Court Opinion

ID: 9781842
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 17:33:30.7664+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:34:40.423494
License: Public Domain

KITE, Justice.
[T1] Appellant WJH admitted several allegations of juvenile delinquent behavior. The juvenile court ordered an indefinite term of probation with specific terms and conditions to be met including 360 hours of community service in lieu of financial restitution. WJH appealed contending the juvenile court did not have statutory authority to order an indefinite term of probation, the damages assessed were excessive and not supported by the evidence, and the community service was unreasonable, constituted indentured servitude, and violated the child labor laws. We affirm the Order Adjudicating Child Delinquent and Requiring Predispositional Study and reverse the Dispositional Order. We remand with direction to the juvenile court to (1) assign a sanction level as set out in Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 14-6-248 through 14-6-252 (LEXIS 1999) or (2) enter written reasons in the record to explain both its decision to deviate from the guidelines, through its omission of assignment of a sanetion level as set out in §§ 14-6-248 through 14-6-252, and its imposition of sanctions dif*1149ferent from any provided at any sanction level and (8) conduct such further proceedings as are appropriate and consistent with this decision.
ISSUES
[12] WJH framed the issues on appeal as follows:
ISSUE I
Were the adjudication and disposition orders legally correct?
ISSUE II
Were the terms of disposition reasonable under the cireumstances?
ISSUE III
Does the record support the extent of sanctions imposed?
Appellee State of Wyoming posited a single issue:
Did the juvenile court abuse its discretion in imposing the sanctions it did for Appellant's delinquent acts?
FACTS
[T3] A delinquency petition was filed in Juvenile Court for the Fourth Judicial District, which alleged WJH, a minor, engaged in four delinquent acts generally described as follows: (1) In September of 1999, WJH and another boy, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-201(a) and (b)(i) (LEXIS 1999),1 damaged a fire extinguisher owned by City Electric, discharging and depleting its contents which required the extinguisher to be serviced; (2) during the same time frame, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-8-802 (LEXIS 1999),2 WJH entered the Hubbard Mill building without authority and (8) in violation of § 6-3-201(a) and (b)) vandalized the building and contents by damaging pallets of bagged feed, pouring liquid around the interior of the building, and writing graffiti on the walls; and lastly (4) in May of 1999, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-201(a) and (b)(ii) (LEXIS 1999),3 WJH vandalized a bulldozer by pouring dirt or sand into the radiator, fuel tank, and crankease causing $3,575.90 in damages.4 At the initial hearing, WJH admitted (1) he had discharged the fire extinguisher, (2) had entered the Hubbard Mill building without permission and (8) opened feed sacks spilling seed on the floor of the building, and (4) had engaged in a dirt clod war with another boy in the vicinity of the bulldozer resulting in WJH putting a stick in the smokestack to denote he had "captured" the machine and this act might have caused dirt to go into the smokestack.5 Upon these admissions, the juvenile court indicated it was satisfied WJH had voluntarily admitted the delinquent acts.
[T4] The juvenile court appointed a public defender to represent WJH and a court appointed special advocate (CASA) guardian ad litem who was to file a CASA investigation report with the court. The court also ordered the Department of Family Services (DFS) to file a predisposition report. The CASA and DFS reports indicated WJH had no prior violations of the law, his parents were divorced, and he was in the primary care of his father. They further reflected WJH had moved a number of times over the past several years, he currently resided with his father at a local motel, and the animosity between his parents had resulted in a number of law enforcement interventions. Despite the difficult family dynamics, the re*1150ports also noted WJH was doing well in school both academically and behaviorally.
[T5] At the disposition hearing, WJH's public defender objected to the amount of alleged damages as reflected in the DFS report. Specific objection was made regarding the alleged damages to Thar's Feed 6 in the amount of $4,721.91. The prosecutor brought Exhibit A to the court's attention, a document purportedly itemizing $8,575.90 of damage to the bulldozer attributable to WJH's delinquent acts. WJH's attorney also objected to these damages as being excessive due to WJH's qualified admission and the $2,000 liability limitation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-203 (LEXIS 1999).7 Exhibit A was not admitted and, beyond the discussion reported in the disposition hearing transcript, was not made part of the record on appeal. WJH's public defender recommended the court require WJH to perform community service in lieu of financial restitution because he did not have the means to make payment. Upon the court's inquiry, the prosecutor stated the DFS worker had advised him she could arrange community service. No testimony or evidence was introduced at the disposition hearing to establish the amount of damages. The only damage/restitution information developed at the disposition proceeding was the result of unsworn discussions on the record between the attorneys and the judge. The judge stated he was convinced that WJH's behavior had "cost people in excess of $2,000 in damages."
