Court Opinion

ID: 9377379
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-07 18:08:12.453578+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:13.804457
License: Public Domain

J-S35014-22 & J-S35015-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    MITCHELL EDWARD PEDRO                      :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1680 MDA 2021

       Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 2, 2021
      In the Court of Common Pleas of Sullivan County Criminal Division at
                        No(s): CP-57-CR-0000063-2019

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    MITCHELL EDWARD PEDRO                      :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1685 MDA 2021

       Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 2, 2021
      In the Court of Common Pleas of Sullivan County Criminal Division at
                        No(s): CP-57-CR-0000026-2019

BEFORE:      BENDER, P.J.E., McLAUGHLIN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.:                          FILED: MARCH 7, 2023

        Mitchell Edward Pedro appeals from the judgment of sentence of 27 to

72 months of incarceration entered following his convictions for three counts

____________________________________________

*   Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S35014-22 & J-S35015-22

of home improvement fraud.1 We affirm but remand for entry of a corrected

judgment of sentence order imposing the recidivism risk reduction incentive

(“RRRI”) minimum sentence as required by law.

       The following facts pertain to the charges filed at docket CP-57-CR-

0000063-2019. Appellant was the owner of Mitchell E. Pedro Carpentry. In

July of 2018, Irene Sigler, a 73-year-old woman, responded to an

advertisement in the Sullivan Review newspaper promoting Appellant’s

business. Ms. Sigler owned a vacation cabin in Sullivan County that required

roof repairs. She and her husband informed Appellant that the job needed to

be completed promptly as they expected company in a few weeks. Appellant

wrote a proposal, which subsequently became the parties’ contract, and

specifically promised that the work would be done within two weeks. On July

29, 2018, Ms. Sigler wrote Appellant a check for the quoted figure of

$2,773.50, which Appellant cashed the next day.

       As of August 29, 2018, Appellant had not returned to the Siglers’ cabin

and ignored their communications. Ms. Sigler eventually emailed Appellant,

informing him that they no longer wanted his services and requested a refund.
____________________________________________

1Appellant was convicted of one count of home improvement fraud at docket
CP-57-CR-0000026-2019, and two counts of home improvement fraud at
docket CP-57-CR-0000063-2019. We have sua sponte consolidated the
appeals as the issues presented are identical. See Pa.R.A.P. 513.

Additionally, Appellant purports to appeal from the trial court’s orders denying
his post-sentence motions. However, appeal properly lies from the judgment
of sentence made final by the denial of post-sentence motions.              See
Commonwealth v. Shamberger, 788 A.2d 408, 410 n.2 (Pa. Super 2001)
(en banc) (citation omitted). We have amended the captions accordingly.

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Appellant did not respond to the email. Instead, he visited the Siglers’ cabin

the next day and dropped off a man named Eddie to do work. When the

Siglers confronted Appellant, he claimed that the repairs had already been

done and that Eddie needed an hour to finish the work. Appellant did not

answer the Siglers’ inquiries regarding when the work had been done. Eddie

tore a hole in the ceiling but stopped work shortly thereafter and drank beer

on their porch.

      That evening, Appellant called the Siglers and informed them that he

had purchased drywall that he wished to store at the cabin.           The Siglers

reluctantly agreed since Appellant still had their money but instructed

Appellant not to install the drywall until they confirmed that the roof was fixed.

Four days later, following a rainfall, the Siglers visited their cabin and observed

leaks. They contacted Appellant and asked him to visit the property. He did

not show.    On September 7, 2018, the Siglers again demanded a refund.

Appellant called at approximately 8 p.m. and offered to meet in person to

discuss the matter, which the Siglers declined due to the late hour. Appellant

abruptly ended the conversation.

      The Siglers then sent Appellant a demand letter via certified mail to the

address listed on the contract, which was returned as undeliverable.           The

Siglers had no further contact with Appellant and did not receive a refund.

They then hired another contractor to complete the repairs.

      The Commonwealth charged Appellant with two counts of home

improvement fraud. At count one, the Commonwealth charged Appellant with

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violating 73 P.S. § 517.8(a)(2), and at count two, it charged a violation of 73

P.S. § 517.8(a)(8). Those crimes read as follows:

       (a) Offense defined.--A person commits the offense of home
       improvement fraud if, with intent to defraud or injure anyone or
       with knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud or injury to be
       perpetrated by anyone, the actor:

                                      ....
          (2) receives any advance payment for performing home
          improvement services or providing home improvement
          materials and fails to perform or provide such services or
          materials when specified in the contract taking into account
          any force majeure or unforeseen labor strike that would
          extend the time frame or unless extended by agreement
          with the owner and fails to return the payment received for
          such services or materials which were not provided by that
          date;

                                     ....
          (8) directly or indirectly publishes a false or deceptive
          advertisement in violation of State law governing
          advertising about home improvement.

73 P.S. § 517.8.

       Regarding count two, the Home Improvement Consumer Protection Act

(“HICPA”), 73 P.S. §§ 517.1-517.19, requires contractors performing home

improvement services2 to register with the Bureau of Consumer Protection

(“Bureau”), a division of the Office of Attorney General of Pennsylvania. 73

P.S. § 517.3(a).      The Bureau then issues a registration certificate, which

includes a unique registration number.               Renewals are required every two

____________________________________________

2 The terms “contractor” and “home improvement” are separately defined.
There is no dispute that Appellant was a contractor performing home
improvement services as defined.

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years.   A contractor is required to include the registration number in any

advertisement distributed within the Commonwealth.               73 P.S. § 517.6.

Appellant registered with the Bureau in August of 2011.            That registration

expired on August 11, 2013, and he failed to renew it.3                  Thus, the

advertisements he placed in the newspaper, which included his registration

number, falsely conveyed that he was validly registered with the Bureau.

