Court Opinion

ID: 9352524
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-06 20:08:18.020587+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:57:40.436423
License: Public Domain

J-A19020-22

                                    2023 PA Super 2

    V.L.-P.                                    :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                        Appellee               :
                                               :
                  v.                           :
                                               :
    S.R.D.                                     :
                                               :
                        Appellant              :       No. 477 MDA 2022

                  Appeal from the Order Entered February 18, 2022
                  In the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County
                     Domestic Relations at No(s): 2020-5-0545

BEFORE:         BOWES, J., KING, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

OPINION BY KING, J.:                                  FILED: JANUARY 6, 2023

        Appellant, S.R.D., appeals from the order entered in the Lebanon

County Court of Common Pleas, denying his petition for genetic testing. We

affirm in part and vacate and remand in part for further proceedings consistent

with this decision.

        The trial court set forth the relevant facts and procedural history of this

case as follows:

              [V.L.-P. (“Mother”)] is the biological mother of A.D.
              [(“Child”)]. In early 2008, [the parties] were engaged in an
              “on-again,    off-again”   relationship.      Both   parties
              acknowledge that they engaged in sexual intercourse on
              February 3, 2008, which was Super Bowl Sunday. [Mother]
              denied that she had sex with anyone else during the two
              months before and the two months after Super Bowl
              Sunday. [Appellant] presented a witness[, G.H.,] who
              proclaimed that her brother and [Mother] spent a great deal
              of time together and spoke about being engaged during
____________________________________________

*   Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A19020-22

       February of 2008.

       When [Mother] discovered that she was pregnant, she
       notified [Appellant] “because he is the father.” [Appellant]
       attended pre-natal ultrasounds and expressed some
       excitement about becoming a father. At no time during
       pregnancy did [Mother] relate that anyone else could
       possibly be the father of her unborn child.

       [I]n October…2008, [Mother] gave birth to an infant
       daughter[, Child]. [Appellant] was notified and he was
       permitted to be present in the hospital at the time of birth.
       Both [Appellant] and [Mother] acknowledge that a
       conversation occurred regarding paternity. Although the
       details of the conversation are disputed, both [Appellant]
       and [Mother] agree that [Mother] assured [Appellant] that
       only he could be the father. Based upon this representation,
       [Appellant] signed an acknowledgment of paternity and
       [Child] was given his last name.

       Starting six (6) months following birth, [Appellant] began
       enjoying alternating weekend periods of time with his
       daughter. As [Child] grew, [Appellant] attended doctor’s
       appointments, parent-teacher conferences, and athletic
       events involving [Child]. Almost every night, [Appellant]
       telephoned or FaceTimed [Child]. These communications
       inevitably ended with “I love you” being expressed by both
       [Appellant] and [Child].

       [Appellant] is a part of a close extended family.
       [Appellant’s] family embraced [Child] as one of their own.
       During twelve years leading up to 2020, [Child] developed
       a close relationship with [Appellant’s] parents, who were
       called “Mimi and PopPop,” [Appellant’s] sister “Auntie M”
       and [Appellant’s] grandfather, “Pappy Beers.”

       In early 2020, [Appellant] and his wife [K.D.] became
       involved with Ancestry.com.       They presented DNA to
       Ancestry. Both [Appellant] and [K.D.] professed surprise
       when the Ancestry.com analysis was received and [Child]
       was not mentioned as being part of their family tree.
       According to [Appellant], “[Child’s] Ancestry profile did not
       match either me or anyone else in my family…I was
       shocked.”

                                   -2-
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       Prior to April of 2020, [Appellant] paid roughly $400 per
       month in voluntary child support. He stopped paying in May
       of 2020. [Appellant] testified that his cessation of support
       was due to COVID-driven unemployment and not the
       Ancestry.com information. In fact, [Appellant] testified that
       he had a difficult time believing the Ancestry.com test
       results. [Appellant’s] custody rights with respect to [Child]
       were expanded to equal 50-50 periods of time between May
       and September of 2020.        During this period of time,
       [Appellant] did not mention or question paternity.

       With the advent of in-person school in September of 2020,
       [Mother] again undertook primary physical custody of
       [Child] and [Appellant] returned to an alternating weekend
       schedule. However, [Appellant] did not pay any child
       support. Eventually, on November 16, 2020, [Mother] filed
       a Complaint Seeking Child Support against [Appellant].

       [Following Thanksgiving weekend in] November of 2020,
       [Appellant] confronted [Mother] about the Ancestry.com
       paternity information.      [Mother’s father] and [K.D.’s
       mother] were present…when the disclosure about the
       Ancestry.com information was accomplished.        [Mother]
       testified that [Appellant] said: “Had you not sued me for
       support, I would have taken the information [about
       paternity] with me to my grave.” [Appellant] denied making
       such a statement.          [Mother’s father] corroborated
       [Mother’s] version of the conversation. Everyone agrees
       that [Mother] continued to assert that [Appellant] was the
       only man who could be the father of [Child.]

       Following the conversation between [Mother] and
       [Appellant] about paternity, the parties’ relationship
       understandably deteriorated.     [Appellant] testified that
       [Mother] withheld contact with [Child]. [Mother] denies that
       she withheld contact. [Appellant] did acknowledge that
       after November 30, 2020, he declined to have telephone
       contact with [Child]. As summarized by the subsequently-
       appointed [guardian ad litem (“GAL”)], “There were a few
       instances where brief communication occurred between
       [Child] and [Appellant] after November 30, 2020. By and
       large, however, their telephone communications ceased.
       Indeed, the nightly telephone or FaceTime contacts stopped

                                   -3-
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       altogether.” In fact, the GAL documented that [Appellant]
       would hand over his telephone to other relatives whenever
       [Child] called him following November 30, 2020.

       According to [Child], her relationship with [Appellant]
       underwent a “radical transformation” following November of
       2020. At some unknown time, [Appellant] told [Child] that
       he may not be her biological father. According to [the GAL],
       [Child] “understands that [Appellant] is denying paternity
       for her based upon the Ancestry.com/Ancestry DNA
       results.”

       [Appellant] did enjoy physical custody of [Child] on
       Christmas of 2020. [Appellant] described the visit as
       “rough.” In addition, [Appellant] acknowledged that he
       requested custody rights with [Child] on New Year’s
       Eve/Day. According to [Appellant], [Mother] refused to give
       him custody of [Child] at any time during the New Year’s
       holiday. Since Christmas of 2020, [Appellant] has not
       exercised any physical custody rights with [Child].
       However, [Appellant] acknowledged that he sent an email
       on December 31, 2020 within which he asked for a
       resumption of alternating weekend periods of physical
       custody. Those weekend visits were never re-initiated.

       In February of 2021, [Appellant’s] grandfather, Pappy
       Beers, passed away. Because [Child] was especially close
       to Pappy Beers, she was invited to his funeral. [Child]
       attended the funeral and sat with “Auntie M.” According to
       witnesses, very little interaction occurred between
       [Appellant and Child] during the funeral or the subsequent
       reception.   Following the funeral, no further contact
       occurred between [Child] and [Appellant].

       [Appellant] testified that he no longer considers himself to
       be [Child’s] father. According to [Appellant], he did not
       really reach the conclusion that he was not [Child’s] father
       until January of 2021. In addition to the Ancestry.com test
       results, [Appellant] indicated that he received information
       in October that [Mother] suffered from chlamydia when
       [Child] was born. [Appellant] indicated that he never
       contracted chlamydia and he attributed this [sexually
       transmitted disease] to [Mother’s] sexual contact with the
       true biological father of [Child]. In addition, [Appellant]

                                  -4-
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       received information through Ancestry.com from a woman
       by the name of [G.H.] [G.H.] testified that [Mother] and
       her brother were “close” to one another in February of 2008.
       In fact, [G.H.] believed that her brother and [Mother] may
       have been engaged at that period of time. According to
       [G.H.], her family has a history of suffering from a
       connective tissue disorder. [Child] was described as having
       a problem with connective tissue in her knee.

