Court Opinion

ID: 9408676
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-13 15:07:32.755025+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:45.647012
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                    No. 23-0783
                                Filed July 13, 2023

IN THE INTEREST OF Y.R.,
Minor Child,

M.R., Mother,
      Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

       Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Lynn Poschner, District

Associate Judge.

       A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. AFFIRMED.

       Lynn Vogan of the Juvenile Public Defender, Des Moines, attorney for

appellant mother.

       Cathleen J. Siebrecht of Siebrecht Law Firm, Pleasant Hill, guardian ad

litem for appellant mother.

       Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Tamara Knight, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee State.

       Barbara Davis of Barbara Durden Davis, P.C., West Des Moines, attorney

and guardian ad litem for minor child.

       Scott Bandstra of The Bandstra Law Firm PC, Des Moines, for intervenors

M.A. and J.A.

       Considered by Ahlers, P.J., Chicchelly, J., and Scott, S.J.*

       *Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206

(2023).
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SCOTT, Senior Judge.

       The mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to Y.R. pursuant

to Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(h) (2022). Under section 232.116(1)(h), the court

may terminate a parent’s rights when there is clear and convincing evidence the

child is three years of age or younger, has been adjudicated a child in need of

assistance (CINA), has been removed from the parent’s physical custody for at

least six of the last twelve months without a trial period at home longer than thirty

days, and there is clear and convincing evidence the child could not be returned

to the home at the present time. There is no dispute that Y.R. is three years of

age or younger, has been adjudicated a CINA, and has been out of parental care

for the requisite period. See Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(h)(1)-(3). But the mother

claims the State failed to make “specialized reasonable efforts” and, thus, there is

insufficient proof to support termination or conclude termination of her rights is in

the child’s best interest.

       “We review proceedings to terminate parental rights de novo. We give

weight to the juvenile court’s factual findings, especially when considering the

credibility of witnesses, but we are not bound by them.” In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d

764, 773 (Iowa 2012) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

       In In re G.J., No. 19-0282, 2019 WL 1934003, at *3–5 (Iowa Ct. App. May

1, 2019), a parent raised the issue of reasonable accommodations under the

American with Disabilities Act (ADA).        In that case, we noted, “The purpose

underlying the reasonable-efforts requirement is to help the parent to make the

changes necessary for the child to return.” G.J., 2019 WL 1934003, at *3. There,

the mother argued she was denied reasonable effort accommodations—"picture
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books to help her comprehend the parenting curriculum, the provision of an alert

system for when the child cries, an ‘appropriate’ psychological evaluator, and

providing adequate communications.” Id. at *4. We concluded:

               We find [the department of human services1] made
        reasonable efforts to facilitate the reunification of the mother and the
        child. [H]HS provided reasonable accommodations in compliance
        with the ADA to the extent possible given the mother’s refusal to
        actively participate in ordered services. The mother has failed to
        show she requested a reasonable service that was not offered to her.
        [H]HS can offer the services, but the parent must make the effort if
        the services are to remedy deficiencies and help return the child to
        the home.

Id. at *5.

        Here, the mother asserts, “The case turns on whether, due to the lack of

reasonable effort provided, the [S]tate has proven that the child cannot be safely

returned to the parent’s care at this time.” The only deficiency in service the mother

identifies on appeal is not a service to be provided to her; rather, she asserts HHS

did not consistently provide language interpreters to her parents.2 The juvenile

court addressed this claim in its October 2022 permanency order:

               [The mother] speaks English fluently and does not need
        interpretation services.
               Counsel raises the issues of whether interpretation services
        have been provided at [the mother]’s professionally supervised visits
        with [Y.R.] when [the mother]’s parents attend.
               On February 1, 2022, the court ordered as follows: “[H]HS
        shall explore options for bilingual FCS and Safe Care services for
        this family; and alternatively, all providers shall use interpretation
        services during interactions with [the mother]’s parents including

1 The agency is now the Iowa Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).
2 To the extent she asserts these claims for her parents—who were allowed to
intervene in the juvenile proceedings—she has no standing to make claims for
them. See In re K.R., 737 N.W.2d 321, 323 (Iowa Ct. App. 2007) (“[The father] did
not have standing to assert that argument on [the mother’s] behalf in an effort to
ultimately gain a benefit for himself, that is, the reversal of the termination of his
parental rights.”).
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         visits when [the mother]’s parents are present and Safe Care. [H]HS
         shall engage the grandparents in visits with [Y.R.] to explain safety
         concerns and provide education. [H]HS shall use these services to
         make efforts toward concurrent planning of placement of [Y.R.] with
         a family member.”         It is necessary to consider the family
         circumstances in February, 2022, and the full context of that order.
                  As of the February 1, 2022 hearing, [Y.R.] was in foster care.
         [The mother] was living with her parents. Reunification at that time
         would include [the mother] living with her parents, and her parents
         being involved in caring for [Y.R.]. Alternatively, relative placements
         such as [the mother]’s parents would be considered. Neither [the
         mother] nor her parents were able to safely care for [Y.R.] at that
         time. It was reasonable at that time for FCS services and Safe Care
         services to include education for [the mother]’s parents to
         understand [the mother]’s abilities and how to support her parenting,
         or fill in where [the mother]’s parenting was inadequate. These
         measures would support reunification or, alternatively, relative
         placement. The purpose was not for [the mother]’s parents to act as
         interpreters for [the mother]. The court wrote “The situation is
         atypical in that [the mother]’s parents are acting as caregivers for [the
         mother] and also learning to act as simultaneous caregivers for
         [Y.R.], and services must be tailored to meet the family’s
         circumstances.”
                  The family’s circumstances are different now. [Y.R.] is in
         relative care. [Y.R.] was placed in relative placement in April, 2022.
         [The mother] lives with her brother. [The mother] moved in with her
         brother in mid-July, 2022 by her and her family’s own choosing.
         Reunification with [the mother] would no longer include [the mother]’s
         parents living with [the mother] and [Y.R.] [H]HS is under no
         obligation to make efforts to place [Y.R.] with [the mother]’s parents.
         A review hearing was held in April, 2022 and the court found that
         reasonable efforts had been provided toward reunification.

