Court Opinion

ID: 9551743
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:58:31.882925+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:24:28.049183
License: Public Domain

RAPER, Justice,
dissenting.
I believe we should get down to business and decide the issues as they ought to be decided rather than encumbering the judicial system and litigants with an unnecessary and improper duplication of effort and expense. For that reason I must dissent.
Because of the length of this dissenting opinion, I will at the outset summarize the reasons I believe the majority opinion reaches an erroneous result:
Part I. The rule espoused by the majority is not founded on any applicable Wyoming authority or any rule existing elsewhere. The parties to the “dispute” in this case are heirs, or devisees or legatees or both and not strangers, and all differences between them are settled in the probate matter. The rule applied by the majority, that a claimant must go into a court other than probate, has, before now, only been applicable when one of the parties to the dispute was a stranger to the estate, even when there has been a difference between the district court and the district court sitting in probate. As a result, when a dispute has occurred between parties to the probate proceedings, the probate court has been allowed to settle the matter.
Part II. I also am convinced that the distinction between the district court sitting in probate and sitting as a district court is pure fiction, impractical, unreasonable, judicially inefficient, and should not be used as a reason to affirm the district court. See my dissent in Estate of Scott, Wyo., 642 P.2d 1287, 1292 (1982), which in this dissent I enlarge and fortify. It is said that repetition is a useful tool in teaching.
Part III. I must also observe that for the type of case this court now has before it, the legislature has made specific provision in the Wyoming Probate Code for its disposition by providing for a choice of law as to the meaning and legal effect to be given a will executed in another state. Section 2— 6-104, W.S.1977. The legislative intent is that this court recognize the community property law of Texas in the administration of a Texas testator’s estate in foreign probate. We should give effect to that intent. Hopefully I may get the attention of someone interested in judicial efficiency having influence with the legislature, in order to eradicate the judicial oddity which results under the approach of the majority opinion.
PART I
I will open this part by agreeing with Justice Brown that by affirming the district court, the majority is permitting that court to try title in a probate file inconsistent with its theme that a district court does not have jurisdiction to do so.
The majority misapplies Estate of Blaney, Wyo., 607 P.2d 354, 356 (1980) in its reference to the controlling rule:
*562“The controlling rule is stated in 1 Bancroft’s Probate Practice 2d ed., § 27, pp. 70-71 (1950):
“ ‘ * * * It is thoroughly established that in probate proceedings title to property as between the estate, the heirs or devi-sees, and a third person2 may not be tried. Thus a superior court, sitting in probate, has no jurisdiction or authority to determine disputed titles to the property of the estate of a deceased person. The rule extends to disputes as to the ownership of personalty as well as to title to realty. * * * (Footnote appearing was added by author of Blaney opinion. Emphasis added.)
It is important that the footnote be set out:
“2The rule is not applicable where third persons are not involved, e.g., administrator claiming in his own right. Wayman v. Alanko, Wyo., 351 P.2d 100 (1960); Security-First Nat. Bank of Los Angeles v. King, 46 Wyo. 59, 23 P.2d 851 (1933).”1
In Estate of Blaney a third person (not an heir, devisee or legatee, or the administrator acting for the estate) was claiming title to a gun collection as the result of a transaction with the decedent before death.
Leach v. Misters, 13 Wyo. 239, 79 P. 28 (1905), cited by the majority, is an unusual sort of case but has no bearing on the question of jurisdiction. In Leach, the daughter of decedent by a previous wife filed a petition for appointment of an administrator and requested that decedent’s surviving spouse be required to account for personal property which was to become petitioner’s upon her reaching majority. The district court, after a hearing on the petition, rendered judgment:
“ * * * ‘It is hereby adjudged, ordered, and decreed that Sarah E. Leach pay to Lettie M. Misters five hundred dollars on or before January 8, 1903, or show cause why she should not be punished for contempt of court, to which ruling the said Sarah E. Leach excepts.’ * * * ” 79 P. at 29.
All the supreme court held in that case was that the only questions presented were “whether or not an administrator should be appointed, and, if so, who should be so appointed,” and that “[t]he question of the right or title to the property * * * was not and could not be put in issue in the pending proceeding * * There was no issue involving the distinction between the district court and the probate court.
In Estate of Frederick, Wyo., 599 P.2d 550 (1979), cited by the majority, a stranger to the estate made a claim in the estate with respect to a service station lease he had with decedent. This court construed the proceedings to be one for a statutory petition for a conveyance2 and a probate matter. The separation of district court and probate court was mentioned but was not held dispositive. The appeal was disposed of on its merits.
In Estate of Stringer, 80 Wyo. 389, 343 P.2d 508 (1959), on rehearing, 80 Wyo. 426, 345 P.2d 786, the claim made by a stranger was premised upon a contract arising out of an agreement to will property between decedent and a former wife who was deceased. The stranger argued that under the agreement between decedent and the former wife, a later will leaving decedent’s property to the survivors of decedent including decedent’s wife at the time of death should be held void. The court held that not to be a matter to be decided in the probate court.
In Church v. Quiner, 31 Wyo. 222, 224 P. 1073 (1924), Henry Church died testate. Al-mon Church, son of decedent and a residuary legatee, made two conflicting written assignments of his interest in the estate, one to his wife and another to the Mander-son State Bank. The executor paid the *563bank. The wife of the assigning legatee objected to the final report. The district court handled the dispute in the probate matter. This court reversed. Once again it was a stranger to the probate asserting a claim to estate assets. This court in Church decided the very narrow question of whether the court acting in probate can decide a dispute involving the validity of disputed assignments of a distributive share of an heir or legatee. This court ordered modification of the order of the district court so that the legatee’s share could be distributed to him subject to the assignments. This would require the legatee and his assignees to fight it out in a separate proceeding.
