Court Opinion

ID: 9929903
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-05 18:02:19.093266+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:59:35.270529
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/5/24 P. v. Leon CA4/1
                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,                                                          D083426

         Plaintiff and Respondent,

         v.                                                          (Super. Ct. No. FVI20002857)

JENNIFER MARIE LEON,

         Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Bernardino
County, Charlie Hill, Judge. Affirmed.
         Deanna L. Lopas, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Senior Assistant Attorney General,
Melissa A. Mandel and Joseph C. Anagnos, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
                               INTRODUCTION
      Jennifer Marie Leon pled no contest to transportation of a controlled

substance in violation of Health and Safety Code1 section 11379, subdivision
(a). On appeal, Leon argues the trial court wrongly denied her motion to
suppress evidence obtained during a warrantless search of her vehicle
following a traffic stop that led to Leon’s arrest. We conclude the officers had
reasonable suspicion to detain Leon, probable cause to arrest her, and a
reasonable basis to search her vehicle incident to the arrest. Accordingly, we
affirm.
              FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      In fall 2020, two sheriff’s deputies initiated a traffic stop of Leon after
she parked in front of her home. Leon does not challenge the validity of the
traffic stop. One of the deputies observed Leon exit and “quickly” re-enter
her vehicle after they initiated the stop and activated the lights on the patrol
car. He observed Leon close the driver-side door behind her then reach over
to the passenger’s side before getting out of the car again.
      The deputy approached Leon and soon concluded she “was under the
influence.” He immediately noticed her “bloodshot red eyes,” “rapid . . . body
movement,” and a “white coating around her mouth.” He also observed she
“avoided making eye contact,” her eyes were “rapidly moving side to side,”
and her pupils were “constricted.” The deputy testified during his “training
at the academy” he was taught to look for signs that someone is under the
influence of a controlled substance, including “[r]apid eye movement,
bloodshot eyes, a white coating around the mouth,” “[c]ontinuous body
movement[,] [a]nd avoiding eye contact.” He also testified he had conducted

1     Further undesignated statutory references are to the Health and Safety
Code.
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five to ten prior investigations into whether someone was under the influence
of a controlled substance and had been in contact with someone under the
influence more than five times.
      Leon began to walk to her house and the deputy asked her to stop. The
deputy and his partner questioned Leon for several minutes, although the
record does not establish the exact duration of the interaction. They asked if
she had been arrested before, whether she was on probation or parole, and
whether she had guns, drugs, or anything illegal in her car. They told her
she was “acting strange,” and she said she had smoked marijuana “ ‘a little
while ago.’ ” She also told them she had “low blood sugar.”
      After questioning her, the deputy handcuffed Leon, who “briefly
resisted,” and placed her in the back seat of his patrol car. He then searched
her vehicle for “controlled substances” and discovered “[a] white crystal
substance located inside her purse.”
      Leon was charged with transportation of amphetamine, a controlled
substance, in violation of section 11379, subdivision (a) and possession of
amphetamine for sale in violation of section 11378. She filed a motion to
suppress the evidence recovered in the search pursuant to Penal Code section
1538.5. Leon argued, among other things: the traffic stop was
unconstitutionally prolonged; the officers did not have reasonable suspicion
that Leon was under the influence of a controlled substance; the officers did
not have probable cause to arrest her for being under the influence of a
controlled substance; and the search of the vehicle was not a proper search
incident to arrest and not supported by probable cause. The arresting deputy
and Leon testified at the suppression hearing.
      The court denied Leon’s motion. The court credited the deputy’s
testimony that he “saw that [Leon] was under the influence” once he made

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contact with her and found at that point the investigation “bec[a]me an under
the influence investigation.” The court found it was “reasonable” in such an
investigation to search for “paraphernalia” or “controlled substances” in the
vehicle.
                                     DISCUSSION
      Leon makes four principal arguments on appeal. First, she claims the
traffic stop “was unlawfully prolonged” beyond the time it would reasonably
take to investigate and resolve the traffic offense, failing to have a front

license plate.2 Second, she argues the officers did not have reasonable
suspicion to detain and question her for any other offense. Third, she
contends the officers lacked probable cause to support an arrest. And fourth,
she argues even if she was lawfully arrested, the vehicle search was
constitutionally impermissible. As explained below, none of these arguments
supports reversal.
      In reviewing a court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, we
review “the trial court's express and implied factual findings” for “substantial
evidence,” “considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial
court’s order.” (People v. Lee (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 853, 860–861; citing
People v. Brown (2015) 61 Cal.4th 968, 975, and People v. Tully (2012) 54
Cal.4th 952, 979.) We “independently determine whether the search was
constitutional.” (Lee, at p. 860.)
      “The Fourth Amendment permits brief investigative stops . . . when a
law enforcement officer has [reasonable suspicion, which comprises] ‘a
particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person

