Court Opinion

ID: 9726398
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 12:47:37.434751+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:26.799855
License: Public Domain

Robert W. Hansen, J.
(dissenting — Case No. 139). Here the plaintiff walked into the side of a passing bus that was moving, well within the speed limit permitted, in a curbside lane of traffic reserved for bus travel. Under the “nonfault” concept, she would be entitled to reimbursement for expenses and compensation on a schedule basis for her injury, all without regard to her fault or negligence in causing the accident. Such social insurance approach, disregarding the fault of the injured person, is the law in Wisconsin, under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, for employees injured in work-connected accidents. However, it is not the law,1 at least not yet, as to injuries resulting from highway accidents.
Under the law as it is, the plaintiff must base her claim for damages on the negligence or fault of others involved in the accident. Here she alleged negligence on the part of the bus driver and the city. Under the statute then applicable, she was required, to recover, to establish that her negligence was less than that of the driver or city. The jury found her 50 percent negligent, the bus driver 25 percent negligent, and the city 25 percent negligent.
The court majority reverses and orders a new trial. It does not do so on the basis of reversible error, finding no such claims of error preserved by proper objection at the time of trial. It reverses “in the interest of jus*725tice,” a basis requiring a finding that a different result would probably be reached at a new trial. Landrey v. United Services Automobile Asso., ante, pp. 150, 160, 181 N. W. 2d 407. Is there any basis here for believing that a jury would or could find the plaintiff less negligent than the driver or less negligent than the city? While the heart says Yes, the mind says No. Under any view of the evidence, as a matter of law, the plaintiff’s causal negligence was greater than that of the driver or of the city.
As to the bus driver, the claim of negligence relates to lookout. But this is not a case of a bus hitting a pedestrian who moved into its path. The plaintiff walked into the side of the bus when it was right in front of her. In fact, she walked into the rear half of the bus. The bus was being driven along a broad avenue that flanks a university campus. Granted that he was driving in a single lane reserved for bus and taxicab traffic, the driver was required to give constant attention to the road in front of him. Can he also be required to give attention to persons the front of the bus has passed and to anticipate that one such person might step from a sidewalk or safety island into the rear end of his bus? If so, can it be held that any such breach of duty as to an all-encompassing lookout was greater in degree than the negligence of the person who walked without looking or seeing, into the rear side of the vehicle? The question suggests, in fact, gives the answer.
As to the city, the claim of fault is based upon a nearby sign, indicating that traffic was one-way, which was true as to automobile traffic, but did not mention that a special lane of traffic was reserved for buses and taxicabs traveling in the opposite direction. It is undisputed that the plaintiff, a student at the university, had crossed the street in question at least twenty-four times. It is difficult to believe that she had not at any time observed a bus or taxicab operating in the lane. Even if this were the case, even if she relied upon the sign, it is *726obvious that her negligence is independent of and greater than that of the city in posting the sign. If the plaintiff had stepped in front of the moving bus, it could be argued that the “one-way” sign led her to look only in the wrong direction and excuse her from looking in any other direction before proceeding. Where she in fact stepped off the curb or island into the rear side of the bus, it is her failure to look ahead that is the lookout failure on her part that is causally most important. The direction in which the bus was moving cannot change, much less eliminate, the responsibility of a pedestrian to look ahead before stepping into the side of a moving vehicle directly in front of him. As a matter of law, we would hold that the negligence of walking into a vehicle is greater than the negligence of the municipality that posted a sign indicating vehicular traffic moved in one direction only.
It is sad to see the serious consequences of a moment of forgetfulness or thoughtlessness or carelessness on the part of the plaintiff. It is exactly against such tragic consequences that the victims of industrial accidents are completely insured. But for as long as the law in this state requires, as it did here, that the negligence of the person injured be causally less than the negligence that can be attributed to the other persons complained against, the plaintiff cannot prevail. The law as it is applied to the facts as they clearly are requires affirmance.

 The Wisconsin legislature has established a comparative negligence formula applicable to automobile accident cases (Sec. 895.045, Stats.) and its right to do so has been upheld. Vincent v. Pabst Brewing Co. (1970), 47 Wis. 2d 120, 177 N. W. 2d 513.