Court Opinion

ID: 9555985
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-15 18:12:04.183199+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:35:53.263266
License: Public Domain

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA              :    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                           :         PENNSYLVANIA
                    Appellant              :
                                           :
                                           :
              v.                           :
                                           :
                                           :
 TYMIR STEVENSON                           :    No. 1455 EDA 2022

                Appeal from the Order Entered May 18, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-51-CR-0007779-2021

BEFORE: OLSON, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.:                       FILED AUGUST 15, 2023

      The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania appeals from the order granting

Tymir Stevenson’s motion to suppress the results of the search of his car

based on the validity of the search warrant. We affirm in part, reverse in part,

and remand.

      On November 4, 2020, a detective from the Philadelphia Police

Department applied for a warrant to search Stevenson’s car. The affidavit

supporting the application, in its entirety, consisted of the following statement.

      On 10-28-20 at approximately 4:55pm, 15th District Officers
      responded to the area of 1900 Ruan St. to a radio call for
      gunshots. Upon arrival, sixteen 9mm FCC’s were located at 1900
      Ruan St. and a vehicle with multiple bullet holes was unattended
      outside 1930 Ruan St. Neighbors reported an unknown B/M ran
      from the vehicle eastbound on Ruan St. towards Torresdale Ave.
      It was later found the complainant is the owner of the vehicle, a
      2019 Chevy Impala with Pa tag: LHG9496, and he was
      transported to Temple Hospital by an unknown person in a private
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       vehicle. He was shot one time in the right shoulder and was in
       stable condition. The vehicle was towed to 4298 Macalester St.

Trial Court Opinion, 9/28/22, at 1 (quoting Application for Search Warrant and

Affidavit, 11/4/20, at 2).1 The items to be searched for and seized included,

“any and all firearms or ballistic evidence. Any photographs or proof of

ownership. And anything of an evidentiary value.” Id. at 2 (quoting

Application for Search Warrant and Affidavit at 1).

       The warrant was issued and executed. During the search, the police

seized bullet fragments, Stevenson’s driver’s license, a firearm, and a

backpack containing marijuana. See Complaint, Affidavit of Probable Cause,

4/1/21, at 2. The Commonwealth charged Stevenson with drugs and firearms

violations.2 On his trial date, Stevenson made an oral motion to suppress the

results of the search, arguing that the warrant was not supported by probable

cause. N.T., 5/18/22, at 3-4.

       After argument, the court granted the motion. It found the affidavit for

the warrant was “extraordinarily sparse,” and lacking not only information

about the affiant, such as his “assignment to the case, how long he was a

detective, what his duties were, or his experience as a police officer,” but also

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1 The Application for Search Warrant and Affidavit is not otherwise included in

the certified record, although it was marked as an exhibit at the suppression
hearing.

2 The Commonwealth charged Stevenson with possession of a controlled
substance with intent to deliver, possession of a controlled substance,
possession of drug paraphernalia, carrying firearms in public in Philadelphia,
and possession of an instrument of crime. See 35 P.S. §§ 780-113(a)(30),
(a)(16), (a)(32); 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6108, 907(a), respectively.

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the identity of the neighbors who had relayed information about the shooting

or how they obtained it. Trial Court Opinion, 9/28/22, at 7 (emphasis in

original). It thus concluded the affidavit lacked “veracity and basis of

knowledge” for probable cause to believe the car held evidence of criminal

activity. Id. at 8 (quoting Commonwealth v. David M. Torres, 764 A.2d

532, 537 (Pa. 2001)).

      The court further found that even if the affidavit contained enough

information to render the hearsay statements reliable, it would only give rise

to probable cause to search the vehicle for bullet fragments. Id. The court

observed that the affidavit contained nothing to suggest Stevenson had had a

firearm, or that there were firearms in the vehicle, as the unidentified

neighbors did not report that Stevenson had interacted with the shooter,

possessed a firearm, or fired any shots. Id. at 7. Moreover, the court

observed, the unidentified neighbors had never even stated that the bullet

holes in the car were from the shooting that had been reported, and, while

the shell casings were located at 1900 Ruan St., the car was found at 1930

Ruan St. Id. The court also noted that the affidavit did not include any

information regarding the police investigation that took place in the seven

days between the shooting and the warrant application. Id. at 9 n.6. The court

summarized, “All told, we have shots fired, 16 shell casings, and a car down

the street with some number of bullet holes located somewhere on the vehicle,

from which an unknown black male allegedly ran.” Id. at 7-8.

