Court Opinion

ID: 9882481
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-05 22:10:28.190951+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:01:23.998563
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Mendenhall, 2023-Ohio-3297.]

                      IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                          THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                               HARDIN COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,

        PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,                              CASE NO. 6-23-01

        v.

TRISTAN ALAN MENDENHALL,                                 OPINION

        DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

                 Appeal from Hardin County Common Pleas Court
                          Trial Court No. CRI 20222038

                                     Judgment Affirmed

                         Date of Decision: September 18, 2023

APPEARANCES:

        Emily P. Beckley for Appellant

        McKenzie J. Klingler for Appellee
Case No. 6-23-01

MILLER, P.J.

       {¶1} Defendant-appellant, Tristan Alan Mendenhall (“Mendenhall”) appeals

the December 7, 2022 judgment of the Hardin County Court of Common Pleas

determining he violated the terms of his community control and imposing a prison

term. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

                                    Background

       {¶2} On April 13, 2022, the Hardin County Grand Jury indicted Mendenhall

on six counts: Counts One and Two of disrupting public services in violation of R.C.

2909.04(A)(1), (C), fourth-degree felonies; Count Three of tampering with evidence

in violation of R.C. 2921.12(A)(1), (B), a third-degree felony; Counts Four and Five

of domestic violence in violation of R.C. 2919.25(A), (D)(4), third-degree felonies;

and Count Six of theft in violation of R.C. 2913.02(A), (B)(2), a fifth-degree felony.

Mendenhall appeared for arraignment on May 3, 2022 and entered not guilty pleas.

       {¶3} Pursuant to a negotiated-plea agreement, on June 2, 2022, Mendenhall

appeared for a change-of-plea hearing where he entered guilty pleas to Counts One,

Three, Four, and Six. In exchange, the State agreed to recommend dismissal of the

remaining counts. The trial court accepted Mendenhall’s guilty pleas, found him

guilty of the four counts and, at the request of the State, dismissed the remaining

counts. The trial court ordered a presentence investigation.

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Case No. 6-23-01

       {¶4} On August 8, 2022, Mendenhall appeared for sentencing. Pursuant to

the parties’ recommendation, the trial court sentenced Mendenhall to five years of

community control. As a condition of his community control, Mendenhall was

ordered to complete a treatment program at the W.O.R.T.H. Center, a community-

based-correctional facility (“CBCF”). He was also ordered to complete the Hardin

County Recovery Court (“Recovery Court”) program and follow all terms and

recommendations therein which also included completing treatment at a CBCF.

       {¶5} On or about November 3, 2022, Mendenhall’s supervising officer was

notified Mendenhall was being unsuccessfully discharged from the W.O.R.T.H.

Center. Thereafter, on November 9, 2022, the trial court filed an entry suspending

Mendenhall’s participation in Recovery Court. In its judgment entry, the trial court

stated the Recovery Court treatment team recommended the termination of

Mendenhall’s participation in the program due to an alleged violation of the terms

of the Recovery Court program. On November 22, 2022, the State filed a motion

requesting the trial court revoke Mendenhall’s community-control supervision due

to his violation of the terms of his community control, specifically, his alleged

violation of the terms of his participation in the Recovery Court program and his

unsuccessful completion of a CBCF.

       {¶6} On December 7, 2022, a hearing was held on Mendenhall’s alleged

violation of community control. At the hearing, Mendenhall denied violating the

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Case No. 6-23-01

terms of his supervision. The State introduced evidence and rested. Mendenhall

rested without introducing evidence. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court

found Mendenhall violated the terms of his community-control supervision and his

participation in Recovery Court was terminated.

         {¶7} The trial court proceeded immediately to sentencing and sentenced

Mendenhall to 8 months in prison on Count One, 12 months in prison on Count

Three, 30 months in prison on Count Four, and 10 months in prison on Count Six.

The trial court further ordered the prison terms be served consecutively for an

aggregate term of 60 months in prison. Later that day, the trial court filed its

attendant judgment entry.

         {¶8} On January 3, 2023, Mendenhall filed a notice of appeal. He raises

three assignments of error for our review. For ease of discussion, we will first

address Mendenhall’s third assignment of error.

