Court Opinion

ID: 9902237
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-24 15:06:24.132352+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:48.060062
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                      IN THE OFFICE OF THE
                                                                   CLERK OF SUPREME COURT
                                                                        NOVEMBER 9, 2023
                                                                    STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

                  IN THE SUPREME COURT
                  STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

                                2023 ND 210

State of North Dakota,                                  Plaintiff and Appellee
      v.
Aaron Wayne Anderson,                               Defendant and Appellant

                                No. 20230145

Appeal from the District Court of Cass County, East Central Judicial District,
the Honorable Tristan J. Van de Streek, Judge.

AFFIRMED.

Opinion of the Court by Jensen, Chief Justice.

Joshua J. Traiser, Assistant State’s Attorney, Fargo, ND, for plaintiff and
appellee.

Daniel J. Howell, Devils Lake, ND, for defendant and appellant; submitted on
brief.
                              State v. Anderson
                                No. 20230145

Jensen, Chief Justice.

       Aaron Anderson appeals from a criminal judgment entered following a
jury verdict finding him guilty of terrorizing, simple assault on a police officer,
preventing arrest, solicitation of a minor, and indecent exposure. On appeal,
Anderson argues the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support the
jury’s verdicts for the charges of terrorizing and preventing arrest. We affirm.

                                        I

       The State charged Anderson with terrorizing in violation of N.D.C.C. §
12.1-17-04(1), simple assault on a peace officer in violation of N.D.C.C. § 12.1-
17-01(1)(a), preventing arrest in violation of N.D.C.C. § 12.1-08-02(1),
solicitation of a minor in violation of N.D.C.C. § 12.1-20-05(1), and indecent
exposure in violation of N.D.C.C. § 12.1-20-12.1(1)(b). At trial, the State
provided testimony of two law enforcement officers who responded to a 911 call
of a man making sexual advances to a minor at a local business. The officers
testified that upon their arrival at the business they located a naked Anderson
in the bathroom. Once dressed, they escorted Anderson out of the business,
informed him he was being detained, administered Miranda rights, and sat
him in the back seat of a squad car uncuffed. Officers then proceeded to make
calls to determine if the jail would be able to house Anderson.

       After determining the jail would accept him, officers returned to the
vehicle to effect the arrest and ordered Anderson out of the back seat to secure
him in handcuffs for transport. Upon exiting the vehicle, Anderson was
cooperative and faced the car, placed his hands behind his back, and handcuffs
were secured. Anderson was informed the officers were double-locking the
handcuffs when Anderson reared back and kicked the assisting officer in the
knee. As officers attempted to direct Anderson back into the squad car, he bent
over, stiffened up, and started grabbing portions of the car, making it difficult
to move him. In order to get him into the vehicle, one of the officers went to the
driver-side of the patrol car and grabbed Anderson’s arm pulling him into the

                                        1
back seat. After Anderson was secured, officers transported him to Essentia
Health to be cleared before booking. During transport, Anderson made several
comments to one of the officers to the effect that the officer and his family were
going to die. The comments included the following: that Anderson “was going
to shoot [the officer] one time in the left lung, lower[,]” asking the officer if he
wanted to go to heaven or hell, and indicating Anderson was “going to take a
piece of [the officer’s] skin off” him when he’s still alive. Anderson was later
cleared for custody.

       At the conclusion of the State’s case, Anderson made a N.D.R.Crim.P. 29
motion requesting a judgment of acquittal on all five charges. The district court
denied the motion, finding sufficient evidence to put the charges before the
jury. The jury then returned a verdict convicting Anderson on all five charges.

                                        II

      We review challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence as follows:

      [W]e look only to the evidence and reasonable inferences most
      favorable to the verdict to ascertain if there is substantial evidence
      to warrant the conviction. A conviction rests upon insufficient
      evidence only when, after reviewing the evidence in the light most
      favorable to the prosecution and giving the prosecution the benefit
      of all inferences reasonably to be drawn in its favor, no rational
      fact finder could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
      doubt. In considering a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we do not
      weigh conflicting evidence, or judge the credibility of witnesses.

State v. Hannah, 2016 ND 11, ¶ 7, 873 N.W.2d 668 (quoting State v. Rufus,
2015 ND 212, ¶ 6, 868 N.W.2d 534).

      Anderson was charged with violating N.D.C.C. § 12.1-17-04(1) which
states a person is guilty of a class C felony if, “with intent to place another
human being in fear for that human being’s or another’s safety . . . or in reckless
disregard of the risk of causing such terror, disruption, or inconvenience . . .
[t]hreatens to commit any crime of violence or act dangerous to human life[.]”
To convict under this statute, the State must prove: “(1) the defendant intended
to cause another person to fear for his or another person’s safety or acted with

                                         2
reckless disregard of the risk of causing such fear, and (2) the defendant made
a threat to commit a ‘crime of violence or act dangerous to human life.’” State
v. Brossart, 2015 ND 1, ¶ 19, 858 N.W.2d 275.

      Anderson asserts there was insufficient evidence to sustain a guilty
verdict on the charge of terrorizing because the officer alleged to have been
threatened gave only a “lukewarm confirmation” that he was alarmed by
Anderson’s statements, and the State further failed to show Anderson had the
requisite intent to commit the crime. Anderson argues the testimony supports
this assertion as during the entire process, he was “talking about things that
did not make sense” and was “unable to intelligently communicate.”

