Court Opinion

ID: 9899878
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-17 20:05:09.332062+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:52.886926
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/17/23 Schwartzman v. South Coast Tax Resolution CA2/2
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION TWO

VAN SCHWARTZMAN,                                                    B314770
                                                                    c/w B320410
         Plaintiff and Appellant,
                                                                    (Los Angeles County
         v.                                                         Super. Ct. No.
                                                                    21STCV01307)
SOUTH COAST TAX
RESOLUTION, INC. et al.,

         Defendants and Respondents.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Barbara Ann Meiers, Judge. Dismissed
with sanctions.

      Law Office of Reshma Kamath and Reshma Kamath for
Plaintiff and Appellant.

     Thompson Coburn, Yael Tobi and Jeffrey N. Brown for
Defendants and Respondents.
                    _________________________
      In a confusing and at times unintelligible opening brief,
plaintiff and appellant Van Schwartzman (Schwartzman)
purports to appeal from, among other things, the trial court’s
order dismissing his case against defendants and respondents
South Coast Tax Resolution, Inc.; Ryan Eric Born; and Sandra
Wolfe (collectively respondents). However, Schwartzman’s notice
of appeal only challenges an earlier interlocutory order denying
various motions, including his motion to seek leave to amend a
then-pending motion to strike respondents’ cross-complaint to
include grounds under California’s anti-SLAPP statute1 (Code
Civ. Proc., § 425.16).2 Because that order is nonappealable, we
dismiss this appeal. We also order appellant’s counsel, Reshma
Kamath (Kamath) to pay sanctions to respondents in the amount
of $5,000 and to the court in the amount of $5,000.
                PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I.    Complaint, Cross-Complaint, and Related Motions
      In January 2021, Schwartzman filed a complaint against
respondents, alleging multiple claims stemming from their
failure to provide him with adequate tax services.3 On
February 18, 2021, respondents filed a cross-complaint against

1       SLAPP is an acronym for strategic lawsuit against public
participation. (Wilcox v. Superior Court (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th
809, 813, overruled in part on other grounds in Equilon
Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 68,
fn. 5.)

2    All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure unless otherwise indicated.

3    The record does not contain a copy of the original
complaint.

                                2
Schwartzman for breach of contract and the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing, intentional interference with
prospective economic relations, and libel.
      On March 26, 2021, Schwartzman filed a motion to strike
the cross-complaint, arguing that it failed to sufficiently state any
cause of action against him. The motion to strike argued that
respondents’ libel claim purported to sue Schwartzman for the
constitutionally protected act of filing a lawsuit, but did not
invoke the anti-SLAPP statute.
      On April 20, 2021, Schwartzman filed a substitution of
attorney form, substituting Kamath for his former attorney,
David R. Griffin (Griffin).4
      On or around April 21, 2021, the trial court moved sua
sponte to strike the pleadings or portion of the pleadings (§ 436)
and for judgment on the pleadings (§ 438).5 Schwartzman
opposed both motions. In his opposition, he accused the trial
judge of “engaging in dilatory tactics, and condescending attitude
and remarks to [Kamath] during hearings[,]” and characterized
the motion for judgment on the pleadings as stemming solely
from the trial judge’s “bias” and “flippant attitude.”
Schwartzman also “demand[ed]” that the trial judge “be recused
from this matter[.]”

4     Prior to the submission of this substitution form, Griffin
and Kamath had worked together on some motions. From this
point onwards, Kamath is the sole attorney appearing for
Schwartzman.

5     The record does not contain a transcript of the hearing(s) or
a copy of the minute order(s) in which these motions were made.

                                 3
II.    The June 23, 2021 Hearing
       A hearing on Schwartzman’s motion to strike was
originally scheduled for April 2021, but the hearing was
continued until June 23, 2021.
       The day before the hearing, Schwartzman filed a motion
seeking leave to amend his pending motion to strike “to include
[section] 425.16, California anti-SLAPP statute.”
       On the day of the hearing, Schwartzman also filed a motion
purporting to seek recusal of the trial judge, arguing that she
should be disqualified for “demonstrat[ing] bias against
[Schwartzman] and/or their counsel and in favor of [respondents]
and/or their counsel” at prior hearings.6 Among other things,
Schwartzman accused the trial judge of “play[ing] ‘third
attorney’ in this matter, instead of an unbiased and
impartial judge, in compelling [Schwartzman] to file an
[o]pposition to [the trial court’s] sudden . . . Motion for Judgment-
on-the-Pleadings” (bolding in original).
       At the hearing, the trial court expressed concern about
Schwartzman’s “rather disturbing opposition to the motion for
judgment on the pleadings, which engages in a lot of negative
comments about me and my role in the case[.]” The court briefly
described the purpose of sections 436 and 438, before explaining
at length the fatal flaws in both parties’ pleadings which
prompted the court’s sua sponte motions.
       Kamath interrupted the court’s presentation twice, asking
for an opportunity to be heard.7 The trial court asked her to

