Court Opinion

ID: 9585959
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:05:33.824211+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:24:17.627195
License: Public Domain

*347Justice MARTIN
dissenting.
I cannot concur in the conclusion that the evidence was insufficient to submit the aggravating circumstance that the killing was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. The question before us is whether, as a matter of law, there is sufficient evidence to submit the issue to the jury for its determination. In making this decision, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, discrepancies and contradictions are disregarded, the state’s evidence is taken as true, and the state is entitled to every inference of fact that may be reasonably deduced therefrom. State v. Lester, 294 N.C. 220, 240 S.E. 2d 391 (1978); State v. Witherspoon, 293 N.C. 321, 237 S.E. 2d 822 (1977). The defendant’s evidence, unless favorable to the state, is not to be considered in deciding the question. State v. Earnhardt, 307 N.C. 62, 296 S.E. 2d 649 (1982). If there is substantial evidence of each element of the issue under consideration, the issue must be submitted to the jury for its determination. State v. Roseman, 279 N.C. 573, 184 S.E. 2d 289 (1971). If the evidence only raises a suspicion or conjecture as to the existence of the fact to be found, the issue should not be submitted. State v. Cutler, 271 N.C. 379, 156 S.E. 2d 679 (1967).
Chief Justice Stacy stated the applicable rule as follows:
[I]f there be any evidence tending to prove the fact in issue, or which reasonably conduces to its conclusion as a fairly logical and legitimate deduction, and not merely such as raises a suspicion or conjecture' in regard to it, the case should be submitted to the jury.
State v. Johnson, 199 N.C. 429, 431, 154 S.E. 730, 731 (1930).
The majority fails to properly apply the rule. Rather, it analyzes the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant. This is demonstrated by the following excerpts from its opinion:
1. “[D]efendant fired nine shots at the victim ...” (Emphasis added.) In the light most favorable to the state, defendant hit Joyce with each of the nine bullets. The medical doctor testified she was shot nine times, leaving eleven wounds in her body.
*3482. “[T]he lethal wound . . . rendered her unconscious within minutes.” True, but in the view most favorable to the state, Joyce experienced the pain of each of the nine bullets entering her body. The medical doctor testified that she was conscious during the entire incident.
3. “There is no evidence that defendant intended that his wife suffer a prolonged, torturous death . . . .” In the light most favorable to the state, the circumstantial evidence indicates that defendant intended his wife, Joyce, to suffer, not die instantaneously. Although he shot her nine times, striking her in various parts of her body, she remained conscious for several minutes. The doctor testified she was conscious during the entire incident. Immediately after the killing, the defendant laughed and said, “That’s all right. I killed the bitch.” Furthermore, defendant’s intention is not relevant as to whether there is sufficient evidence to submit the issue to the jury.
4. “The words [“Please, Stan”] also could have been uttered with reference to some other momentary conflict between the victim and her estranged husband.” I assume that the majority is indicating that Joyce Stanley, under these circumstances — with defendant pointing a gun out of the car window at her —meant “Please, Stan, go pay the light bill.” True, the jury could so find, but applying the rule as we are bound to do, the logical inference is: “Please, Stan, don’t kill me.”
5. “[T]he evidence does not support a reasonable inference that defendant, who never left his car, heard these words uttered by the victim who was standing on the curb.” In the light most favorable to the state, the inference is that defendant did hear the plea, but ignored it, and proceeded to gun down Joyce Stanley. Joyce was ten to twelve feet from Stanley at the time.
6. “Since no eyewitness other than Sandra Taylor heard this utterance, it is not reasonable to infer that defendant heard it.” This infers that numerous persons were in the area of the killing. Only one other witness, Joyce’s son, James, was in the immediate vicinity. Other persons were on the porch of a house some distance from the street. In the light *349most favorable to the state, since Sandra heard what Joyce said, the defendant also heard it. He was only ten to twelve feet from her.
7. “Neither is there any evidence which supports an inference that defendant boasted after the shooting . . . that he had killed someone begging for his life . . . .” True, he did not use those words. Whether he was boasting when he laughed and said “That’s all right. I killed the bitch,” was for the jury.
8. “[T]he victim did not linger and suffer for any prolonged period before death.” The medical doctor testified that Joyce was conscious during the entire incident. The mortal wound ruptured the main blood vessel from the heart, causing Joyce to bleed to death internally. She was conscious for several minutes before she died, according to the doctor. Several minutes can be a prolonged or extended period of time, depending upon what is happening and whose point of view is being considered. The time in question may have passed very quickly for defendant, but agonizingly slow and painful for Joyce before she mercifully slipped into unconsciousness. Joyce was not killed instantaneously. Having been shot nine times, the inference most favorable to the state is that she did indeed suffer.
9. “The victim and her family, knowing of defendant’s presence in the area, nevertheless went outside the house ‘for a walk.’ Obviously they were not being tortured psychologically by defendant’s actions ...” Actually, Sandra testified that they went into the street to get the license number on defendant’s car. James did say, “We were all going out for a walk.” (Emphasis added.) Defendant’s arrival altered their intentions. They then resolved to get the license number. Again, discrepancies in the evidence are to be disregarded.
Other examples may be found in the opinion, the point being that the majority abandoned the proper rule with respect to the issue. It resolved all the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant.
*350Moreover, it appears that the majority seeks to perform the task of the jury and make the determination of whether the killing was in fact especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. The majority states: “Only after accepting this view may we then differentiate among murders on the basis of their respective brutality, winnowing case by case those which are merely heinous, atrocious or cruel, from those which the jury could find are especially so. It is a grisly duty.” Our duty on the issue presently before us is not to “differentiate among murders” with respect to the heinousness of the crime. That task is properly our duty when we undertake a proportionality review. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-2000(d)(2) (1983). Here, we have only to determine if there is sufficient evidence to submit the issue to the jury. State v. Oliver, 309 N.C. 326, 307 S.E. 2d 304 (1983).
