Court Opinion

ID: 9947648
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-05 15:08:32.77435+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:27:15.770969
License: Public Domain

IN THE NEBRASKA COURT OF APPEALS

               MEMORANDUM OPINION AND JUDGMENT ON APPEAL
                        (Memorandum Web Opinion)

                                         STATE V. MARK

  NOTICE: THIS OPINION IS NOT DESIGNATED FOR PERMANENT PUBLICATION
 AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY NEB. CT. R. APP. P. § 2-102(E).

                                 STATE OF NEBRASKA, APPELLEE,
                                                V.

                                  JOSEPH J. MARK, APPELLANT.

                              Filed March 5, 2024.    No. A-23-428.

       Appeal from the District Court for Douglas County: JAMES M. MASTELLER, Judge.
Affirmed.
       Joseph J. Mark, pro se.
       Michael T. Hilgers, Attorney General, and Nathan A. Liss for appellee.

       PIRTLE, Chief Judge, and RIEDMANN and WELCH, Judges.
       PIRTLE, Chief Judge.
                                        INTRODUCTION
         Joseph J. Mark appeals from the order of the district court for Douglas County denying his
motion for postconviction relief without an evidentiary hearing and denying his motion to
disqualify the trial court judge from presiding over his postconviction motion. Based on the reasons
that follow, we affirm.
                                        BACKGROUND
       In 2019, the State filed two criminal cases against Mark. Between the two cases, he was
charged with 15 counts pertaining to incidents of sexual abuse of his 15-year-old and 11-year-old
biological daughters and his 13-year-old biological son. See State v. Mark, Nos. A-21-125,
A-21-126, 2021 WL 4851273 (Neb. App. Oct. 19, 2021) (not designated for permanent
publication). The cases were consolidated, and the parties reached a plea agreement whereby Mark

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pled no contest to six counts, and the remaining nine counts were dismissed. Id. The court
subsequently sentenced Mark to a total of 80 to 110 years’ imprisonment. Id.
Direct Appeal.
         Mark filed a consolidated direct appeal with the assistance of new counsel. He alleged: (1)
the trial court misadvised him of the penalty for first degree sexual assault of a child, rendering his
plea invalid on that offense; (2) the trial court erred by imposing excessive sentences; and (3) his
trial counsel was ineffective in four respects. See id.
         This court rejected all of Mark’s assignments of error on direct appeal, except for a claim
that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to review the presentence investigation (PSI) report
with Mark prior to sentencing. We concluded this claim could not be addressed on direct appeal
due to an insufficient record and was preserved for postconviction review. See id. The Court of
Appeals’ mandate was entered on January 19, 2022.
First Motion for Postconviction Relief.
        On June 22, 2022, Mark filed a pro se motion for postconviction relief. In his motion he
argued the trial court erred in regard to ordering psychological testing and raised issues of trial
counsel’s ineffectiveness in addition to the claim preserved in his direct appeal.
        On December 15, 2022, the trial court entered an order denying Mark’s postconviction
motion without an evidentiary hearing. The trial court found that Mark’s postconviction claims
alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and errors made by the trial court were procedurally
barred because they were or could have been litigated on direct appeal. Regarding his preserved
claim from his direct appeal, the court found he failed to allege deficient performance or prejudice.
        On March 27, 2023, Mark attempted to appeal from the denial of his postconviction motion
by filing a notice of appeal and a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. However, we dismissed the
appeal as untimely. See State v. Mark, A-23-247 & A-23-248. Mark filed a motion for rehearing,
which was denied.
Second Motion for Postconviction Relief and Motion to Disqualify.
        On April 27, 2023, Mark initiated the present action by filing a second motion for
postconviction relief. He argued that there was new evidence about his mental condition that was
not discovered until February 14, 2022, four months after his direct appeal was decided, which
gave merit to the claims he previously raised on direct appeal and in his first postconviction
motion. The new evidence about his mental condition was a diagnosis of general anxiety disorder
given by a mental health professional with the Department of Corrections. Mark alleged that this
new information confirmed that his pleas were involuntary, that the trial court erred by failing to
address his mental health condition prior to accepting his plea and sentencing him, and that his
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to properly investigate and address his mental health
condition.
        Mark also alleged in his second postconviction motion that this new information would
have been relevant to his guilt and/or his sentencing for the sexual offenses because it would have
shown that he did not act out of sexual motivation but rather to help his daughter from being hurt
or harmed in the future. He stated that his daughter had anxiety about not knowing how to act in

