Court Opinion

ID: 9379575
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-15 19:08:04.690493+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:36.437212
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Cruz, 2023-Ohio-794.]

                                        COURT OF APPEALS
                                       STARK COUNTY, OHIO
                                    FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

STATE OF OHIO                                :       JUDGES:
                                             :       Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J.
        Plaintiff-Appellant                  :       Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J.
                                             :       Hon. Andrew J. King, J.
-vs-                                         :
                                             :
MANUELES CRUZ                                :       Case Nos. 2022CA00055
                                             :                 2022CA00056
                                             :
        Defendant-Appellee                   :       OPINION

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING:                             Appeal from the Canton Municipal
                                                     Court, Case Nos. 2022CRB5454 &
                                                     2022TRC6674

JUDGMENT:                                           Reversed

DATE OF JUDGMENT:                                    March 14, 2023

APPEARANCES:

For Plaintiff-Appellant                              For Defendant-Appellee

KEVIN R. L’HOMMEDIEU                                 D. COLEMAN BOND
KRISTINA M. LOCKWOOD                                 116 Cleveland Avenue NW
218 Cleveland Avenue SW                              Suite 600
Canton, OH 44702-1413                                Canton, OH 44702
Stark County, Case Nos. 2022CA00055 & 2022CA00056                                    2

King, J.

       {¶ 1} Appellant, the city of Canton, appeals the April 26, 2022 judgment of the

Canton Municipal court which partially granted appellee's motion to suppress.

                                Facts and Procedural History

       {¶ 2} On November 2, 2021 around 11:00 p.m., Plain Township paramedics

Daniel Ventura and Patrick Martinez were traveling on Middlebranch Road in their

ambulance when appellee Cruz pulled in front of them in his Ford Escape. The

paramedics observed Cruz as he drove 10 feet off the side of the road, overcorrected,

and then drove over the double yellow line. Believing something was wrong with Cruz,

Ventura called dispatch to send a deputy to their location. As the paramedics continued

to follow Cruz, he pulled to the side of the road and stopped.

       {¶ 3} The paramedics pulled up alongside of Cruz and activated the overhead

lights on the ambulance for safety reasons. Ventura asked Cruz if he was okay and noted

Cruz spoke broken English. He also noted Cruz was slow to respond and slurring his

words. He asked Cruz if he wanted a vitals check to make sure he was okay and if not,

advised they could transport him to a hospital.

       {¶ 4} Cruz dropped his keys on the ground as he got out of his car. Ventura

placed the keys on top of Cruz's car. Cruz got in the ambulance, but then changed his

mind. When Stark County Sheriff's Deputy Jason Fisher arrived, Cruz was standing

beside his car. Fisher could smell alcohol on Cruz and observed his eyes were bloodshot

and glassy. Cruz performed poorly on field sobriety testing and based on his admission

to driving, was cited for driving under the influence.

       {¶ 5} A subsequent search of Cruz's car produced multiple empty beer bottles

and an open, partially full, and still cold bottle of beer.
Stark County, Case Nos. 2022CA00055 & 2022CA00056                                            3

       {¶ 6} Cruz filed a motion to suppress. He sought to suppress testimony from the

paramedics regarding their observations of Cruz, opinions regarding Cruz's sobriety, any

statements made by Cruz to police or any other law enforcement officer, and any

testimony regarding Cruz's performance on field sobriety tests. Relevant to this appeal,

Cruz argued the paramedics had no authority to conduct a traffic stop, nor the authority

to ask Cruz to exit his vehicle and then take his keys. The city did not file a response.

       {¶ 7} Then a hearing was held on Cruz's motion. The parties stipulated the

paramedics were state actors. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court granted

Cruz's motion in part finding:

       I don't see where policies, procedures, or the Constitution allows any state actor

       just to randomly make stops. * * * I don't think, despite what most of us believe,

       there's a statute on point that [sic] who may make an arrest, although we know that

       an officer must be in uniform in a clearly marked vehicle. But the remedy isn't there

       in statute when an un-uniformed officer or detective – although I'm familiar with the

       local case, not out of this Court, but not far, that holds anyone making an arrest

       without authority, without being marked, a traffic stop, that aren't in a marked

       vehicle and in uniform are not competent to testify.

