Court Opinion

ID: 9587818
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:26:41.917541+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:38:33.383716
License: Public Domain

Eberhardt, Judge, dissenting.
A careful review of both the pleadings and the evidence submitted in connection with the motion for summary judgment impels me to dissent—not because of *443any disagreement with, the philosophy of the able opinion of the majority, but because I find cases in the reports of both this court and the Supreme Court which demand a different result. I have called these cases to the attention of the court, urging that they should be frankly met and dealt with. As I see it, that has not been done and só I here direct them to the attention of the bar. They may be wrong. If so, they ought to be overruled—and it ought not to be done sub silentio. They have an honorable ancestiy and, as evidenced by their number and the many times they have been cited, have served faithfully and long. If they are to suffer the fate of Lidice1 our cases should be afforded a respectful interment so that Shepard’s may give appropriate notice in its obituary. If they are right they ought to be followed. If we are bound by them our duty is to follow them. Certainly they should be examined with care.
While it appears that a modernization of the floating dock facility on which Mrs. Kreiss and her husband rented a boat slip was in progress, it also appears that she was familiar with it and with the condition of the dock, walkway and the catwalk. They had rented the boat slip for some time and she testified that they had gone there every weekend during the summer months. The owner testified that he had sent out letters to the people who rented boat slips and who were customers of the facility informing them of the plans which were in progress. Mrs. Kreiss said that she had noticed the changes that were being made, and particularly on the very day she was hurt. It appears that the work had stopped on Friday afternoon and was not resumed until the following Monday. On the intervening Saturday about midafternoon she walked the route along the dock from the shore to the boat, and later in the afternoon, but in full daylight, she walked the very same route again from boat to shore. Nothing, at either time, prevented her from seeing the exact location of the catwalk with reference to the runway, in-*444eluding the four-inch opening between them. She testified that she discussed something of the situation at the dock with her husband, particularly with reference to changes that were being made. Not only these facts, but her testimony that “We were familiar with the Allatoona landing—very familiar with it,” leads inescapably to the conclusion that if there was a dangerous situation she knew of it, Vaissiere v. J. B. Pound Hotel Co., 184 Ga. 72 (190 SE 354); Ford v. S. A. Lynch Corp., 79 Ga. App. 481 (54 SE2d 320), and thus when she returned to the boat along the dock an.d walkway in the darkness that night she was testing a known and obvious peril, and in voluntarily doing so she took the risk of physical injury. Youngblood v. Henry C. Beck Co., 93 Ga. App. 451 (91 SE2d 796); Alexander v. Rhodes, 104 Ga. 807 (30 SE 968); City of Rome v. Baker, 107 Ga. 347, 352 (33 SE 406). Volenti non fit injuria.
The plaintiff here, as every other individual, is presumed to be possessed of the ordinary human faculties and to have them in ordinary capacity. Amis v. Georgia Power Co., 42 Ga. App. 754, 758 (157 SE 242). To the same effect, see Davis v. Central R., 60 Ga. 329, 333; Gardner v. State, 81 Ga. 144 (4) (7 SE 144); Holcombe v. State, 5 Ga. App. 47 (4) (62 SE 647).
But conceding that for some reason she was not familiar with the situation, another equally compelling reason would bar her recovery. She testified that when she returned to the boat at about 11 p.m., “You couldn’t see in front of you where you were going. It was more or less a guess where you were.”
This court, in Braun v. Wright, 100 Ga. App. 295 (3) (111 SE2d 100), where a contractor failed to light the premises so as to reveal hazards in connection with the construction of a house, as a result of which a subcontractor who went there at night to do some work was injured when he stepped on an insecurely anchored plank over a ditch and fell, held: “If the failure of the contractor to furnish lights to reveal such hazards . . . amounts to a failure on his part to exercise ordinary care to prevent injury to the subcontractor, the latter is equally negligent in going on and over premises where it was to be reasonably expected perils and pitfalls incident to building activities exist and are concealed by the darkness. Fricks v. Knox Corp., 84 *445Ga. App. 5, 10 (65 SE2d 423); Bridger v. Gresham, 111 Ga. 814 (35 SE 677). In such circumstances one who chooses to walk in darkness does not exercise ordinary care for his own safety. [Citations].” (Emphasis supplied.) And see Baxley v. Williams Constr. Co., 98 Ga. App. 662 (5) (106 SE2d 799).
