Court Opinion

ID: 9865021
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 16:20:56.116142+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:36:52.101271
License: Public Domain

Me. Justice Butlee
dissenting,
James Compton was charged with and convicted of the crime of aiding and assisting one Edward Smith to escape from the Jefferson county jail.
Section 6805, C. L., under which Compton was prosecuted, is as follows: “If any person shall aid or assist a prisoner lawfully committed or detained in any jail for an offense against this state, or who shall he lawfully confined by virtue of any civil process, to make his or her escape from the jail, though no escape be actually made, or if any person shall convey of cause to he delivered to any such prisoner any disguise, instrument or arms proper to facilitate the escape of such prisoner, any person so offending (although no escape or attempt to escape be actually made) shall, on conviction, he punished by a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars and imprisoned in the county jail for a term not exceeding one year. ’ ’
1. Two separate and distinct crimes are created: (1) Aiding or assisting a prisoner to escape; and (2) conveying or causing to he delivered to a prisoner any disguise, instrument or arms proper to facilitate his escape. To constitute the first crime it is provided that no escape need be actually made. To constitute the second crime it is provided that no escape or attempt to escape need he actually made. The fact that the legislature clearly made a distinction between the two crimes *116in this important particular seems to have been given but scant consideration in the majority opinion.
As Compton was charged with and convicted of the first crime, let us consider the language of- the statute defining that crime. In Hurst, et al. v. State, 79 Ala. 55, the court said that: ‘ ‘ The clause, ‘ assists such prisoner to escape/ in its ordinary import, means that the prisoner does effect his escape, and that he has assistance' in accomplishing it.” So, in our statute, the words “aid or assist a prisoner / * * to make his * * * escape,” in their ordinary import, mean, (1) that a prisoner .has attempted to escape; (2) that the defendant has aided or assisted him in such attempt; and (3) that the attempt has succeeded, i. e., that the prisoner has escaped. The words should be given that meaning except so far, and only so far, as other words limit the meaning. Their meaning is limited by the words, “though no escape be actually made.” This dispenses with the third condition, but does not dispense with either of the other two. So limited, the meaning is, (1) that a prisoner has attempted to escape; and (2) that the defendant has aided or assisted him in such attempt. If these conditions concur, the crime has been committed, even though the attempt has failed and “no escape be actually made.” In the absence of a statute providing otherwise, to constitute the crime of aiding or assisting a prisoner to escape there must be an attempt by the prisoner to escape. State v. Christian, 253 Mo. 382, 161 S. W. 736; Harvey v. State, 8 Ga. App. 660, 70 S. E. 141. There are statutes expressly dispensing with the necessity of proving an attempt. A failure to note that fact has misled the writer of the majority opinion into the position taken in that opinion. Thus, in paragraph 8 there is a quotation from 21 C. J., p. 837, the latter part being as follows: “ * * * in others, under statutory provisions, that there need be no overt act on the prisoner’s part. An actual escape, however, need not be effected.” The opinion then says, “Our law comes under the latter *117part of the quotation — there need be no overt act on the prisoner’s part.” The quotation itself shows that such holdings are by virtue of statutory provisions. To sustain the text, five cases are cited in the notes; two from Alabama and one each from Arkansas, Georgia and Pennsylvania. In Alabama, the statute expressly made the act a crime, “whether such escape be attempted or effected or not.” Wilson v. State, 61 Ala. 151; Hurst et al. v. State, 79 Ala. 55. The language already quoted from the opinion in the Hurst case indicates what the holding would have been had the statute not contained the words just quoted. In Arkansas, the statute makes the crime complete, “whether such an escape be effected or attempted or not.” Maxey v. State, 76 Ark. 276, 88 S. W. 1009. In Pennsylvania, the statute makes the act a crime, “although no escape or attempt to escape be actually made.” Com. v. Rodman, 34 Pa. Super. 607. The following is the opinion in full in Simmons v. State, 88 Ga. 169, 14 S. E. 122: “That a person confined in jail, after effecting an exit from his own cell into a common hall, used a saw upon the fastenings of the door to the cell of a fellow-prisoner in such a way as to indicate a purpose to open that door, is evidence enough to convict him on an indictment for aiding such fellow-prisoner to escape, the statute declaring that the offense may be complete whether the escape be actually effected or not. Code, § 4482. ’ ’ The recital of facts is too meagre to make the decision satisfactory as a precedent, and the total absence of a discussion makes the opinion of little weight.
