Court Opinion

ID: 9927181
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-26 15:05:21.961023+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:08.449496
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RENDERED: JANUARY 19, 2024; 10:00 A.M.
                            NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                    Commonwealth of Kentucky
                               Court of Appeals

                                  NO. 2022-CA-0889-MR

GEORGE SLAUGHTER                                                   APPELLANT

                    APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v.                   HONORABLE MITCHELL PERRY, JUDGE
                           ACTION NO. 16-CR-000409

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                             APPELLEE

                                         OPINION
                                        AFFIRMING

                                        ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; ECKERLE AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.

ECKERLE, JUDGE: This case is before us following a remand for an evidentiary

hearing on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The Trial Court conducted

a hearing and entered an order denying the motion of Appellant, George Slaughter,

pursuant to RCr 111.42. Finding no error, we affirm.

1
    Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
                                 BACKGROUND

             On February 13, 2016, Slaughter, who was a convicted felon with a

prior manslaughter conviction, used a gun to murder three people. Slaughter was

subsequently indicted by a Jefferson County Grand Jury on three counts of murder,

one count of being a convicted felon in possession of a handgun, and one count of

tampering with physical evidence. There was one “living victim” from the

murders who interacted with Slaughter at some point during or after the

commission of the crimes. According to one of Slaughter’s trial counsel, this

“living victim” was the only witness to what happened, and the victim’s statements

regarding Slaughter were not consistent with any mental health defense Slaughter

might attempt. Slaughter ultimately pleaded guilty; thus, the facts underlying these

crimes are not fully developed in the record.

             Slaughter later, representing himself pro se, filed for post-conviction

relief pursuant to RCr 11.42, claiming both of his trial counsel rendered ineffective

assistance by neither informing him of a possible insanity defense nor properly

investigating and pursuing the same. The Trial Court denied the RCr 11.42 motion

without a hearing. On appeal, a panel of this Court reversed and remanded for an

evidentiary hearing:

                                         -2-
                        Appellant,[2] through counsel, argues that his trial
                 counsel was ineffective when she advised him to plead
                 guilty without explaining any defenses available to him
                 and telling him he would receive the death penalty if the
                 matter proceeded to trial. He asserts that trial counsel did
                 not investigate, prepare, or explain to him his best and
                 only defense – that of insanity. Appellant directs our
                 attention to KCPC[3]’s competency evaluation, which
                 indicates that Appellant was treated at the University of
                 Louisville Hospital where he was diagnosed with
                 paranoid schizophrenia. He was also treated at Our Lady
                 of Peace Hospital, where he was diagnosed with
                 substance-induced psychotic disorder, cocaine
                 dependency, and cocaine-induced psychosis. Citing
                 KRS[4] 504.020(1), Appellant argues that he was not
                 responsible for his criminal offenses because it is likely
                 that at the time of those offenses, he was mentally ill and
                 was incapable of appreciating the criminality of his
                 conduct or conforming his conduct to the requirements of
                 the law.

                        Appellant claims that his trial counsel never
                 informed him that an insanity defense was possible. He
                 maintains that had counsel explained the insanity
                 defense, he would not have accepted the plea and would
                 have insisted on going to trial. He also contends that he
                 was instructed to accept the plea because his failure to do
                 so would have resulted in the death penalty. Appellant
                 argues that trial counsel did not give him a voluntary and
                 intelligent choice of whether to plead guilty or go to trial.
                 The focus of his argument on this issue is that by not
                 adequately advising him of the insanity defense, trial
                 counsel provided deficient performance and rendered his
                 guilty plea unknowing. . . .

2
    Slaughter was referred to as “Appellant” in the prior appeal.
3
    Kentucky Correctional Psychiatric Center.
4
    Kentucky Revised Statutes.

                                                  -3-
...

       Appellant presented evidence in the form of his
KCPC evaluation that he suffers from a variety of
psychiatric issues. The KCPC evaluator determined that
Appellant was competent to stand trial through a
combination of psychiatric treatment and sobriety. The
fact that Appellant could be considered competent to
stand trial through treatment and sobriety, however, does
not mean that Appellant was sane at the time he allegedly
committed the crimes at issue. Given Appellant’s
significant mental health issues, a reasonable attorney
would have at least investigated the possibility of an
insanity defense and discussed it with Appellant before
advising him to plead guilty and accept a sentence of life
without parole for twenty-five years.

