Court Opinion

ID: 9516603
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 23:46:49.003956+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:37:26.706722
License: Public Domain

*289Beasley, J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent.
The resolution of defendant Village of Mancelona approving defendant bank’s plans for a 34-foot curb cut violated defendant village’s ordinance limiting curb cuts, which provides as follows:
"9. Curb cuts. No openings in or through any curb of any street shall be made without first obtaining a written permit from the Superintendent. Curb cuts and sidewalk drive way crossings to provide access to private property shall comply with the following:
"(a) No single curb cut shall exceed twenty-five (25) feet nor be less than ten (10) feet.”
Defendant village did not comply with the amendment procedure provided in its own ordinance. Neither defendant village nor the defendant bank had any right to violate the village ordinances. On the contrary, both are bound to comply with the ordinances, the same as everyone else.1 I do not share the trial court’s conclusion that somehow subsection 9(d) permits defendant village to ignore 9(a). Subsection 9(d) provides as follows:
"(d) The maximum number of lineal feet of sidewalk drive way crossings permitted on any lot, parcel of land, business or enterprise, shall be forty-five (45%) percent of the total abutting street frontage up to and including two hundred (200) lineal feet of street frontage plus twenty (20%) percent of the lineal feet of street frontage in excess of two hundred (200) feet.”
It may be, as the majority suggests, much ado about nothing to grant the bank special privileges regarding curb cuts, but the fact is that defendant *290village and the defendant bank violated the clear, unambiguous ordinances.
There was available a simple, straightforward way to amend the ordinance. Defendant village and the defendant bank did not choose to follow it. Under these circumstances, I would vote to grant the request for injunction, to set aside the permission insofar as it violates the ordinances, and to afford defendant village and the defendant bank a brief period to seek the requisite amendment of the ordinance. In the event defendant village does not so amend the ordinance and then permits the curb cut that has been constructed, I would grant plaintiff equitable relief to enforce compliance by the defendant bank with the ordinance.

 Magruder v City of Redwood, 203 Cal 665; 265 P 806 (1928), cited with approval in White Lake Twp v Amos, 371 Mich 693, 698-699; 124 NW2d 803 (1963).