                                   Third Assignment of Error

         The trial court erred in revoking Appellant’s community
         control.1

1
  Mendenhall’s argument for this assignment of error consists of three sentences. He complains the State did
not prove a community-control violation due to a confrontation error. The brief fails to specify the nature of
this confrontation violation, provide adequate contentions with respect to the assignment of error, and fails
to provide any argument, citations or authorities. We are only able to discern the basis of appellant’s
argument because he cites the transcript where trial counsel set forth the objection and argument challenging
the State’s evidence. We choose to address the assignment of error out of fairness and to provide resolution
in this matter.

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Case No. 6-23-01

       {¶9} In his third assignment of error, Mendenhall argues that the trial court

erred by revoking his community control. Mendenhall alleges he was denied his

constitutional right to confront and cross examine witnesses against him when the

trial court admitted State’s Exhibit 1, a letter from Mendenhall’s case manager at

the W.O.R.T.H. Center to Tyler Overly (“Overly”), Mendenhall’s probation officer,

indicating that Mendenhall was being unsuccessfully discharged from the

W.O.R.T.H. Center due to aggressive behavior. (State’s Ex. 1). While Mendenhall

could not deny that he was removed from the W.O.R.T.H. Center program, he

wanted to refute the allegations of aggressive behavior. Mendenhall alleges that,

because the author of the letter did not testify at his community-control violation

hearing, he was denied his constitution right to confront witnesses against him. We

disagree.

       {¶10} “The Confrontation Clause to the Sixth Amendment of the United

States Constitution, made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment,

provides that ‘“[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right * * *

to be confronted with the witnesses against him * * *.”’” State v. Thomas, 3d Dist.

Marion No. 9-19-73, 2020-Ohio-5379, ¶ 17, quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541

U.S. 36, 42, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (2004), quoting the Confrontation Clause. The similar

provisions of Section 10, Article I of the Ohio Constitution “provide[ ] no greater

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Case No. 6-23-01

right of confrontation than the Sixth Amendment * * *.” State v. Self, 56 Ohio St.3d

73, 79 (1990).

       {¶11} However, Evid.R. 101(D)(3) expressly provides that the rules of

evidence do not apply to “proceedings with respect to community control

sanctions.” “A probation revocation hearing is not a formal criminal trial but is ‘“an

informal hearing structured to assure that the finding of a * * * [probation] violation

will be based on verified facts and that the exercise of discretion will be informed

by an accurate knowledge of the * * * [probationer’s] behavior.”’” State v. Reese,

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109055, 2020-Ohio-4747, ¶ 14, quoting State v. Hylton, 75

Ohio App.3d 778, 781 (4th Dist.1991), quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,

92 S.Ct. 2593 (1972).

       {¶12} Nonetheless, “[a] defendant charged with violating community control

and facing imprisonment is entitled to due process of the law under the Fourteenth

Amendment to the United States Constitution.” State v. Theisen, 4th Dist. Athens

No. 22CA8, 2023-Ohio-2412, ¶ 20, citing Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 781,

93 S.Ct. 1756, 1759 (1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 485, 92 S.Ct. 2593

(1972); State v. Boling, 4th Dist. Athens No. 01CA30, 2001 WL 1646691, *2 (Dec.

17, 2001); Crim.R. 32.3. Specifically, at a final hearing on the alleged violation of

community control, before a defendant can be sent to prison for violating

community control, the defendant is entitled to the following procedures:

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       “(a) written notice of the claimed violations of [community control];
       (b) disclosure to the [defendant] of evidence against him; (c)
       opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and
       documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-examine
       adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good
       cause for not allowing confrontation); (e) a ‘neutral and detached’
       hearing body * * * ; and (f) a written statement by the factfinders as
       to the evidence relied on and reasons for [finding a community-
       control violation].”

Gagnon at 786, quoting Morrissey at 489.

       {¶13} At the December 7, 2022 hearing, the State called Overly,

Mendenhall’s supervising community-control officer. (Dec. 7, 2022 Tr. at 6-7).

The State introduced State’s Exhibit 1, a letter written to Overly by Emily

Aufderhaar (“Aufderhaar”), Mendenhall’s case manager at the W.O.R.T.H. Center,

stating that Mendenhall is being “unsuccessfully discharged” from the facility “for

repeated verbal and physical aggression.” (Id. at 9); (State’s Ex. 1). Overly stated

that, as part of his responsibilities as a community-control officer, he receives such

letters with respect to his supervisees. (Dec. 7, 2022 Tr. at 9-10). The State moved

for the admission of State’s Exhibit 1, and Mendenhall’s trial counsel objected on

the basis of hearsay, lack of foundation, and violation of Mendenhall’s right to

confront Aufderhaar. (Id. at 10-11). The trial court admitted State’s Exhibit 1 over

Mendenhall’s objection. (Id. at 11).

