Court Opinion

ID: 9365973
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-25 17:03:54.892154+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:48.540276
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                     No. 22-0040
                               Filed January 25, 2023

JESSE EDWARD BROWN,
     Applicant-Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF IOWA,
     Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________

      Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Jeffrey D. Bert, Judge.

      Applicant appeals the summary dismissal of his fifth application for

postconviction relief. AFFIRMED.

      Agnes G. Warutere of Warutere Law Firm, P.L.L.C., Ankeny, for appellant.

      Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Sheryl Soich, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee State.

      Considered by Greer, P.J., Ahlers, J., and Blane, S.J.*

      *Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206

(2023).
                                            2

BLANE, Senior Judge.

          Jesse Edward Brown appeals the district court’s grant of the State’s motion

for summary dismissal of his fifth postconviction-relief (PCR) application. In this

appeal, he raises two issues. First, he claims that trial counsel was ineffective for

failing to challenge for cause two potential jurors and that this claim is not time-

barred as the Iowa Supreme Court decision in State v. Jonas1 establishes a

change in the law since his conviction. Second, Brown claims he should be

allowed to pursue his claim of newly discovered evidence. Upon our review we

affirm.

     I. Background facts and procedure.

          In a prior opinion by our court, we briefly set out the facts giving rise to

Brown’s convictions:

          In January 2007, Jesse Brown was charged with first-degree
          kidnapping and sexual abuse after he forced his estranged wife
          [M.B.] and [her children and mother] into [M.B.’s] vehicle and ordered
          her, at knife point, to drive around. They eventually ended up at a
          motel, where Jesse had sexual intercourse with [M.B.]

Brown v. State, No. 14-1646, 2016 WL 351459, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 27, 2016).

Police arrested Brown as he left the motel.

          On August 16, 2007, a jury found Brown guilty of kidnapping in the first

degree and sexual abuse in the second degree. He appealed, our court affirmed

the convictions,2 and the Iowa Supreme Court denied further review. Procedendo

issued February 27, 2009. Before this PCR application, Brown filed four previous

applications.     Each was resolved adverse to Brown or voluntarily dismissed.

1   904 N.W.2d 566 (Iowa 2017).
2   State v. Brown, No 07-1479, 2008 WL 5235495 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 17, 2008).
                                           3

Specific issues and their resolutions in those prior proceedings will be discussed

where appropriate.

           Brown filed the current PCR action on October 18, 2019.3 The amended

application raised seven issues. On November 8, 2021, the State filed its motion

for summary dismissal. Brown resisted. The court held a hearing on the motion

on December 3, 2021, and issued its ruling on the State’s motion for summary

dismissal on January 3, 2022, which specifically addressed each of Brown’s

claims, granted the State’s motion, and dismissed the PCR application. Brown

now appeals the trial court’s ruling as to two of the issues.

    II.       Standard of review.

           “We ordinarily review summary dispositions of PCR applications for

corrections of errors at law. However, our review is de novo when the basis for

[PCR] implicates a constitutional violation.” Linn v. State, 929 N.W.2d 717, 729

(Iowa 2019) (citations omitted).

    III.      Discussion.

              A. Challenge for cause of two potential jurors.

           Iowa Code section 822.3 (2019) requires PCR applications “be filed within

three years from the date the conviction or decision is final or, in the event of an

appeal, from the date the writ of procedendo is issued.” There is an exception to

that three-year statute of limitations for “a ground of fact or law that could not have

been raised within the applicable time period.” Iowa Code § 822.3; see Thongvanh

3 Brown was self-represented when he filed the initial PCR application. His counsel
then filed an amended application on June 5, 2020.
                                          4

v. State, 938 N.W.2d 2, 8–9 (Iowa 2020). In his re-casted PCR application Brown

asserted this claim fit within the exception.

       Brown received ineffective assistance of trial counsel when trial
       counsel failed to move to strike for cause two jurors that he ultimately
       used peremptory strikes on. The Iowa [S]upreme [C]ourt’s reasoning
       in State v. Jonas, . . . requires a new evaluation of this issue and is
       a ground of law that Brown could not have raised during the
       pendency of [his criminal proceeding] and the appeal therein or in his
       prior PCR proceedings . . . .

The State’s motion for summary dismissal contended: “This issue was specifically

decided on direct appeal of the criminal case . . . . That ruling is law of the case.

The claim is barred from being re-litigated by the rule of res judicata. In addition,

this claim would be barred by the statute of limitations.”

       The PCR court found that Brown’s claim was barred for three reasons. First,

siding with the State’s argument, the court held the issue was addressed on direct

appeal and was barred by res judicata, stating: “The opinion in Brown indicates

defense counsel passed the jury for cause and used peremptory challenges to

strike two jurors who ‘answered questions in ways that could be interpreted to

mean they could not judge the defendant impartially.’” A review of the Brown

appeal opinion shows our court identified one of the issues in that appeal: “[Brown]

further contends defense counsel was ineffective in not striking two potential jurors

for cause.” Brown, 2008 WL 5235495, at *1. We concluded: “The appellant has

not claimed or shown that any of the jurors actually seated were biased. He has

not demonstrated prejudice. This claim of ineffective assistance fails.” Id. at *2.

Brown’s attempt to raise it again is barred by res judicata.

