Court Opinion

ID: 9474032
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:46:03.660003+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:43:51.980985
License: Public Domain

BRIGHT, Senior Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I dissent.
Liberty Mutual’s defense in this action was not one of mutual mistake with a request for court-ordered reformation. If that situation had existed, the decision to grant reformation would properly lie with the court. See 5 Moore’s Federal Practice H 38.22 at 38-185 (2d ed. 1985). Liberty Mutual never sought the court’s aid in reforming the LG policy, however. It and its insured, American Hydrotherm, altered the policy themselves after the Kennet explosion triggered liability under the policy as originally drawn. At trial, Liberty Mutual asserted that the altered policy reflected the parties’ true intent and must be enforced. The court and jury thus faced the question of which of two policies applied, that represented by the original LG policy, *982as Great Atlantic maintained, or that represented by the “reformed” policy, as Liberty Mutual maintained. The determinative issue, therefore, was solely that of Liberty Mutual’s and American Hydrotherm’s intent when they entered the insurance contract and was properly for the jury as fact finder. See Collins v. Swope, 605 S.W.2d 538, 540 (Mo.App.1980) (“The trier of facts, be it the court or jury, usually decides the question of intention.”)
Moreover, even if Liberty Mutual’s defense is termed “equitable,” this court should be reluctant to transform the defense into one tried by the district court when all parties and the court agreed to submit it to the jury. Traditionally equitable cases are often tried to juries. This court has observed that “the historic distinction between law and equity, although still the standard for determining when a jury trial is constitutionally required, is no longer the only factor in determining if a trial by jury will be granted in ‘equity’ cases.” Turner v. Burlington Northern Railroad Co., 771 F.2d 341 (8th Cir.1985) (citing Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538-39, 90 S.Ct. 733, 738-39, 24 L.Ed.2d 729 (1970); Fitzgerald v. United States Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16, 21, 83 S.Ct. 1646, 1650, 10 L.Ed.2d 720 (1963); Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 477-78, 82 S.Ct. 894, 899-900, 8 L.Ed.2d 44 (1962); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 504-05, 79 S.Ct. 948, 953-54, 3 L.Ed.2d 988 (1959)). Liberty Mutual never requested that the trial court evoke its equity jurisdiction, but was content to proceed in front of a jury. Even on appeal, it urges only that this court review the trial court’s ruling under the standard of review for judgments notwithstanding the verdict. Further, the trial court never attempted to exercise its equity jurisdiction, granting a judgment notwithstanding the verdict rather than treating the jury’s findings as advisory and substituting its own. By restyling the defense as one tried to the court, the majority unilaterally deprives the district court of its power to send “equitable” defenses to the jury when the party asserting the defense consents. More seriously, however, it encourages parties to seek independent court review of equitable defenses after adverse jury decisions to which they initially agreed to be bound. We should discourage, rather than encourage, such attempts to take a “second bite of the apple.”
Whether equitable or legal, therefore, Liberty Mutual’s defense was properly tried before the jury. The jury heard extensive evidence and rejected the after-the-fact collaborative alteration of the LG policy as reflecting the parties’ original intent. Under Missouri law, the alteration was thus irrelevant and the LG policy as issued controlled. See Pennsylvania Casualty Co. v. Phoenix, 139 F.2d 823 (10th Cir.1944) (construing Missouri law); Hocken v. Allstate Ins. Co., 235 Mo.App. 991, 147 S.W.2d 182, 187 (1941). The district court was only justified in granting a judgment notwithstanding the verdict if no evidence supported the view that the LG policy as issued expressed the original intentions of Liberty Mutual and American Hydrotherm. See Coleman v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 681 F.2d 542, 545 (8th Cir.1982). The very existence of the LG policy, however, was evidence of the parties’ intent at contracting. The district court therefore erred in granting the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
The district court alternatively granted Liberty Mutual a new trial on the grounds that the jury verdict for Great Atlantic was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence and that the charge to the jury was prejudicially misleading. In my view, the trial court did not err in its alternative ruling. I would therefore reverse the district court’s ruling granting the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and affirm on the alternative ruling for a new trial.