Court Opinion

ID: 9539203
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 11:09:27.777778+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:58:36.052297
License: Public Domain

Opinion issued August 3, 2023

                                      In The

                              Court of Appeals
                                     For The

                          First District of Texas
                           ————————————
                              NO. 01-22-00621-CV
                            ———————————
   DANSK EXPRESS, LLC, A/K/A DANSKE EXPRESS, LLC, Appellant
                                        V.
                       IPFS CORPORATION, Appellee

             On Appeal from the County Civil Court at Law No. 3
                           Harris County, Texas
                       Trial Court Case No. 1175867

                          MEMORANDUM OPINION

      This is a restricted appeal in a suit on a note. Appellee IPFS Corporation sued

appellant Dansk Express, LLC, also known as Danske Express, LLC, for breach of

contract. The trial court rendered a no-answer default judgment against Dansk.
      Dansk now appeals. In two issues, Dansk contends that the trial court erred

in rendering judgment against it because IPFS did not properly serve Dansk with the

lawsuit and failed to ensure that a reporter’s record was made of any proceedings.

      Because we do not find error on the face of the record, we affirm.

                                   Background

      In December 2019, Dansk financed a commercial auto insurance policy

through a Premium Finance Agreement (“Agreement”) with IPFS. Pursuant to the

Agreement, IPFS paid the annual premium of $196,650.24 to the insurer, and Dansk

agreed to pay IPFS in 10 monthly installments of $20,482.00. The Agreement listed

the insured as: “Jarrett Justice [“Justice”], Danske Express LLC, 278 Park Road,

Glendale, TX 75862.” And Justice executed the Agreement on behalf of Dansk.

      In September 2021, IPFS sued Dansk, asserting that Dansk had failed to pay

as agreed and that its breach of the Agreement had caused IPFS to incur damages of

$26,595.88.   In its petition, IPFS directed that Dansk be served through its

“Registered Agent, Jarrett B. Justice, at the registered address: 8211 Shoregrove,

Humble, Texas 77346” (the “Shoregrove address”).

      The process server’s affidavit was filed with the trial court. In her October

20, 2021 “Affidavit of Due Diligence” (“Affidavit”), the process server stated that

she attempted to deliver the citation to Justice at the Shoregrove address on October

18, 19, and 20, 2021—but was unsuccessful. On October 20, 2021, the process
server returned the citation unexecuted and recommended service upon the Texas

Secretary of State (“SOS”).

      On November 10, 2021, IPFS filed an amended petition, asserting that,

because Dansk’s registered agent could not “with reasonable diligence be found at

the registered office,” service through the SOS was authorized under section 5.251

of the Texas Business Organizations Code.1 IPFS directed that Dansk be served by

delivering the citation to the SOS for service on Dansk “at the most recent address

on file with the [SOS],” which it identified as the Shoregrove address. IPFS attached

the process server’s Affidavit to its amended petition.

      On February 23, 2022, IPFS filed the SOS’s Whitney Certificate, discussed

below. In the Certificate, the SOS certified that it had received a copy of the citation

and IPFS’s amended petition, that it forwarded these by certified mail to Dansk at

the Shoregrove address, and that “[t]he Process was returned to this office on January

31, 2022, [b]earing the notation Return to Sender, Unable to Forward.”

      Dansk did not file an answer.

      On March 9, 2022, IPFS moved for a default judgment, asserting that Dansk

had been duly served and failed to appear. IPFS filed a “Certificate of Last Known

Address,” listing the Shoregrove address. IPFS sought damages in the amount of

$26,595.88 and attorney’s fees. It directed the trial court to the exhibits attached to

1
      See TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE § 5.251.
its amended petition, including copies of the Agreement and Dansk’s Customer

Account and Transaction History, which it “incorporated [t]herein by reference as

though fully recited.” IPFS also attached an affidavit in support of its attorney’s

fees.

