Court Opinion

ID: 9794445
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:05:48.129772+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:13:43.230176
License: Public Domain

WELCH, J.
(dissenting). I would affirm the action of the Corporation Commission. That body had before it the numerous witnesses who intervened and protested removal of these trains, and testified as to the need for the train services rendered. The commission observed the service being rendered by transportation of passengers, baggage, express, mail and milk. It .is quite apparent that the commission was convinced of the value of these services and of the need of these services by the people.
*439The majority opinion is based primarily, if not solely, on the matter of profit or lack of profit to the railway. There the theory is followed that this continued operation would result in loss. Apparently it would, but such loss is rather insignificant as compared to-the aggregate income of the vast railway system of the “Frisco.” And it was vigorously urged in oral argument that improved service and modern equipment could reduce expenses and reclaim patronage lost by present- service and long used equipment and thus reduce the loss on this train operation, or change it to a gain.
I think the case should be considered on the broader ground of the needs and necessities of the people and the obligation of the carrier.
The result of the majority decision will be to cast all this railway travel and transportation, whatever it amounts to, on the highway. As a further result, this decision will promote or encourage other such applications to abandon railway service where the revenue therefrom as a separate operation is not just now profitable. Thus much additional travel and transportation will be cast on the highways over the state. But all know that our highways are now over crowded. This is true to the point of increasing the hazard to human life. Further crowding of these roads must lead to greater hazard, and greater expense.
I think we should preserve both methods of travel and transportation. This railway carrier, after a period of cessation of this service, can of course reinstate the service when they have decided that more efficient equipment and operation, with perhaps more pressing need for the service, will make it pay. But in that interim the added cars, buses and trucks on the highway will have taken their toll of added highway expense and perhaps of added loss of life and limb as well.
While a continuation of this service might result in some financial loss from this separate operation, until the carrier by modern efficiency could regain lost patronage, and show profit from that, or from a natural gain of business, I think that loss would not be a price too high to pay to preserve the needed service. It seems to me it is no time now to curtail this needed service to the detriment of these citizens and to the burden of the roads and highways.
Whatever, of the various considerations, guided the Corporation Commission, I am convinced the conclusion of that body to continue this railway service for the present was correct and that we should affirm it.
In Missouri-K. T. Ry. Co. v. State, 189 Okla. 685, 119 P. 2d 835, the court said:
“So far as the issues in this case are concerned, the absolute duty of the company could be no more than to furnish reasonably adequate mail and express facilities along the line of road in question. Beyond that requirement the point of consideration resolves itself into one of convenience to the public as counterbalanced with cost to the company,. If reasonably adequate service is being rendered by the facilities in use, the item of cost of additional facilities is the controlling factor. The furnishing of any facilities in excess of those that are essential to reasonably adequate service is not to be classed among the absolute, or charter, duties of the company.”
And further in the opinion it was said:
“In the instant case, as we have said, the public needs will be reasonably met by the service of the two night trains.”
And further it was said:
“When a common carrier seeks to avoid an absolute duty, the revenues from other sources on its system are to be considered in determining the question of due process in such case. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Public Service Comm, of West Virginia, 242 U. S. 603, 37 S. Ct. 234, 235, 61 L. Ed. 520. ...”
*440As the majority opinion points out, the proposed mixed train service is not an equivalent substitute ior the existing passenger, express, mail, baggage, milk and cream service. Therefore the removal of these two trains would in effect be an abandonment of this present service. These are the only such trains operating over this line. This case differs from the M.-K.-T. case where other passenger trains over the same line amounted to reasonably adequate service. There was there no abandonment of the service. Since this is the only such service now furnished its continuance is within the “absolute duty of the company” as that expression is used in the M.-K.-T. case, supra.
And under the last- quoted portion of the former decision, the freight revenues on this line should be considered since the carrier seeks to avoid this absolute duty by substituting freight train service which, as the evidence demonstrates, is not an equivalent substitute for the existing passenger train service.
We must bear in mind that the protestants requested, but the company expressly declined, to furnish a statement of the freight rates derived from the operation of the branch line in question. Thus it is fair to assume that the profit on freight business is substantial, and I think it is not unfair to assume that the profit of combined freight and passenger service would amount to a sufficient profit, if not a satisfactory profit.
In Werner v. C. M. St. P. R. R. Co., 14 Wis. R. C. 573, it was said that it could not be expected that the passenger business on a branch line would be entirely self-supporting.
