Court Opinion

ID: 2963771
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:15:00.366939+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:46.286283
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                 ____________________

          No. 95-1249

                                CHAULK SERVICES, INC.,

                                Plaintiff - Appellant,

                                          v.

                           MASSACHUSETTS COMMISSION AGAINST
                               DISCRIMINATION, ET AL.,

                               Defendants - Appellees.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                   [Hon. Reginald C. Lindsay, U.S. District Judge]
                                              ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                               Torruella, Chief Judge,
                                          ___________

                                Lynch, Circuit Judge,
                                       _____________

                            and Casellas,* District Judge.
                                           ______________

                                _____________________

               Arthur P. Menard, with whom Paul J. Murphy and Menard Murphy
               ________________            ______________     _____________
          & Walsh were on brief for appellant.
          _______
               Macy  Lee,  Assistant  Attorney  General,  with  whom  Scott
               _________                                              _____
          Harshbarger, Attorney General of  Massachusetts, was on brief for
          ___________
          appellee   Massachusetts   Commission   Against   Discrimination;
          Katherine    McClure    on    brief    for    appellees   Petrina
          ____________________
          Doulamis/Sullivan  and  International   Association  of  EMTs   &
          Paramedics, NAGE and AFL-CIO.

                                 ____________________

                                  November 27, 1995
                              
          ____________________

          *  Of the District of Puerto Rico, sitting by designation.

                                 ____________________

                                         -2-

                    CASELLAS, District Judge.   Plaintiff-appellant  Chaulk
                    CASELLAS, District Judge.
                              ______________

          Services,  Inc. ("Chaulk")  originally  brought  this action  for

          declaratory judgment, preliminary and permanent injunctive relief

          against  the  Massachusetts  Commission   Against  Discrimination

          ("MCAD")("the     Commission"),     Petrina     Doulamis/Sullivan

          ("Doulamis")  and  the   International  Association  of   EMTs  &

          Paramedics, NAGE, AFL-CIO ("the  Union"), to prevent  defendants-

          appellees from  proceeding with  the case of  Doulamis v.  Chaulk
                                                        ________     ______

          Services, Inc., 93-BEM-2145, then pending before the MCAD, on the
          ______________

          basis that the action was preempted by federal law, particularly,

          the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA")("the Act"), 29 U.S.C.  

          151  et seq.  The district court abstained from deciding Chaulk's
               ______

          preemption  claim, citing Younger v.  Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971),
                                    _______     ______

          Ohio Civil  Rights Commission v. Dayton  Christian Schools, Inc.,
          _____________________________    _______________________________

          477 U.S.  619 (1986) and  Brotherhood of Locomotive  Engineers v.
                                    ____________________________________

          MCAD,  695  F.  Supp.  1321  (D. Mass.  1988),  and  consequently
          ____

          dismissed Chaulk's complaint.   We vacate the judgment  below and

          remand the case to the district court.

                              I.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE
                              I.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE
                                  _____________________

                    A.  Facts
                    A.  Facts

                    In the middle of 1993, the International Association of

          EMTs and  Paramedics, NAGE,  AFL-CIO, began a  union organization

          campaign  at Chaulk.   Doulamis became  involved in  the campaign

          sometime during the fall  of 1993, when she  and Eric Burgess,  a

          male Chaulk employee, wrote a letter to the president of Chaulk's

          parent  company  calling for  the organization  of  a union.   On

                                         -2-

          November  10,  1993,  Chaulk's  CEO Nicholas  O'Neil  and  Joseph

          Gilmore, vice-president,  as part  of their own  campaign against

          the union organization effort, met with Doulamis in an attempt to

          pressure  her  into  becoming  a non-union  advocate.    Doulamis

          declined their invitation.

                    As  a result  of this  meeting, the Union  filed unfair

          labor practice charges  on November  29, 1993  with the  National

          Labor Relations  Board ("NLRB") against Chaulk,  claiming that it

          coerced  and intimidated  Doulamis, a  known union  organizer, by

          questioning   her  regarding  union  activities  and  threatening

          retaliation for those union activities,  in violation of the Act.

          On December 6 and 9, 1993, the Union filed two additional charges

          with  the NLRB, both of which alleged that Chaulk interfered with

          Doulamis'  labor activity  rights and  discriminated  against her

          because of her union organization efforts.1

                    Thereafter, the NLRB issued  a complaint against Chaulk

          alleging specific violations of     8(a)(1) and (3) of  the NLRA,

          and  charging that  Chaulk  had interfered  with, restrained  and

          coerced several employees, including Doulamis, in the exercise of

          rights guaranteed by   7  of the Act.  With respect  to Doulamis,

          the complaint alleged that  on November 29, 1993 Chaulk  issued a

                              
          ____________________

          1   The  Union filed  several  additional unfair  labor  practice
          charges against  Chaulk stemming  from  its alleged  interference
          with  the protected rights of numerous other employees.  Here, we
          refer  in  particular  only  to those  which,  according  to  the
          parties, involve  charges  of unlawful  conduct directed  against
          Doulamis.   Furthermore,  while  Doulamis  is not  named  as  the
          aggrieved  employee in these charges, both parties agree that the
          employee referred to therein is, in fact, Doulamis.

                                         -3-

          written warning and on December 7, 1993 issued a letter addressed

          to Doulamis threatening  her with discipline if  she attended any

          future 401(K) meetings  held by  Chaulk with its  employees.   In

          addition, the complaint  charged that on December 2, 1993, Chaulk

          suspended  the coauthor  of the  pro-union letter,  Eric Burgess.

          According  to  the  complaint,  Chaulk engaged  in  this  conduct

          because  it mistakenly  believed  that  Doulamis,  together  with

          several  of  her  fellow  employees, had  engaged  in  misconduct

          arising  out of union or other protected concerted activity.  See
                                                                        ___

          Complaint and  Notice of Hearing at   s 7-8.  It  is also alleged

          that these  employees formed, joined  and assisted the  Union and

          otherwise  engaged in  concerted  activities, and  that  Chaulk's

          conduct was a deliberate attempt to discourage the employees from

          engaging in  these activities,  in violation of  sections 8(a)(3)

          and (1) of the Act.  See Complaint and Notice of Hearing at  s 7-
                               ___

          10.

