Court Opinion

ID: 9963951
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-26 16:01:54.861404+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:05.371265
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-12289    Document: 23-1      Date Filed: 04/26/2024   Page: 1 of 14

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 23-12289
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        JAMES ELTON ROBERTS,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
        versus
        SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
        M. MILLER,
        Chaplain,

                                                   Defendants-Appellees.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Middle District of Florida
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        2                     Opinion of the Court               23-12289

                   D.C. Docket No. 3:22-cv-00575-MMH-JBT
                          ____________________

        Before NEWSOM, BRANCH, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               James Roberts sued the Florida Department of Corrections
        (“FDC”) and Chaplain Marcus Miller (collectively, the “FDC
        defendants”), alleging that they improperly removed him from the
        Religious Diet Program (“RDP”) in violation of his First
        Amendment rights and the Religious Land Use and
        Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”). The district court
        dismissed Roberts’s amended complaint as moot because the FDC
        defendants had placed him back in the RDP after he sued. On
        appeal, Roberts argues that his claim was not mooted because of
        his pending request for costs.
               After careful review, we conclude that the district court
        erred in dismissing Roberts’s case as moot because an exception to
        the mootness doctrine, which arises when a defendant voluntarily
        ceases its allegedly illegal conduct, applies to Roberts’s case.
        Accordingly, we vacate and remand the district court’s decision.
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        23-12289                 Opinion of the Court                             3

                                    I.     Background 1
               At one point while in the custody of the FDC, Roberts
        participated in the RDP and received kosher meals consistent with
        his Jewish faith. On July 15, 2021, Roberts received a notice of
        violation “for no reason.” He promptly responded to the notice on
        July 23, 2021, but received another violation form stating that he
        never responded to the initial notice, was withdrawn from the
        program, and could reapply on January 23, 2022.
               Roberts reapplied on January 23, 2022. He sent a request
        two days later asking about his status and received a response
        stating, “approval in process[,] allow 10 days.” Roberts then
        received a letter on February 2, 2022, explaining that he was denied
        participation in the RDP on January 27, 2022, because he did not
        properly describe the kosher diet, despite using the same
        description from his previously approved application. Roberts
        appealed the denial to the Secretary of the FDC and his appeal was
        denied.
               Roberts, proceeding pro se, sued the FDC defendants on May
        25, 2022. On July 11, 2022, he ﬁled his amended complaint alleging
        violations of the First Amendment, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
        and RLUIPA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1, by the FDC defendants. He
        alleged that the FDC defendants improperly denied him
        participation in the RDP for kosher meals. He said that, after

        1 We draw the following facts from the allegations in Roberts’s complaint,

        “which on a motion to dismiss are accepted as true.” Doe v. Wooten, 747 F.3d
        1317, 1320 (11th Cir. 2014).
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        4                          Opinion of the Court                        23-12289

        reporting multiple times via formal and informal grievances that
        “[his] food was being withheld and tampered with,” Roberts had
        been on hunger strikes, reported “psychological emergencies,” and
        attempted suicide, which were all “covered up,” presumably by
        FDC employees. He also alleged that his property and paperwork
        had been stolen, destroyed, or “lost” in an attempt (again,
        presumably by FDC employees) to hinder his eﬀorts “in these
        proceedings.” For relief, he requested to be placed in the RDP and
        that “all court costs be paid by the defendants including ﬁling fees
        and whatever other costs that result from [the] case.”
               On July 27, 2022, after ﬁling suit, Roberts submitted another
        request to participate in the RDP. Miller forwarded the request to
        his supervisor, writing, “I would really like your ‘take’ on this
        particular application. This is the inmate who is pursuing a lawsuit
        against me.” Less than thirty minutes later, his supervisor
        responded, “Go ahead and approve it.” Miller then placed Roberts
        in the RDP on July 29, 2022. Roberts formally started participating
        in the RDP again on August 8, 2022.
              In a signed declaration, 2 Miller explained that he asked his
        supervisor for guidance as “an independent decisionmaker” and

