Court Opinion

ID: 9428705
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:24:30.279924+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:14.810920
License: Public Domain

Justice Stevens,
dissenting.
The words “transportation in interstate or foreign commerce” appear in a host of federal criminal statutes.1 These statutes prohibit the interstate transportation of stolen motor vehicles, forged checks, prostitutes, explosives, obscene materials, kidnap victims, counterfeit phonograph records, and numerous other items. In all of these statutes the predicate for federal jurisdiction might reasonably be identified in either of two ways: first, as I read the statutory language, it might require that the subject be transported *660across a state line; second, as the Court reads this language, it may merely require that the subject be transported during an interstate journey.
In this case the evidence indicates that petitioner transported stolen checks from Ohio into Pennsylvania. We must assume, because of insufficient contrary evidence, that petitioner did not forge the checks until he was on the Pennsylvania side of his interstate journey. The Court holds that this evidence proves a violation of 18 U. S. C. §2314, which in pertinent part proscribes the transportation in interstate commerce of forged checks.2 According to the Court, a forged check is transported in interstate commerce as long as the check was in a forged condition at some point during the defendant’s journey from one State to another. Consistent with this rationale, it was not even necessary that the Government proved that the checks crossed state lines.3 Under the Court’s analysis, petitioner would have violated § 2314 if he had left his home in Ohio, picked up a forged check in Pittsburgh, and negotiated it in Beaver Falls.4
If the Court’s reading of this language is consistently applied to all of the statutes in which the same jurisdictional predicate appears, this is an extremely important case. If the Court’s holding is limited to the situation in which a check has been carried across a state line and then forged in the *661destination State, the holding is not very significant. Although it would be illogical to limit the holding in that way, a review of the relevant legislative history will demonstrate that the holding should not be extended to its logical conclusion. That review also demonstrates, I believe, that today’s holding does not faithfully reflect the intent of Congress.
I
“[T]he issue in the present case is the meaning that Congress ascribed to the phrase ‘interstate commerce’ in §2314.” Ante, at 647, n. 9. More specifically, the question is “whether the statutory phrase ‘interstate commerce’ comprehends movement of a forged security [wholly] within the destination State,” ante, at 648, or whether petitioner is correct that Congress intended “to limit the reach of that provision to those persons who transport forged securities across state lines,” ante, at 647. For the answer to this question, the Court correctly looks to the legislative history of §3 of the Dyer Act, the precursor of § 2314. The interstate commerce language that was enacted as § 3 of the Dyer Act in 1919 has been retained in § 2314; for our purposes, the subsequent enactments in 1934 and 1939 merely expanded the coverage of § 3 to other types of stolen property and to forged securities, respectively.
Section 3 of the Dyer Act proscribes, in accurate paraphrase, the transportation in interstate commerce of stolen motor vehicles. See 41 Stat. 325. The phrase, standing alone, admittedly is ambiguous. It is clarified by § 2(b) of the same statute, which provides that “[t]he term ‘interstate . . . commerce’ as used in this Act shall include transportation from one State ... to another State.” Ibid. Any lingering ambiguity is dispelled by the legislative history.
The problem that gave rise to the legislation, the House Judiciary Committee reported, was that “[tjhieves steal automobiles and take them from one State to another and oft*662times have associates in this crime who receive and sell the stolen machines.” H. R. Rep. No. 312, 66th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1919) (hereafter H. R. Rep. No. 312). In a discussion of congressional power under the Commerce Clause, the Committee manifested its intention to proscribe only this problem: “The power of the Congress to enact this law and to punish the theft of automobiles in one State and the removing of them into another State can not be questioned,” id., at 3; “[n]o good reason exists why Congress, invested with the power to regulate commerce among the several States, should not provide that such commerce should not be polluted by the carrying of stolen property from one State to another,” id., at 4. In introducing the bill to the House, Representative Dyer opened his remarks by stating that “this bill is for the purpose of providing punishment for those stealing automobiles and automobile trucks and taking them from one State to another State.” 58 Cong. Rec. 5470 (1919). He described §§3 and 4 of-the Act, the precursors of 18 U. S. C. §§2314 and 2315, as follows:
“It provides, gentlemen, for only two things. Section 3 provides for the punishment of a thief stealing a car and transporting it from one State to another. Section 4 provides for the receipt of the stolen car by thieves in another State for the purpose of selling and disposing of it.” 58 Cong. Rec. 5472 (1919).
Representative Igoe stated that “[t]he offense sought to be reached in the act is the transportation, the taking it across the line, taking it from one State to another.” Id., at 5473. Senator Cummins, in introducing the House bill to the Senate, described its purpose to be “to punish the transportation of stolen motor vehicles in interstate or foreign commerce.” Id., at 6433. He explained:
“I want Senators to know what the bill is. The favorite place for such thefts is near a State line, where vehicles are carried quickly across the State line, and there is *663very great difficulty in securing the punishment of the offender. The bill is for the purpose of giving the Federal courts jurisdiction for the punishment of such an offender.” Ibid,.6
Representative Bee, like Representative Reavis, objected to the bill because it “single[d] out automobiles” for special treatment. Id., at 5473. Representative Reavis stated that he would “be very glad indeed to vote for a bill making it a felony to transport stolen property of any kind from one State to another.” Ibid.
The Court’s expansive interpretation of the interstate commerce phrase in § 3 of the Dyer Act is far broader than any that was expressed by the Committees and the Members of the 66th Congress. The Court offers several reasons for its reading of the statute, but none withstands analysis.
