Court Opinion

ID: 9444963
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 21:17:05.429069+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:30:04.910611
License: Public Domain

ALLEN, Circuit Judge.
This case arises on petition to review a decision of the Tax Court of the United States sustaining a determination of deficiencies for the calendar years 1943 to 1947, inclusive, in the aggregate amount of $447,445.44, $161,184.43 being income taxes and $286,261.01 being excess profits taxes. Petitioner was organized as a nonprofit corporation without capital stock or shares and has never paid dividends. The facts are not in dispute and the questions presented are questions of law. The purposes of petitioner stated in its Articles of Association are the following :
To promote and foster the healthy growth of the automobile industry; to secure the adoption and enforcement of reasonable and useful traffic ordinances and motor vehicle laws; to promote the establishment and construction of permanent highways for traffic; to interest automobile owners and drivers in the principles of “Safety First,” as applied to automobile traffic; to promote touring and to obtain and furnish touring information and the necessary sign boarding of public highways; and to cooperate in any work or movement which may tend to benefit the automobile driver, user, owner, or manufacturer, and the automobile industry in general.
As found by the Tax Court:
During 1943 through 1947 the petitioner devoted most of its resources and efforts to the bettering of conditions for motorists and the promotion of proper laws relating to the use of the motor car, the promotion of travel and the use of the automobile for other modes of transportation. It engaged in the promotion of safety, the solution of traffic problems and the promotion of the formation of school boy patrols. It organized the school boy patrols in Michigan. To teachers in the schools it furnished textbooks dealing with the conduct and operation of school boy patrols. As a reward it annually took some of the patrol boys to Washington, D. C. Annually it conducted seminars in the University of Michigan to promote the education of school teachers in the state in driver training courses. Petitioner’s safety and traffic and engineer departments made surveys throughout the State of Michigan at the request of various cities and communities and many of its proposals as to safety measures were adopted. Petitioner supplied to its members in Michigan and those affiliated with the American Automobile Association emergency road service. The petitioner published and furnished to each of its active members a magazine containing news about travel and news about laws as they pertain to the use of *587automobiles. Maps and other touring information with reference to road conditions were also provided, as was assistance to the American Automobile Association in its designation or appointment of proper places for tourists to be housed and fed. The petitioner secured reservations for its members when traveling abroad and arranged for the shipping of their cars abroad. Petitioner also promoted and furnished gratis to various communities proper directional and stop signs. In its services the petitioner attempted to do for the motorist in a collective way that which he was unable to do as an individual.
The petitioner does not engage in or conduct any social activities.
Petitioner during 1934 had supplied the Commissioner with detailed information concerning its operations, its financial assets and liabilities, and its receipts and disbursements. On June 11, 1934, the Commissioner wrote petitioner that on the basis of evidence submitted petitioner was entitled to exemption under the provisions of Section 103(9) of the Revenue Act of 1932, 26 U.S.C.A.Int.Rev. Acts, page 507, and the corresponding sections of prior revenue acts; that, therefore, it was not required to file returns for 1933 and prior years, and that under the provisions of Section 101(9) of the Revenue Act of 1934, 26 U.S.C.A. Int.Rev.Aets, page 688, it would not be required to file returns so long as there was no change in its organization, its purposes or methods of doing business.
On July 5, 1938, after submission by-petitioner of the information required concerning its claim for exemption under Section 101(9) of the Revenue Act of 1936, 26 U.S.C.A. Int.Rev.Aets, page 849, the Commissioner wrote petitioner advising it that “since it appeared that there had been no change in its form of organization or activities which would affect its status, the previous ruling of the Bureau holding it to be exempt from filing returns of income was affirmed under the Revenue Act of 1936.”
In May, 1935, the Commissioner wrote petitioner that the Bureau of Internal Revenue was reconsidering the question of the exemption of automobile associations from Federal income taxation in light of the opinion of the Chief Counsel of the Bureau of Internal Revenue as set forth in G. C. M. 23688, C.B.1943, 283. After petitioner had furnished certain further information, the Commissioner again wrote petitioner on July 16, 1945, calling attention to the fact that Section 101(9) of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C.A., provides for the exemption of
“Clubs organized and operated exclusively for pleasure, recreation, and other nonprofitable purposes, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder”.
The Commissioner’s communication continued as follows:
“This office holds that the term ‘club’ as used in the above section of law contemplates commingling of members, one with the other in fellowship. Thus, an organization should be so composed and its activities be such that fellowship among the members plays a material part in the life of the organization in order for it to come within the meaning of the term ‘club.’
“The evidence submitted shows that fellowship does not constitute a material part of the life of your organization and that your principal activity is the rendering of commercial services to your members.
