Court Opinion

ID: 9373118
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:02:51.060799+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:39.692816
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     ANTHONY GAGLIARDO,                              DOCKET NUMBER
                 Appellant,                          DC-0752-15-0117-I-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF                                   DATE: January 13, 2023
       TRANSPORTATION,
                 Agency.

             THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Michael W. Pearson, Esquire, Phoenix, Arizona, for the appellant.

           Elisabeth Boyen Fry, Washington, D.C., for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                                  Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                   Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                    Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                       FINAL ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     affirmed his removal. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the
     following circumstances:      the initial decision contains erroneous findings of
     material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                        2

     or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the
     administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial
     decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of
     discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and
     material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due
     diligence, was not available when the record closed.       Title 5 of the Code of
     Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115).            After fully
     considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not
     established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review.
     Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision,
     which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b).

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2        The agency’s Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) removed the appellant
     from his Supervisory Aviation Systems Specialist position based on a charge of
     Inappropriate Conduct supported by 12 specifications. Initial Appeal File (IAF),
     Tab 4 at 17-23, Tab 5 at 128-33.        The agency asserted that the appellant:
     (1) misused his position to help a private individual obtain employment on a
     subcontract; (2) impermissibly provided advice to a contractor regarding rate
     negotiations; (3) received “VIP” passes to a conference from a contractor that was
     providing services to his group; (4) provided feedback to a contractor in its
     drafting of a “Business Case” regarding what the contractor was supposed to be
     aware of and who would be the focal point for conversations; (5) improperly
     involved himself in the hiring process for several vacant positions for which a
     contractor had applied; (6) made inappropriate comments of a sexual nature in the
     workplace; (7) informed a coworker that her job would be “on the line” if she did
     not get funding approved that was necessary for contract approval; (8) informed a
     coworker that he would destroy her if she “sa[id] anything against [him]” ;
     (9) informed a coworker on two occasions that he would “destroy him” if he
                                                                                         3

     talked about the appellant behind his back or went around him; (10) made
     inflammatory statements and spread rumors about the personal lives of
     employees, specifically, that two coworkers were having an affair and cheating on
     their spouses; (11) poured alcohol into his coffee cup and drank it while in the
     office during duty hours; and (12) lowered his trousers and exposed his “behind”
     to highway traffic from his office window while others were present. IAF, Tab 5
     at 128-30.
¶3        After a hearing, the administrative judge issued an initial decision that
     affirmed the agency’s action upon finding that the agency proved its charge based
     on only four of the specifications, namely, specifications (2), (8), (9), and (10).
     IAF, Tab 145, Initial Decision (ID) at 1-27, 43. The administrative judge also
     found that the appellant did not prove harmful error, a due process violation, or
     reprisal for whistleblowing. ID at 27-39. Finally, the administrative judge found
     that the penalty of removal was reasonable and promoted the efficiency of the
     service. ID at 39-42.
¶4        The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, the
     agency has filed a response in opposition, and the appellant has filed a reply to
     the agency’s response. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tabs 4, 14-15. 2

                                         ANALYSIS
     The appellant has not shown that the administrative judge erred in finding that the
     agency proved its charge by preponderant evidence.
¶5        The appellant asserts on review that the agency did                  not prove
     specification (2) because the investigator of this misconduct indicated that none

     2
       The appellant requests that the Board grant oral argument in this case. PFR File,
     Tab 4 at 5. In any case that is reopened or reviewed, the Board “may . . . [h]ear oral
     arguments.” 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(a)(2). We deny the appellant’s request because he
     does not explain why he believes that such argument would assist the Board in deciding
     his case, see Kravitz v. Department of the Navy, 104 M.S.P.R. 483, ¶ 4 n.3 (2007), nor
     has he shown what evidence or argument he would present at oral argument or how
     such oral argument would add to the proceedings, see Lee v. Department of Justice,
     99 M.S.P.R. 256, ¶ 7 n.4 (2005).
                                                                                       4

