Court Opinion

ID: 9880968
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-29 01:00:34.277565+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:58:47.816997
License: Public Domain

RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
                               Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)
                                      File Name: 23a0220p.06

                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                 FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

                                                            ┐
 L. C.,                                                     │
                                  Plaintiff-Appellant,      │
                                                             >        No. 22-6105
                                                            │
          v.                                                │
                                                            │
                                                            │
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                            │
                                 Defendant-Appellee.        ┘

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky at Lexington.
              No. 5:21-cv-00124—Gregory F. Van Tatenhove, District Judge.

                                    Argued: July 26, 2023

                           Decided and Filed: September 28, 2023

                   Before: MOORE, GIBBONS, and BUSH, Circuit Judges.

                                     _________________

                                           COUNSEL

ARGUED: Anthony I. Werner, JOHN & WERNER LAW OFFICES, PLLC, Wheeling, West
Virginia, for Appellant. Leif Overvold, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
Washington, D.C., for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Anthony I. Werner, JOHN & WERNER LAW
OFFICES, PLLC, Wheeling, West Virginia, David G. Bryant, DAVID BRYANT LAW, PLLC,
Louisville, Kentucky, for Appellant. Leif Overvold, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellee.

                                     _________________

                                            OPINION
                                     _________________

          KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. While L. C. was incarcerated at Federal
Medical Center, Lexington (“FMC”) in Lexington, Kentucky, she was repeatedly sexually
 No. 22-6105                          L. C. v. United States                               Page 2

assaulted by Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) employee Hosea Lee. L. C. alleges that the BOP knew
or should have known of Lee’s assaults on her and other incarcerated women. She claims that
the BOP failed to enforce its zero-tolerance policy for sexual assault in BOP facilities because
BOP officials failed timely to report and investigate Lee’s assaults. Accordingly, L. C. filed a
negligence claim against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”).
Because a BOP policy imposes specific and mandatory directives on all BOP officials timely to
report and investigate information pertaining to sexual assault by a BOP official, and because
deciding whether to do so is not susceptible to policy considerations, this type of negligence
claim falls outside the scope of the discretionary-function exception to the FTCA. But because
L. C.’s specific allegations fail to state a plausible claim upon which relief can be granted, we
AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

                                       I. BACKGROUND

        Plaintiff L. C. is incarcerated in a federal prison and within the custody of the BOP. R. 1
(Compl. ¶¶ 1, 69) (Page ID #1, 12). The BOP transferred L. C. to FMC in Lexington, Kentucky.
Id. ¶ 23 (Page ID #6). At FMC, Plaintiff needed to complete Aftercare, a required component of
her Residential Drug Abuse Program (“RDAP”). Id. ¶¶ 24, 25 (Page ID #6). Successfully
completing Aftercare, and thus RDAP, affords a person the opportunity to seek, among other
benefits, “early release; money; preferred living quarters; special recognition privileges; personal
property allowances; photographs of an RDAP completion ceremony sent to her family
members; and a nearer-release transfer.” Id. ¶ 29 (Page ID #6–7). Failing to complete RDAP
risks

        ineligibility for a reduced sentence; revocation of any prior incentives given (e.g.
        money); transfer back to prior institution; extended length of community
        confinement; ineligibility for a furlough (other than possibly an emergency
        furlough); ineligibility for performance pay above maintenance pay level, bonus
        pay, or vacation pay; ineligibility for the Federal Prison Industries work program
        assignment; and an increased risk of harm and retaliation in her current institution
        for ‘causing trouble’ and angering an RDAP teacher.

Id. ¶ 30 (Page ID #7).
 No. 22-6105                                 L. C. v. United States                                        Page 3

        L. C. alleges that her RDAP instructor at FMC, Defendant Hosea Lee, repeatedly
sexually assaulted and sexually harassed her. Id. ¶¶ 3, 32–53 (Page ID #2, 7–10). Lee’s attacks
began when L. C. started her Aftercare course in August 2019. Id. ¶ 32 (Page ID #7). L. C.
alleges that Lee “sexualized the questions” that he publicly asked her, id. ¶ 33 (Page ID #7), and
sexually harassed her outside of class, id. ¶ 34 (Page ID #8). Then, around August 20, 2019, Lee
sexually assaulted L. C. Id. ¶¶ 35–41 (Page ID #8). According to L. C., another incarcerated
individual told L. C. that Lee wanted to see her. Id. ¶ 35 (Page ID #8). When L. C. arrived,
Lee “ordered L. C. into the closet in his office and raped her vaginally without a condom.”
Id. ¶ 40 (Page ID #8). Lee ordered L. C. to return the following week. Id. ¶ 41 (Page ID #8).
“Several days later, L. C. discovered a rash on her vagina, which then turned into [ ] several
sores.” Id. ¶ 42 (Page ID #8). L. C. did not initially seek medical treatment, fearing that “it
would get back to Lee and get her in trouble.” Id. ¶ 43 (Page ID #8). Months later, on February
18, 2020, L. C. tested positive for oral and genital Herpes. Id. ¶ 44 (Page ID #9).

