Court Opinion

ID: 9942411
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-20 23:06:58.848697+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:48:04.157532
License: Public Domain

02/20/2024

                                         DA 21-0511
                                                                                  Case Number: DA 21-0511

              IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

                                         2024 MT 32

STATE OF MONTANA,

              Plaintiff and Appellee,

         v.

BRADLEY ALAN STOKES,

              Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL FROM:          District Court of the Fourteenth Judicial District,
                      In and For the County of Musselshell, Cause No. DC-20-32
                      Honorable Randal I. Spaulding, Presiding Judge

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

               For Appellant:

                      Chad Wright, Appellate Defender, Deborah S. Smith, Assistant
                      Appellate Defender, Helena, Montana

               For Appellee:

                      Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Daniel M. Guzynski,
                      Mardell Ployhar, Assistant Attorneys General, Helena, Montana

                                                Submitted on Briefs: October 4, 2023

                                                          Decided: February 20, 2024
Filed:

                      __________________________________________
                                       Clerk
Justice James Jeremiah Shea delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1     Defendant Bradley Alan Stokes appeals his convictions in the Fourteenth Judicial

District Court, Musselshell County on both burglary and assault with a weapon. The State

concedes that Stokes cannot be convicted of both charges because the assault with a

weapon charge was the predicate offense for the burglary conviction. Although Stokes’s

trial counsel did not object to Stokes’s convictions on both charges, the State acknowledges

that plain error review is appropriate under the facts of this case. On appeal, the parties

dispute which of Stokes’s convictions should be vacated and whether the matter should be

remanded for resentencing on whichever conviction remains. The State argues that the

burglary conviction should be vacated and the matter should be remanded to the District

Court for resentencing on the assault with a weapon conviction. Stokes argues that the

assault with a weapon conviction should be vacated and his sentence for burglary should

stand as originally imposed. We address:

       Issue One: Whether Stokes’s conviction for burglary or his conviction for
       assault with a weapon should be vacated.

       Issue Two: Whether Stokes’s conviction for burglary should be remanded for
       resentencing.

¶2     We reverse Stokes’s conviction for assault with a weapon and remand this matter to

the District Court to vacate that conviction and for resentencing on the remaining

conviction of burglary.

                 PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

¶3     After a December 2020 altercation at the home of Michael Benson, Stokes was

charged with aggravated burglary, assault with a weapon, and robbery, all felonies. Benson
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and his acquaintance reported that Stokes, seeking money he had previously loaned

Benson, used a crowbar to break into the residence and assaulted Benson with the crowbar.

Law enforcement arrested Stokes the following day at his home. Stokes denied forcing his

way into Benson’s residence and denied bringing the weapon, but acknowledged that he

was present that night seeking repayment of the money he had loaned Benson.

¶4       Stokes was convicted of burglary, as a lesser-included offense of the aggravated

burglary charge, and assault with a weapon.1 The District Court sentenced Stokes to

consecutive five-year suspended sentences on each conviction. The District Court imposed

concurrent $5,000 fines on each conviction. On Stokes’s assault with a weapon sentence,

the District Court imposed the condition that Stokes complete counseling to address

violence, controlling behavior, or chemical dependency. Section 46-23-502(14)(a)(vii),

MCA, requires Stokes to register as a violent offender on the assault with a weapon

conviction.

                                  STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶5       Under the plain error doctrine, the Court “may discretionarily review claimed errors

that implicate a criminal defendant’s fundamental constitutional rights, even if no

contemporaneous objection was made, where failing to review the claimed error may result

in a manifest miscarriage of justice, may leave unsettled the question of the fundamental

fairness of the trial or proceedings, or may compromise the integrity of the judicial

1
    The robbery charge was dismissed upon motion of both parties.
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process.” State v. Wagner, 2009 MT 256, ¶ 12, 352 Mont. 1, 215 P.3d 20 (internal

quotations and citation omitted).

                                      DISCUSSION

       Issue One: Whether Stokes’s conviction for burglary or his conviction for
       assault with a weapon should be vacated.

¶6     The parties agree that the assault with a weapon charge was the predicate offense

for Stokes’s burglary conviction. When a second offense is charged as a predicate to a

principal charge, the accused cannot be convicted of the principal charge without having

committed the predicate offense. State v. Russell, 2008 MT 417, ¶ 26, 347 Mont. 301, 198

P.3d 271. “When the State chooses to charge the offenses in that fashion, the offenses

merge. The predicate offense becomes a lesser included offense . . . .” Russell, ¶ 26 (citing

§§ 46-11-410, 46-1-202(9), MCA). “When a criminal defendant is improperly convicted

of two offenses arising out of the same transaction, the remedy is to reverse the conviction

for the lesser-included offense only and to remand for resentencing.” State v. Brandt, 2020

MT 79, ¶ 31, 399 Mont. 415, 460 P.3d 427 (citing State v. Ellison, 2018 MT 252, ¶ 26, 393

Mont. 90, 428 P.3d 826).

¶7     In this case, the predicate offense of assault with a weapon merged with the burglary

offense and the assault with a weapon offense became the “lesser included offense.”

Russell, ¶ 26. Having been improperly convicted of these two offenses, Stokes’s remedy

“is to reverse the conviction for the lesser-included [assault with a weapon] offense only

and to remand for resentencing.” Brandt, ¶ 31 (citing Ellison, ¶ 26).

