Court Opinion

ID: 9386874
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-13 21:00:26.788193+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:09.232233
License: Public Domain

USCA4 Appeal: 20-1730         Doc: 39         Filed: 04/12/2023   Pg: 1 of 12

                                               UNPUBLISHED

                                   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                       FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                                  No. 20-1730

        ANNAKUTTY JOSEPH,

                                Plaintiff − Appellant,

                        v.

        TARGET STORES, INC., a/k/a Target Corporation,

                                Defendant – Appellee.

        ------------------------------

        VIRGINIA TRIAL LAWYERS ASSOCIATION,

                                Amicus Supporting Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at
        Alexandria. Claude M. Hilton, Senior District Judge. (1:19−cv−00614−CMH−IDD)

        Argued: March 8, 2023                                             Decided: April 12, 2023

        Before KING, DIAZ, and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges.

        Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Judge Diaz wrote the opinion, in which Judge King and
        Judge Quattlebaum joined.

        ARGUED: Kevin Michael Leach, TURBITT LEACH & CRUM, PLLC, Burke, Virginia,
        for Appellant. John D. McGavin, MCGAVIN, BOYCE, BARDOT, THORSEN & KATZ,
        P.C., Fairfax, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Anna G. Zick, BANCROFT,
USCA4 Appeal: 20-1730      Doc: 39         Filed: 04/12/2023    Pg: 2 of 12

        MCGAVIN, HORVATH & JUDKINS P.C., Fairfax, Virginia, for Appellee. Mary Lynn
        Tate, TATE LAW PC, Abingdon, Virginia; Roger T. Creager, THE CREAGER LAW
        FIRM, PLLC, Richmond, Virginia, for Amicus Curiae.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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        DIAZ, Circuit Judge:

               While walking through a Target store in Gainesville, Virginia, Annakutty Joseph

        slipped and fell on a puddle apparently formed in a store aisle by rainwater dripping from

        the ceiling. Joseph sued Target for negligence, and the district court granted summary

        judgment for Target. Because Joseph didn’t present sufficient evidence that Target had

        constructive knowledge of the puddle, we affirm.

                                                     I.

                                                     A.

               It rained heavily in Gainesville on the morning of May 21, 2016. Around 1:20 p.m.

        that day, Joseph slipped and fell on a puddle of water in aisle W27 of the Gainesville Target

        store, injuring herself. At the time, Joseph—an “Event Facilitator” who helped conduct

        product demos at the store—was headed to the back storage area to get cups and utensils. 1

        J.A. 435–36. Joseph “was not in a hurry and was looking where [she] was going,” but saw

        “no indication that there was water in the aisle” because the puddle was “transparent and

        clear on the white floor.” J.A. 436. According to Joseph, the puddle was large: at least

        two feet wide and six or seven feet long.

               1
                 Joseph is not a Target employee, and below, Target didn’t dispute her
        characterization as an invitee. Though Target’s counsel suggested for the first time at oral
        argument that Joseph may have been a “bare licensee,” we consider that argument waived.
        See Kadel v. N.C. State Health Plan, 12 F.4th 422, 430–31 (4th Cir. 2021) (given litigant’s
        “silence on the issue below, the district court had no reason to understand it as anything
        but undisputed”).

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                 Craig Shipman, a Target employee, heard Joseph fall and came over to help her.

        Shipman later wrote in a guest-incident report that he saw “water leaking from ceiling –

        formed a puddle.” J.A. 429. Kristina Centanni, the store’s day manager, wrote in the

        incident report that “rain had leaked through roof & began dripping on ground.” J.A. 428.

        She noted that the “leak [was] discovered” when Joseph slipped, and that it was “[n]ot easy

        to see water.” Id. Centanni also testified that “everybody” working in the area was

        responsible for making sure the floors were “clean and appropriate,” but that the store

        didn’t keep records of its floor inspections. J.A. 376.

                                                     B.

                 Joseph sued Target in Virginia state court, alleging that the company negligently

        failed to maintain its premises in a safe condition. Target removed the action to federal

        court.

