Court Opinion

ID: 9930011
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-05 22:00:57.587427+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:58:28.086187
License: Public Domain

In the

    United States Court of Appeals
                  For the Seventh Circuit
                      ____________________
No. 22-2944
LAURA MULLEN, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated,
                                          Plaintiff-Appellee,

                                   v.

RICKY BUTLER, et al.,
                                                Defendants-Appellants.

                      ____________________

              Appeal from the United States District Court
         for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
            No. 18-cv-1465 — Matthew F. Kennelly, Judge.

                        ___________________

   ARGUED OCTOBER 26, 2023 — DECIDED FEBRUARY 5, 2024
                ____________________

   Before FLAUM, BRENNAN, and KIRSCH, Circuit Judges.
    BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. Laura Mullen’s daughters played
for a youth volleyball club. She ﬁled a class action suit against
the club, GLV, Inc., and its owners, Ricky and Cheryl Butler
(collectively “the Butlers”). Mullen claimed the Butlers fraud-
ulently concealed previous claims of sexual abuse. The dis-
trict court granted summary judgment to the Butlers. The
2                                                  No. 22-2944

court also imposed Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 sanc-
tions against the Butlers and their lawyer, but it declined to
sanction Mullen.
    The club and its owners appeal the sanctions. Because the
district court provided factual and legal support for its deci-
sions, we conclude that court did not abuse its discretion or
commit clear error. So, we aﬃrm.
                        I. Background
    A. The Underlying Dispute
    In 1995, the Illinois Department of Children and Family
Services (“DCFS”) and USA Volleyball, a governing body,
both found that Ricky Butler “had sexual intercourse with at
least three underage girls he was training” in the 1980s. In
2018, USA Volleyball completed its investigation of the alle-
gations and banned Ricky Butler from participating in the
sport for life. Ricky Butler has admitted that he had sexual re-
lationships with some of his accusers, but he denies that the
women were underage and denies the allegations of rape and
abuse. A month after USA Volleyball entered its ban, Laura
Mullen ﬁled a class action suit against the Butlers.
    Between 2012 and 2017, Laura Mullen’s two daughters
participated in volleyball programs through GLV Inc. In 2018,
Mullen alleged the Butlers fraudulently concealed claims of
sexual abuse made against Ricky Butler. Mullen claimed that
had she and members of a class known about those allega-
tions, they would not have participated in any GLV-
associated volleyball programs. The district court granted the
Butlers summary judgment on all claims against Mullen. The
court found that there was suﬃcient publicly available infor-
mation about Ricky’s past behavior. So, Mullen could not
No. 22-2944                                                   3

justiﬁably rely on the Butlers’ concealment of information,
and she had not been deceived or injured.
     The merits of this case have been adjudicated. This appeal
is limited to the district court’s two sanctions decisions.
   B. Improper Activity Alleged During the Class Notice
   Period
    Mullen moved for sanctions against the Butlers and their
attorney, Danielle D’Ambrose, for improperly interfering
with the class notice process under Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 23(d). To support her motion, Mullen pointed to the
Butlers’ numerous communications with potential class
members and D’Ambrose’s statements to the district court
during two status hearings. The Butlers later ﬁled their own
motion for sanctions against Mullen.
       1. Approval of Class Notice and Initial Communica-
       tions
   The court approved a class notice in February 2019. The
notice included a brief description of the case, informed class
members about their options to either stay in the suit or opt
out of the class, and it explained the legal implications of
those options. It also advised class members that they could
opt out only via mail by April 19, 2019. Neither party’s mem-
bers nor attorneys could communicate with putative class
members. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 and ABA MODEL RULE OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 4.2.
    The class administrator published the URL address of the
class website and distributed class notices via email on March
19, 2019. That same day, Cheryl Butler emailed GLV’s employ-
ees alerting them that GLV was “starting to get phone calls”
about the class action. In the email, she instructed that “[o]pt
4                                                 No. 22-2944

