Court Opinion

ID: 9965341
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-02 14:02:40.59073+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:54.267703
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 20-14721    Document: 34-1      Date Filed: 05/02/2024    Page: 1 of 37

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 20-14721
                           ____________________

        LUZ ELENA MEYERS,
                                                                Petitioner,
        versus
        U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,

                                                               Respondent.

                           ____________________

                    Petition for Review of a Decision of the
                         Board of Immigration Appeals
                           Agency No. A087-252-574
                           ____________________
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                20-14721

        Before JORDAN, LUCK, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.
        LUCK, Circuit Judge:
               Luz Meyers, a native and citizen of Colombia, petitions for
        review of the denial of her motion to reopen removal proceedings
        under 8 U.S.C. section 1229a(b)(5)(C). Meyers, in her motion, ar-
        gued that the immigration judge should reopen proceedings be-
        cause she “did not receive notice” of her removal hearing. 8 U.S.C.
        § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii). After considering the evidence, the immigra-
        tion judge denied the motion to reopen because Meyers had not
        met her burden to show she did not receive notice of her removal
        hearing. Because the immigration judge’s decision was not arbi-
        trary or capricious, we deny Meyers’s petition for review.
            FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
               Meyers first entered the United States in 1998 on a B2 tourist
        visa. In 2008, while renting a house on Pecan Run Radial in Ocala,
        Florida, Meyers married a United States citizen who moved in with
        her.
               That same year, Meyers’s husband petitioned the Depart-
        ment of Homeland Security on her behalf to grant her permanent
        resident status. The petition listed the Pecan Run address as Mey-
        ers’s current address and the one where she “intend[ed] to live.”
        The department conditionally approved the petition in 2009. But
        Meyers failed to petition to remove the conditions, so the depart-
        ment terminated her permanent resident status in 2011.
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        20-14721               Opinion of the Court                        3

               In June 2013, the department sent Meyers a notice to appear
        at her removal proceedings. The notice to appear was sent by reg-
        ular mail to the Pecan Run address and charged Meyers as remov-
        able. It ordered her to appear before an immigration judge on a
        date and time “to be set.” It also warned that if Meyers didn’t ap-
        pear, the immigration judge may order that she be removed in her
        absence.
                Two weeks later, the immigration court sent Meyers—also
        by regular mail to the Pecan Run address—a notice of hearing. The
        notice of hearing set Meyers’s removal hearing for July 11, 2013, at
        8:30 A.M. in Orlando, Florida. Like the notice to appear, it warned
        that if Meyers failed to appear, the hearing could be held without
        her. It also warned that if the hearing was held in her absence an
        order of removal could be entered against her.
                The hearing was held as scheduled on July 11, but Meyers
        didn’t appear. The immigration judge conducted the hearing in
        Meyers’s absence, or “in absentia,” under 8 U.S.C. section
        1229a(b)(5)(A), and ordered that Meyers be removed to Colombia.
        The immigration judge found that: (1) Meyers “was provided writ-
        ten notification of the time, date[,] and location” of the hearing;
        (2) Meyers was “provided a written warning that failure to attend
        th[e] hearing . . . would result in the issuance of an order of re-
        moval in [her] absence”; and (3) the department “submitted docu-
        mentary evidence relating to [Meyers] which established the truth
        of the factual allegations” charged in the notice to appear. Like the
        notices, the removal order was mailed to the Pecan Run address.
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                 20-14721

                Meyers did not appeal the 2013 removal order to the Board
        of Immigration Appeals. Instead, in August 2019—six years after
        she was ordered removed—Meyers filed a motion to reopen re-
        moval proceedings under 8 U.S.C. section 1229a(b)(5)(C). Meyers
        argued she was “eligible to reopen . . . on three grounds,” but only
        the first ground—lack of notice—is relevant to her petition.
                Meyers argued that “[w]hen [a] [c]ourt considers a motion
        to reopen, the central inquiry is whether or not the alien actually
        received notice” of the removal hearing. Meyers submitted an af-
        fidavit stating that she didn’t receive notice of her removal hearing.
        She said that both she and her ex-husband left the Pecan Run ad-
        dress in 2010 after they separated. So, Meyers explained, she “no
        longer resided at [the Pecan Run] address” when the department
        mailed the notice to appear and notice of hearing because she had
        moved in with a friend. Meyers admitted that she never provided
        the department with an updated mailing address. But she said that
        she didn’t provide an updated address because her original attorney
        told her “to not file anything.” When Meyers retained new counsel
        in 2019, that attorney requested Meyers’s records from the depart-
        ment and discovered the order of removal.
               The department opposed reopening removal proceedings.
        It responded that Meyers couldn’t “on the one hand fail to update
        her address as required, and on the other hand use that same failure
        to claim a lack of notice.”
              The immigration judge denied Meyers’s motion to reopen
        proceedings. The immigration judge acknowledged that an in
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        20-14721               Opinion of the Court                          5

        absentia removal order can be rescinded at any time under 8 U.S.C.
        section 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii) if the movant shows she didn’t receive a
        written notice satisfying 8 U.S.C. section 1229(a). The immigration
        judge concluded, however, that Meyers did not satisfy her burden
        of showing she lacked notice.
                Under In re M-R-A-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 665, 671 (B.I.A. 2008), the
        immigration judge explained, a “properly addressed notice . . . is
        presumed to have been received by [an] addressee” if it is “sent [by]
        regular mail according to normal office procedures.” The immi-
        gration judge also explained that the presumption is rebuttable and
        weaker than the one that applies when notice is sent by certified
        mail. Under this framework, the immigration judge first found that
        the weaker presumption applied to Meyers’s motion. The immi-
        gration judge cited evidence that the Pecan Run address was Mey-
        ers’s mailing address—specifically, Meyers’s own affidavit
        acknowledged she rented the house on Pecan Run, and she listed
        that house’s address when applying for residency. The immigra-
        tion judge also cited how “[Meyers] concede[d] that the [notice to
        appear], notice of hearing, and in absentia order were sent to her
        [Pecan Run] address.” The immigration judge then found that
        Meyers didn’t overcome the presumption. The immigration judge
        reasoned that Meyers conceded that the notice to appear and no-
        tice of hearing were mailed to the Pecan Run address, that Meyers
        “by her own admission” never notified the department that she
        moved out of the Pecan Run house, and that Meyers produced no
        evidence that the notice documents were returned as undeliverable
        by the post office.
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                  20-14721

               Meyers appealed the immigration judge’s order to the
        board. On appeal, Meyers acknowledged that a noncitizen “may
        be served with a [notice to appear] or [notice of hearing] by regular
        mail.” And she acknowledged that the department did that here
        by mailing the notice to appear and notice of hearing to the Pecan
        Run address in 2013. But, Meyers pointed out, she provided the
        Pecan Run address to the department “years earlier.” Thus, she
        contended, the department “did the same thing” here that the Im-
        migration and Naturalization Service did in In re G-Y-R-, where the
        board concluded that “the entry of an in absentia order is pre-
        cluded” if the noncitizen “did not receive the [n]otice to [a]ppear
        and the notice of hearing it contains.” 23 I. & N. Dec. 181, 189–90
        (B.I.A. 2001) (en banc).
              The board affirmed the immigration judge’s order “without
        opinion.” Meyers then petitioned for our review.
                            STANDARD OF REVIEW
               Because the board summarily affirmed the immigration
        judge’s order “without opinion,” we review the immigration
        judge’s reasoning as if it were the board’s. Dragomirescu v. U.S. Att’y
        Gen., 44 F.4th 1351, 1353 (11th Cir. 2022). We review for an abuse
        of discretion the denial of a motion to reopen removal proceedings,
        Li v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 488 F.3d 1371, 1374 (11th Cir. 2007), and that
        review is “limited” to determining whether the denial was “arbi-
        trary or capricious,” Zhang v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 572 F.3d 1316, 1319
        (11th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). We review de novo any under-
        lying legal conclusions. Li, 488 F.3d at 1374.
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        20-14721                  Opinion of the Court                                7

