Court Opinion

ID: 9445991
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 21:43:16.882024+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:30:29.006186
License: Public Domain

RIVES, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
I agree with the learned district judge that the Florida Drainage District “had no authority to bind itself as an indemnitor as consideration for the acquisition of an easement.” Further, it seems to me that what the Drainage District actually acquired from the Railroad does not rise to the dignity of an easement, but is nothing more than a mere license. That is shown by the contract as a whole and particularly by paragraph 7 thereof:
“7. The Railway may terminate this agreement at any time by giving the Licensee thirty days notice, in writing, of its intention so to do, and upon termination of this agreement the Licensee, if required by the Railway so to do, will, at his own expense, remove said lines of pipe and all appliances or appurtenances thereunto belonging, from beneath the tracks and from the property of the Railway, or the Railway, at its option, or upon the refusal of the Licensee so to do, may remove the same, at the expense of the Licensee.”
Florida gives full recognition to the difference between an easement and a license, an easement being an interest in land permanent in nature, while a license is a mere privilege to do some act or acts upon the lands of another.1
*589Florida Statute, § 298.22, quoted in pertinent part in footnote 3 to the majority opinion, gives the Drainage District authority to acquire “ * * * any land, easement, railway right of way * * * for right of way * * Section 298.62, quoted in footnote 4 of the majority opinion, gives the District authority to acquire “ * * * any lands within or without the said district * * Nowhere can there be found authority to enter into an executory contract for the acquisition of a mere revocable license.
A drainage district in Florida is a governmental body with a limited sphere of operation and limited powers, and with no power or authority other than that conferred by statute.2
The authority to enter into the contract of indemnity, here sought to be enforced, cannot be derived from the authority to “purchase” or “exchange” “lands” or an “easement.” The word “purchase” in common usage means to obtain property by paying an equivalent in money.3 “Exchange” is a word of precise import meaning the giving of one thing for another and requiring the transfers to be in kind.4 The Florida statutes do not expressly or impliedly authorize the Drainage District to bind itself by future promises contained in an executory contract any more than they authorize the District to bargain for or acquire a mere license or personal privilege for a right of way.
The Wisconsin case of H. Hohensee Construction Company v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. Ry. Co., 218 Wis. 390, 261 N.W. 242, 243, is distinguishable because the City of Milwaukee had much broader powers than the Florida Drainage District. A later Wisconsin case, Pohland v. City of Sheboygan, 251 Wis. 20, 27 N.W.2d 736, 739, pointed out that that case should not be construed to hold that the city can make an indemnity contract “except so far as it is necessary for its own protection.” It was not necessary here for the Drainage District to make a contract of indemnity for, if it could not agree with the Railroad on the purchase of a right of way, the Florida statutes vested in the Drainage District the power of condemnation.
No principle of estoppel can apply against the Drainage District, because it is a creature of the general statutes and all persons dealing with it are charged with notice of the limitation of its powers.5
It has been clearly established that a drainage district is not liable for its torts. Rabin v. Lake Worth Drainage District, Fla.1955, 82 So.2d 353. One of the grounds for that immunity was thus expressed by the Supreme Court of Florida:
“The district has the power only to assess against lands within its boundaries assessments to accomplish an over-all drainage operation to make the lands within the whole area cultivable and keep them so. The assessments for main and subsidiary canals are made against the individual parcels of lands according to the benefit each parcel will receive from the project as a whole. Hearings are conducted so that any property owner aggrieved by the as*590sessment may be heard. The financing of the improvement is based on the total assessment, the obligation undertaken to construct the project is discharged from the assessments paid. How could the district be coerced to pay any judgment obtained in a tort action except on the theory that by the commission of the tort the lands in the district were benefited?” 82 So.2d at page 355.
The immunity of the drainage district from liability for torts is for the benefit of the landowners of the district and to insure that their tax moneys will be applied to the purposes for which the drainage district was established.
The same public policy of the State of Florida which immunizes the Drainage District from liability for its torts should apply with all the more force to forbid it to enter into an indemnity agreement covering but not limited to losses resulting from the negligence or fault of the Drainage District.
When the Florida Legislature and its courts have thus declared the public policy of the State, that policy should not be nullified by the contract of the supervisors of the district.
I would affirm the judgment of the district court. If, however, its judgment is to be reversed, then, considering the nature of this action, its importance to the Drainage District, and to the execution of the policies of the State of Florida, I would not think that the form of the action as being at law instead of in equity ought to prevent the federal district court, as a matter of sound discretion, from declining to exercise its jurisdiction until the State courts can authoritatively settle the questions of State law.6
I respectfully dissent.

. See Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. Dorsey, 1932, 111 Fla. 22, 149 So. 759, 761; Burdine v. Sewell, 1926, 92 Fla. 375, 109 So. 648, 652; J. C. Vereen & *589Sons v. Houser, 1936, 123 Fla. 641, 167 So. 45, 47; 17 Am.Jur., Easements, § 4; 28 C.J.S. Easements § 2b.

. Forbes Pioneer Boat Line v. Board of Com’rs, 1919, 77 Fla. 742, 82 So. 346, 350; Halifax Drainage District of Volusia County v. State, 1938, 134 Fla. 471, 185 So. 123, 129; State ex rel. Davis v. Jumper Creek Drainage District. 1943, 153 Fla. 451, 14 So.2d 900, 901.

. 35 Words and Phrases, Purchase, p. 477.

. 15A Words and Phrases, Exchange pp. 131, et seq.

. State ex rel. Davis v. Jumper Creek Drainage District, 1943, 153 Fla. 451, 14 So.2d 900, 901. See, also, Mayor, etc. of City of Nashville v. Sutherland, 92 Tenn. 335, 21 S.W. 674.

. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U.S. 176, 185, 55 S.Ct. 380, 385, 79 L.Ed. 841; Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 318, 63 S.Ct. 1098, 87 L.Ed. 1424; Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293, 297, 63 S.Ct. 1070, 87 L.Ed. 1407; Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 235, 64 S.Ct. 7, 88 L.Ed. 9; Alabama Public Service Commission v. Southern Ry. Co., 341 U.S. 341, 349, 350, 71 S.Ct. 762, 95 L.Ed. 1002; Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States, 1957, 352 U.S. 220, 229, 77 S.Ct. 287, 1 L.Ed.2d 267.