Court Opinion

ID: 9943665
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-24 00:01:06.831474+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:42.761358
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES ARMY COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

Before
WALKER, PENLAND, and MORRIS
Appellate Military Judges

UNITED STATES, Appellee
Vv.
Major DAVID J. RUDOMETKIN
United States Army, Appellant

ARMY 20180058

Headquarters, U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Command
Richard J. Henry, Military Judge (trial)
Jeffrey R. Nance, Military Judge (post-trial motion hearing)

Douglas K. Watkins, Military Judge (post-trial motion hearing)
Lieutenant Colonel Anthony C. Adolph, Staff Judge Advocate (pretrial)
Colonel Martha L. Foss, Staff Judge Advocate (post-trial)

Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Derner, Staff Judge Advocate (new review and action)

For Appellant: Captain Andrew R. Britt, JA; Jonathan F. Potter, Esquire; Philip D.
Cave, Esquire (on brief, reply brief, and petition for new trial).

For Appellee: Colonel Christopher B. Burgess, JA; Lieutenant Colonel Jacqueline J.
DeGaine, JA; Major Pamela L. Jones, JA (on brief and brief in opposition to petition
for new trial).

22 February 2024

MEMORANDUM OPINION ON REMAND AND
ACTION ON PETITION FOR NEW TRIAL

This opinion is issued as an unpublished opinion and, as such, does not serve as precedent.
Per Curiam:

This case is before us on remand from our superior court for further Article
66, Uniform Code of Military Justice, review. We address the issue of whether the
military judge lawfully used a proceeding in revision to address a post-trial
challenge to the statute of limitations for three specifications of rape of which
appellant had been convicted and subsequently revise appellant’s sentence upon
dismissing two specifications of rape. We hold that the military judge—while
improperly characterizing the post-trial hearing as a proceeding in revision—
possessed the authority to hold the hearing and affirm the findings and sentence.
RUDOMETKIN — ARMY 20180058
BACKGROUND
A. Appellant’s Offenses

Appellant’s offenses occurred during the course of two marriages and two
short-lived intimate relationships that spanned a period of fifteen years.! He was
charged with rape, sexual assault, and assault consummated by a battery upon his
first wife and aggravated sexual assault of his second wife. He was also charged
with assault consummated by a battery, during sexual intercourse, upon a female
with whom he had an intimate relationship. Lastly, appellant was charged with three
specifications of conduct unbecoming an officer for engaging in extramarital sexual
relationships with three women.”

On 2 February 2018, a military judge sitting as a general court-martial
convicted appellant, contrary to his pleas, of three specifications of rape occurring
prior to | October 2007, two specifications of aggravated sexual assault occurring
between 1 October 2007 and 27 June 2012, one specification of assault consummated
by a battery, and three specifications of conduct unbecoming an officer and
gentleman, in violation of Articles 120, 128, and 133, Uniform Code of Military
Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 920, 928, and 933 [UCMJ]. The military judge sentenced
appellant to a dismissal and twenty-five years’ confinement.

Four days after appellant’s trial, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
(CAAF) decided United States v. Mangahas, 77 M.J. 220 (C.A.A.F. 2018) (holding
that the death penalty is not a constitutionally available punishment for the offense
of rape, therefore, the offense of rape was not exempt from the five-year statute of
limitations under Article 43, UCMJ, if the offense occurred prior to 1 October 2007)
(emphasis added). On 12 March 2018, the military judge held a post-trial Article
39(a), UCMJ, session, at appellant’s request, based upon CAAF’s Mangahas
decision and its potential impact on rape offenses for which appellant was convicted.
Based upon the Mangahas decision, the military judge dismissed two specifications
of rape of which appellant had been convicted, occurring in 1999 and 2000, since the

' Our discussion of the facts and circumstances surrounding appellant’s convictions
is limited to those facts and circumstances necessary to resolve the issue addressed
herein.

