Court Opinion

ID: 9300456
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-12-02 17:06:54.640753+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:13:39.952182
License: Public Domain

KANE, District Judge.
The thirty-nine counts of this indictment are included in two general propositions. The first, that the accused, being one of the ship’s company, of a vessel which was at the time owned or employed by a citizen or citizens of the United States, did receive or did detain on board one or more negroes, with intent to make slaves of them; or that he did aid and abet others in doing so. The second, that the accused did some one or more of the acts, which are charged and as I have recited them, on board of a vessel; no matter by whom owned or employed; he being a citizen of the United States.
The first class, regarding his own national character as of no consequence; but making the character of the- vessel, the national ownership of the vessel, the national character of the owners of the vessel, an indispensable criterion; the second, disregarding the nationality of the owners and employers, but fixing itself upon the national character of the captain, or member of the ship’s company, represented by the defendant. ,
I have to say to you, in the first place; tha t every one of the elements of the charge, as i have recited them before you, must be- proved by the United States before they can claim a verdict of guilty. That is to say: the United States must prove, that this accused prisoner was one of the ship’s company of a vessel, which was at the time owned or employed by a citizen or citizens of the United States, and that he then and there received and detained on board one or more negroes with intent to make slaves of them; or did aid and abet others in doing so. Or else, the United States must satisfy you, that the defendant, being himself a citizen of the United States, did one or the other of these acts on board a vessel, without regard to her ownership. upon the high seas.
Among the elements which alternatively constitute the crime, is the citizenship of the accused, or that of the ship’s owner. It is not merely a question of jurisdiction in the view of the court, according to the ordinary use of the term. It is a question of the essential elements of the crime. The offence is a statutory one. It not only describes the place where the offence may be committed, and the circumstances which shall go to make the offence, but it defines the persons who alone are capable of committing it. And the statute is as inapplicable to other persons as it is- to other places or to other acts.
There is good reason for this, a reason sufficiently obvious. Every nation has absolute jurisdiction of crimes committed within its own territory; and may make whatever laws it chooses, declaring what acts shall be crimes if committed there. But no nation can legislate for others. And as the high seas are the common territory of nations, those laws only *760which all nations recognize are the laws of that common territory by which all men are bound. No state can any more legislate for the high-seas, than a corporator can legislate for the corporation of which he is a member. or an individual citizen for the county or state in which he lives. No nation can make or enforce special laws for the high seas, without infringing upon the rights of other nations. It was an effort on the part of England, like this, to declare what should be the law affecting neutrals, third persons, individuals of other nations, which led to our war of 1812. It was an effort on the part of France, to prescribe what should be the muniments of title borne by American vessels on the high seas, which embroiled us in hostilities with that country in the early part of the present century. It was an attempt of the same sort, or in the same spirit, by Spain, by Denmark, and by other foreign powers, which at different periods led to reclamations, stern and in the end successful, on the part of the American government, for the damage sustained by American citizens by reason of acts of unauthorized jurisdiction.
In a word, no state can make a general law applicable to all upon the high seas. Where an act has been denounced as crime by the universal law of nations, where the evil to be guarded against is one 'which ail mankind recognize as an evil, where the of-fence is one- that all mankind concur in punishing, we have an offence against the law of nations, which any nation may vindicate through the instrumentality of its courts. Thus the robber on the high seas, the murderer on the high seas, the ravisher on the high seas, pirates all of them, recognizing no allegiance to any country, because the very act violatés their allegiance to all their fellow men, if caught, may be punished by the first taker. And so too, if the nations of the so-called civilized world, who are fond of calling themselves the whole world, and of arrogating to themselves somewhat too readily all the rights that belong to the whole world, could for once unite in defining that some one act should be regarded as a crime by ail, it may be that after such an agreement by all the world, the courts of any one nation might without reference to the nationality of the individual undertake to punish the offence he had committed.
