Court Opinion

ID: 9788573
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:05:58.149537+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:43:24.814086
License: Public Domain

Justice RICE
dissents.
The Colorado Constitution directs the General Assembly to "provide for the establishment and maintenance of a thorough and uniform system of free public schools throughout the state," placing discretionary education questions in Colorado squarely and solely within the legislative ambit. Colo. Const. art. IX, § 2. That language, however, does not completely foreclose any judicial review of education in Colorado, but it does implicate the political question doctrine and its constraints on justiciability. See Lujan v. Colo. State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1025 (Colo.1982).
Therefore, I believe this court should adopt the United States Supreme Court's framework defining the parameters of the political question doctrine and apply it to this issue. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962). Moreover, having reviewed this case through the lens of Baker, I am convinced that, despite the vital role that public education plays in our state, this court should not exercise its jurisdiction and determine what constitutes a "thorough" education. The majority's efforts to do so result in its flawed attempt to affix an untested, undefined, and unlimited rational basis review to all education claims.
For that reason, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion regarding justicia-bility and would hold this issue not appropriate for judicial review.
I. The Political Question Doctrine
The political question doctrine traces its roots to the earliest days of the judiciary, when the Court struggled to define its role and level of oversight of the executive and legislative branches. See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (18038). At the time, although the Supreme Court unambiguously stated that it had the power to interpret the law, Chief Justice Marshall noted that without the restraints imposed by the political question doctrine, "[the division of power ... could exist no longer, and the other departments would be swallowed up by the judiciary." Speech of the Honorable John Marshall (Mar. 7, 1800), in 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) app. n. I, at 16 (1820).
Such a view remains compelling today. The United States Supreme Court noted as recently as 2004 that, although Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177, plainly gives the courts the "province and duty ... to say what the law *377is;" "[slometimes, however, the law is that the judicial department has no business entertaining the claim of unlawfulness-because the question is entrusted to one of the political branches or involves no judicially enforceable rights." Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 277, 124 S.Ct. 1769, 158 L.Ed.2d 546 (2004) (plurality opinion) (citations omitted).
This court too has recognized the political question doctrine, maintaining the position that "the resolution of [political questions] should be eschewed by the courts." Colo. Gen. Assembly v. Lamm, 704 P.2d 1371, 1378 (Colo.1985); see also Colo. Common Cause v. Bledsoe, 810 P.2d 201, 205-06 (Colo.1991).1 Adopting the federal rationale within the framework of laws governing this state, we have observed:
The judiciary's avoidance of deciding political questions finds its roots in the Colorado Constitution's provisions separating the powers of state government, see e.g., Colo. Const. art III, and recognizes that certain issues are best left for resolution by the other branches of government, or 'to be fought out on the hustings and determined by the people at the polls.
Colo. Common Cause, 810 P.2d at 205 (quoting People ex rel. Tate v. Prevost, 55 Colo. 199, 212, 134 P. 129, 133 (1913)).
In 2008, we renewed our position that the political question doctrine applies in this state, declaring that "courts must refrain from reviewing controversies concerning policy choices and value determinations that are constitutionally committed for resolution to the legislative or executive branch...." Busse v. City of Golden, 73 P.3d 660, 664 (Colo.2003) (citing Baker, 369 U.S. at 217, 82 S.Ct. 691 and rephrasing the first Baker factor). This strong endorsement stands as our most recent treatment of the doctrine.
Thus, our own precedent demands that this court adhere to the constraints of the political question doctrine, and it should not be ignored or minimized as applied to this case. Indeed, the political question doctrine is not some novel theory plucked from the outskirts of jurisprudence; it is a core tenet of this state's judiciary rooted directly in the Colorado Constitution.
It is for this reason that I take issue with the majority's attempt to minimize this court's history of applying the political question doctrine by stating that the doctrine has never yielded a finding of nonjusticiability when applied. It is important to differentiate between the very existence of the doctrine-and, in turn, the majority's apparent calls for abandonment of the doctrine outright-and the application of the doctrine. See maj. op. at 369 n.11, 871. Indeed, without explicitly stating its aims, the majority seems to be arguing for an absolute rejection of the political question doctrine and its self-imposed check on judicial decision-making.2 Furthermore, not only does the majority apparently reject the doctrine, but it offers no workable standard with which to replace it, leaving the courts without any justiciability framework and judges unclear whether the concept still exists in Colorado jurisprudence.
