Court Opinion

ID: 9926446
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-24 19:02:10.442793+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:01.111388
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/24/24 In re L.B. CA2/6
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                         DIVISION SIX

 In re L.B. et al.,                                            2d Juv. No. B329665
 Persons Coming Under the                                   (Super. Ct. No. 21JD00112)
 Juvenile Court Law.                                         (San Luis Obispo County)

 SAN LUIS OBISPO COUNTY
 DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL
 SERVICES,

      Plaintiff and Respondent,

 v.

 A.B.,

      Defendant and Appellant.

     A.B. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court order
terminating her parental rights as to her daughter, L.B., and two
sons, I.B., and K.B. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26.)1 She contends

         1 Subsequent statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
the court erred when it found the beneficial parental relationship
exception did not apply. We affirm.2
            FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
                        Social services history
      In 2012, Mother agreed to a voluntary service plan after
using methamphetamine and heroin during her pregnancy with
her eldest child, L.B. In 2018, Mother overdosed after injecting
methamphetamine into her arm with L.B. and I.B present. L.B.
observed first responders attempt to revive Mother. As a result,
L.B. and I.B. became juvenile court dependents from 2018
through 2020. Mother relapsed shortly after that case closed,
using drugs daily with her boyfriend B.P., including heroin,
methamphetamine, and oxycodone laced with fentanyl.
      In July 2021, Mother and the children were homeless.
Mother and B.P. had arguments in front of the children. Mother
tested positive for fentanyl, opiates, methamphetamine, and
amphetamine. I.B. witnessed an altercation in which B.P.
slapped Mother and she hit him, breaking his nose. I.B. reported
that B.P. slaps L.B.’s face, and B.P. grabbed I.B. and L.B. “very
hard.”
                          Current petition
      In September 2021, Mother overdosed on amphetamine,
methamphetamine, benzodiazepine, and opioids. The children
reported she was “screaming.” B.P. dropped her off at the
emergency room. During her hospitalization, the children slept
in B.P.’s car. A social worker found the children “sad and
distraught.” The children said B.P. previously yelled at them and
they had seen him punch Mother in the face.

      2 The children’s fathers are not parties to the appeal.

                                 2
       L.B. and I.B. were not attending school. I.B. was behind in
school based on numerous absences. Both L.B. and I.B. needed
major dental work resulting from chronic neglect.
       The San Luis Obispo County Department of Social Services
(the department) filed dependency petitions regarding L.B. (age
8), I.B. (age 7), and K.B. (age 2) (§ 300, subd. (b)(1) as to all three,
and subd. (j) as to L.B and K.B.). The children were placed with
a foster parent, their long-term daycare provider. The juvenile
court sustained the petition, removed the children from Mother’s
custody (§ 361, subd. (c)(1)), and ordered that she receive
reunification services.
                         Reunification efforts
       Mother was discharged from three residential programs—
twice for drug use and once for noncompliance with program
rules.
       Mother had periods of sobriety during the case. But she
also provided multiple positive drug tests for methamphetamine,
fentanyl, and opioids.
       At the six-month review hearing, the court accepted a
mediation agreement and extended Mother’s reunification
services for six months. During the extended period, she used
methamphetamine and other drugs on multiple occasions. She
entered a fourth residential treatment program but relapsed
three times and stopped submitting to testing. She left the
program without permission of the department and moved in
with her new boyfriend, Mr. T.
       Mother visited the children regularly in person, by
telephone, and remotely by computer. The foster parent reported
I.B. and K.B. showed significant increases in anger and
aggression following in-person visits. The children did not ask
about visits or when the next one might occur.

                                   3
       Mother was allowed an unsupervised visit, but contrary to
her written agreement with the department, brought Mr. T.
During the visit, Mother and Mr. T had a verbal altercation in
front of the children. She told the children that if they told
anyone he was there, “they would never see her again and would
be permanently separated from each other.” L.B. cried about
this, and I.B. had bad dreams.
       Despite direction from the department to the contrary,
Mother repeatedly talked to the children about them returning to
her care. She brought a puppy to one visit and said the family
would be together again when she found housing, and the puppy
would be waiting for the children.
       At the 12-month review, Mother was participating in
several therapy programs but had missed virtually all group
counseling and testing at a mandated Drug and Alcohol Services
Program. Mother’s therapist testified she was actively involved
in therapy. He also testified that safety and stability are
important to child development and multiple placement changes
are detrimental to children. The court terminated Mother’s
reunification services.
               Selection and implementation hearing
       The social worker’s report for the selection and
implementation hearing (§ 366.26) stated the foster parent “has
known and cared for these kids the majority of their young lives.
Her home has always been a steady, stable, consistent, and
loving place for them.” The children reported they were happy
about staying with the foster parent long term and being
adopted. The social worker opined that adoption would be in
their best interest because it would provide “stability,
permanence, structure, support, and love that they all need to
continue to grow.”

