Court Opinion

ID: 9894907
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-03 16:09:09.368544+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:10:58.398430
License: Public Domain

J-S29041-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    NATHAN WILLIAM WEAVER                      :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 119 MDA 2023

         Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 25, 2022
               In the Court of Common Pleas of Clinton County
            Criminal Division at No(s): CP-18-CR-0000432-2019

BEFORE:      MURRAY, J., KING, J., and COLINS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.:                           FILED: NOVEMBER 3, 2023

       Nathan William Weaver appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed

following a jury convicting him of sexual assault, aggravated indecent assault,

and indecent assault.1 For these offenses, Weaver was aggregately sentenced

to nine and one-half to twenty-four years of incarceration. On appeal, Weaver

presents three issues for our consideration, contending that the evidence was

insufficient to sustain the jury’s verdict on all counts, that the court erred in

allowing prior uncharged “bad act” testimony from two witnesses, and that

the Commonwealth failed to demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence,

that he was a sexually violent predator (“SVP”). After a thorough review of

the record, we affirm.
____________________________________________

 Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 See 18 Pa.C.S. § 3124.1; 18 Pa.C.S. § 3125(a)(1); and 18 Pa.C.S. §
3126(a)(1), respectively.
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     Briefly, as recounted by the trial court:

            On or about October 26, 2018, the victim … (age 21),
     attended an apartment party with her sister and her sister’s
     fiancé, … Weaver. The victim acknowledged that she was
     consuming alcoholic beverages and, around 3:15 a.m., went to a
     bedroom and laid down on the bed. A short time thereafter, the
     victim heard [Weaver] enter the room and state that he was going
     to sleep on the floor. The victim later realized that [Weaver] was
     in her bed and kissing her. The victim believed that it was her
     boyfriend who entered into her bed. Later on she felt her vagina
     being digitally penetrated and her … shorts being removed. At that
     point she felt someone having sexual intercourse with her. She
     eventually realized that it was not her boyfriend and that it was
     [Weaver]. She pushed [Weaver] off of her and waited until [he]
     fell asleep. At that point she left the room and called the police.
     At the time of this event [Weaver] was the victim’s sister’s fiancé.
     [Weaver] denied having sex with the victim but later DNA testing
     confirmed [Weaver’s] DNA on the vaginal swab.

Trial Court Opinion and Order, 7/15/22, at 1-2.

     In a subsequent opinion, the court expanded upon the factual

underpinnings of this case:

           The victim testified that on the night in question, she was
     present at her own rental unit near … Lock Haven University,
     which she was attending as a student. Also present at the time of
     the incident was the victim’s sister and her sister’s fiancé,
     [Weaver].

           The participants consumed alcoholic drinks and the victim
     made a decision to proceed to her own bedroom in the early
     morning hours to lay down and rest. Shortly thereafter, [Weaver],
     uninvited, entered the victim’s bedroom indicating that he was
     going to sleep on the floor. The victim, while under the influence
     of alcohol and attempting to sleep in her own bed, realized that
     someone was in her bed kissing her, believing it to be her
     boyfriend. A short time later the victim felt her vagina being
     penetrated by fingers and her clothing being removed. The
     encounter proceeded to a point where the victim was engaging in
     vaginal intercourse with the person in her bed whom she still

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      believed to be her own boyfriend. A light outside of the window
      illuminated [Weaver’s] body and the victim identified [Weaver’s]
      tribal tattoos and gold chains. The victim immediately pushed
      [Weaver] off of her. [Weaver] put the victim’s clothing back on
      her and then proceeded to go to sleep with the victim fleeing the
      bedroom and calling the police. The victim clearly testified at the
      time of trial that she in no way consented to any type or level of
      sexual activity with [Weaver] and that she never would.

Trial Court Opinion and Order, 1/10/23, at 2-3.