     of the specifications could be substantiated by preponderant evidence without a
     more thorough investigation, including interviews of the appellant and others.
     PFR File, Tab 4 at 28. He also contends that the agency did not prove that he
     violated 5 C.F.R. § 2635.703(a), which, he asserts, is the regulation at issue in
     this specification, because it did not show that the contractor used the information
     and opinion that the appellant had provided to him. Id. at 28-29.
¶6        Contrary to the appellant’s assertion, the Board need not consider the
     evidence an agency had before it when it proposed or effected an action because a
     Board appeal is a de novo review of the agency’s evidence, and the Board will
     decide whether that evidence supports the charge. See Barrett v. Department of
     the Interior, 54 M.S.P.R. 356, 365 (1992); see also Jackson v. Veterans
     Administration, 768 F.2d 1325, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (requiring a de novo
     determination of the facts in a Board appeal). Thus, to have its action sustained,
     the agency must present preponderant evidence before the Board. See 5 U.S.C.
     § 7701(c)(1)(B); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(b)(1)(ii). The appellant has not, therefore,
     shown that the agency needed to show that the proposing and deciding officials
     had preponderant evidence in support of the action when they decided to take
     their respective actions. In any event, the thoroughness or lack of thoroughness
     of an agency investigation of alleged misconduct is not a proper basis for not
     sustaining an agency’s charge. Uske v. U.S. Postal Service, 60 M.S.P.R. 544, 550
     (1994), aff’d, 56 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
¶7        Moreover, we disagree with the appellant’s contention that the agency did
     not prove a violation of 5 C.F.R. § 2635.703(a).       Under section 2635.703(a),
     which addresses the use of nonpublic information, an employee “shall not engage
     in a financial transaction using nonpublic information, nor allow the improper use
     of nonpublic information to further his own private interest or that of another,
     whether through advice or recommendation, or by knowing unauthorized
     disclosure.”   Despite the appellant’s contention that the individual to whom
     nonpublic information is provided must use the information to prove a violation ,
                                                                                        5

     the examples set forth in the regulation show otherwise. Example 1 describes a
     Navy employee who advises friends or relatives to purchase stock in a small
     corporation that will be awarded a Navy contract.             5 C.F.R. § 2635.703.
     Similarly, Example 2 provides that “[a] General Services Administration
     employee involved in evaluating proposals for a construction contract cannot
     disclose the terms of a competing proposal to a friend employed by a company
     bidding on the work.”     Id.   These examples do not describe any use of the
     nonpublic information by the recipient of the information.         In addition, our
     reading of the regulation is consistent with the history of the final rule
     implementing the regulation, which notes that the purpose of the broad principle
     underlying the regulation “is as much to protect nonpublic information as it is [to]
     ensure that the employee and others do not profit from the improper disclosure of
     such information.” Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive
     Branch, 57 Fed. Reg. 35006, 35031 (Aug. 7, 1992).         The Board’s decision in
     Suarez v. Department of Housing & Urban Development, 96 M.S.P.R. 213 (2004),
     aff’d, 125 F. App’x 1010 (Fed. Cir. 2005), which the appellant cites on review, is
     distinguishable from this case. In Suarez, it appears that the agency alleged in its
     charge that the recipient of the nonpublic information used that information to
     purchase real estate. 96 M.S.P.R. 213, ¶¶ 2, 9, 13, 17-19, 26. Here, by contrast,
     the agency did not assert in the narrative underlying specification (2) that the
     individual who received the nonpublic information from the appellant ultimately
     used that information to further his own interests. IAF, Tab 5 at 128-29.
¶8        In   any   event,   even    if   the   appellant   has   correctly   interpreted
     section 2635.703(a), he has not established that the agency needed to prove a
     violation of that section to sustain its charge.    Unlike the agency in Suarez,
     96 M.S.P.R. 213, ¶ 20, which expressly charged Ms. Suarez with violating
     section 2635.703(a), the agency in this case charged the appellant with
     “Inappropriate conduct,” followed by a narrative of the facts underlying
     specification (2). IAF, Tab 5 at 128. An agency is not required to affix a label to
                                                                                       6

