Court Opinion

ID: 9900340
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-18 22:11:14.943959+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:08.642085
License: Public Domain

620                  October 11, 2023               No. 538

         IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                 STATE OF OREGON

              THE FINAL TABLE, LLC
                 and Jason Thompson,
                  Plaintiffs-Appellants,
                             v.
 ACCEPTANCE CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY,
                 Defendant-Respondent,
                           and
                    David GARCIA;
                       GDR, LLC,
      dba Creative Insurance Marketing Company;
  and EVERGREEN INSURANCE MANAGERS, INC.,
                      Defendants.
           Multnomah County Circuit Court
                 20CV06497; A176545

   Bruce C. Hamlin, Judge pro tempore. (Limited judgment
entered July 1, 2021)
   Katharine von Ter Stegge, Judge. (Limited judgment
entered July 21, 2021)
  Argued and submitted September 13, 2023.
   Brandon B. Mayfield argued the cause for appellants.
Also on the briefs were Kyle A. Sturm and Nicholas A. Thede.
  Jonathan Henderson argued the cause for respondent.
   Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, and Egan, Judge, and
Kistler, Senior Judge.
  KISTLER, S. J.
  Affirmed.
Cite as 328 Or App 620 (2023)   621
622          Final Table, LLC v. Acceptance Casualty Ins. Co.

           KISTLER, S. J.
         This appeal arises out of plaintiffs’ action to recover
on a liquor liability policy that defendant issued. The trial
court ruled on summary judgment that defendant did not
have a duty to defend its insured because the insured failed
to provide defendant with timely notice of the complaint
filed against it. The court also ruled that defendant did not
have a duty to indemnify its insured because the complaint
came within an exclusion from coverage. The court entered
a limited judgment consistent with that ruling, which plain-
tiffs have appealed. We affirm.
         We summarize the historical facts briefly before
turning to the issues that plaintiffs raise on appeal. Because
the trial court granted defendant’s summary judgment
motion, we set out the facts in the light most favorable to
plaintiffs.
         This case arises out of a shooting at Puff’s Pub in
Gresham. One of Puff’s customers (Sheets) had been drink-
ing heavily before he arrived at Puff’s around 10:00 p.m.
While he was at Puff’s, Sheets experienced a bout of flat-
ulence, which caused some of the people around him to
make rude gestures and another person (Thompson) to
make a crude comment. Approximately five minutes after
Thompson made the comment, Sheets stepped outside of
Puff’s briefly and came back into the pub with a gun. Sheets
shot Thompson in the face. Thompson survived but experi-
enced substantial injuries.1 Following the shooting, Sheets
pled no contest to and was convicted of attempted murder
and second-degree assault.
         Before arriving at Puff’s, Sheets had been drinking
at another bar, The Final Table. Thompson served a statuto-
rily required notice of a liquor liability claim on Final Table,
asserting that Final Table had negligently overserved
Sheets and that the shooting at Puff’s was a foreseeable con-
sequence of Final Table’s negligence.

    1
      An officer viewing the surveillance video from Puff’s opined that the bullet
that Sheets fired at Thompson went through Thompson’s cheek and ear and hit a
bystander in the buttocks. Sheets fired at least one other shot, which did not hit
Thompson but did hit another bystander also in the buttocks.
Cite as 328 Or App 620 (2023)                                        623

