Court Opinion

ID: 9795863
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:40:23.513191+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:37:45.175307
License: Public Domain

Justice EID,
concurring in the judgment.
I agree with the majority's conclusion that the detective in this case did not "serupulously honor" the defendant's right to remain silent, but disagree with the analysis it employs to reach that conclusion. First, contrary to the majority's analysis, maj. op. at 1096, the detective did in fact cease interrogation when the defendant initially invoked his right to remain silent. The questions the detective posed to the defendant after he invoked the right, which requested that he identify and give the ages of the four young children who had accompanied him to the station just before midnight on April 23, did not constitute interrogation because they were attendant to arrest and custody and necessary to protect the safety of the children. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980) (questions "attendant to 'arrest and custody" do not constitute "interrogation"). Second, the majority gives virtually no weight to the fact that there was a lapse of a day-and-a-half between the second interview (during which the defendant reaffirmed his right to remain silent) and the third interview (during which he confessed). Maj. op. at 1098. Such a significant break in events-during which the defendant changed locations and spoke with an attorney-should be given considerable weight in the totality of the circumstances. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104-06, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975) (finding the passage of two hours to be significant). I agree, however, with the result reached by the majority because, during
the third interview, the detective sought to convince the defendant to abandon his earlier invocation of the right to remain silent by diminishing the importance of having an attorney present during questioning. I therefore concur only in the judgment reached by the majority.
I.
First, the majority finds that the police detective did not cease interrogating the defendant onee he invoked his right to remain silent at the initial interview. Maj. op. at 1097; see also Mosley, 423 U.S. at 106, 96 S.Ct. 321 (one factor to consider is whether interrogation .ceased once the defendant invoked his right to remain silent). The majority points to the fact that the detective asked the defendant to identify and give the ages of the children who were transported with him to the police station on the night that the victim was killed. While the majority characterizes these questions as interrogation, maj. op. at 1097, there is no support for that conclusion.
On the night of April 23, 2008, police arrived at defendant's home to find the vietim, who had apparently been strangled to death; her four young children (ages nine, seven, six, and nine months); and the defendant. At 11:30 pm, the defendant and the four children were transported to the police station, where the defendant was placed in an interview room. The defendant was given his Miranda rights, and he said that he did not want to talk to the police. It is undisputed that at this point the police detective asked the defendant no further questions about the death of the victim.
The detective did go on to ask the defendant to identify and give the ages of the children. For example, the detective asked, "How many-you know there are four kids though-you have four kids?," to which the defendant (through an interpreter) replied, "Yes." The detective then asked, "Can you tell me their names and ages to make sure I understand all that?" The defendant (through an interpreter) answered, "Jasmine Munoz." The detective asked, "And how old is Jasmine?" And the defendant (through an *1100interpreter) answered, "Nine years old." Similar questions and responses were given for the other three children. As the detective later testified, he asked about the children to "identify the kids."
The majority holds that these questions constituted "interrogation," concluding that "[tlhough [the detective's] questions ... were not overt attempts to extract a confession, . the children were witnesses to events connected with a death in the household, and these express questions about the children might well have elicited incriminating information." Maj. op. at 1097. Yet the detective did not ask the defendgnt about what the children witnessed, or could have witnessed, at the home that night. Instead, the questions asked by the detective were strictly limited to obtaining identification of the children. As we have held, "(interrogation includes any words or actions on the part of the police ... that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit &n incriminating response from the suspect." People v. Wood, 185 P.3d 744, 749-50 (Colo.2006) (citing Innis, 446 U.S. at 301, 100 S.Ct. 1682). Here, the questions were not reasonably likely to elicit incriminating responses, but rather the names and ages of the children-in other words, precisely what the questions did in fact yield.
Furthermore, the majority recognizes that booking questions-that is, requests for identifying information from the defendant-are not to be deemed interrogation. See, e.g., Innis, 446 U.S. at 301, 100 S.Ct. 1682 (questions "attendant to arrest and custody" do not constitute "interrogation"); Wood, 185 P.3d at 749-50 (same); maj. op. at 1097 (citing Innis). But the majority goes on to hold that the questions posed to the defendant in this case regarding the names and ages of the children are not analogous to booking questions because they are not asked of every defendant who comes to the station house. Maj. op. at 1097, 1097 n. 10. Yet there is a simple reason why every defendant is not asked the names and ages of the young children who accompanied him to the police station-namely, that such a situation does not arise in every case, or perhaps even in a large number of cases. That such questions are not asked of every defendant does not mean that they were not "attendant to arrest and custody" with regard to this defendant.