       The following facts pertain to the charges filed at docket CP-57-CR-

0000026-2019. James Bausher, seventy-one-years old, and his wife, Bonnie,

who was sixty-nine-years old, also owned a vacation home in Sullivan County

that required roofing repairs. The Baushers saw Appellant’s ad in the Sullivan

Times and responded. Appellant visited the property in their absence and

wrote up a proposal.

       On June 27, 2018, Mr. Bausher wrote a check for $3,450, the amount

requested by Appellant as a down payment.               Appellant did not arrange a

schedule with the Baushers as planned, prompting Mr. Bausher to call

Appellant on July 9, 2018. Mr. Bausher asked Appellant if he had received the

check; Appellant stated he had not.             Mr. Bausher told Appellant he would

check with his bank to determine if it had been cashed, but Appellant advised

him not to do so. Mr. Bausher visited his bank and learned that Appellant had

____________________________________________

3 Appellant renewed the registration in February of 2019, but his registration
was deactivated in August of 2019, after an audit revealed Appellant’s
insurance had lapsed. Appellant was given an opportunity to update his
information, but he failed to do so.

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endorsed and cashed the check on June 29, 2018.             When confronted,

Appellant claimed he mistook the down payment for another client. Appellant

promised to begin work the week of July 16, but failed to appear onsite. Mr.

Bausher called Appellant during this time period to ask when work would begin

but Appellant would not give a definitive answer.

      Finally, on August 14, 2018, Mr. Bausher told Appellant that if he failed

to start work by August 31, he would take steps to get his money back.

Appellant showed up on August 31 and unloaded tarps at the property. He

claimed, however, that he would not be able to start work as he had trouble

finding workers to assist. Eventually, Mr. Bausher sent a demand letter via

certified mail, which was received and signed for by a woman named Marla.

Appellant did not return the money, nor did he ever start the work.        The

Commonwealth charged Appellant with four counts, including, at count four,

a violation of 73 P.S. § 517.8(a)(8).

      The Commonwealth consolidated the two dockets, and the parties

proceeded to a jury trial on August 23, 2021. At docket CP-57-CR-0000063-

2019, the jury found Appellant guilty of both counts of home improvement

fraud. At CP-57-CR-0000026-2019, the jury convicted Appellant of count four

and acquitted him of the other three counts.

      On November 2, 2021, the trial court sentenced Appellant to 9 to 24

months of incarceration at each of the three counts, set consecutively to each

other for the aggregate sentence of 27 to 72 months of incarceration.

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Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion, which was denied on November

22, 2021.4       Appellant timely appealed5 and filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)

statement. The trial court filed its responsive Rule 1925(a) opinion, and we

now address the issues presented:

       1.     Did the Trial Court err in denying the Post Sentence Motion
       when HICPA states no Criminal penalty for failing to register as
       set forth in 73 P.S. § 517.8, Home Improvement Fraud, being
       specified by the Legislature Regarding advertising an alleged
       expired registration number when no notice is provided that
       criminal penalties attach to the conduct alleged to have been done
       by Appellant in violation of due process to convict Appellant, the
       Trial Court had no jurisdiction for a criminal matter that could have
____________________________________________

4  The post-sentence motion was docketed on November 15, 2021. See
Pa.R.Crim.P. 720 (post-sentence motion must be filed within ten days after
sentence). Because an untimely post-sentence motion does not toll the
appeal period, this Court issued a rule to show cause why the appeal should
not be quashed as untimely, given that Appellant did not file his notice of
appeal until December 17, 2021. See Commonwealth v. Dreves, 839 A.2d
1122, 1127 (Pa. Super. 2003) (en banc) (“[W]here the defendant does not
file a timely post-sentence motion, there is no basis to permit the filing of an
appeal beyond 30 days after the imposition of sentence.”). Appellant’s
response included a copy of his post-sentence motion, establishing that it was
electronically filed and accepted on Friday, November 12, 2021. Appellant
noted that per Pa.R.Crim.P. 576.1(E)(5), a filing should be docketed on the
day it was electronically submitted. The Court discharged the rule to show
cause and deferred the issue to this panel. We agree that the post-sentence
motion was timely filed, thereby tolling the thirty-day appeal period.
Therefore, this appeal is timely.

5Appellant filed six notices of appeal on December 17, 2021, docketed at 1680
MDA 2021, 1681 MDA 2021, 1682 MDA 2021, 1683 MDA 2021, 1684 MDA
2021, 1685 MDA 2021, 1686 MDA 2021, and 1687 MDA 2021.

The appeals at 1681 through 1684 were quashed by this Court as duplicative
of the 1680 MDA 2021 appellate docket. The 1685 MDA 2021 docket pertains
to CP-57-CR-0000026-2019 and remains active. The 1686 and 1687 dockets
were quashed by this Court as duplicative of 1685 MDA 2021. As previously
stated, we have consolidated the two active dockets.

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     been resolved by civil remedies and the verdict is so contrary to
     the evidence it shocks one’s sense of justice.

     2.     Did the Trial Court err in denying the Motion to Dismiss at
     Trial of August 23, 2021 even though HICPA states no Criminal
     penalty for failing to register as set forth in 73 P.S. § 517.8, Home
     Improvement Fraud, being specified by the Legislature Regarding
     advertising an alleged expired registration number when no notice
     is provided that criminal penalties attach to the conduct alleged to
     have been done by Appellant in violation of due process to convict
     Appellant.

     3.     Did the Trial Court err in denying the Motion for Leave to
     File Petition for Habeas Corpus of March 23, 2021 by the Order of
     April 20, 2021 even though Appellant was represented by his third
     attorney and provided cause for the delay in the filing pursuant to
     PA.R.Crim. P. 579 which amounted to a break down in the legal
     process and the interests of the justice required the meritorious
     Petition for Habeas Corpus be heard by the Trial Court.

