Court Opinion

ID: 9881551
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-03 13:08:55.868183+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:17:23.376164
License: Public Domain

Fourth Court of Appeals
                                     San Antonio, Texas
                                              OPINION

                                          No. 04-22-00333-CR

                                          Steven James ELSIK,
                                                Appellant

                                                  v.

                                          The STATE of Texas,
                                                Appellee

                   From the 156th Judicial District Court, McMullen County, Texas
                                 Trial Court No. M-21-0009-CR-B
                          Honorable Starr Boldrick Bauer, Judge Presiding

                               OPINION ON MOTION FOR REHEARING

Opinion by:       Beth Watkins, Justice

Sitting:          Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice
                  Beth Watkins, Justice
                  Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice

Delivered and Filed: September 27, 2023

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART

           Appellant Steven James Elsik appeals his second-and third-degree smuggling of persons

convictions on sufficiency and evidence grounds. On July 26, 2023, this court issued an opinion

and judgment affirming in part, reversing in part, and remanding the cause to the trial court for

further proceedings. The State filed a motion for rehearing. After consideration, we deny the

motion for rehearing, withdraw our July 26, 2023 opinion and judgment, and substitute this opinion
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and judgment in their place. We again affirm the trial court’s judgment in part, reverse it in part,

and remand the cause to the trial court for further proceedings.

                                          BACKGROUND

       Around 1:00 a.m. on July 22, 2021, McMullen County Sheriff’s Office Deputy David

Gardner observed a weighted-down U-Haul pickup truck traveling on Highway 16, closely

following a silver SUV. Gardner, who was driving a marked vehicle, caught up to the truck. The

truck pulled onto the shoulder “for a few hundred yards and then pull[ed] back into the main lane

of traffic.” Gardner then turned on his emergency lights to conduct a traffic stop for a weight

inspection. The highway was a construction zone with reflective cones spaced tightly together and

no obvious place to pull over; the truck did not pull over. Gardner engaged his siren and the truck

quickly accelerated, crossed a double yellow line, and passed the silver SUV. The truck reached

eighty-eight miles per hour and traveled several miles before pulling over.

       Gardner drew his service weapon and conducted a “felony takedown” of the driver, Elsik,

who cooperated. After Gardner arrested Elsik and placed him in the patrol car, he noticed “blankets

covering the bed of the truck and [what] appeared to be movement with people hiding underneath

the blankets.” Gardner waited for back up; after two more deputies arrived, they removed the

blankets and discovered passengers laying horizontal in stacked layers. The deputies ordered them

out of the truck at gunpoint, two at a time, and immediately handcuffed them. There were thirteen

passengers altogether—one female in the passenger seat of the truck plus five females and seven

males in the bed of the truck. All the passengers later identified themselves as Mexican citizens to

United States Border Patrol; two identified themselves as juveniles—a seventeen-year-old boy and

a seventeen-year-old girl.

       The grand jury charged Elsik with two counts of second-degree smuggling of persons under

18, eleven counts of third-degree smuggling of adults, and one third-degree count of evading arrest

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with a motor vehicle. The jury convicted Elsik on all counts. He pled true to an enhancement

paragraph and the jury assessed punishment at ninety-nine years on the second-degree smuggling

counts, twenty years on the third-degree smuggling counts, and five years on the evading count.

Elsik appeals the smuggling counts.

                                             ANALYSIS

                                        Issue 1-Sufficiency

       In his first issue, Elsik argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions for

smuggling the six female passengers.

                             Standard of Review and Applicable Law

       We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence under the standard set forth in

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). See Matlock v. State, 392 S.W.3d 662, 667 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2013). Under that standard, we examine all the evidence in the light most favorable to the

verdict and resolve all reasonable inferences from the evidence in the verdict’s favor to determine

whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the charged offense

beyond a reasonable doubt. Nowlin v. State, 473 S.W.3d 312, 317 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). “[N]o

evidence is ignored because the standard requires a reviewing court to view all of the evidence in

the light most favorable to the verdict.” Cary v. State, 507 S.W.3d 750, 759 n.8 (Tex. Crim. App.

