Court Opinion

ID: 9661843
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:52:41.596187+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:34.402244
License: Public Domain

DONNELLY, Judge,
concurring.
I would make a few observations on the issue of double jeopardy.
My Brother Seiler would, for constitutional purposes, and in a situation calling for a bifurcated proceeding, relate the prohibition against double jeopardy not only to the offense of capital murder of which Bull-ington was convicted but also to the punishment imposed for the offense of which he was convicted. He would reason that Bull-ington can be retried for the offense of which he was originally convicted because he waived the double jeopardy protection by attacking the validity of his conviction on Duren grounds — but Bullington cannot be subjected to a punishment greater than that assessed at his first trial because there was an implied acquittal of punishment by death.
In order to embrace such a position, capital murder must be treated as two offenses (capital murder where death may be imposed and capital murder where imprisonment for at least fifty years may be imposed) or it must be assumed that there are two “degrees” of capital murder (one sufficient to impose death and one not).
In my view, the discretion given by statute to assess punishment at less than death does not support either proposition. I find nothing in either constitution which would require that we construe capital murder as constituting two offenses or as being divided into degrees. The jury finding in October 1978 that Bullington should be sentenced to life imprisonment without probation or parole for not less than fifty years was not a determination that any element of the offense of capital murder is lacking. The constraints of double jeopardy are not involved here.
I would also make a few observations about imposition of the death penalty under § 565.008, RSMo 1978.
Article I, § 21 of the Constitution of Missouri provides that “excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted.” (Emphasis supplied.)
In my view, the taking of a life for a life is not always cruel. History teaches us that it is not unusual.
The taking of the life of a human being by another human being “unlawfully, willfully, knowingly, deliberately, and with premeditation” (§ 565.001, RSMo 1978) cannot be tolerated by organized society. Our *919Constitution promises that the “natural right to life” of all persons will be protected. Mo.Const. art. I, § 2.
The ultimate question is: May that protection be effected by the imposition of capital punishment? The arguments which swirl about us as to the validity of suggested justifications for the imposition of death as punishment (e. g., retribution and deterrence) make for fascinating reading but miss the mark. See S. Donnelly, A Theory of Justice, Judicial Methodology, and the Constitutionality of Capital Punishment: Rawls, Dworkin, and a Theory of Criminal Responsibility, 29 Syracuse L.Rev. 1109 (1978); and R. Gardner, Capital Punishment: The Philosophers and the Court, 29 Syracuse L.Rev. 1175 (1978).
However, it is my personal belief that an organized society that takes a life for a life as a part of its public policy is mistaken in its belief that it is promoting its own basic premise “that all government * * * is instituted solely for the good of the whole.” Mo.Const. art. I, § 1.
Although I am compelled to concur, it is my view that taking the life of a human being “willfully, knowingly, deliberately, and with premeditation” (albeit “lawfully”) by an organized society is socially amoral. I think it will be self-destructive and that inevitably it will lower the quality of society and will be detrimental, if not devastating, to “the good of the whole.” In warfare a fragile line sometimes exists between amoral killing and killing regarded as moral by world society. Here I think the line is not fragile but plain. Establishment of a studied public policy by which a whole community intentionally crosses the line into what I view as amoral killing, even though legal, represents a risk too great to itself for that community to assume.
In my view, banishment for fifty years (§ 565.008, RSMo 1978), with no concern for the probable fiction of rehabilitation, is an acceptable alternative. It would effectually excise the transgressor from our society without debilitating our society’s collective concept of decency.
However, I have no authority to impose such views on the people of Missouri. To borrow from Mr. Justice Frankfurter: “As a member of this Court I am not justified in writing my private notions of policy into the Constitution, no matter how deeply I may cherish them or how mischievous I may deem their disregard.” West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 647, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 1189, 87 L.Ed. 1628 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
I have spoken of the death penalty in terms of public policy. It should be noted that constitutional concerns must be addressed by this Court, under authority of § 565.014, RSMo 1978, in each case where death is imposed as punishment.
I concur.