Court Opinion

ID: 9651691
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 16:31:16.634737+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:41.250306
License: Public Domain

LARSEN, Justice,
dissenting.
On August 6, 1982, the appellee, John J. Kurtas (Husband), filed a complaint for divorce against the appellant Wife. The Wife responded with a multi-count answer to the complaint, raising claims for equitable distribution, alimony, counsel fees and expenses. On August 14, 1985, a de novo *110hearing on the Husband’s complaint and the Wife’s claims was held before the Family Division of the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County with the Honorable Judge Joseph A. Smyth presiding. Subsequently, on November 15, 1985, Judge Smyth filed a decree and order divorcing the Husband and Wife from the bonds of matrimony. Further, he ordered that the parties’ residential property be sold for a price no lower than $72,000.00 and the net proceeds of the sale be divided 50%-50% between the Husband and Wife. All other claims for relief asserted by the Wife were denied. Shortly thereafter, on November 19, 1985, Judge Smyth filed an adjudication containing findings of fact and conclusions of law. Following entry of the written adjudication, the Wife discharged her trial counsel. On November 26, 1985, the Wife retained new counsel to represent her. The Wife’s new counsel, without having access to former counsel’s file, prepared post-trial motions on behalf of the Wife and filed them on November 27, 1985.
On January 3, 1986, the Wife’s post-trial motions came up for argument and were heard by Judge Smyth. In opposing her motions, the Husband did not raise the question of their timeliness. Instead, he argued the Wife’s motions on the merits. Similarly, the lower court did not raise the late filing of the Wife’s motions when they came before it for argument. The court considered the Wife’s post trial motions on their merits and, by order dated January 3, 1986, denied relief. The Wife proceeded to file a timely Notice of Appeal from that order.
On appeal in the Superior Court, the Husband and Wife submitted briefs and presented oral arguments on the merits. At no time during the briefing process or at oral argument did the Husband raise any question concerning the timeliness of the post trial motions in the lower court. The late filing of the motions was raised for the first time in the Superior Court’s memorandum opinion deciding the case. In its unpublished memorandum opinion the Superior Court said: “Because the post-trial motions were not filed within ten days of the date of entry of the final decree and *111order, we find the issues raised therein to be waived and affirm the order of the lower court.”
Since in this case a de novo hearing was held before Judge Smyth following appellant’s exception to the Master’s report, Pa.R.Civ.P. 1920.52(a) applies to post-trial practice. Rule 1920.52(a) provides that post-trial procedures “shall be in accordance with Rules of Civil Procedure 227.1 to 227.4, inclusive. Rule 227.1(c) mandates that Post Trial Motions shall be filed within ten days after the filing of the decision. In this case the decision was filed by the court on November 15,1985 when the decree and order divorcing the parties from the bonds of matrimony and disposing of all economic claims was entered. Thus, under the dictates of Rule 227.1(c), post-trial motions had to be filed by November 25, 1985. The record shows that the wife did not file her motions until November 27, 1985, two days beyond the time set by the applicable rule. Further, it is clear from the record that the Husband, at no time, raised the question of the timeliness of the Wife’s post-trial motions. Thus, the question present in this case is: May the Superior Court raise, sua sponte, the timeliness of the Wife’s motions and then dismiss her appeal on the basis that because her motions were untimely, she waived all of the issues set forth therein.
The majority concludes that under the provisions of Pa.R. C.P. 126 the lower court is permitted to ignore a procedural defect such as the late filing of post trial motions. The majority further concludes that the lower court was exercising the latitude granted it by Rule 126 in choosing to overlook the untimely filing of appellant’s post-trial motions and rendering a decision based upon the parties’ arguments on the merits. The majority reaches this conclusion notwithstanding that the lower court dismissed appellant’s motions by an order without discussion of Rule 126, which is cited by the majority, or Rules 1920.52(a) and 227.1(c), which govern post-trial procedures in this case. In so concluding, the majority exercises the discretion which, by its opinion, is reposed in the lower court. The majority goes *112on to hold that the Superior Court erred in not reviewing appellant’s appeal on the merits. I disagree.
In a recent line of cases, the Superior Court has consistently affirmed that before the merits of an appeal are addressed, it is incumbent upon the appellate court to determine whether the case is properly before it. Sipowicz v. Sipowicz, 358 Pa.Super 319, 517 A.2d 960 (1986); Wertz v. Anderson, 352 Pa.Super 572, 508 A.2d 1218 (1986); Huber v. Huber, 323 Pa.Super 530, 470 A.2d 1385 (1984). Although the question is not raised by any party to the proceeding, an appellate court may address the issue of appealability sua sponte. Sipowicz v. Sipowicz, Supra. 358 Pa.Super. at 322, 517 A.2d at 962. I believe this line of cases correctly interpret and applies applicable law.
The failure to comply with the time limitation of Rule 227.1 which requires that all post-trial motions be filed within ten days can be raised sua sponte by the appellate court. Rule 227.1 requires that post-trial motions be filed within ten days after the filing of a decision by the lower court or the issues raised with respect to that decision are waived. Taylor v. Taylor, 345 Pa.Super. 184, 497 A.2d 1365 (1985), Szakmeister v. Szakmeister, 344 Pa.Super. 465, 496 A.2d 1199 (1985). Thus, where an appellate court determines from the record that post trial motions were not filed within the ten day period prescribed by Rule 227.1, it is incumbent upon that court to declare that all matters raised in the appeal have been waived.
The post-trial practice ordained by the Rules establish a mandatory procedure for preserving issues for appeal. Part of that procedure is that exceptions must be filed within ten days as set forth in Rule 227.1 otherwise all issues are waived. In Tagnani v. Lew, 493 Pa. 371, 426 A.2d 595 (1981), we observed:
With the volume and complexities of the matters coming to our judicial system for resolution, it has become imperative that the former paternalistic approach be discarded and a high degree of professionalism be insisted upon. Our resources are not unlimited and must be *113utilized to provide the greatest good to the greatest number. To maximize our efficiency and to maintain and enhance the quality of our dispute resolution process, strict compliance with the procedure designed for issue preservation is essential.
Id., 493 Pa. at 376, 426 A.2d at 597. An appellate court always has the right to determine if the appeal is properly before it and if the issues raised have been properly preserved.
I would affirm the order of the Superior Court.
FLAHERTY and PAPADAKOS, JJ., join in this dissenting opinion.