Court Opinion

ID: 9777653
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 20:18:14.210555+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:58.379310
License: Public Domain

OSBORNE, Judge
(concurring).
I concur in the majority opinion and especially do I look favorably upon that portion of the opinion which permits a plaintiff to join the insurance company with the defendant and to disclose to the jury the fact that there is insurance and the extent of coverage. I have felt for some time that our policy in this state of not permitting insurance to be mentioned in actions where there is liability coverage does more harm than good. The Supreme Court of Florida in Shingleton v. Bussey, Fla., 223 So.2d 713 (1969), has recently faced up to this situation and reversed all of its previous cases holding as we have been. It is my opinion that the policy should be viewed as one vesting in the injured third party a direct cause of action and the clause in most policies which prohibits action against the insurer until judgment is first obtained against the insured is against public policy. In facing up to this proposition the Supreme Court of Florida stated:
“Admittedly, a contract of insurance can be entered into which imposes certain reasonable conditions or limitations on the responsibility of the insurer to pay out the proceeds or benefits contemplated by the contract. But such conditions cannot unreasonably burden or curtail the otherwise actionable right of a third party beneficiary to sue jointly the parties charged with liability, viz., the tort-feasor and the insurer of the tort-feasor. The insurer is, of course, not a joint tort-feasor. The unfettered right of a plaintiff to sue defendants jointly is so universal and essential to due process that it can rarely be curtailed or restricted by private contract between potential defendants. An insurer is free not to enter into a liability policy with an insured, but if it does so it cannot unreasonably circumscribe its potential liability under the contract by stipulating therein restraints upon the right of the third party beneficiary to sue directly an insurer contingently or secondarily liable and to join the insurer as a defendant in the action to determine the liability of the insured.
“Such a view is particularly warranted where as in the present case the injured party plaintiff is a nonconsenting party to the contract and derives standing as a third party beneficiary entitled to sue in a direct joint action to recover the benefits of the policy by virtue of operation of law.
“The insured may agree to conditions vis-a-vis the insurer to waive his own constitutional rights and curtail or postpone his remedies under the policy, but it is a contradiction of public policy to contract for liability coverage for members of the public and simultaneously deny a beneficiary thereunder the ordinary rights of a litigant to sue for such coverage through the restraint of a ‘no join-der’ clause. It is an anomaly in the law and discriminatory for the parties to a contract to attempt to deny nonconsent-ing members of the public a full, complete, adequate remedy at law which is constitutionally guaranteed all citizens.”
There is no other instance in the law of which I have knowledge that permits the real party in interest to an action to remain anonymous. For the life of me, I cannot see why this right should be accorded insurance companies. I believe the time is at hand when we should lay the interests of all parties on the board for the jury to see and consider. As was pointed out in the Shingleton case, supra, this “ostrich head in the sand” approach to the problem *565which we have been following does more mischief by misleading juries than it does good. I would extend the rule today adopted in this case for noninsured motorist policies to all indemnity policies.