Court Opinion

ID: 9695484
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:20:51.33941+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:13.232176
License: Public Domain

Black, J.

(dissenting).

“Courts are supposed in the name of constitutional right to scrutinize and determine these modern motions for decisive pretrial judgment by the same test we profess when a motion for directed verdict is presented at conclusion of trial of a negligence case, that is, ‘in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.’ The recent cases of Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 368 US 464 (82 S Ct 486, 7 L ed 2d 458); and United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 US 654 (82 S Ct 993, 8 L ed 2d 176), s.o attest. As said in Diebold, if there is a choice of conflicting inferences to be drawn from the submitted affidavits, exhibits, and depositions, the motion should be denied.” Romero v. King, 368 Mich 45, 50.
In Romero we considered a motion to dismiss under former practice (Court Rule 18, § 1[g] [1945]). The point though, exemplified by the cited Poller and Diebold Cases, is the same regardless of the procedural garb in which the specific motion for summary action may be clothed.. Whether the movant assigning contributory negligence asks for dismissal on pretrial motion, for summary judgment  on pretrial motion, or for an instructed verdict during or at close-of trial-, the controlling question is whether upon the whole record, viewing it favorably to the party opposing the movant, the case should go to the jury, or, in the event of no demand. for jury trial, to formal trial before the court.
*123This case of Green is, in its present pretrial posture, one where the plaintiff pedestrian did not see the defendant motorist’s approaching car, and the defendant motorist did not see the plaintiff pedestrian,2 ahead in the path of his car. What then caused the collision? Inattentiveness of plaintiff? Of defendant? Of both? Some other cause, which superseded negligence of defendant, of plaintiff, or both? Such questions should he tried to a jury upon complete rather than truncated record; plaintiff having made due demand for jury trial and the questions of proximate cause and contributory cause being jury questions in all but the rarest of instances.
I am moved to say — again after it has been said again and again — that the question of contributory negligence invariably is determinable by the necessity of taking into account the actions of two persons, not just one.3 Thus the circuit judge, when he undertakes appraisal of a motion assigning contributory negligence as a matter of law, no matter whether that motion is made before, during, or at close of trial, should view dually and on favorable-to-plaintiff view the acts and omissions of both parties. Such is the essence of and reason for our general rule *124that “the question of negligence is a question of fact and not of law.” Van Steinburg at 118.
Aside from the above it is important to note again that the burden of persuasion respecting contributory negligence rests now on the party asserting it (City of Dearborn v. Bacila, 353 Mich 99, 117; former Court Rule 23, § 3a, effective June 1, 1958 ;  GCR 1963, 111.7); also that (Speiser v. Randall, 357 US 513, 525 [78 S Ct 1332, 2 L ed 2d 1460]):
’ “In all kinds of litigation it is plain that where the burden of proof lies may be decisive of the outcome. Cities Service Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 308 US 208 (60 S Ct 201, 84 L ed 196); United States v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 355 US 253 (78 S Ct 212, 2 L ed 2d 247); Sampson v. Channell (CA 1), 110 F2d 754, 758 (128 ALR 394).”
Since—as I understand—we are obliged to .examine a record which is supposed to support a motion for summary judgment “in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion,” I would include in our reported record the following quotations from the defendant’s pretrial deposition:
“Q. When was the first time that you had occasion; if you did observe anybody before the accident occurred?
“A. Bring that question again? * * *
(Previous question read.)
“A. Well, the accident with Mr. Green was the first pedestrian I seen.
“Q. (By Mr. Lopatin) That was the first pedestrian you saw other than the school children?
“A. Right.
“Q. Do you know where Mr.- Green came from ?
“A. I don’t know-where he came from, no.
“Q. Did you see him at any time before you struck' him?
“A. Approximately three feet. * * *
*125“Q. And did you at any time apply the brakes before Mr. Green came in contact?
“A. I did not.
“Q. Did you at any time sound your horn?
“A. I did not. * * *
“Q. Did you also state, ‘I don’t know where he came from. I never saw him before I’ --
"A. I did not.
“Q. You never made that statement?
“A. No.”
The action below was an offense to plaintiff’s constitutional right of trial by jury  in that it brought about premature judgment without semblance of that essence of due process, a fair day in court. For that reason I would reverse and remand for entry of order denying motion for summary judgment, with costs to plaintiff.
T. M. Kavanagh, C. J., and Souris, J., concurred with Black, J.

 The defendant’s admission was, according to plaintiff’s deposition, “I never seen him.” According to defendant’s deposition the admission was that he, defendant, did not see the plaintiff nntil the car he was driving was “approximately three feet” from plaintiff. See quotation of defendant’s deposition, post. These facts do not appear in Justice Dethmers’ “favorable-to-plaintiff” account of the record.

 “Moreover, if the danger depends at all upon the action of any other person under a given set of circumstances, the prudence of the party injured must be estimated in view of what he had a right to expect from such other person, and he is not to be considered blamable if the injury has resulted from the action of another which he could not reasonably have anticipated. Thus the problem is complicated by the necessity of taking into account the two sets of circumstances affecting the conduct of different persons, and is only to be satisfactorily solved by the jury placing themselves in the position of the injured person, and examining those circumstances as they then presented themselves to him, and from that standpoint judging whether he was guilty of negligence or not,” Detroit & M. R. Co. v. Van Steinburg, 17 Mich 99, 119.