Court Opinion

ID: 9559238
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:24:51.506053+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:10:11.265556
License: Public Domain

SIMMS, Justice
(specially concurring) :
I concur specially in this case by reason of a clear distinction in Perry v. Perry, Okl., 551 P.2d 256, and the case at bar.
In Perry, this Court was pointedly treating the issue of termination of alimony *617for support. I joined in the view that the parties could not contract in contravention of legislatively established public policy, nor could a trial judge validly approve such an agreement. Neither could the trial court include in its decree a written proviso contrary to the provisions of 12 O.S.1971, § 1289(b). I respectfully still adhere to that view.
However, in the instant case, we are not dealing with the clear award of alimony for support, only. By the express provisions of the property settlement and agreement, the award was lumped into the category of “property settlement, alimony, maintenance, and support, and property division of the parties”. In this case, the Divorce Decree referred to the award as “alimony, maintenance and support,” not alimony as or for support and maintenance. The Decree is silent as to the termination provisions in § 1289(b), supra.
It is submitted that the award of alimony in this case was by all parties intended to be primarily by way of division of property, and the insertion of the language “support and maintenance” was surplusage as not being the primary intent of the parties in contracting nor the trial court in entering its Decree.
In essence, it is respectfully submitted that in Perry, we dealt with alimony exclusively for support which is terminable, while here, we review attempted termination of division of property, not per'missively terminable.
I therefor Concur Specially.