Court Opinion

ID: 9927214
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-26 16:00:55.265529+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:05.319361
License: Public Domain

22-1780
     Abdalla v. United States

                                UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                        SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

 1          At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at
 2   the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
 3   on the 26th day of January, two thousand twenty-four.
 4
 5   PRESENT:
 6               JOHN M. WALKER, JR.,
 7               SUSAN L. CARNEY,
 8               MICHAEL H. PARK,
 9                     Circuit Judges.
10   _______________________________________
11
12   Ibrahim Akasha Abdalla,
13
14                               Petitioner-Appellant,
15
16                      v.                                           22-1780
17
18   United States of America,
19
20                     Respondent-Appellee.
21   _______________________________________
22
23   FOR PETITIONER-APPELLANT:                                D. CRAIG HUGHES, Houston, Texas
24
25   FOR RESPONDENT-APPELLEE:                                 JASON RICHMAN, Assistant United
26                                                            States Attorney, (Hagan Scotten,
27                                                            Assistant United States Attorney, on
28                                                            the brief ) for Damian Williams,
29                                                            United States Attorney for the
30                                                            Southern District of New York
31
 1          Appeal from an order of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New

 2   York (Marrero, J.).

 3          UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

 4   DECREED that the order of the district court is VACATED, and the case is REMANDED.

 5          Ibrahim Akasha Abdalla appeals the denial of his motion to vacate his sentence.          We

 6   assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal, which we

 7   discuss only as required to explain our decision.

 8          Abdalla pleaded guilty to six counts arising out of an international heroin and

 9   methamphetamine importation conspiracy.             Under his October 2018 plea agreement, the

10   stipulated Guidelines range was life imprisonment, and both the government and probation

11   recommended that a life sentence be imposed.        Pointing to both the 300-month sentence given to

12   Abdalla’s codefendant (whom the district court considered more culpable) and Abdalla’s role as a

13   willing lieutenant in the scheme, the district court varied downward and imposed a sentence of

14   276 months’ imprisonment.       We affirmed.            See generally United States v. Abdalla, 839

15   F. App’x 656 (2d Cir. 2021) (discussing the background of the case on direct appeal).

16          Abdalla then filed a motion seeking to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.     In his

17   motion, Abdalla argued that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to timely

18   communicate an initial plea offer issued in August 2018—two months before a different offer,

19   which he ultimately accepted.    See Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134 (2012).        Under the earlier

20   offer, Abdalla would have pleaded guilty to only two counts, not six, yielding a stipulated

21   Guidelines range of 262–327 months instead of the life range specified in the accepted offer.

22   Abdalla submitted a sworn declaration stating that, had his former counsel timely informed him of

23   the August offer, he would have accepted it.

                                                         2
 1           The district court denied Abdalla’s motion without an evidentiary hearing, reasoning that

 2   Abdalla would not have been prejudiced by his counsel’s alleged failure to timely communicate

 3   the earlier plea offer.   The district court stated that Abdalla could not show prejudice primarily

 4   because (1) he ultimately received a sentence within the Guidelines range of the unaccepted plea,

 5   and (2) he received concurrent (rather than consecutive) sentences on the counts contained only in

 6   the accepted plea.   We initially granted Abdalla a certificate of appealability, and we now vacate

 7   and remand.

 8           We review a district court’s denial of an evidentiary hearing on a § 2255 motion for abuse

 9   of discretion.   Gonzalez v. United States, 722 F.3d 118, 131 (2d Cir. 2013).        An evidentiary

10   hearing is required if a § 2255 movant can show a “plausible” claim to relief, which is not the same

11   as demonstrating he will ultimately prevail; a hearing is properly denied only if the record

12   “conclusively show[s]” that the prisoner is entitled to no relief. Puglisi v. United States, 586 F.3d

13   209, 213 (2d Cir. 2009); see 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b).        To demonstrate prejudice under Frye, a

14   prisoner must “demonstrate a reasonable probability” that (1) he “would have accepted the earlier

15   plea offer” if counsel had communicated it, (2) “the plea would have been entered without the

16   prosecution canceling it or the trial court refusing to accept it,” and (3) “the end result of the

17   criminal process would have been more favorable by reason of a plea to a lesser charge or a

18   sentence of less prison time.” 566 U.S. at 147.

19           The district court never solicited an affidavit or testimony from Abdalla’s trial counsel as

20   to whether Abdalla was given the opportunity to accept the government’s initial offer.      Abdalla

21   submitted an affidavit stating that he was not given that opportunity.    Unlike when a defendant

22   proceeds to trial, Abdalla’s acceptance of the later offer tends to corroborate his affidavit.   See

23   Puglisi, 586 F.3d at 215 (noting that a petitioner may make out a prima facie case that he would

                                                       3
 1   have accepted a plea offer through his “own sworn statement if it is credible in light of all the

 2   relevant circumstances”).      Neither the government nor the district court offered any reason to

 3   believe that, had Abdalla accepted the first offer, it would not have been accepted by the district

 4   court.

 5              Finally, the record does not “conclusively show” that Abdalla suffered no prejudice as a

 6   result of his pleading guilty under the terms of the second offer, for two reasons.        First, the

 7   stipulated Guidelines range went from 262 to 327 months’ imprisonment in the first offer to life

 8   in the second offer, and both the government and the Probation Office recommended a sentence

 9   of life.    In light of the importance of a proper Guidelines calculation as the starting point for

10   sentencing, we cannot be certain that the increased Guidelines range in the second offer had no

11   effect on the district court’s chosen sentence.    Second, the government made frequent reference

12   at Abdalla’s sentencing hearing to conduct encompassed by charges included only in the second

13   offer.     The government’s discussion of this conduct may well have been more persuasive because

14   Abdalla had pleaded guilty to the additional charges.

15              For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Abdalla has met his initial burden of showing

16   a plausible claim to relief and that the district court should have sought a sworn statement from his

17   trial counsel and, if necessary, held an evidentiary hearing on Abdalla’s claims.     See Gonzalez,

18   722 F.3d at 131.      We express no opinion on the merits of Abdalla’s claims.   The district court’s

19   order is VACATED, and the case is REMANDED.

20                                                   FOR THE COURT:
21                                                   Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
22

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