Court Opinion

ID: 9890179
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-12 17:04:47.906025+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:04:50.462523
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/12/23
                 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                 SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                        DIVISION SEVEN

 JULIE PARK et al.,                    B323063

        Plaintiffs, Cross-defendants   (Los Angeles County
        and Respondents,               Super. Ct. No.
                                       21STCV42599)
        v.

 NMSI, INC.,

        Defendant, Cross-
        complainant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Mary H. Strobel, Judge. Affirmed.
      Lee, Hong, Degerman, Kang & Waimey, Eric D. Olson and
Soojin Youn for Defendant, Cross-complainant and Appellant.
      Kingfisher Law, Nithin Kumar; Cohen Williams, Marc S.
Williams, Alyssa D. Bell and Martin J. Christopher Santos for
Plaintiffs, Cross-defendants and Respondents.
                        _________________
      At the request of plaintiffs and cross-defendants Julie Park
and Danny Chung, the trial court issued prejudgment right to
attach orders (RTAO) in the aggregate amount of $7,192,607.16
against their former employer, NMSI, Inc. Appealing the orders
as authorized by Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1,
subdivision (a)(5),1 NMSI contends Park and Chung failed to
establish the probable validity of their claims because, contrary
to the allegations in their first amended complaint, the
agreements underlying their breach of contract causes of action
had been modified through an exchange of emails, as well as by
the parties’ subsequent conduct. NMSI also contends the
amounts to be attached were not readily ascertainable and the
court erred in considering documents incorporated by reference
into the applications for a writ of attachment. We affirm.
      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      1. Park’s and Chung’s Revenue-sharing Agreements
      NMSI is a residential mortgage lender licensed in 26 states
with six regional fulfillment centers in this country and a foreign
branch in Korea. NMSI funded loans exceeding $5.5 billion in
2020 and $5.6 billion in 2021.2

1      Statutory references are to this code unless otherwise
stated.
2      “A real property loan generally involves two documents, a
promissory note and a security instrument. The security
instrument secures the promissory note. This instrument
‘entitles the lender to reach some asset of the debtor if the note is
not paid. In California, the security instrument is most
commonly a deed of trust (with the debtor and creditor known as
trustor and beneficiary and a neutral third party known as
trustee). The security instrument may also be a mortgage (with
mortgagor and mortgagee, as participants). In either case, the

                                  2
        Park and Chung were both employed in NMSI’s Brea office.
Chung was the company’s chief marketing officer; Park was the
executive vice president. In January 2019 Chung and Park
entered into almost identical, but separate, branch manager/sales
manager employment agreements with NMSI (2019 agreements).
Pursuant to their 2019 agreements, Park and Chung were both
responsible for the operation of the branch, including hiring and
paying operating expenses. In consideration Park and Chung
were jointly entitled to 75 percent of the net revenue generated
by loans originated by their branch office provided the net
revenue of the office was greater than $90,000. Under the terms
of the 2019 agreements, revenue included loan origination fees,
discount points, rebates, processing fees, any other fees charged
to the borrower at the time of closing, branch margin built-in on
top of NMSI’s wholesale rate sheet, net premiums gained through
the sale of branch loans in the secondary market and any net
revenue gained on the lender’s fee. Expenses included rent,
utilities, taxes and payroll.
        The 2019 agreements were fully integrated and provided
they could be modified only by the written agreement of the
parties. Section 24.5 of each agreement stated, “This agreement
constitutes the entire understanding between the parties hereto
. . . and shall not be terminated . . . or amended, except in a
writing executed by the parties hereto.” Section 24.13 reiterated
that “[t]his agreement may be modified only by a further writing
that is duly executed by both parties.”

creditor is said to have a lien on the property given as security,
which is also referred to as collateral.’” (Alliance Mortgage Co. v.
Rothwell (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1226, 1235.)

