Court Opinion

ID: 9947663
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-05 15:10:54.428323+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:27:21.335352
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-1404-22

GEORGANNE YOUNGCLAUS,

          Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

RESIDENTIAL HOME FUNDING
CORP., its agents, servants and/or
employees, TOM MARINARO,
ROBERTO LUPI, and FRANK KURI,

     Defendants-Respondents.
________________________________

                   Submitted February 26, 2024 – Decided March 5, 2024

                   Before Judges Mawla and Vinci.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Morris County, Docket No. L-0402-22.

                   Law Offices of Rosemarie Arnold, attorneys for
                   appellant (William R. Stoltz, Crystal Elaine Dozier, and
                   Paige R. Butler, on the briefs).

                   Carmagnola & Ritardi, LLC, attorneys for respondents
                   Residential Home Funding Corp., Roberto Lupi, and
                   Frank Kuri (Domenick Carmagnola, of counsel and on
                   the brief; Stephanie Torres, on the brief).
            Fox Rothschild, LLP, attorneys for respondent Tom
            Marinaro (Kenneth Aaron Rosenberg, of counsel and
            on the brief; Sara Hale Bernstein, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

      Plaintiff Georganne Youngclaus appeals from two November 28, 2022

orders dismissing her complaint against defendants Residential Home Funding

Corp. (RHFC), Tom Marinaro, Robert Lupi, and Frank Kuri for failure to state

a claim. We reverse and remand for the reasons expressed in this opinion.

      RHFC is a mortgage lending firm. In May 2016, plaintiff was hired by

RHFC as a marketing manager and director of marketing. Marinaro owned

RHFC, Lupi was the company CEO, and Kuri the vice president of branch

development.

      In September 2021, plaintiff sued defendants, alleging:             gender

discrimination and sexual harassment under the New Jersey Law Against

Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-12; emotional distress; and a per quod

claim on behalf of her husband. The complaint set forth twenty-one instances

of alleged discrimination that took place between 2016 and 2020. In January

2022, the trial court granted defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint for

failure to state a claim because the allegations were time barred under the LAD's

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                                       2
two-year statute of limitations.    The court's order noted the dismissal was

without prejudice.

      On March 4, 2022, plaintiff filed a second lawsuit.            Her complaint

contained one count alleging gender discrimination, sexual harassment, and

wrongful termination. The complaint alleged twenty-five acts of discrimination,

including all the acts asserted in her first complaint in greater detail, and added

that the discrimination culminated in her wrongful termination on July 20, 2020.

The allegation related to plaintiff's termination read as follows:

            On or about July 20, 2020, [p]laintiff was wrongfully
            terminated by . . . [RHFC] due to her female gender, to
            wit: while [p]laintiff was on maternity leave, the
            company relocated from Morris County . . . to White
            Plains, New York. Since that was very far from
            [p]laintiff's home, she asked to work remotely like the
            similarly situated male employees of the company were
            permitted to do. Plaintiff was informed that she would
            not be permitted to work from home and was abruptly,
            wrongfully terminated.

Defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim based on the statute of

limitations, and argued the lawsuit was barred by the entire controversy doctrine.

      Following oral argument, the trial court issued the November 2022 orders

and a written opinion dismissing the complaint with prejudice.           The court

rejected defendants' entire controversy doctrine argument. However, it held

plaintiff had not alleged sufficient facts occurring within the statute of

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limitations because, although she had alleged "one or more discrete acts of

discriminatory conduct . . . throughout her employment . . . [she did] not provide

specific incidents, but rather repeats that the conduct happened 'on occasions too

numerous to list,' or occurred, 'constantly and continuously.'"