Upon such weak foundation rests the majority opinion on this — the controlling — point. Without the support of, authority, the opinion on this point, it is my belief, is also without the support of reason.
As there is no evidence that Smith attempted to escape —indeed, the evidence affirmatively shows that he did not • — Compton was not proven guilty of the crime charged.
*1182. The majority opinion says that, “an information charging a crime necessarily charges an attempt to commit such crime.” As applied to the crime charged in this case, the proposition is correct. It is also true that such attempt is itself a crime. But the conclusion that this requires an affirmance of the judgment in the present case, is not justified. The crime charged is aiding and assisting Smith to escape. If Compton had succeeded in conveying the saw blades and files to Smith, he would have committed the second crime created by section 6805, supra, namely, the crime of conveying to a prisoner instruments proper to facilitate his escape. But, as Smith made no attempt to escape, Compton would not have committed the crime charged, namely, the crime of aiding and assisting him to escape. This being true, even if the court had submitted to the jury the question of Compton’s guilt or innocence of the crime of attempt (which it did not do), and if the jury had brought in a verdict finding Compton guilty of attempting to aid and assist Smith to escape (which the jury did not do), the judgment could not be upheld. The verdict, by the way, was “ * * * guilty as charged in the information.”
3. It will not do to say that the information also charges Compton with the second crime created by section 6805, supra, namely, that of conveying to Smith instruments “proper to facilitate” his escape. One may aid or assist a prisoner in many ways in his attempt to escape; for example, by sawing or prying apart the window bars of the cell; by administering a drug to the jailor, or by seizing and binding him, or beating him into insensibility, and then taking his keys and unlocking the cell door; by removing portions of the cell wall or ceiling or floor; by setting fire to the jail; by conveying saw blades and files to a prisoner attempting to escape.' Many other examples will occur to anyone. Some of the means adopted may constitute an independent crime, e. g., burglary, arson, assault and battery, false imprisonment, larceny, malicious mischief. Whether or not, in an *119information charging one with aiding and assisting a prisoner to escape, it is necessary in Colorado to allege the means by which such aid or assistance is given, need not be considered here. The reports show that it is the common practice to state the means. If an information charges one with aiding and assisting a prisoner to escape, by forcibly seizing and binding the jailor, forcibly taking keys from his person, and unlocking the cell door, the crime charged would be, not assault and battery, or false imprisonment, or larceny, but aiding and assisting a prisoner to escape. On such an information, and upon proof of those facts, the defendant could not be convicted of assault and battery, or of false imprisonment, or of larceny. So, in the present case, the charge is, not that Compton conveyed to Smith instruments proper to facilitate his escape, but that he aided and assisted Smith to escape by conveying them to him. The conveying of the instruments to Smith was merely the means by which the crime charged is alleged to have been committed.
4. Even if the crime charged were conveying such instruments to the prisoner, the evidence does not establish the commission of that crime. The evidence is to the effect that Compton, with a package of saw blades and files in his pocket, went to the jail and conversed with Smith. There is no doubt that he went with the intention of conveying the blades and files to Smith. But before Compton could carry out his purpose, the deputy sheriff in attendance, becoming suspicious, searched Compton and took the instruments from his pocket, and thereupon placed Compton in custody. Compton, Smith and the deputy sheriff, the only witnesses to the occurrence, all testified that the instruments did not leave the possession of Compton. Some statutes, for example, those of Illinois, Michigan, Texas, New York, Arkansas, Kentucky, and perhaps other states, make it a crime to convey such instruments “into any jail,” or to send them “into any prison.” Patrick v. People, 132 Ill. 529, 24 N. E. 619; In re Parks, 81 Mich. 240, 45 N. W. 824; *120Peeler v. State, 3 Tex. App. 533; People v. Buckley, 91 App. Div. (N. Y.) 586, 590, 591; Maxey v. State, 76 Ark. 276, 88 S. W. 1009; Edwards v. Commonwealth, 145 Ky. 560, 140 S. W. 1046. In Colorado,, to constitute the crime, the statute requires the conveyance or delivery to be, not “to the jail,” or “into the jail,” but to the prisoner himself. The fact that the legislature adopted this provision, instead of the provisions in the statutes to which we have just referred, is important. Webster’s New International Dictionary defines “convey” thus: “4. To cause to pass from one place or person to another ; * * * 6. To transfer or deliver to another. ’ ’ The Standard Dictionary says that “convey” implies ‘ ‘ delivery at a destination; as, I will convey the information to your friend.” The language of the statute, “If any person shall convey or cause to be delivered to any such prisoner,” indicates that the word “convey” is used in the sense of ‘ ‘ deliver. ’ ’ Evidently it was intended to prohibit the same act (delivery), whether done by the defendant himself or by another person at his solicitation. In the case at bar, the most that can be said is that it was proven that Compton intended and attempted to convey or deliver the instruments to Smith, which attempt the vigilance of the deputy sheriff rendered abortive. The difference between the commission of a certain crime and an attempt to commit that crime, is not a mere fine-spun technicality, a trivial distinction, that does not affect the substantial rights of a defendant, but is a real, substantial difference, one that courts are not permitted to ignore. Ordinarily, at common law, an unsuccessful attempt to commit a crime is an independent crime — a misdemeanor. Bishop, Stat. Crimes, sec. 138. Common-law crimes are punishable in Colorado. C. L., secs. 6516, 7122; Marmaduke v. People, 45 Colo. 357, 101 Pac. 337.
