Court Opinion

ID: 9364434
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-19 16:08:17.93992+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:38.013882
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Wilhelms v. ProMedica Health Sys., Inc., 2023-Ohio-143.]

                            IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                                SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                     LUCAS COUNTY

Andrew J. Wilhelms, et al.                                 Court of Appeals No. L-22-1085

        Appellants                                         Trial Court No. CI0202003713

v.

ProMedica Health System, Inc., et al.                      DECISION AND JUDGMENT

        Appellees                                          Decided: January 18, 2023

                                                 *****

        Robert W. Kerpsack, for appellants.

        Julia Smith Wiley, Corey L. Tomlinson, and Jeff M. Smith,
        for appellee, ProMedica Health Systems, Inc.

        Michael P. Murphy, Taylor C. Knight, and Alexander M.
        Esposito, for appellee, Moshir K. Jacob, M.D.

                                                 *****

        DUHART, P.J.

        {¶ 1} Appellants, Andrew and Valerie Wilhelms, appeal the March 28, 2022

judgments of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas, granting the Civ.12(C) Motion
for Judgment on the Pleadings by defendant-appellees ProMedica Defendants1 and the

Civ.R. 12(B)(1) and (6) Motion to Dismiss of defendant-appellee, Moshir Jacob, M.D. on

the grounds that appellants’ medical malpractice claims against the appellees were pre-

empted by, and fell within, the liability and immunity provisions of the Public Readiness

and Emergency Preparedness Act, (“the Prep Act), 42 U.S.C. 247d-6d(a)(2)(B).

       {¶ 2} While the statutory provisions of the Prep Act and the ultimate facts of this

medical malpractice action may be complicated, the dispositive issue in this appeal is

quite narrow at this stage of litigation. Appellants allege the appellees provided negligent

medical care during the times appellees were treating Andrew for COVID-19, which they

allege resulted in the development of pressure ulcers/bed sores. At various times,

appellees used a ventilator/respirator, which is a “covered counter measure” under the

Prep Act, in treating Mr. Wilhlem’s COVID-19. We find the question for consideration

is, Does the limited evidence in the trial court record establish as a matter of law that the

Wilhelms’ claims for loss, [i.e. the development of pressure ulcers/bed sores] were

caused by, arose out of, relate to, or result from the administration or use of a covered

counter measure, i.e. the ventilator/respirator?

       {¶ 3} Based upon our review of the trial court record, and reviewing the limited

evidence before the trial court, we find that the trial court erred in finding as a matter of

1
 The trial court’s judgment entries refer to defendants-appellees ProMedica Health
System, Inc., Bay Park Community Hospital, The Toledo Hospital, ProMedica Flower
Hospital, as the ProMedica Defendants. For ease of discussion, we will also use the term
ProMedica Defendants for purposes of discussion here.

2.
law that the appellants’ medical negligence claims for the development of pressure

ulcers/bed sores fell within the scope of the liability and immunity provisions of the Prep

Act. We reverse the judgments of the trial court, and remand this matter for further

proceedings.

                              Facts and Procedural History

       {¶ 4} The Wilhelms filed this medical malpractice action against the appellees.

To summarize, in their first amended complaint, the Wilhelms alleged that while Andrew

was a patient under the care of the ProMedica Defendants and Jacob between March 29

and May 30, 2020, appellees failed to properly staff, properly supervise, identify potential

risk factors, and properly provide nursing care services within the requisite standard of

care causing Andrew to sustain permanent physical injuries, including pressure ulcers

and/or bed sores. At various points during this treatment, Andrew was hospitalized and

treated by the appellees for COVID-19. Andrew was also placed on a

ventilator/respirator during his hospitalization to treat his COVID-19.

       {¶ 5} On April 26, 2021, appellee Jacob filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to

Civ.R. 12(B)(6) and 12(B)(1), which contained an affidavit by Jacob, and which attached

pages of Andrew’s medical records. The ProMedica Defendants then filed a Civ.R.

12(C) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. Appellants filed memoranda in opposition

to both motions.

