Court Opinion

ID: 9895969
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-08 23:04:06.462028+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:11.003656
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/8/23 Robinson v. County of Los Angeles CA2/3
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
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purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                      SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                  DIVISION THREE

 KEISHA ROBINSON,                                                    B317521

          Plaintiff and Appellant,                                   (Los Angeles County
                                                                     Super. Ct. No. 20STCV01022)
          v.

 COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES,

          Defendant and Respondent.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, William Fahey, Judge. Affirmed in part,
reversed in part, and remanded.
      The Finkel Firm, Jake Finkel, Sheryl Marx; Law Office of
Maximilian Lee and Maximilian Lee, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
      Peterson, Bradford, Burkwitz, Gregorio, Burkwitz, and Su,
Avi Burkwitz, Gil Burkwitz, and Avery Canty, for Defendant and
Respondent.
                 ‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗

       Plaintiff and appellant Keisha Robinson sued defendant
and respondent County of Los Angeles (the County), alleging
several violations of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (the
FEHA), Government Code section 12900 et seq.1 Robinson
alleges that while employed by the County Public Defender’s
office in Long Beach, she was subjected to sexual harassment and
terminated as the result of gender and disability discrimination.
She also asserts the County failed to engage in an interactive
process in good faith, failed to provide a reasonable
accommodation, retaliated against her, and failed to investigate
and prevent harassment and discrimination.
       The trial court granted the County’s motion for summary
judgment or, alternatively, summary adjudication. We affirm as
to Robinson’s claims for sexual harassment and gender
discrimination. We reverse as to Robinson’s claims for disability
discrimination, failure to accommodate, failure to engage in the
interactive process, retaliation, and failure to prevent
discrimination.
        FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       Robinson began working for the County in 1999. In 2015,
she suffered a permanent injury while working for the County’s
fire department, caused by repetitive typing.
       In late March 2018, Robinson began working at the County
Public Defender’s Long Beach office as a student professional
worker. A student professional worker is employed part time
while also attending school, and Robinson worked approximately

1    All undesignated statutory references are to the
Government Code.

                                2
30 hours a week. The County’s official job description for the
position encompasses a wide range of possible duties depending
on the occupational area, including tasks such as assisting in
filing legal documents and preparing reports. The job description
indicates the student worker will do “related clerical work as
required.”
       Olivia Janelle Wyatt supervised Robinson. Wyatt’s
supervisor was Gregory McCambridge. Robinson performed
clerical tasks, including answering phones, helping clients,
conducting research, making copies, data entry, and typing.
Facts Relevant to the Sexual Harassment and Gender
Discrimination Claims
       Robinson alleged that McCambridge frequently leered and
stared at her “in a sexual manner.” She tried to avoid him
because he made her uncomfortable. In late April 2018, at a
work party for Administrative Staff Appreciation Day,
McCambridge gave two male employees cards and shook their
hands. When McCambridge handed Robinson a card, he hugged
her instead of shaking her hand. In a declaration filed in
opposition to the motion for summary judgment, Robinson
indicated the hug was unwanted. She “felt completely grossed
out and embarrassed” and was “very upset.”
       Around one week later, McCambridge came up behind
Robinson as she worked in her cubicle and said something like,
“ ‘Hey, Keisha, when are you gonna [sic] stop going on those porn
sites’ ” or “ ‘You know you’re not supposed to be on the porn.’ ”2

2     In a May 31, 2018 complaint letter, Robinson indicated
McCambridge made the comment on one of the first days of her
employment, and that he said: “ ‘Make sure you stay off those
porn sites.’ ”

                                3
Robinson was shocked and embarrassed. She felt this was an
invitation to flirt and believed “McCambridge’s demeanor
changed to angry” when she “did not respond in the manner that
McCambridge wanted.”
       According to McCambridge, he did not see pornography or
anything inappropriate on Robinson’s computer when he made
the comment. He told Robinson to stay off of pornography sites
because “she had access to the internet but cannot utilize it for
inappropriate reasons,” and he told her “what [he] tell[s] all the
lawyers.” McCambridge explained that he gave this instruction
to Robinson and not the employee working next to her because
that employee already knew the policy.
Facts Relevant to the Disability-Related Claims and
Termination
       Near the end of her shift on Friday, May 25, 2018, just
before Memorial Day weekend, Robinson gave Wyatt a letter
from a doctor indicating Robinson had medical restrictions. The
letter stated that Robinson could not work at a computer screen
for longer than 30 minutes per hour, and could not push, pull, or
lift anything over 20 pounds. When Robinson gave Wyatt the
letter, Wyatt asked “ ‘Why are you giving me this now?’ ”
Robinson responded that she had just received the letter, and
Wyatt replied that they would have to hold a meeting to discuss
the letter.
       On Tuesday, May 29, the first workday after the holiday
weekend, Wyatt told Robinson “10 to 20 times” that they were
going to have a meeting about the letter. By this time, Lorraine
Moore Welch, a return-to-work coordinator in the human
resources department, was involved. According to an e-mail
Welch sent to her supervisor in June 2018, she, Wyatt, and