        Following Lee’s orders, L. C. returned to Lee’s office, and Lee again assaulted her.
Id. ¶¶ 46–47 (Page ID #9).           Lee then ordered L. C. “to return to his office on alternating
Tuesdays and Thursdays every two weeks.” Id. ¶ 48 (Page ID #9). “Lee raped L. C. at least
three times vaginally and, additionally, forced her to perform oral sex upon him at least two
times” in his office closet. Id. ¶ 49 (Page ID #9). Additionally, L. C. alleges that “Lee would
occasionally pull L. C. around a corner and ‘make out’ with her. He also rubbed himself against
her for his sexual gratification as if having sex with her.” Id. ¶ 51 (Page ID #9). L. C.’s
Complaint does not identify when Lee stopped assaulting her. L. C.’s administrative complaints
identified two dates: September 3, 2019, R. 28-2 (Aug. 28, 2020 SF 95) (Page ID #222) and
October 3, 2019, R. 28-1 (Mar. 10, 2020 SF 95) (Page ID #186).1

        1In the district court’s Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) analysis, it treated a number of exhibits
attached to the United States’s motion to dismiss (R. 28-1 through R. 28-5) as part of the pleadings. L. C. v. United
States, No. 5:21-cv-00124-GFVT, 2022 WL 1179400, at *9 n.5 (E.D. Ky. Apr. 19, 2022). L. C. does not challenge
that determination on appeal. We therefore consider the evidence where necessary and accept L. C.’s allegations as
true unless an allegation is directly contradicted by the United States’s exhibits. See Clark v. Stone, 998 F.3d 287,
298 (6th Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 773 (2022).
 No. 22-6105                               L. C. v. United States                                      Page 4

        The United States asserted in its motion to dismiss that it “first learned” of Lee’s sexual
assaults when two other incarcerated people independently reported Lee on November 22, 2019:
one reported “that Lee made inappropriate sexual comments towards her,” and another reported
that “Lee was supposedly exchanging cigarettes for sexual favors with inmates.” R. 26 (USA’s
Mot. to Dismiss at 2) (Page ID #160); see also R. 28-3 (Nov. 22, 2019 Referral of Incident
Report) (Page ID #228); R. 28-3 (Employee’s Mem.) (Page ID #237). One of the reports
identified L. C. as one of Lee’s victims. R. 28-3 (Employee’s Mem.) (Page ID #237). L. C.,
however, contends that the BOP knew or should have known of Lee’s attacks on women earlier.
She alleges that “[u]pon information and belief, prior to and during Defendant Lee’s sexual
assaults upon Plaintiff, BOP personnel, not only at FMC Lexington but at other prison facilities,
knew or should have known of Defendant Lee’s propensity for sexual misconduct involving
inmates.” R. 1 (Compl. ¶ 63) (Page ID #11).

        As part of the investigation, BOP officials interviewed L. C. on November 25, 2019;
L. C. did not then disclose Lee’s attacks. Id. ¶ 54 (Page ID #10); R. 28-3 (L. C. Nov. 25, 2019
Aff.) (Page ID #239–40). That same day, the BOP informed Lee of the allegations against him
and barred Lee from FMC “[w]hile the matter is being reviewed,” but kept his schedule the
same. R. 28-3 (Post Change Mem.) (Page ID #235). On January 15, 2020, Lee resigned.2
R. 28-2 (BOP Resp. to Admin Claim at 2) (Page ID #225). Shortly thereafter, L. C., who had
been temporarily transferred to another facility because of drug use in December 2019, disclosed
Lee’s attacks during another interview with investigators. R. 1 (Compl. ¶¶ 55–57) (Page ID
#10); R. 28-2 (BOP Resp. to Admin Claim at 2) (Page ID #225).

        On February 18, 2020, L. C. returned to FMC. R. 1 (Compl. ¶¶ 44, 58–59) (Page ID
#9-10); R. 28-2 (BOP Resp. to Admin Claim at 2) (Page ID #225). That day, a medical official
diagnosed L. C. with “oral herpes (HSV I) and genital herpes (HSV II).” R. 1 (Compl. ¶¶ 44,
58–59) (Page ID #9, 10). While she received treatment, a BOP employee in the FMC medical
department, Mr. Higgins, told L. C. that all of Lee’s victims had contracted herpes. Id. ¶ 60

        2Lee eventually pleaded guilty to and was convicted of five counts of sexual abuse of an individual in
federal custody in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2243(b) and was sentenced to eighty months of imprisonment. Criminal
J. at 1–2, United States v. Lee, No. 5:21-cr-00084-DCR-MAS-1 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 26, 2022), ECF No. 68 (Page ID
#271–72).
 No. 22-6105                               L. C. v. United States                                      Page 5

(Page ID #10). According to L. C., other BOP officials also made comments about Lee’s history
of attacking women. For instance, L. C. alleges that a BOP counselor, Ms. Chaney, told L. C.
that Lee had been reported “a long time ago.” Id. ¶ 65 (Page ID #11). L. C.’s Complaint does
not identify when Chaney made this statement. See id.

        L. C. filed an administrative complaint, which the BOP denied on February 26, 2021.
R. 28-2 (BOP Resp. to Admin Claim at 3) (Page ID #226). The BOP’s denial letter stated that
“[a]s soon as FMC Lexington” officials learned of Lee’s assaults, they took actions to separate
him from L. C. Id. It further stated that before “November 25, 2019, FMC Lexington officials
were unaware of sexual misconduct by [Lee], as it had not been reported, nor did FMC
Lexington staff have prior knowledge of [Lee]’s action and/or alleged pattern of conduct.” Id. It
concluded that the BOP had properly followed the relevant guidelines and had not acted in a
negligent manner. Id.

        L. C. then filed this action in the U.S. District Court for Eastern District of Kentucky
against Lee and the United States.3 L. C. brought an assault-and-battery claim and a negligence
claim against the United States under the FTCA. R. 1 (Compl. ¶¶ 89–111) (Page ID #13–17).
Relevant to this appeal, the negligence claim addressed the BOP’s duty to provide those whom it
incarcerates with a safe environment by enforcing a policy of a zero tolerance of sexual assault
by BOP officials and in BOP facilities. Id. ¶¶ 95–111 (Page ID #14–17). Underlying the
allegations that the BOP failed to enforce its zero-tolerance policy are allegations that BOP
officials failed timely to report and investigate information pertaining to Lee’s sexual harassment
and assault of L. C. and other incarcerated women. Id. ¶¶ 63–67, 101, 108–09 (Page ID #11, 15,
17); see also id. ¶¶ 13–22 (Page ID #3–6) (discussing the reporting and investigation
requirements in the BOP Program Statement 5324.12).

