Court Opinion

ID: 9675920
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:09:52.031012+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:41.356563
License: Public Domain

Young, P.J.
(dissenting). Because I believe that the Worker’s Compensation Appellate Commission correctly decided plaintiff’s underlying claim, I would affirm. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On February 15, 1977, while in the course of his employment, plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident. Plaintiff, for reasons not explained in the *349record, was initially supplied with a specially equipped van by defendant Gateway Transportation Company's then worker’s compensation insurance carrier. That insurance carrier later became bankrupt, and defendant Gateway Transportation has since ceased doing business. Defendant Michigan Property & Casualty Guarantee Association assumed responsibility for Gateway’s previous worker’s compensation insurance carrier’s liabilities.
Eventually, plaintiff requested that the original van he was supplied be replaced because of its high mileage and its increasing cost of maintenance. Plaintiff’s request was denied by Michigan Property & Casualty. At the worker’s compensation proceeding that followed as a result of the refusal to accede to plaintiffs request for a new van, plaintiff presented testimony that, because of the nature of his continuing work-related disability and his height (6’ 7”), he was unable to get in and out of a car, even a specially equipped one. Consequently, it was suggested that a van was medically required.
At issue in the worker’s compensation proceeding was the construction of § 315(1) of the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act, MCL 418.315(1); MSA 17.237(315)(1). Section 315(1) provides in relevant part:
The employer shall also supply to the injured employee dental service, crutches, artificial limbs, eyes, teeth, eyeglasses, hearing apparatus, and other appliances necessary to cure, so far as reasonably possible, and relieve from the effects of the injury. [Emphasis added.]
*350The magistrate, relying on the wcac’s prior interpretation of § 315(1),1 held that Michigan Property & Casualty was not required to buy a van, but was obligated to pay for any special adaptive equipment and the costs of modifying a vehicle supplied by plaintiff. Plaintiff appealed the magistrate’s decision and the wcac affirmed. In affirming the decision of the magistrate, the WCAC stated:
In order for us to reverse the magistrate on this issue, we would be obligated to characterize the entire vehicle as an appliance. We would be stretching the statute beyond the clear legislative intent if we did so.
This Court initially denied plaintiff’s application for leave to appeal in an unpublished order, entered May 25, 1995 (Docket No. 181602). However, the Supreme Court, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, remanded the case for consideration as on leave granted. 451 Mich 863 (1996).
ANALYSIS
Simply put, the merit of plaintiff’s claim for a new van, as opposed to compensation for the modifications made to a vehicle supplied by him, turns upon the construction of the term “other appliances” found in § 315(1). Although previously interpreted by the wcac, this statute has never been judicially construed by this Court. Consequently, the resolution of plaintiff’s claim involves a pure question of law.
Judicial review of worker’s compensation appeals is generally limited to questions of law; reviewing courts may not reweigh evidence, and the findings of *351fact made by or adopted by the wcac are conclusive on appeal if there is any competent evidence in the record to support them. Holden v Ford Motor Co, 439 Mich 257, 263; 484 NW2d 227 (1992). Although this Court reviews questions of law de novo, Cardinal Mooney High School v Michigan High School Athletic Ass’n, 437 Mich 75, 80; 467 NW2d 21 (1991), we generally accord deference to an administrative tribunal’s reasonable construction of the statute it administers. Breuhan v Plymouth-Canton Community Schools, 425 Mich 278, 282-283; 389 NW2d 85 (1986).
The fundamental rule of statutory construction is to give meaning to the Legislature’s intent in enacting a provision. Farrington v Total Petroleum, Inc, 442 Mich 201, 212; 501 NW2d 76 (1993). The Legislature is presumed to have intended the meaning it plainly expressed. Frasier v Model Coverall Service, Inc, 182 Mich App 741, 744; 453 NW2d 301 (1990). If the statutory language at issue is clear and unambiguous, judicial interpretation is unnecessary and precluded. Lorencz v Ford Motor Co, 439 Mich 370, 376; 483 NW2d 844 (1992). This Court must enforce a clear and unambiguous statute as written. Snyder v General Safety Corp (On Remand), 200 Mich App 332, 334; 504 NW2d 31 (1993).
I believe that the wcac’s construction of the worker’s compensation act is both reasonable and consistent with the plain meaning of the language the Legislature chose when it enacted § 315. An “appliance” is generally defined as an “instrument, apparatus, or device for a particular purpose.” The Random House Dictionary of the English Language: Unabridged Edition (1973), p 73. I am unpersuaded that a van (or other vehicle) falls within the ambit of the *352kind of articles one would normally consider to be “appliances.”
This construction of appliance is buttressed by the remaining language of § 315(1), because the term “other appliances” is preceded by an iteration of no fewer than seven other illustrative examples of medical devices or artificial aids designed to enhance an injured employee’s ability to overcome the effects of disability. I conclude that the Legislature’s selection of the phrase “other appliances,” when preceded by specific examples of artificial adaptive aids (such as crutches, hearing aids, dentures, glasses, etc.), creates an unambiguous legislative intent to mandate that an employer is obligated only to supply devices of like kind. In giving construction to statutes, words are to be taken “ ‘ “in the sense in which they are understood in common language . . . ” Romano v South Range Constr Co, 8 Mich App 533, 538; 154 NW2d 560 (1967) (citations omitted). Consequently, I find it hard to reconcile with my construction of the statute the majority’s view that a van is considered to be “like” such adaptive aids as a crutch, a hearing aid, false teeth, or a pair of eyeglasses. While I believe that the majority has reached its conclusions in good faith, I believe that its construction of this statute ranges too far afield from the common understanding of the language employed by the Legislature. I scarcely believe it conceivable that the Legislature, given the language it used in this statute, embraced the majority’s expansive interpretation of the language in question.
