Court Opinion

ID: 9882548
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-05 22:11:30.069107+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:03:34.769199
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Smith v. Nelsonville, 2023-Ohio-2844.]

                           IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                              FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                   ATHENS COUNTY

GREGORY SMITH,                    :
                                  :
        Appellant-Appellee,       :   Case No. 22CA4
                                  :
        v.                        :
                                  :
CITY OF NELSONVILLE, OHIO, :          DECISION AND
et al.,                           :   JUDGMENT ENTRY
                                  :
        Appellees-Appellants.     :   RELEASED 8/07/2023
_____________________________________________________________
                              APPEARANCES:

Patrick Kasson and Kent Husion, Reminger Co., L.P.A., Columbus, Ohio, for
Appellants.

Daniel H. Klos, Lancaster, Ohio, for Appellee.
_____________________________________________________________

Smith, P.J.

        {¶1} The appellants in this matter consist of the City of Nelsonville as well

as Dan Sherman, Toni Dunfee, Elizabeth Jones, Justin Booth, Carla Grant, and

Cory Taylor, all members of the Nelsonville City Council. The appellee in this

matter is Gregory Smith, a former member of the Nelsonville City Council.

Appellants are appealing the judgment of the Athens County Court of Common

Pleas reversing the council’s removal of Smith from his elected seat on the council.

On appeal, Appellants contend 1) that the trial court erroneously held that council

was required to request the county prosecutor to prosecute the removal proceedings
Athens App. No. 22CA4                                                                  2

via an ordinance or resolution; 2) that even if it ran afoul of the charter, the

council’s appointment procedure constituted harmless error; 3) that even if the

appointment procedure prejudiced him, Appellee waived his right to challenge the

appointment; and 4) that while it did not expressly reverse the council’s decision

based upon the sufficiency of the evidence, the trial court abused its discretion in

providing a cursory evaluation of the evidence below.

      {¶2} However, because we find that council was required to contact the

county prosecutor via ordinance or resolution, that such contact was a prerequisite

to the appointment of special council, and that the failure of the council to act by

resolution or ordinance did not constitute harmless error, but instead rendered

Appellee’s removal from council a nullity, Appellants’ first and second

assignments of error are overruled. We likewise find no merit to Appellants’

argument that Appellee waived his right to challenge the appointment of the

special prosecutor and therefore, Appellants’ third assignment is overruled.

Finally, in light of our disposition of Appellants’ first, second, and third

assignments of error, their fourth assignment of error has been rendered moot and

we need not address it. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

                                        FACTS

      {¶3} The current appeal stems from what the record reveals was the

Nelsonville City Council’s third attempt to remove Appellee from his elected seat
Athens App. No. 22CA4                                                                 3

on the council. The third removal attempt, which is central to the present appeal,

appears to have been initiated on August 16, 2021. Council member Cory Taylor

issued a notice of probable cause for the removal of Appellee based upon his claim

that Appellee had failed to maintain continuous residence in the city and that he

instead resided in either Belpre, Ohio or Waterford, Ohio.

      {¶4} In commencing the third removal attempt, it appears that the members

of city council relied on a prior request made by the city manager to the county

prosecutor, which was made as part of one of the previous removal attempts,

asking that the county prosecutor prosecute the removal proceedings. It also

appears that upon receiving a request to prosecute either Appellee’s first or second

removal from the council, the county prosecutor indicated he was not interested in

doing so. There is some suggestion in the record that the city manager may have

also requested the county prosecutor’s assistance in the third removal attempt, but

the facts surrounding that request are very limited. In any event, the parties herein

agree that any request that was made to the county prosecutor was done so by the

city manager, not city council, and that no formal resolution or ordinance was

passed authorizing that the county prosecutor be contacted. Although there is no

formal document evidencing the county prosecutor’s refusal to prosecute the

present matter, the record reveals that council appointed a special prosecutor to
Athens App. No. 22CA4                                                                4

prosecute Appellee’s removal from city council. This appointment was

accomplished through the passage of Resolution No. 2246 on August 23, 2021.

