Court Opinion

ID: 9384183
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-01 00:00:50.093748+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:51.228842
License: Public Domain

Case: 20-60974         Document: 00516697075              Page: 1       Date Filed: 03/31/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit
                                                                                     United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                              Fifth Circuit
                                         No. 20-60974
                                                                                            FILED
                                                                                       March 31, 2023

   Heystin Jesus Lopez-Aguilar,                                                        Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                            Clerk
                                                                                     Petitioner,

                                              versus

   Merrick Garland, U.S. Attorney General,

                                                                                 Respondent.

                          Petition for Review of an Order of the
                              Board of Immigration Appeals
                                Agency No. A206 421 355

   Before Richman, Chief Judge, and Elrod and Oldham, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
         Heystin Jesus Lopez-Aguilar petitions for review of a decision of the
   Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upholding an immigration judge’s (IJ)
   denial of his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection
   under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). He argues that the BIA erred
   by determining that he had not demonstrated the required nexus between his
   persecution and his membership in a particular social group (PSG) without

         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 20-60974      Document: 00516697075          Page: 2   Date Filed: 03/31/2023

                                    No. 20-60974

   first deciding whether his proposed PSG was cognizable; that the BIA applied
   the wrong legal standard to his claim for withholding of removal; and that the
   BIA applied the wrong legal standard to his CAT claim and erred in
   determining he was ineligible for CAT protection. Because Lopez-Aguilar’s
   first argument remains unexhausted, we dismiss his petition as to that claim
   for lack of jurisdiction. The BIA applied the correct legal standards to Lopez-
   Aguilar’s withholding of removal and CAT claims, and substantial evidence
   supports the BIA’s factual conclusions regarding his ineligibility for CAT
   protection. We therefore deny Lopez-Aguilar’s petition as to those claims.
                                         I
          Lopez-Aguilar, a citizen and native of Honduras, entered the United
   States unlawfully in 2014. After being apprehended by U.S. Border Patrol
   agents, Lopez-Aguilar—then fifteen years old—was served with a notice to
   appear, charging that he was removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) as
   being an “alien present in the United States without being admitted or
   paroled . . . .” Lopez-Aguilar conceded the charge but applied for asylum
   and withholding of removal based upon persecution on account of his
   membership in a PSG. He also sought protection under the CAT.
          In 2018, an IJ held a hearing regarding Lopez-Aguilar’s three claims
   for relief. Lopez-Aguilar, who was then nineteen, testified that his parents
   had departed Honduras for the United States when he was three, leaving him
   and his brother in the care of a family friend named Oscar. According to
   Lopez-Aguilar, Oscar, a gang member, systematically abused him for thirteen
   years until Lopez-Aguilar fled to the United States. Lopez-Aguilar also
   claimed that other gang members—friends of Oscar’s—attempted to recruit
   him into the gang and assaulted him when he refused. Lopez-Aguilar stated

                                         2
Case: 20-60974      Document: 00516697075           Page: 3    Date Filed: 03/31/2023

                                     No. 20-60974

   that he feared he would suffer further abuse or death at the hands of Oscar
   and the other gang members if returned to Honduras.
          In support of his applications, Lopez-Aguilar submitted—among
   other items—affidavits from witnesses to Oscar’s abuse and an expert
   declaration describing the vulnerability of Honduran children and the
   Honduran government’s inability to protect them.
          Despite finding Lopez-Aguilar credible, the IJ denied his applications
   for relief and ordered him removed to Honduras. With respect to Lopez-
   Aguilar’s claims for asylum and withholding of removal, the IJ concluded that
   Lopez-Aguilar was a “victim of a crime” and had therefore not made the
   required showing that he was “subjected to persecution based on a protected
   ground.” The IJ also denied relief under the CAT because the abuse Lopez-
   Aguilar suffered did not “rise[] to the level of torture” and was not “carried
   out” or “condone[d]” by a government official.
          Lopez-Aguilar appealed to the BIA, arguing only that his proposed
   PSG was cognizable. The BIA dismissed Lopez-Aguilar’s appeal. In a brief
   opinion, it affirmed the IJ’s denial of Lopez-Aguilar’s asylum claim because
   he feared “harm due to no other apparent reason than criminal gang activity”
   and therefore “ha[d] not shown that he [would] be harmed on account of his
   membership in a particular social group.” For the same reason, the BIA
   determined that Lopez-Aguilar “also did not satisfy the higher burden of
   proof for withholding of removal.” Finally, the BIA agreed with the IJ that
   Lopez-Aguilar did not qualify for CAT protection because he “did not show
   that he more likely than not . . . will face torture by or with the consent or
   acquiescence (including willful blindness) of any public official . . . .” Lopez-
   Aguilar subsequently petitioned this court for review.
          Lopez-Aguilar makes three primary claims to this court. First,
   Lopez-Aguilar alleges the BIA erred by determining he had not demonstrated

