Court Opinion

ID: 9882550
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-05 22:11:31.768022+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:00:21.597584
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Conn, 2023-Ohio-2669.]

                             IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                                FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                      ADAMS COUNTY

State of Ohio,                             :     Case No. 23CA1163

        Plaintiff-Appellee,                :     DECISION AND
                                                 JUDGMENT ENTRY
        v.                                 :

Justin Conn,                               :

        Defendant-Appellant.               :     RELEASED 7/27/2023

______________________________________________________________________
                            APPEARANCES:

Brian T. Goldberg, Cincinnati, Ohio, for appellant.

Austin Ervin, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, West Union, Ohio, for appellee.
______________________________________________________________________
Hess, J.

        {¶1}     Justin Conn appeals from a judgment entry on sentence issued by the

Adams County Court of Common Pleas following his guilty plea to four counts of

obstructing official business and four counts of failure to stop after an accident. Conn

raises two assignments of error asserting that the trial court committed plain error when

it did not merge the obstructing official business counts and that the trial court erred in

imposing consecutive sentences when it failed to make the requisite findings to do so

during the sentencing hearing. For the reasons which follow, we conclude that the trial

court did not commit plain error when it did not merge the obstructing official business

counts. However, we conclude that the trial court did err when it ordered Conn to serve

the sentences for the obstruction counts consecutively because it did not make all the

findings required by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) at the sentencing hearing. Therefore, we clearly
Adams App. No. 23CA1163                                                                     2

and convincingly find that the order of consecutive sentences is contrary to law, vacate

Conn’s sentence for his obstructing official business convictions, and remand the case

for the limited purpose of resentencing him on those convictions. We affirm the trial

court's judgment in all other respects.

                         I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

       {¶2}    In February 2022, the Adams County grand jury indicted Conn on four

counts of obstructing official business in violation of R.C. 2921.31(A), fifth-degree felonies

because he allegedly “created a risk of physical harm to any person,” see R.C.

2921.31(B). The grand jury also indicted him on four counts of failure to stop after an

accident in violation of R.C. 4549.02(A)(1)(a), (b), and (c), first-degree misdemeanors.

Each failure to stop count indicated it pertained to a collision Conn was involved in with a

different named individual. All eight counts were alleged to have occurred “[o]n or about

and between January 19, 2022 and January 21, 2022 in Adams County, Ohio.” Conn

initially pleaded not guilty.

       {¶3}    On March 1, 2022, the trial court modified Conn’s bond to approve a new

address for him at the Counseling Center in West Union, Ohio. On March 8, 2022, the

court revoked his bond and ordered that a capias be issued for his arrest because it

appeared to the court, upon notification by a probation officer, that Conn had left the

Counseling Center three days prior and had not contacted the court with a new address.

On March 11, 2022, Conn was arrested on the capias.

       {¶4}    In April 2022, Conn withdrew his not guilty plea and pleaded guilty. Conn

agreed that he would pay a total of $2,750 in restitution to the four individuals named in

the failure to stop after an accident counts but would otherwise be free to argue about
Adams App. No. 23CA1163                                                                   3

sentencing. At the change of plea hearing, the trial court asked Conn to describe what

happened during the timeframe alleged in the indictment. Conn testified, “Well, I’ll start

off with, uh, that day I was cutting wood. I had, uh, mud all over my shoes. I had a mat

in the back of my truck that didn’t really fit my truck. So, uh, I was cutting wood at my

mom’s house. So, I came into town to get, uh, some stuff at AutoZone. Went down, went

down by I, the old IGA.” He “turned left” and “went up” South Street. Conn further

testified:

        Uh, went up that street, didn’t see a car on my right. Started, you know, I
        stopped at the stop sign. I, I, uh, side swiped her. My mat got caught up in
        my brake. I backed up. I tried to, uh, hit my brake. My gas went. So, then
        I went, I went around her about rear-end another truck. Went up to the other
        stop sign, ran it because I couldn’t stop sideswiped another car. Got my
        mat out, tried to stay in the middle lane, and then rear-ended somebody
        else, and then just freaked out and ran.