      {¶5} An administrative hearing was held on September 2, 2021. Cory

Taylor, the charging party, presented one witness, as did Appellee. At the

conclusion of the hearing, council voted to remove Appellee from his elected seat

on city council for failing to continuously be a resident of the city. The council

then formally removed Appellee via Resolution No. 2247. Appellee thereafter

filed a notice of appeal to the Athens County Court of Common Pleas, which

ultimately reversed the administrative decision removing Appellee from his seat on

the council. The trial court found that council’s removal of Appellee was a nullity

because the council was required by the Nelsonville City Charter to request the

county prosecutor prosecute the removal action by either an ordinance or

resolution, and that the failure to do so precluded the appointment of the special

prosecutor and essentially rendered Appellee’s removal from council a nullity.

      {¶6} Appellants’ have now appealed the judgment of the trial court to this

Court, setting forth four assignments of error for our review.

                           ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

      I.     THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY HELD THAT
             COUNCIL WAS REQUIRED TO REQUEST THE
             [COUNTY PROSECUTOR] TO PROSECUTE THE
             REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS VIA AN ORDINANCE
             OR RESOLUTION.
Athens App. No. 22CA4                                                                5

      II.    EVEN IF IT RAN AFOUL OF THE CHARTER, THE
             COUNCIL’S     APPOINTMENT     PROCEDURE
             CONSTITUTED HARMLESS ERROR.

      III.   EVEN IF THE APPOINTMENT PROCEDURE
             PREJUDICED HIM, MR. SMITH WAIVED HIS RIGHT
             TO CHALLENGE THE APPOINTMENT.

      IV.    WHILE IT DID NOT EXPRESSLY REVERSE THE
             COUNCIL’S   DECISION   BASED    ON   THE
             SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE, THE TRIAL
             COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN PROVIDING
             A CURSORY EVALUATION OF THE EVIDENCE
             BELOW.

                        ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR I & II

      {¶7} For ease of analysis we address Appellants’ first and second

assignments of error in conjunction with one another. In their first assignment of

error, Appellants contend that the trial court erroneously held that council was

required to request the county prosecutor to prosecute the removal proceedings via

an ordinance or resolution. More specifically, Appellants argue that the

Nelsonville City Charter does not require council to pass an ordinance or

resolution that requests the county prosecutor’s participation in a member’s

removal proceeding and that because the passage of an ordinance or resolution was

not required, the council properly appointed special counsel to try the removal

proceedings. Appellee counters by arguing that the Nelsonville City Charter

provides that council may only act by ordinance or resolution and points out that

Appellants admit they did not pass an ordinance or resolution that requested the
Athens App. No. 22CA4                                                                 6

county prosecutor oversee Appellee’s removal proceeding. Appellee alternatively

argues that if the Nelsonville City Charter is interpreted to permit “some formal

action such as the removal of an elected Council member, it must comply with

R.C. 121.22 and be adopted in an open meeting or it is otherwise invalid.”

Appellee further notes that “[t]he record is entirely devoid of any action meeting

the mandates of R.C. 121.22 by Council to comply with the requirement of NCC

§11.08 to contact the [county prosecutor] by anyone at anytime for Mr. Smith’s

removal in this instant action.”

      {¶8} In their second assignment of error, Appellants contend that even if the

appointment procedure for the special prosecutor “ran afoul” of the city charter, the

appointment procedure that was used constituted harmless error. Appellants

further argue that the appointment procedure used in appointing the special

prosecutor did not affect Appellee’s substantive rights or interests and thus,

Appellant can not and has not demonstrated prejudice. Appellee counters by

arguing that the procedure used by Appellants to remove him from council was in

conflict with the city charter’s directives and was therefore a nullity. He further

argues that there is no distinction between procedural versus substantive due

process rights as applied to the removal of elected officials from office.
Athens App. No. 22CA4                                                                7

                                Standard of Review

      {¶9} R.C. 2506.01 governs “[a]ppeal[s] from decisions of any agency of any

political subdivision” and provides that every final order, adjudication, or decision

of any officer, tribunal, authority, board, bureau, commission, department, or other

division of any political subdivision of the state may be reviewed by the Court of

Common Pleas. The decision made by the Nelsonville City Council to remove

Appellee was first appealed to the Athens County Court of Common Pleas by

Appellee, which resulted in a judgment in Appellee’s favor. Appellants have now

filed an administrative appeal to this Court pursuant to R.C. 2506.04, which

provides that “[t]he judgment of the court may be appealed by any party on

questions of law as provided in the Rules of Appellate Procedure and, to the extent

not in conflict with those rules, Chapter 2505. of the Revised Code.”

