Court Opinion

ID: 9698741
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:58:46.947012+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:43.095518
License: Public Domain

MONTEMURO, Judge,
concurring and dissenting:
I am in full accord with the majority’s conclusions that effectiveness of counsel is a cognizable issue in the review of termination proceedings; that the rights of the mother herein were justifiably terminated by the trial court, and that appellant’s legal representation was not of such charac*619ter as to be a critical factor in this decision. However, I disagree with the majority’s reasoning as to the suggested procedure for preserving and raising the ineffectiveness of counsel issue in the context of a termination hearing.
The majority insists that the standard and manner of reviewing ineffectiveness must be tailored to fit the sort of case in which the allegation of counsel’s poor performance occurs, in this instance a termination of parental rights. (Majority Opinion at 607-609). However, given the number of contexts in which the right to counsel exists, a logical reading of the action-specific ineffectiveness standard suggested by the Majority would require that there must be a discrete form of testing effectiveness dependent upon the type of proceeding in which it is alleged to have occurred. Clearly, such a schema is unwieldy. It seems more feasible, if only as a practical matter, that where there is a right to counsel it should carry a particular and unmistakable meaning, obvious to everyone involved, whether provider or recipient of the representation.
In fact the method utilized by the Majority in assessing appellant’s claims, although described as a combination of the standard set by the PCRA and verbalization of the “fundamental fairness” doctrine, is easily recognizable as a close relative of the formula employed in criminal cases, and the analysis applied bears strong resemblance to that which appears in Commonwealth v. Durst, 522 Pa. 2, 559 A.2d 504 (1989) (Ineffectiveness claim grounded in counsel’s failure to interview putatively exculpatory witnesses.)
The issue presented by appellant herein is that counsel failed to call witnesses whose testimony would have demonstrated the possibility of appellant’s recovery from drug addiction at some undetermined future date. The Majority finds that there was more than enough evidence to justify termination. Compare, id., 522 Pa. at 5, 559 A.2d at 506. It further concludes that even the foregone testimony would have little or no effect in vitiating appellant’s admitted present drug usage and lack of parental capacity. The introduction of such speculative evidence as appellant *620claims was necessary would be a useless act which counsel need not have performed. Compare, id. Finally the Majority concludes that in view of the quality of the putative evidence, its absence played no part in the result, i.e., caused no prejudice to appellant’s case. Compare, id. Nomenclature apart, there is remarkable consistency in treatment of these claims.
The majority dismisses the structure of raising and assessing ineffectiveness claims already provided by parallel systems, the criminal, civil commitment, and paternity action processes, as paradigms unsuitable for adaptation to a termination proceedings because their derivation is from the Sixth Amendment rather than the Fourteenth. It is argued that because no liberty interest is involved in termination cases, they are not truly adversarial, and the paternal/avuncular responsibility of the trial courts to determine the best interests of the child, buttressed by our broad scope of review is sufficient to insure the effectuation of due process. However, I am not convinced that a threat to liberty is the sole determinant of the worth of an interest, or of whether measures are necessary to protect it. Permanent deprivation of one’s child is a weighty interest, albeit one involving no “right”. The importance of reasons other than a liberty interest for instituting protective procedures becomes more obvious in light of the Majority’s avoidance of the use of the criminal standard of ineffectiveness even where the liberty interest of a juvenile headed for long term commitment to a secure facility is involved. See, Commonwealth v. Smith, — Pa.Super.-, 573 A.2d 1077 (1990) (Dissenting Opinion by Tamilia, J.); In re Cunningham, 00609 Pittsburgh 1988, slip op., — Pa.Super. -, 573 A.2d 1096 (1990, Dissenting Opinion by Tamilia, J.). The existence of a liberty interest is not, therefore, dispositive of the propriety of using the criminal system’s ineffectiveness standard in other contexts. Further, the Majority’s invocation of the rules applied in federal habeas corpus cases is inapposite, since the federal courts have traditionally refused to intervene in family court cases.
