Court Opinion

ID: 9497166
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 16:45:03.573556+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:58:02.531061
License: Public Domain

McKEAGUE, District Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
The majority opinion addresses three issues: exhaustion, procedural default, and the merits of petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Addressing the last of these issues first, I concur in the conclusion that the district court’s judgment denying the petition on the merits should be vacated. For the reasons that follow, I am constrained to conclude, however, on the present record, that the Sixth Circuit is no less prohibited than the district court from granting the writ — -even conditionally. I therefore concur in part and dissent in part.
I
The district court reached the merits of petitioner’s ineffective assistance claim notwithstanding petitioner’s failure to exhaust available state court remedies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2), which allows a federal court only to deny, not grant, an unexhausted habeas petition. Report and recommendation, p. 25, J.A. 50. Applying Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), the district court concluded petitioner had failed to carry his burden both of overcoming the strong presumption that counsel’s purported strategic choice not to give timely notice of alibi defense was reasonable; and of demonstrating that, even if counsel’s performance was deficient, such deficiency so prejudiced petitioner as to deny him a fair trial. Id. at 25-30, J.A. 50-55. For the reasons set forth in Part III.D of the majority opinion, I, too, would hold the district court erred in its conclusion, based on the record before it, that the ineffective assistance claim must be denied.
The record presented suggests petitioner has a colorable claim, but the record is not sufficiently clear and complete to enable a definitive ruling either way. The insufficiency of the record is evident in the majority’s analysis. For instance, with respect to the first prong of the Strickland test, the majority recognizes the conflict between the affidavits of petitioner’s two trial attorneys, one claiming that the late filing of the alibi defense notice was the function of strategic choice, and the other surmising that it was a matter of error by counsel. The record offers no explanation of the “strategic choice” and no means of reconciling the two affidavits. The district court resolved the difficulties by holding simply that petitioner has failed to carry *447his burden, while ignoring his request for an evidentiary hearing. The majority, on the other hand, relies on its deduction that the unexplained strategic choice is “self-serving” and “doubtful.” Because the majority is unable to conceive of a sound reason for the late filing of the notice, it finds the “strong presumption” of Strickland adequately rebutted.-
Similar ambiguities undermine evaluation of the second Strickland prong as well. In holding that petitioner had not shown prejudice, the district court noted that petitioner had offered no proof of the nature of his putative alibi witnesses’ testimony or even that they would in fact have been available and willing to so testify. The majority correctly points out that the district court erroneously ignored the affidavit of one of the alibi witnesses, petitioner’s father. The majority concedes that the father’s credibility is not unassailable, but finds corroboration of petitioner’s alibi in an investigator’s affidavit and report. Using these sources, the majority launches into speculation regarding what “is reasonable to assume” and what the alibi witnesses “might have testified” to if they had been called..
My purpose is not to attack the soundness of the majority’s speculation, but to highlight the inadequacy of the present record. Faced with this inadequacy, the district court, in my opinion, had two legitimate alternatives. First, it could have granted petitioner’s request for an eviden-tiary hearing, to allow completion of the record before evaluating the merits. Second, it could have dismissed the claim without prejudice, because unexhausted, and allowed petitioner to pursue his remedies, potentially including an evidentiary hearing, in the state courts. For reasons evident below, the first alternative is superior. Indeed, this is the course recently taken by the Sixth Circuit in Bigelow v. Williams, 367 F.3d 562 (6th Cir.2004). Faced with a habeas claim based on ineffective assistance where counsel’s supposed strategic decision was, on the record presented, “unexplained, if not inexplicable,” id. at 573, the Bigelow court remanded the matter to the district court for fiirther proceedings, possibly including an evidentiary hearing, to determine both prongs of the Strickland standard in the first instance. In “rushing to judgment” on the merits of petitioner’s claim, rather than remanding to the district court for clarification of the record, the majority simply declares the record to be sufficient and then supplies the missing details with its own supposition and speculation. I respectfully submit that completion of the factual record is a task better committed to the district court.
Further, in refusing to recognize that deficiencies in the record are due in part to petitioner’s failure to exhaust an available state court remedy, the majority goes to great lengths to explain why petitioner’s failure to exhaust is no impediment to reaching thp merits, reasoning even that the exhaustion requirement has been satisfied, even though neither party has challenged the district court’s contrary conclusion in this appeal. In this regard, too, for the reasons set forth below, I find the majority’s approach flawed.
II
In analyzing the exhaustion issue, the majority purports to write on a blank slate, observing that, although the respondent has not expressly ásserted the defense, it is not waived and may be raised sua sponte. -Albeit true, this approach nonetheless ignores the fact that the district court first raised the issue sua sponte and, in a ruling that remains unchallenged on appeal, held the exhaustion require*448ment had not been satisfied.1 It comes as no surprise that respondent has not challenged this conclusion on appeal, for it redounds to respondent’s benefit. Neither is petitioner’s silence on the issue surprising, as he even conceded in his petition that the claim was unexhausted and actually moved the district court to stay proceedings on the petition pending exhaustion of state remedies. Petition for writ of habeas corpus, ¶ 7, J.A. 8.
The parties’ reasons for focusing their appellate arguments on the merits of the claim, rather than exhaustion, are thus understandable. Nevertheless, these reasons do not justify our departure from the well-settled rule that issues not raised on appeal are deemed abandoned. See Mitchell v. Chapman, 343 F.3d 811, 825 n. 15 (6th Cir.2003); Security Watch, Inc. v. Sentinel Systems, Inc. 176 F.3d 369, 376 (6th Cir.1999). If the rule is adhered to, then the district court’s finding of non-exhaustion must be left undisturbed. It follows that once we have determined the district court’s denial of the claim on its merits is flawed, but we refrain from remanding the matter for reconsideration based on a fuller factual development, we are left with a finding of non-exhaustion that should, ordinarily, in compliance with 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) and in the interests of comity, require dismissal of the claim pending exhaustion. See Rockwell v. Yukins, 217 F.3d 421, 424-25 (6th Cir.2000)(vacating judgment granting ha-beas relief and remanding for dismissal without prejudice because petition contained unexhausted claim, even though meritorious claim had been exhausted).
