Court Opinion

ID: 2964881
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:32:33.483603+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:43:03.006943
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                                [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
                           United States Court of Appeals
                                For the First Circuit
                                ____________________
          No. 95-2246
                                   UNITED STATES,
                                      Appellee,
                                         v.
                                  GUILIANO ANTOINE,
                                Defendant, Appellant.
                                ____________________
                    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
                     [Hon. Patti B. Saris, U.S. District Judge]
                                ____________________
                                       Before
                                Lynch, Circuit Judge,
                  Hill and John R. Gibson,  Senior Circuit Judges.
                                _____________________
               Charles P. McGinty, Federal Defender Office, for appellant.
               James 
                     F. 
                        Lang, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom
          Donald K. Stern
                        , United States Attorney, was on brief for appellee.
                                ____________________
                                 September 15, 1997
                                ____________________
                              
           Of the Eleventh Circuit, sitting by designation.
           Of the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation.

                    HILL, 
                         Senior Circuit Judge
                                             . Guiliano Antoine was charged
          with conspiracy to engage in the business of dealing in firearms
          without a license, in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 371, and with the
          substantive offense of engaging in the business of dealing in
          firearms without a license, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
          S 922(a)(1)(A). At trial, the court admitted evidence of flight
          and instructed the jury regarding that evidence. Antoine was
          convicted. This appeal ensued.
                                         I.
                    The government's principal witness at trial was Roy
          Boone. Boone testified that he cooperated with Bureau of Alcohol,
          Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) agents as required by his plea
          agreement on firearms charges against him. The government believed
          Antoine had been illegally purchasing guns from Boone. Boone
          agreed to offer to sell more guns to Antoine and to allow the
          government to record his conversations with Antoine and set up the
          arrangements for the "buy." 
                    Boone contacted Antoine and offered to sell him nine
          millimeter handguns. Boone told Antoine to meet him at a motel
          near Boston to see the guns. A video camera hidden in the room
          recorded the events. Antoine and two companions arrived and
          examined the guns (provided by the ATF). Boone and Antoine
          negotiated a price for the guns. Antoine stated that he was low on
          cash, but gave Boone a $250 deposit for several of the guns and
          promised to pay the rest and collect the guns later that night. 
                                         -2-

                    As soon as Antoine and his companions left the motel
          room, ATF agents and Boston Police officers moved in to arrest
          them. An ATF agent testified without objection that Antoine ran
          across the parking lot "attempting to flee." The agent gave chase,
          and Antoine was apprehended.
                    Antoine was indicted and charged with conspiracy to deal
          in and dealing in firearms without a license. On the fifth day of
          his trial, just prior to the closing arguments, the court held a
          brief charge conference (having held a more lengthy conference the
          day before). The court indicated       sua  
                                                      sponte that it was
          considering giving a consciousness of guilt instruction based on
          the testimony that Antoine had fled from police immediately prior
          to his arrest. After much discussion with counsel, the court gave
          the following instruction:
                      In determining whether the government met
                      its burden of proving the defendant acted
                      wilfully--remember we discussed this
                      before--how do you decide someone's state
                      of mind? You may consider the direct
                      evidence before you, as well as the
                      circumstantial evidence as to his state of
                      mind.
                      The one thing that you can also consider
                      is you've heard testimony that Mr. Antoine
                      at one point fled right after the purchase
                      of--well, right after whatever happened in
                      that motel room.
                      The government claims that the flight or
                      the--
                        (Pause.)
                      Well, let me just say, if you do find that
                      the defendant did flee, if you find that
                      he fled, you're permitted to consider
                      whether such actions indicate feelings of
                                         -3-

                      guilt by Mr. Antoine and whether in terms
                      of feeling guilt might tend to show actual
                      guilt on these charges.
                      You are not required to draw such
                      inferences and you should not do so unless
                      they appear to be reasonable in light of
                      all the circumstances of the case. 
                      If you decide that such inferences are
                      reasonable, it will be up to you to decide
                      how much importance to give them. But you
                      should always remember that there may be
                      many reasons why an innocent person might
                      flee. Such conduct does not necessarily
                      reflect feelings of guilt. Please bear in
                      mind that a person who's innocent might
                      flee and a person having feelings of guilt
                      is not necessarily guilty in fact.
                      Because such feelings are sometimes found
                      in innocent people. 
                      If you find that the defendant did flee,
                      the government has proven beyond a
                      reasonable doubt, in order to divert
                      suspicion or for any other reason that you
                      find reflect feelings of guilt, you may,
                      but are not required to, infer that Mr.
                      Antoine believed that he was guilty. You
                      may not, however, infer on this basis
                      alone that the defendant is, in fact,
                      guilty of the crime for which he is
                      charged. Whether or not the evidence as
                      to the defendant's statements--excuse me,
                      to the defendant's fleeing shows that Mr.
                      Antoine believed that he was guilty and
                      the significance, if any, to be attached
                      to any such evidence of flight are matters
                      for you, the jury, to decide.
                      But first you have to decide beyond a
                      reasonable doubt whether or not the
                      government has proven that he fled and
                      then you have to decide what inference, if
                      any, to draw from that.
                    At the conclusion of the charge, defense counsel objected
          to the consciousness of guilt instruction, noting that while the
          court had cautioned the jury that an innocent person might flee, it
                                         -4-

          had not also stated that a person "might flee from something he
          perceived as a crime, which conduct doesn't bear on" the charged
          offense. After consultation, the court gave the following
          supplemental instruction:
                      [O]n the tail-end of the charge, I talked
                      to you briefly about what weight, if any,
                      you were going to give to flight. And I
                      just want to point out to you, that not
                      only do sometimes innocent people flee,
                      but sometimes people can be guilty of a
                      crime or think that they are guilty of a
                      crime and flee. But that crime may have
                      absolutely nothing to do with the crime
                      charged here.
                        
