Court Opinion

ID: 9368946
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-07 17:00:30.248648+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:11.883104
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-12075    Document: 26-1      Date Filed: 02/07/2023   Page: 1 of 11

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-12075
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiff-Appellee,
        versus
        JOSE ANTONIO CANARIO-VILOMAR,

                                                    Defendant-Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of Florida
                     D.C. Docket No. 1:22-cr-20019-BB-3
                           ____________________
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                22-12075

        Before WILSON, LUCK, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
                Jose Antonio Canario‑Vilomar appeals his sentence of
        110 months’ imprisonment for conspiracy to possess with intent to
        distribute more than 5 kilograms of cocaine on a vessel subject to
        the jurisdiction of the United States. Canario‑Vilomar makes three
        arguments on appeal. First, Canario‑Vilomar contends that the dis-
        trict court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the relevant ves-
        sel because the government did not provide a certification from the
        Secretary of State under 46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(2). Second, Ca-
        nario‑Vilomar argues that the district court erred in determining
        the amount of cocaine involved for purposes of his sentence calcu-
        lation. Third, Canario‑Vilomar claims that the district court erred
        by denying him a minor role adjustment under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2.
              After careful review, we affirm Canario‑Vilomar’s sentence.
               I.     FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
               The government alleges the following facts. On or about
        December 6, 2021, a Dutch DH-8 Maritime Patrol Aircraft located
        a go-fast vessel (the “Vessel”) approximately 145 nautical miles
        north of La Guajira, Colombia, in international waters and upon
        the high seas. This prompted the HNLMS Holland, manned by the
        United States Coast Guard, to investigate the Vessel. Canario-Vi-
        lomar, his brother, and another individual were aboard the Vessel.
        Upon the arrival of the Coast Guard, one of the three individuals
        on board claimed Dominican Republic nationality for the Vessel.
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        22-12075              Opinion of the Court                       3

        That individual was identified as the master of the Vessel. The
        Coast Guard then contacted the authorities of the Dominican Re-
        public, which expressed that they could neither confirm nor deny
        registry of the Vessel. Thus, the Coast Guard treated the Vessel as
        a stateless vessel under 46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(1)(C) and conducted a
        full law enforcement boarding. At that point, the Coast Guard lo-
        cated on the Vessel nineteen bales and three individual packages
        containing cocaine. The Coast Guard recovered another ten bales
        from the jettison field. Following these discoveries, the Coast
        Guard transported the three individuals to the Southern District of
        Florida for prosecution.
               The government filed a criminal complaint on December
        16, 2021, finding probable cause to charge the three individuals
        with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms
        or more of cocaine while on board a vessel subject to the jurisdic-
        tion of the United States in violation of 46 U.S.C. § 70506(b).
              On January 20, 2022, a grand jury returned a two-count in-
        dictment against the three defendants, charging them with conspir-
        acy to possess cocaine aboard a vessel in violation of 46 U.S.C.
        § 70506(b) (Count 1) and possession with intent to distribute co-
        caine aboard a vessel in violation of 46 U.S.C. § 70503(a)(1)
        (Count 2).
               Around two months later, all three defendants entered
        guilty pleas. Along with his guilty plea, Canario-Vilomar filed a
        factual proffer. In that proffer, Canario-Vilomar agreed that the
        government would have been able to prove beyond a reasonable
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                 22-12075

        doubt the version of events discussed above—i.e., that the Coast
        Guard approached the Vessel on December 6, 2021; that one of the
        three individuals on board claimed Dominican Republic national-
        ity for the Vessel, but authorities from the Dominican Republic
        could neither confirm nor deny the Vessel’s registration; that the
        Coast Guard subsequently seized nineteen bales and three pack-
        ages from the Vessel, along with ten bales from the jettison field,
        which testified positive for the presence of cocaine; and that the
        volume, packaging, and transportation of the cocaine was con-
        sistent with the intent to distribute.
               On April 7, 2022, the three defendants jointly moved to
        withdraw their guilty pleas and dismiss the indictment. In that mo-
        tion, the defendants challenged jurisdiction by arguing that 46
        U.S.C. § 70502(d)(1)(C) is facially unconstitutional. The district
        court denied the motion in full.
               On June 10, 2022, the district court entered judgment against
        Canario-Vilomar on Count 1—i.e., conspiracy to possess cocaine
        aboard a vessel in violation of 46 U.S.C. § 70506(b)—and sentenced
        him to 110 months in prison followed by two years of supervised
        release. The district court dismissed Count 2—i.e., possession with
        intent to distribute cocaine aboard a vessel in violation of 46 U.S.C.
        § 70503(a)(1)—on the government’s motion.
                Canario-Vilomar subsequently filed a timely notice of ap-
        peal.
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        22-12075                 Opinion of the Court                        5

