Court Opinion

ID: 9553813
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:35:38.042187+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:32:17.615210
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE ERICKSON
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority opinion which holds that the value of a restrictively endorsed check is to be determined by its face amount for purposes of the Colorado Theft Statute, 1967 Perm. Supp., C.R.S. 1963, 40-5-2.
The theft statute requires that something of value must be taken. 1967 Perm. Supp., C.R.S. 1963, 40-5-2. The restrictively endorsed checks which were stolen in this case represented indebtednesses to Empire Welding Supply Company arising from sales transactions. Until the checks were presented for collection, the indebtedness was still outstanding, and Empire Welding Supply Company retained the right to enforce the debt obligation. C.R.S. 1963, 155-2-511(3). The fact that the checks were stolen does not in any way affect the underlying debt obligation. In fact, C.R.S. 1963, 155-3-804 specifically recognizes that the theft of checks which represent the payment of an obligation is not a taking of the obligation itself. Thus, even if the checks involved in this case had not been restrictively endorsed, Empire still retained the right to recover the indebtedness represented by the checks. Therefore, even if it is assumed that the stolen checks represented the loss of some value to Empire, it must be conceded that the amount of that loss is not necessarily equal to the face amount of the checks.
The majority opinion, however, overlooks these provisions *272of the Colorado Uniform Commercial Code and focuses its attention upon a tortured view of market value and a misinterpretation of C.R.S. 1963, 155-3-206, which deals with the negotiability of a restrictively endorsed check.
The majority correctly recognizes that market value is defined as the amount which a willing buyer will pay to the true owner of an item which has been stolen, but then ignores the fact that a market must exist for the item before it can have a market value. In Maisel v. People, 166 Colo. 161, 442 P.3d 399 (1968), and Lee v. People, 137 Colo. 465, 326 P.2d 660 (1958), we recognized that market value related to that price which an item would bring on an open market prior to the time it was stolen. If there was no open market for the item prior to the time it was stolen, then no market value existed, and its value for purposes of the theft statute must be established in another manner. Under various provisions of the Colorado Uniform Commercial Code (C.R.S. 1963, 155-1-1, et seq.), which relate to checks and other negotiable instruments, it is clear that a check which carries the restrictive endorsement “For Deposit Only” would not be marketable until the restrictive endorsement was either fulfilled or voided. As a result, the stolen check’s value for purposes of the theft statute could not be determined by its face amount.
A check which is made payable to bearer or to a named individual and endorsed by that individual is freely negotiable by any person in possession of the check. As a result, it has an open market value which is equal to its face amount. A check which is restrictively endorced “For Deposit Only,” on the other hand, is not freely negotiable by any person in possession of the check. In fact, even the named payee of the check who has placed the restrictive endorsement on the check may not freely negotiate the check to any other person until the restrictive endorsement is fulfilled or voided. C.R.S. 1963, 155-3-206(3) provides, in part:
“(3) [A] ny transferee under an indorsement which is . . . ‘for deposit’ . . . must . . . apply any value given by him for or on . . . the instrument consistently with the indorsement . . . .”
*273In this case, since the stolen checks all contained the restrictive endorsement which, at the time of the theft, had not been fulfilled or voided, the checks were not negotiable until the depository bank presented the checks to the drawee bank for collection and credited Empire’s account. The majority’s statement that “the instrument is still negotiable” is incorrect in that respect, or at least misleading. Although C.R.S. 1963, 155-3-206(1) does state that “no restrictive indorsement prevents further transfer or negotiation of the instrument,” that provision must be read in pari materia with the other portions of the Uniform Commercial Code. Camden v. People, 184 Colo. 131, 518 P.2d 1172; State v. Beckman, 149 Colo. 54, 368 P.2d 793 (196l); In re Thomas, 16 Colo. 441, 27 P. 707 (1891). When C.R.S. 1963, 155-3-206(1) is considered along with C.R.S. 1963, 155-3-206(3), it becomes readily apparent that the instrument is further negotiable only after a second or successive endorsement is placed on the instrument indicating that the restrictive endorsement has been fulfilled or voided. See C.R.S. 1963, 155-3-206, comment 3.
In this case, the only second or successive endorsement which would allow the restrictively endorsed checks to become further negotiable was an endorsement by Empire’s depository bank. At the time the checks were stolen, there was no second endorsement on the checks. They were not negotiable. Since the checks were not negotiable at the time they were stolen, there would have been no buyer willing to “buy” the checks for their face amount, and therefore, they did not have a value equal to their face amount.
In my view, the restrictive endorsement on all of the checks taken in this theft is far from being irrelevant to the value of the thing taken. As a result, I would hold that the face amount of a check which is restrictively endorsed “For Deposit Only” does not represent the value of the thing taken for purposes of the Colorado Theft Statute.
Accordingly, I would affirm Marques’ conviction, but remand to the trial court for instructions to vacate the sentence imposed and to resentence Marques for theft of *274property valued at an amount less than $100, since there was no evidence of value of the checks apart from their face amount.
JUSTICE DAY has authorized me to say that he joins me in this dissent.