Court Opinion

ID: 9844457
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:03:04.001112+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:35.505146
License: Public Domain

McQUADE, Justice
(dissenting).
The city of Idaho Falls on October 18, 1962, annexed ten acres of land adjacent to its southern city limits. Prior to this date, the ten acres had been zoned for a residential shopping center by Bonneville County. This had been done pursuant to the grant of power given the county by I.C. § 31-3801 “for the purposes of promoting health, safety, morals and general welfare, to provide for orderly development *606of land and to protect property values.” The county approved a shopping center plan which was proposed by the president of appellant corporation while he still held individually an option upon this ten acres. The plan included a service station proposed for the 110' x 125' lot on the northeast corner of the ten acre tract, but the ■county refused to issue a building permit for the station. The use of this 110' x 125' lot, now owned by appellant corporation, is the subject of this litigation.
After this ten acre tract was annexed to the city, but about three weeks before It had been zoned by the city, appellant requested a building permit for a gasoline station on its land so it might lease the land to an oil company. This request was .the only one made by appellant. For this purpose appellant also requested permission to cross with a driveway to the gasoline station a thirty foot wide planting easement along Seventeenth Street. The city ■delayed issuing a building permit because it first wished to pass an ordinance zoning the annexed land. The city passed ordinance 1063 on August 22, 1963, ten months after it had annexed the land. The district court found that this delay was not unreasonable, and the majority appears not to question that conclusion. This ordinance again zoned the land for a residential shopping center, and at the same meeting the city adopted a comprehensive shopping center plan. Because appellant’s proposed gasoline station was not adapted for this plan, its application for a permit was denied. Appellant therefore brought suit to compel the issuance of a permit, which suit was unsuccessful in the district court.
The majority opinion is based on the conclusion that appellant’s land was unzoned. The majority concludes that, since the annexed land was unzoned when appellant applied for its permit to build a gasoline station, it was the city’s “ministerial duty” to issue the permit. This conclusion postulates that the annexed ten acres came into the city as unzoned land, and the larger number of the few cases dealing with this point do appear to support this view. However, the Kentucky cases 1 rely upon a comprehensive statutory scheme (K.R.S. §§ 100.031 to 100.098) which establishes a combination city-county planning and zoning commission whose recommendations require separate approval by the county and city (K.R.S. §§ 100.048, 100.049). This planning organization emphasizes the separate entities of city and county. Land annexed to the city from the county can be zoned in accordance with the commission’s proposals only with the express consent of the city, and until such action is taken the annexed land remains unzoned. The California 2 and New York3 cases rely solely upon California Const, art. XI, § 11, and N.Y. Town Law § 132 (McKinney’s Con-sol.Laws, c. 62, 1965), respectively, which .provide simply that ordinances will be effective only within the territorial limits of the municipality or county involved.
On the other hand, the Supreme Court of Mississippi has expressly refused to follow such authority. In Highland Village Land Company v. City of Jackson,4 plaintiff’s land was zoned mostly for residential purposes by the county. When the city an- . nexed this land, plaintiff requested that the .residential portion be rezoned for commercial purposes. The city council refused to do so, and plaintiff brought suit, urging that
“the action of the city is void because when the city limits were extended and the property taken into the city the zoning ordinances adopted by the county board of supervisors terminated insofar *607as said property was concerned and such property was unzoned so that the city, until it had taken the necessary legal steps, had no jurisdiction over zoning of this particular property.” 5
The Court stated, however, that it was 'unwilling a'*d unable to accept as law the proposition that when property which had been zoned by the county was taken into the city it came as unzoned property.”6 The Court in order to protect residential property values in the area, to vindicate reliance upon existing ordinances until they were duly changed, and to carry out the beneficial purposes of zoning, held that the city was authorized to take the action it did. In effect, the Court refused to permit a lapse in zoning control like that said to be present in this case.