                    A  full  and  comprehensive  settlement  agreement  was

          reached between Chaulk and the NLRB in March 1995 regarding these

          claims.  As part of the settlement, Chaulk agreed to, inter alia,
                                                                _____ ____

          expunge  from its  files any  reference to  the transfer  of Eric

          Burgess;  the written  warnings  set forth  in the  complaints of

          Doulamis, Richard Graham, Chris Adler, Gary Winitzer, Jim Taubert

          and Jean Taubert; the suspensions  of Eric Burgess, Chris  Adler,

          Jim Taubert,  Jean Taubert, Gary Winitzer,  Michael Cook, Kathryn

          Edwards  and  James  McLaughlin;  and the  terminations  of  Fran

          Wilkerson,  John  Borden and  McLaughlin.    In addition,  Chaulk

                                         -4-

          agreedto payout approximately$12,000in backpay tothese employees.

                    Meanwhile,  on December  1, 1993,  after the  Union had

          already  filed its first charge  with the NLRB,  Doulamis filed a

          complaint with the MCAD  against Chaulk, claiming she had  been a

          victim  of  unlawful  sex  discrimination.    Specifically,   she

          complained of being harassed  about her union activity, allegedly

          because of her gender, in  that the "males who are  also involved

          [in the union activity] are not being harassed."

                    On February 18, 1994, Chaulk moved to dismiss Doulamis'

          complaint  at the MCAD for  lack of jurisdiction,  on the grounds

          that it was preempted by federal law.  On May 13, 1994, the  MCAD

          issued  an order  denying  the motion  to  dismiss and  retaining

          jurisdiction over Doulamis' discrimination claims, reasoning that

          it  did not have  to address the  merits of  the underlying labor

          dispute   in  order   to  resolve   the  allegations   of  gender

          discrimination.  The  Commission then  promptly issued  a set  of

          interrogatories to Chaulk, requesting detailed  information about

          all known union organizers, their  role in organizing efforts and

          any  significant acts  of  union organizing  known to  appellant,

          including   copies  of  any  communications  between  Chaulk  and

          Doulamis relative to the union organization effort.

                    B.  Proceedings Below
                    B.  Proceedings Below

                    The  present  action was  filed  in  the United  States

          District Court for the  District of Massachusetts on December  8,

          1994, seeking a  declaratory judgment  as well  as an  injunction

          barring the  continued prosecution of  Doulamis' complaint before

                                         -5-

          the MCAD.   Chaulk  claimed  that the  Commission's assertion  of

          state  authority   over  her   charge  directly   threatened  and

          significantly  interfered with the jurisdiction of  the NLRB.  As

          noted above, the  district court granted MCAD's motion to dismiss

          on abstention grounds.   It did not decide the  preemption issue.

          Chaulk now appeals the district court's judgment.

                                    II.  ANALYSIS
                                    II.  ANALYSIS
                                         ________

                    A.Preemption
                    A.Preemption

                    Relying on the doctrine  of preemption first enunciated

          in  San Diego  Building Trades  v. Garmon,  359 U.S.  236 (1959),
              __________________________     ______

          appellant argues  that the district  court erred in  allowing the

          Commission's  motion  to  dismiss   on  the  grounds  of  Younger
                                                                    _______

          abstention and that  it should have decided the preemption issue.

          Citing primarily to Bud Antle, Inc. v. Barbosa, 35 F.3d 1355 (9th
                              _______________    _______

          Cir. 1994), Chaulk asserts  that when it is clear  that the state

          tribunal is acting  beyond the  lawful limits  of its  authority,

          there is no  principle of  comity that is  served by  abstention.

          Id. at  1356.   Accordingly,  it urges  us  to find  the  Younger
          __                                                        _______

          abstention doctrine inapplicable to this case, address the merits

          of its  preemption claim, and  declare that appellee's  charge of

          sex discrimination  before the Commission is  indeed preempted by

          federal law.

                    We  begin by delineating  the present  scope of  the so

          called  Garmon preemption  doctrine.   The Supreme Court  held in
                  ______

          Garmon that when an activity is arguably subject to   7 or   8 of
          ______

          the  National  Labor Relations  Act, the  states  as well  as the

                                         -6-

          federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the NLRB

          if the danger of state interference with national labor policy is

          to  be averted.  Id. at 245.   When Congress enacted the NLRA, it
                           __

          enacted comprehensive  procedural rules  and created the  NLRB to

          administer  this specially  designed  regulatory structure.   The

          result was  a complex  and interrelated  scheme  of federal  law,

          remedies and administration designed to achieve uniformity in our

          national  labor  policy.   Garmon,  359  U.S.  at  242; New  York
                                     ______                       _________

          Telephone Co.  v. New  York  Dept. of  Labor, 440  U.S. 519,  527
          _____________     __________________________

          (1979); Jones v. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 299, 838 F.2d 856,
                  _____    _________________________________

          872  (6th   Cir.  1988)(Merritt,  J.,  concurring   in  part  and

          dissenting in part).

                    In  order to  achieve the desired  uniformity, Congress

          entrusted  the interpretation and  enforcement of  the NLRA  to a

          centralized administrative agency, armed with its own procedures,

          and  equipped  with  its  specialized  knowledge  and  cumulative

          experience.   See Garmon, 359  U.S. at 242.   This administrative
                        ___ ______

          scheme  was  designed  to  avoid the  danger  of  conflicting  or

          incompatible adjudications  such as would  inevitably result from

          having  multiple forums, with their diverse procedures, entertain

          claims  under the  NLRA.   Garner  v.  Teamsters, Chauffeurs  and
                                     ______      __________________________

          Helpers Local Union  No. 776, 346 U.S.  485, 490-91 (1953).   The
          ____________________________

          Garmon rule is therefore  intended to preclude state interference
          ______

          with the NLRB's interpretation  and enforcement of the integrated

          scheme  of  regulation established  by  the NLRA.    Golden State
                                                               ____________

          Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 475 U.S. 608, 613 (1986).
          _____________    ___________________

                                         -7-

                    Withal, the  Garmon rule  admits of some  exceptions to
                                 ______

          the NLRB's primary jurisdiction.  For instance, where the conduct

          at issue is of only "peripheral concern" to federal labor policy,

          the  states  are  not  precluded from  regulating  the  activity.

          Garmon,  359 U.S.  at  243.    Similarly,  state  action  is  not
          ______

          preempted where  the  regulated  conduct  touches  interests  "so

          deeply rooted in  local feeling and  responsibility that, in  the

          absence  of  compelling  congressional  direction,  courts cannot

          infer that Congress has deprived the states of the power to act."

          Id.2
          __

                    When  called  to  determine  whether  these  exceptions

          apply, courts must balance the state's interest in  remedying the

          effects of  the challenged conduct against  both the interference

          with  the NLRB's ability  to adjudicate  the controversy  and the

          risk that the state will approve conduct that the NLRA prohibits.