                                4
McCambridge met together first, before meeting with Robinson,
on May 29. Wyatt reported that she had no work Robinson could
do. McCambridge thought it was possible other attorneys might
have work for Robinson. Welch recounted that McCambridge
said “he would check” and “let us know the following day. We
informed the [employee] we will let her know, and if we were
unable to locate a position, we would have to release her.”3
       However, according to Welch’s e-mail, that same afternoon,
the County held the “interactive process meeting” regarding
Robinson’s medical restrictions. Robinson, Wyatt, and
McCambridge attended in person. Welch attended
telephonically. At her deposition, Welch testified that Wyatt said
Robinson could not perform the duties of her current role given
her work restrictions. Welch’s e-mail summarized the meeting:
“During the [interactive process meeting], both [Wyatt and
McCambridge] confirmed there were no assignments that would
accommodate [Robinson’s] work restrictions and as the HR Rep I
informed the [employee] of the release. After the meeting, we
discussed it further, and [McCambridge] really wanted to find
work for her because he hated to lose the resource.”
       Wyatt testified that the interactive process meeting ended
with her and McCambridge trying to figure out “other tasks” for
Robinson, so she told Robinson to “sit at her cubicle and just . . .
relax, what have you, until the next day.” McCambridge testified
that it was his understanding at the end of the meeting that
Robinson was still employed.

3     The e-mail does not clearly indicate when Robinson was
informed that “[they would] let her know,” as she was not present
during the “pre-meet.”

                                 5
       Robinson, however, testified that during the meeting
McCambridge said he did not believe Robinson could do her job
with the restrictions on computer use.4 Robinson also testified
that Welch explained they did not have any work for her. Welch
told Robinson she could clean out her desk and leave. Robinson
began to cry and was emotional. According to Robinson, no one
told her they would look for another position for her.
       It is undisputed that Robinson did not return to work the
next day. According to Robinson, Wyatt called her two days after
the meeting and asked why she had not reported for work.
Robinson responded: “ ‘I was’ – ‘you guys said I was fired.’ And
but actually [Wyatt] was calling to tell me that, ‘Because you’re
fired, if you want your check, you need to bring your badge, and
you need to bring your keys in order to get your check.’ ”
       According to Wyatt, she called Robinson the day after the
meeting and asked if she planned to come to work. Robinson
replied she did not plan to return because it would be a “hostile
environment.” Wyatt then told Robinson that if she was not
planning on returning to work, she would need to come into the
office to complete exit paperwork, which Robinson did on May 31.
On that day, Wyatt again asked if Robinson intended to sign in
and work, and Robinson again replied that she would not return
to work because she thought it would be a “hostile environment.”
       The same day, Robinson sent a letter to the Los Angeles
County Board of Supervisors claiming she was terminated and
harassed because of her disability. She also reported
McCambridge’s pornography comment. The letter prompted an
inquiry by a public defender’s office employee responsible for

4     Robinson testified that McCambridge used his own position
as an analogy, stating that he used a computer all day.

                                6
conducting County “policy of equity” complaint investigations.
The employee interviewed Robinson. There is no evidence in the
record about the outcome of the investigation.
Procedural History
       In January 2020, Robinson filed suit against the County.
Her operative first amended complaint asserts seven causes of
action under the FEHA: (1) sexual harassment; (2) gender
discrimination; (3) disability discrimination; (4) failure to
accommodate; (5) failure to engage in the interactive process;
(6) retaliation; and (7) failure to investigate and prevent
harassment and discrimination.
       The County moved for summary judgment, or, in the
alternative, summary adjudication of all claims. In December
2021, the trial court granted the motion in its entirety. The court
found there was no triable issue of material fact regarding sexual
harassment because the incidents Robinson described were not
severe or pervasive. The court further found there was no
evidence of gender discrimination and that Robinson had failed to
support her gender discrimination claim with legal argument;
Robinson could not establish the County had taken any adverse
employment action against her, thus her claims for gender and
disability discrimination and retaliation necessarily failed. As to
the disability claims, the court additionally found Robinson could
not perform her basic job requirements, and the claims asserting
a failure to accommodate and to engage in the interactive process
failed because the County had the right to determine if Robinson
could be accommodated. The court concluded the undisputed
evidence established that Robinson failed to return to work and
thereby ended the interactive process herself. Finally, the court

                                7
determined Robinson’s remaining claims were derivative of the
discrimination and harassment claims and therefore also failed.
       Robinson timely appealed from the judgment.
                            DISCUSSION
I.     Standard of Review
       Summary judgment is appropriate if there are no triable
issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c);
Regents of University of California v. Superior Court (2018) 4
Cal.5th 607, 618.) A defendant moving for summary judgment
has the initial burden of showing that a cause of action lacks
merit because the plaintiff cannot establish an element of the
cause of action or there is a complete defense. (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 437c, subd. (p)(2); Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25
Cal.4th 826, 853 (Aguilar).) If the defendant satisfies this initial
burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to present evidence
demonstrating there is a triable issue of material fact based on
specific facts. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); Aguilar, at
p. 850.)
       “There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the
evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the
underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in
accordance with the applicable standard of proof.” (Aguilar,
supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850.) “In determining if the papers show
that there is no triable issue as to any material fact, the court
shall consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers, except
the evidence to which objections have been made and sustained
by the court, and all inferences reasonably deducible from the
evidence, except summary judgment shall not be granted by the
court based on inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence

                                  8
if contradicted by other inferences or evidence that raise a triable
issue as to any material fact.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)
       “ ‘ “We liberally construe the evidence in support of the
party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning
the evidence in favor of that party.” ’ [Citation.]” (Hampton v.
County of San Diego (2015) 62 Cal.4th 340, 347.) We apply the
same standard in reviewing an order granting summary
adjudication. (Mireskandari v. Edwards Wildman Palmer LLP
(2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 247, 256–257.)
       In the employment discrimination context, the employee’s
“subjective beliefs . . . do not create a genuine issue of fact; nor do
uncorroborated and self-serving declarations.” (King v. United
Parcel Service, Inc. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 426, 433 (King);
accord Featherstone v. Southern California Permanente Medical
Group (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1150, 1159 (Featherstone).)
II.    The Trial Court Properly Granted Summary
       Adjudication of Robinson’s Sexual Harassment and
       Gender Discrimination Claims
       A.     Hostile work environment
       Under the FEHA, an employer is prohibited from harassing
an employee because of sex or gender. (§ 12940, subd. (j)(1).)
Unlike discrimination claims, “harassment often does not involve
any official exercise of delegated power on behalf of the
employer,” but rather “focuses on situations in which the social
environment of the workplace becomes intolerable because the
harassment (whether verbal, physical, or visual) communicates
an offensive message to the harassed employee.” (Roby v.
McKesson Corp. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 686, 706.)
       To prevail on her sexual harassment claim based on a
hostile work environment, Robinson must show: “(1) she is a

                                  9
member of a protected class; (2) she was subjected to unwelcome
harassment; (3) the harassment was based on her protected
status; (4) the harassment unreasonably interfered with her work
performance by creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive
work environment; and (5) defendants are liable for the
harassment.” (Ortiz v. Dameron Hospital Assn. (2019) 37
Cal.App.5th 568, 581 (Ortiz).) Actionable conduct must be
“ ‘severe enough or sufficiently pervasive to alter the conditions of
employment and create a work environment that qualifies as
hostile or abusive to employees.’ ” (Id. at p. 582; accord Alexander
v. Community Hospital of Long Beach (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 238,
262.)
       The conduct must be more than “annoying or ‘merely
offensive’ comments,” and it cannot be “occasional, isolated,
sporadic, or trivial; rather, the employee must show a concerted
pattern of harassment of a repeated, routine, or a generalized
nature.” (Lyle v. Warner Brothers Television Productions (2006)
38 Cal.4th 264, 283 (Lyle).) “[W]e consider several factors,
including ‘ “the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its
severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a
mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes
with an employee’s work performance.” ’ [Citation.]” (Cornell v.
Berkeley Tennis Club (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 908, 940 (Cornell).)
       Whether the harassment is sufficiently severe or pervasive
to create a hostile work environment “must be assessed from the
‘perspective of a reasonable person belonging to [the same
protected class as] the plaintiff.’ [Citation.]” (Nazir v. United
Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243, 264 (Nazir).) In
addition, an employee must “subjectively” perceive the work
environment to be hostile. (Ortiz, supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at

                                 10
p. 583.) In other words, a plaintiff must show that the
“ ‘ “conduct would have interfered with a reasonable employee’s
work performance and would have seriously affected the
psychological well-being of a reasonable employee and that [she]
was actually offended.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Ibid., italics
added.) In Lyle, the California Supreme Court explained that
conduct interferes with an employee’s work performance if it
results in the loss of a concrete job benefit or if the plaintiff
satisfies the “ ‘ “commensurately higher showing” ’ ” that the
conduct “ ‘ “was pervasive and destructive of the working
environment.” ’ [Citations.]” (Lyle, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 284.)
       Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature amended the
FEHA to clarify that, among other things, “[a] single incident of
harassing conduct is sufficient to create a triable issue regarding
the existence of a hostile work environment if the harassing
conduct has unreasonably interfered with the plaintiff’s work
performance or created an intimidating, hostile, or offensive
working environment.” (§ 12923, subd. (b).)
       Section 12923, subdivision (a) also states: “[H]arassment
creates a hostile, offensive, oppressive, or intimidating work
environment and deprives victims of their statutory right to work
in a place free of discrimination when the harassing conduct
sufficiently offends, humiliates, distresses, or intrudes upon its
victim, so as to disrupt the victim’s emotional tranquility in the
workplace, affect the victim’s ability to perform the job as usual,
or otherwise interfere with and undermine the victim’s personal
sense of well-being. In this regard, the Legislature affirms its
approval of the standard set forth by Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg in her concurrence in Harris v. Forklift Systems (1993)
510 U.S. 17 that in a workplace harassment suit ‘the plaintiff

