Court Opinion

ID: 9900354
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-18 22:11:30.515296+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:04.709383
License: Public Domain

228                 September 20, 2023              No. 494

          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                  STATE OF OREGON

                  STATE OF OREGON,
                   Plaintiff-Respondent,
                             v.
             SHIHAILY DOREEN SANTINI,
                   Defendant-Appellant.
                Linn County Circuit Court
      20CR19600, 19CR73139, 20CR07884, 20CR07901;
       A176654 (Control), A176655, A176656, A176657

  Michael B. Wynhausen, Judge.
  Argued and submitted March 17, 2023.
   Kyle Krohn, Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause
for appellant. Also on the brief was Ernest G. Lannet, Chief
Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, Office of Public
Defense Services.
   Jordan R. Silk, Assistant Attorney General, argued
the cause for respondent. Also on the brief were Ellen F.
Rosenblum, Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General.
   Before Aoyagi, Presiding Judge, and Joyce, Judge, and
Jacquot, Judge.
  JACQUOT, J.
   In Case Number 20CR19600, conviction on Count 5
reversed and remanded for entry of a conviction for second-
degree criminal mischief; remanded for resentencing; other-
wise affirmed. In Case Numbers 19CR73139, 20CR07884,
and 20CR07901, reversed and remanded.
Cite as 328 Or App 228 (2023)   229
230                                           State v. Santini

        JACQUOT, J.
         In this consolidated appeal of three probation-
revocation judgments (Case Numbers 19CR73139,
20CR07884, and 20CR07901) and a judgment of conviction
(Case Number 20CR19600), defendant challenges her con-
victions in the latter judgment. After a jury trial in absentia,
defendant was convicted of first-degree criminal trespass,
ORS 164.255 (Count 1); third-degree theft, ORS 164.043
(Count 3); first-degree criminal mischief, ORS 164.365
(Count 5); and resisting arrest, ORS 162.315 (Count 6).
Defendant raises five assignments of error. We describe only
the first three because our resolution makes it unnecessary
to reach the fourth and fifth. First, defendant argues that
the trial court erred when it accepted a waiver of her pres-
ence at trial because, although it ensured that her waiver
was voluntary, it failed to ensure it was knowing. Second,
defendant argues that the trial court erred when it denied
her motion for a judgment of acquittal (MJOA) on Count 3,
third-degree theft, because the state failed to adduce suffi-
cient evidence to show that the items defendant took were
“property.” Third, defendant argues that the trial court
erred when it denied her MJOA on Count 5, first-degree
criminal mischief, because the state failed to adduce suf-
ficient evidence to show that the damage defendant caused
totaled over $1,000.
        Because the state’s evidence was insufficient for
the jury to find that the damage exceeded $1,000, in Case
Number 20CR19600, we reverse defendant’s first-degree
criminal mischief conviction, remand for entry of a second-
degree criminal mischief conviction and for resentenc-
ing, and otherwise affirm. In Case Numbers 19CR73139,
20CR07884, and 20CR07901, we reverse and remand.
        Defendant’s charges arise from two incidents at
her aunt’s home. First, after being asked to leave the home,
defendant refused and instead locked and barricaded herself
in a bedroom, prompting her aunt to call the police. While
in the bedroom, defendant took at least one of her aunt’s
prescribed vitamin D pills without permission. Police broke
down the door and removed defendant from the residence.
Second, later that day, defendant returned to the home and
Cite as 328 Or App 228 (2023)                             231

