Court Opinion

ID: 9769083
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 14:30:35.515324+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:53.818871
License: Public Domain

DUNCAN, Justice,
dissenting.
Because I disagree with the majority’s approach to the rules — and the dismissal to which it inevitably leads — I must respectfully dissent.
Discussion
In my view, the Verburgts’ failure to file a motion to extend the time for perfecting their appeal is plainly a defect or irregularity in appellate procedure. Accordingly, I start from the premise that this court may not dismiss the Verburgts’ appeal without first providing them with an opportunity to correct the defect, ie., notice that the appeal will be dismissed unless they file a motion to extend within a specified, reasonable period of time. See Tex.R.App. P. 83.1 The majority effectively holds, however, that it cannot comply with Rule 832 because Rule 41(a)(2)’s requirement of a motion to extend within fifteen days of the due date is jurisdictional. In so doing, the majority runs afoul of not only Rule 83 but also Rule 2(a), which provides that the rules “shall not be construed to ... limit the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals....”
The flaw in the majority’s analysis — and its disregard of not only Rule 83 but also Rule 2 — arises out of its initial characterization of the issue as “whether the appellate rules condone a [patently unfair] result.” By phrasing the issue in this manner, the majority presumes that a patently unfair result must obtain unless a rule or supreme court opinion precludes it. Finding no such authority, the majority concludes that the rules must condone the patently unfair result it reaches. But the majority’s presumption rests upon an approach to the rules that has been repeatedly rejected by the supreme court. The correct approach rests upon the opposite presumption, ie., the issue is not whether the rules condone a patently unfair result but whether they require it. The correct presumption has perhaps been most eloquently and succinctly stated by one of the original drafters of the rules, Chief Justice Alexander:
The object of the new rules is ‘to obtain a just, fair, equitable and impartial adjudication of the rights of litigants’, Rule 1, and where this can be done without doing violence to the rules or injustice to the rights of the parties, it is the duty of the court do so....
Smirl v. Globe Laboratories, 144 Tex. 41, 188 S.W.2d 676, 678 (Tex.1945) (quoting Tex.R. Civ. P. 1). Applying the correct presumption in this ease yields retention, not dismissal.
*658Rule 41(a)(2) provides that this court may permit late filing of an appeal bond if the bond and a motion reasonably explaining the need for an extension are filed within fifteen days of the date the bond was initially due. Nothing in Rule 41(a)(2) or any other rule states that we may not permit late filing of a bond when the bond is filed within the fifteen-day period but, because the appellant believes the bond to have been timely filed, no motion to extend is filed. To the contrary, retention of the appeal appears mandated by Rules 2 and 83.
Retention of the appeal is also suggested by dicta in many recent supreme court opinions. As repeatedly stated by the supreme court, its “policy [is] that ‘the decisions of the courts of appeals [should] turn on substance rather than procedural technicality.’” City of San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 828 S.W.2d 417, 418 (Tex.1992) (per curiam) (quoting Crown Life Ins. Co. v. Estate of Gonzalez, 820 S.W.2d 121, 121 (Tex.1991) (per curiam)). Accordingly, the court has mandated that we “construe rules reasonably but liberally, when possible, so that the right to appeal is not lost by creating a requirement not absolutely necessary from the literal words of the rule.” Jamar v. Patterson, 868 S.W.2d 318, 319 (Tex.1993) (per curiam).
From these policies emanates the general rule quoted — but then disregarded — by the majority: “The court of appeals [ ] has jurisdiction over the appeal if a party files an instrument in a bona fide attempt to invoke the appellate court’s jurisdiction.” E.g., Linwood v. NCNB Texas, 885 S.W.2d 102, 103 (Tex.1994) (per curiam); City of San Antonio, 828 S.W.2d at 418; Grand Prairie Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Southern Parts Imports, Inc., 813 S.W.2d 499, 500 (Tex.1991) (per curiam); Walker v. Blue Water Garden Apartments, 776 S.W.2d 578, 581 (Tex.1989) (all holding that incorrect perfecting instrument was “bona fide attempt to invoke appellate court jurisdiction”). The record in this case conclusively establishes that the Ver-burgts filed their cost bond in a bona fide attempt to invoke this court’s jurisdiction. The majority, however, distinguishes Linwood and Grand Prairie because the appellants there involved filed their perfecting instruments within the period provided by Rule 41(a)(1). I believe this distinction to be invalid.
