Court Opinion

ID: 9596827
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:53:17.782636+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:42:53.339157
License: Public Domain

Carley, Justice,
concurring.
Our holding that the trial court erred in denying the pro-pounder’s motion for directed verdict is dispositive of all issues raised in the appeal and in the caveator’s cross-appeal. This is so because the only basis for the caveat was the alleged monomania of the testator. Except for the allegation of monomania, caveator admitted the testamentary capacity of the testator. Because our reversal of the denial of the directed verdict leaves nothing to be retried, we need not consider the propounder’s additional enumeration of error complaining of the trial court’s admission of evidence concerning an earlier will. Likewise our holding deprives the “defensive” cross-appeal of any viability. The caveator’s cross-appeal asserted that in the event of the reversal of the judgment in his favor, this Court should determine that the admission of certain evidence was erroneous so that such evidence would be excluded on retrial. However,
reversal by an appellate court of the trial court’s denial of a motion for a directed verdict can mean only that a directed verdict should have been and should be entered. This is tantamount to a reversal with direction, and thus no retrial can *843be held on those issues.
Decided October 16, 1995
Reconsideration denied November 9, 1995.
Newton, Smith, Durden, Kaufold & Rice, Wilson R. Smith, for appellant.
Gandy, Rice & Sundberg, L. Spencer Gandy, Jr., for appellee.
(Emphasis in original.) Kirkland v. Southern Discount Co., 187 Ga. App. 453, 454 (1) (370 SE2d 640) (1988). Thus, even if the trial court erred as alleged in the cross-appeal, it is not reviewable because the propounder is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law and, thus, there will be no new trial.
I am authorized to state that Justice Sears joins in this concurrence.