Court Opinion

ID: 9369176
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-07 23:01:53.194293+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:13.399270
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/7/23 Kroenke Sports & Entertainment v. Salomon CA2/7
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION SEVEN

 KROENKE SPORTS &                                                 B320536
 ENTERTAINMENT, LLC et al.,
                                                                  (Los Angeles County
           Plaintiffs and Respondents,                            Super. Ct. No.
                                                                  18STCP02712,
           v.                                                     19STCP00654)

 NICOLAS A. SALOMON,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, David Sotelo, Judge. Dismissed.
      Fish & Richardson and Jeremy D. Anderson for Defendant
and Appellant.
      Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, Susan K. Leader and
Will A. Ostrander for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
                        INTRODUCTION

       Kroenke Sports & Entertainment, LLC and its affiliates,
Outdoor Channel Holdings, Inc., SkyCam, LLC, and CableCam,
LLC, (collectively, Kroenke) filed an arbitration demand against
Nicolas Salomon, former president of SkyCam and CableCam,
claiming he misappropriated confidential information. The
arbitrator awarded Kroenke $440,126.48, plus interest, on its
claims. In March 2019 the trial court entered judgment
confirming the award. The arbitrator then issued a second
award, dismissing Salomon’s counterclaims against Kroenke. In
March 2022 the court entered judgment confirming that award.
Salomon appeals from the March 2022 judgment.
       Salomon challenges the March 2019 judgment on the
ground the trial court lacked authority to confirm the arbitrator’s
first award under Code of Civil Procedure section 1283.4.1 He
also challenges the March 2022 judgment, arguing the court
should have vacated the arbitrator’s second award because the
arbitrator refused to hear evidence material to the case.
       Because the March 2019 judgment was a final judgment
from which Salomon did not timely appeal, we dismiss as
untimely the portion of his appeal challenging that judgment.
We dismiss the rest of Salomon’s appeal as moot because, in a
separate lawsuit in Delaware, he has obtained the relief sought
by his counterclaims in the arbitration and therefore reversing
the March 2022 judgment would provide him no effective relief.

1     Statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.

                                 2
      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

      A.       The Arbitrator Issues an Award, and the Trial Court
               Enters a Judgment
       In January 2018 Kroenke filed an arbitration demand
against Salomon with Judicial Arbitration and Mediation
Services, Inc. (JAMS). Kroenke asserted breach of contract and
other claims, based on allegations Salomon had misappropriated
confidential information from SkyCam and CableCam before they
terminated his employment as their president in 2014. Kroenke
filed the demand pursuant to a 2009 employment agreement with
Salomon, which provided JAMS would administer arbitration
between the parties.
       In February 2018 Salomon filed a response to the demand
that included a request to dismiss the proceeding for lack of
jurisdiction. Citing a 2011 employment agreement between the
parties that provided the American Arbitration Association
(AAA) would administer arbitration, Salomon argued AAA, not
JAMS, had to conduct any arbitration between the parties.
Salomon did not assert any counterclaims in his response to
Kroenke’s demand for arbitration, but “reserve[d] the right to
assert . . . such Counterclaims as may be available to him” in the
event his jurisdictional challenge did not succeed.
       In a March 2018 email exchange with the arbitrator’s case
administrator, Salomon indicated he was without counsel in the
arbitration and asserted Kroenke was obligated to provide him
counsel under an “Indemnification Agreement” between the

                                3
parties.2 Salomon wrote: “Can you please see if the arbitrator
can address this lack of counsel issue? I would like to have
counsel for the hearing.”3
       Later in March 2018, the arbitrator held a telephonic
hearing on Salomon’s jurisdictional challenge. Salomon
participated without counsel and again claimed Kroenke was
obligated to indemnify him in the arbitration proceeding.
Kroenke argued that indemnification was “an issue to be resolved
at the end of the case” and that Salomon’s request for
indemnification was “not ripe.” The arbitrator told the parties
“the issue of indemnification raised by Mr. Salomon was reserved
and would be addressed at a later date” and urged Salomon to
obtain counsel. The arbitrator issued a written order rejecting
Salomon’s jurisdictional challenge and ruling the “arbitration
properly is a JAMS arbitration.” The arbitrator observed that, at
an earlier conference in the arbitration, he had ruled he would
decide the jurisdictional issue before considering Kroenke’s
request for a temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction and Salomon’s request for “a determination of a right
to indemnification for his attorneys’ fees in connection with this
arbitration.’’
       In May 2018 the arbitrator held a hearing on Kroenke’s
request for a temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction, after which the arbitrator issued a written ruling

2     Salomon, however, was represented at that time by counsel
in an action he had filed against Kroenke in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Texas.