? Appellant’s second wife left their marital home in August 2011 but the two of them
remained married until they divorced in June 2016. During the time that appellant
remained married to his second wife, he engaged in sexual relationships with his ex-
wife and two other females spanning a time frame from February 2013 until
November 2015.
RUDOMETKIN — ARMY 20180058

statute of limitations expired prior to those offenses being charged.*? The military
judge then denied appellant’s request for a mistrial as to sentencing and appellant’s
motion for the military judge to disqualify himself for resentencing. Acting
pursuant to Rule for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 1102, the military judge resentenced
appellant. After hearing only additional sentencing argument, the military judge
resentenced appellant to seventeen years’ confinement and a dismissal. The
convening authority approved the revised sentence.

B. Procedural History

Appellant was arraigned on 8 November 2016 and tried 30 January - 2
February 2018 at Redstone Arsenal, Alabama. During the course of appellant’s
court-martial, eight pretrial Article 39(a), UCMJ, sessions were conducted from
December 2016 through 31 January 2018 for purposes of litigating motions and
addressing other pretrial matters. Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Richard Henry was the
military judge at all proceedings in appellant’s case to include a post-trial Article
39(a) session on 12 March 2018. At one of these Article 39(a), UCMJ, sessions
prior to trial, LTC Henry stated on the record that he was not aware of any matter
that might be a ground for challenging him as the presiding judge. Neither the
prosecution nor the defense challenged or conducted voir dire of the military judge.

On 8 September 2018, at a post-trial Article 39(a), UCMJ, session, appellant
requested a mistrial asserting that the military judge should have recused himself
from appellant’s court-martial. The evidence demonstrated that from the fall of
2016 until he was eventually removed from the bench in April 2018, only a few
months after appellant’s court-martial, LTC Henry developed a very close and
intimate relationship with the wife of a junior officer serving as a prosecutor in his
jurisdiction. While there was no direct evidence uncovered that the relationship
between LTC Henry and a prosecutor’s wife became physically intimate, the
investigation concluded “the relationship created [an] appearance of impropriety.”
Appellant argued at the post-trial hearing that LTC Henry should have recused
himself from appellant’s court-martial given the similarity between LTC Henry’s
misconduct and the conduct unbecoming offenses for adultery of which appellant
was convicted. The new military judge detailed to appellant’s case denied
appellant’s motion for a mistrial.

In his appeal before this court, appellant raised five assignments of error,
having withdrawn one. Appellant also submitted matters pursuant to United States
v. Grostefon, 12 M.J. 431 (C.M.A. 1982). Having fully and fairly considered all of
appellant’s assignments of error—with the exception of the one addressed in this

3 The military judge dismissed Specifications 1 and 2 of Charge I.
RUDOMETKIN — ARMY 20180058

opinion—and the matters personally submitted pursuant to United States v.
Grostefon, 12 M.J. 431 (C.M.A. 1982), this court concluded that only one of
appellant’s assignments of error warranted both discussion and relief. United States
v. Rudometkin, ARMY 20180058, 2021 CCA LEXIS 596 (Army Ct. Crim. App. 9
Nov. 2021) (mem. op.). Specifically, we addressed appellant’s assertion that the
military judge should have recused himself from appellant’s case because a
reasonable person would question the military judge’s impartiality given his on-
going inappropriate relationship with a prosecutor’s wife while presiding over
appellant’s court-martial involving offenses of conduct unbecoming for engaging in
adulterous relationships. See R.C.M. 902; United States v. Kincheloe, 14 M.J. 40,
50 (C.M.A. 1982) (cleaned up). We held that a reasonable person would question
the military judge’s impartiality given facts elicited pertaining to the military
judge’s relationship with a prosecutor’s wife during the time of appellant’s trial.*
Rudometkin, 2021 CCA LEXIS 596, at *14. While we did not find that appellant
suffered material prejudice to a substantial right pursuant to Article 59(a), UCMJ,
we did hold that the military judge’s failure to disqualify himself required a remedy
in accordance with Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp. 486 U.S. 847,
862-64 (1988).° We thus set aside appellant’s findings and sentence and authorized
a rehearing.