      At   trial,   following    a   hearing,   the   lower   court   granted   the

Commonwealth’s motion to introduce, pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of

Evidence 404(b), the testimony of two individuals who both testified that

Weaver had engaged in nonconsensual, uncharged bad acts of a sexual nature

on them. These acts were alleged to have occurred some eight to ten years

prior to the present incident.

      Ultimately, a jury found Weaver guilty of the three aforementioned

crimes. Weaver was correspondingly sentenced to nine and one-half to

twenty-four years of incarceration and additionally determined by the trial

court to be an SVP.

      After sentencing, Weaver filed a timely post-sentence motion. However,

the trial court ruled on this motion—the determination Weaver has now

appealed from—outside of its 120-day period to do so, as outlined in

Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 720(B)(3)(a). Moreover, once that

120-day period had elapsed, the clerk of courts failed to enter and distribute

an order deeming the motion denied on behalf of the trial court by operation

of law. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(B)(3)(c). While, ordinarily, an appeal taken from

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a decision issued outside the 120-day period would be untimely, this court has

“found a breakdown [in court operations] where the clerk of court did not

enter an order notifying the appellant that his post-sentence motion was

denied by the operation of law.” Commonwealth v. Patterson, 940 A.2d

493, 499 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation omitted). As such, and because Weaver

filed his notice of appeal within thirty days of the trial court’s order denying

his post-sentence motion, we may excuse the untimely filing of Weaver’s

notice of appeal and proceed to adjudicate this appeal’s merits.

      On appeal, Weaver asks:

      1. Was the evidence submitted to the jury sufficient to sustain its
         guilty verdicts?

      2. Is Weaver entitled to a new trial because the court erred in
         allowing 404(b) testimony?

      3. Was the evidence sufficient, based on a clear and convincing
         evidence standard, to establish that Weaver met the definition
         of an SVP?

See Appellant’s Brief, at 12.

      As Weaver’s first issue contests the sufficiency of evidence employed

against him at all three guilty verdicts, we note our well-settled standard of

review:

      The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of evidence is
      whether, viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light
      most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence
      to enable the fact[-]finder to find every element of the crime
      beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may
      not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of
      the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and
      circumstances established by the Commonwealth may not

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      preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a
      defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the
      evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no
      probability of fact may be drawn from the combined
      circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of
      proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by
      means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying
      the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all
      evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the trier
      of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the
      weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or none
      of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Lambert, 795 A.2d 1010, 1014-15 (Pa. Super. 2002)

(citations omitted).

      Relevant to the claim at hand, “it is well-established that the

uncorroborated testimony of the complaining witness is sufficient to convict a

defendant of sexual offenses.” Commonwealth v. Castelhun, 889 A.2d

1228, 1232 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citations and internal quotation marks

omitted). We also emphasize that “resistance to sexual assault is not required

to sustain a conviction.” Commonwealth v. Smith, 863 A.2d 1172, 1176

(Pa. Super. 2004).

      Weaver does not discuss, with any particularity, the elements of any of

his convictions. Instead, he argues that “the evidence failed to show that the

alleged victim did not consent to the alleged sexual activity or, in the

alternative, [Weaver] was not aware that the victim was not consenting to

said sexual activity.” Appellant’s Brief, at 18. Specifically, Weaver illuminates

that: (1) Weaver got into the victim’s bed; (2) Weaver and the victim engaged

in sexual activity without any verbal or physical resistance, with the victim

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seemingly going along with this activity; and then, (3) when the victim

realized Weaver was not her boyfriend, she pushed Weaver away, leading to

an immediate cessation of sexual activity between the two. See id. Weaver

contends that “a person in [his] position would have believed that the victim

was consenting to the activity until she pushed him off.” Id. As such, the

Commonwealth failed to prove non-consent and that Weaver recklessly

disregarded that non-consent. See id., at 19 (citing Commonwealth v.

Carter, 418 A.2d 537 (Pa. Super. 1980)).

