Court Opinion

ID: 9906995
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-05 17:25:31.19638+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:55:11.672213
License: Public Domain

J-A17040-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellee                :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
  GEORGE ANDERSON                              :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :      No. 1062 EDA 2022

      Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 28, 2022
              In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County
            Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0001662-2020

BEFORE:      KING, J., SULLIVAN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.:                              FILED DECEMBER 5, 2023

       Appellant, George Anderson, appeals from the judgment of sentence

entered in the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas, following his jury

trial conviction for firearms not to be carried without a license.1 We affirm.

       The trial court opinion set forth the relevant facts of this case as follows:

          [The testimony adduced at the suppression hearing in this
          matter is as follows.] On May 7, 2020, at approximately
          10:54 p.m., Officer Jeffrey Walls of the Chester City Police
          Department was on routine patrol, in uniform and in a
          marked vehicle, in the area of the 200 Block of East 14th
          Street. Officer Walls was at a red light when he observed a
          silver Jeep traveling south in the 1400 block of Edgemont
          Avenue, with a green light, when the vehicle abruptly came
          to a stop upon observing the officer, and then made a left
          hand turn without a turn signal. Officer [Walls] observed
          the vehicle had a cracked windshield, and he could see that
____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6106(a).
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       the inspection sticker was expired. Officer [Walls] then got
       behind the vehicle, and was unable to read the license plate
       due to a hazy plastic cover over top of it, and dim license
       plate lights, which is a violation of the Motor Vehicle Code.

       Officer [Walls] performed a traffic stop, which was located
       in a high crime area, based on numerous shootings,
       robberies, drug sales, gang activity and homicides in the
       area. Upon pulling the vehicle over, [O]fficer [Walls] read
       the registration and determined it was expired. While
       Officer [Walls] was still seated in his patrol vehicle, he
       observed furtive movements towards the center console
       within the vehicle, and dropped his head down toward the
       center console.

       Officer [Walls] approached the vehicle, and [Appellant]
       (driver) provided his information, which revealed his license
       was suspended (DUI related) and he was not the owner of
       the vehicle. Officer [Walls] smelled the odor of marijuana
       inside the vehicle and asked [Appellant] if he had anything
       illegal inside the vehicle, to which he responded, while
       opening the center console, I don’t have anything in here
       except hand sanitizer. Officer [Walls] found this strange and
       asked again if he had anything illegal, at which point
       [Appellant] became extremely nervous and reaching around
       his person and his sides[.] Officer Walls asked [Appellant]
       to exit the vehicle and he performed a pat down search for
       weapons and was placed toward the rear of the vehicle.

       Officer Litivenko arrived on location, and at that time,
       Officer Walls was performing a protective sweep of the areas
       of the vehicle within reach of [Appellant]. The rear of the
       center console was dislodged, and [O]fficer [Walls] could
       see the handle of a firearm. [Appellant] was placed into
       custody.

       The vehicle was to be towed, in accordance with Department
       policy and procedures, which were followed, and an
       inventory search was performed. Officer Litivenko observed
       marijuana on the passenger side of the vehicle in plain sight
       upon opening the door.

       [Appellant] was taken back to police headquarters where

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          Officer Walls read him Miranda[2] and asked if he would be
          willing to give a written statement that it was his firearm.
          [Appellant] replied that he was the only person in the car,
          so it has to be his, but he would not give a written
          statement. There is nothing in the record that indicates the
          statement was the result of coercion or other unlawful
          means. [Appellant] knowingly and voluntarily made the
          statement to police.

(Trial Court Opinion, filed 11/8/22, at 2-3) (internal citations omitted).

       Procedurally, the Commonwealth charged Appellant with possession of

a firearm prohibited, possession of a firearm with an altered manufacturer

number, firearms not to be carried without a license, possession of a controlled

substance, possession of marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia, and

several violations of the motor vehicle code.

