Court Opinion

ID: 9383105
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-29 16:18:22.881103+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:43.715578
License: Public Domain

J-S36017-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    IN THE INTEREST OF: D.M.S-F.               :    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :         PENNSYLVANIA
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    APPEAL OF: D.M.S-F.                        :            No. 369 WDA 2022

               Appeal from the Order Entered November 18, 2021
               In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
              Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-02-JV-0001364-2020

BEFORE:      STABILE, J., KING, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.:                                      FILED: MARCH 29, 2023

        Appellant, D.M.S-F., appeals from the dispositional order entered in the

Allegheny     County    Court    of   Common       Pleas,   Juvenile   Division,   which

adjudicated her delinquent for simple assault and recklessly endangering

another person (“REAP”).1 We affirm.

        The trial court set forth the facts of this case as follows:

           On the evening of June 17, 2020, the victim’s mother took
           her two girls to visit her own sister’s townhouse. [N.T.
           Hearing, 11/18/21,] at 23, 25, 75-77. The sister has a
           young daughter as well. Id. At that time, the victim was 7
           years old, and her younger sister was 4 years old.

           [Appellant], then age 15, was there at the townhouse to
           babysit for the night. Id. at 24, 76-77, 103. The victim and
           her sister asked if they could stay over as well, and the
____________________________________________

*   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1   18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2701(a)(1) and 2705, respectively.
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       parents agreed, leaving the three in the care of [Appellant].
       Id. at 24-25, 76-77. The victim’s mother had never known
       of any problems with [Appellant] in the past. Id. at 82. The
       victim herself had met [Appellant] previously without any
       difficulties with [Appellant]. Id. at 37. The parents left, and
       the victim’s mother had her phone off that night. Id. at 80.

       [Appellant] acknowledged that during the evening, they
       played and danced around before eating and going to bed.
       Id. at 26, 111. [Appellant] thought that the victim was “fast
       for her age. She acted way older than a seven-year-old.”
       Id. at 109. By this, [Appellant] meant that while listening
       to music, the girls “were all shaking their butts” and cursing.
       Id. at 109-10.

       The townhouse had a bunk bed, and later, the victim’s sister
       and cousin got into the top bunk and went to sleep. Id. at
       26. The victim got into the bottom bunk. Id. [Appellant]
       got into the bottom bunk bed with the victim, as [Appellant]
       later admitted to police. Id. at 26, 38-39, 94. The victim
       had trouble falling asleep because of music playing, but
       eventually, she went to sleep. Id. At that time, the sheets
       were on the bed. Id. at 31-32.

       She woke at some point because [Appellant] poured hot
       water onto what the victim called her “private area.” Id. at
       27. Testimony indicated that [Appellant] used a bowl to
       pour the water onto the victim as the victim slept. Id. at
       26-27. The victim woke up, finding this painful. Id. at 27.
       The victim’s testimony on her reaction was unclear as she
       testified that she screamed but did not cry. Id. at 27, 31.
       When she woke up in pain, she saw [Appellant] there with
       her. Id. In court, the victim identified [Appellant] as the
       person she saw and who caused the injury. Id. at 35-36.

       The victim saw that the sheets were no longer on the bed
       the way they had been at bedtime. Id. at 32. [Appellant]
       got back into the bed with the victim and told her not to tell
       anybody about the events. Id. at 28, 30. Later, [Appellant]
       told the police that the sheets were in such disarray because
       she “sleeps wild.” Id. at 94.

       That night, the victim tried to call her mother using her
       cousin’s phone, but her mother did not answer. Id. at 28-

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       29. Later that week, a Penn Hills police detective checked
       the cousin’s phone and saw that there were in fact two
       attempted calls to the victim’s mother. Id. at 91-92.

       When the victim’s aunt came home toward morning, the
       aunt was angry that the room was messy because it had
       been orderly when the aunt had gone out. Id. at 31. The
       aunt returned the victim and her sister to their home with
       their mother. Id. at 78.

       The victim had trouble walking because she said that it hurt.
       Id. at 34. Nonetheless, she did not tell anyone what
       happened; she explained: “I got scared if I thought it was
       going to get anyone in trouble.” Id. at 34, 39 (she also said
       she did not want to make her aunt any angrier because of
       the messy room). Further, the victim had no experience of
       this kind, never having had a burn, or blisters from a burn,
       before. Id. at 39.