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¶8     Relying on State v. Peterson, 227 Mont. 511, 744 P.2d 870 (1987), the State argues

that because Stokes’s assault with a weapon sentence included a statutorily required violent

offender registration and conditions that were not imposed on his burglary sentence, this

means that it exceeded the burglary sentence for purposes of determining which conviction

should be vacated. In Peterson, we held:

       [I]f a defendant is convicted of two crimes, one of which is a lesser-included
       offense of the other, the proper remedy is to remand the case to the trial court
       with instructions to vacate the conviction of the lesser charge where the
       sentence for the lesser-included offense does not exceed that for the main
       offense.

Peterson, 227 Mont. at 512, 744 P.2d at 870. The State’s reliance on Peterson is misplaced.

¶9     The Peterson rule involved a lesser included offense, but not a predicate offense

that merged into the principal offense pursuant to § 46-11-410, MCA. A predicate offense

is both a lesser-included offense and an element of the principal offense. Russell, ¶ 24.

The principal offense encompasses and subsumes the predicate offense.                 In this

circumstance, it is the predicate conviction that violates the statute and therefore must be

the charge that is dismissed. Russell, ¶ 25 (“Russell's conviction of felony homicide

precludes a conviction on the [predicate] aggravated assault charge . . . .”); see also, Kills

on Top v. Guyer, No. OP 18-0656, 2019 Mont. LEXIS 292, 11-12 (Mont. July 30, 2019)

(“Russell was clear that the predicate conviction violates the statute, which must be

dismissed.”).

¶10    Because the predicate offense of assault with a weapon merged into the principal

offense of burglary, the assault with a weapon conviction must be vacated.

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       Issue Two: Whether Stokes’s conviction for burglary should be remanded for
       resentencing.

¶11    The State argues that regardless of which conviction is vacated, the case should be

remanded to the District Court for resentencing. Stokes argues that “[t]here is no basis in

law for the District Court to resentence [him because] [t]he judgment for burglary is legal.”

Stokes argues that the remedy is “to strike the illegal portion of the sentence on remand.”

Stokes’s argument is unavailing.

¶12    Stokes cites our denial of the State’s rehearing petition in Kills on Top in ostensible

support of his argument that the appropriate remedy in this case is to just “strike the illegal

portion of the sentence on remand.” While Kills on Top may be factually analogous

because it involved vacating a predicate offense conviction, it does not support Stokes’s

argument. In Kills on Top, neither side requested resentencing. Having noted that fact, we

nevertheless considered whether remand for resentencing was appropriate. Toward that

end, we expressly considered the amount of time Kills on Top had remaining on his existing

sentence, the remaining years before parole eligibility, his age, and his designation as a

dangerous offender. Having considered all of those factors, we determined that our ruling

would not “fundamentally undermine his sentence in a manner that would require

resentencing, when all the circumstances are considered.” Kills on Top, 2019 Mont.

LEXIS 292, 12 (emphasis added).

¶13    When the State petitioned for rehearing in Kills on Top on the basis that the case

should be remanded for resentencing, we noted that the State had failed to raise this issue

in its opposition to Kills on Top’s petition. We noted that although we had made

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observations about the circumstances of Kills on Top’s sentence, we concluded that

resentencing was unwarranted under the circumstances because those observations were

not material facts on which the decision was based—the decision being our ruling on the

sole issue of whether or not to grant Kills on Top’s petition to reverse his conviction for

aggravated kidnapping. We therefore concluded that “the State’s request for resentencing

is not properly raised for the first time on rehearing.”2 Kills on Top v. Guyer, No. OP

18-0656, 398 Mont. 444, 454 P.3d 627 (Oct. 8, 2019).

¶14    Contrary to Stokes’s argument that “there is no basis in law” for the District Court

to resentence him, we have consistently held that “[w]hen a criminal defendant is

improperly convicted of two offenses arising out of the same transaction, the remedy is to

reverse the conviction for the lesser-included offense only and to remand for

resentencing.” Brandt, ¶ 31 (emphasis added) (citing Ellison, ¶ 26). A predicate offense

is the lesser-included offense to the principal offense. Russell, ¶ 26. In this case, having

reversed the conviction for the predicate, lesser-included offense, Stoke’s remedy is for the

matter to be remanded for resentencing on the remaining conviction. Russell, ¶ 26.

2
  The State’s petition for rehearing failed because it did not secure the requisite support of four
members of the Court. Two members of the Court supported granting the petition, three members
of the Court were opposed. Pursuant to Section IV, Paragraph 2, Supreme Court Internal Operating
Rules, a petition for rehearing is considered by those justices hearing the case in the first instance
and, “[w]hether decided by a five-judge panel or en banc,” four members of the Court must decide
in favor of granting rehearing for it to be granted.
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                                    CONCLUSION

¶15   We reverse Stokes’s conviction for assault with a weapon. We remand this matter

to the District Court to vacate that conviction and for resentencing on Stokes’s burglary

conviction.

                                               /S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA

We Concur:

/S/ MIKE McGRATH
/S/ BETH BAKER
/S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON
/S/ DIRK M. SANDEFUR

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