The Supreme Court, in Bridger v. Gresham, 111 Ga. 814 (35 SE 667), one of the cases cited and relied upon in Braun, dealt with a situation where the plaintiff went to the office of the defendant’s hotel at night to offer berries for sale. A guest informed him that the proprietor was out but that his son, who might buy the berries, was in the kitchen or dining room. Going in search of the son, plaintiff went out a door leading from the office, which was lighted, to a veranda where there was no light, closing the door behind him. While walking along the veranda in the darkness he fell down a stairway and was injured. It was held that “irrespectively of the question of whether or not the defendant, relatively to the plaintiff, was bound to use ordinary care in keeping the premises safe, the granting of a nonsuit was proper, it being manifest that the plaintiff, by the exercise of ordinary care, could have avoided the injury.”
In Mattox v. Atlanta E6terprises, 91 Ga. App. 847 (87 SE2d 432), it appears that the plaintiff was directed by an usher at a theatre to follow a stairway down to the ladies restroom, the stairway was dark and unlighted (it could have been lighted but ceiling lights were turned off), the carpet on the stairway had grease spots that were slick and slippery and had holes in it—all of these matters being within the knowledge of the defendant. Plaintiff alleged that she went “cautiously . . . forward down the stairs, feeling her way as she advanced,” but that the heel of her shoe caught in the carpet and the other foot came in contact with a greasy spot causing her to fall and be injured. Holding the petition to set forth no cause of action this court said: “The averments of the petition . . . show that the plaintiff was aware that the stairway was ‘dark,’ and that she could not safely descend it; that, nevertheless she continued down the steps ‘feeling her way as she advanced,’ fell, and sustained . . . injuries. Under the rulings of Hendricks v. Jones, 28 Ga. App. 335 (111 SE 81); Flournoy v. American Hat Mfg. Co., 21 Ga. App. 599 *446(94 SE 835); Lobby v. Atlanta Realty Corp., 25 Ga. App. 369 (103 SE 433); Avary v. Anderson, 31 Ga. App. 402, 404 (120 SE 683); Frierson v. Mutual Realty Co., 48 Ga. App. 839 (174 SE 144), we are constrained to hold that the danger was obvious to her, and by the exercise of ordinary care for her own safety, she could have avoided being injured. Therefore, she was precluded from recovery because of her own negligence. . . . [U] nder the ruling in Dacus v. Dickinson Trust Co., 65 Ga. App. 872 (16 SE2d 786), it was of no consequence whether the defendant was negligent in allowing the stairway to become defective, because the plaintiff was not in the exercise of ordinary care in proceeding through the darkness.” (Emphasis supplied.)2
Nor does the fact that the plaintiff may have “proceeded with caution” aid her—though, that does not appear from either the pleadings or the evidence here as it did in Mattox, supra, and in Tuten v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 4 Ga. App. 353 (61 SE 511) where plaintiff alleged that she had alighted from the train, gone into the waiting room until after the train departed, and then went out on the platform where (as here) it was so dark she “could not see her hand before her,” endeavoring to find the steps leading to the street. In moving along the platform she alleged she was “sliding her feet before her” and when she came to what she thought to be the steps “eased one foot down to feel for the step”-—then lost her balance, fell and was injured. A nonsuit was affirmed.
Only recently in Hardigree v. Housing Authority of the City of Atlanta, 107 Ga. App. 406, supra, a decision by Chief Judge Felton, the plaintiff, a tenant in an apartment house sought damages for injuries sustained when he got up at 4 a.m. to go to the bathroom down the hall. The hallway was dark because the defendant had failed to replace a burned out light bulb, and *447plaintiff missed the bathroom, falling headlong down the stairs. Holding that there was no duty on the part of the landlord to maintain lights or to illuminate passageways, porches and steps in the absence of a contractual obligation, or when so required by statute, the sustaining of a general demurrer was affirmed, and it was further asserted (p. 408) that “Even if it were true that there was a duty on the landlord to replace the burned-out light bulb, the plaintiff was aware of the danger existing and could have easily avoided the consequence ... by the exercise of ordinary care.”
