Court Opinion

ID: 9673979
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:21:28.687079+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:06:47.627335
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing or to Modify Opinion
LOZIER, C.
Plaintiff has asked a rehearing or, in the alternate, a modification of the opinion or a transfer to the court en bane. He contends that in this court mere exeessiveness can be corrected by remittitur and that, in any event, “where the only error is excessiveness of verdict a retrial should be limited to the issue of damages. ’ ’
As stated in the opinion, the railroad’s motion for new trial and its assignments here involved issues additional to that of excessiveness. Accordingly, disposition of plaintiff’s motion requires determination of these other issues. Compare Steuernagel v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 361 Mo. 1066, 238 SW 2d 426, wherein, upon motion to modify, the only issue was that of excessiveness.
Upon the assumption that plaintiff’s status was not that of a passenger, and that it did not have exclusive control of the train and the engine, the railroad contends that no submissible res ipsa case was made as to it. We have found that plaintiff’s status was that of a passenger. And the record does not sustain the railroad’s contention that the terminal had exclusive control of the coupling movement. Railroad employees were in charge of the standing railroad-owned cars and were operating the railroad-owned engine. The terminal’s evidence was that the railroad engineer ignored the slow and stop signals of the terminal’s inspector. The railroad’s evidence was that the inspector was not present. Both defendants’ evidence was that the custom and practice of making a “safety stop” of the engine, if its crew could not see the inspector, was not observed. Under the railroad’s own theory, it had actual, complete and exclusive control of the coupling movement. See Hunt v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. Co., 212 Mass. 102, 98 NE 787, 40 LRA (NS) 778.
But, says the railroad: there was no joint control by the two defendants; plaintiff’s requested Instruction 1 required a finding against, both defendants if there was “joint and exclusive management and control of both defendants”; and, therefore, the jury did not follow the instructions. Apparently, it is the railroad’s position that plaintiff, having pleaded and submitted a prima facie res ipsa ease against both defendants, cannot recover against one defendant alone.
*196Plaintiff pleaded and offered evidence tending to' prove a res ipsa case which, if believed by the jury, made the defendants liable jointly and severally. See 65 CJS, “Negligence,” Secs. 102 and 182b, pp. 639, 868; 10 Am. Jur., “Carriers,” Sec. 1605, p. 350; and Zichler v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 332 Mo. 902, 59 SW 2d 654. Each defendant tried and submitted its case upon the theory of joint control but that plaintiff’s injuries were caused by the specific negligence of its codefendant. Plaintiff neither pleaded, nor offered evidence of or instructions relating to, specific alleged negligent acts or omissions of either defendant. Compare Zichler v. St. Louis Public Service Co., supra. That each defendant offered evidence of its codefendant’s negligence did not require plaintiff to submit his res ipsa case upon specific negligence. Philibert v. Benjamin Ansehl Co., 342 Mo. 1239, 119 SW 2d 797.
Furthermore, Instruction 2, also submitting plaintiff’s case against both defendants, made no reference to control. Instructions 4 and 5 referred to finding the issues “against the defendants, or either of them.” Each defendant submitted instructions upon the theory that a verdict could be returned against its codefendant alone; and the jury were so informed by the instruction relating to the form of verdict.
The railroad complains of two instructions given at the terminal’s request. “It is well settled that a defendant will not be heard to complain of an instruction on the ground that it is too favorable to its codefendant, or that it prevented a joint verdict against both. * * * However, this court has very recently held that a defendant can complain of instructions given at the request of a codefendant which affect the question of his liability to plaintiff. ’ ’ Barr v. Nafziger Baking Co., 328 Mo. 423, 41 SW 2d 559. See also: Neal v. Curtis & Co. Mfg. Co., 328 Mo. 289, 41 SW 2d 543, and State ex rel. Nevins v. Hughes, 347 Mo. 968, 149 SW 2d 836.
Instruction A-l was that if the jury found that the inspector was guiding the engine in, that it was traveling 3 or 4 miles per hour, that he gave the engineer a slow signal when it was 50 or '60 feet away, and a stop signal when it was 12 feet from the train, and the engineer did not stop in response to said stop signal, the terminal was not negligent and that the verdict should be in its favor.
The railroad asserts there was no evidence that the engine could have been stopped in 12 feet. Plaintiff asserts that, while there was no direct evidence of that fact, there was sufficient substantial evidence from which the jury could reasonably infer that the engine could have been stopped within 12 feet. He also suggests that we could judicially notice that the engine, traveling 3 or 4 miles per hour, could have been stopped within that distance by an alert, observing engineer. However, we shall assume that there was no such evidence, and we shall not take such judicial notice.
*197It was conceded that the engine did not stop. It was the railroad’s evidence, and its theory as submitted in its Instruction B, that there was no car inspector present “to signal the diesel engine into the train so the coupling thereof with the east end of the train could be made safely without a violent jar. * * *” Whether or not the engine could have been stopped within 12 feet was not material to the railroad’s defense. Contrast Barr v. Nafziger Baking Co., supra. In no way was the railroad’s case prejudiced by this instruction.
Nor did Instruction A-l single out or give undue emphasis to the testimony of the terminal inspector. It was based upon the terminal’s evidence and properly submitted the terminal’s theory. Borgstede v. Waldbauer, 337 Mo. 1205, 88 SW 2d 373; and Wilson v. Miss Hulling’s Cafeterias, 360 Mo. 559, 229 SW 2d 556.
