Court Opinion

ID: 9954081
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-25 18:01:10.271293+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:11:50.317775
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     LEATRICE FORD LANE,                             DOCKET NUMBER
                  Appellant,                         DC-0752-18-0760-I-3

                  v.

     COURT SERVICES AND OFFENDER                     DATE: March 22, 2024
       SUPERVISION AGENCY FOR DC,
                  Agency.

               THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Sheila S Iverson , Mount Rainier, Maryland, for the appellant.

           Julia Martin and Marvelle Butler , Washington, D.C., for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                                Cathy A. Harris, Chairman
                             Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman

                                     REMAND ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     dismissed her removal appeal as untimely refiled.         For the reasons discussed
     below, we GRANT the appellant’s petition for review, REVERSE the initial
     decision, WAIVE the refiling deadline, and REMAND the case to the regional
     office for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                      2

                                    BACKGROUND
¶2        The appellant was a GL-07 Offender Processing Assistant for the agency.
     Lane v. Court Services and Offender Supervision Agency for D.C. , MSPB Docket
     No. DC-0752-18-0760-I-1, Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 5 at 79.       Effective
     July 18, 2018, the agency removed her under 5 U.S.C. chapter 75. Id. at 79-88,
     92-99. On August 17, 2018, the appellant filed a timely Board appeal of her
     removal. IAF, Tab 1. Prior to the close of the record, the appellant submitted
     medical documentation, indicating that she was suffering from numerous
     psychological problems and had to undergo surgery for a brain aneurysm. IAF,
     Tab 13.   The administrative judge contacted the appellant, who agreed to a
     dismissal without prejudice. IAF, Tab 15 at 2. The agency had no objection. Id.
     at 2 n.*. Accordingly, on November 16, 2018, the administrative judge issued an
     initial decision dismissing the appeal without prejudice to refiling within
     120 days. Id. at 1-3.
¶3        On February 20, 2019, the appellant sent the administrative judge an
     ambiguous email about her case.        Lane v. Court Services and Offender
     Supervision Agency for D.C., MSPB Docket No. DC-0752-18-0760-I-2, Appeal
     File (I-2 AF), Tabs 1-2.     A Board paralegal contacted the appellant, who
     confirmed that she intended to refile her appeal.    I-2 AF, Tab 2 at 1 n.1*.
     However, the appellant requested that her appeal be dismissed without prejudice
     for an additional 120 days, and on February 27, 2019, the administrative judge
     granted the appellant’s motion.   I-2 AF, Tab 3; Lane v. Court Services and
     Offender Supervision Agency for D.C., MSPB Docket No. DC-0752-18-0760-I-3,
     Appeal File (I-3 AF), Tab 2 at 2. The new refiling deadline was June 27, 2019.
¶4        On August 9, 2019, the appellant sent the administrative judge another
     email, stating as follows:
                                                                                       3

                 My apologies for missing deadline to request reopening of my
           appeal in the above matter.
                 I have been recovering from brain surgery to remove an
           aneurysm, while, battling depression and anxiety. I was recently
           hospitalized and released from [the] hospital on Tuesday, August 6[,]
           2019. I am requesting reopening appeal in the above matter.
     I-3 AF, Tab 1. The administrative judge issued a show cause order, informing the
     appellant that her refiled appeal was untimely. He notified her of the standard for
     showing good cause for an untimely refiling and directed her to submit evidence
     and argument on the issue. I-3 AF, Tab 2 at 1-3. After both parties responded to
     the order, I-3 AF, Tabs 3, 5, the administrative judge dismissed the appeal as
     untimely refiled without good cause shown for the delay, I-3 AF, Tab 6, Initial
     Decision (ID).    He considered various factors weighing both in favor of and
     against waiving the refiling deadline, and he determined that dismissal was
     appropriate under the totality of the circumstances. ID at 7-18.
¶5         The appellant has filed a petition for review, disputing the administrative
     judge’s good cause analysis and several of his underlying findings of fact.
     Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1. The agency has filed a response. PFR
     File, Tab 3.

                                         ANALYSIS
¶6         As stated above, the refiling deadline was June 27, 2019, and the appellant
     did not refile her appeal until August 9, 2019, forty-four days late. Supra ¶¶ 3-4.
     These facts are undisputed.     Therefore, the only issue is whether the refiling
     deadline should be waived. The Board has held that dismissals without prejudice
     should not become a trap to deny an appellant the opportunity to have her case
     decided on the merits. Jaramillo v. Department of the Air Force, 106 M.S.P.R.
     244, ¶ 6 (2007). The Board has also found that an appellant should not be denied
     the opportunity to have her appeal heard on the merits when her intention to refile
     a Board appeal has been clear throughout the proceedings and the appeal was
     initially timely filed.   Shenwick v. Department of State, 90 M.S.P.R. 192, ¶ 9
                                                                                             4