                                          3
Case: 20-60974          Document: 00516697075              Page: 4     Date Filed: 03/31/2023

                                            No. 20-60974

   the required nexus between his persecution and membership in a PSG
   without first deciding whether his proposed PSG was cognizable. Second, he
   claims the BIA applied the wrong legal standard to his claim for withholding
   of removal. Finally, he challenges the legal standard used to assess his CAT
   claim, as well as the substantive determination that he is ineligible for CAT
   protection.
                                                 II
           “[J]urisdiction is always first.”1 Before we can reach the merits of
   Lopez-Aguilar’s claims, we must determine whether we have jurisdiction to
   address them.2 “We examine our jurisdiction on our own motion when
   necessary.”3
           The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) confers on the courts of
   appeals exclusive jurisdiction to review final orders of removal.4 It does not,
   however, give us carte blanche. We may only exercise jurisdiction when an
   alien has “exhausted all administrative remedies available . . . as of
   right . . . .”5 “A remedy is available as of right if (1) the petitioner could have
   argued the claim before the BIA, and (2) the BIA has adequate mechanisms
   to address and remedy such a claim.”6 The exhaustion requirement reduces
   “the risk that we must prolong a proceeding by reversing to correct errors

           1
            Arulnanthy v. Garland, 17 F.4th 586, 592 (5th Cir. 2021) (alteration in original)
   (quoting United States v. Shkambi, 993 F.3d 388, 389 (5th Cir. 2021)).
           2
               Mejia v. Whitaker, 913 F.3d 482, 487 (5th Cir. 2019).
           3
               Id.
           4
               8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5).
           5
            8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1); Omari v. Holder, 562 F.3d 314, 318 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting
   8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)).
           6
               Omari, 562 F.3d at 318-19.

                                                  4
Case: 20-60974           Document: 00516697075              Page: 5       Date Filed: 03/31/2023

                                            No. 20-60974

   that the [BIA] had no chance to address”7 and permits the BIA to apply its
   “expertise in immigration matters . . . in the first instance.”8 A “[f]ailure to
   exhaust an issue creates a jurisdictional bar as to that issue.”9
          An alien may exhaust a claim by raising it “in the first instance before
   the BIA . . . on direct appeal . . . in a motion to reopen,”10 or “on a motion to
   reconsider.”11 Whether an alien must file a motion for reconsideration before
   petitioning the court depends on the “posture” of the relevant claim “before
   the BIA.”12 When a claim is “raised or lost at the BIA,” it is exhausted, and
   no motion for reconsideration is required.13                      But “[a] motion for
   reconsideration is . . . confined to the substance of the BIA’s original
   decision.”14 Therefore, when a new issue arises solely from “the BIA’s act
   of decisionmaking” such that “neither party could have possibly raised [it]
   prior to the BIA’s decision,” the alien “must first bring it to the BIA’s
   attention through a motion for reconsideration.”15
          As we have noted, however, the purpose of the exhaustion
   requirement is to give the BIA the first “chance to address” any errors that
   may arise during immigration proceedings.16 Because of this, when the BIA

          7
              Martinez-Guevara v. Garland, 27 F.4th 353, 359 (5th Cir. 2022).
          8
               Omari, 562 F.3d at 322.
          9
               Roy v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 132, 137 (5th Cir. 2004) (per curiam).
          10
               Id. (quoting Wang v. Ashcroft, 260 F.3d 448, 453 (5th Cir. 2001)).
          11
               Martinez-Guevara, 27 F.4th at 360.
          12
               Lopez-Dubon v. Holder, 609 F.3d 642, 644 (5th Cir. 2010).
          13
               Martinez-Guevara, 27 F.4th at 360.
          14
               Omari v. Holder, 562 F.3d 314, 319 (5th Cir. 2009).
          15
               Id. at 320-21.
          16
               See Martinez-Guevara, 27 F.4th at 359.

                                                  5
Case: 20-60974           Document: 00516697075             Page: 6      Date Filed: 03/31/2023

                                           No. 20-60974

   itself “chooses to address an issue on the merits,” it is exhausted “despite
   potential defects in its posture . . . .”17 We consider each of Lopez-Aguilar’s
   claims against these standards.
                                                 A
           Lopez-Aguilar first argues that the BIA erred in dismissing his claim
   for asylum on the grounds that no nexus exists between his persecution and
   membership in a PSG without first deciding whether Lopez-Aguilar is a
   member of a cognizable PSG.
           Asylum is a discretionary grant of relief available to “refugees who
   meet certain requirements.”18 The INA defines a refugee as “an alien who
   is unable or unwilling to return to his home country ‘because of persecution
   or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of’” a statutorily protected
   ground, including “membership in a particular social group . . . .”19 To
   prevail on an asylum claim, an alien must therefore show both that the PSG
   in which he claims membership is “cognizable” within the meaning of the
   INA and that there is a nexus between his persecution and membership in
   that group.20 The “nexus requirement” is satisfied when membership in a
   PSG is “one central reason” for the alien’s persecution.21 A PSG is
   cognizable when it is “(1) composed of members who share a common
   immutable characteristic, (2) defined with particularity, and (3) socially

           17
                Lopez-Dubon, 609 F.3d at 644.
           18
                Vazquez-Guerra v. Garland, 7 F.4th 265, 268-69 (5th Cir. 2021).
           19
              I.N.S. v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992) (quoting 8 U.S.C.
   § 1101(a)(42)(A)).
           20
                See Vazquez-Guerra, 7 F.4th at 269.
           21
             Id. (quoting Sealed Petitioner v. Sealed Respondent, 829 F.3d 379, 383 (5th Cir.
   2016)); 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i).

