Court Opinion

ID: 9865585
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 19:04:27.498768+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:40:30.924760
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/25/23 P. v. Jones CA2/7
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE,                                                  B324257

         Plaintiff and Respondent,

         v.                                                  (Los Angeles County
                                                             Super. Ct. No. NA003332)
KEVIN JONES,

         Defendant and Appellant.

________________________________

THE PEOPLE,                                                  B318647

         Plaintiff and Respondent,

         v.

RONALD WAYNE MCCLAIN,

         Defendant and Appellant.
      APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Chet L. Taylor and Laura L. Laesecke, Judges.
Affirmed.
      Law Office of Stein and Markus, Andrew M. Stein, Joseph
A. Markus and Brentford Ferreira for Defendant and Appellant
Kevin Jones.
      Jonathan E. Demson, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Ronald Wayne McClain.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, Zee Rodriguez, Heidi
Salerno and John Yang, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
                        _________________

      In 1990, following a jury trial, Kevin Jones, Ronald Wayne
McClain, and McClain’s brother, Randall McClain,1 were
convicted of the burglary and first degree murder of 80-year-old
Esther Mae Allen. Allen was found in her home the morning
following the burglary, bludgeoned to death. Jones, McClain, and
Randall appealed, and we affirmed. (People v. Jones et al.
(July 15, 1992, B055397) [nonpub. opn.] (Jones I).)
      In 2020 Jones and McClain filed separate petitions for
resentencing pursuant to Penal Code former section 1170.95 (now
section 1172.6).2 Following briefing and evidentiary hearings, the
superior courts (two different judges) denied the petitions. The

1     We refer to Randall McClain by his first name to avoid
confusion.
2     Further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

                                2
courts found Jones and McClain could still be convicted of felony
murder because the People proved beyond a reasonable doubt
that they were major participants and acted with reckless
indifference to human life under the factors articulated in People
v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 (Banks), People v. Clark (2016)
63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark), and In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667
(Scoggins).
       On appeal, Jones and McClain contend there was
insufficient evidence to support the superior courts’ findings each
was a major participant in the burglary and acted with reckless
indifference to human life.3 We affirm both orders.

      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A.      The Killing4
        In 1989 Allen lived in a two-bedroom, one-bathroom
bungalow in Long Beach. According to Allen’s daughter-in-law
Jovita Allen (Jovita), the house had two back doors. One back
door led to the laundry area, followed by the kitchen, and then
the dining area of the living room. The other back door led
directly to the living room. To the right of the living room was “a
little tiny hallway” and Allen’s bedroom. A second bedroom and a
bathroom were to the left of the living room.

3     We consider the appeals in People v. Jones (B324257) and
People v. McClain (B318647) together because they involve the
same trial testimony.
4     The facts are taken from the testimony at the joint trial of
Jones, McClain, and Randall. The trial transcript was admitted
into evidence at the evidentiary hearings.

                                 3
       Between 5:30 and 6:00 p.m. on October 26, 1989 Jovita left
Allen’s house. Shortly thereafter 20-year-old Jones, 20-year-old
McClain, and 17-year-old Randall entered the house. The three
men gained access through the kitchen window.
       At approximately 7:30 a.m. the next morning Allen’s
daughter Joan Walsh went to Allen’s house and entered through
the front door using her key after Allen failed to answer her
phone. Walsh walked through the living room toward the hall
leading to Allen’s bedroom. When Walsh reached the hallway,
she saw blood “all over” on the hallway walls and Allen’s bed, and
she called the police. Allen’s purse was under the door jamb of
Allen’s bedroom door, with the purse’s contents scattered nearby.
Allen’s wallet was missing.
       Shortly after the incident, Long Beach Police Sergeant
James Bisetti and his partner, Long Beach Detective Bill
Collette, arrived at Allen’s house to investigate the crime.
According to Sergeant Bisetti, Allen’s house appeared “to be [an]
early California style bungalow house” built in the mid- to late
1920s or early 1930s. Sergeant Bisetti observed the house had
been ransacked with drawers open and items “removed from
those drawers and strewn about the floors.” He took a
photograph of a black purse and its contents lying on the hallway
floor just outside Allen’s bedroom. He took a photograph inside
Allen’s bedroom showing a bloody sweatshirt and blood stains on
a tennis shoe, a chest of drawers, and a bookcase. He also took a
photograph depicting a heavily blood-stained pillow case and a
bloody bedsheet on Allen’s bed, a blood-stained pillow on the floor
near the bed, “and numerous blood smears along the white wall
window frame and Venetian blind.” Two electrical cords had

