Court Opinion

ID: 9797426
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:20:27.568108+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:54:58.611589
License: Public Domain

BURKE, Justice,
dissenting.
[T25] I respectfully dissent, and would affirm the district court's decision that this was a valid search incident to arrest and reasonable under all of the circumstances. In my view, the majority reaches the opposite result by misapplying the standard of review, marginalizing officer safety as a factor to be weighed in the analysis, and overlooking the most meaningful difference between the state and federal standards.
[126] As part of its standard of review, the majority recites that "evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the district court's determination." It then proceeds to view the evidence in Mr. Pierce's favor. As just one example, the majority cites this factor in finding the search invalid:
By the officer's own account, he and the appellant engaged in a friendly conversation, the appellant was honest about his suspended license, and the appellant seemingly offered a reasonable explanation for his presence at the park.
The record presents a rather different picture. Mr. Pierce was in a municipal park in violation of a city ordinance. When the officer initiated contact, Mr. Pierce "raised his head and then flopped it back," a reaction that caused the officer concern for Mr. Pierce's welfare. Mr. Pierce admitted that his license was suspended, but attempted to mislead the officer by saying that he "did not have proof of insurance as it was in the process of getting transferred from his old car to the car he was driving now." He also provided the officer with inaccurate and misleading information concerning ownership of the vehicle. The majority portrays Mr. Pierce as a model citizen, when the facts of record, particularly viewed in the light most favorable to the district court's ruling, suggest otherwise.
[1 27] -It is the majority's weighing of officer safety, or rather its failure to weigh it properly in determining reasonableness, that I find most disturbing. There is evidence in the record indicating that Mr. Pierce's arrest raised safety concerns. For example, the officer called for backup and waited for it to arrive before arresting Mr. Pierce. Upon making the arrest, the officer placed Mr. Pierce in handcuffs and removed him to the police vehicle before initiating the search. In addition, the officer testified that leaving an unattended vehicle in a public park raised concerns about community safety.
[1 28] The majority appears to ignore this evidence, and instead relies on the fact that the officer who arrested Mr. Pierce did not express concern for his safety. However, "the test of officer safety is objective rather than subjective, and therefore the officer need not personally be in fear" to justify a search. United States v. Dennison, 410 F.3d 1203, 1213 (10th Cir.2005). "(Iln judging the legality of a search, courts must apply an objective standard and will not be bound by the subjective beliefs of the arresting officer." United States v. Jenkins, 496 F.2d 57, 72 (2d Cir.1974) (internal punctuation omitted). See also Brown v. State, 738 P.2d 1092, 1099 (Wyo.1987) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Whether or not the officer who arrested Mr. Pierce subjectively feared for his safety, the objective fact remains that he took routine safety precautions when arresting Mr. Pierce.
[129] The majority also seems to adopt Mr. Pierce's suggestion that officer safety concerns arise only when the nature of the crime makes it reasonable to suspect the presence of weapons. However, it fails to provide any guidance to help law enforce ment officials determine which arrests present safety risks and which do not. I agree with the United States Supreme Court, which has said it is not inclined, "on the basis of what seems to us to be a rather speculative judgment," to base the authority to *537search incident to arrest on the nature of the crime. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234, 94 S.Ct. 467, 476, 38 L.Ed.2d 427, 440 (1973).15 As a practical matter, when making an arrest, a police officer should not be required to make fine distinctions about which crimes imply the presence of weapons and which do not.
[180] Arrests are inherently dangerous. "Every arrest must be presumed to present a risk of danger to the arresting officer." Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 7, 102 S.Ct. 812, 817, 70 L.Ed.2d 778, 785 (1982). For that reason, the "constitutionality of a search incident to an arrest does not depend on whether there is any indication that the person arrested possesses weapons or evidence. The fact of a lawful arrest, standing alone, authorizes a search." Michigan v. DeFillippo, 448 U.S. 31, 35, 99 S.Ct. 2627, 2631, 61 L.Ed.2d 343, 348 (1979); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 2040, 23 L.Ed.2d 685, 694 (1969).
[T 81] It is well established that an officer is allowed to search an arrested person and the area within his or her immediate control. Clark v. State, 2006 WY 88, ¶16, 138 P.3d 677, 681 (Wyo.2006); Guzman v. State, 2003 WY 118, 118, 76 P.3d 825, 828 (Wyo.2003). Vasquez v. State, 990 P.2d 476 (Wyo.1999) says that such a search is allowed when there is reason to suspect the presence of evidence or weapons, but it does not say that a search is allowed only when there is evidence that weapons are present. Although 'it would seem obvious that every arrest involves officer safety concerns, it will be the rare case indeed when the officer will find "empty gun cartridges or casings in the bed of the truck." Id. at 480. There is no dispute that the officer validly arrested Mr. Pierce. Under our prior precedent, the officer was then allowed to search Mr. Pierce and the area within his immediate control at the time of the arrest. Surely, the officer must be allowed to conduct the search in a safe manner.
