Court Opinion

ID: 9758442
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 23:31:08.544805+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:51.755720
License: Public Domain

WIEAND, Judge,
dissenting:
Under the shibboleth of “broad scope of review” a majority of this Court has determined that an appellate court has a duty to make an “independent determination” in custody cases coming before it for review. I dissent. In my judgment, the determination of the trial judge who has heard the evidence and has seen the witnesses should not be reversed in the absence of an abuse of discretion.
The scope and proper standard of appellate review in custody cases were set forth in the opinion of Justice (now Chief Justice) Nix in Commonwealth ex rel. Spriggs v. Carson, 470 Pa. 290, 368 A.2d 635 (1977) (plurality opinion) as follows:
“It is now beyond dispute that the sole issue to be decided in a custody proceeding ... is the best interests and welfare of the child. Act of June 26, 1895, P.L. 316, § 2, 48 P.S. § 92 (1965); Commonwealth ex rel. Myers v. Myers, [468] Pa. [134], 360 A.2d 587 (1976); Commonwealth ex rel. Holschuh v. Holland-Moritz, 448 Pa. 437, 292 A.2d 380 (1972); Commonwealth ex rel. v. Daven, 298 Pa. 416, 148 A. 524 (1930). In order to insure such a *81focus, our law has long recognized that the scope of review of an appellate court reviewing a custody matter is of the broadest type. Commonwealth ex rel. Holschuh v. Holland-Moritz, supra; Davidyan v. Davidyan, 230 Pa.Super. 599, 327 A.2d 145 (1974). Thus, an appellate court is not bound by deductions or inferences made by a trial court from the facts found; Commonwealth ex rel. Bowser v. Bowser, 224 Pa.Super. 1, 302 A.2d 450 (1973), nor must a reviewing court accept a finding which has no competent evidence to support it; Commonwealth ex rel. Ulmer v. Ulmer, 231 Pa.Super. 144, 331 A.2d 665 (1974).
However, we have also taken great care to stress: ‘... [Tjhis broader power of review was never intended to mean that an appellate court is free to nullify the fact-finding function of the hearing judge. It is a principle which runs through all our cases that the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony by reason of their character, intelligence, and knowledge of the subject can best be determined by the judge before whom they appear.’ Commonwealth ex rel. Harry v. Eastridge, 374 Pa. 172, 177, 97 A.2d 350, 353 (1953) (citations omitted).
This fundamental limitation of a reviewing court’s power has been articulated by the Superior Court as well in defining its own scope of review in custody matters: ‘... [W]e have recognized that the trial judge is in a position to evaluate the attitudes, sincerity, credibility, and demeanor of the witness. Because we are not in such a position, we have recognized that a trial judge’s determination of custody should be accorded great weight. Only where we are constrained to hold that there was a gross abuse of discretion should an appellate court interfere with the decisions of the hearing judge.’ Commonwealth ex rel. Rainford v. Cirillo, 222 Pa.Super. 591, 597-98, 296 A.2d 838, 841 (1972).”
Id., 470 Pa. at 294-296, 368 A.2d at 637 (emphasis added).
The majority properly accepts the broad scope of review which the Supreme Court requires of an appellate court in *82custody cases but then confuses that scope of review with the standard of review to be applied. Because of this confusion, the majority has erroneously concluded that an appellate court has a duty to make an independent determination of all custody cases coming before it on appeal. Several panel decisions of this Court, it must be conceded, appear to have accepted such a rule. See: Commonwealth ex rel. Newcomer v. King, 301 Pa.Super. 239, 447 A.2d 630 (1981); Robert H.H. v. May L.H., 293 Pa.Super. 431, 439 A.2d 187 (1981); L.D. v. B.D., 291 Pa.Super. 589, 436 A.2d 657 (1981); Jon M.W. v. Brenda K., 279 Pa.Super. 50, 420 A.2d 738 (1980). Therefore, it becomes necessary to examine more closely and to determine once and for all time, subject to final review by the Supreme Court, the standard to be applied by this Court in custody appeals.