                                11
need not prove that his or her tangible productivity has declined
as a result of the harassment. It suffices to prove that a
reasonable person subjected to the discriminatory conduct would
find, as the plaintiff did, that the harassment so altered working
conditions as to make it more difficult to do the job.’ [Citation.]”
        The parties dispute whether section 12923 applies
retroactively to the conduct in this case, which occurred in 2018.
We need not decide this issue. Even considering the text of
section 12923, which still requires “severe or pervasive” conduct
(§ 12923, subd. (b)), summary adjudication was warranted.
        Robinson alleged only two incidents and one type of conduct
in support of her hostile work environment claim. First, at a staff
appreciation event, McCambridge hugged Robinson instead of
shaking her hand as he did with two male employees. Second,
McCambridge told Robinson to stay off “porn” sites, making
Robinson uncomfortable and appearing to flirt with her. Third,
McCambridge frequently stared at Robinson in a sexual manner.
        Taken together and liberally construed in Robinson’s favor,
this evidence is insufficient for a reasonable factfinder to
conclude Robinson’s workplace was “ ‘permeated with
discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that [was]
“ ‘sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of
[Robinson’s] employment and create an abusive working
environment.’ ” ’ [Citations.]” (Nazir, supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at
p. 263.) There was no evidence that McCambridge’s hug was
unduly prolonged, sexualized, intimidating, threatening, or
demeaning, or that McCambridge touched Robinson on any other
occasion. (Cf. Zetwick v. County of Yolo (9th Cir. 2017) 850 F.3d
436, 438–439, 444 [holding that a reasonable juror could find
conduct severe under the FEHA where there were unwelcome

                                12
hugs on more than 100 occasions, and at least one unwelcome
kiss].)
       Similarly, McCambridge’s pornography admonition was not
“explicitly derogatory or threatening” to Robinson. (Cornell,
supra, 18 Cal.App.5th at p. 940.) Further, a sole derogatory
comment does not create a triable issue of fact. (Ibid. [“Four
comments over several months does not establish a pattern of
routine harassment . . . particularly given that the comments
were not extreme”].) Aside from Robinson’s subjective and
uncorroborated statement that she felt the pornography comment
was flirtatious, there is no basis to infer that the comment was
motivated by a gender-based discriminatory intent. (Pantoja v.
Anton (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 87, 131–132.) The “FEHA is ‘not a
“civility code” and [is] not designed to rid the workplace of
vulgarity.’ [Citations.]” (Lyle, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 295.) It
“does not outlaw . . . language or conduct that merely offends.”
(Ibid.)
       That Robinson alleges McCambridge stared at her in a
sexual manner does not alter the analysis. Staring that is the
manifestation of unwanted sexual advances, or of sex-based
animus, may constitute actionable sexual harassment under the
FEHA when considered along with other harassing conduct. Yet,
Robinson proffered no evidence from which a reasonable
factfinder could infer the staring was related to her gender.
       Birschtein v. New United Motor Manufacturing, Inc. (2001)
92 Cal.App.4th 994 (Birschtein) provides an instructive contrast.
In Birschtein, a co-worker asked the plaintiff on dates three or
four times, told her he wanted to “ ‘eat her,’ ” and described his
sexual fantasies about her in detail. (Id. at pp. 997–998.) When
the plaintiff rejected his advances and complained to

                               13
management, the co-worker began a “campaign of staring” at the
plaintiff. (Id. at p. 998.) He drove past her workstation five to 10
times a day and stared directly at her for several seconds each
time. (Ibid.) After the plaintiff complained, the co-worker
reduced the staring incidents to two or three times a day; once he
drove past the plaintiff’s workstation and stared at her while
grabbing his crotch. (Id. at pp. 998–999.)
       The Birschtein court concluded this evidence was sufficient
to withstand summary adjudication of the plaintiff’s sexual
harassment claim. As the court explained, “[w]hat began as [the
co-worker’s] overt acts of sexual harassment (asking for dates,
the ‘eat you’ remarks, his specifically sexual bathing fantasies)
were later transmuted by plaintiff’s reaction . . . into an allegedly
daily series of retaliatory acts—the prolonged campaign of staring
at plaintiff—acts that were directly related to, indeed assertedly
grew out of, the antecedent unlawful harassment.” (Birschtein,
supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at p. 1002.)
       Here, there was no evidence the conduct was severe or
pervasive, aside from Robinson’s conclusory statements that the
staring was “frequent” and “all the time.” The evidence did not
indicate that McCambridge sought Robinson out to stare at her,
as was the case in Birschtein, and there is no evidence as to the
duration of the staring. (King, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at p. 433
[“subjective beliefs” do not create a triable issue of fact].) In
contrast to Birschtein, there is no evidence the staring here was
accompanied by descriptions of sexual fantasies or sexual
interest. (Birschtein, supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at pp. 997–998.) The
evidence also created no inference that the staring was
retaliatory conduct arising out of unlawful harassment. Indeed,
the evidence failed to suggest that sexual advances, sex-based

                                 14
animus, or any motivation related to gender were the reasons for
the staring.
       Under California law, “when the harassing conduct is not
severe in the extreme, more than a few isolated incidents must
have occurred to prove a claim based on working conditions.”
(Lyle, supra, 18 Cal.App.5th at p. 284.) Here, there is specific
evidence only of the pornography comment and the hugging
incident, and non-specific evidence of McCambridge staring at
Robinson. Robinson’s declaration and testimony indicated
McCambridge’s behavior upset her and made her uncomfortable
when it occurred, but she offered no evidence that the behavior
made it more difficult for her to do her job. Even considered
together and liberally construed in Robinson’s favor, this
evidence fails to provide a basis for a reasonable factfinder to
conclude McCambridge’s conduct interfered with Robinson’s work
performance or altered her working conditions. The County met
its burden of showing Robinson was not subjected to sufficiently
severe or pervasive conduct and Robinson did not counter by
showing a triable issue of material fact. Summary adjudication
was proper.
       B.    Gender discrimination
       The FEHA prohibits an employer from terminating an
employee based on gender. (§ 12940, subd. (a).) To establish a
prima facie case of discrimination under the FEHA, a plaintiff
must show he or she was (1) a member of a protected class;
(2) qualified for the position or was performing competently in
the position he or she held; (3) suffered an adverse employment
action, such as termination; and (4) some other circumstance
suggested discriminatory motive. (Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc.
(2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 355 (Guz).)