        2 While Miller’s declaration is unsworn, it carries the same force as an affidavit

        under 28 U.S.C. § 1746 because he signed and dated the document, and
        “declare[d] under penalties of perjury that” the facts within “are true and
        correct.” See Furcron v. Mail Ctrs. Plus, LLC, 843 F.3d 1295, 1303 n.2 (11th Cir.
        2016) (clarifying that “[a]n affidavit is made under oath,” while “a declaration
        is not sworn, but is subject to the penalty of perjury” and that, under § 1746,
        “declarations are afforded the same legal weight as affidavits, and are treated
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        23-12289                   Opinion of the Court                                 5

        that the lawsuit against him did not inﬂuence his decision to
        include Roberts in the RDP. Miller stated that “there is no intention
        to remove [Roberts] from the [RDP],” and that Roberts would only
        be removed from the program if he violated the rules.
               Then, on September 14, 2022, the FDC defendants moved to
        dismiss Roberts’s amended complaint. They argued that Roberts’s
        suit had been moot “since August 8, 2022, when he was aﬀorded
        the relief he requested in his Amended Complaint due to his being
        placed in the RDP.” They added that during a phone call with
        opposing counsel on August 15, 2022, Roberts admitted that he was
        in the RDP. The FDC defendants asked the district court to dismiss
        the case with prejudice.
               Roberts responded by arguing that the action was not
        moot. 3 He attached to his response various grievances and

        accordingly” (alteration in original) (quotations omitted)); Roy v. Ivy, 53 F.4th
        1338, 1348 (11th Cir. 2022) (“[U]nder § 1746, a declaration executed within the
        United States will substitute for a sworn affidavit if the declarant dates and
        subscribes the document as true under penalty of perjury in substantially the
        following form: ‘I declare (or certify, verify, or state) under penalty of perjury
        that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on (date). (Signature).’”
        (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1746(2)).
        3 Although Roberts argued this point in a motion to show cause, rather than a

        response to the FDC defendants’ motion to dismiss, we still take note of his
        argument. See Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998)
        (“Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted
        by attorneys[.]”).
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        6                         Opinion of the Court                       23-12289

        responses from 2020 to 2022 showing that his attempts to be placed
        in the RDP had been repeatedly rejected.
               The district court determined that Roberts’s case was moot
        because he had been placed in the RDP. It explained that although
        a “narrow” exception to the mootness doctrine applies to injuries
        that are capable of repetition yet evade review, that exception did
        not apply to Roberts’s case (citing Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 273 F.3d 1330,
        1336 (11th Cir. 2001)). The court therefore concluded that Roberts
        “failed to satisfy his burden of demonstrating that jurisdiction
        exists” and dismissed his amended complaint without prejudice. 4
               This appeal followed.
                                 II.     Standard of Review
              “A [d]istrict [c]ourt’s decision on mootness is a question of
        law we review de novo.” Wooten, 747 F.3d at 1321–22 (italics added).
        “[B]ecause the question of mootness is jurisdictional in nature,” we
        may apply exceptions to the mootness doctrine sua sponte,
        “regardless of whether the district court considered it or if the

        4 The district court also found that Roberts’s request for punitive damages,

        fees, and court costs did not save his case from mootness. It said that, even if
        Roberts had properly requested such relief in the amended complaint, he was
        “not a prevailing party who may recover court costs” because no “judicial
        imprimatur on the change in the legal relationship between the parties”
        occurred (quoting Smalbein v. City of Daytona Beach, 353 F.3d 901, 904–05 (11th
        Cir. 2003)). Although the FDC defendants make this argument on appeal, we
        need not evaluate it because we conclude that Roberts’s case is not moot under
        the voluntary-cessation exception.
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        23-12289                Opinion of the Court                           7