Because children are one of society’s most valuable resources, it is argued, an appellate court must retain the right to make an independent determination in custody cases. Children are too important, the argument implies, to allow their custody to be determined by trial judges. This argument belittles the ability and sincerity of trial judges and is patently wrong. In the first place, there is no basis for the assumption that one who sits on an appellate court has achieved such understanding, experience and Solomonic wisdom that he or she can more nearly achieve a perfectly just and proper award of custody than the trial judge who sees and hears the witnesses. On the contrary, the trial judge, because he or she has seen and heard the witnesses as well as the conduct of and subtle interplay between the interested parties, is in a much better position to evaluate the attitudes, the sincerity, and the credibility of the witnesses than an appellate court. See: Commonwealth ex rel. E.H.T. v. R.E.T., 285 Pa.Super. 444, 448, 427 A.2d 1370, 1372 (1981). Accord: Commonwealth ex rel. Davenport v. Montgomery County Children and Youth Services, 501 Pa. 472, 476, 462 A.2d 221, 223-224 (1983); Commonwealth ex rel. Zaffarano v. Genaro, 500 Pa. 256, 261, 455 A.2d 1180, 1183 (1983). It is precisely because custody decisions *83are so important and also because they are sensitive and difficult, that an appellate court must be hesitant about reversing a trial court’s decision in the absence of an abuse of discretion.1
The chances for achieving a just and proper result will not be enhanced but will be impaired greatly by relying on appellate courts to make independent decisions from printed records. Important elements in deciding custody cases frequently are not contained in the recorded testimony and cannot readily be discerned or deduced from the printed record. These include the trial judge’s observations of the witnesses, of glances exchanged between children and their parents, of a grimace, a nod of the head, or a blinking of the eye. Those observations will frequently disclose a great deal more than the credibility of witnesses. They may disclose a love and concern between parent and child or comparative responses to a child’s needs which do not readily appear from the printed record. It is for this reason, among others, that an appellate court should not usurp the function of the trial court. Rather, there should be a strong presumption in favor of upholding the trial court’s decision. That decision should be overturned only upon a clear and convincing showing that discretion has been abused or the law misapplied.
A broad or searching appellate review in custody cases is entirely proper. A broad review, however, does not vest in the reviewing court either the duty or the privilege of making its own, independent determination. This Court has repeatedly said that it will require from the trial judge in custody cases “a comprehensive opinion reflecting a thor*84ough analysis of the record ... and specifying the reasons for the ultimate decision.” Commonwealth ex rel. Grillo v. Shuster, 226 Pa.Super. 229, 237, 312 A.2d 58, 63 (1973) citing Commonwealth ex rel. Fox v. Fox, 216 Pa.Super. 11, 260 A.2d 470 (1969). See also: Tettis v. Boyum, 317 Pa.Super. 8, 24, 463 A.2d 1056, 1064 (1983); Ray v. Ray, 293 Pa.Super. 216, 218, 438 A.2d 614, 615 (1981); Commonwealth ex rel. Oxenreider v. Oxenreider, 290 Pa.Super. 63, 68, 434 A.2d 130, 133 (1981); In re Custody of White, 270 Pa.Super. 165, 168, 411 A.2d 231, 232 (1979); Lewis v. Lewis, 267 Pa.Super. 235, 240, 406 A.2d 781, 784 (1979); Gunter v. Gunter, 240 Pa.Super. 382, 390, 361 A.2d 307, 311 (1976). We have imposed this duty on trial courts in order that we, as a reviewing court, may better determine whether there has been an abuse of discretion. A thorough analysis by the trial court is necessary, we have said, “so that there may be assurance that the presumption has been thus confined, and that the fact finding process and ultimate adjudication did focus on what will serve the best interest of the child.” Commonwealth ex rel. Grillo v. Shuster, supra, 226 Pa.Super. at 236, 312 A.2d at 63. When an appellate court reserves to itself the right to make an independent determination in custody cases, it reduces the function of the trial judge to that of a master. The trial judge can make recommendations, but it belongs to the appellate court to decide. This is clearly wrong; it is not the function of appellate courts to make independent determinations.
