Court Opinion

ID: 9690721
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 19:37:47.200923+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:03:32.300909
License: Public Domain

STUMBO, Judge,
dissenting.
Respectfully, I must dissent. The inferred intent rule is supported by sound public policy principles, in part because it removes from the trial court the burden of determining what an actor was thinking when he or she engaged in conduct resulting in harm. That is to say, in certain circumstances one may reasonably infer from the facts that the actor intended the harm, without resorting to proof of that intent. But we cannot go so far, however, as to conclude that one may infer intent where the actor is incapable of understanding the physical nature of the consequences of his actions. Stated differently, intent may not be inferred where the actor is incapable of forming intent. This should be axiomatic, and forms the basis for my conclusion that the Campbell Circuit Court did not err in failing to apply the inferred intent rule in the matter at bar.
I recognize that Goldsmith reaches a different result. The Goldsmith opinion, however, was very clear that its application was limited to the arena of sexual abuse cases. It based this limitation on the insidious nature of the resultant psychological harm to the victim and the difficulty or impossibility of objectively proving that harm. It concluded that psychological harm is a ubiquitous result of sexual abuse, and found that public policy demanded the inference of intent to harm irrespective of the actor’s ability to actually form that intent.'
The Goldsmith opinion remains applicable to sexual molestation and other sexual abuse scenarios, but having studied the development of the inferred intent rule and the public policy reasons for its application, I believe that in cases other than *819sexual molestation the inferred intent rule cannot be applied to show intent where the actor is objectively incapable of forming intent to harm or of understanding the physical nature of the consequences of his actions. I base this belief on the conclusion that — outside the sexual molestation genre — one may not infer intent where it is demonstrated that the actor is incapable of forming intent. Accordingly, I would affirm the Campbell Circuit Court on this issue.
Nationwide also argues that the trial court erred in finding that the “criminal in nature” exclusion is ambiguous and cannot be applied to the facts at bar. It notes that under the terms of the policy, the exclusion is applicable regardless of whether the insured is actually charged with or convicted of a crime. It also maintains that coverage for Mr. Swope’s conduct is barred irrespective of whether he was able to appreciate the consequences of his acts, and argues that the rule of strict construction against an insurance company does not mean that every doubt must be resolved against it.
The phrase “criminal in nature” is not defined in the insurance policy, and the circuit court found it to be ambiguous. To resolve the ambiguity, the court relied in part on KRS 504.020(1), which states that a person is not responsible for criminal conduct if, at the time of the conduct and as a result of mental illness, he lacks the capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. This leads to the question of whether an act is “criminal in nature” if the statutory law does not hold the actor culpable for it. The circuit court answered this question in the negative, and I agree with this conclusion. Without a contractual definition of what constitutes “criminal in nature,” in this context the statutory law and associate case law provide a reasonable basis for concluding that Mr. Swope’s acts are not encompassed by the exclusion. This is especially true in light of canon stating that insurance policy exceptions, where ambiguous, are to be strictly construed to make the insurance effective. Kentucky Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. McKinney, 831 S.W.2d 164 (Ky.1992). While Nationwide correctly notes that this rule does not mean that every doubt must be resolved against it, Brown v. Indiana Ins. Co., 184 S.W.3d 528 (Ky.2005), the circuit court’s interpretation of the phrase in light of KRS 504.020(1) was proper, and I would find no error.