Court Opinion

ID: 9908282
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-08 15:06:19.994506+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:04.629273
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: DECEMBER 1, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                 Commonwealth of Kentucky
                           Court of Appeals
                              NO. 2022-CA-1375-MR

QUIMON TAYLOR                                                           APPELLANT

                 APPEAL FROM CHRISTIAN CIRCUIT COURT
v.                 HONORABLE JOHN L. ATKINS, JUDGE
                 ACTION NOS. 13-CR-00562 AND 15-CR-00566

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                                  APPELLEE

                                     OPINION
                                    AFFIRMING

                                   ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; ECKERLE AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.

THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE: Quimon Taylor (“Appellant”), pro se, appeals

from an order of the Christian Circuit Court denying his Kentucky Rules of

Criminal Procedure (“RCr”) 11.42 motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his

sentence. Appellant argues that the circuit court erred in failing to find that he did

not receive the effective assistance of counsel to which he was entitled. He also

argues that he was entitled to a hearing on the motion. After careful review, we

find no error and affirm the order on appeal.
                       FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

                On November 15, 2013, the Christian County grand jury indicted

Appellant on one count each of murder and robbery in the first degree.1 On

November 18, 2016, Appellant entered a guilty plea to the murder charge and to an

amended charge of criminal facilitation.2 He subsequently entered a guilty plea to

additional charges of two counts of promoting contraband in the first degree, and

one count of promoting contraband in the second degree.3 Appellant was

sentenced to 25 years on the murder and facilitation charges. He received a

separate 2-year sentence on the counts of promoting contraband.

                On September 13, 2019, Appellant filed a pro se RCr 11.42 motion

requesting a hearing and seeking to vacate his conviction. In support of the

motion, Appellant alleged that his trial counsel improperly coerced him into

accepting a plea offer rather than proceeding to trial. He asserted that this failure

constituted ineffective assistance requiring RCr 11.42 relief. After considering

Appellant’s motion and the Commonwealth’s response, the Christian Circuit Court

entered an order denying Appellant’s motion. Specifically, the court found that

Appellant failed to demonstrate that his trial counsel’s performance was deficient

1
    Kentucky Revised Statutes (“KRS”) 507.020; KRS 515.020.
2
    KRS 506.080.
3
 KRS 520.050; KRS 520.060. The charges of promoting contraband were handed down by way
of a separate indictment.

                                             -2-
per Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674

(1984). This appeal followed.

                                STANDARD OF REVIEW

             To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Appellant

must show two things:

             First, the defendant must show that counsel’s
             performance was deficient. This requires showing that
             counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not
             functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by
             the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show
             that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.
             This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so
             serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial
             whose result is reliable.

Id. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. “[T]he proper standard for attorney performance is

that of reasonably effective assistance.” Id.

                    An error by counsel, even if professionally
             unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the
             judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no
             effect on the judgment. The purpose of the Sixth
             Amendment guarantee of counsel is to ensure that a
             defendant has the assistance necessary to justify reliance
             on the outcome of the proceeding. Accordingly, any
             deficiencies in counsel’s performance must be prejudicial
             to the defense in order to constitute ineffective assistance
             under the Constitution.

Id. at 691-92, 104 S. Ct. at 2066-67 (citation omitted). “It is not enough for the

defendant to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of

the proceeding.” Id. at 693, 104 S. Ct. at 2067. “The defendant must show that

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there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the

result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694, 104 S.

Ct. at 2068. Additionally, “a hearing is required only if there is an issue of fact

which cannot be determined on the face of the record.” Stanford v.

Commonwealth, 854 S.W.2d 742, 743-44 (Ky. 1993).

                         ARGUMENTS AND ANALYSIS

             Appellant argues that the Christian Circuit Court committed reversible

error by failing to conduct a hearing on his RCr 11.42 motion and to grant the

relief sought. He asserts that he was forced to change counsel on four separate

occasions, and that none of the counsel presented a plan to properly defend

Appellant at trial. With respect to his last counsel, Appellant argues that counsel’s

sole objective was to coerce him into taking a plea agreement in lieu of

formulating a proper trial strategy. Appellant also argues that his trial counsel was

ineffective in failing to file an RCr 8.07 motion requesting a mental examination or

raising a mental condition as a defense.

