Court Opinion

ID: 9633567
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:52:38.170931+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:08:37.493105
License: Public Domain

SCHAUER, J., Dissenting.
In their concluding paragraph the majority {ante, p. 154) say: “We have said that the jury must decide the question without benefit of guideposts, standards or applicable criteria; we have pointed out that the very subject matter of the penalty trial is not clearly defined. To attempt to assess the effect of error in this legal vacuum is to superimpose one untestable surmise upon another. We must not pile conjecture upon conjecture and posit the decision of life or death upon a pyramid of guesses. ’ ’
The quoted language, like that of the same majority in People v Hines (1964) post, p. 164 [37 Cal.Rptr. 622, 390 P.2d 398] is the language of speculation,.“conjecture,” and “guesses.” In the face of that language our constitutional duty is altogether clear: we are obligated to affirm.
Reference is made to sections 4 and 4% of article VI, California Constitution, and to the discussion of those sections and the relevant decisional law of this state, all as related in my concurring and dissenting opinion in People v. Hines (1964) supra, post, p. 175. For all of the reasons explained therein I would affirm the judgment.
McComb, J., concurred.
The petitions of the appellant and the respondent for a rehearing were denied April 15, 1964. Schauer, J., and McComb, J., were of the opinion that the petition of the respondent should be granted.