Court Opinion

ID: 9942799
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-21 21:00:43.012074+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:44:41.918011
License: Public Domain

USCA4 Appeal: 21-1168     Doc: 92        Filed: 02/20/2024   Pg: 1 of 32

                                            PUBLISHED

                             UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                 FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                             No. 21-1168

        SONY MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT; ARISTA MUSIC; ARISTA RECORDS,
        LLC; LAFACE RECORDS LLC; PROVIDENT LABEL GROUP, LLC; SONY
        MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT US LATIN LLC; VOLCANO ENTERTAINMENT
        III, LLC; ZOMBA RECORDINGS LLC; SONY/ATV MUSIC PUBLISHING
        LLC; EMI AI GALLICO MUSIC CORP.; EMI ALGEE MUSIC CORP.; EMI
        APRIL MUSIC INC.; EMI BLACKWOOD MUSIC INC.; COLGEMS-EMI
        MUSIC INC.; EMI CONSORTIUM MUSIC PUBLISHING INC., d/b/a EMI Full
        Keel Music; EMI CONSORTIUM SONGS, INC., d/b/a EMI Longitude Music;
        EMI FEIST CATALOG INC.; EMI MILLER CATALOG INC.; EMI MILLS
        MUSIC, INC.; EMI UNART CATALOG INC.; EMI U CATALOG INC.; JOBETE
        MUSIC COMPANY, INCORPORATED; STONE AGATE MUSIC; SCREEN
        GEMS-EMI MUSIC, INCORPORATED; STONE DIAMOND MUSIC CORP.;
        ATLANTIC RECORDING CORPORATION; BAD BOYS RECORDS LLC;
        ELEKTRA ENTERTAINMENT GROUP, INCORPORATED; FUELED BY
        RAMEN LLC; ROADRUNNER RECORDS, INC.; WARNER-TAMERLANE
        PUBLISHING        CORPORATION;           WB     MUSIC   CORPORATION;
        UNICHAPPELL MUSIC, INCORPORATED; RIGHTSONG MUSIC INC.;
        COTILLION MUSIC, INCORPORATED; INTERSONG U.S.A., INC.; UMG
        RECORDINGS, INCORPORATED; CAPITOL RECORDS, LLC; UNIVERSAL
        MUSIC CORPORATION; UNIVERSAL MUSIC-MGB NA LLC; UNIVERSAL
        MUSIC PUBLISHING INC.; UNIVERSAL MUSIC PUBLISHING AB;
        UNIVERSAL PUBLISHING LIMITED; UNIVERSAL MUSIC PUBLISHING
        MGB LIMITED; UNIVERSAL MUSIC - Z TUNES LLC; UNIVERSAL/ISLAND
        MUSIC LIMITED; UNIVERSAL/MCA MUSIC PUBLISHING PTY. LIMITED;
        POLYGRAM PUBLISHING, INC.; SONGS OF UNIVERSAL, INC.; WARNER
        RECORDS, INC., f/k/a W.B.M. Music Corp.; WARNER CHAPPELL MUSIC,
        INC., f/k/a Warner/Chappell Music, Inc.; W.C.M. MUSIC CORP., f/k/a W.B.M.
        Music Corp.,

                           Plaintiffs – Appellees,

                    and
USCA4 Appeal: 21-1168          Doc: 92          Filed: 02/20/2024   Pg: 2 of 32

        NONESUCH RECORDS INC.; WARNER BROS. RECORDS, INC.;
        WARNER/CHAPPELL MUSIC, INC.; W.B.M. MUSIC CORP.; UNIVERSAL -
        POLYGRAM INTERNATIONAL TUNES, INC.; UNIVERSAL - SONGS OF
        POLYGRAM    INTERNATIONAL,      INC.;  UNIVERSAL      POLYGRAM
        INTERNATIONAL PUBLISHING, INC.; MUSIC CORPORATION OF
        AMERICA, INC., d/b/a Universal Music Corporation; RONDOR MUSIC
        INTERNATIONAL,

                                Plaintiffs,

                        v.

        COX COMMUNICATIONS, INCORPORATED; COXCOM, LLC,

                                Defendants – Appellants.

        -------------------------

        INTERNET ASSOCIATION; ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION;
        CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND TECHNOLOGY; AMERICAN LIBRARY
        ASSOCIATION; ASSOCIATION OF COLLEGE AND RESEARCH LIBRARIES;
        ASSOCIATION OF RESEARCH LIBRARIES; PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE; NTCA
        THE RURAL BROADBAND ASSOCIATION; CTIA - THE WIRELESS
        ASSOCIATION; USTELECOM THE BROADBAND ASSOCIATION;
        INTERNET COMMERCE COALITION; INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
        PROFESSORS,

                                Amici Supporting Appellant,

                        and

        NATIONAL   MUSIC   PUBLISHERS’  ASSOCIATION; NASHVILLE
        SONGWRITERS ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONAL; SONGWRITERS OF
        NORTH AMERICA; COPYRIGHT ALLIANCE,

                                    Amici Supporting Appellee.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at
        Alexandria. Liam O’Grady, Senior District Judge. (1:18-cv-00950-LO-JFA)

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        Argued: March 9, 2022                                      Decided: February 20, 2024

        Before HARRIS and RUSHING, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge.

        Affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by published opinion.
        Judge Rushing wrote the opinion, in which Judge Harris and Senior Judge Floyd joined.

