Court Opinion

ID: 9671526
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:38:24.060937+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:10.490211
License: Public Domain

ON MOTIONS FOR REHEARNG AND ALTERNATIVE MOTION TO TRANSFER TO SUPREME COURT
PER CURIAM:
Both defendant Hopkins and defendant Selinger have filed motions for rehearing; defendant Selinger has joined his motion for rehearing with an alternative motion for transfer to the Supreme Court, as authorized by Rule 84.05(a), V.A.M.R. One point made in common by both parties is that a joint judgment should not have been entered against them, but that separate judgments should be entered, if at all, against each party for that sum expended during the course of his or her administration. Defendant Hopkins claims she should be held to account for only the sum of $52.49, while defendant Selinger maintains he should be held to account for only the sum which he received, $4,822.51.
In our view of this case, the entry of separate judgments was not and would not be authorized. Although, as some authorities point out, the nature of a case of this kind is difficult to characterize, Anno., 44 A.L.R. at 657, the view of this court is that defendants’ conduct in retaining possession of the proceeds of the sale as part of the estates constituted a species of conversion, that is, a failure to deliver personal property (here the proceeds of the sale) after demand for possession by the persons entitled thereto. See generally, 18 Am. Jur.2d Conversion, § 43, pp. 182-183. The language of the decisions upon which we based our principal opinion seems to us to support this conclusion, at least indirectly.6 Conversion being a tort, we believe this action must be generally characterized as an action ex delicto for compensatory damages and that a joint judgment must be entered against both defendants Hopkins and Selinger, who were sued jointly. State ex rel. Hall v. Cook, Mo., 400 S.W.2d 39, 40 [2] ; Electrolytic Chlorine Co. v. Wallace & Tierman Co., 328 Mo. 782, 791, 41 S.W. 2d 1049, 1052, 78 A.L.R. 930, 937.
Defendant Selinger further complains that affirmance of the judgment of the trial court permits a collateral attack upon orders of the probate court, which is of course true. We have before us, however, the whole record, not just the record of the probate court, and that record shows on its face (because of the judgment in the Circuit Court of Washington County) that the probate court’s order of sale was wholly- void because the real property in question was never part of either estate. In *449other words, as was true in Linville v. Ripley, 347 Mo. 95, 100-101; 146 S.W.2d 581, 582-583 [1] [2-4] [5,6], one of the essentials necessary to give the probate court jurisdiction to administer the proceeds of the sale as part of the two estates is affirmatively shown upon the whole record to be lacking, and the objection that the present suit constitutes a collateral attack upon the probate court’s judgments or orders is of no avail.
Defendant Selinger further argues that since the original petition against Mrs. Hopkins stated a cause of action for fraud it cannot fairly be said that he was apprised of the nature of plaintiffs’ claim. He could not have known, counsel argues, that a suit against the estate was contemplated. In our view, the pleadings filed by defendant Selinger indicate that he was indeed aware of the true nature of plaintiffs’ claim. In his motion to intervene as a party in the quiet title action in Washington County, defendant Selinger gave as a reason “[t]hat in the event that defendant [Moses] should prevail * * * there is a distinct possibility * * * that the Estate of Essie Yount would be required to pay to the plaintiffs herein certain monies and assets of said estate.’’ (Our emphasis.) The date of this particular pleading is not shown precisely, but it recites that a copy thereof was mailed to opposing counsel in December 1965, soon after defendant Selinger qualified as administrator. This motion, plus the allegations of the other pleadings filed as soon as Mr. Selinger qualified, convinces us that the trial court could reasonably have found that Mr. Sel-inger — or his counsel, at least — was aware that plaintiffs, in their action, claimed that the personal representatives involved were wrongfully detaining property belonging to plaintiffs as assets of the estate.
For the reasons indicated, the motions for rehearing and the alternative motion for transfer to the Supreme Court are denied.

. State ex rel. and to Use of Gnekow v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., supra, 349 Mo. at 536, 163 S.W.2d at 90, speaks of the general conflict of authority on estate and bond liability for conversion of property; in Nye v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., supra, 225 Mo.App. at 595, 37 S.W.2d at 989 [1], the court held that an action in replevin or conversion would lie; in State ex rel. Whitlow v. American Surety Co. of New York, supra, 191 Mo.App. at 196, 177 S.W. at 1076, the court characterized the administrator’s wrongful retention of partnership property as “his conversion thereof. * * * ”