It has been said that children have a surprising resiliency to inexperienced, if not bad, parents. Frequently, a young life can be more severely and permanently scarred by the uncertainty of a protracted custody suit than by a prompt award to either parent or even in some cases to a non-parental, caring third person. A prompt decision in custody cases, supported by presumed finality in the absence of an abuse of discretion, has much to recommend it. It is calculated to achieve promptly an award intended to serve the best interests of the child. It keeps to a minimum the *85protracted uncertainty inherent in an appeal in which the losing party invariably gets the proverbial “second bite.” It eliminates that lack of stability which has been decried again and again by the courts and by child psychologists alike. Therefore, children, as well as the parties to custody proceedings and the courts themselves, are better served by an “abuse of discretion” standard.
An overwhelming majority of courts in sister states has rejected the right of an appellate court to make an independent determination in custody appeals and has opted for an abuse of discretion standard. These courts have concluded that child custody proceedings are so delicate and sensitive that it would be wholly inappropriate to permit an appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. See: Dimitro v. Dimitro, 398 So.2d 297, 300 (Ala.Civ.App.1981) (trial court’s custody determination will not be set aside unless plainly wrong); Sanguinetti v. Sanguinetti, 628 P.2d 913, 916 n. 3 (Alaska 1981) (trial court is given broad discretion in awarding custody of children and its resolution of issues will be disturbed only if the record convincingly shows an abuse of discretion or that controlling findings of fact were clearly erroneous); Smith v. Smith, 117 Ariz. 249, 253, 571 P.2d 1045, 1049 (1977) (appellate court will not overturn trial court’s child custody decision in the absence of a clear showing of an abuse of discretion); Brasher v. Brasher, 253 Cal.App.2d 867, 868-869, 61 Cal.Rptr. 136, 137 (1967) (“Since important elements of the problem [in a child custody case] are not necessarily contained in the testimony nor easily deduced from the written record, a strong presumption favors the decision of the trial court which will only be overturned on a clear and convincing showing of abuse.”); Christian v. Randall, 33 Colo.App. 129, 130-132, 516 P.2d 132, 133 (1973) (standard of appellate review is abuse of discretion); Simons v. Simons, 172 Conn. 341, 346-348, 374 A.2d 1040, 1043 (1977) (abuse of discretion); Kahn v. Kahn, 252 A.2d 901, 903 (D.C.1969) (“Award of custody presents to trial court a most serious and difficult question, and we are slow to *86substitute our collective judgment for that of the trial court.”); Johnston v. Boram, 386 So.2d 1230, 1230 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1980) (clear abuse of discretion); Brock v. Little, 241 Ga. 549, 550, 246 S.E.2d 668, 669 (1978) (abuse of discretion); Fujikane v. Fujikane, 61 Haw. 352, 354-355, 604 P.2d 43, 45 (1979) (manifest abuse of discretion); Overman v. Overman, 102 Idaho 235, 238, 629 P.2d 127, 130 (1980) (abuse of discretion); Drake v. Hohimer, 35 Ill.App.3d 529, 531-532, 341 N.E.2d 399, 402 (1976) (manifest injustice); Williams v. Trowbridge, Ind.App., 422 N.E.2d 331, 333 (1981) (manifest abuse of discretion); Harris v. Johnson, 149 Ind.App. 512, 517-518, 273 N.E.2d 779, 781 (1971) (“Because of the intimate and personal nature of the decisions of trial judges regarding custody, courts of review have properly exercised