6     The record does not contain any account of these prior
hearings.

7     Kamath attended the hearing remotely via Court Connect.

                                  4
“[w]ait until I’m finished and then everybody will have a chance
to say whatever they want to say.”
        After concluding its opening remarks, the trial court
solicited argument on the cross-complaint from respondents’ trial
counsel. Kamath again interrupted. She “object[ed] . . . [to] the
conversation between you and [respondents’ trial counsel]”
because “[w]e have a motion to recuse you filed on calendar. So
based on this—any of your substantive comments today . . . any
of your dialogue right now—is demonstrating partiality, further,
must be stopped because we have a motion to recuse you.”
        The trial court informed Kamath that it was “not aware of
any such motion.” Kamath insisted that the motion “was filed”
and “will be served in your chambers.” She objected again to the
trial court’s “substantive comments” before asserting that she
had “provided [the trial court] a chance to speak.” The trial court
then interjected, “[e]xcuse me. You don’t provide me with
opportunity to speak. I’m afraid it works the other way. So I’m
going to finish hearing . . . [¶] . . . what [respondents’ trial
counsel] was trying to say.”
        The trial court continued its colloquy with respondents’
trial counsel, who eventually stated that respondents would
“dismiss the cross-complaint without prejudice.” Kamath again
interrupted, prompting the trial court to ask her to “please try to
restrain yourself.”
        Kamath soon interrupted yet again, asking “may
[Schwartzman’s] counsel finally speak on anything . . . [¶]
. . . substantive?” The trial court asked her to “wait for a
moment, please.” Kamath interjected that she had “been
waiting. And I only . . . for the last 20 minutes hear a dialogue
between the two of you.” The trial court explained that it wanted

                                 5
to “get through these points” on the cross-complaint before
hearing argument from Kamath. Kamath responded that “it’s
surprising that you let [respondents’ trial] counsel speak first
before [Schwartzman’s] counsel if [Schwartzman] brought the
complaint.”
       The trial court wrapped up its discussion with respondent’s
trial counsel, then asked to hear from Kamath. Kamath began by
arguing that the trial judge “must recuse [her]self from making
any ruling today” because “there is a motion for recuse on file.”
       The trial court explained the process of disqualification
under section 170.3, explaining that “[y]ou do not make a
motion. . . . [¶] . . . you have to file what is called a verified
statement.” It deemed Kamath’s comments as a request for the
trial judge to disqualify herself and declined to do so, then
advised that Schwartzman could proceed with filing a verified
statement if he chose.8
       Kamath argued with the trial court, claiming that she had
attached a verified statement to the motion seeking recusal and
insisting that the motion precluded the trial court from making
any rulings at the hearing. The trial court found that “[t]here is
no impediment to my taking whatever action the court deems
appropriate this morning” and asked Kamath to move on to
another point.

8      On June 30, 2021, the trial court issued a lengthy ruling
and order striking Kamath’s motion, and, in the interest of
caution, attached a verified answer to the charges of bias “just in
case any forum might decide that this striking of the filing made
is not sufficient and that this Motion is and was a filing under
Section 170.3, and that the striking herein has been done in
error.” From the record, it appears that no further action was
taken to disqualify the trial judge.

                                 6
       Instead, Kamath returned to her disqualification
arguments. The trial court again explained the statutory
disqualification process, and again asked Kamath to move on.
Kamath continued to insist that the trial court “continue this
hearing and not make any substantive rulings.” For a third time,
the trial court asked Kamath to “move on to your next point.”
       Kamath then accused the trial court of “demonstrat[ing]
some bias in saying” things like “‘I know [how] you feel’” and “‘I’m
sorry’” to respondents’ counsel earlier in the hearing.
       Only then did Kamath turn to arguments on the merits.
Among other things, she suggested that respondents should not
be permitted to voluntarily dismiss their cross-complaint when
Schwartzman had a pending motion to strike, as well as a motion
for leave to amend that motion to strike to include anti-SLAPP
grounds.
       After Kamath had presented several arguments, the trial
court interrupted her to organize other matters pending on its
morning calendar. Kamath objected, prompting the following
exchange:
       “MS. KAMATH: Your Honor, you’re doing this again.
You’re doing this again. I make a point, and you start talking
about other things.
       “THE COURT: Would you please—
       “MS. KAMATH: You have to recuse yourself. . . . This is
the second time you’re doing this.
       “THE COURT: Ms. Kamath—
       “MS. KAMATH: I made substantive argument.
       “THE COURT: —[Y]ou—
       “MS. KAMATH: And you start talking about recess—[9]

