Court Opinion

ID: 9769284
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 14:43:21.279885+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:59.593866
License: Public Domain

STEPHENSON, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. All of the cases in this state that I have read, do not support the conclusion reached in the majority opinion.
In that opinion, the issue is drawn as follows:
“In order to maintain venue under subdivision 4, Art. 1995, must plaintiff prove the existence of a cause of action at the time of the hearing against the resident defendant ?”
It is apparent that question is susceptible of two entirely different meanings. Does it mean that proof of a cause of action must be made at the hearing of the plea of privilege? Or, does it mean that the cause of action must exist at the time of such hearing?
All of the cases cited by the dissent simply hold that proof of a cause of action against the resident defendant must be made at the hearing without reference to the time of the existence of the cause of action. The Stockyards National Bank Case is the primary case relied upon in the dissent. There is not one word in that case to indicate it is decisive of the issue before us. Whether the cause of action existed at the time the plea of privilege was filed and not at the time of the hearing, simply is not in that case, or in any of the other cases cited in the dissent.
It is conceded here that apparently there are no recent cases passing upon this point; however, all of the cases I have read hold that it is the time of filing the plea of privilege, rather than the time of hearing the plea of privilege, which controls. In Logan v. Ludwick, 283 S.W. 548 (Tex.Civ.App., Fort Worth, 1926, no writ), the resident defendant disclaimed any interest in the personal property being sued for and asked to be dismissed. At the venue hearing the trial court sustained the disclaimer and overruled the pleas of privilege of the two non-resident defendants. On appeal it was contended that venue could not be maintained under subdivision 4, because the cause of action against the resident defendant (Brock) no longer existed. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed with this statement:
“If Brock, at the institution of plaintiff’s suit, was a necessary or even a proper party, as we think he was, it would be immaterial that he was permitted to disclaim and be discharged upon the date of the trial of the pleas of privilege, his interest or right, such as it was, having at that time ended, for the court, having originally acquired jurisdiction under exception 4 of article 1830, would retain that jurisdiction throughout, in the absence of a plea that the allegations of the plaintiff’s petition showing jurisdiction had been fraudulently made, and there was no such plea. Brooks v. Chatham, 57 Tex. 31; Ablowich v. National Bank, 95 Tex. 429, 67 S.W. 79, 881; Ry. Co. v. Grayson Co. Natl. Bank, *696100 Tex. 17, 93 S.W. 431; Ogburn-Dalchau Lumber Co. v. Taylor, 59 Tex.Civ.App. 442, 126 S.W. 48.” (283 S.W. 550)
Other cases, under subdivision 4, are as follows: Harris v. Allison, 29 S.W.2d 413 (Tex.Civ.App., San Antonio, 1930, no writ); and Lewis v. Davidson, 51 Tex. 251 (1879).
Cases under other subdivisions are: Boettcher v. Federal Land Bank of Huston, 142 S.W.2d 272 (Tex.Civ.App., Galveston, 1940, writ dism’d) (subdivision 29a); Ogburn-Dalchau Lumber Co. v. Taylor, 59 Tex.Civ.App. 442, 126 S.W. 48 (Tex.Civ.App., Texarkana, 1910, no writ) (subdivision 12); Beer v. Wheelock, 331 S.W.2d 92 (Tex.Civ.App., Waco, 1959, no writ) (subdivision 13). See also Slaton v. Anthony, 143 S.W. 201 (Tex.Civ.App., Amarillo, 1911, no writ).