      The court noted this was the same deficiency it had highlighted when it

dismissed the original complaint.           It reasoned plaintiff's assertion the

discrimination "happened 'on several occasions' or 'on occasions too numerous

to list' is not sufficient to assess whether the continuing violation doctrine

applies.   Particularly, there is no identifiable 'allegedly discriminatory act'

within the statutory period." Rather, the second complaint "simply extended the

time period within which these 'continuous' allegations occurred so that they

now have an end-date of July 20, 2020. In the [o]riginal [c]omplaint, the

timelines for these claims ended such that each claim took place outside the

statutory period." Plaintiff's complaint was barred because "all identifiable acts

occurred outside the statutory period." Moreover, citing Roa v. Roa, 200 N.J.

555, 564 (2010), the court ruled plaintiff's termination was a discrete act and not

a continuing violation. Therefore, it was "immaterial" whether her claims were

based on discrete acts or the continuing violation doctrine.

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                                        I.

      Rule 4:6-2(e) motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim are reviewed

de novo. Baskin v. P.C. Richard & Son, LLC, 246 N.J. 157, 171 (2021) (citing

Dimitrakopoulos v. Borrus, Goldin, Foley, Vignuolo, Hyman & Stahl, P.C., 237

N.J. 91, 108 (2019)).    We utilize the same standard as the trial court and

"examine 'the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged on the face of the complaint,'

giving the plaintiff the benefit of 'every reasonable inference of fact.'" Ibid.

(quoting Dimitrakopoulos, 237 N.J. at 107). We review the adequacy of a

pleading to determine "whether a cause of action is 'suggested' by the facts."

Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 746 (1989)

(quoting Velantzas v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 109 N.J. 189, 192 (1988)). "[I]f

the complaint states no claim that supports relief, and discovery will not give

rise to such a claim, the action should be dismissed." Dimitrakopoulos, 237 N.J.

at 107.

      On appeal, plaintiff argues the trial court applied a higher standard than

the liberal one required by Rule 4:6-2(e). She asserts the court should not have

dismissed the complaint because the wrongful termination by itself was well

within the two-year statute of limitations, considering her complaint was filed

on March 4, 2022. Plaintiff also claims her termination was part of a continuing

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                                        5
violation, which brought the events preceding it within the statute of limitations,

because the termination was a part of a pattern of discriminatory conduct. 1

      A wrongful termination claim accrues on the date that an employee is

terminated. Holmin v. TRW, Inc., 330 N.J. Super. 30, 46 (App. Div. 2000). To

establish a prima facie case for wrongful termination, a plaintiff must show: "(1)

[they are] a member of a protected class; (2) [they were] performing [their] job

at a level that met [defendant's] legitimate expectations; (3) [they were]

terminated; and (4) [they were] terminated under circumstances that give rise to

an inference of unlawful discrimination." Young v. Hobart W. Grp., 385 N.J.

Super. 448, 463 (App. Div. 2005).

      "To state a claim for hostile work environment sexual harassment, a . . .

plaintiff must allege conduct that occurred because of [their] sex and that a

reasonable [person] would consider sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the

conditions of employment and create an intimidating, hostile, or offensive

working environment." Lehmann v. Toys 'R' Us, 132 N.J. 587, 603 (1993). A

1
   Both parties raise arguments regarding the entire controversy doctrine and
plaintiff further asserts defendants are liable as supervisors for aiding and
abetting others in discriminating against her. We decline to address either
argument because the trial court's ruling is not based on them. Moreover, we do
not need to reach the aiding and abetting argument to decide this appeal , and
defendants have not cross-appealed from the court's entire controversy ruling.
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                                        6
plaintiff must "show that the complained-of conduct (1) would not have

occurred but for the employee's protected status, and was (2) severe or pervasive

enough to make a (3) reasonable person believe that (4) the conditions of

employment have been altered and that the working environment is hostile or

abusive." Shepherd v. Hunterdon Developmental Ctr., 174 N.J. 1, 24 (2002)

(citing Lehmann, 132 N.J. at 603-04).

      The statute of limitations for LAD claims is two years.         Montells v.

Haynes, 133 N.J. 282, 292 (1993). However, "a judicially created doctrine

known as the continuing violation theory has developed as an equitable

exception to the statute of limitations" for LAD claims. Bolinger v. Bell Atl.,

330 N.J. Super. 300, 306 (App. Div. 2000). The doctrine provides that when an

individual experiences a "continual, cumulative pattern of tortious conduct, the

statute of limitations does not begin to run until the wrongful action ceases."

