Court Opinion

ID: 9852277
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:27:34.377824+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:24.931554
License: Public Domain

Eldridge, Judge,
dissenting.
1. Vogleson did not object to the trial court’s ruling that he was not to go into mandatory minimum sentencing requirements. His only response to the court’s ruling was to state, “Okay,” and then to inform the jury anyway that Damon Wilson had saved himself 15 years by pleading to a lesser offense than trafficking. Vogleson “cannot submit to the ruling or otherwise acquiesce in the holding or response and then complain of the same on appeal; he must stand his ground.”31 There is no basis for reversal since this issue is waived.
2. The jury was informed that Vogleson’s co-defendant, Wilson, received ten years to serve pursuant to a plea to a lesser offense than the trafficking for which he was co-indicted. On cross-examination, the trial court ruled only that Vogleson could not bring out the mandatory minimum sentence Wilson would have gotten for trafficking had he not pled: ‘We don’t talk about mandatory sentences. We don’t talk about that stuff.”
Vogleson’s lawyer, however, disregarded the trial court’s ruling and stated before the jury that “You [Wilson] are saving yourself 15 years, aren’t you?” The trial court did not strike the question, but reinforced defense counsel’s assertion by immediately declaring before the jury that counsel had “completely disregarded” the court’s *564ruling not to go into the mandatory minimum sentence.
In fact, the mandatory minimum sentence for trafficking in the indicted amount of cocaine is 25 years.32 While the majority dismisses defense counsel’s question as “not evidence,” that view ignores the realities of the courtroom wherein a jury can and does consider the implications contained in a statement of fact masquerading as a “question.” This reality has been the basis for many a motion for mistrial, corrective instruction, and reversal.33 No. Vogleson’s lawyer rang that bell, and the average juror can add the ten years Wilson received and the fifteen years defense counsel informed them Wilson “saved himself” in order to arrive at the mandatory minimum sentence. Pretermitting error, Vogleson made his point to the jury about the discrepancy between the specific amount of time Wilson received and the specific amount of time he avoided — which point was reinforced by the trial court. Accordingly, there is no requisite showing of harm, and Vogleson’s claim of error provides no basis for reversal of his criminal conviction.34
3. The injection of sentence in a jury’s deliberation as to guilt or innocence is improper.35 It is error to instruct the jury as to a possible sentence in a felony case before the jury has determined the question of guilt or innocence.36 In most cases, an accomplice is indicted, either directly or as a party, for the same offenses as the defendant and is facing the same sentencing provisions for those offenses. Thus, introduction of testimony about the specific mandatory minimum sentence the accomplice avoided via a plea to a lesser offense lets the jury know the specific sentence the defendant will receive if a verdict of guilty is returned on the indicted charge.
So too, in this case, Wilson was indicted for the same trafficking offense as Vogleson. Had he not pled guilty to a lesser offense, Wilson was facing the same mandatory minimum sentence for trafficking that Vogleson faced during trial. The single cross-examination question in dispute, while in the guise of an exposé of bias, would have permitted the injection of the specific mandatory sentence for trafficking into the jury’s deliberations of Vogleson’s guilt or innocence of that offense. This is error.37
*565Further, I question the majority’s contention that the specific amount of prison time avoided was “the most important aspect of Wilson’s deal.” The purpose of Vogleson’s cross-examination was to demonstrate a motive for Wilson to take the stand and say damaging things about him on behalf of the State. To that end, Vogleson does not argue and nothing compels the conclusion that a reasonable jury might have received a significantly different impression of Wilson’s credibility had they been informed that Wilson avoided “fifteen years,” as opposed to “a very lengthy prison sentence” or “years and years of jail time.” In this case, the issue is that Wilson avoided significant jail time in exchange for testimony. The issue is not the specific amount of the significant jail time he avoided. The addition of the latter information serves only to inform the jury that Vogleson will receive such jail time if convicted, even though Wilson did not. This is error.
4. Finally, there is no conflict between Hernandez v. State38 and the cases sought to be disapproved by the majority.39 In that regard, it is not only important, it is determinative to recognize the posture in which Hernandez came to us:
Hernandez was not an appeal from a criminal conviction with an enumeration of error claiming defendant was denied his constitutional right to a thorough and sifting cross-examination, as in this case. Hernandez was an appeal from the trial court’s denial of a plea in bar of double jeopardy.
The issue in Hernandez was not the scope of the right to cross-examine, as in this case. It was whether a cross-examination question which violated a trial court’s ruling justified the granting of a State’s mistrial motion on the basis of “manifest necessity”: “the manifest necessity for a mistrial can exist alongside less drastic alternatives, so long as the record discloses that the trial court considered alternatives before declaring mistrial.”40
And so, in Hernandez, we examined the basis for the State’s mistrial motion as demonstrating a manifest necessity therefor:
During the jury trial, Hernandez cross-examined his co-defendant, Diaz, about Diaz’s prior negotiated plea to a lesser offense and reduced sentence in exchange for State’s testimony. This questioning went without objection. Hernandez then asked Diaz if, by his plea, he had avoided a specific mandatory minimum sentence. The State moved for mistrial specifically based on a violation of OCGA *566§ 17-8-7641 and claimed manifest necessity. Mistrial was granted on such basis without considering alternatives, because the “prosecutor simply did not know what th[e] remedy would be.”42
On appeal of the denial of Hernandez’s subsequent plea in bar, we found no manifest necessity for mistrial. In so doing, we held: (a) that defense counsel’s questioning did not violate OCGA § 17-8-76. “OCGA § 17-8-76 prohibits only argument that a defendant may not serve the full amount of his sentence; it does not prohibit even making argument in this regard concerning a witness”-,43 (b) that questioning an accomplice about his deal with the State is a constitutionally protected form of cross-examination: “the exposure of a witness’ motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination”;44 and (c) that, within the context of the constitutionally protected cross-examination, the State could have addressed its concerns about revealing mandatory minimum sentencing by “mov[ing] in limine to limit cross-examination. If genuine concerns existed they could have been addressed by establishing proper boundaries or by carefully instructing the jury.”45 These alternatives were not even considered in Hernandez. So, we found that a “manifest necessity” for mistrial was not shown: “the cross-examination was proper and . . . the prosecutor’s concerns could have been alleviated short of a mistrial [. N]o such manifest necessity existed here.”46
Thus, contrary to the majority’s assertion, we did not hold in Hernandez that a defendant has a “constitutional right” to inject sentencing considerations into the jury’s deliberations and reveal the mandatory minimum sentence an accomplice would have received. Instead, we determined that a cross-examination question as to a mandatory minimum sentence was properly subject to a pretrial motion in limine or, if asked during trial, subject to a corrective instruction, which actions were not taken by the State.47 As such, Hernandez offers no “additional protection” to a defendant’s constitutional right of confrontation so as to warrant reversal of Whitlock v. *567State and Ross v. State. A cross-examination question about a specific mandatory minimum sentence is improper under all three cases.
As the single cross-examination question about which Vogleson complains could have been excluded in limine pursuant to Hernandez, it follows that the trial court’s exclusion of such question during the trial of this case does not demonstrate an abuse of discretion: “[t]he trial court. . . retains wide latitude to impose reasonable limits on cross-examination, based on such concerns as the prevention of prejudice and of questioning on subjects that are only marginally relevant.”48 Here, multiple cross-examination questions about Wilson’s plea to a lesser offense and reduced sentence in exchange for State’s testimony were permitted. As noted by the majority, “[m]uch of Wilson’s deal with the State was revealed.” In this case, “the transcript is clear that the trial court restricted him only from asking questions couched in terms of ‘mandatory minimum sentence.’ [Vogleson] was free to question the co-defendant [ ] as to [his] understanding of the possible sentence, as long as the jury was not informed of the mandatory minimum sentence for [trafficking] .”49
In sum, the issue upon which the majority reverses was waived by Vogleson’s failure to object to the trial court’s ruling. Further, the information about which Vogleson complains was put before the jury despite the trial court’s ruling. Finally, under Hernandez, Ross, and Whitlock, the single question about the mandatory sentence Wilson would have received was properly kept out as an injection of punishment for the indicted crime. Thus, reversal of neither judgment nor precedent is warranted.
I am authorized to state that Chief Judge Blackburn and Presiding Judge Andrews join in this dissent.