9     The trial court had not said anything about a recess.

                                 7
       “THE COURT: You do not control—
       “MS. KAMATH: —[A]nd other—and other matters, your
Honor. [¶] . . . [¶]
       “THE COURT: —[T]he calendar of this court. Stop
speaking.
       “MS. KAMATH: Your Honor, this is the second time you
are doing this.
       “THE COURT: Stop speaking. I have other—
       “MS. KAMATH: I was speaking.
       “THE COURT: —[P]eople—
       “MS. KAMATH: And you started—
       “THE COURT: —[I]n this courtroom.
       “MS. KAMATH: This is not okay.
       “THE COURT: You are not entitled to sit there and yell at
me and tell me—
       “MS. KAMATH: Your Honor, you aren’t entitled to start
talking—
       “THE COURT: There are people in this courtroom, ma’am.
The people in this courtroom are shaking their heads—literally
shaking their heads—at you while—
       “MS. KAMATH: Your Honor, I’m shaking my head—
       “THE COURT: —[Y]ou speak.
       “MS. KAMATH: —because this is continued from April.
This is June.
       “THE COURT: You have to control yourself.
       “MS. KAMATH: You’re portraying yourself in a positive
light. They don’t know—
       “THE COURT: You have to control yourself.
       “MS. KAMATH: —what you have done, your Honor.
       “THE COURT: All right.

                               8
        “MS. KAMATH: Let them shake their heads as much as
they want.”
        The trial court attempted to proceed, but Kamath
continued interrupting both the court and other attorneys
attempting to answer the court’s questions. Eventually, the trial
court ordered its staff to place Kamath’s line on mute.
Regardless, Kamath soon continued her volley of interruptions; a
member of the trial court’s staff told the court that Kamath
“continues to unmute her microphone even though we placed her
on mute.”
        The trial court told Kamath that “[w]e’re still going to
continue with Schwartzman, if you will please be patient,
ma’am.” Kamath started to object, and the court ordered its staff
to “[m]ute it again. Mute it, please.”
        The trial court quickly finished its conversation and invited
Kamath to continue with her arguments. When the subject of
Kamath’s pending motions arose, the trial court noted that it was
not aware of any pending anti-SLAPP motion. Kamath
responded that “we have a motion to leave to amend to include
the anti-SLAPP[.]”
        After Kamath finished, the trial court took the matter
under submission.
III. The Parties’ Subsequent Motions
        The hearing concluded at 11:16 a.m. At 12:34 p.m.,
Schwartzman filed two identical “Motion[s] for California Anti-
SLAPP[.]” The motions purported to “move for [a] Motion
. . . pursuant to the . . . California anti-SLAPP statute” and stated
that “[t]his will apply to the original Motion-to-Strike filed on
April 21, 2021.” The attached memoranda said that
Schwartzman was “bring[ing] th[ese] motion[s] under . . . [the]

                                 9
California anti-SLAPP” statute, but also “request[ed] this Court
leave to amend to include California ANTI-SLAPP . . . in his
Motion-to-Strike[.]”
      That same day, respondents filed a motion to dismiss the
cross-complaint.
      Respondents later opposed Schwartzman’s purported anti-
SLAPP motions, arguing, among other things, that they were
moot and untimely.
      Schwartzman filed a supporting motion, in which he
conceded that “[o]n the motion-to-strike filing, [he] was
inadvertent in not including this anti-SLAPP motion . . . . Yet,
based on the motion-to-strike, and subsequent pleadings,
[Schwartzman] remains compelled to include the anti-SLAPP
motion.” He “request[ed] this Court to include the anti-SLAPP
provisions” in his original motion to strike “at the time of filing,
and on the date of hearing, i.e., April 21, 2021” using the court’s
“‘inherent power to enter judgments nunc pro tunc so as to relate
back to the time when they should have been entered.’
[Citation.]”
IV. Cross-Complaint Dismissed
      On June 29, 2021, the trial court entered dismissal on the
cross-complaint.
V.    The August 2, 2021 Order
      On August 2, 2021, the trial court denied all pending
motions in the case, including Schwartzman’s motion to strike,
his motion for leave to amend his motion to strike to include anti-
SLAPP grounds, and his “‘anti-slapp’ [sic] motion[.]”10 The court
explained that Schwartzman’s motions were “denied because they

