Court Opinion

ID: 9664046
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:00:45.712252+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:01.460005
License: Public Domain

LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J.
¶ 72. {dissenting). I respectfully dissent. The resolution of this case was decided over 150 years ago in Norval v. Rice, 2 Wis. 17, [*22], 23, [*30] (1853). Because I see no reason to abandon Norval, I would conclude that McGrew is constitutionally entitled to a jury of 12 persons.
I
¶ 73. Article I, Section 5 of the Wisconsin Constitution provides that "[t]he right of trial by jury shall *555remain inviolate, and shall extend to all cases at law without regard to the amount in controversy." As McGrew's case concerns money damages (a civil forfeiture penalty), this is a case "at law." See Village Food & Liquor Mart v. H&S Petroleum, Inc., 2002 WI 92, ¶ 33, 254 Wis. 2d 478, 647 N.W.2d 177; Farr v. Spain, 67 Wis. 631, 632, 31 N.W. 21 (1887); Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 422-25 (1987). The constitutional right to a trial by jury, however, must be gleaned from the common law as it was at the time of the formation and adoption of the constitution. Norval, 2 Wis. at 22, [*29]. That is because of the "peculiarity of the language" of Article I, Section 5, which provides that the right shall "remain" inviolate. Id. We must therefore determine whether the then-existing common law of 1849 provides McGrew with a constitutional right to a trial by jury. If McGrew is entitled to a trial by jury, we must then determine the requisite number of jurors.
A
¶ 74.. While there were few "laws of the road" that existed during this state's formative years, there were still laws of the road. See Lead op., ¶ 30 n.23 (quoting Wis. Rev. Stat. ch. 33 (1849)). Those laws regulated public carriages and vehicular travel on the roadways and highways of this state. Id. I would conclude that the laws of the road that existed in 1849 are "essential counterpart[s]" of today's "rules of the road"1 embodied in our current traffic laws, as the modern rules also regulate public carriages and vehicular travel on the roadways and highways of this state. Compare Village Food, 254 Wis. 2d 478, ¶ 28. I am thus in complete agreement with the lead opinion's sentiment that" [i]t *556makes little sense to us to scrutinize whether each individual traffic violation was recognized at common law so as to determine whether a violator is entitled to a six- or 12-person jury." Lead op., ¶ 49. Because the right to a jury trial is a fundamental right,2 I conclude that the rules of the road represent the seedling for the modern traffic laws and that that satisfies that prong of the Village Food test.
¶ 75. As a predicate for this conclusion, a closer reading of the laws of the road reveal that there was an antedated "essential counterpart" to the specific offense of speeding. Wisconsin Stat. ch. 33, § 1 stated:
Whenever any persons shall meet each other on any bridge or road, traveling with carriages, wagons, sleds, sleighs or other vehicles, each person shall seasonably drive his carriage or other vehicle to the right of the middle of the travelled part of such bridge or road, so that the respective carriages, or other vehicles aforesaid, may pass each other without interference.
In 1849, "seasonably" was understood as meaning not done rashly or in haste. Bagnall v. Ableman, 4 Wis. 184 [*163], 200 [*178] (1855).3 A synonym for haste is "speed." Webster's Third New Inti Dictionary 1037 (un-abr. 1986). Thus, in 1849, when a person in a vehicle met another vehicle on the road, each driver had to *557drive on the right side of the road not in haste, that is, without speeding in order to avoid interfering with each other.
¶ 76. Requiring drivers to drive their vehicles "seasonably" under certain circumstances undoubtedly represents the "forerunners" of modern speeding laws. See Village Foods, 254 Wis. 2d 478, ¶ 27. The fact that this offense differs slightly in its means from modern day speeding, in that the 1849 offense did not regulate speed of its own accord, is an insufficient distinguishing characteristic that does not restrict the right to a jury trial. See id., ¶ 28. A fair reading of the antedated offense leads me to the conclusion that it was an essential "counterpart;" indeed, it represents an origin of modern day regulations of motor vehicles' speed.
B
¶ 77. The next step is to figure out whether a person challenging a law of the road violation had a right to a jury at all. Given that the laws of the road offenses were punishable by nominal monetary fines, these offenses would have been tried in justice of the peace courts. See Wis. Stat. ch. 33 (1849) ;4 Wis. Stat. ch. 88, § 5(5).5 In a justice of the peace court, a defendant had a right to up to a six-person jury. Wis. Stat. ch. 88, § 80.6
¶ 78. Furthermore, in some situations, a defen dant convicted in a justice of the peace court could *558appeal to the county courts. Wis. Stat. ch. 88, § 226;7 *559Wis. Stat. ch. 86, § 2;8 Wis. Stat. ch. 86, § 29.9 Violating the antedated essential counterpart of speeding, Wis. Stat. ch. 33, § 1, constituted one of the offenses that could be appealed. See Wis. Stat. ch. 88, § 226 (appeals to county courts if judgment exceeds $15); Wis. Stat. ch. 33, § 2 (establishing fine of not more than $20 for violating Wis. Stat. ch. 33, § 1). As opposed to justice of the peace courts, county courts were courts of record. Wis. Stat. ch. 86, § 2 ("The county court shall be a court of record ...."). While in the county courts, the defendant could request a jury trial on issues of fact. Wis. Stat. ch. 86, § 16.10
