Court Opinion

ID: 9575804
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:17:26.898406+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:50:08.507377
License: Public Domain

PHELPS, Justice
(dissenting).
I regret that I am unable to agree with the majority members of this court on their interpretation of our Rule 59(e) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
Arizona, so far as I have been unable to discover from considerable research, is the only state in the union which has our Rule 59(e). Wisconsin, Texas, Oregon, Montana and California are apparently the only states that have anything similar.
The Legislature of Arizona adopted from Texas, sections 836-837 of the Revised Statutes of Arizona 1887, relating to motions for new trial. These sections have been materially amended since then and section 837, as amended, now appears as Rule 59(e), Rules of Civil Procedure 1956.
The act as adopted from the state of Texas provided in substance, that motions for new trial should be made within two days after rendition of judgment, if the term of court should continue so long, if not then, before the end of the term and that such motions should be determined at the term of the court at which the motion was made.
In 1901, § 1479 was amended to read:
*191“■All motions for new trials in arrest of judgment or to set aside a judgment shall be determined at the term of the court at which the motion shall be made, unless continued for good cause.”
Our Constitution abolished terms of court and the Legislature at its 1912 regular session again amended this section which appeared in the Arizona Revised Statutes of 1901 as section 1479. As amended it appears in the 1913 R.S.A. as section 591 and reads as follows:
Sec. 591. “All motions for new trial, in arrest of judgment, or to set aside a judgment shall be determined within twenty days after the rendition of judgment, and if not so determined shall be deemed denied, unless continued by order of the court, or by stipulation.”
Since promulgated in substance by this court as Rule 59(e).
The Texas courts construed the act we adopted from it to be mandatory and held and still hold, that a motion was discharged by operation of law if not acted upon at the same term. James v. Appel, 192 U.S. 129, 135, 24 S.Ct. 222, 48 L.Ed. 377. To the same effect is Svea Ins. Co. v. McFarland, 7 Ariz. 131, 60 P. 936.
This court in Chenoweth v. Prewett, 17 Ariz. 400, 153 P. 420; Bigler v. Welker, 16 Ariz. 44, 141 P. 124; List v. Wilkinson, 23 Ariz. 262, 203 P. 333, and Mosher v. Way land, 62 Ariz. 498, 158 P.2d 654, held that the failure to rule upon a motion for a new trial within twenty days after rendition of judgment, had the effect of denying such motion by operation of law unless, continued by order of court or by stipulation of the parties.
In the case of E. A. Tovrea & Co. v. Yutich, 24 Ariz. 41, 206 P. 595, we held that the refusal to consider a motion for a new trial is equivalent to a dismissal of the motion, and, in the case of Van Dyke v. Cordova Copper Co., 14 Ariz. 499, 132 P. 94, we held that the dismissing of a motion for a new trial is equivalent to a denial of the motion.
List v. Wilkinson, supra [23 Ariz. 262, 203 P. 334], held that:
“ * * * the order of the court, taking the motion for new trial under advisement, was in effect an order of continuance such as is contemplated by the statute, and that the court did not lose jurisdiction to rule thereon thereafter.”
In reaching this conclusion it followed' Ex parte Doak, 188 Ala. 406, 66 So. 64, 66, which held that an order taking a motion for a new trial under advisement, had the effect of continuing the motion “ * * * *192until the court might, during the lawful sitting, attain a conclusion and pronounce judgment thereupon. * * *" (Emphasis supplied.) After stating that the question involved in the Alabama case was, in its general character, the same as the one being considered, our court then quoted the following language from that case:
“So, the real question in this connection is whether the taking under advisement of the motion to set aside the judgment by default within the thirty-day period operated a continuance thereof to such time as the court might lawfully act upon it; whether that action by the court preserved the court’s power (subsequently to the expiration of the thirty-day period) to determine the issue presented by the motion.” (Emphasis supplied.)
In Bryan v. Inspiration Consol. Copper Co., 27 Ariz. 188, 231 P. 1091, 1094 (on third appeal here), we held that the twenty-two days allowed counsel to file briefs was in effect, a submission by the court of the motion to it for its consideration after the briefs were in. The court said:
“ * * * The order, therefore, in addition to submitting the motion for a new trial upon the filing of the briefs, continued it until such time thereafter as the court could determine the question involved * * (Emphasis supplied.)
