Court Opinion

ID: 9946516
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-29 20:03:12.088746+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:38.652106
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/29/24 Oshodin v. Fire Insurance Exchange CA2/4

   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                       DIVISION FOUR

 ROBERT OSHODIN et al.,                                           B319043 consolidated with B322806

           Plaintiffs and Appellants,                             (Los Angeles County
                                                                  Super. Ct. No. BC623155)
           v.

 FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE,

           Defendant and Respondent.

      APPEAL from an order and judgment of the Superior Court
of Los Angeles County, Terry A. Green, Judge. Affirmed.
      Law Offices of Alvin L. Pittman and Alvin L. Pittman; Law
Office of Christie E. Webb and Christie E. Webb for Plaintiffs and
Appellants.
      Tharpe & Howell, Christopher S. Maile; Greines, Martin,
Stein & Richland, Edward L. Xanders, Rachel A. Beyda for
Defendant and Respondent.
       Plaintiff and appellant Robert Oshodin (Oshodin) asked
Okason Okey, an agent of defendant and respondent Fire
Insurance Exchange (Fire), to sell him a homeowner’s insurance
policy that covered “everything in the house, fully and
completely.” Okey said he would, and Oshodin purchased the
policy Okey prepared without reviewing it. The home Oshodin
shared with his wife, plaintiff and appellant Mimi Oshodin, was
later burglarized; two safes containing jewelry Oshodin testified
was worth millions of dollars were among the items stolen. The
Oshodins made a claim of loss to Fire, which issued a policy-limit
payment of $5,000 for the jewelry.
       The Oshodins sued Fire, asserting in their operative second
amended complaint claims of negligence, negligent
misrepresentation, breach of oral contract, and breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The trial court
sustained Fire’s demurrer to the breach claims without leave to
amend. The negligence and negligent misrepresentation claims
went to jury trial after the Oshodins rejected Fire’s Code of Civil
Procedure section 998 settlement offer of $25,000. By special
verdict, the jury found that Fire, through Okey, was not negligent
by failing to obtain the insurance Oshodin requested and did not
make a false representation of fact to Oshodin. The trial court
subsequently awarded Fire $484,834.16 in costs. The Oshodins
appealed from both the judgment and the cost award; we
consolidated the appeals for all purposes.
       The Oshodins contend the trial court made several errors.
First, they argue the court erred by denying their motion to
exclude testimony by Fire’s experts, whom the Oshodins contend
gave impermissible and argumentative testimony about legal
duties. Second, they argue the court erred by refusing their

                                2
requests to modify CACI No. 2361, the pattern jury instruction
on negligent failure to obtain insurance coverage, and to deliver
special instructions on negligence and reliance. Third, the
Oshodins argue the court erred in sustaining Fire’s demurrer to
their breach causes of action without leave to amend. Finally,
they argue the court abused its discretion by finding Fire’s Code
of Civil Procedure section 998 offer of $25,000 reasonable, and
improperly ordered them to pay expert fees Fire incurred after
making the offer. They alternatively assert that even if the
settlement offer was reasonable, certain expert testimony was not
reasonably necessary to the litigation and therefore should have
been taxed from Fire’s costs. We affirm the judgment and costs
order.
                   FACTUAL BACKGROUND
        Oshodin testified that he was retired from a lengthy career
in furniture manufacturing. Although he was not formally
educated, and was largely unable to read English, Oshodin
started his own successful furniture manufacturing company in
1962. By the late 1960s, he began traveling the world from his
native Nigeria. Oshodin gave much of the jewelry to Mimi1 as
gifts, though he also had his own sizable collection of watches and
other items.
       In 1982, Oshodin began purchasing real estate in the
United States. He first learned about homeowner’s insurance at

1     We refer to Mimi by her given name to distinguish her from
her husband Robert and avoid confusion. No disrespect is
intended.

                                3
that time.2 During Oshodin’s subsequent purchase of a home in
Marina Del Rey, his friend introduced him to Farmers Insurance,
a service mark under which Fire and its affiliates market and sell
insurance that the friend described as “the best.” Oshodin
insured the Marina Del Rey home through Farmers.
       Okey testified that he began working for Farmers in 2006
and became Oshodin’s insurance agent in 2009 or 2010. Okey
learned that Oshodin could not read English at some point prior
to the events at issue here. Both Okey and Oshodin testified that
Okey wrote premium checks that Oshodin signed.
       In or about 2012, Oshodin purchased a home on Kenway
Avenue. He insured the home through Farmers. While Oshodin
was living there, the home sustained $400,000 worth of water
damage. Oshodin filed a claim with Farmers, but the claim was
denied. Oshodin decided to remain with Farmers despite being
upset about the claim denial because he had a long relationship
with Farmers and did not want to look for a new insurance
provider.
       In 2014, Oshodin purchased a $9.5 million home on South
Lorraine Boulevard. Before escrow closed, he called Okey to
obtain insurance for the home. Oshodin testified that Okey came
to the house but said he could not insure it yet because it was not
fully furnished; Okey testified that he went to the house but
could not insure it because escrow had not closed. The parties
agree that Okey later returned to the home and Oshodin
repeatedly told Okey that he wanted “everything” in the house
“completely and fully insured.” They also agree that Okey

2     Oshodin explained that “in Nigeria, you don’t insure” and
instead “pay the government” to ensure that “police men secure
your house.”

                                4
responded “yes” or “okay,” and that Oshodin walked Okey
through the entire home.
       What happened during the walkthrough was disputed.
Oshodin testified that he showed Okey “everything” in the house,
including valuable items such as a 5,000-bottle wine collection,
“over 30 crystal chandeliers,” “a lot of paintings,” $1.1 million
draperies, and a “very beautiful door . . . from Wolfgang Amadeus
Mozart.” Oshodin further testified that he showed Okey a safe
containing his substantial jewelry collection. Oshodin testified
that he opened the safe, which he described as “big,” about three
feet tall and “maybe 300 pounds.”3 Okey looked inside the safe
but did not ask Oshodin any questions about its contents, which
according to Oshodin included “about 27 wrist watches” ranging
in price from about $30,000 or $40,000 to $2.6 million; “like 12”
rings, one of which Oshodin paid $950,000 for; “more than ten”
diamond bracelets; a $45,000, 18-karat gold Vertu phone; and “a
lot of documents,” including “the appraisal of the whole jewelry.”
       A similar safe containing Mimi’s jewelry was also in the
home at the time, but the parties agreed that Oshodin did not

3      Fire witness Michael Larsen, a gemologist, testified that he
went to a security store and measured the exact model of safes
Oshodin owned. According to Larsen, the safes were 20 inches
tall and 17 inches wide, with interior dimensions of “like 12
inches by 12 inches by 15 inches.” Larsen built a replica safe
using those dimensions. The replica was shown to the jury as a
demonstrative, and photographs of the replica were admitted into
evidence. Another Fire witness, Amy Brasseur, testified that she
reviewed the specifications for the safes based on the model
numbers listed on receipts Oshodin provided. Those
specifications indicated that each “safe was about 20 inches, so
less than 2 feet tall, small inside. It weighed about 165 pounds
and had one tray in it.”

                                 5
open it. Oshodin testified that Mimi’s safe contained ladies’
versions of the watches he owned, in addition to “rings, very
expensive ones,” and “unlimited” bracelets, necklaces, and
earrings. There was conflicting evidence regarding how much
jewelry was in Mimi’s safe during the walkthrough. Mimi was
unavailable for trial but testified, via deposition excerpts read to
the jury, that her safe contained at least 86 pieces of jewelry
when it was stolen. Larsen opined that “it does not seem like
there is any way that you can fit all of those items” in the safe.
       During his deposition, Okey testified that Oshodin showed
him a “sizable” safe during the walkthrough. Okey also testified
during his deposition that Oshodin opened the safe, and he saw
“[a] bunch of jewelry. And you know, . . . different kinds, gold. I
guess . . . some of them, you know, colors like this. Some – some
like this color, but mainly gold, you know, kind of bling bling stuff
in there and that was so.”
       On the stand during trial, however, Okey disavowed his
deposition testimony, explaining that he was “not in my clear
mind” during the deposition due to stress and depression from a
marital separation. At trial, where he said his mental health was
“a lot more clearer [sic]” and he knew “what I’m saying is true,”
Okey testified he did not see a safe. He also said that he saw
“something there that I thought may have been a safe,” but he
“wasn’t sure now.” The defense additionally introduced a
recorded statement Okey made prior to his deposition, in which
he said he did not see any safe or the contents thereof during the
walkthrough.
       Okey admitted at trial that he saw “a few cases” of wine,
and some artwork, but stated that Oshodin did not provide and
he did not request an inventory of those items or any other

                                 6
personal property in the home, including the jewelry. Oshodin
also testified that he did not specifically ask or tell Okey to insure
the jewelry or any other items of personal property; he “just told
him he should insure everything in my house fully. Everything.
Everything.” Had he known that the jewelry would not be fully
covered under the policy, Oshodin would have hidden it
throughout his house and hired armed guards to protect the
house “24/7.”
       The parties agreed that when the walkthrough was
complete, Okey entered information into Fire’s computer system
and printed out a policy proposal or insurance quote. They
disputed what happened next. Oshodin testified that Okey
presented him with papers and told him where to sign without
reviewing the contents with him or reading anything to him.
During his deposition, Okey said that after he learned Oshodin
could not read, Okey did not “bother” to review paperwork with
him and would “just tell [Oshodin] okay. . . . [Oshodin says]
Okason, are you sure that this covers me completely because I
don’t . . . want what happened on . . . Kenway to happen in
Lorraine, and I tell him yes. And he says okay, and he says okay.
And then he went ahead and signed.” Okey also said during his
deposition, “I should have brought it up to him when we were
getting the initial quote, that I should have told that, you know,
that the jewelry or the jewelries they have is not - - is not covered
or it has very limited coverage under the current policy.” Indeed,
he stated, “I made a mistake.”4

