Court Opinion

ID: 9743025
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:24:17.154693+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:38.633598
License: Public Domain

Liacos, J.
(dissenting, with whom Abrams, J., joins). The defendant in this case is entitled to a new trial on the grounds that (1) the charge to the jury who convicted the defendant did not reflect the construction of G. L. c. 268A, § 17 (a), given by the majority opinion; (2) he was convicted under a theory of law which misconstrued the nature of G. L. c. 268A, § 17 (a);1 and (3) the admission of the prior recorded testimony as part of the Commonwealth’s case-in-chief denied the defendant his constitutional right to confront his accuser.
This is the first case to reach this court calling for a construction of G. L. c. 268A, § 17 (a). The task of interpreting the statute, in harmony with the other provisions of G. L. c. 268A, is one of not inconsiderable difficulty, as is evident from the apparent confusion of both parties and the trial judge as to the nature and scope of the offense defined in § 17 (a).
The view of the statute taken by the majority of this court is a view with which I am in accord. The fact is, however, that this record reveals it as a view not followed at the trial by either the prosecutor or an able trial judge — nor is it a view in accord with that of the Appeals Court. Cf. Commonwealth v. Dutney, 4 Mass. App. Ct. 363 *503(1976). Some further elaboration of the meaning of § 17 (a) seems appropriate in this circumstance.
1. Chapter 268A of the General Laws is a comprehensive measure aimed at thwarting the improper use of influence on State and local public officials. Section 17 (a), on which the defendant’s conviction is grounded, is specifically directed at regulating the conduct of municipal employees which is inconsistent with the responsibilities inherent in the proper performance of a government job. Conflict of interest laws such as § 17 (a) occupy an area between bribery or the offer and acceptance of gratuities and innocent or trivial association with persons seeking the favor of municipal authorities for personal or business reasons. See Staff Report to Subcommittee No. 5, “The Conflict of Interest Laws,” House Committee on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (March 1,1958).
The conduct proscribed by § 17 (a) is the request or receipt, by a municipal employee, of compensation from a nonmunicipal source whose private interests relate to a particular matter in which the municipality has a direct and substantial interest. Compensation, as defined by § 1 of c. 268A, includes “any money, thing of value or economic benefit conferred on or received by any person in return for services rendered or to be rendered by himself or another.”
Section 17 (a) tracks the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 203 (1970). See Buss, The Massachusetts Conflict of Interest Statute: An Analysis, 45 B.U.L. Rev. 299 (1965); R. Braucher, Conflict of Interest in Massachusetts, in Perspectives of Law, Essays for Austin Wakeman Scott 8 (1964); see generally B. Manning, Federal Conflict of Interest Law (1964). As such, it is clear that the intent of the Legislature in enacting § 17 (a) was to incorporate, as the crucial elements of this offense, those elements which are the basis of the correlative Federal offense. These elements are (1) the receipt of compensation as defined in § 1, (2) contingent on the receipt or promise of services rendered. In the absence of either element, the apparent impropriety of the official’s conduct does not make out the *504offense under § 17 (a). See Manning, supra at 36. Conversely, it is immaterial that the services rendered or to be rendered in exchange for the compensation may be viewed as otherwise proper in nature. Id. at 36, 43. See May v. United States, 175 F.2d 994, 1006 (D.C. Cir. 1949). This section of the statute reflects the old maxim that “a man cannot serve two masters.” It seeks to preclude circumstances leading to a conflict of loyalties by a public employee. As such, it does not require a showing of any attempt to influence — by action or inaction — official decisions. What is required is merely a showing of an economic benefit received by the employee for services rendered or to be rendered to the private interests when his sole loyalty should be to the public interest.
It seems equally clear that not every act by a municipal employee may serve as the basis of an indictment which fails to discriminate between the various activities proscribed by the statutory scheme. What once were the activities involved in the so called bribery offenses under G. L. c. 268, § 8, are now covered by G. L. c. 268A, particularly §§ 2 (6) and 3 (b). See Commonwealth v. Sta-siun, 349 Mass. 38 (1965). Other penal offenses are defined by the statute in various sections. Additionally, a number of proscribed acts are covered by G. L. c. 268A, § 23, in nonpenal terms. Such latter acts may be grounds for administrative action against the offending employee whether covered by the criminal provisions of the statute or not.
