Court Opinion

ID: 9947951
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-05 22:03:15.686038+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:28:47.688744
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/5/24 P. v. Lopez CA6
                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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                  IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 THE PEOPLE,                                                          H050372
                                                                     (Santa Clara County
             Plaintiff and Respondent,                                Super. Ct. No. C1119504)

             v.

 FERNANDO MATEO LOPEZ,

             Defendant and Appellant.

         This matter is one of two pending appeals from defendant Fernando Mateo Lopez,
who was convicted by a jury of second degree murder and other offenses with gang and
firearm enhancements for a gang-related drive-by shooting. A different panel of this
court conditionally reversed the judgment in 2020 to allow the trial court to determine
whether to strike previously mandatory firearm enhancements. In this appeal, defendant
contends the trial court abused its discretion on remand when it declined to strike those
enhancements. He also argues the gang and firearm enhancements must be reversed
because of changes to the gang statute that became effective while this appeal was
pending.1 For the reasons stated here, we will reverse the judgment and remand the
matter for possible retrial on the gang and firearm enhancements.

         In defendant’s other appeal (case No. H050242), which we dispose of by
         1

separate opinion, defendant challenges the trial court’s denial of his petition for
resentencing under former Penal Code section 1170.95 (now Penal Code section 1172.6).
                          I.   TRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS
       The 2020 opinion affirming defendant’s judgment on direct appeal accurately
summarized the factual background and charges in the case: “Defendant and four
companions drove by a group of teenagers gathered in front of an apartment complex.
They fired into the group, killing a 14-year-old girl and injuring three other teens.
Defendant and Ricardo Salvador Diaz were charged after a preliminary hearing with:
special circumstances murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 190.2, subd. (a)(21)–(22); count 1);
five counts of attempted murder with premeditation (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 189, 664,
subd. (a); counts 2 – 6); and three counts of shooting at an inhabited dwelling (Pen. Code,
§ 246; counts 7 – 9). All counts were alleged to have been committed for the benefit of a
criminal street gang (Pen. Code, § 186.22, subd. (b)(4), (5)), and during which a principal
intentionally used a firearm (an SKS assault rifle) to inflict great bodily injury or death on
a person other than an accomplice (Pen. Code, § 12022.53, subds. (d), (e)(1)).” (People
v. Lopez (June 17, 2020, H043949) [nonpub. opn.].)2 Defendant was tried with
accomplice Primitivo Hernandez. We summarize the trial evidence relevant to the
limited issues raised in this new appeal.
   A. ACCOMPLICE DIAZ’S TESTIMONY
       Accomplice Ricardo Diaz testified for the prosecution against defendant. He
testified that he and Esmeling Bahena exchanged text messages in November 2011 about
their windows having been damaged and wanting “to look for retaliation.” He was a
Sureño gang member at the time. Diaz had seen “Northerners” break his car windows
and wanted to retaliate against “any Northerner that [they] saw.” Bahena proposed that
they drive to Gilroy to pick up guns from people he knew. Bahena picked up Diaz and
Ramon Gutierrez. They drove to Gilroy, where they met defendant and Primitivo

       2
       We have taken judicial notice of the records in case Nos. H043949 and
H050242.
                                              2
Hernandez. Defendant indicated he had guns, and the five men drove to defendant’s
house to get them.
       Diaz testified that the men were seated in the following arrangement: Diaz drove,
Bahena sat in the front passenger seat, defendant sat behind Diaz, Gutierrez sat in the
middle back seat, and Hernandez sat in the remaining rear seat. Defendant retrieved from
his house something wrapped in a big towel that was large enough to hold a rifle. The
men agreed to go looking for “Nortenos.” Using a handgun he got from defendant,
Bahena fired at a suspected Norteño they drove past in Gilroy. The individual ran away,
and Diaz drove the men back to Morgan Hill.
       Bahena directed Diaz to a park where Norteños were known to hang out. The men
saw a group standing nearby, and someone in the car said the group included Norteños.
Diaz drove slowly past the group. Someone in the back seat fired five to seven shots at
the group using an SKS rifle. Diaz did not see who fired the gun, but saw a muzzle flash
on the right (passenger) side of the car. They drove from the scene after the shots were
fired. Diaz pleaded guilty to one count of murder and one count of attempted murder
related to the shooting.
   B. GANG EXPERT TESTIMONY
       Sergeant Mario Ramirez of the Morgan Hill Police Department testified as an
expert on the Norteño and Sureño gangs in Morgan Hill and Gilroy. The Sureño gang is
associated with the color blue, the number 13, and the letter M (the 13th letter of the
alphabet). The number and letter both refer to the Mexican Mafia, the parent
organization that oversees the Sureño gang. They also use the nickname “Sur” to
describe the gang. Tattoos can indicate gang affiliation, and a non-gang member who
gets a gang-related tattoo is likely to be assaulted. Their rivals are the Norteños, who are
associated with the color red, the number 14, and the letter N. Ramirez testified that the
shooting occurred at a known meeting point for Norteño gang members.

