Court Opinion

ID: 9714241
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:33:41.337646+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:24.558137
License: Public Domain

ROBERTSON, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The exigent circumstances/impracticability justification is no longer germane to the automobile exception. Instead, modern jurisprudence justifies the warrantless search of an automobile and its contents on the basis that a citizen has a lesser expectation of privacy in an automobile. United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478, 485, 105 S.Ct. 881, 885-86, 83 L.Ed.2d 890 (1985). The Johns court noted that the protection afforded by the Fourth Amendment varies in different settings and that an individual's expectation of privacy in a vehicle and its contents may not survive if probable cause is given to believe that the vehicle is transporting contraband. Id. The Johns court held:
Consequently, '[i]f probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search.
Id. (quoting United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 2178, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982); Accord Moody v. State (19883), Ind., 448 N.E.2d 660, 668; Cf. Fyock v. State (1982), Ind., 486 N.E.2d 1089, 1095 (Warrant-*697less search of sock recovered from the floor of an automobile upheld as defendant could not entertain reasonable or substantial privacy expectation with regard to that sock); See also Curry v. State (1994), Ind.App., 6483 N.E.2d 963, 973 (Reliance upon Johns, Ross, Chambers, and Carroll for the proposition that, if probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle that may conceal the object of the search).
The majority's reliance upon California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 111 S.Ct. 1982, 114 L.Ed.2d 619 (1991), for the proposition that the exigent cireumstances/impracticability analysis of Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925) is still required under -the automobile exception is misplaced. The Acevedo court held:
Our holding today neither extends the Carroll doctrine nor broadens the seope of the permissible automobile search delineated in Carroll, Chambers [v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 1981, 26 LEd.2d 419 (1969) (also relied upon in the majority) 1, and Ross. ... We therefore interpret Carroll as providing one rule to govern all automobile searches. The police may search an automobile and the containers within it where they have probable cause to believe contraband or evidence is contained.
500 U.S. at 580, 111 S.Ct. at 1991 (Emphasis added). The dissenters in Acevedo noted:
Relying on arguments that conservative judges have repeatedly rejected in past cases, the Court today-despite its disclaimer to the contrary, ibid. -enlarges the seope of the automobile exception ...
500 U.S. at 585, 111 S.Ct. at 1994 (dissenting opinion of Justice Stevens joined by Justice Marshall). The dissenters noted further:
The Court does not attempt to identify any exigent circumstances that would justify its refusal to apply the general rule against warrantless searches.
500 U.S. at 598, 111 S.Ct. at 1998. Acevedo simply does not support the proposition that exigent cireumstances or impracticability are still required under the automobile exception.
In the present case, as noted by the majority, the police had probable cause to believe that Green was transporting cocaine in Pepsi cans, WD-40 cans, and a film canister in his automobile. As the police had the requisite probable cause, the warrantless search was legal under the automobile exception as defined under current law. Therefore, I would uphold the legality of the search and affirm Green's conviction.