To prevent such lapses in the future, I.C. § 50-1206 now provides that cities must determine the proper zoning of annexed areas “concurrently with or immediately following the ordinance of annexation * * It would be eminently sensible for this Court to effectuate the same purpose in this case, which happened to arise before the enactment of I.C. § 50-1206. It is unfortunate that1 appellant, by utilizing the lapse in this case, is allowed to acquire the gasoline station which was denied under the county ordinance which the city attempted to deny under its ordinance. Moreover, such a result is contrary to the implications of certain of our own cases. In Boise City v. Better Homes 7 and in Gaige v. City of Boise,8 owners of certain parcels of land which were annexed to the city were given the benefit of whatever status the county had assigned to their land before annexation. In both cases, this Court prevented the city from automatically applying its ordinances to deprive the owners of uses acquired when the land was situated in the county. In this case the owner of county land was refused a certain use under the county ordinances and hence acquired no vested interests under the county ordinances. Appellant should not be permitted that use merely because the land is annexed by a new legal sub-division which temporarily has no ordinance to cover the land. To do so is to allow owners of annexed land to reject the burdens of county ordinances while enforcing their benefits. For certain porposes, city and county are separate legal sub-divisions, but for zoning and planning purposes the county zoning ordinances should furnish a basis for the city’s refusal to issue building permits for newly-annexed land until the city affirmatively enacts its own ordinances.
There are other bases for the city’s refusal to issue a permit in this case. It may be noticed that when an area is about to be zoned, individual entrepreneurs may desire to build structures and acquire vested interests on the land, which might later be prohibited. There is a rush to acquire non-' conforming uses:
“As a consequence, property owners in the area being zoned frequently hasten to acquire building permits under the existing ordinance, if there be one * * *. This practice has been characterized by the courts as a ‘race for diligence’ and has been stated to be neither in the best interests of the community nor individual property owners.” 9
Unless there is some means of temporarily retaining the status quo in such land, this race will always be won by the individual landowner to the detriment of the general public. This is true because the enactment of zoning ordinances normally requires a great deal of time for study, planning and administrative consideration.
The aggregate result of these races for diligence can be tragic. Planning author*608ities who advocate the formation of nucleus-type commercial centers for low-density fringe areas like the area in this case point out that
“[I]n practice, however, the most noticeable commercial development in these areas is ‘strip commercial’ * * *. It comprises everything from billboards to drive-in movies, from gas stations to motels, from diners to trucking terminals, from farm fruit stands (and even working farmland) to discount department stores, from junkyards to dime-and-dance.” 10
The authors point out that compact centers such as they have favored must be developed at one time by one entrepreneur acquiring a large tract of land under his centralized control. “A strip, by contrast, grows by gradual accretion, in tune with * * * the pattern of individual land ownership.” 11 It is also stated that there are remedies for the situation, including ■“ * * * a growing trend to give more zoning power to counties, especially a veto power over zoning changes along county and state roads.” 12
More specifically in relation to shopping centers, it is recognized that “the intent of zoning is to bring a semblance of order into dynamic but anarchistically expanding areas and to guide their growth along more desirable lines: ” 13
“[In contrast to strip zoning] the modern shopping center which integrates commercial, business, entertainment and cultural facilities within a carefully planned framework, which separates various modes of traffic from each other, and which provides for the protection of surrounding residential areas from any objectionable performances, has made a significant contribution in this direction.” 14
It is stated that one of the most important objectives of a shopping center planner is to convince all interested parties that the center “will, by careful planning, achieve harmonious integration with the neighborhood.” 15