        The United States moved to dismiss L. C.’s claims. R. 26 (USA’s Mot. to Dismiss)
(Page ID #159–74). It argued for dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1),
contending a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. at 4–14 (Page ID #162–72). It urged

         3This appeal concerns L. C.’s negligence claim against the United States, and not her claim against Lee
himself. See R. 52 (Notice of Appeal) (Page ID #476).
 No. 22-6105                           L. C. v. United States                                Page 6

dismissal of the assault-and-battery claim “because Lee’s alleged acts were not committed in
furtherance of the United States’ business of safely housing inmates.” Id. at 4 (Page ID #162).
The United States argued that L. C.’s “negligent confinement claim,” id. at 10 (Page ID #168),
failed under the discretionary-function exception.       It further argued that L. C.’s “negligent
confinement claim” failed under Rule 12(b)(6) because she had not sufficiently alleged a breach
of the BOP’s duty. Id. at 14 (Page ID #172). L. C. opposed the motion. R. 29 (Pl.’s Opp’n)
(Page ID #264–86). L. C., however, did not seek jurisdictional discovery from the district court.
See generally id.

       The district court granted the United States’s motion. L. C. v. United States, No. 5:21-cv-
00124-GFVT, 2022 WL 1179400 (E.D. Ky. Apr. 19, 2022). The district court dismissed the
assault-and-battery claim because it concluded that the FTCA’s exception to sovereign immunity
does not apply to torts committed by federal employees who act beyond the scope of their
employment. Id. at *4. It dismissed her negligence claim under the discretionary-function
exception to the FTCA. Id. at *8. It determined that, in the alternative, the negligence claim
should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) because L. C.’s Complaint failed to allege sufficiently
that the BOP knew or should have known of Lee’s attacks. Id. at *9. L. C. appeals the district
court’s ruling regarding her negligence claim only. Appellant Br. at 10.

                    II. THE DISCRETIONARY-FUNCTION EXCEPTION

       The FTCA provides an exception to sovereign immunity’s bar on claims against the
United States. Kohl v. United States, 699 F.3d 935, 939 (6th Cir. 2012). Through the FTCA,
Congress waived immunity for certain tort claims. Id. Accordingly, “[t]he United States shall be
liable, respecting the provisions of this title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the
same extent as a private individual under like circumstances, but shall not be liable for interest
prior to judgment or for punitive damages.” 28 U.S.C. § 2674. There are numerous statutory
exceptions to the FTCA’s limited waiver of sovereign immunity; when an exception to
the FTCA applies, the United States cannot be sued for tort liability and federal courts lack
subject-matter jurisdiction over the action. Id. § 2680; Milligan v. United States, 670 F.3d 686,
692 (6th Cir. 2012). The parties dispute whether one of these exceptions—the discretionary-
function exception—applies. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a).
 No. 22-6105                                L. C. v. United States                                       Page 7

A. THE STANDARD OF REVIEW

        The district court incorrectly concluded that any assertion of sovereign immunity
amounts to a factual attack on jurisdiction. L. C., 2022 WL 1179400, at *2. Motions to dismiss
for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) either facially or factually attack
jurisdiction.    5B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1350 (3d ed. Apr. 2023 Update). “A facial attack goes to the question of whether
the plaintiff has alleged a basis for subject matter jurisdiction.” Cartwright v. Garner, 751 F.3d
752, 759 (6th Cir. 2014). It “challenges subject matter jurisdiction without disputing the facts
alleged in the complaint and requires the court to treat the allegations of the complaint as true.”
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra § 1350; see also Cartwright, 751 F.3d at 759. A factual attack, on the
other hand “challenges the factual existence of subject matter jurisdiction.” Cartwright, 751
F.3d at 759; see also WRIGHT & MILLER, supra § 1350. It “attacks the factual allegations
underlying the assertion of jurisdiction, either through the filing of an answer or otherwise
presenting competing facts.” WRIGHT & MILLER, supra § 1350. When adjudicating

        a factual attack, a court has broad discretion with respect to what evidence[4] to
        consider in deciding whether subject matter jurisdiction exists, including evidence
        outside of the pleadings, and has the power to weigh the evidence and determine
        the effect of that evidence on the court’s authority to hear the case.

Cartwright, 751 F.3d at 759–60; see also Adkisson v. Jacobs Eng’g Grp., Inc., 790 F.3d 641, 647
(6th Cir. 2015). The United States can bring either type of attack when challenging jurisdiction
under the FTCA. See, e.g., Mynatt v. United States, 45 F.4th 889, 894 n.2 (6th Cir. 2022)
(considering     the    discretionary-function       exception     and    rejecting     the   district    court’s
characterization “that it evaluated the government’s motion to dismiss as” a factual attack
because “the district court did not make any factual findings deciding the jurisdictional
challenge, which means the facial-attack standard applies”); Kohl, 699 F.3d at 939 n.1 (treating a
motion to dismiss that raised the discretionary-function exception as a facial attack because “the
district court made essentially no factual findings in deciding” the jurisdictional issue).

         4When “the court takes evidence for a limited purpose of ruling on jurisdiction, the preclusive effect of
such findings is limited to the issue decided.” United States v. Ritchie, 15 F.3d 592, 598 (6th Cir. 1994)).
 No. 22-6105                            L. C. v. United States                               Page 8

          We review de novo a district court’s decision to dismiss claims under the FTCA’s
discretionary-function exception. Cartwright, 751 F.3d at 760. When presented with a factual
attack, we review de novo “the district court’s application of the law to the facts,” but we review
the district court’s factual findings with regards to the jurisdictional question for clear error.
Id. Here, the United States “present[ed] a facial attack under Rule 12(b)(1) to Plaintiff’s
argument.” R. 26 (USA’s Mot. to Dismiss at 4) (Page ID #162) (emphasis added). It continued
to describe its motion as a facial attack on jurisdiction and told us to treat it as such at oral
argument. Oral Arg. at. 14:52–15:08, 23:02–24:08. Thus, treating its attack as facial, we review
de novo the discretionary-function question. Mynatt, 45 F.4th at 894 n.2; Cartwright, 751 F.3d
at 760.

