Court Opinion

ID: 9832064
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 21:35:27.726895+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:41.692156
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.'
The able counsel for appellee earnestly and with apparent force insist that the motion for rehearing should be granted and' the judgment below affirmed, for the reason, as insisted, that the undisputed evidence shows that Copeland was entitled to recovery.
We have at all times been unable to so construe the evidence set out in our original opinion, and perhaps more fully set out in appellant’s reply to' the motion for rehearing. While it is true that the Texas corporation issued the 22,000 shares of common stock, *585and that Copeland paid the purchase price therefor, yet the money paid by him was furnished by parties.acting for the Massachusetts corporation, who testified that the purchase was for reorganization purposes, and that Copeland was to hold and dispose of the stock as a trustee., If it was his individual property, why did he send 11,000 shares of it to parties acting for the Massachusetts corporation, and give his note for one-third of the stock? And why did he deposit the remaining 11,000 shares with the bank to be given away to purchasers of shares of the preferred stock in the Massachusetts corporation? Are we required to believe that in so doing he was prompted by altruistic purposes? We think not. On the contrary, we think there was evidence at least tending to show that Copeland had but the naked legal .title in the bonus stock, the beneficial interest being in the appellant corporation, or at least that he was without such right as entitled him to the judgment he recovered under his cross-action.
But it is urged that the special charges requested were insufficient, and that appellant’s assignments of error are in violation of the court rules, and should be disregarded. AVliile it may be true that the criticisms relating to the requested charges and assignments are well grounded, yet if, under assignments that require of us an examination of the record, we discover an error of fact or law which has resulted in a miscarriage of justice, we conceive it to be our duty to right the wrong. Article 1844, Rev. Civ. Statutes of 1925, expressly provides that an assignment of error “shall be sufficient which directs the attention of the court to the error complained of.” In Morrison v. Neely, 231 S. W. 728, by section B of the Commission of Appeals, it was held, in effect, that assignments of error sufficient to direct the court’s attention to the fact that appellant claimed that the evidence was not sufficient to support the judgment required the determination of whether the evidence was sufficient to support the finding of fact of the trial court, though the assignments did not directly and specifically attack the finding of fact.
In Graves v. Haynes, 231 S. W. 383, 385, by section A of the Commission of Appeals, specially approved by the Supreme Court, a requested charge, declared to be “not technically correct in every particular,” was sufficiently so as to require the court to give a proper charge on the subject.
We accordingly feel unwilling to affirm the judgment in appellees’ favor, in the absence of a submission of a clear presentation of the material issues in the claim and a clear-cut verdict thereon in appellees’ favor..
The motion for rehearing will accordingly be overruled.