                                       DISCUSSION
               Meyers argues that her case should have been reopened be-
        cause it is “undisputed” that she didn’t receive written notice, citing
        her affidavit’s statement that she didn’t live at the Pecan Run ad-
        dress when notice was mailed. Under those circumstances, she
        contends, the board’s In re G-Y-R- decision required reopening pro-
        ceedings. We disagree. Because the immigration judge’s finding
        that Meyers failed to satisfy her burden of showing she never re-
        ceived notice was not arbitrary or capricious, we conclude the im-
        migration judge didn’t commit an abuse of discretion by denying
                                                                 1
        her motion to reopen the removal proceedings.
               We begin by describing the relevant statutory framework.
        The Immigration and Nationality Act establishes “an intricate set
        of procedures” for removing noncitizens. Dragomirescu, 44 F.4th at
        1354 (citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229, 1229a). The removal process “often

        1
          The government argues that, under 8 U.S.C. section 1252(d)(1), we cannot
        review Meyers’s “Matter of G-Y-R- claim” because she didn’t exhaust it and ex-
        haustion is jurisdictional. The Supreme Court has since clarified that sec-
        tion 1252(d)(1)’s exhaustion requirement is not jurisdictional; instead, it is a
        claim processing rule. See Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 598 U.S. 411, 419 (2023).
        We assume without deciding that Meyers satisfied the exhaustion require-
        ment because her petition fails on the merits. See Donnelly v. Controlled Appli-
        cation Rev. & Resol. Program Unit, 37 F.4th 44, 56 (2d Cir. 2022) (“[W]e may
        assume that [claim processing] rules are satisfied to resolve the case on other
        grounds.”); Ponce v. Garland, 70 F.4th 296, 300–02 (5th Cir. 2023) (acknowledg-
        ing that the petitioner did not raise an issue before the board in a motion to
        reconsider, but rejecting the petitioner’s argument on the merits because sec-
        tion 1252(d)(1) is not jurisdictional).
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                 20-14721

        includes multiple hearings before an immigration judge,” and the
        noncitizen “generally has a right to be present” at these hearings.
        Dacostagomez-Aguilar v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 40 F.4th 1312, 1315 (11th
        Cir. 2022) (citations omitted). But if the noncitizen fails to appear,
        the immigration judge can order that she be removed in absentia if
        she received “written notice” of the hearing as “required under par-
        agraph (1) or (2) of [8 U.S.C.] section 1229(a).” 8 U.S.C.
        § 1229a(b)(5)(A); see Dacostagomez-Aguilar, 40 F.4th at 1315 (“[S]kip-
        ping a hearing does not strip the immigration court of its power.”).
        “[W]ritten notice” is “sufficient for purposes of [sec-
        tion 1229a(b)(5)(A)]” if given “at the most recent address provided
        under section 1229(a)(1)(F).” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(A).
              Section 1229(a) refers to two kinds of written notice. See id.
        § 1229(a)(1)–(2). Either type of written notice may be given to the
        noncitizen “in person” or, “if personal service is not practicable,
        through service by mail.” Id. § 1229(a)(1), (2)(A).
                The first type of written notice is a “notice to appear.” Id.
        § 1229(a)(1). “Akin to a charging document,” a notice to appear
        informs the noncitizen of the factual allegations, the “obligation to
        keep [the department] apprised of any changes to [her] address,”
        the “time and place at which [her] removal hearing will be held,”
        and that—if she fails to appear—“the immigration judge can order
        [her] removed . . . in [her] absence.” Dragomirescu, 44 F.4th at 1354
        (citations omitted).
              Although a notice to appear is sent to the noncitizen “in
        every removal case,” the second type of written notice—a notice
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        20-14721               Opinion of the Court                          9

        of hearing—is only required if “the time or place of [the original]
        removal hearing . . . change[s]” or additional hearings are sched-
        uled. Id. at 1354–55 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(2)); see also Da-
        costagomez-Aguilar, 40 F.4th at 1317. A notice of hearing contains
        the updated time or place of the hearing. Dragomirescu 44 F.4th at
        1355. And, like a notice to appear, a notice of hearing informs the
        noncitizen that failing to appear may result in the immigration
        judge ordering removal in her absence. 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(2)(A)(ii).
                If the noncitizen is ordered removed in absentia without
        written notice, there are two ways she can seek relief. Under the
        first option, she can directly appeal the removal order to the board
        under 8 C.F.R. section 1003.38(a). Or, under the second option,
        she may file a motion to rescind the removal order under 8 U.S.C.
        section 1229a(b)(5)(C).
                The second option, section 1229a(b)(5)(C), allows for an in
        absentia removal order to “be rescinded . . . upon a motion to reo-
        pen,” but only “if the alien demonstrates that [she] did not receive
        notice in accordance with paragraph (1) or (2) of section 1229(a).”
        Id. § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii). That means if the noncitizen missed “the
        original hearing” the burden is on her to show she did not receive
        a notice to appear as required by section 1229(a)(1). Dacostagomez-
        Aguilar, 40 F.4th at 1316–17 (“[Section 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii)] keeps
        th[e] [removal] order in place unless an alien shows that he did not
        receive the required notice. . . . [T]he notice that matters is the no-
        tice for the hearing missed.”).           Or, if she missed “any
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                  20-14721

        rescheduled . . . or additional hearing,” she must show she did not
        receive a notice of hearing as required by section 1229(a)(2). Id.
               Meyers chose the second option and moved to rescind her
        removal order under section 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii). As Meyers
        acknowledged in her motion to reopen under that provision, “the
        central inquiry is whether or not [she] actually received notice.”
                In re M-R-A- controls that inquiry. In re M-R-A- “concern[ed]
        the standard to be applied and the evidence to be considered by an
        [i]mmigration [j]udge” when a noncitizen moves to reopen pro-
        ceedings “claim[ing] that [she] did not receive” notice. 24 I. & N.
        Dec. at 667. The board held that “when a respondent seeks to reo-
        pen proceedings based on a claim of lack of receipt of notice,” a
        “presumption of receipt” applies “to a [n]otice to [a]ppear or
        [n]otice of [h]earing sent by regular mail [if] the notice was properly
        addressed and mailed according to normal office procedures.” Id.
        at 673 (noting that this presumption “is weaker than that accorded
        to notice sent by certified mail”). If the presumption applies, “the
        question to be determined is whether the respondent has presented
        sufficient evidence to overcome the . . . presumption.” Id.
              Under this framework, “all relevant evidence submitted to
        overcome the weaker presumption of delivery must be consid-
        ered.” Id. at 674. Relevant rebuttal evidence includes:
               (1) the respondent’s aﬃdavit; (2) aﬃdavits from fam-
               ily members or other individuals who are knowledge-
               able about the facts relevant to whether notice was
               received; (3) the respondent’s actions upon learning
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        20-14721                  Opinion of the Court                              11

               of the in absentia order, and whether due diligence
               was exercised in seeking to redress the situation;
               (4) any prior aﬃrmative application for relief, indicat-
               ing that the respondent had an incentive to appear;
               (5) any prior application for relief ﬁled with the
               [i]mmigration [c]ourt or any prima facie evidence in
               the record or the respondent’s motion of statutory el-
               igibility for relief, indicating that the respondent had
               an incentive to appear; [and] (6) the respondent’s pre-
               vious attendance at [i]mmigration [c]ourt hearings, if
               applicable.