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romantic and sexual situations and she came to him asking to be “taught and trained in the ways
of a ‘proper woman.’” Mark further alleged that his daughter’s anxiety triggered his own anxiety,
leading to sexual acts that “had the intention of mitigating the anxieties of both parties.”
         On the same day Mark filed his second motion for postconviction relief, he filed a motion
to disqualify, asking the trial judge to recuse himself from presiding over his second postconviction
action because the judge had a conflict of interest and there was an “appearance of impropriety.”
         On May 22, 2023, the trial court issued an order denying Mark’s second postconviction
motion without an evidentiary hearing and denying his motion to disqualify. The court found that
his second postconviction motion was time barred under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-3001(4) (Reissue
2016) given that it was not filed within 1 year of his convictions becoming final on direct appeal.
It also found that his second postconviction motion was procedurally barred because all the claims
in the second motion could have been raised in the prior postconviction proceeding. As such, the
court found that an evidentiary hearing was not warranted and denied Mark’s second
postconviction motion.
         Regarding the motion to disqualify, the trial court found that Mark had failed to meet his
burden of showing that recusal was warranted and overruled his motion.
                                    ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
        Mark assigns that the trial court erred in (1) finding that his postconviction motion was an
invalid successive motion, (2) finding his postconviction motion was untimely, (3) citing the “need
for finality in the judicial process,” (4) finding that the postconviction motions failed to allege
sufficient facts, which if proved true, entitled him to relief, (5) violating his due process in the first
motion for postconviction relief, and (6) overruling his motion to disqualify.
                                     STANDARD OF REVIEW
        Whether a claim raised in a postconviction proceeding is procedurally barred is a question
of law which an appellate court reviews independently of the lower court’s ruling. State v. Lotter,
311 Neb. 878, 976 N.W.2d 721 (2022).
        A motion requesting a judge to recuse himself or herself on the ground of bias or prejudice
is addressed to the discretion of the judge, and an order overruling such a motion will be affirmed
on appeal unless the record establishes bias or prejudice as a matter of law. State v. Ezell, 314 Neb.
825, 993 N.W.2d 449 (2023).
                                              ANALYSIS
       Mark’s first four assignments of error generally allege that the trial court erred in denying
his second motion for postconviction relief without an evidentiary hearing because it was time
barred and procedurally barred.
Standards Governing Postconviction Relief.
        In Nebraska, postconviction relief is a very narrow category of relief, available only to
remedy prejudicial constitutional violations that render the judgment void or voidable. State v.
Lotter, supra. In a motion for postconviction relief, the defendant must allege facts which, if
proved, constitute a denial or violation of his or her rights under the U.S. or Nebraska Constitution,
causing the judgment against the defendant to be void or voidable. State v. Cox, 314 Neb. 104, 989

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N.W.2d 65 (2023). The district court must grant an evidentiary hearing to resolve the claims in a
postconviction motion when the motion contains factual allegations which, if proved, constitute
an infringement of the defendant’s rights under the state or federal Constitution. Id.
         However, the allegations in a motion for postconviction relief must be sufficiently specific
for the district court to make a preliminary determination as to whether an evidentiary hearing is
justified. State v. Lessley, 312 Neb. 316, 978 N.W.2d 620 (2022). An evidentiary hearing is not
required on a motion for postconviction relief when (1) the motion does not contain factual
allegations which, if proved, constitute an infringement of the movant’s constitutional rights
rendering the judgment void or voidable; (2) the motion alleges only conclusions of fact or law
without supporting facts; or (3) the records and files affirmatively show that the defendant is
entitled to no relief. Id.
         Further, § 29-3001(4) provides a one-year limitation for postconviction relief. This period
runs from the later of (a) the date the judgment of conviction became final by the conclusion of a
direct appeal or the expiration of the time for filing a direct appeal; (b) the date on which the factual
predicate of the constitutional claim or claims alleged could have been discovered through the
exercise of due diligence; (c) the date on which an impediment created by state action, in violation
of the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of Nebraska or any law of this state, is
removed, if the prisoner was prevented from filing a verified motion by such state action; (d) the
date on which a constitutional claim asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court of the
United States or the Nebraska Supreme Court, if the newly recognized right has been made
applicable retroactively to cases on postconviction collateral review; or (e) August 27, 2011. The
1-year statute of limitations in § 29-3001(4) applies to all verified motions for postconviction
relief, including successive motions. State v. Amaya, 298 Neb. 70, 902 N.W.2d 675 (2017).
Timeliness of Second Motion for Postconviction Relief.
        The trial court overruled Mark’s second motion for postconviction relief without an
evidentiary hearing in part because it was untimely filed. As stated above, § 29-3001(4)(a)
provides a 1-year limitation for postconviction relief, which runs from the date the judgment of
conviction became final by the conclusion of a direct appeal or the expiration of the time for filing
a direct appeal. For purposes of § 29-3001(4), the “conclusion of a direct appeal” occurs when a
Nebraska appellate court issues the mandate in the direct appeal. State v. Huggins, 291 Neb. 443,
866 N.W.2d 80 (2015). Mark’s judgment of conviction became final on January 19, 2022. The
present motion for postconviction relief was filed on April 27, 2023, more than a year after his
conviction became final on direct appeal. Clearly, his second motion for postconviction relief is
time barred under subsection (a).
        Mark does not claim that any of the other subsections of § 29-3001(4) apply to make his
motion timely. He argues, however, that his second postconviction motion is not time barred
because it is merely a “refiling” of the same claims as previously dismissed and not a subsequent
filing of a previously denied motion for postconviction relief. He argues this is so because his first
postconviction motion was never fully adjudicated and never became final because it was “denied”
rather than “sustained or overruled” as contemplated by Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-3002 (Reissue 2016).
Brief for appellant at 16-18.

