Court Opinion

ID: 9770420
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:04:37.711739+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:17.270693
License: Public Domain

ON APPELLANT’S motion for rehearing
DICE, Judge.
In his motion for rehearing, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his convicton.
He first contends that the evidence is insufficient to establish his identity as the guilty party because the prosecutrix was unable to positively identify him at the trial and only testified that he looked like, and was about the same size as, the man who entered her apartment and ravished her. While the prosecutrix did so testify, appellant overlooks the fact that in his confession, which was introduced in evidence, he admitted breaking and entering the house on the night in question and ravishing the prosecutrix. Appellant was positively identified by the arresting officers at the trial as the person they arrested on the night in question as he was walking out of the yard at prosecutrix’ house. It was further shown, without objection, that at the time of his arrest, appellant was identified by the prosecutrix to the officers as the man wRo raped Rer. SucR facts clearly distinguisR this case from that of Alexander v. State, 164 Tex. Cr. R. 663, 302 S. W. 2d 414, relied upon by appellant.
He next contends that if the evidence is sufficient to establish his identity, it fails to show that at the time he entered the house he did so with intent to commit rape. A review of the evidence, and particularly appellant’s written confession in which he stated that before breaking and entering the house “I decided to look in one of the houses there and try to find another girl to have *381intercourse with,” is clearly sufficient to support the finding that appellant entered the house with intent to commit rape and by force and threats to have carnal knowledge of the prosecuting witness.
Appellant also complains of the court’s failure to charge on circumstantial evidence.
There being direct evidence showing that appellant was the person who entered the house and comitted the crime, a charge on circumstantial evidence was not required. Davis v. State, 107 Tex. Cr. R. 134, 295 S. W. 608 and Chaney v. State, 119 Tex. Cr. R. 59, 46 S. W. 2d 998.
We find no error in the court’s refusal of appellant’s requested charge on intent at the time of entry. The court instructed the jury that before they would be warranted in finding a verdict of guilty they must be satisfied from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt “that the entry was made with the intent to commit the offense of rape.” Such was a sufficient instruction under the evidence.
We have again considered appellant’s remaining contentions which were disposed of in our opinion on original submission and remain convinced that no reversible error is shown.
The motion is overruled.
Opinion approved by the Court.