Court Opinion

ID: 9411233
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-26 00:00:55.73744+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:05.563679
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-51038          Document: 00516833688             Page: 1      Date Filed: 07/25/2023

               United States Court of Appeals
                    for the Fifth Circuit                                        United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                          Fifth Circuit

                                      ____________                                      FILED
                                                                                    July 25, 2023
                                        No. 21-51038
                                                                                   Lyle W. Cayce
                                      ____________                                      Clerk

   Consumer Data Industry Association,

                                                                       Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                             versus

   State of Texas, through Attorney General Ken Paxton, acting in his
   official capacity,

                                               Defendant—Appellant.
                      ______________________________

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                           for the Western District of Texas
                                USDC No. 1:19-CV-876
                      ______________________________

   Before Graves, Willett, and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges. *
   Per Curiam: **
          Defendant-Appellant, the State of Texas, through Attorney General
   Ken Paxton (“Paxton”), 1 appeals the district court’s determination that the

          _____________________
          *
              Judge Willett concurs in the judgment only.
          **
               This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
          1
            On July 14, 2023, Texas Governor Greg Abbott appointed Angela Colmenero to
   serve as Interim Attorney General for the State of Texas pending the Texas Senate’s
   resolution of the articles of impeachment filed against Ken Paxton. See Press Release,
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                                        No. 21-51038

   Ex parte Young exception to sovereign immunity applies, that Plaintiff-
   Appellee Consumer Data Industry Association (“CDIA”) has standing, and
   that CDIA’s claim is ripe for review. On the instant record, we AFFIRM.
                                             I.
          Plaintiff-Appellee CDIA is an international trade association that rep-
   resents the three nationwide credit reporting agencies (“CRAs”)—Ex-
   perian, Equifax, and Trans Union—and other credit reporting agencies that
   furnish information concerning Texas consumers. On September 9, 2019,
   CDIA sued Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton, in his official capacity, con-
   tending that Section 20.05(a)(5) of the Texas Business & Commerce Code is
   preempted by the Federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C.
   § 1681, et seq., and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The Texas stat-
   utory provision, § 20.05(a)(5), prohibits CRAs from including information
   regarding certain medical debt collection accounts in consumer credit reports
   that are furnished to third-parties. Tex. Bus. & Com. Code
   § 20.05(a)(5).
          Defendant-Appellant Paxton filed motions to dismiss, pursuant to
   Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), contending that (1)
   CDIA has not suffered an “injury in fact” and thus lacks standing; (2)
   CDIA’s claim is not ripe for review; (3) the State of Texas is entitled to
   sovereign immunity from suit; and (4) § 20.05(a)(5) is not preempted by the
   FCRA. On September 28, 2021, the district court denied the motions.
   Considering the prospective nature of the relief sought by CDIA, and
   CDIA’s factual allegations, the district court determined that Ex parte
   Young’s exception to sovereign immunity applies, CDIA has Article III

          _____________________
   Office of the Texas Governor (July 10, 2023), https://gov.texas.gov/news/post/governor-
   abbott-appoints-angela-colmenero-as-interim-attorney-general-of-texas.

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   standing, and its claim is ripe for review. In rejecting the Rule 12(b)(6)
   motion, the district court reasoned that CDIA had sufficiently alleged
   express preemption because the state and federal statutory provisions
   concern the same subject matter. This interlocutory appeal followed. 2
                                                II.
           The statutory provision that CDIA claims is preempted by federal law,
   and thus seeks to enjoin its enforcement—Section 20.05(a)(5) of the Texas
   Business and Commerce Code—was enacted in 2019 and became effective
   on May 31, 2019. It prohibits CRAs from including information regarding
   certain medical debt collection accounts in consumer credit reports that are
   furnished to third-parties. Specifically, § 20.05(a)(5) states:
           (a) Except as provided by Subsection (b), a consumer reporting
           agency [“CRA”)] may not furnish a consumer report contain-
           ing information related to:
                                              ***
           (5) a collection account with a medical industry code, if the

