Court Opinion

ID: 9956138
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-01 13:00:37.657399+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:08.455126
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                    MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

    JASON S. FASS,                               DOCKET NUMBER
                     Appellant,                  DE-0752-17-0441-I-2

               v.

    DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE,                 DATE: March 29, 2024
                Agency.

              THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

        James R. Tanner , Esquire, Tooele, Utah, for the appellant.

        Dustin W. Smith , Esquire, Hill Air Force Base, Utah, for the agency.

                                      BEFORE

                            Cathy A. Harris, Chairman
                         Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman

                                  REMAND ORDER

        The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision that
sustained his removal from the agency for various acts of misconduct and found
that he did not prove any of his affirmative defenses. For the reasons discussed
below, we GRANT IN PART and DENY IN PART the appellant’s petition for
review. We AFFIRM the following holdings from the initial decision: (1) the
agency proved the charges of careless performance of duties and disregard of a
1
   A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                    2

directive; (2) a sufficient nexus exists between these charges and the efficiency of
the service; (3) the appellant failed to prove his due process violation claims that
the administrative judge addressed in the initial decision; and (4) the appellant
did not prove his harmful procedural error affirmative defense. We VACATE the
initial decision’s findings related to (1) the lack of candor charge, (2) whether the
appellant made protected whistleblowing disclosures, (3) the analysis of the
factors set forth in Carr v. Social Security Administration, 185 F.3d 1318, 1323
(Fed. Cir. 1999), and (4) the penalty determination. We FIND instead that (1) the
agency failed to prove the lack of candor charge, and (2) the appellant proved that
he made whistleblowing disclosures that were a contributing factor in the removal
action.   Finally, we REMAND this appeal to the Denver Field Office to
(1) conduct a new Carr factor analysis and render a new conclusion on whether
the agency met its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that it
would have removed the appellant in the absence of his whistleblowing
disclosures, (2) address the appellant’s remaining due process violation claims,
and (3) reassess the reasonableness of the penalty.

                                 BACKGROUND
      The appellant worked as a General Schedule grade 11 Air Traffic Control
Specialist (Terminal) at the agency’s Hill Air Force Base in Utah.           Fass v.
Department of the Air Force, MSPB Docket No. DE-0752-17-0441-I-1,
Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 9 at 13. In this position, the appellant supported
the 75th Operations Support Squadron, trained Air Traffic Controllers, and served
as a Watch Supervisor in the flight control tower at the base (Hill Tower).
Hearing Testimony (HT) (testimony of the appellant); Fass v. Department of the
Air Force, MSPB Docket No. DE-0752-17-0441-I-2, Appeal File (I-2 AF), Tab 4,
Initial Decision (ID) at 2. On May 5, 2017, the agency proposed the appellant’s
removal under chapter 75 of Title 5 of the U.S. Code, alleging three charges of
                                                                                      3

misconduct (careless performance of duties, disregard of a directive, and lack of
candor). IAF, Tab 12 at 12-14.
      Regarding the careless performance of duties charge, the agency alleged
that the appellant failed to maintain situational awareness of air traffic operations
on March 15, 2017, when he allowed a local controller that he was training in Hill
Tower to clear a military aircraft (RAID92) for takeoff without providing
RAID92 instructions to remain outside of Salt Lake City International Airport’s
Class B controlled airspace. 2 Id. at 12. As a result, the appellant was unaware
that RAID92 then entered Class B controlled airspace without clearance.              Id.
In the disregard of a directive charge, the agency alleged through three
specifications that the appellant failed to follow agency policy or instructions
when he did not maintain headset use during training, did not properly notify
management of the RAID92 incident, and failed to enter the RAID92 incident
into the daily log. Id. at 12-13. In the lack of candor charge, the agency alleged
through three specifications that the appellant gave incorrect or incomplete
information about the RAID92 incident. Id. at 13.
      After the appellant provided written and oral replies to the proposed
removal, the deciding official sought written statements from witnesses who were
in Hill Tower during the RAID92 incident, along with the March 2017 Air Traffic
Control Operations Schedule.        IAF, Tab 9 at 44-79.        The deciding official
provided the appellant with these statements and schedule and gave him an
additional opportunity to provide an oral and/or written reply.          Id. at 44-45.
The appellant then provided additional oral and written replies.          Id. at 17-43.
Subsequently, the deciding official upheld each of the specifications and charges
and removed the appellant, effective August 25, 2017. Id. at 13-14.

