Court Opinion

ID: 9374695
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-23 19:00:36.969934+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:52.503170
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                             FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         FEB 23 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JULIE M. NELSON,                                No.    22-35273

                Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 3:21-cv-05263-MAT

 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner
of Social Security,

                Defendant-Appellee.

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                    for the Western District of Washington
                 Mary Alice Theiler, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

                           Submitted February 8, 2023**
                                Portland, Oregon

Before: MURGUIA, Chief Judge, and FORREST and SUNG, Circuit Judges.

      Julie Nelson appeals from the district court’s order affirming the

Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of Nelson’s application for Social

Security disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. We

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
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have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

      1.     Nelson’s argument that the 2017 revised medical evidence

regulations 1 are partially invalid is foreclosed by Woods v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785,

787 (9th Cir. 2022) (holding that the revised regulations displaced our

“longstanding caselaw” that required heightened deference to a treating physician’s

opinion).

      2.     Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that the opinion of

Nelson’s treating physician was unsupported and inconsistent with the medical

record. See Webb v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 683, 686 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Substantial

evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate

to support a conclusion.” (citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401

(1971))).

      The treating physician’s 2017 letter only generally states his view that

Nelson “is unable to resume any type of gainful employment due to physical

impairment” and his belief that Nelson’s medical issues have been “lifelong.” The

treating physician did not specifically state an opinion that Nelson was unable to

work during the relevant time period. Even assuming that opinion is implied, there

are no medical records from the relevant time period that support it, and it is

1
 See Revisions to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 82 Fed.
Reg. 5844 (Jan. 18, 2017) (codified at 20 C.F.R. pts. 404, 416).

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inconsistent with the uncontested fact that Nelson was able to work until 2004.

      3.     Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that the opinion of

a retained medical expert was unsupported and inconsistent with the medical

record. The expert did not explain why he believed that Nelson had a diminished

residual functional capacity during the relevant period. Additionally, the expert

acknowledged that there were “no records whatsoever” during that time.

      4.     Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination at step two that

Nelson did not suffer from a severe impairment during the relevant period. At step

two, an impairment must be established by “objective medical evidence from an

acceptable medical source.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521. The ALJ appropriately

concluded that the medical opinions discussed above were unsupported and

inconsistent with the medical record. Because there is no other objective medical

evidence that addresses the relevant time period, the ALJ’s conclusion at step two

was supported by substantial evidence.

      5.     To the extent that the ALJ failed to consider Nelson’s own testimony

or other lay testimony, that error was harmless. See Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d

1104, 1115–21 (9th Cir. 2012), superseded by regulation on other grounds

(holding that the ALJ’s failure to address lay testimony may be deemed harmless

where it is inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination). The lay

testimony alone, without objective medical evidence, could not establish a severe

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impairment at step two. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521.

      AFFIRMED.

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