Court Opinion

ID: 9900376
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-18 22:11:52.302919+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:04.909169
License: Public Domain

No. 416              August 16, 2023                    475

          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                  STATE OF OREGON

                    Junki YOSHIDA,
                      an individual,
                   Plaintiff-Appellant,
                             v.
                    Samuel WATSON,
                      an individual;
               Greensky Collective, LLC,
           an Oregon limited liability company;
                    Luna Verde, LLC,
           an Oregon limited liability company;
             and Jeffrey’s Flower & Oil, LLC,
           an Oregon limited liability company,
                Defendants-Respondents.
            Multnomah County Circuit Court
                  18CV09136; A175509

  Kathleen M. Dailey, Judge.
  Argued and submitted March 24, 2023.
   Keith A. Pitt argued the cause for appellant. Also on the
briefs was Slinde Nelson.
   Gabriel Aaron Watson argued the cause for respondents.
Also on the brief was McKean Smith.
  Before Shorr, Presiding Judge, and Mooney, Judge, and
Pagán, Judge.
  MOONEY, J.
  Affirmed.
476   Yoshida v. Watson
Cite as 327 Or App 475 (2023)                               477

         MOONEY, J.
         Plaintiff appeals from the trial court’s post-judgment
order that denies plaintiff’s motion for entry of partial sat-
isfaction of judgment, grants defendants’ motion for entry of
satisfaction, declares a deficiency, and awards attorney fees
to defendants. The underlying judgment had been entered
by stipulation of the parties after settlement of a conten-
tious dispute about a loan between former in-laws. The loan,
which was secured by business-related collateral, was made
to help fund a marijuana business. Among other things, the
stipulated judgment awarded $164,329.10 to plaintiff and
ordered “that execution issue for these amounts.”
         Plaintiff raises three assignments of error. In his
first assignment of error, plaintiff argues that defendant’s
motion was facially deficient under ORS 18.235 and that
the trial court erred in awarding fees under ORS 18.235. In
his second assignment, plaintiff asserts that the trial court
did not retain jurisdiction to adjudicate the motion, given
a pending appeal on a separate ruling. Finally, plaintiff
asserts that the trial court erred in its “continued misinter-
pretation” of the stipulated judgment.
          We reject the third assignment because it does
not comply with ORAP 5.45(3), which requires that “[e]ach
assignment of error must identify precisely the legal, pro-
cedural, factual, or other ruling that is being challenged.”
“A failure to comply with ORAP 5.45 generally renders the
claim of error unreviewable on appeal.” Village at North
Pointe Condo. Assn. v. Bloedel Constr., 278 Or App 354, 360,
374 P3d 978, adh’d to as modified on recons, 281 Or App 322
(2016). An assignment must do more than challenge a fac-
tual finding or legal conclusion of the court, otherwise we are
left to “divine * * * what the [appellant] most likely is getting
at.” Justice and Crum, 265 Or App 635, 638 n 1, 337 P3d 840
(2014) (quoting Association of Unit Owners v. Dunning, 187
Or App 595, 605, 69 P3d 788 (2003)). Assigning error to the
“continued misinterpretation” of the stipulated judgment
lacks the precision needed for review and, therefore, we will
not review that assignment.
       For the reasons that follow, we reject the first two
assignments as well. We affirm.
478                                                     Yoshida v. Watson

         We reject plaintiff’s request for de novo review with-
out discussion. To the extent that plaintiff argues that the
trial court erred in its interpretation of ORS 18.235, we
review for legal error. See State v. Kirkpatrick, 302 Or App
62, 65, 460 P3d 114 (2020). As to the award of attorney fees
under ORS 20.075(3),1 we review for abuse of discretion.
         The pertinent facts begin with the court’s entry of
a Stipulated Judgment awarding plaintiff $164,329.10 and
ordering that a Writ of Execution “shall be granted in favor
of the [p]laintiff,” and allowing “the sheriff of Multnomah
County and/or a representative of the Oregon Liquor Control
Commission, within ten (10) days from the date of this [j]
udgment” to take possession of “the collateral” securing the
loan. The judgment also provided that:
        “* * * pursuant to the Writ of Execution the sheriff of
    Multnomah County and/or a representative of the Oregon
    Liquor Control Commission shall sell all of the Collateral
    in order to satisfy the entire debt.
        “* * * [d]efendants are hereby foreclosed of any right,
    title and interest in said Collateral.”
Plaintiff did not pursue a writ of execution within the 10 days
contemplated by the judgment and the sale authorized by
the judgment likewise did not occur.
         Several months after entry of the stipulated judg-
ment, defendants filed a Motion to Enter Satisfaction of
Judgment under ORS 18.235, alleging that plaintiff wrong-
fully and willfully declined to provide one. ORS 18.235 pro-
vides, as relevant:
       “(1) A judgment debtor, or a person with an interest in
    real property against which a judgment lien exists, may
    move the court for an order declaring that a money award
    has been satisfied or for a determination of the amount
    necessary to satisfy the money award, when the person
    making the motion cannot otherwise obtain a satisfaction
    document from a judgment creditor.