A
The Court first reasons that, by using the phrase “transportation in interstate commerce of stolen motor vehicles” in the statute, Congress must have intended to proscribe more than the “transportation across state lines of stolen motor vehicles” or the “interstate transportation of stolen motor vehicles.” The Court’s reasoning from the text, however, is flawed in two respects.
First, the House Report and the Members of Congress who described the Dyer Act proscription as the “interstate *664transportation of stolen motor vehicles,” or some such phrase focusing on state lines, used these phrases interchangeably with the phrase “transportation in interstate commerce of stolen motor vehicles,” which was the formulation included in the proposed and enacted bill. The point is illustrated by Representative Dyer’s descriptions of the interstate commerce element of the bill. For example, the final paragraph of the House Report that he submitted begins with the sentence, “The purpose of the proposed law is to suppress crime in interstate commerce.” H. R. Rep. No. 312, at 4. Two sentences later, however, the Report urges that Congress, pursuant to its power to regulate commerce, should “provide that such commerce should not be polluted by the carrying of stolen property from one State to another.” Ibid. Representative Dyer opened his remarks to the House with the statement that “this bill is for the purpose of providing punishment for those stealing automobiles and automobile trucks and taking them from one State to another State.” 58 Cong. Rec. 5470 (1919). It is inconceivable that Representative Dyer or any of the other legislators who used interchangeably the various phrases6 nevertheless intended the statutory formulation “transportation in interstate commerce of stolen motor vehicles” to mean any more than “interstate transportation of stolen motor vehicles” or “transportation across state fines of stolen motor vehicles” or “transportation of stolen motor vehicles from one State to another.”
The second flaw in the Court’s textual analysis is its reference to 18 U. S. C. § 10 for the definition of “interstate commerce.” See ante, at 648-649. Section 10 provides that “[t]he term ‘interstate commerce’, as used in this title, includes commerce between one State . . . and another State.” It merits reiteration, however, that “interstate commerce” is defined much more narrowly in the Dyer Act and the Na*665tional Stolen Property Act of 1934. Section 2(b) of the Dyer Act provides that the term “shall include transportation from one State ... to another State.” 41 Stat. 325 (emphasis added). Section 2(a) of the 1934 enactment provides that the term “shall mean transportation from one State ... to another State.” 48 Stat. 794 (emphasis added). When Congress revised the Federal Criminal Code in 1948, it consolidated several definitions of “interstate commerce” into § 10. The Reviser’s Notes state only that, “[i]n addition to slight improvements in style, the word ‘commerce’ was substituted for ‘transportation’ in order to avoid the narrower connotation of the word ‘transportation’ since ‘commerce’ obviously includes more than ‘transportation.’” Notes following 18 U. S. C. § 10. For purposes of divining the intent of Congress in enacting the Dyer Act in 1919, the National Stolen Property Act in 1934, and the amendments thereto in 1939, we must refer to the definition by which those Congresses understood the reach of those criminal statutes. .
B
There is a logical explanation — albeit an unarticulated one — for Congress’ use of the arguably broader formulation in the statute when its intent was so clearly less ambitious. This explanation is derived from the part of the legislative history in which the constitutionality of the proposed Dyer Act was justified by reference to this Court’s expositions of the scope of congressional power under the Commerce Clause. The Court infers from one such part of the legislative history that “Congress intended the statutory phrase to be as broad as this Court had used the phrase in Commerce Clause decisions before 1919.” Ante, at 653. If the legislative history is examined through 1919 lenses instead of from a distance of six decades, however, the only supportable conclusion is that Congress used the phrase “interstate commerce” merely to indicate the source of its authority to pro*666scribe conduct that had previously been regulated solely by the States.
In the Court’s words, the House Report “justif[ied] Congress’ authority to enact the Dyer Act by reference to this Court’s decisions holding that Congress has plenary power under the Commerce Clause to regulate interstate commerce.” Ante, at 652. From this discussion in the House Report, the Court draws the conclusion that Congress meant to adopt as the definition of the statutory term this Court’s construction of the constitutional term “interstate commerce.” That conclusion does not logically follow from its premise and is without any support in the legislative history.
The part of the House Report cited by the Court begins with this paragraph:
“The power of the Congress to enact this law and to punish the theft of automobiles in one State and the removing of them into another State can not be questioned, in view of laws of similar nature heretofore enacted by Congress and the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States touching same.” H. R. Rep. No. 312, at 3.
This statement establishes that (1) the objective of the' statute was to proscribe the transportation of a stolen automobile from one State to another, and (2) the House Judiciary. Committee was confident that this objective could be accomplished under the Commerce Clause, as interpreted by this Court. The Report’s discussion of this Court’s decisions justifies the Committee’s confidence in the constitutionality of the Act. Indeed, the penultimate paragraph of the Report explains just how far Congress can act under the Commerce Clause;7 in the paragraph’s closing sentence, which the *667Court quotes, ante, at 650, the Report states that even “[larceny of goods from railroad cars being transported in interstate commerce has . . . been declared a crime by act of Congress.” H. R. Rep. No. 312, at 4. But the Committee had a much more limited objective in proposing the Dyer Act. In the closing paragraph of the Report, it expressly linked its discussion of this Court’s Commerce Clause cases with the statutory objective: “No good reason exists why Congress, invested with the power to regulate commerce among the several States, should not provide that such commerce should not be polluted by the carrying of stolen property from one State to another.” Ibid.