     4.    Did the Trial Court err in denying the Appellant’s request for
     bail pending appeal at the time of Sentencing by failing to state
     on the record the reasons for his decision of denial of bail at the
     time of sentencing or after written request in the Post Sentence
     Motion pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 521(C).

     5.    Did the Trial Court err and abuse its discretion by denying
     the Appellant's objection to Commonwealth Exhibit 11 and
     denying the Appellant's requested jury instruction defining the
     term fraud which effected the outcome of the Trial.

     6.    Did the Trial Court err and abuse its discretion by sentencing
     the Appellant to an F2 when the charge was listed as an F3 in the
     Criminal Information, failing to award appropriate time credit and
     sentencing Appellant to an unduly harsh sentence consecutive to
     his other case when he had a prior record score of “0”.

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Appellant’s Brief at 1680 MDA 2021 at 5-7 (verbatim) reordered for ease of

disposition).6

       Appellant’s first issue involves the sufficiency of the evidence.         Our

standard of review is well-settled. “The law is settled in this Commonwealth

that in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, the appellate court is required

to review all the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in

the light most favorable to the Commonwealth[.]”                 Commonwealth v.

McCollum,        926     A.2d     527,     530       (Pa.   Super.   2007)   (quoting

Commonwealth v. Earnest, 563 A.2d 158, 159 (Pa. Super. 1989)).

       The Commonwealth maintains that Appellant has waived this issue as

he failed to challenge any element in the concise statement of errors

complained of on appeal. This Court has repeatedly held that, to preserve a

claim attacking the sufficiency of evidence on appeal, the Rule 1925(b)

statement “needs to specify the element or elements upon which the evidence

was insufficient.”     Commonwealth v. Arnold, 284 A.3d 1262, 1279 (Pa.

Super. 2022) (quoting Commonwealth v. Tyack, 128 A.3d 254, 260 (Pa.

Super. 2015)). Similarly, a statement that “is too vague can result in waiver

of issues on appeal.” Id. (citation omitted). Appellant’s concise statement

identified his first issue as follows:

       Whether the Trial Court erred by Denying the Post Sentence
       Motion of November 12, 2021 including the Motion for Judgment
____________________________________________

6 We reiterate that the issues raised in the 1685 MDA 2021 appeal are
substantively identical.

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       of Acquittal based upon the insufficiency facts in the law, Motion
       for Arrest of Judgment based upon HICPA not criminalizing the
       conduct alleged to have been done by the Defendant in the
       charging documents and at trial therefore the Court did not have
       jurisdiction for a criminal prosecution of this matter which could
       have been resolved by civil remedies, Motion for New Trial based
       upon jury's verdict is so contrary to the evidence that it shocks
       one’s sense of justice and that a new trial is imperative so that
       Mr. Pedro may given another opportunity to prevail, Motion to
       Modify Sentence based upon improper and/or unduly harsh
       sentence including failing to include proper time credit, running
       all sentences consecutively instead of concurrently, sentencing
       the Defendant outside the eligibility of Boot Camp when he had a
       prior record score of “0” and would be otherwise eligible for Boot
       Camp and denying Mr. Pedro bail pending Appeal pursuant to Pa.
       R. Crim. P. 521(B).

Concise Statement, 1/28/22, at unnumbered 3 (verbatim).

      The Commonwealth characterizes this as a “lengthy and, frankly,

confusing statement” that failed to “put the trial court on notice of the specific

sufficiency argument Appellant makes on appeal.” Commonwealth’s Brief at

16.   We agree that Appellant failed to preserve his present argument.

Appellant’s confusing concise statement has little relation to Appellant’s

current argument, which focuses on a phrase within Section 517.8(a)(8). That

crime reads:

      (a)   Offense defined.--A person commits the offense of home
            improvement fraud if, with intent to defraud or injure
            anyone or with knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud or
            injury to be perpetrated by anyone, the actor:

         (8) directly or indirectly publishes a false or deceptive
         advertisement in violation of State law governing
         advertising about home improvement.

73 P.S. § 517.8 (emphasis added).

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      While his argument is undeveloped, it appears that the gravamen of

Appellant’s argument is that Section 517.9 supplies the exclusive ‘State law

governing advertising about home improvement’ for purposes of establishing

a violation of Section 517.8(a)(8). Section 517.9, entitled “Prohibited acts,”

states in pertinent part:

      No person shall:

                                      ....

      (8) Advertise or offer, by any means, to perform a home
      improvement if the person does not intend to do any of the
      following:

         (i) Accept a home improvement contract.

         (ii) Perform the home improvement.

         (iii) Charge for the home improvement at the price
         advertised or offered.

73 P.S. § 517.9.

      We agree with the Commonwealth that the prolix concise statement

failed to alert the trial court of that specific argument. We therefore find that

Appellant has waived his claim.

      We additionally determine that, even if the statement preserved his

sufficiency challenge, the claim is waived for deficient presentation. “[W]hen

defects in a brief impede our ability to conduct meaningful appellate review,

we may dismiss the appeal entirely or find certain issues to be waived.”

Commonwealth v. Kane, 10 A.3d 327, 331 (Pa. Super. 2010) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Hardy, 918 A.2d 766, 771 (Pa. Super. 2007)). To begin,

Appellant’s statement is internally inconsistent as its requested relief is for a

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new trial. However, a successful sufficiency challenge results in discharge.

See Commonwealth v. Yanoff, 690 A.2d 260, 263 (Pa. Super. 1997).

