Court Opinion

ID: 9633098
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:34:05.790125+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:05:38.241991
License: Public Domain

Opinion by
Justice NOBLE,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Respectfully, I dissent with the majority view that it was appropriate to read the contents of the citation, which stated “1993 burglary third. Fayette County. Subject utilized a baseball bat. Broke the glass of the front door of Autosound in Lexington *269and took several items of value. Used force to enter a business and steal from that business.” This statement goes far beyond what this Court has previously held to be acceptable when listing prior convictions in truth in sentencing. Specifically, in Hudson v. Commonwealth, 979 S.W.2d 106 (K.y.1998), a case which cites Robinson v. Commonwealth, 926 S.W.2d 858 (Ky.1996), this Court held as follows: “In addition to reading the convictions, dates, and sentences, the supervisor read information regarding the factual circumstances of each conviction from the warrants or uniform citations. The amount of information heard by the jury was clearly beyond the limitation set forth in Robin-sort,, and therefore, should not have been admitted.” That was exactly the case here. Then, as now, the witness did nothing more than read the entire warrants or citations.
In Robinson, this Court noted that the purpose of truth in sentencing in regard to a persistent felony offender (PFO) conviction was simply to inform the jury that the defendant had prior convictions, and what their general nature was, so that the jury could determine whether the defendant had the status of a persistent felon. In making this rule, the Court balanced the unduly prejudicial nature of detailing previous offenses with the information necessary to obtain a PFO conviction. Since PFO is a status which allows for the enhancement of the sentence in a case that has just been tried, the Court was acutely aware that how the prior offenses occurred was not information necessary to the determination that they had occurred, and that those details could result in punishment aimed at those offenses rather than in merely establishing a status. The Court determined that merely stating the general nature of the offenses would suffice to allow the jury to fix the penalty within the appropriate enhanced penalty range without potential inflammatory influence. Thus, it has been the law in Kentucky for the last ten years that it is inappropriate to read the entire contents of a warrant or citation to the jury during the sentencing phase.
Without explicitly saying it, the majority is essentially overruling Hudson and is inviting this kind of testimony henceforth. The majority’s view is that what was read is truthful, and was limited solely to the information contained on the citation. This, however, is precisely what Hudson forbids. Based on this, how can a witness guess when he or she has read too much? The majority blurs what was previously a bright line rule.
Appellant was drunk and ran away from the police. He was obviously a risk to other drivers, pedestrians, and property. However, his underlying offenses carry a maximum sentence of five years. The jury decided to sentence him to the maximum sentence possible under the PFO First enhancement, twenty years. It is certainly arguable that the implied violence of using a baseball bat to knock in the door of a local business, a business which may have employed some of the jurors or at the very least been known to the others, since it was not disclosed in voir dire, could have inflamed the jury. This kind of potential prejudice would have been avoided if the conviction and sentence for burglary was all that was read to the jury, which is all a plain reading of Hudson allows.
Consequently, I would reverse and remand for a new sentencing hearing as this Court did in Hudson.
MINTON, C.J.; ABRAMSON, J., join this opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part.