Court Opinion

ID: 9737820
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:35:05.127748+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:01.647078
License: Public Domain

HUSPENI, Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent and would reverse the award of summary judgment. I conclude that the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel were inappropriately invoked and improperly relied upon in this case.
Many of the concerns expressed by this court in Clapper v. Budget Oil Company, 437 N.W.2d 722, 726 (Minn.App.1989), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. June 9, 1989) are present here. The Clapper court, in reversing the trial court’s application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel, noted among other concerns that, in administrative hearings, common law or statutory rules of evidence need not be followed, that hearsay is admissible, and that a jury trial is not available. Id.
The hearing officer in this case recognized the first two Clapper concerns. An even more persuasive argument is raised, I believe, regarding the lack of availability of a jury trial in administrative hearings. Appellant has raised issues in this proceeding which she is entitled to put before a jury.
A further concern, and a most important one, I submit, is the repeated objection of respondents to admission in the termination proceedings of any evidence relating to appellant’s defamation or retaliatory discharge claims. I conclude from that posture that respondents waived their rights to invoke the doctrines upon which summary judgment was granted. Respondents’ objections to admission of evidence in the termination proceedings were made on the grounds that such evidence was to be considered in other pending proceedings.1 To now permit respondents to utilize the scant evidence admitted over their objection to support their summary judgment motion is to permit them to use as a sword that which should only be used as a shield.
With reference to the majority’s analysis of Brundin v. Indep. School Dist. No. 112, No. C6-89-1469 (Minn.App. Jan. 16, 1990), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 16, 1990), I agree that case is not precedential. Even if it were, however, it is also distinguishable. The appellant in Brundin did not hesitate to raise all issues during the termination proceedings. Only after she failed to prevail on any issue in those proceedings or upon appeal did she commence a civil action and raise there the very same issues upon which she had been defeated. Here, appellant commenced a civil proceeding pri- or to the termination hearing; all parties were not only aware of that civil proceeding but referred to it at various points during the termination proceeding when objections to evidence were raised and argued.2 The waiver by respondents of the right to invoke res judicata and collateral estoppel which I discern here was notably absent in Brundin.
A final observation: equitable remedies should not be rigidly applied. Johnson v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc., 420 N.W.2d 608, 613 (Minn.1988). While trial courts have not only the right but the duty to avoid protracted and repetitious litigation, they must also conscientiously ensure that litigants receive a full and fair opportunity to be heard on the issues properly raised and preserved in litigation. I do not believe appellant was afforded that opportunity in this case.

. Appellant raises troubling allegations about the minimal discovery available to her during the termination proceedings. Respondents’ hesitancy to engage in full discovery in that termination proceeding would be consistent with their position that certain issues were to be addressed elsewhere.

. Reference by this court in Graham I to issues other than those properly considered in the termination proceeding constitutes dicta and does not persuade me that those, issues were properly before our court.