Court Opinion

ID: 9483964
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 09:36:38.02897+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:49:56.371717
License: Public Domain

TROTT, Circuit Judge,
with whom WIGGINS and KLEINFELD, Circuit Judges, join, and with whom WALLACE, Chief Judge, joins in part, dissenting:
I begin with some information about prisons. This information is helpful to a complete understanding of this case.
Prisons, by definition, are places of involuntary confinement of persons who have a demonstrated proclivity for antisocial criminal, and often violent, conduct. Inmates have necessarily shown a lapse in ability to control and conform their behavior to the legitimate standards of society by the normal impulses of self-restraint; they have shown an inability to regulate their conduct in a way that reflects either a respect for law or an appreciation of the rights of others. Even a partial survey of the statistics on violent crime in our Nation’s prisons illustrates the magnitude of the problem____
Within this volatile “community,” prison administrators are to take all necessary steps to ensure the safety of not only the prison staffs and administrative personnel, but also visitors. They are under an obligation to take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates themselves. They must be ever alert to attempts to introduce drugs and other contraband into the premises which, we can judicially notice, is one of the most perplexing problems of prisons today; they must prevent, so far as possible, the flow of illicit weapons into the prison; they must be vigilant to detect escape plots, in which drugs or weapons may be involved, before the schemes materialize. In addition to these monumental tasks, it is incumbent upon these officials at the same time to maintain as sanitary an environment for the inmates as feasible, given the difficulties of the circumstances.
Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 3200, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984) (emphasis added).
I
The Supreme Court tells us that "[t]o be cruel and unusual punishment, conduct that does not purport to be punishment at all must involve more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner’s interests or safety." Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 1084, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1986) (emphasis added). The "more" that it must involve is a state of mind on the part of the antagonist that is "wanton." Id. at 320, 106 S.Ct. at 1084. "The source of [this] intent requirement is not the predilections of this Court, but the Eighth Amendment itself, which bans only cruel and unusual punishment." Wilson v. Seiter, — U.S. —, —, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 2325, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991) (emphasis in original).
Whitley’s subjective requirement was reiterated in Wilson with considerable emphasis:
It is obduracy and wantonness, not inadvertence or error in good faith, that characterize the conduct prohibited by the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, whether that conduct occurs in connection with establishing conditions of confinement, supplying medical needs, *1546or restoring official control over a tumultuous cellblock.
Id. — U.S. at —, 111 S.Ct. at 2324 (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319, 106 S.Ct. at 1084) (emphasis in original).
In repeating this holding, the Court in Wilson flatly rejected the idea that intent is irrelevant to the inquiry. Id. — U.S. at — n. 1, 111 S.Ct. at 2324 n. 1. Justice White made this crystal clear in the second paragraph of his dissent where he complained that the majority disregarded prior decisions holding that "conditions [of confinement] are themselves part of the punishment, even though not specifically `meted out’ by a statute or judge." Id. — U.S. at —, 111 S.Ct. at 2328 (emphasis in original).
As to “the objective component of [Jordan’s] Eighth Amendment prison claim (was the deprivation sufficiently serious?),” Wilson, — U.S. at —, 111 S.Ct. at 2324, I accept Judge O’Scannlain’s conclusion that it has been satisfied. I believe, however, that the inmates’ “shocking” testimony, which he has summarized quite well, has seeped into his analysis of the subjective element. Wilson makes it clear one should not inappropriately carry over into the other: “We do not agree with respondents’ suggestion that the ‘wantonness’ of conduct depends upon its effect upon the prisoner. Whitley teaches that, assuming the conduct is harmful enough to satisfy the objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim, whether it can be characterized as ‘wanton’ depends upon the constraints facing the official.’’ Wilson, — U.S. at —, 111 S.Ct. at 2326 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
To summarize, all controlling Supreme Court Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause cases “mandate inquiry into a prison official’s state of mind when it is claimed that the official has inflicted cruel and unusual punishment. See also Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 398, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 1872, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989).” Wilson, — U.S. at —, 111 S.Ct. at 2324. Unless an actionable state of mind can be identified, the claim must fail.
The problem is there are two definitions of wantonness in this Constitutional context, and one of our tasks is to determine which standard controls. Is it "deliberate indifference" as defined in Wilson and Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976), or is it "maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm" as explicated in Whitley and Hudson v. McMillian, — U.S. —, —, 112 S.Ct. 995, 998, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992)?
For the answer to this question, we need turn first to the record to examine what it is we are dealing with: a security expedient, a medical need of the prisoner, or a measure of both? Justice Holmes issued a wise admonition that is useful to keep in mind as we perform this exercise. He said, “We must think things not words, or at least we must constantly translate our words into the facts for which they stand, if we are to keep to the real and the true.” Oliver W. Holmes, Collected Legal Papers 238 (1920). The facts of this case are these: Some women in prison with histories of sexual and physical abuse by men will have their external private parts periodically searched through their clothing by the hands of male corrections officers. This touching may cause them considerable distress, a distress which those of us who have not experienced it may not fully appreciate. Nevertheless, these women are in prison because they committed serious felony offenses, thus forfeiting their liberty. Prisons are difficult places, but we must deal with the way things are, not the way we would like them to be.
As we examine our subject’s Constitutional morphology, we kill two birds with one look, for as we take its measurements, we also explore the mental state of the warden responsible for the practice to see whether that mental state was “culpable” or not. The practice under scrutiny here turns out to be inseparable from the intent with which it was both conceived and implemented.
II
A.
Are we dealing with a practice instituted in the Washington Corrections Center for *1547Women (“WCCW”) that “purports to be punishment”? My answer is no. The record is devoid of any evidence whatsoever even suggesting that the disputed searches were designed to be or implemented as punishment. Whatever one thinks of the propriety or efficacy of these searches, they were intended only to control the unacceptable movement of contraband throughout the facility.
The idea of implementing cross-gender searches for contraband at WCCW originated with Mrs. Tana D. Wood, the Assistant Director of the Division of Prisons of the Washington State Department of Corrections. During her lengthy career, she had been a classification counselor, a correctional unit supervisor, a correctional program manager, the Associate Superintendent of the Washington State Penitentiary, and a division director. Mrs. Wood was the Acting Superintendent of the WCCW between October 1, 1988, and January 20, 1989, when she turned the job over to Superintendent Vail. Mrs. Wood served at WCCW while recruitment and hiring of a permanent superintendent was being conducted after the reassignment of the previous warden.
One of Mrs. Wood’s first tasks on arrival at WCCW was to conduct an overview of security; she called it her “primary interest.” She concluded “security was quite lax.” She testified: “I was quite surprised to find out, for example, that pat searches were done very infrequently and only in one or two well-specified places;” and “I discovered that we were not doing cross-gender pat searches. I was very surprised they weren’t doing it.” When asked to explain her surprise, she answered “I would presume any correctional officer would pat search ... because of my experience in the male institutions [where female correctional officers patted down male inmates] and partly because I consider a correctional officer to be a professional person, and I don’t think gender has anything to do with a correctional officer’s performance of duties.”
Mrs. Wood discussed her security findings and concerns with Larry Kincheloe, the Director of the Division of Prisons, telling him among other things that she was surprised to discover not all officials were conducting pat searches at WCCW, only the females. Mr. Kincheloe testified he was surprised because in the women’s prisons he had visited, there “was always a cross-gender search.”
When Eldon Vail was chosen to take over WCCW, Mrs. Wood transmitted her concerns to him.
A____ I alerted him to the fact that [the absence of cross-gender searches] was an issue, how how [sic] I felt that it related to security in terms of not doing random searches and not doing enough searches, and that that was something that he was going to have to deal with right away.
Mrs. Wood, however, did not make the disputed decision. She left it to her successor.
Q. Before you left WCCW as its interim superintendent, had you made a decision in your own mind regarding cross-gender pat searching at WCCW?
A. I had made what was probably a personal decision. I made a conscious decision, in fact, that I would not deal with that, being the interim superintendent. It was more appropriate for the new superintendent to make a policy decision. My observation was that I felt that it was something that was long overdue and should be implemented, but I did nothing formally to cause that to happen.