In reaching the conclusion that a van is not an appliance within the meaning of § 315(1), I am mindful of the majority’s admonition that the worker’s *353compensation act, being remedial in nature, must be broadly construed. However, such a proposition cannot be utilized as judicial license to interpret statutes in a manner foreign to their plain terms. See Dillon v Secretary of State, 61 Mich App 588, 591; 233 NW2d 96 (1975). In any event, the most direct response to this proposition is that the worker’s compensation act, being in derogation of the common law, must be literally construed. Paschke v Retool Industries, 445 Mich 502, 510-511; 519 NW2d 441 (1994). As stated, the Legislature has provided a compelling basis for defining and therefore construing the term “other appliances” by supplying seven examples of the kind of prosthetic and adaptive appliances it had in mind. Consequently, the legislative goal of relieving the effects of an injury must be read in conjunction with the kind of illustrative devices the Legislature specifically chose to include in the statute.
The majority has taken obvious pains to focus upon and limit its opinion to the unique characteristics of the plaintiff and his work-related disability. However, I find this to be a particularly unsuitable basis either for statutory construction in general or for determining the Legislature’s intent concerning the statute involved in this case.2 The majority opinion also gives particular emphasis to the portion of the statute that requires employers to supply appliances “necessary to cure, so far as reasonably possible, and relieve from *354the effects of the injury” as its basis for construing the term “other appliances” expansively. The majority effectively defines the term “appliance” as any device that will serve to ameliorate the effects of a work-related injury.3 If it were actually the Legislature’s intent to require the provision of any device that would cure the injury as much as possible without regard to the nature of the device, one would have expected the Legislature to have done so explicitly by eliminating all the exemplar appliances it included to define the term “other appliances.”
My criticism of the majority’s construction is best illustrated by one of plaintiff’s claims that was rejected below but has not been appealed. Plaintiff requested below that Michigan Property & Casualty install an in-ground swimming pool on his property because a pool would provide him a therapeutic means of exercise. This claim was properly denied below. A claim for a swimming pool must be rejected under my reading of § 315 because an in-ground pool is not and cannot be considered an “appliance” within the meaning of the statute. However, I believe that the majority’s construction of the statute would require (or at least would not preclude) a contrary result because the majority concludes that the statute requires the provision of “products as are reasonably necessary to cure or relieve the effects of injury.” Ante at 345. Thus, plaintiff’s request for the installation of an in-ground pool would have merit under *355§ 315 to the extent that a pool would provide relief for plaintiffs injury.4
Despite its attempt to provide some limitation on its construction of this statute, the majority’s construction admits of no real or determinate basis for deciding in future cases what may be properly characterized as an appliance. Moreover, the majority essentially concedes that the rule it adopts has not been accepted by a majority of jurisdictions. Having undertaken to expand the scope of the statute beyond the meaning I believe that its language will bear, the majority owes not only an explanation regarding how far its construction will take us but what factors must be considered in determining whether a particular requested device is an appliance or something more than an appliance. The majority clearly has not done so.
Finally, the majority rests its construction of § 315(1) on Davis v Citizens Ins Co, 195 Mich App 323, 327; 489 NW2d 214 (1992), a case which it acknowledges does not arise under the worker’s compensation act, but rather under § 3107(a) of the no-fault act, MCL 500.3107(a); MSA 24.13107(a). The *356no-fault act requires, as a reimbursable personal injury protection (pip) expense, reasonable charges for “reasonably necessary products” as well as services and accommodations. See MCL 500.3107(a); MSA 24.13107(a) (emphasis added).
However, there are at least three fundamental problems with the majority’s reliance upon Davis. First, the no-fault act contains no listing of illustrative “products” that provide a limitation on the potential meaning of that term. Consequently, the no-fault act markedly and materially differs from § 315(1), wherein the Legislature attempted to define by example the term “other appliances.” Second, the duty under the no-fault act to supply “reasonably necessary products,” MCL 500.3107(a); MSA 24.13107(a), is considerably more expansive than the obligation under § 315(1) of the worker’s compensation act to provide “other appliances.” A van might well be a product; I do not believe that a van can easily be deemed an appliance, particularly in light of the examples of prosthetic and adaptive devices the Legislature chose to illustrate the kind of appliances an employer is obligated to provide under the worker’s compensation act. Third, despite what I consider to be material differences between the two statutes, even if, arguendo, I concluded that these differences were not material, I do not find Davis to be persuasive authority in this case. Davis is an exceedingly spare opinion. Other than quoting the no-fault statute, Davis contains almost no textual analysis of the no-fault language at issue. Davis merely affirms the trial court’s award as a reimbursable pip expense the full costs of a modified van purchased by the plaintiff after the insurer refused to buy the vehicle. Nowhere *357is it apparent that the parties raised on appeal, and the Davis opinion surely does not purport to address, the question whether reimbursable PIP expenses should encompass the van and its modifications, or whether they should be apportioned to include only the modifications made to the van to accommodate the disabilities of the insured.
Because I believe that the wcac gave a reasonable interpretation of the worker’s compensation act and because that interpretation is not only reasonable, but comports with the plain meaning of the terms the Legislature chose in establishing the contours of an employer’s obligation to furnish rehabilitative aids to injured employees, I would affirm the decision of the WCAC.

