Court Opinion

ID: 9394914
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-16 16:08:23.571444+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:04.098352
License: Public Domain

J-S31002-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    MARK FRIEDMAN                              :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellant               :
                                               :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    WILLIAM HUDSON                             :   No. 1881 EDA 2021

             Appeal from the Judgment Entered November 22, 2021
      In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Civil Division at
                              No(s): 2019-00890

BEFORE:      BOWES, J., NICHOLS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                                  FILED MAY 16, 2023

        Mark Friedman appeals from the judgment entered on the non-jury

verdict in favor of the defendant, William Hudson in a contract dispute

concerning investment properties. We reverse and remand with instructions.

        Hudson is a contractor who owned investment property located at 439

Beech Street (“439 Beech Street”) in Pottstown, Montgomery County. While

that property was not encumbered by a mortgage, Hudson owed an unsecured

debt of $20,000 to a third party for property-related expenses.               On

September 25, 2015, Hudson entered into a partnership agreement with

Friedman, a work acquaintance with moderate construction experience as an

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*   Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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unskilled laborer.     Hudson drafted the handwritten agreement (“the

Partnership Agreement”), which provided as follows:

                                                            9/25/15

         William C. Hudson and Mark W. Friedman as of today will
         start a Properties Company.

            •    William C. Hudson offers property 439 Beech St.
                 Pottstown, Pa.

            •    Mark W. Friedman offer[s $]25,000.00 which is to
                 pay off loan, against said house.

            •    Doing this Mark W. Friedman will be added to the
                 title of said House and become half owner.

         I agree to this agreement.

         [Signatures of both parties]

N.T., 2/8/21, 17-18 Exhibit P-2. As the trial court accurately observed, “[t]he

agreement does not contain an integration clause.”       Trial Court Opinion,

2/17/22, at 3.

            The trial court continued,

            For his part, Friedman invested a total of $25,000.00 in the
      partnership and orally agreed to help Hudson with the repair and
      renovation of the properties in the partnership. For his part,
      Hudson offered up his unencumbered 439 Beech house with a
      purported market value of approximately $90,000.00 to
      $100,000.00 as collateral and orally agreed to bring his general
      contractor skills to repair and/or renovate the residential
      properties purchased by the partnership. Friedman agreed the
      condition of 439 Beech was “very good,” it was “ready to go” and
      was “a nice house.” He explained that he would not have invested
      his money in it if it were not.

            ....

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            According to Hudson, sometime following the signing of the
      written agreement, Friedman informed Hudson that he was
      concerned that adding his name to the title of 439 Beech would
      negatively affect Friedman’s employment claim with Vanguard
      and that Friedman’s bad credit would negatively affect the
      partnership’s ability to get a loan. Consequently, the parties orally
      agreed that, although Friedman’s name would not be added to the
      deed for 439 Beech, Friedman would continue to own 50% interest
      in the business. This amendment to the contract was not
      contained in any writing.

Id. at 3-5.

      Hudson rented the property periodically between 2015 and 2019. He

either reinvested the rental proceeds into repairs and renovations that he

performed between tenants or used the money to satisfy property-related

expenses such as insurance and property taxes. The parties dispute whether

Friedman helped Hudson complete any repairs or manage the property.

      On May 3, 2016, Hudson, acting on behalf of the partnership, used the

property to secure a loan for $64,500, but he neglected to inform the

mortgage lender that Friedman owned a fifty-percent interest in the real

estate. Thereafter, Hudson and Friedman agreed to use approximately one-

third of the loan proceeds to purchase a second investment property on Beech

Street (“20 Beech Street”). However, a subsequent dispute concerning the

postponed settlement date caused a rift between the two men so severe that

the partners did not communicate for several months.

