Court Opinion

ID: 9951782
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-19 00:03:33.957672+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:42:42.050739
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/18/24
             CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION *

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                             DIVISION FIVE

    In re Ca.M., et al., Persons Coming        B326320
    Under the Juvenile Court Law.
    ___________________________________        (Los Angeles County
    LOS ANGELES COUNTY                         Super. Ct. No.
    DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN                     22CCJP04019A-E)
    AND FAMILY SERVICES,

            Plaintiff and Respondent,

            v.

    L.C.,

            Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Tiana J. Murillo, Judge. Affirmed.
     Sean Angele Burleigh, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

*
     Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1105(b) and
8.1110, all but Part II.B of this opinion is certified for publication.
      Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Stephen Watson, Senior Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                              2
       In In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, our Supreme Court
explained that ‘“[w]hen a dependency petition alleges multiple
grounds for its assertion that a minor comes within the
dependency court’s jurisdiction, a reviewing court can affirm the
juvenile court’s finding of jurisdiction over the minor if any one of
the statutory bases for jurisdiction that are enumerated in the
petition is supported by substantial evidence. In such a case, the
reviewing court need not consider whether any or all of the other
alleged statutory grounds for jurisdiction are supported by the
evidence.”’ (Id. at 773.) In this case, we follow this language in
I.J.—an opinion that has not since been disapproved—to affirm
the juvenile court’s finding of dependency jurisdiction over
defendant and appellant L.C.’s (Mother’s) children. We also
conclude, in the unpublished portion of our opinion, that Mother’s
challenge to the disposition orders removing the children from
her custody is moot and does not warrant resolution.

                         I. BACKGROUND
       Mother has five children involved in this appeal: eight-
year-old Ca.M., five-year-old Ch.M., three-year-old Cr.M., two-
year-old Cl.M., and four-month-old Ce.M. (collectively, the
Minors). 1
       On September 18, 2022, Father, Mother, Mother’s sister
V.P., and the four oldest Minors attended a “low-rider” car show
in the City of Compton. During the drive home, Father began to
yell at Mother, calling her names and accusing her of infidelity.
Father then punched Mother several times in the face and she

1
      These were Minors’ ages at the initiation of dependency
proceedings.

                                 3
demanded he stop the vehicle and let her and the children out.
As she was removing Cl.M. from her car seat, Father started to
drive away, dragging Mother approximately two feet.
Eventually, Father drove away with Cl.M. still in the vehicle. As
a result of the incident, Mother sustained severe swelling,
lacerations, and bruising to her face. Mother received medical
treatment at the scene by paramedics.
       When interviewed at the scene by deputies from the Los
Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, Mother advised Father
had been drinking. Ca.M., Ch.M., and V.P. were also interviewed
at the scene by deputies. They confirmed the argument between
Father and Mother, Father’s battery of Mother, and Father
dragging Mother several feet with his vehicle. Ch.M. also
advised Father was driving “drunk.”
       As the deputies were interviewing Mother and members of
her family, Father returned. The deputies stopped him and he
denied punching Mother, dragging her with his vehicle, or having
a firearm during the incident. Mother positively identified
Father as the man who assaulted her, but she declined the
deputies’ offer of an emergency protective order. Based on
Mother’s statement and the statements provided by Ca.M.,
Ch.M., and V.P., the deputies arrested Father.
       Three days after Father’s arrest, a social worker from the
Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services
(the Department) interviewed the two oldest children and Mother
at the family home.
       Ca.M. told the social worker that during the incident
following the car show, Father not only struck Mother but also
brandished a gun at her. Although that was not the first time he
witnessed Father hitting Mother, it was the first time Ca.M. had

