Court Opinion

ID: 9578990
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:50:17.573932+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:34:07.465127
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Judge,
concurring specially.
I concur in the affirmance of summary judgment but not in all that is written in reaching that resolution. I also dissent from the overruling of Ogletree v. Navistar Intl. &c. Corp., 194 Ga. App. 41 (390 SE2d 61) (1989), cert. den. March 13, 1990, and do not fully agree with the majority’s analysis of Ogletree.
Ogletree was correct in its two-fold analysis. It focused first on the injured party, as the law provides that if the “defect” and danger arising therefrom were open and obvious to him, then the parties representing his position would be precluded from recovery. There were questions of fact remaining after all the evidence was considered.
A subjective test is applicable when examining the relationship between the injured person and the product, because it is the knowledge and actions of this particular person or the user which are at issue.
If Ogletree knew of the defect and the danger, i.e., if it were subjectively open and obvious to him, then whether or not the manufacturer owed a duty to the world in general would not be reached as it would prevail on the affirmative defense of assumption of the risk. See Yaeger v. Canadair, Ltd., 189 Ga. App. 207, 208 (375 SE2d 469) (1988), for a recognition of this principle. Barnes, in Barnes v. Harley-Davidson Motor Co., 182 Ga. App. 778, 780 (357 SE2d 127) (1987), was in this position. So was the child in Poppell v. Waters, 126 Ga. App. 385, 386 (1) (190 SE2d 817) (1972), and Hunt in Hunt v. Harley-Davidson Motor Co., 147 Ga. App. 44 (1) and (2) (248 SE2d 15) (1978).
We concluded in Ogletree that from the state of the evidence at that summary judgment stage, the record did not establish conclusively that he knew there was a blind spot in the driver’s field of vision coupled with an absence of a warning device which would alert him to the danger of the truck’s hitting him. He, as a person located behind the moving truck, would be the intended beneficiary of a backup alarm. If he knew, of course, Navistar would be entitled to judgment in its favor. Barnes, supra, is illustrative.
The same applied to the operator. If he had actual knowledge, not only of the absence of a backup alarm and of a blind spot but also of the danger which such presented under the circumstances, i.e., if *175these were open and obvious to him, then the manufacturer would be shielded by what amounted to an intervening cause. That was the case in Stovall & Co. v. Tate, 124 Ga. App. 605 (184 SE2d 834) (1971). The evidence was not conclusive in Ogletree.
The Supreme Court, in Mann v. Coast Catamaran Corp., 254 Ga. 201, 202 (326 SE2d 436) (1985), alluded to the particular use in question: “ ‘If the injury results from abnormal handling . . . the seller is not liable.’ ” There was no abnormal operation of the truck in Ogle-tree, as it was simply being driven rearwards, albeit there may have been negligence on the operator’s part as to the caution he took. In sum, there was not a preclusion of liability arising from the affirmative defense of total fault attributable to the user or injured party or both in the particular instance of use.
We then focused on the manufacturer’s duty, the first element of a tort, and examined whether the evidence established that it had no duty to install a backup alarm. Such a device would be primarily for the protection of people and objects located behind the truck when it was being backed up, rather than for the protection of the operator. The Supreme Court in Mann focused on the duty aspect in its opinion. It pointed out that in claims based on OCGA § 51-1-11 (b), which is invoked here and was the foundation of the Ogletree claim, a product “ ‘is not in a defective condition when it is safe for normal handling and consumption.’ ” In Ogletree, there was evidence that it was reasonably foreseeable that an operator would back the truck up without full vision, due to blind spots created by whatever was mounted on the truck. The Supreme Court in Mann recognized that the manufacturer’s duty is, for one thing, to provide adequate warnings and instructions for use, in order for the product to be deemed not defective in law.
We applied the objective standard of “open and obvious” in viewing the manufacturer’s relationship to the product in Ogletree’s case, applying the traditional “reasonably foreseeable” test. See Ford Motor Co. v. Stubblefield, 171 Ga. App. 331, 335 (2) (319 SE2d 470) (1984). We discovered that there was evidence of reasonable foreseeability and resultant inadequacy. The ultimate resolution was left to the jury because of disputed material facts.
Thus there was no departure in Ogletree from decisional law. The majority in the case now under consideration may differ with the result in Ogletree insofar as the extent to which a manufacturer’s duty extends, but the principles on which it was based were not askew. There is no cause to overrule it, which would not affect the ruling made for that case nor change, for future cases, the principles applied in it.
The Weatherby case differs significantly. For one thing, the product was being used in an abnormal manner, and “ ‘the injury re*176sult[ed] from abnormal handling.’ ” Mann, supra at 202. The off-road one-seat motorcycle, which had the gas tank in front of the seat, was being driven off-road by an adult who had allowed the child to sit in front of him on top of the gas tank and immediately behind the opening at the top through which the adult had just put gas. He did not put the safety device, the gas cap, on because he did not know where it was and had often operated the cycle without it. The gas sloshed out and ignited when he drove down a dip in the terrain. It was “open and obvious” to him, subjectively, that he was riding on a rough surface with gasoline exposed to a motor.
Decided March 16, 1990
Rehearing denied March 28, 1990
Robert K. Finnell, Ellerin & Williams, Irwin M. Ellerin, Denise A. Hinds for appellants.
King & Spalding, Lanny B. Bridgers, Sally C. Quillian, Steven J. Estep, for appellees.
David Boone, amicus curiae.
That does not preclude recovery, say the Weatherbys, because there is no evidence that the danger was open and obvious to the injured party, the child. Even if it were not, however, the manufacturer would not be liable if it owed to the child none of the duties claimed. So the next consideration turns to the manufacturer.
Analogous to Mann, the product as manufactured “was reasonably suited for its intended purpose” of movement off-road. The absence of an additional safety device, to create a failsafe mechanism should the primary safety device, the gas cap, not be used, would not only be irrelevant to the cycle’s “functioning properly in its intended use,” in Mann’s words, but would come close to requiring the manufacturer to be an insurer. As pointed out in the majority opinion and in Ogletree, Georgia law does not impose such a duty. It would be a burden far beyond what the manufacturer should reasonably perceive being needed when the product is put to its intended use. That is to say, Honda would not be expected to foresee that someone would do what was done in this case, so as to create a duty to preclude injury by installing a secondary-stage protective device to keep gasoline confined or at least away from an open source of ignition, or to warn of danger from the absence thereof. Both were objectively “open and obvious,” not latent.
I am authorized to state that Chief Judge Carley joins in this special concurrence.