Court Opinion

ID: 9900496
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-18 22:24:08.826183+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:06.503612
License: Public Domain

E-FILED
                                                       CNMI SUPREME COURT
                                                       E-filed: Apr 20 2023 01:50PM
                                                       Clerk Review: Apr 20 2023 01:52PM
                                                       Filing ID: 69857547
                                                       Case No.: 2022-SCC-0010-CIV
                                                       NoraV Borja

                          IN THE
                   Supreme Court
                          OF THE

Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands

  IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF ROSA LISUA MOTEISOU,

                         Deceased.

          Supreme Court No. 2022-SCC-0010-CIV

                       SLIP OPINION

                    Cite as: 2023 MP 3

                   Decided April 20, 2023

            CHIEF JUSTICE ALEXANDRO C. CASTRO
           ASSOCIATE JUSTICE JOHN A. MANGLOÑA
              ASSOCIATE JUSTICE PERRY B. INOS

               Superior Court No. 22-0040-CV
        Associate Judge Joseph N. Camacho, Presiding
                        In Re Estate of Moteisou, 2023 MP 3

INOS, J.:
¶1     Hermina Moteisou Mettao (“Mettao”) appeals from an order appointing
 Appellee Rebecca White (“White”) as the administrator of the estate of Rosa
 Lisua Moteisou (“Moteisou”). We find Commonwealth Rule of Probate
 Procedure 14 (“Rule 14”) does not confer standing to any Commonwealth
 resident over 18 years old to initiate a probate of an intestate estate and hold a
 person must have a personal stake or interest in the estate to petition for letters
 of administration. We further hold that a petitioner without standing cannot
 substitute in a party with standing and hold that dismissal is the proper remedy.

¶2      We VACATE the order and REMAND with orders to dismiss.

                            I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶3      Moteisou borrowed money from the Northern Marianas Housing
 Corporation (“NMHC”) to build her house, and she secured the loan with a real
 property mortgage. She died intestate, and a few years passed without her estate
 being probated. NMHC hired an attorney to probate the estate. Because the
 probate court had interpreted the probate rules to only allow natural persons, as
 opposed to corporations, to be administrators, the attorney used White to petition
 for letters of administration. White had no relationship to Moteisou or interest in
 the estate and was not NMHC’s agent.

¶4      Mettao, one of Moteisou’s children, saw the notice of hearing on the
 petition posted on a newspaper and objected to the appointment. She moved for
 dismissal because White lacked standing to initiate the probate. White agreed
 she lacked standing, but asked for leave to amend the petition to allow NMHC
 to substitute for her.

¶5    The court denied the motion to dismiss and granted the petition. It found
 Rule of Probate Procedure 14 conferred standing on White. The court further
 found that White had standing as an agent of NMHC. Mettao appeals.

                                   II. JURISDICTION
¶6     We have interlocutory appellate jurisdiction over “an order granting or
 revoking letters testamentary or of administration.” 8 CMC § 2206.

                               III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶7      Whether White was NMHC’s agent is a “mixed question of law and fact.”
 City & County of Denver v. Fey Concert Co., 960 P.2d 657, 670 (Colo. 1998);
 see also Agulto v. Northern Marianas Investment Group, Ltd., 4 NMI 7, 10
 (1993). “The existence of an agency relationship is generally a question of fact,”
 but becomes a question of law when “the material facts from which it is to be
 inferred are not in dispute.” Repeki v. Mac Homes (Saipan) Co., Ltd., 2 NMI 33,
 50–51 (1991). We review questions of fact for clear error. Commonwealth v.
 Kaipat, 2022 MP 9 ¶ 14. We review de novo questions of law such as whether
 Rule of Probate Procedure 14 confers standing. Atalig v. Mobil Oil Marianas,
 Inc., 2013 MP 11 ¶ 9; In re Commonwealth, 2022 MP 5 ¶ 8.
                         In Re Estate of Moteisou, 2023 MP 3

                                    IV. DISCUSSION
¶8     Mettao asserts that White lacks standing because she has no interest in the
 probate and that the proper remedy is dismissal. White has changed her position
 on whether she has standing. In the trial court, she conceded an absence of
 standing, but on appeal contends she has standing through Rule 14. White
 additionally argues that if we find otherwise, we should allow the petition to be
 amended and substitute NMHC as the petitioner.