3.
       {¶ 6} In their respective motions, appellees each alleged that the Wilhelms’

malpractice claims, were preempted by the Prep Act. Specifically, appellees alleged in

their motions that appellants’ medical negligence claims were barred and fell within the

immunity provisions of the Prep Act because the Wilhelms’ claims for loss, which

included the pressure ulcers/bed sores that developed during Andrew’s hospitalization

with COVID-19, were caused by, arose out of, related to, or resulted from the

administration to or use * * * of a covered COVID-19 counter measure, i.e. appellees’

use of a ventilator/respirator in treating Mr. Wilhelms. The trial court agreed with

appellees and ruled the Wilhelms’ medical malpractice claims had “the requisite causal

relationship with administration of the mechanical ventilator used to treat Mr. Wilhelms’

COVID-19 infection.” (Emphasis added.) Appellants timely appealed the trial court’s

findings.2

       {¶ 7} Appellants present two assignments of error for review:

2
  The Wilhelms also alleged in their first-amended complaint that the appellees’ conduct
was also willful and wanton. In ruling that the Wilhelms claims had the requisite causal
connection to trigger the negligence immunity afforded under the Prep Act, the trial court
also observed that because of the causal connection, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to
review the “willful and wanton claims,” which were then required to be brought in
United District Court for the District of Columbia. Because we find the trial court erred
in finding the causal relationship that triggered the immunity provisions of the Prep Act,
we find that the trial court also erred in ruling that the Wilhelms’ “willful and wanton”
were required to be brought in United District Court for the District of Columbia.
Accordingly, appellant’s first-amended complaint is remanded in its entirety for
consideration.

4.
              I. The trial court committed reversible error to the substantial

       prejudice of appellants Andrew J. Wilhelms and Valerie L. Wilhelms by

       ordering judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Civ.R. 12(C) in favor of

       appellees ProMedica Health System, Inc., Bay Park Community Hospital,

       The Toledo Hospital, ProMedica Flower Hospital * * *.

              II. The trial court committed reversible error to the substantial

       prejudice of appellants Andrew J. Wilhelms and Valerie L. Wilhelms by

       ordering judgment of dismissal pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(1) and 12(B)(6) in

       favor of appellee, Moshir Jacob, Md. * * *.

Because appellants’ assignments of error are related, they will be discussed together.

                                        The Prep Act

       {¶ 8} The Prep Act provides for liability and immunity protections for certain

claims arising during the COVID-19 pandemic. 42 U.S.C. 247D-6d provides:

              § 247d-6d. Targeted liability protections for pandemic and epidemic

       products and security countermeasures

              (a) Liability protections

              (1) In general

              Subject to the other provisions of this section, a covered person shall

       be immune from suit and liability under Federal and State law with respect

       to all claims for loss caused by, arising out of, relating to, or resulting from

5.
     the administration to or the use by an individual of a covered

     countermeasure if a declaration under subsection (b) has been issued with

     respect to such countermeasure.

               (2) Scope of claims for loss

               (A) Loss

               For purposes of this section, the term “loss” means any type of loss,

     including--

               (i) death;

               (ii) physical, mental, or emotional injury, illness, disability, or

     condition;

               (iii) fear of physical, mental, or emotional injury, illness, disability,

     or condition, including any need for medical monitoring; and

               ***

               Each of clauses (i) through (iv) applies without regard to the date of

     the occurrence, presentation, or discovery of the loss described in the

     clause.

               (B) Scope

               The immunity under paragraph (1) applies to any claim for loss that

     has a causal relationship with the administration to or use by an individual

     of a covered countermeasure, including a causal relationship with the

6.
      design, development, clinical testing or investigation, manufacture* * *

      dispensing, prescribing, administration, licensing, or use of such

      countermeasure.

The liability and immunity limitation in 247d-6d (a)(1) is limited to “covered

countermeasures,” which are defined as follows:

             (1) Covered countermeasure

             The term “covered countermeasure” means--

             (A) a qualified pandemic or epidemic product (as defined in

      paragraph (7));

             (B) a security countermeasure (as defined in section 247d-

      6b(c)(1)(B) of this title);

             (C) a drug (as such term is defined in section 201(g)(1) of the

      Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 321(g)(1)),2 biological

      product (as such term is defined by section 262(i) of this title), or device (as

      such term is defined by section 201(h) of the Federal Food, Drug and

      Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 321(h)) that is authorized for emergency use in

      accordance with section 564, 564A, or 564B of the Federal Food, Drug, and

      Cosmetic Act; or

             (D) a respiratory protective device that is approved by the National

      Institute for Occupational Safety and Health under part 84 of title 42, Code

7.
       of Federal Regulations (or any successor regulations), and that the

       Secretary determines to be a priority for use during a public health

       emergency declared under section 247d of this title.