The Judge Advocate General of the Army certified two issues in appellant’s
case to the CAAF. One of those issues was whether the military judge abused his
discretion in denying appellant’s request for a mistrial and concluding no relief was
warranted under Liljeberg. United States v. Rudometkin, 82 M.J. 396, 400 (C.A.A.F.
2022). The CAAF held that Military Judge Watkins did not abuse his discretion in
applying the three factors outlined in Liljeberg and concluded that “‘a reasonable
member of the public, knowing all the facts and circumstances, to include not only
this unique relationship, but the sentence, sentence reduction, and crux of the case as

* We applied a plain error analysis in determining whether the military judge was
disqualified in appellant’s case. United States v. Rudometkin, 2021 CCA LEXIS
596, at *9. Since appellant did not challenge LTC Henry until after his trial, we
applied the same standard of review as if appellant first raised this issue on appeal.
We did note, however, that even reviewing this case under an abuse of discretion
standard, we would have reached the same result.

> We found the third factor of Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp.
dispositive in concluding that a reasonable member of the public would lose
confidence in the judicial process given the military judge’s failure to disclose his
close and intimate relationship with a prosecutor’s wife while presiding over
appellant’s case for similar charges of conduct unbecoming for engaging in
adulterous relationships. Rudometkin, 2021 CCA LEXIS 596.
RUDOMETKIN — ARMY 20180058

well, would not lose confidence in the justice system.’” Jd. at 402. On 15 August
15, 2022, our superior court reversed this court’s decision and returned the record of
trial to the Judge Advocate General of the Army for remand to this court for further
review under Article 66, UCMJ. Id.

When this court conducted its initial Article 66, UCMJ, review of appellant’s
case we did not review the issue of whether the military judge could, as a matter of
law, revise appellant’s sentence after dismissing two specifications of rape in a post-
trial Article 39(a), UCMJ, session as it was rendered moot in light of our setting
aside the findings and sentence.®° Rudometkin, 2021 CCA LEXIS 596, at *4 n.4.
Now that appellant’s case is back with this court on remand, we will address this
issue, finding that it merits discussion but no relief. We also fully and fairly
considered appellant’s assignment of error on remand and find that it merits neither
discussion nor relief.

LAW AND DISCUSSION
A. Proceedings in Revision

Proceedings in revision preceded the UCMJ and are only authorized in limited
circumstances. See Dep’t of Army, Pam. 27-175-1, Military Justice Review of
Courts-Martial, § 7, (29 Jun. 1962). Congress incorporated proceedings in revision
into the Uniform Code of Military Justice in 1950. UCMJ art. 62, 10 U.S.C. § 862
(1950) [UCMJ, 1950]. While the statute only referenced the convening authority’s
ability to order a proceeding in revision, the 1951 Manual for Courts-Martial
provided the court the authority, on its own motion, to order a proceeding in
revision. Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (1951 ed.) [MCM], ch. XV,
{80.c.

Congress narrowly limited the scope of proceedings in revision by directing
that a revision only be utilized in those instances in which a court-martial could
reconsider an issue “without material prejudice to the substantial rights of the
accused... .” UCMJ art. 62, 1950. See also United States v. Carpenter, 15
U.S.C.M.A. 526, 528-29, 36 C.M.R. 24, 26-27 (1965); United States v. Roman, 22
U.S.C.M.A. 78, 79-80, 46 C.M.R. 78, 79-80 (1972). The Army Court of Military
Review previously held that proceedings in revision are limited to correcting errors
that are not substantive. United States v. Jackson, 34 M.J. 1145, 1151 (A.C.M.R.
1992) (citation omitted) (holding that “[p]roceedings in revision cannot be used to

° While we recognize that appellant requested to withdraw this assignment of error
in supplemental briefing, we will address this issue under our plenary review
authority under Article 66, UCMJ.
RUDOMETKIN — ARMY 20180058

reopen a case, or to consider newly-discovered evidence and then to change the
findings and sentence”). For example, proceedings in revision are not authorized for
purposes of reconsidering a finding of not guilty or increasing the severity of an
accused’s sentence that was erroneously announced by the panel unless the sentence
prescribed for the offense was mandatory. UCM] art. 62, 1950; see also United
States v. Baker, 32 M.J. 290, 293 (C.M.A. 1991) (holding that "after a court-martial
has announced the sentence and adjourned, the sentence cannot be increased upon
reassembly” unless the sentence is mandatory). On the other hand, sentences can be
corrected downward in proceedings in revision. Jd. at 292-93. Omitted panel
instructions on the sentence has also been held to be “substantially different from
the type of corrective action appropriate in revision proceedings.” Roman, 22
U.S.C.M.A. at 81, 46 C.M.R. at 81 (holding that a fault in instructions is a
substantive error not correctable by proceedings in revision) (cleaned up). Use of
proceedings in revision to correct substantive errors in instructing the panel on a
defense raised by the evidence has also been held to be an improper use of such
proceedings. United States v. Chandler, 74 M.J. 674, 684 (Army Ct. Crim. App.
2015). Proceedings in revision are intended to be utilized for “correction of the
record to reflect unintended omissions, to clarify ambiguities, and to correct
improper or illegal sentence announcements, the alteration of which does not
materially prejudice the substantial rights of the accused.” Roman, 22 U.S.C.M.A.
at 81, 46 C.M.R. at 81.