10    The trial court also denied its pending motions under
sections 436 and 438.

                                10
are all moot. They are all directed to seeking to strike various
aspects of the [respondents’] once filed cross-complaint, but that
Cross-Complaint having been dismissed before the filing of the
anti-slapp [sic] motion and before any hearing of any of
[Schwartzman’s] other motions to strike or to amend which would
serve to no purpose other than to ‘attack’ the Cross-Complaint,
[Schwartzman’s] motions are now immaterial and all moot.”
VI. Appeal
       Schwartzman timely filed a notice of appeal challenging the
August 2, 2021 order. He checked a box indicating that the order
was appealable under section 904.1, subdivision (a)(3)–(13).
       Meanwhile, the case proceeded through the trial court. On
April 5, 2022, Schwartzman filed a second notice of appeal from
an order establishing that, since Schwartzman had not timely
filed an amended complaint, a prior order granting judgment on
the pleadings had become final (the second appeal).
       On August 29, 2022, Schwartzman filed a motion to
consolidate both appeals. We granted the motion. However, the
trial court subsequently issued a notice of default on the second
appeal because Schwartzman did not timely pay the required fees
to obtain the record from the trial court. We then dismissed the
second appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.140(b)(1).)
       Schwartzman moved to vacate our dismissal. Respondents
filed an opposition. We denied the motion to vacate, and the
order challenged in the second appeal became final as of
January 24, 2023
                           DISCUSSION
I.     Dismissal
       As an initial matter, we must determine whether we have
jurisdiction to consider this appeal. It is well-established that

                               11
our jurisdiction extends only to appealable judgments and
appealable orders. (Griset v. Fair Political Practices Comm.
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 688, 696.) If “the order is not appealable, we
must dismiss the appeal.” (Reddish v. Westamerica Bank (2021)
68 Cal.App.5th 275, 277.)
       Schwartzman’s operative notice of appeal challenges the
trial court’s August 2, 2021 order, denying his conventional
motion to strike and his motions requesting leave to amend the
motion to strike to include anti-SLAPP grounds. This type of
order is not appealable without express statutory authorization.
(See In re Baycol Cases I & II (2011) 51 Cal.4th 751, 754 [“The
right to appeal in California is generally governed by the ‘one
final judgment’ rule, under which most interlocutory orders are
not appealable”].)
       The notice of appeal avers that the challenged order is
appealable under subdivision (a)(3)–(13) of section 904.1. The
only part of that statute notionally relevant to the challenged
order is subdivision (a)(13), which permits appeals “[f]rom an
order granting or denying a special motion to strike under
[section] 425.16[,]” California’s anti-SLAPP statute.
       The filing of an anti-SLAPP motion is a necessary
prerequisite to an appealable order granting or denying it. Here,
Schwartzman never filed a viable anti-SLAPP motion. Instead,
he filed a conventional motion to strike, which did not invoke the
anti-SLAPP statute, and then filed several motions requesting
leave to amend that motion to strike to include the anti-SLAPP.11

11    Each of these motions, including the ones titled “Motion for
California Anti-SLAPP”, request leave to amend. But even if we
construed these papers as anti-SLAPP motions, they would still
be invalid as untimely. Schwartzman did not file the first of

                                12
And, in his final filing on the issue, Schwartzman admitted that
he had not filed a timely anti-SLAPP motion due to
“inadverten[ce,]” and thus needed the trial court’s intervention to
render any of his purported anti-SLAPP motions viable.
       Because Schwartzman never filed a viable anti-SLAPP
motion, his appeal is not authorized by section 904.1, subdivision
(a)(13). Nor does any other statute grant us jurisdiction over this
interlocutory appeal. Accordingly, we must dismiss the appeal.
       Schwartzman raises four arguments against our
conclusion. All four are meritless. First, he argues that “since
the [challenged] Order ruled on [his] anti-SLAPP arguments, it
should be construed as an order denying an anti-SLAPP
motion[.]” But he cites no legal authority that would permit us to
treat the denial of his motions for leave to amend as a denial of
an anti-SLAPP motion. (City of Santa Maria v. Adam (2012) 211
Cal.App.4th 266, 287 (City of Santa Maria) [“[W]e may disregard
conclusory arguments that are not supported by pertinent legal
authority”]; see also L.O. v. Kilrain (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 616,
619–620 (L.O.)[“[A]ppellant must do more than assert error and

these motions until June 22, 2021, 124 days after the cross-
complaint was filed. (§ 425.16, subd. (f) [an anti-SLAPP motion
“may be filed within 60 days of the service of the [challenged]
complaint or, in the court’s discretion, at any later time upon
terms it deems proper”]; see also Newport Harbor Ventures, LLC
v. Morris Cerullo World Evangelism (2018) 4 Cal.5th 637, 645
[“[S]ection 425.16, subdivision (f), should be interpreted to permit
an anti-SLAPP motion against an amended complaint if it could
not have been brought earlier, but to prohibit belated motions
that could have been brought earlier (subject to the trial court’s
discretion to permit a late motion)”].) Because the trial court
never exercised its discretion to permit a late anti-SLAPP filing,
it follows that no anti-SLAPP motion was filed.

