Court Opinion

ID: 9764720
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 03:37:47.131765+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:00.999789
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Musmanno:
From the moment that the wife of the plaintiff spoke to the three jurors outside the courtroom the cold neutrality of the trial disappeared in the flush of embarrassment and self-imposed vindication. The three jurors, being human, could not dismiss from their minds the fact that they had become involved, involuntarily or not, in a situation which could cast doubt upon their undeviating impartiality. How much were they resolved that they must not, by their verdict, show that they had been influenced by Mrs. Paustenbaugh? How far did the jurors lean back to prove this honorable intention? And when one leans back to ostentatiously demonstrate that he has not been improperly persuaded, is there not danger that the spine of fairness itself may crack?
These three jurors, in conjunction with their nine brothers and sisters, had but one duty to perform and that was to evaluate the plaintiffs losses, since the de*426fendant admitted that it was responsible for the accident which gave rise to the lawsuit. The plaintiff’s medical expenses amounted to $1091.62. He lost wages in the sum of $1690.93, the damage to his automobile amounted to $450.00.' Apart from pain and suffering, as well as impairment of earning power, the plaintiff’s monetary loss up to the date of trial was $3232.55. For as long as this case will be recalled, the ghost of suspicion will hover over it that the untoAvard incident, Avhich happened beyond the courtroom doors, caused the amputation of $232.55 from the established losses and the complete asphyxiation of the items of pain, suffering and inconvenience and impairment of earning power.
In the case of Fitzgerald v. Penn Transit Co., 353 Pa. 43, the plaintiff proved a monetary loss of $1270, and the jury returned a verdict of $3000. This Court held that the verdict Avas inadequate: “Since the plaintiff was put to a loss of $1270 for expenses and Avages, only $1730 Avas allowed him for pain, suffering, inconvenience and impairment of earning power, past, present and future, which we believe is not fair compensation. This is not a case in which plaintiff was negligent and a verdict could properly be rendered for defendants. Here the jury found the accident was caused by both defendants, not contributed to by plaintiff, and therefore from both, plaintiff should get adequate damages.”
With what greater reason should a new trial be granted here where the amount of the verdict is less than the established expenses? - '
In Todd v. Bercini, 371 Pa. 605, we said that' “When it is apparent that a jury by its verdict holds the.defendant responsible- for -a- -whole -loaf of.-, -bread,: it' .'may not then neglectfully,.-indifferently,-or capriciously cut .off a portion of .that loaf as it hands, it .to.-the plaintiff.” *427The plaintiff in this case was denied a full loaf because of an argument in the bakeshop entirely beyond his control, cognizance or knowledge. A party litigant is entitled to an adjudication of his cause in a tribunal uninfluenced by extraneous matters. Thomas A. Paustenbaugh did not receive that kind of an adjudication.
In his opinion denying a new trial the learned Trial Judge stated that he had asked the involved jurors if they could ignore the incident which had occurred during the court recess. And he then explained that the questioned jurors “were unhesitatingly of the opinion that they could.” The testimony of this interrogation reads as follows: “The Court: Ladies, the next problem is whether you feel you can dismiss this out of your mind and decide the case on the evidence you hear from the witness stand and the exhibits, and decide it fairly and justly, not only as to the plaintiff, but as to the defendant. Mrs. Howe: I could. Mrs. Barr: I think I could too. Mrs. Ritchie: I think I could too. Mr. Vaira: Q. Since she talked to you, would you feel her testimony would be colored in any way when she would go on the witness stand and testify to the same thing she stated to you? Would that affect you or would properly evaluate that testimony? A. Oh, I think I could.”1
I do not find that these replies were so vigorously expressed that one could say their utterers were three pillars of strength unhesitatingly resolved that the incident which brought them before the scrutiny of the judge was now completely wiped out of their consciousness.
Nor is it entirely a matter of unhesitating conviction that the unfortunate episode occurred in the manner described by the juror who apparently spoke for *428the three. Mrs. Paustenbaugh’s version of the occurrence is somewhat different: “A. They wanted to know how — two of them [jurors] wanted to know how he was in here and I said how it was. Q. Did you make any statement to them as to your husband’s health, the fact he wasn’t well. A. Yes, I did say he wasn’t well. Q. Of course, you might very easily be guilty of a criminal offense, in this matter. A. I didn’t expect anything of it, you know, they asked me— Q. I am sure you didn’t do it with any malicious intent, but it is a very serious matter. You have put your attorneys in a very embarrassing and difficult position in the trial. We are going to go on with the trial, however. A. You know what I mean, I didn’t say anything to them for sympathy or anything, or mean anything about it. They asked me if I was in as a witness and I said I am Mr. Paustenbaugh’s wife, that is all I stated.”
I do not believe, (no matter which version is accepted as true,) that either the jurors on one side, or Mrs. Paustenbaugh on the other, intended to do anything wrong, and the Trial Judge was entirely justified in coming to that conclusion. But I am equally satisfied that the damage done by the contact between the jurors and the plaintiff’s wife, no matter how innocently brought about, could not be undone, and the motion of the plaintiff’s attorney for the declaration of a mistrial should have been granted. The trial was far from its termination, and although a continuance would have subjected witnesses to inconvenience, that trouble would not have been so costly to the cause of justice as a trial whose fairness is called into question.
In the case of Gross v. Moore, 166 Pa. Superior Ct. 575, the adjuster of an insurance carrier involved in the litigation spoke on a family matter with a juror who Was his niece. In ordering the new trial which the *429lower court liad refused, the Superior Court said: “Although there may have been no actual fraud or gross misbehavior on the part of anyone in this case, on the facts set forth in the record and the additional facts admitted at the argument before this Court a new trial will be granted. In our opinion, a new trial is required to assure a fair and impartial trial in fact as well as in appearance, and to preserve the orderly administration of justice.”
I firmly believe that this is a case where, in the words of the Superior Court, “. . . a new trial is required to assure a fair and impartial trial in fact as well as in appearance, and to preserve the orderly administration of justice.”

 Italics throughout, mine.