        parties briefed the issue.” Nat’l Advert. Co. v. City of Miami, 402 F.3d
        1329, 1331–32 (11th Cir. 2005).
                                    III.   Discussion
               On appeal, Roberts challenges the dismissal of his suit as
        moot. After careful review, we conclude that the district court
        erred in dismissing Roberts’s case as moot because it falls within
        the voluntary-cessation exception to the mootness doctrine.
                Article III of the Constitution limits federal courts to
        deciding “Cases” and “Controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III § 2.
        When an appeal does not present a case or controversy as to which
        we can give meaningful relief, the appeal is moot and should be
        dismissed. De La Teja v. United States, 321 F.3d 1357, 1362 (11th Cir.
        2003). A case becomes moot “when the issues presented are no
        longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the
        outcome.” Fla. Ass’n of Rehab. Facilities, Inc. v. State of Fla. Dep’t of
        Health & Rehab. Servs., 225 F.3d 1208, 1216 (11th Cir. 2000)
        (quotations omitted). A motion to dismiss based on mootness can
        challenge jurisdiction in fact, irrespective of the pleadings, and a
        district court can consider evidence outside the pleadings to
        determine whether it has jurisdiction. Lawrence v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d
        1525, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990).
              The district court considered the capable-of-repetition-yet-
        evading-review exception to the mootness doctrine when it found
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        8                          Opinion of the Court                       23-12289

        that Roberts’s claims were moot. 5 But we conclude that a diﬀerent
        exception to the mootness doctrine—the voluntary-cessation
        doctrine—applies to Roberts’s case.
                The voluntary-cessation exception may apply when a
        defendant voluntarily ceases its allegedly illegal conduct. Doe, 747
        F.3d at 1322 (“[W]hen a defendant chooses to end a challenged
        practice, this choice does not always deprive a federal court of its
        power to decide the legality of the practice.”). “A defendant
        claiming that its voluntary compliance moots a case bears the
        formidable burden of showing that it is absolutely clear the
        allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to
        recur.” Id. (brackets omitted) (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.
        Laidlaw Env’t Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000)); Rich v.
        Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 716 F.3d 525, 531 (11th Cir. 2013) (“Since
        the defendant is free to return to his old ways, he bears a heavy

        5 The Supreme Court and our Court have recognized a narrow exception to

        the mootness doctrine where the original injury is “capable of repetition, yet
        evading review.” Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United States, 579 U.S. 162, 170
        (2016) (quotations omitted); Al Najjar, 273 F.3d at 1336 (explaining the
        exception is a narrow one). To satisfy this standard, a plaintiﬀ must
        demonstrate (1) “a reasonable expectation or a demonstrated probability that
        the same controversy will recur involving the same complaining party,” and (2)
        that “the challenged action [was] in its duration too short to be fully litigated
        prior to its cessation or expiration.” Al Najjar, 273 F.3d at 1336 (emphasis in
        original) (quotations omitted).
        Because we conclude that Roberts’s case is not moot under the voluntary-
        cessation exception to mootness, we need not also address whether the
        capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review exception applies.
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        23-12289                Opinion of the Court                           9

        burden of demonstrating that his cessation of the challenged
        conduct renders the controversy moot.” (quotations omitted)).
               The voluntary-cessation exception applies to cases involving
        government actors. Doe, 747 F.3d at 1322. “Because of the unique
        characteristics of public defendants, this Court often gives
        government actors more leeway than private parties in the
        presumption that they are unlikely to resume illegal activities,”
        which we have called a “rebuttable presumption” or a “lesser
        burden.” Id. (quotations omitted). Under this presumption, the
        controversy “will be moot in the absence of some reasonable basis
        to believe that the policy will be reinstated if the suit is terminated.”
        Id. (quotations omitted). That said, “[a] government actor is
        entitled to this presumption only after it has shown unambiguous
        termination of the complained of activity.” Id.
               We have considered various factors when conducting both
        “the initial inquiry” of whether a government actor has shown
        unambiguous termination as well as “the following evaluation
        about whether there is a reasonable basis the challenged conduct
        will recur.” Id. at 1322–23. While not an exhaustive list, we have
        considered the following: (1) “whether the termination of the
        offending conduct was unambiguous,” (2) “whether the change in
        government policy or conduct appears to be the result of
        substantial deliberation, or is simply an attempt to manipulate
        jurisdiction,” and (3) “whether the government has consistently
        applied a new policy or adhered to a new course of conduct[.]” Id.
        at 1323 (quotations omitted). “The timing and content of the
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        10                    Opinion of the Court                 23-12289

