Court Opinion

ID: 2964771
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:30:49.235891+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:43:01.184958
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            United States Court of Appeals
                                For the First Circuit
                                 ____________________

        Nos. 96-1269, 96-1455, 96-1998, 96-1999

                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                      Appellee,

                                          v.

                            FRANK BRIMAGE and TRACY ROSS,
                               Defendants, Appellants.

                                 ____________________
                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
                      [Hon. Patti B. Saris, U.S. District Judge]
                                            ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before
                                Selya, Circuit Judge,
                                       _____________

                            Coffin, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                    ____________________
                              and Lynch, Circuit Judge.
                                         _____________
                                 ____________________

            Frances S. Cohen, with whom Michael D. Vhay,  C. Dylan Sanders and
            ________________            _______________   ________________
        Hill & Barlow PC were on brief, for appellant Tracy Ross.
        ________________

            Peter  B. Krupp,  with whom  Lurie & Krupp  LLP was on  brief, for
            _______________              __________________
        appellant Frank Brimage.

            James F. Lang, Assistant  United States Attorney, with whom Donald
            _____________                                               ______
        K. Stern, United States Attorney, was on brief, for appellee.
        ________

                                 ____________________

                                     June 9, 1997
                                 ____________________

                      LYNCH, Circuit Judge.  A sting operation in the gun
                      LYNCH, Circuit Judge.
                             _____________

            trade involving a government informant resulted in the arrest

            of  Frank Brimage and Tracy  Ross.  Brimage  was convicted of

            being a  felon in  possession  of a  firearm and  ammunition;

            Ross, of being a  felon in possession of ammunition,  both in

            violation of 18 U.S.C.   922(g)(1).  Brimage was sentenced to

            more than  11 years in prison;  Ross to more than  8 years in

            prison. 

                      The primary  argument they make on appeal is that a

            federal  agent  acted  in bad  faith  in  monitoring but  not

            recording  their  conversations during  the  sting (thus  not

            preserving  conversations said  to be  exculpatory)  and that

            such  bad faith requires dismissal of the charges.  They also

            argue that there was error in not requiring the government to

            disclose prior investigative reports involving the government

            informant, and that certain other evidence was Brady material
                                                           _____

            which  should have been  disclosed.  Ross  argues in addition

            that he should  have been granted a new  trial based on newly

            discovered exculpatory evidence and  that the district  court

            erroneously concluded  it did  not have discretion  to depart

            downward  to  make  him   eligible  for  a  residential  drug

            rehabilitation   program.      Both   defendants   are   ably

            represented, but  the record  reveals no  such errors  and we

            affirm.

                                          I.

                                         -2-
                                          2

                      This  weapons  transaction  unfolded  in  a  Boston

            neighborhood  which had been  plagued with drive-by shootings

            and murders.  Freddy Pena, a supplier of both guns and drugs,

            decided  to lessen  his  potential criminal  liability --  on

            account  of pending  state  cocaine  charges  and  threatened

            federal firearms charges -- by accepting an offer extended by

            Special  Agent  Daniel Campbell  of  the  Bureau of  Alcohol,

            Tobacco, and Firearms (the "ATF") to become an informant.

                      To compensate  Pena for  his initial efforts  as an

            informant,  the federal  authorities intervened  and arranged

            for a  reduction  in Pena's  state  charges, and  they  never

            brought the  threatened federal firearms charge.  Thereafter,

            he earned  cash for his efforts,  and was paid  $600 for this

            particular sting.

                      This sadly common urban tale unfolded in January of

            1995.  Frank Brimage then had a considerable criminal record,

            including commitments  for rape, armed  robbery, and  assault

            with  a deadly  weapon.   Tracy Ross  had a  relatively minor

            prior  criminal record.  He had been a high school basketball

            star who won a scholarship to college, but apparently flunked

            out.   After this,  he worked intermittently,  and ultimately

            descended into heroin addiction.   According to Ross, Brimage

            was his dealer.

                      Brimage usually hung out next to a liquor  store on

            Blue Hill Avenue  in Boston.   Pena approached  him there  on

                                         -3-
                                          3

            January 16,  1995 and asked him  if he had any  guns to sell.