[16] As reflected in the Dispositional Order, the juvenile court placed WJH on probation with the DFS for an indefinite period of time under specific terms and conditions. In this appeal, WJH takes issue with the indefinite period of the probation and the 860 hours of community service which was ordered to be completed in a reasonable time frame with the monthly amount determined by the DFS. During the disposition hearing, the court made remarks indicating the 360 hours of community service were derived, to an extent, by dividing the $2,000 damage amount by the $5.50 minimum wage figure. The Dispositional Order reflected that, due to WJH's age, no monetary restitution was imposed and instead he was required to complete 360 hours of community service. WJH appeals the alleged errors and deficiencies of the Order Adjudicating Child Delinquent and Requiring Predispositional Study and the Dispositional Order.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1 7] We discern the primary issue of this appeal is whether, in the disposition of an admitted juvenile delinquency petition, the juvenile court is statutorily limited to impose only the specific sanctions set out in Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 14-6-245 through 14-6-252 (LEXIS 1999). This is a question of statutory interpretation, and the answer must be found in the language of these provisions.
Determining the lawmakers' intent is our primary focus when we interpret statutes. Initially, we make an inquiry respecting the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words employed according to their arrangement and connection. We construe together all parts of the statutes in pari materia, giving effect to each word, clause, and sentence so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous. We will not con*1151strue statutes in a manner which renders any portion meaningless or produces absurd results.
McAdams v. State, 907 P.2d 1302, 1304 (Wyo.1995) (citations omitted); see also GN v. State (In re C.N.), 816 P.2d 1282, 1288 (Wyo.1991).
[YT8] Pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-229(d) (LEXIS 1999), if a "child is found to be delinquent the court may impose any sanction authorized by W.S. 14-6-245 through 14-6-252." "The dispositional phase of juvenile proceedings requires broad judicial discretion to accommodate the unique rehabilitative needs of juveniles." ALJ v. State, 836 P.2d 307, 311 (Wyo.1992); see also A.M.R. v. State, 741 N.E.2d 727, 729 (Ind.Ct.App.2000); In the Matter of C.C., 13 S.W.3d 854, 859 (Tex.App.2000); People v. V.O., 287 Ill. App.3d 1055, 223 Ill.Dec. 468, 679 N.E.2d 1241, 1248 (1997) State v. James P., 180 Wis.2d 677, 510 NW.2d 730, 782 (Ct.App. 1998); San Diego County Department of Social Services v. Sherry A. (In re Corey A.), 227 Cal.App.3d 339, 277 Cal.Rptr. 782, 786 (1991).
DISCUSSION
[T9] The juvenile justice system, from its genesis, has had an ideological foundation of concern for the welfare of children with an emphasis on specialized, noneriminal treatment of youths. Craig J. Herkal, You Live, You Learn: A Comment on Oklahoma's Youthful Offender Act, 34 Tulsa L.J. 599, 602 (1999). In this system, the state through the juvenile court judge and welfare workers becomes in essence the de facto parents of juveniles, under the legal rationale of parens patrige.8 Id. Children are not assumed to have the capacity to care for themselves and are assumed to be subject to the control of their parents. If parental control falters, the state must step in as parens patrige.9 Id.; see also Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 825, 108 S.Ct. 2687, 2693, 101 L.Ed.2d 702, 712 (1988). The system developed informal proceedings, dispensing with many technicalities and formalities, to facilitate the understanding of juveniles and also invested the court with broad discretion regarding disposition. Herkal, supra, at 608; Candace Zierdt, The Little Engine That Arrived at the Wrong Station: How to Get Juvenile Justice Back on the Right Track, 33 U.S.F. L.Rev. 401, 409 (1999); see also ALJ v. State, 836 P.2d 307, 311 (Wyo.1992).
[110] These theoretical underpinnings are reflected in Wyoming case law:
By enacting a juvenile code separate from the criminal code, Wyoming's legislature has recognized that juveniles and adults are not similarly situated. Juvenile proceedings are designed to rehabilitate and protect the juvenile, not to punish him. These goals of rehabilitation and protection are reflected throughout the juvenile code. Proceedings in juvenile court are equitable as opposed to being criminal. Juveniles are not convicted; they are merely adjudicated delinquents. By treating juveniles more gently than it treats adults, the legislature is compensating for juveniles' inherent lack of experience and maturity.