Mrs. Wood did, however, ask her administrative assistant to take a brief survey for Superintendent Vail’s use of cross-gender search practices at other penal corrective facilities.
Thus, the actual decision-maker was Superintendent Vail, who the district court found to be a credible witness. To unveil Superintendent Vail’s purpose and his motivation, I quote him directly:
Q. Were there any specific security goals and objectives you wanted to achieve through this cross-gender pat searching?
*1548A. From my experience, the ability for a correctional officer to conduct a pat search is a fundamental part of his or her job, and in most institutions or in other facilities that I had been in, what I had witnessed was that taking place. Inmates knew it and staff knew it, that searches of the clothed body can occur any place, any time when an officer decides that it needs to occur. That creates the unpredictable element in inmate movement throughout the institution so that inmates always have to be on guard a bit about packing contraband. That there’s always at least a slim chance that someone will ask to search them. And overall, that was—that was and is the security issue that we’ve tried to implement.
Later, Superintendent Vail observed “that you’ve got to have an element of unpredictability in a correctional facility to impede and deter the flow of contraband within it.” Director Kincheloe, with whom Superintendent Vail consulted about his decisions, agreed: “I felt that the control of contraband was necessary ... and that without the cross-gender searches that could not be accomplished.” The reason for his belief? The need for unpredictability.
B.
What kind of a problem was Superintendent Vail addressing? Was his a relatively trouble-free institution housing mostly passive offenders, or over the years had it become something else? What does he mean by “contraband?” Superintendent Vail gives us the answers:
A. I believe from ’85 to ’88 our records show that we doubled the amount of contraband discoveries within the institution. Inside of that larger category of contraband are [sic] weapons recoveries also doubled. Drug and drug paraphernalia recovery has approximately tripled during that time. From 1985 to 1988 we doubled the amount of drug offenders in the institution. The number of violent offenders, I think, went up seven percent. Today at the institution, one out of five individuals are incarcerated there for killing another human being. We have 31 percent drug offenders.
“Contraband" includes everything from egg salad sandwiches and guitar strings to deadly weapons, alcohol, drugs, heroin, cocaine, and hypodermic needles. Mrs. Wood testified that contraband food is a problem because it is used to make “pruno,” or prison alcohol. The ingenuity of prisoners in this regard is beyond debate. Superintendent Vail also noted that he has “HIV”, or the potential for AIDS, in the institution, and that he was very worried about the “three or four” syringes found in 1989 that could be shared by the prisoners for whom he had responsibility.
The record also reflects an increasing level of violence by inmates against Superintendent Vail’s staff and other prisoners: two instances in 1982, five in 1983, fifteen in 1984, eight in 1985, twelve in 1986, eighteen in 1987, fourteen in 1988, and twenty-one as of November, 1989.
Mrs. Wood also provides information as to the nature of WCCW, information that may be of interest to those who are interested in women’s behavior in prison as compared to men’s.
Q. During your three- or four-month period as the interim superintendent at WCCW, did you make—did you have the opportunity to make any observations of female inmates regarding topics such as violence, contraband?
A. I spent actually quite a bit of time observing, talking to, and also comparing the female offender with the—my experience in the male facilities. I was—actually it was of interest to me and I was—I don’t know if I was surprised or not, but I found that there was not that much difference in most issues. The types of crimes that they were committed for, the types of issues that were important to them were very, very similar to the males. I made some—I don’t know if they were relevant, you know—observations about what I thought about in terms of property and the money they had at their disposal. I found that they intimidate each other, they pressure each *1549other. Weapons of choice may be slightly different than a man just because of physical strength. But I spent a lot of time, I was very interested in determining similarities or dissimilarities between the two populations.
C.
Was Superintendent Vail cognizant of the potential of these searches to cause negative side effects such as psychological distress and gender harassment? The answer is yes.
A. I’ve never pretended that this is anything but a very complex issue, and I think there are merits on both sides of this case. I think that the concerns expressed by the inmates are very real regarding the discomfort and potential for harm and at least fear at having this occur. I want to build some checks and balances into the system so that they feel that there’s some protection from the administrative level on how these searches and when these searches get conducted.
There’s other features in the policy that speak to that, too. The idea of having a sergeant decide whether or not a search is to occur is something I would never put in a policy at a male facility. I wouldn’t need to. That comes from their initial training and it’s an expectation of all officers and it’s conducted regularly with all officers. It represents such a radical change at WCCW, though, that I wanted the sergeants’ involvement to eliminate any appearance of harassment.
Moreover, Superintendent Vail consulted his mental health staff regarding the search procedure, changed some of its aspects to reflect their input, and produced a lengthy training video tape for all staff. The tape was designed to ensure that the staff knows how to conduct the searches with professionalism and to interfere as little as possible with the inmates’ dignity.
The title of the training tape is “Philosophical Aspects of Cross-Gender Pat Searches.” It features Superintendent Vail and psychiatric social worker Lindy Simons discussing (1) the psychological characteristics of the women in WCCW, (2) the prior abuse factor and its implications on behavior, (3) how such women relate in prison to male supervisors, (4) the possible effects of pat searches on inmates, and (5) how correctional officials should cope with the inmates’ reactions to cross-gender searches. The tape also contains a section entitled “Improper Pat Search Procedure” in which a male officer demonstrates on a female officer the wrong way to conduct a search. This is followed by a section called “Proper Pat Search Procedure.” It is noteworthy that this lengthy training tape is not designed to teach officials how to find contraband, but how to conduct the search with sensitivity to the concerns of the inmates. The tone of the tape can be summed up by a “voice over” statement during the demonstration sections that says, “Remember, maintain a professional demeanor at all times.”
D.
How did Superintendent Vail implement his decision to use cross-gender searches to promote security in his prison? Again, I quote from his testimony.
Q. How quickly—well, how quickly did you start thinking about training regarding cross-gender pat searching after you made your decision on February 26th, 1989, to implement such a policy?
A. Immediately training became an issue in my mind.
Q. What were your initial thoughts regarding training on the policy?
A. That it was going to be very important to the success or failure of the implementation of that policy.
Q. Did you delegate any responsibility regarding training?
A. Different portions of it, yeah.
Q. How did you do this?
A. That was through the task force committee—whatever you want to call that group of folks—that we put together to sit down and talk and work each of the different issues.
Primarily, training and coming up with the technique of the cross-gender search, *1550or a female pat search, actually, was charged to Wanda McRae. I think there’s a couple of other people involved as well. It might have been Willy Daigle and Walt Waitkevoch, but I’m not sure of that. I asked them too—mainly asked Wanda to go and find out what resources exist describing the different ways to do this type of search and to look at those resources, to combine, subtract, add, do whatever she felt was appropriate to come up with the best search for the facility.
Q. Did you monitor the progress of this training committee?
A. Sure. We met regularly.
Q. What is regularly? How often did you meet?
A. At least once every couple of weeks, even if the meeting was only ten or fifteen minutes, to find out what tasks had been completed or what obstacles folks had run up against____
Q. Were there any specific training outlines, documents, studies, ever prepared in connection with this training mission?
A. Well, there was a training outline that was a final result of the work that Wanda did. It was refined on a couple of occasions. I had some input into it. Actually I had a lot of input into it and changed some lines in it that I didn’t like.
Q. Now, Lindy Simons. We see you talking with her on the videotape. I think it’s Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 15, if I’m not mistaken. Was Lindy Simons involved at all on the training committee, directly or indirectly?
A. On the training committee?
Q. Yes.
A. No. On the implementation committee, but not training committee.
Q. All right. Let’s talk for a few moments about the implementation committee, what its distinct mission was apart from the training committee?
A. I brought together folks from different areas of the institution to sit and talk this issue through. Different individuals or pairings or trios from that group were given specific assignments to go off and do and bring back to the larger group. Lindy was part of the larger group.
Q. What was the mission of this implementation committee?
A. To take us from start to finish on this issue. The decision had been made that we were going to pursue this search, and I needed all the help I could get from the institution staff about how to get that done.
