Court Opinion

ID: 9494419
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:37:34.732571+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:56:24.402585
License: Public Domain

GARWOOD, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I concur in Judge DeMoss’s good opinion with these additional observations.
The government, of course, has the burden of justifying a warrantless detention. Here there is no sufficient evidence that a computer check was ever requested with respect to the validity of Valadez’s driver’s license or vehicle registration and the evidence clearly shows that it was not Officer Slubar’s routine practice to run any computer checks on vehicles stopped for traffic violations. As I see it, then, the ruling below can only be sustained if we were to hold that detention may lawfully be extended, beyond the time it has become apparent there is neither probable cause nor reasonable suspicion the detained party has committed any offense, to await the results of a previously requested, non-routine criminal history check. For the reasons stated by Judge DeMoss, I agree that we may not so hold.
I note, however, that arguably different considerations should apply to brief additional detention (after there is no longer any probable cause or reasonable suspicion of any violation) to await results of a driver's license or vehicle registration check which was requested while there was probable cause or reasonable suspicion, particularly if the request was pursuant to a standard operating procedure. The Supreme Court has indicated that in calculating Fourth Amendment reasonableness, in the context of vehicle stops and resulting brief detentions, the interests of the state tend to be weighed more heavily, and those of the motorist less heavily, where the subject matter concerns the privilege of driving on the highway, see Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 110 S.Ct. 2481, 110 L.Ed.2d 412 (1990); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660(1979), and, conversely, that the interests of the state are weighed less heavily, and those of the motorist more heavily, where the subject matter is “the general interest in crime control.” City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 121 S.Ct. 447, 453, 148 L.Ed.2d 333 (2000). A criminal history check, unlike a driver’s license or vehicle registration check, clearly relates only to “the general interest in crime control.” Of course, Prouse precludes individualized stops (not based on reasonable suspicion) even to check on licenses and vehicle registration, and Edmond precludes fixed point type stops aimed at general narcotics crime control. But, here the stop was concededly lawful, and it is the stop which constitutes the principal intrusion on the interests of the motorist. The additional invasion of. those interests occasioned by briefly prolonging the detention is comparatively minimal. And, the minimal extent of an intrusion into the motorist’s interests is certainly a factor tending to support (though concededly not always sufficient to require) a determination of Fourth Amendment reasonableness. See Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 110 S.Ct. at 2486-87.