                                                 6
Case: 20-60974           Document: 00516697075              Page: 7       Date Filed: 03/31/2023

                                           No. 20-60974

   distinct within the society in question.”22 The group must also “exist
   independently of the fact of persecution.”23
          Lopez-Aguilar contends that the agency erred in its application of two
   cases, Matter of A-B-24 and Orellana-Monson v. Holder,25 in determining that
   he had not demonstrated he would be harmed “on account of his
   membership in a particular social group.” The thrust of his argument,
   however, is that the BIA and the IJ erred by making this determination
   without first deciding whether his proposed PSG was cognizable. The
   Government, for its part, insists that the agency can dispose of an asylum
   claim on nexus grounds alone and without consideration of whether a
   proposed PSG is cognizable.
          Either way, Lopez-Aguilar has not exhausted this claim. He filed but
   a single document with the BIA—his notice of appeal—and that document
   contained but a single claim: “Previously the BIA has affirmed the same PSG
   used in the instant case to be cognizable . . . ‘minors without resources who
   have been abused by a custodial parent/guardian.’ Here, the Respondent is
   also from Honduras and the facts are substantially similar.” He submitted
   no briefing to the BIA,26 and filed no motion to reopen. He therefore failed
   to present the issue to the BIA on direct appeal.
          This is also not a “new issue” arising only from the “BIA’s act of
   decisionmaking,” and which “neither party could have possibly raised prior

          22
               Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 237 (BIA 2014).
          23
               Id. at 236 n.11.
          24
               27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018).
          25
               685 F.3d 511 (5th Cir. 2012).
          26
               See, e.g., Omari v. Holder, 562 F.3d 314, 319 (5th Cir. 2009).

                                                  7
Case: 20-60974            Document: 00516697075         Page: 8      Date Filed: 03/31/2023

                                         No. 20-60974

   to the BIA’s decision.”27 The IJ demonstrated that he denied asylum
   without considering Lopez-Aguilar’s PSG when he declared in his oral
   opinion, “I don’t remember the exact formulation . . . as to the composition
   of this group . . . [but] he was not subjected to persecution based on a
   protected ground.” Given the clear basis of the IJ’s judgment, Lopez-Aguilar
   could easily have raised to the BIA the claim that the agency may not make a
   nexus determination without first assessing the propriety of a proposed PSG.
   Even if it were a “new issue” before the BIA, however, Lopez-Aguilar would
   have been required to file a motion for reconsideration, which he failed to
   do.28
           The BIA also did not consider this issue of its own accord. Its decision
   merely reiterated the IJ’s, stating that “regardless of whether the respondent
   has shown that that he belongs to a cognizable particular social group, he has
   not established eligibility for asylum.”
           Because Lopez-Aguilar did not avail himself of the “full and fair
   opportunity to present” this claim to the BIA,29 the claim remains
   unexhausted, and we lack jurisdiction to consider it. To the extent that
   Lopez-Aguilar also claims that the BIA or IJ “ignor[ed]” or
   “mischaracterized the [r]ecord,” he did not raise this issue in any form
   before the BIA, and it too remains unexhausted.30

           27
                Id. at 320-21.
           28
                See id. at 320.
           29
                See id. at 323.
           30
              See id., 562 F.3d at 320-21; cf. Martinez-Guevara v. Garland, 27 F.4th 353, 361
   (5th Cir. 2022) (claim that the BIA ignored evidence was exhausted because petitioner
   asked BIA to correct IJ’s identical error).

                                               8
Case: 20-60974           Document: 00516697075             Page: 9      Date Filed: 03/31/2023

                                           No. 20-60974

                                                 B
           Lopez-Aguilar next claims that the BIA and the IJ erred by applying
   an incorrect legal standard to his claim for withholding of removal under 8
   U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3), which, like asylum, requires a nexus between an alien’s
   persecution and a statutorily protected ground, such as membership in a
   PSG.31 Lopez-Aguilar contends that the standard for establishing a nexus for
   withholding of removal is distinct from and more permissive than the
   corresponding standard in asylum claims. Lopez-Aguilar argues, therefore,
   that the BIA and the IJ improperly denied his withholding claim by
   impermissibly conflating these standards when they determined, after
   denying his asylum claim on nexus grounds, that he necessarily failed to
   qualify for withholding of removal.
           At first glance, “one might think we lack jurisdiction.”32 Lopez-
   Aguilar could have presented this claim on direct appeal to the BIA based on
   the IJ’s decision, yet he did not, and he also filed no motion for
   reconsideration. Still, we think otherwise.
           Ordinarily, a claim of legal error such as this would require review by
   the BIA on a motion for reconsideration before we could assert jurisdiction.33
   As we have said, however, the BIA’s choice to “address an issue on the