out is crucial!” and included an excerpt of the opt-out details
from the class notice. Over the course of the following week,
the Butlers communicated with potential class members at
least ten times.
    On March 20, 2019, Troy Gilb, GLV’s Vice President of Op-
erations (and one of the recipients of Cheryl’s email), sent a
mass email to class members describing the suit and implica-
tions of opting out. Gilb told the recipients it was “important
that you understand you are now a part of the lawsuit as a
member of the class.” He explained, “you can choose [to] do
nothing and you will remain as a member of the class and a
plaintiﬀ in the lawsuit against Sports Performance/GLV Inc.
and Rick & Cheryl Butler.” Further, “[i]f you choose not to be
part of the lawsuit …, you must send a letter to the class ad-
ministrator before April 19th, 2019.”
     Several class members replied to Gilb’s email. One stated
he had already opted out, to which Gilb responded: “Thank
you very much for the show of support!! We all know what is
going on with the lawsuit and I hope that with enough voices
of support that this whole thing will be thrown out! We are
doing all we can to ﬁght this and we have great defense coun-
cil [sic] on our side!” Gilb forwarded his mass email to class
members and his communications with this speciﬁc class
member to D’Ambrose as part of a longer email string.
   One recipient of the class administrator’s notice emailed
Gilb to ask about the lawsuit and whether it would aﬀect the
club the following year. He responded, “Yes, I am aware of
the lawsuit. For next year our plan is to continue doing what
we are doing.” He added, “If there is a groundswell of parents
that opt out of the lawsuit, which I think will happen, then it
most likely will get dismissed. If you have any questions
No. 22-2944                                                  5

please let me know.” In response to another member’s email,
Gilb replied: “Everyone knows what this lawsuit is about and
… there are a lot of parents opting out. I hope that … all the
opt outs will have a positive impact on the judge.”
    Meanwhile, Cheryl Butler was also communicating with
class members about the suit. In response to a text message
asking about opting out, Cheryl directed the class member to
a Facebook page, “Parents against the Sports Performance
Class Action Lawsuit.” There, class members could ﬁnd a
printable letter “to make [opting out] easy.” Cheryl also
emailed one class member expressing her displeasure about
the requirement that class members submit opt-outs by mail
rather than email. Replying to another class member’s inquiry
about the suit, Cheryl wrote: “[S]everal alumni and current
parents are trying to help us in anyway [sic] possible in re-
gards [sic] to this.” In addition, Cheryl sent texts and emails
thanking class members who expressed their intentions to opt
out but who had not yet done so.
   Ricky Butler also communicated with class members dur-
ing this time. After the class notice was issued, some class
members began emailing others to encourage them to opt out.
A class member forwarded one email to Cheryl and Ricky
Butler, seeking their opinion of the email’s author and
whether they recommended acting on the advice to opt out.
To this, Ricky Butler responded that the email’s author “[i]s a
great friend!”
      2. The First Status Hearing and Further Communica-
      tions
    On March 27, 2019, Mullen and class counsel notiﬁed the
district court that they suspected the Butlers were improperly
6                                                   No. 22-2944

communicating with class members and encouraging them to
opt out. The court held a status hearing and asked D’Ambrose
whether the Butlers were communicating with class members
“in a way other than the only way that it’s appropriate to do
that, which is through the notice.” D’Ambrose responded
with an unequivocal denial:
       Ever since we became involved in the case, I
       have not seen one bit—they are—[the defend-
       ants] are very careful about talking about any-
       thing. They received e-mails from class mem-
       bers regarding the opt-outs, regarding their
       opinions on the lawsuit, and every e-mail I’ve
       seen them respond with is, I’m very sorry, I
       can’t talk about this right now, you know, thank
       you, something along those lines.
    Despite this response, the Butlers and D’Ambrose contin-
ued to communicate with class members about the suit. For
example, GLV’s oﬃce administrator emailed two class mem-
bers with instructions for opting out of the class. Cheryl Butler
responded to a class member’s inquiry about opting out, stat-
ing, “If you opt out then you would not be suing Rick, myself
and Sports Performance.” And, after receiving what appears
to be a forwarded April 11 email conversation, D’Ambrose di-
rectly contacted a class member involved in the exchange.
       3. The Second Status Hearing and a Concession
   Before the next status hearing, Mullen submitted copies of
several of the Butlers’ email and text exchanges described
above, including the mass email Gilb forwarded to D’Am-
brose on March 21, 2019. At the hearing, the district court re-
minded D’Ambrose of her statement at the ﬁrst status
No. 22-2944                                                  7