*621It is also the Majority’s position that “the ineffectiveness of the lawyer does not carry the deleterious impact it would in a criminal case which is purely adversarial and over which the presiding judge acts primarily as arbiter” (Majority Opinion at 609-610). However convincing this notion might be were this the best of all possible worlds, it is not operational in the system as it is now constituted. Harried judges, case-laden by the demands of populous judicial districts, or in some instances bearing the entire judicial burden of the areas they serve, may, despite a full measure of dedication, simply lack the time to perform the role of parens patriae in any meaningful way. It is also unfortunately true that in the real world, not all probation officers, social workers, and other personnel assigned the duty of dealing with the problems of children, and sometimes acting as their advocates, possess the same, or the necessary degree of intelligence, dedication, compassion and interest. Under our system of jurisprudence there is no substitute for competent legal counsel whose primary responsibility it has always been to ferret out all facts of a case and bring them to the attention of the trial judge. This fact was clearly recognized by the Supreme Court in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967), and motivated the assignment to the juvenile system of those due process, and other, rights which it now enjoys. Indeed, recognition of the necessity for their formalization was driven by arguments such as those the Majority makes. Comparison with the juvenile system is apt because the procedural track established for Juvenile Court proceedings closely parallels what occurs in termination actions. Moreover, the same gaps in procedure exist, viz., guidance on the treatment of ineffectiveness claims. The Majority’s insistence that the court would inevitably be hindered in its performance by procedural or “technical” requirements becomes less persuasive in light of the finding by Justice Fortas, that “unbridled discretion, however benevolently *622motivated is frequently a poor substitute for principle and procedure.” Id. at 18, 87 S.Ct. at 1439. As is explained at great length, there is no inconsistency between the establishment of procedure and the continuation of those aspects of the system uniquely favorable to children.
While the Majority suggests that the direct appeal process coupled with the broad scope of appellate review are jointly adequate to meet the exigencies of whatever might occur in a termination case, this belief ignores the impact of the waiver doctrine on claims not properly preserved for our review. See, In re Sanders Children, 454 Pa. 350, 312 A.2d 414 (1973) (Issues not properly raised in court below would not be considered on appeal from judgment involuntarily terminating parental-rights.) Hence, the expectation that fundamental fairness will allow us to resolve issues of trial error or counsel’s representation becomes a vain hope.
It is insisted that the imposition of procedural requirements would affect the brevity of time within which matters involving the welfare of children are handled, and that our access to the whole record obviates the necessity for, e.g., remand for hearing, appointment of new counsel, or any other time-consuming intermediate remedial or investigatory steps. However, the question of delay reflects more upon the size of the criminal system than upon an inherent defect in the procedure prescribed to test ineffectiveness claims; the presentation of such a claim in the context of termination proceedings would offer no greater guarantee of remand than it does in the criminal system. As the analysis performed by the Majority in this case demonstrates, the obstacles to presenting a meritorious case of ineffectiveness are formidable: since counsel is presumed to be competent, he/she may not be second-guessed on appellate review; the issues must, a priori, have arguable merit; the strategies chosen by counsel must have no reasonable basis designed to effectuate the client’s interests; if proven, the ineffectiveness must have had some discernable prejudicial effect. Some of this must be persuasively argues before remand is warranted, and mere *623unsupported allegations would, as they always have, receive short shrift. Again, use of a similar formula to argue incompetence of counsel in matters relating to children does not and should not automatically decrease the burden or increase the time necessary to determine the best interests of the child.
What is lacking now is any suggestion about what must occur where the necessity an explanation of counsel’s actions becomes apparent. Without remand we would not have a complete record, and without new counsel, there would be no one to raise and/or preserve the issue unless trial counsel were willing to accuse him or herself of malfeasance. A party seeking to terminate parental rights must do so by clear and convincing evidence. In re Shives, 363 Pa.Super. 225, 525 A.2d 801 (1987). It may be that absent the assistance of competent counsel, the evidence will, although meeting the standard, not reflect the true circumstances of the case.
In summary, I believe the majority overemphasizes the differences existing between this and other sorts of proceedings in order to deny applicability of similar procedures and standards. What is common to all of the cases in which the ineffectiveness formula is used, is that despite the theoretical lack, in some instances, of truly adversarial parties, e.g., dependency, delinquency and termination proceedings, civil commitments, paternity determinations, it is always the state, with its superior and seemingly endless legal resources, against which a defense must be mounted. The majority would also have us assume that it is only the state which can represent the child’s best interests. This theory obviates the necessity for any system, since it would be redundant to litigate a foregone conclusion. As no liberty interests would be involved, and if indeed these are the sole consideration, the state need only seize those children whose parents are alleged to perform their responsibilities poorly, and give them to others, either institutions or individuals whom the state has determined to be worth, an absurd scenario. Whether the end result involves incarcer*624ation, confinement in a mental hospital or youth treatment center, or as here the permanent removal of one’s child, the forces of opposition are always larger and better equipped, but are not always either correct or just in their assessments. We may not, in addition to their already formidable array of resources, credit them with omniscience.
If such purely procedural requirements as the Rules of Appellate Procedure find universal application to cases of widely diverse provenance, interest, and relief, I see no reason why the methodology for dealing with ineffectiveness claims posited as desirable in In Re Smith, — Pa.Super.-, 573 A.2d 1077 (1990), and In Re Cunningham, — Pa.Super.-, 573 A.2d 1096 (1990), cannot be applied here. In the last analysis, adoption of these procedures would, I believe operate in the best interests of the child.
CAVANAUGH and ROWLEY, JJ., join.