Court Opinion

ID: 9709745
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 03:53:52.527406+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:51.186627
License: Public Domain

LARSEN, Justice,
dissenting.
On January 9, 1979, Barry C. Chesler, a licensed medical doctor,1 was killed in a motor vehicle accident in Chester, Pennsylvania. At the time of the accident, Dr. Chesler was driving his Triumph automobile which was insured under a No-fault policy of insurance issued by appellant, Government Employee Insurance Company. Dr. Chesler was unmarried and was not the father of any child or children. He was survived by his mother, a step-father, brother and uncle. His mother resides in South Africa and she was not financially dependent upon Dr. Chesler when he died. She maintains, however, that the decedent would have contributed some financial support to her had he lived.2
*297The appellant challenges the claim of decedent’s mother for survivor’s loss benefits by urging that she is not a “survivor” within the meaning of “survivor” as defined in the No-fault statute. Section 103 of the Act provides:
“Survivor” means:
(A) Spouse, or
(B) child, parent, brother, sister or relative dependent upon the deceased for support.
Act of July 19, 1974, P.L. 489, No. 176; 40 P.S. § 1009.103.
I disagree with the majority’s holding that Section 103 “requires a ‘child, parent, brother [or] sister’ of a deceased victim of an automobile accident to show dependency on the victim as a condition of eligibility for survivor’s loss benefits.” The qualifying phrase, “dependent upon the deceased for support,” set forth in Section 103 does not modify the entire Subsection (B), but only the immediately preceding antecedent, relative.
“The object of all interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly.” Statutory Construction Act, 1972, Sec. 6, P.L. 1339, No. 290 § 3(a), 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(a). When the words of a statute are ambiguous, among the prime considerations in ascertaining the intent of the legislature are, the occasion and necessity for the statute, and the object to be attained by the enactment. Statutory Construction Act, 1972, Sec. 6, P.L. 1339, No. 290, § 3(c), 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(c).
In enacting the No-fault Act, the General Assembly declared the occasion and necessity for the statute:
“the maximum feasible restoration of all individuals injured and compensation of the economic losses of the survivors of all individuals killed in motor vehicle accidents on Commonwealth highways, in intrastate commerce, and in activity affecting intrastate commerce is essential to the humane and purposeful functioning of commerce.”
*298No-fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act, July 19, 1974, P.L. 489, No. 176, Art. I § 102(a)(3); 40 P.S. § 1009.102(a)(3).
The purpose or object of the No-fault Act is stated as follows:
[I]t is hereby declared to be the policy of the General Assembly to establish ... a statewide system of prompt and adequate basic loss benefits for motor vehicle accident victims and the survivors of deceased victims.
No-fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act, July 19, 1974, P.L. 489, No. 176, Art. I § 102(b); 40 P.S. § 1009.102(b).
In construing a statute, appropriate recognition must be accorded to the canon of construction that the legislature intends every provision and word to have effect. Statutory Construction Act, 1972, Sec. 6, P.L. 1339, No. 290, § 3(a); 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(a); See: Commonwealth v. Driscoll, 485 Pa. 99, 401 A.2d 312 (1979); Lukus v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 276 Pa.Super. 232, 419 A.2d 431 (1980).
A child, parent, brother and sister, as set forth in the No-fault Act, are all relatives of a deceased victim. If the legislature intended that all relatives, other than a spouse, must prove dependency, then the words, “child, parent, brother, sister” have no meaning in the context of the Act and their separate listing is wholly unnecessary. The interpretation adopted by the majority reduces to surplusage the words, “child, parent, brother, sister.” Additionally, this construction tends to nullify the definition of “Survivor’s Loss” as set forth in the No-fault Act.
“Survivor’s Loss” means the:
(A) loss of income of a deceased victim which would probably have been contributed to a survivor or survivors, if such victim had not sustained the fatal injury; and
(B) expenses reasonably incurred by a survivor or survivors, after a victim’s death resulting from injury, in obtaining ordinary and necessary services in lieu of those which the victim would have performed, not for income, but for their benefit, if he had not sustained the fatal injury.
*299No-fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act, July 19, 1974, P.L. 489, No. 176, Art. I, § 103; 40 P.S. § 1009.103.
Under the majority’s interpretation, a child, parent, brother and sister is required to prove both dependency on the deceased and that the decedent would probably have contributed income to him or her. If the claimant was dependent upon the deceased for support, it is axiomatic that decedent would have contributed income to the surviving claimant. Subsection (A) of the definition of “Survivor’s Loss” then would be excess baggage and of no effect.
An additional construction aid courts of this Commonwealth have employed in construing statutes is the “last antecedent rule”. This principle provides that: When a phrase follows several expressions to which it might be applied, application of the phrase is to be limited to the last antecedent. Buntz v. General American Life Ins. Co., 136 Pa.Super. 284, 7 A.2d 93 (1939); See: Midboe v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., (Dissenting Opinion, Larsen, J.) 495 Pa. 348, 433 A.2d 1342 (1981).
Applying this rule here and considering the purpose and sense of the entire No-fault Act, I would hold that the phrase “dependent upon the deceased for support” applies only to relative, and does not apply to those class of kin who are designated prior to relative in Subsection (B) of the definition of survivor.
“Insurance statutes are to be liberally construed to effect their purposes and to promote justice. 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1928(c). Sheppard v. Old Republic Life Insurance Co., 21 Pa.Cmwlth. 360, 346 A.2d 383 (1975).”
Midboe v. State Farm Mutual Ins. Co., (Dissenting Opinion, Larsen, J.) 495 Pa. 348, 433 A.2d 1342, 1349 (1981).
Accordingly, I would affirm and hold that a child, parent, brother and sister need not prove dependency, but need only to show that the deceased would probably have contributed income to him or her for entitlement to survivor’s benefits under the No-fault Act. Only a relative other than a child, *300parent, brother and sister, (and spouse), need to show dependency.
I dissent.

. Dr. Barry C. Chesler was employed as a resident in obstetrics and gynecology earning $16,112.00 a year.

. It was stipulated that decedent's mother would have received a sum in excess of $5,000.00 in voluntary contributions from the deceased had he not been killed.