Court Opinion

ID: 9685528
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 14:45:46.66916+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:07.405198
License: Public Domain

D. E. Shelton, J.
(dissenting). 1 concur in the decision of my colleagues, except with regard to issue ii. I dissent with regard to that issue, and would reverse.
*149As the majority points out, the prosecutor’s statement that the child involved could not be called as a witness was an intentional misrepresentation of material fact. The intentional nature of this misconduct by the prosecutor is apparent from the fact that the prosecutor had listed the child as a witness and had just successfully opposed a motion that would have required the prosecutor to call her as a witness. She was available and had not been ruled incompetent to testify. It is clear that the prosecutor had predetermined a strategy that would allow her to admit the child’s out-of-court statement of identification without having to call her as a witness. There is certainly nothing inherently unfair about that strategy. But when the prosecutor then told the jury that she could not call the child as a witness, it was a deliberate attempt to deceive the jury with regard to why the child had not testified.
The intentional misrepresentation of material fact by a prosecutor is offensive to the maintenance of a sound judicial system. People v Robinson, 386 Mich 551, 563; 194 NW2d 709 (1972). It is manifestly unjust. People v McCain, 84 Mich App 210; 269 NW2d 528 (1978); People v George, 130 Mich App 174; 342 NW2d 908 (1983).
The majority holds that the prosecutor’s misconduct was waived by defendant’s failure to request a curative instruction. I disagree. Such a waiver should be found only when the misconduct is not so manifest as to result in a miscarriage of justice. People v Federico, 146 Mich App 776; 381 NW2d 819 (1985); People v Williams, 114 Mich App 186; 318 NW2d 671 (1982). Where the prosecutor’s misconduct goes to the essential element of the case, a failure to request a curative instruction should not prevent this Court from remedying the prosecutor’s intentional misrepresentation. People *150v Foster, 175 Mich App 311, 317-319; 437 NW2d 395 (1989); George, supra at 180.
Here, the child’s statement and her alleged observation of the man who placed cocaine on the ground was the crucial evidence in the prosecution’s case and was clearly instrumental in defendant’s conviction. Although the jury may well have had some doubts about that evidence in light of the prosecutor’s failure to call the child as a witness, any such doubt may have been alleviated when the prosecutor misled them by stating that she could not call the child to verify the identification in court. It is manifest injustice to uphold a conviction obtained by such misconduct. I would reverse on the basis of that issue.