Court Opinion

ID: 9701407
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 22:18:55.002028+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:03:41.734541
License: Public Domain

*393Levin, J.
(concurring). I concur in the Court’s disposition remanding the cause to Recorder’s Court for an evidentiary hearing on the suppression issue. I agree that the Court of Appeals erred in passing upon the merits of the motion to suppress without a suppression hearing having been held by that court. I write separately for two reasons:
This case did not require the judge, and consequently does not require us, to review the magistrate’s exercise of discretion in binding the defendant over. The meritorious question presented by both the motion to suppress and the motion to quash the information involved the credibility of the arresting officer. That question should have been addressed at a suppression hearing, at which the judge would have exercised his own discretion and would have assessed credibility on the basis of live testimony.
Reiteration of the "classic description” of abuse of discretion set forth in Spalding v Spalding1 gives further currency to an overly restrictive conception of the role of appellate courts in reviewing an exercise of discretion.
I
The preliminary question raised by this appeal is the nature of the motion. This Court, in effect, characterizes the motion as a request to review the magistrate’s decision to bind over rather than a motion to suppress. The Court finds that there was no abuse of discretion but remands to permit the judge, in the independent exercise of his own discretion, to reverse the magistrate’s decision after holding a suppression hearing.
*394The Court’s analysis is not conceptually incorrect, but I cannot join in it because the sound administration of justice requires that a judge eschew reviewing a magistrate’s exercise of discretion when he is, in essence, asked to review the credibility of a witness whose testimony would be evaluated at a suppression hearing. The same interest requires that this Court not address that issue of credibility when it remains to be passed upon on remand and may well return to the appellate courts, albeit in a different form.
The judge should have recognized that the essence of the issue presented to him was whether the evidence should be suppressed and that he could avoid reviewing the magistrate’s discretionary decision by exercising his own independent judgment upon a suppression hearing. Conceding that the defendant’s motion asked the judge to review the magistrate’s decision, it should nevertheless have been apparent to the judge that the motion was essentially one to suppress the evidence on the ground that the circumstances leading to its seizure were not as described by Officer Henry. It should have been clear to the judge that he could not readily substitute his discretion for that of the magistrate, but that he could readily do so on a separate record.
Under these circumstances the judge erred. He should have cut to the heart of the matter, interpreted the motion as one to suppress, held an evidentiary hearing and based his conclusion on his own assessment of the witnesses.
The opinion of the Court indicates that there may be circumstances in which preliminary examination testimony can be used to decide a motion to suppress.2 Since we raise the question, we *395should provide such guidance as we can at this time. While a preliminary examination transcript may be used to establish uncontroverted facts, where there is an issue of credibility it is necessary to conduct a hearing and hear the witnesses. Unless the judge himself hears the witnesses, the advantage of the judge’s superior opportunity to assess credibility is lost.
I would not allow the parties to stipulate to use of a preliminary examination record as a basis for deciding a credibility issue. There will be judges who would prefer to rely on a transcript rather than hold a hearing and whose wishes in that regard will become known to the parties. Only the most resolute lawyers will be able to resist; most will be constrained to stipulate to the use of the preliminary examination transcript. Indeed, some lawyers, especially inadequately compensated assigned counsel, may themselves be reluctant to conduct a full hearing.
Thus, where it should be apparent to the judge that the determinative issue — here the assertedly inherent incredibility of the officer’s testimony— will be addressed both in reviewing the magistrate’s discretion in binding over the defendant and in determining de novo whether the evidence should be suppressed, he should avoid the difficult and sensitive review of discretion — where the scope of his inquiry is limited — in favor of holding the suppression hearing where he can review the evidence de novo and assess the credibility of witnesses in person.
In reviewing the judge’s review of the magistrate’s decision to bind over we compound the judge’s error. Both are the same kind of mistake. Once it appears that the motion involves a question which can be decided by the judge in an *396independent exercise of his discretion and that it was error for him to assess the magistrate’s decision, the case should be remanded by the appellate court for hearing. There is no need to reach the question whether the magistrate erred. That question should not be reached to avoid appellate intrusion on the judge’s independent exercise of discretion on remand and to avoid the appearance of inconsistent decision making.
Only lawyers will understand a conclusion that in his role as reviewer of a magistrate’s action, a judge cannot assess credibility, but as a trier of fact he can do so on a separate record. By addressing the merits of the magistrate’s decision, we are setting the one court of justice up to be perceived as having taken a pratfall, although we acknowledge that a different question would be presented if this case were again to reach the appellate courts.
In sum, I would hold that where a judge is confronted with such a motion, he should recognize the need for conducting an independent hearing, rather than embarrass his ability to properly dispose of it by approaching the matter on an inadequate or inappropriate record. Similarly, this Court should not reach the substantive issue about which a trial court on remand will be asked to exercise its discretion and which may return to the appellate courts for review.
II
Spalding’s hyperbolic statement leaves the impression that a judge will be reversed only if it can be found that he acted egregiously — the result evidencing "perversity of will”, the "defiance [of judgment]”, "passion or bias”. To repeatedly invoke this overstatement leads lawyers and judges *397to believe that a discretionary decision is virtually immune from review and leads appellate courts to view any challenge to such a decision as essentially unfounded. Repetition of this statement is simplistic and misleading, and should not be indulged in by this Court or any other.
The question in Spalding was whether the judge had abused his discretion by granting only half the requested increase in child support payments. Appellant had been granted three prior increases, from an original $15 weekly to $35, over a period of four years. She then sought an increase to $50, but the judge granted an increase to only $42.50.
This Court was obviously impatient with this type of appeal and wished to send an emphatic message to this particular class of appellants. It introduced its statement of the standard as follows:
"We have held repeatedly, and we again hold, that we will not interfere with the discretion of the trial chancellor in these cases unless a clear abuse thereof is manifest in the result reached below. The kind of determination before us requires a weighing of human and economic factors of the utmost complexity, a weighing that can best be accomplished at the local level, not in these chambers. In view of the frequency with which cases are reaching this Court assailing the exercise of a trial court’s discretion as an abuse thereof, we deem it pertinent to make certain observations with respect thereto in the interests of saving expense to the litigants and avoiding delay in reaching final adjudication on the merits.”3
The rhetoric of Spalding was the result. A more restrained statement, speaking merely of the exercise of will, logic and reason, would have said all that needed to be said. Unfortunately, in the en*398deavor to send an unmistakably clear message the Court raised the standard of review to an apparently insurmountable height.
A more balanced view of judicial discretion was presented in Langnes v Green4 where Justice Sutherland said:
"The term 'discretion’ denotes the absence of a hard and fast rule. * * * When invoked as a guide to judicial action it means a sound discretion, that is to say, a discretion exercised not arbitrarily or wilfully, but with regard to what is right and equitable under the circumstances and the law, and directed by the reason and conscience of the judge to a just result.”
Discretion is lodged in a judge in areas where "hard and fast” rules have not yet developed. This, of course, does not mean that once the common law labels a particular type of decision discretionary that it will remain so forever. After courts gain experience with the considerations involved in a particular type of decision, a "hard and fast” rule may develop. Repeated encounters with a particular type of question, at first labeled discretionary, may over time lead to a rule or at least to a more specific list of considerations to be weighed by the judge and to that extent limit his discretion.5
This gradual development of rules and standards, however, assumes that a discretionary decision is reviewable and, in fact, is fully reviewed by a higher judicial authority whenever a question of abuse is raised. A standard of review that states *399that only the most extreme and perverse discretionary decisions will be reversed seriously threatens this evolutionary process by giving the impression that a discretionary decision is beyond effective review.
Further, to constantly apply a standard developed in one particular context gives the impression that all discretionary decisions are judged by the same standard. This is not the case.6 The types of discretionary decisions are multifarious and for each type of decision different considerations must be recognized and weighed by the court. Although each decision may be discretionary, each requires a unique analysis and mode of review. As the Court notes, we have held that the standard of review is stricter in a criminal case.7 This is only a more specific statement of the general principle that discretion must be exercised "with regard to what is right and equitable under the circumstances and the law”.8
Thus when a question of abuse of discretion is properly framed, it is incumbent upon a reviewing court to engage in an in-depth analysis of the record on appeal. This Court has, in spite of references to Spalding, continued to give full-fledged review to discretionary decisions by carefully weighing the various rights and considerations involved in each type of discretionary decision.9 We should, however, discontinue the references to *400Spalding, which imply a review which would reverse only in the most egregious cases and that incantation of the Spalding standard may serve as a substitute for reasoned analysis.
Even if the only question raised in the appellant’s one appeal of right concerns an abuse of discretion, significant rights entitled to careful review may be involved. More than a talismanic reference to Spalding is called for. The facts, the equities, the rights of the parties, and the interests of the judicial system should all be examined and weighed carefully when reviewing a discretionary decision.
This is not to say, of course, that review of a discretionary decision is not fundamentally different than review of a question of law. In the latter instance a reviewing court may substitute its judgment whenever, after full analysis, it decides the judge erred. In a discretionary matter a higher quantum of proof of error is required and the reviewing court will necessarily be more reluctant to reverse. That the line which bounds the proper decision of the court will be less clear for a discretionary decision does not imply that there is no boundary at all. The difference in review is one of degree — not of kind.10
I would, therefore, no longer repeat the Spalding statement of the standard of review for abuse of discretion. To do so impedes the proper evolution of rules and standards for specific types of decisions and glosses over the different considerations involved in various discretionary decisions._