      In October 2016, Friedman informed Hudson that he wanted the return

of his $25,000 investment. Hudson agreed but, as he was unable to access

cash to pay in a lump sum, proposed a series of $500 monthly payments to

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satisfy the debt. Friedman rejected that proposal, but in the winter of 2016,

he subsequently accepted two checks for a total of $6,000 and agreed to defer

the remaining $19,000 debt until Hudson either sold or mortgaged the 20

Beech Street property.1 The memo line on the first check read “Pay Back

Payment” and the second check noted “Balance $19,000.00.” N.T., 2/17/21,

at 87, Exhibits D and E.

       Over the ensuing two-year period, Hudson neither sold nor mortgaged

the 20 Beech Street property, and he did not make any additional payments

to Friedman.      In January 2019, Friedman initiated the lawsuit that is the

genesis of this appeal.          He subsequently filed an amended complaint

asserting: (1) that Hudson was in breach of the Partnership Agreement by

failing to pay $42,606.31, which Friedman averred was his equal share of the

alleged profits from the partnership; and (2) that Hudson was in breach of the

2016 repayment agreement because he failed to satisfy the remaining

$19,000 debt. Friedman also presented a third, alternative count of unjust

enrichment, i.e., “Friedman conferred on Hudson the benefit of the estimated

$42,606.31 in Partnership profits and the $19,000 in Partnership interest [and

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1  As we discuss infra, the parties and the trial court each presented
overlapping characterizations of the 2016 agreement. Friedman’s amended
complaint portrayed the payment plan as Hudson’s purchase of Friedman’s
ownership interest in the partnership. During trial, Hudson described it as a
mutual rescission agreement that discharged the remaining obligations of
either party, and following trial, both Hudson and the trial court characterized
it as a novation, i.e., a substitute agreement that replaced the original written
contract.

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u]der the circumstances, it would be inequitable and unjust for Hudson to

retain the benefit of Friedman’s money without paying for the value of that

benefit.” Amended Complaint, 12/27/19, at 6.

       In his answer and new matter Hudson denied that the partnership

realized any profit for the ventures at 20 Beech Street or 439 Beech Street.

See Answer and New Matter Counterclaim, 2/18/20, at 4,5. As to the October

2016 agreement to pay Friedman $25,000, which he framed as a mutual

rescission, Hudson asserted that Friedman breached that agreement by filing

this lawsuit and demanding payment before Hudson was able to sell or

mortgage 20 Beech Street.2 Id. at 6. The concomitant counterclaim asserted

that Friedman was in breach of the Partnership Agreement because Friedman

failed to provide labor or any further capital for 439 Beech Street and utterly

abandoned his responsibilities for renovating 20 Beech Street.     He opined,

“Friedman’s breach[es] of the [Partnership Agreement] have caused Hudson

to suffer loss in the amount of $75,000.” Id. at 9.

       During the bench trial, both parties proffered testimony that was

generally consistent with their pleadings.       Friedman stated that his only

obligation under the Partnership Agreement was to contribute $25,000 to the

venture. See N.T., 2/17/21, at 116. He believed that he was purchasing one-

____________________________________________

2 While the litigation was pending, on July, 10, 2019, Hudson sold 20 Beech
Street for $35,000, realizing net gain of $21,226.13.        Thereafter, on
October 18, 2019, he sold 439 Beech Street for $90,000, realizing net
proceeds of $22,687.33.

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half interest in the rental property and would receive rental income when it

was occupied. Id. at 116. For his part, Hudson testified that, in October

2016, after the dispute regarding the settlement date for 20 Beech Street,

Friedman informed him that he wanted to terminate the partnership. Id. at

83. Hudson recalled, “[H]e told me he wanted out. He did not want to be in

this anymore. He changed his mind. He would like his money back.” Id.

Thereafter, Hudson outlined the two payments that he made to Friedman

totaling $6,000, confirmed the $19,000 balance, and explained why he

subsequently refused to pay the amount remaining on the debt. Id. 84-86,

87-88, 95. He reasoned:

      [W]hen I had that money to pay him back, . . . that’s when we
      got the lawsuit that he wanted a ridiculous amount of money for
      his interest, and I then decided not to give him the $19,000 and
      we’ll wait for what the court decides, if he wants to take it to court
      and not, you know, do what we had agreed.

