Court Opinion

ID: 9519187
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:11:00.136093+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:43:53.842671
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE WEBBER, concurring in part and dissenting in part: I concur with the majority that the general contractor is a necessary party to a subcontractor’s suit to foreclose a lien. I differ in the majority’s analysis of the application of that principle to this case. Admitting for the purposes of argument that it is unorthodox to raise the question of nonjoinder by an affirmative defense as was done in this case, nonetheless any difficulty with such procedure was cured by plaintiff’s motion at the close of its evidence. The record shows sufficient evidence during the plaintiff’s case that Brewster and Three-B were prima facie the general contractor. Plaintiff’s motion to join them as parties defendant in substance and in effect confesses the fact and confesses the affirmative defense. The trial court was then called upon to make a ruling under section 46(4) of the Civil Practice Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 110, par. 46(4)) which provides for late joinder of parties provided all of five conditions are met. One of these conditions is that “failure to join the person as a defendant was inadvertent.” In oral argument it was represented to us that this was the basis of the trial court’s ruling. It apparently found that plaintiff had known of Brewster and Three-B since the inception of the suit. This being true, the trial court was left with no alternative and, in my judgment, proceeded correctly. A necessary party was lacking; there was a statutory bar to his joinder; the suit must fail for lack of jurisdiction. If the plaintiff had not made the joinder motion, I would agree with the majority that judgment could not have been entered since the burden of proof on an affirmative defense lies on the one asserting it and that stage of the trial had not yet been reached. By making the motion, plaintiff became hoist by his own petard. The result may appear harsh, but the mechanics’ lien statute is a harsh remedy and must be strictly construed. It is an in rem procedure and the statute contemplates a single action to adjust the rights of all parties with any interest in the real estate. There are few, if any, second chances in a lien suit. The philosophy of this may be debatable, but so far, the legislature has not seen fit to change it. I would affirm the trial court.