        ARGUED: E. Joshua Rosenkranz, ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP, New
        York, New York, for Appellants. Catherine Emily Stetson, HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP,
        Washington, D.C., for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Michael S. Elkin, Jennifer A. Golinveaux,
        Geoffrey P. Eaton, WINSTON & STRAWN LLP, New York, New York; Mark S. Davies,
        Sheila A. Baynes, Washington, D.C., Christopher J. Cariello, Rachel G. Shalev, Alexandra
        Bursak, ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP, New York, New York, for
        Appellants. Matthew J. Oppenheim, Scott A. Zebrak, Jeffrey M. Gould, OPPENHEIM +
        ZEBRAK, LLP, Washington, D.C.; Jo-Ann Tamila Sagar, Patrick C. Valencia, HOGAN
        LOVELLS US LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellees. Joseph C. Gratz, Samuel J. Zeitlin,
        DURIE TANGRI LLP, San Francisco, California, for Amicus Internet Association.
        Mitchell L. Stoltz, Corynne McSherry, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, San
        Francisco, California; Erik Stallman, Juliana DeVries, Samuelson Law, Technology &
        Public Policy Clinic, UC BERKELEY SCHOOL OF LAW, Berkeley, California, for
        Amici Electronic Frontier Foundation, Center for Democracy and Technology, American
        Library Association, Association of College and Research Libraries, Association of
        Research Libraries, and Public Knowledge. David E. Weslow, Megan L. Brown, Ari S.
        Meltzer, Kevin G. Rupy, Adrienne J. Kosak, WILEY REIN LLP, Washington, D.C., for
        Amici NTCA – The Rural Broadband Association, CTIA – The Wireless Association, and
        USTelecom – The Broadband Association. Andrew L. Deutsch, DLA PIPER LLP (US),
        Los Angeles, California, for Amicus Internet Commerce Coalition. Phillip R. Malone,
        Juelsgaard Intellectual Property and Innovation Clinic, Mills Legal Clinic, STANFORD
        LAW SCHOOL, Stanford, California, for Amici Intellectual Property Law Professors.
        Danielle M. Aguirre, Kerry M. Mustico, Christopher A. Bates, NATIONAL MUSIC
        PUBLISHERS’ ASSOCIATION, Washington, D.C.; Ruthanne M. Deutsch, Hyland Hunt,
        Alexandra Mansbach, DEUTSCH HUNT PLLC, Washington, D.C., for Amici National
        Music Publishers’ Association, Nashville Songwriters Association International, and
        Songwriters of North America. Nancy Wolff, Sara Gates, COWAN DEBAETS
        ABRAHAMS & SHEPPARD LLP, New York, New York, for Amicus The Copyright
        Alliance.

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        RUSHING, Circuit Judge:

               Defendant Cox Communications sells internet, telephone, and cable television

        service to 6 million homes and businesses across the United States. Plaintiffs—Sony

        Music Entertainment and numerous other record companies and music publishers—own

        some of the most popular copyrighted musical works of our time. Some users of Cox’s

        internet service infringed Plaintiffs’ copyrights by downloading or distributing songs over

        the internet without permission. Rather than sue those individuals, Plaintiffs sued Cox,

        seeking to hold it responsible for its customers’ copyright infringement.

               Federal law protects internet service providers from monetary liability for copyright

        infringement committed by users of their networks, but only if those service providers

        reasonably implement a policy to terminate repeat infringers in appropriate circumstances.

        In a prior case, our Court held that Cox had failed to reasonably implement an anti-piracy

        program and therefore did not qualify for the statutory safe harbor.

               This case proceeded to trial on two theories of secondary liability: vicarious and

        contributory copyright infringement.        The jury found Cox liable for both willful

        contributory and vicarious infringement of 10,017 copyrighted works owned by Plaintiffs

        and awarded $1 billion in statutory damages. Cox appealed.

               We affirm the jury’s finding of willful contributory infringement. But we reverse

        the vicarious liability verdict and remand for a new trial on damages because Cox did not

        profit from its subscribers’ acts of infringement, a legal prerequisite for vicarious liability.

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                                                     I.

               Copyright owners possess the “exclusive rights” to “reproduce,” “distribute,”

        “perform,” “display,” or “prepare derivative works based upon” their copyrighted works,

        subject to limitations not relevant here. 17 U.S.C. § 106. Anyone who violates any of

        these exclusive rights of the copyright owner is “an infringer of the copyright.” Id.

        § 501(a). A copyright owner may “institute an action” against an infringer, id. § 501(b),

        and receive either statutory damages, id. § 504(a)(2), or actual damages plus the infringer’s

        profits, id. § 504(a)(1). Although the Copyright Act “does not expressly render anyone

        liable for infringement committed by another,” the Supreme Court has long held that

        vicarious and contributory liability for copyright infringement rest on firm legal footing.

        Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 434–435 (1984).

               Congress recognized that internet service providers may get caught in the crossfire

        when infringers use the internet to reproduce or distribute copyrighted works, so it created

        a safe harbor defense in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). See 17 U.S.C.

        § 512. To be eligible for the defense, an internet service provider must have “adopted and

        reasonably implemented . . . a policy that provides for the termination in appropriate

        circumstances of subscribers and account holders of the service provider’s system or

        network who are repeat infringers.” Id. § 512(i)(1)(A). This Court previously held that

        Cox did not qualify for the safe harbor because its repeat infringer policy as implemented

        was inadequate under the DMCA. See BMG Rts. Mgmt. (US) LLC v. Cox Commc’ns, Inc.,

        881 F.3d 293, 301–305 (4th Cir. 2018). The claim period in this case coincides with the

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        period during which Cox was ineligible for the safe harbor, so Cox faces the secondary

        liability claims here without that protection. 1

                  This lawsuit began when Sony and other owners of copyrighted musical works

        (collectively, Sony or Plaintiffs) sued Cox for infringement committed by subscribers to

        Cox’s internet service from 2013 to 2014. During the claim period, Cox provided internet

        service to residential and commercial subscribers, charging different flat fees for different

        download speeds according to a tiered pricing plan.

                  Plaintiffs are members of the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA),

        which hired the anti-piracy company MarkMonitor to catch infringements of its members’

        copyrights on peer-to-peer networks using file-sharing protocols like BitTorrent and

        others.       See BMG, 881 F.3d at 298–299 (explaining peer-to-peer file sharing and

        BitTorrent). When MarkMonitor discovered an internet user downloading or distributing

        a copyrighted music file, it notified the user’s internet service provider. Only the service

        provider can match an alleged infringer’s internet protocol address to its owner’s identity.

        When Cox received infringement notices from MarkMonitor, Cox’s automated system sent

        notices to the infringing subscribers. The notice Cox sent varied by how far along the

        subscriber was in Cox’s thirteen-strike policy, ranging from an email warning to a

        temporary suspension. See BMG, 881 F.3d at 299 (describing the thirteen-strike policy).

                The DMCA safe harbor defense is not exclusive, so Cox remains “entitled to all
                  1

        other arguments under the law” in its defense. CoStar Grp., Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373
        F.3d 544, 552 (4th Cir. 2004); see 17 U.S.C. § 512(l).
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               Over time, Cox developed various methods to stem the tidal wave of infringement

        notices it was receiving and mitigate the consequences for its subscribers. It capped the

        number of notices it would accept from RIAA, eventually holding it at 600 notices per day.