Congress has left proceedings in revision relatively unchanged since the
passage of the UCMJ. At the time of appellant’s court-martial in 2018, a proceeding
in revision was authorized “to correct an apparent error, omission, or improper or
inconsistent action by the court-martial, which can be rectified by reopening the
proceedings without material prejudice to the accused.” R.C.M. 1102, MCM, 2016.
In appellant’s case, the military judge ordered a proceeding in revision to address a
post-trial defense motion for mistrial on three specifications of rape of which
appellant had been found guilty.’ The motion asserted that the statute of limitations
had run prior to trial on those specifications given our superior court’s decision in
United States v. Mangahas, 77 M.J. 220 (C.A.A.F. 2018), an opinion released mere
days after appellant’s court-martial.’ In Mangahas, our superior court held that the
death penalty was not a constitutionally permissible punishment for the offense of
rape. Id. at 224-25. This decision resulted in a five-year statute of limitations for
rape offenses that occurred prior to the 2007 Congressional changes to Article 43,

7“*A proceeding in revision, unlike a mistrial, does not amount to a withdrawal of
the charges.’” United States v. Jackson, 34 M.J. 1145, 1151 (A.C.M.R. 1992)
(quoting United States v. Wilson, 27 M.J. 555, 558 (A.C.M.R. 1988)).

® This decision was later overruled by United States v. Briggs, 141 S. Ct. 467 (2020).
RUDOMETKIN — ARMY 20180058

UCM]. Id. at 222-25. In this case, appellant was charged with two specifications of
rape occurring in 1999 and 2000 which did not reach the summary court-martial
convening authority until 2016, several years after the expiration of the five-year
statute of limitations.” The military judge granted the defense motion for mistrial as
to Specifications 1 and 2 of Charge I by setting aside the findings of guilty and
dismissing both specifications.

The first issue for this court is whether the military judge erred in using a
proceeding in revision to address the defense motion for a mistrial. We find the use
of a proceeding in revision to address whether certain specifications had been
referred to a court-martial beyond the statute of limitations was not an authorized
action within the limitations of a proceedings in revision. We first note that the
state of the law at the time of appellant’s court-martial was that there was no statute
of limitations for the offense of rape. We can only presume that is the reason for the
defense failure to raise a statute of limitations issue prior to, and during, the trial
proceedings. Therefore, there was no error for the military judge to correct when
the defense filed a post-trial motion to dismiss certain specifications for a statute of
limitations issue that arose after the trial due to a newly issued court decision.
Under the facts of this case, there was no error, omission, or improper action by the
court-martial when it occurred that required correction. The military judge’s
characterization of the post-trial hearing as a “proceeding in revision” was an
unauthorized use of such a proceeding and an inaccurate manner of addressing the
defense post-trial motion. The binding precedent of this court and our superior court
prohibits a proceeding in revision in these circumstances.

B. Post-trial Hearing and Motion for Mistrial

Despite the military judge’s improper characterization of the post-trial
hearing as a proceeding in revision, we hold that the military judge appropriately
held a post-trial Article 39(a) hearing for the purpose of addressing the defense
motion for a mistrial. As this court and our sister service courts have recognized,
the military judge’s characterization of a court session as a proceeding in revision or
a post-trial session is not determinative of its nature. Jackson, 34 M.J. at 1151
(citing United States v. Dorsey, 26 M.J. 538, 540 (A.F.C.M.R. 1988); United States
v. Scaff, 26 M.J. 985, 988 (A.F.C.M.R. 1988)) (citation omitted).

