Court Opinion

ID: 9745469
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 23:00:30.698828+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:26:24.832323
License: Public Domain

MILLER, Judge,
dissenting.
I dissent. Although I agree that Diana's mental health, if suspect, is a relevant consideration for the trial court as Diana is the children's primary care-giver, the information Deborah seeks is not relevant to the issue of Diana's mental health or to the issue of the best interest of the children.
The majority decision is based on Ind. Code 31-1-11.5-21(a)(6) which makes the "mental and physical health of all individuals involved" a relevant consideration. There is no question here about the mental or physical health of either party. The question is whether Allan and Diana remain fit parents for the ten and eight year-old girls. In this regard, the court was well informed. Elizabeth Siegmann-who testified at trial-conducted a custody evaluation for the court. In addition to interviewing the children, Allan and Diana, she evaluated both Allan's and Deborah's home *908and observed the children with each parent. Her detailed report was in evidence as well as her testimony. She was not able to make a custody choice.
In addition, both children were in coun-selling. Counselor Sandra Zimmerman testified about the problems the children were having. She testified that Diana had disciplined the children improperly, but stopped when Sandra told her it was improper. The substance of Zimmerman's testimony was that the girls were having problems from time to time, some of which may have been related to Allan's and Diana's marital problems, but the family was working through them. Also not mentioned by the majority is the fact that Allan and Diana have two children, ages two and four.
The evidence also shows that Deborah has been married and divorced five times. She is living with a man in Texas in a home that was described by a Texas social worker as "more than adequate for herself and her two daughters". R. 470. Siegmann's report contained a letter from a prospective employer who hoped to hire Deborah (then unemployed) for part-time work in June, 1990. The letter also stated that Deborah would hopefully become a full-time employee upon completion of computer training. Finally, the trial court interviewed both girls. Based on all this information, the trial court determined Allan and Diana were fit parents.
Back to the issue before us. The majority holds that Deborah should be allowed to conduct a fishing expedition into the intimate details of Diana's and Allan's marriage counselling. I cannot agree. In my opinion, Diana and Allan show good judgment and should be commended for seeking help-possibly to prevent another divorce and another disruption to the children's lives. Instead of encouraging this behavior, the majority opinion puts the single or remarried parent, who is wise enough to seek counselling, in a position of loging custody based on potentially damaging information revealed to a marriage counselor. Custodial parents will now be justifiably reluctant to seek such counsel ling for fear their ex-spouse will have access to the records and intimate details of their lives which are not material or relevant to custody.
It is unquestionable that children are affected by their parents' divorce and their subsequent remarriages. They could also be adversely affected when problems arise between their custodial parent and second spouse, which may or may not justify a change in custody. However, an ex-spouse who just wants to see "what's going on" between the custodial parent and his spouse should not be permitted to invade the sanctity of the custodial parent's subsequent marriage. It is unfortunate that the majority opinion would permit such an invasion when it would be unthinkable to require couples who have never been divorced to divulge records of their counsel-ling to a third person who wants to see what's going on between the couple.
Indiana Code 31-1-11.5-21(a)(6) states that "the mental and physical health of all individuals involved" is a relevant consideration for the court in making a custody determination. Thus, under the majority's view, a parent seeking custody should have access to the records of the custodial parent's and his spouse's marriage counselling upon request. A logical extension of this holding is that the non-custodial parent should be permitted to see the custodial parent's and his spouse's medical records upon request. However, one who goes to a doctor is not necessarily physically ill. A visit to the doctor could be for a routine checkup, a flu shot, or for other "preventive health" reasons. Similarly, going to a marriage counselor does not show signs of mental illness; rather, it shows good judgment. Marriage counselors treat healthy, intelligent people who have difficulty dealing with marital problems and need advice. Just as custodial parents might be relue-tant to disclose potentially relevant, but embarrassing, information to a physician if an ex-spouse would soon learn those details, custodial parents would likewise be reluctant to share information with a marriage counselor. I agree with the trial judge that the counselling information was irrelevant here and should not have been discoverable.
*909The question of relevance in any particular case is, of course, a question for the trial court. Here, the only reason given by Deborah is that she knew Allan and Diana were having problems and she wanted to see what was going on between them. This is not sufficient to raise a serious question as to Diana's mental health. Iam not willing to concede that records of private marital counselling of a custodial parent or of a non-custodial parent with visitation rights is subject to discovery as being relevant in a custody proceeding. The object of custody proceedings is to determine the best interest of the children and not to disrupt or even destroy later marriages. The trial court has ample investigative tools (including a home study and interviews which were done here) to determine the best interest of the children.
The second issue raised by Deborah-whether the trial court erred in refusing to modify custody-is an invitation to this court to reweigh the evidence, which we may not do. I would therefore affirm the decision of the trial court.