2
  The control tower at Salt Lake City International Airport was responsible for Class B
controlled airspace above 7,000 feet, which was subject to high aircraft traffic, mostly
from passenger planes departing from and landing at Salt Lake City International
Airport. HT (testimony of the appellant, the proposing official, the appellant’s
second-line supervisor, and the deciding official); ID at 11 n.2.
                                                                                     4

      On September 22, 2017, the appellant filed a Board appeal contesting his
removal, while also raising the affirmative defenses of reprisal for whistleblowing
disclosures, due process violations, and harmful procedural error. IAF, Tab 1,
Tab 16 at 4-20, Tab 25 at 11-17, Tab 28 at 4. A 4-day hearing was held. 3 IAF,
Tabs 31, 33, 37, 39. At the conclusion of the hearing, the administrative judge
dismissed the appeal without prejudice, with an automatic refiling date, in order
for the parties to review the hearing record and submit closing briefs.
IAF, Tab 41 at 1-2. Following the refiling, the administrative judge issued an
initial decision finding that the agency proved the charges and upheld the
removal. ID at 10-19, 24-27. The administrative judge also determined that the
appellant failed to meet his burden of proving any of his affirmative defenses.
Id. at 19-24.
      The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision. Petition
for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1. The agency has responded in opposition, and the
appellant has filed a reply to the agency’s response. PFR File, Tabs 4-5.

                                     ANALYSIS
      In an appeal before the Board of a removal taken under 5 U.S.C. chapter
75, an agency bears the burden to prove by preponderant evidence the charged
misconduct, a sufficient nexus between the charge and the efficiency of the
service, and the reasonableness of the imposed penalty.                 Pope v. U.S.
Postal Service, 114 F.3d 1144, 1147 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see 5 U.S.C. §§ 7513(a),
7701(c)(1)(B).
3
  The first 2 days of the hearing were held in-person and the final 2 days were held
telephonically. ID at 1. Telephonic testimony was taken from multiple witnesses,
notably the appellant and the deciding official. IAF, Tab 38. The Board has held that,
with certain limitations not relevant here, an appellant is entitled to an in-person
hearing but may avail himself of the opportunity for a telephonic hearing in lieu of an
in-person hearing. McGrath v. Department of Defense, 64 M.S.P.R. 112, 115 (1994).
The appellant made no argument before the administrative judge, or on review, that the
decision to hold the telephonic portion of the hearing was done over his objection.
To the contrary, the evidence shows that the appellant agreed to such a decision.
IAF, Tab 30 at 1, Tab 35 at 4.
                                                                                       5

Charges of misconduct
      Upon review, we find that the administrative judge appropriately found in
the initial decision that the agency proved the charges of careless performance of
duties and disregard of a directive and that a sufficient nexus exists between both
of these charges and the efficiency of the service. 4             ID at 10-17, 24-25.
The appellant’s arguments on review disputing these findings, including that he
was on an authorized break during the RAID92 incident, essentially mirror those
that he set forth before the administrative judge. I-2 AF, Tab 1 at 7-28; PFR File,
Tab 1 at 5-13.    However, we discern no reason to disturb the administrative
judge’s findings on these matters, as they are supported by the evidence,
the inferences   are    appropriate,   and    the   credibility    determinations    are
well-reasoned.    See Clay v. Department of the Army, 123 M.S.P.R. 245, ¶ 6
(2016) (finding no reason to disturb the administrative judge's findings where she
considered the evidence as a whole, drew appropriate inferences, and made
reasoned conclusions); Broughton v. Department of Health and Human Services ,
33 M.S.P.R. 357, 359 (1987) (same). Thus, the initial decision is affirmed as to
the findings on these two charges and their nexus to the efficiency of the service. 5