     a charge but may simply describe actions that constitute misbehavior in narrative
     form in its charge letter; if the agency chooses to label an action of alleged
     misconduct, then it must prove the elements that make up the legal definition of
     the charge, if any. Otero v. U.S. Postal Service, 73 M.S.P.R. 198, 202 (1997).
     Here, the agency’s charge and specification did not allege a violation of
     section 2635.703(a); thus, the agency did not have to prove a violation of the
     elements of section 2635.703(a). Cf. Otero, 73 M.S.P.R. at 203-04 (explaining
     that, because the agency charged the appellant with “improper conduct,” it was
     not required to prove a threat under Metz v. Department of the Treasury, 780 F.2d
     1001, 1004 (Fed. Cir. 1986), even though the narrative description of the
     misconduct accompanying the charge described the appellant’s behavior as
     threatening).   Although the agency mentioned section 2635.703(a) later in the
     proposal notice, it referenced that regulation in noting that the appellant’s
     interactions with contract personnel “created the appearance of violating ethical
     standards.” IAF, Tab 5 at 131.
¶9        The appellant further contends that the administrative judge improperly
     sustained specification (2) based on “a partial writing” because the agency did not
     produce in discovery parts of an email thread, which the appellant contends
     included communications that would exonerate him. PFR File, Tab 4 at 32-34.
     Although the appellant contends that the missing documents include a longer
     response he had written to “discrete questions” raised by a contractor, id. at 33,
     he does not describe the nature of his response or explain how it would tend to
     undermine the portions of the emails showing that he impermissibly provided
     advice to a contractor regarding rate negotiations .    The administrative judge
     denied as untimely filed the appellant’s motion to compel this information. IAF,
     Tab 47. The appellant has not alleged or shown that the administrative judge
     abused his discretion in this regard. See Figueroa v. Department of Homeland
     Security, 119 M.S.P.R. 422, ¶ 9 (2013) (holding that the Board will not reverse an
     administrative judge’s rulings on discovery matters absent an abuse of
                                                                                       7

      discretion), overruled on other grounds by Singh v. U.S. Postal Ser vice, 2022
      MSPB 15, ¶¶ 9, 11. Thus, he has shown no basis for disturbing the administrative
      judge’s finding that the agency proved specification (2) by preponderant
      evidence.
¶10        The appellant also contends that the agency did not prove specification (8)
      because, among other things, the witness to this misconduct did not report the
      alleged threat to destroy her to anyone in a timely manner. PFR File, Tab 4 at 30.
      A petition for review must be supported by specific references to the record.
      5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(b). Here, the appellant has not identified any evidence in the
      record supporting his contention that the witness did not report the alleged threat
      in a timely manner. In any event, the administrative judge found that this witness
      testified in a “sincere straight-forward manner.” ID at 19. The Board must defer
      to an administrative judge’s credibility determinations when they are based,
      explicitly or implicitly, on observing the demeanor of witnesses testifying at a
      hearing; the Board may overturn such determinations only when it has
      “sufficiently sound” reasons for doing so.      Haebe v. Department of Justice,
      288 F.3d 1288, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2002) .      The appellant has not established that
      there are sufficiently sound reasons for overturning the administrative judge’s
      credibility determinations regarding this witness. Under these circumstances, the
      appellant has not demonstrated that the administrative judge erred when he found
      that the agency proved specification (8).
¶11        Next, the appellant asserts that the agency did not prove specification (9)
      because the administrative judge found that the witness who alleged that the
      appellant   engaged    in   this   misconduct     was   not   credible   regarding
      specification (11) and that this witness was inconsistent as to when the
      misconduct underlying specification (9) took place. PFR File, Tab 4 at 29-30.
      As set forth above, specification (9) alleged that the appellant informed a
      coworker that he would “destroy him” if he talked about the appellant behind his
      back or went around him. IAF, Tab 5 at 129. An administrative judge is not
                                                                                        8

