Court Opinion

ID: 9776546
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:38:55.395718+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:39.655502
License: Public Domain

VANCE, Justice,
dissenting.
Respectfully, I dissent. We have repeatedly held that when there are two reasonable interpretations of the language of an act of the General Assembly, one of which would uphold the constitutionality of *954the act, and the other of which would render it unconstitutional, it is the duty of the Court to uphold the constitutionality of the act.
The majority opinion invalidates the laws of Kentucky pertaining to “vote buying” and leaves us defenseless against election frauds because of the virtual impossibility of drafting a statute which specifically denominates in every instance the exact limits at which attempts to influence voters passes beyond that which is considered permissible and thereby becomes impermissible.
I believe the majority opinion goes astray in its interpretation of the word “influence” as used in the statute. Influence comes in all sizes, shapes, and degrees. When a bank robber stands at a teller’s cage and demands money, he is attempting to influence the actions of the teller. This constitutes an attempt to influence in an obligatory manner in which the person sought to be influenced is obligated to respond.
But many attempts to influence are simply efforts to- persuade, and the person sought to be influenced is not obligated in any degree whatsoever.
I would interpret the word “influence,” as used in the statute, to mean influence which seeks to obligate rather than influence which only seeks to persuade.
Thus, when a candidate gives a voter a candidate card or a pencil with his name on it, or when he purchases advertisements in the media, he is seeking to influence voters by persuasion, but they do not incur thereby any obligation to him. On the other hand, when a candidate offers a person $10.00 to vote for him, it is his intention, at least, that the recipient of the money will be obligated to so vote. This is an attempt to use obligatory influence and would violate the statute. Likewise, the gift of anything of such great value as would, within reason, constitute an attempt to create an obligation on the part of the recipient would violate the statute.
This places a burden upon the citizenry to use common sense and reason in drawing the line between what is acceptable and what is not acceptable, but this court has held in O’Leary v. Commonwealth, Ky., 441 S.W.2d 150 (1969):
“It is firmly established that a criminal law is not unconstitutional merely because it throws upon people the risk of rightly estimating a matter of degree which deals with fixed and actual, as distinguished from imaginary and unas-certained, conditions.”
The risk of rightly estimating when the gift by a candidate of things of value goes beyond that which can, under the circumstances, reasonably constitute payment for services rendered and becomes, in fact, an attempt to purchase the vote or influence of the recipient does not render the statute invalid. The standard is reasonableness, and reasonableness is an acceptable measure of conduct.
There is no question whatever but that a person of ordinary understanding would comprehend that the acts with which appel-lees are charged would violate K.R.S. 119.-205. They cannot claim that because of its vagueness they did not understand that the conduct of which they are accused is illegal.
Although they are not charged with the offer of a thing of insignificant intrinsic value such as a candidate card or a pencil in an effort to persuade, they contend the statute must be struck down in its entirety because conceivably some person some day might be so charged. I would interpret the statute in such a manner that it does not criminalize conduct which is intended only to exercise an influence to persuade as contrasted with conduct which is intended to obligate a voter.
I would uphold the constitutionality of K.R.S. 119.205 against the challenge presented by these appellees.
GANT and WINTERSHEIMER, JJ„ join in this dissent.