Court Opinion

ID: 9948949
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-08 15:15:13.242461+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:25.078704
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: MARCH 1, 2024; 10:00 A.M.
                            NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                    Commonwealth of Kentucky
                                Court of Appeals

                                   NO. 2023-CA-0104-MR

DOROTHY ASH                                                        APPELLANT

                APPEAL FROM DAVIESS CIRCUIT COURT
v.                 HONORABLE LISA P. JONES, JUDGE
   ACTION NOS. 17-CR-00378, 18-CR-00894, 19-CR-00716, 19-CR-00846, 19-
   CR-00972, 19-CR-01036, 19-CR-01162, 20-CR-00326, 20-CR-00382, 21-CR-
              00032, 22-CR-00330, 22-CR-00332, & 22-CR-00334

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                             APPELLEE

                                          OPINION
                                         AFFIRMING

                                         ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: ACREE, COMBS, AND ECKERLE, JUDGES.

ECKERLE, JUDGE: Appellant, Dorothy Ash (“Ash”), appeals from an order of

the Daviess Circuit Court denying her motion for relief from her sentences

pursuant to CR1 60.02 and CR 60.03. First, Ash improperly attempted to raise new

1
    Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
grounds for relief on appeal. Furthermore, we agree with the Trial Court that Ash

failed to state any grounds for relief under these rules. Hence, we affirm.

             On March 31, 2022, Ash pleaded guilty in 11 different cases.

Specifically, the charges were as follows: (Case No. 19-CR-00716) one count of

theft by unlawful taking (over $500 and less than $10,000); (Case No. 19-CR-

00846) four counts of second-degree possession of a forged instrument; (Case No.

19-CR-00972) three counts of second-degree criminal possession of a forged

instrument; (Case No. 19-CR-01036) one count of theft of identity; (Case No. 19-

CR-01162) one count of theft of identity and six counts of second-degree criminal

possession; (Case No. 20-CR-00326) one count of theft of identify, one count of

third-degree forgery, and one count of second-degree criminal possession of a

forged instrument; (Case No. 20-CR-00382) one count of theft of identify and 6

counts of second degree criminal possession of a forged instrument; (Case No. 21-

CR-00032) one count of theft of identify; (Case No. 22-CR-00330) one count of

engaging in organized crime (criminal syndicate); (Case No. 22-CR-00332) one

count of theft of a motor vehicle (value more than $1,000 and less than $10,000);

and (Case No. 22-CR-00334) one count of theft of a motor vehicle registration

plate or renewal decal. The Commonwealth recommended a total sentence of 20

years, which the Trial Court imposed.

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                On the same day, Ash’s probation was revoked in two separate cases

(Case Nos. 17-CR-00378 and 18-CR-00897). The Trial Court directed that those

sentences run consecutively to the sentences imposed that day. The combined

sentences totaled 25 years.

                On December 12, 2022, Ash filed a pro se motion for relief from the

sentence pursuant to CR 60.02 and 60.03. She requested that the Trial Court

modify the judgment to run all sentences concurrently for a total of ten years. As a

basis for the motion, Ash stated that “she requests a modification so that she can

focus on rebuilding her life and making substantial changes[,]” and “[h]er

character and circumstances have changed since the time the crimes were

committed[.]” The Trial Court denied the motion on December 14, 2022. This

appeal followed.

                Ash now argues that her trial counsel was ineffective for failing to

withdraw the guilty plea after the Trial Court imposed the 25-year sentence. It is

well-established that a new theory of error “cannot be raised for the first time on

appeal.” Springer v. Commonwealth, 998 S.W.2d 439, 446 (Ky. 1999).

Furthermore, CR 60.02 is not intended as a means of raising issues that could have

been addressed in an RCr2 11.42 motion. Gross v. Commonwealth, 648 S.W.2d

853, 856 (Ky. 1983). Ash’s current claim of ineffective assistance of counsel

2
    Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.

                                            -3-
should have been raised in an RCr 11.42 motion and is not a ground for relief

under CR 60.02 or 60.03. Because the issue is not properly presented, we decline

to address the matter further.

                The plain language of CR 60.03 requires a separate, independent

action, which Ash did not file. Jackson v. Commonwealth, 640 S.W.3d 99, 103

(Ky. App. 2022). Thus, that rule is not applicable to this proceeding. The standard

of review on a CR 60.02 motion is whether the Trial Court abused its discretion.

Brown v. Commonwealth, 932 S.W.2d 359, 362 (Ky. 1996). “The test for abuse of

discretion is whether the trial judge’s decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair,

or unsupported by sound legal principles.” Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d

941, 945 (Ky. 1999).

                We find no abuse of discretion in this case. Ash does not claim that

the total sentence exceeded the statutory maximum. Ash received the 20-year

sentence for which she bargained, plus an additional five years on a previously

imposed sentence. KRS3 533.060(2) required the Trial Court to run the revoked

sentence consecutively to the sentence imposed under Ash’s guilty plea. See

Blackburn v. Commonwealth, 394 S.W.3d 395, 401 (Ky. 2011). Thus, the total

sentence was not statutorily defective or violative of Ash’s due-process rights.

3
    Kentucky Revised Statutes.

                                           -4-
             Finally, none of the provisions of CR 60.02 allows for relief from a

sentence merely because a Trial Court, or a litigant, believes the sentence was too

harsh. Likewise, Ash’s claims that she is remorseful for her actions and that her

circumstances have changed do not amount to any “reason of an extraordinary

nature justifying relief” under CR 60.02(f). Given Ash’s failure to state a valid

ground for relief under CR 60.02, the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion by

denying her motion.

             Accordingly, we affirm the order of the Daviess Circuit Court denying

Ash’s CR 60.03 and CR 60.03 motions.

             ALL CONCUR.

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:                       BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Dorothy Ash                                Daniel Cameron
Pewee Valley, Kentucky                     Attorney General of Kentucky

                                           Jenny L. Sanders
                                           Assistant Attorney General
                                           Frankfort, Kentucky

                                         -5-