Court Opinion

ID: 9394639
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-15 22:02:47.838431+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:01.408368
License: Public Domain

Filed 5/15/23 P. v. Hernandez CA1/5
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                  DIVISION FIVE

 THE PEOPLE,
           Plaintiff and Respondent,                                     A161740
 v.
 AUDREY JOYCE HERNANDEZ,                                                 (Mendocino County
           Defendant and Appellant.                                      Super. Ct. No.
                                                                            SCUK-CRCR-19-31442)

         This is an appeal from final judgment. Defendant Audrey Joyce
Hernandez was convicted after a bench trial of two counts of corporal injury
on a child (counts one–two) and three counts of child neglect (counts three–
five). The court sentenced her to a total term of seven years four months,
which included an aggravated six-year term on count one and a consecutive
one-year four-months term on count two.
         Defendant challenges the judgment on the grounds that (1) the trial
court’s denial of her request to continue trial resulted in a violation of her
constitutional right to a jury trial (U.S. Const., 6th Amend.); (2) an
ameliorative change to our determinate sentencing law requires a remand for
resentencing; and (3) imposition of $4,312 in fees and fines despite her
inability to pay violated her constitutional rights to due process and the
prohibition against excessive fines (U.S. Const., 14th, 8th Amends.). As the

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People concede, defendant’s latter two arguments have merit. Accordingly,
we reverse and remand for further proceedings on defendant’s sentence
under the newly amended Penal Code1 section 1170, subdivision (b) and her
ability to pay the imposed fines and fees. In all other regards, we affirm the
judgment.
                 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
        On August 1, 2019, an information was filed charging defendant with
two counts of corporal injury on a child, D.R. (§ 273d, subd. (a); counts one–
two), and three counts of child neglect involving T.R., L.R. and S.R. (§ 273a,
subd. (b); counts three–five). These charges stemmed from events that
occurred on or between May 1 and May 7, 2019. A bench trial began
October 5, 2020, and revealed the following evidence.
        Defendant lived with her five grandchildren, including 10-year-old D.R.
and her 13-year-old sister, T.R. On May 7, 2019, D.R. reported to a school
counselor that defendant was abusing her. The school counselor
photographed significant bruising and injuries on D.R.’s body consistent with
abuse and reported the matter to Child Protective Services. D.R. and the
counselor were interviewed by a detective later that day. D.R. reported that
defendant regularly beat her with a belt and occasionally directed T.R. to do
the same.
        The next day, police officers searched defendant’s home and recovered
her cell phone. On it, dated May 4, 2019, was a video showing D.R. naked,
being ordered to put a pair of underwear in her mouth while a dog jumped at
her and tried to bite the underwear. The dog can be seen scratching and
biting D.R. while defendant laughed. Three of D.R.’s siblings, T.R. (age 13),

        1   Unless otherwise stated, all statutory citations herein are to the Penal
Code.

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L.R. (age 9) and A.H. (age 4), were present during this incident, and two of
them participated in the abuse at defendant’s direction. 2
      At trial, defendant took the stand and denied abusing D.R. The court
rejected defendant’s testimony and found her guilty as charged.
      At the December 3, 2020, sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed
an aggravated six-year term on count one with a consecutive one-year four-
month term on count two. As to counts three–five, the court imposed one-
year concurrent terms, resulting in a total sentence of seven years four
months to be served locally in county jail. The court then split this term,
requiring defendant to serve four years in custody and three years four
months under mandatory supervision. This timely appeal followed.
                                DISCUSSION
I.    No Sixth Amendment Violation.
      Defendant claims the trial court violated her right to a jury trial under
the Sixth Amendment of the federal Constitution when it denied her request
for a continuance of trial for health reasons. On appeal, she argues there was
good cause to grant a continuance under section 1050, subdivision (e). We
conclude, however, defendant forfeited this claim when, in open court, she
knowingly and voluntarily waived her jury trial rights. We begin with the
relevant facts.
      The charged crimes occurred in May 2019. In June 2019, defense
counsel requested a continuance for a “couple weeks” to permit defendant to
retain private counsel, advising the court, “This would be my last request.”
The court put the matter over until July 9, 2019, at which time she entered a
not guilty plea. A preliminary hearing then went forward on July 30, 2019.

