Court Opinion

ID: 9961725
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-19 16:12:48.399667+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:44.122196
License: Public Domain

J-S05014-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  KARA L. HOLLABAUGH                           :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 868 WDA 2023

          Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 11, 2023
               In the Court of Common Pleas of Crawford County
             Criminal Division at No(s): CP-20-CR-0000775-2022

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., KING, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.E.:                           FILED: April 19, 2024

       Kara Leigh Hollabaugh appeals from her judgment of sentence for, inter

alia, Driving Under the Influence (“DUI”). She argues the Crawford County

Court of Common Pleas improperly considered her acceptance of an

Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition (“ARD”) for a previous DUI conviction

as a prior offense for purposes of sentencing her on the current DUI. We

affirm.

       As this case involves an issue that is not dependent on the specific facts

of the case, we offer only a brief recitation of those facts. Hollabaugh was

charged with, among other things, three counts of DUI.1 At her stipulated non-

____________________________________________

1 Specifically, Hollabaugh was charged with DUI pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S.A. §

3802(d)(2); DUI pursuant to 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 3802(d)(1)(ii); and DUI pursuant
to 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 3802(d)(1)(iii).
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jury trial, Hollabaugh stipulated that if called to testify at trial, Officer Daniel

Palka of the Meadville City Police would report that he pulled Hollabaugh over

for a traffic stop on May 7, 2022. During the stop, Hollabaugh admitted she

had smoked methamphetamine and had methamphetamine on her person.

She   failed   a   sobriety   test,   and   later   tested   positive   for   having

methamphetamine in her blood. Important to this appeal, Hollabaugh also

stipulated she had one prior DUI, which had been disposed of through ARD.

See Stipulation of Facts, 5/19/2023, at 5 (unpaginated).

      The trial court found Hollabaugh guilty of, inter alia, the three counts of

DUI. In its verdict slip, the court specifically stated that for purposes of

sentencing, Hollabaugh would be treated as a repeat offender because

Hollabaugh’s prior ARD constituted a prior offense.

      The court held a sentencing hearing on July 11, 2023. The court did, in

fact, classify Hollabaugh’s conviction for DUI under 75 Pa. C.S.A. §

3802(d)(1)(ii) as a second offense because of her previous ARD and

“sentenced her on the M1 DUI to probation with restrictive conditions [of 60

months] including incarceration, house arrest and probation.” Trial Court

Opinion, 8/17/2023, at 1. The court did not impose any additional sentence

for the other two DUI convictions.

      Hollabaugh filed a notice of appeal. She raises a single issue, namely

she contends it was unconstitutional for the sentencing court to consider her

prior ARD as a prior offense to enhance the sentence of her subsequent DUI

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offense. She argues, in essence, this violated Commonwealth v. Chichkin,

232 A.3d 959 (Pa. Super. 2020). This claim has no merit.

      “Section 3804 [of the Motor Vehicle Code] sets forth mandatory

minimum sentence terms for first, second, and subsequent DUI offenses.”

Chichkin, 232 A.3d at 963. Section 3806 of the Motor Vehicle Code, in turn,

defines “prior offenses” as follows:

      (a) General rule.—Except as set forth in subsection (b), the term
      “prior offense” as used in this chapter shall mean any conviction
      for which judgment of sentence has been imposed, adjudication
      of delinquency, juvenile consent decree, acceptance of
      Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition or other form of preliminary
      disposition before the sentencing on the present violation for any
      of the following:

            (1) an offense under section 3802 (relating to driving under
      influence of alcohol or controlled substance)[.]

75 Pa. C.S.A. § 3806(a)(1).

      As Hollabaugh highlights, Chichkin held that “the particular provision

of 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 3806(a), which defines a prior acceptance of ARD in a DUI

case as a ‘prior offense’ for DUI sentencing enhancement purposes … [is]

unconstitutional.” Chichkin, 232 A.3d at 971. However, this Court expressly

overruled Chichkin in a pair of decisions, i.e., Commonwealth v. Moroz,

284 A.3d 227 (Pa. Super. 2022) (en banc) and Commonwealth v. Richards,

284 A.3d 214 (Pa. Super. 2022) (en banc). Richards stated in no uncertain

terms:

      We now hold that the portion of Section 3806(a), which equates
      prior acceptance of ARD to a prior conviction for purposes of

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       imposing a Section 3804 mandatory minimum sentence, passes
       constitutional muster.

Richards, 284 A.3d at 220.

       Hollabaugh     essentially    concedes    the   sentencing   court   properly

considered her ARD as a prior offense for sentencing purposes under this

Court’s decision in Richards. However, she points out that the Pennsylvania

Supreme Court granted Richards’ petition for allowance of appeal in that case,

see Commonwealth v. Richards, 294 A.3d 300 (Pa. March 15, 2023), and

she “believ[es] the Supreme Court will find that the definition of prior [offense]

is unconstitutional where it calls the acceptance of ARD as a prior [offense]

for sentence enhancement.” Appellant’s Brief at 3. Of course, Hollabaugh’s

speculation as to how the Supreme Court will rule in the future does not

equate to binding precedent that must be followed by this Court. The Supreme

Court, although granting the appeal in Richards, has not yet issued its

decision in the matter.2 Therefore, this Court’s decision in Richards remains

the precedent we must follow, and, under that controlling precedent, the

____________________________________________

2 As the trial court pointed out in its opinion, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court

considered whether a prior ARD should constitute a prior offense for
sentencing purposes in Commonwealth v. Verbeck, 290 A.3d 260 (Pa.
2023). However, Verbeck resulted in a non-precedential 3-3 decision.
Therefore, as the trial court explained, “binding authority rests with the
decisions in Richards, Moroz and [Commonwealth v. Hummel, 295 A.3d
719 (Pa. Super. 2023)(holding the defendant’s prior ARD was a prior offense
for sentencing purposes under Richards and Moroz). See Commonwealth
v. Mosley, 114 A.3d 1072, 1082 n.11 (Pa. Super. 2015) [(stating that
“[w]hen a judgment of sentence is affirmed by an equally divided court… no
precedent is established)].” Trial Court Opinion, 8/17/2023, at 2 n.1.

                                           -4-
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sentencing court did not err by considering Hollabaugh’s ARD as a prior

offense for sentencing purposes on her current DUI conviction.

     Judgment of sentence affirmed.

DATE: 04/19/2024

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