        It took no action on the first DMCA complaint for each subscriber, limited the number of

        account suspensions per day, and restarted the strike count for subscribers once it

        terminated and reinstated them. MarkMonitor sent Cox 163,148 infringement notices

        during the claim period. Over that time, Cox terminated 32 subscribers for violation of its

        Acceptable Use Policy, which prohibits copyright infringement among other things. By

        comparison, it terminated over 600,000 subscribers for nonpayment over that same time.

        Frustrated with Cox’s lackluster response to the notices, Sony sued Cox for vicarious and

        contributory copyright infringement.

               After discovery, Sony and Cox cross-moved for summary judgment. Two of the

        district court’s rulings at that stage are relevant for this appeal. First, the district court

        concluded that the infringement notices MarkMonitor sent to Cox proved Cox’s knowledge

        of infringement as a matter of law.         That knowledge established one element of

        contributory liability. Second, the district court denied Cox’s motion to reduce the number

        of copyrighted works in suit. Cox argued that, for the purpose of statutory damages, all

        songs included on a single album constitute one work, and a sound recording and the music

        composition it embodies likewise count as a single work. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1)

        (authorizing statutory damages for infringement “with respect to any one work” and

        explaining that “all the parts of a compilation or derivative work constitute one work”).

        The district court found that issues of material fact remained and so this claim should “be

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        resolved at trial.” Sony Music Ent. v. Cox Commc’ns, Inc., 426 F. Supp. 3d. 217, 236 (E.D.

        Va. 2019).

               The parties presented their case to the jury over the course of twelve days. Plaintiffs

        limited their case to Cox subscribers who received three or more infringement notices. In

        the end, the jury found Cox liable for vicarious and contributory infringement of all 10,017

        copyrighted works alleged. The jury also found that Cox’s infringement was willful, which

        increased the available maximum statutory damages to $150,000 per work. See 17 U.S.C.

        § 504(c)(1)–(2). The jury awarded Sony $99,830.29 per infringed work, for a total of $1

        billion in statutory damages.

               After the verdict, Cox renewed its motion for judgment as a matter of law, which

        the district court ultimately denied in full. Regarding liability, the district court rejected

        Cox’s arguments that the evidence did not prove vicarious or contributory infringement.

        Cox also sought again to reduce the number of works—and with it, damages—to account

        for compilations and derivative works. The district court rejected Cox’s request as to

        compilations but invited Cox to submit a calculation of the derivative works that were

        allegedly double counted. After receiving Cox’s submission, however, the district court

        denied any reduction in the number of works, reasoning that Cox’s posttrial arguments

        required factfinding within the province of the jury and that Cox had failed to present

        evidence sufficient to enable the jury to make the adjustments it requested.

               Now on appeal, Cox raises numerous questions of law concerning the scope of

        secondary liability for copyright infringement and what constitutes a compilation or

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        derivative work in the internet age. Ultimately, we find we must answer only some of these

        novel questions to resolve this appeal.

                                                       II.

               We begin with Cox’s contention that the district court erred in denying it judgment

        as a matter of law on Sony’s vicarious infringement claim. We review that ruling de novo.

        Russell v. Absolute Collection Servs., Inc., 763 F.3d 385, 391 (4th Cir. 2014). Judgment

        as a matter of law is proper if, viewing all evidence and reasonable inferences in the light

        most favorable to the nonmoving party, “a reasonable jury would not have a legally

        sufficient evidentiary basis to find for [that] party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1). A district

        court should grant judgment as a matter of law “if the nonmoving party failed to make a

        showing on an essential element of his case with respect to which he had the burden of

        proof.” Russell, 763 F.3d at 391 (internal quotation marks omitted).

               A defendant may be held vicariously liable for a third party’s copyright

        infringement if the defendant “[1] profits directly from the infringement and [2] has a right

        and ability to supervise the direct infringer.” Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v.

        Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 930 n.9 (2005); see also CoStar Grp., Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc.,

        373 F.3d 544, 550 (4th Cir. 2004) (“[A] defendant who ‘has the right and ability to

        supervise the infringing activity and also has a direct financial interest in such activities’ is

        [vicariously] liable.” (quoting Gershwin Pub. Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443

        F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971))). Cox contests both elements on appeal. Because we

        conclude Sony failed, as a matter of law, to prove that Cox profits directly from its

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        subscribers’ copyright infringement, we do not reach the additional question of Cox’s right

        and ability to supervise its subscribers.

               Cox argues that it does not profit directly from its subscribers’ infringement because

        “[a]ll subscribers pay Cox a flat monthly fee for their internet access package no matter

        what they do online.” Opening Br. 27. Whether a subscriber uses her internet access for

        lawful or unlawful purposes, Cox receives the same monthly fee, and a subscriber’s

        decision to download or distribute a copyrighted song without permission does not benefit

        Cox. The district court rejected this argument, concluding that Sony had proven Cox’s

        direct financial interest by showing that Cox repeatedly declined to terminate the accounts

        of infringing subscribers in order to continue collecting their monthly fees. To understand

        this issue, some legal background is necessary.

               Vicarious liability for copyright infringement is an “outgrowth of the agency

        principles of respondeat superior.” Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259,

        262 (9th Cir. 1996); see also A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1022 (9th

        Cir. 2001). It extends beyond a strict employer-employee relationship to other settings in

        which a defendant similarly “‘has the right and ability to supervise the infringing activity

        and also has a direct financial interest in such activities.’” Costar Grp., 373 F.3d at 550

        (quoting Gershwin Pub. Corp., 443 F.2d at 1162). So, for example, we have held that a

        property owner was vicariously liable for its closely related developer’s infringing use of

        copyrighted architectural drawings in a construction project. Nelson-Salabes, Inc. v.

        Morningside Dev., LLC, 284 F.3d 505, 513–514 (4th Cir. 2002). In addition to its control

        over the project, the property owner had “an obvious and direct financial interest in the

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        [developer’s] infringing activities” because the owner “enjoyed the benefit of any increase

        in the Project’s value resulting from [the developer’s] infringement” of the copyrighted

        drawings. Id. at 514. In another example, a company that sold nutritional supplements

        was vicariously liable for its distributors’ infringing use of copyrighted photographs to

        advertise its products because the company could control the distributors and stood to

        benefit from increased sales spurred by the infringing advertisements. Leonard v. Stemtech

        Int’l, Inc., 834 F.3d 376, 389 (3d Cir. 2016).

