Court Opinion

ID: 9406193
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-30 07:09:40.191696+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:27.645148
License: Public Domain

In The

                                Court of Appeals

                    Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

                              __________________

                              NO. 09-22-00221-CV
                              __________________

                       JERRY L. BANGMON, Appellant

                                        V.

            LATONIA JONES AND RODNEY SIMON, Appellees

 ________________________________________________________________

                On Appeal from the 136th District Court
                       Jefferson County, Texas
                      Trial Cause No. D-203,523
__________________________________________________________________

                          MEMORANDUM OPINION

      Jerry L. Bangmon (Bangmon or Appellant) appeals the trial court’s judgment

granting Latonia Jones (Jones) and Rodney Simon’s (Simon) (collectively

Defendants or Appellees) plea to the jurisdiction and dismissing Bangmon’s claims

with prejudice. Finding no error, we affirm.

                                   Background

      Bangmon filed a pro se original petition entitled “Derivative Tort Claim”

against Defendants Jones and Simon. Bangmon, an inmate serving a sentence at the

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Stiles Prison Unit, alleged that Jones and Simon, who were Law Librarians at the

Stiles Prison Unit, denied Bangmon access to the restroom. According to Bangmon,

the Defendants, in the course and scope of their employment, committed criminal

offenses under the Texas Penal Code because they denied him access to the restroom

during the time when prison officials were conducting a “headcount.” He argues the

Defendants’ actions were intentional torts against him based on the Defendants’

alleged criminal actions. His petition asserted that the Defendants’ actions were an

intentional denial of his rights and violations of laws relating to the Defendants’

employment that constituted the following criminal offenses: Official Oppression

under Penal Code Chapter 39.03, Violations of the Civil Rights of Person in Custody

under Penal Code Chapter 39.04, Abuse of Official Capacity under Penal Code

Chapter 39.01, and Criminal Conspiracy under Penal Code Chapter 15.02. Bangmon

asserts these alleged criminal offenses are predicated on violations of the Civil

Rights of Institutionalized Person Act, Americans with Disabilities Act,

Rehabilitation Act, and various civil rights. According to Bangmon, the alleged

criminal offenses resulted in the denial of his rights under the First, Fifth, Eighth,

and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Bangmon’s petition

seeks compensatory damages and criminal charges against the Defendants.

      Jones and Simon filed their Plea to the Jurisdiction, asking the trial court to

dismiss all claims against them for lack of jurisdiction. According to Jones and

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Simon, the trial court lacks jurisdiction because Bangmon’s tort claims are barred

by sovereign immunity because his petition asserts that the Defendants at the time

of the alleged acts were working within their official duties while employed by the

Texas Department of Criminal Justice, and Bangmon’s alleged tort claims do not

fall within the limited statutory waiver of sovereign immunity found exclusively in

the Texas Tort Claims Act. Jones and Simon also argue that the trial court lacks

jurisdiction over Bangmon’s alleged criminal violations because the Penal Code

does not confer a private right of action.

      The trial court granted the Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction and dismissed

Bangmon’s claims against the Defendants with prejudice. Bangmon filed this

appeal.

                                  Issues on Appeal

      In his pro se brief, Bangmon raises two issues on appeal. His “Statement of

Issues Presented for Review” are as follows:

      1. Whether the court in granting dismissal with prejudice after Plaintiff
         had requested for the court to take out all Penal Codes and proceed
         with the claim on the Americans with Disabilities Act, []
         Rehabilitation Act, and violations of civil rights. Judgment
         improperly disputed factual issues.
      2. Whether the Plaintiff’s factual allegations of deprivation[]s of
         restroom use by prison staff raised a material issue under the Eighth
         and Fourteenth Amendment[s] for depriving Plaintiff to dispose of
         his bodily fluids, and or wastes.

He also then states that he is presenting the following “points of error:”

                                             3
                             Point of Error 1.

The district court err[]ed by failing to take out all Penal Codes used or
cited in the claim, as Plaintiff had requested in his motion to amend, to
give the court jurisdiction over the constitutional claims, since the court
lacks jurisdiction over criminal violations because Penal Codes does
not confer a private right of action.