                                4
seen him point a gun at her. He directed the social worker to a
shoebox in Mother’s closet and explained that was where Father
had stored his firearm. When the social worker inquired about
holes in a bedroom door, Ca.M. explained that they were made by
Father one time when he kicked and punched the door after
Mother locked herself inside the room. Ca.M. denied suffering
any physical abuse by Father or witnessing Father strike any of
his siblings; he stated Father hit only Mother.
       Ch.M. denied Father ever struck him or his siblings, but he
confirmed Father hit Mother, which made Ch.M. cry. Ch.M. also
corroborated Ca.M.’s statement that Father made the holes in the
bedroom door by kicking it and striking it with his fist. In
addition, Ch.M. said Father “drinks beers all day long” and kept
a firearm in the home.
       Mother confirmed the facts of the post-car show abuse that
she previously related to the police. She denied any prior
domestic violence, denied knowing Father kept a firearm in the
home, and denied she was offered a domestic violence restraining
order by Sheriff’s deputies. Mother added she did not plan on
seeking a restraining order due to the difficulty of going to court
with five young children.
       The social worker also interviewed, among others, Father,
the maternal aunt V.P., and the detective investigating the case.
Father affirmed he and Mother argued after the car show but he
denied hitting Mother with his fists or dragging her with his
vehicle; he attributed Mother’s injuries to her falling out of the
car while it was still moving. Father also denied hitting Mother
on any previous occasion, any current use of alcohol or drugs, and
owning a firearm. Father described Mother as an excellent
parent and he and Mother as a very happy couple. V.P. told the

                                5
social worker Father was drunk on the day of the car show but
refused to let Mother drive the family home. V.P. explained the
incident following the car show was not the first time Father
struck Mother and not the first time police became involved in a
domestic dispute between them. 2 V.P. stated Mother is
frightened of Father and “wants to leave but she’s too scared to
do so.” The detective advised Mother had declined to cooperate
with a criminal prosecution against Father and twice declined to
seek a protective order against him.
       The Department removed Minors from their parents’
custody and filed a petition asking the juvenile court to assume
dependency jurisdiction over Minors. As later amended, the
petition alleged Minors were at substantial risk of suffering
serious physical harm as a result of: their parents’ history of
engaging in violent altercations and Mother’s failure to protect
them by allowing Father to reside in the family home and have
unlimited access to them (count b-1); Father’s driving under the
influence of alcohol on the day of the car show and Mother’s
failure to protect them from the risk that presented (count b-2);
Father’s history of substance abuse and Mother’s failure to
protect Minors (count b-3); and Mother and Father’s failure to
store a firearm and ammunition safely in the family home (count
b-4).
       At the initial hearing on the petition, the juvenile court
detained Minors from their parents, ordered monitored visitation,

2
      V.P.’s assertion about prior police intervention was
confirmed by the social worker, who learned that the police had
been called to the family home on three prior occasions to
investigate domestic violence.

                                6
and set a jurisdiction and disposition hearing. That same day,
Mother filed a request for a restraining order protecting her from
Father.
       In advance of the jurisdiction and disposition hearing, a
Department investigator re-interviewed members of the family.
       Mother continued to maintain the first time Father ever hit
her was on the way home from the car show. She claimed that on
the day of the car show she did not know Father was intoxicated
until they got into Father’s SUV to return home; she admitted,
however, it was a mistake not to realize Father was intoxicated
sooner—especially because she knew Father had previously been
arrested for driving under the influence. Mother also admitted
the holes in the bedroom door seen by a social worker were made
by Father. Mother denied all knowledge of a firearm being kept
in her home. She also stated she was currently separated from
Father and did not plan to reconcile with him.
       Ca.M. and Ch.M. reaffirmed their earlier statements about
the incident following the car show and acknowledged Father
scared them, especially when he was drunk and hit Mother.
Ca.M. also explained that Mother knew Father kept a firearm in
the house but did not want Minors to know about the gun.
       Father declined to discuss the petition’s allegations with
the investigator, but he did state that he and Mother had
separated in mid-September due to problems that pre-dated the
incident following the car show and did not plan to reunite.
Father advised he wanted Minors returned to Mother’s custody.
       At the jurisdiction and disposition hearing, held in
December 2022, the juvenile court admitted all of the parties’
proffered exhibits and took judicial notice of the court file. The
court accepted Father’s no contest plea to the petition’s