It is and should remain this court's practice to consider the justiciability of questions brought before it. I would not abandon years of both federal and Colorado jurispru*378dence respecting the political question doctrine as a valuable check on otherwise unrestrained judicial decision-making. Common sense combined with stare decisis militate in favor of preserving the doctrine and applying it when appropriate.
II. Application of the Baker Factors
After discussing the merits of the political question doctrine, this court in Colorado Common Cause employed the Baker framework to determine justiciability. We should use the same approach in this case.3 Colo. Common Cause, 810 P.2d at 205-06. The Baker factors, as adopted in Colorado Common Cause, focus the application of the polit ical question doctrine into a workable and understandable formula, thereby limiting misapplication and "exposing the attributes" of the doctrine. Baker, 369 U.S. at 210, 82 S.Ct. 691. It should also be noted that, after some years where the Court rarely employed Baker, the Supreme Court recently both reaffirmed Baker's vitality and clarified its factors or "tests." Vieth, 541 U.S. at 277, 124 S.Ct. 1769.
Specifically, the Baker court held that any one of the following six factors could sustain a finding of nonjusticiability:
[1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or [2] a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or [8] the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or [4] the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or [5] an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or [6] the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.
Baker, 369 U.S. at 217, 82 S.Ct. 691. In conjunction with its goals of narrowing and focusing the seope of the doctrine, the Court stressed that a court should dismiss a case if any one of the factors become "inextricable from the case at bar." Id. Thus, the presence of any factor makes a case nonjusticia-ble. Although all six each suggest that the issue before us is not justiciable, I will discuss the first four factors in greater depth.
A. -A Demonstrable Textual Constitutional Commitment of the Issue to a Coordinate Political Department
In considering this first factor, the Supreme Court noted that:
Deciding whether a matter has in any measure been committed by the Constitution to another branch of government ... is itself a delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation, and is a responsibility of this Court as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution. To demonstrate this requires no less than to analyze representative cases and to infer from them the analytical threads that make up the political question doctrine.
Baker, 369 U.S. at 211, 82 S.Ct. 691.
Therefore, in weighing the first factor we must look to both the exact constitutional language in question and to the prior cases which offer an interpretation of that language. The constitutional language controlling this issue reads: "The general assembly shall, as soon as practicable, provide for the establishment and maintenance of a thorough and uniform system of free public schools throughout the state...." Colo. Const. art. IX, § 2.4 Thus, on its face, the plain language *379"the general assembly shall" controls the argument, and a review of precedent supports this conclusion. See, eg., Washington County Bd. of Equalization v. Petron Dev. Co., 109 P.3d 146, 149 (Colo.2005).
Moreover, our precedent in Lyjan strongly suggests that this issue is constitutionally committed to the General Assembly. Interpreting the same "thorough and uniform education" clause at issue today, we held:
While it is clearly the province and duty of the judiciary to determine what the law is, the fashioning of a constitutional system for financing elementary and secondary public education in Colorado is not only the proper function of the General Assembly, but this function is expressly mandated by the Colorado Constitution.
Lujan, 649 P.2d at 1025 (citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039 (1974); Colo. Const. art. IX, § 2).
In short, the plain language of the constitutional provision coupled with our precedent strongly suggest that the issue before us has been constitutionally committed to the legislative branch.
B. A Lack of Judicially Discoverable and Manageable Standards for Resolving the Case
I turn now to the second Baker factor, namely whether there are any judicially manageable standards by which to resolve the issue presented. This factor is closely tied to the first, as the Supreme Court has observed that, "the lack of judicially manageable standards may strengthen the conclusion that there is a textually demonstrable commitment to a coordinate branch." Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228-29, 113 S.Ct. 732, 122 L.Ed.2d 1 (1993). Such standards and rules are conspicuously absent in this case.
Furthermore, our holding in Lyjan offers no standards or rules that would be of assistance here because our holding in Lujan only applied to an equal protection claim. Lyjan, 649 P.2d at 1011, 1024-25. Even though the Lujan plaintiffs made two distinct claims-one a classic equal protection challenge and the other under the "thorough and uniform" clause-the Lyjan court spent the majority of its opinion reasoning that education was not a fundamental right nor was wealth a suspect classification, both of which are equal protection analyses. See id. at 1014-22. Those two determinations led the court to conclude that a rational basis standard should apply, resulting in a holding that the school funding system at the time was "rationally related to the legitimate state purpose of controlling the public debt." Id. at 1024. Because that holding and the use of the rational basis standard responded only to a traditional equal protection argument, it has no controlling effect on today's issue.
