Court Opinion

ID: 9912935
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-26 15:05:52.614891+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:06:21.572260
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                       SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                       APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                       DOCKET NO. A-4022-21

53-55 E. KINNEY, LLC,
CHESSLETE'S PROPERTY
LLC, and 335 MULBERRY
ASSOCIATES, LLC,

         Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

THE CITY OF NEWARK
CENTRAL PLANNING
BOARD,

         Defendant-Respondent.

AC AND J RESTORATION
GROUP CORP.,

         Intervenor-Respondent.

                  Submitted December 4, 2023 – Decided December 26, 2023

                  Before Judges Marczyk and Chase.

                  On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                  Division, Essex County, Docket No. L-7835-20.
            Gaccione Pomaco, PC, attorneys for appellants
            (Michael J. Piromalli, on the brief).

            Post Polak, PA, attorneys for intervenor/respondent AC
            and J Restoration Group Corp. (David L. Epstein, of
            counsel and on the brief; Kathryn A. Kopp, on the
            brief).

PER CURIAM

      Plaintiffs 53-55 E. Kinney, LLC, Chesslete's Property LLC, and 335

Mulberry Associates, LLC appeal from the trial court's August 4, 2022 order

dismissing plaintiffs' complaint with prejudice. The issue in this appeal involves

whether the limitations period under Rule 4:69-6(c) should have been enlarged

so plaintiffs could amend their original complaint to name AC and J Restoration

Group Corp. ("Intervenor") as defendants. Based on our review of the record

and the applicable legal principles, we affirm.

                                        I.

      Plaintiffs and intervenor each own several properties in Newark.

Plaintiffs own 329 and 335 Mulberry Street, 13 and 15 Scott Street, and 53-55

East Kinney Street. Intervenor owns Block 884, Lots 18, 20, 22 and 24-27; these

properties are more commonly known as 333, 337, and 339 Mulberry Street and

17, 19, 21, and 23 Scott Street ("property").

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         In January 2020, intervenor filed an application for preliminary and final

site plan approval ("Development Application") seeking variances related to the

development of its property as a nine-story mixed-use building with 1,460

square feet of retail space, 1,290 square feet of community space, ninety-two

residential units on the upper floors, and thirteen parking spaces on the ground

floor.

         On August 17, 2020, the City of Newark Central Planning Board

("Board") held a hearing regarding the development application. At the time of

the hearing, intervenor presented testimony of an architect, civil engineer, traffic

engineer, and professional planner in support of the application.           At the

conclusion of the presentation, the Board approved the development application.

         The Board adopted a resolution memorializing the approval on September

14, 2020. The notice of the approval was published in the Newark Star Ledger

newspaper on October 2, 2020. 1 Forty-five days later, on November 16, 2020,

plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Law Division challenging the approval of the

development application. However, the complaint did not name intervenor as a

defendant. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, Newark City Hall was closed to

1
  The propriety of the notice is not in contention. Both parties agree the notice
in the newspaper was valid to start the clock on the time limit under Rule 4:69-
6(b)(3).
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                                          3
the public, and personal service of the complaint upon the Board—the only

named defendant—did not occur until January 8, 2021. On January 11, 2021,

plaintiffs' counsel transmitted the complaint via email attachment to the Board's

attorney and copied intervenor's attorney. The Board answered on January 19,

2021.

        From January to September 2021, the action was dormant. In September

2021, intervenor moved to intervene as defendant and to dismiss the complaint

with prejudice based on plaintiffs' failure to timely join it as a necessary party.

The court granted the application to intervene but denied the motion to dismiss

to afford plaintiffs an opportunity to seek additional time to file an amended

complaint pursuant Rule 4:69-6(c).

        On November 16, 2021, plaintiffs moved to enlarge the forty-five-day

time limit under Rule 4:69-6(b)(3) to file an action in lieu of prerogative writs

and to amend the complaint to name intervenor as a defendant. On December

9, 2021, intervenor opposed the motion and cross-moved to dismiss the

complaint with prejudice.

        In July 2022, the trial court held oral argument on these companion

motions. At that hearing, plaintiffs agreed intervenor was an indispensable party

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to the action that should have been named. 2 However, plaintiffs argued the time

limit should be extended because the parking issue involved a matter of public

importance that would allow enlargement under Rule 4:69-6(c). Specifically,

plaintiffs argued:

               in that context, appealing this approval to the [Board],
               the plaintiff is attempting to address an important
               public interest in addition to the fact that my client is a
               landowner within the area and they have a private
               interest as well that [is] being affected by this, but
               certainly it is an important public interest to the
               community at large.