        Id. This list is nonexhaustive because “[e]ach case presents differ-
        ent facts and circumstances.” Id. Immigration judges “are neither
        required to deny reopening if exactly such evidence is not provided
        nor obliged to grant a motion, even if every type of evidence is
        submitted.” Id.
              Because Meyers sought the same relief as the In re
        M-R-A- movant—rescinding a removal order based on a lack of no-
        tice—the immigration judge applied In re M-R-A-’s framework and
        found that Meyers failed to show she didn’t receive notice. See id.
        at 666–67. The immigration judge’s finding wasn’t “arbitrary or
                      2
        capricious.” See Zhang, 572 F.3d at 1319. “[T]he hearing missed”

        2
         We reject the government’s argument that our decision in Dominguez v. U.S.
        Attorney General, 284 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2002), controls. Dominguez addressed
        a due process claim and, as we’ve recently explained, “our statements [in
        Dominguez] about the . . . statutory [notice] requirements for in absentia re-
        moval were dicta.” Dragomirescu, 44 F.4th at 1356 n.4.
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        12                     Opinion of the Court                  20-14721

        was the July 11, 2013, 8:30 A.M. hearing, meaning “the notice that
        matters” is the notice of hearing because it set that date and time.
        See Dacostagomez-Aguilar, 40 F.4th at 1317. So, to reopen proceed-
        ings under section 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii), Meyers had the burden to
        “demonstrate[] that [she] did not receive notice in accordance with
        paragraph . . . (2) of section 1229(a).” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii);
        see Dacostagomez-Aguilar, 40 F.4th at 1317–19. That’s “a heavy bur-
        den.” Zhang, 572 F.3d at 1319 (“[M]otions to reopen are disfavored,
        especially in removal proceedings.” (citation omitted)); see also Ali
        v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 443 F.3d 804, 813 (11th Cir. 2006).
               The immigration judge’s finding that Meyers did not meet
        her burden was not arbitrary or capricious. As the immigration
        judge explained, there was evidence Meyers resided at the Pecan
        Run house. Meyers rented that house after entering the United
        States and lived there with her ex-husband. She gave the depart-
        ment the Pecan Run address as her current address and the one
        where she intended to live when applying for residency status.
        When the department notified Meyers in 2009 that it conditionally
        approved the application, its notice listed the Pecan Run address as
        her address. Meyers never notified the department that she later
        moved out of the house. So, in 2013, when Meyers was charged as
        removable, three different documents were sent by regular mail
        and addressed to her at the Pecan Run house—a notice to appear,
        a notice of hearing, and the removal order. None of the three doc-
        uments were returned as undeliverable by the post office. And
        Meyers did not challenge her removal order for six years.
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        20-14721                Opinion of the Court                         13

                Meyers argues that the immigration judge’s application of
        In re M-R-A- was arbitrary and capricious because “[In re]
        M-R-A- has no bearing on the outcome of this case.” Instead, she
        maintains, the “[immigration judge] was bound to apply [In re]
        G-Y-R- to reopen this case.” Her “position is that [In re G-Y-R-] and
        [In re] M-R-A- apply to distinct situations and claims.” She argues
        that under In re G-Y-R-, “the ‘last address’ or the ‘most recent ad-
        dress’ provided by the alien ‘in accordance with subsection (a)(1)(F)
        [of section 1229]’ will necessarily be an address arising from the al-
        ien’s receipt of . . . the [n]otice to [a]ppear.” See 23 I. & N. Dec. at
        187–88 (citations omitted). She contends that, because notice here
        was “sent to the wrong address” under section 1229(a), In re
        G-Y-R- dictates that she can’t be charged with receiving it. In re
        M-R-A-, she says, “supplies the analysis to determine ‘whether a re-
        spondent has presented sufficient evidence to overcome the pre-
        sumption’” of receipt.
               We agree with Meyers that In re G-Y-R- and In re M-R-A- gov-
        ern “distinct situations and claims.” But In re G-Y-R- did not address
        a situation and claim like Meyers’s.
               In re G-Y-R- considered whether an immigration judge may
        enter a removal order in absentia in the first place if the respondent
        “ha[d] never been notified of the initiation of removal proceed-
        ings.” Id. at 183. The Immigration and Naturalization Service had
        mailed a notice to appear to the respondent, but the post office re-
        turned the notice to the service as undeliverable. Id. at 182. Then,
        after the respondent failed to appear at her removal hearing, the
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        14                      Opinion of the Court                   20-14721

        immigration judge found that she lacked notice of the hearing and
        terminated removal proceedings. Id.
                 The service appealed to the board, arguing that the immi-
        gration judge erred by terminating removal proceedings. Id. at
        182–83. The immigration judge, the service contended, “should
        have . . . ordered the respondent removed in absentia” under sec-
        tion 1229a(b)(5)(A) because it attempted to deliver the notice to her
        “most recent address provided under section [1229](a)(1)(F).” Id.
        at 182–83, 185–86 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(A)). The board
        rejected that argument, concluding that it was “proper for the
        [i]mmigration [j]udge to terminate proceedings.” Id. at 192. The
        board explained that section 1229a(b)(5)(A) didn’t authorize in ab-
        sentia removal because, although “the [s]ervice mail[ed] the
        [n]otice to [a]ppear to the last address it ha[d] on file for the al-
        ien, . . . the record reflect[ed] that [she] did not receive the [n]otice
        to [a]ppear, and the notice of hearing it contain[ed].” Id.
                This is not an In re G-Y-R- case because In re G-Y-R- addressed
        a different situation. There, the immigration judge denied the ser-
        vice’s request for in abstentia removal because the notice to appear
        was never delivered to the respondent. Id. at 182. The respond-
        ent’s notice to appear—which was the “only notice of the date,
        time, and place of her removal hearing”—was returned to the de-
        partment by the post office as undeliverable. Id. at 183; see also id.
        at 182 (“We understand . . . that the respondent did not receive the
        [n]otice to [a]ppear because it was returned to the [s]ervice by the
        [p]ostal [s]ervice.”); id. at 186 (“This case . . . involves constructive
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        20-14721                Opinion of the Court                          15