The Lyjan court then turned to the purely Colorado constitutional claim that unequal per pupil spending violated the "thorough and uniform" clause. Id. at 1024-25. Lyjan, however, only defined what the constitution does not require, specifically uniform and equalized spending per pupil. In support of its ruling that only "uniform educational opportunities" must be available, the Lyjan court merely cited instances where this court had interpreted aspects of the education clause in response to discrete issues demanding "yes" or "no", "constitutional" or "unconstitutional" answers. Id. at 1025 (emphasis added).5 Thus, this court issued no prospective rule, only basic reasoning through analogy, leaving nothing to guide or bind future courts.
The majority refers to "Lujan's explicit pronouncement that the court's function is to rule on the constitutionality of our state's system' of public education," but the majority fails to recognize the context surrounding *380that uncontested principle. Maj. op. at 372 (citing Lujan, 649 P.2d at 1025). In its entirety, the quoted sentence reads: "Thus, whether a better financing system could be devised is not material to this decision, as our sole function is to rule on the constitutionality of our state's system." Lujan, 649 P.2d at 1025. Plaintiffs today ask the court to decide not on a constitutional question but, almost verbatim, on "whether a better financing system could be devised." 6 Id. Lyjan neither controls this case nor sanctions review of all claims brought under the education clause. It actually states the opposite, maintaining that financing decisions are instead "the proper function of the General Assembly." Lujan, 649 P.2d at 1025.
Moreover, the majority states that in Lu-jan "the court affirmed ... that [it] has the responsibility to review whether the actions of the legislature are consistent with its obligation to provide a thorough and uniform public school system." Maj. op. at 872. Again, this is a misreading of the Lyjan opinion, and it is instructive only as evidence of the majority's conflation of Lyjan's separate equal protection and "thorough and uniform" holdings.
The majority writes that "[the Lujan court engaged in rational basis review of whether the state's system ... violated the 'thorough and uniform' mandate." Maj. op. at 374. This is simply untrue-the Lujan court never references any test for "thorough and uniform," uses the words "rational basis," or posits any standard of review. See Lujan, 649 P.2d at 1024-25. Indeed, the majority offers no support for its statement that rational basis review applies here.7 Stated succinetly, the Lyjan holding on the education clause rested solely on prior decisions, all of which involved discrete "yes" or "no" answers considerably different from the abstract one presented in this case.
On the other hand, the plaintiffs today ask this court to define an "adequate" or "thorough" education in this state, but this intangible concept is ill-fitted for a judicial rule. Plaintiffs ask:
[That this Court enter judgment declaring that the education clause guarantees to each school age resident of the state the right to a public education sufficient to permit him or her to participate meaningfully in the civic, political, economic, social, and other activities of our society and the world, and to exercise the basic civil and other rights of a citizen of the State of Colorado and the United States of America. This is the "constitutionally adequate, quality education" that must be established and maintained-and must be funded in order to be more than an empty promise.
Pet'r Reply Br. 14. Plaintiffs attempt to constrain this request by directing the courts to defer all specific decisions to the General Assembly, but, as other state courts have found, such a partitioning of responsibilities is not workable in reality. Pet'r Br. at 80; See, e.g., infra n.10 (describing the New Jersey courts' attempts to manage education from the bench).
The central feature of a "judicially manageable standard" is a logical framework that can guide future courts. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 278, 124 S.Ct. 1769 ("judicial action must be governed by standard, by rule") (emphases in original). It is impossible to create a judicial standard or rule that can define, accommodate, and limit the enormity of preparing students for meaningful "civic, political, economic, social" engagement in the world. The majority's attempts to affix a rational basis standard to a nebulous concept like this do not present a manageable framework, and the standard fails to inform or channel judicial discretion.
*381Such an unbound standard of review simply substitutes the trial court for the General Assembly, essentially giving the trial court veto power over any legislative policy determination. in education. I believe such a breach of the separation of powers is unacceptable. The majority's rational basis concept does not represent the requisite "judicially manageable standard."
Finally, I believe that this court is not in a position to devise a judicially manageable standard on which to evaluate the adequacy or thoroughness of an education. There is no precedent to guide our hand in fashioning a standard, creating the unacceptable appearance of an arbitrary judicial decree. In Lujan, we recognized that:
We have never been called upon to interpret article IX, section 2 [the "thorough and uniform" clause] in any context which would prove helpful to this case although the provision is discussed in many cases. Also, we are unable to find any historical background to glean guidance regarding the intention of the framers.
Lujan, 649 P.2d at 1024-25 (citations omitted).
The lack of any constitutional or judicial history to guide our interpretation distinguishes this case from other state cases that have created educational standards from the bench. As the court of appeals correctly observed, "the contours of a 'quality' public education cannot be ascertained by judicially discoverable or manageable standards because the education clause 'provides no principled basis for a judicial definition." Lobato, 216 P.3d at 39 (quoting Comm. For Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 174 Ill.2d 1, 220 Ill.Dec. 166, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1191 (Ill.1996)).8
In addition, we have already held that the education clause itself "mandates the General Assembly to provide to each school age child the opportunity to receive a free education, and to establish guidelines for a thorough and uniform system of public schools." Lujan, 649 P.2d at 1018-19 (emphasis added). Thus, we have already assigned to the General Assembly the responsibility to create and impose broad education policy determinations. It would be a marked transgression for this court to now usurp the role it has already designated to the legislature in Lu-jan by attempting to devise new standards for education.
C. The Impossibility of Deciding the Case Without an Initial Policy Determination of a Kind Clearly for Nonjudicial Discretion
We have consistently held that "courts must avoid making decisions that are intrinsically legislative. It is not up to the court to make policy or to weigh policy. If we determine that the issue is legitimately one over which the General Assembly has authority, then our inquiry must end." Town of Telluride v. Lot Thirty-Four Venture, L.L.C., 3 P.3d 30, 38 (Colo.2000) (citations omitted).
Applying this general jurisprudence to the education clause, we observed in Lyjan that:
While our representative form of government and democratic society may benefit to a greater degree from a public school system in which each school district spends the exact dollar amount per student with an eye toward providing identical edu*382cation for all, these are considerations and goals which properly lie within the legislative domain. Judicial intrusion to weigh such considerations and achieve such goals must be avoided. This is especially so in this case where the controversy, as we perceive it, is essentially directed toward what is the best public policy which can be adopted to attain quality schooling and equal educational opportunity for all children who attend our public schools.
649 P.2d at 1018 (emphasis added). Hence, this court has firmly held that defining a "thorough" or "adequate" education is a policy determination for the legislature. See also Comm. For Educ. Rights, 220 Ill.Dec. at 179, 672 N.E.2d at 1191 ("[The question of educational quality is inherently one of policy involving philosophical and practical considerations that call for the exercise of legislative and administrative discretion.").
Also, while some state courts have chosen to opine on constitutional provisions similar or identical to ours, they have offered wildly disparate conclusions. For example, New Jersey defined "thorough" as "more than simply adequate or minimal," but Montana focused on promoting "physical well-being" in order to become an asset to the state. Compare Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.J.Super. 228, 287 A.2d 187, 211 (Law Div.1972) with McNair v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 87 Mont. 423, 288 P. 188, 190 (1930). Similarly, Wyoming defined "thorough" as "marked by full detail or complete in all respects and productive without waste," while West Virginia held that the school system must properly prepare students and that it do so "economically." Compare Campbell County Sch. Dist. v. State, 907 P.2d 1238, 1258-59 (Wyo.1995) with Pauley v. Kelly, 162 W.Va. 672, 255 $.E.2d 859, 877 (1979). There is no national standard from which this court could adopt a definition of "thorough", and, more importantly, the varying definitions other states ascribe to the term illustrate no consensus on what "thorough" means. As such, any definition we might construe would necessarily constitute a policy determination.
And, of course, onee courts begin to make policy, it is difficult to stop. The Nebraska Supreme Court observed: "The landscape is littered with courts that have been bogged down in the legal quicksand of continuous litigation and challenges to their states' school funding systems. Unlike those courts, we refuse to wade into that Stygian swamp." Nebraska Coal. for Educ. Equity & Adequacy, 731 N.W.2d at 183.9
D. The Impossibility of a Court's Undertaking Independent Resolution without Impinging Upon Coordinate Branches of Government
Turning now to the fourth Baker factor, the Supreme Court demands a finding of nonjusticiability if no decision can be rendered without impinging upon legislative authority. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217, 82 S.Ct. 691. In addition to the considerations specified in the previous sections, a ruling by this court that more funding must go towards education would almost certainly take funding from other state programs. Such a broad imposition on legislative fiscal authority is clearly beyond the proper judicial scope. See Coal. for Adequacy & Fairness in Sch. Funding, Inc. v. Chiles, 680 So.2d 400, 406-07 (Fla.1996) (refusing to define an "adequate" education for fear that "the courts would necessarily be required to subjectively evaluate the Legislature's value judgments as to the spending priorities to be assigned to the *383state's many needs, education being one among them.").10