In the case currently before the court for decision, the defendant concedes that he was the city engineer of Marlborough during the planning stages of the real estate investment scheme and at the time he received an initial payment of $5,000 following the sale of what was called the Davenport parcel to the developer. However, the defendant argues, in effect, that the $5,000 he received did not constitute compensation from a private source within the meaning of the statute. The defendant does not deny that the $5,000 payment he accepted was a direct consequence of the sale of the Davenport property to the developer, but he contends that the Commonwealth failed to demon-*505strata that he had rendered any services in exchange for the economic benefit he realized on the real estate venture. He argues that he was an investor like any other and that, absent evidence of services (or the promise of them) which were exchanged for compensation from a private source, the Commonwealth makes out no case under § 17 (a). The Commonwealth’s response appears to be that a prima facie case is made by evidence (here present) that the defendant promised not to interfere with official municipal approval of the project if he was allowed to become an investor in the project. Assuming the Commonwealth’s argument to be valid, it is an argument more properly addressed to the offense alleged under G. L. c. 268A, § 2 (b) (3),2 or § 3 (6) ,3 a charge which went to the jury and of which the defendant was acquitted. I cannot ascribe to the Legislature an intent to be redundant. It seems clear that, if the defendant were receiving a benefit in order to affect his official conduct or to refrain from interfering with the progress of an application for a special permit as was here involved, that might well be an offense under G. L. c. 268A, §§ 2 (b) and 3 (b).4 Section 17 (a), on the other hand, reaches an area of activity not proscribed by either of those sections. In short, I construe this section so as to *506make criminal what had not been so prior to the enactment of G. L. c. 268A, namely, to receive compensation from private sources for services rendered, or to be rendered, to such private sources in any particular matter in which the municipality has a direct and substantial interest.
It is incumbent on the Commonwealth under this view of § 17 (a) to show that the employee rendered or promised services in exchange for money and in relation to a particular matter in which the municipality has a direct and substantial interest. The particular matter in this case is the issuance of the special permit.
The Commonwealth argues that the defendant’s general “study” of the sewer problems for the site constitutes a rendering of services. I would agree that as a general matter such action in exchange for money would constitute a violation of § 17 (a), and there was sufficient evidence of such services in exchange for compensation (i.e., defendant’s investment interest) to deny the motion for a directed verdict. Where the difficulty arises is that neither the judge’s view of the case as expressed in his denial of the motion for a directed verdict, his charge, nor the Commonwealth’s response to the defendant’s motion for a bill of particulars or its presentation of the case defined this aspect as the Commonwealth’s basis of alleged criminal conduct at the trial. To say that the defendant’s conviction should stand because, in any event, a jury judging the facts of a case tried on a correct theory of law could have reached a verdict of guilty is improperly to invade the province of the jury to weigh the relevant evidence in accord with the applicable legal principles.
The law of this case, as tried and submitted to the jury, was not in accord with the majority’s view of the nature of the crime under the statute. See Commonwealth v. Graves, 363 Mass. 863, 868 (1973). The judge’s understanding of § 17 (a) seemed to rest on the proposition that only the receipt of money need be shown to justify the conviction. Nowhere were “services” as discussed here or in the majority opinion defined; nor need they have been under the judge’s view of the case. It follows that *507the construction given the statute by the majority and myself cannot be used retroactively to validate a conviction based on an entirely different theory of what constituted the offense. I believe the conviction should be reversed so that the defendant can have the opportunity to defend this case on a theory consistent with the statutory prohibition.
2. During the Commonwealth’s case-in-chief, testimony given at a prior civil trial by a coindictee, one Curley, was read in evidence following Curley’s refusal to testify on Fifth Amendment grounds. The defendant contends that the admission of Curley’s former testimony violated his Sixth Amendment right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”5 I would hold that the introduction in this case of testimony given in a prior civil proceeding by an individual who was thereafter indicted with the defendant abridged the defendant’s constitutional right to be confronted with adverse witnesses.
Where the unavailability of a witness has been diligently established, we have sanctioned the introduction of testimony given at the defendant’s initial criminal trial involving similar charges at which the defendant had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness. Commonwealth v. Clark, 363 Mass. 467, 470 (1973). Commonwealth v. Gallo, 275 Mass. 320, 328-334 (1931). Commonwealth v. Glassman, 253 Mass. 65, 73-74 (1925). Commonwealth v. Richards, 18 Pick. 434, 437-440 (1837). Accord, Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895). Similarly, we have authorized the introduction at a criminal trial of testimony given at preliminary hearings in the same criminal proceedings when the defendant had the opportunity during the preliminary hearing to cross-examine the witness and where the testimony of that witness was demonstrated to be unavailable at the defendant’s trial. Commonwealth v. Caine, 366 *508Mass. 366, 371-372 (1974). Commonwealth v. Mustone, 353 Mass. 490, 492-493 (1968). Commonwealth v. Caruso, 251 Mass. 362, 366-367 (1925). Cf. Andrews, petitioner, 368 Mass. 468, 477 (1975). Accord, United States v. Bell, 500 F.2d 1287, 1290 (2d Cir. 1974); Havey v. Kropp, 458 F.2d 1054, 1057 (6th Cir. 1972). Cf. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970) (testimony given by a witness at a preliminary hearing, at which the defendant had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness, was properly introduced at the defendant’s subsequent trial when the witness was available and subject to full cross-examinatian) ; United States v. Ricketson, 498 F.2d 367, 374 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v. Singleton, 460 F.2d 1148, 1152-1153 (2d Cir. 1972) (admitting a deposition at the defendant’s trial did not violate the Sixth Amendment where the defendant had an opportunity to cross-examine the deponent when the deposition was taken and where the deponent was unavailable at trial).
