Court Opinion

ID: 9457608
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 20:27:27.763068+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:35:25.583041
License: Public Domain

COLEMAN, Circuit Judge:
On or about October 25, 1969, the appellant, John Thomas Flower, Peace Education Secretary of the American Friends Service Committee for Texas, Oklahoma, and Arkansas, received a properly prepared and executed order of debarment (Appendix “A”) from the Deputy Commander of Fort Sam Houston located in San Antonio, Texas. In the order Flower was told that his re-entry upon said reservation would result in his arrest and prosecution under the provisions of 18 U.S.C., § 1382 (Appendix *82“B”). This order was issued because information had been received at headquarters that on or about October 22, 1969, the appellant had participated in an attempt to distribute an unauthorized publication contrary to Fort Sam Houston Regulation 210-6 dated June 12, 1969 (Appendix “C”). This regulation governed the distribution and dissemination of publications on Fort Sam Houston and was promulgated under the authority of Army Regulation 210-10 issued by the Secretary of the Army pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 3012(b) (1) (Appendix “D”).
On December 11,1969, the appellant reentered Fort Sam Houston in defiance of the order dated October 24, 1969. At the time of his arrest he was in the vicinity of the post library distributing leaflets advertising a “Town Meeting on the Vietnam War” which was to be held at Trinity University.
He was charged with the violation of 18 U.S.C., § 1382 and adjudged guilty of the same in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. Flower appeals from the decision of that Court and asks that both Fort Sam Houston Regulation 210-6 and 18 U.S.C., § 1382 be declared unconstitutional because they violate the First and Fifth Amendments. He, in short, claims that both his re-entry and prior conduct of October 22, 1969, are protected by the First Amendment and that both the statute and regulation are constitutionally defective in light of the First and Fifth Amendments.
Under the explicit authority of the regulation and in light of the historically unquestioned power of a commanding officer to summarily exclude civilians from the area of his command, there can remain no serious doubt of his authority to do so. Such summary exclusion has also been held not to violate the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers, etc. v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 81 S.Ct. 1743, 6 L.Ed.2d 1230 (1961); United States v. Jelinski, 5 Cir., 1969, 411 F.2d 476; Government of Canal Zone v. Brooks, 5 Cir., 1970, 427 F.2d 346.
However, as stated, appellant claims that his re-entry and conduct in violation of Fort Sam Houston Regulation 210-6 previous to his re-entry are protected by the First Amendment. The violation of this regulation was the basis of the debarment order of October 24, 1969. For his conduct to be immune from prosecution either the statute or the regulation must be declared unconstitutional.
To acquiesce in appellant’s claim that both the statute and the regulation are unconstitutional we would have to accept his contention that there is no difference between public streets, public roads, towns, shopping centers, and public parks on one hand and military reservations under the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government on the other. We would have to agree all are one and the same and that the exercise of First Amendment rights at all of these places is governed by the same standards. This we cannot do.
From the decisions which have construed the First Amendment certain principles clearly emerge.
The rights of free speech and assembly are fundamental in our democratic society but they do not mean that everyone who has opinions or beliefs to express may, at his option only, address a group at any public place, at any time. Even where municipal or state property is open to the public generally, the exercise of First Amendment rights may be regulated so as to prevent interference with the use to which the property is ordinarly put, Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 85 S.Ct. 453, 13 L.Ed.2d 471 (1964); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 85 S.Ct. 466, 476, 13 L.Ed.2d 487 (1964); Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 88 S.Ct. 1335, 20 L.Ed.2d 182 (1967).
The Supreme Court in Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 87 S.Ct. 242, 17 L.Ed.2d 149 (1966), held that the arrest of 107 demonstrators on county jail premises did not violate their First Amendment rights. Mr. Justice Black, writing for the majority, stated that “The state, no less than a private owner *83of property, has power to preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated”. (At page 47, 87 S.Ct. at page 247). He also said that the concept of constitutional law which says that people who want to exercise First Amendment rights have a constitutional right to do so whenever, however, and wherever they please had been rejected in Cox v. Louisiana, supra, and was again being rejected. Furthermore, it was stated that the United States Constitution does not forbid a state to control the use of its own property for its own lawful nondiscriminatory purposes. Quite obviously, this would apply to the federal government and to its military installations.
