Court Opinion

ID: 9832924
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 22:18:09.259438+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:55.467613
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
The motion for rehearing attacks the original opinion in so far as it holds that the error, if any, has not been properly presented either by the record or by appellant’s brief. While the affirmance was based primarily upon these defects, we did say in the original opinion that the appellant did not show in its motion for new trial that it had a meritorious defense, and that the motion was further insufficient in that it showed that there has been no diligence exercised in filing an answer in time to prevent a judgment by default. We did not enlarge upon this phase .of the case, deeming it unnecessary, but in justice to appellant we think it proper to discuss these questions in the light of the record.
The only proposition urged in appellant’s brief, unsupported by any assignment filed in the trial court or in this court, by its very language confesses that there has been such negligence and carelessness in the manner of filing an answer that the motion should have been overruled. The proposition asserts that because it appears from the allegations of the motion and the evidence introduced upon the hearing of the motion that the failure to file an answer in the cause “was due to an inadvertence and mistake and to the absence of said attorney from his office” etc., that the court erred in overruling the motion to set aside the judgment. “Inadvertence” means inattention; neglect. Unfortunately for appellant, this is too true/and the record shows it.
The citation was served July 21, 1926. The judgment by default was not rendered until August 18th, that being the third day of the return term. In his motion for new trial Mr. Senter says that this citation was received by appellant’s general agents, at Houston, about the 25th of July, and forwarded by them to him at Dallas; that he as the member of the firm of Senter, Strong & Young, was employed by the general agents of appellant to give attention to that business; that he was not in the city of Dallas at the time the citation was received in the office of his firm, and did not return to his office until several days thereafter; that the citation was misplaced in the office by a clerk therein, and was not brought to his attention until after default judgment was rendered, because he was absent on the return day of the citation; that it was accidentally discovered by a clerk upon that day that it had been misplaced, and as soon as it was discovered a telegram was sent to attorneys at Uubbock, requesting them to file a formal answer.
Upon the trial of the motion, Mr. True Strong, a member of Mr. Senter’s firm during July and August, 1926, testified that Mr. Senter was the member of his firm who represented the appellant insurance company, and that all matters were sent direct to him from the general agents; that Mr. Senter opened all the mail received in the office and disbursed it' to the different parties to handle it with instructions. He further testified that at the time the citation was received, Mr. Senter was in Decatur, Wichita Palls, and Dumas, appearing in cases in all three towns, and he did not return until about the 19th day of August, but was gone some three or four weeks, and that during most of that time he, Mr. Strong, was out of the office in Clarksville and Dublin; however, he further testified that he returned about the 1st of August and that the citation was on his desk without any file or any information or data on the loss from which answer could be made.
If Mr. Senter was the member of the firm who opened the mail and distributed the business among the other members, then how is it that the citation was found on Mr. Strong’s desk on August 1st? If the clerk had lost it and misplaced it upon its arrival, as Mr. Senter states, and it was not called to his attention until'default day, who opened the mail and placed the citation on Mr. Strong’s desk on August 1st? Mr. Strong states that he returned to his office on the 18th of August, and on turning through the firm’s docket sheets saw there was ho notation on there of an answer having been filed. How does it happen that the case was docketed if the citation had never been seen by any one until Mr. Senter returned on the 18th? Mr. Strong further says, “When we made an investigation to find our office copy of an answer, we found none, and I immediately wired Bledsoe & Crenshaw to file á formal answer.” If this business was the personal and special business of Mr. Senter, and he alone was employed by the general agents to look after it, how does it -happen that Mr. Strong is attending to it? If Mr. Strong was authorized on the 18th to wire attorneys at Lubbock to file a formal answer, why could he not have sent the wire on August 1st? Or, better still, why could not a formal answer have been prepared on August 1st and mailed to the district clerk at Lubbock? If Mr. Strong found the citation lying on his desk on August 1st, then Mr. Senter is mistaken in saying that it came to his office during his absence and was misplaced by some clerk in his office. He charges that' it was the clerk in the office who failed to bring the matter of the citation to his attention until after default judgment was rendered. By every principle of law *685and equity tibe negligence of Mr. Senter’s clerk is Mr. Senter’s negligence.
If it be admitted that Mr. Senter’s absence from his office for three or four weeks, during which time the citation reached his office, excuses him for failing to file an'answer or wiring local counsel at Lubbock to file an answer, it does not excuse the general agents, nor the other members of Mr. Senter’s firm, for their failure to file .a formal answer. A general demurrer and a general denial filed before appearance day would have prevented a judgment by default, so we sustain that part of the proposition which says the failure to file an answer was due to inadvertence; and we must presume that the trial court arrived at the same conclusion.
