Court Opinion

ID: 9586553
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:12:50.485449+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:32:42.995380
License: Public Domain

BROTHERTON, Justice
dissenting:
I must dissent to the majority opinion in this case, in both reasoning and result. I am compelled to point out a fact virtually ignored by the majority. This case involved an action for civil contempt, not criminal, or even “quasi-criminal” contempt. The jury verdict in this case resulted in monetary fines, not a term of imprisonment for any of the defendants. See syllabus point 1, Hendershot v. Hendershot, 164 W.Va. 190, 263 S.E.2d 90 (1980). It has long been held that the primary distinction between civil and criminal contempt proceedings is the constitutional safeguards required in criminal contempt proceedings that are not guaranteed in civil contempt actions.1 Consequently, absent the hallmarks that make a contempt proceeding criminal in nature, a party to a civil contempt action is not owed the same constitutional safeguards given to a criminal contemnor.
The majority, however, found that Rule 15(b) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure does not apply to this case. In a sweeping generalization that ignores all the prior efforts made to distinguish civil and criminal contempt, the majority characterizes all contempt proceedings as “quasi-criminal” and thus apparently subject to all the rights due a criminal defendant. Few, if any, of the cases cited by the majority speak with any great specificity about the “quasi-criminal” character of all contempt actions. To the contrary, in In re Yoho, 171 W.Va. 625, 301 S.E.2d 581 (1983), the Court takes great pains to distinguish between the four different types of contempt. Id. 171 W.Va. at 627-629, 301 S.E.2d at 583-85. Nowhere in Yoho do I find a pronouncement of the “historic rule” so grandly cited by the majority which treats civil contempt as “quasi-criminal.”2 Further, in Doctors Memorial Hospital v. Woodruff, 165 W.Va. 324, 267 S.E.2d 620 (1980), a per curiam opinion heavily relied upon by the majority, the Court notes that criminal contempt proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature and therefore subject to the Rules of Criminal Procedure. Similarly, in State ex rel. Koppers Co., Inc. v. International Union of Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers, 171 W.Va. 290, 298 S.E.2d 827 (1982), this Court found that *580criminal contemnors are entitled to the same rights as other criminal defendants. Id. 171 W.Va. at 293, 298 S.E.2d at 829. Nowhere in either opinion are civil contempt actions given the same status as criminal contempt actions.
Moreover, the majority’s reliance on State ex rel. United Mine Workers of America v. Maynard, 176 W.Va. 131, 342 S.E.2d 96 (1985), is equally ill-founded. The majority cites to Maynard, at footnote 2, for the proposition that parties must be given notice of the particular acts that violated the court’s order. However, footnote 2 refers to Koppers, Doctors Memorial Hospital, and Yoho, discussed above, in support of this proposition despite the fact that the latter two cases involve criminal contempt. Yoho, which addressed the due process issues of the different types of contempt proceedings, merely found that the defendant’s due process rights had been adequately protected by being informed prior to and after his refusal to testify that his actions were contemptuous.
In the present situation, the plaintiffs were put on notice, first by the temporary injunction and later by the pleadings, that any violation of the temporary injunction would stand as an act of contempt of that court order. Moreover, the evidence presented at trial, amended to conform to the pleadings, gave adequate notice of the charges as permitted in civil litigation. The majority’s sudden assumption that specific written notice was required of each additional act of civil contempt after the original pleadings were filed makes a leap of faith at which even the most ardent legalist would marvel.
The majority spends a great deal of time bemoaning the lack of notice given the defendants regarding the specific acts that violated the temporary injunction. Hogwash. The injunction was very specific in its terms and gave the defendants more than adequate notice that if they performed any of the acts forbidden therein, they would be in violation of that court order. To say that the defendants required additional notice before they could be tried for each new injunction violation, after knowingly violating the court order, is like arguing that Moses should have been given second notice he was breaking the Ten Commandments when he threw the tablets down in a fit of rage.
After reviewing the facts surrounding this case and the law cited by the majority, the majority’s classification of all contempt proceedings as “quasi-criminal” is nothing more than a transparent attempt to weaken the power of the courts to control strike activity in violation of a valid court order. The contempt power of a court is an inherent one, necessary to the very existence of that court. Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall) 505, 22 L.Ed. 205 (1873); United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 3 L.Ed.259 (1812). While we agree contempt power must be carefully regulated, it is a necessary power and one properly utilized by the court below in this case. This case, along with Hendershot, virtually emasculates a state court’s power to enforce an injunction.
For the foregoing reasons, .1 must dissent to the majority’s opinion.
I am authorized to say that Justice NEELY joins with me in this dissent.

. Martineau, Contempt of Court: Eliminating the Confusion Between Civil and Criminal Contempt, 50 U.Cinn.L.R. 677,681 (1981). See also State ex rel. Koppers Co., Inc. v. International Union of Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers, 171 W.Va. 290, 298 S.E.2d 827, 829 (1982).

. In fact, Yoho quotes with approval In Re Bianchi, 542 F.2d 98 (1st Cir.1976), which recognized that civil contempt proceedings for recalcitrant grand jury witnesses did "not require meaningless formalities that would only serve to delay the proceedings.” Id. 171 W.Va. at 630, 301 S.E.2d at 587.