                        II.      STANDARDS OF REVIEW
                “We review a district court’s interpretation and application
        of a statute concerning its subject-matter jurisdiction de novo, but
        we review factual findings with respect to jurisdiction for clear er-
        ror.” United States v. Cruickshank, 837 F.3d 1182, 1187 (11th Cir.
        2016). “We review for clear error a district court’s determination
        of the drug quantity attributable to a defendant,” United States v.
        Azmat, 805 F.3d 1018, 1046 (11th Cir. 2015), as well as a district
        court’s denial of a role reduction, United States v. Valois, 915 F.3d
        717, 731 (11th Cir. 2019). Under the clear error standard, “we will
        not disturb a district court’s findings unless we are left with a defi-
        nite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Id.
                                   III.   ANALYSIS
               As previewed, Canario‑Vilomar’s arguments on appeal con-
        cern subject-matter jurisdiction, the district court’s determination
        of the amount of cocaine attributable to him, and the district
        court’s denial of a minor role adjustment. We address these argu-
        ments in turn.
                               A. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
               Under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act, a vessel
        without nationality is subject to the jurisdiction of the United
        States. 46 U.S.C. § 70502(c)(1)(A). The statute defines a “vessel
        without nationality” to include “a vessel aboard which the master
        or individual in charge makes a claim of registry and for which the
        claimed nation of registry does not affirmatively and unequivocally
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                 22-12075

        assert that the vessel is of its nationality.”             46 U.S.C.
        § 70502(d)(1)(C). The statute clarifies that the response by a
        claimed nation of registry “may be made by radio, telephone, or
        similar oral or electronic means, and is proved conclusively by cer-
        tification of the Secretary of State or the Secretary’s designee.” 46
        U.S.C. § 70502(d)(2).
                Canario‑Vilomar contends that the government failed to
        meet its burden of establishing subject-matter jurisdiction—and
        that the district court erred by finding otherwise—because the gov-
        ernment neither produced nor claimed the existence of a certifica-
        tion from the Secretary of State confirming the Dominican Repub-
        lic’s response on December 6, 2021. But as this Court has ex-
        plained, the notion that the government “must produce a certifica-
        tion when subject-matter jurisdiction is based on [46 U.S.C. §
        70502(d)(1)(C)] is unsupported by the language of [46 U.S.C. §
        70502(d)(2)].” United States v. Cabezas-Montano, 949 F.3d 567, 589
        n.15 (11th Cir. 2020) (emphasis added). “While a certification pro-
        vides conclusive proof of the foreign nation’s response, [46 U.S.C.
        § 70502(d)(2)] does not state that the response cannot be proven by
        other means.” Id.
                In this case, Canario‑Vilomar’s factual proffer confirms that,
        when the Coast Guard approached the Vessel, one of the three in-
        dividuals on board “made a verbal claim of Dominican Republic
        nationality for the [Vessel]” and that authorities from the Domini-
        can Republic “advised [that they] could not confirm nor deny reg-
        istration of the [Vessel].” That proffer, along with the affidavit of
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        22-12075               Opinion of the Court                         7

        Alec M. Sanchez and the other record evidence, provided a suffi-
        cient basis for the district court to determine that the Vessel satis-
        fied 46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(1)(C) and therefore subject-matter juris-
        diction exists. We find no error on this point.
                                B. Amount of Cocaine
                For sentencing purposes, “[t]he government bears the bur-
        den of establishing drug quantity by a preponderance of the evi-
        dence.” Azmat, 805 F.3d at 1046. To meet that burden, the gov-
        ernment must “present[] reliable and specific evidence.” United
        States v. Almedina, 686 F.3d 1312, 1315 (11th Cir. 2012). In this
        case, the district court found the government’s showing sufficient
        to establish that Canario‑Vilomar was responsible for at least 450
        kilograms of cocaine. This determination was based on, among
        other things, the DEA 7 report produced by the government,
        which states that the property seized had a gross weight of 561.7
        kilograms and includes an inventory listing 493 kilogram-sized
        bricks.
              Canario‑Vilomar contends that the district court’s determi-
        nation was clear error for several reasons. First, Canario‑Vilomar
        argues that the DEA 7 constituted hearsay and therefore, in order
        to consider it, the district court was required to make a finding
        about its reliability. During the sentencing hearing, however, Ca-
        nario‑Vilomar acknowledged the DEA 7 as “a reliable document.”
        Thus, any error on this point was invited by Canario‑Vilomar and
        does not warrant reversal. See United States v. Stone, 139 F.3d 822,
        838 (11th Cir. 1998) (“The doctrine of invited error is implicated
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                22-12075