3     It is not clear what hearing Salomon was referring to.

                                4
granting the request. In his ruling the arbitrator stated that
Salomon had participated in the hearing without counsel, that
during the hearing the arbitrator advised him repeatedly to
obtain counsel to represent him in the arbitration, and that
during the hearing the arbitrator also stated Salomon’s
“repetition of a right to indemnification or the like is no reason or
excuse for a stay or further delay of this arbitration.” The
arbitrator added that, after the hearing, Salomon submitted by
email a request for a stay of any decision on Kroenke’s “request
for injunctive relief,” which the arbitrator “denied or denied
again—(A) because Mr. Salomon, . . . without specifics, said that
he is close to retaining (unnamed) new counsel, but (again
without specifics) is having difficulty because of ‘who Claimants
are,’ and (B) he should not have to defend this arbitration unless
and until Claimants are required to advance his legal fees.”
       In July 2018 the arbitrator held a hearing in Los Angeles
on the merits of Kroenke’s claims. Despite having agreed to the
date and location of the hearing and having received notice of the
hearing a month in advance, Salomon did not participate. At the
hearing Kroenke presented extensive evidence in support of its
claims.
       On September 6, 2018 the arbitrator issued a “Partial Final
Award” (the “first arbitration award”), awarding Kroenke
$440,126.28, plus interest, on its claims. The award also
provided: “This Partial Final Award does not cover
Mr. Salomon’s claim for indemnification, which shall remain
reserved for future resolution—subject to the express condition
that Mr. Salomon shall file and serve a counterclaim in this
arbitration, within ten (10) days of the issuance of this Partial
Final Award, setting forth his claim for indemnification,

                                  5
including the basis or bases for that claim.” The award further
provided: “This Partial Final Award fully and finally determines
all claims, remedies . . . and principal issues and contentions
concerning Mr. Salomon’s liability to Claimants in this
arbitration. [¶] Except for Mr. Salomon’s reserved claim for
indemnification, all claims, issues and contentions which have
not been granted—expressly or by necessary implication—in this
Partial Final Award, are and shall be deemed denied.”
       On November 21, 2018, with Salomon not having filed or
served any counterclaim in the arbitration, Kroenke filed a
petition in Los Angeles County Superior Court to confirm the
first arbitration award. Salomon, represented by attorneys S.
Michael Kernan and R. Paul Katrinak, opposed the petition. The
court granted the petition, and on March 25, 2019 it entered
judgment confirming the first arbitration award. Salomon did
not file a notice of appeal within 60 days of the clerk’s serving
him with notice of entry of the March 25, 2019 judgment.4

      B.     The Arbitrator Issues a Second Award, Salomon Files
             a Petition To Vacate It, and the Trial Court Denies the
             Petition
       The day after the trial court entered its March 25, 2019
judgment, the arbitrator issued an order titled “Order of March
26, 2019.” In it the arbitrator stated that “earlier this month . . .
JAMS added [Kernan] and his law firm as Mr. Salomon’s counsel
in this arbitration.” The arbitrator also stated that, despite the

4     In July 2019 a state court in Texas granted a petition by
Kroenke to domesticate the judgment for purposes of
enforcement. Salomon asserts his appeal of that ruling is
pending.