hearing—that the Mullens had received emails from class
members about the lawsuit and that the Butlers had not dis-
cussed the suit with them.
    The district court asked D’Ambrose if she wanted to cor-
rect that statement. D’Ambrose then acknowledged her re-
ceipt of a copy of Gilb’s mass email to class members, and she
conceded the email was an inappropriate communication.
D’Ambrose explained her contrary statement at the ﬁrst hear-
ing by asserting that she had received Gilb’s mass email as
part of an email conversation with more than one message
and that she “did not see” his improper message.
   Mullen moved for sanctions against the Butlers and
D’Ambrose for improperly interfering with the class notice
process. The Butlers later moved for sanctions against Mullen.
   C. Sanctions Imposed against the Butlers and Their At-
   torney
   In its March 13, 2020 opinion and order, the district court
gave reasons for and imposed monetary sanctions against the
Butlers as well as non-monetary sanctions against D’Am-
brose.
      1. Monetary Sanctions against the Butlers
    The court concluded that the Butlers’ communications
with class members during the notice period were potentially
coercive and therefore undermined the process set forth in
Rule 23. Finding that the Butlers intentionally interfered with
the class notice and opt-out process, the court granted Mul-
len’s motion for sanctions. Mullen was “entitled to recover
from the defendants their reasonable attorney’s fees and ex-
penses,” the court ruled. In addition, “because the defendants
conducted a campaign to interfere with the processes of the
8                                                  No. 22-2944

Court,” GLV, Inc., Ricky Butler, and Cheryl Butler were each
“assessed a civil sanction of $5,000, payable to the Clerk, as a
penalty for their misconduct.”
   Much later, after reviewing the parties’ joint October 12,
2022 status report concerning reasonable time reductions and
appropriate hourly rates for Mullen’s attorneys, the court
awarded ﬁnal attorneys’ fees and costs “in favor of plaintiﬀ
and against defendants GLV, Inc., Ricky Butler, and Cheryl
Butler in the total amount of $20,998.10.”
       2. Non-Monetary Sanctions against D’Ambrose
    The district court ruled that D’Ambrose’s April 11, 2019
email to a class member violated Model Rule 4.2, which pro-
hibits attorneys from directly contacting parties they know
are represented by counsel. The court also found that D’Am-
brose’s statement to the court at the ﬁrst status hearing vio-
lated Model Rule 3.3, which prohibits attorneys from know-
ingly making false statements to the court. “D’Ambrose’s
characterization of the defendants’ statements to class mem-
bers contained a signiﬁcant falsehood,” the court stated. It
further found that “D’Ambrose took deliberate action to
avoid conﬁrming a high probability of wrongdoing” which
“amounts to willful blindness” that was “quite serious” and
“prejudiced the class.” Under this reasoning and “due to
D’Ambrose’s relative lack of practice experience,” the district
court imposed a non-monetary sanction. The court “repri-
mand[ed] D’Ambrose for her false statement to the Court”
and directed her to complete twice the required amount of
professional responsibility hours for her next continuing legal
education cycle imposed by the state bar.
No. 22-2944                                                    9

   D. Sanctions Denied against Mullen
    In June 2020, the Butlers moved for imposition of sanctions
against Mullen and her attorneys under Rule 11, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1927, and the court’s inherent power. The district court con-
densed the Butlers’ assertions in their 49-page motion into
several categories in support of their request:
    First, per the district court, the Butlers claimed that “Mul-
len and her counsel included all sorts of irrelevant and extra-
neous material in her complaint in an eﬀort to prejudice and
embarrass the defendants.” The Butlers included Mullen’s
use of the term “rape” in this category. The district court did
not agree that “inclusion of these accusations was irrelevant
and extraneous to the lawsuit.” It concluded that Mullen used
the term “rape” in an “accurate and widely (though perhaps
not universally) accepted” fashion. Therefore, “there was no
violation of Rule 11 or section 1927 here and no sanctionable
misconduct.”
   Second, according to the district court, the Butlers alleged
inconsistencies between Mullen’s actions before the lawsuit
and the accusations in her complaint. This included “a num-
ber of false factual assertions and irrelevant allegations.” One
example, to the district court, was that the Butlers looked at
“Mullen’s enrollment of one of her daughters in a program
associated with the Butlers and GLV in 2018, after the lawsuit
was ﬁled.”
    The district court held that although it “overruled Mul-
len’s contention that knowing some facts about Rick’s sexual
misconduct was way diﬀerent from knowing all the facts, the
argument was a colorable one.” So, “ruling against Mullen on
the merits doesn’t, as defendants contend[,] ‘prove that
10                                                    No. 22-2944

