Court Opinion

ID: 9783462
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 19:46:16.16985+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:35:23.864123
License: Public Domain

Justice HOBBS
dissents.
I respectfully dissent. Colorado residents Herman and Bebra Jenkins, Rainey and Na-thanial Estes, Bonnie Bills, and Travis Law (collectively "Jenkins") sustained injures in a train accident while on vacation in Panama. Jenkins filed this lawsuit in the district court within two years of the injuries. In my view, the majority incorrectly applies Panama's one-year limitations period by invoking the borrowing - statute. § 13-80-110, CRS. (2008). Instead, Colorado's Uniform Conflict of Laws-Limitations Act ("UCLLA"), see-tions 13-82-1011 to -107, C.R.S. (2008), in particular, the fairness provision of section 13-82-106, should apply to this case to effectuate the General Assembly's policy that a two-year statute of limitations is the shortest period required for filing a personal injury lawsuit. See § 13-80-102, CRS. (2008). The UCLLA's fairness provision, section 183-82-106, states that:
If the court determines that the limitation period of another state applicable under sections 18-82-104 and 13-82-105 is substantially different from the limitation period of this state and has not afforded a fair opportunity to sue upon or imposes an unfair burden in defending against the claim, the limitation period of this state applies.
Thus, the fairness provision allows a court to apply Colorado's limitation period when another state's substantially different limitation period has not afforded a fair opportunity to sue or imposes an unfair burden in defending against the claim. § 183-82-106.
The UCLLA should apply in this case for several reasons: (1) it is the more specific statute because it includes a fairness provision for resolving conflicts between limitations statutes, a provision the more general borrowing statute does not contain, (2) the legislature did not intend for the borrowing statute to prevail over the UCLLA in circumstances such as this case, and (8) fairness and public policy reasons of the General Assembly require such a result.
When a court is faced with irreconcilable statutes, it first considers whether those statutes address the same class of cases, and if they do, then the specific provision prevails over the general one, unless the legislature evidences a manifest intent that the more recently enacted general provision should prevail. § 2-4-205, C.R.S. (2008); People v. Smith, 971 P.2d 1056, 1058 (Colo.1999). If specificity fails to resolve the conflict, then the more recent statute may prevail. See City of Florence v. Pepper, 145 P.3d 654, 657, 660 (Colo.2006). If neither of these canons resolves the conflict, then public policy and common law doctrine dictate that the statute with the longer limitations period governs. Reg'l Transp. Dist. v. Voss, 890 P.2d 663, 668 (Colo.1995); see Dawson v. Reider, 872 P.2d 212, 214 (Colo.1994); see also Jones v. Cox, 828 P.2d 218, 222 (Colo.1992).
A. The UCLLA is the More Specific Statute
In my view, the majority is correct in finding that the UCLLA and the borrowing statute are irreconcilable and the court must first ask whether the UCLLA is the more specific statute. The UCLLA and the borrowing statute both address the same class *245of cases. Consequently, section 2-4-205 requires us to determine whether the UCLLA is more specific than the borrowing statute. Since the General Assembly has not exhibit, ed any manifest intent that the more general borrowing statute should prevail over the TUCLLA, the UCLLA governs the filing of Jenkins' lawsuit.
In drawing its conclusion that the two statutes address different classes of cases, the majority reasons that "the statutes are defined by different terms. The borrowing statute assigns a limitations period based on where a case arose. In contrast, the [UCL-LA] assigns a limitations period based on what substantive law applies to a case, along with the fairness doctrine operating in the escape clause." Maj. op. at 248. However, the plain wording of the UCLLA states that it applies when there is a conflict with the statute of limitations law of another "state." Under section 13-82-1083(2), C.R.S. (2008), the term "state" includes "a foreign country." 1 So, too, the borrowing statute, section 13-80-110, provides that it applies to a cause of action arising in "a foreign country."
