Court Opinion

ID: 9652478
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 17:24:36.913218+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:51.778674
License: Public Domain

Springer, D.J.
(Ret.), Specially Assigned, concurring in the result; dissenting from decision on the law. As the foregoing opinion for this Court states, this appeal from probate court involves but one question, i.e., whether the probate court, as a matter of law, properly determined that petitioner-appellee *133gained ownership of the parcel of land in question by adverse possession against his fellow co-tenants. Obviously, the answer to that question depends on what the law of adverse possession is when the person claiming ownership of land under it is a co-tenant of the person against whom the claim is made. In this case an additional factor is involved, for it is alleged that the co-tenants did not know that they were co-tenants. The majority concludes that, under those circumstances and on the facts found by the trial court, the question at issue should be answered in the negative. In my view, that conclusion is premature for reasons stated below. I do agree, however, that the case should be remanded for further findings by the trial court.
I.
Since the law of adverse possession in this state as it relates to cases involving co-tenants who know they are co-tenants is fully and well stated by Justice Peck’s opinion for the majority, there is no need for me to state it herein. However, this is a case of first impression where the co-tenants or some of them do not know of the existence of the co-tenancy. The trial court did not make any finding that the parties knew of the co-tenancy, although it could and should have done so. Notwithstanding that fact, the parties briefed this case on the basis that they had no knowledge of the co-tenancy until 1981 when appellee approached them to obtain a release of their title interest. The majority decides the question at issue herein on the same basis. I reluctantly decline to join them until a finding is made as to that knowledge. In my opinion that is the crux of the question posed in this case, and the problems in it stem from the absence of a finding thereon.
If the trial court had fully considered facts contained in the record, it is likely that it would have found that one or more of the appellants, if not all of them, did have knowledge of the co-tenancy. Such a finding would bear directly on the basic elements of adverse possession, such as whether the acts of the appellee were sufficient to put them on notice as to ouster and the hostile nature of the claim, and would clarify the question of laches about which the majority of this Court is concerned. I will deal with the fact situation later.
*134My reluctance to join the majority opinion is also based on what I perceive as an illogical position as to the effect that lack of knowledge by co-tenants as to the existence of the record co-tenancy has on the basic elements of adverse possession. To prove adverse possession and thereby gain ownership of real property one must possess that property in an open, notorious, hostile and continuous manner for, under the statute of this state, a period of fifteen years. When that is done, the law presumes that the possessor has ousted anyone claiming to be the true owner by reason of a record title, however it has come to him. The basis of that presumption is that when the person holding the record title fails to act to protect his interest in the property for the statutory period, he acquiesces in or permits the possession by the claimant to negate his own rights, in other words, he permits himself to be ousted.
But this Court has held that when the opposing parties are co-tenants, there is a presumption that the possessor is exercising possession as an incident of the co-tenancy relationship. Moreover, the possessor must overcome that presumption by clear, definite and unequivocal notice to the co-tenant that his possession is “hostile” as that term is used in the law of adverse possession, i.e., that he is claiming a right to the exclusive ownership of the property.
When all of the parties know of the co-tenancy, that rule is at least logical even though it is inconsistent with the basic presumption underlying the doctrine of adverse possession; but when they do not, it is illogical. In the latter situation, the co-tenants not in possession could have no reasonable expectation that they should be treated any differently than members of the general public. Nor is there any reason for the person in possession to expect that he must act any differently toward the co-tenants than toward the general public.
When the co-tenants are family members, this Court has held that the claimant must establish his claim by stronger proof than when there is no such relationship. Harlow v. Miller, 147 Vt. 480, 484, 520 A.2d 995, 998 (1986). However, that too is illogical when all of the co-tenants, although family members, do not know of the co-tenancy. If the acts are hostile enough to put the general public on notice, the same acts should suffice for family members not in possession when they *135do not know of the co-tenancy. By like token, the claimant would have no reason to believe he had any obligation to treat family members any differently than members of the public, certainly not that he had to take any stronger action or give any more notice that he intends to oust them. The position of the majority, if carried to its logical conclusion in family member co-tenancy cases, would result in the ’claimant never being able to establish adverse possession. Therefore, when none of the parties know that they are co-tenants, the rule should be that the proof required of the claimant should be the same as for the general public even when family members are involved. Cf. Allen v. Batchelder, 17 Mass. App. 453, 459 N.E.2d 129 (1984); Collier v. Welker, 19 N.C. App. 617, 199 S.E.2d 691 (1973); and Graham v. Graham, 45 Misc. 2d 198, 256 N.Y.S.2d 888 (Sup. Ct. 1965); cf. also 3 Am. Jur. 2d Adverse Possession § 173. Thus, I believe that this Court should reconsider the whole matter of the effect of co-tenancy in adverse possession cases.
It should be noted also that our rule in co-tenancy cases, which requires actual notice, prevents adoption of any theory of constructive ouster. We should reconsider the actual notice requirement also.
II.
Whether a person claiming ownership of real estate by adverse possession has acted to satisfy the rule as to open, notorious, hostile and continuous possession for the statutory period requires, of course, a determination of the facts sufficient to enable the court to apply the law; so, when a co-tenancy of which the parties have had no knowledge is alleged, the trial court must also find the facts as to that knowledge so that it may apply relevant law. Without adequate fact finding by the trial court, an appellate court cannot know what law applies.