2016) (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted). “An appellate court cannot act as a

thirteenth juror and make its own assessment of the evidence.” Nisbett v. State, 552 S.W.3d 244,

262 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). Rather, “[a] court’s role on appeal is restricted to guarding against

the rare occurrence when the factfinder does not act rationally.” Id. This rationality requirement is

a key and explicit component of the Jackson sufficiency standard. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319.

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                                                     Application

         Under the version of the statute that applies here, 1 a person commits an offense of

smuggling of persons “if the person, with the intent to obtain a pecuniary benefit, knowingly: (1)

uses a motor vehicle . . . to transport an individual with the intent to . . . conceal the individual

from a peace officer[.]” TEX. PENAL CODE § 20.05(a)(1)(A) (West 2019). This offense “is a felony

of the third degree” unless the “smuggled individual is a child younger than 18 years of age at the

time of the offense,” in which case it is a “a felony of the second degree[.]” TEX. PENAL CODE

§ 20.05(b), (b)(1)(B).

         Elsik argues the State failed to prove he intended to conceal the passenger in the front seat.

He acknowledges “clear evidence that twelve people were hiding under blankets in the bed of the

truck,” but contends “the State made no attempt to prove that the front seat female passenger was

concealed.” He also argues that because the State “failed to connect its evidence of concealed

passengers to actual counts in the indictment, there is insufficient evidence that Elsik intended to

conceal with respect to all six counts identifying female passengers.” In other words, because the

evidence is insufficient to establish the intent to conceal the female passenger in the front seat, and

because the State did not establish the identity of the front-seat passenger, none of the six counts

identifying female passengers were proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Elsik relies on Stahmann

v. State, a case in which the Court of Criminal Appeals held that, for purposes of the tampering-

with-physical-evidence statute, concealment requires a showing that the allegedly concealed item

was “hidden, removed from sight or notice, or kept from discovery or observation[.]” Stahmann v.

1
 In 2021, the legislature amended this statute to remove the “with the intent to obtain a pecuniary benefit” element
and make it a sentencing enhancement. Acts 1999, 76th Leg., ch. 1014, § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1999. Amended by Acts 2011,
82nd Leg., ch. 223 (H.B. 260), § 2, eff. Sept. 1, 2011; Acts 2015, 84th Leg., ch. 333 (H.B. 11), § 14, eff. Sept. 1, 2015;
Acts 2021, 87th Leg., ch. 572 (S.B. 576), § 2, eff. Sept. 1, 2021 (current version at TEX. PENAL CODE § 20.05).

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State, 602 S.W.3d 573, 581 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). But under

the statute at issue in Stahmann, the State had the burden to prove actual concealment. Id. at 576.

       Here, in contrast, the smuggling statute only requires an intent to conceal. TEX. PENAL

CODE § 20.05(a)(1)(A). The State’s evidence that Elsik drove a U-Haul truck late at night and

evaded detention by speeding up instead of pulling over after Deputy Gardner activated the lights

and siren on his marked patrol vehicle was evidence from which a rational trier of fact could have

found an intent to conceal all the passengers in the truck. See United States v. Perez-Gonzalez, 307

F.3d 443, 446 (6th Cir. 2002). We overrule Elsik’s first argument.

                                     Issues 2 and 3-Evidence

       In his second and third issues, Elsik argues that the trial court’s admission of the out-of-

court statements from the passengers providing their names, nationalities, and birthdates violated

his confrontation rights and was inadmissible hearsay. Over Elsik’s objections, the trial court

admitted United States Border Patrol Supervisor Alfonso Carrion Gonzales’s testimony about his

questioning of the passengers after their detention. Gonzales testified that he was dispatched from

the Freer Border Patrol Checkpoint to the Sheriff’s Office to question the thirteen passengers. He

collected the name, country of origin, and date of birth from each passenger and recorded them in

a report. Gonzales testified that all thirteen passengers admitted to being in the United States

illegally and to having come from Mexico. Gonzales read the information in the report to the jury.