ALJ, 836 P.2d at 313. "Juvenile delinquency proceedings are not criminal prosecutions, but are special proceedings that serve as an ameliorative alternate to the criminal prosecution of children." Interest of W.L.F., Nos. 0-760, 00-0939, 2001 WL 108522, at *1 (Iowa Ct.App. Feb.7, 2001). In general terms, special proceedings are those which were not actions in law or suits in equity under common law and which may be commenced by motion or petition upon notice for the pur*1152pose of obtaining relief of a special or distinct type. State in Interest of C., 638 P.2d 165, 168 (Wyo.1981). They result from a right conferred by law together with authorization of a special application to the courts to enforce the right. Id. This court has recognized that, even in cases involving delinquency, proceedings under the Juvenile Court Act could be in lieu of proceedings under the general criminal procedure. Id.
[T11] With this background, we now address WJH's argument that strict construction of § 14-6-229(d)10 allows only those sanctions found within the four corners of §§ 14-6-245 through 14-6-252 to be imposed in a juvenile delinquency disposition. It is further contended, as the juvenile court failed to assign a specific sanction level as provided in §§ 14-6-248 through 14-6-252, the only sanctions available to the court were those common to all sanction levels as set out in § 14-6-247(a). WJH concedes there is no requirement a sanction level be imposed but asserts, in absence of such an assignment, the juvenile court is constrained to the sanctions detailed in § 14-6-247(a). For reasons to be discussed more fully below, we disagree as such an interpretation is inconsistent with the language of the statutes and the philosophy of juvenile justice and serves only to hamstring the judicial system to the detriment of the very juveniles it is endeavoring to steward.
[112] The progressive sanctions guidelines became effective July 1, 1998. 1997 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 119, § 4. Prior to that time, the sanctions set out in the statutes were in substance the provisions of § 14-6-247, entitled "Sanctions common to all levels." See Wyo. Stat. § 14-109 (Michie 1957); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-229 (Michie 1994); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-229 (Michie 1997). The new law provides a purposes provision as follows:
§ 14-6-245. Progressive guidelines sanction
(a) The purpose of the progressive sane-tions guidelines authorized by W.S. 14-6-245 through 14-6-252 are to:
(1) Ensure that juvenile offenders face uniform and consistent consequences and punishments that correspond to the seriousness of each offender's current offense, prior delinquent history, special treatment or training needs and effectiveness of prior interventions;
(ii) Balance public protection and rehabilitation while holding juvenile offenders accountable;
(ii) Permit flexibility in the decisions made in relation to the juvenile offender to the extent allowed by law;
(iv) Consider the juvenile offender's cireumstances; and
(v) Improve juvenile justice planning and resource allocation by ensuring uniform and consistent reporting of disposition decisions at all levels.
Section 14-6-245. This provision makes it clear the legislature intended to provide uniformity and consistency of punishments for juvenile offenders across the state while maintaining the flexibility of the juvenile courts to deal effectively with individual offenders. The question raised is whether this legislation makes application of the "guidelines" and imposition of sanction levels or sanctions delineated in §§ 14-6-246 through 14-6-252 mandatory. We conclude it does not.
[113] There is no mandatory requirement that any one of the five sanction levels be imposed. The statutes provide in pertinent part, "when a child is adjudicated as a delinquent the juvenile court may, in a disposition hearing, assign the child one (1) of the following sanction levels." Section 14-6-246(a) (emphasis added). There is likewise no mandatory language that limits the courts to the sanctions in § 14-6-247 entitled "Sanctions common to all levels." The permissive and discretionary term "may" is used a number of times in the provisions of § 14-6-246, entitled "Sanction levels," and § 14-6-247, entitled "Sanctions common to all levels."
[T14] "We have, in a number of instance-es, noted that the term 'may' connotes per*1153missive authority and does not structure a mandatory requirement." Rawson v. State, 900 P.2d 1136, 1138 (Wyo.1995). All the "may" references pertain to the court's discretion to apply or not to apply specific sanction levels or specific sanctions. This explicit discretion is mirrored in the progressive sanction purpose language of § 14-6-245(a)(@ii) to "[plermit flexibility in the decisions made in relation to the juvenile offender to the extent allowed by law." It is also evident in the parens patrice provision of § 14-6-247(a)(x), which gives the court the authority to do all things with regard to a child that his parents might reasonably or lawfully do.
[T15] The catchall provision of § 14-6-246(d), which WJH failed to brief, most pointedly addresses the broad extent of the juvenile court's discretion.
