Court Opinion

ID: 9682917
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:19:34.511282+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:43.137094
License: Public Domain

STEPHENSON, Justice,
concurring.
I concur with the opinion written by Justice Keith and add an additional reason for sustaining defendant’s point of error number seven.
*744The Constitution of the State of Texas, as originally written, and not amended, provides in part in Art. V, § 13 as follows:
“. . . In trials of civil cases . in the District Courts, nine members of the jury, concurring, may render a verdict . . . .”
I attach real significance to the word “concurrence” as used in this constitutional provision and give it its usual meaning, that is, to unite, combine and agree.
The plaintiff in the case before us, as stated in the majority opinion, alleged among other things that defendant was negligent in the construction, materials and maintenance of the bed and ties under the track in question. This jury was asked only whether the defendant was negligent on the occasion in question. It is obvious that it is impossible to ascertain whether there was any “concurrence” upon the part of the jury upon a particular act of negligence.
The Supreme Court of this state, in Trinity & B. V. Ry. Co. v. Geary, 107 Tex. 11, 172 S.W. 545 (1915), made it crystal clear that “concurrence” meant the same thing to it as I have indicated above. In this case it is stated that the trial court submitted two grounds of negligence to the jury, and the court’s charge permitted the jury to allow the plaintiff to recover upon either ground separately or upon the combined grounds together. The form of the jury answer showed the recovery was upon the combined grounds. The case was reversed and remanded with this statement:
“Interpreted by the charge, the verdict clearly expresses that a part of the jury found for plaintiff under the first ground, and part under the third ground. It is manifest that some of the jury based their finding on the first, and some on the third ground, but all did not agree upon either. There being no ‘concurrence’ of all of the members of the jury on either ground of negligence, the action of the district court in receiving the verdict was in direct disregard of the statute.”
I have found no case in this state which indicates to me that the law of Geary, supra, is no longer the law in this state. To paraphrase Justice Norvell in Reed v. Buck, 370 S.W.2d 867 (Tex.1963), that ancient cases, like old soldiers, do not just fade away, but remain decisions of the Supreme Court and unless there is some good reason for overruling them, they should not be disregarded.
In my humble opinion, the constitution of this state requires “concurrence” by the jury, which is not reflected in this record before us.