Court Opinion

ID: 9559225
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:24:46.046736+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:10:09.313632
License: Public Domain

LOPEZ, Judge (dissenting). I dissent. Judge Sutin’s opinion concludes that a case filed before a statute was amended is nonetheless controlled by that statute. In the recent case of Estate of William L. Childers, Sr. v. Childers, N.M., 552 P.2d 465, 1976 the Supreme Court decided that another provision of the amended probate laws (Laws 1975, Ch. 120, § 3) prohibiting challenges based on the district court not having jurisdiction, could not apply to a case which was filed before that amendment became effective. Similarly, in the case before us the court is attempting to apply a jurisdictional provision of a statute to a case which was already filed when the statute became effective. This interpretation is contrary to our constitutional provision which states: “No act of the legislature shall affect the right or remedy of either party, or change the rules of evidence or procedure, in any pending case. N.M.Constitution, Art. IV, § 34.” There would seem little room for argument that this case was “pending” as of the date when it was commenced. State ex rel. Barela v. New Mexico State Bd. of Ed., 80 N.M. 220, 453 P.2d 583 (1969). The meaning of “pending” was discussed in Stockard v. Hamilton, 25 N.M. 240, 180 P. 294 (1919): “ . . . The evident intention of the Constitution is to prevent legislative interference with matters of evidence and procedure in cases that are in the process or course of litigation in the various courts of the state, and which have not been concluded, finished, or determined by a final judgment. . . . ” This constitutional provision has been held to bar a court from hearing an appeal, where the case was filed before the statute allowing appeal was passed. Brown v. Board of Education, 81 N.M. 460, 468 P.2d 431 (Ct.App.1970). Accord, In re Sevilleta De La Joya Grant, Socorro County, 41 N.M. 305, 68 P.2d 160 (1973); Marquez v. Wylie, 78 N.M. 544, 434 P.2d 69 (1967). Because the defendant was jurisdictional, the date when the defendants called the court’s attention to the defect is irrelevant. Secondly, even if the 1975 amended version were effective, I do not agree that it should be interpreted to have the effect given it by this opinion. Although the district courts are given concurrent jurisdiction by the 1975 amendment, I do not think that the legislature intended to allow a probate proceeding to be completed in the probate court, and then retried in the district court. Finally, I am in disagreement with the conclusion of the majority opinion that the district court had equitable jurisdiction to entertain the plaintiff’s claim. It is not sufficient to allege fraud to confer jurisdiction on the district court; it must also be shown that the remedy at law is inadequate. In First Nat. Bank of Albuquerque v. Dunbar, 32 N.M. 419, 258 P. 817 (1924), the district court was held to be without jurisdiction because the time for filing an appeal in the district court had not expired at the time the motion to set aside was filed. The burden is on the plaintiff to show the facts sustaining equitable jurisdiction. In the record before us there is no showing that theré was not a remedy at law at the time that the wrongfulness of the defendants’ acts was discovered. Alternatively, the district court may have determined that jurisdiction was lacking because there were no equitable grounds for intervention. Without knowing the contents of the materials considered by the trial court, we cannot foreclose the possibility that it determined that there were no facts sufficient to sustain the plaintiff’s allegations of wrongful conduct and fraud. I would affirm the summary judgment.