Court Opinion

ID: 9939580
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-10 17:11:13.248005+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:41:26.093283
License: Public Domain

J-A27040-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  AUGUST BAKER AND DIANA BAKER                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellants              :
                                               :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  PPL ELECTRIC UTILITIES                       :   No. 497 MDA 2023
  CORPORATION AND T & D POWER,                 :
  INC.                                         :

             Appeal from the Judgment Entered March 6, 2023
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County Civil Division at
                           No(s): 2015-04264

BEFORE:      LAZARUS, J., NICHOLS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:                 FILED: FEBRUARY 8, 2024

       Appellants, August Baker and Diana Baker (“the Bakers”), appeal from

the judgment entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County in

favor of Appellees, PPL Electric Utilities (“PPL Electric”) and T&D Power, Inc.

(“T&D Power”), following a non-jury trial. After a careful review, we affirm.

       The relevant facts and procedural history have been aptly set forth by

the trial court, in part, as follows:

             [The Bakers] claim ownership of a parcel of real property
       situated on Bell Mountain in Dickson City and Scott Township,
       Lackawanna County, based on two deeds from 2009 and 2013.
       That parcel is referred to throughout the litigation as the Edginton
       Tract. [PPL Electric] claims a right-of-way interest across the
       Edginton Tract under a 1969 right-of-way agreement (“ROW
       Agreement”) with Lackawanna County after the Lackawanna
____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A27040-23

       County Treasurer’s Office conducted a tax sale on August 27,
       1965, and then acknowledged a deed to the Lackawanna County
       Commissioners on December 21, 1965.
             [PPL    Electric] presently     maintains   two    electrical
       transmission lines on the right-of-way. [PPL Electric] has also
       cleared trees and brush and constructed roads to access the lines
       over the mountain terrain. One of [PPL Electric’s] transmission
       lines was constructed in 1970. The parties dispute the timeline
       regarding construction of the second transmission line; however,
       the construction occurred after [the Bakers] received a quit-claim
       deed to the Edginton Tract in 2009 for $7,500.
              On July 7, 2015, and following construction of the second
       transmission line through the Edginton Tract, [the Bakers] filed [a
       complaint] against [PPL Electric] and one of its contractors, T&D
       Power…seeking declaratory relief and damages. [Specifically, the
       Bakers asserted] claims for: 1) declaratory judgment; 2) unjust
       enrichment; 3) conversion; 4) trespass to land; and 5) trespass
       to personal property. [The Bakers specifically sought a declaration
       that PPL Electric had no rights over the Edginton Tract.1 Appellees
       filed answers with new matter.2]
             On February 9, 2022, the parties filed a Joint Motion to
       Bifurcate Trial, which [the trial court] granted. The parties agreed
       to bifurcate the issues of liability and damages, and this matter
       then proceeded to a non-jury trial on the issue of liability against
       [Appellees] commencing on August 25, 2022.

____________________________________________

1 In response to the complaint, PPL Electric filed preliminary objections, which

T&D Power joined. By order entered on September 30, 2015, the trial court
granted the preliminary objections for a more specific pleading, as well as
granted the motion to strike the Bakers’ request for attorneys’ fees and
punitive damages. On October 14, 2015, the Bakers filed an amended
complaint against Appellees.

2 On July 27, 2017, PPL Electric filed a motion for summary judgment, and

T&D Power joined the motion. On November 13, 2017, the Bakers filed a
motion for summary judgment. By order and opinion entered on January 18,
2018, the trial court denied Appellees’ motion for summary judgment. On
March 20, 2018, the trial court denied the Bakers’ motion for summary
judgment.
      Moreover, on April 1, 2021, Appellees filed a joint motion for the entry
of judgment of non pros, which the trial court denied on July 6, 2021.

                                           -2-
J-A27040-23

                                  ***
            [Based on the evidence presented at the non-jury trial, the
     trial court made the following findings of fact:] The Bakers are
     husband and wife. [Mr. Baker] holds both a bachelor’s and
     master’s degree in civil engineering, and [he] is registered in the
     Commonwealth of Pennsylvania as a Professional Land Surveyor
     and a Professional Engineer. [N.T.,] 8/25/22, at 9. [Mrs. Baker]
     is employed by the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation as
     a Right-of-Way Specialist.
           [PPL Electric] is a regulated public utility and holds the
     statutory power of eminent domain. [PPL Electric contracted with
     T&D Power, which engaged in various construction projects
     related to electrical towers and electric lines on the subject
     property.]
           The Edginton Tract is a seventy-seven-acre parcel and
     located in both Dickson City and Scott Township. [Id.] at 13[.]
     The property is situated on Bell Mountain, above the Scranton-
     Carbondale Highway and a Wegmans Food Markets location.
     [N.T.,] 8/26/22, at 61-65[.] Despite its location near commercial
     development in Dickson City, the testimony of both [] Mr. Baker
     and [PPL Electric’s] Senior Right-of-Way Specialist, Chad Huber,
     established that the Edginton Tract is difficult to access due to the
     mountainous terrain. [N.T.,] 8/25/22, at 51[; N.T.,] 8/26/22, at
     60, 64[.]
            [PPL Electric] constructed and currently maintains two large
     electrical transmission lines, which traverse a portion of the
     Edginton Tract in Dickson City based on the ROW Agreement with
     Lackawanna County.
            The first transmission line is the 230kV Summit-Lackawanna
     line, which was constructed in 1970 and was formerly referred to
     as the Peckville-Stanton line. [N.T.,] 8/26/22, at 92. Mr. Huber
     testified that the Summit-Lackawanna line serves 32,000
     customers in the immediate vicinity.           [Id.] at 57, 59-60.
     [According to Mr. Huber,] [t]he Summit-Lackawanna line serves
     a state hospital, a sewage treatment plant, a natural gas
     compressor station, and a water provider[.] Id. at 60.
            Per Mr. Huber, [PPL Electric] is engaged in a multi-year
     process to build and improve the Summit-Lackawanna
     transmission line due to the age and deterioration of the original
     steel lattice towers. Id. at 58-59. The plan involves replacing
     two lattice towers for the Summit-Lackawanna line on the

                                     -3-
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     Edginton Tract and replacing them with monopole structures. Id.
     Mr. Huber testified that the Summit-Lackawanna line towers
     currently on the Edginton Tract are somewhere between thirteen
     and fourteen stories tall. Id. at 59.
           At trial, Mr. Huber used street-view images available
     through Google Maps to show that the Summit-Lackawanna line
     and its towers are observable from Business Route 6, below Bell
     Mountain. Id. at 63-64. Mr. Huber also used satellite images
     available through Google Maps to show that the Summit-
     Lackawanna line is located on the south or southeast side of the
     Edginton Tract. Id. at 65.
           The second transmission line is the 500kV Shickshinny-
     Lackawanna line, which is part of the larger Susquehanna-
     Roseland project, jointly developed by [PPL Electric] and PJM, the
     independent system operator. [Id.] at 86. The Susquehanna-
     Roseland project was deemed necessary by PJM in 2006 or 2007
     to address reliability needs in the electric grid. [Id.] See Energy
     Conservation Council of Pennsylvania v. Pub. Util. Comm’n
     (Susquehanna-Roseland Appeal), 25 A.3d 440, 442-43 (Pa.
     Cmwlth. 2011) (“PJM’s 2007 and 2008 [regional transmission
     expansion plan] identified the need for a new line between
     Pennsylvania and New Jersey because forecasts reflected that
     transmission facilities in Pennsylvania would be overloaded by
     early 2013, i.e., loading on the transmission facilities was
     projected to exceed applicable ratings, which may cause
     permanent damage to transmission infrastructure and widespread
     power outages.”).
           In the construction phase of the Susquehanna-Roseland
     project, [PPL Electric] built the new transmission line, in part,
     through existing corridors. [N.T.,] 8/26/22, at 88. Ronald
     Reybitz, [PPL Electric’s] associate general counsel, testified that
     construction on the new transmission line was completed in 2015.
     Id. at 90.
           Mr. Huber used satellite images to show that the
     Shickshinny-Lackawanna line is located on the north or northwest
     side of the Edginton Tract. [Id.] at 65. The satellite images used
     by Mr. Huber in his testimony showed that the Edginton Tract is
     undeveloped [except for] the two transmission lines crossing the
     property.
           Construction of the 500vK Shickshinny-Lackawanna line on
     the Edginton Tract began in the spring of 2012, as acknowledged
     by [Mr.] Baker. [N.T.,] 8/25/22, at 60-61; [N.T.,] 8/30/22, at 34-

                                    -4-
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     35, 37. Mr. Huber used satellite images dated September 2012
     to show that trees had been cleared on the Edginton Tract around
     that time. [N.T.,] 8/26/22, at 66. Per the testimony of Mr. Baker,
     [PPL Electric] and its contractors began blasting, removing stone,
     and constructing roads on the Edginton Tract around Labor Day in
     2013. [N.T.,] 8/30/22, at 35-36. [PPL Electric’s] representative,
     Mr. Huber, testified that the Shickshinny-Lackawanna line was
     completed around 2013 or 2014 and existed on satellite images
     in 2014. [N.T.,] 8/26/22, at 65-66. From Mr. Baker’s testimony,
     [PPL Electric’s] alleged stone removal and road construction on
     the Edginton Tract prompted the litigation by [the Bakers].
           In the years prior to construction of the Shickshinny-
     Lackawanna line, [PPL Electric] engaged directly with [the Bakers]
     to discuss the parties’ property rights in the area and the timeline
     of construction. [Id.] at 85, 90-92; [N.T.,] 8/30/22, at 77-78,
     81-82[.]
           [The Bakers] claim title to the Edginton Tract by way of two
     quit-claim deeds: (i) a deed from Phyllis D. Riefenberg and Phyllis
     D. Riefenberg, Trustee, of the Frank B. Riefenberg Trust dated
     December 30, 2009, and recorded in the Lackawanna County
     Recorder of Deeds Office[;] and (ii) a deed from John J. Dunn, Sr.
     and Joanne M. Dunn, his wife, (“the Dunns”) dated December 20
     2013, and recorded in the Lackawanna County Recorder of Deeds
     Office[.]
           [Mr.] Baker testified at trial that he envisions developing
     residential townhouses on the Edginton Tract. [N.T.,] 8/25/22, at
     109. Mr. Baker stated that he paid $7,500 in exchange for the
     deed from Phyllis Riefenberg and the Frank B. Riefenberg Trust in
     2009. Id. at 88. Mr. Baker acknowledged he did not have a
     survey done of the property prior to purchase in 2009. Id. at 88-
     89. In exchange for the deed from [the Dunns] in 2013, the
     [Bakers] paid $10,000.
            Two title searchers testified in this matter, David Durkovic
     for [the Bakers], and Charles Fogarty, for [PPL Electric].
     Regarding [the Bakers’] first transaction, Mr. Durkovic completed
     a title search on December 15, 2009. [Id.] at 22. Mr. Durkovic
     concluded, at that time, that the Frank B. Riefenberg Trust owned
     three-quarters of an interest and [the Dunns] owned a one-
     quarter interest. Id. Mr. Durkovic noted no exceptions in his title
     search. Id. at 191. Mr. Durkovic also completed title searches of
     adjacent parcels during the litigation. [Id.] at 161, 165-66, 170-
     75.