4
  The administrative judge did not sustain the portion of the careless performance of
duties charge pertaining to the appellant failing to ensure that the trainee under his
supervision reminded RAID92 prior to takeoff to remain outside of controlled airspace.
ID at 12-13. Further, the administrative judge did not consider specification 2 of the
disregard of a directive charge, which alleged that the appellant failed to notify
management of the RAID92 incident, because the specific misconduct was not clearly
set forth in the proposal. ID at 15 n.6. Neither party disputes these findings on review,
and we find no reason to disturb them. Even though we affirm the administrative
judge’s decision not to sustain these specifications, the administrative judge still
properly found that the agency proved the careless performance of duties and disregard
of a directive charges. See Burroughs v. Department of the Army, 918 F.2d 170, 172
(Fed. Cir. 1990) (holding that where more than one event or factual specification
support a single charge, proof of one or more, but not all, of the supporting
specifications is sufficient to sustain the charge).
5
 The appellant’s argument relating to the impropriety of the agency charging him with
unacceptable performance is misplaced, as unacceptable performance is not one of the
charges in this removal action. IAF, Tab 12 at 12-14; PFR File, Tab 1 at 9-10.
                                                                                        6

      The lack of candor charge consists of three specifications.              The first
specification alleged that during a conversation with Salt Lake City International
Airport’s control tower, the appellant mischaracterized statements that Hill Tower
made to RAID92 and also failed to advise that Hill Tower made two
transmissions to RAID92 after the plane entered Class B controlled airspace.
IAF, Tab 12 at 13. The second specification alleged that the appellant failed to
inform his supervisor of all pertinent details regarding the RAID92 incident when
they spoke shortly after it occurred. Id. The final specification alleged that the
appellant, when questioned days later by management, provided incorrect
information regarding RAID92’s altitude and location during the incident. Id.
      In his decision to sustain specifications 1 and 2 of the lack of candor charge
and the charge itself, the administrative judge assessed the appellant’s alleged
misconduct to see if the agency proved that his statements were “less than candid,
truthful, accurate, or complete, and involved deception.” 6            ID at 8, 17-18.
We agree with the appellant’s argument on review that the administrative judge
committed an error by applying a broader definition of lack of candor and not the
elements for the charge that are set forth in Fargnoli v. Department of Commerce,
123 M.S.P.R. 330 (2016). PFR File, Tab 1 at 14. In Fargnoli, 123 M.S.P.R. 330,
¶ 17, the Board detailed that lack of candor requires proof of two elements:
(1) the employee gave incorrect or incomplete information, and (2) he did so
knowingly. When an agency affixes a labeled charge to the alleged misconduct,
as was done in the appellant’s case, it must prove the elements that make up the
legal definition of the charge. Hollingsworth v. Department of the Air Force,
121 M.S.P.R. 397, ¶ 4 (2014). Thus, in order to meet its burden in proving that
the appellant lacked candor, the agency must meet the standard from Fargnoli.
      We agree with the administrative judge that the appellant provided
incorrect and incomplete information as set forth in specifications 1 and 2 of the
6
  The administrative judge did not uphold a portion of specification 1 and the entirety of
specification 3 of the lack of candor charge. ID at 18-19. Neither party disputes these
findings on review, and we discern no error in this regard.
                                                                                   7

charge. ID at 17-18. We also concur with the administrative judge’s finding that
the evidence shows that the appellant lacked “actual knowledge” that the
information that he was providing was incorrect and/or incomplete. Id. When
applying these determinations, in conjunction with the standard as set forth in
Fargnoli, we find that the agency failed to prove these specifications and charge
by preponderant evidence because the appellant did not knowingly provide
incorrect or incomplete information, which is a necessary element to prove in
order for a lack of candor charge to be upheld. Therefore, we find that the agency
did not prove the lack of candor specifications or charge.

Affirmative defenses
      In an appeal of a removal before the Board, an appellant bears the burden
to prove his affirmative defenses by preponderant evidence.               5 C.F.R.
§ 1201.56(b)(2)(i)(C).      In this appeal, the appellant raised the affirmative
defenses of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures, due process violations, and
harmful procedural error. IAF, Tab 16 at 4-20, Tab 25 at 11-17, Tab 28 at 4.
In the initial decision, the administrative judge found that the appellant did not
meet his burden in proving any of his affirmative defenses. ID at 19-24.