       [Appellant] testified that he asked [Mother] to take a DNA
       test. He testified: “If [Mother] believed I was the father,
       then do the DNA test and let’s be done with this.” According
       to [Appellant], it was the confluence of all of the above
       information (the Ancestry test, the chlamydia, the
       connective tissue disease and [Mother’s] refusal to consent
       to genetic testing) that caused him to reach the conclusion
       in January of 2021 that he was not [Child’s] biological
       father. At that point, he cut off all contact with [Child].

       [Mother] acknowledged that she would not consent to
       genetic testing. She explained that genetic testing would
       be “traumatic” for [Child], but she could not explain
       precisely how or why such trauma would flow from testing.

       [Appellant] raised a question about paternity with the
       [c]ourt for the first time on December 18, 2020. The [c]ourt
       refused [Appellant’s] invitation to order genetic testing
       based exclusively upon a written petition.1 Instead, on
       December 21, 2020, the [c]ourt scheduled a hearing for the
       purpose of determining whether genetic testing should be
       [c]ourt-ordered.

          1 When [Appellant’s] Motion was provided to the
          [c]ourt, we quickly perceived that the child in question
          was 12-years of age and that a Child Support dispute
          had recently been filed. Given these facts that were
          apparent from the record, we were unwilling to issue
          an immediate order to direct that genetic testing be
          undertaken.

       On March 1, 2021, [Appellant] filed an Amended Request
       for Genetic Testing in which he raised an allegation of fraud
       against [Mother]. Following the March 1[, 2021] Amended
       Request for Genetic Testing, a Lebanon County Domestic

                                   -5-
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       Relations Master (DRM) issued a recommendation and
       report regarding child support. Based upon the parties’
       respective incomes, the DRM recommended that [Appellant]
       pay $766.18 per month in child support. This was roughly
       $350 more than what [Appellant] had been paying prior to
       2020. On March 16, 2021, this jurist met with both parties
       and both counsel. After a lengthy discussion, it became
       obvious that the parties were not in agreement as it related
       to the concept of genetic testing or the process by which it
       could be ordered. Because of this, the [c]ourt ordered both
       parties to file briefs.

       Because this jurist refused to simply order genetic testing
       based on [Appellant’s] request, [Appellant] filed a Motion to
       Recuse this jurist on April 5, 2021. This motion was denied
       on April 7, 2021.

       Both [Mother] and [Appellant] filed briefs regarding the
       genetic testing issue. On April 27, 2021, this [c]ourt issued
       a 16-page Opinion. In that Opinion, we set forth our
       analysis of what we described as a “morass of Pennsylvania
       Paternity by Estoppel law.” Because we concluded that
       Paternity by Estoppel requires a court to analyze the best
       interests of the child involved, we decided to appoint a
       [GAL] to represent the interests of [Child].

       On April 27, 2021, we formally appointed [a] GAL for
       [Child]. [The GAL] is a licensed attorney who left the legal
       profession in order to launch a career as a family counselor.
       [The GAL] has served as GAL in numerous Lebanon County
       custody proceedings. He was asked by this [c]ourt to
       undertake an analysis with respect to whether
       disestablishment of paternity would be in the [best] interest
       of [Child].

       [The GAL] began his assignment by reaching out to both
       counsel and both parties. As was his assigned role, [the
       GAL] attempted to focus upon [Child] and her interests.
       This was difficult to accomplish with [Appellant], because he
       was myopically focused upon the issue of fraud and his own
       self-victimization.

       [The GAL] issued a formal report on June 28, 2021. As
       instructed, his report focused upon how disestablishment of

                                   -6-
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         paternity would affect [Child]. (To his credit, the GAL did
         not accept [Appellant’s] invitation to detour into the issue of
         fraud.) In focusing upon his assignment, [the GAL] met with
         the parties and [Child].       He described [Child] as an
         intelligent and focused young lady. He stated that [Child]
         was “confused” about how and why her relationship with
         “Dad” had changed so dramatically. [The GAL] described
         the emotion and tears shed by [Child] and he concluded that
         she has genuine love for [Appellant] and is suffering
         emotional pain as a result of what occurred in 2021.
         Ultimately, [the GAL] concluded that disestablishment of
         paternity would not be in the interest of [Child].

         Following [the GAL’s] report, [Appellant] filed objections
         and asked this [c]ourt to strike the report from the record.
         This [c]ourt refused to grant [Appellant’s] motion.

         The Factual Hearing was commenced on July 20, 2021. In
         accordance with our Opinion of April 27, 2021, we permitted
         [Appellant] to articulate and present evidence regarding his
         theory of fraud. Of necessity, the fraud-related testimony
         delved into [Mother’s] sexual and romantic history. In
         addition, we instructed the parties to focus upon the best
         interests of [Child]. As it related to that topic, we directed
         that [the GAL] provide sworn testimony in [c]ourt subject
         to cross-examination by both parties.

         A Factual Hearing could not be completed on July 20, 2021.
         After several COVID-related postponements, the factual
         testimony relevant to our decision was completed on
         January 31, 2022. …

(Trial Court Opinion, filed 2/18/22, at 2-10) (internal citations omitted)

(emphasis in original).

      At the July 20, 2021 hearing, Appellant testified that he was in a casual

relationship with Mother prior to Child’s birth.    Appellant was not aware if

Mother was having any intimate relationships with other men while she was

intimate with Appellant. On February 3, 2008, Appellant and Mother had sex.

                                      -7-
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Appellant remembered the date because it was Super Bowl Sunday. In mid-

to-late June 2008, Mother told Appellant she was pregnant with his child.

Mother said Appellant was the only possible father.             Mother reassured

Appellant multiple times leading up to Child’s birth that he was Child’s father.

Based on Mother’s representations, Appellant testified that he never had a

reason   to    question   paternity.    Appellant    attended    some   pre-natal

appointments with Mother. After Child’s birth while at the hospital, Appellant

had to sign various forms including an acknowledgment of paternity form.

Prior to signing, Appellant again asked Mother if he was the only possible

father. Mother assured Appellant that he was the only possible father. Mother

stated that if Appellant did not sign the form, then she would not let Child

have his last name. Appellant signed the form based on Mother’s assurances.

      Appellant placed Child on his health insurance plan, but Mother made

most healthcare decisions regarding Child.          Mother and Appellant lived

approximately 45 minutes away, and although Appellant visited with Child

after her birth, the visits were not regular. Appellant attended some of Child’s

well visits.   Eventually, after consulting with a lawyer, Appellant obtained

partial physical custody. In 2015, Mother got married to J.P. (“Ex-Husband”),

whom she divorced in 2016. Prior to their marriage, Appellant observed that

Ex-Husband was regularly involved in Child’s life. After Mother’s divorce from

Ex-Husband, Ex-Husband no longer played a role in Child’s life.

      In the beginning of 2020 when Appellant was working from home during

                                       -8-
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the pandemic, he exercised more custodial time with Child. Since the time

Child could talk, Appellant tried to speak to her on the phone as many days

as possible. Once Child had her own phone, Appellant and Child frequently

had FaceTime calls. Over the years, Appellant felt a lot of push-back from

Mother if Appellant tried to express an opinion regarding Child that was not

aligned with Mother’s view.

       In the spring of 2020, Appellant learned that he might not be Child’s

biological father. Appellant’s stepson’s father was adopted, and Appellant was

helping his stepson conduct a family tree project through Ancestry.com to

learn more about his heritage. The Ancestry.com results1 did not reveal Child

as part of Appellant’s familial matches. Instead, the test showed a close family

relation between Child and G.H. G.H. is someone who Appellant knew of in

the area. Initially, Appellant believed the test must be mistaken. Appellant

spent the next couple of months trying to verify the accuracy of the results.

