Court Opinion

ID: 9865302
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 16:30:58.524946+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:38:23.700514
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Holland,
dissenting.
The statement of the case contained in the majority opinion is based upon the evidence permitted by the trial court to be introduced under a defective information. From such a statement of the issues, or from the evidence, the materiality of the alleged perjured testimony can be determined, but I challenge the ability of the writer of the majority opinion or any of the concurring Justices, to determine such materiality from the four corners of the information, and this the trial court was called upon to do when its sufficiency was challenged by demurrer. He could not look elsewhere.
On the question of the sufficiency of the information, in that the materiality of the alleged perjured testimony does not appear, there is no distinction, and I contend none can be made, between the case at bar and that of Treece v. People, 96 Colo. 32, 40 P. (2d) 233, which to date stands as the pronouncement of this court of the law upon that question.
Much reliance seems to be placed upon the following language of the opinion in Thompson v. People, 26 Colo. 496, 59 Pac. 51: “Nor is the information defective because of the failure to set forth how or in what way the evidence alleged to be false was material to the issue. It is well settled that it is sufficient if its materiality appears either from the facts alleged, or by direct averment. ’ ’
*319The majority seems convinced that these words, “It then and there became and was material to said issue and point in question between the parties aforesaid,” as used in the information, is a direct averment of materiality and meets the rule quoted from Thompson v. People, supra. It is not necessary to attempt to set forth how or in what manner the evidence is material, but the materiality must appear. The word “appears” is all-important in the above quotation from the Thompson case. There should be no misapprehension as to the meaning of the words ‘ ‘ direct averment. ’ ’ An averment is a positive statement of fact, as opposed to an argumentative or inferential one. Particular or direct averments are the assertions of particular facts. The majority opinion quotes section 6779, Compiled Laws of 1921, as follows: “In every indictment for perjury '* * * it shall be sufficient to set forth the substance of the offense charged. ’ ’ And then the opinion states, “We hold therefore that the materiality of the testimony charged to be perjured appears by averment.” The substance of the offense charged against this defendant was that he swore falsely. Section 6776, Compiled Laws of 1921, requires the false swearing to be “ * * * in a matter material to the issue or point in question. * * Are we to accept, as sufficient, the opinion or conclusion of the pleader in making the bare averment “That it then and there became and was material”? The majority opinion says, that “Prior to trial it is sufficient if materiality appear in the information in either of two ways: (a) By a setting forth of so much of the testimony or by a recital of such facts that the court can say as a matter of law that it was material, (b) By a direct averment that it was material, as in the instant ease, where it is stated in the language of the statute, * * * that ‘it then and there became and was material to said issue and point in question between the parties.’ ” This follows approval of the opinion in the Thompson case, which says, ‘ ‘ That on a trial for perjury *320the question of the materiality of the testimony is one of law for the court. ’ ’
According to the majority opinion, it seems from subdivision (a) that sufficient facts must be set forth to enable the court to say as a matter of law that it was material, and subdivision (b) indicates that the bare statement or conclusion of the pleader, without sufficient recital of facts, would be sufficient. This presents an inconsistency that I cannot accept as being the law.
The majority opinion further states that there was no possibility that the defendant could be misled, because what was lacking, as appeared from the face of the information, defendant could ascertain from the public record, available to him, and he also could determine from the record the materiality of the testimony charged to be perjured. Such requirements are not imposed upon defendants in criminal cases, and this statement in the opinion is equivalent to saying that the materiality does not sufficiently appear upon the face of the information, but intimates by way of direction, where the materiality may be determined, and that it would be from the record of the case to which reference is made, and not the information.
I respectfully dissent.
Me. Justice Hilliakd concurs in this dissenting opinion.