Court Opinion

ID: 9963778
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-26 06:06:25.086685+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:59.348149
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                          STATE OF MICHIGAN

                           COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,                                   UNPUBLISHED
                                                                   April 25, 2024
               Plaintiff-Appellee,

v                                                                  No. 351593
                                                                   Clare Circuit Court
ALEXANDER JAMES HAUPT,                                             LC No. 17-005731-FH

               Defendant-Appellant.

                                         ON REMAND

Before: MURRAY, P.J., and M. J. KELLY and O’BRIEN, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        This matter is before us again on remand from the Supreme Court. See People v Haupt,
997 NW2d 175 (2023). In that order, the Court vacated those parts of our prior opinion dealing
with defendant’s right to counsel and disproportionate sentencing arguments, and remanded those
issues for reconsideration in light of People v Posey, 512 Mich 317; 1 NW3d 101 (2023), and
People v King, 512 Mich 1; 999 NW2d 670 (2023). Haupt, 997 NW2d 175. We affirm.

                       I. SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL

        With respect to defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel argument, we held in the
prior opinion that defendant alleged a structural error, People v Russell, 471 Mich 182, 194 n 29;
684 NW2d 745 (2004), but that his failure to have counsel for two hearings over a two-month
period, in violation of People v Anderson, 398 Mich 361, 367-368; 247 NW2d 857 (1976), and
MCR 6.005(D), did not meet the fourth prong of the plain error test under People v Carines, 460
Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999):

                 The only period when defendant was without appointed counsel and
       proceeding in propria persona with advisory counsel was from the day appointed
       counsel was allowed to withdraw on June 10, 2019, until the day trial was to
       commence on July 23, 2019, when counsel was reappointed to represent defendant
       at trial. When appointed counsel was allowed to withdraw, defendant did not object
       to the withdrawal, but he also did not request to represent himself. The record
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indicates that the trial court failed to comply with the substance of Anderson and
MCR 6.005(D).

        Nevertheless, even if the first three prongs of the plain error standard have
been established, we conclude that reversal is not warranted under the fourth
Carines prong. Carines, 460 Mich at 763-764. Defendant does not claim that he
is actually innocent, and we are not convinced that the trial court’s plain error
seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings
independent of the defendant’s innocence. Id. “[T]he fourth Carines prong is
meant to be applied on a case-specific and fact-intensive basis,” and reversal is not
justified if the “underlying purposes” of the right at issue have been alternatively
upheld.

        In People v Kammeraad, 307 Mich App 98, 130; 858 NW2d 490 (2014),
this Court noted that “the right to assistance of counsel, cherished and fundamental
though it may be, may not be put to service as a means of delaying or trifling with
the court.” Kammeraad recognized that a defendant may forfeit his right to counsel
through “purposeful tactics and conduct that were employed to delay and frustrate
the orderly process of the lower court’s proceedings.” Id. at 131, citing State v Mee,
756 SE2d 103, 114 (NC App, 2014). In other words, “willful conduct by a
defendant that results in the absence of defense counsel constitutes a forfeiture of
the right to counsel.” Kammeraad, 307 Mich App at 131. Forfeiture is
distinguishable from waiver. When a defendant forfeits the right to counsel, the
court is not required to determine whether the defendant knowingly,
understandingly, and voluntarily gave up his right. Id.

         The defendant in Kammeraad forfeited his right to counsel by “refus[ing]
to accept, recognize, or communicate with appointed counsel, . . . refus[ing] . . .
self-representation, and . . . refus[ing] to otherwise participate in the proceedings.”
Id., at 131-132. Although in Kammeraad the defendant refused to get dressed and
walk into the courtroom, requiring court officers to place him in a wheelchair, cover
him up, and haul him in, id. at 112, we said that a forfeiture can be found on the
basis of less outlandish conduct. A defendant might forfeit his right to counsel, for
example, by refusing to accept appointed counsel while also failing “ ‘to retain
counsel within a reasonable time,’ ” or by acting “ ‘abusive toward’ ” his retained
or appointed counsel. Id. at 132, quoting United States v McLeod, 53 F3d 322, 325
(CA 11, 1995).

