Court Opinion

ID: 9945034
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-26 21:03:08.269805+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:20.379662
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/26/24 P. v. Morfin CA4/3

                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                     FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION THREE

 THE PEOPLE,

      Plaintiff and Respondent,                                        G061381

           v.                                                          (Super. Ct. No. 01WF0782)

 JAMES MORFIN,                                                         OPINION

      Defendant and Appellant.

                   Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County, Julian W.
Bailey, Judge. Reversed and remanded.
                   Valerie G. Wass, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
                   Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Melissa Mandel, Alan L.
Amann and Tami Falkenstein Hennick, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
                                             *               *               *
              In 2001, defendant James Morfin was convicted of first degree murder and
street terrorism and ultimately sentenced to 25 years to life in state prison. The case was
later remanded after a habeas corpus petition was granted, and the defendant’s conviction
was reduced to second degree murder with a sentence of 15 years to life. In 2019, the
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defendant filed a petition under former Penal Code section 1170.95 for resentencing.
After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court determined the defendant was not entitled to
relief because he was a major participant who acted with reckless indifference for human
life.
              The defendant argues the court’s ruling was erroneous because he had not
been convicted on a theory of felony murder, and second degree felony murder no longer
exists. Further, the court never indicated the qualifying felony in which the defendant
had been a major participant. The Attorney General concedes that the court relied on the
inapplicable theory of felony murder as a basis for denying the petition, but contends that
“the court’s ruling that [defendant] was a major participant who acted with reckless
disregard for life is a higher standard and necessarily encompasses a finding that
[defendant] acted with conscious disregard for life as required for implied malice murder,
this court should affirm the court’s denial of the petition.”
              We conclude that the trial court’s reliance on the inapplicable theory of
felony murder mandates both reversal of the order and remand. It is not this court’s role
to determine facts and apply them to the relevant law in the first instance.

1
  Effective June 30, 2022, Penal Code section 1170.95 was renumbered section 1172.6,
with no change in text (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10). Subsequent statutory references are to
the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.

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                                              I
                                          FACTS
              A summary of the facts is set forth in the direct appeal in this matter,
People v. Morfin and Amezola (July 22, 2004, G030390) [nonpub. opn.] (Morfin I). To
summarize briefly, on July 24, 1999, defendant, the leader of the Southside gang, was
attending a party at a home in Huntington Beach. After an altercation, the victim,
Alberto Olmedo, was shot in the head while sitting in the back of a nearby apartment.
Morfin was connected to the murder through the car he was driving, his statements to
other gang members, the gun, and the statements of numerous witnesses. (Morfin I,
supra, G030390.) After the jury convicted him of first degree murder with a gang
enhancement (§§ 187, subd. (a), 186.22, subd. (b)) and street terrorism (§ 186.22,
subd. (a)), the court sentenced him to 25 years to life. This court affirmed. (Morfin I,
supra, G030390.)
              In March 2016, Morfin filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
Pursuant to People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155, he contended he was tried on the
invalid natural and probable consequences doctrine of first degree murder, and because
the record did not establish the jurors based the first degree murder verdict on a valid
theory, his conviction must either be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial, or in
the alternative, his conviction must be reduced to second degree murder. The trial court
granted the petition, vacated the first degree murder conviction, and gave the prosecution
the option of a retrial or accepting a reduction of the conviction to second degree murder.
The prosecution accepted the reduction, and on July 17, 2017, Morfin was resentenced to
15 years to life for second degree murder. He was released from prison on June 7, 2018.
              On May 14, 2019, Morfin filed a petition on his own behalf for
resentencing pursuant to former section 1170.95, as well as a request for judicial notice.
The court appointed the public defender to represent him. Additional briefing followed,
and on March 6, 2020, the court determined Morfin had established a prima facie case for

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relief. The hearing was delayed due to the pandemic, but was eventually held over
several days in December 2021 and May 2022. On the final day of the hearing, the court
denied the petition.
              The court ruled from the bench. The first thing the court stated when
issuing its ruling was “My task, as I see it, is to determine whether or not Mr. Morfin was
a major participant in this killing, this murder. And, if so, whether or not he acted with
reckless indifference to human life.” The court then went on to review the law regarding
that standard (citing by name People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 and People v. Clark
(2016) 63 Cal.4th 522), and determined that Morfin was both a major participant and
acted with the required reckless indifference. Accordingly, the court denied the petition.

                                              II
                                       DISCUSSION
Statutory Context
              Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.), which took effect in January
2019, narrowed or eliminated certain forms of accomplice liability for murder. (Stats.
2018, ch. 1015.) “Senate Bill 1437 altered the substantive law of murder in two areas.
First, with certain exceptions, it narrowed the application of the felony-murder rule . . . .”
(People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 448.) The bill also eliminated the natural and
probable consequences doctrine as it relates to murder. (People v. Lopez (2022) 78
Cal.App.5th 1, 11.)
              In addition to changing the substantive law of murder, Senate Bill No. 1437
also created former section 1170.95, which gave those convicted of first or second degree
murder the right to petition for resentencing under certain circumstances. Effective
January 1, 2022, the Legislature amended former section 1170.95 (now known as
§ 1172.6) to include convictions for attempted murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2; § 1172.6, subd. (a).)