       {¶14} Overly stated that around November 3, 2022, he learned Mendenhall

was unsuccessfully discharged from the W.O.R.T.H. Center.             (Id.).   Overly

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Case No. 6-23-01

indicated that successful completion of the program at the W.O.R.T.H. Center was

a term of Mendenhall’s community control; however, Mendenhall failed to

complete the program. (Id. at 11-12). According to Overly, after being discharged

from the W.O.R.T.H. Center, Mendenhall was preliminarily terminated from

Recovery Court. (Id. at 12). Overly stated that completion of the Recovery Court

program was a term of Mendenhall’s community control. (Id.). Thus, according to

Overly, Mendenhall violated the terms of his community control by (1) his

unsuccessful discharge from the W.O.R.T.H. Center and (2) his termination from

Recovery Court. (Id.).

       {¶15} Overly also specified that he was responsible for retrieving

Mendenhall from the W.O.R.T.H. Center and that the W.O.R.T.H. Center staff

released Mendenhall to him because he was being discharged. (Dec. 7, 2022 Tr. at

14).

       {¶16} Mendenhall was given the opportunity to cross examine Overly, but

declined to do so. (Id. at 12-14). Mendenhall did not present any evidence or

witnesses. (Id. at 14-15).

       {¶17} “‘The introduction of hearsay evidence into a [community-control]-

revocation hearing is reversible error when that evidence is the only evidence

presented and is crucial to a determination of a [community-control] violation.’”

State v. Johnson, 4th Dist. Meigs No. 14CA10, 2015-Ohio-1373, ¶ 25, quoting State

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Case No. 6-23-01

v. Ohly, 166 Ohio App.3d 808, 2006-Ohio-2353, ¶ 21 (6th Dist.). After reviewing

the evidence adduced at the hearing, it is evident the trial court did not rely

exclusively on hearsay evidence. Notably, the State presented testimony in addition

to State’s Exhibit 1 to demonstrate that Mendenhall violated the terms of his

community control. For instance, Overly testified he picked up Mendenhall from

the W.O.R.T.H. Center following his discharge. See State v. Newsome, 4th Dist.

Hocking No. 17CA2, 2017-Ohio-7488, ¶ 22-23.             Furthermore, we note that

Mendenhall does not contest that he was discharged from the W.O.R.T.H. Center

or that he did not successfully complete the treatment program, rather he argues he

did not actually engage in the repeated violence and aggression referenced in State’s

Exhibit 1. However, the reason for his termination from the treatment program at

the W.O.R.T.H. Center is not necessarily relevant to the trial court’s determination

that he violated the terms of his community control by not completing (1) the

treatment program at the W.O.R.T.H. Center and (2) Recovery Court, both of which

were specific conditions of his community control.

       {¶18} Moreover, State’s Exhibit 1 is not hearsay. Hearsay is a “statement,

other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered

in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.” Evid.R.

801(C). “Only testimonial hearsay implicates the Confrontation Clause.” State v.

McKelton, 148 Ohio St.3d 261, 2016-Ohio-5735, ¶ 185. “If the statement is

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Case No. 6-23-01

nontestimonial, it is merely subject to the regular admissibility requirements of the

hearsay rules.” State v. Peeples, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 07 MA 212, 2009-Ohio-

1198, ¶ 19.

       {¶19} Here, State’s Exhibit 1 was introduced not for the truth of its contents,

i.e. that Mendenhall engaged in aggressive behavior, but to demonstrate that

Mendenhall was terminated from the W.O.R.T.H. Center and how Overly was

informed of Mendenhall’s discharge from the program. Accordingly, the State

relied on State’s Exhibit 1 to demonstrate how Overly became aware of

Mendenhall’s discharge from the W.O.R.T.H. Center rather than to demonstrate the

veracity of Aufderhaar’s statement that Mendenhall engaged in repeated verbal and

physical aggression.    Overly testified, based on his personal knowledge, that

Mendenhall was unsuccessfully discharged from the W.O.R.T.H. Center.