       Appellant claims that his attorney never discussed
with him the possibility of an insanity defense. It is
impossible to determine from the record before us
whether defense counsel considered an insanity defense
and/or discussed such a defense with Appellant before
advising him to plead guilty. In Commonwealth v. Rank,
494 S.W.3d 476 (Ky. 2016), the Kentucky Supreme
Court considered a similar claim in the context of
counsel’s alleged failure to investigate and discuss a
possible extreme emotional disturbance (“EED”) defense
before advising his client to plead guilty. The Court
ultimately held that an evidentiary hearing was required
to determine what counsel discussed with the defendant
prior to advising him to accept the guilty plea and
whether counsel’s decision to forego an EED defense
was made as part of an informed investigation and as part
of solid trial strategy. The Kentucky Supreme Court
stated that

            Rank’s motion raised a material
      question as to the reasonableness of [defense
      counsel's] investigation of the potential for
      an EED defense or, framed differently,

                           -4-
                   whether it was reasonable for [defense
                   counsel] not to pursue an EED defense. See
                   Hodge v. Commonwealth, 68 S.W.3d 338
                   (Ky. 2001) (an evidentiary hearing is
                   required to determine whether counsel’s
                   decision was “trial strategy or an abdication
                   of advocacy”). [Defense counsel’s]
                   knowledge and understanding of the
                   relevant facts relating to a potential EED
                   defense are not evident on the face of the
                   record. An evidentiary hearing on Rank’s
                   RCr 11.42 motion was required to ascertain
                   those facts.

            Id. at 485.

                                 CONCLUSION

                   The facts before us parallel those of Rank. As
            defense counsel’s knowledge and understanding of the
            relevant facts relating to a potential insanity defense are
            not evident on the face of the record, an evidentiary
            hearing on Appellant’s RCr 11.42 motion is required to
            ascertain those facts. Accordingly, we vacate the order
            of the Jefferson Circuit Court and remand the matter with
            instructions that the circuit court conduct an evidentiary
            hearing on Appellant’s ineffective assistance of counsel
            claim.

Slaughter v. Commonwealth, 2020-CA-0259-MR, 2021 WL 1051589, at *2-3 (Ky.

App. Mar. 19, 2021) (footnote omitted).

            The Trial Court held the evidentiary hearing on remand. One of the

issues Slaughter raises on appeal concerns a denial of procedural due process; thus,

we take a moment to discuss the hearings leading up to the evidentiary hearing. At

one status conference following remand, with the Commonwealth present,

                                          -5-
Slaughter informed the Trial Court that he would soon be filing a request for funds

to have himself evaluated. Slaughter’s request was unclear, and the Trial Court

questioned whether Slaughter was seeking to evaluate his present competency or

his past competency. The Commonwealth agreed that Slaughter needed to be

competent during this hearing and noted that KCPC could perform an evaluation if

necessary. After multiple follow-up questions, the Trial Court ultimately requested

that Slaughter’s post-conviction counsel5 put their request in writing. The Trial

Court indicated that the Commonwealth could then respond to the “Chapter 504”

request.6 Slaughter then clarified that his request would be ex parte for his own

expert to show what his defense counsel should have known and done. The Trial

Court then asked Slaughter to explain how his request was a confidential request,

at which point Slaughter stated he would be “happy” to file in the record his

request for funds.

              The Trial Court then stated it understood Slaughter’s request was for a

competency evaluation or possibly funds for a private expert. Either way, the Trial

Court informed Slaughter that he could file his request, then the Commonwealth

5
  Slaughter always had two post-conviction counsel present at each status conference and the
hearing. One of his post-conviction counsel withdrew after the first status conference and was
replaced by another attorney from the Department of Public Advocacy.
6
 Presumably a KRS 504.100 request for the court to appoint a psychologist or psychiatrist to
examine, treat, and report on a defendant’s mental condition as it relates to competency.

                                              -6-
could have time to respond. Slaughter did not object to this ruling. The parties

then scheduled the evidentiary hearing.