The question presently before us is markedly different from that decided in the preceding cases. Nor is the question here the same as that before this court in the recently decided case of Commonwealth v. DiPietro, ante, 369 (1977). The issue here is whether a defendant’s constitutional right of confrontation is breached by the introduction of former testimony given during a civil trial by a witness whose live testimony becomes “unavailable” at the defendant’s subsequent criminal trial. This case exhibits a perceptible discord between the interests protected by the right of confrontation and the rationale which supports the well recognized exception to the hearsay rule permitting, under special conditions, the admission of testimony given during a prior judicial proceeding.
Both the courts6 and legal commentators7 have recognized that the confrontation right and the hearsay rule *509safeguard similar values. However, the courts have been careful to note that the parameters of the confrontation clause and the hearsay rule are not congruent. Therefore, even though some hearsay statements are constitutionally admissible, exceptions to the hearsay rule do not uniformly contour the confrontation clause. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 86 (1970) .8 California v. Green, supra at 155.
“The right to confrontation is basically a trial right.” Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968). It is designed to make prosecution witnesses available for full cross-examination by the defendant and to ensure that the testimony of a witness is given under oath before the jury who will have an opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witness as he testifies. The right entitles the defendant to confront adverse witnesses personally. “The primary object of the constitutional provision in question was to prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits, such as were sometimes admitted in civil cases, being used against the prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and cross-examination of the witness in which the accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief.” Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-243 (1895).
When a prosecution witness becomes unavailable after testifying at a pre-trial hearing or at the defendant’s first trial, and a second trial becomes necessary, the Supreme Court has concluded that the substance of the confrontation right was afforded the defendant by the advantage he “once had of seeing the witness face to face, and of subjecting him to the ordeal of a cross-examination.” Mattox v. United States, supra at 244. Accord, Commonwealth v. Gallo, 275 Mass, at 328-334.
*510At the outset of the defendant’s trial on the conflict of interest indictments, the Commonwealth presented a motion to the trial judge seeking an order compelling coin-dictee Curley to testify on the theory that he had waived his right to assert the privilege against self-incrimination to the extent that he testified before the grand jury and at the prior civil trial on matters related to the criminal charges. Alternatively, the Commonwealth sought permission to introduce Curley’s stenographically recorded testimony given during the earlier civil trial. The judge denied the Commonwealth’s motion to compel Curley to testify but thereafter allowed the Commonwealth to introduce portions of the testimony given by Curley at the civil trial. The judge never articulated his reasons for permitting Curley’s Fifth Amendment claim to stand. The majority opinion finds that a “plausible” claim of the privilege is sufficient. If “plausible” means “valid,” I agree. It seems to me, however, that a decision resulting in a loss of a constitutionally protected interest should be more specific as to the particular circumstances which warrant the kind of procedure here used.
The unavailability of a witness during a criminal trial is a condition precedent to the introduction of former testimony in conformance with the confrontation clause and the exception to the hearsay rule. Plainly the unavailability of a witness is established when the individual’s physical presence is impossible to procure. However, the salient consideration is not whether the individual’s physical presence is obtainable, but whether the testimony of that person is available. Mason v. United States, 408 F.2d 903, 906 (10th Cir. 1969), cert, denied, 400 U.S. 993 (1971). Accord, Poe v. Turner, 490 F.2d 329, 332 (10th Cir. 1974); United States v. Allen, 409 F.2d 611, 613 (10th Cir. 1969); 4 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Evidence par. 804 (a) [01] (1976) (Weinstein & Berger); McCormick § 253.
I agree that, when a prospective witness validly declines to testify based on a proper assertion of the Fifth Amendment guaranty against self-incrimination or steadfastly refuses to testify despite a court order to do so, the testi-*511many of that witness is rendered unavailable. United States v. Elmore, 423 F.2d 775, 778 (4th Cir.), cert, denied, 400 U.S. 825 (1970). United States v. Allen, supra at 613. Mason v. United States, supra at 906. Fed. R. Evid. 804 (a) (1). See Cal. Evid. Code §240 (a) (1) (West); 4 Weinstein & Berger par. 804 (a) [01]; McCormick § 253; Annot., 45 A.L.R.2d 1354 (1956).
