Court Opinion

ID: 2963509
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:11:09.451716+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:42.006845
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            United States Court of Appeals
                            United States Court of Appeals
                                For the First Circuit
                                For the First Circuit
                                 ____________________

        No. 94-2198

                         EDWARD J. MCALEER, ADMINISTRATOR OF
                         THE ESTATE OF JAMES F. MCALEER, AND
                      HARDY LEBEL AND JOAN LEBEL, ADMINISTRATORS
                          OF THE ESTATE OF THOMAS A. LEBEL,

                               Plaintiffs, Appellants,

                                          v.

                        TRAVER C. SMITH, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE
                             ESTATE OF STUART A. FINLAY,

                                 Defendant, Appellee.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                           FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

                    [Hon. Ronald R. Lagueux, U.S. District Judge]
                                             ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                  Cyr, Circuit Judge,
                                       _____________
                           Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                     ____________________
                              and Stahl, Circuit Judge.
                                         _____________

                                 ____________________

            Edward  M.  Pitts  with  whom Pitts  &  Pitts  was  on  brief  for
            _________________             _______________
        appellants.
            Holly S. Harvey with whom  Thornton, Davis & Murray,  P.A., was on
            _______________            _______________________________
        brief for appellee.

                                 ____________________

                                    June 19, 1995
                                 ____________________

                      STAHL, Circuit Judge.  Plaintiffs-appellants appeal
                      STAHL, Circuit Judge.
                             _____________

            from  the  district  court's  grant of  summary  judgment  to

            defendant-appellee in this admiralty case.  We affirm.

                                          I.
                                          I.
                                          __

                                      BACKGROUND
                                      BACKGROUND
                                      __________

                      On  June 3,  1984,  the Tall  Ship  S/V MARQUES,  a

            participant in  the Cutty Sark International  Tall Ships Race

            between Bermuda and Nova Scotia, encountered a violent squall

            about  eighty miles  northeast  of Bermuda.   Almost  without

            warning, and within seconds of starting to take on water, the

            vessel sank  with the  loss of nineteen  of the  twenty-eight

            persons on board, including the plaintiffs' decedents and the

            defendant's decedent, the vessel's  master or captain, Stuart

            A.  Finlay.   Plaintiffs'  decedents,  James  F. McAleer  and

            Thomas  A. Lebel,  were  on board  under  the auspices  of  a

            sailing program run by the American Sail Training Association

            ("ASTA"),  which had arranged  for six sail  trainees to crew

            for the MARQUES during the race.

                      Plaintiffs  brought  claims  against defendant  for

            unseaworthiness  under   the   general  maritime   law;   for

            negligence  under  the  Jones  Act,  46  U.S.C.     688;  for

            negligence under  the general maritime law;  and for wrongful

            death under the Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C.    761-

            768 ("DOHSA").   The district court  granted summary judgment

            to defendant, holding  that defendant could not be liable for

                                         -2-
                                          2

            unseaworthiness  because  Finlay  was  not an  owner  of  the

            MARQUES,  McAleer v.  Smith, 818  F.  Supp. 486,  494 (D.R.I.
                      _______     _____

            1993); for negligence under the Jones Act, because Finlay did

            not  employ  plaintiffs'   decedents,  id.  at   493-94;  for
                                                   ___

            negligence  under the  general  maritime  law,  because  such

            claims cannot  be brought by  seamen against masters,  id. at
                                                                   ___

            496; or under DOHSA,  because DOHSA is a derivative  cause of

            action requiring the existence  of another claim not existent

            here,  id.  at  496-97.    From  that  judgment  this  appeal
                   ___

            followed.1

                                         II.
                                         II.
                                         ___

                                      DISCUSSION
                                      DISCUSSION
                                      __________

            A.  Standard of Review
            ______________________

                      As always,  we review  a district court's  grant of

            summary judgment de novo and, like the district court, review
                             __ ____

            the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.

            See, e.g., Lareau v. Page, 39 F.3d  384, 387 (1st Cir. 1994).
            ___  ____  ______    ____

            Summary   judgment  is   appropriate  when   "the  pleadings,

            depositions,  answers to  interrogatories, and  admissions on

            file, together with  the affidavits, if any, show  that there

                                
            ____________________

            1.  The district court granted defendant's motion for summary
            judgment  on April 8,  1993.  The  district court nonetheless
            held a  trial to  determine  damages because  it had  entered
            default judgments  against the co-owners of  the MARQUES, see
                                                                      ___
            McAleer v. Smith, 860  F. Supp. 924, 930 n.10  (D.R.I. 1994).
            _______    _____
            On October 18, 1994, the district  court entered judgments of
            $403,246.57 for Lebel and $322,597.25 for McAleer against the
            co-owners, and entered final  judgments in favor of defendant
            in the instant appeal and other defendants.

                                         -3-
                                          3

            is no  genuine issue as  to any  material fact  and that  the

            moving party is entitled to  a judgment as a matter  of law."

            Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

            B.  Unseaworthiness
            ___________________

                      Shipowners  are  liable  to  indemnify  seamen2 for

            injuries "caused by the unseaworthiness of the vessel  or its

            appurtenant appliances and equipment."   Seas Shipping Co. v.
                                                     _________________

            Sieracki,  328 U.S. 85,  90 (1946)  (citing The  Osceola, 189
            ________                                    ____________

            U.S. 158 (1903)).   Unseaworthiness "is essentially a species

            of liability without fault . .  . . It is a form  of absolute

            duty."   Id. at 94-95;  see also  Grant Gilmore &  Charles L.
                     ___            ___ ____

            Black,  Jr., The  Law  of Admiralty    6-41,  at 393  (2d ed.
                         ______________________

            1975).  Shipowners may  not delegate their duty to  provide a

            seaworthy ship.  Sieracki, 328 U.S. at 94 n.11.
                             ________

                      Plaintiffs  concede  that Finlay  did  not  own the

            MARQUES, which was co-owned by Mark Shirley Portal Litchfield

            and Robin  Patrick Cecil-Wright,  the sole principals  in the

            China Clipper Company, an unincorporated holding company that

            held title to the  MARQUES.  Plaintiffs argue,  however, that

            Finlay is  nonetheless liable for unseaworthiness  because he

            was an owner pro hac vice.
                         ___ ___ ____

                                
            ____________________

            2.  For  the purposes  of  this summary  judgment motion,  we
            assume arguendo,  as Judge Selya  did for other  MARQUES sail
                   ________
            trainees in  Heath v.  American Sail  Training Ass'n,  644 F.
                         _____     _____________________________
            Supp. 1459, 1468 (D.R.I.  1986) (Selya, J.), that plaintiffs'
            decedents were seamen despite the fact that they  were unpaid
            (indeed,  themselves paying  for  the privilege  of being  on
            board as trainees).   

                                         -4-
                                          4

                      An "owner pro  hac vice"  of a vessel  is "one  who
                                ___  ___ ____

            `stands in the place of  the owner for the voyage  or service

            contemplated  and bears  the  owner's responsibilities,  even

            though the latter  remains the legal  owner of the  vessel.'"

            Matute v. Lloyd  Berm. Lines, Ltd., 931 F.2d 231, 235 n.2 (3d
            ______    ________________________

            Cir.)  (quoting Aird v. Weyerhaeuser S.S.  Co., 169 F.2d 606,
                            ____    ______________________

            610 (3d Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 959 (1949)), cert.
                                _____ ______                        _____

            denied,  502  U.S.  919  (1991).   In  effect,  for liability
            ______

            purposes,  an owner pro hac  vice is treated  as a shipowner.
                                ___ ___  ____

            See  Reed v.  The  Yaka, 373  U.S.  410, 412-13  (1963);  see
            ___  ____     _________                                   ___

            generally  Gilmore & Black, The  Law of Admiralty    4-23, at
            _________                   _____________________

            242.   Thus,  an owner  pro hac  vice may  be liable  for the
                                    ___ ___  ____

            unseaworthiness of a vessel.   See Reed, 373 U.S.  at 412-13.
                                           ___ ____

            In general,  if there  is an  owner pro  hac vice,  the title
                                                ___  ___ ____

            owner  will be  absolved  of personal  liability (except  for

            defective conditions  that existed  before the owner  pro hac
                                                                  ___ ___

            vice took control of  the vessel).  See Ramos  v. Beauregard,
            ____                                ___ _____     ___________

            Inc., 423 F.2d 916, 917-18 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
            ____                                   _____ ______

            865 (1970); see generally Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Admiralty and
                        ___ _________                       _____________

            Maritime Law   5-3, at 168 (1987).  
            ____________

                      Admiralty cases  have recognized only two  types of

            owners  pro hac  vice:  demise,  or bareboat,  charterers and
                    ___ ___  ____

            captains of fishing vessels operated under agreements, called

            "lays."  A  demise charterer  is "one who  contracts for  the

            vessel  itself and  assumes  exclusive  possession,  control,

                                         -5-
                                          5

            command  and  navigation  thereof  for a  specified  period,"

            Stephenson  v. Star-Kist Caribe, Inc., 598 F.2d 676, 679 (1st
            __________     ______________________

            Cir. 1979), in  contrast to  a time or  voyage charterer  who

            "contracts  not  for the  vessel  itself but  for  a specific

            service  of the vessel, such  as carriage of  goods, which is

            rendered  by  the  owner's  master  and  crew,"  id.   Demise
                                                             ___

            charters are  created when  "the owner of  the vessel  . .  .

            completely   and   exclusively   relinquish[es]   possession,

            command, and navigation thereof  to the demisee.  [They  are]

            therefore tantamount  to, though  just short of,  an outright

            transfer of  ownership.   However, anything short  of such  a

            complete transfer is a time or voyage charter party  or not a

            charter  party at all."   Guzman v. Pichirilo,  369 U.S. 698,
                                      ______    _________

