Court Opinion

ID: 9884901
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 03:22:53.268327+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:41:06.282394
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Solfisburg, specially concurring: I agree with the result reached by this opinion but not with all that is said therein. Irrespective of whether further testimony from independent medical experts would add anything significant to the record, it is the contention of amicus curiae, the Illinois State Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, AFL-CIO, that that portion of the circuit court’s remandment order which directed that: “The petitioner shall be examined by qualified and disinterested medical and surgical experts selected and designated by the Industrial Commission of Illinois, whose reports and recommendations shall be received and considered in support of such further orders and decisions as may be hereafter entered in this case,” is invalid. They state that it encroaches on the discretionary powers vested by statute in the Industrial Commission and is contrary to the holdings of this court that the reviewing tribunal should not substitute its discretion for that of the administrative body. (People ex rel. Miller v. Gill, 389 III. 394.) The power to appoint impartial medical examiners is a discretionary one vested in the Industrial Commission pursuant to section 19(c) of the Workmen’s Compensation Act. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1963, chap. 48, par. 138.19(c).) Such an examination is not mandatory but it is provided that the Commission may require such an examination. As the record does not reveal any request for an impartial examination before the Industrial Commission, there could have been no abuse of discretion. Abuse of discretion will not be presumed and, of course, the burden of showing such abuse falls upon the party claiming it. (Anthony v. Gilbrath, 396 Ill. 125.) Section 19(f)(2) of the Workmen’s Compensation Act provides in part as follows: “The court may confirm or set aside the decision of the Commission. If the decision is set aside and the facts found in the proceedings before the Commission are sufficient, the court may enter such decision as is justified by law, or may remand the cause to the Commission for further proceedings and may state the questions requiring further hearing, and give such other instructions as may be proper.” Inasmuch as the question of impartial medical examination was not before the circuit court, it was improper for that court to remand with the directions for an impartial medical examination. Furthermore it is noted that the examination order compels the Commission to consider the reports and recommendations made by the medical examiner. As the order does not call for testimony, but only reports and recommendations to the Commission, the order would result in denying the parties their constitutional right to have witnesses appear and testify under oath and be subject to cross-examination. Rule 17 — 2 of this court (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1965, chap, no, par. 101.17 — 2) which permits impartial medical examinations where they are deemed appropriate by the trial court provides in substance that if the examining expert’s findings are to be offered against any party, he is required to appear, testify under oath, and be subject to cross-examination. The parties constitutional rights are, therefore, protected under our rule but not under the order of the circuit court. Even rule 17 — 2 of this court does not permit a reviewing court to order an impartial medical examination in a trial court where no request pursuant to the rule was made in the trial court. For these reasons the circuit court had no right to enter that portion of the order which it did pertaining to impartial medical examination and the Commission was not bound to follow the directions of the circuit court under these circumstances. Mr. Chief Justice Klingbiel joins in this special concurrence.