Court Opinion

ID: 9786061
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 23:46:14.254729+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:43:05.239114
License: Public Domain

WERDEGAR, J., Concurring.
I concur in the judgment.
I agree with the majority that plaintiff Steven Yount may sue defendants under 42 United States Code section 1983 (section 1983) and for battery based on the claim that a police officer shot him while he was handcuffed and restrained. On this point the majority reasons: “[T]o the extent Yount’s section 1983 claim alleges simply that Officer Shrum’s use of deadly force was an unjustified and excessive response to Yount’s resistance, the claim is not barred. As defendants have conceded, the record at the Heck hearing [see Heck v. Humphrey (1994) 512 U.S. 477 [129 L.Ed.2d 383, 114 S.Ct. 2364]] did not support the use of deadly force against Yount, nor did the criminal conviction in itself establish a justification for the use of deadly force. [Citations.] A claim alleging that Officer Shrum’s use of deadly force was not a reasonable response to Yount’s criminal acts of resistance does not ‘implicitly question the validity of [his] conviction’ for resisting the officers in this instance [citation] and thus is not barred by Heck.” (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 898-899, fn. omitted; see also id. at p. 902 [applying the same reasoning to plaintiff’s claim for battery].)
This reasoning suffices. The remainder of the majority’s opinion is unnecessary to the decision and thus constitutes, in my view, obiter dictum of no precedential value. The majority attempts to justify its dictum by purporting to decide “that [plaintiff’s] claims are barred to the extent they allege that Officer Shram was not entitled to use force at all in this incident.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 889.) But no such claim is before us. At the time of trial, plaintiff had elected to proceed on two theories only: section 1983 and battery. Both claims, as alleged in the first amended complaint, are based exclusively on the shooting. Plaintiff names only Officer Shram as a defendant in his claim under section 1983, and he bases the claim on the allegation that Officer Shram, “while acting under color of law with the Sacramento Police Department, shot and seriously and permanently injured” him. Plaintiff names both Officer Shram and his employer, the City of Sacramento, as defendants in his claim for battery. But the only battery alleged is that plaintiff “was shot and seriously and permanently injured by defendant Officer Shram . . . .”
*904I wish particularly to note that the case offers no proper occasion for the majority’s elaborate effort to distinguish and criticize the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Smith v. City of Hemet (9th Cir. 2005) 394 F.3d 689 (en banc) (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 900-901) or for the majority’s implicit suggestion that Smith may not have been “correctly decided” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 901). This dictum, if followed, could have the unfortunate effect of causing California state courts to apply Heck, supra, 512 U.S. 477, a decision of the United States Supreme Court on a point of federal law, differently than the federal courts of the Ninth Circuit, and thus may encourage forum shopping and create conflicts that only the high court can finally resolve.
Respondents’ petition for a rehearing was denied July 16, 2008.