Court Opinion

ID: 9765181
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 03:54:40.812664+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:05.965783
License: Public Domain

BAIRD, Judge,
dissenting.
Appellant pled guilty to aggravated robbery and was sentenced to 60 years confine*639ment. The trial court wholly failed to admonish appellant regarding the range of punishment pursuant to Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.13(a)(1). The Court of Appeals reversed, relying upon Ex parte McAtee, 599 S.W.2d 335 (Tex.Cr.App.1980). High v. State, 962 S.W.2d 53 (Tex.App.— Houston [First Dist.] 1997). The majority now vacates that judgment and remands for a harm analysis to be conducted pursuant to Tex.R.App. P. 44.2.
Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.13 is unique in that it prescribes its own harm inquiry in the event of noneompliance. See, id., at (c). Under a subsection (c) inquiry there can not be substantial compliance where there was no compliance. Cain v. State, 947 S.W.2d 262, 264 (Tex.Cr.App.1997) (“To claim that an admonishment was in substantial compliance even though it was never given is a legal fiction.”) (citing Morales v. State, 872 S.W.2d 753 (Tex.Cr.App.1994)). Therefore, the inquiry is over and reversal is mandated. Because of this unique statutory feature, it is improper for this Court to require an additional and separate harm analysis. Matchett v. State, 941 S.W.2d 922, 942 (Tex.Cr.App.1996) (BAIRD and Mansfield, JJ., concurring). It is improper because the effect of performing a rule 44.2 analysis after performing the subsection (e) inquiry is to permit the rule to trump the statute. This, of course, violates the accepted scheme of hierarchical governance that statutory provisions prevail over court-promulgated rules. See generally, Tex. R.Crim. Evid. 101(c).
With these comments, I dissent.
OVERSTREET, MEYERS and PRICE, JJ., join this opinion.