Court Opinion

ID: 9454015
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 18:32:24.479786+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:33:55.563790
License: Public Domain

KILKENNY, District Judge
(dissenting):
The totality of evidence supports the lower Court’s finding that defendant took an affirmative step to conceal the crime. Beyond question, he had knowledge of the commission of the crime. That he knew the money was stolen and received some of it is crystal clear. A principal witness testified defendant received “half” of the stolen money. Later, the same witness said defendant received “some” of the money. In my view, it is of little importance whether he received “half” or “some” of the money. In either case, he took an af*698firmative step to conceal the crime. The suggestion that he might have received the money in payment of a debt is pure speculation. Even if true, he knew the money was stolen and, consequently, knew its acceptance by him helped conceal the crime.
I fail to see the constitutional problems envisioned by the majority. Defendant, knowing the money was stolen, could have refused acceptance and reported the crime to the authorities or, in the alternative, he could have accepted the money and immediately delivered the evidence to the Government. If the logic of the majority is followed to its natural conclusion, one knowingly receiving and keeping any type of stolen property could employ the suggested constitutional shield and thus prevent prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 4 (1964).
Defendant was in no way implicated in the bank robbery until he knowingly received the stolen money. Consequently, the rule stated in Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486, 71 S.Ct. 814, 95 L.Ed. 1118 (1951), and United States v. Trigilio, 255 F.2d 385 (2d Cir. 1958), is not applicable.
I would affirm.