Court Opinion

ID: 9391056
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-29 06:00:09.607072+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:39.322072
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     RODNEY M. WALLS,                                DOCKET NUMBER
                  Appellant,                         DC-0752-21-0100-I-1

                  v.

     UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE,                   DATE: April 28, 2023
                   Agency.

             THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Albert E. Lum, Esquire, Brooklyn, New York, for the appellant.

           Keith L. Reid, Esquire, Piscataway, New Jersey, for the appellant.

           LaSandy K. Raynor, Esquire, Landover, Maryland, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                Tristan L. Leavitt, Member 2

                                       FINAL ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     sustained his demotion.     On petition for review, the appellant argues that the
     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
     2
       Member Leavitt’s name is included in decisions on which the three -member Board
     completed the voting process prior to his March 1, 2023 departure.
                                                                                             2

     administrative judge considered evidence that she should not have considered,
     and he generally challenges her credibility determinations. Petition for Review
     (PFR) File, Tab 1. He also reasserts his affirmative defenses of reprisal for equal
     employment opportunity (EEO) and whistleblowing activity and his claim of due
     process violations. Id. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the
     following circumstances:       the initial decision contains erroneous findings of
     material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute
     or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the
     administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial
     decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of
     discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and
     material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due
     diligence, was not available when the record closed.           Title 5 of the Code of
     Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115).                 After fully
     considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not
     established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review.
     Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED to
     clarify   the   appropriate   legal   framework     for   analyzing    the   appellant’s
     whistleblower reprisal claim, we AFFIRM the initial decision.
¶2         We discern no error in the administrative judge’s findings that the agency
     proved the charge of inappropriate behavior by a supervisor by preponderant
     evidence and that the penalty of demotion promotes the efficiency of the service
     and was reasonable.      Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 35, Initial Decision (ID)
     at 14-25, 32-35. 3 Regarding the appellant’s affirmative defenses, we discern no

     3
       Regarding the penalty of demotion, we observe that, in the decision notice, the
     deciding official stated that the appellant’s 23 years of service “should have afforded
     [him] many opportunities to understand and put into practice the Postal Service’s
     commitment to certain standards and expectations, espe cially those concerning conduct
     and behavior.” IAF, Tab 4 at 23. To the extent this statement suggests that the
     appellant’s length of service was an aggravating factor, such an analysis is in error. See
                                                                                            3

     error in the administrative judge’s finding that the appellant failed to prove his
     claim that the agency violated his due process rights. 4 ID at 30-32. We similarly
     find no basis to disturb the administrative judge’s finding that the appellant failed
     to prove his claim of EEO reprisal.
¶3         Regarding the appellant’s EEO reprisal claim, however, we note that, in the
     initial decision, the administrative judge relied on the standard applied by the

     Brown v. Department of the Treasury, 91 M.S.P.R. 60, ¶ 17 (2002) (stating that it is
     erroneous to consider an employee’s length of service as an aggravating, rather than
     mitigating, factor); Shelly v. Department of the Treasury, 75 M.S.P.R. 677, 684 (1997)
     (explaining that the Board does not endorse an approach that categorizes an employee’s
     lengthy service as aggravating because, under that approach, “the longer someone
     works, the more likely it is that a single misstep will be fatal to his or her career”) .
     Nonetheless, we independently find the penalty of demotion to be reasonable. The
     appellant’s misconduct was serious, as it directly relates to his work relationship with
     his coworkers. Further, he was in a supervisory role and was, therefore, held to a
     higher standard of conduct.        See Bowman v. Small Business Administration,
     122 M.S.P.R. 217, ¶ 12 (2015). Finally, the appellant’s misconduct was repeated.
     Thus, we discern no reason to disturb the administrative judge’s finding that the penalty
     of demotion was reasonable. ID at 35; see Arena v. U.S. Postal Service, 121 M.S.P.R.
     125, ¶ 6 (2014), aff’d, 617 F. App’x 996 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Table) (stating that, in
     evaluating the penalty, the Board will consider, first and foremost, the nature and
     seriousness of the misconduct and its relationship to the employee’s duties, position,
     and responsibilities, including whether the offense was intentional or was frequently
     repeated); Hanna v. Department of Labor, 80 M.S.P.R. 294, ¶¶ 15-17 (1998) (finding
     that the appellant’s demotion was reasonable, despite 19 years of service, based on a
     charge of inappropriate behavior by a supervisor).
     4
       The appellant also argues on review that the administrative judge violated his due
     process rights when she considered evidence related to events that predate the charge at
     issue here and complaints from other employees that were not named in the notice of
     proposed removal and the decision notice mitigating the penalty. PFR File, Tab 1
     at 7-8, 10-11. This argument is without merit. Although the administrative judge
     discussed events prior to those identified in the agency’s charge, she did not rely on
     evidence related to those events in her analysis of the charge. Rather, any such
     discussion is limited to background information. ID at 2-25. Regarding his claim that
     the administrative judge heard evidence from complainants not na med in the proposal
     or decision notice, we observe that both the notice of proposed removal and the
     decision notice explicitly reference “other employees” in the appellant’s department as
     those having issues with the appellant’s behavior. IAF, Tab 4 at 22 , 30-31. Thus, it
     was not inappropriate for the administrative judge to hear evidence of “other
     employees.” Accordingly, the appellant has not proven that the administrative judge
     violated his due process rights.
                                                                                       4

