Court Opinion

ID: 9852189
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:26:21.632555+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:23.951443
License: Public Domain

E. A. Quinnell, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I agree that the judgment should be amended, but disagree as to the appropriate remedy.
The division of marital property is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. However, review in this Court is not governed by the typical "abuse of discretion” definition.1 This Court reviews property settlements de novo on the record, *12but will not reverse or modify the property division unless it is convinced that it would have reached another result had it occupied the position of the trial court. Perrin v Perrin, 169 Mich App 18, 22; 425 NW2d 494 (1988). Other cases have held that the standard of review requires this Court to determine whether the lower court result is "clearly erroneous.” A finding is clearly erroneous only if, after review of the entire record, we are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Kowalesky v Kowalesky, 148 Mich App 151, 155; 384 NW2d 112 (1986), lv den 425 Mich 876 (1986).
This panel would have reached another result had we occupied the position of the trial court, and we are left with the definite and firm conviction, after review of the entire record, that a mistake has been made. I view the origin of the mistake as being the attempt by the parties, by stipulation, to limit the trial court to deciding whether or not the advanced degree was a marital asset. This attempt has at least two flaws.
First, the parties lacked the authority to so limit a court.
The end sought in the division of property is a fair and equitable distribution under all of the circumstances. Ripley v Ripley, 112 Mich App 219, 226-227; 315 NW2d 576 (1982). The division is not governed by any rigid rules or mathematical formulas. Ripley, supra. To the extent that the relevant provision of the parties’ consent judgment attempts to alter this function, it is invalid. [Greaves v Greaves, 148 Mich App 643, 647;384 NW2d 830 (1986)].
Second, an attempt to address the mba as a *13discrete issue is nothing more than an attempt to find a simple answer to a complex issue. The majority opinion and the trial court have accurately noted that different panels of this Court are not in agreement as to whether an advanced degree should be considered a marital asset to be distributed as property, or as a factor in awarding alimony. More importantly, attempting to value an mba degree in terms of either property concepts or alimony concepts ignores the overall objective of accomplishing a fair and equitable result in a divorce case, under all the circumstances. Traditionally, factors to be considered in distributing property include the source of the property, the length of the marriage, the needs of the parties, their earning ability, and the cause of the divorce. Overlapping factors to be considered in awarding alimony include the duration of the marriage, the contributions of the parties to the joint estate, the ages of the parties, their health, their stations in life, the necessities and circumstances of the parties, and the earning ability of the parties. Wilkins v Wilkins, 149 Mich App 779, 791; 386 NW2d 677 (1986). In considering these factors, it really matters little whether the defendant has an mba, or whether he is a licensed master plumber as distinct from a journeyman plumber. Whatever the attainment, it is only one part of the overall circumstances of the parties and cannot be considered fairly in isolation.
Here, the stipulation of the parties and the ruling of the trial court that the mba is not property have combined to accomplish an inequitable result. The assets of the parties have been divided equally, but defendant has a gross income of approximately $1,000 per month more than plaintiff, and presumably his retirement benefits will be somewhat greater also. I agree that some *14amendment is necessary, and that amendment can take one of at least three possible forms.
1. Under the authority of Greaves, supra, we could amend the stipulation of the parties, e.g., award the wife the marital home plus half the cash, and award the husband one-half the cash. All courts, including this one, are most reluctant to set aside a stipulation of the parties, in that we are not familiar with the motives of the parties in reaching that stipulation.
2. We could award a lump sum of money to the wife, which the majority has seen fit to do, payable in installments; such payments are sometimes called alimony in gross, a term which should be abandoned since it is really nothing more than a property provision. See Daniels v Daniels, 165 Mich App 726, 731; 418 NW2d 924 (1988), and Wilkins, supra, pp 794-795 (J. P. Noecker, J. concurring).
3. We could award the wife periodic alimony.
On balance, I conclude that an equitable result would be achieved by an amendment to the judgment requiring defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of $300 per month until her death or remarriage or until further order of the trial court. Such an award will increase plaintiffs annual gross income to some $34,6002 in recognition of her contribution to the financial circumstances of the parties at the time of the divorce, including the existence of the mba degree. Defendant’s gross income will be reduced to some $40,400,3 some $5,800 more than plaintiffs. I consider this difference to be appropriate. As to the mba degree itself, it was defendant who did the studying and wrote the exams. As to the overall condition of the finances of the parties *15while they were married, this difference also recognizes defendant’s talent and industry in generating a higher income. Such a provision allows flexibility in dealing with possible future changes, e.g., defendant’s loss of his job, plaintiffs loss of her job. I would decline to order any lump sum amount paid based on a calculation of present value. Such a provision becomes unchangeable and could result in unfairness or inequity in the future as to either of the parties. Further, consideration of an advanced degree as "property” distorts traditional property concepts beyond recognition.
Accordingly, I would remand this matter to the trial court for an order amending the judgment of divorce so as to provide for periodic alimony as set forth above and award no costs, neither party having prevailed in full.

 A frequently cited definition is found in Spalding v Spalding, 355 Mich 382, 384-385; 94 NW2d 810 (1959). However, in Bosak v Hutchinson, 422 Mich 712, 737-738; 375 NW2d 333 (1985), the Court at least tacitly approved the far more realistic statement of the concept *12expressed by Justice Levin, concurring in People v Talley, 410 Mich 378, 396-400; 301 NW2d 809 (1981).

 Based on income as of the date of trial.

 Id.