Court Opinion

ID: 9889736
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-11 14:06:49.064168+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:48:21.135873
License: Public Domain

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                    COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

                            APPEALS COURT

                                            22-P-511

            JOHN DOE, SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD NO. 1483

                                 vs.

                     SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD.

              MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

     The plaintiff, John Doe (Doe), appeals from a Superior

Court judgment affirming his reclassification by the Sex

Offender Registry Board (board) as a level two sex offender.

Doe primarily argues that the level two reclassification should

be vacated because it was not supported by clear and convincing

evidence.    We affirm.

     Background.    We summarize the facts as found by the hearing

examiner, "supplemented by undisputed facts from the record."

Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 10800 v. Sex Offender

Registry Bd., 459 Mass. 603, 606 (2011) (Doe No. 10800).

     On March 13, 1978, a woman and her boyfriend were sitting

in a car in Boston around 1:50 A.M.    Doe approached the parked

car, brandished a knife, and robbed the boyfriend of fifty

dollars.    He then forced the woman to accompany him into a
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building, raped her, and robbed her of ten dollars.    On May 10,

1978, following a trial in the Superior Court, Doe was convicted

of rape, armed robbery, and kidnapping, and sentenced to

concurrent State prison terms of from fifteen to twenty-five

years on the rape and armed robbery convictions, and from five

to ten years on the kidnapping conviction.

     On October 21, 1998, "several citizens" reported that Doe

"was masturbating in the street for the past couple of weeks."

Doe was subsequently arrested and charged with open and gross

lewdness and lascivious behavior, possession of a class D

substance, and failure to register as a sex offender.   He

pleaded guilty 1 to the lesser included offense of lewd and

lascivious behavior. 2

     On November 8, 2004, a woman sitting in the food court at

South Station saw Doe "looking right at her while he stroked his

penis through the outside of his pants."   She "observed his

penis to be erect, through an outline in his pants."    The woman

1 The defendant's criminal offender record information ("CORI")
shows the entry of a not guilty finding on the counts of
possession of a class D substance and failure to register.
2 Although Doe was convicted of the lesser included offense only,

the hearing examiner found that "the incident of open and gross
lewdness and lascivious behavior in fact occurred," in view of
the "several citizens" who reported the crime, as well as the
corroborating similarities to Doe's pattern of behavior during
subsequent sexual misconduct.
                                                                   3

left the area, reported the incident, and, upon her return with

a security guard, Doe "got up and fled the area."

     A few weeks later, on November 29, 2004, the same woman,

dining in the same public location, again observed Doe

"masturbating while looking at her."    The woman subsequently

identified Doe from a "photo lineup," and Doe was charged and

convicted of two counts of "lewdness, wanton, and lascivious

behavior."

     On April 8, 2006, a different woman, while sitting with her

mother in the lobby of a building, observed Doe sit across from

her and place a newspaper across his lap.    When the woman made

eye contact with Doe, he removed the newspaper from his lap,

exposed his penis, and "began to masturbate in front of her and

her mother."    Although Doe was charged with open and gross

lewdness and lascivious behavior, the charge was dismissed.

Nonetheless, the board's hearing examiner found "there to be

sufficient reliable and credible evidence to believe that the

[criminal charge] in fact occurred," and considered this event

to be "further sexual misconduct."

     On August 3, 2006, the board classified Doe as a level

three sex offender.    Doe subsequently filed a motion for

reclassification and, following a de novo reclassification

hearing, a hearing examiner reclassified Doe as a level two sex

offender.    Thereafter, Doe sought judicial review pursuant to
                                                                      4

G. L. c. 30A, § 14, and a Superior Court judge denied his motion

for judgment on the pleadings and affirmed the level two

classification.    Doe timely appealed.

     Discussion.   1.   Standard of review.   A reviewing court may

set aside a decision of the board if it determines "that the

decision is unsupported by substantial evidence or is arbitrary

or capricious, an abuse of discretion, or not in accordance with

law" (citation omitted).    Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No.

22188 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 101 Mass. App. Ct. 797, 801

(2022).   While we review a judge's consideration of an agency

decision de novo, Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 523391 v.

Sex Offender Registry Bd., 95 Mass. App. Ct. 85, 89 (2019) (Doe

No. 523391), we "give due weight to the experience, technical

competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency, as well as

to the discretionary authority conferred upon it."    Doe, Sex

Offender Registry Bd. No. 10216 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd.,

447 Mass. 779, 787 (2006), quoting G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7) (Doe

No. 10216).   Doe therefore "bears a heavy burden of establishing

that the [board]'s decision was incorrect" (citation omitted).

Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 3177 v. Sex Offender Registry

Bd., 486 Mass. 749, 757 (2021).

     2.   Application of statutory and regulatory factors.   Doe

contends that the level two reclassification was not supported

by substantial evidence because the hearing examiner erred in
                                                                    5

the application of board factors 2 (repetitive and compulsive

behavior), 7 (relationship between offender and victim), 13

(non-compliance with community supervision), and 29 (offense-

free time in the community).   See 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.33

(2016).   The claim is unavailing.

     When reviewing a decision by the board, we "must determine

whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence,"

which is defined as "such evidence as a reasonable mind might

accept as adequate to support a conclusion."   Doe No. 10800, 459

Mass. at 632, quoting Doe No. 10216, 447 Mass. at 787, and G. L.

c. 30A, § 1 (6).   Our review "does not turn on whether, faced

with the same set of facts, we would have drawn the same

conclusion, . . . but only whether a contrary conclusion is not

merely a possible but a necessary inference" (quotation and

citation omitted).   Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 68549 v.

Sex Offender Registry Bd., 470 Mass. 102, 110 (2014) (Doe No.

68549).   See also Doe No. 10800, supra at 633 ("It is the

province of the board, not this court, to weigh the credibility

of the witnesses and to resolve any factual disputes").

Furthermore, the "hearing examiner has discretion . . . to

consider which statutory and regulatory factors are applicable

and how much weight to ascribe to each factor."   Doe No. 68549,

470 Mass. at 109-110.
                                                                    6

     Here, the record reveals a comprehensive and reasonable

analysis and weighing of the various board factors.   First,

apart from the findings vis-à-vis the four factors now

challenged on appeal, the hearing examiner determined that risk

elevating factors 8 (weapons, violence, or infliction of bodily

injury), 9 (alcohol and substance abuse), 10 (contact with

criminal justice system), 11 (violence unrelated to sexual

assaults), 12 (behavior while incarcerated or civilly

committed), 16 (public place), 19 (level of physical contact),

20 (diverse sexual behavior), and 22 (number of victims) all

applied to Doe.   Furthermore, the hearing examiner also ascribed

full weight to risk mitigating factors 30 (advanced age), 33

(home situation and support systems), and 34 (stability in the

community).   The hearing examiner also applied factor 32 (sex

offender treatment), but gave it minimal weight, as Doe had

reoffended after participating in such treatment, thus "calling

into question its effectiveness."   The record supports the

hearing examiner's analysis and application of these myriad

factors, and Doe does not challenge them on appeal.

     With this background in mind, we return to Doe's claim that

because the hearing examiner misapplied factors 2, 7, 13, and

29, he could not have provided a "reasoned analysis" supported

by substantial evidence.   As to factor 2 (repetitive and

compulsive behavior), Doe's counsel acknowledged at oral
                                                                  7

argument that in view of the recent Supreme Judicial Court

decision in Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 6729 v. Sex

Offender Registry Bd., 490 Mass. 759, 765 (2022), the hearing

examiner did not err in his application of this factor. 3   See id.

(Doe's engagement "in sexual offenses after being convicted of,

and while being investigated for, other sex offenses was

sufficient to satisfy the separate requirement of proving that

his conduct was compulsive as well as repetitive").

     As to the claim that the judge erred in applying factor 7

(relationship between offender and victim), Doe did not raise

this issue before the hearing examiner or the Superior Court

judge.   Accordingly, that argument is waived.   See Doe, Sex

Offender Registry Bd. No. 203108 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd.,

87 Mass. App. Ct. 313, 321 (2015) (claims that application of

certain regulatory factors was arbitrary and capricious "waived

because they were not raised below").

     As to Doe's claim that the hearing examiner erred in

applying factor 13 (non-compliance with community supervision),

the record demonstrates that Doe violated probation on three

occasions and violated parole for his rape conviction on three

occasions.   See 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.33(13)(a) ("The Board

3 We acknowledge Doe's counsel's candor in this regard, and
further acknowledge the thorough briefing and arguments of the
parties.
                                                                   8

shall consider the offender who engages in sexual misconduct

while on community supervision to pose a greater risk of

reoffense and a greater degree of danger to the public"). 4

     Finally, we agree with Doe's claim that the hearing

examiner erred in determining that Doe had been offense free for

fifteen years, as his correct offense-free time in the community

was approximately nineteen years, eight months.   That

notwithstanding, the error was minor where the hearing examiner

afforded "full weight to this mitigating factor," even if this

meant full weight to fifteen years, rather than nineteen.