            Brimage replied  that he had a .32 caliber handgun and a .380

            caliber  handgun  but  was not  going  to  sell  them.   Pena

            reported the  conversation  to  his  ATF  contact,  Campbell.

            Campbell told Pena to ask Brimage if he wanted to participate

            in an armed robbery of a drug dealer.  Pena asked Brimage the

            next  day, saying  that he  needed "two  guys and  two guns."

            Brimage  responded "[t]hat's  me."   Ross  then joined  them.

            Pena  and  Brimage  continued  discussing  the robbery;  Ross

            indicated that he  wanted to participate  and asked how  much

            money he  would get out of  it.  None of  these conversations

            were recorded or monitored by the ATF.

                      Pena told the ATF agent that Brimage and Ross  were

            willing  to commit  the  robbery  on  January  19.    On  the

            appointed  day, Agent Campbell met  Pena and took  him to the

            police  station.    Pena  was strip-searched,  wired  with  a

            transmitter, given a  car, and told where  to go and what  to

            do.   Pena was kept under surveillance by three mobile units,

            including  one  carrying  Agent Campbell,  who  monitored the

            conversations  from Pena's  transmitter  on  an ATF  portable

            radio.    Two  Boston  Police Detectives  were  also  in  the

            unmarked vehicle with Campbell.

                      Pena drove to  the vicinity of the  liquor store on

            Blue Hill Avenue to pick  up Brimage and Ross.   Brimage told

            Pena, in a  conversation overheard by two officers, that they

                                         -4-
                                          4

            had to go to Greenville Street to get the guns.  Before doing

            that, Brimage went into a store and emerged with a bag.  Ross

            and  Brimage got into the car and drove to Greenville Street.

            In an overheard conversation,  Brimage said the bag contained

            tape.

                      At Greenville Street, Brimage got out and went into

            a building.   While  he was gone,  Ross again  asked how  the

            money would  be divided.  Pena told him to ask Brimage.  When

            Brimage  returned, Pena  drove to  a large  parking lot  in a

            shopping center where  a Toys'R'Us  was located,  as the  ATF

            agent had previously  directed.  En route, Pena  talked about

            how  the drug dealer would not  resist so they would not have

            to shoot  him.  At the  shopping center, Pena got  out of the

            car  and walked  alone  into the  store,  ostensibly to  meet

            someone  who  had  a  key  to  the  drug  dealer's  apartment

            building.

                      On signal, the police teams surrounded the car.  On

            the floor  of the front  passenger's side, where  Brimage had

            been seated,  the police found a  .380 caliber semi-automatic

            pistol, loaded with six  rounds of ammunition.  On  the floor

            of the rear passenger  side, where Ross had been  seated, the

            ATF agent  found a  .32  caliber revolver,  loaded with  five

            rounds, in a clear  plastic bag.  There were  no fingerprints

            on the guns.   On the rear seat was a  white plastic bag with

            two rolls  of duct tape.   Brimage and Ross were  arrested by

                                         -5-
                                          5

            the Boston Police.   Throughout these  events on January  19,

            Agent  Campbell   monitored   but  did   not  record   Pena's

            conversations with the two defendants.

                                         II.

            Failure To Record Wire Transmissions
            ____________________________________

                      Defendants   advance  the   theory  that   the  ATF

            deliberately failed to record  Pena's initial solicitation of

            their participation  in the robbery and  the circumstances of

            the  sting, in a  bad faith effort  to avoid  the creation or

            preservation of  exculpatory evidence.  From  this they argue

            that:   (1) the  government is  obligated not  to act  in bad

            faith in  its decisions as  to which conversations  to record

            (and monitor);  (2) that  the  appropriate remedy  for a  bad

            faith failure to record is dismissal of the charges; (3) that

            the  district  court was  obligated  to  hold an  evidentiary

            hearing; and  (4)  that the  affidavits defendants  submitted

            supported findings that the government acted in bad faith and

            that the "lost" evidence was exculpatory and irreplaceable.