great judicial restraint in respect to such decisions on appeal.”); Treiber v. Stong, 5 Kan.App.2d 392, 397-398, 617 P.2d 114, 119 (1980) (abuse of discretion); Taylor v. Taylor, 591 S.W.2d 369, 370 (Ky.1979) (trial court’s determination must be clearly erroneous, an abuse of discretion); Dudgeon v. Dudgeon, 458 S.W.2d 159, 160-161 (Ky.1970) (A very clear and substantial showing of manifest error on the part of the trial court is required before an appellate court should substitute its judgment for trial court’s.); Bordelon v. Bordelon, 390 So.2d 1325, 1329 (La.1980) (clear abuse of discretion); Sheldon v. Sheldon, 423 A.2d 943, 945-946 (Me.1980) (“ ‘[I]t would be inappropriate for us to reevaluate the facts from a cold record in an effort to find error.’ Cooley v. St. Andre’s Child Placing Agency, Me., 415 A.2d 1084, 1087 (1980) quoting O’Malley v. O’Malley, Me., 338 A.2d 149, 153 (1975). It is not the role of an appellate court in reviewing a child custody order to substitute its judgment for that of the trial court ____ [‘]An appellate court’s independent evaluation of the evidence is especially inappropriate in a delicate issue of this sort.’ Cooley, 415 A.2d at 1086. . . .”); McAndrew v. McAndrew, 39 Md.App. 1, 382 A.2d 1081 (1978) (limited appellate review); Prindle v. Fisk, 2 Mass.App. 843, 844, 311 N.E.2d 586, 587 (1974) (trial court must be plainly wrong); Wallin v. Wallin, 290 Minn. 261, 266-268, 187 *87N.W.2d 627, 631 (1971) (clear abuse of discretion in the sense that the trial court’s custody order was arbitrary, unreasonable, or without evidentiary support); Yates v. Yates, 284 So.2d 46, 47-48 (Miss.1973) (manifest error); In re Marriage of McLean, Mont., 609 P.2d 282, 284 (1980) (clear abuse of discretion); Petersen v. Petersen, 190 Neb. 805, 806-807, 212 N.W.2d 580, 581 (1973) (clear abuse of discretion or clearly against the weight of the evidence); Norris v. Graville, 95 Nev. 71, 72-73, 589 P.2d 1024, 1025 (1979); LaPoint v. Girard, 74 A.D.2d 656, 657, 424 N.Y.S.2d 857, 858 (1980) (abuse of discretion); Falls v. Falls, 52 N.C.App. 203, 278 S.E.2d 546 (1981) (abuse of discretion); Jarman v. Jarman, 14 N.C.App. 531, 188 S.E.2d 647, cert. denied, 281 N.C. 622, 190 S.E.2d 465 (1972) (error of law on the face of the record); Miller v. Miller, 305 N.W.2d 666, 671 (N.D.1981) (clearly erroneous; definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made); Rice v. Rice, 603 P.2d 1125, 1128 (Okl.1979) (abuse of discretion); Paolino v. Paolino, R.I., 420 A.2d 830, 834 (1980) (improper exercise of discretionary power or an abuse thereof); O’Conner v. O’Conner, 307 N.W.2d 132, 136 (S.D.1981) (clear case of abuse); Altamirano v. Altamirano, 591 S.W.2d 336, 338 (Tex.Civ.App.1979) (clear abuse of discretion); Tom v. Baker, 556 P.2d 213, 216 (Utah 1976) (abuse of discretion/error of law); In re Gregoire, 71 Wash.2d 745, 747, 430 P.2d 983, 983 (1967) (strong reliance on trial court’s determination of what is in child’s best interests); Horton v. Horton, 264 S.E.2d 160, 163 (W.Va.1980) (clear abuse of discretion); Heiting v. Heiting, 64 Wis.2d 110, 118-120, 218 N.W.2d 334, 339 (1974) (abuse of discretion/error of law).
I would follow this view and hold that an “abuse of discretion” standard is proper in deciding custody appeals. Under this standard, an appellate court would not reverse a custody order unless it were evident that the trial court had abused its discretion, committed an error of law, or lacked evidentiary support for its findings. Applying such a standard in the instant case, I would conclude that the order of the trial court should be affirmed.