 Wilburn v. State, 199 Ga. App. 667, 669 (2) (405 SE2d 889) (1991). See also Cox v. State, 242 Ga. App. 334, 339 (10) (528 SE2d 871) (2000); James v. Tyler, 215 Ga. App. 479, 480-481 (451 SE2d 506) (1994); Warsham v. State, 200 Ga. App. 322 (2) (408 SE2d 122) (1991).

 OCGA § 16-13-31 (a) (1) (C).

 See, e.g., King v. State, 273 Ga. 258, 273 (30) (539 SE2d 783) (2000); Goss Bros. Trucking v. Ashley, 228 Ga. App. 354, 356 (492 SE2d 7) (1997); Willett v. State, 223 Ga. App. 866, 868 (1) (479 SE2d 132) (1996).

 Copeland v. State, 235 Ga. App. 682, 685 (2) (b) (510 SE2d 124) (1998). See also Sanders v. State, 181 Ga. App. 117, 121-122 (3) (351 SE2d 666) (1986).

 Green v. State, 206 Ga. App. 539, 541 (2) (426 SE2d 65) (1992).

 Bellamy v. State, 272 Ga. 157, 159 (4) (527 SE2d 867) (2000); Ford v. State, 232 Ga. 511, 518-519 (14) (207 SE2d 494) (1974).

 Fletcher v. State, 197 Ga. App. 112, 113 (3) (397 SE2d 605) (1990). See Bellamy v. State, supra at 159.

 244 Ga. App. 874 (537 SE2d 149) (2000).

 Whitlock v. State, 239 Ga. App. 763, 766 (2) (521 SE2d 901) (1999); Ross v. State, 231 Ga. App. 506, 509 (3) (499 SE2d 351) (1998).

 (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Banks v. State, 230 Ga. App. 258, 263, fn. 27 (495 SE2d 877) (1998).

 No attorney at law in a criminal case shall argue to or in the presence of the jury that a defendant, if convicted, may not be required to suffer the full penalty imposed by.the court or jury because pardon, parole, or clemency of any nature may be granted by the Governor, the State Board of Pardons and Paroles, or other proper authority vested with the right to grant clemency.
OCGA § 17-8-76 (a).

 Hernandez v. State, supra at 875.

 (Emphasis in original.) Id. at 876 (1).

 (Punctuation omitted.) Id. at 877 (1) (c).

 Id.

 Id. at 878 (2).

 Id. at 878, citing Steele v. State, 181 Ga. App. 695, 696 (1) (353 SE2d 612) (1987) (curative instructions suffice when sentencing issues improperly interjected during trial).

 Whitlock v. State, supra at 766 (2).

 See Ross v. State, supra at 509 (3). See also Hodo v. State, 272 Ga. 272, 275 (528 SE2d 250) (2000).