      2These children were later interviewed about the incident by Child
Protective Services.

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      When the matter came up for trial, defendant was 76 years old and
suffering from health issues that required several more continuances. Most
significant, defendant had open heart surgery in early 2020. Afterward, on
March 13, 2020, defense counsel provided the court with a letter from
defendant’s physician recommending a trial delay for two months so that
defendant could heal from the surgery. The trial court agreed and set a new
trial date of May 13, 2020. However, on that date, defense counsel again
asked for more time and the trial date was pushed back to October 5, 2020.
      At a pretrial conference on September 16, 2020, defense counsel made
an oral motion for a continuance based on defendant’s continued health
concerns. The prosecution refused to waive proper written notice, prompting
the court to continue the hearing until October 1, 2020, so that defense
counsel could file a written motion supported by necessary documentation
regarding defendant’s health. Defense counsel failed to do this. Instead, on
October 1, 2020, he made another oral motion for a continuance, advising the
court that defendant was still not recovered from surgery and recently
suffered a “transient ischemic [attack]” or “mini stroke.” Counsel further
stated that he was still awaiting documentation as to defendant’s condition
from her physician but that it was his opinion that she was too fragile to sit
through a multi-day jury trial. Counsel also informally offered the
prosecution a letter from defendant’s treating family nurse practitioner
opining that defendant was not physically able to sit through trial due to her
fragile medical condition, particularly considering the significant risks posed
to her by the COVID-19 pandemic. The prosecutor opposed defense counsel’s
oral motion and objected to the nurse practitioner’s informal letter as
hearsay.

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      The trial court denied defense counsel’s motion, as follows: “The Court
does not find good cause to waive written notice of the [motion for
continuance]. This issue has been percolating and there have been multiple
attempts at an oral [motion]. From what was stated orally, even if there was
a written [motion], without more from a medical doctor with a recent
evaluation of [defendant], even with a—a written declaration, my tentative
would be to deny it and not find good cause.” The court was ready to proceed
with a jury trial. However, the next day, on October 2, 2020, defendant
waived her right to a jury trial and proceeded with a bench trial.
      On appeal, defendant now contends the trial court’s denial of her oral
motion for continuance resulted in her subsequent waiver of a jury trial and,
thereby, violated her constitutional right under the Sixth Amendment to a
trial by jury. Defendant’s argument fails, as she neither argues nor presents
any evidence that her express waiver of the right to a jury trial was
unknowing or involuntary.
      On the contrary, before accepting defendant’s jury trial waiver, the trial
court questioned her extensively in open court. Among other things, the trial
court confirmed defendant understood that the Constitution guaranteed her
the right to a trial by jury consisting of 12 members of the community who
could only find her guilty of the charges if the prosecutor proved the People’s
case beyond a reasonable doubt. On the other hand, if defendant waived her
jury trial right, one person—the judge—would determine her guilt, based on
the same burden of proof. The court also confirmed that defendant had
enough time to discuss this waiver and its consequences with her attorney
and that she understood that, once given, her waiver could not be taken back.
      This record belies defendant’s argument that her waiver of the right to
a jury trial was the result of the trial court’s denial of her request for a