           _____________________
           2
               This court’s appellate jurisdiction is generally limited to appeals from “final
   decisions.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1291. However, “beginning with Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial
   Loan Corp.,[337 U.S. 541, 548–49 (1949)], the Supreme Court has recognized narrow
   exceptions to this rule under what is now termed the collateral-order doctrine.” Planned
   Parenthood Gulf Coast, Inc. v. Phillips, 24 F.4th 442, 448 (5th Cir. 2022). “The collateral-
   order doctrine permits appeals of interlocutory orders that ‘[1] conclusively determine the
   disputed question, [2] resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of
   the action, and [3] [are] effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.’” Id.
   (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978)). When dismissal on
   grounds of sovereign immunity is denied, interlocutory appeal is permitted under the Cohen
   collateral-order doctrine. Id. at 448–50. Given the significant overlap in the issues
   presented in this appeal, we also will review the district court’s interlocutory rulings
   regarding standing and ripeness. See, e.g., City of Austin v. Paxton, 943 F.3d 993, 1003 n. 3
   (5th Cir. 2019) (declining to consider standing on interlocutory appeal of sovereign
   immunity ruling but citing cases where standing was considered). The same is not true,
   however, of the district court’s preemption ruling.

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           consumer was covered by a health benefit plan at the time of
           the event giving rise to the collection and the collection is for
           an outstanding balance, after copayments, deductibles, and co-
           insurance, owed to an emergency care provider or a facility-
           based provider for an out-of-network benefit claim[.]
   Tex. Bus.& Com. Code § 20.05(a)(5).
           Enforcement of the provisions of Chapter 20 of the Texas Business
   and Commerce Code—which is entitled “Regulation of Consumer Credit
   Reporting Agencies”—is addressed in Subchapter D, §§ 20.08–20.13. No-
   tably, both consumers and the Texas Attorney General are granted enforce-
   ment authority. A consumer may file an enforcement action in court or, if
   agreed to by the parties, submit the matter to binding arbitration. Tex. Bus.
   & Com. Code § 20.08(a). 3 If the CRA’s violation is willful, the CRA is
   liable to the consumer against whom the violation occurred for the greater of
   three times the amount of the consumer’s actual damages or $1,000, as well
   as reasonable attorney fees and court or arbitration costs. Id. § 20.09(a). 4 If
   a CRA negligently violates the chapter, it can be liable to the consumer for the
   greater of the actual amount of damages or $500, as well as reasonable attor-
   ney fees and court or arbitration costs. Id. § 20.09(b).

           _____________________
           3
            If the consumer prevails in arbitration and the disputed adverse information in
   the consumer’s file or record is not stricken or removed in a timely manner, the consumer
   may bring an action against the noncomplying CRA without regard to the 120-day waiting
   period otherwise required by § 20.08(d) for successive arbitrations. Tex. Bus. & Com.
   Code § 20.08(f).
           4
              In addition to liability imposed under § 20.09(a), a consumer reporting agency
   that does not correct inaccurate information in a consumer’s file and consumer report
   before the 10th day after the date on which a judgment is entered against the agency is also
   liable for $1,000 a day until the inaccuracy is corrected. Tex. Bus. & Com. Code
   § 20.09(c).

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             The Texas Attorney General’s enforcement power relative to
   § 20.05(a)(5) is found in §§ 20.11 and 20.12. Section 20.11 states:
             § 20.11 Injunctive Relief; Civil Penalty
             (a) The attorney general may file a suit against a person for:
                (1) injunctive relief to prevent or restrain a violation of this
             chapter; or
                 (2) a civil penalty in an amount not to exceed $2,000 for each
             violation of this chapter.
             (b) If the attorney general brings an action against a person under
             Subsection (a) and an injunction is granted against the person or the
             person is found liable for a civil penalty, the attorney general may
             recover reasonable expenses, court costs, investigative costs, and
             attorney’s fees.
             (c) Each day a violation continues or occurs is a separate viola-
             tion for purposes of imposing a penalty under this section.
   Tex. Bus.& Com. Code § 20.11. Section 20.12 adds, relative to the
   Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act–Consumer Protection Act:
             § 20.12 Deceptive Trade Practice
             A violation of this chapter is a false, misleading or deceptive act
             or practice under Subchapter E, Chapter 17.
   Tex. Bus.& Com. Code § 20.12; Tex. Bus.& Com. Code § 17.41,
   et seq.
             As stated in the district court’s order, CDIA’s First Amended Com-
   plaint includes the following allegations:
             •   Some CDIA members currently include in their reports Medical
                 Account Information that the Statute now prohibits.
             •   The State has the authority to enforce the Statute and has never
                 agreed not to enforce it against CDIA members.

