Court Opinion

ID: 9469990
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 02:54:11.38983+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:41:39.900725
License: Public Domain

WILLIAM E. DOYLE, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The above cause has been before this court on a prior occasion. In that previous appeal the only point considered, was the adequacy of counsel at the trial. We ruled on that occasion, at 638 F.2d 185, that there was an inadequacy of counsel due to the trial court’s forcing the case to go to trial and the inability of counsel who finally entered his appearance to make adequate preparation for the trial in the time allowed.
We later took notice of the fact that the trial court had not had an opportunity to rule on this issue. In view of that deficiency we remanded the cause for the purpose of the trial court’s consideration of the inadequacy issue. We now are reviewing the trial court’s ruling that the defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel.
In briefly recounting the facts as they appear in that opinion it is important to note that the time frame is of some importance. The indictment was returned February 14, 1979 for eight counts of mail fraud and interstate transportation of money *218obtained by fraud. Arraignment took place February 24, 1979. On March 7, 1979 the cause was set for trial commencing the week of April 16, 1979. Daniel Smith appeared as counsel with the defendant at the arraignment. But on March 30th, 1979 the mentioned lawyer moved to withdraw from the case stating that he had not been paid and that the defendant had not cooperated in that he had failed to keep some appointments and had misled counsel as to his whereabouts. In view of the magnitude of the attorneys fee it is not surprising that the defendant had not been able to abide by the agreement which had been previously made. A hearing was held on April 9,1979 before the trial judge. At that time the judge granted the motion of Mr. Smith requesting that he be allowed to withdraw. Defendant did not object to the withdrawal. No doubt he was unaware of the significance of this. On that occasion, April 9, 1979, the judge advised the defendant that no continuances would be granted and that the case would go to trial as scheduled whether the defendant was represented or not. The trial was scheduled to commence on April 17th, 1979. The trial court did not inquire of the defendant as to whether or not he was financially able to employ other counsel. This notwithstanding, it appeared that there was a funds problem of some kind inasmuch as the defendant had not made any payment to his then counsel, Mr. Smith. Notwithstanding that condition the judge told the defendant in unmistakable terms that no continuance would be granted and that the case would go to trial as scheduled whether the defendant was represented by counsel or not.1
The defendant was unable to employ counsel at that late date so he enlisted the help of an uncle by marriage, Mr. Sheldon Emeson, an attorney, who practiced in Lamar, Colorado. Emeson sought to obtain counsel for him at first, but no lawyer would accept a case of that complexity in view of the circumstances, that is, the time problem that was present. So Emeson, himself, sought to gain some time from the judge. He called the judge on the phone. Emeson said that his application for a continuance was mainly for the purpose of providing him with the necessary time to prepare for trial. The judge said that the request was made because Mr. Emeson had some county court cases pending and preferred to try them rather than that of the defendant. In any event the judge denied his telephone request. The failure of Mr. Emeson to file a written motion for a continuance, together with the failure to make a record on the day of trial that he was unprepared, indicate that he was not familiar with the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
So the trial began on April 17, 1979 and on April 20th, after the jury had deliberated for two days, defendant was found guilty on six of the eight counts. Subsequently he was sentenced to five years imprisonment.
Inasmuch as the defendant had failed to provide any of the money which Smith had charged for a fee, just prior to the trial, Daniel Smith filed the motion to withdraw from the case and the motion was granted. Mr. Smith acknowledged at the recent hearing that he was surprised. Defendant’s monetary problems were not brought to the court’s attention at the time Smith filed his *219motion to withdraw or. at the time of trial. It was, however, brought to the court’s attention that the reason for Smith’s withdrawal was failure to receive his fee.