     1
       ORS 20.075(3): “In any appeal from the award or denial of an attorney fee
subject to this section, the court reviewing the award may not modify the decision
of the court in making or denying an award, or the decision of the court as to the
amount of the award, except upon a finding of an abuse of discretion.”
Cite as 327 Or App 475 (2023)                                     479

      “(2) Motions under this section shall be filed in the
   action in which the judgment was entered. All proceedings
   on the motion shall be conducted as part of the action in
   which the judgment was entered. An appearance fee may
   not be charged for filing a motion under this section.
      “(3) A motion under this section must include the follow-
   ing information, to the extent known to the person making
   the motion:
     “(a) The date of entry and principal amount of the money
   award.
     “(b) The rate of interest and the date the interest com-
   menced to accrue.
      “(c) The date or dates and amounts of any payments on
   the money award.
      “(d) Any amount that the person believes remains to be
   paid on the money award, including any supporting math-
   ematical calculations.
      “(e) Any other information necessary or helpful to the
   court in making its determination.
      “* * * * *
       “(7) If the court determines that the person making the
   motion is entitled to relief, the court shall issue an order
   providing that the money award has been satisfied in full
   or, if the money award has not been satisfied in full, the
   specific amount that will satisfy the judgment on a specific
   date or within a period of time specified in the order.
       “(8) If the court finds that the judgment creditor willfully
   failed to provide a satisfaction document under ORS 18.225,
   the court may render a supplemental judgment awarding
   reasonable attorney fees to the person making the motion.
   The supplemental judgment may provide that the person
   making the motion may satisfy the judgment by paying
   such amounts the court determines to be necessary to sat-
   isfy the judgment less that sum of money the court awards
   as attorney fees.”
The trial court denied the motion as “premature” and ordered
defendants to “use their best efforts to have [p]laintiff’s
right of ownership of the [collateral] manifested legally.” The
court found that although defendants had been foreclosed
480                                          Yoshida v. Watson

from ownership by the judgment, it was unclear whether
“[p]laintiff’s failure to exercise his right to have the sher-
iff’s sale should result in [d]efendants’ right to an entry of
Satisfaction of Judgment.” Plaintiff appealed the denial of
that motion even though he prevailed on it, and we affirmed
because plaintiff did not challenge the trial court’s deter-
mination “that defendants were not entitled to have a sat-
isfaction of judgment entered with respect to the stipulated
judgment.” Yoshida v. Watson, 316 Or App 104, 105, 500 P3d
772 (2021).
         While that appeal was still pending, defendants
filed a “Supplemental Motion” for entry of satisfaction of
judgment. In that motion, defendants argued that plain-
tiff had the limited right, under the judgment, to seize
the collateral within 10 days after entering the judgment.
They conceded that if plaintiff could identify collateral that
existed within 10 days of the judgment, he was entitled to
that collateral, but argued that if plaintiff was unable to
identify collateral to which he was entitled, satisfaction
should be entered. Plaintiff opposed defendants’ supplemen-
tal motion and filed his own motion for entry of partial sat-
isfaction and requesting a declaration of deficiency. Plaintiff
argued that defendants’ improper removal and transfer of
the collateral that secured the loan resulted in the judgment
remaining unsatisfied, except for $22,376 from collateral he
had already received.
         On January 22, 2021, the trial court entered the
post-judgment order that is the subject of this appeal.
Because the parties agreed that the stipulated judgment
had been partially satisfied, the court determined the out-
standing deficiency and, in a detailed written opinion and
order, explained its decision:
       “This Court previously held that the [stipulated]
   Judgment limits Plaintiff’s remedy to foreclosure. The
   Judgment does not, however, further limit the remedy of
   foreclosure so that the sale of the collateral would satisfy
   the entire debt regardless of any discrepancy between the
   sold collateral’s value and the money award amount listed
   in the Judgment. Under Oregon law, the remedy of fore-
   closure includes the right to enforce a judgment by execu-
   tion where a judgment includes a money award that the
Cite as 327 Or App 475 (2023)                                                 481