4     Specifically, he said that he told Oshodin, “I made a
mistake” after Fire determined that the full claimed loss of the
jewelry would not be covered. Okey was initially included as a

                                  7
      At trial, Okey testified that he did “not even remember
how” the deposition testimony happened. He stated that he
always reviewed insurance quotes with Oshodin and did so with
regard to the Lorraine property. Okey further testified that he
“remember[ed] mentioning both the jewelry and earthquake”
policy limits to Oshodin. Okey said that when he told Oshodin
jewelry was not included in the policy, Oshodin responded, “well,
he has cameras and alarm system [sic] in the house.” Regarding
his “mistake,” Okey testified, “I think I may have said that, but I
really – I really didn’t make a mistake.” As addressed more fully
in the Discussion section below, Fire called several expert
witnesses who concurred in this assessment and opined that
Okey met the requisite standard of care.
      Ultimately, Oshodin signed the proposal, which contained a
coverage limit of $2,090,250 for personal property and did not
include any policy endorsements. He did not read it and did not
ask Okey or anyone else to read it to him. Oshodin also signed an
accompanying “California Residential Property Insurance
Disclosure” form that stated, “[a]lmost all policies include specific
dollar limitations on certain property that is particularly
valuable, such as jewelry, art, or silverware. Contact your agent,
broker or insurance company if you have any questions about
your contents coverage.” Oshodin paid the quoted premium of
$10,115.15 by check. He did not contact Okey with questions.

defendant in this action but was dismissed from the case with
prejudice after he settled with the Oshodins for $1 million under
his errors and omissions policy. The jury heard the “mistake”
testimony (and argument related thereto) but was not told about
the settlement.

                                 8
       A few weeks later, an insurance policy dated August 15,
2014 was sent to Oshodin at the Lorraine address. The
declarations page of the policy stated that the coverage limit for
personal property was $2,090,250. Page 12 of the policy stated
that “[s]pecial limits of coverage apply to certain types of personal
property.” “Jewelry, watches, precious and semi-precious stones,
and furs” were explicitly listed as property subject to coverage
limitations. The coverage was limited as follows: “$1,000 limit on
any one article and $5,000 total limit on theft of jewelry, watches,
precious and semi-precious stones and furs. . . . This applies even
if such items are considered artwork or used as decoration.”
Oshodin testified that he did not read or have anyone read to him
the policy or any notices Farmers sent. Indeed, he denied
receiving the policy or other notices in the mail and stated that
he asked Okey to hold his mailings so he would not receive mail
from Farmers.5 However, Oshodin admitted to receiving and
cashing two refund checks Farmers sent him around the same
time.
       It is undisputed that Oshodin renewed the insurance policy
the following year. The renewed policy contained the same
coverage limitations.

5      Okey testified that he initiated a “hold mail” or “stop mail”
in Farmers’ system at Oshodin’s request sometime after Oshodin
moved to the Lorraine home. Okey said he did not know whether
certain types of mailings, including refund checks, could actually
be stopped. Donald Fare, Fire’s Director of Postal Compliance,
testified that Fire’s “documentation trails” showed that the
policy, policy renewal, and other related documents addressed to
Oshodin were picked up for processing by its mail vendor in the
normal course of business.

                                 9
       On November 22, 2015, while the renewed policy was in
effect and the Oshodins were out of the country, thieves
burglarized the Lorraine home. The two safes, which Oshodin
testified collectively contained approximately $50 million worth
of jewelry in addition to documents, luxury car keys, a pen set,
and expensive phones, were among the items stolen. Oshodin
testified that police called him, notified him of the robbery, and
asked his permission to enter the home to investigate. The police
also said they had been told the safes contained about $100
million worth of jewelry, but Oshodin told them it was “about $50
million” because his “upbringing” was to avoid “dishonesty.” The
police asked Oshodin to provide them with receipts or pictures of
the jewelry. Oshodin told them that most of the receipts and
appraisals were in the safes with the jewelry but began gathering
photographs of himself and Mimi wearing various pieces. The
Oshodins compiled a list of items they believed were taken,
though they noted the list was likely incomplete.
       In January 2016, the Oshodins submitted a claim of loss to
Farmers. The document exceeded 200 pages and included “(1)
the Preliminary ‘Proof of Loss, with Declaration’; (2) a
preliminary list of identified items stolen, together with their
values; (3) receipts for some of the items identified; and (4) some
photographs depicting some of the items know [sic] to have been
stolen from the insured home.” It also included a disclaimer that
the Oshodins were “experiencing mental and emotional trauma
and depression associated with this shocking intrusion and theft
of valuable personal property” and thus “neither claim, nor
believe, that the items listed . . . is a complete statement of items
taken.” The document was admitted into evidence amid lengthy
testimony about its contents.

                                 10
        Farmers claims adjuster Amy Brasseur handled the $7.2
million claim. She testified to numerous problems with the
document, including duplicative claims, numerical discrepancies,
unusual dates, failure to account for currency exchange rates,
and a lack of corroborating receipts, appraisals, and purchase
details. Notwithstanding these issues,6 some of which Oshodin
characterized as calculation mistakes by the person who
prepared the document, Farmers paid the Oshodins the policy
sub-limit of $5,000 for the jewelry losses. Brasseur testified that
she did not “even price out all of the jewelry” before paying the
claim, because given the quantity and “high-end names” claimed,
“it’s reasonable to assume that you’re going to hit that $5,000
limit” and “it doesn’t make sense to spend the time and effort to
price out each item when the end value isn’t going to change.”
Brasseur acknowledged on cross-examination that Farmers could
deny claims in their entirety if it determined that the insured
made material misrepresentations, and no such denial was made
in this case. In total, Farmers paid the Oshodins $113,695.48.
                    PROCEDURAL HISTORY
        The Oshodins filed suit against Okey, Fire, and various
related corporate entities7 in June 2016. After two rounds of
demurrers and roughly contemporaneously with Okey’s
dismissal, the Oshodins filed their operative second amended

6      The Oshodins’ counsel acknowledged the document was “a
train wreck” during closing argument.
7      The corporate defendants included Farmers Group, Inc.,
Farmers Insurance Group, Inc., and Farmers Insurance
Company, Inc. The trial court granted summary judgment in
their favor on the second amended complaint in October 2017;
neither those defendants nor the ruling dismissing them is at
issue here.

                                11
complaint against Fire on April 18, 2017. They asserted four
causes of action: negligence, negligent misrepresentation, breach
of oral contract, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing.
       As discussed more fully below, the trial court sustained
Fire’s demurrer to the two breach counts without leave to amend.
Fire subsequently moved for summary judgment on the
remaining causes of action for negligence and negligent
misrepresentation. The trial court denied the motion. Shortly
thereafter, Fire offered to settle the matter for $25,000 pursuant
to Code of Civil Procedure section 998, with each party to bear its
own costs. The Oshodins rejected the offer, and the matter
proceeded to jury trial.
       Prior to trial, the Oshodins filed a motion in limine “to
preclude lay and expert testimony on insurance industry factors
as irrelevant and prejudicial and lacking foundation.” The trial
court denied the motion. As discussed more fully below, Fire
called three experts at trial to testify about typical practices and
standards of care in the insurance industry.
       Toward the end of the 15-day trial, the parties and the
court had several discussions about jury instructions and verdict
forms. As discussed more fully below, the trial court denied the
Oshodins’ request to modify CACI No. 2361, the pattern jury
instruction on negligent failure to obtain insurance coverage. It
also denied their request for special instructions on negligence
and reliance. The parties agreed on a special verdict form, and
the jury used the form to find, 10-2, that Fire, through Okey, was
not negligent by failing to obtain the insurance Oshodin
requested and did not make a false representation of fact to
Oshodin.

                                12
       After trial, Fire filed a memorandum of costs seeking a
total of $668,817.60. The Oshodins responded with a motion to
tax costs. After hearing the matter, the trial court granted the
Oshodins’ motion to tax costs in part and taxed Fire’s costs in the
amount of $183,983.44, awarding it $484,834.16.
                             DISCUSSION
I.     Expert Testimony
       The Oshodins first contend the trial court erred by denying
their motion in limine to exclude expert and lay testimony on
“insurance industry factors.” They argue that expert testimony
was irrelevant to the issues of negligence and negligent
misrepresentation and therefore “served to mislead and confuse”
the jury. They further argue that three of Fire’s witnesses, Peter
Marchel, Van Hedges, and James Michael Pickens impermissibly
testified about Okey and Oshodin’s legal duties and engaged in
legal argument. They assert that the admission of this testimony
was prejudicial because it “changed the burdens of proof and
turned this case from a ‘failure to provide the agreed upon
coverage’ case to order taking standard case.” We find no error.
       A.    Background
             1.     Motion in Limine
       Prior to trial, the Oshodins moved to “preclude lay and
expert testimony on insurance factors as irrelevant and
prejudicial.” The Oshodins asserted that they expected Fire’s
experts to “testify the requested coverage was not available,
about the risks of the coverage requested, the obligations and
responsibilities of the insured and insurer’s agent, etc.” They
argued such testimony was “irrelevant to Plaintiffs’ simple claims
for negligence and negligent misrepresentation” because “[n]one
of those insurance industry factors were known to the Oshodins