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       Ramirez described that power, violence, and respect are important traits for
Sureños. A gang gains power by committing crimes within the community, including
“vandaliz[ing] areas by marking their territory, doing assaults on individuals.”
Retaliating against a rival gang shows that the gang is not weak.
       Ramirez testified that the Sureño gang’s primary activities include murder, assault
with a deadly weapon (including shootings), vehicle theft, car break-ins, and vandalism.
As evidence of a pattern of criminal gang activity, the prosecution relied on two cases
resulting in multiple convictions. The first was a car vandalism case Ramirez personally
investigated. Ramirez testified that the defendant in that case (Luis Pacheco) was a
Sureño gang member who broke the windows of a Norteño gang member’s car; Pacheco
was convicted of vandalism. The second case led to the convictions of Julio Larios,
Celso Flores, and Ricardo Montoya for assault with a deadly weapon with gang
enhancements. Evidence about that case came from Gilroy Police Department Sergeant
Chad Gallacinao, who testified that in May 2009 he witnessed four subjects beating
someone with their hands and feet. One of them was also making stabbing motions
toward the victim with a white metal object. The victim was wearing red clothing.
Police found a screwdriver inside a blue bandana in the route used by one of the
assailants to flee the scene. Based on Gallacinao’s testimony and evidence of the
assailants’ tattoos, Ramirez opined that the three men were Sureño gang members.
       Ramirez further opined that defendant and the others in the car at the time of the
shooting were all Sureño gang members based on their tattoos and possession of gang
paraphernalia. Ramirez’s opinion was also informed by Diaz’s admission that he was a
Sureño gang member.
       Posing a hypothetical similar to the facts of the case, the prosecutor asked Ramirez
whether he believed the shooting was done for the benefit, in association with, or at the
direction of a criminal street gang. Answering affirmatively, Ramirez explained the
shooting benefited the gang because, “[b]y going and retaliating, going to a known
                                             4
Norteno location, agreeing and going out looking for Nortenos to retaliate against, and
shooting at a known Norteno location, the Sureno gang is showing power and showing
that they are not going to be intimidated by rivals, the Nortenos.” The shooting also
helped “develop a reputation on the street that they are willing to commit violence and
particularly willing to shoot individuals for their gang, and to show that they will not be
intimidated by other individuals.”
   C. VERDICTS, SENTENCING, AND CONDITIONAL REVERSAL
       The jury acquitted defendant of first degree murder and convicted him of the
lesser included offense of second degree murder on count 1. The jury also convicted
defendant of attempted murder on counts 2 through 6, but found the premeditation
allegations not true. And the jury convicted defendant of counts 7 through 9 as charged.
Gang and firearm allegations were found true as to all counts. Defendant was sentenced
to a 154-year prison term, consisting of 40 years to life on count 1; 32 years to life
(consecutive) on count 2; 27 years four months to life (consecutive) on each of counts 3
through 5; 32 years to life (concurrent) on count 6; and 30 years to life (concurrent) on
each of counts 7 through 9. Each count included a 25-years-to-life gun use enhancement
under Penal Code section 12022.53.
       The judgment was conditionally reversed in 2020 for the limited purpose of
allowing the trial court to exercise its discretion to determine whether to strike the Penal
Code section 12022.53 enhancements. (People v. Lopez (June 17, 2020, H043949)
[nonpub. opn.].) On remand, the trial court declined to strike the enhancements,
reasoning that “I do not find the interests of justice are served by exercising the limited
discretion I have to strike or dismiss the enhancements.”

