Court Opinion

ID: 9375723
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-28 18:00:53.336475+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:01.126218
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                            FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

 KEITH ANGELO JACKSON,

                       Plaintiff,

                       v.                         Case No. 1:22-cv-2058 (CRC)

 WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN
 AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY, et al.,

                       Defendant.

                                    MEMORANDUM OPINION

       Keith Angelo Jackson was fired from his job as a bus driver with the Washington

Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (“WMATA”) after WMATA found that he lied in an

unsuccessful effort to obtain workers’ compensation benefits. Taking issue with the finding,

Jackson filed suit in District of Columbia Superior Court against WMATA; Lucious Rucker, the

supervisor who issued his termination letter; and Sedgwick Claims Services, Inc., a benefits

administrator which denied Jackson’s workers’ compensation claim. Jackson’s complaint

alleges defamation and wrongful termination stemming from his firing and seeks $2.4 million in

damages.

       After receiving service, WMATA appeared through its Office of General Counsel and

removed the case to this Court. Notice of Removal. It then filed a motion to dismiss under

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), urging dismissal of the complaint as to

all three defendants. The Court will grant the motion and dismiss the case.
       WMATA was established through an interstate compact executed by Maryland, Virginia,

and Washington, D.C. The compact contains a specific provision, Section 80, on liability for

contract and tort claims. It states:

              The Authority shall be liable for its contracts and for its torts and those of its
       Directors, officers, employees and agent committed in the conduct of any proprietary
       function . . . but shall not be liable for any torts occurring in the performance of a
       governmental function. The exclusive remedy for such breach of contracts and torts for
       which the Authority shall be liable, as herein provided, shall be by suit against the
       Authority.

       Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth. Compact, D.C. CODE § 9-1107.01(80) (2022)

(“Compact”).

       The courts of this Circuit have uniformly held that WMATA’s discretionary personnel

decisions are governmental functions that enjoy immunity from tort liability under Section 80 of

the WMATA Compact. See, e.g., Beebe v. WMATA, 129 F.3d 1283, 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1997)

(“Although employment decisions are not quintessential governmental functions . . . decisions

concerning the hiring, training, and supervising of WMATA employees are discretionary in

nature, and thus immune from judicial review.” (internal quotations and citation omitted)); Tapp

v. WMATA., 306 F. Supp. 3d 383, 397 (D.D.C. 2016) (“[D]ecisions regarding the firing of

WMATA employees are discretionary” and thus immunized). Because Jackson’s allegations of

defamation and wrongful termination describe classic tort claims arising from WMATA’s

discretionary personnel decision, WMATA is immune from suit and, as a result, the Court lacks

jurisdiction over the claims against it.

       WMATA’s tort immunity has also been held to extend to its employees so long as their

conduct “falls within the scope of their official duties and the conduct is discretionary in nature.”

Beebe, 129 F.3d at 1289 (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). The sum of

Jackson’s claims against his supervisor, Mr. Rucker, is that he was a “participant[] in [the]

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alleged allegation” of untruthfulness that resulted in Jackson’s termination. Compl. at 1. That

alleged conduct falls within the scope of Rucker’s discretionary duties as a WMATA employee.

Rucker is therefore entitled to immunity, meaning the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction

over the claims against him as well.

       That leaves Sedgwick, which Jackson merely alleges was a “participant” in his

termination, along with Mr. Rucker. As quoted above, the WMATA Compact immunizes “the

Authority” not only for torts based on its discretionary conduct, but also for those based on the

discretionary conduct of its “Directors, officers, employees and agent . . . .” Compact § 80

(emphasis added). Although WMATA does not offer any caselaw for the proposition that

WMATA’s non-employee agents are themselves immune from tort liability premised on their

own discretionary conduct, the cases it cites extending immunity to WMATA employees appear

to apply with equal force to WMATA’s contracted agents. See also Johnson v. Bechtel Assocs.