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        The court also explained that the warrant’s provision allowing the police

to search for “anything of evidentiary value” amounted to “carte blanche

authorization to recover literally ‘anything.’” Id. at 9 (emphasis in original)

(citing Commonwealth v. Grossman, 555 A.2d 896, 899 (Pa. 1989), and

Commonwealth v. Santner, 454 A.2d 24, 28-29 (Pa.Super. 1982)). In this

aspect, the court found the warrant to be vague and overly broad. Id. The

court also noted, as to a search for ballistics evidence, the warrant failed to

specify the exact place to be searched, i.e., the location of the bullet holes in

the car. Id. at 8 n.3. The court acknowledged that some of the items the

police seized may have been in plain view from a lawful vantage point but

found the record on that issue was incomplete. Id. at 8 n.4.

        The Commonwealth appealed,3 and presents the following issue: “Did

the suppression court err in determining that there was no probable cause to

support a warrant that authorized police to search for ballistics evidence in a

car that had been struck by gunfire during a shoot-out?” Commonwealth’s Br.

at 4.

        The Commonwealth argues the suppression court erred in conducting a

de novo review of the issuing authority’s probable cause determination, rather

than giving deference to that authority when determining, in a common-sense

and non-technical manner, whether there is substantial evidence in the record

supporting the decision to issue the warrant. Id. at 8-9 (citing, inter alia,
____________________________________________

3 The Commonwealth certified in its notice of appeal that the suppression order

terminates or substantially handicaps the prosecution. See Pa.R.A.P. 311(d).

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Commonwealth        v.   Jones,   988   A.2d   649,   655   (Pa.   2010)).   The

Commonwealth posits there was substantial evidence in the record to support

the finding of probable cause, as “[i]t is a common-sense inference that a

search of a car riddled with bullet holes at the scene of a shooting would

produce proof of ownership of the car and ballistics evidence of the shooting

under investigation.” Id. at 10. The Commonwealth thus contends the court

erred in concluding the warrant failed because the affidavit did not include the

number of bullet holes in the “bullet-riddled” car; the background of the police

officer; or any additional information the police learned in the seven days

between the shooting and the warrant application.

      The Commonwealth also argues that the search for the non-ballistics

items was supported by probable cause, as there was common-sense reason

to believe guns, proof of ownership, and other evidence would be found in a

bullet-riddled car found at the scene of a shooting. Id. at 14. In the

alternative, the Commonwealth argues the court erred in invalidating the

entire warrant, as those portions of the warrant relating to non-ballistics

evidence were severable. Finally, the Commonwealth complains that the court

erred in faulting the Commonwealth for failing to establish where in the vehicle

the police recovered the backpack — i.e., whether it was in plain view — when

Stevenson had only challenged the four corners of the warrant.

      We begin with the applicable standards. When deciding whether to issue

a search warrant, the issuing authority must apply a “totality of the

circumstances test” to determine whether probable cause exists. David M.

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Torres, 764 A.2d at 537. That is, it must “make a practical, common-sense

decision whether, given all of the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before

him, including the veracity and basis of knowledge of persons supplying

hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of

a crime will be found in a particular place.” Id. (quotation marks and citations

omitted). The issuing authority is limited to reviewing the information within

the four corners of the affidavit. Pa.R.Crim.P. 203(B).

      A court reviewing the probable cause determination must not conduct a

de novo review, but “ensure that the magistrate had a substantial basis for

concluding that probable cause existed.” David M. Torres, 764 A.2d at 537-

38, 540. “[T]he reviewing court must accord deference to the issuing

authority’s probable cause determination, and must view the information

offered to establish probable cause in a common-sense, non-technical

manner.” Id. at 538. At the same time, the reviewing court must balance “the

relative weights of the indicia of reliability (and unreliability) attending [the]

information [included in the affidavit]” when considering whether there was a

substantial basis to support the magistrate’s probable cause determination.

