Court Opinion

ID: 9734116
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:25:51.985969+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:45.761449
License: Public Domain

*549Nolan, J.
(dissenting with whom Hennessey, C.J., and Lynch, J., join). I dissent. Although the judge did not specifically instruct the jury that they had to find that Watson knew that Clay had a gun, justice does not require a new trial of this case. An eyewitness saw Watson, Clay, and another man pull Boyajian from the taxicab. The same eyewitness saw Watson and the others beat Boyajian after he pleaded for his life. The same eyewitness saw Watson hold Boyajian while Clay went through his pockets. After Clay pumped five bullets into Boyajian’s head, the three men ran away. There was a moment in time, apparently just before Clay shot Boyajian, when Watson disappeared from the sight of the witness. The jury had every right to believe, as they evidently did believe, that Watson was present in that fleeting moment.
The court attaches great significance to the jury’s request for further instruction. Admittedly, the judge answered the jury correctly. The judge had already correctly charged on the elements of armed robbery. He had already correctly instructed the jury on the law of joint criminal enterprise. He said that the Commonwealth must “prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the person that they allege is guilty on the theory of joint criminal venture with another was actively involved in the participation of the crime that was the object of the venture. That he shared the specific intent to see the successful completion of that crime. And that he actively did something in pursuance of that crime . . . .” This instruction is faithful to our law on joint criminal, enterprise. See Commonwealth v. Whitehead, 379 Mass. 640, 650-652 (1980). It is difficult to understand how the jury could conclude that Watson met these criteria for a joint undertaking if they found that he did not know that Clay had a gun and would use it, if necessary. It is even more difficult to believe on the overwhelming evidence in this case that Watson did not know of the gun.
A judge is not required to “instruct on every subsidiary fact and possible inference.” Commonwealth v. Chasson, 383 Mass. 183, 188 (1981). Further, it was open to Watson *550to argue to the jury that he did not know that Clay had a gun.
The requirement demanded by the court today is unreasonable, especially in light of the failure of defense counsel to request such an instruction before the charge and his failure to object to its omission after the charge.