Additionally, Appellant does not separately contest his conviction for violating

73 P.S. § 517.8(a)(2). His requested remedy is a new trial on the grounds

the verdict “is shock to justice [sic] the Appellant would be found guilty of the

HICPA [v]iolations.”    Appellant’s Brief at 20.      The plural suggests that

Appellant seeks a new trial on all counts, not just the Section (a)(8) violations.

This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that Appellant references his motion

for a writ of habeas corpus, which requested dismissal of all charges, in part

because “the basis for the fraud is the use of the allegedly expired contractor

registration number,” and “it is a violation of due process to pursue criminal

charges.”   See Brief in Support of Motion for Habeas Corpus, 3/22/21, at

unnumbered 3.

      Even if we were to limit our focus to the Section (a)(8) convictions,

Appellant’s argument offers no focused examination of the statutory language

‘State law governing advertising about improvement.’ Ascertaining legislative

intent presents a pure question of law. See Commonwealth v. Gamby, 283

A.3d 298 (Pa. 2022) (determining that the neck qualified as “sexual or other

intimate parts” for indecent assault and the evidence was therefore sufficient

to convict). The phrase ‘governed by State law’ is undefined, thus we would

need to determine the plain meaning of that language. Id. at 304. In lieu of

an argument focused on what the General Assembly intended by employing

the phrase ‘governed by State law,’ Appellant seems to argue that Section

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517.9(a)(8) establishes the sole basis by which the Commonwealth can

sanction an individual for what may generically be referred to as ‘false

advertising.’ But, of course, the Commonwealth did not allege that Appellant’s

false advertising satisfied any of the Section 517.9(a)(8)(i)-(iii) conditions,

none of which involve fraud. Instead, it charged Appellant with intending to

defraud the victims pursuant to Sections 517.8(a)(2) and (8).

      We add that Appellant’s reply brief argues that we must read the

language in the light most favorable to him, which is the rule of lenity.

Appellant’s Reply Brief at 3 (arguing that the Commonwealth “may not argue

[l]egislative [i]intent contrary to the plain meaning of the language” and that

the language “must be interpreted in the light most favorable to the

[a]ppellant”).   However, that rule only applies when a penal statute is

ambiguous. “Under the rule of lenity, when a penal statute is ambiguous, it

must be strictly construed in favor of the defendant.” Commonwealth v.

Cousins, 212 A.3d 34, 39 (Pa. 2019) (citation omitted). Appellant does not

claim that the statutory language is ambiguous.

      In sum, Appellant’s argument is confusing and impedes appellate

review.   He offers no analysis of the key statutory phrase ‘governing

advertising about home improvement.’ Nor is it even clear that Appellant is

solely attacking his convictions for those counts, as portions of his argument

seem to suggest that the Commonwealth could not prosecute Appellant for

any criminal act. In addition to the quoted habeas corpus request for relief,

Appellant makes the entirely unexplained assertion that the trial court “had

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no jurisdiction for a criminal matter that could have been resolved by civil

remedies[.]” Appellant’s Brief at 5. All of these defects impede our ability to

address Appellant’s claim. “This Court will not act as counsel and will not

develop arguments on behalf of an appellant.” Commonwealth v. Hardy,

918 A.2d 766, 771 (Pa. Super. 2007).           Appellant’s failure to develop a

coherent argument mandates waiver of this issue.

      Appellant’s reordered second issue is a repackaging of the foregoing

argument. After the Commonwealth rested its case, Appellant requested that

the court grant a judgment of acquittal. As with the first claim, we will not

develop Appellant’s argument, and we deem it waived for the same reasons.

      Appellant’s reordered third point of error involves Appellant’s request

for leave to file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeking dismissal of the

charges. The trial court declined to consider the motion based on Rule 579,

which specifies that pre-trial motions for relief shall be filed “within 30 days

after arraignment, unless opportunity therefor did not exist, or the defendant

or defense attorney, or the attorney for the Commonwealth, was not aware of

the grounds for the motion, or unless the time for filing has been extended by

the court for cause shown.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 579(A). Appellant filed the motion

for leave on March 22, 2021. The trial court’s opinion noted that Appellant

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was charged at several dockets7 and that the last arraignment occurred on

October 25, 2019.

       Appellant submits that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to

find cause to excuse the late filing. His primary argument is that his prior

attorneys failed to file the motion in a timely manner for various reasons,

including defending a homicide trial, moving offices, and having COVID. See

Appellant’s Brief at 21-22.

       We agree with the Commonwealth that this issue is moot.              See

Commonwealth’s Brief at 22-23. If the Commonwealth proves the offense

beyond a reasonable doubt, “any defects at a preliminary hearing regarding

the sufficiency of the evidence are considered harmless.” Commonwealth

v. Wilson, 172 A.3d 605, 610 (Pa. Super. 2017) (quotation marks and citation

omitted).    The “conviction at trial precludes this Court from reviewing his

pretrial habeas issues.” Id. Moreover, Appellant simply states that the trial

court abused its discretion in accepting the untimely filing but does not discuss

what remedy would attach. At best, we would decide the issue as if timely

filed, but that simply returns us to the conclusion that the subsequent guilty

verdicts obviated the need to address those claims.

____________________________________________

7 Appellant was charged at five total dockets. In addition to the two dockets
at issue in this consolidated appeal, two of the dockets were dismissed at trial.
The trial court granted dismissal of the fifth pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 586,
which permits parties in cases not involving violence to reach an agreement.
Presumably, Appellant returned whatever sum was involved.