Moreover, in view of the correct application of the myriad other

factors, we cannot say that the reclassification of Doe as a

4 Doe claims that the hearing examiner erred in relying on
hearsay to find that the October 21, 1998, incident of open and
gross lewdness and lascivious behavior "in fact occurred," even
though Doe only pleaded guilty to the lesser included offense of
lewd and lascivious behavior. We are not persuaded that the
hearing examiner erred or abused his discretion in this regard.
See note 2, supra. See also Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No.
10304 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 70 Mass. App. Ct. 309, 311-
313 (2007) (permissible use of second level hearsay in finding
that petitioner committed forcible rape pursuant to G. L.
c. 265, § 22A, despite his guilty plea to statutory rape only,
pursuant to G. L. c. 265, § 23). Even assuming, arguendo, that
the hearing examiner erred, Doe has shown no harm requiring
reversal. After a thorough review of the hearing examiner's
comprehensive findings and rulings, we cannot conclude on the
record before us that the downward reclassification of Doe to a
level two sex offender was not based on a "reasoned analysis"
supported by substantial evidence. See Doe No. 10800, 459 Mass.
at 639 (administrative record showed substantial evidence to
support the board's classification, "[e]ven if we were to
conclude that the hearing examiner improperly credited the
[hearsay] statements" of two victims).
                                                                    9

level two sex offender was unsupported by substantial evidence.

To the contrary, the hearing examiner's application and analysis

of all the relevant factors, including but not limited to, Doe's

repetitive and compulsive behavior, substance abuse, criminal

behavior, and violations of the terms of his probation and

parole, viewed in their totality, support the level two

reclassification level. 5

     Upon weighing these factors, the hearing examiner reduced

Doe's classification from a level three to a level two sex

offender.   While Doe does not agree with that result, we

conclude that the hearing examiner's determination that clear

and convincing evidence supported a level two classification was

supported by substantial evidence.   We further conclude that the

5 We note that "[d]etermining an individual's degree of
dangerousness . . . requires a hearing examiner to consider what
type of sexual crime the offender would likely commit if he or
she were to reoffend." See Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No.
496501 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 482 Mass. 643, 651 (2019).
"Pragmatically . . . a hearing examiner would make this
determination based on the sexual crime or crimes that the
offender committed in the past. Where there is a history of
different sexual offenses, the primary focus would likely be on
the crime or crimes recently committed by the offender." Id.
"A hearing examiner, however, may consider an offender's older
sexual offenses where they are relevant to a holistic assessment
of the offender's current degree of dangerousness." Id. In
light of these requirements, it would be helpful to us if, in
the future, hearing examiners explicitly delineate "what type of
sexual crime the offender would likely commit if he or she were
to reoffend," and explain their consideration of the "offender's
older sexual offenses where they are relevant to a holistic
assessment of the offender's current degree of dangerousness,"
where relevant. Id.
                                                                  10

evidence supported the hearing examiner's determination that

Internet publication of Doe's sex offender registration

information served a public safety interest, and that the risk,

danger, and degree of public access determinations were

established by clear and convincing evidence.   See Doe, Sex

Offender Registry Bd. No. 496501 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd.,

482 Mass. 643, 655 (2019) ("Where a sexually violent offender

presents a moderate risk to reoffend and a moderate degree of

dangerousness, Internet publication will almost invariably serve

a public safety interest by notifying potential victims of the

risks presented by the offender in their geographic area. . . .

The efficacy of Internet publication in protecting potential

victims must be determined based on the facts of each individual

case").    Although that implies that the hearing examiner found a

moderate risk that Doe would reoffend by committing a contact

offense, or a noncontact offense that will put a victim in fear

of bodily harm by reason of a contact sex offense, see id. at

659-660,
                                                               11

we think on this record such a finding is supported. 6

                                   Judgment affirmed.

                                   By the Court (Rubin, Neyman &
                                     Walsh, JJ. 7),

                                   Clerk

Entered:   October 11, 2023.

6 To the extent that we have not specifically addressed
additional arguments in the parties' briefs, they have been
considered, and do not warrant further discussion. See
Commonwealth v. Domanski, 332 Mass. 66, 78 (1954).
7 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.