Court Opinion

ID: 9961520
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-19 05:07:28.130532+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:20:52.509476
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to revision
                          until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                               STATE OF MICHIGAN

                                COURT OF APPEALS

                                                                     UNPUBLISHED
In re C. SPARKS, Jr., Minor.                                         April 18, 2024

                                                                     Nos. 367130; 367590
                                                                     Macomb Circuit Court
                                                                     Family Division
                                                                     LC No. 2021-000004-NA

Before: GARRETT, P.J., and RIORDAN and LETICA, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

         In Docket No. 367130, respondent-mother appeals as of right an order terminating her parental
rights to her minor child, CSJ. In Docket No. 367590, respondent-father appeals as of right the same
order, which terminated his parental rights to CSJ.1 Respondents’ respective parental rights were
terminated under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) (the conditions leading to the adjudication continue to exist)
and (ii) (other conditions exist causing the child to come within the court’s jurisdiction); (g) (the parent
fails to provide proper care or custody); and (j) (reasonable likelihood child will be harmed). We affirm.

                                           I. BACKGROUND

         This matter began when petitioner, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), filed
a petition in January 2021. The petition alleged that respondents were “abusing Acid,” gave CSJ NyQuil
to help him sleep, and respondent-father stated that if Child Protective Services (CPS) brought law
enforcement to the home to remove CSJ, he was going to “barricade them in the home and shoot all
parties.” It was further alleged that respondents had issues with substance abuse, an extensive criminal
history, and respondent-mother had a history with CPS, in which prior services were unsuccessful.
Further, the petition alleged that CSJ was born with signs of opiate withdrawal. It was requested that the
trial court: (1) authorize the petition and take jurisdiction of CSJ, and (2) enter an order removing CSJ

1
 The appeals were consolidated “to advance the efficient administration of the appellate process.” In re
C Sparks Minor, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered September 13, 2023 (Docket Nos.
367130; 367590).

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from the home under MCL 712A.2(b)(1) and (2). The trial court entered such an order, placing CSJ with
DHHS for care and supervision.

       The trial court exercised jurisdiction and ordered reasonable efforts toward reunification be made.
Respondents were referred to court-ordered services, which included parenting classes; parental visits;
individual therapy; stable housing and income; regular drug screens; individual counseling; psychological
evaluation; and substance-abuse counseling. Respondents missed most drug screens, tested positive on
the screens they did submit to, and were terminated from parenting classes. For over two years,
respondents had a number of dispositional hearings. In each, it became clear that respondents made no
progress toward addressing the underlying issues which led to CSJ’s removal.

        In October 2022, DHHS filed a supplemental petition for termination, requesting that the trial court
terminate respondents’ parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) and (ii), (g), and (j). On the first day
of the termination hearing in January 2023, the trial court was made aware of a potential guardianship
option with R. Loren, respondent-mother’s father. DHHS later informed the trial court that Loren was
denied as a relative placement for failing to be forthcoming regarding his criminal history, and his
girlfriend, who resided with him, did not provide the necessary criminal background check. Respondents
stipulated to the statutory grounds for termination, and the trial court delayed ruling on best interests to
allow DHHS to further explore guardianship with Loren.

        At the best-interests hearing in June 2023, DHHS expressed concerns with Loren’s truthfulness
regarding his criminal history, and his girlfriend still had not provided the background check. Loren noted
that he began visiting CSJ several months before the best-interests hearing and was unaware he could step
forward and request for CSJ to be placed in his care.

       The trial court found that CSJ required permanence, which respondents were unable to provide.
Further, it found Loren was an unsuitable guardian. The trial court entered an order terminating
respondents’ parental rights, and finding guardianship with Loren was not in CSJ’s best interests. These
appeals followed.

                                          II. BEST INTERESTS

        Respondent-mother and respondent-father argue that the trial court clearly erred when it failed to
consider a relative placement for CSJ with Loren and found that guardianship with Loren was not in CSJ’s
best interests. We disagree.