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     Appellant’s reordered fourth issue challenges the trial court’s order

denying bail pending appeal, as raised in his post-sentence motion.          The

Commonwealth argues that, per Rule of Appellate Procedure 1762, an appeal

of a trial court’s decision pertaining to bail following sentencing cannot be

raised on direct appeal from the judgment of sentence. That Rule states:

     (a) Bail when an appeal is pending--Applications relating to
     bail when an appeal is pending shall ordinarily first be presented
     to the trial court and shall be governed by the Pennsylvania Rules
     of Criminal Procedure. If the trial court denies relief, a party may
     seek relief in the appellate court by filing an application, pursuant
     to Pa.R.A.P. 123, ancillary to the pending appeal.

     (b) Bail when no appeal is pending.--Applications relating to
     bail when no appeal is pending:

        (1) Applications relating to bail when no appeal is pending
        shall first be presented to the trial court and shall be
        governed by the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure.

        (2) An order relating to bail shall be subject to review
        pursuant to Chapter 16.

Pa.R.A.P. 1762.

     Appellant sought bail after sentencing, which was denied, and then

included another application for bail in a post-sentence motion as opposed to

filing a separate application for bail pending the outcome of the motion. See

Comment, Pa.R.Crim.P. 720 (“For bail proceedings pending the outcome of

the post-sentence motion, see Rules 521 and 523.”).          Because the bail

application preceded the pendency of his appeal, Rule 1762(b)(1) applies.

Appellant did not follow the procedures for seeking appellate review of that

order pursuant to Chapter 16 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure, which

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creates a specialized petition for review process for denials of bail.         See

Commonwealth v. Carter, 247 A.3d 27 (Pa. Super. 2021). We therefore

cannot review the claim.

      The reordered fifth issue involves two distinct issues. First, Appellant

argues that the trial court erroneously admitted Commonwealth’s Exhibit 11,

which was a sample of a registration certificate that the Bureau issues to home

contractors. The Commonwealth admitted a sample because it does not retain

copies of the originals.

      Q. Does your office retain a copy of that certification that was
      issued, for example, to Mitchell Pedro in 2011?

      A. We do not retain certificates, no.

      Q. OK, so is what you have in front of you, is that just a sample
      of what would have been sent?

      A. Correct.

N.T., 8/23/21, at 53.

      Second, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in declining to give

his suggested jury instruction defining “fraud.” We reproduce the entirety of

Appellant’s argument in support of this issue:

      At the Trial, the Trial Court improperly admitted Commonwealth’s
      Exhibit 11, a sample form with the name of a person from
      Philadelphia from the Consumer Protection Bureau, into the
      evidence which was objected to by Mr. Pedro as it did not have
      Mr. Pedro’s name or address on the document. (Hearing 8-23-21
      N.T. 52-55). The Trial Court failed to provide a definition of fraud
      in the Jury instructions even though the Jury deliberated for
      numerous hours, asked numerous questions regarding the jury
      instructions including the importance of the age of victims,
      requesting all the exhibits, written copies of the definitions of each
      charge presented verbally by the Court to the Jury. (Hearing 8-

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      23-21 N.T. 219-232).

      The admissibility of evidence is at the discretion of the trial court
      and only a showing of an abuse of that discretion, and resulting
      prejudice, constitutes reversible error.” Commonwealth v. Glass,
      2012 PA Super 137, 50 A.3d 720, 724-25 (Pa. Super. 2012). In
      reviewing a trial court’s refusal to provide a jury instruction, the
      appellate court reviews whether the jury instruction is warranted
      by the evidence presented in the case and changed outcome of
      case. Commonwealth v. Baker, 963 A.2d 495 (Pa. Super. 2008).

      The Trial Court’s decision to admit Exhibit 11 and failure to provide
      a definition of the term “Fraud” directly effected and changed the
      outcome of the case and prejudiced the Appellant.

Appellant’s Brief at 26-27 (verbatim).

      For evidentiary errors, the standard of review is an abuse of discretion.

“As our Supreme Court has explained, ‘[t]he admissibility of evidence is a

matter solely within the discretion of the trial court. This Court will reverse

an evidentiary ruling only where a clear abuse of discretion occurs.’”

Commonwealth v. Woeber, 174 A.3d 1096, 1100 (Pa. Super. 2017)

(quoting Commonwealth v. Johnson, 638 A.2d 940, 942 (Pa. 1994)).

Appellant offers no argument as to why admitting the evidence was an abuse

of discretion, and we cannot discern one. Appellant correctly notes that the

form “did not have [Appellant]’s name or address on the document.”

Appellant’s Brief at 26. But the Commonwealth clearly admitted the document

for its demonstrative value, showing the jury what Appellant’s form would

have generically looked like. Additionally, even if we accept that the trial court

somehow erred in admitting the exhibit, Appellant offers no argument as to

how an innocuous document like this one could have possibly prejudiced him.

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      Turning to the jury instruction issue, we agree with the Commonwealth

that Appellant did not preserve his objection. “[U]nder Criminal Procedural

Rules 603 and 647(B), the mere submission and subsequent denial of

proposed points for charge that are inconsistent with or omitted from the

instructions actually given will not suffice to preserve an issue, absent a

specific objection or exception to the charge or the trial court’s ruling

respecting the points.” Commonwealth v. Pressley, 887 A.2d 220, 225 (Pa.

2005).   In Commonwealth v. Green, 273 A.3d 1080, 1084 (Pa. Super.

2022), this Court held that Pressley’s interpretation of those Rules did not

require waiver when counsel argued, on two separate days, for self-defense

and voluntary manslaughter charges. The appellant preserved his objections

on the record during the charging conferences and the trial court assured

counsel that the issues were preserved for appeal. We acknowledged that an

objection at the end of the charge would have eliminated any need to discuss

waiver, but “we do not find that preserving his objections on the record during

the charging conferences, rather than at the end of the jury charge, where

the trial court expressly informs counsel his objections were preserved, runs

afoul of Pressley or Rule 647(B).”     Id. at 1084.    Green stated that the

Pressley holding applied when “there is no indication that counsel did

anything more than merely submit proposed points that the trial court

denied.” Id. at 1083.