                                13
or influenced the communications between them and Defendant’s
agent Okey.” They asserted that the case was “based on a simple
set of facts . . .[,] not specialized information outside the domain
of lay consumers, and thus the expert testimony designated is
totally irrelevant and impermissible and will be unduly
prejudicial and confusing to the jury.” In their view, the “only
relevant facts are what the consumer Mr. Oshodin requested and
what [Fire’s] agent Okey failed to do to fulfill that request, while
he then represented to the Oshodins he had obtained the
insurance required to cover everything in their . . . home.” The
Oshodins further asserted that even if the testimony were
relevant, it should be excluded under Evidence Code section 352
because it would shift the jury’s focus away from the interaction
between Oshodin and Okey.
       Fire opposed the motion. It argued that its proffered
testimony would “show the standard of care to be applied to Mr.
Okey’s conduct and whether he breached it; the responsibility
and obligations of the Oshodins in obtaining coverage for their
jewelry and whether they satisfied them; and whether the
conduct of Mr. Okey was a substantial factor in causing
Plaintiffs’ damages, among other things.” Fire further argued
that expert testimony was necessary to establish the standard of
care, because the case involved professional negligence. Fire also
argued that the expert testimony would establish that no
reasonable consumer could have expected the requested coverage
under the circumstances.
       In reply, the Oshodins reiterated that expert testimony was
unnecessary “because it is common knowledge that an agent’s
failure to procure the insurance coverage requested by an insured
breaches the duty of care owed to the insured.” They further

                                14
asserted that their case was “like a res ipsa case where a
professional acts negligently and the negligent act is within the
common knowledge of lay persons,” and that Okey’s “admitted
failure to obtain the coverage requested by the Oshodins
constitutes negligence as a matter of law.”
       The court denied the motion before trial. Characterizing
the motion as a “meat cleaver,” the court reasoned it was
“premature to say that this is off limits.” The court also
remarked that it would like to hear the Oshodins’ evidence before
limiting Fire’s.
       After the Oshodins completed their case-in-chief, and one of
Fire’s experts already had testified, the Oshodins’ counsel raised
the issue of whether it would be proper for Fire’s experts to
testify about Oshodin’s reasonable expectations when interacting
with Okey. The court stated, “I don’t know that they can tell us
how Mr. Oshodin was reasonable, how he should have acted,” but
“they can tell us what obligations that [sic] consumers have in
applying for insurance.” The court also said, “Yeah,” after Fire’s
counsel remarked, “When I ask an inappropriate question, all
they have to do is object for the court to rule on it, not try to put a
gag order on it at this point in time.”
             2.    Expert Testimony
                   a.    James Michael Pickens
       Pickens was the first expert Fire called, before the
discussion regarding Oshodin’s expectations. Pickens was a
former insurance defense attorney and Arkansas insurance
commissioner and current administrative law judge in Arkansas.
He testified that Fire asked him to consider four questions: (1)
whether any insurance company in California could legally offer
the coverage Oshodin requested; (2) whether the Oshodins “did

                                  15
everything that they were supposed to do in order to obtain
insurance for this alleged jewelry collection”; (3) whether Okey
“satisfied all of his duties and obligations in procuring the
coverage that the plaintiff requested”; and (4) whether Okey “had
an obligation or responsibility to obtain coverage for this alleged
jewelry collection.”
       Pickens testified that it was “very important that the
insurance company knows exactly what risk they’re insuring,”
because “if they don’t know what they’re covering or what all the
risks are, then they don’t know how to price the insurance policy,
and they could be charging too much or two [sic] little depending
on the amount of risk.” He further testified that if a customer
says that he or she wants “everything in the house insured” but
does not add, “including my jewelry,” the insurance company
“would have absolutely no way to know: number 1, whether or
not a jewelry collection exists. If a jewelry collection does exist,
what it consists of, how much the insured paid for the jewelry,
what the current appraisal is of the jewelry.” In such a situation,
it would be “impossible . . . for the insurance company to know
what they’re even being asked to insure; and . . . how they can
possibly price that risk.”
       Pickens opined that the Oshodins “absolutely did not
satisfy even the minimum obligations that they had to procure
the coverage for their jewelry collection.” He testified that “there
is something in the law, a concept in the law, called ‘the duty of
good faith and fair dealing’” that requires participants in a
transaction to disclose all material facts, and Insurance Code
section 332 imposes the duty in the context of insurance
contracts. Pickens opined that Oshodin had an “affirmative duty”
to disclose information about the jewelry collection to Okey, “just

                                16
like it’s an affirmative duty on the part of the insurance company
to tell me what is and isn’t covered under the policy.” He further
opined that Oshodin’s request to insure everything in the home
fully and completely was “vague,” “nonspecific,” and “ridiculous.”
He added that it would be “impossible” and “illegal” under
Insurance Code section 381 “for an insurance company to provide
the coverage that the plaintiffs requested.” Pickens further
testified about “moral hazards,” which he defined as “any term or
condition in an insurance policy that increases the risk of fraud
or increases the risk of exaggerated claims.” As an example, he
said an insured could falsely claim “I had $2 million worth of gold
bricks . . . in a suitcase in my closet,” and “the company has no
way of knowing on the front end what they’re being asked to
insure.” He added that “FBI statistics” show about $40 billion in
insurance fraud each year, which translates to “each and every
American family” paying an additional $400 to $700 in premiums
each year, because insurance companies “pass that charge on to
the consumer.”
       Pickens opined, based on “the fundamental principals [sic]
of insurance regulatory law and public policy,” that Okey “did
everything that was possible under the circumstances and the
facts of this case to procure the coverage that the plaintiffs
requested.” He opined that a reasonable insurance agent would
understand a request for full and complete coverage of everything
to mean “I want the very best policy that you have to offer,” and
Okey provided a “top-of-the-line policy.” Pickens further opined
that Okey had no obligation to provide coverage for the jewelry
collection because he was not specifically told about it.
       The Oshodins’ counsel did not object to any of this
testimony.

                                17
                     b. Peter Marchel
       Marchel was a licensed attorney and the president of an
“insurance wholesaler” or “surplus lines” broker that “specializes
in placing difficult-to-place risk.” Marchel explained that surplus
lines insurers issue insurance policies for unusual items, such as
Marilyn Monroe’s legs, or against non-standard risks, such as
cyber attacks. He testified that Fire asked him to “investigate,
research, and develop an opinion as it relates to the insurance
risk, as it relates to the placement, and as it relat[ed] to
marketing and insurance industry practices in relationship to the
availability of the insurance requested as well as the pricing.”
       Marchel opined that “one of the key principles of insurance
is that you rely on the insured to tell you what insurance you
want as well as how much,” and that principle is incorporated
into the insurance application, which “says that you have the
responsibility of doing that, you’ve acknowledged that, and you
agree with the terms and conditions that are set forth in the
application.” He “would anticipate that if they are unable or
cannot read, they would have somebody explain that to them or
read that to them, and that’s common.” Marchel opined that
Oshodin could not have obtained a policy that “literally provided
full and complete coverage for everything the Oshodins owned,”
because such a policy would have “unlimited terms and unlimited
conditions,” and “spelling out exactly what is covered . . . helps
limit moral hazards.” He characterized a policy without such
limits as “a blank piece of paper” and reiterated, “it can’t be
done.”
       Marchel further opined that “if somebody says I want you
to insure everything I own inside and outside the house, it’s

                                18
assumed it’s a homeowner’s policy because the homeowner’s
policy covers what’s inside and outside the house.” “If he would
have said, I have a $20 million jewelry collection I want insured,
a jewelry collection worth tens of millions, the focus is no longer
on the house.” Marchel testified that the existence of such a
collection is material to insurers because jewelry is a “high-theft
item” and “they don’t want to have to worry about it
disappearing.” “They want to insure risk, but they want to
insure intelligent risk.” He opined that “given all the facts that
we have in this case, no. No insurance carrier would insure it.”
       The Oshodins’ counsel did not object to any of this
testimony.8
                    c.    Van Hedges
       Hedges was a former adjunct professor of insurance who
currently co-owned an insurance consulting business. Hedges
testified that Fire asked him “to opine on what the
responsibilities and obligations of an insured like Mr. Oshodin
are in requesting insurance” and “to develop an opinion as to
what the obligations and responsibilities of the agent were, Mr.
Okey, in placing insurance, the insurance that was requested.”
Fire also asked him “given the insurance that was requested,
what could Mr. Oshodin reasonably have expected to receive,”
and “if there were any exclusions or conditions within the policy
that would apply in this case.” Hedges testified that in preparing

8      Counsel objected only when Marchel testified that “Nigeria
and Ukraine and other eastern European countries are kind of a
no-fly zone for insurance. In other words, there’s a lot of risk.
That’s because of the political and economic environment.
They’re not going to want to write anything out of those
countries.” The court overruled counsel’s Evidence Code section
352 objection of “[r]acially prejudicial.”

