Court Opinion

ID: 9965472
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-02 16:01:01.857423+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:06.749359
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION

   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
        FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                  No. 22-50064

               Plaintiff-Appellee,           D.C. No.
                                          8:21-cr-00017-
 v.                                           JVS-1

FRANCISCO LUCAS, Jr., AKA
Choko, AKA Francisco Lucas,                  OPINION

               Defendant-Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court
           for the Central District of California
         James V. Selna, District Judge, Presiding

      Argued and Submitted En Banc January 23, 2024
                   Pasadena, California

                    Filed May 2, 2024

Before: Mary H. Murguia, Chief Judge, and Kim McLane
 Wardlaw, Johnnie B. Rawlinson, Consuelo M. Callahan,
Sandra S. Ikuta, Morgan Christen, Mark J. Bennett, Bridget
   S. Bade, Kenneth K. Lee, Lucy H. Koh and Holly A.
                 Thomas, Circuit Judges.

             Opinion by Chief Judge Murguia
2                          USA V. LUCAS

                          SUMMARY*

                         Criminal Law

    Vacating a sentence and remanding, the en banc court
held that clear and convincing evidence is not required for
factual findings under the advisory Sentencing Guidelines,
even when potentially large enhancements are at stake; fact-
finding by a preponderance of the evidence is sufficient to
satisfy due process at sentencing.
    The en banc court therefore overruled United States v.
Staten, 466 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2006), and its progeny.
    The en banc court remanded for the district court to apply
the proper standard in the first instance.

                           COUNSEL

Bram M. Alden (argued), Assistant United States Attorney,
Criminal Appeals Section Chief; Bradley E. Marrett,
Assistant United States Attorney, Santa Ana Branch Office;
Stephanie S. Christensen, Acting United States Attorney; E.
Martin Estrada, United States Attorney; United States
Department of Justice, Office of the United States Attorney;
for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Sonam A.H. Henderson (argued), Deputy Federal Public
Defender; Cuauhtemoc Ortega, Federal Public Defender;

*
 This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
                        USA V. LUCAS                       3

Federal Public Defender’s Office, Los Angeles, California;
for Defendant-Appellant.
Jessica Agatstein and Vincent Brunkow, Federal Defenders
of San Diego Inc., San Diego, California, for Amici Curiae
Ninth Circuit Federal Public and Community Defenders.

                        OPINION

MURGUIA, Chief Judge:

    We voted to rehear this case en banc to reconsider our
heightened standard of proof for factual findings at
sentencing. Under this standard, we have long required trial
courts to make factual findings by clear and convincing
evidence “when a sentencing factor has an extremely
disproportionate effect on the sentence relative to the
conviction.” United States v. Staten, 466 F.3d 708, 717 (9th
Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Lynch, 437 F.3d 902,
916 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (per curiam)).
    On rehearing en banc, we overrule our prior precedent
and fully adopt the “preponderance of the evidence”
standard. We remand this case for the district court to apply
the proper standard in the first instance.
                              I
    Francisco Lucas, Jr., was previously convicted of two
felonies under state law in California. While Lucas was on
probation in late 2020, law enforcement searched his cell
phone and found photographs and videos that appeared to
depict Lucas in his home with a firearm and magazine.
Lucas was indicted for and pleaded guilty to a single count
4                            USA V. LUCAS

of illegal possession of a firearm as a convicted felon, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
    At sentencing, the main issue was whether to apply a
heightened base offense level, which turned on whether
Lucas possessed a “semiautomatic firearm that is capable of
accepting a large capacity magazine.”               U.S. Sent’g
Guidelines Manual § 2K2.1(a)(4)(B) (U.S. Sent’g Comm’n
2021) (“U.S.S.G.”). Relevant to this appeal, Application
Note 2 to this Guideline defines “large capacity magazine”
as a magazine that “at the time of the offense . . . could accept
more than 15 rounds of ammunition.” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1
app. n.2.1 The government conceded in its sentencing
memorandum that “the magazine was not seized in this case,
and thus the magazine itself was not examined by
investigators.” Nonetheless, the government maintained
“that the magazine could hold more than 15 rounds of
ammunition.”
    Both parties submitted reports from experts who had
reviewed the photograph and video evidence.           The
government expert observed that the magazine in the photos
appeared unusually long, “consistent with an extended
magazine that is capable of accepting more than 15 rounds
of ammunition.” Although he had never encountered a
magazine with a blocker installed to limit capacity, the
expert acknowledged that magazines could be modified in

