Court Opinion

ID: 9581362
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:14:09.070892+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:53.510748
License: Public Domain

Benham, Judge,
dissenting.
1. I am unable to agree with the majority ruling that ITT is not responsible for the medical expenses sought by the appellee because he made no effort to select from a panel of physicians provided by the employer in accordance with OCGA § 39-9-201. There was no evidence of record to show that such a list was posted in a prominent place or that ITT complied with the other requirements of OCGA § 34-9-201 (b). Compare Dairymen, Inc. v. Wood, 162 Ga. App. 430 (4) (291 SE2d 763) (1982). “[I]f the employer does not adequately meet *537the duty of providing treatment the employee may make other arrangements and once treatment by a physician is undertaken an employer may not change positions and cut off the right to continue such treatment. [Cit.]” Boaz v. K-Mart Corp., 254 Ga. 707, 710 (334 SE2d 167) (1985).
Moreover, if an emergency or “other similarly justifiable reason” exists, under OCGA § 34-9-201 (c) the selection requirements are not applicable. The evidence was undisputed that appellee was advised to “see a doctor” by his supervisor when his worsening condition became apparent, that he did so and was treated. After the ALJ awarded medical benefits for such treatment, appellants complained for the first time on their appeals to the board and the superior court that the ALJ had not considered “the entire issue of whether [appellee’s doctor’s] medical treatment was authorized.” However, at no time did appellants submit any evidence to show how or why appellee’s choice of a doctor or his treatment was not authorized, either before or after the finding of the ALJ that appellee was entitled to an award of his medical expenses, arguing on appeal only that it was not. Appellants’ notice to controvert was based solely upon the alleged noncompensability of his injury.
While the majority states that appellee “made no effort to select from the panel of physicians,” it could also be said in the absence of any evidence to the contrary that ITT made no effort to adequately meet its duty of providing treatment. In my view, the burden should be placed upon the employer to show that it complied with the requirements of OCGA § 34-9-201 before it can assert the employee’s noncompliance as a defense to the claim. See generally Firestone Tire &c. Co. v. Crawford, 177 Ga. App. 242 (3) (339 SE2d 292) (1985); Cornell-Young v. Minter, 168 Ga. App. 325 (309 SE2d 159) (1983). Such a construction is necessary to effectuate the humane purposes for which the Workers’ Compensation Act was enacted. Cf. Schwartz v. Greenbaum, 236 Ga. 476 (1) (224 SE2d 38) (1976); Wilson v. Manville Bldg. Materials Prods., 179 Ga. App. 408, 410 (346 SE2d 851) (1986). Thus I must dissent from the holding in Division 2 of the majority opinion.
2. The ALJ found that appellee was employed on February 11, 1984, and that, shortly thereafter, appellee noticed that his feet were swelling and getting worse; that the supervisor noticed appellee was limping and the limping was happening more frequently; that appellee told the supervisor that prolonged standing on concrete caused his feet to swell and he had to have surgery on June 9, 1984; that appellee returned to work on September 8, 1984, was given the job of dough mixing and performed normal duty work; that appellee was discharged on March 24, 1985, and presently has foot problems and is unable to perform any job that requires bending or squatting. After *538reviewing the reports of appellee’s treating physician and the doctor employed by appellants for an independent medical evaluation, the ALJ concluded that appellee had sustained a compensable injury on June 9, 1984, at which time he became totally disabled. He further found that appellee underwent a change for the better when he returned to work after the foot surgery, but then incurred a change in condition from ability to work to total disability as of March 24, 1985, at which time he was discharged, and still suffered from the residual effects of his surgery. The full board reviewed the claim, adopted the ALJ’s findings of fact and conclusions of law, and made his award the award of the board. The superior court found evidence to support the findings and conclusions, and affirmed the award of the board.
Review of the record before this court on appeal convinces me that there was sufficient evidence to support the award of income benefits. “The issue on appeal to the superior court is whether there is any evidence to authorize a finding in accordance with the contentions of the prevailing party before the Full Board. The rule is that the decision of the trier of fact will not be set aside on appeal if there is any evidence to support the finding. The Full Board’s findings of fact are not to be set aside because the reviewing court disagrees with the conclusions drawn therefrom. When using the any evidence criteria, the facts are to be construed in a light most favorable to the party prevailing before the board. Reviewing courts do not consider the weight of evidence. [Cit.] With the foregoing standards of appellate review in mind, we turn to the facts of this case. The issue is simply whether or not there is any evidence to support the finding of the ALJ and the board that the claimant is incapable of doing whatever bending or stooping is required by the lighter duty job .... Holloway v. Lo-Temp, 180 Ga. App. 513, 514 (349 SE2d 534) (1986). Although [appellants] presented medical evidence to the contrary, we find sufficient record evidence to support the Full Board’s award in claimant's favor. [Cits.] Questions as to credibility and preponderance address themselves to the trier of facts. On appeal, the appellate tribunal does not determine the credibility of witnesses or the preponderance of the evidence. The appellate tribunal utilizes the any evidence test, a test not available to the trier of facts in deciding disputed factual issues. This court and the superior court are bound by the findings of the Board supported by any evidence. [Cit.]” Id. at 515. Accord Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth. v. Hadley, 174 Ga. App. 503 (1) (330 SE2d 432) (1985); Walton County Bd. of Commissioners v. Williams, 171 Ga. App. 779 (320 SE2d 846) (1984). I therefore also disagree with the ruling of the majority in Division 3, that there was no evidence to support the finding of the board that appellee’s inability to find suitable employment was caused by his injury. Accordingly, I also respectfully dissent from Division 3.
*539Decided March 20, 1987
Rehearing denied April 3, 1987
Daniel C. Kniffen, for appellants.
John M. Strain, for appellee.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Banke and Presiding Judge McMurray join in this dissent. Judge Carley joins in this dissent as to Division 3 of the majority opinion.