         Final Table forwarded a copy of Thompson’s claim
to defendant. After reviewing that claim, defendant notified
Final Table that Thompson’s claim came within an exclu-
sion to the liquor liability policy for “[a]ny claims arising out
of Assault and/or Battery.” As a result, defendant declined
to defend or indemnify Final Table. Defendant, however,
advised Final Table that it was basing its response on the
information it knew at the time, and it asked Final Table to
send it any new information that it received as well as any
“[a]mended [c]omplaint.”
         Over a year later, Thompson filed and served his
initial complaint on Final Table. The complaint added alle-
gations that were not included in the statutorily required
notice of claim, although it repeated the essence of that
claim—that the shooting at Puff’s had been a foresee-
able consequence of Final Table’s negligent overserving
of Sheets.2 Having received Thompson’s complaint, Final
Table did not notify defendant that Thompson had initiated
an action against it, nor did it forward a copy of Thompson’s
complaint to defendant.
         Final Table did not defend against Thompson’s
action. Approximately 40 days after Thompson served its
complaint on Final Table, the trial court issued an order of
default against Final Table. Three months after the order of
default, Thompson put on a prima facie case, and the trial
court entered a limited judgment in favor of Thompson and
against Final Table for approximately $419,000. Defendant
did not learn that Thompson had filed a complaint against
Final Table until approximately six months after the judg-
ment against Final Table became final.
         Final Table and Thompson entered into a settlement
agreement. As part of that agreement, Final Table assigned
its claims against defendant to Thompson. Thompson and
Final Table (plaintiffs) then brought this action, alleging
that defendant had breached its duty to defend and indem-
nify Final Table. The trial court ruled on summary judg-
ment that defendant had no duty to defend Final Table.
    2
      As discussed below, Thompson’s complaint included allegations that
strengthened the inference that Sheets intended to injure Thompson when he
shot him.
624          Final Table, LLC v. Acceptance Casualty Ins. Co.

The court explained that the statutory claim that Final
Table forwarded to defendant did not trigger the duty to
defend. Only Thompson’s complaint could trigger that duty.
However, Final Table did not provide defendant with timely
notice that Thompson had filed a complaint against it. The
court then turned to the duty to indemnify. It determined
that the only reasonable conclusion that could be drawn
from the evidence on summary judgment was that Sheets
had acted intentionally when he shot Thompson. It followed
that Thompson’s claim against Final Table came within the
exclusion in the liquor liability policy for claims arising out
of assault and battery and that defendant had no duty to
indemnify Final Table.3
         On appeal, plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred
in ruling that defendant had no duty to defend or indemnify
Final Table. The duty to defend is separate from the duty to
indemnify, ZRZ Realty v. Beneficial Fire and Casualty Ins.,
349 Or 117, 150, 241 P3d 710 (2010), and we begin with the
duty to indemnify. In the liquor liability policy that defen-
dant issued to Final Table, defendant agreed to pay Final
Table “those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated
to pay as damages because of [injuries for which the insured
is liable] by reason of the selling, serving or furnishing of
any alcoholic beverage.” The policy also contained an exclu-
sion from coverage, which is at issue here. That exclusion
provided that “[t]his insurance does not apply to * * * [a]ny
claims arising out of Assault and/or Battery.” Additionally,
the exclusion provided that the policy did not apply to any
act or omission taken “in connection with such acts,” nor did
it apply to claims of negligent hiring, training, and the like
“arising from any of the foregoing.”
          On appeal, plaintiffs raise essentially three issues
regarding the duty to indemnify. They argue that the terms
“assault” and “battery” in the exclusion require proof of spe-
cific intent, that a reasonable juror could find on this record

    3
      The trial court did not rule against plaintiffs because no reasonable juror
could infer that Sheets’ actions at Puff’s were a foreseeable consequence of Final
Table’s negligent overservice. Cf. Chapman v. Mayfield, 358 Or 196, 361 P3d 566
(2015) (discussing that issue). Similarly, we assume without deciding that Sheets’
actions at Puff’s were a reasonably foreseeable consequence of Final Table’s
overservice.
Cite as 328 Or App 620 (2023)                                           625

