARA and KASSERMAN, JJ., concur.