    sale of foreclosed property fails to satisfy. ORS 88.060(3).
    Based on the inclusion of the money award amount in the
    Judgment and the language used in the foreclosure pro-
    vision, Plaintiff’s exclusive remedy of foreclosure encom-
    passes this right.
        “ORS 88.060(3) provides that where a ‘judgment includes
    a money award against the defendants[,]’ and the proceeds
    of a sheriff’s sale do not satisfy the judgment, ‘the judg-
    ment may be enforced by execution as in ordinary cases.’
    Therefore, the enforcement of a judgment of lien foreclo-
    sure includes a right to enforcement by execution if ‘the
    net sale proceeds’ do not satisfy the money award in the
    judgment. The Judgment clearly includes a ‘money award’
    for Plaintiff. The Court held earlier that this money award
    did not create an award for Plaintiff independent of fore-
    closure. The Parties agreement that the collateral would
    be sold ‘in order to satisfy the entire debt’ does not limit
    Plaintiffs remedies of foreclosure. The Judgment does not
    say, for example, that the sale of the collateral ‘will’ satisfy
    the entire debt.
        “As the sale of the Collateral did not ‘satisfy the entire
    debt,’ Plaintiff may, under his remedy of foreclosure, enforce
    the Judgment by execution for the amount remaining.
    Therefore, the Judgment has only been partially satisfied.
    Having found that ‘the money award has not been satisfied
    in full,’ the Court must state ‘the specific amount that will
    satisfy the judgment….’ ORS 18.235(7). The Court finds
    that the money award has been satisfied in the amount of
    $22,376.00, leaving a remaining balance of $162,565.63,
    inclusive of post-judgment interest, as of July 21, 2020.
    Interest accrual is ongoing.”2
    2
      The court correctly denied plaintiff’s motion for entry of partial satisfac-
tion because he lacked standing to file it. ORS 18.235 allows only a “judgment
debtor, or a person with an interest in real property against which a judgment
lien exists” to file such a motion. That order is not before us on appeal.
The court did, however, declare a $162,565.63 deficiency, as plaintiff requested,
under ORS 88.060. ORS 88.060 provides, as relevant:
         “(1) A judgment of foreclosure and sale may be enforced by execution as
    provided in this section.
         “(2) If a judgment of foreclosure and sale is given, an execution may issue
    against the property adjudged to be sold. If the judgment is in favor of the
    plaintiff only, the execution may issue as in ordinary cases * * *
         “(3) If the judgment includes a money award against the defendants or
    any one of the defendants in person, and the net sale proceeds of the property
    upon which the lien is foreclosed are insufficient to satisfy the money award
482                                                     Yoshida v. Watson

         The court then turned to the question of defendants’
request for an award of attorney fees under ORS 18.235(8)
which, as already noted, permits the trial court to “render
a supplemental judgment awarding reasonable attorney
fees to the person making the motion” when it “finds that
the judgment creditor willfully failed to provide a satisfac-
tion document under ORS 18.225.” Plaintiff did not provide
defendants with a satisfaction document at any time. The
court found that because plaintiff
        “did not provide a satisfaction document to [d]efen-
    dant[s] even while asserting that the [j]udgment had been
    satisfied in part, [p]laintiff has ‘willfully failed to provide a
    satisfaction document.’ Therefore, [d]efendants are entitled
    to their reasonable attorney fees incurred in pursuit of the
    satisfaction document.”
          Trial court’s jurisdiction: We reject plaintiff’s
assignment challenging the trial court’s “determin[ation]
that it retained jurisdiction” over matters concerning collec-
tion and satisfaction of the judgment once the first appeal
was filed. We do so, in part, because that assignment does
not identify the specific ruling that it challenges as required
by ORAP 5.45(3). To the extent that the assignment impli-
cates the trial court’s brief reference to jurisdiction during a
hearing on defendants’ motion,3 we note that the trial court
retained jurisdiction under ORS 19.270(1)(b) to enforce the
judgment and under ORS 19.270(5)(c) to “enter an order or
supplemental judgment for the purpose of implementing a
settlement * * *.”
        Plaintiff misreads State ex rel Gattman v. Abraham,
302 Or 301, 729 P2d 560 (1986), as supporting his position
on jurisdiction. That case concerned the question whether
under ORS 19.033(1) a notice of appeal from a partial judg-
ment under ORCP 67 B divested the trial court of jurisdiction
    as to the sum remaining unsatisfied, the judgment may be enforced by exe-
    cution as in ordinary cases.”
    3
      The trial court addressed jurisdiction briefly on the record in a hearing on
the supplemental motion, as follows:
        “I’m not going to change my opinion on the money award versus foreclo-
    sure. So you’ve filed your appeal on that. And in that regard, after reading
    everything, I do believe, and I’m going to make the decision out loud here
    now, that I retain jurisdiction to sort out the judgment issue. So I disagree
    with Plaintiff that I’ve lost jurisdiction.”
Cite as 327 Or App 475 (2023)                              483

