Court Opinion

ID: 9759591
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:20:40.829325+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:03.062400
License: Public Domain

Justice LaVECCHIA,
dissenting.
The majority seemingly concedes that there is no “principled” way to fit the facts of this case within the requirement of N.J.SA 59:4-2 that public property be “dangerous at the time of the injury” for liability to attach. Ante at 214, 850 A.2d at 465. The public property here simply was not in a dangerous condition *218when plaintiff suffered his injury. Plaintiff had removed the dangerous article from public land, transported it to private property, where it exploded weeks later — after tampering by plaintiff — causing injury.
To save the cause of action the majority simply dispenses with the required temporal element. The majority concludes that although the statutory definition of the cause of action is written in mandatory terms, the Legislature must have intended that the requirement would be dispensed with in cases such as this, where it could not be satisfied. Otherwise, posits the majority, a whole category of plaintiffs — those who remove dangerous articles from public land and are injured by them on private property at a later time (“the transport cases”) — will be without remedy against the public entity. The majority apparently abhors that result and thinks the Legislature would as well. That, in its opinion, justifies its disregard of a clearly stated statutory mandate. I disagree and would affirm the decision of the Appellate Division.
The New Jersey Tort Claims Act, N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 to 12-3(TCA), unequivocally requires that the public property be in a dangerous condition “at the time of injury,” N.J.S.A. 59:4-2, as a necessary element of the cause of action. The legislative language cannot be ignored. It is a material requirement in the Legislature’s integrated scheme limiting when liability will be permitted for dangerous conditions on public property. The Legislature, in adopting the TCA, did not intend to provide a remedy for all plaintiffs, so we should not be surprised or offended that some plaintiffs — like those in the transport cases — will be without remedy. The temporal requirement serves an important safeguard in the legislative scheme and should be enforced.
I.
The principles guiding application of the TCA are settled. It is well known that as a direct result of the Court’s abrogation of common law sovereign immunity in Willis v. Department of Cons.& Econ. Dev., 55 N.J. 534, 264 A.2d 34 (1970), the Legisla *219ture reestablished the immunity through the TCA, stating that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by this act, a public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other person.” N.J.S.A 59:2-1. “The theme of the [TCA] is immunity for public entities with liability as the exception.” Gilhooley v. County of Union, 164 N.J. 533, 538, 753 A.2d 1137 (2000) (citing Collins v. Union County Jail, 150 N.J. 407, 413, 696 A2d 625 (1997)). Where “both liability and immunity appear to exist, the latter trumps the former.” Tice v. Cramer, 133 N.J. 347, 356, 627 A.2d 1090 (1993).
The TCA’s declarations section explains:
The Legislature recognizes the inherently unfair and inequitable results which occur in the strict application of the traditional doctrine of sovereign immunity. On the other hand the Legislature recognizes that while a private entrepreneur may readily be held liable for negligence within the chosen ambit of his activity, the area within which government has the power to act for the public good is almost without limit and therefore government should not have the duty to do everything that might be done. Consequently, it is hereby declared to be the public policy of this State that public entities shall only be liable for their negligence within the limitations of this act and in accordance with the fair and uniform principles established herein. All of the provisions of this act should be construed with a view to carrying out the above legislative declaration.
[N.J.S.A 59:1-2.]
See also The Report Attorney General’s Task Force on Sovereign Immunity 210, comment to N.J.S.A 59:2-1 (1972) (Task Force Comment) (stating that when applying TCA courts should ask “whether an immunity applies and if not, should liability attach ” (emphasis in the original)). Thus, we repeatedly have reminded courts to “approach these cases from the perspective that immunity is the dominant theme of the Act,” Civalier v. Estate of Trancucci, 138 N.J. 52, 59, 648 A.2d 705 (1994) (citing Weiss v. New Jersey Transit, 128 N.J. 376, 383, 608 A.2d 254 (1992)), and that the liability exceptions are narrow. Vincitore ex rel. Estate of Vincitore v. New Jersey Sports & Expo. Auth., 169 N.J. 119, 124, 777 A.2d 9 (2001). The exceptions must be construed consistent with the TCA’s theme of broadly limiting public entity liability. See Margolis and Novack, Claims Against Public Enti *220ties, comment to N.J.S.A. 59:1-2 (2003). It was never the intention of the Legislature to put government on the same footing as private parties.
