Court Opinion

ID: 9376246
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-02 16:00:33.501737+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:05.543098
License: Public Domain

21-916
     Sullivan v. Snider
                          UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                              FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                SUMMARY ORDER

     RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT.
     CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007,
     IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
     PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT'S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING
     A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A
     PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC
     DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION "SUMMARY ORDER"). A PARTY
     CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY
     NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

 1         At a stated Term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
 2   held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse at Foley Square, in the City
 3   of New York, on the 2nd day of March, two thousand twenty-three.
 4
 5   Present:    AMALYA L. KEARSE,
 6               ROSEMARY S. POOLER,
 7               STEVEN J. MENASHI,
 8
 9                               Circuit Judges.
10   __________________________________________________
11
12   ROBERT SULLIVAN,
13                                     Plaintiff-Counter-
14                                     Defendant-Appellee,
15
16                            - v. -                                 No. 21-916
17
18   ROBIN A. SNIDER,
19                                     Defendant-Counter-
20                                     Claimant-Appellant,
 1   DAVID B. SNIDER,
 2
 3                               Defendant-Appellant.
 4   ________________________________________________
 5
 6   For Appellants:                  NOREEN MCCARTHY, Keene Valley, N.Y.
 7
 8   For Appellee:                    MATTHEW D. NORFOLK, Norfolk Law, Lake
 9                                    Placid, N.Y.
10

11           Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of New

12   York.

13           This cause came on to be heard on the record from the United States District

14   Court for the Northern District of New York, and was argued by counsel.

15           ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, it is now hereby ordered, adjudged, and

16   decreed that the appeal is dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction.

17           Defendants Robin A. Snider and David B. Snider (defendants or the

18   "Sniders"), who own property adjacent to that of plaintiff Robert Sullivan, and who

19   constructed an 80-square-foot cabin (the "Cabin"--sometimes referred to by

20   defendants as a "treehouse") partially on plaintiff's property, seek reversal of the

21   parts of an order of the United States District Court for the Northern District of New

22   York, Glenn T. Suddaby, then-Chief Judge, that granted a motion by plaintiff for

                                               2
 1   partial summary judgment, denied a motion by defendants for partial summary

 2   judgment, and denied a motion by defendants to dismiss plaintiff's complaint for

 3   failure to state a claim. At oral argument, we requested that the parties provide

 4   additional briefing as to the appealability of the issues argued by defendants in their

 5   briefs on this appeal. For the reasons that follow, we dismiss the appeal for lack of

 6   appellate jurisdiction. We presume the parties' familiarity with the record and

 7   proceedings below.

 8         Plaintiff commenced the present action against the Sniders after his attempt

 9   to consummate a contract for the sale of his property failed when the buyer raised

10   issues as to the encroachment of defendants' Cabin on plaintiff's lot. The complaint

11   sought a declaratory judgment that the Cabin was partially on plaintiff's property

12   and an injunction ordering defendants to remove the Cabin; it also included claims

13   of slander of title, trespass, nuisance, negligence, and tortious interference with a

14   contractual relationship and business dealings. In a Decision and Order dated April

15   7, 2021 (the "April 2021 Decision" or "Decision"), the district court principally (a)

16   granted partial summary judgment in favor of plaintiff declaring that defendants

17   had no right to have the Cabin encroach on plaintiff's lot and that plaintiff has the

18   right to remove it and recover from defendants the reasonable cost of doing so; (b)

                                               3
 1   dismissed Robin A. Snider's counterclaim asserting ownership, by reason of adverse

 2   possession, of the land occupied by the Cabin beyond their own property; and (c)

 3   denied defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. The

 4   April 2021 Decision also ordered that

 5         Defendants are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from maintaining and
 6         continuing to keep the Cabin on Plaintiff's Lot, and are ordered to
 7         REMOVE the Cabin from Plaintiff's Lot within THIRTY (30) DAYS
 8         from the entry of the final Judgment in this action; . . . .
 9
10   April 2021 Decision at 51. The court stated that plaintiff's claims of slander of title,

11   trespass, nuisance, negligence, and tortious interference with a contractual

12   relationship and business dealings remained to be tried. See id.