 Spalding v Spalding, 355 Mich 382, 384-385; 94 NW2d 810 (1959).

 See opinion of the Court, p 382.

 Spalding v Spalding, supra, p 384.

 Langnes v Green, 282 US 531, 541; 51 S Ct 243; 75 L Ed 520 (1931).

 As this Court noted in Teetzel v Atkinson, 292 Mich 592, 595; 291 NW 18 (1940): "Courts have not attempted to define in every case what constitutes abuse of discretion; rather, various principles have been established as guides to direct the actions of courts.”

 "That is to say, we have no single standard by which we measure the exercise of such discretion in all cases where discretionary judicial actions are challenged.” Alder v Flint City Coach Lines, Inc, 364 Mich 29, 30; 110 NW2d 606 (1961) (equally divided Court).

 See opinion of the Court, p 387; People v Wilson, 397 Mich 76, 81; 243 NW2d 257 (1976); People v Merritt, 396 Mich 67, 80-81; 238 NW2d 31 (1976); People v Charles O Williams, 386 Mich 565, 573; 194 NW2d 337, 340 (1972).

 Langnes v Green, supra.

 See cases cited in fn 7, supra.

 As Judge Learned Hand noted with respect to review of factual findings:
"It is idle to try to define the meaning of the phrase, 'clearly erroneous’; all that can be profitably said is that an appellate court, though it will hesitate less to reverse the finding of a judge than that of an administrative tribunal or of a jury, will nevertheless reverse it most reluctantly and only when well persuaded.” United States v Aluminum Co of America, 148 F2d 416, 433 (CA 2, 1945).