B. WHETHER THE DISCRETIONARY-FUNCTION EXCEPTION APPLIES TO
   CLAIMS OF FAILURE TO REPORT OR INVESTIGATE
          Because the FTCA’s exceptions limit our jurisdiction, “a plaintiff can invoke jurisdiction
only if the complaint is facially outside the exceptions of § 2680.” Carlyle v. U.S. Dep’t of the
Army, 674 F.2d 554, 556 (6th Cir. 1982).           Thus, once a plaintiff meets their burden and
“successfully invoke[s] jurisdiction by a pleading that facially alleges matters not excepted by
§ 2680 . . . the burden fall[s] on the government to prove the applicability of a specific provision
of § 2680.” Id. The discretionary-function exception exempts the United States from liability
for

          [a]ny claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government,
          exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not
          such statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or
          the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a
          federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion
          involved be abused.

28 U.S.C. § 2680(a).

          We apply a two-part test to determine whether the discretionary-function exception
applies. Milligan, 670 F.3d at 693. First, the challenged government action must have been
discretionary; it must “involv[e] an element of judgment or choice.” United States v. Gaubert,
499 U.S. 315, 322 (1991) (alteration in original) (quoting Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S.
531, 536 (1988)). “The requirement of judgment or choice is not satisfied if a federal statute,
 No. 22-6105                             L. C. v. United States                                    Page 9

regulation, or policy specifically prescribes a course of action for an employee to follow, because
the employee had no rightful option but to adhere to the directive.” Milligan, 670 F.3d at 693
(quoting Rosebush v. United States, 119 F.3d 438, 441 (6th Cir. 1997)). Government actions are
not discretionary when “they [are] . . . controlled by mandatory statutes or regulations.”
Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 328.

        Where discretionary conduct exists, we turn to the second prong and ask “whether that
judgment is of the kind that the discretionary function exception was designed to shield.” Id. at
322–23 (quoting Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536). “The proper inquiry is whether the challenged
actions are ‘susceptible to policy analysis,’ not whether they were the result of a policy analysis.”
Rosebush, 119 F.3d at 444 (quoting Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 324–25). Gaubert explained that
certain discretionary acts may still fall outside “the discretionary function exception because
these acts cannot be said to be based on the purposes that the regulatory regime seeks to
accomplish.” 499 U.S. at 325 n.7. It offered an example: “If one of the officials . . . drove an
automobile on a mission connected with his official duties and negligently collided with another
car, the exception would not apply” because “[a]lthough driving requires the constant exercise of
discretion, the official’s decisions in exercising that discretion can hardly be said to be grounded
in regulatory policy.”     Id.   The discretionary-function exception aims “to ‘prevent judicial
“second-guessing” of legislative and administrative decisions grounded in social, economic, and
political policy through the medium of an action in tort.’” Id. at 323 (quoting United States
v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797, 814 (1984)); see
also Sharp ex rel. Est. of Sharp v. United States, 401 F.3d 440, 443 (6th Cir. 2005) (same). For
the discretionary-function exception to apply, both prongs must be resolved in the United
States’s favor. Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 325 n.7; Mynatt, 45 F.4th at 897–98.

        1. Prong One: Whether a BOP Official’s Failure Timely to Report and Investigate
           Information Regarding Sexual Assault by a BOP Official Is a Discretionary Act
        Relevant here,5 L. C. seeks to hold the United States liable for failing to keep her safe and
protect her from Lee’s attacks. More specifically, however, she alleges that the BOP failed to

         5L. C. voluntarily dismissed aspects of her negligence claim that focused on negligent training and
supervision. See Appellant Br. at 2.
 No. 22-6105                         L. C. v. United States                             Page 10

enforce its zero-tolerance policy because its personnel knew or should have known of Lee’s
attacks sooner and failed to report and investigate Lee. See R. 1 (Compl. ¶¶ 12–22, 63–64, 101,
103, 108–09) (Page ID #3–6, 11, 15, 17). One of the sources of federal law that L. C. included
in her Complaint is BOP Program Statement 5324.12, which specifically addresses sexual
harassment and abuse in federal prisons. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Fed. Bureau of Prisons Program
Statement 5324.12, Sexually Abusive Behavior Prevention and Intervention Program,
https://perma.cc/G2C9-BRK4 [hereinafter Program Statement 5324.12].            The BOP issued
Program Statement 5324.12 pursuant to the Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003 (“PREA”),
34 U.S.C. § 30307(a)(1), and PREA’s implementing regulations, 28 C.F.R. § 115.11(a).
Program Statement 5324.12 at 2.

       As a threshold matter, we must address whether L. C. forfeited her argument that
Program Statement 5324.12 imposed non-discretionary and mandatory directives on BOP
officials timely to report and investigate information regarding sexual assault by a BOP official.
Specifically, we consider whether she forfeited the argument by not thoroughly addressing
Program Statement 5324.12’s mandatory directives in her opening brief before this court. See
Island Creek Coal Co. v. Wilkerson, 910 F.3d 254, 256 (6th Cir. 2018) (explaining that a party
forfeits an argument that it fails to raise in its opening brief before this court). Far from the
typical instance of forfeiture, however, the record before us includes multiple concessions by
the United States on this very point.    The United States conceded that certain sections of
Program Statement 5324.12 impose mandatory reporting and investigation requirements that fall
outside the scope of the discretionary-function exception. R. 30 (Gov’t’s Reply Br. at 10 &
nn.3–4, 11–12 & n.5) (Page ID #296–98). Yet, the United States still asks us to find that L. C.
forfeited this argument—even though the United States forfeited its own forfeiture argument.
See United States v. Shultz, 733 F.3d 616, 619 (6th Cir. 2013); Mynatt, 45 F.4th at 899 (finding
that the United States forfeited its forfeiture argument in a FTCA case when it first raised the
plaintiff’s forfeiture at oral argument). Under these circumstances, we decline to find forfeiture
by L. C.

