Court Opinion

ID: 9669789
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:09:27.634278+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:00.313192
License: Public Domain

STRINGER, Justice
(concurring specially).
While I agree with the court’s conclusion that appellant is entitled to a Schwartz hearing, I do not agree that it is necessitated by the cumulative errors committed by the trial court over the course of appellant’s trial. In my opinion the trial court’s error in allowing the jury to separate overnight during deliberations, without the appellant’s consent, was sufficiently serious, standing alone, to require remand for a Schwartz hearing.
Rule 26.03, subd. 5(1) provides in plain and simple language: “With the consent of the defendant the court, in its discretion, may allow the jurors to separate over night during deliberation.” See also State v. Sanders, 376 N.W.2d 196, 202 (Minn.1985). The trial court violated this rule, the jury separated overnight and on review here the majority cites our ruling in Sanders to require the appellant to show prejudice in order to be entitled to a new *905trial. The majority’s reliance on Sanders is misplaced. First, unlike the situation in Sanders, the majority here is only ordering a Schivartz hearing, not a new trial. It is implementing the first step of the inquiry as to whether a new trial might be necessary — therefore I would conclude that the Sanders holding placing the burden on appellant to show prejudice is misguided.
Second, applying the Sanders holding puts the appellant in a perfect “Catch 22.” Appellant is not entitled to a Schwartz hearing absent a showing of prejudice, but without a Schwaitz hearing the appellant has no way of showing prejudice. He can only speculate as to improprieties that could have taken place while the jury was separated.1
Fundamental fairness requires a presumption of prejudice to the appellant entitling the appellant to a Schivartz hearing where the jury has been allowed to separate in violation of Rule 26.03, subd. 5(1), and, contrary to the ruling of the majority, the trial court’s error in this regard need not have been embellished by its other errors in order to justify a Schwartz hearing.

. I would save for another day a consideration of the ruling in Sanders requiring proof of prejudice as a predicate for a new trial based upon a violation oí Rule 26.03, subd. 5(1).