Court Opinion

ID: 9498554
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 17:20:24.24501+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:58:53.806143
License: Public Domain

FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I cannot agree with the proposition that burglary of a dwelling is not necessarily a crime of moral turpitude. Washington’s burglary statute punishes anyone who, “with intent to commit a crime against a person or property therein ... enters or remains unlawfully in a dwelling other than a vehicle.” Wash. Rev.Code *1030§ 9A.52.025(1). A dwelling is a-“building or structure ... which is used or ordinarily used by a person for lodging.” Id. § 9A.04.110(7). Since 1935, Ninth Circuit cases have consistently treated burglary as a crime -involving moral turpitude. See Baer v. Norene, 79 F.2d 340, 341 (9th Cir.1935); see also, e.g., Alberto-Gonzalez v. INS, 215 E,3d 906, 908 n. 5 (9th Cir. 2000); Perez v. INS, 116 F.3d 405, 407 (9th Cir.1997); De La Cruz v. INS, 951 F.2d 226, 228 (9th Cir.1991); Mahini v. INS, 779 F.2d 1419, 1421 (9th Cir.1986). I have found no case from this or any other circuit holding otherwise. See, e.g., Sierra-Reyes v. INS, 585 F.2d 762, 763 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Stromberg, 227 F.2d 903, 905 (5th Cir.1955); Rudolph v. United States ex rel. Rock, 6 F.2d 487, 490 (D.C.Cir.1925). In fact, in Ye v. INS, 214 F.3d 1128, 1134 n. 5 (9th Cir.2000), this court said that even vehicle burglary,1 which is inherently less intrusive than burglary of a dwelling, is a crime involving moral turpitude. Hence, even if burglary were not a malum in se crime — -which it clearly is — the law of this circuit would dictate a finding of a crime of moral turpitude. See Beltran-Tirado v. INS, 213 F.3d 1179, 1184-85 (9th Cir.2000) (indicating that malum in se crimes are crimes involving moral turpitude); see also United States v. Barker, 514 F.2d 208, 266 n. 70 (D.C.Cir.1975) (saying that “[bjurglary is clearly malum in se”); Rudolph, ,6 F.2d at 490 (same).
Requiring the BIA to- look beyond the-burglary conviction to Cuevas’ intent is unnecessary and improper. This is not a case involving burglary of a vending machine, a boat, a commercial establishment, or any other uninhabited structure. It involves, the burglary of a residence. Whatever specific crime Cuevas intended to commit once inside the dwelling,2 his illegal presence alone was base, or depraved and contrary to the accepted rules of morality. Grageda v. INS, 12 F.3d 919, 921 (9th Cir.1993). The Supreme Court has declared that:
The fact that an'offender enters a building to commit a crime often creates the possibility of a violent confrontation between the offender and an occupant ... who comes to investigate. And the offender’s own awareness of this possibility may mean that he is prepared to use violence if necessary to carry out his plans or to escape.
Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 588, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 2153, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990); cf. United States v. M.C.E., 232 F.3d 1252, 1255-56 (9th Cir.2000) (applying a categorical approach to hold that residential burglary is a crime of violence because of the risk of a violent confrontation with the occupant); United States v. Becker, 919 F.2d 568, 573 (9th Cir.1990) (saying that “[t]he confluence of common sense and precedent lead to the conclusion that the unauthorized daytime entry of the dwelling of another with the intent to commit a larceny or any felony carries with it a substantial risk that force will be used against the person or property of another”). “ ‘The fact that [a burglar] may be contemplating a minor offense will be no solace to those who may reasonably fear the worst and who may- react with measures that may well escalate the criminal purposes of the intruder.’ ” M.C.E., 232 F.3d at 1256 n. 5 (quoting Model Penal Code § 221.1 cmt. 3(c), at 75 (1980)). Clearly, the intrusion into someone’s home *1031with the intent to commit a crime therein is a categorically depraved act. Thus, the majority improperly encumbers the Immigration Judges with the task of determining the facts underlying a conviction for burglary of a dwelling — a job often impossible given the scant facts in many records of conviction. See Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 125 S.Ct. 1254, 1260-63, 161 L.Ed.2d 205 (2005). Still, it does ultimately decide that the crime here was one of moral turpitude. Of course, I agree that it was.