that Sheets was too intoxicated to form that intent, and
that, in any event, the exclusion does not apply to claims
that originate from negligent overservice. We address those
issues in that order.
          The parties disagree whether the terms “assault”
and “battery,” as used in the liquor liability policy, require
proof of specific intent. In support of their respective posi-
tions, defendant relies on what it describes as a national
consensus regarding those terms while plaintiffs rely on the
way that the Oregon Supreme Court defined the common
law torts of assault and battery in Cook v. Kinzua Pine Mills
Co., 207 Or 34, 293 P2d 717 (1956).4 Even if we assume that
defendant reasonably looks to a national consensus to deter-
mine what the terms “assault” and “battery” mean, plain-
tiffs’ reliance on Cook reflects, at a minimum, an equally
reasonable way of determining what those terms mean in
an insurance policy issued to an Oregon business.
        The policy does not define the terms “assault” and
“battery,” nor does it provide any context that favors one
interpretation over the other. It follows that, under Hoffman
Construction Co. v. Fred S. James & Co., 313 Or 464, 836
P2d 703 (1992), we construe the terms “assault” and “bat-
tery” against the drafter and follow Cook’s definition of
those terms. Specifically, Cook explained:
   “We must distinguish between an intent to do an act which
   may be willful and wanton and which may result in con-
   tact, on the one hand, and an act involving an intent to
   cause harmful or offensive contact with the person, on the
   other. An assault and battery involves more than an inten-
   tional act. There must be an intent to injure. However, the
   authorities plainly indicate that the word ‘injure’ refers to
   a legal injury, a violation of a protected right. It does not
   necessarily mean bodily or physical injury.”
207 Or at 48.
        With that definition in mind, we turn to the facts
on summary judgment. In his complaint against Final
Table, Thompson alleged and Final Table admitted when

    4
      Defendant does not dispute that the court’s opinion in Cook provides the
controlling Oregon definition of those common law terms.
626          Final Table, LLC v. Acceptance Casualty Ins. Co.

it defaulted5 that, before Sheets arrived at Final Table, he
had “consumed a fifth of whiskey” and that Final Table
served alcoholic drinks to Sheets even though he was “vis-
ibly intoxicated.” Thompson’s complaint also alleged that
Sheets briefly left Puff’s and reentered with a handgun.
According to the complaint, Sheets “placed one hand behind
[Thompson’s] head [and] then with the other hand placed
the handgun to the right side of [Thompson’s] head and shot
him through the side of the head.” Additionally, evidence
from surveillance videos at Puff’s shows that, after Sheets
shot Thompson in the head, he walked after Thompson
pointing the gun at him as Thompson tried to crawl away.
Put differently, the surveillance video is consistent with the
deliberate way in which Thompson’s complaint alleged that
Sheets shot Thompson.
        After the shooting, the state charged Sheets with
multiple counts of attempted murder and assault. Sheets
pled no contest to one count of attempted murder and one
count of second-degree assault. He was convicted of those
charges and is serving a 13-year sentence for his crimes.6
         Plaintiffs argue that the question whether Sheets’
acts constituted an assault or battery, as Cook defined those
terms, turns on whether Sheets was too intoxicated to form
“an intent to cause harmful or offensive contact.” See Cook,
207 Or at 48 (defining the intent necessary to prove assault
and battery). Plaintiffs reason that the record permits a rea-
sonable trier of fact to find that Sheets either had or did not
have the requisite intent, with the result that the trial court
erred in granting summary judgment in defendant’s favor
on its duty to indemnify Final Table. Ordinarily, plaintiffs’
argument might have some force. After all, Thompson’s com-
plaint alleged and Final Table admitted when it defaulted
that Sheets drank a fifth of whiskey before he arrived at
Final Table; that Final Table continued to serve Sheets

