Court Opinion

ID: 9665911
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:59:28.021438+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:20.512024
License: Public Domain

Shanahan, J.,
dissenting.
In an ironic 180° maneuver, this court has transformed the discovery doctrine, previously an equitable solution to the harshly literal onus of a statute of limitations, into a more severe burden on one who, through diligence, discovers a previously undiscovered cause of action. Whereas equitable consideration, inherent in the discovery doctrine, formerly assisted and protected the diligent, today the majority of this court molds the discovery doctrine into a hindrance and peril to the diligent.
I agree with one conclusion reached by this court’s majority, namely, Ames did not discover, and reasonably could not have discovered, the existence of her cause of action until August of 1984, when a physician first diagnosed the condition which is the subject of Ames’ malpractice action. The majority then proceeds to hold that, because Ames discovered her cause of action within 2 years from Hehner’s final treatment in December 1982, she had only 4 months, which was the remainder of the 2-year statute of limitations in August of 1984, to file her lawsuit.
The continuing treatment rule, as well as the discovery rule, originated in equity. This court was equitably applying a judicially fashioned discovery rule long before the Legislature prescribed the discovery provision of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-222 (Reissue 1985). See, e.g., Johansen v. Union Stock Yards Co., 99 Neb. 328, 156 N.W. 511 (1916); Dryden v. Omaha Steel Works, 148 Neb. 1, 26 N.W.2d 293 (1947); Spath v. Morrow, 174 Neb. 38, 115 N.W.2d 581 (1962); Acker v. Sorensen, 183 *158Neb. 866, 165 N.W.2d 74 (1969). Codification of a judicially fashioned equitable principle does not annihilate the equitable considerations which engendered the judicial principle eventually codified.
The plain language of § 25-222 dictates that Ames’ petition stated a cause of action which is not barred by the statute of limitations. Section 25-222 requires a plaintiff to bring a malpractice action within 2 years “after the alleged act or omission . . . providing the basis for such action . . . .” (Emphasis supplied.) If a plaintiff is unable to discover a cause of action within the 2-year limitation, the plaintiff is allowed to file a petition within 1 year after discovery of the cause of action. In the light of the provisions of § 25-222, it is clear that the “act or omission... providing the basis for” Ames’ medical malpractice claim was Hehner’s negligent surgery performed on February 13, 1981. Ames’ malpractice claim is based on Hehner’s negligence in the surgical procedure performed on Ames, not Hehner’s failure to properly diagnose Ames’ condition. Thus, under the plain language of the statute, Ames was required to file her action within 2 years after February 13, 1981, unless she was unable to discover her cause of action during the 2-year period after the negligence occurred. As correctly noted by the majority, Ames was unable to discover her cause of action until August 1984, more than 2 years after the surgery which is the basis for her malpractice claim. Ames is entitled, therefore, to the additional year provided by § 25-222 and, as a result, had until August of 1985 in which to file her petition. Because Ames’ petition was filed in June of 1985, I conclude that her petition was not subject to successful attack by demurrer based on the 2-year statute of limitations contained in § 25-222.
Under the majority’s approach, the action for negligence in Hehner’s repeated misdiagnosis of Ames’ condition is time-barred because the misdiagnosis was discovered, but not made the subject of a lawsuit, within the 2-year limitation of § 25-222. However, Ames alleged other instances of Hehner’s negligent conduct as the basis for her claim, namely, mispositioning her during surgery, failing to use an arm board during surgery, and failing to supervise support personnel at the *159hospital, all of which were undiscovered negligent omissions notwithstanding Ames’ diligence during the 2 years immediately after the specified omissions. As allowed by § 25-222, Ames filed her petition within 1 year after discovery of Hehner’s negligence. Thus, Ames’ claim based on Hehner’s negligent omissions regarding the surgical procedure is clearly not time-barred.
Ames’ petition was not subject to successful attack by a general demurrer, which is sustainable only when the petition, that is, the entire petition, fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-806(6) (Reissue 1985).
“ ‘If from the facts stated in the petition it appears that the plaintiff is entitled to any relief, a general demurrer will not lie.’ ” [Citation omitted.] A single paragraph of a statement of a cause of action is not subject to a demurrer on the ground that it does not state a cause of action if the pleading as a whole states a cause of action.
