Court Opinion

ID: 9668952
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 02:33:33.661027+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:50.501222
License: Public Domain

Opinion by
Chief Justice LAMBERT,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
The power of the purse is the most potent assignment of power in our Constitution; for it provides the resources upon which all others subsist.1 In this respect the power of the purse is akin to freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment, which is the most fundamental of all rights because freedom of speech is at the means by which all other constitutional rights are exercised.2 For example, the right to exercise one’s religion depends upon the right to speak freely. Likewise, the making of war, imprisoning of society’s miscreants, and adjudicating cases and controversies — to name but a few — cannot be performed without the use of resources that reach the executive and judicial branches by way of legislative appropriations. And because of its potency, the power to withhold the purse has the ability, if untamed, to bring the other branches of government to their knees by depriving them of essential funds to carry out their constitutional mandates.
That is what this case is about: the power of the purse as articulated in Section 230 of the Constitution of Kentucky. Section 230 says that “[n]o money shall be drawn from the State Treasury, except in pursuance of appropriations made by law.” But while Section 230 is at the heart of this case, it is not the only constitutional section implicated or necessary for proper resolution. For example, the separation of powers provisions3 are also in play in a number of different ways, not least of which is the potential to use the appropriations clause to control the executive and *874judicial branches of government. Practically, for the everyday Kentuckian, what is at stake is government itself. .Without funds elections cannot be held, the Kentucky State Police cannot be called upon to serve and protect, there will be no reading, writing, or arithmetic instruction in public schools, and government will shut down. This is not merely a parade of horribles, but a real and natural consequence of omitted funding.
The majority begins its analysis of the appropriations power by citing Justice Hugo Black for the proposition that “ ‘Congress shall make no law’ means Congress shall make no law.” Applying that simple analysis to the language of Section 230, the majority asserts that a constitutional section means precisely what it says. But what the majority fails to acknowledge is that relatively no one agrees with Justice Black on this issue, and certainly no other Justice of the United States Supreme Court in the entire twentieth or twenty-first centuries agrees.4 And even Justice Black himself cannot be considered an absolutist in the truest sense5 because he upheld the criminalization of burning the American flag,6 laws against picketing,7 and prohibitions on wearing an armband to protest the Vietnam War.8 Perhaps Justice O’Connor said it best: “The protections afforded by the First Amendment, however, are not absolute, and we have long recognized that the government may regulate certain categories of expression consistent with the Constitution.”9
If one applied Justice Black’s quasi-absolutist views, all laws against defamation, sexual harassment, threats of violence, and obscenity, and all laws regulating campaigns, corporate reporting, attorney advertisements and other commercial speech (just to name a few) would be stricken from the books as violative of the First Amendment. But no one agrees with that. Therefore, the .views of Justice Black on the First Amendment have little to do with our analysis of Section 230. Only if the majority adopted an absolutist view of Section 230, which it does not, would the Justice Black quotation have persuasive effect.
Thus, while the majority tips its hat to an absolute standard it retreats when that standard becomes untenable. In retreat, the majority cleverly holds that when state statutes mandate spending, or when the federal Supremacy Clause10 requires spending, or when other constitutional sections so require a de facto appropriation is made, dispensing with Section 230. And to a certain extent I agree. Let me first set out the situations with which I agree and then those with which I disagree. First, there are two types of statutes. One tells the treasurer to pay for services, and the other tells the treasurer how much to pay for services. Only the latter kind of statute can be truly deemed an appropria*875tion. The majority opinion states it thusly: “Only those statutes specifically mandating that payments or contributions be made can be interpreted as self-executing appropriations. A mandated appropriation cannot be inferred from the mere existence of an unfunded statute.” In other words, the statute that calls for a $50 payment to the dog-catcher is an appropriation, but the statute that merely calls for the dog-catcher to be paid is not.
I also agree with the majority’s analysis of the federal Supremacy Clause. It states that “[t]he Supremacy Clause ... requires compliance with any federal mandates made in pursuance of the United States Constitution, notwithstanding Section 230 of the Constitution of Kentucky. ... the Treasurer must fund such mandates.” It couldn’t have been said better.
