Court Opinion

ID: 9394147
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-12 15:00:46.154818+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:57.534145
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-11325     Document: 43-1      Date Filed: 05/12/2023   Page: 1 of 6

                                                            [PUBLISH]
                                     In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                  No. 22-11325
                           ____________________

       ISRAEL ROSELL and ROBERTO GONZALEZ,
       for themselves and on behalf of those similarly situated,
                                                     Plaintiﬀs-Appellants,
       versus
       VMSB, LLC,
       a Florida Limited Liability Company
       d.b.a. Gianni’s,
       d.b.a. CASA CASUARINA,

                                                     Defendant-Appellee.

                           ____________________
USCA11 Case: 22-11325     Document: 43-1     Date Filed: 05/12/2023   Page: 2 of 6

       2                       Opinion of the Court              22-11325

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Southern District of Florida
                    D.C. Docket No. 1:20-cv-20857-KMW
                          ____________________

       Before JILL PRYOR, GRANT, and HULL, Circuit Judges.
       GRANT, Circuit Judge:
              Today we make explicit what our precedent has implied for
       almost two decades: Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2)
       provides only for the dismissal of an entire action. Any attempt to
       use this rule to dismiss a single claim, or anything less than the
       entire action, will be invalid—just like it would be under Rule
       41(a)(1). Because the parties here attempted to use Rule 41(a) to
       dismiss a single count and not an entire lawsuit, a final judgment
       was never rendered. We thus lack jurisdiction to hear this appeal,
       so we dismiss it.
                                        I.
              Israel Rosell and Roberto Gonzalez were employees of
       VMSB’s restaurant. They argue that VMSB failed to meet its
       minimum wage and overtime pay obligations under the Fair Labor
       Standards Act and comparable Florida laws. Speciﬁcally, they say
       that a “service charge” collected from customers and divided
       among staﬀ was in fact a tip that should not have counted as part
       of their regular rate of pay. And they claim that VMSB is estopped
       from asserting that the service charge is not a tip because of
       statements made in its tax returns. This posture parallels an
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       22-11325               Opinion of the Court                          3

       argument we previously considered—and rejected—in Compere v.
       Nusret Miami, LLC, 28 F.4th 1180, 1181–82, 1187 (11th Cir. 2022).
              Rosell and Gonzalez’s complaint alleged three counts, and
       both sides ﬁled cross-motions for summary judgment. In 2021, a
       magistrate judge recommended granting partial summary
       judgment for VMSB on Counts I and II (the federal and state
       minimum wage claims) and denying summary judgment to both
       sides on Count III (the federal overtime claim). While the district
       court was considering the magistrate judge’s report and
       recommendation, the parties settled Count III.           Without
       opposition, the plaintiﬀs moved the district court to approve the
       settlement and to “direct the clerk to dismiss Count III” with
       prejudice.
              The district court ultimately adopted the magistrate judge’s
       report and recommendation and entered judgment for VMSB on
       Counts I and II. The next day, it issued an order scrutinizing the
       settlement, as our precedent requires in certain Fair Labor
       Standards Act cases. See Lynn’s Food Stores, Inc. v. United States, 679
       F.2d 1350, 1353 (11th Cir. 1982). The district court’s order approved
       the settlement and closed the case—but it also directed the parties
       to “ﬁle a joint stipulation of dismissal of Count 3 with prejudice”
       within 30 days and added that the “stipulation shall be self-
       executing upon its ﬁling.” Rosell and Gonzalez then ﬁled a notice
       of appeal regarding Counts I and II.
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       4                           Opinion of the Court                          22-11325

                                                II.
              We have a sua sponte obligation to consider our subject
       matter jurisdiction, which we review de novo. Univ. of S. Alabama
       v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 408–10 (11th Cir. 1999).
                                               III.
              Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41 governs the “Dismissal
       of Actions” in general, and Rule 41(a) outlines the procedure for
       voluntary dismissals at the parties’ request. Rule 41(a)(1) explains
       how a plaintiﬀ can dismiss an “action” without a court order, and
       Rule 41(a)(2) speciﬁes when an “action” can be dismissed at
       plaintiﬀ’s request by court order. Here, neither the court nor any
       party explained which subsection of Rule 41(a) authorized the
       dismissal. 1 But we need not decide how to classify it, because the
       dismissal was procedurally improper either way.