        On March 11, 2022, the trial court signed a Final Default Judgment. It found

that Dansk, although duly served with process, had failed to file an answer and that

the return had been on file for at least 10 days. It also found that Dansk was in

default on the Agreement and that the damages were liquidated. The trial court

awarded IPFS $26,595.88 in damages and $8,865.00 in attorney’s fees.

                                  Restricted Appeal

        Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 30 states in pertinent part:

        A party who did not participate—either in person or through counsel—
        in the hearing that resulted in the judgment complained of and who did
        not timely file a postjudgment motion or request for findings of fact and
        conclusions of law, or a notice of appeal within the time permitted by
        Rule 26.1(a), may file a notice of appeal within the time permitted by
        Rule 26.1(c).

TEX. R. APP. P. 30. Rule 26.1(c) then provides that “in a restricted appeal, the notice

of appeal must be filed within six months after the judgment or order is signed.” Id.

26.1(c).

        Accordingly, to prevail in this restricted appeal, Dansk must show that: (1) it

filed a notice of restricted appeal within six months after the judgment was signed;

(2) it was a party to the underlying suit; (3) it did not participate in the hearing that
resulted in the complained-of judgment and did not timely file any post-judgment

motions or requests for findings of fact and conclusions of law; and (4) error is

apparent on the face of the record. Pike-Grant v. Grant, 447 S.W.3d 884, 886 (Tex.

2014).

      The first three requirements “are jurisdictional.” Ex parte E.H., 602 S.W.3d

486, 497 (Tex. 2020); see, e.g., In re S.W., 614 S.W.3d 311, 315–16 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth 2020, no pet.) (dismissing Father’s restricted appeal based on failure to

establish second requirement). The fourth requirement, which is derived from case

law, goes to the merits of the appeal and is not jurisdictional. Ex parte E.H., 602

S.W.3d at 495, 497; see, e.g., In re S.W., 614 S.W.3d at 315–16 (affirming trial

court’s judgment in Mother’s restricted appeal based on fourth requirement).

      In our review, we “liberally construe the non-participation requirement for

restricted appeals in favor of the right to appeal.” Grant, 447 S.W.3d at 886. And in

determining whether error is apparent on the face of the record, we must consider

the evidence that was before the trial court at the time that it rendered its final

judgment. See In re S.W., 614 S.W.3d at 315.

      Discussion

      Here, the record shows that Dansk was a party to IPFS’s lawsuit. See Grant,

447 S.W.3d at 886. In addition, the record shows that the trial court signed its

judgment on March 11, 2022, and that Dansk filed its notice of appeal on August 24,
2022. Thus, Dansk filed its notice of appeal within six months after the date the

judgment was signed. See id.; see also TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1(c), 30.

      The record further shows that Dansk did not participate “in the hearing that

resulted in the judgment complained of,” as the record does not reflect that a hearing

took place. See TEX. R. APP. P. 30 (authorizing restricted appeal when party “did not

participate—either in person or through counsel—in the hearing that resulted in the

judgment complained of”); Schamp v. Mitchell, No. 04-14-00741-CV, 2015 WL

4478150, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio July 22, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.). The

trial court’s judgment recites that it “considered the pleadings, official records, and

evidence on file.” And there are no notices of submission or setting and no settings

listed on the trial court’s docket sheet. See Schamp, 2015 WL 4478150, at *2.

      The record additionally reflects that Dansk did not timely file any

post-judgment motions or requests for findings of fact and conclusions of law. See

TEX. R. APP. P. 30; Grant, 447 S.W.3d at 886; Schamp, 2015 WL 4478150, at *2.

      Accordingly, we conclude that the first three requirements for a restricted

appeal are established and that we have jurisdiction to hear Dansk’s restricted

appeal. See Ex parte E.H., 602 S.W.3d at 497 (holding first three requirements are

jurisdictional); see, e.g., Maan v. First ATM, Inc., No. 03-06-00698-CV, 2008 WL

5210923, at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin Dec. 12, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding

that jurisdiction to consider restricted appeal was established and turning to merits).
      Next, we consider the fourth requirement—whether error is apparent on the

face of the record. See Grant, 447 S.W.3d at 886. This requires us to analyze the

merits of Dansk’s grounds for appeal. See Ex parte E.H., 602 S.W.3d at 497.