Overall, the first four Baker factors each yield a conclusion that defining a "thorough" education is not a justiciable question that should be heard in this court. Baker presents an established, cogent standard for weighing political questions, and this court should adhere to its conclusion that this case demands dismissal for want of justiciability.
III. Lujan and the Proper Political Question Standard
Based on the above discussion of the Baker factors, I believe that this court should not exercise its jurisdiction to decide this case but rather should find the issues posed to be nonjusticiable. My adoption of the political question doctrine and the lack of justiciability in this case should not be interpreted, however, to impose an absolute bar on educational questions in the courts. Rather, I believe that some cases involving the education clause should be adjudicated in this court. The difficulty is deciding, in a principled way, which ones present a justiciable question and which ones a political question.
As noted previously, the political question doctrine draws from the earliest days of the judiciary, and the reasoning underlying cere-ation of the principle elucidates the difficult questions confronting this court today. Speaking of the first United States Supreme Court decisions that defined the role of the judicial branch, Rachel Barkow observed:
It was appropriate at that time for courts to engage in a threshold inquiry to determine how much interpretive room a constitutional delegation of power gave the branch receiving that power. While the courts remained responsible for declaring the boundaries, it was recognized that the Constitution contemplated room for the political actors to give substantive meaning within those boundaries.
Rachel Barkow, More Supreme than Court? The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 Colum. L.Rev. 237, 252 (2002) (emphasis added).
When this court found Lujan justiciable, it did so as part of the "threshold inquiry" to "give substantive meaning" to the constitutional term "uniform." In holding that "[the constitutional mandate which requires the General Assembly to establish 'a thorough and uniform system of free public schools, is not a mandate for absolute equality in educational services or expenditures," the Lwjan court defined the boundary of the General Assembly's power to lie beyond absolute equality in spending. 649 P.2d at 1018. But it did so without impinging upon the General Assembly's constitutional power over education; it did so without stepping beyond the bounds of the judicial branch and defining exactly what funding levels will equal a "thorough and uniform" education in this state.
The Lyjan court was careful to stress that "(olur decision today declares only that [the education system at the time] is constitutionally permissible" Id. at 1025. It further emphasized that, "whether a better financing system could be devised is not material to this decision, as our sole function is to rule on the constitutionality of our state's system." Id.
Turning now to the far different question presented in this case, plaintiffs here ask the court to move beyond a threshold inquiry and actually design and implement a better financing system. Lobato, 216 P.8d at 82 (plaintiffs demand "an injunction compelling defendants to design, enact, fund, and implement a school financing system...."). This request is truly remarkable in light of Lu-jan's narrow holding. Lyjan, 649 P.2d at 1025. Instead of asking within what boundaries must the General Assembly make educational policy, plaintiffs want this court to enter into an unbounded inquiry into what makes the best financing system for students. While the question is undoubtedly important, it is a question which, in my opin*384ion, is specifically reserved for the General Assembly, not the courts.11
I believe that it is just such a distinction between properly defining constitutional parameters and improperly determining the policy questions within those boundaries that should guide this court in the future.12 The Baker factors employed above together with a common sense view of political questions can and should guide the Colorado courts on these matters.
I hope the General Assembly will address any educational disparities that might threaten the health of this state, but I also refuse to commit the courts to the resolution of this clearly legislative policy determination.
IV. Conclusion
"Constitutions must necessarily be interpreted to meet the needs of changing times, but the critical, constitutionally-prescribed boundary separating the executive and legislative powers must remain constant." Lamm, 704 P.2d at 1378. I would hold today that this court should apply this unquestionably prudent logic to the judiciary as well, reinforcing the boundaries between all three branches of government. Education funding in this state may represent a crisis demanding resolution, but that resolution must take place within the constitutionally-prescribed forum as the inherent policy determinations in such a remedy lie outside the seope of this court.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion regarding justicia-bility.
I am authorized to state that Justice COATS and Justice EID join in this dissent.