Fort Sam Houston was lawfully dedicated and designed to be used as a training base for the preparation of soldiers of the United States. The regulations which were promulgated by the commanding officer of Fort Sam Houston were designed to insure that the use for which the reservation had been dedicated and designed could and would be maintained. At entrances, signs disclosed the nature and name of the installation. The area is an important part of the armed forces of our Country. Soldiers based there continually undergo training, and participate in programs supporting the national defense of the United States.
To say that a military base is like the company town in Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 66 S.Ct. 276, 90 L.Ed. 265 (1945), a city as in Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 89 S.Ct. 935, 22 L.Ed.2d 162 (1968), a shopping center as in Amalgamated Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 88 S.Ct. 1601, 20 L.Ed.2d 603 (1967), state capitol grounds as in Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 83 S.Ct. 680, 9 L.Ed.2d 697 (1962), a bus terminal in Wolin v. Port of New York Authority, 2 Cir., 1968, 392 F.2d 83, or the World’s Fair Grounds as in Farmer v. Moses, 232 F.Supp. 154 (S.D., New York, 1964) would ignore the indisputable fact that military bases do not extend a general and open invitation to the public to use their facilities. A military base simply cannot be said to be dedicated to general use by the public at large.
Traditionally, towns, shopping centers, parks, and the like, have been open to the public. Historically, they are associated with the right of assembly and opportunities for the communication of thought which are common to public questions. There is no room for an argument that military bases have existed in like fashion.
To argue that Fort Sam Houston is “open” to the public is to disregard the fact that all forms of activity by civilians on a military base are permitted as a matter of license and never as a matter of right. Civilians who work, or visit, or enter there do so because of a privilege afforded them by the United States Army. That privilege, like any other grant, is subject to revocation or denial. It has long been recognized that military personnel, and others who enter upon a military reservation, surrender some of their individual rights so that military discipline and security may remain inviolate, United States v. Miller, 261 F.Supp. 442 (D.Del., 1966).
Admitting that a military reservation has some aspects of public property it is also true, as Justice White said in his dissent in Amalgamated Food Employees, supra, that “some property is available for some uses and not for others ; some public property is neither designed nor dedicated for use by pickets or for other communicative activities”. (391 U.S. at page 338, 88 S.Ct. at page 1619). This would certainly seem to be the import of the Cox, Adderley, and Cameron eases.
Appellant’s contention that his reentry was constitutionally protected is based primarily on three cases. In United States v. Bradley, 4 Cir., 1969, 418 F.2d 688, two students, who had been arrested while distributing leaflets on Fort Bragg, were convicted of violating 18 U.S.C., § 1382 because their presence was seemingly prohibited by a lawful post regulation. The Post Regulation *8427-1, which they were accused of violating, prohibited picketing, demonstrations, sit-ins, protest marches and political speeches but made no reference to prohibiting handbilling. Their conviction was reversed because the applicable regulation did not prohibit the activities which were the basis for the prosecution. Here, appellant’s re-entry onto Fort Sam Houston was prohibited by an appropriate order of debarment. Furthermore, there can be no question that Post Regulation 210-6 prohibited appellant’s unauthorized distribution of literature on October 22, 1969 and on December 11, 1969.