Defense counsel stated, “And they rear-ended somebody else,” and Conn testified, “And

they, then they rear-ended somebody else.” The court asked Conn why he “got out and

ran,” and Conn testified, “I have no idea.” The court later asked Conn, “Do you, uh, feel

that by leaving, uh, and, and not staying at the scene of the various accidents that, uh,

that hampered or impeded, uh, the, uh, public official in this case, probably a law

enforcement officer in the performance of their duties to investigate the, uh, various, uh,

wrecks that occurred?” Conn stated, “Yes.” The court accepted the guilty plea and

ordered a pre-sentence investigation report (“PSI”).

        {¶5}   On December 22, 2022, the trial court conducted the sentencing hearing.

During it, defense counsel stated, “I don’t think that anybody’s going to, to argue the fact

that the misdemeanor charges in this case would have to run concurrent or in a concurrent

manner with the overarching felony cases. So, um, I’m going to, for purposes of the
Adams App. No. 23CA1163                                                                   4

sentencing hearing, disregard those today * * * and ask the court to consider, given the

fact that this all took place in span of an hour less [sic], there’s not an exact timeframe,

but [sic].” Conn stated, “Three minutes,” and defense counsel stated, “Yeah. Uh, it

somewhere, somewhere [sic] more than a minute and, and less than an hour. This was

all really one series of events that occurred back on, uh, in January of, um, 2022. I, I

believe, um.” The court said, “The, on or about between [sic] January 19th and January

21st.” Defense counsel stated, “Yeah.” Defense counsel later stated:

              And while I realized that there are four specific victims in these
       matters for Mr. Conn’s purposes, these are, this is one, one day that he
       shouldn’t be driving when he’s driving. Uh, and while there are the four
       victims and any [sic] is appreciative of the fact that they need to be
       recompensed and, and made whole again, and he’s willing than [sic] willing
       to do that. For driving offenses, I would, um, venture to guess that that
       leaving, you know, sending someone to prison for four years would be
       excessive in, in Mr. Conn’s viewpoint and mine.

             Um, so we’d be asking the court to run the cases concurrently with
       one another, uh, and give him credit for whatever, whatever time he’s got
       served.

The court then asked defense counsel, “What do you think the victim’s viewpoint would

be,” and defense counsel stated, “They haven’t been here. I don’t know.” The court said,

“Okay.”

       {¶6}   The court gave Conn an opportunity to speak. Conn told the court that he

had “issues” but was “working on them.” The court asked how he was doing that when

he had left the place where he was “getting help for the issues.” Conn told the court he

was “seeing the psych now” and “trying to get meds.” He told the court that he had spent

20 years in prison, and the court asked why he kept putting himself “in a position to go

back.” Conn said, “It’s like something inside of me just makes, makes me, uh, want to

go. You know what I mean? I don’t even know. I can’t even explain it.” The court told
Adams App. No. 23CA1163                                                                   5

Conn that it did not know what he meant and that “the wake behind your boat is full of,

um, damage to so many people.” Conn said, “I already know,” and the court said, “I just

don’t understand it.”

       {¶7}   Subsequently, the court indicated that it had considered the record, oral

statements, any victim impacts statements, and the PSI. Among other things, the PSI

contains information about Conn’s lengthy criminal history and history of substance

abuse, including the fact that he attended but failed to complete treatment at the

Counseling Center. The PSI also contains details regarding the offenses in this case.

The PSI indicates that on January 20, 2022, Conn was driving westbound on South Street

at “a very high rate of speed,” failed to stop at a stop sign at the intersection of South

Street and Cherry Street, and struck a vehicle traveling southbound on Cherry Street

through the intersection, disabling that vehicle and causing minor injury to the driver.

Conn “continued in his vehicle, still at a high rate of speed westbound on South Street to

North Manchester Street (State Route 41),” where he ran another stop sign and struck a

vehicle traveling northbound on State Route 41. Conn “then turned southbound on State

Route 41 and continued at a high rate of speed in the center left turn lane from South

Street to the area of Blaine Drive.” He drove “for approximately 1 mile” and rear-ended a

vehicle which was stopped in the center turn lane attempting to turn left on Blaine Drive,

forcing that vehicle into another vehicle “traveling northbound on State Route 41 at Blaine

