Court Opinion

ID: 9410370
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-21 05:06:55.420714+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:57.233346
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                          STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,                                     UNPUBLISHED
                                                                     July 20, 2023
               Plaintiff-Appellee,

v                                                                    No. 361571
                                                                     Wayne Circuit Court
EARVIN JAMIL PARCHMAN,                                               LC No. 17-001509-01-FC

               Defendant-Appellant.

Before: REDFORD, P.J., and O’BRIEN and FEENEY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        Defendant appeals as of right his resentencing on two counts of first-degree criminal sexual
conduct (CSC-I), MCL 750.520b (multiple variables).1 The trial court departed upward from the
sentencing guidelines range and ordered defendant to serve concurrent prison terms of 25 to 50
years’ imprisonment for each conviction, but did not explain why the departure sentences were
more proportionate than sentences within guidelines. We remand again for the trial court to
explain the grounds for the departures and the reasons for the extent of the departures, or for
resentencing.

                   A. RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

       The relevant facts were summarized in this Court’s previous opinion in this case:

       On January 19, 2017, the victim returned to her apartment and found that the door
       was unlocked, and defendant and another man were in her kitchen. The victim later
       testified that she had known defendant for approximately three or four years, and
       that she owed defendant $60 for drugs. Defendant demanded that she pay him, then
       ordered her to go into the bedroom where he repeatedly penetrated the victim

1
  Defendant was also convicted of, and sentenced for, one count of unarmed robbery, MCL
750.530, and one count of stealing or retaining a financial transaction device, MCL 750.157n(1),
but does not challenge those sentences in this appeal.

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       vaginally and anally with a broom handle. After the attack, defendant took $20 and
       the victim’s Bridge Card1 from her wallet. He ordered the victim not to call the
       police.

               After the two men left her apartment, the victim called the police and met
       with a police officer at a gas station. The victim gave the officer the broom that
       defendant used to assault her, having first placed a plastic bag over the top of the
       broom’s handle. A medical examination revealed that the victim had injuries
       consistent with her description of the attack. Defendant later was identified in
       surveillance videos from locations where he used the victim’s Bridge card.

               Defendant was arrested and, after a jury trial, convicted of two counts of
       first-degree criminal sexual conduct, unarmed robbery, and stealing or retaining a
       financial device. Defendant was thereafter sentenced to consecutive terms of 25 to
       50 years’ imprisonment for the CSC-I convictions, and concurrent terms of 10 to
       15 years’ imprisonment for the unarmed robbery conviction and two to four years’
       imprisonment for the stealing or retaining a financial device conviction. Defendant
       now appeals from the judgment of sentence, challenging both his convictions and
       his sentence. [People v Parchman, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of
       Appeals, issued March 24, 2020 (Docket No. 341726), pp 1-2 (Parchman I).]
       1
        A Bridge card issued by the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services
       enables a qualified recipient to purchase certain food items and to access cash
       benefits.

        After his jury-trial convictions, the trial court originally sentenced defendant to 25 to 50
years’ imprisonment for each of the aforementioned convictions, to be served consecutively. On
appeal, this Court affirmed defendant’s convictions but remanded to the trial court to fully
articulate its rationale underlying the imposition and extent of each departure sentence, or for
resentencing if the court determined on remand that the upward departure sentences were not
warranted. Parchman I, unpub op at 5. At resentencing, the trial court determined that it would
not impose consecutive sentencing, but resentenced defendant to 25 to 50 years’ imprisonment for
each CSC-1 conviction, to be served concurrently. Defendant’s minimum sentences exceeded the
minimum sentencing guidelines range of 171 to 285 months’ (14¼ to 23¾ years’) imprisonment.
During the resentencing hearing, the trial court expressly acknowledged that it was departing from
the advisory minimum sentencing guidelines range and provided the following rationale:

              I’m going to sentence though on Count 1—and I’m going, I’m still going
       outside the guideline[s] because the testimony was horrible. It was horrific and it
       was it was [sic] heinous. There was a weapon that was, a broom—the testimony
       came out—used in this matter. That’s repulsive. That’s deviant in this [c]ourt’s
       assessment.

                                                -2-
              The threats. The arrogance. The assaultive nature. Captivating [sic]
       someone, the [c]ourt found disturbing causing the [c]ourt to go beyond the
       guidelines. And the reliance was on the facts that came out during the trial . . . .

This appeal followed.

        Defendant argues he is entitled to resentencing because the trial court imposed upward
departure sentences for the CSC-I convictions which were disproportionate and unreasonable.
Defendant advances that the trial court’s reliance on factors that were allegedly not considered by
the scoring of the sentencing guidelines, such as the seriousness of the offenses, did not establish
why the departure sentences were appropriate. Defendant further argues that the court failed to
sufficiently explain the reasons and extent for the departures from the minimum sentencing
guidelines range, or why the departure sentences were more proportionate than sentences within
the guidelines range for the CSC-I convictions. We agree.

                           B. UPWARD DEPARTURE SENTENCES

        We reviewed the relevant law in our opinion in Parchman I and we need not extensively
repeat it here. While sentencing guidelines are now advisory, and no longer require substantial
and compelling reasons for a departure after Lockridge, they remain a highly relevant
consideration for purposes of exercising sentencing discretion, and trial courts must consult and
account for the guidelines when imposing sentences. Lockridge, 498 Mich 358, 392; 870 NW2d
502 (2015). In this case, defendant’s recommended minimum sentencing guidelines range for the
CSC-I convictions was 171 to 285 months’ (14¼ to 23¾ years’) imprisonment. The trial court
sentenced defendant to serve 25 to 50 years’ imprisonment for each CSC-I conviction, thus
departing upward from defendant’s recommended minimum sentence guidelines range by 15
months.

       This Court explained in Parchman I, unpub op at 4-5, the need for greater detail in
explaining the reasons for imposing a sentence that exceeds the sentencing guidelines
recommendation. Admittedly, the trial court’s explanation, as quoted earlier, for imposing a
departure sentence was more extensive that its explanation at the original sentencing: “He had a
broomstick. Everybody saw the broomstick. It was a heinous crime.” But the trial court failed to
comply with the following specific directive on remand:

       The trial court, however, did not explain the extent of the departure nor why a 15-
       month departure sentence is more proportionate than a sentence within the
       guidelines. A sentence cannot be upheld when the connection between the reasons,
       given by the trial court for the departure and the extent of the departure is unclear.
       People v Smith, 482 Mich 292, 304; 754 NW2d 284 (2008). [Parchman I, unpub
       op at 5.]

Simply put, while the trial court at resentencing did provide slightly greater detail to justify a
departure sentence, it did not provide an adequate explanation why the sentences imposed were
more proportionate than that recommended by the sentencing guidelines.

                                                -3-
        For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we again remand this case for the trial court to
further articulate its reasoning for its upward departure sentences, including a detailed explanation
why the trial court believes that the sentences imposed are more proportionate than that
recommended by the guidelines, or to resentence defendant. We do not retain jurisdiction.

                                                              /s/ Colleen A. O’Brien
                                                              /s/ Kathleen A. Feeney

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