       The victim’s mother noticed that the victim was subdued,
       lying around that day and walking oddly; the mother
       thought maybe the victim had a cramp. Id. at 80. The
       victim denied that anything was wrong. Id. at 82. Then,
       the next day, the victim’s sister informed the mother that
       the victim had a burn in her private area. Id.

       [The victim’s m]other looked down her daughter’s pants and
       saw the burns. Id. at 80. The victim told her mother what
       happened. Id. at 34-35. The victim’s mother took photos
       of the injuries and confronted [Appellant’s] mother, who
       denied any wrongdoing by [Appellant]. Id. at 83.

       The victim’s mother also took the child to the hospital. Id.
       at 34-35, 81.

       Kathleen Roth is a physician assistant (“PA”) who was on
       duty at Mercy Hospital’s emergency room on June 19, 2020,
       when the victim and her mother were sent from Children’s
       Hospital, where they first went, because Mercy Hospital has
       a burn center. Id. at 58-64. The PA examined the girl and
       observed blistering burns on the child’s inner thigh,
       suprapubic region and around her genitalia. Id. at 60-61.
       The PA concluded that the injury was strongly indicative of
       a non-accidental trauma. Id. at 62. The PA credibly

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        testified that “the appearance of the burns did appear
        consistent with a partial thickness burn secondary to most
        likely a hot liquid, hot water being a strong possibility.” Id.
        at 61. There were no chemical or oily substances present
        that led her to think otherwise. Id. at 61-62. She explained
        that burns progress, and blisters develop[.] Id. at 62. She
        estimated that the injury would have occurred within one to
        three days, but most likely within 48 hours judging by the
        amount of time that it takes for blisters to form and then
        begin leaking fluid. Id. at 62-63.

        The PA also observed the victim’s mother and determined
        that “mother seems appropriately concerned.” Id. at 64.
        She diagnosed the child as having genital burns secondary
        to a hot liquid with a concern for child abuse. Id. at 64.
        The protocol at the hospital was to send anyone with a
        “significant burn” to the Hydrotherapy Unit at the hospital’s
        burn unit. Id. at 64-65. The PA explained that a partial
        thickness burn is what was called a second-degree burn, and
        these burns could be caused by tap water if the water was
        hot enough, a phenomenon she had seen previously in her
        career. Id. at 64-65. She also took photos. Id. at 67.

        The PA documented the burns as “blister burns to the pubic
        majora, which is kind of the external genitalia region, as well
        as the inner thigh and the suprapubic region, which is just
        kind of encroaching above the labia there” and which were
        a “partial thickness burn with blistering inflammation” with
        a portion “traveling back towards the rectal opening….” Id.
        at 68.

        The PA did not find it unusual that there was a delay of a
        day between the burning and the hospital visit. Id. at 72.
        [Appellant’s] attorney confronted the PA with a document
        from a Child Advocacy Center containing a statement by a
        forensic interviewer indicating it was unclear how the injury
        pattern would have resulted from the history, but the PA
        held firm to her prior testimony that “the burn and history
        pattern matched.” Id. at 72-73. [Appellant] did not call
        the author of the written statement to testify.

(Trial Court Opinion, 5/25/22, 2-5) (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

     On November 18, 2021, the trial court held an adjudicatory hearing.

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After the hearing, the trial court found Appellant delinquent of simple assault

and REAP. The court placed Appellant on probation until further order of court.

      Following the entry of new counsel for Appellant, on December 10, 2021,

Appellant filed a motion to reinstate her post-dispositional motion rights nunc

pro tunc. On December 16, 2021, the court granted the motion. The court

expressly permitted Appellant to file the post-dispositional motion within 30

days after the court reporter filed the transcript from the adjudicatory hearing.

The transcript was filed on January 10, 2022. On February 9, 2022, Appellant

filed a timely post-dispositional motion for reconsideration. After a hearing on

March 1, 2022, the court denied relief. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal

on March 29, 2021. On April 4, 2022, the court ordered Appellant to file a

concise statement of errors complained of on appeal per Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).

Appellant complied and timely filed her concise statement on April 21, 2022.

      Appellant raises the following questions:

         1. Whether the evidence presented by the Commonwealth
         was insufficient to establish the elements of each
         adjudicated crime beyond a reasonable doubt and sustain
         the adjudication of delinquency on all…counts?

