Court Opinion

ID: 9388247
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-20 15:00:39.232824+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:19.103174
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-1061   Document: 34     Page: 1   Filed: 04/20/2023

   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                 ______________________

                MICHAEL R. VITERNA,
                  Claimant-Appellant

                            v.

   DENIS MCDONOUGH, SECRETARY OF VETER-
                ANS AFFAIRS,
              Respondent-Appellee
             ______________________

                       2022-1061
                 ______________________

    Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for
 Veterans Claims in No. 19-2940, Judge Joseph L. Toth.
                 ______________________

                 Decided: April 20, 2023
                 ______________________

    KENNETH M. CARPENTER, Law Offices of Carpenter
 Chartered, Topeka, KS, argued for claimant-appellant.

     NATHANAEL YALE, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil
 Division, United States Department of Justice, Washing-
 ton, DC, argued for respondent-appellee. Also represented
 by BRIAN M. BOYNTON, CLAUDIA BURKE, PATRICIA M.
 MCCARTHY; NATHAN KROES, CHRISTA A. SHRIBER, Office of
 General Counsel, United States Department of Veterans
 Affairs, Washington, DC.
                  ______________________
Case: 22-1061     Document: 34      Page: 2    Filed: 04/20/2023

 2                                      VITERNA   v. MCDONOUGH

        Before DYK, LINN, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.
 DYK, Circuit Judge.
      Michael R. Viterna appeals a decision of the United
 States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (“Veterans
 Court”). The Veterans Court affirmed a Board of Veterans’
 Appeals (“Board”) decision affirming the Department of
 Veterans Affairs (“VA”) determination that it would not
 pay Mr. Viterna attorneys’ fees because he was not owed
 such fees under his agreement with his client. Mr. Viterna
 argues that the VA does not have the statutory authority
 to interpret and apply the agreement. We affirm.
                         BACKGROUND
                               I
     Before 1988, Congress barred attorneys from charging
 more than $10 per claim to represent claimants before the
 VA. See Stanley v. Principi, 283 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir.
 2002). In 1988, Congress enacted the Veterans’ Judicial
 Review Act (“Review Act”), Pub. L. No. 100–687, 102 Stat.
 4105 (1988). That statute “allow[ed], for the first time, ju-
 dicial review of VA decisions.” Mil.-Veterans Advoc. v. Sec’y
 of Veterans Affs., 7 F.4th 1110, 1135 (Fed. Cir. 2021).
 “[R]ecognizing the importance of retaining legal counsel in
 both judicial proceedings and administrative appeals,”
 Congress relaxed “the [then-]existing limitations on attor-
 neys’ fees.” Id. In doing so Congress viewed the existence
 of written fee agreements as critical.
     Congress provided that when there is an agreement
 stating that the fee “is to be paid to the . . . attorney . . .
 directly from any past-due benefits awarded on the basis of
 the claim,” 38 U.S.C. § 5904(d)(2)(A)(i), the VA will dis-
 burse fees directly to the attorney up to a maximum of 20%
 of the proceeds from “past-due benefits awarded on the
Case: 22-1061      Document: 34      Page: 3    Filed: 04/20/2023

 VITERNA   v. MCDONOUGH                                       3

 basis of the claim.” Id. § 5904(d)(1). 1 See Ravin v. Wilkie,
 956 F.3d 1346, 1349–50 (Fed. Cir. 2020); Scates v. Principi,