The Committee’s confidence in the constitutionality of the Act was not shared by all Members of Congress. Representative Newton described in detail the practice of automobile thieves of stealing cars and driving them across state lines where they could not be pursued by the police of the first State. See 58 Cong. Rec. 5474-5475 (1919). After summarizing the need for federal legislation,8 he turned to the question of its constitutionality:
*668“But it has been seriously argued by Members of this House that Congress has no power to pass such a law; that such legislation is an invasion of the rights of the States. But if you will study the laws upon kindred subjects heretofore enacted by Congress and will read the decisions of the courts sustaining such laws I do not believe that a doubt will remain in the mind of even the most ardent States-rights advocate as to the powers of Congress upon this subject.” Id., at 5475.
Representative Newton discussed a number of court decisions and repeatedly compared the federal laws therein upheld with the bill Congress was considering:
“In the face of the decisons which I have just read, can there be any question but what an automobile which is stolen in one State and transported across a State line into another State for the purpose of yielding a profit to the person transporting the same constitutes 'interstate commerce’? . . .
“Thus it will be observed that no particular vehicle of transportation is necessary in order to make the article transported interstate commerce, nor is it necesary that the article should be transported for any specific pur-. pose. All that is ..necessary for it to become interstate commerce is that it shall be transported from one State to another, even though it be live stock driven on foot.
“If the driving of diseased cattle from one State to another is interstate commerce, as held in the decision just cited, and as held by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Railroad u Hus[e]n (95 U. S., 465), then the driving of a stolen automobile from one State to another certainly falls within the meaning of that term.
*669“If the transportation of a woman from one State to another, by means of an automobile, for prostitution, constitutes interstate commerce, then how can it be argued, with any show of color, that the driving of a stolen automobile from one State to another for profit is not interstate commerce?” Id., at 5475-5476.
Given these statements in the legislative history and the absence of any indication that any legislator intended the Dyer Act to proscribe more than the transportation of stolen automobiles from one State into another, it is manifest that Congress used the term “interstate commerce” and referred to this Court’s decisions construing the Commerce Clause simply to articulate the source of its authority to proscribe the interstate transportation of stolen automobiles. The Court’s suggestion that Congress incorporated into the statute the constitutional definition of “interstate commerce” is quite implausible.
C
The final leg of the Court’s analysis of the legislative history is the following colloquy between Representatives Anderson and Dyer:
“Mr. ANDERSON. I will ask the gentleman whether the committee meant the same thing in its definition of interstate commerce in section 2 as it meant in section 4?
“Mr. DYER. I think so. If the gentleman will point out wherein it differs, I shall be glad.
“Mr. ANDERSON. In the definition under section 2 interstate commerce means transportation from one State to another, while if you refer to section 4 you find there you have a vehicle or motor car constituting interstate or foreign commerce, and you scarcely have a sensible section.
“Mr. DYER. I will say to the gentleman that if there is any difference there, which I do not see, the matter *670would be construed by the Supreme Court, which has passed many times upon what is meant by interstate and foreign commerce. I think it really is not necessary to put the definition in this bill. It was done at the request of some of the members of the committee. The Supreme Court has decided many times what is interstate commerce. I do not think myself that any definition is necessary.” Id., at 5472.
Since the Court places so much reliance upon Representative Dyer’s answer, see ante, at 650-652, a careful parsing is necessary. Section 2(b) of the bill provided that “[t]he term ‘interstate . . . commerce,’ as used in this Act, shall include transportation from one State ... to another State.” 41 Stat. 325. Section 4 of the bill proscribed the receipt, concealment, storage, bartering, sale, or disposition of any stolen motor vehicle “moving as, or which is a part of, or which constitutes interstate . . . commerce.” Ibid. Representative Anderson’s confusion is understandable: §2 defined interstate commerce in terms of interstate transportation; § 4, however, seemed to indicate that the automobile itself constituted interstate commerce, apart from the transportation of it.9 Representative Dyer obviously did not understand the confusion because he perceived no difference between the two sections insofar as the meaning of “interstate commerce” was concerned. He had no doubt that this Court knew what the term meant and that § 4 would be construed correctly; indeed, he saw no need for the statutory definition of “interstate commerce.” Even if it could be said that Representative Dyer was willing to defer to this Court for the definition of the interstate commerce element of § 4, that is not what Congress did. The Dyer Act as proposed and as enacted in-*671eluded the definition of “interstate commerce” as transportation from one State to another. Moreover, § 4, which contained the confusing reference to interstate commerce, is the precursor of §2315, not the section the Court interprets today. The precursor of § 2314 is § 3 of the Dyer Act, which has nothing to do with Representative Anderson’s confusion and Representative Dyer’s answer.
Interestingly, another colloquy, this one between Representatives Hastings and Saunders, also indicates the confusion about the meaning of § 4 of the bill:
“Mr. HASTINGS. I want to direct the gentleman’s attention to section 4. Suppose an automobile is stolen, say, in the State of Virginia at some one point and is transported to some other point in the State of Virginia and sold to some one there who knows that property to have been stolen, would that be a Federal offense under section 4?
“Mr. SAUNDERS of Virginia. I think not. How would it be? Up to that point what has been done has not reached the dignity of a Federal offense. The Federal offense begins when there is a movement in interstate commerce.