                      The government  responds that it has no obligations

            whatsoever to  record and  thus "create" evidence.   It  says

            that  the application  of the  bad faith  test is  limited to

            failure  to  preserve   already  existing  evidence  in   the

            government's possession.    The government  argues  that  the

            doctrines announced in California  v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479
                                   __________     _________

            (1984),  and  Arizona  v.  Youngblood, 488  U.S.  51  (1988),
                          _______      __________

                                         -6-
                                          6

            requiring the preservation  of existing  evidence, should  be

            taken no further.   In  any event, the  government says,  the

            defendants' allegations do not rise to the level of bad faith

            under the  test this court used in  United States v. Femia, 9
                                                _____________    _____

            F.3d 990 (1st Cir.  1993), in the aftermath of  Trombetta and
                                                            _________

            Youngblood.  Femia, 9 F.3d at 993-95.
            __________   _____

                      The government is surely  correct that the decision

            not to record a  conversation is categorically different from

            the failure by  police to  maintain the breath  samples of  a

            drunk driving defendant, as was the case in Trombetta, or the
                                                        _________

            failure to preserve  semen samples in a sexual  assault case,

            as  happened in  Youngblood.   Those  cases  raise issues  of
                             __________

            destruction of  evidence closer  to those involved  in Femia,
                                                                   _____

            which  concerned the  destruction of  recorded conversations.

            For the purposes of the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C.   3500, we have

            already recognized such a  distinction, holding that the Act,

            which requires the production of all statements by government

            witnesses relating to the  substance of their testimony, does

            not  require   the  government  to  record   all  aspects  of

            interviews with  witnesses, United  States v.  Lieberman, 608
                                        ______________     _________

            F.2d  889,  897 (1st  Cir. 1979),  or  always to  take notes,

            Campbell  v. United States,   296 F.2d 527,  531-32 (1st Cir.
            ________     _____________

            1961).

                      At the same time it is not particularly  helpful to

            think  of the issue as  broadly as the  government frames it:

                                         -7-
                                          7

            that  there  is  absolutely  no  duty  on  the  part  of  the

            government  to  "create" evidence.    At  issue  here is  the

            government's   decision   not    to   "create"    independent

            verification evidence  in the form of  recordings and instead

            to  rely on the memory of witnesses and their testimony about

            what was said, and we limit our inquiry accordingly.

                      The  breadth of  the defendants'  line of  argument

            poses  its  own  problems.   It  is,  of course,  easy  for a

            defendant to  raise a  claim that an  unrecorded conversation

            should  have been  recorded.   Even if  the recording  of the

            conversation would  have inculpated,  not  exonerated him,  a

            defendant may get some  benefit from the government's failure

            to record by raising the argument and flagging that issue for

            the jury.

                      The government is quite correct to point to another

            problem  with the defendants' argument.   There is  a need by

            law enforcement personnel for considerable flexibility in how

            they  go about  their investigations,  and courts  should not

            intrude into this area.  That  interest is somewhat lessened,

            but  not eliminated here, by  evidence that the  ATF may have

            violated its  own somewhat ambiguous regulations  in deciding

            not to record  the sting operation  or the initial  contact.1

                                
            ____________________

            1.  The   pertinent  ATF  policy   required  "all  undercover
            contacts by . .  . confidential informants" to  be "supported
            by electronic  surveillance monitoring/recording in  order to
            enhance special  agent/officer/confidential informant safety,
            as well as to collect evidence in the investigation."

                                         -8-
                                          8

            The government's  interests may,  however, be thought  to cut

            another way  in this matter.  As this court recently noted in

            rejecting  a   Jencks  Act  challenge  to   the  practice  of

            government agents not to take notes or record interviews with

            government witnesses:

                      By adopting a "what we don't create can't
                      come   back   to   haunt  us"   approach,
                      prosecutors demean their primary mission:
                      to  see that justice is  done. . .  .  By
                      and  large,  the legitimate  interests of
                      law  enforcement will be better served by
                      using  recording equipment  and/or taking
                      accurate notes than by  playing hide-and-
                      seek.

            United States  v.  Houlihan, 92  F.3d  1271, 1289  (1st  Cir.
            _____________      ________

            1996).