                              15
       “Once a plaintiff establishes a prima face case, the
employer is required to offer a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason
for the adverse employment action. If the employer produces a
legitimate reason for the adverse employment action . . . the
burden shifts back to the employee to prove intentional
retaliation or discrimination. This is the three-part burden
shifting analysis of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) 411
U.S. 792, 802–805 . . . adopted by California for use in FEHA
cases. [Citations.]” (Khoiny v. Dignity Health (2022) 76
Cal.App.5th 390, 397–398.) When the burden is shifted back to
the plaintiff, he or she must present evidence that the employer’s
decision was motivated by prohibited discrimination. (Guz,
supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 353, 357; Horsford v. Board of Trustees of
California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 377 [“A
plaintiff’s burden is . . . to produce evidence that, taken as a
whole, permits a rational inference that intentional
discrimination was a substantial motivating factor in the
employer’s actions toward the plaintiff”].)
       Robinson asserts that McCambridge’s involvement in the
decision to discharge her is enough to create an inference that her
termination was based on gender discrimination. She relies on
DeJung v. Superior Court (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 533 (DeJung).
In DeJung, the plaintiff, a part-time court commissioner, sought
a full-time position. The presiding justice of the superior court,
who was on the court’s executive committee, told the plaintiff
that the committee wanted someone younger. (Id. at p. 540.)
The plaintiff nonetheless applied for a full-time commissioner job
and was passed over for a younger applicant. (Id. at p. 542.) The
DeJung court concluded that under the “ ‘cat’s paw’ ” doctrine,
the plaintiff was not required to show that every individual who

                                16
participated in the hiring decision shared a discriminatory
animus in order to defeat summary judgment. “[S]howing that a
significant participant in an employment decision exhibited
discriminatory animus is enough to raise an inference that the
employment decision itself was discriminatory, even absent
evidence that others in the process harbored such animus.” (Id.
at p. 551.)
       While it is undisputed McCambridge participated in the
interactive process meeting, there is no evidence that he was
motivated to terminate Robinson because of her gender. Rather,
there is undisputed evidence that McCambridge wanted to keep
Robinson on staff. In Welch’s email to her supervisor about
Robinson’s interactive process meeting, she wrote that
McCambridge said he “hated to lose the resource,” and he wanted
to try to find Robinson a different position.
       Robinson suggests McCambridge demonstrated sex or
gender-based animus when he engaged in the conduct she alleges
was evidence of sexual harassment. Yet, as explained above,
even viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to
Robinson as the non-moving party, it fails to create a reasonable
inference that McCambridge harbored a discriminatory animus
toward Robinson because of her gender that would have tainted
the termination decision. Without more, the subjective,
conclusory statements in Robinson’s declaration do not create a
triable issue of fact. (King, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at p. 433; cf.
Kelly v. Stamps.com Inc. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 1088, 1099–1101
[finding evidence that termination was motivated by sex
discrimination based on comment that plaintiff had “ ‘checked
out’ ” when she was pregnant, and overall attitude towards

                                17
retention of plaintiff was negative, along with evidence that
manager’s explanation for discharge was untrue].)
      In addition, there is undisputed evidence that if Robinson
was terminated at the interactive process meeting, it was because
Wyatt and McCambridge concluded she could not perform her job
in compliance with her medical restrictions. While Robinson
contends this was evidence of unlawful disability discrimination,
she has not presented any evidence that the explanation was also
a pretext for gender discrimination. (Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at
pp. 353, 357.)
      The trial court properly granted summary adjudication of
Robinson’s claim for gender discrimination.
III. There Are Triable Issues of Material Fact as to
      Robinson’s Disability-Related Claims
      A.     Disability discrimination
      Under the FEHA, to prevail on a discriminatory discharge
claim under section 12940, subdivision (a) based on physical
disability, an employee is required to show he or she (1) suffered
from a disability, (2) could perform the essential duties of the job
with or without reasonable accommodation, and (3) suffered an
adverse employment action because of the disability or perceived
disability. (Zamora v. Security Industry Specialists, Inc. (2021)
71 Cal.App.5th 1, 37–38; Lui v. City and County of San Francisco
(2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 962, 970–971 (Lui).) Section 12940,
subdivision (a)(1) “does not prohibit an employer from . . .
discharging an employee with a . . . disability . . . if the employee,
because of a physical or mental disability, is unable to perform
the employee’s essential duties even with reasonable
accommodations . . . .”