42 U.S.C. 247d-6d(i)(1).

The term “covered person” is defined as follows:

               (2) Covered person. The term “covered person”, when used with

       respect to the administration or use of a covered countermeasure, means—

               ***

               (B) a person or entity that is—

               (i) a manufacturer of such countermeasure;

               (ii) a distributor of such countermeasure;

               (iii) a program planner of such countermeasure;

               (iv) a qualified person who prescribed, administered, or dispensed

       such countermeasure; or

               (v) an official, agent, or employee of a person or entity described in

       clause (i), (ii), (iii), or (iv).

42 U.S.C. 247d-6d(i)(2).

       {¶ 9} The parties appear to agree that a ventilator/respirator, such as that used to

treat Andrew during his hospitalization, falls within the definition of a “covered

countermeasure.”

8.
       {¶ 10} As noted, the ProMedica appellees moved for judgment on the pleadings

pursuant to Civ.R. 12(C)(1), while appellee Jacob moved for dismissal for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(1) and 12(B)(6). Despite the procedural

difference in the motions, the trial court applied the same reasoning in granting both

motions. The trial court found as a matter of law that the PREP Act preempts and/or

immunizes the appellees from the Wilhelms’ negligence claims because the Wilhelms’

claims “have the requisite causal relationship with administration of the mechanical

ventilator used to treat Mr. Wilhelms’ COVID-19 infection.”

                                 Review of a Civ.R. 12 Dismissal

       {¶ 11} In State ex rel. Bush v. Spurlock, 42 Ohio St.3d 77, 80, 537 N.E.2d 641,

(1989), the Court addressed the review of a Civ.R. 12(B)(1) and (6) order granting

dismissal:

              The standard of review for a dismissal pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(1) is

       whether any cause of action cognizable by the forum has been raised in the

       complaint. Avco Financial Services Loan, Inc. v. Hale (1987), 36 Ohio

       App.3d 65, 67, 520 N.E.2d 1378, 1380, citing Steffen v. General Tel. Co.

       (1978), 60 Ohio App.2d 144, 14 O.O.3d 111, 395 N.E.2d 1346. A Civ.R.

       12(B)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can

       be granted will only be granted where the party opposing the motion is

       unable to prove any set of facts that would entitle him to relief. Korodi v.

9.
      Minot (1987), 40 Ohio App.3d 1, 3, 531 N.E.2d 318, 321. Indeed, before a

      court may dismiss an action under this rule, “ * * * it must appear beyond

      doubt from the complaint that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts

      entitling him to recovery.” O’Brien v. University Community Tenants

      Union (1975), 42 Ohio St.2d 242, 71 O.O.2d 223, 327 N.E.2d 753,

      syllabus. To make this determination, the court is required to interpret all

      material allegations in the complaint as true and admitted. Phung v. Waste

      Management, Inc. (1986), 23 Ohio St.3d 100, 102, 23 OBR 260, 262, 491

      N.E.2d 1114, 1116.

      {¶ 12} In reviewing an order granting judgment on the pleadings, courts apply the

following:

             Under Civ.R. 12(C), a party may move for judgment on the

      pleadings after the pleadings have closed, but within such time as to not

      delay trial. “A motion for judgment on the pleadings presents only

      questions of law and may only be granted when no material issues of fact

      exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

      Mousa v. Mount Carmel Health Sys., Inc., 10th Dist. No. 12AP-737, 2013-

      Ohio-2661, ¶ 10. In construing a motion for judgment on the pleadings

      under Civ.R. 12(C), the pleadings and any reasonable inferences to be

      drawn therefrom are to be liberally construed in favor of the non-moving

10.
          party. Id. “Appellate review of motions for judgment on the pleadings is de

          novo.” Id.

Roddy v. Williamson, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 16AP-195, 2016-Ohio-8437, ¶ 6.

(Emphasis added.) See also State ex rel. Midwest Pride IV, Inc. v. Pontius, 75 Ohio St.3d

565, 570, 664 N.E.2d 931 (1996)) (“Thus, Civ.R. 12(C) requires a determination that no

material factual issues exist and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law.”).

          {¶ 13} “In order to grant such a motion, it must appear, considering all the

averments of the pleadings, that simply a question of law is presented. If an issue of fact,

or a direct issue joined on any single material proposition is made, requiring the

introduction of testimony by the moving party to sustain such issue, the motion will be

denied.” Wainscott v. Young, 74 Ohio App. 463, 464, 59 N.E.2d 609 (1st Dist.1944).