Mullen and her attorneys intended to commit a fraud upon
the Court’” deserving of sanctions.
    Third, the district court noted the Butlers’ argument that
Mullen and her counsel did not have a proper basis for suing
them. The Butlers believed that Mullen wanted to “force the
defendants out of business.” The district court ruled that
“Mullen had a facially viable lawsuit for damages.” Further,
the Butlers had “not shown that Mullen ﬁled suit for an im-
proper purpose within the meaning of Rule 11 … .” Nor had
they shown that Mullen “would not have pursued the lawsuit
if the goal she could achieve was winning the case and an
award of damages.” Thus, there “was no violation of Rule 11.”
    Fourth, the Butlers asserted Mullen’s presentation of evi-
dence was sanctionable. According to the district court, they
believed that Mullen and her attorneys “misrepresented []ma-
terial about the DCFS proceedings.” The district court
explained that although the DCFS proceedings were not a
matter of public record, they were still relevant to the case at
hand. The court held that “claims of inaccuracy are not a basis
to impose sanctions upon Mullen or her attorneys.” Finally,
the district court had “also considered the defendants’ other
claims regarding allegations by Mullen that they contend
were false” and it did “not ﬁnd them to be a basis for impos-
ing sanctions under any of the legal authorities the defend-
ants cite.”
   After considering these and the Butlers’ other contentions,
the court denied their motion for sanctions in full.

                         II. Discussion
   District courts have broad discretion to fashion sanctions
against litigants. Greyer v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., 933 F.3d 871, 877
No. 22-2944                                                     11

(7th Cir. 2019). Therefore, we review their factual ﬁndings for
clear error and their choice of which sanctions to impose for
an abuse of discretion. Id. “[C]aution and restraint” must be
used when a district court exercises its inherent power. Salm-
eron v. Enter. Recovery Sys., Inc., 579 F.3d 787, 793 (7th Cir.
2009). Appellate review of the court’s choice of sanction is def-
erential, though. Id.; see REXA, Inc. v. Chester, 42 F.4th 652, 671
(7th Cir. 2022).
    We reverse a district court’s imposition of sanctions only
if one or more of the following is true: “‘(1) the record contains
no evidence upon which the court could have rationally based
its decision; (2) the decision is based on an erroneous conclu-
sion of law; (3) the decision is based on clearly erroneous fac-
tual ﬁndings; or (4) the decision clearly appears arbitrary.’”
Salmeron, 579 F.3d at 793 (quoting Judson Atkinson Candies, Inc.
v. Latini-Hohberger Dhimantec, 529 F.3d 371, 386 (7th Cir.
2008)); see REXA, 42 F.4th at 671.
   A. Monetary Sanctions against the Butlers
    The Butlers willfully communicated with class members
in a manner that was “potentially coercive and therefore
undermined the notice process set forth in Rule 23,” so the
district court sanctioned them. Class actions present “‘oppor-
tunities for abuse as well as problems for courts and counsel
in the management of cases.’” Williams v. Chartwell Fin. Servs.,
Ltd., 204 F.3d 748, 759 (7th Cir. 2000) (quoting Gulf Oil Co. v.
Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 100 (1981)). A district court thus has both
“‘the duty and the broad authority to exercise control over a
class action and to enter appropriate orders governing the
conduct of counsel and parties.’” Id. The district court may
prohibit a party from communicating directly with class
members to solicit them to opt out of the class. 2 MCLAUGHLIN
12                                                  No. 22-2944