broke a window in the front door, the front windshield of one
car in the driveway, and both the front and back windshields
of a second car. Defendant was subsequently charged with,
among other things, third-degree theft for taking the vita-
min D pill and first-degree criminal mischief for breaking
the windows.
         Following a trial in which defendant waived her
appearance, defendant was convicted on four counts, includ-
ing third-degree theft and first-degree criminal mischief.
The court revoked defendant’s probations after finding her
in violation for committing new crimes related to the new
criminal convictions.
                          WAIVER
         In her first assignment of error, defendant argues
that the trial court erred in accepting the waiver of her pres-
ence at trial because, although her waiver was voluntary, it
was not knowing.
         The relevant facts are as follows. Approximately two
months before defendant’s trial, defendant’s attorney filed a
“Motion to Reevaluate at Oregon State Hospital, Request
to Require Defendant to Appear and Determine if She
Wants to be Present at Trial.” In the motion, he explained
that defendant had refused to cooperate with him or a hired
mental status evaluator and requested that the court order
that defendant be reevaluated at the Oregon State Hospital.
However, “[i]f the court does not believe reevaluation is
appropriate, then counsel requests to bring [defendant] out
of her cell for her to make a decision as to whether she wishes
to be present in trial given the adverse position she would be
placed in.” (Emphasis added.) The trial court subsequently
held two hearings prior to trial. At the second, according
to the docket, the court denied defense counsel’s request to
have defendant reevaluated at the hospital and set a trial
date. Transcripts of those hearings are not in the record for
our review.
          On the morning of trial, defendant refused to leave
her cell, and deputies explained that they would need to use
force to bring her to court. Defendant’s attorney asked if the
deputies wore body cameras and then stated, “I would be
232                                          State v. Santini

okay as her counsel if you were to record her stating” her
waiver. The trial court explained that it needed defendant
on record waiving her right to appear and had defendant
brought to the jail courtroom. The trial court then remotely
engaged in a colloquy with defendant about her waiver:
     “THE COURT: Alright. So I’ve been told that you—
  well, we had a discussion a while back where you had indi-
  cated that you wanted a trial and that you wanted to be
  present at that trial. Do you remember that hearing that
  we had?
      “THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
     “THE COURT: Alright. And so I’m being told this
  morning that you don’t wish to appear at trial. Is that
  correct?
      “THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
     “THE COURT: Okay. And so do you wish to waive
  your right to appear at trial?
      “THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
      “THE COURT: But do you still wish to have a trial?
      “THE DEFENDANT: No. I waived my right, so no.
      “THE COURT: Well, there’s a difference. Your—
    “THE DEFENDANT: It’s my prerogative. I changed
  my mind. It’s a no. We covered that.
     “THE COURT: No, no. I understand, [defendant], but
  there are two things that we’re talking about. One is your
  right to have a trial at all, or rather—
      “THE DEFENDANT: I waive my rights.
     “THE COURT: Do you want to enter pleas to the
  charges?
      “THE DEFENDANT: There is no plea.
      “THE COURT: Alright. But you’re waiving your right
  to appear at the trial?
      “THE DEFENDANT: Yes.”
        Defendant, neither personally nor through counsel,
contested the validity of her waiver with the trial court.
Cite as 328 Or App 228 (2023)                               233

         Defendant now argues on appeal that her waiver
was not made knowingly. According to defendant, the record
insufficiently established that her waiver was knowingly
made, because it failed to show that the court communi-
cated any of the risks or consequences of waiving her right
to be present at trial, especially with regard to how it would
affect her other trial rights. Additionally, per defendant, the
record did not establish “that she had any prior knowledge
of the risks of a trial in absentia,” because, “as far as the
record shows, all her prior convictions resulted from pleas
and not trials.”
         A criminal defendant has a fundamental constitu-
tional right to be present at trial. State v. Peltier, 318 Or App
267, 273, 508 P3d 567, rev den, 370 Or 197 (2022). However,
the defendant may waive that right if the waiver is both vol-
untary and knowing. Id. “Whether a defendant has know-
ingly and intentionally waived his right to be present at trial
is a question of law that we review for legal error.” Id. at 272.
A waiver is knowing if the defendant is aware of the right to
be present and understands the risks of not attending. Id. at
273. Those risks include the fact that the trial will proceed
without the defendant and “the impact on the defendant’s
other rights” that will result from their absence. Id. at 274.
         We prefer that the trial court engage in a colloquy
on the record to establish that a waiver is made knowingly,
but “we will also affirm a trial court’s acceptance of a defen-
dant’s waiver where, under the totality of the circumstances,
the record reflects that the defendant knew of the right [to
be present] and understood the risks.” Id. at 273-74 (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted; brackets in original).
“Whether there has been an ‘intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right or privilege will depend on
the particular circumstances of each case, including the
defendant’s age, education, experience, and mental capacity’
as well as the charge, possible defenses, and other relevant
factors.” Id. at 273 (quoting State v. Meyrick, 313 Or 125,
132, 831 P2d 666 (1992)).
        We begin with preservation. Defendant acknowl-
edges that she failed to object to the sufficiency of her waiver
but argues in her opening brief that preservation is excused
234                                           State v. Santini