                                    -5-
J-A27040-23

            Mr. Fogarty conducted two title searches with cover pages
     dated December 30, 2009, and March 5, 2010. Mr. Fogarty
     identified several exceptions in his title search, including an
     outstanding interest of Lackawanna County in the Edginton Tract
     in his [March 5, 2010,] search report. [N.T.,] 8/30/22, at 67-71.
             The parties traced the history of the Edginton Tract back to
     1886 as part of the Benjamin McLean warrant, showing two chains
     of title leading to George T. Edginton,[ who may also have been
     known as George T. Edington]. [The parties stipulated that,] [b]y
     1902, George T. Edginton was the owner of the entire interest in
     the Edginton Tract. From 1907 to 1908, George T. Edginton
     entered into a coal lease with Joseph Speicher, which included an
     option to purchase an undivided one-half interest in the Edginton
     Tract. In 1908, Joseph Speicher released and surrendered the
     coal lease back to George T. Edginton. From this point forward,
     there are multiple clouds or defects to consider in the title to the
     Edginton Tract.
            [The parties further stipulated that,] [o]n July 9, 1909,
     George T. Edginton entered into a coal lease with Berton E. Davis,
     which included an option for Berton E. Davis to acquire an
     undivided one-half interest in the Edginton Tract. On the next
     day, July 10, 1909, George Edginton and his then spouse, Annie
     Edginton, conveyed to Berton E. Davis an interest in the Edginton
     Tract.
           Mr. Fogarty opined that George T. Edginton sold a full
     interest in the Edginton Tract on July 19, 1909. [Id.] at 71-72.
     Per Mr. Fogarty, George T. Edginton “was out of the picture[,]”
     noting that the deed called for “full title[,]” and “doesn’t say half
     interest.” Id. at 72.
           However, the July 10, 1909, indenture indicates:
                 This conveyance is made subject to the terms of
           that certain indenture of lease dated July 9, 1909,
           wherein said party of the first part leased the coal in,
           upon, and under said land to said party of the second
           part.
           As of July 10, 1909, when the coal lease option was
     exercised, Berton E. Davis owned a one-half interest in the
     Edginton Tract pursuant to the terms of the July 9, 1909,
     indenture. George T. Edginton retained one-half interest.
           [The parties stipulated that] Berton E. Davis died in 1913.
     At the time of Berton E. Davis’s death, Berton E. Davis and his

                                     -6-
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     wife, Verna Davis, had three sons: 1) Charles H. Davis; 2) Ward
     A. Davis; and 3) Berton E. Davis, Jr. Upon Berton E. Davis’s death
     in 1913, he left a one-third (1/3) undivided interest in his estate
     to his sons. In 1922, the family proceeded in Orphans’ Court for
     approval of the sale of real estate in Dunmore from the Estate of
     Berton E. Davis, which included the appointment of Charles H.
     Davis as Guardian for his younger brother, Berton E. Davis, Jr.
           [The parties stipulated that] Verna Davis died in 1938.
     Verna Davis left her entire estate to her sons. Charles H. Davis
     and Ward A. Davis were named the executors of Verna Davis’s
     estate. The inventory of Verna Davis’s estate included a one-third
     (1/3) undivided interest in numerous properties in Scranton, and
     one in Mount Pocono, but the inventory did not list out any real
     estate in Dickson City or Scott Township. See [N.T.,] 8/25/22, at
     211.
           By operation of the July 10, 1909, coal lease option, [as well
     as Berton E. Davis’s will and Verna Davis’s will], Charles H. Davis,
     Ward A. Davis, and Berton E. Davis, Jr. would have shared
     whatever interest in the Edginton Tract that Berton E. Davis had
     upon the death of their parents.
           [The parties stipulated that] Ward A. Davis died on April 2,
     1963. Ward A. Davis was married and had two sons: 1) Berton L.
     Davis and 2) William R. Davis. Ward A. Davis’s wife, Margaret A.
     Davis, died on October 16, 1978.
           [The parties also stipulated that] Berton E. Davis, Jr. died
     on January 25, 1976. At the time of his death, Berton E. Davis,
     Jr. was married to Eleanor V. Davis.
           On June 9, 1980, following the 1965 County Treasurer’s sale
     [as] discussed below, Berton E. Davis’s interest in the Edginton
     Tract was conveyed by Charles H. Davis, Eleanor V. Davis, Berton
     L. Davis, and William R. Davis by way of [a] quit-claim deed to
     Frank Riefenberg and Anthony A. Lawrence. See [PPL Electric]
     Exh. 12. The quit-claim deed provided that “[t]he purpose of this
     instrument is to convey, release, or otherwise extinguish whatever
     interest the grantors as sole surviving heirs of Berton E. Davis
     have in the [Edginton Tract].” Id. As discussed below, Frank
     Riefenberg claimed an interest in the Edginton Tract at the time
     from other sources.
          [The parties stipulated that,] [p]rior to 1980, there is no
     deed or instrument conveying any interest in the real estate to
     any of Berton E. Davis’s heirs. There is no known record of a

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     spouse or heir of Berton E. Davis filing an instrument declaring an
     ownership interest in the subject premises. There were no other
     estate or Orphans’ Court records to consider. There is also no
     record of a spouse or heir of Berton E. Davis ever paying property
     taxes to Lackawanna County regarding the Edginton Trust.
            Anthony A. Lawrence and Elizabeth Lawrence conveyed
     their interest in the Edginton Tract to [the Dunns] on June 14,
     1989. [The Dunns] then conveyed their interest in the Edginton
     Tract to [the Bakers] by way of [a] quit-claim deed dated
     December 20, 2013.
           [The parties stipulated that], [a]fter George T. Edginton’s
     conveyance of a one-half interest in the property to Berton E.
     Davis in 1909, there is no record of title activity involving the
     Edginton Tract until 1974.
           George T. Edginton died in 1921. George T. Edginton was
     married to Louise Edginton at the time of his death.
            [The parties stipulated that,] [o]n January 4, 1927, a
     petition was filed in [the] Orphans’ Court to compel Louise
     Edginton, George T. Edginton’s third wife, to probate George T.
     Edginton’s will. The petition identified five children as heirs to
     George T. Edginton: 1) Mrs. Frank Riefenberg; 2) Mrs. Orin R.
     Swink (Elizabeth Swink); 3) George T. Edginton; 4) Mrs. John K.
     Lambie; and 5) Mrs. R.J. Waters.
            Louise Edginton responded to the petition and filed George
     T. Edginton’s 1913 will and a 1918 codicil for probate. George T.
     Edginton’s will [indicated] a sixth child, Mary N. Freeman. The
     1918 codicil devised to Louise Edginton an undivided interest “in
     all land owned by me in Dickson City borough Pa. and also in all
     other land wish I may die siesed [sic].” Other than this reference,
     there is no other record more particularly describing the land
     devised to Louise Edginton in the will or codicil.
           George T. Edginton’s 1913 will and 1918 codicil devised
     George T. Edginton’s interest in the Edginton Tract to Louise
     Edginton upon his death and not to any of George T. Edginton’s
     children.
           [The parties stipulated that] Louise Edginton died in 1940.
     The parties supplied no record or evidence of any heirs to Louise
     Edginton. There is no record of probate.
           In the 1913 will, George T. Edginton left the rest and residue
     of his estate to all of his children to be divided among them in
     equal shares. The 1918 codicil does not alter this provision.

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     Addressing any suggestion that George T. Edginton’s remaining
     interest in the Edginton Tract passed to his children, there would
     be numerous unknown heirs to that interest. At this juncture, and
     based on the record, it appears that George T. Edginton was
     survived by six children at the time of his death.
           One of George T. Edginton’s children, Elizabeth Swink, died
     in 1953. Frank B. Riefenberg, one of Elizabeth Swink’s nephews,
     was named the executor of her estate. Ms. Swink’s will called for
     her real and personal property to be sold and the proceeds to be
     divided equally to her nieces and nephews in 1/19 shares. The
     adjudication of Ms. Swink’s estate indicates that one of Ms.
     Swink’s nephews predeceased her, and per the will, that nephew’s
     1/19 share was given to Ms. Swink’s grandnephew, Bruce
     Edginton.
           The parties provided no estate records regarding Geroge T.
     Edginton’s five other children. There is also no record of a spouse,
     heir, or family member of George T. Edginton paying property
     taxes on the Edginton Tract until at least 1974 and possibly as late
     as 1984. Between 1921 and 1974, there is no record of any of
     George T. Edginton’s descendants claiming an ownership interest
     in the Edginton Tract.
            On May 31, 1974, and following the 1965 County
     Treasurer’s sale discussed below, Bruce Edginton and his wife,
     Audry Edginton, conveyed any interest they had in the Edginton
     Tract to Frank B. Riefenberg and Irene J. Riefenberg by [a] quit-
     claim deed. This quit-claim deed indicates that George T. Edginton
     died intestate in 1921 and was survived by Louise Edginton and
     Bruce Edginton as his only heirs. [Given the above discussion
     regarding the Estate of George T. Edginton and the Estate of
     Elizabeth Swink,] [t]his quit-claim deed recites an inaccurate
     history regarding George T. Edginton’s heirs[.] There is no deed
     or any other instrument prior to 1974 conveying any interest in
     the Edginton Tract to Bruce Edginton. [N.T.,] 8/25/22, at 201. At
     trial, Mr. Baker testified that he did not do anything to determine
     whether Bruce Edginton held any actual interest to convey title to
     the Edginton Tract. Id. at 38.
           As noted [supra], Frank B. Riefenberg and Anthony A.
     Lawrence obtained a quit-claim deed regarding the Berton E.
     Davis interests in the Edginton Tract in 1980. There is no record
     that Frank B. Riefenberg filed an action to quiet title regarding the
     Edginton Tract at any point.

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           By quit-claim deed dated October 8, 1991, Frank B.
     Riefenberg and Irene Riefenberg conveyed their interests in the
     Edginton Tract to the Frank B. Riefenberg Trust.
            [The parties stipulated that,] [o]n December 30, 2009,
     Phyllis D. Riefenberg and Phyllis D. Riefenberg, Trustee of the
     Frank Riefenberg Trust, executed a quit-claim deed in favor of [the
     Bakers] regarding Frank B. Riefenberg’s interests in the Edginton
     Tract. [The Bakers] paid $7,500 as consideration. [The Bakers]
     then obtained the portion of the Berton E. Davis interest that had
     been previously conveyed to Anthony A. Lawerence and then later
     to [the Dunns] by quit-claim deed on December 20, 2013. [The
     Bakers] paid the Dunns $10,000 as consideration.
           At trial, Mr. Baker testified regarding his due diligence prior
     to investing in the Edginton Tract. Mr. Baker stated that he walked
     on the property, obtained a title search, and spoke to Phyllis
     Riefenberg prior to executing the December 30, 2009, deed. [Id.]
     at 13-17. Mr. Baker testified that he was not aware that the
     Summit-Lackawanna line was located on the property at the time
     of purchase. Id. at 16-17. According to Mr. Baker, Ms. Riefenberg
     later advised Mr. Baker of correspondence from [PPL Electric]
     regarding the existence of the initial transmission line. Id. at 18.
     However, Mr. Baker also acknowledged at trial that he had noticed
     one transmission line while walking the Edginton Tract prior to
     purchase. Id. at 17.
            Mr. Baker testified that, in December of 2009, he hired
     David Durkovic to perform a title search prior to purchase. Id. at
     13-14, 25. Per Mr. Baker, Mr. Durkovic noted no exceptions on
     the title search. Id. As noted above, Mr. Durkovic’s initial title
     search is dated December 15, 2009. Mr. Durkovic testified that
     his 2009 search did not identify any issues in the title to the
     Edginton Tract. [Id.] at 189. However, Mr. Durkovic conceded
     at trial that “[t]here’s always reasonable doubt on a search when
     you have so many [e]states.” Id. at 9, 23.
           Mr. Baker testified that he is a licensed land surveyor. Id.
     at 9, 23. Mr. Baker, however, chose not to survey the property
     at the time of the transaction with Ms. Riefenberg and the
     Riefenberg Trust. Id. at 59, 86-87. Mr. Baker stated he did not
     personally determine that the transmission lines were on his
     property until a survey was completed. Id. at 58. Mr. Baker
     obtained a survey from Guy DeAngelo, P.L.S. and Mr. DeAngelo’s
     survey drawing is dated between February 2014 and May 2017.
     Mr. Baker admitted that if he obtained a survey prior to purchase,