       1 At oral argument, VMSB conceded that the dismissal of Count III was an
       attempted voluntary dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a),
       without specifying whether it was a Rule 41(a)(1) or 41(a)(2) dismissal. Rosell
       and Gonzalez responded that because the district court cited Lynn’s Food Stores
       when scrutinizing the settlement for fairness, it exercised its “inherent
       authority” to dismiss the case. Our Circuit and the Supreme Court have
       recognized a court’s inherent authority to dismiss sua sponte for lack of
       prosecution. See Betty K Agencies, Ltd. v. M/V MONADA, 432 F.3d 1333, 1337
       (11th Cir. 2005) (citing Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630 (1962)). But
       Rosell and Gonzalez cited no authority for a broader inherent power. Instead,
       district courts have interpreted dismissals involving Lynn’s Food Stores as Rule
       41(a)(2) dismissals. See, e.g., Padilla v. Smith, 53 F.4th 1303, 1308 & n.8 (11th Cir.
       2022).
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       22-11325                   Opinion of the Court                                 5

               Rule 41(a)(1) cannot be used to create appellate jurisdiction
       over a partial grant of summary judgment. As “the Rule’s plain
       text says: a joint stipulation of voluntary dismissal may be used to
       dismiss only an ‘action’ in its entirety.” Perry v. Schumacher Grp. of
       Louisiana, 891 F.3d 954, 958 (11th Cir. 2018). We recently
       reemphasized our Perry holding, noting that “Rule 41(a) does not
       permit plaintiﬀs to pick and choose, dismissing only particular
       claims within an action.” In re Esteva, 60 F.4th 664, 677 (11th Cir.
       2023) (quotation omitted). Our precedent has been consistent on
       this point for almost two decades. See, e.g., Klay v. United
       Healthgroup, Inc., 376 F.3d 1092, 1106 (11th Cir. 2004); Campbell v.
       Altec Indus., Inc., 605 F.3d 839, 841 n.1 (11th Cir. 2010).
              These same conclusions apply to Rule 41(a)(2). To start,
       Esteva discussed Rule 41(a) in general, not just Rule 41(a)(1). See
       Esteva, 60 F.4th at 677. And the word “action” is used identically in
       both Rules 41(a)(1) and 41(a)(2). So we now make explicit what
       Esteva at a minimum implied—a Rule 41(a)(2) dismissal can only be
       for an entire action, and not an individual claim. 2

       2 Our Circuit has recognized that Rule 41(a) allows a district court to    dismiss
       all claims against a particular defendant. See Klay, 376 F.3d at 1106; Esteva, 60
       F.4th at 677. But that exception (if it can be called that) is compatible with the
       rule’s text because in a multi-defendant lawsuit, an “action” can refer to all the
       claims against one party. See 9 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal
       Practice and Procedure § 2362 & n.14 (4th ed. 2023 update). No one argues that
       the exception applies here, and it obviously could not in this single-defendant
       case.
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       6                      Opinion of the Court                 22-11325

               Here, because the parties attempted to dismiss one count
       rather than the entire action, no part of Rule 41(a) authorized the
       dismissal. And because the dismissal was ineﬀective, Count III is
       still pending before the district court. That means we have no ﬁnal
       decision to review. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our “cases make clear that
       a voluntary dismissal purporting to dismiss a single claim is invalid,
       even if all other claims in the action have already been resolved.”
       Esteva, 60 F.4th at 677–78. The lower court “still must address or
       otherwise dispose of ” the claim in some manner. Id. at 678.
              Does this rule create procedural oddities? Not if parties plan
       around it. Litigants who wish to dismiss, settle, or otherwise
       resolve less than an entire action can ensure that they receive a ﬁnal
       judgment on the remainder of their claims—which means that we
       have appellate jurisdiction—by seeking partial ﬁnal judgment
       under Rule 54(b) from the district court, or by amending their
       complaints under Rule 15. Perry, 891 F.3d at 958.
                                  *      *      *
             We DISMISS the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.