However, I disagree with the analysis of funding required by various constitutional sections. Before explaining that disagreement I pause to note that while I agree with the result, I strenuously disagree with the reasoning to that result. And, as in most aspects of life, the reasoning is important. In this case, it is particularly important because when one accepts the notion that Section 230 is not to be read in an absolute, trump-all-other-sections-of-the-Constitution fashion, the analysis leads to a more expansive ultimate result. Now, to the disagreement.
The majority says that all constitutional sections dealing with funding are de facto appropriations. “In the absence of appropriations by the General Assembly, the Treasurer must fund these constitutional mandates at no more than existing levels until the General Assembly provides otherwise.” Aside, for now, from the utter lack of authority for such a spending limit at “existing levels,” there are a number of problems otherwise. Essentially, there are four types of constitutional spending sections. First, there are those that require the General Assembly to meet a constitutional standard of spending. An example of this is Section 183, which states that “[t]he General Assembly shall, by appropriate legislation, provide for an efficient system of common schools throughout the State.” This section requires further action by the General Assembly and gives no guidance as to the required amount of funding. A second type of constitutional section does not call for the General Assembly to do anything, but requires some amount of funding. Section 221, dealing with the militia, is an example of this type. It states that that “the militia shall conform as nearly as practicable to the ... armies of the United States.” This section does not call for action by the General Assembly and does not give guidance as to the required funding. A third type is one that requires the General Assembly to provide a determinable amount of funding, such as Section 120. Section 120 deals with salaries for justices and judges, but specifically calls for action by the General Assembly even though the amount is determinable. Finally, there are those that do not call for the General Assembly to do anything, and by their terms require a determinable amount of funding. An example of this type is Section 96, which states that “[a]ll officers mentioned in Section 95 shall be paid for their services by salary, and not otherwise.”
Only the fourth type of constitutional section can be truly regarded as an appropriation. It is the only one that meets both requirements of a constitutional appropriation, i.e., that the General Assembly is not required to do anything more and that the amount of money to be spent by the Treasurer is determinable. The other three types of constitutional sections are *876not appropriations because they either require further action by the General Assembly or they do not provide sufficient guidance as to how much funding is required.
In effect, the majority interprets all of these sections to be appropriations, thus creating a vast inconsistency with absolutism. But the majority fails to acknowledge clear differences among the varying types of constitutional sections. I agree with the majority that some constitutional sections can be properly interpreted as appropriations, thus falling within the language of Section 230. However, I disagree with lumping them all together as one and the same. For instance, however desirable the outcome, it cannot be said that Section 183 is an appropriation because it requires the General Assembly to take further action and the amount is generally within its discretion. A simple hypothetical is illustrative. When a catcher gives the curve-ball sign to the'pitcher, it is not a curve ball. It is a signal for a curve ball. Similarly, when the constitution gives the “appropriation sign” to the General Assembly, it is not an appropriation. It is a signal for an appropriation. Only the fourth type of constitutional section, as discussed above and of which there are few, is an appropriation.
Furthermore, what the majority’s analysis of constitutional sections leaves behind the curtain is revealing, because it glosses over the sections that require action by the General Assembly. Telling Dorothy to pay no attention to the man behind the curtain did not change the fact that Oz had no resident wizard. By the same token, glossing over the constitutional sections that require further action by the General Assembly does not change the fact that not all sections can be honestly interpreted as “appropriations made by law.” An absolute interpretation of Section 230 would require disregard of the plain language of numerous other constitutional sections that specifically require action by the General Assembly. Disjoining the latter part of Section 183 (“provide for an efficient system of common schools”) from its beginning (“The General Assembly shall, by appropriate legislation, provide”) is to disallow Section 183 to mean what it says. The responsibility to comply with Section 183 is squarely on the General Assembly,11 and it is not a self-executing provision.
