Court Opinion

ID: 9782511
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 18:54:02.66309+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:35:04.199117
License: Public Domain

CHIEF JUSTICE KILBRIDE, specially concurring: I agree with the opinion’s analysis in this appeal. As the author of People v. Patrick, 233 Ill. 2d 62 (2009), I write separately to voice my disagreement with Justice Carman’s special concurrence. Respectfully, the special concurrence has, regrettably, misconstrued Patrick’s harmless-error analysis. In conducting the harmless-error analysis in Patrick, we pointed out that the State has the burden of proving that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Patrick, 233 Ill. 2d at 75 (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)). Chapman focused on whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence might have contributed to the conviction or affected a party’s substantial rights. This court’s focus in Patrick was on how a delay in the trial court’s ruling on a defendant’s motion in limine would affect the defendant’s decision whether to testify and the impact of the trial court’s delayed ruling. We determined that, as a result of the trial court’s unjustified delay in ruling on Patrick’s motion in limine, Patrick was required to make a tactical decision without the ability to evaluate the impact it would have on his defense and was, therefore, “substantially prejudiced.” Patrick, 233 Ill. 2d at 75. We then examined the impact of the use of the convictions on Patrick’s testimony and, applying the Chapman standard, held that the trial court’s error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Patrick, 233 Ill. 2d at 76. The special concurrence presents two problems. First, the special concurrence turns the harmless-error analysis into a balancing test of harmless versus not harmless error when it criticizes the opinion for not stating “whether [defendant’s need to testify] weighs for or against a finding of harmless error.” 241 Ill. 2d at 35 (Garman, J., specially concurring, joined by Thomas, Karmeier and Theis, JJ.). This is not the proper test. Rather, the State bears the burden of proving that the error was “not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” under Chapman. Second, the special concurrence concludes that under Patrick, the more important it is to the defense theory of the case to have the defendant testify, the more harm is done by improperly deferring the ruling. 241 Ill. 2d at 32 (Garman, J., specially concurring, joined by Thomas, Karmeier and Theis, JJ.). This is exactly the opposite of Patrick’s analysis. In Patrick, the defendant’s need to know whether the convictions would be used was a vital factor in his decision whether to testify. Patrick’s testimony was not “absolutely necessary” to his defense. Nevertheless, his decision whether to testify was still “critical.” Patrick, 233 Ill. 2d at 75. Patrick “was unjustifiably required to make a tactical decision [whether to testify] without the ability to evaluate the impact it would have on his defense.” Patrick, 233 Ill. 2d at 75. The focus was on Patrick’s need to know whether the prior convictions would be used to impeach his testimony because his ability to make an informed decision whether to testify was especially important when his defense did not require his testimony. It is the right to make an informed decision whether to testify that is vital in this analysis. The importance of the defendant’s testimony affects how critical it is for the defendant to know whether his prior convictions can be used to impeach him. When the defendant’s testimony is absolutely necessary, his need to know whether the convictions can be used to impeach him is likely to have little, if any, effect on his decision to testify. When this knowledge would not have affected his decision whether to testify, the defendant would not have been prejudiced by the error and, accordingly, the error would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. In my view, the special concurrence has focused on a narrow aspect of the Patrick analysis and has unfortunately misapplied it in this case. Moreover, any analysis on the actual impact of the trial court’s delayed ruling in this case is unnecessary. The State proved the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt since defendant’s need to know if the prior convictions were going to be admissible was not a vital factor in his decision to testify. In sum, the focus of our harmless-error inquiry under Patrick is not on the defendant’s need to testify but, rather, on the defendant’s ability to make an informed decision about whether to testify. Accordingly, I specially concur.