*88When this matter was previously before a panel of this Court in In re Donna W., 284 Pa.Super. 338, 425 A.2d 1132 (1981), the facts were recited as follows. “The subjects of these proceedings are Donna, born October 8, 1976 and Edward, born November 9, 1977. The events leading up to their being adjudicated dependent and placed in foster care are as follows. In April, 1977, appellant [their mother] requested Children and Youth Services of Allegheny County (CYS) to provide immediate temporary foster care for Donna. Appellant, then age 17, sought this assistance because she was having serious marital problems and was suffering from a nervous condition associated with her pregnancy with Edward. CYS provided foster care for several weeks and then returned Donna at appellant’s request. CYS became involved with the family again in June, 1977, following renewed marital problems in appellant’s household. Over the next several months CYS attempted to work with the family and arranged for their participation in a parenting program. During this period Edward was born, and he too was included in the program. Despite the assistance of CYS, the family’s problems worsened. Appellant and her husband separated, and the husband was later arrested for automobile theft. Appellant soon found herself without suitable housing for herself and the children. Consequently, on March 30, 1978, appellant once again contacted CYS to request that her children be placed in temporary foster care. CYS arranged for such care immediately and then proceeded to file a dependency petition in the court below. On May 23, 1978, after a hearing the court adjudicated Donna and Edward dependent and ordered CYS to assume custody with authorization to place the children in foster care. Appellant did not appeal this order.” Id., 284 Pa.Superior Ct. at 340-341, 425 A.2d at 1133 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
More than a year later, appellant petitioned the court to establish a plan for returning the children to her. By then, she and her husband had been divorced. However, her life had not yet been stabilized. Appellant’s visits with her *89children were increased, but the court refused to order the children returned to her custody until definite housing arrangements had been made and appellant’s parenting abilities had been demonstrated. On January 30, 1980, at what was intended to be the final hearing, the court learned that appellant had been sexually involved with, perhaps raped by, a sixteen year old boy whom she had invited home one evening. The court ordered the children to remain in foster care until further review at a later time.
This Court, having reviewed the record on an appeal from the trial court’s order, remanded “in order for the court to reconsider appellant’s fitness as a custodian in light of both the evidence already presented and present circumstances as revealed through additional testimony.” Id., 284 Pa.Superior Ct. at 348, 425 A.2d at 1137. In remanding, the Court observed, “... although the [trial] court concluded that the evidence ‘mitigates [sic] against removal of the two children from a stable, healthy environment which they have known for two years,’ ... the record in fact is totally devoid of any evidence regarding the nature and quality of the children’s foster placements, the degree of attachments which the children have formed in foster care, and the effect which return of the children would have on them.” Id., 284 Pa.Superior Ct. at 349, 425 A.2d at 1137.
This was more than two and a half years ago. The children have now been raised by foster parents for more than five years. Subsequent hearings held by the trial court pursuant to this Court’s remand order produced evidence, found credible by the trial court, that both Donna and Edward were receiving excellent care in foster homes and had interacted well with their respective foster parents, who loved them and were loved by the children in return. The children’s foster care had been interrupted briefly, with unfortunate, adverse consequences, the evidence showed, when appellant abducted them following a visit on August 26, 1980 and kept them until they were returned to the custody of their foster parents by court order and attachment on September 1, 1980. The children’s interaction with *90appellant during those five days was extremely poor. It continued to be poor on subsequent visits.
Dr. Neil Rosenbloom, a clinical psychologist employed by the Child Guidance Clinic and attached to the University of Pittsburgh, was one of three experts who testified. The hearing judge reviewed the credibility of all three expert witnesses. He expressly found Dr. Rosenbloom’s testimony credible and entitled to greater weight than the testimony of the other witnesses. This Court is required to accept the trial court’s finding on credibility.
Dr. Rosenbloom described his own observations regarding appellant’s immaturity and her failure to comprehend, much less respond to, the special needs of Donna, who possessed a borderline retarded intelligence level. Edward, he said, was uncomfortable with his natural mother and irritable in her presence. Appellant was also uncomfortable and tentative with the son whom she had never parented. She conceded that it would be difficult to establish a relationship with him. It was the opinion of Dr. Rosenbloom that a precipitous removal of the children from their foster parents in favor of an award of custody to appellant would be harmful. He said that the foster parents could better provide for the children’s needs and that in the immediate^ future it would be in the children’s best interests to remain with such foster parents. An ultimate return of custody to appellant could be achieved gradually, he said, and should be accompanied by intensive counselling.