Since there is no Oklahoma decision directly in point, we may look elsewhere for guiding authority. In the case of Gardner v. Commerce Commission, 400 Ill. 123, I find complete authority to affirm the Corporation Commission’s order here.
The Illinois case, upon analyzing the figures, is peculiarly applicable to the facts in the case at bar. That case involved a branch line, as this one. There the Commerce Commission denied application to discontinue the passenger train service, as here. There, likewise, operation was one-passenger train daily each way. There the mileage involved was 39 miles, here it is 240 miles. There the annual operating loss per mile was $314.69, while here it is $311.51. There the line served eight towns with a total population of 13,771 or 353 persons per mile. Here the lines involved serve 36 towns with a population including 1950 increases of 80,623 or 335 persons per mile. There, as here, the passenger trains carried mail, passengers. express, baggage, milk and cream.
Thus it is observed that these Oklahoma lines, though serving less persons per mile, show in the aggregate less loss per mile than in the Illinois case.
There is more reason for the state to deny the application in this case than there was in the Illinois case, because in this case in Oklahoma these lines furnish passenger train service to seven county seat towns, and two of them have no other railroad.
This county seat service has some importance to the state, in law enforcement, in the transaction of business by the citizen with his county seat, and in the citizen’s attendance upon the courts at the .county seat as witnesses and jurors.
It is well known that flood waters frequently block our highways, but seldom interfere with rail traffic. If this rail passenger service is eliminated then a flooded highway or washed-out bridge might seriously interfere with the business of the county seat, and especially is that true as to the two county seats which have no other rail service.
Our Constitution gives some recognition to the value of rail transporta*441tion to the county seats by reason of the provision in art. 9, sec. 14.
In Yellow Transit Company v. State, 198 Okla. 229, 178 P. 2d 83, this court held:
“Under Art. IX, sec. 20, Constitution of Oklahoma, as amended by Senate Bill 61, S. L. 1941, p. 544, on appeal from the Corporation Commission, this court is required to review the evidence, and must sustain the order appealed from if it is supported by substantial evidence.”
This is perhaps a universal rule. At any rate, it was applied in Norfolk & W. R. Co. v. Public Service Commission, 82 W. Va. 408, 8 A. L. R. 155. In that case the Public Service Commission had required the furnishing of shipping facilities and upon appeal by the railway the order was affirmed. It was held in paragraph three of the syllabus that “findings of fact by the Public Service Commission based upon evidence to support them will not be reviewed by this coürt.”
The majority opinion, as I view it, merely substitutes the court’s view of the evidence for the Corporation Commission’s view of the evidence. This is contrary to the rule recognized in the Yellow Transit case, supra, and others to the effect we should affirm if the commission’s finding is supported by substantial evidence. The commission found this passenger train service was a public necessity. There was substantial evidence offered by the appearing protestants to support that finding. The majority opinion holds there exists no public necessity. But we should affirm the commission, supported as it is by substantial evidence, even though the opposite conclusion might also have some support by substantial evidence.
In Southern Ry. Co. v. South Carolina Public Service Commission et al., 31 Fed. Supp. 707, the commission had refused application to discontinue two passenger trains, one train a day each way, on a short line of its railway system. The Federal Court refused to interfere with the commission’s order. The opinion by Parker, Circuit Judge, contains legal philosophy so well in point with my dissenting view that I quote extensively from the opinion as follows:
“ . . . The remainder of the line, approximately 75 miles in length, being the portion between Branchville and Augusta, serves as a highway for traffic of local origin or destination and also for freight from Charleston to Augusta and the West.
“As a result of the building of good roads and the use of buses and private automobiles, plaintiff has experienced a loss of passenger traffic, especially that of a local character. It has reduced the passenger service on the 75 mile stretch of this railroad to one train a day each way between Blanch-ville and Augusta, and finds that even this minimum service results in a loss. . . . For this reason plaintiff desires to abandon all passenger service on the portion of the line between Branch-ville and Augusta, while continuing to use that portion of the line for transportation of freight and while maintaining passenger service over the Branchville-Charleston portion of the line as a part of its main line between Columbia and Charleston. . . .