            Slaughter then filed what was titled an ex parte request for funds

pursuant to KRS 31.185. It was placed in the record, though it does not appear that

it was filed under seal. The motion was generically discussed at a subsequent and

lengthy status conference where the Commonwealth was present. The

Commonwealth argued generally against the request. The Commonwealth noted

the remand directive was only to determine whether: (1) counsel advised

Slaughter to plead guilty without discussing possible defenses; (2) counsel told him

he would receive the death penalty if he did not plead; and (3) counsel

investigated, prepared, or explained to Slaughter an insanity defense. The remand

directive, the Commonwealth argued, could be resolved solely on the deficient

performance prong of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80

L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). The Commonwealth requested the Trial Court bifurcate the

proceedings. Slaughter objected, and the Trial Court bifurcated the proceedings

and held the ex parte motion in abeyance unless and until proceedings regarding

the prejudice prong of Strickland were necessary.

            At the evidentiary hearing Slaughter called two witnesses: himself;

and Tracey Mudd (Mudd), one of his two defense counsel. The Commonwealth,

                                          -7-
surprised that Slaughter did not call both of his defense counsel, called Angela

Elleman (Elleman), Slaughter’s other defense counsel, to testify.

             Slaughter admitted he visited frequently with both of his attorneys

prior to entry of his guilty plea. He told his defense counsel about his beliefs in the

Illuminati. He claimed his defense counsel told Slaughter they were afraid that if

Slaughter went to trial, he would receive the death penalty. He did not recall his

defense counsel talking to him about any defenses, and he denied that they

discussed with him an insanity defense. He claimed he asked Mudd about an

insanity defense due to his previous diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia and, “I

was told that in the state of Kentucky that that didn’t matter and, uh, I would still

probably receive the death penalty.”

             Slaughter’s defense team was comprised of two experienced trial

attorneys. Mudd was a seasoned criminal defense attorney with years of trial

experience. She had moved to the Capital Trial Division at the Louisville Metro

Public Defender’s Office prior to representing Slaughter. She had since left

criminal defense work and spent the past several years working at the Social

Security Administration. Elleman was also a highly-experienced criminal defense

attorney, who was the head of the Capital Trial Division at the Louisville Metro

Public Defender’s Office when she represented Slaughter. Elleman has worked

                                          -8-
criminal defense on capital cases in multiple states, and, as of the hearing date, was

working capital cases in Indiana.

             Slaughter’s defense team met with Slaughter at least once every two

weeks throughout their representation. Their caseloads, which were almost

exclusively capital cases, were very small, and they could devote substantial time

and resources to the capital cases.

             They had Slaughter evaluated by a mental health expert almost

immediately after he was arrested. They consulted with two other mental health

experts and employed them during Slaughter’s competency proceedings. Elleman

continually provided one of their experts additional information and spoke with

him frequently about the case. She never obtained a supportive verbal opinion,

though, so she never requested her expert draft a written opinion.

             Mudd testified that she explained the defenses to Slaughter. She

noted that Slaughter’s concern regarded when he could get out of prison. She

specifically recalled discussing the insanity defense and explaining to Slaughter

that it was not necessarily a “get out of jail free card” because there was another

procedure that could keep Slaughter institutionalized. The evidence of an insanity

defense was also lacking, as Mudd explained, “we didn’t, insanity was hard, we

didn’t have anybody who was saying that.” The jail records, Mudd explained,

showed malingering and included observations of Slaughter’s behaviors when he

                                         -9-
did not know anyone was watching. Additionally, none of the experts opined that

Slaughter was insane at the time of the offense. And, Mudd noted, had they

pursued an insanity defense, the Commonwealth not only would have been entitled

to its own expert evaluation of Slaughter, but it could have put in front of the jury

all of the jail records regarding Slaughter’s suspected malingering behaviors. This

negative evidence was substantial, according to Mudd, and would challenge

Slaughter’s credibility. “Once we’ve called into (sic) malingering, and, perhaps,

induced psychosis through drugs, then the jury is done believing the legitimacy of

the real claims.”

                 Mudd explained that they discussed multiple defenses with Slaughter.

They even discussed an alibi defense per Slaughter’s request – even though there

was a living victim who identified Slaughter as the perpetrator. Mudd denied ever

telling Slaughter that he would receive the death penalty or any other penalty if he

went to trial.

                 Ultimately, Slaughter stated he wanted an opportunity to get out of

prison at some point. So, his counsel approached the Commonwealth with an offer

– a guilty plea in exchange for a sentence of life without the possibility of parole

for 25 years. The Commonwealth accepted the offer, and Slaughter entered a

guilty plea pursuant to the same.

