Court Opinion

ID: 9849010
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:32:41.729252+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:57.190766
License: Public Domain

Bobbitt, J.,
dissenting. In approaching and entering the intersection, plaintiff was driving north on Woodland and defendant was driving west on Hughes. Hence, defendant approached and entered the intersection from plaintiff’s right.
It was the duty of the presiding judge to instruct the jury as to the relative rights of plaintiff and defendant in respect of right of way with reference to this intersection at the time of the collision.
G.S. 20-155(a) provides: “When two vehicles approach or enter an intersection and/or junction at approximately the same time, the driver of the vehicle on the left shall yield the right-of-way to the vehicle on the right except as otherwise provided in § 20-156 and except where the vehicle on the right is required to stop hy a sign erected pursuant to the provisions of § 20-158 and except where the vehicle on the right is required to yield the right-of-way by a sign erected pursuant to the provisions of § 20-158.1.” (My italics) G.S. 20-156 and G.S. 20-158.1 are not pertinent to the present factual situation.
When the collision occurred, no stop sign “erected pursuant to the provisions of § 20-158,” faced westbound traffic on Hughes Street. Nor was there evidence defendant knew a stop sign had been there.
The judge instructed the jury, if plaintiff and defendant approached and entered the intersection at approximately the same time, it was plaintiff’s duty, by reason of the quoted statutory provision, to yield the right of way to the vehicle approaching from his right. Under the *344evidence, this instruction, in my opinion, was in accord with our decision and opinion in Tucker v. Moorefield, 250 N.C. 340, 108 S.E. 2d 637.
A police officer testified that Woodland and Hughes were paved streets; that Woodland was “22 feet wide at that point”; that he did not know whether Hughes was “narrower or wider than Woodland”; that Woodland had been paved “a long time”; and that Hughes had been “recently paved.” The city clerk testified: “Hughes Street from Lee Avenue up to Woodland was paved by the City and assessed. Woodland Avenue as best I remember was paved by the State.” (My italics) Apart from the officer’s testimony that Plughes had been “recently paved,” I find no evidence as to when Hughes was paved. Nor do I find evidence that stop signs were erected after Hughes was paved.
There was evidence that stop signs had been erected, facing eastbound and westbound traffic on Hughes Street. When they were erected does not appear. Plaintiff testified he had observed these signs; that he had been riding up and down Woodland ever since he had been driving; that he was twenty-six years old and got his license when he was sixteen. He testified: “As to how long the sign had been there before it was taken down, it had been on the east side of Hughes Street for a couple or a number of years.” (Note: I assume plaintiff intended to say there had been a stop sign on the north side of Hughes, facing westbound traffic thereon.) Again: “As I approached the intersection I thought there was a stop sign on Hughes Street.”
There was no evidence as to when or by whom the stop sign that had faced westbound traffic on Hughes was removed. Nor was there evidence as to when such stop sign was last observed by plaintiff or anyone else.
During the trial, plaintiff moved for leave to amend his complaint by pleading portions of an ordinance of the City of Sanford, identified by the city clerk, referred to as follows:
“Section 6.2. This is entitled ‘STOP, BEFORE ENTERING CERTAIN STREET INTERSECTIONS. Those intersections described in Schedule 10, attached hereto and made a part hereof, are hereby declared to be stop intersections when entered from the streets first named, and when stop signs are placed, erected or installed at such intersections every driver of a vehicle or street car shall stop in obedience to such sign before entering the intersection, and shall not proceed into or across the through street until he has first determined that no conflict with traffic will be involved.’ ”
“Section 10, entitled ‘INTERSECTION AT WHICH STOP *345IS REQUIRED BEFORE ENTERING’ — it says ‘Hughes at Woodland.’ ”
Plaintiff’s said motion for leave to amend was denied. However, it is noted that this ordinance does not purport to designate Woodland as a boulevard, through street or arterial highway. It relates to a single intersection. It does not appear when this ordinance was adopted.
Under the rule adopted by the court for determination as to whether plaintiff was negligent in failing to yield the right of way, the burden of proof, in my opinion, is on plaintiff to establish that he believed, and had reasonable grounds to believe, that there was a stop sign facing westbound traffic on Hughes on the occasion of the collision. Absent evidence as to when plaintiff had last seen the sign and as to how long before the collision the sign had been removed, plaintiff’s evidence, in my opinion, is insufficient to entitle him to the benefit of the rule adopted by the Court. In my opinion, the fact there had been a stop sign facing westbound traffic on Hughes and plaintiff had seen it. is, standing alone, insufficient to support a finding that plaintiff had reasonable grounds to believe it was there on the occasion of the collision.
In Tucker v. Moorefield, supra, the sign had been removed at least two months before the date of the collision; and Tucker, a route salesman, traveled North Smith Street two or three times a week.
Had plaintiff, traveling on Woodland, passed this intersection many times after the stop sign had been removed? It is noteworthy that a licensed motorist must be able to identify a standard stop sign by its octagonal shape; and, absent unusual conditions, a motorist can see whether a stop sign faces traffic approaching an intersection from his right.