      Weaver is correct insofar as all of his convictions required the

Commonwealth to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the

complainant did not consent to his actions. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 3124.1 (“without

the complainant’s consent”); 18 Pa.C.S. § 3125(a)(1) (“without the

complainant’s consent”); 18 Pa.C.S. § 3126(a)(1) (“without the complainant’s

consent”). We note that, because none of the relevant statutes define the

mental state sufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt, the Commonwealth

was required to prove that Weaver acted intentionally, knowingly, or

recklessly with respect to each material element of the offenses. See 18

Pa.C.S. § 302(c); A.L. v. Pennsylvania State Police, 274 A.3d 1228, 1240

(Pa. 2022) (indicating that the offense of sexual assault requires at least a

finding of reckless mental state pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 302(c)); Carter, 418

A.2d at 540-41 (stating that because the indecent assault statute is silent as

to the culpability sufficient to establish the crime, 18 Pa.C.S. § 302(c) requires

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that the Commonwealth establish that the defendant acted, at a minimum,

recklessly with respect to the material elements of the offense). Recklessness,

which requires the lowest level of proof among the three levels of intent, see

A.L., 274 A.3d at 1240, is defined in the Crimes Code as follows:

      A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an
      offense when he consciously disregards a substantial and
      unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result
      from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree
      that, considering the nature and intent of the actor’s conduct and
      the circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a gross
      deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person
      would observe in the actor’s situation.

18 Pa.C.S. § 302(b)(3). In accordance with these precepts, the trial court

instructed the jury that to find Weaver guilty of sexual assault, aggravated

indecent   assault,   and   indecent   assault,   they   had   to   find   that   the

Commonwealth established beyond a reasonable doubt that Weaver “acted

knowingly or at least recklessly regarding [the victim’s] nonconsent.” N.T.,

10/1/21, at 43-44 (sexual assault charge); see also id. at 44 (aggravated

indecent assault charge), 44-46 (indecent assault charge).

      We first note that the victim unequivocally expressed at trial that she

did not engage in consensual sex with Weaver on the night in question and

furthermore never would. See N.T., 9/30/21, at 59-60. In specifically recalling

events as they happened, the victim testified that after Weaver had entered

her bedroom, he laid down on the floor and then, thereafter, the victim fell

“asleep or lost consciousness again[.]” Id., at 41-42. The next thing that the

victim remembered was “someone kind of laying in the bed behind [her]

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reaching around over [her] hip and inserting … [his] finger through [her]

shorts into [her] vagina.” Id., at 42. The victim was not awake when this

other individual, later identified as Weaver, got into her bed. See id. At some

point, the victim said her boyfriend’s name “a few times during this assault

asking if it was [the boyfriend, Mark] … [The victim] just … said [Mark’s] name

out loud with a question mark to try to make sense of it because [the victim]

knew it couldn’t be him but … wasn’t sure who else would be in that situation.”

Id., at 43. The victim said “Mark, Mark” multiple times. Id. There was no

response from Weaver, who then proceeded to take off the victim’s pants and

underwear and vaginally penetrate the victim with his penis. See id., at 43-

44, 47. As soon as the victim realized that it was Weaver who was engaging

in sexual contact with her when she saw his distinctive tattoos and gold chains,

she immediately pushed him off of her. See id., at 46-47.

      When viewed in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth, we

conclude there was sufficient evidence to demonstrate that Weaver acted

recklessly with respect to the victim’s absence of consent. In addition to the

fact that Weaver had been engaged to the victim’s sister, there is no evidence

that prior to Weaver’s actions in the victim’s bed, Weaver and the victim were

occupied in any kind of romantic or sexual activity with one another. More

importantly, however, with Weaver suddenly appearing in the victim’s bed and

then proceeding to digitally penetrate the victim without asking whether she

wanted to engage in any sexual activity, the victim calling out her boyfriend’s

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name in order to elicit a response from Weaver establishes that he consciously

disregarded what a reasonable person would have done in that specific

moment: cease engaging in sexual activity. With there being evidence from

which a jury could have concluded that the victim did not consent to Weaver’s

actions, Weaver’s sufficiency claim necessarily fails.

