Court Opinion

ID: 9896005
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-09 14:08:05.70488+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:19.603163
License: Public Domain

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as
Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Carson, Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-4036.]

                                        NOTICE
     This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an
     advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to
     promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65
     South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other
     formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before
     the opinion is published.

                         SLIP OPINION NO. 2023-OHIO-4036
         CLEVELAND METROPOLITAN BAR ASSOCIATION v. CARSON.
  [Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it
    may be cited as Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Carson, Slip Opinion No.
                                   2023-Ohio-4036.]
Unauthorized practice of law (“UPL”)—Under Gov.Bar R. VII(12)(G), in a default
        UPL proceeding, there must be sufficient “sworn” or certified documentary
        evidence submitted with default motion for trier of fact to find that each
        element of charged offense, in absence of contradictory evidence, has been
        proved by preponderance of evidence—For purposes of Gov.Bar R.
        VII(12)(G), “sworn” means that the evidence is based on personal
        knowledge of the facts being relayed, sets forth such facts as would be
        admissible into evidence, and shows that affiant is competent to testify to
        matters stated—Respondent engaged in UPL by holding himself out as an
        attorney on return of service for four subpoenas—Relator failed to present
        sworn or certified documentary prima facie evidence regarding relator’s
                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

       other alleged conduct—Permanent injunction issued and civil penalty
       imposed in connection with first of two charged counts.
    (No. 2023-0426—Submitted May 2, 2023—Decided November 9, 2023.)
      ON FINAL REPORT by the Board on the Unauthorized Practice of Law
                       of the Supreme Court, No. 2021-002.
                            _______________________
       Per Curiam.
       {¶ 1} In a two-count December 2021 complaint, relator, Cleveland
Metropolitan Bar Association, charged respondent, Brett Carson, with engaging in
the unauthorized practice of law in Ohio by holding himself out as an attorney and
by preparing various legal documents on behalf of two other people.
       {¶ 2} In January 2022, the Board on the Unauthorized Practice of Law
attempted to serve relator’s complaint on Carson at a South Euclid address by
certified mail and by ordinary mail, the latter evidenced by a certificate of mailing,
but both attempts were returned marked “NOT DELIVERABLE AS
ADDRESSED” and “UNABLE TO FORWARD.” (Capitalization sic.)
       {¶ 3} In June 2022, the board issued an order to show cause directing relator
to submit an alternative address for service on Carson. Relator furnished to the
board two other addresses for Carson—one in Cleveland and the other in North
Carolina. On July 13, 2022, the board attempted to serve Carson at each of those
addresses by certified mail and by ordinary mail with certificates of mailing. Both
certified-mail attempts were returned marked “UNABLE TO FORWARD”; the
North Carolina attempt was also marked “INSUFFICIENT ADDRESS,” and the
Cleveland attempt was also marked “UNCLAIMED.” (Capitalization sic.) The
ordinary-mail attempt sent to North Carolina was returned marked “Does Not Live
Here.” However, the complaint sent to the Cleveland address by ordinary mail was
not returned; therefore, service of the complaint on Carson is deemed complete.
See Gov.Bar R. VII(2)(C).

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                                January Term, 2023

       {¶ 4} On January 6, 2023, relator filed a motion for default pursuant to
Gov.Bar R. VII(12)(B) that contained a statement of its efforts to engage with
Carson, purported sworn or certified documentary prima facie evidence in support
of the allegations of the complaint, citations to authorities relator was relying on, a
statement of mitigating factors or exculpatory evidence known to relator, a
statement of the relief sought, and a certificate of service stating that the motion
had been sent by ordinary mail to Carson at the Cleveland and South Euclid
addresses. See Gov.Bar R. VII(12)(B). Carson has not answered the complaint or
responded to the motion for default.
       {¶ 5} A three-member panel of the board found that Carson was in default
and that relator had proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Carson engaged
in the unauthorized practice of law as described in both of the charged counts. The
panel recommended that Carson be enjoined from engaging in additional acts of
the unauthorized practice of law and be ordered to pay a civil penalty of $5,000 for
each of the two violations.        The board adopted the panel’s findings and
recommended sanction but recommended that we limit our finding of the
unauthorized practice of law to Carson’s holding himself out as an attorney in the
two matters.
       {¶ 6} For the reasons that follow, we find that relator has submitted sworn
or certified prima facie evidence demonstrating that Carson engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law by holding himself out as an attorney as charged in
Count One of relator’s complaint and we agree with the board’s assessment that an
injunction and a civil penalty for that violation are warranted. However, we reject
the board’s findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation with respect
to Count Two and dismiss it based on the insufficiency of the evidence.

