Court Opinion

ID: 9949697
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-12 14:08:33.544424+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:47.694694
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-3791-21

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

AARON SWANN, a/k/a
AARON JORDAN, and
TYLER SWANN,

          Defendant-Appellant.

                   Argued January 30, 2024 – Decided March 12, 2024

                   Before Judges Haas and Puglisi.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Camden County, Indictment No. 16-10-2985.

                   John P. Flynn, Assistant Deputy Public Defender,
                   argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora,
                   Public Defender, attorney; John P. Flynn, of counsel
                   and on the briefs).

                   Maura Murphy Sullivan, Assistant Prosecutor, argued
                   the cause for respondent (Grace C. MacAuley, Camden
                   County Prosecutor, attorney; Maura Murphy Sullivan,
                   of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM

      Defendant Aaron Swann appeals from the August 3, 2022 amended

judgment of conviction (JOC), entered after we remanded for reconsideration

under State v. Torres, 246 N.J. 246 (2021). We affirm.

                                          I.

      On May 17, 2016, defendant, who was eighteen years old at the time,

drove his mother's vehicle around the city of Camden with his co-defendants,

then ages sixteen through eighteen. Around 11:30 p.m., defendant approached

a random vehicle and fired a shotgun through the front windshield, injuring the

two front-seat occupants.

      Approximately forty-five minutes later, defendant drove to another

location about three miles away, and his co-defendant exited the vehicle and

approached an individual to rob him. The co-defendant fired a shotgun at the

individual, which missed, and the individual fled. The co-defendant returned to

defendant's vehicle.

      About an hour later, defendant drove to a third location about two miles

away. Two co-defendants exited the vehicle and approached another victim,

robbed him, and shot him in the torso. Police officers found the victim laying

in the street, and he died of his injuries.

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      On November 15, 2018, a Camden County grand jury indicted defendant

and his three co-defendants with third-degree possession of a rifle or a shotgun,

N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(c)(1) (count one); third-degree possession of a sawed-off

shotgun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(b) (count two); second-degree possession, receipt, or

transfer of a community gun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a)(2) (count three); second-

degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39 -4(a)(1)

(count four); second-degree conspiracy to commit armed robbery, N.J.S.A.

2C:5-2, :15-1(a)(1) (count five); first-degree conspiracy to commit murder,

N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2, :11-3(a)(1) (count six); three counts of first-degree armed

robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(a)(1) (count seven), N.J.S.A. 2C: 15-1(a)(2) (counts

eleven and thirteen); two counts of first-degree attempted murder, N.J.S.A.

2C:5-1, :11-3(a)(1) (counts eight and twelve); two counts of third-degree

aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(2) (counts nine and ten); first-degree

aggravated manslaughter, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a)(1) (count fourteen); and first-

degree felony murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(3) (count fifteen).

      On June 27, 2017, pursuant to an agreement, defendant pleaded guilty to

three counts of first-degree armed robbery (counts seven, eleven and thirteen).

In exchange for defendant's guilty plea, the State agreed to recommend the court

impose a ten-year sentence on counts seven and eleven, to run concurrently; and

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a thirteen-year sentence on count thirteen, to run consecutively to counts seven

and eleven; with all three counts subject to the No Early Release Act (NERA),

N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2.

      On August 11, 2017, the court conducted a sentencing hearing.

Defendant's counsel submitted letters of support and asked the court to sentence

defendant in accordance with the plea agreement. Neither defense counsel nor

the State addressed aggravating and mitigating factors during the hearing.

Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a), the court found aggravating factors three (the

risk defendant will commit another offense) and nine (the need for deterring

defendant and others from violating the law). Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b),

the court found mitigating factor seven (defendant has no history of prior

delinquency or criminal activity or has led a law-abiding life for a substantial

period of time before the commission of the present offense).        The court

determined the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors and

sentenced defendant in accordance with the plea agreement to an aggregate

sentence of twenty-three years, subject to NERA.

      Defendant appealed his sentence, which was placed on the excessive

sentencing calendar pursuant to Rule 2:9-11. At oral argument, defendant's

appellate counsel, who had not represented him during the plea and sentencing,

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asked us to remand the case because the trial judge did not consider mitigating

factors and evidence and did not provide a statement of reasons as to why he

was imposing consecutive sentences. The State conceded the latter point. On

March 13, 2020, we issued an order remanding "the matter to the trial court for

reconsideration of the factors set forth in State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627

(1985)," and did not retain jurisdiction.