         2. Whether the evidence presented at trial by the
         Commonwealth was insufficient as a matter of law to sustain
         an adjudication of delinquency for [REAP].

         3. Whether the adjudication of delinquency of Simple
         Assault…and [REAP]…was against the weight of the
         evidence?

(Appellant’s Brief at 3) (questions reordered for ease of disposition;

unnecessary capitalization omitted).

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      Our standard of review is well settled: “The Juvenile Act grants broad

discretion to juvenile courts in determining appropriate dispositions.      In

addition, this Court will not disturb the juvenile court’s disposition absent a

manifest abuse of discretion.”     In Int. of J.G., 145 A.3d 1179, 1184

(Pa.Super. 2016) (citations omitted).

      In her first claim, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence

underlying her adjudication of delinquency as to each offense, arguing that

the Commonwealth failed to prove that Appellant was the person who

committed the crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellant claims that the

evidence was so weak and insubstantial that it raises significant reasonable

doubt as to whether Appellant was the perpetrator of the acts against the

victim. She notes that the victim was asleep during the incident and did not

see Appellant pour hot water on her.     Appellant argues that there was no

physical evidence from the scene corroborating the victim’s story, and no

other witness saw Appellant assault the victim.       Furthermore, Appellant

argues that the delay in reporting the injuries gives rise to reasonable doubt

as to when the injuries occurred and whether the injuries happened while the

victim was in the care of Appellant. Accordingly, Appellant asserts that the

evidence was insufficient to establish her identity as the perpetrator.    We

disagree.

      This Court has explained:

            When a juvenile is charged with an act that would
            constitute a crime if committed by an adult, the

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            Commonwealth must establish the elements of the
            crime by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. When
            considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the
            evidence following an adjudication of delinquency, we
            must review the entire record and view the evidence
            in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth. In
            determining whether the Commonwealth presented
            sufficient evidence to meet its burden of proof, the
            test to be applied is whether, viewing the evidence in
            the light most favorable to the Commonwealth and
            drawing all reasonable inferences therefrom, there is
            sufficient evidence to find every element of the crime
            charged. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden
            of proving every element of the crime beyond a
            reasonable doubt by wholly circumstantial evidence.

            The facts and circumstances established by the
            Commonwealth need not be absolutely incompatible
            with a defendant’s innocence. Questions of doubt are
            for the hearing judge, unless the evidence is so weak
            that, as a matter of law, no probability of fact can be
            drawn from the combined circumstances established
            by the Commonwealth.

         In re V.C., 66 A.3d 341, 348–349 (Pa.Super. 2013)[,
         appeal denied, 622 Pa. 762, 80 A.3d 778 (2013)] (quoting
         In re A.V., 48 A.3d 1251, 1252-1253 (Pa.Super. 2012)).
         The finder of fact is free to believe some, all, or none of the
         evidence presented. Commonwealth v. Gainer, 7 A.3d
         291, 292 (Pa.Super. 2010)[, appeal denied, 611 Pa. 631, 23
         A.3d 1055 (2011)].

Int. of J.G., supra at 1888.

      The crime of REAP is defined as follows:

         A person commits a misdemeanor of the second degree if
         [s]he recklessly engages in conduct which places or may
         place another person in danger of death or serious bodily
         injury.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2705. The Crimes Code further sets forth that a person is

guilty of simple assault if she “attempts to cause or intentionally, knowingly

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or recklessly causes bodily injury to another[.]” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2701(a)(1).

      Instantly, the trial court explained that it found the PA’s testimony to be

credible and reliable. The PA gave a timeline for the injury based on blistering

for the burn, and this testimony supported the timeline of the injury occurring

while the victim was under Appellant’s care.      The court noted that the PA

testified that delay in reporting the injury is common. Additionally, as the

court noted, “the [v]ictim identified [Appellant] as the perpetrator and

testified very credibly that she woke to the hot water in her genital area and

that [Appellant] had committed this act.” (Trial Court Opinion at 11). Hence,

the court found the evidence sufficient to establish that Appellant was the

perpetrator.

      As we noted above, the court was free to believe all, part, or none of

the evidence, and we must defer to the court’s credibility determinations.

Thus, when this evidence is viewed in a light most favorable to the

Commonwealth, it was sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that

Appellant poured the hot water on the victim and caused burns to her

genitalia. Consequently, Appellant’s first issue merits no relief.

