Court Opinion

ID: 9786934
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 00:05:40.388985+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:50.033407
License: Public Domain

EDMONDS, J.,
dissenting.
The determinative issue in this case is whether the people of the State of Oregon intended that appointments and reappointments to state public office made by the governor would become subject to confirmation by the senate when they enacted Article III, section 4, of the Oregon Constitution *99as an initiative measure in 1978. If they did, we have no authority, constitutional or statutory, to do other than declare and honor their intent. The intent of the measure on its face could not be more clear. That intent is further confirmed when the history underlying the measure is examined. Article III, section 4, was intended to amend Article XV, section 1, of the Oregon Constitution, by repealing section l’s holdover provision to the extent it would otherwise apply to reappointments subject to senate confirmation.
The majority reaches a contrary conclusion as the result of its resort to a maxim of constitutional construction in lieu of determining the intent of Article III, section 4, by the usual means. That methodology is flawed because it uses a principle intended to aid courts to discern the probable intent of a constitutional provision when it is unnecessary in this case. The result of the majority’s analysis is that the initiative process reserved to the people by Article IV, section 1 (21(a)1 is effectively nullified and the well-recognized doctrine of amendment or repeal by implication no longer has efficacy in Oregon jurisprudence, even when it is clear that amendment was intended by the electorate.
Article III, section 4, provides, in pertinent part:
“(1) The Legislative Assembly in the manner provided by law may require that all appointments and reappointments to state public office made by the Governor shall be subject to confirmation by the Senate.
“(2) The appointee shall not be eligible to serve until confirmed in the manner required by law and if not confirmed in that manner, shall not be eligible to serve in the public office.”
The majority and I agree that the word “appointee” in section 4 refers to incumbents and newly named appointees. It follows that defendant, as the governor’s appointee, is subject to its provisions.
*100Article XV, section 1, of the Oregon Constitution, provides:
“All officers, except members of the Legislative Assembly and incumbents who seek reelection and are defeated, shall hold their offices until their successors are elected, and qualified.”
Section 1 applies to appointed officers as well as elected officers and was in existence at the time that the people enacted Article III, section 4.
The resolution of the issue is determined by ascertaining the intent of the voters in 1978 regarding the continuing validity of Article XV, section 1, when they enacted Article III, section 4.
“In interpreting a constitutional provision adopted through the initiative process, our task is to discern the intent of the voters. The best evidence of the voter’s intent is the text of the provision itself. The context of the language of the ballot measure may also be considered; however, if the intent is clear based on the text and context of the constitutional provision, the court does not look further.” Roseburg School Dist. v. City of Roseburg, 316 Or 374, 378, 851 P2d 595 (1993) (citations and footnotes omitted).
The provision of Article XV, section 1, providing for the hold over by the appointed incumbent when a vacancy occurs is clearly inconsistent with the provision of Article III, section 4, which expressly provides that “[t]he appointee shall not be eligible to serve until confirmed in the manner provided by law and if not confirmed in that manner, shall not be eligible to serve in the public office.” Only the failure of Article III, section 4, to expressly amend Article XV, section 1, provides any ground for debate. The majority seizes on that omission. It says,
“[u]nder plaintiffs interpretation, whenever confirmation is denied, Article III, section 4, creates a vacancy, and Article XV, section 1, is without effect because its purpose is to prevent vacancies when a public office cannot be filled.
“However, Article III, section 4, says nothing about creating vacancies. Thus, if it amends Article XV, section 1, as plaintiffs urge, it does so entirely by implication, a doctrine that is disfavored in Oregon. * * * By amending Article XV, *101section 1, plaintiffs’ interpretation of Article III, section 4, would not give effect ‘to every part and every word of a Constitution.’ ” 171 Or App at 99 (emphasis in original; citations omitted).
In State v. Guzek, 322 Or 245, 266-68, 906 P2d 272 (1995), the court rejected the argument that the voters had intended to amend ORS 163.150 (1985) by implication before it attempted to harmonize two statutes. Here, the majority uses a principle of constitutional construction in lieu of interpreting the voters’ intent and before considering whether they intended to repeal section 4. The majority’s explanation for its understanding is that “section 4 says nothing about creating vacancies.” 1710r App at 99. However, that argument begs the question. If Article III, section 4, was intended to amend the holdover provision of Article XV, section 1, as applied to appointees, necessarily, it was intended to create vacancies when no confirmation occurred. That maxim of giving effect where possible to every word and every part of a constitutional provision is a maxim to aid the court in determining the probable intent of language that has a disputed meaning. The maxim, which is intended to give effect to all language in the constitution, presupposes that both provisions are intended to be included in the constitution at the same time. Thus, the maxim can play no role in the situation where the issue is not to interpret both provisions so as to give both meaning, but to ascertain whether the original language was intended by the voters to be repealed by the new provision.2
Also, the majority cites Klamath Falls v. Oregon Liquor Comm., 146 Or 83, 29 P2d 564 (1934) in support of its analysis. However, the court in Klamath Falls held that an initiative did repeal by implication the constitutional authority of municipalities to control and regulate the sale of alcoholic beverages, thereby making use of the very doctrine that *102the majority denigrates in deference to its maxim of constitutional interpretation. City of Klamath Falls stands for the proposition that the doctrine of implied amendment is alive and well in Oregon jurisprudence when it is necessary to carry out the intent of the voters.
Even if the intent of the voters is not clear from the text and context of the measure, we need not resort to maxims of constitutional construction to ascertain the voters’ intent.3 As the Supreme Court stated in Ecumenical Ministries v. Oregon State Lottery Comm., 318 Or 551, 559-60 n 8, 871 P2d 106 (1994), the public’s understanding of a measure is to be ascertained from materials that were available to the voters at the time of its adoption. In voting on the adoption of Article III, section 4, the voters had the following materials before them. The ballot title appeared as follows:
BALLOT TITLE
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The official Explanation included the statement, “A person could not serve until approved and if not approved could not serve at all.”
*103In evaluating the import of these materials, we apply the same method of analysis that we use to ascertain the intent of the legislature when we interpret a statute. Words of common usage are given their plain, natural and ordinary meaning. Ecumenical Ministries, 318 Or at 560. There are three words in Article III, section 4, and its history whose ordinary meanings are important to the issue before us. They are, “appointments,” “reappointments,” and “appointees.” According to Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, 105 (unabridged ed 1993), the word “appointment” includes the “designation of a person to hold a nonelective office or perform a function.” The word “appointee” refers to “one that is appointed (as to an office).” Id. The word “reappointment” connotes a “second or fresh appointment.” Id. at 1891.4 The ordinary meanings of the words, “appointment,” “reappointment,” and “appointee” in Article III, section 4, create an obvious conflict with the language of Article XV, section 1, when it is given its ordinary meaning. Section 1 plainly requires that all officers except members of the legislative assembly and incumbents “shall hold their offices until their successors are elected and qualified.” Before the enactment of Article III, section 4, appointed public officers had a qualified right to serve until their successors were confirmed to take their place under Article XV, section l.5 Under the later-enacted Article III, section 4, those public officers whose reappointments depend on senate confirmation are not eligible to continue to serve until confirmation occurs. The two constitutional provisions are in irreconcilable conflict, but that conflict is easily resolved by viewing the subsequent amendment as impliedly amending the earlier constitutional provision.
*104The argument for an implied amendment is supported by the language of section 4, its ballot title and the explanatory statement in the Voters’ Pamphlet, and also by the circumstances under which the measure was adopted. In 1977, the legislature referred Senate Joint Resolution 20 to the voters, and it appeared on the November 1978 general election ballot. The legislature referred the measure after Governors McCall and Straub challenged the authority of the Senate to reject their appointments, notwithstanding a century of history of the requirement of senate confirmation of certain gubernatorial appointees. 39 Op Atty Gen 608 (1979). The precise issue that prompted the resolution was described by Attorney General Redden:
“The issue was raised again more recently by action of the Senate Committee on Appointments in rejecting confirmation of Governor Straub’s appointee to the Board of Examiners of Nursing Home Administrators. Asserting that the requirement of confirmation violated Or. Const, art. Ill, sec. 1, the Governor directed the appointee to take office and he did so. A mandamus suit was subsequently filed in the Supreme Court to require the Governor to make a new appointment. The court dismissed the writ without considering the constitutional question, on grounds it should have been filed as an action in the nature of quo warrantor
“Meanwhile, the legislature passed SJR 20, proposing adoption of a constitutional provision relating to confirmation, and in November 1978, it was approved by the people as a new section 4 of Article II of the Oregon Constitution.” Id. at 609.
The doctrine of implied amendment by implication is a recognized rule of law to be applied when two constitutional provisions are in irreconcilable conflict.6 It is a doctrine that should be used when the people’s intent to amend an existing constitutional provision is clear, from the above-described materials. As the official explanation in the Voters’ Pamphlet told the voters in 1978, “A person could not serve until *105approved and if not approved could not serve at all.” Defendant Powell is an appointee who has not been approved for a new term by the senate, and Article III, section 4, plainly applies to him. In the face of the overwhelming evidence about the people’s intent, the majority errs when it rules, without citation to authority, that the doctrine of implied amendment is trumped by an inapplicable rule of constitutional construction.
For these reasons, I dissent.
Landau, J., joins in this dissent.