2     “Since California issues two license plates for motor vehicles other than
motorcycles [Veh. Code, § 4850], the absence of a California license plate on
the front of a vehicle is an established basis for a traffic stop.” (People v.
Reyes (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 856, 860.)
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stopped of criminal activity.’ ” (Navarette v. California (2014) 572 U.S. 393,
396–397.) Here, the officers had reasonable suspicion to support at least a
brief seizure almost as soon as the traffic stop began, as she appeared to be
under the influence of a controlled substance. (Cf. People v. Campuzano
(2015) 237 Cal.App.4th Supp. 14, 21 [“Under the totality of the
circumstances, there was no prolonged detention because immediately after
the stop and detention for [an] infraction, the officer observed the defendant’s
objective symptoms of drug intoxication and had probable cause to arrest
defendant for being under the influence of a controlled substance.”].)
      Leon claims there is no substantial evidence in support of the trial
court’s conclusion that she was observed to be under the influence. However,
the deputy testified once he approached Leon, he saw objective “signs and
symptoms” that she was under the influence of a controlled substance,
consistent with his law enforcement training. These included bloodshot
eyes, rapid body and eye movement, constricted pupils, a white coating
around her mouth, and avoidance of eye contact. Leon claims the deputy was
not sufficiently experienced to determine whether a person is under the
influence based on demeanor and appearance. However, she ignores that the
deputy testified he received specific training on identifying whether a person
is under the influence. Although he did not have extensive experience, the
deputy had applied his training on multiple prior occasions. Given that Leon
displayed numerous signs of intoxication consistent with the deputy’s
training, his unrebutted testimony is substantial evidence that Leon was
apparently under the influence of a controlled substance.
      Leon argues her use of marijuana and her low blood sugar could have
“contribute[d] to her appearance and demeanor.” But the record suggests the
deputies learned of these circumstances somewhat late in the interaction,

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after the majority of the questioning was complete. In any case, Leon does
not claim all of the symptoms the deputy observed could have resulted from
low blood sugar or marijuana use. Nor is there any record evidence bearing
on the symptoms of low blood sugar or marijuana use. Accordingly, we need
not conclude that this information would dispel a reasonable officer’s belief
that Leon was under the influence. “In urging us to reject [the trial court’s]
findings and disbelieve the testifying officer, [Leon] asks us to reweigh the
evidence and substitute our findings for those of the trial court. We decline
[her] invitation, which runs contrary to well-settled principles of appellate
review.” (People v. Sims (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 943, 954.)
      Leon also contends the questioning was more significant than
necessary to confirm she was under the influence, claiming it strayed into
topics unrelated to her drug use. Given that the deputy was relying on
Leon’s demeanor as evidence of intoxication, it was reasonable to confirm the
suspicion by continuing to talk to her and observe her behavior. The record
does not support that the detention was longer than necessary, as the officers
appear to have asked fewer than a dozen questions, and the thrust of the
questioning was not obviously beyond the scope of a reasonable investigation.
For example, a suspect’s potential criminal history and possession of guns are
circumstances that can indicate involvement in commercial drug offenses.
(See, e.g., People v. Washington (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 776, 793 [evidence that
defendant was carrying a gun supported conviction for selling drugs]; People
v. Aho (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 984, 992 [“defendant’s arrest and conviction
record” relevant to whether search warrant for suspected drug trafficker’s
residence was supported by probable cause].)
      Leon next claims her arrest was not supported by probable cause.
“[A]n officer must have probable cause before making an arrest.” (In re J.G.

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(2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1501, 1505.) “ ‘[P]robable cause exists if the facts and
circumstances known to the officer warrant a prudent man in believing that
the offense has been committed.’ ” (People v. Ingle (1960) 53 Cal.2d 407, 414.)
As already discussed, the deputy reasonably concluded, based on objective
indicia and his training and experience, that Leon was under the influence of
a controlled substance. He continued to observe Leon over the course of the
questioning, noted she “was acting strange,” and continued to believe her
appearance and demeanor were consistent with being under the influence.
(See People v. Sanchez (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 42, 48 [“plain-sight
observations” of defendant’s “demeanor,” including droopy eyelids, slurred
speech and constricted pupils, “clearly furnished probable cause to arrest
[him] for being under the influence of a controlled substance”].) In addition,
Leon admitted to the deputies she had recently smoked marijuana, which,
because the deputies had just observed her driving a car, provided probable
cause to believe she was unlawfully driving under the influence of a drug.
(See Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (f) [“It is unlawful for a person who is under
the influence of any drug to drive a vehicle.”].)
      Leon argues the deputy’s testimony was inconsistent as to whether he
had “arrested” her before the search. She also notes he “did not claim
probable cause to arrest prior to the vehicle search.” But the deputy clearly
testified, after refreshing his recollection with his contemporaneous incident
report, he had in fact arrested Leon by placing her in handcuffs in the back of
his patrol car before searching her vehicle. And we do not need the deputy to
testify he had concluded probable cause existed. “An action is ‘reasonable’
under the Fourth Amendment, regardless of the individual officer’s state of
mind, ‘as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify [the] action.’ ”
(Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart (2006) 547 U.S. 398, 404.) Thus, even when a

