Court Opinion

ID: 9752455
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 18:09:11.513349+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:42:09.051748
License: Public Domain

Opinion issued August 24, 2023

                                    In The

                            Court of Appeals
                                    For The

                        First District of Texas
                          ————————————
                            NO. 01-22-00519-CR
                         ———————————
                       PAUL GENNUSA, Appellant
                                      V.
                    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

                 On Appeal from the 228th District Court
                         Harris County, Texas
                     Trial Court Case No. 1690746

                       MEMORANDUM OPINION

     A jury found appellant, Paul Gennusa, guilty of burglary of a habitation,1

enhanced with a prior conviction for assault on a family member as a repeat

offender. The jury further assessed Gennusa’s punishment at 35 years’

1
     See TEX. PENAL CODE § 30.02.
confinement. In three issues on appeal, Gennusa’s argues that (1) the trial court

abused its discretion by having Gennusa’s legs shackled during trial; (2) the trial

court abused its discretion by allowing improper jury argument from the State; and

(3) the judgment of conviction should be reformed to reflect that he was convicted

of burglary of a habitation with intent to commit aggravated assault. Because we

conclude that Gennusa was not harmed by the trial court’s error in leaving him

shackled during trial, nor was he harmed by the State’s jury argument, we affirm

the judgment but modify it to reflect that Gennusa was convicted of burglary of

habitation with intent to commit aggravated assault.

                                   Background

      Christian Marrder, the neighbor of the complainants Howard and Rhonda

Rogers, was driving home when he observed a man on a motorcycle behaving

erratically. The man on the motorcycle drove into Marrder’s neighborhood and

stopped at the Rogers’ house. Marrder watched the man, who he later identified as

Gennusa, force his way past Rhonda Rogers. When he heard Rhonda scream,

Marrder called 9-1-1. Less than a minute later, Marrder saw Howard Rogers

wrestling with Gennusa in the Rogers’ front yard. Howard Rogers was bleeding

profusely. Gennusa fled on foot.

      Rhonda Rogers testified that she and her husband were preparing to leave

for dinner, and her husband had just stepped out of the shower, when she heard a

                                         2
motorcycle and her husband saw someone approaching the door. Rhonda identified

Gennusa as the man who came to the door, and she testified that he asked whether

she had seen his dog. She cracked the door to talk to him, and he insisted that she

had stolen his dog. She told him she had not seen his dog and tried to close the

door. Gennusa pulled a knife out of his pocket and forced his way into her house.

She shouted to her husband to get his gun, warning him that Gennusa had a knife.

She saw Gennusa charge up the stairs toward her husband, and she ran out the back

door to get help.

      Howard Rogers testified that he heard Rhonda scream and then saw Gennusa

rushing up the stairs toward him. He fought with Gennusa inside the house.

Gennusa stabbed Howard several times, but Howard was eventually able to chase

Gennusa from the house. As he left the house, Gennusa dropped the knife, and

Howard picked it up. Gennusa tried to get on his motorcycle to ride away, but

Howard used the knife to puncture the tires. Gennusa fled on foot. He was arrested

outside a nearby dance studio.

      Howard sustained multiple injuries, including gashes on his head, neck, and

arm. He also had stab wounds to his stomach. He spent more than a week in the

hospital recovering from the injuries he sustained. Howard and Rhonda both

testified during the punishment phase of the trial about the impact the crime had on

them. They moved to a new house in a “safer” neighborhood but continued to be

                                         3
fearful about opening the door to people. Howard continued to have numbness and

other physical effects from the assault.

      The State also presented evidence from Brigette Roulaine, whose niece was

taking a class at the nearby dance studio. While Roulaine was waiting, she saw a

man covered in blood come around the corner and attempt to enter the dance

studio. Roulaine called 9-1-1. The responding officer, A. Villareal, arrived and

observed Gennusa behaving erratically. He detained Gennusa, who was eventually

charged with burglary of a habitation with the intent to commit aggravated assault.

      The jury found him guilty of the offense of burglary of a habitation with the

intent to commit aggravated assault, as instructed by the jury charge. Gennusa also

chose to have the jury assess his punishment, and the jury found that he should be

confined for 35 years. Although the indictment, jury charge, and evidence at trial

indicated that Genussa was charged with and convicted of the offense of burglary

of a habitation with the intent to commit aggravated assault, the trial court’s

judgment of conviction reflected that Gennusa was convicted of burglary of a

habitation with the intent to commit theft. This appeal followed.