“The Public Service Commission denied the application of plaintiff for leave to discontinue the trains and abandon passenger service on the portion of the road between Branchville and Augusta on the ground that the maintenance of passenger service is required by the franchise under which the road is operated, that the discontinuance of the trains in question would leave the communities on that portion of the road without adequate service for express and mail as well as without rail passenger service, and that, to insure the fair treatment of these communities contemplated by the statutes of the state, the operation of the trains should be continued. . . .”
“ . . . The question before us is not whether the action of the state authorities of which complaint is made is wise, but whether it is unlawful; and, in view of the charter obligations of *442the plaintiff to maintain passenger service on the road in question, we cannot see how an order of the Public Service Commission refusing to permit abandonment of passenger service on a portion of the' line can be said to be unlawful. . . .
“Since, therefore, plaintiff is charged with the duty under its franchise of maintaining passenger service on the entire line of the railroad, an order enforcing that duty may not be said to be unreasonable and arbitrary merely because its performance may result in loss to plaintiff. Atlantic Coast Line v. North Carolina Corporation Com., 206 U. S. 1, 27 S. Ct. 585, 51 L. Ed. 933, 11 Ann. Cas. 398; Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 262, 30 S. Ct. 330, 54 L. Ed. 472; Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. v. Public Service Commission, supra; Fort Smith Traction Co. v. Bourland, supra; State v. Board River Power Co., supra. As said by Mr. Justice (later Chief Justice) White in the Atlantic Coast Line case (206 U. S. 1, 27 S. Ct. 595, 51 L. Ed. 933, 11 Ann. Cas. 398), ‘As the primal duty of a carrier is to furnish adequate facilities to the public, that duty may well be compelled, although, by doing so, as an incident some pecuniary loss from rendering such service may result.’ . . .
“Even if there were no charter obligation with respect to maintaining passenger service over this entire line of railroad, we do not think that the order of the Commission denying to the company the right to discontinue all passenger service on this portion of the line could be held arbitrary and unreasonable so as to fall under the condemnation of the due process or the equal protection clause. The State of South Carolina, for the convenience and welfare of its people, had chartered this line of railroad from Charleston to Augusta. People along the line had been served by it for over a hundred years. The discontinuance of the trains in question would leave those on a large part of the line without the benefit of passenger service and without the benefit of the express and mail service dependent upon the operation of passenger trains. The Company intends to use the Branchville-Augusta portion of the line for the hauling of freight because of its ‘convenience' value’, as explained by one of the witnesses. We cannot say that it was arbitrary and unreasonable for the Commission to consider the ‘convenience’ of the communities served and order that the company continue to maintain the customary service ordinarily afforded by railroad companies over it. . . .
“Plaintiff is, of course, interested primarily in using the road as an integral part of its great interstate system. It accordingly uses the 61-mile portion between Branchville and Charleston as a part of its main line from Columbia to Charleston, runs excellent trains over it and has no idea of abandoning passenger service so far as that portion is concerned. Likewise it proposes to use the Branch-ville-Augusta portion for the convenience of its system in the hauling of freight. The Commission, however, must look to the interest of the people of South Carolina, as well as to that of the railway system; and we cannot think that, in the light of the purpose for which the charter was granted, it is arbitrary and unreasonable action to require that passenger service be continued over the entire line, and not merely on the portion where operation is to the advantage of plaintiff’s system. ‘The primary duty of the public utility is to serve on reasonable terms all those who desire the service it renders. This duty does not permit it to pick and choose and to serve only those portions of the territory which it finds most profitable, leaving the remainder to get along without the service which it alone is in a position to give. An important purpose of state supervision is to prevent such discriminations.’ United Fuel Gas Co. v. R. R. Com. of Kentucky, 278 U. S. 300, 309, 49 S. Ct. 150, 152, 73 L. Ed. 390.
“ ... It must be remembered that the issue before the Commission was not whether the plaintiff should be required to furnish more or less pas-enger service over the portion of the line in question, but whether -it should be permitted to abandon all passenger service over it.”
If the order of the commission is arbitrary it should be reversed. It is arbitrary if no substantial evidence supports the affirmative finding of public *443need. That is the rule of several of the cases cited in the majority opinion. The converse of that rule would be that the order is not arbitrary if the finding is supported by substantial evidence, and we should affirm. The record discloses to me that numerous cities and towns and many citizens made proof of public need. The evidence was substantial. It convinced the commissioners. They found affirmatively and unanimously that public need did exist. We should affirm under the last-stated rule and under the specific rule of the Yellow Transit case, supra.