Rule for Courts-Martial 905(h) generally addresses written motions and states,
in part: “[u]pon request, either party is entitled to an Article 39(a) session to present
oral argument or have an evidentiary hearing concerning the disposition of written

? Receipt of sworn charges and specifications by the summary court-martial
convening authority tolls the statute of limitations. UCMJ, art. 43(b)(1).
RUDOMETKIN — ARMY 20180058

motions.” R.C.M. 905(h), MCM, 2016. Further, R.C.M. 915(b) states that upon a
motion for mistrial “the military judge shall inquire into the views of the parties on
the matter... .” (emphasis added). R.C.M. 915(b), MCM, 2016. We also
recognize that R.C.M. 1102(b)(2) in effect at the time of appellant’s trial authorized
a military judge to call an Article 39(a) session for “resolving any matter that arises
after trial and that substantially affects the legal sufficiency of any findings of guilty
or the sentence.” R.C.M. 1102(b)(2), MCM, 2016. Our superior court has held that,
prior to authentication the record of trial,!° if

[A] military judge becomes aware of an error which has
prejudiced the rights of the accused — whether this error
involves jury misconduct, misleading instructions, or
insufficient evidence — he may take remedial action on
behalf of the accused without awaiting an order therefor
by an appellate court.

United States v. Griffith, 27 M.J. 42, 47 (C.M.A. 1988) (emphasis in original). See
also United States v. Brickey, 16 M.J. 258, 263 (C.M.A. 1983) (holding that a
military judge “misconceived the scope of the powers available to him after the trial
had ended” because “the powers of a military judge do not cease with the court-
martial’s announcement of the sentence”).

Based upon the broad authority given to a military judge by (1) Article 39,
UCMgJ, to call a court into session, (2) the mandate to inquire into the view of the
parties prescribed in R.C.M. 915, and (3) the right to be heard in accordance with
R.C.M. 905, the military judge was well within his authority to address appellant’s
motion for mistrial in a post-trial hearing.

We now turn to whether the military judge erred in his resolution of
appellant’s motion for mistrial. As our superior court has recognized, “[a] military
judge has considerable latitude in determining when to grant a mistrial.” United
States v. Diaz, 59 M.J. 79, 90 (C.A.A.F. 2003) (citation and internal quotations
omitted). This court reviews a military judge’s decision on whether to grant a
mistrial for abuse of discretion. Jd. (citation omitted).

We hold that the military judge did not abuse his discretion in granting
appellant’s motion for mistrial as to Specifications 1 and 2 of Charge I by setting
aside the findings of guilty and dismissing those two specifications. See R.C.M.

'© We note this case occurred prior to significant changes in post-trial procedures
implemented by Military Justice Act of 2016. See National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2017, Pub. L. 114-328 §§ 5321-5330 (23 Dec. 2016).
RUDOMETKIN — ARMY 20180058

915(a) (authorizing a mistrial as to just some of the charges). Based upon our
superior court’s decision in Mangahas, which was the controlling law at the time of
the military judge’s ruling, the five-year statute of limitations for those
specifications had expired by the time those charges were referred to trial in October
2016.'' The military judge properly denied appellant’s motion for mistrial as to
Specification 3 of Charge I alleging appellant committed the offense of rape between
1 May 2007 and 30 June 2007. The military judge properly recognized that
Congress amended Article 43, UCM], effective 1 October 2007, which mandated that
there was no statute of limitations for murder, rape, or any other offense punishable
by death. See Pub. L. 109-163, §553(a), 119 Stat. 3264 (2006). Given that this
statutory language specifically outlined rape as an offense with no statute of
limitations, the rape offense for Specification 3 which was alleged to have occurred
was beyond the scope of the decision in Mangahas. The military judge properly
applied the state of the law at the time of his ruling and did not abuse his discretion
in dismissing Specifications 1 and 2 of Charge I.

C. Revision of Appellant’s Sentence

We must now consider whether the military judge erred by correcting
appellant’s sentence during the post-trial hearing.'? We find no error in the military
judge’s revising appellant’s sentence during the post-trial Article 39(a) after having
set aside findings of guilt on two specifications of rape. Even if the military judge
erred, appellant did not suffer any prejudice.