      required to discredit a witness’s testimony on all issues or charges once that
      testimony is discredited on one or more issues or charges . Rackers v. Department
      of Justice, 79 M.S.P.R. 262, 281 (1998), aff’d, 194 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
      (Table). Thus, the appellant has shown no error in this regard, particularly given
      that the administrative judge provided a persuasive explanation as to why he
      found the witness credible as to specification (9) but less credible regarding
      specification (11). ID at 20-21, 25. Moreover, even assuming that the witness
      was not clear as to whether the appellant made the charged statement before or
      after the witness left to serve on a detail at Joint Base Andrews, we find that this
      does not undermine his credibility.     The agency charged that these types of
      statements were made in May 2012 and March 2013. IAF, Tab 5 at 129. Any
      imprecision regarding when the statements were made does not detract from this
      witness’s credibility because he told the investigator and testified at the hearing
      that the appellant had made those types of threatening statements numerous times,
      i.e., at least six to eight times since 2011.    IAF, Tab 6 at 106-07; Hearing
      Transcript (HT) (June 23, 2015) at 162-66. The witness also testified that he was
      not certain he told the investigator that the appellant made the statement before he
      left for the detail.     HT (June 23, 2015) at 165-66.          The investigator’s
      memorandum of her interview with the witness was not signed by the witness or
      certified by him as accurate. IAF, Tab 6 at 106-14. Under these circumstances,
      the appellant has not shown that the administrative judge erred when he found
      that the agency proved specification (9).
¶12        Finally, the appellant asserts that the administrative judge should not have
      sustained specification (10) because the allegation that he spread a rumor that
      certain employees were having an affair was “dated” and inherently improbable.
      PFR File, Tab 4 at 31. We disagree. The appellant has not shown that the age of
      the rumor precluded the agency from relying on it in its charge of misconduct nor
      has he shown that it was inherently improbable that the appellant would spread
      such a rumor. Moreover, he has not shown that any delay in bringing the action
                                                                                        9

      was unreasonable and that he was materially prejudiced by t he delay.           See
      Kirkland v. Department of Homeland Security, 119 M.S.P.R. 74, ¶¶ 22-23 (2013)
      (holding that the defense of staleness falls under the equitable doctrine of laches,
      under which an appellant must prove both that the delay in bringing the action
      was unreasonable and that she was materially prejudiced by the delay). Further,
      the appellant has not shown that it is inherently improbable that the subject of the
      rumor would bring the matter to the appellant’s attention and ask him to initiate
      an investigation into the source of the rumor to “diffuse [his] rumor-spreading.”
      ID at 22-24.

