Court Opinion

ID: 9890537
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-13 15:00:20.321693+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:26:26.177662
License: Public Domain

22-1189
State of New York v. Raimondo

                                           In the
                   United States Court of Appeals
                                For the Second Circuit
                                      _________________

                                     August Term 2022
                                   Argued: May 24, 2023
                                  Decided: October 13, 2023

                                     Docket No. 22-1189

     STATE OF NEW YORK, BASIL SEGGOS, as Commissioner of the New York State
    Department of Environmental Conservation, NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF
                         ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION,

                                                        Plaintiffs-Appellants,

                                              v.

      GINA RAIMONDO, in her official capacity as Secretary of the United States
       Department of Commerce, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,
     NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION, NATIONAL MARINE
                    FISHERIES SERVICE, a/k/a NOAA FISHERIES,

                                                      Defendants-Appellees.
                                      _________________

Before:                         WESLEY and PARK, Circuit Judges. ∗
                                      _________________

∗
 Circuit Judge Rosemary S. Pooler, who was a member of the panel, passed away on
August 10, 2023. Judge Pooler participated in the consideration and decision of this case
and had initial responsibility for the opinion of the Court. The two remaining members
of the panel have determined to issue this opinion. See 28 U.S.C. § 46(d); 2d Cir. IOP E(b).
      The federal government uses a fishery management plan to conserve and

manage summer flounder, also known as fluke, off the Eastern Seaboard. Under

the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, that fishery

management plan must account for ten “national standards.” Each national

standard prioritizes a different objective: from preventing overfishing, to using

accurate data, to promoting fairness and efficiency, to protecting existing fishing

communities, and more.

      Eleven states participate in the summer flounder fishery.        The fishery

management plan includes annual commercial quotas for each state, which

determine how much summer flounder that state’s fishermen can catch. One of

those states, New York, brought this action against the National Marine Fisheries

Service—the federal agency responsible for the summer flounder fishery—and

several related federal entities. New York argues the current quotas fail to account

for the long-term movement of summer flounder northward, closer to New York’s

shores. New York claims the quotas violate the Magnuson-Stevens Act as well as

the Administrative Procedure Act. The district court rejected that argument; it

granted summary judgment to the Fisheries Service.

                                         2
      We conclude that in setting each state’s summer flounder quotas, the

Fisheries Service properly weighed the relevant statutory considerations. We

therefore AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

                              _________________

            STEPHEN J. YANNI, Assistant Solicitor General (Barbara D.
                 Underwood, Solicitor General, Judith N. Vale, Deputy Solicitor
                 General, on the brief) for Letitia James, Attorney General of the
                 State of New York, New York, NY for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

            LUCAS ISSACHAROFF, Assistant United States Attorney (Benjamin H.
                 Torrance, Assistant United States Attorney, on the brief) for
                 Damian Williams, United States Attorney for the Southern
                 District of New York, New York, NY, for Defendants-Appellees.

            HOPE SENZER GABOR, Assistant County Attorney, for Dennis M.
                 Cohen, Suffolk County Attorney, Suffolk, NY, for Amicus Curiae
                 Suffolk County.

                              _________________

WESLEY, Circuit Judge:

      The federal government uses a fishery management plan to conserve and

manage summer flounder, also known as fluke, off the Eastern Seaboard. Under

the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (the “MSA”),

16 U.S.C. §§ 1801 et seq., that fishery management plan must account for ten

“national standards.” Each national standard prioritizes a different objective:

                                        3
from preventing overfishing, to using accurate scientific data, to promoting

efficiency, to protecting existing fishing communities, and more.

      Eleven states participate in the summer flounder fishery.      The fishery

management plan includes annual commercial quotas for each state, which

determine how much summer flounder that state’s fishermen can catch. One of

those states, New York, brought this action against the National Marine Fisheries

Service (the “NMFS”)—the federal agency responsible for the summer flounder

fishery—and several related federal entities. New York argues that in setting the

current quotas, the NMFS failed to account for the long-term movement of

summer flounder northward, closer to New York’s shores. New York claims the

quotas violate several of the MSA’s national standards as well as the

Administrative Procedure Act (the “APA”), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq. The district

court rejected that argument; it granted summary judgment to the NMFS.