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continuance. “Under both the federal Constitution and the California
Constitution, a defendant in a criminal prosecution is guaranteed the right to
a jury trial. [Citation.] Nonetheless, as enshrined in our state Constitution,
a ‘jury may be waived in a criminal cause by the consent of both parties
expressed in open court by the defendant and the defendant's counsel.’ (Cal.
Const., art. I, § 16.) Waiver must be ‘express[ed] in words . . . and will not be
implied from a defendant’s conduct.’ [Citation.] Moreover, a court may not
accept a defendant’s waiver of a jury trial unless the waiver ‘is knowing and
intelligent, that is, “ ‘ “made with a full awareness both of the nature of the
right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it,” ’ ”
as well as voluntary “ ‘ “in the sense that it was the product of a free and
deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception.” ’ ” ’ ”
(People v. Daniels (2017) 3 Cal.5th 961, 990.) “We uphold the validity of a
jury waiver ‘ “if the record affirmatively shows that it is voluntary and
intelligent under the totality of the circumstances.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 991.)
      We conclude our record affirmatively demonstrates defendant’s waiver
was voluntary and intelligent under the totality of the circumstances.
(People v. Robertson (1989) 48 Cal.3d 18, 36–37 & fn. 5 [jury trial waiver
stands where the court provides a thorough advisement that includes the
following: “You understand, also, that if you do waive jury and submit it to
the Court, the Court will act solely. If you have a jury trial, before a verdict
can be returned either way, it requires unanimous agreement of all 12 jurors;
do you understand that?”].) Defendant does not claim otherwise. Even
accepting that a “proper weighing of the totality of the circumstances forces
us to take into account [the court’s denial of defendant’s continuance motion]”
(People v. Daniels, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 996), defendant was advised of both
the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision

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to abandon it and was offered more time to discuss these issues with her
counsel. Under these circumstances, her Sixth Amendment challenge,
premised on the court’s denial of her continuance motion the previous day,
fails.
II.      Remand for Resentencing Under Section 1170.
         The parties agree defendant is entitled to a remand for resentencing to
permit the trial court to apply the newly amended section 1170,
subdivision (b), an ameliorative change to our determinate sentencing law
that went into effect postjudgment, on January 1, 2022. We also agree.
         Senate Bill No. 567 (2020–2021 Reg. Sess.) amended section 1170 in
fundamental ways. (Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1.3.) Relevant here, the bill made
the statutorily prescribed middle term sentence the presumptive term unless
“there are circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify the
imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term, and the
facts underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the
defendant, or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the
jury or by the judge in a court trial.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(2).)
         To the contrary, under the version of section 1170 in effect at the time
of defendant’s sentencing, the trial court had broad discretion to select a
lower, middle, or upper term sentence. (Former § 1170, subd. (b); former Cal.
Rules of Court, rules 4.420, 4.421, 4.423.) The court, exercising this
discretion, chose the upper six-year term as the primary term on count one
based on the aggravating factors set forth in the probation report. These
aggravating factors included, among others, the fact that the crimes involved
a high degree of callousness and cruelty, defendant was armed with a belt
and dog during their commission, the victim was particularly vulnerable, and
defendant tried to hide a cell phone to obstruct the investigation. None of

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these facts were stipulated to or expressly found true beyond a reasonable
doubt by a fact finder, as required under the amendatory version of section
1170, subdivision (b)(2).
       Notwithstanding the trial court’s adherence to the law in effect at the
time of sentencing, it is well-established law that the amendatory version of
section 1170, subdivision (b) applies retroactively in this case because the
judgment is not yet final. (In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 745 [an
“amendatory act imposing the lighter punishment can be applied
constitutionally to acts committed before its passage provided the judgment
convicting the defendant of the act is not final”]; People v. Lopez (2019) 42
Cal.App.5th 337, 341–342 [“For the purpose of determining the retroactive
application of an amendment to a criminal statute, the finality of a judgment
is extended until the time has passed for petitioning for a writ of certiorari in
the United States Supreme Court”].)
       Accordingly, we remand this matter for further proceedings to permit
the trial court to apply the amendatory version of section 1170,
subdivision (b) in setting defendant’s sentence.
III.   Inability to Pay Hearing on Remand.
       Claiming an inability to pay, defendant challenges the trial court’s
imposition of a $600 restitution fine (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)), a reduced $3,000
fine for willfully inflicting upon a child cruel or inhuman corporal
punishment or injury resulting in a traumatic condition (§ 273d), and a $712
probation supervision fee3 (former § 1203.1, subd. (b)) as violations of the due
process, equal protection, and excessive fines clauses of the federal and state
Constitutions. In doing so, defendant relies primarily on People v. Dueñas
(2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157 (Dueñas) and People v. Kopp (2019) 38

