Court Opinion

ID: 9828266
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 18:15:02.246276+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:21:52.785574
License: Public Domain

On Appellee’s Motion for Rehearing.
Our holding that appellant was entitled to an equitable lien to reimburse him for taxes he had paid on the property is assailed by appellee on the ground that “appellant could not possibly become sub-rogated to the tax lien because such subro-gation can never be in favor of, but is always against the true owner of the land at the time such payment is made.” The cases cited in our original opinion are asserted to be inept; and in support of the above contention Harrison v. First Nat. Bank, Tex.Com.App., 238 S.W. 209, 210, is cited. This case fully recognizes the principle we have here applied; and quotes as a rule of universal application the following from Pomeroy’s Eq. Juris, 4th Ed., Vol. 3, par. 1212, p. 2902: “In general, when any person having a subsequent interest in the premises, and who is therefore entitled to redeem for the purpose of protecting such interest, and who is not the principal debtor primarily and absolutely liable for the mortgage debt, pays oil the mortgage, he thereby becomes an equitable assignee thereof, and may keep alive and enforce the lien so far as may be necessary in equity for his own benefit; he is subro-gated to the rights of the mortgagee to the extent necessary for his own equitable protection.”
A distinction, which is fundamental and controlling, is made between such case and one where the purchaser of property is himself obligated to pay the debt which is secured by the prior incum-brance. The rule in the latter case is thus given in the syllabus: “When a grantee as part of the consideration for land assumes the payment of a mortgage or other lien against it, the payment of the indebtedness which the lien represents completely extinguishes the lien, and the grantee cannot be subrogated to the rights of the lienholder, nor keep the lien alive for any purpose.”
The applicable rule is thus stated in 25 R.C.L., p. 1353: “There are numerous decisions to the effect that where a purchaser buys land and takes a deed thereto, and subsequently pays a prior lien on the • property which he is not primarily bound to pay, but which if not paid might cause him to lose his interest therein, he is subrogated to the rights and remedies of such prior lien, as against a lien which is superior to his title.”
The same rule is announced in 60 C.J. p. 789, § 99, and 39 Tex.Jur. p. 780, § 23.
In so far as concerns the question at issue, there is no difference in principle between a tax lien and other incumbrance. The rule is one of general application based upon established principles of equity jurisprudence of long standing.
There is an extended note upon the subject as related specifically to taxes in 61 A.L.R., beginning on page 599, second *1110column. See, also, 39 Tex.Jur. p. 779, § 22.
Appellant was in no sense liable for these taxes. He acquired the property from Mrs. Witliff, July 26, 1937, by general warranty deed for $500 cash. At that time the involved taxes, which were for prior years, had already accrued and were a first lien upon the property. Appellee’s lien was subordinate thereto. There was no obligation on appellant’s part to discharge the tax lien, and his only purpose in discharging it was to protect the title he acquired under his deed. Under the above authorities he was entitled to an equitable lien, superior to appellant’s lien, to reimburse him for the taxes he had so paid.
The motion is overruled.
Overruled.