           31
                Vazquez-Guerra v. Garland, 7 F.4th 265, 270-71 (5th Cir. 2021).
           32
                Martinez-Guevara, 27 F.4th at 360.
           33
              See, e.g., Rodriguez Hernandez v. Barr, 770 F. App’x 669, 670 (5th Cir. 2019)
   (unpublished) (per curiam) (quoting Omari, 562 F.3d at 320-21) (explaining that a “claim
   that the BIA relied on an erroneous legal standard is an issue ‘stemming from BIA’s act of
   decisionmaking’” and therefore must be raised “in a motion to reopen or for
   reconsideration to satisfy the exhaustion requirement.”); see also Omari 562 F.3d at 320
   (explaining that a motion for reconsideration may allege errors of “fact or law.”).

                                                  9
Case: 20-60974          Document: 00516697075             Page: 10       Date Filed: 03/31/2023

                                           No. 20-60974

   merits despite potential defects in its posture” exhausts that issue.34 In his
   decision, the IJ applied the same nexus standard to both Lopez-Aguilar’s
   asylum and withholding of removal claims, noting that because “Respondent
   failed to meet the burden of proof for establishing an asylum claim, he has
   necessarily also failed to meet the higher burden of proof required for
   withholding of removal . . . .”
           The BIA adopted the IJ’s determination and reasoning and concluded
   that because Lopez-Aguilar “has not established eligibility for asylum[,] [i]t
   follows that the respondent also did not satisfy the higher burden of proof for
   withholding of removal.” Though it did not say explicitly that the nexus
   standards for withholding of removal and asylum are the same, we are
   permitted to make reasonable inferences as to the bases for the BIA’s
   judgments.35         The BIA had the “opportunity to apply its specialized
   knowledge” to the IJ’s use of the same nexus standard for both claims.36 It
   similarly applied the same standard to both in affirming the IJ’s decision.
           Though Lopez-Aguilar never affirmatively brought his claim
   regarding the nexus standard for withholding of removal before the BIA, the
   BIA “addressed the issue on the merits . . . .”37 The issue is therefore
   exhausted, and we have jurisdiction to entertain it.
                                                 C
           Finally, Lopez-Aguilar avers that the BIA erred in denying him CAT
   protection because it applied an incorrect legal standard to his claim.

           34
                Lopez-Dubon v. Holder, 609 F.3d 642, 644 (5th Cir. 2010).
           35
                See Manzano-Garcia v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 462, 468 (5th Cir. 2005) (per curiam).
           36
              Lopez-Dubon, 609 F.3d at 644 (quoting Sidabutar v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 1116, 1121
   (10th Cir. 2007)).
           37
                Id.

                                                 10
Case: 20-60974         Document: 00516697075            Page: 11   Date Filed: 03/31/2023

                                         No. 20-60974

   Specifically, he suggests that the BIA required him to demonstrate that
   government officials are “willfully accepting” of torture, but that he need
   only make the lesser showing that government officials are aware or willfully
   blind to torture and are either unable or unwilling to intervene. He also
   challenges the BIA’s determination that he is ineligible for CAT protection.
          As above, an allegation of legal error such as this would ordinarily
   require review by BIA on a motion for reconsideration before we could
   exercise jurisdiction over it.38 In this case, however, BIA expressly recited
   the legal standard against which it assessed Lopez-Aguilar’s CAT claim. The
   BIA’s decision noted that “the respondent did not show that he more likely
   than not . . . will face torture by or with the consent or acquiescence
   (including willful blindness) of any public official . . . .”
          The BIA having considered and addressed the proper legal standard
   for Lopez-Aguilar’s CAT claim, as well as his eligibility for CAT protection,
   we conclude that these issues are exhausted and that we have jurisdiction to
   consider them.39

          38
               Omari, 562 F.3d at 320.
          39
               Lopez-Dubon, 609 F.3d at 644.

                                               11
Case: 20-60974         Document: 00516697075               Page: 12       Date Filed: 03/31/2023

                                            No. 20-60974

                                                 III
          We now turn to the merits of Lopez-Aguilar’s claims regarding the
   nexus standard in withholding of removal, the legal standard for CAT
   protection, and his eligibility for withholding under the CAT.
                                                  A
          Lopez-Aguilar contends that BIA and the IJ erred by applying an
   improper legal standard for the nexus requirement to his claim for
   withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3).
          Though we “typically only review the final decision of the BIA,”40
   “[w]hen, as in the present case, the BIA’s decision is affected by the IJ’s
   ruling . . . we also review the IJ’s decision.”41               “We review the BIA’s
   conclusions of law de novo,” including claims that the BIA applied an
   incorrect legal standard.42
          “[W]ithholding of removal is a mandatory form of relief for aliens”
   that meet certain statutory requirements.43 To qualify for withholding under
   8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3), aliens must “demonstrate a clear probability that their
   life or freedom would be threatened because of a protected ground, such as
   membership in a particular social group, if they were returned to the country
   of removal.”44 Accordingly—and as with asylum claims—the alien must
   establish a nexus between his persecution and his membership in a PSG.45

          40
               Parada-Orellana v. Garland, 21 F.4th 887, 893 (5th Cir. 2022).
          41
               Sealed Petitioner v. Sealed Respondent, 829 F.3d 379, 383 (5th Cir. 2016).
          42
               See Ontunez-Tursios v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 341, 348 (5th Cir. 2002).
          43
               Vazquez-Guerra v. Garland, 7 F.4th 265, 270 (5th Cir. 2021).
          44
               Id.; 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A).
          45
               See Vazquez-Guerra, 7 F.4th at 270-71.