13         Defendants promptly filed notices of appeal stating that the Sniders

14         appeal to the Second Circuit from the Decision and Order, entered in
15         this action on April 7, 2020, granting a motion, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
16         P. 56(a), for summary judgment by Plaintiff, denying a motion,
17         pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), for summary judgment by the
18         Defendants, and denying a motion, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6),
19         for failure to state a claim by Defendants.
20
21   (Defendants' Notice of Appeal dated April 8, 2021; Amended Notice of Appeal

22   dated April 29, 2021.)

23         In general there is a "'historic federal policy against piecemeal appeals.'"

24   Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Electric Co., 446 U.S. 1, 8 (1980) (quoting Sears, Roebuck

                                                 4
 1   & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 438 (1956)). For purposes of the Federal Rules of Civil

 2   Procedure ("Federal Rules"), the term "'[j]udgment'" includes "any order from which

 3   an appeal lies." Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(a). Final judgments are appealable under 28

 4   U.S.C. § 1291. A final judgment within the meaning of § 1291 is one that conclusively

 5   determines the rights of the parties to the litigation, leaving nothing for the court to

 6   do but execute the judgment. See, e.g., Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 467

 7   (1978); see also id. at 468-69 (discussing exception for certain final collateral orders).

 8   In the absence of a final judgment,

 9         any order or other decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer
10         than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the
11         parties does not end the action as to any of the claims or parties and may be
12         revised at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the
13         claims and all of the parties' rights and liabilities.
14
15   Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) (emphasis added). Thus, an order or judgment that disposes of

16   fewer than all of the claims asserted by a party, or the claims of fewer than all of the

17   parties, is not ordinarily a final judgment appealable under § 1291. In such a case,

18   however, the Federal Rules permit the district court to order that a partial final

19   judgment be entered--thereby permitting an aggrieved party to take an immediate

20   appeal from that judgment--but "only if the court expressly determines that there is

21   no just reason for delay." Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). The federal policy against piecemeal

                                                 5
 1   appeals requires that before ordering the entry of a partial final judgment, the

 2   district court consider not only the equities but also judicial administrative interests.

 3   A "unified" appeal, rather than a series of appeals, "is particularly desirable where

 4   . . . the adjudicated and pending claims are closely related and stem from essentially

 5   the same factual allegations." Cullen v. Margiotta, 618 F.2d 226, 228 (2d Cir. 1980).

 6         In sum, where a challenged decision of the district court is not embodied in

 7   an order or judgment that is "final" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291, does not

 8   relate to an injunction, a receivership, or a case in admiralty, see 28 U.S.C.

 9   §§ 1292(a)(1) (2) and (3), and is not an interlocutory order as to which the court of

10   appeals has granted leave to appeal, see id. § 1292(b), the court of appeals lacks

11   jurisdiction to hear an appeal. See, e.g., Citizens Accord, Inc. v. Town of Rochester, 235

12   F.3d 126, 129 (2d Cir. 2000) (per curiam).

13         In the present case, after defendants filed their notices of appeal--which, as

14   quoted above, expressly challenged only those aspects of the April 2021 Decision

15   that had granted a motion by plaintiff for partial summary judgment and denied

16   defense motions seeking partial summary judgment and dismissal of the complaint

17   for failure to state a claim--defendants submitted appeal-related information

18   required by the "Second Circuit Civil Appeal Pre-Argument Statement (Form C)" as

                                                 6
 1   to, inter alia, the type of judgment or order being appealed, the basis for appellate

 2   jurisdiction, the status of the case, and the relief sought on appeal. The form

 3   provided choices of boxes that could be checked with respect to specific information.

 4   Defendants, on the form, designated their appeal as one from a "Final Decision," not

 5   one from an "Interlocutory Decision Appealable As of Right" (Defendants' Form C

 6   dated June 13, 2021 ("Defendants' Form C"), at 1)--although they also stated that

 7   "only partial summary judgment [had been] granted" (id. at 2).           Defendants

 8   described the relief granted by the district court as a "Permanent" Injunction, not as

 9   a "Preliminary" Injunction. (Id.)

