Court Opinion

ID: 9848216
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:14:45.284125+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:08.056829
License: Public Domain

BRIGHTMIRE, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I do not view the child custody and support provision in the decree as voidable,8 or as one terminating the parent-child relationship, nor do I think it relegates an adoptive relationship to a second-class status.9 To hold that subject agreement and order are contrary to public policy is to collide head-on with the exceedingly strong public policy that encourages litigants to resolve their differences outside of the courtroom. Filial affection, involving either natural or adoptive children, cannot be contracted for nor judicially decreed. It is a personal relationship that must ebb and flow with time, yield to altering circumstances, and, in the area of family law, strive to survive the deep and unpleasant stresses of a one-parent custodial commitment.
Parents have no vested property rights in children. What rights they have are subject to the supervening power of the state to protect the welfare of children. Within the parameters of the best interest criterion, I perceive no legitimate reason why divorcing parents should not be urged to agree on matters of custody, support and other related incidentals pertaining to their minor children. Such agreement is, of course, not binding on the court. He may disapprove it if he finds it not be in the best interest of the children or he may approve it if he finds their interest is unaffected or improved.
An agreement such as we have here is not altogether surprising in view of the short duration of the marriage. What started out as connubial euphoria soon foundered on the shoals of dissension. Details of why the adoptions occurred are not available to us. I suppose one might speculate that the idea of the man adopting the *1302boys emerged in the warm glow of embers wrought by the romantic flames that engulfed two lovers who, before the chilling effect of daily nuptial realities overcame them, headily assumed their vows would attain a live-happily-ever-after storybook ending. Whether the adoptive father was close to his children or whether the relationship disintegrated along with the marriage we are not told. But one might well assume that the parents, in entering into the agreement they did, did so for what they both considered to be the best interest of the children. And one might also assume the court approved the agreement for the same reason. There is testimony that the agreement was conceived by the mother and nurtured by her desire to have the father pay off some $70,000 in debts, some of which were hers. Why she insisted on the father foregoing his visitation rights is not clear. On the other hand, although it was the father who filed this lawsuit, she testified that he told her he would not give her a divorce if he had to pay child support and she agreed because she had to get away from him. Given evidence of such antipathy, the thought looms large that the children might well have also felt the need to avoid visitation with their adoptive dad. But however that may be, the fact is she walked away with most of the property the parties had, including a nearly new 1976 Chrysler car, while he got most of the debts.
Just what happened during the next ten months to significantly change the situation in favor of the woman is cloudy. She pleaded only that “she [could] no longer adequately support, feed, clothe, house and maintain the minor children without the aid and contribution of the adoptive father” and asked the court to require the father to pay some child support. Her evidence was that one boy lost part of his hearing and the other boy suffered from dyslexia — a reading disability — and needed some remedial tutoring because he was not doing well in school. The father, on the other hand, testified there was no post divorce change in conditions, except that he was seriously injured in a car wreck and has suffered a substantial decrease in earnings.
I agree that the court retained jurisdiction to modify the decree and that there is probably sufficient, though marginal, evidence of changed circumstances to justify the modification. I disagree, however, with the notion that the original agreement violated any sort of public policy or that it negated any of the legal attributes of the adoptive status. Of course, had the parties attempted in some way to annul the relationship by, say, agreeing that the children could not inherit from the man, the effort would have to be condemned as illegal.
I, therefore, concur in the result reached by the majority but dissent as to the obiter dicta regarding the validity of the custodial agreement and order.

. It should be pointed out that in holding that subject decree provision is voidable “and subject to attack at any time,” the majority opinion implies, mistakenly, this is a collateral proceeding. Also overlooked is the fact that its conclusion is contrary to long established precedent. A judgment that is void may be collaterally attacked at any time, but not one that is merely voidable. Woodrow v. Ewing, Okl., 263 P.2d 167 (1953). The fact is, however, that the woman is not trying to “attack” the decree, but merely trying to modify it.

. The majority apparently cites Parkey v. Parkey, Okl., 371 P.2d 711 (1962), for the conclusion that the parties cannot by agreement “set aside” the “duty of [the] court to provide for the support of ... minor children.” I agree that such a thing may not be done. If, however, Parkey is being cited as holding that the parties may not make an agreement as to the support of their minor children, then I disagree because there is no such holding in Parkey. True, it does contain some dictum in it to the effect that a “wife cannot, by contract, relieve her husband of his duty to support their minor children.” But this statement was actually an aside. It was not germane to any issue decided by the court and, being dictum, is without any operative effect. Eckels v. Traverse, Okl., 362 P.2d 683 (1961).
Incidentally, Parkey picked up the discriminatory remark from more mere dictum of a syllabus found in Donahoe v. Alcorn, 188 Okl. 305, 108 P.2d 786 (1940). Donahoe, in turn, evidently copied the statement from a syllabus found in Bynum v. Bynum, 184 Okl. 36, 84 P.2d 424 (1938) — a syllabus that was also dictum since the language was not used in the body of the opinion nor was such a concept essential to the decision.
Today courts are beginning to see child custody and support duties as a two-parent obligation in situations were there are, of course, two parents. So long as the children are taken care of adequately, I fail to see why gender-based concepts must control to the exclusion of what might be other, more significant and overriding considerations.