                                     Shackling

      In his first issue, Gennusa argues that the trial court reversibly erred in

denying his counsel’s request to remove his leg shackle prior to the trial.

                                           4
A.    Relevant Facts

      During voir dire, while both sides were making their strikes, defense counsel

became aware that Gennusa was shackled, telling the trial court, “Judge, I was not

aware that my client was shackled. So I told him to move seats, and it was only

once he moved that I realized he was shackled. I’m not sure why, and I’m sure that

that front row saw.” Defense counsel went on to explain, “I looked down at the

table; and the way his feet were, I didn’t see any chains. And, so, I said, oh, let’s us

move and it was only when I came around that I saw it but they did not move him.

That’s on me. I just was not aware that he was shackled.”

      The trial court questioned why Gennusa was shackled, observing that it was

generally not necessary or proper to have a defendant shackled in the courtroom

for a trial. The deputy in the courtroom stated simply that Gennusa was “in

custody,” and he stated that Gennusa “was blocked off from both angles so the

jurors couldn’t see him; and I made it known to the folks that, you know, he’s not

going to be moved in view of the panel or the jury should it be selected.” The trial

court and defense counsel agreed that the restraints on Gennusa’s legs were not

visible unless Gennusa moved, but defense counsel nevertheless objected to

Gennusa’s being shackled absent the articulation of some particular justification

for restraining him.

                                           5
      The trial court proceeded to question the venire panel. Several members of

the venire saw the restraints, but only one of those—Juror 12—was eventually

seated on the jury. When the trial court asked Juror 12 whether he had observed

anything unusual when Gennusa stood up, Juror 12 stated that he saw Gennusa’s

leg restraints. Defense counsel asked, “[I]f you were chosen on this jury, [would

you use] that information [i.e., the fact that Gennusa was wearing leg irons] in

deciding guilt/innocence in this case?” Juror 12 answered, “No.”

      Two other members of the venire panel—Jurors 2 and 8—saw the shackles

and indicated that it would impact their consideration of Gennusa’s guilt or

innocence, and therefore should be struck. The trial court pointed out, however,

that those jurors had already been struck with peremptory strikes and stated, “All

right. Now, that issue I think is moot because the way that you guys exercised your

strikes, they’re off. They’re not on.” Defense counsel consulted with Gennusa, then

informed the trial court that, because Jurors 2 and 8 had previously been struck,

Gennusa was “prepared to go forward with the jury that we have.”

      When trial commenced, before the jury was seated, defense counsel again

moved that Gennusa not be shackled and stating, “[I]f they can articulate, Judge,

that my client has been violent or untrustworthy in the jail, I certainly would want

to hear that but I’ve not been informed of anything like that and I think just having

a blanket policy that we’re gonna shackle people who are unfortunate enough to

                                         6
not have money to make a bond is wrong.” The trial court questioned the deputies

regarding why Gennusa was shackled, and the deputies stated that it was simply

their policy to shackle people who were in custody.

      The trial court clarified: “I want to make sure that the record is clear that he

was seated in a position where the jury could not see that he was shackled.” The

trial court denied the motion to remove the shackles, and the record reflects that the

trial court and deputies intended that Gennusa would be positioned so that the

restraints would not be visible to the jury. If he needed to move, the trial court

would “take a break” so that the jury would not see the shackles.

B.    Standard of Review and Relevant Law

      The United States Constitution forbids the routine use of visible shackles on

defendants during trial. Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 624, 626–29 (2005); Ex

parte Chavez, 560 S.W.3d 191, 201 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018); Bell v. State, 415

S.W.3d 278, 281 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). When the jury sees the defendant in

shackles, his constitutional presumption of innocence is undermined. Bell, 415

S.W.3d at 281–82. Thus, the trial court should make all efforts to prevent a jury

from seeing a defendant in shackles unless there has been a showing that there are

extreme or exceptional circumstances requiring a need for such restraints. Id.

