Court Opinion

ID: 9398167
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-30 15:08:27.141471+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:31.004413
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Horner v. Tarleton, 2023-Ohio-1785.]

STATE OF OHIO                    )                    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
                                 )ss:                 NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF MEDINA                 )

JONATHAN E. HORNER                                    C.A. No.       22CA0040-M

        Appellee

        v.                                            APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
                                                      ENTERED IN THE
MARY TARLETON                                         COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
                                                      COUNTY OF MEDINA, OHIO
        Appellant                                     CASE No.   18PA0004

                                 DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY

Dated: May 30, 2023

        STEVENSON, Judge.

        {¶1}    Defendant-Appellant, Mary Tarleton, nka Cummings (“Mother”), appeals the

judgment of the Medina County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Division. For the following

reasons, this Court affirms in part, reverses in part, and remands for further proceedings.

                                                 I.

        {¶2}    The parties are the parents of one minor child, B.H. In October 2018, the parties

signed an agreed judgment entry that designated Plaintiff-Appellee, Jonathan Horner (“Father”)

the sole residential parent and legal custodian of B.H. Mother was awarded parenting time. At

that time, Mother had recently moved to Illinois. She was granted parenting time in Illinois the

third week of every month, one weekend per month in the state of Ohio, and an alternating two-

week on, two-week off schedule during the summer months. The parties agreed to no exchange

of child support.
                                                  2

       {¶3}    In October 2020, Mother moved to modify parenting time. While her motion was

styled as a request to modify her parenting time, the trial court treated it as a motion to modify the

allocation of parental rights and responsibilities between the parties because Mother requested that

the court designate her the sole residential parent and legal custodian of B.H. Mother’s motion

was based on Father’s alleged failure to attend to B.H.’s health, namely her vaccinations, annual

check-ups, and diet. Mother also relied heavily on the fact that she had gotten sober and made

positive changes to her life.

       {¶4}    In January 2021, Father moved to modify child support. The following day he filed

an emergency motion to suspend parenting time, for supervised visitation, and for a no-contact

order between B.H. and her stepfather (“Stepfather”). The latter three motions were based on

B.H.’s allegations of sexual abuse against Stepfather. Those allegations were later substantiated

by the Medina County Department of Job & Family Services (“JFS”) following a forensic

interview with B.H. As a result, JFS considered the child to be at high risk for further abuse if

placed with Mother.

       {¶5}    The Magistrate conducted a hearing on both parties’ motions. Testimony was

adduced from both parties, four character witnesses on behalf of Mother, the investigative worker

for JFS, and the Guardian Ad Litem (“GAL”). The Magistrate issued a decision recommending

that Father remain the sole residential parent and legal custodian; that Mother’s motion to modify

the allocation of parental rights and responsibilities be denied; that Father’s motion to modify

parenting time be granted; and, that Father’s motion to modify child support be denied. The

Magistrate modified Mother’s parenting time to the Medina County Domestic Relations Court

Standard Long Distance Parenting Time Schedule. The new schedule was to include two
                                                   3

weekends in Medina County. It was also subject to the caveat that Stepfather was not permitted

to have unsupervised contact with B.H.

        {¶6}    The trial court adopted the Magistrate’s findings and decision the same day.

Shortly thereafter, the trial court issued a nunc pro tunc judgment entry correcting certain

typographical errors in its original judgment entry.

        {¶7}    Mother objected to the Magistrate’s Decision. She maintained that the Magistrate

erred as follows: 1) in finding no change in circumstances that warranted granting Mother’s motion

to modify the allocation of parental rights; 2) in failing to address the best interest of the child; 3)

in missing some details and failing to identify the correct child; and 4) that the Magistrate’s

Decision and Judge’s decision conflict.

        {¶8}    Father also objected to the Magistrate’s Decision.           He maintained that the

Magistrate erred as follows: 1) in citing to Case No. 21DV0033 [Ex Parte Civil Protection Order

on behalf of B.H. against Stepfather], as the final hearing in that case had not happened by the time

of the final hearing in this case; 2) in ordering that Stepfather may have supervised contact with

the minor child, as opposed to no contact whatsoever; 3) by not providing time frames for Mother’s

weekend parenting time to occur in Medina County, Ohio, and for failing to require Mother to

provide Father with notice of when she intends to exercise her weekend parenting time; and 4) by

finding that Father did not meet his burden of proof regarding a modification of child support.