The right to confront a witness before the jury who hear the case should not be lost in the absence of a clear showing of need. Liacos, The Right of Confrontation, 33 Am. Trial Law. J. 243 (1970). Liacos, The Right of Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule: Another Look, 34 Am. Trial Law. J. 153 (1972). I note in this regard that the record fails to reveal any findings by the judge on the issue of whether or not a witness’s prior testimony constitutes a waiver of the privilege. In these circumstances, the record fails to demonstrate satisfaction of even the threshold justification of a use of the Curley transcript in lieu of his live testimony.
Additionally, the unavailability of Curley’s live testimony at the defendant’s trial on the conflict of interest indictments is only an initial factor in a determination whether the former testimony was properly placed before the jury. Because the use of Curley’s former testimony prevented the defendant from physically confronting Cur-ley during the criminal proceedings, the circumstances in which the former testimony was given must be examined to ascertain whether the testimony was given in compliance with the requisites of the confrontation clause. Of primary concern is whether Curley’s testimony in the civil trial bore sufficient “indicia of reliability,” Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. at 213; Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. at 89, to afford a satisfactory basis for the jury in the defendant’s subsequent criminal trial to evaluate the trustworthiness of the prior testimony.
Opportunity and motive for cross-examination are the most crucial factors in any evaluation of the reliability of former testimony. The prior judicial proceeding must furnish the defendant with an opportunity to confront the *512witness directly and to cross-examine him while he is under oath. More importantly, the considerations which guide the conduct of the cross-examination or the decision to waive cross-examination during the prior trial must be functionally equivalent to the considerations which prevail at the later trial where the former testimony is introduced. The defendant must have been a party to the earlier action. The confrontation clause permits nothing less. The issue on which the testimony was introduced in the first proceeding as well as the purpose for which the testimony was offered must be substantially similar to the issue and purpose for which the same testimony is offered at the subsequent criminal trial. See McCormick § 257. The issue and the purpose for offering the testimony need not be identical in both proceedings, but they must be sufficiently similar to ensure that the defendant had the same motive for cross-examining the witness at the earlier proceeding as he would have had at the later criminal trial, if the witness had appeared to testify. See Poe v. Turner, supra; Peterson v. United States, 344 F.2d 419, 424 (5th Cir. 1965); United States v. Franklin, 235 F. Supp. 338, 341 (D.D.C. 1964); Fed. R. Evid. 804 (b) (1); McCormick § 257; 5 Wigmore § 1387; 4 Weinstein & Berger par. 804 (b) (1) [04]. Cf. United States v. Wingate, 520 F.2d 309, 316 (2d Cir. 1975); First Nat’l Bank v. National Airlines, Inc., 22 F.R.D. 46, 48 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
The defendant in the present case was a party plaintiff in the prior civil proceeding. That trial was the result of an action initiated against Curley and Lynch by him to recover his share of the profits realized by the real estate investment venture. Among the defenses relied on by Cur-ley and Lynch was the assertion that the agreement to include the defendant in the real estate venture was illegal because it violated G. L. c. 268A. Curley was called by the defendant to testify about the real estate venture and the oral agreement which made the defendant a coinvestor in the project. Having called the opposing party while putting in his own case, the defendant was entitled to cross-examine him. G. L. c. 233, § 22. However, the issue on *513which Curley’s testimony was introduced was whether an agreement to include the defendant in the real estate venture had been reached by the parties. The defendant’s motive for examining Curley was to demonstrate that an agreement had been concluded which made the defendant a participant in the project and entitled him to receive an equal share of the profit realized by the venture. Conversely, the testimony given by Curley in the civil trial was introduced by the Commonwealth at the defendant’s criminal trial to prove that the defendant had illegally used his public office to foster private gain. Had Curley testified in person at the defendant’s trial on the indictments, the defendant’s motive for cross-examining him would certainly have been altered. He would have undoubtedly probed for inaccuracies and inconsistencies in Curley’s testimony and he would have had a stronger motive to impeach the witness.
Equally important in considering whether the defendant’s motive for cross-examining the witness was the same in both proceedings is the obvious shift in the underlying liability associated with the cases. In the civil action the defendant sought a financial recovery on the basis of an alleged breach of contract, but in the criminal prosecution, not only his liberty, but his personal and professional reputation in the community, was at stake. The crucial question whether private services were promised or rendered to the private project by the defendant was not in issue at the civil trial. Although one of the defenses asserted in response to the defendant’s contract claim was the alleged illegality of the agreement, the foundational theory and liability of the two cases were not parallel.
In the circumstances of this case, Curley’s testimony at the civil trial failed to contain sufficient indicia of reliability to justify its placement before the jury in the defendant’s trial on the conflict of interest indictments. The defendant is therefore entitled to a new trial at which his right to confront Curley will not be abridged by the introduction of testimony given by that witness in the earlier civil proceeding.

