Court Opinion

ID: 9399178
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-02 14:05:01.000021+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:44.648213
License: Public Domain

2023 IL 127223

                                         IN THE
                                SUPREME COURT
                                            OF
                          THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

                                    (Docket No. 127223)

               THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v.
                        MICHAEL B. PINKETT, Appellee.

                                 Opinion filed June 2, 2023.

        JUSTICE O’BRIEN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

        Chief Justice Theis and Justices Neville, Overstreet, Cunningham, and
     Rochford concurred in the judgment and opinion.

        Justice Holder White took no part in the decision.

                                         OPINION

¶1       Defendant Michael B. Pinkett was detained in a Walmart bathroom, was
     ordered to accompany a sheriff’s deputy to the front of the store, and complied with
     the deputy’s orders to “not make a scene.” At Pinkett’s subsequent trial on criminal
     and motor vehicle violations, the State commented on defendant’s silence in its
     opening statement, defendant sought a mistrial, and the Pike County circuit court
     denied his motion. Defendant was found guilty, and he appealed, arguing, in part,
     that the circuit court should have granted his motion for a mistrial. The appellate
     court agreed that defendant was entitled to a mistrial, finding that the circuit court
     erred in denying defendant’s motion for a mistrial and reversed and remanded. 2021
     IL App (4th) 190172-U. We affirm the judgment of the appellate court.

¶2                                        BACKGROUND

¶3       Defendant was charged with aggravated fleeing or attempting to elude a peace
     officer (625 ILCS 5/11-204.1(a)(1) (West 2016)), resulting from a June 2017
     incident where he failed to stop his motorcycle in response to police sirens and
     lights and traveled more than 21 miles per hour over the speed limit. Additional
     charges of speeding 1 (id. § 11-601(b)) and failure to use a turn signal (id. § 11-
     804(d)) were added in July 2018.

¶4       At a preliminary hearing, Pike County Sheriff’s Department deputy sheriff Brad
     Wassell testified to his 13-mile pursuit of three motorcycles at a high rate of speed
     in June 2017. On cross-examination, Wassell said he could not recall if defendant’s
     motorcycle lacked rearview mirrors but, if defendant could not see behind him and
     did not turn around, it is possible defendant did not know Wassell was in pursuit.
     Wassell stated, if defendant was wearing earplugs, “[y]eah. I can see where that
     could have been difficult[ ]” to hear the siren, above the noise of the motorcycles
     and the wind. At the end of the hearing, the circuit court found probable cause
     existed.

¶5       A jury trial took place. Evidence presented at the trial established that defendant
     was ultimately arrested inside a Walmart based on his alleged act of fleeing and
     eluding a peace officer. Prior to opening statements, the trial court informed the
     jury that “[n]either opening statements nor closing arguments are evidence. And
     any statement or argument made by the attorneys which is not based on the
     evidence should be disregarded.” In its opening statement, the State said that the
     arresting officers would “both testify in spite of the fact that they tried to arrest him

         1
          Defendant did not challenge the speeding conviction on appeal, the appellate court did not
     discuss it, and it is not an issue before this court.

                                                  -2-
     there at Walmart without making a scene since it’s in the middle of the store, at no
     point did he ever ask in any way the reason why he was being detained.” Defense
     counsel objected, a sidebar took place, and defense counsel moved for a mistrial,
     arguing that it was improper to comment on defendant’s right to remain silent. The
     State disagreed, arguing that a defendant’s postarrest, pre-Miranda silence (see
     Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)) is not constitutionally protected, citing
     People v. Givens, 135 Ill. App. 3d 810 (1985). Applying Givens, the trial court
     denied the mistrial motion.

¶6       Wassell testified he was on duty on June 10 in uniform in an unmarked sheriff’s
     department vehicle. While on patrol traveling westbound outside of Pittsfield, he
     noticed three motorcycles riding eastbound in a triangular formation. The
     motorcycle at the front was a “crotch-rocket” style sport motorcycle, while the other
     two looked like Harley-Davidson models. The motorcycles appeared to be
     speeding. He activated his radar gun, which was calibrated and in working order,
     and clocked the motorcycles at 78 miles per hour (mph) in a 55-mph speed zone.
     He pulled onto the shoulder and activated the vehicle’s lights, which included visor
     lights, a Wig-Wag system which alternates the headlights, side warning lights in
     the headlights, and blue and red lights in the grille.

