Court Opinion

ID: 9895249
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-06 16:02:07.722524+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:11:46.572724
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-10585     Document: 43-1      Date Filed: 11/06/2023   Page: 1 of 8

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                     In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                  No. 23-10585
                            Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

       MICHAEL XU,
       DANIEL VAZ-POCAS,
       Individually and on behalf of all others
       similarly situated,
                                                     Plaintiﬀs-Appellants,
       versus
       PORSCHE CARS NORTH AMERICA, INC.,
       a Delaware corporation,

                                                     Defendant-Appellee.

                           ____________________
USCA11 Case: 23-10585         Document: 43-1         Date Filed: 11/06/2023         Page: 2 of 8

       2                          Opinion of the Court                       23-10585

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Northern District of Georgia
                      D.C. Docket No. 1:20-cv-00510-SEG
                            ____________________

       Before JORDAN, NEWSOM, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
               Plaintiffs-Appellants Michael Xu and Daniel Vaz-Pocas both
       purchased Porsche vehicles that they claim have a defect in the
       cooling system. They brought an action against Defendant-Appel-
       lee Porsche Cars North America, Inc. alleging various product-lia-
       bility claims, including violations of California and New Jersey law.
       The district court granted summary judgment in favor of PCNA
       and the Porsche-owners appeal. 1
              On appeal, Plaintiff Xu argues that the district court erred by
       not applying the delayed-discovery rule to his California Unfair
       Competition Law and Consumer Legal Remedies Act claims.
       Plaintiff Vaz-Pocas argues that the district court erred by

       1 Xu and Vaz-Pocas also purport to appeal the district court’s decision on

       PCNA’s motion to dismiss, which was decided almost three years before the
       decision on summary judgment. We are not convinced, however, that they
       have standing to appeal that decision. This Circuit has held that “[o]nly a liti-
       gant who is aggrieved by the judgment or order may appeal.” Knight v. Ala-
       bama, 14 F.3d 1534, 1556 (11th Cir. 1994) (quotation marks and citation omit-
       ted). Because the district court did not dismiss the claims that Xu and Vaz-
       Pocas now appeal, they are not parties “aggrieved” by the district court’s de-
       cision on the motion to dismiss.
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       23-10585                  Opinion of the Court                                3

       concluding that Porsche’s New Car Limited Warranty is not un-
       conscionable. After careful review of the parties’ arguments, we
       affirm the district court’s entry of summary judgment.2
                                              I
              “This Court has ‘repeatedly held that an issue not raised in
       the district court and raised for the first time in an appeal will not
       be considered by this court.’” Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines
       Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1331 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Walker v. Jones,
       10 F.3d 1569, 1572 (11th Cir. 1994)). The reasons for this are axio-
       matic: appellate courts review claims of judicial error in lower
       courts. “If we were to regularly address questions—particularly
       fact-bound issues—that district[] court[s] never had a chance to ex-
       amine, we would not only waste our resources, but also deviate
       from the essential nature, purpose, and competence of an appellate
       court.” Id.
               Thus, we have held that “if a party hopes to preserve a claim,
       argument, theory, or defense for appeal, she must first clearly pre-
       sent it to the district court, that is, in such a way as to afford the
       district court an opportunity to recognize and rule on it.” In re Pan
       Am. World Airways, Inc., Maternity Leave Pracs. & Flight Attendant
       Weight Program Litig., 905 F.2d 1457, 1462 (11th Cir. 1990).

       2 “We review a district court’s decision on summary judgment de novo and

       apply the same legal standard used by the district court, drawing all inferences
       in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and recognizing that sum-
       mary judgment is appropriate only where there are no genuine issues of ma-
       terial fact.” Smith v. Owens, 848 F.3d 975, 978 (11th Cir. 2017).
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       4                          Opinion of the Court                       23-10585

              Xu contends the district court applied the incorrect standard
       or inquiry to deny application of the delayed-discovery rule to his
       claims. He argues that has properly preserved his discovery-rule
       arguments for appellate review (1) in the briefing on the motion to
       dismiss, a decision which he purports to appeal, and (2) in his brief-
       ing on the motion for summary judgment, a decision which he also
       appeals. 3
              Upon review of the record, we find that Xu did not preserve
       his delayed-discovery issue for appeal. During briefing at the mo-
       tion-to-dismiss stage, Xu did indeed argue the delayed-discovery
       rule applied to his claims. The district court found that his claims
       did not satisfy that specific test, but still found his claims were not
       time-barred under another theory for tolling the statute of limita-
       tions. The district court denied PCNA’s motion to dismiss Xu’s
       UCL and CLRA claims, but it specifically noted “that many of the
       threshold issues raised by Defendant’s motion, including as to stat-
       utes of limitations and tolling, entail factually intensive matters that
       may ultimately, with the introduction of evidence at summary
       judgment, cut off Plaintiffs’ claims at the pass,” but found “these
       questions are for a later day.”