[132] Under the majority opinion, however, the officer apparently lost the authority to search Mr. Pierce's vehicle because he removed Mr. Pierce from the vehicle, handcuffed him, and placed him in the patrol car. The majority does not indicate at what point the officer lost the authority to conduct the search. This fails to provide sufficient guidance to allow law enforcement officials to determine when a search is unconstitutional, and thereby :"threaten[s] the stability that law enforcement expects and needs from the rules set forth by this Court governing officer conduct." Bailey v. State, 12 P.3d 173, 179 (Wyo.2000). Must an officer, trying to comply with the majority's ruling, conduct the search while the arrested person is still in the vehicle, before he is placed in handcuffs? It does not "make sense to prescribe a constitutional test that is entirely at odds with safe and sensible police procedures." United States v. Fleming, 677 F.2d 602, 607 (7th Cir.1982); United States v. Turner, 926 F.2d 883, 887-88 (Oth Cir.1991).
[133] The fundamental purpose underlying the exclusionary rule is prevention of police misconduct. As we recently observed:
The purpose of the exelusionary rule is to deter law enforcement from obtaining evidence through illegal means. However, the public has a vital interest in prosecuting those accused of crime and having them acquitted or convicted on the basis of all the evidence which exposes the truth. [AJpplication of the rule has been restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served. The penalties visited upon the Government, and in turn upon the public because its officers have violated the law, must bear some relation to the purposes which the law is to serve.
Hall v. State, 2007 WY 138, ¶11, 166 P.3d 875, 878 (Wyo.2007) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Considering the actions of the officer who arrested Mr. Pierce, it is unclear what conduct the majority seeks to discourage. The officer acted in *538accordance with established procedure, with due regard for the safety of himself, the other officers, the community, and Mr. Pierce. To the extent his safety precautions were routine police procedure, that underscores the point; routine police procedure treats every arrest as dangerous.
[T 34] A search incident to arrest may be lawfully performed only when a valid eustodial arrest is made, and an arrest may be made only with probable cause. "The search incident to arrest is reasonable ... because the privacy interest protected by that constitutional guarantee is legitimately abated by the fact of arrest." Robinson, 414 U.S. at 287-88, 94 S.Ct. at 477. Further, under the Wyoming constitutional standard, as under the federal standard, a search incident to arrest must be conducted "as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest." New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 2864, 69 L.Ed.2d 768, 775 (1981). Moreover, it is important to note that the occupant of a vehicle has a relatively low expectation of privacy. Vasquez, 990 P.2d at 488. Wyoming law has long recognized that automobiles are less protected from warrantless searches than homes. State v. Kelly, 38 Wyo. 455, 268 P. 571, 572 (1928). Together, these factors establish that an officer's authority to perform a vehicle search incident to arrest does not unduly impinge on individual rights.
[185] To be reasonable under all of the cireumstances, a search incident to arrest must be reasonable in scope. See Vasquez, 990 P.2d at 489. It is at this step in our analysis that the Wyoming standard varies most significantly from the bright-line Belton rule. Under Belton, an officer may search the entire passenger compartment of a vehicle, including containers, open or closed, without further justification. Under Vas-ques, the officers were allowed to search the entire passenger compartment, including the inside of a closed fuse box, based on reasonable suspicion that weapons or evidence were present. If the officer in Mr. Pierce's case had conducted such an intrusive search, it could well have violated Article 1, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution. However, the officer in Mr. Pierce's case searched only the driver's seat and its vicinity, that area within Mr. Pierce's immediate control at the time of his arrest. He opened the back door of the vehicle only to complete the search of the area immediately behind the driver's seat. There, he saw the syringes in plain view. The district court analyzed the evidence presented and concluded that the search was reasonable, stating:
Additionally, I think I agree with [defense counsel] that under the Vasquez case, we need to look at a reasonableness type standard. I think you articulated that very well.
It seemed to me from the testimony that I heard from this officer, who was very straightforward in my opinion, was that it was extremely reasonable for him to take a look at the interior of the vehicle. I presume that he opened the front door. And I think also in viewing the compartment area of the vehicle, his opening the back door was completely reasonable. He de-seribed it as a four-door vehicle, so there would be four doors into the compartment. And I would think opening any of the doors to undertake the search incident to arrest would be reasonable. And I think it would especially have application in this case given the area that he looked was right behind the front seat. And clearly that would be within the wingspan area or the area of reach from the area the defendant was sitting when he made contact with law enforcement.
I agree with the district court.
[186] The majority concedes that the search was valid under the federal standard established in Belton, 458 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 2860. We rejected the Belton bright-line rule in Vasquez, 990 P.2d 476, but with the reassurance that "[it will not be common that a search of an automobile incident to arrest will violate" the Wyoming Constitution, "and our decision should not raise new concerns for law enforcement." Id. at 489. In spite of this reassurance, the decision reached by the majority significantly alters the landscape for law enforcement. There is nothing uncommon about the officer's actions in this case. There is nothing in the record to' suggest that the procedures used were *539anything other than routine. Simply put, this is not one of those rare cases that would justify different results under federal and state constitutional analyses.

. "Although we are not bound by the Fourth Amendment decisions of the United States Supreme Court in this case, we may certainly follow its lead when we find its reasoning persuasive." Fertig v. State, 2006 WY 148, ¶17, 146 P.3d 492, 497 (Wyo.2006) (quoting Almada v. State, 994 P.2d 299, 309 (Wyo.1999)).