            699-700  (1962) (internal  quotation and  citations omitted);

            see generally Gilmore &  Black, The Law of Admiralty    4-21,
            ___ _________                   ____________________

            at   240.    While  demise   charterers  may  be  liable  for

            unseaworthiness as owners pro hac vice, see Reed, 373 U.S. at
                                      ___ ___ ____  ___ ____

            412-13, time or voyage charterers may not be, see Stephenson,
                                                          ___ __________

            598  F.2d  at 679;  see also  Rodriguez v.  McAllister Bros.,
                                ___ ____  _________     _________________

            Inc., 736  F.2d 813, 815 (1st Cir. 1984).  The mere fact that
            ____

            a time or voyage charterer "`has some control over the master

            .  . . [or] selects the routes to be taken or the cargo to be

            carried  does  not  make  him   the  owner  pro  hac  vice.'"
                                                        ___  ___  ____

            Stephenson,  598  F.2d at  681  (quoting  Fitzgerald v.  A.L.
            __________                                __________     ____

                                         -6-
                                          6

            Burbank & Co., 451 F.2d 670, 676 (2d Cir. 1971)) (alterations
            _____________

            in Stephenson).  
               __________

                      Captains  of vessels  operated under  fishing lays,

            which  are agreements under which the participating fishermen

            share the catch, may also be  liable as owners pro hac  vice.
                                                           ___ ___  ____

            See Cromwell v.  Slaney, 65  F.2d 940, 941  (1st Cir.  1933).
            ___ ________     ______

            Such  situations  are  similar  to  demise  charters,  for  a

            fishing-lay captain will only be found to be an owner pro hac
                                                                  ___ ___

            vice  if "the  captain employs  the members  of the  crew and
            ____

            controls all the operations of the vessel, both in purchasing

            supplies for the  voyage, in determining where he  will fish,

            how long, and in disposing of the catch and  settling all the

            bills."  Id.
                     ___

                      Plaintiffs cite  no case,  and we have  found none,

            outside  the context of a  fishing lay that  accords a master

            status as an owner  pro hac vice.  In fact, many of our cases
                                ___ ___ ____

            find  an owner  liable  precisely because  the owner  (rather
                                              _______

            than, say,  the time charterer) provided the master and crew.

            See Stephenson, 598 F.2d at 680.  As a general rule, we think
            ___ __________

            that  masters are not owners  pro hac vice  because a master,
                                          ___ ___ ____

            despite  having  control  over  the  vessel,  exercises  that

            control on  behalf of the  owner.   Cf. 46 U.S.C.    10101(1)
                                                ___

            (defining  "master" as  "the individual  having command  of a

            vessel");  46 U.S.C.     10101(2) (defining  "owner" as  "the

            person to whom the vessel belongs").

                                         -7-
                                          7

                      Plaintiffs argue, however, that even if masters are

            not generally considered  to be owners pro hac  vice, Captain
                                                   ___ ___  ____

            Finlay had responsibilities for  and interests in the MARQUES

            beyond  those of an ordinary master that render him liable as

            an owner pro hac  vice.  In particular, plaintiffs  point out
                     ___ ___  ____

            that  Finlay had  full  operational control  of the  MARQUES,

            except that he had to report itinerary changes to the owners;

            that  Finlay drew the  ship's regulations for  both mates and

            crew members,  and that  everyone on  board  was required  to

            "read" his orders; that  Finlay's contract with the MARQUES's

            owners designated  him as  "self-employed";  that Finlay  was

            engaged in  promoting the  business of  the MARQUES,  such as

            charters and cruises, for  which he was paid a  commission in

            addition to his  monthly base pay;3 that  Finlay was required

            to solicit contributions  towards expenses and was  obligated

            whenever possible  to  negotiate directly  with suppliers  to

            obtain free or discounted  supplies in exchange for publicity

            or other recompense arrangements;  that Finlay was a founding

            member and  chief instructor of the  Antiguan Maritime School

            and expected to use the  MARQUES as a training ship to  train

            young  Antiguans   in  seamanship;   and  that   the  "Ship's

            Regulations"  provided  that  one  person, the  captain,  was

                                
            ____________________

            3.  Although he  received  1000 British  pounds sterling  per
            month while  the MARQUES was at sea  and 500 pounds per month
            while ashore,  plaintiffs also  argue that Finlay  was not  a
            salaried employee.

                                         -8-
                                          8

            solely  responsible for the safety  of the ship  and those on

            board.  Plaintiffs also point out that their decedents had no

            contact with the MARQUES's actual  owners, but only with ASTA

            and Finlay, and  make much of  the fact that  Finlay had  the

            right  to direct  and  control plaintiffs'  decedents in  the

            performance of their duties as sail trainees and the right to

            fire and/or remove them from the ship.

