Court Opinion

ID: 9693054
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 16:17:45.839088+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:39.271516
License: Public Domain

HENDERSON, Justice
(concurring specially).
As the majority opinion, in my mind, completely retries the facts of this case from our state capitel at Pierre, I feel compelled to write specially. This case was tried to the court, without a jury, on September 17 and 19, and October 7, 1985, with a decision first issued on October 10, 1985, by a most able and experienced trial judge who thereafter entered findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment on October 31, 1985. True, the testimony of Elke Pankratz was by deposition and the majority opinion espouses the correct scope of review on deposition testimony. Ayres v. Junek, 247 N.W.2d 488 (S.D.1976).
However, the majority opinion treats most lightly the scope of appellate review where a trial judge has tried a case and has observed the witnesses and heard the testimony from their mouths. Perhaps we should go back to the schoolhouse and remind ourselves of some of these rules. The credibility of witnesses and weight to be accorded their testimony and weight of evidence is for the trial court. Nicolaus v. Deming, 81 S.D. 626, 139 N.W.2d 875 (1966); Lukens v. Zavadil, 281 N.W.2d 78 (S.D.1979); Scott v. Wagner, 274 N.W.2d 266 (S.D.1979). Also, this Court in Mulder v. Tague, 85 S.D. 544, 186 N.W.2d 884 (1971), put forth the rule that a reviewing court is not at liberty to change findings where the trial court has resolved conflicts in the evidence.
By the majority opinion’s own admissions, there was great conflict in the evidence in this case. Therefore, this reviewing court should not be at liberty to change the trial court’s findings. We have repeatedly held that it is not our function to resolve conflicts in the evidence, pass on the credibility of witnesses, or weigh the evidence. If it is a jury trial, it is the function of the jury to make those determinations; if it is a trial to the court, it is the function of the trial court to make those determinations. Determining whether a party having the burden of proof on an *550issue has sustained such a burden, involves weighing the evidence and determining credibility of witnesses and it is a question for the trial court. Hilde v. Flood, 81 S.D. 25, 130 N.W.2d 100 (1964).
In Hilde, we also held that the trial court’s findings of fact are presumptively correct and the burden is upon appellant to show error in said findings. Further, we have held that if there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the trial court’s decision, the reviewing court will not disturb the trial court’s finding. McLaughlin Elec. Supply v. American Empire Ins., 269 N.W.2d 766 (S.D.1978); City of Rapid City v. Hoogterp, 85 S.D. 176, 179 N.W.2d 15 (1970). See SDCL 15-6-52(a).
When this Court applies the clearly erroneous standard in this case, our function is not to decide factual issues de novo* The question is not whether this Court would have made the same findings that the trial court did, but whether on the entire evidence we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. In re Estate of Hobelsberger, 85 S.D. 282, 181 N.W.2d 455 (1970). Do we find here, in the majority opinion’s recitation, that findings of fact did not support the conclusions of law and judgment? See Knodel v. Board of County Comm’rs, 269 N.W.2d 386 (S.D.1978); Hartpence v. Youth Forestry Camp, 325 N.W.2d 292 (S.D.1982). We have also said that our standard of review is to uphold the trial court unless its findings are “clearly erroneous.” A finding is “clearly erroneous” when after reviewing all of the evidence, we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake was made. Dakota Harvestore v. South Dakota Dep’t of Revenue, 331 N.W.2d 828 (S.D.1983). In In re Estate of Nelson, 330 N.W.2d 151 (S.D.1983), and Bennett v. Jansma, 329 N.W.2d 134 (S.D.1983), we reiterated that a finding of fact can only be reversed on a clearly erroneous standard.
Therefore, I strenuously object to a retrial, in the eyes of an appellate beholder, where there is such a sharp conflict of evidence and there is an absolute reversal of the findings of fact by the appellate beholder over the trial court judge who “heard and saw it all.” This, then, is simply a factual appeal and no argument, to the contrary, can prevail against the above authorities. Appellant should not achieve a reversal on his factual appeal.
Appellant’s second point.is simply that the cause of action for alienation of affections should be abolished. In Hunt v. Hunt, 309 N.W.2d 818 (S.D.1981), I wrote that this common law tort should be abolished. My writing did not sustain a majority but was joined by Chief Justice Woll-man, who is now a sitting judge on the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. My viewpoints were expressed quite fully in Hunt and it would serve little purpose to recite the various authorities which I previously relied upon for the abolition of this tort.
It is my opinion that a suit founded upon alienation of affections is often fraught with grave abuses. Often, it creates undue humiliation and embarrassment to families and persons who are free of wrongdoing. Many of these cases are predicated upon a vindication of a spouse’s own shortcomings. Breakups in marriage are created by many factors and love is really not a property that may be stolen. It is, in my opinion, in the keeping of sound public policy to abrogate this tort. An action of alienation of affections inherently demeans the parties involved and the courts of law which preside over it. See Fundermann v. Mickelson, 304 N.W.2d 790 (Iowa 1981), which was cited in my writing in Hunt.
Therefore, although I disagree with the treatment of the factual issues/factual appeal by the majority opinion, I would reverse this case based upon the preservation of appellant’s legal stance, namely, to re*551verse the damage award on a matter of law which was preserved on appeal.

 Note that the majority opinion does not appear to seriously abide by the clearly erroneous standard of review, except to point out that this. deferential standard of review does not apply to Elke’s testimony. See majority opinion, at 548.