                                      A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

         “[This Court] review[s] for clear error the trial court’s determination regarding the children’s best
interests.” In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 713; 846 NW2d 61 (2014). “A finding is clearly erroneous if
the reviewing court has a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” In re Mota,
334 Mich App 300, 320; 964 NW2d 881 (2020) (cleaned up). “When applying the clear-error standard in
parental termination cases, regard is to be given to the special opportunity of the trial court to judge the
credibility of the witnesses who appeared before it.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). This
Court also reviews for clear error a trial court’s determination that DHHS made reasonable efforts toward
reunification. In re Fried, 266 Mich App 535, 542-543; 702 NW2d 192 (2005). Included in reasonable
efforts is identifying relatives able to provide care for a child. See In re Rood, 483 Mich 73, 107-109; 763
NW2d 587 (2009).

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                                       B. LAW AND ANALYSIS

       The trial court did not clearly err by not considering relative placement of CSJ with Loren, and
finding guardianship with Loren was not in CSJ’s best interests.

        “The trial court must order the parent’s rights terminated if [DHHS] has established a statutory
ground for termination by clear and convincing evidence and it finds from a preponderance of the evidence
on the whole record that termination is in the child[]’s best interests.” In re White, 303 Mich App at 713.
“The focus at the best-interest stage has always been on the child, not the parent.” In re Atchley, 341 Mich
App 332, 346; 990 NW2d 685 (2022) (quotation marks and citation omitted). When determining best
interests,

       the court should consider a wide variety of factors that may include the child’s bond to the
       parent, the parent’s parenting ability, the child’s need for permanency, stability, and
       finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the parent’s home. The trial court may
       also consider a parent’s history of domestic violence, the parent’s compliance with his or
       her case service plan, the parent’s visitation history with the child, the children’s well-being
       while in care, and the possibility of adoption. [In re White, 303 Mich App at 713-714
       (quotation marks and citations omitted).]

        “A child’s placement with relatives is a factor that the trial court is required to consider.” In re
Atchley, 341 Mich App at 347 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Relative placement is “an explicit
factor to consider in determining whether termination [is] in the [child’s] best interests[.]” In re Mason,
486 Mich 142, 164; 782 NW2d 747 (2010). “Placement with a relative weighs against termination, but
that fact is not dispositive given that a trial court may terminate parental rights in lieu of placement with
relatives if it finds that termination is in the child’s best interests.” In re Atchley, 341 Mich App at 347
(quotation marks and citation omitted).

         Respondents stipulated to statutory grounds for termination under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) and (ii),
(g), and (j). The issue is whether the trial court clearly erred by not adequately considering Loren for a
relative placement of CSJ, and finding guardianship with Loren was not in CSJ’s best interests. We find
that it did not clearly err.

        “Upon removal, as part of a child’s initial case service plan . . . , the supervising agency must,
within 30 days, identify, locate, notify, and consult with relatives to determine placement with a fit and
appropriate relative who would meet the child’s developmental, emotional, and physical needs.” MCL
722.954a(2). There is a statutory preference for placing a child with relatives “immediately after a child
is removed from his or her parents’ care and during the statutory review period established in [MCL
722.954a(5)].” In re COH, 495 Mich 184, 198; 848 NW2d 107 (2014).

       DHHS filed a petition for removal on January 8, 2021. In its May 14, 2021 report, DHHS
highlighted its efforts to locate potential relatives for placement: “[DHHS case worker] has spoken to Mr.
Loren, [respondent-mother’s] father, and he has expressed interest in possibly providing placement for
[CSJ] in the furture [sic]. He stated that he wishes to become relative placement for [CSJ] but that he
needs to have shoulder surgery first and recover.” The report added:

       [Loren] has expressed interest in possible placement of [CSJ] in the furture [sic]. [DHHS
       case workers] completed a home visit at Mr. Loren’s home and he had stated that he was

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       in need of shoulder surgery and that he was not sure when he would have it. Mr. Loren
       was also provided paperwork to gain information to begin the home study on 3/1/21 but
       has not yet returned it back to the department. Mr. Loren states that he will inform DHHS
       once he knows what is going to happen with his surgery. [DHHS case workers] followed
       up with Mr. Loren on 3/8/21 and 3/19/21 to check on the status of the paperwork and gain
       information on his surgery. Mr. Loren stated he did not have [the paperwork] completed
       yet and was not sure about his surgery.