      {¶10} Administrative appeals at the municipal level are governed by R.C.

Chapter 2506. Willoughby Hills v. C.C. Bar's Sahara, Inc., 64 Ohio St.3d 24, 26,

591 N.E.2d 1203 (1992). Under R.C. Chapter 2506, the court of common pleas

may find that the order, adjudication or decision of the administrative agency is

“unconstitutional, illegal, arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, or unsupported by

the preponderance of substantial, reliable, and probative evidence on the whole

record.” R.C. 2506.04. Consistent with its findings, the court of common pleas

may then “affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the order, adjudication, or decision, or
Athens App. No. 22CA4                                                                   8

remand the cause to the officer or body appealed from with instructions to enter an

order, adjudication, or decision consistent with the findings or opinion of the

court.” R.C. 2506.04. “[I]n weighing evidence, the court may not ‘blatantly

substitute its judgment for that of the agency, especially in areas of administrative

expertise.’ ” AT&T Communications of Ohio, Inc. v. Lynch, 132 Ohio St.3d 92,

2012-Ohio-1975, 969 N.E.2d 1166, ¶ 13, quoting Dudukovich v. Lorain Metro.

Hous. Auth., 58 Ohio St.2d 202, 207, 389 N.E.2d 1113 (1979). Accordingly, the

court of common pleas must affirm the agency's decision if it is supported by “a

preponderance of reliable, probative, and substantial evidence.” Burchfield v.

Jackson Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 4th Dist. Pickaway No. 07CA11, 2008-Ohio-

1228, ¶ 8.

      {¶11} However, reviews by appellate courts under R.C. 2506.04 are more

limited in scope than the court of common pleas. Three Wide Entertainment v.

Athens Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 194 Ohio App.3d 1, 2011-Ohio-2304, 954 N.E.2d

191, ¶ 9 (4th Dist.). “ ‘This statute grants a more limited power to the court of

appeals to review the judgment of the common pleas court only on “questions of

law,” which does not include the same extensive power to weigh “the

preponderance of substantial, reliable and probative evidence,” as is granted to the

common pleas court.’ ” Henley v. Youngstown Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 90 Ohio
Athens App. No. 22CA4                                                                  9

St.3d 142, 147, 735 N.E.2d 433 (2000), quoting Kisil v. Sandusky, 12 Ohio St.3d

30, 34, 465 N.E.2d 848, fn. 4 (1984).

      “It is incumbent on the trial court to examine the evidence. Such
      is not the charge of the appellate court. * * * The fact that the
      court of appeals * * * might have arrived at a different conclusion
      than the administrative agency is immaterial. Appellate courts
      must not substitute their judgment for those of an administrative
      agency or a trial court absent the approved criteria for doing so.”

Henley at 147, quoting Lorain City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. State Emp.

Relations Bd., 40 Ohio St.3d 257, 261, 533 N.E.2d 264 (1988).

      {¶12} The court of common pleas' ruling “may be appealed by any party on

questions of law.” R.C. 2506.04. Thus, the standard of review we apply is more

limited in scope; appellate courts are limited in an R.C. 2506.01 appeal to

reviewing questions of law. Lorain City School Dist. at 261. See also Burchfield

at ¶ 9. However, “ ‘[w]ithin the ambit of “questions of law” for the appellate

review would be abuse of discretion by the common pleas court,’ ” in choosing or

applying the law. Henley at 148, quoting Kisil at 34. An abuse of discretion

constitutes more than an error of law or judgment; rather, it implies that the trial

court's attitude was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. See, e.g., Landis v.

Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 82 Ohio St.3d 339, 342, 695 N.E.2d 1140 (1998); Malone v.

