Court Opinion

ID: 9585360
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:59:41.319933+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:41:25.390292
License: Public Domain

Jordan, Presiding Judge,
dissenting. This is another in a line of slip or fall down cases in which courts have encountered difficulty in determining when a petition sets forth a cause of action. While the principles governing the duties of the parties in such cases and the rules of construction of petitions on general demurrer are well established, the problem arises in the application of such principles to a given factual situation, for as stated in the majority opinion, every negligence case must be judged by its own facts. Unfortunately very few, if any, such cases reaching the appellate courts are on “all fours” factually.
For instance, in this case appellant’s counsel relies upon the case of Pilgreen v. Hanson, 89 Ga. App. 703 (81 SE2d 18), as does the majority opinion in twice citing the Pilgreen case. Yet there is a very substantial factual difference in the two cases, for in Pilgreen in addition to alleging that the hump in the floor *225was not visible to plaintiff because of the manner in which the asphalt tile had been laid (diagonal rows of alternating colors) there were the additional allegations of “murkiness or semidarkness” and “slippery surface” of the tile. It was clear in the Pilgreen case that the court considered these factors along with the alleged optical illusion in concluding that the petition stated a cause of action as against general demurrer. No slippery surface or other defect in the tile is alleged in this case and it is affirmatively alleged that the room was brilliantly illuminated. Such substantial factual differences eliminate Pilgreen as authority for the conclusion reached by the majority opinion.
Applying the well known principles in construing plaintiff’s petition I fail to find allegations upon which defendant’s negligence can be based. There is no allegation of defective materials or defective construction or improper maintenance of defendant’s premises (Gibson v. Consolidated Credit Corp., 110 Ga. App. 170 (138 SE2d 77)); the allegation of a two-level floor requiring a step up or step down does not alone constitute negligence (Korn v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 108 Ga. App. 510, 515 (133 SE2d 616)); and it would be difficult to conclude under any circumstances that a place of business extremely well lighted or “brilliantly illuminated” would constitute negligence. See also Vaissiere v. J. B. Pound Hotel Co., 184 Ga. 72 (190 SE 354); Executive Committee of The Baptist Convention v. Wardlaw, 180 Ga. 148 (178 SE 155) (reversing 47 Ga. App. 595) and White v. City of Manchester, 92 Ga. App. 642 (2) (89 SE2d 581).
Construing the petition most strongly against the pleader, as we must do and in the light of its omissions as well as its averments, it seems obvious that the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injury was her own negligence and not the failure of the defendant to exercise ordinary care to keep the premises safe as required by Code § 105-401. The judgment of the trial court sustaining the general demurrer to the petition should be affirmed.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Bell and Judges Eberhardt and Quillian concur in this dissent.