Court Opinion

ID: 9608887
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:19:29.532951+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:22:17.773201
License: Public Domain

LEE ANN DAUPHINOT, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent to the majority’s holding that attempting to pass a forged check constitutes theft under chapter 31 of the penal code. The majority correctly states that issuing or .passing a check drawn on a bank in which the person had no account constitutes theft, but only if it purports to be his own act and not the act of another. That is, if a person issues a check drawn on an account which he has closed or in which he has insufficient funds or if he stops payment on a check, his conduct falls within the ambit of section 31.03, the theft statute, and may have satisfied the intent element through the presumptions of theft by check established in section 31.06.1 If, however, the writing purports to be the act of another who did not authorize the act, then the conduct falls under the forgery statute, section 32.21.2
The facts of this case do not reveal that Appellant attempted theft by check. The record indicates that Appellant attempted to pass a check on the account of Duane Fyvie or Shirley Fyvie that bore the signature “Duane Fyvie.” Duane Fyvie did not testify at trial. Shirley Fyvie testified that someone had stolen 500 checks out of their mailbox and was “writing checks on us.” She also testified that she had not authorized anyone to write the check in question. These facts establish that Appellant committed the offense of forgery, not theft by check.3
The legislature has defined theft and has separately defined forgery.4 They are two distinct offenses. Theft offenses have ■been consolidated under chapter 31 of the penal code. Conversely, forgery is a chapter 32 fraud offense. Robbery is an as-saultive offense that the legislature has specifically limited to chapter 31 theft offenses:
A person commits [robbery] if, in the course of committing theft as defined in Chapter 31 and with intent to obtain or maintain control of the property, he:
(1) intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another; or
(2) intentionally or knowingly threatens or places another in fear of imminent bodily injury or death.5
There is no evidence Appellant committed a chapter 31 theft offense. Additionally, there is no evidence of who would bear the loss once the check is passed. Although there is evidence that someone stole the checks from the Fyvies’ mailbox before Appellant attempted to pass the check, the State did not attempt to prove Appellant committed that theft, nor did the State attempt to prove theft of stolen property. Further, I do not believe that the robbery statute is broad enough to include threats of bodily injury or death at all times a person is in possession of stolen property.
We have before us some evidence of forgery by either uttering or possessing with intent to utter a forged writing that purports to be the act of Duane Fyvie with intent to defraud or harm another.6 There is no evidence Duane Fyvie did not authorize the act, but Appellant has not raised that issue. Appellant’s conduct falls squarely within the forgery statute and *557does not constitute a chapter 31 offense. When, as in this case, a statute governs the legal issue, we apply the plain meaning of the statute’s language, unless its application is ambiguous or would lead to an absurd result.7 The plain meaning of the robbery statute is that it applies only to chapter 31 offenses. Consequently, the legislature has decreed that Appellant’s offense does not constitute robbery.
I agree that there is ample evidence that Appellant threatened bodily injury or death and that he used and exhibited a deadly weapon. I cannot, however, square the majority’s analysis of theft with the clear intent of the legislature. For these reasons, I would hold that the trial court erred in failing to sua sponte withdraw the plea. I respectfully dissent to the scholarly and compelling opinion of the majority.

. See Tex Penal Code Ann. §§ 31.03, 31.06 (Vernon Supp.2000).

. See id. § 32.21.

. See id.

.See id. §§ 31.03, 32.21.

. Id. § 29.02(a) (Vernon 1994) (emphasis added).

. See id. § 32.21 (a)-(b).

. See Ex parte Serrato, 3 S.W.3d 41, 42 (Tex.Crim.App.1999).