Court Opinion

ID: 9791984
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:21:36.088753+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:39.972527
License: Public Domain

OPINION DISSENTING TO DENIAL OF REHEARING
STERNBERG, Judge,
dissenting from the denial of petition for rehearing.
I would grant the petition for rehearing and, therefore, withdraw my concurrence in the original opinion.
I disagree with the holding that the Public Utilities Commission has jurisdiction to regulate counties operating mass transit systems within their political boundaries.
Colo. Const, art. XXV provides, in effect, that the Public Utilities Commission does not have jurisdiction over “municipally owned utilities,” and that nothing in the article shall “affect the power of municipalities .... ” The term municipality can be interpreted narrowly to include only cities and towns, or more broadly to cover counties. See 1 E. McQuillin, Municipal Corporations §§ 246, 246(a) and 2:23 (3rd ed. 1987). The majority opinion would limit this language to apply to cities and towns and not to counties. I would give a broad*434er meaning to the term and, in this usage, would interpret it to include counties.
We are required to interpret ambiguities by considering the object to be attained, the consequences of a particular construction, and the administrative construction thereof. See § 2-4-203, C.R.S.; City & County of Denver v. Industrial Commission, 690 P.2d 199 (Colo.1984). The interpretation I urge would give proper deference to the construction of Article XXV which, we are informed, has been followed by the Public Utilities Commission for many years.
Moreover, we must look to the rationale behind the constitutional exemption of public utilities from regulation by the Public Utilities Commission. In Town of Holyoke v. Smith, 75 Colo. 286, 226 P. 158 (1924), the court explained:
“On principle it would seem entirely unnecessary to give a commission authority to regulate the rates of a municipally owned utility. The only parties to be affected by the rates are the municipality and its citizens, and, since the municipal government is chosen by the people, they need no protection by an outside body. If the rates for electric light or power are not satisfactory to a majority of the citizens, they' can easily effect a change, either at a regular election, or by the exercise of the right of recall.”
See also Union Rural Electric Ass’n v. Town of Frederick, 670 P.2d 4 (Colo.1983); City of Loveland v. Public Utilities Commission, 195 Colo. 298, 580 P.2d 381 (1978); K.C. Electric Ass’n v. Public Utilities Commission, 191 Colo. 96, 550 P.2d 871 (1976); and City & County of Denver v. Public Utilities Commission, 181 Colo. 38, 507 P.2d 871 (1973). This rationale is as applicable to counties as it is to cities.
For these reasons I would hold that a county is not subject to regulation by the Public Utilities Commission in the operation of a mass transportation system within its territorial boundaries.