Court Opinion

ID: 9539738
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:09:22.661676+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:59:17.474414
License: Public Domain

Banke, Chief Judge.
The appellants sued the appellee to recover actual and punitive damages for his alleged misappropriation of a set of diamonds which had been entrusted to him for use in fabricating a ring. This appeal follows the trial court’s grant of the appellee’s motion for directed verdict, based on the absence of any proof of damages.
The evidence, construed most favorably to the appellants, established that in April of 1982, appellant Delores Tilley delivered two rings to the appellee, one of which was a gold band containing a cluster of seven diamonds and the other a plain gold band without stones. For the sum of $35, the appellee, who was the father of Mrs. Tilley’s son’s fiancee, agreed to design and fabricate a new ring from the gold and the diamonds contained in the two original rings.
Mrs. Tilley picked up the new ring in December of 1982, shortly before Christmas. Noticing that the diamonds did not appear to have the same brilliance as before, she took the ring to an Ellman’s jewelry store on the day after Christmas to have them inspected. She was informed at this time that the stones in the ring were not diamonds, whereupon she proceeded to the appellee’s place of business and confronted him with this information. According to Mrs. Tilley, the appellee responded by acknowledging that “there could have been a mix-up,” and he assured her that he wanted to “make it right.” However, she stated that when she telephoned him about the matter later, he told her she would have to talk with his attorney.
An expert gemologist called by the appellants testified that he had examined and tested the stones in question prior to trial and had determined that they were not diamonds but cubic zirconium. He further testified that they had no “intrinsic value.” Mrs. Tilley testified that the original diamond ring had been purchased from Ellman’s, and she presented evidence to the effect that Ellman’s did not carry cubic zirconium stones in its inventory. However, the appellants presented no evidence to establish the market value of the diamonds at the time of their alleged conversion; and it was for this reason that the trial court granted the appellee’s motion for directed verdict. Held:
1. Although we agree with the trial court that the appellants did not present any evidence from which the jury could have assessed the amount of their actual damages with reasonable certainty, we hold the evidence would nevertheless have supported a verdict in their *99favor for nominal damages. “A plaintiff may recover nominal damages not only where his actual damages are minute, but also where he has not proved his actual damages by a preponderance of the evidence to the satisfaction of the jury.” Miller & Meier & Assoc. v. Diedrich, 174 Ga. App. 249, 254 (329 SE2d 918) (1985), rev’d, in part, on other grounds, Diedrich v. Miller & Meier & Assoc., 254 Ga. 734 (334 SE2d 308) (1985). We accordingly hold that the trial court erred in granting the appellee’s motion for directed verdict with respect to the appellants’ right to recover nominal damages from the appellee for conversion or breach of contract. Moreover, based on the evidence that the appellee had substituted virtually worthless imitation diamonds for the diamonds entrusted to him by Mrs. Tilley and had refused to return the authentic stones to her upon demand, we hold that the jury would also have been authorized to assess punitive damages against him for the wilful and knowing conversion of her property. See generally Youngblood v. Mock, 143 Ga. App. 320, 322 (2) (238 SE2d 250) (1977).
2. The trial court was correct, however, in concluding that the appellants had failed to establish a prima facie case against the appellee with respect to their additional claim for relief under the Georgia Fair Business Practices Act, OCGA § 10-1-390 et seq. Even assuming arguendo that the transaction occurred in “the context of the consumer marketplace” (see Zeeman v. Black, 156 Ga. App. 82, 83 (273 SE2d 910) (1980)), the appellants’ right to recover under the Act was foreclosed by their failure to introduce evidence that they had delivered a written demand for relief to the appellee at least 30 days prior to filing suit, as required by OCGA § 10-1-399 (b).
