Court Opinion

ID: 9686041
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 15:21:18.57442+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:35:35.061232
License: Public Domain

*833Hall, J.
This is a workmen’s compensation case. The appellant was employed by Westinghouse at its plant in Vicksburg, Mississippi, from June 8, 1953 to August 30, 1955, with the exception of a brief period of time in April 1954 when she obtained sick leave from her work and had an operation for the removal of an abscessed ovary. One of the doctors participating in this operation testified that she was back at work and in apparently good condition within a period of about four to six weeks. The other doctor participating in the operation testified that it usually takes sixty to ninety days for a complete recovery. At any rate appellant returned to her work and continued in the employment of Westinghouse until August 30, 1955. On that date she was required to operate a press which is apparently a large and heavy machine into which were fed steel sheets approximately 10% feet in length, 9% inches in width, and 3/32nds of an inch in thickness, and weighing approximately 28 pounds. These large sheets were cut by the press into 47 small pieces which were used as braces or brackets in connection with the manufacture of some kind of product.
A supply of these steel sheets was placed on a skid which was elevated a distance of about 6 inches from the floor. Five presses were in operation and it was the duty of a helper to obtain these loaded skids from a warehouse or storage place and transport them to the presses by means of a portable piece of machinery. In doing this work to keep the presses supplied most of the time of the helper was spent in getting materials and transporting them to the presses.
Appellant was required to pick up these- large sheets of metal and place them on a kind of table which formed *834a part of the press. Appellant is a very small woman and it was necessary for her to lift these steel sheets to approximately the height of her shoulders. On August 30, 1955, while doing this work of lifting these steel sheets onto the high table arrangement, the appellant felt something give in her stomach which she said burned like fire. She made complaint immediately to a nurse on duty in the plant who instructed her to go to see Dr. L. J. Clark for attention. Before going to the doctor she reported her condition to the general foreman in the feeder section and tool department of Westinghouse and also a representative of the union contacted this general foreman who went over the job classification with the union business agent and reported that notwithstanding the heavy work, appellant was due to do the work without assistance. Appellant also reported the matter to the supervisor of industrial relations with Westinghouse who told her that if he had as many complaints as she had he would quit the job if he were she.
Appellant reported to Dr. Clark who examined her on August 31st and found tenderness in the lower left portion of her abdomen and found that she had fever and that her blood count was elevated. He described it as an inflammatory condition. He called in Dr. J. A. K. Birchett on the case who assisted in the treatment. Both of these doctors testified at the hearing and both testified positively that the appellant could not do any work in the future which required lifting. Prior to . the hearing these tw<? doctors signed a joint statement describing in detail their findings. In this statement they said that appellant was advised to go home and go to bed and they gave her treatment for trauma and soreness- and activation of .the trouble in the pelvis, but that on, the following day, September 1st, her condition became so much worse that she was forced to come to the hospital for treatment. In. this statement they bo.th said that her trouble was unquestionably due to a tearing loose of *835ligaments and adhesions from the previous operation in April 1954. They made a diagnosis of acute peritoneal irritation and advised her to stay in bed and take the necessary treatment to overcome this soreness. She remained in the hospital about eight days and was then allowed to go home and the statement says that she has been observed in the clinic at intervals since then and has apparently shown satisfactory progress, “but is not, by any means, able to return to this heavy type of work that she had been doing previous to entering the hospital”. The statement further says that she is able to do a secretarial job but that unquestionably the injuries “were the result of the class of work that she was doing while working at the Westinghouse Electric Corporation”. This statement is dated October 21, 1955.
Dr. Clark testified that after the operation in April 1954 appellant returned to her work and that her condition at that time was “apparently all right”. He also said that he did not remember any aftereffects that appellant incurred as a result of the April 1954 operation. He further said that Dr. Birchett made a pelvic examination of appellant and that he, Dr. Clark, did not feel qualified to give an opinion as to her present condition, and that Dr. Birchett would be in a better position to do so. The doctor confirmed the writing of the aforesaid letter of October 21st.
