Court Opinion

ID: 9520035
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:29:45.793498+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:45:27.710860
License: Public Domain

*537MacKenzie, J.
(dissenting). I dissent. I am unable to conclude that the power to sell grave markers and memorials can be fairly implied from the authority to operate cemeteries. As noted by the majority, the power of municipalities fall into three separate categories: those granted in express words; those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted; and, those essential to the accomplishment of the declared objects and purposes of the corporation. These categories were set forth in Toebe v City of Munising, 282 Mich 1, 15-16; 275 NW 744 (1937), which further stated that any fair, reasonable or substantial doubt concerning the existence of a power is resolved against the corporation, and the power is denied.
According to commentator McQuillin:
"The object of the creation of a municipal corporation is that it may perform certain local public functions as a subordinate branch of the state government; and, while it is invested with full power to do everything necessarily incident to a proper discharge thereof, no right to do more can ever be implied. In the absence of express legislative sanction, it has no authority to engage in any independent business enterprise or occupation such as is usually pursued by private individuals.” 12 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3d ed), § 36.02, p 502.
The principle that a party engaging in legitimate private business is entitled to be free from unauthorized proprietary business activity of a municipality has been adhered to by prior decisions in this state. In Toebe v City of Munising, supra, the Michigan Supreme Court held that the plaintiff was entitled to sell coal to a community free from municipal competition, despite the fact that the city had been the sole distributor of coal to the *538public for several years preceding the plaintiff’s entry into the field. The Court indicated that the selling of coal could not fairly be implied in a constitutional provision empowering cities to acquire, own, and operate "public utilities for supplying water, light, heat, power, and transportation”. The Court stated that a different situation existed where there was an emergency and the city had to provide fuel to prevent general suffering. In the case confronting it, however, an overruling public necessity did not exist justifying the private venture. See also Baker v City of Grand Rapids, 142 Mich 687; 106 NW 208 (1906), Attorney General v City Council of the City of Detroit, 150 Mich 310; 113 NW 1107 (1907).
Plaintiff Inch has sold monuments in Pontiac for approximately 80 years. It and its competitors in the private sector are apparently capable of selling an unlimited number of stones conforming to city regulations. There was no sign that, absent municipal participation, the public desire or need for monuments could not be met. The city’s late entry into the business indicates that the need was traditionally met by private suppliers.
The issue facing us was encountered by the Maine Supreme Court in Morrison v City of Portland, 286 A2d 334 (Me, 1972). The defendant municipality sold markers ostensibly under the authority of a Maine statute which provided:
"A municipality may raise or appropriate money:
3. Cemeteries. Providing for public cemeteries; maintaining private cemeteries established before 1880; caring for graves of veterans and maintaining fences around cemeteries in which veterans are buried.” 30 Me Rev Stat Ann 5103.
*539The Court held that the selling of grave markers could not be viewed as necessarily or reasonably incidental to the operation or maintenance of a cemetery by a municipality.
The Morrison Court employed a test set forth in Laughlin v City of Portland, 111 Me 486, 499; 90 A 318 (1914), for determining what constitutes a public use when municipal sales are involved:
"Its two tests are: first, the subject matter, or commodity, must be one 'of public necessity, convenience or welfare.’ * * * The second test is the difficulty which individuals have in providing it for themselves. The causes creating the difficulty may vary, but if the difficulty exists, the test is met.”
The Court concluded that the markers were not a public necessity and they were readily obtainable from private businesses. This is equally true of the markers and memorials sold by the plaintiff in the instant case. Unlike fuel, food, or housing, the markers do not constitute an important public need. Further, there is no indication that the public need for monuments could not be met by plaintiff and its competitors in the private sector.
Although provisions in the home rule cities act are to be liberally construed, City Comm of Jackson v Hirschman, 253 Mich 596, 599; 235 NW 265 (1931), a construction in the instant case in favor of the commercial activity by the defendant is outweighed by the principle that a municipality should not encroach upon the field of private enterprise where the articles provided are not of public necessity and are available from private enterprise.
Finally, the Michigan Supreme Court decision in Wetherby v City of Jackson, 264 Mich 146; 249 NW 484 (1933), does not mandate a different re-*540suit. In that case, the city had a regulation that completely prohibited the erection of tents of private funeral directors for use at funerals conducted at municipal cemeteries. That case did not involve a municipality competing in the field of private enterprise with private businesses. The ordinance permitting exclusive use of city tents was justified in large measure by the city’s inherent police power to protect the rights of the other lot owners.
I would reverse.