DISCUSSION
It is to be noted that the statute on appointment of counsel, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(b) recognizes the obligation to make inquiry in a situation such as this. This section provides in part as follows:
Unless the defendant waives representation by counsel, the United States Magistrate or the court, if satisfied after appropriate inquiry that the defendant is financially unable to obtain counsel, shall appoint counsel to represent him. Such appointment may be made retroactive to include any representation furnished pursuant to the plan prior to appointment.
The trial court made no inquiry as to defendant’s financial ability to employ an attorney notwithstanding that it was apparent from Smith’s withdrawal that there was a money problem.2 Indeed, this was the reason why his counsel wished to be relieved of the representation. It was very likely the most important reason. It is difficult to believe that he would have withdrawn because of the defendant’s failure to cooperate in respect to keeping appointments if he was being paid. From counsel’s statement at that time the court could very easily have recognized that the fee problem was paramount. The circumstances were such that the court could and should have taken some initiative with respect to whether the defendant had funds to employ counsel. The court did mention in its findings that it was impossible to grant moneys to bring witnesses in unless the defendant had made a showing that he was a pauper. But it would appear that he did make some showing although not purposeful. It was plenty apparent that there wasn’t any money to be paid to the.lawyers, otherwise he would not have turned to his uncle by marriage to represent him.
In every criminal case in which the defendant is charged with a felony or a misdemeanor, ... the United States magistrate or the court shall advise the defendant that he has the right to be represented by counsel and that counsel will be appointed to represent him if he is financially unable to obtain counsel. Unless the defendant waives representation by counsel, the United States magistrate or the court, if satisfied after appropriate inquiry that the defendant is financially unable to obtain counsel, shall appoint counsel to represent him. (emphasis supplied.)
Our view is that the court ought to have taken some initiative in view of the fact that the case was set for trial in one week, and the court was determined to go forward. Indeed, later, the court did appoint a lawyer to represent him on the original appeal to this court. And incidentally defendant has been well represented by present counsel.
Had the judge made an inquiry, the problem would have been solved. He had a man before him whose lawyer had been relieved. He was faced with getting a lawyer or having to try the case without one. The Seventh Circuit in a very recent case, United States v. Martin-Trigona, faced a similar condition and dealt with it. See 684 F.2d 485 (7th Cir.1982).
The sixth amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.” If the defendant is financially unable to retain private counsel, the trial court must appoint counsel to represent him. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 [92 S.Ct. 2006, 32 L.Ed.2d 530] (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 [83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799] (1963). The Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A, describes those situations in which a federal court must appoint counsel to represent a defendant. The court must advise the pro se felony defendant of his right to be represented by counsel and inform him that counsel will be appointed to represent him if he is “financially unable to obtain counsel.” Id at § 3006A(b). If the defendant does not waive the right to be represented by appointed counsel, the court must appoint counsel to represent *220him unless the court “is satisfied after appropriate inquiry” that the defendant is financially able to obtain counsel. Id. (Emphasis added.)
It might be argued in the present case that the defendant waived his right to counsel. However, since he was uninformed, it could not have been an informed waiver.
Following the remand by this court to the trial court for further proceedings the trial court held extensive supplemental hearings in which a good deal of additional facts were developed. This began on May 26, 1981 and continued at various times over a period of several months. The government made a broad scale presentation of the witnesses who were aware of the conditions. Several former members of the U.S. Attorney’s staff were called and the witnesses who were endorsed by the government. The court heard all of these witnesses and finally concluded that none of them would have been of any value to the defendant had they been called. In other words the effect of the hearings was that no prejudice had been suffered by forcing the defendant to trial. The element that was overlooked was the inadequacy of time for preparation of the case. This resulted in inadequacy of counsel and this inadequacy was acknowledged by the lawyer, Mr. Emeson, who represented the defendant. The inadequacy of representation, resulting from insufficient time to prepare, is unquestionably a violation of defendant’s constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel. United States v. Olivas, 558 F.2d 1366 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 866, 98 S.Ct. 203, 54 L.Ed.2d 142 (1977); United States v. King, 664 F.2d 1171 (10th Cir.1981). Whether defense counsel had adequate time to prepare is, it is true, a question of fact with respect to which the trial court has some discretion. However, the failure of the trial court to grant a continuance to allow additional time to prepare under circumstances such as these is an abuse of discretion. United States v. Gallagher, 620 F.2d 797 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 878, 101 S.Ct. 224, 66 L.Ed.2d 100 (1980).