But so soon as we leave these crimes of universal recognition, the jurisdiction of a state over the acts of men upon the high seas becomes circumscribed. It is no longer an exponent of the law of individual or international morals. The owner of a farm cannot legislate for the highway, however conscientious or wise he may be. All the jurisdiction which any nation exerts, or can properly affect to exert upon the high seas, except as the representative of the general sense of mankind, declared in the general law of nations, is founded on the control which every nation has over its own citizens, and their conduct wherever they may be found, or over the acts of others who for the time have subjected themselves to our jurisdiction by accepting the protection of our flag. If you or myself, entitled to the protection of our country, and with our country pledged to defend us wherever we go, not having yet passed within the territory of a foreign sovereign, but being on the common highway of nations, violate the laws of our government, we may be punished for violating them. And if we. being citizens owning vessels under the American flag, entitled, therefore, to' protection as American vessels, engage others, w'hether foreigners or citizens, to be our voluntary associates in violating the laws of our country, and they are caught violating them upon the common highway of nations, they may be brought here and punished.
But it is only in the two cases, where the individual accused is himself a citizen, whose allegiance to his government continued while • he was upon the common highway of nations, or where the property upon which the individual was found perpetrating a wrong was property recognized as American, owned by Americans, it is only in these two cases that the United States can make a law which would be binding upon all citizens or which could be enforced by courts of justice: and I do not hesitate to say, after something of mature consideration, mat if the congress of the United States, in its honorable zeal for the repression of a grievous crime against mankind, were to call upon courts of justice to extend the jurisdiction of the United States beyond the limits I have indicated, it would be the duty of courts of justice to decline the jurisdiction so conferred. It is for this reason, then, that our government, in denouncing guilt and punishment against acts like those charged upon this prisoner, denounces acts done by American citizens and by persons sailing under the sanction and auspices of American citizens on vessels owned by American citizens or in their employ.
That the offence is called in our particular statute piracy, does not vary the legal position and consequences of the case. Piracy is es- ; sentially an offence against the universal law of the sea. It assumes that the individual i has thrown off his allegiance to mankind. He is the enemy of all who meet him. The slave j trade, however horrible it may be, is not with- ; in that category. It has been recognized as j lawful for many centuries by all the nations Í of the world. It is only within a few years, ! within the memory perhaps of every one j whom I am addressing ou the jury, that the j first declaration was made by national au-j thority that it was a crime. And up to the present moment there are nations professing to be civilized. Christian nations, that have refused peremptorily to unite in so recognizing it. It is not, therefore, piracy—such a piracy, no matter whether so called in our acts of j congress or not—not such a piracy as consti- i tutes a man the enemy of his race, and con- * *761fers upon every court of justice in every land the right to try and punish him for his acts. It is no further unlawful in the estimation of courts, it is no further unlawful in the estimation of jurors, considered as jurors, whatever it may be in the estimation of all of us as men and as Christians, than as it is distinctly declared by the laws of our own country to be prohibited to you and myself.
The element, therefore, of citizenship in the description of the crime, on the part of the ship’s, owner and of the master or member of the ship’s company, is an essential condition and element of the crime with which this prisoner is charged; and it must be proved as such, or the accused cannot be convicted here.
Having said this, I have nearly got through 'with the legal propositions that have a bearing upon the case. 1 come to the consideration of questions of fact—questions peculiarly for you to decide; and in regard to which I desire to go no further than to gather together from my memory those portions of the evidence which bear upon particular points.
First, then, was this vessel owned by an American citizen, or navigated for or in behalf of an American citizen or citizens, at the time of the acts charged in this indictment? In the tirst place she was American built, and her American character remained unchanged, of course, until in some way or other, she was divorced from it.- It remained unchanged, when Mr. Hollingsworth, acting on behalf of a company of gentlemen, but acting in his own name, purchased her, and took out her register in his own name—all those gentlemen being American citizens. She was at that time a vessel owned by American citizens. Those citizens, through the instrumentality of Mr. Hollingsworth, sold her to Mars-den, for the time being of New York, and a citizen of the United States, who paid for her and took title in his own name; whether as sole owner, or whether like Mr. Hollings-worth, owner with others, or whether as agent or representative of others, without personal interest on his part, does not appear.
