Court Opinion

ID: 9579588
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:56:31.705032+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:35:36.503791
License: Public Domain

FADELEY, J.,
specially concurring.
I concur in the result of remand to develop the actual issues in this habeas corpus, conditions of confinement case.
The petitioner alleged that the prison authorities would not provide necessary prosthetics (in his case, arch supports) by paying for them “even where” a petitioner is unable to pay. That allegation is less than a direct claim that this petitioner is unable to pay. The trial judge, in a show cause proceeding1 on the petition for writ of habeas corpus, found as fact:
“Plaintiff chooses not to use any of the funds placed in his account for arch supports.”
I disagree with the Court of Appeals’ holding that the affidavits, medical records, and other materials were impermissi-bly considered by the judge in a show cause proceeding. He was justified in considering them, in my view. Thus, his findings must be considered.
The most likely meaning of the trial court’s findings, mentioning funds placed in petitioner’s account, is that petitioner has funds in his prison account with which to purchase the medically necessary arch supports that are for sale at the prison store, but that meaning is not free from doubt, so I concur in the remand. On this state of ambiguity, however, it seems to me premature to issue an advisory opinion about what constitutional standard will apply if medical indigency is the fact.
Assuming medical indigency is alleged, the lead opinion holds that the petitioner’s allegations are sufficient to meet a standard of “deliberate indifference” and, for that reason, that the judgment of dismissal should be vacated. I would agree that they are sufficient to meet that standard. However, assuming medical indigency is present, I would *186hold that the allegations meet a “medically necessary” standard and that for that reason dismissal was error requiring reversal and remand.
The lead opinion declares that the terms “deliberate indifference” and “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” are synonymous and that those terms represent the minimum constitutional standards for condition of confinement cases in Oregon. I do not agree that either of those different descriptions is an accurate description of the “evolving standards of decency,” existing in Oregon today, regarding provision of necessary medical care to those who are prevented from obtaining such care for themselves because of incarceration.
Instead, I think that providing a medically necessary and reasonably available prosthetic appliance to a medically indigent inmate is dictated by this state’s standards of decency when, as here, the appliance permits the prisoner to walk and, therefore, to work. I would hold that a petition for a writ alleging denial of a prosthetic appliance should be tested under the “medically necessary and reasonably available” standard. That is the Oregon standard of decency for provision of medical care to those who are prevented from obtaining the care by reason of incarceration, in my opinion.
ORS 423.020 provides in part:
“(1) The Department of Corrections is created. The department shall:
* * * *
“(d) Provide adequate food, clothing, health and medical care, sanitation and security for persons confined[.]”
OAR 291-124-085 provides:
“(2) Prosthetics and Self Care Items:
“(a) Inmates shall be required to pay for prostheses and/or other devices which become the personal property of the inmate;
«* * * * *
*187“(d) An inmate shall not be denied prostheses and/or other devices which are medically necessary because of lack of funds [.]”
OAR 291-124-050 provides:
“(1) The provision of medical/dental treatment during incarceration is limited to medically necessary interventions that correct:
“* * * * *
“(b) A functional deficit substantial enough to jeopardize the inmate’s current health status or safety during incarceration.”
Reliance on Estelle v. Gamble, 429 US 97, 97 S Ct 285, 50 L Ed 2d 251, reh’g den 429 US 1066 (1976), is misplaced. First, Estelle is essentially a tort case. In Estelle, the Court characterized the part of the action brought against a prison’s chief medical officer as a “malpractice” case.
In Estelle, the prisoner refused to work because of pain related to a back injury. He received medical attention. Also, the prison guards provided pain medicine, including refills. He later was diagnosed also to have a heart condition. No X-ray was taken. A medical doctor obtained by the prison diagnosed and prescribed medication for the heart condition and, when asked, extended that prescription. Later, while the prisoner was in “administrative segregation,” guards refused on three separate days either to obtain a doctor or to take the prisoner to a doctor based on his oral complaints of pain and blanking out. The foregoing facts were held by the Supreme Court to be insufficient to establish a civil tort claim under 42 USC § 1983 based on an Eighth Amendment standard for conduct of prison officials. Describing the basis for its ruling, the Estelle majority held that negligence in providing medical treatment is insufficient to create section 1983 tort liability. The Court held that deliberate indifference to the inmate’s medical condition, not merely malpractice in treating it, would be required to support civil tort liability for deprivation of the constitutional right in the form of a failure to provide medical treatment.
Commenting on Estelle, Professor Tribe states:
*188“Surely Justice Stevens was right to insist in Estelle v. Gamble, for example, that ‘[w]hether the conditions in Andersonville were the product of design, negligence, or mere poverty, they were cruel and inhuman,’36 and to conclude that governmental indifference to a prisoner’s medical needs violates the eighth and fourteenth amendments.37
The United States Supreme Court has not limited its application of the Eighth Amendment to cases in which physical pain or torture are inflicted. In Trop v. Dulles, 356 US 86, 78 S Ct 590, 2 L Ed 2d 630, 642-43 (1958), the Supreme Court held that, because of the Eighth Amendment the government could not “denationalize” a person as a punishment. And, near the turn of this century, in Weems v. United States, 217 US 349, 30 S Ct 544, 54 L Ed 793 (1910), that Court held that use of an ankle-to-wrist chain plus deprivation of civil rights for life violated the Eighth Amendment. Those cases are cited favorably by the Estelle Court, yet those cases are not ones of deliberate indifference to physical pain, the “standard” for which the lead opinion cites Estelle.
However, and in any event, the case before us is habeas corpus concerning conditions of confinement. In such *189a habeas in Oregon we must look to Bedell,2 not Estelle. In the present case there is no failure to diagnose or prescribe treatment. Petitioner’s disabling condition was diagnosed, and medically necessary treatment was authorized and was reasonably available inside the walls. In the present case there is no failure to diagnose or prescribe treatment. The only question left is who would or could pay for the medically necessary item.

 ORS 34.370, as amended by Or Laws 1995, ch 294, § 1 and Or Laws 1995, ch 657, § 8, provides the show cause process.

“36 429 U.S. 97,116-17 (1976) (dissenting opinion).

“37 The majority held only that the inmate’s complaint was insufficient to suggest such indifference by prison personnel to the inmate’s medical condition as to constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Although the majority indicated that ‘deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners,’ id. at 106, would violate the eighth amendment, and expressed no view on the constitutional status of inattention that could not be characterized as ‘deliberate,’ Justice Stevens disagreed both with the majority’s cramped reading of the complaint and with the majority’s apparent concern with ‘the subjective motivation of the defendant as a criterion for determining whether cruel and unusual punishment has been inflicted.’ Id. at 116. See also Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986), discussed in § 10-7, note 10, supra.” Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law, 1335 (2d ed 1988) (footnotes to the quoted text are also Professor Tribe’s).

 Bedell v. Schiedler, 307 Or 562, 770 P2d 909 (1989), a condition of confinement case, held that subjecting an incarcerated nonsmoker to cigarette smoke in her living space could justify habeas conditions of confinement relief, preventing dismissal without hearing.