       On November 12, 2021, Appellant filed a motion to suppress. The trial

court conducted a hearing on the motion on February 24, 2022. On April 1,

2022, the court denied the motion to suppress,3 and the case proceeded to

trial. At the close of the evidence, but prior to charging the jury, the trial

court held a charging conference with counsel.        Neither Appellant nor the

Commonwealth raised any objections to the proposed charges.

       During deliberations, the jury raised two questions. After responding to

the first question, which concerned whether all jurors had to agree for a

____________________________________________

2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

3 The trial court “found the testimony of Officer Jeffrey Walls to be [a] credible

account of the events that took place on May 7, 2020.” (Id. at 2).

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unanimous verdict, the court explained the following concerning the jury’s

second question:

         THE COURT: For the second question, which is a little bit—
         we had to re-write it. It seems to be the question is for the
         first element of carrying a firearm without a license, the
         question is (a) if the firearm is anywhere in the car, does it
         qualify as carrying a firearm about one’s person; (b) are all
         the elements of possession relevant for determining
         whether someone was carrying a firearm; and (c) define
         carrying.

(N.T. Trial, 12/7/22, at 171-72).

      The court stated that after discussing the issue with counsel, it appeared

that there was an error in the court’s initial instruction for the elements of

firearms not to be carried without a license.      Specifically, the instruction

originally given to the jury stated “first, that the defendant carried a firearm

concealed or about his person.” (Id. at 172). Upon realizing its error, the

trial court instructed the jury with the correct language, “first that the

defendant carried a firearm concealed inside a vehicle.” (Id.) Appellant did

not object to the trial court’s correction.

      The jury then asked an additional question concerning the definitions of

possession and carrying with respect to the charges of carrying a firearm

without a license and possession of a firearm with an altered serial number.

(See id. at 176-78). The trial court stated: “Possession of a Firearm with an

Altered Serial Number.       That’s what Possession refers to that charge

specifically. Carrying a Firearm Without a License is—in here, it’s not the same

definition of the first charge. Do you understand?” (Id. at 178). The jurors

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stated that they understood, and defense counsel made no objection. Later,

at side bar, defense counsel told the court that everybody was confused and

asked the court to re-read the charge for possession of a firearm with an

altered manufacturer number. (Id. at 179, 181-82). After re-reading the

charge, and confirming the jury understood, the court excused the jury to

continue its deliberation. Defense counsel made no objection to the court’s

subsequent instruction.

       Ultimately, the jury found Appellant guilty of firearms not to be carried

without a license, and not guilty of possession of a firearm with an altered

manufacturer number. After the second portion of the bifurcated trial, where

the Commonwealth introduced evidence of Appellant’s prior conviction, the

jury found Appellant not guilty of persons not to possess a firearm.4        On

February 28, 2022, the court sentenced Appellant to 42 to 84 months of

incarceration. Appellant did not file a post-sentence motion. On March 30,

2022, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. The trial court subsequently

ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal

per Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and Appellant timely complied.

       Appellant raises the following issues on appeal:

          1. Did the trial court err by denying [A]ppellant’s motion to
          suppress physical evidence and statements where Appellant
          had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the areas of the
          vehicle searched?

____________________________________________

4 The Commonwealth withdrew all remaining charges prior to trial.

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         2. Did the trial court err by denying [A]ppellant’s motion to
         suppress physical evidence and statements where the
         officer prolonged the traffic stop beyond its original mission
         absent reasonable suspicion of criminal activity such that
         the searches of the vehicle were unlawful and there was no
         other lawful basis for a warrantless search, in violation of
         the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions?

         3. Did the trial court impose an illegal sentence for carrying
         a firearm without a license where the court had no authority
         to sentence on this charge when the finding of guilt was
         made in the absence of any instruction on the requisite
         element of possession of a firearm?

(Appellant’s Brief at 4) (reordered for purposes of disposition; unnecessary

capitalization omitted).

