Court Opinion

ID: 9692127
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 15:43:26.264883+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:30.794986
License: Public Domain

JIM HANNAH, Chief Justice, dissenting. I respectfully dissent. Quite simply the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to vacate Charles Wayne Green’s sentence. “[W]here the defendant has entered upon the execution of a valid sentence, the court loses jurisdiction over the case.” Coones v. State, 280 Ark. 321, 323, 657 S.W.2d 553, 555 (1983). |uAny attempt to alter or revise a valid sentence already put into execution is a void act, and the original sentence remains in force. Williams v. State, 229 Ark. 42, 313 S.W.2d 242 (1958). Once a valid judgment is put into execution, the trial court is without jurisdiction to modify, amend, or revise it. Renshaw v. Norris, 337 Ark. 494, 989 S.W.2d 515 (1999); Davis v. State, 291 Ark. 191, 723 S.W.2d 366 (1987); see also Emerson v. Boyles, 170 Ark. 621, 280 S.W. 1005 (1926). The majority cites Gavin v. State, 354 Ark. 425, 125 S.W.3d 189 (2003), for the proposition that a valid sentence may not be amended or modified, but it may be vacated because that is not a modification. Gavin does not support that proposition. The critical language in Gavin is that conviction and imposition of sentence deprive “the trial court of jurisdiction to amend or modify a sentence”. Id. at 430,125 S.W.3d at 191. The issue in Gavin was loss of jurisdiction (emphasis added) and not whether a circuit court could vacate a sentence that it could not modify or amend. I fail to understand how a court lacks jurisdiction to modify a sentence but has jurisdiction to vacate that sentence. The concern is that, because Green entered into a plea agreement and received the benefit of the agreement, he should not be able to retain that benefit unless he carries out his end of the agreement by testifying against his father. I could not agree more that Green should be required to fulfill his agreement. However, the majority, in insuring that Green does not retain the benefit of his bargain without fulfilling his end of the bargain, is disregarding over eighty years of precedent by allowing the circuit court to vacate Green’s 11Bsentence. This is not necessary. While we have not previously addressed a similar fact pattern, other states have. The case of Brunelle v. State, 113 S.W.3d 788 (Tex.Crim.App.2003) is similar to the one before us. In a plea agreement to a charge of capital murder, Brunelle agreed to testify against a co-defendant and in return received a lesser conviction and sentence. However, Brunelle then refused to testify. The State of Texas moved the trial court to set aside the plea agreement and conviction arguing that Brunelle had breached his agreement. The trial court did so. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals noted that the conviction on the plea agreement was three years old and held that the trial court’s jurisdiction over the matter had expired. The court expressly rejected the notion of “a species of contract jurisdiction enabling it to interpret the plea agreement and to set it aside if it determines the agreement has been breached.” Brunelle, 113 S.W.3d at 790. The court noted that while contract principles apply to plea agreements, “they may not be enforced to the detriment of due process.” Id. The proper path was set out in Brunelle: We find no precedent for the proceeding initiated by the State in this case, nor can we see any necessity or purpose for it. Appellant has been reindicted for this offense, which should serve as adequate notice to Appellant that the State considers the plea agreement invalid. If Appellant believes this conviction still bars the subsequent prosecution, he may challenge the subsequent prosecution in an appropriate proceeding wherein he would have the opportunity to more fully develop the facts. Id. By entering into the plea agreement, Green waived any objections to trial on the 1charges if he breached the agreement. Therefore, if Green breached the plea agreement, the existing judgment and conviction on the plea agreement is no bar to a subsequent prosecution and trial. Double jeopardy concerns do not dictate that the former conviction and sentence be vacated before Green is tried on the charges. In short, either Green breached the plea agreement, waiving any objection to prosecution, or he did not. The circuit court lost jurisdiction to consider the plea agreement or its breach under both the criminal law and contract law. The State may proceed with the prosecution and let the question of the breach and the defense of double jeopardy be decided as a defense in that subsequent prosecution, a proceeding in which the circuit court has jurisdiction to act. I would declare the acts of the circuit court void and allow the State to proceed as it sees fit.