Court Opinion

ID: 9529301
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:49:38.596198+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:43.971852
License: Public Domain

CHIEF JUSTICE FREEMAN, concurring in part and dissenting in part: I agree with that portion of the court’s judgment holding that the defendant must refile his tort counterclaims in the Court of Claims. I disagree, however, with the determination that the counterclaim seeking ejectment of the state from the land at issue may properly be asserted in the circuit court. I therefore respectfully dissent from that portion of today’s opinion. As the majority observes, actions against the State of Illinois may not be brought in any court except as permitted under the Court of Claims Act (Act). Sass v. Kramer, 72 Ill. 2d 485 (1978). Consistent with this principle, a counterclaim against the state that would otherwise fall under the bar of sovereign immunity may not be asserted in the circuit court, but must be filed as provided under the Act. See, e.g., Gorman, 111 Ill. App. 3d 729. This court has determined that disputes involving property of which the state is the record titleholder constitute “actions against the State” under the Act, and thus are within the exclusive province of the Court of Claims. Gordon v. Department of Transportation, 99 Ill. 2d 44 (1983); see also Sass, 72 Ill. 2d at 490-91. The Court of Claims also possesses sole jurisdiction over all claims against the state “founded upon any law of the State.” 705 ILCS 505/8(a) (West 1996). The majority contends that, because the counterclaim at issue, like the state’s complaint, sought an adjudication of the correct boundary line between the defendant’s property and the state park, it was merely “defensive in nature” and was “asserted for the purpose of defeating the state’s action” rather than for “obtaining an affirmative judgment against the state.” 184 Ill. 2d at 249-50. However, this ignores the fact that the counterclaim also explicitly demanded that “the [state] be ejected from [defendant’s] property.” As a basis for.this demand, the defendant alleged that the state had illicitly “entered upon, placed new boundary signs upon, trespassed upon and *** exercised dominion and possession over” that portion of the land belonging to the defendant. An action in ejectment is an affirmative, statutory claim which must be pleaded and proved. See 735 ILCS 5/6—101 et seq. (West 1994); Dagit v. Childerson, 391 Ill. 611 (1945); Bulatovic v. Dobritchanin, 252 Ill. App. 3d 122, 128 (1993). In the event the defendant in this case prevails on his claim as to the proper boundary line, the court will be required to enter an order ousting the state from its current possession of the land, thus entering an “affirmative judgment against the State.” For this reason, as well as the fact that the counterclaim was “founded upon [a] law of the State” (705 ILCS 505/8(a) (West 1996)), the claim must be brought in the Court of Claims as required under the Act.