      Whistleblower reprisal
      The appellant alleged that the agency’s decision to remove him was taken
in reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures that he made. IAF, Tab 16 at 4-20,
Tab 25   at   11-12;   HT    (testimony   of   the   appellant).   An   adverse   or
performance-based action appealable to the Board, such as a removal, may not be
sustained if it is shown “that the decision was based on any prohibited personnel
practice described in [5 U.S.C. §] 2302(b).” 5 U.S.C. § 7701(c)(2)(B). Among
other things, section 2302(b)(8) prohibits reprisal against an employee for making
a whistleblowing disclosure, while section 2302(b)(9) prohibits reprisal for
engaging in protected activity. In order to prevail on the merits of this claim, an
appellant must prove by preponderant evidence that he made a whistleblowing
                                                                                       8

disclosure as described under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or engaged in protected
activity as described under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D), and the
disclosure or protected activity was a contributing factor in the agency’s decision
to take or fail to take a personnel action outlined in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a). 5 U.S.C.
§ 1221(e)(1); Ayers v. Department of the Army, 123 M.S.P.R. 11, ¶ 12 (2015). If
an appellant meets his burden, then the Board shall order corrective action unless
the agency shows by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the
same personnel action in the absence of the whistleblowing disclosure and/or
protected activity. 5 U.S.C § 1221(e)(2); Ayers, 123 M.S.P.R. 11, ¶¶ 12, 27.
      In the initial decision in this case, the administrative judge determined that
the appellant failed to establish that he made a whistleblowing disclosure. 7
ID at 20-21. The administrative judge found in the alternative that even if the
agency perceived the appellant as a whistleblower, it proved by clear and
convincing evidence that it did not remove him based on such a perception. 8 ID
at 21-22.
      Protected whistleblowing takes place when an appellant makes a disclosure
that he reasonably believes evidences any violation of any law, rule, or
regulation, gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority,
or a substantial and specific danger to public health and safety.              5 U.S.C.
7
  The appellant does not allege that he engaged in protected activity as described under
5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
8
  An appellant who is perceived as a whistleblower by an agency is still entitled to the
protection of the whistleblower protection statutes, even in the absence of a
whistleblowing disclosure. King v. Department of the Army, 116 M.S.P.R. 689, ¶ 6
(2011). It does not appear that the appellant ever advanced a claim that the agency
perceived him as a whistleblower, so the administrative judge’s consideration of this
alternative argument was likely a typographical or administrative error that did not
prejudice the appellant. IAF, Tab 16 at 4-20, Tab 25 at 11-12; I-2; AF, Tab 1 at 36-44;
see Panter v. Department of the Air Force , 22 M.S.P.R. 281, 282 (1984) (holding that
an adjudicatory error that is not prejudicial to a party’s substantive rights provides no
basis for reversal of an initial decision). Nevertheless, as discussed further herein,
because we have found that the appellant proved that he made whistleblowing
disclosures that contributed to his removal, an assessment of whether the agency met its
clear and convincing burden is necessary.
                                                                                  9

§ 2302(b)(8)(A); DeLeonardo v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
103 M.S.P.R. 301, ¶ 6 (2006).      An appellant need not show that the matter
disclosed actually established a violation or other situation as described in
5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A).    DeLeonardo, 103 M.S.P.R. 301, ¶ 6.         Instead, an
appellant must prove that the matter disclosed was one which a reasonable person
in his position would believe evidenced any of the situations set forth in 5 U.S.C.
§ 2302(b)(8). Id. The proper test for determining whether an appellant had a
reasonable belief that his disclosures revealed misconduct prohibited under the
whistleblower protection statutes is whether a disinterested observer, with
knowledge of the essential facts known to and readily ascertainable by an
appellant, could reasonably conclude that the disclosure describing the actions of
the government evidences wrongdoing as defined in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8).
Id. (citing Lachance v. White, 174 F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
      The appellant’s disclosures consisted of multiple conversations that he had
with officials in his supervisory chain between April 2016 and May 2017 wherein
he expressed concerns with the delay in training of military personnel to serve as
Air Traffic Control Specialists. IAF, Tab 16 at 5-6, 16-17; Tab 25 at 11-12;
HT (testimony of the appellant).    We disagree with the administrative judge’s
finding in the initial decision that these disclosures were not protected and were
merely expressions of policy disagreements. ID at 20. A reasonable person in
the appellant’s position, an Air Traffic Control Specialist with over a decade of
experience who also served as a Watch Supervisor, would conclude that the
appellant’s disclosures evidenced, among other things, a substantial and specific
danger to public health and safety, as the delays in training purportedly had
negative impacts on the staffing of Hill Tower, the fatigue of controllers, and the
safety of air traffic control at the base. IAF, Tab 16 at 5, 16. To further support
that such belief was reasonable, the appellant’s second-line supervisor, to whom
he made some of the whistleblowing disclosures, testified that the issues raised by
the appellant had merit. HT (testimony of the appellant’s second-line supervisor).
                                                                                     10