1
 “Application Notes . . . serve to ‘interpret’ and ‘explain’ the Guidelines
for district courts.” United States v. Prien-Pinto, 917 F.3d 1155, 1157
(9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 38 (1993))
(brackets omitted). Because the parties have assumed that Application
Note 2 applies, the court does as well.
                            USA V. LUCAS                               5

that way.2 Accordingly, the expert explained that “[w]ithout
physical examination, it cannot be conclusively determined
whether the magazine seen in photographs and video is
capable of accepting more tha[n] 15 rounds of ammunition
or only ten (10) rounds of ammunition.” The defense expert
offered a largely similar analysis.
    The district court found that Lucas had possessed a large
capacity magazine. Even if the magazine were modified to
accept less ammunition, the district court reasoned that “it
was susceptible to easy conversion to accept a high capacity
magazine.” In a footnote, the district court briefly alluded to
the government’s discussion of a recorded jail phone call.
That recorded call involved an individual incarcerated
alongside Lucas who said that Lucas was “here for a 40
Glock with a 30 round stick.” Altogether, the district court
found this evidence clear and convincing, “notwithstanding
the absence of either the weapon or the magazine.” The
district court therefore applied the sentencing enhancement
and sentenced Lucas to a 57-month term of incarceration.3
   A divided three-judge panel reversed the sentence.
United States v. Lucas, 70 F.4th 1218, 1220 (9th Cir.),
vacated, 77 F.4th 1275 (9th Cir. 2023). The panel majority

2
  Magazines that are altered to accept only ten cartridges are sometimes
referred to as “California compliant” due to California’s limit on
magazine capacity. See Cal. Penal Code § 32310 (prohibiting large-
capacity magazines); Cal. Penal Code § 16740 (defining a “large-
capacity magazine” as “any ammunition feeding device with the capacity
to accept more than 10 rounds”).
3
  Application of the heightened base offense level increased Lucas’s
advisory Guidelines range from 33–41 months to 63–78 months. The
district court varied downward in recognition of Lucas’s “difficulties in
growing up, particularly impoverished in gang neighborhoods.” The
Guidelines range after the downward variance was 57–71 months.
6                       USA V. LUCAS

first assumed that application of the Section 2K2.1(a)(4)(B)
sentencing enhancement requires the heightened standard of
proof. 70 F.4th at 1221–22. The panel then held that “the
district court clearly erred in finding, by clear and
convincing evidence, that Lucas’s magazine could accept
more than 15 rounds.” Id. at 1222. Thus, “the district court
improperly increased Lucas’s base offense level.” Id. at
1223.
    We received supplemental briefing on “whether the clear
and convincing standard applies for factual findings that
have an extreme impact on the sentence in light of Beckles
v. United States, 580 U.S. 256 (2017).” We subsequently
voted to rehear the case en banc.
                              II
                              A
    The federal Sentencing Guidelines became law in 1987.
Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the
Key Compromises Upon Which They Rest, 17 Hofstra L.
Rev. 1, 1 (1988). The Guidelines were intentionally
formulaic, see id. at 6–7, and undoubtedly “limit[ed] a
sentencing judge’s discretion,” United States v. Brady, 895
F.2d 538, 540 (9th Cir. 1990). “One of the most important
features of the original Guidelines was that sentencing
within the Guidelines range was mandatory.” United States
v. Fisher, 502 F.3d 293, 301 (3d Cir. 2007). Thus, in
response to this new Guidelines regime, we soon recognized
“that a defendant’s due process right to ensure the reliability
of information used at sentencing includes the requirement
that facts underlying sentencing factors be proved according
to a specified standard of proof.” United States v. Wilson,
900 F.2d 1350, 1354 (9th Cir. 1990). And like every other
circuit, we identified preponderance of the evidence as the
                            USA V. LUCAS                              7

appropriate standard. Id.; see also United States v. Restrepo,
946 F.2d 654, 655–56 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (collecting
cases).
    At the same time, we hinted that “there may be an
exception to the general rule that the preponderance standard
satisfies due process when a sentencing factor has an
extremely disproportionate effect on the sentence relative to
the offense of conviction.” Restrepo, 946 F.2d at 659 (citing
McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 87–91 (1986)); see
also id. at 662 (Tang, J., concurring) (“[T]he quantitative
effect of a sentencing factor does remain relevant in deciding
what procedural safeguards are appropriate.”). In carving
out that exception, we followed the lead of the Third Circuit,
which had recognized that “if a sentencing factor has an
extreme effect on the sentence, . . . the factor must be proven
by clear and convincing evidence.” Id. at 656 n.1 (citing
United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 1101–02 (3d Cir.
1990)).4 Since Restrepo, the clear and convincing standard
became well-established circuit precedent. See United
States v. Jordan, 256 F.3d 922, 927–31 (9th Cir. 2001);
United States v. Mezas de Jesus, 217 F.3d 638, 643 (9th Cir.
2000); United States v. Hopper, 177 F.3d 824, 833 (9th Cir.
1999).