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     the survey would have defined the boundaries of the Edginton
     Tract. [Id.] at 89. Mr. Baker testified that he visually observed
     the Peckville-Stanton line (also called the Summit-Lackawanna
     line) while he was walking on the Edginton Tract prior to purchase.
     Id. at 89-90. Mr. Baker, in his testimony, seemed to agree that
     the towers associated with the Summit-Lackawanna line were
     obvious and big. Id. at 46.
           Mr. DeAngelo did not testify in this matter. Lawrence LaRue,
     a separate surveyor, testified for [the Bakers] based on Mr.
     DeAngelo’s survey. [N.T.,] 8/30/22, at 27, 31. On cross-
     examination, Mr. LaRue testified that once the southeast or
     southwest corner of the Edginton Tract is located, a survey would
     not be necessary to know that a power line crosses the Edginton
     Tract. Id. at 26-27, 30. Mr. LaRue also testified that research
     into recorded documents regarding the Sandy McLean warrant
     and Benjamin McLean warrant boundary, along with walking the
     property, would [have] show[n] that a power line was located on
     the Edginton Tract. Id. at 28-30.
           Mr. Baker also testified that he “had no reason” to have a
     survey done prior to the transaction with Ms. Riefenberg and the
     Riefenberg Trust. [N.T.,] 8/25/22, at 88-89. Despite Mr. Baker
     being a licensed surveyor, [the Bakers] chose not to survey the
     Edginton Tract in 2009. That was the case even after Mr. Baker
     observed the noticeable presence of the Summit-Lackawanna line
     on Bell Mountain. Id. at 90.
            From the testimony, it appears [the Bakers] made an
     investment decision not to survey the Edginton Tract at that time.
     Mr. Baker attempted to downplay this conscious financial decision,
     even when confronted with his deposition testimony at trial. See
     id. at 86-94. At his deposition, Mr. Baker conceded he proceeded
     in the transaction with Ms. Riefenberg without a survey or an
     appraisal, as Ms. Riefenberg was willing to accept $7,500 in
     exchange for a deed to the Edginton Tract. Id. at 88, 92.
           [The trial court determined that] Mr. Baker’s lack of
     credibility in this area [was] reflected in the following exchange
     on cross-examination:
                  Q. And, in fact, you already stipulated that [PPL
           Electric has] exercised rights on that land, since 1970,
           when the first line was built?
                 A. I can’t answer that.

                                    - 11 -
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                  Q. Well, it’s a stipulated fact, so I think we agree
           with it. Would you agree that you stipulated that the
           line was in place since 1970?
                  A. Not on my parcel.
                  Q. Okay. When did they move it to your parcel?
                  A. When we did the survey and then located
           that; when that survey was done by me, then I found
           that it was on my parcel.
                Q. Who lifted up the 140-foot towers and moved
           them onto your parcel after 1970?
                  A. I can’t speak for the prior owners.
                 Q. It’s a simple question. Were these towers,
           physically, on your property since 1970?
                A. After we completed the survey, we
           determined they were. Prior to that, I would tell you,
           no.
     Id. at 58.
            Mr. Baker believed the deed from Phyllis Riefenberg and the
     Frank B. Riefenberg Trust dated December 30, 2009, was a special
     warranty deed and not a quit-claim deed. Id. at 28. [The Bakers]
     also obtained a deed from [the Dunns] for their interest in the
     Edginton Tract in 2013, contrary to any assertions by Mr. Baker
     that the 2009 deed was a special warranty deed. On cross-
     examination of Mr. Baker, [PPL Electric’s counsel] referenced a
     letter sent to Ms. Riefenberg on March 20, 2009, wherein Ms.
     Riefenberg was advised of [PPL Electric’s] plans to construct an
     additional line within the existing right-of-way, nine months
     before the transaction between Ms. Riefenberg and [the Bakers].
     See id. at 46-48.          Mr. Baker acknowledged that any
     representations from Ms. Riefenberg to [the Bakers] about the
     existing transmission line prior to the closing would conflict with
     the letter. Id. at 48. However, [the Bakers] never acted against
     Ms. Riefenberg or the Frank B. Riefenberg Trust. Mr. Baker
     testified that he did not seek recourse against Ms. Riefenberg
     because of her age. See id. at 66-67. [The Bakers] chose to
     pursue claims against [PPL Electric].
           It also must be noted that several years transpired between
     [the Bakers’] transaction with Ms. Riefenberg and the Frank B.
     Riefenberg Trust and the litigation against [Appellees]. On June
     8, 2010, [PPL Electric] hand delivered a letter to [the Bakers]

                                     - 12 -
J-A27040-23

     advising them that [PPL Electric] believed it enjoyed a valid right-
     of-way across the Edginton Tract and would continue to exercise
     their rights. Id. at 55-56; [N.T.,] 8/26/22, at 90-92. Mr. Baker
     acknowledged the contents of this letter in his testimony. [N.T.,]
     8/25/22, at 55-57. Additionally, [the Bakers] and [PPL Electric’s]
     representatives interacted and had at least one meeting in 2010
     regarding many of the same factual and legal issues raised at
     trial[.] Id. at 54-57.
            Mr. Baker also admitted that he was aware that [PPL
     Electric] was moving forward with construction on the Edginton
     Tract in 2012 to build the second transmission line as part of the
     Susquehanna-Roseland project. Id. at 60-61. Mr. Baker testified
     that he noticed tree clearing in the Edginton Tract in 2012 by [PPL
     Electric] or their agents, which he acknowledged was part of the
     construction process. [N.T.,] 8/30/22, at 34-35, 37. Mr. Baker
     testified that he thought [PPL Electric] “had a legitimate easement
     across the parcel” at that time. Id. at 35, 37. Road construction
     then began around Labor Day in 2013, according to Mr. Baker.
     Id. at 35. However, Mr. Baker also testified that he had never
     given [PPL Electric] permission to be on the Edginton Tract.
     [N.T.,] 8/25/22, at 20. [The trial court determined that] Mr.
     Baker’s testimony in these areas of examination was not credible.
           [The trial court further determined] Mr. Baker was…not
     credible in his testimony about other lawsuits. [PPL Electric’s
     counsel] referenced litigation between [the Bakers] and Wegmans
     Food Markets over an easement for access to the Edginton Tract
     during Mr. Baker’s cross-examination. Mr. Baker denied that he
     was sued by Wegmans regarding an easement claimed by [the
     Bakers] on Wegmans’ property. Id. at 107-08. Mr. Baker testified
     that an easement to access the Edginton Tract was negotiated
     through a different property owner. Id. Although Mr. Baker
     denied being sued by Wegmans, he indicated that the litigation
     with Wegmans settled upon negotiations with a different property
     owner. Id.
           Finally, [the trial court found that] Mr. Baker’s testimony in
     regard to not suing Ms. Riefenberg or the Riefenberg Trust also
     advanced [PPL Electric’s counsel’s] arguments that [the Bakers]
     calculated and timed their challenge to [PPL Electric’s] right-of-
     way interests on the Edginton Tract in the pursuit of money
     damages following construction of the second transmission line.
     Id. at 64-66.

                                    - 13 -
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             Against the backdrop of the above discussion, the [trial
       court found that] the other evidence and testimony at trial
       established that Lackawanna County maintains outstanding rights
       and interests in the Edginton Tract.
             Returning to the estate histories detailed above, Verna
       Davis died in 1938, and Louise Edginton died in 1940. Verna
       Davis’s estate did not list the Edginton Tract as an asset. No
       estate records were offered regarding Louise Edginton. Records
       from the Lackawanna County Recorder of Deeds reflect a gap in
       [the Bakers’] chain of title between 1909 and 1974. Real estate
       taxes on the Edginton Tract were unpaid for an unknown period
       of time prior to 1965.
             Lackawanna County Treasurer’s Deed Book Entries confirm
       that Lackawanna County took action against the Edginton Tract
       due to the non-payment of taxes in 1965 as follows:
              (a)    A tax sale occurred on August 27, 1965;
              (b)    A confirmation nisi [was] issued on October 11, 1965;
              (c)    A confirmation absolute [was] issued on December
                     21, 1965; and
              (d)    The County Treasurer then acknowledged a Deed to
                     the County Commissioners for the Edginton Tract and
                     other parcels exposed to the Treasurer’s Sale.
        See [Joint] Exh. 19; [Joint Stipulation of Facts (“Jt. Stip.”)] at ¶¶
       44-45, 48-49.[3]
              Lackawanna County has apparently advised the parties that
       it no longer has or can locate a complete set of records pertaining
       to the Edginton Tract, the 1965 County Treasurer’s sale, or the
       subsequent deed to the Commissioners of Lackawanna County
       other than the recorded Lackawanna County Treasurer’s Deed
       book entries. See Jt. Stip. at ¶ 53[.]

____________________________________________

3 The parties filed a joint stipulation of facts with the trial court on August 23,

2022. The trial court noted that, despite the stipulations set forth supra, Mr.
Durkovic testified he did not find records of the 1965 Treasurer’s sale in his
title search. Trial Court Opinion, filed 12/14/22, at 19 n.5 (citing N.T.,
8/25/22, at 19). Mr. Durkovic conceded that PPL Electric was able to
determine that Lackawanna County claimed ownership of the property in
1969, but he was unable to locate these records during his 2009 title search.
Id. (citing N.T., 8/25/22, at 203).

                                          - 14 -
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            Lackawanna County is not a named party to this action. It
     appears that the parties obtained documents from Lackawanna
     County through informal requests or because Lackawanna County
     makes records available to title searchers and the general public.
     See PPL [Electric] Exh. 8 ([a letter] to PPL [Electric] from Mary F.
     Rinaldi, Lackawanna County Clerk of Judicial Records). [The trial
     court finds] the absence of Lackawanna County from this action
     complicates any reconstruction of the events from time-frames
     critical to [the trial court’s] analysis.
            At the heart of [the Bakers’] action is a challenge to the
     validity of the 1965 sale by the Lackawanna County Treasurer.
     The December 21, 1965, acknowledgement of deed to the
     Lackawanna County Commissioners describes the Edginton Tract
     as “Unknown Owner[,] Bell Mt. Edington Tr.[,] 346.42.” See Jt.
     Stip. at ¶ 53; [Joint] Exh. 19[.] The description denotes the
     property as “Edington Tr.” [and] not “Edginton Tr.” Id. The same
     acknowledgement describes the Edginton Tract as being in Ward
     Three of Dickson City, but the Edginton Tract is actually located in
     Ward One of Dickson City and in Scott Township. [Bakers] Exh.
     12; PPL [Electric] Exh. 19; [N.T.,] 8/25/22, at 137-38[.] The
     acknowledgement references that the Lackawanna County
     Treasurer acknowledged the deed to the Lackawanna County
     Commissioners in open court before the Lackawanna County Court
     of Common Pleas. See [Joint] Exh. 19.
            Notice of the August 27, 1965, tax sale appeared in The
     Scranton Times on August 6, 1965, August 13, 1965, and August
     20, 1965. [Joint] Exh. 17. Each of the notices refer to the property
     being exposed to sale as “Unknown Owner, Bell Mt. Edington Tr.,
     346.42”. Id. The notices reflect the same discrepancies identified
     above. Id.; [N.T.,] 8/25/22, at 148-50. The notices do not list
     the acreage or reference the block and lot numbers for the
     Edginton Tract. See [N.T.,] 8/25/22, at 136. The notices do not
     identify George T. Edginton, Berton E. Davis, their spouses, or any
     of their heirs. Id. at 132-33, 152[.]
            The notices, which appeared in The Scranton Tribune on
     August 6, 1965, August 13, 1965, and August 20, 1965, do not
     identify any properties in Dickson City being exposed at the
     August 27, 1965, tax sale. [Bakers] Exh. 15; [Joint] Exh. 18;
     [N.T.,] 8/25/22, at 154.
           [The Bakers’] title searcher, Mr. Durkovic, testified that he
     could not locate a deed from the Lackawanna County Treasurer to