*560¶ 79. The fact that defendants could obtain a jury either in the justice of the peace courts or, in some instances, in the county courts shortly after the adoption of the constitution satisfies me that there was a right to a trial by jury at the time of the constitution's adoption. Accordingly, a constitutional right to trial by jury existed for violations of the laws of the road in general, and for the essential counterpart to speeding in particular.
C
¶ 80. The next question, then, is how large did the jury have to be? As noted above, a party in the justice of the peace court could request a jury of up to six persons. Wis. Stat. ch. 88, § 80. Whether a jury of six, rather than a jury of 12, persons in the justice of the peace courts was constitutional, however, was never tested. See Norval, 2 Wis. at 23, [*30]. Norval explicitly left this question unanswered. Id.
¶ 81. Assuming that the legislature could constitutionally limit the size of the juries in justice of the peace courts to six people, it does not follow that the answer to the question of how large the jury had to be must be six persons. As noted, a defendant may have been able to appeal from a judgment of the justice of the peace court to the county courts. Id.
¶ 82. With regard to the size of the jury in county courts, Wis. Stat. ch. 86, § 16 provided that the jury could be comprised of "not more than six persons." However, in 1853, this court declared this statute unconstitutional as violating Article I, Section 5. Nor-*561val, 2 Wis. at 23, [*30]. The Norval decision reveals why McGrew should be entitled to a jury of 12.
1
¶ 83. At issue in Norval was whether the limitation on the number of jurors to six in county courts by virtue of Wis. Stat. ch. 86, § 16 violated Article I, Section 5. The Norval court framed the issue as whether a jury of six persons constituted "such a trial by jury as is contemplated by section 5 of article 1 of the Constitution?" Norval, 2 Wis. at 19, [*25] (emphasis in original).
¶ 84. The Norval court laid down the core doctrinal principle that Article I, Section 5 secured the right to "trial by jury" as it existed "at the time of the formation and adoption of the Constitution by the people of this State." Id. at 22 [*29]. After undergoing an extensive historical examination of the common law practices regarding juries, this court concluded that the common law revealed that "trial by jury" meant that a jury was to be comprised of 12 persons. See id. at 20-23, [*26-*30]. Thus, this court held:
In our view of the provisions of the Revised Statutes concerning County Courts, where they restrict the jury to six persons, they conflict with the enjoyment of a constitutional right, secured to every citizen, namely, the right of trial by a jury of twelve men[.]
Id. at 23, [*30] (emphasis in original). Therefore, because Wis. Stat. ch. 86, § 16's limitation on the number of jurors to six persons in county court was inconsistent with the constitution, this court declared the statute unconstitutional. Id.
¶ 85. Aside from this holding, it is noteworthy that part of this court's historical examination recog*562nized that prior to the formation of the Wisconsin Constitution, the judiciary system was comprised of the following:
[A] Supreme Court, in which no questions of fact were tried by a jury; District Courts, in which grand and petit juries were empanneled, the latter consisting of twelve men; Courts of Probate, wherein a jury was not used; and courts of justices of the peace, in which, in actions of forcible entry and detainer, a jury of twelve, and in all other cases of trial, of six only, was allowed.
Id. at 23 [*29-30]. This court recognized that certain actions injustice of the peace courts required 12 person juries but others did not. Id. While the Norval court recognized this, it explicitly did not pass on whether such practices would pass constitutional scrutiny. Id. at 23 [*30].
¶ 86. However, the Norval court did make two observations regarding this pre-constitutional judiciary system that are particularly relevant here. First, the court remarked that "the party aggrieved by the decision before the justice [of the peace court], might, in certain cases, remove the case by appeal to the District Court, where a trial by jury of twelve men would be available." Id.
¶ 87. Second, the court noted that justice of the peace courts were not "courts of record." See id. Regarding all of the courts that were courts of record, the Norval court specifically observed that the trial by jury meant that a jury would be comprised of 12 persons, and that right "remains inviolate":
[W]hen our Constitution was adopted, we had no court of record in existence in Wisconsin, in which the number of the jury for trials of facts in any case, except by consent, could be less than twelve; so that it cannot *563be said that when a trial by jury, in a court of record such as the County Court, must be by a jury of six persons and no more, the trial by jury in a court of record which has been enjoyed before the adoption of the Constitution, remains inviolate.
Id. (emphasis in original).
2
¶ 88. Under Norval, McGrew is entitled to a 12-person jury for at least two reasons.
a