Instruction B-l told the jury that if they found that the engineer “did not see” the inspector “south of and adjacent to Track No. 20, then it was his duty to stop” before coupling; and that if they found that the inspector “was not on the platform, at the head end of the train,” the engineer was negligent and the verdict must be for the terminal. (Italics ours.)
The record does not sustain the railroad’s contention that the italicized words placed the inspector in two different positions. There was no issue as to where the inspector was if he was present, which he was not, according to the railroad.
Nor does the record sustain the railroad’s contention that Instruction B-l was not justified by the evidence. The instruction hypothesized facts which the railroad itself had placed in evidence. The railroad’s case was that, as the engine was backing toward the train, the engineer and fireman, both leaning out of the cab and looking backward, did not see an inspector, and that there was no inspector there. And witnesses for the railroad, as well as those for the terminal, testified that it was the rule, custom and practice to stop if the inspector was not there to “guide them in.”
It is not material that Instruction B-l did not require a finding that the terminal was not negligent. Ordinarily only a plaintiff can complain of such an error. See Barr v. Nafziger Baking Co., supra, and Leighton v. Davis, (Mo. Sup.) 260 SW 986. Contrast Berry v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 341 Mo. 658, 108 SW 2d 98, where one defendant’s instruction was the converse of the instruction by which the codefendant submitted its theory. We are unable to see wherein the railroad’s defense could have been affected or injured by either Instruction A-l or B-l.
We have found that the railroad owed plaintiff the same duty it owed a fare-paying passenger. Accordingly, the railroad’s assignment of error in Instructions 1 and 3, requiring of the railroad the highest degree of care and defining that degree, is ruled against the railroad. And, inasmuch as plaintiff made a submissible res ipsa *198case against the railroad, the assignment that its motion for a directed verdict should have been sustained is overruled.
Summarizing, we have sustained the railroad’s contention that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering a new trial and have overruled the railroad’s assignments of error urged in justification for a new trial.
"We now return to plaintiff’s motion to modify the opinion by remanding the case for purposes of allowing plaintiff to remit or for trial upon the damages issue only. The latter suggestion must be ruled adversely to plaintiff. Plaintiff had his trial and a verdict as to his damages. lie refused to remit and appealed from an order in the making of which we have held there was no- abuse of discretion. He is in no position now to ask us to remand for trial upon the damages issue alone — upon the very issue upon which plaintiff appealed and the very issue we have decided was properly ruled below. Such a remand would, in effect, render nugatory our decision that the trial court did not err in granting a new trial upon all issues upon plaintiff’s failure to remit.
In the alternate remittitur-new trial order here, defendant’s motion for new trial was sustained generally. In the order made after refusal to remit excessiveness only was assigned. In Steuernagel v. St. Louis Public Service Co., supra, this court, en banc, held that the new trial is granted by the initial alternate order and not by the subsequent order. And our remand in that case did not limit the new trial to the damages issue, though both the initial and the later order assigned only excessiveness.
Plaintiff cites Wilson v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 354 Mo. 1032, 193 SW 2d 5; Franklin v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 239 Mo. App. 151, 186 SW 2d 546; and Zarisky v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 239 Mo. App. 396, 186 SW 2d 854. In those cases, the cause was remanded for trial on the damages issue alone because the only errors found related to that issue. In the instant case, the only assignment on that issue has been ruled against the party making the assignment, the appealing plaintiff. Moreover, in the cases cited, remittitur was not involved, the appeal was by the defendant, and whether the trial court had abused its discretion in ordering remittitur and a new trial upon failure to remit was not in issue.
Should we allow plaintiff another opportunity to enter the remittitur he refused to enter below? In Steuernagel v. St. Louis Public Service Co., supra, plaintiff refused to remit, new trial was granted on the ground of excessiveness' and plaintiff appealed but defendant did not. In that case, defendant did not assign in this court any reason other than excessiveness why ^ts new trial motion should have been sustained. In the instant case, we have found insufficient the other reasons urged by the defendant — • thus analogizing *199the’two cases on this issue. There, as here, we held that the trial court had,not abused its discretion. (Compare Dodd v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co., 354 Mo. 1205, 193 SW 2d 905, wherein it was held that the trial court had abused its discretion.)
In Steuernagel v. St. Louis Public Service Co., supra, this court said that under Sec. 847.140(c), Mo. RSA, Sec. 512.160(3), Mo. RS 1949, it had “authority to direct the judgment that should be entered even though the trial court ordered a new trial,” and remanded to allow plaintiff to enter the remittitur ordered by the trial court, otherwise for a new trial on the ground of excessiveness. No reason appears why a similar ruling should not be made in the instant case.
Accordingly, our affirmance of the trial court’s order is set aside, and the case is remanded with directions to set aside the order granting a new trial and to allow plaintiff to file a remittitur of $8,000 as of the date of the original judgment, within a time to be fixed by the trial court, and thereupon'to enter judgment for plaintiff for $12,000; or if such remittitur is not made, to order a new trial.
Van Osclol, C., concurs; Coil, C., not sitting.
PER CURIAM:
The foregoing opinion by Lozier, C., is adopted as the opinion of the court.
All the judges concur.