                       A. Whether White was NMHC’s Agent
¶9     Before the trial court, White never explicitly stated or claimed she was
 acting as NMHC’s agent. Nonetheless, the court found she was NMHC’s agent.
 Appendix to Appellant’s Br. at 31. In her opening brief, she said nothing about
 agency. At oral argument, she took a different stance. White claimed to be
 NMHC’s agent but admitted the record does not reflect this. Because the record
 does not support the new claim and the facts “are not in dispute,” we hold the
 court erred as a matter of law in finding that White was NMHC’s agent. Repeki
 v. Mac Homes (Saipan) Co., Ltd., 2 NMI 33, 50–51 (1991). Because she is not
 an agent, she is not a fiduciary representing an interested person. See id. at 49
 (holding that agents are fiduciaries); 8 CMC § 2107(p) (providing that an
 “interested person” for purposes of the probate code includes “fiduciaries
 representing interested persons”).

                                B. Standing Requirement
¶ 10     Standing is “a concept utilized to determine if a party is sufficiently
  affected so as to [e]nsure that a justiciable controversy is presented to the court.”
  Commonwealth v. Anglo, 1999 MP 6 ¶ 8. The NMI Constitution requires litigants
  to have standing. See Atalig v. Mobil Oil Mariana Islands, Inc., 2013 MP 11 ¶
  10; Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 125
  (2014) (explaining constitutional standing in federal court is required by Article
  III’s limitation of the judicial power to resolving ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies’
  and the separation-of-powers principles underlying that limitation); Joeten
  Motors Co., Inc. v. Leon Guerrero, 2020 MP 14 ¶ 15 (explaining how there must
  be a “case or controversy” for the court to act). NMI CONST. art. IV, § 2.
  Consequently, if the litigant lacks standing, the court lacks subject matter
  jurisdiction to hear them. See Mafnas v. Commonwealth, 2 NMI 248, 256 (1991);
  Commonwealth v. Anglo, 1999 MP 6 ¶ 3; Atalig v. Mobil Oil Marianas, Inc.,
  2013 MP 11 ¶ 10; Blanco-Maratita v. Borja, 2017 MP 6 ¶ 14 (“The issue of
  standing is a jurisdictional question”); Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 780
  A.2d 98, 119 (Conn. 2001) (“It is axiomatic that a party must have standing to
  assert a claim in order for the court to have subject matter jurisdiction over the
  claim.”).

¶ 11    The basic standing requirements are that a litigant:

        (1) must have suffered an injury in fact—an invasion of a legally
        protected interest which is a) concrete and particularized, and b)
        actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) there must
        be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct
                         In Re Estate of Moteisou, 2023 MP 3

        complained of—the injury has to be fairly traceable to the
        challenged action of the defendant, and not the result of independent
        action of some third party not before the court; and (3) it must be
        likely, as opposed to merely speculative that the injury will be
        redressed by a favorable decision.
        Estate of Ogumoro v. Han Yoon Ko, 2011 MP 11 ¶ 19 (internal
        quotation and citation omitted).

¶ 12    Courts describe these requirements taken together to mean that a litigant
  must have an interest in the case to have standing. Falcon v. McCue, 2005 MP 7
  ¶ 31 n.8; PFC v. Sablan, 2011 MP 19 ¶ 24.

¶ 13    Our probate decisions have addressed the standing of claimants and
  objectors, and have required “an interest, even a speculative one, that could be
  affected by the outcome of the case.” In re Estate of Maria Mangabao, 2019 MP
  13 ¶ 10; see also In re Estate of Tudela, 3 NMI 316, 318 (1992) (holding
  presumptive heirs had standing to challenge an order finding they were not heirs
  because “they may have pecuniary and property interest[s] that will be affected
  by the outcome of this case”); Malite v. Superior Court, 2007 MP 3 ¶ 35 (holding
  vested heirs clearly had standing to challenge an award of attorney fees under
  Tudela’s reasoning because “[a] vested interest [is] stronger than a speculative
  one”); In re Estate of Pangelinan, 2020 MP 19 ¶ 10 (holding appellant lacked
  standing to object to the determination of heirship because under his theory of
  the case, he was “not an heir with even a speculative interest”). The Probate Code
  specifies who may have an interest in an estate:

        “Interested person” includes heirs, devisees, children, spouses,
        creditors, beneficiaries, and any others having a property right in or
        claim against the estate of a decedent which may be affected by the
        proceeding. It also includes persons having priority for appointment
        as personal representative, and other fiduciaries representing
        interested persons. The meaning as it relates to particular persons
        may vary from time to time and must be determined according to
        the particular purposes of, and matter involved in, any proceeding.
        8 CMC § 2107(p).

