Court Opinion

ID: 9384430
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-03 19:11:21.716804+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:53.404791
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA

                    January 2023 Term                  FILED
                                                  April 3, 2023
                  _____________________
                                                    released at 3:00 p.m.
                                                EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK
                       No. 21-0438              SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
                                                     OF WEST VIRGINIA

                  _____________________

EVERETT FRAZIER, COMMISSIONER OF THE WEST VIRGINIA
           DIVISION OF MOTOR VEHICLES,
               Petitioner below, Petitioner,

                            v.

                 RAYMOND BURCKER,
               Respondent below, Respondent.

_________________________________________________________

                           AND

                  _____________________

                       No. 21-0686

                  _____________________

EVERETT FRAZIER, COMMISSIONER OF THE WEST VIRGINIA
           DIVISION OF MOTOR VEHICLES,
               Petitioner below, Petitioner,

                            v.

                    AARON POWERS,
               Respondent below, Respondent.
       ___________________________________________________________

                  Appeals from the Circuit Court of Kanawha County
                      The Honorable Jennifer F. Bailey, Judge
                    Civil Action Nos. 19-AA-75 and 19-AA-122

                               AFFIRMED
        _________________________________________________________

                             Submitted: January 11, 2023
                                Filed: April 3, 2023

Patrick Morrisey, Esq.                           Raymond Burcker
Attorney General                                 Charles Town, West Virginia
Elaine L. Skorich, Esq.                          Self-Represented Respondent
Assistant Attorney General
Charleston, West Virginia                        B. Craig Manford, Esq,
Counsel for Petitioner                           Martinsburg, West Virginia
                                                 Counsel for Respondent Powers

JUSTICE HUTCHISON delivered the Opinion of the Court.

JUSTICE ARMSTEAD dissents and reserves the right to file a dissenting opinion.
                              SYLLABUS OF THE COURT

              1.     “Upon judicial review of a contested case under the West Virginia

Administrative Procedure Act, Chapter 29A, Article 5, Section 4(g), the circuit court may

affirm the order or decision of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings. The

circuit court shall reverse, vacate or modify the order or decision of the agency if the

substantial rights of the petitioner or petitioners have been prejudiced because the

administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, decisions or order are: ‘(1) In violation of

constitutional or statutory provisions; or (2) In excess of the statutory authority or

jurisdiction of the agency; or (3) Made upon unlawful procedures; or (4) Affected by other

error of law; or (5) Clearly wrong in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence

on the whole record; or (6) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion

or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.’” Syl. Pt. 2, Shepherdstown Volunteer Fire

Department v. State ex rel. State of West Virginia Human Rights Commission, 172 W. Va.

627, 309 S.E.2d 342 (1983).

              2. “On appeal of an administrative order from a circuit court, this Court is

bound by the statutory standards contained in W. Va. Code § 29A–5–4(a) and reviews

questions of law presented de novo; findings of fact by the administrative officer are

accorded deference unless the reviewing court believes the findings to be clearly wrong.”

Syl. Pt. 1, Muscatell v. Cline, 196 W. Va. 588, 474 S.E.2d 518 (1996).

                                              i
             3. “The determination of whether a circuit court applied the proper legal

standard is a question of law we review de novo.” Syl. Pt. 1, Hubbard v. State Farm

Indemnity Co., 213 W. Va. 542, 584 S.E.2d 176 (2003).

      .

                                          ii
HUTCHISON, Justice:

                 West Virginia Code of State Rules § 64-10-8, entitled Blood Analysis;

Standards and Methods, sets forth—as its title suggests—the standards and methods the

West Virginia Bureau of Public Health has established to ensure the accuracy of blood tests

administered to determine the amount of ethyl alcohol in a person’s blood. See id. § 64-10-

8.1 (“Methods of analyzing blood specimens for ethyl alcohol shall meet the following

standards[.]”). In Frazier v. Corley, No. 18-1033, 2020 WL 1493971, at *5 (W. Va. Mar.

26, 2020) (memorandum decision), pet’n for rehearing refused (June 16, 2020), this Court

unanimously concluded that absent evidence that a diagnostic blood test complied with the

requirements of West Virginia Code of State Rules § 64-10-8, the Office of Administrative

Hearings (OAH) was justified in discounting the accuracy of any blood test results for the

purposes of an aggravated DUI enhancement.