                                 13
leave it to the appellate court to search the record and the law
books to test his claim. The appellant must present an adequate
argument including citations to supporting authorities[.]
[Citations.]’ [Citation.]”
       Second, Schwartzman contends that the instant appeal is
not interlocutory because it was consolidated with the second
appeal, which was taken from a final judgment. Although he
recognizes that the second appeal was dismissed, he insists that
“the fact of the consolidation of the two appeals” is sufficient to
save this appeal from dismissal.12 Again, Schwartzman cites no
legal authority supporting the idea that a dismissed appeal from
a final judgment provides any jurisdictional basis for an
interlocutory appeal with which it was once consolidated. (City of
Santa Maria, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 287; L.O., supra,
96 Cal.App.5th at pp. 619–620.)
       Third, Schwartzman asserts that the challenged order is
appealable under section 906. That section does not provide an
independent basis for appealability, but only establishes that
“[u]pon an appeal pursuant to [s]ection 904.1 or 904.2, the
reviewing court may review the verdict or decision and any
intermediate ruling, proceeding, order or decision which involves
the merits or necessarily affects the judgment or order appealed
from or which substantially affects the rights of a party.” (§ 906
[italics added].) Schwartzman does not explain how this statute
could authorize his appeal. (Hodjat v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Ins. Co. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1, 10 [“[A]n appellant

12     To the extent that Schwartzman argues that the second
appeal was erroneously dismissed, he improperly attempts to
relitigate a decision that was made final in January 2023.

                                14
is required to not only cite to valid legal authority, but also
explain how it applies in his case”].)
       Lastly, Schwartzman asks us to liberally construe his
notice of appeal. But the policy of liberally construing a notice of
appeal in favor of its sufficiency to permit review of the merits
(Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.100(a)(2), 8.406(d)) does not apply to
a notice of appeal that expressly targets a nonappealable order.
(See Winter v. Rice (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 679, 683 [“While there
is a well recognized policy in favor of resolving appeals on their
merits [citation], this court has no power to make appealable an
order which is nonappealable”]; see also Doe v. United States
Swimming, Inc. (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1424, 1432 [“‘An attempt
to appeal from a nonappealable order does not give this court
jurisdiction or authority to review it.’ [Citation.]”].)
II.    Sanctions
       A.     Additional Relevant Procedural History
       On September 28, 2023, respondents moved to sanction
Schwartzman and Kamath in the amount of $50,111.28, which is
the amount respondents claim it has cost them to prepare this
appeal. Among other things, respondents argue that this appeal
is sanctionable because it is frivolous, as it was “taken from a[]
non-appealable order[,]” and because Schwartzman’s appellate
briefs embark on a “vitriolic crusade against the judiciary—a
crusade unrelated to the merits of any substantive issue on
appeal—[which] violates California’s civility guidelines” (bolding
in original).
       As to the latter point, respondents cite numerous
outrageous statements made against the trial court in
Schwartzman’s briefs, including that the trial judge: (1) “acted as
a judicial bully” and employed “judicial tricks” to “scar[e]”

                                15
Schwartzman and “forc[e]” him to file motions against his better
judgment; (2) repeatedly engaged in “Pro-White/Pro-Male
behavior” and “Judicial Bullyism[;]” (3) “shap[ed] the case to
favor [r]espondents, and their white attorneys” by “coach[ing]”
respondents’ trial counsel to dismiss their cross-complaint,
because the trial judge is a “homogenous and ivory pedagogy-type
judicial officer” looking to deny Kamath a victory on her motions;
(4) engaged in “constant sadistic harassment of a young female
attorney [i.e., Kamath]” by “wielding her judicial power to do
whatever she wants[,]” and “spewed her bias in [a] case where
she sees a person of color [i.e., Kamath] [;]” and (5) “hired a light-
skinned Latin clerk” and “often demonstrates her prejudice to
immigrants and tanner-toned attorneys and litigants.” She also
attacked this court, blaming “P[residing] J[ustice] Liu [sic] and
his incompetent, prejudicial court staff” for the default that led to
the dismissal of Schwartzman’s second appeal, and the California
judiciary at large, accusing courts of harboring a “lax attitude,
circumventing of the code and rules, and . . . protecting from
shame to[o] many-a-white, and/or male attorneys” such that “it is
unbelievable that the courts are not in complete shambles.”
      On October 3, 2023, we sent notice to both parties that we
would consider sanctioning Schwartzman and/or Kamath, either
pursuant to respondents’ motion for sanctions or on our own
motion, and invited Kamath to “file a supplemental letter brief
addressing the propriety of sanctions” to be “no more than 1500
words[.]” On October 16, 2023, Kamath filed a brief purporting to
respond to the sanctions issue; however, it was 9477 words long.
Accordingly, we rejected the filing, but gave Kamath an
additional five days to submit a compliant brief.