                                 6
10-day deadline in the first arbitration award, Salomon still had
not filed a counterclaim for indemnification in the arbitration.
Nevertheless, “[a]s a last chance opportunity,” the arbitrator
stated he was giving Salomon another 10 days (from the date of
the order) to file and serve a counterclaim.
       On the (second) tenth day, Kernan, on Salomon’s behalf,
filed and served counterclaims in the arbitration for express
indemnity, implied indemnity, equitable indemnity, and
declaratory relief. Salomon alleged that, under the 2011
employment agreement and a separate 2011 “Indemnification
Agreement,” Kroenke “should have completely indemnified [him]
in this action,” but refused to do so. Salomon sought to recover
“all damages” he had suffered “as a result of the initiation of this
arbitration” and “full and complete indemnity of [him] by
[Kroenke] in this arbitration.”
       Kroenke moved to dismiss the counterclaims, arguing it
had no obligation to indemnify Salomon because he had engaged
in “bad faith, intentional misconduct.” Kroenke also disputed
Salomon’s suggestion it “had certain obligations to him that arose
prior to the final disposition of this matter” because “‘an
indemnity claim does not accrue until the underlying action is
resolved.’” Kroenke acknowledged that the 2011 Indemnification
Agreement—specifically, a provision Salomon and the arbitrator
referred to as “section 7”—provided Kroenke would “pay the
expenses incurred by Indemnitee in defending any proceeding in
advance of its final disposition, provided that, to the extent
required by law, the payment of expenses in advance . . . shall be
made only upon receipt of an undertaking.” Kroenke argued,
however, Salomon “repeatedly refused to provide an undertaking[

                                 7
] and indeed acknowledges in his Counter-Claim that none was
provided.”
       After Kroenke filed its motion to dismiss the counterclaims,
Kernan withdrew as counsel for Salomon. Salomon, representing
himself, filed an opposition to the motion, attaching numerous
exhibits. He argued he was entitled both to indemnification and
to “advancement for legal fees to defend himself,” the latter
“without provision of an undertaking.”
       The day before the scheduled hearing on Kroenke’s motion
to dismiss his counterclaims, Salomon engaged new counsel,
Jeremy Anderson, who immediately wrote the arbitrator to
request a one-week continuance of the hearing. The arbitrator
granted the request, on the condition Salomon and Anderson not
do anything to “stay, delay, obstruct, or impede” the resolution of
Kroenke’s motion to dismiss. The arbitrator prohibited all
parties from filing any additional briefing, evidence, or written
submissions relating to the pending motion.
       On August 5, 2019, one day before the rescheduled hearing
on Kroenke’s motion to dismiss Salomon’s counterclaims,
Anderson sent counsel for Kroenke an email that attached an
“Undertaking for Advancement of Fees and Expenses,” signed
and dated that day by Salomon. This document stated that,
“[s]ubject to the terms of” section 7 of the 2011 Indemnification
Agreement, Salomon was undertaking to repay Kroenke all
attorneys’ fees and expenses paid by Kroenke on Salomon’s
behalf in advance of the final disposition of the arbitration
proceeding, in the event it was ultimately determined Salomon
was not entitled to indemnification. Anderson also sent the
arbitrator a copy of this email, including the attached
undertaking by Salomon.

                                 8
       The following day Anderson appeared for Salomon at the
hearing on Kroenke’s motion to dismiss Salomon’s counterclaims.
Conceding the counterclaims for indemnification lacked merit,
Anderson focused on Salomon’s request for advancement of his
attorneys’ fees and costs. He argued the undertaking Salomon
had provided entitled him to the advancement under section 7 of
the 2011 Indemnification Agreement.
       In September 2019 the arbitrator issued (and amended in
no relevant respect) a “Partial Final Award No. 2” (the “second
arbitration award”). In it the arbitrator dismissed with prejudice
Salomon’s counterclaims for indemnification on the ground
Salomon had “conceded or, at a minimum, failed to sustain any
entitlement to any form of indemnification.” Construing
Salomon’s request for advancement of attorneys’ fees under
section 7 of the 2011 Indemnification Agreement as a separate
counterclaim, the arbitrator ruled Salomon had “failed to sustain
any entitlement to Section 7 advancement . . . .” This ruling
rested on the arbitrator’s determination that under Delaware
law, which the parties agreed applied, the undertaking Salomon
had provided was not valid because he knew, when he provided
it, he could not “meet his contingent performance obligation to
repay” the advanced fees.5 The arbitrator dismissed with
prejudice Salomon’s counterclaim “for Section 7 advancement of

5     The arbitrator based this conclusion about Salomon’s
inability to repay the advanced fees on, among other things,
(a) Salomon’s filing in the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit an “Indigent Financial Affidavit,” dated August 3,
2019; (b) his recent statement to the arbitrator he was
“consulting bankruptcy counsel”; and (c) the “more than
$600,000” he already owed Kroenke as a result of, among other
things, the earlier award on Kroenke’s arbitration’s claims.

