Court Opinion

ID: 9745310
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 22:48:12.426912+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:25:49.612483
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE WARD, dissenting: I join in the dissent of Justice Miller, who correctly observes that the defendant was not disadvantaged in any way by taking the polygraphic examination. Of course, there are circumstances in which the prosecution should be and is bound to fulfill promises to an accused. Plea bargaining, which was discussed in Santobello v. New York (1971), 404 U.S. 257, 30 L. Ed. 2d 427, 92 S. Ct. 495, is a familiar example of the binding promise. There are circumstances, too, where it would be a disservice to the public interest and justice to enforce the terms of a statement made to an accused. The required balancing of considerations was described in United States v. Pascal (N.D. Ill. 1979), 496 F. Supp. 313, which involved a promise made by agents that any cooperation by the defendant would be made known to the United States Attorney. The court observed: “Case law also dictates that when the ‘totality of circumstances’ surrounding the government misconduct is such as to offend basic tenets of fair play and justice, dismissal of the indictment with prejudice is proper. [Citations.]” The court went on to say: “This court recognizes that dismissal of an indictment with prejudice is not a step to be taken lightly. Nor is this court unaware that its supervisory power is limited and should be exercised rarely and with extreme caution. As pointed out by the government in its response to the defendant’s brief, ‘the basis of this restraint is the public interest in enforcement of our criminal laws, an interest which should not be forfeited on less than compelling evidence of prejudice and inability to receive a fair trial.’ ” 496 F. Supp. 313, 319-20. The majority paints with too broad a brush when it says that the prosecution must honor the terms of all agreements made with defendants. The majority, following the mistaken analysis of the defendant, talks in terms of legal consideration as if contract law were involved. (Even in People v. Reagan (1975), 235 N.W. 2d 581, 585, 395 Mich. 306, 314, on which the majority principally relies, the court pointed out that a contract law analysis is incorrect, saying “[t]he standards of commerce do not govern, and should not govern, the administration of criminal justice.”) The majority then goes on to say under this contract analysis that the defendant surrendered his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. This, of course, is illusory. Results of a poly-graphic examination are inadmissible even though the parties might wish to stipulate to the results being received in evidence. The defendant here gave up nothing; he did not risk self-incrimination in submitting to a test, the results of which could not be introduced in evidence. In no way did the defendant impair his “not guilty” position, and in no way did his taking the test improve the prosecution’s opportunities for conviction. The taking of the polygraph examination was of no more legal effect than if he had agreed to a spiritualistic seance, or to having tea leaves read or to having a coin flipped on the question of whether he robbed the bank. The dissenting opinion in People v. Reagan acutely noted that under the resembling circumstances there: “The defendant having given up nothing has lost nothing. The worst that could have happened to him was to remain in the same legal posture. Defendant risked nothing in this one-sided ‘agreement’ — and indeed had nothing to lose by taking the polygraph test. It is the people of Michigan who instead are cast in the role of ‘losers.’ ” People v. Reagan (1975), 235 N.W.2d 581, 590, 395 Mich. 306, 325. MORAN and MILLER, JJ., join in this dissent.