      The appellant has not proven harmful error.
¶13        Harmful error is error by the agency in the application of its procedures that
      is likely to have caused the agency to reach a conclusion different from the one it
      would have reached in the absence or cure of the error.       5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(r).
      The appellant asserts that the agency committed harmful error when it reopened a
      closed complaint (the April 2013 “Ward” complaint) in violation of FAA
      Accountability Board (AB) Order 1110.125a and used information it discovered
      during the course of that reopened investigation to support its action. PFR File,
      Tab 4 at 13-14, 16.     In addition, he contends that the administrative judge
      incorrectly found that the investigation that led to his removal was based on a
      new AB complaint (the November 2013 “Carroll” complaint), which was entirely
      unrelated to the Ward complaint. Id. at 14-15.
¶14        FAA AB Order 1110.125a sets forth procedures for reporting, investigating,
      and processing allegations of harassment and other misconduct that creates a
      hostile work environment.     IAF, Tab 8 at 54.      It provides that, based on a
      preliminary assessment of the seriousness or sensitivity of the allegation, the
      complexity of the case, and the likelihood of determin ing the relevant facts in a
      short period of time, the Accountable Official, who is generally a high-level
      management official representing the organization employing the individual
      against whom an allegation is made, may either address the matter by conducting
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      an internal inquiry without requesting a formal investigation or refer the matter to
      the Accountability Board Coordinator and request a formal security investigation .
      Id. at 59-61, 66.      If the Accountable Official determines that a formal
      investigation is not necessary, he or she has 15 workdays from the date the
      allegation was first reported in which to address the allegation, i.e., determine the
      facts and decide what, if any, action is appropriate and, where such action is
      appropriate, initiate that action. Id. at 66. If, within 15 workdays of the date the
      allegation was first reported, or the date the incident otherwise became known to
      management, it is determined that the facts of the case are sufficiently known to
      determine the appropriate course of action (including a determination that no
      further action is needed, which appears to have been the case regarding the Ward
      complaint), the management official may initiate action after coordination with
      the human resources point of contact (HR POC). Id. If the Accountable Official
      and the HR POC agree on the proposed action, the Accountable Official may
      initiate such action and report it to the Accountability Board, stating the
      allegation and the facts relevant to determining the appropriateness of the action
      taken, if any. IAF, Tab 8 at 67.
¶15         The appellant has not identified, and we have not found, any provision of
      FAA AB Order 1110.125a that would prevent the agency from reopening a
      complaint after an initial determination has been made during an in ternal inquiry
      that no action should be taken. Id. at 54-70. Although the appellant contends
      that an extension of time to complete a formal security investigation must be
      requested from the Accountability Board Director and that an Accountable
      Official cannot, therefore, begin such an investigation months after a complaint is
      received, PFR File, Tab 4 at 14, the appellant has not shown that this case
      involved an ongoing investigation in which an extension might have been needed
      and requested, IAF, Tab 8 at 68.      We therefore agree with the administrative
      judge that, although the appellant identified at length the procedures applicable to
      the AB-related investigations, “neither the timing of the investigation nor the
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      procedural responses by management were overtly erroneous.”           ID at 32-33.
      Thus, regardless of whether the Ward complaint or the Carroll complaint
      prompted the investigation that led to the agency’s action, the appellant has
      shown no error in the agency’s procedures.
¶16        The appellant also asserts that the agency committed harmful error when it
      “made a determination” before the investigation was complete in violation of
      FAA AB Order 1110.125a, which provides that no “determination” may be made
      about an employee’s conduct until the conclusion of the appropriate inquiry or
      investigation. PFR File, Tab 4 at 17. The appellant contends that the agency
      made a “determination” when it removed him, even though the investigator of his
      contract-related misconduct only submitted a memorandum of preliminary results ,
      and the investigation had not, therefore, concluded. Id. at 17-18.
¶17        As set forth above, FAA AB Order 1110.125a provides procedures for
      reporting, investigating, and processing allegations of harassment and other
      misconduct that creates a hostile work environment. IAF, Tab 8 at 54. Altho ugh
      the appellant contends that the procedures set forth in the above order also apply
      to investigations that do not involve allegations of harassme nt or a hostile work
      environment, including the investigation of the ethical and contractual allegations
      at issue in this case, PFR File, Tab 4 at 17 n.11, we disagree. The appellant relies
      upon FAA Order 1600.38F for this contention, but that document does not appear
      to be included in the record of this case. Even if we were to take official notice
      of the version of FAA Order 1600.38F that is publicly available online, see Lovoy
      v. Department of Health & Human Services, 94 M.S.P.R. 571, ¶ 37 (2003) (taking
      official notice of pay tables that were published online); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.64, there
      is no indication in that order or its appendix that the FAA will apply the
      procedures set forth in FAA AB Order 1110.125a to investigations that do not
      involve allegations of harassment and a hostile work environment, see Order
      1600.38F      (Mar.     15,     2010),       https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/
      media/Order/1600.38F.pdf (last visited January 6, 2022).
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¶18         Even assuming that FAA AB Order 1110.125a did apply to the investigation
      in question, its provisions do not support the appellant’s contentions.         The
      provisions regarding making a “determination” before an investigation is
      completed address how a respondent, i.e., the individual against whom an
      allegation is made, is to be notified of the allegations against him and merely
      instructs supervisors not to make statements that imply judgment or culpability,
      assess the merits of the allegations, or make a “determination” about the
      respondent’s conduct until the conclusion of the appropriate inquiry. IAF, Tab 8
      at 59, 65.     There is no suggestion in FAA AB Order 1110.125a that the
      “determination” in question relates to a decision to propose or take disciplinary
      action.   There also is no indication in the record, and the appellant does not
      allege, that a supervisor failed to maintain such neutrality in notifying him of the
      nature of the allegations against him. Thus, we find that he has shown no error in
      this regard nor has he shown that the agency likely would have reached a
      different result in the absence or cure of such error.
¶19         The appellant further alleges that the agency committed harmful error when
      it violated the requirement in FAA AB Order 1110.125a that the Accountable
      Official coordinate with the designated HR POC when choosing an investigator,
      deciding whether to conduct an internal inquiry or a formal security investigation,
      and engaging in other phases of the Accountability Board process.        PFR File,
      Tab 4 at 18-19.    The appellant asserts that, although the Accountable Official
      conferred with other human resources officials, he did not coordinate with the
      HR POC.      Id. at 18.   The appellant contends that this error resulted in harm
      because “having a second set of eyes” on the Accountable Official’s activities
      likely would have prevented many of the errors he allegedly committed in
      investigating and resolving the matter, including the alleged harmful errors set
      forth above. Id. at 19. The appellant also contends that the agency committed
      harmful error when it selected investigators who were not Special Agents with the
      Office of Civil Aviation Security Operations. Id. at 20-21.
                                                                                      13