      The statute provides the State must show Anderson acted either
intentionally or with reckless disregard. Regardless of whether there may have
not been sufficient evidence to show he acted intentionally, a rational fact
finder could still have found Anderson acted with reckless disregard. Prior to
deliberation, the district court provided the jury with instructions which
included the differing levels of intent. The court instructed the jury that people
engage in reckless conduct:

      [I]f they engage in conduct in conscious and clearly unjustifiable
      disregard of a substantial likelihood of the existence of the relevant
      facts or risks. Such disregard involving a gross deviation from
      acceptable standards of conduct, except that awareness of risk is
      not required when its absence is due to self-induced intoxication.

      The officer who alleged to have been threatened testified Anderson’s odd
behavior and mannerisms were indicative of someone under the influence of
some sort of drug. The other officer also testified these behaviors, such as
erratic movements, seeing and talking about things that aren’t real, and
paranoid behaviors, are recognizable to him as an individual under the
influence of methamphetamine.

      A reasonable jury, after reviewing the provided testimony of Anderson’s
behavior and the signs indicating methamphetamine use, could infer
Anderson’s behaviors were due to self-induced intoxication. As awareness of
the risk is not required if the absence is due to self-induced intoxication, a

                                        3
reasonable jury could find Anderson met the intent requirement of reckless
disregard. Anderson’s assertion there is insufficient evidence to support the
conviction because the State did not prove he acted intentionally is without
merit.

       Additionally, the State provided evidence of both the statements made
and their effect on the officer. When the State asked the threatened officer
what differentiated Anderson’s statements from somebody who is just saying
nonsensical things, the officer testified, “Well, like I said, he’s unstable. I took
it serious[ly] . . . . So yeah, it’s disturbing.” Upon review of the evidence, a
rational jury could find Anderson threatened to commit a crime of violence with
reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror, disruption, or
inconvenience to the threatened officer. We conclude Anderson’s assertion
there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction of terrorizing is
without merit.

                                       III

      Anderson asserts there was insufficient evidence to convict him of the
charge of preventing arrest because, at the time of the resistance, the arrest
had already been completed for the class A misdemeanor offenses of indecent
exposure and solicitation of a minor, and there was no indication a felony had
occurred.

      Anderson was charged with violating N.D.C.C. § 12.1-08-02(1), which
states a person is guilty of a class C felony if:

      [W]ith intent to prevent a public servant from effecting an arrest
      of himself . . . for a class A, B, or C felony, he creates a substantial
      risk of bodily injury to the public servant or to anyone except
      himself, or employs means justifying or requiring substantial force
      to overcome resistance to effecting such an arrest.

      Anderson asserts that because his resistance occurred after the officers
had already placed him under arrest for the two misdemeanors, his actions
could not be resisting arrest. Anderson is correct the officers testified he
cooperated with the arrest process for the misdemeanors. One of the officers

                                         4
testified after Anderson had been placed under arrest for the misdemeanors,
Anderson was asked to get out of the squad car, face the car, and place his
hands behind his back, and handcuffs were secured without issue. After being
informed the handcuffs were about to be double-locked, Anderson committed
the simple assault on a police officer, a class C felony, in violation of N.D.C.C.
§ 12.1-17-01(1)(a). At that time, the officers had to use force to get Anderson
into the squad car.

       We have not previously drawn the bright line requested by Anderson
that preventing arrest does not extend to the entire process of arresting the
defendant. We have, however, in State v. Skarsgard, concluded there was
sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction of preventing arrest under N.D.C.C.
§ 12.1-08-02(1) under almost identical circumstances. 2008 ND 31, ¶ 14, 745
N.W.2d 358. In Skarsgard, the arresting officer testified “the arrest occurred
after he removed Skarsgard from Skarsgard’s vehicle and held Skarsgard at
the hood of the patrol car.” Id. The officer further “testified that while
attempting to place Skarsgard in his patrol car, he had to call for the help of
another police officer because Skarsgard would not climb into the back seat of
the patrol car until both officers used physical force to place him there.” Id. The
statute not only includes preventing the arrest but also includes “effecting such
an arrest.” N.D.C.C. § 12.1-08-02(1). We reject Anderson’s claim the prior
arrest for the two misdemeanors created a bright line, after which he could no
longer be determined by the jury to have engaged in acts constituting the
prevention of his arrest. We conclude there was sufficient evidence to convict
Anderson of the charge of preventing arrest because, at the time of the
resistance, the jury could conclude that Anderson’s actions impeded the
officers’ ability to effectuate his arrest.

                                       IV

       After viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution
and giving the prosecution the benefit of all inferences reasonably to be drawn
in its favor, we find there was sufficient evidence presented for a rational fact
finder to find Anderson guilty of terrorizing in violation of N.D.C.C. § 12.1-17-

                                        5
04(1) and felony preventing arrest in violation of N.D.C.C. § 12.1-08-02(1). We
affirm.

      Jon J. Jensen, C.J.
      Daniel J. Crothers
      Lisa Fair McEvers
      Jerod E. Tufte
      Douglas A. Bahr

                                      6