In the case of Wolfs v. Britton, 509 F.2d 304 (8th Cir.1975) the court set out several guidelines which are applicable in assessing whether counsel had sufficient time to prepare a case for trial. These include 1) the amount of time afforded counsel; 2) the experience of counsel; 3) the gravity of the charge; 4) the complexity of possible defenses; and 5) the accessibility of witnesses to counsel.
In Olivas, supra, defense counsel had 33 days to prepare for trial in a somewhat routine type of narcotics case. The court found that there was no abuse of discretion. The trial court’s denial of a motion for additional time was not an abuse of discretion.
In United States v. Gallagher, supra, it was also held that the refusal of the court to grant a continuance in a case involving escape from a federal penitentiary, did not constitute a violation of the Constitution. The court found that it was a very simple issue.
In the case of Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589, 84 S.Ct. 841, 849, 11 L.Ed.2d 921 (1964), the Supreme Court said: “Myopic insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay can render the right to defend with counsel an empty formality.” Id.
The present case is a mail fraud case in which the defendant was obtaining advanced fees for loans. This is. a sophisticated type of fraud case. Here the counsel for the defendant had only eleven days from the time he learned of the indictment until trial to prepare the case and only seven days from the date the first attorney was actually allowed to withdraw. Only two witnesses were called by the defendant, whereas the government called four witnesses from Colorado, three from Texas, two from New York, and one each from Oklahoma and Mississippi. Regardless of this the jury deliberated for two days on the question of guilt or innocence before reaching a verdict. The fact that the trial was completed in less than two days does not measure the seriousness or the complexity of the case. We certainly must take *221notice that fraud cases are notoriously difficult for both sides and this did not constitute an exception.
It seems to be assumed that a showing of no prejudice offsets any claim as to incompetency of counsel. In a careful reading of United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 101 S.Ct. 665, 66 L.Ed.2d 564 (1981) the Supreme Court was speaking of the sanction to be imposed and it concluded that absent demonstrable prejudice the dismissal of the indictment was plainly inappropriate, even though the violation may have been deliberate. However, the presence or absence of prejudice should not be and cannot be the test of a violation of the Constitution. In an inadequacy of counsel case to require proof that a different result would have occurred had able counsel been present is not a true test of the unconstitutionality of the action.
Finally we do not wish to seem unduly critical of the trial court. Crowded dockets and associated problems make the job very difficult. We are not claiming that the kind of action that the record discloses here is uncommon. Indeed, the trial judge here is extraordinarily competent. But a ease like this reminds us all of the unhappy fact that we are fallible.
I would reverse the case and remand it for a new trial.

. THE COURT: ... And you will go to trial next Monday. If you have a new lawyer, fine; and if you don’t, it will go to trial without a lawyer, you will have to represent yourself, but it is going to trial. You fully understand that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: All right, that being so, the motion of defense counsel to withdraw is granted and the case will go to trial as scheduled, and you should so plan, Mr. Stuckey. MR. STUCKEY: We have planned on it, Your Honor. But may I ask if the Court would inquire of the defendant as to whether or not he knows with any more specificity if he’s going to get another attorney? Because if he’s going to, I guess the first thing the Court will be confronted with is a Motion for Continuance Thursday or Friday.
THE COURT: Well, there’s not going to be a continuance granted. He should come in here and go over the file. If he wants to get information about the case, I’m sure both Mr. Wiggins and Mr. Smith will be happy to cooperate with him in turning over anything they have gotten.

. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3006A provides in part: