Court Opinion

ID: 9885805
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 14:07:33.139987+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:17:49.419776
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

                       COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

                                 APPEALS COURT

                                                  22-P-294

                               BLB TRADING, LLC

                                       vs.

                         BRUCE BOGUSLAV & another.1

               MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

       The defendants Linda and Bruce Boguslav (collectively

 Boguslavs or individually, Linda or Bruce) appeal from a Housing

 Court judge's order denying their motion for relief from

 judgment.2    We affirm.

       Background.     We need not detail the complex procedural and

 factual history in this postforeclosure summary process matter

 except to note that a judgment of possession entered in favor of

 the plaintiff, BLB Trading in August 2017.            That judgment was

 1 Linda Boguslav.
 2 In that same order the motion judge also dismissed the
 Boguslavs' earlier-filed merits-based appeal from the judgment
 itself, which appeal originally entered on our docket as 17-P-
 1631. The Boguslavs have not, however, made any discernable
 argument addressing that aspect of the order; as such, we deem
 it waived. Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (9) (A), as appearing in 481
 Mass. 1628 (2019) ("appellate court need not pass upon questions
 or issues not argued in the brief").
based in large part on the preclusive effects of earlier-entered

judgments in both State and Federal court.3    The Boguslavs filed

a timely notice of appeal from that judgment; the appeal

eventually was dismissed, see note 2, supra.    See BLB Trading,

LLC vs. Boguslav, No. 17-P-1631 (Sept. 30, 2021).

     In the interim, the Boguslavs filed a motion for relief

from judgment.   They argued that newly discovered evidence had

come "to light with both significant legal and substantive

relevance.   This evidence demonstrates that BLB's claim to own

the Boguslav mortgage is knowingly and intentionally false" and

that had such evidence previously been known and available "it

would probably change this court's decision."    A judge denied

the motion, ruling that whether considered under either

subsections (2) or (6) of Mass. R. Civ. P. 60 (b), 365 Mass. 828

(1974),4 the motion was untimely, having been filed more than two

3 See BLB Trading, LLC vs. Boguslav, Worcester Hous. Ct., No. 16-
SP-0682 (June 10, 2016); Boguslav vs. BLB Trading, LLC,
Worcester Sup. Ct., No. 1585CV01904 (Dec. 22, 2015); Boguslav v.
BLB Trading, LLC, 136 F. Supp. 3d 11 (D. Mass. 2015), aff'd,
U.S. Ct. App., No. 15-2295 (1st Cir. Nov. 15, 2016).
4 Rule 60 (b) generally provides that a party may in certain

circumstances seek relief from a judgment. Subsection (b) (2)
specifies that such relief may be had if there exists "newly
discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been
discovered in time to move for a new trial" provided that such
motion is made "not more than one year after the judgment . . .
entered." Subsection (b) (6) specifies that such relief may be
had for "any other reason justifying relief from the operation
of the judgment" provided that such motion is "made within a
reasonable time."

                                 2
years after the Boguslavs had knowledge of the purportedly newly

discovered evidence.   In the alternative, the judge concluded

that the Boguslavs failed to demonstrate adequate grounds to

reopen the judgment.

     Discussion.   We review an order on a motion for relief from

judgment for abuse of discretion.    Cullen Enters., Inc. v.

Massachusetts Prop. Ins. Underwriting Ass'n, 399 Mass. 886, 894

(1987).   A "discretionary decision constitutes an abuse of

discretion where we conclude the judge made a clear error of

judgment in weighing the factors relevant to the decision . . .

such that the decision falls outside the range of reasonable

alternatives" (quotation omitted).    L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470

Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014).    For the reasons that follow, we

agree with the judge's conclusion that the motion for relief

from judgment was untimely.5

     In a March 25, 2019 adversary complaint filed by Linda in

her chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding, the Boguslavs asserted

that BLB Trading "was not the holder of the Boguslav Mortgage

and/or Promissory Note . . . since at least February 12, 2014

well before their claimed foreclosure of the Boguslav Residence

on December 21, 2015 based upon sworn evidence and testimony

5 Nothing herein should be taken to suggest that we think the
arguments raised by the defendants have merit. To the contrary,
the record materials upon which the defendants rely appear to
undercut their defenses.

                                 3
recently discovered by the Boguslav's in a case in Florida."

These appear to be the same claims, supported by many of the

same documents, as the Boguslavs raised in their motion for

relief from judgment in the Housing Court.   Otherwise put, and

as the motion judge observed, the Boguslavs "had to be aware of

the documents in the Florida case well before March 25, 2019

given that they had to spend time to analyze, organize and

distill the Florida case information into Linda Boguslav's

adversary complaint."   Regardless, the Boguslavs waited more

than two years before they filed the motion for relief from

judgment.   The motion judge, in a well-reasoned decision, found

this delay to be unreasonable.