10          In addenda, defendants provided brief details, consistent with the boxes they

11   had checked. They described the district court's April 2021 Decision as dealing with

12   the parties' motions for "Partial Summary Judgment" "in their entirety," and stated

13   that

14          the Court also issued a permanent injunction against the Appellants
15          barring them from maintaining the structure at issue on the Appellee's
16          lot and ordering the structure to be removed.
17
18   (Defendants' Pre-Argument Statement Addendum A at 3.) As to the "issues

19   proposed to be raised on appeal," defendants stated that the district court erred (1)

20   when it determined that no genuine issue of fact existed with respect to defendants'

                                               7
 1   claim of adverse possession, (2) when it determined that genuine issues of material

 2   fact existed with respect to plaintiff's claims as to which the court order a trial, and

 3   (3) "when it granted the Plaintiff permanent injunctions regarding the presence of and

 4   removal of the structure at issue."         (Defendants' Pre-Argument Statement

 5   Addendum B at 1-2 (emphasis added)). As to each of their proposed issues,

 6   defendants stated that the "Standard of Review" is "De Novo." (Id. at 1-2.)

 7         After defendants filed their Form C and addenda, a question was raised as to

 8   appealability. Defendants then asked the district court to enter a Rule 54(b)

 9   certification and order for a partial final judgment as to those parts of the Decision

10   "which granted Plaintiff's partial motion for summary judgment and denied

11   Defendants' counterclaims." (Letter from defense attorney Bryan Liam Kennelly to

12   then-Chief Judge Suddaby dated July 16, 2021, at 1.). Defendants stated that

13         [i]t appears that without entry of final judgment and a finding by this
14         Court that no just cause exists to delay appeal on the above-noted
15         rulings, the appeal cannot proceed as the Court of Appeals will not
16         have jurisdiction.
17
18   (Id.) Defendants also submitted their appellate attorney's affidavit stating that the

19   parties "and the Court" had expected the April 2021 Decision to be immediately

20   appealable. (Affidavit of Noreen McCarthy dated July 16, 2021, ¶ 13; see id. ¶ 8.)

                                                8
 1          The district court, in a text order, immediately requested a response from

 2   plaintiff to defendants' Rule 54(b) motion; but it stated that "[t]he Court notes . . .

 3   that it is unclear how Defendants reasonably could have not realized . . . that the Decision

 4   and Order of 04/07/2021 was non-final" in light of (a) its "express language" that

 5   defendants were "to remove the Cabin from Plaintiff's Lot within thirty (30) days

 6   from 'the entry of the final Judgment in this action,'" and (b) a May 11, 2021 text

 7   order that stated expressly that the court "did not direct the Clerk of Court to enter

 8   a final judgment on part of the claims in the case pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b)."

 9   D.Ct. Dkt. 88, July 16, 2021 (other internal quotation marks omitted) (emphases

10   ours). The court thereafter entered a text order denying defendants' July 16, 2021

11   request, stating that "if the Court were to find that no closely related issues remain

12   to be litigated ( . . . a finding that it does not make), the Court would not, and does

13   not, render an express determination that there is no just reason for delay under

14   Rule 54(b)." D.Ct. Dkt. 94, July 30, 2021.

15          In the meantime, on July 15, 2021, plaintiff moved in this Court to dismiss the

16   appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.         Defendants opposed, arguing that

17   "28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) expressly authorizes an interlocutory appeal from an order

18   granting an injunction, and this appeal involves such an order." (Defendants'

                                                  9
 1   opposition to plaintiff's motion to dismiss appeal, unnumbered second page.) They

 2   argued that "§ 1292(a)(1) expressly authorizes the instant appeal" because it

 3   "involves an order by the District Court enjoining Appellant Robin Snider from accessing

 4   her property; ordering her to remove the treehouse within 30 days of entry of final

 5   judgment; and authorizing Appellee to remove the treehouse and to recover any

 6   associated costs from Appellant." (Id. at unnumbered fifth page (emphasis added);

 7   see also id. at unnumbered sixth page ("28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) . . . authorizes the

 8   instant appeal" because the district court "issued a permanent injunction prohibiting

 9   Appellant from maintaining or accessing the disputed property").)

10         However, only the immediately effective portion of the April 2021 Decision's

11   injunctive order was immediately appealable under "§ 1292(a)(1), i.e., the part that

12   immediately barred defendants from "maintaining and continuing to keep" the

13   Cabin. While the April 2021 Decision appeared to characterize the injunction as

14   permanent, "permanent injunctions that are interlocutory in nature"--i.e., that take

15   effect prior to the entry of a final judgment--are appealable under § 1292(a)(1).