In this case, it will be recalled, there was clear necessity for separating these children from appellant. Because appellant had been wholly unable to house or care for the children, she voluntarily delivered them to CYS. When the children were subsequently adjudicated “dependent” and placed in foster care, she did not appeal. In the present proceedings to determine custody, the court was required to determine and adhere to the children’s best interests.
The law applicable to the facts of this case was well stated by our colleague, the Honorable J. Sydney Hoffman, when the matter was previously before a panel of this *91Court in In re Donna W., supra. Because we cannot improve on his statement of the law, we adopt the same and incorporate it herein.
“ ‘... [0]nce the child has been taken from the parents, the court will appraise the evidence, and award custody, according to the child’s best interests. In applying this standard the court will recognize the natural parents’ claim to custody. In a given case this claim may prove of decisive weight; the particular circumstances of each case, including such facts as the length of time the child has been separated from their parents, must be taken into account.’ Stapleton v. Dauphin County Child Care Service, 228 Pa.Super. 371, 391, 324 A.2d 562, 572 (1974).
“As we noted in Stapleton, supra, ‘the natural parents’ claim to custody’ is a significant, and sometimes decisive factor in custody disputes such as this one. Indeed, our cases have long recognized ‘that depriving a parent of [his or] her child is one of the most serious interferences that the state can impose on an individual.’ Milligan v. Davison, 244 Pa.Super. 255, 261, 367 A.2d 299, 302 (1976). See also In re William L., 477 Pa. 322, 383 A.2d 1228 (1978); Commonwealth ex rel. Children’s Aid Society v. Gard, 362 Pa. 85, 66 A.2d 300 (1949); In the Interest of LaRue [244 Pa.Super. 218, 366 A.2d 1271 (1976)], supra; Rinker Appeal, 180 Pa.Super. 143, 117 A.2d 780 (1955). Moreover, in a slightly different context, our courts have acknowledged the importance of natural parents’ claims to custody by requiring third parties seeking custody to meet a substantial evidentiary burden. Accordingly, ‘[w]hen the judge is hearing a dispute between the parents, or a parent, and a third party, ... [t]he question still is, what is in the child’s best interest? However, the parties do not start out even; the parents have a “prima facie right to custody,” which will be forfeited only if “convincing reasons” appear that the child’s best interest will be served by an award to the third party. Thus, even before the proceedings start, the evidentiary scale is tipped, and tipped hard, to the parents’ side. What the judge must do, therefore, is first, hear all *92evidence relevant to the child’s best interest, and then, decide whether the evidence on behalf of the third party is weighty enough to bring the scale up to even, and down on the third party’s side.’ Ellerbe v. Hooks, 490 Pa. 363, 367-68, 416 A.2d 512, 513-14 (1980) (quoting In re Custody of Hernandez, 249 Pa.Super. 274, 286, 376 A.2d 648, 654 (1977)). See also Commonwealth ex rel. Patricia L.F. v. Malbert J.F., [278] Pa.Super. [343], 420 A.2d 572 (1980). In adopting this standard, our Supreme Court has pertinently-noted that ‘deference to the parental relationship is not an archaic adherence to any property rights theory of the family---- Our determination today is only an appropriate recognition that the blood relationship of parenthood has traditionally served and continues to serve as our society’s fundamental criterion for allocating control over and responsibility for our children, and that without some showing of harm, the courts should not interfere with that arrangement.’ Ellerbe v. Hooks, supra [490 Pa.] at 369, 416 A.2d at 514-15.