It is to be lamented, and it may be a subject of lamentation not only among moralists, that the preliminaries of title which are prescribed by our laws, and which exact the solemn oath of the party as to the nature of his title, the extent of it, and the number and names of his associates in the purchase, and that the consequent records of title to American ships, are so often irregular and erroneous. You have had a single instance of it, in the case of a gentleman of unimpeached honor in our commercial circles, who makes or rather signs at the custom house a formal oath, that he is the. sole and exclusive owner of the vessel, when, in point of fact, it was altogether otherwise; when he was neither the sole nor exclusive owner, but only one of six or seven or eight owners.
The title, the paper title, as between the persons who have themselves taken part in its fabrication, may be regarded as conclusive against them; that is to say, that if you, sir, have executed a bill of sale in my favor, and permitted me to take the register in my name, you shall not be permitted to deny after-wards that you had sold the vessel; and if I accept from you a bill of sale, and go and take out the register, and hold it in possession, I shall not hereafter deny that you sold me the vessel. So far the register may with safety be received as evidence of the transaction. But to say that the execution of a bill of sale by you to me, the surrender of the register by you, and the issuing of a new register in my name, is to be given as evidence against our learned friends who have argued this case before us. who neither could have known nor prevented what we were doing, who had no opportunity of interfering with us, who, if they knew that the whole transaction was a spurious one. an imaginary sale, intended merely as a disguise, and had gone into the custom house to protest against it, would not have been even listened to; to say that they should be bound by what we had done, would be to say that their rights would be at the mercy of our discretion, integrity and honor.
Still, the title, the apparent title, passed from Hollingsworth to Marsden; and it had something more of strength than would properly attach to its paper character, inasmuch as Marsden paid his money before he took it. And thus, at first glance, and till something was shown to the contrary, we should have reason to believe that he was the owner; and he being an American citizen, the vessel continued the property of an American citizen, after passing into his hands. Had. then, the case rested here, it would have been proper for us to require some directness of proof from the parties who should undertake to deny the American ownership of the vessel.
But the United States do not stop here. After showing the title of Marsden, they gó on to show that the title, the paper title, the bill of sale title, the register title, passed after-wards to Gray. He, also, is alleged to be a citizen of-the United States on the face of the papers. And thus the paper title, upon which, so far as it was worth anything, Marsden’s ownership rested, passed altogether by the transfer of that same paper title to another man, described in like terms as a citizen of the United States.
But it is asserted on the part of the United States, that although some one in the name of Gray went through all the formalities at the custom house in the'authentication and record of the bill of sale and in procuring the register, yet that this Gray was never the owner at all; and in thus asserting that Gray was never the owner, the United States denounce the truth and efficiency of that title to ownership which is disclosed by the papers of the custom house.
Passing, then, outside of the paper title, the title according to the custom house, whose records have only conducted us into a difficulty from which they fail to relieve *762us, how stands the fact of ownership? Who was it that did own this vessel? . The defendant says Marsden never owned it, just as the United States say Gray never owned it; and both of the paper titles being thus impeached, we must seek for the real ownership in the other'evidence that is before us. How stands that evidence?
We had the cotemporary declarations of Marsden, that he bought the vessel and was fitting it out not for himself, but for a Spaniard named Rivero. We had also the declarations of Rivero, ■ that Marsden had bought for him.- We had the evidence of a .witness called by the United States, Mr. Oaksmith, that Marsden had no means of his own, wherewith to buy the vessel; and we have the evidence of Mr. Machado, and of his clerks, one of them, if not both, that the funds disbursed by Marsden in the purchase of this vessel belonged to Rivero. 1 am not aware that there is any other direct evidence going to show whose funds purchased that vessel.'
