Court Opinion

ID: 9899037
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-15 20:03:39.726407+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:20.543214
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/15/23 P. v. Roberson CA2/6
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                         DIVISION SIX

 THE PEOPLE,                                                   2d Crim No. B321001
                                                            (Super. Ct. No. 19CR04521)
      Plaintiff and Respondent,                               (Santa Barbara County)

 v.

 TERRENCE EDWARD
 ROBERSON,

      Defendant and Appellant.

      Terrence Edward Roberson appeals from the judgment
after he was convicted at a court trial for attempted willful,
deliberate, and premeditated murder (count 1; Pen. Code, §§ 664,
subd. (a), 187, subd. (a))1 and carrying a concealed firearm (count
2; § 25400, subd. (a)(2)). As to count 1, the court found true
enhancements of intentional and personal discharge of a firearm
causing great bodily injury (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)), and personal
use of a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)). The trial court sentenced

         1
             Further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Roberson to a prison term of seven years to life for count 1, a
consecutive term of 25 years to life for discharging a firearm
causing great bodily injury, and a concurrent term of two years
for count 2. Pursuant to section 654, the court stayed a four-year
term for use of a firearm.
       Appellant contends: (1) the case must be remanded for the
trial court to exercise its discretion to reduce the enhancement for
discharging a firearm, (2) the enhancement for personal use of a
firearm must be dismissed, and (3) the sentence for count 2 must
be stayed pursuant to section 654.
       We reject these contentions but conclude the sentence for
count 1 must be modified to life with parole, and count 2 must be
reduced to a misdemeanor. In all other respects, we affirm.
            FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
       Roberson and victim D.Z. passed each other on the
sidewalk. When they were directly next to each other, Roberson
said something like “bitch” under his breath. D.Z. turned around
and said, “Excuse me?” Roberson stated, “I’ll show you who I
am.” As they stood five to 10 feet apart, Roberson fired a .22
caliber revolver several times, hitting D.Z. in the back twice. D.Z.
had not threatened Roberson.
       D.Z. was hospitalized with two gunshot wounds: one to his
right side below his collarbone, and the other to his back near his
left shoulder. At the time of trial, he remained in “great pain”
from the bullet fragments still lodged in his body.
       Roberson admitted to police that he shot the victim five or
six times “from his chest to his stomach.” Roberson said he acted
in self-defense to “[k]eep from getting stabbed in the back”
because the victim had a knife. Roberson admitted the victim’s
hands were at his side. The trial court noted that Roberson never

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claimed the victim brandished the knife.
                              DISCUSSION
                                  Count 1
        The trial court found Roberson guilty of attempted willful,
deliberate, and premeditated murder (§§ 664, subd. (a), 187,
subd. (a)) and imposed a sentence of seven years to life. This
sentence is not authorized by statute. The punishment for
attempted “willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder” is
“imprisonment in the state prison for life with the possibility of
parole” (§ 664, subd. (a)), not seven years to life.
        “An inmate imprisoned under a life sentence” for attempted
premeditated murder is not eligible for parole for “at least seven
calendar years.” (§ 3046, subd. (a)(1).) But that is a matter for
parole authorities and does not affect the statutory sentence
imposed by the court. While “ ‘7 years to life’ . . . is common
shorthand to refer to a life sentence with minimum parole
eligibility,” it “is incorrect because . . . [the] minimum parole
eligibility of seven years . . . is not part of the sentence that is
pronounced.” (People v. Wong (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 972, 977, fn.
4; People v. Robbins (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 660, 678.)
Accordingly, we direct the trial court to modify the sentence for
count 1 to life with the possibility of parole. (Robbins, at p. 678.)
                      Section 12022.53 enhancement
        The trial court imposed a consecutive sentence of 25 years
to life for intentionally and personally discharging a firearm that
proximately caused great bodily injury to the victim. (§ 12022.53,
subd. (d).) Appellant’s counsel contends the matter must be
remanded for the trial court to exercise its discretion whether to
reduce the enhancement to section 12022.53, subdivision (b)
(10-year enhancement for personal use of firearm in commission

                                 3
of designated offense) or (c) (20-year enhancement for personally
and intentionally discharging firearm in commission of such
offense). The issue is forfeited.
       At sentencing, the prosecutor told the court it had the
discretion to strike the enhancement (§ 12022.53, subd. (h)), but
urged the court not to do so. Roberson did not ask the court to
either dismiss the enhancement or to impose a lesser
enhancement. “A party in a criminal case may not, on appeal,
raise ‘claims involving the trial court’s failure to properly make or
articulate its discretionary sentencing choices’ if the party did not
object to the sentence at trial.” (People v. Gonzalez (2003) 31
Cal.4th 745, 751.)
       Nor would Roberson be entitled to relief on the merits. In
People v. Tirado (2022) 12 Cal.5th 688, 700, our Supreme Court
resolved a conflict of authority and held that when a sentencing
enhancement pursuant to section 12022.53, subdivision (d) has
been found true, a sentencing court has the discretion to impose a
lesser enhancement pursuant to subdivision (b) or (c). Roberson
was sentenced five months after Tirado. Because there is no
evidence to the contrary, we presume the trial court knew and
followed the applicable statutory and case law. (People v.
Ramirez (2021) 10 Cal.5th 983, 1042.) And because there has
been no showing the trial court misunderstood the scope of its
discretion, no error has been shown. (People v. Rodriguez (1998)
17 Cal.4th 253, 257.)
                    Section 12022.5 enhancement
       Appellant’s counsel contends the trial court should have
dismissed the enhancement for personal use of a firearm
(§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) rather than imposing and staying a
four-year term. Our Supreme Court has rejected this contention.

