Court Opinion

ID: 9846887
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:50:02.745993+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:56.670937
License: Public Domain

GRAY, Justice
(dissenting).
I am unable to accept the holding of the majority that the so-called supplemental' instruction relating to the manner in which the jury should proceed in its deliberations with respect to the lesser included offenses-was not prejudicial to the defendant.
It is well recognized that care must be exercised by the trial judge to refrain from making any statement or giving any directive to the jury that might tend to-coerce jurors into surrendering their individual conscientious views. Jenkins v. United States, 380 U.S. 445, 85 S.Ct. 1059, 1060, 13 L.Ed.2d 957; Abbott v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 352 S.W.2d 552, 554; People v. Baumgartner, 166 Cal.App.2d 103, 332 P.2d 366, 370. While some liberality is. afforded, depending largely upon the existing circumstances, it has been said that'. *311if there was error in this respect and there is an equal balance of reasonable prob■abilities which leaves the court in serious ■doubt as to whether such error is prejudicial to the accused in a criminal case, such doubt should be resolved in his favor. People v. Dewberry, 51 Cal.2d 548, 334 P. 2d 852, 858; Baker v. State, Okl.Cr., 432 P. 2d 935, 939. In State v. Carroll, 52 Wyo. 29, 69 P.2d 542, 563, this court said:
“ * * * The trial court should not in any way attempt to influence the jury in bringing in a verdict either increasing or decreasing the penalty which might otherwise be inflicted. * * * ”
:and such pronouncement has application liere.
The supplemental instruction here was not a so-called “get-together” instruction such as this court approved in Nicholson v. State, 24 Wyo. 347, 157 P. 1013, 1015-1016. Neither did it admonish the jury that such instruction should be considered along with all of the other instructions on the law •given to the jury at the time it retired. State v. Shinovich, 40 Wyo. 174, 276 P. 172, 175. Its effect was simply to direct the jury either to convict or acquit the defendant of the primary charge when obviously the members were in serious disagreement on that charge. It is no more reasonable to say that those members voting against conviction on such charge were finally persuaded by the wisdom and convincing arguments of those for conviction, which resulted in the verdict rendered, than to say that those unpersuaded of the defendant’s guilt in that respect might not have likewise prevailed upon the others to accept their views had not the trial court circumscribed the jury’s discretionary power to deliberate upon the lesser included offenses. Certainly the inquiry of the jury to the trial judge could bear no other inference than that the jury, having failed to agree upon the principal charge, was desirous of proceeding to consider the lesser charges.
Under the circumstances I would hold that the giving of the supplemental instruction was error and that such error was prejudicial. I would reverse the judgment.