Appellant also relies on Kiiskila v. Nichols, 7 Cir., 1970, 433 F.2d 745. Carolyn Kiiskila, a civilian employee of a credit union of Fort Sheridan, was excluded from the base because she had distributed anti-war literature near a naval base. In holding her exclusion unconstitutional, because it denied her the freedom of speech and association, the court emphasized that Kiiskila had not violated an applicable post regulation and also noted that. she had not distributed literature on Fort Sheridan. The court said that “never in the past has plaintiff distributed literature on Fort Sheridan or any other military base and the record is devoid of statements by Kiiskila or others in the Veterans for Peace indicating an intent to do so in the future”. It thus appears that the court may have reached a different result if Kiiskila had been arrested for distributing literature on base in violation of an applicable post regulation. Appellant’s reliance on this case is therefore of no help to his contentions.
Appellant also cites United States v. Watson, 80 F.Supp. 649 (E.D., Va., 1948), as support for his contention that although Fort Sam Houston had been conveyed to the United States government for military purposes, the inference that the taking for such purposes dissolved all the right of users theretofore held by the public or by persons having a special interest therein was not justified. In Watson the defendant was found guilty of recklessly driving an automobile on a road on Quantieo Marine Corps Reservation which was the only thoroughfare connecting the town of Quantieo with the remainder of the state of Virginia. However, he was found not guilty of violating 18 U.S.C., § 1382, reentering a military reservation after being warned not to do so. It is important to note that this highway existed before the taking by the government and that in Watson the defendant was forced by necessity to use the highway in order to go to and from Quantieo. Appellant Flower shows us no such similar need for his activities on the base.
There is no similar showing, as there was in Watson, that the United States acquired the land subject to any rights of the appellant or that anything but exclusive use was contemplated by the parties when the land was conveyed. In the deed of conveyance there is no mention of “other public uses”. Exclusive jurisdiction is ceded to the United States over the particular tract of land “to hold, use, occupy, own, possess, and exercise said jurisdiction over the same as long as the same remains the property of the United States. * * * ”
That appellant’s re-entry was not protected by the First Amendment is supported by Holdridge v. United States, 8 Cir., 1960, 282 F.2d 302. In Holdridge three young men were convicted of violating 18 U.S.C., § 1382 because they had re-entered Mead Ordnance Depot after having been removed therefrom and ordered not to re-enter. The Court of Appeals, Blackmun, Circuit Judge, affirmed the conviction and held that the prosecution of the defendants for violating the statute prohibiting re-entry onto the military reservation (after having been removed therefrom and ordered not to re-enter) did not violate guarantees of freedom of religion, speech and assembly, notwithstanding that their reentries were motivated by religious beliefs with respect to the immorality of war. Judge Blackmun stated:
“The defense suggests the Constitution’s guarantees of freedom of re*85ligion, speech and assembly. While these are fundamental rights, it is well settled that they are not absolute in all their aspects. * * * Moreover, the doing of an act motivated by religious belief or thought to be a proper exercise of free speech does not necessarily preclude criminal liability.” * * * (282 F.2d at 311).
Flower’s attempted analogy between various public places and a military base is not in step with reality. As has been repeatedly stated, the First Amendment is not an absolute. When First Amendment freedoms are sought to be regulated we must weigh the circumstances and appraise the reasons in support of such regulations. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 60 S.Ct. 146, 84 L.Ed. 155 (1939). We hold that both the circumstances and the reasons in support of the regulation at Fort Sam Houston pass Constitutional muster.
To manage the internal operation of an important part of the national military establishment, and in its proprietary military capacity, the federal government, throughout history, has exercised unfettered control over areas dedicated to military purposes. Military regulations must be considered in the light of military necessity, must be geared to meet important and imperative needs of mobilization and national vigilance. There is no time for litigious interruption. Therefore, wide discretion exists in the executive department in both the formation and the application of necessary regulations as well as in their interpretation as what constitutes “for the good of the service”. Noyd v. McNamara, 10 Cir., 1967, 378 F.2d 538.
Stationed at Fort Sam Houston are units continually and continuously undergoing training and participating in programs for the national defense. The installation commander has a duty to maintain order and discipline among his personnel. In pursuance of this duty he would be expected to monitor the literature available "to military personnel on the base. He must be aware of the contents of materials which are to be distributed outside of regularly established and approved channels and to determine if such materials interfere with the purposes of the reservation. Fort Sam Houston Regulation 210-6 is, we think, a highly reasonable method of maintaining discipline and morale on the base. It is a justifiable means of accomplishing these purposes.