             In response, the Commonwealth notes that Appellant’s brief fails to

comply with Rules of Appellate Procedure (“RAP”) 32(A)(3) requiring a

Statement of the Case with ample supportive references to the record. It also

points out that Appellant’s brief does not comply with RAP 32(A)(4), which

                                           -4-
requires an Argument with ample supportive references to the record. The

Commonwealth notes that Appellant’s brief does not cite to the record even once

in his argument section. The Commonwealth asserts that per RAP 10(B), this

Court would be justified in striking Appellant’s brief and dismissing his appeal. In

the alternative, it argues that we should summarily affirm the order on appeal per

Leamon v. Phillips, 423 S.W.3d 759, 762 (Ky. App. 2014) (citing Skaggs v. Assad,

By and Through Assad, 712 S.W.2d 947 (Ky. 1986)).

             In his Reply Brief, Appellant states that he was confined to another

penal institution before being transferred to the Eastern Kentucky Correctional

Complex, where a legal aide assisted him in the filing of his written argument.

Appellant argues that in the rush to print the preliminary draft of his argument and

forward it to Appellant, the references to the record were lost. Appellant reminds

us that he is proceeding pro se, that the applicable rules are effectively a foreign

language to him, and he asks for leniency in this matter or an opportunity to correct

his appellate brief.

             While pro se litigants are held to less stringent standards than lawyers

when drafting formal pleadings, Kentucky courts still require procedural rules to

be followed. Beechum v. Commonwealth, 657 S.W.2d 234, 236 (Ky. 1983);

Watkins v. Fannin, 278 S.W.3d 637, 643 (Ky. 2009). The “conciliatory attitude

                                          -5-
toward unrepresented parties is not boundless.” Cardwell v. Commonwealth, 354

S.W.3d 582, 585 (Ky. App. 2011).

             RAP 10(A) provides that appeals shall be dismissed for failure to

timely file a notice of appeal, cross-appeal or motion, for discretionary review.

The failure to comply with other filing rules may result in action including striking

the party’s brief or dismissing the appeal. RAP 10(B)(1-6). Whereas RAP 10(A)

contains mandatory language requiring dismissal, the application of RAP 10(B) is

discretionary as it contains language allowing but not requiring action to address

the failure to comply. Though Appellant’s brief fails to comply with several RAP

provisions, we will consider his written argument as if it were compliant with the

rules.

             The focus of Appellant’s argument is that he was denied effective

assistance when his trial counsel failed to have him evaluated for competency to

stand trial and when counsel coerced him into accepting the plea offer. Having

closely examined the record and the law, we find no basis for either of these

assertions. Appellant has not presented any facts upon which the circuit court

could have concluded that trial counsel was ineffective prior to the entry of

Appellant’s guilty plea. Appellant participated in the standard plea colloquy,

stated that he was satisfied with counsel’s performance, and indicated he wished to

continue with the guilty plea. Appellant stated that he did not have any mental

                                         -6-
issues affecting the plea and acknowledged that he had discussed the plea with his

counsel and understood the terms of the plea. Finally, Appellant acknowledged

that he understood the rights he was waiving, including the rights to remain silent,

to a trial, and to appeal.

              Appellant could have raised any claim of a mental condition affecting

the proceedings or trial counsel’s alleged coercion during his plea colloquy, but did

not. Instead, Appellant acknowledged his signature on the guilty plea and accepted

the benefit of avoiding a trial on the underlying charges and a possible death

sentence. Appellant’s claims of ineffective assistance are self-serving and

conclusory, and do not form a basis for reversing the order denying his motion for

RCr 11.42 relief. Further, as his claim of ineffective assistance is justiciable by

reference to the record, he was not entitled to a hearing on the motion. Stanford,

supra. The circuit court properly so found.

                                  CONCLUSION

              For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the Christian Circuit

Court denying Appellant’s RCr 11.42 motion.

              ALL CONCUR.

                                          -7-
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:     BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Quimon Taylor, pro se     Daniel Cameron
West Liberty, Kentucky    Attorney General of Kentucky

                          Thomas A. Van De Rostyne
                          Assistant Attorney General
                          Frankfort, Kentucky

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