                                 16
       Instead, Kamath accused a clerk of this court of
“discriminatorily rejecting a time-sensitive filing” and threatened
to sue both the clerk and the court. She then immediately
attempted to refile the rejected brief as an attachment to a
document titled “NOTICE RE TIMELY-FILING OF AN
OPPOSITION AND LETTER[.]” The notice insisted that the
rejection of the brief was part of a pattern of “constant
discrimination against APPELLATE COUNSEL RESHMA
KAMATH[,]” and that “[t]he PRO-WHITE sentiments and
discrimination at the appellate level is only reflective of the
California courts, and California societies.”
       On October 24, 2023, Kamath filed a request to continue
oral argument in this case.13 The request again accused the clerk
of rejecting Kamath’s filings “purely based on her racist
intent . . . . As much as Latin-American women demonstrate
hatred and racism towards Indian/Indian-American women in
America, [the clerk] has demonstrated the same.”14
       On that same day, Kamath filed another document titled
“NOTICE RE DEFENDANT-JUSTICE ASHMANN-GERST’S
RACIALLY-MOTIVATED ORDER[.]” In it, she argued that

13    We denied the request to continue for lack of good cause.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.60(b).) Kamath did not appear for
oral argument.

14    Kamath attempted to support this claim by arguing that
the clerk, “on October 17, 2023, . . . accepted the filing of the
White/Caucasian attorneys in this case[,] [t]hus making the
White/Caucasian attorneys look like first-filers[.]” We note that
respondents’ counsel did not file any papers in this case on
October 17, 2023.

                                17
Presiding Justice Lui and Justice Ashmann-Gerst “are
PRECLUDED from ruling on any actions where APPELLANT’S
COUNSEL participates as counsel[,]” because they are
“racially/ethnically motivated[,]” and/or “strayed far away from
their ministerial duties engaging in their PERSONAL BIASES,
AND PREJUDICES.”15
       On October 27, 2023, Kamath attempted to file a document
entitled “NOTICE RE JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT AND
APPEARANCES OF JUDICIAL IMPROPRIETY[.]” The notice
accused multiple Justices of potentially engaging in improper
behavior, including: (1) financial and/or political involvement
with agents of foreign governments; (2) supporting Christian and
religious groups that “directly, and/or indirectly, provide any
funding/contributions/donations to local chapters such as Proud
Boys[;]” (3) harboring biases “in favor of attorneys practicing the
Jewish faith that JUSTICES . . . blindly support in cases where
[Kamath] is against[;]” and (4) having “minimal involvement with
Indian/Indian American/Hindu individuals and/or attorneys in
their entire lifetimes.”
       A clerk of this court rejected the filing, advising that
“[c]omplaints against any justice of the Court of Appeal may be
submitted through the Commission on Judicial Performance[.]”
       Kamath then e-mailed the clerk, objecting to the rejection
by saying that it was “highly improper for [her] to act such as this
as you’re a non-lawyer clerk. [¶] Please refrain from your on-
going racism towards me[.]” Kamath also sent an e-mail to the
clerk and multiple justices of this court, complaining that the
clerk “has demonstrated open and invidious racism” and thus

15     Kamath also included another Justice from a separate
division, who is not involved in this case, in these accusations.

                                 18
“must refrain from any kind of action on any of my work and filed
cases based on [the clerk’s] tangible/objective acts of racism
. . . towards me.”
        B.    Applicable Law
        Although this power should be used sparingly, monetary
sanctions may be awarded against an appellant and/or his
counsel for taking a frivolous appeal. (§ 907; Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.276(a)(1).)
        In particular, sanctions against an appellant’s counsel “are
appropriate when . . . counsel had a professional obligation not to
pursue the appeal or should have declined the case outright.
[Citation.]” (Malek Media Group, LLC v. AXQG Corp. (2020)
58 Cal.App.5th 817, 837 (Malek Media Group).)
        An appeal is frivolous when it “was prosecuted for an
improper motive” or “indisputably has no merit”—that is, “‘when
any reasonable attorney would agree that the appeal is totally
and completely without merit.’” (Singh v. Lipworth (2014) 227
Cal.App.4th 813, 826; quoting, In re Marriage of Flaherty (1982)
31 Cal.3d 637, 650 (Flaherty).) To determine whether an appeal
is frivolous, we apply both an objective standard, analyzing the
merits of the appeal, and a subjective standard, examining the
motives of appellant and his counsel. (Id. at pp. 649–650.) “A
finding of frivolousness may be based on either standard by itself,
but the two tests are ordinarily used together, with one
sometimes providing evidence relevant to the other.” (Malek
Media Group, supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at p. 834.)
        “When deciding the amount of sanctions to impose, courts
may consider ‘the amount of respondent’s attorney fees on appeal;
. . . the degree of objective frivolousness and delay; and the need
for discouragement of like conduct in the future[,]’” (Keitel v.

