Court Opinion

ID: 9738730
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:01:39.967598+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:08.174325
License: Public Domain

Abrams, J.
(concurring, with whom Quirico and Liacos,
JJ., join). I concur in the decision by the court but suggest that this court consider further action on this matter. This court has not yet promulgated comprehensive rules concerning public access to court records of current proceedings. Cf. S.J.C. Rule 3:09, as amended, 375 Mass. 856 (1978), Rule Relative to the Disposal of Obsolete and Useless Papers and Records in Court.
*416It has often been the policy of this court to defer to the Legislature in that sometimes overlapping and undefinable area of power that exists between the two branches of government. While I do not think we should now depart from our past "spirit of mutual cooperation,” see O’Coin’s, Inc. v. Treasurer of the County of Worcester, 362 Mass. 507, 515 (1972), accord, State v. Clemente, 166 Conn. 501, 515 (1974); In re PA 267, 400 Mich 660, 664 (1977); see Note: The Judiciary and the Rule-Making Power, 23 S.C.L. Rev. 377, 394 (1971), I believe we should take action which would grant some measure of relief in this area.
In the absence of court rules, the Legislature has enacted legislation in aid of the judicial branch, but the fact that the Legislature has acted does not deprive the judicial branch of its power of decision in the area of judicial administration. See Collins v. Godfrey, 324 Mass. 574, 576 (1949). Accord, Opinion of the Justices, 375 Mass. 795, 813-814 (1978); O’Coin’s, Inc. v. Treasurer of the County of Worcester, supra at 513; Opinion of the Justices, 279 Mass. 607, 611 (1932).
While I recognize the need for a spirit of cooperation, I think some additional comment should be made as to the arguments set forth by the defendants.
First, I think we should reject the argument of the defendant clerk that he has a right to collect information of a personal nature as a part of the alphabetical index which he maintains.1 See G. L. c. 221, § 23. In my view he has no such right. The information being collected by the clerk in this case is appropriately collected by the probation department and no other. See G. L. c. 276, § 100. I would order the clerk to discontinue this practice forthwith. See also G. L. c. 6, § 177.
*417Second, I think we should reject the argument of the Attorney General appearing for the defendants, that the only power courts possess is "that necessary for their very existence.” To the extent that this argument is addressed not to this court as a constitutional court and a coequal branch of government but to statutory courts, I assume that the Legislature has the power to abolish every court but this court. However, the Legislature having established statutory courts cannot then unduly interfere with the exercise of the judicial powers by the courts, a term far more encompassing than "mere existence.” See O’Coin’s, supra at 509, 510.
Alternatively, if the argument were addressed to this court’s powers, I disagree with it. As one of the three equal branches of the government of this Commonwealth, this court, not the Legislature or the Executive, is accountable for the efficient and fair administration of justice. C. Grau, Judicial Rulemaking: Administration, Access and Accountability 11 (Am. Jud. Soc. [1978]). Thus the powers of this court are plenary with respect to the administration of justice.2
Third, greater access to information about the actions of public officers and institutions is increasingly recognized as an essential ingredient of public confidence in government. See Open Meeting Statutes: The Press Fights for the "Right to Know,” 75 Harv. L. Rev. 1199, 1201 (1962). The Legislature has responded by enacting numerous provisions, including open meeting laws (G. L. c. 39, §§ 23A-23C; G. L. c. 30A, §§ 11A-11A 1/2; G. L. c. 34, §§ 9F-9G; see Ghiglione v. School Comm. of Southbridge, 376 Mass. 70 [1978]; Attorney Gen. v. School Comm. of Northampton, 375 Mass. 127 [1978]), to increase the pub-*418lie’s access to governmental records (see G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth; G. L. c. 66, § 10; Attorney Gen. v. Collector of Lynn, ante 151, 152 [1979]; Hastings & Sons Publishing Co. v. City Treasurer of Lynn, 374 Mass. 812, 817-818 [1978]; Cunningham v. Health Officer of Chelsea, 7 Mass. App. Ct. 861 [1979])3 and has required financial disclosure by public officials. G. L. c. 268B.
By contrast CORI enshrouds certain records of proceedings in the judicial branch in secrecy and darkness. The trial judge found that under that statute access to records of past proceedings is possible only by "searching hundreds of thousands of docket entries ... at tremendous time and expense.” Obviously this difficulty is magnified in urban courts where the CORI requirement amounts to a virtual impoundment of records concerning all but the most recent cases.
The public primarily holds the judiciary, not the Executive or the Legislature, accountable for the administration of justice. C. Grau, supra. Since CORI impairs public access to court records and undermines confidence in the judiciary and injudicial integrity, we should consider the promulgation of rules permitting meaningful access to court records of pending cases. The CORI restrictions undercut the "general principle of publicity” with respect to judicial proceedings. See Ottaway Newspapers, Inc. v. Appeals Court, 372 Mass. 539, 546 (1977), quoting from Commonwealth v. Blondin, 324 Mass. 564, 571 (1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 984 (1950).
I suggest consideration of the promulgation of a rule forthwith that the clerk of each court, at least as to all pending cases, shall keep, maintain, and make available for public use an alphabetical list of the names of the parties, which list shall contain a reference, by case number, book, and page, of the records of each such case. See G. L. c. 221, § 23.
*419With respect to the closed cases, I suggest that we invite comments on what type of rule of court may be necessary to ensure that persons having a rightful interest in the records of those cases may have reasonable access thereto.

 The defendant clerk’s alphabetical index contains on one side of the card the defendant’s name, date of birth, the year, docket number, date of complaints, offenses, and judgments. The other side of the card contains the individual’s social security number, occupation, date and place of birth, height, weight, color of eyes and hair, complexion, and residential address. Cf. G. L. c. 221, § 23.

 The view expressed by the assistant attorney general suggests to me that a judge faced with a serious issue of separation of powers as between the judicial branch and the legislative branch should consider taking measures to obtain independent counsel for the judiciary. It is, after all, the Attorney General’s statutory obligation to represent the Legislature in such a case. See G. L. c. 231A, § 8.

 Apparently most of the information sought in this particular case is publicly available from the health officers of the various cities and towns served by the plaintiff. See G. L. c. 111, § 127B.