Court Opinion

ID: 9700478
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 21:31:58.617555+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:09.533051
License: Public Domain

KLAPHAKE, Judge
(dissenting).
Can a public accommodation discriminate by refusing to deliver food to one who strongly holds and publicly proclaims objectionable beliefs on abortion?
Based on the Minneapolis Human Rights ordinance, the Minneapolis Civil Rights Commission answered “no.” I would affirm the Commission for two reasons. First, relators have not raised a constitutional freedom of conscience claim which would circumvent the mandates of the ordinance, and no facts indicate relators’ actions were premised on religious grounds. Second, the word “creed,” as used in the ordinance, should be defined to prohibit the discrimination which occurred in this case because: (1) the common meaning of “creed” includes more than religious beliefs; (2) the canons of legislative construction reject a meaning limited to religion; (3) *517the facts of the cases cited as equating religion with creed are inapposite; and (4) the human rights ordinance is remedial, compelling a construction consistent with elimination rather than encouragement of discriminatory practices.
Should relators’ constitutional freedom of conscience claim relieve them from compliance with the Minneapolis ordinance? Not in this case. Simply put, .the four-part test used where religious freedom conflicts with state or local laws does not support reversal of the Commission.
Unlike the majority, I cannot assume that relators’ refusal of food deliveries to Midwest was grounded on a strongly-held religious belief against abortion. The Commission made no findings supporting this legal theory. The record shows that rela-tors had previously delivered food to Midwest knowing that Midwest performed abortions. The record reveals that the true reason for relators’ stance was not an epiphany, but personal embarrassment caused by relator unexpectedly encountering an acquaintance who was at the clinic for an abortion. It was only after that encounter that relator excluded Midwest from its delivery service. When Midwest confronted relator about the exclusion, relator stated he would not deliver to Midwest and further informed Midwest, apparently by analogy, that he “had a right not to serve drunks.” Relator did not offer to deliver to Midwest’s door until the hearing, nearly two years after the initial refusal, when relator was no longer in business.
The record lacks factual support for the majority’s conclusion that relators’ actions have been occasioned only by conscience. At best, such a conclusion is impermissible fact finding on appeal. At worst, it is simply wrong. Without a finding, or even a claim, that strongly and sincerely held religious beliefs motivated relators’ conduct, there is no conflict between the Minneapolis ordinance and the Minnesota Constitution, and the constitutional analysis ends.
Even if we assume, as did the majority, that relators’ actions were firmly rooted in religious conviction, the second part of the test has not been met. The majority incorrectly assumes that the Minneapolis ordinance imposes an inherent burden on rela-tors’ religious beliefs. Any such burden on relators was self-imposed by their public offer to deliver food to all businesses in a specific area. Where an entity is involved in a public activity, “the limits they accept on their own conduct as a matter of conscience and faith are not to be superimposed on the statutory schemes which are binding on others in that activity.” United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261, 102 S.Ct. 1051, 1057 (1982).
And under part three of the test, the majority summarily concludes that, because relators’ conduct does not create a threat to public peace or safety, the City of Minneapolis has no compelling or overriding interest in the enforcement of its anti-discrimination ordinance. This position was rejected in State by McClure v. Sports & Health Club, Inc., 370 N.W.2d 844 (Minn.1985). In McClure, the supreme court held that the government’s compelling interest in eliminating discrimination and providing equal access to public accommodations outweighed the burden on business owners to comply with the Minnesota Human Rights Act. Id. at 852-53.
In my opinion, where the record does not establish that relators’ conduct was conscience-driven and where relators’ burden was self-imposed, a freedom of conscience claim must fail when balanced against the City of Minneapolis’ compelling interest in eliminating discrimination.