In differentiating the two statutes, the Majority focuses on the General Assembly's specific language. The UCLLA applies "if the claim is substantively based" on the law of another state, while the borrowing statute applies a cause of action arises in another state." Yet this language does not differentiate the two statutes. The UCLLA does consider whether a claim is substantively based on another state's law. § 18-82-104. The borrowing statute does the same thing; but, instead of using the words "if a claim is substantively based," it considers whether a claim arises "by the laws [of another state]." § 13-80-110 ("If a cause of action arises in another state or territory or in a foreign country and, by the laws thereof .. ..") (emphasis added).
Though the language of the two statutes is different, the meaning of those words is no different. Both consider the laws of foreign states in deciding what statute of limitations applies when a conflict arises. In footnote 3, the majority, noting concessions made by respondents' counsel, attempts to distinguish the terms of the two statutes by arguing that where the case arose and what substantive law applies "are terms with different meanings." Maj. op. at 248 n. 3. Though this is correct, the majority frames the question incorrectly to conclude the two statutes have differing terms. Id. The terms may not be exact matches, but they are similar enough in that both statutes address conflicts of law situations generally, and more specifically, the conflicts of law question at issue here.
Given these similar terms, the fairness provision defines the UCLLA as the more specific of the two statutes because it addresses the General Assembly's overarching fairness concerns by adding an element that is not present in the borrowing statute, thus providing an exception. See maj. op. at 242 (noting that "similar terms" are enough for one statute to function as an exception to another). Therefore, the two statutes do not use "different factors to assign a limitations period" as the majority suggests. Maj. op. at 248.
In contrast to the UCLLA, the borrowing statute is more general in its language, simply adopting the limitations period of another state without considering fairness. § 183-80-110. Arguments can be made to portray each statute as more specific than the other, but the General Assembly's insertion of the fairness provision indicates that the UCLLA is the more specific statute. See maj. op. at 242.
In my view, the borrowing statute could prevail only if the General Assembly's "manifest intent" demonstrated for the borrowing statute to do so. § 2-4-205. A review of the legislative history demonstrates no such manifest intent.
B. Legislative History
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws drafted the UCL-LA in 1982 and recommended that all states adopt the law. National Conference of Com*246missioners on Uniform State Laws, Uniform Conflict of Laiws-Limutations Act (approved and recommended for enactment in all states, July 30-Aug. 6, 1982). The American Bar Association approved the commission's recommendation at its February 1983 meeting. Id. In 1984, Colorado adopted the UCLLA.
Two years earlier, the Colorado Bar Association ("CBA") had begun studying reforms to Colorado's limitations periods and, throughout the hearings on the 1984 bill in the House and Senate, made no objection to repealing the borrowing statute. CBA Proposal on Statutes of Limitation: Consolidation and Simplification, 12 Colo. Law. 10 at 1617 (Oct.1983); see, eg., Hearings on HB 1141 before the House Judiciary Committee, 54th Gen. Assembly, 2nd Reg. Sess. (audio tape, Jan. 12, 1984, at 2:20-2:80 PM). More importantly, no legislator voiced concern over the UCLLA's explicit repeal of the borrowing statute, which had been in effect since 1921. See, eg., Hearings on HB 1141 before the House Judiciary Committee, 54th Gen. Assembly, 2nd Reg. Sess. (audio tape, Jan. 12, 1984, at 2:20-2:80 PM).
Notably, the CBA had published its proposed recommendations on the consolidation and simplification of Colorado's statutes of limitations in the October 1988 issue of the Colorado Lawyer: the year prior to the adoption of the UCLLA. CBA Proposal on Statutes of Limitation: Consolidation and Simplification, 12 Colo. Law. 10 at 1617. The 1985 report of Governor Richard Lamm's Special Task Force on Tort Liability and Insurance included the entire proposal, which the General Assembly largely adopted in 1986. See Liability Insurance and the Law of Torts in Colorado, Problems and Remedies at F-9 (Jan.1986). These documents do not evidence any intent to negate the UCLLA's applicability. Inexplicably, the borrowing statute appeared in the 1986 bill, and it appears that no one commented on the possibility that it might override the UCL-LA. Thus, I respectfully disagree with the majority's assumption that the General Assembly was aware of its prior enactment of the UCLLA and "that by passing an irrecon-clilable statute at a later date the legislature intended to alter the prior statute." Maj. op. at 241.