      We conclude that in setting each state’s summer flounder quotas, the NMFS

properly weighed the relevant statutory considerations. We therefore affirm the

judgment of the district court.

                                        4
                                   BACKGROUND

      Summer flounder are a sought-after commercial fish. Their habitat spans

the Eastern Seaboard, but during winter months they concentrate in offshore

waters managed by the federal government through the NMFS. 1 Commercial

fishermen in eleven coastal states, from Maine to North Carolina, fish these waters.

      The NMFS regulates the commercial summer flounder catch through a

fishery management plan.        Congress, through the MSA, requires the fishery

management plan to account for ten national standards. Those national standards

are set forth in full below, but at a high level, they seek to conserve and manage

the fishery for future generations. See 16 U.S.C. § 1802(5) (defining “conservation

and management”); id. § 1851(a) (requiring “conservation and management”

measures to comport with the ten national standards).

      The summer flounder fishery incorporates a quota system designed to

prevent overfishing. Each state is allocated a quota percentage of the total summer

flounder catch for the year. Any summer flounder that are “landed” (brought

1 “The federal government is responsible for regulation of the ‘exclusive economic
zone’—waters from three to 200 miles from shore.” New York v. Atl. States Marine Fisheries
Comm’n, 609 F.3d 524, 527 (2d Cir. 2010). By contrast, states “retain primary authority
over the conservation and management of fisheries within the ‘territorial sea’—waters
within three miles of shore, as well as in rivers and estuaries.” Id.
                                            5
ashore) in a state count towards that state’s annual quota—regardless of where

those fish were caught. For example, fishermen from Virginia catch summer

flounder near Long Island, New York, “land” those fish back in Virginia, and those

fish count towards Virginia’s quota.

       The NMFS first incorporated quotas into the fishery management plan in

1992, with a slight adjustment in 1993 (the “1993 Allocation Rule”). At that time,

each state’s quota was based on how much summer flounder that state had landed

from 1980 through 1989. From 1993 onward, New York received authorization for

approximately 7% of each year’s total catch. States with higher historical landings

received higher quotas: for example, Virginia received approximately 21% of each

year’s total catch. 2

       Since 1993, however, summer flounder populations have shifted steadily

northward, closer to the coast of New York. In response, NMFS undertook a

rulemaking process to reassess and potentially revise the quota system.            It

completed that process in 2020, when it promulgated a new rule (the “2020

2 The exact baseline quotas are as follows: Maine 0.04756%; New Hampshire 0.00046%;
Massachusetts 6.82046%; Rhode Island 15.68298%; Connecticut 2.25708%; New York
7.64699%; New Jersey 16.72499%; Delaware 0.01779%; Maryland 2.03910%; Virginia
21.31676%; North Carolina 27.44584%. See 58 Fed. Reg. 49,937, 49,940 (Sept. 24, 1993)
(codified at 50 C.F.R. § 625.20).
                                         6
Allocation Rule”) that New York now challenges. See 85 Fed. Reg. 80,661 (Dec. 14,

2020) (codified at 50 C.F.R. § 648.102(c)(1)).

      The 2020 Allocation Rule retains each state’s original quota from the 1993

Allocation Rule—but only up to the first 9.55 million pounds of summer flounder

caught. See 50 C.F.R. § 648.102(c)(1)(i). Past that point, the 2020 Allocation Rule

subjects any additional catch to a new, evenly divided, “surplus” quota—by which

every state receives approximately 12% of any additional catch during a good

fishing year. 3 See id. § 648.102(c)(1)(ii). Consequently, under the 2020 Allocation

Rule, New York is entitled to its historical 7% of the first 9.55 million pounds of

coastwide catch, and 12% of any surplus beyond that.