The record in the present case indicates that the city of Idaho Falls was attempting to achieve just such objectives. To accomplish these objectives, municipalities have sought means to retain the status quo of unzoned areas so that uses inconsistent with the ordinance as ultimately adopted do not develop in an uncontrolled fashion. Most often the means chosen is a stop-gap or emergency zoning ordinance.16 Administrative delay also may be a means to this end,17 and that was the means chosen by the city in this case. The majority would require that an ordinance actually be pending before the municipality at the time it denies building permits, but even the cases said to support this rule are not unqualified.18 This conclusion fails to take ac*609count of the time needed for careful study and planning of projected zoning, during which time anxious entrepreneurs may decimate an expanding area with “Strip Commercial.” It would encourage precipitous action by municipalities in its increasingly important responsibilities as a land-use planner. Moreover, it places too heavy an emphasis upon the individual economic rights of an entrepreneur as opposed to the rights of the general public. It is certainly true that loose procedures in zoning law may lead to serious abuses.19 But it is also becoming apparent that the “individualistic bias for our legal system” can have adverse effects upon community planning,20 although theoretically the public interest in zoning is preferred over private interest in property.21 “Courts are more and more being called on to decide issues which are increasingly technical and complex * * * yet courts are ill-equipped to make decisions on technical matters, and it is far from clear that the adversary system provides the best approach to [this kind of] decision making.”22
On the basis of these considerations, I find more persuasive those authorities which temper their protection of individual economic rights with a substantial measure of respect for municipalities exercising legislative functions in zoning matters. In Cohen v. Incorporated Village of Valley Stream,23 plaintiff entered a lease with an oil company for the use of a corner lot as gasoline station premises, conditional upon plaintiff’s acquisition of a special use permit from the village. Plaintiff made application at a time when he would have been entitled to the permit, but a month later the village amended the ordinance to prohibit further gasoline stations in the area where plaintiff’s land was situated. The village board had thus deliberately held up its decision upon plaintiff’s application until the amendment could be accomplished, but the court held this exercise of power was not arbitrary, discriminatory or confiscatory :
“The right of a municipality to determine zoning for itself is a legislative power, which may not be interfered with by a court unless it is clearly arbitrary, unreasonable, discriminatory or confiscatory. A village may adopt plans suitable to its own particular location and needs, and these are purely for legislative discretion.”24
In Gramatan Hills Manor, Inc. v. Manganiello,25 the facts disclosed “the existence of a question which has plagued courts time and again in zoning cases — the respective rights of the applicant for a building permit, and a municipality, when official action on his application is delayed until a new ordinance outlawing the use has become effective.” Plaintiff made application for a permit to build an apartment house at a time when it would have been entitled to a permit but when the Village of Tuckahoe had engaged consultants to prepare a master plan. After plaintiff filed various plans on which consideration was delayed, the village adopted an ordinance prohibiting the issuance of new building permits until the master plan was adopted. It later re*610zoned plaintiff’s land to the exclusion of apartment houses. The court held, nevertheless, that as plaintiff had not acquired any vested rights by beginning construction or physically using the land for the contemplated structure, it could not compel the issuance of a permit.26
Once it is conceded that the enactment of municipal zoning ordinances is a legislative function subsuming the plenary power to alter zoning ordinances as the public need arises,27 it should follow that the municipality also has the power either to enact emergency ordinances to preserve the character of the land until comprehensive ordinances can be enacted 28 or to delay the issuance of new permits under the old or non-existent ordinances so long as that delay is neither unreasonably long nor unrelated to the city’s efforts to plan the use of the land. Otherwise the primary police power of the municipality to zone land would be substantially undermined. Underlying the decisions in these cases is the sound recognition that the hardship to one property owner caused by the refusal of a permit when he has made no substantial change in his economic position is much less costly to society generally than the relatively permanent hardship caused by the existence of non-conforming land uses.
As applied to the present case, these principles indicate that it was within the legislative power of the city of Idaho Falls to withhold a building permit for a gasoline station on appellant’s land. The city could refuse to issue permits for a reasonable time and for the purpose of halting uncontrolled development on newly-annexed and unzoned land whose use for an integrated shopping center the city was then planning. It must be concluded that the • city did not have a ministerial duty to issue a permit but on the contrary had a duty to the general public to withhold it so the land use could be rationally planned for the welfare of the entire community. Without such a permit, appellant was properly prevented from changing his economic position by beginning construction on a gasoline station. Therefore it acquired no substantial vested rights which would require this Court to interfere with the city planning of Idaho Falls.
