Court Opinion

ID: 9625249
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:33:17.125004+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:18:29.281763
License: Public Domain

Banke, Judge,
concurring specially.
While I fully concur in the judgment, it appears appellant’s enumerations of error and brief indicate an underlying contention that a probation revocation hearing should be governed by the same rules of evidence that apply to the trial in chief. This contention is misplaced. I have seen many other cases come to this court under similar contentions. "At a revocation hearing after due notice the trial judge is not bound by the same rules of evidence as a jury in passing upon the guilt or innocence of the accused in the first instance, and it is not necessary that the evidence support the finding beyond a reasonable doubt or even by a preponderance of the evidence. The trial judge is the trior of the facts and has a very wide discretion.” Cooper v. State, 118 Ga. App. 57 (162 SE2d 753). This is as it should be because the trial judge has exercised a discretion in placing a convicted person on probation in the first instance. No person convicted of a crime has the right to have his sentence probated. A trial judge in the exercise of sound discretion may revoke probation upon the slightest degree of evidence or under the "any evidence” rule. See Barlow v. State, 140 Ga. App. 667 (231 SE2d 561).