                                 3
     2. The October 2019 Proposed Modification
       In September 2019 Jae Chong, NMSI’s chief executive
officer, first proposed a change to the compensation structure in
the 2019 agreements. According to Chong, Chung orally agreed
to the terms of the modifications, which were then confirmed in
an email Chong sent Chung on October 22, 2019. The subject
line of the email (in Korean) stated, “[R]e: what we discussed
yesterday.” The body of the email purported to summarize the
terms of the modified agreement and, in particular, that the
share of branch net revenue paid to Chung and Park would be
reduced from 75 percent to a range between 25 percent and
40 percent based on what was described as a sliding scale
proportionate revenue sharing model. On October 23, 2019
Chung emailed (also in Korean) stating, “All agreed. What you
said about the profit sharing starting in January next year
means that the loan purchase date in the P&L [profit and loss]
will be January, right?”
       Beginning in January 2020 NMSI paid Park and Chung
according to the October 2019 sliding scale model. Chung
promptly notified NMSI’s accounting department that neither he
nor Park had agreed to modify their compensation structure.
Nevertheless, the reduced compensation continued; and, as Park
and Chung have alleged in this lawsuit, in August 2020 NMSI
reduced their compensation even further by refusing to share
revenues generated by loan servicing and the sales of servicing
rights.
       On January 14, 2021 Park and Chung were advised that
NMSI was terminating their employment. Thereafter, NMSI
allegedly began withholding commissions owed to two other
NMSI loan originators (Mike Koh and Ryan Kim) “for no

                                4
apparent reason other than their long-time association” with
Park and Chung.
      3. The Operative First Amended Complaint
       Park, Chung, Koh and Kim sued NMSI and Chong on
November 18, 2021 and filed a verified amended complaint on
January 7, 2022 alleging causes of action for breach of contract,
failure to pay wages, breach of fiduciary duty, accounting and
violation of California’s unfair competition law (Bus. & Prof.
Code, § 17200 et seq.). As to Park and Chung, the amended
complaint alleged, “[I]f the proper 75% split had been applied to
the net revenue amounts calculated by NMSI for 2020 and 2021,
[they] would have received over $9 million additional dollars. . . .
Of that amount, $7.5 million should have been paid . . . in 2020,
and $1.8 million should have been paid in 2021.” The amended
complaint attached as exhibits the 2019 agreements.
      4. The Right To Attach Order and Writs of Attachment
      On February 2, 2022 Park filed an ex parte application for
writ of attachment. Park’s application included a declaration
describing NMSI’s breach of the 2019 revenue sharing
agreements and asserted that she and Chung were owed past
compensation totaling $9,624,329.39. The declaration detailed
Park’s calculation of the amount due and was supported by what
purported to be NMSI’s profit and loss statements for 2019, 2020
and the first half of 2021. The trial court, finding no exigency,
denied the ex parte application without prejudice to filing a
regularly noticed motion.3

3     Shortly after the trial court denied the ex parte application
for a writ of attachment, NMSI filed a cross-complaint against
Park and Chung for breach of fiduciary duty, aiding and abetting

                                  5
       On May 27, 2022 Park and Chung filed new applications
for an RTAO, seeking to attach $9,624,329.39 (divided equally
between Park and Chung) on the ground they had established the
probable validity of their breach of contract claims. They argued,
“NMSI breached Plaintiffs’ branch manager agreements by
failing to apply the proper compensation formula to the net
revenues generated in 2020 and 2021, as well as by failing to pay
any share of other revenues that were excluded from the profit[ ]
and loss statements.”
       The application was supported by declarations from Park
and Chung. In his declaration Chung denied he had been acting
on behalf of Park when discussing the proposed October 2019
modification, and insisted it was his understanding that “NMSI
would be sending written agreements containing the exact details
of the proposed modification, at which point Ms. Park and I
would be able to negotiate further before signing the agreements.
I never intended to waive the requirement in my branch manager
agreement that any modifications to the agreed-upon terms be
made only pursuant to an executed written agreement, nor did I
ever sign anything in the writing modifying my branch manager
agreement.” Park’s declaration similarly denied modification and
asserted she had “repeatedly informed Jae Chong that Mr. Chung
was not authorized to negotiate on my behalf.” Park also
reaffirmed her February 2, 2022 declaration, submitted with the
ex parte application, which “remains true and accurate and is
incorporated by reference as if set forth herein.”
       NMSI opposed the motion, arguing Park and Chung “have
not and cannot establish the ‘probable validity’ of their claims or

breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract and unfair
competition.

