Court Opinion

ID: 9443077
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 19:10:25.894823+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:29:22.023565
License: Public Domain

STEPHENS, Circuit Judge.
I dissent.
The very name of the crime “manslaughter by culpable negligence” connotes a bad act. It is not a crime to be negligent. It is the fate of all to be more or less negligent by character and it is somewhat a conflict of terms to qualify negligence with the word “culpable”.
Strictly speaking, a negligent act is one performed unwittingly and it is abhorrent to name an unwitting act a crime. The better term, it seems to me, would be “manslaughter by culpable recklessness”. By such term it would be apparent that no innocent act could be warped into a crime as I think was done in the instant case and as I think has been done in numerous cases. A glance at the case excerpts in 10 Words and Phrases 639 et seq., and particularly at page 640, will 'show that the principles I here state are amply supported by authority. It will also be revealed that cases have mistakenly been held criminal which arise from mere negligent acts. Of course, one cannot generally act with disregard of others’ safety without risking a compensatory judgment for resulting injury but an oversight can hardly be prescribed as a crime. The court relates the incident of the shooting and places the culpability upon the idea that there is conflict as to whether the safety catch of the gun was on “safety” when the gun went off. The court say the jury resolved that question and that it was culpable negligence to load the gun while the safety was not “on”. There is not a word of substantial evidence in the case that the safety was not on. It is significant that the government does not even mention this phase of the case in its brief on appeal. If the jury so found, it was an inference with scarcely anything to. support it except that when the safety is on, guns do not ordinarily discharge. Appellant testified directly that the catch was on and there is creditable evidence in the case to the effect that the particular make of gun is in fact defective in a manner to permit the discharge exactly as appellant related it.
Of course, the'evidence is not weighed on appeal, but it seems to me the jury followed mere suspicion. Wherein is found in this evidence any act remotely suggesting wantonness, gross negligence, or anything denoting an intent to act recklessly of another’s safety ? There must be evil or there is no crime. Pages and pages of testimony and certain exhibits are in the case relating to a possible wrongdoing relating to an automobile in the interest of showing a motive for the killing. Of course, all of this testimony was applicable only to the degrees of homicide above “manslaughter by culpable negligence” since that crime imports no intent to kill. The jury should have been so instructed. No instruction was offered on this point by appellant but there was objection to the exhibits on that subject going to the jury room for consideration and there were motions made for acquittal. It is probable that this motive evidence greatly prejudiced appellant’s case.
*951I think the conviction rests upon suspicion supported by irrelevant and immaterial evidence and should be reversed.
Upon petition for rehearing.
The petition for rehearing is denied.