Appellant claims that the statute and regulation constitute a prior restraint on speech in violation of the First Amendment. Prior restraint is not per se unconstitutional under all circumstances. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 85 S.Ct. 734, 13 L.Ed.2d 649 (1946); Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 81 S.Ct. 391, 5 L.Ed.2d 403 (1960). The prior permission requirement here in issue is necessary in order to allow the installation commander to carry out his assigned duty and is not unreasonable in that regard. Moreover, the on base distribution of materials through unauthorized distribution outlets could wrongfully imply that their contents had been approved and were an expression of Army policy.
For reasons stated in preceding paragraphs, and at the same time realizing the purpose of a military installation and the function of a base commander, we hold that this case established no unjustifiable prior restraint in violation of the First Amendment. We detect only a reasonable regulation promulgated in pursuance of an essential objective. It must be remembered that the capacity for, or extent of, evil may justify a prior restraint on First Amendment rights. Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, supra.
Appellant charges that the regulation and the statute are vague and uncertain, contravening the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. Appellant refuses to acknowledge the basic nature of a military installation and the function of a base commander. The power of a military commandant over the reservation he commands, although not that of a czar or a dictator, is necessarily *86extensive. This regulation places much discretion in the base commander, but who in a military situation could better determine what is necessary for the discipline, loyalty, the morale of the military personnel on the base, the maintenance of the military mission and the safeguarding of military personnel?
Appellant points to Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, supra, which held that a Birmingham parade ordinance which gave the City Commission extensive authority to issue parade permits on the basis of broad criteria entirely unrelated to the legitimate regulation of the public streets and sidewalks was unconstitutional on its face because of its over-breadth and vagueness. Birmingham is not Fort Sam Houston. The criteria which govern the base commander’s decision are entirely related to the legitimate regulation and function of an army base.
The terms of the regulation are clear. It plainly points out that one seeking to distribute materials on base must first seek approval before doing so. The punishment given to those who disobey the regulation is also clearly set out.
Neither is there anything vague or uncertain about 18 U.S.C., § 1382. It points out that one who is ordered not to re-enter a military reservation and is found there after re-entry may be arrested and imprisoned. It is aimed at conduct of a limited kind. There is no lack of notice in the statute, nothing to trap or to fool the unwary. In its terms it is clear and concise.. Appellant does not deny that he had notice of the statute. Yet, he chose to disobey it.
The record does not show that the regulation in question has been administered otherwise than in a fair and non-discriminatory manner. All who wish to distribute publications on Fort Sam Houston through other than regularly established and approved channels must go through the same procedure set out in Post Regulation 210-6. There has been no showing that any person submitting materials for approval has been unwarrantedly discriminated against. There has been no showing of any arbitrary and discriminatory denials of requests. Therefore, in view of these facts, we cannot say that there has been a denial of equal protection of the law.
We do not infer that the commander has unfettered discretion under this regulation. We hold only that within' certain limits, the military establishment has authority to restrict the distribution of printed materials. This right to restrict distribution must be kept within reasonable bounds and courts may determine whether there is a reasonable basis for the restriction, Dash v. Commanding General, Fort Jackson, South Carolina, 307 F.Supp. 849 (D.,S.C. 1969), affirmed 4 Cir., 1970, 429 F.2d 427, certiorari denied 401 U.S. 981, 91 S.Ct. 1192, 28 L.Ed.2d 333 (1970). Whether the Post Commander acts arbitrarily or capriciously, without proper justification, is a question which the courts are always open to decide. Flower invoked not the aid of the courts but resorted to the defiance of self help at his own whim and caprice.