(d) If the juvenile court deviates from the guidelines under this section it shall state in writing its reasons for the deviation and enter the statement into the ree-ord. Nothing in W.S,. 14-6-245 through 14-6-252 prohibits the imposition of appropriate sanctions that are different from those provided at any sanction level.
Section 14-6-246(d) (emphasis added). The language "Nothing in W.S. 14-6-245 through 14-6-252 prohibits the imposition of appropriate sanctions that are different from those provided at any sanction level" is, by its plain terms, a catchall provision. The Ohio court has construed a similar provision within its juvenile code which vests the courts with wide discretion to "[mJake any further disposition that the court finds proper." In re Lyons, No. CAQ8-11-024, 1999 WL 988819, at *2 (Ohio Ct.App. Nov. 1, 1999) (citing In re Caldwell, 76 Ohio St.8d 156, 666 N.E.2d 1867 (1996)). The Ohio court determined its general assembly, by adding the word "any," gave the judge discretion to further implement the rehabilitative disposition of a juvenile. Id. It further concluded this latitude was provided because of the judge's unique ability to see and hear the delinquent child, to assess the consequences of the child's delinquent behavior, and to evaluate all the cireumstances involved. Id. The Ohio court held the catchall provision empowered the Juvenile court with broad discretion to tailor its dispositional order to the specific needs of a particular juvenile in a specific set of circumstances. Id.
[116] This reasoning is persuasive and applicable to Wyoming's catchall provision. The language indisputably provides the juvenile court with the ability to impose any sanctions it deems appropriate. It permits the court to customize dispositional orders to the unique characteristics of individual children, in light of both their personal cireumstances and the nature of their delinquent behavior. The provision is not amenable to any other reasonable interpretation, and to impose another interpretation would render the statute language meaningless. Such an interpretation is consistent with the meaning and intent of the other juvenile sanction provisions. Furthermore, it is consistent with the purposes statute, § 14-6-245, that encourages, but does not mandate, use of the progressive sanction guidelines to effect consistent sentences for similarly situated juvenile offenders while maintaining the juvenile court's flexibility. We decline to interpret the plain language of these provisions to limit the sentencing discretion of juvenile courts. If that was the legislature's clear intent, it would have utilized mandatory, not permissive, language. We construe together all parts of the statutes in pari materia, and, in ascertaining the meaning of a given law, we consider and construe in harmony all statutes relating to the same subject or having the same general purpose. Fosler v. Collins, 13 P.3d 686, 688 (Wyo.2000).
[117] The sole qualification to the juvenile court's broad sanction authority is, in the event of deviation from the guidelines (§§ 14-6-245 through 14-6-252), the court must state its reasons in writing and enter the statement into the record. Section 14-6-246(d). We hold that the juvenile court's decision, which omitted the assignment of a sanetion level as set out in §§ 14-6-248 through 14-6-252, does deviate from the guidelines and therefore written reasons were required to be entered into the record.
*1154[118] The requirement for a written explanation to be made part of the record is eminently reasonable. It ensures the juvenile court has carefully considered the relevant circumstances, has set forth its rationale, and has provided a basis for appellate review.
[Ilt is important that the exercise of discretion be accompanied by the trial court's articulation of the factors considered and the weight accorded to them .... [AJrticu-lation of the reasons for the decision tends to provide a firm base for an appellate judgment that discretion was soundly exercised. -It confines review of the exercise of discretion to its appropriate secope-4e., whether the relevant factors were considered and given appropriate weight ....
United States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814, 819 (3d Cir.1981). A thorough list of such relevant factors is found in State ex rel. K.O., 327 N.J.Super. 555, 744 A.2d 233, 239 (Ct.App.Div.2000), as follows:
(1) The nature and circumstances of the offense;
(2) The degree of injury to persons or damage to property caused by the juvenile's offense;
(8) The juvenile's age, previous record, prior social service received and out-of-home placement history;
(4) Whether the disposition supports family strength, responsibility and unity and the well-being and physical safety of the juvenile;
(5) Whether the disposition provides for reasonable participation by the child's parent, guardian, or custodian, provided, however, that the failure of a parent or parents to cooperate in the disposition shall not be weighed against the juvenile in arriving at an appropriate disposition;
(6) Whether the disposition recognizes and treats unique physical, psychological and social characteristics and needs of the child;
(7) Whether the disposition contributes to the developmental needs of the child, including the academic and social needs of the child where the child has mental retardation or learning disabilities; and
