Court Opinion

ID: 9574713
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:07:29.449035+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:44:52.174144
License: Public Domain

Eldridge, Judge,
concurring specially in judgment only.
I concur in judgment only.
In Brown v. State, Case No. A97A1851, decided March 20, 1998 (transferred to the Supreme Court of Georgia, Case No. S98A0981), the majority articulated its “furtive movements doctrine” as justifying the search of a one-inch piece of paper under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (88 SC 1868, 20 LE2d 889) (1968), for “safety” reasons. Here, the majority again expands the standard for a Terry-stop protective search when the majority states: “When a minimally intrusive pat-down evolves to an intrusive search, the question is whether in all the circumstances a suspicion that the detained suspect is armed would be reasonable.” (Emphasis supplied.) This is not the law.
Terry v. Ohio permits a limited protective pat-down for weapons, *28after “reasonable suspicions” that a crime has been committed justify the stop. The majority opinion juxtaposes the standard and finds that the “reasonable suspicions” go to the protective search, rather than the justification for the stop. However, the search — pursuant to the stop — is strictly limited and “reasonable suspicions” cannot expand it beyond its basic limitations of a general, protective search, as has been suggested by the majority herein.
Decided March 10, 1998
Reconsideration denied April 3, 1998.
Christopher A. Frazier, Stephen G. Scarlett, for appellants.
Stephen D. Kelley, District Attorney, George C. Turner, Jr., Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
A “protective search — permitted without . . . probable cause . . . must be strictly limited to that which is necessary for the discovery of weapons. ... If the protective search goes beyond what is necessary to determine if the suspect is armed, it is no longer valid under Terry and its fruits will be suppressed.” (Citations omitted.) Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U. S. 366, 373 (113 SC 2130, 124 LE2d 334) (1993).
Accordingly, in my view, a minimally intrusive protective pat-down under Terry may not “evolve into an intrusive search” without probable cause. And, in fact, such expansion of Terry is not necessary for the disposition of this case.
Here, the officers discovered the contraband pursuant to a legitimate Terry protective search of Montoya’s jacket, which the videotape shows was bulging out in front so far that it could have been concealing a bomb. The bulge was “hard”; Montoya would not identify it; he guarded it with his arms; and he would not remove his hands from near it when asked to do so. There was no way in which the officers could determine if Montoya had a weapon concealed in his jacket until it was unzipped and the “bulge” revealed. Then, once the hard, brown paper-wrapped bricks concealed in Montoya’s jacket were in plain view, the officers knew that they contained contraband, as demonstrated by testimony and the videotape together. Under the factual circumstances of this case, the trial court’s denial of appellants’ motions to suppress was not clearly erroneous.