(Emphasis added.)

          {¶ 14} In determining whether a court granted relief pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B) or

Civ.R. 12(C), “A reviewing court must examine the entire journal entry and the

proceedings below where necessary to ascertain the precise basis of a lower court’s

judgment.” State ex rel. Midwest Pride IV, Inc. at 569, quoting Joyce v. Gen. Motors

Corp. 49 Ohio St.3d 93, 95, 551 N.E.2d 172 (1990). See id, quoting Burnside v.

Leimbach, 71 Ohio App.3d 399, 402–403, 594 N.E.2d 60 (10th Dist.1991). (“Civ.R.

12(C) permits consideration of the complaint and answer, but a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion

11.
must be judged on the face of the complaint alone.”). We also note that Civ.R. 8(A) only

requires “'a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to

relief.'” David v. Matter, 2017-Ohio-7351, 96 N.E.2d 1012, ¶ 24 (6th Dist.), quoting

Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 95 Ohio St.3d 416, 2002-Ohio-2480, 768 N.E.2d, ¶ 5.

       {¶ 15} The trial court issued two nearly identical decisions dismissing appellants’

amended complaint. We find that despite the filing of both a Civ.R. 12(B)(1) and (6)

motion by appellee Jacob and a Civ.R. 12(C) motion by the ProMedica Defendants, in

examining the entire journal entries and the proceedings below, the trial court’s March 28

orders both effectively granted appellees judgment pursuant to 12(C). Thus, even though

appellee Jacob’s motion was captioned as a Civ.R. 12(B) motion, we will review this

matter pursuant to Civ.R. 12(C).

       {¶ 16} We find that applying this standard of review, and viewing the allegations

and complaint in a light most favorably to appellants as we must at this stage in the

litigation, there is a genuine material dispute as to whether the Wilhelms’ claims for loss

are caused by, arose out of, relate to, or resulting from the administration to or use * * *

of a covered measure”, which would trigger the immunity and liability protections in 42

U.S.C. 247D-6d. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court must be reversed.

       {¶ 17} The affidavit and medical records attached to Jacob’s motion to dismiss

included Andrew’s medical records reciting that he had been hospitalized and treated for

COVID-19 during the time period in question, and that Andrew had been placed on a

12.
respirator at various points during his hospitalization. The medical records stated that

appellant also “developed pressure ulcers relating to his hospital stay.” Notably, the

affidavit and the medical records do not state that Wilhelms’ pressure ulcers/bed sores

were caused by, arose out of, related to, or resulted from the administration of or the use

of the ventilator or respirator, a covered countermeasure under the Prep Act.3

       {¶ 18} The trial court also took no testimony on the issue, which it was permitted

to do under Civ.R. 12(B). No depositions or affidavits were filed establishing causation

between Mr. Wilhelms’ pressure ulcers and the use of the ventilator/respirator. Both the

ProMedica Defendants and Defendant Jacob asked the trial court to conclude as a matter

of law that appellant’s damages, his pressure ulcers/bed sores were caused by, arose out

of, related to, or resulted from the administration of or the use of the ventilator/respirator,

thus triggering the immunity and liability protections of the Prep Act. Similarly, appellee

Jacob states in his brief that “all of the allegations against all of the medical defendants in

this case * * * are related to the treatment of bedsores, which he developed while

3
  Even if the court were to review the trial court’s dismissal with respect to appellee
Jacob under Civ.R. 12(B)(1), the current trial court record, i.e. pleadings and affidavits,
before the trial court was insufficient to establish the requisite causal relationship with
administration of the mechanical ventilator used to treat Mr. Wilhelms’ COVID-19
infection and his injuries, and the trial court’s causal finding based upon the limited
evidence in the record was clearly erroneous. See e.g. Linkous v. Mayfield, 4th Dist.
Scioto No. CA1894, 1991 WL 100358, *4 ( June 4, 1991) (“In determining a motion to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the court is not restricted to the pleadings,
but may review any evidence, such as affidavits and testimony, to resolve factual disputes
concerning the existence of jurisdiction to hear the action. 2A Moore's Federal Practice
(1985) 12-45-12-46, Para. 12.07[2.-1]”).

13.
immobilized and isolated on a ventilator, receiving treatment of Covid 19.” Appellees

also describe Wilhelm’s injuries as “ventilator related injuries.”

