Court Opinion

ID: 9792664
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:33:52.784187+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:44.559096
License: Public Domain

EDMONDS, J., Dissenting.
I cannot join in the conclusion of my associates that negligence of the persons struck by the appellant’s automobile would exonerate him only if it was the sole proximate cause of the accident.
It appears that after the jurors had considered the case for some time, they returned to the courtroom and the foreman stated they had been unable to agree because “one member feels that negligence has something to do with it”. To this the trial judge replied, “It has absolutely nothing to do with it and I made that plain to you in my instructions. . . There is only one basis upon which you can consider the negligence of the decedents, and that is if it is the sole and only cause of the accident.”
*688Of course, the negligence of one killed in a traffic accident is not a defense to prosecution for negligent homicide as defined in section 500 of the Vehicle Code. However, under that section, the operator of a vehicle is only criminally responsible ‘ ‘ when the death of any person ensues ... as the proximate result of injuries caused by the driving of [such] vehicle in a negligent manner. ...” And testimony of the decedent's negligence, though not the sole cause of an accident, has a legitimate place in the evidence upon which the trier of fact is to determine whether a defendant was driving “in a negligent manner”. As the District Court of Appeal declared in a recent case, although the contributory negligence of a deceased is no defense in a prosecution for manslaughter, it may have an important bearing on the degree of culpability of one charged with that offense. (People v. Hurley, 13 Cal. App. (2d) 208 [56 Pac. (2d) 978].) In other words, it may be determinative of the question whether, under all the circumstances and conditions existing at the time of the accident, the defendant operated his car with due care and circumspection.
The authorities are reviewed in 5 Am. Jur., p. 930, where it is said: “The familiar rule that contributory negligence of the person injured or killed by the negligence of the defendant in the operation of an automobile bars a recovery in a civil action, has no application to a prosecution for homicide due to criminal negligence in operating an automobile. In such case, the decedent’s behavior may have a material bearing upon the question of the defendant’s guilt, but if the culpable negligence of the latter is found to be the cause of the death, he is criminally responsible whether the decedent's failure to use due care contributed to the injury or not. In some cases, the conduct of the decedent is material to the extent that it bears upon the question whether, under all the circumstances of the case, the defendant was negligent.” (Citing cases.)
Another writer discusses the subject as follows: “The general rule of the criminal law that contributory negligence, unless considered as an element of proximate cause, is no excuse for or defense to crime, applies, in prosecutions for homicide caused by the negligent operation of motor vehicles. . . . Except as it may be noted hereafter, it is generally held that the contributory negligence of the decedent *689is no defense, excuse, or justification for the homicide. . . . The conduct of the deceased, however, is material in a prosecution of this nature to the extent that it bears upon the negligence or wrongful conduct of the accused, or on the issue whether the conduct of the accused was the proximate cause of the death of the deceased.” (Huddy’s Cyclopedia of Automobile Law, vol. 9, p. 83, sec. 43.)
In reversing the conviction of an automobile driver who was charged with manslaughter, the Supreme Court of Tennessee declared that the contributory negligence of the boy who was killed would not relieve the defendant of the consequence of his unlawful act. (Copeland v. State, 154 Tenn. 7 [285 S. W. 565, 49 A. L. R. 605].) “But the conduct of the boy was entitled to consideration in determining whether, under the circumstances, Copeland’s negligence was the proximate cause of death, or whether death resulted from an unavoidable accident. . . . Allowance must always be made for misadventure and accident, as distinguished from culpable negligence.” The same conclusion was reached in State v. Custer, 129 Kan. 381 [282 Pac. 1071, 67 A. L. R. 909]. In that case the trial court instructed the jury that contributory negligence was not available as a defense in a criminal prosecution for homicide in the operation of an automobile but that evidence of contributory negligence of the victim was admitted “for whatever it may be worth to you as material evidence bearing upon the question of the defendant’s guilt”. Upon appeal, the court said that the act of the deceased in getting under -the rear of an automobile standing at night on the traveled part of the highway without a red light, was a circumstance to be considered by the jury in determining whether death was or was not caused by unlawful driving, although his conduct did not of itself relieve the defendant of liability. Later the same court said: “Contributory negligence on the part of the deceased is not a defense to a charge of manslaughter. It is only a circumstance determining whether it was or was not caused by the unlawful conduct of the defendant.” (State v. Pendleton, 144 Kan. 410 [61 Pac. (2d) 107].)
So, also, in Held v. Commonwealth, 183 Ky. 209 [208 S. W. 772], the court decided that although the decedent’s negligence was not available to the defendant by way of defense, *690it was relevant and competent on the question of whether the defendant was negligent in the operation of the vehicle, and thereby unintentionally committed the homicide.
From the discussion between the foreman of the jury and the judge, it appears that except for the instruction concerning contributory negligence on the part of the persons killed in the accident, the appellant would not have been convicted. Under these circumstances, in my opinion, there has been a miscarriage of justice entitling the appellant to a new trial. (Const., see. 4%, art. VI.)