      On remand, defense counsel submitted a sentencing memorandum

detailing defendant's rehabilitative efforts while incarcerated and discussing

studies regarding adolescent brain development. Defendant asked the court to

find additional mitigating factors eight (defendant's conduct was the result of

circumstances unlikely to recur), nine (the character and attitude of defendant

indicate that he is unlikely to commit another offense), eleven (the imprisonment

of defendant would entail excessive hardship to himself or his dependents) ,

twelve (the willingness of defendant to cooperate with law enforcement

authorities), and fourteen (defendant was under twenty-six years of age at the

time of the commission of the offense). Defendant also asked the court to give

substantial weight to mitigating factor seven, and to give minimal weight to the

aggravating factors found at sentencing, in light of defendant's youth.

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       On September 17, 2021, Judge Yolanda C. Rodriguez considered

arguments of counsel and defendant's sentencing memorandum, having

reviewed the transcripts of the initial sentencing and appellate argument. The

judge read our order to require her to set forth a Yarbough analysis, not to

conduct a sentencing hearing anew. She declined to consider adding additional

mitigating factors, finding it "clear that the trial judge did consider aggravating

and mitigating factors" at the time of sentencing and placed his reasons on the

record and in the JOC. Because defendant was entitled to mitigating factor

fourteen as a matter of law, she granted defendant's request to add that factor

and, in accordance with our order, issued the following Yarbough analysis:

                  Number one, the crimes and their objectives were
            predominantly independent of each other. The [c]ourt
            finds that these three shootings and robberies were
            independent of each other with different victims and
            locations.

                  Two, the crimes involved separate acts of
            violence or threats of violence. The [c]ourt finds that
            these three random acts of violence were miles apart,
            and what's significant to [the] [c]ourt, [is the] time in
            between each one.

                  Number three, the crimes were committed at
            different times or separate places rather than being
            committed so closely in time and place as to indicate a
            single period of [aberrant] behavior. As explained,
            these three random shooting and robberies were in
            separate places, miles apart, with different victims

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             unknown to defendant . . . and the co[-]defendants, also
             unknown to each other. This was not a single period of
             impulsive [aberrant] behavior. This was certainly
             something that took time and thought and reflection
             between each location, each shooting, between each
             victim driving between one and the other.

                   Number four, any of the crimes involved multiple
             victims. Well[,] that is certainly the case here. And,
             sadly, one of the victims, the young [victim] lost his
             life.

                    Number five, the convictions for which the
             sentences are to be imposed are numerous. That is the
             case here. And, again, this [c]ourt finds significant that
             in this case what we're talking about is defendant . . .
             pled guilty to three counts of first-degree armed
             robbery. There had been a number of other charges that
             was placed on the record today, a number of other
             counts.

      The judge noted defendant's exposure for just the three counts of first-

degree armed robbery was twenty years for each count, for a total of sixty years.

The plea agreement called for ten-year concurrent terms for the non-fatal

robberies and thirteen years for the robbery that resulted in the victim's death,

to run consecutively. The judge noted the plea agreement anticipated a total

term of twenty-three years, which was "still less than half of his potential

exposure of . . . [sixty] years."

      In light of the additional mitigating factor, the judge re-balanced the

factors, finding the aggravating factors still substantially outweighed the

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mitigating factors.   In doing so, the judge acknowledged the rehabilitative

efforts defendant demonstrated while incarcerated, noting he participated in

"academics, programs, religion," earned certificates, and worked on "developing

employment skills."

      The judge also referenced Torres and State v. Bellamy, 468 N.J. Super. 29

(App. Div. 2021), which were decided after we remanded defendant's appeal. In

light of the holdings in those cases, the judge considered the overall fairness of

the sentence imposed:

            [C]onsidering defendant . . . as he stands there today
            and the totality of the circumstances, the [c]ourt still
            finds that having sentenced defendant to the lowest
            possible sentence in two of the three first-degree counts
            and those two running concurrently, and on the low end
            of the third first-degree robbery count, and having that
            run consecutively, as courts have said, there is no free
            crime and that one was the where [the victim] tragically
            lost his life that day, the [c]ourt finds these to be fair
            and reasonable sentences.