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           •   Absent a declaration that the Statute is preempted by the FCRA,
               CDIA members will be forced to make material changes to their
               day-to-day business operations to comply with the Statute, includ-
               ing making changes to products currently provided in Texas.
           •   CDIA members which maintain Medical Account Information
               will have to undertake significant efforts and adopt processes to:
               (i) identify any information that would be implicated by the Stat-
               ute; (ii) take steps to assure the removal of such data from their
               files or otherwise prevent such data from being included in con-
               sumer reports provided in Texas; and (iii) manage the collection
               of such information from the furnishers in the future to prevent its
               appearance.
           •   These remediation efforts require material investments of time
               and resources. Similar undertakings regarding other changes to
               the credit reporting system have taken members years to com-
               plete.
   See September 28, 2021 District Court Order at 5 (citing First Amended
   Complaint, ¶¶ 5-6, 8, 10, 18, 20, 25–28, 30–34 (emphasis added)). For pur-
   poses of this appeal, the factual allegations in the complaint are accepted as
   true.
                                         III.
           On appeal, Paxton challenges the district court’s sovereign immunity,
   standing, and ripeness rulings. We review the district court’s standing and
   ripeness determinations de novo. Ctr. for Individual Freedom v. Carmouche,
   449 F.3d 655, 659 (5th Cir. 2006). The same is true for the district court’s
   jurisdictional determination of sovereign immunity. City of Austin v. Paxton,
   943 F.3d 993, 997 (5th Cir. 2019). “If the district court resolves any factual
   disputes in making its jurisdictional findings, the facts expressly or impliedly
   found by the district court are accepted on appeal unless the findings are
   clearly erroneous.” Pederson v. Louisiana State Univ., 213 F.3d 858, 869 (5th
   Cir. 2000).

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           In this instance, our decision regarding standing also is determinative
   of Paxton’s assertions of error regarding the district court’s sovereign
   immunity and ripeness rulings. Thus, although it is the district court’s
   sovereign immunity ruling that provides interlocutory appellate jurisdiction, 5
   we will address Article III standing first.
                                                IV.
          Article III of the United States Constitution permits federal courts to
   decide certain “cases” and “controversies.” Choice Inc. of Texas v. Green-
   stein, 691 F.3d 710, 715 (5th Cir. 2012); U.S. Const., art. III, § 2. And,
   “the justiciability doctrines of standing, mootness, political question, and
   ripeness all originate from Article III’s ‘case’ or ‘controversy’ language.”
   Greenstein, 691 F.3d at 715 (internal quotation marks deleted). “A question
   of standing raises the issue of whether the plaintiff is entitled to have the
   court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues.” Pederson, 213
   F.3d at 869 (quoting Cook v. Reno, 74 F.3d 97, 98–99 (5th Cir. 1996)). Stand-
   ing must exist at the time suit is filed. Id. 6
           “[T]he irreducible constitutional minimum of standing consists of
   three elements.” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). “The
   plaintiff must have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to
   the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed
   by a favorable judicial decision.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338
   (2016), as revised (May 24, 2016). To establish Article III standing, an alleged
   “injury in fact” must be “concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent.”
   Clapper v. Amnesty Intern. USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013). The district court,
           _____________________
           5
               See note 1, supra.
           6
             The mootness doctrine, in contrast, considers whether the present or threatened
   injury required for standing continues to exist. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw, 528
   U.S. 167, 189–94 (2000) (distinguishing standing and mootness).

