Court Opinion

ID: 2963664
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:13:42.143092+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:44.473644
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

          September 15, 1995    [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                             
                                 ____________________

        No. 95-1542

                                ANTHONY J. DECIANTIS,

                                     Petitioner,

                                          v.

                                     GEORGE VOSE,

                                     Respondent.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                           FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

                 [Hon. Francis J. Boyle, Senior U.S. District Judge]
                                         __________________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                Selya, Stahl and Lynch,
                                   Circuit Judges.
                                   ______________

                                 ____________________

            William T.  Murphy  on  Memorandum in  Support of  Certificate  of
            __________________
        Probable Cause, for petitioner.

                                 ____________________

                                 ____________________

                      Per Curiam.   Petitioner Anthony DeCiantis requests
                      __________

            this court to issue a certificate of probable cause to appeal

            from the denial  of his petition for a  writ of habeas corpus

            filed under 28 U.S.C.   2254.

                      Petitioner  was   the  only  person   named  in  an

            indictment charging him with murder.   The evidence at  trial

            revealed  that the victim was forced into a car defendant was

            driving.  The victim's  body was discovered the next  day; he

            had been  shot twice, stabbed and run over by a car.  He died

            from  one of  the gunshot  wounds.   According to  witnesses,

            defendant  stated to  them  that he  and another  individual,

            Ricky Silva, had  killed the victim.  It turns out that Silva

            had  fired  the  fatal  shot.    Silva  never   was  charged.

            Petitioner's  conviction was upheld on  appeal.  See State v.
                                                             ___ _____

            DeCiantis, 501 A.2d 365 (R.I. 1985).
            _________

                      In  his    2254 petition,  petitioner raises  three

            grounds  for relief:  (1) the trial court instructed the jury

            that  it could convict petitioner of "aiding and abetting" in

            violation  of his  Sixth  Amendment right  to  notice of  the

            charges against  him; (2) this instruction  also violated the

            due process clause of  the Fourteenth Amendment by improperly

            amending  the  grand jury  indictment;  and  (3) counsel  was

            ineffective in neglecting  to object to the instruction.  The

            district court denied the  habeas petition.  Because  we find

            that the  instruction was  proper, we need  only discuss  the

            first ground.

                      The  due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

            encompasses the Sixth  Amendment right to fair  notice of the

            criminal charges one will face.  Tarpley v. Estelle, 703 F.2d
                                             _______    _______

            157,  161 n.7 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1002 (1983);
                                      ____________

            Watson v.  Jago, 558 F.2d 330, 338 (6th Cir. 1977).  Thus, "a
            ______     ____

            criminal defendant  [has] a  fundamental right to  be clearly

            informed of the nature  and cause of the charges  in order to

            permit adequate preparation of a defense."  Sheppard v. Rees,
                                                        ________    ____

            909 F.2d 1234, 1236  (9th Cir. 1989) (footnote omitted).   To

            determine whether  a defendant has been convicted  of a crime

            not  charged in  the indictment,  courts look  to state  law.

            See, e.g., Tarpley, 703 F.2d at 160 (Texas law of credit card
            ___  ____  _______

            fraud);  Carothers v. Rhay, 594 F.2d 225, 229 (9th Cir. 1979)
                     _________    ____

            (Washington law of aiding and abetting); Watson,  558 F.2d at
                                                     ______

            334 (Ohio law of murder). 

                      Turning to Rhode Island law, then, R.I. Gen. Laws  

            11-1-3 provides:

                           Liability   for  aiding,   abetting,
                           Liability   for  aiding,   abetting,
                      counseling,    hiring,   or    commanding
                      counseling,    hiring,   or    commanding
                      offenses.  -- Every person who shall aid,
                      offenses.  -- 
                      assist, abet, counsel, hire,  command, or
                      procure  another to  commit any  crime or
                      offense,  shall  be proceeded  against as
                      principal or  as an accessory  before the
                      fact,  according  to  the  nature  of the
                      offense  committed,  and upon  conviction
                      shall suffer  the like punishment  as the

                                         -3-

                      principal  offender is subject to by this
                      title.

            The Rhode  Island Supreme Court construed  the predecessor of

            this statute in State v.  Patriarca, 43 A.2d 54, 71 R.I.  151
                            _____     _________

            (1945), where  it held that the statute of limitations, which

            exempted  from its  reach  the crime  of murder,  nonetheless

            barred an  indictment for aiding and  abetting the commission

            of a murder.  In so holding the court stated:

                           In this  state it  is still the  law
                      that  an  indictment  for a  felony  must
                      charge a  person as a principal  or as an
                      accessory before the  fact, according  to
                      the  facts;  and  that on  an  indictment
                      which charges the defendant  as principal
                      he  cannot  be   convicted  on   evidence
                      showing that he  was merely an accessory,
                      or vice  versa,  1 Brill,  Cyc. of  Crim.
                      Law,   252, p. 450.  On that principle it
                      has been  held in numerous  cases that an
                      accessory   before   the  fact   must  be
                      proceeded against as  such accessory  and
                      not as a principal.