        {¶9}    The trial court held a hearing on both parties’ objections. Counsel appeared and

briefly addressed the court. The trial court overruled all of Mother’s objections, overruled Father’s

objections in part, and sustained Father’s objections in part.

        {¶10} In its decision, the trial court addressed collectively Father’s second objection and

Mother’s first, second, third, and fourth objections, and overruled them. The trial court adopted
                                                   4

the Magistrate’s finding that Mother failed to demonstrate that a change in circumstances had

occurred for either B.H. or Father and that custody should remain with Father. The trial court

agreed with the Magistrate that Father’s alleged failure to have the minor child vaccinated until

she started school did not constitute a change in circumstances because Mother’s own testimony

reflected that she consented to that plan. The trial court acknowledged that Mother had gotten

sober but held that a change in           Mother’s circumstances did not qualify under R.C.

3109.04(E)(1)(a).

       {¶11} The trial court further found that the Magistrate did not err and properly considered

the best interest factors set forth in R.C. 3109.051(D) regarding the modification of Mother’s

parenting time.

       {¶12}      The trial court sustained Father’s first objection, concluding that the Magistrate

erred in taking judicial notice of Case No. 21DV0033, and ordered that any reference to or

consideration of it be stricken from the record.

       {¶13} The trial court sustained Father’s third objection, concluding that the Magistrate

erred by not providing time frames for Mother’s weekend parenting time to occur in Medina

County and for failing to require Mother to give Father adequate notice when she intends to

exercise her weekends. The trial court set specific visitation dates and a notice requirement.

       {¶14} Regarding Father’s fourth objection, the trial court agreed that the Magistrate erred

in finding he did not meet his burden of proof for a modification of child support and sustained the

objection. The trial court found that a change in circumstances had occurred that was not

contemplated by the parties when they agreed to no support, and that a zero support order was no

longer in B.H.’s best interest.
                                                5

       {¶15} Regarding the parties’ financial information as relevant to the calculation of

support, the trial court found that Father earns annual income of $41,600.00 but that he did not

submit any evidence regarding other children, health insurance, or childcare costs. The court also

found that Mother is a stay-at-home mom, that she wishes to remain as such, and that she presented

no evidence that she is incapable of working or otherwise maintaining gainful employment. The

court also found that she did not submit any evidence regarding other children, health insurance,

or childcare costs. The Court further found that that Mother is voluntarily unemployed and that

she should be imputed with full-time minimum wage income of $19,304.00. After inserting these

figures into the child support guideline worksheet, the court calculated Mother’s child support

obligation as $138.10 per month and imposed a child support order.

       {¶16} Mother timely appealed the trial court’s judgment and asserts two assignments of

error for our review.

                                                II.

                                 ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I

       THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN OVERRULING
       MOTHER’S OBJECTION TO THE MAGISTRATE’S DECISION AND
       DENYING HER MOTION TO MODIFY PARENTING TIME.1

       {¶17} Mother argues the trial court should have found that a change in circumstances had

occurred and granted her motion to reallocate the parental rights and responsibilities between the

parties. Mother claims the evidence demonstrated that a change in circumstances had taken place

       1
         As noted previously and to avoid confusion, we reiterate that Mother styled her motion
as a motion to modify parenting time, however, her actual request was to be designated the sole
residential parent and legal custodian of B.H. Thus, the trial court properly treated her motion as
a motion to modify the parental rights and responsibilities between the parties.
                                                 6

for both B.H. and Father, and that it was in B.H.’s best interest to grant sole custody to her. We

disagree.