So, while I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the Governor can execute the requirements of the law as enunciated in (some) statutes, federal mandates made in compliance of the United States Constitution by way of the Supremacy Clause, and (some) Kentucky constitutional provisions, I disagree that all constitutional sections can be deemed to be appropriations without intellectual legerdemain. In my view the majority has presented a weak rationale for allowing executive spending for such things as education, and its rationale would not allow spending for elections or the Kentucky State Police. Nevertheless, other rationale achieve a similar, albeit more expansive, result with proper fidelity to the principle of comprehensive constitutional construction.
Analogous situations in history and other jurisdictions provide ample authority for unappropriated executive spending. The history of the appropriations clause does not suggest that it was intended as a power of the legislature as much as it was intended to ensure fiscal responsibility and accountability.12 Justice Story noted that *877this was “apparent upon the slightest examination. It is to secure regularity, punctuality, and fidelity, in the disbursements of the public money.”13 Obviously, Justice Story was commenting upon the appropriations clause in the federal constitution, but it is clear that Section 230 of Kentucky’s Constitution is derived from its federal counterpart.14 Furthermore, the question presented has been considered by other jurisdictions, and in limited circumstances the appropriations power has given way to other compelling interests when a strict adherence to its literal language would violate separation of powers. It has been said that the constitution is not a suicide pact,15 and must be interpreted to further its purpose of supporting the endurance of a representative republic.16 Allowing the General Assembly to control the executive by way of the appropriations clause strikes at the heart of the purpose of separation of powers, especially in Kentucky where it is overwhelmingly expressed in Sections 27 and 28 of the Constitution. The logical extension of such an idea would be destruction of government.
When the ink on the Constitution was barely dry, the President of the Convention and the first President of the United States, George Washington, spent unappropriated funds to suppress the Whisky Rebellion.17 Nine years later President Thomas Jefferson made perhaps the most important and controversial purchase in our nascent nation’s history: the Louisiana Territory. He purchased this territory from France for $15 million “even though he had only received authorization from Congress ... in the amount of $2 million for the acquisition of New Orleans or West Florida.”18 More recently, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts was presented with the propriety of similar unappropriated spending, this time by the judicial branch. In O’Coins v. Treasurer of the County of Worcester,19 the court stated that a judge may order unappropriated funds to be spent so that he may carry out the duties imposed upon him by the constit*878ution.20 In holding that the appropriations section of that state’s constitution was subservient to other constitutionally required mandates, the court noted that “[i]t is not essential that there have been a prior appropriation to cover the expenditure.”21 This holding is consistent with other jurisdictions that have been presented with similar questions.22
As shown above, a non-absolutist interpretation of the appropriations clause is not novel in the least. And just as in the context of the First Amendment, we are not confined to literalism when to so interpret would neither comport with the purpose of the clause or its history, or the legitimate ends of government. Constitutional interpretation must be upon the whole of the document, tempered by the accumulation of historical occurrences and the wisdom gained from those accounts. And what that history has taught is that— to sustain the welfare of the people — ’there must be some practical application.
This is not to say that the Governor may infringe upon what is constitutionally delegated to the legislative branch of government at will. Rather, such an allowance only arises on the heels of failure of the General Assembly to either appropriate funds that are necessary for the executive branch to faithfully execute the laws23 or even to pass a statute that sets forth what shall happen in the event that necessary appropriations are not made. What the Governor did here was not an encroachment upon the appropriations power of the legislature in violation of separation of powers; the violation of separation of powers occurred when the legislature encroached upon the functions of the executive by failing to appropriate funds necessary for the Governor to perform his constitutional obligations. The response by the Governor in adopting a spending plan was the only rational option.
So the principle by which the Governor may spend unappropriated funds — those which are required by the constitution but may not be properly deemed constitutional appropriations — is in the performance of his constitutional obligation to see that the laws are faithfully executed. This result is consistent with the purpose, history, and spirit of the appropriations clause; fulfillment of separation of powers principles by not allowing the legislature to handcuff the other branches of government; and the role of government in promoting the advancement of a representative republic to secure the liberty of the people.