                                                  12
Case: 20-60974          Document: 00516697075                Page: 13        Date Filed: 03/31/2023

                                            No. 20-60974

           Lopez-Aguilar urges that the statutes governing asylum and
   withholding of removal are “unambiguously different” in that the legal
   standard for establishing a nexus in withholding of removal claims—unlike in
   asylum claims—does not require a showing that a statutorily protected
   ground is “one central reason” for an alien’s persecution.46 On this basis, he
   concludes that the nexus requirement in withholding of removal claims is
   “less stringent” than that in asylum claims. Because the standards are
   different, he suggests, the BIA and IJ should have analyzed each claim
   independently and provided further explanation regarding its nexus
   determination.
           On its face, Lopez-Aguilar’s statement regarding the relevant statutes
   is correct. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i), which sets forth the standard for
   demonstrating a nexus in asylum claims, explicitly declares that a statutorily
   protected ground must be “one central reason” for an alien’s persecution.47
   In contrast, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(C), elaborating on the burden of proof for
   withholding of removal, describes how a trier of fact might determine that
   the alien “would be threatened for a reason” enumerated elsewhere in the
   statute, including membership in a PSG.48                       Relying on out-of-circuit
   precedent, Lopez-Aguilar interprets these differences to mean that
   withholding of removal requires a “less demanding standard” for showing a
   nexus—“a reason”—than does asylum—“one central reason.”49 While

           46
                See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (For asylum, an “applicant must establish
   that . . . membership in a particular social group . . . was or will be at least one central reason
   for persecuting the applicant.”).
           47
                8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (emphasis added).
           48
                8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(C) (emphasis added); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A).
           49
             Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351, 360 (9th Cir. 2017); see also 8 U.S.C.
   § 1231(b)(3)(C); 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (emphasis added).

                                                   13
Case: 20-60974          Document: 00516697075                Page: 14    Date Filed: 03/31/2023

                                              No. 20-60974

   Lopez-Aguilar may be correct that the courts of appeals are divided on this
   question,50 the law in this circuit is unambiguous and squarely forecloses his
   argument.
          Indeed, we recently denied a petition for review on nearly identical
   grounds to those on which the BIA dismissed Lopez-Aguilar’s withholding
   of removal claim.           In Vazquez-Guerra v. Garland,51 we rejected the
   petitioner’s argument that “withholding of removal involves a ‘less
   demanding’ and ‘more relaxed’ standard than asylum for meeting the nexus
   requirement . . . .”52 We have previously noted that the “key difference in
   the standards for asylum and withholding of removal” is not the nexus
   requirement, but the burden of proof for demonstrating future persecution.53
   While asylum requires only a “well-founded fear” of persecution,
   withholding of removal requires the heightened showing of a “clear
   probability.”54 The nexus requirement, however, is the same for both—a
   statutorily protected ground must be “one central reason” for the alien’s

          50
             Compare Barajas-Romero, 846 F.3d at 360 (holding that “‘a reason’ is a less
   demanding standard than ‘one central reason.’”), and Guzman-Vazquez v. Barr, 959 F.3d
   253, 272 (6th Cir. 2020) (same), with Gonzalez-Posadas v. Att'y Gen. U.S., 781 F.3d 677,
   684-85 (3d Cir. 2015) (requiring a showing that membership in a PSG is “one central
   reason” for an alien’s persecution for the purposes of withholding of removal).
          51
               7 F.4th 265 (5th Cir. 2021).
          52
               Id. at 271.
          53
               Revencu v. Sessions, 895 F.3d 396, 402 (5th Cir. 2018).
          54
               Id.

                                                   14
Case: 20-60974          Document: 00516697075             Page: 15          Date Filed: 03/31/2023

                                           No. 20-60974

   persecution.55 Therefore, “[a]n applicant who fails to establish eligibility for
   asylum also fails to establish eligibility for withholding of removal.”56
           Lopez-Aguilar relies in part on the Supreme Court’s decision in I.N.S.
   v. Cardoza-Fonseca57 to support his contention that asylum and withholding
   of removal claims involve distinct standards for establishing a nexus to
   persecution, but this reliance is misplaced. In Cardoza-Fonseca, the Court
   concluded, as we have noted, that withholding of removal and asylum involve
   different burdens of proof for future persecution.58 The case says nothing,
   however, about the standard for establishing a nexus between persecution
   and a statutorily protected ground.
           Because our circuit’s case law clearly requires that the same “one
   central reason” standard for establishing a nexus between persecution and
   membership in a PSG be applied to both asylum and withholding of removal
   claims,59 we deny Lopez-Aguilar’s petition with respect to this argument.
           We express no opinion as to whether Lopez-Aguilar has in fact
   satisfied the nexus requirement for withholding of removal—or, for that
   matter, asylum. Though the Government argues that Lopez-Aguilar has
   forfeited a challenge to the agency’s nexus determination by failing to raise it
   in his opening brief to this court, we disagree; Lopez-Aguilar couches his

