Court Opinion

ID: 9939608
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-10 18:15:17.671476+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:41:30.385596
License: Public Domain

NUMBER 13-23-00164-CR

                             COURT OF APPEALS

                    THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

                      CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

CHARLES KEPFORD,                                                              Appellant,

                                            v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,                                                            Appellee.

                   On appeal from the 28th District Court of
                          Nueces County, Texas.

                           MEMORANDUM OPINION

 Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Benavides and Tijerina
         Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Contreras

       The trial court revoked appellant Charles Kepford’s community supervision and

adjudicated him guilty of cruelty to a non-livestock animal, a third-degree felony. See TEX.

PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.092(b)(1), (c-1). By his sole issue, Kepford argues that the trial

court erred by sentencing him without giving him an opportunity to speak in allocution.

We affirm.
                                   I.     BACKGROUND

       Pursuant to a plea agreement, Kepford was placed on seven years’ deferred-

adjudication community supervision on October 27, 2021. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.

ANN. art. 42A.101. The State filed a motion to revoke community supervision, and the trial

court held a hearing on the motion on March 28, 2023. Kepford pleaded true to certain

allegations in the State’s motion, and the trial court revoked Kepford’s community

supervision and adjudicated him guilty. After the parties’ closing arguments, the trial court

rendered its verdict, to which Kepford replied, “Yes, ma’am.” The trial court wished

Kepford “Good luck,” and Kepford said, “Thank you ma’am.”

       This appeal followed.

                                    II.    ALLOCUTION

       Allocution refers to a criminal defendant’s right to speak in mitigation of the

sentence yet to be imposed. Norton v. State, 434 S.W.3d 767, 771 (Tex. App.—Houston

[14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.); see also Casas v. State, No. 13-21-00213-CR, 2022 WL

551273, at *2 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Feb. 24, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.,

not designated for publication). A defendant’s right to allocution exists as both a statutory

and a common-law right. Vasquez v. State, 605 S.W.3d 734, 739 (Tex. App.—Houston

[1st Dist.] 2020, no pet.); see also Vela v. State, No. 13-21-00245-CR, 2022 WL 868536,

at *2 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Mar. 24, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op., not

designated for publication). The statutory right, codified in Article 42.07 of the Texas Code

of Criminal Procedure, states that “[b]efore pronouncing sentence, the defendant shall be

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asked whether he has anything to say why the sentence should not be pronounced

against him.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.07.

         However, regardless of whether the defendant asserts his statutory or common-

law right to allocution, the issue is waived on appeal if the defendant fails to make a “timely

request, objection, or motion” to the trial court and obtain an express or implied ruling to

preserve error for appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); Vasquez, 605 S.W.3d at 739–40

(concluding appellant’s allocution complaint was not preserved where there was no

objection to the trial court’s denial of his opportunity for allocution); see also Casas, 2022

WL 551273, at *2 (same); Vela, 2022 WL 868536, at *2 (same). Thus, a defendant who

fails to do so forfeits his complaint on appeal. See Vasquez, 605 S.W.3d at 739–40.

         Kepford did not request to speak before sentencing and did not object after the

trial court sentenced him. Kepford did not timely communicate the allocution complaint he

now raises on appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a). Accordingly, we conclude Kepford did

not preserve this alleged error for review. See id.; Vasquez, 605 S.W.3d at 739–40; see

also Casas, 2022 WL 551273, at *2; Vela, 2022 WL 868536, at *2. 1 We overrule his sole

issue.

        1 Kepford argues that the common-law right to allocution is a constitutional right that cannot be

waived. However, this court, and several appellate courts, have held otherwise. See, e.g., Eisen v. State,
40 S.W.3d 628, 636 (Tex. App.—Waco 2001, pet. ref’d) (holding the common-law right of allocution “did
not achieve constitutional status” and defendant waived his during sentencing); see also Vela v. State, No.
13-21-00245-CR, 2022 WL 868536, at *2 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Mar. 24, 2022, no pet.)
(mem. op., not designated for publication) (following Eisen’s holding); Busbee v. State, No. 13-16-00555-
CR, 2017 WL 541133, at *4–5 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Feb. 9, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op., not
designated for publication) (same).

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                                  III.   CONCLUSION

      We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                      DORI CONTRERAS
                                                      Chief Justice
Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Delivered and filed on the
8th day of February, 2024.

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