      “Even when shackles are not visible to the jury, however, shackling a

defendant during trial is non-constitutional error in violation of the common law

                                          7
unless it is necessary for a particular defendant in a particular proceeding.” Chavez,

560 S.W.3d at 202. For shackling to be justified, “the record must manifest the trial

judge’s reasons for restraining a defendant,” and a trial judge errs in ordering

shackles if “the record fails to detail the grounds for restraint.” Id. (quoting Bell,

415 S.W.3d at 281). Further, those grounds must articulate why shackling is

“necessary for a particular defendant in a particular proceeding.” Bell, 415 S.W.3d

at 281, 283 (holding that trial court erred when it made no particularized finding

articulating reason for shackling defendant, instead expressing “a generalized

concern for courtroom security”).

      We review the trial court’s ruling for abuse of discretion. See Bell, 415

S.W.3d at 281; Long v. State, 823 S.W.2d 259, 282 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). If we

conclude that the use of shackles constituted error, then we must determine

whether it was harmful. Bell, 415 S.W.3d at 281–83 (holding that visible shackling

without justification is constitutional error, but improper use of non-visible

shackles is non-constitutional error to be considered under Texas Rule of Appellate

Procedure 44.2(b)); see TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2 (setting out standard for both

constitutional and non-constitutional harm analysis); see also Chavez, 560 S.W.3d

at 201 (“Even when shackles are not visible to the jury, however, shackling a

defendant during trial is non-constitutional error in violation of the common law

unless it is necessary for a particular defendant in a particular proceeding.”).

                                           8
C.    Analysis

      Gennusa moved to have his leg shackles removed prior to the start of trial,

and the trial court denied the motion without making any particularized findings

regarding why it was necessary to restrain Gennusa. The only reasons set forth in

the record were a general policy of leaving restraints on people who were “in

custody.” This is insufficient justification for shackling Gennusa during the guilt-

innocence phase of trial, and thus we conclude that the trial court abused its

discretion in denying Gennusa’s motion remove the shackles. See Bell, 415 S.W.3d

at 281, 283.

      “Whether this error is of constitutional dimension in that it deprived

[Gennusa] of his presumption of innocence turns on an additional inquiry: whether

the record shows a reasonable probability that the jury was aware of [his]

shackles.” Id. at 283. “Shackles are considered visible for constitutional purposes if

‘the record reflects a reasonable probability that the jury was aware of the

defendant’s shackles.’” Chavez, 560 S.W.3d at 201 (quoting Bell, 415 S.W.3d at

283). Here, the trial court stated on the record that the shackles would not be

visible to the jurors because of how Gennusa was positioned in the courtroom. The

record also reflected that the trial court intended to take measures to ensure that the

jury did not see the shackles if Gennusa needed to move. After these statements

were made on the record, defense counsel never raised the issue of shackling again

                                          9
or expressed any concern that the jurors had an opportunity to see the shackles. We

conclude that the record reflects no reasonable probability that the jury was aware

of Gennusa’s shackles. See id.

      Gennusa argues that Juror 12 was aware of the shackles because he saw

them during voir dire. We observe, however, that after Juror 12 saw the leg

restraints, he indicated that he would not use that information in deciding

Gennusa’s guilt or innocence, and Gennusa affirmatively approved Juror 12’s

seating on the jury. There is no indication that Juror 12 had any further chance to

observe Gennusa’s restraints or that he was aware whether they remained in place

or not. The fact that Juror 12 saw the restraints during voir dire—a concern which

Gennusa effectively waived by agreeing to have Juror 12 seated on the jury—does

not establish a reasonable probability that Juror 12 or any other member of the jury

was aware that the shackles were still in place during the trial. Accordingly, we

conclude that we must review this error for non-constitutional harm. See id.

      Under Rule 44.2(b), any non-constitutional “error, defect, irregularity, or

variance that does not affect substantial rights must be disregarded.” TEX. R. APP.

P. 44.2(b). “A substantial right is affected when the error had a substantial and

injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Schmutz v. State,

440 S.W.3d 29, 39 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). In assessing the likelihood that the

jury’s decision was adversely affected by the error, important factors to consider

                                        10
include the nature of the evidence supporting the verdict, the character of the

alleged error and how it might be considered in connection with other evidence in

the case. Id. The analysis may include whether the State emphasized the error and

whether overwhelming evidence of guilt was present. Id.

      The record does not show that the jury saw or was otherwise aware of

Gennusa’s shackles during the guilt-innocence phase of trial. There is no indication

that Gennusa’s shackles hampered his ability to participate in the trial or to

communicate with his counsel. Furthermore, significant evidence supports the

finding of guilt. Marrder, Rhonda, and Howard all identified Gennusa in court as

the man who forced his way into the Rogers’ home and assaulted Howard.