                                 4
been cut from kitchen appliances, and the ends of the cords were
found in Allen’s bedroom.
       Allen died four days after the burglary. According to the
coroner, Allen had multiple lacerations, skull fractures, and brain
injuries to the right side of her head “consistent with blunt force
[injuries].” The coroner opined Allen died from cranial cerebral
trauma consistent with being struck with a crowbar “at least
10 times.”
       Long Beach Police Officer Logan Wren testified
fingerprints were found at Allen’s house and seven other
burglarized Long Beach residences matching the fingerprints of
Jones or McClain.5 In April 1990 Officer Wren and Detective
Collette interviewed Jones, McClain, and Randall separately
after they each signed waivers of their Miranda rights.6
       Jones stated that at approximately 8:00 p.m. on an
unspecified date he, McClain, and Randall entered Allen’s house
through a window (or a back door that one of the three had
opened) to commit a burglary. Jones walked through a laundry
room and kitchen before entering the living room. Jones saw

5      The amended information charged Jones, McClain, and
Randall with the murder and burglary of Allen (§§ 187, subd. (a)
(count 1); 459 (count 2)). The amended information also charged
Jones with three additional burglaries, including of Kim Vo on
November 21, 1989 (count 3), Olga Apponi on November 22, 1989
(count 4), and Jim Sciurda on January 9, 1990 (count 5). The
amended information also charged McClain with five additional
burglaries, including of H. Soukup on February 20, 1990 (count
6), A. Gallegos on February 27, 1990 (count 7), Sherri Gonser on
March 2, 1990 (count 8), Janice Ede on March 5, 1990 (count 9),
and Cynthia Burkart on February 26, 1990 (count 10).
6     Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 284 U.S. 436, 444-445.

                                5
items against the wall and a piano in the living room. He was in
the living room when a purse was emptied out and money was
taken from the purse. In addition, electrical cords in the house
were cut, and one of the three brought a crowbar into the house.
Jones admitted someone was in the house. He could hear
pounding sounds in the bedroom, and the person in the bedroom
was beaten.
       McClain said that at approximately 6:00 p.m. on an
unspecified date just before Halloween, as it got dark outside, he,
Jones, and Randall entered Allen’s house to commit a burglary.
McClain did not wear gloves. Wren described McClain’s
statement about the entry: “Entry was made through the kitchen
window. The back door was open to enter. A tire iron was taken
into the house. He walked through the laundry room and into
the kitchen. He thought somebody might have been in the
house.” McClain was shown photographs of the interior of Allen’s
house, and he recognized the back door, laundry room, and living
room. When McClain was shown a photograph of Allen, he
denied ever seeing her. McClain took a videocassette recorder
(VCR) that was on top of the television, and he later sold the VCR
to a person at a bar.
       Randall stated he entered the kitchen of Allen’s house at
approximately 6:00 p.m. on an unspecified date. One of the group
took a crowbar into the house. Randall searched through the
kitchen drawers, and some electrical cords in the house were cut.
He was not sure what rooms he had entered, but he denied
entering any bedrooms. He acknowledged that someone was
home. Randall heard six or seven pounding sounds, but he was
not sure what caused the sounds.

                                6
B.     The Verdicts and Sentencing
       The jury found Jones, McClain, and Randall guilty of first
degree murder and the first degree burglary of Allen. Further,
the jury found Jones guilty of the first degree burglary of Vo,
Apponi, and Sciurda, and McClain guilty of the first degree
burglary of Gallegos, Gonser, Ede, and Burkart. The trial court7
sentenced Jones to an aggregate term of 34 years five months to
life. The court sentenced McClain to an aggregate term of
36 years four months to life.

C.     Jones’s Petition for Resentencing
       On December 18, 2020 Jones, represented by counsel, filed
a petition for resentencing in which he argued he was eligible for
relief under former section 1170.95 because he was convicted
under the prior felony murder rule. Jones argued under
section 189, as amended by Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg.
Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437), he was not liable for Allen’s murder
because he was not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to
kill, and was neither a major participant in the burglary nor
acted with reckless indifference to human life. Jones submitted
with his petition among other documents the trial transcript,
clerk’s transcript from his appeal in Jones I, supra, B055397, and
our opinion in Jones I.8 The People in their opposition argued

7     Judge Charles D. Sheldon presided over the trial and
sentencing of Jones and McClain. He passed away before Jones
and McClaim filed their resentencing petitions.
8     Jones’s sole contention in his prior appeal was that there
was insufficient evidence to support his conviction of burglary of
Sciurba’s residence. We rejected Jones’s argument and affirmed
the judgment.