                                19
his testimony, he reviewed the policy, the pleadings, and the
depositions, as well as “a lot of what we call ‘insurance treatises,’”
including “New Appleman on Insurance Law.”
       Hedges opined that an insurance agent has a responsibility
to “provide the coverage that was specifically requested,” and a
request to cover “everything in a house . . . fully and completely”
is not a specific request because “[t]here is no such thing as a
policy that covers everything.” He further opined, “[t]he standard
of care in California and in 39 other states is what’s called the
‘order taker standard of care,’” which “is to provide any insurance
specifically requested or if he cannot provide it, to inform the
insured that he cannot provide it. Period.” Hedges opined that
Okey complied with that standard of care because Oshodin
“asked for coverage on his house and Mr. Okey provided a very
broad insurance policy.” He further opined that is what a
consumer would have expected to receive in this case. On cross-
examination, Hedges stated, “it is clear within the insurance
industry, that absent a specific request, he [Okey] has no duty, no
responsibility, and no obligation to provide any additional
coverage. So he met the standard of care in this case.”
       If a customer wants to insure millions of dollars’ worth of
jewelry, Hedges opined, he or she would need to say “[e]xactly
what it is he wants insured and how much he wants it insured
for.” Hedges opined that “before Mr. Okey would have an
obligation under the order taker rule to tell the Oshodins that he
could not get them insurance for tens of millions of dollars of
jewelry,” the Oshodins would have to “specifically request
coverage for jewelry.” Because “each piece of jewelry is of
additional significance for exposure” to the insurance company in
terms of risk and the premium it would require, Okey “would

                                 20
need a great deal of additional information before he could
determine whether or not he could provide” insurance for the
jewelry. Hedges stated that “there is no way” for an insurance
company to cover everything, and that such a request is
“nonsensical.”
       The Oshodins’ counsel did not object to any of this
testimony.
       B.     Analysis
       “‘A motion in limine is made to exclude evidence before the
evidence is offered at trial, on grounds that would be sufficient to
object to or move to strike the evidence. The purpose of a motion
in limine is “to avoid the obviously futile attempt to ‘unring the
bell’ in the event a motion to strike is granted in the proceedings
before the jury.’”’ (Condon-Johnson & Associates, Inc. v.
Sacramento Municipal Utility District (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th
1384, 1392.) Unless the trial court’s ruling on a motion in limine
has the effect of precluding an entire cause of action or defense,
we review the ruling for abuse of discretion. (Ibid.; Garner v.
BNSF Railway Company (2024) ---Cal.Rptr.3d---, 2024 WL
45102, at *6.) We review rulings concerning the admission or
exclusion of expert testimony the same way. (Sargon Enterprises,
Inc. v. University of Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747,
772.) The parties agree the abuse of discretion standard applies
to the evidentiary issues raised here.
       Expert witnesses generally are permitted to offer opinion
testimony regarding any “subject that is sufficiently beyond
common experience that the opinion of an expert would assist the
trier of fact,” and “[b]ased on matter . . . that is of a type that
reasonably may be relied upon by an expert in forming an opinion
upon the subject to which his [or her] testimony relates.” (Evid.

                                21
Code, § 801.) Additionally, “[t]estimony in the form of an opinion
that is otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it
embraces the ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.”
(Evid. Code, § 805.) “However, the admissibility of opinion
evidence that embraces an ultimate issue in a case does not
bestow upon an expert carte blanche to express any opinion he or
she wishes.” (Summers v. A.L. Gilbert Co. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th
1155, 1178 (Summers).) For instance, it is well-established that
experts are not permitted to opine on questions of law or offer
legal conclusions. (Ibid.; see also City of Rocklin v. Legacy Family
Adventures-Rocklin, LLC (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 713, 728
[collecting cases].) Experts also may not overtly advocate from
the stand; that is “a misuse of expert witnesses” which “renders
[their] testimony inadmissible under Evidence Code section 801.”
(Summers, supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at p. 1185.)
       The Oshodins contend that testimony from Pickens,
Marchel, and Hedges violated these principles. They assert that
the experts improperly opined on the legal question of duty by
testifying about Oshodin’s and Okey’s respective obligations.
They also assert that the experts offered a legal conclusion by
opining that insurance coverage for “everything” is not available.
They further argue that the experts engaged in improper
advocacy by referring to the jewelry as an “alleged jewelry
collection,” using the phrase “moral hazard,” using a “charged
example” of “suitcases with gold bullion in the closets,” stating
that Nigeria was inherently risky for insurance, and calling
Oshodin’s request to insure “everything” “ridiculous” and
“nonsensical.”
       As we noted above, however, the Oshodins’ counsel objected
to only one small slice of the experts’ testimony during trial:

                                22
Marchel’s assertion that Nigeria was a risky insurance market.
A party who seeks to exclude expert testimony—or any
evidence—is required to make a timely and specific objection to
the evidence. (Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (a); Heiner v. Kmart Corp.
(2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 335, 346 (Heiner).) “A timely objection
allows the trial court to exercise its sound discretion with respect
to admissibility of expert testimony.” (Heiner, supra, 84
Cal.App.4th at p. 346.) As the Oshodins point out, a motion in
limine filed before trial “is normally sufficient to preserve an
issue for review without the necessity of the moving party’s
renewing its objection at the time the evidence is offered.”
(Summers, supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1157-1158; see also
People v. Morris (1991) 53 Cal.3d 152, 189, disapproved on
another ground in People v. Stansbury (1995) 9 Cal.4th 824, 830
fn. 1 [“mere repetition of the same objection advanced on the
motion in limine would serve no useful purpose”].) However, the
objections raised in the motion in limine—relevance and undue
prejudice—are different in kind than most of the contentions
presented here. “To satisfy Evidence Code section 353,
subdivision (a), the objection or motion to strike must be both
timely and specific as to its ground. An objection to evidence
must generally be preserved by specific objection at the time the
evidence is introduced; the opponent cannot make a ‘placeholder’
objection stating general or incorrect grounds (e.g., ‘relevance’)
and revise the objection later in a motion to strike stating specific
or different grounds.” (People v. Demetrulias (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1,
22.) To the extent the objections regarding improper legal
opinion, legal conclusions, and argument amounting to advocacy
were not presented to the trial court before or during trial, they

                                 23
are forfeited here.9 (See SCI California Funeral Services, Inc. v.
Five Bridges Foundation (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 549, 564-565.)
       Even if these arguments were not forfeited, we disagree
with the Oshodins that any error in admitting the challenged
testimony was prejudicial. We find reversible evidentiary error
only where “the error or errors complained of resulted in a
miscarriage of justice.” (Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (b).) A review of
the complete trial record demonstrates that admission of the
challenged expert testimony did not result in a miscarriage of
justice. Other defense witnesses whose testimony is not
challenged on appeal, Fire employees Voltan Nagy and Andrew
Smidt, gave substantially similar testimony about the obligations
of insureds and insurers. Nagy also testified that it is “not
possible” to provide full and complete insurance coverage for
“everything” inside a house. He stated, “[i]n my 28 years, I don’t
know of anybody who would think or assume that everything that
I have or want would be covered. It’s not physically possible. It’s
not possible.” Smidt additionally testified about the concept of
moral hazard, though he did not use the term: Fire “need[s] to
know what they [jewelry] are in order to insure anything more
than” the standard $5,000 homeowner’s policy sublimit because
jewelry is “highly susceptible to theft,” “hard to value, and they’re
small, transportable, easily stolen.” The jury thus had before it

9     The Oshodins accurately point out that the trial court
sustained objections by Fire’s counsel when their counsel asked
Okey about his “duty.” It is unclear what conclusion they wish us
to draw from this, though we note that it suggests both the trial
court’s receptivity to such objections and an awareness by the
Oshodins’ counsel that testimony about duty was objectionable.

                                 24
the same evidence the Oshodins now contend was improperly
admitted through the expert witnesses.
      To the extent the objection to the Nigeria testimony on
“racially prejudicial” or general Evidence Code section 352
grounds preserves the contention that the testimony constituted
impermissible legal argument, we are not persuaded any
reversible error occurred. The Oshodins have not demonstrated a
miscarriage of justice from the admission of that testimony. The
Oshodins’ testimony previously established that they hailed from
Nigeria and that Mimi brought the jewelry from Nigeria to the
United States. Moreover, Oshodin sought to obtain insurance in
the United States, not in Nigeria, where he testified that he did
use insurance.
      The Oshodins properly preserved their current contention
that the expert testimony was irrelevant and prejudicial. They
contend, as they did in the motion in limine, that the expert
testimony served only to confuse the jury because the experts had
training and experience not available to a typical insurance
consumer. According to the Oshodins, expert “opinions that non-
expert lay-person Oshodin should have known that his request to
insure ‘everything’ was impossible, are irrelevant and should
have been excluded on that basis.” The court did not abuse its
discretion in concluding otherwise.
      Evidence is relevant when it has “any tendency in reason to
prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action,” including witness credibility. (Evid.
Code, § 210.) In a negligence case, a plaintiff must prove the
existence of a legal duty, a breach of that duty, and injury
proximately caused by the breach. (Webster v. Claremont Yoga
(2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 284, 288.) “‘Breach is the failure to meet

                                25
the standard of care.’” (Ibid.) When the alleged negligence arises
from the provision of professional services, expert testimony is
generally required to establish the standard of care the
professional must meet. (Ibid.) The primary exception to this
rule, which the Oshodins appear to invoke without citation here,
is the “common knowledge” exception. It is “principally limited to
situations in which the plaintiff can invoke the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur, i.e., when a layperson ‘is able to say as a matter of
common knowledge and observation that the consequences of
professional treatment were not such as ordinarily would have
followed if due care had been exercised.’” (Flowers v. Torrance
Memorial Hospital Medical Center (1994) 8 Cal.4th 992, 1001.)
“The classic example, of course, is the X-ray revealing a scalpel
left in the patient’s body following surgery.” (Ibid.) Whether the
defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff is a legal question
for the court, but whether the defendant breached the duty owed
is a factual question for the jury. (Cabral v. Ralphs Grocery Co.
(2011) 51 Cal.4th 764, 772.)
       Here, the court reasonably concluded that expert testimony
was relevant to the case and beneficial to the jury. Even though
most people have had at least some interaction with insurance
agents, the standard of care to which an insurance agent is held
is outside a layperson’s common experience. So too are the
processes by which someone requests insurance for millions of
dollars’ worth of jewelry and other valuable assets, and by which
insurance policies for those items are prepared and
communicated to the customer. “‘“[T]he admissibility of expert
opinion is a question of degree. The jury need not be wholly
ignorant of the subject matter of the opinion in order to justify its
admission; if that were the test, little expert opinion would ever