        This Court also recognized “the hybrid situation of ‘waiver by conduct,’ ”
also known as “ ‘forfeiture with knowledge,’ ” “which combines elements of
forfeiture and waiver.” Kammeraad, 307 Mich App at 133-134, quoting United
States v Goldberg, 67 F3d 1092, 1101 (CA 3, 1995). Waiver by conduct/forfeiture
with knowledge occurs when “a defendant is warned that he or she will lose counsel
if the defendant engages in dilatory tactics, with any misconduct thereafter being
treated as an implied request for self-representation.” Kammeraad, 307 Mich App
at 133.

       Here, the trial court seemingly found that defendant had given up his right
to counsel through his conduct. Although the court should have (again) advised
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       defendant of the charges against him, the sentencing consequences he faced, and
       the various risks of representing himself before allowing appointed counsel to
       withdraw, this failure is not outcome-determinative given defendant’s conduct. As
       the trial court noted, defendant’s actions delayed the case for over two years, in part
       by repeatedly terminating the services of his retained and appointed counsel. He
       initially waived his preliminary examination in 2017 because the prosecution made
       a plea offer, but defendant continually rejected plea offers that his attorneys
       recommended he should take. Just one week before his previously adjourned
       October 2018 trial, defendant moved to remand to district court for a preliminary
       hearing. He made his counsel’s work impossible. He refused to communicate with
       his retained counsel, and his lack of communication continued with his appointed
       counsel. He threatened his retained counsel’s professional license, while he
       accused his appointed attorney of lying and colluding with the prosecutor’s office.

               During the less than two months that defendant represented himself with
       advisory counsel, two hearings took place: (1) a final pretrial hearing and (2) a
       hearing on defendant’s motion to suppress evidence and motion to dismiss, and on
       the prosecutor’s motion to use AM’s preliminary examination testimony at trial.
       Consistent with his demonstrated lack of communication throughout the case,
       defendant did not reach out to advisory counsel for any advice or counsel during
       this time. Under these circumstances, the trial court did not violate defendant’s
       constitutional right to counsel at a critical stage of the proceeding. Defendant has
       failed to show plain error. [People v Haupt, unpublished per curiam opinion of the
       Court of Appeals, issued September 23, 2021 (Docket No. 351593), p 3-5 (citations
       omitted).]

        We must now reconsider this holding in light of King. In that decision, the Court held that
a defendant’s invalid waiver of counsel which deprived him of counsel at critical stages of the
proceedings was not subject to waiver or forfeiture, and required automatic reversal. King, 512
Mich at 17 (“Defendant was not required to affirmatively invoke his Sixth Amendment right to
counsel in order to preserve that right. Defendant was not required to object to the invalid waiver
of the right to counsel, and the Carines forfeiture doctrine does not apply. Because defendant’s
waiver of his right to counsel was invalid, he was deprived of counsel during significant portions
of the critical stages in the proceedings, including trial, and the error is subject to automatic
reversal”).

        Under the Sixth Amendment, an accused has the right to counsel during all critical stages
of a criminal prosecution. US Const, Am VI; see also People v Russell, 471 Mich 182, 187-188;
684 NW2d 745 (2004). When this right is violated it constitutes a structural, constitutional error
requiring automatic reversal. People v Willing, 267 Mich App 208, 224; 704 NW2d 472 (2005).
Not all stages of a criminal proceeding constitute critical stages. People v Lewis, 501 Mich 1, 8 n
4; 903 NW2d 816 (2017) (recognizing that “neither [People v] Arnold [477 Mich 852; 720 NW2d
740 (2006)] nor Russell could have held that the complete denial of counsel at any critical stage of
a criminal proceeding is structural error requiring automatic reversal, when the Supreme Court of
the United States has held otherwise.”). “Structural errors, as explained in Neder [v United States,
527 US 1, 7; 119 S Ct 1827; 144 L Ed 2d 35 (1999)], are intrinsically harmful, without regard to
their effect on the outcome, so as to require automatic reversal.” People v Duncan, 462 Mich 47,
51; 610 NW2d 551 (2000). This holds true because “structural errors deprive defendants of basic