This clearly limited the period of continuance until such time thereafter as the court could determine the question of law involved. The order taking a motion under advisement manifests the fact that the hearing is completed and a continuance is for the sole purpose of deliberation by the court and to enter an order thereon after reaching a conclusion. It was not contemplated that it was to be used for the purpose of further hearings, or for a continuance beyond the time required by the court to become advised in the premises. Therefore, there existed no legal reason for further study or deliberation upon the questions of law presented.
The court said in the Chenoweth case, supra, that the Legislature enacted section 591, supra, (now our Rule 59(e) :
“ * * * to fix a limit beyond which a hearing thereon could not be had, except by a strict observance of its provisions. During territorial days we had terms of court. In most of the counties they were limited to two terms a year. It was found under that system that the losing party could by filing a motion for a new trial often effect the postponement of the fruits of the judgment for as long as 6 months if the court, for any reason, failed to *193act upon the same before the adjournment of the term. * * * ”
It is apparent, as expressed by Chief Justice Ross, in the Chenoweth case, that the primary purpose of this law, was to prevent unnecessary delay after judgment is rendered, thus depriving the successful litigant of the fruits of his judgment.
It appears to me therefore, from the language above quoted, that this court in holding that an order of a trial court taking a motion for a new trial under advisement, had the effect of continuing said cause — intended only that the continuance was for the sole purpose of enabling it to fully advise itself concerning the questions of law raised in the motion and not that such motion was deemed to be taken under advisement indefinitely. The majority opinion is giving it the latter effect which gives it greater potency than an order of continuance which is required to specify the date to which the continuance is made. In the instant case the effect of the majority opinion is to continue the time for ruling on the motion for new trial for more than two years. We presume, if this court had not reached the case for six to ten years, their holding would be the same.
Such an interpretation is inconceivable to me, especially in light of the fact that the plain purpose of its enactment was to prevent unnecessary delay in litigation after judgment, and, in the light of Rule 77{j), Rules of Civil Procedure 1956, which provides that every matter submitted for determination to a judge of the 'Superior Court for his decision, shall be determined and ruling made .thereon within sixty days from submission thereof.
It is my position, (although I confess I did not state it too clearly in the original opinion in this case) that when the trial judge in the instant case, granted defendant’s motion for judgment n. o. v. and stated in substance, if he had not granted the motion for judgment n. o. v. he would have granted the motion for a new trial upon the ground of misconduct of plaintiff’s attorney, that this clearly showed he had considered the legal grounds upon which the motion for a new trial was based and was then and there prepared to rule upon the motion as a matter of law. His statement from the bench therefore, must be construed either (1) as a denial of the motion for a new trial, (2) a refusal to rule thereon which this court has held to be equivalent to a denial thereof, (See E. A. Tovrea & Co. v. Yutich; Van Dyke v. Cordova Copper Co., supra) (3) that the motion was then and there denied by operation of law because of the failure of the court to rule upon it.
*194As heretofore shown, it seems clear to me that the decisions of this court above-mentioned, unmistakably show that “taking a motion for a new trial under advisement” operates only to continue it to such time as the court has prepared itself to correctly rule upon the questions of law presented. When it reaches that conclusion, it is its bounden duty to rule thereon, and by failing to discharge it.s duty, cannot under any stretch of the imagination, be distorted into an order for an indefinite continuance. This is a dangerous precedent to establish. “ ‘Rehearings, new trials, are not essential to due process of law, either in judicial or administrative proceedings.’ ” James v. Appel, supra [192 U.S. 129, 24 S.Ct. 224].
Unless we ignore the plain language of these decisions we are compelled to conclude that the motion for a new trial in this case died on July 20, 1954 (when the court failed to definitely rule thereon), either at the hands of the court or by operation of law, and in either event, this court is without power to restore it to life.
'I agree, without reservation, that if we did not have Rule 59(e), having adopted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A., we would necessarily■ follow the Federal court’s rule with respect to new trials, but, it is my position that since we have Rule 59(e), we can neither ignore the rule nor its plain intendment that the successful litigant may not be deprived of the fruits of his judgment by unwarranted delay, such as has resulted in this case and will inevitably result from the tule laid down by the majority opinion.
The rehearing should have been denied.