                      We fail to see how these facts  convert Finlay into

            an owner pro hac vice.  In determining that Finlay was not an
                     ___ ___ ____

            owner pro hac  vice, we are  mindful not only  of the law  of
                  ___ ___  ____

            agency,  but also of the  fact that time  charterers, who may

            exercise  large  amounts of  control  over  the vessels  they

            charter, are  not subject  to liability  for unseaworthiness,

            see Stephenson, 598 F.2d  at 679.  While we  take plaintiffs'
            ___ __________

            arguments  in turn,  even considered  cumulatively we  do not

            think  they support Finlay being  considered an owner pro hac
                                                                  ___ ___

            vice.
            ____

                      While Finlay did  exercise operational control over

            the MARQUES, that control  is inherent in being a  master; it

            does   not  convert  Finlay  into  an  owner  pro  hac  vice.
                                                          ___  ___  ____

            Similarly,  drawing  up  the ship's  regulations  and  giving

            orders  are  part  and  parcel  of  a  master's  duties; such

            activities  do not accord Finlay  status as an  owner pro hac
                                                                  ___ ___

            vice.   That  Finlay was  designated as  "self-employed" also
            ____

            does  not make  him an  owner pro  hac vice.   Despite  being
                                          ___  ___ ____

                                         -9-
                                          9

            "self-employed," Finlay  still functioned as an  agent of the

            owners; he did not assume  control of the MARQUES in  his own

            right and, accordingly, cannot  be said to have stood  in the

            place of the owner.

                      We  also do not think that the fact that Finlay was

            to receive  a  commission  for  business he  brought  to  the

            MARQUES makes  him an  owner pro hac  vice, any  more than  a
                                         ___ ___  ____

            salesman  paid a commission  for his  sales or  a businessman

            paid a bonus  for business  brought in or  money saved  would

            become  an owner of the business.  Similarly, that Finlay was

            required to  negotiate with  suppliers does not  make him  an

            owner pro  hac vice; rather,  it was just  one of  the duties
                  ___  ___ ____

            imposed on him by the  MARQUES's actual owners.  There  is no

            evidence that Finlay was to share in any savings generated by

            these negotiations.  Indeed,  the owners were responsible for

            all expenses  associated  with the  MARQUES, including  those

            incurred by  captains for generating  business or negotiating

            for supplies.

                      Nor do we think that Finlay's  role in the Antiguan

            Maritime  School converts  him into  an  owner pro  hac vice.
                                                           ___  ___ ____

            While  at some point in the future this may have brought some

            business to  the MARQUES, thus being  mutually beneficial for

            both  Finlay and  the  owners of  the  MARQUES, there  is  no

            evidence that  Finlay had  actually brought such  business to

            the  MARQUES  or that  arrangements  for such  a  venture had

                                         -10-
                                          10

            actually been made.   Nor  is there any  evidence to  suggest

            that Finlay had entered into any sort of partnership with the

            owners of the MARQUES  regarding the school; the implication,

            therefore, is  that Finlay  would have received  his standard

            commission for bringing business to the MARQUES if in fact he

            ever brought such business from the school.

                      The fact that the  Ship's Regulations provided that

            the captain was solely responsible for the safety of the ship

            and those on board does not make Finlay liable for the ship's

            unseaworthiness,  because a  shipowner's  duty to  provide  a

            seaworthy ship is nondelegable.  See Sieracki, 328 U.S. at 94
                                             ___ ________

            n.11.  Holding Finlay to be an owner pro hac vice because the
                                                 ___ ___ ____

            Ship's Regulations made him solely responsible for the safety

            of  the ship would defeat the rule of nondelegability, for it

            would absolve the  owners of  liability for  unseaworthiness.

            See Ramos, 423 F.2d  at 917-18 (holding that owner  could not
            ___ _____

            be "liable  for unseaworthy  conditions arising after  he has

            parted with control over  his vessel under a demise  charter"

            and that  "a shipowner cannot escape  liability by delegating

            partial control of his vessel to an independent contractor").

                      That plaintiffs' decedents had  no contact with the

            MARQUES's  owners, but  only with ASTA  and Finlay,  does not

            convert Finlay into an owner pro hac vice.   Finlay played no
                                         ___ ___ ____

            part  in hiring  plaintiffs' decedents  or in  arranging with

            ASTA to have  paying sail trainees on board.   Finlay was not

                                         -11-
                                          11

            to share in  the profits  from the  owners' arrangement  with

            ASTA, nor in  any profits from the vessel's  participation in

            the  tall  ships  race.    That  Finlay  had  authority  over

            plaintiffs' decedents is not indicative of status as an owner

            pro  hac vice,  for any  master would  necessarily have  such
            ___  ___ ____

            authority over his crew.

                      To the extent that plaintiffs argue that Finlay was

            a  partner  or co-venturer  with  the  MARQUES's owners,  the

            undisputed  facts make  clear, as  the district  court noted,

            that  Finlay had no ownership interest in the vessel, did not

            share in the profits from the vessel's operations, and had no

            control over  the vessel's  itinerary beyond the  operational

            control necessarily assumed by a captain.  The marketing  and

            commission arrangement raises no inference of a partnership.

                      Because  plaintiffs have  not  produced facts  that

            give rise to an inference that Finlay was either an owner pro
                                                                      ___

            hac  vice or a partner  in the MARQUES,  summary judgment was
            ___  ____

            properly granted to  defendant on plaintiffs' unseaworthiness

            claims.