Courtyard by Marriott L.P., 74 Ohio St.3d 440, 448, 659 N.E.2d 1242 (1996).
Athens App. No. 22CA4                                                                 10

                                   Legal Analysis

      {¶13} As set forth in Appellants’ brief, “[t]his dispute centers on the proper

interpretation of the prosecutorial appointment procedure, as a prerequisite to a

Member’s removal proceeding * * *.” In determining that Appellants failed to

comply with the proper procedure for appointing a special prosecutor and, as a

result, that Appellants also failed to comply with the Nelsonville City Charter in

removing Appellee from his elected seat on the council, the trial court applied

Nelsonville City Charter §4.09 and §11.08 in reference to one another. Appellants

urge this Court to find that these two charter provisions were irreconcilable with

one another and thus, could not be read and interpreted in pari materia.

      {¶14} The trial court found and this Court agrees that the city charter

provides that membership on city council is expressly restricted to those who are

“qualified electors” who have been “continuously a resident” for one year prior to

their election and who “continue to be a resident and qualified elector of the City

throughout [their] term * * *.” Nelsonville City Charter §4.02. All parties further

agree that the charter permits council to remove a member for failing to possess or

maintain those qualifications. Nelsonville City Charter §11.08 addresses the

removal of officials and provides in section (A) that “[t]he Council members and

members of boards of commissions shall be removed for cause” for various

reasons set forth in the charter. At issue here is whether Appellee was
Athens App. No. 22CA4                                                             11

“continuously a resident” during the course of his term on council. Appellants did

not challenge that Appellee was a “qualified elector.”

      {¶15} Article XI of the city charter is entitled “General Provisions” and

contains §11.08, which is entitled “Removal of official.” §11.08(F) states as

follows regarding the process for the removal of a member of city council:

      Council shall request the County Prosecutor or his designee to
      prosecute the removal proceedings before the Council and any
      reviews thereof by the Courts. If the County Prosecutor refuses
      to accept the responsibility, Council shall appoint a Special
      Prosecutor who shall prosecute the removal proceedings before
      the Council and any reviews thereof by the Courts. If a person
      accused is not finally removed, the City shall pay the reasonable
      costs of the defense of such persons and any compensation
      withheld pending the appeal of the action of the Council.

Article IV of the city charter is entitled “The Council” and contains §4.09, which is

entitled “Forms of action by Council.” §4.09 states as follows:

      The action of Council shall be by ordinance or resolution. On all
      matters of a general or permanent nature, or granting a franchise,
      or levying a tax, or appropriating money, or contracting
      indebtedness, or issuing bonds or notes, or for the purchase, lease
      or transfer of property, action shall be taken formally, by
      ordinance, in the manner hereinafter provided. Action on all
      other matters of a temporary or informal nature may be taken by
      resolution.

      {¶16} Appellants contend that despite §4.09’s language stating “[t]he action

of Council shall be by ordinance or resolution[,]” §11.08 does not require the

passage of an ordinance or resolution to “request” the county prosecutor to

prosecute removal proceedings. In support of their argument, Appellants direct our
Athens App. No. 22CA4                                                                    12

attention to the fact that several other sections of the city charter explicitly state

that passage of an ordinance or resolution is necessary to accomplish certain acts,

whereas §11.08(F) does not. Appellants argue that if §4.09 were interpreted to

require the passage of an ordinance or resolution for essentially every action taken

by council, these certain other provisions of the city charter that expressly require

the passage of an ordinance or resolution would be rendered “superfluous.”

      {¶17} Appellants do not dispute that no ordinance or resolution was passed

empowering the council to request the county prosecutor handle the removal

proceedings prior to moving forward with the passage of a resolution appointing a

special prosecutor to handle the matter. The trial court found this flaw in the

removal of Appellee to a be a fatal one, resulting in the nullification of the

removal. Because the trial court found the council’s failure to pass either an

ordinance or resolution formally requesting that the county prosecutor prosecute

the removal to be a fatal flaw that nullified the action of council, it did not reach

the merits of Appellee’s additional argument below that the determination that he

had failed to continuously be a resident was not supported by a preponderance of

reliable, probative and substantial evidence. For the following reasons, we believe

the trial court correctly disposed of the appeal based upon this question of law

without the need for addressing the substantive question of whether the council’s
Athens App. No. 22CA4                                                                      13

stated grounds for removal were supported by the evidence introduced during the

administrative hearing.

