Court Opinion

ID: 9671975
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:46:33.806213+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:13.529039
License: Public Domain

Steele Hays, Justice, dissenting. Without discussion, the majority opinion assumes, incorrectly I believe, that if the trial judge had ruled differently on the impeachment evidence (point three in the majority opinion) there would be substantial evidence of an intentional interference with appellant’s contract of employment and, therefore, the directed verdict for the defendant (appellee) was improper. I disagree with that conclusion and I think the issue deserves more careful treatment than it receives in the majority opinion. Even if the impeachment proof were allowed, the plaintiff (appellant) failed to produce substantial evidence that the appellee either intended or caused him to lose his job. Both are essential elements of the cause of action. Prosser and Keeton on Torts, 5th Edition, § 129, p. 989. Restatement of Torts, § 766. Stebbins & Roberts, Inc. v. Halsey, 265 Ark. 903, 582 S.W.2d 266 (1979); Walt Bennett Ford, Inc. v. Pulaski County Special School District, 274 Ark. 208, 624 S.W.2d 426 (1981). In Mason v. Funderburk, 247 Ark. 521, 446 S.W.2d 543 (1969) we cited the following language with approval: It has now come to be the view of a majority of courts in this country that one who maliciously or without justifiable cause induces a person to breach his contract with another may be held responsible to the latter for the damages resulting from such breach. The term ‘maliciously’ in this connection alludes to malice in its technical legal sense, that is, the intentional doing of a harmful act without justification or excuse, and does not necessarily include actual malice, that is, malice in the sense of spite or ill will. It is true that the requirement of malice or spiteful intent has been relaxed, Stebbins & Roberts, Inc. v. Halsey, supra, but an intentional interference remains a key element which the plaintiff must prove. Giving the appellant’s proof its highest probative value, it still fails to create a fair inference that the bank sought to breach the employment agreement between Systematics and the appellant. The bank was being made the victim of a “cash-back” scheme which undisputedly involved the appellant’s account and the appellant admittedly had withdrawn (by A-T-M machine) some $ 1,500 above what he knew to be the correct balance of his own deposits. In that situation there ought to be no actionable conduct on the bank’s part in making reasonable inquiries concerning the depositor whose account was involved. But whatever may be said of the proof on the issue of intent, there is not a shred of evidence, even from the appellant, that his discharge by Systematics was due to anything other than his admitted withdrawal of money that did not belong to him. The case was submitted to the jury on the defamation issue and I believe the trial court was correct in directing a verdict on the issue of intentional interference.