      Our standard of review of a trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress

evidence is well settled. “Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to

a trial court’s denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining whether

the factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal

conclusions drawn from those facts are correct.”          Commonwealth v.

Williams, 941 A.2d 14, 26 (Pa.Super. 2008) (en banc) (internal citations

omitted).

         [W]e may consider only the evidence of the prosecution and
         so much of the evidence for the defense as remains
         uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a
         whole. Where the record supports the findings of the
         suppression court, we are bound by those facts and may
         reverse only if the court erred in reaching its legal
         conclusions based upon the facts.

Id. at 27.

      Our scope of review is limited to the evidentiary record of the pre-trial

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hearing on the suppression motion. In re L.J., 622 Pa. 126, 79 A.3d 1073

(2013). “It is within the suppression court’s sole province as factfinder to pass

on the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony.”

Commonwealth v. Luczki, 212 A.3d 530, 542 (Pa.Super. 2019) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Clemens, 66 A.3d 373, 378 (Pa.Super. 2013)).                   If

appellate review of the suppression court’s decision “turns on allegations of

legal error,” then the trial court’s legal conclusions are nonbinding on appeal

and subject to plenary review. Commonwealth v. Smith, 164 A.3d 1255,

1257 (Pa.Super. 2017).

       In his first issue, Appellant claims that the trial court erred in finding

that he had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle searched.5

Appellant argues that the Commonwealth’s sole reliance on the fact that he

did not own the vehicle was insufficient to establish the lack of a privacy

interest. Appellant suggests that the “the mere fact that a person is operating

a motor vehicle is sufficient to sustain a finding of reasonable expectation of

privacy in the vehicle where there is no other evidence suggesting that a

defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in a vehicle.” (Appellant’s

Brief at 40).      Further, Appellant insists that evidence showed he was

previously issued a traffic citation while driving the vehicle, and that he was

____________________________________________

5 As previously mentioned, we have reordered Appellant’s issues to consider

this question first, because a reasonable expectation of privacy is a predicate
required to challenge a search. See Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 14 A.3d
907, 910 (Pa.Super. 2011).

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previously involved in an accident in the vehicle, which demonstrates he had

a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle. Appellant concludes the

court’s finding that he lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle

was erroneous, and this Court must grant relief. We disagree.6

       “The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I,

Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution protect individuals against

unreasonable searches and seizures.” Commonwealth v. Hudson, 92 A.3d

1235, 1241 (Pa.Super. 2014), appeal denied, 630 Pa. 734, 106 A.3d 724

(2014).    Article I, Section 8 can provide no less protection than what the

Fourth Amendment requires. Commonwealth v. McCree, 592 Pa. 238, 246,

924 A.2d 621, 626 (2007). “A defendant moving to suppress evidence has

the preliminary burden of establishing standing and a legitimate expectation

of privacy.” Maldonado, supra at 910.

              [G]enerally under Pennsylvania law, a defendant
              charged with a possessory offense has automatic
              standing to challenge a search. “However, in order to
              prevail, the defendant, as a preliminary matter, must
              show that he had a privacy interest in the area
              searched.”

              An expectation of privacy is present when the
              individual, by his conduct, exhibits an actual
              (subjective) expectation of privacy and that the
              subjective expectation is one that society is prepared
              to recognize as reasonable.        The constitutional
____________________________________________

6 Although Appellant also emphasizes his standing to challenge the search in

question, the law in Pennsylvania remains clear that “[a] defendant with
standing must still establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area
searched.” Maldonado, supra at 911 n.3.

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            legitimacy of an expectation of privacy is not
            dependent on the subjective intent of the individual
            asserting the right but on whether the expectation is
            reasonable in light of all the surrounding
            circumstances.

         Commonwealth v. Jones, 874 A.2d 108, 118 (Pa.Super.
         2005) (internal citations omitted).

Commonwealth v. Burton, 973 A.2d 428, 435 (Pa.Super. 2009) (en banc).

