Court Opinion

ID: 9587139
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:18:21.646078+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:33:03.069824
License: Public Domain

BAKES, Chief Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
Until this Court’s decision in Sterling v. Bloom, 111 Idaho 211, 723 P.2d 755 (1986), is overruled either by the legislature or by this Court, the majority may well be correct in concluding that there was a triable issue of fact over whether or not the principal was negligent in calling off the ambulance, and also whether that act of alleged negligence was an operational rather than a policy decision, and thus not immune under the Tort Claims Act.
However, the other alleged acts of negligence described in the plaintiffs’ complaint, i.e., failure to have medical supplies and equipment available, failure to provide adequate medical emergency training to school personnel, failure to establish adequate policies, practices or procedures regarding the training of personnel in emergency first aid, inadequate training of the principal in procedures for providing and securing medical assistance, and negligently training the principal in emergency medical first aid, are all policy decisions of the school board, which for the most part are tied directly or indirectly to the budgetary constraints under which school districts operate. Those are policy decisions resulting from statutory limitations placed upon school districts to raise funds to carry out their educational function. Accordingly, in my view, on those other issues the school district is immune from liability under the Tort Claims.Act.
Regarding Part III of the majority opinion, dealing with the issue of emotional distress, our prior cases have required that any claim for damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress be accompanied with objective physical manifestations before any such claim is cognizable. Subjective claims of pain, injury or suffering are not sufficient. There must be objective physical manifestations. Complaints such as those raised by the plaintiffs in this case, such as loss of appetite, stomach pains, fatigue, reduced libido, sleep disorders, suicidal thoughts and headaches, are not the kinds of objective physical manifestations which our cases, and the cases from other jurisdictions around the country, have allowed recovery for under a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress. Payton v. Abbott Labs, 386 Mass. 540, 437 N.E.2d 171, 181 (1982) (“In order to recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiff must allege and prove physical harm [which] must be manifested by objective symptomology and substantiated by expert medical testimony”); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Young, 384 So.2d 69, 71 (Miss.1980) (no recovery allowed for mental distress without a showing of “objectively observable physical consequences”); W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser & Keeton on The Law of Torts ¶ 54 at p. 364 (5th ed. 1984) (“[T]he mental distress [must] be certified by some physical injury, illness or other objective physical manifestation.”); Gill v. Brown, 107 Idaho 1137, 1138, 695 P.2d 1276, 1277 (Ct.App.1985) (“In order for the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress to lie, the actions of the defendant must have caused some physical injury to the plaintiff *335which accompanies the emotional distress.”).
Accordingly, I also' dissent as to Part III of the majority opinion.