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               EVIDENTIARY REQUIREMENTS IN DEFAULT
          UNAUTHORIZED-PRACTICE-OF-LAW PROCEEDINGS
        {¶ 7} Gov.Bar R. VII(12)(B)(2) requires a relator to submit “[s]worn or
certified documentary prima facie evidence” to support the allegations of the
complaint in a motion for default judgment in an unauthorized-practice-of-law
(“UPL”) proceeding. By its very nature, the respondent in a default UPL proceeding
has not entered an appearance and thus cannot object to the relator’s evidence.
Therefore, if the requirements of the rule are to have any meaning, it is incumbent on
this court to enforce them.
        {¶ 8} Gov.Bar R. VII does not define the phrase “sworn or certified
documentary prima facie evidence.” Prima facie evidence is “[e]vidence that will
establish a fact or sustain a judgment unless contradictory evidence is produced.”
Black’s Law Dictionary 701 (11th Ed.2019). This court has held, in the context of a
criminal case, that “[p]rima facie evidence is such evidence as is sufficient * * * to
establish the fact of guilt, and, if believed by the trier of the facts, it is sufficient for
that purpose, unless rebutted or the contrary proved.” State v. Cummings, 25 Ohio
St.2d 219, 267 N.E.2d 812 (1971), paragraph two of the syllabus. Thus, in a default
UPL proceeding, there must be sufficient sworn or certified documentary evidence
submitted with the default motion for a trier of fact to find that each element of the
charged offense, in the absence of contradictory evidence, has been proved by a
preponderance of the evidence. See Gov.Bar R. VII(12)(G).
        {¶ 9} “Documentary evidence” is “[e]vidence supplied by a writing or other
document, which must be authenticated before the evidence is admissible.” Black’s
Law Dictionary at 699.         For the evidence to be admissible, there must be
authentication or identification “sufficient to support a finding that the matter in
question is what its proponent claims,” Evid.R. 901(A)—hence the need for the
evidence to be sworn or certified in default proceedings, in which there will be no
oral testimony. Certified copies of public records are self-authenticating and do not

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                                      January Term, 2023

require extrinsic evidence of authenticity. Evid.R. 902(4). But other documents must
be sworn to be admissible in a default proceeding. A “sworn statement” is “[a]
statement given under oath; an affidavit.”                (Emphasis added.)          Black’s Law
Dictionary at 1699.
         {¶ 10} “An affidavit must appear, on its face, to have been taken before the
proper officer and in compliance with all legal requisites. A paper purporting to be
an affidavit, but not to have been sworn to before an officer, is not an affidavit.” In
re Disqualification of Pokorny, 74 Ohio St.3d 1238, 657 N.E.2d 1345 (1992); see
also R.C. 2319.02 (“An affidavit is a written declaration under oath * * *”).
Accordingly, this court has rejected documents bearing a notary public’s stamp but
not her signature and lacking a notarial jurat or any other indication that the
declarants had sworn to their statements or had made their statements under oath.
See State ex rel. White v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Elections, 160 Ohio St.3d 1, 2020-
Ohio-524, 153 N.E.3d 1, ¶ 13; see also R.C. 147.542 (setting forth the requirements
for a valid notarial certificate).
         {¶ 11} In Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Newman, 124 Ohio St.3d 505, 2010-Ohio-
928, 924 N.E.2d 359, ¶ 7, we analogized the requirements of Civ.R. 56(E) for
“[s]worn or certified copies” of documents submitted in support of motions for
summary judgment to the requirement for “sworn or certified documents” submitted
in support of a default motion in an attorney-discipline case under former Gov.Bar
R. V(6)(F)(1).1 Civ.R. 56(E) provides that “[s]worn or certified copies of all papers
or parts of papers referred to in an affidavit shall be attached to or served with the
affidavit.” And we have held, “ ‘The requirement of Civ.R. 56(E) that sworn or
certified copies of all papers referred to in the affidavit be attached is satisfied by

1. The requirement for sworn or certified documentary prima facie evidence in support of a default
motion in an attorney-discipline proceeding is now set forth in Gov.Bar R. V(14)(F)(1)(b). The
requirements under that rule and its predecessor discussed in Newman are identical to the requirement
of Gov.Bar R. VII(12)(B)(2) in a default UPL proceeding.

