Court Opinion

ID: 9810673
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 21:55:54.373318+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:40:08.622874
License: Public Domain

Stacy, J.,
dissenting: I am unable to agree to the proposition that the present action is not to obtain relief against the apparent effect of .plaintiff’s deed. The deed, upon its face, purports to convey, and does convey, lot No. 6 as well as lot No. 7. If this represent the actual transaction between ■ the parties, then the defendant has rightfully acquired title to both lots, and the plaintiffs have been paid for what they sold.
On the other hand, for plaintiffs to undertake to recover the value of lot No. 6 upon the theory of an “unjust enrichment,” ’ thereby affirming the deed, it is necessary for them to assert that when L. M. Lewis, their grantee, took title to said lot, .he did so in trust for them; and it is the law of this State that no trust will be implied or allowed to result in favor of grantors, as against the terms of their own deed, by reason of the circumstance that no consideration was in fact paid or that the same was different from the recital contained in the deed. Gaylord v. Gaylord, 150 N. C., 222, and cases there cited. If A. make a deed to B. for a tract of land, with no agreement as to the purchase price, A. cannot recover in a suit against B. for its value, except upon the theory that B. has something which in reality belongs to A., and this he may not show without an attack of some kind upon the apparent force and effect of his deed. A/s right to affirm the deed and sue for damages, where the land has passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser, as it has here, is bottomed upon his initial right to impeach the deed. This is a *581barrier wbicb be must overcome before be can establish bis right to damages in an action like the present.
Plaintiffs have abandoned their allegation of fraud in procuring the deed, and its fraudulent alteration after delivery, together 'with the allegation of mutual mistake; they rely entirely upon the allegation' of mistake on their part, and fraud on the part of the defendant. Therefore, at the threshold of the case, they must show: (1) that the description of lot No. 6 was inserted by their mistake; and (2) that the defendant, with knowledge of this mistake, accepted the deed with intent to cheat and defraud the plaintiffs. The mistake of the plaintiffs, if not the fraud of the defendant, according to our decisions, must be established by clear, strong and convincing evidence. Harding v. Long, 103 N. C., 1; Lamb v. Perry, 169 N. C. p. 444.
The reason for this is, the plaintiffs are asking to be relieved, not only as against the fraud of the defendant, which, under the circumstances, would not be sufficient, but also from the consequences of their own mistake; and this must be established by evidence stronger than the deed itself. Ely v. Early, 94 N. C., 1. There is ho allegation that the plaintiffs’ mistake was induced by the fraud of the defendant.
This rule as to the quantum of proof makes for the preservation of titles; it w;as adopted in the interest of upholding their integrity, and it should not be relaxed.