          Belknap,  Inc. v.  Hale, 463  U.S. 491,  498-499 (1983);  NLRB v.
          ______________     ____                                   ____

          State  of Ill. Dept.  of Emp. Sec.,  988 F.2d 735,  739 (7th Cir.
          __________________________________

          1993).  In doing so, we intentionally focus on the conduct at the

                              
          ____________________

          2    Courts  have recognized  a  third  exception  to the  Garmon
                                                                     ______
          doctrine  where  Congress  has   expressly  carved  out  such  an
          exception to the NLRB's primary jurisdiction.  See  Tamburello v.
                                                         ___  __________
          Comm-Tract  Corporation, No.  95-1295, slip  op.  at 6  (1st Cir.
          _______________________
          October  2, 1995)  (citing Vaca  v. Sipes,  386 U.S.  171, 179-80
                                     ____     _____
          (1967);  Brennan v. Chestnut, 973 F.2d 644, 646 (8th Cir. 1992)).
                   _______    ________
          Congress  has  not  made  an  exception  to  the  NLRB's  primary
          jurisdiction  for  claims  alleging  sex  discrimination  in  the
          context of an unfair  labor practice.  See Jones v. Truck Drivers
                                                 ___ _____    _____________
          Local Union, 838 F.2d  at 861 (sexual discrimination is  a breach
          ___________
          of duty of  fair representation and  within scope of    8 of  the
          NLRA); NLRB v.  Local 106,  520 F.2d 693  (6th Cir.  1975)(same).
                 ____     _________
          This  exception therefore  does not  apply to  the facts  in this
          case.

                                         -8-

          root of  this controversy,  namely Chaulk's  alleged interference

          with Doulamis'  union activities,  as opposed to  the descriptive

          title of sex discrimination  given to her cause of  action before

          the MCAD.  That  is because preemption is designed  to shield the

          system  from  conflicting  regulation  of conduct.    "It  is the
                                                    _______

          conduct being regulated, not  the formal description of governing

          legal   standards  that   is  the   proper  focus   of  concern."

          Amalgamated Ass'n  of St., E.R.  & M.  C. Emp. v.  Lockridge, 403
          ______________________________________________     _________

          U.S. 274, 292 (1971).  See also,  Garmon, 359 U.S. at 246 ("It is
                                 ___ ____   ______

          not the label affixed to the cause of action under state law that

          controls the determination of  the relationship between state and

          federal jurisdiction").

                    Doulamis'  complaint highlights  the risk that  a state

          cause of action will touch on an area of primary federal concern.

          She  complains  of  incidents  of  interference  with  her  union

          activities  as a union organizer.  The very same conduct provides

          the factual basis  for the unfair labor practice  charges brought

          by the  Union on her  behalf, which were  eventually incorporated

          into the complaint and notice of hearing issued by the NLRB.  Her

          claims are fundamentally grounded in an assertion that the rights

          which her  employer interfered  with involve her  union activity.

          Where, as here,  the case involves conduct arguably prohibited by

             8 of the  Act, the NLRB  has broad authority  to determine the

          appropriate  remedy  for wronged  employees.3    "In fact,  since
                              
          ____________________

          3  MCAD presses the argument that gender-based  discrimination is
          not  even within  the realm  of  prohibited activities  under the
          NLRA.  According  to MCAD, the scope of prohibited discrimination

                                         -9-

          remedies  form   an  ingredient  of  any   integrated  scheme  of

          regulation,  to allow the state to grant  a remedy here which has

          been withheld  from  the  NLRB  only accentuates  the  danger  of

          conflict."   Garmon,  359 U.S.  at 247;  Richardson v.  Kruchko &
                       ______                      __________     _________

          Fries, 966 F.2d  153, 157 (4th Cir. 1992).   Board authority over
          _____

          claims  of interference  with union  activities is not  merely of

          peripheral  concern to the Act.  Rather, the Board's authority to

          remedy  such practices is central to its purpose.  See Tamburello
                                                             ___ __________

          v.  Comm-Tract Corporation, No. 95-1295,  slip op. at  9 n.5 (1st
              ______________________

          Cir. October 2, 1995).

                    Moreover,  the fact that  the Union  clearly considered

          Chaulk's conduct  an unfair labor  practice, and  that the  Board

          entertained  such charges, only buttresses the Court's conclusion

          that  said   conduct  is  not  only   "arguably",  but  obviously

          prohibited  under section 8(a) of  the NLRA.   It also highlights

          the   very  real   danger   of  interference   with  the   NLRB's

          jurisdiction, as it was precisely the Board's timely intervention

          which  in this  case led  to the  agreement through  which Chaulk

          pledged, among  other things,  not  to engage  in the  challenged

          conduct, or take similar actions to hinder its employees in their

          union activities.

                    Significantly, the Supreme Court has held that in cases
                              
          ____________________

          under  the  Act  is  limited  to  discrimination  based  on union
          activities or  membership.   Still, the  argument  has been  made
          successfully that  sexual  discrimination constitutes  an  unfair
          labor practice under   8 of the NLRA.  See Jones v. Truck Drivers
                                                 ___ _____    _____________
          Local Union, 838 F.2d  at 861 (sexual discrimination is  a breach
          ___________
          of  duty of fair  representation and within  scope of    8 of the
          NLRA); NLRB v. Local 106, 520 F.2d 693 (6th Cir. 1975)(same).
                 ____    _________

                                         -10-

          where the underlying conduct is arguably prohibited by the  NLRA,

          application of the so-called  "local interests" exception hinges,

          in the first  place, upon  the existence of  a significant  state

          interest in protecting its  citizens from the challenged conduct.

          In  second place, the controversy which could be presented to the

          state court must  be different  from that which  could have  been

          presented to the NLRB.  Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.  San Diego County
                                  ____________________     ________________

          Dist.  Council of Carpenters, 436  U.S. 180, 196-97  (1978).  See
          ____________________________                                  ___

          also, Tamburello v. Comm-Tract Corporation, No. 95-1295, slip op.
          ____  __________    ______________________

          at 14 (1st Cir. October 2, 1995).