¶ 89. First, under Norval, when an offender charged with violating the laws of the road in general, and Wis. Stat. ch. 33, § 1 in particular, could appeal a judgment from the justice of the peace courts to the county courts, that person would receive a jury of 12 persons. County courts existed up until the creation of Wisconsin's unified court system in the late 1970s. See 1 Edwin E. Bryant, Wisconsin Pleading & Practice, § 2.64 at 129 (4th ed. 2002). "With the institution of the single-level trial courts, the county courts were abolished and matters formerly heard by them now are heard by the circuit courts." Id.
¶ 90. Contrary to the assertions of the concurrence, my view of the Norval decision does not merely focus on the fact that an aggrieved party could have appealed to county court. See Bradley, J., concurring, ¶¶ 66-69. Norval instead makes it clear that where there was a constitutional right to a trial by jury, the number of jurors depended on whether the trial was in county court. Because an offender was entitled to a jury trial of 12 in county courts (regardless of whether that *564action was commenced there or was on appeal) for laws of the road violations, and because rules of the road can now be heard in circuit courts, I would conclude that a defendant today should have the same right to a 12 person jury in the circuit courts.
b
¶ 91. Second, Norval's historical evaluation reveals that its conclusion that "trial by jury" meant a jury of 12 persons stemmed from the fact that county courts were courts of record. Norval, 2 Wis. at 23 [*30]. The circuit courts of today are also courts of record. See Malinowski v. Moss, 196 Wis. 292, 220 N.W. 197 (1928);11 Wis. Stat. § 753.05 (2003-04) (seals); Wis. Stat. § 753.26 (court records); Wis. Stat. § 753.30 (2003-04) (clerk of circuit court).12
¶ 92. From this, I read Norval as suggesting that what may have been ultimately important was where the offense was tried.13 Part of Norval's reason for not *565assessing whether justice of the peace courts could constitutionally limit the size of the jury to six was its observations that an aggrieved party from a justice of the peace court could appeal to a court of record (which, before the constitution was enacted was appealed to the District Courts and after the constitution was enacted was appealed to the county courts) and receive a jury of 12 persons there. To me, it is not coincidence that this court allayed its concerns regarding the six-person juries in justice of the peace courts (which it chose not to decide) by noting that 12-person juries could eventually be obtained in a court of record.
¶ 93. Because the former laws of the road violations could be tried in the county courts that were courts of record, and because the current speeding violations are tried in the circuit courts which are courts of record, I would conclude that McGrew is entitled to a jury of 12 persons.
D
¶ 94. Unlike the lead opinion, I see no legitimate reason for abandoning Norval. I do not agree with the *566lead opinion's sentiment that Norval would be decided differently today based on the lead opinion's exceedingly superficial distinctions. See Lead op., ¶¶ 45-46.
¶ 95. That Norval proclaimed in various places that the jury was to be comprised of men is irrelevant to the ultimate issue of the size of the jury or the nature of the right to "trial by jury." See Lead op., ¶ 45. Although the common law practices at the time disgracefully curbed women's abilities to participate in civic affairs, Milwaukee delegate Charles H. Lakin made the following statement in his speech during the constitutional convention regarding Article I, Section 5: "Erect within your temples of justice twelve hollow, graven, brazen images ... [A]nd if you will, you may call this, trial by jury." State v. Hansford, 219 Wis. 2d 226, 236, 580 N.W.2d 171 (1998) (quoting Journal of the Convention to form a Constitution for the State of Wisconsin, 124 (1848)(emphasis in original)). Notwithstanding common law practices, the emphasis at the time of the constitutional convention was then on the number, not the gender of the jurors.14 Id.
*567¶ 96. The same can be said for where the jury was to be collected from and the procedures for how the jury was to be selected. See Lead op., ¶ 45. In my view, these are meaningless distinctions that do not detract from Norval's clear holding: "trial by jury" necessarily means a jury of 12.
¶ 97. That Norval did not accord the six-person jury statute a presumption of constitutionality is nothing more than a ploy. No amount of presumption could have saved the statute. The Norval analysis made clear that the statute was at odds with the practices that the constitution protected. The legislature cannot achieve by statute what the constitution forbids. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
¶ 98. Finally, that the United States Supreme Court has concluded in Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970), that the Sixth Amendment did not require that a jury be comprised of 12 persons has limited import on what the Wisconsin Constitution secures. See State v. Knapp, 2005 WI 127, 285 Wis. 2d 86, 700 N.W.2d 899; State v. Dubose, 2005 WI 126, 285 Wis. 2d 143, 699 N.W.2d 582. Besides, this court in Hansford specifically rejected the holding in Williams with respect to Article I, Section 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution.15 Hansford, 219 Wis. 2d at 242-43.
HH HH
¶ 99. In sum, consistent with Norval, I would conclude that "trial by jury" in Article I, Section 5 necessarily means a jury of 12 persons. Because McGrew is entitled to a trial by jury here for his alleged *568violation of the rules of the road, I would conclude that he is entitled to a jury of 12 persons.
¶ 100. For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.