      Service of Process

      In its first issue, Dansk asserts that the trial court erred in rendering a default

judgment against it because the record shows that IPFS failed to properly serve

Dansk in strict compliance with the applicable rules. Dansk asserts: “According to

the Texas Business Organizations Code [section 5.251], [IPFS] does not get to serve

[Dansk] through the [SOS] all the while alleging and affirming the existence of

[Dansk’s] registered agent, Jarrett B. Justice.” See TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE § 5.251.

      A court obtains jurisdiction over a defendant through valid service of process

or through the defendant’s appearance. Mapco, Inc. v. Carter, 817 S.W.2d 686, 687

(Tex. 1991) (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 124) (“In no case shall judgment be rendered

against any defendant unless upon service, or acceptance or waiver of process, or

upon an appearance.”); Velasco v. Ayala, 312 S.W.3d 783, 797 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (“Personal jurisdiction is comprised of two

elements: (1) the defendant must be amenable to the jurisdiction of the court and

(2) the plaintiff must validly invoke that jurisdiction by valid service of process on

the defendant.”). And where a court rendering judgment has no jurisdiction over the

parties, that judgment is void. In re D.S., 602 S.W.3d 504, 512 (Tex. 2020).
      In reviewing a no-answer default judgment in a restricted appeal, we do not

presume valid issuance, service, and return of citation. Hubicki v. Festina, 226

S.W.3d 405, 407 (Tex. 2007). A no-answer default judgment cannot stand unless

the record shows strict compliance with the rules of procedure governing issuance,

service, and return of citation. Id. at 408. A record that fails to affirmatively show

proper service of process constitutes error apparent on the face of the record. See

GMR Gymnastics Sales, Inc. v. Walz, 117 S.W.3d 57, 60 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth

2003, pet. denied). “Whether service strictly complies with the rules is a question

of law which we review de novo.” Martell v. Tex. Concrete Enter. Readymix, Inc.,

595 S.W.3d 279, 282 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, no pet.).

      Section 5.251 of the Texas Business Organizations Code, governing

substituted service of process through the SOS, provides that the SOS “is an agent

of an entity for purposes of service of process, notice, or demand on the entity” if:

      (1)    the entity is a filing entity . . . and:
             (A)    the entity fails to appoint or does not maintain a registered
                    agent in this state; or
             (B)    the registered agent of the entity cannot with reasonable
                    diligence be found at the registered office of the entity[.]

TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE § 5.251.

      A “filing entity” includes a “domestic entity that is a . . . limited liability

company.” Id. § 1.002(22). Here, Dansk is a domestic limited liability company.

The Business Organizations Code requires that each such filing entity “shall
designate and continuously maintain in this state: (1) a registered agent; and (2) a

registered office.” Id. § 5.201(a). “The designation or appointment of a person as

registered agent by an organizer or managerial official of an entity in a registered

agent filing is an affirmation by the organizer or managerial official that the person

named as registered agent has consented to serve in that capacity.” Id. § 5.2011(a).

      Diligence is determined by whether the plaintiff acted as an ordinarily prudent

person would under the same or similar circumstance. Proulx v. Wells, 235 S.W.3d

213, 216 (Tex. 2007). Generally, the question of the plaintiff's diligence in effecting

service is one of fact and is determined by examining the type of effort or lack of

effort the plaintiff expended in procuring service. See id. This Court has held that

“[a]t least one attempt to serve the registered agent must be made before resorting to

substituted service.” J&J Container Mfg., Inc. v. Cintas-R. U.S., L.P., No. 01-14-

00933-CV, 2015 WL 5829667, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 6, 2015,

no pet.) (mem. op.). And “reasonable diligence” under section 5.251 may be shown

by a single attempt to serve the registered agent at the registered address if further

attempts would be futile. Ingram Indus., Inc. v. U.S. Bolt Mfg., Inc., 121 S.W.3d 31,

34–35 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.).