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law enforcement official contends there was no probable cause, which is not
the case here, a court may find to the contrary. (See Florida v. Royer (1983)
460 U.S. 491, 507 (plurality opinion) [although officer testified “there was no
probable cause to arrest until [defendant’s] bags were opened” this did “not
foreclose the State from justifying [the] custody by proving probable cause”].)
      Leon relies on In re Antonio B. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 435 for the
proposition that “the deputy’s observations fell far short of probable cause to
make an arrest for unlawful drug use.” In In re Antonio B. there was “no
dispute that the police officers had cause to conduct an investigative
detention of appellant, but they did not have probable cause to arrest him at
the time of the stop.” (Id. at 441.) Even if probable cause had been in dispute
in In re Antonio B., the facts are not similar: the defendant was detained
solely because he had been walking with someone who was smoking
marijuana. (Ibid.) Unlike Leon, there were no signs he was under the
influence of a controlled substance.
      Finally, Leon argues the search of her car was impermissible even if
she was properly arrested. “Police may search a vehicle incident to a recent
occupant’s arrest only if . . . it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains
evidence of the offense of arrest.” (Arizona v. Gant (2009) 556 U.S. 332, 351
(Gant).) When the occupant of a car is arrested for a “drug offense[ ],” it “will
supply a basis for searching the passenger compartment of an arrestee’s
vehicle and any containers therein.” (Id. at 344; see also People v. Evans
(2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 735, 750 (Evans) [“[A]bsent unusual circumstances,
when a driver is arrested for driving under the influence, or being under the
influence, it will generally be reasonable for an officer to believe evidence
related to that crime might be found in the vehicle.”].)

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      Leon relies heavily on a federal district court case from Tennessee,
United States v. Reagan (E.D. Tenn. 2010) 713 F.Supp.2d 724 (Reagan). In
Reagan, the court found it was not reasonable for the officer to believe there
was evidence of the crime of driving under the influence of alcohol “inside the
passenger compartment of a vehicle based solely upon the nature of the
charge or the existence of evidence that the vehicle’s driver is intoxicated.”
(Id. at p. 733.) According to Reagan, neither the driver’s intoxication nor the
officer’s testimony that “he had sometimes discovered open containers of
alcohol when searching some vehicles following the arrest of their drivers for
DUI” was sufficiently particularized to support a reasonable belief that there
was evidence of the offense in the defendant’s car. (Ibid.)
      Two California courts have discussed Reagan and have disagreed with
this view. (See People v. Nottoli (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 531, 553 [noting
“Gant indicated that the nature of the crime of arrest was determinative” and
thus finding an “arrest for ‘being under the influence of a controlled
substance’ supplied a reasonable basis for believing that evidence ‘relevant’ to
that type of offense might be in his vehicle”]; Evans, supra, 200 Cal.App.4th
at p. 750 & fn. 9 [“part[ing] company” with Reagan and concluding “[i]t is
certainly logical and reasonable to expect that items related to alcohol or
drug consumption, such as alcoholic beverage bottles or drug paraphernalia,
might readily be contained in the intoxicated driver’s car”].) As applied to
arrests for being under the influence of a controlled substance, we think these
cases better comport with Gant, which itself suggests arresting a driver for a
drug offense will support a search of the vehicle. (Gant, supra, 556 U.S. at p.
344; see also People v. Quick (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 1006, 1012 [“In accordance
with Gant, ‘the focus of the inquiry is entirely upon the nature of the offense
of arrest, rather than the particular facts of the case.’ ”].) There are no

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circumstances here that would make it unreasonable to believe that Leon’s
car contained evidence. In fact, after they initiated the stop and activated
their patrol car lights, the deputies observed Leon park, exit her car, quickly
re-enter after they initiated the traffic stop, and reach over to the passenger’s
side. There was additional reason to believe that the passenger compartment
contained evidence beyond the nature of the offense of arrest.
                                 DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed.

                                                                          DO, J.

      WE CONCUR:

      O'ROURKE, Acting P. J.

                     IRION, J.

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