The court in Church v. Quiner cited In Re Black’s Estate, 30 Wyo. 55, 216 P. 1059, 1063 (1923) for only one very short statement:
“ * * * [t]hat whenever the acts of the court in probate, though a court of general jurisdiction, are without the limits of the special jurisdiction conferred, they are nugatory, and have no binding effect, ‘even upon those who have invoked its authority.’ ”
Actually the only question was whether a petition for determination of heirship was filed at the right time in the estate proceeding. The court remanded the case to the district court to take more evidence to assure more positively that the petitioners were or were not heirs of decedent, so it apparently held the filing proper. There is no gold to mine in this case that is helpful to our disposition; it simply does not support the majority.
Also, the majority has failed to explain that in Will of Conley, 58 N.M. 771, 276 P.2d 906 (1954), the only case it cites as authority from the law of other jurisdictions, there was a New Mexico constitutional provision, Art. YI, § 23, which at that time created a separate probate court (not the district court) with limited powers as follows:
“A probate court is hereby established for each county, which shall be a court of record, and, until otherwise provided by law, shall have the same jurisdiction as is now exercised by the probate courts of the Territory of New Mexico. The legislature shall have power from time to time to confer upon the probate court in any county in this state, general civil jurisdiction coextensive with the county; provided, however, that such court shall not have jurisdiction in civil causes in which the matter in controversy shall exceed in value one thousand dollars, exclusive of interest; nor in any action for malicious prosecution, divorce and alimony, slander and libel; nor in any action against officers for misconduct in office; nor in any action for the specific performance of contracts for the sale of real estate; nor in any action for the possession of land; nor in any matter wherein the title or boundaries of land may be in dispute or drawn in question * * *.
“Any civil or criminal case pending in the probate court, in which the probate judge is disqualified, shall be transferred to the district court of the same county for trial.”
In Conley, the matter was transferred from the probate court to the district court, and the New Mexico Supreme Court held that the district court was only acting as a probate court upon disqualification of a probate judge.
The Wyoming Constitution is vastly different. Article 5, § 10:
“The district court shall have original jurisdiction of all causes both at law and in equity and in all criminal cases, of all matters of probate and insolvency and of such special cases and proceedings as are not otherwise provided for. The district court shall also have original jurisdiction in all cases and of all proceedings in which jurisdiction shall not have been by law vested exclusively in some other court * *
While the majority may think my position is “unique,” it is practical and is the same position as that taken by the Supreme Court of California from which state our *564probate code is said to have been derived.3 Estate of Baglione, 65 Cal.2d 192, 58 Cal.Rptr. 139, 417 P.2d 683 (1966), held that a superior court (like Wyoming’s district court) sitting in probate can determine the claim of a surviving wife to her share of community property, or adjudicate a dispute between claimants to property conceded to be or to have been acquired in the course of probate proceedings. Chief Justice Traynor, speaking for the court, outlined the whole picture and is well worth repeating in full:
“As a general rule the jurisdiction of superior courts sitting in probate to administer decedents’ estates does not encompass power to pass upon assertions of title to property by parties who are not in privity with the estate but are claiming adversely to it. (Estate of Hart, 51 Cal.2d 819, 823, 337 P.2d 73; Estate of Dabney, 37 Cal.2d 672, 676, 234 P.2d 962.) There are, however, several well-recognized exceptions to this rule ‘where a controversy has been held to have a sufficient connection with a pending probate proceeding to be properly litigated therein * * *.’ (Central Bank v. Superior Court, 45 Cal.2d 10, 15, 285 P.2d 906, 909.) The connection may arise out of the relationship between the parties. Thus the superior court sitting in probate can adjudicate a claim to assets from the estate asserted by an executor or administrator in his individual capacity (Schlyen v. Schlyen, 43 Cal.2d 361, 372-373, 273 P.2d 897; Stevens v. Superior Court, 155 Cal. 148, 150-151, 99 P. 512), and it can determine whether an assignment or other transfer of the interest of an heir, legatee, or devisee to a third party is valid and order distribution accordingly. (Prob.Code, §§ 1020, 1020.1; Estate of Stanley, 34 Cal.2d 311, 318-319, 209 P.2d 941.) The connection may also arise out of the nature of the claim to the property. The superior court sitting in probate can determine the claim of a surviving wife to her share of the community property (Estate of Burdick, 112 Cal. 387, 393-396, 44 P. 734; Colden v. Costello, 50 Cal.App.2d 363, 369, 122 P.2d 959) or adjudicate a dispute between claimants to property ‘conceded * * * to be or to have been acquired * * * in the course of probate proceedings.’ (Central Bank v. Superior Court, supra, 45 Cal.2d at p. 16, 285 P.2d at p. 909; Estate of DeBarry, 43 Cal.App.2d 715, 725-726, 111 P.2d 728.) In Woods v. Security-First Nat. Bank, 46 Cal.2d 697, 299 P.2d 657, we recognized a third type of exception based on the nature of the claim and the claimant’s relationship to the estate. When a party invokes the jurisdiction of a court sitting in probate by asserting a substantive right in a particular piece of property or in certain assets as an heir, legatee, or devisee, he may also obtain a judgment in that court determining any additional claims that he asserts against those in privity with the estate in the same property. (Id. at p. 704, 299 P.2d 657; see Estate of Stone, 170 Cal.App.2d 533, 537—539, 339 P.2d 220.) The rationale for this exception is the conservation of time, energy, and money of all concerned. To deny a superior court sitting in probate the power to determine the whole controversy between the parties before it is pointless. In the exercise of its legal and equitable powers (see Schlyen v. Schlyen, supra, 43 Cal.2d at p. 371, 273 P.2d 897; Estate of Cover, 188 Cal. 133, 139, 204 P. 583), a superior court sitting in probate that his [has] jurisdiction over one aspect of a claim to certain property can determine all aspects of the claim. A claimant is not required to sever and litigate a multi-faceted claim in separate proceedings once all the necessary parties are before the court. Thus in the instant case, once the court determined that Marie had a community interest in the Lake Tahoe property subject to probate, it should have resolved the entire controversy and determined her rights to that *565property under the alleged oral agreement with the deceased. Any statements in Sieroty v. Silver, 58 Cal.2d 799, 26 Cal.Rptr. 635, 376 P.2d 563, and Smith v. Smith, 220 Cal.App.2d 30, 33 Cal.Rptr. 559, to the contrary are disapproved.” 53 Cal.Rptr. at 142-143, 417 P.2d at 686-687.