      In his second claim, Weaver suggests that he is entitled to a new trial

because the court erred in allowing the testimony of two witnesses who both

alleged that Weaver had committed prior uncharged bad acts on them of a

sexual nature. Weaver reasons by analogy to a previous Commonwealth

appeal in this case wherein another panel of this Court ruled that the lower

court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Commonwealth’s pre-trial

motion to introduce prior bad acts evidence pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of

Evidence 404(b). See Commonwealth v. Weaver, 2020 WL 5890671, 484

MDA 2020 (Pa. Super. filed Oct. 5, 2020) (unpublished memorandum).

      The Commonwealth attempted to admit Weaver’s 2011 convictions for

aggravated assault and indecent assault, arguing that the instant case’s

factual elements were similar to the facts underpinning his 2011 convictions,

as both evidenced a common plan. See id., at *4. However, this Court

ultimately found that Weaver’s actions were not usual or distinctive enough to

constitute a common scheme, notwithstanding that sexually assaultive

behavior and alcohol consumption were present in both instances. See id, at

*7. In addition, despite the Commonwealth’s assertion that unconsciousness

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of the victim was a key element of both sexual assaults, such an averment

was not supported by the record in the present case, further demonstrating

dissimilarities between Weaver’s prior convictions and the facts as had been

alleged at the time in the case at bar. See id.

      Preliminarily,

      [i]t is well-established that the admissibility of evidence is within
      the discretion of the trial court, and such rulings will not form the
      basis for appellate relief absent an abuse of discretion. When a
      trial court comes to a conclusion through the exercise of its
      discretion, there is a heavy burden on the appellant to show that
      this discretion has been abused. An appellant cannot meet this
      burden by simply persuading an appellate court that it may have
      reached a different conclusion than that reached by the trial court;
      rather, to overcome this heavy burden, the appellant must
      demonstrate that the trial court actually abused its discretionary
      power. A determination that a trial court abused its discretion in
      making an evidentiary ruling may not be made merely because an
      appellate court might have reached a different conclusion, but
      requires a result of manifest unreasonableness, or partiality,
      prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such lack of support so as to be clearly
      erroneous.

Commonwealth v. Saez, 225 A.3d 169, 177-78 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citations

and internal quotation marks omitted).

      Under Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 404, evidence of other crimes,

wrongs, or acts is inadmissible to “prove a person’s character in order to show

that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the

character.” Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1). However, such evidence “may be admissible

for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,

plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident. In a

criminal case this evidence is admissible only if the probative value of the

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evidence outweighs its potential for unfair prejudice.” Pa.R.E. 404(b)(2).

      As highlighted in the prior appeal, “[e]vidence of a prior crime may also

be admitted to show a defendant’s actions were not the result of a mistake or

accident, where the manner and circumstances of two crimes are remarkably

similar.” Commonwealth v. Tyson, 119 A.3d 353, 359 (Pa. Super. 2015)

(citations omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Ross, 57 A.3d 85, 102 (Pa.

Super. 2012) (indicating that “much more is demanding than the mere

repeated commission of crimes of the same class[.] The device used must be

so unusual and distinctive as to be like a signature.”) (citation and emphasis

omitted). Nevertheless, “[t]he     Commonwealth      must   prove   beyond a

reasonable doubt that a defendant has committed the particular crime of

which he is accused, and it may not strip him of the presumption of innocence

by proving that he has committed other criminal acts.” Commonwealth v.

Sitler, 144 A.3d 156, 163 (Pa. Super. 2016) (en banc) (citations omitted).