       In clarifying its evidentiary ruling on Elsik’s confrontation and hearsay objections, the trial

court found the passengers “unavailable” and their identities and nationalities “within the personal

knowledge of Agent Gonzales.”

1.     Confrontation Clause

       If “testimonial evidence is at issue,” then “the Sixth Amendment demands what the

common law required: [witness] unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination.”

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Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004). Statements are testimonial if “the primary

purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal

prosecution.” Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006). “Davis requires a combined inquiry

that accounts for both the declarant and the interrogator.” Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 367

(2011). And in “many instances, the primary purpose of the interrogation will be most accurately

ascertained by looking to the contents of both the questions and the answers.” Id. at 367–68. We

review a trial court’s finding on the testimonial nature of a statement de novo. See Wall v. State,

184 S.W.3d 730, 742 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

        Elsik argues that the passengers’ statements relating to their names, nationalities, and

birthdates were testimonial, and their admission through Gonzales constituted a violation of the

Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause.

        Entry into the United States at any time or place other than as designated by immigration

officers is a crime. 8 U.S.C. § 1325. Therefore, a border patrol agent’s interview of a person

thought to have entered the country illegally may lead to prosecution of the entrant. See Davis, 547

U.S. at 822. The State acknowledges that Crawford would bar statements relating to the underlying

smuggling transactions but argues Crawford does not bar “basic identifying data” because such

data are “non-testimonial facts.”

        Some federal courts have excluded an unavailable witness’s statements made during

custodial interrogation about citizenship and alienage on the ground that admission of the

statement would violate the transporting defendant’s right to confrontation. See, e.g., United States

v. Gonzalez-Marichal, 317 F. Supp. 2d 1200, 1202–04 (S.D. Cal. 2004). Other courts have

concluded immigration files containing “routine biographical information—the entrant’s name,

date of birth, place of birth[,]” are nontestimonial and admissible under the public records

exception to the hearsay rule. See, e.g., United States v. Caraballo, 595 F.3d 1214, 1226–27 (11th

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Cir. 2010). This is because the primary purpose of the collection of biographical information “is

administrative, not investigative or prosecutorial.” United States v. Noria, 945 F.3d 847, 857 (5th

Cir. 2019). Still other courts have found confrontation rights are protected where the agent who

was personally involved in processing the noncitizen found in the defendant’s vehicle testified and

was subject to cross-examination. United States v. Gutierrez de Lopez, 761 F.3d 1123, 1133–34

(10th Cir. 2014).

        We find no confrontation violation. Gonzales—a federal agent—testified that he

interviewed the passengers to determine their eligibility to remain in this country. This testimony

supports a conclusion that Gonzales’s “primary purpose” in questioning the passengers “was to

elicit routine biographical information that is required of every foreign entrant for the proper

administration of our immigration laws and policies.” Caraballo, 595 F.3d at 1229; see I.N.S. v.

Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984) (deportation proceeding is “civil action to determine

eligibility to remain in this country, not to punish an unlawful entry,” though that is itself a crime).

Even after each of the passengers admitted to being in the country illegally, no steps were taken to

prosecute them. Instead, Gonzales “transported them back to . . . the Freer Border Patrol checkpoint

station” where they were assigned to be deported. As a result of Gonzales’s investigation, the

eleven adults “were returned back to Mexico” immediately; similarly, the juveniles “were not

allowed to stay.”

        Because the circumstances objectively indicate that the primary purpose of Gonzales’s

interviews was other than to “establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal

prosecution,” we conclude the resulting statements were not testimonial and their admission did

not violate Elsik’s confrontation rights. See Davis, 547 U.S. at 822; Caraballo, 595 F.3d at 1227.