       ***

       [T]he firefighters pulled him over. The only remedy I have is to suppress their

       testimony at trial, not the stop. I would withhold their testimony, say that they're not

       competent to testify because they were the ones engaging in the activity of the

       stop, purposely or non-purposely. I mean, the firefighter gets out and clearly says

       they [sic] thought we were cops. I got to take that face value. He thought we were
Stark County, Case Nos. 2022CA00055 & 2022CA00056                                              4

       police, we don't know. But if he thinks they're police, it gives good ground to the

       fact that he stopped because he thought he was stopping for police. But then to

       me, it's only throwing the firefighter's testimony out, they – they're not competent

       to testify at trial.

       {¶ 8} Transcript of April 19, 2022 suppression hearing, 74-75, 77.

       {¶ 9} In its subsequent judgment entry, the trial court granted Cruz's motion in

part, finding the paramedics were state actors who were not authorized to conduct a traffic

stop because they were not in a marked police vehicle and uniform. The trial court

therefore suppressed any observations made by the paramedics, but the court found

Deputy Fisher still had probable cause to arrest based on his own observations after he

arrived at the scene.

       {¶ 10} The city filed an appeal and the matter is now before this court for

consideration. The city raises one assignment of error as follows:

                                               I

       {¶ 11} "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUPPRESSING EVIDENCE THAT WAS

NOT SECURED IN VIOLATION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT."

       {¶ 12} In its sole assignment of error, the city argues the trial court erred in partially

granting Cruz's motion to suppress finding Ventura incompetent to testify because he was

not in a marked police cruiser nor wearing the appropriate distinctive uniform in violation

of R.C. 4549.14 and Evid.R. 601(B)(4). We agree.

       {¶ 13} Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law

and fact. State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 154-155, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d

71, ¶ 8. When ruling on a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of trier of
Stark County, Case Nos. 2022CA00055 & 2022CA00056                                          5

fact and is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and to evaluate witness

credibility. See State v. Dunlap, 73 Ohio St.3d 308,314, 1995-Ohio-243, 652 N.E.2d 988;

State v. Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 20, 437 N.E.2d 583 (1982). Accordingly, a reviewing

court must defer to the trial court's factual findings if competent, credible evidence exists

to support those findings. See Burnside, supra; Dunlap, supra. Once this Court has

accepted those facts as true, it must independently determine as a matter of law whether

the trial court met the applicable legal standard. See Burnside, supra, citing State v.

McNamara, 124 Ohio App.3d 706, 707 N.E.2d 539(4th Dist. 1997); See, generally, United

States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002). That is, the

application of the law to the trial court's findings of fact is subject to a de novo standard

of review Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 116 S.Ct. 1657(1996).

       {¶ 14} The trial court did not cite any case law or statutes on the record or in its

judgment entry. The city suggests that the principals referred to by the trial court are

contained in R.C. 4549.13, R.C. 4549.14, and Evid.R. 601(B)(4). R.C. 4549.13 governs

vehicles used by traffic officers. The section provides:

              Any motor vehicle used by a member of the state highway patrol or

              by any other peace officer, while said officer is on duty for the

              exclusive or main purpose of enforcing the motor vehicle or traffic

              laws of this state, provided the offense is punishable as a

              misdemeanor, shall be marked in some distinctive manner or color

              and shall be equipped with, but need not necessarily have in

              operation at all times, at least one flashing, oscillating, or rotating

              colored light mounted outside on top of the vehicle. The
Stark County, Case Nos. 2022CA00055 & 2022CA00056                                         6

            superintendent of the state highway patrol shall specify what

            constitutes such a distinctive marking or color for the state highway

            patrol.

