Court Opinion

ID: 9658440
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 21:00:07.427678+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:55.290376
License: Public Domain

Allen, J.
(dissenting). Respectfully, I disagree that the township’s use of the property was neither hostile nor exclusive.
I know of no act exhibiting more hostility than *750bringing in a bulldozer, leveling the natural terrain of the land, and cutting trees. This was done in 1948. Nor can I conceive of conduct which would more clearly indicate ownership in the township than erecting. signs declaring that the property was a township park. While plaintiffs Cummings contend that there were no signs until a large four-foot by five-foot sign was erected in 1974, other witnesses stated that smaller signs had been erected in the 1950’s. The trial judge who saw the witnesses and was best able to determine credibility chose to believe that signs had been erected on the property long before 1974. The testimony of Truman H. Cummings, Jr., evidenced the township’s hostile claim when he explained that he had recently platted his property but didn’t attempt to include the 33 feet which he owned of the parcel in question "because we were afraid we wouldn’t get the okay of the township if we did”. The majority opinion acknowledges that physical possession was held by the township and that the township’s use of the property was open and notorious. Under such circumstances, hostility is presumed according to Michigan law.
"In Dubois v Karazin, 315 Mich 598, the Court quoted with approval from Greene v Anglemire, 77 Mich 168, as follows:
" 'When the possession is by actual occupation of the possessor, or by his tenants, under claim of title, his possession is visible, open, notorious, distinct, and will be presumed to be hostile. In such case the conditions are all sufficiently complied with to make the possession adverse, and sufficiently notified to other claimants, or parties interested.’ ” Walker v Bowen, 333 Mich 13, 22; 52 NW2d 574 (1952).
Nor am I persuaded that, merely because Truman H. Cummings, Jr., testified that better than *751once a month he picked up trash and informed third-party visitors that overnight camping was prohibited, the necessary element of exclusiveness was not established. I don’t believe this single claim is sufficient to rebut the overwhelming testimony of some 15 long-time residents connoting exclusivity. Furthermore, Cummings admitted that when problems arose concerning noise, litter, fire and the cutting down of trees, the other property owners in the area would complain to the township. That testimony indicates that people in the area believed that the township, rather than the plaintiffs, was the owner of the property.
Finally, I cannot agree that, on the facts before us, the deciding factor on the element of hostility is that the property descriptions in tax bills included the small park area. The tax bill to the Cummingses described 433 feet of Lake Michigan frontage of which the park property was. only 33 feet. The tax bill to plaintiffs Bachus described 14.12 acres of which the park property was only 33 feet. Therefore, we do not have the situation found in Levering v City of Tarpon Springs, 92 So 2d 638, 639 (Fla, 1957), and cited by the majority where the taxing unit claims adverse possession to all or a major portion of the property described in the tax bill.1
The situation in the instant case is more like that found in Dunnick v Stockgrowers Bank of Marmouth, 191 Neb 370; 215 NW2d 93 (1974), also *752cited by the majority. There the trial court had quieted title in the City of Dakota City to that portion of accretion land used by the public as a road. There was ample evidence that from 1959 on the property had been used by the public as a road and had been maintained by the city. On appeal, plaintiff claimed that it had been paying taxes on a larger parcel of which the portion used as a roadway was a part and, hence, adverse possession could not be acquired by the city. The Supreme Court disagreed, saying:
"Plaintiffs also assert that the city cannot obtain any title or rights by adverse possession or use of this real estate because it accepted payment of taxes on the land from plaintiffs. Cases cited in support of the proposition are largely from states which have statutes requiring payment of taxes on property as a necessary element of proof of adverse possession. Payment of taxes is not a necessary element of adverse possession unless made so by express statutory requirement. There is no such statutory provision in this state. The payment of taxes is an element and circumstance which may be considered together with all the circumstances of the case with respect to the subject of adverse possession. Wells v Tietge, 143 Neb 230; 9 NW2d 180 [1943], In view of the nature and description of the land, and the facts and circumstances here, the acceptance of taxes by the city did not create an estoppel nor bar its acquisition of title through adverse possession and use of the property by the public.” Id., 373-374.
Two witnesses, one a former township assessor and the other the current township assessor, testified that where a right-of-way or street marked the outer boundary of the property to be assessed, it was the township’s practice to include the right-of-way or street in the property description but not include it as part of the property taxed. This *753testimony was not rebutted by plaintiffs and the trial judge found:
"Annual tax statements by defendant to the plaintiffs contained the general descriptions of the real estate owned by the respective plaintiffs on either side of the section common to sections 32 and 5, including the 'parcel’ in question. While this is true, it does not necessarily follow that the taxes so paid by the plaintiffs on the property described on the tax statements included taxes paid on the 'parcel’ of land in dispute. On the contrary, in this case it would seem [that] the opposite were true. The 'parcel’ represented a portion of land acquired by the defendant for the construction of a roadway known as Middle Road. Although the township may not have altered descriptions on tax statements to conform with its acquisition of land for construction of the roadway, taxpayers abutting the roadway could not believe that they were paying taxes on property legally acquired by defendant for highway purposes. Therefore, plaintiffs claim, standing alone, as it does, does not defeat defendant’s claim of adverse possession.”
Accordingly, I disagree with the majority that it was necessary to introduce further testimony that in this case the 33-foot parcels were not taxed. A trial court’s finding of fact of adverse possession may not be overturned unless clearly erroneous. De Hollander v Holwerda Greenhouses, 45 Mich App 564, 566; 207 NW2d 187 (1973). Given the overwhelming testimony of open and notorious use of the property by the public — testimony controverted only by one witness, Truman Cummings, Jr., "chutzpah” or not, I am not persuaded the trial court clearly erred.

 In Levering, plaintiffs were owners of tract 146, a parcel 300 feet north and south and 922 feet east and west. In 1926, the city mistakenly built its waterworks plant on the north half of tract 146, and on the south half of tract 147 (owned by the city). The mistake wasn’t discovered until 1955 but during the intervening period the city had sent tax bills to plaintiffs for the entire tract and plaintiffs had paid. The city sought to acquire title by adverse possession but the court held that collecting taxes showed the city’s ownership was not hostile.