       In April or May of 2020, Appellant stopped paying child support, which

Appellant had paid voluntarily since Child’s birth. Appellant had job changes

due to the pandemic and was under financial stress. In late summer or fall of

2020, Mother filed for child support. During the week after Thanksgiving in

2020, Appellant brought up the Ancestry.com results to Mother. Appellant

____________________________________________

1 The court did not admit the results of the Ancestry.com test for the truth of
the matter asserted regarding paternity but merely to demonstrate Appellant’s
state of mind after reading the results.

                                           -9-
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was anxious to approach Mother on the topic because he anticipated an

argument. When he presented Mother with the Ancestry.com results, Mother

maintained that Appellant was Child’s father. Mother denied knowing anyone

with the last name shared by G.H.

      Following the conversation, on December 3, 2020, Appellant e-mailed

Mother and proposed obtaining private genetic testing to confirm or deny the

accuracy of the Ancestry.com results. Mother said she would only proceed

through the court system.    Mother also said that she was not comfortable

letting Appellant visit with Child following the discussion regarding the

Ancestry.com results. Mother permitted Child to see Appellant for a couple

hours on Christmas, but Mother distanced Child from Appellant regarding their

otherwise regularly scheduled visits.

      Around December 2020 or January 2021, Appellant obtained medical

records showing that Mother had chlamydia during her pregnancy, and Mother

was admitted to the hospital in September 2008 for treatment. Appellant was

unaware that Mother had this infection during her pregnancy.          Appellant

testified that he has never had chlamydia to his knowledge, and he would

have insisted on a DNA test to confirm paternity had Mother disclosed this

infection.

      Appellant maintained this his relationship with Child is now non-existent.

Appellant no longer holds Child out as his own in the community. After the

visit on Christmas, Child removed personal belongings from Appellant’s home.

                                    - 10 -
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After Christmas, Child attended the funeral of Appellant’s grandfather, with

whom Child was very close. Other than that event and the luncheon following

the funeral, Appellant has not seen Child.

      On cross-examination, Appellant admitted that he sought shared

custody in the summer of 2020 even after receipt of the Ancestry.com results.

At that point, Appellant still doubted the accuracy of the test results and

believed he was Child’s father. (See N.T. Hearing, 7/20/21, at 5-114). The

court concluded the hearing following Appellant’s testimony, to resume at a

later date. The court further ordered that pending a final decision in the case,

all future support payments paid by Appellant were to be held in escrow by

the Domestic Relations office.

      The hearing continued on January 31, 2022.        Mother testified at the

hearing that at the time Child was conceived, she was in an “on-again, off-

again” relationship with Appellant. Mother agreed she had sex with Appellant

on February 3, 2008, which was Super Bowl Sunday. Mother said she also

had sex with Appellant about a week before that date. Mother said she notified

Appellant about the pregnancy a few months after discovering she was

pregnant. Mother denied that Appellant ever questioned paternity prior to

Child’s   birth.   Mother   denied   pressuring   Appellant   into   signing   the

acknowledgment of paternity after Child was born. Mother said that Appellant

told her in the hospital at the time of Child’s birth that his employer required

a paternity test for health insurance documents. Mother responded that if

                                     - 11 -
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Appellant wanted to take a paternity test, then she would have given Child

her last name (and not the last name of Appellant) on the hospital paperwork

until the results came back.       Appellant did not hesitate to sign the

acknowledgment of paternity after this brief discussion. Mother maintained

there was (and is) no reason to question paternity because Appellant is the

only person with whom she was sexually active at the time Child was

conceived.    Appellant did not mention anything regarding paternity (aside

from the health insurance requirement discussion) to Mother until November

30, 2020.

      Beginning when Child was approximately six months old, Appellant and

Mother had an informal custody arrangement whereby Appellant had custody

every other weekend. Appellant also saw Child during the holidays and Child

spent vacations with Appellant and his family.        Appellant attended Child’s

medical and dental appointments.           Appellant attended parent/teacher

conferences    every   year.   Appellant      also   attended   some   of   Child’s

extracurricular activities. Mother said Appellant and Child spoke regularly on

FaceTime.

      On November 30, 2020, Appellant texted Mother indicating that he

wanted to have a conversation with her. During the ensuing conversation,

Appellant informed Mother that he had conducted an Ancestry.com project

several months before, and no one in his family matched with Child as being

a blood relative. Appellant told Mother that had she not filed for child support

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two weeks prior, Appellant would have “taken it [the Ancestry.com results] to

his grave.” Mother did not believe the accuracy of the results because she

insisted that Appellant is Child’s father.

      Mother testified that this situation has been tough on Child because she

has not seen most of Appellant’s family since January 2021. Child expresses

to Mother that she misses Appellant and his family.

      Mother explained that in May 2020, while Child’s school was virtual

during the pandemic, Appellant sought week-on/week-off custody. Mother

agreed and this shared custody arrangement continued until the fall of 2020

when in-person education resumed. During this time, Appellant exercised the

greatest amount of custodial time he had with Child since her birth. When in-

person learning resumed, the custody arrangement went back to Appellant

having every other weekend with Child, until Thanksgiving weekend.

      Mother emphasized that she is certain Appellant is Child’s father because

she was not sexually active with anyone else during the relevant timeframe.

Regarding the sexually transmitted infection, Mother claimed she contracted

that from somebody else who she had been dating during her pregnancy, and

Mother was treated for it at the end of July 2008. Mother explained she had

been dating someone from June to August in 2008 while she was pregnant.

      On cross-examination, Mother claimed that requiring Child to undergo a

paternity test would not serve her best interest. Specifically, Mother testified

that giving Child doubt about the status of paternity, when Mother is certain

                                      - 13 -
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Appellant is her father, would not be in Child’s emotional best interest. Mother

also stated that she does not know anyone with the last name shared by G.H.,

who was identified as a relative of Child in the Ancestry.com results. Mother

admitted that she has a 2008 conviction for theft by unlawful taking, for which

she served probation. Mother also admitted that she lost her driver’s license

around 2017; she did not notify Appellant of her license suspension. Mother

maintained she had migraine issues around the time of her license suspicion

so she would not have driven even if she had her license during that period.

Mother maintained she never drove with Child when her license was

suspended. Mother explained that Child would have to give up some activities

if she would no longer receive child support payments from Appellant. (See

N.T. Hearing, 1/31/22, at 5-78).

      Appellant’s wife, K.D., testified that Appellant was initially shocked by

the Ancestry.com results. K.D. said that she and Appellant tried to verify the

accuracy of the results, and they learned the results are 99.9% accurate. K.D.

claimed Appellant was scared to discuss the results with Mother.          When

Appellant confronted her, Mother insisted Appellant is Child’s father.     K.D.

denied that Appellant made the comment about taking the Ancestry.com

results to the grave if Mother had not filed for child support. K.D. stated that

the last time Appellant spent any meaningful time with Child was on Christmas

Eve of 2020. K.D. said that Child’s phone calls with Appellant and his family

stopped in January of 2021.

                                     - 14 -
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      K.D. testified that around 2017, Mother told K.D. and Appellant that she

could not drive because of bad migraines. Appellant transported Child more

often around that time. K.D. said that Mother still drove during the period

when she complained of migraines but usually shorter distances. K.D. later

learned Mother had been driving without a license.

      K.D. testified that she no longer considers Child as part of their family.

When K.D. and Appellant tell people how many children they have, they no

longer count Child as one of their own.        K.D. and Appellant specifically

excluded Child from their wills and removed her pictures from their home.

K.D. testified that Appellant believed he was Child’s father until early 2021,

when Appellant and K.D. received the medical records showing Mother’s

sexually transmitted infection, coupled with information from G.H. that Mother

had a close relationship with G.H.’s brother around the time of conception, as

well as Appellant and K.D.’s communications with Ancestry.com regarding the

accuracy of results.   At that point, Appellant and K.D. no longer believed

Appellant was Child’s father. (See id. at 79-123).

      G.H. testified that she has an Ancestry.com profile and that her

Ancestry.com results connect her with Child as “close family.” G.H. stated

that she knows Mother, as Mother was good friends with her brother, R.H.