       Next, the PCR court found that our court had already determined that Jonas

did not create a new ground of law so as to trigger the exception in section 822.3.
                                           5

Citing our unpublished opinion in Jandreau v. State, the court stated: “While it is

true that [Brown] did not previously raise this claim in a [PCR] application, this is

irrelevant as Jonas did not create a new law that would allow [him] to bypass the

three-year statute of limitations on PCRs.” See No. 19-1323, 2020 WL 7868235,

at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 16, 2020) (holding Jonas did not create new law so as to

make the exception to section 822.3 applicable).4

       Finally, the PCR court noted that to establish ineffective assistance of

counsel, Brown “must establish both deficient performance and prejudice.” See

State v. Clay, 824 N.W.2d 488, 494–95 (Iowa 2012). Since on direct appeal, the

court of appeals had already found that Brown’s counsel used peremptory strikes

to eliminate the two objectionable jurors, Brown could not establish the prejudice

prong and his claim was likewise subject to dismissal.

       To circumvent the district court’s ruling, Brown argues in this appeal that we

need to re-examine and reverse our Jandreau opinion in light of constitutional

parameters of due process. He cites two Tennessee cases which held that even

where an applicable PCR statute of limitations is not tolled by a statutory exception

contained within it, due process nonetheless may require the tolling of the limitation

period. See Williams v. State, 44 S.W.3d 464, 470–71 (Tenn. 2001) (holding that

where an attorney may have misrepresented willingness to represent a defendant

on a second appeal, due process considerations could toll the statute of limitations

4 After the filing of the district court ruling, our court has also held, “[An applicant]
could only take advantage of Jonas if it applies retroactively. And ‘new rules of
procedure generally do not apply retroactively.’ So [the applicant] cannot benefit
from Jonas, a case about the procedures governing jury selection and related
appeals.” Velazquez-Ramirez v. State, 973 N.W.2d 598, 600 (Iowa Ct. App. 2022)
(citation omitted).
                                          6

for filing an application for postconviction relief); Seals v. State, 23 S.W.3d 272,

279 (Tenn. 2000).5

       We have scoured the record made before the PCR court and cannot find

where Brown raised a constitutional challenge to section 822.3’s statute of

limitation or exception based on a constitutional denial of access to the court. Our

supreme court recently considered this situation in Sandoval v. State:

       Sandoval . . . contends constitutional principles of equal protection
       and due process require that he be allowed to pursue his untimely
       fourth application for [PCR] notwithstanding the statute of limitations.
       Sandoval failed to raise these issues in the district court, and the
       district court did not rule on these constitutional challenges. These
       challenges are thus not preserved for appellate review, and we will
       not consider them for the first time on appeal.

975 N.W.2d 434, 438 (Iowa 2022) (citations omitted). This holding prevents us

from considering Brown’s attempted constitutional end run of the statute of

limitations in section 822.3. And we see no basis to reconsider our opinion in

Jandreau.

       Upon our de novo review of the record, we find all three bases in the district

court ruling for summary dismissal of Brown's claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel related to juror challenges were supported by the record and law.

Consequently, we find no error in the district court’s conclusions and dismissal of

this claim.

5 Brown also cites to one of our court’s cases where we assumed without deciding
that the time for filing an application for PCR provided by Iowa Code section 822.3
could be tolled by a constitutional denial of the right to access the courts. See
Myers v. State, No. 01-1214, 2005 WL 1981518, at *2–3 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 17,
2005). That case was based upon Myers’ claim that his PCR application was not
timely filed due to delays caused by the prison, which affected his constitutional
right to access to the courts. Factually it is not applicable here.
                                           7

           B. Claim of newly discovered evidence.

       Brown’s application asserts he has newly discovered evidence that could

not have been reasonably discovered before his trial. In January 2007, Officer

Chris Wolfe briefly talked to M.B. during the criminal investigation and urged her

to go to the hospital for a sexual assault exam. Officer Wolfe did not testify at trial.

Nine years later—in 2016—an Illinois human services department report contained

a statement that Wolfe purchased a trailer for $6000 for M.B. and her children to

reside in. As the district court characterized: “Brown alleges that this fact could

suggest that there was a relationship between Wolfe and [M.B.] which provides

motive for [her] to fabricate or exaggerate her allegations against Brown.” Brown

concludes that he could use this evidence to impeach M.B.

       To support such motion the proponent of the “newly discovered”
       evidence must show:
                    (1) that the evidence was discovered after the
             verdict;
                    (2) that it could not have been discovered earlier
             in the exercise of due diligence;
                    (3) that the evidence is material to the issue in
             the case and not merely cumulative or impeaching; and
                    (4) that the evidence probably would have
             changed the result of the trial.

Whitsel v. State, 525 N.W.2d 860, 863 (Iowa 1994) (quoting Jones v. State, 479

N.W.2d 265, 274 (Iowa 1991)).

       We agree with the district court that Brown’s newly discovered evidence

does not establish that Wolfe and M.B. had any sort of a relationship back in 2007.

Further, the newly discovered evidence, according to Brown, is to be used solely

for impeachment. However, to qualify as a new fact under section 822.3 and an

exception to the three-year statute of limitation, newly discovered evidence must
                                        8

not be “merely . . . impeaching.” Jones, 479 N.W.2d at 274. Brown’s newly

discovered evidence does not qualify for the extended limitation period. The

district court did not err in granting the State’s motion for summary dismissal on

this claim.

       AFFIRMED.