Court Opinion

ID: 9560311
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:47:11.310414+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:49.240396
License: Public Domain

Petrich, J.*
(concurring in part, dissenting in part) — While I agree with the majority's conclusion that the dissolution decree encumbered the insurance policy in favor of the daughter, Michelle, I disagree with its holding that the daughter's interest is limited to the lesser of the father's interest in the policy or the value of past unpaid and future child support obligations. In my view the entire interest of *865the deceased father in the policy should be awarded to the daughter.
As the majority points out, children as beneficiaries of an insurance policy mandated by a divorce decree have a vested equitable interest in the proceeds of the policy which cannot be divested by a later formal change of beneficiary. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Bunt, 110 Wn.2d 368, 380, 754 P.2d 993 (1988); Standard Ins. Co. v. Schwalbe, 110 Wn.2d 520, 523, 755 P.2d 802 (1988).
The majority, in support of its ultimate conclusion, relies on cases in which the obligated parent successfully challenged on appeal the trial court's decree requiring the parent to maintain minor children as beneficiaries of the parent's policy. Those cases hold that such decrees amount to an award of property to the children and the trial court exceeds its authority where the award is not limited in the amount or extent needed to secure or pay the parent's child support obligation. Majority opinion, at 862 (citing Sutherland v. Sutherland, 77 Wn.2d 6, 10, 459 P.2d 397 (1969); In re Marriage of Donovan, 25 Wn. App. 691, 612 P.2d 387 (1980).10
Here we are not dealing with an appeal from the divorce decree challenging the award of the insurance benefits. The Sager decree was never appealed. The case before us is much like the issue resolved by an opinion of this division rendered in Puckett v. Puckett, 41 Wn. App. 78, 702 P.2d 477, review denied, 104 Wn.2d 1018 (1985). In Puckett the decree provided for child support payments as well as requiring the father to maintain an existing Pan American Life Insurance policy for the benefit of his minor child. Prior to his death, *866the father changed the beneficiary of the policy to his estate and by his will provided that the child was to receive $90,000 of the policy proceeds which then totaled $187,500. The trial court ruled that the policy was only security for the decedent's support obligation, which was satisfied by the $90,000 bequest, and that the estate was entitled to the insurance benefits. This court disagreed and awarded the entire policy benefits to the child. In support of its ruling the court there stated:
For all purposes, the obligation to maintain the Pan American policy for Jai Ann is a property provision without restriction. The terms of the divorce decree clearly express this intent. It may well be, as decedent's estate argues, that the decedent did not intend such an outcome or that the divorce court lacked the authority to award property to the child over and above the support obligation. Sutherland v. Sutherland, supra. However, decedent neither contested the divorce proceedings, nor appealed the default divorce decree. We will not look behind the face of the judgment now. Thompson v. Thompson, 82 Wn.2d 352, 359, 510 P.2d 827 (1973); Svatonsky v. Svatonsky, 63 Wn.2d 902, 904, 389 P.2d 663 (1964).
Puckett, 41 Wn. App. at 83.
In support of its holding the majority erroneously concludes that the provision regarding insurance in the Sager decree is ambiguous and then construes the decree to have included something that may have been intended in light of limited authority of the court to award property to children but was never expressed. In so doing, the majority has misapplied the tenets governing the determination of the intent of a judicial decree.
The construction of a dissolution decree is a question of law. Byrne v. Ackerlund, 108 Wn.2d 445, 739 P.2d 1138 (1987). A reviewing court, charged with the task of ascertaining the intended effect of a divorce decree, is limited to examining the provision of the decree and if the decree is unambiguous it is not open to construction. Puckett. If the judgment is ambiguous, the court seeks to ascertain the intention of the court entering the decree guided by the general rules of construction applicable to statutes, contracts and other writings. Callan v. Callan, 2 Wn. App. 446, 448-49, 468 P.2d 456 (1970). An *867instrument is ambiguous when its terms are uncertain or susceptible to more than one meaning. Harding v. Warren, 30 Wn. App. 848, 850, 639 P.2d 750 (1982).
In interpreting a statute, a court cannot read into a clear statute that which it may believe the Legislature intended but failed to express. Automobile Drivers & Demonstrators Union Local 882 v. Department of Retirement Sys., 92 Wn.2d 415, 598 P.2d 379 (1979), appeal dismissed, 440 U.S. 1040 (1980); Vita Food Prods., Inc. v. State, 91 Wn.2d 132, 587 P.2d 535 (1978). The same applies to a court's interpretation of a former judgment or decree. Callan.
It may be that the judge intended the insurance provision to be a means of securing support obligations, but one cannot glean that from the decree itself. One thing is certain, on that score the provision is clear and unambiguous.
The decree governing the insurance provision is contained in paragraph 8, which in its entirety states:
8. Medical and Life Insurance: The petitioner, OCIE (NMI) SAGER, shall make the minor children of the parties . . . beneficiaries of the medical and life insurance policies which exist through his place of employment.
This provision is placed three paragraphs down from the provision for child support payments; it does not limit the amount of insurance benefits in any way, shape, or form; and neither does it limit the effectiveness of the grant to the minority of the children.
I will concede that such a provision exceeds the court's authority and if it was challenged it should have been modified, but it is not ambiguous and thus subject to the majority's construction.
In the case before us the decree expressly awards the insurance policy benefits to the children. No appeal was taken from that award. We should not look behind the face of the judgment now. I would hold that the daughter is entitled to the deceased father's entire interest in the policy.

 Judge John A. Petrich was a member of the Court of Appeals at the time oral argument was heard on this matter. He is now serving as a judge pro tem-pore of the court pursuant to CAR 21(c).

Riser v. Riser, 7 Wn. App. 647, 501 P.2d 1069 (1972), cited by the majority, was not an appeal challenging the divorce court's authority to award property in the form of an obligation to maintain insurance benefits for minor children. At issue was the interpretation of an unappealed decree which incorporated a property settlement agreement. The court there held that the decree awarding the policies to the father, subject to the obligation to maintain the policies with the children as irrevocable beneficiaries until the children reached majority, was a provision in addition to support and maintenance requiring policy benefits to be paid without regard to any balance of support/maintenance that, but for the death of the father, would have become payable.