¶20        We agree with the appellant that, under FAA AB Order 1110.125a, during
      all phases of the Accountability Board process, including the reporting of an
      allegation, interviewing a reporting party, and reviewing the facts of the case and
      determining whether to take corrective or disciplinary action, coordination with
      the HR POC is required. IAF, Tab 8 at 62. We also agree with the appellant that,
      after the Accountable Official notifies the Accountability Board Coordinator that
      an allegation warrants formal investigation, the Accountability Board Coordinator
      will refer requests for investigation to the Accountability Board Investigations
      Program Manager, “who will assign the allegation to the Office of Civil Aviation
      Security Operations or appropriate regional or center Civil Aviation Security
      Division.” Id. at 67. Here, even assuming that the agency failed to follow these
      requirements, the appellant has not shown that any such error likely caused the
      agency to reach a conclusion different from the one it wou ld have reached in the
      absence or cure of the error. See Leftridge v. U.S. Postal Service, 56 M.S.P.R.
      340, 344-45 (1993). The appellant does not, for example, identify on review any
      testimony from the HR POC as to how that individual would have acted if
      coordination had taken place or any testimony or other evidence showing that the
      agency likely would have reached a different result if the investigation had been
      assigned to a Special Agent. Thus, we agree with the administrative judge that
      the appellant has not proven his harmful error allegation.

      The appellant has not proven a due process violation .
¶21        The appellant asserts that the agency denied him a meaningful opportunity
      to respond to the proposal notice and thereby violated his due process rights,
      when it “fail[ed] to disclose materials in its possession that would allow
      Petitioner to defend himself against the specifications.” PFR File, Tab 4 at 22.
      In apparent support of this argument, the appellant contends that the
      administrative judge improperly denied as untimely filed his motion to compel
      the production of certain documents. Id. at 23-24.
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¶22        The essential requirements of constitutional due process for a tenured public
      employee are notice of the charges against him, an explanation of the evidence,
      and an opportunity for him to present his account of events.         Henderson v.
      Department of Veterans Affairs, 123 M.S.P.R. 536, ¶ 11 (2016).            Here, as
      required by 5 C.F.R. § 752.404(b)(1), the agency indicated in its proposal notice
      that it had attached the material it relied upon to support the proposed action.
      IAF, Tab 5 at 132.     The proposal notice listed 26 attachments that included,
      among other things, an investigative report, an investigative summary, multiple
      interviews with witnesses, along with relevant emails, and two AB case reports.
      Id. at 132-33. The appellant filed a 17-page reply to the proposal notice that
      addressed each of the agency’s 12 specifications in detail, along with 15 exhibits
      comprising over 100 additional pages. IAF, Tab 5 at 4-127. The appellant does
      not allege on review, and it does not appear from his attorney’s response to the
      proposal notice, that he did not understand the agency’s charge. As found by the
      administrative judge below, the appellant has not identified any material actually
      considered by the deciding official that he did not receive, other than generally
      alleging that the agency “fail[ed] to disclose materials in its possession.”    ID
      at 33. Thus, we find that he received sufficient notice to enable him to make a
      meaningful reply.   See Alvarado v. Department of the Air Force, 97 M.S.P.R.
      389, ¶¶ 8-13 (2004). Moreover, the appellant has shown no error in the denial of
      his motions to compel as untimely filed. E.g., IAF, Tab 21 at 4, 32, 39, 47, 87,
      108; see also 5 C.F.R. § 1201.73(d)(3).