      {¶18} In reaching its decision, the trial court relied on the reasoning set forth

in State ex rel. Gerhardt v. Krehbiel, 38 Ohio St.2d 90, 310 N.E.2d 251 (1974). In

Gerhardt, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that “[w]here a municipal charter

prescribes the manner for removal of municipal officers, any attempt by the

municipality’s legislative body to remove an officer in a manner at variance or in

conflict with the charter’s directives is a nullity.” Id. at syllabus. Here, the trial

court found that although council was empowered to remove one of its own

members for a designated cause, it had to do so in strict compliance with the city

charter. The trial court further found that because a prerequisite to the prosecution

of such action by a special prosecutor was the passage of an ordinance or

resolution requesting the county prosecutor to prosecute the removal, along with

the denial thereof by the county prosecutor, and because there was no dispute that

council failed to pass either an ordinance or resolution approving a request be

made to the county prosecutor, the removal attempt was a nullity and therefore

“illegal and unreasonable within the meaning of R.C. 2506.04.”

      {¶19} After reviewing the record, which includes the city charter as well as

the administrative hearing transcript and related exhibits, we cannot conclude that

the trial court abused its discretion in its application of the law to the facts of this
Athens App. No. 22CA4                                                                14

case. Not only do we find Gerhardt to be applicable and controlling, we are

mindful of a prior decision issued by this Court finding that where a village

ordinance required the passage of a resolution to accomplish a particular action, the

passage of such resolution was “the only manner in which the board may act.”

Village of New Holland v. Murphy, 4th Dist. Pickaway No. 18CA6, 2019-Ohio-

2423, ¶ 17. In that case, we found the absence of a resolution, coupled with our

conclusion that the board could only act by resolution, to be central to the

disposition of the case. Id. at ¶ 15.

      {¶20} Here, in reaching our decision, we reject Appellants’ argument that

§§4.09 and 11.08 of the Nelsonville City Charter are irreconcilable. As set forth

above, §4.09 states as follows:

      The action of Council shall be by ordinance or resolution. On
      all matters of a general or permanent nature, or granting a
      franchise, or levying a tax, or appropriating money, or
      contracting indebtedness, or issuing bonds or notes, or for the
      purchase, lease or transfer of property, action shall be taken
      formally, by ordinance, in the manner hereinafter provided.
      Action on all other matters of a temporary or informal nature
      may be taken by resolution. (Emphasis added).

§4.09 obviously appears first, chronologically, in the city charter. It specifies that

the action of council “shall be by ordinance or resolution.” For matters of a

general or permanent nature, action shall be taken by ordinance “in the manner

[thereafter] provided.” Action on “all other matters of a temporary or informal

nature may be taken by resolution.”
Athens App. No. 22CA4                                                                 15

      {¶21} §11.08 appears later in the charter, chronologically, falling under

Chapter XI, entitled “General provisions.” Reading §4.09 in pari materia with

§11.08(F), we conclude the charter provides that the removal of an official is a

“general” matter by definition in the charter. Thus, at the very least, such action

requires the passage of a resolution, but likely requires the passage of an ordinance.

Again, reading these two charter provisions in pari materia, action to remove a

council member shall be taken by ordinance (or resolution as noted), “in the

manner hereinafter provided,” which here would be the manner set forth in §11.08.

§11.08(F) states that before appointing a special prosecutor to handle a removal

action, council first “shall request the County Prosecutor or his designee to

prosecute the removal proceedings * * *.” If, and only if, the county prosecutor

refuses, may council proceed with the appointment of a special prosecutor. We

conclude that the charter itself makes clear that council was required to request the

county prosecutor’s involvement by ordinance (or at the least, by resolution).

