Court Opinion

ID: 9916556
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-10 01:10:00.313879+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:25:34.493580
License: Public Domain

Bunn v Faxton-St. Luke's Healthcare
               2022 NY Slip Op 34670(U)
                    October 4, 2022
             Supreme Court, Oneida County
     Docket Number: Index No. EFCA2017-002702
               Judge: Bernadette T. Clark
Cases posted with a "30000" identifier, i.e., 2013 NY Slip
 Op 30001(U), are republished from various New York
 State and local government sources, including the New
  York State Unified Court System's eCourts Service.
 This opinion is uncorrected and not selected for official
                       publication.
  FILED: ONEIDA COUNTY CLERK 10/04/2022 03:59 PM                                              INDEX NO. EFCA2017-002702
  NYSCEF DOC. NO. 296                                                                      RECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/04/2022

                                                             At a term of Supreme Court of the State of
                                                             New York held in and for the County of
                                                             Oneida at the Oneida County Courthouse
                                                             200 Elizabeth Street, Utica, New York on
                                                             the 4 th day of October, 2022.

            PRESENT:    HONORABLE BERNADETTE T. CLARK
                        Justice Presiding

            STATE OF NEW YORK
            SUPREME COURT     COUNTY OF ONEIDA

            GAYLE BUNN and PETER BUNN, SR.,

                                   Plaintiffs,                                DECISION AND ORDER

                            -vs-                                              Index No. EFCA2017-002702
                                                                              RJI No. 32-19-0525
            FAXTON-ST. LUKE'S HEALTHCARE AND
            FAIRBROTHER PROPERTY MAINTENANCE , LLC,

                                   Defendants.

            APPEARANCES:           BRINDISI, MURAD & BRINDISI PEARLMAN, LLP
                                   Anthony A. Murad, Esq.
                                   Attorneys for Plaintifft, Gayle Bunn and Peter Bunn, Sr.
                                   213 7 Genesee Street
                                   Utica, New York 13501
                                   (315) 733-2396

                                   GALE, GALE & HUNT
                                   Kirsten Lerch Kroft, Esq.
                                   Attorneys for Defendant, Faxton-St. Luke's Healthcare
                                   P.O. Box 6527
                                   Syracuse, New York 13217-6527
                                   (315) 637-3667

                                   ROSSI & ROSSI
                                   Vincent J. Rossi, Jr., Esq.
                                   Attorneys for Defendant, Fairbrother Property Maintenance, LLC
                                   587 Main Street;-Suite302
                                   New York Mills, New York 13417
                                   (315) 362-8966

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                Clark, Bernadette T.

                        Presently before the Court are three motions. The first of these motions, which was

                brought py defendant Paxton-St. Luke's Healthcare (hereinafter FSLH), seeks summary

                dismissal of the plaintiffs complaint on the ground that there was a storm in progress at the time

                of the plaintiffs accident. The second motion was brought by defendant Fairbrother Property

                Maintenance, LLC, (hereinafter Fairbrother). This motion, first of all, seeks summary dismissal

                of the plaintiffs direct claims against Fairbrother on two grounds, namely, that, as a third-party

                contractor, Fairbrother owed no duty to the plaintiff and, moreover, even if a duty existed, that

                duty, as asserted by FSLH in its own motion, was suspended by a storm in progress.

                Additionally, the motion by Fairbrother seeks summary dismissal of the cross-claims asserted

                against it by FSLH for contribution and indemnification. The third, and final, motion before the

                Court was brought by the plaintiff, and, by this motion, the plaintiff requests, pursuant to CPLR

                § 3126 and owing to Fairbrother's alleged spoliation of certain evidence, that this Court

               determine as a matter of law that Fairbrother created the dangerous condition that caused the

               plaintiffs fall and an order precluding Fairbrother from offering any evidence about the

                condition of the sidewalk upon which the plaintiffs accident occurred.

                        In support of its motion for summary judgment, FSLH submitted a notice of motion; a

               memorandum of law; a statement of material facts; an affidavit by Mr. Wayne Mahar, which

               referenced and was accompanied by his curriculum vitae, as well the weather data and a

               photograph upon which he relied; additional affidavits by Mr. Christopher Kilmartin and

_ _ _ _ _Nicholas~Eairbrother;_and,_finall)':,-an..affirmation..b__y_Kirsten I,erch,Esq...,,___._.__,.LU<,...._.........,'-------------------1

               accompanied by numerous exhibits, namely, (A) the summons and complaint in this matter, (B)

