Court Opinion

ID: 9729905
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:52:12.503259+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:02.159489
License: Public Domain

CERCONE, Judge,
dissenting:
The instant appeal arose from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Criminal Division, which was reviewing appellant’s conviction on certiorari from the Municipal Court. The question raised on that certiorari was whether the Commonwealth had failed to sustain its burden of proving violations of Sections 6106 and 6108 of the Crimes Code1 (Firearms not to be carried without a license; carrying firearms on public streets or public property in Philadelphia, respectively) when it failed to offer any evidence at trial in the Municipal Court that appellant did not have a license to carry the weapon in question. Based upon the authority of Commonwealth v. McNeil, 461 Pa. 709, 337 A.2d 840 (1975) and its progeny the Honorable Ethan Allen Doty sustained appellant’s claim of insufficient evidence but, rather than arrest judgment on the charges, Judge Doty remanded the case for a new trial in Municipal Court. Only the defendant has appealed from this order.
At the outset it must be noted that the question of whether Judge Doty properly applied McNeil to Sections 6106 and 6108 of the Crimes Code in vacating appellant’s convictions in the instant case is not before us, because the Commonwealth, which was the party aggrieved by that *574determination, has not appealed.2 If we were to hold that the court improperly applied McNeil to the claimed violation of Section 6108 and reinstate the judgment entered in the Municipal Court, as the majority would prefer to do, we would be violating well-entrenched principles of appellate practice:
“[I]t is settled that ordinarily an appellee who did not file a cross appeal is not entitled to an appellate review to obtain a decision more favorable to him than that appealed from by the other party. . . . Errors prejudicially affecting an appellee who made no cross appeal are not within the scope of appellate review, despite his objections in the court below, to those errors. . . . Unless the decision below is reversed in favor of the appellant, it must on appeal stand even though it is not as favorable to the appellee as the evidence would have warranted, and where the decision of the court below was in part favorable and in part unfavorable to each of the adverse parties, it can be reviewed for the benefit of each party only if each party has attacked it either by appeal or cross-appeal.” 5 Am.Jur.2d, Appeal & Error § 707 at pp. 153-54. See also 5 C.J.S. Appeal & Error § 1498; Annotation, 1 L.Ed.2d 1820.
In the instant case we have a decision by Judge Doty that was both favorable and unfavorable to each party. The Commonwealth was adversely affected by the court’s determination of insufficient evidence and its consequential vacation of the conviction in the Municipal Court, but the Commonwealth did not appeal. Therefore, the determination of insufficient evidence has become the law of this case. On the other hand, appellant was aggrieved by the court’s ordering a new trial after finding that the evidence was insufficient, and he did appeal that order. Of course, since the court’s finding of insufficient evidence was favorable to him, appellant has not challenged it here and, therefore, it cannot be reviewed. Nevertheless, in an off-handed manner *575at the very end of its opinion, the majority seeks to justify its reaching the question of whether the evidence was indeed insufficient. While the reason given is cryptic at best, it appears to rest on a supposed permutation of the rule that an order of the trial court may be affirmed on any ground which appears in the record.3 This is certainly a peculiar suggestion in this case, since the majority opinion is manifestly an argument for reversal and reinstatement of the judgment of the Municipal Court. In short, the majority has concluded that Judge Doty’s order granting a new trial must be affirmed because it should be reversed! That paradox underscores why the majority errs in reviewing Judge Doty’s determination of insufficient evidence when the Commonwealth has not appealed and is obviously willing to accept it.
Hence, the only question before us is, given the insufficiency of the evidence produced by the Commonwealth at the first Municipal Court trial, could the court on certiorari properly remand for a new trial, or should it have arrested judgment as appellant argues herein. In Commonwealth v. Wright, 449 Pa. 358, 296 A.2d 746 (1972) our Supreme Court found evidence of receiving stolen goods insufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and confronted the question of whether a new trial was a permissible remedy. Basing its decision on the guideline of the Act of June 15, 1951, P.L. 585, § 1, 19 P.S. § 871 (1964), the Court concluded that the only remedy was arrest of judgment and discharge of the defendant. As the Court stated:
“Where it is determined after a review of the entire record that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the charge, the trial court is mandated to discharge the defendant and dismiss the case. This act does not leave the remedy to the discretion of the court, but rather, directs the dismissal of the action and the discharge of the defendant.” Id. 449 Pa. at 361, 296 A.2d at 748. See Commonwealth v. Dale, 232 Pa.Super. 213, 335 A.2d 454 *576(1975). Cf. Commonwealth v. Henderson, 451 Pa. 452, 304 A.2d 154 (1973); Commonwealth v. Brown, 234 Pa.Super. 119, 126, n. 2, 338 A.2d 659 (1975) (Dissenting Opinion by Hoffman, J.).
Therefore, the lower court erred in remanding the instant case for a new trial after it determined that the evidence was insufficient. The court should have arrested judgment and discharged appellant.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the court below should be vacated, judgment should be arrested and appellant discharged.
SPAETH, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.

. Act of December 6, 1972, P.L. 1482, No. 334, § 1, eff. June 6, 1973 (1973).

. Indeed, the Commonwealth has not even filed a brief with this Court.

. See Commonwealth v. Marks, 442 Pa. 208, 275 A.2d 81 (1971); Commonwealth v. Whitehouse, 222 Pa.Super. 127, 292 A.2d 469 (1972).