Court Opinion

ID: 9380230
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-17 17:08:38.722742+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:23.605196
License: Public Domain

J-A03018-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellant               :
                                               :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    LEKIRR BROWN                               :   No. 265 EDA 2022

             Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered January 10, 2022
              In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
              Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0002118-2012

BEFORE:      KING, J., SULLIVAN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.:                              FILED MARCH 17, 2023

        The Commonwealth appeals from the order granting the Post-Conviction

Relief Act1 (“PCRA”) petition of Lekirr Brown (“Brown”). We reverse.

        The PCRA court provided the factual and procedural history, which we

set forth in relevant part as follows:

               [In the early hours of the morning in November 2011, Brown
        shot his victim Zandar Cotton in the stomach outside of a bar.
        See generally Commonwealth v. Brown, 258 A.3d 539 (Pa.
        Super. 2021) (unpublished memorandum at *1).] [I]n July []
        2012, [following] a bench trial, [Brown] was found guilty of the
        following charges: attempted murder, aggravated assault,
        possession of a firearm prohibited . . ., carrying firearms in public
        in Philadelphia . . ., and possession of an instrument of crime . . ..
        [Brown] was found not guilty of firearms not to be carried without
        a license . . .. [I]n December [] 2012, the [trial court] . . . imposed
        . . . [an] aggregate sentence [of] ten to twenty years [of
        incarceration].
____________________________________________

*   Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1   See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541–9546.
J-A03018-23

           [I]n February [] 2013, [Brown] filed his first PCRA petition
     and then an amended PCRA petition [i]n March [] 2013, wherein
     he claimed that his trial counsel was ineffective because he did
     not timely petition the [trial c]ourt to appoint counsel for appeal.
     [Following reinstatement of Brown’s direct appeal rights nunc pro
     tunc,] the Superior Court affirmed [Brown’s] judgment of
     sentence [i]n June [] 2014.         [Brown] filed a [p]etition for
     [a]llowance of [a]ppeal to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania [i]n
     June[] 2014[,] and his petition was denied on October 7, 2014.

                                   ****

           [Brown timely filed his second PCRA petition.] . . .[O]n
     March 2, 2018, th[e PCRA c]ourt issued an order denying . . .
     post[-]conviction relief.

                                   ****

            [Brown appealed to the Superior Court[,] which dismissed
     the appeal in April 2019, based on substantial defects in Brown’s
     brief.] [Brown] filed his [third petition seeking reinstatement of
     his right to appeal nunc pro tunc the dismissal of his second
     petition. By agreement of the parties,] . . . [t]he PCRA Court . . .
     reinstated [Brown’s] right to file an appeal of the dismissal of his
     second PCRA petition[] nunc pro tunc.

           [I]n June [] 2020, [Brown] filed a [n]otice of [a]ppeal of the
     dismissal of his [second] PCRA petition.

                                   ****

           On June 21, 2021, the Superior Court vacated the PCRA
     [c]ourt’s March 2, 2018 order in part, affirmed it in part, and
     remanded for an evidentiary hearing . . . on the newly raised issue
     of whether [Brown’s] trial counsel failed to notify [him] of a plea
     deal offered by the prosecution. The Superior Court found that
     [Brown’s] first two claims of ineffective assistance of counsel had
     no merit. . .. [See Brown, 258 A.3d 539.]

                                   ****

           In his PCRA [p]etition, [Brown] argued that trial counsel . . .
     was ineffective for failing to notify [him] of a plea deal offered by

                                     -2-
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     the prosecution. A docket entry dated April 2, 2012, states
     “Commonwealth’s Offer Rejected.”      At a[ PCRA] evidentiary
     hearing, held on November[] 2, 2021, [Brown] contended that he
     was never informed of any offer:

       PCRA Counsel:        Were you ever presented by [trial
                            counsel] with any guilty plea offer?

       [Brown]:             No, I was never informed by him.

       PCRA Counsel:        Did you ever ask him for a guilty plea
                            offer?

       [Brown]:             Yes, I did.

       PCRA Counsel:        And what did [trial counsel] state to
                            you?

       [Brown]:             He said it was—it wasn’t—nothing was
                            offered. He’s going to handle it.

                                  ****

       [Commonwealth]: So you agree that you reached a deal in
                       the drug case, but you did not have any
                       deal conveyed to you on the—on the
                       attempted murder case, is that your
                       testimony today?

       [Brown]:             Yes, that’s my testimony. He said there
                            wasn’t any offers.

     N.T.[,] 11/2/11[,] at 12-13, 15.

           The PCRA Court concluded, and both counsel for [Brown] as
     well as for the Commonwealth agreed, that the transcripts from
     April 2, 2012 were inconclusive with regard[] to the details of a
     plea deal:

       [PCRA Court]:        We also don’t have any sort of record
                            from the plea date or what would have
                            been the plea date as to what the offer
                            was extended, if that offer was in fact
                            conveyed to . . . Brown, and if it was

                                    -3-
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                             rejected. We just have, as I understand
                             it from the written transcripts, the crier
                             in the room essentially saying offer was
                             rejected, and giving it a trial date. Is
                             that accurate, [c]ounsel?