                                           -10-
            Following briefing, the Trial Court issued an order denying

Slaughter’s RCr 11.42 motion, holding in relevant part:

            The Court heard testimony from [Slaughter], Ms.
            Elleman, and Ms. Mudd. The two sides present very
            different pictures of the course of litigation. [Slaughter]
            claimed that his attorneys rarely met with, never
            discussed the possibility of an insanity defense with him,
            and did not give him any discovery to review. The
            attorneys on the other hand, presented very detailed and
            thorough accounts of their actions throughout the case.
            They visited [Slaughter] frequently, knew that mental
            health would be a factor from the very beginning as
            evidenced by their petition for expert funding in District
            Court, and discussed a wide range of defense strategies
            and tactics with [Slaughter] over the many months of
            their involvement in the case. As both attorneys testified,
            they understood just how important mental health could
            be to this case which is why they proceeded to retain
            three mental health experts.

            In providing effective assistance, counsel has a duty to
            conduct a reasonable investigation, including defenses to
            the charges. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521-523
            (2003). Counsel’s investigation need only be reasonable
            under the totality of the circumstances. Robbins v.
            Commonwealth, 365 S.W.3d 211, 214 (Ky. App. 2014).
            The previous defense counsel here clearly went above
            and beyond what is required and conducted a thorough
            investigation into [Slaughter’s] mental health and how
            that might factor into the case. Their decision not to
            pursue an insanity defense is the result of a strategic
            choice based on the lack of evidence to successfully
            support such a defense, and not because of any oversight,
            lack of effort, or deficiency on their part. This Court
            cannot say that the actions of the previous defense
            counsel fell below the prevailing professional norms or
            standards. They demonstrated clear knowledge of the
            possibility of an insanity defense and more than adequate

                                       -11-
             understanding that it likely would not have prevailed at
             trial. Therefore, their performance cannot be deficient
             under Strickland. With [Slaughter] unable to satisfy the
             first prong of the Strickland analysis, it is unnecessary to
             proceed to an examination of prejudice.

Opinion at 4.

             ANALYSIS

             Slaughter timely appealed, raising four issues. Following the standard

of review, we discuss Slaughter’s claims seriatim.

             Slaughter pleaded guilty. To obtain post-conviction relief pursuant to

RCr 11.42 on the ground that his plea was invalid, Slaughter must demonstrate

facts that would render the plea: (1) involuntary under the Fourteenth

Amendment’s Due Process Clause; (2) so tainted by counsel’s ineffective

assistance as to violate the Sixth Amendment; or (3) otherwise clearly invalid.

Stiger v. Commonwealth, 381 S.W.3d 230, 234 (Ky. 2012) (citing Fraser v.

Commonwealth, 59 S.W.3d 448 (Ky. 2001)). Slaughter claims ineffective

assistance of counsel; thus, his claims fall into the second category.

             “Before deciding whether to plead guilty, a defendant is entitled to

‘the effective assistance of competent counsel.’” Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S.

356, 364, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1481-82, 176 L. Ed. 2d 284 (2010) (quoting McMann v.

Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771, 90 S. Ct. 1441, 1449, 25 L. Ed. 2d 763 (1970), and

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686). Ineffective assistance of counsel may render a guilty

                                         -12-
plea invalid if that assistance violates the Sixth Amendment of the United States

Constitution. Ineffective assistance occurs when a defendant proves: (1) counsel’s

performance is deficient; and (2) that deficiency results in prejudice to the

defendant. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.

             Deficient performance “requires showing that counsel made errors so

serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant

by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. Review of counsel’s performance is under an

objective standard of reasonably effective assistance. Id. All of the underlying

circumstances must be considered when assessing whether counsel’s assistance

was reasonably effective. Id. at 688. Additionally, prevailing professional norms

may guide the reasonableness inquiry. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 366-67. But guides are

just that – guides – as any set of rules would “restrict the wide latitude counsel

must have in making tactical decisions.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.

             Our examination of counsel’s performance requires a high amount of

deference that avoids second guessing counsel’s assistance. Id. In fact, our review

“indulge[s] a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range

of reasonable professional assistance[.]” Id.