Q. Now, was it at this time that Lindy Simons started to discuss her concerns regarding the cross-gender policy at WCCW?
A. Probably before the time that that group was put together.
Q. And again, this would have been after your February 26th, 1989 decision?
A. She may have spoken to me briefly before then, but I'm not sure.
Q. You say that you did have some input into how the search was finally trained?
A. Yes.
Q. Did any of this input come through the conduit of this implementation committee?
A. Yes.
Q. What was some of that kind of input?
A. Well, I believe at one of the meetings we reviewed the training outline— when I say training outline, I’m talking about the actual technique that Wanda had put together with her group—and we did some editing of it, made some changes to it.
Superintendent Vail revised the search his policy called for as he acquired more information about its potential for causing distress to some inmates. Originally, the search was to be conducted by an officer positioned behind an inmate using the palm of the hand. Superintendent Vail altered this as he attempted to minimize the search’s invasiveness. He explained:
A. A search, any search of a room, of going through a metal detector, or whatever, is an invasive procedure, and my own feeling was that to do it from behind *1551was too invasive of a procedure. It made me too uncomfortable.
Q. What did you suggest and what was finally implemented as an accommodation to this feeling?
A. That we would do that portion of the search from the front and that we would do it with the back of the hand.
Q. And again, what portion of the search were you talking about at this point, where you are in front of the inmate?
A. The groin.
Q. And how is that done from in front of the inmate?
A. You put your—the training that I went through, which hopefully was similar to what everybody else went through—you put your hands around the lower to upper thigh of the inmate and then you go • up, twisting and turning until you get to the crotch area, and your hand is—this blade of your hand (indicating) is into the crotch at that point and you simply turn sideways and you go back down the leg all the way.
Q. You turn sideways so that the back of your hand—
A. Is in the crotch area.
Q. What is the length of the contact of the back of your hand with the crotch area?
A. Very brief. A second.
Q. Is there any movement with the back of the hand against the crotch area? Is there a sliding movement?
A. No. No. The intent is to see if it feels like there is something in there that shouldn’t be or any sounds such as cellophane are made.
Q. So it’s just a momentary pat literally of the crotch area?
A. Yes.
A____The original examples when we were figuring this thing out of how the search could be conducted was almost exclusively from behind the inmate. It was exclusively from behind the inmate. I was uncomfortable with that for a number of reasons, some of them relating to the input from mental health staff. What I did do was direct that the search move more towards the front—in other words, the position of the officer in relationship to the inmate. I think yesterday I said to the front, and that was probably misleading—so that the breast area and the legs and crotch area are generally searched from the side.
The court itself explored the particulars of the disputed search. Once again, Superintendent Vail displayed an appreciation of the competing sides of the issue.
By Judge Bryan:
Q. Mr. Vail, it seems to me, I guess— well, maybe that’s not the right way to put it. I—I asked questions where I seem to take a position, and I don’t mean to take a position. I’m asking them to find out what you think. I guess what it seems to me is that, generally, the palm and fingertips are more sensitive than the back of one’s hand or the side of one’s hand?
A. Yes.
Q. If security is the issue, wouldn’t it be a far better search to use the palms and fingers than the back and sides of hands in these sensitive areas that are areas that contraband can easily be transported?
A. It would be a better search, but I guess part of the balancing act of—of the needs of the staff and the inmates is to try and reach away (sic) to do this as painlessly as possible.
Q. I think you already addressed this, but I guess—trap you into the idea that there is some pain involved for the inmates?
A. I recognize that.
(emphasis added).
Moreover, Superintendent Vail instituted a transitional “two officers present” policy. He explained this feature as follows:
Q. Was there requirement for an observer under the old searching policy?
A. No. No, there was not.
Q. Did you make a change regarding that aspect?
A. Yes.
*1552Q. What was the change, and why would you make it?
A. Well, we required two officers to be present during the search, one to actually conduct it and one to observe, and that was for a number of reasons. One, probably the main one, was that both staff and inmates were going to be very uncomfortable doing this search, and the possibility of accusations of staff misconduct existed and continue to exist.
Fears on the part of the offender were also of concern, and it was hoped that the presence of a second individual would simply have a calming influence on the whole process. And also provide another source of information should allegations occur, either from the inmate as to improper search—there were two possibilities. One, the inmate says there’s an improper search and it didn’t occur. The other is that there was an improper search and it did occur. That gave me another person to ask about what happened on that day.
Superintendent Vail also established a grievance procedure for inmate complaints which included a channel directly to him. In addition, he displayed an interest in the selection process of the correctional officers who would be responsible for carrying out this procedure.
A____Also in progress right now, I’ve got my personnel manager, my training manager, and one of the psychiatric social workers working on a list of questions to ask perspective candidates to hopefully weed out those people who are racist or have negative attitudes towards women.
E.
Superintendent Vail’s implementation of cross-gender pat searches at WCCW cannot correctly be evaluated in isolation. It was part of an overall readjustment of security search practices within the Corrections Center. By using random cross-gender pat searches, Superintendent Vail was able substantially to reduce other search procedures, one of which is very invasive and dehumanizing: the strip search. Superintendent Vail explains:
Q. Now, did I understand your earlier testimony correctly when I thought you said that you cut down on the incidents of mandatory pat searching?
A. Yes, you did understand that correctly.
Q. What specific areas did you remove from the requirement for mandatory pat searches?
A. Going through the maintenance gate and coming to visiting.
Q. Are no inmates pat searched who are going to visiting?
A. Sometimes they are.
Q. You have random pat searching?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you make any other changes to search practice at WCCW?
A. We eliminated 50 percent of the strip searches for medium security inmates after contact visiting. In other words, we went from 100 percent to 50 percent.
Q. Why?
A. Well, if the point is to deter, then the most important element is to be unpredictable. And also, you know, despite the fact that I think it is important to do pat searches and I think it is also important to do strip searches, it is an invasive procedure and it is difficult for some women to go through that experience. I felt like we could maintain a similar, same, or may be even better level of security by a different approach to those two searches.
Q. And again, I want you to be specific on the different approach.
A. Well, it was so—you know, it was predictable. If you go to visiting and you’re a medium security inmate, you are going to be strip-searched. You know that. Well, that tells an inmate what they need to do or not do to get contraband inside the institution. It’s just like the pat searches being mandatory at certain locations. What was more important was to introduce the element of unpredictability into the operation. And if we could do that by avoiding half of *1553the strip searches, it was better, in my estimation.
F.
The obvious question persists as to why Superintendent Vail did not assign the pat search task only to female correctional officers? His answer is illuminating as to not only the problems a superintendent faces in managing a prison but also certain legal complexities created by laudable measures our society has adopted to insure equal employment opportunities for both sexes.
Superintendent Vail was operating under a system-wide affirmative action program in the Department of Corrections that had a specific goal of 43 female officers for his institution. As of the date of his testimony, he had 45 male and 41 female correctional officers, and 3 male and 4 female correctional sergeants. He testified that parity for female officers was one of his concerns.
Second, when Superintendent Vail took over his job—in the shadow of an escape and with a mandate to tighten security— female correctional officers were conducting all routine pat searches; and he discovered that the correctional officers’ union had filed a grievance against this practice because it required women to do more work than men. The union was threatening action unless this inequality in workload was eliminated.
In an honorable attempt to extricate himself from these cross currents, Superintendent Vail explored a possible solution: the BFOQ. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988).
Q. (By Mr. Betsacon) Mr. Vail, are you familiar with the acronym BFOQ?
A. Yes, I am.
Q. What is that?
A. Bona fide occupational qualifications.
Q. And what is the purpose of a bona fide occupation qualification?
A. In that way you can designate certain positions in an institution for particular sexes. It could be for males, it could be for females.
Q. Did you consider BFOQ as an alternative to cross-gender pat searching in your facility?
A. I talked about it with a number of folks, Mr. Kincheloe being one. He indicated to me that based on his experience, we wouldn’t get them. And also personnel staff, Robert Turk and Donna Grazzini. Their opinion was the same as Mr. Kincheloe’s, that we would be unsuccessful in an attempt to get BFOQ’s for the institution.