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protections without which a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for a
determination of guilt or innocence.” Id. at 52. An error becomes a structural defect when it
“infects the entire trial mechanism.” People v Anderson (After Remand), 446 Mich 392, 406; 521
NW2d 538 (1994). See also Arizona v Fulminante, 499 US 279, 309-310; 111 S Ct 1246; 113 L
Ed 2d 302 (1991). Harmless error analysis should not be applied where “deprivation of the right
to counsel affected—and contaminated—the entire criminal proceeding.” Satterwhite v Texas,
486 US 249, 257; 108 S Ct 1792; 100 L Ed 2d 284 (1988).

         For example, in Lewis the Court held that the deprivation of counsel at a preliminary
examination was subject to a harmless-error analysis. Lewis, 501 Mich at 9. On the opposite end
of Lewis is King. There, defendant was deprived of counsel minimally “during (1) pretrial
preparations, including at least one pretrial hearing, (2) jury selection, (3) opening statements, (4)
judge’s instructions, and (5) direct and cross-examination of key witnesses.” King, 512 Mich at
16. Unlike in Lewis, where the absence of counsel at the preliminary examination was subject to
harmless-error analysis, because the defendant in King “was deprived of his right to counsel at
critical stages of the criminal proceedings, including at trial, the error [was] subject to automatic
reversal.” Id. (emphasis added).1

        In light of this precedent, we hold that defendant was not deprived of counsel at a critical
stage of the proceeding such that it constituted a structural error requiring automatic reversal. As
stated in our prior decision in this case, “During the less than two months that defendant
represented himself with advisory counsel, two hearings took place: (1) a final pretrial hearing and
(2) a hearing on defendant’s motion to suppress evidence and motion to dismiss, and on the
prosecutor’s motion to use AM’s preliminary examination testimony at trial.” Haupt, unpub op at
4-5.

         The critical stage analysis “applies to preliminary proceedings where rights may be
sacrificed or defenses lost.” Duncan v Michigan, 284 Mich App 246, 263-264; 774 NW2d 89
(2009) (quotation marks and citations omitted). In Van v Jones, 475 F3d 292 (CA 6 2007), the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals lamented the lack of a “comprehensive and final one-line definition
of ‘critical stage,’ ” but stated “the Supreme Court and our court have offered six short definitional
statements over time:

         1) A critical stage presents a moment when “[a]vailable defenses may be
         irretrievably lost, if not then and there asserted.”

1
    As stated by the Court in King, 512 Mich at 15-16:

         Lewis is categorically different from the instant case. The defendant in Lewis was
         only denied counsel during a preliminary examination. Id. at 3. Harmless-error
         analysis applied in Lewis because after defendant's preliminary examination, he
         was found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in an otherwise fair trial. Id. at 11.
         Here, because defendant's invalid waiver of counsel occurred before his trial began,
         defendant was denied his right to counsel during most of the critical stages of the
         proceedings.

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        2) A critical stage is one “where rights are preserved or lost.”

        3) Counsel’s assistance is guaranteed “whenever necessary to mount a meaningful
        defence.”

        4) Determination as to “whether a hearing is a ‘critical stage’ requiring the
        provision of counsel depends . . . upon an analysis ‘whether potential substantial
        prejudice to defendant’s rights inheres in the . . . confrontation and the ability of
        counsel to help avoid that prejudice.’ ”

        5) A critical stage holds “significant consequences for the accused.”

