Court Opinion

ID: 9687410
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:27:29.917593+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:27.080121
License: Public Domain

Holbrook, J.
(dissenting). My concurrence in the case of Corporation & Securities Commission v. American Motors Corporation (Appeal re Detroit Edison Company) (1966), 4 Mich App 65, was required by reason of the principle of res judicata following the decision between the same parties and involving the same issues in Detroit Edison Company v. Corporation & Securities Commission (1962), 367 Mich 104. Although my brother judges have ruled that “the trial court is not precluded from holding that its prior determination of the law in this area is controlling in the instant case, and the fact that the original opinion was based upon principles set forth in a 3-2 Supreme Court decision is immaterial,” I believe it best to elaborate further in this regard. The binding force of Detroit Edison Company v. Corporation & Securities Commission, supra, is absent in the instant case because there are different parties and the prevailing opinion of 3 of 8 justices of the Michigan Supreme Court establishes no precedent1 for subsequent cases.
*559The main issue of controversy appears to he whether or not the State franchise fees shall be determined by the Michigan corporation and securities commission on the basis of accounting methods permitted or required by the Michigan public service commission.2 At first blush it would appear that the 2 divisions of government should ascertain capital and surplus upon the same basis or under the same accounting methods. However, upon closer look we find that the MPSC has to do with setting rates whereas the MCSC is required to assess and collect ■ franchise fees. In reviewing similar situations we find that a common subject has on occasion been treated differently when considered for different purposes. In our opinion of Williams v. Primary School District #3, Green Township (1966), 3 Mich App 468, in a footnote at p 472, we stated as follows:
“It is immaterial that school districts are characterized as ‘local units’ or ‘municipal corporations’ for purposes of allocation under the property tax limitation act, Act No 62, PA 1933, as amended, CL 1948, § 211.201 et seq. (Stat Ann I960 Rev § 7.61 et seq.). The case of Bacon v. Kent-Ottawa Metropolitan Water Authority (1958), 354 Mich 159, holds that school districts possess the authority of ‘municipal corporations’ for purposes of property tax imposition. The case of Sayers v. School District #1, Fractional (1962), 366 Mich 217, identifies school districts as ‘State agencies’ for purposes of tort liability.”
Any theory in this case that would require the accounting method of the MPSC to control that of *560the MCSC appears to be -without statutory foundation. It would be improper to allow the accounting method approved or required by the MPSC to control the assessing procedures of the MCSC in determining State franchise taxes because it is contrary to specific statutory authority3 and therefore unconstitutional.4 See Cheney v. St. Louis S.W.R.R. Co. (1965), 239 Ark 870 (394 SW2d 731).
For the reasons herein stated and because I feel the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Edwards in Detroit Edison Company v. Corporation & Securities Commission (1960), 361 Mich 150, and the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Souris in Detroit Edison Company v. Corporation & Securities Commission (1962), 367 Mich 104, properly set forth the law in this matter, I am constrained to dissent. It appears without question that there is a justiciable issue between the parties and therefore a controversy existing which should be disposed of upon the merits. I would reverse and remand for further proceedings.

 In Detroit Edison Company v. Corporation & Securities Commission supra, the majority opinion was written by Justice Black; Justice Kelly concurred and Justice Dethmers concurred in result; Justice Souris dissented and Chief Justice Carr concurred in dissent; Justice T. M. Kavanash, Justice Oris Smith and Justice P. L. _A,ijams did no,t sjlt. Thus the prevailing opinion does not constitute *559stare decisis. 21 CJS, Courts, § 189, pp 305-308. Sommers v. City of Flint (1959), 355 Mieli 655; Zirkalos v. Zirkalos (1949), 326 Mich 420; Groening v. McCambridge (1937), 282 Mich 135; Kangas v. New York Life Insurance Co. (1923), 223 Mich 238; City of Kalamazoo v. Crawford (1908), 154 Mich 58.

 CLS 1961, § 460.6 (Stat A»n I960 Cum Supp §22.13 [6]),

 CDS 1956, § 450.304 (Stat Aim 1963 Cum Supp § 21.205) states the applicable definition of “surplus” as follows:
“The term 'surplus’, as used in this act, shall be taken and deemed to mean the net value of the corporation’s property, less its outstanding indebtedness and paid-up capital; but in no ease, either as to domestic or as to foreign corporations, shall any deduction be made from the item of paid-up capital, in computing the franchise fee thereon, by reason of any impairment of the same.” There is no legislative direction qualifying or cutting back the above quoted language — viz.: “less its outstanding indebtedness.” The duty of the MCSC is all too clear, and absent authorization from the legislature, it is extremely difficult to understand how orders of the MiPSC .can r.estrjet. the MCpO jn its franchise tax determinations (see above quote from Williams v. Primary School District #3, Green Township, supra).

 Const 1908, art 10, § 4 states:
“The legislature may by law ipipose..specific .faxes, ^hiqh shall b® uniform upon the classes upon which they operate.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Const 1908, art 10, § 6 states:
“Every law which imposes, continues or revives a tax shall distinctly state the tax, and the objects to which it is to be applied; and it shall not he sufficient to refer to any other law to fix s¡tich tqx.jqr object.” (Emphasis supplied.)