                                 7
Jones was ineligible for relief because he was a major participant
who acted with reckless indifference to human life. In his reply,
Jones disputed the Banks/Clark factors supported a finding of
liability. On September 22, 2021 the superior court found Jones
made a prima facie showing for relief and issued an order to show
cause.
       At the August 26, 2022 evidentiary hearing, the prosecutor
argued Jones knew someone was home, a tire iron was taken into
the bedroom, Jones heard pounding, and Jones knew a person
was beaten, “yet [he] did nothing to stop it, if he was not the
actual murderer.” Further, Jones did nothing to minimize the
harm to Allen. Jones’s attorney argued Jones was 20 years old at
the time of the crime and played no role in Allen’s death. Jones
was in the kitchen when he heard noises in the bedroom, and he
could not have prevented McClain from beating Allen because he
was in a separate room.
       After hearing argument from counsel, the superior court9
denied Jones’s petition, acknowledging it had considered the trial
testimony and non-hearsay preliminary hearing testimony. The
court read into the record the CALCRIM No. 540B instruction
that listed the Banks/Clark factors, and stated the “issue really
comes down to whether or not Mr. Jones acted with reckless
indifference to human life.”
       The superior court explained, “We know that Mr. Jones
went to the victim’s home with two other individuals. And
sometimes, in some of the cases that we’ve come across, at least
I’ve come across, youth can be a major issue. I don’t think it
applies here, in light of the fact that Randall McClain was, in

9     Judge Chet L. Taylor.

                                8
fact, a juvenile himself. And I believe at the time that this event
took place, Mr. Jones was older tha[n] Randall McClain. . . . [I]t
appears that Mr. Jones and Randall both pointed to Ronald
McClain as having in his possession the crowbar that was used to
beat the victim to death in this particular case. But we know
that all of them went into that house together. And you can
argue that although McClain had the crowbar in his possession,
all three of them were in possession of that crowbar when they
entered into that home. They knew exactly what they were
doing. . . . I think the People make a good argument that it was
planned, in light of the fact that the defendants waited until the
victim’s daughter left the house. . . . [T]hey became aware that
there was someone inside. And I think that’s important, because
there was an opportunity for Mr. Jones to leave the residence at
that time, knowing that someone was inside the home, and that
one of them had in their possession a crowbar.”
       The court continued, “[Jones] might not have been in the
bedroom, . . . but [he] was nearby. It was a bungalow-type style
home, a small home. And according to the statements of [Jones],
he was able to hear the pounding that was going on in the next
room, as he stood in the kitchen while the victim was beaten by—
I guess we can make an assumption, by perhaps Ronald McClain.
We don’t know for sure, but we know that he was inside the
house, at a minimum when the beating took place. But when we
add the fact that he did not do anything to mitigate the beating
that was taking place, he continued with the others to finish the
robbery of the house. They continued to grab the valuables, and
they all left together.”
       The court distinguished the facts in Scoggins on the basis
the defendant there returned to the scene to see if the victim was

                                 9
still breathing, and he cooperated with the police. By contrast,
“[a]fter the beating took place, and according to the testimony of
the daughter, there was blood everywhere. Surely Mr. Jones
should have seen the blood, and in addition to the pounding that
he heard that was going on when the victim was beaten, he would
have known that something serious or egregious was taking place
in the bedroom involving an occupant of the house. So for all
those reasons, the petition is going to be denied.”
       Jones timely appealed.

D.     McClain’s Petition for Resentencing
       On October 20, 2020 McClain, representing himself, filed a
form resentencing petition under former section 1170.95 in which
he checked the boxes indicating he was convicted of murder and
he “could not now be convicted of 1st or 2nd murder because of
changes made to Penal Code §§ 188 and 189, effective January 1,
2019.” McClain also checked the boxes stating he was convicted
of first degree felony murder; he was not the actual killer; and he
did not, with the intent to kill, aid or abet the actual killer. On
November 18 the court appointed counsel for McClain.
       In their opposition, the People argued Jones and Randall
implicated McClain as Allen’s actual killer. The People asserted,
“Jones and Randall told police they never saw the victim but both
men believed someone was home and they heard pounding
sounds coming from the bedroom.” (Boldface omitted.) However,
the People acknowledged “it is unknown which of the three men
bludgeoned Ms. Allen to death.” The People further argued
McClain was a major participant who acted with reckless
disregard for Allen’s life under the Banks/Clark and Scoggins
factors. The People attached to their opposition our opinion in