                                    - 15 -
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     the Lackawanna County Commissioners. [N.T.,] 8/25/22, at 140-
     41.
           [The trial court found] there was no evidence presented by
     [the Bakers] that the property was redeemed following the 1965
     County Treasurer’s sale. [PPL Electric’s] title searcher, Mr.
     Fogarty, opined that there was no redemption at that time in his
     review of the Lackawanna County Treasurer’s deed book. [N.T.,]
     8/30/22, at 74-77. Mr. Fogarty testified that he reviewed this
     evidence with [the Bakers] and [Mr. Durkovic] in a meeting prior
     to April 19, 2010. Id. at 77-78, 81. Mr. Fogarty testified that, in
     his experience, the above situation reflected “[q]uite a mess, but
     not a unique thing.” [Id.] at 78, 80-81.
           Following the acknowledgement of deed to the Lackawanna
     County Commissioners in 1965, and for reasons that [could not]
     be discerned [by the trial court] without speculation due to
     Lackawanna County’s absence from the litigation, the Lackawanna
     County Tax Claim Bureau sought to collect property taxes from
     Frank and Irene Riefenberg for the Edginton Tract beginning in
     1974.
            After the conveyance from Bruce Riefenberg and Audrey
     Riefenberg by [a] quit-claim deed to Frank and Irene Riefenberg
     on May 31, 1974, tax claim docket entries show that Frank and
     Irene Riefenberg failed to pay taxes on the Edginton Tract, leading
     to a tax sale on December 10, 1975. Jt. Stip. at ¶ 51; [Joint] Exh.
     20. However, Frank and Irene Riefenberg redeemed the property
     on October 1, 1984, nine years later. Jt. Stip. at ¶ 52; [Joint]
     Exh. 20. In 1980, and during the interim, Frank B. Riefenberg
     and Anthony A. Lawrence obtained a quit-claim deed regarding
     the Berton E. Davis interest in the Edginton Tract.
           [PPL Electric’s] title searcher, Charles Fogarty, offered [this]
     explanation:
                 Q. My question is, why would the County expose
           the property to [a] tax sale noting Frank and Irene
           Riefenberg as owners if, in fact, the County had title
           to the property by virtue of the 1965 sale?
                A. Because Riefenberg came in and claimed it,
           and [they] star[ed] taxing him for it. The County
           doesn’t pay taxes. Can’t go for tax sale from the
           County. He came in [during] ’74, saying he owned it
           and became assessed for it.

                                    - 16 -
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           I don’t know whether the assessment was for full title,
           part title, good title. I don’t know. But he failed to
           pay those taxes that he came in and became assessed
           for. It went through standard course of a tax sale.
                 Q. So, as of December 10, 1975, you would
           agree that the County Tax Assessment Office
           recognized Frank and Irene Riefenberg as the owners
           of the property?
                 A. As one of the owners.           They have
           Lackawanna County on that card also and unknown
           carried as owner unknown prior to putting in the card.
           Clear on the card it’s not just him.
           And as he gets partial interest, the other names are
           put on there, they don’t say what interest those
           people have, what percentage or whatever on the
           card.
     [N.T.,] 8/30/22, at 118-19.
           The real estate appraisal study card maintained by the
     Lackawanna County Assessor’s Office identifies the location as
     “Edginton Tr. Bell Mountain” and features various typed notations,
     sections where notations were whited out or crossed out, and
     handwriting. [Bakers] Exh. 12; PPL [Electric] Exh. 19. The real
     estate appraisal study card is initially dated May 23, 1974. Id.
     One typed notation indicates, “1974 carried out as unknown
     owner.” Id. Another provides, “[r]evision int. to T.C.” Id. A third
     typed notation states, “[c]orrect to deed owner.” Id.
           [The Bakers] based their challenge to the 1965 County
     Treasurer’s sale, in part, on another notation that indicates “Out
     of the Sandy McLean wt.” Id. As noted above, the Edginton Tract
     derives from portions of the Benjamin McLean warrant. The
     Sandy McLean warrant is adjacent to the Benjamin McLean
     warrant and borders the Edginton Tract. See [Bakers] Exh. 20[;]
     [N.T.,] 8/30/22, at 28.
           [The Bakers’] title searcher, Mr. Durkovic, was the Chief
     Clerk in the Lackawanna County Assessor’s Office from January
     1976 to May 1979. [N.T.,] 8/25/22, at 112. Mr. Durkovic testified
     that when he worked in the Assessor’s Office, it “was in horrible
     disarray.” Id. at 130. Mr. Durkovic opined with regard to the
     Edginton Tract that “[t]he Assessment Office had a problem with
     the location. The Ward it was in. The owner of it with the other
     tax sale.” Id. at 179. Mr. Durkovic, however, could not locate any

                                   - 17 -
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     deed from the Lackawanna County Commissioners to Frank and
     Irene Riefenberg. Id. at 119, 140. There was no other evidence
     presented reflecting a private sale by Lackawanna County of the
     Lackawanna County Tax Claim Bureau to Frank and Irene
     Riefenberg.
           Furthermore, per Mr. Baker’s own testimony, [the Bakers]
     acknowledge that they never initiated a quiet title action in the
     Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas regarding the
     Edginton Tract. [Id.] at 82.
           Approximately four years after the Lackawanna County
     Treasurer acknowledged a deed to the Edginton Tract to the
     Lackawanna County Commissioners, the Lackawanna County
     Commissioners executed the ROW Agreement with [PPL Electric]
     on June 12, 19696. Jt. Stip. at ¶ 54, [Joint] Exh. 21. The ROW
     Agreement was recorded with the Lackawanna County Recorder
     of Deeds Office[.] Id. The ROW Agreement was additionally filed
     with the Pennsylvania Public Utilities Commission in March of
     1970. Jt. Stip. at ¶ 55; [Joint] Exh. 21.
     6 Despite the parties’ stipulation, it must be noted that Mr. Durkovic
     testified he did not find the 1969 ROW Agreement in his 2009 title search
     because the Treasurer’s Sale and acknowledgement of deed was
     indexed against an unknown owner. [N.T.,] 8/25/22, at 120, 156-57.
     Mr. Durkovic conceded that he was aware from oil and gas leases at the
     time of his search that [PPL Electric] had an easement to the south of
     the Edginton Tract and a fee interest in property to the southwest of the
     Edginton Tract that bisected lands of Penn Anthracite Collieries the same
     width of the right-of-way on the Edginton Tract in a long straight line.
     [N.T.,] 8/26/22, at 6-8, 24. Mr. Fogarty also testified that, in 2009, he
     was able to identify [PPL Electric’s] right-of-way on GIS mapping
     available from Lackawanna County. [N.T.,] 8/30/22, at 66-67, 87-88.

          The ROW Agreement granted [PPL                 Electric] and its
     successors, assigns, and lessees:
           […] the right to construct, operate and maintain, and
           from time to time to reconstruct its electric lines,
           including such poles, towers, cables, and wires above
           and under the surface of the ground, fixtures and
           apparatus as may be from time to time necessary for
           the convenient transaction of the business of [PPL
           Electric], its successors, assigns and lessees upon,
           across, over, under and along the strip of land 325
           feet in width as shown in red on plan hereto attached
           and made part hereof, which the COUNTY OF

                                      - 18 -
J-A27040-23

            LACKAWANNA now owns or in which it has an
            interest, situate in the Borough of Dickson City,
            Lackawanna County, Pennsylvania, […]; including the
            right of ingress and egress to and from said lines at
            all times for any of the purposes aforesaid, […] and
            also the right to cut down, trim, remove, and to keep
            cut down and trimmed by mechanical means or
            otherwise, any and all trees, brush, or other
            undergrowth on said strip of land or adjoining the
            same which in the judgment of [PPL Electric], its
            successors, assigns or lessees, may at any time
            interfere with the construction, reconstruction,
            maintenance, or operation of said lines […]
      Joint Exh. 21 (emphasis added).
             The ROW Agreement also specifically contemplates [PPL
      Electric’s] future ability “to construct, operate and maintain, and
      from time to time to reconstruct additional poles, towers, wires,
      cables, fixtures and apparatus upon, across, over, under or along
      the said strip of land.” Id.
            The ROW Agreement indicates that Lackawanna County and
      [PPL Electric] understood that there was no representation or
      warranty of title and that the ROW Agreement was made “subject
      to the rights of redemption, if any, that may now or hereinafter
      remain in any former owner or other person interested in said
      premises.” Id. Further, the ROW Agreement was made by
      Lackawanna County “free and clear of any and all tax liens which
      it may hold against” the property. Id.
             The recorded plan drawing attached to the ROW Agreement
      depicts two transmission lines: 1) the Peckville-Stanton line, the
      former name of the Summit-Lackawanna line, and 2) a future line.
      Id. The plan drawing appended to the ROW Agreement depicts a
      right-of-way over “Property of County of Lackawanna.” Id. Jt.
      Stip. at ¶ 56. The recorded plan drawing depicts a 325’ wide right-
      of-way and it also depicts an easement distance length of 3,280
      feet from property line to property line in a generally east/west
      direction. Jt. Stip. at ¶ 57.

Trial Court Opinion, filed 12/14/22, at 1-25 (some citations to record omitted)

(footnotes omitted) (footnotes added) (bold in original).

                                    - 19 -
J-A27040-23

      At the conclusion of the non-jury trial, the trial court filed an order and

opinion on December 14, 2022. Specifically, the trial court ordered that Count

1 (declaratory judgment) of the Bakers’ amended complaint was dismissed for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and the trial court entered a verdict in favor

of Appellees on all remaining counts of the Bakers’ amended complaint.

      On December 22, 2022, the Bakers filed a timely post-trial motion, and

the trial court filed an order on March 3, 2023, which denied the Bakers’ post-

trial motion in its entirety. On March 6, 2023, the Bakers filed a praecipe for

the entry of judgment in favor of Appellees and against the Bakers. On March

30, 2023, the Bakers filed a notice of appeal, and all Pa.R.A.P. 1925

requirements have been met.

      On appeal, the Bakers sets forth the following issues in their “Statement

of the Questions Involved” (verbatim):

      A. Did the trial court err in dismissing Mr. & Mrs. Baker’s claim for
         declaratory relief for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and/or
         otherwise concluding that the County of Lackawanna was an
         indispensable party?
      B. Did the trial court err in rejecting Mr. & Mrs. Baker’s claims for
         unjust enrichment, conversion, trespass to land, and trespass
         to personal property and/or in concluding that the interests of
         Mr. & Mrs. Baker were not superior to the pre-existing rights
         held by PPL?
      C. Did the trial court improperly conclude that a sketch attached
         to the purported Easement Agreement benefitting PPL was
         sufficient despite the uncontroverted evidence that the length
         of the easement area depicted therein was “short” by 394.29
         feet and/or in concluding that the purported Easement was
         “ambiguous”?

The Bakers’ Brief at 5.