. The 'proposition further states that it was due to mistake, but we are not informed as to whose mistake resulted in the judgment by default. Whether the mistake is attributable to the general agents, Mr. Senter, Mr. Strong, ór the clerk in their office, it certainly is not chargeable, to the appellee in this case. What was the mistake? The record fails to show. There was the citation commanding the appellant to answer on the 18th of August. They knew that unless some answer was filed on or before appearance day a judgment by default would probably result. While we think the proposition is true in so far as it says the failure to file the answer was the result of inadvertence and negligence, there is not a syllable in the record that shows that it was due to any mistake by any one which is chargeable to the appellees.
The ■ failure of appellant’s counsel under all the circumstances to wire local attorneys at Lubbock until the afternoon of the day following appearance day to file a formal answer shows utter lack of diligence. Appellate courts treat with great deference the action of trial courts on motions for new trial (Cotulla State Bank v. Herron [Tex. Civ. App.] 202 S. W. 797), because that is a matter largely within the discretion of the lower cofirt, and every reasonable presumption must be indulged in support of the ruling on such motions (McCaskey v. McCall [Tex. Civ. App.] 226 S. W: 432). As said by Judge Wheeler in Ables v. Donley, 8 Tex. 331:
“In revising the judgment of the district court, refusing a new trial, it has been the uniform practice of this court, not to reverse the judgment, unless it clearly appears that the party applying has brought his application within those rules which entitle him to a new trial, as a matter of law. The inquiry has been, not whether, upon the evidence in the record, it apparently might have been proper to grant the application in the particular case; but, whether the refusal of it has involved the violation of a clear legal right, or a manifest abuse of judicial discretion.”
Nothing is clearer than that no legal right of the appellant was violated by the action of the trial court in waiting until the morning of the day following appearance day to render the judgment by default. Mr. Senter’s affidavit would make the clerk in his office his scapegoat, but Mr. Strong’s testimony upon the hearing exculpates the clerk, who, presumably, during the protracted absence of Mr. Senter, had opened the letter from the general agents to the latter, and had laid the citation on Mr. Strong’s desk on or before August 1st, where Mr. Strong found it 17 days prior to the rendition of the judgment. Upon this question the clerk has not yet been heard from. The mistake, if any, according to Mr. Senter’s affidavit, is that of the appellant company in having general agents who had employed only one busy member of a'law firm, who had, in turn, employed a careless clerk, or' in employing only one such member of the firm whose business kept him for three or four weeks at a time away from his office when his services were badly needed. None of these mistakes, if they can be properly so termed, are chargeable to appellee. This is not a case where a judgment has been rendered after answer filed, and during the unavoidable or excusable absence of a defendant’s counsel, nor is it a case where the judgment is a result of any fraud or misleading conduct of defendants or their counsel, or because of any mistake of any officer of the court. It is simply a case where a defendant, though properly served with citation nearly a month prior to appearance day, has failed to file an answer in time to prevent judgment by default. One reason for such failure is stated by its counsel to be inadvertence. Another reason is mistake. Exactly whose inadvertence or mistake is not made clear by the record. In the absence of a showing that appellees are in some manner responsible, appellant shows no ground for a new trial. Southwestern Surety Ind. Co. v. Gulf, T. & W. Ry. (Tex. Civ. App.) 196 S. W. 276; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Skinner, 60 Tex. Civ. App. 477, 128 S. W. 715; Shipp v. Anderson (Tex. Civ. App.) 173 S. W. 598; Commonwealth B. & C. Co. v. Stearns (Tex. Civ. App.) 182 S. W. 1197; Freeman v. Neyland, 23 Tex. 530. Mistakes of one’s counsel, unaccompanied with fraud, accident, or improper conduct of the opposite side, unmixed with fraud or negligence on his part, is not ground for setting aside a judgment by default. M., K. & T. Ry. v. Davidson, 25 Tex. Civ. App. 134, 60 S. W. 278; Scrivner v. Malone, 30 Tex. 773; Foster v. Martin, 20 Tex. 118; Tarrant County v. Lively, 25 Tex. Supp. 403; Union Central Life Insurance Co. v. Lipscombe (Tex. Civ. App.) 27 S. W. 307; Merrill v. Roberts, 78 Tex. 28, 14 S. W. 254; Harn v. Phelps, 65 Tex. 597; Vardeman v. Edwards, 21 Tex. 737; Burnley v. Rice, 21 Tex. 171; Cromer v. Sgit*686covich, 28 Tex. Civ. App. 193, 66 S. W. 882; Wilson v. Smith, 17 Tex. Civ. App. 188, 43 S. W. 1086; Martin v. Clements (Tex. Civ. App.) 193 S. W. 437; Power v. Gillispie, 27 Tex. 370; Western Lmb. Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & G. Ry. (Tex. Civ. App.) 180 S. W. 644; Wheat v. Ward County Water Imp. Dist. No. 2 (Tex. Civ. App.) 217 S. W. 713; Schultz v. Burk (Tex. Civ. App.) 227 S. W. 700; Flanagan v. Holbrook (Tex. Civ. App.) 60 S. W. 321; Texas Fire Ins. Co. v. Berry, 33 Tex. Civ. App. 228, 76 S. W. 219.