                 In the two cases now before us, 1 the Commissioner basically asks us to

overrule Corley. Because the Commissioner presents us with no legitimate reasons for

doing so, we decline the Commissioner’s request and reaffirm that in the absence of

evidence that a diagnostic blood test complied with the requirements of West Virginia Code

of State Rules § 64-10-8, the OAH is justified in discounting the accuracy of any blood test

       1
           We have consolidated these two cases as they both present the same legal issue.

                                               1
results for the purposes of an aggravated DUI enhancement. Therefore, we affirm the

judgments of the circuit court.

                         I.       Facts and Procedural Background 2

   A. Facts in No. 21-0438

              On February 23, 2012, Raymond Burcker was driving a car involved in a

three-vehicle traffic accident. While the police officer investigating the accident (the

Investigating Officer) found that Mr. Burcker did not contribute to causing the accident,

the Investigating Officer nevertheless suspected Mr. Burcker may have been under the

influence of alcohol while driving based upon observations related to the Investigating

Officer by the emergency medical personnel and by hospital staff. 3

       The appendix records in these cases contain the entire administrative records from
       2

the OAH. We remind counsel and parties appearing in this Court of West Virginia Rule of
Appellate Procedure 6(b), which provides:

           Parties on appeal are discouraged from including the entire record of the
       case in the lower tribunal in an appendix record or a designated record. The
       record on appeal should be selectively abridged by the parties in order to
       permit the Intermediate Court or the Supreme Court to easily refer to relevant
       parts of the record and to save the parties the expense of reproducing the
       entire record.
       3
        No field sobriety tests were conducted due to a head injury Mr. Burcker suffered
in the accident.

                                             2
              At the hospital, Mr. Burcker was given a diagnostic blood test. 4 Afterwards,

the Investigating Officer obtained a search warrant for Mr. Burcker’s medical records. The

medical records showed Mr. Burcker’s blood alcohol concentration was .23 g/dL of serum.

Applying the formula set out in West Virginia Code of State Rules § 64-10-8.2(d) (2005),

a blood alcohol concentration of .23g/dL translates into a blood alcohol level of .198%.

              On March 17, 2012, the Investigating Officer spoke to Mr. Burcker, who

admitted to consuming a bottle and a half of Nyquil and a Coors beer between 1 p.m. and

6 p.m. on February 12, 2012. The Commissioner revoked Mr. Burcker’s driver’s license

for driving with a blood alcohol level of .15% or greater (or what is commonly termed

aggravated DUI). 5 Mr. Burcker sought an administrative hearing before the OAH.

       4
        A diagnostic blood test is one conducted to diagnose, evaluate, and treat a patient.
Law enforcement officers are not involved in ordering a diagnostic test. Tests conducted
at the direction of law enforcement officers, or forensic tests, are administered to obtain
potential evidence of a crime. See State v. Miller, No. 21-0378, 2022 WL 856614, at *3
(W. Va. Mar. 23, 2022) (memorandum decision).

       Aggravated DUI carries with it enhanced penalties beyond those imposed for non-
       5

aggravated DUI. W. Va. Code § 17C-5A-2(k)(1) (2010) (version applicable to Mr.
Burcker); see also W. Va. Code § 17C-5A-2(k)(1) (2015) (version applicable to Mr.
Powers).

                                             3
              At the OAH administrative hearing, Mr. Burcker’s counsel 6 objected to Mr.

Burcker’s medical records being admitted into evidence:

                     [HEARING       EXAMINER]:         Do   you   object    to
              (unintelligible)?

                     [MR. BURCKER’S COUNSEL]: Yeah, particularly the
              medical records, Your Honor. I mean, without any foundation
              or any type of – I mean, they could be admitted into the file,
              but what consideration is given, I mean, there’s zero
              foundation and zero medical personnel here. So, I mean, how
              was the sample collected? What was – was any deformity [sic]
              with the health regs, and all the things that would be needed to
              give any kind of validity and foundation to you considering
              blood evidence.

              The Hearing Examiner admitted Mr. Burcker’s medical records into

evidence but concluded whatever weight they should be afforded would be determined

after all the evidence was presented at the hearing.

