Court Opinion

ID: 9910334
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-15 15:05:09.430236+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:52:18.549021
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: DECEMBER 8, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                           Court of Appeals
                              NO. 2023-CA-0343-MR

JOHN MCGAUGHEY                                                        APPELLANT

               APPEAL FROM WOODFORD CIRCUIT COURT
v.             HONORABLE KATHRYN H. GABHART, JUDGE
                       ACTION NO. 19-CI-00157

JENNY WARNICK                                                           APPELLEE

                                    OPINION
                                   AFFIRMING

                                   ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; ECKERLE AND KAREM, JUDGES.

THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE: John McGaughey appeals from an order of the

Woodford Circuit Court which denied his motion for a new trial. Appellant argues

that he was entitled to a new trial due to attorney misconduct and because the trial

court erroneously allowed certain testimony into evidence. We find no error and

affirm.
                    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

             On June 30, 2018, Appellant and Jenny Warnick were involved in a

motor vehicle accident. At trial, Appellee claimed that while she was turning

around in someone’s driveway, she looked to her left and saw Appellant and his

motorcycle on the ground. Her theory at trial was that Appellant lost control of his

motorcycle while coming around a nearby curve, causing him to crash.

             Appellant claimed that when he rounded the nearby curve, he saw

Appellee’s car in both lanes of the road. Appellant then claimed that he did not

have room to maneuver around the vehicle; therefore, he chose to “lay his

motorcycle down” to prevent a crash. Both parties agree that there was no

collision between the two vehicles.

             The jury eventually returned a verdict finding both parties fifty

percent at fault. Appellant later filed a motion for a new trial alleging attorney

misconduct and the improper inclusion of evidence. The trial court denied the

motion and this appeal followed.

                            STANDARD OF REVIEW

             Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 59.01 states:

             A new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and
             on all or part of the issues for any of the following
             causes:

                (a) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or
                prevailing party, or an order of the court, or abuse of

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                discretion, by which the party was prevented from
                having a fair trial.

                (b) Misconduct of the jury, of the prevailing party, or
                of his attorney.

                (c) Accident or surprise which ordinary prudence
                could not have guarded against.

                (d) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to
                have been given under the influence of passion or
                prejudice or in disregard of the evidence or the
                instructions of the court.

                (e) Error in the assessment of the amount of recovery
                whether too large or too small.

                (f) That the verdict is not sustained by sufficient
                evidence, or is contrary to law.

                (g) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party
                applying, which he could not, with reasonable
                diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial.

                (h) Errors of law occurring at the trial and objected to
                by the party under the provisions of these rules.

We review a trial court’s determination that grounds for a new trial exist under the

clearly erroneous standard. If such grounds exist, we then review the decision

whether to grant a new trial for abuse of discretion. Gibson v. Fuel Transport,

Inc., 410 S.W.3d 56, 62 (Ky. 2013).

                                    ANALYSIS

             Appellant’s first argument on appeal is that Appellee’s attorney

referred to Appellant’s vehicle as unit one, which had been prohibited via a motion

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in limine. Prior to trial, Appellant moved to prohibit the introduction of the police

report created for this accident. Appellant also moved to preclude any mention

that Appellant was named as “unit 1” in the report and Appellee was listed as a

witness. Appellant believed that any reference to Appellant being named as “unit

one” and Appellee being listed as a witness would cause the jury to infer that

Appellant was the cause of the accident. In addition, Appellant believed that some

members of the jury who had been in an accident or were related to police officers

would know that a person named as “unit 1” in a police report would be considered

by the police as the cause of the accident. This motion was granted.

             During Appellant’s cross-examination, trial counsel for Appellee,

Bradford Breeding, questioned Appellant about the accident and previous

statements he made to the officer who created the accident report. Mr. Breeding

began referencing Appellant’s statements made during a deposition. During the

deposition, Appellant was asked about the accident report and references were

made to him being “unit 1.” At trial, Mr. Breeding showed the deposition to

Appellant and, in order to orient him to the section to which he was referring,

stated that he was referring to the section where he was named as “unit 1.”

             Counsel for Appellant objected at the mention of “unit 1” and a bench

conference was held. Mr. Breeding was reminded not to refer to “unit 1.” The

trial court also admonished the jury not to consider the last question asked by Mr.

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Breeding. Mr. Breeding then continued with Appellant’s cross-examination and

again asked about statements he might have made to a police officer. During the

course of answering the question, Appellant read a part of his prior deposition and

stated he was described as “unit 1.”

               At this point another bench conference was held and Mr. Breeding

stated he would move on to a different line of questioning. After the bench

conference, the trial court gave another admonition to the jury. The court told the

jury to disregard the part of Appellant’s testimony where he read from his

deposition and stated that any “reference to the term unit one carries no weight in

this trial.”

               Appellant claims on appeal that when defense counsel used the term

unit one and the elicited testimony where the term was used again, counsel was

committing misconduct. Appellant claims that the term should not have been used

at trial due to the motion in limine and that counsel purposefully caused it to be

said in front of the jury. Appellant believes that this caused the jury to infer that

Appellant was the cause of the accident.

               We believe the use of the term “unit 1” on two occasions, once by

defense counsel and once by Appellant, does not amount to attorney misconduct.