¶7       After the motorcycles drove past him without stopping, he did a U-turn and
     began to pursue them. The motorcycles reduced their speed to 60 or 65 mph but did
     not stop. He turned on his siren and continued pursuit from approximately 200 feet
     behind them. They all arrived at a four-way stop in the town of Atlas, where Wassell
     pulled within 10 or 15 feet of the motorcycles and turned off his siren. He observed
     that the front motorcyclist wore a helmet and a large black knife sheathed at his
     waist. The motorcycle lacked rearview mirrors and had a piece of plastic dragging
     from its undercarriage and a darkened license plate. The passenger on one of the
     other motorcycles looked back at Wassell, who gestured for the motorcycle to pull
     over. It did not. All three motorcycles stopped before proceeding through the
     intersection. Wassell continued to pursue the motorcycles from 100 to 300 feet
     behind them.

¶8      As the pursuit neared Pittsfield, Wassell noticed Pittsfield police officer Lisa
     Hobbs sitting in her squad car in a commercial driveway off the side of the road.
     After they passed Hobbs, who had activated her emergency lights as the

                                             -3-
       motorcycles neared her location, the motorcycles disengaged from the triangle
       formation into a single file, sped up, and passed an SUV. At that point, Wassell was
       traveling at 90 mph in a 45-mph zone. He fell behind the motorcycles and lost sight
       of two of the motorcyclists, including defendant. He pursued the third motorcycle
       and ultimately arrested the driver at a gas station in Pittsfield where the motorcyclist
       had stopped.

¶9          Wassell identified, and the jury viewed, still pictures from Hobbs’s squad car
       camera as the SUV and motorcycles passed her, Wassell’s interview of defendant,
       and surveillance footage videos from Pike Feed and Walmart. He identified the
       three motorcycles and Hobbs passing Pike Feed in its video. In the Walmart video,
       he identified a motorcycle pulling into the lot and two motorcycles being pursued
       by two squad cars driving by on the road in front of the store. He also identified
       still photographs of the motorcycles shown in the Walmart video and pictures he
       had taken of two of the motorcycles, including defendant’s.

¶ 10       On cross-examination, Wassell said defendant told him he did not see the
       deputy’s lights because he was looking down when he initially passed Wassell. The
       motorcyclists did not split up or take other evasive actions. He followed the SUV
       for approximately a mile during the pursuit before it pulled off the road. Wassell
       acknowledged that defendant’s motorcycle did not have rearview mirrors, he did
       not see defendant turn around at any time, defendant was wearing a helmet, and the
       motorcycles were louder than smaller motorcycles. He also stated that, if defendant
       was wearing a face mask that covered his ears, with the wind and motorcycle noise,
       it would be difficult to hear the siren.

¶ 11       Hobbs, who worked part-time as a Pittsfield police officer, testified. She was
       also a part-time officer for the Pleasant Hill Police Department and a full-time
       officer for the Pike County Sheriff’s Department. She heard Wassell’s request for
       assistance and positioned her car in the driveway of an implement dealership
       located on the road the motorcycles were travelling. Her squad car was
       perpendicular to the roadway. When she heard Wassell’s siren, she turned on her
       MARS lights, which activated her dashboard camera. The video showed the
       motorcyclists driving by less than a minute later with Wassell a few seconds behind
       them. She joined the pursuit, and the video showed her squad car following Wassell
       into Pittsfield and into the gas station where he arrested one of the motorcyclists.

                                                -4-
¶ 12       Hobbs was then dispatched to Walmart. On her way to the store, she stopped to
       pick up from the roadway a small leather item, which remained unidentified. When
       she arrived at Walmart, she noted a black motorcycle in the parking lot and found
       a black face mask on the ground. She waited while Sergeant Matt Frazier entered
       the store. On cross-examination, she examined a photograph of defendant entering
       Walmart, acknowledged there was an item hanging around defendant’s neck but
       said she could not tell if it was earplugs or otherwise identify it.

¶ 13       Frank Smith testified. He was in the Walmart parking lot in Pittsfield with his
       family when defendant pulled in on his motorcycle and startled him. He estimated
       defendant’s speed to be between 40 and 45 mph. The defendant drove around to
       the back of the store near the loading dock. Smith then heard sirens and “loud pipes
       going by” and saw two motorcycles drive by with two squad cars in pursuit. The
       other motorcycle emerged from behind the store and parked by the pallets of mulch.
       The driver entered the store carrying a shirt or jacket. Smith called his friend who
       was an Illinois State Police (ISP) officer and told him about the motorcyclist.

¶ 14        Smith said another motorcycle with a female passenger also pulled into the
       Walmart parking lot and went around the back of the building before backing into
       a spot next to the parking spot from which he was in the process of backing out.
       The passenger dismounted the motorcycle and began to walk toward the store
       entrance when she then turned around and remounted the motorcycle, which then
       left the parking lot. Smith further testified that he instructed his wife to place their
       child in the car so they could leave because he was fearful an incident might occur.
       However, he did not leave but pulled his vehicle into a corner of the parking lot to
       observe. He identified the motorcycles from the Walmart surveillance videos.
       Smith was excused as a witness but recalled the following morning to identify the
       defendant based on his encounter with him at Walmart. On cross-examination,
       Smith explained he was never interviewed by any law enforcement in connection
       with the case. He also said he saw defendant on the courthouse steps the prior day
       and recognized him from the Walmart parking lot.

