Court Opinion

ID: 9948141
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-06 16:06:07.751391+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:29:15.662965
License: Public Domain

Third District Court of Appeal
                               State of Florida

                         Opinion filed March 6, 2024.
       Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

                            ________________

                            No. 3D23-0025
                     Lower Tribunal No. F89-12383C
                          ________________

                          David B. Ingraham,
                                  Appellant,

                                     vs.

                         The State of Florida,
                                  Appellee.

      An Appeal under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.141(b)(2) from
the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Michelle Delancy, Judge.

     David B. Ingraham, in proper person.

    Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Linda S. Katz, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.

Before LOGUE, C.J., and LINDSEY, and GORDO, JJ.

     LINDSEY, J.
      Appellant David B. Ingraham (Defendant below) appeals from an order

denying his pro se motion to vacate illegal sentence. The trial court correctly

denied Ingraham’s motion because it determined the claims had previously

been raised and rejected. Accordingly, we affirm.

      Ingraham was convicted of one count of first-degree murder (Count I)

and two counts of attempted second-degree murder (Counts II and III) for his

role in the murder of Lee Arthur Lawrence.1         Ingraham’s crimes were

committed in 1989 when he was a juvenile. He was sentenced to life in

prison with parole eligibility after 25 years for first-degree murder and 30

years in prison for each of his two attempted second-degree murder counts.

All three sentences run consecutively. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed

Ingraham’s convictions and sentences. Ingraham v. State, 626 So. 2d 1117

(Fla. 3d DCA 1993).

      After Ingraham was convicted and sentenced, several United States

Supreme Court and Florida Supreme Court decisions changed the juvenile

sentencing landscape. In 2010, the United States Supreme Court held that

the Eighth Amendment prohibits a sentence of life without parole for juvenile

nonhomicide offenders. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010), as modified

1
 Additional details can be found in Johnson v. State, 696 So. 2d 317 (Fla.
1997), a case involving one of Ingraham’s co-defendants.

                                      2
(July 6, 2010). In 2012, the Supreme Court expanded the holding in Graham

to invalidate mandatory life without parole sentences for juvenile homicide

offenders. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012).2 In 2015, the Florida

Supreme Court held that Graham not only applies to life sentences but also

to term-of-years sentences that are the functional equivalent of life without

the possibility of parole. Henry v. State, 175 So. 3d 675, 679 (Fla. 2015).3

And in Kelsey v. State, 206 So. 3d 5, 8 (Fla. 2016), the Florida Supreme

Court held that “all juveniles who have sentences that violate Graham are

entitled to resentencing pursuant to chapter 2014–220, Laws of Florida,

codified in sections 775.082, 921.1401 and 921.1402, Florida Statutes

(2014).”4

2
  Miller’s prohibition of mandatory life without parole does not foreclose the
possibility of a life without parole sentence for juvenile homicide offenders.
But it requires a sentencing court “to take into account how children are
different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing
them to a lifetime in prison.” 567 U.S. at 480.
3
  In Henry, the aggregate sentence totaled 90 years and required
imprisonment until Henry was at least 95 years old. 175 So. 3d at 679–80.
4
  Kelsey also contained language that “could be understood as holding that
any juvenile sentence longer than twenty years violates the Eighth
Amendment.” Pedroza v. State, 291 So. 3d 541, 546 (Fla. 2020). However,
the Court in Pedroza clarified that this was not a holding but dictum. Id. at
546-47.

                                      3
      In 2017, Ingraham, through counsel, filed a motion to vacate his

sentences.   He raised two arguments: (1) his life with parole sentence

violated Miller and Graham and (2) his two consecutive 30-year sentences,

to be served at the conclusion of his life-with-parole sentence, were contrary

to Henry and Kelsey.

      The trial court denied his first claim but did not address his second

claim. On appeal, this Court affirmed the denial of Ingraham’s first claim but

remanded to the trial court to address whether “Ingraham's claim that the

aggregate sixty-year sentence, to be served at the conclusion of his life-with-

parole sentence on Count I, is unconstitutional and contrary to Henry and

Kelsey.” Ingraham v. State, 277 So. 3d 243, 244 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019).

      On remand, the trial court conducted a hearing to determine whether

the aggregate 60-year sentence following a life-with-parole sentence was

unconstitutional. Importantly, the arguments raised at the hearing addressed

the entire sentencing scheme and not only the aggregate 60-year

sentence. Specifically, counsel for Ingraham argued that his aggregate 60-

year sentence in conjunction with his life-with-parole sentence amounted to

a de facto life sentence. The State argued that the aggregate, consecutive

                                      4
60-year sentence that followed his life-with-parole sentence was not a de

facto life sentence because of Ingraham’s eligibility for gain time.5

      Following the hearing, the trial court entered an order that once again

denied Ingraham’s motion to vacate illegal sentence. According to the order,

“there is no legal reason to change, reduce or resentence the Defendant on

Count Two and Three.” The hearing transcript was attached to the order.