            43 A.2d at 57, 71 R.I. at 156-57.

                      The  Rhode  Island  Supreme  Court  has  adhered to

            Patriarca.   In State  v. Colvin, 107  A.2d 324, 82  R.I. 212
            _________       _____     ______

            (1954),  for  example,  the   defendant  was  charged  in  an

            indictment  as a principal in the commission of larceny.  She

            argued that there was  evidence at trial that she  had driven

            away while  another entered the house,  establishing that she

            only  was an accessory before the fact.  Thus, she concluded,

            there was insufficient evidence  to support her conviction as

            a  principal.   The  court  disagreed.   After  reviewing the

                                         -4-

            record,  it held that the  jury could have  believed that she

            had waited in the car  directly in front of the house.   This

            would make her a principal.  107 A.2d at 328, 82 R.I. at 219-

            20.  See also  State v. Hart, 258 A.2d 70, 72,  106 R.I. 213,
                 ___ ____  _____    ____

            217 (1969)  (as in Colvin, the act of waiting at the scene in
                               ______

            order to assist in the getaway is  sufficient to render one a

            principal; defendant's conviction for larceny was upheld).

                      Finally, in  State v.  McMaugh, 512 A.2d  824 (R.I.
                                   _____     _______

            1986),  the court  addressed an  argument similar to  the one

            petitioner is  advancing here.  Defendants  were both charged

            with  murder,  conspiracy and  carrying  a  weapon without  a

            license.   They were found  guilty of  all the  charges.   On

            appeal, one of the  defendants argued that, although indicted

            as  a principal in the murder, he actually had been convicted

            of aiding and assisting (his co-defendant had fired  the shot

            that killed the  victim).  In the same vein, he asserted that

            the trial court should not have instructed the jury on aiding

            and assisting.

                      The court disagreed.   Acknowledging Patriarca,  it
                                                           _________

            iterated  that a person must either be charged as a principal

            or  as an  accessory and  that "on  an indictment  charging a

            defendant as  a principal he cannot be  convicted on evidence

            showing  that he  was  merely an  accessory."   Id.  at  831.
                                                            ___

            However, the  court went on, "one  who aids and  abets in the

            commission of the crime and is  also present at the scene may

                                         -5-

            be  charged and convicted as a principal."  Id. (citing State
                                                        ___         _____

            v. Colvin, supra).  Because defendant was there when the shot
               ______  _____

            was fired and  had assisted  in the crime,  he therefore  was

            properly charged and convicted  as a principal.  Id.  at 831.
                                                             ___

            In  so  ruling,  it is  obvious,  we  think,  that the  court

            rejected defendant's  contention that  he had, in  fact, been

            convicted of aiding and abetting.

                      The  jury instruction  to which  petitioner objects

            states: 

                           [I]f  you  find that  the  State has
                      proved  within  the   meaning  of   proof
                      defined that the Defendant  committed the
                      crimes charged or the Defendant aided and
                      abetted in  any way  in that crime,  it's
                      your duty  to  say guilty  of  the  crime
                      charged by the State.

            Petitioner maintains that this  instruction added the new and

            distinct offense of aiding and abetting and directed the jury

            that it  could convict him of  this crime.  In  his view, the

            court raised a new charge after the prosecution had presented

            its evidence.   Thus, petitioner concludes that the court did

            not give him  fair notice  and an opportunity  to develop  an

            appropriate defense.

                      Petitioner's argument proceeds on what we think are

            at  least  three mistaken  assumptions:   (1)  that  the jury

            instruction, in fact, added a new charge; (2) that there only

            was  evidence of  aiding and  abetting; and  (3) that  he, in

            fact,  was convicted of aiding  and abetting instead  of as a

                                         -6-

            principal.   As  for  the first  assumption, the  instruction

            states  that if the evidence showed that petitioner aided and

            abetted the murder, the  jury should find him guilty  of "the
                                                                      ___

            crime  charged by the State."  The quoted language, we think,
            ___________________________

            can only refer  to the crime charged in the indictment.  That
                                                        __________

            is,  given that  presence  at the  scene  plus assistance  is

            sufficient  to render one a  principal, it is  plain that the

            trial court did not  instruct the jury that it  could convict

            petitioner as  an accessory.   Indeed,  we  hesitate even  to

            characterize  this   charge  as  an   "aiding  and  abetting"

            instruction in the sense of permitting a conviction on aiding

            and  abetting as  opposed to  allowing the  jury to  consider

            evidence of acts of assistance that, under Rhode Island  law,

            constitute the commission of the crime as a principal.

                      The   second  assumption   is  wrong,   of  course,

            precisely  because there  is evidence  that petitioner  was a
                                      __

            principal.    Specifically,  petitioner  stated  that  he had

            driven  over   the  victim  and  had   stabbed  him,  thereby

            demonstrating both  presence and  assistance.  The  foregoing

            also makes  clear that  the jury found  petitioner guilty  of

            murder, not aiding and abetting  another in the commission of

            murder.  This brings  the case within the holdings  of Colvin
                                                                   ______

            and McMaugh.   Finally, we reject  petitioner's argument that
                _______

            his conviction was contrary to Patriarca.  Simply, petitioner
                                           _________

                                         -7-

            was indicted as a principal and convicted on evidence showing

            that that is what he was.

                      Because we find that the  state court did not amend

            the indictment by  changing the crime  charged to aiding  and

            abetting,  petitioner's  claim  that the  court  violated due

            process   fails.    The  same  is  true  of  the  claim  that

            petitioner'sattorneyprovided ineffectiveassistanceof counsel.

                      The petition for a certificate of probable cause is

            denied.  Petitioner's appeal is terminated.
            ______

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