                                4
       The social worker testified as an expert regarding
permanency planning and adoption. She was concerned that
ongoing contact with Mother would harm the children because
she often gave them false hope they would be back together as a
family. She believed that based on the history of being removed
and then returned to Mother’s custody, the conflicting messages
confused the children. She testified that during telephone visits,
I.B. and K.B. got “riled up” and fought with each other. On her
own initiative, L.B. set a timer and ended the calls after 10
minutes.
       The social worker did not believe the children would suffer
great harm if their relationship with Mother were severed. She
testified that adoption was important to their well-being by
providing the security of a permanent living situation and a sole
decision maker.
       The children’s attorney joined with the department in
recommending adoption as the permanent plan.
       Mother testified that during in-person visits, the children
ran up to her and hugged her. At the visits, they played, ate
snacks, and talked about school. Mother said K.B. cried at the
end of their last visit. Mother testified she was “losing
everything because of little things here and there . . . [T]his is so
hard to lose my kids.” She requested that the children be placed
with her stepfather.
       The Court Appointed Special Advocate (CASA) reported
that when the children lived with Mother, their life was “chaotic,
with even the basics of food and shelter irregularly provided.”
K.B. continued to suffer from “screaming fits, separation anxiety,
and food insecurity.” The CASA noted the two older children had
been removed from the home once before, and it would be difficult
to uproot them again when they were thriving in foster care. She

                                 5
stated the children “crave security” and were “very happy” with
the foster parent.
        The juvenile court found clear and convincing evidence
that it was likely the children would be adopted. The court found
the beneficial parental relationship exception (§ 366.26, subd.
(c)(1)(B)(i)) did not apply, terminated Mother’s parental rights,
and selected adoption as the permanent plan.
                             DISCUSSION
       Mother contends the juvenile court erred when it failed to
apply the beneficial parental relationship exception to bar
adoption as the permanent plan. We disagree.
       After reunification services have been terminated, the court
sets a section 366.26 hearing “ ‘to select and implement a
permanent plan for the child.’ ” (In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th
614, 630 (Caden C.).) The statutory preference is termination of
parental rights and placing the child for adoption. (§ 366.26,
subd. (b)(1).)
       The beneficial parental relationship exception allows the
court to choose an option other than adoption “ ‘in exceptional
circumstances.’ ” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 631.) The
exception has three elements: “(1) regular visitation and contact,
and (2) a relationship, the continuation of which would benefit the
child such that (3) the termination of parental rights would be
detrimental to the child.” (Ibid.) The parent must establish these
three elements by a preponderance of the evidence. (Id. at p.
629.) What the court must determine “is how the child would be
affected by losing the parental relationship—in effect, what life
would be like for the child in an adoptive home without the
parent in the child’s life.” (Id. at p. 633.)
       The juvenile court here applied the standards of Caden C.
and correctly summarized its requirements, stating: “I think that

                                6
[Caden C.] requires the court to find that there is a significant,
positive emotional attachment from the child to the parent and
that severance of that attachment would result in harm to the
child.” (See Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 632-633.) As
discussed below, Mother has not demonstrated error.
                         Regular visitation
       The first element is not at issue here because the parties do
not dispute that Mother regularly visited the children.
                       Beneficial relationship
       We review the second element—benefit from continuing the
relationship—for substantial evidence. (Caden C., supra, 11
Cal.5th at pp. 639-640.) Courts must consider “a slew of factors,
such as ‘the age of the child, the portion of the child’s life spent in
the parent’s custody, the “positive” or “negative” effect of
interaction between parent and child, and the child’s particular
needs’ ” to determine whether the child would benefit from a
continued relationship with the parent. (Id. at p. 632.)
       Here, there was evidence that the children had a
relationship with Mother even though they spent a significant
amount of time outside Mother’s custody. The children were 8, 7,
and 2 years old when the petition was filed. They were in the
foster parent’s custody during the 21 months in which the case
was pending. During “much of” the previous case from June 2018
through October 2020, L.B. and I.B. were in foster care with
Mother’s stepfather.
       But there was also evidence that the children would not
benefit from continuing the relationship. (Caden C., supra, at p.
631.) For example, the children were exposed to abusive
boyfriends, the children acted out after visits with Mother, and
Mother undermined their sense of security by telling them they
would return to her custody. On her own initiative, L.B. set a