in this context. Alternatively, she seeks plain-error review.
ORAP 5.45(1). The state disagrees that preservation is
excused, pointing to our decision in Frost v. State of Oregon,
320 Or App 753, 514 P3d 1182 (2022), adh’d to as modified
on recons, 324 Or App 295, 525 P3d 98 (2023)—decided after
defendant filed her opening brief—to argue that preserva-
tion rules do apply to personal-presence claims and, here,
preservation is not excused because defendant’s counsel was
present and could have objected to the sufficiency of the
waiver. The state then argues that the record is insufficient
for plain-error review. Specifically, the state contends that
the waiver colloquy between the court and defendant on the
morning of trial establishes that they had a prior discussion
about defendant’s trial rights, supporting competing infer-
ences about defendant’s knowledge of the rights she was
waiving and precluding plain-error review.
          In a subsequent memorandum of additional author-
ities, defendant agrees that in Frost, “this court held that a
violation of the right to be present for trial is subject to the
preservation requirement.” However, she notes that Frost
“also held that such an error constitutes plain error that this
court should exercise its discretion to correct.” Additionally,
defendant notes that in State v. Reed, 247 Or App 155, 163,
268 P3d 756 (2011)—a case concerning the pro se defen-
dant’s waiver of the right to counsel—we held that because
a probation-violation hearing is a critical stage in a criminal
prosecution, and the state has the burden of establishing a
valid waiver, a defendant is not required to provide a tran-
script of each hearing to show that their waiver was invalid.
Accordingly, defendant argues that she was not required to
provide a transcript of the prior discussion between her and
the court to show that her waiver was invalid.
        The state filed a response to appellant’s memoran-
dum of additional authorities, stating that it is not argu-
ing that defendant had to provide all relevant transcripts.
Rather, the state noted it was arguing that Reed is inap-
posite because here, unlike in Reed, preservation is not
excused, and any review must be for plain error. Further,
the state argues that because the court and defendant
acknowledged a prior discussion about her trial attendance,
Cite as 328 Or App 228 (2023)                             235

defendant expressly waived her right to attend, and defen-
dant’s counsel did not object, we can infer that defendant
understood the risks of her waiver. That inference, accord-
ing to the state, precludes plain-error review.
         We conclude that preservation was required because
defendant appeared with counsel at the waiver hearing
and therefore had an opportunity to object. See Frost, 320
Or App at 758 (concluding that the post-conviction peti-
tioner was required to preserve his claim that, under ORS
138.620(1), the court erred in failing to order his presence at
the post-conviction trial where he had a prior opportunity
to object through counsel and when his counsel appeared
at prior hearings and discussed ORS 138.620 and whether
petitioner would be appearing at the trial). Therefore, for us
to consider the unpreserved error, it must meet the require-
ments for plain-error review.
         We further conclude that the requirements for
plain-error review are not met. For an unpreserved error to
be plain and warrant consideration for correction, the error
must be “an error of law, obvious and not reasonably in dis-
pute, and apparent on the record without requiring the court
to choose among competing inferences.” State v. Vanornum,
354 Or 614, 629, 317 P3d 889 (2013). Here, the error is not
apparent on the record. Defense counsel’s earlier motion
asked that if the court denies the request for reevaluation
at the Oregon State Hospital, defendant be brought to court
to make a decision about attending “given the adverse posi-
tion she would be placed in.” A hearing was held, and the
trial court denied the reevaluation request. In discussing
defendant’s waiver, the trial court asked defendant if she
remembered a discussion that they had “a while back where
[she] had indicated that [she] wanted a trial and that [she]
wanted to be present at that trial,” and she answered, “Yes,
Your Honor.” The court then asked if it was correct that she
wanted to “waive [her] right to appear at trial,” and she
responded, “Yes, Your Honor.” Defense counsel did not object
to the sufficiency of defendant’s waiver but in fact suggested
an even less stringent method of obtaining it. Defendant’s
waiver in the context of the entire colloquy with the court
permits the inference that defendant understood from their
236                                            State v. Santini

