Court Opinion

ID: 9861643
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 00:15:31.233253+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:28:45.353787
License: Public Domain

Robert W. Hansen, J.
(dissenting). The sole goal in the transfer of property as directed by will is to carry out the expressed intent of the person who made the will. Ordinarily this requires no more than judicial compliance with the express directions of the will. In what this court termed the “mine run of cases,” this involves no more than following the plain, unchallenged and explicit directions of the will.1 However, there are three situations in which this cannot thus easily be done:
1. Ambiguity. Where there is language in a will which is unclear and requires judicial construction to determine its meaning, the court construes the will to resolve the ambiguity.2
2. Mistake. Where there is a mistake in a will, as in matters of identification of property or beneficiaries, the court may correct the mistake in order to reach an intended result.3
*4603. Omission. Where there is a void or omission in the expressed terms of a will, the court may ascertain the intent of the testator and create a gift by implication to fill such void or omission.4
The general term, “construction of the will,” is used to describe (1) the construing of a will to resolve an ambiguity; (2) the correction of a mistake in will;5 and (3) the filling in of a void or omission by creating a gift by implication.6 However, since there are in, this state, somewhat different requirements for using each of these three approaches, we set forth, individually, the applicable rule as to each:
*4611. Construction. For construction of a will to resolve ambiguity, it is required that “. . . there must be language in the will which requires construction, ...” 7 and the general rule for construing the will is: “ ‘In construing a will the purpose of the court is to ascertain the intent of the testator as it is expressed in the full and complete will read in the light of the circumstances surrounding the testator at the time the will was executed. . . .’ ” 8
2. Correction. For correction of a mistake made in a will as to the identification of a specific legatee, this court held extrinsic evidence admissible as to intent, concluding: . . Where such details of identification are involved, courts should receive evidence tending to show that a mistake has been made and should disregard the details when the proof establishes to the highest degree of certainty that a mistake was, in fact, made.” 9
3. Creation of gift by implication. For the creation of a gift by implication to fill a void or omission in a will, there are three requirements in this state: (a) “. . . an omission to cover the contingency which subsequently arose, . . .” 10 (b) “. . . the ascertainment of the intention of the testator from all the words used in the will in the light of surrounding circumstances to fill in a void *462or an omission in the expressed terms of the will. ...” 11 (c) that the “. . . clue to the intention is imbedded in the words of the will . ...” 12
The situation in the case before us fits squarely into MacLean category of a void or omission in a will and meets, with margin to spare, the three MacLean tests or requirements for the creation here of a gift by implication.
Void or omission. What we have in the case before us is a void or omission to cover a contingency which subsequently arose. Clearly and unmistakably, the will provides that the bulk of the estate is devised by the testatrix to her friend, Margaret McElligott, as residuary legatee. Just as clearly and unmistakably, the testatrix provided that her living relatives were not to receive anything at all. However, the will did not specify who was to receive the residuary legacy if friend Margaret died before the testatrix did. This is not a case, as in Weh-r, of construing a word or term used in a will.13 It is not a case of mistake made, as in Gibbs, as to the middle initial and street address of a named legatee.14 It is, exactly as in MacLean, a void or omission to cover a particular contingency. In MacLean, the court cited and followed an earlier Wisconsin case in which “. . . The will omitted to state who should receive the trust assets if the daughter survived the five years. ...” 15 In our case here, the will omitted to state who should receive the bulk of the estate if the named residuary legatee, Margaret Mc-Elligott, predeceased the testatrix. The ailing testatrix, late in her seventies when she executed her will, may well *463have expected that she, and not her younger and healthier friend, would be the first to shuffle off this mortal coil. But, in any event, the will contains no provision providing for the contingency which occurred. So there is what MacLean terms and requires for the creation of a gift by implication: “. . . a void or an omission in the expressed terms of the will. . . .” 16
Clues imbedded in will. For the creation of a gift by implication, clues to the intention of the testator as to a void or omission in a will, must be “. . . imbedded in the words of the will . ...” 17 Such clues to intent are easily located in the express provisions of the will here. One such clue is the specific disinheritance of living relatives. 18 Such positive language in a will is not to be disregarded.19 The bequest to friend Margaret being a residuary legacy is another clue. Such expressed desire not to die intestate, while it is not, alone, sufficient to effect a gift over,20 is a factor given weight in MacLecm.21 *464That case also holds that there is a presumption of intent to completely distribute an estate by will.22 Another clue or factor as to intent, imbedded in this will, is the wording of the bequest of nearly all of the estate to the residuary legatee.23 The nature, degree and duration of the friendship involved are clearly set forth in the will. Here is no minor bequest to a valued employee or one of a series of bequests to nieces or grandnieces. Almost all of the estate is bequeathed to a friend, further identified as one who “has been most kind and helpful for the past many years.” While clues as to intent are needed, clues there are, imbedded in this will, as to the intent of the testator to fill the void or omission in the will.