G.H. confirmed that Mother “hung out” at her brother’s house approximately

eight to ten years earlier. G.H. testified that Mother and R.H. were in a serious

relationship around February 2008, and G.H. believed they were engaged to

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be married.     G.H. explained that she has a genetic disorder called Ehlers-

Danlos syndrome, which is a connective tissue disorder that causes frequent

dislocations of joints. (Id. at 124-136).

      K.D.’s mother, M.Q., testified that Appellant and Child had a good

relationship.    M.Q. treated Child like an adopted granddaughter.           M.Q.

explained that Appellant had little authority concerning decisions over Child’s

activities and medical appointments, as Mother made the decisions and

Appellant just had to accept them. (Id.at 137-145).

      Mother’s father, K.L., Sr. (“Maternal Grandfather”), testified that he lives

with his wife, Mother, and Child.    Maternal Grandfather was present when

Appellant confronted Mother about the Ancestry.com results.             Maternal

Grandfather overheard Appellant make the comment about taking the

Ancestry.com results to his grave, but Maternal Grandfather could not recall

the precise context of that statement. Maternal Grandfather stated that Child

had a very close relationship with Appellant and his family.            Maternal

Grandfather indicated that Child misses Appellant and his family. Maternal

Grandfather has no recollection of Mother having a relationship with anyone

named R.H. (Id. at 145-161).

      On rebuttal, Appellant testified that if he made the comment about

taking the Ancestry.com results to his grave, that might have been his initial

response to the situation.      Appellant clarified that after processing the

information more deeply, he could not keep the truth bottled up if he is not

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Child’s biological father. Appellant explained that G.H.’s genetic connective

tissue disorder sounds very similar to joint issues that Child has experienced,

which had been attributed to sports injuries. Appellant claimed he saw Mother

driving in 2017 when her license was suspended, around the time Mother had

been complaining of migraines. Appellant stated that his mother-in-law, M.Q.,

discovered that R.H. is a mutual Facebook friend of hers through Mother. In

other words, Facebook showed that Mother and R.H. are connected as friends

on social media.

      Appellant testified that he began to reduce communication with Child in

January of 2021 because he did not want to confuse her or cause her more

emotional harm until the truth is determined. Appellant claimed that when he

met G.H., he believed her nose looked extremely similar to Child’s nose. (Id.

at 161-174).

      On rebuttal, Mother confirmed that she does not know G.H. or R.H.

Mother denied that she was engaged to R.H. in February of 2008. Mother

stated that Child has never been diagnosed with a genetic connective tissue

disorder. Mother maintained that Child plays soccer, basketball, and lacrosse,

and periodically suffers knee injuries from those activities. Mother denied ever

driving while her license was suspended. (Id. at 174-179).

      At the conclusion of Mother’s rebuttal testimony, the court indicated that

it had previously sentenced a man by the name of R.H. for creation of child

pornography, solicitation to create child pornography, corruption of minors,

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and intimidation of a witness. Based on court documents, the court confirmed

that the R.H. convicted of those offenses has a sister, G.H. Thus, the court

indicated that the R.H. mentioned in the proceedings as allegedly having a

past relationship with Mother is likely the same individual who has been

sentenced for sex offenses. As a result of his convictions, R.H. is prohibited

from having any contact with minors. The court stated it could take judicial

notice of R.H.’s conviction history because it is a matter of public record.

      The GAL testified that he interviewed Child for approximately one hour

and conducted a few follow-up phone calls with her.         In that time, Child

expressed her sadness based on her disconnection with Appellant, whom Child

regarded as her father for her whole life. The GAL believed Child displayed an

authentic emotional response from someone who feels a void in her life based

on Appellant’s disconnection. The GAL also interviewed Appellant and K.D.

Appellant maintained that he does not intend to have a relationship with Child

going forward. The GAL opined that it would not be in Child’s best interest to

disestablish paternity.   The court admitted into evidence the GAL’s report,

over Appellant’s objection. (Id. at 185-239). Following the GAL’s testimony,

the court directed the parties to file post-hearing briefs and took the matter

under advisement.

      On February 18, 2022, the court denied Appellant’s request for genetic

testing.   In doing so, the court found “that the best interest of the child

paradigm can, should and must play a predominant role in our decision” and

                                     - 18 -
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specifically   rejected   Appellant’s    “argument   that   fraud   precludes   a

consideration of what is best for [Child].”        (Trial Court Opinion at 13).

Although the court acknowledged that Appellant’s “questions about paternity

are not irrational[,]” the court stated that its decision would not hinge upon

an analysis of fraud. (Id. at 18). Rather, the court focused upon Child’s best

interests, which the court found were served if Appellant remained as Child’s

legal father. (Id. at 19-29). Additionally, the court directed that Appellant’s

previously escrowed child support payments be released to Mother within ten

days.

        On February 28, 2022, Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration and

to stay/maintain the escrow of support payments pending an appeal. The

court denied Appellant’s motion for reconsideration on March 8, 2022. With

respect to the motion to stay, the court granted relief in part and denied relief

in part. Specifically, the court directed the Domestic Relations office to release

50% of all amounts currently held in escrow to Mother for Child’s support, and

to forward 50% of all future support payments to Mother. The court instructed

that the remaining 50% of the escrow fund and support payments should be

maintained in escrow.

        On March 18, 2022, Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal and a

contemporaneous concise statement of errors per Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i).

        Appellant presents five issues for our review:

           Whether the trial court erred in finding that Appellant failed
           to establish fraud by a preponderance of the evidence, and

                                        - 19 -
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           improperly applied the standard of paternity by estoppel?

           Whether the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s request
           for a paternity test and finding that Appellant “is considered
           the official parent of” the subject child prior to engaging in
           any factual finding on Appellant’s challenge to paternity?

           Whether the trial court improperly appointed and admitted
           the report of a [GAL], where there is no legal authority for
           such appointment in an action for paternity by fraud?

           Whether the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s stay of
           escrowed funds pending this appeal of the paternity action?

           Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying
           Appellant’s request for recusal, when prior to engaging in
           any finding of fact, the trial judge authored an email
           showing his bias against Appellant?

(Appellant’s Brief at 6).

      In reviewing matters of child support and cases involving a question of

paternity, we will not disturb a trial court order absent an abuse of discretion.

Vargo v. Schwartz, 940 A.2d 459, 462 (Pa.Super. 2007).

           An abuse of discretion exists if the trial court has overridden
           or misapplied the law, or if there is insufficient evidence to
           sustain the order. Moreover, resolution of factual issues is
           for the trial court, and a reviewing court will not disturb the
           trial court’s findings if they are supported by competent
           evidence. It is not enough for reversal that we, if sitting as
           a trial court, may have made a different finding.

Id. (quoting Doran v. Doran, 820 A.2d 1279, 1282 (Pa.Super. 2003)).

Further:

           “The finder of fact is entitled to weigh the evidence
           presented and assess its credibility.” Smith v. Smith, 904
           A.2d 15, 20 (Pa.Super. 2006). In so doing, the finder of
           fact “is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence and
           we as an appellate court will not disturb the credibility

                                       - 20 -
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          determinations of the court below.” Id. (citation omitted).

Vargo, supra.

      For purposes of disposition, we combine Appellant’s first and second

issues. In those issues, Appellant argues that the trial court failed to reconcile

its conclusion that Mother is at best uncertain about Child’s paternity, with

Pennsylvania’s principle of paternity by fraud. Appellant claims he relied on

Mother’s statements that he was Child’s biological father and did what any

“decent man would have done under the circumstances.” (Appellant’s Brief

at 17).    Appellant insists that Mother informed him that he was Child’s

biological father both upon learning she was pregnant and at the time of

Child’s birth. In fact, Appellant contends that Mother threatened Appellant at

the time of Child’s birth that if he requested a paternity test and did not sign

the acknowledgment of paternity form, that Child would not bear his last

name. Appellant submits that he justifiably relied on Mother’s assertions that

he was Child’s biological father and paid child support and acted as Child’s

father throughout the years based on those representations.

