Court Opinion

ID: 9412479
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-31 16:02:21.200965+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:26.139969
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                             FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

RONALD HILLIS, et al.,                         )
                                               )
               Plaintiffs.                     )      Civil Action No. 1:23-cv-02016 (UNA)
                                               )
                                               )
       v.                                      )
                                               )
                                               )
OREGON BAR ASSOCIATION, et al.,                )
                                               )
                Defendants.                    )

                                  MEMORANDUM OPINION

       Plaintiffs Ronald Hillis and Calvin Griffin are both Louisiana state inmates appearing pro

se, who have together filed a civil complaint, ECF No. 1. Hillis has filed an application for leave

to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), ECF No. 2. The court will grant Hillis’s IFP application

and dismiss this action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) (requiring dismissal of a case upon a

determination that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted).

       At the outset, the court notes that only Hillis has filed an IFP application and the required

associated financial information, see ECF No. 3; Griffin has neither filed an IFP application nor

paid the associated civil filing fee. So Griffin cannot proceed as a party in this case. See 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1914, 1915(a)–(b). But even if he could, the case must be dismissed.

       Plaintiffs sue the Louisiana and Oregon State Bar and attempt to bring this matter as a qui

tam action. They also attempt to bring this matter a class action. They allege that defendants have

conspired and engaged in “organized crime,” in violation of multiple state, federal, and

international laws, statutes, and treaties, due to their members’ alleged failures to advise

“[t]housands of state prisoners” of their “right of [federal] removal for cause.” They demand an

order directing defendants to
            remit a listing of all trial attorneys, and defendants who were arraigned on
            criminal charges . . . within their jurisdiction between May 22, 1972, and
            January 1, 2019, with stipulations of notice of right to removal, right of
            removal on the face of the records; and with stipulations as to the due-
            process of the right of/to remove; and remit a listing of all trial judges and
            prosecutors with waiver of right of removal waiver forms of colloquy
            transcripts where those criminal defendants waived their right to trial by
            jury in any United States District Court wherein the prosecution was State
            initiated.

       First, plaintiffs are prohibited from filing a qui tam action. Whistleblowers are generally

authorized to bring a qui tam actions under the False Claims Act (“FCA”), 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–

3732, “an anti-fraud statute that prohibits the knowing submission of false or fraudulent claims to

the federal government.” United States ex rel. Bledsoe v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., 342 F.3d 634,

640 (6th Cir. 2003). More specifically, the FCA authorizes a private individual, as a relator, “to

bring [a qui tam] action in the Government’s name, and to recover a portion of the proceeds of the

action, subject to the requirements of the statute.” U.S. ex rel. Batiste v. SLM Corp., 659 F.3d

1204, 1206 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citations omitted); 31 U.S.C. § 3730.

       In federal courts a plaintiff generally “may plead and conduct their own cases personally

or by counsel[,]” 28 U.S.C. § 1654, but in a qui tam action, the United States is “the real party in

interest,” Cobb v. California, No. 15-cv-176, 2015 WL 512896, at *1 (D.D.C. Feb. 4, 2015),

therefore, a “pro se plaintiff may not file” on its behalf. Jones v. Jindal, 409 Fed. App’x. 356

(D.C. Cir. 2011) (per curiam); see Gunn v. Credit Suisse Grp. AG, 610 Fed. App’x 155, 157 (3d

Cir. 2015) (noting that “every circuit that has [addressed the issue] is in agreement that a pro se

litigant may not pursue a qui tam action on behalf of the Government.”) (citing cases).

       Second, plaintiffs may not bring this matter as a class action because, as noted above, a pro

se litigant can represent only himself in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1654; Georgiades v.

Martin–Trigona, 729 F.2d 831, 834 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (individual “not a member of the bar of any
court . . . may appear pro se but is not qualified to appear in [federal] court as counsel for others”)

(citation and footnote omitted); see also U.S. ex rel. Rockefeller v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 274 F.

Supp. 2d 10, 16 (D.D.C. 2003), aff'd sub nom. Rockefeller ex rel. U.S. v. Washington TRU

Solutions LLC, No. 03–7120, 2004 WL 180264 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 21, 2004) (“[A] class member

cannot represent the class without counsel, because a class action suit affects the rights of the other

members of the class”) (citing Oxendine v. Williams, 509 F.2d 1405, 1407 (4th Cir. 1975)). Put

simply, plaintiffs have neither a constitutional nor a statutory right to pursue the claims of the

United States, or on behalf of the other prisoners, without counsel.

        Third, venue is in this district is improper. Venue in a civil action is proper only in (1) the

district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same state in which the district

is located, (2) in a district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the

claim occurred (or a substantial part of the property that is the subject of the action is situated), or

(3) in a district in which any defendant may be found, if there is no district in which the action

may otherwise be brought. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). Here, the defendants live in Oregon and

Louisiana, respectively, and none of the alleged events giving rise to this case occurred in the

District of Columbia. See 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).

        For all of these reasons, this case is dismissed without prejudice. A separate order

accompanies this memorandum opinion.

                                                         TREVOR N. McFADDEN
  Date: 7/31/23                                          United States District Judge