Court Opinion

ID: 9697614
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:23:03.767313+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:33.705699
License: Public Domain

GANTMAN, J.,
Dissenting.
¶ 1 With all due respect, I disagree with the majority when it concludes the parole officers had no basis to enter the unapproved residence where they found Appel-lee. Hence, I dissent.
¶2 “A parolee and a probationer have limited Fourth Amendment rights because of a diminished expectation of privacy.” Commonwealth v. Williams, 547 Pa. 577, 585, 692 A.2d 1031, 1035 (1997).
[A parolee’s] home like anyone else’s, is protected by the Fourth Amendment’s requirement that searches be reasonable. However, the requirement that a parole officer obtain a warrant based upon probable cause before conducting a search does not apply to a parolee because parole is a form of criminal punishment imposed after a guilty verdict and the states must have the necessary power over parolees in order to successfully administer a parole system as a controlled passageway between prison and freedom.
Id. (citing Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 107 S.Ct. 3164, 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987)). The prisoner on parole is still in the custody of the state and remains under the control of the Commonwealth until his sentence expires. Williams, supra at 587, *1199692 A.2d at 1036. Our Supreme Court explained:
[T]he parolee’s signing of a parole agreement giving his parole officer permission to conduct a warrantless search does not mean either that the parole officer can conduct a search at any time or for any reason or that the parolee relinquishes his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches. Rather, the parolee’s signature acts as acknowledgement that the parole officer has a right to conduct reasonable searches of [the parolee’s] residence listed on the parole agreement without a warrant. A search will be deemed reasonable if the totality of the evidence demonstrates: (1) that the parole officer had a reasonable suspicion that the parolee had committed a parole violation, and (2) that the search was reasonably related to the parole officer’s duty.
Id. at 588, 692 A.2d at 1036.
The statutory authority relating to searches by county parole and probation officers based on reasonable suspicion is derived from 61 P.S. § 331.27b(d)(1)(i). Pursuant to that statute, a personal search of an offender may be conducted by any officer ... if there is a reasonable suspicion to believe that the offender possesses contraband or other evidence of violations of the conditions of supervision. ... [T]he requirement that a parole [or probation] officer obtain a warrant based on probable cause before conducting a search does not apply.
Commonwealth v. Moore, 805 A.2d 616, 620 (2002).
¶ 3 In the instant case, Appellee signed a parole agreement allowing for warrant-less searches of his premises. In the performance of their duties, the parole officers investigated information that Appellee was living at an unapproved residence. Once the parole officers actually saw Ap-pellee at the reported unapproved residential address, watched him go freely into the residence and come out quickly to talk to them, and observed a pager lying inside the house on the floor in plain view, I think the parole officers had reasonable grounds to suspect Appellee was living at that location and violating his parole. The parole officers were not obligated to accept Ap-pellee’s story at face value. See generally Commonwealth v. Riley, 715 A.2d 1131 (Pa.Super.1998), appeal denied, 558 Pa. 617, 737 A.2d 741 (1999) (reiterating that detention and limited investigation is not illegal simply because suspected criminal behavior may also be consistent with innocent behavior).
¶ 4 The inquiry here was whether the unapproved location was Appellee’s living quarters and whether it could be subject to a parole search. Appellee’s parole agreement barred his lodging at an unapproved address. That agreement also banned access to a pager or cell phone, considered to be associated with drugs. However, Pennsylvania law on parole agreements allows for parole searches of the “approved” residence.
¶ 5 Nevertheless, I conclude the parole officers has sufficient reasonable suspicion to conduct a property search of the unapproved residence under Section 331.27b(d)(2), which provides: “A property search may be conducted by any officer if there is reasonable suspicion to believe that the real or other property in the possession of or under the control of the offender contains contraband or other evidence of violations of the conditions of supervision.” See 61 P.S. § 331.27b(d)(2) (emphasis added). When the officers went inside the home, they immediately saw mail in plain view and addressed to Appel-lee at the unapproved address. Appellee also had a key to the premises on his key *1200ring. This evidence coupled with the pager constituted indicia of the precise parole violations the officers were investigating.
¶ 6 Based on this evidence, Appellee’s parole officer sought his supervisor’s approval for a property search related to the specific parole violations under investigation. Once Appellee’s parole officer established Appellee was residing in the unapproved address and observed drugs incident to his parole search, the parole search ceased.
¶ 7 Under the totality of the circumstances, I think the parole officer had reasonable suspicion to believe Appellee was living at that unapproved address and committing possessory parole violations; and, the officer’s search was consistent with and reasonably related to his duty to confirm the violations. See Williams, supra. The search was not illegal simply because it revealed incriminating evidence for use in a criminal prosecution. See id.
¶ 8 Frankly, I do not share the “what if’ concerns suggested in the majority’s analysis. Parolees remain in the Commonwealth’s custody until their sentences expire, and parole officers still have to meet a threshold albeit reduced requirement of reasonable suspicion. Further, nothing in the record indicates Appellee objected to the parole officers entering the home. In fact, Appellee had actual or apparent authority to allow it.
¶ 9 Finally, I disagree with the majority, which states: “In the present case, when POs Anderson and Cooper entered the residence at 357 S. 18th Street they did not yet have probable cause to believe that Appellee resided at that address.” I think that standard is incorrect. Accordingly, I dissent.