       3 Xu also seems to suggest the issue is preserved from the district court’s order

       granting summary judgment, which cited a case that references the delayed-
       discovery rule. However, the district court cited this case for a purpose other
       than analyzing the delayed-discovery rule, and it is the party’s obligation to
       preserve an issue for appeal, not the district court’s. See Access Now, 385 F.3d
       at 1331.
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       23-10585                    Opinion of the Court                                  5

               Unsurprisingly, at the summary judgment stage, PCNA ar-
       gued that Xu’s UCL and CLRA claims were time-barred. Despite
       the district court’s warning in its decision on the motion to dismiss,
       in his arguments opposing summary judgment, Xu spent only one
       paragraph for each claim arguing that his claims were timely. And
       in doing so, he relied largely on the court’s motion-to-dismiss deci-
       sion—again, despite the court’s warning that evidence may “cut off
       Plaintiffs’ claims at the pass.” At summary judgment, Xu relied
       wholly on a theory of fraudulent concealment to toll the statute of
       limitations on his claim and did not raise (except in passing) the
       delayed discovery rule. 4
             Addressing only the arguments before it at the summary
       judgment stage, the district court analyzed whether Xu’s claims
       were tolled under a fraudulent-concealment theory and found they
       were not. Xu now argues that the standard the court applied in its
       delayed-discovery analysis in its decision on the motion to dismiss
       was incorrect. Although Xu had an opportunity to renew his de-
       layed discovery argument at summary judgment—including an

       4 Xu mentioned the delayed-discovery rule only in a parenthetical when citing

       California caselaw to support his assertion that his CLRA claim was timely
       “because it was tolled by Porche’s fraudulent concealment.” This is not enough
       to preserve the issue for appeal. See SEC v. Big Apple Consulting USA, Inc., 783
       F.3d 786, 812 (11th Cir. 2015) (explaining that a litigant’s “fleeting footnote
       explaining” an argument to the district court “in one sentence . . . is insufficient
       to properly assert a claim on appeal”); Tims v. LGE Cmty. Credit Union, 935 F.3d
       1228, 1240 n.8 (11th Cir. 2019) (finding an argument raised only as a “fleeting
       reference in a footnote” was “insufficient to preserve [the] argument for ap-
       peal”).
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       6                      Opinion of the Court                 23-10585

       argument that the court had applied the incorrect standard at the
       motion-to-dismiss stage—he failed to raise it for either his UCL or
       CRLA claim. Therefore, we find that Xu did not preserve any is-
       sues regarding the application of the delayed-discovery rule for ap-
       peal.
                                         II
               As explained above, “if a party hopes to preserve a claim,
       argument, theory, or defense for appeal, she must first clearly pre-
       sent it to the district court, that is, in such a way as to afford the
       district court an opportunity to recognize and rule on it.” In re Pan
       Am., 905 F.2d at 1462.
              Vaz-Pocas argues the district court erred by concluding that
       Porsche’s New Car Limited Warranty is not unconscionable. On
       appeal, Vaz-Pocas argues that the district court erred because “it
       failed to consider public policy implications under the facts” and
       thus “conducted the wrong analysis.” But in his briefing below,
       Vaz-Pocas never mentioned public policy or the four-factor test
       that he now says governs his claim. Rather, Vaz-Pocas argued
       that—and the district court thus considered whether—the war-
       ranty was unconscionable because it was “so one-sided as to shock
       the court’s conscience.” The district court also directly addressed
       the caselaw Vaz-Pocas cited in support of his argument suggesting
       that unconscionability of a limited warranty can be shown if a man-
       ufacturer knew of the latent defect and manipulated the warranty
       terms. Concluding that Vaz-Pocas did not meet this standard and
       that the warranty terms did not shock the court’s conscience, the
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       23-10585               Opinion of the Court                          7

       district court granted summary judgment in favor of PNCA. Given
       that the district court directly addressed the unconscionability ar-
       guments raised by Vaz-Pocas below, and that Vaz-Pocas never
       raised before the district court the public-policy analysis he now
       advances on appeal, we hold that Vaz-Pocas did not preserve this
       issue for appeal.
              Moreover, even if Vaz-Pocas had raised this specific public-
       policy test below, we are not convinced that the court’s conclusion
       would have been different. In its decision, the court examined the
       relevant factors that Vaz-Pocas now emphasizes—including the
       parties’ respective bargaining power, the contract being one of ad-
       hesion, and PCNA’s superior knowledge of the defect. Even so,
       the court concluded, in light of the entire record, that the warranty
       was not so one-sided as to shock the court’s conscience. We are
       not convinced that framing as a public-policy analysis would have
       altered this conclusion.
                                         III
              Also pending before us are two motions from PCNA—a mo-
       tion to file a surreply and a motion for sanctions.
              Because PCNA’s surreply focuses on claims by Plaintiff Xu
       that we now find were not properly preserved for appeal, the mo-
       tion to file a surreply is moot.
              PCNA also filed a motion for sanctions requesting “just
       damages” because Xu’s appeal is frivolous. “Rule 38 sanctions are
       appropriately imposed against appellants who raise ‘clearly frivo-
       lous claims in the face of established law and clear facts.’” Parker v.
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       8                      Opinion of the Court                  23-10585

       Am. Traffic Sols., Inc., 835 F.3d 1363, 1371 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting
       Farese v. Scherer, 342 F.3d 1223, 1232 (11th Cir. 2003)). And our law
       is clear that “a claim is clearly frivolous if it is ‘utterly devoid of
       merit.’” Id. (quoting Bonfiglio v. Nugent, 986 F.2d 1391, 1393 (11th
       Cir. 1993)). While it is true that Xu failed to preserve his claims for
       appeal, not every losing argument—or unpreserved claim—is so
       “utterly devoid of merit” to warrant sanctions. We therefore de-
       cline to issue sanctions.
                                  *      *       *
              Because none of the issues presented by Plaintiffs-Appel-
       lants were properly preserved for appeal we AFFIRM. Defend-
       ant-Appellant’s motion to file a surreply is DENIED as moot. De-
       fendant-Appellant’s motion for sanctions is DENIED.