Id. at 95.

      At the close of testimony, the trial court held a non-record sidebar and

then directed counsel to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of

law. In pertinent part, Friedman’s submission noted the $6,000 repayment

but did not outline his position as to the remaining $19,000.        Instead, he

focused on recovering what he asserted were “the benefits of his ownership,”

i.e., $57,602.52, which included interest on any unpaid profit.         Plaintiff’s

Proposed Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, 2/18/21, at 8. As it relates

to the $19,000 balance, Hudson reiterated his position that Friedman

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breached the 2016 repayment agreement by initiating the instant lawsuit

seeking additional damages. See Defendant’s Proposed Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law, 2/19/21, at 4-5.

     On June 15, 2021, the trial court entered a self-styled “Decision”

outlining defense verdicts against Friedman’s breach of contract and unjust

enrichment claims and Hudson’s counterclaim for breach of contract. As to

Friedman’s request for substantial damages relating to the accruing benefits

of ownership under the partnership agreement, the trial court found that the

2016 repayment agreement was “a novation of the partnership agreement

. . . in which Friedman agreed to relinquish any stake in the partnership for

the return of his original $25,000.00 investment.”     Trial Court Decision,

6/15/21, at 19.   It found that “Friedman’s consent to the novation [wa]s

evidenced by his acceptance of $6,000 toward the agreed upon amount of

$25,000.00[.]”    Id.   Hence, the court concluded that Friedman did not

establish that Hudson breached the written contract: “The evidence adduced

at trial demonstrates that the original written instrument documenting the

partnership agreement was subsequently amended by valid oral agreements

such that the original terms of the written instrument were no longer

controlling.” Id at 20. Presumably referencing that oral agreement, the court

further concluded, without any explanation, that Friedman did not establish

that Hudson breached “their” contract. Id. at 19.

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      Similarly, in rejecting Hudson’s counterclaim, the ensuing trial court

order stated: “Hudson failed to cite any statutory or case law in support of

his bald claim for the repudiation of the balance of $19,000.00 due and owing

to Plaintiff, Mark Friedman. Trial Court Order, 6/15/21, at 2. Nevertheless,

despite finding the amount “due and owing to Plaintiff,” the court did not enter

a verdict in Friedman’s favor. Instead, the court dismissed with prejudice both

Friedman’s amended complaint and Hudson’s counterclaim. Id.

      Thereafter, the trial court denied Friedman’s timely motion for post-trial

relief seeking, inter alia, the entry of a $19,000 judgment in his favor. In

pertinent part, the court determined that, because Friedman failed to assert

an alternative claim under the novation, “there is no merit to Friedman’s

argument that the [c]ourt should have awarded $19,000 to Friedman under

the novation.” Order, 8/9/21, at 4. The court continued: “This court may

award judgment only on a claim advanced at trial, in this case, under a

novation which, in fact, Friedman disputed at trial and in post-trial filings.”

Id. at 4. Moreover, the trial court revised the June 15, 2021 order to state in

the past tense “had been due and owing” when referencing the $19,000

balance that it continued to deny Friedman. Id.

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       Friedman timely filed this appeal3 and both he and the trial court

complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. Friedman presents one issue for our review:

“The trial court erred in concluding that Friedman is not entitled to a minimum

of $ 19,000.00 as damages for Hudson’s breach of the novation of the

Partnership Agreement, which novation Hudson advanced as his defense and

which the court found to be valid and enforceable.”      Friedman’s brief at 7

(cleaned up).

       We review a non-jury verdict to verify that the decision was rendered

on competent evidence and with the correct application of the law.         See

Yablonski v. Keevican Weiss Bauerle & Hirsch LLC, 197 A.3d 1234, 1238

(Pa. Super. 2018). “For discretionary questions, we review for an abuse of

that discretion. For pure questions of law, our review is de novo.” Affordable

Outdoor, LLC v. Tri-Outdoor, Inc., 210 A.3d 270, 280 (Pa.Super. 2019).

