Court Opinion

ID: 9930747
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-07 17:05:42.395683+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:29:55.964169
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                  No. 22-2098
                             Filed February 7, 2024

ROCHON CORPORATION OF IOWA, INC., n/k/a GRAPHITE CONSTRUCTION
GROUP, INC.,
    Defendant-Appellant.

vs.

DES MOINES AREA COMMUNITY COLLEGE,
     Defendant-Appellee,
________________________________________________________________

      Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Robert B. Hanson,

Judge.

      The principal contractor on a public construction project appeals the district

court’s ruling that the contractor was not yet due part of the retainage being held

by the owner of the project. REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.

      Stephen D. Marso and Bryn E. Hazelwonder of Whitfield & Eddy, P.L.C.,

Des Moines, for appellant.

      Jodie McDougal, Philip S. Bubb, and Michael D. Currie of Fredrikson &

Byron, P.A., Des Moines, for appellee.

      Heard by Greer, P.J., and Ahlers and Buller, JJ.
                                         2

GREER, Presiding Judge.

       We are faced with what one party characterizes as an issue of first

impression and a second issue complicated by conflicting case law. Graphite

Construction Group, Inc. (Graphite Construction),1 the principal contractor on a

public construction project owned by Des Moines Area Community College

(DMACC), makes these assertions.         The dispute between these two parties

centers on the retainage2 being held by DMACC; the question is what funds—if

any—DMACC was required to release to Graphite Construction once it obtained

the necessary bond to cover (“bonded off”) a subcontractor’s claim even though

the project was not yet completed. Answering that question requires us to interpret

the language of Iowa Code chapter 573 and to assess how the subsections

interplay with each other. And, under that same code chapter, the second issue

concerns whether, as a principal contractor, Graphite Construction can be

awarded attorney fees. Neither party argues in support of the reasoning of the

district court, which dismissed Graphite Construction’s motion to compel payment

of the retainage. In the end, we accept the reasoning of Graphite Construction

and reverse the decision of the district court; we remand for entry of an order

granting payment from the retention fund in the amount of $82,627.78, plus interest

as provided by section 573.16(2). We deny Graphite Construction’s request to

award attorney fees.

1 Graphite Construction was previously known as Rochon Corporation of Iowa, Inc.
2 The owner of the project is required to pay the principal contractor monthly.
                                                                           Iowa
Code § 573.12 (2022). “From the amount payable to the general contractor, the
public [owner] is allowed—but not required—to retain up to five percent of the
amount owed.” Star Equip., Ltd. v. State, Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 843 N.W.2d 446,
453 (Iowa 2014) (citing Iowa Code § 573.12(1)).
                                         3

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

       DMACC is the owner of a public construction project in Ankeny; it entered

into a written agreement with Graphite Construction to be the principal contractor

on the project. And Graphite Construction entered into a written contract with

Metro Concrete, Inc. (Metro Concrete) to provide labor and materials as a

subcontractor on the project.3

       Metro Concrete initiated this suit against Graphite Construction, DMACC,

and others who are not relevant here in April 2022. Metro Concrete asserted that

it completed all services it was contracted to perform on DMACC’s project and filed

a claim, in accordance with Iowa Code chapter 573, for the unpaid balance of its

subcontract: $217,221.32.     Because the claim was not paid, Metro Concrete

sought judgment on the retainage and any chapter 573 bond for $217,221.32, plus

interest and attorney fees.

       In May, Graphite Construction provided DMACC with a “bond for release of

contract funds—Iowa Code § 573.16” for $434,442.64 (double the amount of Metro

Concrete’s claim) and asked DMACC to release the same amount from the

retainage fund to Graphite Construction.

       Then in July, Graphite Construction filed what it called a “motion to compel

defendant DMACC to release retainage.” Graphite Construction complained that

DMACC refused to release the requested retainage in contravention of the

statutory requirements in section 573.16(2), which states in relevant part:

3 Metro Concrete filed for bankruptcy before this suit began; Charles L. Smith was

appointed the trustee. For ease, we do not distinguish between the actions of
Metro Concrete and the actions of Charles L. Smith acting as trustee in the
bankruptcy of Metro Concrete.
                                        4

      After an action is commenced, upon the general contractor filing with
      the public corporation or person withholding the funds, a surety bond
      in double the amount of the claim in controversy, conditioned to pay
      any final judgment rendered for the claims so filed, the public
      corporation or person shall pay to the contractor the amount of funds
      withheld.

It asked the court to “enter an order compelling DMACC to pay Graphite”

$434,442.64 out of the retainage.     Under the facts developed here, DMACC

conceded that if it had no claim to keep 200% of the value of the unfinished work

in the retainage fund, then Graphite Construction would be entitled to $434,442.64,

which was double the amount of Metro Concrete’s claim (i.e. the amount of the

surety bond).

      But other factors were at play according to DMACC. So DMACC resisted

the motion by asserting that—as it had told Graphite Construction before—it was

withholding the requested retainage funds based on the contract between DMACC

and Graphite Construction, which provided that no retained percentage would

become due until Graphite Construction submitted consent from its surety, and

Graphite Construction had not done so. Additionally, DMACC relied on Iowa Code

section 573.28(2)(c), which states:

              If labor and materials are yet to be provided at the time the
      request for the release of the retained funds is made, an amount
      equal to two hundred percent of the value of the labor or materials
      yet to be provided, as determined by the governmental entity’s or the
      department’s authorized contract representative, may be withheld
      until such labor or materials are provided.

