Court Opinion

ID: 9670092
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:14:32.415513+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:02.404866
License: Public Domain

Mulronby, J.
(dissenting)' — I recognize the soundness of the majority opinion under the “law of the case” doctrine if our former opinion commanded no pay allowance to Glenn after his discharge, if Rank was paid a salary for performing the duties of the office during the period in question. Because I do not so interpret our former opinion in 242 Iowa 760, 48 N.W.2d 275, I dissent from the majority opinion here.
It is true the defendants in the former case assigned as error the trial court’s order of Glenn’s reinstatement and the order of payment of his salary while he was discharged. We did not decide plaintiff’s right to pay after discharge “because Code section 365.27 and our opinions heretofore cited contemplate the decision in the first instance rests with the defendants council and commission and also because payment to Rank does not definitely appear.” We affirmed the reinstatement order but left *756open “plaintiff’s right to pay during the period of his removal.” We stated that question was “for future determination in harmony with the views herein expressed.” Quotations are from last paragraph of former opinion.
To reach the conclusion of the majority opinion one must find the clear expression of law in the former opinion that compels an adjudication denying any payment to Glenn if compensation was paid to Rank. I just do not find that clear statement of law in the “views expressed” in the former opinion.
The former opinion points out that the parties had stipulated that Rank had performed the duties of the position after Glenn’s discharge and it was not there asserted or argued that Rank was not paid for performing those duties. As the opinion states, the parties argued Glenn’s right to payment, assuming payment to Rank for performing the duties of the office after Glenn’s discharge. In commenting upon this record we said it was not “definitely” shown Rank was paid, but we all knew that it was most likely Rank was paid and defendants would probably have no trouble showing that fact. We then stated, quite properly I think, that we would “express our views as to the effect upon plaintiff’s right to compensation of payment to Rank, if in fact * * * Rank was paid for performing the duties of the position after plaintiff’s discharge.” Page 769 of 242 Iowa, page 280 of 48 N.W.2d. If the “effect” was to be a denial of Glenn’s right to payment and any other determination would be absolutely void, we could have been expected to say so. I think it abundantly clear we did not say payment to Rank would compel a denial of Glenn’s claim for salary payment.
We reviewed Brown v. Tama County, 122 Iowa 745, 98 N.W. 562, 101 Am. St. Rep. 296, holding a de jure officer after ousting a do facto officer could not recover the salary for the office if the de facto officer had been paid — upon the rule or principle that “the public should not be compelled to pay twice for the same service.” We pointed out this principle had been applied to two policemen wrongfully discharged by the civil service commission in Harding v. City of Des Moines, 193 Iowa 885, 188 N.W. 135. Then we pointed out that this decision in the Harding case was before the passage of the statute here *757involved by quoting tbe statement by way of dictum in McClinton v. Melson, 232 Iowa 543, 548, 4 N.W.2d 247, 249, as follows:
“In passing, it might be added that the rule applied in Harding v. Des Moines, supra, insofar as it has application to civil-service cases, has been changed by specific legislation. Section 5711, Code, 1939 [now section 365.27, Code, 1950] ; City of Des Moines v. Board of Civil Service Commrs., 227 Iowa 66, 73, 287 N.W. 288.”
We then went on to again point, out that this Harding-decision which had applied the doctrine of Brown v. Tama County — that the public should not be compelled to pay twice— to a police officer dismissal, was before the statute, and that the statute “made it discretionary with the civil service commission to allow or not allow compensation during the period of suspension” and we cited prior. decisions of this court so holding. Finally, after this discussion of the prior decisions rendered before the statute, and the statute itself, and decisions interpreting the statute, we emerged with our conclusion which was (page 770 of 242 Iowa, page 280 of 48 N.W.2d) that there is “nothing-in this statute * * * section 365.27 * * * which compels either a city council or civil service commission in such a controversy as this to ignore the rule of Brown v. Tama County, supra, * * * and .the decisions which have followed it.” Since we had earlier stated the rule of Brown v. Tama County was: “the public should not be compelled to pay twice for the same service” the statement means the council and commission could, under the statute, refuse to allow compensation where the allowance would mean payment twice for the same services. That is all it means and that is the “law of this case.”
When we left the question of Glenn’s right to payment open for future determination in harmony with our expressed views “if in fact Bank was paid”, we told the commission that it had discretion to allow or not to allow compensation and that the statute making it the commission’s duty to decide the issue could, stating it affirmatively: refuse to allow the claim on the ground it would be making the city pay twice for the same service. We certainly did not mean this discretion was to be *758ruled by a certain fact finding and a determination for plaintiff would be absolutely void if certain facts were found by tbe commission. As I read tbe opinion it expresses views designed to clear up doubts which might exist after the statement of dictum in McClinton v. Melson, supra. There we had held that a highway commission employee, wrongfully discharged, could not in certiorari recover salary after discharge under the rule of Brown v. Tama County, when it would mean double payment for the same work “in the absence of such legislation”, as the statute here in question. We pointed out that the rule applied in Harding v. City of Des Moines, supra, admittedly the Brown v. Tama County rule, had been “changed” by the statute. That statement of dictum in the McClinton case might be thought to mean the statute forbade the commission from applying the rule of Brown v. Tama County after the statute; that they must not deny the salary claim on the ground it would mean double payment. We cleared up that doubt and said the statute did no more than give the commission discretion to allow compensation or not (we cited our prior holdings to that effect) and they were not barred from still holding no compensation would be allowed where “in such a controversy as this” it would mean double payment.
The majority opinion does not reach the merits of the ease. I will go on to say that I would reverse and hold the court should have required the city council to pay plaintiff his back compensation as ordered by the civil service commission. Section 365.27, Code, 1950, gives the civil service commission appellate jurisdiction over all matters involving civil service employees and especially the right to determine salary controversies during periods of suspensions. City of Des Moines v. Board of Civil Service Commissioners, 227 Iowa 66, 287 N.W. 288; Luke v. Civil Service Commission, 225 Iowa 189, 279 N.W. 443. This is not an action to review the correctness 'of the commission’s order. It was not void. I would reverse.
Hays and Thompson, JJ., join in this dissent.