Court Opinion

ID: 9909697
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-13 21:02:22.758009+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:48:55.190430
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/13/23 P. v. Aguilar CA2/1
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION ONE

 THE PEOPLE,                                                   B326891
                                                               (Los Angeles County
           Plaintiff and Respondent,                           Super. Ct. No. BA505745)
           v.

 ALFREDO DIAZ AGUILAR,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, James R. Dabney, Judge. Affirmed.
      John L. Staley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Nikhil Cooper, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                       _____________________
      Defendant and appellant Alfredo Diaz Aguilar pleaded no
contest to one count of possession of a firearm by a felon (Pen.
Code, § 29800, subd. (a)(1))1 after a California Highway Patrol
officer found a handgun in his waistband during a traffic stop.
Aguilar also admitted he had previously been convicted of a
serious and violent felony, robbery (§ 211), in 2011. Pursuant to
a plea agreement, the trial court sentenced Aguilar to 32 months
in state prison and imposed various fines and fees.
       In this appeal, Aguilar contends the highway patrol officer
violated his Fourth Amendment rights by conducting a pat-down
search without reasonable suspicion that Aguilar was armed and
dangerous, and that the trial court erred by denying his motion to
suppress evidence of the handgun the officer found in the search.
Aguilar asks that we reverse the denial of his suppression motion
and remand the case to the trial court to allow him to withdraw
his plea. We disagree and affirm.
     FACTUAL SUMMARY RELATED TO AGUILAR’S
              SUPPRESSION MOTION
       At approximately 1:00 a.m. on May 25, 2022, California
Highway Patrol officers responded to a report of an abandoned
vehicle in one of the traffic lanes of the 710 Freeway in East Los
Angeles. Officers halted freeway traffic to investigate. As the
officers approached the vehicle, they found Aguilar asleep behind
the wheel of his car, which was stopped in the second lane from
the left on the freeway. The keys were in the ignition, the engine
was running, and the car was in gear; the car was not moving

      1 Unless otherwise specified, subsequent statutory
references are to the Penal Code.

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because Aguilar’s foot was on the brake pedal. The officers
positioned a patrol car directly in front of Aguilar’s car with its
headlights shining on Aguilar to prevent Aguilar’s car from
moving forward.
       Despite all this hubbub, Aguilar did not wake up until one
of the officers, Sanchez, opened the car door and instructed him
to get out of the vehicle. Aguilar did so, and Sanchez handed him
over to a second officer, Andy Venoza, who handcuffed Aguilar
and led him toward his patrol car. Officer Venoza noticed that
Aguilar’s eyes appeared red and watery, and that Aguilar was
“agitated.”
       Ordinarily, Officer Venoza would have conducted an
investigation at the scene. But because it was too dangerous to
remain in the middle of the interstate, he planned to put Aguilar
in his patrol car, exit the freeway so cars stopped by the traffic
break could resume travel, and investigate further from the side
of the road. Officer Venoza’s car did not have a cage for
transporting suspects, so pursuant to department policy, he
needed to sit Aguilar next to him in the front seat of the patrol
car. Prior to transporting Aguilar, Officer Venoza conducted a
preliminary pat-down search for weapons and discovered a
handgun in Aguilar’s waistband near his right hip. Officer
Venoza called for his partner, who took the gun away.
       With Aguilar disarmed, Officer Venoza placed him in the
passenger seat of the patrol car and exited the freeway. Officer
Venoza then questioned Aguilar further. Aguilar remained
agitated. He claimed not to remember his name, and his breath
smelled of alcohol.

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                          DISCUSSION
      “In Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1 [88 S.Ct. 1868, 20
L.Ed.2d 889] . . . , the United States Supreme Court held that
there exists ‘a narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable
search for weapons for the protection of the police officer, where
he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and
dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has probable
cause to arrest the individual for a crime. The officer need not be
absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is
whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would
be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in
danger.’ [Citation.]” (King v. State of California (2015) 242
Cal.App.4th 265, 283.)
      To conduct this kind of search, “ ‘The officer must be able to
point to specific and articulable facts together with rational
inferences therefrom which reasonably support a suspicion that
the suspect is armed and dangerous.’ [Citation.] ‘[A]n “inchoate
and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch’ ” is insufficient.’
[Citation.]” (People v. Pantoja (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 483, 489.)
      When a defendant challenges the trial court’s denial of a
motion to suppress evidence on the ground that it was seized in
an unreasonable search (§ 1538.5, subd. (a)), we review the
court’s factual findings for substantial evidence, but “ ‘we exercise
our independent judgment in determining the legality of a search
on the facts so found. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Lomax
(2010) 49 Cal.4th 530, 563.)
      Aguilar does not deny that he was lawfully ordered from
the car, nor does he claim that officers acted improperly in
handcuffing him prior to the search. He contests only the pat-
down search itself, noting that such searches of suspects in traffic

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stops have been held to be unreasonable where the officer who
conducted the search could not “point to specific and articulable
facts which . . . give rise to a reasonable suspicion that the
suspect is armed and dangerous.” (People v. Medina (2003) 110
Cal.App.4th 171, 176; see also People v. Pantoja, supra, 77
Cal.App.5th at pp. 490-492.) Aguilar argues that Officer Venoza
did not identify any such facts when he testified at the
suppression hearing.
      We are not persuaded. This case does not involve a typical
minor traffic violation such as a broken taillight (People v.
Medina, supra, 110 Cal.App.4th at p. 174) or license plate light
(People v. Pantoja, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 486). Aguilar was
unconscious in a car, in gear and with the motor running, stopped
in the middle of a major interstate. He remained unconscious
even when officers drove a patrol car to face his car nose-to-nose
and shone the car’s headlights at Aguilar. When he finally came
to and stepped out of the car, his eyes were red and watery, and
he was agitated. Officer Venoza did not know at the time what
had led Aguilar to engage in this bizarre behavior, and had
reason to believe “his safety or that of others was in danger.”
(Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. at p. 27.)
      Courts have “expressly declined to accept the argument
that traffic violations necessarily involve less danger to officers
than other types of confrontations,” and noted the Fourth
Amendment has never “ ‘require[d] that police officers take
unnecessary risks in the performance of their duties.’ [Citation.]”
(Pennsylvania v. Mimms (1977) 434 U.S. 106, 110 [98 S.Ct. 330,
54 L.Ed.2d 331].) At the end of the suppression hearing, the trial
court stated that the idea that an officer would transport Aguilar
in the front seat of his patrol car in that condition “sit[ting] next

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to [him], unhandcuffed and not patted-down is insane.” Given
the circumstances that led to Aguilar’s detention, we agree and
similarly conclude that the pat-down search was reasonable.
                          DISPOSITION
     The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                                         WEINGART, J.

We concur:

             ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

             CHANEY, J.

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