ON CLASS ACTIONS, Status of Communications with Class Mem-
bers § 11:1 (20th ed. 2023).
   On appeal, the Butlers challenge this sanctions order.
Their claims include that the district court got the facts wrong,
and that the monetary sanctions—both Mullen’s attorneys’
fees and the court’s civil penalty—were too high.
       1. Factual Findings
     The Butlers argue the district court erroneously ruled that
their communications with class members abused and under-
mined the purposes of Rule 23. They claim those communica-
tions were not misleading or coercive and that there is no ev-
idence a class member’s decision to opt out of the class was
unduly inﬂuenced or based upon anything but the member’s
own free will. They further submit that they did not intend to
interfere with class members’ decisions to participate in the
litigation. Rather, their communications were in response to
class members who initiated contact with the Butlers and un-
equivocally expressed an intent to opt out of the class action.
The Butlers claim it was illogical for the district court to rely
on a business relationship between them and the class mem-
bers to ﬁnd that the communications could have been coer-
cive.
    In denying these claims, the district court pointed to rec-
ord evidence that the Butlers acted aﬃrmatively with the in-
tent to interfere with class members’ decisions to participate
in the litigation. The district court found that Cheryl’s email,
stating that “[o]pt out is crucial!”, was a “clear direction … to
her employees to respond to class members’ inquiries by em-
phasizing and focusing on opting out, not by directing them
to the class notice.”
No. 22-2944                                                      13

    Further, when the district court asked D’Ambrose for an
acceptable theory as to why Gilb reached out to class mem-
bers, she could not provide one. Instead, she said, “I don’t be-
lieve it was appropriate.” The district court found that Gilb’s
mass email to individuals who would “probably be receiving
a notice” indicated that he wanted to connect with class mem-
bers just as they were learning about the suit via the class no-
tice, or even before that. And Gilb’s use of his own language—
rather than the complete language of the class notice—to de-
scribe the suit indicated an intention to inﬂuence class mem-
bers’ opinions. “[Gilb] attempted to catch people early in their
thinking about the case and provide his own take on the im-
plications of joining the class or opting out.”
    Notably, the district court relied on a statement in the
Butlers’ own brief to support its ﬁnding that the Butlers’ com-
munications with class members had signiﬁcant coercive po-
tential based on class members’ business relationship with
them. Our court has not spoken on this proposition, but an-
other circuit has: “[I]f the class and the class opponent are in-
volved in an ongoing business relationship, communications
from the class opponent to the class may be coercive.” Kleiner
v. First Nat. Bank of Atlanta, 751 F.2d 1193, 1202 (11th Cir. 1985);
see also Piekarski v. Amedisys Illinois, LLC, 4 F. Supp. 3d 952, 955
(N.D. Ill. 2013); Reid v. Unilever U.S., Inc., 964 F. Supp. 2d 893,
927 (N.D. Ill. 2013).
    The Butlers list other examples of where they believe the
district court’s factual ﬁndings were clearly erroneous, but the
record also supports those ﬁndings. We decline to address
their arguments in detail. See United States v. Cunningham, 429
F.3d 673, 678 (7th Cir. 2005) (courts need not address all argu-
ments made by litigants). In the end, the Butlers disagree with
14                                                  No. 22-2944

the district court’s factual ﬁndings, but they fail to show an
abuse of discretion.
       2. Nature and Amount of Sanctions
    Even if the district court’s ﬁnding of sanctionable conduct
is not vacated, the Butlers assert that the monetary sanctions
imposed against them are excessive. To them, Mullen’s attor-
neys’ fees and the court’s civil penalty were too high.
    Attorneys’ Fees. The Butlers see an insuﬃcient causal con-
nection between their sanctionable conduct and the attorneys’
fees awarded to Mullen. Whether an award is appropriately
connected to the sanctionable conduct is a but-for test: “The
complaining party may recover only the portion of his fees
that he would not have paid but for the misconduct.” Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co. v. Haeger, 581 U.S. 101, 109 (2017) (cleaned
up). If a party’s attorneys would have conducted “similar fact-
gathering activities—taken many of the same depositions,
produced and reviewed many of the same documents,” and
undertaken similar discovery absent the opposing party’s
misconduct, then it is not appropriate to award attorneys’ fees
incurred in conducting those activities. Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S.
826, 839 (2011).
     But “[u]nder Goodyear, calibrating the sanction to the bad
faith conduct only requires ‘rough justice’ and not account-
ant-like precision.” Fuery v. City of Chicago, 900 F.3d 450, 469
(7th Cir. 2018). Here, “the district court assessed the total ef-
fect of the misconduct on the integrity of the proceedings.” Id.
It issued a sanction which would “maintain … the integrity of
the trial process,” and compensate for the time that Mullen
and her counsel spent responding to the misconduct. Id. As
the district court explained, this time was “reasonably spent
No. 22-2944                                                    15