     {¶ 15} R.C. 4549.14 states:

            Any officer arresting, or participating or assisting in the arrest of, a

            person charged with violating the motor vehicle or traffic laws of this

            state, provided the offense is punishable as a misdemeanor, such

            officer being on duty exclusively or for the main purpose of enforcing

            such laws, is incompetent to testify as a witness in any prosecution

            against such arrested person if such officer at the time of the arrest

            was using a motor vehicle not marked in accordance with section

            4549.13 of the Revised Code.

     {¶ 16} Evid.R. 601(B)(4) states:

     (B) Disqualification of Witness in General. A person is disqualified to testify as a

     witness when the court determines that the person is:

     ***

     (4) An officer, while on duty for the exclusive or main purpose of enforcing traffic

     laws, arresting or assisting in the arrest of a person charged with a traffic violation

     punishable as a misdemeanor where the officer at the time of the arrest was not
Stark County, Case Nos. 2022CA00055 & 2022CA00056                                             7

       using a properly marked motor vehicle as defined by statute or was not wearing a

       legally distinctive uniform as defined by statute.

       {¶ 17} First, we agree with the city – the forgoing code sections and evidence rule

are inapplicable to the paramedics in this matter. They apply instead to law enforcement

officers who are on duty exclusively or for the main purpose of enforcing motor vehicle or

traffic laws. State v. Huth, 24 Ohio St.3d 114, 115, 493 N.E.2d 961 (1986). The

paramedics were neither.

       {¶ 18} We next turn to the Cruz's counter argument. Cruz argues the trial court did

not find the paramedics incompetent to testify for lack of a marked cruiser and appropriate

uniform, but rather because the paramedics were state actors who improperly conducted

a traffic stop.

       {¶ 19} During the suppression hearing, there was conflicting testimony as to

whether Cruz pulled over on his own, or whether the paramedics caused Cruz to pull

over. But the trial court specifically found the paramedics pulled Cruz over. T. 77. Although

it is not clear from the record, it appears that the trial court found that the paramedics first

turned on their lights and that Cruz pulled over in response to those lights. In the ordinary

course of their duties, paramedics would not enforce the laws, perform traffic stops, or

arrest individuals. Accordingly, the record does not demonstrate that a similarly situated

reasonable person would believe he or she was not free to leave merely because a medic

vehicle pulled up behind a stopped vehicle with its lights on. See United States v.

Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980).

       {¶ 20} Thus, the current record supports finding, at best, that the seizure by the

paramedics occurred at the point when Cruz refused medical treatment and was unable
Stark County, Case Nos. 2022CA00055 & 2022CA00056                                       8

to drive away. Thus, the trial court improperly suppressed the testimony of the paramedics

as it relates to their pre-seizure observations and actions. Until the point that Cruz was

seized under the Fourth Amendment, there is no constitutional basis for suppressing their

testimony, even with the stipulation that they were state actors. And as discussed above,

the other apparent authority for suppression is inapplicable here.

       {¶ 21} On remand, the trial court should also consider whether community-

caretaking/emergency-aid exception applies here.

       {¶ 22} In State v. Dunn, 131 Ohio St.3d 325, 2012-Ohio-1008, 964 N.E.2d 1037 at

syllabus, the Supreme Court of Ohio held:

              The community-caretaking/emergency-aid exception to the Fourth

              Amendment warrant requirement allows a law-enforcement officer

              with objectively reasonable grounds to believe that there is an

              immediate need for his or her assistance to protect life or prevent

              serious injury to effect a community-caretaking/emergency-aid stop.

       {¶ 23} In further proceedings, the trial court can determine whether this exception

should apply to any state actor or just law enforcement officers. Moreover, the facts

developed by the parties on remand may give the trial court a clearer picture of whether

the paramedics actions were objectively reasonable under these circumstances and thus

whether it is appropriate to apply this doctrine here.
Stark County, Case Nos. 2022CA00055 & 2022CA00056                                        9

       {¶ 24} The city's assignment of error is sustained. The judgment of the Canton

Municipal Court is reversed, and this matter is remanded to the trial court for proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

By King, J.,

Delaney, J. concurs,

Gwin, P.J. dissents.