      Appellant emphasizes the Ancestry.com testing demonstrates that he

and Child have no genetic relationship, whereas the testing showed that G.H.

is Child’s “close relative.” Father concedes he is unsure who Child’s biological

father is, but he maintains that the Ancestry.com results suggest Child’s

biological father is an immediate family member of G.H. Appellant highlights

G.H.’s testimony that she knew Mother, and Mother was dating R.H. near the

                                     - 21 -
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time of Child’s conception. Appellant submits that Mother’s refusal to admit

to sexual relations with another man near the time of Child’s conception

“should not be given more weight than the substantive and credible evidence

[Appellant] produced.” (Id. at 21). Appellant points out that Child resembles

G.H. Appellant further maintains that G.H. suffers from a rare genetic disorder

that causes issues with connective tissue and ligaments in joints. Similarly,

Child has seen doctors on several occasions for orthopedic issues.

      Appellant also contends the trial court ignored other evidence

demonstrating Mother’s fraud.      For example, in 2021, Appellant obtained

Child’s birth records and learned for the first time that Mother had chlamydia

during her pregnancy; Appellant denies ever having chlamydia.        Appellant

maintains that Mother testified that she contracted chlamydia while dating

another man during her pregnancy. Appellant insists that if he knew Mother

was sexually active with other men during her pregnancy, he would have

insisted on a paternity test immediately after Child’s birth.

      Appellant insists that he has distanced himself from Child’s life since

learning of Mother’s fraud, no longer holds Child out as his own, and they no

longer maintain a parent-child relationship. Appellant further complains the

court improperly weighed the credibility of the witnesses. Appellant claims

the court failed to consider Mother’s untruthfulness, especially in light of

Mother’s prior conviction involving dishonesty. Appellant also claims the court

focused solely on the best interests of Child as it relates to the doctrine of

                                     - 22 -
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paternity by estoppel, without any regard for Appellant’s claim of fraud.

Appellant submits that “[i]njecting the best interest of a child into a paternity

by fraud action is like forcing a round peg into a square hole.” (Id. at 37).

      Appellant emphasizes that the court erred by stating he was not entitled

to genetic testing simply because he signed an acknowledgment of paternity

when Child was born. Appellant asserts that other courts have ordered and

utilized the authenticity of genetic tests “to properly flesh out the merits of

fraud arguments and to get to the bottom of the truth of the matter asserted,

which is what a court is bound to do.” (Id. at 38). By denying genetic testing,

Appellant complains the trial court has invited more litigation.       Appellant

points out that as Child’s legal father, Appellant could take Child at any future

time to obtain a private paternity test which will allow Appellant to resurrect

his fraud claim with definitive evidence of Mother’s untruthfulness, if the

results confirm Appellant’s suspicions of fraud. Appellant concludes the court

erred by rejecting his claim of fraud and denying genetic testing, and this

Court must grant relief. We agree that Appellant is entitled to genetic testing

under the unique facts of this case.

      “The presumption of paternity, i.e., the presumption that a child

conceived or born during a marriage is a child of the marriage, …is one of the

strongest presumptions known to the law.” Vargo, supra at 463 (citation

omitted). Because the policy underlying the presumption is the preservation

of marriages, “the presumption of paternity applies only where the underlying

                                       - 23 -
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policy to preserve marriages would be advanced by application of the

presumption.” Id. (emphasis in original). Thus, the presumption of paternity

is not applicable when there is no longer an intact family or a marriage to

preserve. Id. If the presumption of paternity is inapplicable, the court must

then consider whether the doctrine of paternity by estoppel applies to the facts

of the case. Id. at 464.

         “Generally, estoppel in paternity issues is aimed at
         achieving fairness as between the parents by holding both
         mother and father to their prior conduct regarding paternity
         of the child.” Buccieri v. Campagna, 889 A.2d 1220, 1224
         (Pa.Super. 2005) (quoting Freedman v. McCandless, 539
         Pa. 584, 592, 654 A.2d 529, 533 (1995)). This Court has
         held that the principle of paternity by estoppel is well suited
         to cases where no presumption of paternity applies. Gulla
         v. Fitzpatrick, [596 A.2d 851, 858 (Pa.Super. 1991)]. The
         number of months or years a party held out another as the
         father of a child is not determinative of an estoppel claim.
         Id. “Rather, it is the nature of the conduct and the effect
         on the father and the child and their relationship that is the
         proper focus of our attention.” Id.

         Estoppel has been used variously in cases involving
         paternity and support. See, e.g., Fish v. Behers, 559 Pa.
         523, 741 A.2d 721 (1999) (holding as between mother and
         biological father, mother was estopped from asserting
         paternity of biological father, where she repeatedly assured
         her ex-husband that he was child’s biological father);
         Moyer v. Gresh, 904 A.2d 958 (Pa.Super. 2006) (holding
         as between putative father and biological father, biological
         father was estopped from challenging paternity of putative
         father where putative father raised child for nine years);
         Buccieri, supra (holding biological father was estopped
         from asserting paternity due to eight-year delay in
         accepting any responsibility as parent); J.C. v. J.S., 826
         A.2d 1, 5 (Pa.Super. 2003)[, appeal denied, 576 Pa. 724,
         841 A.2d 531 (2003)] (holding putative father was estopped
         from denying paternity because he continued to act as
         child’s father after his paternity was disproved); Gulla,

                                     - 24 -
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        supra (holding as between mother and putative father,
        mother was estopped from denying paternity of putative
        father where she had held him out as child’s father). Even
        in the context of a marriage, the principle of estoppel can
        be applied if fraud occurs. See also Doran, supra (holding
        husband was not estopped from denying paternity of child
        born during husband’s marriage to mother, where she
        deceived him into believing he was child’s biological father);
        Kohler[ v. Bleem, 654 A.2d 569 (Pa.Super. 1995), appeal
        denied, 541 Pa. 652, 664 A.2d 541 (1995)] (holding
        biological father could not assert estoppel to prevent
        presumptive father from denying paternity, in light of
        conclusive      evidence    of   paternity,     fraud     and
        misrepresentation on issue of true identity of biological
        father, and absence of intact family).

                                 *      *      *

        “Estoppel in paternity actions is based on the public policy
        that children should be secure in knowing who their parents
        are….” Gebler v. Gatti, 895 A.2d 1, 3 (Pa.Super. 2006)
        (citing Brinkley v. King, 549 Pa. 241, 701 A.2d 176
        (1997)). “The doctrine is designed to protect the best
        interests of minor children by allowing them to ‘be secure in
        knowing who their parents are.’” Moyer, supra (internal
        citation omitted). The application of paternity by estoppel
        in any form is very fact specific and must be grounded in a
        close analysis of the circumstances of the case. Gebler,
        supra (citing T.L.F. v. D.W.T., 796 A.2d 358, 363
        (Pa.Super. 2002)); Matter of Green, [650 A.2d 1072, 1075
        (Pa.Super. 1994)]. The length of time involved is only one
        circumstance to be considered. Gulla, supra. This Court
        has also considered society’s concerns for stability in the
        child’s life, such as whether there is a stable family unit to
        preserve. Buccieri, supra. An additional factor is whether
        the child’s father “is willing to care [for the child]…and
        capable of doing so….” Moyer, supra at 963.

Conroy v. Rosenwald, 940 A.2d 409, 416-17 (Pa.Super. 2007).

     Additionally,   the   relevant    portion     of   the   statute   governing

acknowledgments of paternity provides as follows:

                                      - 25 -
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        (a) Acknowledgment of paternity.—The father of a child
        born to an unmarried woman may file with the Department
        of Public Welfare, on forms prescribed by the department,
        an acknowledgment of paternity of the child which shall
        include the consent of the mother of the child, supported by
        her witnessed statement subject to 18 Pa.C.S. § 4904
        (relating to unsworn falsification to authorities). In such
        case, the father shall have all the rights and duties as to the
        child which he would have had if he had been married to the
        mother at the time of the birth of the child, and the child
        shall have all the rights and duties as to the father which
        the child would have had if the father had been married to
        the mother at the time of birth…

                                   *     *      *

        (g) Rescission.—

           (1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a signed,
        voluntary, witnessed acknowledgment of paternity subject
        to 18 Pa.C.S. § 4904 shall be considered a legal finding of
        paternity, subject to the right of any signatory to rescind the
        acknowledgment within the earlier of the following:

              (i) sixty days; or

              (ii) the date of an administrative or judicial proceeding
           relating to the child, including, but not limited to, a
           domestic relations section conference or a proceeding to
           establish a support order in which the signatory is a
           party.