                 Joseph hired David Hawn, a roofing consultant, to offer an expert opinion on how

        the puddle formed. Relying on a “[p]ersonal inspection” of the roof, the incident report,

        and other discovery materials, Hawn concluded that “the cause for the leak . . . was more

        likely than not an open panel door” on a rooftop [heating, ventilation, and air conditioning

        (HVAC)] unit located directly above aisle W27. J.A. 557, 559. Hawn explained that the

        open door would have allowed rainwater into the HVAC’s interior, which “would then

        have leaked into the store interior and formed a puddle on aisle w27.” J.A. 559.

                 Subsequent discovery revealed that a Target employee, Mac Campbell, had worked

        on the HVAC unit about two weeks before Joseph’s fall. In a declaration, Campbell said

        that he didn’t think he left any doors open on the HVAC unit, and that it was “very unlikely

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        that [he] could mistakenly leave a door partially open given the way the doors close and

        latch.” J.A. 347. He also noted that when he inspected the roof a few days after Joseph’s

        fall, none of the HVAC doors were open. J.A. 348.

               Target moved for summary judgment, arguing that Joseph’s main theory of the

        case—that an open HVAC door had created the puddle—was speculative. But even if the

        HVAC door had been open, Target contended, Joseph couldn’t prove that the puddle

        existed long enough to give the store constructive knowledge of it. Target also argued that

        in any case, Joseph’s own negligence in failing to spot the large puddle barred her recovery.

               The district court agreed on all fronts. Though Joseph characterized Hawn’s opinion

        as “evidence,” the court found it “apparent that Hawn is only speculating that the [HVAC]

        door may have been left open.” Joseph v. Target Stores, Inc., No. 1:19-CV-614, 2020 WL

        3549181, at *2 (E.D. Va. June 30, 2020). But even “assuming Hawn is correct that the

        roof hatch was open,” the court held that there was “still no evidence as to how long the

        water took to saturate and leak through the ceiling tiles and form the puddle on the floor of

        aisle 27”—the “dispositive issue” in the case. Id. And the court agreed that while there

        was “some evidence in the record that the puddle was difficult to see,” Joseph was

        contributorily negligent for failing to avoid an “open and obvious” hazard. Id. at *3.

               Joseph timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

                                                     II.

               We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the facts

        and reasonable inferences drawn from them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving

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        party. Carter v. Fleming, 879 F.3d 132, 139 (4th Cir. 2018). Summary judgment is

        appropriate only when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact—that is, if a

        reasonable jury couldn’t return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty

        Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

               The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of

        material fact and that it’s entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

        477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). They can do this in one of two ways: (1) by offering evidence

        that negates an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim, Adickes v. Kress Co.,

        398 U.S. 144, 158 (1970); or (2) by showing that the nonmoving party lacks evidence to

        carry its burden of persuasion at trial, Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322–23.

               Once the motion is properly supported under either Adickes or Celotex, the burden

        shifts to the nonmoving party to show that a genuine dispute of material fact exists.

        Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). “Conclusory

        or speculative allegations do not suffice, nor does a ‘mere scintilla of evidence’ in support

        of [the non-movant’s] case.” Thompson v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 312 F.3d 645, 649

        (4th Cir. 2002).

               We recap this hornbook law on summary judgment because Joseph contends that

        the movant “must not leave a gap in the evidence and must ‘foreclose the possibility’ that

        an issue of fact exists for trial.” Appellant’s Br. at 17. She argues that because Target

        failed to “foreclose the possibility” that a door on the HVAC unit was left open, the store

        didn’t carry its initial burden under Adickes. Id. at 19.

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               But Target’s motion for summary judgment took the Celotex route, arguing that

        Joseph didn’t have evidence to prove that Target had constructive knowledge of the puddle.

        And where the movant points out that “there is an absence of evidence to support the

        nonmoving party’s case,” they need not also “produce evidence showing the absence of a

        genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325.

                                                     A.