      New York filed comments regarding the 2020 Allocation Rule; it protested

that it should receive a higher quota percentage because summer flounder

populations had relocated closer to its own shores. New York claimed that the

NMFS had ignored scientific evidence showing the summer flounder movement.

3 The exceptions are Maine, New Hampshire, and Delaware, who receive only a de
minimis amount of the surplus quota. These three states do not participate substantially
in the summer flounder catch.
                                           7
The NMFS rejected New York’s comments and explained why the quotas crafted

in the 2020 Allocation Rule were preferrable.

      After the NMFS finalized the 2020 Allocation Rule, New York filed this

action against the NMFS and related federal entities. New York maintained its

argument that the 2020 Allocation Rule, as well as annual implementation rules

promulgated thereunder, 4 fail to account for the summer flounder’s long-term

relocation. New York claimed that by doing so, the NMFS disregarded four of the

MSA’s ten national standards—which required the agency to use the “best

scientific data available” and to promote efficiency and fairness among fishermen.

      The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York

(Vyskocil, J.) denied New York’s motion for summary judgment and granted the

defendants’ cross-motion. The district court concluded it was “clear from the

administrative record that NMFS appropriately considered all the ten national

standards and, in exercising its discretion to formulate the 2020 Allocation Rule,

4Each year, NMFS adopts a “Specifications Rule,” which announces that year’s coastwide
quota and then, based on the 2020 Allocation Rule, calculates the distribution of that
quota among the states. See 50 C.F.R. § 648.102(c). New York has also challenged the
most recent Specifications Rule, but the parties agree that the validity of the 2020
Allocation Rule will determine the validity of any derivative Specifications Rule. See New
York v. Raimondo, 594 F. Supp. 3d 588, 597 (S.D.N.Y. 2022).
                                            8
did not violate the MSA.” New York v. Raimondo, 594 F. Supp. 3d 588, 599 (S.D.N.Y.

2022). New York appealed.

                                   DISCUSSION

      Standard of Review

      “On appeal from a grant of summary judgment involving a claim brought

under the [APA], we review the administrative record de novo without according

deference to the decision of the district court.” Town of Southold v. Wheeler, 48 F.4th

67, 77 (2d Cir. 2022) (quoting Karpova v. Snow, 497 F.3d 262, 267 (2d Cir. 2007)).

Nevertheless, our review in this case is narrow, and deferential to the NMFS’s

expertise as an agency. See id. That is because MSA provides that courts review

NMFS rulemakings under the APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard. See 16

U.S.C. § 1855(f). Under that standard, an agency need only “examine the relevant

data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a rational

connection between the facts found and the choice made.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs.

Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted); see 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).

                                          9
      Validity of the 2020 Allocation Rule

      Fishery management plans “shall be consistent with” the MSA’s ten

national standards. 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a). Those standards are:

      (1) Conservation and management measures shall prevent
      overfishing while achieving, on a continuing basis, the optimum yield
      from each fishery for the United States fishing industry.

      (2) Conservation and management measures shall be based upon the
      best scientific information available.

      (3) To the extent practicable, an individual stock of fish shall be
      managed as a unit throughout its range, and interrelated stocks of fish
      shall be managed as a unit or in close coordination.

      (4) Conservation and management measures shall not discriminate
      between residents of different States. If it becomes necessary to
      allocate or assign fishing privileges among various United States
      fishermen, such allocation shall be (A) fair and equitable to all such
      fishermen; (B) reasonably calculated to promote conservation; and
      (C) carried out in such manner that no particular individual,
      corporation, or other entity acquires an excessive share of such
      privileges.

      (5) Conservation and management measures shall, where practicable,
      consider efficiency in the utilization of fishery resources; except that
      no such measure shall have economic allocation as its sole purpose.

      (6) Conservation and management measures shall take into account
      and allow for variations among, and contingencies in, fisheries,
      fishery resources, and catches.