  The requirement of having an interest clearly applies in this case. Therefore, we
  hold that a petitioner for letters of administration must be an interested person to
  have standing.

                       C. Whether Rule 14 Grants Standing
¶ 14     Rule 14 provides who may petition for letters of administration. It reads in
  its entirety “Any person who is a resident of the Commonwealth and over 18
  years of age may petition for Letters of Administration.” COM. R. PRO. P. 14.
  The court, applying the basic canon of construction that language should be
  given its plain meaning, found that White met these requirements as a
  Commonwealth resident over the age of 18. See In re Estate of Roberto, 2002
  MP 23 ¶ 21. The rule does not explicitly limit petitioners to interested parties.
                            In Re Estate of Moteisou, 2023 MP 3

    We will not, however, apply a plain meaning interpretation when there is
    evidence that a contrary meaning was intended or if the interpretation defies
    common sense or leads to absurd results. In the Matter of a Petition for Certified
    Question, 2020 MP 2 ¶ 13. Rule 14 is a court rule, and we can best interpret our
    rules. Citizens’ Natural Gas Co. v. Waynesburg Natural Gas Co. 59 A. 822, 822
    (Pa. 1904) (holding “[a] court without doubt is the best interpreter of its own
    rules and its constructions of them ought to be authoritative.”).

¶ 15    Mettao argues that Rule 14 concerns not standing but a different concept—
  capacity. The New York Court of Appeals has explained the distinction:

          “Standing” is an element of the larger question of “justiciability” . . .
          The various tests that have been devised to determine standing are
          designed to ensure that the party seeking relief has a sufficiently
          cognizable stake in the outcome so as to “cast[] the dispute ‘in a
          form traditionally capable of judicial resolution’” . . . “Capacity,”
          in contrast, concerns a litigant's power to appear and bring its
          grievance before the court. The concept of a lack of capacity, which
          has also occasionally been intermingled with the analytically
          distinct concept of a failure to state a cause of action, does not admit
          of precise or comprehensive definition . . . Capacity, or the lack
          thereof, sometimes depends purely upon a litigant's status. A natural
          person's status as an infant, an adjudicated incompetent or,
          formerly, a felony prisoner, for example, could disqualify that
          individual from seeking relief in court.”
          Cmty. Bd. 7 v. Schaffer, 639 N.E.2d 1, 2 (N.Y. 1994) (internal
          citations omitted).

¶ 16     We agree that Rule 14 concerns capacity rather than standing. First, a plain
  meaning interpretation would overrule a number of our holdings that litigants
  require an interest, even a speculative one, that could be affected by the outcome
  of the case. In re Estate of Maria Mangabao, 2019 MP 13 ¶ 10. “Under the
  doctrine of stare decisis, we afford a presumption that previous decisions should
  be followed.” Castro v. Telesource CNMI, Inc., 2022 MP 7 ¶ 9. None of the
  factors we use when deciding to overrule precedent support overturning.1 Our
  prior decisions applied the constitutional requirement of standing, which 8 CMC
  § 2107(p) grants. Overruling prior opinions would be proper only if there was a
  change in the statute, but there has been none.

¶ 17    Second, a plain meaning interpretation would render the “personal
  interest” requirement in 8 CMC § 2107(p) meaningless and lead to an absurd

1
     “These factors include the quality of the precedent’s reasoning, the precedent’s
     consistency and coherence with earlier or subsequent decisions, changed law since the
     prior decision, changed facts since the prior decision, the workability of the precedent,
     and reliance interests on the precedent.” Castro v. Telesource CNMI, Inc., 2022 MP 7
     ¶ 9.
                           In Re Estate of Moteisou, 2023 MP 3

    result. The probate code was enacted in 1984.2 The Commonwealth Rules of
    Probate Procedure were promulgated later in time, in 1996. Rule of Probate
    Procedure 1 specifically instructs that the probate rules “are to be used in
    conjunction with the Code.” This is consistent with our explanation in
    Commonwealth v. Camacho, 2002 MP 14 ¶ 20 that we interpret procedural rules
    in pari materia with the relevant statutes and make all attempts to harmonize
    them. “[Q]uestions of dominance between the judiciary’s rules and the
    legislature’s statutes only occurs when a statute directly and irreconcilably
    conflicts with a rule of this court on a matter within the court's authority.” Id. at
    ¶ 19. No such conflict exists here; an interpretation of Rule 14 as overruling 8
    CMC § 2107(p) would ignore the clear command to harmonize the probate rules
    with the probate code.