        cessation decision are also relevant in evaluating whether the
        defendant’s stopping of the challenged conduct is sufficiently
        unambiguous.” Id. And we are “more likely to find a reasonable
        expectation of recurrence when the challenged behavior
        constituted a continuing practice or was otherwise deliberate.” Id.
                We first take the “crucial first step” of asking whether the
        FDC defendants, as government actors, unambiguously
        terminated the challenged action. See id. If the FDC defendants
        unambiguously terminated the challenged action, then there is a
        “rebuttable presumption” that “they are unlikely to resume illegal
        activities.” Id. at 1322. If they have not unambiguously terminated
        the action, then they do not enjoy the “leeway” that “this Court
        often gives government actors.” Id. (quotations omitted). Rather,
        the FDC defendants would “bear[] the formidable burden of
        showing that it is absolutely clear the allegedly wrongful behavior
        could not reasonably be expected to recur.” Id. (quotations
        omitted).
               We first conclude that the FDC defendants did not shoulder
        their burden of showing unambiguous termination. We reach this
        conclusion by analyzing the three factors considered in a
        voluntary-cessation inquiry. Applying the first factor, the FDC
        defendants did not show that they unambiguously terminated its
        pattern of excluding Roberts from the program. Although they
        formally included him on August 8, 2022, a one-time approval of
        Roberts’s application, particularly given the persistent rejections
        from 2020 to 2022, is not a permanent guarantee that Roberts will
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        23-12289              Opinion of the Court                       11

        not be wrongfully removed again from the RDP. See id. at 1324
        (explaining that plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief was not
        moot because, despite receiving the requested injunctive relief,
        there was no showing of unambiguous termination of the pattern
        of allegedly wrongful conduct).
                 Addressing the second factor in our initial inquiry of
        whether the FDC defendants have shown unambiguous
        termination, we conclude that the timing and content of the FDC
        defendants’ decision to place Roberts in the RDP “appears to
        be . . . an attempt to manipulate jurisdiction[.]” Id. at 1323
        (quotations omitted). The FDC defendants, after a years-long
        pattern of refusing Roberts’s requests to participate in the RDP,
        changed position only after Roberts sued. After Miller forwarded
        Roberts’s July 27, 2022, request to join the RDP to his supervisor,
        explaining that the application came from “the inmate who is
        pursuing a lawsuit,” the supervisor told Miller to “[g]o ahead and
        approve” the request less than thirty minutes later. Neither Miller
        nor his supervisor specified how Roberts’s future requests would
        be evaluated or why they approved his participation in the
        program after so many years of refusing Roberts kosher meals. See
        id. at 1325 (concluding that the timing and substance of the BOP’s
        decision did not “indicate an unambiguous termination” because,
        after years of misconduct, it “suddenly changed its position days
        before [] trial” and without any indication of how it “intends to
        hold steady” in its new course). The FDC defendants’ actions thus
        do not appear to be “the result of substantial deliberation,” id. at
        1322–23 (quotations omitted), nor do they appear to be “well-
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        12                    Opinion of the Court                 23-12289