               FSLH's answer, (C) FSLH's demand for a bill of particulars and the plaintiffs response, (D) the
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                 plaintiffs combined discovery demands and FLSH's response, (E) surveillance footage of the

                 plaintiffs fall, (F) the plaintiffs supplemental summons and complaint, (G) FSLH's answer to

                 the plaintiffs amended complaint, (H) the plaintiffs notice to produce as to Fairbrother and

                 Fairbrother' s response thereto, (I) the plaintiffs supplemental bill of particulars, (J) the

                 plaintiffs third notice to produce and FSLH's response, (K) a report as to an incident involving

                 Ms. Bonnie Steele-Johnson, (L) surveillance footage relative to that incident, (M) the deposition

                 testimony of the plaintiff, (N) the deposition testimony of Mr. Peter Bunn, (0) the deposition

                 testimony of Mr. Michael Fairbrother, (P) the deposition testimony of Mr. Nicholas Fairbrother,

                 (Q) the deposition testimony of Mr. Allen Hurd, (R) the deposition testimony of Ms. Tracy

                 Hilderbran, (S) the deposition testimony of Ms. Carly Insel, (T) the deposition testimony of Ms.

                 Carolynn Lyman, (U) the deposition testimony of Ms. Kelli Thomas, (V) the deposition

                 testimony of Mr. Christopher Kilmartin, (W) the deposition testimony of Mr. Kevin Leach, (X)

                 the deposition testimony of Mr. David Siriano, (Y) the deposition testimony of Ms. Brandy

                 Stack, (Z) the deposition testimony of Dr. Juleen Qandah, (AA) a sworn statement by Ms.

                 Steele-Johnson, (BB) FSLH's amended answer to the plaintiffs amended complaint, and,

                 finally, (CC) records of the Kunkel Ambulance Service. In addition to the above-mentioned

                 items, this Court also considered several items submitted by FSLH that were offered in reply to

                 the plaintiffs opposition to this motion, including an affirmation by Ms. Christine Sullivan, Esq.,

                 an additional memorandum of law, and a response to the plaintiffs counterstatement of material

                 facts. Lastly, the Court considered papers submitted by FSLH in response to the motion brought

                                                                                                                       r..._es.iJ-.l>.,._..,_>,L...__~----+
- - - - - + · •y-Fairbr0ther,which-paper.s-consisted-0£another-affirmation...b_y.-Ms..B..ullhran,_Es.q...,..,. .a. . . .

                 to Fairbrother's statement of facts, and yet another memorandum oflaw.

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                                   Fairbrother, in support of its motion, submitted a notice of motion; a memorandum of

                        law; a statement of material facts; the same affidavit by Mr. Mahar that was submitted by FSLH

                        in support of its own motion, including the exhibits upon which he relied; an affidavit by Mr.

                       Nicholas Fairbrother; and, finally, an affidavit by Mr. Evan Rossi, Esq. The Court considered

                        each of these items with regard to Fairbrother's motion, along with the several exhibits that were

                       annexed to the latter affidavit, including (A) the plaintiffs initial summons and complaint, (B)

                       FSLH's answer to that initial complaint, (C) the plaintiffs amended complaint, (D) FSLH's

                       answer to that amended complaint with cross-claims against Fairbrother, (E) Fairbrother's

                       answer to the plaintiffs amended complaint, (F) a document prepared by FSLH outlining the

                       scope of snow plowing services to be provided by Fairbrother, (G) Fairbrother's demand for a

                       bill of particulars, (H) the plaintiffs bill of particulars as to Fairbrother, (I) the plaintiffs second

                       bill of particulars as to Fairbrother, (J) the plaintiffs third bill of particulars as to Fairbrother, (K)

                       Fairbrother's amended answer, (L) the deposition testimony of the plaintiff, (M) the deposition

                       testimony of Ms. Stack, (N) the deposition testimony of Ms. Thomas, (0) a log prepared by Mr.

                       Nicholas Fairbrother with regard to salting operations performed on January 17, 2017, on the

                       property of FSLH, (P) a photograph secured by Mr. Fairbrother in the aftermath of the plaintiffs

                       fall depicting the area where the fall occurred, (Q) an incident report with regard to the plaintiffs

                       fall, (R) records of the Kunkel Ambulance Service, (S) the deposition testimony of Ms. Insel,

                       and, finally, (T) the deposition testimony of Mr. Siriano. This Court also considered several

                       additional items submitted by Fairbrother, which were, at once, in reply to the plaintiffs

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                                                                                                                                       .LLI.LJL.LLIJa.L.Laa~.........,.loea.lJ"""-1 ..L~------------------"--9--

                       included an additional memorandum of law; an affidavit by Mr. W. Curtis Nichols; an affidavit

                       by Mr. Nicholas Fairbrother; and an additional affidavit by Mr. Rossi, which was accompanied
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                     by Fairbrother's demand for a supplemental bill of particulars, an article authored by Mr. John

                     Allin, photographs depicting a flood in Fairbrother's office space, documentation with regard to

                     a flooding incident in the vicinity of Fairbrother's place of business, material safety data sheets

                     for sodium chloride and calcium chloride, and, finally, a manual promulgated by the New York

                     State Department of Transportation addressing snow and ice control.