So that leaves me in agreement with the majority’s destination for the most part, but disagreeing with its path. I agree that statutes directing payment of a specific sum are properly considered appropriations pursuant to Section 230 of the Constitution of Kentucky. I also agree that funding required by the Supremacy Clause may be deemed appropriations pursuant to Section 230. However, when it comes to the constitutional sections I would go further and allow an executive spending plan. The Governor clearly can spend to satisfy those constitutional sections that require any spending because the General Assembly failed in its express duty to do so. As for the constitutional sections that call for a determinable amount of funding, the Governor is restricted to the determined *879amount. And as for the constitutional sections that require undetermined funding, the Governor may spend whatever he deems appropriate, subject to Section 2 of the Constitution of Kentucky. In coming to an appropriate amount of funding for these uses, the Governor may look to prior legislative budgets. However, contrary to the majority’s contention, I find no authority that would require him to so look to or be constrained by prior budgets. Obviously, spending consistent with prior appropriations is not arbitrary or in violation of Section 2.
Neither the majority nor I would adhere to a strict absolutist interpretation of Section 230. Therefore, our disagreement is only a matter of degree. Under the majority view, the people of the Commonwealth will not be protected by the Kentucky State Police, and more objectionably, the ballot box will be shut. In other words, the General Assembly could prevent elections by refusing to pay the cost. By the majority opinion, this unreasonable result will come to pass the next time the General Assembly fails to enact appropriations. A more reasonable construction of Section 230 would protect the legislative authority to enact appropriations, while at the same time recognizing that the people’s business must continue when the General Assembly defaults in its constitutional duty to pass appropriations. Such an interpretation would also permit two additional sources of executive spending.
First, it is important to recognize that the power to fund what is required by the constitution includes the power to fund the necessary incidentals to those functions.24 For instance, Section 74 states, among other things, that the Governor shall receive compensation for his services. But included are necessary and proper expenditures to effectuate the Governor’s services, such as secretaries, advisors, state police, etc. Similar common sense extensions have been recognized by this Court. For example, in Kentucky Human Rights Commission v. Pendennis we held that implicit in the power to make determinations was the power to investigate.25 Such expenditures would not be allowed by the majority.
Second, the Governor always retains the right to meet genuine emergencies, whether the General Assembly appropriates money for that purpose or not.26 To some, this may seem to abrogate the powers of the legislature even when it is not derelict in its constitutional duties to appropriate for legitimate purposes. Let me attempt to assuage those fears. Genuine emergencies are exceedingly rare. Destruction of a bridge by an earthquake would be a genuine emergency that government must be .able to confront with or without legislative appropriations for that purpose. But responding to exceptionally high traffic on a bridge would not be such an emergency. Astonishingly, the majority has specifically overruled Miller v. Quertermous, which allowed the Governor to respond to colossal and immediate emergencies. Section 230 cannot mean that in such a genuine emergency the Governor may only call the legislature back into special session, but be otherwise impotent. Such an interpretation has the very real potential to lead to a cataclysmic result.
*880In sum, I would allow the executive to spend in furtherance of five categories. First, spending should be allowed to effectuate statutes that call for a specified sum of money to be spent. Second, there should be spending in furtherance of the federal Supremacy Clause. Third, spending to fulfill constitutional mandates should be permitted. Fourth, there should be a common-sense extension for necessary incidentals. And finally, the executive should have the power to meet genuine emergencies that threaten the welfare of citizens of the Commonwealth.
Those who believe that this opinion allows too great an encroachment upon power constitutionally assigned to the legislature should be reminded that there are two remedies. The General Assembly may act in accordance with what is contemplated by the constitution and the electorate and appropriate money to operate the government. In the alternative, it may enact statutes that outline how the government is to operate when the legislature is unable to pass appropriations bills. The power to appropriate money is a power properly belonging to the legislature. However, if it does not fulfill its constitutional duty, others must. •

