Court Opinion

ID: 9789682
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:40:02.365596+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:35:21.230279
License: Public Domain

COMPTON, Justice,
dissenting in part.
In interpreting Alaska’s equal protection clause we expressly depart from the burdensome federal constitutional threshold test which requires both a showing of intentional discrimination against an identifiable group and a substantial discriminatory effect on that group. See Davis v. Bandemer, — U.S. —, —, 106 S.Ct. 2797, 2808, 92 L.Ed.2d 85, 102 (1986) (plurality). The test we set out under Alaska’s equal protection clause also has two parts: 1) a showing of purposeful discrimination against voters of a geographic area; 2) without effectuating proportional representation. However, unlike the federal standard, “we will not consider any effect of disproportionality de minimus when determining the legitimacy of the Board’s purpose.” Opinion at 1372.
The extra protection afforded by Alaska’s equal protection clause is, however, illusory. Although we are willing to “declare” Senate District E unconstitutional, we refuse to grant affirmative relief1 because the effect of disproportionality is de minimus. Because relief is tied to a showing of more than a de minimus violation, Alaska’s equal protection clause goes no further to protect Alaskan citizens than does the United States Constitution. If indeed the harm in this case is de minimus then we should have declined to reach the constitutional issue in the first place. Cf. Wickwire v. City and Borough of Juneau, 557 P.2d 783, 786 (Alaska 1976) (Boochever, J., dissenting). However, after having articulated the Alaska constitutional standard the court should not now be heard to say that it is not going to do anything about it.
The court reaches the incredible conclusion that a mere “declaration” of illegitimate purpose is an adequate remedy. Such a declaration is no remedy at all. The United States Supreme Court has stated: “once a State’s legislative apportionment scheme has been found to be unconstitutional, it would be the unusual case in which a court would be justified in not taking appropriate action to insure that no further elections are conducted under the invalid plan.” Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 585, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 1393, 12 L.Ed.2d 506, 541 (1964).2 Merely opining that Sen*1375ate District E is unconstitutional is no guarantee that a reapportionment board will “scrupulously observe” the mandate of the Alaska constitution in the future. If there is no sanction for engaging in an unlawful process, a board can continue to do so risking only the inconvenience and expense of defending another declaratory suit. Accordingly, awarding only declaratory relief may encourage a board to cut corners when by so doing it can further illegal goals at little or no risk.
The court decides to withhold affirmative relief based on the principle that the relief fashioned should remedy the actual injury. Opinion at 1373. The court concludes that because the actual injury in this case is a de minimus discriminatory effect3 of un-derrepresentation of .51 senate seats, the relief fashioned should be similarly inconsiderable.
The court relies upon cases brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a “constitutional tort” provision,4 to support the proposition that in the instant case declaratory relief remedies the actual injury. However, section 1983 cases are inapposite. Typically in a section 1983 action a plaintiff seeks to redress a violation of an intangible constitutional right which has resulted in measurable harm. For example, in Memphis Community School District v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 106 S.Ct. 2537, 91 L.Ed.2d 249 (1986) a school teacher who was wrongfully dismissed proved certain compensatory damages such as out of pocket loss, damage to reputation, personal humiliation and mental anguish. 477 U.S. at —, 106 S.Ct. at 2541-42, 91 L.Ed.2d at 256-58 (citing Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978) (mental and emotional distress constitute compensable injury in a section 1983 claim)). In contrast, the constitutional right here violated, the right to an equally powerful and geographically effective vote in the state legislature, does not need to be, and indeed cannot be, reduced to a monetary figure to grant relief. The court has been asked to exercise its broad equitable powers because the remedy at law (damages) is inadequate. Consequently, this court’s reliance on tort cases is misplaced.
Similarly misguided is the court’s reliance upon cases which stand for the proposition that the motivation of those who undertake an act does not in and of itself violate equal protection guarantees. See Opinion at 1373 n. 41 (citing Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 91 S.Ct. 1940, 29 L.Ed.2d 438 (1971); Bandemer, — U.S. at —, 106 S.Ct. at 2808, 92 L.Ed.2d at 102). The court today expressly rejects the two part federal analysis in formulating Alaska’s equal protection standard. We state “once the Board’s discriminatory intent is evident, its purpose in redistricting will be held illegitimate unless the redistricting effects a greater proportionality of representation.” Opinion at 1372. Thus, improper motive with no redeeming purpose is enough to violate Alaska’s equal protection guarantees. Therefore, it is illogical to embrace the more demanding federal analysis to justify denial of affirmative relief under the Alaska standard.

. The Court explained that a court may defer awarding relief, but retain jurisdiction, when an impending election is imminent or when the legislature undertakes to reapportion. 377 U.S. at 585, 84 S.Ct. at 1394, 12 L.Ed.2d at 541. Here, neither contingency is on the horizon. Moreover, because no affirmative relief has been granted to appellants, there is no need for any court to retain jurisdiction.
This court has adopted an analogous supervisory approach in the context of criminal constitutional rights. In State v. Stundberg, 611 P.2d 44 (Alaska 1980) we decided not to apply the exclusionary rule to an excessive force arrest because we noted that there are other deterrents and at that time there was no history of excessive force arrests. Id. at 52. However, this court specifically left open the option to reexamine the exclusionary sanction in future cases, not so with respect to reapportionment.

. I disagree that the discriminatory effect is de minimus. As a result of this Board’s plan Anchorage may have been denied one senate seat. Moreover, by refusing to order the Board to redraw Senate District E, Anchorage voters will remain underrepresented in elections to be held before the next reapportionment process. Since the next federal census is in 1990, elections in 1988 and possibly 1992 will be held under an illegal plan. Alaska Const, art. VI §§ 3, 10 (following each decennial census a board shall submit to the governor a plan for reapportionment).

. Memphis Community School Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, —, 106 S.Ct. 2537, 2542, 91 L.Ed.2d 249, 258 (1986) observes that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a species of tort liability in favor of persons who are deprived of constitutional rights. Accordingly, when § 1983 plaintiffs seek damages, the level of damages is ordinarily determined according to principles derived from the common law of torts.