What, then, did the City of Minneapolis mean by prohibiting public accommodation discrimination based on “creed”? The Commission referenced Webster’s dictionary to determine a common and ordinary meaning. The majority rejects this definition, relying instead on other definitions also found in Webster, and then buttresses its choice with definitions found in specialized legal dictionaries. Yet, the issue is what the Minneapolis City Council intended in its use of “creed,” not what lexicographers understood at another time or in a different context. There is nothing compellingly common or ordinary in specialized legal dictionaries. Moreover, the Commis*518sion’s reliance on a common and ordinary-dictionary definition is consistent with statutory canons of legislative construction, see Minn.Stat. § 645.08(1) (1990); reliance on a legal dictionary definition is not.
The Commission’s definition is also consistent with other rules of statutory interpretation. By defining “creed” to include more than just religious beliefs, the Commission correctly interpreted the term “creed” to have a broader definition than “religion.” See Minn.Stat. § 645.16 (1990) (laws construed to give effect to all provisions); Gale v. Commission of Taxation, 228 Minn. 345, 349, 37 N.W.2d 711, 715 (1949) (statute should be construed so that no word is superfluous, void or insignificant); see also Ginsberg v. Department of Jobs & Training, 481 N.W.2d 138, 143 (Minn.App.1992) (every term of statute should be given meaning), pet, for rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 9, 1992). Like the terms “race,” “color,” and “ancestry,” the terms “creed” and “religion” have overlapping meanings but are not synonymous or superfluous in the ordinance. The Commission properly applied a broader definition of “creed” under the rule of statutory interpretation that these terms should not be rendered superfluous.
Additionally, the Commission’s broad definition of “creed” better serves the anti-discrimination goals of the Minneapolis ordinance. “Statutes are to be so construed as to * * * promote rather than defeat the purpose of the legislature.” Governmental Research Bureau, Inc. v. Borgen, 224 Minn. 313, 322, 28 N.W.2d 760, 765 (1947). The ordinance’s plain language shows its purpose is to prohibit public accommodations from engaging in discrimination on a wide variety of bases, including
race, color, creed, religion, ancestry, national origin, sex, including sexual harassment, affectional preference, disability, age, marital status, or status with regard to public assistance.
Minneapolis, Minn., Code of Ordinances § 139.10(b)(2) (1991).1 To define “creed” as a synonym for “religion” is to imply that the Minneapolis City Council meant to allow discrimination based on non-religious, strongly held and publicly proclaimed beliefs, despite its broad prohibition against discrimination of all kinds. There is no basis whatsoever for this conclusion.
Is case law helpful in defining “creed” as used in the Minneapolis ordinance? Every case which the majority cites as support for its narrow definition of “creed” is inappo-site to the facts of this case. Unlike the Minneapolis ordinance, which contains both the words “creed” and “religion,” the civil rights statutes interpreted in these cases only prohibited discrimination based upon “creed.” See Shuchter v. Division on Civil Rights, 117 N.J.Super. 405, 285 A.2d 42, 43 (App.Div.1971) (interpreting N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-3 (West 1976)); Riste v. Eastern Wash. Bible Camp, Inc., 25 Wash.App. 299, 605 P.2d 1294, 1295 (1980); Augustine v. Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith, 75 Wis.2d 207, 249 N.W.2d 547, 551 (1977). As the Wisconsin Supreme Court explained in Augustine:
There is no specific mention [in the Fair Employment Act] of discrimination on the basis of religion. Yet, it would be unthinkable to conclude that any anti-discrimination legislation would not prohibit discrimination based upon religious grounds. “Creed” * * * does, however, refer to religion. It seems abundantly clear, therefore, that the term, “creed,” as used in the Wisconsin statute means * * * a system of religious beliefs.
249 N.W.2d at 551-52. And, although the New York Public Housing Law interpreted in Cummings did prohibit discrimination based upon “race, color, creed or religion,” the statute’s legislative history stated that the words “religion” and “creed” were to be used interchangeably. Cummings v. Weinfeld, 177 Misc. 129, 30 N.Y.S.2d 36, 38 (App.Div.1941). There is no such legislative history in this case. Neither the facts nor the logic of the cited cases supports a reversal.
I respectfully dissent and would affirm the Commission.

. Section 139.10(b)(2) was last amended in 1982.