¶ 15       Brian Douglas, an ISP officer, testified that Smith called him at home and
       informed him that the motorcyclist the police were chasing had parked his
       motorcycle by the mulch in the Walmart parking lot. He relayed the information to
       the dispatcher. On cross-examination, Douglas said Smith did not give a description

                                                -5-
       of the defendant or the motorcycle when he called but merely indicated they were
       at Walmart.

¶ 16       Matt Frazier, a sergeant with the Pike County Sheriff’s Department, testified.
       He was Wassell’s supervisor. Wassell called him and said he was in pursuit of three
       motorcyclists. Frazier was off duty and in a T-shirt and shorts when Wassell called
       him. He left home in anticipation of further police activity, saw one of the
       motorcycles pull into the gas station in Pittsfield, and followed him. He was then
       notified another one of the motorcyclists had entered the Pittsfield Walmart. Frazier
       responded to the Walmart parking lot, found the motorcycle by the mulch, and
       blocked it with his vehicle. He lacked handcuffs, a weapon, or any identification.
       He entered the store along with Paul Petty, the Pike County sheriff, who was also
       in plainclothes. Petty stayed at the front of the store, and employees directed Frazier
       to the men’s bathroom in the back of the store.

¶ 17       Frazier found defendant at the sink in “biker attire” with a large knife at his side
       and said, “Hey, what’s up?” Defendant appeared “somewhat nervous.” As
       defendant left the bathroom, Frazier followed him, identified himself as a deputy
       sheriff, and said not to “make a scene.” He explained: “at that time I just grabbed
       that knife from the sheaf [sic] that was on his side and pulled it out and I said, ‘We
       need to walk out the store without making a scene,’ and he did it with no problem.”
       Frazier said that “[a]t some point” defendant told him why he was in Walmart,
       which was to buy zip ties “for something that had came off his motorcycle.”

¶ 18      The following exchange took place:

              “[STATE]: You talked about walking in from the bathroom to the front. Did
          he at that point, when you had detained him, ask why he was being detained?

              [FRAZIER]: No, not like somebody going to your side and grabbing—in
          plain clothes grabbing a knife off your waistband and anything. He didn’t act
          like I was doing anything out of line whatsoever which to me is odd.”

       Frazier said defendant made several comments, including asking how defendant
       could be certain Frazier was a peace officer and requesting identification. Frazier
       handcuffed defendant at the store’s front doors with handcuffs he obtained from
       Petty. Defendant directed Frazier to the knife sheath, worried that the unsheathed

                                                -6-
       knife would cut someone. Defendant also told Petty to take his motorcycle to the
       police station so it would not be towed. At some point, defendant told Frazier he
       was at Walmart to buy zip ties to fix something on his bike and that he was not
       running from the police.

¶ 19       On cross-examination, defense counsel elicited testimony that defendant was
       an ideal arrestee because he complied with Frazier’s orders to not make a scene and
       to keep his mouth shut. He agreed defendant had a right to remain silent and
       exercised his right by remaining silent. He did not infer any guilt from defendant’s
       silence. Counsel also asked Frazier about an object around defendant’s neck that
       was visible on the pictures showing him entering the store. According to Frazier,
       the object looked like earplugs or headphones. He admitted it was not unusual for
       someone to be washing their hands at the bathroom sink and the knife was not
       illegal. It was also not illegal for defendant to be in the store to purchase zip ties.

¶ 20      Petty, the Pike County sheriff and coroner, testified. He heard the radio reports
       about the pursuit and knew that a high-volume area was a good place to hide, so he
       headed to Walmart, checking the alleys along the route. He suspected the defendant
       was “generally trying to blend [in].” He met Frazier and Hobbs in the Walmart
       parking lot. Petty was wearing shorts or sweatpants and a T-shirt. After defendant
       was arrested, he drove defendant’s motorcycle to the police garage with defendant’s
       permission. It had a plastic piece dragging under it, which Petty had to pull up and
       hold. On cross-examination, Petty described defendant as cooperative, keeping his
       mouth shut as directed, and following the deputies’ directions.