“Mr. HASTINGS. Section 4 provides that anyone receiving stolen property knowing it to have been stolen, and it does not require it to have gone across State lines, as you will perceive if you read section 4 closely.
“Mr. SAUNDERS of Virginia. The gentleman did not read the language in line 10, which says:
Moving as, or which is a part of, or which constitutes interstate or foreign commerce.
“And that answers the difficulty of the gentleman from Oklahoma.” 58 Cong. Rec. 5477 (1919).
Immediately after this colloquy, Representative Dyer asked for a vote, and the House passed the bill. If we were construing § 2315, which is the successor to § 4 of the Dyer Act, *672then this colloquy would seem to indicate that § 4 requires the automobile to have crossed state lines, notwithstanding the confusing reference to “interstate commerce” in that section and Representative Dyer’s answer to Representative Anderson’s observation. In any event, we are not construing §2315, but §2314, and the definition of “interstate commerce” included in the Dyer Act, as well as the statute’s legislative history, clearly indicates that §3, the precursor of § 2314, proscribed only the transportation across state lines of stolen automobiles.
II
The National Stolen Property Act, enacted in 1934, merely extended the Dyer Act to the transportation in interstate commerce of other types of stolen property.10 The Act was passed with little debate, but its legislative history confirms the points made above. As they did in 1919, the Committees and Members of Congress used the phrase “transportation in interstate commerce of stolen property” interchangeably with such phrases as “interstate transportation of stolen property” or “transportation across state lines of stolen property.” The Senate Judiciary Committee Report described the Dyer Act as “concerned [with] interstate transportation of stolen motor vehicles.” S. Rep. No. 538, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1934). The House Judiciary Committee Report stated that “[t]his bill is designed to punish interstate transportation of stolen property, securities, or money.” H. R. Rep. No. 1462, 73d Cong, 2d Sess. , 2 (1934). It also noted *673that “[previous Congresses have considered bills providing punishment for interstate shipment of stolen property.” Ibid. Senator Ashurst told the Senate: “Gangsters who now convey stolen property, except vehicles, across the State line, with that immemorial gesture of derision, thumb their nose at the officers. This bill extends the provisions of the [Dyer Act] to other stolen property described in the bill.” 78 Cong. Rec. 6981 (1934). Also like the legislative history of the Dyer Act, the Reports in 1934 substantiated the constitutionality of the enactment, this time by reference to the decisions upholding the Dyer Act. See S. Rep. No. 538, supra, at 2; H. R. Rep. No. 1462, supra, at 2.
The Reports made an additional point that merits consideration. The Department of Justice, in a memorandum reprinted in the Senate Report, explained the troubles that previous attempts at extending the Dyer Act to other stolen property had faced:
“The explanation for the opposition to federalizing such crimes was in the concern which had developed at that time over the burdening of the Federal machinery for administering criminal justice. It was for this reason also that the Senate failed to pass a similar bill in 1930. The heavy burden placed on the Federal Government by the Dyer Act, which concerned interstate transportation .of stolen motor vehicles, had then become apparent.” S. Rep. No. 538, supra, at 2.
The Senate bill therefore limited federal jurisdiction to cases involving stolen property worth $1,000 or more. The House increased the limit to $5,000, with this explanation:
“It is believed that it would place too great a burden on the Department of Justice to ask it to undertake to apprehend and prosecute every person violating the substantive provisions of such a“Iaw without regard to the amount of property involved. The minimum valuations *674fixed in the bill required to give the Federal Government jurisdiction are the figures asked and recommended by the Attorney General.” H. R. Rep. No. 1462, swpra, at 2.
The Senate acceded to the increase. The point to be made is that Congress recognized that federal law enforcement authorities had limited resources. This recognition makes it all the more likely that Congress did not intend in 1934 to extend its proscription beyond the interstate transportation of stolen property.
Ill
Quoting from United States v. Sheridan, 329 U. S. 379, 384, the Court declares that “in [enacting] §2314 Congress ‘contemplated coming to the aid of the states in detecting and punishing criminals whose offenses are complete under state law, but who utilize the channels of interstate commerce to make a successful getaway and thus make the state’s detecting and punitive processes impotent.’” Ante, at 654. Ironically, this quote actually refutes the- Court’s position. The Court assumes, as it must, that the state offense committed by petitioner — forging a check — was committed in Pennsylvania rather than in Ohio, from which petitioner commenced his interstate journey. This is not a case, therefore, in which the defendant’s offense was complete under state law before he crossed state lines to make his. getaway. Rather, this is a case in which the defendant crossed state lines and then committed the underlying state offense.11 It is even more ironic that, although the issue of the meaning of the interstate commerce phrase of § 2314 was not before the Court in Sheridan, the Court thrice referred to that element as the “interstate transportation” of forged securities. See 329 U. S., at 384, 385, 387. Remarkably, the Court today places so much significance upon the statutory formulation of the in*675terstate commerce element of § 2314 even though in referring to that element the Committees and Members of the 1919 and 1934 Congresses, as well this Court in Sheridan, repeatedly-used the formulation that the Court rejects today as too narrow.
IV
The petitioner’s argument that he was prosecuted and convicted under the wrong statute may generate little sympathy.12 Our primary concern, however, is not with the fate of this defendant. Rather, our concern is to identify the scope of the Federal Government’s responsibility for law enforcement. That scope is a matter for Congress to determine. ■In this case, it is clear to me that the Court has allowed the prosecutor to encroach into an area of state responsibility and to cross a line that Congress has drawn. I therefore respectfully dissent.