                                      - 20 -
J-A27040-23

      In their first issue, as to their claim for declaratory judgment, the Bakers

contend the trial court erred in concluding that Lackawanna County was an

indispensable party to the instant litigation such that the Bakers’ failure to join

Lackawanna County resulted in the trial court lacking subject matter

jurisdiction. Specifically, the Bakers contend the following portion of the trial

court’s analysis is not supported by substantial evidence and constitutes an

error of law:

            The evidence from trial in this matter indicates that
      Lackawanna County has continued ownership rights and interests
      in the Edginton Tract based on the 1965 County Treasurer’s sale.
      [The Bakers] did not produce any evidence that Lackawanna
      County’s ownership interests in the Edginton Tract were ever sold,
      transferred, or otherwise extinguished by subsequent events….

The Bakers’ Brief at 20 (quoting Trial Court Opinion, filed 12/14/22, at 28).

      In this vein, the Bakers aver there is insufficient evidence to sustain the

trial court’s finding that Lackawanna County obtained an interest in the

Edginton Tract following the 1965 Treasurer’s tax sale.         For example, the

Bakers contend notice of the 1965 tax sale was not properly advertised and

included incorrect descriptions of the property. Thus, the Bakers aver the

1965 Treasurer’s sale was, as a matter of law, void ab initio, and, therefore,

Lackawanna County did not obtain an interest in the Edginton Tract.

Consequently, the Bakers aver the Lackawanna County Commissioners did not

have the authority to grant an easement or other interest to PPL Electric.

      Further, in support of their contention, the Bakers aver the unrefuted

evidence establishes that Lackawanna County conducted a second tax sale on

                                      - 21 -
J-A27040-23

the Edginton Tract in 1975, and they reason that, since “Lackawanna County

would not have conducted a second sale in 1975 had it held title or any other

interest in the subject premises[,]” the trial court erred in holding Lackawanna

County acquired an interest during the 1965 tax sale. The Bakers’ Brief at 25.

      Moreover, the Bakers aver the evidence reveals the Edginton Tract was

redeemed “in 1984 and treated accordingly by Lackawanna County.” Id. at

23. In support thereof, the Bakers aver the unrefuted evidence establishes

that a notation on the Tax Claim Docket indicates the Edginton Tract was

redeemed on October 1, 1984, per the Lackawanna County Tax Claim Bureau

Director, Thomas Harrison. See id.

      Preliminarily, we note:

            Our standard of review in a declaratory judgment action is
      limited to determining whether the trial court clearly abused its
      discretion or committed an error of law. We may not substitute
      our judgment for that of the trial court if the court’s determination
      is supported by the evidence.
            Additionally, [w]e will review the decision of the lower court
      as we would a decree in equity and set aside the factual
      conclusions of that court only where they are not supported by
      adequate evidence. The application of the law, however, is always
      subject to our review.

Erie Ins. Group v. Catania, 95 A.3d 320, 322 (Pa.Super. 2014) (citations

omitted).

      This Court has held the following:

            Under Pennsylvania law, the failure to join an indispensable
      party implicates the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction.
      “Failure to join an indispensable party goes absolutely to the
      court’s jurisdiction and the issue should be raised sua sponte.”

                                     - 22 -
J-A27040-23

     Barren v. Dubas, 441 A.2d 1315, 1316 (Pa.Super. 1982)
     (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). This requirement
     is reflected in our Rules of Civil Procedure.
           Rule 1032. Waiver of Defenses. Exceptions.
           Suggestion    of  Lack   of   Subject  Matter
           Jurisdiction or Failure to Join Indispensable
           Party
           (a) A party waives all defenses and objections which
           are not presented either by preliminary objection,
           answer or reply, except a defense which is not
           required to be pleaded under Rule 1030(b), the
           defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief
           can be granted, the defense of failure to join an
           indispensable party, the objection of failure to state a
           legal defense to a claim, the defenses of failure to
           exercise or exhaust a statutory remedy and an
           adequate remedy at law and any other nonwaivable
           defense or objection.
                                     ***
           (b) Whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties
           or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the
           subject matter or that there has been a failure to join
           an indispensable party, the court shall order that the
           action be transferred to a court of the Commonwealth
           which has jurisdiction or that the indispensable party
           be joined, but if that is not possible, then it shall
           dismiss the action.
     Pa.R.C.P. 1032[.] See id. at 2227(a) (stating, “[p]ersons having
     only a joint interest in the subject matter of an action must be
     joined on the same side as plaintiffs or defendants[ ]”). Whether
     a court has subject matter jurisdiction presents a question of law,
     making our standard of review de novo and the scope of our
     review plenary. Mazur v. Trinity Area Sch. Dist., 599 Pa. 232,
     961 A.2d 96, 101 (2008).
           “[A] party is indispensable ‘when his or her rights are so
     connected with the claims of the litigants that no decree can be
     made without impairing those rights.’” City of Phila. v.
     Commonwealth, 575 Pa. 542, 838 A.2d 566, 581 (2003),
     quoting Sprague v. Casey, 520 Pa. 38, 550 A.2d 184, 189
     (1988). If no redress is sought against a party, and its rights
     would not be prejudiced by any decision in the case, it is not
     indispensable with respect to the litigation. We have consistently

                                    - 23 -
J-A27040-23

      held that a trial court must weigh the following considerations in
      determining if a party is indispensable to a particular litigation.
             1. Do absent parties have a right or an interest related
             to the claim?
             2. If so, what is the nature of that right or interest?
             3. Is that right or interest essential to the merits of
             the issue?
             4. Can justice be afforded without violating the due
             process rights of absent parties?
      Martin v. Rite Aid of Pa., Inc., 80 A.3d 813, 814 (Pa.Super.
      2013)[.] “In determining whether a party is indispensable, the
      basic inquiry remains ‘whether justice can be done in the absence
      of a third party.’” Pa. State Educ. Ass'n v. Commonwealth,
      616 Pa. 491, 50 A.3d 1263, 1277 (2012)[.]
            This Court has held that in a quiet title action, all parties
      who claimed title to the property at issue must be joined as
      indispensable parties. Hartzfeld v. Green Glen Corp., 552 A.2d
      306, 310 (Pa.Super. 1989).

Orman v. Mortgage, I.T., 118 A.3d 403, 406-07 (Pa.Super. 2015) (some

citations, quotation marks, and quotations omitted). See N. Forests II, Inc.

v. Keta Realty Co., 130 A.3d 19, 30 (Pa.Super. 2015) (“The law requiring

joinder of indispensable parties is strict and non-waivable. No matter how

exhaustive or diligent the plaintiff’s title search may be, its failure to join an

indispensable party deprives the court of jurisdiction.”) (footnote and citation

omitted)).

      Further,

            [We have held that] the fee owner of land is an
      indispensable party to litigation over the right to use and enjoy
      his property. We have explained that…there can be no question
      that the fee simple owner of [a] servient tenement is an
      indispensable party. The right to the use and enjoyment of his
      property will be adversely affected by any litigation involving the

                                      - 24 -
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      easement and, therefore, he must be joined. The failure to do so
      deprives the court of jurisdiction.
             Similarly, when there is a dispute as to the existence of an
      easement, all owners of servient tenements have a material
      interest in the controversy and should be joined as defendants,
      even though such an owner may have had no part in the
      interference with, or obstruction of, the alleged easement. [See]
      Tigue v. Basalyga, [451 Pa. 436, 304 A.2d 119 (1973)] (in suit
      to set aside deed allegedly obtained through fraud, deceased’s
      personal representative was indispensable party); Kelley v.
      Kelley, 382 Pa. 537, 115 A.2d 202 (1955) (when adjudicating
      interests in coal lands, all co-tenants are indispensable parties)[.]

Strasburg Scooters, LLC v. Strasburg Rail Road, Inc., 210 A.3d 1064,

1070 (Pa.Super. 2019) (some citations, quotation marks, and quotations

omitted).

      Here, in addressing the Bakers’ issue, the trial court initially indicated

the following:

             This matter presents complex issues involving real property
      and tax sales that occurred several decades ago. In the late
      1960s, Lackawanna County represented to [PPL Electric] that it
      owned or had an interest in the Edginton Tract when the ROW
      Agreement was executed. [PPL Electric] then over time exercised
      the rights it claims were afforded to it through the ROW
      Agreement. In seeking a declaration that [PPL Electric] has no
      rights over the Edginton Tract, [the Bakers] raise questions
      regarding the validity of the tax sale conducted by the
      Lackawanna County Treasurer in 1965.              Based on the
      documentation in the trial record, the Edginton Tract was not
      redeemed by any party in [the Bakers’] chain of title after the
      Lackawanna County Treasurer acknowledged a deed to the
      Lackawanna County Commissioners in 1965. There is also no
      documentation of a subsequent private sale. For reasons that
      were unclear at the time of trial, the Lackawanna County Tax
      Claim Bureau conducted a subsequent tax sale on the Edginton
      Tract in 1975 after Frank and Irene Riefenberg claimed an interest
      in the property. The property was redeemed from the 1975 tax
      sale in 1984 by the Riefenbergs.

                                     - 25 -
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Trial Court Opinion, filed 12/14/22, at 2-3.

      Additionally, the trial court relevantly indicated:

            [The Bakers’] first cause of action against [PPL Electric] is
      for declaratory judgment. [The Bakers] seek declarations that
      [PPL Electric] does not have the right to use the Edginton Tract
      for any purpose whatsoever. [The Bakers] also seek a declaration
      that [PPL Electric] does not have a right-of-way over, on, or across
      the Edginton Tract….
             All of [PPL Electric’s] interests in the Edginton Tract derive
      from the ROW Agreement with Lackawanna County, which
      asserted ownership rights in the property following the 1965
      County Treasurer’s sale.         [The Bakers’] amended complaint
      challenges Lackawanna County’s ownership rights to the Edginton
      Tract, yet Lackawanna County was never sued or joined as a party
      in this litigation. [The Bakers] chose not to bring an action to
      quiet title against Lackawanna County or attempt to have the
      1965 County Treasurer’s sale set aside. In making the findings of
      fact above, [the trial] court is mindful of the fact that Lackawanna
      County was not properly named as a party to the declaratory
      judgment action and that [the Bakers], in seeking redress against
      [Appellees], are also seeking redress against Lackawanna County.
                                   ***
            The requirement under [42 Pa.C.S.A. §] 7540(a) “that all
      who have an interest in the declaration be made parties to the
      action is mandatory.” HYK Const. Co. v. Smithfield Twp., 8
      A.3d 1009, 1015 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010)[.] Section 7540(a)
      “constitutes a jurisdictional requirement with respect to joinder of
      indispensable parties.”
                                   ***
            The evidence from trial in this matter indicates that
      Lackawanna County has continued ownership rights and interests
      in the Edginton Tract based on the 1965 County Treasurer’s sale.
      [The Bakers] did not produce any evidence that Lackawanna
      County’s ownership interests in the Edginton Tract were ever sold,
      transferred, or otherwise extinguished by subsequent events. The
      Riefenbergs’ ownership claims to the Edginton Tract in [the
      Bakers’] chain-of-title came about from the 1974 quit-claim deed
      from Bruce Edginton and then from the 1980 quit-claim deed from
      the Berton E. Davis heirs, not from Lackawanna County. There is