         The mother did not appeal the October 2022 permanency order.3 See In re

D.S., 563 N.W.2d 12, 15 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997) (noting principles of res judicata

3   We note our supreme court has held:
        [H]HS’s obligation to provide reasonable efforts until a final written
        termination order does not necessarily require [H]HS to provide
        reasonable efforts toward reunification. The legislature instructed
        that “the paramount concern[s] in making reasonable efforts” are “[a]
        child’s health and safety.” Iowa Code § 232.102(10)(a). Where it is
        inappropriate to return a child to the family home, the legislature
        specified that “reasonable efforts shall include the efforts made in a
        timely manner to finalize a permanency plan for the child.” Id. “If it
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preclude the court from relitigating issues that have already been decided and

reiterating the parent’s obligation to timely challenge the services offered).

       The juvenile court’s termination order noted the services the mother was

provided, including supervised visits with parenting training, mental-health care,

parenting evaluation, and Integrated Health Home (IHH) services. The court also

noted the mother’s failure to engage with a number of the services:

       [The mother] continues to be unable to respond to [Y.R.]’s cues and
       continues to show a lack of connection to and interest in [Y.R.] [The
       mother] is not willing to participate in additional services, such as
       IHH. [The mother] is not interested in fully participating in the
       services that are offered such as supervised visits where she would
       have additional support and instruction about parenting. [The
       mother]’s insight into her mental health needs and mental health care
       is limited, as shown by her uncertainty about her need for mental
       health care. [The mother]’s mental health has improved since the
       winter for 2021/2022, but only to the extent that she is better able to
       take care of herself.
               No specific services were requested to address [the mother]’s
       disability—her mental illness. [She] was provided services to
       address her mental health. [She] was also provided parenting
       education through FCS and a parenting assessment. There was no
       evidence how a different service to accommodate [her] disability
       would have changed the outcome.

       We conclude HHS offered reasonable services designed to address the

concerns that resulted in the removal of the child. See G.J., 2019 WL 1934003, at

*4. The mother is unable to meet the child’s basic needs without prompting and

cues from others and thus the child cannot safely be returned to her custody.

       has been determined that the child cannot return to the child’s home,”
       the child’s “case permanency plan” must include “documentation of
       the steps taken to make and finalize an adoption or other permanent
       placement.” Id. § 232.2(4)(j). Therefore, the statute provides for
       situations in which reunification need not be a goal or component of
       [H]HS’s reasonable efforts.
In re L.T., 924 N.W.2d 521, 528–29 (Iowa 2019) (third and fourth alterations in
original).
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There is clear and convincing evidence to support termination of the mother’s

parental rights.

       Because a statutory ground for termination exists, we must next determine

whether termination is in the child’s best interests. A.B., 815 N.W.2d at 776. We

“give primary consideration to the child’s safety, to the best placement for

furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child, and to the physical,

mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child.” Iowa Code § 232.116(2);

see In re J.E., 723 N.W.2d 793, 802 (Iowa 2006) (Cady, J., concurring specially)

(stating that a child’s safety and the child’s need for a permanent home are the

“defining elements” in determining a child’s best interests).

       The mother’s guardian ad litem argued Y.R.’s best interests would be

served by allowing the child to remain in her current placement with a relative under

a guardianship. Although transfer of guardianship and custody to a suitable person

or an adult relative is a permanency option, Iowa Code section 232.104(4)(a)

requires a showing by convincing evidence that termination would be contrary to

the child’s best interests. And our courts have noted “a guardianship is not a legally

preferable alternative to termination.” In re B.T., 894 N.W.2d 29, 32 (Iowa Ct. App.

2017). Here, the juvenile court rejected guardianship:

       A guardianship is not in [Y.R.]’s best interest. [Y.R.] is only one year
       old. A guardianship does not provide the same level of permanency
       as termination of parental rights and adoption as a guardianship can
       be litigated repeatedly and even terminated. [Y.R.] deserves to have
       the chance to be adopted and have permanent parents and stability
       for the rest of her childhood.

Accord In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 477 (Iowa 2019) (discussing age of child,

guardianship, and lack of permanency). The child is in a stable and suitable pre-
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adoptive placement with relatives. Termination of the mother’s parental rights and

adoption will best further the child’s long-term nurturing and growth.

       There is no permissive factor in Iowa Code section 232.116(3) applicable

here. We affirm the termination of the mother’s parental rights.

       AFFIRMED.