In summary, by its very nature, function, and purpose, a military reservation must be distinguished from a normal public community and its adjuncts. It has peculiar needs and its regulations must be fitted to meet those needs. We find that the regulation and the statute here in issue are reasonably adapted to meet those needs. They trample on no constitutionally protected right. This case presents a situation, recognized in other cases, where the unfettered exercise of First Amendment rights would be inconsistent with the necessary purposes of the federally owned property in question. The Government has the right to preserve its military property for the uses to which that property is lawfully dedicated. The Constitution does not require us to hold otherwise.
The judgment of the District Court is
Affirmed.
*87APPENDIX “A”
DEFENDANT’S EXHIBIT D (EMBLEM)
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY Headquarters Fort Sam Houston Fort Sam Houston, Texas 78234
24 OCT. 1969
AKPSH-PM
SUBJECT: Prohibition from Entering the Fort Sam Houston Military Reservation
John Thomas Flower
126 Brees Boulevard
San Antonio, Texas 78201
1. Title 18, Section 1382, United States Code, provides as follows:
“Whoever, within the jurisdiction of the United States, goes upon any military, naval, or Coast Guard reservation, post, fort, arsenal, yard, station, or installation, for any purpose prohibited by law or lawful regulation; or Whoever reenters or is found within any such reservation, post, fort, arsenal, yard, station, or installation, after having been removed therefrom or ordered not to reenter by any officer or person in command or charge thereof — Shall be fined not more than $500 or imprisoned not more than six months, or both.” (June 25, 1948, ch. 645, Sec. 1, 62 Stat. 765)
2. Information received at this headquarters indicates that on or about 22 October 1969, you participated in a plan by a member of the United States Army to enter the Military Reservation of Fort Sam Houston, Texas, and distribute an unauthorized publication contrary to a lawful Fort Sam Houston’s Regulation, and that you did subsequent thereto enter the Military Reservation of Fort Sam Houston, Texas, and by your presence encouraged and supported the unlawful distribution as previously planned.
3. You are hereby prohibited from entering the Military Reservation of Fort Sam Houston, Texas, and any land under the jurisdiction of Fort Sam Houston. You are hereby notified of this prohibition and warned that re-entry upon said reservation will result in arrest and prosecution under the provisions of the foregoing Federal Statute.
FOR THE COMMANDER:
(Signed) MORRIS B. MONTGOMERY
MORRIS B. MONTGOMERY
COL, INF
Deputy Commander
APPENDIX “B”
TITLE 18. — CRIMES AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
§ 1382. Entering military, naval, or Coast Guard property.
Whoever, within the jurisdiction of the United States, goes upon any military, naval, or Coast Guard reservation, post, fort, arsenal, yard, station, or installation, for any purpose prohibited by law or lawful regulation; or
Whoever reenters or is found within any such reservation, post, fort, arsenal, yard, station, or installation, after having been removed therefrom or ordered not to reenter by any officer or person in command or charge thereof—
Shall be fined not more than $500 or imprisoned not more than six months, or both.
APPENDIX “C”
' HEADQUARTERS, FORT SAM HOUSTON
Fort Sam Houston, Texas 78234
FSH Regulation 12 June 1969
No. 210-6
INSTALLATIONS
Distribution and Dissemination of Publications on Fort Sam Houston
1. Purpose. This regulation prescribes policies and procedures for the distribution and dissemination of publications on the Fort Sam Houston Reservation.
2. Applicability. This regulation is applicable to all units and personnel assigned to Headquarters, Fort Sam Houston and any subordinate units.