                      The issue  is whether the fair trial  rights of the

            defendants  have  somehow been  violated  by  the failure  to

            record.  Some situations may raise concerns about whether the

            government is putting the due process rights of defendants at

            risk.  Here, of  the six persons who heard  the conversations

            and  could  testify  to them,  four  were  on  the government

            payroll  (the  three  officers  and the  informant)  and  the

            remaining  two, the defendants, would have had to waive their

            Fifth Amendment right to remain silent in order to testify to

            their  versions  of   the  conversations.     However,   that

            situation, absent a good  deal more, is not in  itself enough

            to raise due process concerns.

                                         -9-
                                          9

                      Given the vastly  different fact patterns in  which

            this  issue  may  arise,  we  see  no  reason  to  adopt  the

            government's  position that  a  decision by  law  enforcement

            officials not to record key conversations (to be relied on in

            the  prosecution) between  a  defendant  and  a  confidential

            informant may  never be probed  to determine if  the decision

            was made in bad faith.

                      Neither  do we adopt  the mirror  rule that  such a

            test is always appropriate,  as defendants would have us  do.

            Instead  we turn  to what we  said once  in a  case raising a

            similar claim:

                           Perhaps  there may  be a  case where
                      selective recording  presents a reviewing
                      court with constitutional  concerns.   We
                      need   not   speculate  on   this  score,
                      however, for  this is  surely not  such a
                      case.

            United States v. Chaudhry, 850 F.2d 851, 857 (1st Cir. 1988)
            _____________    ________

            (rejecting  due process  claim of  selective recording  where

            defendant did not assert government acted in bad faith).

                      Nothing about the circumstances  of this case or in

            defendants'  meager proffer comes  close to  raising concerns

            that  Agent Campbell's decision not to record was made in bad

            faith.  Brimage submitted an  affidavit, in which  he made no

            claim that  the statements attributed  to him were  false but

            said  only  that  "The  statements  that  I  made  during  my

            conversations with Freddy Pena, if taken in context, are much

            more innocuous than the statements . . . attributed to me out

                                         -10-
                                          10

            of context . . . ."  Ross submitted an affidavit from counsel

            also suggesting that  the statements by her client  should be

            understood in  context.  Both  counsel took advantage  of the

            lack of  context and  argued  to the  jury the  issue of  the

            government's failure  to record.   Their proffer has  quite a

            distance yet to go before it raises the spectre of bad faith.

                      Defendants rely  heavily on another argument:   the

            allegedly implausible nature of Agent  Campbell's articulated

            reasons  for  not  recording.    Defendants   largely  ignore

            Campbell's testimony that his squad usually monitored but did

            not record sting  operations and that the primary  reason for

            doing even  that was  to protect the  confidential informant,

            not  to create  evidence.   Agent  Campbell testified  before

            trial that he  did not record the  conversations here because

            this was a joint state-federal operation and he  believed the

            recordings would be inadmissible in state court.2

                      At trial, Agent Campbell gave a somewhat  different

            reason for not recording:   "I didn't  think I would have  to

            rely  on anything that was said in  order to convict the both

            suspects [sic]."   While the responses  were characterized by

            the district court  as "lame," they are  not inconsistent and

                                
            ____________________

            2.  The  dispute  between  the  parties as  to  whether  such
            recordings  are  admissible   in  state   court  is   largely
            irrelevant.   One cannot  say that the  agent's understanding
            was plainly  wrong, see  Commonwealth v. Jarabek,  424 N.E.2d
                                ___  ____________    _______
            491,  493  (Mass. 1981),  that he  should  have known  it was
            wrong, and thus that  it was reasonable to think  he had some
            other nefarious motive.

                                         -11-
                                          11

            do  not show bad faith.  In fact, Agent Campbell's assessment

            of  the case  may have been  correct: the car  was clean when

            Agent Campbell gave it to Pena  to use in the sting, Campbell

            then monitored Pena's use of the car, and guns and ammunition

            were  found  on  the  floor  of the  car  where  each  of the

            defendants had been sitting.  The agent's testimony  does not

            mandate an inference of bad faith.