“It is, accordingly, held that you are not a club ‘organized and operated exclusively for pleasure, recreation and other nonprofitable purposes,’ within the meaning of section 101(9) of the Internal Revenue Code or the corresponding sections of pri- or revenue acts, and, therefore, are not entitled to exemption under those sections. Furthermore, there is no other provision of law under which an organization of your character can be held to be exempt from Federal income tax.
*588“Bureau rulings of June 11, 1934 and July 5, 1938 are hereby revoked.
“In view of all the facts and circumstances in your case it is held, with the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury, that you will not be required to file income tax returns for years beginning prior to January 1, 1943. You are, however, required to file returns for the year 1943 and subsequent years.”
In compliance with this communication petitioner filed income and excess profits tax returns for the calendar years 1943 and 1944 under protest, on the ground that it was exempt from taxes, and filed a petition to review the determination of the Commissioner. During the trial before the Tax Court petitioner admitted that it was taxable “for the period subsequent to July 16, 1945,” but contended that the Commissioner acted arbitrarily and without authority in revoking previous rulings as to exemption, and in determining a deficiency in taxes for any period prior to July 16, 1945. In this court petitioner contends that the Commissioner in 1945 was estopped from retroactively revoking the prior determinations, made by a predecessor Commissioner, upon the ground that there had been no change in the law or in the character and operation of petitioner as a club.
The Commissioner ruled correctly in his determination of July 16, 1945, that petitioner was not exempt from tax under Section 101(9), Internal Revenue Code. The statute plainly applies, as decided in G. C. M. 23688, not to any and all organizations in which no dividends are declared, but to “clubs,” namely, to organizations in which members commingle in fellowship. Also this section of the statute applies, not to every kind of club, but to clubs organized and operated exclusively for pleasure, recreation and other nonprofitable purposes. Since petitioner performs commercial services for its members it is not the kind of organization defined in the statute. The right to exemption which arises under Section 101(9), as it is created by statute, cannot be modified by the regulations. Since petitioner did not fall within the exemption provision it was at no time exempt from taxation, but was excused from taxation by a legal error of the Commissioner. The requirement that petitioner file returns for the years 1943 and 1944 was therefore valid and proper and, since petitioner was not required to file returns for a number of preceding years, it cannot be claimed that the ruling was arbitrary and oppressive.
As to the question of estoppel, petitioner does not assert that it has altered its position to its detriment in reliance on the former rulings of the Commissioner. In default of proof to that effect estoppel does not enter into the case.
Petitioner urges that H. S. D. Co. v. Kavanagh, 6 Cir., 191 F.2d 831, and Woodworth v. Kales, 6 Cir., 26 F.2d 178, require reversal of the Tax Court’s decision. In the H. S. D. Co. case the District Court, which had upheld the Commissioner in changing a ruling as to the exemption from taxation of contributions to two employees’ trusts, was reversed by this court. We held that the Commissioner under the facts of that case was bound by the previous rulings of his predecessor determining that contributions to the employees’ trusts were exempt from taxation. The court pointed out that the reasons for the successor Commissioner’s action involved no new facts and no mistake of law, but only different inferences from the same facts. We there cited with approval an opinion by Judge Raymond, Boyne City Lumber Co. v. Doyle, D.C.Mich., 47 F.2d 772, which declared that it is “an insupportable principle to say that such a determination of value may be reopened by each succeeding Commissioner, or by the .same Commissioner, because a review of the same facts results in a difference or change of opinion.” [191 F.2d 846.] In Woodworth v. Kales, supra, this court held that, where income tax was assessed under a ruling approved by the then Commissioner of Internal Revenue, a succeeding Commissioner was without au*589thority, upon a re-examination of the same evidence to revoke such assessment and reassess an additional tax. The court concluded that there was no statutory authority for the right to reopen and re-examine the question of the 1913 fair value of the stock involved and “then, upon a re-examination of the same evidence, to reach a different result, flowing not from the discovery of any fraud or mistake, clerical or otherwise, in any fundamental fact or matter of law, but resulting only from a ‘more matured judgment.’ ” [26 F.2d 180.] These cases do not, however, support petitioner’s contention. In the Kales case the court declared that the Commissioner’s “mistake of law will often, or usually, justify a revision of his conclusion.” In the H. S. D. Co. case we pointed out that the facts involved “no mistake of law, but only different inferences from the same facts”. The Commissioner is not bound by his own or his predecessor’s piior mistakes of law. Chattanooga Automobile Club v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 6 Cir., 182 F.2d 551; Austin Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 6 Cir., 35 F.2d 910; Keystone Automobile Club v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 3 Cir., 181 F. 2d 402; Smyth v. California State Automobile Association, 9 Cir., 175 F.2d 752, certiorari denied 338 U.S. 905, 70 S.Ct. 307, 94 L.Ed. 557. Cf. Langstaff v. Lucas, D.C., 9 F.2d 691, affirmed per curiam 6 Cir., 13 F.2d 1022, certiorari denied 273 U.S. 721, 47 S.Ct. 111, 71 L.Ed. 858.
