Court Opinion

ID: 9666183
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:07:13.811503+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:24.487598
License: Public Domain

ROWE, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I cannot agree that appellate review of a special appearance hearing is comparable to appellate review of a venue hearing. The statute governing venue hearings specifically provides that an appellate court shall consider the entire record in determining whether venue was proper, including evidence adduced at trial on the merits. Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 15.064(a) (Vernon 1986). To the contrary, the rule governing special appearances strongly suggests that discovery practices traditionally associated with a trial on the merits, such as the serving of requests for admissions, shall have no adverse effect on a party’s right to object to trial court jurisdiction. Tex.R.Civ.P. 120a (Vernon 1979). Accordingly, I would follow the general rule and limit our review to the record before the trial court when it denied Bellair’s special appearance. Gould v. City of El Paso, 440 S.W.2d 696, 699 (Tex.Civ.App.—El Paso 1969, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
The majority's conclusion that the trial court properly denied Bellair’s special appearance is based upon a posthearing “deemed admission” regarding Bellair’s due execution of a forum selection provision. Without detailing other evidence substantiating the lack of “sufficient minimum contacts,” I conclude from review of that part of the record limited to the special appearance hearing that Bellair established its objection to trial court jurisdiction as a matter of law. Thus, Bellair was entitled to an appropriate order dismissing the cause. Tex.R.Civ.P. 120a (Vernon 1979).
I would sustain Bellair’s first point of error, reverse the trial court’s judgment, and render judgment in favor of Bellair, Incorporated.