Under this section, DMACC contended that because Graphite Construction was

requesting the early release of retainage funds (i.e. requesting release before the

project was completed and accepted), DMACC had the right to retain a value equal

to 200% of the cost of labor and materials yet to be provided. (Everyone agreed
                                           5

the project was not at final completion.) DMACC indicated that the architect placed

a value of $78,795.00 on the unfinished work and materials, so it intended to

withhold $157,590.00 of the retainage funds but would otherwise turn over any

other funds related to Metro Concrete’s claim once Graphite Construction

submitted consent from the surety. This would not result in Graphite Construction

receiving the full $434,442.64 it requested because the retainage fund held only

$510,004.86.4 DMACC asked the district court to require Graphite Construction to

act in accordance with the contract it entered.

       Graphite Construction filed a reply, asserting, “The parties’ dispute revolves

around retainage, specifically whether, after Graphite [Construction] furnished an

Iowa Code section 573.16 bond discharging Metro Concrete’s chapter 573 claim,

DMACC must release to Graphite all retainage it is holding for Metro Concrete’s

Chapter 573 claim.” Graphite Construction maintained that DMACC could not

refuse to comply with the requirements of chapter 573 by contracting around them.

It also argued that section 573.28 had no role in the dispute because that statute

was applicable “prior to final completion and acceptance of the project, and . . .

prior to the filing of a lawsuit seeking an adjudication of the rights to withheld funds”

and—on its face—that section required Graphite Construction to initiate that

4 Because DMACC would keep $157,590.00 of the $510,004.86            retainage for
unfinished work, it intended to release only $352,414.86 to Graphite Construction,
which was $82,027.78 less than the requested amount.
       These numbers changed in DMACC’s sur-reply—in that filing, DMACC
showed the value of the unfinished work and materials was $79,095 ($300 more
than previously claimed). Using this updated number, DMACC retained $158,190
of the retainage, leaving Graphite Construction $82,627.78 short of its requested
amount.
       We note the discrepancy of $300 in DMACC’s value of the unfinished work
and materials but have found nothing in the record that explains it.
                                          6

option. See Iowa Code § 573.28 (requiring the contractor asking for early release

of funds to first provide notice to all known subcontractors, sub-subcontractors,

and suppliers that it was making the request). Graphite Construction asserted that

once a lawsuit was filed and bonded—as had occurred here—only section 573.16

applied so DMACC could not rely on section 573.28 to withhold the release of the

full $434,442.64. In its reply, Graphite Construction also asked the court to award

it attorney fees under section 573.21.

       DMACC filed a sur-reply brief because, as it contended, “additional

events . . . occurred relating to the payment of the retainage.”        According to

DMACC, since it filed its initial resistance, Graphite Construction had provided

consent from the surety for partial release of the retainage. After that, DMACC

released $351,814.86 to Graphite Construction. It continued to retain $158,190,

which represented 200% of the value of the work and materials that were still

needed. The dispute between DMACC and Graphite Construction about the

retainage being held was therefore limited to the difference between the amount

Graphite Construction requested ($434,442.64) and the amount DMACC actually

released ($351,814.86): $82,627.78. For the first time, DMACC asserted that

Graphite Construction’s motion to compel was “procedurally improper,” arguing

that Graphite Construction’s so-called motion to compel was actually a request for

permanent injunctive relief or for partial summary judgment.           Yet, DMACC

complained Graphite Construction had not asserted a cause of action against it,

thus the district court could not consider the “improper vehicle” used to seek relief.

       At this stage, DMACC again relied on section 573.28 for authority it was

allowed to retain the funds and pointed to a provision of the parties’ contract that
                                          7

largely mirrored the statute. DMACC argued that if the court reached the merits of

Graphite Construction’s request, it should deny the motion because while the bond

Graphite Construction obtained following Metro Concrete’s claim was “intended to

nullify the impact of the claims filed against the retainage” and prevented DMACC

from withholding “the retainage on the basis that subcontractors or suppliers have

filed claims against the retainage,” nothing in section 573.16 “require[d] the owner

to ignore any other bases for withholding retainage; it merely remove[d] the

impediment caused by the filed claims.” For this reason, DMACC asserted, while

it had complied with section 573.16, it continued to retain $158,190 (200% of

$79.095) for unfinished work. Finally, DMACC argued Graphite Construction was

not entitled to recover attorney fees under section 573.21 because the right to

recover was limited to claimants, which the principal contractor could not be under

the statute.

       Following a hearing, the district court denied Graphite Construction’s

motion. Taking a different tack altogether, the district court ruled DMACC was not

yet required to release any of the retainage related to Metro Concrete’s claim

because section 573.16(1) provided that the appropriate time for the action to be

brought “to adjudicate all rights to [the retainage] fund” was “at any time after the

expiration of thirty days, and not later than sixty days, following the completion and

final acceptance of said improvement.” In other words, the district court ruled

section 573.16(2) is not triggered until after the project is completed and

accepted—neither party claimed the project had yet reached that stage. The

district court also denied Graphite Construction’s request for attorney fees under

section 573.21, concluding it could not recover because it was not the prevailing
                                           8

party. Given this ruling, the district did not address DMACC’s contention that

Graphite Construction had not used the proper vehicle to obtain relief.

       Graphite Construction appeals.

II. Discussion.

       To summarize the claims, Graphite Construction, relying on Iowa Code

section 573.16(2), maintains that once it bonded off the claim filed by Metro

Concrete, DMACC was statutorily required to release the full amount of the bond.

DMACC responds that section 573.28(2)(c) provides it with authority to withhold

certain retainage funds for the value of uncompleted work and materials while still

complying with section 573.16(2). Additionally, the parties also raise questions of

jurisdiction, authority, and as mentioned above, whether section 573.21 allows a

principal contractor to recover attorney fees if successful in obtaining the release

of retainage funds.