      Ingraham, through counsel, appealed.            On appeal, Ingraham

continued to argue that the sentencing structure in his case resulted in a de

facto illegal life sentence:

            Given the consecutive sentencing structure in this
            case, even if Mr. Ingraham was paroled today in
            count I, he would have to serve an additional sixty
            years in prison. In other words, he has yet to serve a
            single day in prison for his non-homicide offenses.
            Because this sentencing scheme guarantees that
            Mr. Ingraham will die in prison for non-homicide
            offenses committed as a juvenile, it violates Henry.

      The State also addressed the entire sentencing structure and again

relied on possible gain time:

                  Thus, the instant case presents the question of
            whether consecutive sentences, totaling 60 years,
            which could conceivably have been reduced, from
            the original time of sentencing, by about two-thirds,

5
  In 1995, section 944.275, Florida Statutes, was amended to require that
convicted offenders serve a minimum of 85% of their entire sentence. This
requirement does not apply to Ingraham because his offenses predated the
enactment of the legislation.

                                       5
           with a resulting 20-years of sentences to be served,
           resulted in a de facto life sentence when viewed in
           conjunction with the life sentence with parole
           eligibility after 25 years for the first-degree murder.
           Based on numerous decisions from Florida appellate
           courts, it does not.

     The State further set forth calculations based on gain time to show that

at the time of his original sentence, Ingraham was facing the possibility of

release at about age 63. Ingraham did not file a reply disputing these

calculations. The State’s arguments were primarily based on Pedroza, a

recently decided case in which the Florida Supreme Court clarified and

receded from some of its prior decisions.6

     This Court per curiam affirmed, citing to Pedroza. Ingraham v. State,

314 So. 3d 715 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021). Ingraham, this time pro se, filed a

motion for rehearing in which he argued that this Court overlooked that

“although [Appellant] has a parole eligible sentence, the structure of his

sentences clearly deprives him of a meaningful opportunity for release and

amounts to the fundamental equivalent of a life sentence.”           Ingraham

provided his own calculations, which did not take into account gain time,

6
  In Johnson v. State, 215 So. 3d 1237 (Fla. 2017), the Florida Supreme
Court held that the application of gain time was insufficient to satisfy the
requirements of Graham, Henry, and Kelsey. However, the Court in Pedroza
receded from Johnson. Pedroza, 291 So. 3d at 548.

                                     6
showing that he would not be eligible for release until he was 95. This Court

denied Ingraham’s motion for rehearing.7

      In November 2021, Ingraham, pro se, filed another motion below to

vacate his sentence. Ingraham again focused on the structure of the

sentence and argued that it was a de facto life sentence because he will be

95 years old upon completing the consecutive, aggregate 60-year

sentence. In response, the State argued that the court had already

considered and rejected Ingraham’s arguments. The trial court agreed and

denied Ingraham’s motion “because the defendant’s claim has already been

previously denied by the court and because the court already found

that there is no legal reason to change, reduce, or resentence the Defendant

on Count Two and Three.” Ingraham sought rehearing, and following the

denial of rehearing, Ingraham filed the instant appeal.

      On appeal, Ingraham continues to focus on the structure of his

sentences.      But   this   argument     has   already   been    raised   and

7
  Because the effect of gain time was raised in the prior appeal, we do not
consider it here. See Buchman v. Canard, 926 So. 2d 390, 392 (Fla. 3d DCA
2005) (“A per curiam decision of the appellate court is the law of the case
between the same parties on the same issues and facts, and determines all
issues necessarily involved in the appeal, whether mentioned in the court's
opinion or not.” (quoting Bueno v. Bueno de Khawly, 677 So. 2d 3, 4 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1996))). Though we may reconsider a prior decision where manifest
injustice would result, Strazzulla v. Hendrick, 177 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1965), we
do not do so here because this argument has not been raised.

                                      7
considered. Indeed, when this Court remanded the case for further

proceedings in 2019, this was to consider whether Ingraham’s “aggregate

sentence of sixty years in prison for the non-homicide offenses (two

consecutive thirty-year sentences on Counts II and III), to be served at the

conclusion of his life-with-parole sentence on Count I, is unconstitutional and

contrary to the Florida Supreme Court’s decisions in Henry and Kelsey.”

Ingraham, 277 So. 3d at 244 (emphasis added). On remand, the transcript

of the hearing makes clear that the trial court did in fact consider the entire

structure of the sentences. Moreover, this argument was raised in a prior

appeal and rejected and again rejected when the panel denied rehearing.

      Because Ingraham’s argument in this appeal was previously raised

and rejected, we affirm. See Garcia v. State, 69 So. 3d 1003, 1004 (Fla. 3d

DCA 2011) (“[A] defendant is not entitled to successive review of a specific

issue that already has been decided on the merits.”); Bueno v. Bueno de

Khawly, 677 So. 2d 3, 4 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) (“We affirm the judgment on

appeal, as we are governed by the doctrine of law of the case. ‘Simply stated,

that doctrine is that those points of law adjudicated in a prior appeal are

binding in order to promote stability of judicial decisions and to avoid

piecemeal litigation.’” (quoting Jacobson v. Humana Medical Plan, Inc., 636

So. 2d 120, 121 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994))).

                                      8
Affirmed.

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