Court Opinion

ID: 9764182
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 03:13:55.001247+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:54.465415
License: Public Domain

BENTON, Judge,
dissenting.
The principal opinion affirms the result of the trial court by invoking a special standard of review and by emphasizing selective facts.
Two important procedural facts dominate this case. First, the trial court heard no live testimony. Instead, the only evidence presented was a stipulation of facts and the deposition testimony of Doug Graue, the plaintiff-respondent, and Deanna Maclin, his insurance agent (including the deposition exhibits). Second, the trial court made findings of facts and conclusions of law on the only issue plead to it — that the Missouri Property Insurance Placement Facility (the “Facility”) is required to give a notice of nonrenewal before a policy can expire. While some evidence implicates other points, the other two issues in this case— the apparent authority of Bond & Associates to accept premiums and bind the Facility, and the effect of mailing this premium to the Facility — were first clearly raised in Graue’s brief to the Court of Appeals, Southern District.
Assuming that all three issues are properly before this Court, the law and the evidence support reversing the trial court, not affirming it.

I. The Proper Standard of Review

The key difference between this opinion and the principal opinion is the standard of review. Once the standard of review required by this Court’s decisions and Rules is determined, the evidence clearly shows that the decision below must be reversed.
“[Wjhere the facts are derived from the pleadings, stipulations, exhibits, and depositions, ... no deference is due the trial court’s judgment.” Southgate Bank & *786Trust Co. v. May, 696 S.W.2d 516, 519 (Mo.App.1985); see also Sheldon v. Board of Trustees of the Police Retirement System, 779 S.W.2d 553, 554 (Mo. banc 1989); Johnson v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 745 S.W.2d 661, 662 (Mo. banc 1988); Bremen Bank & Trust Co. v. Muskopf, 817 S.W.2d 602, 604 (Mo.App.1991); Housing Authority of St. Louis County v. Boone, 747 S.W.2d 311, 313 (Mo.App.1988). Deference is required only when the trial court has had a superior opportunity to determine the credibility of the witnesses — namely where there has been live testimony. Rule 73.-01(c)(2). Otherwise, review is in the nature of a suit in equity. Rule 73.01(c)(1); see also Murphy v. Carrón, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976).
Where, as in this case, the trial court heard no live testimony and did not consider the now-determinative issue, there is no reason to view the evidence in accordance with the trial court’s judgment. Schroeder v. Horack, 592 S.W.2d 742, 744 (Mo. banc 1979). Instead, this Court should draw the proper factual and legal conclusions from the evidence. Id.
The cases cited by the principal opinion are founded on the law of appellate review as it existed before any statute or rule on that subject (let alone Murphy v. Carrón). McHenry v. Claspill, 545 S.W.2d 690, 693 (Mo.App.1976), relies solely on Adams v. White, 488 S.W.2d 289, 293 (Mo.App.1972) and Semo Motor Co. v. National Mutual Insurance Co., 383 S.W.2d 158, 161 (Mo. App.1964). Adams, in turn, relies solely on Semo Motor, which relies solely on Murphy v. Doniphan Telephone Co, 147 S.W.2d 616, 619-20 (Mo.1941). Doniphan Telephone predates the 1945 Constitution, which first authorized this Court to make rules of procedure. At the time of Doni-phan Telephone, there was no statute or rule governing appellate review.
In this case, Rule 73.01(c) instructs this Court to review the evidence, not in accordance with the trial court decision, but rather to determine the proper factual and legal conclusion.

II. Application of the Standard of Review

The principal opinion affirms the trial court on the theory that Bond & Associates had apparent authority to accept payment and bind the Facility. To recover on the basis of apparent authority, a plaintiff must show that: 1) he possessed a careful and prudent belief that an agent has authority to act on behalf of the principal; 2) the principal must have known or had reason to know of the agent’s conduct, and allow such conduct; and 3) the plaintiff must have acted reasonably relying on the agent’s conduct. Jeff-Cole Quarries, Inc. v. Bell, 454 S.W.2d 5, 12-13 (Mo.1970); see also MAI 13.07(1) & 13.07(2).
Assuming (as the principal opinion does) that, as an insurance agent, Bond & Associates could possess apparent authority to act on behalf of the Facility,1 Graue — the plaintiff with the burden of proof — failed to prove reasonable reliance. To prove reasonable reliance a party “must not have closed his eyes to warning or inconsistent circumstances.” Jeff-Cole Quarries, 454 S.W.2d at 13. The major inconsistent circumstance is the premium notice received by Graue stating:
*787RENEWAL IN ORDER TO RENEW YOUR POLICY WITH NO LAPSE IN COVERAGE, PAYMENT MUST BE RECEIVED BEFORE THE EXPIRATION DATE INDICATED ABOVE. IF PAYMENT IS RECEIVED ON OR AFTER THE EXPIRATION DATE SHOWN ABOVE, COVERAGE WILL BE EFFECTIVE 12:01 A.M. STANDARD TIME THE DAY FOLLOWING RECEIPT OF PAYMENT PROVIDED PAYMENT IS RECEIVED WITHIN FORTY-FIVE DAYS FROM EXPIRATION DATE SHOWN ABOVE. QUOTE IS NULL AND VOID THEREAFTER, (emphasis in original).
In another place, the notice stated (with capitalization and typeface as follows):