                                 18
       The County does not dispute that Robinson can establish
that she suffers from a disability. Our analysis thus turns on the
second and third elements: whether Robinson suffered an adverse
employment action, and whether the County has presented
evidence Robinson could not perform the essential elements of
her position with or without a reasonable accommodation. For
the reasons below, we find Robinson established triable issues of
material fact as to both elements.
             i. Adverse employment action
       The County argues Robinson cannot show there was an
adverse employment action because she resigned. As described
above, the County provided evidence in the form of testimony
from McCambridge, Wyatt, and Welch that the County did not
terminate Robinson’s employment at the interactive process
meeting and, instead, the supervisors told her they would look for
“other tasks” for her and to return the next day. The County’s
evidence indicated it was Robinson who then declined to return to
work, asserting she would be subjected to a “hostile environment”
if she returned. This evidence supported the County’s burden as
the moving party to establish Robinson cannot show an essential
element of her claim: that she suffered an adverse employment
action. (Cornell, supra, 18 Cal.App.5th at p. 926.)
       However, Robinson proffered evidence from which a
reasonable fact finder could conclude she was terminated.
(Cornell, supra, 18 Cal.App.5th at p. 926.) Robinson testified
that at the end of the interactive process meeting, Welch told her
there was no work for her and she should clean out her desk and
pack her things. Robinson also testified that Wyatt called her
two days later to tell her: “ ‘Because you’re fired, if you want your
check, you need to bring your badge, and you need to bring your

                                 19
keys in order to get your check.’ ” Robinson’s declaration states
that during the interactive process meeting, no one told her they
would try to find her another position.
       While Robinson’s subjective beliefs and self-serving
statements alone may not create a triable issue of fact (King,
supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at p. 433), she supported her statements
with a significant piece of evidence, a statement from the human
resources representative. Welch’s June 2018 email to her
supervisor indicated that at the interactive process meeting,
“[Wyatt and McCambridge] confirmed there were no assignments
that would accommodate [Robinson’s] work restrictions and as
the HR Rep. I informed the [employee] of the release.”5 Erin
Campos, another County human resources employee, testified
that “release” and “termination” both mean end of employment.
While the e-mail indicated that even after the meeting
McCambridge wanted to find work for Robinson, Welch did not
refer to or describe any efforts to search for a different position
after the meeting concluded.

5      Welch later testified at a deposition that she did not tell
Robinson she was being released, indicating the contrary line in
the e-mail was a mistake or a misinterpretation. Yet, when
asked again whether she wrote the line in the e-mail, Welch
testified: “That is what I informed the employee. If we are unable
to find a location to accommodate her, then that would most
likely be what would happen. She would be released, but we
never got to that point . . . . Like I said, we would have to get
back to her.” This testimony was contradictory, unclear, and did
not conclusively invalidate the inference that may otherwise be
drawn from the e-mail that Welch in fact told Robinson during
the meeting that the County was terminating her employment.

                                20
       Drawing all reasonable inferences in Robinson’s favor as we
must (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 843), and “liberally
construing her evidentiary submission while strictly scrutinizing
[the County’s] own showing” (Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 768), we conclude there is a triable issue of
fact as to whether Robinson was terminated during the May 29
interactive process meeting. We may not weigh the evidence or
inferences. (Aguilar, at p. 856.) A defendant’s motion for
summary judgment cannot be granted if the inferences that arise
from the defendant’s evidence—here, that Robinson was not
terminated, but was asked to return the next day—are “
‘contradicted by other inferences or evidence, which raise a
triable issue as to any material fact.’ (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c,
subd. (c).)” (Ibid.) The County’s evidence that Robinson resigned
is contradicted by Welch’s statement in her email that she
informed Robinson of “the release” at the interactive process
meeting, in addition to Robinson’s testimony. Robinson has
therefore set forth “specific facts” showing a triable issue as to
whether she suffered an adverse employment action. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)
             ii. Ability to perform the essential duties of her
                 job
       “To prevail on summary adjudication of [a] section 12940(a)
claim, [the County] must show there is no triable issue of fact
about [Robinson’s] ability, with or without accommodation, to
perform the essential functions” of her position or another
available, vacant position. (Nadaf-Rahrov v. Neiman Marcus
Group, Inc. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 952, 963.)
       Section 12926, subdivision (f) defines “essential functions”
as “the fundamental job duties of the employment position the

                                21
individual with a disability holds or desires. ‘Essential functions’
does not include the marginal functions of the position.”
(§ 12926, subd. (f).) Evidence of whether a particular function is
essential includes the employer’s judgment of what functions are
essential, written job descriptions, the amount of time spent on
the job performing the specific function, and the past experiences
of others in the same job. (§ 12926, subd. (f)(2)(A)–(C), (F).)
       The County’s evidence was sufficient to establish that at
least one of the essential functions of Robinson’s position was
data entry, which would require the use of a computer. The
letter from Robinson’s doctor stated she could not work at a
“computer screen longer than 30 minutes an hour,” thus
impacting her ability to perform that essential function. Yet, the
County failed to offer any argument in the summary judgment
motion, or any evidence, to establish that Robinson could not
perform this essential function with accommodation. On this
basis alone, the County failed to demonstrate its entitlement to
summary adjudication of the disability discrimination claim.
       Further, both the County’s and Robinson’s evidence
demonstrated a triable issue of material fact as to whether
Robinson could perform the essential functions of her position
with accommodation. Wyatt testified that data entry was not
Robinson’s only job responsibility. She also made copies,
answered phones, and took on other unspecified tasks as the
office required. Wyatt further testified that past student
professional workers had engaged in clerical work and data
entry, as well as “whatever the office needed . . . . We found
things geared to whatever they can do.” Robinson similarly
offered evidence that her duties included indexing client records,