A surviving wife is no stranger to the property of her husband and the estate matter. No one is more intimately interested nor more protected than the wife of a decedent. To say she is a stranger is to overlook the facts of life. In fact, in the record of this appeal she is named in the will as one of its executors, though she was not one of the executors petitioning for ancillary probate. No one could be less a stranger. See fn. 1.
California is not the only enlightened jurisdiction. In Oklahoma, where there was a dispute between the daughter and spouse of the deceased joint tenant, and no third party (outsider) to the estate, the court in Matter of Lindell’s Death, Okl.App., 573 P.2d 716, 720 (1977), said this:
“We feel compelled to point out herein the necessity for settling the law for practical reasons regarding a district court’s being unable in one capacity to decide an issue that the same judge could decide while sitting in another capacity. In Oklahoma, after court reform, as pointed out in Duke, the district court was conferred with unlimited original jurisdiction in all justiciable matters except as was otherwise provided by law. We can see no law or logical reason why a district court in Oklahoma cannot determine all of the issues in a case without the necessity of at least two separate actions being filed, that is, (1) a probate proceeding, and (2) an action to determine title. Any other procedure appears to be somewhat inconsistent. For example, on the one hand it appears that the district court must sit in dual capacities because there is a probate proceeding and an action to determine title, whereas on the other hand, if the court in a probate proceeding admits or denies a will to probate no appeal is taken to the district court as in the past, but it goes directly to the appellate court. It is clearly the law in Oklahoma that the district court is the successor to the jurisdiction of all other trial courts which included the county court, and therefore has jurisdiction to determine all of the issues in one capacity. This of course would do away with the necessity of filing two separate lawsuits involving two separate sets of notice, hearings, and responsive pleadings. “As we see it, the only possible rationale for the cases which conclude that the district court must sit in a dual capacity — that is, hear two separate lawsuits— is because originally there were two separate courts which now have become one. Yet, to follow the reasoning in Jones, Duke, and Kizziar, the court cannot sit as one court but still has to sit as two. Why a judge must hear only one part of a case and, before hearing the remaining issues of the case or additional issues, he or she must get up and walk across the hall to another court escapes us. We find nothing in the statutes nor has anything been called to our attention which makes such a procedure mandatory for the same trial judge to change chairs depending upon the type of action or actions pending before the court. This seems to go against the very letter and spirit of the statutory court reform in Oklahoma. We are not unmindful of the fact that in numerous cases throughout the state of Oklahoma trial judges will consolidate the two proceedings to resolve all of the issues by one set of hearings.”
Oklahoma’s “reform” brought the Oklahoma judicial system into a position having the same status as that in Wyoming.
In Idaho, the rule is well settled by a string of cases summarized in Pincock v. Pocatello Gold and Copper Mining Company, Inc., 100 Idaho 325, 597 P.2d 211, 215 (1979):
“ ‘[T]he probate courts have exclusive, original jurisdiction in the settlement of estates of deceased persons, and it is within the jurisdiction of those courts to determine who are the heirs of a deceased *566person and who is entitled to succeed to the estate and their respective shares and interests therein. The decrees of probate courts are conclusive in such matters. A probate court, however, does not have jurisdiction to determine adverse claims or an adverse title to real estate, except in so far as such questions arise between the heirs or devisees of an estate, and are necessary to be determined in the administration of the estate. No such jurisdiction, however, exists in the probate court to determine and adjudicate adverse and conflicting claims to title to real estate as between the estate or heirs thereof and third parties, and such issues can only be tried in a court of competent jurisdiction where the issue as to title and interest is directly and squarely made and presented to the court.’ ”
In Kansas, like the language of Art. 5, § 10, Wyoming Constitution, supra, giving the district court exclusive jurisdiction in probate, in Adams v. Adams, 4 Kan.App.2d 1, 602 P.2d 115 (1979), review denied (1980), it is declared that the probate court is to administer all property of the decedent which encompasses the power “to determine a question of title to or ownership of property when necessary to final settlement and distribution, unless the probate code expressly provides otherwise. This includes a question regarding title to real estate and applies whether the decedent died testate or intestate.” The Kansas court expressed its concern regarding the state of title where such problems are fully settled in the probate matter without any question being raised a3 to the jurisdiction of the court to do so. See also, Gonzalez v. Superior Court in and for County of Pima, 117 Ariz. 64, 570 P.2d 1077 (1977). In Snow v. Martensen, 255 Ark. 1049, 505 S.W.2d 20 (1974) it was held that heirs and beneficiaries under a will are not strangers to an estate, and the probate court has jurisdiction.