Drive.” Conn fled on foot and officers were unable to locate him that day despite a lengthy

search of the area “via foot, drone, and the use of OSP helicopter.” Eight days later, two

detectives located him and took him into custody. That same day, a sergeant “completed

the reports” and “referred the case” to the county prosecutor “for consideration of 4 counts
Adams App. No. 23CA1163                                                                    6

of Felonious Assault with a Motor Vehicle.” The PSI states that Conn “had a total

disregard for the public’s safety and concern of occupants in the vehicle [sic], nor the

school bus that was attempting to drop off children at the intersection at the time of the

crash.” In addition, the PSI indicates that three of the drivers Conn was involved in

collisions with did not provide a victim impact statement, but the driver of the vehicle he

rear-ended requested that Conn “be held responsible for his actions” and “receive jail

and/or prison time ‘for the risk to life he showed.’ ”

       {¶8}   The court noted it had also considered the principles and purposes of

sentencing under R.C. 2929.11(A) and that the overriding purposes of felony sentencing

are “to protect the public from future crime by the offender, as well as others, as well as

to punish the offender using the minimum sanctions that the court determines,

accomplishes those purposes without imposing an unnecessary burden upon the state or

local government resources.” The court also noted that to achieve those purposes, “the

sentencing court shall consider the need for incapacitating the offender, deterring the

offender, and others from future crime, rehabilitating effectively the offender, as well as

making restitution to the victim of the offense, the public, or both.” In addition, the court

indicated it had considered the seriousness and recidivism factors in R.C. 2929.12.

       {¶9}   The court found that Conn had been convicted, pursuant to his guilty plea,

on all counts and stated:

       I do agree that, uh, misdemeanor statutorily must be concurrent with
       anything imposed in the felony [sic]. Uh, the, uh, just, just for the benefit of
       the record, um, in light of the history and, and four different people being
       injured, um, their, their cars being injured, uh, their lives being disrupted,
       uh, to get to work, pick up their children, everything else, um, the court still
       reached out to Mr. Conn and tried to get him help. We talked about going
       to other states to get him out of this environment that didn’t work. We
Adams App. No. 23CA1163                                                                    7

       expended a lot of time and energy on that. Um, but we were the ones
       seeking help, not Mr. [sic] Um, we find Salvation Army [sic].

Conn said, “That’s not true.” The court asked, “Did you look also?” Conn said, “Huh? It’s

not true. I am seeking help.” The court later said, “So, I would say a lot of per people

[sic] would’ve lost the bet that [I] would send Justin Conn to Salvation Army. But I did

with hopes.” Conn said, “Everybody deserves a chance.” The court stated, “I gave you

that chance.” Conn stated, “I know, you, I’m, I’m saying everybody deserves a chance.

Just cause my name’s Justin Conn don’t [sic] mean I don’t deserve a chance.” The court

responded:

       No, it, it, whoever has a name with the criminal record behind it and the
       amount of damage that is, it has nothing to do with name. * * * Um, but for
       the record, um, the, the number one thing in, in sentencing guidelines is
       protect the public from future crime by the offender and others, we hope
       there would be rehabilitation. We hoped he’d be, become productive. Uh,
       he’s been employed previously at Southern Ohio Lumber, uh, and, and he
       leaves, doesn’t report. Uh, it’s the second time we’ve had to issue capias
       for his arrest. * * *

The court asked Conn about his most recent arrest and then stated, “Um, anyway, so

unfortunately Mr. Conn’s put the court in a position and himself in a position that, um, he’s

no longer amenable to the available community control sanctions we were attempting

previously.”

       {¶10} The court sentenced Conn to 8 months in prison on each count of

obstructing official business and 90 days of local incarceration on each count of failure to

stop after an accident. The court ordered him to serve the sentences on the obstruction

counts consecutively and to serve the sentences on the failure to stop counts concurrently

with each other and the sentences on the obstruction counts, for an aggregate term of 32

months in prison. The court also ordered him to pay a total of $2,750 in restitution to the
Adams App. No. 23CA1163                                                                     8

four individuals named in the failure to stop after an accident counts and the costs of

prosecution.

       {¶11} The trial court memorialized Conn’s sentence in a judgment entry on

sentence. The entry explained the court may require the offender to serve prison terms

consecutively if it finds that “consecutive service is necessary to protect the public from

future crime or to punish the offender,” “that consecutive sentences are not

disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and to the danger the

offender poses to the public,” and that one of three additional circumstances applies. The

court initialed two of the three circumstances, i.e., “[a]t least two of the multiple offenses

were committed as part of one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two

or more of the multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single

prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses of conduct

adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender’s conduct” and “[t]he offender’s history

of criminal conduct demonstrates that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect

the public from future crime by the offender.” This appeal followed.