                                The plaintiff, for her part, and as indicated, filed her own motion and, additionally,

                     submitted papers responsive to the foregoing motions brought by FSLH and Fairbrother. As to

                     the motion filed by FSLH, the plaintiff, in response, submitted a memorandum of law, a response

                     to FSLH's statement of material facts, a counter statement of material facts, an affirmation by

                     Anthony A. Murad, Esq., including a photograph depicting the entrance to FSLH's Regional

                     Cancer Center, and finally, an affidavit by Mr. John A. Allin, which affidavit was accompanied

                     by Mr. Allin's curriculum vitae and his investigative report, the findings of which were

                     incorporated in his affidavit. With regard to her own motion, the plaintiff submitted papers that

                     were supportive thereof and that were also, at the same time, responsive to the motion filed by

                     Fairbrother. These papers consisted of a notice of motion; a memorandum of law; a response to

                     Fairbrother's statement of material facts; a counter statement of material facts; an affidavit by the

                     plaintiff herself; the same affidavit of Mr. Allin, along with exhibits, that was submitted in

                     opposition to the motion brought by FSLH; and, also, another affirmation by Mr. Murad, Esq.,

                     which was accompanied by certain e-mails between staff at FSLH and the plaintiffs first

                     supplemental verified bill of particulars as to Fairbrother. Finally, this Court considered yet

-====aaanother ~:ffii:matio.~by Mr Murad,.E,.,.sq'f".·•r,w~h"'"ic.....h....w.......,as=-.:ufil.ulh,...mUJjU.Jtt...,e,..d,_...,in...._....,re..,_¥,1,,J...J.Ji.L.W~~~l.dd.!,l,<.!d~==-==-~+

                     Fairbrother in opposition to the plaintiffs motion.

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                                                        Background

                    The plaintiff in this case alleges that, on January 17, 2017, at roughly 1:15pm, while on

             the property of FSLH, she slipped on ice, fell to the ground, and suffered an injury. At the time

             of this incident, there existed a contractual relationship between FSLH and Fairbrother such that

             the latter was responsible for providing snow plowing services to the former. By virtue of its

             agreement with FSLH, Fairbrother was responsible for plowing and salting the parking lots and

             sidewalks at FSLH and the entrances to its building. More particularly, the agreement required,

             in pertinent part, that plowing be done upon any accumulation of one and one-half inches or

             more of snow and, also, that salting be done upon one-half inch or more of accumulation or in

             the event of any freezing rain or ice storm. Additionally, the agreement required the use of

             calcium chloride for "salting" the sidewalks and entrances at FSLH and, moreover, required that

             Fairbrother leave a supply of calcium chloride for use by FSLH staff in an emergency.

                    As to procedural history, this case was commenced by the filing of a summons and

            complaint on December 19, 2017. Issue was joined by FSLH on January 31, 2018, whereafter,

            on January 3, 2019, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint adding Fairbrother as a defendant.

            On January 14, 2019, FSLH served an answer to the amended complaint, which answer asserted

            cross-claims against Fairbrother, and then, on March 6, 2019, Fairbrother served its own answer.

            Thereafter, Fairbrother moved for and was granted leave to serve an amended answer, which it

            subsequently did on July 8, 2021. Roughly a month later, on August 2, 2021, the plaintiff filed a

            Note oflssue and Certificate of Readiness for trial, but, then, this Court issued an order on

-----S-eptember--14,..2021.,.-whi.ch..pennitted liSI.Il to fi-le--its-o.wn..amended.a~nd,..s~::;..u.~~-'-----....+

            the plaintiff an opportunity to pursue additional discovery concerning any items raised in that

            amended answer, the note of issue was held in abeyance until September 10, 2022. Importantly,
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           the Court's order also extended the deadline for dispositive motions to December 30, 2021, and,

           accordingly, each of the pending motions is timely. Oral argument was held in person on June

           30, 2022, and this Court reserved decision.

