Court Opinion

ID: 9852398
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:29:50.792097+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:27.480012
License: Public Domain

HUNSTEIN, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
“[W]e have repeatedly recognized that Scherer [v. Scherer, 249 Ga. 635 (292 SE2d 662) (1982)] imposes an affirmative duty of full and fair disclosure of all material facts on parties entering into an antenuptial agreement.” (Footnote omitted.) Blige v. Blige, 283 Ga. 65, 70 (656 SE2d 822) (2008). Because I disagree with the majority’s conclusion in Division 4 that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding adequate pre-execution disclosure of Husband’s financial status, I must respectfully dissent.
The antenuptial agreement in this case states that it is a “property agreement” and that it is the intent of the parties to clarify their respective rights to property owned at the time of, during, and after the marriage. The agreement includes a clause providing that the parties “have made a full disclosure unto each other of their assets and liabilities, and a full disclosure of their ownership of real and personal properties.” Even assuming that this clause is sufficient to evidence full and fair disclosure of the facts enumerated therein, the agreement provides no information regarding the parties’ income, and there is no inherent correlation between the value of one’s property or assets and one’s income. Thus, Wife’s waiver of alimony, among other marital rights, was made without the disclosure of a factor critical to reaching such a decision. See Corbett v. Corbett, 280 Ga. 369 (1) (628 SE2d 585) (2006) (where antenuptial agreement purporting to disclose husband’s separate property and assets failed to disclose his income and wife waived her right to alimony, nondisclosure was material).
The majority concedes that Wife never saw documentation of Husband’s financial condition before entering into the agreement, and its recitation of facts regarding Wife’s knowledge of Husband’s business dealings and spending habits is insufficient to show that Husband met his burden under Scherer of establishing that Wife entered into the antenuptial agreement with knowledge of all material facts. That one is aware of certain assets does not foreclose *316the possibility that other assets or income streams exist. See Alexander v. Alexander, 279 Ga. 116 (610 SE2d 48) (2005) (antenuptial agreement rendered unenforceable by failure to disclose existence of investment account). The majority cites Mallen v. Mallen, 280 Ga. 43 (622 SE2d 812) (2005) in support of its conclusion that there was full and fair disclosure of Husband’s financial condition. But in Mallen, the wife was aware that the husband received significant income from his business and other sources because they had lived together for four years prior to the marriage and because financial disclosure forms attached to the antenuptial agreement set out their respective assets and liabilities, from which the nature of the husband’s income could be ascertained. In contrast, the parties here had lived together for a significantly shorter period of time when their agreement was executed and no financial documentation of any kind was incorporated therein. Thus, Mallen is neither controlling nor persuasive authority under the facts of this case.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent to Division 4 of the majority opinion and the affirmance of the trial court’s ruling upholding the enforceability of the parties’ antenuptial agreement.
I am authorized to state that Chief Judge Williams joins in this dissent.