      A mere submission of proposed points describes what happened here.

The relevant exchange reads as follows:

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      [Appellant]: Regarding fraud, with the intent to fraud [sic] or
      injure anyone with knowledge that you’re facilitating a fraud or
      injury to be perpetrated by anyone, I would ask that the Court
      define fraud as knowingly or recklessly deceptive and I took that
      definition from … Commonwealth v. Hill, 140 A.3d 713 [(Pa.
      Super. 2016)].

      [Trial Court]: Attorney Anderson?

      [Commonwealth]: Judge, I don’t feel there’s a need to define the
      word fraud. I feel that’s a commonly known and used word in
      general society and would not require further explanation or
      definition by the [c]ourt.

                                     ***

      [Trial Court]: [W]ith respect to fraud, I’ll agree with the
      Commonwealth. That is a more common phrase and … an average
      member of the public would be aware of the same.

N.T., 8/23/21, at 161-62.

      Following the instructions regarding the elements of each crime, the trial

court asked Appellant, “has this [c]ourt failed to instruct the jury with respect

to the elements of the offenses?” Appellant replied, “No, Your Honor.” Id. at

205. Appellant thus failed to preserve his challenge to the jury instructions.

      Appellant’s final issue raises several challenges to his sentence,

involving both its legality and the discretionary aspects.       We find these

arguments to be meritless. However, we find an error regarding the RRRI

sentence and remand to the trial court for entry of a corrected sentencing

order.

      Beginning with the legality, Appellant argues that the sentence imposed

at docket CP-57-CR-0000026-2019 is illegal because the criminal information

specified that the crime was graded as a felony of the third degree. The trial

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court accepted the Commonwealth’s argument that the enhanced felony of

the second degree grading applied.

       The criminal information for docket CP-57-CR-0000026-2019 was

prepared by the Sullivan County District Attorney’s Office, which was

prosecuting the case before the Attorney General took over.8 The information

charging Appellant with a violation of 73 P.S. § 517.8(a)(8) listed the grading

as a felony of the third degree.

       That grading applies when the amount involved exceeds $2,000. 73

P.S. § 517.8(c)(1)(i) (“A violation of subsection (a) … (8) constitutes … a

felony of the third degree if the amount involved exceeds $2,000.”).                 The

offense is graded as a felony of the second degree if the victim was sixty years

or older. 73 P.S. § 517.8(c)(4) (“Where a person commits an offense under

subsection (a) and the victim is 60 years of age or older, the grading of the

offense shall be one grade higher than specified in paragraphs (1), (2) and

(3).”).

       We    find   that   this   notice       was   constitutionally   defective.    In

Commonwealth v. King, 234 A.3d 549 (Pa. 2020), our Supreme Court

considered the legality of an “enhanced sentence for attempted murder

resulting in serious bodily injury … when the Commonwealth failed to provide

formal notice of its intent to seek the enhancement in the charging

documents.” Id. at 552. The sentence for attempted murder normally carries
____________________________________________

8The criminal information in the other case was filed by the Attorney General
and correctly lists the grading as a felony of the second degree.

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a maximum penalty of twenty years unless serious bodily injury occurs, in

which case the maximum is forty years. The charging documents listed the

crime of attempted murder but made no reference to the statutory section

authorizing the increased penalty. The King Court held that this defect

violated due process.

     [T]he Commonwealth in effect prosecuted King for the aggravated
     crime of attempted murder causing serious bodily injury despite
     charging him with the crime of attempted murder. The statutory
     definition of attempted murder does not require proof of serious
     bodily injury. See 18 Pa.C.S. §[§] 901, 2502. Section 1102(c)
     provides that a person convicted of attempted murder that does
     not result in serious bodily injury may be sentenced to a maximum
     term of twenty years of imprisonment, whereas a person
     convicted of attempted murder that results in serious bodily injury
     faces a maximum term of forty years of imprisonment. 18 Pa.C.S.
     § 1102(c). Serious bodily injury caused by the attempted murder
     is undoubtedly an essential element of the offense that must be
     included in the charging documents.

     It therefore follows that the charging instrument must include
     those elements to put the defendant on notice of the crime.

                                  ****

     Here, the criminal information plainly put King on notice of the
     crime of attempted murder. But ... King was convicted of the
     aggravated crime of attempted murder causing serious bodily
     injury. Nothing in the indictment or criminal information itself
     alerted King to the Commonwealth’s intention to prosecute him of
     that crime. We therefore hold that when the Commonwealth
     intends to seek an enhanced sentence for attempted murder
     resulting in serious bodily injury under Section 1102(c), the
     Commonwealth must include a citation to the statutory provision
     as well as its language in the charging documents. While the
     information arguably gave some notice of the Commonwealth’s
     intent to seek the sentencing enhancement based on the facts
     alleged in the charging documents and the Commonwealth’s
     mention of the sentencing guidelines prior to trial, this degree of
     notice was insufficient.

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J-S35014-22 & J-S35015-22

Id. at 562-63.

      Similarly, the criminal information here put Appellant on notice that it

intended to prosecute him of the crime of home improvement fraud by false

or deceptive advertising, causing a loss in excess of $2,000. Nothing in the

information signaled that the Commonwealth intended to prove the crime

Appellant was actually sentenced for, which may be described as home

improvement fraud by false or deceptive advertising against a person over the

age of sixty. This was, for constitutional purposes, an aggravated crime. The

Commonwealth’s criminal information therefore violated due process by failing

to include a reference to the 73 P.S. § 517.8(c)(4) provision authorizing the

enhanced penalty.