              The OAH affirmed the revocation of Mr. Burcker’s license, but it rescinded

the portion of the revocation for aggravated DUI. 7 The OAH concluded that since there

was no evidence that the diagnostic blood test was conducted consistent with West Virginia

Code of State Rules § 64-10-8, the test results could not be used to show a blood alcohol

       Mr. Burcker was represented by counsel before the OAH. He is self-represented in
       6

this Court.
       7
        A non-aggravated DUI can be established either by proof that a driver had a BAC
of .08% or more or proof that the driver was impaired by consumption of alcohol while
driving. Albrecht v. State, 173 W. Va. 268, 271, 314 S.E.2d 859, 862 (1984). In the latter
case, a chemical test is not required proof. See id., Syl. Pt. 1.
                                             4
content of .15%. or greater. The Commissioner appealed the OAH’s decision to rescind

Mr. Burcker’s aggravated DUI to the circuit court. The circuit court affirmed the OAH

finding that “[i]n the complete absence of evidence that the blood diagnostic was performed

in compliance with the Code of State Rules, the OAH was justified in assigning no weight

to the results for the purpose of an aggravated enhancement.” The Commissioner timely

appealed to this Court.

   B. Facts in No. 21-0686

              On August 6, 2017, Aaron Powers was involved in a single vehicle accident.

At the accident scene, the Investigating Officer observed that Mr. Powers’ speech was

“pretty much unintelligible.” Mr. Powers’ eyes were red and watery, and he smelled of an

alcoholic beverage. There were two boxes of Bud Light brand beer in Mr. Powers’ car, and

several empty beer bottles were scattered about the vehicle. Field sobriety tests were not

administered because, when the Investigating Officer arrived, Mr. Powers was being

treated by emergency medical providers. Mr. Powers was taken to the hospital where his

blood was drawn at the direction of medical personnel. The Investigating Officer obtained

a search warrant for Mr. Powers’ medical records. The medical records showed a blood

serum concentration of .242 mg/dL which, applying the formula contained in West

Virginia Code of State Rules § 64-10-8.4(d), translated to a .208% alcohol concentration

in the blood. The Commissioner revoked Mr. Powers’ driver’s license for aggravated DUI,

and Mr. Powers sought a hearing before the OAH.

                                            5
              At the administrative license revocation hearing, Mr. Powers’ counsel

objected to the admission of the blood test evidence because there was no showing that the

blood testing satisfied West Virginia Code of State Rules § 64-10-8. The OAH admitted

Mr. Power’ medical records. While the final order stated that the OAH did “not afford the

‘result’ of the blood analysis any weight in deciding this matter,” the OAH nevertheless

considered the blood evidence as “relevant evidence that [Mr. Powers] had consumed

alcoholic beverages[.]” The OAH affirmed the revocation of Mr. Powers’ license but

rescinded the aggravated portion of the revocation. The circuit court affirmed the OAH.

The circuit court found that absent evidence that the blood was drawn according to West

Virginia Code of State Rules § 64-10-8 “it was not error for the OAH to discount the

accuracy of the blood diagnostic results and assign the results no weight for the purpose of

an aggravated enhancement.” The Commissioner timely appealed to this Court.

                                 II.    Standard of Review

              When the Commissioner appeals from a circuit court order in an

administrative license revocation case, this Court applies the same standard of review that

the circuit court applied. Ullom v. Miller, 227 W. Va. 1, 7, 705 S.E.2d 111, 117 (2010).

That standard is contained in the West Virginia Administrative Procedures Act as “[a]n

administrative revocation of a driver’s license is required to be appealed under the

                                             6
provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act, W.Va. Code, 29A–5–4.” Harper v.

Bechtold, 180 W. Va. 674, 675-76, 379 S.E.2d 397, 398-99 (1989).