      {¶22} We find no irreconcilable conflict between these two charter

provisions. Instead, we find that §4.09 is a provision that overarches the rest of the

charter and informs the reading of subsequent provisions, such as §11.08. We

further reject Appellants’ argument that interpreting the charter to require the

passage of a resolution or ordinance to contact the prosecutor for a removal action

renders superfluous other charter provisions that expressly require the passage of
Athens App. No. 22CA4                                                                 16

an ordinance or resolution. The fact that certain other charter provisions expressly

state that an ordinance or resolution is required, whereas §11.08(F) does not

include that express requirement, does not remove §11.08(F) from the application

of §4.09. To the extent the drafting of these other provisions of the charter may

appear illogical in light of the mandate contained in §4.09, we note that the

Supreme Court of Ohio has stated “that the feasibility or wisdom of charter

provisions is ‘not a matter for our consideration.’ ” State ex rel. Cater v. Olmsted,

69 Ohio St.3d 315, 324, 631 N.E.2d 1048 (1994), quoting Fuldauer v. Cleveland,

32 Ohio St.2d 114, 118, 290 N.E.2d 546 (1972) (noting the Court’s prior reasoning

that municipalities have the right in adopting charters “to make provisions that may

be silly and unwise[,]” and that “the remedy is in the hands of the people who have

adopted the charter”).

      {¶23} Here, because the record is clear that neither an ordinance or

resolution was passed, council failed to strictly comply with the requirements of

the charter in the removal of Appellee. Thus, because council failed to strictly

comply with the process for removal of an elected official as set forth in the city

charter, Appellee’s removal from council was rendered a nullity. Accordingly, we

find no merit to the arguments raised under Appellants’ first assignment of error.

Additionally, in light of the fact that we have not found that a resolution or
Athens App. No. 22CA4                                                             17

ordinance was unnecessary, we need not address Appellee’s alternate argument in

support of affirmance which alleges violations of the Sunshine Act.

      {¶24} Appellants’ further contend, however, under their second assignment

of error, that even if the appointment procedure used to appoint the special

prosecutor ran afoul of the city charter, any error was harmless because Appellee’s

substantive due process right were unaffected. In making this argument,

Appellants contend that Gerhardt involved a denial of substantive due process, by

virtue of the fact that a member was removed with fewer than the required number

of votes, as opposed to the situation here, where Appellee was removed without

strict adherence to the process for requesting the participation of the county

prosecutor in the removal process before appointing a special prosecutor.

Appellants describe any deficiencies from the required procedure in the present

case to be merely procedural, trivial, or ministerial. As such, Appellants argue that

Gerhardt is inapplicable to the present case.

      {¶25} First, we note that Gerhardt involved the removal of a city manager

as opposed to an elected official. State ex rel. Gerhardt at 91. Second, in

Gerhardt, a resolution was actually passed removing the city manager from office.

Id. The Gerhardt court determined that despite the fact that a resolution was

passed for the removal, the resolution was in conflict with provisions of the charter

specifying the number of votes required to effect removal. Id. at 93-94. In holding
Athens App. No. 22CA4                                                                18

that the removal of “an officer in a manner at variance or in conflict with the

charter’s directives is a nullity[,]” the Court reasoned as follows:

      “If the members of a legislative body can ignore, with impunity,
      the mandates of a * * * city charter, than [sic] it is certain that the
      faith of the people in constitutional government will be
      underminded [sic] and eventually eroded completely.”

Id. at 94, quoting Cleveland ex rel. Neelon v. Locher, 25 Ohio St.2d 49, 52, 266

N.E.2d 831 (1971).

      {¶26} Third, in reaching its decision, the Supreme Court of Ohio drew no

distinctions between substantive versus procedural due process when it came to

strict compliance with a city charter in removing an official.