      When a defendant’s registered agent cannot be served after reasonable

diligence, the SOS becomes “an agent of [the defendant] entity for purposes of

service of process, notice, or demand on the entity.” See TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE
§ 5.251. “When substituted service on a statutory agent is allowed, the designee is

not an agent for serving but for receiving process on the defendant’s behalf.”

Campus Invs., Inc. v. Cullever, 144 S.W.3d 464, 466 (Tex. 2004).

      A plaintiff is authorized to serve process on the SOS as the defendant’s agent

by delivering duplicate copies of the process to the SOS. TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE

§ 5.252(a). In turn, the SOS’s duty is to forward the process, by certified mail, return

receipt requested, to the named entity at the “most recent address of the entity on file

with the [SOS].” Id. § 5.253(b)(1). After doing so, the SOS issues a certificate

(known as a “Whitney Certificate”2) stating that the SOS received the process and

forwarded it to the registered address. AES Valves, LLC v. Kobi Int’l, Inc., No. 01-

18-00081-CV, 2020 WL 1880781, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 16,

2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.). “Absent fraud or mistake, the [SOS’s] certificate is

conclusive evidence that the [SOS], as agent of [the defendant], received service of

process for [the defendant] and forwarded the service as required by the statute.”

Capitol Brick, Inc. v. Fleming Mfg. Co., Inc., 722 S.W.2d 399, 401 (Tex. 1986).

      Here, IPFS stated in its original petition that Dansk “may be served with

citation by delivering the citation to [Dansk’s] Registered Agent, [Justice], at the

registered address: 8211 Shoregrove, Humble, Texas 77346.” The process server’s

Affidavit states that she attempted three times, at different times of the day (October

2
      See Whitney v. L&L Realty Corp., 500 S.W.2d 94 (Tex. 1973).
18, 2021 at 6:10 p.m.; October 19, 2021 at 1:35 p.m.; and October 20, 2021 at 9:00

a.m.), to serve Justice at the Shoregrove address, but was unsuccessful. Each time,

there was not an answer at the door. And neighbors were unable to confirm whether

Justice resided there. The process server returned the citation unexecuted and

recommended service upon the SOS.

      Thus, IPFS attempted to serve Dansk’s registered agent at its registered office

three times before serving the SOS. This is not a case in which no such effort was

made. See, e.g., J&J Container Mfg., 2015 WL 5829667, at *4 (holding that plaintiff

who made no attempt to serve defendant’s registered agent at registered office before

serving SOS did not show reasonable diligence necessary to support substituted

service, which constituted error on face of record); RWL Const., Inc. v. Erickson,

877 S.W.2d 449, 451–52 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no writ) (holding

record that did not reflect where or when constable attempted service, or on whom,

did not show reasonable diligence in attempting to serve defendant’s registered agent

at registered address and reversing default judgment).

      Dansk presents no authority that IPFS was required to continue with more

repeated attempts to serve Dansk’s registered agent at the registered address. See

BLS Dev., LLC v. Lopez, 359 S.W.3d 824, 827–28 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2012, no

pet.) (holding that process server was not required to “inquire as to when the
registered agent would return from being out of the country” and that repeated

service attempts at registered office were not required).

      Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not err in its implied conclusion that

IPFS used reasonable diligence in attempting service on Dansk’s registered agent

before taking the final step of serving the SOS. See Houston’s Wild W., Inc. v.

