Court Opinion

ID: 9827642
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 17:43:31.340229+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:34.029664
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Appellees complain of the assumption in our findings of fact .that surveys Nos. 68 and 71 are located as shown by the Land Office map of 1SS3, which assumption was based upon the written agreement filed in the case, and related solely to the question whether these surveys are located by the field notes in the ninth or tenth tier of surveys east of the beginning point of the block. If located in the tenth tier, a change of five degrees in the-course would throw the surveys further south than if in the ninth tier, and from the clause in the agreement which shows the relative positions survey No. 71 would occupy under the two theories we concluded the field notes must have placed the two surveys in the tenth tier, and therefore as depicted on the map of 1883, instead of as on the previous map and the Corwin sketch. We think it obvious from the connection in which we used the language ‘ ob-' jected to- that such was our meaning, but make this statement because appellees profess a fear that we assumed from the agreement the survey lines should be run according to the cardinal points of the compass instead of with a deflection- of five degrees from such cardinal points.
Appellees also infer, from our describing, in our findings of fact, the Land Office maps introduced in evidence, that we gave great weight to such maps in determining the issues in this case. The Supreme Court held these maps admissible in this case “for whatever they might be worth as throwing light on or as corroborative of the location of the land in suit as originally fixed and placed.” The opinions upon the former appeal do not disclose that the question was raised whether block 3'should be laid out according to the cardinal points of the compass or by lines variant five degrees from such points; in fact, it appears that the only question was whether the evidence was sufficient to show the location of survey No. 71, and it was held that it was not sufficient because the field notes connecting it with the beginning point of the block were not introduced, but merely the maps. Such maps being held admissible by Supreme Court and being admitted in evidence, we described the same in our findings .of fact, though of the opinion that as the case is made by the agreement filed herein they have no probative value “as throwing light on or as corroborative of the location of the land in suit as originally fixed and placed.”
Counsel for appellees have much to say concerning the question whether “north” means according to the true meridian or according to the magnetic meridian, and say we assume that it means according to the true meridian. They have signed an agreement filed in this case, by which it is provided that the lines of survey 71 S. P. Ry. Co. are correctly located by running upon a variation of 9° 15' E. and that the lines of block 3 are to be run upon the same variation, so far as locating surveys 68 and 71 is concerned. We are not informed whether by using the variation agreed upon they sought to locate the lines according to the true meridian, or whether they estimated that such a variation was required in order to locate the surveys where a survey according to the magnetic meridian, if made in 1876, would have placed the surveys. However, as ap-pellees in their motion for rehearing repeatedly assume that the east line of survey No. 71 S. P. Ry. Co. is a line running five degrees east of the sidereal north, we infer that the variation was agreed upon for the purpose of running the lines on the basis of the true meridian,. either in accordance with the cardinal points of the compass or variant five degrees therefrom. The discussion in regard to whether survey lines should be run according'to the true meridian or the *512magnetic meridian, is foreign to the issue in this case. The issue as made by the agreement is whether the lines of block 3 (using a variation of 9° 15' E.) shall be run according to the cardinal points of the compass or by courses varying five degrees from such points. Appellees’ real contention is that “north” does not necessarily mean north, but may mean about north, or in a northerly •direction, and that in this case in the call for the beginning line of survey No. 1, block •3, it means N. 5° E., and that each other •course called for in the field notes of the block must be construed to be five degrees variant from the course actually mentioned. Several cases are referred to in support of this theory, but all are very different from this case. The case of Grace v. Walker, 95 Tex. 39, 64 S. W. 930, 65 S. W. 482, which appellees contend is virtually overruled by us, was one involving the construction of an •agreement to donate land for a road. Certain landowners made a proposal for a •change of road which was accepted by the •city council by the adoption of an ordinance making the change and describing the road. The owners agreed to donate a strip of land 40 feet wide along the lines of their lands. The call construed by the Supreme Court read as follows: “Hence north along Kennedy’s and C. D. Grace’s west line to J. I. ■Chenowith’s S. E. corner.” Said line was not a true north line, and it was contended that the description in the ordinance could not be applied because a north course would pass through Grace’s land instead of along his line. The court held that the call for north gave only the course which was controlled by the calls for Grace’s west line and 'Chenowith’s southeast corner.
The written descriptions in a deed are to •be construed in the light of the facts known to and in the minds of the parties at the time, and with reference to any facts or monuments on the ground, which are referred to in the deed. It was apparent in ■said case that all the parties knew exactly where the lines were, and intended the road to run with such lines at a width of 49 feet, •and that the word “north” used by the city •council did not express the meaning of the parties, but was used mistakenly for the purpose of expressing the idea of a general northwardly direction. The calls for the lines expressed the true intent of the parties and controlled the call for a north course which was used mistakenly.
In this ease we find the words “north,” '“east,” “south,” and “west,” each used 80 times by a practical surveyor of long experience, who was preparing field notes of 80 ■sections of land, upon which field notes patents should issue containing as a means of identifying the land the field notes so prepared by him. It is safe to say he would not lightly use the words “north,” “east,” ■“.south,” and “west,” in any inexact sense, as all of his training forbade such course. He is bound to have known that a difference of five degrees in the course would make a difference of 165 varas in a mile. He calls for the west line of survey No. 1, block 3, to run north with the. east line of survey No. 71 S. P. Ry. Co., which line was not located on the ground, but was to be located on a course running N. 5° E. from the S. E. corner, which was also not located on the ground, but to be located by running course and distance from the S. W. corner of survey No. 71. He had never been on the ground, but the field notes and a sketch of the S. P. Ry. -Co. block were on file in the Land Office. The fact that he failed to call for the west line, survey No. 1, to run N. 5° E., in itself indicates that he overlooked the fact that- the line of survey 71 was to be located by that course; but his sketch and his other calls in the field notes of the 80 surveys make it very clear that he overlooked, or did not know, that the east line of survey 71 S. P. Ry. Co. was to be located by running N. 5° E. Appellees infer, from the fact that we lay little stress upon the testimony of Corwin to the effect that he did not know of such deflection in the east line of survey No. 71 S. P. Ry. Co., that we considered such testimony inadmissible.
[5] We think the knowledge of the person making the calls in a deed or in field notes, with respect to facts having connection with his survey, is admissible as a circumstance to be considered with the other evidence in determining what he meant by language used by him, and do not agree with appellees that such testimony constitutes a statement of what he intended to do, or of what he did not intend to do. However, we think the evidence, aside from his testimony, plainly showed that at the time he made the office survey he either had not examined the field notes of survey 71 S. P. Ry. Co., or that he had not noticed or remembered the deflection in the course of the east line. The words “north,” “east,” “south,” and “west” mean due north, east, south, and west, and when applied to courses of lines cannot be discarded or given a different meaning unless used in connection with calls for specific objects or lines, which, in view of all the facts, more certainly locate the lines in accordance with the true intent of the party using the language than the calls for course.
The survey of the 80 surveys constituting block 3 being considered as one survey, it is apparent that, by letting the courses given for all lines control the call for a portion of an unloeated line of another survey, the true intent of the surveyor will be arrived at, and that is the object to be attained. We will also say that had the east line of S. P. Ry. survey No. 1 been located on the ground and known to the surveyor, and called for by its correct course, and yet all *513other calls been for the cardinal points of the compass alone, we would not feel authorized to change such other calls upon a mere presumption that the surveyor in compliance with a directory statute intended to make the surveys square.
We see no reason for changing the conclusion arrived at in our original opinion, and therefore overrule the motion for rehearing.