16   National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Expresstrak, L.L.C., 330 F.3d 523, 527 (D.C. Cir. 2003).

17   The part of the Decision that required defendants to "remove" the Cabin from

18   plaintiff's property had no immediate effect because it specified that that obligation

                                                10
 1   would exist only after the entry of final judgment. It thus was not an injunction

 2   within the scope of § 1292(a)(1); nor was it part of any final judgment that could

 3   have been appealed under § 1291. And though defendants also complain of the

 4   ruling that plaintiff was entitled to remove the Cabin, that ruling was neither an

 5   injunctive order imposing any duty or restraint on plaintiff, nor part of a final

 6   judgment.

 7         Because the part of the April 2021 Decision that barred defendants from

 8   "maintaining" the Cabin could have had immediate effect, a motions panel of this

 9   Court denied plaintiff's motion to dismiss the appeal. We stated that "the portion of

10   the district court's order granting preliminary injunctive relief is immediately

11   appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1)." Order, 2d Cir. Oct. 21, 2021, at 1 (emphases

12   added). We stated that "[f]or purposes of this order, it is assumed that the portion

13   of the district court's injunction barring the Appellants from 'maintaining and

14   continuing to keep' the cabin--apparently barring them from, inter alia, accessing,

15   cleaning, or repairing the cabin pending final decision--was immediately effective."

16   Id. at 2. Accordingly, defendants were permitted to proceed with the appeal of the

17   preliminary injunction aspect of the April 2021 Decision.

                                              11
 1         The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure ("FRAP") provide that an

 2   appellant's brief must contain, inter alia, a statement of the issues for review, see Fed.

 3   R. App. P. 28(a)(5); "a concise statement of the applicable standard of review" for

 4   each issue, id. Rule 28(a)(8)(B); and "a short conclusion stating the precise relief

 5   sought," id. Rule 28(a)(9). However, after this Court found that the preliminary

 6   injunction "portion" of the April 2021 Decision was appealable, defendants filed their

 7   appellate brief which contains nothing to meet any of these requirements with

 8   respect to the preliminary injunction.        Under "Issues Presented for Review,"

 9   defendants specify seven questions; but all seven deal only with the district court's

10   rulings on summary judgment, or on the sufficiency of the complaint, or the

11   admissibility of various evidence to support of plaintiff's claims. (Defendants' brief

12   on appeal at 1-3.) There is no mention of the preliminary injunction.

13         And consistently with their descriptions of their seven stated issues,

14   defendants, in addressing applicable standards of review, state for each issue that

15   the district court's ruling is subject to "de novo" review. (Id. at 10, 12, 28, 33.) There

16   is no mention of the standard for reviewing a district court's grant of a preliminary

17   injunction; that decision is reviewable for abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Doran v.

                                                12
 1   Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 931-32 (1975); Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat

 2   Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 1979).

 3          Further, the arguments presented in the brief--despite the fact that the only

 4   immediately appealable aspect of the April 2021 Decision is its preliminary

 5   injunctive order prohibiting defendants from "maintaining" the Cabin--make no

 6   mention of any current restriction on defendants. The only mention of an injunction

 7   in their brief is a passing reference in their "Statement of the Case," stating that the

 8   district court "enjoined the Sniders from using the treehouse, and ordered them to

 9   remove it within thirty days." (Defendants' brief on appeal at 3.) And the latter part

10   of this statement is highly misleading as an attempt to appeal from a preliminary

11   injunction because--as the Decision itself stated explicitly and as the district court

12   reiterated in its order denying a Rule 54(b) certification--"on page 51 of its Decision

13   and Order of 04/07/2021, the Court ordered Defendants to remove the Cabin from

14   Plaintiff's Lot merely within thirty (30) days from 'the entry of the final Judgment in this

15   action.'" D.Ct. Dkt. 94, July 30, 2021 (emphasis added).