                    Under the  Sears  rationale, the  critical  inquiry  is
                               _____

          whether the controversy presented to the state court is identical

          to or different from  that which could have been presented to the

          NLRB.4  Sears, 436  U.S. at 197.   The Court reasoned that it  is
                  _____

          only  in   the  former  situation  that  a  state's  exercise  of

          jurisdiction necessarily involves a risk of interference with the

          unfair  labor practice jurisdiction of the Board which the Garmon
                                                                     ______
                              
          ____________________

          4   We note that  Sears is not  entirely on point, as  it differs
                            _____
          from the  instant case in at  least one fundamental respect.   In
          that case, the  Court was  presented with a  situation where  the
          party seeking relief  in the state  forum had no right  to invoke
          the  Board's jurisdiction  and the  party that  had the  right to
          invoke the Board's jurisdiction had failed  to do so.  The  Court
          expressed concern that  in the circumstances of that  case, Sears
          may not  have a  chance  for a  hearing on  its  claims if  state
          jurisdiction  were  preempted  without  any  assurance  that  the
          dispute might eventually be  brought before the NLRB.   The Court
          reasoned  that preemption  was justified  only when  an aggrieved
          party has a reasonable  opportunity either to invoke the  Board's
          jurisdiction  himself or else to  induce his adversary  to do so.
          Id.  at 201.  Here, of  course, there is no  such concern, as the
          __
          Union  filed the unfair labor practice charges with the NLRB even
          before Doulamis filed her gender discrimination claims before the
          Commission.

                                         -11-

          doctrine was designed to avoid.  Id.  We assume arguendo that the
                                           __             ________

          Commonwealth  of  Massachusetts  has a  significant  interest  in

          protecting  its  citizens  against  sex discrimination  in  their

          employment.  Following  the guidelines set  forth by the  Supreme

          Court  in Sears,  we  therefore examine  whether the  controversy
                    _____

          before the  state forum would  indeed be the  same as  that which

          could be brought before the NLRB.  Id.
                                             __

                    In  this regard,  it is  telling  that the  Union, upon

          learning   of  Chaulk's   alleged  interference   with  Doulamis'

          activities as  a union organizer, promptly filed  an unfair labor

          practice charge on her behalf, claiming violations  of   8 of the

          Act--thereby clearly  characterizing the controversy  as a  labor

          dispute, subject  to the  NLRB's primary  jurisdiction.  For  its

          part,  the   NLRB  received  the  Union's  allegations  regarding

          Chaulk's  conduct--the same  conduct  that would  later form  the

          basis  for  Doulamis'  discrimination  claim  before  the  MCAD--

          investigated them, proceeded then to issue a Complaint and Notice

          of  Hearing, and eventually settled the matter.  Plainly, this is

          not  a  case  where the  NLRB  declined  to  exercise its  lawful

          jurisdiction over a labor controversy, or where the NLRB's actual

          exercise of jurisdiction remains a matter of speculation.  On the

          contrary, the Board  in this case  moved aggressively to  acquire

          such  jurisdiction  and bring  the matter  to  a full  and speedy

          resolution.

                    Furthermore,  even Doulamis'  own pleadings  before the

          Commission  couch her claims in  terms of a  labor dispute within

                                         -12-

          the NLRB's primary jurisdiction.  Her complaint accuses Chaulk of

          harassment "about  [her] union activities."   She also  claims to

          have  been "intimidated by Mr. O'Neil  about involvement in union

          activity" and  "accused of  distracting the other  employees with

          union activity."   As noted  above, such  conduct on the  part of

          Chaulk,  if adequately  established  through competent  evidence,

          would  constitute  an  undue interference  with  Doulamis' rights

          under   7 of the  NLRA and consequently a violation of    8(a)(1)

          of  the Act.    The application  of  additional remedies  to  the

          conduct  here at  issue only  invites conflict.   As  the Supreme

          Court stated in Garmon, "[t]he obligation to pay compensation can
                          ______

          be,  indeed is  designed  to be,  a  potent method  of  governing

          conduct and controlling policy."  Id. at 247.  See Sears, Roebuck
                                            __           ___ ______________

          &  Co., 436 U.S. at  193-94 ("[T]he pertinent  inquiry is whether
          ______

          the two potentially conflicting statutes [are] brought to bear on

          precisely the same conduct.")  (citations omitted).  As discussed

          above,  Doulamis' claim of sex discrimination is founded upon the

          identical facts  which provided  the basis  for the  unfair labor

          practices   charge  brought   on   her  behalf   by  the   Union.

          Accordingly,  under the  Garmon rationale,  her claim  before the
                                   ______

          Commission is expressly preempted.

                    Moreover, as  pointed out by Chaulk,  the interrogatory

          issued  by  the  MCAD in  the  course  of  the investigation  and

          prosecution of Doulamis'  case belies the Commission's  assertion

          that it need not delve into the labor  aspects of the controversy

          in order to dispose of her gender discrimination claims.  Rather,

                                         -13-

          the  interrogatory  is further  proof  that issues  of  labor law

          ordinarily   considered  to   be   within   the  NLRB's   primary

          jurisdiction  are precisely the type of questions that lie at the

          heart of this controversy.

                    Finally, in order to  determine the merits of Doulamis'

          claims of sex disrimination, the MCAD will have to decide whether

          in  fact Doulamis was engaged in protected union activity, and if

          so, whether she was engaged in the same type of union activity as

          the other union  organizers.   Such a finding  requires that  the

          MCAD  become embroiled  in a factual  and legal  determination of

          what constitutes union activity, a  task which has been expressly

          reserved to the jurisdiction  of the NLRB.  More  importantly, if

          the  Commission  were allowed  to  entertain  Doulamis' claim  of

          sexual discrimination, there is the  potential risk that it  will

          incorrectly   apply  the   substantive   rules  governing   labor

          controversies laid out by Congress in  the NLRA.  It is precisely

          this potential for incompatible or conflicting adjudications that

          Congress sought to  avoid by leaving these  determinations in the

          first instance to the NLRB.

                    In  the end,  no recharacterization  of this  claim can

          obscure the fact that, at bottom, this is a classic example of an

          unfair labor practice  claim of the kind traditionally handled in

          the first instance by the NLRB.  Since the controversy before the

          MCAD and that resolved by the  NLRB are the same in a fundamental

          respect,  and   the  risk   of  interference  with   the  Board's

          jurisdiction  is obvious and  substantial, we hold  that the MCAD

                                         -14-

          has  no  jurisdiction to  entertain  Doulamis'  charge of  sexual

          discrimination based on her  employer's alleged interference with

          her union activities.  International Union of Operating Engineers
                                 __________________________________________

          v. Jones, 460 U.S. 669, 674 (1983).5
             _____

                    B.Abstention
                    B.Abstention

                    We turn now to  what is in essence the  threshold issue

          in  this appeal-whether  the district  court erred  in abstaining

          under the  Younger doctrine.  In  Younger v. Harris, 401  U.S. 37
                     _______                _______    ______

