Court Opinion

ID: 9959369
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-11 16:11:18.053616+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:32.845998
License: Public Domain

J-S06045-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  IN THE INTEREST OF: N.H., A                  :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
  MINOR                                        :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                                               :
  APPEAL OF: N.W., FATHER                      :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 2364 EDA 2023

                 Appeal from the Order Entered August 17, 2023
              In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
              Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-51-DP-0001371-2020

  IN THE INTEREST OF: N.H., A                  :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
  MINOR                                        :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                                               :
  APPEAL OF: N.W., FATHER                      :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 2365 EDA 2023

                Appeal from the Decree Entered August 17, 2023
              In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
              Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000184-2023

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.:                              FILED APRIL 11, 2024

       N.W. (“Father”) appeals from the decree granting the petition filed by

the Department of Human Services (“DHS”) to involuntary terminate his

parental rights to N.H. (“Child”) (born February 2020), and the order changing

Child’s goal to adoption.1 We affirm.

____________________________________________

1 Mother consented to the involuntary termination of her parental rights.   See
N.T., 8/17/23, at 14-20.
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       The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows.             The

Philadelphia Department of Human Services (“DHS”) became involved with

the family shortly after Child’s first birthday due to Mother’s aggressive

behavior. The court adjudicated Child dependent in April 2021. In May 2023,

DHS filed a petition to terminate Father’s parental rights.

       In August 2023, the Family Court held a hearing on DHS’s petition.

Crystal   Atkins    (“Ms.    Atkins”),    Community   Umbrella   Agency   (“CUA”)

caseworker, testified CUA provided Father2 with objectives including making

his whereabouts known and participating in parenting classes. See id. at 24.

CUA also spoke with Father in prison3 twice, but he failed to comply with his

objectives. Father requested Child be placed with his mother but mother did

not respond to contacts. See id. at 24-26. Ms. Atkins testified that Child and

a sibling are thriving in kinship care with a parental cousin, whom he regards

as a mother, in an affectionate, loving, caring, and consistent relationship,

and, further, severance of that bond would detrimentally affect Child. See id.

at 27, 29, 32, 36-37. Father has had no in-person visits with Child or any

contact since Child entered kinship care in 2021. See id. Child does not know

Father, has never asked for Father, has not received any cards or presents

____________________________________________

2 Father is not listed as Child’s father on his birth certificate.    See N.T.,
8/17/23, at 31.

3 Father is serving a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of

parole for second-degree murder. See N.T., 8/17/23, at 21-22, 28-29, 45.

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from him and, in Ms. Atkins’s opinion, would not be irreparably harmed by the

termination of Father’s parental rights. See id. at 29-32.4

       Father testified he had been moved twice to different prisons and did

not receive materials from Ms. Atkins until March 2023.        He testified his

current prison does not have classes for anger management, drugs, or mental

health. See id. at 42-44. He said he had a prison job but never sent money

for Child’s support. See id. at 46. He testified that before his August 2022

incarceration, he did not see Child much because he did not have “a real good

connection” with Mother. He testified that he has seen Child, then three and

one-half years old, five or six times. See id. at 48.

       The Family Court found clear and convincing evidence established the

applicability of 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), and (b), entered a decree

terminating Father’s parental rights, and ordered Child’s goal changed to

adoption. See id. at 53-59.

       Father timely appealed and filed a timely notice of appeal pursuant to

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i), and the Family Court filed a brief notice of compliance

with Rule 1925.5

____________________________________________

4 Ms. Atkins’s testimony also established Father knew how to contact her office

and failed to do so or had any family member do so. See N.T., 8/17/23, at
34-35.

5 The Orphans’ Court document is less than one-and-one-half pages long and

fails to summarize the relevant facts or its reasoning and refers this Court to
the hearing transcript.

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      Father presents two issues for our review:

      1. Whether the trial court erred or abused [its] discretion when
         terminating Father’s rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1),
         (2)[,] absent clear and convincing evidence[?]

      2. Whether the trial court erred or abused [its] discretion when
         terminating Father’s rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b)[,]
         absent clear and convincing evidence, and changing [Child’s]
         goal to adoption[?]

See Father’s Brief at 5.

      An appellate court reviews an involuntary termination order for an abuse

of discretion, which limits its review to a determination of whether competent

evidence supports the termination court’s decree. See In re Adoption of

C.M., 255 A.3d 343, 358 (Pa. 2021).          An appellate court must accept the

Family Court’s findings of fact and credibility determinations which the record

supports. See Interest of S.K.L.R., 256 A.3d 1108, 1123 (Pa. 2021). Where

the record supports the Family Court’s factual findings, an appellate court may

not disturb that court’s ruling absent an error of law or abuse of discretion.

See In re Adoption of L.A.K., 265 A.3d 580, 591 (Pa. 2021). An abuse of

discretion   exists   where    there    is    a   demonstration   of   manifest

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. See id. Section 2511

of the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511, governs the involuntary termination

of parental rights. If the Family Court determines the petitioner established

grounds for termination under section 2511(a) by clear and convincing

evidence, then it must assess the petition under section 2511(b), which

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focuses on the Child’s needs and welfare. See In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251,

267 (Pa. 2013).

      In this case, the Family Court terminated Father’s parental rights

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), and (b), which provide as follows:

      (a) General rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a Child
      may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
      grounds:

           (2)   The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,
                 neglect, or refusal of the parent has caused the child
                 to be without essential parental care, control or
                 subsistence necessary for his physical or mental
                 well-being and the conditions and causes of the
                 incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will
                 not be remedied by the parent.