                  These sentences still allow defendant . . . to
            possibly be released while he's still a relatively young
            man. As I said, having the two counts, the non-fatal
            shooting counts run concurrently, and the third run
            consecutively, the [c]ourt does find under these
            circumstances to be fair and reasonable.

      In light of her decision, the judge denied defendant's motion for

reconsideration of the sentence and reimposed the prior sentence. The amended

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JOC reflected the court's analysis under Yarbough but not its findings under

Torres. The JOC was again amended on October 15, 2021, to correct the

mandatory parole supervision term.

      Defendant appealed, which was again placed on the excessive sentence

calendar. At oral argument, defense counsel argued the trial court erred by not

considering studies regarding adolescent brain development and failing to

address the additional mitigating factors he requested. Although both defense

counsel and the State discussed the judge's analysis under Yarbough, neither

acknowledged the judge had also conducted an analysis under Torres. On

January 10, 2022, this court remanded for a second time "for reconsideration of

the nature of the imposition of consecutive sentences" under Torres.

      On May 11, 2022, Judge Rodriguez conducted another hearing. Based on

her review of the sentencing oral argument, she rejected defendant's contention

the proceeding was required to be a "full re-sentencing from start to finish." She

noted the sole question asked of defense counsel was, "So you want us to remand

because of Torres and remand for reconsideration on Yarbough," to which

counsel answered, "Right. And for those specific mitigating factors that weren't

found that were supported by the evidence." Although counsel requested a

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remand for both issues, the judge noted that our "order says Torres. Only Torres.

It only says Torres." She reasoned:

                   They did not state in their order that the remand
            was to address Torres and Yarbough. They only
            required that Torres be addressed. They did not state
            that the sentence imposed in September of 2021
            shocked the conscience. They merely stated that the
            trial [c]ourt consider "the imposition of consecutive
            sentences under Torres."

      The judge noted that this reading of our order made sense because the case

had already been remanded to address the Yarbough factors, which had been

overlooked by the original sentencing court. She therefore determined the issue

on remand was limited to that specifically noted in our order, because if we

"want[ed] further resentencing because it shocked the conscience," we would

have ordered resentencing.

      Accordingly, the judge recited her prior findings regarding the Yarbough

factors, her weighing of the aggravating and mitigating factors, and found the

twenty-three-year aggregate sentence to be fair. She again noted defendant was

not receiving the maximum sentence for any one of the three first-degree crimes

to which he pleaded guilty. Instead, he was sentenced to the lowest term on two

of the robberies, to run concurrently, even though the court found the

aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors. The judge found that

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running the third sentence consecutively was also fair, in light of all the facts in

this case, including the fact that the robbery resulted in death.

      The judge further found the aggregate sentence of twenty-three years was

fair in light of defendant's age, noting he will be eligible for parole at a young

age and even if he served the maximum term, would be forty-one when released.

      The judge also considered the sentence in light of the general purposes of

offender sentencing pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:1-2(b), and found the overall

sentence to be fair: "A [twenty-three]-year aggregate sentence for these three

first[-]degree robberies with these four different victims serves to prevent and

condemn such behavior . . . [and] will insure public safety and deter the

defendant from committing similar crimes." She reiterated that defendant's

potential exposure was sixty years, and a term of twenty-three years was not

"excessive or disproportionate punishment, in light of the severity of the

first[-]degree crimes" to which he pleaded guilty.        On August 3, 2022, an

amended JOC was entered reflecting the findings and decision.

      Defendant filed a notice of appeal which, on his motion, was transferred

from the sentencing oral argument calendar to the plenary calendar. Defendant

presents the following issues for our consideration:

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POINT I

THE    TRIAL    COURT    ERRONEOUSLY
CONCLUDED THAT THE REMAND ORDER
REQUIRED ONLY A STATEMENT OF REASONS
RATHER THAN A FULL RESENTENCING.

POINT II

THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO FIND AMPLY
SUPPORTED MITIGATING FACTORS.

      A.     Because Swann agreed to cooperate in the
prosecution of his co-defendants, the trial court was
required to find mitigating factor twelve.

      B.   Considering      Swann's      youth     and
demonstrated rehabilitation in prison, the trial court
should have found mitigating factors eight and nine.

POINT III

THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO APPROPRIATELY
CONSIDER SWANN'S YOUTH IN ANALYZING
THE YARBOUGH FACTORS AND THE FAIRNESS
OF THE AGGREGATE SENTENCE.