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   accepting CDIA’s allegations as true, concluded that CDIA had satisfied Ar-
   ticle III’s requirement of an “injury in fact” and thus had “associational
   standing” to bring this pre-enforcement judicial action, on behalf of its mem-
   bers, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief relative to Texas Business and
   Commerce Code § 20.05(a)(5). 7
           On appeal, Paxton challenges this determination, contending CDIA’s
   assertion that the Texas Attorney General will seek to enforce § 20.05(a)(5)
   by filing a suit seeking injunctive relief or a civil penalty, pursuant to §§ 20.11
   and 20.12, is likewise “purely speculative” and, thus, insufficient to provide
   the “injury in fact” required for Article III standing. In making this assertion,
   Paxton emphasizes the absence of any formal enforcement proceedings un-
   dertaken, or threatened, by the Texas Attorney General since § 20.05(a)(5)
   became effective on the May 31, 2019 enactment date. Based on that history,
   Paxton also argues that the operational changes that CDIA’s members alleg-
   edly must make (to comply with § 20.05(a)(5)) are not traceable to actions by
   the Texas Attorney General. Lastly, Paxton contends that enjoining the
           _____________________
           7
             As noted by the district court, an association has standing to sue on behalf of its
   members when “(a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right;
   (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s purpose; and
   (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of
   individual members in the lawsuit.” Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S.
   333, 343 (1977). Participation of individual members generally is not required when the
   association seeks prospective or injunctive relief, as opposed to damages. United Food &
   Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Grp., Inc., 517 U.S. 544, 546 (1996). Paxton’s
   standing challenge focuses solely on the requirement that CDIA’s members “would
   otherwise have standing to sue in their own right.” Notably, the presence of any one party
   with standing as to each claim satisfies Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement.
   Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Inst. Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 52 n. 2 (2006); Bowsher v.
   Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 721 (1986); Brackeen v. Haaland, 994 F.3d 249, 291 (5th Cir. 2021)
   rev’d in part on other grounds, 143 S. Ct. 1609 (2023). Still, a plaintiff must establish standing
   for each form of relief sought. See Transunion, LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2210 (2021)
   (standing to seek injunctive relief does not necessarily establish standing to seek
   retrospective damages).

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   Texas Attorney General’s enforcement of § 20.05(a)(5) will not redress
   CDIA’s injury because consumers still will be able to enforce the provision’s
   requirements by suing, under §§ 20.08 and 20.09, for damages.
          An allegation of future injury may establish standing if the threatened
   injury is “certainly impending or there is a substantial risk that the harm will
   occur.” Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 158 (2014) (quoting
   Clapper, 568 U.S. at 414 n.5). Here, CDIA does not allege that the Texas
   Attorney General has threatened any of its members with enforcement,
   issued warning letters, or formally announced an intent to enforce the statute.
   On the other hand, the Texas Attorney General has never stated or even
   suggested that the statute would not be enforced in the future. Indeed, in
   Attorney General Opinion No. KP-0367, issued on April 13, 2021, in
   response to a query from the San Patricio County Attorney, Paxton opined
   regarding the likelihood that a court would conclude that the prohibition set
   forth in § 20.05(a)(5) applies to a certain type of health plan. See Tex.
   Atty. Gen. Op. KP-0367 (Apr. 13, 2021), 2021 WL 2803919.
   Significantly, nonenforcement of the prohibition is never mentioned.
          Paxton’s submissions to the district court and this court likewise lack
   a clear statement of intent regarding future enforcement of § 20.05(a)(5)
   despite the obvious materiality of that information. Given the ease by which
   this point could be clarified by the Texas Attorney General—thereby
   enlightening federal courts, state courts, the Texas Legislature, the Texas
   Governor, Texas voters, CRAs, consumers, debt collection agencies, health
   care providers, health care insurers, etc.—the omission is telling.
          This is particularly true given that the risk of harm to CDIA’s
   members is decidedly different from pre-enforcement cases in which
   standing was lacking because the plaintiff was not within the class of persons
   to whom the statute in question applied, or the statute had such general