to ferret out what had occurred” and was caused by the But-
lers’ misconduct. Once misconduct became clear, the court
found it necessary to conduct further investigation to discover
its nature and extent. Without the Butlers’ misconduct, such
further investigation would not have occurred.
   The Butlers say the district court did not properly connect
their sanctioned misconduct with the attorneys’ fees awarded.
But the court carefully examined the billing records submitted
by Mullen’s counsel, discussed each allowed cost, and cut out
fees and expenses not caused by the Butlers’ misconduct.
    Civil Penalty. The Butlers insist that the district court can-
not enter a civil penalty, such as a ﬁne, without a criminal
trial. A ﬁne is punitive, they contend, because it goes beyond
any fees or damage incurred but for the misconduct. But this
assertion misreads Goodyear, which limits courts’ inherent au-
thority to award attorneys’ fees as a sanction beyond what is
necessary to compensate the other party. 581 U.S. at 108. Un-
der Goodyear, a “fee award may go no further than to redress
the wronged party for losses sustained; it may not impose an
additional amount as punishment for the sanctioned party’s
misbehavior.” Id. (quotations omitted).
    But Goodyear did not overrule the long-standing rule that
courts can impose modest civil monetary sanctions, payable
to the clerk, to curb abuses of the litigation process. See Fuery,
900 F.3d at 468−69 (expressing doubt that “the Goodyear re-
quirement to calibrate the sanction to the bad-faith acts also
applies to sanctions other than an award of attorneys’ fees”);
Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821,
833 (1994) (explaining that sanctions employed “to penalize a
party’s failure to comply with the rules of conduct governing
the litigation process … never have been considered
16                                                   No. 22-2944

criminal”). Even after Goodyear, this court routinely levies
modest ﬁnes against both attorneys and litigants for unac-
ceptable litigation conduct. See, e.g., Camacho-Valdez v. Garland,
30 F.4th 675, 679 (7th Cir. 2022). The district court was well
within its authority to do the same here.
    Bad Faith. The Butlers argue that they did not act in bad
faith and their actions had no tangible impact on the litigation.
The sanctions, they say, are therefore not proportionate to the
gravity of their oﬀense.
    To the contrary, the district court made a detailed record
with factual and legal support for its decisions on these
points. See Section I.B. The Butlers simply disagree with the
district court’s factual ﬁndings. The court explained that the
Butlers could not speak with potential class members and
gave them an opportunity at the ﬁrst status hearing to rectify
their actions. Both the attorneys’ fees and civil penalty were
chosen in accord with the principles set forth in Goodyear and
Fuery. The attorneys’ fees were properly calibrated to main-
tain the integrity of the trial process and to compensate
Mullen and her counsel for their time spent dealing with the
misconduct. And the civil penalty aligned with our precedent.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing
monetary sanctions against the Butlers.
     B. Non-Monetary Sanctions against Butlers’ Counsel
   The Butlers contend that sanctions against D’Ambrose are
not appropriate because she acted in good faith, and she did
not knowingly or intentionally violate the rules of ethics. Yet,
we do not have jurisdiction to address this issue. A district
court’s sanctions order can be appealed only by the person
with “the obligation imposed by the previous order.” Feldman
No. 22-2944                                                   17

v. Olin Corp., 692 F.3d 748, 759 (7th Cir. 2012). A party cannot
appeal a sanction against the party’s attorney. Id.
    D’Ambrose herself did not ﬁle a notice of appeal. Under
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c)(7), an appeal should
not be dismissed “for failure to name a party whose intent to
appeal is otherwise clear from the notice” of appeal. But here,
D’Ambrose’s “intent to appeal is not clear from the notice of
appeal—indeed is not so much as hinted at in it.” Reed v. Great
Lakes Cos., 330 F.3d 931, 933 (7th Cir. 2003). Further, when dis-
cussing this issue in their reply brief and at oral argument, the
Butlers do not argue that D’Ambrose intended to appeal the
sanctions against her. Instead, the Butlers reiterate that they
are appealing the district court’s order that the Butlers pay at-
torneys’ fees.
   C. Denial of Sanctions against Mullen
    The Butlers offer a series of arguments as to why the dis-
trict court abused its discretion by refusing to impose sanc-
tions against Mullen and her counsel. They cite three sources
of authority for those sanctions: Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 11, 28 U.S.C. § 1927, and the district court’s inherent
power.
    Rule 11(b) requires attorneys to certify “‘to the best of
[their] knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an in-
quiry reasonable under the circumstances’” that their filings
have “adequate foundation in fact and law and lack an ‘im-
proper purpose.’” Royce v. Michael R. Needle P.C., 950 F.3d 939,
957 (7th Cir. 2020) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 11). Section 1927
permits courts to levy sanctions against an attorney—not a
party—if the attorney has “acted in an objectively unreasona-
ble manner by engaging in a serious and studied disregard
18                                                  No. 22-2944

