Court Opinion

ID: 9384865
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-05 14:04:34.312566+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:57.001313
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

                       COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

                                 APPEALS COURT

                                                  22-P-663

                        KIRBY MASTRANGELO & others1

                                       vs.

                        CITY OF AMESBURY & others.2

               MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

       The plaintiffs appeal from the entry of summary judgment

 against them in the Superior Court.           Two counts from the

 plaintiffs' first amended complaint are at issue:              one alleging

 that the former mayor of Amesbury, C. Kenneth Gray (mayor), in

 his individual capacity,3 intentionally interfered with the

 plaintiffs' advantageous economic relationship with the Cannabis

 Control Commission (commission), and the other seeking

 declaratory and injunctive relief against the mayor and the city

 of Amesbury.     We affirm.

 1 Candace Kattar and CKR Natural Solutions, LLC (CKR).
 2 C. Kenneth Gray, individually and in his capacity as Mayor of
 the city of Amesbury, and the Cannabis Control Commission.
 3 The plaintiffs' intentional interference claim against Mayor

 Gray in his official capacity was previously dismissed and is
 not before us.
    Discussion.     We review a decision on a motion for summary

judgment de novo without deference to the motion judge.      Boelter

v. Selectmen of Wayland, 479 Mass. 233, 237 (2018).     "Summary

judgment is appropriate where there are no material facts in

dispute and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law."   Federal Nat'l Mtge. Ass'n v. Rego, 474 Mass. 329, 332

(2016).    We may consider any ground that supports the judgment.

Augat, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 410 Mass. 117, 120 (1991).

    1.     Intentional interference.   The plaintiffs assert two

primary claims of error in the motion judge's decision entering

summary judgment for the mayor on their intentional interference

claim.    First, the plaintiffs argue that the judge erred by

applying a heightened actual malice standard to the "improper

motive or means" element of the tort of intentional interference

with an advantageous economic relationship.     Second, they assert

that, even if the actual malice standard applied here, there is

sufficient evidence in the record from which a jury could infer

that the mayor acted with malice.      The plaintiffs' brief is

silent, however, on the alternative ground supporting the motion

judge's decision -- i.e., common-law immunity.     See Gildea v.

Ellershaw, 363 Mass. 800, 820 (1973).     Accordingly, the issue is

waived.    See Abate v. Fremont Inv. & Loan, 470 Mass. 821, 833

(2015) (failure to address issue on appeal waives right to

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appellate review); Sullivan v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 444 Mass.

34, 35 n.1 (2005) (same).

     Even if the issue were not waived, we agree with the motion

judge that the mayor is shielded from liability by the common-

law immunity doctrine.   Under Massachusetts common law, "a

public official, exercising judgment and discretion, is not

liable for negligence or other error in the making of an

official decision if the official acted in good faith, without

malice, and without corruption."       Nelson v. Salem State College,

446 Mass. 525, 537 (2006).   The mayor's decision to not enter a

host community agreement (HCA)4 on behalf of the city with CKR

and instead request that the plaintiffs first obtain a special

permit from the planning board was a discretionary act.5      See

Mederi, Inc. v. Salem, 488 Mass. 60, 66 (2021) ("a municipality

4 "A host community agreement is an agreement between the
prospective marijuana establishment and the host community
'setting forth the conditions to have a marijuana establishment
. . . located within the host community.'" CommCan, Inc. v.
Mansfield, 488 Mass. 291, 292 n.3 (2021), quoting G. L. c. 94G,
§ 3 (d). "An applicant must provide the commission with proof
of an HCA as part of its application for a license." Mederi,
Inc. v. Salem, 488 Mass. 60, 63 (2021), citing 935 Code Mass.
Regs. § 500.101(1)(a)(8) (2021).
5 The commission requires that applications to operate a retail

marijuana establishment (RME) include, among other things,
certification of an HCA with the host municipality, completion
of a community outreach meeting, and a description of plans to
ensure compliance with all local codes, ordinances, and bylaws.
935 Code Mass. Regs. § 500.101(1)(a)(8)-(10) (2021).

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may use its discretion in determining whether to enter into an

HCA with a prospective retail establishment").

    Here, the mayor submitted affidavits stating he requested

the plaintiffs to first obtain a permit from the planning board

in response to local opposition to CKR's plans, including

opposition from a councilor.    The burden then shifted to the

plaintiff to show a dispute of material fact as to malice or bad

faith.   See Godbout v. Cousens, 396 Mass. 254, 261-262 (1985)

(discussing shifting burdens of proof on summary judgment).       The

plaintiffs did not submit any admissible evidence that the mayor

harbored any personal hostility or ill will toward the

plaintiffs.   Also absent from the summary judgment record is

evidence that the mayor's decision was motivated by revenge, cf.