                                10
Jones I, supra, B055397,10 the trial transcript, and the clerk’s
transcript. McClain did not file a reply.
      On February 24, 2022 the superior court11 found McClain
had made a prima facie showing for relief and proceeded with the
evidentiary hearing. McClain testified at the hearing. McClain
admitted he was involved in a series of burglaries, including the
burglary of Allen’s house. Further, the Allen burglary was the
only one he “did with other people.” He denied ever going into
Allen’s bedroom or attacking, hurting, or killing Allen. Further,
McClain did not hear anything that would have alerted him to an
attack on Allen, nor did he see anyone kill Allen while he was in
the house. He did not know who killed Allen. He testified the
crowbar was used to break into the house, but he was not aware
that electrical cords had been cut.
      On cross-examination, McClain acknowledged he told police
he recognized Allen’s living room and dining room from the
photographs, but he did not see Allen’s bedroom. He knew
someone was home because he heard Jones tell Randall that
“someone was in the house.” When asked why he did not leave
upon learning someone was home, McClain responded, “I already
had the VCR. When I heard someone was in the house, I left.”
At the time he heard that someone was home, Randall had the
crowbar. McClain insisted he was in Allen’s house for “maybe
three to four minutes,” which was “long enough to unhook the
VCR.” McClain admitted he told the police that Jones and

10    In Jones I, supra, B055397, McClain principally challenged
the failure to bifurcate at trial the additional burglary counts
from the murder count. We found the counts were properly
joined and affirmed the judgment.
11   Judge Laura Laesecke.

                               11
Randall remained inside the house after he left. But he did not
know how long they stayed because he ran out of the house.
McClain had spoken with Randall during the past 33 years, and
Randall continued to deny he killed Allen. McClain had not
spoken to Jones since the murder.
      The prosecutor argued McClain, Randall, and Jones
planned the burglary; the men brought a tire iron with them into
the house; and they took time to obtain additional weapons by
cutting electrical cords from kitchen appliances. The prosecutor
further argued based on Walsh’s “testimony that there was blood
everywhere” that it could be inferred “the murderer himself
would have been covered in blood”; thus, “it would have been very
easy for his compatriots to have seen the blood and recognize
what happened were they not actually in the room when it
happened.” The prosecutor maintained McClain lied when he
denied going into Allen’s bedroom because “[i]t wouldn’t make
any sense to go into a home and to burglarize a home and yet not
go into any particular room.” And McClain could have
intervened, called the police, or rendered aid, but “[h]e did
nothing to alleviate or help” Allen.
      McClain’s attorney argued the crowbar was not a weapon,
but rather, “it’s brought as a means of entrance” into Allen’s
house. Further, there was no evidence McClain cut the electrical
cords or entered Allen’s bedroom. In addition, McClain was
consistent in his statement to police and his testimony at the
evidentiary hearing “that he took the VCR and left before
anybody went into the bedroom.” McClain’s attorney conceded
the People had shown McClain was a major participant in the
burglary, but they had not shown beyond a reasonable doubt that
he acted with reckless disregard for human life.

                               12
      After hearing argument from counsel, the superior court
found beyond a reasonable doubt that McClain was a major
participant who acted with reckless disregard for human life, and
further, he was “directly involved in” the killing of Allen.12 The
court explained, “[T]he court notes that the victim in this case is
an 80-year-old woman, particularly vulnerable in her home. . . .
There are lots of options that these defendants could have chosen
to somehow minimize the damage or injuries to her, one of which
would simply have been to close the door, tell her not to come out,
do their burglary and leave. They didn’t do that. Another option
would have been to tie her up, put her in the bathroom to be able
to ransack the bedroom. They didn’t do that. They didn’t just
put a blindfold over her to keep her from being able to identify
who the perpetrators are. We’re talking about someone who
really posed absolutely no threat to these men. . . . [W]hen
[McClain] just took the stand here, he was, in my opinion, very
cavalier and very arrogant and very reckless with his comments
even here. No remorse. I just outlined what happened to this
woman. She was bludgeoned 10 times with a crowbar. There is
blood everywhere. This woman died a horrific death. Her
daughter ended up walking in and seeing a horrific scene of her
mother killed with a crowbar, and Mr. McClain didn’t even
indicate any slight bit of remorse, any sort of acknowledgment of
what a terrible scene it is. And the fact he is not willing to
identify who is involved weighs heavily against him in this
court’s mind. I know he knows. And he is continuing to aid the
other perpetrators by not saying who did it.”

12    The court granted the People’s request to receive into
evidence the clerk’s transcript, the reporter’s transcripts, and the
procedural history detailed in Jones I, supra, B055397.