Q. Thank you.
Mr. Vail, if you had an all-female staff, would that help you out at all on the pat searching at WCCW and the concerns that have been registered by inmates regarding cross-gender searching?
A. Yes, it would.
Q. Is that an alternative that you considered in this case at all?
A. No, it’s not one that I would believe in, nor is it one that I think is legal from my training.
Mr. Kincheloe testified that they did have BFOQs in the Division of Prisons, but only for unclothed searches. It was his opinion based on dealing with the state Human Rights Commission that BFOQs for clothed searches would not be approved.
When this solution proved unpromising, the Superintendent implemented his disputed policy, giving the following explanation as to why cross-gender searching, as opposed to searches conducted only by female officers, was necessary:
Q. Now, Mr. Vail, you have indicated to the court your feelings when you first took over as the superintendent of the facility regarding security matters in general and your idea of the security goals that you set out for the facility. You have explained some of your specific concerns regarding assaults, contraband seizures, and increase in those activities. If we were to presume that this was the right direction to take, random pat searching as opposed to all the mandatory stations that existed prior to your becoming a superintendent and everything else you have done regarding *1554changing the searching at the facility, why do you need to have cross-gender searching to implement this new security plan?
A. Well, I think it’s similar to what I said yesterday, that if an inmate or inmates can predict who can search, where they can search, and when they can search, it becomes easier for them to move contraband throughout the institution. On numerous occasions, I have only men, for example, in a living unit on a particular shift, two males at the same time. If you want to move some contraband in that direction, you know now is the time.
At another point in his testimony, he was more specific:
Q. Why did you need to implement cross-gender pat searching in order to achieve this security goal that you have outlined for the court?
A. Well, from a security point of view—and there’s other reasons as well—but from a security point of view, if an inmate knows that there’s three male officers on that side of the institution, then that’s the time to move the contraband. If there’s no expectation, no reasonable expectation that they might be stopped for a pat search, then it gives them a green light to go and move.
On redirect examination, Superintendent Vail remained firm:
Q. Mr. Vail, if the court does not allow you to implement the cross-gender pat searching policy, will that impact your security goal, and if so, how?
A. Going back to 22 hours ago, one of the first things that I said, still—or I will say again, that correctional officers in a prison facility, all correctional officers, need to have the ability to pat search inmates, so that the element of unpredictability about when that might occur is there.
Q. How will not being able to have the cross-gender searching impact on your random search policy?
A. Then I would continue with random searches, depending upon where it heads with individual employees and union by having female officers do them. What that does is limits our ability to have that element of unpredictability. If you see the female officers there, then you know you might get searched. If some point or some section of the institution is just male officers, you know you won’t be.
Q. Does it exclude some portion of your correctional staff from doing these searches?
A. It excludes the males. The beginning of this issue, as I understand it, was that there was a lot of female officers who were simply tired of doing all the searches and the males didn’t do them. They didn’t see that that was fair or equitable.
Q. If you operate by the guidelines that you are given on affirmative action hiring, how many of your correctional staff may be excluded from performing these random pat searches?
A. Well, if I was precise with those numbers—and I’m not going to be able to do that sitting here—but over half— no, just under half would have to do them and just over half would not have to do them.
Superintendent Vail likened having only female officers conduct the searches to “putting a red flag on half the officers and we assume we ignore gender for a minute. Those with red flags can search; those without can’t. It’s the same issue. You can see them coming.”
It is impossible to deny the utility of unpredictability and the element of surprise when it comes to the efficacy of prison searches. As I discuss more fully in Section VI of this opinion, unpredictability is the backbone of this expedient.
Near the end of Superintendent Vail’s testimony, the court inquired as to the feasibility of solving the warden’s security problems with BFOQs:
Q. You indicated that you had made—I’m not sure whether you said you made application or only talked to Mr. Kincheloe about making an application for additional BFOQs.
*1555A. As it regards pat searches, we simply talked about it. There was no formal application. They had been made previously at the institution, before I got there. But my best understanding is that they never cleared the Department of Corrections and made it to the Human Rights Commission.
Q. Well, let’s suppose that Mr. Kincheloe, or whoever your superiors are in the system, said they thought they could get additional BFOQs, if applied for. Would you want to apply for more? Would it help your operation?
A. There’s a couple of hypotheticals there. I’m assuming we’re not involved in this court ease.
Q. Yeah.
A. To give you the answer—
Q. Forget all this. You’ve got the security problem and the other problem that you’ve indicated you recognize, about how the inmates may, feel about this. And would it make your life easier and could you do your job better if you had some more positions?
A. It would make my life a lot easier. We could do a better job of security at the institution, but we’d be left with the hypothetical red flag situation. The other part of it is that in my reading of this document, and that tells me who works in the institution day in and day out, I count in the neighborhood of 22 BFOQs in order to accomplish it, unless I go with a procedure of a designated pat searcher who wanders around the institution all the time and does nothing else. And I don’t think that’s very realistic or functional.
The pat searches should be a tool that all corrections officers employ. So I would probably have to look at getting a whole lot of them. That’s extremely disruptive and a tough way to go. It would throw this schedule out the window. I would have to go through it again. We did that July of this year in terms of putting online a new roster for the staff. And it causes a major disruption in the institution operation.
I’m doing everything but answer your question, I think. There’s lots of issues there. You know. It would make it easier. It would improve security. Whether I decided to go that way or not would take a lot of discussion and a lot of talk with folks, because I still think it leaves the window of vulnerability there.
Implicit in my analysis is an acceptance of the gender-balanced workforce of prison officials available at WCCW to perform these searches. There was a time, of course, when women in custodial guard work were rare or nonexistent. Now, men and women share these professional employment opportunities, as it should be. No one is excluded because of gender, again, as it should be. Yet, this court shatters this balance and this overdue accomplishment by effectively forcing twenty-two BFOQs on an employer and a gender-integrated union that do not want or require them. We do so not knowing whether there is money in the system to hire twenty-two BFOQs or whether women who may be interested in these difficult jobs are available in that area to fill them. This misguided interference with the valuable employment opportunities of men and women alike is based on the peculiar characteristics of some — but not all — imprisoned murderers, drug traffickers, and other felons, not on the officials’ "ability to perform the duties of the job." International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, — U.S. —, —, 111 S.Ct. 1196, 1206, 113 L.Ed.2d 158 (1991). See generally Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 97 S.Ct. 2720, 53 L.Ed.2d 786 (1977) (discussing BFOQs for correctional officials with security-sensitive jobs).
Judge O’Scannlain minimizes the implications of a possible lawsuit by the employees’ union aimed at unbalanced work requirements in favor of more employees. When Superintendent Vail was pressed directly as to whether the impetus for his choice was "fear of a union suit," his answer was, "Not out of fear of a union suit, no." But I hardly find Superintendent Vail’s attempt to accommodate the work concerns of his female officers and their union to be "wanton." See Torres v. Wis*1556consin Dep’t of Health & Social Servs., 859 F.2d 1523 (7th Cir.1988). What these work concerns illustrate is one of the many "constraints" with which he was faced.
Near the end of Superintendent Vail’s testimony, he was asked what he had meant when he referred in his testimony to himself as being in “a lose/lose situation in connection with some part of this policy.” He described his position as follows:
A. I think it was Jennifer James who testified that she would support this search if it meant someone was going to die. That’s the worst extreme of what might happen some day at that institution, and it might happen because we didn’t do everything we could to be as secure as we can.
The other pole of that issue is the very real information provided to me by Lindy Simons, Carol Day, Gretta Woodlock, and in more detail some of what I have heard in the court, that this search does pose some risk to some offenders. The difficult part about it is the knowing who and how and what. It’s not like the measles, you can't see it. And it's further complicated, at least if I understand Ms. Simons correctly, by the fact that these folks who may be injured the worst probably won’t show it. And those are the— you know, that’s the fundamental balancing act, and if I go one way, someone may get hurt, and if I go the other way, someone else may get hurt. I suppose I’ve come down on the side of physical safety as opposed to emotional safety. If there was a third option, I would love to see it.
