Court Opinion

ID: 9399110
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-01 21:00:57.092434+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:38.930592
License: Public Domain

USCA4 Appeal: 21-1826      Doc: 34        Filed: 05/31/2023     Pg: 1 of 11

                                           UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                              No. 21-1826

        R.S., By and through his father Ronald E. Soltes,

                            Plaintiff – Appellee,

                     v.

        BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF WOODS CHARTER SCHOOL COMPANY;
        WOODS CHARTER SCHOOL; DOES 1-10, Inclusive,

                            Defendants – Appellants.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at
        Greensboro. Thomas D. Schroeder, Chief District Judge. (1:16-cv-00119-TDS-LPA)

        Argued: October 28, 2022                                         Decided: May 31, 2023

        Before KING and HARRIS, Circuit Judges, and Michael S. NACHMANOFF, United
        States District Judge for the Eastern District of Virginia, sitting by designation.

        Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Judge Nachmanoff wrote the opinion, in which Judges
        King and Harris joined.

        ARGUED: Steven Andrew Bader, CRANFILL SUMNER, LLP, Raleigh, North Carolina,
        for Appellants. Keith Lamar Pryor Howard, LAW OFFICES OF KEITH L. HOWARD,
        PLLC, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Donna R. Rascoe,
        CRANFILL SUMNER, LLP, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellants. Kelli Espaillat,
        KINCAID & ASSOCIATES, PLLC, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.
USCA4 Appeal: 21-1826      Doc: 34         Filed: 05/31/2023    Pg: 2 of 11

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

                                                    2
USCA4 Appeal: 21-1826      Doc: 34         Filed: 05/31/2023     Pg: 3 of 11

        MICHAEL S. NACHMANOFF, District Judge:

               Plaintiff R.S., by and through his parents, brought an action under the Individuals

        with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. While the action was

        pending, R.S.’s attorneys withdrew from their representation of R.S. and were replaced by

        a new set of attorneys. At the conclusion of that suit, the district court awarded summary

        judgment in R.S.’s favor, which this Court affirmed. Petitions for attorneys’ fees and costs

        were submitted by both the current and former attorneys for R.S. Finding that the former

        attorneys’ motion was properly before the court, the district court determined an award

        amount after considering several factors, including the degree of success achieved by R.S.

        on the merits of his claims.

               The defendant school board now challenges the award on grounds that (1) the

        former attorneys did not have standing to bring their motion, and (2) the district court

        abused its discretion in determining the degree of success on R.S.’s claims. Upon review,

        we affirm the judgment of the district court.

                                                        I.

               States receiving federal funds for education under the IDEA must provide disabled

        schoolchildren with a “free appropriate public education” (“FAPE”), 20 U.S.C.

        § 1412(a)(1)(A), to include an “individualized education program” (“IEP”) for each

        disabled schoolchild, id. § 1412(a)(4). If parents disagree with the services provided to

        their child under the IDEA, they may file a complaint, id. § 1415(b)(6), and are entitled to

        certain procedural safeguards in adjudicating that complaint, including an impartial due

                                                        3
USCA4 Appeal: 21-1826      Doc: 34         Filed: 05/31/2023      Pg: 4 of 11

        process hearing conducted by the state or local educational agency, id. § 1415(f). Parties

        may challenge the final state administrative decision in either state or federal court. Id.

        § 1415(i)(2)(A). Following an action or proceeding under the IDEA, a court may award

        “reasonable attorneys’ fees as part of the costs” to the “prevailing party who is the parent

        of a child with a disability.” Id. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i). The statute provides a non-exhaustive

        list of circumstances under which a court may reduce an attorneys’ fee award. Id.

        § 1415(i)(3)(F).

               In the instant case, R.S. was a child eligible for services under the IDEA. In 2013,

        he enrolled at the Woods Charter School (“WCS”). Dissatisfied with the accommodations

        WCS provided, R.S.’s father initiated a due process proceeding under the IDEA in October

        2014. At that time, R.S. was represented by attorneys J. Denton Adams and Steven Wyner

        (together, “Former Attorneys”). That proceeding resulted in a final administrative decision

        granting R.S. compensatory education based on the denial of a FAPE solely for WCS’s

        failure to timely develop an IEP for R.S.—far less than the full relief R.S. sought.

