Court Opinion

ID: 9556107
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-16 06:00:23.820767+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:26.724845
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     ARMANDO SANTIAGO,                               DOCKET NUMBER
                 Appellant,                          DC-4324-20-0796-I-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS                          DATE: August 15, 2023
       AFFAIRS,
                 Agency.

             THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Brian Lawler, Esquire, San Diego, California, for the appellant.

           Keta J. Barnes, Durham, North Carolina, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member

                                       FINAL ORDER

¶1         The agency has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, w hich
     granted in part and denied in part the appellant’s request for corrective action
     under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act
     (USERRA). For the reasons discussed below, we GRANT the agency’s petition

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                        2

     for review, and REVERSE the portion of the initial decision that found the
     appellant was entitled to differential pay under 5 U.S.C. § 5538(a). The initial
     decision is otherwise AFFIRMED.

                     DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
¶2        Generally, an employee making a USERRA claim under 38 U.S.C. § 4311
     must show that (1) he was denied a benefit of employment, and (2) his military
     service was a substantial or motivating factor in the denial of such a benefit.
     Sheehan v. Department of the Navy, 240 F.3d 1009, 1013 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
     However, in a case such as this one, where the benefit in question is available
     only to members of the military, element (2) is redundant, and it is unnecessary
     for the employee to make an additional showing that his military service was a
     substantial or motivating factor. See Adams v. Department of Homeland Security,
     3 F.4th 1375, 1377-78 (Fed. Cir. 2021), certiorari denied, 142 S. Ct. 2835 (2022);
     Butterbaugh v. Department of Justice, 336 F.3d 1332, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
     Thus, the only issue to be decided in this case is whether the appellant was
     entitled to differential pay under 5 U.S.C. § 5538(a) based on his active duty
     service from October 8, 2018, through February 22, 2019.
¶3        Title 5 U.S.C. § 5538(a) provides, in relevant part:
           An employee who is absent from a position of employment with the
           Federal Government in order to perform active duty in the uniformed
           services pursuant to a call or order to active duty under . . . a
           provision of law referred to in section 101(a)(13)(B) of title 10 shall
           be entitled to [differential pay].
     The administrative judge found that, whereas the appellant was entitled to
     additional military leave under 5 U.S.C. § 6323(b) only if he served “in support
     of a contingency operation,” 5 U.S.C. § 5538(a) includes no such requirement.
     Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 17, Initial Decision (ID) at 9. Accordingly, in
     addressing the appellant’s entitlement to differential pay, the administrative judge
     did not consider whether the appellant was performing active duty in or in
     support of a contingency operation. ID at 9-10. However, as the agency observes
                                                                                        3

     on review, 10 U.S.C. § 101(a)(13) defines the term “contingency operation,” and
     the provisions of law listed at 10 U.S.C. § 101(a)(13)(B) are part of that
     definition. Hence, the agency argues, the appellant is entitled to di fferential pay
     under 5 U.S.C. § 5538(a) only if he served active duty in a contingency operation.
     Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 6-9.
¶4        Our reviewing court has since endorsed the agency’s interpretation.          In
     Adams, the court examined the relevant statutory provisions and concluded that
     for a claimant to be entitled to differential pay under 5 U.S.C. § 5538(a), the
     claimant “must have served pursuant to a call to active duty that meets the
     statutory definition of contingency operation.” Adams, 3 F.4th at 1378. Thus,
     contrary to the administrative judge’s analysis, the requirements for entitlement
     to differential pay under section 5538(a) are stricter than those for entitlement to
     additional leave under section 6323(b). Whereas claimants may be entitled to
     benefits under section 6323 if they were called to duty “in support” of a
     contingency operation, differential pay under section 5538(a) is available only to
     claimants who were directly called to serve in a contingency operation. Adams,
     3 F.4th at 1379 & n.1. Accordingly, to establish his entitlement to differential
     pay under 5 U.S.C. § 5538, the appellant must show that he served active duty in
     a contingency operation, as defined at 10 U.S.C. § 101(13)(B).
¶5        As relevant here, 10 U.S.C. § 101(a)(13)(B) defines the term “contingency
     operation” to include:
           [A] military operation that . . . results in the call or order to, or
           retention on, active duty of members of the uniformed services under
           section 688, 12301(a), 12302, 12304, 12304a, 12405, or 12406 of
           this title, chapter 13 of this title, section [3713] of title 14, or any
           other provision of law during a war or during a national emergency .
     Id. (emphasis added). Our reviewing court has held that the use of the term “any”
     indicates that the list of statutory provisions is nonexhaustive and that the phrase
     “other provision[s] of law” should be interpreted broadly.            O’Farrell v.
     Department of Defense, 882 F.3d 1080, 1084-85 (Fed. Cir. 2018). In this case,
                                                                                          4