                      The claim that the district court was obligated, on

            this  showing, to hold an evidentiary hearing on the issue of

            bad  faith is without merit.   Such decisions  are within the

            discretion of the district  court, United States v. Calderon,
                                               _____________    ________

            77 F.3d 6, 9 (1st Cir. 1996), and there was no abuse here.

            Prior Investigative Reports
            ___________________________

                      Brimage and Ross argue  that the government's prior

            investigative reports  should have been disclosed  to them as

            they would have demonstrated the informant's  modus operandi.

            This information might, they say,3 have shown  that, in prior

            stings,  Pena  attributed to  others  the same  incriminating

            comments he now  attributes to  them.  This,  in turn,  might

            have shown that Pena  was confused about who said  what when.

            Defendants also argue that the  reports might have shown that

            Pena had an opportunity to plant  weapons and that he knew he

            could successfully attribute incriminating remarks  to others

                                
            ____________________

            3.  Defendants  have  reshaped  their arguments  somewhat  on
            appeal.   While there  may be something  to the  government's
            waiver argument, the same result is reached on the merits.

                                         -12-
                                          12

            if he  was not being  recorded.  By  not having  the reports,

            they say, they  were deprived of their Sixth  Amendment right

            to cross-examine Pena effectively.

                      Although  the  trial judge  preliminarily disagreed

            that  the  reports  were  discoverable  exculpatory  material

            within  the terms of Brady  v. Maryland, 373  U.S. 83 (1963),
                                 _____     ________

            she did, at  the defendants' request,  review the reports  in

            camera  before  trial.    Judge  Saris  concluded  that  they

            contained no  exculpatory  information.   The  defendants  at

            trial raised for the first time the argument that the reports

            were Jencks  Act material.   Judge Saris  again reviewed  the

            reports and  again ruled they  were not exculpatory  and were

            not Jencks Act material.  In fact, she found that the reports

            tended to buttress Pena's testimony.

                      Our review of these  determinations is for abuse of

            discretion.    United  States v. Femia,  57 F.3d 43,  45 (1st
                           ______________    _____

            Cir. 1995)  (Jencks Act material); United  States v. Perkins,
                                               ______________    _______

            926  F.2d 1271, 1276 (1st  Cir. 1991) (Brady  material).  The
                                                   _____

            prosection vigorously  disputes that these reports are Jencks

            Act  material  because  the  reports  involved investigations

            other than  the one in this  case.  We need  not resolve that

            argument.  This case does not provide the occasion to explore

            the parameters of the  Jencks Act requirement that statements

            be produced "which relate[] to the subject matter as to which

            the witness has  testified."  18 U.S.C.   3500(b).   Like the

                                         -13-
                                          13

            district  court, we  have reviewed  the reports  submitted in

            camera.   We readily hold  that the conclusions  drawn by the

            trial judge were not an abuse of discretion.

            The Motions for New Trial
            _________________________

                      1.  The Victoria Pena Evidence
                      ______________________________

                      Defendants   argue  from   the  premise   that  the

            impeachment of Freddy  Pena was key  to the defense,  despite

            the  fact  that  the   firearms  and  ammunition  were  found

            virtually  at their  feet.   Even accepting the  premise, the

            defense acknowledges that it knew at trial that Pena had been

            arrested  in 1989 and charged  in state court  with a cocaine

            trafficking count, that the trafficking charge was reduced to

            a possession  charge, and  that  Pena was  sentenced to  time

            served.

                      What defendants  did not  know, they say,  was that

            the charge was reduced  because Pena's sister, Victoria Pena,

            had worked as  an informant for  the state  police in a  case

            involving  another drug  dealer, Jose  Calderon.   In January

            1996, four months after the conviction,  Brimage sought a new

            trial  based on  the  government's failure  to disclose  this

            information.  The district court held that the government had

            not suppressed  the information within the  meaning of United
                                                                   ______

            States v. Osorio, 929 F.2d 753 (1st Cir. 1991),  and that the
            ______    ______

            evidence was not  material in  the sense of  requiring a  new

            trial.