       {¶18} This Court generally reviews a trial court's decision to adopt a magistrate's decision

for an abuse of discretion. Tabatabai v. Tabatabai, 9th Dist. Summit No. No. 08CA0049–M, 2009-

Ohio-3139, ¶ 17. “Under this standard, we must determine whether the trial court’s decision was

unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable.” Id., citing Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217,

219 (1983). “In so doing, we consider the trial court's action with reference to the nature of the

underlying matter.” Id. at ¶ 18. That means “we must consider * * * whether the trial court abused

its discretion by determining that the findings of the magistrate were supported by the weight of

the evidence.” Id. When applying the abuse of discretion standard, this Court may not substitute

its judgment for that of the trial court. Pons v. Ohio State Med. Bd., 66 Ohio St.3d 619, 621 (1993).

       {¶19} The applicable statute, R.C. 3109.04(E)(1)(a), provides in relevant part that:

       The court shall not modify a prior decree allocating parental rights and
       responsibilities for the care of children unless it finds, based on facts that have
       arisen since the prior decree or that were unknown to the court at the time of the
       prior decree, that a change has occurred in the circumstances of the child, the child’s
       residential parent, or either of the parents subject to a shared parenting decree, and
       that the modification is necessary to serve the best interest of the child.

       {¶20} Therefore, before a modification of parental rights and responsibilities can be made

pursuant to R.C. 3109.04(E)(1)(a), the trial court must make a threshold finding that a change in

circumstances has occurred since the prior order.         Pirkel v. Pirkel, 9th Dist. Lorain No.

13CA010436, 2014-Ohio-4327, ¶ 5.          The change in circumstances must be substantiated,

continuing, and have a materially adverse effect upon the child, Wyss v. Wyss, 3 Ohio App.3d 412,

416 (10th Dist.1982), and not be slight or inconsequential. Davis v. Flickinger, 77 Ohio St.3d 415,

417 (1987). As the parties here are not subject to shared parenting, but rather, Father is the sole
                                                 7

residential parent, the change in circumstances must be in the circumstances of B.H. or Father.

R.C. 3109.04(E)(1)(a).

       {¶21} If the party moving to reallocate parental rights and responsibilities demonstrates

the requisite change in circumstances, the court must then determine whether reallocating the

parental rights and responsibilities is in the child’s best interest. Gunderman v. Gunderman, 9th

Dist. Medina No. 08CA0067-M, 2009-Ohio-3787, ¶ 9, citing Fisher v. Hasenjager, 116 Ohio St.3d

53, 2007-Ohio-5589, syllabus.

       {¶22} Mother lists several alleged failures on Father’s part in support of her claim that a

change in circumstances has occurred. First, she contends that Father has not been vaccinating or

“keeping up with” B.H. Specifically, she states B.H. did not receive any vaccinations after getting

the Hepatis B vaccine as a baby until December 2020. Mother further claims B.H. only eats fast

food when she is with Father, and that Father does not take her to the doctor for regular check-ups.

       {¶23} The testimony reflects that both Mother and Father agreed to wait until B.H. was

older, had built up an immune system, and was starting school to have her fully vaccinated. Mother

testified that she and Father agreed to ease B.H. into her vaccinations and to get the “bare

minimum” before school. Mother did not disagree that as of the hearing the child had been fully

vaccinated in time for the start of school. Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not err in

finding that Mother’s own testimony undermines her position that the child’s vaccination status

constitutes a change in circumstances.

       {¶24} Mother does not point to any testimony in the record supporting the fact that Father

only feeds B.H. fast food. Even if it were true, we do not agree that it constitutes a change in

circumstances that is substantive and materially averse to the child. Wyss, 3 Ohio App.3d at 416.

Similarly, Mother did not provide any medical records or direct us to any testimony or other
                                                 8

evidence supporting her position that B.H. was not receiving regular medical care. App.R.

16(A)(3) requires Mother to cite to the place in the record where each error is reflected. It is not

our duty to search the record for evidence to support her argument. Nemes v. Nemes, 9th Dist.

Medina No. C.A. 2127-M, 1993 WL 62132 (Mar. 10, 1993), *2 citing Van Meter v. Coates, 9th

Dist. Lorain No. 91CA005220, 1992 WL 194372 (Aug. 12, 1992), *4.

       {¶25} Next, Mother states that she has taken significant steps to change her life; that she

has maintained her sobriety, gotten married, and accepted responsibility for her past behavior. As

Mother is not the residential parent, a change of circumstances in her life is not relevant to the

analysis. The trial court correctly found that this change in Mother’s circumstances, albeit

commendable, does not qualify as the type of change contemplated by R.C. 3109.04(E)(1)(a).