             The second prong of the Strickland analysis requires a defendant to

prove he or she was prejudiced by the deficient performance. “In the context of

guilty pleas, the prejudice prong is satisfied when the defendant shows ‘that there

                                          -13-
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded

guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.’” Commonwealth v. Carneal, 274

S.W.3d 420, 431 (Ky. 2008) (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S. Ct.

366, 370, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203 (1985)).

             “We review the trial court’s factual findings only for clear error, but

its application of legal standards and precedents we review de novo.” Stiger, 381

S.W.3d at 234 (citing Brown v. Commonwealth, 253 S.W.3d 490 (Ky. 2008)).

   I.     Were Slaughter’s due process rights violated?

             We now turn to Slaughter’s first claim of error. Slaughter raises what

he claims is a matter of first impression: whether his due process rights were

violated when the Trial Court initially “bifurcated,” or limited, its review of the

Strickland claim solely to the deficient performance prong but then allegedly

permitted the Commonwealth to ask some questions pertaining to the prejudice

prong. This issue presents a pure question of law; thus, we review the Trial

Court’s ruling de novo.

             Due process claims fall into two categories: procedural and

substantive. White v. Boards-Bey, 426 S.W.3d 569, 573 (Ky. 2014) (citing

McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 561 U.S. 742, 860-65, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3090-92,

177 L. Ed. 2d 894 (2010)). Substantive due process “provides protection against

governmental interference with certain fundamental rights that are encompassed in

                                         -14-
the terms life, liberty, and property.” Id. at 574. When the government seeks to

regulate a “fundamental” right “such as the right to free speech or to vote[,]” then

substantive due process rights are implicated, and the “government must have an

exceedingly important reason to regulate them, if at all[.]” Miller v. Johnson

Controls, Inc., 296 S.W.3d 392, 397 (Ky. 2009).

             In contrast to substantive due process protections for fundamental

rights, procedural due process “ensures fair process when protected rights are

abridged[.]” White, 426 S.W.3d at 573 (emphasis added). This protection

“requires the government to follow known and established procedures, and not to

act arbitrarily or unfairly in regulating life, liberty or property.” Miller, 296

S.W.3d at 397.

             Slaughter’s case – a rule-based collateral attack on a criminal

conviction – is based on a protected right, not a fundamental right. As our

Supreme Court has held, “[t]here is no constitutional right to a post-conviction

collateral attack on a criminal conviction or to be represented by counsel at such a

proceeding where it exists.” Fraser v. Commonwealth, 59 S.W.3d 448, 451 (2001)

(citing Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 8, 109 S. Ct. 2765, 2769, 106 L. Ed. 2d 1

(1989), and Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 557, 107 S. Ct. 1990, 1994, 95

L. Ed. 2d 539 (1987)). The Kentucky Constitution only “provides for one appeal

as a matter of right,” Fraser, 59 S.W.3d at 451, and Slaughter’s post-conviction

                                          -15-
claim does not fall into this matter-of-right, direct appeal category. Even though

Slaughter’s ineffective assistance claim implicates the Constitution, the collateral

attack itself is not a fundamental right. Thus, his due process claim is reviewed

under the procedural due process framework.

             “The fundamental requirement of procedural due process is simply

that all affected parties be given ‘the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time

and in a meaningful manner.’” Hilltop Basic Resources, Inc. v. County of Boone,

180 S.W.3d 464, 469 (Ky. 2005) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333,

96 S. Ct. 893, 902, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1976)). What rises to a violation of procedural

due process proffers a challenging calculus as the “appropriate amount of due

process to which one is entitled is an inquiry that is often times difficult to

evaluate[.]” White, 426 S.W.3d at 574. At minimum, in administrative procedures

procedural due process requires “notice, an opportunity for a hearing appropriate to

the nature of the case, and the making of particularized findings of fact for the

record.” Pangallo v. Kentucky Law Enforcement Council, 106 S.W.3d 474, 477

(Ky. App. 2003) (citing Cape Publications, Inc. v. Braden, 39 S.W.3d 823, 827

(Ky. 2001)). These minimal procedural due process protections are not as all-

encompassing as substantive due process protections:

                     Not always does due process require a trial or the
             strict application of evidentiary rules and/or unlimited
             discovery. The court may construct, especially under
             special statutory proceedings, a more flexible procedure

                                          -16-
               to account for the affected interest or potential
               deprivation. Procedural due process is not a static
               concept, but calls for such procedural protections as the
               particular situation may demand.

