Court Opinion

ID: 9521267
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:01:48.556142+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:11.292102
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE BARRY, dissenting: I am compelled to dissent in this case because I feel that given the contents of the affidavit submitted by the plaintiff in support of her motion to vacate the summary judgment, the trial court’s refusal to consider the affidavit was a clear abuse of discretion. In affirming the trial court, the majority places a great deal of emphasis on the fact that the plaintiff failed to produce any evidence that the range in question was unreasonably dangerous. However, such evidence was in fact contained in the affidavit of Marvin Salzenstein presented to support the plaintiff s motion to vacate. As an expert, Mr. Salzenstein’s findings with regard to the ease with which the single-motion control knobs on the stove could be turned are of considerable probative force, and similar findings have been held sufficient to establish that ranges with these types of control knobs are defectively designed and therefore unreasonably dangerous. Magic Chef, Inc. v. Sibley (Tex. Civ. App. 1977), 546 S.W.2d 851. The importance of Mr. Salzenstein’s affidavit in support of the motion to vacate the summary judgment is indisputable. However, the trial court refused to consider it when ruling on the motion, ostensibly because the plaintiff had been less than diligent in obtaining an expert and delayed in submitting the affidavit. We agree with the majority that whether affidavits pursuant to a motion to vacate a summary judgment are to be considered is within the discretion of the trial court (Des Plaines Motor Sales, Inc. v. Whetzal (1965), 58 Ill. App. 2d 143, 206 N.E.2d 806), but that discretion is not unbounded. The trial court may only exercise its discretion within the parameters of equity and justice, and if the discretionary action of the trial court results in manifest injustice to a litigant, this court must not passively condone it. In the instant case the contents of Mr. Salzenstein’s affidavit not only supplied evidence to prove that the range was unreasonably dangerous, but also gave vitality to the plaintiff’s motion to vacate. The trial court’s refusal to consider the affidavit effectively prevented the plaintiff from bringing forward that evidence which was so essential to her case and made the denial of the motion to vacate a foregone conclusion. I do not believe that such a harsh result is mandated by the mere delay in submitting the affidavit. A trial court should not exercise its discretion in the same manner that it would apply a statutory time limitation, but rather should, and indeed must, weigh the equities of each individual case before reaching a decision. Under the facts of this case, I believe the delay in submitting the affidavit, without more, is insufficient reason to refuse to consider its contents, and the trial court’s decision to rule on the motion sans affidavit does not aid in the furtherance of justice. I would reverse and remand for consideration of the plaintiffs motion to vacate, accompanied by Mr. Salzenstein’s affidavit.