       L. C. pleaded nearly a dozen allegations regarding the BOP Program Statements and the
mandatory reporting and investigatory requirements that apply when a BOP official learns of
 No. 22-6105                                L. C. v. United States                                      Page 11

information related to sexual assault in a BOP facility. See R. 1 (Compl. ¶¶ 12–22) (Page ID #3–
6). Nonetheless, in its motion to dismiss, the United States argued that 18 U.S.C. § 4042(a)
provided “[t]he foundation for Plaintiff’s duty argument,” R. 26 (USA’s Mot. to Dismiss at 11)
(Page ID #169), and that the statute failed to supply a mandatory directive such that “[t]he first
factor of the DFE test is thus satisfied,” id. at 12 (Page ID #170). The United States ignored
L. C.’s allegations about the Program Statement’s reporting and investigation requirements. In
her response brief, L. C. argued that “Program Statement 5324.12 sets out a number of relevant
non-discretionary duties.” R. 29 (Pl.’s Resp. at 12) (Page ID #275) (listing Program Statement
5324.12’s numerous nondiscretionary requirements, id. at 12–13 (Page ID #275–76)). The
United States then in its reply directly addressed Program Statement 5324.12 and conceded that
certain sections imposed mandatory directives that BOP officials timely report and investigate
information pertaining to sexual assault. R. 30 (Gov’t’s Reply Br. at 10 & nn. 3–4, 11–12 & n.5)
(Page ID #296–98).           It recognized that “Program Statement 5324.[12]6 . . . § 115.61(a);
§ 115.62; [and] § 115.71(f)(2) . . . impose some specific duties on the BOP,” id. at 11 (Page ID
#297) (citing R. 29 (Pl.’s Resp. at 13–16) (Page ID #276–79)), while “[o]ther duties in § 115.61,
however, are not as clearly established and are subject to dismissal under the DFE,” id. at 11 n.5
(Page ID #297). Perplexingly, the district court ignored the United States’s explicit concession
and neglected to address the Program Statements.7 See generally L. C., 2022 WL 1179400. On
appeal, L. C.’s counsel did not alert us to the district court’s significant error and rested too
heavily on L. C.’s Complaint rather than thoroughly re-presenting the argument. See, e.g.,
Appellant Br. at 14 (noting that L. C.’s Complaint “alleged duties grounded in the BOP policies
that are publicly available” and cited to the Complaint’s allegations that discuss the Program
Statements). But the United States did not argue that L. C. forfeited her argument that the
Program Statement imposed mandatory reporting and investigatory directives in its brief before
us. Gov’t Br. at 15; Oral Arg. at 26:17–30 (“We did not preemptively say that, to extent they try
to raise some additional directive that they failed to raise in their opening brief, that it is
forfeited.”). The United States’s failure to argue forfeiture is telling, given that it requested that

        6A typographical error referred to this as “5324.06.” There is no Program Statement 5324.06.

       7Instead, the district court addressed 18 U.S.C. § 4042; 34 U.S.C. §§ 30302, 30307; and the regulations that
implement PREA (28 C.F.R. §§ 115.11, 115.13).
 No. 22-6105                           L. C. v. United States                              Page 12

we apply our forfeiture rules to another argument just pages later. Gov’t Br. at 18 (“[L. C.’s]
argument in this regard is consequently forfeited.”).

       A party that sees a forfeited argument must preemptively raise forfeiture—waiting to
raise a forfeiture argument until oral argument “forfeit[s] the forfeiture.” Shultz, 733 F.3d at 619.
Addressing the merits is even more appropriate here because we know the parties’ positions and
we are not left guessing each party’s argument. Quite the opposite, the United States has
conceded that certain portions of Program Statement 5324.12 impose non-discretionary
requirements on BOP officials timely to report and investigate sexual assault by BOP officials.
Our forfeiture rules exist in part because we find it “inappropriate to consider” arguments raised
by one party when the other party has not had the opportunity to respond to that argument. Cf.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Leahey Const. Co., 219 F.3d 519, 545 (6th Cir. 2000); United States
v. Johnson, 186 F. App’x 560, 564 (6th Cir. 2006) (“As this case illustrates, unless both parties
have an ample opportunity to present arguments, this court may receive an incomplete picture of
the legal landscape.”). That is not what occurred here, and therefore we will address L. C.’s
argument that Program Statement 5324.12 imposes mandatory reporting and investigation
requirements.