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         Section 29-3002 provides that an order “sustaining or overruling” a postconviction shall
be deemed to be a final judgment, and an appeal may be taken from the district court as provided
for in appeals in civil cases. The trial court “denied” Mark’s first postconviction motion. However,
for purposes of § 29-3002, the court’s denial of Mark’s first postconviction motion was equivalent
to the court “overruling” the motion. See e.g. State v. Hudson, 273 Neb. 42, 727 N.W.2d 219
(2007) (order denying evidentiary hearing on postconviction claim is effectively order overruling
motion for postconviction relief as to that claim, and order is therefore “final judgment” as to such
claim under § 29-3002). Contrary to Mark’s assertion, the denial of his first postconviction motion
was a final judgment, and his second postconviction motion was filed past the 1-year time
limitation.
         Mark also argues that his current postconviction motion was timely filed under the
principle of “equitable tolling.” The doctrine of equitable tolling permits a court to excuse a party’s
failure to comply with the statute of limitations where, because of disability, irremediable lack of
information, or other circumstances beyond his or her control, the plaintiff cannot be expected to
file suit on time. State v. Hill, 310 Neb. 647, 968 N.W.2d 96 (2021). Mark claims that the 1-year
limitation period was tolled between the date he filed his first postconviction motion and the date
the trial court denied the motion, a total of 176 days, because he had no control over the
proceedings during that time. He argues that when those days are excluded from the 1-year
limitations period, his second postconviction motion is timely.
         While the Supreme Court has not yet determined whether equitable tolling applies to
postconviction proceedings under § 29-3001, it has stated that “it is difficult to conceive of a
circumstance outside § 29-3001(4)(c) that would support application of the equitable tolling
doctrine in a postconviction motion.” State v. Hill, 310 Neb. at 652, 968 N.W.2d at 100. The court
further stated that “a prisoner is not deprived of the opportunity to bring a postconviction action if
there is some time within the period of the 1-year limitation that the prisoner could have filed a
postconviction action.” Id. at 652-53, 968 N.W.2d at 101.
         In the present case, Mark clearly had time within the 1-year limitation to file a
postconviction action as his first motion for postconviction relief was filed within that timeframe.
Mark points to no authority, and we are aware of none, which suggests that the 1-year limitation
period was tolled during his first postconviction proceeding.
         Therefore, as the trial court found, Mark’s second motion for postconviction relief was
time barred under § 29-3001(4).
Procedural Bar to Second Motion for Postconviction Relief.
         The trial court also found that Mark’s second motion for postconviction relief was
procedurally barred because he was alleging issues that have been or could have been raised in his
first motion for postconviction relief.
         The need for finality in the criminal process requires that a defendant bring all claims for
relief at the first opportunity. State v. Lotter, 311 Neb. 878, 976 N.W.2d 721 (2022). Therefore, it
is fundamental that a motion for postconviction relief cannot be used to secure review of issues
which were known to the defendant and could have been litigated on direct appeal. Id. The
Supreme Court has explained that when an issue could have been raised on direct appeal, it is