                                 6
that their damages are in a ‘readily ascertainable’ amount
because the very formula for calculating those purported
damages is the central issue in dispute in this case. Moreover,
Plaintiffs claim for themselves a purported right to attach over
$9.6 million as purported damages that differs from the amount
of damages claimed in the verified complaint, and which were
calculated by combining the claims of all plaintiffs,” including
Koh and Kim who were not parties to the motion for writ of
attachment. Finally, Chong contended in his declaration that his
email exchange with Chung confirmed they had agreed to the
modified revenue sharing, a modification that was also confirmed
by Park’s and Chung’s subsequent conduct. Chong also asserted
“it was common practice for Chung to communicate . . . on both
his and Park’s behalf.”
      The trial court on July 26, 2022 found Park and Chung had
established the probable validity of their breach of contract
claims and issued right to attach orders and authorized writs of
attachment on behalf of Park and Chung for $3,596,303.58 each
(a combined total of $7,192,607.16). The court concluded (using
the probable validity standard) the 2019 agreements had not
been modified as argued by NSMI, finding that Chung “did not
insert an electronic signature or other symbol showing intent to
sign a modified agreement by his email” and, in addition, Chung
did not have authority to enter into any modification agreement
on behalf of Park. The court also found the 2019 agreements had
not been modified by the subsequent conduct of Park and Chung.
      In setting the amount to be attached, the court, after
concluding there was sufficient evidence NMSI had breached the
2019 revenue sharing agreement, found that Chung and Park
had submitted “undisputed evidence that they jointly suffered

                               7
damage of $6,681,150.82.” The court noted that NMSI did “not
provide any responsive declarations about damages or argue that
Park’s calculations of damages under the profit-sharing plan
from the January 2019 agreement are inaccurate.” The court
also found that NMSI had failed to rebut Park and Chung’s claim
an additional $163,688.94 was due for selling mortgage servicing
rights and $347,767.33 for outstanding branch reserves that were
to be paid within 30 days of termination of the 2019 agreements.
However, the court agreed a material disputed issue existed
whether Park and Chung were entitled to compensation for
servicing one type of loan product (“KVOE loans”) (75 percent of
$3,242,296.32) and, on that basis, concluded they had failed to
show a probable validity of prevailing on that aspect of their
damage claim.4
                         DISCUSSION
      1. Governing Law and Standard of Review
      “Attachment is an ancillary or provisional remedy to aid
the collection of a money demand by seizure of property in
advance of trial or judgment as security for satisfaction of a
judgment for the attaching party.” (Burke v. Superior Court
(1969) 71 Cal.2d 276, 279, fn. 3; accord, Rreef America Reit II
Corp, YYYY v. Samsara Inc. (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 609, 616-617
(Rreef America); Kemp Bros. Construction, Inc. v. Titan Electric
Corp. (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1474, 1476.) With exceptions not
applicable here, “an attachment may be issued only in an action
on a claim or claims for money, each of which is based upon a
contract, express or implied, where the total amount of the claim

4     Park and Chung each posted an undertaking of $10,000, as
ordered.

                                8
or claims is a fixed or readily ascertainable amount.” (§ 483.010.)
The amount to be secured is “[t]he amount of the defendant’s
indebtedness claimed by the plaintiff” plus an estimated amount
for attorney fees and costs authorized by the court. (§§ 483.015,
subd. (a)(1), (2), 482.110; see Royals v. Lu (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th
328, 345.)
        “Before an attachment order is issued, the court must find
all of the following: (1) the claim upon which the attachment is
based is one upon which an attachment may be issued; (2) the
applicant has established ‘the probable validity’ of the claim upon
which the attachment is based; (3) the attachment is not sought
for a purpose other than the recovery upon which the request for
attachment is based; and (4) the amount to be secured by the
attachment is greater than zero. [Citation.] The plaintiff has the
burden of establishing the probable validity of the claim upon
which the attachment is based.” (Rreef America, supra,
91 Cal.App.5th at p. 617; accord, Royals v. Lu, supra,
81 Cal.App.5th at p. 345; Goldstein v. Barak Construction (2008)
164 Cal.App.4th 845, 852.) Probable validity means “it is more
likely than not that the plaintiff will obtain a judgment against
the defendant on that claim.” (§ 481.190.)
        “‘On appeal from an attachment order, we review the
record for substantial evidence to support the trial court’s factual
findings.’ [Citation.] ‘We will not disturb a determination upon
controverted facts unless no substantial evidence supports the
court’s determination.’ [Citation.] However, where there are no
contested issues of fact, the issue becomes one of law subject to
de novo review.” (Rreef America, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 617;
accord, Goldstein v. Barak Construction, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th
at p. 853; see Santa Clara Waste Water Co. v. Allied World

