Court Opinion

ID: 9743783
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:42:57.478248+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:43.521227
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE QUINN, dissenting: I concur with the majority’s affirmance of defendant’s conviction. I dissent as to the majority’s vacating the defendant’s sentence because of the trial court’s failure to order a TASC evaluation. This issue has been waived. In pertinent part, section 5 — 8—1(c) provides: “A motion to reduce a sentence may be made, or the court may reduce a sentence without motion, within 30 days after the sentence is imposed. A defendant’s challenge to the correctness of a sentence or to any aspect of the sentencing hearing shall be made by a written motion filed within 30 days following the imposition of sentence. However, the court may not increase a sentence once it is imposed.” 730 ILCS 5/5 — 8—1(c) (West 1998). People v. Reed, 177 Ill. 2d 389 (1997), held that “the legislative purpose behind section 5 — 8—1(c) was to require sentencing issues be raised in the trial court in order to preserve those issues for appellate review.” Reed, 177 Ill. 2d at 393. “Requiring a written post-sentencing motion will allow the trial court the opportunity to review a defendant’s contention of sentencing error and save the delay and expense inherent in appeal if they are meritorious. Such a motion also focuses the attention of the trial court upon a defendant’s alleged errors and gives the appellate court the benefit of the trial court’s reasoned judgment on those issues.” Reed, 177 Ill. 2d at 394. In the instant case, defendant filed a motion to reduce sentence. In that motion, defendant asked the trial court to reduce the number of years defendant was to serve in prison. Defendant did not ask to be evaluated for TASC or to be sentenced to TASC. If the failure of the trial court to order that defendant be evaluated for TASC was an error, any such error was waived by defendant’s failure to raise this error in his motion to reduce sentence. Reed, 177 Ill. 2d at 394. The majority rely on People v. Hamilton, 155 Ill. App. 3d 555, 558 (1987), for their holding that this issue may be reviewed under the plain error doctrine. Hamilton was decided six years before the language of section 5 — 8—1(c) was amended to make a postsentencing motion mandatory and 10 years before the holding in Reed. Our supreme court has explained that “plain error” exists only when the essential fairness of a trial has been undermined. This “occurs only in situations which ‘reveal breakdowns in the adversary system,’ as distinguished from ‘typical trial mistakes.’ [Citation.]” People v. Keene, 169 Ill. 2d 1, 17 (1995). The plain error doctrine does not apply to the facts of this case. More importantly, I believe that defendant’s motion to reduce sentence clearly shows that he does not want to be sentenced to TASC. This is not the first time in this case that the trial court was informed that defendant did not want to be evaluated or sentenced to TASC. The majority quote defendant’s trial counsel at the sentencing hearing. Defendant’s attorney first commented on defendant’s prior failure to comply with a prior sentence of probation with a requirement that defendant comply with TASC. Counsel then said defendant asked him (defense counsel) “about TASC, and he wanted to ask the court about TASC. We are asking, Judge, that you sentence him to the minimum of penitentiary time on the case.” This is an unequivocal request that defendant be sentenced to a minimum prison sentence and is not a request that defendant be evaluated for TASC. This is very different than the request by defense counsel in People v. Brown, 267 Ill. App. 3d 482, 484 (1994): “ ‘we would be asking that [defendant] be examined under [the Act] for drug treatment.’” Any doubt regarding whether it was defendant’s personal desire to not be evaluated for TASC was dispelled when defendant filed a pro se motion to reduce sentence when he again asked that he be sentenced to a shorter prison sentence and did not ask to be evaluated or sentenced to TASC. The only person connected to this case who wants defendant to be evaluated for TASC is defendant’s appellate counsel. This is not a minor point. Our supreme court in Reed made it very clear that sentencing issues must be brought to the attention of the trial court before they can be raised on appeal. The instant case is an excellent example of the wisdom of that decision. We are vacating a defendant’s sentence and remanding the case to the trial court with an order that defendant be evaluated for participation in a program that defendant’s trial counsel does not believe defendant belongs in, that the trial court does not believe that defendant belongs in, and in which defendant himself has clearly said that he does not wish to participate. This decision does not merely place an unwarranted and unnecessary burden on an overworked trial court, it also requires that the scarce resources of TASC be expended upon a person who does not want them.