Court Opinion

ID: 9518690
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 00:59:01.854899+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:29:49.028595
License: Public Domain

N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.
¶ 27. (dissenting). I cannot join the majority's opinion because I disagree that failure to comply with Wis. Stat. § 655.44(5) does not necessitate dismissal. The majority acknowledges that Ocasio failed to comply with § 655.44(5), but then concludes that the statute is silent as to the appropriate remedy, requiring the court to look to the purpose of the statute and previous interpretations given other timing provisions in ch. 655.1 respectfully dissent because this analysis is wholly unnecessary. The language in § 655.44(5) unambiguously states, "no court action may *377be commenced" unless two conditions are satisfied. I find this language unambiguous and instructive regarding the appropriate remedy for failure to comply with the statute. Failure to comply with § 655.44(5) necessitates dismissal since a statutory condition precedent was not met.
¶ 28. The majority first turns to the purpose of the medical malpractice mediation system and states that ch. 655 is intended to provide claimants with an "informal, inexpensive, and expedient means for resolving disputes." Majority op. at ¶ 14 (citing Wis. Stat. § 655.42(1)). After examining case law interpreting various sections of ch. 655, the majority then concludes, "in the absence of language expressly mandating the remedy of dismissal, we are unwilling to read into [§ 655.44(5)] the requirement of such a harsh remedy for noncompliance with this mediation provision." Id. at ¶ 23.1 agree with the objectives and purpose of ch. 655. I disagree, however, that § 655.44(5) does not expressly mandate the remedy of dismissal for noncompliance. Furthermore, I conclude that mandating dismissal for failure to comply with § 655.44(5) is consistent with the purpose of ch. 655.
¶ 29. The majority needs to look no further than the statute itself to determine that Wis. Stat. § 655.44(5) mandates that Ocasio's medical malpractice cause of action must be dismissed. Wisconsin Stat. § 655.44(5) states: "Except as provided in s. 655.445, no court action may be commenced unless a request for mediation has been filed under this section and until the expiration of the mediation period under s. 655.465(7)." (Emphasis added). It is undisputed that Ocasio did not follow the statutory requirements because she filed the summons and complaint 83 days before the mediation period expired. To determine the appropriate remedy for noncompliance, therefore, we *378need simply to interpret the meaning of this language: "no court action may be commenced."
¶ 30. By holding that Ocasio's lawsuit does not necessitate dismissal, the majority apparently concludes that the statutory language, "no court action may be commenced," is directory rather than mandatory. I disagree. Although the statute uses the word "may," which often indicates directory language, here it is coupled with "no." Using "may" in a negative sense— such as "may not" — makes the statute mandatory. For example, in Brookhouse v. State Farm Mutual Insurance, 130 Wis. 2d 166, 170, 387 N.W.2d 82 (Ct. App. 1986), the court of appeals concluded that the statutory language "may not be enlarged" is mandatory.
The distinction is not between "shall" and "may" but between "may" and "may not." "May not" is a negative term. Where statutory restrictions are couched in negative terms, they are usually held to be mandatory. Negative words in a grant of power should never be construed as directory... . Thus, where the statute says that the time for motions after verdict may not be enlarged, these are negative words regarding the grant of power. We hold that the language is mandatory.
(Citations omitted.)
¶ 31. This case presents a similar question and accordingly, I conclude that "no court action may be commenced" is mandatory. When statutory language is unambiguous, the court's duty is to give that language its ordinary meaning. Gauger v. Mueller, 149 Wis. 2d 737, 740, 439 N.W.2d 637 (Ct. App 1989). Section 655.44(5) is unambiguous and means exactly what it states. Acting under the statute at issue, Ocasio may not commence a court action until the mediation period has expired. The unambiguous language in § 655.44(5) *379prohibits the commencement of Ocasio's court action here; thus, failure to comply with the statute necessitates dismissal.1
¶ 32. I find further support for this conclusion because the plain language of Wis. Stat. § 655.44(5) creates a condition precedent, which, when not complied with, means that the cause of action has not been properly commenced. "If an action may not be brought except upon the happening of an event, then the occurrence of that event is a condition precedent to the commencement of the action." Siemering v. Siemering, 95 Wis. 2d 111, 114, 288 N.W.2d 881 (Ct. App. 1980). The plain language in § 655.44(5) states that a cause of action may not be brought except upon the expiration of the mediation period under § 655.465(7). Expiration of the mediation period, therefore, is a condition precedent and a suit filed prematurely is void because of the failure to comply with the condition precedent.
¶ 33. Applied here, Ocasio failed to comply with the condition precedent in Wis. Stat. § 655.44(5); thus, the circuit court did not have competency to hear the case.2 See Colby v. Columbia County, 202 Wis. 2d 342, 362, 550 N.W.2d 124 (1996) ("A cause of action is not *380properly commenced when a plaintiff prematurely files a summons and complaint. ... "); McMillan-Warner Mut. Ins. v. Kauffman, 159 Wis. 2d 588, 594, 465 N.W.2d 201 (Ct. App. 1990) (noting that the court has "competency to act when a properly subscribed summons and complaint is filed with the court.").3 I conclude, therefore, that the circuit court properly dismissed Ocasio's medical malpractice claim since the circuit court lacked competency to proceed with the matter.
¶ 34. Contrary to the majority's approach, I further conclude that mandating dismissal for failure to comply with Wis. Stat. § 655.44(5) is consistent with the purpose of the medical malpractice mediation system. The majority claims that dismissal is a harsh penalty in a system where procedures are intended to be informal and flexible. Majority op. at ¶ 21. Again, I disagree.
¶ 35. In establishing the mediation system in ch. 655, the legislature provided for flexibility by creating *381two options for commencing a medical malpractice case. See Eby v. Kozarek, 153 Wis. 2d 75, 82, 450 N.W.2d 249 (1990) (describing the current statutory scheme as "two alternatives for pursuing redress"); Seaquist v. Physicians Ins. Co., 192 Wis. 2d 530, 541, 531 N.W.2d 437 (Ct. App. 1995) ("A claimant must choose one of two ways of participating in the mediation system."). First, under Wis. Stat. § 655.445 a plaintiff can initially file a claim in court and then within fifteen days file a request for mediation. Second, under § 655.44, which Ocasio relied on, a plaintiff can initially request mediation and then, after the mediation period has expired, file a claim in court. These two procedures are clearly written in the statutes to provide the flexibility that the legislature intended for medical malpractice cases. The majority's decision here unnecessarily bends those procedures to allow for further options that are contrary to the unambiguous language of § 655.44.
¶ 36. Finally, mandating dismissal for failure to comply with the condition precedent in Wis. Stat. § 655.44(5) is consistent with the legislature's intent of having a "cooling off' period. Chapter 655 provides that during the mediation period, the statutes of limitations are tolled, and furthermore, no discovery, pretrial conference, or scheduling conference is to take place until the mediation period expires. Wis. Stat. § 655.445(2) and (3). Moreover, this court discussed the mediation period in Schulz v. Nienhuis, 152 Wis. 2d 434, 448 N.W.2d 655 (1989). Now Chief Justice Abrahamson, writing for a unanimous court, described the mediation period:
Section 655.445(3) provides that "no trial, pretrial conference or scheduling conference may be held until the expiration of the mediation period under sec. 655.465(7)." Thus litigation cannot proceed until the statutory mediation period ends. The prohibition on *382pretrial activities applies to the entire 90-day period. No provision is made for allowing parties who complete the mediation session before the statutory mediation period expires to proceed to trial. The period for mediation under the statutes therefore seems to he a statutory "cooling off' period, apparently unrelated to whether a mediation session occurs during that period.
152 Wis. 2d at 441 (emphasis added). I acknowledge that Schulz was addressing the procedure in § 655.445, rather than § 655.44(5). Nonetheless, the purpose of the mediation period — to allow the parties to "cool off' — applies to both statutes. The legislature intended that litigation neither be initiated nor proceed during the mediation period. Consequently, the circuit court appropriately dismissed Ocasio's claim for failure to follow that statutory mandate.
¶ 37. In conclusion, ch. 655 unambiguously and explicitly provides two options for commencement of a medical malpractice claim. Ocasio did not follow either. Her actions were contrary to the unambiguous language in Wis. Stat. § 655.44(5). I agree with the circuit court and the court of appeals, therefore, that her failure to comply with § 655.44(5) mandates dismissal of her medical malpractice claim since the circuit court lacked competency to hear the case. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
¶ 38. I am authorized to state that Justice DIANE S. SYKES joins this dissent.