        reasoned and therefore likely to endure.” Id. at 1325 (quotations
        omitted). Instead, they appear to be a short-term attempt to avoid
        the court’s jurisdiction.
               As for the third factor, there is no evidence at all that the
        FDC defendants “ha[ve] consistently applied a new policy or
        adhered to a new course of conduct,” leading us to the conclusion
        that the FDC defendants have not unambiguously terminated the
        challenged action. Id. at 1323. And, as noted, there is no evidence
        of why Roberts was removed from the RDP in the first place.
               Considering the circumstances of Roberts’s case, we thus
        conclude that the FDC defendants failed to carry their burden of
        demonstrating that they unambiguously stopped their pattern of
        excluding Roberts from the RDP. As a result, the FDC defendants
        “bear[] the formidable burden of showing that it is absolutely clear
        the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected
        to recur.” Id. (quotations omitted).
               We conclude that the FDC defendants failed to meet this
        “formidable burden.” Id. at 1322 (quotations omitted). Miller
        merely stated in his declaration that “there is no intention to
        remove [Roberts] from the [RDP],” and that Roberts would only
        be removed from the program if he violated the rules of the RDP.
        But we have said that a non-permanent decision that “could change
        for any number of unrelated reasons,” including the plaintiff’s own
        behavior, does not alone show that “the allegedly wrongful
        behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.” See id. at
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        23-12289                  Opinion of the Court                              13

        1323–24. 6 “To the contrary, the fact that [Roberts] has been
        [rejected] repeatedly over a period of years supports a finding of
        likely recurrence.” Id. at 1324.
               Our conclusion is fortified by Rich v. Secretary, Florida
        Department of Corrections, 716 F.3d 525 (11th Cir. 2013). Rich also
        involved a Florida prisoner who filed a pro se complaint alleging
        that the FDC violated his rights by denying him “a strictly kosher
        diet.” 716 F.3d at 528. We concluded that the prisoner’s claims
        were not moot even though Florida implemented “a plan to
        provide kosher meals to qualified inmates.” Id. at 530–32.
        Evaluating the timing of the policy change in question, we found
        ambiguity where the change “was not made before litigation was
        threatened, but was instead late in the game.” Id. at 532 (quotations
        omitted). We explained that “Florida announced that it was going
        to change its policy only after [the prisoner] filed his counseled brief
        to this Court and after the U.S. Department of Justice filed suit
        against it,” which “ma[d]e it appear that the change in policy [was]
        an attempt to manipulate jurisdiction.” Id. (quotations omitted).
        Further, we said that “[t]here [was] nothing to suggest that Florida

        6 Indeed, Roberts’s opening brief on appeal says that the allegedly wrongful

        conduct did recur because the FDC defendants “suspended [him] again for no
        reason” after the district court dismissed his case. Of course, if Roberts’s
        assertion is true, then we may easily conclude his case is not moot because
        “we look at the events at the present time, not at the time the complaint was
        filed or when the federal order on review was issued.” Dow Jones & Co. v. Kaye,
        256 F.3d 1251, 1254 (11th Cir. 2001). But we need not investigate the matter
        because, as explained in this opinion, this case is not moot due to the
        voluntary-cessation doctrine.
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        14                    Opinion of the Court                23-12289

        [would] not simply end the new kosher meal program at some
        point in the future,” as it had years earlier. Id. We therefore
        concluded that FDC had not unambiguously terminated its policy
        that had deprived the prisoner of his meals, and the prisoner’s
        claims were not moot. Id. at 532. The same analysis holds here.
                In sum, the district court erred by failing to analyze
        mootness under the voluntary-cessation doctrine. In doing so, it
        improperly placed the burden on Roberts to show jurisdiction
        existed, when that burden falls on the shoulders of the FDC
        defendants. See Doe, 747 F.3d at 1323 (stating that “[t]he District
        Court skipped [the] crucial first step by failing to require the
        government to shoulder its initial burden” of showing
        unambiguous termination and “therefore improperly shifting the
        burden to [the plaintiff]”). Because the FDC defendants failed to
        show both that they have unambiguously terminated the
        complained of activity and that the complained of activity could
        not reasonably be expected to recur, Roberts’s case is not moot.
        See id. at 1322.
                                 IV.    Conclusion
              Because the district court erred in dismissing Roberts’s case
        as moot, we vacate and remand.
              VACATED AND REMANDED.