       A.    Considering the Yarbough factors in light
of Swann's youth, concurrent sentences are warranted
for this single period of aberrant behavior.

      B.     The trial court's assessment of the overall
fairness of the aggregate sentence was deficient
because, in addition to the aforementioned errors, the
court failed to consider Swann's youth in weighing the
existence of a plea agreement and in analyzing the
sentencing purposes set forth in N.J.S.A 2C:1- 2(b).

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                          12
            POINT IV

            THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED STRUCTURAL
            ERROR BY FAILING TO AFFORD SWANN THE
            OPPORTUNITY TO ALLOCUTE DURING THE
            SECOND RESENTENCING HEARING.

            POINT V

            THE MATTER SHOULD BE REMANDED FOR
            RESENTENCING BEFORE A DIFFERENT JUDGE
            BECAUSE THE JUDGE HAS SHOWN A
            COMMITMENT TO IMPOSING THE SAME
            SENTENCE.

      We disagree and affirm.

                                       II.

      An appellate court's review of a sentencing court's imposition of sentence

is guided by an abuse of discretion standard. Torres, 246 N.J. at 272. "Appellate

review of a criminal sentence is limited; a reviewing court decides whether there

is a 'clear showing of abuse of discretion.'" State v. Bolvito, 217 N.J. 221, 228

(2014) (quoting State v. Whitaker, 79 N.J. 503, 512 (1979)).

      The deferential standard of review applies, however, "only if the trial

judge follows the [Criminal] Code and the basic precepts that channel

sentencing discretion." State v. Trinidad, 241 N.J. 425, 453 (2020) (quoting

State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49, 65 (2014)). Therefore, if the sentencing judge

followed the Criminal Code "and the basic precepts that channel sentencing

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discretion," this court should affirm the sentence so long as it does not "shock

the judicial conscience." Case, 220 N.J. at 65. "On the other hand, if the trial

court fails to identify relevant aggravating and mitigating factors, or merely

enumerates them, or forgoes a qualitative analysis, or provides little 'insight into

the sentencing decision,' then the deferential standard will not apply." Ibid.

      It is within the trial judge's discretion to determine if a sentence should be

concurrent or consecutive.     State v. Cuff, 239 N.J. 321, 350 (2019). The

sentencing judge should "place on the record its statement of reasons for the

decision to impose consecutive sentences, which…should focus 'on the fairness

of the overall sentence, and the sentencing court should set forth in detail its

reasons for concluding that a particular sentence is warranted.'" Torres, 246 N.J.

at 267-68.

      Turning to defendant's arguments, his first contention is that the judge

erred in conducting a limited hearing instead of a full resentencing on remand.

We disagree. Because the remand orders were limited in scope, defendant was

not entitled to reopen the sentencing for additional argument and consideration.

      Our Supreme Court has addressed the scope of remand orders. In State v.

Randolph, the defendant pleaded guilty to three counts of aggravated assault and

eight counts of weapons offenses, spanning five separate indictments. 210 N.J.

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330, 335 (2012). He was sentenced to three consecutive maximum terms, with

the remaining counts to run concurrently. Id. at 336. At the time of sentencing,

the court did not explain its justification for imposing three consecutive

maximum sentences.      Ibid.   On defendant's first appeal, we remanded for

resentencing and the court reimposed the same sentence. Ibid. We remanded

defendant's second appeal because the trial court did not justify elements of the

sentence, including "[t]he terms, the parole ineligibility, consecutiveness, and

. . . special considerations when [imposing] more than two consecutive terms."

Id. at 337. That order stated: "We remand for reconsideration and justification

for the sentence of three consecutive maximum terms." Ibid. On remand, the

trial court made limited findings and declined to consider defendant's post-

sentencing rehabilitative evidence. Id. at 338. We then affirmed the sentence,

and our Supreme Court reversed, holding the scope of the remand hearing was

too narrow.

      The Court held that "except where the remand order is made limited in

scope or is designed to correct a technical error, the Appellate Division has

implied that a defendant should be assessed as he stands before the court at

resentencing." Id. at 351. Because we remanded not just for reconsideration

but for "justification of both the consecutive nature of his sentences and the

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imposition of maximum terms, which are two separate considerations ," a full

resentencing was required. Id. at 352.

