Court Opinion

ID: 9550409
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:35:00.16399+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:21:30.727485
License: Public Domain

EUBANK, Presiding Judge,
dissenting:
I dissent because in my opinion special action jurisdiction should not be exercised in this situation: a discovery dispute. Rule 3, Arizona Rules of Procedure for Special Actions (Rule) states:
The only questions that may be raised in a special action are:
(a) Whether the defendant has failed to exercise discretion which he has a duty to exercise; or to perform a duty required by law as to which he has no discretion; or
(b) Whether the defendant has proceeded or is threatening to proceed without or in excess of jurisdiction or legal authority; or
(c) Whether a determination was arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion.
Rule 3(a) is mandamus; Rule 3(b) is certio-rari and prohibition; Rule 3(c) goes beyond the traditional writs to review “abuse of discretion” of the trial judge. Law Note, The Plight of the Sorcerer’s Apprentice: Arizona’s Special Action Practice, Ariz. State L.J. 3, 1983, p. 535.. A special action is merely a procedure for obtaining extraordinary relief. It “[sjhall not be available where there is an equally plain, speedy, and adequate remedy by appeal; and nothing in these rules shall be construed as enlarging the scope of relief traditionally granted under the writs of certio-rari, mandamus, and prohibition.” Rule 1.
The majority does not state its basis for granting special action extraordinary relief but it must be Rule 3(c): That the trial judge somehow abused his discretion in following the law as it was before this opinion.
The fact situation before us is that petitioners moved for an ordér compelling respondents to respond to discovery requests concerning their experience with and use of seat belts. After the issue was briefed and argued, the trial court denied the motion. It stated:
Although the Court is sympathetic with Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff should be compelled to respond to discovery regarding plaintiff’s knowledge, experience and use of seat belts in this incident, Nash v. Kamrath, 21 Ariz.App. 530 [521 P.2d 161] (1974), has squarely held that evidence regarding Plaintiff’s failure to wear seat belts as being a cause of Plaintiff’s injuries is irrelevant and that Plaintiff has no duty to wear seat belts. The Court finds that the rationale of Clarkson v. Wright, [108 Ill.2d 129, 90 Ill.Dec. 950] 483 N.E.2d 268 (Ill.1985), which held that evidence of failure to wear seat belts is not admissible on either the question of comparative negligence/liability or damages, is persuasive.
On June 20, 1986, following the denial of discovery, petitioners filed this special action, alleging that the trial judge had abused his discretion; that there was no equally plain, speedy and adequate remedy by appeal; and that the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act (A.R.S. § 12-2501, et seq.) had changed the seat belt law in Arizona. Whether or not the trial judge abused his discretion in refusing to order discovery in this situation should be left to the appeal process. In my opin*147ion the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in so ruling. Thus, special action extraordinary relief should have been denied pursuant to Rule 3.