               The landmark case on vicarious liability for infringing copyrighted musical

        recordings is Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H. L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1963).

        There a department store was held accountable for the infringing sale of “bootleg” records

        by a concessionaire operating in its stores. Id. at 307–308. The store retained the ultimate

        right to supervise the concessionaire and its employees, demonstrating its control over the

        infringement. And the store received a percentage of every record sale, “whether ‘bootleg’

        or legitimate,” giving it “a most definite financial interest” in the infringing sales. 2 Id.

               Courts have recognized, however, that a defendant may possess a financial interest

        in a third party’s infringement of copyrighted music even absent a strict correlation

               2
                  In an analysis that courts still use today, the Shapiro court contrasted two types of
        relationships: (1) landlords and tenants and (2) dance halls and bands. Shapiro, 316 F.2d
        at 307; see Sony, 464 U.S. at 437 n.18 (picking up this comparison); Leonard, 834 F.3d at
        388–389 (same). A landlord is not vicariously liable for a tenant’s copyright infringement,
        the court explained, because he exercises no supervision over the tenant and charges a fixed
        rental fee regardless of whether the tenant infringes copyrights in the rented house.
        Shapiro, 316 F.2d at 307. But the dance hall proprietor who hires a band can control the
        premises, and the band’s infringing performances of copyrighted songs “provide the
        proprietor with a source of customers and enhanced income,” exposing him to vicarious
        liability. Id.
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        between each act of infringement and an added penny of profits. For example, Fonovisa

        concerned the operator of a swap meet who allowed vendors to sell infringing records. The

        complaint alleged that the operator collected “admission fees, concession stand sales and

        parking fees”—but no sales commission—“from customers who want[ed] to buy the

        counterfeit recordings at bargain basement prices.” Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 263. These

        allegations sufficed to state a direct financial benefit to the swap meet operator, the court

        held, because “the sale of pirated recordings at the . . . swap meet [was] a ‘draw’ for

        customers.” Id. The infringing sales “enhance[d] the attractiveness of the venue to

        potential customers,” giving the swap meet operator a financial interest in the infringement

        sufficient to state a claim for vicarious liability. Id.

               Applying these principles to copyright infringement in cyberspace, courts and

        Congress agree that “‘receiving a one-time set-up fee and flat periodic payments for

        service’” from infringing and noninfringing users alike ordinarily “‘would not constitute

        receiving a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity.’” Ellison v.

        Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting S. Rep. 105-190, at 44 (1998)).

        But “‘where the value of the service lies in providing access to infringing material,’” those

        flat fees may constitute a direct financial benefit. Id. (quoting S. Rep. 105-190, at 45).

               For example, the file-sharing service Napster had a direct financial interest in its

        users’ exploitation of copyrighted music. An increasing volume of pirated music available

        for download drew more users to register with Napster, and its “future revenue [was]

        directly dependent upon increases in userbase.” Napster, 239 F.3d at 1023 (internal

        quotation marks omitted).

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               By contrast, America Online (AOL) was not vicariously liable for copyright

        infringement occurring over an online forum to which it provided its subscribers access.

        Although access to online forums encouraged overall subscription to AOL’s services, there

        was no direct financial benefit from infringement where no evidence indicated “that AOL

        customers either subscribed because of the available infringing material” or “canceled

        subscriptions” when the material was no longer available. Ellison, 357 F.3d at 1079.

        Without “evidence that AOL attracted or retained subscriptions because of the

        infringement or lost subscriptions because of [its] eventual obstruction of the

        infringement,” “no jury could reasonably conclude that AOL received a direct financial

        benefit from providing access to the infringing material.” Id.

               As these cases illustrate, the crux of the financial benefit inquiry is whether a causal

        relationship exists between the infringing activity and a financial benefit to the defendant.

        If copyright infringement draws customers to the defendant’s service or incentivizes them

        to pay more for their service, that financial benefit may be profit from infringement. See,

        e.g., EMI Christian Music Grp., Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC, 844 F.3d 79, 99 (2d Cir. 2016).

        But in every case, the financial benefit to the defendant must flow directly from the third

        party’s acts of infringement to establish vicarious liability. See Grokster, 545 U.S. at 930

        & n.9; Nelson-Salabes, 284 F.3d at 513.

               To prove vicarious liability, therefore, Sony had to show that Cox profited from its

        subscribers’ infringing download and distribution of Plaintiffs’ copyrighted songs. It did

        not.

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               The district court thought it was enough that Cox repeatedly declined to terminate

        infringing subscribers’ internet service in order to continue collecting their monthly fees.

        Evidence showed that, when deciding whether to terminate a subscriber for repeat

        infringement, Cox considered the subscriber’s monthly payments. See, e.g., J.A. 1499

        (“This customer will likely fail again, but let’s give him one more chan[c]e. [H]e pays

        317.63 a month.”). To the district court, this demonstrated the requisite connection

        between the customers’ continued infringement and Cox’s financial gain.

               We disagree. The continued payment of monthly fees for internet service, even by

        repeat infringers, was not a financial benefit flowing directly from the copyright

        infringement itself. As Cox points out, subscribers paid a flat monthly fee for their internet

        access no matter what they did online. Indeed, Cox would receive the same monthly fees

        even if all of its subscribers stopped infringing. Cox’s financial interest in retaining

        subscriptions to its internet service did not give it a financial interest in its subscribers’

        myriad online activities, whether acts of copyright infringement or any other unlawful acts.

        An internet service provider would necessarily lose money if it canceled subscriptions, but

        that demonstrates only that the service provider profits directly from the sale of internet

        access. Vicarious liability, on the other hand, demands proof that the defendant profits

        directly from the acts of infringement for which it is being held accountable.

               Sony responds that, even if we disagree with the district court, the jury heard other

        evidence of Cox’s direct financial interest in its subscribers’ copyright infringement. But

        none of Sony’s alternative theories supports vicarious liability here.