for the orderly process of justice” or where a claim is “without
a plausible legal or factual basis and lacking in justification.”
Lightspeed Media Corp. v. Smith, 761 F.3d 699, 708 (7th Cir.
2014) (quotations omitted). And to sanction a party under its
inherent authority, a court must find that the party “willfully
abused the judicial process or otherwise conducted litigation
in bad faith.” Fuery, 900 F.3d at 463.
   The Butlers’ arguments fall into two groups: four ad-
dressed by the district court and two additional contentions.
    Use of the Term “Rape.” The Butlers argue that the district
court abused its discretion by declining to impose sanctions
for Mullen’s use of the term “rape.” They claim Mullen
should be sanctioned because Ricky Butler’s past sexual rela-
tionships were not legally defined as rape in the State of Illi-
nois in the 1980s.
    When denying sanctions against Mullen, the district court
was not required to base its decision on the technical meaning
of that term decades ago. As that court explained, Mullen’s
use of “rape” to describe Ricky Butler’s sexual relationships
with the girls he coached comports with “an accurate and
widely (though perhaps not universally) accepted use of the
term.” Mullen produced declarations under penalty of per-
jury from several women describing Butler’s conduct in terms
that could be considered rape. And the Butlers did not explain
why Mullen should not have described Ricky Butler’s past
conduct as rape.
    Alleged Inconsistencies. Recall, the Butlers asserted that
Mullen’s actions before and after filing her complaint were in-
consistent. After Mullen’s lawsuit was filed, she enrolled one
of her children in a program associated with the Butlers and
No. 22-2944                                                    19

GLV. This shows, the Butlers contend, that Mullen was lying
when she claimed to rely on the Butlers’ disclosures, which
they submit should have resulted in sanctions.
    The district court found Mullen’s actions to be a “relevant
point on the issu[es] of reliance and causation.” But it con-
cluded that “Mullen had an at-least-colorable argument that
this was not inconsistent with her central allegations.” Alt-
hough the program used GLV’s facilities, it was not run by
the Butlers. So, enrollment in the program did not undermine
Mullen’s position that, had she known about the claims of
sexual abuse made against Ricky Butler, she would not have
participated in any GLV-associated volleyball programs.
Mullen therefore was not sanctioned on these facts.
    The Butlers disagree that Mullen’s argument was colora-
ble, but they fail to explain how that disagreement rises to re-
versible error. Instead, the Butlers merely repeat their view of
the facts, which the district court already addressed and re-
jected. The district court’s explanation of why it denied sanc-
tions on this basis was logical and reasonable.
    A Proper Basis for Bringing Mullen’s Suit. To the Butlers,
Mullen brought the suit for reasons beyond just obtaining
monetary damages. They object to the district court’s decision
to the contrary.
    As the district court observed, Mullen may have had many
purposes for pursuing this case. But if her claims are sup-
ported by a good-faith belief in their merits, a parallel reason
does not violate Rule 11. Monetary recovery does not need to
be the sole—or even primary—goal of filing a lawsuit. See,
e.g., City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 575 (1986) (“Con-
gress expressly recognized that a plaintiff who obtains relief
20                                                    No. 22-2944

