Court Opinion

ID: 9492970
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:54:18.751227+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:34.437506
License: Public Domain

MURPHY, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the district court failed to adequately investigate the possibility of juror impropriety. The majority properly employs an abuse of discretion standard in reviewing the district court’s decision to circumscribe its investigation in the manner it did. See Majority Op. at 1198; United States v. Davis, 60 F.3d 1479, 1483 (10th Cir.1995). I further agree with the majority that when an allegation of jury taint arises, the district court is obligated to “ ‘investigate sufficiently to assure itself that constitutional rights of the criminal defendant have not been violated.’ ” Majority Op. at 1198 (quoting United States v. Rigsby, 45 F.3d 120, 125 (6th Cir.1995)). I diverge from'the majority, however, in its determination that the district court in this particular case abused its discretion in ending the investigation at the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing on August 10, 1998.
The district court did not conclude its investigation of the allegation of juror impropriety until it held two separate hearings at which it heard testimony both from the juror who alleged the misconduct, Juror # 1, and from the jury foreperson. After those two evidentiary hearings, the district court judge made a credibility determination that the foreperson, who denied the alleged improper comment was made, was more believable than Juror # 1. The majority concludes that the district court erred in ending its investigation at that point, because it should have at least examined two more witnesses-Juror # 3, who may have spoken with Juror # 1 about the purported comment during a cigarette break, and Juror # 2, the alleged source of the improper comment. See Majority Op. at 1200.
I fail to see why the district court should have considered Juror # 3’s testimony more important than that of any other juror, except the foreperson and Ju*1214rors # 1 and # 2, as the majority opinion suggests. During the first evidentiary hearing, at which all counsel had an opportunity to question her, Juror # 1 never testified that she spoke about the purported comment with Juror # 3; that claim was made only in the letter which Regan’s attorney wrote alerting the court to the possible jury taint.1 Juror # 1 merely testified that Juror #2 made two improper comments before the entire jury and that following the second comment, the foreperson “straightened [Juror # 2] right out.” The district court, therefore, had no evidence before it indicating that an examination of Juror # 3 would be more fruitful than questioning any of the nine remaining jurors who may have heard the comment and who were not called to testify.
Because the only evidence before the district court was that improper comments were uttered to the entire jury, the logical extension of the majority’s mandate that the district court examine Juror # 3 is to require trial courts to examine all jurors whenever there is evidence of an impropriety in the presence of the entire jury. We should refrain from imposing such a burdensome requirement on trial courts and instead allow them to exercise discretion in determining the necessary scope of an investigation into alleged jury taint, as the district court in this case properly did. Furthermore, regardless of how many more jurors a district court examines, when faced with conflicting testimony, at some point it will need to make a credibility determination to resolve whether an improper comment was in fact made. The district court judge in the instant case, having worked closely with these particular jurors, was in the best position to ascertain -when it could confidently make that credibility determination.
I further disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the district court erred in failing to question Juror #2, the person who allegedly made the improper comment. The majority states that Juror # 2’s testimony is “critical” to determine whether the defendants’ constitutional right to a fair trial was violated. Majority Op. at 1200. The majority’s assessment of the value of Juror # 2’s testimony, however, overlooks the position which the attorneys for each defendant took during the second hearing. After the examination of the foreperson was completed, the district court solicited comments from all the attorneys, to which the attorney for defendant Regan responded,
Your honor, I think that at this point certainly it’s looking more speculative. I’d ask the Court to — to attempt to find [Juror #3]. He seems like the other person who would either confirm or deny what [Juror # 1] said and continue it for that particular purpose only and limited purpose only.
(emphasis added). The attorney for defendant Humphrey similarly stated, “Nothing to add other than [Juror # 3] has become important, and I guess I’d be interested to see what he has to say, either personally or through you. But that’s all — that’s all I’d add.” Neither attorney, therefore, even requested an examination of Juror # 2, though they had an opportunity to do so when the judge solicited their comments both before and after ruling.2 Because the defense attorneys themselves apparently did not deem Juror # 2’s testimony either sufficiently helpful or necessary to warrant a request for her examination, I cannot accept the majority’s characterization of this testimony as “critical.” For the same reasons, I cannot conclude the district *1215court’s failure to call Juror # 2 for questioning was error.
Quite independent of the majority’s characterization of the testimony of Juror # 2, defendants’ failure to request an examination of Juror # 2 constitutes a waiver of their right to challenge on appeal the district court’s failure to call that juror for questioning. Cf. Robinson v. Maruffi, 895 F.2d 649, 657-58 (10th Cir.1990) (plaintiff could not appeal his inability to cross-examine a -witness who was temporarily dismissed during direct examination when the plaintiff failed to object to the temporary excusal and later agreed to a permanent excusal); Fitzpatrick v. Board of Educ., 578 F.2d 858, 860-61 (10th Cir.1978) (concluding plaintiffs waived right to call certain witnesses even though they had reserved that right earlier in the trial, because they failed to raise the issue at the end of the trial when the judge asked if they were prepared to rest). Among the many difficult tasks of a district judge is addressing challenges to jury verdicts. In fulfilling that obligation, a district court should consider and be able to rely upon the suggestions of the very counsel challenging the verdict. The majority opinion fails to attach any significance to the role of counsel, whose views, suggestions, and advocacy, unimpeded by the rigors of trial, did not propose what the majority now orders.
In short, given the circumstances of this particular case, the specific evidence before the district court after two investigatory hearings, and the conduct of the defendants’ attorneys, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the district court here abused its discretion in terminating its investigation of the possible jury taint, rather than proceeding to question more jurors.

. Despite having the opportunity to question Juror # 1, neither defense counsel asked any questions about Juror # l's alleged conversa- . tion with Juror # 3. If, as the majority believes, that alleged conversation is important to establish the necessity of examining Juror #3, it seems defense counsel would have examined Juror # 1 concerning the purported conversation.

. The majority apparently deems it important “that at the August 10, 1998 hearing, counsel for Humphrey favored calling Juror # 3 for questioning.” Majority Op. at 1200 n. 5. It should be equally significant that defense counsel did not similarly favor or request calling Juror # 2.