From all of the foregoing I am of the opinion that the jurisdiction of the district court in probate matters is sufficiently wide so that it can make complete disposition of all matters affecting the estate of a decedent and thus make it unnecessary to initiate separate proceedings in the same court at oppressive additional expense and unnecessary delay. We should not thwart the granting of complete justice in one place.
This is the second case before us in which the district court and counsel have assumed — I am convinced properly — to settle matters of title. I can imagine that there are many others which must exist where the district court’s jurisdiction was never questioned. The majority’s opinion and decision raise the spectre of title being challenged for years to come; at least until curative statutes take over. It must be realized that this court has never before, except in the Estate of Scott, supra, 642 P.2d at 1289, raised the question that the district court in probate could not settle title to property as between heirs, devisees and legatees. It is so unreasonable to believe that a probate court is not intended to do that. It is logical that the clear language of § 2-2-101, W.S.1977, “ * * * [t]he court granting the letters has exclusive jurisdiction of ail matters touching the settlement and distribution of the estates for which letters have been granted,” (emphasis added) means what it says.
PART II
Maintaining the fictional line drawn between the district court sitting in law and equity and sitting in probate amounts to a pagan worship of the idol of stare decisis even which was misapplied in this case. It is a vestige of archaic times. We no longer require separate actions to be filed on the equity side of the district court. The same judge, the same clerk of court, the same courthouse, and the same courtroom all serve the district court in all its functions. I notice from the record that all the filings in this case are captioned “In the District Court, Second Judicial District.” Some say “Probate Docket No. 4814” or “Probate No. 4814.” The “probate court” is nothing more than a docket book or filing cabinet. In neither this case nor Estate of Scott, supra, did either the district judge or counsel realize that they were not in the district *567court and before the district judge. They went ahead, unaware that they were surrounded by a mystical presence where they should not have been and their time and effort were being frittered away.
To require a separate action to be filed in order to satisfy precedent, even if it existed as to the particular question we have here as to a matter already tried or which can be tried and decided in a single proceeding, is the ultimate in judicial inefficiency. It makes about as much sense as having two benches in the courtroom, one to sit at when handling law and equity cases and another when handling a probate matter, or requiring different colored robes, black when sitting in law and equity, purple when sitting in probate.
I have examined the source of this rule which the majority attributes to Church v. Quiner, supra, 31 Wyo. 222, 224 P. 1073. In Re Black’s Estate, supra, 30 Wyo. 55, 216 P. 1059, is another. In the last cited case, there was adopted the language of In Re Strong’s Estate, 119 Cal. 663, 51 P. 1078, an 1898 case, which held that whenever the acts of the court in probate, though a court of general jurisdiction, are without the limits of the special jurisdiction conferred, they are nugatory and have no binding effect even upon those who invoked its authority. The rule is without reason as applied by the majority in the appeal before us. It would have been simpler to say “the district court has jurisdiction but does not have jurisdiction.” Nowhere in the relied upon cases is the reason for such a conclusion stated, nor do I think it is within the spirit of the Wyoming Constitution, Art. 5, § 10:
“The district court shall have original jurisdiction of all causes both at law and in equity and in all criminal cases, of all matters of probate and insolvency and of such special cases and proceedings as are not otherwise provided for. The district court shall also have original jurisdiction in all cases and of all proceedings in which jurisdiction shall not have been by law vested exclusively in some other court; and said court shall have the power of naturalization and to issue papers therefor. They shall have such appellate jurisdiction in cases arising in justices’ and other inferior courts in their respective counties as may be prescribed by law. Said courts and their judges shall have power to issue writs of mandamus, quo warranto, review, certiorari, prohibition, injunction and writs of habeas corpus, on petition by or on behalf of any person in actual custody in their respective districts.”
I need to see something there which prohibits the district court settling title in this estate matter. The statute, § 2-2-101, W.S.1977, a part of the Wyoming Probate Code recently readopted, but which has been on the books for years, including during the entire period of the administration of the estate we now consider, contains no prohibition that I can see:
“The district courts of the state have exclusive original jurisdiction of ail matters relating to the probate and contest of wills and testaments, the granting of letters testamentary and of administration, and the settlement and distribution of decedents’ estates. The court granting the letters has exclusive jurisdiction of all matters touching the settlement and distribution of the estates for which letters have been granted.”
“[A]ll matters” and “all matters touching the settlement and distribution of the estates for which letters have been granted” seem pretty all-inclusive to me. Under that language, I believe a complete disposition can and should be justified.
When the new Wyoming Probate Code was adopted, one of its purposes was to “[pjromote a speedy and efficient system for liquidating the estate of the decedent and making distribution to his successors.” Section 2 — 1—102(a)(iii), W.S.1977.4 That is *568good policy any time. We can start by throwing out an ancient concept no longer valid, intended only for jurisdictions where separate and distinct courts exist.
PART III
What follows is the substance of the original form of opinion which I tendered to the other members of the court. After tender, Estate of Scott, supra, was formulated and published and in the interest of what it considered consistency, the majority apparently felt obligated to take the same stance in this case. Even if I could agree with the majority opinion as to probate jurisdiction in the Estate of Scott case, the appeal before us is factually different and falls specifically within the provisions of § 2-6-104, W.S.1977, infra, a new section of the Wyoming Probate Code, having to do with the choice of law as to the meaning and effect of wills executed in another state. A full development of my position requires that I compose the opinion as I hereinafter do in order to weave a complete fabric.