Having determined the admission of the identification statements did not violate Elsik’s

confrontation rights, we turn to whether they were inadmissible hearsay.

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2.       Hearsay

         Certain hearsay statements are admissible through Texas Rule of Evidence 804 if “the

declarant is unavailable as a witness.” TEX. R. EVID. 804. A witness is “unavailable” if he or she

“is absent from the trial or hearing and the statement’s proponent has not been able, by process or

other reasonable means, to procure the declarant’s attendance or testimony.” TEX. R. EVID.

804(a)(5). 2

         Rule 804 contains an exception for a “Statement of Personal or Family History,” which

includes statements about “the declarant’s own birth, adoption, legitimacy, ancestry, marriage,

divorce, relationship by blood, adoption or marriage, or similar facts of personal or family

history[.]” TEX. R. EVID. 804(b)(3)(A). We review the trial court’s ruling on a hearsay objection

for an abuse of discretion and are required to affirm the trial court’s decision unless it “was so

clearly wrong as to lie outside the zone within which reasonable people might disagree.” See

Taylor v. State, 268 S.W.3d 571, 579 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).

         At trial, the State offered Gonzales’s testimony about the names, nationalities, and

birthdates of the passengers under the hearsay exception for “Statement of Personal or Family

History.” TEX. R. EVID. 804(b)(3). The trial court found the passengers unavailable, but Elsik

argues that the State failed to prove unavailability under Rule 804 because it failed to put on any

evidence that it had not been able, by process or other reasonable means, to procure the declarants’

attendance or testimony. TEX. R. EVID. 804(a)(5).

         In response to Elsik’s hearsay objection, the prosecutor stated:

             Well if I asked the Sheriff, gave him a subpoena to go into Mexico and serve
         the subpoenas there I think he would look at me in askance and askew and tell me
         he doesn’t have jurisdiction to serve subpoenas over there in Mexico and I’m not
         going to waste his time.

2
  Elsik does not argue that the State “procured or wrongfully caused the declarant’s unavailability as a witness in order
to prevent the declarant from attending or testifying.” Id.

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           Once they were deported we’re not the federal government. We do not have the
       ability to hold onto them. They were outside our jurisdiction and outside our reach.
       And we were unable to get them and find them to even issue a subpoena.

Relying on Loun v. State, Elsik argues the prosecutor’s statement is no substitute for “evidence

that attempting compulsory process in this case would be futile.” 273 S.W.3d 406, 420 (Tex.

App.—Texarkana 2008, no pet.) (argument that it would be too expensive and impossible to

procure out-of-state witness’s attendance insufficient to show Rule 804 unavailability). We agree.

An unsworn statement by counsel is not competent evidence. State v. Lopez, 631 S.W.3d 107, 115

(Tex. Crim. App. 2021). And, to establish that a witness is “unavailable” under Rule 804(a)(5),

the proponent of the testimony must demonstrate that a good-faith effort was made prior to trial to

locate and present the witness. Compare Reed v. State, 312 S.W.3d 682, 685–86 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. ref’d) (evidence of investigator’s attempts to locate witness—

including exhausting contacts among witness’s family and friends who speculated she might be in

Chicago and performing records searches—sufficient to show Rule 804 unavailability), with Reyes

v. State, 845 S.W.2d 328, 331 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1992, no pet.) (evidence that witness’s family

was asked to locate witness in Mexico three days prior to trial insufficient to show Rule 804

unavailability), and Otero-Miranda v. State, 746 S.W.2d 352, 354–55 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1988,

pet. ref’d, untimely filed) (evidence of inability to subpoena Mexican citizen witnesses insufficient

to show Rule 804 unavailability). Because the State failed to present any evidence that it had not

been able, by process or other reasonable means, to procure the declarants’ attendance or

testimony, the trial court abused its discretion in finding the declarants unavailable and admitting

the hearsay statements under Rule 804. Loun, 273 S.W.3d at 420; Reyes, 845 S.W.2d at 331; Otero-

Miranda, 746 S.W.2d at 354–55; see also United States v. Yida, 498 F.3d 945, 952 (9th Cir. 2007)

(holding requirement in Federal Rule of Evidence 804 that movant be “unable to procure the

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declarant’s attendance” by “reasonable means” applies to government’s actions both before and

after witness was deported).