                             II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

       {¶12} Conn presents two assignments of error:

       First Assignment of Error: The trial court erred in imposing consecutive
       sentences when it failed [to] make the mandatory findings during the
       sentencing hearing.

       Second Assignment of Error: The trial court committed plain error when it
       did not merge the four counts of obstructing official business.

We will address the assignments of error out of order.
Adams App. No. 23CA1163                                                                 9

                                      III. MERGER

      {¶13} In the second assignment of error, Conn contends that the trial court

committed plain error when it did not merge the four counts of obstructing official

business. Conn asserts that the basis for the obstruction charges was him “leaving the

scene of various accidents which impeded law enforcement in the performance of their

duty to investigate the accidents.” He asserts that the victim of each obstruction offense

was the public and that “[j]ust because there were four separate victims of a vehicle

accident does not mean that official business was obstructed four separate times.” He

concedes that the indictment alleges the offenses “took place sometime within a three-

day time frame” and that “[t]he record is not clear exactly in what timeframe the separate

accidents occurred.” However, he maintains that “everything in the record points towards

everything happening as one single course of conduct.” He asserts that “if all the

accidents happened close in time to one another there would have presumably been only

one investigation,” and him “leaving the scene may have obstructed that investigation,

but that would be it.” And he asserts that upon considering the merger factors, “it

becomes clearer that all charges of obstructing official business should merge” because

the offenses “did not cause separate identifiable harm to the public,” “were not committed

separately,” and “were not committed with a separate animus or motivation.”

      {¶14} “Under the plain-error doctrine, intervention by a reviewing court is

warranted only under exceptional circumstances to prevent injustice.” State v. Bailey,

___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2022-Ohio-4407, ___ N.E.3d ___, ¶ 8, citing State v. Long, 53 Ohio

St.2d 91, 372 N.E.2d 804 (1978), paragraph three of the syllabus. “To prevail under the

plain-error doctrine,” Conn “must establish that ‘an error occurred, that the error was
Adams App. No. 23CA1163                                                                   10

obvious, and that there is “a reasonable probability that the error resulted in prejudice,”

meaning that the error affected the outcome of the trial.’ ” (Emphasis added in Rogers.)

Id., quoting State v. McAlpin, 169 Ohio St.3d 279, 2022-Ohio-1567, 204 N.E.3d 459, ¶

66, quoting State v. Rogers, 143 Ohio St.3d 385, 2015-Ohio-2459, 38 N.E.3d 860, ¶ 22.

“The elements of the plain-error doctrine are conjunctive: all three must apply to justify an

appellate court’s intervention.” Id. at ¶ 9.

       {¶15} R.C. 2941.25 states:

       (A) Where the same conduct by defendant can be construed to constitute
       two or more allied offenses of similar import, the indictment or information
       may contain counts for all such offenses, but the defendant may be
       convicted of only one.

       (B) Where the defendant’s conduct constitutes two or more offenses of
       dissimilar import, or where his conduct results in two or more offenses of
       the same or similar kind committed separately or with a separate animus as
       to each, the indictment or information may contain counts for all such
       offenses, and the defendant may be convicted of all of them.

       {¶16} “In determining whether offenses are allied offenses of similar import within

the meaning of R.C. 2941.25, courts must evaluate three separate factors—the conduct,

the animus, and the import.” State v. Ruff, 143 Ohio St.3d 114, 2015-Ohio-995, 34 N.E.3d

892, at paragraph one of the syllabus. “Two or more offenses of dissimilar import exist

within the meaning of R.C. 2941.25(B) when the defendant’s conduct constitutes offenses

involving separate victims or if the harm that results from each offense is separate and

identifiable.” Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus. “Under R.C. 2941.25(B), a defendant

whose conduct supports multiple offenses may be convicted of all the offenses if any one

of the following is true: (1) the conduct constitutes offenses of dissimilar import, (2) the

conduct shows that the offenses were committed separately, or (3) the conduct shows

that the offenses were committed with separate animus.” Id. at paragraph three of the
Adams App. No. 23CA1163                                                                   11

syllabus. “Although determining whether R.C. 2941.25 has been properly applied is a

legal question, it necessarily turns on an analysis of the facts, which can lead to

exceedingly fine distinctions.” Bailey at ¶ 11.

