Court Opinion

ID: 9845325
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:19:00.106496+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:01.219280
License: Public Domain

JOHNSON, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
I concur with all of the majority opinion except part VI (VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENT IN PRESENTENCING REPORT), and part VII (PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION FROM PRIOR OREGON PROSECUTION). From those parts, I respectfully dissent.
I.
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT HAS NOT REQUIRED THE APPLICATION OF THE HARMLESS ERROR RULE IN DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING, BUT HAS ONLY ALr LOWED IT TO BE USED BY THE STATES. THE HARMLESS ERROR RULE SHOULD NOT APPLY TO THE TRIAL COURT’S ERROR IN CONSIDERING THE VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENTS.
As to part VI, I cannot agree that the harmless error rule should be applied to the trial court’s error in considering the victim impact statements.
The United States Supreme Court has not required states to use the harmless error rule in death penalty sentencing cases. In Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 108 S.Ct. 1792, 1798, 100 L.Ed.2d 284, 294 (1988), the Court specifically pointed out that the application of the harmless error rule in state death penalty sentencing case is permissive:
We have permitted harmless error analysis in both capital and noncapital cases where the evil caused by a Sixth Amendment violation is limited to the erroneous admission of particular evidence at trial.
(Emphasis added.)
On March 28, 1990, the United States Supreme Court made it clear that whether a state uses the harmless error doctrine in death penalty sentencing cases where violations of federal constitutional rights are involved is a decision to be made by the appellate courts of the state. In Clemons v. Mississippi, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 1441, 108 L.Ed.2d 725 (1990) (citing Satterwhite), the Court vacated a death penalty sentence and said that “it was open to the Mississippi Supreme Court to find that the error which occurred during the sentencing proceeding was harmless.” Later in the opinion, the Court made the meaning of this statement clear:

Nothing in this opinion is intended to convey the impression that state appellate courts are required to or necessarily should engage in ... harmless error analysis when errors have occurred in a capital sentencing proceeding. Our holding is only that such procedures are constitutionally permissible.

