Court Opinion

ID: 9727294
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:29:43.205104+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:36.045148
License: Public Domain

PAGE, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. Based on the evidence in the record before us, I would hold that the state has failed to meet its heavy burden of establishing that the suppression of the Child B evidence will have a critical impact on the state’s prosecution of McLeod. I would, therefore, dismiss the state’s appeal.
Appeals by the state in criminal cases are not favored and “rules governing pretrial prosecution appeals are strictly construed.” State v. Barrett, 694 N.W.2d 783, 786 (Minn.2005). In order to proceed with a pretrial appeal, the state must establish that the trial court’s suppression of evidence will have a critical impact on the outcome of the trial, that is, “[t]o prevail, the state must ‘clearly and unequivocally’ show both that the trial court’s order will have a ‘critical impact’ on the state’s ability to prosecute the defendant successfully and that the order constituted error.” State v. Zanter, 535 N.W.2d 624, 630 (Minn.1995). “Critical impact is met when the suppression of the evidence significantly reduces the likelihood of a successful prosecution.” In re L.E.P., 594 N.W.2d 163, 168 (Minn.1999). When analyzing critical impact, the reviewing court must examine all of the admissible evidence to determine the impact the excluded evidence will have on the prosecution. Id.
Although the court, in its opinion, identifies the correct standard for determining critical impact, the court fails to properly apply that standard in this case. The court in effect ignores the requirement that all admissible evidence be examined to determine the impact the excluded evidence will have on the prosecution. While the court acknowledges that “the state has *790not delineated all of the admissible evidence because the district court has not made formal rulings on the admissibility of some of the evidence,” the court, without more, launches into a discussion of the fact that the state’s case hinges on Child A’s credibility and then summarily concludes that excluding the Child B evidence will “significantly reduce the state’s chances of a successful prosecution.” So much for strictly construing our rules governing prosecution pretrial appeals.
Interestingly, the court states, with a great deal of certainty, “[ejxclusion of Child B’s testimony would make it practically impossible for the state to demonstrate a pattern of conduct or design by McLeod to abuse male teenage patients when they were alone with him in his examination room.” How the court can reach this conclusion without knowing all the admissible evidence is puzzling. In reaching the conclusion that the exclusion of the Child B evidence will “significantly reduce the state’s chances of a successful prosecution” without first assessing its exclusion in light of all the admissible evidence, the court disregards our standard for assessing critical impact. How can the impact of excluding the evidence related to Child B be assessed without having the admissible evidence delineated? The court attempts to explain this inconsistency away by claiming “the structure of the facts and arguments is sufficiently established in this case to determine that the excluded evidence would have a critical impact at trial.” This explanation does not change the state of the law: the court must examine all of the admissible evidence. In re L.E.P., 594 N.W.2d at 168. Yet the state, as the court admits, has not even attempted to delineate all of the admissible evidence. Given that the state has failed to delineate the admissible evidence, which therefore cannot be assessed to determine the impact of excluding the evidence related to Child B, I would conclude that the state has not met its burden of establishing critical impact.
Three explanations come to mind for the court’s conclusion that the state has met the requirement of establishing critical impact without having assessed the impact of the Child B evidence in light of the other admissible evidence. One, the court has decided to apply the requirement in some cases, but not others, based on whim. Two, the court has, without saying so, simply changed the standards for assessing critical impact. Or three, the court has, again without saying so expressly, concluded that in child sexual abuse cases the exclusion of evidence relating to other acts of alleged sexual abuse by the defendant will always have a critical impact on the state’s ability to prosecute the case, presumably because without the evidence the state will not be able to show a pattern of conduct by the defendant. It is my hope that the court’s decision is not based on either of the first two explanations. I assume that its decision is based on the third. But, if the court is changing the rules for assessing critical impact in child sexual abuse cases, it should do so explicitly. It should also explain why it is changing the rules. Unfortunately, it has done neither. It certainly must do more than merely assert that the factors present in this case — “Child A’s allegations are the primary evidence, Child A’s credibility is affected by his delay in reporting abuse alleged to have occurred over a continuation of appointments with the alleged abuser, Child A has a reported history of psychological problems, and Child B has come forward with similar allegations,”- — warrant a critical impact determination.1
I am also troubled by the court’s critical impact decision because it implies that the *791pretrial exclusion of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts will always have a critical impact. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is by its nature inadmissible except to the extent that Minn. R. Evid. 404(b) makes it admissible. Yet, to the extent that our precedent allows the admission of that evidence only when the state’s case is weak and the evidence is needed to bolster the prosecution’s burden of proof,2 there will always be a critical impact under the court’s analysis if the evidence is excluded pretrial.
It is true, as the court notes, that excluded evidence may have “a critical impact not only when the excluded evidence ‘completely destroys’ the state’s case, but also when excluding the evidence ‘significantly reduces the likelihood of a successful prosecution.’ ” However, it seems to me that when the evidence being excluded is by its very nature inadmissible, except under limited circumstances, something more than a significant reduction in the likelihood of a successful prosecution should be required before critical impact will be found. This is especially true when the evidence in question is highly inflammatory evidence involving child sexual abuse that can easily persuade by illegitimate means.
Having reached the conclusion that the state has not met its burden of establishing that the exclusion of the Child B evidence will have a critical impact on the prosecution, I would not reach the merits of whether that evidence was properly excluded.
ANDERSON, PAUL H., J.
(dissenting).
I join in the dissent of Justice Page.

. The court's explanation for its failure to require a delineation of all of the admissible evidence is flawed. The court uses the very evidence that it is analyzing for critical impact — the Child B evidence — as justification *791for a finding of critical impact. Logically, the Child B evidence can only be evaluated for its critical impact in light of all the other admissible evidence.
I would also note that the factors the court contends justify its consideration of critical impact without requiring delineation of the other admissible evidence in this case are not as unique as the court implies. In almost every sexual abuse case, particularly child sexual abuse, the victim's allegations will be the primary evidence. As such, the victim's credibility will be an issue. Moreover, the questions regarding Child A’s psychological health go to nothing more than the issue of credibility. Delayed reporting, which is typical in child sexual abuse cases, also goes to the victim's credibility. If almost every case of sexual abuse involves the factors relied on here, the court’s holding will impact far more than the specific situation presented here. In essence, the holding will allow courts to determine critical impact without examining all admissible evidence in every sexual abuse case.
Finally, with respect to the court's statement that the determination of critical impact "is, by its nature, forward-looking,” I would note that, while a critical impact determination is always forward-looking, under our cases the forward look must be considered in light of the admissible evidence. Here, the court has made the critical impact decision without even having the admissible evidence delineated.

. See State v. Billstrom, 276 Minn. 174, 178-79, 149 N.W.2d 281, 284 (1967) ("Evidence of other crimes is admissible only if the trial court finds the direct or circumstantial evidence [ ] is otherwise weak or inadequate, and that it is necessary to support the state’s burden of proof.”).