       Turning to the first prong of the discretionary-function exception, we hold that BOP
Program Statement 5324.12 contains non-discretionary directives requiring BOP officials timely
to report and investigate information regarding sexual assault in BOP facilities. When Congress
enacted PREA, codified as 34 U.S.C. §§ 30301–30309, it found that, despite the “[i]nsufficient
research [that] has been conducted and [the] insufficient data reported on the extent of prison
rape . . . experts have conservatively estimated that at least 13 percent of the inmates in the
United States have been sexually assaulted in prison.” 34 U.S.C. § 30301(2). Accordingly,
Congress determined that “[u]nder this estimate, nearly 200,000 inmates now incarcerated have
been or will be the victims of prison rape.” Id. It further found that “[m]ost prison staff are not
adequately trained or prepared to prevent, report, or treat inmate sexual assaults,” and that
“[p]rison rape often goes unreported, and inmate victims often receive inadequate treatment for
the severe physical and psychological effects of sexual assault—if they receive treatment at all.”
Id. § 30301(5)–(6). Congress enacted PREA in part to “establish a zero-tolerance standard for
 No. 22-6105                              L. C. v. United States                                     Page 13

the incidence of prison rape in prisons in the United States” and “make the prevention of prison
rape a top priority in each prison system.” Id. § 30302(1)–(2). PREA sought to “increase
the accountability of prison officials who fail to detect, prevent, reduce, and punish prison rape.”
Id. § 30302(6). PREA also required “the Attorney General . . . [to] publish a final rule adopting
national standards for the detection, prevention, reduction, and punishment of prison rape.”
Id. § 30307(a)(1). Accordingly, federal regulations required that “[a]n agency shall have a
written policy mandating zero tolerance toward all forms of sexual abuse and sexual harassment
and outlining the agency’s approach to preventing, detecting, and responding to such conduct.”
28 C.F.R. § 115.11(a).

        On June 4, 2015, the BOP issued Program Statement 5324.12.8 The Program Statement
“provide[s] a written policy that implements zero tolerance toward all forms of sexual activity,
including sexual abuse and sexual harassment, and . . . provide[s] guidelines to address the
following prohibited and/or illegal sexually abusive behavior involving . . . [s]taff perpetrator
against inmate victim.” Program Statement 5324.12 at 1. L. C.’s Complaint points to numerous
portions of Program Statement 5324.12 and relevant portions of Program Statement 3420.11,9
which are incorporated into Program Statement 5324.12, § 115.61(a). See R. 1 (Compl. ¶¶ 12–
22) (Page ID #3–6). Again, both before the district court and at our oral argument, the United
States agreed that Program Statement 5324.12 imposes a number of non-discretionary mandates
on BOP officials. R. 30 (Gov’t’s Reply Br. at 10 & nn.3–4, 11–12 & n.5) (Page ID #296–98)
(conceding that Program Statement 5324.12, § 115.61(a), § 115.62, § 115.71 imposed mandatory
duties on BOP officials and address conduct outside of the discretionary-function exception);
Oral Arg. at 24:01–25:17.

        We look first to the reporting requirements. Program Statement 5324.12, § 115.61(a)
quotes 28 C.F.R. § 115.61’s requirement that the BOP

        8Program Statement 5324.12 “follows the organization of the relevant portions of 28 CFR Part 115 (Prison
Rape Elimination Act National Standards): §§ 115.5, 115.6, Subpart A, and Subpart E.” Program Statement
5324.12 at 5. In essence, it quotes (in bolded blue) the PREA implementing regulations promulgated in 28 C.F.R.
§§ 115.5, 115.3, and then provides additional policies and guidelines below the regulations’ text. Id.
        9See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Fed. Bureau of Prisons Program Statement, Standard of Employee Conduct
3420.11, https://perma.cc/7BS8-6JZ5 [hereinafter Program Statement 3420.11].
 No. 22-6105                          L. C. v. United States                              Page 14

        shall require all staff to report immediately and according to [BOP] policy any
        knowledge, suspicion, or information regarding an incident of sexual abuse or
        sexual harassment that occurred in a facility, whether or not it is part of the
        [BOP]; retaliation against inmates or staff who reported such an incident; and any
        staff neglect or violation of responsibilities that may have contributed to an
        incident or retaliation.

To effectuate this regulatory mandate, § 115.61 requires that “[a]ll staff must report information
concerning incidents or possible incidents of sexual abuse or sexual harassment to the Operations
Lieutenant, or, where appropriate, in accordance with the Program Statement [3420.11,]
Standards of Employee Conduct.”         Id. § 115.61(a) (emphasis added).      Program Statement
3420.11 explicitly prohibits BOP “employee[s from] . . . engag[ing] in, or allow[ing] another
person to engage in, sexual behavior with an inmate” and explains that “[t]here is never any such
thing as consensual sex between staff and inmates.” Program Statement 3420.11 at 7. It goes on
to define “[s]exual contact,” and identifies the disciplinary consequences of violating this
directive. Id. at 7, see also id. at 6, 29, 34. Program Statement 3420.11 mandates that BOP

        [e]mployees must . . . [a]s soon as practicable (but no later than 24 hours) report
        to their CEO (or other appropriate authority such as the Office of Internal Affairs
        or the Office of the Inspector General) any violation, appearance of a violation, or
        attempted violation of these Standards or of any law, rule, or regulation.

Id. at 5–6. Program Statement 3420.11 further requires that “[a]ll allegations of sexual abuse
will be thoroughly investigated and, when appropriate, referred to authorities for prosecution.”
Id. at 7.

        Program Statement 5324.12, § 115.71 addresses the investigation that must follow. The
regulations and Program Statement require a “prompt[], thorough[], and objective[]”
investigation into all “allegations of sexual abuse and sexual harassment.” Program Statement
5324.12, § 115.71(a); 28 C.F.R. § 115.71(a). The Program Statement also provides a specific
reporting chain to be used when “a staff member is alleged to have perpetrated sexually abusive
behavior against an inmate” mandating that “the Warden [be] notified immediately,” who in turn
“notifies the Regional Director and the Office of Internal Affairs (OIA), who in turn notify the
Office of the Inspector General (OIG), and, when appropriate, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI).” Program Statement 5324.12, § 115.71(a)(2). Additionally, the BOP’s
 No. 22-6105                             L. C. v. United States                           Page 15

investigation “[s]hall be documented in written reports that include a description of the physical
and testimonial evidence, the reasoning behind credibility assessments, and investigative facts
and findings.”     Program Statement 5324.12, § 115.71(f)(2); 28 C.F.R. § 115.71(f)(2).        The
investigation must also “include an effort to determine whether staff actions or failures to act
contributed to the abuse.” Program Statement 5324.12, § 115.71(f)(1); 28 C.F.R. § 115.71(f)(1).

