Court Opinion

ID: 9571847
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:35:42.519211+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:31:05.497285
License: Public Domain

Justice EXUM
dissenting in part and concurring in part.
I dissent from the part of the majority’s opinion in which it concludes defendant’s confession was not obtained in violation of defendant’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to counsel and to remain silent.
The pertinent facts as found by the trial judge are as follows:
2. In January, 1981, the defendant was charged in Mecklenburg County with taking indecent liberties with a minor and with indecent exposure. The Public Defender’s office of Mecklenburg County was appointed by the Court to represent him in those cases which were assigned to Lyle Yurko, then an Assistant Public Defender. These cases were finally concluded March 19, 1981.
3. Sometime before the representation of the defendant by the Mecklenburg Public Defender in those cases ended Officer Kirshner of the Charlotte Police Department talked with Mr. Yurko and told him that the defendant was a suspect in the Smith and Ray cases, which were unsolved *695homicides occurring in Mecklenburg County, and was also a suspect in a case in Caldwell County. The Officer asked Mr. Yurko if the defendant was willing to be interrogated about the Smith and Ray cases. There were no charges pending against the defendant in connection with those cases in Mecklenburg County at that time. Mr. Yurko then conferred with Mr. Fritz Mercer, the Public Defender for Mecklenburg County, concerning the matter. Mr. Mercer, without any Court order appointing his office to represent the defendant as to the Smith and Ray cases as required by G.S. 7A-452, nonetheless authorized Mr. Yurko to act as the defendant’s attorney as to the Smith and Ray matters.
4. Mr. Yurko then conferred with the defendant who was apparently serving a sentence in the Mecklenburg County jail at the time. The defendant advised Mr. Yurko that he had been questioned by the police about these cases and did not want to answer any further questions concerning them. Mr. Yurko informed Officer Kirshner of this. Mr. Yurko had no further contact with the defendant concerning these matters until the time he left the Mecklenburg Public Defender’s office on June 30, 1981, to enter private practice. However, sometime prior to April 28, 1981, Mr. Yurko learned through the news media that the defendant may have been again interrogated by police officers as to the Smith and Ray matters. On April 28, 1981, he wrote a letter to the District Attorney of the Twenty-sixth Judicial District advising him that Mr. Franklin did wish to have an attorney and requesting that if such questioning was desired the Public Defender’s office be contacted. A copy of this letter was sent to the Chief of the Charlotte Police Department and the Chief of the Mecklenburg County Police Department.1
5. On October 9, 1981, the defendant was in custody in Mecklenburg County on charges arising there, and unrelated to the instant case or to the Smith and Ray cases. On that date Officer J. F. Styron of the Mecklenburg County Police *696Department, who had on occasions in March, 1981, talked with the defendant concerning the Smith and Ray cases, learned that the defendant was in custody and went to the jail to talk to him about them. Officer Styron knew that the defendant had been a suspect in the instant case, but his sole purpose in going to the jail was to talk to the defendant about the Smith and Ray cases. Officer Styron at the time did not have actual knowledge of the notice given by Mr. Yurko as to the Public Defender’s representation of the defendant in the Ray and Smith cases.
6 .At the Mecklenburg County jail Officer Styron advised the defendant that he wanted to talk to him about the Smith and Ray cases. He then orally advised the defendant that he had a right to remain silent; that anything he said could and would be used against him in court; that he had the right to talk to a lawyer and have him present while being questioned; that if he could not afford to hire a lawyer one would be appointed to represent him before any questioning if he wished one. After the warning the defendant stated that he understood these rights and that he was willing to talk to Officer Styron without an attorney. Thereafter the defendant talked to Officer Styron about the problems as a result of which he was then in custody, about prior sexual offenses for which he had served time in prison, and complained that he had never received any treatment for his problem. The defendant then asked Officer Styron to take him to the police offices. Officer Styron asked him if he wanted to talk about the cases, and the defendant replied that he did.
7. Later in the day the defendant was taken from the Mecklenburg County jail by Officer S. L. Price of the Mecklenburg Police Department to the Charlotte Law Enforcement Center. There Officer Price, in the presence of Officer Styron, in writing and orally advised the defendant that he had a right to remain silent and make no statements; that any statement he made could and would be used as evidence against him; that he had a right to have an attorney present to advise and counsel him at that time; that if he could not afford to hire an attorney one would be provided for him at no cost; that if at any time he should desire to stop making any statement or wish to contact an attorney he would be al*697lowed to do so at once. Officer Price read these rights to the defendant from a printed form, which the defendant followed. The defendant, in writing, stated that he did not wish to have an attorney present; that he was 23 years of age, had attained the 12th grade in school; that he had read the waiver, and having been informed verbally and in writing of his rights and understanding that he could exercise them at any time waived his rights and agreed to answer any questions asked.
8. Immediately after the execution of the waiver form Officer Price asked the defendant what he wanted to talk about. The defendant immediately began to talk about the killing of a girl named Michelle in Lenoir. He stated to the officers that he wanted to get it over with and did not want a lawyer.
9. The information given to Officers Price and Styron on this occasion was reduced to writing and signed by the defendant. [Emphasis added.]
Following his initial confession to the Mecklenburg County officers, defendant was questioned on the same day at the Charlotte law enforcement center by two officers from the Lenoir Police Department. Defendant was given his Miranda warnings by the Lenoir officers. Then the officers went over the statement defendant had given about the instant case to Officers Styron and Price, eliciting additional details about the incident. The next day, 10 October 1981, defendant was questioned by an SBI agent who had read the statement given by defendant to the Lenoir police officers and was accompanied during the interview by a Lenoir police officer. On 13 October defendant was brought to the Lenoir Police Department where he was interviewed by an assistant district attorney. The interview was recorded after defendant said he did not object. Finally, on 14 October defendant was taken to the Lenoir Mall by Lenoir police officers where he reenacted for videotaping the events to which he had confessed.
