Court Opinion

ID: 9848515
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:21:19.630795+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:22.030838
License: Public Domain

HARTEN, Judge,*
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s affirmance of the decision of respondent Minneapolis Civil Rights Commission. The record on which the commission made its analysis and found discrimination is fatally deficient. The commission identifies no overt police racial discrimination; instead, it relies on its own obscure notion of constructive racial discrimination, beginning with an unwarranted assumption and proceeding directly to a foregone conclusion.
As a threshold matter, I refuse to subscribe to the majority’s view that the commission’s decision is entitled to an altered scope of review because the commissioners sat as a jury. We review a jury’s verdict by making “a painstaking review of the record to determine whether the evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, were sufficient to allow the jury to reach its verdict.” State v. Brown, 732 N.W.2d 625, 628 (Minn.2007). But the commission is not a jury: it is an administrative agency, and its decisions are reviewed under the standards set out in the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). Minneapolis, Minn., Code of Ordinances § 141.60(b) (2008). Specifically, we reverse the commission’s findings if they are “unsupported by substantial evidence in view of the entire record as submitted” or *774“arbitrary and capricious.” Minn.Stat. § 14.69(e), (f) (2008). I believe the majority blurs the line between these standards of review by giving added weight to the commission’s “hybrid-jury” findings.1
A finding of discrimination may be made when the record establishes (1) an adverse difference in treatment with respect to public services of one or more persons when compared to the treatment accorded others similarly situated except for the existence of an impermissible factor such as race, color, creed, sex, etc.; or (2) treatment so at variance with what would reasonably be anticipated absent discrimination that discrimination is the probable explanation.
City of Minneapolis v. Richardson, 307 Minn. 80, 87, 239 N.W.2d 197, 202 (1976). Richardson, on which the majority relies extensively, is readily distinguishable on its facts.2 It involved police officers who threatened a crowd that included a 12-year-old African-American youth; used police dogs that attacked the youth; dragged the youth by his feet, face down, to a squad car; and used racial epithets to disparage the youth while taking him to the station. Id. at 82-83, 239 N.W.2d at 200. The officers’ use of racial slurs “coupled with” their egregious acts supported the inference that they had a racially discriminatory motive. Id. at 89, 239 N.W.2d at 203.
The decision of officers Villamor and Dubay to arrest Kelly was a far cry from the shameful behavior of the Richardson officers. Officers Villamor and Dubay used what the commissioner has deemed “reasonable force” to apprehend a notably defiant, possibly armed, and struggling suspect. In the heat of that struggle, they decided to arrest, based on their impression that Kelly, who admitted to being angry, would scoff at a citation. See Minn. R.Crim. P. 6.01, subd.(l)(a) (providing that law enforcement officers may arrest for misdemeanors if “it reasonably appears to the officer ... that there is a substantial likelihood that the accused will fail to respond to a citation.”) (Emphasis added). The officers’ testimony reflects their compliance with this rule.
Officer Villamor testified that he decided to arrest “[bjecause I believe that [Kelly] would have failed to respond to a citation.” Asked why he believed this, Villamor replied, “Because of his level of uncoopera-tiveness and resistance.”
Officer Dubay testified, “[Kelly] was placed under arrest for disorderly conduct and obstructing the legal process. His actions — his belligerent action, his vulgarity out in a public place, the fact that Officer Villamor had to use force on Mr. Kelly. From experience I believe that Mr. Kelly would not have accepted a citation because he was too angry.” When asked why he believed this, Dubay answered, “From my experience, the disorderly way that he was conducting himself in a public place, drawing attention to himself from *775other people, people gathering around, [and] it is my experience that if [an officer is] issuing someone a citation instead of bringing them to jail, because they’re so upset, that a lot of times they won’t respond,” and, “In my experience, sir, given his behavior that day, I do not believe he would have responded to a citation. I’ve been doing this for a long time.”
Asked what sort of things Kelly was yelling and screaming, Officer Dubay testified, “[T]hat we were racist, that we were brutalizing him, you know, ... and he made some comments to Officer Villamor [an Asian American] that his white masters had brainwashed him.... ” Officer Dubay answered “No” when asked if he “[made] any racially derogatory remarks to Mr. Kelly” or “[heard] any [other] police officers make any derogatory remarks to Mr. Kelly”. Both Dubay and Villamor answered “No” when asked if they “use[d] any force on Mr. Kelly because of his race”; “treat[ed] Mr. Kelly any differently than [they] would have treated a nonAfri-can-American under those circumstances”; and “arrest[ed] Mr. Kelly because of his race.”