To the contrary, the General Assembly was not made aware of the conflict it created when it re-enacted the borrowing statute two years later as part of a larger statutory scheme. The focus of the 1986 reform of limitation periods was not conflict of laws. Rather, this reform centered on the state's insurance crisis with limitations periods in civil actions but a small part. The blue ribbon task force, created by Governor Lamm and the General Assembly to address Colorado's insurance crisis, explicitly concluded that a one-year statute of limitations period was too short because:
(a) It would encourage precipitous filing of lawsuits;
(b) It would be inconsistent with our proposed amendment to C.R.C.P. 11, which places greater responsibility on counsel to ascertain that there is a good basis for the suit;
(c) More than one year is often needed to ascertain the extent of injury and damages;
(d) California has a one-year statute, but so many exceptions have been created that it has become virtually unworkable; and
(e) It is desirable to have a "cooling-off period," which a one-year statute of limitations does not permit.
Liability Insurance and the Law of Torts in Colorado, Problems and Remedies at 53.
The General Assembly adopted the UCL-LA to address conflict of laws situations such as this, There is no reasonable basis to believe, with regard to the case before us, that the General Assembly intended anything other than a two-year statute of limitations as being applicable to a case such as Jen-king'. Every time since 1984 that it has been asked to specifically consider the length of a personal injury statute of limitations, the General Assembly has chosen a two-year statute as the minimum applicable period. § 13-80-102 (adopting, in 1986, a general two-year limitations period for civil actions).
Applicability of the borrowing statute in the case before us does not comport with the General Assembly's reform goals and con*247flicts with the General Assembly's choice of a two-year limitations period as being the minimum applicable period. See Reg'l Transp. Dist., 890 P.2d at 669; Jones, 828 P.2d at 223; § 2-4-201(1)(c), C.R.S. (2008) ("In enacting a statute, it is presumed that ... [al just and reasonable result is intended.").
In Regional Transportation District, we resolved the case in favor of the longer limitations period. 890 P.2d at 668 (recognizing that "because statutes of limitations are in derogation of a presumptively valid claim, a longer period of limitations should prevail where two statutes are arguably applicable"); see Dawson, 872 P.2d at 214; see also Jones, 828 P.2d at 222. We "buttressed" this conclusion with "notions of fairness." Reg'l Tranps. Dist., 890 P.2d at 669. We observed that plaintiffs "timely notified the RTD of their injuries and of their intent to commence civil proceedings against it. The RTD thus had ample time to prepare to defend itself." Id. at 669-70. Thus, we concluded that "(all-though the respondents' civil action was filed more than two years after they discovered their injuries, the RTD has not suggested that in this case it was prejudiced." Id. at 669-70..
In this case, Jenkins was injured in Panama and refused treatment there because he was required to first sign a release form in Spanish-a language he did not speak-and was not treated until he returned to Colorado. Sophisticated businesses such as defendants, the Panama Canal Railway Company and the Kansas City Southern Railway Company, could reasonably assume the persons injured while utilizing their services would seek some sort of redress for their injuries.
Jenkins, like most tort plaintiffs, had to decide whether to pursue his tort claim, decide where to pursue it, seek out counsel, gather the facts, and file his case. Particularly when the injury occurs in a foreign country, accomplishing this in a short period of time is not what the General Assembly intended. The General Assembly included a fairness provision in the UCLLA to address just such unfairness as exists in this case.
Accordingly, because the UCLLA is the more specific statute and because the General Assembly has concluded that fairness dictates a two-year minimum limitation period on personal injury actions, I respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that CHIEF JUSTICE MULLARKEY joins in this dissent.

. "State" is defined by section 13-82-103(2), C.R.S. (2008), as "a state, commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, a foreign country, or a political subdivision of any of them."