However, we again part company on the question of cancellation of removal. Cue-vas seeks cancellation of his removal by relying on 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) (INA § 240A(a)). That statute allows the Attorney General to cancel the removal of certain permanent residents if the following conditions are met: (1) the alien has been “lawfully admitted for permanent residence for not less than 5 years,” (2) the alien “has resided in the United States continuously for 7 years after having been admitted in any status,” and (3) the alien “has not been convicted of any aggravated felony.” Id. The BIA found that Cuevas failed the second requirement because he had been admitted for only a little over four years before he committed burglary.3 I agree.
Cuevas argues that because he was a minor when his mother achieved lawful permanent resident (LPR) status in December, 1990, his mother’s LPR date should be imputed to him, which would give him more than eleven years of continuous residence after admission and satisfy part (2). For that proposition, Cuevas relies on a prior case. See Lepe-Guitron v. INS, 16 F.3d 1021 (9th Cir.1994). He claims that because Lepe-Guitron imputed the parents’ “lawful unrelinquished domicile” to a minor child, this panel should impute a mother’s lawful admission date to her minor son. I decline to do so.
Lepe-Guitron does not apply to Cuevas’ case. There, we interpreted INA § 212(c), which, prior to its repeal in 1997,4 allowed cancellation of deportation for aliens who had maintained “a lawful unrelinquished domicile of seven consecutive years.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1997). We reasoned that because a minor is not legally capable of forming the intent necessary to establish domicile, his or her legal domicile must be determined by his custodial parents. Lepe-Guitron, 16 F.3d at 1025. Moreover, we emphasized that Lepe-Guitron, “legally entered the United States with his parents, [and] was always legally within the country....” Id. at 1024. This, we held, was the pivotal reason for us to stray from precedent and impute his parents’ status to him. Id. (contrasting Castillo-Felix v. INS, 601 F.2d 459, 461 (9th Cir.1979)).
That does not help Cuevas. First, the new cancellation of removal statute contains no domicile requirement. Instead, it requires seven years of residence after having been admitted in any status. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(2). Residence contains no element of subjective intent. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(33) (“The term ‘residence’ means place of general abode; the place of general abode of a person means his principal, actual dwelling place in fact, without regard to intent.”). Thus, unlike Lepe-Guitron, there is no legal reason for us to *1032turn to his parents to determine Cuevas’ intent. Second, Cuevas readily admits that he was not legally admitted until he obtained LPR status in December, 1997. “Admitted” as used in § 240A means “the lawful entry ... into the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A) (emphasis added). Thus, a necessary element of the Lepe-Guitron decision is absent here.
Without Lepe-Guitron, there is no precedent to help Cuevas. Instead, he is left with a statute that could not be more clear. It requires seven years of residence subsequent to admission; yet, by Cuevas’ own concession, he committed burglary just four years and three months after being admitted. Even if one could argue that the statute is ambiguous, the BIA’s interpretation is quite reasonable, and to that we must defer. See INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424, 119 S.Ct. 1439, 1445, 143 L.Ed.2d 590 (1999); Chevron U.S A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2781-83, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). Thus the BIA correctly determined that Cuevas is ineligible for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a).
The majority’s concern for aliens who have been here a long time, even residential burglars like Cuevas, has caused it to find a path that may allow Cuevas an opportunity to stay in this country. But Congress has shown more concern for his victims than for him and has provided that our society need not abide such as he. It is not for us to listen to the susurrant promptings of our own convictions rather than the stentorian proclamations of the legislature.
Thus, I respectfully dissent.

. The illegal entry of a vehicle with the intent to commit a felony therein. Cal.Penal Code § 459.

. In fact, we know from the Plea Agreement that Cuevas admitted that he "helped another person take property without permission” from the home.

. If an alien is being removed for committing a crime, the period of continuous residence ends at the time the crime was committed. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(l). Cuevas clearly satisfies part (1). He was lawfully admitted for permanent residence on December 4, 1997, and was issued a notice to appear on March 18, 2003. He satisfies part (3) because he was sentenced to less than one year for his crime of burglary. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(43)(G).

. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-208, Div. C, Tit. Ill, § 304(b), 110 Stat. 3009.