Court Opinion

ID: 9859273
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 19:36:42.648096+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:23:46.956339
License: Public Domain

STEIN, J.,
dissenting.
The Department of Corrections disciplinary hearing implicated by this appeal violated the departmental regulation mandating that inmates be afforded not less than twenty-four hours between notification of charges and commencement of the hearing for the purpose of preparing a defense. N.J.A.C. 10A:4-9.2. Although the issue was not raised, the hearing also violated N.J.A.C. 10A:4-9.12, which requires that “counsel substitutes” be afforded “at least 24 hours to prepare the inmate’s defense.” The record suggests that appellant’s counsel-substitute met with appellant for the first time a few minutes before the hearing. The Court acknowledges the twenty-four-hour-notice requirement to be of constitutional dimension, ante at 217-218, 652 A.2d at 714. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2978, 41 L.Ed.2d 935, 956 (1974); Avant v. Clifford, 67 N.J. 496, 525, 341 A.2d 629 (1975). Nevertheless, the Court characterizes that violation as harmless error because overwhelming evidence supported the hearing officer’s determination that appellant had committed the charged offense. Ante at 221-223, 652 A.2d 715-716. In my view, absent a knowing and informed waiver, the mandatory twenty-four-hour waiting period between notice of charges and commencement of a hearing should be regarded as an essential element of appellant’s due-process rights, and its violation should result in vacation of the Hearing Officer’s determination and a remand for a new disciplinary hearing.
I
The material facts are not disputed. The offending conduct occurred at approximately 2:00 p.m. on September 14, 1992. A *225Corrections Officer placed Jacobs in pre-hearing detention after charging him with “threatening another with bodily harm.” Another officer delivered to Jacobs a copy of the written charges at 10:30 a.m. on September 15. Jacobs was not afforded an opportunity to meet with his counsel substitute until the following morning, shortly before the disciplinary hearing, which commenced at 8:55 a.m. on September 16, 1992. The Hearing Officer was unaware that the hearing was beginning before Jacobs had had twenty-four-hours notice of the charges. The Hearing Officer noted that neither Jacobs nor his counsel-substitute had requested more time when asked if they were ready to proceed, but no express waiver of the twenty-four-hour-notice period had been solicited or provided.
II
Wolff, supra, 418 U.S. at 563-64, 94 S.Ct. at 2978-79, 41 L.Ed.2d at 955-56, reveals that the twenty-four-hour-notice requirement is rooted in due process. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex instituted suit alleging that various disciplinary practices and proceedings at the Complex did not comply with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. Among the challenged procedures was the Nebraska Complex’s practice of providing inmates charged with disciplinary violations oral notice of the charges “somewhat in advance” of the hearing before the committee responsible for imposing discipline, and on other occasions providing inmates with their first notice of charges at the time of the hearing before the committee. Id. at 564, 94 S.Ct. at 2979, 41 L.Ed.2,d at 955. Finding the challenged practice to be constitutionally inadequate, the Court held that
if the minimum requirements of procedural due process are to be satisfied * * * written notice of the charges must be given to the disciplinary-action defendant in order to inform him of the charges and to enable him to marshal the facts and prepare a defense. At least a brief period of time after the notice, no less than 24 horn's, should be allowed to the inmate to prepare for the appearance before the Adjustment Committee.
[Id. at 563-64, 94 S.Ct. at 2978, 41 L.Ed.2d at 955-56.]
*226In Avant, supra, 67 N.J. at 525, 341 A.2d 629, we confirmed that the twenty-four-hour-notice requirement was necessary to satisfy the demands of due process in the context of an action challenging the constitutionality of prison-disciplinary standards. We observed that
[t]he first requirement of procedural due process is notice. Wolff requires and the Standards provide “that written notice * * * be given to the disciplinary action defendant in order to inform him of the charges and to enable him to marshal the facts and prepare a defense. * * * [N]o less than 24 hours should be allowed to the inmate to prepare for the appearance before the Adjustment Committee.” See Standards, 254.262. Such notice of a specific alleged violation, plus the amplitude of general notice of prison rules, offenses, sanctions and the like, to which we have already referred, seem to us to fully satisfy constitutional and “fairness” requirements of notice.
Ubid. ]
Other courts presented with allegations that prison-disciplinary proceedings did not comply with the minimal twenty-four-hour-notice requirement have set aside the discipline imposed and, on occasion, assessed damages against prison officials. For example, in Martin v. Foti, 561 F.Supp. 252 (E.D.La.1983), inmates of a Louisiana state prison filed a 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (section 1983) action against prison officials alleging violations of the prisoners’ constitutional rights in respect of placement in administrative segregation and the procedure followed in disciplinary hearings. The prison’s regulations did not require written notice of charges to be provided to inmates in advance of disciplinary hearings, and the evidence adduced by the plaintiffs demonstrated that they had specifically requested and been denied copies of the disciplinary reports alleging their commission of violations. The court, concluding that the prisoners’ due-process rights had been violated, ordered that the determinations of guilt of disciplinary violations be expunged from their records and assessed damages against the responsible prison officials. Id. at 261-62. The court stated:
As to the first requirement of Wolff set forth above, however, it is clear that defendants have violated plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. The regulations themselves do not require any notice whatsoever to be given inmates of the charges for which they are brought before the disciplinary board, and the prison practice is clearly only to give oral notice, if that. In the specific instances in question, *227moreover, plaintiffs requested written notice of the charges by requesting copies of the disciplinary reports.
Therefore, the Court finds that the defendants did violate plaintiffs’ constitutional rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to receive written notification of the charges against them at least twenty-four hours prior to appearing before the disciplinary board.