            C.  The Jones Act
            _________________

                      Congress passed  the Jones Act in  1920 to abrogate

            the Supreme Court's holding in The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 175
                                           ___________

            (1903),  that  seamen could  not  recover  under the  general

            maritime law for the negligence  of the master or crew.   See
                                                                      ___

            generally  Gilmore & Black, The  Law of Admiralty    6-20, at
            _________                   _____________________

                                         -12-
                                          12

            325-28.    The Jones  Act4 provides  a  remedy to  a "seaman"

            injured  (or killed) "in the  course of his  employment."  46

            U.S.C.   688.  The Jones Act remedy is available only against

            the  seaman's  employer.     Cosmopolitan  Shipping   Co.  v.
                                         ____________________________

            McAllister,  337  U.S. 783,  787  n.6  (1949).   Accordingly,
            __________

            plaintiffs can recover against  defendant under the Jones Act

            only if Finlay was plaintiffs' decedents' employer.

                      Plaintiffs  contend that  if their  decedents "were

            employees of anyone," they  were employees of Captain Finlay.

            We do not  agree.  Although  Finlay exercised authority  over

            plaintiffs'  decedents, he  did so  only as  an agent  of the

                                
            ____________________

            4.  The Jones Act provides:

                           Any seaman who shall suffer personal
                      injury  in the  course of  his employment
                      may,  at his election, maintain an action
                      for damages  at law,  with  the right  of
                      trial  by  jury, and  in such  action all
                      statutes of the  United States  modifying
                      or  extending  the  common-law  right  or
                      remedy in  cases  of personal  injury  to
                      railway  employees  shall  apply; and  in
                      case  of the  death  of any  seaman as  a
                      result  of any  such personal  injury the
                      personal  representative  of such  seaman
                      may maintain an action for damages at law
                      with the  right of trial by  jury, and in
                      such  action all  statutes of  the United
                      States conferring or regulating the right
                      of  action  for  death  in  the  case  of
                      railway  employees  shall be  applicable.
                      Jurisdiction  in  such  actions shall  be
                      under the  court of the district in which
                      the  defendant  employer  resides  or  in
                      which his principal office is located.

            46 U.S.C.   688.

                                         -13-
                                          13

            owners,  and not on his own behalf.   Cf. Matute, 931 F.2d at
                                                  ___ ______

            236 (Holding  that  a  time  charterer  was  not  a  seaman's

            employer  when  "[t]he  owner .  .  .  ,  through the  ship's
                                                      ___________________

            captain,  hired Matute [the seaman] and eventually terminated
            _______

            him.  It set the amount of Matute's wages and was responsible

            for  paying  him.    The  captain  supervised  Matute in  his

            position as oiler.") (emphasis added).  Finlay had nothing to

            do with arranging with  ASTA for the sail  trainees to be  on

            board  the MARQUES;  accordingly, he  cannot be said  to have

            "hired" them  in any sense.   Nor was  Finlay to receive  any

            benefit  from  having the  sail  trainees  on board;  rather,

            monies paid  by the sail  trainees went to the  owners of the

            MARQUES,  with a small amount  reserved by ASTA  to cover its

            expenses.  

                      In  arguing  that  Finlay  should  be  held  to  be

            plaintiffs'  decedents' employer, plaintiffs  rely on many of

            the same reasons they relied on in arguing that Finlay was an

            owner pro hac  vice.   We need not  re-analyze those  reasons
                  ___ ___  ____

            here because they do not indicate that Finlay was an employer

            any  more than they  indicate that  he was  an owner  pro hac
                                                                  ___ ___

            vice.    Accordingly,  the district  court  properly  granted
            ____

            summary  judgment  to  defendant  on  plaintiffs'  Jones  Act

            claims.  

            D.  Negligence Under General Maritime Law
            _________________________________________

                                         -14-
                                          14

                      Plaintiffs argue that they are  entitled to recover

            from defendant for negligence  under the general maritime law

            on two separate theories.   First, plaintiffs argue that they

            have  such  a cause  of action  if  their decedents,  as sail

            trainees who each paid $750 to crew on the MARQUES, are found

            to  be passengers  rather  than seamen.   Second,  plaintiffs

            argue that if their  decedents were seamen, they nevertheless

            may  maintain a cause  of action  for negligence  against the

            master  under the  general maritime  law.  We  consider these

            arguments in turn.

                                         -15-
                                          15

                      1.  Recovery as Passengers
                      __________________________

                      Plaintiffs  now urge  that because  their decedents

            paid  to  crew  on  the   MARQUES,  they  may  be  considered

            passengers rather than seamen  and so have a cause  of action

            against the master for  negligence under the general maritime

            law.   Defendant argues, however, that  plaintiffs never made

            this  argument  to the  district  court,  and  that  in  fact

            plaintiffs fought hard to establish that their decedents were

            seamen, as  recovery for unseaworthiness and  under the Jones

            Act is limited to seamen.