                                              5
                         II. DISCUSSION
   A. STATUTORY AMENDMENTS AFFECTING THE GANG ALLEGATIONS (ASSEM.
      BILL NO. 333)
       Defendant argues he is entitled to the benefit of ameliorative changes to Penal
Code section 186.22 enacted since his trial. (Unspecified statutory references are to the
Penal Code.) The Attorney General agrees that those changes apply to defendant under
the rule of In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740. But the Attorney General contends
reversal is not required because any deviation from the current law is harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.
       The jury was instructed according to section 186.22 as it existed at the time of
defendant’s trial: “To prove this allegation, the People must prove that: [⁋] 1. The
defendant committed the crime for the benefit of or in association with a criminal street
gang; [⁋] AND [⁋] 2. The defendant intended to assist, further, or promote criminal
conduct by gang members. [⁋] A criminal street gang is any ongoing organization,
association, or group of three or more persons, whether formal or informal: [⁋] 1. That
has a common name or common identifying sign or symbol; [⁋] 2. That has, as one or
more of its primary activities, the commission of murder, assault with a deadline weapon,
auto theft, or vandalism; [⁋] AND [⁋] 3. Whose members, whether acting alone or
together, engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity.” The
instructions defined a pattern of criminal gang activity as: “1. The commission of,
attempted commission of, conspiracy to commit, or conviction of: any combination of
two or more of the following crimes: murder, assault with a deadly weapon, auto theft,
or vandalism; [⁋] 2. At least one of those crimes was committed after September 26,
1988; [⁋] 3. The most recent crime occurred within three years of one of the earlier
crimes; [⁋] AND [⁋] 4. The crimes were committed on separate occasions, or were
personally committed by two or more persons.” The instruction indicated the crimes
“that establish a pattern of criminal gang activity[] need not be gang-related.” The jury

                                             6
was informed that if it found defendant guilty of a crime in the current case, “you may
consider that crime in deciding whether one of the group’s primary activities was
commission of that crime, and whether a pattern of criminal gang activity has been
proved.” And the jury was told that “[y]ou may not find that there was a pattern of
criminal gang activity unless all of you agree that two or more crimes that satisfy these
requirements were committed, but you do not all have to agree on which crimes were
committed.”

              1.    The Jury Instructions Are Inconsistent with Amended
                    Section 186.22

       Assembly Bill No. 333 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) amended section 186.22 in several
substantive areas. (Stats. 2021, ch. 699, § 3.) It changed the definition of “criminal street
gang” in section 186.22 to require collective (as opposed to individual) criminal acts
forming “a pattern of criminal gang activity” by gang members. (§ 186.22, subd. (f).) It
similarly narrowed the “pattern of criminal gang activity” used to establish predicate
offenses by requiring that “(1) the last offense used to show a pattern of criminal gang
activity occurred within three years of the date that the currently charged offense is
alleged to have been committed; (2) the offenses were committed by two or more gang
‘members,’ as opposed to just ‘persons’; (3) the offenses commonly benefitted a criminal
street gang; and (4) the offenses establishing a pattern of gang activity” may not include
the currently charged offense. (People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1206 (Tran);
§ 186.22, subd. (e)(1), (2).) It “narrowed what it means for an offense to have commonly
benefitted a street gang, requiring that any ‘common benefit’ be ‘more than reputational.’
(§ 186.22, subd. (g).)” (Tran, at p. 1206.) And it removed felony vandalism from the list
of offenses that can show a pattern of criminal gang activity or a gang’s primary
activities. (See People v. Lopez (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 1, 20.)
       The parties agree that the jury instructions were accurate when provided, but that
they do not reflect the elements of the gang enhancement as it now exists after Assembly
                                             7
Bill No. 333. The prosecutor’s closing argument was similarly inconsistent with current
law. For example, the prosecutor argued that the Sureño gang’s primary activities
included vandalism. The prosecutor also presented the vandalism predicate offense
conviction and “this present murder” as part of the gang’s pattern of criminal gang
activity.
              2. The Effect of the Instructions was Not Harmless Beyond a
                 Reasonable Doubt
       Because the instructional error implicates defendant’s federal constitutional right
to a jury trial, we apply the prejudice standard of Chapman v. California (1967)
386 U.S. 18. (Tran, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1207; People v. Cooper (2023)
14 Cal.5th 735, 742–743.) Under that standard, the Attorney General must show beyond
a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict. (People v.
Quartermain (1997) 16 Cal.4th 600, 621 (Quartermain).) “In other words, the alleged
error must be ‘unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered on the issue
in question, as revealed in the record.’ ” (People v. Low (2010) 49 Cal.4th 372, 392–
393.) “[T]he appropriate inquiry is ‘not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error,
a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually
rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error.’ ” (Quartermain, at p. 621.)
       Reviewing the evidence along with the now-deficient instructions, we cannot
conclude that the instructional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. One of the
two predicate offenses involved felony vandalism, which can no longer be used to show a
pattern of criminal gang activity. The same is true as to defendant’s culpability for the
charged crimes, which the instructions allowed the jury to consider. And the jury was
informed that it need not unanimously decide which of the predicate offenses satisfied the
gang statute. We acknowledge that one predicate prosecution produced three convictions
for assault with a deadly weapon arising from a single beating carried out by individuals
the gang expert opined were gang members, and therefore arguably could meet the