      Weaver summarizes the bad acts testimony of the two witnesses as

follows:

            [K.E.] testified that she went to a party at a house in
      Trevorton, Pennsylvania approximately during the time period
      2010/2011. She testified that after drinking alcohol she became
      sick and tired and went to sleep. She said she woke up to heavy
      breathing behind her. She noticed that [Weaver] was there. He
      allegedly tried to stick his hands down her shirt. She lifted her
      elbow and shrugged to scare him away. He allegedly jolted back
      and tried again. At that point she threw her elbow harder and
      [Weaver] allegedly jumped and knocked the garbage can over and
      ran out of the room.

            [K.C.] testified that sometime in early June of 2009 she

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      went to a party. She was drinking. She said she got way too
      intoxicated. She was taken to a futon-type couch in the basement
      where she went to sleep. She testified that she woke up to
      someone trying to get in her pants and trying to fondle her
      genitals. She testified that she was able to identify [Weaver] as
      being the person who attempted to molest her. However, she was
      able to escape from the alleged molestation.

Appellant’s Brief, at 23-24 (record citations omitted).

      While Weaver has tersely summarized what these witnesses said at trial,

he has not drawn any comparison to the facts of the present case or cited to

authority that demonstrates an abuse of discretion committed by a lower

court. Instead, he baldly concludes that their testimony “was not so nearly

identical of [the victim] so as to be like a fingerprint.” Id., at 24. We agree

with Weaver that no charges were ever brought in connection to the claims

made by these witnesses, which were several years removed from the facts

at issue in the present case; however, a lack of criminal charges does not

vitiate the ability for the Commonwealth to introduce evidence of prior bad

acts. Further, the lower court gave a specific cautionary instruction as it

pertained to the testimony of the two witnesses, limiting jury consideration of

their testimony to that of showing Weaver’s absence of mistake and/or

common plan. See N.T., 10/1/21, at 46-47.

      Without any specific contrast made between the two witnesses and the

present victim, Weaver has failed to demonstrate his “heavy burden” that the

lower court abused its discretion in allowing this prior bad act testimony.

Saez, 225 A.3d at 177-78. Notwithstanding the infirmity in his argument, the

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court justified its decision based on the similar facts that were present: (1)

nonconsensual sexual acts being performed; (2) by Weaver on like-aged

individuals; (3) who were acquaintances of Weaver; (4) in the presence of

excessive alcohol consumption; (5) with the acts occurring in dark rooms, in

the middle of the night, away from the rest of the party-like environments.

See Opinion and Order, 1/10/23, at 8. The court predicated its admission of

the two witnesses on the fact that their testimony was being used to show

that there was no mistake by Weaver as it related to his present actions and,

too, that Weaver “clearly ha[d] a common plan, scheme, and design.” N.T.,

10/1/21, at 31. Although this Court may have reached a different conclusion

in allowing this testimony to be adduced at trial, Weaver was required to

demonstrate that the lower court, in fact, abused its discretion via, inter alia,

“manifest unreasonableness.” Saez, 225 A.3d at 178. In the absence of any

salient reason to reverse the lower court’s determination, we find that it did

not abuse its discretion in allowing this prior bad act testimonial evidence.

      In his third issue, Weaver argues that the evidence was insufficient for

him to be deemed an SVP. Weaver claims that the Commonwealth did not

provide clear and convincing evidence that he should be adjudicated as such,

given the fact that his expert witness, Dr. Thomas F. Haworth, Ph.D., refuted

the testimony of a Sexual Offenders Assessment Board (“SOAB”) member’s

expert testimony, offered by the Commonwealth. See Appellant’s Brief, at 25.

In particular, while the SOAB member’s testimony indicated that Weaver

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suffered from the paraphilic disorder of non-consent, Dr. Haworth opined that

Weaver was, like the complainants, intoxicated while engaging in sexual

activity, so Weaver did not meet that disorder’s criteria. Moreover, Dr.

Haworth illuminated the non-consensual nature of most sex-related crimes.