                             Point of Error 2.

The court err[]ed by dismissing Plaintiff[’]s claim and not allowing the
claim to proceed on the merits and constitutional violations of civil
rights and equal protection.

                             Point of Error 3.

The court err[]ed by overlooking Plaintiff[’]s exhibit[]s and medical
record[]s submitted as to blood in urine from said deprivation. Plaintiff
may seek damages compensatory under the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA) for emotional distress and humiliation.

                             Point of Error 4.

A complaint should not be dismissed unless the Plaintiff can prove no
set of facts, has failed to demonstrate facts, that if proven would entitle
him to relief. No state shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without due course of law.

                             Point of Error 5.

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom or usage, of any state or territory, or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.

                                     4
                                 Standard of Review

      Whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law. Tex.

Natural Res. Conservation Comm’n v. IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d 849, 855 (Tex. 2002).

We review the trial court’s ruling on the plea to the jurisdiction de novo. See Farmers

Tex. Cty. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Beasley, 598 S.W.3d 237, 240 (Tex. 2020) (citing Presidio

Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Scott, 309 S.W.3d 927, 929 (Tex. 2010)). We must determine

whether Bangmon’s petition alleged facts affirmatively demonstrating the trial

court’s jurisdiction. See Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217,

226 (Tex. 2004).

      Generally, we construe an appellant’s pro se brief liberally. See Giddens v.

Brooks, 92 S.W.3d 878, 880 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2002, pet. denied). That said, a

pro se litigant is held to the same standards as licensed attorneys and must comply

with applicable laws and rules of procedure. Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573

S.W.2d 181, 184-85 (Tex. 1978); Giddens, 92 S.W.3d at 880-81.

                                      Analysis

      Bangmon asserted in his petition a claim he entitled “Derivative Tort Claim” 1

and he stated that the Defendants acted “in their own individual capacity under the

      1
        We assume all common-law tort theories alleged against a governmental unit
or its employees fall under the TTCA for purposes of section 101.106. See Mission
Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 253 S.W.3d 653, 659 (Tex. 2008) (citing
Newman v. Obersteller, 960 S.W.2d 621, 622 (Tex. 1997)).
                                        5
color of state and federal laws” but elsewhere he also stated that the Defendants were

acting as public servants in the course of their employment. Reading Bangmon’s

petition liberally, it appears he sued the Defendants in their official and individual

capacities. See Giddens, 92 S.W.3d at 880. “[P]ublic employees [] have always been

individually liable for their own torts, even when committed in the course of

employment, and suit may be brought against a government employee in his

individual capacity.” Franka v. Velasquez, 332 S.W.3d 367, 383 (Tex. 2011)

(citations omitted). However, under section 101.106 of the Texas Tort Claims Act

(TTCA),

      [i]f a suit is filed against an employee of a governmental unit based on
      conduct within the general scope of that employee’s employment and
      if it could have been brought under this chapter against the
      governmental unit, the suit is considered to be against the employee in
      the employee’s official capacity only.

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.106(f).

      We conclude that Bangmon’s tort claims are governed by section 101.106(f).

First, Appellees are both employees of TDCJ-CID, a state agency. Second, the

TTCA defines scope of employment as “the performance for a governmental unit of

the duties of an employee’s office or employment and includes being in and about

the performance of a task lawfully assigned to an employee by competent authority.”

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.001(5). Scope of employment “extends to

job duties to which the official has been assigned, even if the official errs in

                                          6
completing the task.” Lopez v. Serna, 414 S.W.3d 890, 894 (Tex. App.—San

Antonio 2013, no pet.). In our review of the pleadings, we must ascertain the true

nature of Bangmon’s claims. See State v. Lain, 349 S.W.2d 579, 582 (Tex. 1961)

(court should not exalt form over substance when considering capacity in which an

officer is sued). Bangmon’s allegations relate to tasks lawfully assigned to Appellees

– regulating inmates’ activities in the library during “count time,” when the inmates

are not allowed to change locations in order to be counted in a particular location.

