Court Opinion

ID: 9489355
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 13:13:41.135918+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:53:29.119500
License: Public Domain

MANION, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I concur with the court’s decision to vacate the order of restitution and remand the matter to the district court for entry of a more appropriate order. I write separately to make two points. First, I agree that the district court exceeded its authority in requiring Lampien to deed her home to Wau-sau as part of its restitution order. Except where the court is directing the return of property to its rightful owner, see 18 U.S.C. § 3663(b)(1)(A), which is not the case with Lampien’s home, an order of restitution should generally be a dollar amount payable with whatever financial resources are at the defendant’s disposal. (An exception would arise where the victim consents to services in lieu of money under 18 U.S.C. § 3663(b)(5).) Thus if Lampien has other means of paying the required restitution (e.g., helpful family members, lucky lotto number, etc.), she should be allowed to keep her home. However, there is no question that Lampieris home can be sold in a foreclosure action to enforce the order of restitution if she is otherwise unable to meet her obligations. Id. §§ 3663(h)(1) & (2) and 3613(a) & (e); 26 U.S.C. § 7403(c).
Second, I agree that an order of restitution cannot be impossible. I’m sure the district court understood that as well, but it faced a difficult situation. Lampien stole nearly half a million dollars in a relatively short period of time. A garage full of apparently worthless clothes seems to be the only proceeds recovered. Either she blew a lot of money in a hurry in some other way (e.g., gambling) or she has a pile of cash stashed somewhere. There should be some mechanism to ensure that if any of the stolen money surfaces, it can be recovered. Perhaps the statutes could countenance a contingency order requiring payment against a lump sum due in the event the stolen money reappears, or some other mechanism to ensure appropriate restitution. That is for the district court to decide in the first instance.
As for the order to pay $350.00 per month, when all the facts are known, such a payment may not be an abuse of discretion. It is well established in this circuit that “ ‘a person actually unable to pay may be directed to make restitution, provided there is some likelihood that he will acquire resources in the future.’ ” United States v. Reynolds, 64 F.3d 292, 298 (7th Cir.1995) (quoting United States v. Ahmad, 2 F.3d 245, 247 (7th Cir.1993)). As the district court noted, upon Lampieris release from incarceration, she will be eligible to receive Social Security benefits of $716 per month in addition to a monthly pension benefit of $920, for a total of *1326$1,636 per month or almost $20,000 per year. If Lampien is ultimately able to keep her home, which she owns clear of any mortgage, then with some modest belt-tightening her income will more than cover a $350 monthly payment. But even if she is forced to sell her home and seek out another residence, it is likely that she could still make the payment. The presentence report indicated expenses of $50 a month for water and sewer, $35 for homeowner’s insurance, $44 for cable television, $167 for property taxes, $150 for clothing, and $39 for telephone, which includes expensive specialty features such as call waiting, caller identification, speed calling and multi-ring services. Without a home, the water and sewer, homeowner’s insurance, cable television and property tax expenses can be eliminated, yielding $296 in savings. The presentence report indicated telephone costs could be reduced by $12 a month by canceling luxury services, and $50 a month is plenty for clothes shopping at thrift and second-hand stores (especially when the record indicates she has a house and garage packed full of clothing purchased in part with the proceeds of her crime), so that frees up another $100, for a total savings of $408 ... and so on. How much savings can be squeezed from Lampien’s budget is unclear once the costs of a (very) modest apartment are factored in, but I suspect it is more than enough to make a $350 monthly payment possible.
There are of course limits to the amount of restitution that can be ordered. There must be at least some possibility of payment, either immediately or down the road. But one who steals almost $500,000 cannot complain if as part of making restitution for her crime she must live in a small inexpensive apartment, perhaps with a roommate, limit herself to $50 a month in clothing, forego cable television, and field only one call at a time. That is hardly penury.
I concur on this point because the total amount of restitution ordered was impossibly large given Lampien’s present and (likely) future resources. And as one of several parts of the restitution order, the $350 monthly payment cannot be viewed in isolation. We vacate the entire order and remand for the district court to reformulate an appropriate (i.e., not impossible) order. In so doing the district court must decide whether to establish a time limit with a schedule of installments under the limitations of 18 U.S.C. § 3663(f)(2), or to order payment of a specified amount without a deadline or payment schedule, see id. § 3663(a)(1), subject to the dictates of a subsequent enforcement action. See United States v. House, 808 F.2d 508, 510-11 (7th Cir.1986). These are matters for the sound discretion of the district court.