in a civil rights lawsuit does so not for himself alone but also
as a private attorney general, vindicating a policy that Con-
gress considered of the highest importance.”); Clark v. TAP
Pharm. Prod., Inc., 343 Ill. App. 3d 538, 552 (2003) (“The con-
sumer class action provides restitution to the injured and de-
terrence to the wrongdoer; thus, the ends of equity and justice
are attained.”).
    Mullen sued under the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act,
which allows recovery of punitive damages for the specific
purpose of “punish[ing] the wrongdoer.” Martin v. Heinold
Commodities, Inc., 163 Ill. 2d 33, 81–82 (1994); see also Saccameno
v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 943 F.3d 1071, 1086 (7th Cir. 2019) (ex-
plaining that “punitive damages are retributive in nature”). It
is not improper to bring a lawsuit that seeks relief of the type
contemplated by a statute for the reasons contemplated by the
statute. We review the district court’s order with deference.
The Butlers have not shown clear error in the district court’s
conclusion that Mullen had a proper basis to sue.
    Presentation of Evidence. The Butlers claim Mullen should
have been sanctioned for her allegedly inaccurate presenta-
tion of the DCFS investigation evidence. They offer a lengthy
discussion of documents related to that investigation, and
they contend that because of Mullen’s purportedly inaccurate
submission, the district court considered inadmissible evi-
dence and drew improper conclusions at summary judgment.
   The district court found the opposite—that Mullen’s char-
acterization of the nature and import of the DCFS proceedings
“was supported by evidence in the record.” Further, the
agency’s findings were relevant, even if, as the Butlers con-
tend, the DCFS proceedings are not a matter of public record.
And upon being alerted to the alleged misrepresentations, the
No. 22-2944                                                     21

court reaffirmed that it agreed with Mullen. The court “dealt
at length with the defendants’ claims of inaccurate character-
ization in its ruling on the motion for reconsideration, … and
it overruled those claims.” There is no basis to disturb the dis-
trict court’s decision that Mullen did not make any statements
about the DCFS proceedings that merited sanctions.
   On appeal, the Butlers submit two additional contentions
that the district court abused its discretion in denying their
motion for sanctions against Mullen.
    First, the Butlers say the district court failed to explain
why it denied a number of viable arguments. A district court
abuses its discretion when it “denies sanctions with no expla-
nation, or with an explanation that is so conclusory that the
appellate court cannot review the substance of its decision.”
Feldman, 692 F.3d at 759; see also LaSalle Nat’l Bank of Chicago v.
Cnty. of DuPage, 10 F.3d 1333, 1338 (7th Cir. 1993). But that is
not the case here.
    The district court provided dozens of pages of factual and
legal analysis and addressed many of Mullen’s and the But-
lers’ primary arguments. To deny a motion for sanctions, dis-
trict courts do not need to address and explain why they have
rejected every argument and every fact raised by the moving
party. See Tobey v. Chibucos, 890 F.3d 634, 655 (7th Cir. 2018)
(affirming one-page order denying sanctions where the
district court “cited the correct standard for deciding the
question and provided a sufficient explanation to allow for
meaningful appellate review”); Concepcion v. United States,
142 S. Ct. 2389, 2404 (2022) (“Of course, a district court is not
required to be persuaded by every argument parties make,
and it may, in its discretion, dismiss arguments that it does
not find compelling without a detailed explanation.”).
22                                                   No. 22-2944

    On appeal, we will “uphold any exercise of the [district]
court’s discretion that could be considered reasonable[.]” To-
bey, 890 F.3d at 655. The district court discussed several of the
Butlers’ arguments in detail and rejected them. The district
court did not err by following this court’s direction that “ar-
guments clearly without merit can, and for the sake of judicial
economy should, be passed over in silence.” Cunningham, 429
F.3d at 678.
    Second, the Butlers contend “[e]ach misrepresentation ad-
vanced by Mullen and her attorneys added to the abuse of the
judicial process.” To the Butlers, here the “whole of abusive
action is greater than the sum of the parts of which it is made”
and “these incremental abuses chip away at the fair admin-
istration of justice … .” Fuery, 900 F.3d at 455. So, the district
court should have sanctioned Mullen’s alleged misconduct.
    But the sum of the Butlers’ arguments is as unpersuasive
as are the parts. The few cases they cite for this point speak to
general standards of review and broad understandings of ju-
dicial power and its limits. None contain similar fact patterns
that would counsel ruling in their favor. Even in aggregate,
the Butlers’ arguments fail to show an abuse of discretion for
refusing to sanction Mullen and her counsel.
                         III. Conclusion
    The district court did not abuse its discretion or clearly err
in sanctioning the Butlers and their attorney or in declining to
sanction Mullen.
     For these reasons, we AFFIRM the district court in full.