Kentucky Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Stephens, 897 S.W.2d 583, 590 (Ky. 1995) (citing

Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S. Ct. 2593, 33 L. Ed. 2d 484 (1972)).

               Here, Slaughter was afforded notice, an opportunity to be heard on the

defined remand issue, and an order making particularized findings of fact for the

record. In other words, Slaughter was afforded an entire panoply of procedural due

process rights, and any due process claim must fail.7

               Slaughter further claims more generally that bifurcation of evidentiary

hearings in Strickland cases is inappropriate. He cites two cases. However, both

cases support the opposite conclusion. In Illinois v. Jacobazzi, 966 N.E.2d 1 (Ill.

App. 2009), a foreign appellate court found a bifurcation of the Strickland prongs

was a “reasonable application of our directions on remand,” but nonetheless

erroneous because “the remand directions were insufficient even for their own

purposes.” Id. at 21-22. In Henry v. Florida, 937 So.2d 563, 575 (Fla. 2004), the

Florida Supreme Court cautioned trial judges applying a criminal rule applicable to

7
  There are two important limitations on our holding. First, not all RCr 11.42 claimants are
entitled to the amount of procedural due process Slaughter received. Indeed, not all RCr 11.42
claimants are even entitled to an evidentiary hearing. Second, our holding herein is limited to the
facts before us and the specific remand directive placed on the Trial Court by a previous panel of
this Court. Nothing in our holding should be interpreted as altering the general procedural
framework for the disposition of RCr 11.42 motions.

                                               -17-
death penalty cases “to be very careful when” holding bifurcated proceedings on

Strickland prongs because they may not achieve the “ultimate goal of efficiency in

postconviction proceedings[.]” Both cases implicitly if not explicitly permitted

bifurcated proceedings, and neither case supports that bifurcated proceedings are

ipso facto due process violations. Thus, Jacobazzi and Henry support the Trial

Court’s decision herein.

               In sum, the Trial Court correctly interpreted our remand directive as

requiring only an inquiry into the deficient performance prong of Strickland.

Whether defense counsel informed Slaughter of an insanity defense and whether

defense counsel conducted a reasonable investigation were not so intertwined with

the prejudice inquiry to require a hearing on both prongs. Our review of the

hearing and the remand directive shows that the Trial Court properly exercised its

discretion and limited the hearing. Even the limited questions asked by the

Commonwealth that facially broached the prejudice prong were relevant to the

deficient performance inquiry and do not change the fact that Slaughter received a

hearing and ruling on the deficient performance prong. Slaughter cannot even

point to evidence that he wanted to present on deficient performance that he was

prohibited from presenting.8 And, more importantly, the Trial Court only ruled on

8
 Moreover, Slaughter’s appellate claim is a bit of a moving target. He claims the Trial Court
“first bifurcate[d] a hearing and then un-bifurcate[d] the same hearing so only one side c[ould]

                                               -18-
the deficient performance prong, not the prejudice prong. Any evidence elicited

regarding the latter is superfluous to the substantive claim on appeal. Accordingly,

the Trial Court did not deny Slaughter his procedural due process rights.

   II.     Deficient performance – alleged mis-advice about insanity defense.

               Slaughter next argues that Mudd’s performance was deficient because

she purportedly mis-advised Slaughter that “an insanity defense was the same thing

as guilty but mentally ill.” Appellant’s Brief at 16. The Commonwealth responds

that Slaughter’s factual recitation of Mudd’s testimony is incomplete and taken out

of context. Accordingly, the Commonwealth claims the Trial Court did not err by

finding Mudd did not misadvise Slaughter about an insanity defense.