Q. Mr. Vail, had you considered this—
THE COURT: The third option is to have me decide what the constitution says, I guess.
THE WITNESS: Well, that’s—I didn’t want to say that.
III
A.
Superintendent Vail’s testimony regarding his decision to implement cross-gender pat searches and the manner in which he implemented this practice was unimpeached. This observation is critical in determining whether he had a culpable state of mind as demanded by Whitley, Wilson, and Hudson. About his testimony, the district court made these observations:
Now, I want to point out an exception to what I just said, and that’s Mr. Vail. I found Mr. Vail to be a very credible witness. He is obviously struggling, as I am, with this problem. He is trying his—this is the impression I got—he is trying his best to understand. He is trying to do the right thing for his institution, for his corrections officers, and also for the inmates in it. As he indicated, he’s in a lose-lose situation. He can’t do anything without making somebody mad. His testimony, in my judgment, reflects that he has given this a great deal of thought, has educated himself about the problem over a long period of time, and basically came across to me as a very credible and very critical and very important witness, and we will talk about that further, too.
The other group of witnesses that I want to mention in regard to credibility are the experts that we had here: Medical, psychological, anthropological—is that a word?—academic. Other than corrections experts. Many of this group of people that testified, particularly those called by the plaintiffs, were clearly strong advocates for women’s rights as they saw those rights, and on the other side, were not experts in the corrections problems that Mr. Vail is faced with. I think those attitudes may have colored their judgment to some extent.
(Emphasis added).
B.
There is one fly in this soup. Judge Bryan, the very able district judge, did conclude, as pointed out by Judge O’Scannlain, that the “proposed random or routine cross-gender clothed body searches constitute the infliction of pain without penological justification, and cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth *1557Amendment.” But with all respect to Judges Bryan and O’Scannlain, the emphasized words resulted from an analysis that is inappropriate in an Eighth Amendment context. Why? Because they represent Judge Bryan’s Fourth Amendment conclusions based on a Turner v. Safley analysis, which Judge O’Scannlain himself says is inapposite when the issue is cruel and unusual punishment. I quote Judge O’Scannlain from his opinion:
The prison officials propose use of another test altogether for establishing a violation of the Eighth Amendment. They argue that the Eighth Amendment challenge, like all of the inmates’ other assertions, should be measured by the ‘reasonableness’ standard of Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 [107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64] (1987), rather than by the traditional Eighth Amendment approach. We reject this argument.
Judge O’Scannlain then demonstrates why a Turner analysis is inappropriate, and I agree with his analysis. Essentially, the Turner analysis is inconsistent with the inquiry called for by Whitley and Wilson. While Judge O’Scannlain rejects the district court’s approach, I respectfully believe he overlooks the effect such an approach had on the district court’s conclusions.
None of this is the district judge’s fault. He did an excellent job with this complicated and important case, but in 1989 when he rendered his decision, Wilson had not yet been handed down by the Supreme Court, and he did not have it to illuminate his path. Instead, he used a method of analysis that does not focus on the need to show a culpable state of mind on the part of the actor. He applied a balancing test, measured the searches against alternatives, and concluded the searches simply were not necessary. He jumped from this conclusion to a second conclusion that the searches were thus “without penological justification.” This is what he meant when he so labelled them, not that Superintendent Vail had failed to show the searches were related to a valid institutional concern.
To demonstrate my .conclusions about the meaning of Judge Bryan’s statement, I will let Judge Bryan speak for himself:
I think; the justification for initiating these searches, which is where we turn to Turner v. Safley for analysis; and the place in which it is conducted, which of course is in the prison.
So again, if these searches are reasonable, it turns on the question of security interests, that is penological justification for doing it.
Several factors are relevant in determining that issue. “First, there must be a ‘valid, rational connection’ between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it.” There is no doubt in my mind that there is a valid, rational connection between this desire to do cross-gender pat searches and the legitimate governmental interest of security in the prison. So the defendants have met that first requirement.
“A second factor relevant in determining the reasonableness of a prison restriction ... is whether there are alternative means of exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates.” Are other avenues available for the security on the one hand and the constitutional rights of the inmates on the other. So we come to the question then of does the security requirements of the women’s corrections center overcome this constitutional issue?
(Emphasis added).
Judge Bryan went on to examine the record, and looked at whether, in his judgment, Superintendent Vail had “ample alternatives” to his choice of cross-gender searches. It is here, in my judgment, that the cruel and unusual punishment analysis veered away from the appropriate method of analysis by merging with a Fourth Amendment test.
There can be no doubt about Judge Bryan’s analytical approach, and with it in mind, it becomes easy to understand his Conclusion 28. With this understanding, the fly disappears from the soup. Here is the whole picture as seen by Judge Bryan:
*155825. Applying these considerations to the facts of this case, and deferring to the judgment of prison officials to the extent allowed by the Constitution, the court has concluded that:
(a) there is a rational connection between the proposed searches and prison security interests;
(b) there are no alternative means of exercising the inmates’ rights of free exercise of religious freedom from unreasonable search and seizure and right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment if these searches are conducted;
(c) accommodation of the inmates’ constitutional rights will have some impact on the allocation of prison resources.
(d) there are ample easy alternatives, most of which impose a de minimis cost to valid penological interests. Therefore, the proposed cross-gender pat searches at the Washington Corrections Center for Women are unreasonable.
26. The proposed random or routine cross-gender clothed body searches are unreasonable and therefore violate the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
27. The proposed random or routine cross-gender clothed body searches are an unjustified abridgement of the free exercise of religion of those plaintiffs who have sincere religious objections to such cross-gender contacts.
28. The proposed random or routine cross-gender clothed body searches constitute the infliction of pain without penological justification, and cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
IV
Now that we know the relevant characteristics of our subject, we can return to the task of deciding which standard of wantonness applies to our analysis. In my judgment, it is the higher standard: the conduct complained of must have been pursued "maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm." Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-21, 106 S.Ct. at 1085 (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033, 94 S.Ct. 462, 38 L.Ed.2d 324 (1973)). I have four reasons for so concluding.
First, this practice, including its cross-gender features, does have a valid institutional or penological purpose: to stanch the flow of contraband within an institution in which one out of five prisoners has been convicted of killing another human being, in which 31% of the prisoners are there for drug trafficking, and in which the AIDS virus is present. Such a purpose is compelling. As the Supreme Court reiterated in Bell, "`[C]entral to all other corrections goals is the institutional consideration of internal security within the corrections facilities themselves.’" Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 546-47, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1878, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 823, 94 S.Ct. 2800, 2804, 41 L.Ed.2d 495 (1974)). Even though the security practice in this case may clash with a legitimate mental health concern of some prisoners, the fact remains that it is neither gratuitous nor punishment. Moreover, it is the willful and unlawful behavior of the prisoners themselves that is the primary cause of these security searches. The prisoners violate prison rules, they smuggle contraband under their clothes, and they deliberately secrete contraband in and around their private parts. In so doing, they consciously use our cultural sensitivity to touching each other in certain areas as a shield for their misconduct. The prisoners’ determination to beat the system is so great that strip searching is necessary to thwart their behavior. It is an unseemly but well-known fact that even their body cavities are used for these purposes. See generally Bell, 441 U.S. at 558-560, 99 S.Ct. at 1884-85 (body cavity searches per se in prison do not violate the Fourth Amendment). As we "think things not words," these too are facts of prison life that cannot be ignored.