Before turning to the issues raised by the application of ordinances ' 1063 and 1115 to appellant’s land; the precise character and extent of appellant’s legal demand in this case should be delineated. Appellant’s property fronts on Seventeenth Street.
*611“* * * [0]n January 11, 1961 [appellant] executed a deed of dedication conveying to the public a ‘planting easement’ thirty feet wide and 110 feet long adjacent to 17th Street and along the north end of the easterly 150-foot strip of the shopping center.” 29
This deed is contained in the official plan of the shopping center and was duly recorded in Bonneville County on February 6, 1962. Therefore “* * * a strip 30 feet wide along its front is dedicated to the public as a ‘planting easement.’ ”30 The public owns this easement across the front of appellant’s property.
Appellant then sought permission to build a service station “with curb cuts necessary for access thereto as set forth on Exhibit A.”31 Although exhibit A was not admitted into evidence, other drawings admitted as exhibits show that “the application [by appellant for a gasoline station permit] called for curb-cut access onto 17th Street across the planting strip easement.”32 In effect, then, appellant demands access to his property across property owned by the public in addition to the “access easement [already appurtenant to appellant’s land] across a 40-foot strip of land adjacent to, and immediately west of, the property.”33 On these facts, appellant has not shown how it was deprived of property without due process of law when it was prevented from appropriating the public’s property rights for its gasoline station driveway. On the contrary, if the planting easement were owned by a private party instead of the city, then appellant would be required to pay compensation for its use of the easement.
The majority relies upon various cases for the proposition, that the right of access from one’s land to a public way is a property right which cannot be deprived by a municipality without some police power justification. Conceding the validity of this general statement, it is difficult to apply in support of appellant’s position in this case since the city has not deprived appellant of any property. Appellant has access to its land over the appurtenant easement. Moreover, it is the public rather than appellant which owns the planting easement. Village of Sandpoint v. Doyle 34 involved an owner of land which extended fully to the wooden bridge to which he desired access. The landowner there did not have to cross property or easements owned by another in order to get access to his land. The Court held that the village could not absolutely forbid access to the public way but could “adopt reasonable rules and regulations with reference to the erection * * * of buildings and all approaches to the same, and entrance to * * * the street * * *.”35 Continental Oil Company v. City of Twin Falls 36 also involved an owner of land which extended fully to the street. An ordinance prohibiting driveways across sidewalks near schools was found invalid because the stated concern for safety had little basis in the evidence. The Court there stated, however, that “access to a public way across sidewalks [is] subject to the right of reasonable regulation by the municipality * * 37 These cases therefore do not indicate that a landowner has a free and clear right of access to public roads even when such an access must cross property interests owned by another. The oth*612er cases cited by the majority hold only that a municipality must compensate a landowner when it destroys a pre-existing access.38 White v. City of Twin Falls39 holds only that in the absence of a police power justification it is unreasonable to restrict commercial activity to one side of a street. Whether indeed there is a sufficient police power justification for the ordinances in this case is a question left largely unanswered by the cases just discussed and is the question to which I now turn.
The majority points out that appellant would be entitled to a permit to build a gasoline station even if ordinances 1063 and 1115 applied to its application since a gasoline station is a permitted use under either ordinance. The majority overrides the city council’s decision that a gasoline station should not be permitted if it will not be an integral part of the shopping center and if its access will traverse the planting easement. The majority goes on to substitute its judgment for that of the city council on the merits of the city planning issues involved by asserting that, since the service station exit may facilitate traffic movement and safety, “at least in a functional sense, the requested access would make the service station more of an integral part of the shopping center.”
