Court Opinion

ID: 9519540
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:18:16.946456+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:44:29.008922
License: Public Domain

Boslaugh, J.,
dissenting.
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and article I, § 7, of the Nebraska Constitution prohibit only unreasonable seizures. The issue is whether the seizure of the defendant was unreasonable. It seems to me that the issue must be resolved by consideration of all of the facts and circumstances in the case.
In State v. Colgrove, 198 Neb. 319, 324, 253 N.W.2d 20, 23 (1977), we noted that the officers who had stopped the defendant were not “in the process of any criminal investigation which might have made it reasonable to make inquiry of the car’s occupants.”
In State v. Joao, Jr., 56 Haw. 216, 533 P.2d 270 (1975), the defendant was stopped by a police officer who had been assigned to investigate a traffic accident in which the defendant *80was believed to have been involved. After the defendant was stopped, the officer asked the defendant and a passenger to leave the automobile, after which a firearm was discovered in plain sight. The court held that the stop was lawful, but that the request that the defendant and the passenger leave the automobile was not justified. In holding that the initial stop was lawful, the court said:
The initial stop in this case was proper. Cf. State v. Tsukiyama, 56 Haw. 8, 525 P.2d 1099 (1974). Compare, United States v. Ward, 488 F.2d 162 (9th Cir. 1973); People v. Parisi, 393 Mich. 31, 222 N.W.2d 757 (1974). Officer DeCaires had a perfectly legitimate reason for stopping the defendant in the first instance. He had been assigned to question him relative to a traffic accident which had occurred previously. However, the officer had been unable to carry out his assignment because of his inability to locate the defendant earlier. Had the stop been limited simply to afford the officer the opportunity to arrange for an interview with the defendant at a more reasonable hour and location, there could have been no legal flaw in the police procedure.
Joao, Jr., 56 Haw. at 218, 533 P.2d at 272. See, also, Michigan State Police Dept. v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 110 L. Ed. 2d 412 (1990); Williamson v. U.S., 607 A.2d 471 (D.C. App. 1992).
If the opinion in the Ryland case is understood to mean that any stop where the officer does not have a reasonable suspicion, supported by articulable facts, that criminal activity exists, then it goes too far.
An interesting hypothetical situation to consider would be to determine what the officer should do if Ryland, after stating that he would “ ‘[b]e happy’ ” to give a statement, had added: “Just as soon as I dispose of the dead body in the trunk.”
Hastings, C. J., j oins in this dissent.