               In February 2016, R.S.’s father, represented by the Former Attorneys, brought an

        action in the district court challenging that administrative decision on behalf of his son.

        The Former Attorneys eventually moved to withdraw from their representation of R.S.,

        citing disagreement over litigation strategy. The litigation continued with attorneys Kelli

        Espaillat and Keith Howard (together, “Current Attorneys”) serving as R.S.’s new counsel.

        In March 2019, the district court granted R.S.’s summary judgment motion. This Court

        affirmed that decision in a per curiam opinion. R.S. By & through his father Ronald E.

        Soltes v. Bd. of Dirs. of Woods Charter Sch. Co., 806 F. App’x 229 (4th Cir. 2020).

                                                     4
USCA4 Appeal: 21-1826      Doc: 34          Filed: 05/31/2023     Pg: 5 of 11

               Following affirmance, the two sets of attorneys separately moved for an award of

        attorneys’ fees and costs. R.S., by and through the Current Attorneys, filed his motion first.

        Attached to R.S.’s motion were affidavits from the Current Attorneys, their time and

        expense records, and declarations from two attorneys licensed to practice in North Carolina

        providing expert testimony on the reasonableness of the Current Attorneys’ fees and costs.

        The Former Attorneys filed a motion the following day in which they “move[d] th[e] Court

        for an award of attorneys’ fees.” J.A. 362. The motion was submitted under the case

        caption, which clearly reflected that R.S. was the plaintiff in the action. Attached to the

        Former Attorneys’ motion were affidavits, time and expense records, and declarations from

        attorneys licensed in North Carolina and Virginia who likewise provided expert testimony

        that the fees and costs of the Former Attorneys were reasonable.

               Upon receiving both motions, the district court noted that R.S., as the prevailing

        party, could pursue a motion for attorneys’ fees and costs owed to his current counsel but

        raised concerns regarding whether the Former Attorneys could separately file a motion.

        The district court ordered briefing on the issue and subsequently found that R.S.’s

        agreement with the Former Attorneys required the parents to pay the Former Attorneys’

        fees, and that R.S. knew of and consented to the Former Attorneys’ motion to recover fees.

        As such, the district court concluded that the Former Attorneys’ motion was therefore

        properly before the court.

               The district court then determined a reasonable fee award, taking into consideration

        the records submitted by both sets of attorneys. The court arrived at a lodestar figure for

        each of the attorneys by determining the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied

                                                      5
USCA4 Appeal: 21-1826      Doc: 34          Filed: 05/31/2023     Pg: 6 of 11

        by a reasonable hourly rate. The district court then looked to the twelve factors identified

        by the Supreme Court in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429–30 & n.3 (1983), to

        determine a reasonable fee award. Focusing on the degree of success obtained by the

        prevailing party, the district court found that R.S. prevailed on four of the seven primary

        legal issues, including the most important of those issues—the denial of a FAPE. The

        district court reduced the lodestar figure for each attorney by thirty-three percent. The

        district court explained that the reduction reflected the protracted nature of the dispute, on

        the one hand, and R.S.’s success on a majority of the issues, on the other hand.

               WCS now challenges the district court decision on two grounds. We discuss each

        challenge in turn below.

                                                     II.

                                                     A.

               WCS first challenges the Former Attorneys’ standing to move for attorney’s fees.

        We review the legal question of standing under the IDEA de novo. See J.D. ex rel. Davis

        v. Kanawha Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 571 F.3d 381, 385 (4th Cir. 2009). WCS argues that neither

        the plain language of the IDEA nor existing caselaw supports the conclusion that the

        Former Attorneys could submit their own motion to recover their attorneys’ fees. We

        disagree.

                                                      6
USCA4 Appeal: 21-1826       Doc: 34          Filed: 05/31/2023      Pg: 7 of 11

               WCS frames the issue as one of Article III “standing.” 1 But there is no constitutional

        standing problem here. Under the IDEA, reasonable attorneys’ fees may be awarded to a

        “prevailing party who is the parent of a child with a disability.” 20 U.S.C.

        § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I). The statute’s plain text therefore provides only that the prevailing

        party is entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees. Here, it is undisputed that the district court

        awarded attorneys’ fees to R.S.—the prevailing party in the action. J.A. 846 (“Plaintiff

        shall recover attorneys’ fees . . . and costs” totaling $519,350.76.) (emphasis added). The

        Former Attorneys did not seek to recover fees in their own names as real parties in interest. 2

        Nor did the district court award fees directly to the Former Attorneys. The district court’s

        judgment awarding fees to R.S. therefore complied with the plain text of the fee-shifting

        provision of the IDEA.

               In reality, WCS objects only to the manner in which the Former Attorneys’ fee

        motion came before the district court. We find this objection to be meritless. The fee-

               1
                 Although the district court referred to the “standing” of the Former Attorneys to
        bring a fee motion, the district court’s conclusion actually turned on two factors unrelated
        to a constitutional standing analysis: (1) whether the Former Attorneys brought their
        motion with the permission of R.S., and (2) whether the retainer agreement held R.S.’s
        parents responsible for the Former Attorneys’ fees such that they were eligible for
        reimbursement under the IDEA as the prevailing party.
               2
                 The cases WCS cites concerning recovery of attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C.
        § 1988(b) are of limited utility for this very reason. For instance, in Brown v. General
        Motors Corp., Chevrolet Div., 722 F.2d 1009 (2d Cir. 1983), the Second Circuit considered
        whether a former attorney could seek “attorney’s fees in [the attorney’s] own name as the
        real party in interest” under Section 1988. Id. at 1011 (emphasis added); see also Evans v.
        Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 730 & n.19 (1986) (discussing that the plain language of Section
        1988 “bestow[s] on the ‘prevailing party’ . . . a statutory eligibility for a discretionary
        award of attorney’s fees”).

                                                       7
USCA4 Appeal: 21-1826       Doc: 34            Filed: 05/31/2023   Pg: 8 of 11

        shifting provision of the IDEA expressly awards attorneys’ fees to prevailing parties (and

        not attorneys) for good reason. Such an arrangement avoids conflicts of interests where an

        attorney and client have distinct, and potentially competing, entitlements in the same

        action. Brown, 722 F.2d at 1011. A plaintiff’s control over the litigation may be lost were

        a former attorney able to directly petition the court for an award of fees to be bestowed

        directly upon the attorney. Id. But those concerns do not exist where a client has provided

        informed consent to the former attorneys’ fee motion, and the fee is awarded to the

        prevailing party (not the attorney).

               Indeed, several district courts across the country have suggested that attorneys may

        bring fee motions under the IDEA if the plaintiff has provided informed consent. See, e.g.,

        Davidson v. D.C., 736 F. Supp. 2d 115, 128 (D.D.C. 2010) (directing plaintiff’s counsel to

        submit a declaration from the remaining plaintiff attesting that the action was “commenced

        with [plaintiff’s] knowledge and consent,” in order to determine whether the action was

        “commenced by a party with standing to seek attorney’s fees under the IDEA”); Adams v.

        Compton Unified Sch. Dist., No. 14-cv-04753, 2015 WL 12748005, at *2–3 (C.D. Cal. July

        16, 2015) (finding plaintiff’s attorney could pursue fee claim where complaint was

        amended to include plaintiff as a party and plaintiff indicated she voluntarily consented to

        participating in the attorney fee litigation). For these reasons, we find that a district court

        may properly consider the fee motion of a former attorney under the IDEA when it is clear

        the prevailing party has consented to such a motion.

               Here, the district court found evidence in the record confirming that the Former

        Attorneys were acting with the informed consent of R.S. when bringing their motion. Our

                                                        8
USCA4 Appeal: 21-1826      Doc: 34          Filed: 05/31/2023     Pg: 9 of 11

        review of the record provides no reason to doubt the district court’s conclusion that the

        plaintiff so consented. 3 Given this record, we are not persuaded by WCS’s argument that

        R.S. consented only to the recovery of approximately $70,000 in attorneys’ fees. WCS

        supports this contention by referencing one email in which R.S.’s parents emphasize that

        they specifically wanted to ensure that certain costs amounting to $70,000 would be

        reimbursed. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it considered all of the

        evidence before it, including correspondence demonstrating that the parents provided

        consent to pursue all attorneys’ fees and costs.