Other witnesses testified that the delays in training were a common concern at the
base. HT (testimony of the appellant’s first-line supervisor, J.H.). As a result,
we vacate the administrative judge’s finding in the initial decision on this matter
and find instead that the appellant proved by preponderant evidence that he made
whistleblowing disclosures.
      One way for an appellant to prove that a whistleblowing disclosure was a
contributing factor in a personnel action 9 is the knowledge/timing test, which
includes evidence that the official taking the action knew of the disclosure and
that the action occurred within a period of time such that a reasonable person
could conclude that the disclosure was a contributing factor in the decision to
take the contested action. Mastrullo v. Department of Labor, 123 M.S.P.R. 110,
¶ 18 (2015). Here, the appellant began making whistleblowing disclosures to his
supervisors in April 2016, culminating in a disclosure made to the deciding
official on May 4, 2017. IAF, Tab 16 at 6, 16-17. The agency proposed the
appellant’s removal on May 5, 2017. IAF, Tab 12 at 12-14. The deciding official
issued his decision removing the appellant on August 25, 2017, which was less
than 4 months after he made a whistleblowing disclosure to him. IAF, Tab 9
at 14, Tab 16 at 17. Given this short period of time, a reasonable person could
conclude that the appellant’s whistleblowing disclosures had an impact on the
agency’s   decision   to   remove    him.     Thus,    the   appellant   satisfied   the
knowledge/timing test.       See Ontivero v. Department of Homeland Security,
117 M.S.P.R. 600, ¶¶ 22-23 (2012) (holding that because the responsible agency
official knew of the appellant’s disclosures and only 4 months elapsed between
the   disclosures   and    the   personnel   action,   the   appellant   satisfied   the
knowledge/timing test).
      Because the appellant met his burden of proving that he made
whistleblowing disclosures that were a contributing factor in the agency’s

9
  The appellant’s removal under chapter 75 is a personnel action as recognized under
5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A)(iii).
                                                                                 11

decision to remove him, the analysis shifts to whether the agency proved by clear
and convincing evidence that it would have taken the removal action despite the
whistleblowing disclosures.     Ayers, 123 M.S.P.R. 11, ¶ 12.       In determining
whether an agency meets its burden, the Board considers the relevant facts and
circumstances, including (1) the strength of the agency’s evidence in support of
its action, (2) the existence and strength of any motive to retaliate on the part of
agency officials involved in the decision, and (3) any evidence that the agency
takes similar actions against employees who are not whistleblowers but who are
otherwise similarly situated. Carr, 185 F.3d at 1323. The Board does not view
the Carr factors as discrete elements; rather, they are weighed together to
determine if the evidence is clear and convincing as a whole.              Elder v.
Department of the Air Force, 124 M.S.P.R. 12, ¶ 42 (2016).
      The administrative judge analyzed the Carr factors in his alternate analysis
and found that the agency proved by clear and convincing evidence that it did not
remove the appellant based on any perception that he was a whistleblower.
ID at 21-22. In doing so, the administrative judge determined that the evidence
relevant to Carr factor 1 weighed in the agency’s favor, particularly due to the
fact that the agency met its burden in proving each of the charges of misconduct
laid out in the proposal and that removal was within the tolerable limits of
reasonableness. Id. at 21. Because on review we find that the agency did not
prove the lack of candor charge, the strongest charge in support of removal, the
evidence surrounding Carr factor 1 should be reevaluated.          Further, in the
analysis of Carr factor 2, the administrative judge found that because the
deciding official was not involved in the training delay of military Air Traffic
Control Specialists, he had little, if any, motivation to retaliate against the
appellant for his whistleblowing disclosures. Id. Yet, it is undisputed that the
deciding official was the military officer in charge of the 75th Operations Support
Squadron at Hill Air Force Base during the relevant time period, and thus, was
likely involved in the training of military personnel to work as Air Traffic
                                                                                12

