Court Opinion

ID: 9400876
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-09 17:11:09.472935+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:48.604315
License: Public Domain

J-S16030-23

    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

    IN RE: STEPHEN KANE                        :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
    APPEAL OF: STEPHEN KANE AND                :
    VINCENT KANE                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 1958 EDA 2022

                  Appeal from the Order Entered July 27, 2022
               In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County
                 Criminal Division at CP-23-MD-0000951-2022

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., MURRAY, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.:                                  FILED JUNE 9, 2023

       Stephen J. Kane, acting pro se and purporting to be “Power of Attorney

& Representative,”1 for his son, Vincent Kane (Appellants), appeal from the

order affirming the District Attorney’s refusal to prosecute Appellants’ private

criminal complaint (PCC).

       The trial explained:

             This proceeding emanates from the [Commonwealth’s]
       prosecution of Vincent Kane for procuring “upskirt” and “bathroom
       videos[,]” as well as possession of child pornography. After a

____________________________________________

1 This Court has held that an agent’s pro se legal representation of a principal
under a power of attorney is “contrary to the constitution, the laws, and the
public policy of this Commonwealth,” and constitutes the unauthorized
practice of law. Kohlman v. W. Pennsylvania Hosp., 652 A.2d 849, 853
(Pa. Super. 1994). To the extent Stephen Kane appears pro se, we deem him
to be acting only on his own behalf. However, for clarity, we reference
Stephen J. Kane and Vincent Kane collectively as “Appellants.”
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       [stipulated2] bench trial, convened on November 28, 2017,
       Vincent Kane was found guilty of five counts of invasion of privacy
       (photograph, view intimate parts of another person), three counts
       of possession of child pornography and two counts of criminal use
       of a communications facility. The court imposed a cumulative
       sentence of twenty to sixty months’ incarceration[,] followed by
       eight years’ probation.

Trial Court Opinion, 9/14/22, at 2 (unnumbered) (footnotes omitted, footnote

added).

       Vincent    Kane     unsuccessfully      appealed   his   convictions.   See

Commonwealth v. Kane, 210 A.3d 324 (Pa. Super. 2019), appeal denied,

218 A.3d 856 (Pa. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S.Ct. 2650 (2020).

       While Vincent Kane’s appeal before this Court was pending:

       Stephen Kane (as “Stephen Kane - Power of Attorney &
       Representative for Vincent Kane”) filed a [PCC f]orm seeking the
       [Delaware County District Attorney’s (DCDA)] intervention to
       prosecute a detective [from] the DCDA’s Criminal Investigation
       Division (CID). … The DCDA declined the prosecution on or about
       April 3, 2018. Approximately ten days later, [Stephen Kane filed
       a p]etition for [r]eview of the DCDA’s decision[.] …

             At a hearing convened on May 16, 2018, the court
       entertained argument and received evidence.              …    Shortly
       thereafter, the [trial court] issued a careful and comprehensive
       analysis of [its] decision rejecting [Appellants’] application.

____________________________________________

2 In return for Vincent Kane’s agreement to proceed with a stipulated bench
trial, the Commonwealth dropped 21 counts of invasion of privacy, 17 counts
of possession of child pornography, and two counts of criminal use of a
communication facility.

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Trial Court Opinion, 9/14/22, at 2-3 (unnumbered) (footnotes omitted).3

       In 2020, Vincent Kane filed a petition pursuant to the Post-Conviction

Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. Id. at 3 (unnumbered); see

also Commonwealth v. Kane, 290 A.3d 679 (Pa. Super. 2022) (unpublished

memorandum at 3).            In his PCRA petition, Vincent Kane alleged “the

Commonwealth withheld a second forensic report, which [it allegedly did not

turn] over until the day of the stipulated trial.” Kane, supra at 5. Vincent

Kane claimed the Commonwealth violated his rights under Brady v.

Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Id. The PCRA court held a hearing, after

which it rejected the claim. The PCRA court stated:

       [A]ll non-contraband evidence was prepared in a packet and
       handed to [Vincent Kane’s counsel at the time,] well ahead of trial
       in this matter. … The [PCRA] court finds the testimony of [Vincent
       Kane’s subsequent counsel] incredible as it related to the second
       forensic report allegedly being sprung on him at the “11th hour.”

Id. at 5-6. On appeal, this Court agreed, concluding Vincent Kane “failed to

establish that evidence was suppressed by the Commonwealth[.]” Id. at 6.

       Shortly thereafter, Appellants filed a PCC form

       seeking prosecution of five individuals (either as current or former
       members of the DCDA’s Office or its affiliated investigative arm,
       [CID]) for their supposed involvement in tampering or fabricating
       evidence and criminal conspiracy. Ostensibly the witnesses at the
       PCRA hearing admitted to withholding exculpatory evidence.

____________________________________________

3Appellants appealed the dismissal of their petition for review. On May 10,
2019, this Court dismissed the appeal for failure to file a brief. Kane v.
Pisani, 1582 EDA 2018 (Pa. Super. filed May 10, 2019) (order).