          (1971),  the Supreme Court held  that a federal  court should not

          enjoin  a pending  state criminal proceeding  except in  the very

          unusual  situation that  an  injunction is  necessary to  prevent

          great  and immediate irreparable injury.   Younger stands for the
                                                     _______

          proposition that  principles of comity require  "a proper respect

          for  state functions, a recognition  of the fact  that the entire

          country  is made up of a Union of separate state governments, and

          a continuance of  the belief  that the  National Government  will

          fare  best if the States are  left free to perform their separate

          functions in  their separate ways."   Id. at  44.  The  Court has
                                                __

          since applied its  reasoning in Younger  to civil proceedings  in
                                          _______

                              
          ____________________

          5   The  dissent devotes  a considerable  number of pages  to the
          issue  of  whether Title  VII  and  the  NLRA provide  concurrent
          remedies.  The Supreme Court has made  clear however, that when a
          state proceeding is  claimed to  be preempted by  the NLRA  under
          Garmon, the issue is a  choice-of-forum rather than a  choice-of-
          ______
          law  question.   See International Longshoremen's  Association v.
                           ___ _________________________________________
          Davis, 476  U.S. 380,  391 (1986).   As such,  "it is  a question
          _____
          whether  the  State  or  the  Board  has  jurisdiction  over  the
          dispute."  Id.   If--as here--there  is preemption under  Garmon,
                     __                                             ______
          then  state  jurisdiction  is  extinguished.    Id.    See  also,
                                                          __     ___  ____
          International  Union of Operating Engineers v. Jones, 460 U.S. at
          ___________________________________________    _____
          680-81; Sears, 436 U.S. at 199 n.29; Garmon, 359 U.S. at 245.
                  _____                        ______

                                         -15-

          which  important state  interests are involved.   See  Huffman v.
                                                                 _______

          Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S.  592 (1975); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327
          ____________                        _______    ____

          (1977); Trainor v. Hern ndez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977).
                  _______    _________

                    In  Ohio  Civil  Rights  Comm'n  v.   Dayton  Christian
                        ___________________________       _________________

          Schools, 477  U.S.  619 (1986),  the principles  of comity  first
          _______

          announced in Younger were  made extensive to state administrative
                       _______

          proceedings.   As a result,  where (1) vital  state interests are

          involved, (2)  in an  ongoing state judicial  (or administrative)

          proceeding, a  federal court  should abstain from  exercising its

          jurisdiction  over a claim, (3) unless state law clearly bars the

          interposition of the constitutional claims.  See Middlesex County
                                                           ________________

          Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Assn, 457 U.S. 423, 432  (1982);
          ____________    _____________________

          Moore v. Sims, 442  U.S. 415 (1979).   "The pertinent inquiry  is
          _____    ____

          whether state proceedings afford an adequate opportunity to raise

          the constitutional claims."  Middlesex, supra.
                                       _________

                    The dissent  asserts that,  rather than a  principle of

          discretionary  deference, Younger abstention  requires a district
                                    _______             ________

          court  to abstain  whenever a  case falls  within the  doctrine's

          parameters.    To the  extent it  relies  on the  Supreme Court's

          decision in Colorado River  Water Conservation District v. United
                      ___________________________________________    ______

          States, 424 U.S.  800, 816 n.22 as support for this blanket rule,
          ______

          however,  we respectfully differ.  The cited passage on which the

          dissent  relies clearly refers  to that  category of  cases where

          federal  jurisdiction  has  been   invoked  for  the  purpose  of

          restraining  state  criminal  proceedings.   And  even  for  that
                              ________

          category  of cases, the Supreme Court makes clear that abstention

                                         -16-

          is only  appropriate absent bad faith, harassment,  or a patently

          invalid state  statute.   Id. at  816.   In fact, Colorado  River
                                    __                      _______________

          strongly reaffirmed the basic  principle that abstention from the

          exercise of federal jurisdiction is the exception, not the rule:

                      The doctrine of abstention, under which a
                      district court may decline to exercise or
                                     ___
                      postpone    the     exercise    of    its
                      jurisdiction,  is  an  extraordinary  and
                      narrow  exception  to   the  duty  of   a
                      district    court    to   adjudicate    a
                      controversy    properly     before    it.
                      Abdication  of  the obligation  to decide
                      cases   can   be  justified   under  this
                      doctrine   only    in   the   exceptional
                      circumstances  where  the  order  to  the
                      parties  to  repair  to the  state  court
                      would   clearly    serve   an   important
                      countervailing  interest.  It was never a
                      doctrine of  equity that a  federal court
                      should  exercise its  judicial discretion
                              ________ ___  ________ __________
                      to  dismiss a suit merely because a State
                      court could entertain it."

          Colorado River, 424 U.S.  at 813-14 (emphasis supplied; citations
          ______________

          omitted).   See also, New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council
                      ___ ____  ________________________________    _______

          of the City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 359 (1989).
          __________________________

                    The  Commission  argues  that  the  case  at  bar  fits

          squarely  within  the  principles  of  Younger  abstention.    We
                                                 _______

          disagree.   First,  the procedural  posture of this  case differs

          from that of the customary case where abstention is traditionally

          applied.  Ordinarily, federal courts abstain from the exercise of

          jurisdiction over a particular controversy  out of respect for an

          ongoing  state proceeding begun before the federal action.  It is

          thought that  this procedural  mechanism forestalls the  friction

          that  can arise when the  business of the  two systems--state and

          federal--overlaps.   But the notion  of comity, which  to a great

                                         -17-

          extent  underlies  the  Younger   doctrine  of  abstention,  must
                                  _______

          accommodate  the  legitimate  interests  of both  the  state  and
                                                      ____

          national governments.  Younger,  401 U.S. at 44; Pennzoil  Co. v.
                                 _______                   _____________

          Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 10 (1987).
          ____________

                    In abstaining, the court below seemingly focused on the

          situation  that  existed  on  December  8,  1994,  when  Chaulk's

          complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief  was filed in the

          United States  District Court for the  District of Massachusetts.

          In doing so  however, the court  ignored the fact that  an unfair

          labor  practice  charge,  based  on  the  same  facts  underlying

          Doulamis' complaint of sex discrimination, had been filed against

          Chaulk prior to her discrimination claims and was  pending before
                 _____

          the  NLRB at  the time  of the  filing of  her action  before the

          Commission.    In  addition,  shortly after  Doulamis  filed  her

          action, additional charges were filed by the Union, and the Board

          continued to exercise its jurisdiction over these claims.

