Court Opinion

ID: 9748359
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 16:00:41.014322+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:34.330957
License: Public Domain

MARGARET GARNER MIRABAL, Justice,
dissenting.
The key to this case is the “Separation of Insureds” provision in the insurance *131policy. I agree with the majority that “Dallas Fire has no duty to defend King against the underlying allegations unless the Separation of Insureds provision requires a different result.” (Emphasis added.) I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the Separation of Insureds provision does not require a different result. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
The Facts
The insurance policy involved is a “Commercial General Liability Policy” obtained by a construction company to insure it against claims of liability arising out of its construction activities. It is undisputed that the claims involved in this case arose out of the activities of an employee of the construction company at a construction site. When the plaintiff sued the construction company, the company naturally looked to its commercial general liability insurer to defend against the claim that had arisen out of activities at its construction site.
The Insurance Policy
It is uncontested that the insurance company has a duty to defend the construction company if the plaintiffs bodily injury was caused by an “occurrence,” and if the construction company is not excluded from coverage under one of the policy exclusions. The policy defines “occurrence” as an “accident.” An event is an “accident” if it was unexpected or unanticipated from the standpoint of the insured. See Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Cowan, 945 S.W.2d 819, 827 (Tex.1997).
I agree with the majority that as to the employee, who was an additional named insured, and who intentionally assaulted the plaintiff, there was no “occurrence” as defined in the policy because there was no “accident” involved from the standpoint of the employee. However, the construction company was a separate named insured, and there is summary judgment evidence that it did not intend or anticipate the assault on the plaintiff.
According to the “Separation of Insureds” provision in the policy, the insurance applies:
a. As if each Named Insured were the only Named Insured; and
b. Separately to each insured against whom claim is made or suit is brought.
This provision is similar to the “severability of interest clause” we construed in Admiral Ins. Co. v. Trident NGL, Inc., 988 S.W.2d 451, 455-56 (Tex.App. —Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet denied).1 When a policy has such a clause, each insured against whom a claim is brought is treated as if he or she were the only insured under the policy. Commercial Standard Ins. Co. v. American Gen. Ins. Co., 455 S.W.2d 714, 721 (Tex.1970); Admiral, 988 S.W.2d at 455-56.
Treating the construction company in the present case as the only insured under the policy, a fact issue was raised as to whether the insurance company has a duty to defend the construction company. I reach this conclusion because there was evidence that the injury to plaintiff was caused by an event that was unexpected or unanticipated from the standpoint of the construction company. Accordingly, in my opinion, the trial court erred in entering summary judgment against King, the construction company.

. The "severability of interest clause” provided:
"Insured” means any person or organization qualifying as an Insured in the "Persons Insured” provision of the applicable insur-anee coverage. The insurance afforded applies separately to each Insured against whom claim is made or suit is brought, except with respect to the limits of the company’s liability.