Court Opinion

ID: 9953873
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-22 22:02:10.468965+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:10:18.937267
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/22/24 P. v. Spengler CA2/3
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                      SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                  DIVISION THREE

  THE PEOPLE,                                                         B323589

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                                  (Los Angeles County
                                                                      Super. Ct. No. VA158456)
           v.

  MATTHEW EDWARD SPENGLER,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Debra Cole-Hall, Judge. Affirmed.
      William L. Heyman, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Gabriel Bradley, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                   _________________________
      A jury convicted Matthew Spengler of vandalism and of
disobeying a court order. At his trial, the People introduced prior
incidents involving, among others, Spengler’s altercations with
law enforcement. After finding that Spengler had aggravating
circumstances, the trial court sentenced Spengler to the upper
term for vandalism. On appeal, Spengler contends that the trial
court abused its discretion by imposing the upper term and
instead should have imposed the middle or lower term based on
his mental illness. He alternatively argues that if he forfeited
the claim by failing to raise it below, his trial counsel provided
ineffective assistance. We reject these contentions and affirm the
judgment.
                        BACKGROUND
I.    The charged offenses
       The charged offenses arose out of incidents occurring in
March and May 2022.
       The first incident began on March 31, 2022. Public Safety
Officer Victor Lomas was on patrol in Bellflower when he noticed
something in an alley. When the officer slowed his car, Spengler
yelled at him to get the “fuck out” of there and threw shoes at the
officer’s marked police car. Spengler “charged” the officer’s car
and kicked the driver’s side door. Officer Lomas backed up, but
Spengler charged at the car again and kicked the door and
tailgate, denting and scratching the car. Deputy Michael Arnold
arrived and arrested Spengler, who resisted, saying, “I’m gonna
fuck you guys up.” Spengler kicked at deputies and yelled
profanities, saying this was “personal, you dick” and threatening
to “fuck you guys up.” During this, Deputy Arnold saw another
deputy hit Spengler.

                                 2
      As a result of this incident, Officer Lomas obtained a
restraining order against Spengler. A few days after the officer
obtained the restraining order, he saw Spengler again at a
shopping center. Spengler approached Officer Lomas’s car.
When the officer started to drive away, Spengler spat at the car.
      The second incident occurred on May 30, 2022. Davon
Sanders was working at a store in a strip mall in Bellflower.
That afternoon, Sanders saw Spengler throw pavers from a
nearby pathway at the windows of a granite top business. Video
surveillance from a nearby business captured the incident.
Deputy Saul Ruiz responded to the scene and recognized
Spengler. Spengler told Deputy Ruiz that “people [were] hurting
my balls,” that the deputy should be ashamed of himself, and to
take off that “fucking costume.” Spengler also said, “Criminal
law enforcement? Fuck you!” Knowing that Spengler tended to
be aggressive with law enforcement, Deputy Ruiz decided to
arrest Spengler another day, when he was not agitated. The next
day, Deputy Ruiz was having lunch near the Bellflower
courthouse when he heard glass breaking. He saw Spengler,
who, when told to stop, ran but tripped. When Deputy Ruiz tried
to grab Spengler’s hand to handcuff him, Spengler scratched the
deputy, causing bleeding and scarring.
II.   The prior offenses
      At Spengler’s trial for vandalism and disobeying a court
order, the People introduced evidence of the following prior
incidents.

                                3
      A.    January 17, 2021
      On January 17, 2021, Deputy Sterling Buck was at the
Lakewood Sheriff’s station. The station’s lobby has a memorial
wall commemorating officers who died in the line of duty.
Spengler had just been released from custody and was in the
station’s lobby. He smashed vases, ripped a phone from the wall,
and threw a pot in the corner near the memorial wall.
      B.    April 11, 2021
      On April 11, 2021, Deputy Renata Phillip was at the
Lakewood station when she saw Spengler pick up vases and
throw them down in front of the memorial wall. When deputies
arrested Spengler, he called them “assholes” and said, “Fuck
you.” When Deputy Arnold arrived at the station, Spengler, who
was in a patrol car, spat on him. Deputy Phillip sprayed
Spengler with pepper spray. Spengler said he was sorry that
happened,1 but he did not respect the Sheriff’s Department as a
unit.
      C.    March 23, 2022
      On March 23, 2022, Public Safety Officer Daniel Moreno
was driving his marked officer’s car in Bellflower when he heard
something thump his car several times. The officer saw
Spengler, whom the officer knew to be a local transient, throwing
what the officer assumed were rocks. During prior encounters
with law enforcement, Spengler had “flip[ped] us off” or “cuss[ed]
us out.” When additional law enforcement arrived at the scene,
Spengler stood and approached one of the police cars with a “very