3. The appellee’s contention that the action was barred by OCGA § 9-3-32 because it was not brought within two years of the date of the alleged conversion is clearly without merit. Pretermitting such issues as when the alleged conversion occurred and whether there was evidence of such fraud as would toll the running of the statute, OCGA § 9-3-32 establishes a 4-year limitation period for conversion actions, not a 2-year period.
4. The appellants enumerate as error the court’s admission, for impeachment purposes, of evidence that Mrs. Tilley had previously been convicted of shoplifting based on a plea of nolo contendere. It is contended that such use of a conviction based on a nolo plea is violative of OCGA § 17-7-95, which provides in pertinent part, as follows: “(c) Except as otherwise provided by law, a plea of nolo contendere shall not be used against the defendant in any other court or proceedings as an admission of guilt or otherwise or for any purpose; and the plea shall not be deemed a plea of guilty for the purpose of éffecting any civil disqualification of the defendant to hold public office, to vote, to serve upon any jury, or any other civil disqualification im*100posed upon a person convicted of any offense under the laws of this state. . . .” (Emphasis supplied.)
Mrs. Tilley’s shoplifting conviction was not sought to be used as a conclusive admission by her of her guilt of that offense, nor to effect a civil disqualification, as prohibited by OCGA § 17-7-95 (c). Rather, it was offered merely as a factor to be considered by the jury in assessing her credibility as a witness. It is, of course, well settled that a witness in a civil case may be impeached by proof that he or she has at some time been convicted of a felony or other crime involving moral turpitude. See Giles v. Jones, 169 Ga. App. 882 (315 SE2d 440) (1984). See also State v. Byrd, 255 Ga. 665, 666 (341 SE2d 455) (1986). Indeed, the trend in recent years has been towards increasing liberality in allowing such evidence. For example, in Favors v. State, 234 Ga. 80 (214 SE2d 645) (1975), and Gilstrap v. State, 250 Ga. 814 (2) (301 SE2d 277) (1983), the Supreme Court held that a certified copy of a criminal conviction was admissible to impeach a prosecution witness in a criminal case, even though the conviction had been entered under the provisions of the First Offender Act (OCGA § 42-8-60 et seq.) and was thus, technically speaking, not a conviction at all. See also Hightower v. Gen. Motors Corp., 175 Ga. App. 112, 113 (332 SE2d 336) (1985) (allowing First Offender convictions to be introduced for impeachment in civil cases); James v. State, 160 Ga. App. 185 (286 SE2d 506) (1981) (holding that a criminal conviction may be used for impeachment even though it is not final but is the subject of a pending appeal); and Giles v. Jones, supra (holding that a criminal conviction is relevant and admissible for impeachment notwithstanding the amount of time which has passed since it was entered).
While in the 1961 case of Clinkscales v. State, 104 Ga. App. 723 (5) (123 SE2d 165) (1961), this court held that a conviction entered on a nolo plea was not admissible for impeachment purposes, we believe this authority has been severely eroded by subsequent cases such as those cited above. In the face of such authorities, it would be anomalous to hold that a jury in a civil case could not be apprised of a witness’s prior conviction of a felony or other crime involving moral turpitude simply because that conviction was based on a plea of nolo contendere rather than on a jury verdict or a plea of guilty. Consequently, we overrule the holding in Division 5 of Clinkscales, supra. Because shoplifting is a form of theft or larceny and because such offenses have previously been held to involve moral turpitude (see Perry v. State, 173 Ga. App. 541 (4) (327 SE2d 527) (1985)), we accordingly hold that the trial court in the present case was authorized to admit a properly certified copy of Mrs. Tilley’s shoplifting conviction for consideration by the jury as impeachment evidence, subject, of course, to her right to explain the circumstances surrounding the conviction. See Belvin v. Houston Fertilizer &c. Co., 169 Ga. App. 100 *101(2) (311 SE2d 526) (1983).

Judgment reversed.

Deen, P. J., McMurray, P. J., Birdsong, P. J., and Sognier, J., concur. Carley, Pope, Benham, and Beasley, JJ., concur in Divisions 1, 2, and 3. Benham and Pope, JJ., dissent as to Division 4. Carley and Beasley, JJ., dissent as to Division 4 in judgment only.