Court Opinion

ID: 9626432
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:11:37.470244+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:26.964033
License: Public Domain

TRAYNOR, J.,
Dissenting. It is the established rule in this state that no property shall be exempt from taxation unless *266the Constitution clearly makes it exempt. Tax exemption provisions are therefore strictly construed. (Cypress Lawn Cemetery Association v. San Francisco, 211 Cal. 387, 390 [295 P. 813] ; San Francisco v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co., 166 Cal. 244 [135 P. 971]; Bay Cities Transportation Co. v. Johnson, 8 Cal.2d 706 [68 P.2d 710].) It is to be noted that section 1 of article XIII of the California Constitution does not exempt all property owned by a public school district, as it does property owned by the United States, the state, counties, and municipal corporations. The school property exempted is limited to that used exclusively for public schools. It is my opinion that in so wording the section, the framers of the Constitution did not intend to accord greater tax exemption privileges to school districts than to the United States, the state, counties, and municipal corporations, and certainly did not intend to exempt from taxation privately owned property. On the contrary, by setting apart school property from that of the other public bodies and making its exemption dependent on its use for public schools, they intended to provide for the taxation of any property belonging to school districts but not used exclusively for public schools.
The constitutional provisions relied upon by plaintiffs exempt “property used exclusively for public schools.” (Italics added.) The word “property” includes all of the interests and estates therein. There is a recognized distinction in the several interests that may exist in property, and this court has sanctioned their separate consideration for purposes of taxation. (Pacific Wharf & Storage Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 180 Cal. 31 [179 P. 398]; San Pedro etc. R. R. Co. v. Los Angeles, 180 Cal. 18 [179 P. 393] ; Central Manufacturing Dist. Inc. v. State Board of Equalization, 214 Cal. 288 [5 P.2d 424]; Graciosa Oil Co. v. Santa Barbara County, 155 Cal. 140 [99 P. 483, 20 L.R.A.N.S. 211]; Hammond Lumber Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 104 Cal.App. 235 [285 P. 896]; Hammond Lumber Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 12 Cal.App.2d 277 [55 P.2d 891].) It follows that the property is not tax exempt unless all interests in the property, including the lessor’s interest, are used exclusively for public schools. Even if the interest of the lessee school district is used exclusively for public schools, it does not follow that the interest of the lessor who has rented his property for private gain is so used. The lessor, like any other lessor of commercial property, uses his interest in the property, not *267for public schools, but for the ordinary commercial use of producing income. (In re South Dakota Sigma Chapter House Assn. v. Clay County, 65 S.D. 559 [276, N.W. 258]; State ex rel. Hammer v. Macgurn, 187 Mo. 238 [86 S.W. 138, 2 Ann.Cas. 808] ; Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. City of Wildwood, 118 Fla. 771 [160 So. 208]; Travelers’ Ins. Co. v. Kent, 151 Ind. 349 [50 N.E. 562, 51 N.E. 723]; Spohn v. Stark, 197 Ind. 299 [150 N.E. 787]; Norwegian Lutheran Church v. Wooster, 176 Wash. 581 [30 P.2d 381]; Laurent v. City of Muscatine, 59 Iowa 404 [13 N.W. 409]; see Carteret Academy v. State Board, 102 N.J.L. 525 [133 A. 886].) The removal of such property from the tax rolls serves only to increase the tax burden on other property to meet the costs of government that would otherwise be met by taxes on the exempted property.