Court Opinion

ID: 9566994
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:46:25.118652+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:48:41.752773
License: Public Domain

DAVISON, Justice.
This is an action in the nature of quo warranto, brought for the purpose of determining the title to the office of County Superintendent of Schools of Creek 'County, Oklahoma, for the term beginning on July 2, 1951. The parties appear here in the same order and will be referred to as they appeared in the trial court; namely, Mrs. M. L. Murphy, as plaintiff, and J. L. Darnell, as defendant.
The defendant was inducted into office under authority of a certificate of election thereto for the term beginning on said date, July 2, 1951. Plaintiff was the duly qualified holder of the office for the term ending on that date, claiming the right to continue therein because of the alleged lack of eligibility and qualification of tbe defendant for the office.
It is provided by 70 O.S.1951 § 3-1, that “ * * * No person shall be eligible to nomination, appointment or election to the office of County Superintendent of Schools unless * * * (he) (3) is the holder of an appropriate, administrator’s certificate issued by the State Board of Education; *. * *. ’’ There is little dispute as to the relevant facts herein. Defendant had no such certificate as required by the quoted statute when, on April 28, .1950, he filed a notification and declaration of candidacy for nomination on the Democratic ticket, as the candidate for such office. On May 6, 1950, a temporary certificate was issued, to him, which expired on June 15th of the same year. He was not issued another certificate until June 28, 1951. He received a majority of the votes at the primary election on July 4, 1950, and at the general election on November 5, 1950, and was issued a certificate of election by the County Election Board. He was inducted into office July 2, 1951. The foundation of this action is the alleged ineligibility of defendant for the office because he did not hold or possess the. required certificate of the State Board of Education on the date of filing for candidacy, on the date of the primary election or on the date of the general ■ election. Plaintiff contends that defendant was not qualified to hold the office • and that she, being qualified, holds over until her successor is prbperly elected and qualified.
This court’ has held, in the case of Martin v. County Election Board of McClain Co. 206 Okl. 597, 245 P.2d 714, that, under the provisions of 70 O.S.1951 § 3-1, a County Election Board is justified in refusing to accept the filing of a person as a candidate for the office of 'County Superintendent of Schools if he did not possess such administrator’s certificate. But that is not the question now before us. Defendant’s filing was accepted and there was no objection or challenge to his candidacy within the period prescribed the.refor by 26 O.S. 1951 §465a. ; The filing or the eligibility for filing cannot be questioned at this late date, being prohibited by the last above cited statute. The only question now. before us is the eligibility to hold the office. This is an action in. the nature of quo warranto.
Much the same situation would have arisen had the defendant not received a majority of the votes cast at the primary election, or the general election, and never*862theless had been issued a certificate of election. In the case of State ex rel. King v. Payton, 170 Okl. 455, 41 P.2d 61, 63, it was said, with reference to election contests, that:
“By the act of 1927 [26 O.S.1951 § 391], the right of an individual to try title to public office by quo warranto is replaced by his right to contest said election as in said act provided. * * “ * * * In the present case, the defendant holds title to the office in question, which title has been tried by the exclusive method provided for that purpose, by a court of competent jurisdiction (County Election Board) whose judgment cannot be collaterally attacked. * * * ” (Italics ours.)
The same reasoning applies to questioning a person’s eligibility to file as a candidate. The exclusive method to challenge, question or object to the “legality or regularity of a notification and declaration” is provided by 26 O.S.1951 § 165a. The action of the- County Election Board in placing the applicant’s name on the ballot as a candidate for the office is in the nature of a. judgment of that body in its semi-judicial capacity and that judgment cannot be collaterally attacked. Any person desiring to raise the question of eligibility of a proposed candidate may do so under the provisions of said statute. Not having done so, he cannot, thereafter, question that final action of the board. Such a protest may be filed by anyone, whether he be a member of the political party, in which the filing has been made, or not. Darst v. County Election Board of Craig County, 194 Okl. 469, 152 P.2d 912.
Thus, the only question to determine here is whether or not the defendant was disqualified to be inducted into office on July 2, 1951. He had been issued a proper certificate on June 28, 1951. In the early case of State ex rel. West v. Breckinridge, 34 Okl. 649, 126 P. 806, 809, this court had occasion to discuss the meaning of the word “eligible” as it applies to eligibility to hold office when questioned in an action in the nature of quo warranto. Therein the cases from numerous jurisdictions are discussed. Quoting from the case of State ex rel. Perine v. Van Beek, 87 Iowa 569, 54 N.W. 525, 19 L.R.A. 622, this court approved and adopted the following rule of law:
“ * * * ‘Any person who can qualify himself to take and hold an office is eligible to it at the time of the election.’ * * * ”
Other cases to the same effect are therein cited.
It must be borne in mind that the instant action is in the nature of quo warranto and unless it affects defendant’s eligibility to hold office, we are in no way concerned with his eligibility for nomination or election to that office. That question can only be litigated in the method provided by 26 O.S.1951 § 165a, as above discussed, and in those cases where we have considered the question when so litigated, the pronouncement of the applicable rules of law were not determinative of the issues here. The difference was recognized in the case of Meyer v. Jones, 204 Okl. 160, 219 P.2d 620, 622, wherein it was said:
“We do not have here the question of whether one nominated and elected or appointed to an office before he was eligible to hold the office can qualify therefor, he having become qualified after his election or appointment. * * *»
The same general statement was made in the case of Stafford v. State Election Board, 203 Okl. 132, 218 P.2d 617. As herein above pointed out, the case of Martin v. County ’Election Board, supra, is in the same category.
Because plaintiff could not, in this action, contest defendant’s eligibility for nomination or election, and because defendant had become eligible to hold the same before being inducted into office and before this action was commenced, the trial court was correct in rendering judgment for defendant.
The judgment is affirmed.
HALLEY, C. J., JOHNSON, V. C. J., and WELCH, ARNOLD and BLACKBIRD, JJ., concur.
*863CORN and WILLIAMS, JJ., concur in result.
O’NEAL, J., dissents.