       DHHS repeated this language in its August 4, 2021, and October 27, 2021 reports. On February
7, 2022, DHHS noted: “No relatives have come forward to be assessed for placement for [CSJ].” DHHS
copied the same language to discuss its relative search and engagement efforts in its prepared reports on
(1) May 2, 2022; (2) July 25, 2022; and (3) October 21, 2022.

       On April 10, 2023, DHHS’s report stated:

       The maternal grandfather R[.] Loren came forward for placement in August of 2022. At
       that time, he did not follow through with providing the agency with documents needed to
       complete relative assessment. He came forward again during the court hearing scheduled
       on 1/24/2023. A licensing specialist was assigned to complete the [DHHS] Relative
       Placement Safety Screen. Mr. Loren was denied on 3/16/2023 due to the following
       reasons: 1) Not being truthful/forthcoming with all criminal history and 2) Failure to
       provide criminal history clearances for all members of the household.

        As these documents show, when CSJ was removed, DHHS explored Loren as a possible
placement, although Loren stated that he required shoulder surgery first, and was uncertain when his
surgery would occur. DHHS provided Loren with paperwork on March 1, 2021, which he did not
complete and return. DHHS followed up with him on March 8, 2021, and March 19, 2021, to check on
the status of the paperwork, and to inquire about his surgery and availability. Loren stated that he had not
completed the paperwork and did not know when his surgery would occur, but would inform DHHS when
he knew. By February 2022, DHHS noted that no relatives came forward for placement. Loren again
expressed interest in August 2022 and was again provided paperwork to initiate this process. Testimony
indicated that he filled out half of it, which he returned to DHHS. When Loren believed respondents were
not progressing toward reunification, he filled out the remainder of the paperwork. In November or
December 2022, Loren had a conversation with DHHS about guardianship. Loren finally completed the
paperwork provided by DHHS, and submitted it to DHHS in late 2022.

         From the time of CSJ’s removal, DHHS provided Loren with paperwork and information
regarding relative placement, which Loren did not complete. He did not follow up with DHHS to provide
information regarding his availability or the completed paperwork. Respondent-mother contends on
appeal that DHHS failed to satisfy its statutory duty because it did not follow up with Loren to inform him
of his options for placement. The record belies this argument. Loren was given numerous opportunities
to initiate the process of relative placement but failed to do so. He did not return paperwork, despite
DHHS following up with him. Further, during at least some of these lengthy proceedings, respondents
resided in Loren’s workshop, indicating that he was easily able to be in contact with DHHS to return the
paperwork. Respondent-mother contends DHHS failed to adhere to its statutory obligation under
MCL.722.954a(3) (DHHS must notify relatives of a child’s removal) and explain the full scope of the
situation and its consequences to Loren. The only evidence respondent-mother provides to support her

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claim is Loren’s statement, “I didn’t know about that. I didn’t know I could [request to care for CSJ] right
away.” This statement contradicts DHHS’s record from March 1, 2021, in which it noted providing Loren
with paperwork to begin a home study, which Loren did not complete.