      In her next argument, Appellant contends that the evidence was

insufficient as a matter of law to sustain her adjudication of delinquency for

REAP because there was no evidence of serious bodily injury.           Appellant

argues that the injuries themselves did not constitute serious bodily injury as

they were not life threatening and there was no evidence adduced that the

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victim was receiving ongoing medical treatment or had permanent scaring or

loss of function. Appellant further insists that the Commonwealth failed to

prove that she would know the risk of harm that could be inflicted by pouring

hot water onto someone.        Therefore, Appellant claims the evidence was

insufficient as a matter of law to sustain the adjudication of delinquency for

REAP. We disagree.

      Serious bodily injury supporting a conviction for REAP is defined as

“[b]odily injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes

serious, permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the

function of any bodily member or organ.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2301.

      The term “recklessly,” as used in 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2705, is defined as

follows:

           A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element
           of an offense when [s]he consciously disregards a
           substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element
           exists or will result from h[er] conduct. The risk must be of
           such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and
           intent of the actor’s conduct and the circumstances known
           to h[er], its disregard involves a gross deviation from the
           standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe
           in the actor’s situation.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 302(b)(3).

      Here, in finding sufficient evidence to prove that the victim suffered

serious bodily injury and that Appellant intentionally or recklessly caused the

injury, the court stated:

           Pouring water hot enough to inflict blistering, second-degree
           burns on the sensitive genital area of a child easily

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         constitutes conduct that places a child in danger of serious
         or protracted impairment of the function of genital area. In
         fact, the victim had trouble walking normally beyond the
         immediate aftermath of the burning.

         Moreover, the victim did not have a simple or small burn.
         The medical testimony resulted in a diagnosis of second-
         degree burns that triggered hospital protocol to send her to
         a treatment area where “significant burn[s]” were
         addressed. [N.T. Hearing] at 64-65. As discussed above,
         the PA documented “blister burns to the pubic majora, which
         is kind of the external genitalia region, as well as the inner
         thigh and the suprapubic region, which is just kind of
         encroaching above the labia there” and emphasized that
         they were a “partial thickness burn with blistering
         inflammation” with a portion “traveling back towards the
         rectal opening….” Id. at 68.

         Based on the testimony, the act was reckless, created
         significant injury and placed the child at risk of protracted
         harm….

(Trial Court Opinion at 11-12) (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

      Upon review, we conclude that in considering the totality of the

circumstances, the court, as fact-finder, could infer that Appellant recklessly

created a substantial risk of serious bodily injury to the victim. A reasonable

person would recognize the substantial risk of serious bodily injury created by

pouring burning hot water on a child’s genitalia. Here, Appellant disregarded

this risk and poured hot water on the victim causing second-degree burns

throughout the victim’s genitalia. The victim’s burns were severe enough to

require treatment at the hospital’s burn unit. We agree with the trial court

that this act was reckless, caused significant injury, and placed the child at

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risk of serious bodily injury and protracted harm. Appellant’s second issue

merits no relief.

      In her third issue, Appellant challenges the weight of the evidence,

arguing that the adjudications of simple assault and REAP were against the

weight of evidence presented at trial.    Specifically, she contends that the

victim was asleep during key moments of the incident, and that there was no

physical evidence corroborating the victim’s testimony. Appellant claims the

victim’s testimony lacked specificity and was not credible; therefore, the trial

court abused its discretion in relying on that testimony to make its

adjudication. Finally, Appellant argues that the court’s reliance on the medical

testimony of the PA was misplaced because the medical conclusions were

influenced by the history provided by the victim. Accordingly, Appellant insists

she is entitled to a new trial. We disagree.

      Regarding weight of the evidence claims:

         This Court applies the same standard for reviewing weight
         of the evidence claims in juvenile cases as those involving
         adults. In re R.N., 951 A.2d 363, 370 (Pa.Super. 2008).
         An allegation that the verdict is against the weight of the
         evidence is addressed to the discretion of the trial court.
         Commonwealth v. Ramtahal, 613 Pa. 316, 33 A.3d 602
         (2011). “An appellate court, therefore, reviews the exercise
         of discretion, not the underlying question whether the
         verdict is against the weight of the evidence.” Id. at 327-
         28, 33 A.3d at 609. Moreover, a court’s denial of a motion
         for a new trial based upon a weight of the evidence claim is
         the least assailable of its rulings. Commonwealth v.
         Rivera, 603 Pa. 340, 363, 983 A.2d 1211, 1225 (2009).

