Court Opinion

ID: 996725
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2013-07-04 00:54:56.00224+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:17:52.673449
License: Public Domain

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.                                                                    No. 97-7854

JEROME WALKER,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk.
Rebecca B. Smith, District Judge.
(CR-94-133, CA-97-758-2)

Submitted: September 15, 1998

Decided: October 29, 1998

Before MURNAGHAN and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and
HALL, Senior Circuit Judge.

_________________________________________________________________

Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

Jerome Walker, Appellant Pro Se. Kevin Michael Comstock, OFFICE
OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Norfolk, Virginia, for
Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).
OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Appellant appeals the district court's order dismissing his motion
filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West 1994 & Supp. 1998), as barred
by the one-year limitation period imposed by the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat.
1214 (effective Apr. 24, 1996). Section 2255 states that petitioners for
collateral relief have one year from "the date on which the judgment
of conviction becomes final" to file a motion under that statute.
Appellant's § 2255 motion was dated July 28, 1997, and filed July 31.
Because the district court found that Appellant's judgment became
final on the date of this court's affirmance of his convictions and sen-
tence (July 25, 1996), the district court dismissed Appellant's motion
as untimely.

However, a conviction becomes "final," for purposes of § 2255, on
the date when the petitioner could no longer seek direct review. See
United States v. Simmonds, 111 F.3d 737, 744 (10th Cir. 1997)
(deciding that conviction became final after the Supreme Court
denied certiorari); see also 28 U.S.C.A.§ 2244 (West 1994 & Supp.
1998) (providing, for motions attacking state court convictions, that
a judgment becomes "final by the conclusion of direct review or the
expiration of the time for seeking such review"). An appellant's direct
review procedure terminates when his or her petition for certiorari is
denied or when the deadline for seeking a writ of certiorari has
expired. See Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518 (1997) (determining
finality for purposes of Teague v. Lane); Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S.
255, 258 n.1 (1986) (same).

Because Appellant did not file a petition for a writ of certiorari, his
judgment was not final until 90 days after this court rendered its opin-
ion, or October 23, 1996. See Sup. Ct. R. 13(1). Appellant's motion
was, therefore, not time barred, as he indisputably filed it before the
October 23, 1997, deadline. Accordingly, we grant a certificate of
appealability, vacate the district court's order, and remand for further
proceedings. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

VACATED AND REMANDED

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