The majority also objects to the questions based on timing, suggesting that they could have been asked "before providing a Mi-ramnda advisement" and "before the interrogation commenced," and instead were asked "after ... questions 'normally attendant to arrest and custody' and after [the] defendant [] invoked his right to remain silent." Maj. op. at 1097. Yet the majority cites no authority for the proposition that every question posed after a Miranda advisement has been given and the right to remain silent has been invoked constitutes "interrogation." On the contrary, in Innis, the Supreme Court held that a conversation between police officers that prompted the defendant to incriminate himself did not constitute "interrogation" of the defendant because the police officers "should [not] have known" that it was "reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response" from the defendant-despite the fact that the defendant had received repeated Miranda warnings and had invoked his right to counsel. 446 U.S. at 302, 100 S.Ct. 1682. In other words, the determination of whether interrogation occurred depends not on the timing of the questions, as the majority seems to suggest, but rather on the character of the questions posed (that is, whether the police should have known that the questions were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response). See Inis, 446 U.S. at 302, 100 S.Ct. 1682. Again, in this case, the questions did not constitute interrogation because they were reasonably likely to elicit the names and ages of the children, not incriminating information.1
*1101In my view, faulting the police for asking the defendant for the names and ages of the children who accompanied him to the police station that night simply defies common sense. The police found themselves with four young children at the station; it was just before midnight; the children's mother had just been killed; and they were quite young-ages nine, seven, six and nine months. Under these cireumstances, the children could not be expected to accurately provide information about themselves to the police. The only person who could do so was the defendant. It was therefore plainly reasonable for the police to inquire about the names and ages of the children. Indeed, it would have been utterly negligent for the police not to obtain such information before placing them with a relative or social services.
In sum, unlike the majority, I would find that the detective stopped all interrogation once the right to remain silent was invoked during the initial interview, and asked only those questions necessary to identify and protect the safety of the children.
IL.
Second, unlike the majority, I would give little weight to what occurred during the second interview (which did not produce a confession), and give significant weight to the fact that there was a day-and-a-half break between the second and third interviews. During this time, the defendant changed locations and spoke with an attorney. Such a significant break in events should be given considerable weight in the totality of the cireumstances. Mosley, 423 U.S. at 104-06, 96 S.Ct. 321 (relying on similar factors to find that defendant's right to counsel was serupulously honored).
Regarding the second interview, the record shows that two-and-a-half hours after the initial interview, around 2:00 a.m. on the morning of April 24, the detective came back to the interview room. He told the defendant that the children's grandmother had taken the children from the police station and that they were safe. He then reminded the defendant that he had invoked his right to remain silent earlier, and asked, "[HJave you thought about things more? Do you want to tell me-talk to me now-tell me what happened?"" And the defendant (through an interpreter) responded, "Well actually no ... no." The detective then said, "OK. Is there a reason why?" And the defendant (through an interpreter) responded, "No, because what happened is bad. ..."
It is significant that the detective waited two-and-a-half hours to approach the defendant again about whether he wanted to talk. See Mosley, 423 U.S. at 104-05, 96 S.Ct. 321 (noting that two hours had passed and ultimately holding that defendant's right to remain silent was respected). It is also significant, I believe, that the detective reminded the defendant that he had not wanted to talk earlier. Although, as the majority points out, the detective did not re-mirandize the defendant, maj. op. at 1092, such repeated Miranda warnings are not necessary, especially given that the detective reminded the defendant that he had not wanted to talk earlier, and the defendant said he still did not want to talk. Cf. United States v. Rodriguez-Preciado, 399 F.3d 1118, 1129-30 (9th Cir.2005) (finding officers properly miran-dized defendant at the scene and finding no need to remirandize the defendant a day later when interrogation began anew at the jail).