Surrounding circumstances. With a void or omission present, and clues to intent located imbedded in the will, the MacLean requirements for creating a gift by implication direct that any ascertainment of the intent of the testatrix be made from “. . . all the words used in the will in the light of surrounding circumstances . . . .” 24 *465The intent to be ascertained is the intent expressed . . in the full and complete will read in the light of the circumstances surrounding the testator at the time the will was executed.” 25 What were the circumstances surrounding the testatrix when she executed this will? She was in her late seventies, not in good health, going in and out of nursing homes until her death at the age of eighty-three. The principal and residuary legatee, Margaret McElligott, at the time the will was executed, was sixty-five years of age and widowed. The record in this case establishes that the testatrix had developed a close relationship with the Robert J. McElligott family at least as early as 1940. She was a regular guest at the McElligott home on holidays such as Christmas, Thanksgiving and Easter. During her visits to the McElligott home she got to know the McElligott children — William, Marne and Jeanne — very well, and had become very fond of them. William and Jeanne resided in Milwaukee, visited the testatrix often, including visits to her at the nursing home. As to the disinheritance of living relatives, the record reveals that the testatrix told her attorney when the will was drafted that she had not seen either of the two living relatives for a long time and that she had tried to contact them without any response. As to her leaving the bulk of the estate to her friend Margaret as residuary legatee, the testatrix told her attorney that she wished to do just that . . because she [Margaret] had been a very good friend of hers; had been kind to her and had taken care of her during the time that she needed help from her and had always been her friend, her very close friend.” It is clear that every surrounding circumstance supports and strengthens the clues to the intent of the testatrix found imbedded in the will.
*466Determination of intent. Given these clues to intention, imbedded in this will, and these surrounding circumstances supporting and strengthening such clues to intent, the writer would find the conclusion compelled that this testatrix intended that the children of her friend Margaret should be substituted as residuary legatees should their mother predecease the testatrix. There is po way to read all of the words of this will, full and complete, in the light of the circumstances surrounding the testatrix when the will was written, and come to any other conclusion. In reaching such ascertainment of the intention of the testatrix, meeting the requirements for so doing prescribed in MacLeam,, the writer gives weight to the specific disinheritance paragraph as to living relatives in the will, the naming of a residuary legatee and the presumption against intending intestacy, and the bequeathing of nearly all of the estate to a close and personal friend for many years, with surrounding circumstances confirming that the fondness and friendship involved in such residuary bequest included the children of the friend named as residuary legatee.
Gift by implication. The ascertainment of such intent on the part of the testatrix here, derived from all of the words of the will read in the light of the circumstances surrounding such testatrix at the time of the making of the will, warrants the creation here of a gift by implication to the surviving children of the residuary legatee of the legacy bequeathed to their mother in the will. Such gift by implication, MacLean holds, “ . . may be presumed wherever the conclusion is irresistible that the testator so intended it.’ ” 26 The writer finds such conclusion irresistible here. The gap or void in the will here is “ ‘. . . an omission to state that which was in the testa*467tor’s mind and intended.’ ” 27 Creation of such gift by implication places the children of this residuary legatee in the same position they would, by statute, have been placed if their mother had been a relative of the testatrix.28 Exactly as was done in MacLean, the gift by implication here is based on “. . . the ascertainment of the intention of the testator from all the words used in the will in the light of surrounding circumstances to fill in a void or an omission in the expressed terms of the will. . . .” 29 The case or factual basis for creating a gift by implication in the case before us appears to this writer even clearer and stronger than was the situation in MacLean. Not to do so in the case we have before us appears to the writer to come close to rejecting the doctrine of gift by implication, and that this court ought not do and has refused to do.30 *468The writer would reverse, holding that a gift by implication entitles the children of the deceased residuary legatee to the share of the estate bequeathed to their mother by this will.
I am authorized to state that Mr. Justice Leo B. Hanley joins in this dissent.