           55
             Id. (using the “one central reason” nexus test for a withholding of removal
   claim); Shaikh v. Holder, 588 F.3d 861, 864 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting 8
   U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i)) (same); see also Matter of C-T-L-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 341, 348 (BIA
   2010).
           56
                Vazquez-Guerra v. Garland, 7 F.4th 265, 271 (5th Cir. 2021).
           57
                480 U.S. 421 (1987).
           58
                I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 430, 449 (1987).
           59
             Vazquez-Guerra, 7 F.4th at 271 (quoting Quinteros-Hernandez v. Sessions, 740 F.
   App’x 57, 58 (5th Cir. 2018) (unpublished) (per curiam)).

                                                 15
Case: 20-60974          Document: 00516697075               Page: 16       Date Filed: 03/31/2023

                                            No. 20-60974

   arguments regarding the agency’s substantive nexus holding within his
   claims involving the failure to assess his proposed PSG and the legal standard
   for withholding of removal.
           Nevertheless, Lopez-Aguilar has forfeited the separate issue of
   whether his proposed PSG is cognizable.60 Deciding the nexus issue directly
   would therefore implicitly require us to either consider a forfeited argument
   or render an opinion on whether the agency may make a nexus determination
   without first assessing whether a proposed PSG is cognizable—a question we
   lack jurisdiction to entertain.
                                                   B
           Lopez-Aguilar next argues that the BIA applied an incorrect legal
   standard to his CAT claim. He also challenges the BIA’s factual conclusion
   that he is ineligible for CAT protection.
            Again, “[w]e review the BIA’s conclusions of law de novo” including
   claims that the BIA applied an incorrect legal standard.61 “We review . . . the
   IJ and the BIA[’s] . . . factual findings for substantial evidence.”62 Eligibility
   for CAT protection is one such factual finding.63 Under this deferential
   standard, we reverse only when “the evidence is so compelling that no
   reasonable fact finder could fail to find the petitioner statutorily eligible for
   relief.”64 Indeed, even if “a reasonable factfinder could have found [the facts]

           60
              See, e.g., Rollins v. Home Depot USA, 8 F.4th 393, 397 (5th Cir. 2021) (“A party
   forfeits an argument by . . . failing to adequately brief [it] on appeal.”); see also Fed. R.
   App. P. 28(a)(8)(A).
           61
                See Ontunez-Tursios v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 341, 348 (5th Cir. 2002).
           62
                Sealed Petitioner v. Sealed Respondent, 829 F.3d 379, 383 (5th Cir. 2016).
           63
                Zhang v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 339, 344 (5th Cir. 2005).
           64
             Sharma v. Holder, 729 F.3d 407, 411 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Arif v. Mukasey, 509
   F.3d 677, 679 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam)); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (“[A]dministrative

                                                  16
Case: 20-60974          Document: 00516697075               Page: 17       Date Filed: 03/31/2023

                                            No. 20-60974

   sufficient” to reach a result contrary to the agency’s, it does not follow that
   “a factfinder would be compelled to do so.”65
           “[R]elief under the Convention Against Torture requires a two part
   analysis—first, is it more likely than not that the alien will be tortured upon
   return to his homeland; and second, is there sufficient state action involved
   in that torture.”66 To satisfy the state action requirement, torture must be
   “inflicted by, or at the instigation of, or with the consent or acquiescence of,
   a public official . . . .”67          “Acquiescence . . . requires that the public
   official . . . have awareness of such activity and . . . breach his or her legal
   responsibility to intervene . . . .”68 “[A]wareness requires . . . either actual
   knowledge or willful blindness.”69 “Willful blindness means . . . aware[ness]
   of a high probability of . . . torture and deliberately avoid[ing] learning the
   truth . . . .”70 Finally, the regulations note that, “No person will be deemed
   to have breached a legal responsibility to intervene if such person is unable to
   intervene . . . .”71

   findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to
   conclude to the contrary . . . .”).
           65
                Mikhael v. I.N.S., 115 F.3d 299, 304 (5th Cir. 1997) (emphasis in original).
           66
                Tamara-Gomez v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 343, 350-51 (5th Cir. 2006) (footnote
   omitted).
           67
                8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1).
           68
                8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(7).
           69
               Id.; see also Hakim v. Holder, 628 F.3d 151, 155 (5th Cir. 2010) (“[A]cquiescence
   is satisfied by a government’s willful blindness of tortuous activity.” (internal quotation
   marks omitted)).
           70
                8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(7).
           71
                Id.