prior discussions the rights that she was waiving on the day
of the hearing. As a result, the totality of the circumstances
in the record supports competing inferences that preclude
us from reviewing for plain error.
         Our conclusion is not undermined by Reed, as that
case is inapposite. The court in Reed was not engaged in
plain-error review, while in this case we must determine
whether the plain-error review requirements have been
met. We conclude that—based on the record before us—they
have not, and accordingly we affirm.
                  THIRD-DEGREE THEFT
         In her second assignment of error, defendant argues
that the trial court erred when it denied her MJOA on Count
3, third-degree theft, because the state failed to prove that
the items she took had market value, as required to support
her conviction. On review of the denial of an MJOA, we view
the facts in the light most favorable to the state and deter-
mine whether a rational factfinder could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
State v. Street, 317 Or App 1, 4, 505 P3d 425, rev den, 369 Or
705 (2022).
         Defendant was charged with third-degree theft
after taking at least one of her aunt’s prescription vitamin
D pills while she had locked and barricaded herself in her
aunt’s bedroom. The aunt testified that the prescription was
for three or four pills to take before a blood test. At the close
of the state’s case, defendant moved for a judgment of acquit-
tal on the grounds that the state had failed to offer evidence
to show that the vitamin D pill she took had any value, as
required for a conviction for third-degree theft. The trial
court denied the motion, noting that a vitamin D pill clearly
has value, even if infinitesimal, and third-degree theft does
not require the state to prove any specific value.
        We conclude that a rational factfinder could have
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reason-
able doubt. To convict defendant of third-degree theft, the
state had to prove that she stole “property” worth less than
$100. ORS 164.043(1). To be considered property, the stolen
item must have some value, “specifically, more than zero,
Cite as 328 Or App 228 (2023)                                               237

but less than $100.” State v. Waterhouse, 359 Or 351, 354,
373 P3d 131 (2016); ORS 164.043(1); ORS 164.005(5) (defin-
ing property as “any article, substance or thing of value,
including, but not limited to, money, tangible and intan-
gible personal property * * *”). The state is not required to
prove a specific value but must offer enough evidence for the
jury to reasonably infer that the property had “some value.”
Waterhouse, 359 Or at 361-62 (when a crime is based on a
de minimus value threshold, such as greater than zero, the
valuation is “provable by inference”).
         Defendant argues that the state must prove specifi-
cally that the stolen item had market value, requiring proof
of “a market for the item in which willing buyers and sell-
ers engage in arm’s-length transactions in which the item
is traded for value.” State ex rel Juv. Dept. v. Deford, 177
Or App 555, 578, 34 P3d 673 (2001). According to defendant,
without an established market, the market value becomes
speculative, and speculative worth is insufficient to satisfy
the definition of property. Id. at 578-79. Therefore, defendant
argues, although a market exists for full and sealed bottles
of vitamin D pills, the state needed to prove that there is a
market for individual vitamin D pills. The state responds
that the market value of a container of items is the aggre-
gate value of the items it contains such that each individual
item necessarily holds some fraction of the value. Therefore,
because it is undisputed that a full and sealed bottle of pills
has market value, the individual pills do too.
         Defendant primarily relies on our decision in Deford
to support her position. In Deford, a youth was charged with
first-degree arson after lighting fire to a small stack of news-
papers in his apartment building.1 Deford, 177 Or App at
557. The newspaper was a free publication that was placed
in the laundry room for residents to take as they wished. Id.
at 575. The state presented evidence showing that the left-
over newspapers were eventually taken to a recycling busi-
ness that purchased newspaper in bulk for one penny per
pound. Id. at 575-76. The youth argued that the state failed
to show that the newspapers he burned had market value,