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attaching the papers to the affidavit, coupled with a statement therein that such copies
are true copies and reproductions.’ ” Newman at ¶ 7, quoting State ex. rel. Corrigan
v. Seminatore, 66 Ohio St.2d 459, 467, 423 N.E.2d 105 (1981). Applying that
standard to the evidence submitted in Newman, we found that the record lacked
sufficient sworn or certified documentary prima facie evidence to support the
relator’s allegations of attorney misconduct. Newman at ¶ 9.
        {¶ 12} In addition to sworn or certified copies of all papers referred to, Civ.R.
56(E) requires affidavits—i.e., “sworn statements,” Black’s Law Dictionary at
1699—submitted with motions for summary judgment to (1) be made on personal
knowledge, (2) set forth such facts as would be admissible into evidence, and (3)
show that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated in the affidavit. We
now hold that these requirements, directed toward ensuring the admissibility of the
facts contained in an affidavit or sworn statement, apply equally to the requirement
for “sworn” evidence submitted in support of default motions in UPL proceedings.
        {¶ 13} Having established the form of the sworn evidence necessary to
support a default motion in a UPL proceeding, we turn to the evidence submitted
with relator’s motion in this case.
                      RELATOR’S DEFAULT EVIDENCE
        {¶ 14} Relator has submitted a certificate from this court’s Office of
Attorney Services showing that Carson, an Ohio resident, has never been admitted
to the practice of law in Ohio and that he has not applied for or been granted pro
hac vice status in this state. In addition, relator has submitted additional documents
related to each of the two counts charged in its complaint.
                         Count One: The Jackson Matter
        {¶ 15} The first count of relator’s complaint relates to Carson’s conduct
with respect to his cousin, Randa Jackson. In April 2021, Jackson filed a grievance
against Carson with relator. In the grievance, Jackson stated that Carson had told

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                                January Term, 2023

her that he was an attorney, given her advice regarding a dispute she was having
with a contractor, and filed legal documents on her behalf.
       {¶ 16} Jackson’s grievance consists of a printout of a completed online
complaint form that bears her electronic signature below the statement, “By signing
this form, I attest that my statements herein and the documents attached are true and
accurate to the best of my knowledge.” As noted above, “[a] paper purporting to be
an affidavit, but not to have been sworn to before an officer, is not an affidavit.”
Pokorny, 74 Ohio St.3d at 1238, 657 N.E.2d 1345. Jackson’s signature is not
notarized and offers no indication that it was sworn or affirmed before an officer.
Therefore, Jackson’s grievance is not an affidavit and does not constitute sworn
evidence.
       {¶ 17} Furthermore, even if Jackson’s grievance had been properly sworn
or certified, the only indication in that document that Carson drafted or prepared
legal documents on her behalf as the panel found consists of Jackson’s response to
the question “What services did this person provide?” Next to that question, Jackson
checked a box, among others, indicating that Carson had “[s]elected, drafted, or
completed legal forms, documents, or agreements” on her behalf. Jackson’s narrative
explaining the details of her grievance states only that Carson “filed [a] claim and
amendment against contractor” and “sent subpoenas to banks and researched the
backgrounds of the defendants in [her] case.” (Emphasis added.) But neither of those
actions necessarily encompasses the drafting of those documents. Moreover, with
the exception of the subpoenas discussed below, relator has not submitted copies—
let alone sworn copies—of any of the documents that Carson allegedly prepared.
       {¶ 18} In addition to Jackson’s grievance, relator submitted an affidavit
from bar counsel Christopher Joseph Klasa stating that it is based on his personal
knowledge and establishes his competency to testify. See Evid.R. 601 (providing
that every person is competent to be a witness unless disqualified for certain
enumerated reasons, including that the person is incapable of expressing himself or

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herself so as to be understood or is incapable of understanding the duty of a witness
to tell the truth—none of which apply here).
       {¶ 19} According to Klasa’s affidavit, during relator’s investigation of
Jackson’s grievance, Carson spoke with a member of relator’s Committee on the
Unauthorized Practice of Law. After receiving a copy of relator’s draft complaint
in December 2021, Carson sent relator’s counsel an email describing the work he
had performed in Jackson’s matter. Klasa’s affidavit identifies that email and states
that “[a] true and accurate copy * * * is attached as Exhibit F.” With regard to the
legal aspects of Jackson’s matter, Carson stated in the email that they had talked
about and worked together on her case and that they had “drafted it,” without stating
exactly what “it” was. Carson represented that “[t]his is not the kind of behavior
[he would] ever indulge in again” and that he did not recall issuing document
subpoenas as an attorney on Jackson’s behalf. Carson closed that email with the
typed signature, “Brett W. Carson Jr.”
       {¶ 20} Also identified in Klasa’s affidavit and attached thereto are true and
accurate copies of four subpoenas bearing the caption for Jackson’s case and two
file stamps of the Cuyahoga Count Clerk of Courts dated January 15 and 19, 2021.
The second page of each of those subpoenas includes an affidavit of service bearing
what appears to be Carson’s signature above the circled designation “Attorney,”
indicating that he was serving the subpoenas as an attorney on behalf of Jackson.
The sworn evidence consisting of Klasa’s affidavit authenticating Carson’s own
email and the subpoenas, which contain Carson’s own affidavits of service,
constitute prima facie evidence that Carson held himself out as an attorney as
charged in Count One of relator’s complaint.
                         Count Two: The Ganesh Matter
       {¶ 21} In August 2021, attorney LeeDaun C. Williams filed a grievance
against Carson on behalf of her client Rajeswari Chandrasekar Ganesh. Williams
attached copies of multiple communications that were purportedly exchanged

