Court Opinion

ID: 9762909
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:33:44.56504+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:38.415571
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Spaeth, J.:
Appellant initially offered a plea of guilty before Judge Raup, but when the guilty plea colloquy disclosed that the Commonwealth would try to depict her as the ringleader of the transaction, she withdrew her plea. Thereupon appellant waived her right to a jury trial and began a bench trial with Judge Raup presiding. Although the entry and withdrawal of the plea and the commencement of the bench trial occurred in immediate sequence, appellant’s counsel did not ask the judge to recuse him*295self. I think counsel’s failure to do so denied appellant effective assistance of counsel. I would therefore vacate the judgment of sentence and grant appellant a new trial.
The standard for judging ineffectiveness of counsel is well-settled:
“We cannot emphasize strongly enough, however, that our inquiry ceases and counsel’s assistance is deemed constitutionally effective once we are able to conclude that the particular course chosen by counsel had some reasonable basis designed to effectuate his client’s interests. The test is not whether other alternatives were more reasonable, employing a hindsight evaluation of the record. Although weigh the alternatives we must, the balance tips in favor of a finding of effective assistance as soon as it is determined that trial counsel’s decisions had any reasonable basis.” Commonwealth ex rel. Washington v. Maroney, 427 Pa. 599, 604-605, 235 A.2d 349, 352-353 (1967). (Emphasis added)1
Neither the majority opinion, the Commonwealth’s brief, nor the lower court record suggests “any reasonable basis” for counsel’s failure to request Judge Raup’s re-cusal ; nor can I imagine one. A guilty plea is inherently prejudicial. Counsel cannot reasonably assume that a judge as the trier of fact will be able to put that plea out of his mind and arrive at an impartial adjudication of guilt. See Commonwealth v. Conti, 236 Pa. Superior Ct. 488, 345 A.2d 238 (1975).
*296. Furthermore, it is unreasonable to expect that a judge will not be annoyed at being put through the efforts of what, in light of the original plea, might seem to be a futile trial. By permitting his client to be tried by a potentially annoyed judge, counsel is not only gambling on the impartiality of the adjudication of guilt, but is also risking the imposition of an excessive sentence. In this case, that is exactly what resulted,2 as shown by the trial judge’s letter recommending reduction of the sentence.
A fair trial before an impartial tribunal is a basic requirement of due process. Peters v. Kiff, 407 U. S. 493 (1972) (judgment of the Court, per Marshall, J.) ; In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955) ; Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) ; Commonwealth ex rel. Light v. Maroney, 413 Pa. 254, 196 A.2d 659 (1964). It is therefore fundamental that counsel take every possible reasonable measure to assure that his client is tried before an impartial judge. Counsel here took no such measures, thereby denying appellant effective assistance of counsel.

. The majority correctly quotes the standard, hut does not apply it. Instead the majority fashions a new test from a footnote in Washington: whether appellant’s chances of success would have been “substantially greater” had her attorney chosen an alternative tactic. 427 Pa. at 605, n. 8, 235 A.2d at 353, n. 8, quoted in the majority opinion at 292-3. Since both the Supreme Court and this court have consistently reaffirmed the Washington standard of “no reasonable basis,” Commonwealth v. Nole, 461 Pa. 314, 336 A.2d 302 (1975); Commonwealth v. Betts, 234 Pa. Superior Ct. 642, 645, 341 A.2d 912 (1975), I believe we should continue to apply it.

. Thus, even if we were to use the majority’s standard of ineffectiveness, counsel here would have been ineffective. That is, his chances of success in obtaining a suitable sentence for his client were “substantially greater” before another judge. Indeed, one of appellant’s co-participants, who was more involved in the transaction than appellant, was sentenced by another judge to a term of four to twelve years — a sentence with a minimum term one year shorter than appellant’s.