       {¶20} Moreover, State’s Exhibit 1 fell within the business record exception

to hearsay. “Documents that are ‘neither prepared for the primary purpose of

accusing a targeted individual nor prepared for the primary purpose of providing

evidence in a criminal trial [are] nontestimonial, and [their] admission into evidence

at trial under Evid.R. 803(6) as a business record does not violate a defendant’s

Sixth Amendment confrontation rights.’” State v. Shepherd, 3d Dist. Hardin Nos.

6-19-02 and 6-19-03, 2020-Ohio-3915, ¶ 32, quoting State v. Maxwell, 139 Ohio

St.3d 12, 2014-Ohio-1019, syllabus.            “Generally, business records are

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Case No. 6-23-01

nontestimonial because they are * * * typically not prepared for litigation.” Id.

citing State v. Hood, 135 Ohio St.3d 137, 2012-Ohio-6208, ¶ 34. Here, it appears

the primary purpose of State’s Exhibit 1 was for the W.O.R.T.H. Center to inform

Mendenhall’s supervising officer of Mendenhall’s progress and status in the

treatment program. Overly testified that he regularly receives such communication

from the W.O.R.T.H. Center with respect to his supervisees and that, as part of his

duties, he retains such communication as part of the file he maintains on each person

he supervises. Thus, State’s Exhibit 1 is a business record, which is nontestimonial

in nature. See Shepherd at ¶ 33-34.

       {¶21} Accordingly,    for   the   aforementioned    reasons,   there   is   no

Confrontation-Clause Violation.

       {¶22} Mendenhall’s third assignment of error is overruled.

                            First Assignment of Error

       Appellant’s [sentence] was not supported by sufficient evidence.

                          Second Assignment of Error

       The trial court erred in sentencing Appellant to consecutive
       sentences.

       {¶23} In his first assignment of error, Mendenhall argues that the trial court

erred by sentencing him to a prison term. Specifically, Mendenhall alleges the trial

court did not properly weigh the recidivism factors. In his second assignment of

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Case No. 6-23-01

error, Mendenhall argues the consecutive sentences imposed by the trial court were

not supported by the record. For the reasons that follow, we disagree.

                                  Standard of Review

       {¶24} Under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), an appellate court may reverse a sentence

“only if it determines by clear and convincing evidence that the record does not

support the trial court’s findings under relevant statutes or that the sentence is

otherwise contrary to law.” State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002,

¶ 1. Clear and convincing evidence is that “‘which will produce in the mind of the

trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.’” Id.

at ¶ 22, quoting Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954), paragraph three of the

syllabus.

                        Relevant Authority: Felony Sentencing

       {¶25} “‘Trial courts have full discretion to impose any sentence within the

statutory range.’” State v. Smith, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-15-17, 2015-Ohio-4225, ¶

9, quoting State v. Noble, 3d Dist. Logan No. 8-14-06, 2014-Ohio-5485, ¶ 9. A

sentence imposed within the statutory range is generally valid so long as the trial

court considered the applicable statutory policies that apply to every felony

sentencing, including those contained in R.C. 2929.11, and the sentencing factors

of 2929.12. See State v. Watts, 3d Dist. Auglaize No. 2-20-10, 2020-Ohio-5572, ¶

10 and 14; State v. Maggette, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-16-06, 2016-Ohio-5554, ¶ 31.

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Case No. 6-23-01

       {¶26} R.C. 2929.11 provides, in pertinent part, that the “overriding purposes

of felony sentencing are to protect the public from future crime by the offender and

others, to punish the offender, and to promote the effective rehabilitation of the

offender using the minimum sanctions that the court determines accomplish those

purposes without imposing an unnecessary burden on state or local government

resources.”   R.C. 2929.11(A).     To achieve the overriding purposes of felony

sentencing, R.C. 2929.11 directs courts to “consider the need for incapacitating the

offender, deterring the offender and others from future crime, rehabilitating the

offender, and making restitution to the victim of the offense, the public, or both.”

Id. In addition, R.C. 2929.11(B) instructs that a sentence imposed for a felony “shall

be reasonably calculated to achieve the three overriding purposes of felony

sentencing * * *, commensurate with and not demeaning to the seriousness of the

offender’s conduct and its impact upon the victim, and consistent with sentences

imposed for similar crimes committed by similar offenders.”

       {¶27} “In accordance with these principles, the trial court must consider the

factors set forth in R.C. 2929.12(B)-(E) relating to the seriousness of the offender’s

conduct and the likelihood of the offender’s recidivism.” Smith at ¶ 10, citing R.C.

