Court Opinion

ID: 9473870
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:41:48.038057+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:43:46.610926
License: Public Domain

SPOTTSWOOD W. ROBINSON, III, Chief Judge,
concurring:
I agree with my colleagues that Rule 58’s separate-document requirement bears vitally on the timeliness of post-judgment motions and appeals.1 I also agree that noncompliance with that requirement can be waived, and thus that appellate jurisdiction is not necessarily emasculated.2 Each of these propositions has been fully confirmed by the Supreme Court,3 and their pertinence to the case at bar is obvious. So, if 'appellants’ notice of appeal was time*232ly, I would agree that appellees effectively waived their opportunity to seek dismissal of this appeal as premature.4
My preoccupation has been, rather, with the applicability of the separate-document provision to the District Court’s December 1984 order. But for two sentences illuminating the case’s procedural posture and three sentences summarizing generally the court’s ultimate conclusions,5 the order would pose no Rule 58 problem at all. I thus wondered, in the beginning, whether those five recitals in a three-page instrument otherwise indisputably dispositional in nature were enough to preclude its acceptance as a separate document. Moreover, since the court stated therein that “this Order shall constitute the final order of the Court,” 6 and explained that it would “file a Memorandum Opinion setting forth the reasons for its decision,”7 its effort to pass an appealable order is evident. For me at least, the order was not immediately classifiable either with those that clearly are intercepted by the separate-document rule8 or with those that clearly are not.9
The decided cases have not staked out a bright line dividing these two categories. Only by delving into the historical context and purpose of the separate-document stipulation have I gleaned enough insight to undertake a try in that direction.10 Having done so, I am prepared to join my colleagues in holding that the order in question did not comply with that rule, and accordingly that appellants’ notice of appeal was timely.11
I
Prior to the advent of Rule 58’s separate-document requirement, courts frequently were confronted by “the old, old question of when is a judgment a judgment.” 12 In those days, no particular form of words or form of writing was deemed necessary to rendition of a judgment.13 It is not surprising, then, that problems arose, especially when a judge’s opinion or memorandum included language seemingly dispositional, and thus was readable as an authorization to the clerk to enter a judgment on the civil docket.14 The difficulty intensified when the opinion or memorandum arguably lacked an essential ingredient of a judgment, or when the judge later signed what appeared to be a formal judgment.15
The result was considerable uncertainty as to just what pronouncements amounted to a judgment,16 and correspondingly as to just what would activate post-judgment time periods,17 particularly those for motions 18 and appeals.19 The problem was alleviated somewhat in 1958 when the Su*233preme Court declared that an opinion constituted a judgment when it “embodies the essential elements of a judgment for money and clearly evidences the judge’s intention that it shall be his final act in the case.”20 Uncertainty continued to reign, however, for the judge’s intention was itself a highly subjective criterion.21
It was in 1963 that Rule 58 was amended in an effort to remove all doubt.22 Rejecting the judge’s intention as the test, the rulemakers opted for a wholly pragmatic standard. “Every judgment,” the amendment states, “shall be set forth on a separate document,” and will become “effective only when so set forth and when entered as provided in Rule 79(a).”23 The Advisory Committee explained that “[t]he amended rule eliminates ... uncertainties by requiring that there be a judgment set out on a separate document — distinct from any opinion or memorandum — which provides the basis for the entry of judgment.”24 This, the Supreme Court has acknowledged, was the wholesome purpose of the 1963 amendment,25 and the Court has described its true character. The separate-document provision, the Court has said, is “a ‘mechanical change’ that must be mechanically applied in order to avoid new uncertainties as to the date on which a judgment is entered;” 26 “[tjechnical application of the separate-judgment requirement,” the Court has emphasized, “is necessary in that context to avoid the uncertainties that once plagued the determination of when an appeal must be brought.”27 In sum, the judge’s intention as the criterion has thus been completely displaced by a “mechanical” test, to be given “mechanical,” “technical” operation.
II
While Rule 58 is explicit in its demand that a judgment be set forth “on a separate document,” neither that rule nor any other undertakes to prescribe the precise form the document should take, nor is the case-law very helpful on that score. An historical concomitant of the separate-document, however, affords meaningful guidance in this connection.
Simultaneously with the 1963 amendment of Rule 58 to incorporate that requirement, two specimens of a judgment were added to the appendix of official civil forms.28 One is a model of a judgment on a jury verdict,29 and the other is a sample of a judgment on a decision by the court.30 The 1963 Advisory Committee expressly referred readers of Rule 58 to these forms,31 and declared that they are “illustrative of the judgment to be entered.”32 I find com*234pelling the inference that the 1963 amendment to Rule 58 calls for a document substantially similar to those exhibited in the new official forms.
Additionally, the 1963 Advisory Committee noted that “[t]he rules contemplate a simple judgment promptly entered.”33 Simplicity is indeed the hallmark of the official specimens. Each confines itself (a) to a recital that the issues have been tried and resolved — in the one instance by a jury, and in the other by the judge — and (b) a direction for action in conformity to the jury’s verdict or the judge’s decision. Unlike the District Court’s December 1984 order, neither form alludes to any case history, factfinding or any legal reasoning; rather, each specimen is as free of extrinsic matter as can be. These forms, we are told, are intended not only to assure compliance with the rules, but also to “indicate the simplicity and brevity of statement which the rules contemplate.”34
These considerations lead me to conclude that involvement with Rule 58’s separate-document rule can be avoided only by adhering closely to the official judgment forms. But while complete fidelity to those forms is the safest course,35 it seems clear that trivial departures must be tolerated in the name of common sense. Thus, it has been held that an order does not lose its character as a separate document simply because it includes a one-sentence explanation of what the order is all about,36 or a recital that a magistrate’s report and recommendation are being adopted.37 The same result has been reached with respect to an order merely adding a citation to a reported ease;38 Rule 58, the court said, is to be applied “[mjechanically” but not “mindlessly.”39 On the other hand, orders combining the court’s directives with its statement of factual findings or legal conclusions plainly cannot pass muster as separate documents.40
Where, then, is the line of demarcation? I believe it is to be drawn at the point of substantial conformity to the official forms. These forms, adopted contemporaneously with and cross-referenced to the prescription of a separate-document, designedly are beacons to the type of judgment required. Equally importantly, the very purpose of the separate-document rule was elimination of uncertainty as to when the time periods for post-judgment motions and appeals begin to run.41 Since uncertainty of that sort is bound to increase as the departure from the forms becomes more serious, substantial conformity would seem to be the only acceptable outer limit.
*235III
So measured, there is no separate-document order in the case at bar. In the first of its two written pronouncements, labeled an “order,” the District Court referred to the procedural context,42 summarized the court’s major legal conclusions43 and set forth its several directives.44 While the court declared that the document would constitute its final order,45 and stated that it would later file a memorandum opinion articulating its reasons,46 the order is too far a cry from the “simple judgment” envisioned by the rules47 and illustrated by the official form usable in nonjury cases.48 Indeed, to countenance the order as a separate document within the contemplation of Rule 58 is to open wide the door for a return to the state of uncertainty and confusion that the 1963 amendment was designed to eliminate.49 And the court’s second writing, styled a “memorandum opinion” and elaborating on the court’s logic,50 does not even purport to be an order. Not only did the court note that “[a]n appropriate order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion has issued,"51 but the document itself lacks both the appearance and the essential elements of a judgment.52
It is clear enough to me that what the District Court had in mind was a final judgment with its opinion to follow, but, to repeat, its intention is no longer the standard.53 No matter how manifest a purpose to formulate an appealable order may be, it cannot override Rule 58’s explicit exaction of a separate document.54 For nonfulfillment of that demand, the period for appealing was never set into motion,55 and appellants’ notice of appeal must be honored.56