Yet, without even mentioning the district court’s treatment of the exhaustion issue, the majority takes it up de novo and finds that the claim is exhausted. In my opinion, the majority’s approach is not only proeedurally improper, but also substantively erroneous. The conclusion that the claim is exhausted is based on the finding that the claim was, on direct review, “fairly *449presented” to the Ohio Court of Appeals and Ohio Supreme Court. To reach this conclusion, the majority relies on the established principle that exhaustion does not necessarily require state court adjudication of the asserted claim, and that a claim that is fairly presented but ignored by the state court may be deemed exhausted. The facts of this case, however, do not come within this principle.
There is no dispute, of course, that peti-: tioner did assert, on direct review, his ineffective assistance claim based on the late filing of the notice of alibi defense. The Ohio Court of Appeals did not decide the merits of the claim, but neither did it ignore the claim. Its analysis is contained in one paragraph:
In his third claim, defendant maintains that counsel were ineffective for not timely filing defendant’s notice of alibi. As noted, counsel did clearly indicate that they were aware of the alibi witnesses before the disclosure deadline set forth in Crim.R. 12.1; however, the rec- ' ord contains no explanation of the reason behind the late disclosure. For example, the record does not disclose whether trial counsel failed to investigate or to interview defendant’s alleged alibi witnesses. As a result, we are unable to reach a determination as to whether the delay was the result of trial strategy or was due to counsel’s ineffectiveness as alleged. As the reason for the late disclosure is not a part of the record before this court, defendant must pursue his claim of ineffective assistance based upon the late disclosure by way of a motion for post-conviction relief.
Ohio Court of Appeals Opinion, Dec. 23, 1999, p. 19, J.A. 417. The Ohio Supreme Court denied leave to appeal.
The Ohio courts thus refrained from reaching the merits of the claim because the factual record was deemed incomplete. Petitioner was expressly advised to pursue the claim by filing a motion for post-conviction relief, i.e., a mechanism that would potentially allow for supplementation of the factual record through an evidentiary hearing.
Yet, quite apart from whether petitioner ever pursued the recommended motion, the majority holds that petitioner had exhausted the claim simply by including it in his direct appeal. This holding flies in the face of the teaching of Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 350-51, 109 S.Ct. 1056, 103 L.Ed.2d 380 (1989). In Castille, the Supreme Court made it clear that presenting a claim for the first and only time in a procedural context in which its merits will not necessarily be considered does not constitute “fair presentation.” Id. at 351, 109 S.Ct. 1056. Indeed, as the majority recognizes, the exhaustion requirement demands that the state courts be given a full and fair opportunity to rule on the factual, as well as the legal, bases of a claim. Caver v. Straub, 349 F.3d 340, 346 (6th Cir.2003); Newton v. Million, 349 F.3d 873, 877 (6th Cir.2003); Hannah v. Conley, 49 F.3d 1193, 1196 (6th Cir.1995). Where, as here, petitioner’s fact-based ineffective assistance claim was presented in a procedural context in which the merits were not considered because the factual record was incomplete,, the claim can hardly be deemed to have been “fairly presented.” See Hall v. Huffman, 234 F.3d 1268 (Table), 2000 WL 1562821 at *3 (6th Cir. Oct. 11, 2000)(applying Castille under closely analogous circumstances and remanding unexhausted claim for dismissal without prejudice).
Accordingly, inasmuch as remand to the district court for reconsideration of the merits based on a fuller factual development is not acceptable to the majority, I would alternatively affirm the district court’s ruling that the claim is unexhaust-*450ed and would therefore hold the claim subject to dismissal without prejudice.2
Ill
Finally, for reasons derivative of the above exhaustion analysis, I must take issue with the majority’s treatment of procedural default as well. The district court rejected respondent’s procedural default defense essentially because the subject claim had not been exhausted (through the filing of an appropriate motion for post-conviction relief) and the state courts therefore did not have occasion to enforce a procedural bar.3 Without even acknowledging the district court’s ruling on the issue and the rationale therefore, the majority likewise concludes that the Ohio appellate . courts’ rejection of the claim on direct review was due not to enforcement of a procedural bar, but due to the inadequacy of the record. Ignoring the fact that the record was inadequate because petitioner had not exhausted an available state remedy, the majority nonetheless correctly concludes the claim cannot be deemed procedurally defaulted on the basis of the direct review proceedings alone.
The majority goes on to discuss the significance of the Ohio courts’ disposition of petitioner’s motion for new trial. Even though the motion’s untimeliness was clearly one reason for the trial court’s denial and the appellate court’s affirmance of the denial, the majority is “unable to say” the state courts enforced a procedural bar because the state courts’ decisions also rested on other grounds.
The exact rationale for the Ohio Court of Appeals’ decision affirming denial of the motion for new trial is concededly ambiguous, at least in part. Its significance to our exhaustion and procedural default analyses is therefore uncertain. The uncertainty is exacerbated by the unexplained failure of the parties and the district court to address it in any way. Yet, the Ohio courts’ disposition of the motion for new trial is potentially significant to both the exhaustion and procedural default analyses. These circumstances, too, counsel in favor of remand to the district court for reconsideration, for ordinarily, the Sixth Circuit will not consider an issue not decided below unless “the proper resolution is beyond doubt” or “injustice might otherwise result,” neither of which circumstances is presented here. Baker v. Sunny Chevrolet, Inc., 349 F.3d 862, 866 (6th *451Cir.2003); Chao v. Hall Holding Co., Inc., 285 F.3d 415, 427 (6th Cir.2002). Accordingly, if the case were to be remanded for reconsideration of the merits, then the district court would be properly directed to also reconsider the exhaustion and procedural default issues in light of these further state court proceedings.
IV
In sum, although I agree that the district court’s denial of the writ should be vacated, I believe that granting a conditional writ of habeas corpus on the present record constitutes overreaching. Instead, the matter should be remanded to the district court for completion of the record and reconsideration as indicated above.