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Trial Court Opinion, 9/14/22, at 3 (unnumbered).

      In a letter dated April 5, 2022, Deputy District Attorney Douglas A.

Rhoads stated that after reviewing the PCC, the proposed criminal charges

“lacked prosecutorial merit.” Letter, 4/5/22, at 1 (unnumbered). On July 27,

2022, the trial court entered an order denying the petition and sustaining

disapproval of the complaint. Appellants filed a timely notice of appeal.

      Appellants raise the following issue:

      A)     Did the trial court err and/or abuse its discretion as a matter
      of law in determining that there was a valid legal and policy
      reasons [sic] relied upon by the District Attorney and erred in
      failing to conduct a de novo review of [Appellants’] petition [for]
      review[?]

Appellants’ Brief at 5 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

      PCCs are governed by Rule 506 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal

Procedure, which provides:

      Rule 506. Approval of Private Complaints

      (A) When the affiant is not a law enforcement officer, the
      complaint shall be submitted to an attorney for the
      Commonwealth, who shall approve or disapprove it without
      unreasonable delay.

      (B) If the attorney for the Commonwealth:

            (1) approves the complaint, the attorney shall indicate
            this decision on the complaint form and transmit it to
            the issuing authority;

            (2) disapproves the complaint, the attorney shall state
            the reasons on the complaint form and return it to the
            affiant. Thereafter, the affiant may petition the court
            of common pleas for review of the decision.

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Pa.R.Crim.P. 506(A)-(B).

        Our Supreme Court recently altered the standard by which we review

the disapproval of PCCs:

        We hold that, when reviewing a prosecutor’s decision disapproving
        a private criminal complaint under Rule 506, a court of common
        pleas may only overturn that decision if the private
        complainant demonstrates that the disapproval decision
        amounted to bad faith, occurred due to fraud, or was
        unconstitutional. In so holding, we denounce the prior rubric,
        where the applicable standard of review depended on the asserted
        basis for the prosecutor’s disapproval decision.

In re Ajaj, 288 A.3d 94, 109 (Pa. 2023) (emphasis added).4

        Instantly, the District Attorney stated the following reasons for

disapproving Appellants’ PCCs:

        1) they lack prosecutorial merit; 2) for policy considerations, and
        3) the allegations lack sufficient evidence.
____________________________________________

4   Ajaj was decided on January 19, 2023, during the pendency of this appeal.

        When th[e Pennsylvania Supreme] Court issues a ruling that
        overrules prior law, [or] expresses a fundamental break from
        precedent, upon which litigants may have relied, ... th[e
        Supreme] Court announces a new rule of law. One of the
        hallmarks of whether th[e Supreme] Court has issued a new rule
        of law is if the decision overrules, modifies, or limits any previous
        [appellate] opinions .... While retroactive application of a new rule
        of law is a matter of judicial discretion usually exercised on a case-
        by-case basis, the general rule is that the decision announcing a
        new rule of law is applied retroactively so that a party whose case
        is pending on direct appeal is entitled to the benefit of the changes
        in the law.

In the Interest of L.J., 79 A.3d 1073, 1087 (Pa. 2013) (citations and
quotation marks omitted). While we apply the new rule in the instant matter,
we note that its application made no difference in our disposition, as we would
have affirmed under the prior standard of review.

                                           -5-
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      ….

      The allegations raised in the PCCs were duly raised, litigated, and
      rejected by the trial court in the PCRA opinion. Accordingly, it is
      the view of the Office of District Attorney that the aforementioned
      PCCs lack prosecutorial merit and are denied. Additionally, for
      policy, PCRAs will not be relitigated when subsequently styled as
      PCCs. Finally, the allegations raised by [Appellants] lack sufficient
      evidence.

Letter, 4/5/22, at 2 (unnumbered).

      The trial court found no abuse of discretion by the District Attorney. The

court stated: “Other than the identification of additional individuals involved

in perpetrating the alleged criminal wrong against Vincent Kane, the legal

allegation underlying this proceeding presents a substantially similar

argument to the one offered previously [in the PCRA petition].” Trial Court

Opinion, 9/14/22, at 4 (unnumbered). The court concluded it was bound by

the PCRA court’s decision, and allowing the PCCs would violate the principles

of collateral estoppel and the coordinate jurisdiction rule.         Id. at 4-5

(unnumbered).

      Applying the proper standard and scope of appellate review and upon

review of the record, we conclude Appellants did not demonstrate that the

district attorney’s decision to disprove the PCCs was a result of “bad faith,

occurred due to fraud, or was unconstitutional.” Ajaj, supra. The trial court

did not err in finding the PCCs were an attempt to collaterally overrule the

PCRA court’s decision, and to allow them would violate the coordinate

                                      -6-
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jurisdiction rule. See Zanes v. Friends Hosp., 836 A.2d 25, 29 (Pa. 2003)

(explaining the coordinate jurisdiction rule).

      Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 6/9/2023

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