Control Specialists.   HT (testimony of the deciding official); see Whitmore v.
Department of Labor, 680 F.3d 1353, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[T]hose responsible
for the agency’s performance overall may well be motivated to retaliate even if
they are not directly implicated by the disclosures, and even if they do not know
the whistleblower personally, as the criticism reflects on them in their capacities
as managers and employees.”).          Lastly, when analyzing Carr factor 3,
the administrative judge found that the comparators were not similarly situated
because they did not lack candor like the appellant. ID at 22. Here, too, because
we do not sustain the lack of candor charge, the administrative judge’s analysis of
Carr factor 3 needs to be revisited.
      Therefore, we vacate the Carr factor analysis contained in the initial
decision. On remand, the administrative judge shall conduct a new Carr factor
analysis consistent with this order and render a new conclusion on whether the
agency met its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that it would
have removed the appellant in the absence of his whistleblowing disclosures.
This may require the reopening of the record for additional argument and
evidence on the matter. See Agoranos v. Department of Justice, 119 M.S.P.R.
498, ¶ 33 (2013) (ordering the administrative judge to analyze the Carr factors on
remand due to the findings made on review).

      Due process violations
      A public employee has a property interest in his continued employment,
meaning the Federal government, as an employer, cannot deprive an employee of
such interest without due process. Wilson v. Department of Homeland Security,
120 M.S.P.R. 686, ¶ 7 (2014) (citing Cleveland Board of Education v.
Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538 (1985)). As outlined by the Supreme Court, the
essentials of due process in this context are notice of the reasons for discipline
and an opportunity to respond.     Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 546. Procedural due
process guarantees are not met if the employee has notice of only certain charges
or portions of the evidence and the deciding official considers new and material
                                                                                13

information; therefore, it is constitutionally impermissible to allow a deciding
official to receive additional material information that may undermine the
objectivity required to protect the fairness of the process.     Stone v. Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation, 179 F.3d 1368, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
The Board will consider the following factors, among others, to determine
whether an ex parte contact is constitutionally impermissible: (1) whether the
ex parte communication merely introduces “cumulative” information or new
information; (2) whether the employee knew of the error and had a chance to
respond to it; and (3) whether the ex parte communications were of the type likely
to result in undue pressure upon the deciding official to rule in a particular
manner. Id. at 1377.
      Specifically, the appellant cites the following violations of his due process
rights: (1) the deciding official did not provide him with the questions asked of
witnesses when obtaining statements on the RAID92 incident; (2) the deciding
official did not advise him of conversations that he had with other management
officials regarding the charges of misconduct contained in the proposal; (3) the
deciding official did not advise him that he considered an agreement between
Salt Lake City International Airport and Hill Tower and an Air Force Instruction;
and (4) the deciding official improperly considered the Douglas factors, without
providing him notice of such consideration in his penalty determination. I-2 AF,
Tab 1 at 44-46; PFR File, Tab 1 at 24-26.
      In the initial decision, the administrative judge correctly determined
regarding the first alleged due process violation that the failure to provide the
appellant with the questions that the deciding official asked of the witnesses when
obtaining statements on the incidents involved in the appellant’s removal was not
a due process violation. ID at 23-24. The questions were not new and material
information, and in reaching his decision, the deciding official only considered
the witnesses’ responses, which he indisputably provided to the appellant.
IAF, Tab 9 at 44-45. This finding is hereby affirmed.
                                                                                 14

      However, the administrative judge did not address the appellant’s other
allegations of a due process violation. An initial decision must contain findings
of fact and conclusions of law for the material issues presented in the record,
along with the corresponding reasons or bases. Spithaler v. Office of Personnel
Management,     1 M.S.P.R.    587,   589    (1980);   5     C.F.R.   § 1201.111(b).
The administrative judge’s failure to address these allegations is an error. As a
result, on remand, the administrative judge should analyze these additional due
process violation claims. See Alarid v. Department of the Army, 122 M.S.P.R.
600, ¶ 7 (2015) (remanding an appeal to adjudicate the appellant’s affirmative
defenses when the administrative judge failed to do so).