    5
      Defendant does not dispute that Final Table admitted the allegations in
Thompson’s complaint when it defaulted and that those admitted allegations
count as a fact on summary judgment in support of plaintiffs’ claim that defen-
dant breached its duty to indemnify.
    6
      The record does not suggest, and plaintiffs have not argued, that the con-
viction for attempted murder arose out of the injuries that the two bystanders
sustained.
Cite as 328 Or App 620 (2023)                                               627

alcohol even though Sheets was visibly intoxicated; and that
Sheets left Final Table, went to Puff’s, and shot Thompson.
         Three considerations, however, lead us to conclude
that, on this record, a trier of fact reasonably could reach
only one conclusion: Sheets intended to cause a harmful or
offensive contact when he shot Thompson.
         As an initial matter, it is difficult to see how any
sentient person could grab and then deliberately shoot
another person in the head, as the complaint alleges Sheets
did, without having an “intent to cause harmful or offen-
sive contact.” See id. Some volitional acts permit no other
reasonable inference. This is one of them. Cf. Rose v. Clark,
478 US 570, 580-81, 106 S Ct 3101, 92 L Ed 2d 460 (1986)
(explaining that an instructional error regarding intent can
be harmless because “[i]n many cases, the predicate facts
conclusively establish intent, so that no rational jury [in
a criminal case] could find that the defendant intended to
cause the act but did not intend to cause the injury” (empha-
sis in original)). Here, we conclude that no reasonable juror
could conclude that Sheets did not intend to shoot Thompson
in the head, nor could a reasonable juror find that, having
that intent, Sheets did not intend to cause harmful or offen-
sive contact when he pulled the trigger and shot Thompson.
         Beyond that, the complaint alleged (and the record
shows) that Sheets was convicted of attempted murder, which
required a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Sheets
intended to kill Thompson when he grabbed Thompson’s
head with one hand, held the gun to Thompson’s head with
the other hand, and pulled the trigger. See Kinkel v. Pearson,
363 Or 1, 10, 417 P3d 401 (2018) (discussing what a conviction
for attempted murder establishes). Although Sheets’ convic-
tion for attempted murder does not have preclusive effect
in plaintiffs’ action against defendant, cf. State Farm Fire
& Cas. v. Reuter, 299 Or 155, 700 P2d 236 (1985),7 the trial
    7
      In Reuter, the court held that the victim of an assault was precluded from
recovering on the assailant’s insurance policy. The court reasoned that the
assailant’s criminal conviction precluded him from proving that he had acted
unintentionally. Moreover, because the victim’s claim against the insurer was
derivative of the assailant’s claim, she was in privity with the assailant and was
also precluded from proving that the assailant had acted unintentionally. See
299 Or at 163-67; accord State Farm and Casualty Co. v. Parker, 167 Or App 413,
628          Final Table, LLC v. Acceptance Casualty Ins. Co.

court’s finding in the criminal case that Sheets intended to
kill Thompson is direct evidence that Sheets intended, at a
minimum, to cause a “harmful or offensive contact” when he
shot Thompson in the head.
         Finally, after Thompson fell to the floor and tried
to crawl away, Sheets walked slowly after him pointing the
gun at him, until an acquaintance took the gun away. Given
Sheets’ criminal convictions and the deliberate way in which
he shot Thompson in the head, we agree with the trial court
that no reasonable juror could find that Sheets lacked an
intent “to cause harmful or offensive contact.” It follows that
Sheets’ act of shooting Thompson constituted an assault and
battery, as Cook defined those terms, and came within the
exclusion from coverage.
         Plaintiffs advance an alternative argument. Citing
Clinical Research Institute v. Kemper Ins. Co., 191 Or App
595, 601, 84 P3d 147 (2004), they argue that the policy
exclusion for “[a]ny claims arising out of” assault and bat-
tery applies only to claims that “originate from” an assault
or battery. That is, they read the phrase “arising out of”
narrowly as applying only to claims that find their origin
in or begin with an assault or battery. In plaintiffs’ view,
Thompson’s claim against Final Table originated from
Final Table’s overservice of Sheets; it did not originate from
or begin with Sheets’ assault and battery on Thompson. It
follows, plaintiffs conclude, that, even if Sheets’ acts con-
stituted an assault and battery within the meaning of the
policy, Thompson’s claim against Final Table did not arise
out of Sheets shooting Thompson, and the exclusion does not
apply.
         Plaintiffs’ interpretation of the phrase “arising out
of” is difficult to square with our cases. We explained in
Clinical Research Institute that the ordinary meaning of the
words “arising out of” is “very broad.” 191 Or App at 601.
And we quoted Oakridge Comm. Ambulance v. U. S. Fidelity,
278 Or 21, 25, 563 P2d 164 (1977), for the proposition that,
when used in an automobile liability provision for coverage