110 S.Ct. at 1451 (emphasis added).
In State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 149, 774 P.2d 299, 319 (1989), in vacating a death sentence, in part because it was a violation of the hearsay rule for the trial court to admit a letter written by the victim’s father, I said:
*564In a matter as awesome as the decision whether to impose the death penalty, a strict compliance with the procedures for sentencing is required. Even a well intentioned and conscientious effort by the trial court to avoid considering the hearsay contained in the letter does not suffice. (Emphasis added.)
However, only Justice Huntley concurred in this portion of the opinion. Justices Bakes and Bistline concurred in the result only as to this portion. Therefore, the strict compliance requirement is not controlling precedent. In my view, this rule of strict compliance in death penalty sentencing about which I wrote in Charboneau is directly applicable to the victim impact statements in. this case. I am unable to understand how we can harmonize this rule of strict compliance with the harmless error rule employed by the majority here.
There can be no doubt that the trial court considered the verboten victim impact statements. The findings of the trial court in considering the death penalty contain the statement: “The Court had considered the pre-sentence investigation,____” I am not prepared to assume that the trial court did not do what it said it did — consider the pre-sentence investigation, which contained the victim impact statements.
Also, the trial court’s statement of facts found in aggravation stated: “At the aggravation/mitigation hearing, even though the Defendant had notice of those matters contained in the pre-sentence investigation report, he did not request the presence of those people to testify.” I am not prepared to assume that the trial court did not intend to refer to the victim’s father and Mr. Gould, the two whose statements the majority agrees were prohibited victim impact statements. The only implication I can draw from this finding of the trial court is that if the content of the victim impact statements was to be rebutted, it was the burden of Paz to call for cross-examination of those who made them. Certainly, this is an indication that the trial court considered the victim impact statements along with the other matter contained in the pre-sentence investigation report. Otherwise, why would the trial court offer Paz an opportunity to rebut their statements?
The very process of rebuttal was one of the concerns the Court had in Booth v. Maryland:
We also note that it would be difficult — if not impossible — to provide a fair opportunity to rebut such evidence without shifting the focus of the sentencing hearing away from the defendant. A threshold problem is that victim impact information is not easily susceptible to rebuttal. Presumably the defendant would have the right to cross-examine the declarants, but he rarely would be able to show that the family members have exaggerated the degree of sleeplessness, depression, or emotional trauma suffered. Moreover, if the state is permitted to introduce evidence of the victim’s personal qualities, it cannot be doubted that the defendant also must be given the chance to rebut this evidence. Putting aside the strategic risks of attacking the victim’s character before the jury, in appropriate cases the defendant presumably would be permitted to put on evidence that the victim was of dubious moral character, was unpopular, or was ostracized from his family. The prospect of a “mini-trial” on the victim’s character is more than simply unappealing; it could well distract the sentencing jury from its constitutionally required task— determining whether the death penalty is appropriate in light of the background and record of the accused and the particular circumstances of the crime.
482 U.S. 496, 506-07, 107 S.Ct. 2529, 2535, 96 L.Ed.2d 440, 450-51 (1987) (citations and footnote omitted).
I also note that in the pre-sentence investigation report that is part of the record in this case the words “death penalty,” contained in Mr. Gould’s statement recommending that the trial court should give Paz the death penalty, are underlined in red ink, apparently by the trial court.
I would require the trial court in sentencing a defendant in a death penalty case to comply strictly with the requirement of Booth v. Maryland that victim impact *565statements not be considered. Although there is no specific reference to the consideration the trial court gave to these statements, the risk identified in Booth v. Maryland remains — “an impermissible risk that the capital sentencing decision will be made in an arbitrary manner.” 482 U.S. at 505, 107 S.Ct. at 2534, 96 L.Ed.2d at 450.
II.
THE OREGON PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION INCLUDED EVIDENCE THAT WAS SUPPRESSED BY THE OREGON COURT OF APPEALS.
As to part VII of the majority opinion, I am unable to agree that none of the evidence that was suppressed by the Oregon Court of Appeals in State v. Paz, 572 P.2d 1036 (Or.Ct.App.1977), was included in the Oregon presentence report.
In its decision affirming the trial court’s suppression of Paz’s 1977 statements, the Oregon Court of Appeals pointed out that “the trial court found that the police should have ceased questioning defendant after his request for an attorney at the polygraph test.” 572 P.2d at 1045. It was the questioning that occurred after this request that was suppressed. The Oregon presentence report that was included in the presentence report in this case included the following information that Paz told the police after his request for an attorney at the polygraph test:
In interviews with police, the defendant initially gave various versions of his activities prior to the instant offense. However, following a polygraph examination, defendant stated he would tell authorities what had occurred. He indicated that on approximately 2.4.77 the above-noted altercation had occurred with victim Villalobos present. Defendant professed that the following day he purchased a knife at a surplus store because he felt threatened as a result of the disagreement with Martinez and victim Villalobos. Defendant went on to relate that, on the morning of 2.12.77, defendant and a friend went to the basement of the Bean Complex where the defendant assisted his friend in making a long distance collect telephone call. While the friend was talking on the phone, defendant was sitting on a ping pong table; and after a while, defendant went to his own room where he obtained his knife because he wanted to carve his name into one of the ping pong tables. At his friend’s request the defendant then took the phone and talked to the party in Medford for a short time before hanging up. Defendant’s friend then summoned defendant to the adjacent television viewing room where the friend was reportedly awakening a female student who then went to her room. After she left, defendant told police he was standing at the bask of the room when he first saw the victim raise up and look over the back of a couch on the left side of the room. Defendant stated that, when he saw the victim raise himself off the couch, he felt the victim had a bottle so he took out his knife and went up and stabbed the victim as the victim was trying to get up. The defendant demonstrated to police the manner in which he had stabbed the victim and stated that he felt he may have stabbed the victim about three times. Police asked if there had been any verbal exchange between defendant and victim just prior to the stabbing, and defendant advised, “No, I just walked up and stabbed him. ” Defendant then related that the victim had screamed and ran from the room. When asked why he had stabbed the victim, defendant stated, “I thought he was coming after me so I got him as he was trying to get up. ” Defendant acknowledged to police that, while he felt the victim might have been holding something, he saw nothing in the victim’s hands.
(The underlined portion of this part of the presentence investigation report is underlined in red ink on the report, apparently by the trial court.)
Much of this information received from Paz by the Oregon police that was suppressed by the Oregon courts was used verbatim by the trial court in its facts *566found in aggravation in this case. R. 443-44.
In stating the reasons why the death penalty was imposed, the trial court referred to “past conduct.” R. 458.
III.
CONCLUSION.
I would vacate the sentence and remand the case for resentencing before a different district judge.
DISSENT FROM DENIAL OF PETITION FOR REHEARING