. The district court’s ruling is reflected in the following excerpts from the magistrate judge's report and recommendation, approved by the district court over objection (on other grounds only):
A federal court may grant relief on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus only if the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A).
Issues that must be raised in a post-conviction action pursuant to O.R.C. § 2953.21 include claims which do not appear on the face of the record and claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel where the defendant was represented on direct appeal by the same attorney who represented him at trial.
In addition to raising each claim in the appropriate forum, a habeas litigant, in order to preserve his constitutional claims for habeas review, must present those claims all the way through the Ohio courts.
Since petitioner did not actually file a post-conviction petition, the state courts did not enforce a procedural bar, and it is not entirely clear that petitioner is barred from pursuing post-conviction relief. .... Thus, Ohio law does not clearly foreclose consideration of a post-conviction petition. Although such a petition would be untimely, the trial court could choose to entertain it. Petitioner still has a remedy in state court if he can file a post-conviction action to assert this claim.
However, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2), [a]n application for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the state.”
Report and recommendation pp. 20-25, J.A. 45-50. Thus, the magistrate judge turned to analyze the merits of petitioner's claim only after determining that it was unexhausted and after recognizing that the district court was free only to deny, not grant, the claim without first requiring exhaustion.

. In footnote 5 of the majority opinion, mention is made of petitioner's motion for new trial, made after his direct appeal was denied. In this motion for new trial, petitioner did assert his ineffective assistance claim based on a supplemented factual record. The motion had been denied by the trial court as untimely and the appeal of this denial was pending when petitioner filed his habeas petition. It was due to the pendency of this appeal that petitioner admitted in his petition that the claim remained unexhausted.
During the pendency of the habeas petition in the district court, i.e., before both the report and recommendation and judgment issued, the Ohio Court of Appeals and Ohio Supreme Court had finally denied appellate relief on the motion for new trial. Inexplicably, however, neither the report and recommendation nor the district court judgment includes any reference to these state court proceedings — in connection with either the exhaustion or procedural default analysis.
In my opinion, though the majority has not relied on it, the outcome of these subsequent state court proceedings represents arguably persuasive evidence that petitioner had in fact exhausted (and procedurally defaulted) his claim before the district court ruled on the habeas petition. Hence, if the matter were to be remanded for reconsideration of the merits, the district court would be properly directed to also reconsider, as appropriate, the exhaustion and procedural default issues in light of these further developments.

. Again, the district court ignored the significance of petitioner's motion for new trial.