               “Because this is a diversity case, Virginia law governs the parties’ duties and

        responsibilities.” Goehler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 229 F.3d 1142 (4th Cir. 2000) (per

        curiam) (citing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938)). The rules applicable

        to Virginia slip-and-fall cases are “well settled.” Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Parker, 396

        S.E.2d 649, 650 (Va. 1990). A store owes its invitees a duty to maintain the premises in a

        “reasonably safe condition,” including by removing hazards from the floor “within a

        reasonable time.” Colonial Stores Inc. v. Pulley, 125 S.E.2d 188, 190 (Va. 1962). To

        establish prima facie liability, the plaintiff must “introduce evidence of the responsible

        person’s actual or constructive knowledge of a defective condition.” Grim v. Rahe, Inc.,

        434 S.E.2d 888, 889 (Va. 1993).

               Joseph doesn’t contest that Target lacked actual knowledge of the puddle. Rather,

        she offers three theories to establish the store’s constructive knowledge of it: (1) Target’s

        employee created the hazard by leaving an HVAC door open; (2) large puddles of water

        formed by drips take time to accumulate; and (3) Target’s history of roof leaks created a

        recurring hazard. We’ll discuss each in turn.

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                                                      1.

               First, Joseph says that we may impute constructive knowledge to Target because the

        puddle was caused by a Target employee (Campbell) who left an HVAC door open. Joseph

        cites a line of cases noting that constructive knowledge is established where “a premises

        owner affirmatively creates a dangerous condition” and the resulting hazard is “reasonably

        foreseeable.” Thomas v. Omni Hotels Mgmt. Corp., 742 F. App’x 729, 734 (4th Cir. 2018);

        see Austin v. Shoney’s, Inc., 486 S.E.2d 285 (Va. 1997); Memco Stores, Inc. v. Yeatman,

        348 S.E.2d 228 (Va. 1986).

               The district court addressed this theory only obliquely, noting that Hawn—the

        expert who determined that an open HVAC door was the likely culprit—was “only

        speculating.” Joseph, 2020 WL 3549181, at *2. On appeal, Target argues that Hawn’s

        “speculation . . . does not create a genuine dispute of fact,” and that in any case, it’s “not

        foreseeable that an open HVAC compartment door would cause a puddle on aisle 27.”

        Appellee’s Br. at 24.

               We agree with Joseph that the district court unfairly discounted Hawn’s expert

        report. See Sedar v. Reston Town Ctr. Prop., LLC, 988 F.3d 756, 764 (4th Cir. 2021)

        (crediting an expert report on stair conditions as containing “more than conclusory

        allegations”). Hawn’s report pointed to “specific, material facts” on a likely cause of the

        leak, see id. at 764: There was an HVAC unit directly above aisle W27; Campbell

        performed maintenance on it two weeks before the incident; and the HVAC manual

        required him to open the door and check the inside of the unit, including for “signs of water

        infiltration.” J.A. 559. And while Campbell denied leaving the door open, he admitted

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        that “[g]iven the time elapsed,” he didn’t “specifically recall” that day. J.A. 347. Viewed

        in the light most favorable to Joseph, these facts could allow a jury to find that the open

        HVAC door led to the leak.

               But we disagree with Joseph that this chain of events was reasonably foreseeable.

        In Joseph’s cited cases, the nexus between action and hazard was closer: A store actively

        moved plants known to shed their slippery leaves when jostled, for example, or an

        employee created a “grease-like film” by mopping the floor. See Memco Stores, 348

        S.E.2d at 230; Shoney’s, 486 S.E.2d at 287. By contrast, we’ve found that ice on a

        walkway—allegedly formed by water escaping from a hotel fountain—wasn’t reasonably

        foreseeable where employees testified “they had never observed the fountain causing

        splashes, condensation, or moisture on the surrounding walkway, nor received complaints

        of water or ice on the walkway.” Omni Hotels, 742 F. App’x at 734.

               This case is closer to Omni Hotels than to Memco Stores or Shoney’s. Campbell

        didn’t directly create the puddle—at most, he left open a rooftop panel that allowed

        rainwater to seep in weeks later. And there’s no evidence that an open HVAC door had

        ever caused a roof leak at this Target before. So while accepting Joseph’s version of events,

        it still wasn’t reasonably foreseeable that negligent HVAC maintenance would lead to a

        puddle in aisle W27.