         In determining whether a person’s expectation of privacy is
         legitimate or reasonable, we must consider the totality of
         the circumstances and the determination ultimately rests
         upon a balancing of the societal interests involved. The
         constitutional legitimacy of an expectation of privacy is not
         dependent on the subjective intent of the individual
         asserting the right but on whether the expectation is
         reasonable in light of all the surrounding circumstances.

Commonwealth v. Kane, 210 A.3d 324, 330 (Pa.Super. 2019), appeal

denied, 655 Pa. 496, 218 A.3d 856 (2019), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 140

S.Ct. 2650, 206 L.Ed.2d 718 (2020) (internal citations and quotation marks

omitted).

      In Maldonado, supra, police pulled over the appellee’s vehicle while

the appellee was driving his paramour’s car. At the suppression hearing, the

Commonwealth presented evidence that the appellee’s paramour owned the

vehicle in question and that the appellee lived with her at the address where

the vehicle was registered.   The appellee offered no evidence that he had

permission to drive the car on the day in question. The trial court ultimately

granted the appellee’s suppression motion. On appeal, this Court reversed

and remanded.     In addressing the question of the appellee’s reasonable

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expectation of privacy, this Court stated that the fact that the appellee and

his paramour “might have lived together…does not foreclose the possibility

that [the appellee] was driving [the paramour’s] vehicle without her

knowledge or permission.” Maldonado, supra at 911. Therefore, because

the appellee did not demonstrate that he had the authority to operate the

vehicle, this Court concluded that the suppression court erred in granting the

suppression motion. See id.

        In Commonwealth v. Brown, 64 A.3d 1101 (Pa.Super. 2013), appeal

denied, 622 Pa. 747, 79 A.3d 1096 (2013), this Court again considered

whether a defendant established that he had a reasonable expectation of

privacy in an automobile that he did not own. There, the defendant offered

no evidence of any relationship to the owner, nor did he offer any testimony

that he had the authority to operate the automobile on the night in question.

Thus, this Court agreed with the suppression court that the defendant “failed

to establish a legally cognizable expectation of privacy in the vehicle necessary

for him to prevail” on his challenge to the search of the automobile. Id. at

1107.

        Instantly, police pulled Appellant over while he was driving a car that

was not registered to him. Although the record demonstrated that the car

was registered to Appellant’s aunt, and that Appellant had driven the car in

the past, Appellant presented no evidence that he had permission to drive the

car on the day of his arrest. Under these circumstances, Appellant did not

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demonstrate that he had the authority to operate the vehicle.            Thus, we

conclude that Appellant failed to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy

in the vehicle he was driving.7 See Brown, supra; Maldonado, supra.

       Appellant’s third question on appeal raises two distinct issues, which we

will address separately. First, Appellant claims that his sentence for firearms

not to be carried without a license is illegal based on the trial court’s alleged

error in instructing the jury on this charge. Appellant argues that the trial

court erred in responding to the jury’s question during deliberations by stating

that the definition of “possession” associated with possession of a firearm with

an altered serial number did not apply to the definition of firearms not to be

carried without a license, and that firearms not to be carried without a license

was not a possessory offense.            (Appellant’s Brief at 49-50).   Appellant

maintains that because the court’s jury instruction was flawed, the statutory

preconditions to the court’s sentencing authority were not fulfilled and the

sentence imposed was illegal. We disagree.

       Our Supreme Court has identified four broad categories of challenges

____________________________________________

7 Based on our determination that Appellant did not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the vehicle, we need not address his contention in
his second issue concerning whether officers had the requisite reasonable
suspicion to conduct the vehicle search. Although the trial court denied the
motion to suppress based on its conclusion that the officers had the requisite
reasonable suspicion to search, “if the record supports the result reached by
the suppression court, we may affirm on any ground.” Commonwealth v.
Cartagena, 63 A.3d 294, 301 (Pa.Super. 2013) (en banc).

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that fall within the definition of illegal sentencing challenges.8      Appellant

alleges that his challenge falls within the second category.