        notice in the form of undelivered written notice.”); id. at 188 (“In this
        instance, the [n]otice to [a]ppear never reached the respondent, and
        the advisals were never conveyed.”); id. at 192 (“The record clearly
        reflects that the [n]otice to [a]ppear never reached the respond-
        ent.”).
               Here, however, the immigration judge ordered in absentia
        removal after finding that Meyers (unlike the In re G-Y-R- respond-
        ent) received “written notification of the time, date[,] and location”
        of her removal hearing. Both a notice to appear and notice of hear-
        ing had been sent to Meyers’s Pecan Run address by regular mail—
        where she admittedly lived and where she told the department she
        intended to live when applying for residency. She continued living
        there after the department conditionally approved her application,
        and she never told it that she moved elsewhere. And, critically,
        after the notices were sent to the Pecan Run address by regular
        mail, those documents were never returned as undeliverable. See
        Mauricio-Benitez v. Sessions, 908 F.3d 144, 149–51 (5th Cir. 2018)
        (concluding it wasn’t an abuse of discretion for the immigration
        judge to apply the presumption of receipt because the notice of
        hearing wasn’t returned as undeliverable); Navarette-Lopez v. Barr,
        919 F.3d 951, 953–55 (5th Cir. 2019) (same, despite the noncitizen’s
        affidavit “stat[ing] that she had moved from place to place” over
        the years). Unlike In re G-Y-R-, this is not a situation where we
        know the noncitizen did not receive the notice because the notice
        came back as undelivered.
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        16                      Opinion of the Court                    20-14721

                This is also not an In re G-Y-R- case because In re G-Y-R- ad-
        dressed a different claim. In re G-Y-R- involved the first option for
        challenging the immigration judge’s in absentia removal decision.
        There, the service claimed on direct appeal that the respondent was
        removable in absentia under section 1229a(b)(5)(A). See 23 I. & N.
        Dec. at 182–83. Under that provision, the service had the burden
        to establish that the petitioner received written notice satisfying
        section 1229(a)(1) or (2). See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(A) (providing
        that an immigration judge shall proceed in absentia “if the [s]ervice
        establishes by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence that the
        written notice was . . . provided” (emphasis added)). Because the
        service did not satisfy its burden, the immigration judge found that
        sufficient notice wasn’t provided and denied the service’s request
        for removal (which the board affirmed). In re G-Y-R-, 23 I. & N.
        Dec. at 182, 192.
                Here, on the other hand, Meyers brought a claim under the
        second option—section 1229a(b)(5)(C)—to rescind an in absentia re-
        moval order and reopen proceedings. Under the second option,
        the burden flips. Meyers was the one with the burden and she had
        to show that she lacked notice of her removal hearing. See 8 U.S.C.
        § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii) (“[A]n order [of removal] may be rescinded . . .
        upon a motion to reopen filed at any time if the alien demonstrates
        that the alien did not receive notice in accordance with paragraph
        (1) or (2) of section 1229(a) . . . .” (emphasis added)). In re G-Y-R- did
        not consider—because it involved a different claim—when a
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        20-14721                    Opinion of the Court                                  17

        movant like Meyers satisfies her burden to reopen proceedings. See
        23 I. & N. Dec. at 183. 3

        3 The dissenting opinion adds that the board’s decision was arbitrary and ca-

        pricious because the board did not follow its precedent in In re Anyelo, 25 I. &
        N. Dec. 337 (B.I.A. 2010). But Meyers never made this argument in her initial
        brief, and “we do not consider claims not raised in a party’s initial brief.” APA
        Excelsior III L.P. v. Premiere Techs., Inc., 476 F.3d 1261, 1269 (11th Cir. 2007).
        Even if we did, In re Anyelo (like In re G-Y-R-) is not “factually . . . identical” to
        our case. In In re Anyelo (as in In re G-Y-R-), there was no dispute that the
        noncitizen did not get the notice: the evidence showed that the In re Anyelo
        respondent filed a change-of-address form with the post office. 25 I. & N. Dec.
        at 338; see also Sun v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 543 F. App’x 987, 991 (11th Cir. 2013)
        (“[W]e have distinguished this case from In re G-Y-R- and [In re] Anyelo on the
        basis that the [notice to appear] in those cases was returned by the Postal Ser-
        vice, and the aliens in those cases could not be charged with notice.”). Here,
        though, whether Meyers received notice was disputed. Her notice was not
        returned by the post office—it was delivered—and there’s no evidence that
        Meyers told the government that she changed her address. See Sun, 543 F.
        App’x at 991 (“By contrast, the [notice to appear] was not returned by the
        Postal Service in this case, and [the petitioner] could properly be charged with
        receipt of the [notice to appear] and the [n]otice of [h]earing.”). So the immi-
        gration judge properly applied In re M-R-A- to resolve the factual dispute.
                The dissenting opinion makes four points in reply. First, it chides us
        for relegating the discussion of In re Anyelo to a footnote. But using a footnote
        to respond to a dissenting opinion puts us in good company. See, e.g., Andy
        Warhol Found. for the Visual Arts, Inc. v. Goldsmith, 598 U.S. 508, 534–38 nn.10–
        14, 540–44 nn.16–19, 547–48 nn.21–22 (2023) (responding to a dissenting opin-
        ion in footnotes); Biden v. Nebraska, 143 S. Ct. 2355, 2368 n.3, 2371 n.5, 2375
        n.9 (2023) (same); 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis, 600 U.S. 570, 595–601 nn.3–7
        (2023) (same); Counterman v. Colorado, 600 U.S. 66, 77–82 nn.4 & 6–7 (2023)
        (same); Mallory v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 600 U.S. 122, 131–44 nn.4–10 (2023)
        (same).
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        18                         Opinion of the Court                       20-14721

               The immigration judge found that Meyers did not satisfy her
        burden because she admittedly lived at the Pecan Run address, told
        the department that she lived there when applying for residency,
        and never told the department that she moved somewhere else.
        The notices of her removal proceedings (and the actual removal
        order) were sent to the Pecan Run address by regular mail without
        ever being returned as undeliverable. And Meyers never chal-
        lenged the removal order during the six years between when it was

                Second, the dissenting opinion correctly points out that a party can
        raise new authorities on appeal in support of a preserved issue. But that’s not
        what happened here. The dissenting opinion raises In re Anyelo, not as an ad-
        ditional authority, but as a separate basis to grant Meyers’s petition because
        the board arbitrarily and capriciously failed to follow, or to explain why it
        didn’t follow, In re Anyelo. The problem is that Meyers never raised this
        ground as a basis for granting her petition. And we can’t raise it on our own.
                 Third, the dissenting opinion claims it was undisputed that Meyers
        never received notice of her removal hearing. But, unlike in In re Anyelo,
        whether Meyers received the notice was very much in dispute. The evidence
        before the immigration judge showed: Meyers admittedly lived at the Pecan
        Run address; she applied for residency using the Pecan Run address; she was
        granted conditional status while living at the Pecan Run address; there was no
        suggestion she filed a change of address form with the post office; the notice
        to appear and notice of hearing were sent to the Pecan Run address through
        regular mail; neither document was returned as undeliverable (as in In re
        G-Y-R-); and Meyers said nothing about her supposedly new address until six
        years after she was ordered removed.
                 Finally, the dissenting opinion believes we should grant the petition
        because the board did not give a reasoned explanation for rejecting Meyers’
        affidavit. But this is yet another issue that Meyers did not raise in her initial
        brief. And, again, we cannot raise new issues for her.
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        20-14721             Opinion of the Court                    19

        entered and when she moved for recission. Based on the situation
        and claim in this case, the immigration judge’s decision was not
        arbitrary or capricious. See Zhang, 572 F.3d at 1319.
                                CONCLUSION
              Thus, Meyers’s petition for review is DENIED.
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        20-14721                 JORDAN, J., Dissenting                           1