     Board when analyzing an affirmative defense of discrimination or retaliation
     under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16, which is set forth in Savage v. Department of the
     Army, 122 M.S.P.R. 612, ¶ 51 (2015), overruled in part by Pridgen v. Office of
     Management and Budget, 2022 MSPB 31, ¶¶ 23-25. Under Savage, an appellant
     must show that the prohibited consideration was a motivating factor in the
     contested personnel action. 122 M.S.P.R. 612, ¶ 51. The administrative judge
     found that the appellant failed to make such a showing. ID at 29 -30.
¶4           Upon close examination, the appellant’s EEO complaint does not appear in
     the record, and he has asserted that his EEO complaint was based on threatening,
     retaliatory, and harassing behavior from coworkers. IAF, Tab 8 at 4-5, 28-34.
     He does not appear to assert a claim of discrimination under any of the
     EEO-based antidiscrimination statutes.    Id.   To the extent that the appellant’s
     EEO complaint was not rooted in the antidiscrimination provisions and thus the
     standard governing general reprisal claims set forth in Warren v. Department of
     the Army, 804 F.2d. 654, 656-58 (Fed. Cir. 1986) applies, the result would be the
     same.     Specifically, the administrative judge observed that the appellant had
     explicitly acknowledged that the proposing official had a “standing belief of not
     caring if someone files an EEO.” ID at 30; IAF, Tab 17 at 75. Additionally, she
     credited the proposing official and deciding official’s explanation for taking the
     action against the appellant. ID at 30. Thus, to the extent the administrative
     judge’s application of the Savage standard constitutes error, any such error did
     not affect the outcome of this appeal. See Panter v. Department of the Air Force,
     22 M.S.P.R. 281, 282 (1984) (finding that an adjudicatory error that is not
     prejudicial to a party’s substantive rights provides no basis to reverse an initial
     decision).
¶5           Regarding the appellant’s claim of whistleblower reprisal, a lthough we
     ultimately agree with the administrative judge’s conclusion that the appellant
     failed to prove that his demotion was in reprisal for engaging in whistleblowing
     activity, we clarify here the appropriate standard for such a claim brought by an
                                                                                        5

     employee of the U.S. Postal Service. Below, the appellant alleged that he filed a
     complaint with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and
     the Office of Inspector General (OIG) and that such actions constitute protected
     activity for which he was later retaliated against. IAF, Tab 1 at 8, Tab 10 at 6. In
     considering these claims, the administrative judge applied the analytical
     framework from the whistleblower protection statutes, which assesses whether the
     appellant made a protected disclosure or engaged in a protected activity that was
     a contributing factor to the agency action. ID at 25. In so doing, she found that,
     although the appellant established a prima facie case of whistleblower reprisal,
     the agency proved by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the
     same action even in the absence of the whistleblowing activity.         ID at 25-29
     (citing Carr v. Social Security Administration, 185 F.3d 1318, 1322 (Fed. Cir.
     1999)). On review, the appellant generally challenges the administrative judge’s
     findings regarding this affirmative defense, stating that he “established all the
     factors in his assertion that he was being retaliated against” for his filing of the
     OSHA and OIG complaints.         PFR File, Tab 1 at 13.       He has not, however,
     explained with any specificity this position, nor has he pointed to any evidence in
     the record disputing the administrative judge’s findings.
¶6        Nonetheless, we modify the initial decision to apply the appropriate
     analytical framework to this affirmative defense.           Notably, the appellant’s
     employer is the U.S. Postal Service, and the whistleblower protection statutes do
     not apply to the U.S. Postal Service. 5     See Greenlee v. U.S. Postal Service,
     101 M.S.P.R. 323, ¶ 7 (2006) (stating that the Whistleblower Protection Act does
     not apply to the U.S. Postal Service); Mack v. U.S. Postal Service, 48 M.S.P.R.
     617, 621 (1991) (reasoning that the U.S. Postal Service is not an “agency” as

