Court Opinion

ID: 9390337
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-27 16:00:51.032088+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:33.646302
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       APR 27 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

GILES MANLEY,                                   No.    21-16401

                Petitioner-Appellant,           D.C. No.
                                                3:11-cv-00354-HDM-WGC
 v.

WARDEN, DIRECTOR OF NEVADA         MEMORANDUM*
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al.,

                Respondents-Appellees.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                            for the District of Nevada
                  Howard D. McKibben, District Judge, Presiding

                       Argued and Submitted April 19, 2023
                            San Francisco, California

Before: VANDYKE and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges, and LASNIK,** District
Judge.

      Petitioner Giles Manley appeals the denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas

corpus petition. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253, and we

affirm. This Court reviews the denial of a habeas petition de novo. Runningeagle v.

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
            The Honorable Robert S. Lasnik, United States District Judge for the
Western District of Washington, sitting by designation.
Ryan, 686 F.3d 758, 766 (9th Cir. 2012). To do so, we look “to the last reasoned

[state court] decision that finally resolve[d] the claim at issue.” Amado v. Gonzalez,

758 F.3d 1119, 1130 (9th Cir. 2014) (quotation marks and citations omitted).

Because the parties are familiar with the factual and procedural history of the case,

we need not recount it here.

      Where, as here, § 2254(d) applies to a petitioner’s claims, federal habeas

relief may not be granted unless it is shown that the earlier state court’s decision

was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” or “based

on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see also Harrington v. Richter,

562 U.S. 86, 100 (2011). In other words, the state court’s ruling must be “so

lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended

in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington,

562 U.S. at 103.

      First, Manley argues that his trial counsel’s advice in connection with his

decision to enter a guilty plea constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. An

ineffective assistance claim requires proving that (1) “counsel’s representation fell

below an objective standard of reasonableness,” and (2) there is a reasonable

probability that “but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

                                           2
proceeding would have been different.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,

688, 694 (1984). Manley argues that the Nevada state court’s conclusion that his

trial counsel was not ineffective meets all three potential pathways to habeas relief

under § 2254(d). We disagree. The state court’s determination that Manley’s trial

counsel made no guarantees to Manley that he could withdraw his guilty plea if the

law regarding the execution of juvenile offenders ever changed was not an

unreasonable determination of fact in light of the testimony given during the state

habeas evidentiary hearing. See Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 301 (2010).

      Nor was the state court’s decision contrary to clearly established law. While

the Nevada Supreme Court decision did not apply the Strickland test, this was not

erroneous because the only issue presented was the trial court’s credibility

determination. See Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (per curiam) (“Avoiding

[a ‘contrary to’ error] does not require citation . . . [or] awareness of [Supreme

Court] cases, so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court

decision contradicts them.”) (emphasis in original). Furthermore, the Nevada trial

court’s decision – which addressed Manley’s ineffective assistance of counsel

claims – cited Strickland and laid out the relevant two-part test. See Wilson v.

Sellers, 584 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1193–96 (2018) (explaining that “federal

habeas law employs a ‘look through’ presumption”).

      Finally, the state court’s decision was not an unreasonable application of

                                          3
clearly established federal law. The Supreme Court has cautioned that “[f]ederal

habeas courts must guard against the danger of equating unreasonableness under

Strickland with unreasonableness under § 2254(d). When § 2254(d) applies, the

question is not whether counsel’s actions were reasonable. The question is whether

there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential

standard.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 105. Here, while perhaps counsel could have

better communicated to Manley that the chances of withdrawing his plea were

extremely remote, the Court finds that given the uncertain state of the law

surrounding juvenile death sentences at the time Manley entered into his plea there

is a reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard.

See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770 (1970) (“That a guilty plea must be

intelligently made is not a requirement that all advice offered by the defendant’s

lawyer withstand retrospective examination in a post-conviction hearing.”).

      Second, Manley also argues that the Nevada Supreme Court unreasonably

applied clearly established federal law when it upheld his guilty plea. A guilty plea

must be “intelligent and voluntary.” Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969).

Voluntariness of a plea is determined “only by considering all of the relevant

circumstances surrounding it.” Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 749 (1970).

As part of this totality-of-the-circumstances analysis, courts frequently consider

defendant’s written plea agreements and statements made during the plea hearing.

                                          4
See Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73–74 (1977) (“[T]he representations of the

defendant, his lawyer, and the prosecutor at [a plea] hearing, as well as any

findings made by the judge accepting the plea, constitute a formidable barrier in

any subsequent collateral proceedings.”); United States v. Mims, 928 F.2d 310, 313

(9th Cir. 1991) (“We attach substantial weight to contemporaneous on-the-record

statements in assessing the voluntariness of pleas.”) (citation omitted); see, e.g.,

United States v. Kaczynski, 239 F.3d 1108, 1114–15 (9th Cir. 2001). Here, the

Nevada Supreme Court focused its analysis on the written plea agreement and the

plea canvass, including the trial court’s questioning of both Manley’s defense

counsel and Manley himself. Given the broadness of the rule governing the validity

of plea agreements, the Nevada Supreme Court’s opinion was not an unreasonable

application of clearly established federal law. See Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541

U.S. 652, 664 (2004) (“The more general the rule, the more leeway courts have in

reaching outcomes in case-by-case determinations.”) (citation omitted).

      AFFIRMED.

                                           5