       On appeal, the State also argues that the statements were admissible as statements against

interest under Rule 803(24). Rule 803 provides exceptions to the rule against hearsay, and it

operates regardless of whether the declarant is available as a witness. Rule 803(24) allows

admission of a statement “a reasonable person in the declarant’s position would have made only if

the person believed it to be true because, when made, it . . . had so great a tendency to . . . expose

the declarant to” criminal liability, so long as that statement “is supported by corroborating

circumstances that clearly indicate its trustworthiness. . . .” TEX. R. EVID. 803(24). The State argues

that the statements provided to the Border Patrol agents were admissible because they tended to

expose the declarants to criminal liability for illegal entry into the United States and they were

supported by corroborating circumstances.

       Although the State did not present this theory to the trial court, we are obligated to uphold

a trial court’s ruling if it is reasonably supported by the record and correct under any theory of

applicable law. Osbourn v. State, 92 S.W.3d 531, 538 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). For the same

reasons we rejected Elsik’s argument that the statements were testimonial, we reject the State’s

argument that the statements were admissible under Rule 803(24). As the State acknowledged in

its argument that the statements were nontestimonial:

               In the instant case the statements of the individuals in question did not relate
       any facts regarding the transaction that led to their presence in McMullen County.
       They did not relate any information to Gonzalez that in any fashion bore on the
       question of pecuniary benefit. They did not relate to Gonzalez their immigration
       status. In short, their remarks to the Border Patrol agent/agents reflected nothing
       more than basic identifying data.

Given the nature of the statements, we reject that they could have been properly admitted under

Rule 803(24) and turn to the harm analysis.

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       The erroneous admission of hearsay is non-constitutional error that is subject to a harm

analysis under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2(b). Johnson v. State, 967 S.W.2d 410, 417

(Tex. Crim. App. 1998). Under that rule, an appellate court disregards error that does not affect a

defendant’s substantial rights. TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b). “In making this determination, the

following nonexclusive factors are considered: the character of the alleged error and how it might

be considered in connection with other evidence; the nature of the evidence supporting the verdict;

the existence and degree of additional evidence indicating guilt; whether the State emphasized the

complained-of error; the trial court’s instructions; the theory of the case; and, relevant voir dire.”

Cook v. State, 665 S.W.3d 595, 599 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023). “We should not overturn the

conviction if we have fair assurance from an examination of the record as a whole that the error

did not influence the jury, or had but slight effect.” Taylor, 268 S.W.3d at 592.

       After examining the record, we have a fair assurance that the admission of the hearsay had

but slight effect on the eleven third-degree counts of smuggling of adults. We cannot say the same

about the admission of hearsay’s effect on the two second-degree counts for smuggling of

juveniles.

Character of the evidence

       At the outset, we note that neither the name, nationality, nor birthdate of the transported

individual is an element of the offense of third-degree smuggling. TEX. PENAL CODE

§ 20.05(a)(1)(A) (“(a) A person commits an offense if the person, with the intent to obtain a

pecuniary benefit, knowingly: (1) uses a motor vehicle . . . to transport an individual with the intent

to: (A) conceal the individual from a peace officer[.]”). Conversely, the underage status of the

transported individual is an element of the offense of second-degree smuggling. TEX. PENAL CODE

§ 20.05(a)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B) (“(a) A person commits an offense if the person, with the intent to

obtain a pecuniary benefit, knowingly: (1) uses a motor vehicle . . . to transport an individual with

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the intent to: (A) conceal the individual from a peace officer[]” and (b)(1)(B) “the smuggled

individual is a child younger than 18 years of age at the time of the offense[.]”). Thus, Gonzales’s

testimony about the alleged-juvenile declarants’ birthdates and ages goes to the heart of the State’s

case against Elsik because it proves an element of those two second-degree offenses. While a

hearsay statement of date of birth or age may be neutral in the abstract, as applied to Elsik’s case,

that information is the difference between a second and third-degree felony.