               Slaughter is correct that Kentucky authorizes two distinct verdicts

with disparate outcomes – guilty but mentally ill, and not guilty by reason of

present evidence of both deficiency and prejudice[.]” Reply Brief at 2 (alterations added).
However, if the proceedings were “un-bifurcated” as Slaughter claims, then the bifurcation was
not a denial of due process because Slaughter ultimately received an evidentiary hearing on both
prongs as he requested. Any alleged unfairness is more properly an allegation of error with
Slaughter’s own post-conviction choices. Indeed, Slaughter insinuates error with the handling of
his “ex parte” motion, but it was Slaughter who waived the ex parte nature of his request for
funds by making it in front of the Commonwealth. And when the proceedings were purportedly
“un-bifurcated”, Slaughter should have pressed the Trial Court for rulings on the evidentiary
issue that was being held in abeyance, namely his ex parte motion and the evidence he
potentially could have obtained with Chapter 31 funds. Slaughter also could have requested a
continuance to gather additional evidence or witnesses. His evidentiary choices ostensibly waive
any appellate review of this claim. Perkins v. Commonwealth, 237 S.W.3d 215, 223 (Ky. App.
2007) (citing Hayes v. Commonwealth, 175 S.W.3d 574, 596 (Ky. 2005), Commonwealth v.
Pace, 82 S.W.3d 894, 895 (Ky. 2002), Dillard v. Commonwealth, 995 S.W.2d 366, 371 (Ky.
1999), and Bell v. Commonwealth, 473 S.W.2d 820, 821 (Ky. 1971)) (“Our case law is well
established that a failure to press a trial court for a ruling or an admonition on an objection or on
a motion for relief operates as a waiver of that issue for purposes of appellate review.”).

                                                -19-
insanity at the time of the offense. KRS 504.120(3)-(4). The latter “functions as a

complete defense to conviction.” Star v. Commonwealth, 313 S.W.3d 30, 36 (Ky.

2010). The former “does not relieve an offender of criminal responsibility for his

conduct.” Id. The difference between the two verdicts is that the one who is guilty

but mentally ill “is able to appreciate the wrongfulness of his behavior and is able

to conform his conduct to the requirements of law[,]” while the one who is insane

during the commission of the crime “lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate

the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of

law.” Id. (quoting KRS 504.020(1)).

             Given the substantially different outcomes of each verdict, affirmative

mis-advice regarding them may constitute deficient performance under Strickland.

Cf. Commonwealth v. Rank, 494 S.W.3d 476, 483-84 (Ky. 2016) (alleged mis-

advice about extreme emotional disturbance defense); Commonwealth v. Pridham,

394 S.W.3d 867 (Ky. 2012) (alleged mis-advice about parole eligibility under the

violent offender statute); Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 176

L. Ed. 2d 284 (2010) (mis-advice about deportation consequences of plea).

However, we need not determine whether such mis-advice constitutes deficient

performance because Slaughter’s counsel did not mis-advise him about an insanity

defense.

                                        -20-
                 We have reviewed the evidentiary hearing; substantial evidence

supports the Trial Court’s finding that counsel investigated and understood an

insanity defense and “discussed a wide range of defense strategies and tactics

with” Slaughter. Both of his counsel testified that they discussed a possible

insanity defense with Slaughter. Mudd told Slaughter that “worst-case scenario,”

he “could” spend the rest of his life institutionalized if the insanity defense worked,

but she never told him he “will anything.”9 Mudd’s testimony did not demonstrate

that she confused a guilty but mentally ill verdict and a not guilty by reason of

insanity verdict. It also did not show that she affirmatively misadvised Slaughter

about the two verdicts. Accordingly, Slaughter failed to demonstrate deficient

performance on this issue.

      III.   Deficient performance – failure to pursue a fourth mental health
             expert.

                 Slaughter next argues that his trial counsel’s performances were

deficient by allegedly failing to investigate properly and retain a fourth mental

health expert. We have reviewed the record and find no deficient performance

occurred in counsel’s investigation of Slaughter’s insanity defense.

                 Under Strickland, supra, counsel has a duty to make a reasonable

investigation. That “reasonable investigation is not an investigation that the best

9
    Kentucky permits involuntary hospitalizations for mental illness. KRS Chapter 202A.

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criminal defense lawyer in the world, blessed not only with unlimited time and

resources, but also with the benefit of hindsight, would conduct.” Haight v.

Commonwealth, 41 S.W.3d 436, 446 (Ky. 2001) (citation omitted), overruled on

other grounds by Leonard v. Commonwealth, 279 S.W.3d 151 (Ky. 2009).

Instead, the failure-to-adequately-investigate claim “must be directly assessed for

reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to

counsel’s judgments.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691.