             In Syllabus Point 2 of Shepherdstown Volunteer Fire Department v. State ex

rel. State of West Virginia Human Rights Commission, 172 W. Va. 627, 309 S.E.2d 342

(1983), we explained:

                     Upon judicial review of a contested case under the West
             Virginia Administrative Procedure Act, Chapter 29A, Article
             5, Section 4(g), the circuit court may affirm the order or
             decision of the agency or remand the case for further
             proceedings. The circuit court shall reverse, vacate or modify
             the order or decision of the agency if the substantial rights of
             the petitioner or petitioners have been prejudiced because the
             administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, decisions or
             order are: “(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory
             provisions; or (2) In excess of the statutory authority or
             jurisdiction of the agency; or (3) Made upon unlawful
             procedures; or (4) Affected by other error of law; or (5) Clearly
             wrong in view of the reliable, probative and substantial
             evidence on the whole record; or (6) Arbitrary or capricious or
             characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted
             exercise of discretion.”

             In applying the above standards, we expounded that we review questions of

law under a de novo standard while factual findings are reviewed only for clear error:

                     On appeal of an administrative order from a circuit
             court, this Court is bound by the statutory standards contained
             in W. Va. Code § 29A–5–4(a) and reviews questions of law
             presented de novo; findings of fact by the administrative officer
             are accorded deference unless the reviewing court believes the
             findings to be clearly wrong.

Syl. Pt. 1, Muscatell v. Cline, 196 W. Va. 588, 474 S.E.2d 518 (1996).

                                            7
              Finally, we have held that “[t]he determination of whether a circuit court

applied the proper legal standard is a question of law we review de novo.” Syl. Pt. 1,

Hubbard v. State Farm Indem. Co., 213 W. Va. 542, 584 S.E.2d 176 (2003). With these

standards in mind, we now address the issues at hand.

                                     III. Discussion

              The Commissioner claims that the OAH erred in refusing to give weight to

diagnostic blood test results, even though the DMV did not establish that such tests met the

criteria of West Virginia Code of State Rules § 64-10-8. 8 The Commissioner appears to

       8
        At the time of the blood draws in both Mr. Burcker’s and Mr. Powers’ cases, West
Virginia Code of State Rules § 64-8-10 (2005) provided:

              8.1. Methods of analyzing blood specimens for ethyl alcohol
              shall meet the following standards:

              (a) The method used shall be capable of separating and
              quantifying ethyl alcohol from the blood specimen;

              (b) The method used shall be capable of the analysis of a
              reference sample of known alcohol concentration within
              accuracy and precision limits of plus or minus 0.01 grams per
              cent W/V of the true value. These limits shall be applied to
              alcohol concentrations which are 0.01 grams per cent W/V or
              higher;

              (c) The method used shall be capable of blood alcohol analysis
              which results in a concentration less than 0.01 grams of alcohol
              per one hundred milliliters of blood when alcohol free persons
              are tested; and

                                             8
             (d) The gas-chromatographic method meets the standards in
             this subsection for testing.

             8.2. Blood for alcohol analysis shall be collected as follows:

             (a) The blood shall be drawn only by a licensed doctor of
             medicine or osteopathy, registered professional nurse, trained
             medical technician or any medical professional trained in
             phlebotomy;

             (b) Sterile hypodermic needles and syringes shall be used.
             Sterile disposable units are recommended;

             (c) The skin shall not be disinfected with ethyl alcohol. The use
             of non-alcoholic antiseptics, those which do not contain ethyl
             alcohol, including 1-1000 aqueous solution of mercuric
             chloride, aqueous benzalkonium chloride (zephiran), aqueous
             merthiolate, or other suitable aqueous disinfectants is
             acceptable;

             (d) The quantity of alcohol found in serum shall be divided by
             a factor of 1.16 to determine the quantity of alcohol in the
             blood; and

             (e) The container (tube or vial) shall be clean and dry, and have
             an inert, airtight stopper.

The current version of West Virginia Code of State Rules § 64-10-8 (2022) provides:

             8.1. Methods of analyzing blood specimens for ethyl alcohol
                 shall meet the following standards:

             8.1.1. The method used shall be capable of separating and
                 quantifying ethyl alcohol from the blood specimen;

             8.1.2. The method used shall be capable of the analysis of a
                 reference sample of known alcohol concentration within
                 accuracy and precision limits of plus or minus 0.01 grams
                 per cent W/V of the true value. These limits shall be applied
                 to alcohol concentrations which are 0.01 grams per cent
                 W/V or higher;

                                            9
recognize that the OAH’s and the circuit court’s decisions comply with Corley. The

Commissioner therefore attacks Corley and, implicitly, seeks to have it overruled. We

reject the Commissioner’s arguments and reaffirm Corley.