Turning to the pertinent liability provision with those principles in mind, N.J.S.A. 59:4-2 provides that
[a] public entity is liable for injury caused by a condition of its property if the plaintiff establishes that the property was in dangerous condition at the time of the injury, that the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous condition, that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred, and that either:
a. a negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment created the dangerous condition; or
b. a public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition under section B9:4r-3 a sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition.
Nothing in this section shall be construed to impose liability upon a public entity for a dangerous condition of its public property if the action the entity took to protect against the condition or the failure to take such action was not palpably unreasonable.
[ (Emphasis added).]
The TCA defines “dangerous condition” as “a condition of property that creates a substantial risk of injury when such property is used with due care in a manner in which it is reasonably foreseeable that it will be used”; and defines “public property” as “real or personal property owned or controlled by the public entity.” N.J.S.A. 59:4-1a, -1c. Liability attaches, however, only when the public property is in a dangerous condition “at the time of the injury.”
The majority dispenses with the “time of’ requirement because it obviously cannot be met in “transport cases” such as the one before us, and foreclosing liability seems to fly in the face of what it perceives as legislative acceptance of caselaw allowing recovery under the principle that “the ultimate injury sustained by a plaintiff need not occur at the time and location of the dangerous condition on public property for public entity liability to attach.” Ante at 215, 850 A.2d at 466. It also purports to find support for its conclusion in the Task Force Comment to N.J.S.A. 59:4-2. Neither argument is sound.
*221First, addressing the Task Force Comment, the majority quotes the Comment as explaining that in setting forth the “conditions of liability under which a public entity may be held liable for the dangerous conditions of its property” the provision intended to “comport[ ] generally with the principles of liability established ... for local public entities in their capacity as landowners,” Ante at 208, 850 A2d at 462, and that the provision would develop “in accordance with common law principles of landowner liability.” Ante at 208, 850 A2d at 462. From that the majority finds support for its proposition that, despite the language of its enactment, the Legislature meant to incorporate in full landowner liability common law concerning dangerous conditions of property. The majority did not include in its analysis the second paragraph of that Comment, which provides:
This section recognizes the difficulties inherent in a public entity’s responsibility for maintaining its vast amounts of public property. Thus it is specifically provided that when a public entity exercises or fails to exercise its discretion in determining what action should or should not be taken to protect against the dangerous condition that judgment should only be reversed where it is clear to the court that it was palpably unreasonable. Bergen v. Koppenal, 52 N.J. 478, 480, 246 A2d 442 (1968). That decision was based on the thesis that a public entity’s discretionary decisions to act or not to act in the face of competing demands should generally be free from the second guessing of a coordinate branch of Government. In addition, a public entity is not prohibited from asserting the traditional common law defenses to liability.
[Task Force Comment, supra, at 221, comment to N.J.S.A. 59:4-2.]
The above portion of the Comment reflects that the TCA was establishing a complex analysis involving multiple inquiries concerning the alleged dangerous condition of public property. Within that framework, the Legislature has connected, in no uncertain terms, the dangerous condition on public property to the time of injury as a limitation for liability to attach. Moreover, the time of injury and its connection to the dangerous condition of public property also has relevance in the inquiry concerning public entity notice of the condition and in the assessment of the public entity’s reaction to the dangerous condition under the palpably unreasonable test. N.J.S.A. 59:4-2b. Again, its effect is limiting. Not all *222dangerous conditions on public property were made potential sources of liability. Instead, only those that the public entity should know of and could react to may be a basis for liability, subject to consideration of allocation of public resources and a palpably unreasonable reaction by the public entity. The temporal condition plays a limiting role in each analysis.