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               First, Sony contends that the jury could infer from the volume of infringing activity

        on Cox’s network that the ability to infringe was a draw for customers. In support, Sony

        highlights evidence that roughly 13% of Cox’s network traffic was attributable to peer-to-

        peer activity and over 99% of peer-to-peer usage was infringing. Even if the jury believed

        Sony’s characterization that this was a high volume of infringing activity in general, the

        evidence falls considerably short of demonstrating that customers were drawn to purchase

        Cox’s internet service, or continued to use that service, because it offered them the ability

        to infringe Plaintiffs’ copyrights. Cf. Ellison, 357 F.3d at 1079. Many activities of modern

        life demand internet service. No one disputes that Cox’s subscribers need the internet for

        countless reasons, whether or not they can infringe. Sony has not identified evidence that

        any infringing subscribers purchased internet access because it enabled them to infringe

        copyrighted music. Nor does any evidence suggest that customers chose Cox’s internet

        service, as opposed to a competitor’s, because of any knowledge or expectation about

        Cox’s lenient response to infringement.

               Second, Sony asserts that “subscribers were willing to pay more for the ability to

        infringe,” but the evidence does not go nearly so far. Response Br. 36. Cox had a tiered

        pricing structure by which it charged customers higher monthly fees for increased data

        allowances. According to Sony, peer-to-peer activity is “bandwidth-intensive,” “more data

        usage requires more speed,” and Cox advertised its network speeds in relation to how

        quickly a user could download songs.         Response Br. 37.      Further, Sony explains,

        “residential subscribers who were the subject of 20 or more infringement notices from 2012

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        [to] 2014 paid Cox more per month, on average, than residential subscribers who were the

        subject of only 1 or 2 infringement notices.” Response Br. 34.

               None of this raises a reasonable inference that any Cox subscriber paid more for

        faster internet in order to engage in copyright infringement. As Sony’s expert testified,

        other data intensive activities include legally streaming movies, television shows, and

        music, as well as playing video games. Subscribers may have purchased high speed

        internet for lawful streaming and downloads or because their households had many internet

        users; Sony’s expert didn’t claim to know why any customer purchased a higher tier of

        service. Sony has not identified any evidence that customers were attracted to Cox’s

        internet service or paid higher monthly fees because of the opportunity to infringe

        Plaintiffs’ copyrights.

               At bottom, Sony offered no legally adequate theory to establish the required causal

        connection between subscribers’ copyright infringement and increased revenue to Cox.

        While Cox profited from the sale of internet service, Sony has not shown that Cox, in any

        sense, had a financial interest in its subscribers committing infringement. See Costar Grp.,

        373 F.3d at 550. And it is the infringement itself that must in some fashion profit the

        defendant for vicarious liability to attach. Accordingly, under the correct legal standard,

        no reasonable jury could find that Cox received a direct financial benefit from its

        subscribers’ infringement of Plaintiffs’ copyrights. We therefore conclude that Cox is not

        vicariously liable for its subscribers’ copyright infringement and reverse the district court’s

        denial of Cox’s motion for judgment as a matter of law.

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                                                      III.

               We turn next to contributory infringement. Under this theory, “‘one who, with

        knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or materially contributes to the

        infringing conduct of another’ is liable for the infringement, too.” CoStar Grp., 373 F.3d

        at 550 (quoting Gershwin Pub., 443 F.2d at 1162). The district court resolved the question

        of Cox’s knowledge on summary judgment, while the jury found material contribution at

        trial, so we address Cox’s challenge to each element separately.

                                                      A.

               We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the

        same standard the district court was required to apply. See Variety Stores, Inc. v. Wal-Mart

        Stores, Inc., 888 F.3d 651, 659 (4th Cir. 2018). Summary judgment is appropriate when

        “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment

        as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

               Our Court has recently clarified the intent necessary to prove contributory

        infringement by an internet service provider based on its subscribers’ direct infringement.

        In BMG Rights Management v. Cox Communications, we held that intent to cause

        infringement may be shown by willful blindness—which is not at issue in this appeal—or

        by “know[ledge] that infringement [was] substantially certain to result from the sale” of

        internet service to a customer. 881 F.3d at 307. General knowledge of infringement

        occurring on the defendant’s network is not enough; “[s]elling a product with both lawful

        and unlawful uses suggests an intent to cause infringement only if the seller knows of

        specific instances of infringement.” Id. at 311. Applying these principles to Cox in that

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        case, we held that Cox could not be contributorily liable absent “knowledge that

        infringement [was] substantially certain to result from Cox’s continued provision of

        Internet access to particular subscribers.” Id.

               As BMG suggests, in this scenario, knowledge that particular subscribers are

        substantially certain to infringe is a predictive question. We reasoned in BMG that

        knowledge of past infringement is relevant to proving this element. See id. at 308. Here,

        Cox produced data purporting to show the effectiveness of each step of its thirteen-strike

        policy at reducing future infringement, which could also be relevant. And Sony highlights

        internal emails implying that Cox continued providing internet service to certain habitual

        infringers despite believing they would infringe again. A jury could consider this and other

        evidence to determine whether, when Cox continued providing internet service to

        customers receiving three or more infringement notices, it knew they were substantially

        certain to infringe Plaintiffs’ copyrights by, for example, downloading another song or

        distributing a song they had previously downloaded.

               Cox argues that the district court erred by taking this factual determination away

        from the jury and deciding as a matter of law that notices of past infringement established

        Cox’s knowledge that subscribers were substantially certain to infringe in the future.

        Unfortunately, Cox did not make any argument of this ilk to the district court when

        opposing summary judgment on the knowledge element. Instead, Cox’s opposition to

        Sony’s motion for summary judgment on knowledge focused exclusively on the adequacy

        of the infringement notices from MarkMonitor. Cox argued that the notices lacked

        information, that the notices were too vague to notify Cox of infringement of specific

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        copyrighted works by specific internet users, and that Sony needed additional evidence

        beyond the notices to prove that those infringements occurred.

               In the district court, all parties (and the court itself) appear to have proceeded on the

        assumption that knowledge of subscribers’ past infringement sufficed to prove this element

        of contributory liability. Addressing the arguments Cox actually made, the district court

        concluded that the infringement notices from MarkMonitor were sufficiently detailed to

        notify Cox of specific instances of infringement. 3 And based on Cox’s knowledge of those

        notices, the court concluded that Sony had established the knowledge element of

        contributory liability as a matter of law.

