Court Opinion

ID: 9819595
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 06:28:27.178023+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:38:31.281044
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE McLAREN, specially concurring: I specially concur because I believe that the majority opinion, although correct in its limited analysis, does not address the most fair and correct basis upon which to dismiss the appeal as moot. The majority fails to relate that, according to an uncontroverted statement made by the State, the defendant sought relief in the form of a petition directed to Governor George Ryan as head of the executive branch of government of this state. The Governor granted the petition, and the defendant accepted the commutation of her death sentence. Having accepted the benefits of her request, she has altered the relationship that she had with the State of Illinois. Previously, she was a criminal defendant, subject to the punishment of the criminal justice system. She was also entitled to procedural and substantive due process as a defendant in this system. However, she chose to alter her relationship with the State of Illinois by seeking relief through the executive branch rather than through the judicial branch. Having sought and received relief from the executive branch, she should be estopped from seeking relief from the judicial branch. See Barack Ferrazzano Kirschbaum Perlman & Nagelberg v. Loffredi, 342 Ill. App. 3d 453, 460 (2003) (for the basic premise of precluding inconsistent positions in legal or quasi-judicial proceedings to prevent parties from deliberately shifting positions to suit the exigencies of the moment). The appellate court in Watson related facts that supported the application of estoppel, without specifically enunciating the principle. See Watson, 347 Ill. App. 3d at 192, quoting Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 116, 154 L. Ed. 2d 588, 602, 123 S. Ct. 732, 742 (2003) (“If defendant was deprived of any due process interest in having this issue reviewed, it was ‘only by operation of the “process” he invoked to invalidate’ his death sentence”). The majority relates that this special concurrence assumes a fact that is not contained in the record; however, the majority then relates that Governor Ryan commuted all death sentences to life imprisonment, without citing to the record for support. Regardless of what is not contained in the record, I submit that the majority’s statement regarding what Governor Ryan did fails to establish that this defendant did or did not seek the commutation simply because Governor Ryan may have given relief to others who did not request it. The majority cites to Evans and Rissley as a refutation of my analysis regarding an estoppel. The majority has improperly concluded that absence of evidence is evidence of absence. It is precisely because the other cases do not specifically set forth whether or not the defendants sought relief that they are neither instructive nor controlling. I am not ignoring the supreme court’s rulings, because the supreme court has not yet had occasion to definitively rule on the issue of whether a defendant who has not sought commutation of his sentence is preempted by the sua sponte action taken by Governor Ryan. Granting commutations sua sponte is unprecedented. It is therefore unremarkable that the issue addressed by this special concurrence has not been ruled upon previously by any other Illinois court of review. By suggesting that I have ignored and rejected the reasoning of the supreme court, the majority fails to recognize that I agree with the majority’s limited analysis. See 353 Ill. App. 3d at 787. Additionally, the majority fails to recognize what is actually precedential. The majority does not recognize that the supreme court’s reasoning is not precedential and therefore should be ignored and rejected in situations where the detailed set of facts, as in this case, is not identical or similar. “A judicial precedent attaches a specific legal consequence to a detailed set of facts in an adjudged case or judicial decision, which is then considered as furnishing the rule for the determination of a subsequent case involving identical or similar material facts and arising in the same court or a lower court in the judicial hierarchy.” (Emphasis added.) Allegheny General Hospital v. National Labor Relations Board, 608 E2d 965, 969-70 (3d Cir. 1979), citing R. Aldisert, The Judicial Process, 314 (2d ed. 1996). It would appear that the majority would have written the same disposition even if the record had reflected that this defendant was one of the individuals who had not sought relief. The majority would conclude that prior case law had already considered the unprecedented acts of the Governor, despite the absence of any reference thereto, and would affirm with a summary order. Even Watson was aware of the issue of a possible estoppel arising when it related, “it was ‘only by operation of the “process” he invoked to invalidate’ his death sentence” (Watson, 347 Ill. App. 3d at 192, quoting Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 116, 154 L. Ed. 2d at 602, 123 S. Ct. at 742). The majority emphasizes mootness based upon the supremacy of the executive branch’s commutation. I submit that mootness arises from the precatory and underlying fact that defendant sought the relief granted by the executive branch. She chose one of two roads that diverged in a legalistic wood and is sorry she could not travel both, . . . and that has made all the difference. See Robert Frost, The Road Not Taken (1915). I, therefore, specially concur. JUSTICE BYRNE joins in this special concurrence.