Court Opinion

ID: 9725355
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 11:42:53.534513+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:13.502208
License: Public Domain

SULLIVAN, Judge,
dissenting.
Although compliance with the requirements of the Medical Malpractice Act is a condition precedent for the exercise of jurisdiction in the courts, I do not believe that the question is one of subject matter jurisdiction.
It is well established that subject matter jurisdiction is "the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings then before the court belong." - Mishler v. County of Elkhart (1989), Ind., 544 N.E.2d 149, 151. Clearly, the trial court here has the power to hear and determine the issues presented by a complaint alleging wrongful abortion, assault and battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Accordingly, it had subject matter jurisdiction.
It is perhaps more accurate to say that one who has not met the requirements of a statute as a precondition for filing suit lacks "standing" to bring that suit, or that the court lacks the authority to exercise its jurisdiction in that particular case. It is incorrect to say that the court does not have subject matter jurisdiction. See Wild-wood Park Community Association v. Fort Wayne City Plan - Commission *512(1979), Ind., 396 N.E.2d 678; Home Builder's Association of Indiana, Inc. v. Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission (1989), 3d Dist.Ind.App., 544 N.E.2d 181 (Sullivan, J., concurring in part, 544 N.E.2d at 187); Public Service Company of Indiana, Inc. v. Decatur County REMC (1977), 1st Dist.Ind.App., 363 N.E.2d 995.
Be that as it may, I believe the allegations of the complaint fall within the purview of the Medical Malpractice Act and that until the requirements of the Act have been met, the Hancock Superior Court may not exercise its jurisdiction over this case.
Our statute, LC. 16-9.5-1-1(h) (West's Ann.Code Supp.1989) defines malpractice, insofar as here pertinent, as "a tort." It does not limit malpractice to unintentional torts. Perhaps more importantly, the preceding section, (g), discloses that not only is negligence covered within the Act, but as well, other acts which are either "a legal wrong" or an "unlawful act." I not only discern no legislative intent to restrict the Malpractice Act to unintentional torts, from the manner in which the statute is phrased, I discern a contrary intent.
In Gooley v. Moss (1979), 1st Dist.Ind. App., 398 N.E.2d 1314, the court held that allegations of false imprisonment as a result of improper hospital admission procedures and a wrongful sterilization of the patient were "based upon health care or professional services which were rendered or should have been rendered." 898 N.E.2d at 1818. Because false imprisonment is an intentional tort, the case, as acknowledged by the majority here, indicates that intentional torts are not outside the purview of the Malpractice Act, so long as the conduct occurs in the clear context of medical care or services.
Here, the alleged torts occurred because defendant utilized his medical knowledge, experience and license to examine plaintiff and thereby effect an abortion. Although the personal relationship between the parties provided the opportunity for the tor-tious conduct, the conduct itself occurred in the course of defendant's activity as a health care provider.
The malevolent and intentional aspects of the torts do not remove them from the purview of "health care" as contemplated in the Act. It was not the mental state of defendant nor his motivation which proximately caused plaintiff's injuries and damages. It was his conduct. The intentional and malevolent nature of the alleged acts remove those acts from the realm of medical negligence but not from the coverage of the Act.
I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.