Court Opinion

ID: 9519714
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:23:24.600227+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:44:37.580746
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE JONES, dissenting: When plaintiff’s attorney asked plaintiff on direct examination whether he had participated in the recent invasion of Grenada, it constituted a calculated and deliberate attempt to evoke sympathy for plaintiff in the eyes of the jury. The plaintiff was dressed in his military uniform as he had a perfect right to be since he was on active duty with the armed forces, and had just returned from participation in the then-recent invasion of Grenada by the United States Armed Forces, an action highly favored by the great majority of the citizens of this country. In this action for fraud in the sale of an automobile, it would be completely and totally irrelevant to any issue in the case whether the plaintiff had participated in the invasion of Grenada. Such information had no probative value in the case, and the information could only be misused by the jury, as it obviously was. Plaintiff’s attorney manifestly was aware of the impropriety of his question, and his using it in the manner he did constitutes an abuse of the judicial system and should not be sanctioned by this or any other court. The trial court sustained defendant’s objection to the question and later, in chambers and out of the presence of the jury, termed it “a cheap shot.” That it was. The trial court refused defendant’s motion for a mistrial because of the question for the reason that plaintiff had traveled to the trial from the State of Washington. Such reason is legally insufficient in law to excuse such a deliberate act of his own attorney. The trial court’s error in refusing to grant a mistrial over the “Grenada” question is doubtless reflected in the verdict for punitive damages returned by the jury. That award was in the amount of $17,000, a sum over 15 times the amount of the compensatory verdict, 3.7 times the amount plaintiff agreed to pay for the car, and 10% of the value of the defendant automobile agency. The amount of the punitive damages is further exacerbated by the fact that, at the time of the trial, the plaintiff had driven the ear in question 19,000 miles and still got to keep the car. These factors place the punitive damages award in this case far afield from the principles and purposes of punitive damages set forth in Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc. (1978), 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353, Gent v. Collinsville Volkswagen, Inc. (1983), 116 Ill. App. 3d 496, 451 N.E.2d 1385, and many other cases. There is no question that the plaintiff had been defrauded in the subject transaction. Just as surely, there is no question that an abuse of the judicial system has occurred. I respectfully dissent.