Cachopa v. Stoughton, 72 Mass. App. Ct. 657, 665 (2008) (no

summary judgment on common-law immunity where the plaintiff

produced evidence from which a jury could infer that official's

conduct motivated by revenge, raising inference of malice), or a

"spiteful, malignant purpose, unrelated to [a] legitimate

[municipal] interest" (citation omitted), Blackstone v. Cashman,

448 Mass. 255, 263 (2007).     Nor has the plaintiff offered

evidence to support an inference of bad faith.     See Buffalo-

Water 1, LLC v. Fidelity Real Estate Co., 481 Mass. 13, 25-26

(2018) (bad faith suggests "'a dishonest purpose or some moral

obliquity,' a 'conscious doing of wrong,' or a 'breach of a

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known duty through some motive of interest or ill will'"

[citation omitted]).   The plaintiffs' theory that the mayor held

them to a different standard because of their economic

empowerment (EE) status6 rests more on conjecture and speculation

than rational inferences of probabilities from established facts

where, as here, there was opposition to the application, and the

mayor simply asked that the planning board review the

application.7   See Gram v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 384 Mass. 659,

6 "Economic empowerment priority applicants are, broadly
speaking, those applicants from communities that have been
disproportionately harmed by marijuana law enforcement
(particularly Black, Hispanic, and Latino communities)."
Mederi, Inc., 488 Mass. at 62, citing 935 Code Mass. Regs.
§ 500.002 (2021). "The commission statutorily is required to
prioritize such applicants." Id., citing G. L. c. 94G, § 4 (a
1/2) (iv). See 935 Code Mass. Regs. § 500.102(2)(a) (2021).
7 The plaintiffs’ argument that the requirement that they obtain

a special permit in the first instance put them into an "endless
loop" (because they could not obtain a permit without a
commission application, they could not submit a commission
application without an HCA, and they could not get an HCA
without a permit) is unavailing. The argument is premised on
theoretical hurdles based on regulatory interpretation, rather
than on a factual record of obstruction. For example, the
record reflects that the plaintiffs did initiate the commission
application process, and there is nothing in the record to
suggest that the planning board refused to consider the
plaintiffs for a special permit due to the absence of a complete
commission application. We have also considered the plaintiffs'
argument that the mayor acted unlawfully by entering into an HCA
with two other parties in October 2018 before either applicant
had received a special permit from the planning board, while
requiring the plaintiffs to obtain a special permit in the first
instance. This claim is without merit because no statute,
regulation, or city ordinance explicitly states the order in
which an RME applicant must obtain a special permit or an HCA.
Further, although the statutory and regulatory scheme requires
economic empowerment applicants to receive priority review by

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664 (1981), quoting Alholm v. Wareham, 371 Mass. 621, 627 (1976)

("reasonable inference of malice must . . . be 'based on

probabilities rather than possibilities'").   See also South

Boston Betterment Trust Corp. v. Boston Redev. Auth., 438 Mass.

57, 69 (2002) ("there is every presumption in favor of the

honesty and sufficiency of the motives actuating public officers

in actions ostensibly taken for the general welfare" [citation

omitted]).

    At bottom, there is insufficient evidence on this record to

justify a trial on whether the mayor acted in bad faith, with

malice, or corruptly.   See South Boston Betterment Trust Corp.,

438 Mass. at 69.   Summary judgment was properly entered for the

mayor on the plaintiffs' intentional interference claim.

    2.   Declaratory judgment.   The count for declaratory

judgment was also properly dismissed.   At the time of summary

judgment, the declaratory judgment count applied only to the

city and the mayor, as the commission had been dismissed from

the litigation by stipulation of the parties.   With respect to

any declaration concerning the city and the mayor, the complaint

alleged that the city and/or the mayor violated G. L. c. 94G and

"abused their powers" by placing unreasonable obstacles before

the commission, "municipalities, as the de facto gatekeepers to
such priority application review, are not required to consider
whether any entity seeking to enter an HCA is an economic
empowerment priority applicant." Mederi, Inc., 488 Mass. at 72.

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the plaintiffs to obtain an HCA and by manipulating the process

to preclude them, as EE priority applicants, from obtaining

commission approval.   Although the complaint alleged that

declaratory relief was sought "to secure a determination of the

relative rights, duties, status, and legal relationship of the

Plaintiffs as EE applicants, the Mayor and/or the City and the

[commission]" pursuant to G. L. c. 94G, it did not request any

particular declaration.8    As such, the judge was entirely within

his discretion in concluding that the request for declaratory

relief was too amorphous to address.     See Everett v. Local 1656,

Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, 411 Mass. 361, 369 (1991), citing

G. L. c. 231A, § 3 (judge, in his discretion, may decline

declaratory relief if it would serve no useful purpose).9

                                      Judgment affirmed.

                                      By the Court (Vuono,
                                        Sullivan & Singh, JJ.10),

                                      Clerk

Entered:   April 5, 2023.

8 Within the count for declaratory judgment was a request for
injunctive relief; however, all requests for injunctions were
against the dismissed party, the commission.
9 We recognize that the judge dismissed the declaratory judgment

count as moot since necessary parties had been dismissed from
the litigation and the plaintiffs had no pending application
with the city. We may affirm on any ground apparent from the
record. See O’Keeffe v. Dwyer & Duddy, P.C., 100 Mass. App. Ct.
671, 676 n.10 (2022).
10 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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