Court Opinion

ID: 9738273
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:47:26.260586+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:05.113357
License: Public Domain

ROTH, P. J.
I dissent.
The offense here charged is that Theresa Roy conspired with Kathy Martin. The indictment charges: “That on or about the 1st day of April, 1965, and for a three year period immediately preceding April 1, 1965, at and in the County . . . defendants,
*468Theresa Roy and Kathy Martin
did . . . feloniously conspire, . . . and agree together to commit the crime of Prostitution in violation of Section 647b of the Penal Code ... in violation of Section 182.1, and did in the course of, . . . said conspiracy, . . . commit the following overt acts. ...”
Appellants rely on the ease of De Mond v. Superior Court, 57 Cal.2d 340, 344 [19 Cal.Rptr. 313, 368 P.2d 865], apparently for the proposition that “ ‘An indictment will not be set aside ... if there is some rational ground for assuming the possibility that an offense has been committed and the accused is guilty of it. ’ ”
The charge at bench is a conspiracy between Roy and Martin. The evidence, however, shows no conversation, contact or act between Roy and Martin, either before or after any of the overt acts charged, from which any rational ground can be deduced upon which an agreement between Roy and Martin to commit the crime of prostitution can be bottomed. The only evidence in the record which by strained inference may suggest such a conspiracy is that Roy, without Martin’s knowledge, put Weeks in touch with Martin, and the hearsay statement of Weeks to Martin “. . . I’m . . . still with Terry—you know, Theresa. ’ ’
All the overt acts charged mean nothing and suggest nothing other than that Roy, the operator of the switchboard, knew some of her patrons were prostitutes and knew that Martin was a prostitute, and that Weeks contacted Martin for the ostensible purpose of making an agreement with Martin to handle some of Martin’s patrons.
Weeks, the policewoman, represented to Roy she suffered from lack of patrons. Roy told Weeks that she knew a girl (Kathy Martin) who received many calls and told Weeks, so far as the record shows, without the knowledge of Martin, to get in touch with Martin and try to arrange with Martin to take care of some of her customers. This conversation between Roy and Weeks might be a conspiracy between Roy and Weeks, but it is not the conspiracy charged. Three sentences, all hearsay as to Roy, culled from three admittedly long telephone conversations between Weeks and Martin, are all there is to show a conspiracy between Roy and Martin.
“I said, things have been kind of slow and she suggested that maybe I get together with you and talk about some business.
*469“She said, yeah. She said, oh, my, how am I supposed to reach you ?
“I said, well, I’m kind of on a will-call basis still with Terry—you know, Theresa. ’ ’
There is no evidence, or even a remote suggestion of any kind, of anything that occurred between Roy and Martin at any time which shows that Martin knew she had been suggested to Weeks by Roy as a source of business or that Roy and Martin at any time had a conversation in respect of doing something for Weeks, or that Martin had indicated to Roy at any time that she would like to have Roy suggest to her the name of one of her patrons who could help her with her business.
There is nothing to show or even remotely suggest what brought Weeks and Martin together at any time or that when Roy put the Weeks call through to Martin, Roy introduced Weeks to Martin over the phone, or otherwise, or talked to Martin at all before or after the first telephone conversation, or any of the telephone conversations. In fact, the very evidence excerpted by the majority and the whole record shows the contrary.
The three sentences above quoted almost demonstrate that Roy had never spoken to Martin about Weeks. If Roy had, Martin would not have found it necessary to say to Weeks “. . . how am I supposed to reach you. ...” She would have known without saying anything on the subject that all she had to do was call Roy or the Roy switchboard, as those arrangements would have been already made.
In People v. Steccone, 36 Cal.2d 234, cited by the majority, the court says at page 238 [223 P.2d 77] : “. . . before evidence of the acts and declarations of an alleged coconspirator is admissible against the other, the fact of the conspiracy must be proved.” At bench there is no evidence except the hearsay declaration of a policewoman posing as a prostitute and the hearsay shows not that there was an agreement between Roy and Martin but the contrary.
In People v. Long, 7 Cal.App. 27, cited by Steccone, supra, the court says at page 33 [93 P. 387] : “The admission of the statement made by the Boland woman to the witness Fletcher was error. There was no evidence of any conspiracy between defendant and the woman. Conspiracies cannot be established by suspicions. There must be some evidence. Mere association does not make a conspiracy. There must be evidence of som§ *470participation or interest in the commission of the offense. Neither was her statement a part of the res gestae. ’ ’
So in the ease at bench, there is nothing but the answer of Weeks to Martin’s query of how to get in touch—“. . . I’m kind of on a will-call basis still with Terry—you know, Theresa” to prove an agreement to conspire between Boy and Martin. On the facts of this case the language of the court in People v. James, 189 Cal.App.2d 14, at pp. 15 and 16 [10 Cal.Rptr. 809, 91 A.L.R.2d 697], is peculiarly appropriate: “. . . There can be no question but that there must be a degree of dependent criminality between coconspirators to violate a criminal statute in order for a conviction to stand. In other words, the guilt of both must concur in order to establish the guilt of either. In the early case of People v. Richards, 67 Cal. 412, 413 [7 P. 828, 56 Am.Rep. 716], the court held that: ‘No one can dispute, or ever has disputed, that the offense cannot be committed by one alone . . .’ (See also People v. Miller, 82 Cal. 107 [22 P. 924]; People v. MacMullen, 134 Cal.App. 81 [24 P.2d 794].)
“In amplification of the rule above enunciated, the court in the MacMullen case at page 82, held that: ‘. . . it is the law that on a charge of conspiracy even though but one person is indicted, the statement of the offense in the indictment must show that two or more persons, even though the other person or persons are unknown, did in fact conspire together to commit the crime. Upon a trial for the offense the evidence must show that at least two of the persons named in the charging part of the indictment committed the offense because the gist of the offense is the conspiracy. If these elements are not present then a conviction cannot be had. ’ ’ ’
The record undoubtedly establishes that Boy knew some of her patrons were prostitutes and that Kathy Martin was a prostitute and used the Boy switchboard. This background does not furnish rational ground here anymore than it does in Lauria (filed concurrently herewith) for assuming the possibility of a conspiracy between Boy and Martin to help Weeks. All the record shows to me is that Boy, the owner of the telephone service, in an effort to keep a policewoman, posing as a prostitute, as a customer, undertook to help the policewoman get some business in her simulated occupation by suggesting that she get in touch with an affluent courtesan, without the knowledge of the courtesan, who is made a party to the conspiracy.
My learned brother who authored Lauria says “When the *471intent to further and promote the criminal enterprise comes from the lips of the supplier himself, ambiguities of inference from circumstance need not trouble us. ’ ’
They trouble me because the record as pointed out shows no contact of any kind and nothing coming “. . . from the lips . . .” of Roy to Martin.
The gratuitous conduct on the part of Roy does not, in my opinion, make a felon of Martin nor does it on the indictment before us make a felon of Roy.
The indictment was properly dismissed.
The petition of respondent Roy for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied July 26, 1967. Peters, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.