Court Opinion

ID: 9548135
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:58:02.107093+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:18:30.493150
License: Public Domain

BISTLINE, Justice,
concurring specially.
On the understanding that the majority opinion is confined to a simple holding that the failure to physically “attach” to the body of the earnest money agreement the sheet of paper setting forth the legal description did not vitiate the agreement, I concur.
To my mind, cases cited by Justice McFadden in his dissent seem to support the result reached by Justice Donaldson. Those cases stand for the proposition that a separate writing can be incorporated into a contract by reference, but that the relation or connection between the two writings must appear facially, i. e., that resort to parol evidence is not permissible to establish such a relation or connection. Thus, if the language “full legal attached” had not been a part of the earnest money agreement reference to “Howard Russell property located on Beacon Road, Emmett, Idaho, consisting of approx. 200 acres,” my vote would have been with Justice McFadden. As the dissent intimates, this Court should not enforce “incomplete and informal land sale contracts.”1 On its face, however, “full legal attached” establishes that there *155is another sheet of paper which supplies the complete legal description. That sheet of paper, as the majority observes, “accompanied” the earnest money agreement at all times pertinent to this case.
The dissent argues, nonetheless, that the legal description was “insufficiently incorporated” because it was not physically attached to the earnest money agreement itself. Though the dissent does not specify what type of physical attachment would be required in order to gain validity, it would hold that, just as the war was lost for the lack of a nail, for the lack of a staple this agreement must fail. Again, the concerns voiced by the dissent are not without merit; “careless use” of earnest money forms opens the door to fraud, and it could be said “to promote litigation.” But, if all conceivable fraud is to be precluded, then obviously the best rule on attaching separate papers would be to permit no attaching whatever. As a second best, gluing would be preferable, and many are the form deeds which have been recorded in Idaho with a long legal description over-flap glued on where space on the form did not suffice. However, none of the other familiar methods of attaching — staples, clips, rubber bands, string or simple juxtaposition in an envelope or folder — offer any real guaranty against fraud.
I submit that the prevention of fraud is but one concern. The legal profession, both judges and attorneys, and the real estate profession as well, have long recognized that the tedious work (with the very real possibility of error) of copying a long legal description can be readily avoided by attaching a photocopy. When the entire documentation is found side-by-side in a single folder, as here, a commercial transaction should not be aborted on the grounds that “parol evidence” is necessary in order to point out precisely which document was the one intended for physical attachment.
The Court’s ultimate concern, however, is that it be provided with a description which is sufficiently definite to identify the property which forms the subject of the agreement between the parties. A description is sufficiently definite if it evidences the common intent of the parties to deal with respect to a particular piece of property. The case of Allen v. Kitchen, 16 Idaho 133, 100 P. 1052 (1909), does not require more. The description in that case was defective because, unlike here, there was “no reference to any record or external or extrinsic description from which a complete description could be had.” Id. at 143, 100 P. at 1055. Indeed, the description was so inadequate that the parol evidence which appellant there sought to introduce was “for the purpose of supplying, completing, and perfecting a description on its face insufficient and incapable of application.” Id. at 144, 100 P. at 1055. In that case, as the Court observed, even “[t]he name of the city, town or village, and also the county and state” were lacking and would have to have been supplied. Id. In short, Allen v. Kitchen holds that parol evidence is inadmissible when it is employed for the purpose of “supplying and adding to a description insufficient and void on its face.” Id. The present case presents no such problem. Here there is no allegation of indefiniteness, uncertainty, confusion or fraud with regard to the subject matter of this earnest money agreement. Under such circumstances, to hold that the agreement is void simply because the legal description was not physically attached thereto, would be to exalt form over substance.
I repeat that my concurrence in the majority opinion is on the sole and narrow ground that the earnest money agreement was not invalid simply because the legal description was not physically attached thereto. On retrial, there are many remaining issues which necessarily need to be determined in resolving the controversy.

. The dissent’s statement I presume is made in reliance on Matheson v. Harris, 96 Idaho 759, 536 P.2d 754 (1975), Luke v. Conrad, 96 Idaho 221, 526 P.2d 181 (1974), and Suchan v. Rutherford, 90 Idaho 288, 410 P.2d 434 (1966).