If you are satisfied from what the witnesses have said here, that in truth and in fact Marsden was not a man of adequate means to purchase this vessel; that he bought the vessel for a Spaniard, with funds obtained from that Spaniard; that Spaniard declared that the vessel had been bought for him; that he accompanied and controlled Marsden while the- vessel was getting fitted out, and directed his' correspondent and banker to make advances to Marsden from time to time for the payment of bills, the court says to you, that in the absence of some proof to the contrary, you.are called to believe that Marsden was not really the owner of the vessel, but only the agent for the purchase. It is unnecessary for the court to say to you, conversant as some of you are with the everyday transactions of a business community, that the largest mercantile dealings are conducted and concluded in the names of brokers and agents, without declaring the names of their principals; and that large funds are every day in the year put in the hands of agents to negotiate the purchase of ships and cargoes, without an indication that' there are third parties interested in the purchase.
On the other hand, to contradict these assertions you have the examination of books of account of Mr. Machado and of Marsden, the collation of entry with entry, and the argument ingeniously and very powerfully pressed by the district attorney, that the books show these stories to be false; that Marsden was really a man of adequate wealth; that Rivero never did buy the vessel; that the purchase was never made for him; that the funds which Marsden got from Machado were not Rivero’s funds, but were Marsden’s own, or Machado's own, or that at least they were not Rivero’s.
You are to judge then, gentlemen, upon ail the evidence; I make no further comment upon it, so far as regards this point of the-case; whether the funds and ownership in. point of fact—not according to the paper title, for that paper title fixes it on Gray— but whether the ownership in point of fact was in Marsden, or Rivero, or Machado, or any^ body else. You are to say whether Marsden’s disbursements were of his own funds; whether he was in whole or in part the real beneficial owner of this ship; or whether it was Rivero or some one else who bought and owned her. If it was Rivero-for whom Marsden acted, whose funds he disbursed, for whom he bought and held, then this vessel was not a vessel belonging to an American citizen, or navigated for or on behalf of an American citizen.
I feel the more confidence in putting this point to you strongly and clearly, because I see-that were a different doctrine to be held by our courts, there would be scarcely any protection whatever against the arts of slave-traders. If the paper title, the formalities-of the -custom house, the record of the bill of sale, and the issuing of the register, indicated what was the ownership of the vessel,, no one American, base enough-to engage in the slave trade, would ever be found on board a vessel with an- American register, or an American bill of sale. However Amerieán her ownership in fact, she would' be sold to some Rivero, op some anonymous Portuguese; the Portuguese flag would be hoisted, and the American owner stepping-on board would exult under the protecting-fraud of an alien flag, and a fabricated bill of sale.
I instruct you, gentlemen, that the law-does not regard the semblance, but the fact. Was this vessel in truth, owned by American citizens? if there was a mask, tear it off, and look at the reality. Did this vessel belong to the man who was on board, the Spanish captain as he was called, or did she-belong to an American citizen?
Passing then from this point, I come to the-other category under which the. different counts of the indictment arrange themselves; merely reminding you that unless you are-satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt, that this vessel at the time belonged to an American citizen in whole or in part, or was navigated for or on behalf of an American citizen, then all those counts of the indictment in which the charge is made, that the vessel was so owned, are not proved, and your verdict as to them must be not guilty.
Of all the charges in this second class, it is an essential element, that the accused was a citizen of the United States at the time of the acts. You have heard some discussion as to the meaning of this term, citizenship of the United States. It has a plain, simple, everyday meaning; and that meaning you may safely, take without a definition. It is that unequivocal relation between every American and his country which binds him to allegiance and pledges *763to him protection,—that goes witty him wherever he goes, stamping him a traitor if he be found in the ranks of an enemy, as a criminal if violating her laws; but watching over him, and covering him with the shield of her power, though he traverses the sea under a stranger dag, or sojourns on a foreign shore. It is not the citizenship of domicile; the citizenship, if you may call it so, of the man who comes to be a guest upon your shores, and who is entitled to protection, just as the stranger becomes a member of your household when you invite him to stay for the night. That is not the citizenship the act refers to; for that subjects to nonliability whatever, beyond the territorial limits of the country in which the domicile is. Nor is it what some law books have called judicial citizenship; for that has no relation to a subject like this,' but applies only to the question whether the party can sue or be sued in the courts of the United States, or whether their litigation must go over to the state courts. Nor. gentlemen of the jury, is it what some might call diplomatic citizenship, for want of a bet ter term;, that grade of inchoate citizenship which may be claimed by one who has declared his intention to become a citizen hereafter; prospective in its allegiance, actual in its asserted rights; about which diplomatists have disputed somewhat, but which I believe our courts have not yet recognized; such is not the citizenship meant by the' act of congress. It is citizenship, such as yours and mine—that citizenship which makes us constituent members of this country, and that binds us everywhere to obey its laws, because it protects us everywhere. The right and the duty are inseparable. They begin and end together.
