Court Opinion

ID: 9449480
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 16:13:42.786063+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:51.462899
License: Public Domain

KALODNER, Circuit Judge, with whom HASTIE and WILLIAM F. SMITH, Circuit Judges,
join (dissenting).
I would reverse for the reason that the answers of the jury to the interrogatories are so completely inconsistent and contradictory that they do not support the judgment entered by direction of the District Court in favor of the plaintiff.
Plaintiff’s complaint alleged that the defendant was negligent and its vessel was unseaworthy. The complaint of un*306seaworthiness was premised on plaintiff’s contention that the platform in the passageway leading to the linen room was so constructed, that it, and the pipes atop of it, constituted a hazardous condition. The complaint of negligence was also premised on plaintiff’s contention that the platform was a foreseeable hazard to those who had to traverse it, and created an unsafe place to work; other allegations of negligence were that the defendant had ordered plaintiff, unassisted, to perform tasks “which required at least 2 or 3 men”; that defendant had “improperly” ordered “plaintiff to perform unnecessarily dangerous duties”; and that defendant had failed “to provide prompt and adequate medical care and attention and maintenance for the alleviation and cure of plaintiff's injuries.”
The trial judge gave careful and adequate instructions to the jury with respect to the unseaworthiness and negligence issues. With respect to the role played by the platform in the unseaworthiness phase of the case he charged that if the platform were so constructed that it did not permit the conduct of normal shipboard activities, such as the carrying of linen, with “reasonable safety”, the vessel was unseaworthy. With respect to the role played by the platform in the negligence phase of the case the jury was instructed that the defendant was under a duty to provide the plaintiff with a safe place to work and that if the platform was not “reasonably safe” and was not such a platform as a reasonable, prudent person would maintain under the circumstances, knowing that it was there for passage afoot * * * you could find the defendant negligent in maintaining that platform.” 1
The jury’s answer of “No” to interrogatory 2(a) “Was the defendant negligent?” can only be construed as a finding2 that the platform was reasonably safe for the purpose for which it was used by the plaintiff, and its answer of “Yes” to interrogatory 1(a) “Was defendant's ship unseaworthy?" can only be construed as a finding that the platform was not reasonably safe for the use to which it was put by the plaintiff.
There is no possible “view of the case”3 which would permit a reconciliation of the inconsistent and contradictory findings of the jury here.
The inconsistency of the jury’s answers “construed in the light of, and in connection with, the pleadings, instructions, the issues or questions submitted” 4 cannot support the judgment entered by the court below.5
*307Rule 49(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. provides in relevant part:,
“When the answers are ineon-sistent with each other and one or more is likewise inconsistent with the general verdict, the court shall not direct the entry of judgment but may return the jury for further consideration of its answers and ver-diet or may order a new trial.” (emphasis supplied).
t m u -d lnAO In Welch v. Bauer, 186 F.2d 1002 . ,, , , t> i (5 Cir. 1951) it was held that under Rule „„ ... , : , . , , , ■ , 49(b) the trial judge cannot enter a judgv , , . , ,. . ment based on a jury finding m answer , . , . , . , to a special interrogatory where that „ . . . , 7 ... . finding is inconsistent with an answer to . , T t ■ another interrogatory. In so ruling, this Court said (186 F.2d p. 1004):
“The answer to the special issue is completely inconsistent with the general verdict. This being so, this is a case in which, under Rule 49, Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. 28 U.S.C.A. the , . n . *i • • answer to the special issue being m- • j. x -xt. xt. 1 j- x consistent with the general verdict, the court could not enter a judgment on it, but must either return the case to the jury for further consideration of its answers, or grant a new trial. Since he did not return the case to the jury he should have ordered a new trial.”
In 5 Moore, Federal Practice t[49.04, at 2211-2212 (2d ed. 1951), it is said with respect to the force of Rule 49(b):
“Of course, if the answers are inconsistent with each other, and one or more with the general verdict, the court cannot enter judgment upon the basis of any of the findings, and as provided by the Rule, should, not direct the entry of judgment at all, but should return the jury for further deliberation or should order a new trial.” (emphasis supplied)
It should be noted at this point that Rule 49(b) has been amended, effective July 1, 1963, to provide that “judgment shall not be entered”, when the answers to written interrogatories are inconsistent, in substitution for the prior provision that “the court shall not direct the entry of judgment.” The purpose of the amendment was to make it clear beyond cavil that judgments are invalid when entered on inconsistent answers. p _____ - , ., Rule 49(b) as now amended provides +-u„x , • • , . . that when inconsistent answers are given xi,Q + - n x ,, . „ the trial court shall return the jury for , ,• „ . , further consideration of its answers and . . , „ verdict or shall order a new trial. The „nlk„n„ . . ,, word shall” was m substitution for the d „ /emt)hasic. „nrm,ip.n WOra MC J ’ ^emPüasis supplied)
. ^he impaf eV? in “S Jate prior t° ^ “f6 the judgment directed by the trial judge m the_ instant case invalid That being ^ 18 ^material that the question of the invalidity of the judgment was not . , . , . , , , raised m the trial court or here,
. Although I do not deem it to be matebn view of what has been said, it should be observed that the majority s view that the issue of inconsistent answers cannot be considered on this apPea^ because it was never urged or argued in the court below” is not supported by the cases which it has cited.6 In all of these eases it was merely held that a trial judge’s rulings on evidence cannot be challenged on appeal when they were not urged in the trial court. In one the cases was there present the circumstances of inconsistent answers.
Again, it may be pointed out that in Thorp v. American Aviation and General Insurance Company, 3 Cir., 212 F.2d 821 (1954) we observed (212 F.2d p. 825) *308“there may be exceptional cases which will prompt an appellate court to consider grounds of error not raised below * * * where injustice might otherwise result.”
In the instant case even independent of the compelling impact of Rule 49(b), it is clear that the trial judge’s error in entering judgment on the jury’s inconsistent answers was so fundamental in nature as to require this court’s consideration and reversal even though not urged below.
For the reasons stated I would reverse the judgment of the court below with directions to grant a new trial.