                                19
Heubel (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 324, 342), as well as the cost to
taxpayers of processing an appeal that results in an opinion
(Workman v. Colichman (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 1039, 1065).
       C.    Analysis
       We find that Kamath’s egregious conduct merits monetary
sanctions.
       To begin, this appeal is patently frivolous. As described
above, the appeal is taken from a nonappealable order.
Moreover, this appeal is also moot. An appeal is moot if the
appellate court cannot “‘grant[] any effectual relief[,]’” defined as
the “‘prospect of a remedy that can have a practical, tangible
impact on the parties’ conduct or legal status.’ [Citation.]” (Delta
Stewardship Council Cases (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 1014, 1053.)
Here, Schwartzman has already received the relief that his
denied motions could provide if revived, because the cross-
complaint targeted by those motions has long since been
voluntarily dismissed. If we granted the relief he requests, there
would be no “‘practical, tangible impact’” on this case whatsoever.
(Ibid.)
       Under these circumstances, any “reasonable person would
‘agree that th[is] appeal is completely devoid of merit.’
[Citation.]” (In re Marriage of Deal (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 71, 80;
see also Malek Media Group, supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at p. 836 [“A
complete lack of merit is evidence that the appellant brought the
appeal for the purpose of delay”].)
       Yet Kamath persisted in prosecuting the appeal, baselessly
arguing that the dismissed second appeal provided a basis for
jurisdiction and that the challenged order should be viewed as

                                 20
the denial of an anti-SLAPP motion.16 Her decisions caused the
court to “waste[] its time and resources considering [the] appeal,
which has only served as a drain on the judicial system and the
taxpayers of this state.” (Malek Media Group, supra,
58 Cal.App.5th at p. 837.)
         Equally telling is Kamath’s outrageous conduct throughout
this case. (Flaherty, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 649 [the subjective
standard for assessing frivolousness “looks to the motives of
. . . counsel”]; see also Smith v. Selma Community Hospital (2010)
188 Cal.App.4th 1, 7 [a person’s “conduct [is] relevant evidence
from which inferences can be drawn regarding [her] motives in
. . . litigating a lawsuit”].)
         For over two years, Kamath has persisted in a troubling
pattern of behavior in which, from the moment she is given an
indication that things may not pan out for her client, she
unleashes a flood of unsupported claims of bias in an attempt to
disqualify the presiding tribunal and delay any potential adverse
rulings.
         In this case, the flood commenced when, after the trial
court moved sua sponte to strike the pleadings or portion of the
pleadings, Kamath suddenly accused the trial judge of bias and
“demand[ed]” that she “be recused from this matter[.]” Kamath

16    Confusingly, in the same brief in which Kamath attempts
to characterize the challenged order as functionally equivalent to
an order denying an anti-SLAPP motion, she argues that
Schwartzman “had no intention of filing any kind of anti-SLAPP
motion against the Cross-Complaint[,]” “nor did [he] want to seek
leave to amend to include any type of special motion to strike.”
Instead, Kamath insists that the trial court “forced” her to file a
“judge-ordered leave-to-include anti-SLAPP that [Schwartzman]
never wanted to file.” The record does not support these claims.

                                21
repeated these claims several times, including in the motion to
recuse the trial judge, during her combative performance at the
June 23, 2021 hearings, and in the appellate opening and reply
briefs.
       To the extent that Kamath provides any evidence for these
claims of bias, she cites incidents ranging from mere adverse
rulings (actual or potential) to spurious claims that the trial
judge “coached” the respondents’ trial counsel to dismiss their
cross-complaint and engaged in preferential hiring practices.17
None of these points supports a good faith claim of bias. (See,
e.g., Brown v. American Bicycle Group, LLC (2014) 224
Cal.App.4th 665, 674 [“The mere fact that the trial court issued
rulings adverse to [a party] . . . , even assuming one or more of
those rulings were erroneous, does not indicate an appearance of
bias, much less demonstrate actual bias”].)
       This conduct alone suggests that Kamath prosecuted this
appeal for improper motives. (See In re S.C. (2006)
138 Cal.App.4th 396, 422 [“Disparaging the trial judge is a tactic
that is not taken lightly by a reviewing court. Counsel better
make sure . . . she has the facts right before venturing into such
dangerous territory because it is contemptuous for an attorney to
make the unsupported assertion that the judge was ‘act[ing] out
of bias toward a party.’ [Citation.]”].)
       But Kamath doubled down, using her appellate briefs as a
platform to groundlessly disparage the trial court, this appellate

17    As described above, the record does not support Kamath’s
assertion regarding any biased coaching of respondents’ trial
counsel during the June 23, 2021 hearing. While the trial court
did give guidance to respondents’ trial counsel, Kamath received
just as much (if not more) judicial advice.