                                              8
current requirement of two offenses committed by two or more gang members.
(§ 186.22, subd. (e)(1)(A) [assault with a deadly weapon is a qualifying predicate
offense].) But the record does not indicate whether the jury relied on those offenses
versus others presented, including the charged crimes, to find a pattern of criminal gang
activity.
       Nor can we find the error harmless in relation to the Legislature’s narrowing of
what it means for an offense to have commonly benefitted a street gang. Under current
law, the prosecution must show that predicate offenses “commonly benefited a criminal
street gang, and the common benefit from the offenses is more than reputational.”
(§ 186.22, subd. (e)(1).) The jury instructions in defendant’s trial did not specify that the
common benefit had to be more than reputational. Although there was evidence that the
predicate assaults were committed by gang members and were gang-related, there was no
evidence presented about the reason for the attack. The jury therefore could have found a
merely reputational benefit to the Sureño gang. Similarly, the gang expert testified the
charged offenses helped “develop a reputation on the street that [Sureño gang members]
are willing to commit violence and particularly willing to shoot individuals for their gang,
and to show that they will not be intimidated by other individuals.” A rational jury could
have relied on that now-improper basis. We acknowledge that retaliation remains a valid
basis for a common benefit finding under current law, and the gang expert also testified
that the shooting benefited the gang by showing its willingness to retaliate. (§ 186.22,
subd. (g) [“Examples of a common benefit that are more than reputational may
include ... retaliation.”].) But here again, the record does not show that the jury relied on
the valid basis instead of the now-invalid basis.
       The Attorney General’s arguments misconstrue the prejudice standard. He
contends, for example, that the pertinent question is “whether the crimes contained in [the
predicate assault prosecution] suffice to prove the gang enhancement beyond a
reasonable doubt.” He also discusses whether it was “shown beyond a reasonable doubt
                                              9
that [defendant’s] motivation was gang-related rather than personal.” But that is not the
applicable standard. We do not simply elide invalid theories and evidence to determine
whether the remaining evidence would sustain the jury’s verdict. Instead, we review all
the evidence and instructions from defendant’s trial and determine whether we can
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury’s decision “ ‘actually rendered in this
trial was surely unattributable to the error.’ ” (Quartermain, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 621.)
Even assuming the single predicate prosecution resulting in multiple assault convictions
can satisfy the current statute, that does not render harmless the error in instructing the
jury that it could use the vandalism conviction and the current charges in determining
whether the gang allegation was true.
       The Attorney General asserts defendant is “essentially making the untenable
argument that the Sureños do not qualify as a gang under the new language in
section 186.22.” To the contrary, we interpret defendant’s argument to be that the
existence of a criminal street gang must be proven by competent evidence to a jury
properly instructed in what is now the applicable law. Because we do not find the
instructional error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the true findings on the gang
allegations must be reversed and the matter remanded for possible retrial on those
allegations. (People v. Salgado (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 376, 380–381.)
   B. THE GANG-RELATED FIREARM ALLEGATIONS
       The jury found true firearm special allegations as to all counts. (Pen. Code,
§ 12022.53, subds. (e)(1), (d).) Section 12022.53, subdivision (d) adds an indeterminate
25-years-to-life sentencing enhancement for a person who personally and intentionally
discharges a firearm and proximately causes great bodily injury or death to a person other
than an accomplice. That enhancement can be applied to any principal in the commission
of the offense if the prosecution pleads and proves that the person “violated
subdivision (b) of Section 186.22.” (§ 12022.53, subd. (e)(1)(A).) A true finding on the
gang allegation is thus an element of the firearm allegation.
                                              10
       We invited supplemental briefing about the effect a reversal of the true findings on
the gang allegations would have on the firearm enhancements. We accept the Attorney
General’s concession that our reversal of the gang enhancements necessitates reversal of
the firearm enhancements because the firearm enhancements “were in part dependent on
the jury’s finding with regard to the gang enhancements.”
       The Attorney General urges that any retrial be limited to whether defendant
violated section 186.22, subdivision (b) because that is the only element of the
section 12022.53 firearm allegations affected by Assembly Bill No. 333. Defendant does
not argue otherwise, and we see no legal basis to require retrial of the other elements.
       Because the true findings as to the firearm allegations will be reversed, we do not
reach defendant’s argument about the trial court’s decision not to strike the associated
enhancements under section 1385.
                                  III.   DISPOSITION
       The judgment is reversed. The matter is remanded for possible retrial on the gang
allegations. If upon retrial the gang allegations are found true, the gang enhancements
and firearm enhancements shall be reinstated. If no retrial occurs or the gang allegations
are not found true, the gang enhancements and firearm enhancements shall be stricken.
The trial court must then fully resentence defendant.

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                               ____________________________________
                               Grover, Acting P.J.

WE CONCUR:

____________________________
Lie, J.

____________________________
Bromberg, J.

H050372
The People v. Lopez