                                 13
      The court reasoned that because the house was a small
bungalow, McClain “could hear what was going on in this
bedroom. . . . And to tell me that he doesn’t know who did it, and
he just popped in, took a VCR and left, I find his testimony to be
incredible. I don’t believe it. So I’m not using any of that, in
essence to weigh in his favor.” The court found McClain was a
major participant because he was involved in the plan to
burglarize the home, and further, given the time of the burglary
(between 5:30 p.m. and 7:00 a.m.), McClain would have known
someone was home. The court observed it was not necessary to
use a tire iron to break into the home, so “it’s logical that
[McClain] would know that this is going to be used as a potential
item for damage or being used as a weapon.”13
      The court added, “As to the danger factor, I believe all three
defendants knew or should have known that someone was going
to be at home. And even if [McClain] is saying he wasn’t
involved . . . in the murder, he certainly is hearing the
bludgeoning that is going on with whoever is doing it in this very
small house, very likely with the door being opened, and could
have seen it occurring. . . . I think it’s very clear that all three of

13     The trial court observed that McClain had committed “a
pattern of burglaries with Mr. Jones. So the defendant lied to me
on the stand.” As McClain points out, the court was mistaken as
to whether McClain and Jones had previously committed
burglaries together. However, the court also found McClain’s
description of the burglary—how he took the VCR and fled
without searching for other valuables—not credible. The court’s
error in stating McClain and Jones had committed burglaries
together does not affect our analysis because the court separately
considered whether McClain’s testimony was credible, concluding
it was not.

                                  14
them were involved in ransacking this home and the murder
occurs during the ransacking or during the burglary. . . . He
obviously didn’t do anything to intervene or help the victim, not
that anybody could at that point. He didn’t call the police. He
would have clearly seen that there was blood all over the
house. . . . After the lethal force is used, he does nothing to help
her.”
       The superior court found McClain acted with reckless
indifference to human life under the Clark factors “for many of
the same reasons” the court had articulated in finding McClain
was a major participant, including that the tire iron was used as
a shared weapon, it was not “logical” that McClain would not
have entered the bedroom to steal the valuables, and given the
duration of the burglary (including cutting the electrical cords
and smearing blood everywhere) and the pounding sounds,
McClain would have had time to “to reflect [and] to know what
was going on. He did nothing to reduce the harm.”
       McClain timely appealed.

                          DISCUSSION

A.    Senate Bill 1437 and Section 1172.6
      Senate Bill 1437 eliminated the natural and probable
consequences doctrine as a basis for finding a defendant guilty of
murder and significantly limited the scope of the felony-murder
rule. (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 707-708; People v.
Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957 (Lewis); People v. Gentile (2020)
10 Cal.5th 830, 842-843, 847-848; see People v. Reyes (2023)
14 Cal.5th 981, 984 (Reyes).) Section 188, subdivision (a)(3), now
prohibits imputing malice based solely on an individual’s
participation in a crime and requires proof of malice to convict a

                                 15
principal of murder, except under the revised felony-murder rule
as set forth in section 189, subdivision (e). (Reyes, at p. 986;
Gentile, at pp. 842-843.) Section 189, subdivision (e), now
requires the People to prove specific facts relating to the
defendant’s individual culpability: The defendant was the actual
killer (§ 189, subd. (e)(1)); although not the actual killer, the
defendant, with the intent to kill, assisted in the commission of
murder in the first degree (§ 189, subd. (e)(2)); or the defendant
was a major participant in an underlying felony listed in
section 189, subdivision (a), and acted with reckless indifference
to human life as described in section 190.2, subdivision (d) (the
felony-murder special-circumstance provision) (§ 189,
subd. (e)(3)). (See Strong, at p. 708.) Senate Bill No. 775 (2021-
2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2), effective January 1,
2022, expanded the scope of potential relief to apply Senate
Bill 1437’s ameliorative changes to individuals convicted of
attempted murder and voluntary manslaughter. (See § 1172.6,
subd. (a).)
       Senate Bill 1437 also provided a procedure (now codified in
section 1172.6) for an individual convicted of felony murder or
murder under the natural and probable consequences theory to
petition the sentencing court to vacate the conviction and be
resentenced on any remaining counts if the individual could not
have been convicted of murder under Senate Bill 1437’s changes
to sections 188 and 189. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 959;
People v. Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 847.)
       If the section 1172.6 petition contains all the required
information, including a declaration by the petitioner that he or
she is eligible for relief based on the requirements of
subdivision (a), the sentencing court must appoint counsel to