     1   Subsection 5904(d) was previously codified at
 § 3404(d). See Review Act, Pub. L. No. 100–687, § 104, 102
 Stat. at 4108–09. The current provision reads in full:
     (d) Payment of fees out of past-due benefits.—(1)
     When a claimant and an agent or attorney have en-
     tered into a fee agreement described in paragraph
     (2), the total fee payable to the agent or attorney
     may not exceed 20 percent of the total amount of
     any past-due benefits awarded on the basis of the
     claim.
     (2)(A) A fee agreement referred to in paragraph (1)
     is one under which the total amount of the fee pay-
     able to the agent or attorney—
           (i) is to be paid to the agent or attorney by
           the Secretary directly from any past-due
           benefits awarded on the basis of the claim;
           and
           (ii) is contingent on whether or not the mat-
           ter is resolved in a manner favorable to the
           claimant.
     (B) For purposes of subparagraph (A), a claim shall
     be considered to have been resolved in a manner
     favorable to the claimant if all or any part of the
     relief sought is granted.
     (3) To the extent that past-due benefits are
     awarded in any proceeding before the Secretary,
     the Board of Veterans’ Appeals, or the United
     States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, the
     Secretary may direct that payment of any fee to an
     agent or attorney under a fee arrangement
Case: 22-1061      Document: 34       Page: 4     Filed: 04/20/2023

 4                                        VITERNA   v. MCDONOUGH

 282 F.3d 1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Attorneys were re-
 quired to file fee agreements with the Board, which could
 “review such a fee agreement and . . . order a reduction in
 the fee called for . . . if [it] finds that the fee is excessive or
 unreasonable.” Review Act, Pub. L. No. 100–687, § 104(a),
 102 Stat. at 4108 (codified as amended at 38 U.S.C.
 § 5904(c)(3)(A)).
     Between 1988 and 2006, attorneys were only allowed
 to charge fees for representing claimants in VA proceedings
 after the Board “first [made] a final decision in the case.”
 Mil.-Veterans Advoc., 7 F.4th at 1135 (citation omitted). In
 2006, Congress amended § 5904 to allow attorneys to
 charge for VA representation earlier in the process—as
 soon as a claimant had filed a Notice of Disagreement
 (“NOD”) seeking review of an adverse regional office
 (“R.O.”) decision. See Veterans Benefits, Health Care, and
 Information Technology Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109–461,
 § 101(c), 120 Stat. 3403, 3407 (codified at 38 U.S.C.
 § 5904(c)(1)). This change was effective June 20th, 2007.
 See Pub. L. No. 109–461, § 101(h), 120 Stat. at 3408; Cam-
 eron v. McDonough, 1 F.4th 992, 994–96 (Fed. Cir. 2021). 2
      Under the current statute, the Secretary of Veterans
 Affairs “may, upon the Secretary’s own motion or at the re-
 quest of the claimant, review a fee agreement filed pursu-
 ant to [§ 5904(c)(2)] and may order a reduction in the fee
 called for in the agreement if the Secretary finds that the
 fee is excessive or unreasonable.” 38 U.S.C. § 5904(c)(3)(A).

     described in paragraph (1) be made out of such
     past-due benefits.
     2    Congress has subsequently permitted fee-based
 representation even earlier in the administrative process,
 but that change is not relevant here. See Mil.-Veterans Ad-
 voc., 7 F.4th at 1136.
Case: 22-1061     Document: 34      Page: 5   Filed: 04/20/2023

 VITERNA   v. MCDONOUGH                                      5

 Such determinations are reviewable by the Board. See id.
 §§ 5904(c)(3)(B), 7104(a).
                               II
     In this case, Pauline O. Pitts, the surviving spouse of a
 U.S. Army veteran, filed for dependency and indemnity
 compensation from the VA in 2001. After the R.O. denied
 the claim, Ms. Pitts filed an NOD, which the agency re-
 ceived on October 17, 2005. After further proceedings not
 relevant here, Ms. Pitts appealed the denial of her benefits
 to the Board, which after a remand continued the denial.
     In 2012, Ms. Pitts employed Mr. Viterna to represent
 her before the VA. The following year, she and Mr. Viterna
 signed a fee agreement, which was filed with the VA. The
 agreement provided that Mr. Viterna was owed 20% of any
 past-due benefits Ms. Pitts recovered, less certain ex-
 penses. By its terms, the agreement did not apply to the
 2001 claim, because it was “only effective as to those claims
 for which a notice of disagreement (NOD) has been filed
 after June 20th, 2007,” Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) 61, and the
 NOD covering that claim had been filed in 2005. This pro-
 vision of the agreement was apparently designed to take
 account of the prevailing statute limiting attorneys’ fees for
 work performed as to NODs filed before June 20th, 2007
 for which there was no first final Board decision. Mr.
 Viterna asserts that the date in this limitation was an “un-
 intentional drafting error.” J.A. 7. Because Mr. Viterna’s
 services were performed after the Board made a first final
 decision in this case, there was no statutory bar to his re-
 ceiving fees as to this claim. In 2014, Mr. Viterna secured
 past-due benefits on Ms. Pitts’ dependency and indemnity
 claim, which related back to the NOD filed in 2005.
     By regulation, the agency with original jurisdiction
 over a claim “shall determine whether an . . . attorney is
 eligible for fees” drawn from past-due benefits. 38 C.F.R.
 § 14.636(c)(4). Here, the agency of original jurisdiction (the
 R.O.) informed Mr. Viterna that it would not pay him 20%
Case: 22-1061      Document: 34      Page: 6     Filed: 04/20/2023