2929.12(A). In addition, the trial court must consider “the factors set forth in [R.C.

2929.12(F)] pertaining to the offender’s service in the armed forces of the United

States.” R.C. 2929.12(A). “‘A sentencing court has broad discretion to determine

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Case No. 6-23-01

the relative weight to assign the sentencing factors in R.C. 2929.12.’” Smith at ¶

15, quoting State v. Brimacombe, 195 Ohio App.3d 524, 2011-Ohio-5032, ¶ 18 (6th

Dist.), citing State v. Arnett, 88 Ohio St.3d 208, 215 (2000).

                             Analysis: Felony Sentencing

       {¶28} The trial court sentenced Mendenhall to 12 months and 30 months in

prison for third-degree felony tampering with evidence and domestic violence

respectively; 8 months in prison for fourth-degree felony disrupting public services;

and 10 months in prison for fifth-degree-felony theft. Thus, Mendenhall’s sentences

fall within the respective statutory ranges.      See R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(b); R.C.

2929.14(A)(4); R.C. 2929.14(A)(5).

       {¶29} The record reflects that the trial court considered R.C. 2929.11 and

2929.12 when fashioning Mendenhall’s sentence. In its judgment entry of sentence,

the trial court indicated that “a prison sentence * * * is consistent with the purposes

and principles of sentencing under Ohio Revised Code Section 2929.11 because a

prison sentence is reasonably necessary to punish the offender and to deter,

rehabilitate, and incapacitate the offender in order to protect the public from future

crime, and would not place an unnecessary burden on governmental resources.”

(Doc. No. 52). See R.C. 2929.11(A). Additionally, during sentencing, the trial court

addressed several of the seriousness and recidivism factors contained in R.C.

2929.12. (Dec. 7, 2022 Tr. at 19-22). Therefore, because Mendenhall’s prison

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Case No. 6-23-01

sentence is within the applicable statutory range and the record supports that the

trial court fulfilled its obligation of considering R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12,

Mendenhall’s individual sentences are valid. See Watts, 2020-Ohio-5572, at ¶ 14.

         {¶30} Yet, Mendenhall argues the trial court improperly weighed the

recidivism factors in light of his desire to seek substance-abuse treatment to address

his underlying issues. Mendenhall contends the trial court erred by sentencing him

to prison rather than continuing him on community control and considering another

CBCF or allowing him to complete Recovery Court. However, pursuant to the

agreement of the parties, the trial court did initially sentence Mendenhall to

community control with the special requirements that he complete a treatment

program at the W.O.R.T.H. Center and complete Recovery Court. However, the

record indicates that Mendenhall was terminated from the treatment program at the

W.O.R.T.H. Center and, as a result, was unsuccessfully terminated from Recovery

Court.

         {¶31} At the December 7, 2022 hearing, the trial court detailed the efforts

that it previously made at rehabilitating Mendenhall, including a prior placement in

the W.O.R.T.H. program. The trial court commented, “[w]e tried very hard” and

“went way over the mark in trying to bring him into Recovery Court just to try to

help him.” (Dec. 7, 2022 Tr. at 20). However, the trial court remarked that “all our

efforts were unavailing.” (Id.).

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Case No. 6-23-01

       {¶32} Further, although “R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a) permits an appellate court

to modify or vacate a sentence if it clearly and convincingly finds ‘the record does

not support the sentencing court’s findings under’ certain specified statutory

provisions[,] * * * R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 are not among the statutory provisions

listed in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a).” State v. Jones, 163 Ohio St.3d 242, 2020-Ohio-

6729, ¶ 28. Moreover, “an appellate court’s determination that the record does not

support a sentence does not equate to a determination that the sentence is ‘otherwise

contrary to law’ as that term is used in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b).” Id. at ¶ 32. Thus,

R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) “does not provide a basis for an appellate court to modify or

vacate a sentence based on its view that the sentence is not supported by the record

under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.” Id. at ¶ 39. “[A]n appellate court errs if it * * *

modifies or vacates a sentence ‘based on the lack of support in the record for the

trial court’s findings under R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12.’” State v. Dorsey, 2d

Dist. Montgomery No. 28747, 2021-Ohio-76, ¶ 17, quoting Jones at ¶ 29.