       A. Jurisdiction and Authority.

       DMACC argues the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over

Graphite Construction’s motion to compel because Graphite Construction never

initiated an action against DMACC. As DMACC recognizes, while it never raised

the issue of subject matter jurisdiction to the district court, the issue can be raised

at any stage in the proceedings. See Cooper v. Kirkwood Cmty. Coll., 782 N.W.2d

160, 164 (Iowa 2010). And “[o]nce a court determines that it lacks subject matter

jurisdiction over a claim, it has no power to enter a judgment on the merits and

must dismiss the action.” Id. But

       “[s]ubject matter jurisdiction refers to ‘the authority of a court to hear
       and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings
       in question belong, not merely the particular case then occupying the
                                            9

       court’s attention.’ “A court may have subject matter jurisdiction but
       for one reason or another may not be able to entertain a particular
       case. In such a situation we say the court lacks authority to hear that
       particular case.”
              Importantly, “[a] court may lack authority to hear a particular
       case ‘where a party fails to follow the statutory procedures for
       invoking the court's authority.’”

Alliant Energy-Interstate Power & Light Co. v. Duckett, 732 N.W.2d 869, 874–75

(Iowa 2007) (second alteration in original) (citations omitted).

       The district court is a court of general jurisdiction, and “[i]t is empowered by

the Iowa Constitution to hear all cases in law and equity.” Shott v. Shott, 744

N.W.2d 85, 87 (Iowa 2008); see also Iowa Const. art. V, § 6 (“The district court

shall be a court of law and equity, which shall be distinct and separate jurisdictions,

and have jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters arising in their respective districts,

in such manner as shall be prescribed by law.”); Iowa Code § 602.6101 (“The

district court has exclusive, general, and original jurisdiction of all actions,

proceedings, and remedies, civil, criminal, probate, and juvenile . . . .”). It is clear

the court had subject matter jurisdiction over this case.              See Iowa Code

§ 573.16(1) (directing “[t]he public corporation, the principal contractor, any

claimant for labor or material who has filed a claim, or the surety on any bond given

for the performance of the contract,” to “bring action in equity in the county where

the improvement is located”).

       That said, the question—if any—is whether the court had the authority to

decide this case. See, e.g., State v. Rutherford, 997 N.W.2d 142, 144 (Iowa 2023)

(“There is an important difference between a court’s subject matter jurisdiction and

its authority to act.”); Knutson v. Oellrich, No. 22-1675, 2023 WL 2673137, at *3

(Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 29, 2023) (recognizing it is not uncommon for parties to
                                          10

conflate the concept of jurisdiction with that of authority). However, unlike the

situation with subject matter jurisdiction, “an impediment to a court’s authority can

be obviated by consent, waiver or estoppel.” State v. Mandicino, 509 N.W.2d 481,

483 (Iowa 1993). And here, even if we understand DMACC’s argument in its sur-

reply that Graphite Construction’s motion was “procedurally improper” to be raising

the issue of the court’s authority, the district court never ruled on the issue. So

even if DMACC did not waive the issue, it failed to preserve error to allow for our

review. See State v. Crawford, 972 N.W.2d 189, 198 (Iowa 2022) (“When we

speak of error preservation, all we mean is that a party has an obligation to raise

an issue in the district court and obtain a decision on the issue so that an appellate

court can review the merits of the decision actually rendered.”). As an aside, we

note that under our reading of section 573.16(1), after suit is initiated by a claimant,

the statute authorizes the district court authority “to adjudicate all rights to said

[retainage] fund.”   See also Iowa Code § 573.18. But as the error was not

preserved, we do not consider this issue further.5

5 We recognize that “[i]t is well-settled law that a prevailing party can raise an

alternative ground for affirmance on appeal without filing a notice of cross-appeal,
as long as the prevailing party raised the alternative ground in the district court.”
In re M.W., 876 N.W.2d 212, 221 (Iowa 2016) (citation omitted). And the party can
invoke the alternative ground even if the district court “ignored” it. EnviroGas, L.P.
v. Cedar Rapids/Linn Cnty. Solid Waste Agency, 641 N.W.2d 776, 781 (Iowa
2002). But DMACC’s argument that the district court lacked authority is not an
alternative ground for affirmance. See, e.g., Hawkeye Foodservice Distrib., Inc. v.
Iowa Educators Corp., 812 N.W.2d 600, 609 (Iowa 2012) (“[A] successful party in
the district court may, without appealing, save the judgment . . . based on ground
urged in the district court but not included in that court’s ruling.” (emphasis added)
(citation omitted)).
        An argument the court lacks authority to decide a case or issue is a claim
the court should dismiss the action rather than enter a ruling on the merits. See,
e.g., State v. Mickey, No. 22-0130, 2023 WL 1810518, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb.
8, 2023) (dismissing appeal where court lacked authority to decide the issue before
                                          11

       B. Release of Retainage.

       Here, Metro Concrete submitted a claim alleging Graphite Construction

owed it $217,221.32 at completion of its subcontractor work and then initiated the

current lawsuit. And, Graphite Construction was “obliged to pay those ‘having

contracts directly with the principal . . . all just claims due them for labor performed

or materials furnished.’” S.M. Hentges & Sons Inc. v. City of Iowa City, No. 18-

1933, 2020 WL 377030, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 23, 2020) (alteration in original)

(citing Iowa Code §§ 573.6(1), .22). It is undisputed that both at the time Metro

Concrete brought the suit and when the district court decided Graphite

Construction’s request for the retainage to be released, the public construction

project was not yet completed and had not been accepted by DMACC.                   So

Graphite Construction made an early request for retainage funds and relied on

section 573.16(2) for authority that DMACC was required to release twice the

amount of Metro Concrete’s claim from retainage once Graphite Construction

bonded off.    With this backdrop, Graphite Construction frames the issue as

whether it was immediately entitled to the amount of retainage being held for Metro