That the ruling of July 16, 1945, corrected a mistake of law cannot be disputed. The principal question was the legal significance of the word “club” in Section 101(9) of the Internal Revenue ■Code. Another statutory question was, if petitioner was a club in which its members commingled in fellowship, whether the organization and operation were exclusively for pleasure, recreation, and other nonprofitable purposes. The earlier Commissioners by their erroneous construction of the statute had made mistakes of law which were subject to correction by the later Commissioner.
Petitioner also claims that, irrespective of the decisions in the H. S. D. Co. and the Kales cases, supra, it is entitled to exempt status under the doctrine of Helvering v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 306 U.S. 110, 59 S.Ct. 423, 83 L.Ed. 536. This is on the theory that the Treasury Regulations 111, Section 29.101-1, and previous corresponding Regulations provided in substance that when an organization has established its right to exemption it need not thereafter make a return of income or any further showing with respect to its status unless it changes the character of its operations or the purpose for which it was originally created. An amendment made to the Regulations later in 1944 contained substantially the same provision. Congress enacted a number of Internal Revenue statutes during this period to which the Treasury Regulations cited apply, but Congress did not alter or change the law so as to affect these Regulations. Petitioner therefore claims that the Regulations cited, under the authority of the Reynolds case, supra, constitute a rule of law which cannot be changed by a subsequent determination of the Commissioner.
In the Reynolds case the Supreme Court ruled that the gain secured by a corporation in the sale of its own stock in 1929 should be governed by the regulation in force in 1929, rather than by an amendment adopted by the Treasury in 1934, which made sales by a corporation of shares of its own capital stock subject to tax under certain circumstances. The Supreme Court refused to permit retroactive application of the Treasury amendments of 1934.
The Tax Court differentiated the Reynolds case from the instant one upon the ground that the Regulations there involved provided that a corporation realizes no gain or loss from the sale of its own stock and hence were legislative in character, while the Regulations here involved, Section 29.101-1 of Regulation 111, are administrative only.
In addition to this valid distinction between the Reynolds case and that pre*590sented herein we think a cogent answer to petitioner’s contention is that upon this branch of the case it proceeds from its false premise that it established the right to exemption in 1934-1936, long before July 16, 1945, when the Commissioner revoked his previous ruling. Petitioner never had that right. If it had actually established such a right, the Commissioner could not rightfully revoke it, yet petitioner does not contest the Commissioner’s right of revocation, The fact that the Commissioner in his earlier rulings misinterpreted the statutory meaning of the term “club” and ignored the circumstance that the services rendered petitioner’s members were purely commercial, does not demonstrate that petitioner established a right to exemption. It demonstrates that the Commissioner made a mistake of law which under the weight of authority he was entitled to correct. Chattanooga Automobile Club v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, supra; Keystone Automobile Club v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, supra; Smyth v. California State Automobile Association, supra.
The retroactive ruling of the Commissioner ordering that tax returns be filed for 1943 and 1944 was authorized under Section 3791(b) of the 1939 Code, 26 U. S.C.A. This section reads as follows:
“Retroactivity of regulations or rulings. The Secretary, or the Commissioner with the approval of the Secretary, may prescribe the extent, if any, to which any ruling, regulation, or Treasury Decision, relating to the internal revenue laws, shall be applied without retroactive ef■^ech
This provision clearly vests the Secretary or the Commissioner acting with approval of the Secretary, with the discretionary power to prescribe the extent, “if any,” to which the ruling of the Commissioner shall or shall not be retroactive. The phrase “if any,” authorizes the Secretary or the Commissioner acting with the approval of the Secretary to withhold retroactivity for the entire period involved or for any part thereof. In the instant case, if the Commissioner’s ruling of July 16, 1945, were given full retroactive effect, it would require return of income taxes between the years 1934 and 1945. The Committee Reports of the House of Representatives, in recommending enactment of the predecessor section of the 1934 Act, pointed out that “Regulations, Treasury Decisions, and rulings which are merely interpretive of the statute, will normally have a universal applieation. * * * ” (House Report No. 704, 73rd Congress, 2d Section, page 38). The report then goes on to state that the cases involving rulings with reference to past transactions which have been closed by taxpayers in reliance upon existing practice, in some cases will work such inequitable results that it is believed desirable to lodge in the Treasury Department the power to avoid these results by applying certain regulations, Treasury Decisions, and rulings with prospective effect only. This legislative history supports the above construction of Section 3791(b).