      (7) Conservation and management measures shall, where practicable,
      minimize costs and avoid unnecessary duplication.

                                        10
      (8) Conservation and management measures shall, consistent with the
      conservation requirements of this chapter (including the prevention
      of overfishing and rebuilding of overfished stocks), take into account
      the importance of fishery resources to fishing communities by
      utilizing economic and social data that meet the requirements of
      paragraph (2), in order to (A) provide for the sustained participation
      of such communities, and (B) to the extent practicable, minimize
      adverse economic impacts on such communities.

      (9) Conservation and management measures shall, to the extent
      practicable, (A) minimize bycatch and (B) to the extent bycatch cannot
      be avoided, minimize the mortality of such bycatch.

      (10) Conservation and management measures shall, to the extent
      practicable, promote the safety of human life at sea.

Id.

      The ten national standards encompass disparate concerns.          There is,

consequently, a “necessary tension” among them. All. Against IFQs v. Brown, 84

F.3d 343, 349–50 (9th Cir. 1996). The national standards’ expansive text and

structure reflect that Congress intended for the NMFS to use “discretion and

judgment” to reconcile this tension when managing the fishery. Id. The MSA

gives the NMFS rulemaking flexibility to react to dynamic natural conditions and

account for multiple stakeholders. One national standard does not trump the

others; incremental adjustments to a fishery management plan are acceptable.

See Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. 497, 524 (2007).

                                          11
         Validity of the 2020 Allocation Rule

         New York contends that by failing to allocate a higher quota to New York,

the 2020 Allocation Rule ignores the northward movement of the summer

flounder population and is therefore inconsistent with National Standards 2, 4, 5,

and 7.

             i.   National Standard 2: Best Scientific Information Available

         National Standard 2 provides that “[c]onservation and management

measures shall be based upon the best scientific information available.” 16 U.S.C.

§ 1851(a)(2). New York ties its appeal to National Standard 2 and notes that the

NMFS acknowledged that the “best scientific information available” showed

summer flounder populations had shifted northward toward New York. In New

York’s view, its quota must therefore reflect its increased proximity to the summer

flounder populations. New York argues that by keeping each state’s baseline

quota unchanged from the 1993 Allocation Rule, and by evenly splitting each

state’s surplus quota during good fishing years, the 2020 Allocation Rule is not

“based upon” the recent concentration of summer flounder near New York and

other northern states.

                                         12
      We disagree. New York is correct that the phrase “based upon” implies the

agency must use (and not merely consider) the location of summer flounder

populations when crafting the fishery management plan. “In its plain meaning,

‘based on’ means ‘having as the foundation’ or ‘arising from.’” Env’t Def. v. E.P.A.,

369 F.3d 193, 203 (2d Cir. 2004). However, the agency did use these fish location

data. The new surplus quotas in the 2020 Allocation Rule are based, to some

degree, on the northward movement of summer flounder.                As the NMFS

explained, the surplus quotas are meant to “generally” shift fishing rights during

good fishing years. 85 Fed. Reg. at 80,663. They “reduce the proportion of quota

for states at the southern end of summer flounder distribution (North Carolina,

Virginia, and New Jersey) and increase allocation for many northern states,

including New York.” Id. New York’s quota increases from 7% to 12% during

surplus periods, while states now farther away from the summer flounder see

corresponding decreases in their quotas. The agency explained that it introduced

the surplus quotas to “reflect[] the shift of the center of summer flounder biomass.”

Id. Accordingly, the 2020 Allocation Rule is “based upon” the shifted location of

the summer flounder—and New York can catch a higher percentage of fish under

                                         13
the current rule than the previous rule—just not to a degree that New York would

prefer.