AJK/rw
Stark County, Case Nos. 2022CA00055 & 2022CA00056                                             10

Gwin, P.J., dissenting

       {¶25} I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion finding that the seizure by

the paramedics occurred at the point when Cruz refused medical treatment.

       {¶26} In the case at bar, the trial court found that the paramedics effectuated a

traffic stop of Cruz. T. at 77. “An appellate court's role in reviewing a trial court's ruling on

a motion to suppress is not to reevaluate the evidence or the credibility of the witnesses,

State v. Mills, 62 Ohio St.3d 357, 366, 582 N.E.2d 972, 981-982(1992), but to determine

whether the trial court's application of the law to the facts, as the trial court found them to

be, is appropriate.” State v. Williams, 86 Ohio App.3d 37, 41, 619 N.E.2d 1141, 1143-

1144(1993).

       {¶27} The stop of a vehicle and the detention of its occupants by law enforcement,

for whatever purpose and however brief the detention may be, constitutes a seizure for

Fourth Amendment purposes. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59

L.Ed.2d 660 (1979), citing United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556-558, 96

S.Ct. 3074, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976).

       {¶28} “Paramedics” are defined in R.C. 4765.01. That definition does not include

“law enforcement officer.” “Law enforcement officer” is defined by Crim.R. 2 as follows,

              (J) “Law enforcement officer” means a sheriff, deputy sheriff,

       constable, municipal police officer, marshal, deputy marshal, or state

       highway patrolman, and also means any officer, agent, or employee of the

       state or any of its agencies, instrumentalities, or political subdivisions, upon

       whom, by statute, the authority to arrest violators is conferred, when the

       officer, agent, or employee is acting within the limits of statutory authority.

       The definition of “law enforcement officer” contained in this rule shall not be
Stark County, Case Nos. 2022CA00055 & 2022CA00056                                        11

      construed to limit, modify, or expand any statutory definition, to the extent

      the statutory definition applies to matters not covered by the Rules of

      Criminal Procedure.

See also, R.C. 2901.01(A)(11). The authority to enforce traffic laws is conferred upon

certain law enforcement officers by R.C. 4513.39 as follows,

             (A) The state highway patrol and sheriffs or their deputies shall

      exercise, to the exclusion of all other peace officers, except within municipal

      corporations and except as specified in divisions (B) and (C) of this section

      and division (E) of section 2935.03 of the Revised Code, the power to make

      arrests for violations on all state highways, of sections 4503.11, 4503.21,

      4511.14 to 4511.16, 4511.20 to 4511.23, 4511.26 to 4511.40, 4511.42 to

      4511.48, 4511.58, 4511.59, 4511.62 to 4511.71, 4513.03 to 4513.13,

      4513.15 to 4513.22, 4513.24 to 4513.34, 4549.01, 4549.08 to 4549.12, and

      4549.62 of the Revised Code.

             (B) A member of the police force of a township police district created

      under section 505.48 of the Revised Code or of a joint police district created

      under section 505.482 of the Revised Code, and a township constable

      appointed pursuant to section 509.01 of the Revised Code, who has

      received a certificate from the Ohio peace officer training commission under

      section 109.75 of the Revised Code, shall exercise the power to make

      arrests for violations of those sections listed in division (A) of this section,

      other than sections 4513.33 and 4513.34 of the Revised Code, as follows:

               (1) Except as specified in division (C) of this section, if the

      population of the township that created the township or joint police district
Stark County, Case Nos. 2022CA00055 & 2022CA00056                                       12

      served by the member’s police force or the township that is served by the

      township constable is fifty thousand or less according to the most recent

      federal decennial census, the member or constable shall exercise that

      power on those portions of all state highways, including those highways that

      are part of the national highway system but that are not part of the interstate

      system, that are located within the township or joint police district, in the

      case of a member of a township or joint police district police force, or within

      the unincorporated territory of the township, in the case of a township

      constable.