                      When  asked at oral argument whether plaintiffs had

            raised  this argument  in  the  district  court,  plaintiffs'

            counsel  referred  the  court  to a  portion  of  plaintiffs'

            memorandum  of law  opposing defendant's  motion for  summary

            judgment.   In  turning to  plaintiffs' memorandum,  the most

            applicable statement we could find reads, "A general maritime

            claim for  negligence  exists no  matter what  the status  of

            Finlay was, even if he were found not to be an  owner pro hac
                                                                  ___ ___

            vice."   We do not view this  statement as preserving a claim
            ____

            stemming  from  plaintiffs'  decedents'  possible  status  as

            passengers.  In fact, in another portion of their memorandum,

            plaintiffs cited  Judge Selya's opinion in  Heath v. American
                                                        _____    ________

            Sail Training  Ass'n, 644 F.  Supp. 1459, 1463  (D.R.I. 1986)
            ____________________

            (Selya,  J.)  (dealing with  claims  by  other sail  trainees

            killed in  same  accident),  for the  proposition:    "It  is

                                         -16-
                                          16

            established that the ASTA trainees were considered to be part

            of  the  permanent  crew  and  divided  into  duty  watches."

            Because plaintiffs did not raise any claims stemming from the

            possible passenger status of  their decedents in the district

            court, we will not consider them on appeal.  See, e.g., Focus
                                                         ___  ____  _____

            Investment Assocs., Inc. v. American Title Ins. Co., 992 F.2d
            ________________________    _______________________

            1231, 1240 n.12 (1st Cir. 1993).

                      2.  Recovery as Seamen
                      ______________________

                      Plaintiffs argue that, even if their  decedents are

            considered  to  have  been  seamen,5  they  nonetheless   may

            maintain  a cause of action against the master for negligence

            under the  general maritime law.   Deciding whether  they are

            right requires us to examine the history of negligence  under

            the general maritime law.

                      As  a general matter, anyone who is the victim of a

            maritime tort is  entitled to bring  an action in  admiralty.

            See, e.g., Pope & Talbot, Inc. v.  Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 413-14
            ___  ____  ___________________     ____

            (1953)  (business invitees  may bring  a cause of  action for

            negligence);  cf. United NY &  NJ Sandy Hook  Pilots Ass'n v.
                          ___ ________________________________________

            Halecki,  358 U.S. 613,  632 (1959) ("the owner  of a ship in
            _______

            navigable  waters owes to all  who are on  board for purposes

            not  inimical  to  his   legitimate  interests  the  duty  of

            exercising   reasonable  care").     Seamen,   however,  were

                                
            ____________________

            5.  Defendant  does   not  contest   the  seaman   status  of
            plaintiffs' decedents  for purposes of  the summary  judgment
            motion.

                                         -17-
                                          17

            traditionally barred from exercising this remedy with respect

            to injuries caused by  "the negligence of the master,  or any

            member of the crew."  The  Osceola, 189 U.S. at 175; see also
                                  ____________                   ___ ____

            Gilmore  &  Black,  The Law  of  Admiralty     6-21, at  328.
                                ______________________

            Congress,  in response to the rule of The Osceola, passed the
                                                  ___________

            Jones Act in order to give seamen "the same rights to recover

            for negligence as other tort victims.  It follows, therefore,

            that,  if plaintiff  is a  seaman, he  can recover  under the

            Jones Act;  if he is not  a seaman, he can  recover under the

            general maritime law."  Gilmore & Black, The Law of Admiralty
                                                     ____________________

               6-21,  at  328-29.   Thus,  it  appears  that the  general

            maritime law affords seamen no  right to recover for injuries

            caused  by a negligent master  or crew member,  but that they

            may recover for  such injuries from their  employer under the

            Jones Act.

                      Plaintiffs make several arguments in an  attempt to

            get around  the  rule that  seamen have  no general  maritime

            cause  of action for injuries caused by the negligence of the

            master  or  crew.     First,  plaintiffs  cite  Cerqueira  v.
                                                            _________

            Cerqueira, 828  F.2d  863 (1st  Cir. 1987);  Stoot v.  D &  D
            _________                                    _____     ______

            Catering Serv., Inc., 807 F.2d 1197 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
            ____________________                            _____ ______

            484 U.S. 821 (1987);  Mahramas v. American Export Isbrandtsen
                                  ________    ___________________________

            Lines, Inc., 475 F.2d 165 (2d Cir. 1973); and Favaloro v. S/S
            ___________                                   ________    ___

            Golden  Gate, 687 F. Supp.  475 (N.D. Cal.  1987), which they
            ____________

            construe to  grant seamen  a cause  of action for  negligence

                                         -18-
                                          18

            under the general maritime law.  Upon examining each of these

            cases, however, we find them distinguishable.