        Ultimately, Program Statement 5324.12, § 115.61(a) and its cross references to the
reporting and investigation requirements in Program Statement 3420.11 impose a mandatory
requirement that the first BOP official with “information concerning incidents or possible
incidents of sexual abuse or sexual harassment,” Program Statement 5324.12, § 115.61(a), report
such information “[a]s soon as practicable (but no later than 24 hours),” Program Statement
3420.11 at 5–6, and immediately investigate the information, Program Statement 5324.12,
§§ 115.61(a), 115.71.      These are “mandatory regulation[s and] polic[ies] that allow[] no
judgment or choice.” Kohl, 699 F.3d at 940 (quoting Rosebush, 119 F.3d at 441); cf. Milligan,
670 F.3d at 694.

        2. Prong Two: Whether the BOP’s Failure Timely to Report and Investigate
           Sexual Misconduct by a BOP Official Is Susceptible to Policy Analysis
        Even if, however, timely reporting and investigating information regarding sexual
harassment or assault in a BOP facility were discretionary, a failure of BOP staff to do so is not a
government action susceptible to policy considerations. There are, of course, no legitimate
reasons “grounded in social, economic, and political policy” for failing timely to report and
investigate the sexual assault of a person in BOP custody. Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 323 (quoting
Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 814); see also Rosebush, 119 F.3d at 444. Rather, the type of
considerations that would impact a BOP official’s decision timely to report and investigate
information of sexual assault would be personal, e.g., a desire to protect one’s coworker, fear of
retaliation, or unwillingness to exert the effort to file a report.

        Contrary to the district court’s conclusion (and the United States’s contention), L. C. did
not need to prove the existence of a “specific and immediate threat” to demonstrate that the
BOP’s conduct was not susceptible to policy analysis. L. C., 2022 WL 1179400, at *8. The
United States frames Montez ex rel. Est. of Hearlson v. United States, 359 F.3d 392 (6th Cir.
 No. 22-6105                          L. C. v. United States                              Page 16

2004), as holding that, under the discretionary-function exception’s second prong, “unless a
‘specific and immediate threat’ exists of which prison officials were aware, the method
employed for keeping inmates safe satisfies the second DFE factor and there is no subject matter
jurisdiction over the claim.” R. 26 (USA’s Mot. to Dismiss at 12) (Page ID #170) (quoting
Montez, 359 F.3d at 398). This is incorrect.

       Montez merely observed, without citing to any authorities, that “[a]s a general principle,
a complaint that alleges the existence of a specific and immediate threat against an inmate is
more likely to survive a motion to dismiss than a complaint that . . . alleges a nonspecific threat”
because “decisions by prison officials to ignore specific and immediate threats against inmates
are less likely to be the type of decision that can be said to be grounded in the underlying policy
of the BOP, which requires prison officials to provide for the safekeeping and protection of
inmates.” Montez, 359 F.3d at 398 (emphasis added). Our words in Montez—an observation of
a “general principle” and speculation about what types of allegations would be “more likely to
survive a motion to dismiss”—do not support this absolutist interpretation. See id. We have
never endorsed the United States’s view of Montez or independently held that an incarcerated
individual must plead the existence of a specific and immediate threat to demonstrate that failing
to keep an inmate safe was not based in policy considerations. In some instances, perhaps, the
absence of a specific and immediate threat against an incarcerated individual may demonstrate
that efforts to keep them safe involved policy considerations. In other instances, it may not. A
more tailored focus is required.

       Aside from this incorrect reading, Montez’s holding—that conduct undertaken to
carry out 18 U.S.C. § 4042(a)’s general goal of keeping inmates safe involves policy
considerations—cannot be universally applied to every case involving harm to incarcerated
individuals. See 359 F.3d at 397–98. Montez’s holding relied on different policy considerations.
Montez addressed a claim that the BOP failed to protect adequately an incarcerated decedent
from attacks by other incarcerated people. Id. at 394. In holding that decisions regarding
keeping the incarcerated decedent safe from other incarcerated people were grounded in policy
and “of the kind that the discretionary function exception was designed to shield,” id. at 397, we
looked to cases that specifically addressed the BOP’s alleged negligent failure to prevent
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violence perpetrated by one incarcerated person against another. Id. at 397–98. First, we
examined Calderon v. United States, 123 F.3d 947, 950 (7th Cir. 1997), and its conclusion “that
the BOP’s [decision] not to take disciplinary action against [the inmate who later attacked the
plaintiff] was based on grounds other than considerations of public policy.” Montez, 359 F.3d at
397 (alterations in original) (quoting Calderon, 123 F.3d at 950). Calderon explained that
protecting incarcerated individuals from each other involved “balancing the need to provide
inmate security with the rights of the inmates to circulate and socialize within the prison[, which]
involves considerations based upon public policy.” 123 F.3d at 951. We also analogized to and
relied on Dykstra v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 140 F.3d 791, 796 (8th Cir. 1998). Montez, 359
F.3d at 397–98. Dykstra’s explanation for its similar conclusion that keeping incarcerated
people safe from one another involved policy considerations likewise contemplated the same
logistical and policy concerns of inmate housing and supervision. 140 F.3d at 796. It explained
that:

        Prison officials supervise inmates based upon security levels, available resources,
        classification of inmates, and other factors. These factors upon which prison
        officials base such decisions are inherently grounded in social, political, and
        economic policy. We have no difficulty in concluding that the discretionary
        function exception applies to the correctional officer’s decision not to place
        Dykstra in protective custody or to take other protective action.