    1
      The definition of “property” is the same for arson and theft. ORS 164.005(5)
(providing definition of “property” for offenses against property).
238                                            State v. Santini

as required to prove the charges, because it did not show a
market for such small quantities of newspapers as opposed
to large, bulk amounts. Id. at 577. We held that the state
needed to prove that there was both a willing buyer and a
willing seller of the small quantity, and because it did not
establish that there was anyone willing to expend the effort
to transport and sell such a small quantity, it failed to show
market value. Id. at 580-81.
         Here, unlike the newspapers in Deford, prescription
pills are sold and bought in small quantities. The victim tes-
tified that the prescription from which defendant took the
pill was for only three or four pills. Prescription pills are not
given out to the general public for free. This means that a
drug company sold, and the aunt or her insurance company
paid for, three or four pills in a single transaction. It is rea-
sonable for a factfinder to infer that the same could be true
of one pill and that, therefore, a market exists for a prescrip-
tion for even a single prescription vitamin D pill.
        Therefore, we conclude that there is sufficient evi-
dence from which the jury could infer that the vitamin
D pill taken by defendant possessed some market value.
Accordingly, the trial court did not err when it denied defen-
dant’s MJOA, and we affirm.
         FIRST-DEGREE CRIMINAL MISCHIEF
         In her third assignment of error, defendant argues
that the trial court erred when it denied her MJOA on
Count 5, first-degree criminal mischief. As previously
explained, we view the facts in the light most favorable to
the state and determine whether a rational factfinder could
have found the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt. Street, 317 Or App at 4. We conclude that the state
did not adduce sufficient evidence to show that defendant
caused over $1,000 in damages, as required to uphold her
conviction.
         Shortly after police had removed defendant from her
aunt’s home, defendant returned to the residence. The home’s
front door had a large oval window, and there were two cars
parked in the driveway. Defendant broke the door window,
the front windshield of one car, and both the front and back
Cite as 328 Or App 228 (2023)                                                   239

windshields of the second car. Defendant was arrested soon
after and charged with first-degree criminal mischief.
         To support a conviction for first-degree criminal
mischief, the state had to show that defendant intentionally
damaged another’s property in an amount exceeding $1,000.
ORS 164.365(1)(a)(A). “[D]amage to personal property is gen-
erally measured by the difference between its value imme-
diately before and after the injury” or, alternatively, by “the
reasonable cost of repairs to put the property in substan-
tially the same condition it was in prior to the injury.” State
v. Crace, 26 Or App 927, 932, 554 P2d 628 (1976).
        During the trial, the state adduced limited evi-
dence regarding the monetary amount of damage caused by
defendant. Ultimately, the only evidence presented to the
jury was the victim’s testimony that she bought an “inferior”
replacement door for $200 because she was told an equiva-
lent door would cost too much and paid $200 in deductibles
for the damage to the two cars, along with photos of the
damage to the door and cars from the scene.2
         Defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal, argu-
ing that the state only presented evidence that the victim
paid $400 for the damage, including $200 for the door and
$200 in deductibles for the cars. The trial court denied
defendant’s MJOA, stating that the value of damage was an
issue to be argued, but, although not “necessarily strong,”
evidence that replacing the door was cost prohibitive, along
with photos of the damage to the newer vehicles, was suffi-
cient for the jury to infer that the damage was over $1,000.
        At issue is whether the testimony and photos pro-
vided enough evidence for the jury to permissibly infer
that the damage was over $1,000, or if it crosses the line
     2
       The victim also testified that she was told by an unidentified salesperson
that the cost to replace the glass in the door exceeded $1,000 because it was a
“special order.” Defendant objected based on hearsay, and eventually the trial
court sustained the objection and allowed the testimony only for its effect on the
listener to explain why she bought an “inferior” door, not for its truth. Accordingly,
the jury could not consider the $1,000 figure to be evidence of the actual amount
of damage that defendant caused. See State v. Hren, 237 Or App 605, 607-08, 241
P3d 1168 (2010) (testimony by defendant in theft prosecution that store clerk said
she could take the property could not be offered for its truth—that defendant was
actually entitled to take the property—but could be offered to show she reason-
ably believed she was entitled).
240                                           State v. Santini