                                 26
be heard. Instead, the statute declares that even if the jury has
some knowledge of the matter, expert opinion may be admitted
whenever it would ‘assist’ the jury. It will be excluded only when
it would add nothing at all to the jury’s common fund of
information, i.e., when ‘the subject of inquiry is one of such
common knowledge that men [and women] of ordinary education
could reach a conclusion as intelligently as the witness.’”
[Citation.]’” (Summers, supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1168-1169.)
This was not a “scalpel left inside someone” case, where expert
testimony was wholly unnecessary.
       The Oshodins point to remarks the trial court made outside
the presence of the jury as evidence that the expert testimony
was irrelevant: “What’s an expert going to say in this case?
Either you believe Mr. Okey and what he said in court in which
case he did nothing wrong. Or you believe Mr. Oshodin, or what
Mr. Okey said in the deposition, in which case, you know, he blew
it big time.” Their reliance on these remarks is not persuasive for
at least two reasons.
       First, “[w]hen faced with making a difficult ruling or
decision, some trial court judges, like anyone else, voice aloud the
conflicting arguments in favor of one choice over the other. A
judge’s remarks may suggest one result, yet the judge arrives at
the opposite result. In such circumstances, the appellate court
does not use the judge’s remarks to impeach the ruling.” (People
v. Carter (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 322, 324.) Indeed, the court
stated moments later, “I’m eagerly awaiting to hear what these
witnesses will claim. You may change my mind.” The court’s
oral musings do not demonstrate it abused its discretion.
       Second, as the court recognized, this case largely turned on
the credibility of witnesses Oshodin and Okey. The expert

                                27
testimony was relevant to that credibility determination, even if
we were to accept the Oshodins’ argument that it was irrelevant
to the issues of negligence and negligent misrepresentation.
Evidence of the standards of care applicable to both sides of the
transaction gave the jury a framework against which to assess
the Oshodins’ and Okey’s testimony about how the policy was
obtained and what it covered. In short, the court did not abuse
its discretion by concluding the testimony was relevant and not
unduly confusing.
II.    Jury Instructions
       The Oshodins contend the trial court improperly failed to
give instructions they requested regarding negligence and
reliance. We disagree.
       A.    Legal Principles
       “A party is entitled upon request to correct,
nonargumentative instructions on every theory of the case
advanced by him which is supported by substantial evidence.”
(Soule v. General Motors Corp. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 548, 572 (Soule).)
“The trial court may not force the litigant to rely on abstract
generalities, but must instruct in specific terms that relate the
party’s theory to the particular case.” (Ibid.) The trial court
“may refuse a proposed instruction that incorrectly states the law
or is argumentative, misleading, or incomplete.” (Caldera v.
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (2018) 25
Cal.App.5th 31, 44 (Caldera).) The court “also may refuse an
instruction when the legal point is adequately covered by other
instructions.” (Ibid.)
       We review the propriety of jury instructions de novo.
(Caldera, supra, 25 Cal.App.5th at p. 44.) “In considering the
accuracy or completeness of a jury instruction, we evaluate it in

                               28
the context of all the court’s instructions. [Citation.] We will not
reverse the judgment for instructional error unless the error
results in a miscarriage of justice, i.e., ‘“where it seems probable”
that the error “prejudicially affected the verdict.”’” (Id. at p. 45,
quoting Soule, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 580.)
      B.     Negligence
             1.     Background
      The trial court instructed the jury with a modified version
of CACI No. 2361, the pattern jury instruction on negligent
failure to obtain insurance coverage.10 The given instruction
stated:
      “Robert and Mimi Oshodin claim that they were harmed by
Fire Insurance Exchange’s agent Okason Okey’s negligent failure
to obtain insurance requested by Mr. Oshodin. To establish this
claim, Robert and Mimi Oshodin must prove all of the following:

10    The pattern version of CACI No. 2361 provides:
      “[Name of plaintiff] claims that [he/she/nonbinary
pronoun/it] was harmed by [name of defendant]’s negligent
failure to obtain insurance requested by [him/her/nonbinary
pronoun/it]. To establish this claim, [name of plaintiff] must
prove all of the following:
      1. That [name of plaintiff] requested [name of defendant] to
obtain [describe requested insurance] and [name of defendant]
promised to obtain that insurance for [him/her/nonbinary
pronoun/it];
      2. That [name of defendant] was negligent in failing to
obtain the promised insurance;
      3. That [name of plaintiff] was harmed; and
      4. That [name of defendant]’s negligence was a substantial
factor in causing [name of plaintiff]’s harm.” (CACI No. 2361.)

                                 29
      “1.     That Fire Insurance Exchange’s agent Okey was
              negligent in failing to obtain the insurance Mr.
              Oshodin requested;
       “2.    That Robert and Mimi Oshodin were harmed; and
       “3.    That Fire Insurance Exchange’s agent Okey’s
              negligence was a substantial factor in causing Robert
              and Mimi Oshodin’s harm.”
       The court rejected at least two other versions of the
instruction the Oshodins proposed. The first, submitted as part
of the parties’ second amended packet of proposed jury
instructions, modified the first element of the pattern instruction
to state, “1. That Robert Oshodin requested Fire Insurance
Exchange to obtain insurance to cover everything in their home
and Fire Insurance Exchange promised to obtain that coverage
for him.” While the court was discussing the jury instructions
with the parties after the Oshodins’ case-in-chief, the Oshodins’
counsel explained, “I think that in CACI we have to articulate
what was requested.”
       During that discussion, the Oshodins’ counsel also raised
their second proposed modification to CACI No. 2361 for the first
time.11 Counsel stated the Oshodins “would prefer it said, ‘failing
to obtain the requested insurance or advise the Oshodins the

11    In the operative second amended complaint, the Oshodins
alleged only the following in their cause of action for negligence:
“72. Defendants owed Plaintiffs the duty of care to provide the
insurance coverage that Plaintiffs specifically requested. [¶] 73.
Defendants, through their Agent/Ostensible Agent, breached the
duty to Plaintiffs by mistakenly failing to take the actions that it
was duty bound to take to provide Plaintiffs with the full and
complete scope of insurance coverage that Plaintiffs specifically
requested.” They did not move to conform the complaint to proof.

                                 30
requested insurance was not available.’” Notably, their proposed
instruction including that language did not include the
“everything” language for which they had previously advocated.
It stated, with emphases added:
       “Robert and Mimi Oshodin claim that they were harmed by
Fire Insurance Exchange’s agent Okey’s negligent failure to
obtain insurance requested by Mr. Oshodin or failing to tell Mr.
Oshodin that Fire Insurance Exchange’s agent Okey could not
provide the insurance coverage requested. To establish this claim,
Robert and Mimi Oshodin must prove all of the following:
       “1.   That Robert Oshodin requested Fire Insurance
Exchange’s agent Okey to obtain insurance that Mr. Oshodin
requested;
       “2.   That Fire Insurance Exchange’s agent Okey was
negligent either by failing to obtain the insurance Mr. Oshodin
requested or by failing to notify Mr. Oshodin that Fire Insurance
Exchange could not provide the insurance that Mr. Oshodin
requested;
       “3.   That Robert and Mimi Oshodin were harmed; and
       “4.   That Fire Insurance Exchange’s negligence was a
substantial factor in causing Robert and Mimi Oshodin’s harm.”
       The Oshodins’ counsel asserted that the modification was
necessary because the pattern instruction “limits the acts of
negligence.” After a lengthy discussion about whether the
evidence had shown that the insurance was unavailable and that
Okey knew the insurance was unavailable, the court denied the
request.
       The Oshodins’ counsel raised the issue again the following
day, asserting that “negligence is not limited to the failure to
procure.” Counsel argued that Okey (and thus Fire) was also

                               31
negligent “if it’s something that can’t be [done] or it’s something
unavailable, he’s negligent in failing to disclose, to recognize that
it was unavailable and to disclose it.” After additional discussion
and argument, the court again denied the modification. The
court told the parties that they were welcome to argue about
whether the insurance was unavailable, but it did not “want to
get involved in this factual debate” through the instructions.
       The issue arose a third time during a discussion of the
instructions on negligent misrepresentation. The Oshodins’
counsel asserted that Okey made an affirmative
misrepresentation “when he comes back and says he has
provided” the requested insurance. She suggested that was
distinct from Okey’s “failure to tell Mr. Oshodin that it isn’t
attainable,” which she characterized as “an act of negligence.”
The court stated it was “grouping all that in the negligent failure
to obtain.” Counsel responded, “But that limits us to language
failure to obtain. [sic] I’m not sure what that – whether that
includes failure to obtain or tell them they couldn’t obtain it.”
             2.      Analysis
       The Oshodins contend their proposed modifications to
CACI No. 2361 were “neither argumentative, misleading, or
incomplete,” and therefore should have been given. They assert
that their proposals included “an additional ground for liability—
failure to tell Oshodin coverage for ‘everything’ could not be
provided”—and therefore prejudiced their ability to fully present
their case. We disagree.
       As a general rule, “an insurance agent does not have a duty
to volunteer to an insured that the latter should procure
additional or different insurance coverage” beyond that which the
insured requests. (Fitzpatrick v. Hayes (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th