       {¶17} Conn’s merger argument pertains to the four counts of obstructing official

business. R.C. 2921.31, the statute regarding that offense, states:

       (A) No person, without privilege to do so and with purpose to prevent,
       obstruct, or delay the performance by a public official of any authorized act
       within the public official’s official capacity, shall do any act that hampers or
       impedes a public official in the performance of the public official’s lawful
       duties.

       (B) Whoever violates this section is guilty of obstructing official business.
       Except as otherwise provided in this division, obstructing official business is
       a misdemeanor of the second degree. If a violation of this section creates
       a risk of physical harm to any person, obstructing official business is a felony
       of the fifth degree.

The term “public official” includes law enforcement officers. R.C. 2921.01(A).

       {¶18} Even if we were to assume that the trial court erred by not merging the four

obstructing official business counts, the facts of the case indicate that such an error was

not obvious. “Application of the law governing the merger of allied offenses is dependent

on the specific facts of each case.” Bailey, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2022-Ohio-4407, ___

N.E.3d ___, at ¶ 16. The merger analysis Conn urges us to adopt assumes the existence

of a fact which is key to that analysis—that because the record gives some indication that

the four accidents occurred close in time, law enforcement conducted only one

investigation in which he hampered or impeded a public official in the performance of the

public official’s lawful duties.

       {¶19} However, the circumstances surrounding the accidents vary more than

Conn’s appellate brief indicates. Citing his testimony at the change of plea hearing, Conn
Adams App. No. 23CA1163                                                                 12

claims that “his car mat got caught in the brake” which “caused his vehicle to go out of

control, striking multiple vehicles.” However, Conn testified:

       Uh, went up that street, didn’t see a car on my right. Started, you know, I
       stopped at the stop sign. I, I, uh, side swiped her. My mat got caught up in
       my brake. I backed up. I tried to, uh, hit my brake. My gas went. So, then
       I went, I went around her about rear-end another truck. Went up to the other
       stop sign, ran it because I couldn’t stop sideswiped another car. Got my
       mat out, tried to stay in the middle lane, and then rear-ended somebody
       else, and then just freaked out and ran.

       ***

       And they, then they rear-ended somebody else.

In this testimony, Conn indicated the first accident happened when, after stopping at a

stop sign, he side-swiped a vehicle which he did not see. A mat then got caught in his

brake, and the second accident occurred when he continued driving, ran a different stop

sign due to his inability to brake, and side-swiped a second vehicle. He then extricated

the mat from his brake. But instead of stopping, he continued driving, rear-ended a third

vehicle which then rear-ended a fourth vehicle, and fled on foot. The PSI indicates that

Conn was traveling at a high rate of speed when each accident occurred, that the first

accident actually occurred when he ran a stop sign at the intersection of South Street and

Cherry Street, that the second accident occurred when he ran a stop sign at the

intersection of South Street and State Route 41, and that the third and fourth accidents

occurred after he turned onto State Route 41, drove about a mile, and rear-ended a third

vehicle, forcing it into a fourth vehicle. The PSI also indicates that a sergeant completed

“reports” in connection with these matters.

       {¶20} The fact that the accidents did not all occur at the same location or in the

same manner and the fact that they resulted in more than one report by law enforcement
Adams App. No. 23CA1163                                                                   13

undercuts Conn’s assumption that law enforcement conducted only one investigation in

which he hampered or impeded a public official in the performance of the public official’s

lawful duties. Therefore, the trial court’s alleged error in not merging the four obstruction

counts is not obvious. And because the trial court did not commit plain error when it did

not merge the four counts of obstructing official business, we overrule the second

assignment of error.

