Court Opinion

ID: 9700428
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 21:28:00.214286+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:09.002748
License: Public Domain

Francis, J.
(concurring). I concur in the result reached by the Court in this case. The record reveals clearly that prior to March 12, 1968, the day of the accident, respondent had established a practice of giving advance notice to its piece-work employees, such as the petitioner, not to report for work at the usual hour in the morning, i. e., 8 a.m., whenever there was no work to be performed at that time. It is undisputed that on the day of the accident, contrary to the practice, respondent did not notify Bergman in advance not to appear at its place of business at 8 a.m. even though there would be no garments ready for pressing at that time. It was that failure which was responsible for Bergman’s unneeded presence on the employer’s premises at 8 a.m. Consequently, upon being told by his employer that he could *568go home but that he should return in two hours when he would be needed, I believe that the trip to his home and the return to the employer’s plant ought to be considered sufficiently causally related to his employment as to be deemed within its course.
However, the Court’s opinion, citing Hammond v. The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 56 N. J. 7, 12-13 (1970), seems to indicate that the life expectancy of what has come to be called the “going and coming” rule is open to question. I do not entertain that view. There is no right to workmen’s compensation benefits unless the employee suffers an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. It has long been the rule in this State and elsewhere that during an employee’s ordinary, routine day-to-day journey to work from home and while returning home from work, he is not in the course of employment. If, however, the employee, while going to or from work, engages in some special errand at the employer’s request, or if there are circumstances present indicating that the trip in part serves a purpose reasonably incidental to the duties of his employment, our cases have accepted the view that an accident occurring during such a trip arises “out of” and “in the course of” the employment, and is therefore compensable. O’Brien v. First Camden Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 37 N. J. 158 (1962).
I adhere to the basic rule and to the exceptions, and I do not find at all persuasive the suggestion that an employee ought to be considered in the course of employment during his trips between home and work, simply because he has to walk or ride some distance on public streets in order to reach his employer’s premises.
Mountain. J., joins in this concurrence.
Ekancis and Mountain, JJ., concur in result.
For reversal and remandment — Chief Justice Weintbaub and Justices Jacobs, Ebancis, Peoctob, Schettino and Mountain — 6.
For affirmance — Justice Hall — 1.