Court Opinion

ID: 9641914
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:43:10.646108+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:40.775219
License: Public Domain

STUMBO, Justice,
dissenting.
Respectfully, I must dissent. The jury instruction at issue in this case was more than merely confusing; it was virtually identical to the flawed instruction given in Stoker, and, as such, it was clearly erroneous. I can conceive of no rational reason why defense counsel, had he been aware of the Stoker decision, would not have objected to the instruction and requested a proper, more clear version of same. Because counsel’s performance was so obviously deficient, I believe Pelfrey has satisfied the first prong of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).
As for the second prong of Strickland, that of prejudice, I believe Stoker quite aptly explains the type of prejudice which results from such an erroneous instruction. Although the jury clearly did not intend to run all of Pelfrey’s sentences concurrently for a total sentence of 20 years, in determining that some of Pelfrey’s sentence should run consecutively, it need not necessarily have concluded that all the sentences should run consecutively. Pelfrey was prejudiced by the mere fact that the jury was not properly informed it had the option of sentencing him to a period of time anywhere between 20 and 39 years. Furthermore, it is of little consequence that the trial judge had the ultimate power to sentence Pelfrey, and that the jury’s verdict was simply a recommendation. As we did in Stoker, we should note that the trial judge here sentenced Pelfrey “in conformity with the jury’s verdict,” and acknowledge “the practical difficulty in doing otherwise in the face of the jury’s recommendation.” Stoker v. Commonwealth, Ky., 828 S.W.2d at 619, 627 (1992).
Lastly, I cannot agree with the Court’s refusal to reverse a case such as this, where clear error and prejudice have been conclusively demonstrated, simply because the error has been pointed out in the defendant’s RCr 11.42 motion rather than on direct appeal. Is a defendant who has effective appellate counsel somehow worthier of due process and fair proceedings than one who does not? The error and the prejudice are the same whether brought to the Court’s attention on direct appeal or on collateral attack. It follows that the remedy, too, should be the same.
For the reasons set forth above, I would affirm the Court of Appeals, vacate the sentence of 39 years, and remand the case for another sentencing hearing consistent with Boone v. Commonwealth, Ky., 821 S.W.2d 813 (1992).
LAMBERT, C.J., joins this dissenting opinion.