Court Opinion

ID: 9741302
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:52:58.953671+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:23.304747
License: Public Domain

HENDERSON, Justice
(concurring in part, dissenting in part).
I would reverse the trial court’s order denying appellant a reduction in alimony. A review of the economic posture of the respective parties clearly indicates that ap-pellee is not a needy recipient of alimony. On the contrary, her monetary status greatly exceeds that of her ex-husband.
First, as the trial court noted, appellant has experienced a “drastic reduction” in income since the 1976 proceedings. This reduction was caused by the necessity of appellant selling his chiropractic practice due to the chronically severe crippling of his hands. Appellant’s present income consists of $828 per month from payments received on realty which appellant was forced to sell to support himself, his estranged wife and their child. Appellant also receives $551 as monthly accrued interest on savings accumulated during the years he was able to practice his profession. Between October of 1979 and October of 1980, appellant received one-third of the fees collected from his former patients through the chiropractor who purchased his practice. Currently, appellant is not a practicing chiropractor and, due to the arthritic condition of his hands, appears to have reached the end of his professional career.
In its correspondence to the parties’ attorneys in December of 1979, the trial court stated that “it appears [appellant’s] income level has dropped below $3,000 per month— and on the most conservative basis may have dropped below $2,000 per month. That is a substantial change in circumstances from 1976.” I agree that a substantial change in circumstances has occurred since 1976, and point out that a mere change in circumstances is sufficient for a modification of alimony to occur. Blare v. Blare, 302 N.W.2d 787 (S.D.1981).
It is true, as the majority points out, that surgery might alleviate much of appellant’s discomfort and possibly enable him to resume his chiropractic practice. I find it hard to fathom, however, the “voluntary” nature of appellant’s income reduction. Agreed, appellant apparently does not wish to undergo the rather complex surgical procedure and resulting year of incapacitation. But does appellant’s decision not to have surgery at the age of sixty necessarily mean he “voluntarily” reduced his income? Did appellant “voluntarily” cause the joints in his trained hands to swell-up, thereby inflicting upon himself such pain that work became a painful daily exercise in his profession? The answer to these questions is an obvious “no.”
It is absurd to believe that appellant would avoid surgery merely to reduce his income, thereby possibly reducing his alimony obligation. This Court long ago concluded that the ability of the alimony obligor to pay is a paramount consideration in determining whether alimony obligations should be reduced. Vert v. Vert, 3 S.D. 619, 54 N.W. 655 (1893). “The fact that the husband has suffered a serious impairment of health or physical condition ... since the entry of a decree for alimony or maintenance may authorize a reduction, suspension, or termination of alimony payments where his condition affects his ability to pay.” Annot. 18 A.L.R.2d 45 (1951). See also Silver v. Silver, 269 Ala. 517, 113 So.2d 921 (1959); Lewis v. Lewis, 213 Ark. 262, 209 S.W.2d 874 (1948); Martin v. Martin, 79 Cal.App.2d 409, 179 P.2d 655 (1947); Berkowitz v. Berkowitz, 239 Ga. 1, 236 S.E.2d 7 (1977); Bulmer v. Bulmer, 28 Ill.App.3d 406, 328 N.E.2d 622 (1975); Siders v. Siders, 227 Iowa 764, 288 N.W. 909 (1939); Slagle v. Slagle, 205 La. 694, 17 So.2d 923 (1944); Altenbach v. Altenbach, 162 S.W.2d 361 (Mo.App.1942); 24 Am.Jur.2d Divorce and Separation § 678 (1966). It is unconscionable to require appellant to ply his profession with proficiency and pain (bone rubbing on bone) so as to enable appellee to enrich her already comfortable economic status.
*920Coupled with appellant’s decreased ability to provide alimony is the fact that appellee cannot realistically be said to require alimony. Appellee is currently employed and grossing approximately $14,560 annually. Furthermore, she owns $209,306 worth of assets, including certificates of deposit which alone total over $100,000. At the hearing on the motion for modification, ap-pellee testified that it cost her $8,336 per year to raise and adequately provide for the parties’ son. When appellee’s own income is added to appellant’s child support obligation of $250 per month, appellee’s yearly income comes to $17,560. It is significant that this total does not entail any interest and/or earnings accrued from appellee’s stock, certificates of deposit, rental income, savings, or mutual funds. The record simply does not reflect that appellee needs alimony.
As the trial court stated, appellee’s income and capital assets have increased since 1976. The trial court also pointed out, however, that inflation has offset this increase. If this be true, would not the same inflationary factors have even more severely eroded appellant’s income, in light of the fact that appellant’s income had decreased, not increased, over the same period of time? The answer is clearly a resounding “yes.”
As I have recently expressed, the economic need of an alimony recipient must be considered when reviewing the equity of such an award. Lanphear v. Lanphear, 303 N.W.2d 576 (S.D.1981) (Henderson, Justice, concurring in part, dissenting in part); Herrboldt v. Herrboldt, 303 N.W.2d 571 (S.D.1981) (Henderson, Justice, dissenting). “The fact that the wife has acquired a substantial amount of property, or that her property has increased in value, after the entry of a decree for alimony or maintenance is an important consideration in determining whether and to what extent the decree should be modified.” Annot. 18 A.L. R.2d 74 (1951). See also Hornbaker v. Hornbaker, 25 Ariz.App. 577, 545 P.2d 425 (1976); Brady v. Brady, 94 Cal.App.2d 1, 210 P.2d 69 (1949); Anderson v. Anderson, 333 So.2d 484 (Fla.App.1976); Broday v. Broday, 43 Ill.App.3d 628, 2 Ill.Dec. 151, 357 N.E.2d 128 (1976); Loyacano v. Loyacano, 358 So.2d 304 (La.1978); Eaton v. Eaton, 237 S.W. 896 (Mo.App.1922); Sayland v. Sayland, 267 N.C. 378, 148 S.E.2d 218 (1966); Lines v. Lines, 69 S.D. 299, 9 N.W.2d 705 (1943).
In conclusion, I must agree with the Kentucky Court of Appeals when it stated that “[theoretically, alimony or maintenance is based in part on a consideration of the needs of the parties as well as their respective abilities to meet them.” Gann v. Gann, 347 S.W.2d 540, 542 (Ky.App.1961). Applying this basic theory of equity to the particulars of this case, leads me to the inevitable conclusion that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied appellant’s motion for a termination of alimony.