                                 32
916, 927 (Fitzpatrick); see also Vulk v. State Farm General
Insurance Co. (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 243, 254 (Vulk).) “It is up to
the insured to determine whether he or she has sufficient
coverage for his or her needs.” (Everett v. State Farm General
Insurance Co. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 649, 660.) Thus, in the
general case, the insurance agent is merely an order-taker,
tasked with obtaining the insurance his or her customer requests.
The “failure to obtain the type of insurance requested may
constitute actionable negligence and the proximate cause of
injury” (Desai v. Farmers Insurance Exchange (1996) 47
Cal.App.4th 1110, 1120 (Desai)), but the failure to recommend
additional or different coverage generally does not. The agent
has no duty to make particular insurance available, advise the
insured of the availability of coverage elsewhere, or “advise them
of inadequacies in coverage which plaintiffs should, as reasonable
persons, have themselves been aware.” (Gibson v. Government
Employees Insurance Co. (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 441, 452.)
       “The general no-duty rule changes only when one of the
following three things occurs: (1) the agent misrepresents the
nature, extent or scope of the coverage being offered or provided;
(2) there is a request or inquiry by the insured for a particular
type or extent of coverage; or (3) the agent assumes an additional
duty by either express agreement or by holding themself out as
having expertise in a given field of insurance being sought by the
insured.” (Vulk, supra, 69 Cal.App.5th at pp. 254-255, emphasis
in original; see also Fitzpatrick, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 927.)
“To trigger a special duty of care under the first scenario, there
must be an affirmative misrepresentation.” (Vulk, supra, 69
Cal.App.5th at p. 255.) “To trigger a special duty of care under
the second scenario, an insured’s request for a particular type or

                                33
extent of coverage must be sufficiently ‘targeted’ or ‘specific’
before an insurance agent will be held to have undertaken an
obligation to procure the coverage.” (Ibid.)
       The Oshodins contend that Okey had a special duty of care
both because he made an affirmative misrepresentation and
because “Oshodin’s request for coverage for everything in the
house was specific.” Their reliance on the affirmative
misrepresentation exception is misplaced. The trial court “may
refuse an instruction when the legal point is adequately covered
by other instructions.” (Caldera, supra, 25 Cal.App.5th at p. 44.)
The trial court instructed the jury with CACI No. 1903, the
pattern instruction on negligent misrepresentation. This
instruction adequately covered the only affirmative
misrepresentation alleged in the second amended complaint,
Okey’s indication that the insurance policy covered everything
fully and completely.
       The Oshodins argue that “Okey’s failure to tell Oshodin the
coverage he requested was not available was not only negligent
misrepresentation, it was also negligence.” However, any
omission by Okey could not be negligent misrepresentation. For
that cause of action, “a positive assertion is required; an omission
or an implied representation is not sufficient.” (Apollo Capital
Fund, LLC v. Roth Capital Partners, LLC (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th
226, 243.) For an omission by an insurance agent to be
actionable negligence, it would have to arise from a special duty.
There could be no special duty based on a negligent
misrepresentation, as the jury found none was made here. This
takes us back to the second scenario in which such a special duty
may be triggered: a “targeted” or “specific” request by the insured

                                34
for a particular type or extent of coverage. (Vulk, supra, 69
Cal.App.5th at p. 255.)
       The Oshodins contend that the request to cover “everything
in the house fully and completely” met that specificity threshold.
Relying on the same body of case law, Fire responds that it did
not. The case law supports Fire’s position.
       In Free v. Republic Insurance Co. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1726
(Free), the plaintiff insured repeatedly contacted the defendant
insurer “to inquire whether the coverage limits of his policy were
adequate to rebuild his home. On each occasion he was informed
they were.” (Id. at p. 1729.) An agent made the same
representation when the plaintiff's home was destroyed in a fire.
(Ibid.) When the plaintiff attempted to rebuild his home, he
discovered the policy limit was not sufficient. (Ibid.) The trial
court sustained the insurer’s demurrer, but the court of appeal
reversed. It explained that the plaintiff “sought to be protected
against a very specific eventuality—the destruction of his home,”
and the defendant “assured plaintiff his coverage was sufficient”
rather than apprising him of options for obtaining the desired
coverage. (Id. at p. 1730.) The court concluded that under these
circumstances, “defendants must be deemed to have assumed
additional duties, which, if breached, could subject them to
liability.” (Ibid.)
       The court in Desai, supra, 47 Cal.App.4th 1110, made a
similar ruling on similar facts. The plaintiff alleged that he told
his insurance agent that he wanted “‘100 percent coverage for the
cost of repairing or replacing improvements to the property,
including any increases for inflation.’ ” (Id. at p. 1114.) The
agent responded that the policy provided “100% coverage for the
costs of repairs and/or replacement of the improvements to the

                                35
property including any and all increases in costs of repair or
rebuilding in the event of a loss.” (Ibid.) It did not. Citing Free,
supra, 8 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1729-1730 as “remarkably similar”
and “precisely” analogous, the court of appeal concluded that the
plaintiff stated a “viable claim of negligence.” (Desai, supra, 47
Cal.App.4th at pp. 1120-1121.) The court characterized the case
as an actionable “‘failure to deliver the agreed-upon coverage’
case,” since the agent failed to obtain the specific coverage the
insured requested. (Id. at p. 1119.)
       In Paper Savers, Inc. v. Nacsa (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1090
(Paper Savers), the plaintiff paper bag manufacturer sought a
commercial insurance policy. (Id. at p. 1092.) The parties
disputed what was said during the transaction. As relevant here,
the plaintiff claimed that the agent said the “replacement cost
coverage” endorsement “would provide full coverage to replace all
business personal property in case of a total loss, regardless of
the policy limit,” and that the plaintiff would be “fully insured
against loss.” (Id. at p. 1093.) The court of appeal concluded that
the special duty could be triggered, because the plaintiff had
evidence that “the insurance policy in this case, as in Free, covers
a ‘specific’ eventuality, the loss of defined property with a
quantifiable value, not personal injury to third parties for which
liability may be open-ended.” (Id. at p. 1098.) It distinguished a
case the parties do not cite here, Jones v. Grewe (1987) 189
Cal.App.3d 950 (Jones), which “involved a liability policy for
which the upper limit of desirable coverage cannot truly be
known at the time of purchase.”
       The final case the parties discuss is Butcher v. Truck
Insurance Exchange (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1442 (Butcher).
There, the plaintiff claimed that he gave the insurer “a copy of

                                36
his current policies that were not being renewed and instructed
[the insurer] to secure the same coverage but at higher limits.”
(Butcher, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 1447.) The old policy
included coverage for personal injury arising out of malicious
prosecution. The policy the insurer procured did not. However,
the insurer told the plaintiff that the policy contained the same
coverage as the former policy, and never told Butcher he was not
able to obtain the malicious prosecution coverage. (Ibid.) The
plaintiff filed negligence claims against the insurer after it failed
to defend him against a malicious prosecution action. The
appellate court concluded that “if the facts relating to the
purchase of the Truck policy are shown to be as related by
Butcher, the trier of fact could find the insureds were misled by
[the insurer’s] negligent failure to warn that personal injury was
not among the coverages of the policy.” (Id. at p. 1463.) It
rejected defendants’ contention that the insureds had a duty to
read the policy, emphasizing that the cases imposing such a duty
did not involve insureds who alleged they were misled by
negligent agents. (Ibid.)
       In all these cases, the court of appeals concluded that the
insureds made sufficiently specific requests for insurance to
either state a claim for negligence or take their claim to the jury.
The Oshodins contend their request that “everything” be “fully
and completely” insured is analogous to the requests made in
these cases and specific as a matter of law. It is not. These cases
involved repeated requests for full rebuilding coverage (Free),
“100 percent coverage for the cost of repairing or replacing
improvements to the property, including any increases for
inflation” (Desai), the exact same coverage the insured previously
had (Butcher), and an assurance that all property would be

                                 37
replaced regardless of the policy limit (Paper Savers). These
requests and assurances are much more specific and narrowly
tailored than a general request that “everything” be “fully and
completely” covered.
       As the court in Jones observed, “[a]n insurance policy arises
out of the insured’s desire to be protected in a particular manner
against a specific kind of obligation. It is the insured’s
responsibility to advise the agent of the insurance he wants,
including the limits of the policy to be issued.” (Jones, supra, 189
Cal.App.3d at p. 956.) The request here was essentially limitless,
particularly with regard to valuable personal property that is
easily moved into or out of a home. The Oshodins assert that the
request was sufficiently specific to give rise to the special duty
because it was confined to the house and its contents, to which
Okey had access during the walkthrough. However, it was
undisputed that Okey did not see “everything” during his
walkthrough—Oshodin did not open Mimi’s safe, which he
testified contained “unlimited” jewelry—and that Oshodin did not
clarify or limit the request in any way. For instance, it is unclear
what he understood “full coverage” to mean; as the Oshodins
recognize in their briefing, “[c]osts of repair and replacement vary
significantly,” yet either may constitute full coverage. Oshodin’s
request is thus more closely analogous to the requests made in
Vulk, supra, 69 Cal.App.5th 243 and Ahern v. Dillenback (1991) 1
Cal.App.4th 36 (Ahern), both of which were deemed to be
insufficiently specific to impose a special duty on the insurer.
       In Vulk, the insured asked the agent “to make sure I had
the best policy, and she told me I had full coverage on my house.”
(Vulk, supra, 69 Cal.App.5th at p. 257.) Although the insured
“thought that full coverage meant that I would have enough

                                38
coverage to rebuild my home,” the court concluded that his
request was “vague and conclusory.” (Id. at p. 258.) The court
further concluded that even if it were to consider an untimely
raised argument and questionable evidence that the agent told
the insured he had “full coverage,” there was no special duty as a
matter of law. (Ibid.) It explained that a “nonspecific request for
the ‘best policy’ and a general assurance of ‘full coverage’ is not
the same as a specific request for and assurance of 100 percent
replacement cost coverage.” (Id. at pp. 258-259.)
       Similarly, in Ahern, an insured requested an automobile
insurance policy “that would provide full coverage or the ‘best
coverage that exists.’” (Ahern, supra, 1 Cal.App.4th at p. 40.)
She alleged that the agent responded that “she would receive full
insurance coverage with policy limits that would safely protect
her and her husband.” (Ibid.) The insured did not ask for and
the policy did not include uninsured motorist coverage. The
insurer consequently denied the insured’s claim after she was
involved in a collision with an uninsured motorist. (Id. at p. 41.)
The trial court granted summary judgment on her negligence
claim, and the appellate court affirmed. It concluded that
nothing in the record, including the insured’s request and the
agent’s response, imposed a special duty of care on the agent.
(Id. at pp. 42-43.)
       Because there is no special duty here, the Oshodins’
proposed modification of CACI No. 2361 to include “failing to tell
Mr. Oshodin that Fire Insurance Exchange’s agent Okey could
not provide the insurance requested” was not legally accurate.
The trial court accordingly did not err in denying the
modification.

