Court Opinion

ID: 9793357
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:46:26.544183+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:04:35.191369
License: Public Domain

DURHAM, Justice
(concurring separately in result):
I concur with the opinion of the Chief Justice in affirming Carl Anderton’s conviction of the crimes of production of marijuana and possession of marijuana with intent to distribute for value. See, U.C.A., 1953, §§ 58-37-8(a)(i) & (ii) (Supp.1981). However, I believe that there is insufficient evidence to convict his wife Lana Anderton. The standard of review, as cited by the Chief Justice’s opinion, authorizes this Court to overturn a conviction when the evidence is so lacking or inconclusive that reasonable minds must entertain a doubt of guilt. The evidence in this case is so inadequate as to compel such reasonable doubt of guilt in the case of Mrs. Anderton.
The issue here is whether the facts in the record are sufficient to establish Mrs. An-derton’s guilt for offenses which require both knowledge and intent. See, U.C.A., 1953, § 58-37-8(a) (Supp.1981). Of the two elements of possession with intent to distribute, possession must first be shown. While this Court has stated that “[unlawful possession does not necessarily mean that the substance be found on the person of the accused or that he have sole and exclusive possession thereof,” to prove constructive possession, the evidence must show that the drugs were “subject to [the accused’s] dominion and control.” State v. Carlson, Utah, 635 P.2d 72, 74 (1981) (footnotes omitted).1 Lana Anderton’s conviction on this charge was based solely on her joint ownership of and residence in the home where the drugs were found. There is substantial support for the rule that where a defendant is in nonexclusive possession or occupancy of the premises on which controlled substances are found, there must be some additional incriminating evidence to establish guilt of possession:
[P]roof of a proprietary interest in or regular occupancy of the premises alone is not sufficient to prove constructive possession.
United States v. Davis, 562 F.2d 681, 693 (D.C.Cir.1977). (emphasis in original). The Supreme Court of Virginia has stated that:
There is no presumption of knowing or intentional possession of the marijuana from [defendant’s] occupancy of the residence. Her occupancy of the premises as a cotenant, however, is a factor to be considered with other evidence in determining whether she had constructive possession.
Eckhart v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 447, 281 S.E.2d 853, 855 (1981) (citations omitted). See also United States v. Lawson, 682 F.2d 1012, 1016-18 (D.C.Cir.1982), Evans v. United States, 257 F.2d 121 (9th Cir.1958). One *1264summary of the general rule reads as follows:
[W]here the defendant is in nonexclusive possession of premises on which illicit drugs are found, it cannot be inferred that he knew of the presence of such drugs and had control of them, unless there are other incriminating statements or circumstances tending to buttress such an inference.
Annot., 56 A.L.R.3d 948, 957 (1974 & Supp.1982).
In light of the requirement of other incriminating circumstances in addition to mere occupancy, the facts of each case are critical and must be presented in detail. Some of the key factual determinations which have supported findings of constructive possession in other cases are: 1) the defendant’s presence at the time the drugs were found, with emphasis on the fact that the drugs were in plain or open view, see United States v. Lawson, supra; United States v. Davis, supra; Ford v. State, 37 Md.App. 373, 377 A.2d 577 (1977); Eckhart v. Commonwealth, supra; 2) the defendant’s access to the drugs, see United States v. Davis, supra; State v. Brown, 80 N.J. 587, 404 A.2d 1111, 1115 (1979); 3) the proximity of defendant to the drugs, see Ford v. State, supra, although “[mjere proximity to the controlled substance ... is insufficient to establish possession.” Eckhart v. Commonwealth, supra, at 450, 281 S.E.2d at 855; see also Wright v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 669, 232 S.E.2d 733 (1977) (where the defendant, although not residing in the apartment, was found sitting in a bedroom next to a friend who was injecting himself with heroin, and substantial quantities of heroin were found three feet from the defendant; the defendant was acquitted despite evidence of history of heroin use); 4) evidence indicating that the “defendant was participating with others in the mutual use and enjoyment of the contraband”; Ford v. State, supra, at 382, 377 A.2d at 581-82 (quoting Folk v. State, 11 Md.App. 508, 514-18, 275 A.2d 184, 187-89 (1971)); and 5) incriminating statements, Evans v. United States, supra.2
Thus, it is clear that, in finding constructive possession of controlled substances in nonexclusive occupancy settings, courts have relied on extensive and detailed factual evidence. In contrast,, the facts as stipulated in this case3 consist of a confirmation that the defendants owned and resided in the house where the warrant search was made, a list of the items found in that search, most of which were enclosed in two brown paper bags, and the statement made by defendant Carl Anderton that his wife knew nothing about the drugs and that he had just returned home with them. The only other relevant evidence in the record consists of testimony regarding the amounts of marijuana and hashish generally kept by an individual for personal use.4 There is no evidence as to where in the home the drugs were found or where the defendant Lana Anderton was when the officers entered the house. Moreover, there is no evidence of any incriminating conduct or statements of Lana Anderton. Thus, there is nothing which establishes that the drugs were in her view, accessible or even close to her, or that she was participating in the use of the drugs or knew of their presence in the house.
Similarly, there is no evidence in the record which shows Lana Anderton’s knowing or intentional involvement in the production of marijuana. . The only evidence is that of joint residence in the home where the plants were found; there is nothing to *1265establish how long the plants had been there or where they were found.
When the facts of this case are considered, particularly in light of the cases cited above, it requires a “leap of faith” to find that Lana Anderton is guilty solely on the basis of her marital relationship with her husband and their joint occupancy of the home. In view of the lack of other evidence, the self-inculpatory statement made by Carl Anderton that he had “just brought the drugs home” compels doubt about his wife’s guilt. Lana Anderton’s conviction should therefore be reversed.
STEWART and HOWE, JJ., concur in the concurring opinion of DURHAM, J.

. This case involved a husband and wife who, following a warrant search of their home, were charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute. Police officers searched the bedroom and found guns, drugs and paraphernalia, including sealing agent, plastic bags, measuring spoons, a funnel, a strainer and scales. The charges against the wife were dismissed.

. Other evidentiary factors which have been recognized by courts in determining guilt of possession in nonexclusive occupancy cases include suspicious behavior, previous sale of drugs and drug use. See Annot., supra.

. There was no evidence offered by the State on this issue except for a brief written stipulation of fact.

.That testimony related to use amounts for an individual. Presumably those amounts should have been doubled to determine the amounts for the personal consumption of both defendants.