Court Opinion

ID: 9669749
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:08:54.558233+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:00.091233
License: Public Domain

N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.
¶ 54. (dissenting). I dissent because I conclude the State has met its burden of establishing, by clear and convincing evidence, that the in-court identification is based upon observations of the eyewitness independent of the line-up identification. I further conclude that the certainty of the eyewitness is an appropriate consideration when determining whether the in-court identification is admissible under United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
I.
¶ 55. My review of the record, in accordance with the factors set forth in Wade, leads me to conclude that the in-court identification is based on the eyewitness's observations at the time of the robbery, independent of the line-up identification.
¶ 56. The first Wade factor considers the witness's opportunity to observe the perpetrator at the scene of the crime. In this case, the robbery occurred in a well-lit environment, and the eyewitness was wearing her eyeglasses at the time. The video tape indicates that the eyewitness was within a few feet of and directly facing the robber. The cash register was on the counter directly between the eyewitness and the robber; therefore, the eyewitness did not turn away from the robber to retrieve the requested change. In fact, at no time did the eyewitness turn away from the robber, even when she eventually backed away from him. There was nothing obstructing the eyewitness's view, and the robber made no attempt to conceal his face. *180The robber was the only individual in the store at the time of the robbery, and there is no evidence that the eyewitness was otherwise distracted.
¶ 57. Although the confrontation lasted approximately twenty seconds, courts have concluded that similar periods of time have provided witnesses with a sufficient opportunity to observe. See United States v. Goodman, 797 F.2d 468, 470 (7th Cir. 1986) (fifteen to twenty second observation); United States v. Jarrad, 754 F.2d 1451, 1455 (9th Cir. 1985) (three to four second observation), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 830 (1985); Government of the Canal Zone v. Waldron, 574 F.2d 283, 285 (5th Cir. 1978) (opportunity to view assailant twice, for two to three seconds on each occasion); United States ex rel Phipps v. Follette, 428 F.2d 912, 916 (2nd Cir. 1970) (twenty to thirty second observation), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 908 (1970). Furthermore, the time period is not the only element to consider in assessing whether the witness had a sufficient opportunity to observe. Rather, the time period must be considered within the context of the additional circumstances surrounding the confrontation. Based on the circumstances as they exist in this case, I conclude that the eyewitness had a sufficient opportunity to observe the robber.
¶ 58. The second Wade factor considers any discrepancy between the eyewitness's pre-lineup description and the accused's actual appearance. In this case, there is no significant variance in the eyewitness's statements, and there is no discrepancy between her statements and the defendant's actual appearance.
¶ 59. The eyewitness initially stated the robber had sideburns, but later testified she did not notice or did not know if the robber had facial hair. The significance of this factor is lessened when viewed in light of *181the circumstances. In the video tape of the robbery, it is not apparent whether the robber did or did not have facial hair. It is apparent, however, that even if the robber had facial hair, it was neither voluminous nor lengthy.
¶ 60. Officer Wortock's testimony demonstrates no significant variance in the eyewitness's description of the robber's facial hair either. Officer Wortock consistently indicated that the eyewitness did not tell him whether or not the robber had facial hair. There may be some confusion because Office Wortock's initial testimony at the suppression hearing seemingly indicated that the eyewitness stated the robber did not have facial hair. However, Officer Wortock later clarified his testimony:
Q . . .the victim in this case, indicated that the assailant did not have facial hair, correct. ..?
A She did not say one way or the other.
Q In your report. . .it indicates the following: The assailant in this incident did not have any facial hair. Was that not told to you by the [eyewitness]?
A She did not say that to me. That was my personal observation from the video tape.
Q And was it not, didn't you testify earlier today that she informed you that there was no facial hair on this [sic] assailant?
A When she gave me a description of the party?
Q Yes.
A She did not say that the party had or had not any facial hair.
(R. 19 at 4-5.) (emphasis supplied.) Furthermore, Officer Wortock's failure to recall whether he directly *182asked the eyewitness if the robber had facial hair provides no support for the contention that there is any variance in her description.
¶ 61. There is also no significant variation in the eyewitness's statements regarding the robber's height. The eyewitness testified that she described the robber as "at least six feet tall." (R. 18 at 11.) Officer Wortock testified that the eyewitness described the robber as "taller than her." (R. 27 at 12.) These statements vary somewhat but are consistent because the eyewitness is five feet tall. Thus, an individual who is taller than five feet could also be at least six feet tall. Furthermore, although the defendant's actual height is not noted in the record, there is no evidence that the eyewitness's statements create a discrepancy with the defendant's actual appearance.