                                      *****

      (b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights
      of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
      physical and emotional needs and welfare of the Child. The rights
      of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
      environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
      income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
      control of the parent.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (b).

      Concerning proof of subsection 2511(a)(2), this Court has stated “[t]he

grounds for termination are not limited to affirmative misconduct, but concern

parental incapacity that cannot be remedied. Parents are required to make

diligent efforts toward the reasonably prompt assumption of full parental

duties.”   In re Adoption of A.H., 247 A.3d 439, 443 (Pa. Super. 2021)

(internal citation omitted).   Clear and convincing evidence is that which is so

clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to allow the trier of fact to reach a

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clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.

See In re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa. Super. 2000).

      Regarding the definition of “parental duties,” this Court has stated:

            There is no simple or easy definition of parental
            duties. Parental duty is best understood in relation to
            the needs of a Child. A Child needs love, protection,
            guidance, and support. These needs, physical and
            emotional, cannot be met by a merely passive interest
            in the development of the Child. Thus, this Court has
            held that the parental obligation is a positive duty
            which requires affirmative performance.

            This affirmative duty encompasses more than a
            financial obligation; it requires continuing interest in
            the Child and a genuine effort to maintain
            communication and association with the Child.

            Because a Child needs more than a benefactor,
            parental duty requires that a parent exert himself to
            take and maintain a place of importance in the Child’s
            life.

         Parental duty requires that the parent act affirmatively
         with good faith interest and effort, and not yield to every
         problem, in order to maintain the parent-Child
         relationship to the best of his or her ability, even in
         difficult circumstances. A parent must utilize all available
         resources to preserve the parental relationship[] and must
         exercise reasonable firmness in resisting obstacles placed in
         the path of maintaining the parent-Child relationship. Parental
         rights are not preserved by waiting for a more suitable or
         convenient time to perform one’s parental responsibilities while
         others provide the Child with . . . her physical and emotional
         needs.

In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa. Super. 2004) (internal citations and

quotations omitted) (emphasis added). “[A] parent’s responsibilities are not

tolled during incarceration.   The focus is on whether the parent utilized

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resources available while in prison to maintain a relationship with his or her

child.” See id. Additionally, although a parent’s incarceration is not a “litmus

test” for termination, the length of a parent’s remaining confinement “can be

considered as highly relevant to whether ‘the conditions and causes of the

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the

parent,’ sufficient to provide grounds for termination pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 2511(a)(2).”        In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 830 (Pa. 2012)

(internal citation omitted).6

       Father claims he has an appeal of his conviction listed in January 2024,

and Mother has obstructed his involvement with Child. See Father’s Brief at

11-12.

       The Family Court found Father saw Child five times in Child’s life despite

repeated periods of non-incarceration, took no active part in Child’s care prior

to incarceration, and his appeal would be heard nearly three years after Child

entered care. It concluded DHS presented clear and convincing evidence of

the applicability of section 2511(a)(2). See N.T., 8/17/23, at 57-58.

____________________________________________

6 A panel of this Court has found a life sentence supports the conclusion that

a parent will remain unable to remedy the situation within a reasonable period
of time. See In re Adoption of N.A. N., 237 A.3d 451 (Pa. Super. 2020 at
*7) (unpublished memorandum) (determining Father’s two life sentences
make it most likely he will be unable to remedy his incapacity to parent). See
Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (stating that unpublished memoranda filed by this Court
after May 1, 2019, may be cited for their persuasive value).

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      We perceive no error of law or abuse of discretion in the Family Court’s

determination. The record demonstrates that in addition not being involved

in Child’s life when incarcerated, Father had minimal involvement in Child’s

life when not incarcerated[] and made no effort to oppose Mother’s alleged

obstruction. See In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d at 855.

      Father’s second issue implicates Child’s best interests under section

2511(b).

      A section 2511(b) analysis focuses on the developmental, physical, and

emotional needs and welfare of the Child, see 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b),

including “[i]ntangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability,” In re

K.M., 53 A.3d 781, 791 (Pa. Super. 2012), and a consideration of the parent-

child bond. See In re E.M., 620 A.2d 481, 485 (Pa. 1993). “Common sense

dictates that courts considering termination must also consider whether the

[child is] in a pre-adoptive home and whether [he] has a bond with [his] foster

parents.” See In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 268.

      Father asserts DHS kept Father from Child, did not provide visitations

during incarceration, and has unclean hands. See Father’s Brief at 12-13.

      The Family Court determined Child has no bond with Father, does not

know him, and termination will not cause Child irreparable harm because Child

is in a loving home with a family member who meets all of Child’s needs. See

N.T., 8/17/23, at 58.

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      Father fails to address the factors relevant to a section 2511(b) analysis.

The relevant factors demonstrate Child has no relationship with Father and

has a loving bond with a family caregiver who attends to his needs. See 23

Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b); In re K.M., 53 A.3d at 791; In re E.M., 620 A.2d at

485; In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 268. The Family Court properly evaluated the

evidence.

      In sum, we conclude the Family Court did not abuse its discretion when

it terminated Father’s parental rights under section 2511(a)(2) and (b). The

effect of that determination necessarily renders moot Father’s challenge to the

dependency court’s decision to change Child’s goal to adoption. See A.H.,

247 A.3d at 446 (citation omitted) (holding an issue before a court is moot if

in ruling on the issue the court cannot enter an order that has any legal force

or effect).

      Decree and order affirmed.

      Judge McLaughlin joins memorandum.

      Judge Dubow did not participate in the consideration or decision of this

memorandum.

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Date: 4/11/2024

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