Court Opinion

ID: 9552927
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:19:21.255818+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:29:23.335910
License: Public Domain

Petition eor Rehearing
BRAND, C. J.
 The appellant seeks a rehearing upon the ground that “the opinion of the Court makes no reference whatever to Oregon Laws, 1947, Chapter 572, upon which Appellant relied as authority * * *.” The statute to which appellant refers reads as follows:
“No order or decree for the future payment of money in gross or in instalments, entered under the provisions of section 9-914, O. C. L. A., and acts amendatory or supplementary thereof, shall continue to be a lien on real property for a period of more than 10 years from and after the date of such order and decree unless the same shall have been renewed as provided by section 6-802, O. C. L. A., as amended by section 1, chapter 274, Oregon Laws 1943.” Oregon Laws, 1947, Ch. 572.
The appellant is correct. We made no reference to the 1947 statute because its provisions have no relevancy to the pending case. The 1947 act expressly refers to orders or decrees in gross or in instalments entered under the provisions of OCLA, 9-914. Inspection of that section, as amended by chapter 228 of the Laws *583of 1947, shows that it relates to the powers of courts in suits for the dissolution or annulment of the marriage contract. It refers, and could refer only, to the powers vested in divorce courts of the state of Oregon. It has no bearing and declares no public policy of this state with reference to the effect of divorce decrees rendered in sister states. There is another reason why the 1947 act has no bearing upon the case at bar. It provides that Oregon divorce decrees for the payment of money in instalments shall not continue to be a lien for more than ten years after the date of the decree “unless the same shall have been renewed as provided by section 6-802, O. C. L. A., as amended by section 1, chapter 274, Oregon Laws 1943.” The ease at bar presents no issue concerning the renewal of any judgment or decree. This suit was not brought to renew any decree. The Washington decree of divorce required no renewal in Washington in order to support a judgment for the instalments which had accrued within the six years immediately preceding the commencement of the suit and it had no effect whatever in Oregon until it was given effect by judicial decree in this state.
An Oregon statute provides in part that:
“The effect of a judicial record of a sister state is the same in this state as in the state where it was made, except that it can only be enforced here by an action, suit, or proceeding * * *.” OCLA, § 2-723.
The statute must be read in the light of such exceptions as are indicated in Reed v. Hollister, 106 Or 407, 212 P 367, but those exceptions are not involved in the pending ease. Under the provisions of OCLA, § 2-723, the courts of this state do not enforce the Washington decree as such, but regard it as the basis for an Oregon decree, having the same effect in this state as the *584Washington decree would have in that state, and when such Oregon decree is entered, it may be enforced here by contempt proceedings. Cousineau v. Cousineau, 155 Or 184, 63 P2d 897.
Chapter 572, Oregon Laws 1947, relates to domestic divorce decrees and not to suits pursuant to OCLA, § 2-723. Furthermore, the 1947 statute is a limitation on the duration of the lien of a domestic divorce decree for future payments and not on the duration on the decree itself. On the authority of the decisions cited in our first opinion we hold that when suit is brought in this state, based upon a Washington decree ordering payment of alimony or support money in instalments, each such instalment becomes a separate judgment or decree as and when it accrues, and the Oregon court will treat the Washington decree as a final adjudication as to each accrued instalment, subject to the bar of the statute of limitations as to each such instalment.
The petition for rehearing is denied.