      {¶27} Despite Appellants’ arguments that the harmless error doctrine

applies and that Appellee must demonstrate prejudice in order to warrant reversal,

we are not inclined to hold that a city council’s failure to comply with its charter to

the extent that its purported action has been rendered a nullity can be considered

harmless error. See generally Button v. Button, 2nd Dist. Montgomery No. 16122,

1997 WL 337666, * 7 (1997) (finding that where Button was entitled to notice and

an opportunity to be heard but denied those rights, any judgment rendered against

him was void, a nullity, and of no effect regardless of whether the judgment was

prejudicial). As set forth above, the purported removal of Appellee was completed

without the passage of either an ordinance or resolution requesting the county

prosecutor initiate the removal proceedings. The passage of an ordinance or
Athens App. No. 22CA4                                                                  19

resolution was the very mechanism by which council is empowered to act under

§4.09 of the city charter. Thus, the purported removal was void and of no effect,

regardless of whether or not it was prejudicial to Appellee. Id. We simply find

that the harmless error doctrine is inapplicable here, where council lacked authority

to act by virtue of its failure to pass an ordinance, or at the very least a resolution.

Such a procedural deficiency is more than just trivial or ministerial. Thus, we

reject Appellants’ argument that council’s failure to pass a resolution authorizing

the county prosecutor be requested to initiate Appellee’s removal from council

constituted harmless error.

      {¶28} Accordingly, having found no merit in Appellants’ first or second

assignments of error, they are overruled.

                           ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III

      {¶29} In their third assignment of error, Appellants’ contend that even if the

appointment procedure prejudiced Appellee, he waived his right to challenge the

appointment of a special prosecutor. Appellants argue that Appellee failed to

timely object to the procedural error at issue and thus waived his right to raise it on

appeal. Appellants further argue that council appointed a special prosecutor on

August 23, 2021, and that Appellee failed to object to the appointment procedure

until the close of Appellants’ case-in-chief, which occurred on September 2, 2021.
Athens App. No. 22CA4                                                               20

However, we find no merit in Appellants’ argument that Appellee waived his right

to challenge the appointment of the special prosecutor.

      {¶30} Contrary to Appellants’ representations to this Court, the record

indicates that Appellee made two inquiries to the Athens County Prosecutor’s

Office, described by Appellee as public records requests, in an attempt to obtain

information regarding the manner in which the county prosecutor was consulted

and the manner in which the county prosecutor refused the request. The first

request was made on August 20, 2021, and received no response. The second

request was made on August 25, 2021, and resulted in the provision of a copy of a

letter from the city manager, not city council, to the county prosecutor dated March

8, 2021, which was prior to the date the current removal proceedings were

initiated. During the administrative hearing, only one witness was introduced on

behalf of the charging party, Cory Taylor. During the cross-examination of the

charging party’s sole witness, Appellee’s counsel repeatedly attempted to inquire

into the process used to consult with the county prosecutor and eventually appoint

the special prosecutor. The special prosecutor, however, objected to every

question on the basis of attorney-client privilege and the objections were sustained

by Mr. Dunfee. Despite this challenge, Appellee was able to establish through

cross-examination that no resolution or ordinance was passed authorizing contact

with the county prosecutor.
Athens App. No. 22CA4                                                               21

       {¶31} In light of the foregoing, it appears from the record that Appellee

preserved this issue for purposes of appeal to the common pleas court and the issue

was further preserved at the common pleas level for purposes of appeal to this

Court. Accordingly, because we conclude that Appellee did not waive his right to

challenge the appointment of the special prosecutor, Appellants’ third assignment

of error is overruled.

                           ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR IV

       {¶32} In their fourth assignment of error, Appellants contend that although

the trial court did not expressly reverse the council’s decision based on the

sufficiency of the evidence, the trial court abused its discretion in providing a

cursory evaluation of the evidence below. However, in light of our disposition of

Appellants’ first three assignments of error, any errors raised under this assignment

of error have been rendered moot and we decline to address them.

                                 CONCLUSION

       {¶33} Having found no merit to Appellants’ first three assignments of error,

and having found Appellants’ fourth assignment of error moot, the judgment of the

trial court is affirmed.

                                                     JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
Athens App. No. 22CA4                                                                 22

                              JUDGMENT ENTRY

     It is ordered that the JUDGMENT BE AFFIRMED and costs be assessed to
Appellant.
      The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
     It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the
Athens County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.
       A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule
27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Hess, J. and Wilkin, J. concur in Judgment and Opinion.

                                For the Court,
                                _____________________________
                                Jason P. Smith
                                Presiding Judge

                             NOTICE TO COUNSEL
      Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final
judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the
date of filing with the clerk.