. It is important to distinguish between subject matter jurisdiction and justiciability in this area. As the United States Supreme Court noted, "there is a significant difference between determining whether a ... court has "jurisdiction of the subject matter' and determining whether a cause over which a court has subject matter jurisdiction is 'justiciable.'" Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 512, 89 S.Ct. 1944, 23 L.Ed.2d 491 (1969). Thus, it remains possible and proper for this court to conclude that dictating what is an adequate education for the state's children is a nonjusticiable political question, despite Lujan and prior court findings of subject matter jurisdiction in the topic of education.

. In addressing the doctrine, the majority never states its purpose for citing a narrow collection of scholars-but not courts-criticizing the doctrine, leaving the reader to guess at the majority's reason for inclusion. One could interpret this silence as either an abandonment of the political question doctrine writ large or a more limited refusal to apply Baker to decide political questions. The former would leave this state vulnerable to unchecked judicial decision-making in political issues, while the latter would simply cause a reversion to the "seeming disorderliness" in the doctrine that the Supreme Court remedied in Baker. 369 U.S. at 210, 82 S.Ct. 691. Neither option is viable.

. While questioning the use of Baker, the majority cites broad statements supporting the canon that allows state courts of general jurisdiction to impose separate justiciability standards from federal standards. See, eg., William J. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protections of Individual Rights, 90 Harv. L.Rev. 489, 490-92 (1977) courts that rest their decisions wholly or even partly on state law need not apply federal principles of standing and justiciability that deny litigants access to the courts."). The fact that this is a court of general jurisdiction that need not employ Baker is not at issue, but I believe the Baker factors represent a logical and established standard for determining justiciable political questions. This court would be wise to continue using them today.