¶ 21       The State rested and the defense moved for a directed verdict, which the circuit
       court denied. The defense recalled Wassell and asked him, if defendant was
       wearing earplugs, his ears were covered with his face mask, the bikes were loud,
       and it was windy, whether it could be hard to hear the siren. Wassell responded that
       he could see it would be more difficult but that he was not the best person to answer
       the question. He acknowledged he answered the same question, “Yeah, it would be
       difficult,” at the preliminary hearing. The State conducted redirect examination,
       and Wassell said his answer was the same; it could be difficult to hear.

¶ 22      The defense rested and renewed its motion for a directed verdict, which the
       court denied. Closing arguments took place. In its closing argument, the State said:

                                                -7-
              “[Defendant] doesn’t ask why he’s being detained. [Defense counsel] made
          a lot of arguments about [defendant] has a right to remain silent. Certainly,
          [defendant] has the right to remain silent, but, again, you just have to ask
          yourself what would a normal person who, if it’s his argument ‘it wasn’t me, I
          had nothing to do with this,’ what would that normal person do when someone
          comes up to you in the bathroom of Walmart, plain clothes—now, [Frazier]
          does say I’m a deputy sheriff—takes your knife and detains you? Don’t you
          think a normal person would say what’s this all about, why, why are you
          detaining me, what’s going on? Just, that would be a normal response.

              Again, [defendant] has the right to say nothing. But you have to ask yourself
          what would a normal person who had—if that’s his argument—nothing to do
          with this, what would that normal person have said when they’re suddenly
          detained in the bathroom of Walmart? If it’s [defendant’s] argument that he had
          nothing to do with it, surely you would ask what’s going on.”

¶ 23      The jury found defendant guilty of aggravated fleeing or attempting to elude a
       peace officer (625 ILCS 5/11-204.1(a)(1) (West 2016)) and speeding (id. § 11-
       601(b)) and not guilty of failure to use a turn signal (id. § 11-804(d)). The circuit
       court sentenced defendant to a two-year term of imprisonment.

¶ 24       Defendant appealed, and the appellate court reversed and remanded, finding
       that the circuit court erred when it denied defendant’s motion for a mistrial. 2021
       IL App (4th) 190172-U. The court held that, under Illinois evidentiary rules,
       evidence of the defendant’s silence during and after an arrest is only admissible for
       impeachment purposes whether the silence occurs before or after Miranda
       warnings are given, that evidence of silence is not relevant to the question of guilt,
       that the State erred in eliciting evidence about defendant’s silence, and that the error
       was not harmless. The dissent would have found that the error was harmless
       because there was overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt. The appellate court
       did not reach the issue of prosecutorial misconduct based on the State’s eliciting
       testimony regarding defendant’s silence and commenting on it in closing argument.
       The State appealed, and this court granted its petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct.
       R. 315 (eff. Oct. 1, 2020).

                                                -8-
¶ 25                                       ANALYSIS

¶ 26        The issue for our resolution concerns the State’s comments on defendant’s
       silence in its opening statement. On appeal, the State argues the circuit court
       properly denied defendant’s motion for a mistrial based on its comments in the
       State’s opening statement and, if the court erred in denying the motion, the error
       was harmless. The State further argues that defendant’s claim the State committed
       prosecutorial misconduct by eliciting testimony regarding his postarrest silence in
       its case-in-chief and by commenting on it in its closing argument is forfeited and
       does not constitute plain error. Like the appellate court, we do not reach the issue
       of prosecutorial misconduct. We find that the circuit court should have granted a
       mistrial, its error was not harmless, and the issue is dispositive.

¶ 27        As a preliminary matter, the parties do not dispute that defendant was under
       arrest when he was confronted by law enforcement, and there is no challenge before
       this court regarding his arrest. See People v. Boston, 2018 IL App (1st) 140369,
       ¶ 87 (“ ‘An arrest occurs when a person’s freedom of movement is restrained by
       physical force or a show of authority.’ ” (quoting People v. Surles, 2011 IL App
       (1st) 100068, ¶ 23)). We further note that both parties presented constitutional
       arguments concerning defendant’s right to remain silent in addition to relying on
       Illinois evidentiary law. We determine that the Illinois Rules of Evidence provide
       an adequate framework to decide the issue before us, and we thus determine it on
       the basis of Illinois evidentiary law. See People v. Lee, 214 Ill. 2d 476, 482 (2005)
       (courts should avoid constitutional issues where nonconstitutional basis for
       resolution exists).