               Cox did not argue to the district court, as it does now on appeal, that notices of past

        infringement failed to establish its knowledge that the same subscriber was substantially

        certain to infringe again. Cox cites certain pages of its memorandum opposing Sony’s

        motion for summary judgment where it claims to have preserved this argument. But no

        arguable interpretation of those pages or their context reveals any theory like the one Cox

        advances on appeal. In the district court, Cox contested the sufficiency of the infringement

        notices to prove Cox’s knowledge of the past infringements alleged therein. On appeal,

        Cox argues that its knowledge of past infringements “does not prove Cox knew ex ante that

        the same subscriber was ‘substantially certain’ to infringe again.” Opening Br. 38

        (emphasis added). “These are different arguments entirely, and making the one does not

               3
                  To the extent Cox suggests that disputes about the information in particular
        infringement notices independently warrant vacatur of summary judgment, we agree with
        the district court that these disputes are immaterial.
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        preserve the other.” Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 428 n.24 (4th Cir. 2006). Indeed, Cox

        did not even mention the “substantially certain” standard anywhere in its memorandum

        opposing summary judgment. Cf. Opening Br. 38 (Cox faulting the district court for not

        mentioning this “requirement” in its opinion).

               Because Cox did not press this argument in the district court, it is forfeited for

        appeal. “Arguments raised in a trial court must be specific and in line with those raised on

        appeal.” In re Under Seal, 749 F.3d 276, 287 (4th Cir. 2014). “[A]n objection on one

        ground does not preserve objections based on different grounds.” Id. (internal quotation

        marks omitted); see also, e.g., United States v. Zayyad, 741 F.3d 452, 459 (4th Cir. 2014)

        (“To preserve an argument on appeal, the defendant must object on the same basis below

        as he contends is error on appeal.”); United States v. Banisadr Bldg. Joint Venture, 65 F.3d

        374, 379 (4th Cir. 1995) (“[A] theory not raised at trial cannot be raised on appeal.”).

               “Absent exceptional circumstances, . . . we do not consider issues raised for the first

        time on appeal.” Robinson v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 560 F.3d 235, 242 (4th Cir. 2009);

        see also Agra, Gill & Duffus, Inc. v. Benson, 920 F.2d 1173, 1176 (4th Cir. 1990) (“We

        will not accept on appeal theories that were not raised in the district court except under

        unusual circumstances.”). Cox does not contend that any such circumstances exist here,

        nor does Cox make any effort to show “fundamental error or a denial of fundamental

        justice.” In re Under Seal, 749 F.3d at 285 (internal quotation marks omitted); see id. at

        292 (finding that appellant abandoned any argument for overlooking forfeiture by failing

        to brief it). Consequently, we decline to consider Cox’s new argument on appeal.

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                                                      B.

               Moving to the material contribution element of contributory liability, Cox appeals

        the district court’s denial of its renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law. We review

        that denial de novo and must affirm if, “viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the

        non-moving party, there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to have found in the

        non-moving party’s favor.” First Union Com. Corp. v. GATX Cap. Corp., 411 F.3d 551,

        556 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted); see Fed. R. Civ. P.

        50(a)(1). We may not weigh evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses. See First

        Union Com. Corp., 411 F.3d at 556.

               The district court declined to disturb the jury’s contributory liability verdict because

        sufficient evidence supported a finding that Cox materially contributed to its subscribers’

        direct infringement of Plaintiffs’ copyrights. 4 As the court explained, Cox’s internet

        service “was indispensable to each instance of [peer-to-peer] infringement on its network.”

        Sony Music Ent. v. Cox Commc’ns, Inc., 464 F. Supp. 3d 795, 816 (E.D. Va. 2020). And,

        considering the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, a reasonable jury could

        have found that Cox provided that service “with actual knowledge” of infringement

        occurring “on specific subscribers’ accounts,” yet “fail[ed] to address” that infringement

        occurring on its network. Id.

               Cox makes two principal objections. The first rests on the contention that it cannot

        be liable for materially contributing to copyright infringement because the internet service

               4
                 The jury instruction asked if Cox “induced, caused, or materially contributed to
        the infringing activity,” J.A. 801, but only material contribution is before us on appeal.
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        it provides is capable of substantial lawful use and not designed to promote infringement.

        We rejected that argument in BMG: “In fact, providing a product with ‘substantial non-

        infringing uses’ can constitute a material contribution to copyright infringement.” 881

        F.3d at 306. As we explained there, “Grokster makes clear that what matters is not simply

        whether the product has some or even many non-infringing uses, but whether the product

        is distributed with the intent to cause copyright infringement.” Id. Accordingly, Cox’s

        concern that businesses “would be automatically liable for providing any product or service

        with knowledge that some small set of customers may use it, in part, to infringe” is

        misplaced. Opening Br. 45.

               Second and similarly, Cox claims its contribution must “amount[] to culpable

        conduct equivalent to aiding and abetting the infringement,” Opening Br. 43 (internal

        quotation marks and ellipsis omitted), and that “failing to prevent” its subscribers’

        infringement does not suffice, Opening Br. 46. This argument ignores the evidence before

        the jury.

               It is true that “mere[] . . . failure to take affirmative steps to prevent infringement”

        does not establish contributory liability “in the absence of other evidence of intent.”

        Grokster, 545 U.S. at 939 n.12. But supplying a product with knowledge that the recipient

        will use it to infringe copyrights is exactly the sort of culpable conduct sufficient for

        contributory infringement. For example, in BMG we reasoned that leasing a VCR to a

        customer—innocent conduct by itself—can support contributory liability if the lessor

        knows the customer is substantially certain to use it for copyright infringement. See BMG,

        881 F.3d at 308. In such a situation, providing the means to infringe is culpable pursuant

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        to the common law rule that a person is presumed to intend the substantially certain results

        of his acts. See id. at 307. This accords with principles of aiding and abetting liability in

        the criminal law. Lending a friend a hammer is innocent conduct; doing so with knowledge

        that the friend will use it to break into a credit union ATM supports a conviction for aiding

        and abetting bank larceny. See United States v. Thompson, 539 Fed. App. 778, 779 (9th

        Cir. 2013); United States v. Thompson, 728 F.3d 1011, 1013 (9th Cir. 2013).

               The evidence at trial, viewed in the light most favorable to Sony, showed more than

        mere failure to prevent infringement. The jury saw evidence that Cox knew of specific

        instances of repeat copyright infringement occurring on its network, that Cox traced those

        instances to specific users, and that Cox chose to continue providing monthly internet

        access to those users despite believing the online infringement would continue because it

        wanted to avoid losing revenue.        Sony presented extensive evidence about Cox’s

        increasingly liberal policies and procedures for responding to reported infringement on its

        network, which Sony characterized as ensuring that infringement would recur. And the

        jury reasonably could have interpreted internal Cox emails and chats as displaying

        contempt for laws intended to curb online infringement.           To be sure, Cox’s anti-

        infringement efforts and its claimed success at deterring repeat infringement are also in the

        record. But we do not weigh the evidence at this juncture. The evidence was sufficient to

        support a finding that Cox materially contributed to copyright infringement occurring on

        its network and that its conduct was culpable. Therefore we may not disturb the jury’s

        verdict finding Cox liable for contributory copyright infringement.

