Court Opinion

ID: 9768398
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 06:01:00.33945+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:40.490717
License: Public Domain

James R. Cooper, Judge, dissenting. I do not agree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial judge erred in finding no evidence that the appellee’s repudiation substantially impaired the value of the contract. I submit that, in order to show that the value of the contract had been impaired, the appellant was required to show not only the difference between the market price at the time and place for tender and the unpaid contract price, but also the amount of “expenses saved in consequence of the buyer’s breach” as required by Ark. Code Ann. § 4-2-708(1) (Repl. 1991). This the appellant failed to do, and I believe that the trial court was therefore correct in granting the directed verdict motion. Moreover, the case of Capital Steel Co. v. Foster & Creighton Co., 264 Ark. 683, 574 S.W.2d 256 (1978), cited by the majority for the proposition that a mere showing of lost profits constitutes an adequate basis for a finding of substantial impairment of the contracts value, is inapplicable to the facts of the present case. In Capital Steel, supra, the Court held that a showing of lost profits was sufficient to present an issue for the jury with regard to damages. However, that holding was based squarely on the fact that Ark. Code Ann. § 4-2-708(1) was not applicable because the steel which was to be sold was not in existence at the time of the repudiation, so that the Court was required to “turn to subsection (2), which governs when subsection (1) is not applicable.” In the case at bar, there was no showing that the measure of damages in subsection (1) was inadequate; therefore, there is no occasion to apply the “lost profits” provision of subsection (2), as the majority has done in the case at bar. Because the showing of expenses saved on account of the breach, required by subsection (1), was not adequately made, and because subsection (2) was not applicable, I think the trial court correctly granted the appellee’s motion for directed verdict. I respectfully dissent.