Court Opinion

ID: 9542373
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:33:36.861472+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:07:48.637381
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE O’MALLEY, dissenting: The majority concludes that the charging instrument here is insufficient because “the mental state of awareness of a substantial probability refers to a subjective awareness of the objective existence of a substantial probability that a fact exists” (359 Ill. App. 3d at 220) and the instrument does not adequately allege defendant’s knowledge. I confess that I am unable to fully appreciate this sentence. Nonetheless, I do know that I disagree with the majority’s conclusion, because a charging instrument need not expressly allege all of the elements of a crime if those elements can be inferred from the language of the charging instrument. Baldwin, 199 Ill. 2d at 8. I believe that the charge that defendant “knowingly and without authority entered into the dwelling place *** with the intent to commit therein the offense of Aggravated Criminal Sexual Assault” compels the inference that defendant acted with knowledge that someone was inside. The charging instrument alleges that defendant entered the home intending to commit a crime on a person; certainly, then, defendant would not have entered the home without reason to know that someone was inside. The inference that defendant knew someone was inside is not only reasonable; it is almost unavoidable. Returning to the above-quoted sentence from the majority disposition, I also write separately to comment on the majority’s conclusion that knowledge requires “subjective awareness of the objective existence of a substantial probability that a fact exists.” 359 Ill. App. 3d at 220. In attempting to parse the above sentence, I consider the situation presented in People v. Thomas, 3 Ill. App. 3d 1079, 1083 (1972). In Thomas, the defendant was charged with possession of explosives, which is committed when a person “ ‘knowingly possesses an explosive compound knowing that another intends to use the explosive to commit a crime.’ ” Thomas, 3 Ill. App. 3d at 1083 (quoting jury instruction). The defendant in Thomas had attempted to deliver explosives to an undercover police officer after the officer told the defendant that he intended to use the explosives to blow up a restaurant in Chicago. Thomas, 3 Ill. App. 3d 1079 (affirming defendant’s conviction). At first blush, the holding in Thomas would seem to contradict the majority’s statement, because, objectively, the defendant was mistaken in his belief that the police officer intended to use the explosives to commit a crime. However, if I understand the majority’s statement correctly, it may be considered consistent with Thomas, because, even though the defendant there was incorrect, he nonetheless had a subjective awareness of the objective existence of a substantial probability that the undercover police officer was what he was pretending to be and intended to use the explosives for a criminal activity. It seems the whole point of such undercover police work is premised on there being, objectively, a substantial probability that the officer is what he pretends to be. Using the more common undercover work of purchasing drugs as an example, I surmise such efforts would pass muster with the majority because, if the drug dealer knows that one in 1,000 of his potential customers is in reality an undercover police officer, then there remains “a subjective awareness of the objective existence of a substantial probability” that the officer is what he is pretending to be. In other words, 999 out of 1,000 represents a substantial probability. However, I do not think that criminal law is this obtuse. See also State v. Lee, 75 Haw. 80, 111-12, 856 P.2d 1246, 1263 (1993) (“mere fact that the [drug paraphernalia] buyer is actually an undercover police officer, which fact is unknown to the defendant, cannot render it ‘factually and legally’ impossible that the defendant should reasonably have known that the items sold would be used with illegal drugs” (emphasis added)). Contra State v. Murphy, 674 P.2d 1220, 1225 (Utah 1983) (because police informant posing as buyer did not intend to use items with controlled substances, it was “legally and factually impossible for the appellant to have known that the items sold would be used for illicit purposes as required for conviction”). In any event, the viability of the majority’s pronouncement need not be settled here. Defendant was not operating under a mistake of fact — the notion of his mistaken belief comes only from the hypothetical situation upon which the majority relies. This hypothetical situation cannot defeat the inference from the charging instrument that defendant knew someone was inside the home when he entered it, and I therefore dissent from the majority’s contrary position.