This approach fails to consider both certain zoning law concepts and basic principles regarding the proper relation of judicial and legislative power. Conceding that a gasoline station is a permitted use under these ordinances, it is another matter to conclude that any individual property owner in the RSC-1 zone is entitled to a permit as a matter of right. Ordinance 1063 defined “shopping center” as
“an area or tract of land specifically set apart and zoned to provide commercial services of various types, according to an integrated approved plan.” (Emphasis added).
That ordinance also defined “shopping center plan” as
"an integrated plan, approved by the planning commission and the city council, for a shopping center, on which is indicated the various amounts and locations of land to be devoted to stores, shops, service buildings, parking areas, driveways, service areas, planter strips, and other facilities * * (Emphasis added).
A residential shopping center district is then designated as an “RSC” zone, whose definition and purpose is further elaborated by the ordinance as
“a limited business zone, planned as an integrated center in accordance with a comprehensive plan and located adjacent to, near, or surrounded by residential zones and in which only such uses are permitted as are normally required for the daily local business needs of the residential vicinity or district, and which uses shall not be detrimental to the area to be served.” (Emphasis added).
The use regulations then provide that “in an RSC zone no land shall be used and no buildings shall be used, erected or converted to any use other than the following:
“Service stations permitted within an RSC zone only when access thereto is limited to access from the interior of the shopping center without curb cuts additional to the curb cuts provided for the shopping center area or where the service station is located in compliance with all set-back requirements for the shopping center buildings. * * *”
So that the shopping center may be adapted to the neighborhood, the ordinance further provides in detail for the landscaping of the street sides of such centers by a “strip of lawn, shrubbery and/or trees at least thirty feet in width * * * except for permitted driveways.”
*613The superseding ordinance 1115 enacted by the city council in March of 1964 continues the permitted use of service stations but likewise makes it abundantly clear that the residential shopping center zone is to be developed through comprehensive plans approved by the city and designed to harmonize residential commercial needs with the surrounding property values and the residential amenities and characteristics. Landscaping is designated by the ordinance as an important means to this end:
“The privilege of providing services to the residents in the surrounding neighborhood carries with it a corresponding responsibility to construct and maintain the premise in harmony with the characteristics of the surrounding zone. Therefore, a landscaped strip of lawn, shrubbery and/or trees, at least thirty feet in width shall be provided and maintained [on the street sides] * * * except for permitted driveways.”
To read these ordinances as allowing any individual property owner to place a gasoline station anywhere he pleases because it is a permitted use under the regulations is to nullify the vitally important contextual provisions of the ordinances which plainly require that the land in an RSC zone be developed in accordance with a comprehensive plan. This plan must be approved by the city council in its legislative capacity. The permitted uses may not exist as independent entities but must conform to the plan. The uses may not run rough-shod over the landscape design but must harmonize with the residential surroundings. This shopping center plan represents an attempt to conform to the best modern thought on the planning of city commercial centers.
The language of the ordinances in question also vests the city of Idaho Falls with discretion as to the approval of shopping center plans. Pursuant to its police power as expressed in these ordinances, the city may reject those plans which do not conform to its policy objectives of placing architecturally pleasing commercial centers in residential areas. A fortiori the city may also reject applications for building permits which do not conform to the comprehensive plan. This exercise of the police power may not be thwarted unless it is arbitrary, discriminatory or confiscatory.40 In short, the denial of the permit must have some reasonable basis in fact and be guided by generally applicable standards.41
In City of Baltimore v. Muller,42 plaintiffs owned land the larger part of which was zoned commercial. The owners entered a contract to sell the land to an oil company, contingent upon the acquisition of a permit for a gasoline station. The Board of Zoning Appeals possessed original jurisdiction of such matters, and, pursuant to ordinances allowing it to consider the protection of residents from noise, dust and gases, the character of structures in the vicinity, the effects upon nearby dwellings, the conservation of property values, and any other matters in the general welfare, the board denied the permit. The Court, stating that its scope of judicial review was most limited, held that the test for the validity of a refusal to allow a filling station at a given sight was whether there was a reasonable basis to support the refusal as an exercise of the police power. Added traffic hazards and the disapproval of the planning commission were found sufficient reasons for the refusal in that case.