        6) In Lundberg [v Buchkoe, 389 F2d 154, 158 (CA 6, 1968)], our court defined a
        “floor” for analysis as to whether a phase in a criminal proceeding may be
        considered critical. We do not label as a critical stage “proceedings where even the
        likelihood of later prejudice arising from the failure to appoint is absent.” [Id. at
        312 (citations omitted).]

        The pretrial conference on June 25, 2019, was not a critical stage in the proceedings that
required representation by counsel. Nothing that occurred during the conference substantially
affected defendant’s rights. See United States v Benford, 574 F3d 1228, 1233 (CA 9, 2009)
(holding that the pretrial status conference in that case was not a “critical stage” because “[n]othing
significant occurred,” “there was no ‘loss of significant rights,’ ” and it “plainly did not ‘test[ ] the
merits of the accused’s case.’ ”) (citations omitted; second alteration in original). The prosecution
reiterated a plea offer to defendant that he had previously rejected, and that he rejected again, and
the court set a date by which defendant could make a counter-offer.

         Nor was the joint hearing on defendant’s motion to suppress evidence and motion to
dismiss, and on the prosecutor’s motion to use AM’s preliminary examination testimony at trial, a
critical stage of the proceedings so as to require automatic reversal under King. Defendant moved
for dismissal based on alleged discovery violations by the prosecution, just weeks before the date
set for trial. We are aware of no United States Supreme Court decision holding that a hearing on
a discovery motion similar to defendant’s motion to dismiss, like a motion to compel, is a critical
stage of criminal proceedings. And defendant had counsel—both retained and appointed—for
months prior. Appointed counsel Scott Moore was originally appointed to represent defendant in
October 2018, and tried to work with defendant for months until requesting to withdraw because
of defendant’s actions. During that time, Moore received discovery from the prosecutor and
participated in the remand to district court for a preliminary examination where he cross-examined
AM and a detective.

        With regard to the prosecution’s motion for admission of AM’s preliminary examination
testimony at trial under MRE 804(b)(1), defense counsel Moore had the opportunity to and did
cross-examine AM at the preliminary examination. It was that testimony that was ultimately read
into evidence at trial. Accordingly, we hold that defendant suffered no significant consequences
related to his right to confront this witness from lack of appointed counsel for this motion.

        The same holds true for defendant’s motion to suppress. Defendant argued in his motion
and at the hearing that the initial search warrant authorizing a search of his cell phone for stalking
was overbroad, and led to a second search warrant and the discovery of evidence, including explicit
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pictures, that resulted in his charges for child sexually abusive activity and material. Before jury
selection commenced on the first day of trial, the court denied defendant’s motion to suppress.

       In McCray v Illinois, 386 US 300, 307; 87 S Ct 1056; 18 L Ed 2d 62 (1967), the Supreme
Court explained in a Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause case that a suppression hearing
implicates a lesser concern than trial itself:

       We must remember . . . that we are not dealing with the trial of the criminal charge
       itself. There the need for a truthful verdict outweighs society's need for the informer
       privilege. Here, however, the accused seeks to avoid the truth. The very purpose
       of a motion to suppress is to escape the inculpatory thrust of evidence in hand, not
       because its probative force is diluted in the least by the mode of seizure, but rather
       as a sanction to compel enforcement officers to respect the constitutional security
       of all of us under the Fourth Amendment. If the motion to suppress is denied,
       defendant will still be judged upon the untarnished truth. [Citation omitted.]