                    Federal  courts  seek to  avoid needless  conflict with

          state agencies  and withhold  relief by  way of  injunction where

          state  remedies  are  available  and adequate.    Alabama  Public
                                                            _______________

          Service Commission v. Southern Railroad Co., 341 U.S. 341 (1951).
          __________________    _____________________

          But where Congress, acting  within its constitutional  authority,

          has vested a  federal agency with  exclusive jurisdiction over  a

          subject  matter and the  intrusion of a  state would result  in a

          conflict  of functions,  the federal  court may enjoin  the state

          proceeding  in  order to  preserve the  federal right.   American
                                                                   ________

          Federation of  Labor  v. Watson,  327  U.S. 582,  593-95  (1946);
          ____________________     ______

                                         -18-

          Bowles  v.  Willingham,  321  U.S.  503,  510-11  (1944);  Public
          ______      __________                                     ______

          Utilities Commission of  Ohio v.  United Fuel Gas  Co., 317  U.S.
          _____________________________     ____________________

          456, 468-70 (1943).

                    This   case   is  similar   to   Freehold  Cogeneration
                                                     ______________________

          Associates,  LP  v.  Board  of Regulatory  Commissioners  of  New
          _______________      ____________________________________________

          Jersey, 44  F.3d 1178 (3d  Cir. 1995).   In  that case,  Freehold
          ______

          sought a declaratory judgment in the United States District Court

          for  the  District of  New Jersey  that  the Board  of Regulatory

          Commissioners of the State of New Jersey ("BRC") was preempted by

          the Federal Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act ("PURPA") from

          modifying  the  terms of  a  previously  approved power  purchase

          agreement  between Freehold  and Jersey  Central Power  and Light

          Company ("JCP&L"), a  New Jersey public  utility.  Freehold  also

          sought an  order  enjoining the  ongoing  BRC proceedings.    The

          district court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

          On appeal,  one of  the arguments  raised by  JCP&L was  that the

          federal court  should abstain  from resolving the  merits of  the

          case even if it was found to possess subject matter jurisdiction.

          The Third Circuit rejected the argument saying:

                      [O]ur  concern  is  with  carrying  out a
                      federal  statutory  scheme promoting  the
                      development    of   alternative    energy
                      sources.  The alleged intrusive action is
                      not  by the  federal government,  but, on
                      the  contrary,  by  a   state  regulatory
                      agency.   We conclude  that abstention is
                      not appropriate in this case and does not
                      warrant any extended discussion.

          Freehold Cogeneration, 44 F.3d at  1187 n.6.  As in Freehold,  we
          _____________________                               ________

          are  concerned here with carrying out a federal statutory scheme,

                                         -19-

          in  this case one promoting the development of a uniform national

          labor policy.  The alleged intrusive action is not by the federal

          government,  but by  the MCAD's  purported regulation  of conduct

          within the NLRB's jurisdiction.

                    We  note that in  the particular context  of this case,

          the application of Younger abstention would result in significant
                             _______

          prejudice to Chaulk, who  entered into a comprehensive settlement

          agreement with the  NLRB through which all unfair  labor practice

          claims  were resolved,  subject to  Chaulk's compliance  with the

          conditions  set forth therein, only to be faced with the prospect

          of having to  defend its actions once  again, this time before  a

          state forum.  Such an expansive interpretation of  the abstention

          doctrine   would  have  the  effect  of  encouraging  duplicative

          litigation,   with  the   resultant   waste   of   judicial   and

          administrative resources, as well  as the danger to federal-state

          relations that could result from conflicting adjudications.

                    Under these circumstances, where a  federal agency with

          primary  jurisdiction over the  controversy has already exercised

          said  jurisdiction,  it  would  be inconsistent  with  the  above

          mentioned  principles  of  comity   and  equal  respect  for  the

          interests  of both the federal and state government for a federal

          court  to  abstain on  Younger  grounds  from  deciding  a  claim
                                 _______

          properly  before  it,   in  order   to  give  way   to  a   state

          administrative  action  filed after  the federal  proceedings are
                                        _____

          underway.  Put simply, comity works both ways.
                                 ______ _____ ____ ____

                    The  Commission nevertheless  urges  us to  extend  the

                                         -20-

          application of Younger  and its progeny  to the circumstances  of
                         _______

          this  case.  To  this end, MCAD  argues that the  facts before us

          satisfy the relevant three part test set out by the Supreme Court

          in  Middlesex,  457 U.S.  at  432.   As  it is  however,  even an
              _________

          analysis of the  case within this framework leads us  to the same

          conclusion.  Abstention was improper in this case.  We explain.

                    A number of courts have held that Younger abstention is
                                                      _______

          inappropriate   where  a   claim  of   preemption  is   "facially

          conclusive" or  "readily apparent", because no  significant state

          interests are served  when it is clear that the state tribunal is

          acting beyond the  lawful limits  of its authority.   Bud  Antle,
                                                                ___________

          Inc.  v. Barbosa,  35  F.3d 1355,  1365-66  (9th Cir.  1994),  as
          ____     _______

          amended  by,  45 F.3d  1261,  1272-73 (9th  Cir.  1994); Gartrell
                                                                   ________

          Construction,  Inc.  v.  Aubry,  940  F.2d  437,  441  (9th  Cir.
          ___________________      _____

          1991)(citing Champion International Corp. v. Brown, 731 F.2d 1406
                       ____________________________    _____

          (9th Cir. 1984);  National R.R. Passenger  Corp. v. Florida,  929
                            ______________________________    _______

          F.2d  1532,   1537  n.12  (11th  Cir.   1991)(citing  Baggett  v.
                                                                _______

          Department of Professional Registration,  717 F.2d 521, 524 (11th
          _______________________________________

          Cir.  1983));  Southwestern  Bell  Tel. v.  Ark.  Public  Service
                         ________________________     _____________________

          Commission,  824 F.2d 672, 673  (8th Cir. 1987);  Kentucky W. Va.
          __________                                        _______________

          Gas  Co. v. Pennsylvania Pub.  Util. Comm'n, 791  F.2d 1111, 1115
          ________    _______________________________

          (3d Cir. 1986).   Chaulk asserts that the Commission  is patently

          acting  beyond its  jurisdictional boundaries  and therefore,  no

          principle   of   comity  precluded   the   district   court  from

          entertaining its claim of preemption on the merits.  In response,

          the  Commission cites the Supreme Court's decision in New Orleans
                                                                ___________

                                         -21-

          Public Service, Inc.  v. Council of the City  of New Orleans, 491
          ____________________     ___________________________________

          U.S.  350 (1989)  ("NOPSI")  for the  proposition  that the  mere

          assertion  of  a substantial  constitutional  challenge  to state

          action, such as an argument of federal preemption engenders, will

          not alone compel the exercise of federal  jurisdiction.  Whatever

          the merits of MCAD's  assertion however, even the NOPSI  decision
                                                            _____

          leaves open the possibility that a "facially conclusive" claim of

          preemption might  render abstention  inappropriate.  Id.  at 367.
                                                               __

          Consequently, we  examine the merits of  Chaulk's contention that

          abstention is also  inappropriate because  preemption is  readily

          apparent in this context.

