Court Opinion

ID: 9462288
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 22:37:21.594324+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:37:31.435936
License: Public Domain

COLEMAN, Circuit Judge
(dissenting):
I respectfully dissent. I would certify this question to the Supreme Court of Florida. Under my concept of federalism, that Tribunal should be the one to delineate the authority, power, and duties of its Attorney General in those situations where that authority has been drawn into question, especially where, as here, the authority is not express and, at the best, can only be supplied by implication.
Even though a state Attorney General is exercising common law authority as the chief law officer, of the realm, he dpes not exercise that authority as an unlimited monarch, governed only by his own judgment. He necessarily remains, and can act only, as the duly authorized agent (servant) of the State from whence he derives his authority, as formerly from the King.
“The power and duties of the English attorney general, though frequently referred to as common-law powers and duties, were not in fact such. He was the King’s legal adviser and represented him in the courts, and was when the common law came to this country appointed not under any common-law rule but by letters-patent of the King, which set forth what his powers and duties should be, including the courts in which he could appear as the King’s representative, and he was at all times subject to the King’s supervision and control. 6 Holdsworth’s History of the Common Law, 458 et seq. It is true that the common law recognized his right to represent the King in the courts to the extent authorized by his letters-patent, but did not confer or broaden this right.” 1
As the majority opinion points out, the 1968 Florida Constitution directs that the Attorney General “shall exercise such powers and perform such duties as may be prescribed by law” (emphasis mine). There is much room for doubt that by implication the Attorney General has authority “prescribed by law” to bring this particular suit, freighted as it is with much expense and potentially heavy court costs.
In any event, first and last, this is solely a question of Florida law, dealing with one of its officials who purports to *277act on its behalf. While we have jurisdiction to decide it incidentally to the pending suit, I would give the Florida courts a chance to resolve it in a final, binding manner, especially since we need not invoke the doctrine of abstention but may resort to a specific procedure, frequently invoked in questions of less far reaching consequences.

. Chief Justice Smith, dissenting in Kennington-Saenger Theaters v. State, 196 Miss. 841, 18 So.2d 483, 153 A.L.R. 883 (1944).