Court Opinion

ID: 9943430
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-23 16:04:56.363647+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:00.037506
License: Public Domain

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                STATE OF FLORIDA
                 _____________________________

                      Case No. 5D23-1697
                  LT Case No. 2021-CA-23171
                 _____________________________

FLYING PANDA FLORIDA, LLC, a
Florida Limited Liability
Company,

    Appellant,

    v.

KRISTEN RUTHERFORD, IJUMP
PALM BAY, LLC, D/B/A PLANET 3
EXTREME AIR PARK, a Foreign
Limited Liability Company,
LION TAMER, LLC, a Florida
Limited Liability Company,

    Appellees.
                 _____________________________

Nonfinal appeal from the Circuit Court for Brevard County.
George Paulk, Judge.

Joseph S. Justice, of Buckley, Seacord & Justice, P.A., Orlando,
for Appellant.

Christopher V. Carlyle, of The Carlyle Appellate Law Firm,
Orlando, and Scott D. Alpizar, of Alpizar Law, LLC, Palm Bay,
for Appellee, Kristen Rutherford.

No Appearance for Remaining Appellees.

                        February 23, 2024
HARRIS, J.

     Appellant, Flying Panda, LLC, timely appeals the trial court’s
non-final order granting Appellee, Kristen Rutherford’s, Motion to
Deem Exculpatory Waiver Void and Unenforceable and denying
Flying Panda’s Motion to Compel Mediation and Arbitration.
Flying Panda argues inter alia that the trial court erred in
considering the validity of the exculpatory clause contained within
the Waiver because this consideration was premature and erred in
failing to enforce the unchallenged mediation/arbitration clause.
We find that the court erred in denying Flying Panda’s motion to
compel arbitration and that the issue of the validity of the
exculpatory clause should have been decided in the first instance
by the arbitrator. We therefore reverse and remand for the trial
court to enforce the mediation agreement.

     Kristen Rutherford filed a complaint against Flying Panda
and others alleging that she suffered a serious and permanent
injury while visiting a trampoline park owned by Flying Panda. It
is undisputed that Rutherford was required to sign a document
titled “Plant 3 Palm Bay Waiver” on an electronic device in order
to enter the trampoline park. The Waiver contained a provision
requiring the parties to submit any dispute to mediation and non-
binding arbitration.

     Based on that clause, Flying Panda moved to dismiss the
complaint and/or compel mediation and arbitration, arguing that
Rutherford specifically agreed to such alternative dispute
resolution of her tort claim pursuant to the Waiver. Rutherford
then filed a Motion to Deem Exculpatory Waiver Void and
Unenforceable and a Response in Opposition to Flying Panda’s
Motion to Compel Mediation and Arbitration.

     Flying Panda in turn filed a response to Rutherford’s motion,
arguing that it did not seek to enforce the exculpatory clause, but
rather sought to enforce the alternative dispute resolution clause
and therefore, Rutherford’s motion was premature. Flying Panda
argued that because Rutherford admitted to completing the
Waiver and raised no legal argument against the enforceability of
the alternative dispute resolution clause, the court should enforce
that portion of the agreement.

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      Following a hearing on the motions, the court concluded that
the waiver/exculpatory clause was ambiguous and therefore
unenforceable. The court further found that because the Waiver is
deemed unenforceable, then the severability clause cannot serve
to keep the mediation and arbitration clauses enforceable and thus
denied Flying Panda’s motion to compel mediation/arbitration.

      On appeal, Flying Panda argues that it was the arbitrator’s
role, not the trial court’s, to consider whether the exculpatory
clause was valid. 1 See Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna,
546 U.S. 440, 445–46 (2006) (“[U]nless the challenge is to the
arbitration clause itself, the issue of the contract’s validity is
considered by the arbitrator in the first instance.”). We agree and
find that the trial court should have limited its determination to
whether Rutherford had raised any contractual defenses to the
arbitration clause and since she did not, the trial court should have
compelled arbitration.

      That the ultimate determination of the legality or
enforceability of the Waiver was properly for the arbitrators to
decide was made clear in Cardegna, where the United States
Supreme Court identified two types of challenges to arbitration
agreements:

            Challenges to the validity of arbitration
      agreements “upon such grounds as exist at law or in
      equity for the revocation of any contract” can be
      divided into two types. One type challenges specifically
      the validity of the agreement to arbitrate. . . . The
      other challenges the contract as a whole, either on a
      ground that directly affects the entire agreement (e.g.,
      the agreement was fraudulently induced), or on the
      ground that the illegality of one of the contract’s
      provisions renders the whole contract invalid.

            ....

    1 We have considered and rejected Rutherford’s argument that

Flying Panda has not preserved this issue for appellate review.

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      First, as a matter of substantive federal arbitration
      law, an arbitration provision is severable from the
      remainder of the contract. Second, unless the challenge
      is to the arbitration clause itself, the issue of the
      contract’s validity is considered by the arbitrator in the
      first instance. Third, this arbitration law applies in
      state as well as federal courts. . . . [B]ecause
      respondents challenge the Agreement, but not
      specifically its arbitration provisions, those provisions
      are enforceable apart from the remainder of the
      contract. The challenge should therefore be considered
      by an arbitrator, not a court.

Id. at 444–46 (emphasis supplied). Florida law is in accord. See
Charles Boyd Constr., Inc. v. Vacation Beach, Inc., 959 So. 2d 1227,
1231–32 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007) (“[U]nder either the Florida or
Federal view, only an attack on the making of the arbitration
provision of the contract raises an issue for the court to decide.”);
Arrasola v. MGP Motor Holdings, LLC, 172 So. 3d 508, 513 (Fla.
3d DCA 2015) (holding same); Operis Grp., Corp. v. E.I. at Doral,
LLC, 973 So. 2d 485, 487 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (“Under Florida’s
arbitration code, the trial court must consider three elements
before ruling on a motion to compel arbitration of a given dispute:
(1) whether a valid written agreement to arbitrate exists; (2)
whether an arbitrable issue exists; and (3) whether the right to
arbitration was waived.” (citing Seifert v. U.S. Home Corp., 750 So.
2d 633, 636 (Fla. 1999))); see also § 682.03(1), Fla. Stat.

      Here, Rutherford does not dispute that she signed the
Waiver or that the Waiver contains a provision to arbitrate. She
challenges the validity of the exculpatory clause and argues that
because the clause is invalid, the contract as a whole is as well.
She does not specifically challenge the arbitration provision. Thus,
the claim of invalidity of the exculpatory clause or the Waiver as a
whole must be considered in the first instance by the arbitrator
rather than the court.

     We reverse the trial court’s order in its entirety and remand
with instructions to grant Flying Panda’s motion to compel
mediation/arbitration.

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    REVERSED and REMANDED with instructions.

EISNAUGLE and SOUD, JJ., concur.

                _____________________________

    Not final until disposition of any timely and
    authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
    9.331.
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