        On August 4, 2022, the court issued a written decision, discussed more

fully below, denying plaintiffs' application to enlarge the forty-five-day filing

requirement and granting intervenor's motion to dismiss with prejudice.

                                           II.

2
    Specifically, plaintiffs' attorney stated:

               I don't in any way contest the fact that the case indicates
               that [intervenor] should have been a necessary
               indispensable part[y] and should have been initially
               included in the complaint . . . . I absolutely understand
               [d]efendant [i]nterven[o]r's argument there and I take
               responsibility. It certainly was our responsibility -- my
               responsibility to have filed that action to amend either
               sooner or to have included [d]efendant [i]nterven[o]r on
               the initial complaint.
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      Plaintiffs reprise the arguments raised before the trial court.         More

particularly, they primarily contend the trial court erred in failing to extend the

time to file an amended complaint pursuant to Rule 4:69-6(c) and Brunetti v.

Borough of New Milford, 68 N.J. 576, 586 (1975). Plaintiffs argue the public

interest would be harmed because of the disparity between the proposed number

of dwelling units and the number of on-site parking spaces and its corresponding

impact on the surrounding area given the limited available parking. Plaintiffs

further assert Brunetti did not limit the situations where a court can grant an

enlargement of time, and relief is justified here because intervenor received

notice of the complaint via email shortly after it was served on the Board.

      Intervenor counters that the notice of approval for the development

application was published on October 2, 2020, and plaintiffs had forty-five days

from that date to file an action against intervenor. Intervenor contends plaintiffs'

original complaint, which named only the Board, was filed on November 16,

2020, but was deficient because they failed to name intervenor who was the

successful applicant and an indispensable party pursuant to Stokes v. Lawrence,

111 N.J. Super. 134, 138 (App. Div. 1970). Plaintiffs did not seek to amend the

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complaint until a year later, in response to intervenor's motion to dismiss. 3

Moreover, intervenor asserts this case did not involve an important

constitutional question, an ex parte determination of a legal question by

administrative officials, or an important matter of public interest requiring

adjudication to warrant expanding the time for plaintiffs to file their amended

complaint.

      Rule 4:69-6(b)(3) establishes the time period within which a party

challenging a planning board's decision to grant a development application must

file an action in lieu of prerogative writs. The rule, in pertinent part, provides:

"No action in lieu of prerogative writs shall be commenced . . . to review a

determination of a planning board . . . after [forty-five] days from the publication

of a notice once in the official newspaper of the municipality . . . ." R. 4:69-

6(b)(3).

      Here, the Board published the notice of approval for intervenor's

application on October 2, 2020. Thus, it is not disputed the forty-five-day time

period in which plaintiffs could file an action challenging the Board's decision,

3
   Intervenor further notes plaintiffs failed to move to name intervenor when
intervenor initially moved to intervene in the action and sought to dismiss
plaintiffs' complaint. Intervenor also notes plaintiffs failed to provide even
informal notice of the action until two months after the forty-five-day time
period set forth in Rule 4:69-6(b)(3).
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                                         7
as prescribed by Rule 4:69-6(b)(3), began to run on that date. Plaintiffs also do

not dispute intervenor is a necessary and indispensable party to the action

challenging the Board's approval of its development application. See Stokes,

111 N.J. Super. at 138 (holding the successful applicant is an indispensable party

to an action challenging the grant of a variance). On November 16, 2020,

plaintiffs filed their original complaint within the forty-five-day time limitation

of Rule 4:69-6(b)(3). However, plaintiffs did not seek to add intervenor, an

indispensable party, as a defendant until they moved to enlarge the time limit to

name intervenor a year later—on November 16, 2021—well after the forty-five-

day window had passed. Accordingly, the trial court was correct in determining

plaintiffs failed to name intervenor in a timely manner.

      We next address whether the trial court properly denied plaintiffs'

application to enlarge the forty-five-day time limit in the "interest of justice"

under Rule 4:69-6(c). Rule 4:69-6(c) authorizes a trial court to "enlarge the

period of time provided in paragraph (a) . . . of this rule where it is manifest that

the interest of justice so requires."        The decision "to grant or deny an

enlargement involves a sound exercise of judicial discretion, with consideration

given both to the potential impact upon the public body and upon the plaintiff. "

Tri-State Ship Repair & Dry Dock Co. v. City of Perth Amboy, 349 N.J. Super.