Once the defendant stated he still did not want to talk, however, the detective should not have asked him, "Is there a reason why?"-a question that amounted to interrogation. Maj. op. at 1097. But, as the Supreme Court made plain in Mosley, whether interrogation stopped once the defendant invokes his right to remain silent is only one factor to be considered in the totality of the cireumstances. See Mosley, 423 U.S. at 106, 96 S.Ct. 321 (whether interrogation stopped onee right is invoked is only one factor to be considered). Here, although the question, "Is there a reason why?" was a "misstep," it does not require suppression. Seq e.g., United States v. Wyatt, 179 F.3d 532, 538 (7th Cir.1999) (finding the officers' discussion of the evidence against the defendant before they re-mirandized him was a "misstep" but did not constitute a violation of Mosley); see also Mosley, 423 U.S. at 101-02, 96 S.Ct. 321 *1102(differentiating between the totality of the cireumstances test to be applied in the context of the right to remain silent and the bright-line test of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), subsequently known as the Edwards rule, Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981), to be applied in the context of the right to counsel). In fact, unlike the majority, I would not assign significant weight to the question because it did not produce a confession. On the contrary, the defendant (through an interpreter) stated that "what happened is bad ... I know you have to do more paperwork for me, but it is just too difficult." Thus, the defendant restated his unwillingness to talk, and the interview ended.2
As for the third interview, the record shows that a day and a half passed before the detective and the defendant spoke again on the afternoon of April 25. Even the majority acknowledges that a day and a half is a "significant period of time." Maj. op. at 1098. During that elapsed time, the defendant was transferred from the station house to jail, see Mosley, 423 U.S. at 104, 96 S.Ct. 321 (noting that a new location for a subsequent interrogation is a relevant factor in assessing whether the defendant's right to remain silent has been "serupulously honored"), and consulted with an attorney. The majority puts virtually no weight on the fact that a considerable amount of time passed between the second and third interviews. Maj. op. at 1098. In my view, such a significant break in events-during which the defendant changed locations and spoke with an attorney-should be given considerable weight in the totality of the cireumstances. Mosley, 423 U.S. at 104-06, 96 S.Ct. 321 (noting factors to be considered in assessing whether the right to remain silent was "seru-pulously honored"). In sum, in my view, the majority puts too much weight on the second interview, which did not yield a confession, and too little weight on the significant break between the second and third interviews.
IIL
Despite my disagreement with the majority's analysis, however, I would agree with the majority's outcome in this case based on the fact that, during the third interview, the detective attempted to talk the defendant out of his previous decision to remain silent by diminishing the importance of having an attorney present during the interview.
The detective began the interview by reminding the defendant that he had invoked his right to remain silent earlier, and ultimately asked the defendant whether he wanted to tell him what happened that evening. The defendant answered, "OK," after which the' detective read him the Miranda warnings. After reading the warnings, the detective asked the defendant if he understood them. The defendant (through an interpreter) said, "Yes," but then went on to say that "there [were] some attorneys that showed up. I told them I wanted to talk with them because I was ready to tell the truth." The defendant (through an interpreter) also stated that the attorneys had told him that "they should be present when he is questioned;" that they had given him "some business cards and told him they could be here within five minutes if he wanted to call them;" that "[hle knows what he did was wrong;" and that he was "seared to answer [the detective's] questions."
In response to the defendant's statements, the detective said, "I appreciate that," adding that "those people [the attorneys] coming to talk to you ... the{ir] job is to try to give you any legal advice," while "my job is to try to figure out what happened." At that point, the detective stated, "If you want them here that's fine or if you are comfortable sitting here talking with us it is not-ultimately it is not going to make a huge difference other than [to] help me understand." The defen*1103dant ultimately told the detective to "go ahead" with the interview, during which he confessed.
In this last exehange before the defendant confessed, the detective diminished the importance of having an attorney at interrogation by stating that having one present "is not going to make a huge difference," and by describing the purpose of an attorney as simply to "help [the detective] understand." These statements sought to convince the defendant to set aside his earlier invocation of the right to remain silent and to talk to the detective without an attorney present. Thus, while many of the cireumstances to be considered in the totality of the circumstances point to finding that the defendant's right to remain silent was serupulously honored, as noted above, these statements weigh heavily in the other direction. Ultimately, given that the detective made statements directly aimed at convincing the defendant to set aside his earlier invocation of the right to remain silent and to talk to him outside of the presence of an attorney, I cannot say that, under the totality of the cireumstances, the defendant's invocation of his right to remain silent was "scrupulously honored." Mosley, 423 U.S. at 104-06, 96 S.Ct. 321. I therefore come to the same conclusion reached by the majority, and concur only in its judgment.
I am authorized to state that Justice COATS joins in this concurrence.

. I note that the district court's opinion provides no support for the majority's conclusion that the questions constituied interrogation. The district court made no finding as to whether the questions constituted interrogation. Instead, the court concluded that "questioning continued," which "may have caused some doubt in the Defendant's mind about the assertion of his rights in this case." But again, as noted above, the issue is not whether any sort of questioning continued, but rather whether interrogation continued. I would hold that it did not.

. Contrary to the majority's suggestion, maj. op. at 1097, the statement "No, because what happened is bad ...." is not necessarily inculpatory, as it was readily apparent that what had happened that evening was "bad." Certainly the defendant did not "let the cat out of the bag," so to speak, by confessing to the crime. Cf. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 301, 317-18, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 84 LEd.2d 222 (1985) (where Miranda warnings were not given and the defendant let the "cat out of the bag" by giving an inculpatory statement, the subsequent inculpatory statement given after Miranda warnings was admissible).