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   applicability that the likelihood of its future application vis-à-vis the plaintiff
   was aptly described as little more than mere possibility or speculation. Here,
   in contrast, the statutory provision in question, § 20.05(a)(5), is expressly
   directed to CRAs, i.e., CDIA’s members, and no one else. Cf. Contender
   Farms, L.L.P. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 779 F.3d 258, 264 (5th Cir. 2015) (“If a
   plaintiff is an object of a regulation ‘there is ordinarily little question that the
   action or inaction has caused him injury, and that a judgment preventing or
   requiring the action will redress it.’”) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561)).
   Furthermore, CDIA alleges that some of its members currently include
   information in their reports that § 20.05(a)(5) prohibits.
          Nor, moreover, is the statute moribund such that standing is absent
   because there is no reasonable fear of enforcement. See, e.g., Mayle v. State of
   Illinois, 956 F.3d 966 (7th Cir. 2020) (plaintiff lacked standing to challenge
   Illinois’ “archaic” adultery and fornication laws because they were no longer
   enforced but remained in statute books “‘as a residue of legislative inertia.’”)
   (quoting Peña v. Mattox, 84 F.3d 894, 900 (7th Cir. 1996)). To the contrary,
   § 20.05(a)(5) was enacted less than five years ago, because of, according to
   Paxton, legislative “concern[s] about the damaging effects of credit of in-
   sured individuals whose medical bills appeared past-due based on no fault
   their own.” See Appellant’s Brief, at 5; see also 2019 Texas Senate Bill No.
   1037, Senate Research Center Bill Analysis. 8
          In the First Amendment context, courts addressing similar circum-
   stances “will assume a credible threat of prosecution [or enforcement] in the
   absence of compelling contrary evidence.” See Turtle Island Foods, S.P.C. v.
   Strain, 65 F.4th 211, 218 (5th Cir. 2023); Barilla v. City of Houston, Texas, 13

          _____________________
          8
                   (https://capitol.texas.gov/tlodocs/86R/analysis/html/SB01037F.htm (last
   visited July 24, 2023).

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   F.4th 427, 433–34 (5th Cir. 2021); Speech First, Inc. v. Fenves, 979 F.3d 319,
   335 (5th Cir. 2020); cf. Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat. Union, 442 U.S.
   289, 302 (1979) (though criminal penalty provision had not yet been applied,
   state had not disavowed any intention of invoking it). On this record, we will
   do the same.
          Accordingly, given that CDIA has sufficiently alleged that certain
   members must either make material operational changes to comply with
   § 20.05(a)(5), or expose themselves to a substantial threat of enforcement
   by the Texas Attorney General, pursuant to §§ 20.11 and 20.12, we agree that
   CDIA has alleged the requisite “injury in fact” required for standing. See,
   e.g., Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 1553–54 (1967) (plaintiffs had
   standing to challenge regulation that was directed at them and required sig-
   nificant changes in everyday business practices because noncompliance ex-
   posed them to the imposition of strong sanctions); MedImmune v. Genentech,
   Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 129 (2007) (having to “[choose] between abandoning []
   rights or risking prosecution—is ‘a dilemma that it was the very purpose of
   the Declaratory Judgment Act to ameliorate’”) (quoting Abbott Labs., 387
   U.S. at 152)).
          Paxton’s assertion that the alleged injury is not traceable to actions by
   the Texas Attorney General, but is instead “self-inflicted,” fails for
   essentially the same reasons. See Federal Election Comm’n v. Cruz, 142 S. Ct.
   1638, 1647 (2022) (injury remained fairly traceable to government actor
   despite plaintiffs’ having knowingly triggered election statute because
   plaintiffs were subject to the challenged provision and faced legal penalties
   for non-compliance); id. (distinguishing Clapper on grounds that the plaintiffs
   there could not show that they were likely to be subjected to the challenged

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   government policy). 9
           Finally, Paxton’s contention that enjoining the Texas Attorney
   General’s enforcement of § 20.05(a)(5) will not redress CDIA’s injury—
   because consumers will still be able to enforce the provision’s requirements
   by suing, under §§ 20.08 and 20.09, for money damages—likewise lacks
   merit. While it is true that an injunction directed to the Texas Attorney
   General would not in itself preclude consumers from seeking relief under
   §§ 20.08 and 20.09, it would reduce the total amount of risk and liability that
   CDIA’s members face by failing to comply with § 20.05(a)(5). Such a
   reduction satisfies the redressability required to establish standing. See
   Sanchez v. R.G.L., 761 F.3d 495, 506 (5th Cir. 2014) (“When ‘establishing
   redressability, [a plaintiff] need only show that a favorable ruling could
   potentially lessen its injury; it need not definitively demonstrate that a victory
   would completely remedy the harm.’”) (quoting Antilles Cement Corp. v.
   Fortuno, 678 F.3d 310, 318 (1st Cir. 2012)). 10 And, if an injunction is upheld