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                               January Term, 2023

between Carson and Ganesh. In that grievance, Williams attested that Carson had
prepared legal documents for Ganesh and provided legal advice to her in connection
with a Cuyahoga County domestic-relations case and that he had collected a
“retainer” of $2,500 from her for that representation. Although the grievance was
signed under an attestation that the statements it contained and the documents
attached were true and accurate to the best of Williams’s knowledge, it was not
notarized. Therefore, it is not an affidavit and does not constitute sworn evidence
as required by Gov.Bar R. VII(B)(2).
       {¶ 22} In addition to that infirmity, it is evident that Williams did not
possess personal knowledge of the facts she relayed to relator in her grievance. In
response to a question on the complaint form asking how she had become aware that
Carson was providing legal services, Williams stated: “[Ganesh] informed me that
Brett Carson prepared legal filings for her between her former attorney and myself.
I asked for documentation and she provided it to me. Documentation from Brett
Carson outlines the services he provided to [Ganesh].”
       {¶ 23} This court has previously found that statements of an affiant in a
default UPL proceeding that were not based on personal knowledge consisted of
nothing more than inadmissible hearsay. Ohio State Bar Assn. v. Pro-Net Fin., Inc.,
168 Ohio St.3d 115, 2022-Ohio-726, 196 N.E.3d 792, ¶ 23. We held that those
statements did not constitute proper sworn or certified evidence and could not
support a finding that the respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
Id.; see also Dayton Bar Assn. v. Sebree, 104 Ohio St.3d 448, 2004-Ohio-6560, 820
N.E.2d 318, ¶ 9 (holding that a motion for default in an attorney-discipline
proceeding supported only by summary, conclusory, and hearsay-filled affidavits
is not supported by the prima facie evidence of misconduct required by rule).
Because relator offers Ganesh’s out-of-court statements to Williams to prove the
truth of the matter asserted—i.e., that Carson held himself out as an attorney and
prepared legal documents and filed them on her behalf—those statements constitute

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inadmissible hearsay. And under Pro-Net and Sebree, they would not be admissible
to prove that Carson engaged in the unauthorized practice of law even if Williams’s
grievance had been notarized.
       {¶ 24} The documents that Williams offered to support the allegations in
her grievance—i.e., the emails that Ganesh purportedly exchanged with Carson—
are likewise infirm. It is true that Williams has attested that those documents are
true and accurate to the best of her knowledge, but she did not do so under oath.
Nor is there evidence indicating that she possessed personal knowledge of that fact.
The body of Williams’s grievance states only that she “asked for documentation
and [Ganesh] provided it to [her]” and that the “[d]ocumentation from Brett Carson
outlines the services he provided to [Ganesh].” Those documents include seven
separate emails from Ganesh to Williams. Attached to those emails are other emails
that were exchanged between Ganesh and Carson.
       {¶ 25} The statements attributed to Carson in those emails—particularly the
statements in a December 13, 2020 email regarding the documents he prepared and
the services he provided to Ganesh—could be entirely excluded from the definition
of hearsay as admissions by a party-opponent. See Evid.R. 801(D)(2) (providing
that a statement is not hearsay if it is offered against a party and is the party’s own
statement).   But relator has offered only hearsay statements from Williams
containing hearsay statements from Ganesh to establish the origin of those
documents. Because the emails proffered by relator have not been properly sworn
under Gov.Bar R. VII(12)(B) and are not based on personal knowledge, they are
not admissible to establish that Carson engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
Under Newman and as explained in our holding above, Gov.Bar. R. VII(12)(B)
required relator to submit an affidavit from a person with personal knowledge of
the origin of the emails (e.g., Ganesh) (1) setting forth such facts as would be
admissible into evidence, (2) showing that the affiant is competent to testify to the
matters set forth in the affidavit, (3) identifying those documents as emails