       {¶ 19} Despite the lack of evidence as to causation in the record, and the parties’

clear factual disputes as to the applicability of the immunity of the Prep Act, the trial

court concluded there was a “requisite causal relationship with administration of the

mechanical ventilator used to treat Mr. Wilhelms’ COVID-19 infection.”

       {¶ 20} Reviewing the limited record presented at this stage in the litigation, in a

light most favorable to appellants as we must, we cannot say that the record establishes as

matter of law that the Wilhelms’ claimed injuries and claims for loss were caused by,

arose out of, relate to, or resulted from the administration to or use * * * of a covered

measure. The trial court’s decision essentially treats the mere use of a

ventilator/respirator, i.e., a covered counter countermeasure, at various points of

Wilhelms’ hospitalization as determinative evidence that all the individuals and entities

that treated Wilhelms were all “covered persons” and that the loss or injuries caused arose

out of, related to, or resulted from the administration of or the use of the

ventilator/respirator.

       {¶ 21} Since the time of oral argument, appellants have provided the court with

supplemental authorities addressing the scope of the Prep Act and its relation to state

medical malpractice cases. These cases make clear that the analysis as to whether the

Prep Act immunity applies in a state medical malpractice case involves a fact-intensive

14.
examination of the evidence and record, which was not present before the trial court, to

establish the causation which the trial court presumed. These cases have rejected the

broad interpretation urged by the trial court and appellees. See e.g. Goins v. Saint

Elizabeth Med. Ctr. No. 22-91-DLB-CJS, 2022 WL 17413570 (E.D. Ken. Nov. 9, 2022);

Saldana v. Glenhaven Healthcare LLC, 27 F.4th 679, 689 (9th Cir. 2022), cert. denied,

No. 22-192, 2022 WL 17085186 (U.S. Nov. 21, 2022); and Levert v. Montefiore Home,

No. 1:21-CV-02312, 2022 WL 4591253, *4 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 30, 2022)

       {¶ 22} The recent decision in Goins v. Saint Elizabeth Med. Ctr. is particularly

instructive and persuasive. In that case, the plaintiff, Goins, filed an action in state court,

alleging claims against ModernaTX, Inc. (“Moderna”), the manufacturer of a COVID-19

vaccine that Ms. Goins received; the Kroger Company (“Kroger”), which distributed the

vaccine and provided it to Ms. Goins; Saint Elizabeth Medical Center (“St. Elizabeth”),

which provided care to Ms. Goins during a health episode following her receipt of the

vaccine; Tri-State Gastroenterology Associates (“Tri-State”) and Dr. Joel Warren, who

performed a surgery on Ms. Goins as part of the same health episode. The matter was

removed to federal court and each of the parties moved for dismissal based upon the

liability and immunity provisions of the Prep Act.

       {¶ 23} The District Court granted the motion to dismiss of Moderna and Kroger

finding that the claimed losses clearly were alleged to have been caused by, arose out of,

related to, or resulted from the administration of, or the use of the Moderna vaccine, a

15.
covered countermeasure. However, the District Court was unwilling to find that the Prep

Act immunity and liability protections applied to Warren and Tri-State:

             To the extent that Dr. Warren argues that his treatment of Ms.

      Goins after she received a vaccine amounts to him “administering” a

      covered countermeasure, that argument is also unavailing. (See Doc. # 15-

      1 at 2). The March 2020 declaration provides further guidance on the

      PREP Act's usage of the term “administration,” specifying that “[t]he

      definition of ‘administration’ extends only to physical provision of a

      countermeasure to a recipient, such as ... activities related to management

      and operation of programs and locations for providing countermeasures to

      recipients[.]” Declaration Under the Public Readiness and Emergency

      Preparedness Act for Medical Countermeasures Against COVID-19, 85

      Fed. Reg. 15198, 15200 (March 17, 2020) (emphasis added). * * *

             “Administration” of the vaccine thus refers to the logistical work it

      takes to provide vaccines, and Tri-State and Dr. Warren were not at all

      involved in Ms. Goins’ receipt of the Moderna vaccine. In the Complaint,

      the vaccine itself is only mentioned once following Ms. Goins’ retelling of

      her receiving the dose at Kroger: at Paragraph 26, where she writes that an

      unidentified group of doctors “stated [her condition] could have been a

16.
      reaction to her July 31, 2021 second Moderna COVID-19 vaccine.” (Doc.

      # 1-2 ¶ 26).

             Otherwise, a close reading of the statute itself reveals that Dr.

