Court Opinion

ID: 9717634
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:07:34.10513+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:54.395017
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE REINHARD, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. Applying the “totality-of-the-circumstances” analysis set forth in Illinois v. Gates (1983), 462 U.S. 213, 230-31, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527, 543-44, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2328,1 would find sufficient corroboration of the informant’s information to justify probable cause to make a warrantless arrest. First, I note that the informant had on one prior occasion provided information to the police which ultimately led to an arrest. While the information provided did not concern a specific transaction which resulted in an arrest, the informant demonstrated at least a slight degree of reliability in the past. Under Gates’ totality of the circumstances test, this is one factor to be considered in determining whether there was probable cause to arrest. Second, the subsequent corroboration of the informant’s information provided reliability to the informant’s assertions. The informant told Officer Eliopoulos that a cocaine transaction would be conducted at a particular location, at a particular time, and in a particular way — a car would pull up to the west side of an apartment building in the parking lot; a Hispanic person would exit the building and come to the car with a packet of cocaine, and the cocaine would be given to a person, or his “mule,” from whom the informant would later purchase the cocaine. These details were corroborated by the police investigation. The car came to the parking lot of the apartment building designated by the informant; it arrived at 9 p.m., the time designated by the informant; and a Hispanic person came out of the apartment building and entered the car. While the cocaine was not visible to the police, the Hispanic person carried a gray bag in his hand and, several minutes later, left the car without the gray bag. Further, the police had intelligence that cocaine was stashed in one of the apartments in the apartment building. Further, the informant’s information contained many details relating not just to easily obtained facts and conditions existing at the time the information was given the police, but to future actions of third parties ordinarily not easily predicted. (See Gates, 462 U.S. at 245, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 552-53, 103 S. Ct. at 2335-36.) The accuracy of this information was such that it is likely the information was gained by the informant from someone familiar with the alleged illegal activities to provide an adequate “basis of knowledge.” In this regard, the informant stated he was to purchase the cocaine from a person named John, who would be obtaining that cocaine from a Hispanic person at the precise time and location later corroborated by the police. John would then deliver the cocaine to the informant. Based upon this substantial corroboration of the informant’s detailed information, coupled with a degree of reliability in the informant, I would find, under Gates, sufficient veracity and a basis of knowledge to justify probable cause to arrest the defendant. I note that two factors relied on by the majority to diminish the accuracy of the informant’s information are of no consequence. Whether the police arrested the other individual involved in the transaction is irrelevant to the question of whether there was probable cause to arrest defendant. Similarly, the fact that the informant was not sure that the transaction observed was the same one which he had predicted does not detract from the accuracy of the information provided. The informant’s information was not specific as to the precise identities of the parties to the transaction, so the informant’s inability to determine whether the transaction observed was the one predicted is not inconsistent with his tip. Regardless of the identities of the parties involved, the information provided was corroborated in every detail.