Court Opinion

ID: 9518829
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:03:02.95145+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:36:58.371776
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE GARMAN, concurring in part and dissenting in part: Because I conclude that section 5 — 8—4(a) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Code) (730 ILCS 5/5 — 8—4(a) (West 2002)) requires the imposition of consecutive life sentences when a conviction for multiple felonies triggers the operation of the Habitual Criminal Act (Act) (720 ILCS 5/33B — 1 et seq. (West 2002)), I respectfully dissent in part. The majority errs in relying on the “laws of nature” (218 Ill. 2d at 169) rather than the laws established by our state legislature. This case concerns the interpretation of two of those laws: the Habitual Criminal Act (720 ILCS 5/33B — 1 et seq. (West 2002)) and the sentencing provisions of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5 — 8—1 et seq. (West 2002)). The primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. People v. Whitney, 188 Ill. 2d 91, 97 (1999). The language of a statute is the best means of determining legislative intent. Whitney, 188 Ill. 2d at 97. It is unnecessary to look beyond the plain language of the statutes at issue to reach the proper result in this case. The power to determine the appropriate punishment for criminal conduct rests with the legislature (People v. Taylor, 102 Ill. 2d 201, 205 (1984)), while “[t]he judiciary’s discretion in fashioning a criminal sentence extends only as far as the parameters of the sentencing statute permit” (People v. Woofers, 188 Ill. 2d 500, 506 n.1 (1999)). Via the Unified Code of Corrections, the legislature has imposed specific requirements upon circuit courts with respect to the imposition of mandatory consecutive sentences, and the circuit court is responsible for enforcing these requirements and imposing the appropriate sentence. 730 ILCS 5/5 — 8—4 (West 2004); People ex rel. Waller v. McKoski, 195 Ill. 2d 393, 399-401 (2001). In enacting and later amending section 5 — 8—4 of the Code, the legislature determined that the sentences for certain felonies shall be served consecutively: “Concurrent and Consecutive Terms of Imprisonment, (a) When multiple sentences of imprisonment are imposed on a defendant at the same time, *** the sentences shall run concurrently or consecutively as determined by the court. *** The court shall not impose consecutive sentences for offenses which were committed as part of a single course of conduct during which there was no substantial change in the nature of the criminal objective, unless: (i) one of the offenses for which defendant was convicted was first degree murder or a Class X or Class 1 felony and the defendant inflicted severe bodily injury *** * * * in which event the court shall enter sentences to run consecutively.” 730 ILCS 5/5 — 8—4(a)(i) (West 2002). As this court has noted, these consecutive sentencing provisions are mandatory once the trial court has determined that the defendant’s course of conduct qualifies. People v. Harris, 203 Ill. 2d 111, 114-15 (2003). The trial court in this case appropriately determined that the defendant’s five Class X felonies and the severe bodily injury he inflicted upon M.J. and D.J. qualify the defendant for consecutive sentencing under section 5 — 8—4(a) (i). Thus, regardless of the duration of the defendant’s sentences, the trial court was required to order that he serve those sentences consecutively. Neither the trial court, nor this court, possesses the discretion to breach these statutory parameters requiring consecutive sentencing. See Wooters, 188 Ill. 2d at 506 n.l. While section 5 — 8—4 determines that the defendant’s five sentences must be served consecutively, the Habitual Criminal Act (720 ILCS 5/33B — 1 et seq. (West 2002)) determines the duration of each sentence. Having been twice convicted of qualifying felonies, the defendant is an habitual criminal who must be sentenced to life imprisonment. 720 ILCS 5/33B — 1 (West 2002). The majority correctly concludes that the Act requires a sentence of natural-life imprisonment for each of the defendant’s convictions (218 Ill. 2d at 162). It is these life sentences to which section 5 — 8—4(a) applies, requiring that they be served consecutively. The Unified Code of Corrections subjects all felons, including habitual criminals, to its felony sentencing provisions. It acknowledges its relationship with the Habitual Criminal Act by noting that when a defendant has committed a felony and is adjudged an habitual criminal, the sentence for the felony will be a term of natural-life imprisonment: “Except as otherwise provided in the statute defining the offense, a sentence of imprisonment for a felony shall be a determinate sentence set by the court under this Section, according to the following limitations: * * * (2) for a person adjudged a habitual criminal under Article 33B of the Criminal Code of 1961, as amended [720 ILCS 5/33B — 1 et seq. (West 2002)], the sentence shall be a term of natural life imprisonment[.]” 730 ILCS 5/5 — 8—1(a)(2) (West 2002). The remainder of section 5 — 8—1 establishes the required sentences of imprisonment for the various classes of felonies. The Code then goes on to detail, in section 5 — 8—4(a), what happens when a defendant commits more than one of these felonies, causing a trial court to impose more than one of these sentences. 730 ILCS 5/5 — 8—4(a) (West 2002). Section 5 — 8—4 contains no indication that the habitual criminal life sentences recognized by section 5 — 8—1(a)(2) are not subject to its provisions. Lacking an exemption, multiple life sentences are subject to section 5 — 8—4 in the same way as all other sentences detailed by section 5 — 8—1. Although the Habitual Criminal Act does, as the majority noted, establish a separate sentencing scheme (218 Ill. 2d at 157), the reference to the Act in the Unified Code of Corrections reinforces the conclusion that the two schemes must be read together. In imposing concurrent sentences, the majority notes that “Defendant cannot serve two natural-life sentences in sequence, nor will the total amount of two or more natural-life sentences ever be more than defendant’s one life.” 218 Ill. 2d at 167-68. However, serving five consecutive life sentences is no more of a factual impossibility than serving five concurrent life sentences — after all, it is impossible for the defendant to serve five days’ time in one 24-hour period. A scenario can be factually impossible, yet still be legally possible, as when a defendant is convicted of attempted theft even though his intended victim had nothing of value to steal. See 720 ILCS 5/5— 8 — 4(b) (West 2004) (factual impossibility is no defense to a charge of attempt); People v. Richardson, 32 Ill. 2d 497, 502 (1965). Here, the legislature has determined it is legally possible to serve consecutive natural-life sentences. The majority observes that “[c] ailing it consecutive” will not actually increase or decrease the amount of time the defendant spends in jail (218 Ill. 2d at 169), and thus its decision cannot prejudice either the defendant or the State (218 Ill. 2d at 169). This reasoning, however, overlooks the significance of consecutive sentences to the public and to crime victims such as M.J. and D.J. The legislature has apparently determined that the imposition of consecutive life sentences is meaningful, if only symbolically, and this court must give effect to the legislature’s clear intent. McKoski, 195 Ill. 2d at 399-401. In addition, some disquietude remains under the surface of the majority’s waves of assurances that consecutive life sentences would never be necessary to protect the public should one of the branches of government act to impact defendant’s length of incarceration. The majority could easily dispel such concerns by simply following the sentencing framework enacted by the legislature. Using the language of the Act (720 ILCS 5/33B — 1 et seq. (West 2002)) and section 5 — 8—4(a) of the Code (730 ILCS 5/5 — 8—4(a) (West 2002)), the legislature has mandated the imposition of consecutive natural-life sentences when a conviction for multiple felonies triggers the operation of the Habitual Criminal Act. The trial court sentenced the defendant in accordance with the mandate of these statutes. I would affirm the judgment of the trial court as to the five convictions not vacated by the appellate court. CHIEF JUSTICE THOMAS and JUSTICE KARMEIER join in this partial concurrence and partial dissent.