Dr. Birchett testified that his specialty is gynecology or female surgery and obstetrics. He said that after the operation in 1954 the appellant ‘ ‘ made a pretty good recovery”. He said that he was called in by Dr. Clark on August 31, 1955, and he found the patient not only complaining of considerable pain, but she apparently was in pain. Upon examination he concluded that she had ad-hesions as a result of the operation and “the act of strain or picking up had caused a tearing of these ad-hesions and in my opinion that was the cause of the disability and her complaint”.' He stated that the tearing *836was of a relatively recent nature. He explained the treatment given to her in the hospital in September 1955, and in answer to the question “How did she appear to respond to the treatment”, he said “Well, her inflammation subsided”. He was asked whether she had reached a period of maximum improvement and his reply was “I didn’t find at this time (November 18, 1955) any residual reaction”. Immediately he was asked whether or not she was at this time qualified physically to do the heavy industrial type work she was doing at the time she was injured. And he replied “Well, my advice to Mrs. King was to get some kind of industrial work which would not entail too much physical or manual exertion. * * * Well from the history she gave that she picked up something that weighed twenty-five to twenty-eight pounds, I assumed it wouldn’t be wise for her to go hack to that type of work and that was my recommendation to her. I cautioned her about working around home. I said, ‘Don’t get home and work in the garden and pull up this and do heavy work around home.’ I don’t feel she should have any strenuous exertion for some period of time.” He was then asked “What period ’ ’, and he said ‘ ‘ She is probably as well today as she will ever be, which I consider satisfactory. ’ ’ He further said that she should refrain from anything that would entail a lot of lifting or pulling and that it was his opinion that there was a causal connection between the strain she was engaged in and the tearing which he found at the time of the first examination. On cross examination he repeated that he found no residuals from the injury which she received on August 30th but he immediately repeated that he advised Mrs. King against doing any type work that would require lifting, not only in her employment, but around home. He was also asked if he didn’t advise her against doing heavy lifting after the operation in April 1954 and he replied “for only a limited time”. He further said that if she had a type of work at *837the Westinghouse plant which would not require lifting, she would be physically able to do it “provided it is not a type of work which would entail pulling on the abdominal muscles”.
Upon examination by the attorney-referee Dr. Birehett said that the 1955 accident was in association with the operation and the exertion caused the breaking of these adhesions, and that her disability was caused by a combination of the aftermath of her operation and the accident.
The supervisor of industrial relations for Westinghouse testified, as’ above stated, that he told Mrs. Bing “if I had as many complaints as she had, I would quit, if I were her”, and that she left her badge with him and asked if she could keep the appointment which the nurse had made with the doctor and he told her to do so. He was asked on cross examination whether he had a job at Westinghouse that is available for Mrs. King that she would be able to do, and his reply was “when an employee quits we don’t just make a job for them. Some of them we reemploy”. He also' said that they have some jobs that are light work but he did not say that any such job was available to the appellant.
The attorney-referee made the following findings of fact: “1. On August 8, 1955, claimant, Mrs. Hilda King, was an employee of defendant Westinghouse Electric Corporation in Warren County, Mississippi, at an average weekly wage of $42.53. 2. That on said date claimant sustained a compensable injury within the scope and course of her employment and that as a result thereof was temporarily and totally disabled from the date of said injury until September 15,1955. 3. That there' is no residual of said injury nor is there any permanent partial’ disability to claimant as a result of said injury.” The attorney-referee therefore awarded the claimant $25.00 per week for a period of two weeks.
*838It will be noted that the attorney-referee in his findings gave the wrong date of the injury, which should have been August 30 instead of August 8, and that he also found that there is no residual of said injury and no permanent partial disability.
On appeal by the claimant from his decision, it was affirmed by the full commission and by the circuit court.
Mr. John Scott, the owner of United Electric Company, which company is engaged in general contract and repair work, testified that the claimant now is doing secretarial work for him and has been since about the middle of September 1955 at a salary of $40.00 per week, and that her duties consist only of answering the telephone, making out the payroll and making out invoices for the jobs and getting out the bills. He further testified that he does not consider her employment permanent and that if his work gets slack he couldn’t afford to pay her for full time but would have to cut her to a part time job.
 In National Surety Co. v. Kemp, 217 Miss. 537, 64 So. 2d 723, we said: “We have consistently held that the Workmen’s Compensation law should be given a broad and liberal construction and that doubtful cases should be resolved in favor of compensation. ’ ’ A number of cases are then cited to sustain this proposition.
