Court Opinion

ID: 9566027
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:32:10.377475+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:17.224372
License: Public Domain

Young, J.,
with whom Shearing, J., joins,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. NRS 11.190(l)(a) clearly provides that a judgment creditor has six years to collect upon a judgment. There is nothing within this provision nor is there any principle contained in the United States Bankruptcy Code that justifies the result of the majority decision.
The plain and undisputed facts of this case provide that Spinney obtained a judgment against O’Lane and failed to protect that judgment by filing for recertification within the statutory window provided by NRS 17.214. Although I find O’Lane’s wranglings in bankruptcy court repugnant, they do not warrant application of equitable tolling. Oftentimes difficult and emotional cases create bad precedent. This is such a case.
The majority’s decision cites Copeland v. Desert Inn Hotel, 99 Nev. 823, 673 P.2d 490 (1983), and concludes that the doctrine of equitable tolling may have preserved Spinney’s judgment while O’Lane was in bankruptcy. My colleagues suggest remand to determine whether O’Lane sought bankruptcy protection as a “subertfuge” to avoid satisfying Spinney’s judgment. I submit that no action upon remand or any further findings by the district court could support the application of equitable tolling.
In Copeland, Nevada’s only equitable tolling case, we reversed a district court summary judgment order, reasoning that equitable tolling preserved a claimant’s unlawful discharge cause of action. Id. at 826, 673 P.2d at 492. The claimant in Copeland did not file a timely anti-discrimination charge against her employer because she relied upon statements from the Nevada Equal Rights Commission (NERC) that they would look into the matter and “get back to” her. Id. at 825, 673 P.2d at 491. The court focused upon the public policy goals of Nevada’s anti-discrimination laws and the claimant’s reliance upon statements made by NERC. We held that equitable tolling applied in the context of Nevada’s anti-discrimination employment statutes because it effectuated the laudable goals contained therein. We elaborated upon the holding by asserting that several factors should be examined before applying equitable tolling in a given case. Among those factors was *503consideration of the claimant’s diligence in pursuing the claim for relief. Id. at 826, 673 P.2d at 492.
The facts of this appeal simply do not fit within the definition or purpose of equitable tolling. The factors listed in Copeland cannot be satisfied. Spinney did not diligently pursue her remedy in the instant case. It is inescapable that Spinney realized she had a viable judgment against her former doctor and let that judgment lapse without recertification. O’Lane’s underlying conduct, no matter how egregious, had nothing to do with that failing.
I fear that preserving Spinney’s judgment will open the door and allow a litigant to challenge statute of limitations prohibitions any time a defendant has engaged in some form of non-related and allegedly reprehensible conduct. I am also concerned that the majority’s decision muddies the legal waters and will create issues of fact in almost every forthcoming statute of limitations summary judgment decision.
Although this case represents the tragedy that may ensue when a lawyer neglects a filing deadline, it does not merit waving the equitable tolling wand to circumvent plain statute of limitations requirements. Spinney’s loss of a collection remedy appears to be a garden variety case of nonfeasance. Her remedy rests in a claim against her lawyer and not with this court’s application of equitable tolling.
For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the district court’s ruling. I therefore respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.