      The appellant has not shown that the administrative judge erred when he found
      that the appellant did not prove that his disclosures were a contributing factor in
      the removal action.
¶23        The appellant asserts that, contrary to the findings of the administrative
      judge, the deciding official knew of his disclosures before he effected the removal
      action. PFR File, Tab 4 at 25. In this regard, the appellant contends that an
      investigator uncovered allegations that the deciding official “steered” $3 million
                                                                                       15

      to a contractor to do a special study before the requirements of the study had been
      identified, and the appellant notified the deciding official in his response to the
      proposal notice that he was being retaliated against “due to his knowledge of
      widespread fraud, waste, and abuse within the FAA” and that he had “notified his
      supervisors and congressional sources of these issues.” Id. The appellant further
      contends that witnesses at the hearing testified that the appellant reported his
      “concern” to his superiors, including the deciding official. Id.
¶24        The administrative judge found that the appellant did not claim that he
      notified the deciding official of illegal conduct, gross mismanagement, a gross
      waste of funds, or any other whistleblowing communication.          ID at 38.   The
      administrative judge also found that the deciding official testified in a pat ient,
      calm, and sincere manner and “presented the affect of one seeking to achieve the
      right result for the right reason without motive to retaliate.” ID at 38. Thus, the
      administrative judge credited the deciding official’s testimony that he did not
      know that the appellant made protected disclosures to him or to any other
      authority and found that the appellant did not prove by preponderant evidence
      that his disclosures were a contributing factor in his removal . ID at 38-39.
¶25        As set forth above, the Board must defer to an administrative judge’s
      credibility determinations when they are based, explicitly or implicitly, on
      observing the demeanor of witnesses testifying at a hearing; the Board may
      overturn such determinations only when it has “sufficiently so und” reasons for
      doing so. Haebe, 288 F.3d at 1301 . Here, the administrative judge explicitly
      relied upon the deciding official’s demeanor in finding that he was not aware of
      the appellant’s disclosures when he took the removal action. The appellant has
      not set forth sufficiently sound reasons for overtu rning the administrative judge’s
      credibility determination. Although the appellant contends that an investigator
      uncovered alleged wrongdoing by the deciding official, this does not establish
      that the deciding official was aware of the appellant’s disclos ures. Further, the
      appellant’s general assertion in his response to the proposal notice that he was
                                                                                           16

      being retaliated against due to his “knowledge” of fraud, waste, and abuse, and
      that he notified his supervisors and congressional sources of “these issues ,” IAF,
      Tab 5 at 6, does not establish knowledge by the deciding official of any of the
      particular disclosures found to be protected in this case. Moreover, the appellant
      has not described the testimony in question of the witnesses he refers to on
      review nor has he shown that any such testimony establishes a basis for reversing
      the administrative judge’s decision. PFR File, Tab 4 at 25. Finally, the appellant
      has not identified any agency authority that required the deciding official to
      recuse himself from deciding the appellant’s case. Id. at 27. Thus, we find that
      the appellant has shown no basis for disturbing the administrative judge’s
      determination that he did not prove reprisal for whistleblowing.

      The appellant has not shown that the administrative judge erred when he found
      that the penalty of removal was reasonable.
¶26         The appellant asserts that the penalty is unreasonable because the
      administrative judge improperly sustained certain specifications. PFR File, Tab 4
      at 31-32.   As set forth above, however, the appellant has not shown that the
      administrative judge erred in sustaining those spe cifications. Thus, he has shown
      no basis for disturbing the administrative judge’s findings regarding the penalty.
¶27         Accordingly, we deny the appellant’s petition for review and affirm the
      initial decision’s determination to sustain the appellant’s removal.

                               NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 3
            You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By
      statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such
      review and the appropriate forum with which to file.              5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).
      Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit
      Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most

      3
        Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
      the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
      Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                      17

appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a
statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their
jurisdiction.   If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should
immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all
filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time
limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.
      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.               5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit   your   petition   to   the   court    at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
                                                                                    18

for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or   EEOC     review   of   cases     involving    a   claim   of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.     5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017).              If you have a
representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before
you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days
after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling
condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and
to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
                                                                                     19

with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                  P.O. Box 77960
                             Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant     to   the   Whistleblower       Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section
2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),
(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of
competent jurisdiction. 4   The court of appeals must receive your petition for

4
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115 -195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                                20

review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.           5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                             U.S. Court of Appeals
                             for the Federal Circuit
                            717 Madison Place, N.W.
                            Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor wa rrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                            /s/ for
                                          Jennifer Everling
                                          Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.