[Id. at 261.]
See also Ex Parte Floyd, 457 So. 2d 961, 962 (Ala.1984) (reversing prison-disciplinary board ruling depriving inmate of good-time credits, and holding that failure to provide twenty-four-hours prior written notice of charges violated prisoner’s due-process rights); Kelly v. State, 455 So.2d 1016, 1017 (Ala.Crim.App.1984) (holding that failure of prison officials to provide inmate with at least twenty-four-hours prior written notice of charges constituted denial of due-process rights); O’Malley v. Sheriff of Worcester County, 415 Mass. 132, 612 N.E.2d 641, 647 n.12 (1993) (holding that failure of prison officials to provide prisoners with written notice of charges at least twenty-four hours prior to disciplinary hearing violated inmates’ due-process rights); Cooper v. Morin, 91 Misc.2d 302, 398 N.Y.S.2d 36, 64-65 (Sup.Ct.1977) (holding that due-process requirement of twenty-four-hour advance notice of disciplinary charges applied to inmate-disciplinary proceedings in county jails), aff'd and modified on other grounds 64 A.D.2d 130, 409 N.Y.S.2d 30 (1978), modified 49 N.Y.2d 69, 424 N.Y.S.2d 168, 399 N.E.2d 1188 (1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 984, 100 S.Ct. 2965, 64 L.Ed.2d 840 (1980); People v. Stoddard, 107 Misc.2d 964, 435 N.Y.S.2d 1003, 1004 (Cty.Ct.1980) (reversing disciplinary sanction, and holding that notwithstanding inmate’s admission of guilt, provision of eighteen-hour rather than twenty-four-hour advance written notice of charges constituted due-process violation).
The State asserts that the failure to afford Jacobs twenty-four-hours written notice of the charges prior to commencement of the hearing is not significant because neither Jacobs nor his counsel-substitute requested additional time when the Hearing Officer asked if they were prepared to proceed. However, the Hearing Officer was unaware that the hearing was beginning prematurely, *228and the record does not indicate that either Jacobs or his counsel-substitute was aware that less than twenty-four hours had elapsed between receipt of notice of the charges and commencement of the hearing. Under those circumstances, Jacobs could not have effected a valid waiver of his due-process right to twenty-four-hours notice of the charges prior to hearing, because he was unaware that that right was about to be violated. See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463-64, 58 S.Ct. 1019,1022-23, 82 L.Ed. 1461, 1466 (1937). “A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Id. at 464, 58 S.Ct. at 1023, 82 L.Ed. at 1466. See North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373, 99 S.Ct. 1755, 1757, 60 L.Ed.2d 286, 292 (1979); State v. Kremens, 52 N.J. 303, 310-11, 245 A.2d 313 (1968).
The Court concedes that Jacobs did not receive twenty-four-hours written notice of the charges in advance of the hearing, but concludes that the error was harmless because “overwhelming evidence supports the hearing officer’s determination that Jacobs threatened Officer Hawkins.” Ante at 219, 652 A.2d at 715. No justification exists, however, for diluting the due-process rights of prisoners by application of a harmless-error analysis. See Giano v. Sullivan, 709 F.Supp. 1209,1217 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (“We decline to apply harmless error analysis to the constitutional defects in petitioner’s disciplinary hearing.”); see also Von Kahl v. Brennan, 855 F.Supp. 1413, 1422 (M.D.Pa.1994) (“To the extent 'that the regulations in fact actually track the requirements of due process, failure to comply with them is subject to reversal * * *.”).
The Court’s harmless-error analysis also fails to recognize that the due-process rights applicable to prison-disciplinary proceedings are minimal protections, already having been watered down to reflect the unique requirements of a prison environment:
[T]he fact that prisoners retain rights under the Due Process Clause in no way implies that these rights are not subject to restrictions imposed by the nature of the regime to which they have been lawfully committed. * 11 * In sum, there must be mutual accommodation between institutional needs and objectives and the provisions of the Constitution that are of general application.
*229[Wolff, supra, 418 U.S. at 556, 94 S.Ct. at 2975, 41 L.Ed.2d at 951.]
The requirement of at least twenty-four-hours notice of charges prior to a disciplinary hearing constitutes the Supreme Court’s resolution of the “mutual accommodation” required to balance the needs of prison discipline against the protections afforded by the Due Process Clause. That accommodation has been reflected in a mandatory regulation adopted by the Department of Corrections. N.J.A.C. 10A:4-9.2. In upholding the sanctions imposed on Jacobs in the face of an undisputed violation of his due-process rights, the Court undervalues the importance of full compliance with the minimal constitutional protections afforded in prison-disciplinary hearings, and overestimates the importance of affirming the result in this proceeding.
The Supreme Court observed in Wolff, supra, that “[t]here is no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and the prisons of this country.” 418 U.S. at 555-56, 94 S.Ct. at 2974, 41 L.Ed.2d at 950. The Court dishonors that principle when it ignores a clear violation of due-process rights simply because the evidence established the inmate’s guilt of the charged offense. Rather than encouraging compliance with the minimal due-process protections applicable to disciplinary hearings, the Court’s holding signals that violations of prisoners’ due-process rights are of less significance than determinations of guilt. That value judgment overlooks the purpose of affording due-process protections in prison-disciplinary proceedings, which is to assure that the hearings are fairly conducted and that the inmates have adequate opportunity to assert a defense.
I would reverse the judgment below and remand for a new disciplinary hearing.
For affirmance — Chief Justice WILENTZ and Justices HANDLER, POLLOCK and GARIBALDI — 4.
For reversal and remandment — Justice STEIN — 1.