Court Opinion

ID: 9853309
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:46:22.507988+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:45.526297
License: Public Domain

Littlejohn, Associate Judge:
I concur with the majority’s holding that the evidence supported the jury’s finding that United’s “Your Special Duties” booklet altered Kumpf s otherwise at-will employment status, under Small v. Springs Industries, Inc., 292 S.C. 481, 357 S.E. (2d) 452 (1987). I also concur with the majority that the disclaimer in the booklet was not conspicuous.
However, I respectfully dissent from that part of the majority’s decision which affirms the trial judge’s denial of United’s directed verdict motion. I would hold that the “conflicts of interest” clause was unambiguous, and, without dispute, Kumpf violated the clause.
The clause provided, in pertinent part:
You may not accept any gifts or extraordinary entertainment or any other personal favor from any person or organization that is a supplier of materials or services, or from anyone seeking to become a supplier or with anyone likely to have business dealings with the Company, that may appear to influence a decision by you. (Emphasis added.)
Generally, the construction of contracts is a question of law for the court. Hope Petty Motors v. Hyatt, 425 S.E. (2d) 786 (S.C. Ct. App. 1992). Determining what the parties intended becomes a question of fact for the jury only when the contract is ambiguous. Id. Furthermore, if a contract is unambiguous, extrinsic evidence cannot be used to give the contract a meaning different from that indicated by its plain terms. Bates v. Lewis, 427 S.E. (2d) 907, 909 footnote 1. (S.C. Ct. App. 1993).
In Jordan v. Security Group, Inc., 428 S.E. (2d) 705 (S.C. Sup. Ct. 1993), the Supreme Court stated:
A contract is ambiguous only when it may fairly and reasonable be understood in more ways than one. Where the language of a contract is plain and capable of legal construction, that language alone determines the instrument’s force and effect.
*541Resort to construction by a party is only done when the contract is ambiguous or there is doubt as to its intended meaning.
The Court’s duty is to enforce the contract made by the parties regardless of its wisdom or folly, apparent unreasonableness, or the parties’ failure to guard their rights carefully.
Id. at 707 (citations omitted).
I would hold that the clause cannot be fairly and reasonably understood in more ways than one. The contract prohibited accepting gifts from suppliers or anyone likely to have business dealings with the company where that gift “may appear to influence a decision by you.” (Emphasis added.) This language unambiguously precluded an employee, such as Kumpf, from giving even the appearance that a gift he received from someone who has business dealings with United could influence a decision the employee makes. We, as lawyers and judges, understand this concept all too well — it is one of the guiding principles of our profession. I would hold the clause was unambiguous, and its construction was a matter for the trial judge, not the jury.
I would also hold that there was no factual issue over whether Kumpf violated the clause. It was not disputed that H & M Telephone Company was a “supplier of services” to United and was “likely to have business dealings” with United in the future. It was also undisputed that Ronald Hale, representing H & M, gave Kumpf a check for $75.00 and over a case of liquor, and that Kumpf cashed the check, kept one bottle of liquor and distributed the rest of the bottles of liquor to other United supervisors. In this case, the “appearances” were:
—that Kumpf had discretion to contact Hale regarding any location which needed a pay phone, or could have contacted another contractor;
—that Kumpf was in a position to record (or not record) supplies Hale received for each job, so as to have control over whether Hale would be billed for supplies he received;
—that Kumpf was in a position to approve Hale’s work. *542that is, to “sign off on it,” so that without Kumpf s word, Hale could not get paid (the “appearance” being that even if Hale did a substandard or incomplete job, Kumpf could control whether Hale got paid);
—that Kumpf “fussed” over the price Hale charged United resulting in a reduction in that price, and that Hale subsequently paid Kumpf off to keep Kumpf from continued “fussing” over the Hale’s price.
None of these things may ever have actually occurred, and Kumpf may never have actually strayed from honesty. But the prohibition involved “appearances,” which meant as much to United as reality. A casual observer would not know whether Kumpf in fact had influence on decisions made with respect to Hale — apparently, Hale was not certain whether Kumpf could influence decisions, but he must have speculated as much since he singled Kumpf out as one of a few people to receive a “gift.”
I also attach no significance to the fact that United did not fire several other employees who accepted gifts from Hale, although United did fire Kumpf. The fact that many people were breaking the rules does not mean that when you catch one crook you should let him go. Additionally, I note that Kumpf himself testified to his initial reluctance to accept Hale’s gift, and his inquiry of his supervisor, Douglas Keesee, who told him “Let your conscience be your guide.”
Accordingly, I would reverse the trial judge’s failure to direct a verdict for United on the grounds that the clause was unambiguous, Kumpf indisputably violated the prohibition, and United’s termination of him did not breach the contract, as a matter of law.