Roulaine and Officer Villareal likewise testified about finding Gennusa covered in

blood at the nearby dance studio immediately following the burglary and assault.

Thus, considering the character of the shackling error in connection with the strong

evidence of Gennusa’s guilt, we conclude that the error did not affect any

substantial right. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b); Schmutz, 440 S.W.3d at 39.

      We overrule Gennusa’s first issue.

                                 Jury Argument

      In his second issue, Gennusa argues that the trial court abused its discretion

in allowing the State to make an improper jury argument.

                                         11
A.    Relevant Facts

      During the punishment phase, the State began its jury argument:

      [The State]: Ladies and gentlemen, this was not a targeted attack.
                   Yeah, it wasn’t. That makes it even scarier. He had no
                   idea who these people were, where they lived. He could
                   have gone into your house, your house, to your house.

      [Gennusa]: Objection, Your Honor. Improper argument.

      [Court]:     Overruled.

      [The State]: He could have gone to anyone’s house. It just happened
                   to be the Rogers. . . .

      The State continued its argument regarding other aspects of the case and

Gennusa’s defense that his alleged mental illness was mitigating factor in assessing

his punishment. The State pointed out the violent nature of Gennusa’s actions and

his criminal record, among other factors. The State then concluded, “Again, this

wasn’t a targeted attack and that makes it even worse and as citizens of Harris

County, I am asking you to sentence this man to prison. I’m asking you to take this

man off the streets, and I’m asking you to keep Harris County safe. Thank you.”

B.    Standard of Review

      As a general rule, appropriate jury argument falls within only four areas:

(1) summation of the evidence; (2) reasonable deductions from the evidence;

(3) answer to argument of opposing counsel; and (4) a plea for law enforcement.

Milton v. State, 572 S.W.3d 234, 239 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019). The focus,

therefore, has always been upon encouraging the jury to decide the case on the
                                        12
evidence in front of it rather than encouraging juries to reach a decision based upon

information outside the record. See id. at 240. This is because improper references

to information outside the record are generally designed to arouse the passion and

prejudice of the jury, and, as such, are inappropriate. See id. Further, arguments

must stick to matters that are in evidence or inferable from the evidence; it cannot

be “abusive or inflammatory.” See id. at 241.

      To preserve a complaint that jury argument was improper, a defendant must

lodge a “proper objection,” such as asserting “that the argument was outside the

record, was not a reasonable deduction from the evidence, was not an answer to

argument of opposing counsel, and was not a plea for law enforcement.” Hougham

v. State, 659 S.W.2d 410, 414 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1983); Vasquez v.

State, 501 S.W.3d 691, 705 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. ref’d).

“Ordinarily, an objection to ‘improper argument’ is too general to preserve error.”

Miles v. State, 312 S.W.3d 909, 911 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet.

ref’d) (citing Hougham, 659 S.W.2d at 414 and collecting other cases on

objections to jury argument). Statements such as, “We will object to this line of

argument” are “insufficient to preserve error” regarding a claim of improper jury

argument because they are “too general to apprise the trial court of the ground” for

a defendant’s objection. Hougham, 659 S.W.2d at 414; see TEX. R. APP. P.

33.1(a)(1)(A) (requiring, as prerequisite to review, that objection “stated the

                                         13
grounds for the ruling that the complaining party sought from the trial court with

sufficient specificity to make the trial court aware of the complaint, unless the

specific grounds were apparent from the context”).

C.    Analysis

      The State argues that Gennussa’s general objection that the State’s

comments that “this was not a targeted attack” and Gennusa “could have gone into

your house, your house, to your house” were “improper argument” is too general to

preserve anything for our review. We agree. A general objection like the one

Gennusa made here can be sufficient to preserve error when the record shows the

trial court understood the nature of the objection. See Gonzalez v. State, 541

S.W.3d 306, 316 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.); Vasquez, 501

S.W.3d at 705 (trial court’s understanding of objection may be evidenced by

comments or admonitions after its ruling). However, nothing in the record provides

any context for the objection, nor did the trial court make further rulings that would

make the ground or grounds for Gennusa’s general objection clear. Gennusa did

not specify at trial that he believed the State’s comments encouraged jurors to

abandon their objectivity, nor did he specify “that the argument was outside the

record, was not a reasonable deduction from the evidence, was not an answer to

argument of opposing counsel, and was not a plea for law enforcement.” See

Hougham, 659 S.W.2d at 414; Vasquez, 501 S.W.3d at 705. We conclude that his

                                         14
objection to “improper argument” was “too general to preserve error.” Miles, 312

S.W.3d at 911.