Concrete’s claim ($434,442.64) once Graphite Construction bonded off or, as the

district court ruled, it must wait because section 573.16(2), which provides “the

public corporation . . . shall pay to the contractor the amount of funds withheld,” is

not triggered until after the project is completed and accepted. But there’s also a

it). So, if DMACC was successful in its “authority” argument here, we would
vacate—not affirm—the district court’s ruling interpreting and applying
chapter 573. See, e.g., Knutson, 2023 WL 2673137, at *3–4 (vacating district court
ruling after concluding the court lacked authority to decide the substantive issue).
Because the argument is not an alternative ground for affirmance, DMACC’s failure
to preserve error on the issue prevents us from considering it.
                                         12

third option, for which DMACC seems to advocate. Rather than a simple yes or

no regarding whether section 573.16(2) applies at this point in the construction

project, it could be both that section 573.16(2) applies and that DMACC’s release

of the retainage funds are simultaneously governed by another statute,

section 573.28(2)(c). If the third option is correct, we need to decide what happens

when, as here, there is not enough retainage funds for the public owner to both

release the full bonded off amount for a subcontractor’s claim and retain the value

of 200% of the unfinished work and unprovided materials.6

       As the issue is one concerning the interpretation and application of statutes,

our review is for correction of errors at law. See Noll v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 919 N.W.2d

232, 235 (Iowa 2018) (interpreting a statute); Babka v. Iowa Dep’t of Inspections

& Appeals, 967 N.W.2d 344, 352 (Iowa Ct. App. 2021) (applying a statute).

       When interpreting a statute, our goal is to determine legislative intent. Star

Equip., Ltd. v. State, 843 N.W.2d 446, 452–55 (Iowa 2014) (providing a

comprehensive overview of chapter 573 and the purposes behind the statute).

“We derive legislative intent not only from the language used but also from the

statute’s subject matter, the object sought to be accomplished, the purpose to be

served, underlying policies, remedies provided, and the consequences of the

various interpretations.” Id. at 455 (quoting Postell v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co.,

823 N.W.2d 35, 49 (Iowa 2012)). “We construe chapter 573 liberally with a view

6 In other words, if the retainage fund consisted of $592,632.64, DMACC could

have both released the retainage for Metro Concrete’s claim ($434,442.64) and
retained 200% the value of the unfinished work and materials ($158,190). But
because the fund had less than the amount required to cover both, we would need
to determine whether the law requires DMACC to prioritize one over the other.
                                         13

to promoting its objects and assisting the parties in obtaining justice.” Id. (cleaned

up).   And “[t]he purpose of chapter 573 is to protect subcontractors and

materialmen against nonpayment.” Id., accord id. at 449 (noting situations under

chapter 573 where a public entity might have to “step in the shoes” of the general

contractor to pay balances owed a subcontractor). “All provisions of the chapter

should be considered as parts of a connected whole and harmonized if possible.”

Sinclair Refin. Co. v. Burch, 16 N.W.2d 359, 361 (Iowa 1944) (discussing then-

chapter 452).

       We begin with some general discussion of chapter 573. At its core, chapter

573 operates as a claims process for subcontractors participating in public

improvement projects. To that end, in a public improvement project, if the contract

price equals or exceeds twenty-five thousand dollars, a performance bond is

required, with surety, “conditioned for the faithful performance of the contract.”

Iowa Code § 573.2(1). The bond is mandatory and runs to the public corporation.

Id. §§ 573.3, .5. As monthly payments are made pursuant to the contract, monies

earned by the principal contractor are retained by the public corporation and, as

our supreme court has explained, the retainage held by the public owner—made

up of no more than five percent of the monthly payment owed to the principal

contractor—is a protection for subcontractors. See Star Equip., 843 N.W.2d at

453; see also Iowa Code § 573.12(1)(a) (“Payments made under contracts for the

construction of public improvements, unless provided otherwise by law, shall be

made on the basis of monthly estimates of labor performed and material delivered,

as determined by the project architect or engineer. The public corporation shall
                                          14

retain from each monthly payment not more than five percent of that amount which

is determined to be due according to the estimate of the architect or engineer.”).

       The purpose of the retainage fund is “for the payment of claims for materials

furnished and labor performed.” Iowa Code § 573.13; see also Star Equip., 843

N.W.2d at 452 (“Subcontractors on public improvements left unpaid by the general

contractor ordinarily would collect from funds retained by the state or through

claims against a surety bond.”). Section 573.14 outlines the process for retention

and payment of those funds held by the public corporation and, as here, provides

how subcontractors might finish their portion of the project and seek monies upon

completion of their contract. “Subcontractors owed money on public construction

projects may submit their claims to the responsible public corporation.”       Star

Equip., 843 N.W.2d at 453; see also Iowa Code §§ 573.7, 10.             But, under

section 573.14, the public corporation must hold the retainage for thirty days after

completion and acceptance of the project. “If no claims are submitted against the

retained funds, or if excess funds remain after all claims have been satisfied, the

balance is released to the general contractor.” Star Equip., 843 N.W.2d at 453

(citing Iowa Code § 573.14). But section 573.14(2) specifically provides that “this

subsection does not abridge any of the rights set forth in section 573.16.”

Section 573.16(2) removes the restrictions required under 573.14 if the process

provided in section 573.16 is followed.

       To address the realities of the public construction world, chapter 573

provides various options to access retainage funds depending on circumstances,

such as the stage of the construction and the status of the party requesting funds.

