Court Opinion

ID: 9769072
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 14:30:00.825131+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:14:30.754532
License: Public Domain

GREEN, Justice,
dissenting on refusal to grant En Banc reconsideration,
joined by DUNCAN, J.
A panel member requested en banc review of the panel decision. A majority of the court refused to reconsider the panel decision. I respectfully dissent from the denial of en banc reconsideration.
In my opinion, this ease should be decided on the basis of the Jackson v. Virginia standard of evidentiary review. 448 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). The majority, however, applies language from Clewis as “clarifying and explaining” Jackson in articulating what appears to be a new standard of review. Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126 (Tex.Crim.App.1996). But Clewis is suspect for at least two reasons. First, as of this writing it has been on motion for rehearing for over three months and it is far from certain that it will remain in its present form (particularly with respect to some of its footnote language). Second, to the extent Clewis purports to apply a “no evidence” standard of review, or that the majority reads it that way, it conflicts with Jackson and is wrong.
Jackson establishes the constitutional floor as the minimum due process requirement for evidentiary review. It is not a “some evidence” standard; that is, it is not a pure legal question of whether there is more than a scintilla of evidence to support the verdict. The Jackson standard carries a much greater evidentiary burden than traditional “no *623evidence”; it is required that the evidence be sufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. If all that were required to sustain a guilty verdict was “some evidence,” practically anyone could be convicted.
Moreover, Jackson requires that all the evidence be considered in the analysis, not just the evidence tending to support the verdict. The mistake made by the majority is that it interprets Clewis to mean that “only evidence supporting the verdict is ultimately considered.” That is contrary to what I understand Jackson to require and it results in a departure from the constitutional requirement that guilt be established beyond a reasonable doubt. As I read Jackson, it requires that all the evidence is to be considered, including any evidence supporting innocence, but that deference is to be given to the jury verdict. That is, the trier of fact is given responsibility “fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S.Ct. at 2789. In other words, rather than acting as a second jury and substituting its judgment for that of the trier of fact, the appellate court reviews the evidence as it has already been weighed by the jury. Upon that comprehensive evidentiary base, it must then be determined whether any rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
It is clear to me from reading the majority and dissenting opinions that the only evidence pointing to Amunson’s guilt in the murder is circumstantial, and it consists of the basic facts 1) that he had the opportunity, 2) that he burglarized the decedent’s home on the night of the murder (the theory being that he committed the murder to eliminate a witness to the burglary), and 3) that he ran (but this fact could apply as equally to the burglary as to the murder). The question to me, then, is whether these facts, especially when considered with the lack of certain evidence, can rationally be considered evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that Amunson committed the murder.
The evidence being circumstantial, the jury had to have drawn certain inferences from the facts to arrive at the ultimate conclusion that Amunson was guilty of murder. But to be valid, the inferences had to be reasonably drawn from the basic facts. And I frankly do not believe any such inferences can be reasonably drawn from the pertinent facts established in this case. The dissent clearly articulates the reasons why.
The successful prosecution of Mr. Amun-son under this state of the evidence cannot affect our duty to properly apply constitutional evidentiary safeguards as established by the U.S. Supreme Court in Jackson. Accordingly, if Jackson is the proper standard, then I agree with the dissent that an acquittal is necessitated.