Salinas, 690 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, writ ref’d

n.r.e.). Because Justice, as the registered agent of Dansk, could not “with reasonable

diligence be found at the registered office of the entity,” substituted service through

the SOS was authorized. See TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE § 5.251.3

      Subsequently, IPFS filed an amended petition, stating:

      Defendant may be served with citation by delivering said citation to the
      [SOS] at: PO Box 12079, Austin, Texas 78711-2079. The [SOS] shall
      serve the Defendant at the most recent address on file with the [SOS]:
      8211 SHOREGROVE, HUMBLE, TEXAS 77346[.]

3
      We note that this Court and others have held that substituted service on the SOS
      under section 5.251 of the Texas Business Organizations Code is a method of
      service independent from Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 106 and 107. See Ingram
      Indus., Inc. v. U.S. Bolt Mfg., Inc., 121 S.W.3d 31, 35 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
      Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (“Strict compliance under rule 106 is not necessary because it
      is evident from the record that substituted service was requested under article
      2.11(B) [predecessor to section 5.251], rather than under rule 106.”); see also El
      Paisano Nw. Highway, Inc. v. Arzate, No. 05-12-01457-CV, 2014 WL 1477701, at
      *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 14, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.); see also BLS Dev., LLC
      v. Lopez, 359 S.W.3d 824, 828 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2012, no pet.); Collective
      Ints., Inc. v. Reagan Nat’l Advert., No. 03-08-00283-CV, 2010 WL 2977458, at *4
      (Tex. App.—Austin July 29, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.); Houston’s Wild W., Inc. v.
      Salinas, 690 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, writ ref’d
      n.r.e.). Neither party raises any issue in that regard.
             The named entity defendant has failed to appoint or maintain a
      registered office in the State of Texas. Alternatively, the Defendant’s
      registered agent cannot with reasonable diligence be found at the
      registered office. Therefore, the [SOS] is an agent of the limited liability
      company defendant upon whom any such process, notice, or demand
      may be served pursuant to [TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE § 5.251] . . . .

      The SOS’s Whitney Certificate, which was filed in the trial court on February

23, 2022, states that the SOS received copies of IPFS’s citation and amended petition

on November 29, 2021, and forwarded them to Dansk at the 8211 Shoregrove

address by certified mail, return receipt requested, on December 7, 2021. See id.

§ 5.253(b) (requiring SOS to send process to defendant at “the most recent address

of the entity on file with the [SOS]”).

      Once the Certificate was filed, it constituted conclusive evidence, absent

evidence of fraud or mistake, that the SOS, as the agent of Dansk, received service

of process for Dansk and forwarded the service as required by the statute. See Capitol

Brick, Inc., 722 S.W.2d at 401 (concluding that Whitney Certificate constituted

conclusive evidence that service was valid and upholding default judgment).4

4
      See also Acadian Props. Austin, LLC v. KJMonte Invs., LLC, 650 S.W.3d 98, 111–
      12 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2021, no pet.) (holding, in context of restricted appeal, that
      SOS’s Whitney Certificate conclusively established that defendant was properly
      served with process and that it was defendant’s “own negligence in failing to comply
      with its statutory duty to provide the [SOS] with a valid address for [registered
      agent] that led to its failure to receive actual notice of the lawsuit from the [SOS]”);
      Interaction, Inc./State v. State/Interaction, Inc., 17 S.W.3d 775, 779 (Tex. App.—
      Austin 2000, pet. denied) (holding citation and SOS’s certificate constituted proof
      that defendant was served in compliance with statutory requirements).
      Dansk does not allege that any fraud or mistake occurred in the SOS’s service.

We therefore conclude that the SOS’s Certificate conclusively established service of

process and the trial court’s personal jurisdiction over Dansk. See AES Valves, LLC,

2020 WL 1880781, at *4.

      Dansk complains on appeal that service through the SOS was improper

because IPFS had “actual possession and/or knowledge of [Justice’s] individual,

home address (but never served him)” there.