IMPORTANT

PAYMENT MUST BE in the form of a certified check, bank draft or money order PAYABLE TO:
MISSOURI FAIR PLAN
for the amount due as shown, and MAILED TO:
MISSOURI FAIR PLAN 906 OLIVE, SUITE 1000 ST. LOUIS, MO. 63101.
PLEASE RETURN INDICATED COPY OF THIS NOTICE WITH YOUR PAYMENT.
THIS IS THE ONLY PREMIUM NOTICE YOU WILL RECEIVE.
Immediately beneath these payment instructions, the notice stated: IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS PLEASE CONTACT YOUR AGENT. Lastly, the notice characterized Bond & Associates as the representative of Graue, not the Facility.
The principal opinion construes the notice as ambiguous. Even if it is ambiguous, a reasonable person would try to resolve the apparent inconsistencies and ambiguities between this notice and the letter sent by Bond & Associates.
The record — especially Graue’s own testimony — shows no attempt to resolve these inconsistencies. Instead, Graue repeatedly stated that he did not remember any of the details connected with his dealings with Bond & Associates during December 1989 and January 1990. Maclin’s testimony indicates that, normally, it was Graue’s mother — who died in late December 1989 or early January 1990 — and not Graue who handled this insurance policy.
Finally, the majority tries to minimize Maclin’s statement to Graue upon receipt of the premium that it might not reach St. Louis in time. While Maclin did not refuse to forward payment to the Facility, her words clearly indicate that payment to her did not take the place of payment to the Facility.2
Authority is not “apparent” simply because the party claiming has acted upon his conclusions * * * (nor) simply because it looked so to him.... It is only where a person of ordinary prudence, ... acting in good faith, and giving heed not only to opposing inferences but also to all restrictions * * * brought to his notice, would reasonably rely, that a case is presented within the operation of the rule. Jeff-Cole Quarries, 454 S.W.2d at 13, quoting 1 Mechem on Agency, § 726, at 513 (2d ed.).
In short, the evidence — taken as a whole — simply does not support the conclusion that Graue acted reasonably in relying *788on the apparent authority of Bond & Associates to accept payment and bind coverage.

Ill

Resting solely on the finding of apparent authority, the principal opinion does not reach the other two issues. As the premium was mailed too late to reach the Facility before it was due, the mailbox rule does not apply in this case. Hammond v. Missouri Property Insurance Placement Facility, 731 S.W.2d 360, 366-68 (Mo.App. 1987). On the only issue actually raised by the petition, I believe that there is a substantial difference between a policy expiring because of the insured’s inaction and the Facility choosing not to renew a policy. Because I would reverse the judgment, I therefore dissent.

. There are several pieces of evidence which undercut this assumption by the principal opinion. First, Maclin testified that she represented Graue, not the Facility:
Q. You’re not an agent of Missouri Property Insurance Placement Facility, you are what they call a producer?
A. Yes.
Q. You're actually working for the customer that comes in?
A. Yes.
Q. You all have no authority whatever to bind any insurance coverage for Missouri Property Insurance Placement Facility?
A. No, none whatsoever.
Second, Maclin later testified that Bond & Associates had "brokerage business,” presumably acting as agents of their clients rather than as agents of insurancé companies. Finally, the premium quote was not sent to Bond & Associates by the Facility’s choice. Rather, it was sent to Bond & Associates because the application for coverage filed on Graue’s behalf requested that it be sent to Bond & Associates, instead of Graue. All of these facts taken together strongly suggest that Bond & Associates was the agent of Graue, not the Facility.

. Maclin testified as follows:
Q. When he came in to pay that $102.00 on January 8th, was there any conversation about “this is the day before your policy expires"?
A. Yes, I told him, I told him, I said, “You are barely getting this in here before the expiration date, and I don’t believe it will make it up there before it expires.’’ And he said, “Well, just get it up there.”
Q. Did you tell him that if it did not make it up there prior to the expiration date time and hour that’s shown on the policy that his insurance would be expired?
A. I probably didn’t, because we think that everybody that has been doing business with Missouri Fair Plan has already read this form numerous times and knows this.
(emphasis added).