 6                                       VITERNA   v. MCDONOUGH

 of Ms. Pitts’ past-due benefits because her NOD in the case
 had been filed in 2005, and their fee agreement only cov-
 ered NODs filed after June 20th, 2007. 3 Mr. Viterna ap-
 pealed, arguing that, despite the agreement, he was
 entitled to a fee. The Board affirmed.
      Mr. Viterna then appealed to the Veterans Court. He
 argued that Congress only gave the VA the power to assess
 whether a fee agreement was valid and if its terms were
 excessive or unreasonable—not whether the agreement
 covered the claim at issue in the first place. The court dis-
 agreed. It held that “the [VA] has the authority to review
 a fee agreement for the purposes of determining whether it
 applies to the claim for which it is being proffered because
 that is a predicate act necessarily implied by the [VA’s] ex-
 plicit statutory responsibilities.” J.A. 6; see also J.A. 5 (“Be-
 fore VA can determine whether an agreement is valid or
 whether an attorney is eligible for fees . . . the Agency must
 ascertain whether the agreement even applies to the spe-
 cific claim to which it is purported to apply.”).
     Mr. Viterna appeals. We have jurisdiction under 38
 U.S.C. § 7292, and we review statutory interpretations by
 the Veterans Court without deference. See Stanley, 283
 F.3d at 1354.
                          DISCUSSION
     Mr. Viterna argues that the VA could not refuse to pay
 him pursuant to the agreement because it lacks the power
 to ensure that its attorney fee withholdings “compl[y] with
 the provisions of . . . § 5904(d).” Appellant’s Br. 11; see also
 Appellant’s Br. 13. We disagree.

     3   At about this same time, Ms. Pitts wrote to the VA
 noting that she was dissatisfied with Mr. Viterna’s perfor-
 mance and requesting that it no longer recognize him as
 her attorney.
Case: 22-1061     Document: 34      Page: 7     Filed: 04/20/2023

 VITERNA   v. MCDONOUGH                                        7

       The VA will only pay fees pursuant to agreements be-
 tween attorneys and clients in which “the total amount of
 the fee payable to the . . . attorney [under the agreement]
 . . . is to be paid . . . by the [VA] directly from any past-due
 benefits awarded on the basis of the claim.” 38 U.S.C.
 § 5904(d)(2)(A) (emphasis added). Subsection 5904(d) also
 provides that “the total fee payable to the . . . attorney may
 not exceed 20 percent of the total amount of any past-due
 benefits awarded on the basis of the claim.” Id. § 5904(d)(1)
 (emphasis added).
     In other words, the VA may draw on past-due benefits
 to pay attorneys what they are owed under agreements
 that cover “the claim” that resulted in the award of “past-
 due benefits.” Id. To accomplish that task, the VA must
 determine whether an agreement covers claims that re-
 sulted in the past-due benefits. Here, as the Veterans
 Court found, there was no qualifying agreement between
 Mr. Viterna and Ms. Pitts providing for a payment of a fee
 for the claim in question. The agreement provided only
 that Ms. Pitts had agreed to pay Mr. Viterna for claims
 with NODs filed after June 20th, 2007, and no such claim
 had resulted in the award of past-due benefits.
     Mr. Viterna admits that Ms. Pitts’ claim was not cov-
 ered by their contract. See Oral Arg. at 3:50–4:15. But he
 argues that because their agreement was valid under
 § 5904—in that it was contingent on securing benefits,
 charged a reasonable and permissible fee, and covered
 work in a period permitted by Congress—the VA cannot
 decline to pay him out of the claim award. See Appellant’s
 Br. 9–10. We disagree.
     Subsection 5904(d) only permits the VA to pay attor-
 neys’ fees on the basis of agreements that require payment
 from “past-due benefits awarded on the basis of the claim,”
 38 U.S.C. § 5904(d)(1), (d)(2)(A)(i), and as the Veterans
 Court found, the agreement here did not apply to the claim
 that resulted in past-due benefits. The fact that Mr.
Case: 22-1061    Document: 34      Page: 8    Filed: 04/20/2023