*614In Mrowka v. Board of Zoning Appeals,43 plaintiffs owned a corner lot in an industrial zone and applied for a gasoline station permit. The board denied the permit under the statute there applicable whose ■ultimate standard was whether the use would unduly imperil the safety of the public. The Court of Common Pleas reversed ■the board and stated that it was irrational io distinguish gasoline stations from restaurants and retail stores, for example. Chief Justice Maltbie, speaking for the Supreme ■•Court of Errors, reversed the lower court:
■“To approve the court’s reasoning would mot only go against the judgment of the legislature but would destroy the right of a zoning board ever to refuse a certificate of approval for a gasoline station the proposed location of which was in an industrial zone, a conclusion which cannot be sound.
* * * * * *
“The [trial] court also concluded that the issuance of a license for the gasoline station at the location in question would be in no way harmful or detrimental to the public welfare; it was not for the trial court to substitute its judgment for that of the board [when] the only issue before it was: Could the board reasonably conclude that the presence of the gasoline station at that place would unduly imperil the safety of the public?”44
In the instant case, the ordinances require the city council to consider whether the proposed structure will be adapted to a comprehensive shopping center plan, whether it will blend with the surrounding residences, whether it will have an adverse effect upon nearby property values, and whether it will disrupt an architectural unity, as well as whether it will adversely affect traffic conditions. These are rational considerations, and a refusal of a building permit based upon them cannot be so arbitrary as to deprive due process. The city council reasonably could have concluded that a gasoline station which would disrupt the landscaped perimeter of an integrated shopping center must not be permitted.
The majority declines to give legal recognition to the architectural and aesthetic considerations which entered into the city’s legislative decision to zone this land for residential shopping centers. In this respect it is not inappropriate to recall certain dicta by Justice Sutherland, in the Ambler Realty Co. case: 45
“Regulations, the wisdom, necessity and validity of which, as applied to existing conditions, are so apparent that they are now uniformly sustained a century ago, or even a half a century ago, probably would have been rejected as arbitrary and oppressive. Such regulations are sustained under the complex conditions of our day, for reasons * * * which before * * * would have been condemned as fatally arbitrary and unreasonable * * *. In a changing world, it is impossible that it should be otherwise.”
Courts have held, moreover, that aesthetic considerations are entitled to some weight in determining the reasonableness of zoning regulations.46 Furthermore, ordinances based solely upon aesthetic considerations have been upheld.47 In Berman v. Park*615er,48 the Supreme Court of the United States stated:
“The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive * * *. The values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled. In the present case, the Congress * * * [has] made determinations that take into account a- wide variety of values. It is not for us to reappraise them.” 49
In State ex rel. Saveland Park Holding Corporation v. Wieland,50 the Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of an ordinance which prohibited the issuance of a building permit unless
“the exterior architectural appeal and functional plan of the proposed structure will, when erected, not he so at variance with either the exterior architectural appeal and functional plan of the structures already constructed or in the course of construction in the immediate neighborhood or the character of * * * the district * * * as to cause a substantial depreciation in the property values of said neighborhood.”
In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted that zoning ordinances enacted pursuant to a municipality’s police power by definition impose restrictions upon the use of private property; that where the interest of the individual conflicts with the interests of society as expressed by such ordinances, the individual interest is subordinated to the general welfare; that aesthetic considerations are an integral part of the public welfare; and that such an ordinance does not leave the issuance of building permits to arbitrary discretion. Those principles, are fully applicable to the instant case, and for all of the reasons stated above the judgment of the district court should be affirmed.

