Court Opinion

ID: 9727386
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:33:22.888701+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:36.859917
License: Public Domain

HOFFMAN, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The continued possession of a driver's license is an entitlement or property interest which cannot be taken away without procedural due process.
Bell v. Burson (1971), 402 U.S. 585, 589, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 1589, 29 L.Ed.2d 90, 94; Heying v. State (1987), Ind.App., 515 N.E.2d 1125, 1128.
Procedural due process generally requires notice and an opportunity for a hearing appropriate to the nature of the case. Holmes v. Randolph (1993), Ind., 610 N.E.2d 839, 844. IND.CODE § 35-48-4-15(a), the statute in question, requires the suspension of a convicted drug offender's driver's license and vehicle registration without any process whatsoever. The statute clearly denies licensees procedural due process in violation of the 14th Amendment; therefore, I would reverse and remand to the trial court for resentencing.
See Holmes, at 845 (notice of impoundment and impending sale provided by abandoned vehicle statute satisfies due process);
Quiller v. Bowman (1993) [262 Ga. 769], 425 S.E.2d 641 n. 1 (Georgia statute requiring suspension of driver's license of any person convicted of possession of a controlled substance or marijuana meets procedural due process requirements of state and federal constitutions where defendant receives both adequate notice of suspension and an administrative hearing).
Furthermore, although the supreme court of this state has not held that the right to drive is fundamental for purposes of substantive due process analysis, the realities of modern society demand such a holding at the present time. In Berlinghieri v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1983), 33 Cal.3d 392, 188 Cal.Rptr. 891, 657 P.2d 383, the California Supreme Court held that a driver's license is a fundamental right for purposes of applying an independent standard of review to the DMV's deci*1068sion to suspend or revoke such license. The Berlinghieri court made the following pertinent observations in its opinion:
"In our present travel-oriented society, the retention of a driver's license is an important right to every person who has obtained such a license. [Citation omitted.]. While we might agree with [the DMV's] observation that there exist alternative means of transportation, the reality of contemporary society is that public transportation systems may not meet the needs of many travellers and other forms of transportation, such as taxicabs, are not economically feasible for a large portion of the population.
Whether a driver's license is required only for delivering bread, commuting to work, transporting children or the elderly, meeting medical appointments, attending social or political functions, or any combination of these or other purposes, the revocation or suspension of that license, even for a six-month period, can and often does constitute a severe personal and economic hardship. [Cita tion omitted.]"
Id., 188 Cal.Rptr. at 895, 657 P.2d at 387.
For Maher, as an employee of the South Bend sanitation department, the ability to drive affects his very livelihood. Without a driver's license, Maher cannot work; thus, he cannot support himself or his son. Clearly, the continued possession of his driver's license is of paramount importance to Maher on a personal as well as economic level; therefore, due to its utmost importance and necessity in today's society, the right to drive is fundamental.
Where, as here, a statute burdens a fundamental right, the State must show a compelling rather than a legitimate interest, or the statute will not survive "strict seruti-ny" review for purposes of substantive due process analysis. FHeying at 1129. By mandating the suspension of a convicted drug offender's driver's license, IND. CODE § 85-48-4-15(a) reduces the sale and distribution of drugs by automobile. The statute also removes from the road drivers who are likely to be under the influence of drugs. As the State notes, our legislature has a duty to enact legislation providing for the general welfare and safety of the people of Indiana. Terpstra v. State (1988), Ind.App., 529 N.E.2d 889, 846. IND.CODE § 35-48-4-15(a) promotes highway safety, and as highway safety is a compelling state interest (Terpstra at 846), the statute does not violate substantive due process.