“Notwithstanding the acknowledged importance of the parental interest in custody, application of the ‘best interests’ standard requires the court to consider other factors in making its determination. Our Supreme Court has stressed this fact in custody disputes between parents and third parties, and its observations in that context are equally relevant here. In Albright v. Commonwealth ex rel. Fetters, 491 Pa. 320, 421 A.2d 157 (1980), the Court stated that ‘the Hernandez standard, adopted by this Court in Ellerbe, was intended to emphasize the importance of the maintenance of the parental relationship, yet at the same time permit the hearing court to award custody to the third party where the best interests of the child will be clearly served by such a decision. This point is best demonstrated by the fact that this Court in Ellerbe, after embracing the Hernandez standard, applied it and sustained the decision of the hearing court awarding custody to the maternal grandmother. Ellerbe v. Hooks, supra. . . . Restated, the standard in this area is not to be construed as precluding a *93custody award to a non-parent, absent a demonstration of the parent’s dereliction. We again emphasize that the standard seeks only to stress the importance of parenthood as a factor in determining the best interests of the child. However, other factors which have significant impact on the well being of the child can justify a finding in favor of the non-parent, even though the parent has not been shown to have been unfit.’ Id., 491 Pa. at [326, 328], 421 A.2d at 160-61 (footnote omitted). See also Ellerbe v. Hooks, supra, 490 Pa. at 368, 416 A.2d at 514 (‘No doubt in some instances the best interests of the child are served by awarding custody to a non-parent.’). Factors of importance in determining the best interests of a child in any custody dispute include, inter alia: (1) ‘the length of time the child has been separated from the parents,’ Stapleton, supra [228 Pa.Super.] at 391, 324 A.2d at 573; (2) ‘[t]he adverse effect upon the development of youngsters caused by the disruption of an established stable relationship,’ Albright, supra [491 Pa.] at [327], 421 A.2d at 160; (3) the desirability of raising siblings together ‘whenever possible,’ id.; and (4) the fitness of the party or parties seeking custody, see, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Leighann A. v. Leon A., [280] Pa.Super. [249], 421 A.2d 706 (1980). See generally A. Momjian & N. Perlberger, Pennsylvania Family Law, §§ 5.1, 5.3 (1978). The latter consideration is, of course, especially important when a parent is seeking the return of a dependent child, since in many cases the original finding of dependency and removal of the child resulted from the parent’s past unfitness to retain custody.” Id. 284 Pa.Super. at 343-346, 425 A.2d at 1134-1136 (emphasis altered).
In the instant case, the trial judge followed and applied this law impeccably. After determining issues of credibility, he found that the children had been separated from appellant and from each other almost since birth. During this separation their primary care had been provided continuously by foster parents. He found, consistently with Dr. Rosenbloom’s testimony, that a precipitous disruption of the established, stable relationship which the children enjoyed *94with their foster parents would be harmful to them. It may be noted parenthetically that this conclusion, as well as the psychologist’s opinion, had already been illustrated and confirmed by the unfortunate effect on the children of their abduction by appellant. When all of this evidence was considered in the light of appellant’s history of immaturity and inability to parent these children, the trial court determined that the children should for the immediate future and until they achieved greater maturity so as to cope with change, remain in the custody of CYS in foster homes.
There was no abuse of discretion in this order. On the contrary, the record demonstrates clearly that the court’s order was consistent with and founded upon the best interests of Donna and Edward. If, at some future time, appellant can show that circumstances have changed so that the best interests of the children will be served by returning custody of them to their natural mother, the present order can be appropriately altered. Meanwhile, I would not impose upon the trial court the responsibility to “provide the mother with support and training in the development of her skills as a parent.” It is the business of courts to decide cases. Where, as here, an error-free decision has been made, I would affirm that decision.

. Although the majority denies an intended criticism of trial courts, its entire premise is that trial judges cannot be trusted to make ultimate decisions in custody cases. From personal experience as a former trial judge, the writer can attest that custody decisions are the most difficult, the most gut wrenching, and the most sleep depriving decisions which a trial judge can be called upon to make. Most trial judges have faced decisions in custody cases with a sincere and conscientious resolve to provide in the best way possible for the future of the young lives which they hold in their hands. Custody decisions Eire such that no judge worthy of his or her robe is likely to take them lightly.