In Int. of J.G., supra at 1187 (citation formatting provided).

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        “A weight of the evidence claim concedes that the evidence
        is sufficient to sustain the verdict, but seeks a new trial on
        the grounds that the evidence was so one-sided or so
        weighted in favor of acquittal that a guilty verdict shocks
        one’s sense of justice.” In re J.B., 630 Pa. 124, 106 A.3d
        76, 95 (2014) (citation omitted). Thus, we may reverse the
        juvenile court’s adjudication of delinquency only if it is so
        contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice.
        In re J.M., 89 A.3d 688, 692 (Pa.Super. 2014), appeal
        denied, 628 Pa. 623, 102 A.3d 986 (2014) (citation
        omitted). Moreover, where the juvenile court has ruled on
        the weight claim below, an appellate court’s role is not to
        consider the underlying question of whether the verdict is
        against the weight of the evidence. Id. Rather, this Court
        is limited to a consideration of whether the juvenile court
        palpably abused its discretion in ruling on the weight claim.
        Id. Hence, a juvenile court’s denial of a weight claim is the
        least assailable of its rulings, as conflicts in the evidence and
        contradictions in the testimony of any witnesses are for the
        fact finder to resolve. Id.

Int. of N.A.P., 216 A.3d 330, 336 (Pa.Super. 2019) (quoting In re A.G.C.,

142 A.3d 102, 109 (Pa.Super. 2016)).

     Instantly, the court explained:

        …As observed at the conclusion of the hearing, this [c]ourt
        was convinced that the victim understood the concept of
        truthfulness after discussing this concept with the victim.
        [N.T. Hearing] at 19-20. The victim seemed very credible to
        the [c]ourt about an event that would be memorable. Id.
        at 115. The child had no previous negative relationship with
        [Appellant] that would motivate the child to lie. Id. On the
        other hand, [Appellant] said little, and her testimony
        consisted primarily of an unconvincing denial of the act with
        a brief description of the evening in question. Id. at 105-
        12.

        While the victim’s testimony contained some inconsistencies
        or unclear portions, her overall testimony was clear that she
        woke up in the night burned by water, and that [Appellant]
        was there with her and was the perpetrator. The victim
        testified that [Appellant] said not to tell anyone. The

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         identification was clear. Moreover, the victim’s testimony
         combined with the very credible testimony of the PA to
         convince the court of the elements of the crime beyond a
         reasonable doubt. Id.

                                   *     *      *

         [Appellant] also argues that the court gave too much weight
         to the testimony of the PA rather than a forensic interviewer
         and additionally that the delay in taking the victim to the
         hospital and in the subsequent police investigation raises
         reasonable doubt about [Appellant’s] responsibility.
         However, the PA’s testimony was detailed, and the witness
         struck the court as impartial, knowledgeable, and
         believable. Notably, [Appellant’s] contention rests on a
         sentence in a report written by an individual who did not
         testify, and the sentence states that it is “unclear” how the
         injury resulted from the mechanism. See [id.] at 72-73. It
         was used on cross-examination to attempt to impeach the
         witness, but the PA was resolute in her own assessments
         when confronted with it. Id.

         Lastly, contrary to [Appellant’s] representations, there was
         some corroboration in the case in that the police
         investigation supported the victim’s testimony about trying
         to phone her mother, and the PA’s testimony supported the
         victim’s statement about how the injury occurred.

         For these reasons, the invitation to re-weigh the witness’s
         credibility and resolve the purported inconsistency should
         be declined.

(Trial Court Opinion at 8-9) (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

      Here, Appellant essentially asks us to reassess the credibility of the

victim and reweigh the evidence presented. We decline to do so. See Int.

of J.G., supra. It was for the court, as fact-finder, to determine the credibility

of the witnesses and the weight to be accorded to their testimony.            The

testimony of the victim, which the court credited, supports the court’s

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adjudication of delinquency, and the adjudication does not shock one’s sense

of justice. See Int. of N.A.P., supra. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial

court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting Appellant’s weight of the

evidence claim. Appellant’s third issue is meritless. Accordingly, we affirm.

      Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 3/29/2023

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