 Wis. Stat. ch. 346 (2003-04).

 Krueger v. State, 84 Wis. 2d 272, 280, 267 N.W.2d 602 (1978) cert. denied, 439 U.S. 874 (1978).

 The common understanding of "seasonably" directs us to "seasonable." Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 2049 (unabr. 1986). "Seasonable" means "1: occurring in good or proper time.... 2: suitable to or in keeping with the season or circumstances." Id. According to Black's Law Dictionary, "seasonable" means "[w]ithin the time agreed on; within a reasonable time." Black's Law Dictionary, 1353 (7th ed. 1999).

 See Lead op., ¶ 30 n.23. All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1849 version unless otherwise indicated.

 Wisconsin Stat. ch. 88, § 5(5) stated: "Every such justice shall have jurisdiction over and cognizance of the following actions and proceedings: ... Actions for a penalty not exceeding one hundred dollars, gived by any statute of this state."

 Wisconsin Stat. ch. 88, § 80 stated:
*558In every civil cause brought before a justice of the peace, after issue joined, and before the justice shall proceed to an examination of the testimony, or to inquire into the merits of the cause, either party, on first paying to the justice the jury fees in advance, which shall be taxed against the losing party, may demand that the cause be tried by a jury of six men.
The parties could agree on a jury comprised of less than six jurors, however. Wis. Stat. ch. 88, § 86 ("The parties may agree upon six, or any less number of jurors to try the cause ....").