. See Majority Opinion (Maj. Op.) pt. II; Part I infra.

. See Maj. Op. pt. III;, note 56 infra.

. See United States v. Indrelunas, 411 U.S. 216, 220-22, 93 S.Ct. 1562, 1564-65, 36 L.Ed.2d 202, 206-07 (1973); Bankers Trust Co. v. Mallis, 435 U.S. 381, 384-88, 98 S.Ct. 1117, 1120-22, 55 L.Ed.2d 357, 361-63 (1978).

. See Maj. Op. pt. III; note 56 infra.

. See Diamond v. McKenzie, Civ. No. 84-0241 (D.D.C. Dec. 21, 1984) (order), Record Document (R. Doc.) 24.

. Id. at 3.

. Id. at 2.

. Typically, orders which are tacked onto an opinion, memorandum, findings of fact or conclusions of law. See note 40 infra and accompanying text.

. For example, orders which adhere scrupulously to the official civil-judgment forms. See Part II infra.

. See Parts I, II infra.

. See Part III infra.

. Cedar Creek Oil & Gas Co. v. Fidelity Gas Co., 238 F.2d 298 (9th Cir.1956).

. See United States v. Hark, 320 U.S. 531, 534, 64 S.Ct. 359, 361, 88 L.Ed. 290, 294-95 (1944). See also United States v. F. & M. Schaefer Brewing Co., 356 U.S. 227, 232, 78 S.Ct. 674, 677-78, 2 L.Ed.2d 721, 726 (1958).

. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 58 advisory committee note to 1963 amendment.

. Id.

. Id.; United States v. Indrelunas, supra note 3, 411 U.S. at 220, 93 S.Ct. at 1564, 36 L.Ed.2d at 206 (1973).

. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 58 advisory committee note to 1963 amendment; United States v. F. & M. Schaefer Brewing Co., supra note 13, 356 U.S. at 232, 78 S.Ct. at 677-78, 2 L.Ed.2d at 726.

. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(b), (d), (e).

. See Fed.R.App.P. 4(a).

. United States v. F. & M. Schaefer Brewing Co., supra note 13, 356 U.S. at 232, 78 S.Ct. at 678, 2 L.Ed.2d at 726.