             8.1.3. The method used shall be capable of blood alcohol
                 analysis which results in a concentration less than 0.01
                 grams of alcohol per one hundred milliliters of blood when
                 alcohol free persons are tested; and

             8.1.4. The gas-chromatographic method meets the standards in
                 this subsection for testing.

             8.2. Blood for alcohol analysis shall be collected as follows:

             8.2.1. The blood shall be drawn only by a licensed doctor of
                 medicine or osteopathy, registered professional nurse,
                 trained medical technician or any medical professional
                 trained in phlebotomy;

             8.2.2. Sterile hypodermic needles and syringes shall be used.
                 Sterile disposable units are recommended;

             8.2.3. The skin shall not be disinfected with ethyl alcohol. The
                 use of non-alcoholic antiseptics, those which do not contain
                 ethyl alcohol, including 1-1000 aqueous solution of
                 mercuric chloride, aqueous benzalkonium chloride
                 (zephiran), aqueous merthiolate, or other suitable aqueous
                 disinfectants is acceptable;

             8.2.4. The quantity of alcohol found in serum shall be divided
                 by a factor of 1.16 to determine the quantity of alcohol in
                 the blood; and

             8.2.5. The container (tube or vial) shall be clean and dry, and
                 have an inert, airtight stopper.

                                           10
              In Corley, Mr. Corley was driving his car and struck a tree. He was taken to

the hospital where diagnostic blood and urine tests were performed. Police later obtained

a search warrant for Mr. Corley’s medical records which indicated that his blood serum

alcohol level was .22%. The DMV revoked Mr. Corley’s driver’s license for aggravated

DUI. At the OAH administrative license revocation hearing, one of the Investigating

Officers testified to the blood serum alcohol content evidence from the medical records.

Mr. Corley’s counsel objected, among other reasons, because the DMV offered no

evidence that a non-alcoholic disinfectant was employed to sterilize Mr. Corley’s skin

before his blood was drawn as required by West Virginia Code of State Rules § 64-10-8-

2(c). The OAH upheld the Commissioner’s revocation as a non-aggravated DUI but denied

the aggravated DUI enhancement. The OAH found that the DMV did not show the blood

testing met the requirements of West Virginia Code of State Rules § 64-10-8.2(c). It

therefore concluded the DMV did not prove Mr. Corley’s blood alcohol level was .15% or

greater while driving. 9 The DMV appealed to the circuit court which affirmed. The DMV

then appealed to this Court arguing that “it was not required to show that the blood test was

properly administered under the Court’s holding in State ex rel. Allen v. Bedell[, 193 W.

Va. 32, 454 S.E.2d 77 (1994)].” The DMV specifically argued:

       9
        We have stated that a chemical test is necessary to prove that a driver had a blood
alcohol concentration over a statutorily prescribed amount. See Albrecht, 173 W. Va. at
271, 314 S.E.2d at 862 (“A chemical test is obviously necessary to establish the
concentration of alcohol in a person’s blood when that is the intended basis for
revocation.”). Thus, the only way to prove an aggravated DUI is with a chemical test. Cf.
id. at 272 n.3, 314 S.E.2d at 864 n.3 (“Where the revocation is based on having a blood
alcohol content of .10%, a chemical test is necessary to prove this fact.”).
                                             11
                     [I]t is well settled that blood tests ordered by the
                     medical personnel attending to the driver
                     subsequent to the accident are not subject to
                     exclusion based upon lack of conformity to the
                     administrative requirements of West Virginia
                     Code § 17C-5-4, and the hospital records
                     evidencing the blood results are not subject to
                     exclusion based upon any regulatory scheme for
                     the handling of hospital records.

Corley, No. 18-1033, 2020 WL 1493971, at *4. We rejected the DMV’s contention.

              In Corley, we recognized that Bedell dealt only with the implied consent

statute, W. Va. Code § 17C-5-4, which provides that law enforcement officers may order

a driver to submit to a chemical test only when certain statutorily delineated requirements

are met. In Corley, we also recognized that Bedell did not address the issue Mr. Corley was

arguing, that the DMV’s failure to prove a blood test complied with West Virginia Code

of State Rules § 64-10-8 renders the blood test result unreliable and entitled to no weight.