    First, the motion judge rejected the Boguslavs' assertion

that they were unable earlier to file because the automatic stay

then in place in Linda's chapter 13 proceeding prohibited them

from doing so, the judge pointing out that even if the automatic

stay applied, a question we need not decide, "the bankruptcy

court lifted the automatic stay on February 27, 2020.   The

defendants have not presented any reasonable explanation for

their more than fifteen . . . month delay (measured from

February 27, 2020) in filing their motion for relief from

judgment in the Housing Court that was based on this 'newly

available' evidence."   Second, the judge concluded that while

"both parties stand to be prejudiced depending on the outcome of

                                 4
the motion . . . the potential prejudice" to BLB Trading

significantly outweighed that which the Boguslavs might

experience because

    "over an 11-year period (measured from the date of the
    mortgage loan to the date of the foreclosure sale) [the
    Boguslavs] made only one mortgage loan payment and owe
    $767,486.02 (the deficiency remaining on the mortgage loan
    after the foreclosure sale of the property). However,
    given the extensive litigation history involving this
    foreclosure and the fact that every court that has ruled on
    the matter has concluded that BLB held the Boguslav
    promissory note and mortgage immediately prior to and at
    the time of the December 2015 foreclosure sale, any
    prejudice that might inure to the [the Boguslavs] is offset
    by the prejudice to BLB resulting from their inability to
    secure possession of the property, and the important
    interest in finality."

    For present purposes we need not decide under which part of

rule 60 (b)'s several subsections the Boguslavs' motion was

brought as the judge concluded that the motion was not brought

within a "reasonable time." See Poskus v. Lombardo's of

Randolph, Inc., 48 Mass. App. Ct. 527, 527-528 (2000) (motion

for relief from judgment based on newly discovered evidence must

be brought within one year of judgment and time may not be

extended by recharacterizing motion as being under subsection

[b] [6]). In so concluding the motion judge carefully considered

"the reasons for [the Boguslavs'] delay; the ability of [the

Boguslavs] to learn of the grounds earlier; prejudice to the

parties, if any; and the important interest of finality."    Owens

v. Mukendi, 448 Mass. 66, 74 (2006).   Even at this late date the

                                5
Boguslavs have made no genuine attempt to address the judge's

analysis or, most particularly, to explain the more than two

year delay between the latest date they reasonably could claim

to have "discovered" the now proffered "newly discovered

evidence" and the date they filed their motion (roughly four

years after the 2017 judgment entered).

       In short, we are satisfied that the motion judge did not

abuse his discretion by concluding that the Boguslavs failed to

bring their motion for relief from judgment in a timely manner;

we conclude that the judge's decision fell well within the

bounds of reasonable alternatives and otherwise was according to

law.   See L.L., 470 Mass. at 185 n.27; Sarin v. Ochsner, 48

Mass. App. Ct. 421, 426 (2000) (nearly three year delay

unreasonable).   See also Owens, 448 Mass. at 74 (determining

whether motion brought within reasonable time "must of necessity

depend upon the facts in each individual case" [quotation and

citation omitted]).

       The Boguslavs' unsupported speculation that the motion

judge may have been influenced improperly by certain news

reports concerning the Housing Court's operations, as well their

assertions that the judge displayed bias or otherwise was

prejudiced against them, is without merit.    It is significant

that the Boguslavs did not move to recuse the judge.    See Poly

v. Moylan, 423 Mass. 141, 150 (1996), cert. denied sub nom Poly

                                  6
v. Cargill, 519 U.S. 1114 (1997) (failure to move for

disqualification or recusal of judge "does not necessarily mean

there was no bias" but "we do take this into consideration when

viewing the record").   Moreover, the comments and rulings of

which the Boguslavs now complain "almost never constitute[] a

valid basis for a bias or partiality motion" (citation omitted).

Commonwealth v. Deconinck, 480 Mass. 254, 268 (2018).   It is

enough for present purposes to say that we have reviewed the

record in detail and conclude that the motion judge's rulings

were uninfluenced by any considerations other than the law and

materials before him; the Boguslavs have "failed to point out in

any concrete way how the judge's conduct might have harmed

[them] apart from the judge's decisions," Poly, supra; and the

judge's occasional, unobjectionable comments at the hearing do

not in our view reflect any improper bias or prejudice, let

alone "such a high degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make

fair judgment impossible" (citation omitted).   Deconinck, supra

at 269.   To the extent we have not specifically commented on the

                                7
Boguslavs' remaining arguments, they "have not been overlooked.

We find nothing in them that requires discussion."   Commonwealth

v. Domanski, 332 Mass. 66, 78 (1954).6

                                    Order entered September 28,
                                      2021, denying motion for
                                      relief from judgment
                                      affirmed.

                                    By the Court (Milkey, Blake &
                                      Sacks, JJ.7),

                                    Clerk

Entered:   October 6, 2023.

6 BLB Trading's request for appellate attorney's fees and costs
is denied.
7 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

                                8