In the matter before us, the district judge decided that the law of Texas recognizing community property between husband and wife, both residents of Texas, is inapplicable in Wyoming as to property in Wyoming. The surviving spouse, aggrieved by that ruling, appeals raising as issues:
“1. Whether a decedent’s widow is entitled to one-half of all of the Wyoming mineral interests in the decedent’s name where those interests were acquired with community funds.
“2. Whether the decedent intended to leave only one-half of the mineral interests to the residuary beneficiary under his will.”
I would have reversed the district judge.
The facts before the district judge and this court are stipulated:
“Donald D. Harrington died on April 27, 1974. At the time of his death, he was a resident of Potter County, Texas, and left an estate in the Counties of Carbon and Campbell, Wyoming. His estate in these counties consisted of royalty mineral interests having an appraised value of $1,089,030.00, which interests are more particularly set forth in the inventory and appraisement filed herein. His sole surviving heir was his widow, Sybil Buckingham Harrington, of Amarillo, Texas. Mr. Harrington left a Last Will and Testament, which, in addition to a number of specific bequests, gave, under Section Five thereof, to his wife, an amount equal to the maximum ‘marital deduction allowed his estate under the Internal Revenue Code,’ which amount was satisfied out of other properties in the estate in the probate thereof in the County Court, Potter County, Texas. All of the specific bequests and the marital deduction bequest to the surviving spouse being satisfied out of assets outside of the State of Wyoming, the assets in the State of Wyoming are subject to distribution under the residuary clause, Section XII, of the Last Will and Testament. Under this residuary clause, the residuary of the estate was given to The Don & Sybil Harrington Foundation, a non-profit Texas corporation, organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable and educational purposes. The Last Will and *569Testament of said decedent was duly admitted to probate in the Probate Court of Potter County, Texas, and upon petition for ancillary probate of said Will, it was admitted to probate in the District Court of Carbon County, Wyoming, on January 22, 1975. After publication of notice of final settlement, the Executors filed a first and final account and petition for distribution of the estate herein on November 28, 1980. On December 8, 1980, Sybil Buckingham Harrington, the surviving spouse of Donald D. Harrington, Deceased, filed herein her objections to first and final account and petition for distribution of estate, claiming that all of the assets of the estate situated in the State of Wyoming were acquired with community property funds and, therefore, as the owner of one-half of the community property funds the surviving widow is entitled to one-half of the assets of said estate situated in the State of Wyoming.
“The title to all of said mineral interests are in the name of the decedent, Donald D. Harrington. The executors admit and it can be agreed as a matter of fact that all of the assets were acquired with community property funds of the decedent and the surviving spouse.
“The Wyoming Inheritance Tax Department and the Internal Revenue Service have recognized the community property interests of Mrs. Harrington and accepted one-half of the appraised value for state inheritance and federal estate tax purposes.”
Notice of time for proving will was served by public action and mailing. Both the “First and Final Account and Petition for Distribution of Estate” and the “Objections” thereto were served on The Don & Sybil Harrington Foundation. The majority is mistaken when it asserts that service of these documents was not made upon the heirs. Service was made.5 The Foundation made no appearance in the district court, nor did any heir, devisee or legatee. This indicates that all devisees and legatees had been satisfied from Texas estate assets. Due process in all respects was present. In the recent opinion in Stagner v. Wyoming State Tax Commission and State Board of Equalization, Wyo., 642 P.2d 1296 (1982) it was held that the law is elementary that whatever puts a party on inquiry amounts to “notice,” citing Rodin v. State, Wyo., 417 P.2d 180, 195 (1965). Vast estates are settled on the basis of the statutory notices provided for in estate matters.
The executors (appellees) commendably take a position of impartiality and look to this court only for direction in the distribution of estate assets located in Wyoming. They rely on In Re Ray’s Estate, 74 Wyo. 317, 287 P.2d 629 (1955) which held that the devolution of real property in this state and the effect of the decedent’s will must be determined by the laws of this state — and the doctrine of comity does not apply. In Ray’s Estate, a Nevada resident omitted a natural child from his will and under the requirement of a Nevada statute did not state an intention to do so. A Nevada court held that the pretermitted child was entitled to one-third of his father’s estate. This court refused to conform itself to that law and held the son not entitled to any of the property of his deceased father located in Wyoming. I point out that this determination of title to property was made by this court in a proceeding on objections to the executor's final report, just as here. No separate suit was required.
See also, In Re Smith’s Estate, 55 Wyo. 181, 97 P.2d 677 (1940) involving a deceased domiciled in Colorado at the time of her death and leaving a bank deposit and real estate in Wyoming. It was held that the distribution of the personalty would be in accordance with the laws of Colorado and *570the realty would be distributed according to the laws of Wyoming. The factual surroundings were that the deceased was widowed in Wyoming. Two years later she executed a will in Wyoming, leaving all her property to her four children. The next day after execution of the will, she married a Denver, Colorado resident and moved with her children to that state where they resided until her death some ten years later. Her husband objected to the admission to probate of the Wyoming will on the ground that under Colorado law a last will and testament is revoked by subsequent marriage. This court held that not to be the law of this state. I point out that this appeal settled questions pertaining to property on objections filed in the probate matter. No separate suit was required.
I have no quarrel with these cases. They did not involve community property and are not in point as I shall later explain.
The appellants acknowledged in the district court that the royalty mineral interests were real property, Hageman & Pond, Inc. v. Clark, 69 Wyo. 154, 238 P.2d 919 (1951). The law of Texas also holds that oil and gas in place are part of the realty and an oil and gas lease transfers an interest in real estate to the lessee. Hammonds v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 106 F.2d 420 (10th Cir. 1939).
