Court Opinion

ID: 9844580
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:05:00.668584+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:38.312118
License: Public Domain

OPINION McMANUS, Justice. Defendants appeal from the reversal of their administrative action denying approval of transfer of ownership and location of plaintiff Rigales’ liquor license to Safeway Stores, Inc. The Alcoholic Beverages - Act, §§ 46-1-1 to 46-12-13, N.M.S.A.- (1953 Comp.), establishes certain prerequisites to the granting of a liquor license application or for its transfer to another location; These requirements pertain to the character of the applicant, certain restrictions as to the location of the license, plus other requirements and continuing requisites as to operation of the licensed establishment. However, it is conceded by the defendants that all of the necessary statutory prerequisites were complied with in connection with the plaintiff’s application. Yet, the defendants urge that the trial court erred in failing to find that the New Mexico state legislature has conferred upon state municipalities certain necessary powers, including the discretionary authority to approve or disapprove an application for a liquor license. For purposes of this appeal, we find the above point to be dispositive for our decision. The defendants alleged that they acted under the discretionary powers given them by § 46-4-8(C), N.M.S.A. (1953 Comp.), which states: “Within thirty [30] days after the date of the last publication of the notice in the newspaper, the governing body shall, in regular or special meeting, approve or disapprove the issuance or transfer of the license specified in the notice from the chief of the division of liquor control. The governing body shall, if it disapproves the issuance or transfer contained in the notice, notify the chief of the division of liquor control of such action of disapproval within five [5] days after the action has been taken. Thereupon, the chief of the division of liquor control shall not issue or transfer the license or licenses mentioned in the notice.”  The above section must be read in light of the entire Alcoholic Beverages Act, supra, to determine the intent of the legislature. In recognizing the standards established by the act in seeking to achieve its purposes, “ * * * it is fundamental that those standards — general as they are —are not to be broadened simply to accommodate the particular whims and philosophy that the parties or the various members of the licensing authority might have concerning the subject matter. That is a task for the legislature.” Glenn v. Board of County Com’rs, Sheridan County, 440 P.2d 1 (Wyo.1968). Agreeing that the plaintiffs met all applicable statutory requirements, the defendants maintain that, acting under no guidelines other than their discretion, they could still properly deny the transferral of the license. We cannot agree with this contention. There is nothing within the scope of the applicable statutory material which would indicate that the legislature intended to give local governing bodies discretion well beyond that exercised by the state liquor director or otherwise set forth as statutory guidelines. To give such interpretation to the section quoted by the defendants would result in an unmistakably ambiguous application of liquor law requirements, belying any legislative intent as to uniform, statewide regulation of the affected subject matter. The statute in question, § 46-4-8 (C), supra, in circumstances where the local governing body fails to act for a certain period of time or approves the transfer, authorizes the chief of the division to approve the transfer in his discretion. As written, the statute does not even require discretion on the part of the local governing body. Could it be reasonably held, in the light of the state’s preemption in the field of the regulation of liquor businesses, that the legislature intended local governing bodies to have a broader range of permitted action than the chief of the division? We think not. Without any statutory standard whatever, we do not feel that a local governing body could give vent to whatever whims they might choose. Our duty, when it becomes necessary to look into the legislative intent behind such statutes, is to avoid ambiguity, not create it. The chief aim of statutory construction is to arrive at true legislative intent. See Montoya v. McManus, 68 N.M. 381, 362 P.2d 771 (1961); State v. Chavez, 77 N.M. 79, 419 P.2d 456 (1966).  Plaving made out a prima facie case on behalf of the plaintiffs by meeting the statutory requirements applicable to them, it is then necessary for the defendants to rebut such evidence. See Lyons v. Delaware Liquor Commission, 44 Del. (5 Terry) 304, 58 A.2d 889 (1948). Yet, they fail to come forward with any such evidence, and, apparently relying on their misunderstanding of the law, they allege their ostensibly awesome discretionary power in such matters. A local governing body does perform a valuable discretionary duty in the granting of liquor licenses or in their transfer, but only insofar as determining whether the statutory guidelines have been met locally. The record shows, and the defendants substantively admit, that such guidelines were met. Having considered all of the points raised on appeal, and having noted that the above point is dispositive of the appeal, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. It is so ordered. TACKETT, J., concurs.