 8                                    VITERNA   v. MCDONOUGH

 Viterna’s agreement could have validly resulted in pay-
 ment as to other claims is irrelevant. As Mr. Viterna con-
 ceded at oral argument, if a lawyer had a fee agreement
 with a veteran concerning a toe arthritis disability and suc-
 ceeded in getting compensation for post-traumatic stress
 disorder, the fee agreement would not call for compensa-
 tion out of the PTSD award. See Oral Arg. at 1:27–2:00.
 The same is true here.
      Our decision here is supported by our prior ruling in
 Scates v. Principi. 282 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002). In that
 case, a veteran in the midst of claim proceedings replaced
 his attorney with a veterans organization, which success-
 fully pursued his claim. See id. at 1363–64. Though the
 relevant fee agreement on its face provided that the VA
 would pay the attorney 20% of any past-due benefits, we
 read the agreement to mean that the VA would only pay
 the full amount if the attorney represented the veteran un-
 til the end of the case. Id. at 1365. We therefore agreed
 with the VA that the attorney was not automatically owed
 the full 20% of past-due benefits. Id. at 1366–68. While
 some may argue as to whether Scates was based on the con-
 tract under § 5904(d) or the statutory provision concerning
 reasonableness, now codified at § 5904(c)(3)(A), we read
 the decision as based on the fee agreement provision codi-
 fied at § 5904(d). See Scates, 282 F.3d at 1368.
     The Secretary is therefore charged with both determin-
 ing whether the fee is payable under the qualifying attor-
 ney fee agreement and ensuring that the fee is reasonable. 4

     4   At the time Scates was decided, § 5904 gave the au-
 thority to review the reasonableness of fees in the first in-
 stance to the Board. See 38 U.S.C. § 5904(c)(2) (2005). In
 2006, Congress gave the authority to review fees for rea-
 sonableness to the Secretary more generally. See Pub. L.
 No. 109–461, § 101(d), (e)(3), 120 Stat. at 3407–08 (codified
 at 38 U.S.C. § 5904(c)(2)–(3)).
Case: 22-1061    Document: 34       Page: 9   Filed: 04/20/2023

 VITERNA   v. MCDONOUGH                                     9

 See 38 U.S.C. § 5904(c)(3), (d); see also Ravin, 956 F.3d at
 1350–51 (holding that the VA is not required to withhold
 attorneys’ fees if an attorney failed to comply with regula-
 tions requiring timely filing of fee agreements with the
 agency).
     Our decision is only that the VA correctly interpreted
 § 5904(d) in declining to pay Mr. Viterna a fee out of past-
 due benefits on a claim excluded from his agreement with
 Ms. Pitts. We have not addressed whether the VA has the
 authority to reform the contract on a theory of mutual mis-
 take, an issue that may be governed by federal law, see
 Scates, 282 F.3d at 1369–70, because Mr. Viterna has not
 sought that relief here. See Oral Arg. at 19:10–40.
                          AFFIRMED
                            COSTS
 No costs.