¶ 18     Third, a plain reading of Rule 14 does not ensure someone has a
  cognizable stake in a probate outcome as constitutionally required. The mere fact
  that someone is a certain age and is a resident in a certain location does not grant
  them an interest in a case. If Rule 14 determined who had standing, then a minor
  child of a decedent would have no standing. That interpretation defies common
  sense and reaches an absurd result. Age and residence concern a person’s status
  to bring a grievance before the court. To illustrate the point, a decedent’s minor
  child clearly has standing as an heir under 8 CMC § 2107(p), but would lack
  capacity under Rule 14 to initiate a probate. Instead, a duly appointed guardian
  ad litem that meets the age and residence requirements that Rule 14 imposes
  would have to start the probate on behalf of the minor child.

¶ 19      Courts try to interpret statutes and rules in a way to make them comport
  with the Constitution. “In testing the constitutionality of a statute, the language
  must receive a construction that will conform it to a constitutional limitation, if
  it is susceptible of such an interpretation.” In the Matter of Seman, 3 NMI 57, 73
  (1992); see also Reyes v. Reyes, 2004 MP 1 ¶ 88. We are not persuaded that Rule
  14 intended to remove the constitutional requirement of having an interest. Rule
  14 conforms with the NMI Constitution by us interpreting it to grant capacity
  instead of standing.

¶ 20     Article IV, Section 9 of the NMI Constitution gives this Court the authority
  to propose court rules. Our rules must first receive legislative approval, and so
  we have stated they have “the status of statutes.” Commonwealth v. Camacho,
  2002 MP 14 ¶ 17. However, conferring standing to every Commonwealth
  resident over the age of 18, without requiring that they have an interest, would
  be beyond our power. Statutory standing may be created by establishing a new
  type of injury which fulfills the constitutional standing requirement. In doing so,
  however, the requirement of an injury cannot be waived. See TransUnion LLC
  v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2205 (2021) (rejecting “the proposition that a
  plaintiff automatically satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement whenever a statute
  grants a person a statutory right and purports to authorize that person to sue to
  vindicate that right . . . Article III standing requires a concrete injury even in the

2
     See Northern Marianas Probate Law, PL 3-106.
                        In Re Estate of Moteisou, 2023 MP 3

  context of a statutory violation.”) (internal quotation and citation omitted). In
  probate, Section 2107(p) specifies who has a stake—neither the legislature nor
  the Court, through Rule 14, can grant standing to people without an interest in
  the estate. Doing so would violate Article 4, Section 2 of the NMI Constitution.

¶ 21     We hold that Rule 14 is about capacity of natural persons, not standing.
  Only an interested person can petition for letters of administration. Corporations
  are considered people under the probate code. 8 CMC § 2107(t) provides that
  “person” includes “an individual, a corporation, an organization, or other legal
  entity. The requirement of being an interested person does not apply to the
  administrator themselves. That is, while only an interested person can petition
  under Rule 14, they can ask the court to appoint a non-interested person to be
  the administrator.

                                  D. Dismiss or Leave to Amend
¶ 22    Next, we address whether to dismiss the Petition or allow a third party to
  substitute into the case. As discussed above, standing is a jurisdictional issue.
  See, e.g., Mafnas v. Commonwealth, 2 NMI 248, 256 (1991).

¶ 23     There is little support for allowing amendments in the absence of standing.
  The only authority White cites is NMI Rule of Civil Procedure 1, which states
  that the Rules of Civil Procedure “shall be construed and administered to secure
  the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.”
  Because standing is a constitutional requirement for courts to have jurisdiction,
  however favorable to judicial economy permitting amendment would be,
  “judicial economy cannot supply jurisdiction.” In re Care & Treatment of
  Emerson, 392 P.3d 82, 88 (Kan. 2017); see also Burns v. Waller Thomas Burns
  II & Theo W. Pinson, 2 S.W.3d 339, 345 n.6 (Tex. App. 1999) (“judicial
  economy cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction.”); Gilliam v. State, 860
  S.E.2d 543, 545 (Ga. 2021) (acknowledging that a line of cases where the
  Georgia Supreme Court had exercised jurisdiction in the name of judicial
  economy “was not rightly decided.”).