                                22
court, and the legal system as a whole. Such disparagement is
both improper and ineffective. Appellate briefs provide an
opportunity to present cogent legal arguments; they are “not an
appropriate vehicle for an attorney to ‘“vent h[er] spleen[.]”’”
(City of Riverside v. Horspool (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 670, 674,
fn. 3.)
        Kamath repeated this cycle of behavior in this court. After
appellate briefing concluded and respondents filed their motion
for sanctions, we issued notice that we would consider imposing
monetary sanctions and rejected Kamath’s noncompliant brief.
Kamath responded by disparaging the court and its staff in
numerous filings and e-mails, which included threats to sue the
court. Her groundless allegations of judicial bias quickly
escalated to wild claims of individual justices’ potential
involvement with, inter alia, foreign government agents and
violent hate groups such as the Proud Boys.
        “The Court of Appeal is not an appropriate forum to peddle
far-fetched conspiracy theories . . . disguised as a legitimate
appeal. Nor is it a forum to launch personal attacks against”
judicial officers or court staff. (Malek Media Group, supra,
58 Cal.App.5th at pp. 835–836.) This type of conduct is
sanctionable. (Id. at p. 836 [sanctions are appropriate against a
party who “adopt[s] a war-like mentality toward . . . anyone else
involved with [a] case” and where “[t]he record is replete with
personal attacks . . . as well as numerous unsubstantiated claims
that everyone who was purportedly against [the party] was
engaged in an elaborate conspiracy to destroy h[er]”].)
        Kamath’s conduct is not becoming of an attorney. “[I]t is
vital to the integrity of our adversary legal process that attorneys
strive to maintain the highest standards of ethics, civility, and

                                 23
professionalism in the practice of law. In order to instill public
confidence in the legal profession and our judicial system, an
attorney must be an example of lawfulness, not lawlessness. [¶]
Accordingly, an attorney, ‘however zealous in [her] client’s behalf,
has, as an officer of the court, a paramount obligation to the due
and orderly administration of justice . . . .’ [Citation.] An
attorney must . . . maintain a respectful attitude toward the
court. [Citations.]” (People v. Chong (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 232,
243; see also Snoeck v. ExakTime Innovations, Inc. (Oct. 2, 2023,
B321566) ___ Cal.App.5th ___ [2023 Cal.App.LEXIS 5855, at
pp. *21–*28] [as an officer of the court, an attorney owes the
court and opposing counsel professional courtesy], Cal. Bus. &
Prof. Code, § 6068, Cal. State Bar, California Attorney Guidelines
of Civility and Professionalism (2007), § 4.)
       By turning her client’s case into a showcase for her
conspiracies of personal persecution, Kamath has done a
disservice to Schwartzman and to the courts. And, in our view,
her conduct certainly warrants sanctions.
       When considering the amount of sanctions, we find that the
degree of objective and subjective frivolousness in this appeal is
extremely high, and our desire to discourage conduct like
Kamath’s is very strong. As discussed above, there are two bases
for imposing monetary sanctions in this case. First, this appeal
completely lacks merit. Second, Kamath’s unreasonable behavior
is further evidence that she has abused the appellate process for
improper reasons. Reflecting these considerations, we sanction
Kamath in the amount of $10,000, with $5,000 payable to
respondents and $5,000 payable to this court. “This opinion
constitutes a written statement of our reasons for imposing

                                24
sanctions.” (Huschke v. Slater (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1153,
1164.)
                           DISPOSITION
       The appeal is dismissed. Respondents are entitled to costs
on appeal. Schwartzman’s counsel, Reshma Kamath, is assessed
a total of $10,000 in sanctions, with $5,000 payable to
respondents and $5,000 payable to the Court of Appeal in care of
the clerk of this court no later than 15 days after the date of the
remittitur is filed. The clerk of this court is directed to deposit
said sum in the general fund.
       Reshma Kamath is also ordered to report the sanctions to
the State Bar of California. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6068, subd.
(o)(3).) The clerk of this court is directed to forward a copy of this
opinion to the State Bar of California. (Bus. & Prof. Code,
§ 6086.7, subd. (b).)
       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

                                       ________________________, J.
                                       ASHMANN-GERST

We concur:

________________________, P. J.
LUI

________________________, J.
HOFFSTADT

                                  25