Court Opinion

ID: 9777250
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 20:04:15.980005+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:50.874569
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing.
Appellants insist that we make disposition of their points 1, 3, 5, and 6 at this juncture on ground that same involve questions of law; and cite Southland Life Ins. Co. v. Egan, 126 Tex. 160, 86 S.W.2d 722, holding in effect that on appeal from grant of a temporary injunction, the Court is authorized to rule upon all law questions presented by the record. Appellees offer no objection and we will therefore proceed to a consideration of these points, already set forth in original opinion.
The church trustees first assert invalidity of the detailed restrictions; charging inadequacy of description of lands to which said covenants were to apply; in other words, not described by metes and bounds, lot or block numbers, or “references to any maps, plats or prior deeds, or other instruments capable of identifying the land or any data or information as to where the same may be located.” As already seen, map of Reavilon Addition and dedication thereof as appear in Hunt County Deed Records were introduced in evidence; the latter reciting that more particular description of the land involved is shown in Commissioners Court order of March 16, 1948. These recorded instruments were sufficient as constructive notice of location of the property purchased; appellants admitting to actual notice of the restrictions placed upon its use. Furthermore, Reavilon No. 4, “an Addition to the City of Greenville,” was a part of certain lands annexed to that municipality on July 1, 1952 by Ordinance No. 95, the entire area (two tracts) being described by metes and bounds. We do not have here an action in trespass to try title or for specific performance to which appellants’ citation of authorities would more properly apply. It is well settled that a purchaser is bound by restrictive covenants attaching to property of which he has actual or constructive notice; Couch v. Southern Methodist University, Tex.Civ.App., 290 S.W. 256; Hill v. Trigg, Tex.Com.App., 286 S.W. 182; Wilson Co. v. Gordon, Tex.Civ.App., 224 S.W. 703; and a purchaser is chargeable with notice of all conditions, restrictions, exceptions, or reservations appearing in his chain of title, concerning which he is put on inquiry. Spencer v. Maverick, Tex.Civ.App., 146 S.W.2d 819.
Point 3 charges unenforceability of these restrictions “against a church and/or against a dwelling to be used as a church for the reasons that said restrictions are vague, indefinite, ambiguous, do not restrict the use of the real property, and no general building plan or scheme is established.” In our opinion, the instrument of restrictions conclusively demonstrates the contrary of such contention; and, as asserted by appellees, said covenants clearly and without ambiguity prohibit the employment of the property for anything except a residential use. Paragraph 1 thereof requires that all lots in said tract shall be “residential lots” with limitations on nature of “dwellings” to be erected; paragraph 5 requiring that "Each residence as erected on any lot in said Addition shall have a minimum of 700 sq. ft. exclusive of all porches, garage, *367terraces, lodges, outhouses or unfurnished rooms, whether the same are attached, detached or built into.”
While we recognize the doctrine that covenants restricting the free use of property are not favored, yet it is equally well established “ ‘that where such restrictions are confined to a lawful purpose and are within reasonable bounds, and the language employed in expressing them is clear, such covenants will be enforced.’ ” Walker v. Dorris, Tex.Civ.App., 206 S.W.2d 620, 624, quoting from the early case of Booth v. Knipe, 225 N.Y. 390, 122 N.E. 202. In this connection appellants earnestly argue that the instant restrictions relate merely to the construction of the permitted buildings and not to a prohibition against use (as a church building). In Walker v. Dorris, supra, a similar contention was overruled ; the restriction there providing “ ‘that no building shall be erected on said premises except a dwelling house and outbuildings thereon’”; the Fort Worth Court of ■Civil Appeals approving a grant of injunction against use of the structure as a sanitarium. In the Walker-Dorris appeal, the words “dwelling house” were construed in their ordinary sense to mean “a house ■occupied as a residence, in distinction from a store, office, or other building” (Emphasis ours); further approving the statement from 26 C.J.S., Deeds, § 164, pp. 525, 526: “ * * * The term defines the use to which a building shall be put and not merely the form or character of the structure, and a provision restricting the erection of buildings other than dwelling houses or residences applies not only to the erection ■of the building in the first place, but likewise forbids the use of a building erected as a dwelling house or residence for other than residential purposes.” And see 13 A. L.R.2d 1241, citing authority for the rule that use of a residence for church purposes was violative of a restriction “common to all lots in a subdivision that any house erected should not be used for other than an exclusive private residence * * * ■ notwithstanding the contention of the minister of the church, who occupied the premises with his family, that use of the building for church purposes was merely incidental to its use for residential purposes.”
Appellants’ remaining points may be resolved briefly: (a) The restrictions in question obviously demonstrate a building scheme or plan uniformly applicable to all houses erected in Reavilon Addition No. 4 for residential use. Uniformity of restrictions imposed upon lots is one of the strongest proofs of a general plan of construction. Curlee v. Walker, 112 Tex. 40, 244 S.W. 497. (b) The mere fact that a breach of building covenant is intended constitutes sufficient ground for issuance of injunction, thereby preserving the status quo until trial to the merits and entry of final decree. Anderson v. Rowland, 18 Tex. Civ.App. 460, 44 S.W. 911; Lowrance v. Woods, 54 Tex.Civ.App. 233, 118 S.W. 551; Pendleton v. Crabtree, Tex.Civ.App., 214 S.W.2d 675. (c) “The courts appear in complete accord that the erection of a church will violate a covenant restricting the use of property to residential purposes.” Editor’s note to 13 A.L.R.2d 1239, citing decisions of numerous other jurisdictions. See also Cannon v. Ferguson, Tex.Civ.App., 190 S.W.2d 831, syl. 2, viz.: “Mutual agreement by owners restricting use of lots facing on a designated street to residential purposes, only, was not rendered unenforceable as being against public policy because it forbade erection of a church on such lots.”
Upon careful review of all points advanced to the merits of this appeal, same are overruled and judgment accordingly rendered making final the subsistent injunction of appellees.
Affirmed.