 Estate of MacLean (1970), 47 Wis. 2d 396, 401, 177 N. W. 2d 874, this court observing: “In the mine run of cases, . . . the final decree construes the will only in the sense it follows the plain, unchallenged and explicit commands of the will. Most lawyers and lay persons do not consider this a construction but rather a compliance with the express directions of the will-. . . .”

 Will of Wehr (1967), 36 Wis. 2d 154, 168, 169, 152 N. W. 2d 868, where this court construed a will to find that the word “descendant,” when used in a will, does not, in the absence of a very clear indication, mean heirs of a person or his collateral relatives.

 Estate of Gibbs (1961), 14 Wis. 2d 490, 499, 111 N. W. 2d 413, where this court, finding a specific bequest to an individual, identified by name and street address in the will, was made by mistake and determined that respondent, who had a different *460middle initial and lived at a different street address, was the legatee “. . . whom testators had in mind.” See also: 4 Page, Wills, sec. 30.18, page 119, stating: “Since the courts endeavor to ascertain the intention of testator from his whole will rather than disjointed parts thereof and to enforce this intention if lawful when thus ascertained, it follows that it is possible for testator to dispose of property, not by any formal disposition in his will, but by necessary implication from his will taken as a whole. . . .”

 Estate of MacLean, supra, footnote 1, at pages 405, 406, where this court found that there was an omission to cover the contingency which subsequently arose and the court ascertained the intent of the testator and applied the doctrine of gift by implication to . . fill in a void or an omission in the expressed terms of the will. . . .”

 Estate of Gibbs, supra, footnote 3, at page 497, this court stating, as to its correcting a mistake as to named legatee not apparent from the four corners of the will: “Although the courts subscribe to an inflexible rule against reformation of a will, it seems that they have often strained a point in matters of identification of property or beneficiaries in order to reach a desired result by way of construction. . . .” (Emphasis supplied.)

 Estate of MacLean, supra, footnote 1, at page 406, stating that the doctrine of gift by implication is said to originate in In re Donges’s Estate (1899), 103 Wis. 497, 501, 79 N. W. 786, and quoting as a guideline for creating such implied gift: . . first, that in case of doubt such construction will be adopted as to support and give effect to the will, rather than to defeat it; . . (Emphasis supplied.)

 Will of Wehr, supra, footnote 2, at page 179.

 Id. at page 179, quoting Estate of Breese (1959), 7 Wis. 2d 422, 425, 426, 96 N. W. 2d 712. (Note: In Breese, the dispute was as to the meaning of the word “issue” as used by testatrix in her will and whether it included the adopted children of her deceased brother.)

 Estate of Gibbs, supra, footnote 3, at page 499. 1 Page, Wills, sec. 13.9, page 679, gives the general rule on correcting mistakes in wills: “if a mistake in expression can be cured by a construction of the terms of the will when read in the light of the surrounding circumstances, and aided by admissible evidence, the court which has the power to construe the will, will give such relief. . . .”

 Estate of MacLean, supra, footnote 1, at page 406.

 Id. at pages 405, 406.

 Id. at page 406.

 Will of Wehr, supra, footnote 2.

 Estate of Gibbs, supra, footnote 3.

 Estate of MacLean, supra, footnote 1, at page 407, citing the creation of a gift by implication in Will of Schneider (1955), 268 Wis. 610, 68 N. W. 2d 576.

 Id. at page 406.

 Id. at page 406.