 Wisconsin Stat. ch. 88, § 226 provided:
Any party to a final judgment rendered by a justice of the peace, where the recovery shall exceed fifteen dollars, except judgment of non-suit, exclusive of costs, conceiving himself aggrieved thereby, may appeal therefrom to the county court of the county, where the same was rendered, in the following eases:
1. Where the judgment was rendered upon an issue of law joined between the parties:
2. Where it was rendered on an issue of fact joined between the parties, whether the defendant was present at trial or not.
Wis. Stat. ch. 88, § 227 also dealt with appeals from justice of the peace courts where the judgment was less than fifteen dollars. That section stated:
A party may appeal from a judgment of a justice, where the judgment is less than fifteen dollars, in the following cases:
1. Where the claim of either party, as proved at the trial shall exceed fifty dollars:
2. Where the defendant did not appear and plead, and final judgment was rendered for the plaintiff, on the merits of his claim.
Some of the violations of the laws of the road, including the forerunner for our modern day speeding laws, allowed for forfeitures of more than $15. Wis. Stat. ch. 33, §§ 1 and 2 ($20 forfeiture for failing to seasonably drive carriage or vehicle on the right side of the road when persons meet on road); ch. 33, § 5 ($20 forfeiture for failure to fasten horses when passengers remain in horse drawn vehicle).
*559Some were for $5 per day of violation, ch. 33, § 3 ($5 forfeiture each day a person employs drunken drivers); ch. 33, § 4 ($5 forfeiture each day for employer's failure to fire intoxicated driver).
One other law of the road carried no specific monetary forfeiture. Chapter 33, § 6 (owners of vehicles carrying passengers for hire are jointly and severally liable for all injuries and damages done by drivers).

 Wisconsin Stat. ch. 86, § 2 stated in pertinent part: "The county court... shall have ... exclusive appellate jurisdiction of all cases of appeal... from justices of the peace ...."

 Wisconsin Stat. ch. 86, § 29 provided:
From and after such county courts shaft be organized, all cases hereafter required by law to be removed from justices of the peace to the circuit court, whether by appeal or otherwise, shall be removed to the county courts, and the like proceedings therein shall be had in the county court as is by law required in the circuit corut. And all laws providing for taking cases to the circuit court from justices' courts, shall from thenceforth be construed to mean and read, to the county court, instead of the circuit court.

 Wisconsin Stat. ch. 86, § 16 read:
If an issue of law be made in the cause, it shall be tried by the court; if an issue of fact, it shaft on demand of either party, as hereinafter provided, be tried by a jury to consist of not more than *560six persons; and if no jury be demanded by either party, the issue shall be tried by the court.

 In Malinowski v. Moss, 196 Wis. 292, 296, 220 N.W. 197 (1928), this court defined a "court of record" as follows:
A court of record has been defined as a court where the acts and judicial proceedings are enrolled in parchment for a perpetual memorial and testimony, and which has power to fíne and imprison for contempt of its authority; a court that is bound to keep a record of its proceedings, and that may fine or imprison; a court whose proceedings are enrolled for a perpetual memorial and testimony, which rolls are called the records of the court, and are of such high and super-eminent authority that their truth is not to be called in question; a judicial, organized tribunal having attributes and exercising functions independently of the person of the magistrate designated generally to hold it, and proceeding according to the course of the common law; and a court having a seal.

 Compare Wis. Stat. § 88.13(2) (2003-04) ("Notwithstanding sub. (1), a municipal court is not a court of record.").

 So that my position will not be over read, I make the following two points.
*565First, I agree that there were offenses at common law that would have been tried in a summary manner, without the right to a jury at all. Here, however, we are concerned with an offense that at least secured the right to trial by jury. Once that right attaches, I would conclude that the right to "trial by jury" means that the jury is composed of 12 persons in circuit court.
Second, I recognize that not all judgments for offenses tried before justice of the peace courts could be appealed to county courts. For those offenses that could not be appealed, then the question is whether it was constitutional for justice of the peace courts to sit with six-person juries. I express no opinion on that matter here, other than agree with the concurrence that the constitution required at least that. See Bradley, J., concurring, ¶ 52.

 It was not until 1921 that it was recognized that women had the legal right to sit on jury panels. Wisconsin Stat. § 6.015 (1921) stated in relevant part:
Women shall have the same rights and privileges under the law as men in the exercise of suffrage, freedom of contract, choice of residences for voting purposes, jury service, holding office, holding and conveying property, care and custody of children, and in all other respects.
In 1975, for the first time, the United States Supreme Court concluded that under the Sixth Amendment, "it is no longer tenable to hold that women as a class may be excluded or given automatic exemptions based solely on sex." Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 537 (1975). See Taylor for an interesting discussion of the history of gender bias in jury selection.

 Hansford's analysis relied in part on Article I, Section 5 and the Norval v. Rice, 2 Wis. 17, [*22] (1853) decision. State v. Hansford, 219 Wis. 2d 226, 242-43, 580 N.W.2d (1998).