Court Opinion

ID: 2963527
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:11:30.451048+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:37:21.611790
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                 ____________________

        No. 95-1127

                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                      Appellee,

                                          v.

                                    GARY GARAFANO,

                                Defendant, Appellant.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                           FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

                [Hon. Raymond J. Pettine, Senior U.S. District Judge]
                                          __________________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                Torruella, Chief Judge,
                                           ___________

                          Boudin and Stahl, Circuit Judges.
                                            ______________

                                 ____________________

            John A. MacFadyen for appellant.
            _________________
            Margaret E.  Curran, Assistant United  States Attorney,  with whom
            ___________________
        Sheldon  Whitehouse, United  States  Attorney,  and  Craig  N.  Moore,
        ___________________                                  ________________
        Assistant United States Attorney, were on brief for the United States.

                                 ____________________

                                    August 7, 1995
                                 ____________________

                 BOUDIN, Circuit Judge.  In 1993, Gary Garafano was tried
                         _____________

            under  a single-count  indictment, under  the  Hobbs Act,  18

            U.S.C.    1951, for extortion under color  of official right.

            The substance  of the charge  was that Garafano  had extorted

            money  from Forte  Brothers, a  construction  firm with  city

            contracts,   threatening  otherwise   to  cease   authorizing

            construction  work  performed  by  the  firm  for  the  city.

            Garafano was  at that  time an  official  of the  Providence,

            Rhode Island, Department of Public Works.

                 At  trial,  James  Forte,  the  firm's  vice  president,

            testified  that Garafano  had  initially demanded  $8,000 and

            that he (Forte) gave the $8,000 to Steven Tocco, a supervisor

            in his firm, for delivery  to Garafano.  Tocco testified that

            he delivered the $8,000 to Garafano, that he  made additional

            payments  to Garafano  (for a  total of  $100,000),  and that

            Forte Brothers inflated its billings to the city to cover the

            payments.   Garafano denied receiving any payments from Forte

            Brothers.  The  jury convicted him on a  general verdict that

            did not indicate whether the jury had found multiple payments

            or only a single one.

                 Whether  there  was  one payment  or  multiple  payments

            affected the sentencing guideline range, see United States v.
                                                     ___ _____________

            Garafano, 36 F.3d 133, 134 (1st Cir. 1994), and this was  the
            ________

            principal  subject of controversy  at the original sentencing

            hearing.  There, defense counsel took the  position that only

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            the initial $8,000 payment was supported by adequate evidence

            and  that Tocco's  testimony as  to further  payments was  an

            attempt  to conceal  his own  pocketing  of the  money.   The

            prosecutor  replied  that  the  court  lacked  "discretion to

            piecemeal the jury's verdict in this case."

                 The  district judge  concluded that  Garafano  should be

            sentenced  on  the  premise  that  Garafano  had  engaged  in

            multiple  extortions amounting  to  $100,000,  and the  court

            sentenced  Garafano accordingly.  However, the judge made one

            or two remarks that suggested  that he might be agreeing with
                                                   _____

            the  prosecutor's apparent  suggestion  that a  challenge  to

            Tocco's trial testimony  was effectively a  collateral attack

            on the jury's verdict.   Garafano appealed from his sentence,

            claiming  that the  district  court had  refused  to make  an

            independent assessment of the Tocco testimony.

                 On  the appeal, the government conceded the jury verdict

            did not  resolve the question  of whether there had  been one

            bribe or multiple bribes,  but it asserted that  the district

            judge had  made an  independent assessment.   We agreed  that

            this was likely but "to  remove the shadow of uncertainty" we

            determined  to remand, pointing out that the potential impact

            on the sentence  was significant and that it  would take very

            little effort to resolve the uncertainty.  Garafano,  36 F.3d
                                                       ________

            at  135-36.  We declined  the government's suggestion that we

            retain  jurisdiction  and  also  declined  defense  counsel's

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            alternative request  for an entirely new  sentencing hearing.

