Court Opinion

ID: 8034059
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-09-09 03:18:42.990925+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:37:04.040155
License: Public Domain

Good, J.,
dissenting.
In so far as the opinion holds that defendant is liable for a conversion of the note and mortgage in controversy, I respectfully dissent.
The record shows that while plaintiff was the owner and holder of the note and mortgage he voluntarily surrendered and turned them over to Kline, Ferguson, and McCord, with the understanding and agreement that he was to receive in consideration therefor stock in a trust company which they were then supposed to have organized. Plaintiff testified that he did not expect to receive any part of the consideration that was paid by defendant for the note and mortgage. No doubt exists that Kline, Ferguson, and McCord, through fraud, procured from plaintiff the note and mortgage. Plaintiff knew that they were negotiating for and contemplating a sale thereof and did not protest. When they, through Schmutzer, found a purchaser for the note and mortgage, plaintiff was informed of that fact, and then indorsed the note and assigned the mortgage and placed it in the power of those, to whom he had transferred the note and mortgage, to sell and transfer title to another. They did transfer it to the defendant and received in consideration therefor Liberty bonds to the amount of $8,300 and stock in the Bankers Fire Insurance Company of the face value of $2,000. The total amount paid by defendant for the note and mortgage represented its face value. It is doubtless true that plaintiff did not then realize that he was being victimized by Kline and his associates.
The majority opinion proceeds on the erroneous theory *509that Kline, Ferguson, and McCord were agents of the plaintiff and acting for him in the sale of the note and mortgage, and that, being agents, they had authority to sell only for •cash. The record does not justify the assumption. Kline and his associates were acting for themselves, or nominally for the mythical trust company. Plaintiff, as he testified, was not to receive any of the proceeds of the sale, because he was to receive stock in the trust company, for which he had subscribed. Had the defendant paid to Kline and his associates the full cash value of the note and mortgage, plaintiff would be in no better position; he would have received no' part of the money.
To constitute a conversion there must be a taking of personal property from the owner without his consent. It is a rule, well recognized and almost without exception, that if the owner of personalty expressly or impliedly consents to the taking, use or disposition of his property he cannot recover therefor in an action for conversion. 38 Cyc. 2009. The text announcing this rule cites, in its support, authorities from 17 states, including Nebraska. In Carlson v. Jordan, 4 Neb. (Unof.) 359, it is held: “No action for conversion will lie on account of a disposition of property which plaintiff admits authorizing.”
In the instant case, plaintiff not only authorized the sale of his note and mortgage to defendant, but participated therein, after he had knowledge that the note and mortgage were being negotiated by Kline and his associates. He indorsed the note and the coupons attached thereto and assigned the mortgage, leaving them in possession of Kline and his associates for delivery.
Justice and equity will not permit plaintiff to recoup from defendant the loss which he sustained through the fraud practiced by Kline, Ferguson, and McCord. To do so would be to compensate plaintiff for a loss sustained through fraud not practiced by defendant. The record clearly shows that the officer of defendant, who acted for it in acquiring the note and mortgage, had no knowledge of Kline, Ferguson, and McCord, or of Schmutzer, until *510after plaintiff had subscribed for the stock in the trust company and delivered his note and mortgage to them. There is no direct evidence, nor, as I view the record, are there any facts or circumstances proved, which would justify an inference that any officer of defendant participated in the fraud practiced upon the plaintiff, or had any knowledge thereof, until long after defendant had purchased and paid for the note and mortgage.
In my opinion, the judgment of the district court is not supported by the evidence and should be reversed.
Eberly, J., concurs in this dissent.