Court Opinion

ID: 9752187
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 17:42:49.75609+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:09.126910
License: Public Domain

O’Brien, Superior Judge,
dissenting.
I am unable to concur with the majority opinion.
The first witness called by the plaintiff was Thomas P. Mayo, who identified himself as a Right-of Way Agent in charge of the Court -Liason section of the Right-of-Way Division of the defendant State Highway Board. At the conclusion of the plaintiff’s examination of Mr. Mayo he was then examined by counsel for the defendant. Of course he was the defendant’s witness, although the transcript refers to this as cross-examination.
Commencing at page 50 of the transcript, the following took place:
“Q Is the State Highway Board a part of the Department of Highways?
A Yes, sir.
Q Part of the government of the State of Vermont?
A Yes, sir.
Q Payment for laying out of the construction of highways is paid out by the State of Vermont.
MR. PIERSON. Objection, your Honor.
THE COURT. You withdraw the question and we will exclude it and you restate your question.
Q (By Mr. Frank) I was asking whether payment for land or for *102highways — for construction of highways —• are paid out by the Treasurer of Vermont?
MR. PIERSON. I object to it on the ground it is irrelevent. THE COURT. We’ll permit the answer. We don’t think there is any question about it.
THE WITNESS. Yes.
Q (By Mr. Frank) Is the government of Vermont a non-profit organization?
A I believe so.
Q Many of the activities of the government of Vermont are charitable in character?
MR. PIERSON. Objection. It is irrelevant.
THE COURT. We will exclude it.
Mr. Frank. No further questions at this time.
REDIRECT EXAMINATION
Q (By Mr. Pierson) You say payments are made from the State Treasury?
A. Yes, sir.
Q And the Federal Government then pays ninety per cent of that? MR. FRANK. I object to that.
THE COURT. Exculded.
Q (By Mr. Pierson) Does the State of Vermont bear the entire cost in the final analysis of the purchase of property?
Mr. Frank. I object. This is entirely improper.
THE COURT. Excluded.
MR. PIERSON. Your Honor.
THE COURT. Excluded. You don’t need to argue the Court. You may have an exception.
MR. PIERSON. May I make an offer?
THE COURT. At the bench, if you wish.
(AT THE BENCH)
MR. PIERSON. If it please the Court, I offer to show this information is just an extension of the testimony elicited by Mr. Frank to the effect that the State, of Vermont pays the amount of the damages is clearly misleading as left by him, and I think clearly appeals to the emotions and conservative nature of Vermonters in *103general. If the question has been opened up, my line of questioning should be opened.
THE COURT. The ruling stands. You may have an exception.”
This subject matter was not responsive to anything covered by the plaintiff’s direct examination of this witness.
As stated in the majority opinion, the admission of the evidence relating to the source of payment of the award was irrelevant and error. The question is whether the error was prejudicial or harmless.
The burden is on the plaintiff to show that the error produced prejudice. The test is whether in the circumstances of the particular case it suflicently appears that the rights of the complaining party have been injuriously affected by the error. Towle v. St. Albans Publishing Co., 122 Vt. 134, 135, 165 A. 2d 363. Paul v. Drown, 108 Vt. 458, 461, 189 Atl. 144, while on the question of an offer of improper evidence, sheds additional light on the test. “An offer of improper evidence does not always require a reversal, for much depends upon the character and importance of the offered evidence and the good or bad faith of counsel, and each case must be judged on its own circumstances. But if incompetent and immaterial testimony is offered, with knowledge of its character, and for the purpose of prejudicing the jury, it is error to permit the offer to stand unrebuked, and in the allowance of an exception is an implied ruling that the offer is proper.” (Citations omitted)
Counsel for the defendant has had extensive experience in the trial of these so-called highway cases. I cannot believe the erroneous evidence was introduced through ignorance or inexperience. Niebyski v. Welcome, 93 Vt. 418, 423, 108 Atl. 341.
In my opinion, rulings of the trial court excluding the plaintiff’s offers to explain the erroneous evidence made in the hearing of the jury, cloaked the error with an apparent relevancy. When the error is objected to, when efforts to explain it are excluded and when the jury is not instructed that the erroneously admitted evidence is immaterial to the issue, then I believe they can only conclude that the evidence is in the case for them to consider, and to consider in the light of the rulings that here the state pays the entire award and the federal government apparently does not contribute ninety percent of the award.
Andrews v. Watkins’ Estate, 104 Vt. 321, 328, 160 Atl. 176 states: “when one party gives evidence of a collateral fact, it is permissible for his adversary to meet it by giving evidence of another collateral fact that *104tends to weaken or overcome the impression made on the minds of the jury by the first. Fuller v. Valiquette, 70 Vt. 502, 504, 41 Atl. 579, Lamonda v. Parizo, 90 Vt. 381, 384, 98 Atl. 980.”
The two cases cited in the above excerpt both state that where the inadmissible evidence has been received, the plaintiff "had the right to do away with any impression it may have created in the minds of the jury by evidence of the same character and force which tended directly to meet it”. (Underlining supplied). It is difficult to determine if the use of the word “permissable” in Andrews v. Watkins’ Estate, supra, overrules the use of the word “right” in the two cited cases. In any event, Andrews v. Watkins’ Estate, supra, goes on to say “Common fairness requires that it should be permissible to meet it by proof”. “Common fairness” is certainly the mildest term that could be used. The trial of a lawsuit requires uncommon fairness.
The defendant had an unfair advantage. The record creates prejudicial, and not harmless error, to my mind. I would reverse and remand for a new trial on all issues.