Id. The policy considerations identified in Montez, Calderon, and Dykstra do not apply outside
of the context of keeping incarcerated people safe from one another. For instance, the need to
evaluate security levels and classifications and balance incarcerated people’s “security with
the[ir] rights . . . to circulate and socialize within the prison,” Calderon, 123 F.3d at 951; see also
Dykstra, 140 F.3d at 796, and to keep incarcerated people safe from one another, is not of
concern when deciding whether to enforce the BOP’s zero-tolerance policy for sexual assault
and the requirement timely to report and investigate such information.

        Because BOP policy requires that its staff timely report and investigate any information
pertaining to sexual assault or harassment by a BOP official, and, in any event, the decision to
report and investigate is not susceptible to policy analysis, we hold that a properly alleged claim
that the BOP acted negligently by failing timely to report and investigate information regarding
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sexual assault by a BOP official—as mandated by Program Statement 5324.12, §§ 115.61,
115.71—falls outside of the discretionary-function exception.

           III.   WHETHER L. C.’S COMPLAINT ADEQUATELY STATES A
                  CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED
       We address now the United States’s position that L. C.’s claim fails under Rule 12(b)(6).
We—yet again—face forfeiture. The United States did not argue in its brief before this court
that the district court’s Rule 12(b)(6) ruling should be affirmed, therefore forfeiting the
argument. Island Creek Coal, 910 F.3d at 256. Here too, L. C. forfeited the forfeiture by failing
to raise it in her reply brief. Shultz, 733 F.3d at 619. We therefore proceed to the merits.

       “We review de novo the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss” brought under Rule
12(b)(6). Daunt v. Benson, 999 F.3d 299, 307 (6th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). “[W]e must
determine whether the complaint ‘fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,’ in
which case dismissal is warranted.” Id. at 307–08 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)). “A claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Our review “construe[s] the complaint in the light most favorable to
the Plaintiff[],” Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Hill v. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 409 F.3d 710, 716 (6th Cir. 2005)), and “[w]e accept all of the
complaint’s factual allegations as true, but ‘need not accept as true legal conclusions or
unwarranted factual inferences.’” Michigan Paytel Joint Venture v. City of Detroit, 287 F.3d
527, 533 (6th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted) (quoting Morgan v. Church’s Fried Chicken, 829
F.2d 10, 12 (6th Cir. 1987)).

       Tort liability under the FTCA must be “determined in accordance with the law of the
state where the event giving rise to liability occurred.” Milligan, 670 F.3d at 692 (quoting Young
v. United States, 71 F.3d 1238, 1242 (6th Cir. 1995)). In Kentucky, a negligence claim “requires
proof that (1) the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care, (2) the defendant breached the
standard by which his or her duty is measured, and (3) consequent injury.” Pathways, Inc.
v. Hammons, 113 S.W.3d 85, 88 (Ky. 2003). “Consequent injury” involves “actual injury or
harm to the plaintiff and legal causation between the defendant’s breach and the plaintiff’s
 No. 22-6105                           L. C. v. United States                              Page 19

injury.” Id. at 88–89. As the United States acknowledged, the BOP has a duty timely to report
and investigate information regarding sexual assault. R. 30 (Gov’t’s Reply Br. at 11) (Page ID
#297).

         The breach inquiry turns on whether L. C. has plausibly alleged that BOP officials failed
timely to report or investigate information that Lee may have been attacking women incarcerated
at FMC before November 22, 2019. L. C. has failed to do so. L. C. has not sufficiently alleged
that a BOP official had any information about Lee’s conduct and failed to act on it before
November 22, 2019. L. C. points to her allegation that BOP counselor Ms. Chaney told L. C.
that Lee had been reported “a long time ago.” R. 1 (Compl. ¶ 65) (Page ID #11). L. C.’s
Complaint provides no context for when Chaney made the statement, which limits our ability to
draw inferences that Chaney herself knew of Lee’s attacks before November 22, 2019, or that
Chaney later came to learn that others knew of his attacks before then. Similarly, Dr. Shuster’s
statement that “she was worried about L. C.’s recovery because of ‘what happened with a
clinician[,]’” and L. C.’s allegation that she “had not told Dr. Shuster that she had been sexually
assaulted by one of her recovery clinicians” indicates that this conversation occurred after the
assaults. Id. ¶ 66 (Page ID #11); see also id. ¶¶ 67–68 (Page ID #11). L. C.’s allegation that a
medical department staffer told her on February 18, 2020 that all of Lee’s victims had contracted
herpes does not permit the inference that staff treated multiple other victims before November
22, 2019, and knew then that each person they were treating had contracted herpes because Lee
had attacked them. Id. ¶¶ 44, 60 (Page ID #9–10). Looking at these allegations, there is of
course a possibility that some BOP officials knew of Lee’s assaults before November 22, 2019,
and failed to act on that information. But, though “[t]he plausibility standard is not akin to a
‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. We further note that nothing in the exhibits attached to the
United States’s motion to dismiss, such as its investigatory report, enables us draw inferences
that its staff knew of Lee’s assaults before November 22, 2019. With so many holes in the
timeline in L. C.’s allegations, we cannot plausibly draw the necessary inferences in a manner
that satisfies the pleading standard. See id. Because L. C.’s Complaint fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, the district court properly dismissed L. C.’s negligence claim.
 No. 22-6105                         L. C. v. United States                            Page 20

                                     IV. CONCLUSION

       The BOP is bound by mandatory directives timely to report and investigate information
that a person incarcerated within their custody is the victim of sexual harassment or sexual
assault by a BOP official. Decisions timely to report and investigate such information are not
susceptible to policy considerations. For both reasons, claims that the BOP failed to do so fall
outside the discretionary-function exception. Though L. C.’s Complaint cited these mandatory
directives, it lacked sufficient factual allegations to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.