to try the remaining claims against parties not affected by
the judgment. Abraham, 302 Or at 303. In concluding that
the trial court retained jurisdiction to try those remaining
claims while the appeal was pending, the Supreme Court
concluded that “[i]t was not the intention [of the statute] to
oust the trial court of jurisdiction of those parts of the liti-
gation which are not directly involved in the appeal.” Id. at
310-11. The Supreme Court later clarified that “the ‘cause’ ”
over which the appellate court gains exclusive jurisdiction
by the filing of an appeal “is not always the entire case.”
State v. Branstetter, 332 Or 389, 403, 29 P3d 1121 (2001).
Here, defendants’ supplemental motion was a motion to
enforce the judgment. The trial court retained jurisdiction
over that matter under ORS 19.270(1)(b).
         Sufficiency of defendant’s motion: Plaintiff contends
that defendants’ motion for entry of satisfaction was facially
defective under ORS 18.235 because there had been no
“payment of money” and “unless actual money is received,
there is no statutory predicate for a judgment debtor to
bring a motion under ORS 18.235. Any contrary ruling is
manifest error.” In support of that argument, plaintiff notes
that defendants did not include the information required by
ORS 18.235(3)(c) and (d) in their motion because no pay-
ment was ever made on the money award. The tender of col-
lateral is itself insufficient, according to plaintiff, because
ORS 18.235 requires an actual payment of money, and there
are many practical reasons why a judgment creditor might
decline collateral in favor of seeking actual payment.
         We conclude that defendants’ motion was not facially
defective, and that the trial court did not err in considering
and partially granting the motion. By the time of the court’s
order, plaintiff had filed his own motion for partial satisfac-
tion in the amount of $22,376 that reflected plaintiff’s recov-
ery of certain items of collateral. The trial court reasonably
concluded that plaintiff’s motion for partial satisfaction was,
effectively, a concession that the money award had been sat-
isfied to that extent. Defendants’ motion contained enough
information about when some of the collateral was delivered
and when it was sold at auction to satisfy the requirements
of ORS 18.235(3)(c) and (d).
484                                             Yoshida v. Watson

         Attorney fees: Plaintiff also challenges the trial
court’s award of attorney fees to defendants under ORS
18.235(8). We review that award for abuse of discretion.
ORS 20.075(3). The main focus of plaintiff’s argument is
that he did not “willfully” fail to provide defendants with a
satisfaction of judgment. Willful means “done deliberately:
not accidental or without purpose.” Webster’s Third New Int’l
Dictionary 2617 (unabridged ed 2002). On the question of
whether plaintiff willfully failed to provide a satisfaction,
the trial court found that:
       “Plaintiff has at no time provided [d]efendants a satis-
   faction document since [d]efendants’ first request for one in
   summer of 2019. Even after [p]laintiff sold the collateral he
   obtained at auction [p]laintiff failed to provide a partial sat-
   isfaction document. Because he did not provide a satisfac-
   tion document to [d]efendant even while asserting that the
   Judgment had been satisfied in part, [p]laintiff has ‘will-
   fully failed to provide a satisfaction document.’ Therefore,
   [d]efendants are entitled to their reasonable attorney fees
   incurred in pursuit of the satisfaction document.”
Plaintiff had several opportunities to provide a satisfaction
document. Even after plaintiff conceded that there had been
a partial satisfaction by filing his own motion requesting
that the court enter partial satisfaction, he did not provide
the satisfaction document. The trial court drew the reason-
able inference that plaintiff acted willfully in withholding
the satisfaction document under those circumstances. It did
not abuse its discretion in doing so.
         Affirmed.