16          Finally, for the required "conclusion stating the precise relief sought," FRAP

17   Rule 28(a)(9), defendants' brief states that "[t]he order granting Sullivan's summary

18   judgment motion should be reversed," that "Mrs. Snider was entitled to a

                                                 13
 1   presumption that the land was hers," and that plaintiff's "other claims should be

 2   dismissed." (Defendants' brief on appeal at 53.) There is no request for relief from

 3   the preliminary injunction.

 4         In sum, the district court's April 2021 Decision was not a final judgment; it

 5   neither required that defendants remove the Cabin immediately nor deprived

 6   defendants of ownership of the Cabin; it contained only interlocutory orders. The

 7   only interlocutory order that was immediately appealable was the immediately

 8   effective preliminary injunction that prohibited defendants from "maintaining" the

 9   Cabin. Although defendants did not mention the preliminary injunction in their

10   notice of appeal, or in their descriptions of the appeal in Form C or their addenda

11   to that form, this Court's prior order interpreted the Decision's prohibition against

12   "maintaining" the Cabin as preventing defendants from "cleaning" or "repairing" the

13   Cabin, and therefore found "that portion" of the April 2021 Decision to be

14   immediately appealable under § 1292(a)(1). Yet in defendants' ensuing brief on

15   appeal, there is not a single reference to "maintaining" or "cleaning" or "repairing"

16   the Cabin, or even "accessing" the Cabin. They have given no recognition to the fact

17   that such an order is reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard; have made

18   no effort to assert, or present any argument for the proposition that the sole

                                              14
 1   appealable aspect of the April 2021 Decision constituted an abuse of the court's

 2   discretion; and have not requested any relief from that prohibition. Issues that are

 3   not sufficiently argued in the briefs are considered waived. See, e.g., Warren v.

 4   Garvin, 219 F.3d 111, 113 n.2 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 968 (2000); Norton v. Sam's

 5   Club, 145 F.3d 114, 117 (2d Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1001 (1998)). A passing

 6   reference to a ruling by the lower court, without advancing an accompanying

 7   argument as to why it should be overturned, is not sufficient to present that ruling

 8   for appellate review. See, e.g., Frank v. United States, 78 F.3d 815, 832-33 (2d Cir.

 9   1996), vacated on other grounds, 521 U.S. 1114 (1997). Any challenge by defendants to

10   the preliminary injunction aspect of the April 2021 Decision has been waived.

11          We note that in some cases where one or more, but fewer than all, of the

12   district court orders in an action are appealable before the entry of final judgment,

13   the court of appeals may have discretion to exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction

14   over some of the orders that are not otherwise immediately appealable. See, e.g., Port

15   Authority Police Benevolent Ass'n v. Port Authority of New York & New Jersey, 698 F.2d

16   150, 152 (2d Cir. 1983); EEOC v. Joint Apprenticeship Committee of the Joint Industry

17   Board of the Electrical Industry, 895 F.2d 86, 89-90 (2d Cir. 1990). But the general

18   federal presumption against immediate appellate review of nonfinal orders also

                                                 15
 1   counsels against a "loose" approach in connection with the exercise of pendent

 2   appellate jurisdiction. See generally Swint v. Chambers County Commission, 514 U.S.

 3   35, 45-50 (1995).

 4         On this appeal, defendants seek to argue that the district court's April 2021

 5   Decision erred in granting partial summary judgment declaring that plaintiff has the

 6   right to have the Cabin removed from his property and in denying defendants'

 7   counterclaim for adverse possession of the part of plaintiff's land on which the

 8   Cabin encroaches. While we might have exercised pendent appellate jurisdiction

 9   related to those ultimate issues if there had been any genuine issue raised as to the

10   lone appealable aspect of the April 2021 Decision, we know of no case in which a

11   federal court has exercised pendent appellate jurisdiction over nonappealable orders

12   that are appended only to appealable issues that the appellant neither intended to

13   nor did pursue. This case will not be the first.

14         We have considered all of defendants' contentions in support of appellate

15   jurisdiction over the only issues they argue on this appeal and have found them to

16   be without merit. The appeal is dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction.

17         Costs to plaintiff.

18                                   FOR THE COURT:
19                                   Catherine O'Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
20

                                              16