                                     - 26 -
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     also no evidence of redemption after the 1965 County Treasurer’s
     sale. Significantly, there was no evidence produced that there
     was any private sale of the Edginton Tract by the Lackawanna
     County Tax Claim Bureau to the Riefenbergs following the 1965
     tax sale.
            Moreover, the record regarding the actions by the
     Lackawanna County Tax Claim Bureau in the 1970s and 1980s
     was not developed at trial. From the record, the [trial] court
     cannot piece together the Lackawanna County Tax Claim Bureau’s
     interactions with Frank and Irene Riefenberg after the Riefenbergs
     claimed an interest in the Edginton Tract. The only conclusion the
     [trial] court can reach is that Lackawanna County has continuing
     rights and interests in the Edginton Tract related to [the Bakers’]
     claims for declaratory relief against [PPL Electric].
             Inherent in any declaration in favor of [the Bakers] and
     against [PPL Electric] would include findings that: 1) the 1965 tax
     sale by the Lackawanna County Treasurer was void; 2)
     Lackawanna County never enjoyed ownership rights in the
     Edginton Tract; and 3) Lackawanna Couty was without authority
     to grant an easement to [PPL Electric] in 1969. Although a deed
     to Lackawanna County regarding the Edginton Tract has not been
     produced in this litigation, the Lackawanna County Treasurer
     acknowledged a deed in open court to the County Commissioners
     for this tract of land in 1965 as part of the tax sale proceedings.
     The parties [in the instant matter] stipulated to this fact.
     Furthermore, Lackawanna County, with ownership rights to the
     tract, granted an easement to [PPL Electric] in June of 1969, which
     is filed of record in the Recorder of Deeds office and was certified
     and filed with [the] Pennsylvania Public Utilities Commission in
     1970. [Joint] Exh. 21.
           It appears that [the Bakers’] action against [PPL Electric] is
     also an attempt to quiet title against Lackawanna County. For
     example, [the Bakers] proffered Mr. Durkovic, who opined that
     Lackawanna County never owned the Edginton Tract. [N.T.,]
     8/25/22, at 159-60, 175. Mr. Durkovic believes [the Bakers] have
     “a very concise record of […] ownership of the property.” Id. at
     180; [N.T.,] 8/26/22, at 43 ([Mr. Durkovic] opining that [the
     Bakers] have a “very large interest in the property, percentage
     wise, at the very least.”). However, Mr. Durkovic also referenced
     his involvement in other projects on Bell Mountain. [N.T.,]
     8/25/22, at 215. Mr. Durkovic testified that “they’re just a mess
     in every way you could think of. The people [that] think they have
     good [t]itle up there are way wrong.” Id. Although it appears

                                    - 27 -
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     Mr. Durkovic may have been referring to Lackawanna County’s
     title or the title of other property owners on Bell Mountain, the
     same commentary would be reflective of [the Bakers’] claims to
     ownership of the Edginton Tract.
            From the above testimony, [the Bakers’] ownership
     interests in the Edginton Tract are competing with Lackawanna
     County’s outstanding ownership interests and [PPL Electric’s]
     claims to easement rights from the ROW Agreement with
     Lackawanna County. Thus, Lackawanna County’s rights are so
     interconnected with [the Bakers’] claims that no decree can be
     made against [PPL Electric] without deciding Lackawanna
     County’s current rights in the property. First and foremost, the
     rights of Lackawanna County would be impacted by the res
     judicata or collateral estoppel effects of any declaratory judgment
     in favor of [the Bakers]. Second, [PPL Electric’s] rights under the
     ROW Agreement are not the same property interests that
     Lackawanna County would have, and it cannot be said that [PPL
     Electric] adequately represented Lackawanna County’s interests
     at trial. [PPL Electric] raised some of Lackawanna County’s
     possible defenses, but [PPL Electric] relied on these defenses only
     in support of its right-of-way interests. Lackawanna County, on
     the other hand, would have interests that correlate with absolute
     title.
           At the time of the 1965 Treasurer’s sale, Sections 7 and 8
     of the Act of May 29, 1931, P.L. 280, as amended, 72 P.S. §§
     5971g, 5971h (“County Return Act”), provided for the procedure
     to be followed when a county treasurer sold lands for delinquent
     taxes. See Appeal of City of Erie, 46 A.2d 592 (Pa.Super. 1946)
     (en banc); Fidei v. Underwood, 435 A.2d 1275 (Pa.Super.
     1981). In the course of such a sale, Section 10 of the County
     Return Act, required that “[a]ny such property, for which an
     amount sufficient to pay such taxes, interest, and the costs is not
     bid shall be purchased by the county commissioners.” See 72
     P.S. § 5971j; C.A. Hughes & Co. v. Metzger, 491 A.2d 959, 961
     n.1 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1985).
           Furthermore, Section 12 of the County Return Act states:
           If no objection or exceptions [to the sale] are filed […]
           and the sale confirmed absolutely, the validity of the
           assessment of the tax and its return for nonpayment,
           and the validity of the proceedings of the treasurer
           with respect to such sale shall not thereafter be
           inquired into judicially, in equity or by civil

                                    - 28 -
J-A27040-23

           proceedings, by the person or persons in whose name
           such property was sold, his or her or their heirs, or
           his, her or their grantees or assigns, subsequent to
           the date of the assessment of the taxes for which such
           sale was made; and such sale, after the period of
           redemption shall be terminated, shall be deemed to
           pass a good and valid title to the purchaser free from
           any liens or encumbrances whatsoever, except such
           liens as are hereinbefore specifically saved, and in all
           respects as good and effective as if acquired by
           a sheriff’s deed.
     72 P.S. § 5971l (emphasis added).
            “The effect of the provision, ‘in all respects as good and
     effective as if acquired by a sheriff’s deed,’ is that a treasurer’s
     deed can be defeated only by fraud or want of authority to sell,
     and even gross defects or irregularities are cured by the absolute
     confirmation of the sale.” Thompson v. Frazier, 48 A.2d [6], 9
     ([Pa.Super.] 1946).
           Section 16 of the County Return Act provides:
           The right of redemption of lands purchased by the
           county commissioners shall remain in the real owner
           of such lands, or other persons interested, for two
           years after such sale[.]
     72 P.S. § 5971p (emphasis added). See also Thompson, 48 A.2d
     at 9.
           However, as explained in Thompson:
           [U]nder the Act of July 28, 1941, P.L. 535, 72 P.S. §
           6105.1 et seq., [“any person who was or is entitled
           under existing law to redeem such property”] had a
           right to redeem ‘so long as the title thereto remains
           in said political subdivision’[.]
           [U]nder the Act of July 17, 1935, P.L. 1091, § 1, 72
           P.S. § 5879, the commissioners may permit
           redemption ‘so long as the title thereto remains in the
           county.’
     [Thompson,] 48 A.2d at 9; See also 72 P.S. § 6105.1; 72 P.S.
     § 5879.
            Regarding Lackawanna County’s [alleged] inability to enter
     into the ROW Agreement in 1969, under the Act of May 18, 1945,
     P.L. 685, 72 P.S. § 6153.1:

                                    - 29 -
J-A27040-23

           The county commissioners of any county may grant
           rights of way or licenses for rights of way for roads,
           pipelines, electric lines, telephone lines, and telegraph
           lines on and across lands purchased by the county at
           any tax sale and owned by the county after the period
           of redemption provided by law has expired. They shall
           charge for such rights of way and licenses such
           remuneration and damages as they deem the
           conditions and circumstances warrant.
     Id.
           It appears that Lackawanna County complied with the above
     statutes based on [PPL Electric’s] assertion of Lackawanna
     County’s interests.
            However, as [the Bakers] argue, “a tax sale of land is not
     valid unless both the assessment and the conveyance by the
     treasurer sufficiently identify the parcel sold.” Carratelli v.
     Castrodale, 137 A.2d 805, 807 ([Pa.Super.] 1958). As explained
     in Sarous v. Morgan, 90 A.2d 353 ([Pa.Super.] 1952) (en banc),
     relied upon by [the Bakers] in this matter:
           “It is well-settled rule of this Commonwealth that no
           tax sale of land is valid unless both the assessment
           and the conveyance by the treasurer contain sufficient
           descriptions to identify and disclose the property
           taxed and sold. The land must be so identified that
           the owner, the collector, and the public can determine
           what property is being assessed or sold.” Boulton v.
           Starck, 369 Pa. 45, 85 A.2d 17, 20 [(1951)].
           ‘Whether an assessment identifying a property by a
           name other than that of the true owner is sufficient
           must necessarily depend upon numerous facts and
           circumstances.    Important     factors  in    such
           determination are the nature of the land conveyed,
           whether rural or urban, and whether there are other
           lands in the immediate vicinity owned by the same
           person.’ Humphrey v. Clark, 359 Pa. 250, 58 A.2d
           836, 839 [(1949)].
           If there be no valid assessment, the tax sale is void,
           and on [sic] interest passes to the county as a result
           thereof. Hunter v. McKlveen, 361 Pa. 479, 65 A.2d
           366 [(1949)].
     [Sarous,] 90 A.2d at 354 (formatting modified).

                                    - 30 -
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           [The Bakers] presented no evidence regarding when
     Lackawanna County’s tax assessment of the Edginton Tract
     occurred prior to 1965, which makes it difficult, if not impossible,
     to determine whether the parcel was sufficiently identified for the
     purposes of the Treasurer’s sale. Fifty-seven years later, much is
     unresolved from the trial record.
            For example, focusing on the “Edington Tr. Bell Mountain”
     notation in the advertisements and Treasurer’s Deed book, the
     facts indicate that George T. Edginton died in 1921, and Louise
     Edginton died in 1940. George T. Edginton’s 1913 will and 1918
     codicil devised George T. Edginton’s interest in the Edginton Tract
     to Louise Edginton upon his death and not to any of George T.
     Edginton’s children. The parties supplied no record or evidence of
     any heirs to Louise Edginton, and there is no record of probate.
     There is also the matter of Berton E. Davis’s interest in the
     Edginton Tract. Berton E. David died in 1913, and Verna Davis
     died in 1938. The inventory of Verna Davis’s estate did not list
     out any real estate in Dickson City or Scott Township. Records of
     the Edginton descendants and Davis descendants claiming an
     interest in the Edginton Tract were not filed until 1974 and 1980
     respectively. If Lackawanna County’s tax assessment for the
     parcel occurred after 1940 based on the record available to [the
     trial] court, it is understandable why the Edginton Tract was
     assessed as having an unknown owner at the time of the 1965
     sale.
            Regarding the legitimacy of the 1965 County Treasurer’s
     sale, [PPL Electric] also raised the effects of 21 P.S. § 283.2, which
     validated country [sic] treasurer’s deeds issued prior to December
     31, 1965, if there was no proof of service, improper posting, or
     improper filing of the certificate of posting. However, as [the
     Bakers] point out, 21 P.S. § 283.3 “may not be held to provide a
     cure for […] serious procedural defects.” Fidei, 435 A.2d at 1277.
           However, Fidei involved a quiet title action filed by
     purchasers of a property from a county after a tax sale against a
     decedent’s heirs, not a declaratory judgment action against a
     third-party easement holder such as this. In review of Fidei, the
     decedent purchased a tract of land in 1925 and died testate in
     1947, and the residuary clause of the decedent’s will passed the
     property in question to the decedent’s three sons. [Fidei], 435
     A.2d at 1275. Taxes were not paid, and the county treasurer sold
     the property to the county commissioners in the 1950s. [Id. at
     1276.] Notice was sent to the decedent, which was returned
     unclaimed, and no notice was sent to the sons of the decedent.