        JORDAN, Circuit Judge, Dissenting.
                An immigration judge ordered Luz Meyers removed in ab-
        sentia, but she contends that she never received the Notice to Ap-
        pear which advised her of the charges against her or of the pending
        removal proceeding. This case therefore concerns the statutory
        notice required by the Immigration and Nationality Act before a
        removal proceeding against a noncitizen can be conducted in ab-
        sentia. Fortunately, the BIA addressed and resolved that issue in In
        re G-Y-R-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 181 (BIA 2001) (en banc). G-Y-R- holds
        that “an [i]mmigration [j]udge may not order an alien removed in
        absentia when the [government] mails the Notice to Appear to the
        last address it has on ﬁle for [the] alien but the record reﬂects that
        the alien did not receive the Notice to Appear, and the notice of
        hearing it contains, and therefore has never been notiﬁed of the in-
        itiation of removal proceedings or the alien’s address [update] obli-
        gations under [8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1)] of the [INA].” G-Y-R-, 23 I. &
        N. Dec. at 192. 1
               The relevant facts here are the same as those in G-Y-R-. I
        respectfully dissent from the majority’s failure to apply G-Y-R- and
        its progeny, speciﬁcally In re Anyelo, 25 I. & N. Dec. 337 (BIA 2010),
        which applied G-Y-R- in the motion to reopen context. I discuss G-
        Y-R- in detail and then pivot to what happened to Ms. Meyers.

        1 The terms noncitizen and alien are largely interchangeable in the immigra-

        tion context. I use noncitizen, but some of the cases, statutes, and sources
        cited use the term alien or respondent.
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        2                     JORDAN, J., Dissenting               20-14721

                                         I
               In G-Y-R-, the noncitizen, after entering the United States
        without inspection, ﬁled a request for asylum in 1982. In 1991, she
        submitted a form to the government updating her address. Six
        years later, sometime in 1997, the government mailed an appoint-
        ment notice to her for an asylum interview. The notice was sent
        by regular mail to the address she had provided in 1991 (and which
        she had failed to update). She did not appear for her asylum inter-
        view. See G-Y-R-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 182.
               In July of 1997, the government sent a Notice to Appear to
        the noncitizen by certiﬁed mail to the address she had provided in
        1991. The Notice to Appear was returned undelivered to the gov-
        ernment by the U.S. Postal Service. See id. When she did not ap-
        pear for her removal hearing, the government moved to proceed
        with the hearing in absentia. But the immigration judge refused to
        do so, explaining that he was not satisﬁed that the noncitizen was
        aware of the removal proceeding. The immigration judge termi-
        nated the removal proceeding without prejudice. See id. His order
        was sent by certiﬁed mail to the same address on ﬁle but it was
        returned to the immigration court with the notation “Moved Left
        No Address.” See id.
                The government appealed the immigration judge’s termina-
        tion order to the BIA. It argued that the immigration judge should
        have ordered the noncitizen removed in absentia because the
        “proper notice of proceedings was eﬀected through ‘attempted de-
        livery to the last address provided by the [noncitizen]’ pursuant to
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        20-14721                JORDAN, J., Dissenting                        3

        . . . [8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)].” Id. The government also asserted that 8
        U.S.C. § 1305 “places an aﬃrmative duty on the [noncitizen] to
        keep the Attorney General apprised of her whereabouts or face
        certain consequences under . . . 8 U.S.C. § 1306[.]” Id. at 182–83.
               The BIA dismissed the government’s appeal for a number of
        reasons. A summary of its lengthy analysis, which proceeded in
        the following sequential steps, is necessary to understand why Ms.
        Meyers’ in absentia removal order here cannot stand.
                The BIA began by noting that the noncitizen had not been
        personally served with the Notice to Appear and that she had not
        received any notice of the removal hearing because the certiﬁed
        mailing had been returned. See id. at 183. Given this factual back-
        ground, the BIA framed the issue as follows: “The issue is whether
        an [i]mmigration [j]udge may order an alien removed in absentia
        when the [government] mails the Notice to Appear to the last ad-
        dress it has for an alien, but the record reﬂects that the alien did not
        receive the Notice to Appear, and the notice of hearing it contains,
        and therefore has never been notiﬁed of the initiation of removal
        proceedings or the alien’s address [update] obligations under [8
        U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1)] of the [INA].” Id. After setting out the issue,
        the BIA provided a number of reasons why removal proceedings
        could not be conducted in absentia under such circumstances.
              First, under 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1)(F)(1), it is the “Notice to
        Appear [which] apprises the alien that he or she has a particular
        address obligation respecting removal proceedings: the necessity of
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        4                      JORDAN, J., Dissenting               20-14721

        providing an address ‘at which the alien may be contacted respect-
        ing proceedings under [8 U.S.C. § 1229a].’” Id. at 184.
               Second, the “alien must be properly served with the Notice
        to Appear before the particular address obligations of removal pro-
        ceedings are ﬁxed and the [i]mmigration [j]udge is authorized to
        proceed in absentia.” Id. But “if the alien does not actually receive
        the mailing, . . . the statute [§ 1229(c)] speciﬁes that the suﬃciency
        of service will depend on whether there is ‘proof of attempted de-
        livery to the last address provided by the alien in accordance with
        subsection (a)(1)(F).’ Thus, in cases where the alien does not get the
        mailing, only the use of an address that satisﬁes [§ 1229(a)(1)(F)] of
        the [INA] will suﬃce for the initiation of proceedings.” Id. at 185
        (emphasis in original and citation omitted).
               Third, “the critical question for in absentia cases involving
        mailed notice is whether the notice is mailed to an address that
        qualiﬁes as an ‘address provided under [§ 1229(a)(1)(F)].’ If an ad-
        dress does not, then the [i]mmigration [j]udge many not enter an
        in absentia order of removal because the statutory notice require-
        ment has not been satisﬁed.” Id.
               Fourth, an “address taken from an asylum application or a
        change of address form that accomplishes actual delivery of the No-
        tice to Appear qualiﬁes as a ‘[§ 1229(a)(1)(F)]’ address because the
        alien will actually be informed of the initiation of removal proceed-
        ings and the rights and obligations that attach.” Id. at 186 (ﬁrst em-
        phasis added). But when only constructive notice (through, for ex-
        ample, mailing) has been provided, “an address can be a [§
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        20-14721               JORDAN, J., Dissenting                       5

