Court Opinion

ID: 9660672
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:18:16.353984+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:21.226091
License: Public Domain

Tom Glaze, Justice, dissenting. In my view, the court is wrong in concluding Annie Standridge’s marriage to Carroll Standridge was invalid. The court’s decision is based on the premise that, at the time Annie married Carroll, Annie’s divorce to her former husband, Terry Thacker, was not final. The majority court reasons that, although the chancellor entered on his docket that the Thacker divorce was decreed, a separate written decree had not been filed or entered. Besides working an injustice to Annie Standridge and her now deceased husband, Carroll, I believe the court’s decision will cause future problems and inequities, as well. In support of its holding, the majority court cites Rule 58 of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure which provides as follows: Every judgment or decree shall be set forth on a separate document. A judgment or decree is effective only when so set forth and entered as provided in Rule 79(a). Entry of judgment or decree shall not be delayed for the taxing of costs. The court also notes Administrative Order 2, formerly ARCP Rule 79(a), which provides, among other things, for the trial court to enter the dates and substance of its orders or judgments in a docket book. The Administrative Order further requires that the court’s clerk “keep a judgment record book in which shall be kept a correct copy of every final judgment or appealable order.” After noting Rule 58 and Administrative Order 2, the court construes them to mean that a court’s order or judgment is not final and effective until the order or judgment is reduced to a separate written document which is filed or entered. The court places this construction on Rule 58 even though the Reporter’s Notes clearly explain the rule should have little or no effect on prior practice, which recognized the trial court’s decision to be final when it was rendered. The Reporter’s Notes further state the following: 4. This rule provides that a judgment or decree shall not be effective unless and until it is entered pursuant to Rule 79(a). Thus for appeal purposes, the date of entry or filing of the judgment or decree is the effective date, as opposed to the date of rendition. Cranna v. Long, 225 Ark. 153, 279 5. W.2d 828 (1955); Wilhelm v. McLaughlin, 228 Ark. 582, 309 S.W.2d 203 (1958). (Emphasis added.) As can readily be seen above, the drafters of Rule 58 intended to clarify that,/or appeal purposes, the date of entry or filing of the judgment or decree is the effective date, as opposed to the date of rendition. This rule merely clarified and formalized prior case law on the subject, and was not intended to change prior practice. As already mentioned above, the prior, settled case law (and practice) recognized that decrees rendered in open court are effective from the date they are actually rendered, and not from the date of entry of record. Parker v. Parker, 227 Ark. 898, 302 S.W.2d 533 (1957). The Parker court, quoting from McConnell v. Bourland, 175 Ark. 253, 299 S.W. 44 (1927), said, “the rendition of a judgment is a judicial act on the part of the court, while the entry of a judgment is a ministerial act performed by the clerk.” The court’s decision today clearly changes prior law and makes the formal filing of a judgment a judicial act rather than the ministerial act it truly is. The court’s interpretation of Rule 5 8 will cause frustrations for trial judges and parties alike, since the finality of any decision made by the trial court will now depend upon when the attorneys prepare and return their precedents (orders, judgments or decrees) to the judge for signature and entry of record. As was the situation in the instant case, delays will inevitably occur between the time a judge renders his or her decision and when the written document is actually filed. Given this hiatus in time, one might even expect a party to assert a small amount of gamesmanship in order to obtain an advantage over an opposing party. All of this, I submit, is unnecessary and is based upon this court’s erroneous interpretation and application of its own rule. For the above reasons, I would hold that Annie Standridge was divorced from her former husband when she married her husband, Carroll. Her marriage to Carroll was valid, and this court commits a serious mistake by holding otherwise. Holt, C.J., and Hays, J., join this dissent. 771 S.W.2d 262 MAY 30, 1989 SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION ON DENIAL OF REHEARING Per Curiam. Rehearing denied. Purtle, J., not participating. Holt, C.J., and Hays and Glaze, JJ., would grant rehearing. Tom Glaze, Justice, dissenting.