Once the military judge set aside the findings of guilty as to two
specifications of rape, there was a substantial issue as to the previously imposed
sentence of a dismissal and twenty-five years confinement which accounted for two
dismissed specifications of rape. We find this constituted a matter that substantially
affected the sentence and required remedial action. Defense counsel objected to the
military judge revising appellant’s sentence without a new sentencing hearing.

'' Specification 1 alleged the offense of rape occurring in October 1999 and
Specification 2 alleged the offense of rape occurring in November 2000.

2 We note that at certain points in the appellate briefs both parties characterize the
military judge’s sentence revision as a “reassessment.” Historically, sentence
reassessment is a principle applicable only to appellate authorities such as prior
boards of review and, currently, courts of criminal appeals. See UCM] art. 66;
Jackson v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 569, 577 (1957); United States v. Winckelmann, 73 M.J.
11, 12 (C.A.A.F. 2013). In limited circumstances, convening authorities have also
been authorized to reassess a sentence when authorized by a superior competent
authority. R.C.M. 1107(e)(2)(B)(iii), MCM, 2016.
RUDOMETKIN — ARMY 20180058

Defense counsel further requested the military judge recuse himself from imposing a
new sentence given he had heard evidence of the dismissed rape offenses. The
military judge denied both requests. In ruling on the motion for a new sentencing
hearing, the military judge properly noted on the record that because the post-trial
session was convened under R.C.M. 1102, appellant’s sentence could only be
decreased. R.C.M. 1102(c)(3), MCM, 2016. We note that defense counsel did not
assert any erroneously admitted evidence or other substantive errors in the
sentencing proceedings as justification for a new sentencing proceeding. In denying
the recusal request, the military judge stated that he would disregard all evidence
and testimony in both findings and presentencing proceedings pertaining to the two
dismissed rape offenses. See United States v. Erickson, 65 M.J. 221, 225 (C.A.A.F.
2007) (citation omitted) (“Military judges are presumed to know the law and to
follow it absent clear evidence to the contrary.”). The military judge did not allow
the parties to present any new testimony or evidence before determining appellant’s
sentence. However, the military judge did allow both parties to argue anew as to
what an appropriate sentence was given the change in appellant’s convictions. The
military judge then sentenced appellant to a dismissal and seventeen years
confinement, thereby reducing appellant’s confinement by eight years.

We find that the military judge acted within his authority pursuant to R.C.M.
1102(b)(2) to correct appellant’s sentence. While this case involved an unusual
situation of a military judge setting aside findings of guilty in a post-trial session,
once that occurred the military judge prudently addressed the issue of appellant’s
sentence. Certainly, the original adjudged sentence could not stand when it included
consideration of two rape offenses, subsequently dismissed, of which each carried a
life sentence. We have previously “endorse[d] such initiative-taking by military
judges” finding that “[s]uch an approach is crucial in our justice system, which
favors resolution of disputed issues at trial.” United States v. Chandler, 74 M.J.
674, 683-84 (Army Ct. Crim. App. 2015) (commending a military judge’s efforts in
holding a proceeding in revision to address a panel instructional error in sentencing
but reversing because the military judge’s actions amounted to a sentencing
rehearing before the same panel in violation of Article 63, UCM)J).

We note that our system’s range of post-trial options for addressing
appellant’s flawed sentence is very limited. The convening authority was restricted
from disapproving, commuting, or suspending any portion of appellant’s
confinement or dismissal. R.C.M. 1107(d)(1)(B), MCM, 2016. The convening
authority was also prohibited from ordering a rehearing on the sentence because the
initial adjudged sentence included a dismissal and confinement for more than six
months. R.C.M. 1107(e)(1), MCM, 2016. Nor could the convening authority
reassess the sentence unless a superior competent authority, such as this court,
affirmed the findings of guilty and authorized a rehearing as to the sentence.
R.C.M. 1107(e)(2)(B)(iii), MCM, 2016. In essence, the only available options were

10
RUDOMETKIN — ARMY 20180058

for the military judge to revise the sentence or declare a mistrial as to the sentence
and order a sentence rehearing.