      Warren is not a “covered person.” In defining “covered person,” the PREP

      Act uses past tense to state that a “covered person” is one who “prescribed,

      administered, or dispensed such countermeasure[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 247d-

      6d(i)(2)(B)(iv). Federal statutes “ascribe[ ] significance to verb tense,”

      and different verb tenses carry different meanings. Carr v. United States,

      560 U.S. 438, 448 (2010) (citing 1 U.S.C. § 1); see also Russell v.

      Citigroup, Inc., 748 F.3d 677, 679 (6th Cir. 2014). In the PREP Act,

      Congress chose to use the simple past tense “prescribed” instead of the

      present perfect tense “has prescribed” or the present tense “prescribes.”

      See 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(i)(2)(B)(iv). The simple past tense “refers to

      action completed at a definite time in the past,” while the present perfect

      tense “refers to action already completed or continuing in the present.”

      Robert C. Farrell, Why Grammar Matters: Conjugating Verbs in Modern

      Legal Opinions, 40 Loy. U. Chi. L. J. 1, 19 (2008). Here, the statute’s

      usage of “prescribed, administered, or dispensed,” in the simple past tense,

      refers to an action completed at a definite time – when the countermeasure

      was prescribed, administered, or dispensed to the plaintiff.

17.
             Thus, even though Ms. Goins’ claims against Dr. Warren and Tri-

      State are related to her COVID vaccine, none of her claims, and most

      importantly, none of the facts asserted alongside her claims, make

      allegations regarding Dr. Warren and Tri-State's prescription,

      administration, or dispensation of the vaccine. In that absence, Dr. Warren

      and Tri-State are not “covered persons” under the PREP Act, and its

      immunities are thus unavailable to them. For that reason, their Motion to

      Dismiss * ** is denied.

             The overwhelming bulk of facts in this case relate not to Ms. Goins’

      vaccine, but instead to the medical care she received after taking the

      vaccine. To the extent that Ms. Goins has tacked on claims against the

      vaccine manufacturer and distributor, for whatever reasons she and her

      counsel chose to do so, it is appropriate that those entities have removed

      the case to federal court and invoked protections under the federal PREP

      Act to which they are legally entitled. Otherwise, in the absence of the

      vaccine defendants, this case is an ordinary malpractice suit brought

      under Kentucky law, by a Kentucky plaintiff, against Kentucky defendants.

      The matter will accordingly be remanded to state court for further

      adjudication. (Emphasis added.)

18.
           {¶ 24} As in the Goins case, we cannot say based upon the current record that the

mere allegation that Mr. Wilhelms developed pressure ulcers and bed sores after being

placed on a ventilator/respirator at some point during his COVID hospitalization and

treatment is sufficient to establish that (1) all individuals treating appellant during the

entire course of his treatment were “covered persons” under the Prep Act and; (2) the

Wilhelms’ alleged loss or injuries were caused by, arose out of, related to, or resulted

from the administration of, or the use of a covered countermeasure.

           {¶ 25} Thus, we conclude that the matter should be reversed and remanded for

further proceedings. See Saldana at 689 (Remand to state court affirmed where “only

some of the steps Glenhaven allegedly took, and did not take, may have involved a

‘covered person,’ under the PREP Act. Thus, remand is proper because the complaint

does not present an embedded federal question.’”); See also Levert at *4 (“The Complaint

merely referencing Covid testing * * * is not the equivalent of alleging “improper use” or

“administration” of Covid-19 diagnostic tests. Here, Plaintiff does not allege that his

father was injured due to Defendants’ improper “administration” or “use” of a Covid

test.”).

           {¶ 26} Accordingly, we find appellants’ first and second assignments or error

well-taken. The judgments of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas are reversed

19.
and this matter is remanded for proceedings consistent with this decision.4 The costs of

this matter are assessed to appellees pursuant to App.R. 24. It so ordered.

                                                                        Judgment reversed,
                                                                            and remanded.

       A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.

Mark L. Pietrykowski, J.                        ____________________________
                                                        JUDGE
Gene A. Zmuda, J.
                                                ____________________________
Myron C. Duhart, P.J.                                   JUDGE
CONCUR.
                                                ____________________________
                                                        JUDGE

         This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
    Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
         version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
                  http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.

4
 In deciding this matter, the court has not been asked to address the application or
constitutionality of Ohio H.B. 606 and expresses no opinion thereon.

20.