¶ 28       Illinois Rule of Evidence 401 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011) defines “ ‘[r]elevant
       evidence’ ” as “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that
       is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable
       than it would be without the evidence.” Illinois Rule of Evidence 402 (eff. Jan. 1,
       2011) provides that only relevant evidence is admissible. Illinois Rule of Evidence
       403 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011) instructs that relevant evidence “may be excluded if its
       probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
       confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
       waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”

                                               -9-
¶ 29       The State argues that its comments in its opening statement were not prohibited
       and a mistrial was not warranted. The State submits that, because of the unique
       circumstances of this case, defendant’s silence was probative of consciousness of
       guilt and its probative value outweighed any possible prejudice from admission of
       the evidence under the balancing test set forth in Illinois Rule of Evidence 403 (eff.
       Jan. 1, 2011). Defendant maintains that the State violated his right to remain silent
       under Illinois evidentiary law, that postarrest, pre-Miranda silence is only
       admissible for impeachment purposes under Illinois’s evidentiary framework, and
       that his silence was neither material nor relevant to his guilt. Defendant maintains
       that Rule of Evidence 401 provides a sufficient ground by itself to find the State’s
       comments improper, that this court does not need to use Rule of Evidence 403, and
       that a mistrial was necessitated under Rule of Evidence 401.

¶ 30       We thus begin by examining Illinois Rule of Evidence 401 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011),
       which defines relevant evidence as “evidence having any tendency to make the
       existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
       probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” “Probability is
       tested in the light of logic, experience, and accepted assumption as to human
       behavior.” People v. Patterson, 192 Ill. 2d 93, 115 (2000). Every piece of evidence
       must meet the threshold requirement of relevance. People v. Dabbs, 239 Ill. 2d 277,
       289 (2010). Relevant evidence may be excluded where its probative value is
       outweighed by prejudice to the defendant. Swift v. Schleicher, 2017 IL App (2d)
       170218, ¶ 78.

¶ 31       Under Illinois’s evidentiary law, “[e]vidence of the defendant’s postarrest
       silence is considered neither material nor relevant to proving or disproving the
       charged offense.” People v. Sanchez, 392 Ill. App. 3d 1084, 1096 (2009). Sanchez
       is based on a line of cases beginning with People v. Rothe, 358 Ill. 52 (1934). In
       Rothe, this court determined that the admission of evidence that the defendant
       refused to make a statement at the police station was improper. Id. at 57. “In this
       refusal they were within their rights, and the fact that they refused to make a
       statement had no tendency to either prove or disprove the charge against them.” Id.
       The court found the evidence “neither material nor relevant” and held it should have
       been excluded as prejudicial. Id. In People v. Lewerenz, 24 Ill. 2d 295, 299 (1962),
       this court again found that admission of evidence that “at the time of his arrest
       defendant had refused to make a statement on advice of counsel” was “prejudicial

                                               - 10 -
       error.” Relying on Rothe, the court determined the evidence to be neither material
       nor relevant. Id.

¶ 32        Both Rothe and Lewerenz predate Miranda and are not based on its principles.
       Rather, both cases are founded on this state’s recognition, as depicted in its rules
       and common law, that a defendant’s silence in the face of adversarial interactions
       with law enforcement is not material or relevant to his guilt. In People v. Clark, 335
       Ill. App. 3d 758, 763 (2002) (quoting People v. McMullin, 138 Ill. App. 3d 872,
       876 (1985)), a post-Miranda case, the appellate court, relying on Rothe and
       Lewerenz, found that evidence of a defendant’s postarrest silence is considered
       “ ‘neither material nor relevant’ ” to proving or disproving the charged offense.
       Although in that case the defendant was improperly impeached with evidence of
       his postarrest silence, the court found it impermissible to use the defendant’s
       postarrest silence against him, whether the silence occurred before or after the
       defendant was Mirandized. Id. The court discussed that the prohibition was based
       on Illinois evidentiary law and not federal constitutional principles. Id. In Sanchez,
       the court similarly found that a defendant cannot be impeached with his postarrest
       silence, whether the silence occurred before or after the defendant was provided
       Miranda warnings, because the evidence was not material or relevant to the
       defendant’s guilt. Sanchez, 392 Ill. App. 3d at 1096 (citing Clark, 335 Ill. App. 3d
       at 763).

¶ 33       In light of Illinois evidentiary law, we consider whether the circuit court erred
       in denying defendant’s motion for a mistrial. A mistrial is proper “only if there is
       an occurrence of such character and magnitude as to deprive a party of a fair trial
       and that party demonstrates actual prejudice.” People v. Soto, 2022 IL App (1st)
       201208, ¶ 153. Where a motion for a mistrial has been denied, in addition to
       establishing prejudice, an appellant must also demonstrate that admonishments and
       curative instructions from the circuit court could not remedy the damage from the
       improper comments. People v. Middleton, 2018 IL App (1st) 152040, ¶ 29. The
       circuit court’s denial of a motion for mistrial will not be reversed unless it was an
       abuse of discretion. People v. Bishop, 218 Ill. 2d 232, 251 (2006).