       {¶33} Accordingly, even if we were to agree with Mendenhall that his

sentence is not supported by the record under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12, which we

do not, we could not vacate or modify his sentence on that basis. As discussed

above, Mendenhall’s prison sentence is within the applicable statutory range, and it

is clear the trial court considered R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 when fashioning his

sentence. Hence, Mendenhall’s prison sentence is not clearly and convincingly

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Case No. 6-23-01

contrary to law, and it must therefore be affirmed. See State v. Slife, 3d Dist.

Auglaize No. 2-20-17, 2021-Ohio-644, ¶ 17.

       {¶34} Next, Mendenhall argues that the trial court erred by ordering the

sentences in the instant case to be served consecutively to each other.

                    Relevant Authority: Consecutive Sentencing

       {¶35} “Except as provided in * * * division (C) of section 2929.14, * * * a

prison term, jail term, or sentence of imprisonment shall be served concurrently with

any other prison term, jail term, or sentence of imprisonment imposed by a court of

this state, another state, or the United States.” R.C. 2929.41(A). R.C. 2929.14(C)

provides:

       (4) * * * [T]he court may require the offender to serve the prison terms
       consecutively if the court finds that the consecutive service is
       necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish the
       offender and that consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the
       seriousness of the offender’s conduct and to the danger the offender
       poses to the public, and if the court also finds any of the following:

       (a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses
       while the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a
       sanction imposed pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of
       the Revised Code, or was under post-release control for a prior
       offense.

       (b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of
       one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more
       of the multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no
       single prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of
       the courses of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the
       offender’s conduct.

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Case No. 6-23-01

       (c) The offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that
       consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future
       crime by the offender.

       {¶36} R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) requires a trial court to make specific findings on

the record when imposing consecutive sentences. State v. Hites, 3d Dist. Hardin

No. 6-11-07, 2012-Ohio-1892, ¶ 11. Specifically, the trial court must find: (1)

consecutive sentences are necessary to either protect the public or punish the

offender; (2) the sentences would not be disproportionate to the offense committed;

and (3) one of the factors in R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(a), (b), or (c) applies. Id.

       {¶37} The trial court must state the required findings at the sentencing

hearing prior to imposing consecutive sentences and incorporate those findings into

its sentencing entry. State v. Sharp, 3d Dist. Putnam No. 12-13-01, 2014-Ohio-

4140, ¶ 50, citing State v. Bonnell, 140 Ohio St.3d 209, 2014-Ohio-3177, ¶ 29. A

trial court “has no obligation to state reasons to support its findings” and is not

“required to give a talismanic incantation of the words of the statute, provided that

the necessary findings can be found in the record and are incorporated into the

sentencing entry.” Bonnell at ¶ 37.

                         Analysis: Consecutive Sentencing

       {¶38} Mendenhall does not argue that the trial court failed to make the

requisite consecutive-sentencing findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4).             Rather,

Mendenhall contends the record does not support the trial court’s findings.

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       {¶39} At the sentencing hearing, the trial court stated:

       The Court will find that consecutive sentencing is appropriate, that
       two or more of the events were committed as a course of action, and
       that a single prison term would not be appropriate and would not
       address adequately the seriousness of his conduct and danger that he
       poses to the public.

       Further, the Court will find that the defendant has a history of criminal
       conduct which demonstrates that consecutive sentencing is necessary.
       The Court will, therefore, order that the 8-month, 12-month, 30-
       month, and 10-month term[s] of imprisonment run consecutive for an
       aggregated term of 60 months with the Ohio Department of
       Rehabilitation and Correction.

(Dec. 7, 2022 Tr. at 23). The trial court memorialized those findings in its

sentencing entry. Accordingly, the record reflects that the trial court made the

appropriate R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) findings before imposing consecutive sentences and

incorporated those findings into its sentencing entry.

       {¶40} Nonetheless, Mendenhall summarily argues that his consecutive

sentences are not supported by the record because the charges stemmed from a

single incident.   (Appellant’s Brief at 11).      Mendenhall has failed to argue

specifically how his consecutive sentences are not supported by the record. Having

found no error in the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences, we decline

to root out any possible argument for him. See App.R. 16(A)(7).

       {¶41} Mendenhall’s first and second assignments of error are overruled.

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Case No. 6-23-01

                                   Conclusion

       {¶42} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the

particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the Hardin County Court

of Common Pleas.

                                                              Judgment Affirmed

WALDICK and ZIMMERMAN, J.J., concur.

/jlr

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