        when a party induces or invites the district court into making an
        error.”); Ford ex rel. Est. of Ford v. Garcia, 289 F.3d 1283, 1294
        (11th Cir. 2002) (“Where invited error exists, it precludes a court
        from ‘invoking the plain error rule and reversing.’” (quoting United
        States v. Davis, 443 F.2d 560, 564–65 (5th Cir. 1971))).
               Next, Canario‑Vilomar argues that the amount offered by
        the government, 561.7 kilograms, was the gross weight of all the
        containers—meaning it “include[d] the weight of the boxes, pallets,
        and packing.” But given that this gross weight greatly exceeds 450
        kilograms, and considering the inventory included in the DEA 7
        report and the rest of the evidence in the record, we do not find
        that the district court clearly erred by concluding that Canario‑Vi-
        lomar was responsible for at least 450 kilograms of cocaine.
                Finally, although the proffer recognizes that the govern-
        ment recovered ten bales from the jettison field, Canario‑Vilomar
        insists that the proffer does not connect him to those bales in any
        way and therefore he cannot be held responsible for the cocaine
        contained in those bales. This argument is unavailing. Given the
        factual details and circumstances described in the proffer, along
        with the rest of the evidence, the district court did not clearly err
        by including the ten bales recovered from the jettison field in its
        drug quantity determination.
                              C. Minor Role Adjustment
               The Sentencing Guidelines provide that a defendant is enti-
        tled to a two‑level decrease in his offense level if he was a minor
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        22-12075               Opinion of the Court                        9

        participant in any criminal activity. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b). A minor
        participant is one who is substantially less culpable than the aver-
        age participant in the criminal activity and less culpable than most
        other participants in the criminal activity. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, com-
        ment. (n.3(A), 5). Thus, as we recognized in United States v. De
        Varon, 175 F.3d 930, 940 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc), two principles
        guide the determination of whether a defendant constitutes a mi-
        nor participant: (1) the defendant’s role in the relevant conduct and
        (2) the defendant’s role compared to that of the other participants.
               Furthermore, “[i]n 2015, the Sentencing Commission
        amended § 3B1.2’s commentary to provide additional guidance re-
        garding the minor role reduction.” United States v. Presendieu,
        880 F.3d 1228, 1249 (11th Cir. 2018). According to that amend-
        ment, district courts should also consider (1) “the degree to which
        the defendant understood the scope and structure of the criminal
        activity”; (2) “the degree to which the defendant participated in
        planning or organizing the criminal activity”; (3) “the degree to
        which the defendant exercised decision-making authority or influ-
        enced the exercise of decision-making authority”; (4) “the nature
        and extent of the defendant’s participation in the commission of
        the criminal activity, including the acts the defendant performed
        and the responsibility and discretion the defendant had in perform-
        ing those acts”; and (5) “the degree to which the defendant stood
        to benefit from the criminal activity.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, comment.
        (n.3(C)).
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        10                      Opinion of the Court                 22-12075

               As these authorities indicate, the determination of whether
        a defendant is entitled to this reduction is a “fact‑intensive inquiry”
        based on the totality of the circumstances. See De Varon, 175 F.3d
        at 940–46. And “[t]he defendant bears the burden of establishing
        his minor role in the offense by a preponderance of the evidence.”
        Cruickshank, 837 F.3d at 1192.
                In this case, Canario‑Vilomar sought a minor role adjust-
        ment on the grounds that he (1) came from a poor family; (2) was
        not the master of the Vessel; (3) was not the “intellectual author”
        of the criminal offense; (4) was not going to receive “a greater por-
        tion of the proceeds”; (5) had no prior association with any of the
        individuals who provided the cocaine; and (6) was brought into the
        situation “by a father and a brother who had done this before.” The
        district court denied Canario‑Vilomar’s request, and Canario‑Vi-
        lomar now claims that this denial constituted clear error. We dis-
        agree. The district court recognized that Canario‑Vilomar was less
        culpable than “the major transporters and owners of the [cocaine],”
        but noted and underscored that Canario‑Vilomar presented no ev-
        idence that meaningfully distinguished the role he played in the
        charged offense from the roles played by the other two individuals
        aboard the Vessel. Given the absence of such evidence, the district
        court did not clearly err by concluding that Canario‑Vilomar failed
        to meet the burden of establishing his minor role in the criminal
        activity.
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        22-12075             Opinion of the Court                   11

                            IV.    CONCLUSION
             For these reasons, we affirm Canario‑Vilomar’s sentence of
        110 months’ imprisonment.
              AFFIRMED.