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                                                      IV.

               Having reversed on one theory of liability and affirmed on the other, we now must

        address the scope of the vacatur and proceedings on remand. We conclude that reversal of

        the vicarious infringement verdict warrants vacatur of the damages award and remand for

        a new trial on damages. But we see no reason to vacate the contributory infringement

        verdict, nor will we direct the district court to enter judgment on any part of the now-

        vacated statutory damages verdict.

                                                       A.

               When a jury returns a special verdict form finding two bases for liability but a

        general damages verdict that does “not apportion damages between the claims,” reversal

        of one theory of liability on appeal typically requires “a new trial . . . on the damages issue.”

        Barber v. Whirlpool Corp., 34 F.3d 1268, 1278 (4th Cir. 1994). Only “where it is

        reasonably certain that the jury was not significantly influenced by issues erroneously

        submitted to it” is vacatur of the general damages award unnecessary. Tire Eng’g &

        Distrib., LLC v. Shandong Linglong Rubber Co., 682 F.3d 292, 314 (4th Cir. 2012)

        (internal quotation marks omitted).

               We lack sufficient confidence that the jury’s vicarious liability verdict here did not

        materially influence its statutory damages award. The $1 billion award was a “global

        figure” for all infringements in the case. Barber, 34 F.3d at 1278. Although the vicarious

        and contributory infringement claims were predicated on the same conduct and the

        maximum damages for each is identical, the statutory range is wide and the jury’s choice

        within it is highly discretionary and may have been influenced by the vicarious

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        infringement verdict. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1), (2) (authorizing a “just” award between

        $750 and $150,000 per work for willful infringement). Unlike actual damages, statutory

        damages are not tethered to concrete figures like lost profits or incurred expenses. To the

        contrary, the jury was instructed to award an amount it found “fair under the

        circumstances,” taking into consideration factors such as “[t]he profits Cox earned because

        of the infringement,” “[t]he expenses Cox saved because of the infringement,” “[t]he

        circumstances of the infringement,” and “the need to punish Cox,” among others. J.A. 803.

        We have reversed the vicarious liability verdict because Cox did not directly profit from

        its subscribers’ infringement. Without that legally erroneous finding, the jury’s assessment

        of at least these damages factors may be different. Given the jury’s wide discretion in

        assessing the appropriate damages and its legally erroneous finding that Cox had a direct

        financial interest in its subscribers’ infringement, we are not “reasonably certain that the

        jury was not significantly influenced” in its statutory damages award by its finding of

        vicarious liability. Tire Eng’g, 682 F.3d at 314 (internal quotation marks omitted). We

        therefore vacate the damages award and remand for a new trial on damages.

                                                    B.

               Cox urges us to vacate not just the damages award but also the contributory liability

        verdict because, in its view, the two types of secondary liability are intertwined. We don’t

        see much to support Cox’s unadorned claim that a wrong conclusion on direct financial

        interest in subscriber infringement would significantly influence the jury’s finding on

        material contribution to infringement. Accordingly, we decline to vacate the contributory

        infringement verdict on this ground.

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                                                    C.

               Finally, Cox argues that, even if we remand the case for a new trial on damages, we

        should direct the district court to enter judgment in Cox’s favor as to certain copyrighted

        works that Cox claims cannot be used to calculate statutory damages. Cox renewed its

        motion for judgment as a matter of law on this ground after trial, and the district court

        denied relief. Even though we have vacated the entire damages determination, we address

        this issue because if Cox were right, it would be entitled to exclude a number of works

        from consideration for statutory damages and would not have to prove the status of those

        works to the jury at retrial.

               The Copyright Act authorizes an award of statutory damages within a certain dollar

        range “for all infringements involved in the action, with respect to any one work” and

        specifies that, “[f]or the purposes of this subsection, all the parts of a compilation or

        derivative work constitute one work.” 5 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1). “Although parts of a

        compilation or derivative work may be regarded as independent works for other purposes,

        for purposes of statutory damages, they constitute one work.” Xoom, Inc. v. Imageline,

        Inc., 323 F.3d 279, 285 (4th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted), abrogated on

        other grounds by Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154 (2010). It is undisputed

        on appeal that Cox’s subscribers infringed 10,017 copyrighted works owned by Plaintiffs.

        But Cox contends that many of those works cannot properly be the subject of separate

               5
                  The range depends on whether the infringement was willful. Non-willful
        infringement results in a statutory damages range of $750 to $30,000 per work, whereas
        for willful infringement the upper limit increases to $150,000. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1), (2).
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        statutory damages awards because they are part of a compilation or derivative work.

        Specifically, Cox claims that the number of compensable works was inflated in two ways:

        (1) by counting both musical compositions and their derivative sound recordings, and

        (2) by counting individual sound recordings that were compiled in a single album.

               A “derivative work” is “a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as

        a . . . sound recording[.]” 17 U.S.C. § 101. The copyrighted works in this case include

        sound recordings and musical compositions, some of which overlap. In other words, some

        of the copyrighted recordings are performances of the copyrighted compositions.

        Throughout this litigation, Cox has maintained that Plaintiffs cannot collect statutory

        damages for infringement of both a copyrighted musical composition and its derivative

        sound recording. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1).

               A “compilation” is “a work formed by the collection and assembling of preexisting

        materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the

        resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship.            The term

        ‘compilation’ includes [a] collective work[],” which is “a work, such as a periodical issue,

        anthology, or encyclopedia, in which a number of contributions, constituting separate and

        independent works in themselves, are assembled into a collective whole.” 17 U.S.C. § 101.

        In Cox’s view, a musical album is a compilation, and because “all the parts of a compilation

        . . . constitute one work” for purposes of statutory damages and some of the infringed songs

        were included on albums together, Plaintiffs were limited to one statutory damages award

        per album, not one per song. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1).