        PCRA Counsel:        Yes, Your Honor.

        [Commonwealth]: That is accurate, Your Honor. Although
                        . . . there is some evidence on the
                        written record that [Brown] was
                        present.    And then there’s some
                        questions that I will be asking [Brown].

     Id. at 6-7.

            The Commonwealth represent[ed] that it looked extensively
     through its files and has no record of the specifics of the offer
     made to [Brown’s] trial counsel. The Commonwealth indicate[ed]
     that it has “no doubt” an offer was extended because of the
     markings on its case file and the notation on [Brown’s] criminal
     docket from April 2, 2012.         The Commonwealth contacted
     associates of [trial counsel] and the widow of . . . [Brown’s] initial
     PCRA [c]ounsel, for the purpose of locating [Brown’s] trial records.
     These attempts were unsuccessful. Both [trial counsel] and
     [initial PCRA counsel] are deceased. [See id.] at 34-38.

                                    ****

            [T]he PCRA Court, [by] order dated January 10, 2022,
     granted the PCRA petition, but did not vacate [Brown’s] sentence
     at that time. The PCRA Court determined that trial counsel was
     ineffective but held the issue of a remedy under advisement. On
     January 18, 2022, the Commonwealth filed a notice of appeal to
     th[is] . . . Court. On January 24, 2022, the PCRA Court ordered
     [the Commonwealth] to file a [c]oncise [s]tatement of [e]rrors
     [c]omplained of on [a]ppeal, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). The
     Commonwealth complied and filed its statement of errors on
     February 2, 2022. . ..

                                     -4-
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PCRA Court Opinion, 3/24/22, at 1-6, 8-9 (unnecessarily capitalization and

some internal citations to the record omitted; paragraphs re-ordered for

clarity; bullet points added).

        The Commonwealth raises the following issue for our review:

           Did the lower court err in granting PCRA relief based on
           counsel’s purported failure to convey a plea offer, where
           [Brown] never proved what the offer was and thus failed to
           demonstrate that he was prejudiced, i.e., that the offer was for
           a sentence that was less than the relatively lenient one [he]
           actually received?

Commonwealth’s Brief at 4.

        The standard of review for an order granting a PCRA petition is well-

settled:

              When reviewing an order granting PCRA relief, we must
        determine whether the decision of the PCRA court is supported by
        the evidence of record and is free of legal error. Moreover, we will
        not disturb the findings of the PCRA court unless those findings
        have no support in the certified record.

Commonwealth v. Rivera, 154 A.3d 370, 377 (Pa. Super. 2017) (internal

citations and quotations omitted). This Court analyzes PCRA appeals “in the

light   most    favorable   to   the   prevailing   party   at   the   PCRA   level.”

Commonwealth v. Steckley, 128 A.3d 826, 831 (Pa. Super. 2015) (internal

citation and quotations omitted).

        In its sole appellate issue, the Commonwealth argues the trial court

erred in concluding that Brown had established prejudice based on trial

counsel’s ineffective assistance in the form of an alleged failure to convey to

Brown a plea offer. See Commonwealth’s Brief at 17. Generally speaking,

                                        -5-
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      PCRA claims are not merely direct appeal claims that are made at
      a later stage of the proceedings, cloaked in a boilerplate assertion
      of counsel’s ineffectiveness. In essence, they are extraordinary
      assertions that the system broke down. To establish claims of
      constitutional error or ineffectiveness of counsel, the petitioner
      must plead and prove by a preponderance of evidence that the
      system failed (i.e., for an ineffectiveness or constitutional error
      claim, that in the circumstances of his case, including the facts
      established at trial, guilt or innocence could not have been
      adjudicated reliably), that his claim has not been previously
      litigated or waived, and where a claim was not raised at an earlier
      stage of the proceedings, that counsel could not have had a
      rational strategic or tactical reason for failing to litigate these
      claims earlier.

Commonwealth v. Chazin, 873 A.2d 732, 734 (Pa. Super. 2005).                  For

ineffective assistance of counsel claims, a petitioner must plead and prove:

(1) his underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) counsel lacked any

reasonable basis for the act or omission alleged; and (3) that the petitioner

was prejudiced as a result, that is, there is a reasonable probability that, but

for the act or omission challenged, the outcome of the proceeding would have

been different.   See id. at 735.      Furthermore,    “[o]rdinarily, a claim of

ineffectiveness may be denied by a showing that the petitioner’s evidence fails

to meet a single one of these prongs.” Id. (internal citation and quotations

omitted).

       More specifically, when a petitioner alleges ineffective assistance of

counsel for failure to convey a plea offer, the petitioner must satisfy a four-

part test: (1) an offer for a plea was made; (2) trial counsel failed to inform

him of such offer; (3) trial counsel had no reasonable basis for failing to inform

him of the plea offer; and (4) he was prejudiced thereby. See id. A showing

                                      -6-
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of prejudice requires some evidence that “the result of the plea bargain

process     would    have    been     different   had   he   been   able   to   accept

the Commonwealth’s . . . offer.” Id. at 737.2

        The Commonwealth argues the PCRA court erred in granting Brown’s

petition for relief based on his attorney’s failure to convey a plea offer because

Brown failed to establish prejudice.           The Commonwealth concedes that an

offer was made, but maintains “there is no record of what that offer was and

[Brown] has not proffered such evidence.” Commonwealth’s Brief at 17. The

Commonwealth argues that, given Brown’s sentence was already at the low

end of the standard range—and much less than the twenty-five-year minimum

which the Commonwealth had sought at the sentencing hearing—it was

unlikely that its plea offer had been lower than the actual sentence Brown

received following his conviction at trial. See id.