 The defendant adequately excepted to the charge on this issue by incorporating his arguments relative to his motion for a directed verdict on the issue of the propriety of the charge. See Commonwealth v. Freeman, 352 Mass. 556 (1967) .

 General Laws c. 268A, § 2 (b) (3), reads as follows: “(b) Whoever, being a state, county or municipal employee or a member of the judiciary or a person selected to be such an employee or member of the judiciary, directly or indirectly, corruptly asks, demands, exacts, solicits, seeks, accepts, receives or agrees to receive anything of value for himself or for any other person or entity, in return for... (3) being induced to do or omit to do any acts in violation of his official duty.”

 General Laws c. 268A, § 3 (b), reads as follows: “(b) Whoever, being a present or former state, county or municipal employee or member of the judiciary, or person selected to be such an employee or member of the judiciary, otherwise than as provided by law for the proper discharge of official duty, directly or indirectly, asks, demands, exacts, solicits, seeks, accepts, receives or agrees to receive anything of substantial value for himself for or because of any official act or act within his official responsibility performed or to be performed by him.”

 Cf. Commonwealth v. Dutney, 4 Mass. App. Ct. 363 (1976). To the extent that Dutney indicates that the offenses proscribed by G. L. c. 268A, §§ 2 (b) and 3 (b), are identical with that defined by § 17 (a), it should not be followed. I do not reach the point whether Dutney correctly holds that § 3 (b) is a lesser included offense under § 2 (b).

 Article 12 of the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution sets forth a similar right to meet adverse witnesses “face to face.” The confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution was applied to State proceedings through the Fourteenth Amendment in Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).

 California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155 (1970). Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 86 (1970).

 5 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 1395 (Chadbourn rev. 1974) (hereinafter cited as Wigmore). See McCormick, Evidence § 252 (2d ed. 1972) (hereinafter cited as McCormick).

 Dean Wigmore argues, however, that confrontation is an element of the hearsay rule and hence is merely another name for the opportunity of cross-examination. 5 Wigmore §§ 1366, 1397.