¶ 34       In denying defendant’s mistrial motion, the court relied on Givens, where the
       court analyzed whether the State’s use of defendant’s postarrest silence violated his
       rights against self-incrimination and his due process rights under the Illinois and

                                               - 11 -
       United States Constitutions. Givens, 135 Ill. App. 3d at 820. The Givens court did
       not consider the issue under the Illinois Rules of Evidence and is distinguished on
       that basis. We do, however, find its reasoning helpful. Looking to Doyle v. Ohio,
       426 U.S. 610, 617-18 (1976), the Givens court discussed that pre-Miranda silence
       is “ ‘insolubly ambiguous’ ”; that is, it is unknown whether a defendant’s silence is
       “nothing more than the exercise of the defendant’s rights.” Givens, 135 Ill. App. 3d
       at 820 (quoting Doyle, 426 U.S. at 617).

¶ 35       In its opening statement, the State commented that the officer wanted to arrest
       defendant “at Walmart without making a scene since it’s in the middle of the store,
       [and] at no point did he ever ask in any way the reason why he was being detained.”
       We consider defendant’s silence to be “insolubly ambiguous,” as he was ordered
       by Frazier to keep his mouth shut and not make a scene. Thus, whether his silence
       demonstrated an exercise of his rights or compliance with Frazier’s orders is
       unknown but immaterial to the question of his guilt. Rather than acknowledge
       defendant’s compliance with Frazier’s orders, the State attempted to equate his
       silence with consciousness of guilt. However, under Illinois evidentiary law,
       defendant’s silence was neither material nor relevant to the question of his guilt.

¶ 36       The appellate majority followed Illinois evidentiary law and found that it
       prohibited impeachment of a defendant with his postarrest silence whether the
       silence occurred before or after defendant was given Miranda warnings. 2021 IL
       App (4th) 190172-U, ¶ 53. Following the case law, the majority stated that
       “ ‘[e]vidence of the defendant’s [postarrest] silence is considered neither material
       [n]or relevant to proving or disproving the charged offense.’ ” Id. (quoting Sanchez,
       392 Ill. App. 3d at 1096). The appellate court concluded that the circuit court abused
       its discretion in denying defendant’s motion for a mistrial. Id. ¶ 54. It also
       determined that evidence regarding defendant’s postarrest silence was improperly
       allowed and the State erred in commenting on it in opening statements, eliciting
       Frazier’s testimony regarding it, and commenting on it during closing arguments.
       Id. We agree.

¶ 37      Contrary to the State’s argument that the prosecutor’s comments were proper
       under Illinois evidentiary rules, defendant’s silence was not evidence of
       consciousness of guilt. This is especially true under the circumstances here, where
       Frazier ordered defendant to remain silent and not make a scene. The State used

                                               - 12 -
       defendant’s silence to lead the jury to decide that, because an innocent person
       would have made an outcry upon being accosted by an unidentified person in plain
       clothes, defendant was not an innocent person. Equating his silence with guilt
       prejudiced him in that the improper comments suggested that defendant remained
       silent not because he was ordered to do so by Frazier but as a tacit admission that
       he committed the crimes for which Frazier was arresting him. Under the tacit
       admission rule, “[i]t must affirmatively appear that the defendant knew he was
       being asked about the crime for which he is on trial, for it is the assumption that
       one similarly situated would ordinarily deny the imputation of guilt which renders
       admissible defendant’s failure to do so.” People v. Aughinbaugh, 36 Ill. 2d 320,
       323 (1967). The rule has no application under the instant facts, where defendant
       was not informed of the charges against him at the time of his arrest. In addition,
       although the circuit court admonished the jury before opening statements that they
       did not constitute evidence, we do not consider that general admonishment
       sufficient to remedy the damage from the State’s improper commentary on
       defendant’s silence. At the time the comments were made, the circuit court did not
       give a curative instruction. We find the State’s comments in its opening statement
       violated defendant’s right to remain silent and denied him a fair trial. The circuit
       court should have granted his request for a mistrial.

¶ 38       The State submits that, if the circuit court erred in denying defendant’s mistrial
       motion, the error was harmless error in light of the overwhelming evidence against
       defendant, as the jury would not have acquitted defendant if the error had not
       occurred. The State further submits that any prejudice to defendant was mitigated
       by defense counsel’s cross-examination of Frazier and its closing argument where
       it emphasized defendant had a right to remain silent.

