Court Opinion

ID: 9516729
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 23:50:33.8607+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:39:03.941075
License: Public Domain

McGIVERIN, Chief Justice
(concurring in result).
I would affirm the judgment of the district court in favor of defendant Polk County for reasons different from the majority opinion.
The fighting question is whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting into the record before the jury, over plaintiffs’ relevancy objection, evidence by defendant of Kimberly’s use in the past of marijuana four to five times each week and use of cocaine, L.S.D. and amphetamines occasionally. There was no contention this drug use caused the accident.
Kimberly was age 18 at the time of the accident and apparently was a drug abuser.
Kimberly sought damages for permanent disability, future expenses and continued pain and suffering from her accident injuries.
Her life expectancy is a valid consideration in assessing the duration and amount of her claimed future damages. An expert for plaintiff used the standard mortality table, see III Iowa Code at 1200 (1987), to estimate her life expectancy without considering any lessening of her life span due to other factors relevant to her.
*812Evidence of a person's sobriety or intemperance does bear on his or her life expectancy. See Century “21" Shows v. Owens, 400 F.2d 603, 610 (8th Cir.1968); cf. Iowa-Des Moines Nat’l Bank v. Schwerman Trucking Co., 288 N.W.2d 198, 201 (Iowa 1980); Ehlinger v. State, 237 N.W.2d 784, 792 (Iowa 1976). In the Owens case, evidence of past use of intoxicants was admitted because of the possible effect such intoxicants would have on the personal injury plaintiff’s longevity. 400 F.2d at 610.
The present issue boils down to a discretionary judgment call by the trial court when considering plaintiffs relevancy objection under Iowa Rule of Evidence 403 as to whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to plaintiffs. The trial court exercised its discretion and allowed the evidence.
In order to reverse that ruling, we must say the trial court clearly abused its discretion. Gail v. Clark, 410 N.W.2d 662, 672 (Iowa 1987). We find such an abuse only when the trial court exercises its discretion on grounds or for reasons clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable. Frank v. Iowa Dep’t. of Transp., 386 N.W.2d 86, 88 (Iowa 1986).
When a plaintiff seeks damages on which her life expectancy is relevant, I would conclude she has placed in issue factors such as her sobriety and intemperance as they may bear on her life expectancy. A jury is entitled to this information when asked to assess her claim for future damages. Expert testimony as to the effect of drug abuse on a plaintiff’s life expectancy should not be necessary as a foundation before the jury could assess this evidence.
The trial court’s discretionary ruling was not clearly untenable or clearly unreasonable.
For the above reasons, I concur in the result that the court’s judgment should be affirmed.