                                 9
expenses incurred, if any, to and including the date of issuance of
this Partial Final Award” and dismissed without prejudice “any
claim(s) . . . for Section 7 advancement of expenses incurred or to
be incurred after Mr. Salomon provides [a] valid and enforceable
Section 7 undertaking.”
      In January 2020 Salomon (from then on represented by
counsel) filed a petition in Los Angeles County Superior Court to
vacate the second arbitration award. Salomon argued the court
should vacate the award because the arbitrator refused to hear
evidence material to the controversy, including when, in granting
the one-week continuance of the hearing on Kroenke’s motion to
dismiss Salomon’s counterclaims, the arbitrator prohibited the
parties from submitting further briefing or evidence relating to
the motion. Salomon argued that, had the arbitrator allowed him
to submit additional “legal and factual evidence,” he “would have
been able to demonstrate [his] right to advance indemnification.”
Kroenke opposed the petition to vacate the award, arguing that
Salomon had sufficient opportunity to present his counterclaims
in the arbitration and that the arbitrator did not improperly
refuse to hear evidence. On July 7, 2020 the trial court denied
Salomon’s petition to vacate the second arbitration award.

       C.    Meanwhile, in Delaware . . .
       In October 2019—i.e., after the arbitrator issued the second
arbitration award, but before Salomon filed his petition to vacate
it—Salomon filed a “Verified Complaint for Advancement of
Legal Expenses and Attorneys’ Fees” in the Delaware Court of
Chancery. Salomon alleged in that action that, under the 2011
Indemnification Agreement, he was entitled to advancement of
legal expenses incurred in connection with the arbitration

                                10
proceeding, including any appeal from judgments confirming the
first or second arbitration awards, as well as expenses incurred in
connection with the Delaware action.
       In February 2020 the Delaware Court of Chancery granted
summary judgment in favor of Salomon. Finding Salomon’s
August 5, 2019 undertaking sufficient under Delaware law, the
court ordered Kroenke to advance Salomon attorneys’ fees and
other legal expenses incurred from August 5, 2019 in connection
with the arbitration and the Delaware proceeding.

      D.     After We Dismiss an Earlier Appeal by Salomon, He
             Files This One
       On September 4, 2020 Salomon filed a notice of appeal,
purporting to appeal from (1) the trial court’s March 25, 2019
judgment, which he argued was “‘not appealable [sic]’ because it
was interlocutory,” and (2) the trial court’s July 7, 2020 order
denying his petition to vacate the second arbitration award. In
March 2022 we dismissed the appeal on the ground Salomon had
not timely appealed from an appealable order or judgment.
(Kroenke Sports & Entertainment, LLC v. Salomon (Mar. 15,
2022, B307451) [order of dismissal] (Kroenke I).) Regarding
Salomon’s attempt to appeal from the March 25, 2019 judgment,
we observed that, “if Salomon is right that the March 25, 2019
judgment is not appealable, he can’t appeal from it. If, on the
other hand, Salomon is wrong and the judgment is appealable,
his appeal from it is untimely because, as he concedes, he filed
his notice of appeal more than 60 days—indeed, more than a year
and a half—after the court clerk served him with notice of entry
of the judgment. [Citation.] Either way, Salomon’s appeal from
the March 25, 2019 judgment must be dismissed.” (Kroenke I.)

                                11
        Nor, we held, could Salomon appeal from the July 7, 2020
order denying his petition to vacate the second arbitration award,
because an order denying a petition to vacate an arbitration
award is not appealable, but is instead reviewable on appeal from
a judgment confirming the award. As we explained, quoting from
Law Offices of David S. Karton v. Segreto (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th
1, at pages 8-9, “‘“once a petition to confirm, correct, or vacate is
filed, the trial court has only four choices: It may (1) confirm the
award, (2) correct the award and confirm it as corrected, (3)
vacate the award, or (4) dismiss the proceedings.’” [Citation.] ‘If
a trial court dismisses the petition, it results in an appealable
order. [Citation.] If the trial court which does not dismiss the
petition also does not correct or vacate an arbitration award, it
must confirm the award. Entry of judgment in conformity
therewith is required [citation], resulting in an appealable
judgment under . . . section 1294, subdivision (d). Similarly, if
the nondismissing trial court does not confirm the award (or
confirm [i]t as corrected), the court must vacate it, resulting in an
appealable order under . . . section 1294, subdivision (c).’” We
then observed: “None of the parties here, including Salomon,
asked the court to confirm the arbitrator’s second award and
enter judgment (although presumably Salomon still could, if he
wanted to obtain a judgment against himself).” (Kroenke I,
supra.)
        Which is what Salomon did next. And on March 17, 2022
the trial court entered a judgment confirming the second
arbitration award, from which Salomon (this time) timely
appealed.