The misconception of the district judge on the merits arises because the question has been mistakenly viewed. The real attack is on an effort to distribute property of which decedent did not die seized but was included in the Wyoming estate proceeding inventory. The subject matter was not property of the decedent. The district court’s action would distribute property to a residuary devisee and legatee not belonging to decedent, but which was owned by the appellant. The district judge did not recognize that the decedent was the owner of only a half of the property it is attempting to set over to a residuary devisee and legatee. As said in § 3, pp. 7-8, 1 Principles of Community Property, de Funiak (1943):
“Because the legal concept of the community property or ganancial system is so foreign to that of the common law, it is frequently very difficult for the judge or lawyer, trained and versed in the common law, to grasp and understand its principles. He usually makes the primary mistake of trying to understand it and interpret it by the principles and terminology of the common law; a most serious mistake, for those principles and terminology are not in the least applicable. * * * ” (Footnotes omitted.)
In a nutshell, the community property system is generally as described by de Fun-iak, § 1 pp. 1-7:
“Community of property between husband and wife is that system whereby the property which the husband and wife have is common property, that is, it belongs to both by halves. There are varying forms of this marital community of property system, ranging from the general community, of which the Roman-Dutch law is an example, in which all the property of the spouses owned by each at the time of the marriage, as well as all that acquired after marriage, becomes a part of the community property; to the community only of acquests and gains during the continuance of the marriage. It is this latter or ganancial system and which came to this country from Spain which prevails in several of our American states, specifically, in Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Oregon, Texas and Washington. It includes the property earned or gained by onerous title by either during the union, as well as that given to both during the marital union. All property which they possess is presumed to be held and owned by them in common unless or until it is proved to be the separate property of one of them. In respect of separate property each spouse is equally capable of owning separate property, and separate property owned by either before marriage continues to constitute separate property of that spouse during marriage. Likewise, property given to one spouse alone, during marriage, is the separate property of that spouse. The *571community property system is marked by two essential characteristics: (1) the transmissibility of the wife’s interests to her heirs, so that if the wife dies first, her heirs take the share to which she would have been entitled if she had survived; and (2) during the existence of the marital relationship the spouses are the joint owners, or partners, with respect to gains and losses. This is not to say that the husband’s interest is not also transmissible to his heirs if he dies first, but the point of the essential characteristic relating to the wife is that she is placed on a basis of equality with the husband as to her ownership and rights in the community property. The essential characteristic as to the joint ownership or partnership in the acquests and gains is also particularly to be noticed. Not only are the spouses on the same plane of equality as to ownership but the matter of ownership is of primary importance, as compared with the English common law principle of giving primary importance to the technical matter of in whose name title appears.
* # * * * %
“Under the community or ganancial system the wife retains her own personality as an individual and is an equal partner with the husband in the conjugal relationship. Moreover, her property rights and her rights to enter into transactions with her husband as an equal have long represented in the community property system the advanced state that is only now being reached through statutory modifications in common law jurisdictions. This recognition of the wife as a person in her own right is one of the outstanding principles of the civil law and is one of those in which it diverges sharply from the common law. * * * ” (Footnotes omitted.)6
In this case we are dealing with a conflict-of-laws question. The events and transactions in the case before us has a significant relationship with the state of Texas. In such case, we have what is referred to as a “choice of law.” Section 6, Restatement, Conflict of Laws 2d, explains the principles of choice of law:
“(1) A court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a statutory directive of its own state on choice of law.
“(2) When there is no such directive, the factors relevant to the choice of the applicable rule of law include “(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
“(b) the relevant policies of the forum, “(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue,
“(d) the protection of justified expectations,
“(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
“(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
“(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.” (Emphasis added.)
We do have a statute. The legislature rather recently passed what is known as the Wyoming Probate Code, ch. 142, S.L.Wyo. 1979. Section 1 includes:
“2-6-104. Choice of law as to meaning and effect of wills. The meaning and legal effect of a disposition in a will shall be [7] determined by the law of the state in which the will was executed, unless the will otherwise provides or unless the application of that law is contrary to the public policy of this state otherwise applicable to the disposition.” (Now § 2-6-104, W.S.1977.8)
*572Section 6, chapter 142, S.L.Wyo.1979, provides:
“This act is effective April 1, 1980. The procedure herein prescribed shall govern all proceedings in probate brought after the effective date of this code. It shall also govern further procedure in proceedings in probate then pending, except to the extent that, in the opinion of the court, its application in particular proceedings or parts thereof would not be feasible or would work injustice, in which event the former procedure shall apply.”9
The first and final report and petition for distribution was filed on November 28, 1980. On December 8, 1980, the surviving spouse filed her objections claiming her ownership of one-half of the community property. On the date when the question arose, there was before the court a statutory directive to follow the law of the state in which the will was executed. There is nothing in the stipulated facts that it is not feasible to or that it would work an injustice to apply the Texas law of community property and set over to the wife or declare community property to which she is entitled, hers.
There is no public policy of this state contrary to such a disposition that I know of or which has been called to our attention. In its general sense, public policy has reference to the law of a state embodied in its constitution, statutes and decisions of its courts, when they have not spoken, against anything which tends to undermine that sense of security for individual rights, whether liberty or private property, which any citizen ought to feel has a tendency to be injurious to the public good. Higgins v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, 50 Ala.App. 691, 282 So.2d 295, 298 (1973); Dairyland County Mutual Insurance Company v. Wallgren, Tex.Civ.App., 477 S.W.2d 341, 342 (1972); Craemer v. Superior Court In and For County of Marin, 265 Cal.App.2d 216, 71 Cal.Rptr. 193, 199 (1968); In Re Barnes’ Estate, 256 Iowa 1043, 128 N.W.2d 188, 192 (1964).