         Two federal courts addressing habeas appeals have discussed whether suppression hearings
are a critical stage of the criminal proceeding that counsel must attend to avoid automatic reversal.
One of those courts determined such a hearing to be a critical stage of the proceeding, and held
that because counsel was not present for it, the defendant should have been awarded a new trial.
See Henderson v Frank, 155 F3d 159, 171-172 (CA 3, 1998). The other court upheld the denial
of habeas relief because “no Supreme Court precedent has directly addressed the issue of whether
the denial of counsel at a hearing on a motion to suppress is a ‘complete denial of counsel’ at a
‘critical stage’ of a criminal proceeding for the purposes of the Sixth Amendment.” Gomez v
Thaler, 526 F Appx 355, 359 (CA 5, 2013). Additionally, in United States v Hamilton, 391 F3d
1066 (CA 9, 2004), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a suppression hearing constituted
a critical stage of the proceedings, stating, “ ‘[i]t is quite clear that a pretrial motion to suppress
evidence is a critical stage of the prosecution requiring the presence of counsel for the accused,’
because in many cases the crucial issue is the admissibility of evidence found in the defendant's
possession.” Id. at 1070, quoting Olney v. United States, 433 F2d 161, 163 (CA 9, 1970). There,
“at the suppression hearing the district court permitted the government to conduct redirect
examination of the searching officer concerning [the defendant] with neither [the defendant] nor
his counsel present.” Hamilton, 391 F3d at 1068.

        We have no doubt that a suppression hearing could be a critical stage under certain
circumstances where the absence of counsel affected and contaminated the entire proceedings. But
not so here. Although defendant was without counsel to draft his motion to suppress or at the
motion hearing, and upon first glance, a motion to suppress evidence directly supporting
defendant’s charges would appear to have significant consequences, the lack of representation did
not result in the loss of a substantial right here. Unlike in Hamilton, 391 F3d at 1069, and
Henderson, 155 F3d at 170, where witnesses were called and questioned during the respective
suppression hearings, at defendant’s motion to suppress hearing, no witnesses were called. Rather,
the parties made oral argument, with defendant simply reading his motion into the record, and the
court denied the motion on the first day of trial. Further, at trial outside the presence of the jury,
reappointed defense counsel moved to suppress the evidence related to the sexual abuse charges
obtained from the second search warrant. Although he argued for suppression on a different basis
than defendant had, asserting that the second search warrant authorized a search of defendant’s
phone, not of the data and images extracted from the phone during the first search, he cited caselaw
and made a robust and nuanced argument. Thus, defense counsel had a subsequent opportunity,
                                                 -6-
which he took, to address the issues raised in defendant’s motion to suppress, and in doing so
prevented the irretrievable loss of defendant’s defenses. Accordingly, we hold that defendant was
not deprived of counsel at a critical stage of the proceeding such that it constituted a structural
error requiring automatic reversal.

                                     II. SENTENCING ISSUES

        Defendant also argues that even if the guidelines were properly scored, his sentence of 78
months to 20 years for producing child sexually abusive activity is unreasonable and
disproportionate. In our prior opinion we rejected the argument, citing this Court’s opinion in
People v Posey (Posey I), 334 Mich App 338; 964 NW2d 862 (2020), aff’d in part and vacated in
part by 512 Mich 317 (2023), and stating:

               Here, defendant’s sentence is at the bottom of the sentencing guidelines
        range of 78 to 130 months. Therefore, we must affirm defendant’s sentences
        “absent an error in scoring the sentencing guidelines or inaccurate information
        relied upon in determining the defendant’s sentence[s].” Because we have
        concluded that the challenge to the scoring of the sentencing guidelines lacks merit,
        and defendant does not allege that inaccurate information was relied upon in
        determining his sentence, MCL 769.34(10) directs that the sentence be affirmed.

               “A defendant can only overcome the presumption of proportionality by
        presenting unusual circumstances that would render a presumptively proportionate
        sentence disproportionate,” such as a sentence that constitutes cruel and unusual
        punishment. Defendant appears to be suggesting that the unusual circumstances
        that would allow this Court to conclude that his within-guidelines sentence was
        disproportionate are (1) the numerous plea offers offered by the prosecution that
        included various sentences of less than one year and no more than five months, and
        his consensual sexual relationship with AM, who he asserts “did not look like a
        child” and whose pictures “were not sold as child pornography.” However,
        defendant repeatedly chose not to accept a plea offer that he now deems to include
        what is “illustrative of a fair sentence,” and he acknowledges that consent is not a
        defense to the charges in this case. Defendant has failed to show unusual
        circumstances and has failed to overcome the presumption that his within-
        guidelines sentence was proportionate. [Haupt, unpub op at 14 (citations omitted).]