How then stands the question as to this prisoner? In the first place, it appears that he was a Frenchman by birth and language. Such were his own declarations if you believe the witnesses who have been examined before you. The declarations of a man after he is arrested for a crime, or when he Is about to commit a crime, may be of very little value; and the man who, to prepare himself for going on a slaving voyage, had taken care to announce to the world that he was not an American, would gain very little advantage from his cautionary declarations. But if, at a time when he was not interested in disguising or denying his true national character, he had declared himself either a Frenchman or an American, having uo object in falsifying the truth—not meditating the violation of a law which might subject him to punishment in case he were a citizen of one nation rather than of the other—if by common reputation, in the ordinary converse of his fellowmen. his nationality was recognized as in accordance with his declarations— presenting thus the same sort of evidence of his national character that I have of yours, that you have of mine, that we both have of the gentlemen who surround us in this court-then surely his uncontradicted declarations are entitled to some credit. Just as in a question of pedigree; we speak of parentage and birthplace, on the authority of generally accepted opinion, which resolves itself at last into very little, if anything'else than the assertions of the party, or his household, or his neighbors. Seafaring men rarely travel with the family bible in their pockets.
If then, it be true, that this man did some fourteen or fifteen years ago arrive here, a Frenchman, apparently unable to speak English, that he did represent himself as bom in France, that he did go to a French boarding house, that his associates were French, as this witness testified, that when he applied to one of them to get him a place on board a vessel, he was told it was useless for him to expect to get a place when he could not speak a word of English—having all this before us, and uncontradicted, we are to take him to have been a Frenchman or a foreigner fourteen years ago. If so, when or how did he-become an American citizen? When was it? Where was it? • We have had in the case of Mr. Machado, the proper proof by which j he individual, foreigner by birth, is shown to be an American citizen now. The production of his letters of naturalization, and proof of his identity with the party named in them. We have had no such proof in regard to this man.
What then have we as a substitute? His assertion or- admission that he had become one? Doubtful evidence, gentlemen, I may say to you. I should fear very much in a grave cause like this to determine upon the guilt of the prisoner, simply because he had said at a former time, that he was such a citizen as was amenable to our laws of the sea. I have seen too many of the oaths even, that pass through the custom house; I have seen too many good names signed to the papers that were received in that office as proofs of citizenship, and ownership, and identity of invoiced, with actual values, to be very anxious to begin the game of punishing capitally for a misrepresentation of fact at the custom house. Yet if a man has gravely asserted that he was an American citizen, still more if he swore that he was an American citizen, he cannot complain if we so far vindicate the principles of morality as to accept his oath for truth, until he gives us some better reason for believing that he lied. But in this case, did this defendant ever assert or admit that he was an American citizen? That he never carried a protection as an American citizen, as the district attorney has very truly observed, matters little; for very few American citizens carry protections now, and I trust the time may be very distant when they shall again be thought necessary.