                                16
represent the petitioner upon his or her request pursuant to
section 1172.6, subdivision (b)(3). Where a petitioner makes the
requisite prima facie showing the petitioner falls within the
provisions of section 1172.6 and is entitled to relief, the court
must issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary
hearing to determine whether to vacate the murder, attempted
murder, or manslaughter conviction and resentence the
petitioner on any remaining counts. (§ 1172.6, subds. (c) &
(d)(1).)
       Section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3), provides that at the
evidentiary hearing, “the burden of proof shall be on the
prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
petitioner is guilty of murder or attempted murder under
California law as amended by the changes to Section 188 or 189
made effective January 1, 2019. The admission of evidence in the
hearing shall be governed by the Evidence Code, except that the
court may consider evidence previously admitted at any prior
hearing or trial that is admissible under current law, including
witness testimony, stipulated evidence, and matters judicially
noticed.” Further, “[t]he prosecutor and the petitioner may also
offer new or additional evidence to meet their respective
burdens.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) We review the superior court’s
decision to deny the petition after an evidentiary hearing for
substantial evidence, provided the court understood the elements
of the offense and applied the proper standard and burden of
proof. (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 988; People v. Vargas (2022)
84 Cal.App.5th 943, 951.)

                                17
B.     The Major Participant and Reckless Indifference Factors
       Under Banks, Clark, and Scoggins
       Senate Bill 1437 amended section 189 to limit the scope of
the felony-murder rule, requiring the People to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant “was a major participant in
the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to
human life, as described in subdivision (d) of Section 190.2.”
(§ 189, subd. (e)(3); see § 1170.95, subds. (a)(3) & (d)(3).)
In Banks, the Supreme Court clarified the scope of section 190.2,
subdivision (d), enumerating factors courts must consider in
determining whether a defendant is a major participant under
the totality of the circumstances: “What role did the defendant
have in planning the criminal enterprise that led to one or more
deaths? What role did the defendant have in supplying or using
lethal weapons? What awareness did the defendant have of
particular dangers posed by the nature of the crime, weapons
used, or past experience or conduct of the other participants?
Was the defendant present at the scene of the killing, in a
position to facilitate or prevent the actual murder, and did his or
her own actions or inaction play a particular role in the
death? What did the defendant do after lethal force was used?”
(Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 803, fn. omitted; accord, Clark,
supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 611.)
       In Clark and Scoggins, the Supreme Court specified the
relevant factors in determining whether a defendant acted with
reckless indifference to human life under the totality of the
circumstances: “Did the defendant use or know that a gun would
be used during the felony? How many weapons were ultimately
used? Was the defendant physically present at the crime? Did
he or she have the opportunity to restrain the crime or aid the

                                18
victim? What was the duration of the interaction between the
perpetrators of the felony and the victims? What was the
defendant’s knowledge of his or her confederate’s propensity for
violence or likelihood of using lethal force? What efforts did the
defendant make to minimize the risks of violence during the
felony?” (Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 677; accord, Clark,
supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 618-622.) For both the major participant
factors and the reckless indifference factors, “‘“[n]o one of these
considerations is necessary, nor is any one of them necessarily
sufficient.”’” (Scoggins, at p. 677; accord, Banks, supra,
61 Cal.4th at p. 803.)
       As the Scoggins court explained, “Reckless indifference to
human life is ‘implicit in knowingly engaging in criminal
activities known to carry a grave risk of death.’” (Scoggins,
supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 676; accord, Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at
p. 808 [“[a]wareness of no more than the foreseeable risk of death
inherent in any [violent felony] is insufficient”; reckless
indifference to human life requires “knowingly creating a ‘grave
risk of death’” (Italics added.)].) “Reckless indifference
‘encompasses a willingness to kill (or to assist another in killing)
to achieve a distinct aim, even if the defendant does not
specifically desire that death as the outcome of his actions.’”
(Scoggins, at pp. 676-677, quoting Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at
p. 617.) “Reckless indifference to human life has a subjective and
an objective element. [Citation.] As to the subjective element,
‘[t]he defendant must be aware of and willingly involved in the
violent manner in which the particular offense is committed,’ and
he or she must consciously disregard ‘the significant risk of death
his or her actions create.’ [Citations.] As to the objective
element, ‘“[t]he risk [of death] must be of such a nature and