to impermissible speculation. “The line between permissi-
ble inference and impermissible speculation is not always a
bright one,” but the line is drawn by logic. State v. Guckert,
260 Or App 50, 56, 316 P3d 373 (2013), rev den, 354 Or 840
(2014). “[E]vidence is insufficient if it requires the stacking
of inferences to the point of speculation,” and “even in the
most difficult-to-try cases, speculation cannot be permitted
to substitute for evidence.” State v. Bivens, 191 Or App 460,
468, 470, 83 P3d 379 (2004).
          In this case, the line between first-degree criminal
mischief (a felony) and second-degree criminal mischief (a
misdemeanor) lies entirely upon the monetary amount of
damage. See ORS 164.365(1)(a)(A) (first-degree criminal
mischief requires damage in an amount exceeding $1,000);
State v. Jones, 298 Or App 264, 269-70, 445 P3d 358, rev den,
365 Or 658 (2019) (interpreting second-degree criminal mis-
chief statute, ORS 164.354(1)(b), to mean that if the dam-
age is caused intentionally, second-degree criminal mischief
does not require evidence of a specific value). At no point did
the state introduce evidence about the difference in value or
the cost of replacing or repairing a car window or the front
door. It instead relied entirely on photos of the cars and the
victim’s testimony regarding the door and car deductibles to
show that the damage was over $1,000. The jury could rea-
sonably infer that the damage to the car windows exceeded
the $200 deductibles because a deductible serves to limit the
amount a policy holder pays when damage is in excess of
that deductible, and that because the door the victim bought
was “inferior,” an equivalent replacement door would cost
more than $200. See Skeeters v. Skeeters, 237 Or 204, 214,
389 P2d 313, reh’g den, 237 Or 204 (1964) (although a jury
cannot be permitted to speculate, it may rely on common
experience to draw inferences). However, the inference that
defendant caused “more than” $400 alone does not support
the further inference that the damage was, at minimum,
specifically $601 more.
        When a crime specifically requires the state to
prove a certain monetary threshold, “the state’s burden
cannot be relaxed to the point where less evidence equates
to more proof by giving the state the benefit of a broader
Cite as 328 Or App 228 (2023)                            241

range of imaginable possibilities.” Bivins, 191 Or App at
471. Without further evidence from the state regarding the
amount of damage, “[n]o predicate facts assist in informing
any inference, and any conclusion would constitute specula-
tion or guesswork.” Id. at 469-71 (holding evidence insuffi-
cient to elevate assault from misdemeanor to felony because,
although the defendant’s children were present in a small
house during a loud argument in which the defendant
struck the children’s mother, without more evidence the jury
could not infer that the children actually heard or saw the
assault).
          We therefore conclude that the state’s evidence was
insufficient for the jury to find that defendant caused dam-
ages exceeding $1,000. Accordingly, as defendant requests,
we reverse defendant’s first-degree criminal mischief con-
viction and remand for entry of a conviction for the lesser
included offense of second-degree criminal mischief and for
resentencing. See State v. Wiggins, 272 Or App 748, 750, 358
P3d 318 (2015) (second-degree criminal mischief is a lesser
included offense of first-degree criminal mischief); ORS
164.354(1)(b) (a person commits second-degree criminal mis-
chief if they “intentionally damage[ ] property of another”).
As a result, the probation-violation judgments are reversed
and remanded to allow the court to reconsider its probation
violation determinations.
        In Case Number 20CR19600, conviction on Count 5
reversed and remanded for entry of a conviction for second-
degree criminal mischief; remanded for resentencing; other-
wise affirmed. In Case Numbers 19CR73139, 20CR07884,
and 20CR07901, reversed and remanded.