Court Opinion

ID: 9861575
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 00:10:33.757299+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:28:41.020516
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE GALASSO, dissenting: I respectfully dissent from the conclusion reached by my colleagues. We were fortunate to have the report of proceedings available with the record. The majority is correct in its statement that the written order was inappropriate. The law is clear; the contemnor must know why he is being held in contempt, whether or not the contempt is criminal or civil, and, if civil, what the contemnor must do in order to purge himself. The written order of contempt in this case was poorly drafted and does not meet the standards previously set by this court. However, as mentioned, there was a court reporter present and there is a written record. The contemnor has not argued that he was not advised of the process to purge himself. To the contrary, the record in this case is clear. “MR. UELSMANN (the contemnor): I refuse to do, respectively [sic], sir. You and I are both attorneys. I honor this Court. THE COURT: Sir, do you want to raise your right hand— MR. UELSMANN: Sir, I decline— THE COURT: —and take the oath? Do you decline to do so? MR. UELSMANN: I decline to do so, sir. THE COURT: On what basis? MR. UELSMANN: On the basis that you are asking me to provide information that is privileged without proper authority. THE COURT: Well, here is what we are going to do, Counsel. You have a court reporter here today. I want you to take the oath. And if you believe that there is some information in response to some question that is asked of counsel during the course of the citation, you certainly make a record of it and we will determine that, okay? Do you want to raise your right hand, please?” The trial court allowed the contemnor to consult with his attorney. The trial court then advised the contemnor that, while he could make a record as to the questions that he believed would violate the attorney-client privilege, the citation would proceed. 304 Ill. App. 3d at 113. The following colloquy then occurred: “MR. UELSMANN: Your Honor, I have listened to your comments this morning, and I have carefully considered them. I hear what I perceive to be ongoing prejudice in this matter. I respectfully refuse to proceed further in this matter. THE COURT: Okay. I am going to find you in direct contempt of court. Take him into custody. You are remanded to the custody of the Du Page County Sheriff. You can purge yourself of contempt, sir, by agreeing to answer the questions in keeping with these guidelines.” (Emphasis added.) The trial court denied the contemnor’s request for a trial by jury presided over by a different judge. The order signed by Judge Lucas in this case provided that the contemnor was found in criminal contempt of court. It is clear that it was the trial court’s intention and order to hold the appellant in direct civil contempt. Civil contempt relies on coercion of the contemnor; he is being coerced to do something and thus can be relieved from the coercion by compliance. Morse, 240 Ill. App. 3d at 302. The civil contemnor must be provided with the “keys to his cell.” That is, he must be allowed to purge himself of the contempt even after he has been imprisoned. People v. Doherty, 165 Ill. App. 3d 630, 635 (1988). While the jail commitment order in this case provided that the contemnor was found to be in criminal contempt of court, I believe that the order in this case must be read in conjunction with the statements of the trial court. As quoted above, the trial court’s statement that the contemnor could purge himself of contempt by taking the oath indicated that ordering the contemnor’s incarceration was not punitive but coercive in nature. Once the contemnor would agree to take the oath, no other sanctions were to be imposed upon him. As the contemnor’s refusal to take the oath and be sworn occurred in the presence of the trial court, the contempt was direct. See Betts, 200 Ill. App. 3d at 47. Therefore, contrary to the written order in this case, the contemner was found in direct civil contempt of court and was told in open court what he had to do to purge himself. See Thurston, 255 Ill. App. 3d at 514-15 (in ascertaining the terms of a sentence, a reviewing court may examine the record as a whole, since the oral pronouncement of sentence and the written sentencing order entered on the same day can be viewed as one transaction); Tackett, 130 Ill. App. 3d at 353 (courts may determine which to follow, the common-law record or the report of proceedings, depending on whether one of those sources has an internal inconsistency or would represent improper action). In summary, as the contemnor was found in direct civil contempt, he was not entitled to the procedural safeguards afforded an individual found in criminal contempt, either where the sentence to be imposed for direct criminal contempt exceeds six months or the finding is of indirect criminal contempt. See Betts, 200 Ill. App. 3d at 43-60. While a finding of indirect civil contempt requires that the contemnor be afforded minimal due process of notice and an opportunity to be heard (see Betts, 200 Ill. App. 3d at 52-58), the same are not required for a finding of direct civil contempt. The contemnor’s contention that he was improperly sentenced to an indefinite period of incarceration is without merit since he could purge himself of the contempt by being sworn as a witness, and, thus, he “held the keys to his jail cell.” Finally, while in the future the trial court should pay closer attention to the provisions of the orders it signs, the record in this case was sufficient to determine the basis for the finding of contempt. I conclude, as the report proceedings established, that the contemnor was found to be in direct civil contempt and that the trial court acted properly in ordering him to be incarcerated until such time as he purged himself of the contempt by taking the oath to be sworn as a witness and answer questions in the citation proceeding.