Court Opinion

ID: 9853661
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:51:47.864203+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:58.479402
License: Public Domain

*49BIRD, C. J., Concurring and Dissenting.
I reluctantly cannot sign the majority opinion, since it fails to articulate clear guidelines to trial courts which must rule on severance and joinder issues.
There are two statutes which deal with joinder, severance and consolidation in criminal prosecutions in our courts. Penal Code section 10981 sets forth when separate defendants may be tried together at one trial, and section 954 outlines when separate offenses or counts may be tried together (assuming the defendants may be joined under section 1098.)
These provisions operate in similar fashion. No joint trial is permissible except in certain prescribed situations: two or more defendants may be tried together only if they are “jointly charged” with.a public offense (§ 1098); and two or more offenses or counts may be tried together if they are (1) “different offenses connected together in their commission,” (2) “different statements of the same offense,” or (3) “different offenses of the same class of crimes or offenses.” (§ 954.) Unless these conditions exist, a joint trial of defendants or offenses is “ ‘not authorized by statute and [does] not rest in mere discretion.’ ” (People v. Davis (1940) 42 Cal.App.2d 70, 75 [108 P.2d 85], quoting from McElroy v. U.S., 164 U.S. 76, 81 [41 L.Ed. 355, 357, 17 S.Ct. 31].) However, the trial court may sever one or more defendants and/or counts even where a joint trial is permitted. “[T]he Legislature [has] left to the courts the determination of standards governing such [discretionary] severances.” (People v. Aranda (1965) 63 Cal.2d 518, 529 [47 Cal.Rptr. 353, 407 P.2d 265].) Generally, a severance in this situation will be granted where a joint trial would be potentially prejudicial to one (or more) defendant on any count. (Walker v. Superior Court (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 938 [112 Cal.Rptr. 767]; People v. Chambers (1964) 231 Cal.App.2d 23, 31-32 [41 Cal.Rptr. 551].)
The present case involves a question of the propriety of the joinder of defendants. Therefore, only section 1098 is implicated. The majority hold that since “a joint trial is improper [under section 1098] if there is no joint charge,” the trial court was forbidden by statute from trying appellant together with the codefendants not charged with him in the Mini Mart robbery. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 43.) The majority opinion fails to give any guidance to the trial court as to where the severance line should have been drawn. There were three possibilities, as can be seen by referring to the following diagram:

*50
Count I (robbery of Starling) Count II (robbery of Mini Mart)

F (Fleming)
B (Burris) O (Appellant)
R (Rivens) R
A severance could have been granted between (1) appellant and Rivens; (2) count I and count II, or (3) Rivens and his two codefendants on count I (Burris and Fleming). Yet, these three options, while they each satisfy the strict letter of the majority opinion, do not equally carry out the purpose underlying section 1098. That section places limits on the joinder of defendants in order to minimize “the vices inherent in a mass trial.” (People v. Biehler (1961) 198 Cal.App.2d 290, 298 [17 Cal.Rptr. 862].) Among these are “the danger that the jury will find one or more defendants guilty as charged because of his association with evil men . . .” (ibid.) and the likelihood that the jury will use evidence, admitted only as to a codefendant, to the detriment of the others. (Cf. maj. opn., ante, at p. 47.)
The third severance option would not effectuate these purposes since it would permit evidence of both of the charged robberies to be admitted at appellant’s severed trial. This would include the Starling robbery in which Rivens, but not appellant, was accused. While Fleming and Burris would not appear as defendants in such a trial, virtually all the evidence relating to them and to the Starling robbery would still have been admitted to prove or disprove Rivens’ guilt on that charge. Thus, unless this option is ruled out, the protections to be gained by section 1098’s limitation on joinder of defendants is illusory.
The majority opinion, in failing to address these three options, leaves the trial courts and the prosecutors, who draw up the pleadings in criminal cases, without adequate guidance. The law should not remain in this state of confusion and uncertainty until costly litigation decides the issue at some future date.

All references hereinafter to statutes are to the California Penal Code, unless specifically stated otherwise.