Court Opinion

ID: 9704053
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:20:24.80081+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:55.614150
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE UNVERZAGT, dissenting: I agree the defendant was personally bound by the restrictive covenant, but I would not affirm the injunctive relief afforded by the trial court’s judgment because I find under the facts of this case, the plaintiff failed to properly exercise its option to renew and, thus I believe, defendant was bound by the covenant only until the end of the original five-year lease period; that is, until August 31,1981. The “lessor” at the time the lease was entered into was Olga Fiocchi as executrix of the estate of Frank Fiocchi. By the terms of clause 27, notice of the lessee’s intent to exercise its option to renew was required to be given to “Lessor (or its assigns) in writing on or before ninety (90) days prior to the expiration of the first five (5) year term ***.” (Emphasis added.) Although it is true, as plaintiff argues, that parties to a written contract may waive performance of a condition in a- contract that was inserted for their benefit (Fuchs v. Peterson (1925), 315 Ill. 370, 374-76), the fact remains that the notice provision was inserted for the benefit of Olga Fiocchi as well, and she did not waive the notice requirement. The original “lessor” was no longer in existence, the estate having been closed. Accordingly, notice was to be given in writing to “its assigns.” The assigns of the lessor were Nancy Majzel and Olga Fiocchi by definition; to-wit: an assign includes all those who take either immediately or remotely from an assignor whether by conveyance, devise, descent or act of law. Sauls v. Cox (1946), 394 Ill. 81, 88-89. Plaintiff’s president, Susan Stauffer, testified that in March of 1981, she heard rumors that a second beauty salon was to be open in the shopping center. She then called Olga Fiocchi, who advised her that the rumor was true. Stauffer testified she questioned Fiocchi: “ ‘But what about my lease, it reads that there cannot be another beauty salon.’ And she said, ‘You better get a hold of your lawyer.’ And that was the end of the conversation.” Stauffer also testified she did not notify Fiocchi that she was going to renew her lease with Majzel for another five-year term; the five-year “Extension of Lease” at $400 per month rental between plaintiff and Majzel was executed by Majzel on July 29, 1981. Without notice to Fiocchi, the effect of the restrictive covenant clause in the lease must be construed to mean that Majzel, as lessor under the second five-year lease, would not lease any of her other stores in the Old Elm Shops shopping center for the purpose of a beauty salon. It is established that an injunction is an exceptional remedy which is not granted as a matter of course, but with great caution and only when plaintiff’s right to such relief is clearly established. (Board of Education v. Eckmann (1982), 103 Ill. App. 3d 1127, 1130.) The grant or denial of an injunction is within the discretionary powers of the court, and its decision on the matter will not be reversed unless an abuse of discretion is shown. (Plasti-Drum Corp. v. Ferrell (1979), 70 Ill. App. 3d 441, 452.) Plaintiff here failed to give notice of its intent to exercise its option to renew to Olga Fiocchi who, as one of the lessor’s two assigns, was entitled to such notice under the terms of the plaintiff’s lease. Accordingly, defendant was bound by the terms of the restrictive covenant clause only until the expiration date of the original lease, August 31, 1981, and the trial court’s injunction restraining defendant’s use of the property until August 31, 1986, was, I believe, an abuse of its discretion. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court in entering the injunction should be reversed and the injunction order vacated. I therefore dissent from the majority opinion.