First, the statements were fleeting and admonitions were given by the court.

Second, defense counsel moved on after the second use of the term and it was

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never mentioned again. Third, we do not agree that the term “unit 1” is so

common as to improperly influence the jury to infer that Appellant was the cause

of the accident. While the use of the term was improper, we do not believe it

influenced the jury to such a degree as to require a new trial. See Risen v. Pierce,

807 S.W.2d 945, 949-50 (Ky. 1991). The trial court did not err in denying the

motion for a new trial based on this issue.

               Appellant’s second argument is that he was denied a fair trial because

he was not given certain data from Appellee’s expert witness during discovery.

Appellant categorizes this as attorney misconduct, for failing to turn over

discoverable material, and as the trial court’s abuse of discretion, in allowing

Appellee’s expert to testify over Appellant’s objection.

               Prior to trial, both parties revealed their experts and expert reports

were exchanged. Later, counsel for Appellant requested an IDRR spreadsheet

from Appellee’s expert.1 It appears as though the information contained in the

spreadsheet was sent to Appellant’s counsel, but not the spreadsheet itself.

Appellant’s counsel again asked for the spreadsheet. Appellee’s counsel discussed

the issue with his expert and the creator of the software used to create the

spreadsheet, and believed that releasing the spreadsheet itself would violate a

1
 The experts in this case used a specific computer program to help reconstruct the accident.
This spreadsheet was used in those reconstructions.

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copyright and licensing agreement. Appellee’s counsel relayed this belief to

Appellant’s counsel.

                 On the second day of trial, Appellant’s counsel raised the issue with

the trial court. Counsel informed the court that Appellee’s counsel had not

provided all the expert data she had requested. Appellee’s counsel indicated that

he had provided everything possible and was unclear on what was still outstanding.

Appellee’s counsel believed Appellant was still requesting the IDRR spreadsheet

data. As counsel for Appellant, counsel for Appellee, and the trial judge discussed

the issue, it was clear that there was some confusion over what was being

requested. It was decided that the two experts would discuss the issue in front of

the judge and the parties, but outside of the presence of the jury.

                 This discussion later took place, and it was revealed that what

Appellant was actually seeking was information regarding a “Realworks file.”

This file was related to data used to create 3D reconstruction photographs of the

accident scene. Appellee’s expert stated that this data could be turned over. Later

in the day, Appellant’s counsel informed the court that a file purporting to be the

Realworks file was sent to her, but it could not be opened. Appellant’s expert also

believed the file was too small to be the Realworks file.2 Appellant’s counsel

indicated that she did not object to the jury seeing the reconstruction photographs,

2
    The file could not be opened, but the size of the file that was sent could be determined.

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but did not want them to be included into evidence. The trial court agreed and

allowed Appellee to show the pictures to the jury, but did not allow them into

evidence.3

              We find no error here. When discussing this issue, the trial judge

indicated that she believed the lack of turning over the Realworks file was due to a

miscommunication between the attorneys and was not intentional. We agree. It

was not until the two experts discussed the issue with each other on the record that

the exact nature of the discovery request was revealed. Appellee then attempted to

turn over the data, but was unsuccessful. In addition, the trial court granted

Appellant’s request to preclude the 3D images from being included into evidence.

As this was an unintentional error, Appellant’s request for exclusion of some

evidence was granted, and Appellant’s counsel thoroughly cross-examined

Appellee’s expert, we agree with the trial court that a new trial was unnecessary.

              Appellant’s final argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in

allowing certain testimony from lay witness, Jason DeBold. Mr. DeBold could not

appear live at trial; therefore, portions of his deposition were read to the jury. Mr.

DeBold witnessed Appellant riding his motorcycle just before the accident.

3
  On appeal, Appellant claims that his trial counsel moved to exclude the entirety of the
testimony of Appellee’s expert; however, Appellant provides no citation to the record where this
request was made and we were unable to locate such a motion. The only request made regarding
Appellee’s expert was that the 3D images not be allowed into evidence, and this was granted.

                                              -8-
Appellant sought to exclude portions of the testimony where Mr. DeBold stated he

believed Appellant was speeding because the motorcycle made a sound that

seemed as though it was accelerating. Mr. DeBold also stated that Appellant

seemed to be “out of control” as he rounded the curve just before the accident site.

Appellant believes this was improper opinion testimony.

             We disagree and find no error. A lay witness can testify as to his or

her personal observations, including the speed of a vehicle. Davidson v.

Commonwealth, 548 S.W.3d 255, 260 (Ky. 2018); Clement Bros. Constr. Co. v.

Moore, 314 S.W.2d 526, 530 (Ky. 1958). Mr. DeBold’s statements that Appellant

was speeding were based on what he saw and heard. In addition, his testimony that

Appellant seemed to lose control of the motorcycle was also based on what he

personally observed. Allowing this testimony into evidence was not error.

                                 CONCLUSION

             Based on the foregoing, we find no error. The trial court properly

denied Appellant’s motion for a new trial.

             ALL CONCUR.

                                         -9-
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:     BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Kirsten Daniel            Bradford L. Breeding
Louisville, Kentucky      G. Kirk Smith
                          Megan E.H. Jordan
                          London, Kentucky

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