Court Opinion

ID: 9717332
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:01:56.802968+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:52.466956
License: Public Domain

Grant, J.,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Over objection of defendant as to admissibility, statements made by defendant to a newspaper reporter in an interview in April 1981 were admitted into evidence. In the interview defendant stated that prior to an incarceration in 1962 the story of his life included more than 300 sexual assaults on children, and “How can you tell if your child is being molested? Maybe all children wouldn’t act the same but all my victims did. From my experiences the child wanted to spend a lot of time alone with me and go everywhere I went. They started to rebel against their parents. They *728brought home a lot of money and unnecessary gifts. The children were no longer cautious around strangers. They were too friendly.”
In the case at bar defendant is not charged with being a person who has sexually assaulted many children. He is charged with the specific crime of sexual assault in the first degree on a 12-year-old boy on May 1, 1982. Defendant has pleaded not guilty, is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty, and is entitled to a fair trial.
The only possible basis for admitting the defendant’s statement appears to me to be Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-404(2) (Reissue 1979). The first sentence of that statute, in my judgment, describes exactly what this disputed evidence tends to prove in this case, and why such evidence is not admissible: “Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith.”
To justify the admission of this statement, then, the statement must be fitted into the exceptions carved out of that statute. It must be determined that the statements were admissible as evidence which would establish proof of “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.” In its brief the State contends that the statement was admissible because it showed “modus operandi” or “pattern of seduction,” and because the statement bore on defendant’s intent. My objection is that I think it is wholly improper to attempt to prove plan or intent by a general statement concerning general conduct 20 years before the specific crime at issue.
As set out in State v. Ellis, 208 Neb. 379, 390, 303 N.W.2d 741, 749 (1981): “ ‘The “other-crimes” rule is a rule of relevance and such evidence is ordinarily prejudicial because prior criminal activity is irrelevant. to the proof of the commission of a specific crime. . . .’ ” See, also, State v. Coca, ante p.76, 341 N.W.2d 606 (1983).
*729Likewise, in Ellis, supra at 392-93, 303 N.W.2d at 750, this court quoted at length from Sail v. State, 157 Neb. 688, 61 N.W.2d 256 (1953): “ ‘The extent to which the discretion of the trial court will be allowed to be exercised in this regard has not been fixed by any decision of this court. Probably it cannot be but depends upon the facts of each case. ... In State v. Siddoway, 61 Utah 189, 211 P. 968, it was held: “No exact limitation of time can be fixed as to when another offense tending to prove the intent of the act charged is remote. The decision of that question must depend upon the circumstances of the particular case, and whether evidence is too remote or not is a question whose decision is largely in the sound discretion of the trial court.”. . ”
I suggest that in the case at bar we have approved the extension of the time relevancy of “other crimes” to a period of 20 years. I think that is far too great a span of time and that the trial court abused its discretion in permitting the introduction of defendant’s statements. There has to be some time that is too remote, and it seems that 20 years should qualify.
In this connection it is of interest to note that in State v. Dandridge, 209 Neb. 885, 890, 312 N.W.2d 286, 291 (1981) (a case where the defendant sought to introduce evidence of allegedly similar crimes committed while defendant was in custody), the State of Nebraska argued “that the subsequent robberies were too remote in time or not sufficiently similar to the Burger King robbery for the evidence to be admissible.” The two robberies referred to occurred 2 months and 4 months, respectively, after the crime in that case.
Aside from the remoteness of the offenses, there appears to be another bar to the admission of defendant’s statement. In State v. Johnson, 205 Neb. 778, 781, 290 N.W.2d 205, 206 (1980), we said, “Evidence of other crimes may be admitted in a criminal prosecution where the evidence is so related in time, *730place, and circumstances to the offense or offenses charged as to have substantial probative value in determining the guilt of the accused.” To the same effect in State v. Coca, supra at 80, 341 N.W.2d at 609, we said, ‘‘Evidence of other crimes is admissible where there are unique, almost ‘signature-like’ similarities between them and the offense charged, or the evidence is otherwise so related in time, place, and circumstances to the offense charged as to have substantial probative value in determining the guilt of the accused.”
All the cases seem to refer to specific crimes at specific times and places. In the instant case, due to the generality of the defendant’s admissions, there is no fair opportunity to make a judgment as to the ‘‘time, place, and circumstances” of the earlier offenses, or to fairly determine the ‘‘signature-like” similarities of the earlier offenses. Thus, it is impossible to make a fair judgment on the similarity of the earlier offenses to the instant case.
With regard to defendant’s second assignment of error, in its brief the State summarizes its position by entitling that section as follows: ‘‘THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE TESTIMONY BY THE VICTIM OF THE ASSAULT THAT HE OVERHEARD PERSONS SAY THE DEFENDANT HAD COMMITTED SIMILAR PRIOR ACTS.” To read this statement is to conclude that the trial court indeed did err in this respect, and no more need be said except to determine whether the admission was ‘‘harmless error.” The court’s decision on that question is controlled largely by the fact that defendant’s admission as to over 300 sexual assaults, committed 20 years before, rendered this particular error harmless, in that the improper hearsay testimony only involved an additional few boys. That logic may be sound, but since I believe the admission of defendant’s statement was error, I do not have the predicate for the logical admission of this very prejudicial statement. There *731is also the point that if the jury were at all inclined to think that perhaps events of 20 years ago were not dispositive of this case, then improperly admitted evidence of recent other crimes might well carry the day for conviction.
It seems that often when prosecutors for the State have a strong case, as they did in this instance, the temptation is irresistible to “paint the lily” and try to make the strong case overwhelming. I feel the function of the courts should be to keep the State’s evidence in proper legal bounds and leave the matter to the jury for a decision not colored by improper evidence. I suspect the answer would be the same, without the necessity of bending the law out of shape, in order to avoid the retrial of a defendant who has established himself as a thoroughly despicable person.
I believe the trial court erred both in admitting defendant’s statement and in admitting the hearsay testimony from the victim. I think both rulings were an abuse of discretion and constituted prejudicial error. The case should be remanded for a new trial.