. Kaplan, Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 1961-1963(II), 77 Harv.L.Rev. 801, 831 (1964).

. An Advisory Committee proposal in 1955, which was not adopted, would have amended Rule 58 to provide that an opinion containing a specific direction for the entry of judgment sufficed as a judgment. Kaplan, supra note 21, at 830.

. Fed.R.Civ.P. 79(a) instructs the clerk on entries to be made in the civil docket.

. Fed.R.Civ.P. 58 advisory committee note on 1963 amendment.

. United States v. Indrelunas, supra note 3, 411 U.S. at 219-20, 93 S.Ct. at 1564, 36 L.Ed.2d at 206; Bankers Trust Co. v. Mallis, supra note 3, 435 U.S. at 384-85, 98 S.Ct. at 1120, 55 L.Ed.2d at 361-62.

. United States v. Indrelunas, supra note 3, 411 U.S. at 221-22, 93 S.Ct. at 1565, 36 L.Ed.2d at 207, quoting 6A J. Moore, Federal Practice ¶ 58.04[4.-2], at 58-161 (1972).

. Bankers Trust Co. v. Mallis, supra note 3, 435 U.S. at 386, 98 S.Ct. at 1120-1121, 55 L.Ed.2d at 362.

. The amendment and the forms were each adopted on January 21, 1963, for effective operation commencing July 1, 1963.

. Fed.R.Civ.P. app. Form 31.

. Id.app. Form 32.

. Fed.R.Civ.P. 58 advisory committee note to 1963 amendment.

. Fed.R.Civ.P. app. Forms 31, 32 advisory committee n. 1.

. Id. app. Form 31 advisory committee n. 3. See also United States v. Wissahickon Tool Works, 200 F.2d 936, 938 (2d Cir.1952) (there should be "a simple form of judgment ... eschewing the lengthy recitals familiar in state practice”). The rules expressly provide that "[a] judgment shall not contain a recital of pleadings, the report of a master, or the record of prior proceedings.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(a).

. Fed.R.Civ.P. 84.

. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 84 advisory committee note to 1946 amendment.

. Hamilton v. Nakai, 453 F.2d 152, 154-55 (9th Cir.1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 945, 92 S.Ct. 2044, 32 L.Ed.2d 332 (1972). The court said that to allow this sentence to transform the order into an opinion or memorandum "would be the proverbial elevation of form over substance.” Id.

. United States v. Perez, 736 F.2d 236, 237-38 (5th Cir. 1984).

. Weinberger v. United States, 559 F.2d 401, 402 (5th Cir.1977).

. Id. at 402. The court added, however, that "[i]t would be better had the citation been omitted, and doubtless a very little more would have rendered the order vulnerable to ... attack.” Id.

. E.g., Bankers Trust Co. v. Mallis, supra note 3, 435 U.S. at 382 n. 1, 98 S.Ct. at 1119 n. 1, 55 L.Ed.2d at 360 n. 1; Caperton v. Beatrice Pocahontas Coal Co., 585 F.2d 683, 689 (4th Cir.1978); Taylor v. Sterrett, 527 F.2d 856, 857-858 (5th Cir.1976); Cloyd v. Richardson, 510 F.2d 485, 486 (6th Cir.1975); Baker v. Southern Pac. Transp., 542 F.2d 1123, 1127-28 (9th Cir.1976).

. See notes 24-27 supra and accompanying text.

. Diamond v. McKenzie, supra note 5, at 232.

. Id. at 232.

. Id. at 2-3.

. Id. at 3.

. Id. at 2.

. See text supra at note 33.

. Compare Fed.R.Civ.P. app. Form 32.

. See Part I supra.

. See Diamond v. McKenzie, 602 F.Supp. 632 (D.D.C.1985) (memorandum opinion), R.Doc. 30.

. Id. at 640 (emphasis supplied).

. “ ‘Judgment’ as used in these rules includes a decree and any order from which an appeal lies____” Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(a).

. See text supra at notes 20-23.

. Caperton v. Beatrice Pocahontas Coal Co., supra note 40, 585 F.2d at 689. See also Furr's Cafeterias, Inc. v. NLRB, 566 F.2d 505, 506-07 (5th Cir.1978) (multi-page document containing findings of fact, conclusions of law and injunction, and stating that it was a “final order and judgment”).

. E.g., Bankers Trust Co. v. Mallis, supra note 3, 435 U.S. at 385, 98 S.Ct. at 1120, 55 L.Ed.2d at 361-362; United States v. Indrelunas, supra note 3, 411 U.S. at 220-221, 93 S.Ct. at 1564-65, 36 L.Ed.2d at 206-07.

. The appeal is not vulnerable as premature. Under the circumstances — detailed in the majority opinion, Maj. Op. pt. III — appellees clearly waived their opportunity to move for dismissal on that ground. The case thus falls squarely within the holding in Bankers Trust Co. v. Mallis, supra note 3, 435 U.S. at 386, 387-88, 98 S.Ct. at 1121-22, 55 L.Ed.2d at 362, 363.