(8) Any other cireumstances related to the offense and the juvenile's social history as deemed appropriate by the court.
A written explanation which reviewed and weighed factors such as these would be sufficient to meet the requirements of § 14-6-246(d).
[119] The question, which must now be resolved, is whether a deviation from the sanctions available in §§ 14-6-245 through 14-6-252 requires a written explanation to be made part of the record. We conclude it does. At the risk of being redundant, we note § 14-6-246(d) (emphasis added) states, "If the juvenile court deviates from the guidelines ... it shall state in writing its reasons for the deviation." The guidelines are actually combinations of sanctions that increase in severity through the stages from level one to level five. The next sentence of § 14-6-246(d) provides, "Nothing in W.S. 14-6-245 through 14-6-252 prohibits the imposition of appropriate sanctions that are different from those provided at any sanction level." This language conveys the juvenile court's broad discretion to tailor sanctions as it determines appropriate to the specific juvenile case at hand. Logically, because a deviation from the statutorily established combinations of sanctions, set out as guidelines, requires written explanation, it follows that sanctions imposed which are different from any provided at any sanction level would also constitute a deviation and require written explanation. It also seems apparent that an adequate explanation of deviation from the guidelines would necessarily entail clarification of sanctions imposed that are different from any provided at any sanction level.
[120] Pursuant to this analysis, we conclude the Dispositional Order must be reversed and remanded. We do so with direction to the juvenile court to (1) assign a sanction level as set out in §§ 14-6-248 through 14-6-252 or (2) enter written reasons in the record to explain both its decision to deviate from the guidelines, through its omission of assignment of a sanction level as set out in §§ 14-6-248 through 14-6-252, and its imposition of sanctions different from any provided at any sanction level and (8) *1155conduct such further proceedings as are appropriate and consistent with this decision.
[121] WJH asserts the indefinite period of probation and 860 hours of community service in lieu of restitution were beyond the court's authority and constitute an abuse of discretion. Because we have concluded the Dispositional Order must be reversed and remanded with direction, we decline to address these issues at this time.
[122] WJH also asserts the Order Adjudicating Child Delinquent and Requiring Predispositional Study inappropriately referenced WJH admitting the "charges" as opposed to admitting the "allegations." This contention is correct, and the defect was remedied in the Dispositional Order. As we are reversing and remanding the Dispositional Order, we presume any subsequent order of the juvenile court will also be drafted in such a way as to rectify what is essentially a typographical error. Issue is also taken with a provision of the Order Adjudicating Child Delinquent and Requiring Predispositional Study which stated an admission constituted a waiver of the right to appeal. The purported error is obviously moot as this appeal has gone forward and, pursuant to our reversal and remand, should be rectified in any further order issued by the juvenile court.
[128] Finally, WJH asserts the juvenile court failed, as required by § 14-6-247(c), to advise him of progressive sanctions that might be imposed. This argument is without merit. The provision requires, "For a child at any sanction level, the juvenile court shall inform the child of the progressive sanctions that may be imposed on the child if the child continues to engage in delinquent conduct." Section 14-6-247(c). Although the court must advise the child of the potential for progressively more serious sanctions, it is not required to read the sanetion statutes to the juvenile verbatim to satisfy the requirement. The transcript of the dispositional hearing reflects the court did advise the child, "You cannot have any violations of law during this probation, [ WJH]. If you get involved with setting any fires or trespassing-trespassing on property, things like that, you can be brought back into court for a more serious disposition." It is evident the court was speaking to this eleven-year-old child in terms he would understand. We hold this explanation was sufficient to comply with § 14-6-247(c) and to give the child fair notice that any further delinquent acts would result in more serious sanctions being imposed.
[124] The Order Adjudicating Child Delinquent and Requiring Predispositional Study is affirmed, and the Dispositional Order is reversed. The case is remanded with direction to the juvenile court to (1) assign a sanction level as set out in §§ 14-6-248 through 14-6-252 or (2) enter written reasons in the record to explain both its decision to deviate from the guidelines, through its omission of assignment of a sanction level as set out in §§ 14-6-248 through 14-6-252, and its imposition of sanctions different from any provided at any sanction level and (8) conduct such further proceedings as are appropriate and consistent with this decision.
GOLDEN, J., filed a dissenting opinion.