A temporal connection provides the link between the property under the public entity’s control, the dangerous condition, and the injury to be prevented. Nowhere in this legislative scheme for imposing liability is there a suggestion that the public entity was meant to be liable simply because a dangerous article once occupied its property and later, after it had been removed, caused injury. The Task Force Report therefore does not support the majority’s disregard of the “at the time of’ requirement.
Furthermore, the language is not ambiguous and in need of judicial construction. The majority simply is redrawing the terms of the statutory provision to suit its perceived belief that the Legislature would have intended liability to exist in this instance. That is contrary to how this Court has approached the TCA in the past. Nor is it consistent with past judicial applications of N.J.S.A. 59:4-2 in particular.
The primary focus must be whether the park was in a “dangerous condition” at the time of the injury. As our holdings consistently reflect, “dangerous condition” refers only to “the physical condition of the property itself and not to activities on the property.” Levin v. County of Salem, 133 N.J. 35, 44, 626 A2d 1091 (1993) (citation omitted and internal quotation marks omitted). See also Margolis and Novack, supra, comment to N.J.S.A. 59:4-1. “Absent a defect in the property itself that creates a substantial risk of injury there should be no superimposed liability for protecting persons against their own or other persons activities.” Margolis and Novack, supra, comment to N.J.S.A. 59:4-1. And, as noted, “[t]he existence of a dangerous condition is only one of the essential elements of the cause of action against the public *223entity. It is not the cause of action itself.” Robinson v. City of Jersey City, 284 N.J.Super. 596, 599, 666 A.2d 169 (App.Div.1995).
The majority agrees with the Appellate Division below that the firework is not “the dangerous condition on public property” because it is not public property. Ante at 210, 850 A.2d at 463. The majority finds that it is only the brief combination of the park property and the firework together that brings about a dangerous condition on public property for which the public entity may be held liable. That would be so pursuant to N.J.S.A 59:4 — 2 had the injury occurred at that time. The Legislature made it the public entity’s responsibility to prevent that combination from happening on public property and causing injury at that time. The TCA does not make the public entity liable into the future for that combination of events. The majority’s construction renders meaningless the palpably unreasonable analysis, which is intended to operate as an incentive for public entities to ferret out dangerous conditions on their property and to eliminate the danger of injury from them.
We have not dealt previously with the question whether a party may recover for injuries sustained from an object that was obtained in a public park and later transported to private property where injury occurred a few weeks later. Although the majority may not see the cause of action as novel, it has novelty in that sense. That said, we have permitted recovery against a public entity for injuries sustained on private property only in limited instances when consistent with a fair reading of the language of the dangerous condition on public property provision. In Posey ex rel. Posey v. Bordentown Sewerage Auth., 171 N.J. 172, 187-88, 793 A.2d 607 (2002), a public entity was held liable for injuries that occurred on adjacent private property when the public entity “creat[ed] a dangerous condition on private property that is under the ‘control’ of the public entit[y].” Absent a showing of public entity “control” of a dangerous condition that has been created on private property, liability otherwise is restricted to a dangerous condition that arises on the public property at the time injury *224occurs, even though the injury’s effects are felt on private property. Ibid. See also Russo Farms, Inc. v. Vineland Bd. of Educ., 144 N.J. 84, 105-06, 675 A.2d 1077 (1996) (permitting recovery where dangerous condition (improper strain-drainage system) on public property caused damage on adjacent private property); Saldana v. DiMedio, 275 N.J.Super. 488, 501, 646 A.2d 522 (App.Div.1994) (holding that TCA permitted cause of action for fire that started on public property and spread to adjacent private property).
The majority’s reliance on those and other cases ignores that in each ease there was no temporal disconnect between the dangerous condition, which the public entity allowed to occur and for which it was responsible, and the injury. So, too, in Roe v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, 317 N.J.Super. 72, 80, 721 A.2d 302 (App.Div.1998), certif. denied, 160 N.J. 89, 733 A.2d 494 (1999), the dangerous condition caused by the permanently bolted-open gate on public property existed at the time of injury. Nor does Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 106 N.J. 557, 525 A.2d 287 (1987), provide assistance in this matter. There we addressed the types of damages a plaintiff could claim under the Tort Claims Act. Id. at 569, 525 A.2d 287. Although the decision does not address application of N.J.S.A. 59:4-2, it is apparent that the dangerous condition of a leaching landfill existed on public property at the time it caused injury by contaminating the groundwater and underlying aquifer. Id. at 567, 525 A.2d 287.