                                7
allegations. After hearing argument from counsel for Mother,
Minors, and the Department with regard to the petition’s
allegations against Mother, the court sustained all of the counts
against her. Citing the “especially alarming” statements made by
the two oldest Minors regarding the domestic violence, Father’s
alcohol and substance abuse, and both parents’ carelessness in
storing a firearm and its ammunition in the family home, the
juvenile court found leaving Minors in their parents’ care would
pose a substantial danger to their physical health and emotional
well-being. The court ordered Minors removed from both parents’
custody and, due to Mother’s dilatory pursuit of a protective
order, issued a mutual “stay away” order for Mother and Father.
       At the subsequent six-month review hearing (Welf. & Inst.
Code, § 366.21, subd. (e)), the juvenile court found Mother made
      3

substantial progress toward alleviating the causes which gave
rise to jurisdiction and the release of Minors into her care would
not create a substantial risk to their physical or emotional well-
being. The court ordered Minors returned to Mother’s custody
under the continuing jurisdiction of the court and ordered the
Department to provide her and Minors with family maintenance
services.

                          II. DISCUSSION
      Mother challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for only
one of the several jurisdiction findings the juvenile court made
against her, specifically, the finding that she failed to protect
Minors from a substantial risk of serious physical harm arising

3
     Undesignated statutory references that follow are to the
Welfare and Institutions Code.

                                 8
from Father’s domestic violence. The other jurisdiction findings
against her are uncontested—and with good reason in light of the
evidence supporting them. We will briefly discuss why the
juvenile court’s substantial risk of serious physical harm finding
arising from Mother’s failure to protect from Father’s drunk
driving is supported by sufficient evidence and, following I.J.,
supra, 56 Cal.4th 766, we therefore decline to discuss the
sufficiency of the other allegations against Mother, including the
one she challenges in this appeal.
       Mother additionally argues the juvenile court’s order
removing the Minors from her custody was unjustified. The
contention is moot because Minors have since been returned to
her custody and we decline to exercise our discretion to decide the
moot issue. (See generally In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 285-
287.)

      A.    We Need Not Discuss Mother’s Challenge to the
            Domestic Violence Jurisdiction Finding Because
            Sufficient Evidence Supports the Failure to Protect
            from Drunk Driving Finding
      In D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th 266, our Supreme Court held
reviewing courts have discretion to decide moot appeals from
juvenile court dependency orders and must decide whether to
exercise that discretion when asked to do so. (Id. at 287.) Our
high court explained that appeals in dependency proceedings are
“particularly prone to mootness problems” (id. at 284) and such
problems may “‘“ha[ve] the undesirable result of insulating
erroneous or arbitrary rulings from review”’” (id. at 285). In
discussing why it believed an avenue for discretionary review of
moot issues should remain open, the D.P. court referenced a

                                9
situation we do not have in this case—where a juvenile court
makes jurisdiction findings against both parents but only one
appeals (making the appeal moot because jurisdiction over the
child will continue regardless)—and the situation we do have in
this case: where a juvenile court makes multiple adverse
dependency findings against an appealing parent. (D.P., supra,
14 Cal.5th at 283-284 [“Thus, where jurisdictional findings have
been made as to both parents but only one parent brings a
challenge, the appeal may be rendered moot. [Citation.] The
same is true where there are multiple findings against one
parent; the validity of one finding may render moot the parent’s
attempt to challenge the others”].)
        Although our Supreme Court recognized one valid finding
against a parent will render the others moot in an opinion that
holds courts must decide whether to exercise their discretion to
decide moot issues, we do not read D.P. to require reviewing
courts to invariably consider whether to exercise their discretion
to decide a parent’s challenge to one adverse jurisdiction finding
even if there are other adverse findings against the parent that
are uncontested. As we emphasized at the outset of this opinion,
the Supreme Court in I.J. determined the Courts of Appeal can
affirm a juvenile court’s jurisdiction finding “if any one of the
statutory bases for jurisdiction that are enumerated in the
[dependency] petition is supported by substantial evidence” and
“need not consider whether any or all of the other alleged
statutory grounds for jurisdiction are supported by the evidence.”
(I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at 773.) D.P. did not disapprove this
language in I.J. (or any part of I.J., a case D.P. never cites), and
it accordingly remains good law. That means that so long as we
conclude any one of the findings against Mother is supported by