           (2) After the expiration of the 60 days, an
        acknowledgment of paternity may be challenged in court
        only on the basis of fraud, duress or material mistake of
        fact, which must be established by the challenger through
        clear and convincing evidence. An order for support shall
        not be suspended during the period of challenge except for
        good cause shown.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5103(a), (g) (internal footnote omitted).

     Thus, a signed acknowledgment of paternity may be challenged based

                                       - 26 -
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upon fraud, duress or material mistake of fact. 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5103(g). This

Court has explained the law regarding fraud in this context as follows:

         In B.O. v. C.O., [590 A.2d 313 (Pa.Super. 1991)], this Court
         stated that “when an allegation of fraud is injected in an
         acknowledgment of paternity case, the whole tone and tenor
         of the matter changes. It opens the door to overturning
         settled issues and policies of the law.” B.O., [supra] at
         315. This Court went on to create a narrow fraud exception
         for challenging paternity, which is otherwise a settled issue
         based on the signed acknowledgment. We adopted the
         traditional elements of fraud established in Pennsylvania
         jurisprudence:

            (1) a misrepresentation, (2) a fraudulent utterance
            thereof, (3) an intention by the maker that the
            recipient will thereby be induced to act, (4) justifiable
            reliance by the recipient upon the misrepresentation,
            and (5) damage to the recipient as the proximate
            result.

         Id. Recent cases have moved away from this rigid five-
         prong test which this Court acknowledged in B.O. as
         problematic and somewhat circular. [Id.] Our…decision of
         Glover v. Severino, 946 A.2d 710 (Pa.Super. 2008),
         provides additional guidance as to the elements of fraud in
         the context of challenges to acknowledgments of paternity:

            A misrepresentation need not be an actual statement;
            it can be manifest in the form of silence or failure to
            disclose relevant information when good faith requires
            disclosure. Fraud is practiced when deception of
            another to his damage is brought about by a
            misrepresentation of fact or by silence when good
            faith required expression.          Fraud comprises
            anything calculated to deceive, whether by single act
            or combination, or by suppression of truth, or
            suggestion of what is false, whether by direct
            falsehood or innuendo, by speech or silence, word of
            mouth, or look or gesture.

         Id. (quotations    and   citations   omitted)   (emphasis      in
         original).

                                     - 27 -
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         In Glover, a mother had a brief sexual relationship with a
         putative father and became pregnant. Despite knowing that
         she had other sexual partners at the time of conception, the
         putative father signed an acknowledgment of paternity and
         paid child support, though his involvement in the child’s life
         was minimal and sporadic. Mother insisted that putative
         father was the father of the child, despite the results of later
         testing that revealed he was not. This Court held that
         despite the mother’s strong belief as to the identity of the
         biological father, her silence on the issue of other possible
         fathers and her failure to be forthcoming about the true
         probabilities of paternity constituted fraud by omission.

R.W.E. v. A.B.K., 961 A.2d 161, 168 (Pa.Super. 2008) (en banc). See also

N.C. v. M.H., 923 A.2d 499 (Pa.Super. 2007) (holding doctrine of paternity

by estoppel was inapplicable where appellant operated for over ten years

under false pretense that he was child’s father due to mother’s failure to

inform appellant of extramarital affair she had around time of child’s

conception); Gebler, supra (holding trial court erred in applying doctrine of

paternity by estoppel where appellant’s behavior as responsible father for first

eighteen months of child’s life was due to mother’s concealment of existence

of other sexual partners around time of child’s conception).

      Indeed, this Court has explained:

         The presumption that a child born during the marriage is a
         child of the marriage and the doctrine of paternity by
         estoppel grew out of a concern for the protection of the
         family unit; where the unit no longer exists, it defies both
         logic and fairness to apply equitable principles to
         perpetrate a pretense. In this case, application of
         estoppel would punish the party that sought to do
         what was righteous and reward the party that has
         perpetrated a fraud.

                                     - 28 -
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Doran, supra at 1283-84 (emphasis added).

      In K.E.M. v. P.C.S., 614 Pa. 508, 38 A.3d 798 (2012), our Supreme

Court upheld the continued viability of the paternity by estoppel doctrine

where the developed record demonstrates that doing so would serve the

child’s best interests. In analyzing whether the doctrine should apply, the

Court indicated that the best interests of the child “remains the proper,

overarching litmus, at least in the wider range of cases.” Id. at 525-26,

38 A.3d at 808 (emphasis added). In qualifying its holding, the Court was

clear to state that the strongest case of “overriding equities” to overcome

application of paternity by estoppel is the “typical fraud scenario (in which a

[putative father] is deluded into believing that a child is his own issue)[.]”

Id.at 525 n.7, 38 A.3d at 808 n.7. While the Court acknowledged that “even

in such circumstances, there are arguments to be made that the best interests

of a child should remain the predominate consideration,” the Court expressly

reserved any decision on how the best interests of the child should factor into

the analysis of a fraud scenario. Id.

      Instantly, the parties were never married and there is no intact family

unit to preserve. Consequently, the presumption of paternity does not apply

here. See Vargo, supra. Nevertheless, the trial court applied the doctrine

of paternity by estoppel, reasoning that it is “beyond any doubt that [Child’s]

future life would be better if [Appellant] were to remain as her legal father.”

(Trial Court Opinion at 19). The court acknowledged that there is a legitimate

                                    - 29 -
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question about whether Appellant is Child’s biological father; but the court

concluded Child’s best interests must be the overarching concern.

       We are constrained to disagree with the trial court’s analysis. Since our

High Court’s decision in K.E.M., this Court has had occasion to apply its

principles to scenarios involving claims of fraud. Recently, in Hortman v.

Hortman, No. 2352 EDA 2021 (Pa.Super. Sept. 8, 2022) (unpublished

memorandum),2 this Court upheld the trial court’s finding of fraud and order

granting genetic testing. Although the appellee had held himself out as the

child’s father, the appellee did so based on the mother’s insistence that he

was the child’s father.        In his petition for genetic testing, the appellee

presented evidence that another man was the child’s biological father. The

appellee also underwent private genetic testing, confirming that he was not

the child’s father.

       In rejecting the mother’s claim of paternity by estoppel, this Court

discerned no abuse of discretion by the trial court in concluding that the

mother had perpetrated a fraud upon the appellee by (1) misrepresenting the

nature of her 2015 extramarital sexual encounter with another man; (2) her

adamant and persistent denial of the possibility that the other man could be

child’s biological father and her simultaneous ridicule of the appellee when he

questioned her about paternity; (3) the mother’s intention to induce the

____________________________________________

2See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (stating we may rely on unpublished decisions of this
Court filed after May 1, 2019 for persuasive value).

                                          - 30 -
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appellee to assume parental responsibility for the child; (4) the appellee’s

justifiable reliance upon the mother’s misrepresentation; and (5) the

appellee’s financial and emotional damage as a result. See id. at 22-23. This

Court also noted that the appellee did not continue to hold the child out as his

own after discovering that he was not the child’s biological father, and that

the appellee’s contact with the child had ceased.

