Court Opinion

ID: 9374233
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 17:07:46.767301+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:45.948858
License: Public Domain

J-S45044-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    JAWAUN SALMOND                             :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 905 EDA 2022

       Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 26, 2021
            In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
                 Criminal Division at CP-51-CR-0007686-2018

BEFORE: OLSON, J., STABILE, J., and MURRAY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.:                            FILED FEBRUARY 22, 2023

       Jawaun Salmond (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence

imposed after the trial court convicted him of one count each of attempted

murder, aggravated assault, aggravated assault of an unborn child,

possessing an instrument of crime, simple assault, recklessly endangering

another person, and three counts of violating the Uniform Firearms Act.1 We

affirm.

       The trial court detailed the underlying facts as follows:

       [The Victim] … grew up in the 6600 block of Chew Avenue in
       Northwest Philadelphia … the same area as Appellant, had known
       him for many years, and had spoken with him on previous
       occasions. On August 12, 2018, [the Victim] was visiting her
       friend in the Mount Airy area. While there, [the Victim] saw
       Appellant during the daytime sitting with a group of other men on
____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 901(a), 2702(a), 2606(a), 907(a), 2701(a), 2705,
6105(a)(1), 6106(a)(1), and 6108.
J-S45044-22

     the corner of Chew Avenue and Sharpnack Street. [The Victim]
     testified that she did not speak with Appellant at the time and she
     could not recall what he was wearing.

           Later that evening, [the Victim] stopped at a Chinese store
     to get change so she could take the bus back home. As she was
     exiting the store, she testified that there was a “smoker” named
     Cheryl standing outside, who told [the Victim] something was
     about to happen on Chew Avenue and that she should leave. [The
     Victim] stated that she was already headed toward Chew Avenue
     and Montana Street to catch the bus home, so she continued to
     her destination. Once there, she saw the bus approaching, then
     heard someone running. She glanced back at the person running
     but wasn’t really paying much attention to the person until he was
     behind her. The person then told [the Victim,] “Bitch you said you
     was going to line me” and opened fire on her. [The Victim] tried
     to run but was only able to take two or three steps before she fell
     and hit her face.

            [The Victim] stated that while she could not see the
     shooter’s face because it was covered by a zipped-up hoodie
     revealing only his eyes, she was still able to immediately identify
     him because she recognized his voice. She testified that without
     a doubt, the person who shot her was Appellant, stating: “We sat
     around each other multiple times on Chew and Sharpnack where
     we would hang…. So, I know the young man’s voice.” …             [The
     Victim] stated that she heard eight (8) gunshots and then felt a
     “crippling feeling.” She testified that she was shot four (4) times
     in the back, once in the liver, once in the kidney, once in the lung,
     and had a hematoma in her neck.

            As a result of her injuries sustained during the shooting, [the
     Victim] spent a couple months in the hospital and underwent
     sixteen (16) surgeries. She had multiple drains put in and
     removed due to infection. The infection flooded [the Victim’s]
     stomach with pus, which needed to be extracted several times.
     At the time of trial, [the Victim] stated that she was still fighting
     off re-infection. [The Victim] also suffered a collapsed lung and
     became restricted in her movements because a bullet was lodged
     on top of her rib. At the time of the shooting, [the Victim] was
     thirteen (13) weeks pregnant. Her unborn child died as a result
     of the shooting. [The Victim] was unable to have an operation to
     remove the deceased fetus and was forced to “push it out on the
     toilet” in the hospital.

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J-S45044-22

Trial Court Opinion, 5/17/22, at 3-5 (citations to notes of testimony omitted).

       The Commonwealth charged Appellant with numerous crimes in

connection with the August 12, 2018 shooting, which occurred while Appellant

was on parole and wearing an ankle monitor. See N.T., 10/26/21, at 17.

       The trial court held a non-jury trial and convicted Appellant of the

aforementioned crimes on May 19, 2021.           On October 26, 2021, following

completion of a pre-sentence investigation report (PSI), the trial court

sentenced Appellant to an aggregate standard-range sentence of 22 – 50

years in prison. At the close of sentencing, defense counsel made an oral

motion to withdraw from representation, which the trial court granted. Id. at

21-22. Despite seeking leave to withdraw, trial counsel filed a post-sentence

motion challenging the discretionary aspects of sentence, which was denied

by operation of law on February 28, 2022. Appellant timely appealed and has

filed a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement.2

       Appellant presents a single question for review:

       Is the sentence imposed unduly harsh and excessive under the
       circumstances of this case where, inter alia, the [trial] court relied
       upon an improper factor in fashioning the sentence?