 Section 1 (2)(a) provides:
“The people reserve to themselves the initiative power, which is to propose laws and amendments to the Constitution and enact or reject them at an election independently of the Legislative Assembly.”

 In the context of interpretation of legislative intention, the Supreme Court has held that when “the language of a statute is sufficiently clear so as to reveal the legislature’s intent, it is both unnecessary and improper to resort to such ‘rules’ or ‘maxims’ of statutory construction.” Whipple v. Howser, 291 Or 475, 487, 632 P2d 782 (1981). Simplistic applications of the maxims of statutory interpretation may be useful tool for decision, but they do not substitute for specific analysis in the first instance.” State v. Wagner, 309 Or 5, 9, 786 P2d 93, cert den 498 US 879, 111 S Ct 212, 112 L Ed 2d 171 (1990).

 The majority correctly cites Priest v. Pearce, 314 Or 411, 416-17, 840 P2d 65 (1992) (holding that there are three levels at which constitutional interpretation occurs: text and context; case law; and history underlying the provision). Mistakenly, it resorts to a principle of constitutional construction without dealing with the history of Article III, section 4, as Ecumenical Ministries instructs. See also Stranahan v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 331 Or 38, 57, 11 P3d 228 (2000). As authority for its methodology, it relies on State ex rel Gladden v. Lonergan, 201 Or 163,177,269 P2d 491 (1954). The language on which the majority relies in Lonergan is a quotation from 11 Am Jur 665. It does not purport to establish a template for constitutional interpretation.

 If a person who is reappointed is not subject to confirmation as posited by defendant, then there would have been no need to have used the word “reappointments” in in addition to the word “appointments “ in Article III, section 4(1). The word “appointment” in section 4(1) would have been the only word needed. The panel’s analysis renders the word “reappointments” in section 4(1) meaningless. It follows that the word “appointee” in section (2) must refer to initial appointments and to reappointments.

 As the majority indicates, there are circumstances such as resignation or the commission of a felony to which the holdover provision of Article XV, section 1, obviously does not apply.

 Article XV, section 1, continues to govern elected public officials and the appointment of those public officers whose appointments are not subject to senate confirmation.