Court Opinion

ID: 9588329
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:32:57.887+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:09.462253
License: Public Domain

*428Candler, Justice,
dissenting. Equity requires diligence in the protection of one’s own rights. Code § 37-211; Phillips v. Hayes, 212 Ga. 148, 149 (91 SE2d 19). Neither equity nor law will assist those who neglect to take care of themselves. Marshall v. Means, 12 Ga. 61 (5) (56 AD 444); Smith v. Rogers, 144 Ga. 576 (87 SE 772); and Romar Acceptance Corp. v. Parham, 213 Ga. 223, 225 (2) (98 SE2d 615). “It is well-settled law in this State that equity will grant no relief to one who by the exercise of ordinary diligence could have prevented the injury complained of.” Prince v. Friedman, 202 Ga. 136 (42 SE2d 434); Morrison v. Colquitt Co., 176 Ga. 104 (167 SE 321); Browning v. Richardson, 181 Ga. 413 (182 SE 516). In Lewis v. Foy, 189 Ga. 596, 601 (6 SE2d 788), it was unanimously said: “It is essential to all business relationships that the validity and solemnity of written contracts, freely and voluntarily executed, be upheld. It would be tragic if all such contracts were jeopardized by a rule of law that would permit one of the parties thereto, because of dissatisfaction therewith, to go into court and by oral testimony establishing conduct short of fraud and reasonable diligence obtain nullification of a written contract. If the plaintiff signed the deed here involved without knowing its contents, it was due to her own negligence, and the responsibility is hers and she must abide by the contract as signed.” The allegations of the amended petition in the instant case, if true, show reprehensible conduct on the part of the attorney who prepared and presented the deed to the plaintiff for execution, yet they fail to show that any emergency existed at the time the plaintiff executed it or that any trick or artifice was practiced on her to induce her to sign it or that there was a fiduciary relationship between her and the attorney who represented the defendant grantees in the transaction, or between her and the grantees in the deed involved. Although she was old, confined to her apartment and blind, diligence required the plaintiff to delay execution of the deed until she could be apprised of its contents and of its legal effect by someone other than the defendant grantees’ attorney. For a recent decision by this court which is controlling here, see West v. Carolina Housing &c. Corp., 211 Ga. 789 (2), supra. The petitioners in that case sought to cancel a deed which they *429had executed to one of the defendants and it was held that the allegations of the amended petition “are totally insufficient to relieve them of due diligence or to show any emergency making it necessary for them to sign without delay; and there being no fiduciary relationship between the parties, the petition fails to allege a cause of action, and the court did not err in sustaining the demurrer and in dismissing the petition.” It was there pointed out that the amended petition alleged that the petitioners were ignorant colored people, practically illiterate, and totally incapable of reading and understanding the nature of the paper presented to them for their signature; that it was late at night, and there was no one for them to turn to for advice and guidance at that time; and that they were, therefore, required to rely upon the representations of the agents of one of the defendants, which were false. As authority for the ruling there made, Truitt-Silvey Hat Co. v. Calloway & Truitt, 130 Ga. 637, supra, and Lewis v. Foy, 189 Ga. 596, supra, both of which are full-bench decisions, were cited and relied on by this court. For the reasons stated above, I cannot agree to the majority ruling in the instant case.
I am authorized to say that Chief Justice Duckworth and Justice Grice fully concur in this dissent.