 Paragraph 7, Last Will and Testament of Nellie J. Connolly, reading: “Seventh: I am cognizant of the fact that I have two living relatives, namely, May Cyers, a niece and Mary Walsh, a grand niece, both of Chicago, Illinois, but it is my wish and desire not to give, devise or bequeath anything to them.” [Note: There were five living relatives.]

 Estate of Farber (1973), 57 Wis. 2d 363, 368, 204 N. W. 2d 478, this court stating: “. . . In those cases where the intent to completely disinherit a certain heir or groups of heirs is expressed beyond doubt, as evidenced by positive language stating which heirs are to take, and if any such heirs remain to take, the clearly expressed intention of the testator shall be recognized. . . .” (Emphasis supplied.)

 Will of Wehr, supra, footnote 2, at page 178, stating: “. . . the intent of a testator not to die intestate, manifested by his insertion of a residuary clause in the will, is not sufficient to effect a gift over of a lapsed portion of a. residuary bequest to the other residuary legatees.” Summarizing holding in Estate of Mory (1966), 29 Wis. 2d 557, 139 N. W. 2d 623.

 Estate of MacLean, supra, footnote 1, at page 407, this court stating: “. . . He [the testator] did not intend an intestacy as he attempted to give all his estate in trust; . . .”

 Id. at page 406, giving as a guideline to ascertain intent of testator in gift by implication situations, this rule: “ ‘. . . second, that a testator is presumed to have intended a complete distribution of his estate, and a construction tending to that end will be preferred to one which results in intestacy as to any part. . . .’ ” See also: Estate of Farber, supra, footnote 19, at page 370, stating: . it is to be presumed that he intended a complete distribution of his estate, and a construction tending to that end will be preferred to one which results in intestacy as to any part.’” Quoting Estate of Cordes (1957), 1 Wis. 2d 1, 11, 82 N. W. 2d 920.

 Paragraph 6, Last Will and Testament of Nellie J. Connolly, reading: “Sixth: I give, devise and bequeath the rest and residue of my estate to Mrs. Robert J. McElligott (Margaret), 825 East Kensington, Shorewood, Wisconsin, who has been my friend and has been most kind and helpful for the past many years.”

 Estate of MacLean, supra, footnote 1, at page 406.

 Will of Wehr, supra, footnote 2, at page 179, quoting Estate of Breese, supra, footnote 8, at pages 425, 426.

 Estate of MacLean, supra, footnote 1, at page 406, quoting In re Donges’s Estate, supra, at page 501.

 Id. at page 407, quoting trial court finding as upheld in Will of Schneider (1955), 268 Wis. 610, 68 N. W. 2d 576.

 See: Sec. 853.27 (1), Stats., the anti-lapse statute, providing: “(1) Unless a contrary intent is indicated by the will, if provision in the will is made for any relative of the testator and the relative dies before the testator and leaves issue who survive the testator, then the issue as represent the deceased relative are substituted for him under the will and take the same interest as he would have taken had he survived the testator.”

 Estate of MacLean, supra, footnote 1, at pages 405, 406, also quoting with approval the justification for creation of gifts by implication contained in In re Donges’s Estate, supra, at page 501, stating: . . courts often find themselves constrained to discover an intention to give, by the will, that which is not in fact given by express words, but which, it is clear from the other bequests and devises, it was the intention of the testator to give, as being so clearly implied from the gifts in fact made and the purpose of the will that silence can signify only an omission to state that which was in the testator’s mind and intended. These are called devises or bequests by implication. . . .’”

 Id. at page 408, stating of intestacy holdings in Will of McDowell (1966), 31 Wis. 2d 519, 143 N. W. 2d 506, and Will of Wehr, supra, footnote 2: “. . . The reliance on these cases is misplaced. In those cases the court did not reject the doctrine of a *468gift by implication but could not find in the will an intention of the testator to make a gift under the circumstances which developed and thus an intestacy resulted. In the case at bar we think the conclusion is irresistible that the testator did intend the churches to be the beneficiaries of the trust if the estate exceeded $20,000 after his sister’s death, both when she predeceased him and when she survived him, and no intestacy resulted from the omission to state the latter. expressly in paragraph two of the will.”