Court Opinion

ID: 9656546
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 19:50:48.01998+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:33.186043
License: Public Domain

Currie, J.
(concurring). There would seem to be no question but that, if it were not for Door county being a party plaintiff, there would be federal pre-emption here, and state action would be precluded under Wisconsin E. R. Board v. Chauffeurs, etc., Local 200 (1954), 267 Wis. 356, 366, 66 N. W. (2d) 318. This is because, as pointed out in such case, secs. 158 (a) (3) and 158 (b) (2), 29 USCA, comprising part of the Taft-Hartley amendments to the National Labor Relations Act, make illegal the same type of union activities, where interstate commerce is involved, as does sec. 111.06 (2) (b), Wis. Stats.
The majority opinion grounds its holding, that there is no federal pre-emption, upon the fact that Door county is not a “person” within the definition of such term as used in the National Labor Relations Act. Such definition is to be found in sec. 152 (1), 29 USCA.1 The statute material to the present controversy is sec. 160 (b), 29 USCA, which covers the issuance of a complaint by the National Labor *153Relations Board charging an unfair labor practice after charges have been filed with such board and an investigation has been made thereof. While the word “person” is employed by such section in describing against whom a complaint is to be issued, such word is not used to describe or limit who may file a charge which may result in the issuance of a complaint.
There is nothing in the National Labor Relations Act which would have precluded Door county from filing a charge against the instant defendants with the National Labor Relations Board. This is pointed out in the dissent filed by Mr. Justice Fairchild. Therefore, it cannot be held that congress has failed to pre-empt the field because the definition of the word “person” in the National Labor Relations Act does not embrace a state, or an instrumentality thereof such as a county.
However, there is another basis upon which the judgment below may be sustained. A county is an arm or agency of the state and in the erection of a courthouse, or addition thereto, it is engaged in a governmental function. Green County v. Monroe (1958), 3 Wis. (2d) 196, 87 N. W. (2d) 827. Under our federal system of government it is implied in the United States constitution that the national government, in the exercise of its powers, may not prevent the state, or an agency thereof, from discharging its ordinary functions of government. Mr. Justice Brewer, in South Carolina v. United States (1905), 199 U. S. 437, 451, 26 Sup. Ct. 110, 50 L. Ed. 261, stated this principle with a clarity of language that would be most difficult to improve upon:
“Among those matters which are implied, though not expressed, is that the nation may not, in the exercise of its powers, prevent a state from discharging the ordinary functions of government, just as it follows from the second clause of article VI of the constitution, that no state can interfere with the free and unembarrassed exercise by the national government of all the powers conferred upon it.”
*154The serious delay, which the plaintiff county experienced in the building of the addition to its courthouse by reason of the unlawful acts of the defendants, tended to interfere with the performance of its governmental functions. While congress may pre-empt the field of labor relations as they may affect interstate commerce, the courts of the state under the principle of South Carolina v. United States, supra, can protect the governmental functioning of the state, or one of its agencies, against acts which unlawfully interfere therewith. Both federal and state statutes make the defendants’ activities illegal under the findings of fact of the trial court. We would have an entirely different problem if congress had legislated that all peaceful picketing of an employer, who is engaged in a business affecting interstate commerce, is a valid activity not subject to being enjoined by any court.
The trial court, in addition to finding the activities of the defendants illegal under sec. 111.06 (2) (b), Wis. Stats., also found that the same violated sec. 103.535 because no “labor dispute” existed under the definition of such term set forth in sec. 103.535. Sec. 103.535 is clearly unconstitutional and void under American Federation of Labor v. Swing (1941), 312 U. S. 321, 61 Sup. Ct. 568, 85 L. Ed. 855, and Waukesha v. Plumbers & Gas Fitters Local (1955), 270 Wis. 322, 71 N. W. (2d) 416. See also Milwaukee Boston Store Co. v. American Federation of H. W. (1955), 269 Wis. 338, 356, 357, 69 N. W. (2d) 762. However, the finding of a violation of sec. 111.06 (2) (b) is• sufficient to sustain the judgment below.
For the reasons stated herein I concur in the result.

 “The term ‘person’ includes one or more individuals, labor organizations, partnerships, associations, corporations, legal representatives, trustees, trustees in bankruptcy, or receivers.”