¶ 24     NMI Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 15(a)(2) permits amendments to
  pleadings with court leave, which courts freely grant when justice so requires.
  However, amendments may be denied for reasons such as undue delay, bad faith,
  dilatory motive, prejudice to the opposing party if amendment was allowed, or
  futility of amendment. Commonwealth v. Superior Court, 2008 MP 11 ¶ 14;
  Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).

¶ 25     An amended complaint’s allegations can “be considered in evaluating
  whether there was standing at the time the case was originally filed.” In re
  Zappos.com, Inc., 888 F.3d 1020, 1028 n.10 (9th Cir. 2018); see also ThermoLife
  Int’l L.L.C. v. Neo Genis Labs, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 3d 486, 496 (D. Ariz. 2019)
  (explaining the effect of an amended complaint). That is, “the standing inquiry
  remains focused on whether the party invoking jurisdiction had the requisite
  stake in the outcome when the suit was filed.” Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 734
  (2008). Amendments can demonstrate the litigant has standing on a different
                         In Re Estate of Moteisou, 2023 MP 3

  basis than originally alleged. The Ninth Circuit in United Union of Roofers, etc.
  No. 40 v. Insurance Corp. of America, 919 F.2d 1398, 1403 (9th Cir. 1990), held
  that a union lacked associational standing to seek monetary relief on behalf of
  its members, but let the union amend its complaint in order to show “an
  independent rather than associational basis for standing.”

¶ 26     Courts have also permitted amendments to add new parties in order to cure
  standing issues as long as the original litigant had standing for other claims. In
  Neese v. Lithia Chrysler Jeep of Anchorage, Inc., 210 P.3d 1213, 1219–24
  (Alaska 2009), the Alaska Supreme Court held that in a class action complaint,
  plaintiffs who had no standing against two of the defendants in a multi-defendant
  case should be permitted to amend their complaint to add additional members
  who had standing against those two defendants to avoid piecemeal appeals.
  Similarly, in Triumvirate, LLC v. Zinke, No. 3:18-cv-0091-HRH, 2018 U.S. Dist.
  LEXIS 97134, at *3 (D. Alaska June 8, 2018), the court allowed the plaintiff to
  amend his complaint to add new plaintiffs with standing under one
  environmental law because the plaintiff did have standing under a different
  environmental law. Id. at *9–10. It explained “[b]ecause the court has
  jurisdiction over plaintiff’s [other] claims, this case is ‘much different from those
  in which [courts] have disallowed amendment because jurisdiction was lacking
  over the entire case from its inception.’” Id. at *10 (quoting Cotton v. Certain
  Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London, 831 F.3d 592, 595 (5th Cir. 2016)).

¶ 27     Other jurisdictions also hold that litigants without standing generally
  cannot amend their pleading. The Eleventh Circuit has held “[w]here a plaintiff
  never had standing to assert a claim against the defendants, it does not have
  standing to amend the complaint and control the litigation by substituting new
  plaintiffs, a new class, and a new cause of action.” Wright v. Dougherty County,
  358 F.3d 1352, 1356 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Summit Office Park, Inc. v.
  United States Steel Corp., 639 F.2d 1278, 1282 (5th Cir. 1981)). Similarly, the
  Sixth Circuit has held that when the plaintiff “admittedly has not suffered injury
  in fact by the defendants, it had no standing to bring this action and no standing
  to make a motion to substitute the real party in interest.” Zurich Ins. Co. v.
  Logitrans, Inc., 297 F.3d 528, 531 (6th Cir. 2002). See also DW Aina Le’a Dev.,
  LLC v. Land Use Comm’n, No. 17-00113 SOM-WRP, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
  93652, at *51–53 (D. Haw. May 25, 2022) (denying the plaintiff’s motion to
  amend the complaint because they lacked standing at the outset of the case);
  Lierboe v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 350 F.3d 1018, 1022–23 (9th Cir.
  2003) (dismissing a class action where the sole named plaintiff lacked standing);
  Pressroom Unions-Printers League Income Sec. Fund v. Cont’l Assurance Co.,
  700 F.2d 889, 893 (2d Cir. 1983) (“The longstanding and clear rule is that if
  jurisdiction is lacking at the commencement of [a] suit, it cannot be aided by the
  intervention of a [plaintiff] with a sufficient claim.”) (internal quotation marks
  omitted); Wash. Tennis & Educ. Found. Inc. v. Clark Nexsen, Inc., 270 F. Supp.
  3d 158, 166 (D.D.C. 2017) (“when subject matter jurisdiction is wanting because
  the plaintiff presently named in the complaint lacks standing, a court cannot
  grant leave to amend under Rule 15 to add a plaintiff for purposes of curing the
  jurisdictional defect.”). In short, “standing—where it would have been necessary
                         In Re Estate of Moteisou, 2023 MP 3

  to bring the claim in the [trial] court—cannot be created retroactively.” W.
  Watersheds Project v. Kraayenbrink, 632 F.3d 472, 483 n.6 (9th Cir. 2011).
  Therefore, when a pleading fails to establish the litigant’s standing and cannot
  be amended to show they had standing at the case’s outset, amendment is futile,
  and the court lacks jurisdiction.