      In contrast, the Court noted that when a matter is remanded solely for

consideration of Yarbough factors,

            defendant's post-sentencing rehabilitation would more
            likely be outside the scope of that remand order. Not
            only would such a remand be more technical in nature,
            that is, for the purpose of putting explanatory
            information on the record, but also the Yarbough
            analysis itself, which focuses primarily on the
            circumstances of the crimes committed, does not fairly
            implicate defendant's rehabilitation efforts.

            [Id. at 353.]

      Thus, our first remand order, which was limited to reconsideration of

Yarbough factors, did not require a full resentencing hearing.

      We next turn to our second order, which remanded "to the trial court for

reconsideration of the nature of the imposition of consecutive sentences "

pursuant to Torres. During the appellate argument, counsel contended the first

remand was conducted incorrectly and requested we remand for a full

resentencing. As Judge Rodriguez noted, we could have reversed the sentence

and remanded the matter "for a new resentencing proceeding" as the Court did

in Torres. However, we declined to do so and instead remanded for the limited

purpose of a Torres analysis, which is an amplification of Yarbough that does

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not necessitate a full resentencing. Because the remand hearing comported with

our order, we are unpersuaded by defendant's argument to the contrary.

      Having decided defendant's primary contention, we decline to address the

issues raised in points II, IV and V. The judge correctly divined our intent in

both remand orders not to reopen the entire sentencing proceeding and rejected

defendant's attempt to add mitigating factors not sought at the initial sentencing.

The original sentencing judge made findings regarding aggravating and

mitigating factors that were supported in the record and, other than factor

fourteen, there was no justification for the remand judge to reconsider that

decision or ascribe different weight to those factors.

      To the extent counsel is raising these issues before us for the first time,

they fall under the plain error rule. R. 2:10-2. We otherwise review sentencing

under the deferential abuse of discretion standard. State v. Robinson, 217 N.J.

594, 603 (2014). "On review, appellate courts are deferential to sentencing

determinations and 'must not substitute [their] judgment for that of the

sentencing court.'" State v. Rivera, 249 N.J. 285, 297 (2021) (alteration in

original) (quoting State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57, 70 (2014)). As the Court said:

            The sentence must therefore be affirmed unless (1) the
            sentencing guidelines were violated; (2) the
            aggravating and mitigating factors found were not
            "based upon competent credible evidence in the

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             record"; or (3) "the application of the guidelines to the
             facts of [the] case makes the sentence clearly
             unreasonable so as to shock the judicial conscience."

             [Id. at 297-98 (alteration in original) (quoting State v.
             Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 364-65 (1984)).]

      We recognize that at sentencing, defendant only sought mitigating factor

seven, which was found by the court. He now argues the court erred by not

considering mitigating factors eight, nine, eleven and twelve. In support of his

argument for eight, nine and eleven, defendant points to studies that were not

presented to the sentencing court in the first instance and to defendant's post-

sentencing rehabilitative efforts. The sentencing court's determination was not

plain error because it was based on the competent credible evidence in the record

before it at that time.

      As to mitigating factor twelve, while the plea agreement does not call for

truthful testimony, the transcript of the plea reflects that a "separate

memorandum of understanding" was executed "that incorporate[d] the terms and

conditions . . . that the defendant intend[ed] as part of the plea agreement to

cooperate with the prosecution of this indictment." This agreement was not

referenced in or appended to the plea agreement, nor was it provided in

defendant's appendix filed with this court. We do not have any details as to what

specific cooperation defendant was required to provide or whether defendant

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actually provided any cooperation under that agreement.               Under these

circumstances, we are unable to consider defendant's contention on this point.

      As to the issues raised regarding defendant's youth, the record reflects that

the court considered the fairness of the total sentence imposed, including both

the mandatory minimum and maximum terms, in light of defendant's age at the

time of the crimes, now and when he will be released. Defendant contends the

trial court erred by failing to find the mitigating factors substantially outweigh

the aggravating factors, and therefore urges us to require the trial court to impose

concurrent terms, but we find these arguments unavailing. Youth is one factor

of many and not necessarily, as counsel urges, the overriding or determinative

factor. The record reflects the judge placed ample reasons on the record for both

the imposition of a consecutive sentence under Yarbough and the fairness of the

sentence under Torres, and nothing about that bargained-for sentence "shock[s]

the judicial conscience." Fuentes, 217 N.J. at 70.

      To the extent we have not expressly addressed any issues raised by

defendant, it is because they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a

written opinion. See R. 2:11-3(e)(2).

      Affirmed.

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