Enough of detailing cases. Suffice it to direct attention to the following as cases in which recovery has been denied to plaintiffs who proceeded in the dark: Watson v. McCrory Stores, Inc., 97 Ga. App. 516 (103 SE2d 648) (dimly lighted steps in a variety store); Hopkins v. Barron, 61 Ga. App. 168 (6 SE2d 96) (dark, unlighted lot); Srochi v. Hightower, 57 Ga. App. 322 (195 SE 323) (entrance steps to apartment house dark from bumed-out light bulb or defective switch); Maloof v. Blackmon, 105 Ga. App. 207 (2) (124 SE2d 441) (unlighted porch and steps to apartment house); Ogain v. Imperial Cafe, Inc., 25 Ga. App. 415 (103 SE 594) (dark portion of cafe where butter was on floor); Castleberry v. Fox, 29 Ga. App. 35 (113 SE 110) (banana peel on steps of unlighted stairway in hotel); Sprague v. Atlanta Biltmore Hotel Co., 71 Ga. App. 849 (32 SE2d 534), Macon Savings Bank v. Geoghegan, 48 Ga. App. 1 (171 SE 853), Peniston v. Newnan Hospital, 40 Ga. App. 367 (149 SE 715), and Smith v. Inman, 32 Ga. App. 24 (122 SE 632) (elevator shaft); Frierson v. Mutual Realty Co., 48 Ga. App. 839 (174 SE 144) (unlighted stairway to unlighted basement); Hendricks v. Jones, 28 Ga. App. 335 (111 SE 81) (insufficiently lighted stairway in hotel); Flournoy v. American Hat Mfg. Co., 21 Ga. App. 599 (94 SE 835) (employee in manufacturing plant descending stairway dark because light out); Central of Ga. R. Co. v. Floyd, 3 Ga. App. 257 (59 SE 826) (unlighted station platform), and Malone v. Lombard Ponds, Inc., 105 Ga. App. 828 (125 SE2d 697) (unlighted beach in resort area). Doubtless there are many others. Many of the judges presently on this court have either written or have concurred in some of these opinions.
*448It is not alleged and does not appear that the defendant here was under any contractual or statutory duty to light the dock, and it would thus appear that he was under no duty to do so. White v. Thacker, 89 Ga. App. 656, 658 (80 SE2d 699); Maloof v. Blackmon, 105 Ga. App. 207 (2), supra, and citations; Hardigree v. Housing Authority of the City of Atlanta, 107 Ga. App. 406, 408, supra, and citations.
Again I propose that if the assertions of this court that one who chooses to walk in the darkness assumes the risk of dangers attendant thereon and that he does not exercise ordinary care for his own safety in so doing are wrong, we should overrule them.3 They should not be swept under the rug because, forsooth, the facts here are not identical with them, or even overruled sub silentio. “We [should] not attempt to absolve ourselves of responsibility for perpetuating the error of our decisions regarding cows by attempting to draw a line of distinction between the killing of cows and the killing of bulls.” Justice O’Neill, dissenting in Taylor v. Allen, 151 La. 82, 119 (91 S 635). If the cases are right, they should be followed. The bar is entitled to know whether these decisions still have vitality and whether they may apply in similar situations with which their clients may be confronted.
Plaintiff alleges that the owner was negligent in failing to erect or provide guardrails, but this can not aid her case, not only because of the principle of Dacus v. Dickinson Trust Co., 65 Ga. App. 872, supra, but for the further reason that the owner was under no duty to do so. He testified, and it is undisputed, that “There is no way to construct guardrails. You couldn’t get in and out of the slip. It is not feasible.” Certainly it is not to be required that the dock, walkway and catwalk be so encumbered as to make them unsuitable for the very use for which they were intended—and for which plaintiff and her husband rented the boat slip. A similar contention was disposed of by the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas in Osborne v. Loew’s *449Houston Co., (Tex. Civ. App.) 120 SW2d 947, 950, where it was said: “There was no evidence that such a guardrail or protection was usually installed in theatres as a part of the general construction. Under the evidence, it would seem that a guardrail would have destroyed the use of the seats appellants were seeking. With a guardrail, how would a patron of the theatre have stepped from the aisle into the seats on the side of the aisle? Certainly there was no evidence that appellee, in constructing its theatre departed from the usual method of construction in this respect.” To the same effect is McKelvy v. Capitol Amusement Co., (La.) 159 S 143, where the court asserted:' “It would not be practicable to install guardrails along theatre aisles, as they would block access to the seats.” And see, Johnson v. Matthews Moran Amusement Co., 264 Ore. 636 (102 P2d 703); Central of Ga. R. Co. v. Floyd, 3 Ga. App. 257, supra, and Tuten v. A.C.L. R. Co., 4 Ga. App. 353, supra.
The defendant’s motion for summary judgment was properly sustained. I would affirm.
I am authorized to say that Judge Frankum concurs in this dissent.

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Judge Quillian, now Justice Quillian, the writer of Mattox, observed at p. 849: “Although this writer does not agree that the correct rule is stated in the decisions cited, and while other jurisdictions hold that it is a jury question as to whether or not it is negligence to walk down a strange dark stairway, we are bound to follow the precedents of this court.” (Emphasis supplied).

If they are overruled the question still remains, because the principle appears to be established in Bridger v. Gresham, 111 Ga. 814, supra, and perhaps in other decisions of the Supreme Court.