                                 10
sufficient evidence—whether challenged by her or not—we “need
not consider” whether the other findings against her are
supported by sufficient evidence, including consideration via an
exercise of our discretion to decide a moot issue. 4
       Section 300, subdivision (b)(1)(A) authorizes a juvenile
court to assume dependency jurisdiction over a child when “[t]he
child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will
suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of . . . [t]he
failure or inability of the child’s parent or guardian to adequately
supervise or protect the child . . . .” Our review of a juvenile court
finding under this subdivision is for substantial evidence. (In re
R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 633.)
       Here, ample evidence supports the finding that Minors
were at substantial risk of suffering serious physical harm from
Mother’s failure to protect them from Father’s alcohol abuse—
including his driving under the influence (see generally In re N.R.
(2023) 15 Cal.5th 520, 540). Ca.M. described seeing Father drive
drunk on multiple occasions, explaining, “‘In the morning, if he’s
drinking and driving, he’s fine[,] but at night, if he’s drinking and

4
       Naturally, we express no view on the scenario that is not
presented in this case: when an appeal is moot because of
unchallenged jurisdiction findings solely against a non-appealing
parent. We also recognize there is an argument that Mother’s
failure to challenge the other jurisdiction findings against her
forfeits any claim to have a reviewing court evaluate the
sufficiency of the evidence for those findings. But we read I.J. to
require some such discussion for at least one of the juvenile
court’s jurisdiction findings to trigger the rule that the reviewing
court “need not consider” the other adverse findings against the
appealing parent.

                                 11
driving, he’s drunk.’” Ch.M. reported Father “drinks beers all
day long and throws up on it [sic].” Father had also previously
been arrested for driving under the influence, a fact of which
Mother was aware, and Mother smelled alcohol on Father before
getting in the car with him as the driver after the Compton car
show.
      Having held the failure to protect from Father’s alcohol
abuse finding is supported by sufficient evidence, we decline to
discuss Mother’s challenge to the juvenile court’s failure to
protect from domestic violence jurisdiction finding.

 [Part II.B, below, is deleted from publication. See post at
          p. 13 for where publication is to resume.]

      B.     We Do Not Exercise Our Discretion to Decide Mother’s
             Moot Challenge to the Disposition Order Removing
             Minors from Her Custody
      “A reviewing court must ‘“decide on a case-by-case basis
whether subsequent events in a juvenile dependency matter
make a case moot . . . .”’ [Citation.]” (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at
276.) Even when a dependency appeal is moot, courts “may
exercise their ‘inherent discretion’ to reach the merits of the
dispute.” (Id. at 282, 285-286 [enumerating considerations to
guide decisions on whether to exercise discretion to reach the
merits of moot issues].)
      According to juvenile court minute orders we have
judicially noticed at Mother’s request, the juvenile court found at
a June 2023 review hearing that Mother made substantial
progress in her case plan and ordered Minors returned to her
custody. Because the juvenile court has returned Minors to her

                                12
care, Mother’s challenge to the juvenile court’s detention and
removal orders is moot: we cannot provide her with any effective
relief in this appeal. (In re N.S. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 53, 60
[“[T]he critical factor in considering whether a dependency appeal
is moot is whether the appellate court can provide any effective
relief if it finds reversible error”]; In re E.T. (2013) 217
Cal.App.4th 426, 436 [“[a]n appeal may become moot where
subsequent events, including orders by the juvenile court, render
it impossible for the reviewing court to grant effective relief”].)
       We acknowledge we have discretion to decide Mother’s
challenge to the order removing Minors from her custody even
though it is now moot. (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at 287.) We have
considered the non-exhaustive factors our Supreme Court has
identified as relevant to the exercise of that discretion and
conclude such an exercise is unwarranted in this case.

     [The remainder of the opinion is to be published.]

                          DISPOSITION
      The juvenile court’s orders are affirmed.
        CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION

                        BAKER, Acting P. J.
We concur:

             MOOR, J.                                 KIM, J.

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