Second, because cross-gender pat searches would become an ubiquitous institutional practice in the WCCW, rather than isolated events, and because such searches encroach upon an identifiable human need such as food, warmth or exercise, i.e., men*1559tal well being, they might be seen as "conditions of confinement." Such conditions ordinarily are measured by the "deliberate indifference" yardstick. Wilson, — U.S. at —, 111 S.Ct. at 2321. This is true, however, only where the "needs of prisoners [do] not . . . clash with other equally important governmental responsibilities. . . ." Wilson, — U.S. at —, 111 S.Ct. at 2326 (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320, 106 S.Ct. at 1084). Because the needs here do clash with governmental responsibilities, and because the judgment as to whether they are "equally important" rests in my view with the State of Washington and Superintendent Vail, the "deliberate indifference" standard is inapposite. Moreover, these searches are conducted in the positive interest of inmates’ basic medical needs. The searches are designed to eliminate heroin, alcohol, cocaine, hypodermic needles, weapons, and the likes from the prison environment. Their presence in prison constitutes a health and safety menace. Thus, these searches are designed to ameliorate a harmful condition of confinement that is inimical to other basic human and medical needs of inmates, such as freedom from drugs, the AIDS virus, and assaults. This purpose is obvious, and it relates to the state’s responsibility to provide a safe environment to people with whom it has a special relationship. A knowing failure to eliminate such dangers from a place of confinement might attach civil responsibility to the officials who failed to act. "[W]hen the State takes a person into its custody and holds him there against his will, the Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for his safety and general well being." DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Soc. Servs. Dept., 489 U.S. 189, 199-200, 109 S.Ct. 998, 1005, 103 L.Ed.2d 249 (1989); see Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 110 S.Ct. 1028, 1039 ("Prison administrators have . . . [a] duty to take reasonable measures for the prisoners’ own safety."). What prohibits a state from ignoring such risks to prisoners? The Eighth Amendment, of course, and — as DeShaney points out — Estelle v. Gamble. Id. 489 U.S. at 200, 109 S.Ct. at 1005. A superintendent is not permitted to be deliberately indifferent to drugs, weapons, and hypodermic needles in prison.
I’m not suggesting for a moment that a superintendent’s failure to implement random cross-gender pat searches would constitute deliberate indifference, only that Superintendent Vail’s program is legitimate. This duty is yet another “constraint” facing Superintendent Vail.
Third, the higher standard of wantonness has been held applicable even under circumstances where no valid institutional concerns are present. I have in mind Hudson v. McMillian where no valid or penological purpose whatsoever was found in the unprovoked and gratuitous beating of a prisoner. Yet to demonstrate cruel and unusual punishment, the Court held that the prisoner alleging an excessive force must show more than deliberate indifference to his physical well-being; he must show that the force was applied maliciously and sadistically. Justice Thomas pointed this out in his dissent when he said, "The Court today extends the heightened mental state applied in Whitley to all excessive force cases, even where no competing institutional concerns are present." Hudson v. McMillian, — U.S. at —, 112 S.Ct. at 1008. It would be anomalous indeed for the law to impose the highest mental element standard where gratuitous beatings occur but not where valid competing institutional concerns are implicated.1
Fourth, the higher standard of wantonness was designed to both honor and implement the long-standing principle that "`[p]rison administrators . . . should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adop*1560tion and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security.’" Hudson v. McMillian, — U.S. at —, 112 S.Ct. at 999 (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321-322, 106 S.Ct. at 1085 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1878, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979))). The district court sums up well what it is like to be the warden of a state prison in this age:
The administration there has to fight all kinds of problems in regards to these security interests. They’ve got to fight political problems, taxes, money availability, the budget process with the state. They have to fight contraband, violence. They’ve got to fight inadequate staff levels on occasions, lots of occasions. They have to fight overcrowding, a facility that may or may not be what it ought to be. They have to deal with the public concepts of what rights a prisoner ought to lose when they are being punished. They’ve got to fight, I guess, or consider, the question of the way it’s done elsewhere, as we’ve heard some in this case. Through this, all of this, as Mr. Vail testified, while he’s trying to balance these things, he, too, is faced with a conflicting issue involving women’s rights.
Judge O’Scannlain claims this case arises from the formulation of a policy “in circumstances where there are no particular constraints on the officials’ decisionmaking process____” My good friend and I read this record differently. Thus, I quote it extensively to make my points. In fact, like all others in the United States charged with running anything nowadays, Superintendent Vail is engulfed in constraints, cross currents, competing values, labor unions, government regulations, statutes, exposure to lawsuits, personal liability, and in this case, differing views of what constitutes equal protection and opportunity for women in the workplace. Judge Noonan’s concurrence matched against Mrs. Wood’s testimony demonstrates some of this dissonance. Judge Noonan’s view would remove all men from women’s prisons and probably relegate Mrs. Wood and her career track to second-class status. Mrs. Wood, on the other hand, says, “We are all equal in the workplace.” No less a respected publication than the Yale Law Journal published a Note in 1985 arguing that segregating female prisoners from their male counterparts violates the former’s Equal Protection Rights. R. Herbert, Women’s Prisons: An Equal Protection Evaluation, 94 Yale L.J. 1182 (1985). Shall women be combat pilots and fight alongside men in Iraq and Somalia? These are complex policy matters. The issue in this case is most vexing. No one takes any pleasure in approving strip searches or clothed searches or, for that matter, any personally invasive procedure. But here, Superintendent Vail did his best to make an informed call, and he ends up labelled obdurate and wanton and likened by one respected member of our court to beasts, brutes, and ferocious concentration camp guards. This result gives Harry Truman’s “heat” new meaning and a new level of intensity. When this outcome is matched against the record, and particularly Superintendent Vail’s testimony, the comparison suggests either something is wrong with the test, or it has been misapplied. I respectfully believe it is the latter.
In my view, the majority’s well-intentioned opinion neglects the mandate that "neither judge nor jury freely substitute their judgment for that of officials who have made a considered choice." Whitley, 475 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. at 1085; see also Grummett v. Rushen, 779 F.2d 491, 493 (9th Cir.1985). This rule of deference to the judgment of prison administrators in these matters was not fashioned out of a faint-hearted desire to wash one’s hands of dirty business. The rule recognizes the hard reality that judges simply do not have the knowledge or the skill to run a corrections facility. We do well not to substitute injudiciously our judgment for the judgment of those who do know how to run prisons, for we are not qualified to make these judgments in the first place. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 1807, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1974) ("[C]ourts are ill equipped to deal with the *1561increasingly urgent problems of prison administration. . . . Judicial recognition of that fact reflects no more than a healthy sense of realism."). It is "not . . . wise for [courts] to second-guess the expert administrators on matters on which they are better informed." Bell, 441 U.S. at 531, 99 S.Ct. at 1870 (quoting Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d 118, 124 (2d Cir.1978)).
The interference the majority’s opinion will cause with the difficult task of managing WCCW, not to mention other prisons, is manifest. We need look no farther than Judge Bryan’s discussion of Superintendent Vail’s “alternatives” to support this observation. By identifying a latent mental health interest on the part of previously abused prisoners that Constitutionally trumps an institution’s legitimate security practice, the opinion unleashes a management nightmare. It takes the characteristics of some and projects them onto the entire class.
But the problem cannot be seen only in terms of this group. Now, any individual female or male prisoner previously abused sexually is immune from random pat-down searches conducted by a person of the gender of the prisoner’s abuser. A male prisoner with a history of abuse as a child by a man—and our prisons are full of them— will surely be able to make a case against random pat-down searches by male correctional officers. A woman previously abused by a woman may be able to do the same. These points are made by the Washington State Corrections Employees Association in their intervenor’s brief. What about the victimized prisoner who claims he or she cannot have his or her private parts .touched by anyone regardless of gender without suffering psychological damage? Judge O’Scannlain’s opinion creates the real specter of a special class of untouchable prisoners. Will they wear bright insignias on their clothing so that officers will know they are exempt from this security practice? I submit that anyone who doubts this will happen is unfamiliar with prisons. Mrs. Wood testified that there were no inmate complaints at Walla Walla regarding cross-gender pat searches, but that there were unspecified complaints by male inmates regarding ‘male-on-male searches.” Plus, one cannot help but wonder what impact this decision will have on cross-gender searches of felons arrested on the streets of our communities.