                                39
      The trial court also did not err by refusing two special
instructions based on Desai, supra, 47 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1119-
1120 and the “Sources and Authority” instructional notes for
CACI No. 2361. The first stated, “An agent’s failure to deliver
the agreed-upon coverage is actionable.” The second stated, “An
insurance agent has an obligation to use reasonable care,
diligence, and judgment in procuring insurance requested by an
insured.” The Oshodins assert that the latter “correctly states
the special legal duty of care where there is a request for
particular coverage by the insured and/or agent represents there
is coverage.” Similarly, they assert that the former “reflected a
special duty.” Because a special duty did not exist here, the court
was not obligated to give either instruction. Moreover, neither
instruction was necessary in the context of the other instructions.
CACI No. 2361 focused on the cause of action for negligent failure
to obtain insurance coverage; the jury did not need a special
instruction stating that such a cause of action existed. Nor did it
need what was essentially a restatement of the instructions on
the standard of care, CACI Nos. 401 and 600.
      The Oshodins also contend the court erred by denying their
request to add “everything” to CACI No. 2361. They contend the
instruction as given was legally ambiguous, and adding
“everything” or “everything in their home” to the instruction “at
least makes it clear that Oshodin was looking for full insurance
coverage of the house and its contents and that Okey agreed to
provide such coverage.” The Oshodins have not pointed to any
authority in support of their contention that CACI No. 2361 is
legally ambiguous absent a description of the insurance
requested. Even if we were to conclude it was, we reverse for
instructional error only where the error results in a miscarriage

                                40
of justice. (Caldera, supra, 25 Cal.App.5th at p. 45.) No
miscarriage of justice resulted here. There was no dispute that
Oshodin said “everything”; it was the only request the jury had to
consider when applying the instruction.
       C.     Reliance
       The trial court instructed the jury on the element of
reliance with modified versions of CACI Nos. 1907 and 1908.
Those instructions respectively stated, with emphasis added:
       CACI No. 1907
       “Robert and Mimi Oshodin relied on Fire Insurance
Exchange’s agent Okason Okey’s misrepresentation if:
       “1.    The misrepresentation substantially influenced them
to purchase insurance for the Lorraine Avenue [sic] house from
Fire Insurance Exchange; and
       “2.    They probably would not have purchased insurance
for the Lorraine Avenue [sic] house from Fire Insurance
Exchange without the misrepresentation; Or
       “3.    They did not take alternative measures to protect
their personal property because of the misrepresentation.
       “It is not necessary for the misrepresentation to be the only
reason for Robert Oshodin’s and Mimi Oshodin’s conduct.”
       CACI No. 1908
       “In determining whether Robert Oshodin’s reliance on the
misrepresentations was reasonable, they must first prove that
the matter was material. A matter is material if a reasonable
person would find it important in deciding what to do.
       “If you decide that the matter is material, you must then
decide whether it was reasonable for Robert Oshodin to rely on
the misrepresentation. In making this decision, take into

                                41
consideration Robert Oshodin’s intelligence, knowledge,
education, and experience.
       “However, it is not reasonable for anyone to rely on a
misrepresentation that is preposterous. It also is not reasonable
for anyone to rely on a misrepresentation if facts that are within
their observation show that it is obviously false.”
       The Oshodins contend these instructions “did not reflect
testimony that Oshodin could not read.” They therefore proposed
the following special instruction: “An insured should be able to
rely on an agent’s representations of coverage without
independently verifying the accuracy of those representations by
examining the relevant policy provisions.” The court refused the
instruction. The Oshodins contend this was prejudicial error
because Fire’s experts “faulted Oshodin for not reading the
policy.”
       The trial court properly refused the instruction. The
italicized portion of CACI No. 1908 specifically directed the jury
to consider Oshodin’s “intelligence, knowledge, education, and
experience.” His literacy or lack thereof is encompassed within
those factors. The Oshodins dispute this but do not provide any
authority supporting the notion that literacy is outside the realm
of knowledge, education, and experience. They also contend that
their proposed instruction “reflects California case law that
where there is a Special Duty of Care based on an agent’s
representation the request for coverage has been fulfilled, there
generally is no duty on the part of the insured to read the policy.”
This argument fails in light of our conclusion that there is no
special duty here.

                                42
III.   Demurrer
       A.     Background
       The trial court sustained Fire’s demurrer to two causes of
action in the Oshodins’ second amended complaint: breach of oral
contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
The court found that the Oshodins’ allegations of an oral contract
for insurance were insufficiently specific to state a cause of
action. It then concluded that absent a properly stated cause of
action for breach of contract, the Oshodins’ cause of action for
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing could not
stand. The court denied leave to amend on both causes of action,
concluding it was “improbable” that the Oshodins could state
either cause of action because their allegations were
“substantially similar” to those successfully demurred to in the
first amended complaint. The Oshodins contend the court erred
by sustaining the demurrer.
       B.     Analysis
       “In reviewing an order sustaining a demurrer, we examine
the operative complaint de novo to determine whether it alleges
facts sufficient to state a cause of action under any legal theory.
[Citation.] Where the demurrer was sustained without leave to
amend, we consider whether the plaintiff could cure the defect by
an amendment. The plaintiff bears the burden of proving an
amendment could cure the defect.” (T.H. v. Novartis
Pharmaceuticals Corp. (2017) 4 Cal.5th 145, 162.)
       “[T]he elements of a cause of action for breach of contract
are (1) the existence of the contract, (2) plaintiff’s performance or
excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendant’s breach, and (4) the
resulting damages to the plaintiff.” (Oasis West Realty, LLC v.
Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 821.) In the second amended

                                 43
complaint, the Oshodins alleged that an oral contract for
insurance was formed when Okey responded affirmatively to
Oshodin’s request to insure everything in the house fully and
completely. They alleged, “That from the time of acceptance of
Plaintiffs’ request for the specified coverage by Agent Okey, an
oral agreement came to exist between Plaintiffs and Defendants
providing Plaintiffs with the full and complete coverage that
Agent Okey promised to secure (as requested by Plaintiffs), and
continues to date.” They further alleged that no written policy
was ever delivered; the insurance policy consisted entirely of the
oral contract.12
       The trial court concluded, and we agree, that the
allegations in the second amended complaint were insufficiently
specific to support the existence of an oral contract for insurance.
“In order for acceptance of a proposal to result in the formation of
a contract, the proposal ‘must be sufficiently definite, or must call
for such definite terms in the acceptance, that the performance
promised is reasonably certain.’” (Weddington Productions, Inc.
v. Flick (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 793, 811, quoting 1 Witkin,
Summary of Cal. Law (9th ed. 1987) Contracts, § 145, p. 169.) To
meet that threshold, the terms of the contract must provide a
basis for demonstrating the existence of a breach and providing
an appropriate remedy. (Ibid.) If an alleged contract “does not
provide a basis for determining what obligations the parties have
agreed to, and hence does not make possible a determination of
whether those agreed obligations have been breached, there is no
contract.” (Ibid.; see also Bustamante v. Intuit, Inc. (2006) 141

12    This allegation was arguably undercut by Exhibit 2 to the
second amended complaint, a written policy renewal offer stating
that a written declaration page was sent as an enclosure.

                                 44
Cal.App.4th 199, 209.) In the context of insurance, the insured
has the burden of proving the existence of a contract and its
terms as well as the loss. (Searle v. Allstate Life Ins. Co. (1985)
38 Cal.3d 425, 438.) Even where the oral contract is preliminary,
pending the issuance of a written policy, the policy must be
“‘specific, either by express terms or implication, as to the subject
matter, period, rate, and amount of insurance.’” (Parlier Fruit
Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. (1957) 151 Cal.App.2d 6, 21.)
       The Oshodins alleged that the contract for insurance
consisted of full and complete coverage for everything, for an
indefinite time period. They also attached premium checks and a
renewal offer, from which the rate may be deduced. The second
amended complaint is silent regarding the types of risks against
which the Oshodins were insured, such as fire, flood, earthquake,
or theft; the sort of recompense the Oshodins were to receive in
the event of an insured risk, such as repair or replacement costs;
and the amount of insurance provided by the alleged policy.
Without allegations regarding these material terms, there is no
way to know what insurance the parties allegedly agreed to, what
terms were breached, and what the appropriate remedy would be.
       The Oshodins have not proposed any amendments to rectify
these deficiencies. Instead, their argument in its entirety
consists of an assertion that the second amended complaint “was
specifically pled and established each [ ] element” and an
assertion that “California case law provides that a cause of action
in contract exists for failure to procure requested coverage.”
While they are correct on the latter point (see AMCO Ins. Co. v.
All Solutions Ins. Agency, LLC (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 883, 890),
the contract alleged here was a contract for insurance, not a
contract to procure insurance. The Oshodins have not provided