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               Whether any of the works in this case are derivative or part of a compilation is a

        mixed question of law and fact. See Bryant v. Media Right Prods., 603 F.3d 135, 140 (2d

        Cir. 2010); Gamma Audio & Video, Inc. v. Ean-Chea, 11 F.3d 1106, 1116 (1st Cir. 1993).

        The subsidiary legal questions were for the district court to resolve, and the factual

        questions were for the jury to decide. See Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc.,

        523 U.S. 340, 355 (1998) (“[T]he Seventh Amendment provides a right to a jury trial on

        all issues pertinent to an award of statutory damages under § 504(c) of the Copyright Act,

        including the amount itself.”); cf. Google LLC v. Oracle Am., Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1183, 1199–

        1200 (2021) (explaining mixed questions of law and fact).

               Before and during trial, the parties were aware of the need for evidence to identify

        the alleged derivative works and compilations among the 10,017 copyrighted works at

        issue. Pretrial, the district court denied Cox’s motion for summary judgment on the topics,

        observing that issues of material fact remained. At various points during the trial, Cox

        acknowledged its obligation to put forth evidence identifying the derivative works and

        compilations and forecasted that it would do so through requests for admissions, answers

        to interrogatories, deposition testimony, certificates of registration, or expert testimony.

        But it did not, and pertinent testimony from Cox’s expert witness was excluded from

        evidence as beyond the bounds of his expert report and disclosures. 6 Having heard no

               6
                   Cox does not appeal this evidentiary ruling.
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        evidence or argument about the number of derivative works or compilations, the jury

        returned a statutory damages award for each of the 10,017 copyrighted works infringed. 7

               After trial, Cox asked the district court to reduce the damages award to account for

        derivative works and compilations. The court declined, and we review its judgment de

        novo. See First Union Com. Corp., 411 F.3d at 556.

                                                      1.

               Regarding derivative works, the district court agreed with Cox on the legal question,

        ruling that Plaintiffs were entitled to only one statutory damages award, not two, for

        infringement of a musical composition and its derivative sound recording. 8 But on the

        factual question, the court concluded that Cox had not presented evidence from which the

        jury could determine which recordings and compositions overlapped.

               In support of its posttrial motion, Cox created three schedules identifying the works

        that it claimed overlapped and those that did not. To do so, Cox consulted two trial

        exhibits—PX1, which listed the infringed sound recordings, and PX2, which listed the

        infringed musical compositions—and the works’ copyright registration certificates, some

        but not all of which were in evidence. Cox compared information from these sources,

        including the title of the work, artist, album, publication date, and ownership information,

               7
                   Cox does not challenge the jury instructions or verdict form on appeal.
               8
                Sony challenges that ruling on appeal as an alternative basis for affirmance.
        Because we affirm on the ground Cox raised, we need not address Sony’s alternative
        argument.
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        to make judgment calls about whether a particular sound recording and musical

        composition overlapped.

               As the district court realized, this additional information necessary for

        distinguishing derivative from non-derivative works had not been presented to the jury.

        Even if the jury had been asked to comb through the thousands of entries on PX1 and PX2,

        that comparison alone would not have enabled it to determine which entries were derivative

        of each other, as demonstrated by Cox’s posttrial submissions. The court therefore

        correctly concluded that it could not use the new analysis in Cox’s posttrial schedules to

        decide which works were derivative and reduce the damages award.                As the court

        explained, “Cox did not provide the information to the jury that it has provided to the

        [c]ourt in its post-trial brief,” and “[t]he jury answered that question [about statutory

        damages] with the information available” at trial. Sony Music Ent. v. Cox Commc’ns, Inc.,

        No. 1:18-cv-00950, 2021 WL 1254683, at *3 (E.D. Va. Jan. 12, 2021).

               Cox now argues, based on the information it presented to the district court after trial,

        that the jury’s verdict was unjust because 2,235 sound recordings are undisputedly

        derivative works. But like the district court when deciding the Rule 50 motion, we must

        assess the verdict based on the evidence before the jury, not Cox’s efforts to supplement

        the record after trial. See 9B Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice &

        Procedure § 2529 (3d ed. & Supp. 2023) (“Rule 50 motions must be considered in light of

        the evidence presented at trial.”). Because the evidence at trial supported the jury’s verdict,

        we affirm the district court’s denial of judgment as a matter of law.

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                                                     2.

               As for compilations, Cox contends that Plaintiffs were not entitled to separate

        statutory damages awards for songs that were contained on the same album. We need not

        decide whether Cox’s legal premise is sound because, even assuming it is for the sake of

        argument, Cox does not identify evidence from which the jury could have determined

        which songs were released on albums together. 9

               Nowhere in its briefing does Cox identify evidence it presented to the jury about

        whether infringed works were contained on albums. Neither PX-1 (the list of infringed

        sound recordings) nor PX-2 (the list of infringed compositions) mentions the album

        information for any work. To bridge this gap, Cox relies on the summary judgment record,

        citing deposition testimony and the supposed absence of dispute at that stage about certain

        facts. But we see no indication this evidence was presented to the jury, and our focus when

        reviewing the district court’s Rule 50 ruling must be the record created at trial. See Fed.

        R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1); Ortiz v. Jordan, 562 U.S. 180, 184 (2011) (“Once the case proceeds to

        trial, the full record developed in court supersedes the record existing at the time of the

        summary-judgment motion.”).       Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of

        judgment as a matter of law on compilations too.

               9
                 The district court rejected Cox’s legal theory. It instead followed the reasoning of
        the Second Circuit in EMI Christian, which “allowed separate statutory damages awards
        for songs that the plaintiffs issued as singles, even if those songs were also made available
        on albums.” 844 F.3d at 101. Other circuits have applied a third approach—the
        “independent economic value test”—to determine whether a copyrighted work is part of a
        compilation subject to only one statutory damages award. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Flora, Inc.,
        936 F.3d 562, 570–572 (7th Cir. 2019). We need not delve into these conflicting
        interpretations of the Copyright Act to resolve this appeal.
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                                                   V.

              For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court’s order denying Cox

        judgment as a matter of law on Sony’s claim of vicarious copyright infringement. We

        affirm the district court’s orders denying Cox relief from the jury’s contributory

        infringement verdict and denying judgment as a matter of law regarding the number of

        derivative works and compilations. Given our reversal of the vicarious liability verdict,

        we also vacate the damages award and remand for a new trial on the amount of statutory

        damages to be awarded.

                                                                                 SO ORDERED

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