          The second category encompasses allegations that a
          sentence was imposed without the fulfillment of statutory
          preconditions to the court’s sentencing authority. … [A]
          successful challenge means that the court issued a sentence
          that it lacked the statutory authority to impose. In other
          words, if the sentencing statute at issue conditions the
          court’s authority to impose a sanction upon the existence of
          attendant circumstances, and if those circumstances were
          not present, then the court lacked statutory authority to
          impose the sentence, even though the unfulfilled conditions
          may not raise an issue of constitutional dimension. …

Id. at ___, 277 A.3d at 562 (internal citations omitted).

       Here, the jury convicted Appellant of firearms not to be carried without

a license, and the court sentenced him on that count. Appellant’s concern

with the specific instructions given is not a challenge to the court’s statutory

authority to impose a sentence. Rather, it is a challenge to the trial court’s

jury instructions.     Appellant cites no law to support his proposition that a

court’s allegedly incorrect jury instruction can give way to an illegal sentencing

challenge on these grounds. (See Appellant’s Brief at 47-49).

____________________________________________

8 See Commonwealth v. Prinkey, ___ Pa. ___, ___, 277 A.3d 554, 562-63

(2022) (explaining that illegal sentencing challenges must fall within four
categories: “a claim that a sentence was imposed pursuant to a facially
unconstitutional sentencing statute”; “allegations that a sentence was
imposed without the fulfillment of statutory preconditions to the court’s
sentencing authority”; “claims that allege a violation of a substantive
restriction that the Constitution places upon a court’s power to apply the
statutory sentence to the defendant”; and claims that “a sentence is illegal
[because] the statutory support for the underlying conviction is void ab
initio”).

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      We turn next to Appellant’s alternative claim, that he is entitled to a new

trial because the trial court erred in answering the jury’s question regarding

the definition of possession as applied to firearms not to be carried without a

license. Preliminarily, we must discern whether Appellant properly preserved

this issue for appeal.

      Our Supreme Court has held that “the plain language of [Pa.R.Crim.P.]

647(B) requires a specific objection to assign error to a controverted aspect

of or omission from a jury charge.” Commonwealth v. Pressley, 584 Pa.

624, 629–30, 887 A.2d 220, 223 (2005).

         The pertinent rules, therefore, require a specific
         objection to the charge or an exception to the trial court’s
         ruling on a proposed point to preserve an issue involving a
         jury instruction. Although obligating counsel to take this
         additional step where a specific point for charge has been
         rejected may appear counterintuitive, as the requested
         instruction can be viewed as alerting the trial court to a
         defendant’s substantive legal position, it serves the salutary
         purpose of affording the court an opportunity to avoid or
         remediate potential error, thereby eliminating the need for
         appellate review of an otherwise correctable issue.

Id. at 630-31, 887 A.2d at 223 (footnotes omitted; emphasis added). See

also Pa.R.Crim.P. 647(c) (explaining that no portions of jury charge nor

omissions from charge may be assigned error, unless specific objections are

made thereto before jury retires to deliberate); Commonwealth v. Melton,

No.   849   EDA   2018    (Pa.Super.     filed   Apr.   27,   2020)   (unpublished

memorandum), appeal denied, 662 Pa. 489, 240 A.3d 109 (2020) (holding

appellant waived challenge to court’s failure to give requested corpus delicti

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instruction; although appellant submitted proposed point for charge regarding

corpus delicti instruction and initially objected to jury instructions, appellant

failed to object to court’s supplemental instructions which had inadvertently

omitted requested instruction; appellant’s failure to object to supplemental

instruction deprived court of opportunity to correct its error at appropriate

stage of proceedings and to alleviate appellate issues).9

       Here, the relevant exchange is as follows:

          JUROR: Sorry, Your Honor. So I just want to reiterate if I
          understood correctly. All three elements of possession have
          to be met in order for the carrying a concealed weapon on
          a person to be met?

          THE COURT: Right.