                                 22
filing with the clerk’s office, helping clients with their cases,
“assist[ing] the public walk-in,” and “research.”
       Human resources employee Welch testified that based on
the information she received about Robinson’s duties from the
Long Beach office staff, Robinson could not do her current job
with her medical restrictions. Welch indicated that according to
Wyatt, it was impossible for Robinson to use a computer for only
30 minutes “and then go and do something else.” However,
Welch’s opinion was based solely on Wyatt’s conclusion that there
was no work Robinson could do in compliance with her medical
restrictions. Welch did not ask Wyatt or McCambridge for
Robinson’s specific duties. Welch did not know if Robinson had
duties that did not require the use of a computer. Welch also
testified that after Robinson left the meeting, Welch stayed on
the call with Wyatt and McCambridge because they “didn’t want
to lose [Robinson]. You know, she was providing – she was
performing all job functions, and it’s hard to find employees, you
know, that can come in and do the work.”
       The County proffered no evidence setting forth how much
of each day or hour Robinson devoted to the various tasks she
had already been assigned. The only evidence that Robinson was
required to spend more than 30 minutes each hour using a
computer, or that she could not alternate computer tasks with
other duties each hour as a reasonable accommodation, was
Welch’s testimony that this is what Wyatt had indicated to her.
Yet, the County did not offer testimony from Wyatt to this effect.
Indeed, Wyatt’s testimony that she had assigned past student
professional workers tasks based on what they were capable of
doing creates an inference that there was flexibility in the duties
of the position. Further, Welch’s testimony appeared to include

                                23
the observation that Robinson had already been performing all of
the functions of the job. There were triable issues of material fact
as to Robinson’s ability to perform the essential functions of the
position with reasonable accommodation.
       B. Failure to accommodate claim
       Under the FEHA, it is an unlawful employment practice for
an employer “to fail to make reasonable accommodation for the
known physical or mental disability of an . . . employee” unless
the accommodation would cause “undue hardship” to the
employer. (§ 12940, subd. (m)(1); see Green v. State of California
(2007) 42 Cal.4th 254, 262 (Green).) “A ‘reasonable
accommodation’ means a modification or adjustment to the
workplace that enables the employee to perform the essential
functions of the job held or desired. [Citation.]” (Brown v. Los
Angeles Unified School District (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 1092,
1107.)
       To prevail on a failure to accommodate claim, a plaintiff
must show “(1) the plaintiff has a disability under the FEHA,
(2) the plaintiff is qualified to perform the essential functions of
the position, and (3) the employer failed to reasonably
accommodate the plaintiff’s disability.” (Scotch v. Art Institute of
California (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 986, 1009–1010 (Scotch).)
“[T]he plaintiff employee bears the burden of proving he or she
was able to do the job, with or without reasonable
accommodation.” (Green, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 262; Lui, supra,
211 Cal.App.4th at p. 971.)
       In its summary judgment motion, the County argued
Robinson could not show she was able to perform the essential
duties of her position. As with the unlawful termination claim,
the County failed to address Robinson’s ability to perform the

                                24
job’s essential functions with reasonable accommodation, and
failed to show there is no triable issue of material fact regarding
the availability of a reasonable accommodation. While the
County argued Robinson’s resignation prevented the County from
determining whether it could accommodate her, Robinson has
shown there is a triable issue of material fact as to whether she
was terminated. The County did not establish it was entitled to
summary adjudication of the failure to accommodate claim.
       C. Interactive process claim
       Section 12940, subdivision (n), makes it unlawful for an
“employer or other entity covered by this part to fail to engage in
a timely, good faith, interactive process with the employee or
applicant to determine effective reasonable accommodations, if
any, in response to a request for reasonable accommodation by an
employee or applicant with a known physical or mental disability
or known medical condition.” “[I]n order to succeed on a cause of
action for failure to engage in an interactive process, ‘an
employee must identify a reasonable accommodation that would
have been available at the time the interactive process should
have occurred.’ [Citations.]” (Shirvanyan v. Los Angeles
Community College Dist. (2020) 59 Cal.App.5th 82, 96; Scotch,
supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 1018.) The “FEHA requires an
informal process with the employee to attempt to identify
reasonable accommodations, not necessarily ritualized
discussions.” (Nealy v. Santa Monica (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 359,
379.)
       Robinson’s specific request during the interactive process
meeting was to continue to do her current job. She argues she
was assigned a diversity of tasks that did not require her to sit at
a computer. She contends completing those tasks, and taking

                                25
breaks to stretch each hour, enabled her to perform the job in
compliance with her medical restrictions. The County’s evidence
did not establish that during the interactive process meeting it
meaningfully considered whether Robinson’s essential duties
were all computer tasks, or whether they were tasks that
required continuous computer use for more than 30 minutes each
hour. Indeed, Welch’s e-mail suggested that she, Wyatt, and
McCambridge had already concluded the County could not
accommodate Robinson’s restrictions before they even met with
her. (Kaur v. Foster Poultry Farms LLC (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th
320, 347 (Kaur) [employer has continuous obligation to engage in
interactive process in good faith].)
       The County further asserts it was Robinson who curtailed
the interactive process by failing to return to work. (Gelfo v.
Lockheed Martin Corp. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 34, 54 [“if the
process fails, responsibility for the failure rests with the party
who failed to participate in good faith”].) However, as detailed
above, there is a triable issue of fact as to whether Robinson was
terminated at the interactive process meeting, without the
County inquiring about opportunities for her at other offices of
the County Public Defender. (Kaur, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at
p. 346 [if an employee cannot be accommodated in the current
position, then the employer has “ ‘ “ ‘a duty to reassign a disabled
employee if an already funded, vacant position at the same level
exists’ ” ’ ”].) “ ‘[T]he fact that an employer took some steps to
work with an employee to identify reasonable accommodations
does not absolve the employer of liability . . . . If the employer is
responsible for a later breakdown in the process, it may be held
liable.’ [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 348.)