                      In Cerqueira,  we allowed the equitable  owner of a
                         _________

            boat to  sue his brother, the legal  title owner of the boat,

            for  simple  negligence,  positing  that  jurisdiction seemed

            proper  on   the  basis  of  the   court's  general  maritime

            jurisdiction.    Cerqueira, 828  F.2d at  866.   We  did not,
                             _________

            however, consider the plaintiff  to be a "seaman," nor  do we

            think a shipowner would  generally be accorded seaman status.

            Thus,  while  Cerqueira may  be read  to  provide a  cause of
                          _________

            action for negligence under the general maritime law, it does

            not support plaintiffs' argument  that seamen are entitled to

            bring such an action for injuries arising from the negligence

            of the master or crew.

                      In Stoot, the Fifth Circuit considered the claim of
                         _____

            a  seaman injured  during  an altercation  with the  vessel's

            cook,  who  was employed  by  the  defendant, an  independent

            contractor providing catering  services on board  the vessel.

            The Fifth Circuit held that the catering company could not be

            held  vicariously  liable  for the  cook's  intentional  tort

            because it was committed outside the scope of her employment.

            Stoot, 807 F.2d  at 1200.  In so holding,  however, the Fifth
            _____

            Circuit stated that the catering company could have been held

            vicariously liable to the  seaman for its employee's wrongful

            acts if the employee had been  acting in the course and scope

                                         -19-
                                          19

            of  her employment.  Id. at  1199.  Based on this, plaintiffs
                                 ___

            argue that seamen may assert a cause of action for negligence

            under   the   general   maritime  law   against   independent

            contractors.   Plaintiffs further argue that because Finlay's

            contract  designated  him  as "self-employed,"  he  should be

            treated as an independent contractor and his estate should be

            liable for his negligence under the general maritime law.

                      We  need not  decide  whether we  would follow  the

            Stoot dictum  granting seamen a cause of action against third
            _____

            parties for negligence under the general maritime law because

            we do not consider Finlay  to have been a third party  of the

            type  envisioned  by  Stoot.     Although  his  contract  did
                                  _____

            designate him as "self-employed,"  Finlay did not function as

            an  independent contractor,  but  rather as  an employee  and

            agent of  the owners of the  MARQUES.  Even if  Finlay was an

            independent contractor, however, we would hesitate  to extend

            Stoot to negligence actions under the general maritime law by
            _____

            seamen   against    their   independent-contractor   masters,

            especially  in  light of  the  Supreme  Court's holding  that

            seamen cannot  recover for  the negligence of  the master  or

            crew under  the general  maritime law,  see The  Osceola, 189
                                                    ___ ____________

            U.S. at 175.

                      Mahramas  involved a  hairdresser working  aboard a
                      ________

            cruise ship who  was employed  by the owner  of the  on-board

            beauty salon (not the shipowner) and who was injured when the

                                         -20-
                                          20

            ladder in her cabin  allegedly gave way.  Mahramas,  475 F.2d
                                                      ________

            at 167.  We fail to see  how this case provides a claim under

            the general  maritime law against the  master for negligence.

            To the extent that plaintiff argues that Mahramas granted the
                                                     ________

            plaintiff a  general maritime cause of  action for negligence

            against her independent-contractor  employer (and  therefore,

            by extension, that plaintiffs  should have a general maritime

            cause of action for negligence  against Finlay, since he  was

            "self-employed"), we  think that contention is  belied by the

            case; the  court did not consider  the plaintiff's employer's

            liability for negligence under  the general maritime law, but

            only under the Jones Act.  See id. at 172.
                                       ___ ___

                      Favaloro involved claims brought  by the estates of
                      ________

            fishermen killed when the  defendant tanker collided with and

            sank their fishing boat.  To the extent that it  recognizes a

            cause  of action  for negligence  under the  general maritime

            law, Favaloro does not support the inference that such claims
                 ________

            may be  brought by  a seaman against  the master  of his  own

            vessel, for it  deals only  with claims  against a  colliding

            vessel  and the crew.   See  Favaloro, 687  F. Supp.  at 477.
                                    ___  ________

            Thus,  all  of  the  cases  relied  upon  by  plaintiffs  are

            distinguishable from the instant case.

                      As  a  second basis  for  finding  that seamen  may

            maintain an action against their masters for negligence under

            the general  maritime law,  plaintiffs rely on  the "Seamen's

                                         -21-
                                          21

            Act  of 1915,"  which  provided:   "In  any suit  to  recover

            damages  for any injury sustained  on board vessel  or in its

            service seamen having command shall not be held to be fellow-

            servants with those under their authority."  See 46  U.S.C.A.
                                                         ___

              688  (1975) historical  note.   Plaintiffs argue  that this

            abolishes the  fellow-servant rule,  which the  Supreme Court

            had referred to in The Osceola, 189 U.S. at 175, by  stating:
                               ___________

                      we think  the  law may  be considered  as
                      settled upon  the following propositions:

                           . . . .
                           3.    That all  the  members of  the
                      crew, except, perhaps,  the master,  are,
                            ____________________________
                      as  between themselves,  fellow servants,
                      and  hence  seamen  cannot   recover  for
                      injuries sustained through the negligence
                      of another member of the crew beyond  the
                      expense of their maintenance and cure.

