Court Opinion

ID: 9579451
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:55:20.891199+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:35:31.003532
License: Public Domain

Shulman, Chief Judge,
dissenting.
Although I fully concur in the result and reasoning of the first four divisions of the majority opinion, I respectfully must dissent to the statutory analysis set forth in Division 5.1 believe Code Ann. § 79A-811 (1) (3) (OCGA § 16-13-31 (c) (1)) to be clear in its mandate that trafficking in marijuana shall carry the increased, minimum sentences specified and that the 10-year limitation imposed by Code *112Ann. § 79A-811 (1)(2) (OCGA § 16-13-30 (j) (2)) shall not apply to the trafficking provisions. I reach this conclusion on the basis of the clear and unambiguous wording of those penalty provisions.
I do not agree with the majority’s conclusion that the trafficking penalties applicable to this case are unclear. Code Ann. § 79A-811 (1) (2) is limited by the proviso: “Except as otherwise provided in this subsection...” The subsection then goes on to specify a one to 10-year sentence for possession of marijuana. Code Ann. § 79A-811 (1) (3) clearly provides otherwise: trafficking brings a minimum five, 10, or 15- year sentence depending upon the weight of the marijuana seized. It is patently erroneous to apply a 10-year maximum sentence provision to an offense for which a 15-year minimum sentence may be required. Clearly, the statute applicable to the offense simply failed to specify a maximum penalty.
The majority concedes that its result is obtained only because the trafficking provisions contain no separate, specified maximum penalty. However, the law is clear that “[t]he duration of imprisonment . . . when not regulated by statute, is subject to the sound discretion of the court, or the presiding judge.” Kingsbery v. Ryan, 92 Ga. 108, 118 (17 SE 689). “The punishment can not be cruel, unusual, or excessive, but must be reasonable in view of the particular facts and circumstances.” Brooks v. Sturdivant, 177 Ga. 514, 516 (170 SE 369). I have located no authority prohibiting the legislature from enacting a penal provision providing minimum punishment but leaving the maximum permissible sentence to the discretion of the trial court. Thus, the majority’s concern about leaving without a cap the now defunct (see OCGA § 16-13-31 (f)) penalty provisions for trafficking in marijuana is unfounded.
In addition to misconstruing the wording of the statute, the majority puts forth an interpretation that will have to be rectified in the near future. The legislature has amended OCGA § 16-13-31 (Code Ann. § 79A-811) to provide for a 30-year maximum sentence for trafficking in cocaine, illegal drugs, and marijuana. Ga. L. 1982, p. 2215. However, OCGA § 16-13-30 (j) (2) (“Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c) of Code Section 16-13-31. . .” (emphasis supplied)) and OCGA § 16-13-31 (c) were not;'amended; thus, the majority’s application of the 10-year maximum sentence in § 16- 13-30 (j) (2) to § 16-13-31 (c) appears to remain unaffected by the 1982 amendment. Consequently, either the holding in Division 5 of this opinion will have to be overruled or “marijuana” will have to be read out of § 16-13-31 (f).
I would affirm the trial court’s sentence as being lawful under the statute governing this offense.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Deen and Judges *113Birdsong and Pope join in this dissent.