1
      It is unclear what Spengler was sorry about.

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aggressive demeanor.” When a deputy tried to get Spengler’s
hands behind his back, Spengler resisted.
III.   Verdict and sentence
       A jury found Spengler guilty of vandalism of the granite top
business of $400 or more (Pen. Code,2 § 594, subd. (a); count 1)
and of disobeying a court order (§ 166, subd. (a)(4); count 3).3
       On September 21, 2022, the trial court held a court trial on
the aggravating factors that had been alleged against Spengler.
Relying on the probation report, the trial court found that
Spengler’s prior convictions were numerous or of increasing
seriousness (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(2)), he was on
probation when the crimes were committed (id., rule 4.421(b)(4)),
and his performance on probation was unsatisfactory (id., rule
4.421(b)(5)).
       Turning to sentencing, the trial court asked Spengler’s
counsel if she wanted to be heard, but counsel submitted. The
trial court then said that, given the aggravating factors, it was
sentencing Spengler to the upper term of three years in prison on
count 1 but stayed a six-month sentence on count 3.4

2
     All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.

3
       The jury found Spengler not guilty of battery on a peace
officer, Deputy Ruiz (§ 243, subd. (b); count 2). Also, although the
verdict form stated that count 3 was a felony, the trial court later
clarified it was a misdemeanor.

4
      The trial court imposed a concurrent two years in prison on
a probation violation case also before it.

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                          DISCUSSION
I.    The trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing the
      upper term
       Spengler contends that the trial court abused its discretion
by imposing the upper term. He argues that the trial court
should have instead imposed the middle term under section 1170,
subdivision (b)(2), or the lower term under subdivision (b)(6). As
we explain, the trial court did not abuse its sentencing discretion.
       Trial courts generally have broad sentencing discretion.
(People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 844.) However, recent
amendments to sentencing laws have provided guidance on how
that discretion may be exercised. As relevant here, section 1170,
subdivision (b)(1), now provides that where a statute specifies
three possible terms, the trial court “shall, in its sound
discretion,” impose the middle term, except as otherwise provided
in the section. The trial court may impose a sentence exceeding
the middle term only when aggravating circumstances justify
imposing a term exceeding the middle term and either the
defendant has stipulated to or the trier of fact has found true
beyond a reasonable doubt “the facts underlying those
circumstances.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(2).) Notwithstanding
subdivision (b)(1), unless the trial court finds that aggravating
circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances, the trial court
shall impose the low term if, as relevant here, the “person has
experienced psychological, physical, or childhood trauma,
including, but not limited to, abuse, neglect, exploitation, or
sexual violence” and the trauma was “a contributing factor in the
commission of the offense.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6)(A).)
       On appeal, the party attacking a sentencing decision has
the burden of showing it was irrational and arbitrary, and we will

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not reverse a sentencing decision merely because reasonable
people might disagree. (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367,
375.) A trial court abuses its discretion if it relies on
circumstances irrelevant to the sentencing decision or that
otherwise constitute an improper basis for it. (People v.
Sandoval, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 847.)
       Here, Spengler concedes that his trial counsel did not raise
section 1170 below, thereby forfeiting any issue on appeal
regarding the trial court’s imposition of the upper term. (See
generally People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 351 [defendant
cannot argue for first time on appeal that court improperly
aggravated a sentence]; People v. Tilley (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th
772, 778 (Tilley) [where defendant did not seek lower term, object
to middle term, or argue he suffered psychological trauma
resulting from mental illness, any claim was forfeited].)
Nonetheless, we address the merits of Spengler’s contentions.
       Spengler contends his mental illness required the trial
court to sentence him to either the low term under section 1170,
subdivision (b)(6), or, to the middle term because his mental
illness was a mitigating factor. To show he was mentally ill,
Spengler relies on the probation report, which states, “According
to the consolidated criminal history reporting system, [Spengler]
is classified as ‘mentally disturbed.’ ” He also argues that the
nature of his crimes and his unhoused status show he was
mentally ill.
       Even assuming the record supports a finding that Spengler
was mentally ill, section 1170 subdivision (b)(6), “does not require
the court to impose the lower term because of defendant’s mental
illness, but for psychological trauma.” (Tilley, supra, 92
Cal.App.5th at p. 777.) While psychological trauma based on