 See, e. g., 18 U. S. C. §844(d) (explosives); 18 U. S. C. §924(b) (1976 ed., Supp. IV) (firearms); 18 U. S. C. § 1201(a)(1) (1976 ed., Supp. IV) (kidnaping); 18 U. S. C. § 1231 (strikebreaking); 18 U. S. C. § 1301 (lotteries); 18 U. S. C. §1465 (obscenity); 18 U. S. C. §§2251, 2252 (1976 ed., Supp. IV) (sexual exploitation of children); 18 U. S. C. § 2312 (stolen motor vehicles and aircraft); 18 U. S. C. §2314 (other stolen property); 18 U. S. C. §2318 (1976 ed., Supp. IV) (counterfeit phonograph records); 18 U. S. C. §2421 (prostitution); 18 U. S. C. §§ 2511(l)(b)(iii), 2512(1) (electronic eavesdropping).

 Section 2314 also requires proof that the defendant knew that the transported checks were forged. This element is not at issue here.

 The instructions of the trial court required proof that the check had moved from Ohio to Pennsylvania, see ante, at 645-646, n. 6, but the Court’s interpretation of the statute would apply equally to a forged check picked up in the destination State. For the Court the test is whether there was “movement” of the contraband “within the destination State.” Ante, at 648. The Court of Appeals’ position is unclear. See 644 F. 2d 274, 282, n. 1 (CA3 1981) (Garth, J., concurring and dissenting).