¶ 39       An “evidentiary error is harmless ‘where there is no reasonable probability that
       the jury would have acquitted the defendant absent the’ error.” (Emphasis in
       original.) In re E.H., 224 Ill. 2d 172, 180 (2006) (quoting People v. Nevitt, 135 Ill.
       2d 423, 447 (1990)). To prove defendant guilty of aggravated fleeing or attempting
       to elude a peace officer, the State had to establish that (1) a police officer in uniform
       indicated with hand, voice, siren, or lights that defendant should stop; (2) defendant
       willfully did not stop; and (3) while failing to stop, defendant drove at least 21 mph
       over the speed limit. 625 ILCS 5/11-204, 11-204.1(a)(1) (West 2016).

                                                - 13 -
¶ 40       We thus consider whether there was any reasonable probability the jury would
       have acquitted defendant absent the State’s error in its opening statement. To
       determine whether the error here was harmless, the appellate court, while
       distinguishing Doyle procedurally, used the factors it introduced to determine
       whether the error was harmless. 2021 IL App (4th) 190172-U, ¶ 58. The Doyle
       factors are

          “ ‘(1) the party who elicited the testimony about the defendant’s silence; (2) the
          intensity and frequency of the references to the defendant’s silence; (3) the use
          that the prosecution made of the defendant’s silence; (4) the trial court’s
          opportunity to grant a mistrial motion or to give a curative jury instruction; and
          (5) the quantum of other evidence proving the defendant’s guilt.’ ” Id. ¶ 57
          (quoting People v. Dameron, 196 Ill. 2d 156, 164 (2001)).

       Applying the Doyle factors, the majority found that the State did not carry its burden
       to prove the State’s error was harmless. We agree.

¶ 41       The first factor concerns which party elicited the improper evidence. It was the
       State in its opening statement that referred to defendant’s silence. The State’s
       comments suggested that, had defendant been innocent, he would have verbally
       reacted to Frazier’s actions. The reference inferred that defendant was anticipating
       an imminent arrest and was not surprised when it occurred.

¶ 42       The second factor considers the reference’s intensity and frequency. Although
       the reference was brief, it implicated defendant’s ability to obtain a fair trial.
       Because the improper reference to defendant’s silence occurred during the State’s
       opening, it flavored the entirety of the proceedings. Indeed, the State continued its
       improper commentary on defendant’s silence in its case-in-chief and its closing
       argument.

¶ 43       The third factor examines the State’s use of its reference to defendant’s silence,
       which in this case was to present his silence as evidence of his guilt. The State
       recharacterizes its references to defendant’s silence as drawing reasonable
       inferences from the evidence. According to the State, it may properly comment on
       the emotional tone of defendant’s comments, his facial expressions, and his
       demeanor. See People v. Davis, 151 Ill. App. 3d 435, 441-42 (1986). The State’s
       comments were not reflective of defendant’s emotional tone, facial expressions, or

                                               - 14 -
       demeanor. The only testimony the State offered in this vein was Frazier’s
       perception that defendant seemed nervous in the bathroom when Frazier initially
       greeted him. The State used the improper opening comments to bolster its theory
       that defendant’s silence equated to consciousness of guilt.

¶ 44      Regarding the fourth factor, the circuit court had an opportunity to grant a
       mistrial but declined it, erroneously relying on Givens to do so because that case is
       procedurally distinguishable where the defendant took the stand and opened
       himself to impeachment. No curative instruction was provided after the State’s
       comment on defendant’s silence.

¶ 45       The fifth and final factor considers the quantum of other evidence proving
       defendant’s guilt. In this case, as discussed below, the evidence proving defendant’s
       guilt was not overwhelming. Under the majority’s review of the evidence, it found
       the State failed to present overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt and
       determined that a reasonable person could conclude that defendant did not know he
       was being pursued by police officers. 2021 IL App (4th) 190172-U, ¶ 67. The
       evidence supports its finding.

¶ 46       Wassell first observed the motorcyclists heading in the opposite direction, and
       he pulled off to the shoulder of the road and activated his emergency lights. The
       squad car was an unmarked vehicle with its lights embedded in the headlights,
       visors, and grille. His siren was not activated, but he turned it on after the
       motorcycles failed to stop. Hobbs’s squad car was pulled off the road in the
       driveway of an implement dealer and perpendicular to the roadway. She turned on
       her lights and siren when she saw the vehicles approach but did not pull out into
       the road until after they passed her. The testimony of Frazier and Hobbs, Hobbs’s
       dash cam video, and the surveillance video from Pike Feed establish that defendant
       was the lead motorcycle and the farthest away from the pursuing officers.