Accordingly, it is clear from the record that Appellees were acting within the scope

of their employment. See Lopez, 414 S.W.3d at 894. Third, “if a state employee is

alleged to have committed negligence or other ‘wrongful conduct’ in the general

scope of employment, then the suit is subject to section 101.106(f) because it could

have been brought against the state agency[,]” and this applies to both intentional

and unintentional torts. See id. at 895. Therefore, Bangmon’s tort claims are subject

to section 101.106(f), and his tort claims are against Appellees in their official, not

individual capacity. See id.

      Under Texas Law, a suit against a government employee in his official

capacity is a suit against his government employer. Franka, 332 S.W.3d at 382.

“[A]n employee sued in his official capacity has the same governmental [or

sovereign] immunity, derivatively, as his government employer.” Id. at 382-83.

TDCJ-CID, a state agency, enjoys sovereign immunity from suit unless the

                                          7
legislature expressly waives that immunity. See Tex. Office of Comptroller of Pub.

Accounts v. Saito, 372 S.W.3d 311, 314 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, pet. denied).

      The TTCA provides a limited waiver of immunity for certain suits against

governmental entities. Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 253 S.W.3d 653,

655 (Tex. 2008); see Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.025(a) (providing

wavier of immunity from suit “to the extent of liability created by this chapter[]”).

The TTCA waives immunity from liability in three general areas: “use of publicly

owned automobiles, premises defects, and injuries arising out of conditions or use

of property.” Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Able, 35 S.W.3d 608, 611 (Tex. 2000) (quoting

Lowe v. Tex. Tech Univ., 540 S.W.2d 297, 298 (Tex. 1976)); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.

Code Ann. § 101.021. However, Bangmon alleged that the Defendants’ actions were

intentional torts, and the TTCA does not waive immunity for intentional torts. See

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.057(2) (“This chapter does not apply to a

claim . . . arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, or any other intentional

tort[.]”); Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Petta, 44 S.W.3d 575, 580 (Tex. 2001).

Bangmon’s petition, therefore, affirmatively negates any allegation of waiver of

immunity for the Defendants’ performance of their employment responsibilities and

shows the trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.

                                           8
      In Bangmon’s petition, he also alleges the Defendants committed certain

criminal offenses 2 and each of his constitutional claims are premised on those

alleged criminal acts. We agree with the Defendants that the Texas Penal Code does

not create private causes of action. Burke Ctr. for MHMR v. Carr, No. 09-04-138-

CV, 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS 11499, at *11 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Dec. 22, 2004,

pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing Spurlock v. Johnson, 94 S.W.3d 655, 658 (Tex.

App.—San Antonio 2002, no pet.)). Bangmon admits in his appellate brief that “the

[trial] court lack[ed] jurisdiction over criminal violations because Penal Codes do[]

not confer a private right of action.” Therefore, the allegations in Bangmon’s petition

affirmatively negate the existence of jurisdiction, and the trial court properly

dismissed Bangmon’s claims with prejudice. See Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 227 (“If

the pleadings affirmatively negate the existence of jurisdiction, then a plea to the

jurisdiction may be granted without allowing the plaintiff[] an opportunity to

amend.”); see also Cty. of Cameron v. Brown, 80 S.W.3d 549, 555 (Tex. 2002). We

overrule Bangmon’s issues and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

      2
         We note that although Bangmon argues that based on his “motion to amend,”
the trial court erred in not removing Bangmon’s references to the Penal Code in his
original petition at his request in order to give the court jurisdiction, Bangmon failed
to follow Rule 64 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure for amending his petition.
See Tex. R. Civ. P. 64 (requiring the party amending a pleading to point out the
instrument amended and amend by filing a substitute instrument that is entire and
complete in itself); Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573 S.W.2d 181, 184-85 (Tex.
1978) (pro se litigant is held to the same standards as licensed attorneys and must
comply with applicable laws and rules of procedure).
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      AFFIRMED.

                                                _________________________
                                                    LEANNE JOHNSON
                                                          Justice

Submitted on March 1, 2023
Opinion Delivered June 29, 2023

Before Golemon, C.J., Johnson and Wright, JJ.

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