Court Opinion

ID: 9706558
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:46:22.561396+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:23.589777
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING

By its motion for rehearing, Midgard contends this Court erred by reversing the summary judgment that it recover damages against NGC, and by its motion for rehearing, NGC requests we modify our prior opinion to reverse and remand the entire judgment to the trial court for trial on the merits and tax all costs against Midgard. Remaining convinced that our reversal of the summary judgment was proper, we overrule Midgard’s motion for rehearing, grant NGC’s motion with the following additional comments, and withdraw our judgment dated October 22, 1999.
Midgard contends we erred in holding that the affidavit of William A. Vandivere, which set out Midgard’s damages, was fatally defective, and that because the defect was substantive, it could be considered for the first time on appeal. *380Midgard relies on Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Penn, 363 S.W.2d 230 (Tex.1962), in support of its position. Although Youngstown does support Midgard’s contention to the extent that the affidavit is based upon Midgard’s records, it does not support Midgard’s contention regarding the disk and hearsay information provided by Transok. As noted in Youngstown, hearsay statements in affidavits may not be made the basis of a summary judgment, id. at 233, and do not require the adverse party to contravene the allegations in the motion. Box v. Bates, 162 Tex. 184, 346 S.W.2d 317, 319 (1961).
Notwithstanding our holding in Rodriquez v. Texas Farmers Ins. Co., 903 S.W.2d 499, 506 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 1995, writ denied), Midgard asserts the defect is not substantive, but is a defect in form only, which may not be considered on appeal unless specifically pointed out in the trial court under Rule 166a(f) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. Because the rule does not define a defect in form, we look to case law for guidance. In Laman v. Big Spring State Hospital, 970 S.W.2d 670, 672 (Tex.App.—Eastland 1998, pet. denied), in reversing a summary judgment, the court held that even though the motion for summary judgment was supported by statements acknowledged before a notary public, because they did not contain proper jurats they were substantively defective and the objection could be raised for the first time on appeal. See generally Perkins v. Crittenden, 462 S.W.2d 565, 568 (Tex.1970) (holding that a jurat is not the same as an acknowledgment). Similarly, in Ramirez v. Transcontinental Ins. Co., 881 S.W.2d 818, 829 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied), the court held that an objection to an affidavit on grounds that it states only a legal conclusion is one that relates to a defect of substance. Finding these cases instructive, we hold the defect in Vandivere’s affidavit is one of substance that can be considered for the first time on appeal.
Moreover, because Midgard’s motion for summary judgment must stand on its own merits, the failure of NGC to respond cannot supply by default any proof essential for Midgard to establish its entitlement to summary judgment. City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Authority, 589 S.W.2d 671, 678 (Tex.1979). Affidavits are insufficient unless they contain allegations that are direct and unequivocal and perjury can be assigned upon them. Brownlee v. Brownlee, 665 S.W.2d 111, 112 (Tex.1984). Further, conclusions made by an expert in an affidavit are insufficient to support summary judgment. Anderson v. Snider, 808 S.W.2d 54, 55 (Tex.1991). Among other things, Rule 166a(f) requires that affidavits be made on personal knowledge and must show that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. For these reasons, and because hearsay statements do not constitute summary judgment proof, Lopez v. Hink, 757 S.W.2d 449, 451 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.], 1988, no writ), the portions of Van-divere’s affidavit based upon the information contained in the disk provided by Transok cannot support summary judgment for any specific amount of damages. Midgard’s motion for rehearing is overruled.
Relying on Rule 44.1(b) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, NGC urges that because the damages are unliquidated and NGC contested liability, we should correct our opinion and reverse and remand the cause on all issues, including liability. Agreeing, we grant NGC’s motion for rehearing. Although Midgard’s claim may ultimately constitute “liquidated” damages as defined in Ortiz Oil Co. v. Geyer, 138 Tex. 373, 159 S.W.2d 494, 497 (1942), because Midgard does not contend in its response to NGC’s motion for rehearing that its claim is liquidated, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and the cause remanded for trial on all issues. Accordingly, our judgment dated October 22,1999 is hereby withdrawn.