Court Opinion

ID: 9370854
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-14 20:02:25.148302+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:24.160059
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/14/23 P. v. Gredvig CA5

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

           IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                     FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

    THE PEOPLE,
                                                                                             F084068
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                                (Super. Ct. No. CRF36461)
                    v.

    TRAVIS JAMES GREDVIG,                                                                 OPINION
           Defendant and Appellant.

                                                   THE COURT *
         APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Tuolumne County. Kevin M.
Seibert, Judge.
         Jean M. Marinovich, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Louis M. Vasquez, Amanda D.
Cary, and Joseph Penney, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                                                        -ooOoo-

*        Before Hill, P. J., Detjen, J. and Franson, J.
       Defendant Travis James Gredvig challenges the trial court’s denial of his petition
for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code1 section 1172.6.2 Our review of the record
reveals the trial court failed to consider the petition as contemplated by the statute. As a
result, the order denying the petition is reversed and this matter is remanded so that the
trial court can consider whether defendant’s petition for resentencing has stated a prima
facie case requiring the issuance of an order to show cause.
                                     BACKGROUND
       Defendant was charged with participating in a violent attack on a couple in their
home in August 2011. After the information was filed charging defendant and a
codefendant with nine counts related to this attack and its aftermath, defendant pled
guilty to the following: two counts of second degree attempted murder (§§ 664/187,
subd. (a); counts 1 & 2), two counts of residential robbery (§ 211; counts 3 & 4),
three counts of grand theft of firearms (§ 487, subd. (d); counts 5–7), and two counts of
assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1); counts 8 & 9).3 With respect to the
two second degree attempted murder counts, defendant also admitted causing great
bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subds. (a) & (b)), and using a knife (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). In
May 2012, defendant received a sentence of 20 years for these guilty pleas. 4
       On November 29, 2021, defendant filed a petition for resentencing under
section 1172.6. In his petition, defendant alleged he had been originally charged with
felony murder that could have resulted in convictions for attempted murder or

1      All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2      Former section 1170.95 was recently renumbered as section 1172.6, with no
change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) We will refer to the current section 1172.6 in
this opinion.
3       While the record indicates the People provided stipulated facts at the time of the
plea, the stipulated facts are not part of the record provided to this court.
4     The first nine years of defendant’s sentence was connected to the guilty plea to
second degree attempted murder alleged in count 1.

                                             2.
manslaughter using the natural or probable consequences doctrine. Defendant further
alleged that due to the changes made by the Legislature to the statutes defining murder,
he could no longer be found guilty of attempted murder because he lacked the necessary
level of intent, was not a major participant in the felony acts committed, did not act with
reckless indifference to human life pursuant to section 190.2, and the victim was not a
peace officer in the performance of his or her duties. Defendant further explained he pled
guilty to the two counts of second degree attempted murder because he feared being
found guilty by a jury of first degree attempted murder under the felony-murder rule as it
existed then.
       The trial court denied defendant’s petition on January 26, 2022, stating he was not
eligible for resentencing under section 1172.6 because he had pled guilty rather than
being found guilty by a trial court or jury. This appeal followed.
                                      DISCUSSION
I.     The Standards Governing Section 1172.6 Petitions
       The relevant language of section 1172.6 provides, “[a] person convicted of …
attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine … may file a
petition with the court that sentenced the petitioner to have the petitioner’s … attempted
murder … conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining counts when all of
the following conditions apply:

       “(1) A complaint, information, or indictment was filed against the petitioner
       that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder,
       murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other
       theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that
       person’s participation in a crime, or attempted murder under the natural and
       probable consequences doctrine.

       “(2) The petitioner was convicted of murder, attempted murder, or
       manslaughter following a trial or accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at
       which the petitioner could have been convicted of murder or attempted
       murder.

                                             3.
       “(3) The petitioner could not presently be convicted of murder or attempted
       murder because of changes to [s]ection 188 or 189 made effective
       January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a), emphasis added.)

The petition for resentencing must be filed with the court that sentenced the defendant.
(§ 1172.6, subd. (b).) After all parties have had the opportunity to brief the issues raised
in the petition, “the court shall hold a hearing to determine whether the petitioner has
made a prima facie case for relief. If the petitioner makes a prima facie showing that the
petitioner is entitled to relief, the court shall issue an order to show cause. If the court
declines to make an order to show cause, it shall provide a statement fully setting forth its
reasons for doing so.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).)
       The trial court’s prima facie inquiry under section 1172.6 is limited, however.
(People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 971.) The trial court must accept the defendant’s
“ ‘ “factual allegations as true and make[] a preliminary assessment regarding whether
the [defendant] would be entitled to relief if his or her factual allegations were proved. If
so, the court must issue an order to show cause.” ’ ” (Ibid.) Conversely, the trial court
may deny a petition at this stage “if the petitioner is ineligible for relief as a matter of
law.” (People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 52.) This may occur when
documents in the trial court’s records refute the defendant’s allegations, such as
documentation the jury was never instructed on the “natural and probable consequences”
doctrine. (Ibid.) This initial prima facie inquiry is limited, and the court should not
engage in any form of factfinding that might require the weighing of evidence or the
exercise of discretion. (Lewis, at p. 972.)
       Whether the trial court conducted a proper prima facie inquiry under
section 1172.6, subdivision (c) is a question of statutory interpretation, which we review
de novo. (People v. Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 961.) Moreover, a declaration by the
trial court that the defendant is ineligible as a matter of law is a purely legal conclusion,
which we review de novo. (People v. Ervin (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 90, 101.) The trial

                                               4.
court’s failure to follow the procedures as intended by the Legislature in section 1172.6 is
grounds for reversal. (See People v. Montes (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 1001, 1008.) On this
point, the People agree the trial court failed to consider whether defendant established a
prima facie case, requiring the issuance of an order to show cause.
II.    Remand Is Necessary Due to the Failure to Properly Consider the Petition
       The trial court issued an order denying defendant’s petition with the following
language:

              “[Defendant’s] Petition for Resentencing is denied on the basis that
       it does meet the requirements for … section 117[2.6](a). The Declaration
       of [defendant], paragraph number three, clearly indicates he pled guilty to
       second degree attempted murder. [S]ection 117[2.6](a) only applies to
       persons convicted of felony murder. Here, the [d]efendant pled guilty, and
       was not found guilty.

              “Therefore, the Petition is denied.”

This statement by the trial court suggests the trial court denied the petition without
considering whether a prima facie case had been established. The statement also shows
the trial court failed to recognize the language of section 1172.6, subdivision (a)(2),
which specifically makes the petition process available to those who pled guilty and is
not limited to those who had been found guilty after a court or jury trial. The trial court
offered no other reason defendant should be barred from submitting a petition for
resentencing as a matter of law. (See People v. Harden, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 52.)
       Our de novo review of the trial court’s application of section 1172.6 leads us to
conclude the denial of defendant’s petition must be reversed, and this case must be
remanded to allow the trial court to address the petition for resentencing in a manner
consistent with the standards expressed in this opinion.

                                             5.
                                     DISPOSITION
       The trial court’s order denying defendant’s petition for resentencing under
section 1172.6 is reversed. This case is remanded for further proceedings on the petition
consistent with this opinion.

                                            6.