Along that line, our supreme court has recognized that some sections of
                                           15

chapter 573 apply to different factual scenarios, while other sections might not, so

the language of the chapter must be navigated when addressing claims against

retained funds. See Emps. Mut. Cas. Co. v. City of Marion, 577 N.W.2d 657, 659–

62 (Iowa 1998) (recognizing the interplay between sections of chapter 573 based

upon the party’s status and the claims made and resolving those conflicts in the

language of various sections); see also Star Equip., 843 N.W.2d at 454 (analyzing

the reality of an exception to the bond requirement for “targeted small businesses”

so as to allow subcontractors a remedy against the public entity for unpaid claims);

Accurate Controls, Inc. v. Cerro Gordo Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 627 F. Supp. 2d

976, 1007 (N.D. Iowa 2009) (noting sections 573.12 (paying progress payments

as earned), .14 (paid at final completion and acceptance of project) and .15A (paid

when project is 95% completed) offer paths to release retainage to subcontractors

if certain circumstances are met).

       At the heart of our analysis, we must address the interplay, if any, between

sections 573.16 and 573.28.          To start, section 573.16—titled “optional and

mandatory actions—bond to release,” which the parties’ dispute largely centers

on, states:

              1. The public corporation, the principal contractor, any
       claimant for labor or material who has filed a claim, or the surety on
       any bond given for the performance of the contract, may, at any time
       after the expiration of thirty days, and not later than sixty days,
       following the completion and final acceptance of said improvement,
       bring action in equity in the county where the improvement is located
       to adjudicate all rights to said fund, or to enforce liability on said bond.
              2. Upon written demand of the contractor served, in the
       manner prescribed for original notices, on the person filing a claim,
       requiring the claimant to commence action in court to enforce the
       claim, an action shall be commenced within thirty days, otherwise the
       retained and unpaid funds due the contractor shall be released.
       Unpaid funds shall be paid to the contractor within twenty days of the
                                           16

       receipt by the public corporation of the release as determined
       pursuant to this section. Failure to make payment by that date shall
       cause interest to accrue on the unpaid amount. Interest shall accrue
       during the period commencing the twenty-first day after the date of
       release and ending on the date of the payment. The rate of interest
       shall be determined pursuant to section 573.14. After an action is
       commenced, upon the general contractor filing with the public
       corporation or person withholding the funds, a surety bond in double
       the amount of the claim in controversy, conditioned to pay any final
       judgment rendered for the claims so filed, the public corporation or
       person shall pay to the contractor the amount of funds withheld.

Section 573.16(1) has been referred to as “the statute of limitations governing suits

on the claims,” which “ties the limitation period for filing suit on the claims to

completion and final acceptance of the improvement.” Emps. Mut., 577 N.W.2d at

662 (emphasis removed). More specifically, section 573.16(1) allows a party to

“bring action in equity . . . to adjudicate all rights” to the retainage fund, but only

“after the expiration of thirty days, and not later than sixty days, following the

completion and final acceptance of said improvement.” See Biermann Elec. v.

Larson & Larson Constr., LLC, No. 13-0467, 2014 WL 69672, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App.

Jan. 9, 2014) (recognizing section 573.16 “sets forth the procedure for claimants

to bring an action to judicially enforce . . . rights to a fund” and “establishes a strict

time frame for bringing such an action”).

       The district court applied the limitation period in section 573.16(1) to Granite

Construction’s request made under section 573.16(2), concluding the request for

release of the retainage was not timely. But Granite Construction argues—and we

agree—section 573.16(2) operates separately from the first subsection and allows

the principal contractor to access retained funds to pay a subcontractor’s claim for

monies due for its work on the improvement. See Dobbs v. Knudson, Inc., 292

N.W.2d 692, 694 (Iowa 1980) (noting the principal contractor filed a bond under
                                            17

section 573.16 so that it could obtain payment of the retainage while securing any

possible judgments).

       Under section 573.16(2), once a claim is made, if the principal contractor

demands in writing that the claimant commence action on the claim in court, and

the claimant does so under the deadline imposed in 573.16(2), the amount of the

claim can be determined and paid from retainage. As a protection to the public

corporation and other subcontractors with potential claims, the principal contractor

must file a surety bond in double the value of the claim, which also allows the

principal contractor to avoid the imposition of interest on the unpaid sums. See

Ewing Concrete LLC v. Rochon Corp. of Iowa, No. 14-1628, 2016 WL 146275, at

*1 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 13, 2016) (“Rochon personally served Ewing with a thirty-

day demand letter under Iowa Code section 573.16, requiring Ewing ‘commence

action in court, within [thirty] days of service of this letter, to enforce its Iowa Code

chapter 573 claim’ . . . .     Iowa Code section 573.16 and relevant case law

interpreting this section provide that if Ewing fails to timely file its petition, its

statutory claim is time barred.” (first alteration in original)).

       Contrast the language of section 573.16(2) with that of section 573.28—

entitled “early release of retained funds.” Both involve means to access retainage

funds.7 The latter section was added to chapter 573 in 2018.8 With its relatively

7  The parties acknowledge that both section 573.16(2) and section 573.28
constitute early access exceptions to the rules governing the payment of the
retainage—the district court just interpreted section 573.16 differently.
8 “In 2006, the legislature created a new law that governed chapter 573’s release

of retainage, placing it at Iowa Code section 26.13 within the public construction
competitive bidding statute.” Stephen D. Marso, Pub. Constr. Liens in Iowa: A Hist.
and Analysis of Iowa Code Chapter 573, 60 Drake L. Rev. 101, 176–78 (Fall 2011)
(footnotes omitted); see also 2006 Iowa Acts ch. 1017, § 13. For reasons
                                        18

recent addition to chapter 573, we have found no Iowa case that describes the

interplay between section 573.28 and the other sections of the chapter. To plow

new ground, we start with the language of section 573.28 that applies to our

inquiry:

               1. For purposes of this section:
               ....
               f. “Substantially completed” means the first date on which any
       of the following occurs:
               (1) Completion of the public improvement project or the
       highway, bridge, or culvert project or when the work on the public
       improvement or the highway, bridge, or culvert project has been
       substantially completed in general accordance with the terms and
       provisions of the contract.
               (2) The work on the public improvement or on the designated
       portion is substantially completed in general accordance with the
       terms of the contract so that the governmental entity or the
       department can occupy or utilize the public improvement or
       designated portion of the public improvement for its intended
       purpose. This subparagraph shall not apply to highway, bridge, or
       culvert projects.
               (3) The public improvement project or the highway, bridge, or
       culvert project is certified as having been substantially completed by
       either of the following:
               (a) The architect or engineer authorized to make such
       certification.
               (b) The authorized contract representative.
               ....
               2. Payments made by a governmental entity or the
       department for the construction of public improvements and
       highway, bridge, or culvert projects shall be made in accordance with
       the provisions of this chapter, except as provided in this section:
               a. At any time after all or any part of the work on the public
       improvement or highway, bridge, or culvert project is substantially
       completed, the contractor may request the release of all or part of

unknown, in 2018, the same language was renumbered to section 573.28 and
removed from chapter 26, effective July 1, 2018. See 2018 Iowa Acts ch. 1097,
§ 5.
                                          19

      the retained funds owed. The request shall be accompanied by a
      sworn statement of the contractor that, ten calendar days prior to
      filing the request, notice was given as required by paragraphs “f” and
      “g” to all known subcontractors, sub-subcontractors, and suppliers.
               b. Except as provided under paragraph “c”, upon receipt of the
      request, the governmental entity or the department shall release all
      or part of the retained funds. Retained funds that are approved as
      payable shall be paid at the time of the next monthly payment or
      within thirty days, whichever is sooner. If partial retained funds are
      released pursuant to a contractor’s request, no retained funds shall
      be subsequently held based on that portion of the work. If within
      thirty days of when payment becomes due the governmental entity
      or the department does not release the retained funds due, interest
      shall accrue on the amount of retained funds at the rate of interest
      that is calculated as the prime rate plus one percent per year as of
      the day interest begins to accrue until the amount is paid.
               c. If labor and materials are yet to be provided at the time the
      request for the release of the retained funds is made, an amount
      equal to two hundred percent of the value of the labor or materials
      yet to be provided, as determined by the governmental entity’s or the
      department’s authorized contract representative, may be withheld
      until such labor or materials are provided.
               d. An itemization of the labor or materials yet to be provided,
      or the reason that the request for release of retained funds is denied,
      shall be provided to the contractor in writing within thirty calendar
      days of the receipt of the request for release of retained funds.
               e. The contractor shall release retained funds to the
      subcontractor or subcontractors in the same manner as retained
      funds are released to the contractor by the governmental entity or
      the department. Each subcontractor shall pass through to each
      lower-tier subcontractor all retained fund payments from the
      contractor.
               f. Prior to applying for release of retained funds, the contractor
      shall send a notice to all known subcontractors, sub-subcontractors,
      and suppliers that provided labor or materials for the public
      improvement project or the highway, bridge, or culvert project.

(Emphasis added.)
                                        20

       To meet the overall goal of chapter 573, the statute provides a process at

various stages during the construction project to allow access to the retained

funds. If the project is at completion and final acceptance, a claim can be paid if

the specific guidelines are followed. See Iowa Code § 573.14. Once a project

reaches ninety-five percent completion of the contract there is a path to access the

retainage. See id. §§ 573.15A, .27. If a subcontractor makes a claim and institutes

suit, the principal contractor can access retainage by posting a bond. See id.

§ 573.16(2).   Likewise, under section 573.28, at the stage of “substantial

completion” the payment can be made.9 In reviewing the entire statute, each of

the processes to access retained funds provided in chapter 573 requires steps that

serve as a protection to claimants before payment is made. Yet, DMAAC asserts

section 573.28(2)(c) comes into play at any time in the construction process when

a principal contractor makes an early request for retainage (i.e. there remains work

to be done on the project). But DMAAC is advocating that understanding of section

573.28(2)(c) in isolation and does not consider that it is part of the steps in a

process that starts with the requirement of substantial completion of the project at

section 573.28(2)(a). “Context is critical,” and on the face of this subsection, the

process defined is specific to the early release of retention at the substantial-

9 DMAAC argued in its appeal brief that substantial work on the project was not

completed at the time of the request for retainage funds. While there is no
discussion in the chapter over the difference between ninety-five percent
completion and substantial completion, we assume that there is a difference since
the legislature provided different processes for each. Compare Iowa Code
§ 573.15(A) (allowing the public corporation to “release retained funds upon
completion of ninety-five percent of the contract” and providing the process), with
id. § 573.28 (providing for “the release of all or part of the retained funds owed”
after the project is “substantially completed” and providing the process that must
be followed).
                                        21

completion stage. Beverage v. Alcoa, Inc., 975 N.W.2d 670, 681 (Iowa 2022)

(noting context is derived “from the language’s relationship to other provisions

[within] the same statute”).       We must read all of the paragraphs of

section 573.28(2) together. See Doe v. State, 943 N.W.2d 608, 613 (Iowa 2020)

(“[W]e read statutes as a whole rather than looking at words and phrases in

isolation [when interpretating statutes].” (first alteration in original) (citation

omitted)). As we read these paragraphs, each is triggered by the “receipt of the

request.” See Iowa Code § 573.28(2)(a)–(d), (f), (g). And in this section that

“request” “shall be accompanied by a sworn statement of the contractor” that notice

was given to the subcontractors.