The supreme court has not restricted its policy of liberal interpretation to incorrect perfecting instruments, as the majority suggests. To the contrary, the court’s liberal construction decisions transcend any particular rule or rules and appear targeted at an apparent proclivity for dismissing for want of jurisdiction. See, e.g., Smith v. McCorkle, 895 S.W.2d 692, 692 (Tex.1995) (per curiam) (unsworn declaration substantially complied with statute and perfected appeal); Maxfield v. Terry, 888 S.W.2d 809, 811 (Tex.1994) (per curiam) (cash deposit filed in one cause number was “bona fide attempt to invoke appellate court’s jurisdiction” over order in related but different cause number); Uptmore v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 878 S.W.2d 601, 601 (Tex.1994) (per curiam) (electronic statement of facts filed within the time prescribed by Rule 54 was timely even though untimely under Rule 4 of supreme court’s order governing electronic records and no motion for extension of time filed); Blankenship v. Robins, 878 S.W.2d 138, 139 (Tex.1994) (per cu-riam) (motion for new trial and appeal bond filed in severed cause number perfected appeal filed in original cause number); Jamar, 868 S.W.2d at 319 (motion for new trial conditionally filed when tendered and completed when filing fee paid); In the Matter of V.C., 829 S.W.2d 772, 773 (Tex.1992) (per curiam) (Martin Luther King, Jr. was “legal holiday” within the meaning of Rule 5(a) because courthouse closed by order of commissioner’s court even though not statutorily-designated holiday); Miller Brewing Co. v. Villarreal, 829 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex.1992) (per curiam) (Good Friday was “legal holiday” within the meaning of Rule 4, TexR. Civ. P., because courthouse closed by order of commissioner’s court even though not statutorily-designated holiday); Garcia v. Kastner Farms, Inc., 774 S.W.2d 668, 669-70 (Tex.1989) (counsel’s misunderstanding of the law constituted “reasonable explanation” of late filing of appeal bond because it “qualifies as inadvertence, mistake or mischance” and “conduct short of deliberate or intentional noncompliance”). Some of these same cases might have been decided by the failure to file a timely motion *659to extend or amend, but in none of them did the supreme court hold that the failure to file such a motion was jurisdictionally fatal. See Maxfield, 888 S.W.2d at 811; Uptmore, 878 S.W.2d at 601.
The import of these supreme court decisions is clear and unmistakable. But the majority ignores the trend in the supreme court in favor of the court of criminal appeals’ decision in Olivo v. State, 918 S.W.2d 519 (Tex.Crim.App.1996). Olivo, however, is of little or no effect in this civil case, particularly in light of the court of criminal appeals’ recent, express rejection of the supreme court’s liberal construction policy. Compare, e.g., Miller Brewing Co., 829 S.W.2d at 772 (any day courthouse closed is “legal holiday”) with Mendez v. State, 914 S.W.2d 579, 580 (Tex.Crim.App.1996) (expressly rejecting Miller Brewing Co.).
Conclusion
The supreme court has mandated that we “construe rules reasonably but liberally, when possible, so that the right to appeal is not lost by creating a requirement not absolutely necessary from the literal words of the rule.” Jamar, 868 S.W.2d at 319. It is certainly possible — if not mandated by Rules 2 and 83—that we not construe the requirement of a motion to extend within the fifteen-day grace period in Rule 41(a)(2) as jurisdictional. I would follow that course, construe the Verburgts’ response to our show cause order as a motion to extend,3 and retain their appeal on this court’s docket.

. As explained more fully in the text below, in light of the court of criminal appeals' recent decision in Olivo v. State, 918 S.W.2d 519 (Tex.Crim.App.1996), I feel duty bound not to cite criminal cases in support of this approach. Nonetheless, credit (and my appreciation) are due its creator, Justice Cohen of the First Court of Appeals, and one of its more articulate spokespersons, Justice Yanez of the Thirteenth Court of Appeals. See Sanchez v. State, 885 S.W.2d 444 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1994, no pet.); Boulos v. State, 775 S.W.2d 8 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, pet. ref’d); Jiles v. State, 751 S.W.2d 620 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, pet. ref’d).

. All rule references are to the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure unless otherwise noted.

. See Guillen v. DeLeon, 887 S.W.2d 503, 504 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1994, motion denied) (construing district clerk's affidavit as motion for extension of time).