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procedurally barred from postconviction relief, no matter how the issues may be phrased or
rephrased. Id.
        Additionally, the statute governing postconviction relief expressly provides that a “court
need not entertain a second motion or successive motions for similar relief on behalf of the same
prisoner.” Id. at 888, 976 N.W.2d at 731 citing § 29-3001(3). This provision has long been
construed to require that all available grounds for postconviction relief must be stated in the initial
postconviction motion and, once that motion has been judicially determined, any subsequent
postconviction motion regarding the same conviction and sentence may be dismissed by the district
court unless the motion affirmatively shows on its face that the basis relied upon for relief was not
available at the time of filing the prior motion. See State v. Lotter, supra. Stated differently, a
defendant is entitled to bring a successive postconviction motion only when the face of the motion
affirmatively shows that the issues raised therein could not have been raised in prior motions. Id.
See also State v. Amaya, 298 Neb. 70, 902 N.W.2d 675 (2017) (defendant is entitled to bring
second proceeding for postconviction relief only if grounds relied upon did not exist at time first
motion was filed).
        In his second postconviction motion, Mark argued that new information about his mental
health was discovered after this court’s decision on direct appeal, which gave merit to the claims
he previously raised on direct appeal and in his first postconviction motion. This new information
was his general anxiety disorder diagnosis. However, based on his own allegations, he was aware
of this information before he filed his first motion for postconviction relief. He stated that he
learned of his anxiety diagnosis on February 14, 2022, and his first postconviction motion was
filed on June 22, 2022. Accordingly, this “new information” and the claims related to the
information were available and could have been raised in his first postconviction motion. There
are no allegations in Mark’s second postconviction motion to show that the issues he now raises
did not exist at the time he filed his first postconviction motion. Accordingly, Mark’s second
motion for postconviction relief is procedurally barred as an impermissible successive action. The
trial court properly denied the motion without an evidentiary hearing on this basis, as well as it
being time barred.
Error Related to First Motion for Postconviction Relief.
       Mark’s fifth assignment of error alleges that the trial court violated his due process in his
first motion for postconviction relief. This issue cannot be raised in a successive motion for
postconviction relief. Any alleged errors related to his first motion for postconviction relief are
barred as those claims could have been raised in his appeal of his first postconviction motion, had
he perfected a timely appeal.
Motion to Disqualify.
        Mark’s final assignment of error is that the trial judge erred in failing to disqualify or recuse
himself from presiding over the second postconviction motion. The same trial judge accepted
Mark’s plea agreement, sentenced him, and decided both postconviction motions. Mark alleges
that the judge “has demonstrated not just self-serving bias to prevent himself from being shown to
be wrong at sentencing, but also bias against this defendant specifically . . . .” Brief for appellant
at 41.

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         The Nebraska Revised Code of Judicial Conduct states that a judge must recuse himself or
herself from a case if the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned. Neb. Rev. Code of
Judicial Conduct § 5-302.11. See also State v. Thomas, 311 Neb. 989, 977 N.W.2d 258 (2022). In
order to demonstrate that a trial judge should have recused himself or herself, the moving party
must show that a reasonable person who knew the circumstances of the case would question the
judge’s impartiality under an objective standard of reasonableness, even though no actual bias or
prejudice was shown. Id. In addition, a defendant seeking to disqualify a judge on the basis of bias
or prejudice bears the heavy burden of overcoming the presumption of judicial impartiality. Id.
Judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion directed
to a trial judge. Id.
         In Mark’s motion to disqualify, as well as in his brief on appeal, he alleges that because his
second postconviction motion contains allegations of error by the trial judge, the trial judge was
unable to address his allegations in an unbiased manner. He claims an inherent conflict of interest
caused by the judge ruling on his own alleged error, creating an appearance of impropriety. Mark
also alleges that there is evidence in the record of biased behavior by the trial judge toward Mark,
including multiple violations of due process in the handling of his first postconviction motion.
         There is no rule of law which automatically disqualifies a judge who has presided at trial
from subsequently considering a postconviction action. State v. Sims, 272 Neb. 811, 725 N.W.2d
175 (2006); State v. Herren, 212 Neb. 706, 325 N.W.2d 151 (1982). To the contrary, it is generally
encouraged that the postconviction petition be heard by the same judge that rendered the original
judgment. State v. Sims, supra. The judge’s familiarity with the case is regarded as beneficial to
all concerned because it furthers the goal of an efficient, expeditious, and fair decision on the
motion. Id.
         We conclude that Mark has failed to demonstrate that the trial judge demonstrated bias
against him and, therefore, failed to meet his burden of overcoming the presumption of judicial
impartiality. The motion to disqualify was properly denied.
                                          CONCLUSION
       We affirm the trial court’s order denying Mark’s second motion for postconviction relief
and denying his motion to disqualify.
                                                                                   AFFIRMED.

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