                                                     2.

               Even if a store doesn’t affirmatively create a dangerous condition, a plaintiff can

        establish constructive knowledge by proving that the hazard “had been there long enough

        that the defendant ought to have known of its presence.” Colonial Stores, 125 S.E.2d at

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        190. In that case, summary judgment for the defendant is proper when “the evidence fails

        to show when a defect occurred on the premises.” Grim, 434 S.E.2d at 890.

               Joseph argues we can infer the puddle had been on the floor long enough because it

        would take significant time to “create a two foot by seven foot puddle by drips.”

        Appellant’s Br. at 39 (cleaned up).       Target responds that there’s “no evidence to

        demonstrate when the water began to fall from the ceiling to the floor” and “no reliable

        way to estimate when the puddle was formed.” Appellee’s Br. at 21. The district court

        agreed with Target, finding that Joseph offered no evidence to prove when the puddle

        started to form.

               Virginia’s strict case law in this area dooms Joseph’s argument. Virginia doesn’t

        “permit juries to speculate upon how long a foreign substance had been on the floor”—a

        plaintiff must offer evidence on that point. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Berry, 128 S.E.2d

        311, 313–14 (Va. 1962). So a plaintiff won’t win when it’s “just as probable that [a floor

        hazard] had been there for a short period of time as for a lengthy period.” Id. at 313.

               Joseph concedes that there’s no evidence showing when water started hitting the

        floor. But she asks us to infer from the puddle’s large size—and the fact that it had rained

        in the morning—that rainwater must have been leaking slowly from the ceiling for some

        time, so Target would have discovered the puddle had it looked. Under Virginia law,

        however, a “chain of inferences” isn’t sufficient to demonstrate how long a hazard existed.

        Omni Hotels, 742 F. App’x at 733.

               In Omni Hotels, for example, the plaintiff argued that “ice takes time to form and

        this ice appeared thick approximately thirty minutes after [the] fall.” Id. And in Logan v.

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        Boddie-Noell Enterprises, Inc., the plaintiff pointed to the “large quantity and area of the

        water, suggesting that the water must have accumulated over a significant period of time.”

        No. 4:11-cv-00008, 2012 WL 135284, at *8 (W.D. Va. Jan. 18, 2012). The courts rejected

        the plaintiffs’ theories in both cases, finding that they rested on mere speculation.

               Joseph’s evidence likewise falls short. There’s no evidence in the record to establish

        when the water permeated the ceiling tiles and began forming the puddle. The ceiling

        could have been dripping slowly for hours—or the tile could have given way and dripped

        substantial amounts of water just before Joseph fell. The jury could reach a conclusion

        either way “only by impermissible speculation and conjecture.” Omni Hotels, 742 F.

        App’x at 733 (cleaned up).

                                                      3.

               Finally, Joseph argues that “a jury could also find the puddle was caused by the

        recurring danger of a poorly maintained roof,” and that this “recurring danger” was

        sufficient to charge Target with constructive knowledge. Appellant’s Br. at 30. Joseph

        didn’t advance this theory at summary judgment, so the district court didn’t rule on it. See

        Joseph, 2020 WL 3549181, at *1 (“Plaintiff originally pursued the case under the theory

        that Defendant was aware that the building’s roof had a history of leaking but having found

        no evidence supporting that theory, now argues” that Campbell left the HVAC unit open).

        We therefore deem the argument waived and decline to consider it. See Cox v. SNAP, Inc.,

        859 F.3d 304, 308 n.2 (4th Cir. 2017) (“If a party fails to assert a legal reason why summary

        judgment should not be granted, that ground is waived and cannot be considered or raised

        on appeal.” (cleaned up)).

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                                                    III.

               In all, Joseph hasn’t established Target’s constructive knowledge of the puddle—

        whether by the store’s allegedly negligent HVAC maintenance or inferences about the size

        and formation of the puddle. 2 The district court’s judgment is therefore

                                                                                    AFFIRMED.

               2
                 As a result, we don’t reach the district court’s holding that Joseph was
        contributorily negligent.

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