How it might be considered in connection with other evidence

       Gonzales testified that two of the passengers identified themselves as juveniles—one a

seventeen-year-old boy and the other a seventeen-year-old girl. Gonzales admitted that sometimes

non-citizens “give us false names” and “they have different aliases” and there have “been

occasions where there are adults that claim that they are juveniles.” Gonzales said some of the

passengers had identification cards, but that he could not recall which ones. He also conceded that

he could not identify the juveniles in the photographs of the group. He said he had confirmed the

juveniles’ dates of birth and ages with the Mexican Consulate.

The nature of the evidence supporting the verdict and the existence and degree of additional
evidence indicating guilt

       The State’s case was strong, except on the point of the juvenile status of two of the

passengers. The crime was captured on video and shown to the jury. The dash-cam video showed

the chase, the removal of thirteen individuals from Elsik’s truck, and their detainment on the side

of the road. Photos of the group admitted into evidence do not contain any obvious children; rather,

they show a group of mostly young adults. The jury heard Elsik in jail calls saying that he

understood the consequences for what he had done.

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The existence and degree of additional evidence indicating guilt

       Aside from Gonzales’s testimony based on the alleged juvenile declarants’ statements,

there was no evidence of the juvenile status of two of the passengers.

Whether the State emphasized the complained-of error

       The State argued:

               And in Count 1 and Count 2 you had the testimony of the agent who said
       that he personally identified all 13 folks out there. And that he gave us the dates of
       birth of two of them.
               Regarding José Alfredo Silva-Martinez his date of birth was October 15th,
       2003, and this date of offense is July 22nd 2021. Eighteen plus three is twenty-one.
       So Mr. José Alfredo Silva-Martinez did not turn 18 until October of 2021 and this
       was July. So that tells us José Alfredo Silva-Martinez was 17 at the time.
               In Count 2 lists a person Paulina Salinas-Irlanta and the date of birth that
       she gave Agent Gonzales was March 22, 2004. So you count off 17 years from
       March 22, 2004, and you have 17. So she would not have turned 18 until March 22
       of 2022. So in July 22, 2021, she also was 17 years of age.

The trial court’s instructions

       The trial court appropriately instructed the jury at the guilt-innocence phase of trial that to

find Elsik guilty of the smuggling of juvenile counts, it must find, beyond a reasonable doubt, inter

alia, that he transported an individual, “who was 18 years of age at the time of the offense” and

that if it did not “so find,” it would go on to consider the lesser offense of smuggling of adults.

Relevant voir dire

       At voir dire, the jury learned the punishment range that would apply if the State proved the

smuggling of a person under eighteen. Questioning at voir dire focused on the ability to consider

the entire range of punishment, and the concept of “intent to conceal.”

Conclusion on hearsay

       After considering the above factors, we have fair assurance that the admission of hearsay

did not influence the jury or had but slight effect on the third-degree smuggling of adults

convictions, but that it did influence and had more than a slight effect on the second-degree

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smuggling of juveniles convictions. Johnson, 967 S.W.2d at 417 (defendant entitled to new trial

under Rule 44.2(b) because erroneous admission of evidence affected defendant’s substantial

rights); Hankston v. State, 656 S.W.3d 914, 918 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2022, pet. ref’d)

(same).

          We overrule Elsik’s second issue and sustain his third point of error.

                                             CONCLUSION

          We affirm the judgment of the trial court on counts 3-14, reverse the judgment on counts

1-2, and remand the cause to the trial court for a new trial on counts 1-2.

                                                    Beth Watkins, Justice

PUBLISH

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