      This Court further held that the mother’s reliance on K.E.M. was

misplaced. In doing so, this Court explained: “In contrast to K.E.M., Appellee

in this case raised and proved a claim of fraud.               Thus, K.E.M. is

distinguishable.” Hortman, supra at 29-30 (citing Ellison v. Lopez, 959

A.2d 395, 398 (Pa.Super. 2008) for proposition that even where father/child

relationship has been established, evidence of fraud may preclude application

of doctrine of paternity by estoppel). This Court went on to state that “if the

court estopped Appellee from challenging paternity, it would have punished

[the party] who had ‘sought to do what was righteous’ by assuming parental

duty of [the child], and it would have rewarded Mother who ‘perpetrated a

fraud.’” Hortman, supra at 30 (citing Doran, supra at 1283-84).

      Here, Appellant has presented a colorable claim of fraud. Appellant’s

evidence of fraud includes, inter alia (1) Appellant’s actions taken after receipt

                                     - 31 -
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of the Ancestry.com results;3 (2) testimony from Appellant and K.D. that G.H.

was a person connected as family to Child via the Ancestry.com results; (3)

G.H.’s testimony that Mother and G.H.’s brother, R.H., were engaged in 2008

around the time of Child’s conception; (4) the court’s judicial notice of the fact

that R.H. is a convicted sex offender, which might have provided a motive for

Mother to deny a sexual relationship with R.H.; (5) Mother’s steadfast refusal

to permit Child to undergo genetic testing to protect Child’s best interests,

which the trial court found incredible based on the minimally invasive testing

measures;4 and (6) Mother’s repeated assertions to Appellant that he is Child’s

biological father, upon which Appellant has relied since Child’s birth.

       Certainly, if genetic testing confirms that Appellant is not Child’s

biological father, then he will have successfully proved fraud. In the absence

of genetic testing or an admission by Mother to engaging in sexual relations

with someone else around the time of Child’s conception, however, Appellant

will be unable to prove his claim of fraud. While our High Court recognized

that “there are arguments to be made that the best interests of a child should

remain the predominate consideration” in fraud cases, the Court expressly

____________________________________________

3 We reiterate that the trial court did not admit the Ancestry.com results as
substantive evidence but only to demonstrate Appellant’s state of mind after
receiving those results.

4(See Trial Court Opinion at 16) (stating Mother’s “vague proclamation that
a blood test ‘would be traumatic for my daughter’ is simply not credible.
Modern genetic tests are simple, easy and almost entirely pain-free”).

                                          - 32 -
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declined to embrace such a holding. See K.E.M., supra at 525 n.7, 38 A.3d

at 808 n.7.    We decline to extrapolate our holding today from the Court’s

comment in a footnote, which was mere dicta. Rather, we hold that to apply

the doctrine of paternity by estoppel under the circumstances of this case

would punish Appellant, who “sought to do what was righteous” by assuming

parental duty of Child, and reward Mother, who might be guilty of perpetrating

a fraud.     See Doran, supra.      See also N.C., supra; Gebler, supra;

Hortman, supra.

      In so holding, however, we decline to accept Appellant’s position that

Child’s best interests are completely irrelevant in paternity disputes involving

claims of fraud. To the contrary, we simply do not hold, as the trial court did,

that a child’s best interests are elevated over the interests of a party who has

been defrauded.    The analysis in cases such as these should turn on their

unique facts and consideration of all the relevant circumstances, which

necessarily includes evidence of fraud and the child’s best interests. Only in

cases where fraud is proven, will the “overriding equities” favor disestablishing

paternity, even if doing so would otherwise be against the child’s best

interests. Based upon the foregoing, we hold that Appellant has put forth

sufficient evidence of fraud such that he is entitled to genetic testing to prove

his claim.

      In his third issue, Appellant argues there is no legal authority in

Pennsylvania for the appointment of a GAL in a paternity by fraud action.

                                     - 33 -
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Appellant claims the court erred by relying on Pa.R.C.P. 1915.11-2 to make

this appointment, as that Rule governs actions for custody, not paternity.

Appellant insists the cases on which the court relied as authority to appoint

the GAL did not involve claims of fraud, so they are distinguishable. Appellant

concludes the court’s appointment of a GAL and subsequent admission of his

report was improper, and this Court must grant relief. We disagree.

       Instantly, on April 27, 2021, the court scheduled a factual hearing for

July 20, 2021 and appointed a GAL to assist the court in determining the best

interests of Child.        The order directed “that [the GAL] conduct an

investigation…with respect to whether and/or how [Child] would be affected

by a disestablishment of paternity…[and] to issue a written report on this issue

on or before July 1, 2021.” (Order, 4/27/21, at 1; R.R. at 72). The court

further directed that the GAL “shall be prepared to testify regarding his

investigation and the conclusions that flow from that investigation. He shall

be subject to cross-examination by both parties.” (See id.) In appointing the

GAL, the court stated the GAL “shall represent the best interests of the child

in accordance with Pa.R.C.P. 1915.11-2.[5] The GAL shall not act as the child’s

attorney or represent the child’s legal interests as an advocate in [c]ourt.”

(Id. at 2; R.R. at 73). On June 28, 2021, the GAL issued a report indicating

that it would not be in Child’s best interest to disestablish paternity. Appellant

____________________________________________

5See Pa.R.C.P. 1915.11-2(a) (providing for appointment of GAL to represent
best interests of child in custody action).

                                          - 34 -
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objected to the GAL’s testimony and the report.

      While we agree with Appellant that Rule 1915.11-2 regarding the

appointment of a GAL in custody proceedings is not directly applicable here,

we disagree with Appellant’s position that the court was prohibited from

appointing a GAL under the unique facts of this case. As previously stated,

while a child’s best interests do not take precedence over a colorable claim of

fraud in a paternity by estoppel case, they are not irrelevant, as Appellant

suggests. Rather, these types of cases must each be decided on their own

unique facts. See Gebler, supra. Significantly, Appellant cites no authority

that precludes a court from appointing a GAL in this context to aid the court’s

determination in a paternity dispute case. See, e.g., K.E.M., supra at 528,

38 A.3d at 809 (explaining that trial court has authority to appoint GAL to

advocate child’s best interests in paternity dispute); R.K.J. v. S.P.K., 77 A.3d

33 (Pa.Super. 2013), appeal denied, 624 Pa. 665, 84 A.3d 1064 (2014) (in

which trial court appointed GAL to discern child’s best interests in paternity by

estoppel case). Therefore, Appellant’s third issue merits no relief.

      In his fourth issue, Appellant argues the court improperly ordered that

the support funds held in escrow should be released to Mother. Appellant

claims the court denied his request to stay release of the escrowed funds in

part, by ordering that 50% of the funds be released and 50% of future

payments to be held in escrow pending appeal. Appellant contends the court’s

ruling could be irreparable; recovery of those funds will likely involve even

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more litigation if this Court reverses the trial court’s decision.      Appellant

concludes the court erred by denying his request to stay a release of the

escrowed funds. We disagree.

      As   a   preliminary   matter,    appellate   arguments   which   are   not

appropriately developed are waived. Lackner v. Glosser, 892 A.2d 21, 29

(Pa.Super. 2006).    Here, Mother points out that Appellant cites no legal

authority supporting his claim that the court was prohibited from denying

Appellant’s request for a stay, in part, and keeping some of the child support

payments in escrow.     (See Mother’s Brief at 9).     We agree with Mother’s

contention. In his brief, Appellant cites only to Pa.R.A.P. 1701(b)(1), which

discusses the effect of an appeal generally, and the trial court’s authority to

act while an appeal is pending. See Pa.R.A.P. 1701(b)(1). Appellant’s single

citation to this Rule of Appellate Procedure is insufficient to support his claim

on appeal, and we deem this issue waived for inadequate development. See

Lackner, supra.      See also Irwin Union Nat. Bank and Trust Co. v.

Famous, 4 A.3d 1099 (Pa.Super. 2010), appeal denied, 610 Pa. 610, 20 A.3d

1212 (2011) (stating this Court will not act as counsel and will not develop

arguments on behalf of appellant).

      In his fifth issue, Appellant argues the court erred by denying his request

for recusal. Appellant asserts the court evidenced its bias against Appellant

early in the proceedings, when it authored an e-mail to the parties on March

31, 2021 stating the court was concerned that men might “harass or gain

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leverage over women who are the objects of their ire” by alleging fraud.

