Court Opinion

ID: 9725497
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 11:50:13.944512+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:15.914932
License: Public Domain

WALLIN, J., Concurring.
I very reluctantly concur. I find it hard to believe one can safely apply “the minimal pressure necessary to prevent swallowing” (maj. opn., ante, p. 1338, quoting 2 LaFave, Search and Seizure (2d ed. 1987) § 5.2(i), p. 473) while locked in a desperate struggle like the one here. As Justice Compton wrote in People v. Trevino (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 686 [140 Cal.Rptr. 243]: “The application of force to a person’s throat is a dangerous and sensitive activity. It is the type of force that, more than any other, is likely to result in violent resistance by the arrestee.” (Id., at p. 692.) I could not agree more.
The Attorney General, and the majority, contend the police did not choke Cappellia. They refer to mere hands on the throat, pressure to the Adam’s apple, and “minimal force around the neck to prevent a defendant from destroying evidence by swallowing it . . . .” (Maj. opn., ante, p. 1338.) They should call a spade a spade. I invite my colleagues—who enjoy the benefit of a calm, controlled environment—to try swallowing an object while someone pressures the neck enough to prevent it. The swallowing reflex is a powerful one, and the considerable force required to thwart it can only be called “choking” by any forthright observer. Judges should not decide which police chokings are acceptable, and which are not, based on Orwellian newspeak.
The majority endorses police choking of suspects “as long as excessive force is not used.” The distinction is doomed by its circularity: The type of force used here is, by definition, excessive. Furthermore, the reasonable force rationale was long ago rejected in People v. Sanders (1969) 268 Cal.App.2d 802 [74 Cal.Rptr. 350]. In Sanders the Attorney General took much the same position he does now, asserting “there was in fact no choking and that the force used was no more than was reasonably necessary to *1342prevent destruction of the narcotic evidence. He insisted] the term ‘choking technique’ [was] a misnomer for a legitimate hold commonly used in judo competition.” (People v. Sanders, supra, 268 Cal.App.2d at p. 805.) The appellate court disagreed, although its rationale was based in part on the officer’s testimony the hold in question could stop blood flow to the head, leading to unconsciousness. (Ibid.) Here, the officers testified their procedure did not pressure Cappellia’s carotid artery nor impair his breathing, and the court made a finding to that effect.
Nevertheless, in my view the reasoning of Sanders is still persuasive. As stated in People v. Parham (1963) 60 Cal.2d 378 [33 Cal.Rptr. 497, 384 P.2d 1001], “Choking a man to extract evidence from his mouth violates due process.” (Id., at p. 384.) This was also the unanimous court’s conclusion in People v. Trevino, supra, 72 Cal.App.3d 686, where Justice Compton wrote: “As to the amount of force that is permissible the cases uniformly reject the use of choking as a means of preventing the destruction of evidence or forcing defendant to disgorge it.” (Id., at p. 691.)
More recently, Justice Staniforth, dissenting in Carleton v. Superior Court (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 1182, 1195-1197 [216 Cal.Rptr. 890], warned of the danger of permanent injury or even death from police choke holds. Relying on Rochin v. California (1952) 342 U.S. 165 [96 L.Ed. 183, 72 S.Ct. 205, 25 A.L.R.2d 1396], he observed “[t]he application of a choking force to a person’s throat is a . . . violation of due process. [Citation.]”
I would hold Rochin and its progeny bar police from ever choking suspects to obtain evidence. (See People v. Trevino, supra, 72 Cal.App.3d at p. 692.) If that were the only consideration here, I would dissent and vote to reverse.
In this case, however, the trial court found the officers acted for two reasons: to obtain evidence, and to insure Cappellia did not die of an overdose from swallowing what the police thought were open bindles. I am highly dubious about the trial court’s factual findings, particularly the latter. Cappellia was never given a chance to spit out the evidence. When Cappellia started to run, Officer Gildea grabbed him by the throat. With Gildea’s hand in a V-shaped hold, the second officer, Poe, also grabbed Cappellia’s neck and “constricted defendant’s throat.” (Ante, p. 1335.) The three then “accidentally” fell to the ground, breaking Cappellia’s nose. Somehow the officers’ belated concern for Cappellia’s well-being strikes me as insincere. (This is especially true in light of the subsequent discovery the bindles were sealed, not open.)
Whatever I think of the trial court’s factual findings, however, I am bound by them. Since the officers arguably acted to save Cappellia’s life, it *1343cannot be said their conduct runs afoul of Rochin. But this court—and trial courts—should carefully scrutinize such claims in the future.