       Moreover, the NMFS can base its rule upon multiple sets of “scientific

information.” The MSA does not restrict National Standard 2 to encompass fish

location data alone; other types of scientific information may merit greater

consideration. 5 Here, the primary data that the NMFS employed were landings

data: statistics showing which fishing communities landed summer flounder in

previous years. New York does not dispute that landings data have remained the

same since the 1993 Allocation Rule, or that landings data remain the “best”

information available to determine which fishing communities depend on the

summer flounder today. NMFS has prioritized landings data over fish location

data when allocating state quotas. That is a choice rooted in the agency’s technical

expertise—for which it enjoys substantial deference. See Env’t Def., 369 F.3d at 204.

5 The MSA requires the Secretary of Commerce to establish advisory guidelines based on
the national standards. These guidelines lack the force of law but “assist in the
development” of fishery management plans. 16 U.S.C. § 1851(b). For National
Standard 2, the guidelines state that scientific data should include “biological, ecological,
environmental, economic, and sociological scientific information.” 50 C.F.R. § 600.315(a).
Historical data, such as landings data, may be useful so long as they are “evaluated for
[their] relevance to inform the current situation.” Id. § 600.315(a)(6)(v)(B).
                                             14
          ii.   National Standards 4, 5, and 7: Fairness and Efficiency

      New York also contends the 2020 Allocation Rule violates National

Standards 4, 5, and 7. National Standard 4 provides that “[c]onservation and

management measures shall not discriminate between residents of different

States” and that allocation of fishing privileges shall be “fair and equitable to all

such fishermen.” 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(4). National Standards 5 and 7 call for such

measures, “where practicable,” to “consider efficiency in the utilization of fishery

resources” and to “minimize costs and avoid unnecessary duplication.”             Id.

§§ 1851(a)(5), (7). Similar to its previous argument, New York says it is unfair and

inefficient to allocate higher quotas to states that are farther away from summer

flounder populations.

      We disagree with this argument as well. The NMFS articulated why it

balanced the national standards the way it did, and why it rejected the location-

based rule that New York seeks. Regarding the fairness and equity concerns in

National Standard 4, the NMFS explained why it found it would be unfair to

reduce baseline quotas for communities in states who have become economically

dependent, over time, on fishing for summer flounder. In doing so, the NMFS

explicitly balanced National Standard 4 against National Standard 8, which

                                         15
requires management measures to “take into account the importance of fishery

resources to fishing communities” and “minimize adverse economic impacts on

such communities” where practicable. 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(8). By including ten

standards, the MSA contemplates that other fishery management considerations—

here, the inertia of fishing industries established over decades—can outweigh

equitability concerns that flow from the transitory movement of the summer

flounder. “The [NMFS] is allowed, under this authority, to sacrifice the interests

of some groups of fishermen, for the benefit as the [NMFS] sees it of the fishery as

a whole.” All. Against IFQs, 84 F.3d at 350.

      As for the efficiency and cost concerns in National Standards 5 and 7, the

NMFS reasoned that southern states’ operations involve longer trips and larger

vessels built in reliance on their higher quotas. A location-based rule, the agency

explained, would ignore the “substantial variability in the mobility of each state’s

fleet” and the “traditional areas of operation for each state’s fleet.” 85 Fed. Reg. at

80,663. Put differently, it would not necessarily be efficient for a southern state to

scrap its existing (longer-range) fleet just for a northern state to expand its (shorter-

range) fleet. That is a policy judgment the agency was entitled to draw based on

                                           16
the landings data it reviewed. See F.C.C. v. Prometheus Radio Project, 141 S. Ct. 1150,

1158 (2021).

                                    *      *     *

      The NMFS adopted a rule that sought to “balance preservation of historical

state access and infrastructure at recent quota levels, with the intent to provide

equitability among states when the stock and quota are at higher levels.” 85 Fed.

Reg. at 80,663. We cannot say that this adjustment to the previous rule—the result

of balancing ten different national standards—lacked a rational basis articulated

in the administrative record. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43. We therefore conclude

the NMFS did not violate the MSA or the APA when it set summer flounder quotas

through the 2020 Allocation Rule.

                                  CONCLUSION

      We have considered New York’s remaining arguments and find them to be

without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

                                          17