. Violation of § 6-3-201(a) and (b)(i), commonly referred to as property destruction, constitutes a misdemeanor punishable upon conviction of an adult by imprisonment of not more than six months, a fine of not more than $750, or both.

. Violation of § 6-3-302, commonly referred to as criminal entry, constitutes a misdemeanor punishable upon conviction of an adult by imprisonment of not more than six months, a fine of not more than $750, or both.

. Violation of § 6-3-201(a) and (b)(iii) constitutes a felony punishable upon conviction of an adult by imprisonment of not more than ten years, a fine of not more than $10,000, or both.

. WIJH was born July 29, 1988, and therefore was ten years old at the time of the delinquent act alleged to have occurred in May of 1999 and was eleven years old at the time of the delinquent acts alleged to have occurred in September of 1999.

. In admitting the allegations, WJH stated all incidents involved another juvenile boy.

. Thar's Feed apparently was the operator or responsible party for the Hubbard Mill, although the record is unclear on this fact.

. § 14-2-203. Parental tort liability for property damage of certain minors; exception; action cumulative
(a) Any property owner is entitled to recover damages from the parents of any minor under the age of seventeen (17) years and over the age of ten (10) years who maliciously and willfully damages or destroys his property. The recovery is limited to the actual damages in an amount not to exceed two thousand dollars ($2,000.00) in addition to taxable court costs. This section does not apply to parents whose parental custody and control of the child had been terminated by court order prior to the destructive act.
(b) The action authorized in subsection (a) of this section is in addition to all other actions which the owner is entitled to maintain and nothing in this section precludes recovery in a greater amount from the minor, parents or any person for damages for which the minor or other person would otherwise be liable. The purpose of this section is to authorize recovery from parents in situations where they would not otherwise be liable.

. "Parens patriae," literally "parent of the country," refers traditionally to the role of the state as sovereign and guardian of persons under legal disability, such as juveniles or the insane. It is the principle that the state must care for those who cannot care for themselves, such as minors who lack proper care and custody from their parents. Black's Law Dictionary 1137 (7th ed.1999). ~

. Wyoming's initial juvenile justice legislation was the Juvenile Court Act of 1951 (repealed by the 1971 Act), which provided its purpose was to secure for each child coming before the court such care, guidance, supervision, and control as necessary to serve the best interests of the child and the public and to develop him into a responsible citizen. Kennard F. Nelson, Comments, The Wyoming Juvenile Court Act of 1971, VIH Land & Water L.Rev. 237, 239, 269 (1973).

. "If the child is found to be delinquent the court may impose any sanction authorized by W.S. 14-6-245 through 14-6-252." Section 14-6-229(d).