     (2001).       Accordingly, it has identified specific standards applicable to
     determining whether good cause exists for excusing an untimely refiled appeal of
     a matter previously dismissed without prejudice. These include the following: the
     appellant’s pro se status; the timeliness of the initial appeal; the appellant’s
     demonstrated intent throughout the proceedings to refile the appeal; the length of
     the delay in refiling; confusion surrounding and arbitrariness of the refiling
     deadline; the number of prior dismissals without prejudice; the agency’s failure to
     object to the dismissal without prejudice; and the lack of prejudice to the agency
     in allowing the refiled appeal. Sherman v. U.S. Postal Service, 118 M.S.P.R. 265,
     ¶ 9 (2012).
¶7         In this case, the administrative judge found that the appellant was acting pro
     se for the majority of the proceedings, but that this factor was not particularly
     compelling “given the explicit and unambiguous clarity of notice” in his oral and
     written refiling instructions. ID at 8. The administrative judge considered the
     appellant’s contention that she believed that the 120-day refiling period began on
     the finality date of the initial decision, but he declined to credit this explanation
     because it was inconsistent with the plain language of the refiling instructions and
     she had previously demonstrated her ability to refile on time.            ID at 9.   The
     administrative judge considered that there were only two dismissals without
     prejudice in this case and that the appellant demonstrated her intent to pursue her
     appeal, but he found that these factors weighed only minimally in her favor, given
     her repeated failure to follow his orders in the initial appeal phase. 2 ID at 9-10.
     The administrative judge further considered that the length of the filing delay
     weighed against waiving the deadline and that the agency would suffer at least
     minimal prejudice if the filing deadline were waived. ID at 10-11. He considered
     that the agency had consented to the dismissals, but he found that this fact was
     not particularly significant under the circumstances of the case.              ID at 10.
     2
       The appellant’s failure to follow the administrative judge’s orders resulted in an order
     to show cause why the administrative judge should not impose sanctions, including
     dismissal. IAF, Tab 10.
                                                                                       5

     Finally, the administrative judge considered the appellant’s explanation for the
     filing delay, i.e., that she was suffering from health conditions that interfered
     with the timely refiling. However, he found that the appellant failed to provide
     sufficient medical documentation to substantiate her claims, and that she failed to
     establish a causal connection between these conditions and her ability to refile on
     time. ID at 11-12.
¶8        Considering the record as a whole, we find it appropriate to waive the filing
     deadline. The appellant filed her initial appeal on time, and notwithstanding the
     two dismissals without prejudice, at no point in these proceedings has the
     appellant indicated an intention to abandon her appeal. As for the reason that the
     appellant missed the filing deadline, we agree with the administrative judge that
     she did not submit medical evidence of incapacitation during the relevant time
     period. ID at 11-12. However, the record is sufficient to show that the appellant
     was suffering from health conditions that required intensive treatment and likely
     interfered with her ability to conduct her business, at least to some degree. I-3
     AF, Tab 3.     We also agree with the administrative judge that the dismissal
     without prejudice set forth a clear deadline for refiling, and despite the
     appellant’s arguments on review, it does not appear that she missed that deadline
     because of a miscalculation. 3   PFR File, Tab 1 at 11-14; I-2 AF, Tab 3 at 3.
     Nevertheless, we find that the appellant’s pro se status contributed to her
     untimely refiling to the extent that there was nobody to help her monitor the
     deadline.    In any event, regardless of whether the appellant exercised due
     diligence in refiling her appeal, the Board has occasionally dispensed with the
     due diligence requirement for untimely refilings when, as here, other factors
     favoring a waiver are present.    See, e.g., Jaramillo v. Department of the Air
     Force, 106 M.S.P.R. 244, ¶¶ 5-6, 8 (2007); Hodges v. Office of Personnel

     3
       In particular, the appellant has not explained exactly what mistake she made in
     calculating the deadline, and she has not identified the date that she believed the
     deadline to be.
                                                                                          6

      Management, 101 M.S.P.R. 212, ¶¶ 10-11 (2006); Shenwick v. Department of
      State, 90 M.S.P.R. 192, ¶¶ 8, 11 (2001).
¶9         Finally, although a 44-day filing delay is significant, we disagree with the
      administrative judge that the agency would be prejudiced by a waiver of the
      refiling deadline. ID at 10-11. The administrative judge found that the agency
      would be prejudiced by a waiver of the deadline because the “10-month delay on
      processing time will undoubtedly create some additional work for the agency as it
      relates to preparing and updating its closing submissions,” and the agency would
      suffer an inherent prejudice if he failed to enforce his own orders and the Board’s
      regulations requiring a demonstration of good cause to support a waiver of filing
      deadlines. Id. However, the creation of additional litigation work for agency
      counsel is not the same thing as prejudice to the agency’s substantive rights, i.e.,
      prejudice affecting its ability to prevail on the merits. Moreover, the additional
      work of preparing and updating submissions would have been required even if the
      appellant had refiled on time. We also do not think that an administrative judge’s
      “failure to enforce” a refiling deadline is inherently prejudicial.      Otherwise,
      prejudice would be inherent in any deadline waiver.
¶10        Notwithstanding our decision on this petition for review, we agree with the
      administrative judge that the appellant’s untimely refiling is not the first time she
      has failed to comply with his orders. ID at 9; IAF, Tab 10. We remind the
      appellant that she is required to comply with the orders of the administrative
      judge, and that her failure to do so in the future may result in sanctions, up to and
      including dismissal of her appeal.    See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.43. A party to Board
      proceedings ignores the administrative judge’s orders at her own peril. See White
      v. Social Security Administration, 76 M.S.P.R. 303, 307 (1997), aff’d, 152 F.3d
      948 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
                                                                                     7

                                          ORDER
¶11        For the reasons discussed above, we remand this case to the regional office
      for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

      FOR THE BOARD:                       ______________________________
                                           Gina K. Grippando
                                           Clerk of the Board
      Washington, D.C.