                                                         Analysis

                    At the outset, it bears mentioning that "summary judgment is a drastic remedy and should

           not be granted where there is any doubt as to the existence of a triable issue" or "where the issue

           is arguable." Rotuba Extruders, Inc. v. Ceppos, 46 N.Y.2d 223 (1978) and Sillman v. Twentieth

           Century-Fox Film Corp., 3 N.Y.2d 395 (1957). In deciding motions for summary judgment,

           courts are not at liberty to make credibility determinations or weigh evidence; "issue-finding,

           rather than issue-determination, is the key to the procedure." Vega v. Restani Const. Corp, 18

           N.Y.3d 499 (2012), and see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986). Indeed, on a

           motion for summary judgment, the "facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-

           moving party." Vega Id. citing Ortiz v. Varsity Holdings, LLC, 18 N.Y.3d 335 (2011).

           Procedurally, the party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of making aprima

           facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by tendering sufficient evidence, in

           admissible form, to demonstrate the absence of any material issues of fact. Alvarez v. Prospect

           Hosp., 68 N.Y.2d 320 (Ct. of Appeals, 1986) Then, only after such a showing has been made, the

           burden shifts to the opposing party to show, by admissible evidence, the existence of a factual

           question necessitating a trial. Zuckerman v. City of New York, 49 N.Y.2d 557 (Ct. of Appeals,

           1980).

                    Against this backdrop, the Court turns its attention first to the motion for summary

           judgment filed on behalf of FSLH. FSLH has moved for summary dismissal of the complaint in
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           this matter on the ground that there was a storm in progress at the time of the plaintiff's accident.

           It is well established that, "although a landowner owes a duty of care to keep his ... property in a

           reasonably safe condition, he will not be held liable in negligence for a plaintiffs injuries

           sustained as the result of an icy condition occurring during an ongoing storm or for a reasonable

           time thereafter." Gould v. 93 Nyrpt, LLC, 191 A.D.3d 1452 (4th Dept., 2021); citing Sherman v

           New York State Thruway Auth., 27 N.Y.3d 1019 (Ct. of Appeals, 2016). In the context of a

           motion for summary judgment, a "defendant seeking to avail itself of the storm in progress

           doctrine meets its prima facie burden by establishing as a matter of law that there was a storm in

           progress at the time of the accident" at issue and that the "plaintiffs injuries were caused by

           (that) storm in progress." Govenettio v. Dolgencorp ofNew York, Inc., 175 A.D.3d 1805 (4th

           Dept., 2019) and Stalker ex rel. Stalker v. Crestview Cadillac Corp., 284 A.D.2d 977 (4th Dept.,

           2001); see also Alvarado v. Wegmans Food Mkts., Inc., 134 A.D.3d 1440 (4th Dept., 2015] and

           Glover v. Botsford, 109 A.D.3d 1182 (4th Dept. 2013).

                  FSLH endeavored to meet its burden in this regard by adducing and highlighting proof in

           the form of, inter alia, the deposition testimony of several witnesses, surveillance footage and a

           photograph depicting the area of the plaintiff's fall, as well as an affidavit by Mr. Mahar and the

           weather records upon which he relied in forming his opinion as to the prevailing weather

           conditions. This Court notes, first of all, that, to be sure, the surveillance footage and photograph

           adduced by FSLH offer clues that are indeed suggestive of a storm in progress during and around

           the time of the plaintiff's accident, but, critically, the image quality of these items is such that

                                                                                                                  ed

           weather data, including Doppler Radar Images, these items constitute admissible and competent

           evidence, which this Court credited, and they, too, tend to establish that there was a storm in
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            progress when the plaintiff fell. Moreover, the same can be said as to the deposition testimony

            of certain witnesses, most notably Mr. Nicholas Fairbrother, Ms. Stack, and Ms. Hilderbran, who

            attested to the foul weather at and around the time of the plaintiffs fall. Even so, the defendant

            also adduced the deposition testimony of the plaintiff and a sworn statement of Ms. Steele-

           Johnson. Very importantly, the plaintiff, in her testimony, attested that the inclement weather

           from earlier in the day had stopped by the time of her arrival at FSLH' s property and that no

           further stormy weather occurred until after she fell at approximately 1: 15 p.m. See Lerch Aff. at

           Ex. M, i.e., Bunn Tr. at pg. 16. Likewise, Ms. Steele-Johnson, swore in her statement that "it

           was not precipitating at the time (she) fell," which happened at around 12:45 p.m., and that she

           "does not recall it precipitating when she first arrived" at FLSH's property roughly one hour

           earlier. See Lerch Aff. at Ex. AA. From these latter items of evidence, it is plain to see that,

           instead of demonstrating the absence of any material.issues of fact, the defendant has, in fact,

           raised an issue of fact as to whether there was truly a storm in progress when the plaintiffs

           accident occurred, and, for this reason, summary judgment is inappropriate and the Court need

           not consider the sufficiency of the plaintiffs oppositional papers.

