Court Opinion

ID: 9790121
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:46:22.856928+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:26.360823
License: Public Domain

TURSI, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I respectfully dissent as to the reversal of the punitive damage award entered against Mayer.
The record in this case indicates that the trial was on issues framed in plaintiffs’ second amended complaint. This complaint alleged that the acts of the defendants, because of Mayer’s tortious interference with contract, had made specific performance impossible, and therefore, plaintiffs sought special and punitive damages. The trial court concluded that to allow Mayer to keep the profit he had garnered through his ownership and sale of the property would unjustly enrich him, and that plaintiffs were entitled to restitution for such amount. It entered judgment against Mayer in the sum of $119,291.80 to compensate for the lost profits suffered by plaintiffs as a consequence of his acts. The trial court then concluded that Mayer’s conduct amounted to a tortious interference with contract.
To determine if a claim lies in equity or in law, one must analyze the pleading. In Littlejohn v. Grand International Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 92 Colo. 275, 20 P.2d 311 (1933), there was an allegation of fraud and a prayer for injunctive relief plus special and punitive damages. The court held that insofar as classification was necessary the action was probably one at law. In Wagner v. Dan Unfug Motors, Inc. 35 Colo.App. 102, 529 P.2d 656 (1974), this court held that an award of special damages based on a fraudulent misrepresentation would sustain an award of punitive damages even though the award for general damages had been vacated.
Although, here, the trial court used traditional equity doctrine in computing damages for the injury suffered by plaintiffs because of Mayer’s tortious interference, the award was for loss which specially flowed from the tort. Therefore, damages having in fact been granted, there is no merit to Mayer’s contention that the punitive damages award lacks basis in actual damages.
Moreover, I do not agree with the majority that the injury and remedy sought by plaintiffs falls within the general rule that punitive damages are not recoverable in equity. Miller v. Kaiser, 164 Colo. 206, 433 P.2d 772 (1967). See generally D. Dobbs, Remedies, § 3.9, and C. McCormick, Damages § 81. The modern trend is to allow punitive damages in addition to equitable relief if the injury is caused by a tort, e.g. fraud, Rivero v. Thomas, 86 Cal.App.2d 225, 194 P.2d 533 (1940); conversion by trustee, Adam v. Harris, 564 S.W.2d 152 (Tex.Civ.App.1978); or fraud as basis of rescission of contract, Fousel v. Ted Walker Mobile Homes, Inc., 124 Ariz. 126, 602 P.2d 507 (1979).
Additionally, where distinct forms of action in law and equity have been abolished, the trend is to permit courts applying rules of equity to award punitive damages, if warranted, and when operating under a single form of civil action, courts may grant both legal and equitable relief. See, e.g., Village of Peck v. Denison, 92 Idaho 747, 450 P.2d 310 (1969); Charles v. Epperson & Co., 258 Iowa 409, 137 N.W.2d 605 (1965); Miller v. Fox, 174 Mont. 504, 571 P.2d 804 (1977); I.H.P. Corp. v. 210 Central Park South Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 329, 239 N.Y.S.2d 547, 189 N.E.2d 812 (1963). In Colorado see C.R.C.P. 1, C.R.C.P. 2, and McKenzie v. Crook, 110 Colo. 29, 129 P.2d 906 (1942); Dunlap v. Sanderson, 456 F.Supp. 971 (D.Colo.1978).
I would therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.