      Even if this error were preserved, and assuming without deciding that the

State’s argument was an improper invitation to abandon objectivity, Gennusa has

failed to establish that he suffered any harm. To determine whether an appellant’s

substantial rights were affected, we balance the severity of the misconduct (i.e., the

prejudicial effect), any curative measures, and the certainty of the punishment

assessed absent the misconduct. See Hawkins v. State, 135 S.W.3d 72, 77 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2004) (citing Martinez v. State, 17 S.W.3d 677, 692–93 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2000)).

      Applying these factors, we conclude that the State’s comments did not affect

Gennusa’s substantial rights. The State’s objectionable comments consisted of one

sentence preceded and followed by a proper discussion of the evidence and the

State’s argument that the offense was random, rather than targeted. Further, the

severity of the misconduct as measured by the prejudicial effect of the State’s

remarks is slight. The jury was reminded of the State’s burden of proof prior to the

State’s closing argument and in the court’s jury charge. And the strength of the

evidence supporting the assessment of a 35-year sentence was strong. As we stated

above, Marrder, Rhonda, and Howard all identified Gennusa in court as the man

who forced his way into the Rogers’ home and assaulted Howard. The details of

                                         15
Gennusa’s assault of Howard were graphic, and Howard and Rhonda both testified

about the negative impact the offense had on them physically and emotionally. The

State also presented evidence of Gennusa’s criminal history, including proving an

enhancement based on Gennusa’s previous conviction for assault against a family

member as a repeat offender. Given these factors, we have fair assurance that the

State’s comments had little or no effect. See Hawkins, 135 S.W.3d at 77; see also

Franklin v. State, 459 S.W.3d 670, 681–82 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2015, pet.

ref’d) (concluding that, although prosecutor’s plea to jurors to “fight for those little

girls” was improper plea to abandon objectivity, error was harmless because

severity of misconduct was slight, jurors were reminded of proper burden of proof,

and evidence supporting conviction was strong).

      We overrule Gennusa’s second issue.

                             Reformation of Judgment

      In his third issue, Gennusa asks this Court to modify the judgment to

properly reflect that he was convicted of burglary of a habitation with intent to

commit aggravated assault.

      The record here, including the indictment and jury charge, reflect that

Gennusa was charged with and convicted of burglary of a habitation with the intent

to commit aggravated assault. However, the judgment of conviction erroneously

                                          16
states that he was convicted of burglary of a habitation with the intent to commit

theft.

         “This court has the power to modify an incorrect judgment to make the

record speak the truth when we have the necessary information to do so.” Cazarez

v. State, 606 S.W.3d 549, 557–58 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, no pet.)

(citing TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b) and Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27–28 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1993)); see also Pfeiffer v. State, 363 S.W.3d 594, 599 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2012) (“[W]hen a defendant appeals his conviction, the courts of appeals

have the jurisdiction to address any error in that case.”). “This includes the

authority to reform a judgment to reflect the correct offense.” Cazarez, 606 S.W.3d

at 558 (reforming judgment to reflect correct degree of theft); see Pfeiffer, 363

S.W.3d at 599; see also Jackson v. State, 288 S.W.3d 60, 64 (Tex. App.—Houston

[1st Dist.] 2009, pet. ref’d) (reforming judgment to reflect that appellant was

convicted of aggravated assault and not “aggravated assault against pb servant”).

         The record here reflects that Gennusa was convicted of burglary of a

habitation with the intent to commit aggravated assault, rather than with the intent

to commit theft. Accordingly, we reform the judgment to reflect the correct

offense.

                                        17
      We sustain Gennusa’s third issue and modify the judgment to reflect the

correct offense—burglary of a habitation with the intent to commit aggravated

assault.

                                   Conclusion

      We modify the judgment to reflect that Gennusa was convicted of burglary

of a habitation with intent to commit aggravated assault. We affirm as modified.

                                                Richard Hightower
                                                Justice

Panel consists of Justices Kelly, Hightower, and Countiss.

Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

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