                   Notwithstanding the above, this Court feels compelled to address a few points raised by

           the defendant that are well taken but, nevertheless, fail to establish an entitlement to judgment as

           a matter oflaw. First, to make the point that their memories of the events at issue were clouded

           by the passage of time, the defendant highlights that no less than three full years elapsed before

           the plaintiff was deposed and before Ms. Steele-Johnson's recollections were reduced to a sworn

           testimony of these witnesses at trial, but, in the context of a motion for summary judgment, the

           Court is not empowered to weigh evidence or pass upon the credibility of witnesses. The
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            defendant also makes the legitimate point that "a landowner is not responsible for a failure to

            remove snow and ice until a reasonable time has elapsed after cessation of (a) storm," and, in

            the same vein, this Court further notes that "a temporary lull in (a) storm at the time of (an)

            accident (does) not necessarily establish a reasonable opportunity to clear away (a) hazard."

            Camacho v. Garcia, 273 A.D.2d 835 (4 th Dept., 2000) (emphasis added) and Ndiaye v NEP W.

            119th St. LP, 124 A.D.3d 427 (1 st Dept., 2015) (emphasis added); and see, also, e.g., Mann v.

            Wegmans Food Markets, Inc., 115 A.D.3d 1249 (4th Dept 2014) (emphasis added), wherein the

           plaintiff"failed to raise an issue of fact by submitting evidence that the precipitation had eased or

           ceased at the time of her accident." That said, it bears noting that, "if (a) storm has passed and

           precipitation has tailed off to such an extent that there is no longer any appreciable accumulation,

           then the rationale for continued delay abates, and common sense would dictate that the (storm-

           in-progress) rule not be applied, and, furthermore, that "(o)nce there is a period of inactivity after

           cessation of (a) storm, it becomes a question of fact as to whether the delay in commencing the

           cleanup was reasonable." Patricola v. Gen. Motors Corp., 170 A.D.3d 1506 (4 th Dept., 2019)

           and Cappola v. Michael's Banquet Facility, 8 A.D.3d 1100 (4 th Dept., 2004) (emphasis added).

           Additionally, there is, of course, "no formula ... for determining liability on the basis of the time

           lapse between the end of the storm and (an) accident." Valentine v. City ofNew York, 86 A.D.2d

           381 (1 st Dept., 1982). In the instant case, the sworn attestations of the plaintiff and Ms. Steele-

           Johnson suggest that not only was it no longer precipitating at the time of the plaintiffs fall but,

           indeed and very importantly, the precipitation had conceivably ceased nearly two hours earlier.

           storm in this case had ceased or abated for long enough that the defendant was afforded a

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            reasonable opportunity to ameliorate the icy conditions blamed for the plaintiffs accident, and so

           the defendant's motion for summary dismissal of the plaintiffs complaint must be denied.

                                     Motion/or Summary Judgment by Fairbrother

                   This Court now turns to the second motion before it, which is a motion brought by

           Fairbrother. By this motion, Fairbrother seeks summary dismissal of the plaintiffs direct claims

           and, also, summary dismissal of the cross-claims asserted by FSLH for contribution and

           indemnification.

                   As to the plaintiffs direct claims, Fairbrother, like FSLH, seeks summary dismissal on

           the ground that any duty it owed to the plaintiff was suspended by a storm in progress, but,

           foremost, Fairbrother seeks summary dismissal on the ground that, as a third-party contractor, it

           owed no duty to the plaintiff in the first place. It is, of course, axiomatic that "(i)n the absence of

           a duty, as a matter of law, there can be no liability." Pasternack v Lab. Corp. ofAm. Holdings,

           27 N.Y.3d 817 (2016), citing Solomon v City ofNew York, 66 N.Y.2d 1026 (1985) and Lauer v.

           City o/New York, 95 N.Y.2d 95 (2000); see also Pulka v. Edelman, 40 N.Y.2d 781 (1976),

           wherein the Court noted that "(i)n the absence of duty, there is no breach and without a breach

           there is no liability." In this vein, the Court of Appeals has made very clear that a "contractual

           obligation, standing alone, will generally not give rise to tort liability in favor of a third party."

           Espinal v. Melville Snow Contractors, Inc., 98 N.Y.2d 136 (2002), citing Eaves Brooks Costume

           of Appeals has identified three exceptions to this general rule, "pursuant to which a party who

           enters into a contract to render services may be said to have assumed a duty of care-and thus be
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           potentially liable in tort-to third persons: (1) where the contracting party, in failing to exercise

           reasonable care in the performance of his duties, launche(s) a force or instrument of harm; (2)

           where the plaintiff detrimentally relies on the continued performance of the contracting party's

           duties and (3) where the contracting party has entirely displaced the other party's duty to

           maintain the premises safely." Foster v. Herbert Slepoy Corp., 76 A.D.3d 210 (2 nd Dept., 2010),

           citing Espinal supra. Also, notably, as to this first exception, the Court has clarified that

           launching a force or instrument of harm is substantively the same thing as creating or

           exacerbating a hazardous condition, which latter phrase is typically invoked by the Courts to

           describe a circumstance where a defendant's duty is not suspended by a storm in progress.