*883. Distribution Through Other Than Normal Channels.
a. Distribution on the reservation of publications, including pamphlets, newspapers, magazines, posters, handbills, flyers, and other printed material may not be made except through regularly established and approved distribution outlets, unless prior approval is obtained from the installation commander or his authorized representative.
b. Requests for permission to distribute publications outside of regularly established and approved distribution channels shall be directed to the Commanding General, Headquarters, Fort Sam Houston. Included with the request shall be a copy of the publication to be distributed along with the name and address of the distributor and publisher. The distributor shall also set forth the plan for distribution to include number of copies, identity and number of distributors, area of distribution, hours of distribution, cost to the recipient, if any and frequency of distribution.
c. Requests for permission shall be forwarded to the installation commander no later than ten days prior to the proposed distribution.
d. Approval to distribute on post will not be granted where (1) distribution would be accomplished in a manner which would prevent or materially interfere with the accomplishment of the military mission; (2) the publication is obscene or pornographic; or (3) the publication or distribution thereof is unlawful (e. g., UCMJ, 18 U.S.C. §§ 596, 1381, 2386, 2387, 2388, 2391; 50 U.S.C. App. § 462), or would otherwise constitute a clear danger to military loyalty, discipline, or morale of the military personnel at the installation.
3. Should the commander deny permission to distribute material on post, through other than regularly established distribution channels, the distributor will be immediately notified and informed of the reason for disapproval. The installation commander shall submit to Headquarters Department of the Army (ATTN: CINFO) a report in accordance with para 5-5e, AR 210-10, setting forth the information received from the distributor and the reasons for denial.
4. Distribution of Material Through Normal Channels.
a. Distribution of material through regularly established and approved distribution outlets may be made without prior approval of the installation commander.
b. The installation commander may delay distribution through regularly established distribution channels of any publication which presents a clear danger to the loyalty, discipline or morale of the troops at this installation.
c. Concurrently, with imposing a delay as authorized in (b) above, the installation commander shall inform the next major commander and Headquarters, Department of the Army (Chief of Public Information, extension 74200), and request approval to prohibit distribution according to para 5-5d, AR 210-10.
5. Penalties.
a. Persons not subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice who distribute material outside of regularly established distribution channels are subject to removal from the installation and bar from re-entry.
b. Persons subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, who violate the provisions of this regulation are subject to punishment under the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
6. References.
a. AR 210-10.
(AKPSH-JA)
FOR THE COMMANDER
OFFICIAL
(SEAL)
GRAHAM E. SCHMIDT
Colonel, GS
Chief of Staff
J. W. HARRISON
LTC, AGC
Adjutant General
DISTRIBUTION:
A, B, C, N
*89APPENDIX “D”
TITLE 10. — ARMED FORCES
§ 3012. Secretary of the Army: powers and duties; delegation by.
* * * * * *
(b) The Secretary is responsible for and has the authority necessary to conduct all affairs of the Department of the Army, including—
(1) functions necessary or appropriate for the training, operations, administration, logistical support and maintenance, welfare, preparedness, and effectiveness of the Army, including research and development;
* * * * *
THE LEAFLET
THIS FRIDAY DECEMBER 12
—8:00 PM—
THIS FRIDAY DECEMBER 12
SAMS MEMORIAL GYMNASIUM TRINITY UNIVERSITY

TOWN MEETING ON THE VIETNAM WAR

TOWN MEETING ON THE VIETNAM WAR

—VIET EXPERTS PRO AND CON—
* DAVID CARPENTER, U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT — Mr. Carpenter is the Public Affairs Officer for the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs. He served for several years in the Political Section of the American Embassy in Saigon and has also recently served in Paris, Malta and Monrovia. He is a graduate of Harvard University.
* RICHARD SANCHEZ, chairman of the Mexican-American Advisory Committee to the Republican Party.
* JONATHAN MIRSKY, CO-DIRECTOR OF THE EAST ASIAN CENTER AT DARTMOUTH UNIVERSITY — Mr. Mirsky has visited Vietnam in 1959, 1965 and 1967. He has held lengthy interviews with North Vietnamese government officials both in Cambodia and Laos and has three times interviewed the North Vietnamese and N.L.F. delegations in Paris. He holds a Ph. D. in Chinese History and is about to publish a book on Laos.
* DAVID PLYLAR, a former Air Force officer and now a teacher at Edge-wood High School. Mr. Plylar has a Masters Degree in both History and Government.
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