                            IV. CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES

       {¶21} In the first assignment of error, Conn contends that the trial court erred in

imposing consecutive sentences when it failed to “make the mandatory findings,” i.e., the

findings required by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), during the sentencing hearing. Conn asserts

that “[t]here is nothing in the record that would indicate consecutive sentences were

necessary to protect the public or punish” him. He maintains that even though the court

discussed how he “had been given opportunities for treatment during the pendency of this

case and been unsuccessful,” “[n]one of this goes to the need to protect the public or

punish” him. He asserts that the court did not find that consecutive sentences are not

disproportionate to his conduct or the danger that he poses to the public. Conn also

asserts that the trial court did not find that he committed the offenses “while under

community control or postrelease control, that no single prison term adequately reflects

the seriousness of his conduct,” or that his criminal history “demonstrates that

consecutive sentences are necessary.” He states that “[i]t does not appear that any” of

his criminal history “is addressed at all during the sentencing hearing.” He also asserts

that even if we “could discern from the record that the trial court made some of the

necessary findings, there is nothing in the record discussing the proportionality of the
Adams App. No. 23CA1163                                                                 14

sentence.” And Conn asserts that even though the trial court made the necessary findings

to impose consecutive sentences in its sentencing entry, the court’s failure to make the

findings during the sentencing hearing requires a remand for a new sentencing hearing.

       {¶22} Under R.C. 2953.08(A)(4) “a defendant who is convicted of or pleads guilty

to a felony may appeal as a matter of right the sentence imposed upon the defendant” on

the ground that “[t]he sentence is contrary to law.” “The appellate court may increase,

reduce, or otherwise modify a sentence that is appealed under [R.C. 2953.08] or may

vacate the sentence and remand the matter to the sentencing court for resentencing” “if

it clearly and convincingly finds” that the record does not support certain findings by the

sentencing court, including consecutive sentence findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), or

“[t]hat the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.” R.C. 2953.08(G)(2).

       {¶23} R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) states:

       If multiple prison terms are imposed on an offender for convictions of
       multiple offenses, the court may require the offender to serve the prison
       terms consecutively if the court finds that the consecutive service is
       necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish the offender
       and that consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness
       of the offender’s conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the public,
       and if the court also finds any of the following:

       (a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while the
       offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction imposed
       pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised Code, or
       was under post-release control for a prior offense.

       (b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one or
       more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the
       multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single
       prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses
       of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender’s conduct.

       (c) The offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that consecutive
       sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime by the
       offender.
Adams App. No. 23CA1163                                                                              15

        {¶24} “[B]ased on the language of R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), the consecutive-sentence

findings are not simply threshold findings that, once made, permit any amount of

consecutively stacked individual sentences. Rather, these findings must be made in

consideration of the aggregate term to be imposed.” State v. Gwynne, ___ Ohio St.3d

___, 2022-Ohio-4607, ___ N.E.3d ___, ¶ 1.1 “R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) requires trial courts to

consider the overall number of consecutive sentences and the aggregate sentence to be

imposed when making the necessity and proportionality findings required for the

imposition of consecutive sentences.” Id. at ¶ 31.

        {¶25} “In order to impose consecutive terms of imprisonment, a trial court is

required to make the findings mandated by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) at the sentencing hearing

and incorporate its findings into its sentencing entry * * *.” State v. Bonnell, 140 Ohio

St.3d 209, 2014-Ohio-3177, 16 N.E.3d 659, ¶ 37. However, the court “has no obligation

to state reasons to support its findings” and has no obligation “to give a talismanic

incantation of the words of the statute, provided that the necessary findings can be found

in the record and are incorporated into the sentencing entry.” Id. “[A] word-for-word

recitation of the language of the statute is not required, and as long as the reviewing court

can discern that the trial court engaged in the correct analysis and can determine that the

record contains evidence to support the findings, consecutive sentences should be

upheld.” Id. at ¶ 29.

        {¶26} “The first step in consecutive-sentence review is to ensure that the

consecutive-sentence findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) have been made—i.e., the first

1 The state has moved the Supreme Court of Ohio to reconsider its decision in Gwynne; however, the court

has not yet ruled on that motion. State v. Gwynne, Supreme Court Case No. 2021-1033, 1/3/23 Motion for
Reconsideration.
Adams App. No. 23CA1163                                                                    16

and second findings regarding necessity and proportionality, as well as the third required

finding under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(a), (b), or (c).” Gwynne at ¶ 25. “If the trial court fails

to make these findings, and that issue is properly raised on appeal, then the appellate

court must hold that the order of consecutive sentences is contrary to law and either

modify the sentence or vacate it and remand the case for resentencing.” Id. If the trial

court fails to make the requisite findings at the sentencing hearing, the imposition of

consecutive sentences is contrary to law even if the sentencing entry includes the

findings. See State v. Brickles, 4th Dist. Pickaway No. 19CA16, 2021-Ohio-178, ¶ 9, 11.