 This interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 655.44(5) is consistent with this court's previous decision in Eby v. Kozarek, 153 Wis. 2d 75, 82, 450 N.W.2d 249 (1990). In that case, Justice Bablitch, writing for a unanimous court, cited § 655.44(5) and stated: "Once the request [for mediation] has been filed, the patient may not commence a court action until the mediation period under sec. 655.465(7) has expired."

 The court of appeals correctly noted that the terms "competence" and "jurisdiction" are not synonymous. Ocasio v. Froedtert Memorial Lutheran Hospital, 2001 WI App 264, ¶ 1 n.2, 248 Wis. 2d 932, 637 N.W.2d 459. In Figgs v. City of Milwaukee, 121 Wis. 2d 44, 51-52 n.6, 357 N.W.2d 548 (1984), this court specifically discussed the difference:
*380[W]e point out that this court has stated that [] statutory conditions or conditions precedent have nothing to do with subject matter jurisdiction of a circuit court. They deal only with the appropriate conditions set by the legislature as a prerequisite for commencing or maintaining an action. Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred on the circuit courts by the constitution. Whether or not a proper claim has been filed, the circuit court has jurisdiction of the subject matter.
(Internal citations omitted). Several years later this court revisited that language with approval in Gillen v. City of Neenah, 219 Wis. 2d 806, 824-825, 580 N.W.2d 628 (1998).

 As the court of appeals in this case noted, the condition precedent in Wis. Stat. § 655.44(5) is analogous to notice of claim statutes. Ocasio, 2001 WI App 264, ¶ 16 (analogizing to § 893.80 where failure of a plaintiff to give notice within the statutory time period results in the party losing the right to proceed).