                                    - 31 -
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       [Id. at 1276-77.] The Superior Court invalidated the tax sale and
       was critical of the county treasurer’s actions and county assessor’s
       diligence in determining ownership prior to the tax sale. [Id. at
       1277 n.4.] Relevant to [the instant] case, the Superior Court also
       passed on the questions of whether the description of the property
       was insufficient in the advertised notices of the sale. Id.
              The [trial] court hesitates to apply Fidei in this declaratory
       judgment action due to serious deficiencies in the exhibits and
       testimony offered [in this case] by [the Bakers] and [PPL Electric]
       and because Lackawanna County is not a party here.[4] The
       parties and their witnesses attempted to explain gaps or
       ambiguities in Lackawanna County’s records at trial, and each side
       attempted to use these gaps or ambiguities in support of their
       positions. However, no witnesses from Lackawanna County were
       called. Moreover, [the trial] court does not believe that all of
       Lackawanna County’s records regarding the Edginton Tract were
       available for consideration based on Lackawanna County’s
       absence from this litigation. The trial record does not even
       indicate whether subpoenas were ever served on Lackawanna
       County.
             Complicating this matter further, the Real Estate Tax Sale
       Law (“RETSL”) was enacted in 1947, creating a tax claim bureau
       in each county and authorizing the bureau to receive and collect
       taxes. The RETSL repealed many of the acts cited by the parties
       “in so far as they appl[ied] to taxing districts coming within the
       provisions of and operating under [the RETSL].” 72 P.S. §
       5860.80l (repealing, inter alia, the Act of March 13, 1815, P.L.
       177; the Act of May 29, 1931, P.L. 280; and the Act of May 29,
       1941, P.L. 280). The RETSL was effective January 1, 1948. [See]
       72 P.S. § 5860.803.
             The trial court [in this matter] contained no reference as to
       when Lackawanna County adopted the RETSL; however, the
       Lackawanna County Treasurer was still selling real estate for
       delinquent taxes in 1965 under the County Return Act. The
       Commonwealth Court aids in relevant history:
              The [Lackawanna] County Commissioners in January
              of 1973 established a new tax collection system by
              resolution adopting the [RETSL].

____________________________________________

4 To the extent the Bakers challenge the trial court’s analysis and application

of Fidei to the instant matter, we find no error.

                                          - 32 -
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           The new system established by the [RETSL] provides
           for the creation of a Tax Claims Bureau to take over
           delinquent tax collection duties from the County
           Commissioners and the County Treasurer.
     Hargreaves v. Mid-Valley Sch. Dist., 396 A.2d 894, 895 ([Pa.
     Cmwlth.] 1979).
          The provisions of the RETSL impact any analysis of the
     Lackawanna County Tax Claim Bureau’s actions in the 1970s and
     1980s. As noted above, many of the foregoing tax sale statutes
     were supplanted by the RETSL.
           The record reflects that Lackawanna County asserted
     ownership rights in the Edginton Tract in 1969 when it entered
     into the ROW Agreement with [PPL Electric] and Lackawanna
     County maintained that interest in 1973 when Lackawanna County
     established its tax claim bureau.
            Pursuant to 72 P.S. § 5860.612-1 of the RETSL, if property
     is put up for public sale and sold to the county commissioners, the
     county “shall take and have an absolute title, free and clear of all
     tax and municipal claims, mortgages, liens and charges and
     estates of whatsoever kind, except ground rents […]” Id.
     Moreover, “[a]ny property purchased at such sale by the county
     may thereafter by the county commissioners be […] (2) used for
     any suitable public purpose by the county.” Id.
           Section 701 of the RETSL addresses tax delinquent
     properties that were acquired by county commissioners at county
     treasurer’s sales prior to the effective date:
           Where the county commissioners, any taxing district
           or trustee for any taxing districts have, prior to the
           time when this act became effective in any taxing
           district, acquired any property at a tax sale or a sale
           on a judgment for a tax claim, unless such property
           or interests shall have been resold or used for a public
           purpose, for which the property might otherwise have
           been acquired, such commissioners, taxing
           district or trustees shall deliver possession of
           such property to the bureau together with all the
           pertinent information, as to when and how it
           was acquired, the taxes for which it was offered
           for sale at the time, the party which purchased
           it, the known mortgages, liens or estates, if any,
           not discharged by such sale, and the taxes which

                                    - 33 -
J-A27040-23

           would have been levied against such property
           had it not been purchased by the taxing district.
           Thereafter all rights and title to the property, held by
           such taxing district or trustee, shall vest in the county,
           as trustee, for all taxing districts having the power to
           levy taxes against such property, if it were privately
           owned, and the bureau shall become the agent of all
           taxing districts having an interest in the management
           and control of such property with the following powers
           and duties with respect thereto.
     72 P.S. § 5860.70l (formatting modified) (emphasis added).
           By operation of law, the Edginton Tract was turned over to
     the Lackawanna County Tax Claim Bureau in 1973 when the tax
     claim bureau was established, and the bureau acted as a trustee
     for the taxing districts. See Pennsylvania Game Comm’n v.
     Lackawanna Cnty. Tax Claim Bureau, 422 A.2d 1218, 1218
     ([Pa. Cmwlth.] 1980). The RETSL sets forth various duties and
     powers of the bureau as agent. 72 P.S. § 5860.702. Moreover,
     property turned over to the tax claim bureau “shall not be subject
     to redemption[.]” Id.
            During trial, [the Bakers] offered limited records from the
     Lackawanna County Tax Claim Bureau regarding the events of
     1974, 1975, and 1984, including when Frank and Irene Riefenberg
     claimed an interest in the Edginton Tract, when the property was
     later exposed at a tax sale, and when the property was redeemed
     by the Riefenbergs. See [Joint] Exh. 20. After 1973, the Edginton
     Tract could not be redeemed by operation of law under Section
     702. In 1974, pursuant to the RETSL, the Lackawanna County
     Tax Claim Bureau would have been authorized to sell the Edginton
     Tract at a public or private sale to the Riefenbergs. See Petition
     of Tax Claim Bureau, 366 Pa. 404, 77 A.2d 403, 406 (1951)
     (discussing 72 P.S. § 5860.101 et seq., 5860.601 et seq.,
     5860.701 et seq., 5860.702(h)). However, no evidence of such a
     sale was ever presented at trial.
            [The Bakers] proffered Mr. Durkovic, who was the Chief
     Clerk for the Lackawanna County Assessor’s Office in the 1970s.
     Nevertheless, Mr. Durkovic’s testimony regarding Lackawanna
     County’s actions is unable to be given weight in this matter given
     his role as [the Bakers’] expert, his personal interests as [the
     Bakers’] title searcher, and the doubt cast upon the thoroughness
     of his 2009 title search by cross-examination and by Mr. Fogarty’s
     research and testimony. Moreover, Mr. Durkovic did not work in

                                    - 34 -
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     the Lackawanna County Treasurer’s Office, which conducted the
     1965 tax sale nor did he work in the Lackawanna County Tax
     Claim Bureau, which was the trustee of the [subject] property in
     that relevant time frame. Neither Mr. Durkovic, nor Mr. Fogarty
     for that matter, could competently answer questions as to the
     Lackawanna County Tax Claim Bureau’s actions. [The Bakers’]
     presentation of evidence is deficient in this regard as to the status
     of their title to the property.
            Additionally, the real estate appraisal study card from the
     Lackawanna County Assessor’s Office raises numerous questions
     that [the trial] court is unable to resolve, despite the testimony of
     Mr. Durkovic and Mr. Fogarty. Notations indicating “1974 carried
     as unknown owner” and “Revision int. to T.C.” were not resolved.
     [PPL Electric] believes the second notation references a
     reversionary interest to Lackawanna County’s Tax Claim Bureau.
     See [N.T.,] 8/25/22, at 43-44. Mr. Durkovic, however, testified
     that he believes this notation is not a reference to a reversionary
     interest but [is] a “revision to Tax Claim.” Id. at 142, 199-200.
     Mr. Durkovic’s explanation, however, ignores the abbreviation,
     “int.” After weighing Mr. Durkovic’s testimony, the notations on
     the real estate appraisal study card from the Lackawanna County
     Assessor’s Office ultimately [lead] to the conclusion that
     Lackawanna County maintains rights in the Edginton Tract and is
     an indispensable party. See Pocono Pines Corp. v.
     Pennsylvania Game Comm’n, 464 Pa. 17, 345 A.2d 709, 711
     (1975) (dismissing an action to quiet title with the Board of
     Property for lack of jurisdiction for failure to join an indispensable
     party where the United States of America retained a reversionary
     interest in the property).
           In light of the above, [the trial] court cannot entertain [the
     Bakers’] requests for declaratory relief without Lackawanna
     County as a party. Where a jurisdictional defect exists with regard
     to Section 7540(a) of the Declaratory Judgment Act, dismissal is
     appropriate. See Pilchesky [v. Doherty], 941 A.2d [95], 101
     ([Pa. Cmwlth. 2008]) (citations omitted)[.] See also Mains v.
     Fulton, 423 Pa. 520, 224 A.2d 195, 196 (1966) (holding that a
     declaratory judgment action could not proceed when all property
     owners were not joined in a dispute over the location of a right-
     of-way for transmission lines in a subdivision because other lot
     owners with an interest in the litigation were not named).

                                    - 35 -
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Trial Court Opinion, filed 12/14/22, at 25-39 (some citations and quotations

omitted) (bold in original) (footnote added).

      We find no abuse of discretion or error of law. See Erie Ins. Group,

supra. Contrary to the Bakers’ averment, the trial court’s factual conclusions

are supported by adequate evidence. See id. Specifically, as the trial court

found, Lackawanna County obtained an interest in the Edginton Tract as a

result of the 1965 Treasurer’s tax sale. To the extent the Bakers contend the

tax sale was void ab initio due to alleged defects, we note, as the trial court

properly found, a confirmation absolute was issued on December 21, 1965,

and the County Treasurer then acknowledged a Deed to the County

Commissioners for the Edginton Tract. See Thompson, 48 A.2d at 9 (“[A]

treasurer’s deed can be defeated only by fraud or want of authority to sell,

and that even gross defects or irregularities are cured by the absolute

confirmation of the sale.”) (citation omitted)).

      Moreover, as the trial court found, the Bakers, who sought the

declaratory judgment against PPL Electric, offered “limited records” regarding

the events of 1974, 1975, and 1984, including when the Riefenbergs claimed

an interest in the Edginton Tract, when the property was later exposed at a

tax sale, or when the property was redeemed by the Riefenbergs. See Trial

Court Opinion, filed 12/14/22, at 37. As the trial court concluded, because

Lackawanna County was not joined as a party, there were “numerous

questions that the [trial] court was unable to resolve[.]” Id. at 38. Simply

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put, the trial court neither abused its discretion nor committed an error of law

in holding: 1) the absent party (Lackawanna County) had a right or interest

in the Edginton Tract; 2) the nature of the right or interest was material to

the Bakers’ request for declaratory relief (i.e., whether Lackawanna County

had the right to enter into a ROW Agreement with PPL Electric); 3) the right

or interest was essential to the merits of the Bakers’ request for declaratory

relief (whether PPL Electric has a right-of-way over, on, or across the Edginton

Tract); and 4) justice could not be afforded without violating the due process

rights of the absent party. See id. at 28 (quoting Guiser v. Sieber, 237 A.3d

496, 505 (Pa.Super. 2020) (citation omitted)). Accordingly, the trial court

properly found Lackawanna County was an indispensable party to this matter.

See Orman, supra.

      This does not end our inquiry, however, since the Bakers aver that,

assuming, arguendo, Lackawanna County is an indispensable party, the trial

court “should have afforded [the Bakers] the opportunity to join [the County]

in the litigation[.]” The Bakers’ Brief at 34. Specifically, the Bakers contend

that “[g]iven the significant and unquestioned due process issues associated

with the 1965 tax sale, the [trial] court should have allowed a joinder of the

County rather than dismissing the [Bakers’] complaint.” Id. at 35.

