Court Opinion

ID: 9521773
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:11:33.491286+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:50:57.261170
License: Public Domain

ROBERTSON, Judge.
Thomas S. Bochnowski brings this appeal challenging the granting of summary judgment in favor of the defendants-appellees (Peoples Federal) below in Bochnowski’s action for tortious interference with a contractual or business relation.
We affirm.
Bochnowski alleged in his complaint that he had been employed for over two years as an appraiser by Vernon E. Lee & Associates which did real estate appraisals for the appellee, Peoples Federal Savings & Loan Association (Peoples Federal) when the ap-pellees, members of the Board of Directors of Peoples Federal, conspired to cause Bo-chnowski’s discharge from employment. Bochnowski alleged Peoples Federal coerced and threatened Vernon E. Lee & Associates with the loss of real estate appraisal work if Bochnowski did not settle to the appellees’ advantage, litigation brought against him by a subsidiary of Peoples Federal. As a result of such coercive and malicious acts, Bochnowski alleges he was discharged from his employment.
An action for tortious interference with a contractual relationship cannot be maintained in Indiana without a valid and enforceable contract. Stanley v. Kelley (1981), Ind.App., 422 N.E.2d 663, 667 trans. denied; Biggs v. Marsh (1983), Ind.App., 446 N.E.2d 977, 983, trans. denied. Where there is no promise on the part of the employer that employment will continue for a definite period of time and no binding promise on the part of the employee he will continue in employment, the employment relationship is terminable at will. Such a contract terminable at will cannot form the basis of an action for interference with a contractual relationship. Kelley, supra.
The facts and inferences viewed favorably toward Bochnowski do not disclose a genuine factual dispute on this element. Neither of Bochnowski’s affidavits address the terms of his employment; however, Bochnowski maintains the employer-employee guidelines he signed when he became associated with Vernon E. Lee & Associates demonstrates he was not an employee at will because he agreed not to accept private appraisal assignments in exchange for employment.
Bochnowski does not claim his agreement to refuse private appraisal assignments was given in exchange for the promise of permanent employment and the employer-employee guidelines do not speak to the duration of his employment. Bochnow-ski having failed to show he gave independent consideration in return for permanent employment, see Hamblen v. Danners, Inc. (1985), Ind.App., 478 N.E.2d 926, 928, he has failed to demonstrate he had a contract of employment upon which to maintain his cause of action.
Nonetheless, Indiana law recognizes an action may lie for tortious interference with a business relationship even where no valid contract exists. Biggs v. Marsh, supra. However, it is critical that the defendants act illegally in achieving this end. Id. An act which is lawful in itself and which violates no right cannot be made actionable because of the motive which in*127duced it. A malicious motive will not make wrong that which in its own essence is lawful. See, Biggs, supra at 983, n. 8; Guethler v. Altman (1901), 26 Ind.App. 587, 590, 60 N.E. 355; Dye v. Carmichael Product Co. (1917), 64 Ind.App. 653, 116 N.E. 425.
Assuming the truth of the facts alleged by Bochnowski, the only act relied upon as furnishing a cause of action was Peoples Federal’s threat to discontinue using Vernon E. Lee & Associates for their future appraisal work. Bochnowski does not dispute that Peoples Federal could lawfully discontinue its working relationship with Vernon E. Lee & Associates at any time as to future appraisal assignments. Hence, Peoples Federal’s motive or purpose in threatening to terminate the business relationship between Peoples Federal and Vernon E. Lee & Associates are irrelevant, see Miller v. Ortman (1956), 235 Ind. 641, 136 N.E.2d 17; Guethler, supra; Dye, supra, and Bochnowski has failed again to establish a material factual dispute. The trial court therefore did not err in ruling that Peoples Federal was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
HOFFMAN, J., concurs.
RATLIFF, C.J., dissents with separate opinion.