      In sum, if the contractor chooses to seek advance payment of the retention

at the substantial completion stage, it must—as section 573.28 requires—provide

a sworn statement that it has served all subcontractors a notice of “contractor’s

request for early release of retained funds.” Id. § 573.28(2)(a). That option was

not pursued here. Likewise, section 573.28(2)(c) does not just pertain to labor or

materials left uncompleted by the principal contractor, it also addresses

outstanding labor and materials of subcontractors. See id. § 573.28(2)(g) (setting

out the notice required to subcontractors, noting the “purpose of the request is to

have [name of government entity or department] release and pay funds for all work

that has been performed and charged”). Thus, it makes sense that before the

governmental entity can release all but two hundred percent of remaining labor

and material expense under section 573.28(2)(c), the subcontractors are all

notified of a potential early release of funds from the retainage. Thus, we cannot
                                          22

apply section 573.28(2)(c) because under these facts there is no interplay between

this section and 573.16(2).

      Finally, as Graphite Construction correctly pointed out during oral argument,

DMACC is still protected by the performance bond posted at the beginning of the

project under section 573.2, which is “applicable only to claims not satisfied from

the retainages.” Econ. Forms Corp. v. City of Cedar Rapids, 340 N.W.2d 259, 264

(Iowa 1983); see also Iowa Code § 573.26 (“Nothing in this chapter shall be

construed as limiting in any manner the right of the public corporation to pursue

any remedy on the bond given for performance of the contract.”). Such bond

“run[s] to the public corporation” and is in “an amount not less than seventy-five

percent   of   the   contract    price”   “to   insure    the   fulfillment   of   every

condition . . . embraced in said bond.” Iowa Code § 573.5.

      As a final note, we return to the district court ruling. To arrive at its resolution

that because Metro Concrete’s claim was filed prematurely—before completion of

the improvement—and thus, Graphite Construction could not access the

retainage, the district court relied upon Biermann Electric. 2014 WL 69672, at *2.

But that reliance is misplaced, as the public entity in Biermann had already paid

the retainage it held to the principal contractor, Larson Construction, when Larson

bonded off the claim related to the subcontractor, Biermann. Id. at *6 n.4. So, the

question there was not the same as here. Biermann, as subcontractor, sought

payment of the retainage already paid to the principal contractor, Larson

Construction, plus delay damages, and Larson Construction refused to pay while

the matter was tied up in an arbitration proceeding with the city. Id. at *1–3. And

in Biermann, the question was whether the subcontractor’s suit on its claim could
                                          23

be brought in the district court at that time, but a panel of our court recognized the

question of whether the claim was timely was not before it. Id. at *3. Turning to

the proceedings before us, no one disputed the timeliness of the subcontractor’s

claim or its right to bring suit; the principal contractor made written demand of Metro

Concrete to bring suit as required under section 573.16(2), and the inquiry focused

on whether Graphite Construction could receive all of the retained funds after

bonding off or if another statute allowed DMACC to still keep part of the retainage.

So we find no help in Biermann because we have two different questions involving

two differently situated parties. Finally, neither party here argued Biermann was

instructive on the questions they presented.

       Finding the district court erred in denying Graphite Construction’s motion to

compel the release of retainage funds, we reverse the ruling and remand for an

order granting payment from the retention fund in the amount of $82,627.78, plus

interest as provided by section 573.16(2).

       C. Attorney Fees.

       Graphite Construction requests an award of attorney fees. It challenges the

district court’s ruling denying its request and asks us to rule it is also entitled to

appellate attorney fees.         Graphite Construction relies on Iowa Code

section 573.21. See Homeland Energy Sols., LLC v. Retterath, 938 N.W.2d 664,

707 (Iowa 2020) (recognizing “an award of attorney fees is not allowed unless

authorized by statute or contract”). Section 573.21 states, “The court may tax, as

costs, a reasonable attorney fee in favor of any claimant for labor or materials who

has, in whole or in part, established a claim.” (Emphasis added.) So, is Graphite

Construction a “claimant”?       To the extent this exercise requires statutory
                                          24

interpretation of this code section, we review for corrections of errors at law. See

EMC Ins. Grp., Inc. v. Shepard, 960 N.W.2d 661, 668 (Iowa 2021).

       The parties disagree about whether a principal contractor is ever entitled to

attorney fees under section 573.21.            DMACC argues that, on its face,

section 573.21 limits recovery to “any claimant . . . who has . . .established a

claim” and maintains that section 573.7 excludes principal contractors from being

a claimant. Section 573.7 is titled “[c]laims for material or labor” and states:

              Any person, firm, or corporation who has, under a contract
       with the principal contractor or with subcontractors, performed labor,
       or furnished material, service, or transportation, in the construction
       of a public improvement, may file, with the officer, board, or
       commission authorized by law to let contracts for such
       improvement, an itemized, sworn, written statement of the claim for
       such labor, or material, service, or transportation.

Iowa Code § 573.7(1) (emphasis added).           According to DMACC, because a

principal contractor cannot be “under a contract” with itself and does not perform

labor or furnish material, service, or transportation for a subcontractor, the principal

contractor cannot be a “claimant” and therefore is not entitled to attorney fees

under section 573.21. Graphite Construction seems to concede it is not a claimant

under section 573.7 but argues that nothing in the language of the attorney-fee

provision expressly limits the award of attorney fees to section 573.7 claimants;

and here, it is making a claim for labor or materials from the retention fund.

       As Graphite emphasized in its routing statement,10 there appears to be a

conflict between opinions offered by our court over the past twenty years.