           Espinal supra.

                   A contractor moving for summary judgment against a third party, as here, bears the initial

           burden of, first of all, demonstrating that the plaintiff was not a party to the contract at issue and,

           moreover, but only if the plaintiff alleges facts in her complaint or bill of particulars that would

           tend to establish the applicability of any of the Espinal exceptions, the movant must also

           "affirmatively demonstrate" that no such exceptions apply. See, e.g., Govenettio v Dolgencorp

           ofNew York, Inc., 175 A.D.3d 1805 (4th Dept., 2019) and Foster v. Herbert Slepoy Corp., 76

           A.D.3d 210 (2nd Dept., 2010). If the moving contractor makes the requisite primafacie showing,

           the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to come forward with admissible evidence sufficient to

           raise a triable issue of fact as to the applicability of one or more of the three Espinal exceptions.

           See Foster supra.

           particulars that established the possible applicability of all three Espinal exceptions. Still,

           Fairbrother sustained its initial burden by way of presenting several items of evidence, including,
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           among others, the affidavit of Mr. Nicholas Fairbrother, the plaintiffs deposition testimony, the

           deposition testimony of Ms. Stack, the deposition testimony of Mr. Siriano, the deposition

           testimony of Ms. Insel, the deposition testimony of Ms. Thomas, and finally the document

           prepared by FSLH outlining the terms and conditions concerning the plowing services to be

           provided by Fairbrother. First of all, through the deposition testimony of Ms. Thomas and the

           document detailing the terms and conditions of its contractual relationship with FSLH,

           Fairbrother established, prima facie, that the plaintiff was not a party to the snow and ice

           removal agreement; that agreement was between Fairbrother and FSLH exclusively.

           Additionally, Fairbrother established that it did nothing to create or otherwise exacerbate the icy

           conditions presumed to be responsible for the plaintiffs fall. In this regard, Fairbrother

           submitted the affidavit of Mr. Nicholas Fairbrother, who attested that his intervention on the date

           at issue was limited to merely "applying rock salt to the parking lots and sidewalks" of the FSLH

           campus. Likewise, through the plaintiff's deposition testimony, Fairbrother established that the

           plaintiff could not possibly have relied to her detriment on Fairbrother's performance of the

           snow and ice removal duties required by the agreement with FSLH because, by the plaintiff's

           own admission, she was not aware that such an agreement existed and, indeed, had "never heard"

           of Fairbrother before the date of her accident. See Rossi Aff. at Ex. B-1, i.e., Bunn Tr. at pg. 45.

           Finally, Fairbrother established that it did not completely displace FSLH's duty to maintain its

           premises in a safe condition. Fairbrother accomplished this by adducing the terms and

           conditions of its agreement with FSLH, which required Fairbrother to provide "calcium chloride

           the several FSLH employees mentioned above, who readily acknowledged their practice of

           salting the entryways and sidewalks at FSLH as the need arose. See Rossi Aff. at Ex. A-6
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            (emphasis added) and, also, e.g., Stack Tr. at pgs. 9-12, Siriano Tr. at pg. 21, Insel Tr. at pgs. 14

            and 20.

                      In light of the foregoing, the burden shifted to the plaintiff to raise a question of fact

            concerning the applicability of one or more Espinal exceptions, and, in this regard, the plaintiff

           focused on whether Fairbrother created or exacerbated the icy conditions at issue in this case and

           whether Fairbrother completely displaced FSLH's duty to maintain its premises safely. As to the

           latter, and instead of adducing any new evidence, the plaintiff, in an effort to show complete

           displacement by Fairbrother, simply highlighted that portion of the deposition testimony of Mr.

           Siriano wherein he acknowledged never having applied salt to the very specific location where

           the plaintiff's accident took place - that is, a landing at the bottom of a concrete stairway outside

           of the building entrance. See Siriano Tr. at pgs. 21-26. While this Court is willing to accept as

           true that neither Mr. Siriano nor any other employee of FSLH salted the landing on which the

           plaintiff fell, the balance of Mr. Siriano's testimony- not to mention the above-mentioned

           testimony of the other staff members - makes abundantly clear that employees of FSLH did, in

           fact, and when necessary, salt the entryway to the building and the stairway leading to the

           landing, and, for this reason, the plaintiff has failed to raise a question of fact sufficient to refute

           Fairbrother' s prima facie showing that complete displacement is lacking in this case.