Thus, defendant, had, through his attorney,2 expressed in writing his desire to deal with police only through counsel in *698responding to any questioning about the Ray and Smith murders. The police, not defendant, initiated contact with him for the purpose of questioning him about the Smith and Ray cases. Officer Styron told defendant he wanted to discuss the Smith and Ray murders, then he informed him of his Miranda [v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)] rights. A general conversation was held about defendant’s problem with committing various sex offenses and the lack of treatment afforded him for his problem. Defendant then requested to be taken from jail to the police headquarters. Styron believed defendant was going to talk about the Smith and Ray cases, but after executing a waiver form at the police offices he began to talk about the killing of a girl named Michelle in Lenoir.
The majority states: “It is true that under Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 68 L.Ed. 2d 378 (1981), once a suspected criminal invokes his right to counsel, he may not be questioned further until counsel is provided unless the suspected criminal himself initiates the dialogue at which time he may waive his right to have an attorney present.” I agree with the majority’s interpretation of Edwards. The United States Supreme Court clearly stated:
(A)lthough we have held that after initially being advised of his Miranda rights, the accused may himself validly waive his rights and respond to interrogation, see North Carolina v. Butler [441 U.S. 369, 372-76 (1979) ], the Court has strongly indicated that additional safeguards are necessary when the accused asks for counsel; and we now hold that when an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights. We further hold that an accused, such as Edwards, having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made *699available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.
451 U.S. at 484-85 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). The holding in Edwards has subsequently been characterized by the Supreme Court as a “prophylactic rule” requiring “that before a suspect in custody can be subjected to further interrogation after he requests an attorney there must be a showing that the ‘suspect himself initiates dialogue with the authorities.’ ” Oregon v. Bradshaw, --- U.S. ---, 51 U.S.L.W. 4940 (U.S. June 23, 1983) (No. 81-1857) (quoting Wyrick v. Fields, — U.S. —, — (1982) (per curiam)).
Yet the majority, while recognizing the holding in Edwards, ignores it in its analysis of the instant case. It begs the question when it states “defendant had never invoked his right to counsel with respect to the Moody murder.” The majority states, “We do not decide whether Officers Styron and Price, in good faith, might properly have initiated questioning concerning the Ray and Smith murders in light of defendant’s earlier request that he have an attorney present during questioning on these cases . . . .”
But this is precisely the question which must be decided. The Edwards Court excluded the defendant’s confession to robbery, burglary and first degree murder because his statements were “the fruits” of an interrogation initiated by the police after he had “clearly asserted his right to counsel.” 451 U.S. at 485. In Miranda the Court had stated: “If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present. At that time, the individual must have an opportunity to confer with the attorney and to have him present during any subsequent questioning.” 384 U.S. at 474. The Court in Edwards built on the statement in Miranda that “interrogation must cease until an attorney is present,” in holding that defendant could not be reinterrogated once he had asserted his right to counsel. Thus, Edwards holds that it is impermissible for the police to initiate a meeting with a defendant to discuss a crime for which he has invoked his right to counsel unless counsel has been made available to him. If the police do initiate such a “meeting,” “interrogation,” “conversation” or “exchange,” then any statements which result from such an impermissible contact must be excluded.
The holding in Edwards compels the conclusion that Officers Styron and Price could not have properly initiated questioning *700about the Smith and Ray murders, as they did, in light of defendant’s express request that an attorney be present during any further questioning about those murders. Had defendant confessed to the Smith and Ray murders to the officers, his confession would have been inadmissible under Edwards. That defendant confessed to a murder other than the ones Styron, and later Price, had in mind does not alter the character of Styron’s initial contact. That contact was impermissible under Edwards.
In addition, defendant’s subsequent confessions to the Lenoir officers, the SBI agent, and the assistant district attorney were also inadmissible exploitations of his initial confession. When the Edwards Court used the phrase “the fruits of the interrogation,” it alluded to a principle most memorably set forth in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963). The Wong Sun Court excluded verbal statements made by defendant Toy immediately after an illegal entry and arrest by narcotics officers. Narcotics obtained from defendant Yee pursuant to Toy’s illegally-obtained statements were also excluded as “fruit of the poisonous tree” because the “taint” of the original illegal police action had not been purged. 371 U.S. at 487-88.
In the instant case the taint of the police-initiated interrogation3 was not removed by defendant’s being taken at his request from jail to police headquarters where he confessed not to the Smith and Ray murders but to the Moody murder. Defendant’s confession was in direct response to and the result of the contact impermissibly initiated by Styron at the jail and followed up by *701Price at police headquarters. It was not “completely unsolicited,” a characterization given it by the majority.
Furthermore, there is no “good faith” exception to the Edwards holding. The officers who questioned Edwards had no actual knowledge that he had invoked his right to counsel,4 just as Officer Styron had no actual knowledge in the instant case.
I do not reach the question of whether defendant’s right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment had been violated because I believe the confession must be excluded under Edwards and Miranda.
I also dissent from the majority’s conclusion that no error was committed in death qualifying the jury for the reasons stated in my dissent in State v. Avery, 299 N.C. 126, 261 S.E. 2d 803 (1980).
I concur in the majority’s treatment of the corpus delicti issue.