            (Emphasis added.)  Plaintiffs conclude  that because Congress

            abolished  the fellow-servant rule,  seamen may  recover from

            their master  for negligence under the  general maritime law.

            We do not agree.

                      The Osceola barred seamen  from suing their  master
                      ___________

            or  fellow crew  members  not because  of the  fellow-servant

            rule, but  rather because  the general  maritime law  did not

            provide seamen with a cause of action for such negligence:

                      we think  the  law may  be considered  as
                      settled upon  the following propositions:

                           . . . .
                           4.  That  the seaman is  not allowed
                      to   recover   an   indemnity   for   the

                                         -22-
                                          22

                      negligence of the  master, or any  member
                      of the crew.

            Id.;  see Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372, 384
            ___   ___ _________    ___________________

            (1918)   (characterizing  the   Seamen's  Act   of  1915   as

            "irrelevant"  and holding  that  shipowners may  not be  held

            liable  for the negligence of the crew); Gilmore & Black, The
                                                                      ___

            Law  of Admiralty    6-20,  at 325-26  (describing Congress's
            _________________

            abolition of the fellow-servant  rule as an ill-fated attempt

            to abrogate The  Osceola).  We do not think  the Seamen's Act
                        ____________

            of  1915, now  itself abrogated  by the  Jones Act,  provided

            seamen with a cause of action against a master for negligence

            under the general maritime law.  We note that Kennedy v. Gulf
                                                          _______    ____

            Crews,  Inc., 750 F. Supp.  214, 215-16 (W.D.  La. 1990), the
            ____________

            only other case that  we know of to consider whether a master

            may  be liable to a  seaman for negligence  under the general

            maritime law,  rejected a  similar argument by  the plaintiff

            and  held that  a  seaman does  not have  a  cause of  action

            against  his  master for  negligence.    Cf. California  Home
                                                     ___ ________________

            Brands,  Inc. v.  Ferreira, 871  F.2d 830,  834-35 (9th  Cir.
            _____________     ________

            1989) (holding that  the Jones  Act did not  operate to  make

            negligent crew members liable  to their employers for damages

            paid to other seamen under the Jones Act because crew members

            cannot sue each other for negligence).

                      We  hold that  the  general maritime  law does  not

            afford  seamen  a  cause  of action  for  negligence  against

            masters.  Accordingly, summary judgment  was properly granted

                                         -23-
                                          23

            to defendant  on plaintiffs' counts for  negligence under the

            general maritime law.

            E.  DOHSA
            _________

                      Plaintiffs  argue that they are entitled to recover

            against defendant under DOHSA, which provides:

                      Whenever the  death of a person  shall be
                      caused  by  wrongful  act,   neglect,  or
                      default occurring on the  high seas . . .
                      the   personal   representative  of   the
                      decedent may maintain a suit for damages 
                      . .  . for  the exclusive benefit  of the
                      decedent's wife,  husband, parent, child,
                      or dependent relative against the vessel,
                      person, or corporation  which would  have
                      been liable if death had not ensued.

            46 U.S.C.   761.  The district court held that DOHSA does not

            create any substantive rights, but merely provides a cause of

            action against a party "which would have been liable if death

            had  not ensued."   See  McAleer, 818  F. Supp.  at 496.   We
                                ___  _______

            agree.    Plaintiffs assert  no  theory  of recovery  against

            defendant:  they may not  recover against defendant under the

            general maritime law for unseaworthiness, under the Jones Act

            for  negligence,  or  under  the  general  maritime  law  for

            negligence.    Accordingly, there  is  no  basis under  which

            Finlay or his  estate "would have been liable" to plaintiffs'

            decedents if they were still living.   Thus, summary judgment

            was  properly  granted  to defendant  for  plaintiffs' claims

            under DOHSA.

                                         III.
                                         III.
                                         ____

                                      CONCLUSION
                                      CONCLUSION
                                      __________

                                         -24-
                                          24

                      In  conclusion,  summary   judgment  was   properly

            granted  to defendant because (1) Finlay was not an owner pro
                                                                      ___

            hac  vice  of  the   MARQUES  and  so  was  not   liable  for
            ___  ____

            unseaworthiness;   (2)  Finlay   was  not  the   employer  of

            plaintiffs' decedents and  so was not liable  under the Jones

            Act;  (3) plaintiffs did not  argue below that  they were not

            seamen and  therefore  were  entitled to  sue  a  master  for

            negligence under the general maritime law; (4) seamen may not

            bring a cause of action against a master for negligence under

            the general maritime law; and (5)  plaintiffs may not recover

            under DOHSA because  they assert no theory of  recovery under

            which  Finlay  or  his  estate  would  have  been  liable  to

            plaintiffs' decedents if they were still living.  In light of

            our holding, we need not  consider plaintiffs' request for us

            to transfer the case to the District of Massachusetts.

                      Affirmed.
                      Affirmed.
                      _________

                                         -25-
                                          25