                                                  17
Case: 20-60974     Document: 00516697075            Page: 18    Date Filed: 03/31/2023

                                     No. 20-60974

          Before the IJ, Lopez-Aguilar testified that Oscar had beaten him with
   “belts, cables, and branches” from the time he was three years old until he
   fled to the United States at age fifteen. He further alleged that friends of
   Oscar’s, who were members of a gang, assaulted him when he refused to join
   the gang, in one instance fracturing his shin. He stated that Oscar squandered
   money intended for him, sexually abused him, and once threatened him with
   a gun to prevent him from reporting the abuse to his mother. He stated that
   he feared that if returned to Honduras, he risked further abuse, and possibly
   death, at the hands of Oscar and the other gang members. Lopez-Aguilar
   acknowledged that he never reported Oscar’s abuse to the police.
          Considering this testimony, the IJ denied Lopez-Aguilar’s claim for
   protection under the CAT on two grounds: first that the abuse Lopez-Aguilar
   suffered did not meet the definition of torture, and second, that it was not
   “carried out” or “condone[d]” by the Honduran government. The BIA
   affirmed the IJ’s conclusion that it was not “more likely than not . . . that
   [Lopez-Aguilar] will face torture by or with the consent or acquiescence
   (including willful blindness) of any public official,” noting in particular that
   Lopez-Aguilar had not shown he was ever tortured by any government
   official or that “any public official in Honduras seeks to torture him . . . .”
          Lopez-Aguilar alleges that the BIA applied the wrong legal standard
   to his CAT claim by requiring him to show that the Honduran government
   was “willfully accepting” of torture as opposed to merely aware of or
   willfully blind to it and unable or unwilling to intervene. This necessarily
   implicates the factual finding that he is ineligible for CAT protection. In
   support of his argument, Lopez-Aguilar asserts that the type of abuse he
   suffered is systemic in Honduras and that the government is unable to
   address it.

                                          18
Case: 20-60974          Document: 00516697075              Page: 19        Date Filed: 03/31/2023

                                            No. 20-60974

           On its face, the BIA’s decision approximated the correct standard for
   protection under the CAT. It required that Lopez-Aguilar demonstrate a
   likelihood of torture “with the consent or acquiescence (including willful
   blindness)” of a Honduran public official and relied on controlling authority
   in doing so.72          While this articulation did not consider the “actual
   knowledge” of Honduran authorities,73 the record does not compel reversal
   under either theory.
           Our circuit’s precedent has consistently held that “potential
   instances of violence committed by non-governmental actors . . . together
   with speculation that the police might not prevent that violence, are generally
   insufficient to prove government acquiescence . . . .”74 This is particularly
   true when the government has taken “meaningful steps to address” the
   abuses alleged.75
           In light of these principles, our recent decision in Tabora Gutierrez v.
   Garland76 provides a yardstick for assessing Lopez-Aguilar’s CAT claim. In
   that case, as here, the petitioner fled to the United States from the violence

           72
                See, e.g., Ramirez-Mejia v. Lynch, 794 F.3d 485, 493-94 (5th Cir. 2015).
           73
                8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(7).
           74
                Garcia v. Holder, 756 F.3d 885, 892 (5th Cir. 2014).
           75
              Tabora Gutierrez v. Garland, 12 F.4th 496, 505 (5th Cir. 2021); see also Garcia,
   756 F.3d at 892 (speculation regarding police inability to control private violence
   insufficient for acquiescence when “there is evidence that the government prosecutes
   rogue or corrupt public officials.”); Chen v. Gonzales, 470 F.3d 1131, 1142-43 (5th Cir. 2006)
   (“[G]overnment efforts to combat corruption or abuse . . . [are] relevant to the willful
   blindness inquiry.” Given that the government prosecuted human smugglers and corrupt
   public officials, substantial evidence supported the conclusion that the government did not
   acquiesce in torture).
           76
                12 F.4th 496.

                                                  19
Case: 20-60974          Document: 00516697075             Page: 20   Date Filed: 03/31/2023

                                           No. 20-60974

   of Honduran gangs.77 For his persistent refusal to join or pay off the gang,
   the petitioner was brutally beaten, stabbed, shot multiple times, and
   repeatedly threatened with death.78 Though he reported at least three of
   these incidents to police, authorities informed him either that he lacked
   sufficient proof of his allegations, that they could not help him, or that they
   themselves feared documenting reports of gang violence.79 Ultimately, the
   very people from whom the petitioner sought refuge advised him to leave
   Honduras.80
          Despite the brutality inflicted upon the petitioner and the Honduran
   authorities’ utter failure to protect him, the IJ ordered him removed to
   Honduras.81 The BIA concluded that the police were not willfully blind to
   the petitioner’s treatment by the gangs, pointing in part to evidence of the
   government’s efforts—albeit largely unsuccessful—to combat gang violence
   and corruption.82 The petitioner’s mere “speculation that officers would not
   protect him in the future” was therefore insufficient to show acquiescence.83
   Acknowledging that the BIA and IJ might have concluded otherwise, we
   denied the petition for review because the record did not “compel them to
   do so.”84 This reasoning is fatal to Lopez-Aguilar’s claim.