      Harmful procedural error
      The appellant argued that the agency committed harmful procedural error
because the deciding official and other supervisors relevant to his removal were
not certified Air Traffic Control Specialists, meaning they were not familiar
enough with the mandates of the position to make informed decisions on the
appellant’s alleged misconduct. I-2 AF, Tab 1 at 46; PFR File, Tab 1 at 26-27.
The Board may not sustain an agency’s decision to impose an adverse action if an
appellant shows harmful error in the application of the agency’s procedures in
arriving at that decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7701(c)(2)(A); Doe v. Department of Justice,
123 M.S.P.R. 90, ¶ 7 (2015). Harmful error cannot be presumed; an agency error
is harmful only where the record shows that the procedural error was likely to
have caused the agency to reach a conclusion different from the one it would have
reached in the absence or cure of the error. Doe, 123 M.S.P.R. 90, ¶ 7.
      The administrative judge properly found in the initial decision that the
appellant failed to prove this affirmative defense.       ID at 22-23.    We agree.
The appellant did not cite to any requirement mandating that the deciding official
or other involved supervisors in this case be certified Air Traffic Control
Specialists. Notwithstanding, the administrative judge took into consideration the
fact that the deciding official was not certified in this field when analyzing his
                                                                                  15

testimony and decision making on the careless performance of duties charge.
ID at 23. Therefore, we affirm the initial decision’s finding that the appellant
failed to prove harmful procedural error in this regard.

Penalty determination
      When the Board sustains fewer than all of the charges, as here, it may
mitigate the penalty to the maximum reasonable penalty, so long as the agency
has not indicated in either its final decision or in proceedings before the Board
that it desires that a lesser penalty be imposed on fewer charges. Spencer v. U.S.
Postal Service, 112 M.S.P.R. 132, ¶ 8 (2009). In this case, the deciding official
stated that each charge standing alone warranted removal.        IAF, Tab 9 at 14.
However, a reevaluation of the penalty must be done to determine if removal was
reasonable, especially due to the fact that lack of candor, the strongest charge in
support of removal, is no longer a consideration.
      There are a few issues relating to an assessment of the relevant factors
under Douglas v. Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.R. 280, 305-06 (1981), for
the administrative judge to consider. For example, the deciding official testified
that mitigating factors, such as the appellant’s 12 years of Federal service, lack of
a prior disciplinary history, and positive performance reviews, would have led
him to demote the appellant instead of removing him.         HT (testimony of the
deciding official).   However, the deciding official testified that he could not
demote the appellant because Air Traffic Control Specialist positions are now
filled by active military members, which the appellant is not. Id. It is not clear if
the deciding official considered demotion to another non-Air Traffic Control
Specialist position as an alternative sanction.     Contrary to the administrative
judge’s holding in the initial decision, the Board has held that mitigation of a
penalty can include demotion to a position for which an employee is qualified,
even if it is a different position than the one the employee held when disciplined.
ID at 25-26; see, e.g., Fischer v. Department of the Treasury, 69 M.S.P.R. 614,
619 (1996) (finding that removal was unreasonable and mitigating the penalty to
                                                                                  16

a demotion to a nonsupervisory position with the least reduction in grade and a
suspension). Moreover, it remains unclear whether the agency’s apparent policy
of how it fills Air Traffic Control Specialist positions, in the absence of any other
information that the policy is dictated by statute or regulation, is an appropriate
factor to consider under Douglas. Further, the deciding official’s position that
the appellant lacked rehabilitative potential, another Douglas factor, contradicts
his position that he would have demoted the appellant to a nonsupervisory
Air Traffic Control Specialist position had one been available. HT (testimony of
the deciding official).
      Regarding disparate penalties, when others engaged in similar misconduct,
such as losing situational awareness in the control tower, the agency suspended
their various certifications and required retraining, but did not subject the
employees to chapter 75 adverse actions. IAF, Tab 25 at 40-41, Tab 26 at 26-29;
HT (testimony of the appellant’s first-line supervisor, P.S.). In addition, Board
precedent now dictates that the relevant inquiry for assessing a claim of disparate
penalties is whether the agency knowingly and unjustifiably treated employees
who engaged in the same or similar offenses differently.       Singh v. U.S. Postal
Service, 2022 MSPB 15, ¶ 14 (2022).
      The administrative judge is in a better position to evaluate these factors,
particularly in light of our conclusion to not sustain the lack of candor charge,
which was the most serious charge.        See Downey v. Department of Veterans
Affairs, 119 M.S.P.R. 302, ¶ 14 (2013) (stating that the administrative judge was
in the best position to resolve the reasonableness of the penalty). We therefore
vacate the administrative judge’s penalty analysis contained in the initial
decision.   On remand, the administrative judge should reassess the penalty
consistent with this order. The administrative judge has discretion to reopen the
record to take additional argument and evidence on this issue. See Berkey v. U.S.
Postal Service, 38 M.S.P.R. 55, 58-59 (1988) (remanding an appeal to the
administrative judge to reassess the penalty and noting that the parties shall be
                                                                                     17