Friedman’s sole issue regarding the trial court’s refusal to award the $19,000

balance after finding that it was “due and owing” raises a question of law.

Hence our review is de novo. See e.g. TruServ Corp. v. Morgan's Tool &

Supply Co., Inc., 39 A.3d 253, 258 (Pa. 2012) (issue concerning whether

____________________________________________

3 Although Friedman purported to appeal from the trial court’s August 9, 2021
order, an appeal is properly taken from the entry of judgment, which occurred
on November 22, 2021. Thus, our jurisdiction is proper. See Pa.R.A.P.
905(a)(5) (“A notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a determination
but before the entry of an appealable order shall be treated as filed after such
entry and on the day thereof.”).

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trial court had discretion to refuse to award contractual interest to prevailing

party presented a question of law which reviewed de novo).

       In rejecting Friedman’s request for relief, the trial court first determined

that the deficiencies in Friedman’s pleadings, trial memoranda, and requests

for post-trial relief precluded him from collecting the undisputed debt owed to

him by Hudson.4 In short, the court found that, notwithstanding the factual

averments in the amended complaint, the evidence adduced at trial, or the

claims raised in his post-trial motion, Friedman’s entreaty failed because he

neglected “to state in his post-sentence motion for reconsideration how the

grounds were preserved in pre-trial proceedings or at trial.”          Trial Court

Opinion, 2/17/22, at 18.          Phrased differently, the court determined that

“Friedman did not bring a claim under [the] novation, rather Friedman argued

against the finding of a novation.” Id. at 18-19. It concluded, “Friedman’s

election to seek damages under the [Partnership Agreement] precludes the

relief he now seeks post trial.” Id. at 20.

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4   Hudson asserts similar procedural errors based upon Friedman’s alleged
failure to: (1) assert the novation as a basis for relief during trial; (2) specify
how the grounds for relief were asserted at trial; and (3) preserve the claim
prior to the trial court’s decision. See Hudson’s brief at 4-6. As noted in the
body of this memorandum, Friedman consistently argued that he was owed
$19,000 under what he referred to as 2016 repayment agreement. Moreover,
the grounds for the instant allegation of trial court error did not exist until the
trial court rendered its logically-inconsistent decision to deny relief
notwithstanding its accompanying finding that the $19,000 had been due and
owing to Friedman under the agreement. Thus, we reject these claims of
waiver.

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      For the following reasons, the trial court erred in finding that judgment

was not warranted because Friedman proffered the incorrect legal theory to

obtain it. First, the certified record supports the court’s determination that

Hudson owed the $19,000 to Friedman, and we can discern no error in the

court’s attendant rejection of Hudson’s repudiation claim. In this vein, we also

note that, to the extent that the trial court determined that Hudson did not

breach the 2016 agreement, the certified record does not support that

conclusion.

      To prove breach of contract, Friedman was required to establish: (1) a

contract; (2) Hudson’s breach of a duty imposed by the contract; and (3)

resultant damages.    Harley v. HealthSpark Found., 265 A.3d 674, 685

(Pa.Super. 2021). As delineated supra, the uncontested facts in the certified

record bear out that Hudson agreed to repay Friedman the $25,000, and after

Friedman rejected a proposed installment plan, Friedman accepted $6,000

toward the debt over the next two months, and eventually agreed that Hudson

could repay the remaining amount after he sold or mortgaged the 20 Beech

Street Property.   Hudson sat idle for the ensuing three years in which he

neither sold nor attempted to mortgage the property. Hudson eventually sold

the property and continued to withhold the $19,000 balance of the debt,

ostensibly because he believed Friedman repudiated the agreement by

initiating the underlying lawsuit.   See N.T., 2/17/21, at 95.    Significantly,

however, the court expressly rejected Hudson’s repudiation defense.        See

Trial Court Order, 6/15/21, at 2; Trial Court Order, 8/9/21, at 4. Hence, the

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certified record supports Friedman’s breach of contract claim, i.e., that Hudson

was in breach of the 2016 repayment agreement because he failed to satisfy

the remaining $19,000 debt.        See Amended Complaint, 12/27/19, at 6.