We find that the military judge did not abuse his discretion in denying
appellant’s request for a mistrial as to the sentence and revising appellant’s sentence
during the post-trial session. A mistrial should only occur “when such action is
manifestly necessary in the interest of justice because of circumstances arising
during the proceedings which cast substantial doubt upon the fairness of the
proceedings.” R.C.M. 915(a). It is a “drastic remedy” that should only be necessary
“to prevent a miscarriage of justice.” United States v. Harris, 51 M.J. 191, 196
(C.A.A.F. 1999) (quoting United States v. Garces, 32 M.J. 345, 349 (C.M.A. 1991))
(internal quotation marks omitted). “‘Manifest necessity’ is not a clearly defined
concept in military jurisprudence.” United States v. Cabrera, 83 M.J. 562, 571
(N.M. Ct. Crim. App. 2023). However, our superior court has provided some
guidance by identifying a non-exhaustive list of factors in determining whether
manifest necessity exists: “the timing of the incident leading to the question of a
mistrial, the identity of the factfinder, the reasons for the mistrial, and potential
alternative remedies; but, most importantly, the desires of and the impact on the
defendant.” Harris, 51 M.J. at 196 (citation omitted). In this case, the incident
leading to the request for a mistrial for sentencing occurred after adjournment of the
court-martial because of a higher court decision. The reason for the defense request
for a mistrial was based solely upon the dismissal of two offenses and not due to
errors or improperly admitted evidence during the presentencing hearing. A military
judge served as the fact finder for the court-martial and is presumed to follow the
law and be able to disregard evidence that should not be considered for purposes of
adjudging an appropriate sentence. The potential alternatives to declaring a mistrial
for sentencing were limited; however, one reasonable option was what occurred
here. Considering there was no alleged error that occurred during the presentencing
hearing and the factors outlined by our superior court, we do not find that a mistrial
for sentencing was manifestly necessary. As such, the military judge did not abuse
his discretion in denying the defense request for a mistrial as to sentencing.

We also find appellant was not prejudiced by the military judge’s revising
appellant’s sentence. Appellant had been afforded a presentencing hearing in which
he presented matters in mitigation and extenuation. We find no substantive errors in
appellant’s presentencing proceedings before the military judge. We also note that
on appeal before this court, appellant has not asserted any prejudice due to the
military judge’s sentence revision. Further, the military judge made clear on the
record that he would disregard all evidence and testimony, both on findings and
during the presentencing proceedings, that pertained to the dismissed rape
specifications. After dismissal of two specifications of rape, appellant remained
convicted of one specification of rape, two specifications of aggravated sexual
assault, one specification of assault consummated by a battery, and three
specifications of conduct unbecoming an officer for extra-marital sexual

11
RUDOMETKIN — ARMY 20180058

relationships. Appellant received a one-third reduction in his sentence to
confinement when the judge revised his confinement from twenty-five years to
seventeen years. We do not find appellant suffered prejudice by an eight-year
reduction in his sentence to confinement.

Even if the military judge improperly revised appellant’s sentence and should
have sent appellant’s record to the convening authority for action, the convening
authority had no ability to alter appellant’s sentence as we have already discussed.
The only remedy at that point would have been to allow this court to reassess
appellant’s sentence during our Article 66, UCMJ, review or order a sentencing
rehearing. Having considered the entire record, we conclude we are able to reassess
the sentence and do so in accordance with the principles articulated by our superior
court in United States v. Sales, 22 M.J. 305, 307-08 (C.M.A. 1986) and United
States v. Winckelmann, 73 M.J. 11, 15-16 (C.A.A.F. 2013). We recognize this case
was tried by a military judge alone, which favors reassessment by this court. United
States v. Adams, 74 M.J. 589, 593 (Army Ct. Crim. App. 2015) (finding
reassessment appropriate, in part, because a judge alone sentenced the appellant).
After dismissal of two rape offenses, appellant remains convicted of one
specification of rape, two specifications of aggravated sexual assault, one
specification of assault consummated by a battery, and three specifications of
conduct unbecoming an officer for extra-marital sexual relationships. Based on our
experience as judges on this court, we are familiar with these offenses. Having
conducted this reassessment, we affirm appellant’s sentence to dismissal and
seventeen years confinement.

CONCLUSION
The findings of guilty and the sentence are AFFIRMED. The Petition for New
Trial is DENIED.

FOR THE COURT:

JAMES W. HERRING, JR.
Clerk of Court

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