                                 9
National Assurance Co. (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 881, 885 [“[a] trial
court’s finding on whether a plaintiff established probable
validity is reviewed for substantial evidence”].) To the extent
issuance of an RTAO raises questions of statutory interpretation,
our review is de novo. (See In re Tobacco II Cases (2009)
46 Cal.4th 298, 311 [questions of statutory interpretation are
pure matters of law that we review de novo].)
      2. Substantial Evidence Supports the Trial Court’s Finding
         of the Probable Validity of Park’s and Chung’s Contract
         Claims
         a. The finding the 2019 agreements were not modified
            by the October 2019 email exchange
       NMSI contends the trial court misinterpreted the law
regarding electronic signatures when finding the email exchange
between Chong and Chung did not effect a modification of the
2019 agreements. According to NMSI, Chung’s email of
October 23, 2019, which included “his full name, title, address,
two phone numbers, email address, and webpage URL,” was all
that was needed to satisfy the electronic signature requirement of
the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (UETA) (Civ. Code,
§ 1633.1 et seq.).
       Under the UETA an electronic signature has the same legal
effect as a handwritten signature. (Civ. Code, § 1633.7, subd. (a)
[“[a] signature may not be denied legal effect or enforceability
solely because it is in electronic form”]; Ruiz v. Moss Bros. Auto
Group, Inc. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 836, 843; see Ni v. Slocum
(2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1636, 1647 [“the Legislature has, through
these provisions, expressed general approval of the use of
electronic signatures in commercial and governmental
transactions”].) But to be effective, an electronic signature must
be “executed or adopted by a person with the intent to sign the

                               10
electronic record.” (Civ. Code, § 1633.2, subd. (h).) Thus,
although Chung’s name was at the bottom of his October 23, 2019
email, more was required to establish he electronically signed the
email with the intent to modify his (let alone Park’s) revenue
sharing agreement. (See J.B.B. Investment Partners, Ltd. v. Fair
(2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 974, 988-989 (J.B.B. I) [“[a]ttributing the
name on an e-mail to a particular person and determining that
the printed name is ‘[t]he act of [this] person’ is a necessary
prerequisite but is insufficient, by itself, to establish that it is an
‘electronic signature’”].)
       NMSI’s contention the UETA does not require evidence of
an intent to sign unless the authenticity of an electronic
signature has been called into question—and that the trial court,
therefore, erred in finding no modification of the 2019 agreement
had occurred—finds support in neither statutory language nor
pertinent case law.
       The UETA only applies “to a transaction between parties
each of which has agreed to conduct the transaction by electronic
means. Whether the parties agree to conduct a transaction by
electronic means is determined from the context and surrounding
circumstances, including the parties’ conduct.” (Civ. Code,
§ 1633.5, subd. (b); see J.B.B. I, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 988
[“UETA applies, however, only when the parties consent to
conduct the transaction by electronic means”].) Based on the
evidence it received regarding the October 2019 emails, the trial
court found that “Chung did not insert an electronic signature or
other symbol showing intent to sign a modified agreement by his
email” because “[t]he body of the emails . . . appears to document
a ‘discussion’ or ‘thoughts’ about a revised compensation
structure. . . . In the October 23 email, Chung asked a follow-up

                                  11
question to Chong, which suggests that the parties were still
discussing potential terms of a modification, not that they were
executing a final modified agreement.” We necessarily defer to
the trial court’s credibility finding that Chung did not have an
“intent to sign the electronic record” under Civil Code
sections 1633.2, subdivision (h), and 1633.5, subdivision (b). (See
Nunez v. Cycad Management LLC (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 276,
283-284 [“[w]hen the court weighs conflicting declarations, we
defer to its factual determinations; we have no authority to make
new credibility findings”]; Haraguchi v. Superior Court (2008)
43 Cal.4th 706, 711, fn. 3 [“that the trial court’s findings were
based on declarations and other written evidence does not lessen
the deference due those findings”].)
       The trial court’s finding (and with it, the court’s implicit
interpretation of the requirements of the UETA) is fully
consistent with the decision in J.B.B. I, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th
974, in which the court concluded the defendant Fair’s typed
name in a July 2013 email did not satisfy the “strict signature
requirements” of Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6, which
governs stipulated settlements. (J.B.B. I, at pp. 990-993.) In
finding that Fair’s printed name at the bottom of the email was
not a valid electronic signature under the UETA, the court
explained, “Focusing only on [Civil Code] section 1633.7, the
court appears to have simplistically assumed, as did counsel for
plaintiffs, that because Fair admitted at deposition that the
signature was his, and the signature was indisputably electronic,
the printed signature on the July 4 offer was therefore an
‘electronic signature’ within the meaning of UETA. [¶] . . . [¶]
The exchange of e-mail messages shows that the parties clearly
agreed to negotiate the terms of the settlement by e-mail, but