(Appellant’s Brief at 44) (citing E-mail dated 3/31/21; R.R. at 41). Appellant

insists the court was predisposed to a finding of paternity by estoppel without

an analysis of Appellant’s fraud claim. Appellant emphasizes that the court

offered no comment or judgment on Mother’s deceitful conduct.         Appellant

complains the court summarily denied his recusal motion and did not provide

any rationale for its denial until a supplemental opinion authored after

Appellant appealed.   Appellant contends the court failed to appreciate the

gravity of its words in the March 2021 e-mail until after Appellant appealed.

Appellant claims that based on the court’s “assumptive and inflammatory

tone” in the March 2021 e-mail, “the die was cast, and [Appellant] had no

objective hope that his proof of Mother’s fraud would be heard by an

openminded jurist.” (Appellant’s Brief at 47). Appellant concludes the court

erred by denying his recusal motion, and this Court must grant relief. We

disagree.

      Our scope and standard of review are as follows:

         The denial of a motion to recuse is preserved as an
         assignment of error that can be raised on appeal following
         the conclusion of the case. We review a trial court’s decision
         to deny a motion to recuse for an abuse of discretion.
         Indeed, our review of a trial court’s denial of a motion to
         recuse is exceptionally deferential. We extend extreme
         deference to a trial court’s decision not to recuse. We
         recognize that our trial judges are honorable, fair and
         competent, and although we employ an abuse of discretion
         standard, we do so recognizing that the judge himself is best
         qualified to gauge his ability to preside impartially. Hence,
         a trial judge should grant the motion to recuse only if a

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         doubt exists as to his or her ability to preside impartially or
         if impartiality can be reasonably questioned.

Interest of D.R., 216 A.3d 286, 292 (Pa.Super. 2019), aff’d, 659 Pa. 319,

232 A.3d 547 (2020).

      “A party seeking recusal must assert specific grounds in support of the

recusal motion before the trial judge has issued a ruling on the substantive

matter before him or her.” Bowman v. Rand Spear & Associates, P.C.,

234 A.3d 848, 862 (Pa.Super. 2020) (internal citation omitted). “Recusal is

required whenever there is a substantial doubt as to the jurist’s ability to

preside impartially.” Id. “However, opinions formed by the judge on the basis

of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the current proceedings

do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a

deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment

impossible.” Id. at 862-63.

      Instantly, the court explained its rationale for denying Appellant’s

recusal motion as follows:

         In this case, this jurist had no prior knowledge or contact
         with either [Mother] or [Appellant]. Before presiding over
         the above-referenced case, this jurist had limited
         experience dealing with the issue of paternity by estoppel
         and fraud in the context of paternity. Because of this, we
         solicited legal briefs from the parties. The email sent by this
         jurist on March 31, 2021 merely advised about a concern of
         the [c]ourt so that said concern could be addressed in the
         parties’ briefs. At no time in our email did we accuse
         [Appellant] of any misconduct or improper motive. The
         third paragraph of the email made clear that this jurist had
         concerns because he had “encountered men in my years on
         the bench who would use such a process simply to harass

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         or gain leverage over women who are the objects of their
         ire.”  It became clear to this [c]ourt as the matter
         progressed that the motivation of [Appellant] transcended
         the concern articulated in the March 31, 2021 email.

         At no time did this jurist have or display any “bias” against
         [Appellant]. We confronted a difficult legal question and a
         unique fact pattern as best we could, and we confronted that
         question impartially and fairly without bias or prejudice. We
         understand that [Appellant] disagrees and he can argue his
         disagreement to Pennsylvania’s Superior Court. However,
         this case should not be decided based upon a spurious
         recusal motion based upon “bias” that simply did not exist.

(Supplemental Trial Court Opinion, filed 3/31/22, at 6-7). The record supports

the court’s analysis.

      Here, the court held a hearing on March 16, 2021, at which time it

expressed its concern that granting Appellant’s petition for genetic testing

could “open the floodgates” for any father to allege fraud and seek genetic

testing upon a separation from the mother. (See N.T. 3/16/21, at 4-5; R.R.

at 19-20).   Notwithstanding the court’s concerns, it listened to Appellant’s

arguments and proceeded in a fair and impartial manner by ordering the

parties to brief the relevant legal issues.      (See id. at 7; R.R. at 21).

Specifically, the court indicated that it did not want to hold a hearing to

develop Appellant’s fraud claim until reading legal briefs on what authority the

court had to disestablish paternity after Appellant had already signed an

acknowledgment of paternity and held Child out as his own for many years.

The court explained to Appellant’s counsel: “And it may well be that you’re

right and I need to do a factual hearing; and if that’s so, I’ll read your cases;

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and I’ll set the parameters for that factual hearing.” (Id. at 13; R.R. at 26).

The court entered an order following the March 16, 2021 hearing, directing

the parties to file briefs within 30 days.

      Following the hearing, the parties informed the court’s judicial assistant

via e-mail that they agreed a factual hearing was necessary to resolve the

issues at hand. Based on their agreement, the parties sought to dispense with

filing pre-hearing briefs and to proceed directly to a hearing instead.      In

response, the court drafted the March 31, 2021 e-mail, upon which Appellant’s

recusal motion is based. The e-mail reads:

         Dear counsel—

         I have received your emails indicating concurrence that a
         Factual Hearing is necessary. I will work with the Domestic
         Relations Office to schedule a date and time for such a
         hearing.

         The above being said, I would still like a Memorandum of
         Law from both of you. I have looked briefly at the law
         pertaining to paternity by estoppel. With all due respect, I
         do not believe it is as clear as you make it out to be. While
         some factual issues may need to be resolved, I am not
         willing to entertain a proceeding without being able to
         establish parameters in advance.

         I am concerned about the precedent of enabling a man to
         obtain a Factual Hearing that could involve questions to a
         woman about her sexual history. If all a father needs to do
         in order to open the door to such sensitive topics is allege
         fraud in a petition, there exists a significant danger of
         mischief occurring. I have encountered men in my years on
         the bench who would use such a process simply to harass
         or gain leverage over women who are the objects of their
         ire.

         Because I would like to know how to set parameters in the

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           above-referenced case, I still need you to file legal briefs as
           previously directed. Please focus on the scope of the Factual
           Hearing I will be conducting. Thank you for understanding
           my position.

           Very truly yours,

           [The court].

(E-mail, dated 3/31/21, attached as Exhibit B to Appellant’s Recusal Motion,

4/5/21).

      Contrary to Appellant’s assertions, we see nothing in this e-mail that

rises to the level of a “deep-seated favoritism [for Mother] or antagonism

[against Appellant] that would make fair judgment impossible.”               See

Bowman, supra. Rather, the court reiterated the concerns it expressed at

the March 16, 2021 hearing and made clear that it still wanted to review briefs

on the legal issues before it, so the court could set parameters for the scope

of the hearing. Additionally, when setting parameters for the hearing, the

court expressly permitted Appellant “to articulate his theory of fraud. This will

necessarily require [Appellant] to provide information regarding his belief that

someone else is [Child’s] father.”       (Trial Court Opinion, 4/27/21, at 15).

Simply because the court ultimately disagreed with Appellant’s position

following the hearing, does not mean the court showed bias. On this record,

we see no reason to disrupt the court’s denial of Appellant’s recusal motion.

See Interest of D.R., supra.

      Accordingly, we vacate the portion of the court’s order denying

Appellant’s request for genetic testing and remand for genetic testing such

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that Appellant will have an opportunity to prove his claim of fraud. Following

the results of the genetic testing, the trial court should proceed as it sees fit

under the circumstances. We affirm the court’s order in all other respects.

      Order affirmed in part, vacated and remanded in part. Jurisdiction is

relinquished.

      President Judge Emeritus Stevens joins this opinion.

      Judge Bowes files a concurring opinion.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 01/06/2023

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