But it is argued, that the custom house papers declare or rather assume the citizenship of this prisoner. If so, they would be of value just so far as he had been party to them, or *764had recognized their correctness; and no further. Look then through all these documents, and say whether you find in them any assertion or recognition by the prisoner, of his being an American citizen. So far as I remember them, those papers from the custom house contained no proof at all as to the citizenship of the accused. In fact, the oath which the act of congress had required to be made, and which would have decided the question of his citizenship, so far as a custom house oath can attest anything, that oath prescribed by the act of congress, was for some years before this transaction, pretermitted as obsolete by the custom house at New York; and thus it happens there is no such oath taken by this accused, by which you can test the question "whether he claimed to be a citizen or not. Then you have the crew list. So far as I remember that instrument, it is certified by a notary public that he received sufficient proof of the American character of the vessel, and of the crew named in the list itself. I may say to you gentlemen, that this certificate of that notary public, that he received sufficient proof, and his oath superadded to the instrument that he received such proof, are of little avail to the prosecution. It is this court, w'hieh has to judge of the legal relevancy of the proof; you are to judge of its sufficiency. But that crew list upon examining it, unless my recollection deceives me, does not contain any name by which it is alleged this prisoner has passed himself. There is, therefore, no admission, even supposing that he himself had made oath to the accuracy of the crew list, the oath being as to the American character of the vessel, and of the crew named in it. All these, however, like the other facts and circumstances which have been presented to you by the United States, are for you to consider of.
I have gone over two of the points; there is a third. If you are satisfied that the vessel belonged in whole or in part to American citizens, or that the prisoner was an American citizen; if you are satisfied that this prisoner was engaged on board as one of the ship's company, no matter whether as master or as mate, or as interpreter, or as doctor, if he was engaged on board in the prosecution of these acts, there remains still a point you are to be satisfied upon, of the intent on his part to reduce these people to slavery. I do not mean that it is a question whether this was really a slaving voyage or not; it seems to have been settled all around that it was a slaving voyage; but the character of the prisoner’s intent as to the individuals who were on board is an essential topic of consideration by the jury. The seamen who shipped for the island of San Thomas, as probably supposing they were going to St. Thomas, in the West Indies, and who found out they were going to a little island on the coast of Africa, after they were on the high seas, bound to obedience by the maritime code, and exposed to peril and outrage if they refused; such seamen cannot be said to have sailed with the intent to make or sell slaves.
We had a case of piracy before this court some years ago, which was presided over by my Brother GRIER, during the whole trial, and in which he made the charge. Theevidenee in some respects, not in a great many, but in some respects resembled that which has been before you. And I feel, thát I shall do well to close the remarks I have to make upon this case by quoting some of the language of my eminent colleague. I adopt it entirely as my own: but I know that I shall secure for my own opinion greater weight by a reference to his. He said as follows:
“The United States can assume jurisdiction and a right to punish this offence committed on the high seas, only in consequence of the allegiance or citizenship of the offender, or because the act was done on board or by the crew or ship’s company of a ship or vessel owned in whole or in part or navigated for or in behalf of a citizen or citizens of the United States. Hence it lies at the very foundation of this case, that the prosecution establish to your satisfaction the fact, either that the defendant is a citizen and owing allegiance to the United States and bound by her laws: or that not being such, the ship or vessel was owned in part or in whole by citizens. That the vessel assumed an American character abroad, is in evidence, that she was sent by the consul to an American port, that at Rio she applied, to the American consul and held herself forth to the world as American: this affords a strong presumption of her American character, her national character. But It is not a necessary consequence therefrom that her owners were American citizens. Denizens or resident foreigners might have owned her. But then again, she sailed from New Loudon as an American vessel. The testimony affords a strong probability that she was owned by Americans;—and as the testimony is wholly for your consideration, the court will not say that it is insufficient. if it be satisfactory to your minds.
“But the court think it their duty to observe, in a case of such awful and solemn consequences to the defendant, that the jury should be cautious how they deal with mere probabilities. What hindered the government from sending to New London, and bringing here the register, and the very owners thein-selves, to establish this fact beyond a doubt? Have they a right to call on you to convict on doubtful or probable testimony, when they had it in their power to have removed the doubt and furnished certainty instead of probability? Without wishing to interfere with your prerogative as to the facts. I venture to say that you would not be unreasonable if you required it at their hands.”