            Instead, we said the following (36 F.3d at 136):

                      We propose to vacate the existing sentence and
                 remand  the  matter  to   the  district  court  for
                 resentencing.  The district court has already given
                 Garafano a chance to argue his evidentiary position
                 in full and no request was made by  defense counsel
                 to  offer new evidence;  if the district  court did
                 (at the earlier  hearing)  or did not then  but now
                 does  find (independently of the jury verdict) that
                 bribes  continued  until  December  1990  and  were
                 around  $100,000, the  court  is  free  to  say  so
                 summarily  and to reimpose  the same sentence.   No
                 additional proceedings,  or further  explanation or
                 findings,  are  required.    See United  States  v.
                                              ___ ______________
                 Savoie, 985 F.2d 612, 620-21 (1st Cir. 1993).
                 ______

                      Conversely,  the  district  court  is free  to
                 order any further proceedings it deems  appropriate
                 before  imposing sentence.   It may do  so if there
                 was  an  actual  misunderstanding  at the  original
                 sentencing as to the district court's authority, or
                 merely  because the court thinks that this would be
                 useful to  it.   But if the  court does  change the
                 factual premise on which it sentences Garafano  and
                 thereby  alters the  guideline range  available  we
                 think that  it would  be within  the spirit of  the
                 rules to  provide  counsel  and  the  defendant  an
                 opportunity to allocute again. 

                 On  remand, the  district court  invited  both sides  to

            provide written  submissions detailing the  support for their

            respective  positions.  Defense counsel argued that there was

            not  enough reliable evidence to support findings of multiple

            bribes in  excess of $8,000, and also  submitted an affidavit

            from  Anthony Stanzione,  a city  engineer during  Garafano's

            service with  the Public  Works Department.   Stanzione  said

            that he oversaw daily  work on the job sites and approved the

            bills and said that the  Forte Brothers' invoices did not, to

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            the best  of Stanzione's  knowledge, reflect  inflated bills.

            He  also made  other  statements  that  in  certain  respects

            supported Garafano's testimony at trial.   Garafano's counsel

            requested  an  evidentiary   hearing,  which  the  prosecutor

            opposed.

                 After further written exchanges, the district court held

            a  new sentencing  hearing  on  December 13,  1994.   At  the

            conclusion, the district  judge said:  "There is  no doubt in

            my mind that  at the  earlier hearing  I independently  found

            that bribes continued until December 1990 and were around one

            hundred  thousand  dollars."    As  to  the  request  for  an

            evidentiary  hearing,  the  district  judge  said  that  "the

            testimony  as a  whole supports  Tocco and  I see  nothing in

            Stanzione's affidavit  that steers me in  another direction."

            Accordingly,  the  district  court   reimposed  the  original

            sentence.

                 Garafano  has now  appealed  again.    On  this  appeal,

            Garafano's  main argument is  that the district  court abused

            its  discretion when it  declined to hear  Stanzione testify.

            The government says, correctly, that this court's mandate was

            fully satisfied  by the district court.   The instructions on

            remand explicitly  permitted the district court  to determine

            that  it   "did  (at  the   earlier  hearing)  .  .   .  find

            (independently of  the  jury verdict)  that bribes  continued

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            until  December 1990 and  were around $100,000  . . .  ."  36

            F.3d at 136.

                 We said that,  in that event,  the district court  could

            say  so  summarily,  provide  no  additional  proceedings  or

            further explanations  or  findings,  and  reimpose  the  same

            sentence.   Id.  This  is just what  the district  judge did.
                        ___

            Although  the district court  invited the parties  to restate

            their positions, and the court reviewed again the presentence

            report and associated notes, it did so as part of  the effort

            to assure itself that it had at the original sentencing "made

            the requisite evaluation independent of  the jury verdict . .

            . ."

                 The  result would  not change  if we  viewed the  matter

            independently  of the  mandate.   The  right to  present live

            testimony at sentencing is not automatic and is reviewed only

            for abuse of  discretion.  See United States  v. Gerante, 891
                                       ___ _____________     _______

            F.2d  364, 367  (1st  Cir. 1989).   It  is fairly  common for

            district courts to consider affidavits, proffers and far less

            formal  sources  of  information  at  sentencing,  especially

            where--as here--the  sentencing judge  presided over a  trial

            that involved the same issues presented at sentencing.  

                 In this instance, we read the district court's ruling as

            a determination by the district judge that, even if Stanzione

            had testified to  the substance of what was  contained in his

            affidavit,  the  district  court  would  still  have accepted

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            Tocco's version of  events.  There is no  claim by Garafano--

            and  if there  were, we  would reject  it--that the  district

            judge was rationally obligated to accept  Stanzione's version

            of events.   Indeed, at least some  of Stanzione's assertions

            could   have  been   accepted   without  disproving   Tocco's

            testimony.