It follows, then, that the majority lacks a firm foundation in asserting legislative acquiescence. The TCA literally does not authorize recovery for injuries occurring on spatially disconnected private property at a time distant from when the dangerous condition existed on public property. The Legislature simply did not provide a remedy for what I have characterized as the transport cases. Indeed, a contrary conclusion requires us to ignore the obvious fact that the temporal connection to the point of injury is a significant fact in determining reasonableness of the public entity’s conduct.
*225The TCA’s liability provisions are to be construed narrowly, consistent with the statute’s limitations, and liability imposed only when the TCA requires it. N.J.S.A. 59:1-2. We should not turn that analysis on its head in this matter. The Appellate Division below properly focused on “whether the property was in a dangerous condition at the time of the injury” and reasoned as follows:
Deptford theorized that the firework was the dangerous condition. Accepting the firework as the dangerous condition, it follows that the property was in a dangerous condition at the time [the child] lit it and was injured. Indeed, the judge found that “[i]f you carry around a bomb, according to this statute, the dangerous condition is when it goes off.” However, in our view, the difficulty with this analysis is that the firework at the time it went off and injured [the child] was not “public property” within the definition of N.J.S.A 59:4-1(c), for the following reasons.
First, Deptford did not own the firework. The 1995 contract between Deptford and Girone was not a sales contract; it was a services contract in which Girone agreed to furnish a licensed pyrotechnician, fireworks, and all personnel and equipment necessary to execute the fireworks display.
* * *
Second, in our view, once [the child] removed the firework from the park, it was no longer “controlled by the public entity,” as required by N.J.S.A 59:4^1(c). That is, ... Deptford no longer had control over the dangerous condition and did not have the ability to correct it by finding and disposing of the unspent firework while it sat in the shed at [the child’s] house. Consequently, assuming the unspent firework was the dangerous condition, we conclude that the firework at the time it went off and injured [the child] was not public property for purposes of liability under the Tort Claims Act.
Plaintiffs have theorized that the park was the dangerous condition. Accepting the park as the dangerous condition, it follows that it was no longer in that condition after [the child] took the unspent firework home. Thus, the park was not in a dangerous condition at the time he lit the unspent firework.
Even assuming that plaintiffs can establish a dangerous condition with sufficient degree for the issue to go to a jury, they cannot prove, as a matter of law, the element required for liability under N.J.S.A 59:4-2 that “the property was in dangerous condition at the time of the injury.” Moreover, the principle is well established that courts must exercise restraint in accepting novel causes of action. See Margolis & Novack, comment on N.J.S.A 59:2-1. We see no need to shoehorn this novel case into the dangerous condition of public property concept contemplated by the TCA in N.J.S.A 59:4-1 and 4-2. Obviously, this case does not fit comfortably under extant concepts of governmental responsibility. We see no necessity to torture the TCA to make this case fit under it in this circumstance.
*226Substantially for the reasons expressed in Judge King’s opinion below, I would affirm the Appellate Division’s dismissal of plaintiffs action against Deptford Township. The TCA language in question has clarity of meaning and purpose. It should not be discarded from the legislative design establishing when liability may attach under N.J.S.A. 59:4-2. Although I appreciate the seriousness of Brenden’s injuries, I am constrained to honor the Legislature’s intention in enacting the TCA. Local governmental sponsorship of a fireworks display is undertaken for the benefit of the entire community. I am convinced by the statute’s text and history that lawmakers intended such activity, within the narrow factual context of this ease, to carry the immunity urged by the public entity before us. I respectfully dissent.
Justice VERNIERO joins this opinion.
For reversal — Chief Justice PORITZ and Justices LONG, ZAZZALI, ALBIN and WALLACE — 5.
For affirmance — Justices VERNIERO and LaVECCHIA — 2.