                                12
plaintiffs did not demonstrate, as they must [citation], that the
parties ever agreed to conduct transactions by electronic means
or that Fair intended with his printed name at the end of his
e-mail to sign electronically the July 4 offer.” (Id. at pp. 988-989.)
       Contrary to NMSI’s argument, the discussion in J.B.B. I of
the requirements for a valid electronic signature was not
“clarified and limited” by the later opinion in the same case,
J.B.B. Investment Partners Ltd. v. Fair (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 1
(J.B.B. II). The court of appeal in its 2019 opinion simply
explained that J.B.B. Investment had incorrectly attempted to
extend its 2014 holding that Fair’s typed name did not create a
binding settlement agreement pursuant to Code of Civil
Procedure section 664.6 to argue the plaintiffs’ settlement offer
had never been accepted and could not be enforced through some
other procedural mechanism. (See J.B.B. II, at p. 13
[“Defendants’ partial quotation from our 2014 opinion is
misleading. We were not addressing whether Fair’s responses to
the July 4 offer created a binding settlement agreement, but
instead were addressing the fact that ‘[t]he plain language of the
July 4 offer made it clear that no signature was being requested
as the offer included no signature line or signature block,
contained no signature by any of the plaintiffs, and advised that
future paperwork was forthcoming,’” italics omitted].) J.B.B. I’s
explanation of the requirements for a valid electronic signature
under the UETA remains persuasive authority, which we follow.
          b. The finding the agreements were not modified by the
             parties’ subsequent conduct
      There similarly is no merit to NMSI’s argument
challenging the trial court’s probable validity finding directed to
NMSI’s contention the 2019 agreements were modified by the

                                  13
subsequent conduct of Park and Chung. Relying on Diamond
Woodworks, Inc. v. Argonaut Ins. Co. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th
1020, 1038, and the “uncontroversial principle that written
contracts can be modified by conduct,” NMSI emphasizes that
Park and Chung both continued their employment after the
modification and insists that on November 3, 2020 both
“confirmed” in an email the profit and loss calculations for the
month of October 2020. NMSI also points to a June 14, 2021
email from Chung (after he left his employment with NMSI) in
which he referred to the 40 percent revenue sharing modification.
       A written contract that expressly precludes oral
modification may nonetheless “be modified by an oral agreement
to the extent that the oral agreement is executed by the parties.”
(Civ. Code, § 1698, subd. (b); see LGCY Power, LLC v. Superior
Court (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 844, 868 [“where, as here, a written
agreement prohibits oral modifications, an oral modification
nevertheless is enforceable to the extent it has been executed by
the parties”].) Moreover, even if not modified by an executed oral
agreement, “the parties may, by their words or conduct, waive
contractual rights.” (Wind Dancer Production Group v. Walt
Disney Pictures (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 56, 78; see Biren v.
Equality Emergency Medical Group, Inc. (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th
125, 141 [“‘the parties may, by their conduct, waive [a no oral
modification] provision’ where evidence shows that was their
intent”].) “‘[T]he pivotal issue in a claim of waiver [of contractual
rights] is the intention of the party who allegedly relinquished
the known legal right.’” (Wind Dancer Production Group, at
p. 78; accord, Old Republic Ins. Co. v. FSR Brokerage, Inc. (2000)
80 Cal.App.4th 666, 678 [“[t]hus, ‘[t]he pivotal issue in a claim of
waiver is the intention of the party who allegedly relinquished