Pro. Corp., D.C., 717 F.2d 574, 580 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (The use of “agent” in the Compact applies

to independent contractors), rev'd sub nom. on other grounds, WMATA v. Johnson, 467 U.S.

925 (1984); Beebe, 129 F.3d at 1287 (Section 80 of the Compact “retain[s] immunity for torts

committed by [WMATA’s] agents ‘in the performance of a governmental function.’” (quoting

Compact § 80)). Jackson offers no contrary argument in his opposition to the motion to dismiss.

       WMATA makes a conclusory assertion in its motion that Sedgwick is “WMATA’s

agent,” without offering a declaration or any other evidence to explain the relationship between

the two entities. Mot. to Dismiss at 1. And Sedgwick has not separately appeared in the case. 1

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        It appears that Sedgwick has not been properly served. Jackson filed proof of service as
to Sedgwick in the form of a certified mail receipt showing delivery of the Superior Court
summons and complaint to a post-office box in Kentucky. Notice of Removal, Ex. 9 at 2.
However, the applicable service rules required Jackson to serve the company either personally
though one of its officers or officials, through its registered agent for service, or through
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Ordinarily, that would not be enough to support a factual finding regarding the Court’s subject

matter jurisdiction. Here, however, Jackson has appended copious evidentiary material to his

complaint, including documents indicating that Sedgwick’s role in the case is limited to

administering WMATA’s workers’ compensation claims, a quintessential function of a corporate

agent. See Notice of Removal, Ex. 2 at 9 (WMATA Notification of Workers’ Compensation

Claim Compensability Decision Form listing Sedgwick as the claims receiver); id. at 8 (Letter

from Rucker indicating that WMATA was “advised by Sedgwick that [Jackson’s] Workers’

Compensation claim has been denied”); id. at 11 (Memorandum of Informal Conference noting

that Sedgwick was the “Insurance Carrier” for Jackson’s claim). Regardless, whether Sedgwick

has appeared, the Court has an obligation to assess its subject matter jurisdiction over the entire

case. And the Court may readily consider the evidence Jackson has put before it on a Rule

12(b)(1) motion to dismiss. Having done so, the Court concludes that Sedgwick is WMATA’s

agent for purposes of this suit and, as outlined above, is immune from its discretionary conduct

in connection with Jackson’s termination.

       What’s more, Section 80 of the Compact provides that “[t]he exclusive remedy for

such . . . torts for which the Authority shall be liable” – which include torts committed by its

“Directors, officers, employees and agent” – shall be a “suit against the Authority.” Compact

§ 80. Jackson’s sole allegation against Sedgwick is that it “participated” in WMATA’s slander

and wrongful termination through its role as WMATA’s claims administrator. So, to the extent

registered or certified mail to its principal office. See D.C. Code § 29–104.12 (2022). Sedgwick
appears to be incorporated in Illinois and to have its principal office in Tennessee. See
Corporation File Detail Report, Office of the Illinois Secretary of State,
https://apps.ilsos.gov/corporatellc/CorporateLlcController (last visited Feb. 13, 2023) (search
“Sedgwick Claims Management Services”); Business Entity Detail, Tennessee Secretary of
State, https://tnbear.tn.gov/Ecommerce/FilingSearch.aspx (last visited Feb. 13, 2023) (same).
So, sending the complaint to a Kentucky post-office box was likely deficient.
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that Jackson has any viable claim against Sedgwick based on conduct it committed as

WMATA’s agent, his “exclusive remedy” would be a “suit against the Authority.” See Johnson,

717 F.2d at 577 (“Bechtel was an agent of WMATA and therefore, under section 80 of the

Compact, WMATA is exclusively liable for Bechtel’s torts.”). Jackson has no separate cause of

action against Sedgwick, so the Court lacks jurisdiction over the claims against Sedgwick on that

alternative basis as well.

       Accordingly, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claims against all

defendants and will therefore dismiss the case in its entirety. A separate order will follow.

                                                             CHRISTOPHER R. COOPER
                                                             United States District Judge

Date: February 28, 2023

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