¶ 62. Just as there is no significant variance in the description, there is no discrepancy between the description and the defendant's actual appearance. The majority finds compelling the testimony of the defendant's niece indicating the defendant had a goatee and full mustache on or about the date of the robbery, as well as Officer Bell's testimony that the defendant had facial hair approximately four days prior to the date of the robbery. This testimony does not evince a discrepancy.
¶ 63. The trial court made no findings of fact regarding the defendant's actual appearance on the date of the robbery. Facial hair is an easily modifiable physical feature, and the defendant may or may not have had facial hair on the date of the robbery. The majority's conclusion that a discrepancy exists assumes as true the defendant's niece's testimony that the defendant had facial hair on or about the date of the robbery. This is an improper assumption, as any issues *183surrounding inconsistent witness statements implicate considerations of credibility and are issues to be resolved by the trier of fact. See Boyer v. State, 91 Wis. 2d 647, 672, 284 N.W.2d 30 (1979);Kohlhoff v. State, 85 Wis. 2d 148, 154, 270 N.W.2d 63 (1978). Even assuming arguendo that the defendant's niece's statements are true, it does not create a discrepancy because the eyewitness did not specifically state that the robber did not have facial hair.
¶ 64. The third Wade factor considers whether the witness identified any other individual prior to the line-up. The eyewitness in this case has not identified anyone other than the defendant as the robber.
¶ 65. The fourth Wade factor considers whether the witness identified the accused from a photo array prior to the line-up. As the majority notes, in this case the fourth Wade factor is closely related to the fifth Wade factor, which considers whether the witness failed to identify the accused prior to the in-court identification. The eyewitness did fail to identify the defendant from a photo array; however, the circuit court found the photo presented to the eyewitness was not a reasonable resemblance of the defendant. (R. 23 at 51.)
¶ 66. The sixth Wade factor considers the length of time between the date of the crime and the date of the line-up identification. I conclude the five-week period did not obscure the eyewitness's recollection. Courts have held that even a two- month lapse of time does not require suppression of an in-court identification where the witness does not identify an individual other than the defendant in the interim. See United States v. Monks, 774 F.2d 945, 957 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Barron, 575 F.2d 752, 755 (9th Cir. 1978). As previously noted, the eyewitness in this case *184did not identify any individual other than the defendant as the robber.
¶ 67. The seventh Wade factor considers the facts disclosed relating to the conduct of the line-up. The line-up procedures were not suggestive in this case. The defendant was the suspect, and the defendant had facial hair at the time of the line-up. The additional men included in the line-up also had facial hair, just as they were also the same race and approximately the same size, height, and age as the defendant. It is reasonable that individuals with physical features similar to that of the defendant were included, so that attention was not inappropriately drawn to the defendant, and such procedures were not unduly suggestive. See Messer v. Roberts, 74 F.3d 1009, 1016 (10th Cir. 1996) ("men shown possessed sufficient similarities in size, coloration, height, complexion, hair color, full mustaches, somewhat receding hairlines, dress and weight to pass constitutional muster."). It is also not unduly suggestive that all individuals in the line-up had facial hair, even though the eyewitness's description did not include facial hair. See United States v. Schoels, 685 F.2d 379, 385 (10th Cir. 1982)(photo array of seven black men, all with noticeable facial hair, not unduly suggestive even though eyewitness described criminal as clean-shaven), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1134 (1983). In addition, after reviewing the facts surrounding the line-up, the trial court determined the line-up procedures were not unduly suggestive. (R. 23 at 71.)
¶ 68. An analysis of the Wade factors under the circumstances as they exist in this case leads me to conclude that there is clear and convincing evidence that the eyewitness's in-court identification has an independent origin apart from the line-up identification.
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¶ 69. I also conclude that the certainty of a witness is a proper factor to consider in determining whether the in-court identification is independent of a tainted line-up identification. The "independent basis" test in Wade and the "totality of circumstances" test in Neal v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972) are derived from different constitutional amendments; however, they are both premised on concerns of accurate and reliable witness identification.
