Court Opinion

ID: 9809043
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 20:59:08.120074+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:24:11.047077
License: Public Domain

Clark, J.
(dissenting): If the action brought by defendant against Lockhart, and the ancillary remedy of arrest and bail obtained therein, were not prosecuted bona fide *306but were instituted fictitiously, for purposes of oppression or malice, Lockhart would be entitled to an action for malicious prosecution, but only after the first action had terminated adversely to Bear. To permit Lockhart to bring an action for malicious prosecution while Bear’s action is still 'pending against him would be to try “an action within an action,” for while the merits of the action of Bear v. Lockhart is still pending, Lockhart could not get along in an action against Bear for malicious prosecution without trying the very issues to be determined in the first action. But it is claimed that this can be maintained as an action for “abuse of process” while the former action of Bear v. Lockhart is still pending. If so, the cause of action must be something outside of the matters to be determined in Bear v. Lockhart, and not dependent upon the merits in that case. In other words, it must be admitted, for the purposes of this action, that Bear’s action against Lockhart is properly brought and that whatever has been done within the scope of that action was rightly done, otherwise, the same question, the merits of Bear’s action against Lockhart, would be pending in both cases, at the same time.
Now, itis within the scope of Bear’s action against Lock-hart to allege Lockhart’s indebtedness and upon proper affidavit hold him in arrest and bail. This wras all Bear did. That he offered, for a consideration, to release Lock-hart from the arrest and bail is 2iot outside the scope of the action. If it turns out that the action was brought for purposes of extortion and malice, that can be enquired into by an action for malicious prosecution after the first action is terminated, but neither the suing out an order in arrest and bail, nor the offer to dismiss it upon paying or securing the debt, are outside the scope of the action. They are within its very purview and object. Nor did the *307fact that the defendant was worth nothing above his exemption exempt him from liability to arrest and bail upon the same affidavit as wonld have made anyone else liable thereto. It was simply Lockhart’s misfortune that he was unable to give bail. It would seriously limit the value and use of the ancillary remedy of arrest and bail, if a party, resorting to it in good faith in the cases justified by statute, should become liable whenever the party arrested is unable to give bond. The liability of the plaintiff in such cases depends upon the good faith in the action he is prosecuting and not upon the pecuniary ability of the defendant therein to give bail.
Neither Sneeden v. Harris, 109 N. C., 349, nor Hewit v. Wooten, 52 N. C., 182, nor the cases cited from other States, sustain the plaintiff’s cause of action. In Hewit v. Wooten, it was held that an agreement that the sheriff might accept a sum of money in lieu of a bail bond, could not be considered in any other light than an action for malicious arrest or malicious prosecution which could not be brought till the first action was terminated. In Snee-den v. Harris, Harris maliciously sued out an order of arrest and bail against Sneeden for alleged slander of title, not for the purposes embraced in the scope of that action but that, while Sneeden was under arrest, Harris might get into possession of certain real estate held by Sneeden without resorting to an action of ejectment. And all the other cases, permitting an action to be brought for “abuse or process,” show that the wrong contained for was something done outside of, and distinct from, the acts which could be done within the scope of the first action. But the wrong here complained of is that Bear sought by his action, which was not decided when this action begun, to collect a sum of money which Lockhart denied he owed, that Lockhart was insolvent and could not give bond, and therefore Bear *308expected to force him to pay the debt and offered to release him upon securing part of the debt. This is all within the very scope and purport of the proceedings in arrest and bail. If the debtor is solvent, why resort to arrest and bail? It is when it is doubtful whether the judgment can be collected and upon the state of facts authorizing an arrest and bail that this process is resorted to. It must be remembered that if the arrest and bail was issued upon a state of facts justifying a judgment the defendant therein is not entitled to his homestead and personal property exemption against such judgment. Fertilizer Co. v. Grubbs, 114 N. C., 470 ; State v. Williams, 97 N. C., 414. If it turn out that it was resorted to maliciously and for purposes of extortion, then after the termination of the action in favor of the defendant therein (and not before) he can in turn become plaintiff in an. action for malicious prosecution. But when every act alleged in the complaint, not the inferences argumentatively alleged therein, is done within the scope of the action, as in this case, an action for “malicious abuse of process” does not lie. The Judge below properly sustained the demurrer.
No Error.