                 Defense   counsel  says   that   where  credibility   is

            important, the judge needs  to listen to the witness  testify

            in his own  words in open  court; and counsel  added at  oral

            argument that there  were bound to be helpful  details in the

            testimony  not   captured  in   the  proffer.     There   are

            possibilities   that  would  have  greater  or  lesser  force

            depending on  the facts, and  we think that no  absolute rule

            can be  fashioned.   It  is  enough to  say here  that  these

            considerations   are  part  of  the  calculus  and  that  the

            determination not  to  hear live  testimony here  was not  an

            abuse of discretion.

                 After all, the district court  had heard all of the live

            evidence  on multiple  payments that  either  side sought  to

            present at  trial.  When  the belated proffer  of Stanzione's

            testimony was  made, the  district  judge had  only one  more

            piece to fit into  a puzzle with which the judge  was already

            familiar.   On  the facts  before us,  we think  the district

            court  made a legitimate  practical judgment  that converting

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            the  proffer into live testimony would not materially improve

            the court's ability to make this judgment.

                 Finally, Garafano suggests that, in violation of Fed. R.

            Crim. P. 32(c)(3)(C), he was improperly denied an opportunity

            for  allocution  at  his  second  sentencing  hearing.    The

            suggestion is without merit.   This court said in its mandate

            that an opportunity to allocute again should  be afforded "if

            the [district] court does change the factual premise on which

            it  sentences  Garafano" and  "thereby  alters  the guideline

            range available."   36 F.3d at 136.   The district  court did

            not  change either  the  factual predicate  (multiple  bribes

            amounting to $100,000) or the guideline range.

                 At oral argument, counsel  for Garafano suggested  that,

            assuming  that the mandate was complied  with by the district

            court, this court  lacked authority to fashion such a limited

            remand; put differently, the suggestion is that this court by

            vacating   the  original   sentence  automatically   entitled

            Garafano  to  start  from ground  zero,  as  if the  original

            sentencing hearing had  not occurred.  We flatly  reject this

            kind of legal formalism that sacrifices substance in favor of

            ritual.

                 Federal  appellate  courts,   including  the  courts  of

            appeals as well as the Supreme Court, have been granted broad

            authority under 28 U.S.C.   2106 to

                 affirm, modify,  vacate, set aside  or reverse  any
                 judgment,  decree, or  order  of  a court  lawfully

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                 brought  before it for  review, and may  remand the
                 cause  and  direct the  entry  of such  appropriate
                 judgment, decree, or order, or require such further
                 proceedings to  be  had as  may be  just under  the
                 circumstances.

            One  effect  of  this long-established  formula  is  to allow

            appellate courts the  flexibility to adapt their  mandates to

            the particular problem  discerned on appeal and to provide an

            efficient and  sensible solution.  This  provision authorizes

            just the kind of "middle way" that this court adopted when it

            rejected the government's request that we  pose only a single

            question to  the  district court  and Garafano's  alternative

            request that the district court be required to start afresh. 

                 The   reason  why  we  followed  the  middle  course  is

            apparent.  An entirely new sentencing hearing was unnecessary

            if, as we suspected was  the case, the district court had  at

            the  original  sentencing  made  an  independent  finding  of

            multiple  bribes.   On the  other hand,  if (contrary  to our

            expectation)  the  district  judge said  that  he  had relied

            simply on  the jury  verdict, then  some further  proceedings

            would be necessary, and we  wanted the district court to have

            that authority  without having to  report back to  this court

            and obtain a  new mandate.   Accordingly, our limited  remand
                                                          _______

            embraced both possibilities.

                 Of course,  we would not  frame a remand order  that did

            violence to the substance of  Rule 32(c)(3)(C).  That rule is

            designed to  give  the defendant  an opportunity  "to make  a

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            statement  and present any  information in mitigation  of the

            sentence."  Garafano and his  counsel had this opportunity in

            full at the first  hearing.  There is nothing in  the rule or

            its rationale that requires a  defendant to be given a second

            opportunity if all else remains unchanged.

                 In this  case, all  else did  remain unchanged once  the

            district court  reaffirmed its  original finding  of multiple

            bribes, a $100,000  total, and the original  guideline range.

            The defendant had no more right  under these circumstances to

            a new allocution  than to a new presentence  report.  Defense

            counsel's suggestion  that Stanzione's proffer  was something

            on  which to  base a  new allocution,  after the  proffer was

            effectively rejected by the district  judge, is not a serious

            argument.

                 Affirmed.
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