Court Opinion

ID: 9760768
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 01:13:41.897281+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:17.057616
License: Public Domain

LAMBERT, Justice,
concurring.
The dissenting opinion presents a parade of horrors which it predicts will flow from the majority opinion. The dissent regards this as a case of governmental intrusion into the lives of Kentucky citizens and extravagantly predicts the virtual demise of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Actually, this case is not nearly so dramatic.
What happened here is that a domestic disturbance occurred at appellant’s home which resulted in a 911 call to the police. When the police responded, they encountered appellant on his own property operating a motor vehicle under the influence of intoxicants. Appellant was arrested and subsequently convicted of violating KRS 189A.010(1) which proscribes operating a motor vehicle under the influence of intoxicants “anywhere in this state.” Quite clearly the purpose of the statute is personal and public safety. As the statute was amended to eliminate the “public highway” requirement and more broadly proscribe intoxicated operation of motor vehicles, the General Assembly must be presumed to have intended the result it achieved. The constitutional analysis we make must be to determine whether there is an arbitrary exercise of power “over the lives, liberty and property of freemen. ...” Ky Const. § 2; Commonwealth v. Mitchell, Ky., 355 S.W.2d 686 (1962); see also Commonwealth v. Shivley, Ky., 814 S.W.2d 572 (1991); see generally Roe v. Commonwealth, Ky., 405 S.W.2d 25 (1966).
There could be no serious contention that one may not endanger himself or others by operating a motor vehicle under the influence of intoxicants even on private property. As such, the General Assembly had an ample basis for the statute it wrote. While traditional concepts of private property and its significance continue to be of great importance, an owner of private property is not licensed to engage in all sorts of proscribed conduct thereon but remain insulated from the reach of lawful authority.
While personal rights of freedom of movement will certainly not be lightly regarded, there must always be a balancing of private right against public interests and welfare. There must always be a logical appreciation of the demands of public safety to which an individual’s personal liberties must yield when such yielding is not of an inalienable right or one that is vital but is merely an inconvenience. It is settled that the enjoyment of many personal rights and freedoms is subject to many kinds of restraints under the police power of the state, which includes reasonable conditions as may be determined by the governmental authorities to be essential to the safety, good order and public welfare of the people.
Commonwealth v. Mitchell, Ky., 355 S.W.2d 686, 688 (1962). Here, the police were sum*817moned to appellant’s home in response to a domestic disturbance which rendered lawful their presence on appellant’s property. There they encountered appellant driving an automobile under the influence of intoxicants and near a public highway. In measuring the conduct of the police under these circumstances, one should consider their legal status if faced with a civil claim by one maimed or crippled by appellant on his own property or by one injured by appellant just outside his own gate.
There is a vast difference between mere intoxication on one’s own property and intoxication accompanied by the operation of an automobile. The law regards the latter as criminal conduct because the potential for harm is so great.
REYNOLDS and SPAIN, JJ., join this concurring opinion.