. Louisville and Jefferson County Planning and Zoning Commission v. Fortner, 243 S.W.2d 492 (Ky.App.1951); Farley v. DeMuth, 399 S.W.2d 469 (Ky.App. 1965).

. City of South San Francisco v. Berry, 120 Cal.App.2d 252, 260 P.2d 1045 (1953).

. Ellish v. Village of Suffern, 30 A.D.2d 554, 291 N.Y.S.2d 178 (1968).

. 243 Miss. 34, 137 So.2d 549 (1962).

. Id. at 42, 551.

. Id.

. 72 Idaho 441, 243 P.2d 303 (1952).

. 91 Idaho 481, 425 P.2d 52 (1967).

.Comment, Stop-Gap and Interim Legislation, A Device to Maintain the Status Quo of an Area Pending the Adoption of a Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance or Amendment Thereto, 18 Syracuse L.Rev. 837 at 838-839 (1967).

. Tunnard and Pushkarev, Man-Made America: Chaos or Control? 322 (New Haven and London: Yale Univ. Press 1963); See also Blake, God’s Own Junkyard: The Planned Deterioration of America’s Landscape 109-118 (chapter entitled “Roadscape”) (Holt, Rinehart and Winston: New York, Chicago, San Francisco 1964).

. Id. at 324.

. Id.

. Gruen and Smith, Shopping Towns USA: The Planning of Shopping Centers 46 (New York: Reinhold Pub. Corp. 1960).

. Id. at 48.

. Id. at 49.

. See Rhyne, Municipal Law §§ 32-3, 32-4 (1957); McQuiJlin, Municipal Corporations § 25.64 (rev. ed. 1965).

. Comment, Stop-Gap and Interim Legislation [Etc.], supra, n. 9, at pp. 848-849.

. Russian Hill Imp. Ass’n v. Board of Permit Appeals of City and County of San Francisco, 66 Cal.2d 34, 56 Cal. Rptr. 672, 423 P.2d 824, 832-833 (1907) (under an ordinance making permit final when “lawfully granted” as substitute for judicial doctrine of substantial beginning of construction) ; Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Mt. Holly Township, 135 N.J.L. 112, 51 A.2d 19 (1947) (zoning commission *609“working” on an ordinance); A. J. Aberman, Inc. v. City of New Kensington, 377 Pa. 520, 105 A.2d 586 (1954) (zoning commission submitted final report and proposed ordinance); Chicago Title and Trust Co. v. Village of Palatine, 22 Ill.App.2d 264, 160 N.E.2d 697 (1959) (public hearings on new ordinance being held, but normal rule is that permit is not final until substantial change of position occurs).

. See e. g., Comment, Judicial Control Over Zoning Boards of Appeal: Suggestions for Reform, 12 U.C.L.A. L.Rev. 937 (1965).

. See e. g., Mandelker, The Role of Law in The Planning Process, 30 Law and Contemporary Problems 26 (1965).

. McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 25.41.

. Eldredge, Taming Megalopolis Vol. II 753 (Essay by Reps. “Requiem For Zoning”) (New York: Doubleday 1967).

. 23 Misc.2d 1017, 189 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1959).

. Id. at 116.

. 30 Misc.2d 117, 213 N.Y.S.2d 617 (1961).

. Accord, Felice v. City of Inglewood, 84 Cal.App.2d 263, 190 P.2d 317, 320 (1948); (application for permit vests no rights, and council may refuse permit even if the use is a permitted one); Baxley v. City of Frederick, 133 Okl. 84, 271 P. 257, 259 (1928) (zoning ordinance not invalid as retroactive because made applicable to property for which a permit has been requested); McEachern v. Town of Highland Park, 124 Tex. 36, 73 S.W.2d 487 (1934); Franchise Realty Interstate Corp. v. City of Detroit, 368 Mich. 276, 118 N.W.2d 258 (1962); cf. Poczatek v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 26 A.D.2d 556, 270 N.Y.S.2d 980 (1966).

. Wakefield v. Kraft, 202 Md. 136, 141-142, 96 A.2d 27, 29 (1953); Colt v. Bernard, 279 S.W.2d 527, 530 (Mo.App. 1955); City of Louisville v. Puritan Apartment Hotel Co., 264 S.W.2d 888, 890 (Ky.1954); Stillbar Construction Co. v. Town of Harrison, Sup., 143 N.Y.S.2d 804, 806 (1955).

. Downham v. City Council of Alexandria, 58 F.2d 784, 788 (E.D.Va.1932); Miller v. Board of Public Works, 195 Cal. 477, 234 P. 381, 388, 38 A.L.R. 1479 (1925), cert. den. 273 U.S. 781, 47 S.Ct. 460, 71 L.Ed. 889; Hasco Electric Corp. v. Dassler, Sup., 143 N.Y.S.2d 240, 242-243 aff’d Sup., 144 N.Y.S.2d 857 (1955); McCurly v. City of El Reno, 138 Okl. 92, 94-97, 280 P. 467, 469-472 (1929); City of Dallas v. Meserole Bros., 164 S.W.2d 564 (Tex.Civ.App.1942) ; contra: Whittemore v. Town Clerk of Falmouth, 299 Mass. 64, 12 N.E.2d 187 (1937); Krajenke Buiek Sales v. Kopkowski, 322 Mich. 250, 33 N.W.2d 781 (1948); State ex rel. Kramer v. Schwartz, 336 Mo. 932, 82 S.W.2d 63 (1935); State ex rel. Fairmount Center Co. v. Arnold, 138 Ohio St. 259, 34 N.E. 2d 777, 136 A.L.R. 840 (1941); Kline v. City of Harrisburg, 362 Pa. 438, 68 A.2d 182 (1949).