X intends to set fire to and destroy the house of his enemy, Y. He goes to Y’s house with that intent, taking paper and kindling, saturated with kerosene. He places *121them against the house and applies a lighted match. The paper and the kindling take fire, but before the fire is communicated to the house, an officer arrests X- and puts out the fire. Whatever other crime X commits in performing those acts, he does not commit arson. He deserves punishment of some kind; and, if the court should submit to the jury the question of his guilt or innocence of the crime of attempting to commit arson, and the jury should find him guilty of that crime, he would receive the punishment he deserves. But a conviction of arson could not be sustained.
People v. Buckley, 91 App. Div. (N. Y.) 586, is an instructive case. The defendant was prosecuted under a statute providing that, “A person who, with intent to effect or facilitate the escape of a prisoner, whether the escape is effected or attempted or not, * * * conveys to a prisoner any information * * * [calculated to aid the escape of prisoners], is guilty of felony, if the prisoner is held upon a charge, arrest, commitment, or conviction for a felony. ’ ’ The defendant sent to Carroll, a prisoner in jail, a registered letter containing certain information calculated to aid the escape of one or more of the prisoners. The letter was delivered at the jail, and was receipted for by Carroll. It was handed by the carrier to the keeper of the jail, who handed it to the warden. The warden, in the presence of Carroll, opened the letter and read it. The warden testified that ‘‘ Carroll never had the letter”; that he (the warden) “intercepted it.” The court held that there had been no delivery to Carroll. The court referred to another provision of the statute, declaring it to be a crime to send “into a prison” any disguise, instrument, weapon, or other thing with intent, etc., and said:
‘ ‘ There is a material difference in the language of the Penal Code (§87) in relation to the sending of information and the sending of a disguise, instrument, weapon, or other like thing. In the latter case it is sufficient if the object is sent into the prison; but as to forbidden *122information it is necessary that it shonld be actually conveyed by the accused to a prisoner; in other words that it should reach its object through the agency of the accused. In this respect the defendant’s crime failed of accomplishment because the warden seized the letter before its delivery and the guilt of the defendant then terminated in the abortive attempt.’.’
In the present case there was no conveying of the saw blades and files to Smith; Compton never parted with his possession of them; hence, even if Compton were charged with that crime — and he is not — the evidence does not establish his guilt. In such case, it could not properly be said that, as Compton in fact was guilty of an attempt to commit a crime, though not the one charged, he deserves some punishment; that he got it; and, therefore, that justice has been done. The question of Compton’s guilt or innocence of the crime of attempting to convey the instruments to Smith was not, and under the information filed could not lawfully be, submitted to the jury. The jury did not, and under the information filed could not lawfully, find Compton guilty of that crime.
As ' Compton was not proven guilty of the crime charged, his conviction should not stand. If the district attorney had charged him with the crime that he did commit, and if the jury had found him guilty of that, crime, Compton would properly receive, without a departure from well-established legal principles, the punishment he deserves. The judgment should be reversed.
Mr. Justice Walker concurs in this dissenting opinion.