The author of the majority opinion expresses concern that jurors of “ordinary sensibility” might characterize almost every murder as especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. He urges us to consider this in determining the issue before us in this case. Our speculation as to how a jury would answer an issue has no proper place in our determination of whether the issue should be submitted to the jury. Nevertheless, there are at least three safeguards to protect the administration of justice from this possibility that troubles the majority: (1) Jurors may be examined on voir dire with respect to this question and removed from the jury in proper instances. (2) The trial court must instruct the jury with respect to the issue, and nothing else appearing, we assume that the jury follows such instructions. (3) This Court may correct such a result, either by finding error in the jury selection, the court’s jury instructions, or upon proportionality review, as the circumstances of a case may require.
In passing, I note that in two places the majority appears to be limiting the key factor on this issue to the brutality of the murder: “The defendant’s acts must be characterized by more brutality than is inherent in every murder”; “differentiate among murders on the basis of their respective brutality.” Of course, brutality is a factor to be considered, along with the facts of the killing and the entire set of circumstances surrounding the killing. But it is not conclusive. State v. Oliver, supra, 309 N.C. 326, 307 S.E. 2d 304 (1983). The correct standard is expressed in State v. Pinch, 306 N.C. 1, 292 S.E. 2d 203, cert. denied, 74 L.Ed. 2d 622 *351(1982). The aggravating circumstance “ ‘does not arise in cases in which death was immediate and in which there was no unusual infliction of suffering upon the victim.’ ” Id. at 34, 292 S.E. 2d at 228 (citation omitted). It is appropriate only when there is evidence of “excessive brutality, beyond that normally present in any killing, or when the facts as a whole portray the commission of a crime which was conscienceless, pitiless or unnecessarily torturous to the victim.” Id. See State v. Rook, 304 N.C. 201, 283 S.E. 2d 732 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1038 (1982); State v. Goodman, 298 N.C. 1, 257 S.E. 2d 569 (1979).
The majority relies heavily upon Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). Setting aside the question of whether the language in the Georgia statute, “outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman,” means the same as “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel,” I do note that the Georgia statute is written in the conjunctive, evidently requiring the jury to find that the crime was vile and horrible and inhuman, whereas our statute is written in the disjunctive, only requiring that the killing be especially heinous, or especially atrocious, or especially cruel. Moreover, the cases are factually different. In Godfrey, both victims were killed instantly upon being shot once. Joyce remained conscious for several minutes after the first shot struck her, and was shot eight more times. The victims in Godfrey did not speak; Joyce said “Please, Stan,” arguably pleading for her life. After the killing, Godfrey said nothing at the scene; Stanley laughed and said to Joyce’s sister and son, “That’s all right. I killed the bitch.” Defendant fired nine shots into Joyce; Godfrey only shot each victim once. Godfrey evidently shot his first victim from ambush; Stanley drove back and forth in front of the house where Joyce was visiting her mother. He did this five or six times, arguably causing apprehension to Joyce and her family. I do not find Godfrey controlling.
The evidence, when considered in accordance with the rule set out above, supports the following facts and inferences:
1. Joyce was shot nine times with a rifle. From this, it can be reasonably inferred that the killing was unusually brutal.
2. She remained conscious as each shot struck her and for some time thereafter.
*3523. Joyce bled to death internally.
4. It can be reasonably inferred from these three facts that Joyce suffered both physical and mental pain and anguish before she lapsed into unconsciousness.
5. Before the shooting, Joyce saw defendant drive back and forth in front of the house five or six times. In an effort to get defendant’s car license number, Joyce, Sandra, and James went down to the street, and defendant turned the corner into the street they were on. From this, it can be reasonably inferred that Joyce suffered apprehension as to her safety.
6. Joyce was killed in the presence of her family.
7. After the gun was taken from Stanley, he laughed and said, “That’s all right. I killed the bitch.” From this, it can be reasonably inferred that defendant had no remorse and that the killing was pitiless or conscienceless. It was not until defendant was talking to the officers that he said he “loved his wife.”
8. After Sandra said, “Oh God, he’s got a gun”, Joyce, some ten or twelve feet from defendant, said “Please, Stan.” Defendant then shot her. From this, it can be reasonably inferred that Joyce, understanding the danger she was facing, was pleading for her life. It also supports the conclusion that the killing was pitiless or conscienceless.
I cannot find as a matter of law that the evidence is insufficient to submit this issue to the jury for its determination. Joyce’s death was not immediate, and the evidence supports the inference that she endured unusual suffering by reason of being shot nine times before she became unconscious. The evidence is sufficient for the jury to find that the killing was excessively brutal, beyond that normally present in a killing, and that it was conscienceless, pitiless, or unnecessarily torturous to Joyce Stanley and therefore especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. State v. Pinch, supra, 306 N.C. 1, 292 S.E. 2d 203, cert. denied, 74 L.Ed. 2d 622 (1982). The jury under proper instructions remains free to reject or find the circumstance. State v. Cherry, 298 N.C. 86, 257 S.E. 2d 551 (1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 941 (1980). Certainly, in resolving the question of law as to whether this ag*353gravating circumstance should be submitted to the jury, it is not our province to consider how the jury should have answered the issue. That is the proper function of the jury under proper instructions from the trial court. What the outcome of this case would be on proportionality review is not before us, as we have not reached that stage of the proceedings. The evidence supporting the jury’s finding that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel goes far beyond mere speculation or conjecture and was properly submitted to the jury.
Justice COPELAND joins in this dissent.