Court Opinion

ID: 9570629
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:24:45.413976+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:12:09.991939
License: Public Domain

McMurray, Judge,
dissenting.
The majority hold that probable cause and exigent circumstances have not been shown by the state so as to bring the search of the automobile within the Carroll doctrine or "automobile exception.” See Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132 (45 SC 280, 69 LE 543), and also Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42 (90 SC 1975, 26 LE2d 419). The majority also hold that because the suspects were arrested in the hall and not inside the motel the evidence seized during the search of the motel room must be suppressed. For the following reasons I disagree with the conclusions reached by the majority. I would hold that the search of the automobile in this case comes within the Carroll doctrine and the search of the motel room was a lawful search incident to the arrest.
Matthews received his information from a reliable informant whose reliability had been proven very reliable and trustworthy on numerous occasions over the preceding seven years. Matthews relayed to Angel the information he had received from his informant, but *738whether he stated to Angel the fact of or the reasons for his belief in the reliability of the informant is not shown by the record. The majority hold that due to the absence of evidence that Angel was given information from which to determine the reliability of the informant, it has not been shown that Angel had probable cause to instigate the search and seizure. This holding unsupported by any citation of authority overlooks the decisions of the court in Register v. State, 124 Ga. App. 136, 138 (183 SE2d 68); Meneghan v. State, 132 Ga. App. 380, 383 (2c) (208 SE2d 150); and Baxter v. State, 134 Ga. App. 286, 288 (1) (214 SE2d 578). In these cases information received by one law enforcement officer has been relayed to other officers who have acted upon the information. Compare Buck v. State, 127 Ga. App. 72, 74 (192 SE2d 432). Law enforcement officers are authorized to rely upon the observations of fellow officers engaged in a common investigation.
The majority also hold that because there was time to get a search warrant after probable cause existed there were no exigent circumstances. In reaching their conclusion the majority point out a statement made by the trial judge. The statement of the trial court’s understanding of the law, which the majority here is rejecting, is closely paralleled by the following language of the Supreme Court in Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U. S. 583, 595 (3) (94 SC 2464, 41 LE2d 325): "Assuming that probable cause previously existed, we know of no case or principle that suggests that the right to search on probable cause and the reasonableness of seizing a car under exigent circumstances are foreclosed if a warrant was not obtained at the first practicable moment. Exigent circumstances with regard to vehicles are not limited to situations where probable cause is unforeseeable and arises only at the time of arrest. Cf. Chambers, id. at 50-51... The exigency may arise at any time, and the fact that the police might have obtained a warrant earlier does not negate the possibility of a current situation’s necessitating prompt police action.” See also Chambers v. Maroney, supra, at pp. 50-51.
Here, when the law enforcement officers realized that the suspects did not include McQuirk as they had anticipated the direction of their investigation was *739radically altered. It was at that time that the exigent circumstances arose as the goal of the police action changed from apprehension of the fugitive McQuirk to utilization of the information they had received regarding stolen drugs located in the automobile. The need for prompt police action arose from this change of circumstance as the suspects had been alerted to police intentions and could have thus been motivated to dispose of the stolen goods.
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 (91 SC 2022, 29 LE2d 564), cited by the majority is inapposite. In that case the suspect had already had ample opportunity to destroy any evidence in the automobile, and there was no suggestion that the automobile was being used for an illegal purpose or contained stolen goods, contraband or dangerous instrumentalities.
Finally, in regard to the search of the room, in my opinion it was performed incident to a lawful arrest. The majority apparently do not consider the testimony of Angel at the trial that the suspects at the time of arrest were leaving the room but that the defendant here was physically inside the room when arrested. This court in considering the trial court’s ruling on the motion to suppress must consider the evidence at trial as well as the hearing on the motion. Sanders v. State, 235 Ga. 425, 431 (2) (219 SE2d 768).
The officers were authorized to search the area in the immediate presence of the suspects for their own protection and to discover any evidence which might be destroyed. See United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56 (70 SC 430, 94 LE 653).
For the foregoing reasons I respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Deen and Judge Birdsong join in this dissent.