                                         -14-
                                          14

                      The  denial  of  the  motion  for a  new  trial  is

            reviewed for a  manifest abuse of discretion.   United States
                                                            _____________

            v. Tibolt,  72 F.3d 965, 972  (1st Cir. 1995).   There was no
               ______

            such  abuse.   We  cannot say  that  this evidence  "would so

            undermine  the  government's  case  as  to  give  rise  to  a

            'reasonable' probability of acquittal on retrial."  Id.
                                                                ___

                      Defendants  say that  the  Victoria  Pena  evidence

            would  have permitted them  to pursue two  different lines of

            examination:  that Pena was an incorrigible drug and firearms

            recidivist and that Pena lied when he testified at trial that

            his  sister  Victoria had  never  dealt  drugs  out of  their

            mother's home.

                      A Brady  violation occurs when "(1)  the prosection
                        _____

            . . .  suppress[es] or  withhold[s]  evidence,  (2) which  is

            favorable,  and (3) material to the  defense."  United States
                                                            _____________

            v. Perdomo, 929 F.2d 967, 970 (3d Cir. 1991).   We bypass the
               _______

            Osorio issue  of whether the government  had this information
            ______

            and suppressed it  and go directly to the  third prong of the

            Brady  analysis.  We agree  with the district  court that the
            _____

            evidence is not material and our confidence in the verdict is

            not  undermined by  the  fact that  the  defense lacked  this

            information.

                      Pena's character, if not unblemished  before cross-

            examination,  was  thoroughly  and  ably  sullied  in  cross-

            examination.  Two pages of the district court's order denying

                                         -15-
                                          15

            the  motion for a new  trial were devoted  to descriptions of

            the  impeachment of  Pena.   His  characteristic devotion  to

            drugs  and guns  was explored.   As  to the  "lie" about  his

            sister, Pena testified only that she had never sold drugs out

            of her mother's home, and none  of the new information is  to

            the  contrary: it only shows that she worked as an undercover

            informant for the state police.

                      The premise of the entire argument -- that the case

            turned on the impeachment of Pena -- is itself flawed.  There

            are  the  telltale  guns and  ammunition:    the most  likely

            explanation  was that  the defendants  were in  possession of

            them.

                      2.  Ross' Motion for New Trial
                      ______________________________

                      One  month after  the  jury verdict,  Ross filed  a

            motion  for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence: a

            statement by  Michael  Holmes, Brimage's  cellmate after  the

            arrest.

                      The  district court  heard evidence and  found that

            soon after Brimage was arrested:

                      Brimage told Mr. Holmes that he (Brimage)
                      had  been  "set-up"; that  Ross  had only
                      been  along  for  the  ride  as  a  "drug
                      tester"; and  that  Ross' high  bail  was
                      hard  to understand, because Ross had had
                      "nothing  to do  with  it."   In a  later
                      conversation,  Brimage  told  Mr.  Holmes
                      that Ross was "in the back seat all high"
                      and didn't  know what was  going on;  and
                      that  he (Brimage)  would tell  the court
                      that Ross had nothing to do with it.

                                         -16-
                                          16

            It  is  worth  observing that  Holmes  is  the  son of  Ross'

            fiancee.

                      This  claim  is  subject  to the  same  review  for

            manifest abuse of  discretion as the  other new trial  motion

            and comes  to the same end.  The district court found, and we

            agree,  that Ross  failed  to be  diligent  in attempting  to

            secure  Holmes'  testimony  before  the trial  ended.    Ross

            himself knew of the  alleged conversation between Brimage and

            Holmes within a month or  two of the arrest and while  Holmes

            was  still in jail and thus reachable.   In all events, it is

            unlikely that  this new  evidence would have  resulted in  an

            acquittal.  Ross twice asked what his share of the take would

            be, and a gun  and ammunition were found virtually  under his

            feet.

            Ross' Sentencing Argument
            _________________________

                      Ross says  that he  is in  need of drug  treatment;

            that the guidelines authorize  a downward departure, based on

            a  likelihood of  rehabilitation,  to permit  a defendant  to

            enter a residential Bureau  of Prisons drug treatment program

            that is only open to those within 36  months of release; that

            the district court misunderstood its authority to make such a

            downward departure when  it sentenced him  to 97 months;  and

            that the case should be remanded for resentencing.