       {¶26} Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion

in denying Mother’s motion for reallocation of parental rights and responsibilities. The trial

court’s determination that no change in circumstances occurred relating to B.H. or Father was

supported by the facts and evidence presented at trial. Considering Mother’s failure to prove a

change in circumstances, we need not address the best interest issue.

       {¶27} Mother’s first assignment of error is overruled.

                                 ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II

       THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT FATHER MET HIS
       BURDEN OF PROOF REGARDING A MODIFICATION OF CHILD
       SUPPORT AND THUS AWARDED FATHER $2002 PER MONTH IN
       CHILD SUPPORT.

       2
           We note that this amount is incorrect. According to the child support worksheet attached
to the trial court’s decision, the trial court awarded Father $138.10 in child support. However, this
discrepancy is meaningless considering our disposition of this assignment of error.
                                                  9

       {¶28} In her second assignment of error, Mother argues the trial court erred in finding

that Father met his burden of proving that a modification of child support is warranted.

       {¶29} The standard of review for this assignment of error is likewise abuse of discretion.

A trial court's decision regarding child support obligations falls within the discretion of the trial

court and will not be disturbed absent a showing that it is unreasonable, arbitrary, or

unconscionable. Farmer v. Farmer, 9th Dist. Medina No. 03CA0115-M, 2004-Ohio-4449, ¶ 9.

       {¶30}     Father’s counter argument is that this is not a case pertaining to child support

modification because there was no support established in the 2018 agreed judgment entry, nor was

there a guideline worksheet attached to it. He points out that the parties agreed specifically,

“[t]here shall be no child support order in this matter.” In light of the “no support” order, Father

argues that he did not have the burden of proving that a change in circumstances occurred requisite

to modify child support because there was no child support obligation to modify. He contends that

the trial court’s only obligation was to establish a new child support order and “calculate the

amount of the parents’ child support and cash medical support in accordance with the basic child

support schedule” as set forth in R.C. 3119.02.       Father maintains that the trial court properly

calculated support under the guidelines in R.C. 3119.02.

       {¶31} We agree with Father that this is not a support modification case but disagree that

the trial court properly calculated support. This Court’s decision in Sifferlin v. Sifferlin, 9th Dist.

Summit No. 27169, 2014-Ohio-5645, is instructive in this matter. In Sifferlin, the parties agreed

to deviate from the guideline worksheet and that neither one would pay child support to the other.

This Court noted as a threshold matter that:

        [T]he parties agreed, not that there would be no child support order, but rather that
       neither party would be obligated to pay any child support, effectively establishing
       child support in the amount of zero dollars. We have repeatedly held that ‘a child
                                                  10

       support order which requires zero support to be paid is an existing child support
       order. * * *. Accordingly, such an order is subject to modification.

(Internal citations omitted.) Id. at ¶ 7. Accord Fields v. Fields, 9th Dist. Medina No. 04CA0018-

M, 2005-Ohio-471, ¶ 11.

       {¶32} In contrast to the circumstances in Sifferlin, the parties here agreed that there would

be “no child support order,” which this Court in Sifferlin distinguished from a zero-dollar order

that is subject to modification. Therefore, we agree with Father that the trial court’s only obligation

in this case was to establish a new support order, not modify support, because the language in the

2018 agreed judgment entry does not qualify as a zero-dollar order subject to modification.

       {¶33} Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred in treating the parties’ original

support order as subject to modification. Having so determined, this Court need not proceed to an

analysis of whether Father met his burden of proving the requisite change in circumstances

necessary to modify child support.

       {¶34} We turn now to the trial court’s actual calculation of support. Mother argues under

this assignment of error that the trial court erred in determining that she was voluntarily

unemployed and imputing annual income to her of $19,304.00. We agree.

       {¶35} The trial court may impute income to a parent for purposes of calculating child

support, but only if it first makes the required finding that the parent to whom income is imputed

is voluntarily unemployed. Misleh v. Badwan, 9th Dist. Summit No. 24185, 2009-Ohio-842, ¶ 7.