                                 14
the known legal right’”]; DRG/Beverly Hills, Ltd. v. Chopstix Dim
Sum Cafe & Takeout III, Ltd. (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 54, 60.)
Waiver is ordinarily a question of fact unless “there are no
disputed facts and only one reasonable inference may be drawn.”
(DuBeck v. California Physicians’ Service (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th
1254, 1265.)
        Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that
the November 3, 2020 email does not show that “both Chung and
Park personally supervised the calculations of the Brea branch
profit and loss figures . . . which reflected the modified profit-
sharing model, which they then sent to and confirmed with
NMSI’s accounting team,” and its further finding that the email
did not confirm the modified revenue sharing agreement because
it “failed to include the attachment with the cover email,” so “it
cannot be determined from the November 2020 email what
Plaintiffs were confirming.” Also, as the trial court explained, the
“June 2021 email of Plaintiff Chung which refers to a ‘40:60 split’
. . . post-dates Plaintiffs’ departure from NMSI [and] Park was
not copied on this email. Defendant does not show that the June
2021 email constitutes a signed, written modification by Chung
or Park.” (See generally Goodman v. Lozano (2010) 47 Cal.4th
1327, 1339 [“‘“[w]hen two or more inferences can reasonably be
deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to
substitute its decision for that of the trial court”’”]; Goldstein v.
Barak Construction, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 853 [“[w]e will
not disturb a determination upon controverted facts unless no
substantial evidence supports the court’s determination”].)
        To the extent NMSI contends Park’s and Chung’s continued
employment was sufficient conduct to modify the 2019 revenue
sharing agreements, this argument has been forfeited because it

                                 15
was not raised in the trial court. NMSI argued in general only
that “there are substantial questions of contract interpretation,
estoppel, waiver, ratification, and other legal questions” and
insisted “[t]hese issues are not resolvable in an Attachment
proceeding.” The trial court appropriately declined to develop
this argument for NMSI, and it is not properly considered by this
court in the first instance. (See Zimmerman, Rosenfeld, Gersh &
Leeds LLP v. Larson (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1466, 1488
[“appellate court can deem an argument raised in an appeal . . .
waived if it was not raised below and requires consideration of
new factual questions”]; City of Merced v. American Motorists Inc.
Co. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1316, 1327 [“[s]ince this new theory
involves an issue of fact . . . and the facts to support the theory
were not developed below, we find the argument was waived for
failure to raise it in the trial court”]; Rossiter v. Benoit (1979)
88 Cal.App.3d 706, 712 [“[p]oints not urged in the trial court may
not be urged for the first time on appeal”].)
      3. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Determining the Claims
         Were for a Fixed or Readily Ascertainable Amount
       As discussed, an attachment generally may be issued only
in an action where the claim for money is for “a fixed or readily
ascertainable amount.” (§ 483.010, subd. (a).) “‘“The fact that the
damages are unliquidated is not determinative. [Citations.] But
the contract sued on must furnish a standard by which the
amount due may be clearly ascertained and there must exist a
basis upon which the damages can be determined by proof.”’”
(CIT Group/Equipment Financing, Inc. v. Super DVD, Inc.,
(2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 537, 540; accord, Force v. Hart (1928)
205 Cal. 670, 673 [“[i]t is a well-recognized rule of law in this
state that an attachment will lie upon a cause of action for

                                16
damages for a breach of contract where the damages are readily
ascertainable by reference to the contract and the basis of the
computation of damages appears to be reasonable and definite”].)
       In its opposition to the application for a right to attach
order, NMSI did not challenge the calculations concerning
revenue and expenses presented by Park upon which she and
Chung based their damage claims. The trial court found, “[g]iven
the level of detail provided and the lack of any opposing
calculations,” that Park’s calculations were “credible and
persuasive evidence under the probable validity standard.”
       Although not directly challenging the accuracy of the
revenue figures provided by Park, on appeal NMSI argues
“highly disputed factual issues” exist and the trial court
improperly “made judgments about what was, and what was not,
included in the original profit-sharing agreement.” Specifically,
NMSI contends “the servicing-related profits from ‘MSR’ loan
sales” were not included as revenue under the terms of the 2019
agreements.
       Park’s declaration explained “MSRs are the various rights
associated with servicing a loan, including the right to collect
borrower payments, issue monthly statements, manage escrow
funds, cure defaults, foreclose, etc. [¶] When NMSI sold loans to
investors other than Fannie Mae, the investors typically
purchased the MSRs along with the loans. NMSI always
included the total loan proceeds for those loan sales in calculating
the Brea branch’s monthly revenues, and never sought to exclude
any portion of the proceeds because the MSRs were included in
the sale.” Chong disputed this, insisting in his declaration that
“[s]ervicing fees-related issues are not part of the original