Because Bedell did not address this issue, we recognized that “Bedell is not relevant to [Mr.

Corley’s] challenge[,]” and “does not control our decision in this case.” Corley, No. 18-

1033, 2020 WL 1493971, at *5. Consequently, we concluded, “[i]n the absence of evidence

that the blood diagnostic was performed in compliance with the Code of State Rules, the

OAH was justified in discounting the accuracy of the blood diagnostic results for the

purpose of an aggravated enhancement.” Corley, No. 18-1033, 2020 WL 1493971, at *5.

                                             12
              The Commissioner in the two cases now before us reiterates the identical

argument that the DMV unsuccessfully advanced in Corley, that Bedell disposes of the

issue in the Commissioner’s favor. This is clearly unsupportable. Bedell did not address

the issue that was before the Court in Corley and which is before the Court (again) in these

two consolidated cases—was the OAH justified in discounting the accuracy of diagnostic

blood tests that were not shown to have been made in compliance with West Virginia Code

of State Rules § 64-10-8? We find that Corley properly read Bedell as not pertinent to this

issue because Bedell never addressed it. As such, Bedell is not precedent on this issue. “It

is elementary that an opinion is not binding precedent on an issue it did not address.”

Merrifield v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 654 F.3d 1073, 1084 (10th Cir. 2011). “[I]t is beyond

debate that ‘[q]uestions which merely lurk in the record, neither brought to the attention of

the court nor ruled upon, are not to be considered as having been so decided as to constitute

precedents.’” Ret. Plans Committee v. Jander, 140 S. Ct. 592, 597 (2020) (per curiam)

(Gorsuch, J., concurring) (quoting Webster v. Fall, 266 U.S. 507, 511 (1925)). We

conclude that Corley properly found Bedell was inapposite, and that Corley is the

controlling authority for the cases now pending before us.

              The Commissioner also argues that Corley is inconsistent with two per

curiam opinions of this Court, State v. Coleman, 208 W. Va. 560, 542 S.E.2d 74 (2000)

(per curiam), and Lowe v. Cicchirillo, 223 W. Va. 175, 672 S.E.2d 311 (2008) (per curiam),

and that these per curiam opinions should be followed here. We disagree with the

Commissioner’s position. Both Coleman and Lowe relied on Bedell. Coleman, 208 W. Va.

                                             13
at 563, 542 S.E.2d at 77; Lowe, 223 W. Va. at 181, 672 S.E.2d at 317. Since Bedell did not

address the applicability of West Virginia Code of State Rules § 64-10-8 to diagnostic

blood tests, Coleman and Lowe’s reliance on Bedell is in error. Thus, we do not find

Coleman and Lowe can support the Commissioner’s position. 10

              Finally, the Commissioner argues the diagnostic test results are entitled to a

presumption of accuracy since they were included in the administrative record before the

OAH and were not rebutted. We are compelled to reject the position that diagnostic tests

should be presumed accurate for forensic purposes:

                      First, hospitals are not as concerned with the
              quantitative level of alcohol as they are with the qualitative or
              general range. A general estimate is considered clinically
              acceptable, whereas a specific amount is what is referred to as
              forensically acceptable. Second, the hospital is in the business
              of treating patients—not prosecuting defendants. Thus, use of
              a less reliable or less accurate method is also acceptable for that
              purpose.

Donald J. Ramsell, 25 Ill Prac, DUI Law and Practice Guide § 6:109 (Westlaw March

2022 update) (emphasis in original). 11

                                       III.   Conclusion

       10
         We are not unmindful that in Mr. Powers’ case, the OAH declined to afford any
weight to the diagnostic blood test yet relied on the blood test to conclude Mr. Powers had
alcohol in his system. Any error in this regard is harmless given the substantial amount of
evidence of Mr. Powers’ non-aggravated DUI even completely discounting the blood test.
       11
         In fact, Mr. Powers’ medical records specifically warned that Mr. Powers’ serum
ethanol “test result is for medical purposes only, not legal purposes[.]”
                                              14
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgments of the circuit court.

                                                               Affirmed.

                              15