Court Opinion

ID: 9602818
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:00:26.616881+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:44:55.718350
License: Public Domain

Miller, J.,
dissenting.
The trial court decided that the description of the property conveyed by the deed of January 9, 1909, from W. B. Emmert, Trustee, to Colonial Beach Company, (which description is set out at length in the majority opinion), did not include the parcel of land in litigation. The majority opinion not only sustains that conclusion but in bold and assured language says:
“The language of the deed is simple, clear and explicit. It requires no interpretation. There is no part of the description out of harmony with, or repugnant to any other part. G-iving to the words employed their general and ordinary meaning, they imply no doubt or obscurity and are capable of but one meaning.”
I cannot agree with that statement, or with the legal conclusion reached.
In view of the present division of opinion on the court and remembering the difficulties encountered at conference, I read that paragraph with a feeling of some surprise and dismay. If the question presented is as simple as stated, then there is nothing to decide, and I wonder why the litigation was ever instituted and how it ever gained admittance to this court. However, it is here, and if the language is clear and explicit, and “requires no interpretation,” it would seem that Justice Holt’s brief observation in Title Ins. Co. v. Howell, 158 Va. 713, 718, 164 S. E. 387, “Ambiguities may be cleared away and weasel words explained, but that which is plain needs no explanation,” would be sufficient to end all further discussion of the matter.
Yet, after making the positive statement that the grantor’s language “requires no interpretation,” four pages of interpretation, quotation of rules of construction, and argument are set forth to prove what the “clear and explicit language” really means.
*28To reach, a final conclusion, I cannot start from the assumed premise stated in the majority opinion, which is that the language is “capable of but one meaning.” On the contrary, I think the description is uncertain, inconclusive, unclear and ambiguous, and that is the reason I must resort to recognized rules of construction to reach, what I consider, a correct conclusion. Yet, before doing so, I venture to say that there are others who, upon reading the description, will not find it simple, clear and definite.
It is conceded that the deed conveyed all of the “Hotel Be-servation” east of Taggert street, extended, except this small parcel of land. The majority opinion chides the grantor, W. B. Emmert, Trustee, for not further describing the land conveyed “as being all of the remaining portion of the ‘Hotel Beservation,’ or of that which was conveyed to him by Holtzman and others,” if he intended to grant this parcel in controversy.
Well, let’s see if he should have used that broad and inclusive language.
The majority opinion does not tell us so, but an inspection of the deed of December 31, 1908, from Holtzman and others to W. B. Emmert, Trustee, discloses that those grantors conveyed to Emmert, Trustee, about seventy-five lots of land described by numbers and three tracts of land, i. e., 260.15 acres, 51.25 acres, and 28 and a fraction acres, the last mentioned tract being what was called the “Hotel Beservation.” All of these lots and tracts of land adjoined, or were in close proximity to, each other and made up much of the area known as Colonial Beach. The 28 acres known as the “Hotel Beservation” was composed of an area, part of which lay. east and part west of Taggert street, extended, as shown by the map of 1884. The record does not disclose that any of these lots, or any part of the three tracts of land, had been granted or disposed of by Emmert, Trustee, when he made the deed of January 9, 1909, to Colonial Beach Company. So, if Emmert, Trustee, had used all of the descriptive suggested in the majority opinion as quoted above, he would have, it is true, more definitely granted the lot in question, but he would have also conveyed to Colonial Beach Company some seventy-five other lots and the 260.15 acre tract, the 51.25 acre tract, and that portion of the “Hotel Beservation” that lay west of Taggert street, extended, none of *29which, that Company had purchased. Or he would, at least, have fouled up and beclouded the title to all those lots and the several tracts of land, for the lots and that acreage made up the greater part of the land that had been “conveyed to him by Holtzman and others.” If he had used only part of the language suggested by the majority opinion, i.e., “all of the remaining portion of the ‘Hotel Reservation’ * * he would have conveyed or beclouded the title to that part of the reservation that lay west of Taggert street, extended, which obviously was not intended to be granted to Colonial Beach Company. I think 311 or more acres, and seventy-five lots are too much bonus or free land to include inadvertently in a grant just because a grantor wants to be sure he is getting rid of a few feet of the shore of the Potomac River.
It is stated that the grantor did not intend to, and did not, convey this area by the description used, though it was part of the reservation and lay east of Taggert street, extended. I have grave doubt that the grantor ever consciously thought of this small tit of land when the deed was executed, and thus entertained no intent, specifically directed to whether it was or was not within the descriptive boundaries stated. If he did not intend to convey it, (and the majority opinion holds that he did not), then obviously he should have definitely excluded it by proper language from the grant of the acreage that it adjoins and of which it is a part.
If the truth were known, it is quite probable that neither the grantor nor the draftsman of the deed, if other than he, ever thought about or considered the existence of the small piece of shore now in litigation. Yet the language used is, I think, uncertain and ambiguous, and may be reasonably construed to include it. Therefore, under recognized rules of construction, it should be taken to have been granted to Colonial Beach Company.
In determining what the grantor did actually convey, not only must the facts and circumstances established by the several deeds and maps filed in evidence be remembered, but the following principles of construction of deeds should, I think, be applied to ascertain just what is the legal import and effect of the language used by the grantor.
Though the cardinal rule is that the intention of the parties *30fairly drawn from the entire instrument must govern, yet there are other well recognized principles of construction which may he often resorted to for help in interpreting the instrument. Among these is that uncertain, indefinite, equivocal or ambiguous language should be construed against the grantor and in favor of the grantee. It is stated thus in the following authorities:
“Since a deed is prima facie an expression of the intent of the grantor, the courts, in construing ambiguous, uncertain or repugnant descriptive terms therein, will give them a construction against the grantor and favorable to the grantee with respect to the quantity of land conveyed in conformity with general rules governing the construction of deeds.” 16 Am. Jur., Deeds, sec. 286, pp. 599, 600.
