Court Opinion

ID: 9479577
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:22:18.871092+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:47:07.877784
License: Public Domain

BEAM, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I fully concur in the affirming opinion in this case. I write separately to advert to Chief Judge Lay's reliance on Duckworth v. Eagan, — U.S.-, 109 S.Ct. 2875, 106 L.Ed.2d 166 (1989).
Although on its facts Duckworth is not Butzin, it seems fair to say that in principle Duckworth did reaffirm Miranda. In so doing, however, the Chief Justice, quoting California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 101 S.Ct. 2806, 69 L.Ed.2d 696 (1981), observed that “the ‘rigidity’ of Miranda [does not] exten[d] to the precise formulation of the warnings given a criminal defendant,” and that “no talismanic incantation [is] required to satisfy its strictures.” Duckworth, 109 S.Ct. at 2879. Further “[Reviewing courts ... need not examine Miranda warnings as if construing a will or defining the terms of an easement.” Id. at 2880. In applying this admonition, the Supreme Court, reversing the Seventh Circuit, found acceptable a warning that informed the defendant that “[a lawyer] would be appointed ‘if and when you go to court.’ ” Id. (quoting Eagan v. Duckworth, 843 F.2d 1554, 1556 (7th Cir.1988) (emphasis omitted)). In my view, this was a far greater departure from the specific pronouncements set forth in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) than the warning given Butzin.