Court Opinion

ID: 9677019
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:41:14.218596+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:53.218342
License: Public Domain

JONES, Chief Judge
(concurring).
I concur in the result, but I feel that it is necessary to point up what seems to me to be an important issue in this case which has not been touched upon by the majority.
It is a first principle in law that it is our duty to avoid passing upon the constitutionality of a statute if there are other grounds upon which we may effectively dispose of the controversy.
Keeping that principle in mind, we. should note the wording of the act before us. It provides, “There shall not be paid to any person * * *” [em*593phasis supplied], and there then follows the provisions which the majority has held unconstitutional.
The United States Government has many obligations calling for the payment of money. Some of these arise from contract, others from statute or treaty, and still others from the Constitution itself. Generally speaking, it is within the province of the courts to determine what obligations exist and the extent thereof.
But the payment of these obligations is not the function of the courts. Rather, under the Constitution, the power to pay or to authorize payment of any moneys resides solely in the Congress and it is specifically provided (Art. I, § 9, cl. 7) that,
“No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law *
Out of the three million officials of the Federal Government only 533 are elected by the people, being the 435 members of the House of Representatives, the 96 members of the Senate, the Vice President and President. All others are appointed or selected. In any government, someone must be finally entrusted with the vital responsibility of deciding when money shall be paid out. In a nation in which the source of all power is the people, it is natural that the responsibility for that decision should be lodged in the elected representatives who must come before the voters periodically to account for their stewardship. That is the very essence of democracy and the courts should be ever mindful of the source of governmental power, the careful delegations of that power, and should not lightly presume powers not given to them.
If Congress, therefore, chooses to withhold appropriations to pay the Government’s obligations, or any of them, it is not within the province of the courts to pass upon the wisdom of that decision, nor is it within their power to compel Congress to do otherwise.
In the matter of a pension or gratuity there is no semblance of a contractual relationship or vested right, and the amount may be reduced from time to time by the Congress. But in the case of retirement, where contributions have been made to a retirement fund, the retirement privilege usually is a part of the inducement for remaining in the Government service. In such instances there is a definite contractual relationship which certainly becomes effective upon retirement. See Lynch v. United States, 1934, 292 U.S. 571, 54 S.Ct. 840, 78 L.Ed. 1434; Rafferty v. United States, 3 Cir., 1954, 210 F.2d 934. When such Government employee actually retires the obligation to make the payments becomes fully effective.
I agree fully with the concurring opinion of Judge WHITAKER, infra, that in the present case, the plaintiff, having actually retired, had a vested right (either by statute or contract) to the money for which he now sues. But, if by the act in the present case, Congress has merely withheld payment by restriction on appropriation or by a refusal to appropriate, the obligation of the United States to the plaintiff stands unimpaired, though unpaid. If this is all the act accomplishes, there is nothing to prevent the present or a future Congress from recognizing the obligation to plaintiff by appropriation and payment and neither is there anything to prevent this court from entering judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the amount of the obligation without determining constitutional questions. See Lovett v. United States, 66 F.Supp. 142, at pages 146-148, 149, 104 Ct.Cl. 557 (opinion of Chief Justice Whaley, 582-585; concurring opinion of this, writer, 586-588), affirmed, 1946, 328 U.S. 303 at pages 318-330, 66 S.Ct. 1073, at pages 1080-1086, 90 L.Ed. 1252 (concurring opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
It seems to me, therefore, that it is our duty to determine first whether or not the act before us represents merely a restriction on appropriations or a permanent legislative bar which purports to destroy forever the obligation of the United States to the plaintiff. If it is *594simply the former, the constitutionality of the act cannot, nor need it be, drawn into question. If, however, it is the latter, the question of the act’s constitutionality may properly be reached.
The act before us is peculiarly worded: it is couched in terms of payment, but it is apparently unlimited both in time and in scope. Though it was apparently directed at withholding appropriations to pay persons such as plaintiff, its effect may be to deprive plaintiff of his right to receive satisfaction of the Government’s obligation to him at least until further action by the Congress. It may be that,
“The language * * * goes beyond a mere limitation on appropriation and becomes, unless affirmatively repealed, a permanent denial of plaintiffs’ rights * * Lovett v. United States, supra, 66 F. Supp. at page 149, 104 Ct.Cl. at page 587.
However, the question is a close one, and whichever horn of the dilemma is chosen the obligation to make payment remains unimpaired. If the act be construed as an intention on the part of Congress to destroy a right which became vested at the time of retirement it would be invalid. But on the other hand if, as seems likely, the intention of the Congress was merely to decline to make an appropriation so long as the condition existed, such action was clearly within the scope of its authority.
I therefore concur in the result.