Court Opinion

ID: 9858305
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 16:19:58.444644+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:53:53.846040
License: Public Domain

BATEMAN, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. I am unwilling to insert a promise into the written contract which the contracting parties did not see fit to incorporate therein. The letter agreement contains no express promise by Grossman to return her investment to appellant, either out of the enterprise itself or out of his own pocket; and for Gross-man and his estate to be saddled with such an obligation by mere implication such must result from the language employed in the instrument or be indispensable to carry the intention of the parties into effect. 17 Am.Jur.2d, Contracts, § 255, p. 650.
The parties in this case stipulated that the letter in question “represents the sole, complete and entire agreement and understanding between” them. This unequivocal negation of any additional or implied agreement is in line with the rule of law stated in Danciger Oil & Refining Co. of Texas v. Powell, 137 Tex. 484, 154 S.W.2d 632, 635, 137 A.L.R. 408 (1941), as follows:
“In the outset it should be noted that when parties reduce their agreements to writing, - the written instrument is presumed to embody their entire contract, and the court should not read into the instrument additional provisions unless this be necessary in order to effectuate the intention of the parties as disclosed by the contract as a whole. * * * It is not enough to say that an implied covenant is necessary in order to make *237the contract fair, or that without such a covenant it would be improvident or unwise, or that the contract would operate unjustly. It must arise from the presumed intention of the parties as gathered from the instrument as a whole.’’ (Italics mine.)
See also Weil v. Ann Lewis Shops, 281 S.W.2d 651, 655 (Tex.Civ.App., San Antonio 1955, writ ref’d); East Ohio Gas Co. v. City of Akron, 81 Ohio St. 33, 90 N.E. 40, 42-43 (1909); Freeport Sulphur Co. v. American Sulphur Royalty Co., 117 Tex. 439, 6 S.W.2d 1039, 1041 (1928); Stalcup v. Eastham, 330 S.W.2d 237, 240 (Tex.Civ.App., El Paso 1959, writ ref’d n. r. e.) ; Morganton Mfg. & Trading Co. v. Anderson, 165 N.C. 285, 81 S.E. 418, 420 (1914).
As stated in Ives v. City of Willimantic, 121 Conn. 408, 185 A. 427, 428 (1936) :
“The question is not what intention existed in the minds of the parties, but what intention is expressed in the language used.”
Implied provisions in contracts are not favored by the law, and are permitted only on the ground of necessity, 13 Tex.Jur.2d, Contracts, § 163, p. 349, and then only when a consideration of the entire writing admits of no other reasonable construction. United States v. Nickel, 243 F.2d 924, 927 (10 Cir. 1957).
I think another construction is just as reasonable as the one adopted in the majority opinion. The appellant evidently invested in some business enterprise which both parties assumed would be successful, as evidenced by the optimistic recitation of the high return expected and the provision that appellant should receive her share of the profits of the venture while withdrawing her investment therein. An implication of a right to withdraw her investment from the enterprise itself is quite as reasonable as an implied promise on the part of Gross-man to guarantee the success and solvency of the enterprise by making himself personally liable for the return of appellant’s investment if the enterprise could not be made to return it. The opinion of the majority adopts the latter, but if either implication is warranted the former, being the less onerous of the two, should be the one to be adopted. Carper v. United Fuel Gas Co., 78 W.Va. 433, 89 S.E. 12, 16 (1916).
If any implied promise is to be inferred, it must necessarily arise from the second paragraph of the letter and become effective upon appellant’s wishing for the return of the money and to withdraw from the ventures. If the words used were intended by the parties to have the effect decreed by the majority, the words “and to withdraw from any such ventures” would be superfluous and meaningless. But if we give effect and meaning to the entire sentence the thought is conveyed that if appellant wishes the return of the money invested by her she knows the only way she can get it is by withdrawing from the ventures, and that if given the time stipulated Grossman will endeavor to get it for her from that source.
I cannot concur in the decision on the ground that the letter should be most strictly construed against Grossman because he prepared it. In the first place, I see no evidence in the record that he prepared it. I do not think the appearance of his initials in the lower left corner of the letter constitutes such evidence. Without knowing who placed the initials there, or directed that they be placed there, I would regard their presence on the letter as no more than a scintilla and as having no probative force. Certainly, the fact that Grossman signed the letter is no evidence that he prepared it. It often happens that one paying money to another prepares the release or other agreement to be signed by the one to whom the money is paid or delivered. In the second place, even assuming that he prepared it, this rule of construction is applicable only in the case of an ambiguous instrument, and both *238parties concede that this one is not ambiguous. In the third place, that would amount to a personal guarantee of the safety of an investment cannot in my opinion properly be read into such a letter under the guise of judicial construction even if Grossman did prepare it.
I would affirm the judgment.