                   With regard to the other Espinal exception at issue, the plaintiff adduced and highlighted

           the report and affidavit of Mr. John Allin, who offered, in pertinent part, his opinion that

           Fairbrother's "failure to utilize the correctly specified deicing material (namely, calcium

           caused by the rainstorm resulting in the plaintiffs slip-and-fall accident and subsequent injuries."

           See Allin Aff. at para. 41. On this score, the Court first notes that an "expert should be
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            possessed of the requisite skill, training, education, knowledge or experience from it which it can

            be assumed that the information imparted or the opinion rendered is reliable," but, also, that

            "(p)ractical experience may properly substitute for academic training in determining whether an

            individual has acquired the training necessary to be qualified as an expert." Matott v. Ward, 48

           N.Y.2d 455 (4 th Dept., 1979). With this in mind, and assuming arguendo that Mr. Allin is

           indeed qualified to render the opinion specified above, it is nevertheless apparent to the Court

           that this opinion is conclusory and speculative, and expert opinions that are conclusive and

           speculative are insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact. See, e.g., Aungst v Slippery Slats and

           All That, Inc., 6 A.D.3d 1078 (4th Dept., 2004). A careful reading of Mr. Allin's affidavit makes

           clear that his opinion is premised entirely on his assertion that, as a deicer, sodium chloride, or

           rock salt, as it is commonly called, which was the substance employed by Fairbrother in this

           case, is inferior to calcium chloride, which, pursuant to the agreement with FSLH, is the

           substance that Fairbrother was supposed to have used in the area of the plaintiffs fall. The Court

           accepts this assertion as true, but, regardless, Mr. Allin offers no apparent explanation as to how

           the use of an inferior deicer such as rock salt would somehow create ice that would not have

           otherwise existed or make existing ice more slippery and hazardous than it otherwise would have

           been. To be sure, and as explained by Mr. Allin, Fairbrother's use of a superior deicer like

           calcium chloride likely would have eliminated or removed more ice than the inferior alternative

           that was, in fact, used, but, quite simply, the mere "failure to remove all .. .ice or snow, without

           more, does not establish that (a) defendant increased the risk of harm" and such failure does not

           Vincent's Hous. Dev. Fund Co., Inc., 145 A.D.3d 648 (2 nd Dept., 2016); see also Glover v.

           Botsford, 109 A.D.3d 1182 (4 th Dept., 2013) and Foster supra, the latter of which noted that any
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           "claim that a contractor exacerbated an existing condition requires some showing that the

           contractor left the premises in a more dangerous condition than he or she found them." 1

                    Accordingly, inasmuch as the plaintiff has failed to raise a question of fact as to the

           applicability of any Espinal exception, this Court is compelled to grant the foregoing motion

           insofar as it seeks summary dismissal of the plaintiffs direct claims against Fairbrother.

                    Fairbrother, as already noted, also seeks summary dismissal of FSLH's cross-claims for

           contribution and indemnification. As to this branch of the motion, and in keeping with the

           above, Fairbrother has established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, and

           FSLH has failed to raise a triable issue of fact, with regard to the cross-claims for contribution

           and contractual indemnification. Since there is no evidence that Fairbrother owed a duty of

           reasonable care to the plaintiff or a duty of reasonable care independent of the obligations arising

           out of its contractual relationship with FSLH, FSLH's cross-claim for contribution must, indeed,

           be summarily dismissed. See, e.g., Grove v. Cornell Univ., 151 A.D.3d 1813 (4 th Dept., 2017).

           Moreover, since there is no evidence that Fairbrother ever agreed to indemnify FSLH, summary

           dismissal is also warranted as to the latter's cross-claim for contractual indemnification. See,

           e.g., Zemotel v. Jeld-Wen, Inc., 50 A.D.3d 1586 (4 th Dept., 2008). With regard, though, to the

           cross-claim for common law indemnification, there are clear questions of fact and, for this

           reason, summary dismissal is inappropriate. In particular, and for example, the terms and

           1 The plaintiff, in her papers, cited to Belmonte v. Guilderland Assoc., LLC, to suggest that the use of untreated, as

           opposed to treated, rock salt is, on its own, enough to create or exacerbate a hazardous condition, but, in relying
           on t Is case, t e p amtI over oo e an important an IstmguIs mg act. Be monte v u1 er an                  ssoc.,   ,
           A.D.3d 1128 (3 rd Dept., 2013). In the instant case, the defendant is alleged to have done nothing more than apply
           rock salt, an arguably inferior deicing agent, whereas in Belmonte the defendant not only used untreated rock salt
           but also, very Importantly, shoveled snow from the sidewalk onto the parking lot area where the plaintiff fell,
           which then created "a layer of ice beneath the snow."
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           conditions of the snow and ice removal agreement in this case make clear that Fairbrother was

           required, without prompting or direction, to "salt" all "sidewalks and entrances" in the event of a