We held in the. original opinion that the appellant’s attempt to show that it had a meritorious defense was wholly insufficient. We have again reviewed the motion and the record, and are convinced that the court, even as to this,feature of the motion, did not err in overruling it.
Paragraph 5 of the motion relates to this feature of the case, and it is vaguely intimated that the appellees may possibly have been in some way connected with the destruction of the building, but the averments are not direct and positive that either Mr. Senter ' or his client really believes in the merit of such a defense. It is stated in paragraph 5:
“That this defendant is without knowledge which would authorize it to make the charge that the plaintiffs are chargeable with the destruction of said property; * * * that a full, fair, and impartial investigation should be made of such reports; that defendant has not had time nor an opportunity to make such investigation; that it does not desire to do injustice to the plaintiffs, or either of them, but merely seeks an opportunity to ascertain the facts and to present the case in court if there are facts and circumstances which tend to show the plaintiffs, or either of them, are responsible for the destruction of said property.”
In paragraph 5, the motion recites:
“Defendants show that if a full and fair investigation .of the facts is. made, it shall be disclosed that there is no reasonable ground for believing that plaintiffs, or either of them, are responsible for the destruction of the property, then it is the desire of this defendant to pay off and discharge the amount of the claim as asserted by the plaintiffs in their petition herein.”
The record shows that the building burned more than 4% months prior to the filing of the motion, and the failure of the appellant to make the investigation of the facts incident to the destruction of the building shows such negligence and want of diligence as authorized the trial court to overrule the motion on that ground. Of course, if appellees, or either of them, burned the building or had it done, that would be a complete defense, but there is no averment in the motion that they did, and Mr. Senter does not swear that he believes that they did, nor does he allege or swear that he had credible information with regard to it. The extent of his allegation is “that the defendant” (not the affiant, Mr. Senter) “is advised” (without naming the party imparting the information), and (Mr. Senter) “avers upon credible information” (without giving the name of the informant), “that the officers of Yoakum county, Tex.” (without naming any of them), “immediately after the fire discovered facts and circumstances” (without stating what facts or circumstances they discovered), “which indicated that the building was willfully and deliberately burned.” None of these officers testified upon the hearing of ■the motion, nor did the appellant attach to its motion the affidavit of any Yoakum county officer, credible or incredible,- which showed any facts tending to support the theory, nor does the motion state any reason why the officers, or' their affidavits, were not produced. The credibility of the officers who furnished the appellant the information was a question for the trial court to determine and not Mr. Senter. The probative force of the facts and circumstances which it is al-legep. said officers possessed as tending to show that the building was willfully and deliberately burned, and that appellees were connected with it, was likewise a matter for the court, and since appellant did not see fit to enlighten the trial court upon these essential matters, the motion was properly overruled upon that ground. Hodges v. Ross, 6 Tex. Civ. App. 437, 25 S. W. 975; Neal Com. Co. v. Golston (Tex. Civ. App.) 197 S. W. 1124.
It is stated that two parties had been indicted for the destruction of the building, but we may reasonably infer from the motion that neither of the appellees had been indicted, nor does the motion name the parties charged, or by attaching copies of the indictments show who they were, nor does it state any fact from which the court might have inferred that in burning the building the culprits acted for the appellees. It is clear that the appellant had ample time by the exercise of any sort of diligence to secure this information for the information of the trial court, and, because it failed to do so, we must presume that the charge was not- sincerely made. The idea advanced in the motion that the appellees were connected with the destruction of the building is purely a supposition and a conclusion based upon presumptions and information imparted by unknown parties whom the motion declares to be credible. Specific facts rather than conclusions must be stated. If the facts are not within the personal knowledge of the affiant, the names and residences of the witnesses by whom he expects to prove them should be set out, and, if practicable, the affidavits of the witnesses, setting out the facts to which they will testify, should accompany the motion or good reason shown why such affidavits could not be procured. It must also reasonably appear that the proof *687of these facts will be made upon another trial, and it should reasonably appear that they are true, and that the affiant believes them- to be true. None of these essential prerequisites to the granting of the motion appear therein.
