Court Opinion

ID: 9889692
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-11 06:09:30.555848+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:48:08.369249
License: Public Domain

Affirmed as Modified and Opinion Filed September 26, 2023

                                       In The
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                No. 05-22-00259-CR

                         ANTHONY LEE, Appellant
                                   V.
                       THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

               On Appeal from the 363rd Judicial District Court
                            Dallas County, Texas
                    Trial Court Cause No. F-1976845-W

                        MEMORANDUM OPINION
               Before Justices Partida-Kipness, Reichek, and Miskel
                            Opinion by Justice Miskel
      Anthony Lee appeals the trial court’s judgment convicting him of murder with

a deadly weapon, enhanced by a prior felony conviction for aggravated robbery. See

TEX. PENAL CODE § 19.02. The jury found Lee guilty and the enhancement true,

and it assessed punishment at life in prison.

      Lee raises one issue on appeal, arguing that his sentence is grossly

disproportionate to the offense in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United

States Constitution and Article I, Section 13 of the Texas Constitution because he

was severely mentally impaired. We conclude that Lee did not preserve this issue
for appellate review. Even if he had preserved it, we conclude that Lee’s sentence

was not unconstitutional. In addition, the judgment contains errors that we may

correct on appeal. We affirm the trial court’s judgment as modified.

I.    Failure to Preserve Eighth Amendment and Article I, Section 13 Claims
      The record must show that appellant made a timely request, objection, or

motion to the trial court for error to be preserved on appeal, subject to two narrow

exceptions for absolute rights or waivable-only rights not at issue here. See TEX. R.

APP. P. 33.1(a)(1); Garza v. State, 435 S.W.3d 258, 260–61 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).

      Constitutional rights, including the right to be free from cruel and unusual

punishment, may be forfeited. See Ware v. State, No. 05-22-00302-CR, 2023 WL

1431422, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 1, 2023, no pet. h.) (mem. op., not

designated for publication) (holding that appellant failed to preserve claims under

Eighth Amendment and Article I, Section 13 of Texas Constitution); Castaneda v.

State, 135 S.W.3d 719, 723 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003) (no pet.) (holding that

appellant failed to preserve Eighth Amendment claim); see also Rhoades v. State,

934 S.W.2d 113, 120 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (holding that appellant forfeited claim

under Article I, Section 13 of Texas Constitution).

      Lee did not object that his sentence was grossly disproportionate to his offense

or that it violated the Eighth Amendment or Article I, Section 13 of the Texas

Constitution either at his punishment hearing in the trial court or in his motion for a

                                         –2–
new trial. Consequently, we conclude that Lee failed to preserve this argument for

appellate review.

         II.     No Violation of Eighth Amendment or Article I, Section 13
        Even if Lee had preserved his claims under the Eighth Amendment or Article

I, Section 13 of the Texas Constitution on appeal, we conclude that his sentence is

not grossly disproportionate to his offense.1

        A.      Applicable Law
        The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has long held that a sentence within the

statutory range of punishment generally is not cruel and unusual under the Eighth

Amendment or the Texas Constitution. See State v. Simpson, 488 S.W.3d 318, 323

(Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (reviewing Eighth Amendment claim); Samuel v. State, 477

S.W.2d 611, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972) (reviewing claims under both federal and

state constitutions); Lambright v. State, 318 S.W.2d 653, 653 (Tex. Crim. App.

1958) (reviewing claim under Article I, Section 13 of the Texas Constitution).

        The punishment range for murder as enhanced by a prior felony conviction is

confinement in prison for any term of life, or not more than 99 years or less than 15

years, and a fine not to exceed $10,000. See TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 12.42(c), 19.02.

    1
      We do not address Lee’s challenge under Article I, Section 13 of the Texas Constitution separately in
detail because “the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has concluded there is no significant difference
between the protections afforded” by the state and federal constitutions with respect to cruel and unusual
punishment. Forbit v. State, No. 05-19-00946-CR, 2021 WL 1884655, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 11,
2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing, inter alia, Cantu v. State, 939 S.W.2d 627,
645 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)).
                                                    –3–
In the present case, the jury returned a punishment of life in prison, which was within

the statutory range for Lee’s offense.

      Although the concept of proportionate punishment is embodied in the Eighth

Amendment, this narrow principle does not require strict proportionality between

the crime and the sentence. Simpson, 488 S.W.3d at 322. It forbids only extreme

sentences that are “grossly disproportionate” to the crime. Id. (citing Ewing v.

California, 538 U.S. 11, 23 (2003) (plurality opinion)). A sentence is grossly

disproportionate to the crime only in the exceedingly rare or extreme case. Id. at

322–23 (citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 73 (2003)).

      To determine whether a sentence for a term of years, including a life sentence,

is grossly disproportionate to the crime, the court must conduct a threshold

comparison of the gravity of the offense and the severity of the sentence. Graham

v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 60 (2010). In making this comparison, we must judge (1)

the severity of the sentence in light of the harm caused or threatened to the victim,

(2) the culpability of the offender, and (3) the offender’s prior adjudicated and

unadjudicated offenses. Simpson, 488 S.W.3d at 323. In the rare case in which this

threshold comparison leads to an inference of gross proportionality, we then

compare the defendant’s sentence with the sentences received by other offenders in

the same jurisdiction and with the sentences imposed for the same crime in other

jurisdictions. Id. (citing Graham, 560 U.S. at 60). If this comparison validates an

                                         –4–
initial judgment that the sentence is grossly disproportionate, then the sentence is

cruel and unusual. Id.