Wilson v. Wal-Mart Stores, 158 N.J. 263, 272 (1999). The continuous and

cumulative nature of the conduct is what makes it actionable. Ibid.

      In Roa, our Supreme Court proscribed a plaintiff's ability to revive time-

barred discrete acts under a continuing violation theory. 200 N.J. at 561. There,

the plaintiff alleged two discrete discriminatory acts: (1) wrongful termination

that occurred outside of the statute of limitations; and (2) post-discharge

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                                        7
retaliation that fell withing the statute of limitations. Id. at 565. The plaintiff

argued the retaliation was a continuing violation that revived his time-barred

claim of wrongful termination. Ibid.

      The Court rejected this argument and held "individually actionable

allegations cannot be aggregated" under the LAD. Id. at 567 (quoting O'Connor

v. City of Newark, 440 F.3d 125, 127 (3d Cir. 2006)). The Court explained,

            the continuing violation theory was developed to allow
            for the aggregation of acts, each of which, in itself,
            might not have alerted the employee of the existence of
            a claim, but which together show a pattern of
            discrimination. In those circumstances, the last act is
            said to sweep in otherwise untimely prior non-discrete
            acts.

            [Id. at 569.]

      The Court concluded the plaintiff could not use the timely filing of the

claim for post-discharge retaliation to revive the time-barred claim for wrongful

termination. Id. at 570. However, he could pursue the retaliation claim because

it was not time barred. Id. at 576. Moreover, the Court held the time-barred

claims could be relevant in the underlying suit as "evidence of other 'wrongs' to

prove 'motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or

absence of mistake or accident when such matters are relevant to a material issue

in dispute.'" Ibid. (quoting N.J.R.E. 404(b)).

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                                        8
      Pursuant to these principles and viewing plaintiff's claims, as we must,

through the liberal lens of Rule 4:6-2(e), we conclude the wrongful termination

action should have survived dismissal because it was clearly not time barred.

This claim qualified as a discrete alleged act of discrimination under LAD,

which states:    "It shall be an unlawful employment practice . . . [f]or an

employer, because of the . . . sex . . . of any individual . . . to discharge . . . from

employment such individual . . . ." N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(a). Moreover, pursuant to

Roa, the other acts of discrimination preceding plaintiff's termination, which the

court ruled were time barred, are potentially relevant under N.J.R.E. 404(b).

      Furthermore, we reverse the trial court's rulings the acts preceding the

alleged wrongful termination qualified as discrete acts, rather than a continuing

violation.   Without repeating each allegation, we note the alleged conduct

directed at plaintiff, including: demeaning, abusive, and coarse language and

conduct; sexual advances and innuendo; gender stereotypes; retaliation; and

unequal treatment based on plaintiff's gender. We need not declare whether

these acts are discrete or a continuing violation, except to note that given the

liberal standard we must apply at this juncture, plaintiff's complaint pled a

plausible basis for a continuing violation. Indeed, each of the pre-termination

acts, if proved, would constitute a pattern of sexual harassment and gender

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                                           9
discrimination that was severe or pervasive, and created a hostile or abusive

work environment.

      It appears to us that the trial court, having previously dismissed plaintiff's

first complaint as time barred, continued to separate the pre-termination acts

from the termination itself, accepting defendants' claims plaintiff's second

complaint was an attempt to resuscitate the first one. However, the wrongful

termination claim was a substantial event, and we are unconvinced it was merely

a means to bootstrap plaintiff's time barred discrimination claims. Whether the

pre-termination claims are discrete and therefore barred, or part of a continuing

violation, is a matter that should abide discovery and further motion practice.

      For these reasons, we reverse and remand both November 28, 2022 orders.

To the extent we have not addressed an argument raised on the appeal, it is

because it lacks sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R.

2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

      Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.

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