                                 12
                          DISCUSSION

      A.     Salomon Cannot Challenge the March 25, 2019
             Judgment Because It Was a Final Judgment from
             Which He Did Not Timely Appeal
       Salomon argues the trial court lacked authority to enter its
March 25, 2019 judgment confirming the first arbitration award
because the latter was not an “award” under section 1283.4.6
Salomon can no longer challenge the March 25, 2019 judgment,
however, because it was a final judgment from which he did not
timely appeal.
       “A judgment is final, and therefore appealable, when it
embodies ‘the final determination of the rights of the parties in
an action or proceeding’ [citation]. A judgment constitutes the
final determination of the parties’ rights ‘“where no issue is left
for future consideration except the fact of compliance or
noncompliance with [its] terms . . . .”’” (Kaiser Foundation
Health Plan, Inc. v. Superior Court (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 1125,
1138; see ibid. [“It is a judgment’s substance, not its form or
label, which determines whether it is final.”].) If a judgment is
final, and therefore appealable, “an aggrieved party must file a

6      Salomon argues the first arbitration award was not an
award under section 1283.4 because it left his “advancement
claims . . . undecided.” (See § 1283.4 [an award must, among
other things, “include a determination of all the questions
submitted to the arbitrators the decision of which is necessary in
order to determine the controversy”].) We do not decide whether
the first arbitration award was an “award” within the meaning of
section 1283.4 because, as we explain, Salomon may no longer
obtain review of the March 25, 2019 judgment confirming that
award.

                                13
timely appeal or forever lose the opportunity to obtain appellate
review.” (Reyes v. Kruger (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 58, 67, italics
and quotation marks omitted; see § 906 [reviewing court lacks
authority “to review any decision or order from which an appeal
might have been taken” but was not]; Kinoshita v. Horio (1986)
186 Cal.App.3d 959, 967 [“If the ruling is appealable, the
aggrieved party must appeal or the right to contest it is lost.”].)
       The March 25, 2019 judgment disposed of the only issue
before the trial court: whether to grant Kroenke’s petition to
confirm the first arbitration award. (See EHM Productions, Inc.
v. Starline Tours of Hollywood, Inc. (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 1058,
1063 [“Once a petition to confirm an award is filed, the superior
court must select one of only four courses of action: It may
confirm the award, correct and confirm it, vacate it, or dismiss
the petition.”].) In granting the petition, the court decided that
issue in favor of Kroenke, and no issue remained for the court to
consider. The March 25, 2019 judgment was therefore final and
appealable. And by failing to file a timely notice of appeal from
that judgment (see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(a)(1)), Salomon
lost his right to contest it.
       Salomon argues that, because the arbitrator had not
resolved all claims between the parties, the arbitration award
was not a final award and that therefore the March 25, 2019
judgment was “interlocutory” and “not appealable.” (See Kirk v.
Ratner (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 1052, 1064-1066; Judge v. Nijjar
Realty, Inc. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 619, 633-636.) He relies on
the provision in the first arbitration award stating the arbitrator
“reserved decision on Salomon’s counterclaim for advance
indemnification.” Which is true, as far as it goes. But the
arbitrator did not reserve decision on Salomon’s counterclaim

                                14
indefinitely. Rather, the award conditioned that reservation on
Salomon’s filing and serving the counterclaim within the next 10
days, which Salomon did not do. At that point (i.e., Day 11),
Salomon’s counterclaim was no longer reserved for decision, but
came within the ambit of the award’s provision that “all claims,
issues and contentions which have not been granted . . . in this
Partial Final Award[ ] are and shall be deemed denied.” Thus—
and notwithstanding the arbitrator’s eventual decision (on March
26, 2019) to give Salomon another chance to file a counterclaim—
when the trial court entered judgment on March 25, 2019
confirming the award, Salomon had no counterclaim of any kind
pending or reserved in the arbitration, the first arbitration award
was final, and the trial court had jurisdiction to confirm it.
Because the March 25, 2019 judgment was a final and appealable
judgment from which Salomon did not timely appeal, we dismiss
that portion of his appeal that challenges it.

