Court Opinion

ID: 9850963
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:04:59.656441+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:46.142588
License: Public Domain

PARKS, Judge,
dissenting:
I dissent to the majority’s affirmance of appellants’ convictions, insofar as I agree with appellants that the trial court erred in overruling their motion to quash the information on the ground that the proper charge was first degree manslaughter pursuant to 21 O.S.1981, § 711(1), the misdemeanor-manslaughter rule.
The undisputed testimony in the instant case shows that the appellants knew their child was ill, but chose not to seek secular medical treatment relying instead on spiritual means through prayer. Where the misdemeanor-manslaughter doctrine is applicable, it absolutely precludes a charge of second degree manslaughter as a matter of law. See 21 O.S.1981, § 716; Miller v. State, 523 P.2d 1118, 1121 (Okla.Crim.App.1974). At preliminary hearing and trial, the State presented evidence establishing a prima facie violation of 21 O.S.1981, § 852, which provided in relevant part: “Every parent of any child who willfully omits, without lawful authority, to perform any duty imposed upon the parent by law to furnish necessary food, clothing, shelter or medical attendance for such child is guilty of a misdemeanor_” (emphasis added). See Lamb v. State, 293 P.2d 624 (Okla.Crim.App.1956). A charge of first degree manslaughter was applicable here because the death of appellants’ child occurred “without a design to effect death by a person while engaged in the commission of a misdemeanor.” 21 O.S.1981, § 711(1). Accordingly, the charge of second degree manslaughter was improper and the trial court erred in overruling the motion to quash.
The majority ignores the foregoing applicable law, stating that reliance on the good faith spiritual means defense of 21 O.S. 1981, § 852, would have provided appellants with an absolute defense to first degree manslaughter. It “would have forced the State into the untenable position of charging the appellants with a crime for which they could not be convicted in the State of Oklahoma.” Majority Opinion, at 697. Such a position impermissibly invades the province of the jury by substituting the majority’s judgment, which is speculation at best, that the jury would have found this defense under the facts presented. But the question of whether appellants relied upon spiritual means “in good faith” within the meaning of 21 O.S.1981, § 852, was a question for the jury upon proper instructions. It was for the jury, not the prosecutor or this Court, to determine whether the defense was available based on the evidence presented.
The majority also fails to reconcile its decision today with its prior reasoning in State v. Lockhart, 664 P.2d 1059 (Okla.Crim.App.1983). Judge Bussey, writing for a unanimous court in Lockhart, 664 P.2d at 1060, stated:
We believe that the statute is clear and unambiguous, and expresses a legislative intent that those parents who rely in good faith upon the tenets of their religious belief for the care and protection of their children be allowed a defense to [charges] subsequently arising from their failure to obtain medical assistance for their children.
Thus, under Lockhart, this Court recognized a legislative intent not to punish parents who relied in good faith upon spiritual means for the physical well being of their children. It is absurd to allow district attorneys to circumvent the expressed legislative intent by charging an inapplicable offense under the guise that district attorneys have sole authority to determine what charge to file, as such reasoning flies in the face of Section 716 and Miller, supra.
*700Although it is true that the Legislature amended Section 852, effective November 1, 1983, to eliminate this defense “where permanent physical damage could result to such child,” this substantive change cannot be applied retroactively to the offense here which occurred on July 15, 1983, without violating the ex post facto prohibition. Okla.Const. art. II, § 15. Based on the foregoing, I would reverse and remand for a new trial consistent with the views expressed herein.