. District court amended finding of fact number 9.

. District court amended finding of fact number 11.

. Plaintiff’s amended and supplemental complaint: Count 1, ¶ Y; Count 2, ¶ IX ; Count 7, ¶¶ VI and VII.

. District court finding of fact number 18, which was somewhat amended as finding number 13; see amended findings of fact numbers 18 and 27 to tlie same effect.

. District court amended finding of fact number 11.

. 14 Idaho 749, 95 P. 945 (1908).

. Id. at p. 759, 95 P. 948.

. 49 Idaho 89, 286 P. 353 (1930).

. Id. at p. 107, 286 P. 359.

. Hadfield v. State ex rel. Burns, 86 Idaho 561, 388 P.2d 1018 (1964); Farris v. City of Twin Falls, 81 Idaho 583, 347 P. 2d 996 (1959); Hughes v. State, 80 Idaho 286, 328 P.2d 397 (1958).

. 81 Idaho 176, 338 P.2d 778 (1959).

. McQuillin, Municipal Corporations §§ 25.147, 25.217; Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 at 388-389, 47 S.Ct. 114, 71 L.Ed. 303, 54 A.L.R. 1016 (1926) ; City of Baltimore v. Muller, 242 Md. 269 at 279, 219 A.2d 91 at 96-97 (1966); Turner v. Cook, 9 Misc.2d 850, 168 N.Y.S.2d 556 at 559 (1957); Kidder v. City Council of Brockton, 329 Mass. 288, 107 N.E.2d 774 (1952); Fisher v. City of Irving, 345 S.W.2d 547 at 549 (Tex.Civ.App.1961).

. Bassett, Zoning 54-56 (New York: Russell Sage Foundation 1940); Olp v. Town of Brighton, 173 Misc. 1079, 19 N. Y.S.2d 546 at 552-553 (1940).

. Note 40, supra.

. 134 Conn. 149, 55 A.2d 909 (1947)

. Id. at 154-155, 55 A.2d 911-912; see also Zelazny v. Town Board of Town of North Hempstead, Sup., 101 N.Y.S.2d 178 (1950); cf. State ex rel. Morris v. City of Nashville, 207 Tenn. 672 at 681-682, 343 S.W.2d 847 at 851 (1961).

. Note 40, supra, 272 U.S. at p. 387, 47 S.Ct. at p. 118.

. 122 Main Street Corporation v. City of Brockton, 323 Mass. 646, 650, 84 N.E.2d 13, 16, 8 A.L.R.2d 955 (1949); Barney & Casey Co. v. Town of Milton, 324 Mass. 440, 448, 87 N.E.2d 9, 14-15 (1949); Criterion Service, Inc. v. City of East Cleveland, 88 N.E.2d 300, 303 (Ohio App. 1949).

. City of New Orleans v. Levy, 223 La. 14, 64 So.2d 798 (1953) (historic and architectural qualities preserved): Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 333 Mass. 773, 783, 128 N.E.2d 557, 563 (1955) (historic districts of Nantucket *615and Beacon Hill preserved); City of Miami Beach v. Ocean & Inland Co., 147 Fla. 480, 485-487, 3 So.2d 364, 366-367 (1941) (attractiveness of resort area maintained).

. Id. at 33, 75 S.Ct. at 103. Cf. Blake, op. cit. note 10, supra, at pp. 140-142 (chapter entitled “To Determine That the Community Should be Beautiful”).

. 269 Wis. 262, 69 N.W.2d 217 (1955), cert. den. 350 U.S. 841, 76 S.Ct. SI, 100 L.Ed. 750.

. 348 U.S. 26, 75 S.Ct. 98, 99 L.Ed. 27 (1954).