Court Opinion

ID: 9369691
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-09 16:09:46.710706+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:16.495072
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Angers, 2023-Ohio-369.]

                               COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                              EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                 COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO,                                    :

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,              :
                                                           No. 111481
                 v.                               :

DANIEL ANGERS,                                    :

                 Defendant-Appellant.             :

                                JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: MODIFIED AND REMANDED
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: February 9, 2023

          Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                              Case No. CR-19-636497-A

                                            Appearances:

                 Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
                 Attorney, and Nora C. Bryan, Assistant Prosecuting
                 Attorney, for appellee.

                 Cullen Sweeney, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and
                 Erika B. Cunliffe, Assistant Public Defender, for
                 appellant.
MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, J.:

            Defendant-appellant Daniel Angers appeals from the trial court’s

January 4, 2022 judgment finding him in violation of his community-control

sanctions, sentencing him to a nine-month prison term and imposing a two-year

driver’s license suspension. After a careful review of the facts and pertinent law, we

modify the judgment by vacating the driver’s license suspension.

Factual and Procedural History

            In February 2019, Angers was charged with one count of deception to

obtain a dangerous drug, a felony of the fourth degree in violation of R.C. 2925.22.

In May 2019, Angers pleaded guilty to an amended count of attempted deception to

obtain a dangerous drug, a felony of the fifth degree in violation of R.C. 2923.02 and

2925.22. The trial court sentenced him to five years of community-control sanctions

with conditions.    The court specifically stated that it “elects to not suspend

defendant’s driving privileges.” The court advised Angers that a “violation of the

terms and conditions may result in more restrictive sanctions, or a prison term of

12 months as approved by law.”

            In January 2022, the trial court held a community-control-violation

hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court found Angers in violation of his

community control. The court terminated Angers’s community-control sanctions,

sentenced him to a nine-month prison term, and imposed a two-year driver’s license

suspension. Angers filed a motion to reconsider, contending that because the trial

court did not originally order a license suspension it was without authority to impose
the suspension for his violation. The state did not oppose the motion. The trial court

denied Angers’s motion for reconsideration.

             Angers presents the following assignment of error for our review:

      The trial court’s imposition of a 2-year license suspension in addition
      to a 9-month prison sentence it imposed consequent to a finding that
      the defendant violated his community control sanctions contravenes
      his right to due process and the explicit dictates of R.C. 2929.15.

Law and Analysis

             Appellate review of a trial court’s sentencing decision for a community-

control violation is the same review for felony sentencing set forth under

R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). State v. Roberts, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2019-02-025, 2019-

Ohio-4205, ¶ 5. R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) compels an appellate court to modify or vacate

a sentence only if the appellate court finds by clear and convincing evidence that

“the record does not support the trial court’s findings under relevant statutes or that

the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.” State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516,

2016-Ohio-1002, 59 N.E.3d 1231, ¶ 1.

             When an offender violates the conditions of his or her community

control, a trial court has the option of imposing “a longer period of community

control, a more restrictive community-control sanction, or a prison term of any

length within the range of that available for the original offense, up to the maximum

that the trial court specified at the first sentencing hearing.” R.C. 2929.15(B).
            Angers pleaded guilty to one count of attempted deception to obtain a

dangerous drug. R.C. 2925.22 governs the crime of deception to obtain a dangerous

drug. Relative to sentencing, the statute provides in pertinent part that

      [i]n addition to any prison term authorized or required by division (B)
      of this section and sections 2929.13 and 2929.14 of the Revised Code
      and in addition to any other sanction imposed for the offense under this
      section or sections 2929.11 to 2929.18 of the Revised Code, the court
      that sentences an offender who is convicted of or pleads guilty to a
      violation of division (A) of this section may suspend for not more than
      five years the offender’s driver’s or commercial driver’s license or
      permit.

R.C. 2925.22(C)(1).

             In its original sentence of Angers, the trial court specifically stated that

it opted not to impose a driver’s license suspension. Angers contends that the trial

court erred in imposing the license suspension for the community-control violation

because (1) the court did not advise him at the original sentencing of the possibility

of a driver’s license suspension for a violation as required under State v. Brooks, 103

Ohio St.3d 134, 2004-Ohio-4746, 814 N.E.2d 837; and (2) the suspension is not a

community-control sanction that can be added as a more restrictive sanction.

             In Brooks, the trial court failed to notify the defendant at his sentencing

hearing of the prison term that would be imposed if he violated the terms of his

community control. The day after sentencing, the trial court filed a journal entry

stating that a violation of the defendant’s community-control conditions could lead

to “a prison term of 6 to 12 months.” Id. at ¶ 1. The trial court later sentenced the
defendant to an eight-month prison term for violating his community-control

sanctions.

              The Ohio Supreme Court accepted the case as a certified conflict for

review of the following issue:

       [W]hether or not R.C. 2929.15[B], second sentence, read in pari
       materia with R.C. 2929.19(B)(5), second sentence, requires that a court
       sentencing a defendant to a community control sanction must, at the
       time of such sentencing, notify the defendant of the specific prison term
       it may impose for a violation of such sanction, as a prerequisite to
       imposing a prison term on the defendant for such a violation.

Id. at ¶ 4.

              The court answered in the affirmative. See id. at paragraphs one and

two of the syllabus. The Ohio Supreme Court held that in sentencing a defendant to

a community-control sanction the trial court must, at the time of the sentencing,

notify the defendant of the specific prison term that may be imposed for a violation

of the conditions of the sanction as a prerequisite to imposing a prison term on the

offender for a subsequent violation. Brooks, 103 Ohio St.3d 134, 2004-Ohio-4746,

814 N.E.2d 837, at paragraph two of the syllabus. The state contends that Brooks

applies only to prison terms.