On the facts in this case it is clear that appellee has been in possession of the land in question from 1945 until 1981. During that period, he had provided all of the care which the land had received, had made whatever improvements had been made on it, and had paid not only for that care and those improvements but also for all of the taxes on it without any contribution from any of the co-tenants.
*136Although the trial court made findings of facts as to other aspects of the case, they are sparse, indefinite in many respects and do not include findings as to facts admitted on the record, in the pleadings, in response to interrogatories or upon which conflicting evidence was presented. There is no finding as to the knowledge of the parties about the co-tenancy. If such findings had been made, they would clarify both the question of knowledge of each of the parties as to the existence of the co-tenancy and whether the actions of the appellee were sufficiently strong to put the appellants on notice that his possession was hostile and sufficient to constitute ouster, as well as those relating to laches. From my understanding of the record, the needed findings could have been made. The following are some of the instances of deficiencies in the findings which could have been cured.
The trial court’s Finding of Fact No. 17 states:
That the petitioner, Roger R. Neil, went through the ninth grade of school. He never had any education beyond that point. It is the petitioner’s contention that he paid for the property out of his own funds and that he never received any contributions from any other individual, including his mother. His sister, Evalina Martin, testified in petitioner’s behalf, and sustained his position. His other sister, Elizabeth Carbonneau Wells, testified that her mother paid for the property, so there is a conflict in the testimony as to where the source of the funds came from, as far as the purchase of the property is concerned.
The court did not find who in fact did pay for the property.* Finding No. 18 reads:
That the petitioner, Roger I. Neil, on May 5, 1958, executed an agreement with the Town of Sherburne to convey a right of way for an access road (Pet. Ex. #1). The Town of Sherburne acknowledged in Petitioner’s Exhibit #1 that “Roger I. Neil was the owner in fee” of the property which is referred to in paragraph 8.
*137It ignores the testimony of the petitioner that his father, the town tax collector, assisted the selectmen when they obtained that right of way.
Finding No. 20 reads:
That Irving Neil, husband of Lucy Neil, held several positions with the Town of Sherburne both before and after the death of his wife, Lucy Neil, including that of lister, constable, tax collector and justice of the peace. In these capacities, he never claimed any interest in the property in question on behalf of his wife, Lucy Neil, during the period prior to her death on August 2, 1956, nor did he make a claim that her estate had any interest in the property in question subsequent to her death when her estate was administered and probated through the Rutland District Probate court.
Finding 20 is indefinite in that it fails to reflect the fact that Irving Neil was a lister in 1954 and 1955, and tax collector in 1956 through 1959, the very period during which his wife died and her estate was administered. In both of those capacities he had a duty to know who owned the property and to correctly show the owner in the grand list of the town. Not only did he have that duty, but he was undoubtedly familiar with the effect of the language of the deed creating the co-tenancy and its effect on his own rights. It is unfortunate that he died in 1984 before trial. Nevertheless, the effect of his office in the context of these facts may yield a specific legal conclusion regarding his knowledge.
Nor does Finding No. 20 (or any other finding) refer to the testimony that the town tax records show, that before 1959 the land in question was listed in the grand list in the names of both Roger Neil and the Estate of Lucy M. Neil as the owners, and that the tax notices for 1958 and 1959 were sent to Roger Neil. His father may also have received it. Certainly he should have known of the impact of her death on the assessment.
' The absence of those facts in the findings suggests that at least one of the appellants knew of the co-tenancy (thus raising another question) and bears on the issue of whether that party was guilty of laches. Certainly this possibility requires remand for further findings.
*138III.
In addition to my suggestions in Parts I and II hereof, there is another problem bothering me about this case. In considering whether sufficiently strong evidence is present in this case to establish a hostile possession by the appellee, the majority may be not seeing the forest for the trees (an appropriate pun in this case if ever one was appropriate). Given the undisputed fact that it is forest land about which this case revolves, it is hard to imagine how much stronger action could have been taken by the appellee to show that he was claiming ownership if one assumes, as do the parties and the majority of this Court, that none of the parties knew before 1981 that a co-tenancy existed. Common experience in Vermont is that forest land is rarely, if ever, fenced. It is usually logged periodically, although some enlightened owners do cut selectively on a regular basis. The usual practice was followed by the appellee. Furthermore, the fact that one or more of the appellants went on the land occasionally is not significant, despite appellants’ argument to the contrary on the question of continuity of appellee’s possession, in view of Vermont customs in regard to hunting, hiking, and horseback riding through such land when it is not posted.
In discussing the sufficiency of appellee’s acts as to ouster, the majority discusses them one by one and concludes that no one of them except possibly the last one they mention is sufficient. That is like using a camera to photograph a scene and, by use of a zoom lens concentrating on small portions of the scene one after the other, not getting the whole picture. I ask again, what more would one usually do to exercise exclusive control of a woodland lot of about twenty-five to thirty-five acres than appellee did? So, even on the facts which the trial court found and the parties and the majority accept, it is difficult for me to accept the conclusion of the majority in answering the question mentioned at the outset as being the only legal issue in this case.

 It is interesting to note that although Elizabeth Carbonneau Wells testified that on more than one occasion her mother had said she had paid for the land and had an interest in it, so that Elizabeth Carbonneau Wells had knowledge of that fact, Elizabeth claimed not to have known that she, as an heir of her mother, was a co-tenant in the property.