     the appellant was ordered to active duty under 10 U.S.C. § 12301(d), which is not
     one of the specific provisions listed in the definition. IAF, Tab 5 at 6. The
     appellant argued, and the administrative judge agreed, that the appellant’s service
     nonetheless falls under the catch-all provision of 10 U.S.C. § 101(a)(13)(B), as he
     was called to active duty “under a provision of law,” namely 10 U.S.C.
     § 12301(d), and a national emergency has been in effect since September 11,
     2001. ID at 9-10; see 84 Fed. Reg. 48545 (Sept. 12, 2019) (declaration of the
     President continuing the national emergency for the year 2019 -2020).
¶6         However, while our reviewing court has held that the cat ch-all provision of
     10 U.S.C. § 101(a)(13)(B) should be read broadly, it has declined to read the
     statute so expansively that any reservist called to duty during a national
     emergency would be deemed to be performing a contingency operation. Adams,
     3 F.4th at 1379; see O’Farrell, 882 F.3d at 1086 n.5 (explaining that not all
     reservists called to active duty during a national emergency are acting in support
     of a contingency operation). Rather, the court has found that the term “any other
     provision of law” must be read in the context of the enumerated statutes lis ted in
     10 U.S.C. § 101(a)(13)(B), which all involve some connection to the declared
     national emergency.      Adams, 3 F.4th at 1380 (citing 10 U.S.C. §§ 688(c),
     12031(a), 12302, 12304, 12305, 12406 & chapter 13, and 14 U.S.C. § 3713). The
     court observed that, in contrast to the enumerated statutes, section 12301(d)
     makes no reference to a national emergency, but authorizes the activation of
     reservists “at any time . . . with the consent of that member.” Adams, 3 F.4th
     at 1380. Applying the principle of esjudem generis, 2 the court concluded that it
     was “implausible that Congress intended for the phrase ‘any other provision of
     law during a war or national emergency’ to necessarily include § 12301(d)

     2
       Under the principle of esjudem generis, “[w]here general words follow specific words
     in a statutory enumeration, the general words are construed to embrace only objects
     similar in nature to those objects enumerated by the preceding specific words.” Circuit
     City Stores, Incorporated v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 114 (2001) (quoting 2A N. Singer,
     Sutherland on Statutes and Statutory Construction, § 47.15 (1991)).
                                                                                       5

     voluntary duty that was unconnected to the emergency at hand.” Adams, 3 F.4th
     at 1380.
¶7         The court further observed that its reading of the statute is consistent with
     Office of Personnel Management (OPM) guidance, which explicitly provides that
     duty qualifying for differential pay “does not include voluntary active duty under
     10 U.S.C. § 12301(d).”        Id. (quoting OPM, Policy Guidance Regarding
     Reservist Differential under 5 U.S.C. § 5538 (OPM Guidance), 18 (June 2015), ht
     tps://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/pay-leave/pay-administration/reservist-
     differential/policyguidance.pdf).   The court further noted that OPM’s guidance
     explains that the term “contingency operation” means “a military operation that is
     designated by the Secretary of Defense as an operation in which members of the
     armed forces are or may become involved in military actions, operations, or
     hostilities against an enemy of the United States or against an opposing military
     force.” OPM Guidance at 22. Here, as in Adams, the appellant does not allege
     that he was ordered to perform such service. See Adams, 3 F.4th at 1380.
¶8         Finally, we note that in finding that the appellant was not entitled to
     additional leave under 5 U.S.C. § 6323(a), which limits the benefit to employees
     who were absent for military service “as a result of a call or order to active duty
     in support of a contingency operation,” the administrative judge found that the
     appellant’s training was not even “in support” of a contingency operation—much
     less part of a contingency operation itself. ID at 7-8. The appellant does not
     dispute that finding on review, instead arguing that entitlement to differential pay
     under 5 U.S.C. § 5538(a) does not require that the claimant have been called to
     duty in or in support of a contingency operation. However, as discussed above,
     our reviewing court has explicitly rejected that interpretation of the statute.
                                                                                           6

¶9         In sum, we find that the appellant is not entitled to differential pay under
     5 U.S.C. § 5538(a). 3 Accordingly, we reverse the portion of the initial decision
     that granted corrective action regarding the appellant’s claim for differential pay.
     The initial decision is otherwise affirmed.

                              NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 4
           The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the
     Board’s final decision in this matter.      5 C.F.R. § 1201.113.      You may obtain
     review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of
     your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate
     forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following
     summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not
     provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation and
     the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule
     regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of
     this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your
     claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file
     within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your
     chosen forum.
           Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
     below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
     about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
     should contact that forum for more information.

     3
        Having so found, we need not address the agency’s remaining arguments.
     Accordingly, we do not make any findings regarding the analysis in then -Member
     Robbins’s separate opinion in Marquiz v. Department of Defense, 123 M.S.P.R. 479
     (2016) (nonprecedential split vote).
     4
       Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
     the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
     Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                          7

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.                 5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit    your   petition    to   the   court    at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of partic ular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or    EEOC    review     of   cases      involving   a   claim      of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court (not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
                                                                                  8

receive this decision.     5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative
receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be
entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any
requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security.        See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                         Office of Federal Operations
                  Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                               P.O. Box 77960
                          Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                                                                                      9

                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant     to   the    Whistleblower      Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section
2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),
(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of
competent jurisdiction. 5   The court of appeals must receive your petition for
review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.               5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:

5
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                              10

                             U.S. Court of Appeals
                             for the Federal Circuit
                            717 Madison Place, N.W.
                            Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                                    /s/ for
                                          Jennifer Everling
                                          Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.