       B.    The Rest of Salomon’s Appeal Is Moot
       Salomon next argues the trial court erred in not vacating
the second arbitration award, specifically, in failing to conclude
the arbitrator wrongly refused to hear evidence material to
Salomon’s claim for “advancement rights.” Had the arbitrator
considered that evidence, Salomon argues, the arbitrator “would
have understood that Salomon’s undertaking was sufficient
under Delaware law” and “reached the same correct conclusion
that the Delaware Court of Chancery reached: that Salomon was
entitled to advancement.” The Delaware Court of Chancery
decision to which Salomon refers and in which he prevailed,
however, renders this portion of his appeal moot.

                                15
       “Appellate courts generally will not review matters that are
moot. ‘A case is moot when the decision of the reviewing court
“can have no practical impact or provide the parties effectual
relief. [Citation.]” [Citation.] “When no effective relief can be
granted, an appeal is moot and will be dismissed.”’” (Mercury
Interactive Corp. v. Klein (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 60, 78; see
Calleros v. Rural Metro of San Diego, Inc. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th
660, 667 [“An appeal will be dismissed if a reversal would have
no practical effect.”]; Noergaard v. Noergaard (2020)
57 Cal.App.5th 841, 852 [“‘“Generally, an appeal will be
dismissed as ‘moot’ when, through no fault of respondent, the
occurrence of an event renders it impossible for the appellate
court to grant appellant any effective relief.”’”].)
       Salomon does not dispute that, in its February 2020 ruling,
the Delaware Court of Chancery gave him what he seeks in this
action in connection with his arbitration counterclaim for
“advancement rights”: an order directing Kroenke to advance him
legal expenses incurred from August 5, 2019 (i.e., the date of
Salomon’s undertaking), as provided by section 7 of the 2011
Indemnification Agreement. Nor does Salomon dispute Kroenke
has complied with the Delaware order or argue a California
judgment would give him anything more than the Delaware order
gives him. Because Salomon has obtained the relief sought in his
arbitration counterclaim for advancement of his legal expenses, a
decision in his favor here would not provide him any effective
relief or have any practical effect on this case. Salomon has won
this issue; he presents no reason he needs to win it again.
       Salomon argues his appeal is not moot because the second
arbitration award included supposedly “disparaging statements”
about him—such as that his undertaking was “‘not given in good

                                16
faith’” and was “‘worthless’”—and he “has a right to have the
record . . . corrected.” But he cites no legal authority suggesting
he has any such “right.” He also argues his appeal is not moot
because “correcting the record will expunge the reputational
damage the arbitrator has caused, which will ultimately help
Salomon’s future employment prospects.” But that proposed
relief is too vague, abstract, and speculative to require a decision
here on the merits. (See Eye Dog Foundation v. State Bd. of
Guide Dogs for Blind (1967) 67 Cal.2d 536, 541 [a court’s duty “‘is
to decide actual controversies by a judgment which can be carried
into effect, and not to give opinions upon moot questions or
abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law
which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it”]; see
also In re Rashad D. (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 156, 164, fn. 5
[speculative arguments do not “justify appellate review of an
otherwise moot case”].) Seeking to clear one’s name or correct the
record in a civil case, unlike a criminal case,7 does not justify
hearing an otherwise moot appeal. Because Salomon’s appeal
from the trial court’s March 17, 2022 judgment confirming the
second arbitration award is moot, we dismiss it.8

7     See, e.g., People v. DeLeon (2017) 3 Cal.5th 640, 646, fn. 2;
People v. Succop (1967) 67 Cal.2d 785, 790; People v. Delong
(2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 482, 484.

8     Courts have recognized “three discretionary exceptions to
the rule that an appeal must be dismissed if no effective relief
can be granted to an appellant: ‘“(1) when the case presents an
issue of broad public interest that is likely to recur [citation];
(2) when there may be a recurrence of the controversy between
the parties [citation]; and (3) when a material question remains

                                 17
                          DISPOSITION

     The appeal is dismissed. Kroenke is to recover its costs on
appeal.

                                            SEGAL, J.

We concur:

             PERLUSS, P. J.

             FEUER, J.

for the court's determination [citation].”’” (Rudick v. State Bd. of
Optometry (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 77, 88-89; accord, Golden Door
Properties, LLC v. Superior Court (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 733,
864.) Salomon does not argue any of these exceptions applies
here.

                                 18