           _____________________
           9
              Paxton’s reliance on Clapper to support this argument is particularly problematic.
   As explained therein, the plaintiffs in Clapper—various attorneys and human rights, labor,
   legal, and media organizations—challenged a federal statute that allowed the United States
   Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence to obtain foreign intelligence
   information by authorizing electronic surveillance of individuals who are not “United
   States persons” and are reasonably believed to be located outside of the United States. The
   plaintiffs, as “United States persons” were not the intended target of the statute. Finding
   standing to be lacking, the Supreme Court emphasized that the alleged injury (the
   likelihood that the plaintiffs’ communications with foreign contacts would be intercepted
   at some point in the future) relied upon “highly speculative fear” and “a highly attenuated
   chain of possibilities” that included the discretionary decisions and uncertain conduct of
   multiple third parties. See Clapper, 568 U.S. at 402, 407–20. Additionally, even before the
   statute in question was enacted, the plaintiffs in Clapper “had a similar incentive to engage
   in many of the [‘costly and burdensome’] countermeasures” that they claimed were
   necessitated by the challenged statute. Id. at 407, 417–18.
           10
              The parties’ briefs do not discuss whether, for purposes of evaluating standing,
   the separate statutory enforcement provisions available to the Texas Attorney General and
   consumers yield two separate injuries, rather than one. Nor is it apparent whether that

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   against the Texas Attorney General on grounds of federal preemption, that
   ruling ultimately may have estoppel effect in subsequent actions brought by
   consumers.
          For these reasons, we agree with the district court’s determination
   that CDIA has the associational standing required by Article III. Specifically,
   CDIA has alleged an “injury in fact” that is fairly traceable to the challenged
   conduct of the defendant and is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial
   decision.
                                             V.
          Paxton also contests the district court’s sovereign immunity and
   ripeness rulings. Regarding sovereign immunity, the district court
   determined that the criteria for Ex parte Young’s exception to that immunity
   —permitting suits for prospective injunctive relief against state officials
   acting in violation of federal law—are satisfied. See Verizon Maryland, Inc. v.
   Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Maryland, 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002); Ex parte Young,
   209 U.S. 123 (1908). Specifically, the Texas Attorney General is named in
   his official capacity; CDIA alleges that § 20.05(a)(5) is preempted by the
   Federal Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681, et seq., thus presenting
   an ongoing violation of federal law; and the requested injunction—
   prohibiting the Texas Attorney General from enforcing a preempted state
   law—is properly characterized as prospective relief.
          The district court concluded that CDIA’s claim is ripe for
   adjudication because it involves the “purely legal question” of whether the
   FCRA preempts § 20.05(a)(5), and CDIA has adequately alleged that its

          _____________________
   issue was presented to the district court. Accordingly, we note the question but do not
   consider it further.

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   members face hardship by being forced to either implement the measures
   necessary for compliance with § 20.05(a)(5) or risk a state enforcement
   action. Generally, a case is ripe when any remaining questions are purely legal
   ones and no further factual development is required. Orix Credit All., Inc. v.
   Wolfe, 212 F.3d 891, 895 (5th Cir. 2000). “The ripeness inquiry for an injury
   that is predicated on threat of litigation “‘focuses on whether an injury that
   has not yet occurred is sufficiently likely to happen to justify judicial
   intervention.’” Id. at 897 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Traillour Oil Co., 987
   F.2d 1138, 1153 (5th Cir. 1993)).”
          In contesting Ex parte Young’s application to this dispute, Paxton
   reiterates his assertion that CDIA has not alleged a sufficient threat of
   enforcement by the Texas Attorney General. Paxton likewise maintains that
   CDIA’s claim is not ripe for review for the same reasons that he contends
   CDIA lacks standing. That is, he contends that CDIA’s alleged injury is
   premised on a fear of enforcement that is not sufficiently likely to justify pre-
   enforcement judicial review.
          Given the intertwined nature of Paxton’s assertions of error, our
   reasons for affirming the district court’s “standing” ruling likewise control
   our assessment of Paxton’s sovereign immunity and ripeness challenges.
                                          VI.
          The State of Texas, through Attorney General Ken Paxton, appeals
   the district court’s rulings denying his motion seeking dismissal on grounds
   of sovereign immunity, standing, and ripeness. For the reasons stated herein,
   we AFFIRM and REMAND for additional proceedings, including final
   disposition of the preemption issue.

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