                      Ross  and  the  government  go  through  the  usual

            dispute as to how  to characterize the issue, with  the hopes

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            of persuading us that the district court did or  did not make

            an  error of  law.  United  States v. Saldana,  109 F.3d 100,
                                ______________    _______

            102-03 (1st Cir. 1997).

                      The  question of whether the guidelines authorize a

            downward  departure   to  permit  a  defendant   to  enter  a

            residential  drug treatment  program  is a  thicket which  we

            describe briefly but do not enter.  In pragmatic terms, there

            is now only one residential drug treatment program, available

            at 34 sites, in the federal Bureau of  Prisons system.  There

            are  many more inmates who need treatment than there are beds

            available in this residential program.  The Bureau of Prisons

            has  decided its program is  best suited for  those within 36

            months of release.   Here, Ross' guidelines range was  110 to

            137  months  imprisonment.    He  could  not  be  immediately

            eligiblefortheprogramunlessthedistrictcourt departeddownward.

                      The legal  argument is  put in  these terms.   Ross

            claims  the  district  court  had  the  authority  to  depart

            downward pursuant to 18 U.S.C.   3553(a)(2)(D), which directs

            the sentencing court to consider the need for "educational or

            vocational  training,  medical  care,  or  other correctional

            treatment  . .  .  ."    The  government  counters  that  the

            guidelines  categorically prohibit  departures based  on drug

            dependence.  U.S.S.G.   5H1.4.

                      The circuits  are split on  this issue.   Some have

            concluded  that, because drug rehabilitation presupposes drug

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                                          18

            dependence,  the  guidelines   prohibit  any  departures   to

            facilitate drug rehabilitation.   United States v. Ziegler, 1
                                              _____________    _______

            F.3d 1044,  1049 (10th Cir.  1993); United States  v. Martin,
                                                _____________     ______

            938 F.2d 162, 163-64 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Pharr,
                                                  _____________    _____

            916  F.2d 129,  133  (3d Cir.  1990).   Other  circuits  have

            concluded  that,  while   the  guidelines  prohibit  downward

            departures  due  to drug  dependence  per  se,  they  do  not

            prohibit departures  based on  a defendant's potential  to be

            rehabilitated.   United States v. Maier, 975 F.2d 944, 947-48
                             _____________    _____

            (2d  Cir. 1992); United States v. Williams, 948 F.2d 706, 710
                             _____________    ________

            (11th Cir. 1991).  We need not resolve the legal issue.

                      Looking  at the  totality  of  the  record,  United
                                                                   ______

            States v. Grandmaison, 77  F.3d 555, 561 (1st Cir.  1996), we
            ______    ___________

            understand the district court to  have decided that, in light

            of  specific facts  about  Ross, it  would  not exercise  any

            discretion it  might have to authorize  a downward departure.

            Ross had twice before  failed to complete drug rehabilitation

            programs.  As the court told Ross' counsel:

                      I have less sanguine feelings than you do
                      about the  recidivism, particularly since
                      here's a guy who  panned out of a program
                      one time,  who is facing  trial and  then
                      does it  a second time.   That worries me
                      about  his  ability  to  comply  with the
                      rules of the program.

            Later the court ruled:

                      I  do   not  think  that   I'm  going  to
                      downwardly  depart on  the ground  of the
                      likelihood  of  rehabilitation.   I often
                      say that people make their  bed, they lie

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                                          19

                      in  it, and  all  I have  on the  record,
                      despite the  best of intentions,  is that
                      he went  through  two drug  programs  and
                      they didn't work out.

            The trial  court  is in  the  best position  to make  such  a

            discretionary judgment.   That discretionary decision by  the

            trial court is not subject to our review.

                      To  complete the  picture, we  note that  the trial

            court did recommend  to the  Bureau of Prisons  that Ross  be

            admitted  to  an  alternative  600-hour  drug  rehabilitation

            program while in prison.

                      Affirmed.
                      ________

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