V
Parts I and II of this lengthy opinion provide the answer to whether Superintendent Vail and his staff acted "maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm." They did not. Moreover, I do not believe that even under the lesser standard of deliberate indifference a case of cruel and unusual punishment has been made. We may not favor this controversial practice, just as some may not favor the death penalty, but as to Superintendent Vail it is not only wrong, but highly unfair to conclude his behavior was obdurate and wanton. Even if we believe he has erred in his judgment, it cannot be said his error was not "in good faith." Wilson, — U.S. at —, 111 S.Ct. at 2324 (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319, 106 S.Ct. at 1084).
Judge O’Scannlain suggests my understanding of “deliberate indifference” is infirm. With all respect to my able colleague, his attempt to expose the flaw may reveal his own error.
Where is the authority to claim, “It is not enough to say before enacting a policy prison authorities considered an issue carefully.”? Why isn’t it enough? “Indifference,” especially as itself a definition of wanton conduct, means a state of having “no marked feelings one way or the other.” WEBSTER’S II NEW RIVERSIDE UNIVERSITY DICTIONARY 623 (1st ed.1984). “Considering an issue carefully” and basing one’s judgment on such consideration seems the opposite of “indifference,” especially when the “indifference” has to be “deliberate” to be wanton.
Moreover, Judge O’Scannlain’s analysis, by claiming (1) that “prison authorities are required to afford sufficient weight to the constitutional rights of individuals” (emphasis added), and (2) that “the failure to treat constitutional provisions with appropriate respect constitutes deliberate indif*1562ference,” loads the question in a way that improperly predetermines the answer. In search of a conclusion that these searches are unconstitutional, he begins with a premise that assures the result, the premise being that these searches violate the prisoners’ rights. But what right is he referring to? He declines to confront the prisoner’s Fourth Amendment claim because it raises issues that are abstruse. If it is the Eighth Amendment’s right against cruel and unusual punishment, Judge O’Scannlain crosses the finish line before the analytical race starts; and it cannot be the infliction of pain per se, because unless the pain is inflicted wantonly or maliciously, it violates no Constitutional prohibition.
“No matter how much thought and consideration the superintendent gives to the problem ... ”, says Judge O’Scannlain, the superintendent is necessarily wrong and thus deliberately indifferent if Judge O’Scannlain does not agree with his judgment or his conclusion. This is so even though the superintendent’s judgment arrived at after thoughtful consideration reflects, as it does in this case, a thorough understanding and a thoughtful weighing of the interests and values concerned. A culpable state of mind in this context now includes considered judgment with which we—judges, not prison officials—do not agree. It might have been easier just to say. these searches “violate evolving standards of decency,” whatever that might mean. In my view, it is an assault on the plain meaning of the words “deliberate indifference” and “wanton” to so characterize Superintendent Vail’s testimony, and to do so is incompatible with this record. In essence, the majority opinion imputes a state of mind to Superintendent Vail he does not have: Superintendent Vail’s mens rea is constructively found to be wanton and obdurate. When the relevant test depends on the actual state of mind of the actor, having to impute it to him is an admission that it does not exist.
Because we have in our hands not only the fate of Superintendent Vail’s inmates but also his character and reputation, I repeat what the district court said about his behavior in conceiving of these searches, in implementing them, and in testifying about them in court: He was “very credible,” “obviously struggling, as I am, with this problem,” “he is trying his best to understand,” “trying to do the right thing for his institution, for his corrections officers, and also for the inmates,” “has educated himself about the problem,” and “came across to me as a very credible ... witness.” (emphasis added). We do a disservice to this conscientious professional to say he acted with deliberate indifference and wantonness or in bad faith.
VI
I have a number of problems with my esteemed colleague Judge Reinhardt’s analysis and his conclusion that these searches violate the Fourth Amendment. First, given the record, I cannot understand how he can proclaim that the “predictability” concern cited by Superintendent Vail seems to be “highly conjectural.” This is just a polite way of saying either Superintendent Vail is not credible, or he has bad judgment. Given Judge Bryan’s oral findings that (1) Superintendent Vail was a “very credible witness,” and (2) “there is no doubt in my mind that there is a valid rational connection between this desire to do cross-gender pat searches and the legitimate government interest of security in the prison,” (emphasis added). Judge Reinhardt’s observation is irreconcilable with the record. His observation glosses over the standard of review we are bound to apply to credibility findings. In Anderson v. Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 573-575, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 1511-12, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985), the Supreme Court mandated “special deference” to such findings, citing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a): “Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.” Such findings shall be respected by a court of appeals unless “clearly erroneous.” In explicating this phrase the Court said:
This standard plainly does not entitle a reviewing court to reverse the finding of the trier of fact simply because it is *1563convinced that it would have decided the case differently. The reviewing court oversteps the bounds of its duty under Rule 52(a) if it undertakes to duplicate the role of the lower court.
Id. at 573, 105 S.Ct. at 1511. With all respect, Judge Reinhardt’s selective treatment of Superintendent Vail’s testimony disregards this duty. Furthermore, he fails to acknowledge or contend with the testimony of Mrs. Wood and Director Kincheloe, both of whom linked cross-gender searches to enhanced prison security. Judge Reinhardt’s concurrence simply sweeps these chess pieces off the board.
Moreover, Judge Reinhardt lacks a warrant to dismiss as “exaggerated” the importance Superintendent Vail places on the need for searches that are unpredictable. This element has been ventilated by the Supreme Court in Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984), and validated as a virtual sine qua non of effective prison security against contraband and weapons:
The uncertainty that attends random searches of cells renders these searches perhaps the most effective weapon of the prison administrator in the constant fight against the proliferation of knives and guns, illicit drugs, and other contraband____
A requirement that even random searches be conducted pursuant to an established plan would seriously undermine the effectiveness of this weapon. It is simply naive to believe that prisoners would not eventually decipher any plan officials might devise for “planned random searches,” and thus be able routinely to anticipate searches____ [WJholly random searches are essential to the effective security of penal institutions. We, therefore, cannot accept even the concededly limited holding of the Court of Appeals.
Palmer, 468 U.S. at 528-29, 104 S.Ct. at 3201-02 (emphasis added). Although the searches under consideration in Hudson were of prisoners’ cells, the principle of unpredictability so obviously necessary in this environment applies equally to the searches of the other place prisoners harbor contraband: their bodies. It is simply wrong to write off this element of Superintendent Vail’s program as illusory. If half the prison officials in WCCW are disqualified from conducting these necessary searches, the advantage goes to the inmates, period. In this respect, I repeat my acceptance of WCCW’s gender-balanced workforce.
What all of this means is that in measuring these cross-gender searches objectively under the Fourth Amendment, we must credit Superintendent Vail’s testimony about their utility in fostering security in WCCW, including the importance of their “unpredictability.” If we do so, there is no principled way we can conclude these searches are unreasonable without substituting our judgment for Superintendent Vail’s. The Court in Bell v. Wolfish counsels against such an arrogation of authority:
[C]ourts have, in the name of the Constitution, become increasingly enmeshed in the minutiae of prison operations. Judges, after all, are human. They, no less than others in our society, have a natural tendency to believe that their individual solutions to often intractable problems are better and more workable than those of the persons who are actually charged with and trained in the running of the particular institution under examination____ The wide range of “judgment calls” that meet constitutional and statutory requirements are confided to officials outside the Judicial Branch of Government.
Bell, 441 U.S. at 562, 99 S.Ct. at 1886.
There is a reason, of course, why Judge Reinhardt’s concurrence must shrug off Superintendent Vail’s rationale as “highly conjectural.” If his testimony stands, it is a formidable barrier to concluding that these cross-gender searches are unreasonable. Superintendent Vail’s testimony gives the cross-gender aspect of these searches a legitimate penological purpose, and Judge Bryan found that purpose to be both valid and rationally connected to a legitimate security interest. Judge Reinhardt is simply wrong when he says, “the *1564prison’s policy of authorizing male guards to conduct suspicionless searches is not supportable on the basis of the stated security considerations.” To this, I juxtapose Judge Bryan’s written Finding of Fact No. 17:
17. There is a rational connection between the Department of Corrections [sic] interest to do random and routine cross-gender pat searches and the legitimate governmental interest of security in the prison. However, the defendants and their witnesses claimed, but did not prove, that cross-gender searches were necessary for internal security at the Washington Corrections Center for Women, (emphasis added).