As a matter of interest, the basic features of the community property doctrine enjoy a commendable purpose:
“One concept behind the community property system is that with certain exceptions, property acquired during marriage is as much that of the wife as of the husband. In general, the basic intent of community property laws is to provide a return to the wife for her labors in the home, which are legislatively considered to be substantially commensurate with the efforts of the husband in marital economic gain, and to place husband and wife on an equal footing as to their property rights. In theory, the marital relationship, in respect to certain property acquired during its existence, is a community of which each spouse is a member, contributing by his or her industry to its prosperity, and possessing an equal right to succeed to the property as survivor.” (Footnotes omitted.) 15A Am.Jur.2d Community Property, § 6, p. 635.
I see nothing in such concept offensive to any public policy of Wyoming.
The Wyoming cases relied on by the district judge announce no public policy inconsistent with our use of Texas law in disposition of this case. In Re Smith’s Estate, supra, involved a will made and executed by the decedent in Rock Springs. This does not deviate from the declaration of § 2-6-104, supra, that the law of the state where executed is given legal effect. The Wyoming case of In Re Ray’s Estate, supra, *573would have created an injustice if the Nevada law, the place of execution, had been applied in Wyoming. Justice Blume expounded at length in that regard:
“ * * * Whether these decisions are right or wrong, the fact remains that so far as the record shows the widow of decedent, the principal beneficiary of the will is left utterly penniless so far as Nevada is concerned. That leaves us somewhat perplexed. One cannot help but wonder whether a penalty clause like paragraph tenth of the will, doubtless taken out of some form book, could apply to a person for whose chief benefit the will was made. This court is now asked to complete what was done in Nevada, strip the widow of all property rights and leave her penniless also so far as this state is concerned. They ask that in the name of the law, contending that this court is bound to follow the path laid out for us by the Nevada courts. We might say parenthetically that the ultimate cause of this unfortunate situation is probably, or not unlikely, the fact that Carl Ray, ashamed of his conduct and his record of his younger days, attempted to keep the memory of his life clean in the eyes of his wife and his adopted daughter, and felt that he could not do so by naming in his will a son with a different name than his own. The course taken was, of course, a mistake. Had he confided in his counsel the difficulty, or what he thought was a difficulty, could doubtless have been easily remedied. The testator had forgotten that children, through greed or injured pride, at times mercilessly expose to the public a parent’s shame and misconduct, long hoped for by the latter to have been forgiven and forgotten.” 287 P.2d at 632-633.
This likewise is consistent with § 2-6-104, supra, in that an injustice resulted if the Nevada law was adopted.
I see nothing bad about the Texas law which would conflict with the law of Wyoming. Section 2-6-104, supra, leaves this court with the comparatively simple job of ascertaining the law of Texas and applying it. The parties agree that Texas is a community property state10 and that all of the Wyoming assets were acquired with com*574munity property funds of the decedent and the surviving spouse.
Under the community system the wife’s one-half ownership of community property is a present, equal and existing interest during the marriage and equally recognized upon the death of her husband. She does not take by inheritance in that her ownership of half the community property was full and complete during the marriage. No new interest is created in the wife by her husband’s death; it only terminates the husband’s interest in the community estate. This is formalized in Jones v. State, Tex.Com.App., 5 S.W.2d 973 (1928):
“ * * * It is undisputed that all of the estate possessed by the testator was community property. As matter of law, the wife was the equal owner in her own right of one-half of that estate. To be sure, their estates existed in common, and during the marriage the common estate was indissoluble, but nevertheless her right, subject to certain statutory control, was the equal of the husband’s. Upon the husband’s death, the community estate passes, one-half to the widow and one-half to the children (where there are children). But, while this provision of the law is found in our statutes of descent and distribution, nevertheless the wife’s taking her one-half of the community is not the taking by an heir. She does not inherit such one-half, but she takes it as owner in her own separate right after the dissolution of the marriage. King v. Morris (Tex.Com.App.) 1 S.W.2d 605. * * * ” 5 S.W.2d at 975.
The law has been long settled in Texas that the surviving spouse owns a one-half interest in all of the community properties at the death of the other spouse. George v. Taylor, Tex.Civ.App., 296 S.W.2d 620 (1956); Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 259 F.2d 231 (5th Cir.1958), and the many cases there cited. On the death of the husband, the community is dissolved and the widow holds her interest as a tenant in common, Waterman Lumber & Supply Co. v. Robins, Tex.Civ.App., 159 S.W. 360 (1913), subject only to the payment of community debts, Caddell v. Lufkin Land & Lumber Co., Tex.Com.App., 255 S.W. 397 (1923).
Section 234, Comment “a,” Restatement, Conflict of Laws 2d, summarizes the rule applied by courts of the forum where land is purchased by one spouse from community funds in his name alone:
“a. The forum will attempt to decide questions as to the effect of marriage upon an interest in land acquired during coverture in the same way that these questions would have been decided in the very case at hand by the courts of the situs. These courts would not always decide such questions in accordance with their own local law. They would usually hold that any marital property interests which the spouses had in the funds or other property exchanged for the land have been transferred to the land itself. So if land in a common law state is purchased with funds that are held in community because acquired while the spouses were domiciled in a community property state (compare § 258), the courts of the situs would usually hold that the spouses — at least as between themselves — have the same marital property interests in the land as they formerly had in the funds. * * * ”
This court need not deal with the second issue, in that the intent of the testator is immaterial in the light of the agreed statement that community property funds were used to acquire the Wyoming property and the Texas statute-based presumption that property acquired by either husband or wife is community property.