allowed to present additional argument and evidence concerning the penalty on
remand).

Issues with the hearing
      In his petition for review, the appellant asserts that the administrative judge
denied him a fair and impartial hearing pursuant to 5 C.F.R. § 1201.41(b) when
he allowed the deciding official to serve as a technical representative to the
agency attorney, to be present during the hearing testimony of all of the
witnesses, and to testify after many of the agency’s witnesses testified. PFR File,
Tab 1 at 15-18. The appellant specifically alleges that (1) the deciding official’s
presence had a chilling effect upon the witnesses, many of who were subordinate
in rank; 10 (2) the deciding official testified late in the hearing, and after observing
the testimony of many of the witnesses, improperly refreshed his recollection; and
(3) the deciding official’s testimony effectively served as rebuttal to every
witness that testified before him, as he had the opportunity to shape his testimony
to directly respond to previous testimony that he heard. Id. at 17-18.
      Under 5 C.F.R. § 1201.41(b), Board judges are to conduct fair and
impartial hearings.       When looking to the Board’s guidance on this topic,
sequestration of witnesses is the recommended practice; however, when a witness
serves in a representative capacity, he should testify first without the opportunity
to provide rebuttal testimony. Merit Systems Protection Board Judges Handbook,
Chapter 10 at 50-51, 54.      For reasons that are not clear, the deciding official
testified on the third day of hearing, after many substantive witnesses, including
the appellant, already testified. IAF, Tab 38 at 2. We agree with the appellant
that this was an error.
      However, the appellant has not submitted any evidence to substantiate his
claim that he was denied a fair and impartial hearing.          The appellant had an

10
  The deciding official’s military rank is Lieutenant Colonel. IAF, Tab 9 at 14, 16;
HT (testimony of the deciding official); ID at 2. A number of the witnesses at the
hearing were active duty military. IAF, Tab 28 at 5.
                                                                                 18

opportunity to cross-examine the deciding official and question other witnesses to
ascertain if the deciding official’s presence had a chilling effect on them.
The appellant also had the chance to question the deciding official on various
matters to challenge his credibility. Therefore, while the administrative judge
committed an error by allowing the deciding official to testify late in the hearing
after serving as a technical representative, we find that such error did not impact
the appellant’s substantive right to a fair and impartial hearing.    See Panter v.
Department of the Air Force, 22 M.S.P.R. 281, 282 (1984) (holding that an
adjudicatory error that is not prejudicial to a party’s substantive rights provides
no basis for reversal of an initial decision).

                                       ORDER
      For the reasons discussed above, we affirm the following holdings of the
initial decision: (1) the agency proved the charges of careless performance of
duties and disregard of a directive; (2) a sufficient nexus exists between these
charges and the efficiency of the service; (3) the appellant failed to prove the
portion of his due process violation claims addressed by the administrative judge;
and (4) the appellant did not prove his harmful procedural error affirmative
defense. We vacate the initial decision’s findings related to (1) the lack of candor
charge, (2) whether the appellant made whistleblowing disclosures, (3) the Carr
factor analysis, and (4) the penalty determination. We find instead that (1) the
agency failed to prove the lack of candor charge, and (2) the appellant proved that
he made whistleblowing disclosures that were a contributing factor to the removal
action.   Consistent with this order, we remand this case to the Denver Field
Office to (1) conduct a new Carr factor analysis and render a new conclusion on
whether the agency met its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence
that it would have removed the appellant in the absence of his whistleblowing
                                                                             19

disclosures, (2) address the appellant’s remaining due process violation claims,
and (3) reassess the reasonableness of the penalty.

FOR THE BOARD:                        ______________________________
                                      Gina K. Grippando
                                      Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.