Court Opinion

ID: 9632894
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:27:14.495507+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:00:33.000192
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Justice SCHRODER.
I would reverse and remand for a new trial. The primary issue in this case is whether the conduct amounted to wanton conduct manifesting an extreme indifference to human life to support both convictions. The conduct in question was the speeding in violation of a statute, plus his multitasking, the counting of pills1 or fidgeting with the radio.2 Prior to the adoption of our current penal code, a vehicular wreck resulting in a death produced no such convictions. Hamilton v. Commonwealth, 560 S.W.2d 539, 542 (Ky.1977). Under our current penal code, speeding combined with intoxication has been considered wanton conduct under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life, which elevates the conduct to murder. Id. The Hamilton Court actually commended the legislature for enacting KRS 507.020(l)(b) to deter driving under the influence of intoxicants. Id. at 544. Thus, the Hamilton Court did not consider the speeding alone to be wanton conduct to support a murder conviction.
The cases since Hamilton (save two) also required intoxication, in addition to speeding to sustain a conviction. Brown v. *181Commonwealth, 174 S.W.3d 421, 426 (Ky.2005) cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1115, 126 S.Ct. 1915, 164 L.Ed.2d 669 (2006). In Walden v. Commonwealth, 805 S.W.2d 102 (Ky.1991), overruled on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Burge, 947 S.W.2d 805 (Ky.1996), the defendant blew a .297 on the BA. The Court recognized:
Whatever the legislative view might have been of the elements of wanton murder in 1974 when the Penal Code was enacted, this view of legislative intention is dispelled by an Amendment in 1984, enacted as part of the so-called “Slammer Bill” directed at drunk driving. The 1984 Amendment adds to KRS 507.020(l)(b) by specifying as a prefatory phrase, “including, but not limited to, the operation of a motor vehicle.... ”
Id. at 104. And,
[T]he 1984 Amendment declares legislative intent to include vehicular homicide as potentially serious enough to justify a murder conviction, but it does not change the essential nature of the elements of the offense. Wanton murder continues to be distinguished from second-degree manslaughter, KRS 507.040, which also punishes “wantonly caus[ing] the death of another person,” by the additional element described in the phrase, “under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life” .... The difference between wanton murder and involuntary manslaughter (Manslaughter II) continues to be, as the Penal Code originally intended, whether there is evidence from which the jury could find “circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life.” Depending on the situation, drunk driving may be such a circumstance.
Id. at 104-05.
Johnson v. Commonwealth, 885 S.W.2d 951, 952 (Ky.1994), reversed a wanton murder conviction that arose from a motor vehicle accident wherein the defendant “was not operating his coal truck under the influence of alcohol or drugs.” Possibly running a red light, a traffic offense, without intoxication, did “not rise to such a level of wanton conduct.” Id.
One of the first cases to not require intoxication in addition to a vehicle wreck was Graves v. Commonwealth, 17 S.W.3d 858 (Ky.2000), which involved a high speed chase at upwards of over 100 miles per hour, in a thirty-five mile per hour zone, with an exchange of gunfire, trying to recover drugs for which they had just paid $27,000.00. Driving through a red light, the lead vehicle broadsided a vehicle with two occupants, killing both. The driver, Graves, was convicted of two counts of wanton murder together with other lesser charges. The Court likened the wanton murder charges to the old “felony murder” rule and opined that trafficking in a controlled substance was the main event and the chase, wreck, and death were all part of the main event. Id. at 862.
The other case that did not require intoxication in addition to a vehicle wreck to find wanton murder was Brown, 174 S.W.3d 421. Brown involved a vehicular wreck resulting in multiple deaths and injuries. The facts revealed no intoxication but what has been referred to as “aggravated wantonness.” Id., at 426. Brown was speeding — possibly racing — intentionally ran a red light and was watching TV on a gearshift-mounted monitor. Justice Cooper, in writing the Court’s opinion, stated that “intoxication is not a prerequisite to a finding of extreme indifference to human life in a vehicular homicide case,” id., and the “[ajppellant’s conduct was substantially more than a mere traffic violation.” Id. at 428. Under the circumstances of this case, the Court would not rule “as a matter of law that it was unreasonable for the jury to believe beyond a *182reasonable doubt that [a]ppellant acted under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life.” Id. (citations omitted). Although Brown involved multiple deaths and injuries in the use of a motor vehicle, the “aggravated wantonness” elevated the conduct to near-intentional conduct.
In the case herein, we are asked to consider whether speeding (a traffic offense), combined with mere inattentiveness, may also be wanton murder, “circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life.” I think not. It took an act of the General Assembly to elevate intoxication to an aggravating element of wanton murder. At this time, I see no evidence of the General Assembly’s elevation of inattentiveness while speeding to wanton conduct. As the statistics come out on the number of accidents caused by multitasking while driving, the General Assembly may or may not want to address the issue3 That is them prerogative. But for now, I believe that the trial court erred in not granting a directed verdict as to the offense of wanton murder. See Johnson, 885 S.W.2d at 953. I would remand for a new trial on the lesser offenses.
First-degree assault, under KRS 508.010(l)(b), also requires intentional or “wanton” conduct — “[ujnder circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life he wantonly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another and thereby causes serious physical injury to another person.” My analysis of “wanton” conduct in wanton murder would apply to first-degree assault by wanton conduct. Therefore, the trial court should also have directed a verdict for the Appellant on this charge, and it too should be necessary to remand for a new trial on the lesser offenses.
Berryman also argues that reference to the package and the contents of the package was inadmissible under KRE 402 and KRE 403. Obviously, Berryman was distracted while speeding. Counting the pills probably contributed to the wreck. That is for the jury to decide. Under KRE 402, the evidence was relevant and admissible to show his multitasking — to show that it was not his speeding alone that may have caused the wreck.
KRE 403 excludes relevant, otherwise admissible, evidence if the probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice. Berryman did not have Lortabs (hydrocodone) in his system. Clearly, when the jury was told or allowed to speculate that Berryman was either a drug dealer or user who had a wreck, the object of his distraction became magnified and overshadowed his conduct. The jury should have focused on his conduct— counting the pills — rather than the illegal nature of the object being counted. The jury would no doubt have had a different opinion if vitamins, aspirins, or some prescription drugs were being counted, or if he had been tuning the radio, etc. Applying KRE 402, it was important and admissible that Berryman was watching the counting of some pills while speeding. However, references to the pills as being illegal or obtained without a prescription should have been excluded under KRE 403. Even a trip to Stanton to pick up a package was admissible under KRE 402, but references to the specific drug name or its illegal possession should have been excluded under KRE 403.

. The passenger, Michael Dunn, said Berry-man was keeping track of his counting of the pills.

. Another witness, Ms. Music, believed they "were fiddling with the radio or something.”

. For example, multitasking could include putting in a CD, dialing a phone, or even text messaging,