Court Opinion

ID: 9722534
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 09:38:23.443628+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:36.728191
License: Public Domain

SONENSHINE, J., Dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I do not believe the court had jurisdiction to extend the support obligation beyond the specified termination date.1
Unless jurisdiction is retained, the court loses its ability to extend support. (Civ. Code, § 4801, subd. (d).) And In re Marriage of Vomacka (1984) 36 Cal.3d 459 [204 Cal.Rptr. 568, 683 P.2d 248] did not repeal this legislative mandate. The Vomacka court simply found the underlying order implied a retention of jurisdiction. No such interpretation can be made here.
*915There are, of course, similarities between the Vomacka order and the present one: each provides for the payment of a specified amount of support pending the first to occur of four contingencies, i.e., death of either party, remarriage of wife, modification by court,2 or a specified date. Thus, the trial court in each case had jurisdiction to modify the amount of the award at any time prior to the specified date.
But there is one critical distinction: the Vomacka order contains an express reservation of jurisdiction “regarding spousal support” until a date certain, at which time the wife’s “right to request spousal support shall terminate forever.” It is this language, “suggesting that modification of [the order’s] term [would] be permitted” (Vomacka, at p. 470) which the Vomacka court “interpreted as a retention of the court’s fundamental jurisdiction to . . . extend the spousal support provisions contained therein.” (Ibid.)
Thus, jurisdiction to extend the duration of support was derived from this explicit reservation of jurisdiction terminating on September 1, 1984, and not from the “further order of court” contingency. As the Vomacka court noted: “Had [wife] not sought modification of the interlocutory decree before August 1, 1982, her spousal support payments would have ceased on that date. However, she nonetheless could have sought modification of the decree to provide for a new spousal support award, rather than an extension of the original award, pursuant to the language of the decree retaining jurisdiction to hear [wife’s] requests for spousal support until September 1, 1984. ” (In re Marriage of Vomacka, supra, at p. 470, fn. 9, italics added.) The court further observed the trial court’s “retention of jurisdiction until September 1, 1984, to hear [wife’s] requests for spousal support implies that the court retained the power to grant such requests. If the court was without jurisdiction to award spousal support past September 1, 1984, its retention of jurisdiction until that date to hear [wife’s] requests for support would be meaningless. [Citations.]” (Id., at p. 471.)3
*916This express reservation of jurisdiction has no counterpart here. Nor is there any language from which fundamental jurisdiction to extend support could be implied. Thus, Phyllis’ right to receive spousal support terminated upon the first to occur of the contingencies specified in the order, but in no event later than the order’s eighth anniversary.
Civil Code section 4801, subdivision (d), mandates the loss of jurisdiction to extend support unless it is retained in the original order. Such retention need not be explicit. It must, however, in some fashion, exist. It cannot be created by appellate fiat.

 I do, however, agree with the majority opinion insofar as it concludes the trial court properly increased the amount of the support.

 The contingency, “until modified by a court of competent jurisdiction,” as used in the Bensons’ order, is virtually the same as “until further order from the court.” (See In re Marriage of Vomacka, supra, at p. 470.)

 The majority holds the Supreme Court in Vomacka relied on the first part of the underlying support order as the basis for extending jurisdiction. My colleagues suggest In re Marriage of Keeva (1977) 66 Cal.App.3d 512 [136 Cal.Rptr. 82] is authority for this analysis. However, neither the Supreme Court’s own words nor the facts in Keeva support the majority’s conclusion.
In Keeva, the trial court modified a support order making the amounts payable through November 15, 1975. The order also continued the matter for another hearing on that date. But the hearing was further continued until December 10. Husband argued because the court had not specifically retained jurisdiction beyond November 15, 1975, it could not order any further support. But that argument was rejected. “It is thus apparent that although the court did not use the words that it ‘retains jurisdiction,’ there was no intent to limit the duration of the period of payment for support.” (Id., at p. 518.) In other words, the date itself was *916not controlling, but rather the manifest intent of the court. Jurisdiction was not explicitly retained but the intention to do so was expressed.
The Vomacka court’s reliance on the second part of the underlying order is clear. “As in Keeva, the instant trial court’s retention of jurisdiction until September 1, 1984, to hear Joyce’s requests for spousal support implies that the court retained the power to grant such requests.” (In re Marriage of Vomacka, supra, 36 Cal.3d 470, 471, italics added.)