Court Opinion

ID: 9377299
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-07 16:03:10.06236+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:13.301604
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE                             )
                                              )
          v.                                  )
                                              )     I.D. No. 2010001104
                                              )
DANIEL MOPKINS,                               )
                                              )
                      Defendant.              )

                                       ORDER

                             Submitted: February 8, 2023
                               Decided: March 7, 2023

          AND NOW TO WIT, this 7th day of March, 2023, upon consideration of

Daniel Mopkins (“Defendant”)’s Motion for Modification/Reduction of Sentence

under Superior Court Criminal Rule 35, the sentence imposed upon the

Defendant, and the record in this case, it appears to the Court that:

           1.     On March 17, 2022, Defendant pled guilty to one count of

    Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony (“PFDCF”) and

    one count of Reckless Endangering First Degree.1 On June 3, 2022, Defendant

    was sentenced to: (1) for PFDCF, eight years at Level V, suspended after three

    years for transitioning levels of probation; and (2) for Reckless Endangering

1
    D.I. 13.
    First Degree, five years at Level V, suspended for two years at Level III. 2

          2.     On January 31, 2023, Defendant filed this Motion for Sentence

    Modification/Reduction, asking for “no probation.”3 In support, Defendant

    asserts that he is rehabilitated and employable, received funds from a small

    business association, and has been promoting literacy programs through various

    writings and publications. Further, he asserts that no probation would be good

    for “marketing.”4

          3.     Under Superior Court Criminal Rule 35(b), the Court may reduce a

    sentence of imprisonment on a motion made within ninety days after the

    sentence is imposed.5 Defendant filed this pending Motion 242 days after the

    sentencing. Defendant’s Motion is time-barred. To overcome the ninety-day

    time bar, Defendant must show that “extraordinary circumstances” forgive the

    tardiness of his Motion.6       Rehabilitation, employability, receipt of funds,

    promotion of literacy, and marketability do not constitute extraordinary

    circumstances to justify the delay.

2
  D.I. 15.
3
  D.I. 16.
4
  Id.
5
  Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 35(b).
6
  See Colon v. State, 900 A.2d 635, 638 (Del. 2006); Washington v. State, 2023 WL 2028713, at
*2 (Del. Feb. 15, 2023) (citing State v. Diaz, 2015 WL 1741768, at *2 (Del. Apr. 15, 2015)
(explaining that extraordinary circumstances are the circumstances that “specifically justify the
delay; are entirely beyond a petitioner’s control; and have prevented the applicant from seeking
the remedy on a timely basis.”).
                                               2
          4.     Moreover, Defendant’s request is statutorily barred. 11 Del. C.

    4204(l) requires this Court to impose the period of custodial supervision as

    imposed. 7

          5.     The Sentence was appropriate for all the reasons stated at the time

    of sentencing.

          IT IS SO ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Sentence

Modification is DENIED.

                                                              /s/Vivian L. Medinilla
                                                              Vivian L. Medinilla
                                                              Judge
oc:      Prothonotary
cc:      Defendant
         Investigative Services

7
  11 Del. C. 4204(l) (“Except when the court imposes a life sentence or sentence of death,
whenever a court imposes a period of incarceration at Level V custody for 1 or more offenses
that totals 1 year or more, then that court must include as part of its sentence a period of custodial
supervision at either Level IV, III or II for a period of not less than 6 months to facilitate the
transition of the individual back into society. The 6-month transition period required by this
subsection may, at the discretion of the court, be in addition to the maximum sentence of
imprisonment established by the statute.”); see also Nave v. State, 783 A.2d 120, 122 (Del. 2001)
(“Section 4204(l) clearly requires the sentencing court to impose a period not less than six
months of custodial supervision at Level IV, III, or II, i.e., probation, to follow any Level V
sentence of one year or more.”).

                                                  3