Court Opinion

ID: 9463216
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 23:00:51.244761+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:37:59.138718
License: Public Domain

JAMES C. HILL, Circuit Judge,
with whom GEWIN, GOLDBERG, GODBOLD and RONEY, Circuit Judges,
join (dissenting):
The majority in this case insists upon giving to the prosecution that which it improperly sought as a means of disciplining it for having improperly sought it. Inasmuch as I believe this to be error, and to nourish rather than discourage the mischief sought to be corrected, I dissent.
As noted by the majority opinion, none of the participants who appeared before District Judge King performed in such a manner as to entitle them to the sympathy of a law judge or chancellor. Defendants Washington and Rinaldi stand convicted of a federal crime, subject to their right of appeal which presumably will now be given full consideration. They have no standing to complain that, based upon the same facts, they also stand convicted of a violation of the laws of the State of Florida. See Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 79 S.Ct. 666, 3 L.Ed.2d 729 (1959); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 77 S.Ct. 150, 1 L.Ed.2d 116 (1959).
Counsel for the government, obstinately and in spite of careful inquiry by the district court, persisted in a prosecution contrary to the “Petite Policy” of the Department of Justice. It was incumbent upon government counsel, independent of any inquiry by the trial judge, to acquaint himself with the status of the prosecution and move for its dismissal if contrary to government policy. It became an even heavier responsibility when the alert trial judge made precise and insistent inquiry into that very subject. Yet, blandly reassuring the court that he knew of what he spoke, government counsel stated to the Court that the Department of Justice had deliberately consulted its policy and was yet determined to proceed. The majority of a panel of this court gleaned from its careful review of the entire record that this conduct was in bad faith or, at the very least, amounted to gross negligence. Finally, on oral argument before the en banc court, counsel for the government commendably acknowledged that this determination by the panel was correct, even though government counsel had theretofore insisted to the contrary before Judge King and before a panel of this court! The Department of Justice and its attorneys, who owe a higher duty as officers of the court than displayed in this record, make no valid claim to a sympathetic audience before us.
I submit, however, that the ever present participant in these proceedings deserving of our most attentive and sympathetic consideration is the Constitution of the United States and the separation of powers that it mandates. It is only the result which the majority reaches in appraising “the delicate balance established in Rule 48(a) between executive and judicial powers”1 which compels me to dissent.
I submit that we must first seek to put all of these rather unpleasant facts into proper perspective. The bad faith evidenced by government counsel has been permitted by the majority to flow over into a vessel which ought not to be contaminated by it. The majority attributes the bad faith of government counsel in persisting with the prosecution to the ultimate action of government counsel in moving for the dismissal of the indictment. It seems to me that this bad faith is misapplied. I submit that, insofar as here pertinent, the first time that government counsel acted in good faith was when the government moved that the indictment be dismissed. That is, in what has been determined and, indeed, con*211fessed to have been bad faith, the government persisted in a prosecution and obtained, as a result of that bad faith, convictions. The majority holds today that, in order not to “invite future misconduct by the Government,”2 we insist that the government be rewarded with the very convictions that it obtained through bad faith prosecutions and, we deny government counsel the right at long last to recant and in good faith dismiss the indictment. There must be logic in this result or the majority would not have so held, but I must confess that it escapes me.
I wholeheartedly agree with the majority that we should not invite the type of misconduct on the part of government counsel as is evidenced by the record in this case. However, the prosecution was in bad faith, and the majority would deter this conduct by burdening the prosecutor with a conviction. Thus, let us suppose that a prosecutor in bad faith insists upon the introduction of a confession. The prosecutor knows or in the exercise of reasonable care should know that the confession was obtained in a patently unconstitutional manner. Nevertheless, in his overzealous desire to obtain a conviction, he adamantly and steadfastly adheres to his representation to the court as to the validity of the confession. Finally, after prolonged investigation and several evidentiary hearings, the prosecutor is forced to admit that his prior representations had no basis in fact. However, the district court concludes that in order to discourage the type of misconduct evidenced by the prosecution, he will order that the confession be admitted and refuse to allow the prosecution to withdraw it! I submit that the rationale of the majority sanctions this result.
I submit that we should deal with matters such as this so that, if available under the law, our decision will have a prophylactic effect upon the improper conduct. While it is difficult to see that such a result is available in this case, it seems to me, that whatever we do, we ought not encourage the improper conduct by rewarding it. Clearly that is done by the holding of the majority today.3
Admittedly, “leave of court” is required for the filing of a dismissal pursuant to Rule 48(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Those words have meaning, and they obviously mean that the executive does not have the unfettered authority, no matter what the considerations may be, to terminate a prosecution. Like the majority, I turn to United States v. Cowan, 524 F.2d 504 (5th Cir. 1975), in my search for their meaning. Curiously, it appears to me that the opinion of Judge Murrah in that ease, and particularly those portions quoted in the majority opinion, supports the view that I take of the issue. Throughout the opinion in Cowan Judge Murrah makes it clear that the only thing to be appraised by the court in passing upon a motion to file a dismissal is the motivation of the Executive in moving to dismiss. He makes it clear that the Executive’s decision to terminate a prosecution shall be judged only by the public interest involved in the termination, not whether the public interest has theretofore been served by the Executive in its exercise of its original unfettered decision to initiate the prosecution.