                                 17
agreement . . . and they were never included in the P&L
calculations used to calculate Plaintiffs’ income.”
       Noting that the 2019 agreements broadly defined revenue,
which included “[a]ny other fees charged to the borrower,” “[n]et
[p]remiums gained on lender’s fee” and “[n]et [p]remiums gained
by sale of branch loans to the secondary market,” the trial court
accepted Park and Chung’s position that these servicing related
proceeds were part of the agreed-upon compensation. The court
acted well within its discretion in finding Park’s declaration,
rather than Chong’s, persuasive and including this item in the
amount of the claim subject to attachment. (Cf. Ramos v.
Homeward Residential, Inc. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1434, 1441
[“we defer to factual determinations made by the trial court when
the evidence is in conflict, whether the evidence consists of oral
testimony or declarations”]; Poniktera v. Seiler (2010)
181 Cal.App.4th 121, 130 [“we resolve all conflicts in favor of the
judgment, even when (as here) the trial court’s decision is based
on evidence received by declaration rather than by oral
testimony”].)
       Finally, it is of no consequence that the amount sought in
the application for the RTAO ($9,624,329.39) exceeded the
amount sought in the amended complaint ($9,563,684). The total
amount subject to attachment ordered by the trial court
($7,192,607.16), in addition to being less than the amount sought
in the amended complaint, was properly based on the court’s
evaluation of the record and “the probable outcome of the
litigation.” (Loeb & Loeb v. Beverly Glen Music, Inc. (1985)
166 Cal.App.3d 1110, 1120 [“the court must consider the relative
merits of the positions of the respective parties and make a
determination of the probable outcome of the litigation”]; see

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§ 484.090, subd. (d) [“[t]he court’s determinations shall be made
upon the basis of the pleadings and other papers in the record”];
Goldstein v. Barak Construction, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 853
[same].)
      4. The Trial Court Properly Considered the Documents
         Incorporated by Reference
      Park and Chung based the amounts to be subject to
attachment on the detailed calculations and supporting schedules
in Park’s declaration filed with the February 2022 ex parte
application, which they incorporated into their May 2022 noticed
applications.5 NMSI contends such incorporation by reference is
prohibited by section 484.040, subdivision (c); the trial court
erred in overruling its objection to the consideration of that
information; and, as a consequence, the orders should be
reversed. The law is not so restrictive.
      To be sure, section 484.040 provides, “[T]he defendant shall
be served with all of the following: [¶] . . . [¶] (c) a copy of the
application and of any affidavit in support of the application.”
That language does not preclude incorporation by reference of
documents previously served on the defendant, and inferring
such a prohibition would be inconsistent with California Rules of

5      As discussed, in her declaration Park stated, “The
testimony in my prior declaration remains true and accurate and
is incorporated by reference as if set forth herein.” Chung in his
declaration stated, “I have reviewed the Declaration of Julie Park
filed on February 2, 2022, which contains true and accurate
information to the best of my knowledge.” Although Chung did
not use the word “incorporated,” his reliance on Park’s prior
declaration was sufficient to bring that information before the
trial court in support of his application. (See Larsen v. Johannes
(1970) 7 Cal.App.3d 491, 496.)

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Court, rule 3.1110(d), which expressly permits reference in a
noticed motion to previously filed papers provided they are
identified by date of execution and title. In addition,
section 484.090, subdivision (d), authorizes the court at the
hearing on the application for a writ of attachment, upon good
cause, to “receive and consider” additional evidence. As the court
of appeal held in Roth v. Plikaytis (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 283, 291,
“Consistent with these rules, a litigant may incorporate
previously filed documents and, where practicable, should file
them with the motion. But a litigant is not required to do so
absent a rule precluding incorporation by reference. [Fn.
omitted.]” The trial court did not err in overruling NMSI’s
objection and considering the material from the earlier Park
declaration.
                         DISPOSITION
      The order is affirmed. Park and Chung are to recover their
costs on appeal.

                                     PERLUSS, P. J.

      We concur:

            SEGAL, J.

            MARTINEZ, J.

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