Id. at 540.

      The basis of knowledge and veracity of anonymous sources are

particularly important “where the affidavit of probable cause is almost entirely

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based on information gleaned from anonymous sources.” Id.4 Even when an

affidavit indicates the police know the identity of an anonymous source, an

issuing authority must consider the person to be anonymous if the affidavit

does not give the person’s name or indicate that they previously provided

confidential information to the police. Id. at 537 n.3. Therefore, a suppression

court does not err in invalidating a warrant where the affidavit contains “no

way for the issuing authority to tell how the anonymous sources obtained their

information,” or otherwise assess their reliability. Id. at 538; see id. at 539

(finding affidavit for warrant to search defendant’s residence lacked probable

cause where the affidavit did not set forth the anonymous sources’ bases of

knowledge that the defendant had been involved in a drug deal with the

decedent, and there was minimal independent police investigation to

corroborate the allegations).

       A warrant must describe with particularity the things which are to be

seized and the place to be searched. Pa.R.Crim.P. 205(A)(2), (A)(3).5 “A

warrant unconstitutional for its lack of particularity authorizes a search in

terms so ambiguous as to allow the executing officers to pick and choose

among an individual’s possessions to find which items to seize.” Santner, 454
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4 An identified source is inherently more reliable than an anonymous source

because the person has placed himself/herself/themself at risk for prosecution
for giving false information to the police. Commonwealth v. Butler, 194
A.3d 145, 148-49 (Pa.Super. 2018).

5 The protections of the Pennsylvania Constitution are more stringent in this

regard than the federal Constitution. Commonwealth v. Dougalewicz, 113
A.3d 817, 827 (Pa.Super. 2015).

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A.2d at 25 n.2. In the same vein, the warrant must not be overly broad by

authorizing the seizure of “an entire set of items . . . many of which will prove

unrelated to the crime under investigation.” Id.

      Accordingly, the affidavit must indicate a nexus between the specific and

limited items to be seized, the place to be searched, and the alleged criminal

behavior. Id. at 29 (citation omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Wallace,

42 A.3d 1040, 1049-50 (Pa. 2012) (“[P]robable cause to believe that a man

has committed a crime on the street does not necessarily give rise to probable

cause to search his home”) (citation omitted). A person’s mere proximity to

illegal activity does not give rise to probable cause to search their property.

See Commonwealth v. Lavelle Johnson, 240 A.3d 575, 588-89 (Pa. 2020)

(OAJC) (finding an affidavit asserting the defendant was found in an

apartment with illegal contraband did not provide probable cause to search

his cell phone because it did not allege he “was personally in possession of (or

even aware of) the drugs, guns, or anything else related to criminal activity

found in the apartment”).

      For example, in Commonwealth v. Eric Torres, 177 A.3d 263

(Pa.Super. 2017), this Court held there was an insufficient nexus between the

crimes under investigation, the items to be seized, and the place to be

searched. Id. at 272. The affidavit asserted that the defendant fled from a

traffic stop, and, during his arrest, shot a police officer in the stomach. Id. at

270-71. The warrant allowed a search of the defendant’s residence for “all

ammunition or ballistics evidence . . . as well as any and all handguns, rifles,

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shotguns, ammunition, gun storage boxes/containers, proof of identification,

and any other items of evidentiary value.” Id. at 272. We observed that the

defendant’s identification was not in doubt, and the search of the residence

would not have uncovered the firearm used in the shooting, which was already

in the possession of the police. Id. at 273.

      However, in Commonwealth v. Jones — invoked here by the

Commonwealth — the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a warrant may

be used as a general investigative tool where the police have more than “mere

suspicion” that a crime occurred and are able to describe the items to be

searched for “as is reasonably possible.” 988 A.2d at 657. In that case, the

affidavit asserted the police responded to a call of shots fired and found the

victim dead at the scene with a gunshot wound to his head. Id. at 651-52.

