Court Opinion

ID: 9831992
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 21:31:46.726223+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:40.728616
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Both parties have moved for rehearing. Upon the original hearing appellees contended that, since the property in question was the homestead of A. Martin and wife, the fraud or misrepresentation of A. Martin could not be urged to defeat Mrs. Martin’s homestead interest. This proposition is again urged by appellees on rehearing. Mrs. Martin was not a party to the suit, and as the judgment in the- case could not bind her individual rights in so far as she was not represented in the suit by her husband, we did not consider this question. We have reached the conclusion, however, that the unseverable character of the homestead right in husband and wife is such that so long as the marital relation and the homestead interest exist there could be no judgment which would oust either spouse from possession of the homestead, where the rights of the other spouse had not been adjudicated. The wife in such instance would be a necessary party to a suit for title and possession of the homestead property. The question of necessary parties has not been briefed.
We have reached the conclusion from our independent investigation that in the present case the wife is a necessary party to the action, and the cause must be remanded not only for the reasons set forth in our original opinion, but in order that she may be brought in and the whole homestead question as to both spouses adjudicated. It becomes necessary, therefore, for us to consider the homestead question.
It is now well settled that in a suit Involving the title to or a lien upon community property impressed with the , homeptead character, the question whether the wife is a necessary party to the action by virtue of her homestead interest alone depends upon whether the plea of homestead would in itself be a defense to the suit. The homestead interest must necessarily attach to some title or interest in the property claimed'as homestead, and will stand or fall as that title or interest stands or falls. It has accordingly been held that where the question is one of title by which the homestead property was acquired, or concerns an asserted lien which if established would be superior to the homestead right, the wife is hot a' necessary party to the action, and a judgment against the husband is binding upon her homestead interest. Jergens v. Schiele, 61 Tex. 255; San Antonio v. Berry, 92 Tex. 319, 48 S. W. 496; Bean v. Brownwood (Tex. Civ. App.) 43 S. W. 1036; Coal Co. v. Henry (Tex. Civ. App.) 47 S. W. 281 (writ refused); Collins v. Ferguson, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 552, 56 S. W. 225 (writ refused); Brown v. Humphrey, 43 *448Tex. Civ. App. 23, 95 S. W. 23; Breath v. Flowers, 43 Tex. Civ. App. 516, 95 S. W. 26; Gillaspie v. Huntsville (Tex. Civ. App.) 151 S. W. 1114; Childress v. Robinson (Tex. Civ. App.) 161 S. W. 78 (writ refused); Mitchell v. Robinson (Tex. Civ. App.) 162 S. W. 443 (writ refused); Nunez v. McElroy (Tex. Civ. App.) 174 S. W. 829; Davis v. Cox (Tex. Civ. App.) 176 S. W. 931; Brown v. Foster (Tex. Civ. App.) 178 S. W. 787 (writ refused); Cooley v. Miller (Tex. Com. App.) 228 S. W. 1085; Wyss v. Bookman (Tex. Sup.) 235 S. W. 567; Hanes v. Hanes (Tex. Com. App.) 239 S. W. 190; Robertson v. Lee (Tex. Com. App.) 249 S. W. 217.
Appellant contends that the acts relied upon by the husband as establishing estoppel are binding upon the wife, citing Ranney v. Miller, 51 Tex. 263; Sparks v. Loan Agency (Tex. Sup.) 19 S. W. 256; Trust Co. v. Harrell (Tex. Civ. App.) 39 S. W. 142; Martin v. Granger (Tex. Civ. App.) 204 S. W. 666. The principles applied in those cases are not applicable here. There the title upon which the homestead rested was an equitable one, or the lien, the validity of which was .brought in question, appeared in the chain of title upon which the homestead right depended. Whereas here the legal title to the homestead property was vested in the community by a deed which at the time the property was sold under execution had been placed of record. The case therefore presents the question whether the husband by acts or words can defeat the homestead right of the wife where the legal title to the property impressed with the homestead character is in the community and the party with whom the husband deals and who deals with the homestead property has constructive notice by registration of the existence of that legal title and consequently of the homestead character of the property. This question we think" should be answered in the negative. See Medearis v. Buratti (Tex. Civ. App.) 275 S. W. 617, and authorities there cited.
If the deed to^A. Martin had not been placed of record until after the execution sale a different question would be presented. In that case the only notice to a prospective purchaser would be that which would follow from possession by Martin and wife. As held in our original opinion, that possession was sufficient under the facts of this case to put a prospective purchaser on inquiry. It may be that so long as the deed was not recorded inquiry of the husband alone was necessary. If so the representations claimed by appellant to have been made by A. Martin would be sufficient to meet the requirements of inquiry. But that is not the case here. No abstract of judgment lien attached, for the reason that the judgment creditor was put upon inquiry by the possession of Martin and wife- and no such inquiry was made at or prior to the time the abstract of judgment was recorded and indexed. The rights of Astin, therefore, must depend. entirely upon whether at the time he made his bid and paid the price thereof upon execution sale he was in the attitude of an innocent purchaser. Prior to that time, in fact prior to the representations made to him by A. Martin, the deed under’ which Martin and wife asserted title -and upon which Mrs. Martin’s homestead interest rested was placed of record and constituted constructive notice to all subsequent purchasers. At the time this deed was filed and recorded no rights-or liens had accrued which would be superior to the title conveyed by that deed or the homestead rights attached to the title so conveyed. It is clear, therefore, that the homestead interest of the wife would be a complete defense to any attempt by the creditor bank, or those claiming under it, to fix, establish, or foreclose a lien upon the property by virtue of the bank’s judgment. Under the above authorities, therefore, we think clearly the wife was a necessary party to the suit.
In order for plaintiff to recover it will be necessary to establish acts or representations on the part of A. Martin sufficient to constitute estoppel and participation therein by the wife in such manner as to make her a party thereto.
Both motions are overruled, and the trial court’s judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings in accordance with our original opinion -and with this opinion.
Motions overruled.