Under the established principle that the greater power includes the less, this statute conferred authority upon the Treasury officials named to make the ruling of July 16, 1945, retroactive for only part of the period involved and for only two of the thirteen years. We con-elude that this action was in no way arbitrary. _ The taxpayer was not misled nor has it shown that any unusual hardship resulted from the Commissioner’s action.
Petitioner next urges that the Btatute of limitations bars assessment of the deficiencies asserted, contending that the period of limitations commenced to run from March 15, 1944, and March 15, 1945, when the 1943 and 1944 returns were due. If this is true, the assessment is barred. Ordinarily the three-year statute of limitations begins to run from the date that the return is filed, which date was October 22, 1945. If this date controls, the assessment is not barred, Section 275(a) I.R.C. Petitioner claims that it was under no duty to file a return *591and that in such case the three-year statute of limitations starts running from the date the return should have been filed if there had been a duty to file it. Balkan Nat. Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 2 Cir., 101 F.2d 75.
In this connection the chronology of the proceedings is important. The rulings of exemption were revoked on July 16, 1945. Petitioner was ordered to file 1943 and 1944 returns and these returns were filed October 22, 1945. The parties on August 25, 1948, executed consents that the income and excess profits taxes could be assessed on or before June 30, 1949, and on May 23, 1949, executed similar consents that the income and excess profits taxes could be assessed on or before June 30, 1950. The notice of deficiency was mailed to petitioner February 20, 1950.
Petitioner’s assertion that his returns were due in March, 1944, and March, 1945, ignores the fact that Section 276 (a) provides that in the case “of a failure to file a return the tax may be assessed * * * at any time.”
The Commissioner relies upon this statute and points out that petitioner failed to file the returns for 1943 and 1944 until three months after July 16, 1945. Petitioner answers that it was entirely blameless in its failure to file upon the due dates because its inaction was caused by the Commissioner. But when on July 16, 1945, the Commissioner expressly required petitioner to file returns, petitioner was under an obligation to file them as ordered. The delay in filing for more than three months was not induced by the Commissioner. Moreover, petitioner voluntarily agreed twice to extension of time for the assessment of the tax. This was not induced by the Commissioner.
The returns made upon Form 990 did not constitute the returns contemplated by Section 275(a), namely, return of income taxes. They were not appropriate for the computation or assessment of income or excess profits taxes. As held by the Tax Court, they did not contain the data necessary to enable the Commissioner to compute petitioner’s liability. Two taxes were involved here, income and excess profits taxes for 1943 and 1944. The returns on Form 990 for each year were not the returns required of corporations under Section 52(a) of the Internal Revenue Code. The contention that where two returns are required one return answers the purpose was dismissed by the Supreme Court of the United States as having no merit in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Lane-Wells Co., 321 U.S. 219, 64 S.Ct. 511, 88 L.Ed. 684. We conclude that under this record the assessment was not barred by Section 275(a).
The determination that membership dues received by petitioner should be included in the return of income for the year in which they were received was clearly correct. E. H. Sheldon & Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 6 Cir., 214 F.2d 655, 656; S. Loewenstein & Son v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 6 Cir., 222 F.2d 919; Spencer, White & Prentis, Inc., v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 2 Cir., 144 F.2d 45, certiorari denied 323 U.S. 780, 65 S.Ct. 269, 89 L.Ed. 623; North American Oil Consolidated v. Burnet, 286 U.S. 417, 424, 52 S.Ct. 613, 76 L.Ed. 1197; Security Flour Mills Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 321 U.S. 281, 64 S.Ct. 596, 88 L.Ed. 725; United States v. Lewis, 340 U.S. 590, 71 S.Ct. 522, 523, 95 L. Ed. 560. In this case the Supreme Court stated “The ‘claim of right’ interpretation of the tax laws has long been used to give finality to that [the accounting] period, and is now deeply rooted in the federal tax system. * * * We see no reason why the Court should depart from this well-settled interpretation merely because it results in an advantage or disadvantage to a taxpayer.”
In conclusion the Tax Court correctly decided the issue as to depreciation deductions. Petitioner relies upon two General Counsel Memoranda, Nos. 10857 and 27491, as requiring that a different formula for depreciation deduction be applied from that used by the Commissioner. These memoranda have *592no bearing here. They come into force only where a petitioner is shown at some time during its existence to have been an organization exempt from taxation. As previously shown, petitioner was at no time exempt.
The decision of the Tax Court is affirmed.