Court Opinion

ID: 9601488
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:45:28.056068+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:36:18.582236
License: Public Domain

CARTER, J.,
Concurring and Dissenting. — I concur in the conclusion reached, but dissent from that part of the opinion which holds that the defendant may not, on the trial of the case, offer proof of the invalidity of the plaintiff’s divorce from her first husband.
The existence of an estoppel is a question of fact (10 Cal. Jur., 656; Gump v. Gump, 42 Cal.App.2d 64 [108 P.2d 21] ; Assets Corp. v. Perrin Properties, Inc., 48 Cal.App.2d 220 [119 P.2d 375] ; Judelson v. American Metal Bearing Co., 89 Cal.App.2d 256 [200 P.2d 836]), and the burden of proof is on the party asserting the doctrine (Garrett v. Cook, 89 Cal.App.2d 98 [200 P.2d 21]).
The vital principle of equitable estoppel is that he who by his language or conduct leads another to do what he would not otherwise have done shall not subject such person to loss or injury by disappointing the expectations upon which he acted. Four things are essential to the application of the doctrine: (1) The party to he estopped must he apprised of the facts-, (2) he must intend that his conduct shall be acted upon, or must so act that the party asserting the estoppel had a right to believe it was so intended; (3) the other party must he ignorant of the true state of facts-, (4) the other party must rely upon the conduct to his injury. Defendant’s offer of proof showed that plaintiff went to Nevada for the sole purpose of obtaining a decree of divorce; that she did not remain in that state continuously for the six weeks’ period of residence which is the jurisdictional prerequisite demanded by that forum; that defendant did not know, prior to November, 1951, of the invalidity of the Nevada judgment of divorce awarded to plaintiff from her first husband; that there is no evidence that defendant aided, assisted, or counseled plaintiff to procure a decree of divorce in Nevada. An objection was sustained by the trial court to this offer of proof. Plaintiff offered no evidence controverting defendant’s allegations. It would appear to me that on the record here the first element of an estoppel is missing — that the party to be estopped must *508be apprised of the facts — in that defendant did not know of the invalidity of the Nevada divorce; the second element is present — defendant married plaintiff intending that his conduct be acted upon; the third element is missing — plaintiff was not ignorant of the true state of facts; the fourth element is probably present — plaintiff relied upon the marriage to defendant although the element of injury is problematical. Upon the trial, if defendant is permitted to litigate the question, plaintiff will also be permitted to introduce evidence which may have the effect of supplying the missing elements.
In previous cases where one spouse has been held estopped from denying the validity of a previous divorce, additional elements have been present. The estopped spouse has aided, abetted, counseled, or actively participated by paying the expenses, etc. in the procurement of the fraudulent divorce. In Rediker v. Rediker, 35 Cal.2d 796, 806 [221 P.2d 1, 20 A.L.R.2d 1152], we said “The doctrine of estoppel has also been held applicable to cases in which a husband sought to assert the invalidity of his or his wife’s earlier divorce from another as a defense to her action for divorce and alimony.” Cited as authority are Margulies v. Margulies, 109 N.J.Eq. 391, 392 [157 A. 676] and Van Slyke v. Van Slyke, 186 Mich. 324, 330 [152 N.W. 921]. Both of these cases held estopped a spouse who had actively participated in the procurement of a fraudulent divorce which he later sought to have declared invalid. I feel, therefore, that under the facts as here presented, this court should not preclude defendant from offering proof at the trial of the invalidity of plaintiff’s Nevada decree of divorce.
While I feel that in view of the services rendered, the amount awarded is excessive, I do not feel that I should say that the award of attorneys’ fees in this case is an abuse of discretion.
A ceremonial marriage between plaintiff and defendant having been established the court could properly exercise its discretion in making a preliminary award of alimony pendente lite, attorneys’ fees and costs without hearing evidence as to the invalidity of the marriage, reserving to the trial on its merits the consideration of such evidence.
I, therefore, concur in the affirmance of the award.
Appellant’s petition for a rehearing was denied October 22, 1953.
Carter, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.