Court Opinion

ID: 9673582
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:14:50.727546+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:22.918429
License: Public Domain

TEAGUE, Judge,
dissenting.
There are many things in our criminal justice system and in our statutes that may appear facially to be ridiculous or illogical. But, that does not mean that this Court should legislate when our sole function is to adjudicate.
This statute is mandatory and the majority recognizes this in its opinion, but because it is a “ridiculous” law, by its opinion, we are asked to nullify this Court’s past decisions and allow the prosecutor to supplement this record, at this late date, by pulling a document from his file that purports to meet the requirements of the statute. This is not what the statute permits as it requires in part: “... and the consent and approval of the attorney representing the State shall be in writing, signed by him, and filed in the papers of the cause before the defendant enters his plea.” (Emphasis underscored.) Where do we draw the line on mandatory statutes? If we, as judges, believe that the law needs changing, then there is a forum approximately 200 yards from our front door called the Legislature where we might go and request the law be changed because it is “ridiculous.” But it is not our function to act in the place of that body, which is what the majority asks us to do by this opinion.
When a statute mandatorily requires a written waiver to be signed by the prosecuting attorney, but there is, as here, no evidence indicating that such waiver was signed and filed in the papers of the cause, the conviction should be reversed, if the case is on direct appeal, or a post conviction writ of habeas corpus should be granted if the issue is raised collaterally. That is what the statute demands and we have no power or authority to change that law, albeit its ridiculousness.
I dissent with all the vigor at my command to this proposed legislative action on the part of this Court.