                    We   have  explained   above  the   particularities  of

          Doulamis'  claims  before  the  Commission.    She  complains  of

          incidents  of interference with  her union activities  as a union
                                     ____  ___ _____ __________       _____

          organizer.   We have observed that the very same conduct provides
          _________

          the factual basis for  the unfair labor practice  charges brought

          by the  Union on her behalf.   We have also  highlighted the fact

          that the  NLRB incorporated  these charges  into a  complaint and

          notice  of hearing  claiming violations  to sections  8(a)(1) and

          8(a)(3)  of  the  NLRA.    As  we  have  noted,  her  claims  are

          fundamentally grounded in an assertion that the rights  which her

          employer interfered with involve her union activity.
                                               _____ ________

                    Under these  circumstances, were we to  allow Doulamis'

          state  claims to go forward by simply artfully pleading her claim

          of unfair labor  practices as one  motivated by a  discriminatory

          animus because of her gender, we would be compromising the NLRB's

                                         -22-

          role as chief  arbiter of labor disputes.   Indeed, there are few

          unfair labor  practices which could not  be similarly repackaged.

          Similarly  aggrieved individuals  could  use such  an opening  to

          bypass the NLRB  merely by ascribing  a myriad of  discriminatory

          motives  to  the  relevant  conduct (i.e.  age,  race,  religious

          belief,  etc.),  thereby  creating  a  system  of  labor  dispute

          adjudication parallel to the NLRB, leaving  the state and federal

          courts  to  grapple  piecemeal   with  issues  Congress  intended

          primarily for NLRB resolution.

                    Faced with this  particular factual  scenario, we  find

          that  under the Garmon doctrine it is "readily apparent" that the
                          ______

          Commission  is  acting  beyond  its  jurisdictional  authority by

          entertaining Doulamis' complaint, for it is readily apparent that

          Chaulk's conduct at issue is at least arguably prohibited by, and

          thus subject to the  NLRA.  Accordingly, we hold  that abstention

          was  inappropriate  and  that   the  district  court  abused  its

          discretion when it  dismissed Chaulk's complaint on the  basis of

          Younger abstention.
          _______

                                   III.  CONCLUSION
                                   III.  CONCLUSION
                                         __________

                    In sum, pursuant to  the Garmon preemption doctrine, we
                                             ______

          find that Ms. Doulamis' claims are preempted by the NLRA, thereby

          depriving the MCAD  of jurisdiction to entertain her action based

          on gender discrimination.  In  addition, we find that  abstention

          was inappropriate in this  case, as the principles of  comity and

          of equal respect for state and  federal functions weighed against

          such  an  abdication of  federal  jurisdiction  over the  present

                                         -23-

          controversy.    Accordingly,  Chaulk is  entitled  to  injunctive

          relief, consistent with this opinion.

                    Finally,  with  regard  to  MCAD's  argument  that  the

          Eleventh  Amendment bars Chaulk's  claims against the Commission,

          we  point  out that  the Supreme  Court  has recognized  that the

          Eleventh Amendment  does not  preclude  properly pleaded  actions

          against state officials when the relief sought is prospective and

          equitable in  nature.  See Ex  Parte Young, 209 U.S.  123 (1908);
                                 ___ _______________

          Will  v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989).
          ____     ___________________________________

          We  therefore  reverse the  judgment  of the  district  court and

          remand  the  case,  so  that  Chaulk  may  address  any  pleading

          deficiencies that currently preclude the continued prosecution of

          its petition for relief.

                    Reversed and remanded.
                    _____________________

                    LYNCH, Circuit Judge, dissenting.  Because Congress has
                    LYNCH, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
                           _____________

          clearly expressed  its intent to allow  state anti-discrimination

          statutes  to operate in areas such  as this that may overlap with

          the    National   Labor    Relations   Act    ("NLRA"),   Petrina

          Doulamis/Sullivan's action is not, I believe, preempted.  Because

          the federal  courts are being  asked to enjoin  the Massachusetts

          Commission  Against  Discrimination   ("MCAD")  from  hearing  an

          ongoing gender discrimination action  over which the state agency

          plainly   has  jurisdiction,   I  believe   that  abstention   is

          appropriate.  I respectfully dissent.

                    Under  San Diego  Building  Trades  Council,  Millmen's
                           ________________________________________________

          Union,  Local  2020  v. Garmon,  359  U.S.  236  (1959), and  its
          ___________________     ______

                                         -24-

          progeny, and in  light of the  clear congressional mandate  under

          Title VII,  42 U.S.C.A.   2000e to e-17 (West 1994 & Supp. 1995),

          that  state  anti-discrimination  statutes  have  authority  over

          claims  for discrimination coextensive  with Title VII, Doulamis'

          MCAD  claim coexists  with and  is not  displaced by  the federal

          labor laws.   The employer's  defense here presents  no "facially

          conclusive"  claim  for  preemption.    See  New  Orleans  Public
                                                  ___  ____________________

          Service, Inc.  v. Council of City  of New Orleans, 491  U.S. 350,
          _____________     _______________________________

          367 (1989).  Garmon preemption is a question over which the state
                       ______

          courts  have  concurrent jurisdiction  and Chaulk  Services, Inc.

          ("Chaulk") will have a  full and fair opportunity to  present the

          question  to the Massachusetts courts.  In my view, abstention is

          required under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
                         _______    ______

                                         -25-

                                          I.

                    Garmon  says  that  "[w]hen  an  activity  is  arguably
                    ______

          subject to   7  or   8 of the  [NLRA], the States as well  as the

          federal  courts must  defer to  the exclusive  competence  of the

          National  Labor Relations Board  ["NLRB"] if the  danger of state

          interference with national policy is to be averted."  Garmon, 359
                                                                ______

          U.S. at  245.6   Garmon  also says  that  this principle  is  not
                           ______

          absolute.    There is  no need  to defer  to  the NLRB  where the

          conduct  at issue  is of  "peripheral concern"  to federal  labor

          policy or where the state regulated activities touch "interests .

          . . deeply rooted  in local feeling and responsibility."   Id. at
                                                                     ___

          243-44.