                                19
degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor’s
conduct and the circumstances known to him [or her], its
disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct
that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor’s
situation.”’” (Scoggins, at p. 677; accord, Clark, at p. 617.)
        “In addition, ‘a defendant’s youth is a relevant factor in
determining whether the defendant acted with reckless
indifference to human life.’” (People v. Ramirez (2021)
71 Cal.App.5th 970, 987 (Ramirez); accord, People v. Keel (2022)
84 Cal.App.5th 546, 558-559 (Keel); In re Moore (2021)
68 Cal.App.5th 434, 454; see People v. Oliver (2023)
90 Cal.App.5th 466, 487-488 [“‘[I]n addition to the Banks and
Clark factors, a defendant’s youthful age must be considered’
when determining whether a defendant ‘was a major participant
and acted with reckless indifference to human life based on the
totality of the circumstances.’”].)
       “A juvenile’s immaturity and failure to appreciate the risks
and consequences of his or her actions bear directly on the
question whether the juvenile is subjectively ‘“aware of and
willingly involved in the violent manner in which the particular
offense is committed”’ and has ‘consciously disregard[ed] “the
significant risk of death his or her actions create.”’” (Ramirez,
supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at pp. 991, 993 [reversing order denying
resentencing petition where the petitioner’s age (15 years old) at
the time of the crime “may well have affected his calculation of
the risk of death posed by using the firearm in a carjacking, as
well as his willingness to abandon the crime”]; accord, People v.
Jones (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1076, 1092-1093 [vacating order
denying resentencing petition following evidentiary hearing and
remanding for consideration of defendant’s youth (20 years old) at

                                20
the time of shooting]; Keel, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 562
[reversing order denying resentencing petition, finding
petitioner’s youth (15 years old) at the time of the shooting
“‘greatly diminishes any inference he acted with reckless
disregard for human life’ during the armed robbery” including
evidence suggesting his youth “rendered him especially
vulnerable to outside pressures”]; In re Moore, supra,
68 Cal.App.5th at p. 453 [vacating robbery-murder special-
circumstance finding, explaining that even if the Clark factors
supported a finding of reckless indifference for an adult, the then-
16-year-old petitioner lacked “‘“the experience, perspective, and
judgment”’ to adequately appreciate the risk of death posed by
his criminal activities”].)

C.    Substantial Evidence Supports the Superior Court’s
      Finding Jones Was a Major Participant and Acted with
      Reckless Indifference to Human Life14
      Substantial evidence supports the superior court’s finding
Jones was a major participant under the Banks/Clark factors.
Jones played a role in planning the burglary. He told the police

14    The People contend the superior court properly denied
Jones’s petition based on a theory of implied malice murder.
“Murder is committed with implied malice when ‘the killing is
proximately caused by “‘an act, the natural consequences of
which are dangerous to life, which act was deliberately performed
by a person who knows that his conduct endangers the life of
another and who acts with conscious disregard for life.’”’” (Reyes,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 988.) We need not reach this argument
because we affirm based on the court’s finding Jones was a major
participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life
under the Banks/Clark factors.

                                21
he went to Allen’s house with McClain and Randall to commit the
burglary. Further, the men waited until Jovita left Allen’s house
before they entered through the kitchen window. Even if Jones
was not the one who brought the crowbar to the house, given that
the three men entered the house together, Jones would have
known Randall or McClain brought the crowbar into the house.
Although there is no evidence Jones was aware of McClain’s or
Randall’s propensity for violence, Jones was aware of the dangers
posed by the burglary because he knew someone was at home,
and the crowbar could be used as a weapon. Most significantly,
Jones was in the home when either Randall or McClain struck
Allen at least 10 times with the crowbar. Jones told the police he
heard pounding sounds in the bedroom, and he admitted he knew
the person who was present in the home was beaten. Yet Jones
did nothing to stop the beating or to assist Allen before leaving
the house.
       Substantial evidence similarly supports the superior court’s
finding Jones acted with reckless indifference to human life
under the Clark/Scoggins factors. As discussed, Jones was
aware the murder weapon was brought into the home (the
crowbar), he was physically present at the scene (at least in the
living room), and the commission of the burglary and beating
lasted long enough for the men to cut the electrical cords from
two kitchen appliances and ransack the house. Allen was struck
on the right side of her head with the crowbar at least 10 times
while she was in bed, splattering blood on her bed, bookcase,
chest of drawers, and window frame and blinds, and the killer
left blood “all over” the hallway walls. Jones acknowledged he
heard the pounding sounds and knew a beating was taking place,
and given how small Allen’s house was, it was a reasonable