                                 4
“[A]fter a trial court imposes punishment for the section 12022.53
firearm enhancement . . . any section 12022.5 firearm
enhancements that were found true for the same crime must be
imposed and then stayed.” (People v. Gonzalez (2008) 43 Cal.4th
1118, 1130.) That holding is not expressly or impliedly overruled
by People v. Tirado, supra, 12 Cal.5th 688.
                     Felony conviction for count 2
       The trial court found Roberson guilty of carrying a firearm
unlawfully concealed on his person (§ 25400, subd. (a)(2)) and
imposed a prison sentence of two years, concurrent to the
sentence for count 1. Violation of section 25400 is a felony,
punishable by 16 months, two years, or three years in state
prison, only if certain additional factors are present, i.e., the
defendant has been previously convicted of a felony or designated
firearms offense, the defendant knew the firearm was stolen, the
defendant is an active participant in a criminal street gang, or
the defendant was not in lawful possession of the firearm.
(§§ 25400, subd. (c)(1)-(4), 18, subd. (a).) Section 25400 is an
alternative felony/misdemeanor if certain factors are present, i.e.,
the defendant has been convicted of a crime against a person or
property or a narcotics violation; or the firearm is loaded or
ammunition is readily accessible to the defendant and the
defendant is not registered as the owner of the firearm.
(§§ 25400, subd. (c)(5) & (6), 17, subd. (b).) In all other cases,
violation of section 25400 is a misdemeanor punishable by up to a
year in jail and/or a $1,000 fine. (§§ 25400, subd. (c)(7), 17, subd.
(a).)
       The information here alleged count 2 as willfully and
unlawfully carrying a firearm concealed on the person in
violation of section 25400, subdivision (a)(2), purportedly as a

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felony. But it did not allege, and the trial court did not find, any
of the additional factors designated in section 25400, subdivision
(c)(1) through (6). Because due process requires “ ‘fair notice of
the specific sentence enhancement allegations that will be
invoked to increase punishment for his crimes’ ” (People v.
Anderson (2020) 9 Cal.5th 946, 953), the conviction for count 2
must be modified to a misdemeanor.
                             Section 654
       Appellant’s counsel contends count 2 must be stayed
pursuant to section 654. We disagree.
       “An act or omission that is punishable in different ways by
different provisions of law” shall not “be punished under more
than one provision.” (§ 654, subd. (a).) A “course of conduct
encompassing several acts” may result in multiple punishment if
it reflects “multiple intents and objectives.” (People v. Corpening
(2016) 2 Cal.5th 307, 311.) “If . . . defendant harbored ‘multiple
criminal objectives,’ which were independent of and not merely
incidental to each other, he may be punished for each statutory
violation committed in pursuit of each objective, ‘even though the
violations shared common acts or were parts of an otherwise
indivisible course of conduct.’ ” (People v. Harrison (1989) 48
Cal.3d 321, 335.)
       Multiple punishment for possession of a firearm and use of
the firearm is prohibited where it is possessed “only in
conjunction with the primary offense” but not where possession is
“distinctly antecedent and separate from the primary offense.”
(People v. Bradford (1976) 17 Cal.3d 8, 22.) For example, section
654 bars multiple punishment where “the firearm came into the
defendant’s possession fortuitously ‘at the instant of committing
another offense.’ ” (People v. Jones (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1139,
1145.) But “multiple punishment is proper where the evidence

                                 6
shows that the defendant possessed the firearm before the crime,
with an independent intent.” (Id. at p. 1144.) Jones upheld
multiple punishment for being a felon in possession of a firearm
and shooting at an inhabited dwelling because “Jones committed
two separate acts: arming himself with a firearm, and shooting at
an inhabited dwelling.” (Id. at p. 1147.)
       Similarly here, Roberson possessed and concealed the
firearm well before shooting the victim, and with a different
intent. Roberson admitted he had the gun for almost a year. He
always carried it in a black bag or in his pants pocket to “be safe.”
But his intent in count 1 was attempting to murder a human
being with malice aforethought. Thus, section 654 did not bar
sentencing Roberson for both carrying a concealed firearm and
attempted murder by intentionally discharging the firearm.
                           Other contentions
       Roberson’s supplemental letter brief pursuant to People v.
Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 120, makes several contentions: (1)
he did not have anger toward anyone because they did not
threaten his life, (2) he used the firearm “for safety,” (3) he did
not have the “mind set” to murder anyone, (4) he was not
properly charged and sentenced, (5) great bodily injury should
not be on his record, and (6) he deserves to be with his family and
to have a child.
       The correctness of the sentence is discussed above. The
remaining contentions lack merit. Substantial evidence supports:
the guilty verdict, including the implied finding that Roberson
had the intent to kill (People v. Smith (2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 741);
the trial court’s conclusion that he did not act in self-defense; and
the enhancement for discharging a firearm causing great bodily
injury. Roberson’s desire to be with his family and have a child

                                 7
does not form a basis for relief on appeal.
                          DISPOSITION
      The sentence for count 1 is modified to life with parole.
Count 2 is reduced to a misdemeanor with a one-year concurrent
sentence. (§ 1260.) The clerk of the superior court shall prepare
amended abstracts of judgment and forward copies to the
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. In all other
respects, the judgment is affirmed.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                    BALTODANO, J.

We concur:

             GILBERT, P. J.

             YEGAN, J.

                                8
                   Thomas R. Adams, Judge

            Superior Court County of Santa Barbara

                ______________________________

      Leonard J. Klaif, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Analee J. Brodie,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.