                                 26
       Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
Robinson, there are triable issues of material fact as to whether
the County engaged in the interactive process in good faith.
IV. There Is a Triable Issue of Fact as to Robinson’s
       Retaliation Claim
       “[T]o establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the
FEHA, a plaintiff must show (1) he or she engaged in a ‘protected
activity,’ (2) the employer subjected the employee to an adverse
employment action, and (3) a causal link existed between the
protected activity and the employer’s action.” (Yanowitz v.
L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1042; § 12940,
subd. (h).)
       In her complaint, Robinson alleged she engaged in
protected activity when she requested a reasonable
accommodation and complained of sexual harassment.6 On
appeal, she argues only that the County retaliated against her for
requesting that her “disability be accommodated” when she
presented the doctor’s letter. Requesting an accommodation is a
protected activity under the FEHA. (§ 12940, subd. (m)(2); Moore
v. Regents of University of California (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 216,
246.)
       The County sought summary adjudication of Robinson’s
retaliation claim solely based on the arguments that Robinson
did not suffer an adverse employment action, and that any
adverse employment action was not discriminatory but was based
on the legitimate business reason that she could not perform the

6     There is no evidence that Robinson complained of sexual
harassment while employed by the County. Her first complaint
related to sexual harassment was the letter she sent to the
County Board of Supervisors on May 31, 2018.

                               27
essential duties of her position. The County reasserts the same
arguments on appeal. As discussed above, we conclude Robinson
demonstrated triable issues of fact on both issues. The County
did not establish it was entitled to summary adjudication of the
retaliation claim.
V.     The County Is Not Entitled to Summary Adjudication
       on Robinson’s Claim for Failure to Prevent
       Discrimination
       Finally, Robinson asserts the County violated
section 12940, subdivision (k), which makes it unlawful “[f]or an
employer . . . to fail to take all reasonable steps necessary to
prevent discrimination and harassment from occurring.” She
bases this claim on her sexual harassment, gender
discrimination, disability discrimination, and retaliation claims.
       A claim under section 12940, subdivision (k) has three
elements: (1) the plaintiff was subjected to discrimination,
retaliation, or harassment; (2) the defendant failed to take all
reasonable steps to prevent it; and (3) this failure caused plaintiff
to suffer injury, damage, loss or harm. (Caldera v. Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 31, 43–44
(Caldera).) “An actionable claim under section 12940,
subdivision (k) is dependent on a claim of actual discrimination:
‘Employers should not be held liable to employees for failure to
take necessary steps to prevent such conduct, except where the
actions took place and were not prevented.’ [Citation.]” (Scotch,
supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 1021.) In other words, when a
plaintiff cannot establish a violation of the FEHA based on
certain conduct, the employer as a matter of law cannot be held
responsible for failing to prevent that conduct under
section 12940, subdivision (k). (Featherstone, supra, 10

                                 28
Cal.App.5th at p. 1166.) Robinson’s sexual harassment and
gender discrimination claims fail, so summary adjudication of the
derivative section 12940, subdivision (k) claims was also proper.7
(Ibid.) Only her disability-related and retaliation claims remain
for our analysis.8
       The County failed to show Robinson cannot establish an
element of the claim for failure to prevent disability-related
discrimination and retaliation. While the County presented
undisputed evidence of its anti-discrimination policy, Robinson
has raised triable issues of material fact regarding whether such
discrimination nonetheless occurred. A factfinder could
reasonably determine that the steps the County took to prevent
discrimination and retaliation were thus ineffective. (Caldera,
supra, 25 Cal.App.5th at p. 44 [summary judgment not
warranted where despite evidence of anti-harassment training
supervisor continued to harass plaintiff].) The County was not
entitled to summary adjudication of the failure to prevent claim.

7      Similarly, to the extent Robinson’s seventh cause of action
is based on a claim of failure to investigate harassment pursuant
to section 12940, subdivision (j), summary adjudication was
proper.

8     “[R]etaliation is a form of discrimination actionable under
section 12940, subdivision (k).” (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles
Dept. of Water & Power (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1240,
disapproved on other grounds in Jones v. The Lodge at Torrey
Pines Partnership (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1158, 1162.)

                                29
                           DISPOSITION
      The judgment is reversed. The matter is remanded with
directions that the trial court vacate its order granting
Respondent’s motion for summary judgment. The court is to
enter a new order granting summary adjudication of the claims
for sexual harassment and gender discrimination, and denying
summary adjudication of the claims for disability discrimination,
failure to accommodate, failure to engage in the interactive
process, retaliation, and failure to prevent discrimination based
on disability and retaliation. The parties shall bear their own
costs on appeal.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

                                         ADAMS, J.

We concur:

                  LAVIN, Acting P. J.

                  EGERTON, J.

                               30