       {¶27} In this case, the trial court indicated that it was considering the need to

protect the public, the need to punish Conn, and the PSI, which details Conn’s criminal

history. We can discern from the trial court’s comments about “the history,” the harm

Conn caused to the other four drivers, and his lack of effort at rehabilitation that the court

found a need to protect the public from future crime or to punish Conn. We can also

discern the court found Conn’s history of criminal conduct demonstrated that consecutive

sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime by him based on

statements the court made regarding the “wake behind” Conn’s “boat,” i.e., his criminal

history, being “full of * * * damage to so many people” and indicating the court’s belief that

people would be surprised the court sent Conn to the Salvation Army when his record

and the amount of damage he had caused indicated he did not deserve another chance.

       {¶28} However, we cannot discern that the trial court made the requisite

proportionality finding. The state contends that “the trial court satisfied its obligation to

make a finding of proportionality” because after defense counsel essentially argued that

consecutive sentences would be excessive for what he described as “driving offenses”
Adams App. No. 23CA1163                                                                    17

and asked the court to impose concurrent sentences, the trial court asked, “What do you

think the victim’s viewpoint would be?” The state asserts that “[t]his dialogue * * * provides

evidence that the trial court did consider the seriousness of the offense and the

appropriateness and proportionality of concurrent versus consecutive sentences, even if

not explicitly stated on the record. The trial court seemed to allude to the idea that

regardless if Mr. Conn committed a driving offense or not, a concurrent sentence would

not be sufficient.” However, we fail to see how the trial court inquiring about how the

victims would view concurrent sentences shows the court found that consecutive

sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of Conn’s conduct and to the

danger he poses to the public.

       {¶29} The trial court erred when it imposed consecutive sentences for the

obstructing official business counts. Because the trial court failed to make all the requisite

findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) at the sentencing hearing, we clearly and convincingly

find that the order of consecutive sentences is contrary to law. See Brickles, 4th Dist.

Pickaway No. 19CA16, 2021-Ohio-178, at ¶ 9, 11. Accordingly, we sustain the first

assignment of error, vacate Conn’s sentence for his obstructing official business

convictions, and remand the case for the limited purpose of resentencing him on those

convictions. See generally State v. Beasley, 153 Ohio St.3d 497, 2018-Ohio-493, 108

N.E.3d 1028, ¶ 2, 110, 252-262, (affirming defendant’s convictions and capital sentences

but vacating his sentence for his noncapital convictions, which the trial court had ordered

to run consecutively, and remanding the case for the limited purpose of resentencing him

on those convictions because the trial court failed to make all the requisite findings to

impose consecutive sentences).
Adams App. No. 23CA1163                                                                18

                                    V. CONCLUSION

       {¶30} For the foregoing reasons, we sustain the first assignment of error and

overrule the second assignment of error. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in part,

vacate it in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this decision.

                                                       JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART
                                                            AND VACATED IN PART.
                                                               CAUSE REMANDED.
Adams App. No. 23CA1163                                                                  19

                                   JUDGMENT ENTRY

     It is ordered that the JUDGMENT IS AFFIRMED IN PART AND VACATED IN
PART. CAUSE REMANDED. Appellant and appellee shall split the costs.

       The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

    It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the ADAMS
COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS to carry this judgment into execution.

       IF A STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE AND RELEASE UPON BAIL HAS
BEEN PREVIOUSLY GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT OR THIS COURT, it is
temporarily continued for a period not to exceed 60 days upon the bail previously posted.
The purpose of a continued stay is to allow appellant to file with the Supreme Court of
Ohio an application for a stay during the pendency of proceedings in that court. If a stay
is continued by this entry, it will terminate at the earlier of the expiration of the 60-day
period, or the failure of the appellant to file a notice of appeal with the Supreme Court of
Ohio in the 45-day appeal period pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of
the Supreme Court of Ohio. Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses the
appeal prior to expiration of 60 days, the stay will terminate as of the date of such
dismissal.

      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Smith, P.J. & Abele, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.

                                          For the Court

                                          BY: ________________________
                                              Michael D. Hess, Judge

                                 NOTICE TO COUNSEL

       Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment
entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with
the clerk.