          77
               Id. at 498-99.
          78
               Id. at 499.
          79
               Id.
          80
               Id.
          81
               Id. at 498.
          82
               Id. at 500, 504-505.
          83
               Id. at 500-01 (internal quotation marks omitted).
          84
               Id. at 505-06.

                                                20
Case: 20-60974          Document: 00516697075                 Page: 21      Date Filed: 03/31/2023

                                             No. 20-60974

           Unlike        the    petitioner      in        Tabora   Gutierrez,     Lopez-Aguilar
   acknowledged that he never attempted to report to the police any of the
   violence that Oscar perpetrated against him because “[he] was afraid.” His
   assertion that “the Honduran Government is not able to stop the type of
   harm” he suffered therefore amounts to the same “speculation” we have
   acknowledged as insufficient for government acquiescence in our prior
   cases.85      Indeed, we would be “hard-pressed to find [even] that the
   authorities were unable or unwilling to help . . . if [Lopez-Aguilar] never gave
   them the opportunity to do so.”86 Regardless, the government’s mere
   inability to intervene to prevent torture alone does not amount to
   acquiescence.87
           To be sure, the record is replete with evidence detailing the Honduran
   government’s failure to protect children such as Lopez-Aguilar from abuse
   at the hands of their families, gangs, and society generally. Nevertheless, the
   record also demonstrates “meaningful steps” on the part of Honduran
   authorities to ameliorate these conditions. The government has
   “purg[ed] . . . many policemen” involved in gang-related or other corrupt
   activities. The country has well-crafted laws for the protection of children
   and has continued to reform those laws. Finally, as of 2014, the government
   had proposed an entirely new infrastructure for promoting child welfare.
           Regardless of whether these efforts prove fruitful, as in Tabora
   Gutierrez, we are not compelled to conclude that the Honduran government
   was or will be “willfully blind” to the type of harm Lopez-Aguilar has

           85
                See, e.g., Garcia v. Holder, 756 F.3d 885, 892 (5th Cir. 2014).
           86
            Sanchez-Amador v. Garland, 30 F.4th 529, 534 (5th Cir. 2022) (considering an
   asylum application).
           87
           8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(7); Qorane v. Barr, 919 F.3d 904, 911 (5th Cir. 2019) (“[A]
   government’s inability to protect its citizens does not amount to acquiescence.”).

                                                     21
Case: 20-60974          Document: 00516697075              Page: 22      Date Filed: 03/31/2023

                                            No. 20-60974

   suffered or that it is even aware of his particular abuse, as he never reported
   it.88 We also pause to note the IJ’s observation in this case that—the
   circumstances of Honduran children notwithstanding— Lopez-Aguilar is no
   longer a child. As a result, it is not clear he would still be subject to the harms
   detailed in the record if he were returned to Honduras.
           The possibility that the government might not protect him in the
   future is therefore impermissibly speculative.89 On the evidence presented,
   “a reasonable factfinder” could have concluded that Lopez-Aguilar will not
   “face torture by or with the consent or acquiescence” of the Honduran
   government,90 and there is no indication that the BIA required Lopez-Aguilar
   to demonstrate that “government officials be willfully accepting
   of . . . torture.” Because Lopez-Aguilar’s claim fails on the “state action”
   prong of the test,91 we need not consider whether the harm he suffered
   amounts to torture within the meaning of the regulations.92
           Finally, Lopez-Aguilar alleges that the BIA’s judgment was “not
   reasoned” with respect to his CAT claim. Lopez-Aguilar provides no
   support or explanation for this contention beyond his challenge to the BIA’s
   ultimate conclusion. Even if we were to construe it as a claim that the BIA

           88
             12 F.4th at 501, 505; see also Ramirez-Mejia v. Lynch, 794 F.3d 485, 494 (5th Cir.
   2015) (explaining that “country reports . . . may weigh against [the] conclusion” that it was
   not more likely than not that the petitioner would be tortured upon return to Honduras,
   but “they do not compel the opposite conclusion.”).
           89
                Garcia, 756 F.3d at 892.
           90
                See Ramirez-Mejia, 794 F.3d at 494.
           91
                See Tamara-Gomez v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 343, 350-51 (5th Cir. 2006).
           92
                See C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1) (defining torture).

                                                  22
Case: 20-60974       Document: 00516697075               Page: 23    Date Filed: 03/31/2023

                                          No. 20-60974

   failed to consider relevant evidence, however, such claim was not raised
   before the BIA and therefore remains unexhausted.93
           Because we conclude that BIA applied the correct legal standard and
   that substantial evidence supports its judgment, we deny Lopez-Aguilar’s
   petition as to his CAT claims.
                                      *        *         *
           We DENY Lopez-Aguilar’s petition in part and DISMISS it in part
   for lack of jurisdiction.

           93
             See Omari v. Holder, 562 F.3d 314, 320-21 (5th Cir. 2009); cf. Martinez-Guevara
   v. Garland, 27 F.4th 353, 361 (5th Cir. 2022) (claim that the BIA ignored evidence was
   exhausted because petitioner asked BIA to correct IJ’s identical error).

                                              23