Court Opinion

ID: 9743517
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:35:44.188687+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:41.724832
License: Public Domain

Opinion Concurring in Result
DeBruler, J.
I agree with the disposition of this case by the majority but am unable to agree with the analysis of the law contained therein. In holding that confessions or admissions choked out of an accused by a private citizen are admissible because not obtained by the action of a State official, the majority confounds the recent adoption of constitutional exclusionary rules as formulated in Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, with the long standing common law rule against the introduction of involuntary confessions. In doing so, the majority ignores both statutory and case law to the effect that coerced confessions are inadmissible regardless of the source of the coercion. I.C. 1971, 35-1-31-5, being Burns § 9-1607; Roddy v. State (1970), 254 Ind. 50, 257 N. E. 2d 816; Leaver v. State (1968), 250 Ind. 523, 237 N. E. 2d 368; Thurman v. State (1907), 169 Ind. 240, 82 N. E. 64; Schaumberg v. State (1967) , 83 Nev. 372, 432 P. 2d 500 (cited in Leaver, supra); People v. Berve (1958), 51 C. 2d 286, 332 P. 2d 97; Moore v. Dempsey (1923), 261 U.S. 86, 43 S. Ct. 265; Rochin v. California (1952), 342 U.S. 165, 72 S. Ct. 205, 96 L. Ed. 2d 183; Wigmore, EVIDENCE, § 833. I believe that the trial court was correct in excluding the statements coerced out of one of the appellants here, and since this objectionable evidence was excluded, no error occurred.
The evidence of what occurred at the home of the appellant was not excludable since the owners of the carpet knew before they apprehended the thieves that they had been sent by Trinkle. Thus that evidence was not tainted as the fruit of the poisonous tree. Wong Sun v. U.S. (1963), 371 U.S. 471, 83 S. Ct. 407, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441. The crucial evidence in this case *122cáme from the testimony of the witness who placed the two appellants here in the alleged conspiracy, and that testimony, if believed, was sufficient to convict the appellants.
The appellants also argue that they were prejudiced by the fact that their motion to suppress was not ruled upon until the close of the case. As their brief points out, “the defendants have a right to know what evidence they are required to meet before they decide whether or not to testify, and on what areas their testimony will touch.” I agree with this position and would reverse on this ground, had the appellants properly objected to the delay. A defendant in a criminal action has the right to know precisely what the status of the evidence against him is at the close of the State’s case when he must determine his defense strategy. Forcing the accused to guess at the strength of the case against him at the time that he must decide whether or not to waive his constitutional right against self-incrimination, is to rob him of the ability to make an intelligent waiver of that right. Further, as the United States Supreme Court said in Harrison v. U.S. (1968), 392 U.S. 219, 88 S. Ct. 2008, 20 L. Ed. 2d 1047, an accused’s testimony which is impelled by the introduction of an illegally obtained confession is tainted by the primary illegality and is thus inadmissible. However, the appellants acquiesced in the trial court’s decision to keep the motion to suppress under advisement during the presentation of the defense’s case, and having taken the stand without objection, they cannot now be heard to complain about this procedure. Lewis v. State (1969), 252 Ind. 454, 250 N. E. 2d 358.
Prentice, J., concurs.
Note.—Reported in 284 N. E. 2d 816.