          JUROR: Did I hear that correctly?

          THE COURT: This is not carrying a firearm on a person.
          This case involves a firearm in a car.

          JUROR: Or on a—on or about—

          THE COURT: Right.

          JUROR: —in a vehicle?

          THE COURT: First, that the defendant carried a firearm
          concealed in a vehicle. Has to be met. And then the other
          two elements also have to be met in order to convict the
          defendant of carrying a firearm without a license.

          THE JUROR: I guess my question was we were wondering
          if possession, the definition of possession, applied to—had
          to be met for the carrying—yeah.
____________________________________________

9 See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (stating we may rely on unpublished decisions of this

Court filed after May 1, 2019 for their persuasive value).

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       [DISTRICT ATTORNEY]:       That’s the third question, Your
       Honor.

       THE COURT: The—you mean carrying? Yeah, the third—

       [DISTRICT ATTORNEY]: The one that says—it was the last
       question. Wasn’t there one—

       THE COURT: Well, there [were] two questions.

       [DISTRICT ATTORNEY]: I thought there was one more
       about the possession elements.

       UNKNOWN FEMALE: Define carrying. I think they’re getting
       confused about the definition of carrying versus possession.
       Are they the same thing.

       THE COURT: Okay. Possession only refers to the first
       charge, which is—what was the first charge?

       [DISTRICT ATTORNEY]:       Possession of a firearm with an
       altered serial number.

       THE COURT: Possession of a firearm with an altered serial
       number. That’s what possession refers to that charge
       specifically. Carrying a firearm without a license is—in here,
       it’s not the same definition of the first charge. Do you
       understand?

       JUROR: Yep.

       JUROR: Yes.

       THE COURT: Okay? I’m going to send you back. Does that
       answer your questions?

       JUROR: Yes.

       JUROR: Yes, Your Honor.

       THE COURT: Okay. Does counsel have any other additions
       or thoughts? Okay?

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        [DISTRICT ATTORNEY]: I don’t.

        THE COURT: All right.

        [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Judge –

        THE COURT: I’m going to—this is the re-worded carrying a
        firearm without a license. I believe it answers all your
        questions.

        JUROR: Yes.

        THE COURT: Okay? So we’re going to send you back and
        then—with copies of [these] elements. The other one—the
        other ones you have are the same. Okay? All right.

        [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Judge, can we approach?

                                    *     *      *

        [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: —everybody’s here and they’re very
        confused, I am — I’m going to ask you to read the whole
        charge again, 6110.2, possession of a firearm with an
        altered manufacturer’s number, just for the good of the
        jury.

                                    *     *      *

        THE COURT: Okay? I’m going to re-read it, so.

(N.T. Trial at 176-181) (unnecessary capitalization omitted). The trial court

then re-read the jury instruction for possession of a firearm with an altered

manufacturer’s number, and Appellant did not object to this instruction, or

ask the court to supply any other supplemental instructions.

     Upon review, we conclude that Appellant did not preserve his objection

to the court’s jury instructions.       We disagree with Appellant’s claim that

because defense counsel asserted that “everybody was very confused” he

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sufficiently preserved the issue.10 Significantly, after defense counsel made

that statement, and requested re-reading of the instruction for possession of

a firearm with an altered number, the trial court re-read the full instruction as

counsel requested, and counsel lodged no further objections.11          Notably,

Appellant also did not ask the court to re-read the instruction for firearms not

to be carried without a license. On this record, Appellant waived any challenge

to the jury instructions. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 647(B); Pressley, supra; Melton,

supra. Accordingly, we affirm.

       Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Date: 12/5/2023

____________________________________________

10 We note that defense counsel’s statement that everybody was confused
related to the charge for possession of a firearm with an altered
manufacturer’s number, and not for the charge of firearms not to be carried
without a license, which is at issue here.

11 Although Appellant suggests that defense counsel also made an “off-the-

record” objection, Appellant offers no proof that such objection was made.

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