                                22
inference Jones would have seen the blood on the hallway walls
from the living room, alerting him to the violence going on in the
bedroom. Yet he made no effort to minimize the risks of violence
during the burglary. Jones could have stepped in to stop Randall
or McClain from beating Allen or, as the superior court found,
restrained and blindfolded her to prevent her from identifying
the men while they searched her bedroom for valuables (avoiding
the need to kill her).
       Jones’s failure to stop the beating or to provide aid to Allen
shows reckless indifference to human life. (See People v.
Montanez (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 245, 282-283 [petitioner’s failure
to aid victims after hearing gunshot supported finding of reckless
indifference]; People v. Nieber (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 458, 479
[petitioner showed reckless indifference where “he did not
intervene to prevent the murder” or provide “aid at the scene to
the murder victim, whom intruders left lying facedown in a pool
of blood”]; In re Loza (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 38, 53-54 [petitioner
displayed reckless indifference where he “neither intervened to
dissuade [accomplice] from shooting either clerk nor came to
either clerk’s aid after the shootings”].)
       Jones contends the superior court did not adequately
consider his youth in finding he acted with reckless indifference
to human life. The superior court did not err. At the time of the
killing, Jones and McClain were both 20 years old; Randall was
17 years old. In making its findings, the court acknowledged
youth was a relevant factor, but it noted Jones was older than
Randall, who was a juvenile. Jones argues the fact Randall is
three years younger is irrelevant to whether Jones possessed the
requisite culpable mental state in light of his youth. But the
court properly considered Randall’s age in evaluating whether

                                 23
Jones’s youth made him vulnerable to peer pressure. (See Keel,
supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 562 [then-15-year-old petitioner
“would have felt pressure to ‘hit the block’ and go along with the
robbery instigated by Bolton—a fellow gang associate who was
three years [his] senior”]; Ramirez, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at
p. 991 [then-15-year-old petitioner’s youth made him susceptible
to peer pressure from an older gang member].)
       Jones also argues McClain “appears to have been the boss
of the operation.” But Jones was found guilty of three other
burglaries not involving McClain that occurred in November 1989
and January 1990—after Allen’s murder—suggesting Jones was
not influenced by peer pressure from McClain to participate in
the Allen burglary. Jones does not point to any other evidence
showing his youth and immaturity affected his ability to
appreciate the risks posed by commission of a burglary using a
crowbar where an occupant was in the home during the crime.

D.    Substantial Evidence Supports the Superior Court’s
      Finding McClain Acted with Reckless Indifference to
      Human Life
      Substantial evidence likewise supports the superior court’s
finding McClain acted with reckless indifference to human life
under the Clark/Scoggins factors.15 Although there is no
evidence McClain knew of Jones’s or Randall’s propensity for
violence, McClain admitted to police that the three men entered
Allen’s house with a tire iron (the crowbar) to commit a burglary.
And McClain admitted at the evidentiary hearing that he heard

15    McClain concedes substantial evidence supports the
superior court’s finding he was a major participant in the
burglary of Allen.

                                24
Jones say during the burglary that someone was home. Yet
McClain made no effort to minimize the risk of violence. As the
superior court observed, McClain could have minimized the risk
of harm to 80-year-old Allen by tying her up and blindfolding her
to keep her from identifying the men.
      Substantial evidence also supports the finding McClain was
present in the home while the beating took place. Although
McClain denied going into Allen’s bedroom, claiming he simply
ran out with the VCR once he learned someone was home, the
superior court found his testimony was not credible. The
superior court reasonably inferred McClain entered Allen’s
bedroom in search of valuables because that is where “watches
and jewelry and items that have value are kept.”16 Even
assuming McClain was in the living room when the beating
occurred, the court reasonably inferred McClain heard the
pounding noises coming from the bedroom given the small size of
the bungalow and that the living room was connected to Allen’s
bedroom by a tiny hallway (with bloodstains on it). McClain did
nothing to stop the beating or render aid to Allen, demonstrating
reckless indifference to human life. (See People v. Montanez,
supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at pp. 282-283; People v. Nieber, supra,

16     McClain’s attorney asserted at oral argument that McClain
consistently claimed he did not learn someone was at home until
after he was inside the house. Although we agree McClain was
inside the house when he heard Jones say someone was home, it
is a reasonable reading of McClain’s statement to Officer Wren
that McClain learned this just after entering the home (that is, in
the kitchen), which is inconsistent with his testimony at the
evidentiary hearing that he already had taken the VCR by the
time he heard this, and he fled.

                                25
82 Cal.App.5th at p. 479; In re Loza, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 53-54.)
       As to McClain’s youth, like Jones, McClain was 20 years old
at the time of the burglary and murder. There is no evidence
McClain was pressured by 20-year-old Jones or 17-year-old
Randall to burglarize Allen’s house. And McClain admitted at
the evidentiary hearing that he was involved in a series of
burglaries he committed on his own. The record is bereft of any
evidence McClain’s youth made him vulnerable to peer pressure
or affected his understanding of the risk of death posed by the
use of a crowbar during a burglary of an occupied home.

                         DISPOSITION

      The orders denying Jones’s and McClain’s petitions for
resentencing are affirmed.

                                          FEUER, J.

We concur:

             SEGAL, Acting P. J.

             MARTINEZ, J.

                               26