Court Opinion

ID: 9683902
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:39:57.463711+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:51.209597
License: Public Domain

Terry Crabtree, Judge, dissenting. Appellant maintains that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment as a material issue of fact remains to be decided in this case. I agree with appellant and believe that we should reverse and remand. I am convinced that the majority turns a blind eye to the limiting language contained in appellant’s power of attorney. Powers of attorney are to be construed in accordance with the rules for interpretation of written instruments generally. 3 Am. Jur.2d, Agency § 28 (2004). Where, from the face of a written instrument, there is no doubt about the meaning of an instrument, summary judgment is appropriate. Chlanda v. Estate of Fuller, 326 Ark. 551, 932 S.W.2d 760 (1996). That is simply not the case here. In this instance, I see that there is a facial ambiguity on appellant’s power of attorney. The additional typewritten language under the heading “Other terms” on the power of attorney states, “Agents for my affairs shall collaborate on all decisions.” This conditional language could have different interpretations. It may mean that the two sons are required to discuss or confer on all matters before one of them transacts business on appellant’s behalf. On the other hand, it may mean that the two sons are required to agree and act in unison on all matters and that one may not act without the other. As a result, I think that a genuine issue of material fact exists concerning whether the sons were required to act in concert before transacting banking business pursuant to the power of attorney. I am satisfied that enough doubt and ambiguity arises with the power of attorney to make this case inappropriate for summary judgment. See Schnitt v. McKellar, 244 Ark. 377, 427 S.W.2d 202 (1968); Reed, Ex’r v. Wright, 279 Ark. 45, 603 S.W.2d 422 (Ark. App. 1980).