Court Opinion

ID: 9468568
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 02:17:51.762264+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:40:55.806430
License: Public Domain

BAZELON, Senior Circuit Judge,
concurring in the result:
In view of the compelling legitimate reason for the defendant’s action, the record does not support the finding that retaliation was a “substantial” 1 cause of dismissal. I therefore join in the court’s judgment. I am not prepared, however, to agree with two problematic propositions of law unnecessary to the result.
First, neither precedent nor reason explains why an employee’s qualifications must be a “critical element” of a discriminatory dismissal claim.2 Contrary to the majority’s suggestion, the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas v. Green3 did not in-, tend to define the elements of every employment discrimination claim; 4 that case involved a refusal to hire. The qualifications issued here, on the other hand, seems *120to be an arbitrary barrier to consideration of the merits; the plaintiff was fired not because he lacked qualifications, but because he lied about them.
Second, the adoption of a “but-for” standard of causation is both unexplained and unnecessary to the decision here.5 The majority finds that “[t]he law in this circuit ... is clear.”6 Although retaliation has been recognized as a dangerous threat “to the effectiveness of the Act,” 7 none of the cases relied upon by the majority involved retaliation.8 Nor is any other explanation offered for this standard.9 Moreover, in view of the court’s ruling on the qualifications issue, its discussion of causation must be considered dicta.

. Williams v. Boorstin, 451 F.Supp. 1117, 1123 (D.D.C.1978).

. Majority Opinion (Maj.Op.) at 116.

. 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973).

. Among the elements of a prima facie case listed in McDonnell Douglas was “that [the plaintiff] belongs to a racial minority.” 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. at 1824. In McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Trans. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 96 S.Ct. 2574, 49 L.Ed.2d 493 (1976), the Court found that Title VII prohibited discrimination against all races. The Court noted:
Our discussion in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green ... of the means by which a Title VII litigant might make out a prima facie case ... is not contrary. There we said that a complainant could establish a prima facie case by showing [that he belonged to a racial minority; applied and was qualified for a job for which he was rejected; and, the position remained open]. As we particularly noted, however, this “specification ... is not necessarily applicable in every respect to differing factual circumstances.” Id. at 802, n.13, 93 S.Ct. at 18, 24 n.13.
427 U.S. at 279 n.6, 96 S.Ct. at 2578 n.6 (emphasis supplied). McDonnell Douglas offered only a “sample pattern of proof,” which was “not ... an indication of any substantive limitation. ...” 427 U.S. at 279 n.6, 96 S.Ct. at 2578 n.6.
The majority contends that Womack v. Munson, 619 F.2d 1292, 1296 (8th Cir. 1980), and Rogers v. McCall, 488 F.Supp. 689, 699 (D.D.C.1980), support application of McDonnell Douglas to retaliatory dismissal claims, see Maj.Op. at 115-116 & n.40. But in neither case did the court make “qualifications” an element of *120retaliation; instead, these courts applied the standard found in B. Schlei & P. Grossman, Employment Discrimination Law 436 (1976) (prima facie case includes: (1) protected activity; (2) adverse employment action; (3) causal connection; burden then shifts to employer to show legitimate reason for dismissal). See Gonzalez v. Bolger, 486 F.Supp. 595, 601 (D.D.C.1980).
Outside this case law, no substantial reason is suggested why qualifications must be an element of a retaliatory dismissal claim. The majority’s concern that a “nonqualified employee [will] invoke Title VII to cure [his] deficiencies,” Maj.Op. at 116, seems to overlook the second stage of proof outlined in McDonnell Douglas. At that stage, the employer can respond to a prima facie retaliation claim by offering a legitimate reason for dismissal, which might include lack of qualifications.

. Maj. Op. at 117.

. Id.

. EEOC v. Kallir, Philips, Ross, Inc., 401 F.Supp. 66, 72 (S.D.N.Y.1975) (Weinfeld, J.), aff’d, 559 F.2d 1203 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 920, 98 S.Ct. 395, 54 L.Ed.2d 277 (1977). See Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998 (5th Cir. 1969). Retaliation represents more than a discrete act of discrimination; it also threatens to chill enforcement of the Act’s guarantees. See Gonzalez v. Bolger, 486 F.Supp. 595, 601 (D.D.C.1980).

. See Maj. Op. at n.49 (Weahkee v. Perry, 587 F.2d 1256 (D.C.Cir.1978); Rogers v. EEOC, 551 F.2d 456 (D.C.Cir.1977); Day v. Mathews, 530 F.2d 1083 (D.C.Cir.1976)).

. The Eighth Circuit did apply the but-for standard to a retaliation claim in Womack v. Munson, 619 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1980). Cf. Monteiro v. Poole Silver Co., 615 F.2d 4, 9 (1st Cir.1980) (retaliatory motive must be “determinative factor” of dismissal). But a lower causation standard was applied in EEOC v. Kallir, Philips, Ross, Inc., 401 F.Supp. 66, 72 n.17 (S.D.N.Y.), where Judge Weinfeld rested a Title VII violation on a finding of “partial” retaliatory motivation. In Gonzalez v. Bolger, 486 F.Supp. 595, 602 (D.D.C.1980), the court considered whether the employer’s claimed justification was “in fact a pretext for retaliatory animus. . . . ”
I do not suggest which of these standards is appropriate. These facts do not require us to choose a standard for this circuit; the evidence did not support the finding below that retaliation was a “substantial” cause of dismissal. I believe that under these circumstances it is inappropriate for the majority to adopt a higher standard than the one applied by the trial court.