 Mr. Senter’s verification of the motion is insufficient, in that the affidavit with reference to that portion of the motion setting up the defense of arson, recites :
“The matters stated in paragraph 5 * * * are charged on credible information and belief therein.” El Paso & S. W. Ry. v. Kelly (Tex. Civ. App.) 83 S. W. 855; Calyon v. State, 76 Tex. Cr. R. 83, 174 S. W. 591; Cunningham v. Gaines (Tex. Civ. App.) 176 S. W. 148; Scranton v. Tilley, 16 Tex. 183; Ginners’ Mut. Underw. v. Wiley (Tex. Civ. App.) 147 S. W. 631; Abiline, Ind. T. & T. Co. v. S. W., T. & T. Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 185 S. W. 356.
An affidavit is wholly defective unless perjury can be assigned upon it if untrue. Willis v. Lyman, 22 Tex. 268; Mays v. Lewis, 4 Tex. 38; Cook v. De la Garza, 13 Tex. 431; St. L., B. & M. Ry. Co. v. Dallas Cooperage & Woodenware Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 268 S. W. 769.
' What we have hereinbefore said is in deference to appellant’s insistence that his appeal should be considered on its merits, meaning, we presume, that the merits of the motion, in so far as it states grounds for a new trial, should be considered. We did consider it and passed upon the various grounds in the original opinion, -but have entered into the additional discussion to make our holding clearer.
In the motion for rehearing appellant insists that this court has “inadvertently fallen into error” in holding that the error of the court in overruling the motion for new trial is not properly presented by a bill of exception. It may be possible that we have fallen into error, but it was not done inadvertently. If we fell in at all it was after a very careful and painstaking investigation of all the authorities at hand. In view of the fact that nearly all of the motion for rehearing is concentrated upon that question, we will briefly discuss it further.
That there is some confusion and. want of harmony among the decisions upon the question whether the facts proven upon the hearing of a motion for a new trial should be preserved and presented to the appellate court in a bill of exception, or by a properly prepared and authenticated statement of facts, must be admitted, but the cases cited in the original opinion sustain our holding, and not one of the cases cited by the appellant in its motion for rehearing is in point. Our reason for holding that the evidence should be presented by a statement of facts rather than by bill of exceptions is clearly stated in some early eases in Texas, as follows:
In Carolan v. Jefferson, 24 Tex. 229, Judge Roberts said:
“The bill of exceptions assumes' to state all the facts; but being only a bill of exceptions, the parties were not required to agree to it in the first instance, and the appellee was not bound to see that the facts were stated, except so far as might be necessary to present the objection to the evidence; and indeed he had no control over it.”
In the case of Madden v. Shapard, 3 Tex. 50, Judge Wheeler, in passing upon the sufficiency of a motion for new trial, said:
“And, for the same reason, when the question is brought up for revision here, the record ought to be accompanied by a statement of facts; otherwise, we may have no means of determining upon the propriety of the application. In the ease before us, there is no statement of facts.”
In the case of Dull v. Drake, 68 Tex. 205, 4 S. W. 364, judge Willie said:
“In this case it is attempted to make the bill of exceptions serve the purpose of a statement of facts by incorporating into it evidence' admitted upon the trial, and by this method to show the importance of the rejected testimony. We know of no authority for bringing to the knowledge of this court the facts proved upon á trial of the cause through the medium of a bill of exceptions.- Such a bill brings to our attention rejected testimony, or such as has been admitted over objection; but such as was introduced without complaint, and formed part of the case made before the court or jury, must find its place in the statement of facts; otherwise it will not be noticed.”
 These decisions draw a clear distinction between the offices of the two proceedings. While the statute, article 2237, subd. 6, provides that the judge shall submit a bill of exception to the adverse party, or his counsel, if in attendance on the court, and, if found to. be correct, he shall sign and file it, we think that article applies to proceedings during the trial of the case. The final judgment was rendered in this case on August 18th, while the bill of exceptions was not signed by the trial judge until the 11th day of September thereafter. It does not appear that it was ever presented to opposing counsel or approved by them, and indeed its validity as a bill of exception does not necessarily depend upon the approval of opposing counsel, for the court may approve and order it filed even over the objection of opposing counsel.
This part of the statute is not mandatory, and it is held that even if an appeal is perfected the trial judge has the right, upon motion made for that purpose, to amend the bill of exception so as to make it conform to the facts, or he may strike it from the record. Davis v. Wichita State Bank & Trust Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 286 S. W. 585. The trial court would certainly have no such au*688thority in- dealing with the statement of facts.
We think that the preservation of the evidence in the lower court and its presentation in the appellate court through the medium of a statement of facts agreed to by the parties or their counsel and approved by the trial judge is a safer and better method than by bringing it up in a bill of exception which is not required to be signed by opposing counsel, and .which may be amended or even stricken by the trial, judge after appeal. Therefore we adhere to our former ruling and overrule the motion for rehearing.