Court Opinion

ID: 9499532
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 17:50:59.661177+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:59:34.151209
License: Public Domain

ALICE M. BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge.
I respectfully dissent because I do not agree that this case involves a “series of discrete violations.” I believe this case involves, at most, a single violation that occurred in 1988, and therefore, its statute of limitations expired five years later. I would affirm the district court.
Under Tennessee law, the TVA was required to obtain two separate permits: a construction permit, see Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1200 — 3—9.01; and an operating permit, see id. at .02. The TVA has an operating permit and no one in the present case has alleged any violation of it. The claim here is that because the TVA failed to obtain a construction permit prior to its plant modification in 1988 (or any time since), it is emitting pollutants above the allowable BACT levels. Based on my reading of the law, I would hold that, even if this claim is true, this condition constitutes a series of discrete harms and not a series of discrete violations.
By way of example, suppose I contracted with a carpenter to repair the roof of my home. If he failed to do so, then he would have breached the contract — a single violation. Under this scenario, I suffer a new harm every time it rains, i.e., every time water comes into my living room through the faulty roof. The carpenter does not, however, breach the contract anew every time it rains; that is, the carpenter does not commit a new and discrete violation. I believe the same reasoning applies to the present case, and this reasoning is consistent with Tolbert v. Ohio Department of Transportation, 172 F.3d 934, 940 (6th Cir.1999) (distinguishing “continuing ill effects” from “continuing unlawful acts”). To complete the present example: if a violation (rather than merely a new harm) occurs each time it rains, then the corollary is that it must rain in order for a violation to occur, and under such a theory, I would not be able to sue the carpenter for breaching the contract to repair my roof until after I had suffered through at least one rain storm. In truth, however; I could sue the carpenter as soon as I became aware of his breach of the contract; I need not wait for it to rain, and if I were'to wait, I would likely be held accountable for such a delay.
Returning to the present' case, let us assume, arguendo, that the TVA was in fact required to obtain a construction permit before beginning its modification of the Bull Run plant in 1988. By failing to do so, it committed a violation. Under this scenario, the plaintiffs' may have suffered a new harm every time thereafter that the plant was in operation (i.e., emitting pollutants above the BACT levels), but just as with the carpenter, the TVA did not violate the construction permit requirement anew every time the plant was operating. That is, the TVA did not commit a new and discrete violation of the construction permit requirement every time it operated the plant, particularly if-the TVA was in compliance with its operating permit. To complete this reasoning; if a violation (rather *421than merely a harm) occurs each time the plant operates, then the corollary is that the plant must operate in order for a violation to occur, and under such a theory, there would be no violation for failing to obtain a construction permit until after the TVA had operated the plant at least one time. While that is an apt description of an operating permit, it is an inapt description of a construction permit.
Because I find this “discrete violations” approach unsupported by law or reason, I must respectfully dissent. This seems to me to be the plaintiffs’ strained attempt to circumvent their failure to act within the statute of limitations. If they have a claim that the TVA is violating its operating permit by emitting pollutants in excess of BACT levels, then they should file that claim. The present claim, however, expired in 1993. I would affirm.