I would have reversed and remanded with directions to enter an order of distribution in form and substance consistent with this opinion,11 declaring appellant own*575er of one-half of the community property in Wyoming.

. I note that Section XIII of the Harrington will names the appellant as an executor of the will, though she does not join with the other two executors in the petition for ancillary probate. Her absence on the petition is not explained. I would say that arguably she falls within the rule of Wayman v. Alanko, Wyo., 351 P.2d 100 (1960).

. This was decided under § 2-5-804, W.S.1977, formerly § 2-169, W.S.1957, now § 2-7-604, W.S.1977, 1980 Replacement.

. The Wyoming Supreme Court gives California court decisions particular importance at least when construing Wyoming’s probate statutes. Estate of Kimball, Wyo., 583 P.2d 1274 (1978); Merrill v. District Court of Fifth Judicial Dist., 73 Wyo. 58, 272 P.2d 597 (1954).

. The entire statement of policy, § 2-1-102, W.S.1977:
“(a) This code shall be liberally construed and applied, to promote the following purposes and policies to:
*568“(i) Simplify and clarify the law concerning the affairs of decedents, missing persons, protected persons, minors and incapacitated persons;
“(ii) Discover and make effective the intent of a decedent in distribution of his property;
“(iii) Promote a speedy and efficient system for liquidating the estate of the decedent and making distribution to his successors;
“(iv) Facilitate use and enforcement of certain trusts.
“(b) Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this code, the principles of law and equity supplement the code provisions.
“(c) This code is a general act intended as a unified coverage of its subject matter and no part of it shall be deemed impliedly repealed by subsequent legislation if it can reasonably be avoided.
“(d) The procedure herein prescribed shall govern all proceedings in probate brought after the effective date of this code. It shall also govern further procedure in proceedings in probate then pending unless the court determines its application in particular proceedings or parts thereof is not feasible or will work an injustice, in which event the former procedure shall apply.”

. Section 2-11-104, W.S.1977 pertaining to admission to probate of foreign wills was followed explicitly. In addition, though apparently not necessary, actual service of the notice was made on all heirs, devisees and legatees to satisfy § 2-11-105, W.S.1977. Notice of filing of Final Settlement of Estate was actually served on all heirs, devisees and legatees. The objections to the First and Final Account were actually served on all heirs, legatees and devi-sees.

. For a most enlightening dissertation, see XIX Baylor Law Review 20, The Policy of Community Property and Interspousal Transactions (Michael J. Vaughn 1967).

. The words “shall be” were replaced by the legislature in 1980 with the word “is.”

.Section 2-6-104, W.S.1977 seems to be a slight modification of § 2-602 of the Uniform Probate Code:
“The meaning and legal effect of a disposition in a will shall be determined by the local law of a particular state selected by the testator in his instrument unless the application of *572that law is contrary to the public policy of this state otherwise applicable to the disposition.”
Since the decedent was a resident of Texas, domiciled there, and executed his will in that state, that would certainly be the state selected by him. The purpose of the section as expressed in the comments of the compiler was to permit a testator to select the law of a particular state for purposes of interpreting his will without regard to the location of property covered thereby. The comment goes on to say that as long as public policy is accommodated, the section should be accepted as necessary and desirable to add to the utility of wills.

. Chapter 54, S.L.Wyo. 1980, repealed, amended and renumbered various sections of ch. 142, S.L.Wyo.1979, but did not disturb § 2-6-104 or this section, except as noted in fn. 7.

. Vernon’s Texas Codes Annotated, Family Code, provides:
Section 5.01. Marital Property Characterized
“(a) A spouse’s separate property consists of:
“(1) the property owned or claimed by the spouse before marriage;
“(2) the property acquired by the spouse during marriage by gift, devise, or descent; and
“(3) the recovery for personal injuries sustained by the spouse during marriage, except any recovery for loss of earning capacity during marriage.
“(b) Community property consists of the property, other than separate property, acquired by either spouse during marriage.” Section 5.02. Presumption
“Property possessed by either spouse during or on dissolution of marriage is presumed to be community property.”
Section 5.21. Separate Property
“Each spouse has the sole management, control, and disposition of his or her separate property.”
Section 5.22. Community Property: General Rules
“(a) During marriage, each spouse has the sole management, control, and disposition of the community property that he or she would have owned if single, including but not limited to:
“(1) personal earnings;
“(2) revenue from separate property;
“(3) recoveries for personal injuries; and
“(4) the increase and mutations of, and the revenue from, all property subject to his or her sole management, control, and disposition.
“(b) If community property subject to the sole management, control, and disposition of one spouse is mixed or combined with community property subject to the sole management, control, and disposition of the other spouse, then the mixed or combined community property is subject to the joint management, control, and disposition of the spouses, unless the spouses provide otherwise by power of attorney in writing or other agreement.
“(c) Except as provided in Subsection (a) of this section, the community property is subject to the joint management, control, and disposition of the husband and wife, unless the spouses provide otherwise by power of attorney in writing or other agreement.”
Prior to amendment of § 5.22, community property was under the management of the husband. This is of no concern, however, in the appeal before us.

. The district judge made an improper disposition in declaring “Accordingly, I * * * leave the parties where I find them.” Leaving the parties where the court finds them is a rule applied to illegal contracts. Town of Cody v. Buffalo Bill Memorial Ass’n, 64 Wyo. 468, 196 P.2d 369 (1948). There is no illegal contract here nor was that even a question. In any *575event, I can see that the district judge denied appellant’s objections to the final accounting.