Court Opinion

ID: 9784988
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 21:00:30.164225+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:02.318560
License: Public Domain

ROBINSON, J.,
dissenting.
After no small amount of reflection, I have concluded that I must dissent from the Court’s affirmance of the grant of summary judgment in this case. I readily acknowledge the impressive and almost persuasive review of the facts and the law that is so lucidly set forth in the Court’s opinion. At the end of the day, however, my understanding of the strictures of Rule 56 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure and the opinions of this Court with respect to same has caused me to conclude that the grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants was inappropriate. See Plainfield Pike Gas & Convenience, LLC v. 1889 Plainfield Pike Realty Corp., 994 A.2d 54 (R.I.2010); Estate of Giuliano v. Giuliano, 949 A.2d 386 (R.I.2008).
The majority, in conducting its de novo review of the hearing justice’s grant of summary judgment considers the map at issue to be unambiguous. I reach the opposite conclusion.
*346This Court has often stated that summary judgment is a “drastic remedy.” Ardente v. Horan, 117 R.I. 254, 256-57, 366 A.2d 162, 164 (1976); see also Estate of Giuliano, 949 A.2d at 390. As a corollary to that proposition, this Court has said that summary judgment should be “cautiously” applied. See, e.g., DePasquale v. Venus Pizza, Inc., 727 A.2d 683, 685 (R.I.1999) (“This Court has consistently acknowledged that summary judgment is a harsh remedy that must be applied cautiously.”); Sjogren v. Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance Co., 703 A.2d 608, 610 (R.I.1997); see also Estate of Giuliano, 949 A.2d at 390-91. I am further mindful of the principle that “summary judgment should occasion the termination of a case only where it is absolutely clear that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Estate of Giuliano, 949 A.2d at 394 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In my judgment, in situations where there is something akin to a tie as to whether or not to grant Rule 56 relief, the tie should go to the runner — the runner being the venerable right to a trial on the merits. See Industrial National Bank v. Peloso, 121 R.I. 305, 307, 397 A.2d 1312, 1313 (1979) (“The purpose of the summary judgment procedure is issue finding, not issue determination.”); see also Estate of Giuliano, 949 A.2d at 390-91; Westinghouse Broadcasting Co. v. Dial Media, Inc., 122 R.I. 571, 581, 410 A.2d 986, 992 (1980).
Whether a map is or is not ambiguous constitutes an issue of law to be determined in the first instance by the nisi prius court.6 See Gliottone v. Ethier, 870 A.2d 1022, 1028 (R.I.2005) (involving photographs); see also Beacon Mutual Insurance Co. v. Spino Brothers, Inc., 11 A.3d 645, 648 (R.I.2011); Gorman v. Gorman, 883 A.2d 732, 738 n. 8 (R.I.2005). As such, that initial determination “is freely reviewable by this Court.” Gorman, 883 A.2d at 738 n. 8.7
What differentiates this case from so many other cases involving a map which can readily be classified as unambiguous is the undisputed fact that the map at issue in this case bears the following explicit and intriguing statement: “Note — All lot numbers indicate lots 25' x 100' unless otherwise designated.” (Emphasis added.) I am convinced that the map is ambiguous and that, therefore, it was an inappropriate subject for disposition by summary judgment.
I of course have no idea what an expert witness (or other witness) might make of the above-quoted “Note” that appears on the map. Indeed, at a trial on the merits, there might well be a battle of experts. My attitude is: so be it! It is my view that a trial on the merits constitutes the way in which the meaning of this rather unusual map (with its enigmatic Note and peculiar hash marks) should be arrived at. To my mind, the meaning of the map at issue is fog-enshrouded, and that fog should be dissipated by a trial on the merits and not by the drastic remedy of summary judgment. See Robidoux v. Pelletier, 120 R.I. 425, 434, 391 A.2d 1150, 1155 (1978) (“Very often lines and figures *347drawn on a land-development plat may be unclear as to their intended purpose. When such a case arises, it is the task of the factfinder to interpret the meaning of the disputed item by careful scrutiny of all lines, figures, and letters that appear on the map as well as whatever pertinent evidence may be adduced by the litigants.”) (emphasis added). What was said of the plat at issue in Farrell v. Meadowbrook Corp., 111 R.I. 747, 749, 306 A.2d 806, 807 (1973), can be applied to the problem that the map at issue in this case poses: “Recorded plats are writings that come within the interdictions of the parol evidence rule. However, the rule presupposes a clearly written unambiguous document.” (Citation omitted.)
It certainly is not my place to indicate how a case like this should have been litigated if it had gone to trial. Nor is it my place to speculate as to which party would have had the better chance of prevailing if there had been a trial. See Estate of Giuliano, 949 A.2d at 394 n. 9. I only know that my understanding of Rule 56 has convinced me that summary judgment should not have been granted and that there should have been an actual trial. Having said that, I simply record my very respectful dissent.

. In my judgment, a map such as the one at issue in this case is no different from any other declarative document for purposes of the ambiguity vel non analysis.

. Of course, if a map is determined to be ambiguous, the eventual resolution of that ambiguity by the finder of fact would be reviewed on appeal under the clearly erroneous standard. Farrell v. Meadowbrook Corp., 111 R.I. 747, 750, 306 A.2d 806, 808 (1973); see also Dubis v. East Greenwich Fire District, 754 A.2d 98, 100 (R.I.2000).