A suspect’s defiance and yelling can provide the basis for an officer’s reasonable belief that a citation will be ignored. See, e.g., In re Welfare of T.L.S., 713 N.W.2d 877, 881-82 (Minn.App.2006) (no rule 6.01 violation in arrest of student who was shrieking and swearing and refused to leave school building).3 The majority concedes that Kelly “continued to resist being handcuffed and refused to enter the squad car” — a show of defiance. Given the T.L.S. precedent, I consider the commission’s finding of a violation of rule 6.01 in this case to be highly dubious.
At least equally dubious is the commission’s finding of pretextual behavior on the part of the officers. The record provides insufficient explanation or support for the commission’s finding of pretextual behavior, and only confirms what the officers testified and the majority concedes: Kelly was defiant and dismissive of the legal process. Though the commission briefly noted that Kelly was pacified by the officers after a significant struggle, it in no way rebutted the plain fact that Kelly was defiant and remained extremely angry at the time of arrest. The commission must provide adequate explanations for its factual findings. Minn. Power & Light Co. v. Minn. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 342 N.W.2d 324, 330 (Minn.1983). There is no adequate explanation for the finding that the officers’ stated reasons for taking a defiant and disruptive suspect to jail were merely pretextual.
Moreover, a commission’s finding may be reversed when a “combination of danger signals ... suggestfe] the [commission] has not taken a hard look at the salient problems and the decision lacks articulated standards and reflective findings.” Cable Commc’ns Bd. v. Nor-West Cable Commc’ns P’ship, 356 N.W.2d 658, 669 (Minn.1984) (quotations omitted). Because the finding of pretext satisfies neither reason nor the substantial-evidence test it should, in my view, be reversed.
Even assuming that there was a violation of Minn. R.Crim. P. 6.01, a review of the record reveals no evidence connecting *776the officers’ behavior to any racial motive. In contrast, Richardson found “substantial evidence of discrimination because of race ... [from the suspect’s] uncontradicted testimony ... that two ... police officers addressed him in a racially derogatory manner.” Richardson, 307 Minn. at 88, 239 N.W.2d at 203. The officers here used no epithets or any other language that could imply racial discrimination. Kelly did not produce any quantitative data or expert testimony linking their actions to racial animus. In fact, the only racial slurs in the record came from Kelly himself, who repeatedly used racially tinged insults and referred to the Asian-American Officer Villamor as a “white slave.”
The “so at variance” test requires discrimination to be the “'probable explanation.” Richardson, 307 Minn. at 87, 239 N.W.2d at 202 (emphasis added). Under that nebulous standard, I find it essential that those alleging discrimination show some evidence supporting a fair inference of the officers’ alleged improper discriminatory motive. Where the record indicates no nexus between an officer’s conduct and such a motive, a civil rights claim cannot prevail.
I conclude that, absent any evidence to support an inference of discrimination or a finding of pretext, the commission’s ruling was an exercise of “[its] will rather than its judgment.” In re Max Schwartzman & Sons, Inc., 670 N.W.2d 746, 753 (Minn.App.2003) (holding that agency decision is arbitrary and capricious when it reflects the agency’s will rather than its judgment). For this reason, I would reverse the ruling as “unsupported by substantial evidence” and “arbitrary and capricious.” Minn.Stat. § 14.60(e), (f).

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const, art. VI, § 10.

. For other reasons, I find highly problematic the commission's use of a jury-trial format in making its determination. As a "jury,” the commission panel is not composed of a cross section of the community; nor is it subject to voir dire and strikes that would eliminate biased individuals from the jury. The use of such a -"hybrid jury” is an invalid attempt to simulate jury procedure and then claim its virtues.

. Beaulieu v. City of Mounds View, 518 N.W.2d 567 (Minn.1994), on which the majority also relies, is distinguishable procedurally, because it concerned the denial of a motion for summary judgment, id. at 569, and substantively, because it concerned the application of official immunity to a Human Rights Act claim, id., and because it concerned officers who acted in bad faith. Id. at 573.

. Violations of rule 6.01 have been a basis for excluding evidence obtained incident to arrests. See, e.g., State v. Richmond, 602 N.W.2d 647, 653 (Minn.App.1999) (finding violation when conduct of suspect arrested for a misdemeanor was limited to not answering questions, not immediately producing a driver's license, and removing his hands after being directed to keep them on the squad car), review denied (Minn. 18 Jan. 2000); State v. Carver, 577 N.W.2d 245, 249-50 (Minn.App.1998) (finding violation where suspect was arrested for petty misdemeanor).