Court Opinion

ID: 9860612
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 23:27:28.777058+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:26:11.390332
License: Public Domain

DeBRULER, Justice,
concurring,
In resolving appellant’s claim that the prosecution destroyed evidence, the majority seems to take the position that the defendant would bear a burden to demonstrate prejudice in a case in which he is successful in showing a negligent destruction by the police of exculpatory evidence. If that is the position taken in the majority opinion, it is unsupported by authority in this State. The question of how the burdens should be parcelled out in a negligent or intentional destruction of evidence case was considered by this Court in Johnson v. State (1987), Ind., 507 N.E.2d 980, and left unresolved because the Court was evenly divided.
In my view, yet to be rejected by this Court, once the defendant shows that the government has destroyed evidence of an exculpatory nature, the burden should be upon the government to establish the absence of prejudice. The risk should be upon the prosecution in such situations. The police and prosecutors are trained for, and highly skilled in, the gathering and retention of the products of their criminal investigations. The best knowledge of the exact nature of the items is with the government; and it is upon the government that the risk should fall in these circumstances.
This is an important legal question which is currently being considered by many other courts. It is important because it bears in substantial fashion upon the fairness of criminal proceedings. The case of Reed v. State (1985), Ind., 479 N.E.2d 1248, like the case before us today, places the burden upon the accused to show that evidence was withheld or destroyed by the police, but does not present or resolve the further question of where any additional burdens should be assigned.
The majority quotes with approval the statement in Arizona v. Youngblood (1988), — U.S. -, -, 109 S.Ct. 333, 337, 102 L.Ed.2d 281, 289, that “unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law.” I find myself in accord with the reasoning in the concurring opinion of Justice Stevens, wherein he finds the casting of the burden upon the defendant to show bad faith to be inconsistent with the promise of a fundamentally fair trial. There is a legal duty *708imposed upon the prosecuting forces by Indiana law to preserve potentially useful evidence, and a simple breach of that duty by reason of the failure to use due care should be enough to support a claim of basic unfairness.
In this case, appellant has failed to show that fingerprints upon the knife would have been potentially useful evidence to the defense. I therefore do not dissent from the decision.
DICKSON, J., concurs but dissents on other grounds with separate opinion.