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mental illness may be a qualifying circumstance for the lower
term presumption, mental illness alone is not a basis for
application of the presumption. (Ibid.; People v. Banner (2022) 77
Cal.App.5th 226, 241.) Rather, “[p]sychological trauma must
attend the illness, and that trauma must contribute to the crime.”
(Banner, at p. 241.) Therefore, even assuming Spengler was
mentally ill, nothing in the record shows that any psychological
trauma contributed to his crimes. To the contrary, the record
supports a finding that animus toward the Sheriff’s Department
or law enforcement motivated his crimes.
       As to the upper term, the trial court imposed it after
finding three aggravating factors: (1) Spengler’s prior convictions
were numerous or of increasing seriousness (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 4.421(b)(2)), (2) he was on probation when he committed the
crimes (id., rule 4.421(b)(4)), and (3) his performance on
probation was unsatisfactory (id., rule 4.421(b)(5)). Spengler
does not argue that the trial court erred in making those findings
and, indeed, he acknowledges the aggravating factors “might in
and of themselves justify” imposing the upper term.
       Nonetheless, he asserts those aggravating factors do not
justify the upper term because “no inquiry was made” about a
mitigating circumstance, that is, whether he suffered from a
“mental or physical condition” that “significantly reduced
culpability” for the crimes. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.423(b)(2).)
However, unless the record affirmatively shows otherwise, a trial
court is deemed to have considered all relevant factors. (People v.
Myers (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 305, 309–310.) The record here
affirmatively shows the trial court did consider the probation
report, because the trial court referred to it, noting that Spengler
had “quite a few” priors. Further, referencing the probation

                                 8
report, the prosecutor reminded the trial court that “we” counted
10 misdemeanors. As the trial court examined the probation
report and acknowledged its contents, we can reasonably infer
the trial court considered Spengler’s “mental illness” in exercising
its sentencing discretion.
       Spengler also suggests the trial court was ignorant of
circumstances underlying his prior convictions that might
suggest he was mentally ill. Delving into the details of those
convictions, Spengler asserts they “do not betoken a career
criminal, but someone who[se] mental functions are not normal,”
as “no one in his right mind would stand in front of a business in
the middle of the day” and throw pavers at windows in the full
view of others. However, there is no basis for the suggestion the
trial court did not know the contexts surrounding Spengler’s
charged crimes or prior convictions. The sentencing judge
presided over the trial at which evidence of multiple prior
incidents was introduced. Therefore, the trial court was well
aware, for example, that Spengler was unhoused, had multiple
angry encounters with law enforcement, and was verbally
abusive to law enforcement. To the extent any of this suggested
Spengler was mentally ill, the trial court would have been able to
make that connection.
       In any event, even if the trial court agreed that Spengler
had a mental illness, there was no evidence connecting it to a
reduced culpability for the crimes. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
4.423(b)(2).) Moreover, even if the trial court had found that
Spengler’s mental illness was a mitigating factor, the trial court
was entitled to minimize any mitigating factor without
explanation and to find that the aggravating factors outweighed
the mitigating one. (People v. Salazar (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 799,

                                 9
813.) We therefore cannot find that the trial court abused its
sentencing discretion.
II.   Ineffective assistance of counsel
       Alternatively, Spengler argues that his trial counsel
provided ineffective assistance by failing to introduce evidence of
his mental illness and to request the middle or low terms.
       To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, the appellant
must show that counsel’s performance fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness and prejudice. (See generally
Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687–688; Tilley,
supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 778.) There is a strong presumption
that counsel’s conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance. (People v. Stanley (2006) 39 Cal.4th 913,
954.) We defer to counsel’s reasonable tactical decisions and do
not judge those decisions in hindsight’s harsh light. (Ibid.)
Prejudice occurs where there is a reasonable probability that, but
for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the defendant would have
achieved a more favorable outcome. (Strickland, at p. 694;
Stanley, at p. 954.) A “reasonable probability” is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. (Strickland,
at p. 694; Stanley, at p. 954.)
       Here, trial counsel did not raise mental illness as a reason
to impose the lower term under section 1170, subdivision (b)(6),
or as a circumstance mitigating in favor of the middle term, and
the record reveals no reason why counsel elected not to do so.
However, even assuming the record contains clear evidence of
mental illness and that counsel recognized that Spengler was
mentally ill, counsel may not have had evidence Spengler
suffered resulting psychological trauma that contributed to his
crimes (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6)(A); People v. Banner, supra, 77

                                 10
Cal.App.5th at p. 241) or that his “mental condition”
“significantly reduced culpability” for the crimes (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 4.423(b)(2)). If so, counsel had no obligation to raise
Spengler’s mental illness at sentencing. (See, e.g., People v. Bell
(2019) 7 Cal.5th 70, 126 [attorney not ineffective for failing to
pursue futile or frivolous motion].) We therefore cannot conclude
on this record that Spengler’s trial counsel provided ineffective
assistance.
                         DISPOSITION
    The judgment is affirmed.
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

                                           EDMON, P. J.

We concur:

                        EGERTON, J.

                        ADAMS, J.

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