In a word, gentlemen, I ask you to take the spirit of these remarks, and apply them to this case. When the United States call upon a jury to give a verdict of guilty, they are bound to prove the defendant’s guilt of the *765charge set forth in the indictment. Not. of course, by direct, irrefragable evidence—such evidence, where intent is an element of the crime, is rarely if ever possible—but by evidence which may satisfy the judgment and conscience beyond a reasonable doubt. You will not convict because you suspect; on the other hand, you will not refuse to convict, because you have doubts of legal policy, or sympathies that are to be shocked by a capital execution. You will answer upon the evidence before you, just as you would in a case that called for your cautious because responsible action, in, the concerns of daily life, fearlessly, honestly, as men who have sworn to do justly between him and the state.
Mr. V andyke asked the court to charge, that if the jury believe Marsden exercised the ordinary, usual acts of ownership in the fitting out of this vessel, these acts of his, being part of the res gestse should be taken into consideration in determining the question whether the vessel was navigated for or*on his account.
KANE. District Judge. They are so no doubt. Yet these acts on. his part may be colored and explained by attendant circumstances. If Mr. Marsden acted as owner of this vessel in purchasing her, paying for her, repairing her, fitting her for sea. bargaining and paying for her ship’s stores, procuring her pilot, all these are acts of ownership, and would certainly show that if he was not the owner, she was at least navigated on his behalf. But then if in direct connection with these acts of his, and running alongside of them, it be proved as fact, that the funds which he was using were the funds of a third person not a citizen, that he had no funds of his own, that he spoke of himself as a mere broker or agent, and was recognized as such by the banker who put him in funds, and by the third person whose funds they were; then, if all these be deemed true and not merely devices to disguise the truth, they would establish the fact of ownership in another, just as in a different aspect, they would be proof he was the owner of the vessel.
Verdict, not guilty.
Incidental Points.
In the course of this trial, the following points, aside from the main case, occurred and were decided:
First Point.
After the prisoner had pleaded not guilty, and a jury had been called, one of the jurors who was in delicate health, stated to the court, that certainly he would be unable to go through the cause without an attack' of illness. The prisoner having exhausted his twenty challenges, the court, stating that it had no power to discharge a juror after he was once sworn, unless by consent of parties, suggested to the counsel that in view of the great inconvenience likely to' arise, tire record by consent might be so far falsified as to strike out the juror’s name, and so as not to show that he had ever been called or sworn at all; and that the defendant should have the privilege of another challenge. That in this way both parties would be estopped, from alleging the irregularity as matter of error. Being so recommended by the court, this course was agreed to by the counsel on both sides. ,
Second Point.
When the prosecution had opened its case., and being about to go on with its evidence, had sworn a witness, the prisoner’s counsel asked the court to instruct the witness and. the other witnesses generally, before any of them were examined, and with a view to their own protection, that they were not bound to make any statements criminating themselves.
GRIER. Circuit Justice.
We cannot do this. It would put it in the power of a witness by á mental reservation to tell only what he pleased, and to be the judge of what would, criminate him, and the crimination might be' moral, political or criminal. The court wilL interfere when necessary.
Third Point.
To prove the reputed American character of the vessel on which the piracy alleged in the principal case was charged to have been committed, and the public declaration of her ownership by a citizen of the United States— such character and ownership being essential facts to sustain the indictment—the prosecution offered in evidence the vessel’s original registry at the custom house in New York:, promising to follow this proof up with other evidence of ownership. This registry, as is generally known, is made under an act of congress (Act of December 31, 1792 [1 Stat. 287]), declaring what vessels shall be '‘denominated and deemed vessels of the United States, entitled to the benefits and privileges appertaining to such vessels." It prescribes that before the registry can be made, the owners or one of them must swear or affirm that according to the best of his or their knowledge and belief, the vessel is owned wholly or in part by a citizen of the United States.
Objection being made by Mr. Guillou and Mr. Kane, who relied on U. S. v. Bruñe [Case No. .14,677], that case was distinguished by Mr. Vandyke, district attorney, for the United States, from this, because there the evidence was neither preceded nor to be followed up by any other evidence. It was the only evidence the prosecution relied on; and though offered as prima facie, was in truth relied on as conclusive. Here we shall folio w the matter up by direct evidence of actual ownership. We wish to prove the history of this vessel from her build to the present day. *766and these p.apers are offered as part of the history of the vessel, and as part of the record and title of the vessel. What they are worth will be hereafter a question. As part of the paper title of the vessel, and as showing through whose hands she has passed, and ' in whose hands she now is. they are at least competent.