                      So that you have to decide whether or not
                      the government has proven flight and
                      whether or not there's any inference to be
                      drawn from that, given the crime charged
                      here. Not some other crime or some other
                      perception, but the crime charged here.
                    Following the supplemental instruction, the court
          inquired whether either party had any further concerns about the
          charge. Both counsel said that they had none.
                                         II.
                    Antoine raises only one issue on appeal--whether the
          district court abused its discretion by giving a consciousness of
          guilt jury instruction that was based on his attempt to flee from
          the arresting officers. We hold that it did not.
                    Evidence of flight may be admitted at trial as indicative
          of a guilty mind, so long as there is an adequate factual predicate
          creating an inference of guilt of the crime charged. 
                                                              United States
          v. Camilo 
                    Montoya, 917 F.2d 680, 683 (1st Cir. 1990) (quoting
          United 
                 States v.  Hernandez-Bermudez, 857 F.2d 50, 52 (1st Cir.
                                         -5-

          1988)). There was an adequate factual predicate for the charge
          given in this case.
                    The evidence at trial established that Antoine and Boone
          had an agreement whereby Boone would purchase handguns in Georgia,
          transport them to Boston, and sell them to Antoine. Pursuant to
          this agreement, Boone purchased guns in Georgia which he
          subsequently sold to Antoine in Boston. After being confronted by
          ATF agents and agreeing to cooperate with their investigation,
          Boone had one electronically monitored meeting and several
          telephone conversations with Antoine in which they discussed
          Antoine's purchase of additional handguns from Boone. Antoine went
          to Boone's motel room for the express purpose of viewing the
          handguns. In the room, Antoine and two companions viewed the guns,
          selected certain of them for purchase, and Antoine made a partial
          payment to Boone for the weapons. Antoine told Boone he would pay
          for and take custody of the remaining guns later that same night
          after he acquired more money. After exiting the room, Antoine and
          the other two men attempted to flee on foot from the agents. The
          flight evidence was admitted without objection. 
                    These facts establish a completely adequate factual
          predicate for the crimes charged against Antoine. Under these
          facts, the jury could reasonably infer that Antoine was guilty of
          illegal dealing in arms. The jury could also reasonably infer that
          Antoine ran from authorities because he believed his conspiratorial
          gun dealing activities with Boone had been discovered, i.e., that
          he was conscious of his guilt. Based on the presence of numerous
                                         -6-

          agents and police officers outside the motel room, a reasonable
          jury could have inferred that Antoine fled because he recognized
          that he had been "set up" by Boone and that the authorities were
          well aware of their prior course of illegal conduct.   See, e.g.,
          United 
                 States v. Romero-Carrion, 54 F.3d 15, 17 (1st Cir. 1995)
          (attempt to flee evidences a keen consciousness of guilt); United
          States v. 
                   Luciano-Mosquero, 63 F.3d 1142, 1156 (1st Cir. 1995) (as
          long as there is an adequate factual predicate supporting an
          inference of guilt on the crime charged, evidence of flight may be
          admitted to show consciousness of guilt).
                    Antoine argues that his flight merely reflected knowledge
          that he had just left a motel room full of guns, not that he
          intended to buy any. If so, the fact of flight would not support
          any inference of guilt as to the offenses charged.
                    The court, however, very carefully and fully instructed
          the jury that Antoine's flight may have been for innocent reasons.
          The court reminded the jury that they need not draw any conclusions
          from the flight evidence and to weigh the importance of such
          inferences should they find them reasonable. This instruction did
          not invite the jury to convict based upon an inference of guilt as
          to another crime, and was not an abuse of discretion.  See United
                              
           Antoine also argues that the court's instruction allowed the jury
          to infer from flight that he knew of the federal license
          requirement for dealing in firearms--a necessary component of the
          willfulness element of the gun-dealing charge. This argument is
          without merit. The other evidence was sufficient to permit the
          jury to infer that Antoine knew his course of conduct was illegal.
          The jury was instructed that they might infer from flight that
          Antoine was conscious of his guilt.
                                         -7-

          States v.  Hernandez, 995 F.2d 307, 314-15 (1st Cir. 1993)
          (significance of evidence of flight is for the jury) (citing
          Hernandez-Bermudez, 857 F.2d at 52); United 
                                                      States v. Noone, 913
          F.2d 20, 29-31 (1st Cir. 1991) (no error if flight instruction sets
          out appropriate legal framework for jury consideration of
          contention that accused fled for entirely innocent reasons); 
                                                                     United
          States v. Camilo 
                           Montoya, 917 F.2d 680, 683 (1st Cir. 1990) (no
          error if flight instruction has a solid evidentiary basis and the
          instruction a correct statement of the law).     See 
                                                               also  United
          States v. Martinez, 83 F.3d 371, 373 (11th Cir. 1996) (where the
          act for which defendant claims to have fled and the offense charged
          are sufficiently related, evidence of flight and a consciousness of
          guilt instruction are not abuse of discretion). 
                                        III.
                    Antoine did not object to the admission of evidence of
          his flight from the scene of the crime charged to him. The jury
          heard this evidence, and they were permitted to consider it. The
          court undertook to instruct them as to its proper use. The court
          cautioned the jury against overly broad inferences, and against any
          inference at all if they felt it unreasonable to do so. The
          instruction was not an abuse of discretion. The conviction is
          affirmed.
                                         -8-