             Counsel’s investigation and judgments here were reasonable. At the

beginning of their representation, they recognized mental health may be a defense

and immediately had Slaughter evaluated by a mental health expert. They

thoroughly investigated Slaughter’s prior mental health evaluations and continually

monitored Slaughter’s mental health. They later retained two other mental health

experts to assist with competency proceedings. Counsel also consulted with one of

those experts, giving him additional information about Slaughter and never

receiving a conclusion she believed would be helpful for an insanity defense.

Accordingly, she never had the expert reduce his opinion to writing. Counsel

thoroughly investigated the discovery materials, thoroughly investigated

Slaughter’s past and present mental health issues, and thoroughly kept apprised of

Slaughter’s actions at the jail (which included suspected malingering about mental

health problems).

                                        -22-
             Counsel also sought and obtained a plea deal that aligned with

Slaughter’s ultimate desire – the opportunity to see the parole board. We are

reminded here that “[t]he reasonableness of counsel’s actions may be determined

or substantially influenced by the defendant’s own statements or actions.”

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. Indeed,

             Counsel’s trial actions can reasonably be based on
             strategic choices made by the defendant and on
             information supplied by the defendant, and “when a
             defendant has given counsel reason to believe that
             pursuing certain investigations would be fruitless or even
             harmful, counsel’s failure to pursue those investigations
             may not later be challenged as unreasonable.”

Brown v. Commonwealth, 253 S.W.3d 490, 499 (Ky. 2008) (quoting Strickland,

466 U.S. at 691) (cleaned up). Furthermore, counsel’s performance includes an

“overarching duty to advocate the defendant’s cause and the more particular duties

to consult with the defendant on important decisions and to keep the defendant

informed of important developments in the course of the prosecution.” Strickland,

466 U.S. at 688. Counsel repeatedly and frequently consulted with Slaughter, and,

after multiple mental health evaluations, significant discovery, and discussions

with counsel about potential defenses including an insanity defense, Slaughter’s

expressed desire was to obtain a plea that guaranteed he would see the parole

board. Counsel’s performance was not deficient for securing a plea bargain that

                                        -23-
aligned with Slaughter’s ultimate goal: a guaranteed opportunity to see the parole

board.

             In sum, Slaughter was represented by two highly experienced capital

defense attorneys, one of whom was the head of the capital division, who

employed three mental health experts, thoroughly reviewed the evidence,

extensively met with and counseled Slaughter, and thoroughly investigated the

possibility of an insanity defense. These actions at minimum constituted

reasonable performance, and their actions likely constituted much more. As the

Strickland Court warned, “Courts should strive to ensure that ineffectiveness

claims not become so burdensome to defense counsel that the entire criminal

justice system suffers as a result.” 466 U.S. at 697. Raising the defense bar higher

would certainly cause what Strickland sought to prohibit with its reasonable

performance standard.

             Accordingly, we affirm the Trial Court’s order finding counsel’s

performance not deficient on this point.

   IV.    Entitlement to another evidentiary hearing.

             Finally, Slaughter argues he is entitled to another evidentiary hearing

to present “the factual basis for his entire ineffective assistance of counsel claim”

regarding the alleged insanity defense. Appellant’s Brief at 25. Because we find

no error with the Trial Court’s conclusion on the deficient performance prong,

                                           -24-
Slaughter’s Strickland claim necessarily fails, and he is not entitled to an

evidentiary hearing on the remaining prong. Cf. Haley v. Commonwealth, 586

S.W.3d 744, 751 (Ky. App. 2019) (“Where the record is clear that an ineffective

assistance of counsel claim would ultimately fail the prejudice prong of Strickland,

regardless of the outcome of a hearing on the deficiency prong, the trial court

should be affirmed even in the absence of such a hearing.”) (citing Commonwealth

v. Searight, 423 S.W.3d 226, 231 (Ky. 2014)).

                                  CONCLUSION

             The Trial Court followed this Court’s remand directive and held a

hearing to determine whether Slaughter’s counsel deficiently performed in their

advice about and investigation into an insanity defense. The Trial Court held such

a hearing and found no deficient performance. We have reviewed the same and

find no error. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the order denying the RCr 11.42 motion.

             ALL CONCUR.

 BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:                     BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

 Andrea Reed                               Daniel J. Cameron
 Frankfort, Kentucky                       Attorney General of Kentucky

                                           Matthew R. Krygiel
                                           Assistant Attorney General
                                           Frankfort, Kentucky

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