 Blake v General Motors Corp, 1991 Mich ACO 98.

 Given that the majority has placed such a primary focus on plaintiff’s claimed needs, it is appropriate to note that plaintiff is receiving an approximate annual $4,250 car allowance as part of his worker’s compensation benefits. One may, as a consequence, question why the majority has chosen plaintiff’s case to abrogate the wcac’s entirely sensible interpretation of this statute and, in effect, require that plaintiff be compensated twice for his transportation needs.

 This is presumably why the majority emphasizes plaintiff’s unique characteristics as a rationale for its determination that a van is an “appliance.” The fact that plaintiff’s characteristics play so large a role in the majority’s construction of this statute is a leading indicator of the majority’s nontextual approach to determining the Legislature’ intent.

 Indeed, although not raised as an issue in this appeal, plaintiff also requested that defendant pay for a tractor to be used as transportation on his property. The magistrate explained:
Plaintiff has apparently purchased a farm tractor or alternative vehicle in order to get around his 18 acre homestead. Plaintiff has requested that defendant pay for this vehicle since it is the only means by which he can reach the outer portions of his property.
The magistrate declined to order full reimbursement, instead requiring Michigan Property & Casualty to pay for any necessary modifications. However, once the majority’s opinion is issued, and plaintiff again requests Michigan Property & Casualty to purchase a specially modified tractor for him, I cannot determine how it would be then possible under the majority’s construction of § 315(1) to deny that request.