Court Opinion

ID: 9573179
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:49:18.74932+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:37:46.148856
License: Public Domain

*431SCHUDSON, J.
(concurring). Although I agree with "the bottom line" of affirmance, I disagree with the analysis that precedes it. I write separately, therefore, to attempt to clarify what should have been the basis for resolution of this appeal, and to oppose publication of an opinion that will confuse and mislead LIRC, lawyers, and courts.
The majority opinion is confusing and misleading in many respects, and the confusion could have been so easily avoided. The Attorney General offers an organized and persuasive brief providing the sound and straightforward basis for decision:
(1) Section 102.42(1), Stats., governs. It establishes an employer's liability "for reasonable expense incurred by the employe[e] for necessary treatment to cure and relieve the employe[e] from the effects of occupational disease prior to the time that the employe[e] knew or should have known the nature of his or her disability and its relation to employment." Although the statute does not absolutely and explicitly dictate the "date of injury" determination, the Attorney General's interpretation and application of the statute to the facts of this case are reasonable.
(2) United's position is unreasonable. "It would lead," in the Attorney General's words, "to the unintended and unreasonable result of requiring an occupational disease sufferer, who wishes to continue working, to step away from his or her scheduled work duties, thereby creating a 'date of injury,' in order to get medical expenses paid under the compensation act."
(3) Under settled standards, whenever reasonably possible, worker's compensation statutes are to be liberally construed in favor of the right to compensation. See State v. LIRC, 136 Wis. 2d 281, 288, 401 N.W.2d 585, 588 (1987). It is most reasonable to read *432§ 102.42(1), Stats., to provide for compensation in this case.
Unfortunately, once again, I find myself in the unenviable position of having to warn against publication of what should have emerged as a clear, valuable, and publishable statement of law. I do so knowing full well that, for some, such criticism might seem to reflect negatively on this court and even embarrass my colleagues and myself. Certainly, I do not intend that, and I regret that some may choose to misunderstand my words and misconceive my motives.
I write without rancor. I do write critically, however, and as carefully as I can, for what I hope are reasons good and true. And I do so only after searching for and attempting every possible alternative I know — to cultivate consensus, and to motivate the careful and collegial preparation of opinions. As tempting as it is to "sign off on unsatisfactory opinions and, frankly, as often as I have succumbed to such temptation, I must, at the very least, try not to do so on opinions recommended for publication — opinions, which, if published, guide the bench and bar, and the people we serve.
Accordingly, I respectfully concur.