Judge Reinhardt essentially echoes Judge Bryan’s and Judge O’Scannlain’s statements that these searches are not “necessary,” citing post preliminary injunction conditions in WCCW as supposed proof of his claim. Setting aside the question of whether the prisoners’ alleged (and predictable) post-filing behavior is relevant, the problem with this test is that the Fourth Amendment bans searches which are unreasonable, not those which are unnecessary. “Necessary” means “absolutely required, indispensable.” It is a non sequitur to argue that something that is not absolutely required is thereby unreasonable. This “not necessary” approach to the Fourth Amendment is troublesome. It is similar to an argument made by the defendants and rejected by the Supreme Court in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte:
The defendants argue at length that the public interest in maintaining checkpoints is less than is asserted by the Government because the flow of illegal immigrants could be reduced by means other than checkpoint operations. As one alternative they suggest legislation prohibiting the knowing employment of illegal aliens. The logic of such elaborate less-restrictive-alternative arguments could raise insuperable barriers to the exercise of virtually all search- and-seizure powers.
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556-57 n. 12, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 3082 n. 12, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976) (emphasis added).
This observation is certainly correct. Airport magnetometers and x-ray machines and sobriety checkpoints are not absolutely indispensable to combat air piracy and drunk driving, but this per se does not render them unreasonable.
Moreover, Judge Bryan’s written Finding of Fact No. 18 makes it clear that the alternatives are not that simple:
18. There are ample alternatives to the cross-gender searches, which will meet the security needs of the institution to conduct random and unpredictable body searches of inmates and to conduct mandatory searches at certain locations. Alternative means of achieving the legitimate security goals of the administration include:
Adjusting corrections officers’ scheduling
Adjusting corrections officers’ job responsibilities
Adjusting corrections officers’ duties to equalize work load
Adjusting collective bargaining agreement
Permitting male officers to decide whom to search and having a female do the search
Limiting the necessity for an observer
Adjusting upward the number of random and routine searches
Seeking Bona Fide Occupational Qualifications for certain correction officer positions
Using more magnetometers
Hiring more staff
Keeping inmate population levels reasonable
Changing the physical structure and/or layout of the prison
Building more women’s prisons.
If this list does not enmesh us in the minutiae of running a prison, I do not know what does.
This search issue falls within the "special needs" category, a category that gives greater latitude to the government to con*1565duct certain searches than it would ordinarily have under the Fourth Amendment. The operation by a State of a prison is a classic case of circumstances where the "special needs" rule applies. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873-74, 107 S.Ct. 3164, 3168, 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987); see also Skinner v. Railway Labor Exec. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989) (The government’s interest in regulating conduct of employees engaged in safety-sensitive tasks presents special needs justifying a departure from usual Fourth Amendment requirements.); Bell, 441 U.S. at 544-60, 99 S.Ct. at 1876-85. In this "special needs" context, I do not view Superintendent Vail’s security rationale for cross-gender searches as either exaggerated, irrational, or speculative. Neither did Judge Bryan. The better determinant is that "[i]t is enough to say that [he has] not been conclusively shown to be wrong in this view." Id. at 555, 99 S.Ct. at 1882 (quoting Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 132, 97 S.Ct. 2532, 2541, 53 L.Ed.2d 629 (1977)). The quotation from Hudson v. Palmer with which I began this opinion puts all of this in context.
The most difficult and treacherous aspect of this case is knowing what weight to give to the "subjective intrusion" the cross-gender aspect of these searches will have on some prisoners. Both Judge O’Scannlain and Judge Reinhardt have exposed this aspect of the issue with great skill, and it is clear that the degree of "subjective intrusion" these women prisoners experience as a result of being searched by male guards is something to be considered. See Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 558, 96 S.Ct. at 3083; Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451-55, 110 S.Ct. 2481, 2486-87, 110 L.Ed.2d 412 (1990). On balance, and after considerable deliberation, I come down on the side of the prison experts. I do so for a combination of reasons previously discussed in this opinion. First, the right against unreasonable searches is not a positive right like those included in the First Amendment. Unlike the practice of religion, for example, the prisoners have no right at all to possess contraband and weapons or to break prison rules. This is a freedom-from, not a freedom-to case. Second, the right of privacy is greatly diminished in the case of prisoners lawfully incarcerated as felons. Third, the problem addressed by these searches is entirely of the making of the prisoners who choose to continue to break the rules and the law even though in prison. Fourth, this decision is best made by "the governmental officials who have a unique understanding of, and a responsibility for, limited public resources, including a finite number of police officers." Sitz, 496 U.S. at 454, 110 S.Ct. at 2487. It is not appropriate to sweep away the testimony of Kincheloe, Wood, and Vail as conjectural, speculative, and illusory. This is especially true in view of the Supreme Court’s statement that "[w]here a state penal system is involved, federal courts have, as we indicated in [Procunier v.] Martinez, additional reason to accord deference to the appropriate prison authorities." Turner, 482 U.S. at 76, 107 S.Ct. at 2253. If the prison officials’ rationale is so transparent and flimsy, one wonders why they stick to it? I conclude from this record that they do so because they believe in good faith they are right.
I close this discussion with this observation: If these searches are not unreasonable, if they pass muster as reasonable searches to control contraband, they surely do not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
VII
Now for judicial philosophy. I borrow some thoughts directly from Professor Philip Kurland:
[T]he issue of discretion versus restraint goes to the very heart of constitutionalism. For it is of the essence of constitutionalism that all government—not excepting the courts—is to be contained by established principles. The Justices in espousing the notion that they are the creatures of the higher law and not the creators of it are not indulging myth so much as they are confronting the paradox implicit in constitutional democracy. *1566The paradox has been described, if not so labeled, by Charles Mcllwain:
We live under a written constitution which classifies some things under jurisdiction, as legal fundamentals, and thus puts them under the protection of the courts, while it leaves other matters to the free discretion of the organs of positive government it has created. The distribution of these matters between jurisdiction and gubernaculum, made so many years ago, is of course in constant need of revision by interpretation or by amendment; and it may also be that the mode of amendment is somewhat too slow and cumbersome for the best interests of all____ The long and fascinating story of the balancing of jurisdiction and gubernaculum ... shoüld be, if we could study it with an open mind, of some help in adjusting and maintaining today the delicate balance of will and law, the central practical problem of politics now as it has been in all past ages. The two fundamental correlative elements of constitutionalism for which all lovers of liberty must yet fight are the legal limits to arbitrary power and a complete political responsibility of government to the governed.
Philip B. Kurland, Politics, the Constitution and the Warren Court 8-9 (1970) (quoting Charles Mcllwain, Constitutionalism: Ancient and Modem 145-46 (rev. ed. 1947)).
Absent a showing of cruel and unusual punishment or searches that are unreasonable, our jurisdiction under the Constitution fails. The matter of managing the prison is a question of gubernaculum. Justice Holmes warned against straying over this line: “While the courts must exercise a judgment of their own, it by no means is true that every law is void which may seem to the judges who pass upon it excessive, unsuited to its ostensible end, or based upon conceptions of morality with which they disagree. Considerable latitude must be allowed for differences of view as well as for possible peculiar conditions which this court can know but imperfectly, if at all.” Otis v. Parker, 187 U.S. 606, 608-09, 23 S.Ct. 168, 170, 47 L.Ed. 323 (1903).
I respectfully dissent.

. I take issue with Judge O'Scannlain’s assertion in footnote 7 of his opinion that "the absence of an emergency may be probative of whether the force was indeed inflicted maliciously or sadistically.” There is a flaw in this logic. The presence of an emergency may justify harsh measures to end it, but the absence of an emergency surely is not probative of a malicious state of mind. All the absence of an emergency does is eliminate one of the possible justifications for harsh measures. This flaw demonstrates how hard one must strain to fit Superintendent Vail’s mental state into this category.