416, 1 P3d 498 (2000). In this case, Final Table was the insured. It was not the
assailant and was not in privity with Sheets. As a result, issue preclusion does
not apply.
Cite as 328 Or App 620 (2023)                                                 629

for damages arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or
use of an automobile, “ ‘[t]he words “arising out of” * * * are
of broader significance than the words “caused by,” and are
ordinarily understood to mean originating from, incident
to, or having connection with the use of a vehicle.’ ” Clinical
Research Institute, 191 Or App at 601 (quoting Oakridge
Comm. Ambulance). Plaintiffs focus on one synonym for the
phrase “arising out of” that the court identified in Oakridge
but overlook the other two synonyms that the court identi-
fied, both of which undercut their argument.
          To be sure, we observed in Clinical Research Institute
that the meaning of the phrase “arising out of” can vary with
the context in which that phrase is used. Id. In our view, how-
ever, the context cuts against plaintiffs’ interpretation of that
phrase. Specifically, defendant’s liquor liability policy covers
only “those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated
to pay as damages because of [injuries for which the insured
is liable] by reason of the selling, serving or furnishing of
any alcoholic beverage.” If, as plaintiffs argue, the exclusion
for “[a]ny claims arising out of Assault and/or Battery” does
not apply to claims for assault and battery that are a foresee-
able consequence of negligently overserving alcohol, then the
exclusion becomes a null set. It excludes claims for injuries
for which the policy provides no coverage. After all, the policy
does not provide coverage for assaults and batteries that are
unrelated to selling, serving, or providing alcohol.
        Viewing the exclusion in context, we conclude that
Thompson’s claim against Final Table (and Final Table’s
claim for indemnification under the policy) arose out of
Sheets’ assault and battery on Thompson. As a result,
Thompson’s claim was excluded from coverage.8 The trial

    8
      Plaintiffs offer one contrary contextual argument. They note that the sec-
ond paragraph in the exclusion uses the phrase “in connection with” and the
third paragraph uses the phrase “arising from” rather than “arising out of.” They
infer from the use of those different connecting phrases that “arising out of” in
the first paragraph in the exclusion refers only to claims that originate from an
assault or battery. The second and third paragraphs, however, exclude claims for
incidental acts, such as the failure to prevent an assault or battery or the failure
to train or supervise that can occur in connection with or that may arise from
negligent overservice but are not the foreseeable consequence of negligent over-
service, as an assault or battery may be. The context that plaintiffs identify does
not persuade us that the first paragraph in the exclusion applies narrowly.
630           Final Table, LLC v. Acceptance Casualty Ins. Co.

court correctly ruled on summary judgment that defendant
had no duty to indemnify Final Table.9
         We turn to plaintiffs’ argument that defendant had
a duty to defend Final Table against Thompson’s claim.
We note, as an initial matter, that there is a substantial
question whether Final Table incurred any damages as a
result of defendant’s alleged breach of the duty to defend.
Plaintiffs’ complaint against defendant does not allege any
acts that Final Table took to defend against Thompson’s
complaint, nor does it allege that Final Table incurred
any costs as a result of defending against that complaint.10
Moreover, plaintiffs have not alleged that Thompson would
have recovered fewer damages from Final Table if defendant
had provided Final Table with a defense. Defendant, how-
ever, never moved to dismiss or strike plaintiffs’ claim that
it had breached its duty to defend for the failure to allege
any damages, and we cannot say that plaintiffs could not
have alleged any damages if defendant had raised the issue.
We accordingly turn to the merits of plaintiffs’ claim that
defendant breached its duty to defend Final Table.
         As noted above, Final Table timely sent defen-
dant a copy of the statutorily required notice of claim that
Thompson served on Final Table. Final Table, however, did
not give defendant timely notice that, approximately a year
later, Thompson initiated an action against Final Table
by filing and serving a complaint for damages arising out
of the shooting at Puff’s Pub. Indeed, Final Table did not
notify defendant that Thompson had initiated an action
against Final Table until approximately six months after
the trial court entered a final judgment in that action for