Although the affidavit gave the victim’s identity and did not mention drugs,

the warrant sought to search the victim’s nearby dormitory room for “[a]ny

evidence that provides Identification/Cellular Phones, Pagers, Drugs, Drug

Paraph[er]nalia, handguns, [and] bullets.” Id. at 652.

      In finding there was probable cause to search the residence for these

items, the Court noted that the affidavit identified the last residence of the

victim, “within which there was a fair probability that the police would find

evidence of the murder that had occurred nearby,” and sought specific items

“which, if found, could provide leads with regard to any individuals who had

spoken with or contacted the victim on the night of his murder.” Id. at 656-

57. It also stated that the police required conclusive evidence of the victim’s

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identification to “conduct an investigation intelligently,” provide proof that a

specific individual had been murdered, and “have all reasonable certainty

before contacting family members to inform them that their loved one has

been murdered.” Id. At 657.6

       Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Harve Lamar Johnson, 42 A.3d 1017

(Pa. 2012), the police knew a two-year old child had been assaulted inside a

residence but did not know the details of the assault. Id. at 1030.7 The child’s

mother and her boyfriend gave the police conflicting accounts, and the child’s

mother told the police that her boyfriend had beaten the child, potentially with

a game controller and cord. Id. A warrant was issued to search the residence

for

       Items relating to assault of [victim] including but not limited to
       belts, cords, game controllers, sticks, bedding material, blood,
       hairs, fibers, fingerprints, clothing and any and all other items
       associated     with   this   assault.   Also  photographs,    and
       measurements of residence including exterior, and any other
       items or contraband found while conducting above search.

Id. at 1129-30. Although the warrant allowed a broad search for “any and all

other items associated with [the] assault,” the Supreme Court held the

warrant was not vague or overly broad, given the affidavit established the

police knew the extent of the victim’s injuries and the location of the assault,

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6 The Jones Court was unanimous in the result but divided on the issue of

standard of review. See Eric Torres, 177 A.3d at 270 n.3.

7 The child died from her injuries after the affidavit was sworn.

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and the mother and her boyfriend gave conflicting accounts of how the assault

occurred. Id. at 1031-32.

        Here, the affidavit of probable cause asserted that the police responded

to a radio call for gunshots, where they found fired shell casings, and, at a

nearby residence, a car with multiple bullet holes. Although the initial radio

call must be considered anonymous,8 the police independently corroborated

the information by locating the shell casings and car. The common-sense

conclusion to be drawn from this information is that the car was illegally shot

while parked on the street, and that the shell casings were discarded at that

time.

        Next, the affidavit asserts that “neighbors” reported an unknown black

man ran from the vehicle. The reasonable assumption here is that the man

was inside the vehicle when it was illegally shot. However, as the affidavit

does not identify the neighbors, this information is, on its own, of limited

reliability. See David M. Torres, 764 A.2d at 537 n.3.

        The affidavit then asserts “[i]t was later found” that Stevenson owned

the vehicle, and, at some point, was shot, transported to the hospital, and in

stable condition. The affidavit does not state whether the affiant came upon

____________________________________________

8 See David M. Torres, 764 A.2d at 538. But see Navarette v. California,

134 S. Ct. 1683 (2014) (holding anonymous 911 call that suspect ran
reporting party off roadway was sufficiently reliable to support traffic stop
where tip indicated the caller had eyewitness knowledge of the dangerous
driving, was making a near-contemporaneous statement, and the 911 system
records the informants voice and traces calls).

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this information through an anonymous source, or through independent police

investigation.

      Nonetheless, considering that the police can determine the owner of a

vehicle through its make, model, and registration number—information which

the affiant included—and that the affidavit included the name of the hospital

where Stevenson was convalescing, a common-sense conclusion is that this

information was corroborated by the police, and reliable enough to support

probable cause to believe that Stevenson is the person the neighbors reported

ran from the shooting, that he owns the vehicle, and that he was shot at the

same time his car was shot and the bullet fragments were discharged. Cf.