. The trial judge also submitted to the jury the contentions that defendant was negligent “in asking the plaintiff to do this work without assistance * * * and * * * in actually failing to assign him assistants.” (N.T. p. 509) He did not charge with respect to the complaint’s allegation of negligent failure to provide “prompt and adequate medical care” since no evidence had been adduced on that score and the plaintiff in his “Requests for Charge” had not even adverted to it.

. The answer of “No” to the interrogatory relating to negligence also embraced the issue of the failure to give plaintiff adequate assistance in carrying the linen bags. It may be noted parenthetically that plaintiff limited his “Requests for Charge” on the score of negligence to these points: “creating or maintaining any hose, line, platform or other such obstruction which may have constituted an unsafe place to work * * * ” and * * * ordering, requesting or permitting “plaintiff to carry the bags of linen * * * without providing him with assistance.”

. See Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Ellerman Lines Ltd., 369 U.S. 355, 364, S2 S.Ct. 780, 7 L.Ed.2d 798 (1962).

. Martin v. Swift, 258 F.2d 797, 799 (3 Cir. 1958); Halprin v. Mora, 231 F.2d 197, 201 (3 Cir. 1956). To the same effect see Missouri Pacific Railroad Company v. Salazar, 254 F.2d 847 (5 Cir. 1958).

. The jury here did not return a general verdict in favor of the plaintiff. The trial judge ordered judgment in favor of the plaintiff “in accordance with the jury’s answers to questions submitted.” These questions related only to the issues of unseaworthiness and negligence of the defendant and contributory negligence on *307the part of plaintiff. In response to the question “Irrespective of your answers to 1, 2 and 3, state, in dollars, the total amount of damages suffered by the plaintiff,” the jury answered “$12,500.00.”

. Roberts v. United States and Union Carbide Corp., 316 F.2d 489, 497 (3 Cir. 1963); Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Association v. Francis, 148 F.2d 590 (8 Cir. 1945); Boeing Airplane Co. v. Brown, 291 F.2d 310 (9 Cir. 1961); Burke v. Lincoln Transit Co., 37 N.J.Super. 438, 117 A.2d 521 (1955).