. In a cover letter sent to the Chief of the Charlotte Police Department Mr. Yurko requested that the officers investigating the Smith and Ray murders be given the information that defendant did not want to be questioned without an attorney present. Apparently this was not done since Officer Styron testified he had no actual knowledge of defendant’s invocation of his right to silence.

. Whether or not Mr. Yurko had the statutory authority to represent defendant to the limited extent he did in the Smith and Ray cases is not a relevant ques*698tion in the instant case. As the trial court stated at the suppression hearing, “The evidence is uncontradicted in writing the Police had been notified, whatever the legalities of the appointment, that the defendant invoked his right to remain silent with regard to the Ray and Smith cases, and no interrogation as to those matters were to be carried on by any law enforcement agency in Mecklenburg without the presence of defendant’s counsel.”

. In both Miranda v. Arizona, supra 384 U.S. at 450, and Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 299 (1980), the Supreme Court has recognized that “interrogation” does not mean only “express questioning." Rather, “techniques of persuasion” such as blaming society for the defendant’s behavior amount to interrogation when employed “in a custodial setting.” The test enunciated in Innis for determining whether interrogation has occurred is whether the words or actions of the police are such that “the police should know [they] are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect." 446 U.S. at 301 (footnotes omitted). In the instant case Officer Styron told defendant while defendant was in jail that he wanted to talk about the Smith and Ray cases, read defendant his rights, and then discussed with him defendant’s psychological problems and the failure of the prison system to provide him with treatment for the problem. Officer Styron also testified he could tell defendant was depressed throughout the time he gave the statement and periodically would become very emotional. Thus, it is difficult to characterize Styron's initial conversation with defendant as anything other than an interrogation.

. It is unclear frm the United States Supreme Court opinion whether the interrogating officers knew of Edwards’ previous assertion of his right to counsel. However, the Court expressly stated that it primarily relied upon the statement of facts set forth in the Arizona Supreme Court’s opinion in developing its own statement of the facts. 451 U.S. at 478, n. 1. In the state court’s opinion it is clear that the officers had no actual knowledge Edwards had requested an attorney. 122 Ariz. 206, 209, 594 P. 2d 72, 75 (1979).