Court Opinion

ID: 9679398
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:51:51.891982+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:13.244528
License: Public Domain

Bronson, P.J.
(dissenting). I dissent for the reasons stated in my partial concurrence in Morris v Metriyakool, 107 Mich App 110; 309 NW2d 910 (1981), Judge T. M. Burns’ dissenting opinion in Williams v O’Connor, 108 Mich App 613; 310 NW2d 825 (1981), and the majority opinions in Jackson v Detroit Memorial Hospital, 110 Mich App 202; 312 NW2d 212 (1981), and Piskorski v Art Centre Hospital, 110 Mich App 22; 312 NW2d 160 (1981).
1 make the following remarks concerning the majority’s analogy to self-regulation in the professions as a justification for upholding the arbitration system here. I believe this analogy is faulty. Internal professional regulatory bodies do not make decisions which adversely affect an aggrieved individual’s ability to pursue civil reme*612dies. Disciplinary actions and actions for damages on account of alleged malpractice serve different functions. The two should not be confused and neither adjudicative ¡system should be cited as a reason for upholding some aspect of the other type of system.
I also note that the majority is apparently applying an incorrect legal standard in determining whether the arbitration panels pose due process problems. The question is not whether it is impossible to find unbiased arbitrators within the pool of potential arbitrators, but whether a tribunal is composed in such a way that too great a risk exists that one or more of. the judges may have a personal interest in the outcome of the proceedings and, consequently, be biased. Ward v Village of Monroeville, 409 US 57, 59-61; 93 S Ct 80; 34 L Ed 2d 267 (1972), Crampton v Dep’t of State, 395 Mich 347, 355-356; 235 NW2d 352 (1975).
It is of course true that today plaintiffs’ attorneys can find medical practitioners willing to testify against members of their profession. However, to the extent that the majority opinion implies any sort of parity in the ability of the plaintiffs’ bar to obtain medical experts, I vehemently disagree. As a judge on this Court for some 13 years, it has been my observation from reviewing the records in many medical malpractice cases that the plaintiffs’ bar, with occasional exceptions, must rely on a small group of medical doctors who are used over and over again, while the defense bar faces no such restrictions. Consequently, the plaintiffs’ experts are more susceptible to attacks on their neutrality than defense experts. The defense bar knows which doctors are willing to testify for plaintiffs, and I have no doubt that their faces will not be seen on arbitration panels.
I would reverse.