Court Opinion

ID: 9810394
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 21:49:09.125736+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:39:54.085640
License: Public Domain

JUDGE GABRIEL
dissenting.
139 Although I agree with the majority's analysis of the peremptory challenge issue, I do not agree that the exigent cireamstances exception applies here. Nor do I agree with the People's arguments that the emergency aid exception also applies and that any error in the trial court's denying Terhorst's motion to suppress was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
I. Discussion
'T40 As the majority states, exigent circumstances can justify a warrantless search when there is a risk of the immediate destruction of evidence. Mendes v. People, 986 P.2d 275, 281 (Colo.1999). To establish that there was a risk of the immediate destruction of evidence, the prosecution must show that the police had an articulable basis to justify a reasonable belief that evidence is about to be © removed or destroyed. People v. Wehmas, 246 P.3d 642, 648-49 (Colo.2010). The likelihood of destruction must be "real and immediate such that a warrant could not be obtained in time." Id, at 649; see also People v. Glick, 250 P.3d 578, 586 (Colo.2011) (noting that the police must have a reasonable suspi-clon that relevant evidence is in imminent danger of being destroyed). The mere fact that the evidence is of a type that could easily be destroyed does not alone constitute an exigent .cireumstance. Wehmas, 246 P.3d at 649.
{41 In this case, I have seen nothing suggesting a real and immediate likelihood of the destruction of evidence. Rather, in my view, the evidence shows no more than that alcohol is the type of evidence that could easily be destroyed, which, as noted above, is insufficient. See id.
I am not persuaded otherwise by cases like Mendes. In Mendes, 986 P.2d at 282, our supreme court concluded that "there was a very real and substantial likelihood that contraband would. continue to be destroyed" when an officer investigating a complaint at a motel "smelled the distinct odor of burning marijuana emanating from [the defendant's] room." The court reasoned that "[this odor indicated that evidence of a crime, that is, possession of marijuana, was *247in the process of being burned and thereby destroyed." Id. Thus, in Mendez, unlike in this case, the officer had information beyond the mere fact that evidence could possibly be destroyed. He had evidence that it actually was being destroyed. See id.
1148 Nor am I persuaded by the People's argument that the emergency aid exception applies here. Under the emergency aid exception, the prosecution must prove both that an immediate crisis existed and that assistance would probably have been helpful. People v. Allison, 86 P.3d 421, 426 (Colo.2004). An officer's primary purpose must be to render emergency assistance, not to search for evidence. Id. Thus; an emergency search must be strictly limited by the exigency that created the emergency; the emer- * geney cannot support a general exploratory search. Id. at 426-27.
144 To invoke the emergency aid exception, the police must have a reasonable basis approximating probable cause connecting the emergency to the area to be searched. Id. at 427. In this context, a reasonable basis requires more than a theoretical possibility that another's life or safety is in danger. Id. Instead, it requires a colorable claim that another's life or safety is in danger. Id. The mere possibility of an emergency is insufficient to allow the police to avoid the warrant requirement. Id.
Here, the evidence tended to show that an underage drinking party involving a large number of minors was taking place at Terhorst's home. . In my view, this fact alone was insufficient to establish the requisite immediate crisis. Nor did it support a color-able and nonspeculative claim that another's life or safety. was in danger. And as the above-described case law makes clear, the mere existence of probable cause does not alone establish the requisite emergency, as the People contend.
¶ 46 Accordingly, I do not believe that the emergency aid exception applies here.
147 Because I do not believe that either the exigent cireumstances or emergency aid exception applies in this case, I would conclude that the trial court erred in denying Terhorst's motion to suppress. The question thus becomes whether this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Hagos v. People, 2012 CO 63, ¶ 11, 288 P.3d 116, 119 (noting that preserved constitutional errors require reversal unless the reviewing court is able to say that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and that under this standard, an appellate court must reverse if there is a reasonable possibility that the error might have contributed to the conviction). -
148 On the limited record presented in this case, and given the extent to which the prosecution relied on the evidence discovered in the course of the warrantless search of Terhorst's home, I am unable to say that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
1 49 Accordiﬁgly, I Wbuld reverse the judgment and remand for a new trial,
IL Conclusion
50 For these. reasons, I respectfully dissent.