Court Opinion

ID: 9771986
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:04:05.82097+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:40.787989
License: Public Domain

On Appellees’ Motion for Rehearing
By supplemental transcript we have been furnished a copy of the trial court’s charge to the jury in this case.
Appellees contend that we erred in our original disposition of the case, because appellant waived any right to complain of special instruction number 5 by its failure to object to the reading of Art. 6674W-1 to the jury, by the introduction of a copy of the statute into evidence and by the statement during the trial by the attorney for appellant that such statute should properly be in the charge of the court. Appellees further complain that it had the right to inform the jury by instruction of the rights of the State under a controlled access highway and that instruction number 5 was proper.
In an involved condemnation case such as this one, it is practically impossible for a trial court to control certain evidence which may be introduced by either side of the controversy. It was not error to admit evidence showing changes in the roads and highways brought about by the taking, diversion of traffic, circuitous routes necessary to reach the property, use of frontage roads in lieu of direct access, limited access to the Freeway, loss of traffic and other factors. Under our view it is, therefore, immaterial that one of the parties first introduced evidence of the above and that the other was required to rebut the testimony. We believe the only manner by which the trial court could properly control the effect of the evidence was the use of appropriate special instructions to the jury in a case of this type. In City of Beaumont v. Marks, 443 S.W.2d 253, 256-257, (Tex.Sup.), it was said under similar circumstances:
“Generally, the matter of what may be considered by the jury and what may not be considered will be best determined by the trial court in the admission and exclusion of testimony rather than by instruction to the jury. DuPuy, supra; State v. Carpenter, 126 Tex. 604, 89 S.W.2d 194, 200 (1936). However, we think a special instruction would have been more appropriate in this instance. It was not error to admit the evidence depicting the changes in the streets brought about by the construction and the circuitous routes necessary to travel in reaching the Plaintiff’s property; however, it was harmful error to fail to instruct the jury that the diversion of traffic from the old to the new and the ‘circuity of travel’ cannot constitute a deprivation of reasonable access. Diversion of traffic resulting in the necessity of using circuitous routes is not com-pensable. (citing cases). A special instruction would have adequately informed the jury that it could not consider such evidence in determining the market value of Plaintiff’s property.”
And in the case of Texas Power & Light Company v. Lovinggood, 389 S.W.2d 712, 716-717, (Tex.Civ.App.), writ ref., n. r. e, it was said:
“Appellees also argue that appellant’s pleadings were read to the jury and the jury heard the evidence, therefore no harm could have resulted from the omission of the requested instructions. But the force and effect of pleadings and *259evidence on a jury are much less than the court’s instructions. A jury can hardly be expected to remember the details of the condemnor’s petition read at the beginning of a trial; neither can the jury know that the rights and limitations of the condemnor in the use of the easement are determined by the petition. And of course the jury is not required to believe the testimony of the witnesses offered by a condemnor. On the other hand the court’s instructions become the law of the case and are to be accepted by the jury as the guide on which they must rely.”
The State properly made objections to the court’s charge in regard to special instruction number 5 and brought the alleged error before this Court. Moreover, we do not believe that it was necessary to give instruction number S to explain appellant’s rights under a controlled access highway, and we believe the charge was unusually harmful under the peculiar facts of this case.
Appellees assert that the appellant waived error in submission of instructions 3, 4 and 5 relative to access because appellant originally failed to bring forward in its points of error in this Court any complaint concerning special instruction number 8. Special instructions number 7 and 8 are as follows:
“Instruction No. 7
“You are instructed that in answering Special Issue No. 3 you shall not consider for any purpose injuries, if any, sustained or received by Defendants’ remaining property arising from or due to any additional circuity of travel that results to a vehicle moving between any other point and Defendants’ remaining property by reason of the construction of the controlled access highway with frontage roadways providing ingress and egress to and from said highway and Defendants’ remaining property.”
“Instruction No. 8
“You are further instructed that accessibility is a factor which you may take into consideration in determining the market value of the two remainders of the Frost Estate properties after the taking on February 20, 1962.”
What instruction number 7 gave, instruction number 8 was in conflict therewith. Considering the court’s charge we must concede that appellant’s original points of error are defective, but the entire thrust of appellant’s first three points of error and its argument deal with access or “accesibility” as used in instruction number 8. Such argument dealing directly with access, comprises approximately two-thirds of appellant’s brief. Appellant fully objected to the giving of instruction number 8 by timely exceptions to the charge and clearly raised the point in its motion for new trial. Since the rendition of the original opinion in this case, appellant has filed a supplemental brief to include a point of error dealing with instruction number 8 with leave of this Court. See Minneapolis-Moline Company v. Purser, 361 S.W.2d 239, 246, (Tex.Civ.App.), writ ref., n. r. e., and cases cited. Furthermore, there are factors other than “circuity of travel” in this case not covered by instruction number 7 above and which are non-compensable under these circumstances.
Appellees further contend that whether or not their access has been materially or substantially impaired is of no legal consequence in this case. Appellees take the position on rehearing that such test applies only to cases where there has been no condemnation of a portion of the land. We have been cited no genuine authority which makes such a holding, and we overrule the contention.
Contention is finally made that since appellant took possession of the 31.63 acres condemned by making the required deposit in 1962, and appellant having made *260improvements on said condemned property, appellant could not amend its petition during trial seven years later to reduce the estate taken. The State’s petition for condemnation was filed June 15, 1962 and included a general allegation granting ingress and egress to or from the remaining property of defendants abutting on the highway, and included a statement that ingress and- egress was not to be denied. Under such allegation the award of the commissioners was made. The first and second trial amendments were merely clarifications of the original pleadings, including the clarification of rights of appel-lees in the interval between the taking and the completion of construction of U. S. 90. However, we think the State had the right under the circumstances to amend and take less at any reasonable time during trial of this case, and we do not believe that any injury was thereby suffered by the landowners by reason of the State’s relinquishment or clarification of access.
We correct our statement that the road constructed since 1962 on the property condemned runs wholly parallel to the freeway, and we concede that appellees are correct in their assertion that such road is parallel only for a short distance and then heads in almost a 90 degree angle up the North Loop away from Interstate 10, as shown by the attached plat.
The 31.63 acre tract taken extends from appellees’ remainders to the East Freeway right-of-way only a short distance away. We are convinced that right of ingress and egress was reserved to appellees from such remainders to the East Freeway or to the nearest road or service road constructed or to be constructed since the taking. Adams v. Grapotte, 69 S.W.2d 460, (Tex.Civ.App.), aff’d 111 S.W.2d 690, (Tex.Sup.); Gulf Refining Co. v. City of Dallas, 10 S.W.2d 151, 161, (Tex.Civ.App.), writ dismd. The involved remainders have at all material times bordered on or “abutted” on continuous highway property which extends to the East Freeway or to the nearest service road. We believe that access has not been denied at this point or at any other point pending construction of U. S. 90 under the evidence and the State’s pleadings, as the tendered trial amendment would have clearly revealed. It is undisputed that access will continue to be provided when U. S. 90 is completed.
We remain convinced that this action involving damages to appellees’ remainder should be reversed and remanded, and that consideration by the jury of non-compensable damages, particularly under special instruction number 8 above, renders the judgment of the trial court excessive as appellant contends.
The motion for rehearing is respectfully overruled.