Appellant’s Brief at 4.

____________________________________________

2 The trial court appointed new counsel, who was initially unaware of his
appointment. As a result, Appellant filed a pro se Post-Conviction Relief Act
(PCRA) petition. Appellant withdrew his pro se PCRA petition when appellate
counsel entered his appearance.

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J-S45044-22

       Appellant asserts his sentence is harsh and excessive because the trial

court failed to consider mitigating factors; improperly considered hearsay3;

and improperly imposed consecutive sentences. Id. at 38-49.

       Our review discloses that Appellant has not preserved his claims. There

is no absolute right to challenge the discretionary aspects of a sentence on

appeal. See Commonwealth v. Hill, 66 A.3d 359, 363 (Pa. Super. 2013).

Where the appellant has preserved his sentencing challenge by raising it in a

post-sentence motion, he must (1) include in his brief a concise statement of

the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal with respect to the

discretionary aspects of a sentence pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (2)

show there is a substantial question that the sentence is not appropriate under

the Sentencing Code. Hill, 66 A.3d at 363-64.

       Here, Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion for reconsideration

of sentence, but claimed only in general terms that “the sentence imposed

was done without sufficient reasons for same being placed on the record.”

Post-Sentence Motion, 10/29/21, at 1 (unnumbered). An appellant waives a

challenge to the discretionary aspects of sentence not raised in a post-

sentence motion, and may not raise it for the first time on appeal.       See

____________________________________________

3 Appellant complains the trial court “denied his right to the presumption of
innocence” by considering “hearsay allegations which were unreliable,
unsubstantiated, and disputed by [Appellant.]” Appellant’s Brief at 48. The
hearsay Appellant references is in the PSI, where Appellant was quoted as
saying that the Victim “got what she deserved.” Id. at 46.

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Commonwealth v. Bradley, 237 A.3d 1131, 1138-39 (Pa. Super. 2020)

(claim waived where not specifically raised in post-sentence motion); see also

Pa.R.A.P. 302(a).

       Appellant raised his discrete sentencing claims for the first time in his

Rule 1925(b) statement.      Concise Statement of Errors, 4/4/22, at 1-3

(unnumbered); see Commonwealth v. Coleman, 19 A.3d 1111, 1118 (Pa.

Super. 2011) (issues raised for first time in Rule 1925(b) statement are

waived). Therefore, we are constrained to find waiver.

     Waiver notwithstanding, we would conclude that Appellant’s standard-

range sentence was neither excessive nor unreasonable.              See, e.g.,

Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 171 (Pa. Super. 2010) (stating

that “where a sentence is within the standard range of the guidelines,

Pennsylvania law views the sentence as appropriate under the Sentencing

Code,” and holding that a sentence was not unreasonable where trial court

had the   benefit   of PSI and imposed        a standard range      sentence);

Commonwealth v. Raven, 97 A.3d 1244, 1254-55 (Pa. Super. 2014)

(defendant’s standard range sentences were neither unreasonable nor

excessive where “record reflects that the [sentencing] court carefully

considered all of the evidence presented at the sentencing hearing.”).

     The record demonstrates the trial court considered the PSI, Appellant’s

allocution, and the Victim’s statement in imposing Appellant’s sentence. See

N.T., 10/26/21, at 16-20; Trial Court Opinion, 5/17/22, at 15-19. This is what

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the law requires. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hardy, 939 A.2d 974, 980

(Pa. Super. 2007) (rejecting defendant’s challenge to discretionary aspects of

sentence and stating sentencing court is not required “to ignore context and

instead review [the] charges in a vacuum, where only the name of the offense

and corresponding standard range sentence is considered.”).         Moreover, a

sentencing court is allowed to consider hearsay in determining a sentence; it

is not an improper factor. Commonwealth v. Medley, 725 A.2d 1225, 1230

(Pa. Super. 1999) (“Hearsay testimony is precisely the type of evidence which

is the right of a court in sentencing to consider … pre-sentence investigations

are routinely ordered and considered by the court and a pre-sentence report

is the very definition of hearsay[.]”). Finally, the trial court had discretion to

impose consecutive sentences. Commonwealth v. Radecki, 180 A.3d 441,

470 (Pa. Super. 2018) (“Pennsylvania law affords the sentencing court

discretion to impose its sentence concurrently or consecutively to other

sentences” (citation omitted)). Thus, even if properly preserved, Appellant’s

claims would not merit relief.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

                                      -6-
J-S45044-22

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 2/22/2023

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