              Although Brooks is specific to notification of prison terms for violating

community-control sanctions, which is one of the options under R.C. 2929.15(B)

that a trial court can impose for such a violation, it nonetheless has broader due

process implications for situations such as those presented here. Specifically, the

Brooks court referenced the Ohio Supreme court’s decision in State v. Comer, 99
Ohio St.3d 463, 2003-Ohio-4165, 793 N.E.2d 473, wherein the court held that in

sentencing a defendant the trial court is required to make the statutorily mandated

findings at the sentencing hearing, as opposed to solely stating the findings in its

written judgment of conviction. See Comer at paragraphs one and two of the

syllabus.

              The Brooks Court stated that “in light of our explicit holding based on

Comer that compliance with R.C. 2929.19(B)(5) must come at the sentencing

hearing, we find that notification generally is deficient when the trial court’s

statements to an offender of a possible term of imprisonment occurs at a plea

hearing and is not repeated at a later sentencing hearing.” Brooks at ¶ 17.

              Thus, we find Brooks instructive on the due process a defendant

should be afforded at sentencing. At the sentencing here, the trial court specifically

told Angers it would not be imposing a driver’s license suspension.

              Moreover, we agree with Angers’s contention that a driver’s license

suspension is not a community-control sanction. R.C. 2925.22, governing the crime

of deception to obtain a dangerous drug, provides that a driver’s license suspension

may be imposed “[i]n addition to any prison term authorized or required.”

(Emphasis added.)     R.C. 2925.22(C)(1).    Community-control sanctions are an

alternative to prison. See State v. Anderson, 143 Ohio St.3d 173, 2015-Ohio-2089,

35 N.E.3d 512, ¶ 23-28. Thus, a sentencing court is required to impose either a

prison term or community-control sanctions on each count. Id. at ¶ 23; see also

State v. Jacobs, 189 Ohio App.3d 283, 2010-Ohio-4010, 938 N.E.2d 79, ¶ 5
(8th Dist.) (“This court has previously held that the sentencing statute does not

allow a trial court to impose both a prison sentence and community-control for the

same offense.”).

               In light of the above, the possibility of a license suspension for a

violation of R.C. 2925.22 could only be imposed as part of a defendant’s prison

sentence; it could not be imposed as a community-control sanction.1

              Further, under State v. Carlisle, 131 Ohio St.3d 127, 2011-Ohio-6553,

961 N.E.2d 671, “[a] criminal sentence is final upon issuance of a final order” id. at

¶ 11, citing State ex rel. White v. Junkin, 80 Ohio St.3d 335, 337, 686 N.E.2d 267

(1997), and generally a trial court lacks authority to modify a final criminal

judgment. Carlisle at ¶ 9, citing State ex rel. Cruzado v. Zaleski, 111 Ohio St.3d 353,

2006-Ohio-5795, 856 N.E.2d 263. Thus, when a defendant is originally sentenced

to a term of community-control, the imposition of a subsequent sentence is actually

for the violation of the community-control conditions. State v. Lawrence, 3d Dist.

Seneca No. 13-01-01, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 2156, *4 (May 14, 2001). The trial court

could not therefore modify its original sentence to include a license suspension upon

Angers’s violation of his community-control sanctions.

              The issue in this case appears to be one of first impression for this

court. We note, however, that it has been addressed by the First District Court of

Appeals in State v. Curry, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-200254, 2021-Ohio-2746.

      1
      We further note that R.C. 2929.16, 2929.17, and 2929.18, describing various
community-control sanctions, do not provide for a driver’s license suspension as a
community-control sanction.
In Curry, the defendant pleaded guilty to failure to comply, for which the trial court

was required to impose a definite driver’s license suspension for a period of three

years to life. The trial court sentenced the defendant to three years of community-

control sanctions, with the condition that he complete a treatment program and

aftercare. The trial court failed to impose the mandatory driver’s license suspension.

Neither party appealed the sentence.

              The defendant later pleaded guilty to a violation of his community-

control sanctions and the trial court sentenced him to an 18-month prison term and

a lifetime driver’s license suspension.

              The defendant appealed and the state, citing State v. Henderson, 161

Ohio St.3d 285, 2020-Ohio-4784, 162 N.E.3d 776, conceded that the court’s failure

to include the statutorily mandated license suspension in its original sentence and

sentencing entry rendered that part of the sentence voidable, and it could only have

been corrected on direct appeal.

              Further, citing Carlisle, 131 Ohio St.3d 127, 2011-Ohio-6553, 961

N.E.2d 671, the First Appellate District found that the defendant’s sentence on the

failure-to-comply charge became final upon the filing of the original sentencing

entry and the trial court lacked authority to modify the sentence by imposing the

license suspension as part of its sentence for the defendant’s community-control

sanctions violation.   Consequently, the court held that the license suspension

portion of the defendant’s community-control violation sentence was contrary to

law. Curry, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-200254, 2021-Ohio-2746, at ¶ 6.
              Likewise, here, the license suspension should have been imposed, if at

all, at the original sentencing. The trial court did not impose it, the sentence on the

sole count became final upon the filing of the original sentencing entry, and the trial

court lacked authority to modify it at the sentencing for the community-control

violation. Thus, the imposition of the license suspension is contrary to law.

              The sole assignment of error is sustained. The trial court’s January 4,

2022 judgment is modified to vacate the license suspension. The case is remanded

to the trial court to issue a corrected journal entry consistent with this opinion.

      It is ordered that appellant recover from appellee costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.

      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

______________________________
MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, JUDGE

LISA B. FORBES, P.J., and
MARY J. BOYLE, J., CONCUR