“Voluntary unemployment is a matter to be determined by the trial court based on the unique facts

and circumstances of each case.” Brown v. Allala, 9th Dist. Summit No. 27086, 2014-Ohio-4917,

¶ 23, citing Rock v. Cabral, 67 Ohio St.3d 108, syllabus (1993). The burden of proof is on the

parent who is claiming that the other is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed. Knouff v.

Walsh–Stewart, 9th Dist. Wayne No. 09CA0075, 2010–Ohio–4063, ¶ 27.
                                                11

       {¶36} “This Court reviews a trial court's factual finding that a parent is voluntarily

unemployed to determine if it was against the manifest weight of the evidence.” Stahl v. Stahl,

9th Dist. Summit No. 27876, 2017-Ohio-4170, ¶ 19, citing Kent v. Kent, 9th Dist. Summit No.

25231, 2010-Ohio-6457, ¶ 10-12.

       {¶37} Here, as the parent claiming the other is voluntarily unemployed, Father had the

burden of proof. Knouff at ¶ 27. The trial court stated “[m]other presented no evidence that she is

incapable of working or otherwise maintaining gainful employment,” thus improperly shifting the

burden to Mother to establish that she was incapable of working, and therefore, voluntarily

unemployed.

       {¶38} Upon review of the record and keeping in mind Father’s burden of proof, we

conclude that Father presented absolutely no evidence that Mother is voluntarily unemployed. He

testified as to his own income, then concluded his case in chief by simply requesting that the trial

court calculate guideline child support on that basis alone without more. He presented no evidence

nor made any argument whatsoever regarding Mother’s income, educational and employment

history, or ability to work. His counsel asked him no questions in this regard nor made any request

that the court impute income to Mother in its calculation of support.

       {¶39} During Mother’s testimony on direct examination, she stated, “I sent a message [to

Father] stating that I would be in Ohio for business that week, and Mr. Horner did not answer me

* * *.” (Emphasis added.) That statement indicates that she was possibly employed or working in

some capacity. Shortly thereafter, she was asked what she would like the court to order, and in

response said, “I would like my daughter to live with me in Illinois, and I’d like to be a stay-at-

home mother.” (Emphasis added.) That answer refers to the future and Mother’s hope of staying

home with B.H. should the court grant her custody, not her current status as a stay-at-home mother.
                                                12

However, again, despite indications from Mother that she was perhaps engaged in some sort of

business, and merely intended to stay home, Father did not cross-examine her whatsoever on her

past or present employment status, ability to work, or as to any of the other factors necessary to

calculate child support.

       {¶40} Moreover, notwithstanding that the trial court mistakenly looked to Mother to carry

the burden of proof on whether she is incapable of working, she presented no evidence whatsoever

as to her employment history or inability to work. Her testimony is completely devoid of any

evidence on that issue.

       {¶41} Considering the foregoing, the trial court’s finding that Mother is voluntarily

unemployed is against the manifest weight of the evidence because there was no evidence.

       {¶42} Wherefore, we conclude that the trial court erred in treating the parties’ original

support order as subject to modification rather than establishing a new order. The trial court also

erred in shifting the burden to Mother to show that she was unable to work. Lastly, the trial court

erred in finding that Mother is voluntarily unemployed and should be imputed income. Therefore,

the trial court abused its discretion in sustaining Father’s fourth objection to the Magistrate’s

Decision.

       {¶43} Mother’s second assignment of error is sustained. We reverse and remand for

further proceedings.

                                                III

       {¶44} The judgment of the Medina County Common Pleas Court, Domestic Relations

Division is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with

this opinion.
                                                13

                                                                       Judgment affirmed in part,
                                                                              reversed in part, and
                                                                 remanded for further proceedings.

       There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

       We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common

Pleas, County of Medina, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of

this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.

       Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period

for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to

mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the

docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.

       Costs taxed equally to both parties.

                                                     SCOT STEVENSON
                                                     FOR THE COURT

HENSAL, P. J.
CARR, J.
CONCUR.

APPEARANCES:

THOMAS L. ERB, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.

JESSICA M. TREASE, Attorney at Law, for Appellee.