Court Opinion

ID: 9797877
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:31:21.890112+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:59:18.191968
License: Public Domain

Knudson, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part: I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that JP’s tort claims were filed in a timely manner under K.S.A. 12-105b(d). Even JP does not advance such an argument, recognizing that either K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 60-215(c) applies or the tort claims are barred by the statute of limitations.
Under the uncontroverted facts of this case, the majority’s error in reasoning is caused by computing the 40-day extension of the statute of limitations from the date tire claim was denied by the City. That is not the law. The 40-day extension is from the date tire statute would have otherwise run. See King v. Pimentel, 20 Kan. App. 2d 579, 591-92, 890 P.2d 1217 (1995); Martin v. Board of Johnson County Comm’rs, 18 Kan App. 2d 149, 157-58, 848 P.2d 1000 (1993). A summary of relevant events is helpful:
August 19, 1999 JP’s cause of action accrues
August 17, 2001 JP files notice of claim with the City
September 26, 2001 City denies claim
October 10, 2001 JP files motion to amend its petition to assert tort claims against the City
We all agree that under the above time line it took the City 40 days to deny JP’s tort claim. Consequently, under K.S.A. 12-105b(d), as interpreted in Martin, the 2-year statute of limitations was extended for 40 days until September 28, 2001. Clearly, JP’s motion to amend its petition to assert tort claims was not timely unless K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 60-2l5(c) is applicable.
As I already observed, JP does not even present as an issue interpretation of K.S.A. 12-105b(d) as now urged by the majority. Indeed, at oral argument, JP’s appellate counsel conceded the tort claim is barred unless K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 60-215(c) is applied.
*657As a result of its erroneous interpretation of K.S.A. 12-105b(d), the majority does not address the question raised by the parties in this appeal: Did the trial court err in not permitting JP’s tort claims to relate back to the date of the original petition?
K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 60-215(c) states, in material part, that whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading.
K.S.A. 12-105b(d) provides, in material part:
“Any action brought pursuant to the Kansas tort claims act shall be commenced within the time period provided for in the code of civil procedure or it shall be forever barred, except that, if compliance with the provisions of this subsection would otherwise result in the barring of an action, such time period shall be extended by the time period required for compliance with the provisions of this subsection.”
In considering the interplay between K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 60-215(c) and K.S.A. 12-105b(d), we are mindful that “[gjeneral and special statutes should be read together and harmonized whenever possible, but to the extent a conflict between them exists, the special statute will prevail unless it appears the legislature intended to malee the general statute controlling.” In re Estate ofAntonopoulos, 268 Kan. 178, 189, 993 P.2d 637 (1999).
I conclude K.S.A. 12-105b(d) controls, and a party intending to file a tort claim against a governmental entity is not allowed to do an end run around its strictures under a theory of relation back of claims. I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.