      However, King      held that   the   due   process   violation   does not

automatically result in an illegal sentence, as the error is subject to harmless

error review.    “[W]e conclude that King was adequately apprised through

other means of the Commonwealth’s intentions and that the charging error

was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 563.

      We conclude that the error here was harmless beyond a reasonable

doubt. See Commonwealth v. Hamlett, 234 A.3d 486 (Pa. 2020) (holding

that appellate courts may sua sponte invoke harmless error even where

Commonwealth fails to raise it).      The Commonwealth submitted special

interrogatories to the jury asking it to determine the age of the victim, which

is, of course, an objective fact and was not contested. Additionally, the fact

that Appellant was jointly prosecuted for the exact same crime against another

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victim over the age of 60 is also evidence that Appellant was not taken by

surprise. And perhaps most significantly, it appears that Appellant was fully

aware of the Commonwealth’s intentions. Appellant’s brief in support of his

petition for a writ of habeas corpus argued, “Query how an advertisement in

the newspaper as alleged is specifically targeted to individuals 60 or older.”

Brief in Support of Motion for Habeas Corpus, 3/22/21, at unnumbered 3. The

next paragraph states, “The Commonwealth is required to set forth the basis

for the grading in the Information.” Id.

      The Commonwealth’s response argued, “The Commonwealth will

establish at trial that the victims in all four captioned cases are older than 60.

The applicable grading for the charged offenses is thus enhanced to Felony 2.”

Commonwealth’s Brief in Opposition, 4/23/21, at 10. That response, plainly

stating the Commonwealth’s intention to prove the aggravated crime as we

have described it, meets if not exceeds the de facto notice that the King Court

found.

      While King did not receive formal notice of the Commonwealth’s
      intent to seek the enhancement, King received de facto notice, at
      various points before trial, that the Commonwealth was seeking
      the enhancement. For example, the factual summaries in the
      charging documents made clear that Banks suffered serious bodily
      injury. Moreover, the Commonwealth advised King that the
      minimum penalty for attempted murder if convicted was
      seventeen and one-half years, signaling that the Commonwealth
      intended to seek the enhancement. Finally, the Commonwealth
      and King’s attorney reviewed and agreed to the content and form
      of the verdict sheet prior to jury deliberations, which included a
      special interrogatory regarding whether Banks suffered serious
      bodily injury as a result of the attempted murder.

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J-S35014-22 & J-S35015-22

King, 234 A.3d at 566 (footnote omitted).

      Finally, as in King, we note that it does not appear that the

Commonwealth’s failure to provide formal notice in the information had any

effect on Appellant’s defense. Id. We therefore conclude that any error was

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

      In his next challenge to the sentence’s legality, Appellant argues that he

was entitled to seventy-four days of time credit as a matter of law.         At

sentencing, Appellant stated that he had served “a total of 74 days after his

arrest and prior to sentencing” the Columbia County Correctional Facility. N.T.

Sentencing, 11/2/21, at 7. He asked the court to credit him for those days

because “all the charges … [are] all related to each other[.]”        Id.   The

Commonwealth responded that Appellant was entitled to ten days of time

credit, but the remaining 64 days “ha[ve] no relationship to this case[.]” Id.

at 10. Appellant makes no specific argument regarding the time credit and

does not address the representations that the 64 days involved a case that

has nothing to do with the home improvement fraud dockets. As with other

issues raised in this appeal, this Court will not develop Appellant’s argument.

We therefore deem this aspect of Appellant’s claim waived.

      Turning to the discretionary aspects of Appellant’s sentence, we

conclude that Appellant has failed to present a substantial question warranting

our review. These appeals are not as of right.

      Before [this Court may] reach the merits of [a challenge to the
      discretionary aspects of a sentence], we must engage in a four
      part analysis to determine: (1) whether the appeal [was timely-

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J-S35014-22 & J-S35015-22

      filed]; (2) whether Appellant preserved his issue; (3) whether
      Appellant’s brief includes a concise statement of the reasons relied
      upon for allowance of appeal with respect to the discretionary
      aspects of sentence; and (4) whether the concise statement raises
      a substantial question that the sentence is appropriate under the
      sentencing code…. [I]f the appeal satisfies each of these four
      requirements, we will then proceed to decide the substantive
      merits of the case.

Commonwealth v. White, 193 A.3d 977, 982 (Pa. Super. 2018) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Disalvo, 70 A.3d 900, 902 (Pa. Super. 2013)).

      Appellant has met the first three requirements, but we agree with the

Commonwealth that he has failed to satisfy the fourth requirement. The Rule

2119(f) statement reads:

      The sentence imposed was within the sentencing guidelines. The
      sentences imposed were not run concurrently at the time of
      sentence despite … [Appellant’s] having [a] prior record score of
      0 and no history of violence. The [t]rial [c]ourt refused to allow
      … [Appellant] credit for seventy-four (74) days confinement
      contrary to 42 Pa.C.S.[] § 9760.

Appellant’s Brief at 15.

      We first note the guideline ranges for these crimes.      The sentencing

guidelines codified at 203 Pa. Code. § 303.15 designate offense gravity scores.

The home improvement fraud crimes are not specifically listed, and thus, the

default assignment of an offense gravity score of seven for a felony of the

second degree applies. When paired with Appellant’s prior record score of

zero, the basic sentencing matrix calls for a sentence of 6 to 14 months in the

standard range. Thus, the sentence of 9 to 24 months at the three counts,

set consecutively to each other, falls within the middle of the standard range.

The decision to impose consecutive sentences at all three counts does not

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present a substantial question in the absence of some other allegation. As

this Court stated in Commonwealth v Dodge, 77 A.3d 1263, 1270 (Pa.