           "freezing rain or an ice storm" and was further required to use calcium chloride in those areas,

           which latter requirement Mr. Nicholas Fairbrother concededly disregarded by, instead, using an

           allegedly inferior deicing agent, namely, rock salt. And since there is legitimate dispute as to

           whether Fairbrother complied with the terms and conditions of its agreement with FSLH and

           thereby caused the plaintiffs accident, the cross-claim for common law indemnification remains

           viable.

                     In light of the foregoing, Fairbrother's motion must be granted insofar as it seeks

           summary dismissal of FSLH' s cross-claims for contribution and contractual indemnification but

           must be denied as to the cross-claim for common law indemnification.

                                                     Motion by Plaintiff

                     Finally, this Court turns its attention to the motion brought by the plaintiff, which, owing

           to the alleged spoliation of Fairbrother's logbook, seeks, among other things, a determination as

           a matter of law that Fairbrother created the dangerous condition at issue and that Fairbrother be

           precluded from offering any evidence as to the condition of the sidewalk on the occasion of the

           plaintiffs fall. With regard to this motion, the Court notes, as a starting point, that "a party

           (seeking) sanctions for spoliation of evidence must show that the party having control over the

           evidence possessed an obligation to preserve it at the time of its destruction, that the evidence

           was destroyed with a 'culpable state of mind,' and that the destroyed evidence was relevant to

           that claim or defense." Pegasus Aviation L Inc. v Varig Logistica SA., 26 N.Y.3d 543 (2015).

           In the instant matter, the plaintiff has failed to establish that Fairbrother's logbook was destroyed
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           with a culpable state of mind. To be sure, and as highlighted by the plaintiff, that phrase

           contemplates more than outright willful or intentional conduct; it also contemplates conduct that

           is negligent. Id. Even so, the plaintiff has failed to establish that Fairbrother's loss of the

           logbook at issue was negligent, let alone willful. Fairbrother contends, and the plaintiff has not

           disputed, that its logbook, which theretofore had been stored at its shop, was lost in an

           unforeseen natural disaster - that is, a flood event which resulted in the declaration of a county-

           wide state of emergency. In support of this contention, Fairbrother adduced photographs

           depicting the seemingly catastrophic flood damage caused to its shop, a news article

           corroborating the County Executive's declaration of a state of emergency, and, lastly, a notice

           from the New York State Governor concerning the provision of emergency services to victims of

           the flooding. The plaintiff, for her part, has offered no countervailing proof on this issue.

           Accordingly, inasmuch as the logbook was lost in a flood and was not intentionally or

           negligently destroyed, no sanction is warranted and the plaintiffs motion in this regard must be

           denied. See Iamiceli v. Gen. Motors Corp., 51 A.D.3d 635 (2nd Dept., 2008); see also Cohen v.

           118 E. 60th Owners Inc., 64 Misc. 3d 1230(A) (Sup. Ct., New York County, 2019); Wardlaw v

           1221 Ave. Holdings, L.L.C., 2009 WL 10291401 (Sup. Ct., New York County, 2009); and 274

           Madison Co. LLC v Ramsundar, 2016 WL 1270668 2016 (Sup. Ct., New York County, 2009),

           which address the issue of spoliation in the context of evidence lost to a flood.

                   The Court has reviewed and considered the remaining arguments and contentions of the

           parties and finds them to be without merit.

                   ORDERED that the motion for summary judgment brought by FSLH is DENIED, and it

           is further
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                  ORDERED that the motion for summary judgment brought by Fairbrother is

           GRANTED insofar as it sought summary dismissal of the plaintiffs direct claims and insofar as

           it sought summary dismissal of FSLH's cross-claims for contribution and contractual

           indemnification but is DENIED insofar as it sought summary dismissal of FSLH's cross-claim

           for common law indemnification; and, finally, it is

                  ORDERED that the motion brought by the plaintiff is DENIED in its entirety.

                  This shall constitute the Decision and Order. The original Decision and Order is

           returned to the attorney for the Plaintiff. All other papers are being delivered by the Court to the

           County Clerk for filing. The signing of this Decision and Order does not constitute entry or

           filing under CPLR Rule 2220. Counsel is not relieved from the applicable provisions of that rule

           respecting filing, entry and notice of entry.

           ENTER:

           Dated: October 4, 2022
                  Utica, New York

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