Court Opinion

ID: 9420338
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 22:54:01.651531+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:24.210797
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Jackson,
with whom
The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Burton join, dissenting.
I am unable to join the judgment or opinion of the Court for reasons I will state, but shortly.
Section 3 of the Clayton Act does not make any lease, sale, or contract unlawful unless “the effect of such lease, sale, or contract for sale or such condition, agreement or understanding may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to-create a monopoly in any line of commerce.” 38 Stat. 730, 731, 15 U. S. C. § 14. It is indispensable to the. Government’s case to establish that either the actual or the probable effect of the accused arrangement is to substantially dessen competition or tend to create a monopoly.
I am unable to agree that this requirement was met. To be sure, the contracts cover “a substantial number of outlets and^a substantial amount of products, whether considered comparatively or not.” 78 F. Supp. 850, 875. *322But that fact does not automatically bring the accused arrangement within the prohibitions of the statute. The number of dealers and the volume of sales covered by the arrangement of course was sufficient to be substantial. That is to say, this arrangement operated on enough commerce to violate the Act, provided its effects were substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly; But proof of their quantity does not prove that they had this forbidden quality; and the assumption that they did, without proof, seems to me unwarranted.
Moreovér, the trial court not only made the assumption but he did not allow the defendant affirmatively to. show that such effects do not flow from this arrangement. Such evidence on the subject as was admitted was not considered in reaching the decision that these contracts are illegal.
I regard it as unfortunate that the Clayton Act submits such economic issues to judicial determination. It not only leaves the law vague as a warning or guide, and determined only after the event, but the judicial process is not well adapted to exploration of such industry-wide, and even nation-wide, questions.
> But if they must decide, the only possible way for the courts to arrive at a fair determination is to hear all relevant evidence from both parties and weigh not only .its inherent probabilities of verity but- also compare the experience, disinterestedness and credibility of opposing witnesses. This is a tedious process and not too enlightening, but without it a judicial decree is but a guess in the dark. That is all we have here and I do not think it is an adequate basis on which to upset long-standing and widely practiced business arrangements.
I should therefore vacate this decree , and direct the court below to complete the case by hearing and weighing the Government’s evidence and that of defendant as to the effects of this device.
*323However, if the Court refuses to do that, I cannot agree that the requirements contract is per se an illegal one under the antitrust law, and that is the substance of what the Court seems to hold. l am not convinced that the requirements contract as here used is a device for suppressing competition instead of a device for waging competition. If we look only at its effect in relation to particular retailers who become parties to it, it does restrain their freedom .to purchase their requirements elsewhere and prevents other companies from selling to them. Many contracts have the effect of taking a purchaser out of the market for goods he already has bought or contracted to take. But the retailer in this industry is only a conduit from thé oil fields to the driver’s tank, a means by which the oil companies compete to get the business of the ultimate consumer — the man in whose automobile the gas is used. It means to me, if I must decide without evidence, that these contracts are an almost necessary means to maintain this all-important competition for consumer business, in which it is admitted competition is keen. The retail stations, whether independent or company-owned, are the instrumentalities through which competition for this ultimate market is waged.
It does not seem to me inherently to lessen this real competition when an oil company tries to establish superior' service by providing the consumer with a responsible dealer from which the public can purchase adequate and timely supplies of oil, gasoline and car accessories of some known and reliable .standard of quality. No retailer, whether agent or independent, can long remain in business if he does not always, and not just intermittently, have gas to sell. Retailers’ storage capacity usually is limited and they are in nc position to accumula-te large stocks. They can take gas only when and as they can sell it. The Government can hardly force someone to contract to stand by, ever ready to fill *324fluctuating demands of dealers who will not in turn undertake to buy from that supplier all their requirements. And it is important to the driving public to be able to rely on retailers to have gas to retail. It is equally important that the wholesaler have some incentive to carry the stocks and have the transport facilities to make the irregular deliveries caused by varied consumer demands..
It may be that the Government, if required to do so, could prove that this is a bad system and an illegal one. It- may be that' the deféndant, if permitted to do so, can prove that it is, in its overall aspects, a good system and within the law. But on the present record the Government has not made a case.1
If the courts are to apply the lash of the antitrust laws to the backs of businessmen.to make them compete, we cannot in fairness also apply the lash whenever they hit upon a successful method of competing. That, insofar' as I am permitted by the record to learn the facts, appears to be tiie case before us. I would reverse. •

 The Government can derive no comfort for this sort of thing from International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U. S. 392. There the defendant started with a patent monopoly of the machine for utilization of its product. The customers, canners, were in effect the ultimate consumers of salt as such. But they could get the advantages of the invention only if they tied themselves to use no other salt therein.