Court Opinion

ID: 9705643
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:14:43.271722+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:13.210186
License: Public Domain

*574Concurring Opinion.
Smith, J.
I concur in the result arrived at in the opinion written by Judge Bierly and concurred in by-Judges Hunter and Mote. The reversal of this case is predicated' upon the-proposition that the trial court committed reversible error in submitting to the jury instruction number 19.- With this conclusion I am in agreement.
Instruction 19 reads as follows:
“The court instructs you that all persons are required to assume certain risks which are inherent to existence and to regular and normal functions of life. Every act done by a human being carries with it a certain amount of risk and not every risk may be one which is chargeable to the negligence of some other person.
“If a person knowingly and willingly accepts the possibility that injury may result as a result of such risk, then that person cannot be held liable to a person whose actions or omissions may have created the risk. The voluntary, assumption of such a risk carries with it a concurrent responsibility to assume the results that may occur from assuming such a risk. The pursuit of happiness in recreational activities is not only a normal and customary activity but is one which is fraught with risk. There are hazards and perils which cannot be eliminated in the exercise of ordinary care in the operation ..of public amusement places, and to require a standard of absolute care from the operators of such places would not only cause them to become insurers of the safety of their patrons but would create burdens quite different and much' more restrictive from those placed upon other activities permitted in our - society. Therefore, if you find, that the plaintiff herein knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care, should, have known that the use of the defendants’ slide, ■ as alleged in her complaint, could result in injury to herself and you further find that she voluntarily assumed the risk of such injury, then the plaintiff should not recover and your verdict should be for the defends ants. (Emphasis suppliéd)
*575From an examination and consideration of this instruction it appears that the trial court correetly stated the Indiana law defining the doctrine-of assumed or incurred risk.
However, instructions given to a jury must be confined to the issues and should state correct legal principles so that the jury may be able to apply them to the issues to which they are germane. See, West’s I.L.E. Trial, §221.
It is further the law of this state that instructions must be predicated not only on the issues but also on the evidence in the case; and the giving of instructions which are not sustained by the evidence is reversible error. In the case of New York Central R. Co. v. Powell (1942), 221 Ind. 321, 47 N. E. 2d 615, our Supreme Court, in substance, held that instructions of the court to the jury in a civil action must follow the evidence and be limited to an exposition of the legal effect upon the issues on trial of the relevant facts before the jury for determination. See also, Jarrett v. Ellis (1923), 193 Ind. 687, 141 N. E. 627; Domestic Block Coal Co. v. DeArmey (1913), 179 Ind. 592, 100 N. E. 675; Terre Haute Electric Co. v. Roberts (1910), 174 Ind. 351, 91 N. E. 941; Hayes Freight Lines v. Oestricher (1946), 117 Ind. App. 143, 66 N. E. 2d 612.
The rule that an instruction should be applicable to the evidence cannot be construed to mean that the court is in error in stating correctly to the jury the law applicable to the issues made by the parties. See, State Natl. Bank v. Bennett, (1894), 8 Ind. App. 679, 36 N. E. 551. However, in determining whether an instruction is applicable to the evidence the court is required to consider the evidence in its entirety, .together with all reasonable inferences which may be *576drawn therefrom. Pennsylvania Ice & Coal Co. v. Elischer (1939), 106 Ind. App. 613, 21 N. E. (2d) 436.
Instruction number 19 assumes that the appellant-plaintiff incurred not only the risk inherent and incidental to the use of the slide, but she also incurred the risk that the slide might be defectively constructed. The record evidence is uncontroverted that the appellant-plaintiff had on previous occasions slid down similar slides. However, the record evidence is also uncontroverted that, at the time of the accident in question, it was the first time she had slid down this particular slide. There was no evidence or inference that might be drawn therefrom that the appellant-plaintiff was aware of any defect in the construction of the slide •and that she was aware of any hidden or latent defect in said slide.
The rule as enunciated by our courts of appeal, appears to be that while a person incurs the risk inherent and incidental to the use of a recreational facility, such person does not incur the risk that such facility may be defectively constructed.
In Valentine Co. v. Sloan (1913), 53 Ind. App. 69, 72, 101 N. E. 102, our Supreme Court held in substance as follows: the doctrine of assumption of risk does not apply in the case of a person injured by reason of the unevenness of the steps in an aisle of an opera house, where it appears in the evidence without contradiction that the injured' party had never been in the building before and had no knowledge of the condition of the Steps and was unable to see the condition of the steps. See also, Indiana etc. Oil Co. v. O’Brien (1903), 160 Ind. 266, 65 N. E. 918.
Applying this principle of law to the facts and issues in the case at bar, it is my opinion that the appellant-plaintiff did not incur the risk of a hidden or latent *577defect in the slide of which she had no knowledge either expressed or implied. It is my opinion that the facts in the case at bar fail to establish that the appellant knew or should have known of the alleged defect in the slide and thus an essential element in the doctrine of incurred risk was lacking; and that the jury should have been allowed to determine whether or not the appellees were negligent in the construction, erection and installation of the slide in question.
The opinion further discusses alleged errors predictated upon the giving of instructions number 10, 13, 14 and 25.
Instructions 14 and 25 instructed the jury on the law applicable to contributory negligence. In view of the fact that the appellant tendered an instruction on contributory negligence, I agree with the conclusion stated in the opinion that the appellant has not preserved error in the giving of such instructions. However, I do not agree that it is necessary to write an exhaustive exposition on the rule of law concerning contributory negligence; and it is not necessary to consider any such assigned error in said instructions in view of the fact that the opinion concluded the giving of instruction number 19 is reversible error.
The same thing can be said about the discussion of the alleged errors contained in instructions number 10 and 13.
It is my opinion that the statutory responsibility of this Court is to review assigned errors and make decisions thereon. We are not a court of education and instruction and are not called upon to educate trial courts to keep them from falling into possible error. Therefore, I do not agree with the statement contained in the opinion that we are required to comment briefly upon all alleged errors “due to the importance of the *578questions that might be raised on re-trial.” Any discussion and conclusions of assigned errors arrived at not necessary for a final determination of an appeal amounts to mere dictum and certainly could in no way be binding upon any trial court in the re-trial of this cause. At the most such discussions and conclusions arrived at could be advisory only.
Note. — Reported in 210 N. E. 2d 75.