       3   We address the probation supervision fee separately in part IV, post.

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Cal.App.5th 47, review granted Nov. 13, 2019, S257844 (Kopp)). The People,
in turn, agree with defendant that because no actual determination was
made below as to her financial circumstances, we should remand this matter
to the trial court to permit defendant to request a hearing on her inability to
pay the contemplated amounts.
      “In Dueñas, the court held that the imposition of a court operations
assessment and a court facilities assessment without a determination of the
defendant’s ability to pay was ‘fundamentally unfair’ and violated due
process under the federal and state Constitutions. (Dueñas, supra, 30
Cal.App.5th at p. 1168.) The court also concluded that the execution of a
restitution fine under section 1202.4 ‘must be stayed unless and until the
trial court holds an ability to pay hearing and concludes that the defendant
has the present ability to pay the restitution fine. (Dueñas, supra, at p.
1164.)” (People v. Thompson (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 69, 120.)
      In Kopp, a majority of the court agreed with Dueñas that with respect
to nonpunitive assessments, “due process requires the trial court to conduct
an ability to pay hearing and ascertain a defendant’s ability to pay before it
imposes court facilities and court operations assessments under Penal Code
section 1465.8 and Government Code section 70373, if the defendant requests
such a hearing.” (Kopp, supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at p. 95, rev.gr.) However, the
Kopp majority held that punitive fines, including the restitution fine under
section 1202.4, should be challenged under the excessive fines clauses of the
federal and state Constitutions rather than the due process clauses. (Kopp,
supra, at pp. 96–97, rev.gr.) Again, a hearing on remand was required to
determine whether imposing punitive fines on an indigent defendant violated
the excessive fines clauses. (Id. at pp. 96–98, rev.gr.)

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      Since this matter is already being remanded for the trial court to
resentence defendant under the amendatory version of section 1170,
subdivision (b), and the People have no objection to defendant’s raising her
Dueñas/Kopp claim, we conclude a remand for further proceedings on this
issue is proper. (People v. Thompson, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 121; People
v. Castellano (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 485, 490.)
IV.   Assembly Bill No. 1869 eliminates the probation supervision fee.
      Last, defendant argues, and the People concede, a change in law under
Assembly Bill No. 1869 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.), which eliminated
presentencing report fees, renders unenforceable the $712 probation
supervision fee imposed by the trial court pursuant to former section 1203.1,
subdivision (b). (Assem. Bill No. 1869 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) §§ 2, 62.) This
is correct.
      Assembly Bill No. 1869, effective July 1, 2021, eliminated fees related
to producing a preplea or presentence report. (See former § 1203.1b.)
Relevant here, this bill added section 1465.9, which states: “On and after
January 1, 2022, the balance of any court-imposed costs pursuant to Section
. . . 1203.1 . . . , as those sections read on December 31, 2021, shall be
unenforceable and uncollectible and any portion of a judgment imposing
those costs shall be vacated.” (§ 1465.9, subd. (b).) This statutory language
as well as the legislative purpose make clear this change in law applies
retroactively in this case. (See Assem. Bill No. 1869 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.)
§§ 2 [the legislative purpose of the bill is to “eliminate the range of
administrative fees that agencies and courts are authorized to impose to fund
elements of the criminal legal system and to eliminate all outstanding debt
incurred as a result of the imposition of administrative fees”], 62.) Thus,
under this provision, any balance owed by defendant on the $712 probation

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supervision fee under former section 1203.1 was rendered “unenforceable and
uncollectable” as of January 1, 2022, and the portion of the judgment
imposing this fee must be vacated.
                                    DISPOSITION
       The judgment is reversed, and the matter is remanded for further
proceedings so that the trial court can (1) resentence defendant under the
newly amended version of section 1170, subdivision (b); (2) consider
defendant’s claim that she lacks the ability to pay the previously imposed
monetary penalties; and (3) vacate the portion of the judgment imposing the
$712 probation supervision fee. In all other regards, the judgment is
affirmed.

                                                _________________________
                                                Jackson, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
Simons, J.

_________________________
Burns, J.

A161740/People v. Audrey Joyce Hernandez

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