        1229(a)(1)(F)] address only if the alien has ﬁrst been informed of the
        particular statutory address obligations associated with removal
        proceedings and of the consequences of failing to provide a current
        address. Because that information is ﬁrst communicated in the No-
        tice to Appear, the alien must receive the Notice to Appear before
        he or she can ‘provide’ an address in accordance with [§
        1229(a)(1)(F)] of the [INA].” Id. at 187.
                Fifth, where the Notice to Appear—and its notiﬁcation of
        the in absentia consequences resulting from failure to provide an
        updated address—do not reach the noncitizen, it is insuﬃcient for
        the government to have generally advised the noncitizen about the
        need to update his or her address in another form that does not set
        out the in absentia consequences. The “intent [of § 1229(a)(1)(F)]
        is to accomplish actual notice,” and the government was wrong to
        argue that “the notice requirements of the [INA] are satisﬁed when-
        ever the [government] uses the alien’s last known address—no mat-
        ter how old, incomplete, or obviously inadequate that address may
        be.” Id. at 189 (emphasis in original). Indeed, “[s]imply mailing the
        Notice to Appear to an address authorized under [§ 1229(a)(1)] does
        not automatically convert the alien’s last known address into a [§
        1229(a)(1)(F)] address.” Id. “In short, the notice requirement lead-
        ing to an in absentia order cannot be satisﬁed by mailing the Notice
        to Appear to the last known address of the alien when the alien does
        not receive the mailing.” Id. (emphasis in original).
              Sixth, an “alien can, in certain circumstances, be properly
        charged with receiving notice, even though he or she did not
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        6                      JORDAN, J., Dissenting                20-14721

        personally see the mailed document. If, for example, the Notice to
        Appear reaches the correct address but does not reach the alien
        through some failure of the internal workings of the household,
        the alien can be charged with receiving proper notice, and proper
        service will have been eﬀected. However, if we know that the No-
        tice to Appear did not reach the alien and that the alien cannot
        properly be charged with receiving it, then the mailing address does
        not qualify as a ‘[§ 1229(a)(1)(F)]’ address. In turn, if the mailing
        address does not qualify as a [§ 1229(a)(1)(F)] address, then an in
        absentia order predicated on mailed notice to that address may not
        ensue.” Id. (citation omitted).
                Seventh, a noncitizen generally “has an obligation to provide
        the [government] with a current address pursuant to the registra-
        tion requirements of the [INA],” and “[v]irtually every alien in the
        United States is under an aﬃrmative obligation to report address
        changes to the Attorney General, regardless of immigration status
        or circumstances.” Id. at 190. Although there are various penalties
        for failing to update an address, “the entry of an in absentia order
        of removal is not one of them.” Id. As a result, “the registration
        provisions [of the INA] do not authorize the issuance of an in ab-
        sentia order of removal as a consequence of their violation.” Id.
               Based on these subsidiary conclusions, the BIA in G-Y-R-
        stated its holding this way: “[A]n [i]mmigration [j]udge may not
        order an alien removed in absentia when the [government] mails
        the Notice to Appear to the last address it has on ﬁle for [the] alien,
        but the record reﬂects that the alien did not receive the Notice to
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        20-14721                   JORDAN, J., Dissenting                              7

        Appear, and the notice of hearing it contains, and therefore has
        never been notiﬁed of the initiation of removal proceedings or the
        alien’s address [update] obligations under [8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1)] of
        the [INA].” Id. at 192. See also Ira J. Kurzban, Immigration Law
        Sourcebook 581 (17th ed. 2020) (summarizing G-Y-R-: “If the re-
        spondent did not receive the NTA and the notice of hearing it con-
        tains and therefore was never notiﬁed of the initiation of removal
        proceedings or her address obligations under [§ 1229(a)(1)], the IJ
        may not enter an in absentia order.”).
                Subsequently, the BIA expressly held that G-Y-R- applies with
        full force in immigration cases arising in the Eleventh Circuit. See
        Anyelo, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 338. 2
                                               II
               Under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii), an in absentia removal
        order can be rescinded “if the alien demonstrates that [she] did not
        receive notice in accordance with [§ 1229(a)(1) or (a)(2)].” As laid
        out in excruciating detail above, the BIA’s decision in G-Y-R- sets out

        2 We recently held that a noncitizen has proper statutory notice for purposes

        of in absentia removal under § 1229(a) so long as she receives notice of the
        missed hearing under either subsection 1 (the Notice to Appear) or subsection
        2 (the Notice of Hearing). See Dacostagomez-Aguilar v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 40 F.4th
        1312, 1317–18 (11th Cir. 2022). In doing so, we disagreed with the Ninth Cir-
        cuit’s decision in Singh v. Garland, 24 F.4th 1315, 1320 (9th Cir. 2022), cert.
        granted, 143 S.Ct. 2688 (2023) (oral argument held on Jan. 8, 2024). See 40 F.4th
        at 1318 n.3. Ms. Meyers, of course, did not receive notice under any subsection
        of § 1229(a), so Dacostagomez-Aguilar does not control.
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        8                     JORDAN, J., Dissenting              20-14721

        what notice is required for an immigration judge to issue a removal
        order in absentia.
                                        A
               The relevant undisputed facts in Ms. Meyers’ case mirror
        those in G-Y-R-:
              ◆ Like the noncitizen in G-Y-R-, Ms. Meyers provided the
        government with her Pecan Run address in Ocala years before the
        government initiated removal proceedings against her.
                ◆ Like the noncitizen in G-Y-R-, Ms. Meyers was never
        warned prior to the mailing of the Notice to Appear that, if she
        failed to update her address, she could be removed in absentia.
               ◆ As it did with the noncitizen in G-Y-R-, the government
        sent the Notice to Appear and a Notice of Hearing to Ms. Meyers
        through regular mail at the Pecan Run address, which was the ad-
        dress it had on ﬁle for her. See A.R. at 64. The Notice to Appear
        would have been the ﬁrst time Ms. Meyers was told that she could
        be removed in absentia if she did not update her address, but she
        did not receive the Notice to Appear.
               ◆ At the time the government mailed the Notice to Appear
        to her, Ms. Meyers was no longer living at the Pecan Run address.
        See A.R. at 84–85.
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        20-14721                 JORDAN, J., Dissenting                            9

               ◆ Ms. Meyers never received the Notice to Appear, and
        therefore did not know (a) that she had a pending removal proceed-
        ing or (b) that she could be removed in absentia. See A.R. at 85. 3
               In his order, the immigration judge ﬁrst cited G-Y-R- for the
        proposition that “[a]n alien may properly be charged with receiving
        the [Notice to Appear] even though she did not personally view the
        document.” A.R. at 64. Though this snippet from G-Y-R- was ac-
        curate, it was woefully incomplete and taken out of context. What
        the BIA explained in G-Y-R- was that “[i]f, for example, the Notice
        to Appear reaches the correct address but does not reach the alien
        through some failure of the internal workings of the household, the alien
        can be charged with receiving proper notice, and proper service
        will have been eﬀected.” G-Y-R-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 189 (emphasis
        added). Nothing like that happened here.
               In any event, the BIA made clear in G-Y-R- that “if we know
        that the Notice to Appear did not reach the alien and that the alien
        cannot properly be charged with receiving it, then the mailing ad-
        dress does not qualify as a [§ 1229(a)(1)(F)] address. In turn, if the
        mailing address does not qualify as a [§ 1229(a)(1)(F)] address, then
        an in absentia order predicated on mailed notice to that address
        may not ensue.” Id. This case involves the latter scenario, not the
        former, and the immigration judge erred by failing to realize this