“The general rule is well settled that if there is any ambiguity in a deed so that it is capable of two possible constructions, one of which will be more favorable to the grantee, the other of which will be more favorable to the grantor, that method of construction which will be more favorable to the grantee will be selected and the deed will be construed against the grantor. * * * The rule is predicated upon the reasoning that since a grant is expressed in words of the grantor’s own selection, it is, prima facie, an expression of his intention, and he is therefore chargeable with the language used. If, therefore, the deed can inure in different ways, the grantee, it is said, may take it in such way as will be most to his advantage.” 16 Am. Jur., Deeds, sec. 165, p. 530.
“Where deeds conveyed land abutting on a highway, along the high water line, describes the boundary as ‘ the sea or highway’, ‘beach and highway’, ‘bank and highway’, the grantee may adopt the boundary most favorable to him.” Merwin v. Backer, 80 Conn. 338, 68 A. 373.
Another applicable principle of construction is that all of the words used should, if possible, be given recognition and effect, and the intent of the parties, thus fairly gathered from all of the language employed, carried out. The true inquiry is not what the grantor meant to express but what the words actually used mean and express.
“Some meaning should be given to every clause, word, and expression, if it can reasonably be done, and is not inconsistent *31with, the general intent of the whole instrument. * * *” 26 C.J.S., Deeds, sec. 86(b) (1), p. 332.
“The rule governing the construction of deeds is well stated in 16 Am. Juris. 534: ‘It is a well-settled rule of construction, that inasmuch as the parties must have intended all the provisions and terms of a deed to have some meaning and he given some import, from the fact that the terms and provisions were actually inserted in the deed, a deed will he so interpreted as to make it operative and effective in all its provisions, if its terms are susceptible of such interpretation. ’
“This is not a new doctrine. One of the canons of construction stated in Blackstone, Book II, Chap. 23, p. 379, is, ‘That the construction be made upon the entire deed, and not merely upon disjointed parts of it. And therefore that every part of it he (if possible) made to take effect and no word but what may operate in some shape or other.’ ” Realty Securities, etc., Co. v. National Rubber, etc., Co., 122 W. Va. 21, 7 S. E. (2d) 49, 51.
Virginia decisions in accord with these principles of construction are Bailey v. Hill, 77 Va. 492, Flanary v. Kane, 102 Va. 547, 46 S. E. 312, 681, Wilson v. Langhorne, 102 Va. 631, 47 S. E. 871, Browning v. Bluegrass Hdw. Co., 153 Va. 20, 149 S. E. 497.
I now test the descriptive language in the deed under these rules of interpretation to determine what area was conveyed.
In the first line of the paragraph which designates and describes what is conveyed we find the broad and inclusive word “property.” As there first used, it is evident that it is intended to refer to both real and personal property. When again used it should be given like import unless there be something to indicate that a different meaning is intended.
“Where words in one part of the instrument are construed according to one meaning, words in other parts thereof should ordinarily be given the same construction.” 26 C. J. S., Deeds, sec. 86(b) (1), p. 332.
The main body of land conveyed is then described as bounded by Blocks 87, 93, Taggert street, extended, and the Potomac River. But that is not all that is included in the comprehensive language used for it continues on and conveys other property, rights and interests. It also states that the land conveyed is a *32part of the “Hotel and it should he remembered that the “Hotel Reservation,” when first set aside as snch on the map of 1882, included this parcel in controversy. After including in the description the hotel, which is real estate, and certain personal property, the description of what is conveyed continues as follows:
“* * * and all other property of whatsoever kind situated on said land and in the waters adjoining said land, including the wharf and all other properties, franchises and easements and rights now owned or which may hereafter be acquired by the parties of the first part in and to the waters and shore of the Potomac River in front of and adjoining the above described parcel of land * * *.” Emphasis supplied.
This parcel of land 56' by 95' is a part of the shore of the river and it adjoins the above described main tract conveyed by the deed. All of the shore immediately in front of the main tract and all rights therein would have been adequately conveyed by the use of the words “in front of * * * the above described parcel of land”, and unless the words “and adjoining” are to be given some meaning or significance other than “in front of,” then they are wholly tautological. If they are to be given their true import and significance or mean anything as they follow the phrase “in front of,” then they must refer to and include the lot of land in question which is “not in front of” the main tract and thus not covered by that phrase, but which does adjoin the main tract conveyed and is included if effect be given the words “and adjoining.” It is also to be remembered that unless this construction be given the language, then the southern and eastern boundaries of the tract conveyed do not meet at the southeast comer, and the description is incomplete.
When W. B. Emmert, Trustee, executed the deed in question of January 9, 1909, to Colonial Beach Company, if he had desired to exclude this parcel of land from the grant and thus retain its ownership, some language or word to indicate that intention with reasonable certainty shonld and would, I think, have been used to accomplish that purpose. 26 C. J. S., Deeds, sec. 140, pp. 450, 451. Yet, examine and weigh the language as you will, there is found no word or intimation that the parcel *33in question was intended to be retained, excluded or excepted from tbe grant.
Tlie grantor having failed to exclude this small parcel of shore, the incomplete, ambiguous and unclear language should be construed against him and held to include the area in question.
In my opinion, the description of the land granted by Bm-mert, Trustee, to Colonial Beach Company by deed of January 9, 1909, is uncertain, indefinite and equivocal. Upon application of the recognized principles of construction herein adverted to, and I think they should be applied, they would necessarily result in a finding that includes the parcel of land within the grant.
For the reasons stated, I think the judgment should be reversed and the proceeding remanded for a new trial.
HudgiNS, C. J., and Whittle, J., concur in this dissent.