        When Loren did express interest for placement in August 2022, DHHS once again provided him
with paperwork, which he did not complete until late 2022. DHHS determined that Loren was not a viable
placement because he was untruthful regarding his criminal record, and his girlfriend refused to submit to
a background check. It was fully within DHHS’s statutory authority to make this determination. DHHS
must “determine placement with a fit and appropriate relative who would meet the child’s developmental,
emotional, and physical needs. . . . [and who] meets all relevant state child protection standards.” MCL
722.954a(2). DHHS considered Loren for relative placement, and provided him the necessary paperwork
shortly after CSJ’s removal. It followed up with Loren several times when it did not hear back from him.
The case proceeded for two years, respondents resided in Loren’s workshop, and Loren came forward
again in August 2022. DHHS provided him paperwork, which he again did not complete and return to
DHHS until late 2022. DHHS investigated Loren and found that he did not meet “all relevant state child
protection standards.” MCL 722.954a(2). The record is clear DHHS met its statutory duty to explore
relative placement with Loren, but determined that he was ineligible, in part due to his noncompliance.
No statutory violation occurred.

       Respondents contend that the trial court erred when it found that relative placement or
guardianship with Loren was not in CSJ’s best interests. We disagree.

       At the best-interests hearing, the trial court stated:

       Even if we take [Loren] on his word the Court is also not swayed that [Loren] can meet the
       emotional/physical needs of this child long-term. And this child is three, so we’re talking
       up to 15 years. The child’s age, grandfather’s age and the strength of the bond should also
       be looked at. This is a grandfather who’s not until recently been in the child’s life. He
       works full-time, and even with a flexible schedule will have a lot to handle.

               Testimony was provided this child does not do well with change. He has had speech
       delays and other issues which are being addressed by placement. He is regressing in terms
       of his behaviors, currently having his needs met by placement, and is of an age where
       adoption is possible.

               Given the above, the Court does not find that guardianship is in the child’s best
       interest given the child’s needs. A more permanent plan for adoption is better suited for
       him.

        On appeal, respondents conflate relative placement with guardianship, using the terms almost
interchangeably. “A child’s placement with relatives is a factor that the trial court is required to consider.”
In re Atchley, 341 Mich App at 347 (quotation marks and citation omitted).

       Although the trial court may terminate parental rights in lieu of placement with relatives if
       it finds that termination is in the child’s best interests, the fact that the children are in the
       care of a relative at the time of the termination hearing is an explicit factor to consider in
       determining whether termination was in the children’s best interests. [In re Olive/Metts

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       Minors, 297 Mich App 35, 43; 823 NW2d 144 (2012) (quotation marks and citations
       omitted).]

        CSJ was not placed with Loren at the time of termination because Loren did not complete the
required paperwork or follow up with DHHS regarding his availability, despite several attempts by DHHS
to obtain this information. When Loren expressed interest again in August 2022, DHHS determined that
he did not meet all relevant state child protection criteria pertaining to his failure to disclose his full
criminal history and to allow investigation of all residents of his home. At the best-interests hearing,
Loren sought guardianship over CSJ, not relative placement. “[T]here is no statutory preference for
creating a guardianship with a relative[.]” In re COH, 495 Mich at 207-208. Further,

       [a]lthough . . . MCL 722.954a creates a statutory preference for placement with relatives,
       the plain language of MCL 722.954a limits the applicability of the preference to only the
       initial stage of the process, i.e., immediately after a child is removed from his or her
       parents’ care and during the statutory review period established in MCL 722.954a(3). [Id.
       at 198.]

        Because CSJ was not in relative placement with Loren at the time of the termination, the trial court
had no statutory obligation to consider Loren for guardianship. Id. Moreover, the trial court explained its
reasoning for declining relative placement, noting that its primary concerns with Loren were that he was
not in CSJ’s life until recently and did not appear bonded with CSJ. The trial court also expressed concern
with Loren’s ability to provide the care and stability CSJ required. “The focus at the best-interest stage
has always been on the child, not the parent.” In re Atchley, 341 Mich App at 346 (quotation marks and
citation omitted). For these reasons, the trial court did not clearly err by finding that guardianship or
relative placement with Loren was not in CSJ’s best interests.

                                           III. CONCLUSION

       The trial court did explore relative placement with Loren and did not clearly err by finding that
guardianship or relative placement with Loren was not in CSJ’s best interests. We affirm.

                                                             /s/ Michael J. Riordan
                                                             /s/ Anica Letica

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