 Likewise, a transcontinental hitchhiker who stole a car in Pittsburgh and abandoned it in Philadelphia would have violated the Dyer Act.

 Later, Senator Cummins further described the House bill:
“The practice is to steal an automobile close to a State line and run it across the State line. The first section is intended to punish anyone who does that thing, knowing the vehicle to have been stolen. The further practice is, if possible, to dispose of the vehicle to some other party, confederate or otherwise, when it gets across the State line, and section 4 is for the purpose of punishing a man who barters or sells or disposes of the property with intent to deprive the owner of the possession thereof, or if he conceals it knowing it to have been stolen. I think that would probably embrace every case that could be reached.” 58 Cong. Rec. 6434 (1919).

 See, e. g., id., at 5472-5473 (Rep. Reavis); id., at 5473 (Rep. Igoe); id., at 5474 — 5476 (Rep. Newton); id., at 6433-6434 (Sen. Cummins).

 “Congress has enacted various laws for the regulation of interstate commerce which have uniformly been sustained by the courts. Among them are those relating to the use of safety appliances, hours of labor of employees, monthly reports of accidents, arbitration of controversies between railroads and their employees, the exclusion of impure goods and lot*667tery tickets, employers’ liability, etc. Specific reference may be made to the interstate commerce act, wherein interstate commerce railroads are forbidden to form combinations or pools for the maintenance of rates, and also the antitrust act of July 2,1890, wherein every contract combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States was declared a crime, and made punishable as such. Larceny of goods from railroad cars being transported in interstate commerce has also been declared a crime by act of Congress.” H. R. Rep. No. 312, at 4.

 “That there is a crying need for relief from this rapidly growing evil there can be no question. That the States have been unable to effectively deal with the problem has been fully demonstrated. I have no doubt but that 90 per cent of the cars that are stolen and not recovered cross State lines before they are disposed of. The use which the automobile thief is making of interstate commerce takes him into a sphere which is beyond the reach of State control, and into a field where he can operate with security and where he will continue to do so until Congress asserts its power by the passage of a bill such as the one now under consideration.” 58 Cong. Rec. 5475 (1919).

 This is the section that Representative Dyer had just previously described as providing for the punishment of “the receipt of the stolen car by thieves in another State for the purpose of selling and disposing of it.” Id., at 5472.

 In the 1934 National Stolen Property Act, Congress adopted a slightly different definition of “interstate commerce” than the one included in the 1919 Dyer Act. Section 2(b) of the Dyer Act provides that the term shall include transportation from one State to another State, whereas § 2(a) of the 1934 enactment provides that the terms shall mean transportation from one State to another State. There is no reason to believe that one definition was intended to be any broader than the other. But see the Court’s curious discussion, ante, at 650-652, n. 14.

 The evidence does not indicate where petitioner traveled after the forgeries.

 Petitioner concedes that he violated 18 U. S. C. §2315, the successor to §4 of the Dyer Act. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 11. Petitioner might also have violated other paragraphs of §2314. See 644 F. 2d, at 285 (Higginbotham, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Tr. of Oral Arg. 18.