Super. 2013):

      To make it clear, a defendant may raise a substantial question
      where he receives consecutive sentences within the guideline
      ranges if the case involves circumstances where the application of
      the guidelines would be clearly unreasonable, resulting in an
      excessive sentence; however, a bald claim of excessiveness due
      to the consecutive nature of a sentence will not raise a substantial
      question.

Id. at 1270 (emphasis added). Appellant’s bald claim of excessiveness does

not raise a substantial question and we therefore find that he has failed to

invoke the jurisdiction of this Court to review the discretionary aspects of his

sentence.

      Even if Appellant presented a proper substantial question warranting our

review, we would find no abuse of discretion. The trial court had the benefit

of a pre-sentence investigation report, and its opinion briefly discusses its

rationale for imposing the sentence, writing that consecutive standard range

sentences were appropriate because

      [Appellant] never accepted or took responsibility for his actions.
      [Appellant] engaged in criminal conduct that took advantage of
      society’s most vulnerable individuals, those over sixty (60) years
      of age. [Appellant] never apologized to his victims. Lastly,
      [Appellant] did not comply with his bail conditions. [Appellant]
      admitted to his probation officer that one (1) week prior to his
      interview for his Pre-Sentence Investigation, he used marijuana,
      which was a direct violation of his bail.

Trial Court Opinion, 2/28/22, at 3-4.

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J-S35014-22 & J-S35015-22

      The trial court articulated a reasoned basis for its sentence, and the

sentencing transcript reveals that Appellant, consistent with arguments made

in his appellate briefs, repeatedly expressed his view that these matters

should have been resolved in civil court. We discern no abuse of discretion in

the trial court’s determination that consecutive sentences were warranted in

light of Appellant’s lack of remorse and multiple victims.

      Finally, we address Appellant’s RRRI sentence.           The trial court

determined that Appellant was eligible for that program. As set forth in the

Sentencing Code, the trial court shall determine eligibility at the time of

sentencing.

      (b.1) Recidivism risk reduction incentive minimum
      sentence.--The court shall determine if the defendant is eligible
      for a recidivism risk reduction incentive minimum sentence under
      61 Pa.C.S. Ch. 45 (relating to recidivism risk reduction incentive).
      If the defendant is eligible, the court shall impose a
      recidivism risk reduction incentive minimum sentence in
      addition to a minimum sentence and maximum sentence
      except, if the defendant was previously sentenced to two or more
      recidivism risk reduction incentive minimum sentences, the court
      shall have the discretion to impose a sentence with no recidivism
      risk reduction incentive minimum.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9756(b.1) (emphasis added).

      As the emphasized language illustrates, the trial court must sentence

an RRRI-eligible offender to the ‘normal’ minimum and maximum sentence,

and, separately, to a sentence including the applicable reduction.           The

reductions are set forth in 61 Pa.C.S. § 4505.

      (c) Recidivism risk reduction incentive minimum
      sentence.--If the court determines that the defendant is an

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     eligible offender or the prosecuting attorney has waived the
     eligibility requirements under subsection (b), the court shall
     provide notice of eligibility to the defendant and enter a
     sentencing order that does all of the following:

        (1) Imposes the minimum and maximum sentences as
        required under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9752 (relating to sentencing
        proceeding generally).

        (2) Imposes the recidivism risk reduction incentive
        minimum sentence. The court shall direct the department
        to calculate the length of the sentence. The recidivism risk
        reduction incentive minimum shall be equal to three-fourths
        of the minimum sentence imposed when the minimum
        sentence is three years or less.           The recidivism risk
        reduction incentive minimum shall be equal to five-sixths of
        the minimum sentence if the minimum sentence is greater
        than three years. For purposes of these calculations, partial
        days shall be rounded to the nearest whole day.               In
        determining the recidivism risk reduction incentive
        minimum sentence, the aggregation provisions of 42
        Pa.C.S. §§ 9757 (relating to consecutive sentences of total
        confinement for multiple offenses) and 9762(f) (relating to
        sentencing proceeding; place of confinement) shall apply
        and the recidivism risk reduction incentive minimum
        sentence shall be recalculated following the aggregation of
        consecutive sentences. An offender determined by the
        court to be ineligible for a recidivism risk reduction incentive
        minimum sentence for any of the sentences subject to
        aggregation shall be ineligible for a recidivism risk reduction
        incentive minimum sentence for the aggregated sentence.

61 Pa.C.S. § 4505(c) (emphasis added).

     The sentencing orders reflect that the trial court determined that

Appellant was RRRI eligible and imposed the minimum and maximum. The

sentencing orders do not, however, include any reference to the RRRI

reduction. The aggregate sentence of 27 to 72 months is less than three years

and therefore a three-fourths reduction applied. See also 61 Pa.C.S. § 4506

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(establishing that an offender is eligible for parole at the expiration of the RRRI

minimum sentence).

      Finally, we conclude that this error does not require vacating the

judgment of sentence. While we have not found any case directly on point, in

Commonwealth v. Morales-Feliciano, No. 1445 MDA 2019, unpublished

memorandum (Pa. Super. filed May 4, 2021), this Court determined that the

trial court incorrectly calculated the applicable RRRI reduction by examining

each individual sentence instead of the aggregate sentence. We concluded

that the error was amenable to correction as a patent and obvious error. Id.

at *5-6. The error here does not involve a miscalculation of the applicable

reduction, but the core logic of the error being “based on a non—discretionary

statutory calculation” likewise applies here. The trial court was required to

impose a particular sentence based on a formula.            We deem Morales-

Feliciano persuasive and decline to vacate the judgment of sentence.

      Judgments of sentence affirmed.           Remanded for entry of amended

sentencing order consistent with this memorandum. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 3/07/2023

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