Court Opinion

ID: 9856099
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:38:08.881759+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:26:02.112978
License: Public Domain

Baker, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
These two actions, brought to recover actual and punitive damages for injuries sustained by two minors as the result *433of collision between an automobile in which they were riding, driven by their mother, and a train of appellant, Southern Railway Company, operated by appellant, B. L. Wells, engineer, were tried together, and resulted in a verdict for each of the minors in the amount of $1,500.00 punitive damages, but no actual damages. Immediately after the rendition of the verdict, and before the jury was dismissed, the appellants noted a motion in each case for judgment non obstante vere-dicto, which motions were marked heard and at a later date orally argued. The grounds for the motions were those upon which appellants had previously moved for directed verdict, and the additional ground that a verdict for punitive damages only will not be permitted to stand in an action brought for traumatic injuries.
The exceptions raise seeral issues, but it seems necessary to consider only the first which is set forth in appellants’ brief as follows: “Did the lower Court err in refusing the defendants’ motions for judgments non obstante veredicto made upon the ground that a verdict for punitive damages only will not be permitted to stand in an action brought for personal injury?”
There was testimony to the effect that both of the minors, respondents herein, received injuries of a nature such as would have supported verdicts for actual damages in their behalf if the jury had concluded that their injuries resulted from the negligence of the appellants and as the proximate cause thereof. There was also testimony which the trial Judge deemed sufficient to require the submission to the jury of the issue of punitive damages. The law on both subjects was fully charged by the trial Judge.
The question involved herein has been definitely settled in this State. It was held in Cook v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co., 183 S. C. 279, 190 S. E. 923, 924, that where actual damages are sought for traumatic injuries, or injuries to property, and in addition punitive damages are sought upon the ground that the act causing such injuries was willful, in *434order to sustain a verdict for punitive damages, actual damages in some amount must be found. It was further held in that case that the jury, having absolved the appellant from inflicting actual damages on respondent by failing to bring in a verdict for such damages, there was no legal liability upon which to predicate a verdict for punitive damages, and the trial Judge should have set aside the verdict for punitive damages only and entered judgment for the appellant. We quote from Cook v. A. C. L. R. R. Co., supra:
“The rule is this state appears to be: Where the pleadings allege and the evidence shows a conscious and willful violation, invasion, or infringement of a legal right, the law will presume damages sufficient to sustain an action, even though such damages may be only nominal and not capable of exact measurement; and in such case a verdict for punitive damages without the finding of actual damages will be sustained, since it will be presumed that such nominal damages incapable of admeasurement have been merged in the punitive damages. But where the actual damages sought are for traumatic injury, or injury to property, then in order to sustain a verdict for punitive damages, there must be actual damages capable of being measured in terms of dollars and cents — actual damages in some amount must be found independent of punitive damages.
“This in nowise conflicts with suits against telegraph companies under what is ordinarily known as the ‘Mental Anguish Statute,’ although it is through quoting and citing from some of the cases where the mental anguish statute aided plaintiff that some of the confusion has arisen,” (Emphasis added.)
There is no distinction between the cases now being decided and the Cook case, in so far as concerns applicable legal principles, and it is decisive of the issue above set forth.
It is contended by respondents that a duty rested upon the appellants to object to the form of the verdicts before the jury was discharged, and that the matter could have been *435easily settled one way or another under proper instructions of the Court. The trial Judge could not have instructed the jury to again consider the case and bring in verdicts in some amount as actual damages, because such action on his part would have been tantamount to directing verdicts for actual damages in favor of the respective respondents against the appellants; and appellants are not complaining of the form of the verdicts, but are alleging that the verdicts in this form absolve them, as a matter of law, from all liability to pay any amount as damages. However, it is unnecessary to decide if it was within the power of the trial Judge to have corrected, or permitted the jury in any manner to reconsider, the verdicts that were rendered. We cannot see wherein any duty rested upon appellants to have verdicts corrected, the result of which entitled them to verdicts in their favor notwithstanding, as is above seen.
It seems to us that the respondents were the ones to be concerned about the form of the verdicts in the light of the principles laid down in the Cook case. It is stated in the argument of the respondents that the appellants did not raise the objection to the form of the verdicts until long after the jury was dismissed. The agreed “Statement” in the transcript of record is that “Immediately after the rendition of the verdicts and before the jury was dismissed the defendants (appellants) noted a motion in each case for judgment non obstante veredicto.” This was the only motion which it appears the interests of the appellants suggested should be made. The issue here is very different from that in Burns v. Babb, 190 S. C. 508, 3 S. E. (2d) 247, cited by respondent. This procedure finds a corollary in cases where the jury finds against the master and not against a co-defendant servant where the sole delicts alleged in the complaint are those of this particular servant, and the liability of the master rests solely upon the doctrine of respondeat superior. See Sparks v. A. C. L. R. R. Co., 104 S. C. 266, 88 S. E. 739.
It is contended that Rule 79 of the Circuit Court does not authorize the trial Judge to entertain a motion for judgment *436in favor of the defendant notwithstanding because of the form of the verdict. This position is wholly untenable. If the necessary result of the verdict is that the defendant is not liable to the plaintiff at all, the appropriate relief of the defendant is to have the verdict set aside and a verdict directed in favor of the defendant notwithstanding the jury’s verdict in favor, of the plaintiff.
There is nothing in the cases of Glover v. Charleston & S. Ry. Co., 57 S. C. 228, 35 S. E. 510; Steedman v. S. C. & G. E. Ry. Co., 66 S. C. 542, 45 S. E. 84; Jones v. A. C. L. R. R. Co., 108 S. C. 217, 94 S. E. 490; Fields v. Lancaster Mills, 77 S. C. 546, 58 S. E. 609, 11 L. R. A., N. S., 822, 122 Am. St. Rep. 593, and Doster v. Telegraph Co., 77 S. C. 56, 57 S. E. 671, which would authorize this Court to sustain the verdicts in these cases. Most of the above cases are referred to and distinguished in the opinion in the Cook case, and the inapplicability to these cases of the principles laid down in those cases will be seen by a reading of the Cook decision. The language of that case which controls and renders it necessary for these verdicts to be set aside is as follows: “In this case, involving bodily injuries, all issues were submitted to the jury. We know of no case or authority in this jurisdiction where the general rule has been departed from, where the damages sought were for traumatic injuries or for property damage. The findings of the jury for punitive damages alone expressly refutes a finding of the jury as in actual damages.” In connection with this principle, see the recent case of Allen v. A. & C. Air Line Ry. Co., S. C. 57 S. E. (2d) 249.
Aside from the foregoing, the record discloses that the only reasonable inference which can be drawn from the testimony is that the injuries suffered by the plaintiffs-respondents resulted from the negligence of their mother, which negligence was so gross as to amount in law to willfulness, and that her negligence was the proximate cause.
*437The judgments should be reversed and the cases remanded for entry of judgments in favor of appellants.
Taylor, J., concurs.