¶ 70. The Biggers test is derived from due process considerations and is primarily based upon the need to avoid the " 'very substantial likelihood of irreparable [eyewitness] misidentification.'" Biggers, 409 U.S. at 381 (quoting Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968)). Although the Wade test is derived from the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the Court's concern in Wade was similarly that of "mistaken identification" and protecting the accused from pre-trial identification procedures replete with "innumerable dangers." Wade, 388 U.S. at 228.
¶ 71. The Court's primary concern in Wade was not, as the majority argues, deterring unlawful police conduct and preserving judicial integrity. In fact, the Wade Court noted that "[w]e do not assume that these risks are the result of police procedures intentionally designed to prejudice an accused. Rather we assume they derive from the dangers inherent in eyewitness identification and the suggestibility inherent in the context of the pretrial identification." Wade, 388 U.S. at 235.
¶ 72. In assessing eyewitness identification, "[i]t is the reliability of identification evidence that primarily determines its admissibility." Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 347 (1981). Numerous state and federal *186courts have held that the level of certainty is relevant to a witness's reliability. See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977); United States v. Barron, 575 F.2d 752, 755 (9th Cir. 1978); State v. Figueroa, 665 A.2d 63, 73 (Conn. 1995); Shaw v. State, 846 S.W.2d 482, 484 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993). Because the Wade and Biggers decisions are both premised on concerns regarding the reliability of witness identification, the certainty factor considered in Biggers is equally relevant in a Sixth Amendment Wade analysis.
¶ 73. The witness's certainty is particularly relevant where, as here, it is expressed within the context of the observations at the time of the crime. At the preliminary hearing in this case, the eyewitness identified the defendant during the prosecution's examination regarding the crime itself. Without waiver, the eyewitness positively identified the defendant as the man who asked her for change, pointed the knife at her, and robbed her. (R. 18 at 6-7.) Even more convincing was the eyewitness's testimony at the suppression hearing, wherein she stated she was "positive” and "one hundred percent" certain that the defendant was the armed robber. (R. 19 at 25.) The eyewitness additionally testified at the suppression hearing that she would be able to identify the defendant as the robber even if she saw him on the street, irrespective of the line-up. (R. 19 at 26.)
¶ 74. Undoubtedly, the majority would argue that the eyewitness's certainty at the preliminary hearing and the suppression hearing was irreparably tainted by the line-up identification. Yet, "[tjhis difficulty has not prevented courts from finding sufficient certainty even when the evidence of certainty comes from confrontations that took place after the invocation *187of suggestive procedures." United States ex rel Kosik v. Napoli, 814 F.2d 1151, 1159 (7th Cir. 1987).
¶ 75. The majority emphasizes the unreliable nature of eyewitness identification; however, the Wade test is utilized to remedy such concerns and combat any inherent unreliability. It cannot be discounted that eyewitness identification is relevant and extremely valuable to criminal convictions. Therefore, such identification evidence should not be hastily suppressed. As Justice Black noted in reference to testimony given by a criminally accused at a suppression hearing:
The value of permitting the Government to use such testimony is, of course, so obvious that it is usually left unstated, but it should not for that reason be ignored. The standard of proof necessary to convict in a criminal case is high, and quite properly so, but for this reason highly probative evidence. . .should not lightly be held inadmissible.
Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 397 (1968) (Black, J., dissenting).
¶ 76. The language oí Wade indicates the factors enumerated were proffered as a guideline — not an all-inclusive list of factors to be utilized to the exclusion of any other relevant considerations. See Wade, 388 U.S. at 241. The extent of the witness's certainty would not be dispositive in a Wade analysis. Rather, it would merely be a factor to be considered in addition to those outlined in Wade. See Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199.
¶ 77. I conclude that a review of the record pursuant to Wade provides clear and convincing evidence that the eyewitness's in-court identification is independent of the line-up identification. The eyewitness had a sufficient opportunity to observe the robber; there was no discrepancy between the eyewitness's description *188and the defendant's actual appearance; the eyewitness did not identify any other individual as the robber other than the defendant; the time period between the crime and the line-up did not obscure the eyewitness's recollection of the robber; the line-up procedures were not unduly suggestive. I further conclude that the certainty of the witness is a relevant and appropriate consideration when determining whether there is an independent basis for an in-court identification.
¶ 78. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
¶ 79. I am authorized to state that Justice DONALD W. STEINMETZ and Justice JON P. WILCOX join this dissent.