Court Opinion

ID: 9534556
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:40:52.354001+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:31:29.332035
License: Public Domain

HEFLIN, Chief Justice (concurring in result) :
Under the facts of this case, I do not agree with the treatment given the presumption of self-preservation in the majority opinion. However, I concur in the affirmance of the case, but for a different reason in connection with the issue of contributory negligence.
The fireman, E. L. Edwards, testified that the train engine was approximately 1400 feet north of the crossing when he first saw the automobile; that the automobile at that time was approximately 200 to 250 feet from the crossing; and that the horn (whistle) of the train was not blown at that time. He testified that he told the engineer “to get ready, you may have to blow the whistle”. There is no evidence thereafter that the fireman mentioned the automobile to the engineer. This witness further stated that he did not see the car again until it was approximately 50 to 55 feet from the crossing; that he had lost sight of the car; that the bushes and trees on the east side of the track kept him from seeing the car up until that point; that he knew prior to this time that the bushes and trees interfered with his vision; that he knew there was not a stop sign at the crossing; and that the train was not blowing its whistle. He never testified he told the engineer to blow the whistle. He further testified that at the time he saw the automobile for the second time it was 50 to 55 feet from the crossing and moving toward the crossing; that the automobile could have stopped before reaching the crossing from that point; and that after seeing the automobile at this place, the whistle was blown for the first time.
A witness by the name of McKinney testified that he heard the train blow and almost instantly heard the collision; and that if the train whistle had been blown before that, he could have heard it. Mr. Underwood testified, “that it blowed about the time it hit”, and that the only time he heard the whistle blow was at the time of the crash.
The testimony was in conflict as to when the whistle or horn was first blown. There was no evidence that the speed of the train was reduced after discovery of the approaching automobile before collision. The jury could have inferred from evidence that the bushes and trees also obstructed the view of the motorist.
The jury could have found that the fireman, being on the left-hand side, had the primary duty of vigilance to that side, and the deficiencies in his conduct constituted subsequent negligence upon which the verdict was based. The Court charged the jury on subsequent negligence.
Even if a motorist in grade crossing collision is guilty of contributory negligence, railroad’s request for general affirmative charge was properly refused where evidence as a whole made a case for jury on question of subsequent negligence. Alabama Great Southern R. Co. v. Bolton, 242 Ala. 562, 7 So.2d 296. See also Southern Railway Co. v. Hughes, 267 Ala. 418, 103 So.2d 324 and Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company v. Byrd (5th Cir. 1962) 298 F.2d 586.