Accordingly, other than the SOAB’s member’s testimony “there was no

evidence to sustain the [lower court’s SVP determination].” Id., at 26.

     “[I]n   reviewing   the   sufficiency    of   the   evidence   regarding   the

determination of SVP status, we will reverse the trial court only if the

Commonwealth has not presented clear and convincing evidence sufficient to

enable the trial court to determine that each element required by the statute

has been satisfied.” Commonwealth v. Moody, 843 A.2d 402, 408 (Pa.

Super. 2004) (citation omitted).

     Clear and convincing evidence means that witnesses must be
     found to be credible, that the facts to which they testify are
     distinctly remembered and the details thereof narrated exactly
     and in due order, and that their testimony is so clear, direct,
     weighty, and convincing as to enable the [fact-finder] to come to
     a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the precise
     facts in issue.

Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). An SVP is “an individual

who committed a sexually violent offense” and “who is determined to be a

sexually violent predator ... due to a mental abnormality or personality

disorder that makes the individual likely to engage in predatory sexually

violent offenses.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.12.

     Other than challenging the SOAB member’s credibility to the benefit of

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his own expert’s credibility, Weaver has failed to provide any specific basis to

warrant a conclusion that the evidence was insufficient to find him to be an

SVP. Conversely, the court after evaluating the testimony it was presented

found, inter alia, that Weaver had prior sexual-related arrests and convictions,

which meant that “[h]is arrest history suggests an inability to learn from past

mistakes and/or [is an] endorsement of antisocial traits.” Opinion and Order,

7/15/22, at 5. Further, Weaver “failed to successfully complete his prior

sentence and was revoked from probation as a result of this offense.” Id. “At

the time of the offense [Weaver] was 31-years of age and the victim was 21-

years of age. Both [Weaver] and the victim were consuming alcohol prior to

the sexual assault. Alcohol may have reduced [Weaver’s] inhibitions to

sexually offend and made the victim more vulnerable.” Id.

      As to specific testimony, the court discussed the opinion of the SOAB

member     who    indicated   that   Weaver     “may    suffer   from   alcohol

abuse/dependence, which is considered a concurrent condition and not

relevant to the sexually offending behavior.” Id. That member then went on

to conclude that “[b]ased on his pattern of sexually assaulting vulnerable,

intoxicated, non-consenting females, his offending behavior [met] the

diagnostic criteria for other specified paraphilic disorder-non-consent where

the target of his deviate urges and behaviors are non-consenting, sleeping

females.” Id., at 5-6. This disorder is considered to be a mental abnormality.

See id., at 6. The SOAB member also stated that given his past offenses,

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there was a higher chance of him reoffending. See id. In contrast, the court

“was not persuaded by the testimony of [Dr.] Harworth[.]” Id.

      Other than citing to one piece of authority that broadly defines the

applicable “clear and convincing evidence” standard, Weaver has provided no

substantive refutation of the lower court’s findings and ultimate adjudication

of him as an SVP. Instead, Weaver wants this Court to credit his own expert’s

testimony at the expense of the SOAB member’s findings.

      The court expressly predicated its decision on the SOAB member’s

expert testimony, which identified Weaver as having “other specified

paraphilic disorder, nonconsent” and engaging in “predatory” behavior. SVP

Determination Hearing, 7/5/22, at 12-13. Based on the information that was

gathered and the subsequent analysis thereof, the member unambiguously

concluded that Weaver “suffers from a mental abnormality and personality

disorder as defined by Pennsylvania law.” Id., at 20. In the absence of any

clear indicia that the court made an erroneous conclusion in relying upon this

expert testimony, the evidence was sufficient to find that Weaver was an SVP.

As such, because we may not reweigh credibility determinations, which is

effectively the only clear argument advanced by Weaver in this domain,

Weaver’s third issue merits no relief.

      With none of Weaver’s claims warranting any disturbance of his

sentence, we affirm his judgment of sentence.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

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Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 11/03/2023

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