    9
       Plaintiffs also advance a common law variation of their insurance policy
argument. Relying on Gowans v. N. W. Pac. Indem. Co., 260 Or 618, 489 P2d
947 (1971), they contend that the “proximate cause” of Thompson’s claim against
Final Table was Final Table’s overservice of Sheets, not Sheets’ assault and
battery. It follows, they conclude, that Thompson’s claim was not subject to the
assault and battery exclusion. The court explained, however, in Gowans that the
policy did not exclude the foreseeable loss in that case. Id. at 620. Here, it does.
    10
       Plaintiffs’ complaint against defendant alleged that Final Table incurred
damages in the amount of the default judgment entered against it and that
Thompson has incurred damages for his attempts to recover the default judg-
ment from Final Table. However, neither allegation identifies any damages that
Final Table incurred in defending against Thompson’s complaint.
Cite as 328 Or App 620 (2023)                                                 631

approximately $419,000 in favor of Thompson and against
Final Table.
         At first blush, one might wonder how defendant
could have breached its duty to defend Final Table in an
action that Final Table never mentioned to defendant until
long after that action had been reduced to a judgment.
Plaintiffs argue, however, that the statutorily required
claim that they sent to defendant approximately a year
before Thompson sued Final Table sufficed, either because
that claim was sufficient to trigger the duty to defend under
the policy or because it was substantially the same as the
complaint that Thompson filed a year later. Alternatively,
plaintiffs contend that, even if Final Table breached its duty
under the policy to provide timely notice to defendant of
any complaint filed against it, defendant was not prejudiced
by Final Table’s breach. See Lusch v. Aetna Cas. & Surety
Co., 272 Or 593, 538 P2d 902 (1975); Employers Insurance
of Wausau v. Tektronix, Inc., 211 Or App 485, 156 P3d 105
(2007); Halsey v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 68 Or App 349,
681 P2d 168 (1984). They argue that, even if defendant had
received timely notice of Thompson’s complaint, defendant
still would have determined that, based on the complaint, it
had no duty to defend Final Table.11
         Plaintiffs’ first argument conflates two related
but separate provisions in the insurance policy. The policy
required Final Table to promptly notify defendant of any
“claim” or “suit” against it. It also provided, in a separate
section, that defendant had a duty to defend against any
“suit” that came within the policy’s coverage. Under the poli-
cy’s terms, defendant’s duty to defend arose only in response
to a “suit,” and plaintiffs have cited no authority for the
proposition that the statutorily required claim that Final
Table forwarded to defendant constituted a “suit,” as the
    11
       Plaintiffs advance one other reason to excuse Final Table’s failure to notify
defendant that Thompson had initiated an action against it. They argue that
defendant’s response to the statutory claim that Final Table forwarded to defen-
dant constituted an anticipatory breach, which relieved Final Table of any obli-
gation under the policy to forward Thompson’s complaint to defendant. However,
defendant’s response to the statutory claim was not its final word on the issue.
Rather, defendant’s response asked Final Table to let it know if the facts or plead-
ings changed, which could cause defendant to reevaluate its decision that it had
no duty to defend or indemnify.
632          Final Table, LLC v. Acceptance Casualty Ins. Co.