                                  7
timer and ended the calls with Mother after 10 minutes. The
court may consider these negative effects, including Mother
undermining their foster placement, in “disentangling” the
benefits and burdens of the relationship. (Id. at pp. 634, 637.)
      The juvenile court was not required to make an explicit
finding whether the second element was established. (See In re
Jesse B. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 845, 851 [court required to make
express finding regarding detriment only if it concludes exception
to adoption applies].) Even though the court did not make a
specific finding that continuation of the relationship would not
benefit the children, the juvenile court stated, “I don’t see the
positive attachment as to any of the three children that would
require an application of the [Caden C.] findings in this case.”
This finding was sufficient. “The juvenile court may reject the
parent’s claim simply by finding that the relationship maintained
during visitation does not benefit the child significantly enough
to outweigh the strong preference for adoption.” (In re Jasmine
D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1350, disapproved on other
grounds, Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 636, fn. 5.)
      Because there is substantial evidence that the children
would not benefit from continuing their relationship with Mother,
no error has been shown. “On review of the sufficiency of the
evidence, we presume in favor of the order, considering the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party,
giving the prevailing party the benefit of every reasonable
inference and resolving all conflicts in support of the order.” (In
re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 576.) “[W]e do not
consider whether there is evidence from which the juvenile court
could have drawn a different conclusion but whether there is
substantial evidence to support the conclusion that the court did
draw.” (In re M.R. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 101, 108.) Moreover,

                                8
even if the second element was established, the court properly
exercised its discretion when it determined the exception did not
apply based on the third element.
                         Detriment of termination
       “[T]he parent must show that terminating that attachment
would be detrimental to the child even when balanced against the
countervailing benefit of a new, adoptive home.” (Caden C.,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 636.) A “ ‘showing the child would derive
some benefit from continuing a relationship maintained during
periods of visitation’ ” is not a sufficient ground to depart from
the statutory preference for adoption. (In re G.H. (2022) 84
Cal.App.5th 15, 25.) “Friendly or affectionate visits are not
enough.” (Ibid.) “ ‘To overcome the preference for adoption and
avoid termination of the natural parent’s [parental] rights, the
parent must show that severing the natural parent-child
relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive
emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly
harmed.’ ” (Ibid.)
       We review the third element for substantial evidence as to
factual determinations such as “specific features of the child’s
relationship with the parent,” “the harm that would come from
losing those specific features,” and “the benefit of adoption.”
(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 640.) We review for abuse of
discretion the “delicate balancing” of “the harm of losing the
relationship against the benefits of placement in a new, adoptive
home.” (Ibid.) “A court abuses its discretion only when ‘ “ ‘the
trial court has exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making
an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination’ ” ’ ”
such that “ ‘ “ ‘no judge could reasonably have made the
order.’ ” ’ ” (Id. at p. 641.)
       The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion here. It

                                9
stated, “As with these three children and the time that’s spent
away from their mother’s care and the increase in their
relationship and advantages with [the foster parent], I don’t see
the positive attachment as to any of the three children that would
require an application of the [Caden C.] findings in this case. [¶]
For one example, I honestly think that bringing a puppy to a visit
is manipulative and was intended to draw emotion from children
toward a puppy as opposed to the value of their relationship
between this mother and their children.”
       There is no question Mother loves the children. But
Mother testified about the effect losing the children would have
on her. She did not show that the children would be greatly
harmed by severing the relationship. “[T]he focus is on the
child.” (In re A.L. (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1131, 1151.) “ ‘What
courts need to determine . . . is how the child would be affected by
losing the parental relationship.’ ” (Ibid., italics added.)
       In our view, the juvenile court did not improperly consider
Mother’s continuing substance abuse. The court stated, “I am
sorry that the mother hasn’t made more progress in her case plan
and been in a position where the court could make a different
decision. But the reality is that is not the case here.” The case
plan included not only abstinence from illegal drugs and
completion of a residential treatment program, but also taking
anger management and parenting education classes, and
“demonstrat[ing] an ability to meet the basic needs of the
children consistently, including safe housing.” The juvenile court
was not prohibited from considering the continuing substance
abuse and abusive incidents with boyfriends. “A parent’s
continued struggles with the issues leading to dependency are not
a categorical bar to applying the exception.” (Caden C., supra, 11
Cal.5th at p. 637, italics added.) Instead, such issues “often prove

                                10
relevant to the application of the exception” and “may mean that
interaction between parent and child at least sometimes has a
‘ “negative” effect’ on the child.” (Ibid.)
       Such is the case here. Mother’s drug use exposed the
children to two emergency responses to her overdoses. They
continued to be exposed to abusive boyfriends and Mother’s
representations that the children would again be removed from a
stable home and returned to her custody.
       The juvenile court did not improperly “compar[e] the
parent’s attributes as custodial caregiver relative to those of any
potential adoptive parent(s).” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p.
634.) The children were doing well in a foster home that provided
stability and security. Adoption was in the children’s best
interest because it would provide permanence in a stable home.
       The juvenile court properly concluded that Mother did not
meet her burden to establish the beneficial parental relationship
exception.
                            DISPOSITION
       The juvenile court’s orders terminating Mother’s parental
rights and selecting adoption as the permanent plan, entered
June 5, 2023, are affirmed.
       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                     BALTODANO, J.

We concur:

             YEGAN, Acting P. J.                CODY, J.

                                11
                   Linda D. Hurst, Judge

          Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo

               ______________________________

     Elizabeth Klippi, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
     Rita L. Neal, County Counsel, Ann Duggan, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.