Court Opinion

ID: 9699832
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 20:53:21.188901+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:57.960053
License: Public Domain

McEWEN, Judge,
dissenting:
I most respectfully dissent from the majority opinion and, as well, differ with the views that have been otherwise expressed.
I cling to the view earlier expressed in a dissenting opinion in Leonard v. Harris Corporation, 290 Pa.Super. 370, 434 A.2d 798 (1981), that an employer may be joined as an *379additional defendant for the reason that the 1974 amendment to § 303 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act does not prohibit the joinder of an employer as an additional defendant in an action instituted by an employee against a third party defendant. Rather, § 303(b) of the Act sets forth a considerably more limited restriction when it declares that the employer “shall not be liable to a third party for damages, contribution, or indemnity in the action of law or otherwise... . ” As for the view that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has precluded the joinder of an employer for every purpose including the apportionment of fault, the dissent herein of our eminent colleague Judge James R. Cavanaugh as well as the dissent of the distinguished United States Circuit Court Judge Max Rosenn1 very perceptively responds that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not so held since the Supreme Court has not as yet specifically ruled upon an attempt to join the employer in a fashion that would provide for the determination of the fault of the employer without intrusion upon the immunity of the employer.
It seems, however, that I differ with both the majority and also Judge Cavanaugh upon the issue of the joinder of the employer as an involuntary plaintiff. It is my view that if the Pennsylvania Supreme Court pronounces at a future time that § 303(b) precludes the joinder of the employer as an additional defendant for every purpose and in every circumstance, the employer may be joined as an involuntary plaintiff pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 2227. The very fine majority opinion provides a thorough itemization of reasons for its conclusion that the interests of the employer and the employee are not joint; it strikes me, however, that each reason is but an echo of the conclusion itself. Since an effort to here refer and respond to each reason would be little more than a “ ’tis so”—“ ’tis not” *380dispute, such an exercise would not seem purposeful. Suffice it to say that the employer, by reason of its subrogation interest, has a stake in the cause of action of the employee and that, therefore, both the employer and the employee share a concern in the outcome and an interest in the verdict that can only be termed a joint interest. The majority opinion quite properly observes that the law has never stated the subrogee is an essential party to the action of the employee but our research has not produced any case that has, since the 1974 enactment of § 303(b), so concluded. And, while the interests of the subrogees, if necessary, can be determined, as noted by the majority, in a separate subsequent action, some authorities upon judicial administration may be of the view that such a notion is not consistent with the prudent and effective use of judicial resources.
Finally, while Judge Cavanaugh and I share the view that § 303(b) does not preclude the joinder of the employer as an additional defendant, I do not foresee such a reduction in the total recovery of the employee-plaintiff as he envisions, in the hypothetical case quoted by him, will follow the joinder of the employer. The Pennsylvania Comparative Negligence Act2 provides in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7102:
(b) Recovery against joint defendant; contribution. Where recovery is allowed against more than one defendant, each defendant shall be liable for that portion of the total dollar amount awarded as damages in the ratio of the amount of his causal negligence to the amount of causal negligence attributed to all defendants against whom recovery is allowed. The plaintiff may recover the full amount of the allowed recovery from any defendant against whom the plaintiff is not barred from recovery. Any defendant who is so compelled to pay more than his percentage share may seek contribution.
Since the plaintiff-employee may recover the full amount of the verdict from the third party defendant(s) whenever the employer and the third party defendant(s) are found to be at *381fault, any reduction in the amount of the recovery is limited to a sum equal to the amount of the payments that had been made (or that become payable) to the plaintiff-employee under the Workmen’s Compensation Act.
In summary, I would overrule Heckendorn and, failing that objective, would permit the joinder of the employer as an involuntary plaintiff.

. In Hamme v. Dreis & Frump Mfg. Co., 716 F.2d 152 (1982) Judge Rosenn provides a very thoughtful analysis of the questions that have continued to confront the appellate courts since the enactment of the 1974 amendment to § 303 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act.

. Act 1976, July 9, P.L. 586, No. 142, effective June 27, 1978.