¶ 28       One other rule appears at first glance to support White’s request to
  substitute in NMHC, which is the real party in interest. Rule of Civil Procedure
  17(a)(3) specifies that actions should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute in
  the name of the real party in interest until “reasonable time has been allowed for
  the real party in interest to ratify, join, or be substituted into the action.”
  However, “The real-party-in-interest requirement and Article III standing are
  two distinct issues with separate considerations.” Fisher v. PNC Bank, N.A., 2
  F.4th 1352, 1358 (11th Cir. 2021); (internal quotation and citation omitted); see
  also Cranpark, Inc. v. Rogers Group, Inc., 821 F.3d 723, 732 (6th Cir. 2016)
  (“Lawyers, and courts, often fail to distinguish between these two distinct issues
  . . . A plaintiff may have standing in the Article III sense but not be the real party
  in interest.”). For example, when someone declares bankruptcy, they do not lose
  standing for any causes of action they had; instead, the bankruptcy trustee
  becomes the real party in interest for any suits on those causes of action. See
  Dunmore v. United States, 358 F.3d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir. 2004); Martineau v.
  Wier, 934 F.3d 385, 391 (4th Cir. 2019). “[C]ourts must assure themselves of
  Article III standing at the outset of the litigation . . . But there is no analogous
  rule for the real-party-in-interest requirement.” Id. at 392 (internal quotation and
  citation omitted). That is, in order for Rule 17(a)(3) to apply, the original litigant
  must have standing. See Zurich Ins. Co. v. Logitrans, Inc., 297 F.3d 528, 532
  (6th Cir. 2002) (“[Rule 17(a)(3)] must be read with the limitation that a [trial]
  court must, at a minimum arguably have subject matter jurisdiction over the
  original claims.”

¶ 29      Here, unlike in Neese and Triumvirate, White has no other claim for which
  she has standing. 210 P.3d at 1219–20; 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97134. She
  cannot amend her petition to demonstrate she had standing when she first filed
  it, indicating that amendment would be futile. Commonwealth v. Superior Court,
  2008 MP 11 ¶ 14; Wright v. Dougherty Cnty., 358 F.3d 1352, 1356 (11th Cir.
  2004); Summit Office Park, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 639 F.2d 1278,
  1282 (5th Cir. 1981). Courts vacate the judgment below and remand with
  instructions to dismiss when the litigant lacks standing. See Hawaii’s Thousand
  Friends v. Anderson, 768 P.2d 1293, 1301 (Haw. 1989); Chapman v. Pier 1
  Imps. (U.S.), Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 944 (9th Cir. 2011); California v. Texas, 141 S.
  Ct. 2104 (2021). We agree with these cases and hold that dismissing the petition
  is the remedy when the petitioner lacks standing to initiate probate.

                                      V. CONCLUSION
¶ 30    For the reasons stated above, we find Rule 14 does not confer standing in
  probate proceedings. We VACATE the order appointing White as administrator
  and REMAND with orders to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
                           In Re Estate of Moteisou, 2023 MP 3

SO ORDERED this 20th day of April, 2023.

/s/
ALEXANDRO C. CASTRO
Chief Justice

/s/
JOHN A. MANGLOÑA
Associate Justice

/s/
PERRY B. INOS
Associate Justice

                                         COUNSEL

Jane Mack, Saipan, MP, for Appellant.

Michael A. White, Saipan, MP, for Appellee

                                          NOTICE

This slip opinion has not been certified by the Clerk of the Supreme Court for publication
in the permanent law reports. Until certified, it is subject to revision or withdrawal. In the
event of discrepancies between this slip opinion and the opinion certified for publication,
the certified opinion controls. Readers are requested to bring errors to the attention of the
Clerk of the Supreme Court, P.O. Box 502165 Saipan, MP 96950, phone (670) 236–9715,
fax (670) 236–9702, e–mail Supreme.Court@NMIJudiciary.gov.