Court Opinion

ID: 9494040
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:27:27.587476+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:56:11.110087
License: Public Domain

LOKEN, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I agree with the court that 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is the only vehicle by which a state inmate such as *726Jay Crouch may obtain federal habeas relief, even if his application is purportedly brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 662, 116 S.Ct. 2333, 135 L.Ed.2d 827 (1996); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 482-84, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973). Therefore, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) applies to Crouch’s present application. In my view, it is a second or successive application that requires authorization from this court under § 2244(b)(3). I would deny the request for authorization.
In 1998, the district court denied Crouch’s first § 2254 application on the merits. That application did not raise the parole-denial claims he now seeks to raise.2 Section 2244(b)(2)(B) expressly addresses this situation:
(2) A claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under section 2254 that was not presented in a prior application shall be dismissed unless—
(B)(i) the factual predicate for the claim could not have been discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence; and
(ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in-light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.
In Greenawalt v. Stewart, 105 F.3d 1287, 1288 (9th Cir.1997), the Ninth Circuit applied the plain language of this statute in denying a second or successive application challenging the constitutionality of the manner in which appellant was to be executed. Without considering whether this claim could have been raised in the first § 2254 application, the court denied authorization because the claim “is not relevant to the question whether he is guilty of murder in the first degree” and therefore § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii) could not be satisfied.
The court now declines to follow Greena-walt, concluding instead that Crouch’s application is not “second or successive” within the meaning of § 2244(b) because it would not have been considered an “abuse of the writ” under prior law. The court relies on Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637, 643-45, 118 S.Ct. 1618, 140 L.Ed.2d 849 (1998), and Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 487-88, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000), to justify ignoring the plain meaning of the statutory term “second or successive.” But those cases involved claims raised but not decided on the merits in the first habeas applications. In those situations, it was reasonable as a matter of statutory construction for the Court to look at prior law in determining whether the return to federal court when the claims ripened should be considered “second or successive”, for purposes of the new statute. Here, on the other hand, there can be no question Crouch is seeking to file a “second or successive” petition raising entirely new claims, and therefore no reasonable basis in statutory construction to ignore the plain meaning of § 2244(b)(2). See In re Page, 179 F.3d 1024, 1025 (7th Cir.1999).
The court justifies its decision by observing that “to hold otherwise would lead to ‘perverse’ results.” Ante at p. 725. But habeas corpus is a statutory writ, and *727“judgments about the proper scope of the writ are normally for Congress to make.” Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. at 664, 116 S.Ct. 2333 (upholding § 2244(b) as constitutional). Congress may decide — and in my view has decided — that the federal writ is not available to a state inmate who has unsuccessfully pursued § 2254 relief from his conviction, and who now wishes to use § 2254 to challenge the loss of good time credits, or the denial of parole, or some other aspect of the execution of his state sentence. It is not our prerogative as circuit judges to rewrite § 2244(b) because we would have legislated differently.
For these reasons, I conclude that Crouch requires authorization from this court to file a second or successive habeas corpus application, and I would deny his motion for authorization because he has not made the prima facie showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(C).

. The court asserts that Crouch could not have asserted these parole-denial claims in his first habeas petition. That is not entirely clear, because his first petition was filed in January 1998, after the first three of his six parole denials. But for purposes of this dissent, I assume the court’s assertion is correct.