Court Opinion

ID: 9398458
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-31 15:02:22.508813+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:33.793300
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-12334    Document: 23-1     Date Filed: 05/31/2023   Page: 1 of 5

                                               [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 22-12334
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       KELLY POLING,
                                                     Plaintiff-Appellant,
       versus
       COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

                                                   Defendant-Appellee.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Middle District of Florida
                    D.C. Docket No. 8:21-cv-01481-AAS
                          ____________________
USCA11 Case: 22-12334      Document: 23-1     Date Filed: 05/31/2023     Page: 2 of 5

       2                      Opinion of the Court                 22-12334

       Before LAGOA, BRASHER, and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Kelly Poling appeals the district court’s order affirming the
       Social Security Commissioner’s (Commissioner) denial of her
       claim for a period of disability, disability insurance benefits (DIB),
       and Supplemental Security Income. She asserts the district court
       erred by not remanding her case under the sixth sentence of 42
       U.S.C. § 405(g) because she submitted new and material evi-
       dence—a finding by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) in a sec-
       ond, separate claim that she was disabled with an onset date one
       day after an ALJ found she was not disabled on the claim at issue in
       this case.
              The sixth sentence of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) permits a district
       court to remand an application for benefits to the Commissioner
       for the taking of additional evidence upon a showing “that there is
       new evidence which is material and that there is good cause for the
       failure to incorporate such evidence into the record in a prior pro-
       ceeding.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Ingram v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Ad-
       min., 496 F.3d 1253, 1261 (11th Cir. 2007). To obtain a remand
       under this provision, the claimant must establish: “(1) there is new,
       noncumulative evidence; (2) the evidence is ‘material,’ that is, rel-
       evant and probative so that there is a reasonable possibility that it
       would change the administrative result[;] and (3) there is good
       cause for the failure to submit the evidence at the administrative
USCA11 Case: 22-12334      Document: 23-1      Date Filed: 05/31/2023     Page: 3 of 5

       22-12334                Opinion of the Court                         3

       level.” Hunter v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm’r, 808 F.3d 818, 821
       (11th Cir. 2015) (quotation marks omitted).
              In Hunter, we held a later favorable decision is not “new ev-
       idence” for purposes of § 405(g). Id. at 822. There, Hunter filed
       two successive applications for DIB, the first in May 2010, alleging
       a disability onset date of March 3, 2009, which an ALJ denied, find-
       ing she was not disabled between her alleged onset date and the
       date of the decision, February 10, 2012. Id. at 820. After the Ap-
       peals Council denied her request for review, Hunter sought review
       in the district court. Id. Meanwhile, Hunter filed a second applica-
       tion for DIB, alleging an onset date of February 11, 2012—the day
       after the first ALJ denied her previous application. Id. While her
       appeal of the first decision was still pending in the district court, a
       different ALJ approved her second application, finding she was dis-
       abled as of February 11, 2012. Id.
               Hunter then moved the district court to remand the first
       ALJ’s unfavorable decision to the Commissioner for further pro-
       ceedings, arguing the second ALJ’s favorable decision was new and
       material evidence warranting reconsideration of her first applica-
       tion. Id. The court denied the motion, and Hunter appealed. Id.
       at 820-21. On appeal, we noted there was a split on the issue be-
       tween the Sixth and Ninth Circuits but agreed with the Sixth Cir-
       cuit and affirmed the district court, holding “a later favorable deci-
       sion is not evidence for § 405(g) purposes.” Id. at 821-22. We rea-
       soned that, given the deferential nature of substantial evidence re-
       view, the decisions of both ALJs could be supported by the record,
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       4                          Opinion of the Court                      22-12334

       even though they reached opposite conclusions. Id. at 822. Be-
       cause the only new evidence Hunter cited in support of her request
       for remand was the later favorable decision, which was not evi-
       dence for purposes of § 405(g), we concluded she had not estab-
       lished remand was warranted. Id.
              Because Poling’s argument that the second ALJ’s favorable
       decision was new and material evidence warranting reconsidera-
       tion1 of her first application is identical to the one we rejected in
       Hunter, it is foreclosed under the prior panel precedent rule. See
       United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 2008) (stat-
       ing, under our prior panel precedent rule, “a prior panel’s holding
       is binding on all subsequent panels unless and until it is overruled
       or undermined to the point of abrogation by the Supreme Court
       or by this court sitting en banc”). Poling does not attempt to dis-
       tinguish her case from Hunter but merely argues it was wrongly
       decided, which is not grounds for circumventing Hunter under the
       prior panel precedent rule. See Cohen v. Office Depot, Inc., 204
       F.3d 1069, 1076 (11th Cir. 2000) (explaining the prior panel

       1 Even though Poling submitted new treatment records in support of her re-
       quest for a sentence six remand, she does not argue on appeal the district court
       erred in determining those records did not warrant a remand, instead basing
       her claim solely on the second ALJ’s favorable decision, and thus she has aban-
       doned the argument that remand was warranted based on the treatment rec-
       ords. See Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir.
       2014) (stating a party fails to adequately present an issue on appeal when she
       does not plainly and prominently raise it, for instance by devoting a discrete
       section of her argument to that claim).
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       22-12334                Opinion of the Court                          5

       precedent rule is dependent upon neither “a subsequent panel’s ap-
       praisal of the initial decision’s correctness” nor “the skill of the at-
       torneys or wisdom of the judges involved with the prior decision—
       upon what was argued or considered”). Moreover, there is no ar-
       gument the issue raised by Poling was not brought to the attention
       of the Court in Hunter or ruled upon, as the Court acknowledged
       the circuit split referenced by Poling and expressly chose the ap-
       proach of the Sixth Circuit over the Ninth Circuit. See United
       States v. Jackson, 55 F.4th 846, 853 (11th Cir. 2022) (noting “ques-
       tions which merely lurk in the record, neither brought to the atten-
       tion of the court nor ruled upon, are not to be considered as having
       been so decided as to constitute precedents” (quotation marks and
       brackets omitted)). As Hunter has been neither overruled nor un-
       dermined to the point of abrogation, we affirm.
              AFFIRMED.