The majority opinion seems to agree. Judge Morgan for the majority observes that “Judge Murrah also indicated at several points in his opinion that an important part of the ‘public interest’ test is the requirement that the Government’s motion to dismiss a pending prosecution be made in good faith.” 4 Then, the majority abandons any effort to determine from the record whether the motion to dismiss the prosecution was made in bad faith or contrary to *212the public interest, but instead substitutes for that inquiry its conclusion that, theretofore, government counsel had acted in exceedingly bad faith in continuing the prosecution.
As a first guideline to the meaning of the words “by leave of court” in Rule 48(a), I would suggest that the Court must confine its inquiry solely to the underlying motives for the motion to dismiss. The Court must not use the discretion thus granted as a device to upbraid the Executive’s counsel for other conduct in connection with the handling of the case.
A second rule to guide us toward the meaning of “by leave of court” is found in the observation of Judge Murrah in Cowan.
The Executive remains the absolute judge of whether a prosecution should be initiated and the first and presumptively the best judge of whether a pending prosecution should be terminated. The exercise of its discretion with respect to the termination of pending prosecutions should not be judicially disturbed unless clearly contrary to manifest public interest. 524 F.2d at 518
Upon that authority, I suggest that it is to be presumed that the Executive properly discharges the constitutional power of that branch by moving to terminate a prosecution, and only a clear and convincing showing that a motion to dismiss is motivated by considerations clearly contrary to the public interest can justify withholding leave.
Again, Judge Murrah’s recounting of the actions of the trial court in Cowan lead me, inevitably, to a third rule for our guidance. In the Cowan case, it appeared that the Executive’s motive for dismissal was a plea negotiation that had been entered into between prosecutor and defendant. It was the conclusion of the court, as stated by Judge Murrah, that such a motivation could not be said to have been clearly contrary to the public interest.5 However, as noted in the Cowan decision, the trial judge in that case had himself undertaken to evaluate the conclusions reached by the Executive. The district judge was “unable to perceive how the best interest of justice could be served by dismissing” the indictment. Thus, the trial judge had substituted his judgment for that of the Executive. The Executive, while being motivated by considerations not contrary to the public interest, had reached a decision contrary to the decision that would have been reached by the judge had he been the prosecutor. The Cowan opinion disapproved of that prosecutorial decision-making by the court.
Therefore, I suggest as our third rule that, when it appears that the Executive’s determination to dismiss is motivated by considerations not clearly contrary to the public interest, the Court may not evaluate the wisdom of the Executive resolution of the matter and substitute its judgment for that of the prosecutor.
In sum, I believe that once the underlying motives of the prosecutor in moving to dismiss have been determined, the responsibility of the judiciary ends. Furthermore, if an inquiry as to motivation is not made, a presumption exists that the Executive has properly carried out its function. Motivation clearly not in the public interest can be illustrated, but such illustrations are not suggested as exhaustive. It has frequently been observed that if the prosecutor is motivated by a desire to harass the defendant, leave should be withheld.6 I would suggest that if it should appear that the prosecutor *213is motivated to dismiss because he has accepted a bribe or because he desires to attend a social event instead of attend upon the court in the trial of the case or because he personally dislikes the victim of the crime, the court should withhold leave.
If what I have suggested be the proper considerations for a court in determining whether to grant leave to file a dismissal, then, clearly, the withholding of leave in this case was not justified. The motive of the prosecutor in moving for dismissal was based upon the Petite Policy which is not contrary to the public interest. The prosecutor may have acted in the conduct of the entire litigation in a manner not consistent with the public interest, but his motion to dismiss should not be tainted with that pri- or activity. Whether the trial judge would have decided to discontinue the prosecution because the defendants were being dealt with by the state courts ought not to be controlling. The Executive is empowered under our Constitution to make that decision.
I would reverse the trial court; remand the case for the entry of an appropriate order granting the government’s motion to dismiss; and in that fashion deal with the only good faith step taken by the government insofar as this particular appeal reveals.

. Ante at 209.

. Ante at 209.

. Perhaps the most effective prophylactic can be applied by a trial judge upon whom the imposition in bad faith has been made by attorneys who are supposed to be officers of the court — no matter their employer. I should not want to say or do anything in this case which would limit the options available to a district court in order to deal with this phase of the matter.

. Ante at 208.

. Judge Murrah stated:
Nor was it clearly contrary to the public interest for the government to accept in these plea agreements a reduction in the maximum possible sentence of Cowan and Jacobsen, when, as stated in the government’s motion, it served to further an investigation by an especially created and wholly autonomous arm of the Executive. 524 F.2d at 514.

. See United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1965). In fact, Judge Brown noted in his concurring opinion that the “trial Court’s range of action [under Rule 48(a)] is confined to the protection of the rights of the defendant,” Id. at 182, and he pointed out that the en banc court “seems to be in virtual agreement that this rule is for the protection of the defendant alone.” Id. at 183, n. 6. Of course, he went on to observe that the Cox opinion was not presently limiting the discretion of the trial court to only this consideration.