David M. Torres, 764 A.2d at 537 (finding no probable cause where sources

were anonymous with minimal police corroboration). We therefore hold the

trial court erred in finding the affidavit insufficiently reliable to give rise to

probable cause to search the car for ballistics evidence that might help the

police determine the manner of the shooting.

      However, we affirm the trial court’s ruling that the affidavit did not give

rise to probable cause to conduct a search for non-ballistics evidence. The

affidavit gives probable cause to believe that a single crime occurred: the

shooting of Stevenson and his car. Any search warrant must therefore have a

nexus between that crime, the items to be seized, and the place to be

searched.

      First, there was no indication that Stevenson possessed the firearm used

in the shooting, and common sense does not support the conclusion that the

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perpetrator of a shooting would discard his firearm inside of the car he just

shot. See Eric Torres, 177 A.3d at 272 (finding no probable cause to search

residence for firearms when the search would not produce the firearm used in

the shooting); see also Lavelle Johnson, 240 A.3d at 589 (finding no

probable cause to search a person’s phone where the affidavit did not allege

a connection between that person and the contraband found in another’s

apartment).

      Nor was there probable cause to search the car for the identification of

the vehicle’s owner, Stevenson, who was evidently not the perpetrator, and

whose identity was already known to the police. See Eric Torres, 177 A.3d

at 272 (finding no probable cause to search residence for identification of

shooter, when his identification was not in doubt); cf. Jones (finding probable

cause to search victim’s residence for evidence confirming victim’s identity,

necessary for conducting murder investigation intelligently and correctly

informing next of kin).

      Nor did the affidavit provide a nexus to allow a search for photographs

or “anything of evidentiary value” in Stevenson’s car. Although a search

warrant may be used as an investigatory tool, and here, the police had

reasonably definitive knowledge that an illegal shooting had occurred, this was

not a particularized description of items that would probably be found in the

car. Nor, as was the case in Harve Lamar Johnson and Jones, is this a case

involving homicide or the assault of an infant, where a broader, more

generalized search of a silenced victim’s property might be warranted.

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      Our law demands a showing of probable cause to believe that particular

evidence of the crime that was committed will be found in a particular

place. Categorial assumptions do not suffice. See Commonwealth v.

Jacoby, 170 A.3d 1065, 1085 (Pa. 2017) (rejecting assumption that felons

do not discard firearms, even those used in murders); Commonwealth v.

Ani, 293 A.3d 704, 727 (Pa.Super. 2023) (rejecting assumption that home

invaders are likely to have used their cell phones to aid in the commission of

their crimes); Commonwealth v. Nicholson, 262 A.3d 1276, 1282

(Pa.Super. 2021) (rejecting affiant’s “boilerplate” assertion that his training

and experience gave probable cause to believe that suspected drug dealer

kept drugs, weapons, and other contraband in his home). In short, the instant

affidavit alleged a specific crime, but the warrant’s provisions to search the

entire car for firearms, identification, photographs, or “any” evidence was not

supported by probable cause.

      Because we find there was probable cause to support a search of the

car for ballistics evidence, but not the other items, we find the court erred in

failing to sever the warrant. Under the doctrine of severability, a suppression

court might suppress only the seized evidence for which the warrant did not

provide probable cause to search. Commonwealth v. Anderson, 40 A.3d

1245, 1248 (Pa.Super. 2012). Here, the court should have only suppressed

the non-ballistics evidence which lacked a nexus with the crime alleged in the

affidavit. We therefore reverse the court’s grant of Stevenson’s suppression

motion insofar as it pertains to the ballistics evidence.

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      As to the Commonwealth’s assertion that some of the evidence may be

admissible under the plain view doctrine or the inevitable discovery doctrine,

we find that argument waived by the Commonwealth’s failure to present it to

the court below. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). The trial court did not prevent the

Commonwealth from making this argument in response to the motion to

suppress.

      Order affirmed in part and reversed in part. Case remanded for further

proceedings. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 8/15/2023

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