Court Opinion

ID: 9774940
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:38:42.394421+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:17.888832
License: Public Domain

PHILLIPS, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
The Court today concludes that the Galveston County Beach Park Board of Trustees (Board) is prohibited by Tex.Loc.Gov’t. Code §§ 262.011(d) and 112.006 from making purchases or paying claims except through the county purchasing agent and with the approval of the county auditor. Because these two provisions do not purport to apply to the Board, and because nothing in the Board’s governing statute, Chapter 62 of the Natural Resources Code, makes these provisions applicable, I respectfully dissent from the Court’s decision.
TexLogGov’t Code § 112.006 gives the county auditor general oversight of the “books and records of a county, district, or state officer authorized or required by law to receive or collect money or other property that is intended for the use of the county or that belongs to the county.” The county auditor also has responsibility for enforcement of the law "governing county finances.” Under the statutory scheme governing the Board, however, it is clear that the Board does not receive money that belongs to or is intended for the use of Galveston County, and that the Board’s finances are separate from those of Galveston County.
*367Chapter 62 of the Natural Resources Code indicates that the operations of the beach park boards are distinct from those of the counties, but are made subject to some of the same rules. The Board is authorized to charge and collect fees for access to the public beaches that it manages, Tex.Nat.Res.Code § 62.094, and it may, without county approval, issue bonds payable from the revenues of the properties or facilities under its jurisdiction and control. Id. § 62.131. The funds “belonging to or under control of the board shall be deposited and secured in the same manner prescribed by law for county funds.” Id. § 62.052. The Board is not required to file a financial statement with the commissioners court showing the status of its current operations or a proposed budget with the county auditor for inclusion in the overall county budget; rather, the only requirement imposed by statute is that independent auditors selected by the Board make an annual audit of all financial transactions and records. Id. § 62.053. The Board is empowered, without any express provision for oversight by the county, to enter into contracts and leases, id. §§ 62.096-097, and to “spend money appropriated by the commissioners court for the purpose of cleaning and maintaining public beaches and land within its jurisdiction.” Id. § 62.-095.
These provisions refute the notion that procurement and expenditures by the Board are “county finances.” The statute speaks of money “belonging” to the beach park boards, and seemingly gives the boards considerable autonomy in spending it. In only one particular — the requirements for depositing and securing funds— are the Board’s financial operations made subject to the same rules as those of the County.
Indeed, the Court does not go so far as to hold that section 112.006 of the Local Government Code by its terms applies to the Board. Likewise, it disdains the effort of showing that section 262.011(d), which requires that the county purchasing agent make all purchases for “the county or a subdivision, officer, or employee of the county,” is literally applicable; the Court allows that beach park boards “are not necessarily ‘subdivisions’ and ‘departments’ of the county.” 841 S.W.2d at 366. Rather, the Court reads these additional restrictions into Chapter 62 on the basis that the beach park boards “have numerous characteristics of a county entity” and “were meant to function under county supervision.” Id. In effect, the Court assumes that the Legislature neglected to expressly incorporate into Chapter 62 limitations that it must have intended in authorizing counties to create these entities.
The fallacy of this assumption, however, is demonstrated by Chapters 320 and 321 of the Local Government Code, in which the Legislature previously authorized the creation of park boards. Chapters 320 and 321, enacted in 1957 and 1949, apply respectively to counties with more than 5,000 people and to counties bordering on the Gulf of Mexico with one or more islands suitable for park purposes. These chapters expressly place upon park boards additional limitations of just the type the Court places upon the Board today. Chapter 320 park boards must obtain approval from the commissioners court for all contracts and leases they grant, Tex.Loc.Gov’t Code § 320.050(b), and neither type of board can issue revenue bonds without authorization from the commissioners court. Id. §§ 320.-071(d), 321.071(d). Moreover, both types must annually file with the commissioners court or county judge a complete financial statement showing the financial status of the board and its properties, funds, and indebtedness, and must file a proposed budget for the upcoming year to be included as part of the county budget submitted to the commissioners court. Id. §§ 320.047(a), (c), 321.047(a), (c), (d). The county auditor must maintain current audits of Chapter 320 park boards and must prepare monthly and annual audit reports. Id. § 320.043(b). Chapter 320, unlike Chapter 62, contains a general grant of supervisory authority to the commissioners court: “Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, the board is subject to the supervision of the commissioners court in the exercise of all rights, powers, and privileges and in the *368performance of all duties.” Id. § 320.-050(a).
In these chapters, the Legislature provided in detail the type of county oversight it deemed necessary for each type of park board. By omitting many of these limitations in enacting Chapter 62 of the Natural Resources Code in 1969, the Legislature must be presumed to have made a conscious choice to enable counties to create more autonomous park boards. Instead, the Court today assumes that the Legislature failed to indicate what type of oversight Chapter 62 boards would be subject to, and implies a limitation more restrictive than those in Chapters 320 and 321. Our decision, even if grounded in sound considerations of public policy, is beyond the proper scope of our authority.
In substituting our own judgment for the Legislature’s, we also fail to provide any principled rationale for the details of our decision. Holding that county beach park boards are “entities subject to county supervision,” 841 S.W.2d at 365, the Court adopts two particular oversight requirements from the Local Government Code: mandatory use of the county purchasing agent and approval of purchases by the county auditor. No explanation is suggested as to why these two — as opposed to any others in that code — should apply.
As it has on prior occasions, the Court decides this case based on a general policy consideration — accountability of local government entities — without trying to discern how the Legislature chose to address that policy goal in the particular statute at issue. See, e.g., Webb County Appraisal District v. New Laredo Hotel, Inc., 792 S.W.2d 952, 956 (Tex.1990) (Hecht, J., dissenting). When Chapter 62 is considered in conjunction with the prior authorizations of park boards, the most reasonable conclusion is that the Legislature deemed the restrictions it expressly included in Chapter 62 necessary as a matter of policy, and chose to leave the decision of whether to impose additional limitations to the county commissioners courts who would be appropriating money to the beach park boards. In choosing to apply to the Board provisions not expressly incorporated in Chapter 62, the Court intrudes on the judgment of the Legislature and of the Galveston County Commissioners Court.
Because I believe that nothing in the relevant statutes prohibits Galveston County and the Board from entering into the contractual arrangement challenged in this suit, I would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
HECHT and CORNYN, JJ., join in this dissent.