policy used that term. The claim that Final Table forwarded
to defendant did not trigger the duty to defend.
          Plaintiffs’ argument that defendant was not prej-
udiced by Final Table’s default presents a closer issue. In
its briefing, defendant has not responded to that argument;
that is, it has not disputed that, under established Oregon
precedent, Final Table’s failure to give defendant timely
notice of Thompson’s complaint was not fatal because defen-
dant was not prejudiced by that failure. Indeed, defendant
argues on appeal that, even if it had received timely notice of
Thompson’s complaint, it still would have determined, based
on the allegations in Thompson’s complaint, that it had no
duty to defend Final Table. Given that response, we conclude
that that Final Table’s lapse did not prejudice defendant and
accordingly turn to the question whether the allegations in
Thompson’s complaint came within the terms of the liquor
liability policy that defendant issued. See Ledford v. Gutoski,
319 Or 397, 399, 877 P2d 80 (1994) (explaining that the duty
to defend is determined by comparing the allegations in the
complaint to the terms in the policy).12
         On that issue, the allegations in Thompson’s com-
plaint do not differ in any meaningful way from the evidence
introduced on summary judgment, which we discussed
above in deciding whether defendant had breached its duty
to indemnify Final Table. Thompson’s complaint alleges,
as noted above, that Sheets had drunk a fifth of whisky
before he went to Final Table and that Final Table served
Sheets even though he was visibly impaired. It alleges that
Sheets then went to Puff’s Pub where he “smelled like he
may have defecated on himself.” According to the complaint,
Sheets left Puff’s briefly and returned with a gun; Sheets
then “placed one hand behind [Thompson’s] head [and]
then with the other hand placed the handgun to the right
side of [Thompson’s] head and shot him through the side
of the head.” Finally, the complaint alleges that, after the

    12
       The trial court did not decide defendant’s duty to defend on this ground,
although defendant raised the issue in support of its motion for summary judg-
ment. Moreover, because there is no factual dispute regarding the complaint or
the policy, there is no procedural bar to our considering whether the trial court
was “right for the wrong reason.”
Cite as 328 Or App 620 (2023)                                             633

shooting, Sheets was convicted of attempted murder and
second-degree assault.
         The allegations in the complaint differ in minor
respects from the evidence set out above regarding the duty
to indemnify. The complaint omits any allegation that Sheets
suffered from flatulence at Puff’s, that other people in the
bar made rude gestures in response to Sheets’ condition, or
that Thompson made a crude comment. It does, however,
include a description of how Sheets smelled at Puff’s, and
it sets out how, after he reentered Puff’s with a gun, Sheets
took Thompson’s head in one hand, placed the gun against
his head with the other hand, and pulled the trigger. It also
alleges that Sheets was convicted of attempted murder and
assault.13
          Although the two sets of facts are not identical, the
differences are not material. Most notably, the complaint
sets out the deliberate way in which Sheets held Thompson’s
head while he put the gun against it and pulled the trigger,
and it includes the fact that he was convicted of attempted
murder. For the reasons explained above, no reasonable trier
of fact could infer from those allegations that Sheets lacked
an “intent to cause harmful or offensive contact” when he
shot Thompson in the head. See Cook, 207 Or at 48. Even
if Final Table’s failure to provide defendant with timely
notice of Thompson’s complaint did not prejudice defendant,
the allegations in Thompson’s complaint brought his claim
against Final Table within the exclusion from coverage for
claims arising from an assault and battery. For that reason,
the trial court correctly granted defendant’s motion for sum-
mary judgment on the duty to defend.
           Affirmed.

    13
       The complaint omits an allegation that the bullets from Sheets’ gun hit
two bystanders. For all that appears from the complaint, the only person whom
Sheets injured was Thompson, which leads to the inescapable inference that
Sheets’ criminal convictions resulted from the injuries that Thompson sustained.