             (2) If the population of the township that created the township or joint

      police district served by the member’s police force or the township that is

      served by the township constable is greater than fifty thousand according

      to the most recent federal decennial census, the member or constable shall

      exercise that power on those portions of all state highways, including any

      highway that is a part of the interstate highway system or otherwise a part

      of the national highway system, that are located within the township or joint

      police district, in the case of a member of a township or joint police district

      police force, or within the unincorporated territory of the township, in the

      case of a township constable.

See also, State v. Brown, 143 Ohio St.3d 444, 2015-Ohio-2438, 39 N.E.3d 496, ¶16.

{¶31} Because paramedics have no authority to enforce the traffic laws, they would be

      considered private citizens. In the State of Ohio, a private citizen is generally

      prohibited from effectuating a citizen’s arrest for a misdemeanor. Jackson v.

      Gossard, 48 Ohio App.3d 309, 310-311(3rd Dist. 1989); State v. Ross, 12th Dist.
Stark County, Case Nos. 2022CA00055 & 2022CA00056                                                 13

       Clinton No. CA 2005-08-015, 2006 WL 2042828, ¶19. See also, R.C. 2935.04;

       R.C. 2935.041.

       {¶32} Accordingly, the paramedics had no lawful authority to stop Cruz.

       {¶33} In City of Columbus v. Murchison, the Court noted that the Ohio Supreme

Court has recognized one of the purposes of limiting traffic stops to law enforcement

officers in clearly marked vehicles is to protect the public,

               One of the safety concerns addressed by the General Assembly in

       enacting the statutes was the hazard to members of the public that

       inevitably would result should a police officer, not clearly identified as such,

       confront a driver and attempt to require him to follow the officer’s

       instructions. It requires little imagination to contemplate the unfortunate

       consequences should a frightened motorist believe that he was being forced

       off the road by a stranger. The General Assembly sought to avoid such

       mischief by requiring police officers on traffic duty to be identified clearly.

21 Ohio App.3d 75, 76, 486 N.E.2d 236 (10th Dist. 1984), citing Dayton v. Adams 9 Ohio

St.2d 89, 90, 223 N.E.2d 822 (1967). To permit the paramedics to testify in spite of the

fact that the statues do not give them authority to make traffic stops would be to

encourage what the law forbids. If any private citizen could stop another citizen without

authority to do so yet, still be permitted to testify in court against the driver, citizens would

have no incentive to follow the statutes drafted by the legislature concerning who has

authority to initiate a traffic stop for traffic violations. Citizens will be at risk of being forced

to pull over to the roadside at any time, day or night, for any reason, and by any person

regardless of that person’s intent. R.C. 4549.14 and Evid. R. 601(B)(4) were clearly

adopted to obviate this concern.
Stark County, Case Nos. 2022CA00055 & 2022CA00056                                         14

       {¶34} I would further find that the community caretaking/emergency-aid exception

was not raised in the trial court or the briefs of the parties on appeal. In any event, to

effectuate a traffic stop the exception only applies to law enforcement officers and not to

private citizens. See, e.g., State v. Moiduddin, 3rd Dist., Union No 14-18-15, 2019-Ohio-

3544, ¶26 (community caretaking is an exception to the Fourth Amendments warrant

requirement); Commonwealth v. Livingstone, 644 Pa. 27, 46, 174 A.2d 609(2017)

(collecting cases).

       {¶35} Crim.R.12(J) provides that when the state seeks to appeal an adverse ruling

on a motion to suppress, the prosecutor must certify that the ruling on the motion or

motions has rendered the state’s proof with respect to the pending charge so weak in its

entirety that any reasonable possibility of effective prosecution has been destroyed.

Importantly, the rule further mandates as follows,

               If an appeal from an order suppressing or excluding evidence

       pursuant to this division results in an affirmance of the trial court, the state

       shall be barred from prosecuting the defendant for the same offense or

       offenses except upon a showing of newly discovered evidence that the state

       could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered before filing of the

       notice of appeal.

       {¶36}      I would therefore overrule the state’s sole assignment of error and affirm

the trial court’s holding that all evidence concerning the stop of Cruz's vehicle and/or

testimony from the firefighter/paramedics be excluded from trial.
[Cite as State v. Cruz, 2023-Ohio-794.]