      Relevantly, Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1032(b) provides the

following:

      (b) Whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise
      that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter or that there

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      has been a failure to join an indispensable party, the court shall
      order that the action be transferred to a court of the
      Commonwealth which has jurisdiction or that the indispensable
      party be joined, but if that is not possible, then it shall dismiss the
      action.

Pa.R.C.P. 1032(b).

      Moreover, Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 2232 provides the

following:

      (c) At any stage of an action, the court may order the joinder of
      any additional person who could have joined or who could have
      been joined in the action and may stay all proceedings until such
      person has been joined. The court in its discretion may proceed in
      the action although such person has not been made a party if
      jurisdiction over the person cannot be obtained and the person is
      not an indispensable party to the action.

Pa.R.C.P. 2232(c).

      Here, in rejecting the Bakers’ claim, the trial court relevantly indicated

the following:

            While [under some circumstances] the [trial] court can
      order that Lackawanna County be joined, it is “not possible” [in
      this case] for several reasons. First, [the Bakers] pursued
      declaratory relief and other claims against [PPL Electric] instead
      of, or without including, a cause of action to quiet title against
      Lackawanna County.       Rather than attack the 1965 County
      Treasurer’s sale directly by filing a quiet title action against
      Lackawanna County, [the Bakers] chose to collaterally attack the
      tax sale in these proceedings against [PPL Electric].
             Theoretically, Lackawanna County could be joined to [the
      Bakers’] declaratory judgment claim against [PPL Electric];
      however, this would ignore the very purpose of quiet title actions,
      which [the Bakers] deliberately chose not to pursue. An additional
      cause of action to quiet title against Lackawanna County would
      have been the most appropriate venue here given the long,
      convoluted history and questions as to ownership of the Edginton
      Tract.

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           The Pennsylvania Supreme Court promulgated Pennsylvania
     Rule of Civil Procedure 1061 regarding quiet title actions to “unify
     into one single procedure all of the diverse procedures by which
     clouds on title were formerly tried.” Siskos v. Britz, 567 Pa. 689,
     790 A.2d 1000, 1006-07 (2002)[.] An action to quiet title may be
     brought to “determine any right, lien, title or interest in the land
     or determine the validity or discharge of any document, obligation
     or deed affecting any right, lien, title or interest in land[,]” or
     “obtain possession of land sold at a judicial or tax sale.” Pa.R.C.P.
     1061(b)(2), (b)(4).
           As summarized:
           The purpose of a quiet title action is to settle
           competing claims to interests in property or to
           determine right or title or the validity of any deed
           affecting any interest in land. […]
           A quiet title action is the appropriate forum for
           testing the validity of titles obtained at tax sales.
     Cornwall Mountain Invs., L.P. v. Thomas E. Proctor Heirs
     Tr., 158 A.3d 148, 160 (Pa.Super. 2017) (emphasis added)[.]
           If Lackawanna County was ordered to be joined, the [trial]
     court would also have to grant leave for [the Bakers] to alter their
     action to one in quiet title against Lackawanna County, and [the
     Bakers] failed to proceed in this manner.
           Additionally, so much time has elapsed from the 1965
     County Treasurer’s sale that it is appropriate to consider the
     parties’ statute of limitations arguments here. [PPL Electric] takes
     the position that [the Bakers’] action is time-barred to the extent
     that [the Bakers] challenge Lackawanna County’s ownership
     interests in the Edginton Tract.
           First, [the Bakers] proceeded in this matter with a
     declaratory judgment action asserting additional claims addressed
     below, not by way of action to quiet title or a petition to set aside
     the 1965 tax sale as void. Declaratory judgment actions are
     subject to a four-year limitations period under Pennsylvania law.
     Green v. Pennsylvania Prop. & Cas. Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 158
     A.3d 653, 660 (Pa.Super. 2017). The statute of limitations
     commences to run in a declaratory judgment action “when ‘the
     cause of action accrued.’” Selective Way Ins. Co. v. Hosp. Grp.
     Servs. Inc., 119 A.3d 1035, 1048 (Pa.Super. 2015) (en banc)
     (quoting 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5502(a-b)). “A cause of action for a
     declaratory judgment accrues when an actual controversy exists

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     between the parties.” Id. [The Bakers] first obtained a quit-
     claim deed to the Edginton Tract from the Riefenberg Trust in
     December of 2009. The actual controversy between [the Bakers]
     and Lackawanna County existed at that point. Moreover, after
     this transaction, Mr. Fogarty testified credibly that he reviewed
     evidence regarding Lackawanna County’s ownership interests with
     [the Bakers] and Ms. Durkovic in a meeting approximately four
     months later. [N.T.,] 8/30/22, at 77-78, 81-82. As discussed
     above, [the Bakers] filed suit on July 7, 2015, without naming
     Lackawanna County as a party.
            Likewise, “Section 5527(b) of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S.
     § 5527(b), sets forth [that] the statute of limitations applicable to
     an action to set aside a tax sale is six (6) years.” Pfeifer v.
     Westmoreland Cnty. Tax Claim Bureau, 127 A.3d 848, 851
     (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015). “[A] cause of action to set aside a tax sale
     on the basis of deficient notice accrue[s] and the statute of
     limitations be[gins] to run on the date of the tax sale.” Id.
             The purpose of statute of limitations periods is to expedite
     litigation and thus discourage delay and the presentation of stale
     claims, which may greatly prejudice the defense of such claims.
     Gustine Uniontown Assocs., Ltd. v. Anthony Crane Rental,
     Inc., L.P., 577 Pa. 14, 842 A.2d 334 (2004)[.] Furthermore, they
     serve to give prompt notice to defendants that claims are being
     made against them.
           [Here,] [i]n their proposed findings of fact and conclusions
     of law, [the Bakers] argue that the 1965 tax sale can be
     challenged without reference to the six-year statute of limitations.
     However, the cases cited by [the Bakers] in opposition to
     [Appellees’] statute of limitations arguments all involve quiet title
     actions or actions to set aside a tax sale as void, not a declaratory
     judgment action against a third-party holder of purported
     easement rights where an indispensable party was not originally
     pursued. See Cornwall Mountain Invs., L.P., 158 A.3d at 160
     (“Statutes of limitation and repose do not preclude one from
     defending a quiet title action on the basis that a tax sale was
     void, i.e., where there were jurisdictional defects.”) (emphasis
     added))[.]
            A consideration of the above statutes of limitations disfavors
     joinder at this time. Such joinder would occur fifty-seven years
     after the tax sale, eleven years after [the Bakers] first purchased
     an interest in the Edginton Tract, and seven years after [the
     Bakers] filed suit without naming Lackawanna County as a party.

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      Joinder of Lackawanna County at this juncture would also upend
      the proceedings. The pleadings are closed, discovery has been
      conducted, experts have issued reports, and a non-jury trial has
      occurred without Lackawanna County involved in the matter.
      Joinder of Lackawanna County would require this action to start
      anew to the prejudice of [Appellees], who have devoted years of
      resources in defending against [the Bakers’] claims.
             Based on the testimony of Mr. Baker, Mr. Durkovic, and Mr.
      Fogarty, [the] [trial] court also concludes that [the Bakers]
      deliberately chose not to directly transact with or bring suit
      against Lackawanna County, and such inaction is reflective of [the
      Bakers’] calculated investment and litigation strategies regarding
      the Edginton Tract. See [N.T.,] 8/30/22, at 77-78 ([Mr. Fogarty]
      describing a 2010 meeting where [the Bakers] and Mr. Durkovic
      were “surprised” about the Treasurer’s Sale to Lackawanna
      County and an ownership interest in the Dunns, which [the
      Bakers] later purchased in 2013); See also [N.T.,] 8/25/22, at
      47-49, 54, 64-66 ([Mr. Baker] discussing why [the Bakers] did not
      pursue Mr. Riefenberg or the Riefenberg Trust); Id. at 58-60 ([Mr.
      Baker] testifying he believed that the Summit-Lackawanna line
      was “not on my parcel” until a survey was conducted years after
      the transaction with Ms. Riefenberg); Id. at 85-94 ([Mr. Baker
      testifying] regarding [the Bakers’] investment decisions and due
      diligence in the Edginton Tract and the decision to not initially
      obtain a survey prior to purchase); [N.T.,] 8/26/22, at 18-23 ([Mr.
      Durkovic testifying] regarding [the Bakers’] knowledge of the
      Dunns’ ownership interest in 2009 from a title search); Id. at 27-
      28 ([Mr. Durkovic] testifying that he advised the Bakers to
      investigate further regarding the existing transmission line prior
      to [the Bakers] completing the transaction with the Riefenbergs).
            For the above reasons, the [trial] court finds that it is “not
      possible” under Rule 1032(b) to join Lackawanna County in this
      action. Thus, Count 1 of [the Bakers’] amended complaint seeking
      declaratory judgment is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

Trial Court Opinion, filed 12/14/22, at 40-44 (citations omitted) (emphasis in

original).

      We find no abuse of discretion or error of law.        As the trial court

indicated, the Bakers did not seek permission to join Lackawanna County in

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this matter until after the trial and adverse verdict. Given the trial court’s

finding that the Bakers’ failure to join Lackawanna County was their own

strategic decision, and the request was made well after the statute of

limitations had passed, the trial court did not err in this regard. See Enright

v. Kirkendall, 819 A.2d 555, 557 (Pa.Super. 2003) (holding where no

attempt was made to join an indispensable party within the applicable statute

of limitations the complaint was properly dismissed); Hubert v. Greenwald,

743 A.2d 977, 981 (Pa.Super. 1999) (“The statute of limitations begins to run

as soon as the right to institute and maintain a suit arises; lack of knowledge,

mistake or misunderstanding do not toll the running of the statute of

limitations.”) (citation omitted)). Accordingly, since the Bakers failed to join

Lackawanna County, which is an indispensable party, the trial court properly

found it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the declaratory judgment

action.

      In their second issue, the Bakers contend the trial court’s verdict in favor

of Appellees as to the claims for unjust enrichment, conversion, trespass to

land, and trespass to personal property is contrary to the evidence.

Specifically, the Bakers aver there is no evidence supporting the trial court’s

holding that the ROW Agreement between PPL Electric and Lackawanna

County is valid and enforceable. Moreover, in their third issue, the Bakers

contend the trial court erred determining the scope of the easement via use

of a sketch, which was attached to the ROW Agreement.

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      However, as the trial court noted:

            Declaratory relief is cumulative and additional, not in place
      of other forms of relief and an action for declaratory judgment is
      designed to operate with, not instead of, any underlying dispute.
      Bottomer v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 816 A.2d 1172, 1176
      (Pa.Super. 2003)[.]
             [The Bakers] also pursued other claims against [PPL
      Electric] in their Amended Complaint, including causes of action
      for unjust enrichment, conversion, trespass to land, and trespass
      to personal property. The parties invite [the trial] court to
      consider all claims and defenses, [however;] as noted above, [the
      Bakers’] theories of liability flow from a determination that the
      1965 County Treasurer’s sale is void ab initio and that Lackawanna
      County could not convey any right-of-way interest to [PPL Electric]
      over the Edginton Tract.
            Thus, [the trial] court also finds that Lackawanna County is
      an indispensable party to [the Bakers’] remaining claims for the
      same reasons set forth above based on Lackawanna County’s
      continued rights and interests to the Edginton Tract and it is “not
      possible” to join Lackawanna County at this time.

Trial Court Opinion, filed 12/14/22, at 44-45.

      We agree with the trial court’s sound reasoning and decline to address

the Bakers’ remaining issues further. Simply put, Lackawanna County was an

indispensable party to all claims raised by the Bakers, and because of

Lackawanna County’s absence from this matter, the trial court lacked subject

matter jurisdiction. See Orman, supra.

      For all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

      Affirmed.

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Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 02/08/2024

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