. Because I find this question nonjusticiable based upon the constitutional commitment in article IX, I find it unnecessary to delve into the more murky interpretive argument posed by defendants regarding amendment 23.

. It is important to note that the cases cited in the Lujan decision each demanded concise answers to straightforward questions. See, eg., Marshall v. Sch. Dst. Re No. 3 Morgan County, 191 Colo. 451, 553 P.2d 784 (1976) (holding that "uniform" does not require equal spending on textbooks); Duncan v. People ex rel. Moser, 89 Colo. 149, 299 P. 1060 (1931) (holding the uniform provision does require a public high school education in every district). Analogizing to this line of succinct answers to education questions, the Lujan court both found the question presented justiciable and issued its basic holding. See Lujan, 649 P.2d at 1024-25.

. Specifically, plaintiffs demand this court devise a standard of adequate funding, which they define to mean "funding sufficient to assure that every school child will have a meaningful opportunity to access a course of study designed and sufficient to fulfill the requirements of the Education Clause, supported by necessary teachers, administrators, support personnel, learning materials, and facilities." Pet'r Reply Br. 2. Such an unbound request for judicial oversight quite simply exceeds the bounds of a constitutional review by this court and instead demands a new, court-imposed financing system.

. It is assumed that the majority borrows the standard from the equal protection discussion in the immediately preceding pages; otherwise, there exists absolutely no explanation for a rational basis standard in this context.

. Specifically, when asked to define its constitutional language "high quality public educational institutions," the Illinois Supreme Court held that:
The constitution provides no principled basis for a judicial definition of high quality. It would be a transparent conceit to suggest that whatever standards of quality courts might develop would actually be derived from the constitution in any meaningful sense. Nor is education a subject within the judiciary's field of expertise, such that a judicial role in giving content to the education guarantee might be warranted. Rather, the question of educational quality is inherently one of policy involving philosophical and practical considerations that call for the exercise of legislative and administrative discretion.
Comm. For Educ. Rights, 220 II.Dec. 166, 672 N.E.2d at 1191.
Also, in a recent case in which the plaintiffs alleged an unconstitutional and "inadequate" public school system because of insufficient funding, the Nebraska Supreme Court held, "[wle interpret the paucity of standards in the free instruction clause as the framers' intent to commit the determination of adequate school funding solely to the Legislature's discretion, greater resources, and expertise." Nebraska Coal. for Educ. Equity & Adequacy v. Heineman, 273 Neb. 531, 731 NW.2d 164, 180 (2007).

. New Jersey's experience is instructive. The New Jersey Supreme Court oversaw education from the bench for decades, "consuming significant funds, fees, time, effort, and court attention. The volume of litigation and the extent of judicial oversight provide a chilling example of the thickets that can entrap a court that takes on the duties of a Legislature." City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 59 (R.1.1995). The New Jersey cases regarding school financing include Abbott v. Burke, 136 N.J. 444, 643 A.2d 575 (1994); Abbott v. Burke, 119 N.J. 287, 575 A.2d 359 (1990); Abbott v. Burke, 100 N.J. 269, 495 A.2d 376 (1985); Robinson v. Cahill, 79 N.J. 464, 360 A.2d 400 (N.J.1976); Robinson v. Cahill, 70 NJ. 155, 358 A.2d 457 (1976); Robinson v. Cahill, 69 N.J. 449, 355 A.2d 129 (1976); Robinson v. Cahill, 69 N.J. 133, 351 A.2d 713 (1975); Robinson v. Cahill, 67 N.J. 333, 339 A.2d 193 (1975); Robinson v. Cahill, 67 N.J. 35, 335 A.2d 6 (N.J.1975), Robinson v. Cahill, 63 N.J. 196, 306 A.2d 65 (1973); and Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973).

. I refrain from discussion of the final two Baker factors because no case has considered them in any significant depth and, more importantly, my finding that all four of the first factors auger against justiciability makes further discussion unnecessary.

. See also Chiles, 680 So.2d at 406-07 ("While the courts are competent to decide whether or not the Legislature's distribution of state funds to complement local education expenditures results in the required 'uniform system," the courts cannot decide whether the Legislature's appropriation of funds is adequate in the abstract, divorced from the required uniformity. 'To decide such an abstract question of 'adequate' funding, the courts would necessarily be required to subjectively evaluate the Legislature's value judgments as to the spending priorities." (emphasis in original)).

. See supra section ILB.