       Our Supreme Court subsequently vacated in part this Court’s decision in Posey I, holding
that appellate courts must review all sentences, even those within the guidelines range, for
reasonableness, “which requires the reviewing court to consider whether the sentence is
proportionate to the seriousness of the matter.” Posey (Posey II), 512 Mich at 352. Thus, we have
now been directed to review defendant’s within-guidelines sentence for reasonableness.

         Generally, “the proper inquiry when reviewing a sentence for reasonableness is whether
the trial court abused its discretion by violating the ‘principle of proportionality’ set forth in People
v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630, 636; 461 NW2d 1 (1990), ‘which requires sentences imposed by the
trial court to be proportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances surrounding the offense and
the offender.’ ” People v Steanhouse, 500 Mich 453, 459-460; 902 NW2d 327 (2017). A trial
court abuses its discretion when the sentence imposed by the trial court is disproportionate to the
seriousness of the circumstances involving the offense and the offender. Milbourn, 435 Mich at
                                                  -7-
636. If the trial court selects a sentence that falls within the range recommended under the advisory
guidelines, that sentence is presumptively proportionate. Posey II, 512 Mich at 357.

       Our Court recently set forth the guidelines we must apply in reviewing a within-guidelines
sentence for proportionality:

       “An appropriate sentence should give consideration to the reformation of the
       offender, the protection of society, the discipline of the offender, and the deterrence
       of others from committing the same offense.” People v Boykin, 510 Mich 171, 183;
       987 NW2d 58 (2022). With respect to sentencing and the guidelines, the key test
       is not whether a sentence departs from or adheres to the guidelines range.
       Steanhouse, 500 Mich at 472. The key test is whether the sentence is proportionate
       to the seriousness of the matter. Id. In regard to proportionality, the Milbourn
       Court “observed that the Legislature has determined to visit the stiffest punishment
       against persons who have demonstrated an unwillingness to obey the law after prior
       encounters with the criminal justice system.” Milbourn, 435 Mich at 668. “The
       premise of our system of criminal justice is that, everything else being equal, the
       more egregious the offense, and the more recidivist the criminal, the greater the
       punishment.” People v Babcock, 469 Mich 247, 263; 666 NW2d 231 (2003).
       [People v Posey (Posey III) (On Remand), ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___
       (2023) (Docket No. 345491); slip op at 2-3.]

“In order to overcome the presumption that the sentence is proportionate, a defendant must present
unusual circumstances that would render the presumptively proportionate sentence
disproportionate.” People v Burkett, 337 Mich App 631, 637; 976 NW2d 864 (2021) (quotation
marks and citation omitted).

        Because the Supreme Court vacated our prior opinion with regard to defendant’s sentence
only insofar as it is inconsistent with Posey II, Haupt, 997 NW2d 175, we need only consider the
proportionality argument defendant raised on appeal. Here, defendant’s sentence is at the bottom
of the sentencing guidelines range of 78 to 130 months. Defendant suggests that the unusual
circumstances that would allow this Court to conclude that his within-guidelines sentence was
disproportionate are (1) the numerous plea offers offered by the prosecution that included various
sentences of less than one year and no more than five months, and his consensual sexual
relationship with AM, who he asserts “did not look like a child” and whose pictures “were not sold
as child pornography.” However, as we stated in our prior opinion, defendant repeatedly chose
not to accept a plea offer that he now deems to include what is “illustrative of a fair sentence,” and
he acknowledges that consent is not a defense to the charges in this case. Accordingly, defendant
has failed to show unusual circumstances and has failed to overcome the presumption that his
within-guidelines sentence was proportionate.

       Affirmed.

                                                              /s/ Christopher M. Murray
                                                              /s/ Michael J. Kelly
                                                              /s/ Colleen A. O’Brien

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