4
  As Restrepo acknowledged, the Eighth Circuit also countenanced a
heightened standard of proof for certain sentencing facts. See Restrepo,
946 F.2d at 656 n.1 (citing United States v. Townley, 929 F.2d 365, 370
(8th Cir. 1991)); see also id. at 678 n.8 (Norris, J., dissenting). This
movement towards the clear and convincing evidence standard flowed
from the Supreme Court’s dicta in McMillan about when a sentencing
factor is “a tail which wags the dog of the substantive offense.” See
McMillan, 477 U.S. at 88; see also Restrepo, 946 F.2d at 656 n.1;
Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1101; Townley, 929 F.2d at 369–70.
8                       USA V. LUCAS

    Sentencing law underwent a sea change with United
States v. Booker, which rendered the Guidelines advisory
rather than mandatory. 543 U.S. 220, 264 (2005) (“The
district courts, while not bound to apply the Guidelines, must
consult those Guidelines and take them into account when
sentencing.”). Yet post-Booker, our court recommitted to
the clear and convincing standard. Staten, 466 F.3d at 718
(holding that “the clear and convincing standard still pertains
post-Booker for an enhancement applied by the district court
that has an extremely disproportionate effect on the sentence
imposed”). We noted that Booker “does not discuss the role
that standards of proof play in criminal sentencing,” and that
Booker was therefore not clearly irreconcilable with the clear
and convincing standard. Id. at 718–20. Further, we
explained that “our heightened standard on sentencing due
process jurisprudence traces back to a case, United States v.
Kikumura, in which the reliance on disputed facts to greatly
increase a sentence was discretionary rather than
mandatory.” Id. at 719; see also id. at 719–20 (citing
Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1097–1101). Because Booker did not
require our court to overturn the heightened standard of
proof, the clear and convincing standard survived.
    In Beckles, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the advisory
nature of the modern Guidelines. See 580 U.S. at 265–67
(rejecting a void-for-vagueness challenge to a Guidelines
sentence).    Critically, the Court elaborated that any
expectation grounded in due process “that a criminal
defendant would receive a sentence within the
presumptively applicable Guidelines range did not survive
our decision in [Booker].” Id. at 266 (alteration in original)
(quoting Irizarry v. United States, 553 U.S. 708, 713
(2008)). In other words, the Court made clear that Booker
fundamentally changed what process is due at sentencing.
                            USA V. LUCAS                               9

    Although we have continued to apply the heightened
standard post-Beckles, e.g., United States v. Lonich, 23 F.4th
881, 910–16 (9th Cir. 2022), until now our court has yet to
meaningfully grapple with the growing tension between the
clear and convincing standard and what due process requires
of sentencing under the now-advisory Guidelines. But see
United States v. Buchan, No. 19-50272, 2021 WL 4988020,
at *3–6 (9th Cir. Oct. 27, 2021) (R. Nelson, J., concurring)
(suggesting “that the clear and convincing evidence rule is
clearly irreconcilable with Beckles” or alternatively that it
should be reversed en banc).
                                   B
    The government argues that the preponderance of the
evidence standard is sufficient to satisfy due process for fact-
finding under the advisory Guidelines, even when a fact has
an extremely disproportionate effect on the sentence.5 We
agree.
    As an initial point, the Third Circuit case that first
inspired our heightened standard is no more. See Fisher, 502
F.3d at 305 (holding that “Kikumura is no longer valid as
long as the Guidelines are advisory”). In Fisher, the Third
Circuit explained that while “concerns about the ‘tail

5
  At oral argument, the government conceded that the preponderance
standard is both sufficient and necessary. Even advisory Guidelines are
extraordinarily influential at sentencing. Molina-Martinez v. United
States, 578 U.S. 189, 200 (2016) (explaining that “the Guidelines are not
only the starting point for most federal sentencing proceedings but also
the lodestar”); Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007) (describing
the Guidelines as “the starting point and the initial benchmark” for
sentencing proceedings). Given this reality, it follows that defendants
retain a due process interest in accurate fact-finding at sentencing. The
preponderance standard strikes an appropriate constitutional balance.
See Wilson, 900 F.2d at 1354; see also McMillan, 477 U.S. at 91.
10                          USA V. LUCAS