     5
       Although the Board has expressly addressed this principle as it relates to the
     Whistleblower Protection Act, see Greenlee v. U.S. Postal Service, 101 M.S.P.R. 323,
     ¶ 7 (2006), it has not done so with respect to the Whistleblower Protection
     Enhancement Act (WPEA). Nonetheless, the underlying rationale in Greenlee is not
     changed by the WPEA.
                                                                                        6

     defined under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(C) and its employees are, therefore, not
     covered under 5 U.S.C. § 1221). Specifically, the Board has found that the lower
     “contributing factor” standard of proof set forth in the whistleblower protection
     statutes does not apply to employees who are not in a covered agency, such as the
     U.S. Postal Service.    See Mack, 48 M.S.P.R. at 621.        Rather, the Board has
     explained that the “higher standard of proof applicable to all other claims of
     reprisal,” as set forth in Warren, applies to U.S. Postal Service cases to show
     reprisal such as that prohibited under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8), (9).                Id.
     Accordingly, to establish this affirmative defense, the appellant must show that
     his OSHA and OIG complaints constituted protected activity, that the proposing
     and deciding officials were aware of that protected activity, that the appellant’s
     demotion could, under the circumstances, have been retaliation, and that there
     was a genuine nexus between the retaliation and the demotion.          See Warren,
     804 F.2d at 656-58; Mattison v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 123 M.S.P.R.
     492, ¶ 8 (2016).
¶7         In applying the Warren standard, we nonetheless believe that the
     administrative judge’s analysis is sound. In the initial decision, she reason ed that
     the agency had strong evidence for its demotion action and that the deciding
     official’s decision to mitigate the proposed removal to a demotion evidenced
     “thoughtful consideration of both the appellant’s serious misconduct and his
     ability to perform non-supervisory work.”       ID at 27; IAF, Tab 4 at 23-26.
     Additionally, she noted that, although the proposing official was the subject of
     the OSHA complaint, he was not disciplined or otherwise negatively affected by
     it. ID at 27. Further, there is no evidence that the deciding official or any of the
     appellant’s subordinates who complained about his behavior were implicated in
     the complaint and, therefore, would have had no motive to retaliate. Based on
     these observations and findings, we find that the appellant failed to prove that the
     agency action could have been retaliation or that there was a genuine nexus
     between the OSHA and OIG complaints and his demotion.                 As such, we
                                                                                      7

ultimately agree with the administrative judge that the appellant failed to
establish this affirmative defense.

                         NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 6
      The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the
Board’s final decision in this matter.      5 C.F.R. § 1201.113.     You may obtain
review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of
your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate
forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following
summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not
provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation and
the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule
regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to see k review of
this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your
claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file
within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by you r
chosen forum.
      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.             5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).

6
  Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may hav e updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                         8

      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit    your   petition    to   the   court   at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or    EEOC    review     of   cases      involving    a   claim    of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.      5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017).                 If you have a
representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before
you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days
after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of
                                                                                  9

discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling
condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and
to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                  P.O. Box 77960
                             Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant   to   the   Whistleblower     Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
                                                                                     10

other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section
2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),
(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of
competent jurisdiction. 7   The court of appeals must receive your petition for
review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.               5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                               U.S. Court of Appeals
                               for the Federal Circuit
                              717 Madison Place, N.W.
                              Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our we bsite at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The

7
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                           11

Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                            /s/ for
                                          Jennifer Everling
                                          Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.