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                                         8
418, 424 (App. Div. 2002).       Rule 4:69-6(a)'s forty-five-day time limit "is

designed to give an essential measure of repose to actions taken against public

bodies." Id. at 423 (quoting Wash. Twp. Zoning Bd. v. Wash. Plan. Bd., 217

N.J. Super. 215, 225 (App. Div. 1987)). "Because of the importance of stability

and finality to public actions, courts do not routinely grant an enlargement of

time to file an action in lieu of prerogative writs." Ibid.

      When considering the timeliness of an action in lieu of prerogative writs,

a trial court should consider whether the action involves "(1) important and

novel constitutional questions; (2) informal or ex parte determinations of legal

questions by administrative officials; and (3) important public rather than

private interests which require adjudication or clarification." Ibid. (quoting

Borough of Princeton v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 169 N.J. 135, 152 (2001));

see also Brunetti, 68 N.J. at 586.4

4
    The Court has noted the "list of exceptions was not intended to be
exhaustive[,]" as "the broad language of the enlargement provision belies the
suggestion that the intent of the rule is to restrict enlargement to one of those
three categories." Hopewell Valley Citizens' Grp., Inc. v. Berwind Prop. Grp.
Dev. Co., L.P., 204 N.J. 569, 584 (2011). "[R]elaxation depends on all relevant
equitable considerations under the circumstances." Pressler & Verniero, Current
N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 7.3 on R. 4:69-6(c) (2024) (citing Hopewell Valley
Citizens' Grp., 204 N.J. at 583-84).

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                                         9
      Here, in addressing the parking issues raised by plaintiffs, in the context

of its analysis of Rule 4:69-6(c), the trial court succinctly stated:

                   A residential/commercial development project in
             an urban or suburban community is almost certain to
             raise issues concerning parking and the number of
             required spaces. The [p]laintiff has not pointed to any
             unusual feature of the subject project that would
             suggest the issues presented as to the parking or any
             other matter are particularly acute or of uniquely
             public, as opposed to purely private, concern.

Additionally, the court found that there was no basis to enlarge the forty-five-

day filing requirement reasoning this case did not fit into the criteria for relief

outlined by the Court in Brunetti, 68 N.J. at 586. Specifically, the trial court

noted:

                    Although these are not . . . exhaustive criteria, the
             only basis asserted by the [p]laintiff in this case as a
             basis for relief is that the application presents a matter
             of public importance—specifically, the impact of the
             proposed development on parking in the general area of
             the property. The [p]laintiff further contends that the
             [i]ntervenor would not suffer any prejudice as there
             have been no discovery or other proceedings in this
             case as of today. It points out that the [i]ntervenor has
             been aware of the case since January 202[1], and did
             not seek to intervene until September 2021.

                    The [c]ourt finds the [p]laintiff has not
             established basis for the leave sought to extend the time
             for filing a viable [a]ction in [l]ieu of [p]rerogative
             [w]rits. Indeed, to grant the relief required in this case
             would not only countenance a delay of many months in

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                                        10
              which the [p]laintiff did not take any action to join the
              [i]ntervenor, but it would render the [forty-five]-day
              requirement for initiating an action virtually a nullity.
              There is simply no meaningful distinction presented
              between this case and virtually every other relatively
              complex land use application involving parking issues
              to warrant the granting of the required extension.

        Plaintiffs do not advance any persuasive equitable arguments beyond the

exceptions referenced in Brunetti to warrant an enlargement of time to name

intervenor as a defendant. That plaintiffs timely filed the complaint with respect

to the Board, copied intervenor in a subsequent email, and because no discovery

had been completed at the time the court dismissed the complaint does not

warrant an enlargement in the interest of justice.

        We conclude plaintiffs' arguments fall short of establishing a justification

in which the interests of justice would require an enlargement of the forty-five-

day time limit.       Furthermore, the enlargement would further prejudice

intervenor. We conclude the exceptions set forth in Brunetti are not implicated

under the circumstances of this action, and we affirm substantially for the

reasons set forth in the trial court's opinion. We are satisfied the trial court did

not abuse its discretion in declining to enlarge the time provided in Rule 4:69-

6(a).

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                                        11
      To the extent we have not specifically addressed any of plaintiffs'

remaining arguments, we conclude they lack sufficient merit to warrant

discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

      Affirmed.

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