        3 The last two facts are set out in Ms. Meyers’ unrebutted aﬃdavit. The immi-

        gration judge, whose order was summarily aﬃrmed by a single member of
        the BIA, did not hold an evidentiary hearing and never made a ﬁnding discred-
        iting or discounting the aﬃdavit.
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        10                       JORDAN, J., Dissenting                  20-14721

        critical diﬀerence. Simply stated, Ms. Meyers’ Pecan Run address
        was not a § 1229(a)(1)(F) address under G-Y-R- because she was
        never advised of the in absentia consequences for failing to update
        her address before the Notice to Appear was mailed to her. See id.
        at 187–89. 4
                The immigration judge also said that “a properly addressed
        notice that is sent via regular mail according to normal oﬃce pro-
        cedures is presumed to have been received by the addressee.” A.R.
        at 64. The majority relies on this reasoning in its opinion, and
        points out that Ms. Meyers has the burden of proving non-receipt
        of the Notice to Appear under § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii). But this analysis
        is signiﬁcantly ﬂawed for a number of reasons.
               First, the BIA case that establishes the presumption of deliv-
        ery for documents sent through the U.S. Mail is a case in which—
        unlike in G-Y-R- and unlike the situation here—the noncitizen failed
        to update his address after he was sent a Notice to Appear to his
        correct address warning him that he could be removed in absentia
        if he did not update his address, and after he appeared at the ﬁrst
        removal hearing. Only in that context did the BIA say that there is
        a presumption of receipt for later mailings like a notice changing
        the date and location of future hearings. See In re M-R-A-, 24 I. &

        4 The immigration judge cited a number of facts about Ms. Meyers’ Pecan Run

        address which predated the issuance of the Notice to Appear. Under G-Y-R-
        and Anyelo—discussed later—those facts are irrelevant because at that time
        Ms. Meyers had not been warned that she might be removed in absentia if she
        did not update her address. See G-Y-R-, 23 I & N. Dec. at 187–89.
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        20-14721                 JORDAN, J., Dissenting                          11

        N. Dec. 665, 666, 671, 675 (BIA 2008) (“[T]he DHS sent the respond-
        ent, by regular mail, a Notice to Appear . . . initiating removal pro-
        ceedings and setting a removal hearing for August 15, 2006. The
        respondent appeared for his hearing on that date and received a
        written notice for his next hearing scheduled for February 20, 2007.
        . . . In this case, the Notice of Hearing dated November 6, 2006,
        was sent to the respondent’s current address, yet he claims that he
        did not receive it. . . . Once a respondent has received a Notice to Appear,
        he must comply with th[e] statutory responsibility [to update his ad-
        dress.]”) (emphasis added). M-R-A- therefore does not apply here.
        See Kurzban, Immigration Law Sourcebook, at 713 (“Any notice is-
        sued after the NTA has been received is suﬃcient if it is given at the
        most recent address provided by the respondent.”) (emphasis
        added).
               Second, even assuming that the presumption of delivery
        from M-R-A- applies, it is not unrebuttable or conclusive; in fact, it
        is “weaker than that accorded to notice sent by certiﬁed mail.” M-
        R-A-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 673. So “when a respondent seeks to reopen
        proceedings based on a claim of lack of receipt of notice, the ques-
        tion to be determined is whether the respondent has presented suf-
        ﬁcient evidence to overcome the weaker presumption of delivery
        attached to notice delivered by regular mail.” Id.
               Third, again assuming that M-R-A- applies, the BIA in that
        case explained that an immigration judge may consider a “variety
        of factors” in determining whether a noncitizen has overcome the
        weaker presumption of delivery for notices sent by regular mail,
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        12                         JORDAN, J., Dissenting                     20-14721

        and these include but are not limited to “the [noncitizen’s] aﬃda-
        vit[.]” Id. at 674. Here, Ms. Meyers submitted an unrebutted aﬃda-
        vit stating that (a) she did not live at the Pecan Run address when
        the Notice to Appear was mailed to that address, and (b) she never
        received the Notice to Appear. See A.R. at 84–85. The immigration
        judge, however, did not hold an evidentiary hearing. Nor did he
        discount or discredit her aﬃdavit in any way. That aﬃdavit there-
        fore stood and constituted unrebutted evidence of non-delivery of
        the Notice to Appear. See Kurzban, Immigration Law Sourcebook,
        at 714 (“[W]here the respondent does not receive the NTA which
        informs her of the change of address requirement, she may assert
        the lack of notice.”) (citing G-Y-R-). 5
                                               B
               The majority makes much of the fact that this case involves
        a motion to reopen under § 1229(b)(5)(c)(ii), which it says ﬂips the
        burden to Ms. Meyers. But in a case just like this one, the BIA is-
        sued a precedential decision vacating an immigration judge’s denial
        of a motion to reopen an in absentia removal order. See Anyelo, 25
        I. & N. Dec. at 339. In that case, as here, the noncitizen had failed
        to update his address with the government before he was advised
        of the in absentia consequences that might result from such a

        5 To the extent that the immigration judge refused to consider Ms. Meyers’

        unrebutted affidavit, or decided to give it no weight without providing an ex-
        planation, he erred. See, e.g., Manning v. Barr, 954 F.3d 477, 486 (2d Cir. 2020)
        (“[W]e find error in the IJ’s and BIA’s failure to consider the unrebutted expert
        affidavit of Dr. Harriott, which we assume to be credible.”).
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        20-14721               JORDAN, J., Dissenting                     13

        failure. The government therefore mailed a Notice to Appear to
        the old address it had on ﬁle. The noncitizen understandably did
        not appear, and he was removed in absentia. When he moved to
        reopen, the noncitizen submitted an unrebutted aﬃdavit stating
        that he did not live at the address where the Notice to Appear was
        mailed, and that as a result he did not receive the Notice to Appear.
        The immigration judge denied the motion to reopen. Finding G-
        Y-R- controlling, the BIA disagreed with the immigration judge and
        granted the noncitizen’s appeal. Here’s how the BIA explained its
        decision:
              It is undisputed that the respondent did not receive
              the Notice to Appear, even though it was sent to his
              last known address, and that he did not update the
              DHS with his current mailing address after he moved
              in 2008. Notwithstanding, the respondent cannot be
              charged with getting adequate notice under Matter of
              G-Y-R-, because he did not receive the Notice to Ap-
              pear containing the required warnings and advisals in-
              structing him as to his obligations to advise the Attor-
              ney General (not merely the post oﬃce) of any
              change of address. Matter of G-Y-R- therefore con-
              trols. Accordingly, the respondent’s appeal will be
              sustained, and the record will be remanded to the
              [i]mmigration [j]udge for further proceedings.
        Id.
               In Ms. Meyers’ case, the immigration judge and the BIA did
        not cite, much less discuss, Anyelo and its application of G-Y-R- in
        the motion to reopen context. That constitutes fatal error.
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        14                      JORDAN, J., Dissenting                20-14721