      However, “a diligent party may rely on the registered address a [limited

liability company] has placed on file with the Secretary of State.” Autodynamics Inc.

v. Vervoort, No. 14-10-00021-CV, 2011 WL 1260077, at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston

[14th Dist.] Apr. 5, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.). “[I]t is well-settled that a plaintiff is

only required to attempt service at the address given to the [SOS], and need not make

any attempt to serve the defendant elsewhere.” Acadian Props. Austin, LLC v.

KJMonte Invs., LLC, 650 S.W.3d 98, 109 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2021, no pet.)

(holding plaintiff’s awareness of possible alternative location where defendant could

be found was irrelevant to whether plaintiff used reasonable diligence in attempting

to serve defendant at his registered address).5

5
      See, e.g., Lopez, 359 S.W.3d at 827 (“The only relevant attempt of service, for
      purposes of determining reasonable diligence, is the process server’s sole attempt at
      service on the registered agent at the registered office.”); Liberty Label Co., Inc. v.
      Morgan Adhesives Co., No. 04-04-00279-CV, 2005 WL 1475332, at *1 (Tex.
      App.—San Antonio June 22, 2005, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding, in restricted
      In Ingram Industries, Inc., the defendant argued that the plaintiff did not

exercise reasonable diligence in effecting service of process because the plaintiff and

its counsel knew the address of the defendant’s actual place of business, but did not

serve the citation at that address. 121 S.W.3d at 35. This Court concluded that there

is no requirement that the plaintiff also attempt service at the defendant’s place of

business. Id. (citing statutory predecessor to section 5.251). We held that the

plaintiff demonstrated reasonable diligence because its only duty was to attempt to

serve the defendant’s registered agent at its registered address prior to serving the

SOS. Id. at 34.

      Dansk further argues that “[n]otably absent from the record [are] any

documents or evidence proving that [Dansk] was duly served with process.”

      As discussed above, the SOS’s Certificate constituted conclusive evidence

that the SOS, as the agent of Dansk, received service of process for Dansk and

forwarded the service as required by the statute. See Capitol Brick, Inc., 722 S.W.2d

at 401.

      appeal, that reasonable diligence was shown when process server attempted to serve
      registered agent at registered address and found house was vacant and that nothing
      more was required); Adver. Displays, Inc. v. Cote, 732 S.W.2d 360, 363 (Tex.
      App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no writ) (knowledge of address other than that of
      registered office creates no presumption that appellant was amenable to service at
      that address).
      The SOS’s Certificate reflects that “Process was returned” to the SOS “on

January 31, 2022 [b]earing the notation: ‘Return to Sender, Unable to Forward.’”

The SOS was statutorily required to forward process to Dansk at the “most recent

address of the entity on file with the [SOS].” See TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE § 5.253.

And the record shows that the SOS sent process to Dansk at the Shoregrove address.

Dansk does not assert that the Shoregrove address was incorrect or no longer its

registered address. See, e.g., Liberty Label Co., Inc. v. Morgan Adhesives Co., No.

04-04-00279-CV, 2005 WL 1475332, at *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio June 22,

2005, no pet.) (mem. op.) (noting that it was defendant’s “responsibility to notify the

[SOS] of a change to either its registered agent or his address”).

      Because the SOS’s Whitney Certificate conclusively established that Dansk

was properly served with process, we conclude that Dansk has not demonstrated

error on the face of the record with respect to service of process. See Acadian Props.

Austin, LLC, 650 S.W.3d at 112.

      We overrule Dansk’s first issue.

      Sufficiency of the Evidence

      In its second issue, Dansk complains that IPFS “has insufficient evidence to

support the judgment, as no reporter’s record of any proceedings [was] taken.” It

asserts that a failure to record the proceedings constitutes reversible error on the face

of the record.
      One area in which post-answer and no-answer default judgments differ greatly

is in what is considered admitted because of the default. Whitaker v. Rose, 218

S.W.3d 216, 220 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.).

