Court Opinion

ID: 9647689
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 13:47:20.663787+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:52.105426
License: Public Domain

Mr. Chief Justice Bevilacqua,
dissenting. The majority today, consistent with its recent opinion in State v. Delahunt, 121 R.I. 565, 401 A.2d 1261 (1979), that the right to counsel attaches only to postindictment corporeal lineups, holds that the attendance of counsel is not required at *238postindictment photographic viewing and identification procedures. Any federal constitutional claim to the assistance of counsel at photographc displays has been specifically rejected by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 93 S. Ct. 2568, 37 L.Ed.2d 619 (1973). This court, however, remains free to adopt a higher standard of protection under appropriate provisions of our state constitution. See State v. Maloof, 114 R.I. 380, 389, 333 A.2d 676, 681 (1975). Because of the serious deprivation of liberty that may result from a mistaken identification, I would require the presence of counsel at postindictment photographic displays under article I, section 10, of the Rhode Island Constitution.
I make this conclusion because of my belief that, as a practical matter no difference exists between the inherent dangers of mistaken identification in an uncounseled post-indictment corporeal lineup and a photographic display conducted at the postindictment stage. The general process of eyewitness identification is particularly vulnerable to a number of facts that may ultimately affect the accused’s right to a fair trial. See United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. at 329, 93 S. Ct. at 2583, 37 L.Ed.2d at 638 (Brennan, J., dissenting) citing United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 1933, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149, 1158 (1967). See also Criminal Procedure — Photo-Identifications—Stovall Prospectivity Rule Invoked to Avoid Extension of Right to Counsel, 43 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1019,1020 (1968). Coupled with the high risk of mistaken identification is the fact that “the witness thereafter is apt to retain in his memory the image of the photograph rather than of the person actually seen, reducing the trustworthiness of subsequent lineup or courtroom identifications.” Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 383-84, 88 S. Ct. 967, 971, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247, 1253 (1968). See also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. at 235-36, 87 S. Ct. at 1937, 18 L.Ed.2d at 1162 (accused’s fate can be largely determined at lineup).
*239Mistaken identification can result from unreliable eyewitness perception or memory, particularly where the witness has had slight opportunity for detailed observation during the crime. See United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. at 329, 93 S. Ct. at 2583, 37 L.Ed.2d at 638. Moreover, as the Wade court noted in the context of corporeal lineups “[a] major factor contributing to the high incidence of miscarriage of justice from mistaken identification has been the degree of suggestion inherent in the manner in which the prosecution presents the suspect to witnesses for pretrial identification.” 388 U.S. at 228, 87 S. Ct. at 1933, 18 L.Ed. 2d at 1158 (emphasis added). The potential for such influence, albeit unintentional, exists as well at a photographic display.
A witness under strong psychological pressure to make an identification may, due to various suggestive procedures, unconsciously allow the mug shot image to gain independent status in his mind and replace the true image of the criminal which was obtained during commission of the crime. See Comment, Photographic Identification: The Hidden Persuader, 56 Iowa L.Rev. 408, 412 (1970-71). Suggestion may also be initially communicated by the fact that the witness generally assumes he is being shown pictures of criminals. Wall, Eye-Witness Identification in Criminal Cases 82-83 (1963). The police may also prejudice the witness by impugning the subject’s character or by disclosing that the subject has been convicted of a crime similar to that viewed. See Comment, Photographic Identification: The Hidden Persuader, 56 Iowa L.Rev. at 409-11. Finally, when several witnesses make an identification in each other’s presence, there is a danger of undue influence. See 43 N.Y.U.L. Rev. at 1022. The victim of the crime may be especially vulnerable to these suggestive influences. See Lasker, Possible Procedural Safeguards Against Mistaken Identification By Eye Witnesses, 2 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 552, 554 (1955).
At trial, an accused attacking the fairness of a particular photographic display faces a serious hurdle in accurately reconstructing the manner and mode of that identification procedure. Because the defendant is usually absent from the *240display, any assertions of possible abuse must rest on mere allegations that can be summarily rejected by the police. This absence also hampers effective cross-examination of the witness making the identification. See 43 N.Y.U.L. Rev. at 1021.
Dennis J. Roberts II, Attorney General, Barry N. Capalbo, Special Assistant Attorney General, for plaintiff.
William F. Reilly, Public Defender, Stephen C. Bridge, Assistant Public Defender, for defendant.
The attendance of counsel at postindictment photographic displays does not compel defense counsel’s constant presence as the state assembles its case. A sharp distinction exists between photographic displays and other forms of pre-trial investigation. For example, any improper prosecutorial conduct during witness interviews can be flushed out by adequate cross-examination. Also, evidence obtained through a mechanical, scientific procedure can be tested and impeached on cross-examination despite defense counsel’s absence from the identification proceeding. See Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 267, 87 S. Ct. 1951, 1953-54, 18 L.Ed. 2d 1178, 1183 (1967) (handwriting exemplars).
In some instances, retention and display of photographs used may suffice to bring out the physical suggestiveness of a particular display. I believe, however, that the presence of counsel is required at postindictment photographic displays to detect the “myriad [of] almost imperceptible means of communication” such as an inflection and expression whereby law enforcement officials may influence the witnesses’ identification.2 See United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. at 334, 93 S. Ct. at 2586, 37 L.Ed.2d at 640 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

An examination of the record reveals that the photographic display at issue was conducted while the defendant Was in custody. Because a corporeal identification is considered more reliable than a photographic identification, see Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 386 n.6, 88 S. Ct. 967, 972 n.6, 19 L.Ed. 2d 1247, 1254 n.6 (1968), I would prohibit the use of postindictment photo identifications when a suspect is in custody.