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                                January Term, 2023

exchanged between Carson and Ganesh, and (4) stating that they are true and
accurate copies of the originals.
       {¶ 26} Because relator has not presented any sworn or certified
documentary prima facie evidence regarding Carson’s conduct relative to the
Ganesh matter, we dismiss Count Two of relator’s complaint.
 CARSON ENGAGED IN THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW
       {¶ 27} This court has original jurisdiction over the admission to the practice
of law in Ohio, the discipline of persons so admitted, and “all other matters relating
to the practice of law,” Article IV, Section 2(B)(1)(g), Ohio Constitution, which
includes the regulation of the unauthorized practice of law, Royal Indemn. Co. v.
J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 27 Ohio St.3d 31, 34, 501 N.E.2d 617 (1986); Greenspan v.
Third Fed. S. & L. Assn., 122 Ohio St.3d 455, 2009-Ohio-3508, 912 N.E.2d 567,
¶ 16. The purpose of that regulation is to “protect the public against incompetence,
divided loyalties, and other attendant evils that are often associated with unskilled
representation.” Cleveland Bar Assn. v. CompManagement, Inc., 104 Ohio St.3d
168, 2004-Ohio-6506, 818 N.E.2d 1181, ¶ 40.
       {¶ 28} We have defined the unauthorized practice of law as including both
the “rendering of legal services for another,” Gov.Bar R. VII(31)(J)(1)(a) through
(c), and the “[h]olding out to the public or otherwise representing oneself as
authorized to practice law in Ohio” by any person who is not authorized to practice
law under our rules, Gov.Bar R. VII(31)(J)(1)(d).          Indeed, nonlawyers are
prohibited from holding themselves out “in any manner as an attorney at law” and
from representing that they are authorized to practice law “orally or in writing,
directly or indirectly.” R.C. 4705.07(A)(1) and (2).
       {¶ 29} Relator’s sworn evidence with respect to Count One demonstrates
that Carson held himself out as an attorney in affidavits confirming the service of
four subpoenas in Jackson’s legal matter.         We therefore adopt the board’s

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recommendation and find that Carson engaged in the unauthorized practice of law
with respect to that count.
      AN INJUNCTION AND CIVIL PENALTY ARE WARRANTED
       {¶ 30} Because we have found that Carson engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law in the Jackson matter, we adopt the board’s recommendation that
we issue an injunction prohibiting him from further engaging in the unauthorized
practice of law in Ohio.
       {¶ 31} The board also recommends that we impose a civil penalty of $5,000
for this violation pursuant to Gov.Bar R. VII(14)(B). That provision instructs us to
consider (1) the degree of a respondent’s cooperation during the investigation, (2)
the number of times the respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law,
(3) the flagrancy of the respondent’s violations, (4) any harm that the violations
caused to third parties, and (5) any other relevant factors, which may include the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances identified in UPL Reg. 400(F). See also
Disciplinary Counsel v. Ward, 155 Ohio St.3d 488, 2018-Ohio-5083, 122 N.E.3d
168, ¶ 13.
       {¶ 32} Carson’s participation in relator’s investigation of this matter
consisted of a single telephone conversation with relator’s investigator and an email
he sent in response to relator’s notice of intent to file a complaint against him.
Moreover, Carson failed to participate in the formal proceedings in any way.
Consequently, the board found that his cooperation was minimal, at best. As
discussed above, relator’s evidence shows that Carson engaged in a single instance
of the unauthorized practice of law by holding himself out as an attorney with
respect to the Jackson matter. Although the board found that his conduct in the
Jackson matter was not an isolated incident because it occurred over a period of at
least several months, our findings of the unauthorized practice of law are limited to
his conduct in holding himself out as an attorney on the return of service for four

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separate subpoenas on a single day. Based on the record before us, it appears that
the only harm Jackson suffered was delay in the resolution of her legal matter.
       {¶ 33} Having weighed these factors, we agree with the board’s assessment
that a civil penalty of $5,000—one-half the maximum amount authorized per
offense by Gov.Bar R. VII(14)(B)—is warranted for Carson’s single instance of the
unauthorized practice of law in this case.
                                  CONCLUSION
       {¶ 34} Accordingly, we enjoin Brett Carson from engaging in further acts
constituting the unauthorized practice of law in Ohio. We also order Carson to pay
a civil penalty of $5,000. Costs are taxed to Carson.
                                                            Judgment accordingly.
       KENNEDY, C.J., and FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, STEWART, BRUNNER,
and DETERS, JJ.
                               _________________
       Tucker Ellis, L.L.P., and Chad M. Eggspuehler; and Christopher J. Klasa
and Kelli J. Perk, Bar Counsel, for relator.
                               _________________

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