      In a post-answer default, the defendant has filed an answer with the trial court

and any failure to pursue the remainder of trial does not constitute an abandonment

of that answer or a confession of any issues. See Stoner v. Thompson, 578 S.W.2d

679, 682 (Tex. 1979). The plaintiff must offer evidence and prove the entire case,

including liability and damages. See id. Because the defendant may challenge the

sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, the lack of a reporter’s record requires

reversal. Carstar Collision, Inc. v. Mercury Fin. Co., 23 S.W.3d 368, 370 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. denied).

      Conversely, in a no-answer default context, the non-answering party is

deemed to have admitted all facts properly pled, except the amount of any

unliquidated damages. Dolgencorp of Tex., Inc. v. Lerma, 288 S.W.3d 922, 930

(Tex. 2009). Thus, if the facts set out in the petition allege a cause of action, the

default judgment conclusively establishes the defendant’s liability. Morgan v.

Compugraphic Co., 675 S.W.2d 729, 731 (Tex. 1984).

      With respect to damages, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 241 and 243 require

proof only when the amount is unliquidated or not proven by a written instrument.

Novosad v. Cunningham, 38 S.W.3d 767, 773 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2001, no pet.) (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 241, 243). Damages are liquidated if the

amount can be accurately calculated by the court from the factual, as opposed to the

conclusory, allegations in the petition and an instrument in writing. Id.

      When damages are liquidated, an evidentiary hearing is not required prior to

the entry of a default judgment. Taylor v. State, 293 S.W.3d 913, 916 (Tex. App.—

Austin 2009, no pet.). In fact, when a claim is liquidated and proven by written

instrument, the trial court must assess damages and render a final judgment unless

the defendant demands and is entitled to a trial by jury. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 241

(“When a judgment by default is rendered against the defendant, . . . if the claim is

liquidated and proved by an instrument in writing, the damages shall be assessed by

the court, or under its direction, and final judgment shall be rendered therefor . . . .”).

      Here, IPFS alleged in its amended petition that Dansk breached the

Agreement by failing to pay as agreed. To its amended petition, IPFS attached a

copy of the parties’ Agreement, discussed above; a statement of Dansk’s Customer

Account and Transaction History, showing an outstanding balance of $26,595.88;

and an affidavit in support. By not filing an answer, Dansk admitted all the factual

allegations in IPFS’s petition regarding liability. See Morgan, 675 S.W.2d at 731;

Novosad, 38 S.W.3d at 773.

      In addition, because the amount of IPFS’s damages, i.e., $26,595.88, may be

determined by examining this same evidence, the trial court did not err in concluding
that IPFS’s claim is liquidated and assessing damages. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 241; see,

e.g., Rooftop Grp. USA, Inc. v. Shopper Events LLC, No. 14-15-01040-CV, 2017

WL 2125648, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] May 16, 2017, pet. denied)

(mem. op.). By not filing an answer, Dansk also admitted the liquidated damages

claimed. See Novosad, 38 S.W.3d at 773.

      In the context of a no-answer default, an appellant is precluded from

challenging the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting liability and

liquidated damages. Quality Hardwoods, Inc. v. Midwest Hardwood Corp., No. 2-

05-311-CV, 2007 WL 1879797, at *8 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 28, 2007, no

pet.) (mem. op.) (liquidated damages); Texaco, Inc. v. Phan, 137 S.W.3d 763, 770

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (liability). Thus, in this context, no

reporter’s record is required on appeal. Taylor, 293 S.W.3d at 916. The lack of a

reporter’s record in this case therefore does not constitute error on the face of the

appellate record. See id.; Whitaker, 218 S.W.3d at 220–21.

      Accordingly, we hold that the lack of a reporter’s record in this appeal from a

no-answer default judgment does not constitute error on the face of the record. See

Whitaker, 218 S.W.3d at 220–21.

      We overrule Dansk’s second issue.
                                     Conclusion

      Because Dansk has not demonstrated any error on the face of the record, we

affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                            Terry Adams
                                            Chief Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams and Justices Guerra and Farris.