Court Opinion

ID: 9647281
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 13:29:45.880699+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:47.640506
License: Public Domain

MORRISON, Judge
(concurring).
While I agree with the reversal of this conviction because of the refusal of the court to permit the jury to hear the proffered testimony, I cannot agree that the time honored defense of entrapment is the answer. The defense of necessity is far more fitting for the facts in this case. Surely the officers did not induce this appellant to arm himself for the purpose of catching him so that they could prosecute him. This would be entrapment. See Ramirez v. State, 164 Tex.Cr.R. 498, 301 S.W.2d 125, as an example of how the doctrine applies. See also Practice Commentary, V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Sec. 8.06.
What the officers told this appellant was that his life was in danger and that he had better stay in crowds or arm himself. Presumably, they had no idea that he was going to commit this offense, and, by the same token, they did not intend to catch him and prosecute him therefor. The defense of necessity was thus available to appellant under V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Sec. 9.22,1 and the testimony should have gone to the jury.
I concur in the reversal of this conviction.

. I paraphrase the Practice Commentary, V.T.C.A., Penal Code, following Sec. 9.22: If the harm sought to be avoided (the killing of this appellant by those involved in the murder conspiracy) was clearly greater than the harm actually caused (that is, the offense of carrying a pistol into a lounge), the appellant’s conduct in carrying the pistol is justified, and he is exonerated.