               The argument WCS advances on appeal is highly formalistic. Indeed, at oral

        argument, counsel for WCS conceded there would be no “standing” issue had the Current

        Attorneys merely attached to their fee motion the affidavits and records submitted by the

        Former Attorneys. The Court, however, declines WCS’s invitation to elevate form over

        substance. Accordingly, we find that the district court properly considered the Former

        Attorneys’ fee motion in determining a fee award.

               3
                 As the district court concluded, R.S.’s parents were actively involved in the matter
        throughout its pendency, including during the seeking of fees. The Current Attorneys
        testified that the parents directed them to work with the Former Attorneys to seek recovery
        of R.S.’s attorneys’ fees and costs. The emails submitted by the attorneys confirm their
        testimony. In one email, for instance, Mr. Soltes stated that he had costs that he expected
        to be “addressed appropriately and resolved” and requested that each attorney “keep [him]
        informed and . . . provide clear instruction which will preserve [his] ability to recoup . . .
        costs including fees already paid.” J.A. 786. The Former Attorneys also emailed the parents
        stating their intent “to file a motion to recover our attorneys’ fees as well as costs we
        incurred and paid during the course of [their] representation of [R.S.],” with no apparent
        objection from the parents. J.A. 790.

                                                      9
USCA4 Appeal: 21-1826      Doc: 34          Filed: 05/31/2023     Pg: 10 of 11

                                                     B.

               WCS also argues that the district court abused its discretion in determining the

        degree of success achieved by R.S. for purposes of the fee calculation. We review the

        amount awarded in attorneys’ fees for abuse of discretion. J.D. ex rel. Davis, 571 F.3d at

        385.

               A court has discretion to determine the amount of attorneys’ fees awarded to a

        prevailing party in an action under the IDEA. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i); J.D. ex rel.

        Davis, 571 F.3d at 387. Indeed, while “[t]here is no precise rule or formula” to determine

        the amount of attorneys’ fees, the Supreme Court has identified twelve factors that may

        guide courts in determining reasonable attorneys’ fee awards and explained that the most

        critical of these factors is the “degree of success obtained.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 430 n.3,

        436. When a party achieves only partial success, a court “may simply reduce the award to

        account for the limited success.” Id. at 436–37.

               That is precisely what the district court did here. The district court arrived at a 33%

        reduction in the lodestar figure after a thorough and thoughtful consideration of many

        competing factors. The district court considered, on the one hand, that R.S. had prevailed

        in a majority of the legal issues in dispute, including the most important issue—the denial

        of a FAPE—and was granted relief in the form of services for one student for a school year.

        On the other hand, the district court recognized that some reduction in the lodestar figure

        was appropriate to account for R.S.’s partial success and the protracted nature of the

        dispute, including the duplication of work resulting from the replacement of counsel during

        the pendency of the action.

                                                     10
USCA4 Appeal: 21-1826      Doc: 34          Filed: 05/31/2023     Pg: 11 of 11

               WCS argues that the district court’s 33% reduction does not mathematically align

        with the district court’s assessment of R.S.’s degree of success. WCS reasons that a 33%

        reduction of the lodestar figure amounts to a finding that R.S. achieved a 67% success rate

        on the merits of his claims, which it contends is at odds with the district court’s conclusion

        that R.S. prevailed on 57% of his claims. But, as WCS points out, a precise mathematical

        approach is disfavored. Opening Br. at 23; Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435 n.11, 436 (noting that

        “[t]here is no precise rule or formula for making these determinations” and a mathematical

        approach “provides little aid in determining what a reasonable fee [is] in light of all the

        relevant factors”). Here, the district court thoroughly and systematically applied the factors

        set out in Hensley, evaluated R.S.’s degree of success obtained—“the most critical

        factor”—and determined that it was appropriate to “simply reduce the award to account for

        the limited success.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436–37. The district court’s decision reflects a

        reasoned and careful step-by-step analysis.

               Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion when

        determining the degree of success of R.S.’s claims and reducing the award by 33% in

        accordance with its considered analysis.

                                                           III.

               For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s judgment.

                                                                                         AFFIRMED

                                                      11