Court Opinion

ID: 9730487
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:13:58.480283+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:06.864286
License: Public Domain

MANDERINO, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent. The majority concludes that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to pursue, in post-verdict motions, the issue of whether the trial court erred in allowing a prosecution witness to testify that appellant and three other persons entered his home and robbed him of $15.00. Although the majority correctly states the general law as to the admissibility of evidence of prior criminal conduct (at pp. 68), it fails to correctly apply that law to the case here. The majority says, (at p. 69):
“In the instant case, the Commonwealth maintains that evidence of Martin and three other persons taking money from Brothers; of Martin holding a shotgun on and striking Brothers with it; and, of Kent stopping the ensuing struggle between Martin and Brothers by hitting Martin with a chair is admissible to show motive, intent, and ill-will on the part of Martin, who was charged with killing Kent a mere thirteen days after this incident.”
Clearly, we are dealing in this case with the introduction of three separate and distinct facts. Only one of these facts has any relevance to the question of appellant’s motive, intent, or ill-will as directed toward the decedent, Kent. That fact is in the witness’ testimony that Kent stopped a struggle between appellant and Brothers by striking appel*74lant with a chair. That fact was, of course, admissible. The facts indicating that the struggle between appellant and Brothers was precipitated by appellant’s commission of the crime of armed robbery were not relevant to any motive, intent, or ill-will appellant may later have formed with regard to Kent. The evidence of the commission of this crime was highly prejudicial, however, and should not have been admitted.
Appellant’s counsel could have prevented the prejudice caused by the witness’ statement of these irrelevant facts by seeking, prior to the witness’ testimony, an offer of proof, and then requesting the court to instruct the prosecuting attorney that the witness was not to testify as to the irrelevant prior criminal activity, but was to confine his remarks to the statement that a struggle took place which was terminated by the decedent’s act of striking appellant with a chain. The prosecution would thus have been able to present its evidence relative to appellant’s motive, intent, and ill-will toward decedent, and appellant would not have been prejudiced by the introduction of the irrelevant evidence indicating his participation in prior criminal activity.
For these reasons, I conclude that the issue was of arguable merit, and should have been raised in post-verdict motions. Failure to raise it denied appellant the effective assistance of counsel, and the case should be remanded for the filing of proper post-verdict motions raising this issue.