Court Opinion

ID: 9720556
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:35:22.70134+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:03:48.577160
License: Public Domain

MOSER, J.
(dissenting). Warrantless searches of automobiles can be reasonably made if probable cause ex*416ists that the automobile is an instrumentality of a crime or contains contraband, and if exigent circumstances exist. In this case I have no problem with the probable cause feature of the warrantless search.1 I take particular note that, due to their mobility and the reduced expectation of privacy inherent in their regulation and use, when automobiles are stopped on the street, a reduced2 or slight quantum of exigency is required.3
Nowhere in any of the decisions cited by the majority is there a case determining that exigent circumstances are so reduced or slight as to allow the warrantless dismantling of an automobile, or its parts, on the street. The majority opinion completely destroys the exigent circumstances requirement and leaves police authorities only the remaining probable cause requirement to meet the test of reasonableness of a warrantless search.
Donovan was arrested in his automobile on July 15, 1978, at about 9:30 p.m. at parking meter number 2462. I take judicial notice of the following facts:4 parking meter number 2462 is in the city and county of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and is no more than three normal city blocks from the Milwaukee county courthouse; that same parking meter is no more than six normal city blocks from District No. 1 City of Milwaukee Police Station and that station has indoor garage facilities.
The majority here finds exigent circumstances, not from the facts presented to the trial court, but from musings and opinings that due to the mobility of the automobile it might disappear and the evidence of the key be lost forever because of some sharp-eyed passerby or *417an accomplice, or that Donovan himself, who was under arrest, would post bail and get to the automobile before a search warrant was obtained. They further opined that a cordon of police would be needed to protect the key evidence within the automobile while a search warrant was obtained.
They further inveigh against a search warrant because it is a sticky and cautious method of proceeding. It should be because warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable.5
All that the officers had to do was to impound the vehicle, tow it to the police garage six blocks away, get a judge to issue a search warrant for the vehicle, and the “key” in question would have been available for evidence at the time of the charge for possession of burglarious tools.
For these reasons I would affirm the trial court’s ruling suppressing the “key” evidence.

 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 156 (1925); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948).

 United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12 (1977).

 Thompson v. State, 83 Wis.2d 134, 142, 265 N.W.2d 467, 471 (1978).

 Sec. 902.01(2) and (3), Stats.

 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971).