Joiner v. Pound, 149 Neb. 321, 325, 31 N.W.2d 100, 103 (1948) (quoting Central Nebraska Public Power and Irrigation District v. Walston, 140 Neb. 190, 299 N.W. 609 (1941)). See, also, Alexander v. Thacker, 30 Neb. 614, 618, 46 N.W. 825, 826 (1890) (“ [W]hen a petition contains more than one count, and a general demurrer is directed against the entire pleading, and is not limited to a particular count, if any count states a cause of action, such demurrer must be overruled”).
If this court’s majority were correct regarding its application of the continuing treatment rule, we are faced with a situation where some of the allegations in Ames’ petition refer to a time-barred claim for negligence, while other allegations in the same petition set out a timely claim. In such a situation, a general demurrer to the cause of action as a whole is not sustainable, since the plaintiff is entitled to proceed on those allegations which state a cause of action not barred by the statute of limitations. See, Southwest Mines D. Co. v. Martignene, 49 Ariz. 88, 64 P.2d 1031 (1937); Lewis v. Fahn, 113 Cal. App. 2d 95, 247 P.2d 831 (1952); State ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. Norcross, 132 Wis. 534, 112 N.W. 40 (1907); Atlanta, K. &N. Ry. Co. v. McKinney, 124 Ga. 929, 53 S.E. 701 (1906). *160See, also, 51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation of Actions § 465 (1970).
In keeping with Nebraska law governing a demurrer and in the light of sound decisions of other courts, I conclude that Hehner’s demurrer to Ames’ petition should have been overruled because Ames’ allegations demonstrate that she filed the negligence action within the time limit prescribed in § 25-222.
Assuming that the continuing treatment rule could be applied as suggested by the majority, this court would encounter the situation of two equally applicable but conflicting time limitations. In that situation, we must apply the statutorily supplied “one year from discovery” rule, in which case Ames’ petition survives a demurrer, or apply the continuing treatment rule with an abbreviated time of 4 months remaining under the 2-year statute of limitations, which the majority uses to bar Ames’ suit. In a conflict of time limits imposed by applicable statutes of limitations, the longer period of limitations governs. Crum v. Johnson, 3 Neb. (Unoff.) 826, 92 N.W. 1054 (1902). See, also, Thiel v. Taurus Drilling Ltd. 1980-11, 218 Mont. 201, 710 P.2d 33 (1985); Shew v. Coon Bay Loafers, 76 Wash. 2d 40, 455 P.2d 359 (1969); Gillette Dairy, Inc. v. Mallard Mfg. Corp., 707 F.2d 351 (8th Cir. 1983). Thus, the continuing treatment rule, even if applicable, cannot operate to bar Ames’ suit because utilization of the continuing treatment rule would result in an application of a shorter statute of limitations contrary to Nebraska precedent. See Crum v. Johnson, supra.
The majority has with one broad stroke unfortunately painted this court into a jurisprudential corner from which there is no logical escape. In the present case, the majority holds that Ames had 4 months after discovery to file her petition. What about the plaintiff who discovers the cause of action 1 month before the 2-year period expires? One week? The very last day of the 2-year period? Under the rule fashioned by this court’s majority, each of the plaintiffs in the illustrative abbreviated periods, who has diligently discovered a malpractice cause of action, will have but a matter of a few weeks, days, hours, or even minutes to commence an action against the tort-feasor at the risk of preclusion by the statute of *161limitations. However, if the illustrative plaintiffs do not discover the malpractice cause of action in the waning days of the statutory time limitation, on diligent discovery after the initial 2-year period, each plaintiff has an additional year to file an action for malpractice. Consequently, the rule adopted by the majority penalizes the diligent who discovers a cause of action in the dwindling days of the 2-year period prescribed by § 25-222 because such a plaintiff is allowed but a relatively short time to file a malpractice action. On the other hand, a less inquisitive plaintiff who, nevertheless, discovers the malpractice after the 2-year period has expired, will have a full year from discovery to file a malpractice action. A result so incongruous was not intended by the Legislature and should not be invented by this court.
Linder § 25-222, Elizabeth Ames’ petition stated a cause of action which, as a whole, was not barred by the statute of limitations. Therefore, the general demurrer filed by Hehner should have been overruled. Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the district court and remand this cause for further proceedings.