              The majority relegates Anyelo to a footnote, and makes three
        attempts to argue it away. None are satisfactory.
                First, the majority says that Ms. Meyers did not raise Anyelo
        in her initial brief and has therefore forfeited it. This is simply
        wrong. Ms. Meyers has always argued that under G-Y-R- her in ab-
        sentia removal order cannot stand because she never received the
        Notice to Appear, see Petitioner’s Br. at 11–24, and Anyelo is simply
        an application of G-Y-R- in the motion to reopen context. We must
        therefore apply Anyelo. As our sister circuits have explained, a party
        can raise new authorities on appeal in support of a preserved issue.
        See, e.g., Templeton v. Jarmillo, 28 F.4th 618, 622 (5th Cir. 2022) (“A
        new precedent is not a new argument; it is support for an existing
        argument.”); Alston v. Town of Brookline, 997 F.3d 23, 44 (1st Cir.
        2021) (“Whether or not an issue is preserved in the trial court does
        not depend on what authorities the arguing party cites to that
        court.”); United States v. Rapone, 131 F.3d 188, 197 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
        (“Whether Rapone was entitled to a jury trial is a question of law
        that we review de novo, and we do not think it appropriate to ignore
        relevant legal authority simply because it was not considered in the
        court below.”). And when an appellate court tries to answer legal
        questions, it “should . . . use its ‘full knowledge of its own [and
        other relevant] precedents.’” Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 516
        (1994) (citation omitted) (holding that an appellate court address-
        ing qualiﬁed immunity is not limited to the authorities cited in the
        district court). A contrary rule “could occasion appellate aﬃrma-
        tion of incorrect legal results[.]” Id. at 515 n.3. See also Templeton,
        28 F.4th at 622 (“[T]his court is not restricted to analyzing the issues
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        20-14721                JORDAN, J., Dissenting                        15

        properly presented only on the authorities cited by the parties.”);
        Martin v. United States, 1996 WL 708376, at *1 (7th Cir. Dec. 4, 1996)
        (“[A] court is not restricted to the cases the parties discuss.”). The
        majority cannot ignore Anyelo.
                Second, the majority relies on one of our unpublished cases,
        Sun v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 543 F. App’x 987 (11th Cir. 2013), to distinguish
        Ms. Meyers’ case from G-Y-R and Anyelo. But if we are going to cite
        unpublished cases, I would instead rely on a much more recent de-
        cision where we correctly noted, that under Anyelo, “if [the noncit-
        izen] had begun receiving mail at another address but failed to no-
        tify the government of her change of address, it appears that she
        could not be charged with receiving notice under BIA precedent.”
        Tomas v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 2021 WL 3910275, at *3 n.2. (11th Cir. Sept.
        1, 2021).
                Third, the majority says that “whether [Ms.] Meyers received
        notice was disputed” and that the immigration judge applied “In re
        M-R-A- to resolve [that] factual dispute.” That would be a great
        point if it were only true. The reality, however, is that there was no
        factual dispute to resolve. Ms. Meyers’ ﬁled an aﬃdavit stating that
        she had long since moved from the Pecan Run address and thus did
        not receive the Notice to Appear or the Notice of Hearing. Signif-
        icantly, the government did not dispute the veracity of her aﬃdavit.
        It instead argued that Ms. Meyers could nonetheless be removed in
        absentia because she had an obligation to keep her address updated
        as an applicant for permanent residency. See A.R. 69. As I have
        explained, that is plainly wrong under G-Y-R- and Anyelo—absent
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        16                      JORDAN, J., Dissenting                20-14721

        service of a Notice to Appear, a noncitizen cannot be removed in
        absentia for failing to update her address. The immigration judge,
        without passing on Ms. Meyers’ aﬃdavit, simply and improperly
        adopted the government’s legally erroneous reasoning.
                We should remand for the immigration judge to consider
        Ms. Meyers’ aﬃdavit. That is what we did in Tomas, 2021 WL
        3910275, at *4 (“Neither the [immigration judge] nor the BIA dis-
        counted the aﬃdavits from Tomas or her brother, nor did they dis-
        cuss or weigh Tomas’s prior aﬃrmative application for relief. By
        basing the denial of Tomas’s motion to reopen solely on one non-
        dispositive factor, the [immigration judge] and BIA, without any
        reasoned explanation, failed to apply BIA precedent requiring con-
        sideration of ‘all relevant evidence’ of the ‘particular circum-
        stances.’”). See also Hernandez v. Lynch, 825 F.3d 266, 271–72 (5th
        Cir. 2016) (“Because the BIA concluded that [Mr.] Torres Hernan-
        dez failed to rebut the presumption of notice without considering
        all relevant evidence, it abused its discretion in denying [his] mo-
        tion to reopen.”). Though an immigration judge “need not address
        speciﬁcally . . . each piece of evidence,” it is clear here that the im-
        migration judge failed to provide a “reasoned explanation” as to
        why G-Y-R- did not apply in light of Ms. Meyers’ unrebutted aﬃda-
        vit. See Bing Quan Lin v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 881 F.3d 860, 874 (11th Cir.
        2018).
                                          III
              The rule laid out by the immigration judge and the BIA in
        this case is that the mailing of a Notice to Appear to the
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        20-14721               JORDAN, J., Dissenting                       17

        noncitizen’s last known (and provided) address permits an in absen-
        tia removal proceeding (a) even though the noncitizen has not been
        previously advised that in absentia removal can result if she does
        not update her address, and (b) even though the noncitizen never
        actually receives the Notice to Appear containing that warning be-
        cause she is no longer living at the old address. This is exactly what
        G-Y-R- expressly rejected: “[A]n address can be a [§ 1229(a)(1)(F)]
        address only if the alien has ﬁrst been informed of the particular
        statutory address obligations associated with removal proceedings
        and of the consequences of failing to provide a current address.
        Because that information is ﬁrst communicated in the Notice to
        Appear, the alien must receive the Notice to Appear before he or
        she can ‘provide’ an address in accordance with [§ 1229(a)(1)(F)] of
        the [INA].” G-Y-R-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 187 (emphasis in original).
        And if any further clarity were needed, the BIA applied G-Y-R- in
        Anyelo, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 339, which is identical to Ms. Meyers’ case
        in all relevant respects and which similarly arose in the motion to
        reopen context.
                Put another way, the BIA’s decision in this case amounts to
        an arbitrary and capricious departure from G-Y-R- and Anyelo. In
        the world of administrative law, an agency must generally follow
        its rules and precedents or must explain its departures from them.
        See N.L.R.B. v. Sunnyland Packing Co., 557 F.2d 1157, 1160 (5th Cir.
        1977) (“[A]n agency must either conform itself to its own prior de-
        cisions or else explain the reason for its departure.”). And that prin-
        ciple applies with full force to the BIA, as we recently explained in
        Zarate v. U.S. Att’y. Gen., 26 F.4th 1196, 1207–08 (11th Cir. 2022).
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        18                    JORDAN, J., Dissenting              20-14721

        Setting aside a BIA decision which had failed to follow earlier BIA
        precedent, we held in Zarate that “an agency is generally required
        to ‘follow its own procedure’ when the ‘rights of individuals are
        aﬀected.’ In fact, we have found that ‘[t]he BIA can . . . abuse its
        discretion by not following its own precedents without providing a
        reasoned explanation for doing so.’” Id. (citations omitted).
               I would grant Ms. Meyers’ petition for review and remand
        the case to the BIA with instructions that it correctly apply G-Y-R-
        and Anyelo.