¶ 47       Smith testified the motorcycles he saw pass by on the road in front of Walmart
       had “loud pipes.” Wassell testified the motorcycles were noisier than smaller
       motorcycles, that defendant’s motorcycle lacked rearview mirrors, and that
       defendant was wearing a helmet and never turned around when Wassell was behind
       him. There is evidence defendant was wearing earplugs. Frazier and Hobbs testified
       that the still photographs of defendant entering the Walmart showed something
       hanging around his neck. Hobbs acknowledged she could see something around

                                              - 15 -
       defendant’s neck but could not identify it. Frazier admitted the item around
       defendant’s neck looked like earplugs or headphones. He admitted that, if defendant
       was wearing earplugs, a helmet, and a face mask that covered his ears, along with
       the sound of the wind and the motorcycles, it would be more difficult for defendant
       to hear his siren. Wassell also admitted that defendant told him he did not see the
       emergency lights on Wassell’s car, as defendant looked down when he passed
       Wassell. There was no evidence defendant turned around and saw the squad cars.
       Wassell testified that only the passenger on one of the other bikes looked back while
       at the four-way stop. Wassell had turned off his siren at that point.

¶ 48       Defendant made a complete stop at a four-way stop despite the presence of
       Wassell behind him. The State surmises that defendant came to a complete stop at
       the four-way stop to avoid being hit going through the intersection. However,
       Wassell did not testify any other vehicles were present at or near the four-way stop.
       Wassell testified the only other vehicles he observed during the pursuit were
       Hobbs’s squad car and the silver SUV, which did not initially pull over despite
       Wassell pursuing it for at least a mile with his vehicles lights and siren activated.

¶ 49       The State offered no proof that defendant or the other motorcyclists engaged in
       elusive behavior. The motorcyclists did not split up or turn around and go the
       opposite direction Wassell was travelling. They did not turn down any side roads
       to hide. As Petty testified, once in Pittsfield, there were alleys in which defendant
       could have attempted to hide. Instead, he parked his motorcycle in the Walmart
       parking lot and entered the store carrying his motorcycle attire. Defendant did not
       hide either his motorcycle or himself at Walmart, and his claim that he needed zip
       ties was supported by the fact that something was dragging from his motorcycle.
       Frazier and Petty all testified that something was dragging beneath defendant’s
       motorcycle. Defendant’s and the other motorcyclist’s routes around the back of the
       Walmart before parking could be attributed to safety concerns, and the State’s
       theory they were trying to hide from law enforcement is negated by the fact both
       motorcyclists eventually parked in the lot in the front of the store.

¶ 50       Like the appellate court, we do not find that the State presented overwhelming
       evidence of defendant’s guilt to support a conclusion the circuit court’s failure to
       grant a mistrial was harmless error. Wassell initiated the pursuit on defendant in an
       unmarked vehicle that was not equipped with a standard light bar on its roof. He

                                              - 16 -
       was positioned on the shoulder of the opposite side of the roadway from which
       defendant was traveling. Defendant said he looked down when he passed Wassell’s
       vehicle and did not see the emergency lights. He was in the front of the motorcycle
       formation, his motorcycle lacked rearview mirrors, and arguably he could not hear
       the sirens. Although Wassell also signaled to pull over while at the Atlas four-way
       stop, there was no evidence defendant was aware of Wassell’s signal. Defendant
       fully stopped at the intersection, another indicator that he did not willfully fail to
       stop. In our view, the evidence to support the willfulness component of the eluding
       statute was susceptible to differing conclusions.

¶ 51       Because the evidence against defendant was not overwhelming such that the
       State’s improper references to defendant’s silence did not affect the verdict, we find
       the circuit court’s error was not harmless. Application of the Doyle factors
       establishes that the State elicited the improper comments and referred to
       defendant’s silence as indicative of his guilt and as dispositive of whether he
       committed the charged offenses, the circuit court declined its opportunity to grant
       a mistrial, and the evidence presented by the State against defendant was not
       overwhelming. The State’s improper comments informed the jury that defendant
       was silent not as an exercise of his right to remain silent or as compliance with
       Frazier’s orders but because he was guilty. Through its comments on defendant’s
       silence, the State presented its theory that a “normal” person would have cried out
       and not remained silent had a stranger accosted him in the bathroom at Walmart.
       By making these comments in its opening statement, the State implied to the jury
       that defendant’s silence amounted to guilt. We find that the circuit court erred in
       denying defendant’s motion for a mistrial and affirm the appellate court’s reversal
       of the denial of defendant’s motion for a mistrial and its finding that the State
       improperly commented on defendant’s postarrest silence.

¶ 52                                     CONCLUSION

¶ 53        Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the appellate
       court, which reversed the judgment of the circuit court and remanded for a new
       trial.

¶ 54      Appellate court judgment affirmed.

                                               - 17 -
¶ 55      Circuit court judgment reversed.

¶ 56      Cause remanded.

¶ 57       JUSTICE HOLDER WHITE took no part in the consideration or decision of
       this case.

                                             - 18 -