wagging the dog’ were valid under a mandatory guideline
system . . . these concerns were put to rest when Booker
rendered the Guidelines advisory.” Id. In the wake of
Booker, the Third Circuit held that “sentencing judges are
free to find facts by a preponderance of the evidence,
provided that the sentence actually imposed is within the
statutory range, and is reasonable.” Id.
    This approach is consistent with the standard in nearly
every other circuit—except ours. See United States v.
Walker-Couvertier, 860 F.3d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 2017); United
States v. Vaughn, 430 F.3d 518, 525 (2d Cir. 2005); United
States v. Grubbs, 585 F.3d 793, 802–03 (4th Cir. 2009);
United States v. Brika, 487 F.3d 450, 461–62 (6th Cir. 2007);
United States v. Reuter, 463 F.3d 792, 793 (7th Cir. 2006);
United States v. Villareal-Amarillas, 562 F.3d 892, 897–98
(8th Cir. 2009); United States v. Robertson, 946 F.3d 1168,
1171–72 (10th Cir. 2020); United States v. Arcila Ramirez,
16 F.4th 844, 855 n.8 (11th Cir. 2021); United States v.
Mohammed, 89 F.4th 158, 164–65 (D.C. Cir. 2023).6
    Of course, mere disagreement with our sister circuits
does not compel a change in circuit precedent. But the
overwhelming consensus here makes plain that there is no
longer any sound legal foundation for requiring a heightened
standard of proof. Before Booker, “a defendant had an
entitlement to be sentenced within his guidelines range
absent circumstances justifying upward departure.” Brika,

6
  The Fifth Circuit also appears to have embraced the preponderance of
the evidence standard. United States v. Simpson, 741 F.3d 539, 559 (5th
Cir. 2014) (“[W]e have never actually required a heightened burden for
factual determinations at sentencing.”); see also United States v.
Ramirez-Urbina, No. 22-50404, 2023 WL 3620754, at *1 (5th Cir. May
24, 2023) (stating that defendant’s arguments for a clear and convincing
evidence standard were “foreclosed by our precedent”).
                        USA V. LUCAS                      11

487 F.3d at 461. Now, however, the “post-Booker advisory
nature of the Guidelines eliminates any due process
argument for a heightened standard of proof at sentencing.”
Grubbs, 585 F.3d at 801 (citing Fisher, 502 F.3d at 308); see
also Reuter, 463 F.3d at 793 (“With the guidelines no longer
binding the sentencing judge, there is no need for courts of
appeals to add epicycles to an already complex set of
(merely) advisory guidelines by multiplying standards of
proof.”).
    Considering this landscape, our continued adherence to
the heightened standard of proof makes little sense. We join
our sister circuits in holding that clear and convincing
evidence is not required for factual findings under the
Guidelines, even when potentially large enhancements are at
stake; fact-finding by a preponderance of the evidence is
sufficient to satisfy due process at sentencing. We therefore
overrule Staten, 466 F.3d at 718, and its progeny.
    Going forward, “the only constraints on sentencing
judges are the statutory maximum and minimum for the
offense at issue and the sentencing statutes, particularly 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a).” Brika, 487 F.3d at 461; see also Reuter,
463 F.3d at 793 (“The judge is cabined, but also liberated,
by the statutory sentencing factors.” (citing 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a))).     Put differently, “challenges to ‘large
enhancements . . . should be viewed through the lens of
Booker reasonableness rather than that of due process.’”
Grubbs, 585 F.3d at 802–03 (quoting Brika, 487 F.3d at 462)
(omission in original).
                             III
   Turning back to Lucas’s sentence, the question is
whether a preponderance of the evidence establishes that
Lucas possessed a semiautomatic firearm that is “capable of
12                           USA V. LUCAS

accepting a large capacity magazine” within the meaning of
U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(B). See United States v. Kilby, 443
F.3d 1135, 1141 (9th Cir. 2006) (defining a preponderance
of the evidence as “more likely than not”). It is most
appropriate that the district court answer this question in
light of the newly articulated standard for fact-finding at
sentencing.7 We therefore vacate Lucas’s sentence and
remand for resentencing on an open record. See United
States v. Matthews, 278 F.3d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 2002) (en
banc) (“[A]s a general matter . . . we will remand for
resentencing on an open record—that is, without limitation
on the evidence that the district court may consider.”).
     VACATED and REMANDED.

7
  The government never recovered or physically examined the firearm or
magazine at issue, so neither the government expert nor Lucas’s expert
could confirm whether the magazine had been modified. The recorded
jail call may corroborate that Lucas possessed a large capacity magazine,
and the government expert testified he had “never encountered” a
firearm magazine “with a blocker installed in it to limit the ammunition
capacity.” On the other hand, Lucas adduced evidence that modified
magazines were available from online sources. Meanwhile, the district
court found that regardless of whether Lucas possessed a “California
compliant” firearm, the weapon was nevertheless “susceptible to easy
conversion to accept a high capacity magazine.” However, this
reasoning appears at odds with the district court’s apparent reliance on
Application Note 2; if Application Note 2 applies, it plainly
circumscribes analysis of the magazine to its capacity “at the time of the
offense.” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 app. n.2.