10 Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 6.903(2)(d) requires an appellant’s brief to

include a routing statement that “indicate[s] whether the case should be retained
by the supreme court or transferred to the court of appeals and shall refer to the
applicable criteria in rule 6.1101.”
                                        25

Compare Midland Restoration Co. v. Sioux City Cmty. Sch. Dist., No. 02-0625,

2003 WL 21229272, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App. May 29, 2003) (awarding fees to a

principal contractor where only the amount not the authority was disputed), with

Saydel Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Denis Della Vedova, Inc., No. 06-0070, 2007 WL

1201748, at *1–2 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 25, 2007) (refusing to award fees to the

principal contractor and pointing out Midland was not controlling authority). Yet we

are not always comparing “apples to apples” because these cases often have facts

that are specific to obligations between the parties. And as both parties recognize,

in Midland a panel of this court specifically read section 573.21 to allow attorney

fees to a principal contractor. 2003 WL 21229272, at *5. But, we find little

precedential value in that ruling, as the issue regarding what authority—if any—

allowed for the recovery of attorney fees was not contested; rather, the owner of

the public project “recognize[d] an award of appellate attorney fees would be

authorized under Iowa Code section 573.21.” Id. The court was only asked to

decide the appropriate amount of attorney fees—not whether the principal

contractor was allowed to recover them under the statute. Id. At least one law

review article on the subject of public construction liens has come to the same

conclusion, recognizing the Midland decision may have allowed the principal

contractor to recover as a claimant because “the parties to the lawsuit did not

dispute that [principal] contractors were ‘claimants’ who had attorney-fee rights

under the statute.” Stephen D. Marso, Pub. Constr. Liens in Iowa: A Hist. and

Analysis of Iowa Code Chapter 573, 60 Drake L. Rev. 101, 187 (Fall 2011). And,

the author opined, “[t]o the extent that [Midland] stands for the proposition that a
                                           26

[principal] contractor is a ‘claimant’ under chapter 573 and is entitled to attorney-

fee rights under the section 573.21, it is incorrect.” Id. at 188 (footnote omitted).

       If Graphite Construction is correct in its interpretation of the term “claimant,”

because it has prevailed in this action, it would be entitled to attorney fees. See

Iowa Code § 573.21; see also Star Equip., 843 N.W.2d at 463 (considering

whether to award attorney fees under section 573.21 only after concluding the

subcontractors prevailed in establishing their claims); see also Grady v. S.E.

Gustafson Constr. Co., 103 N.W.2d 737, 743 (Iowa 1960) (affirming fee award

under section 573.21 to party who prevailed in part). But we disagree with Graphite

Construction’s proffered interpretation.

       First, throughout chapter 573, the legislature used the term “principal

contractor” to describe an entity separate from a “claimant.” And, to get to its

interpretation, Graphite Construction now characterizes its entitlement to the

retention funds as a “claim for labor and materials.” As defined in section 573.7,

“claims for material or labor” are available to “[a]ny person, firm, or corporation who

has, under a contract with the principal contractor or with subcontractors,

performed labor, or furnished material, service, or transportation.” (Emphasis

added.) That definition would not include a request by the principal contractor for

payment of retained monies. And, Graphite Construction’s request is indeed a

claim against retainage.     Section 573.15 requires that the “person, firm, or

corporation that has performed labor for or furnished materials” notify “the principal

contractor in writing” the details of the claim, so it is nonsensical to assume

Graphite Construction would be required to notify itself about the details of its own

claim. Of course, this militates against Graphite Construction’s interpretation, as
                                           27

“[w]e always look for an interpretation of a statute that is reasonable and avoids

absurd results.”      State v. Mathias, 936 N.W.2d 222, 232 (Iowa 2019).

Section 573.15A, labeled “[e]arly release of retained funds,” delineates these

separate parties who can file suit: “The public corporation, the principal contractor,

or any claimant for labor or materials, . . . who has filed a claim.” (Emphasis

added.) When we read the statute as a whole, we cannot see how Graphite

Construction can wiggle the terms beyond the common usage in all of the other

sections chapter 573. See Emps. Mut. Cas. Co., 577 N.W.2d at 660 (noting that

one rule of statutory construction requires us to give effect to all of the language in

the statute). For example, section 573.17 defines the “parties” involved under the

statute as: “The official board or officer letting the contract, the principal contractor,

all claimants for labor and material who have filed their claim, and the surety on

any bond given for the performance of the contract . . . .”           Further, Graphite

Construction offered no authority for its position that the principal contractor can

also be a claimant. Our task is to construe the words as how they are actually in

the statute. See Tweeten v. Tweeten, 999 N.W.2d 270, 280 (Iowa 2023) (applying

statutory construction rules to terminology in chapter 85 and noting “[o]rdinarily,

we may not, under the guise of judicial construction, add modifying words to the

statute or change its terms” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)).

       To make Graphite Construction a claimant is nonsensical when reviewing

the entire chapter. Is it next going to argue that the public corporation must

withhold a sum equal to double the total amount of the claim under section 573.14?

Or that a principal contractor must secure a bond under section 573.16 in double

the amount of its “claim”? Finally, it would be very easy for the legislature to have
                                         28

clarified in section 573.21 that any principal contractor is also entitled to attorney

fees. In sum, we deny Graphite Construction’s request for attorney fees.

III. Conclusion.

       Because Graphite Construction’s request for release of the full value of the

surety bond from the retainage fund was timely and appropriate under

section 573.16(2), and because DMACC cannot rely on section 573.28 to withhold

some retainage based on the value of uncompleted labor and materials, we

reverse the decision of the district court and remand for an order granting payment

from the retention fund in the amount of $82,627.78, plus interest as provided by

section 573.16(2).   We deny the request to award attorney fees to Graphite

Construction.

       REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.