Court Opinion

ID: 9679931
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:13:20.839592+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:23.677279
License: Public Domain

STUMBO, Justice,
dissenting.
Respectfully, I must dissent as to the majority’s treatment of the missing evidence instruction issue and the issue in regard to juror Boggs. While I agree with the majority that there is no showing of bad faith on the part of the Commonwealth in regard to the missing evidence, I believe that the instruction as given was incorrect in that this is not a case of the intentional destruction of evidence, but rather a negligent failure to preserve material evidence.
The instruction given was as follows:
If you believe from the evidence that there existed certain items that were potential evidence and that agents or employees of the Commonwealth intentionally destroyed the same, you may, but are not required to, infer that these items would be, if available, adverse to the Commonwealth and favorable to the defendant.
The problem with the instruction is that it injects fact issues which do not exist. Specifically, there is no dispute that the truck involved was released by the State Police to the victim’s family, which was contrary to normal procedure, and promptly repaired. Moreover, there is no dispute that the condition of the truck, including the exact location of the bullet holes, was one of the most critical, if not the most critical, piece of physical evidence in the ease. As such, there is no basis for the jury to decide that the evidence was not lost, nor that only potential evidence was lost. As a result, I would conclude that the instruction as given was erroneous.
When it is established that the Commonwealth has failed to preserve material evidence, which loss was substantially to the prejudice of defendant’s right to a fair trial, the defendant is entitled to relief, of which the least available is an appropriate missing evidence instruction. Tinsley v. Jackson, *564Ky., 771 S.W.2d 381, 332 (1989). The instruction should be closely tailored to the specific factual situation of each case, and not create fact issues when they do not exist. The instruction as given implied that the jury must first determine that the evidence was intentionally destroyed by the Commonwealth. My reading of the record indicates that it was not an intentional destruction, but rather a negligent release of said evidence. Thus, I believe that an appropriate instruction would be as follows:
The Commonwealth has lost or released several pieces of evidence involved in this case including the pickup truck in which Brian Sizemore was killed, a table from Mildred Sizemore’s home, a post from the area of the shooting and a tape recorded statement taken from Kathy Davidson. In your deliberations you may infer, but you are not required to infer, that these articles of evidence, if available now, would be favorable to John S. Johnson’s case.
Thus the jury would not be required to address the issue of an intentional destruction of evidence before considering the effect of said evidence on their deliberations.
The juror, Mr. Boggs, had been sequestered with the rest of the jury beginning July 13, 1993, a Tuesday. The Commonwealth presented evidence on Wednesday and Thursday, July 14 and July 15, respectively. Because the trial court had its regular motion docket in the other two counties in the circuit, and because of difficulties scheduling a witness, there were no proceedings on Friday, July 16. The juror made his complaints known before the trial resumed on the morning of Saturday, July 17, when the Commonwealth was to conclude its ease.
The juror was unhappy about delays in the trial caused by the parties’ failure to secure the attendance of the witness, and with being sequestered. The juror further stated, “I don’t believe I’m going to give fair weight to the defense because I am going to be wondering [sic] getting out of here. Daydreaming so to speak ...” The juror was also of the opinion that even though sequestration had been mentioned during voir dire, it was only an unlikely option. He concluded by stating that, “I will state that I’m not sure I can make a fair judgment.” The trial court asked Johnson’s counsel what he wanted to do, but cut him off before he could express any real decision, and indicated that the matter could be considered. The trial court decided to keep the juror on the case regardless of his expressed disaffection. After the close of all the evidence, the trial court remarked upon the juror’s subsequent behavior saying:
Well I have heard what [the juror] said the other day. I have noticed on ... numerous occasions have paid close attention to [the juror] ... throughout the taking of evidence for both the Commonwealth and for the defendant and I noticed during closing arguments. I don’t know whether he heard what was said or sworn to or not, but he certainly tried to give the impression that he was not paying attention or he was not paying attention. When you’ve got thirteen people seated out there and twelve are looking at the witness and one’s not and it is repeated and it is consistent it is to uh — the point I feel his actions were totally inappropriate for a juror and I have not made up my mind what I will do with [the juror] at this point other than excuse him from this case.
Johnson argues that this juror’s enforced presence with the sequestered jurors over the weekend tainted the whole jury. I must agree. It requires no great leap of faith to conclude that a juror who has expressed the level of disaffection reached in this case with being sequestered, and whose subsequent behavior indicates nothing less than outright contempt, is going to make his feelings known to his fellow jurors when forced to continue on the jury. This can only adversely impact the jury’s ability to properly consider Johnson’s case.
The adverse impact of this error on Johnson’s ease is amply demonstrated by the trial court’s comments and that the jury returned a guilty verdict some twelve minutes after retiring to deliberate, which is scarcely enough time to elect a foreperson, read the six instructions given, and vote, much less carry on any meaningful discussion of the four days of evidence.
*565I would reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for a new trial.
STEPHENS, C.J., and LEIBSON, J., join in this dissent.