                                 45
any citations to the second amended complaint regarding the
existence of a contract to procure insurance, or what the terms of
that contract were. An appellant bears the burden of showing
error, and that showing was not made here. Moreover, even if it
were, we discern no probability of a more favorable outcome at
trial. (See Waller v. TJD, Inc. (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 830, 833.) A
breach of contract claim for failure to obtain insurance is an
alternative theory to the negligence claim the jury squarely
rejected at trial; nothing in the record or the Oshodins’ briefing
suggests a breach of contract claim would have had a higher
likelihood of success.
       The Oshodins also contend the trial court erred in
sustaining Fire’s demurrer to their claim for breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. This contention
necessarily fails. “‘The prerequisite for any action for breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is the
existence of a contractual relationship between the parties, since
the covenant is an implied term in the contract.’” (Molecular
Analytical Systems v. Ciphergen Biosystems, Inc. (2010) 186
Cal.App.4th 696, 711.) “The covenant does not exist
independently of the underlying contract.” (Id. at p. 712.)
Because the trial court properly sustained the demurrer to the
breach of contract claim, there is no contractual claim on which
the breach of the implied covenant may rest.
IV. Expert Fees
       A.    Background
       After trial, Fire submitted a memorandum of costs seeking
a total of $668,817.60. $537,141.85 of that amount was for expert
fees, including fees for the three experts who testified at trial,
Pickens, Marchel, and Hedges, and two experts who testified at

                               46
an Evidence Code section 402 hearing held before trial. The trial
court partially granted the Oshodins’ motion to tax costs,
including $82,940.59 in expert fees it concluded were not
reasonably necessary. The court also taxed $60,319.10 in expert
fees that Fire incurred prior to the Oshodins’ rejection of its Code
of Civil Procedure section 998 (“section 998”) settlement offer.
The trial court concluded the $25,000 settlement offer was
reasonable and therefore permitted Fire to recover reasonably
necessary expert fees it incurred beyond that point. It ultimately
awarded Fire a total of $484,834.16 in costs.
       The Oshodins contend the trial court abused its discretion
by concluding that Fire’s $25,000 settlement offer was
reasonable. They further contend that the court abused its
discretion by awarding fees for the experts who testified at the
Evidence Code section 402 hearing and by not finding the
testimony of the experts who testified at trial “was cumulative
and impermissible legal and argumentative testimony.”
       B.    Analysis
       “Except as otherwise expressly provided by statute, a
prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to recover costs in
any action or proceeding.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1032, subd. (b).)
Allowable costs must be both “reasonable in amount” and
“reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation rather than
merely convenient or beneficial to its preparation.” (Code Civ.
Proc., § 1033.5, subds. (c)(2), (3).) The trial court may disallow
the recovery of costs it deems unnecessary. (Perko’s Enterprises,
Inc. v. RRNS Enterprises (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 238, 245.)
       A plaintiff’s rejection of a settlement offer made under
section 998 also may impact the cost award. In general, expert
witness fees are not recoverable. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd.

                                 47
(b)(1).) However, if the plaintiff rejects an offer and “fails to
obtain a more favorable judgment or award, the plaintiff shall not
recover his or her post offer costs and shall pay the defendant’s
costs from the time of the offer. In addition, in any action or
proceeding other than an eminent domain action, the court or
arbitrator, in its discretion, may require the plaintiff to pay a
reasonable sum to cover postoffer costs of the services of expert
witnesses, who are not regular employees of any party, actually
incurred and reasonably necessary in either, or both, preparation
for trial or arbitration, or during trial or arbitration, of the case
by the defendant. (Code Civ. Proc., § 998, subd. (c)(1).)
       The purpose of section 998 is to encourage settlement
without the need for trial. (Adams v. Ford Motor Co. (2011) 199
Cal.App.4th 1475, 1483 (Adams).) “[A] good faith requirement
must be read into section 998 to effectuate the purpose of the
statute. Good faith in turn requires that the settlement offer be
‘realistically reasonable under the circumstances of the particular
case.’ [Citation.] The offer must therefore ‘carry with it some
reasonable prospect of acceptance. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] On
one hand, a party having no expectation that his offer will be
accepted ‘will not be allowed to benefit from a no-risk offer made
for the sole purpose of later recovering expert witness fees.’
[Citation.] One [sic] the other hand, section 998 punishes a party
who refuses a reasonable settlement offer, and subsequently fails
to receive a more favorable judgment at trial.” (Ibid.)
       “Whether a section 998 offer was reasonable and made in
good faith is a matter left to the sound discretion of the trial
court, and will not be reversed on appeal except for a clear abuse
of discretion.” (Barba v. Perez (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 444, 450.)
That is a high bar; we reverse the trial court’s determination only

                                 48
if we find “that in light of all the evidence viewed most favorably
in support of the trial court, no judge could have reasonably
reached a similar result.” (Adams, supra, 199 Cal.App.4th at p.
1484.) “Similarly, the decision to award expert fees, and the
determination of whether these fees were reasonably necessary,
are issues left to the discretion of the trial court.” (Ibid.)
       The Oshodins contend the trial court abused its discretion
by concluding that the $25,000 offer was reasonable when it was
made in July 2018. We disagree. The trial court explained that
when the offer was made, the parties “knew that defendant Okey
had admitted to a ‘mistake’ which led his insurance carrier to
settle for the full $1 million limit of his policy. They knew that
Plaintiffs claimed $50 million in damages based on the alleged
value of the jewelry Plaintiffs lost. They knew that any damages
ultimately awarded would be offset by the amount of Defendant
Okey’s settlement. They knew that Defendant Fire had an
argument (which the court had not yet rejected) that the jewelry
was uninsurable because it was procured with embezzled
funds.[13] They knew that Defendant Fire had an argument that
the policy Plaintiffs wanted did not exist and could never exist.
They knew that there would be serious issues concerning the
valuation of the jewelry. [¶] All this, combined with the fact that
Defendant Fire actually did prevail, shows that the offer of
$25,000 was ‘realistically reasonable’ under the circumstances of
this case. Even though the offer of $25,000 represented a mere

13    This theory was the subject of the Evidence Code section
402 hearing for which the Oshodins seek to disallow recovery of
expert fees. The trial court ultimately granted the Oshodins’
motions in limine to preclude reference to their alleged
wrongdoing at trial.

                                49
fraction of Plaintiffs’ alleged damages, it was coming on top of a
$1 million offset that Plaintiffs had already received. Defendant
Fire had several good reasons to believe that its liability was
zero, as well as good reasons to believe that any liability a jury
might find would be covered by the offset. In that situation, an
offer of $25,000 represented a ‘reasonable prediction’ of what
Defendant Fire would have to pay following trial.” This thorough
explanation, the salient facts of which the Oshodins do not
dispute, demonstrates that the trial court carefully weighed the
relevant considerations; it does not evince an abuse of discretion.
       The Oshodins note that the trial court denied Fire’s motion
for summary judgment, and assert that “a finding of liability by a
jury was reasonably possible, even probable” in light of Okey’s
deposition testimony. They thus characterize the $25,000 offer as
a “token or nominal offer” that could not satisfy the
reasonableness requirement given their $50 million demand.
(Wear v. Calderon (1981) 121 Cal.App.3d 818, 821.) This
characterization ignores the fact that the offer also provided that
each side would bear its own costs. A “section 998 offer has value
beyond the monetary award provided if it also includes a waiver
of costs.” (Adams, supra, 199 Cal.App.4th at p. 1485.)
Acceptance of the offer thus would have eliminated the Oshodins’
exposure to the substantial expert fees they should have known
were likely to be incurred given the posture of the case and the
parties’ litigation strategies at the point the offer was made.
Moreover, “[e]ven a modest or ‘token’ offer may be reasonable if
an action is completely lacking in merit.” (Nelson v. Anderson
(1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 111, 134.) A defendant who has concluded
that it has a very significant likelihood of success at trial thus
reasonably may make a modest settlement offer. (Bates v.

                                50
Presbyterian Intercommunity Hospital, Inc. (2012) 204
Cal.App.4th 210, 220.) A judgment more favorable to the
defendant than the offer it tendered is prima facie evidence that
the offer was reasonable. (Id. at p. 221.) “It is the plaintiff’s
burden to show otherwise” (ibid.), and the Oshodins have not met
that burden here.
       The Oshodins also have not demonstrated that the court
abused its discretion by awarding fees for the experts who
testified at trial or those who testified at the Evidence Code
section 402 hearing. As discussed above, the expert testimony at
trial was relevant and was not properly objected to on the
grounds of impropriety they now allege. The Oshodins assert
that the experts who testified at the Evidence Code section 402
hearing were not reasonably necessary, because “the defense
theory of wrongdoing in Nigeria was unsubstantiated by any
admissible evidence or proven charges and remains so.”
However, as the trial court cogently explained, “an expense does
not become unnecessary simply because the party incurring it
lost on that discrete issue.” A defendant is entitled to engage the
services of experts to dispute its liability to the plaintiff (Bates v.
Presbyterian Intercommunity Hospital, Inc., supra, 204
Cal.App.4th at p. 220), and that is what Fire endeavored to do
during the Evidence Code section 402 hearing.
       The Oshodins did not object below that the expert
testimony at trial should have been limited as cumulative, nor
did they properly raise the argument in their briefing here by
simply asserting that the testimony was cumulative. Even if that
argument were preserved and properly presented, however, we
would find no abuse of discretion. The trial court reasonably

                                  51
could have concluded that each expert brought a different
perspective to the issues about which he testified.
                          DISPOSITION
      The judgment and cost award are affirmed. Fire is entitled
to recover its costs on appeal.

     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                          COLLINS, J.

We concur:

CURREY, P. J.

MORI, J.

                               52