GRIER, Circuit Justice. You can prove that these are the original custom house papers; and they may go to the jury as part of the case generally, and to show under what public character the vessel appeared and acted. What they are worth in law as evidence of actual ownership by a citizen of the United States, is matter to be considered hereafter.
Fourth Point.
The custom house registry of ownership of the vessel, which was now in evidence, being found to be in the name of one Gray, who on those books thus appeared to be owner, and the prosecution alleging that, the name of Gray was a simulated one, which had been fraudulently assumed by some person in order to get the apparent ownership out of Marsden, a former registered, and still the real owner—the prosecution in order to prove the fraud, and that the name was thus simulated, now offered to prove by an expert that two different signatures on the registry, to wit, the signature to a bond, a crew bond, and a manifest which purported, to be made, one by one person, and one by another, were in fact made by the same person under different names. But the prosecution had not proved, nor was it admitted by the defence, who had made either signature. The question put to the expert was, “Look at the signatures to the bond, to the crew bond, and to. the manifest, and say whether they are, to the best of your knowledge and belief, by the same person?” '
Mr. Guillou objected to the question. Unless you have an acknowledged signature, or one proved by one who saw it signed, for comparison, you cannot bring in the evidence of a mere expert.
Mr. Vandyke. That is true in the case of a forgery. I know that there must then be a test paper by which the other signatures are to be proved. But I wish to show that the same man, whoever he be, signed the manifest, the oath, the crew bond and the register .bond; that they are all signed by one and the same person. If I offered this testimony for the purpose of showing that a certain A. B. signed those papers, then it would be necessary for me to have an admitted signature of A. B., in order to prove that he did sign them; my object now is only to prove the fact that the signatures on all the papers are by the same person.
Mr. Guillou, in reply. In a capital case any doubtful or dangerous evidence ought to be wholly excluded. It does not do to let evidence in to the jury, expecting that an antidote will come from the charge of the court. An effect in a criminal case is produced by the mere admission of evidence, and the charge cannot destroy this effect. How uncertain is the evidence of an expert on a question of this kind! If you would bring every expert from Maine to Louisiana, you would find one half of them would decide directly contrary to this witness on the stand. Nor has the counsel on the other side any right to open so wide a field for controversy; he is able, to produce any number of witnesses he may want on the subject, but the defendant who is a stranger here and a foreigner, has not the same means to do so.
GRIER, Circuit Justice. If the evidence were offered to prove that the prisoner had made both these signatures, it would be incompetent unless you had first an acknowledged or proven signature of the prisoner as a datum for a standard of comparison. Perhaps, indeed, it is only in cases of forgery where there is a similitude of handwriting, that such evidence is admitted at all. But here Mr. Vandyke is trying to prove external facts unconnected with the defendant. He has to show that the defendant did certain acts, that he went to Africa. He has not only to do that, but he must show more —he must show the national character of this vessel, her history, and a hundred other matters; and then her name painted on her stern. So, also, he gives the public register connected with her, showing the public-character the vessel acted under. He then shows that a man by the name of Marsden is connected with her, and is the owner; that he paid her bills and fitted her out to go upon this voyage; that he had a bill of sale to her, and that he is a citizen; that under suspicious circumstances, there was a transfer made to a separate party, who, he alleges, is a man of straw—nobody at all— and in order to prove it so, wants to show that the signature of the captain and that of this party appear to be the same, done by the same hand. Now if that be a fact, would there not be some evidence in the case to show that it is so? He has put himself upon showing that this man is not the true owner; that there is a bill of sale made to him which is a mere sham; that it is made to nobody, and this is legitimate evidence in the ease; not that it fixes this man as Darnaud, but that the transfer upon the record shows upon its face these two signatures were done by the same hand. Whether the signatures appear to be done by the same hand, that, I think, is a question you can put to an expert. Though the testimony is of rather a dangerous character, and not much to be relied on.