. The Federalist No. 58, at 356, 359 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.1961) (calling the power of the purse "the most complete and effectual weapon”).

. E.g., De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365, 57 S.Ct. 255, 261, 81 L.Ed. 278 (1937) ("Therein lies the security of the Republic, the very foundation of constitutional government.”).

. KY CONST. §§ 27 and 28.

. Steven Gey, The Case Against Post-Modem Censorship Theory, 145 U. Pa. L.Rev. 193 (1996).

. See RODNEY SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY, 24 (1992); see also Patricia R. Stembridge, Note, Adjusting Absolutism: First Amendment Protection for the Fringe, 80 B.U.L.Rev. 907 (2000).

. Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 610, 89 S.Ct. 1354, 22 L.Ed.2d 572 (1969).

. NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, 377 U.S. 58, 84 S.Ct. 1063, 12 L.Ed.2d 129 (1964) (Black, J., concurring).

. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 517, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969).

. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 360, 123 S.Ct. 1536, 1548, 155 L.Ed.2d 535 (2003).

. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.

. See Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky.1989).

. See J. Gregory Sidak, The President's Power of the Purse, 1989 Duke L.J. 1162 (1989), for a discussion of the history and meaning of the appropriations clause.

. J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 681, at 486 (1833) (R. Rotunda & J. Nowak eds.1987).

. KY Const, of 1792 at VIII, § 3 (appropriations clause follows the federal appropriations clause verbatim).

. See, e.g., Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37, 69 S.Ct. 894, 93 L.Ed. 1131 (1949) (Vinson, C.J., dissenting) ("The danger is that if the Court does not temper its doctrinaire logic with a little practical wisdom, it will convert the constitutional Bill of Rights into a suicide pact.").

. See Higgins v. Prater, 91 Ky. 6, 14 S.W. 910 (1890) (allowing imposition of a state tax for the benefit of a non-common school even though the constitutional provision in question stated that "any sum which may be hereafter raised in the state by taxation, or otherwise, for purposes of education, shall be held inviolate, for the purpose of sustaining a system of common schools.”); see also Stone v. Pryor, 103 Ky. 645, 45 S.W. 1136 (1898) ("In construing this provision of the constitution, ... the purpose should be to ascertain the intent of the framers of the constitution and the people who adopted it .... The object of construction, as applied to a constitutional provision, is to give effect to the intent of the people adopting it. In arriving at this intent, we should look to the history of the times, and examine the state of things existing when the constitution was framed and adopted. And it is competent for us to look at contemporary interpretation ... ”) (Waddle, J., dissenting); In re Opinion of Judges of Court of Appeals, 79 Ky. 621 (1881) ("it must be borne in mind that the constitution is to be construed as a frame of government, and its interpretation result, if possible, in a consistent whole").

. Supra n. 13 at 1178-81.

. Id. at 1248.

. 362 Mass. 507, 287 N.E.2d 608 (1972).

. Id. at 611-12.

. Id. at 612.

. E.g., Morgan County Comm’n v. Powell, 292 Ala. 300, 293 So.2d 830, 849 (1974); Carroll v. Tate, 442 Pa. 45, 274 A.2d 193, 197 (1971).

.KY CONST. §81.

. M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 4 L.Ed. 579 (1819) (allowing establishment of National Bank even though it was not an enumerated power because it was an appropriate means of exercising an expressly enumerated power).

. 153 S.W.3d 784, 788-89 (Ky.2004). See also Strong v. Chandler, 70 S.W.3d 405 (Ky.2002).

. See Miller v. Quertermons, 304 Ky. 733, 202 S.W.2d 389 (1947).