Therefore, the trial court erred in failing to grant the relief Friedman requested

in his amended complaint and Hudson conceded at trial.             Accord, e.g.,

Andrews v. Jackson, 800 A.2d 959, 965 (Pa.Super. 2002) (holding fact

finder is not permitted to refuse to award damages in tort action for

uncontroverted injury).

      Moreover, in refusing to award the breach-of-contract damages that

Friedman clearly asserted in his amended complaint, the trial court overstated

the impact of Friedman’s legal argument challenging the novation during trial.

The court’s position is accurate insofar as Friedman disputed during trial that

the novation relieved Hudson’s obligation to pay Friedman his share of the

partnership profits. Indeed, it was Hudson, not Friedman, who invoked the

2016 agreement as a defense to Friedman’s breach of contract count

concerning the partnership profits.        Hudson first referred to the 2016

agreement as the “modification” or “rescission” of the written agreement and

did not characterize it as a novation until in his post-trial submission. The trial

court subsequently adopted that terminology in its June 15, 2021 decision,

wherein it concluded that it replaced the Partnership Agreement.

      As Friedman accurately observes in his brief, during the trial he argued

against Hudson’s characterization of the 2016 agreement because it was

contrary to Friedman’s argument that the Partnership Agreement continued

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to exist, profits continued to accumulate, and that he was entitled to receive

his share of the partnership profits up to the date that Hudson completed the

purchase of Friedman’s one-half ownership interest in the partnership. That

is, Friedman argued that he continued to accrue damages under the

Partnership Agreement until Hudson satisfied the remaining $19,000 owed

under the buyout. Thus, Friedman did not invoke the novation because it was

contrary to his position. Crucially, however, Friedman did consistently assert

that the $19,000 balance of his initial contribution remained owing, even if he

contended that he was also entitled to the partnership profits that he believed

continued to accumulate under the Partnership Agreement.

      It defies logic that, although Friedman pled a breach of the repayment

agreement as a separate count for damages in the amended complaint, and

the trial court found that he proved that claim at trial, he somehow abandoned

it because it was not articulated in the proposed findings of fact and

conclusions of law submitted to the trial court at the close of evidence.

Basically, the trial court equated the post-hearing submissions in this case to

the use in jury trials of a proposed special verdict slip, which “promotes judicial

efficiency by preventing needless retrials as well as fairness by keeping a

litigant from benefiting from its own omission in failing to request a special

verdict slip.” Cowher v. Kodali, 283 A.3d 794, 804 (Pa. 2022). However,

the two are not the same.

      As a threshold matter, a proposed special verdict slip is presented for

the benefit of a jury and not a trial court acting as the ultimate arbiter of fact

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in a bench trial. Moreover, unlike the above-stated purpose of a special verdict

slip, the purpose of proposed findings of fact is to allow the court to determine

which material facts are genuinely disputed. Significantly, one fact that was

never disputed in this case is Hudson’s failure to pay Friedman the $19,000

that he agreed to repay in 2016. As we previously observed, Hudson testified,

“I then decided not to give him the $19,000[.]” N.T. 2/17/21, at 95. Thus,

we state once more, because Friedman pled the claim in his amended

complaint and the evidence at trial undisputedly supported it, the trial court

erred as matter of law in concluding that Friedman was barred from recovery

because he did not include the demand specifically in the post-hearing

submission of proposed facts and legal conclusions.

      Having found that the trial court erred in failing to enter judgment in

Friedman’s favor, we reverse the entry of judgment in favor of Hudson, and

remand for the trial court to enter judgment in favor of Friedman for $19,000.

      Judgment reversed.      Case remanded with instructions.       Jurisdiction

relinquished.

      Judge Nichols and P.J.E. Stevens concur in the result.

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 5/16/2023

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