Court Opinion

ID: 9751756
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 16:57:56.148034+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:26:58.669710
License: Public Domain

Collins, J.,
delivered the following dissenting opinion.
I agree with the majority opinion that there was no proof of any express authorization of the representative of the *13Transit Company to make an admission of liability which would bind it. However, I am of opinion that the appellant should have been allowed to state the other conversation with the Transit Company’s representative at the time she signed the statement and which she claimed led up to the statement. This was used by the Transit Company in cross-examination of the appellant for the purpose of contradicting her testimony and was treated by all the parties as if it had been offered in evidence. As pointed out in the majority opinion, the cases of Turner v. Jenkins, 1 Harris & G. 161, Bowie v. Stonestreet, 6 Md. 418, and Smith v. Wood, 31 Md. 293, all involved situations where a part of what was said by one party during a particular conversation was offered in evidence by the opposing party. Also, as pointed out, it was held in each of those cases that a party whose statement was involved was entitled to show all that was said on the subject in the conversation in question and not merely such part as the opponent chose to offer. It was said in Bowie v. Stonestreet, supra: “If her admissions or declarations are to be used for a purpose adverse to her claim, those made at the same time, which are in her favor, must be also received.” In Smith v. Wood, supra, the defendant offered, on cross-examination of a witness, certain statements made by the plaintiff. It was said in that case: “This certainly entitled the other party to offer in evidence all that was said by the plaintiff at the time, in reference to his claim of the property. The offer in testimony of a part of a statement or conversation, upon a well-established rule of evidence, always gives to the opposite party the right to have the whole.” Also, it is well established that an impeached witness has the right to explain away the effect of supposed inconsistencies, by explaining the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement which tend to clear up any apparent inconsistencies. Wigmore on Evidence, 3rd Ed., Vol. III, Secs. 952 and 1044.
Appellant’s contention that the statement by the representative of the Transit Company influenced her in making the written statement seems plausible and, therefore, the statement of this representative should have been submitted to the jury. It may well be that the representative of the Transit *14Company had no authority to tell the appellant what she claimed was told her before she made her written and signed statement. However, the Transit Company was in no way compelled to offer this statement. It was evidently offered to influence the jury and in all probability did influence the jury in reaching its verdict, whether or not there was any causal connection between the statement or misstatement. If the Transit Company chose to offer it, the appellant should in all fairness have been allowed to state all the conversation leading up to the statement. I am of opinion that the judgment should be reversed and a new trial awarded.