 In Ingalls Shipbuilding Corp. v. Byrd, 215 Miss. 234, 60 So. 2d 645, we held that “Pre-existing disease or infirmity of the employee does not disqualify a claim under the ‘arising out of employment’ requirement if the employment aggravated, accelerated, or combined with the disease or infirmity to produce the death or disability for which compensation is sought.” The same thing was held in East v. Pigford Bros. Construction Co., 219 Miss. 121, 68 So. 2d 294, and in not less than a dozen other cases which have been decided by this Court. The principle is so firmly established in the juris*839prudence of this State that it is not subject to serious question. ■
There is no substantial dispute as to the facts disclosed by the record in this case. It shows beyond question that the claimant’s condition was aggravated by the strain which the work required of her. In fact the attorney-referee so found in this case, but he seems to have gone off on the theory that the claimant was entitled to only two weeks compensation because she had obtained other employment which was paying her $40.00 a week, a slight reduction under what she was being paid at the time of the injury.  The attorney-referee and the commission and the circuit court entirely overlooked the provisions of our Workmen’s Compensation statute as construed by three decisions of this Court. In the case of Karr v. Armstrong Tire & Rubber Co., 216 Miss. 132, 61 So. 2d 789, we quoted from Larson and pointed out that the degree of disability is calculated by comparing actual earnings before the injury with earning capacity after the injury. To the same effect is Elliott v. The Ross Carrier Co., 220 Miss. 86, 70 So. 2d 75, and Ebasco Services, Inc., et al v. Harris, 85 So. 2d 784, not yet reported in the State Reports.
 It is our opinion that the fact that the claimant was able to obtain light work in a temporary position which paid her $40.00 per week is not conclusive that her earning capacity is $40.00 per week.
 Section 6998-09 of the Code of 1942 provides for compensation for permanent total disability, then for temporary total disability, and then for permanent partial disability. The latter is defined as a disability which is partial in character and permanent in quality. The attorney-referee in his examination of claimant’s doctor said: “I can appreciate the fact that this is a difficult question to answer. Nevertheless I think it is pertinent. Do you consider that Mrs. King has any permanent physical disability at the present time as a result of the *840aggravation of her conditon by this accident?” The doctor replied with a question as follows: “What do yon mean by the word ‘permanent’? Do yon mean as long as she will live she will have a permanent disability?” The attorney-referee replied “Yes”, and the doctor said “I do not think so.” It will be borne in mind that, as hereinabove stated, his advice to claimant was to get some type of industrial work which would not entail too much physical or manual exertion, and he further said that he assumed it would not he wise for her to go hack to that type of work and that was his recommendation to her. Fairly construed, the doctor’s testimony was that it would he dangerous for the claimant to again engage in the type of work which she was doing when injured.
As we have pointed out already, the compensation act should he given a broad and liberal construction and that doubtful cases should he resolved in favor of compensation. Almost the same rule prevails in this State with reference to insurance policies. In the case of Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Serio, 155 Miss. 515, 124 So. 485, this Court had occasion to deal with the meaning of the word “permanent” in a life insurance policy which insured against total and permanent disability, and in that case this Court said:
“It is the further main argument that the proof does not show that the disability was and is a permanent one. In other words, as we understand the import of the argument, the contention is that it is not shown that the insured may not get wéll. * # *
 “We construe the term permanent, when used in a policy provision such as this, as one used for the proper purpose, and for the purpose only, of excluding disabilities which are merely temporary. Although the disability be one which may or will pass away in a fair period of time, yet if the required period is longer than that which, reasonably considered, is only temporary, *841then it must of necessity fall within the opposite general term permanent, because it is not temporary.  There are many cases and situations in the law, and these outside of insurance problems, where the word permanent is used and interpreted in a time sense far shorter than perpetual or lasting always. The connection in which the word is used, rather than its most restricted literal definition, is required to control. ’ ’
The attorney-referee advised the doctor that the compensation statute means that “permanent” signifies as long as the claimant will live. In this we think he was in error and that the commission and the circuit court were likewise in error in adopting the attorney-referee’s idea as to the meaning of the statute, and that we should construe the word exactly as it was construed in the Serio case.
 The record is without dispute that claimant is not and will not be able to do the work which she formerly did, and it is our opinion that under the undisputed facts in this case the claimant was entitled to recover more than two weeks compensation, and was entitled to recover for a permanent partial disability. How much she was entitled to recover we are unable to determine from the record before us, but in view of our conclusions the judgment of the attorney-referee, the commission and the circuit court are in error and must be reversed and the cause remanded to the circuit court and then to the commission for an adjudication on this matter.
Reversed and remanded.
All Justices concur except Kyle and Gillespie, JJ., who dissent.