        Notably, Brown also concedes that there is no evidence as to what the

extended offer had been; however, he argues it was “likely that the plea offer

____________________________________________

2   Steckley similarly provides that a PCRA petitioner must show that,

        [b]ut for the ineffective advice of counsel[,] there is a reasonable
        probability that the plea offer would have been presented to the
        court (i.e., that the defendant would have accepted the plea and
        the prosecution would not have withdrawn it in light of intervening
        circumstances), that the court would have accepted its terms, and
        that the conviction or sentence, or both, under the offer’s terms
        would have been less severe than under the judgment and
        sentence that in fact were imposed.

128 A.3d at 832 (citing Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 164 (2012)).

                                           -7-
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would have been less than the [ten-to-twenty-year] sentence he was given.”

Brown’s Brief at 14.3 Accordingly, he maintains the PCRA court properly found

trial counsel was ineffective, and that the PCRA court was empowered to

fashion a remedy, even though the terms of the plea offer are unknown.

       The PCRA court ultimately granted Brown’s PCRA petition by order of

January 10, 2022.        See Order, 1/10/22.     However, the court has since

reconsidered its conclusion: “Contrary to this [c]ourt’s initial determination,

[Brown’s] claim that trial counsel was ineffective cannot prevail.” PCRA Court

Opinion, 3/24/22, at 1. The PCRA court explained:

              Initially, th[e PCRA c]ourt determined that [Brown’s] trial
       counsel was ineffective, however, after careful review of the
       record, [Brown] cannot prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance
       of counsel because he cannot show that he was prejudiced by
       [trial counsel’s] failure to communicate a plea deal. The notes of
       testimony[,] from the date when [Brown’s] docket stated that the
____________________________________________

3 Brown cites a New Hampshire case for the proposition that the trial court
has discretion to fashion an appropriate remedy when it finds a defendant
received ineffective assistance of counsel during plea negotiations. See
Brown’s Brief at 15 (citing State v. Fitzgerald, 243 A.3d 1206 (N.H. 2020)).
Notably, in Fitzgerald, the terms of the State’s plea offer were known, so
that case is distinguishable.        That case also involved a sentencing
enhancement that counsel failed to adequately discuss with his client during
plea negotiations. See, e.g., id. at 1217. Brown also cites Commonwealth
v. Bradshaw, 249 A.3d 1148 (Pa. Super. 2021) (unpublished memorandum);
however, in that case, this Court merely reversed and remanded for
supplemental evidentiary hearings concerning allegations of trial counsel’s
ineffectiveness for failure to convey a plea offer. Contra Brown’s Brief at 16.
Brown also cites Commonwealth v. Kruge, 249 A.3d 1164 (Pa. Super. 2021)
(unpublished memorandum), but that case involved a known plea offer, and
the parties agreed that counsel failed to inform his client during plea
negotiations about a mandatory minimum that would be triggered on
conviction at the conclusion of the trial. Contra Brown’s Brief at 16. All cases
offered by Brown are distinguishable and non-precedential in this court.

                                           -8-
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          plea offer was rejected[,] are inconclusive as to the specifics of
          the plea deal. The District Attorney’s Office has no record of the
          details of the plea offer that was conveyed to [trial counsel]. Both
          [Brown’s] trial counsel and his initial PCRA counsel are deceased,
          and their records cannot be located. [Brown] himself testified that
          he was never told that a plea deal existed. To say that
          [Brown’s] sentence would have been less severe if [trial
          counsel] had communicated the plea deal would be purely
          speculative and not based in fact.                      Because of
          this . . .[, Brown] cannot show that he was prejudiced and cannot
          succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

PCRA Court Opinion, 3/24/22, at 9 (emphasis added).

          Following our review, we conclude that the PCRA court’s grant of relief

was premised on speculation unsupported by evidence of record. At the PCRA

stage of litigation, it is the petitioner’s burden to plead and prove his case.

See, e.g., Chazin, 873 A.2d at 734. Thus, it was Brown’s burden to prove

that a plea offer existed, the terms of which were more favorable than the

sentence actually received, and that, there is a reasonable probability that,

had he been presented with that offer, he would have accepted it. See id. at

735; see also Steckley, 128 A.3d at 832. Brown failed to carry his burden

of proving that an offer existed that was more favorable than the sentence he

received, because he could not establish the terms of the offer. Further, to

conclude Brown would have accepted the offer would require speculation

about the terms of the offer, given there is no basis in the record to support

this conclusion. Accordingly, we reverse the PCRA court’s order granting PCRA

relief.

          Order reversed.

                                         -9-
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 3/17/2023

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