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              The court evaluates petitions under section 1172.6 to determine if the
petition makes a prima facie showing that relief is available, and if so, it issues an order
to show cause (OSC). At the prima facie stage, the “‘bar was intentionally and correctly
set very low.’” (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 972.) If the court finds the
petition meets the prima facie requirements, it issues an OSC and an evidentiary hearing
is held after further briefing. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).)

Standard of Review
              While we review the court’s factual findings for substantial evidence, our
review of any errors of law is de novo. (People v. Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 276,
293; People v. Pacheco (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 118, 123, review granted May 18, 2022,
S274102.)

The Trial Court Applied an Incorrect Standard
              The court in determining that its “task . . . is to determine whether or not
Mr. Morfin was a major participant in this killing, this murder. And, if so, whether or not
he acted with reckless indifference to human life,” it treated Morfin as if he had been
convicted of first degree felony murder, but he had not. At the time of trial, the jury was
instructed on various theories, including first degree premeditated murder,
unpremeditated second degree murder based on express malice, implied malice second
degree murder, and the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter based on heat
of passion. The court instructed the jury on various theories of vicarious liability,
including direct aiding and abetting and the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
As of the time of the hearing, Morfin’s conviction was for second degree murder. He
was not, at any point, convicted of an underlying felony that might serve as the basis for a
first degree felony-murder conviction.

                                               5
              The Attorney General does not contest that the trial court relied on the
incorrect and inapplicable theory of felony murder to deny defendant’s petition.

Remand is Required
              As noted above, the Attorney General asks this court to affirm the trial
court’s denial of the petition regardless of the fact that the court clearly applied the wrong
standard. The Attorney General contends the court’s findings that Morfin was a major
participant in an unstated felony and acted with reckless indifference for human life
“necessarily found [Morfin] aided and abetted an implied malice murder.”
              We disagree. Under current law, “‘[a] participant in the perpetration or
attempted perpetration of a [specified felony] in which a death occurs is liable
for murder only if one of the following is proven: [¶] (1) The person was the actual
killer. [¶] (2) The person was not the actual killer, but, with the intent to kill, aided,
abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted the actual killer
in the commission of murder in the first degree. [¶] (3) The person was a major
participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life, as
described in subdivision (d) of Section 190.2.’” (People v. Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at
p. 448.)
              To convict as an aider and abettor, “the prosecution must prove the person
who is not the actual killer ‘engaged in the requisite acts and had the requisite intent’ to
aid and abet the target crime of murder.” (People v. Pacheco, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at
p. 124.) “‘An aider and abettor must do something and have a certain mental state.’” (Id.
at p. 127.) “‘Thus, proof of [direct] aider and abettor liability requires proof in three
distinct areas: (a) the direct perpetrator’s actus reus—a crime committed by the direct
perpetrator, (b) the aider and abettor’s mens rea—knowledge of the direct perpetrator’s
unlawful intent and an intent to assist in achieving those unlawful ends, and (c) the aider
and abettor’s actus reus—conduct by the aider and abettor that in fact assists the

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achievement of the crime.’” (Ibid.) These are not the same factual inquiries as the ones
required for felony murder.
              By setting the case for an OSC, the trial court has already decided that
Morfin met the essential statutory requirements for a petition under section 1172.6. The
rest of the trial court’s role is to make factual determinations and to apply those facts to
the law, ultimately deciding if the defendant could be convicted of murder today on a
valid theory. We decline the Attorney General’s request to essentially undertake that task
ourselves in the first instance, attempting to reshape the court’s factual determinations
into something new in order to reach its desired conclusion. As a matter of due process
and fundamental fairness, Morfin is entitled to have the trial court evaluate the evidence
under the correct standard and issue a new ruling.

Request for a New Judge
              Morfin requests a different judge on remand. Code of Civil Procedure
170.1, subdivision (c), provides: “At the request of a party or on its own motion an
appellate court shall consider whether in the interests of justice it should direct that
further proceedings be heard before a trial judge other than the judge whose judgment or
order was reviewed by the appellate court.” This statute also applies in criminal cases.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 170.5, subd. (a).)
              Morfin contends that “based on the court’s articulated reasons for denying
appellant’s petition, it is obvious the judge either lacked an adequate understanding of the
current murder laws or flagrantly disregarded them.” While the judge here certainly
erred, we cannot go that far. It did not help that neither party pointed out the error on the
record after the judge’s ruling.

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                                           III
                                    DISPOSITION
              The order denying Morfin’s petition is reversed and the matter remanded
for further proceedings.

                                                 MOORE, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’LEARY, P. J.

GOETHALS, J.

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