      B.     Lee’s sentence is not grossly disproportionate to the offense.
      We begin with the threshold analysis. The record in this case shows that Lee

was found guilty of murdering a member of his sister’s household by shooting him

in the head from behind while he was dozing on the couch. In the course of this

murder, Lee also shot his brother-in-law multiple times and thought he also had

killed him, although his brother-in-law survived this attack. The severity of Lee’s

sentence correlates with the harm caused to the victim.

      Lee argues that his history of mental illness, which was known to his family

to some degree, diminishes his culpability. However, Texas courts reviewing Eighth

Amendment claims have rejected similar arguments and upheld sentences within the

statutory punishment range despite claims that the defendant suffered from a mental

illness. See Wilson v. State, No. 05-07-01517-CR, 2008 WL 4966829, at *1 (Tex.

App.—Dallas Nov. 24, 2008, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (holding that

the appellant’s life sentence for murder was not cruel and unusual punishment

because she may have suffered from a mental illness); Quick v. State, 557 S.W.3d

775, 789 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.], pet. ref’d) (rejecting defendant’s

argument that his mental illness lessened his moral culpability where no expert

testified that the appellant’s mental illness caused him to commit the crimes, and the

record did not contain evidence that appellant did not understand his actions were

                                         –5–
wrong); see also Mays v. State, 318 S.W.3d 368, 379–80 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010)

(stating that appellant convicted of capital murder failed to show “[his mental]

impairment was so severe that he is necessarily and categorically less morally

culpable than those who are not mentally ill” and rejecting appellant’s argument that

his execution would violate the Eighth Amendment).

      In the present case, a similar lack of expert evidence exists regarding the

details of Lee’s mental illness and medications or any impact of his illness on his

understanding of, and culpability for, his crime. Before trial, the trial court ordered

that Lee be examined to determine if he was competent to stand trial and if he was a

person with mental illness. The record shows that a licensed psychologist evaluated

Lee and found him competent to stand trial. She further found that he did not exhibit

signs of a severe psychiatric disorder at that time and did not have an identifiable

mental illness that interfered with competency-related capacities. The record also

indicates that Lee had a history of drug use (marijuana and PCP). Although Lee

testified during the punishment phase of the trial that he began to receive counseling

and take medications for depression and schizophrenia intermittently and was

homeless at times, he fails to show he was less morally culpable for his offenses than

a person who is not mentally ill.

      Finally, the record contains evidence of several prior adjudicated and

unadjudicated offenses committed by Lee, including a felony conviction for

aggravated robbery, a high school incident in which Lee groped a female classmate,

                                         –6–
a parole violation for assaulting his girlfriend, and a DWI case pending at the time

of trial in which a police officer found Lee intoxicated inside his car in a parking lot.

      After comparing the gravity of Lee’s offense and the severity of his sentence

in light of the harm to the victims, considerations relating to Lee’s moral culpability,

and his prior adjudicated and unadjudicated offenses, we find that this threshold

comparison does not lead to an inference of a grossly disproportionate punishment.

Consequently, we need not engage in the comparative sentencing required by the

final step of this analysis. We overrule Lee’s sole issue on appeal.

                          III.   Modification of Judgment
      Although neither party raises the issue, we observe that the judgment

incorrectly states that there was neither an enhancement paragraph nor a finding by

the jury on the enhancement paragraph. However, the record shows that the State

filed a notice of intent to enhance Lee’s punishment range with a prior felony

conviction for aggravated robbery. The record also shows that Lee pleaded true to

the enhancement during the punishment hearing, and the jury found the enhancement

true. An appellate court has the authority to modify an incorrect judgment to make

the record speak the truth when it has the necessary information to do so. See TEX.

R. APP. P. 43.2(b); French v. State, 830 S.W.2d 607, 609 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)

(adopting the reasoning in Asberry v. State, 813 S.W.2d 526, 529–30 (Tex. App.—

Dallas 1991, pet. ref’d) (en banc)).

      We conclude the trial court’s final judgment should be modified as follows:

                                          –7–
      (1)   “1st Enhancement Paragraph: N/A” is modified to read “1st
            Enhancement Paragraph: True”; and

      (2)   “Finding on 1st Enhancement Paragraph: N/A” is modified to
            read “Finding on 1st Enhancement Paragraph: True.”

                                 IV.   Conclusion
      Lee’s life sentence does not violate the prohibition against cruel and unusual

punishment under the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution or

Article I, Section 13 of the Texas Constitution. We affirm the trial court’s judgment

as modified.

                                           /Emily Miskel/
220259f.p05                                EMILY MISKEL
                                           JUSTICE

                                        –8–
                           Court of Appeals
                    Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                 JUDGMENT

ANTHONY LEE, Appellant                       On Appeal from the 363rd Judicial
                                             District Court, Dallas County, Texas
No. 05-22-00259-CR          V.               Trial Court Cause No. F-1976845-W.
                                             Opinion delivered by Justice Miskel.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee                 Justices Partida-Kipness and Reichek
                                             participating.

   Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
MODIFIED as follows:

      (1)   “1st Enhancement Paragraph: N/A” is modified to read “1st
            Enhancement Paragraph: True”; and

      (2)   “Finding on 1st Enhancement Paragraph: N/A” is modified to
            read “Finding on 1st Enhancement Paragraph: True.”

As REFORMED, the judgment is AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered this 26th day of September, 2023.

                                       –9–