                    The  Massachusetts anti-discrimination  statute touches

          "interests so  deeply rooted in local  feeling and responsibility

          that,  in  the  absence of  compelling  congressional  direction,

          [courts cannot] infer that Congress [has]  deprived the States of

          the  power to act."  Garmon, 359 U.S. at 244.  This is so whether
                               ______

          or not invidious discrimination in employment can be described as

          being  of "peripheral  concern" to the  NLRA.   Cf. Massachusetts
                                                          ___ _____________

          Electric Co. v. Massachusetts Commission  Against Discrimination,
          ____________    ________________________________________________

          375  Mass.   160,  174   (1978)  (employment  discrimination   of

          peripheral concern to  the NLRA); Walker  Mfg. Co. v.  Industrial
                                            ________________     __________

          Commission,  27 Wis. 2d  669,  681 (1965)  (age discrimination  of
          __________

          peripheral   concern   to   Labor  Management   Relations   Act).
                              
          ____________________

          6  Sex discrimination  is not specifically addressed in  the NLRA
          and  so  it  is not  "clearly  prohibited"  by    8  or  "clearly
          protected" by   7 of the NLRA.

                                         -26-

          Originally enacted in 1946, the Massachusetts anti-discrimination

          statute,  Mass. Gen.  L. ch.  151B,     1-10 (1994),  is eighteen

          years  older than  Title  VII.   See  1946 Mass.  Acts  368.   It
                                           ___

          regulates  conduct  in employment  in  order  to  carry  out  the

          Commonwealth's interest in ensuring  that its workplaces are free

          from particular  categories of discrimination.   It represents no

          less  an exercise  of Massachusetts'  police power  than building

          codes  or fire  regulations.   The interests  it protects  are at

          least  as weighty  as the  interests sought  to be  vindicated in

          actions the Supreme Court has specifically held not preempted  by

          Garmon.  See Belknap,  Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491  (1983) (breach
          ______   ___ ______________    ____

          of   contract  and   misrepresentation  actions   by  replacement

          workers); Farmer v. United  Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners
                    ______    _____________________________________________

          of  America,  Local  25,  430  U.S.  290  (1977)  (infliction  of
          _______________________

          emotional  distress);  Linn  v.  United Plant  Guard  Workers  of
                                 ____      ________________________________

          America, Local 114, 383 U.S. 53 (1966) (libel).
          __________________

                    That chapter 151B  touches interests  deeply rooted  in

          local feeling  and responsibility is  not disputed.   Rather, the

          majority  asserts  that  Doulamis'  claim  is  not  really  a sex

          discrimination claim, describing  Doulamis' claim as  the product

          of "artful[]  pleading."  With  deference, I  believe the  record

          establishes  that   Doulamis'  claim  is  clearly   one  for  sex

          discrimination and has been treated as such by the MCAD.7
                              
          ____________________

          7   Doulamis' claim cannot  be preempted simply  because the case
          arises from a labor dispute.  The Supreme Court has squarely held
          that Garmon preemption does not turn on whether a claim arises in
               ______
          the  context of  a labor  dispute.   Linn, 383  U.S. at  63 ("Nor
                                               ____
          should the  fact that  defamation arises  during a labor  dispute

                                         -27-

                    On the facts  as alleged, Doulamis  has stated a  claim

          before the MCAD for  sex discrimination under chapter 151B.   She

          asserts, inter alia:
                   _____ ____

                      On  November 10,  1993,  I  was  harassed
                      about my  union activity.  I  believe the
                      reason  is because  I am  a female.   The
                      males who are also involved are not being
                      harassed.  Therefore, I charge Respondent
                      with unlawful  discrimination against me,
                      in violation of M.G.L. Chapter 151B . . .
                      and Title VII . . . .

                      I believe  that I am  being single[d] out
                      by the Respondent because  I am a female.
                      There  are  numerous  other   male  union
                      organizers who are not being harassed.

                    That  Doulamis asserts a  bona fide  sex discrimination

          claim is  buttressed by the  underlying papers  in the  pleadings

          submitted  by  Chaulk  to  the  district  court.    Doulamis  was

          apparently a well-respected employee and was featured in Chaulk's

          publicity materials.  From  the time she began working  at Chaulk

          in  1990 until the autumn  of 1993, Doulamis  received no written

          warnings  and no patient complaints.   In the middle of 1993, the

          International Association  of EMTs  and Paramedics began  a union

          organizing campaign at Chaulk.   Although not initially involved,

          Doulamis became involved in the campaign during the fall of 1993,

          when she and Eric Burgess, a male Chaulk employee, wrote a letter

          to  the   president  of  Chaulk's  parent   company  calling  for

          organization  of a  union.   On November  10, 1993,  Doulamis was

          called from a training  session to meet with  the CEO of  Chaulk,

                              
          ____________________

          give   the   Board   exclusive   jurisdiction   to   remedy   its
          consequences."). 

                                         -28-

          Nicholas O'Neil, and a  vice president, Joseph Gilmore.   The two

          men told Doulamis at  that meeting that she was "pretty" and that

          they  believed that the other employees at Chaulk would listen to

          her because  she was "pretty."   They asked her to  become a non-

          union  advocate,  saying  that  her  physical  appearance   would

          persuade other employees to vote against the union.  She refused.

          Shortly  thereafter,  Doulamis  began   receiving  a  series   of

          harassing warnings  from Chaulk  management about her  conduct on

          the job and her  union activities.  Burgess, who  had co-authored

          the  pro-union  letter  with   Doulamis,  did  not  receive  such

          harassment.

                    Doulamis believed  that she  was being singled  out for

          punishment  for her  union activities  because of  her sex.   The
                                                 ___________________

          heart  of her complaint  before the MCAD  was that  she was being

          harassed for  her union activities while male union organizers --

          including one  who had  co-authored the letter  precipitating the

          harassment -- were not (or at least were not until after Doulamis

          filed her complaint  with the  MCAD).  This  allegation states  a

          prima facie claim of sex discrimination under chapter 151B.   See
                                                                        ___

          Ramsdell v. Western Massachusetts Bus Lines, Inc., 415 Mass. 673,
          ________    _____________________________________

          679 (1993);  see  also  Blare  v. Husky  Injection  Molding  Sys.
                       ___  ____  _____     _______________________________

          Boston, Inc., 419 Mass. 437 (1995).  
          ____________

                    Under the facts of this case Doulamis  could allege two

          distinct wrongs -- a claim for unfair labor practices and a claim

          for sex discrimination.  Characterizing Doulamis' latter claim as

          artful pleading assumes away  the difficult legal question raised

                                         -29-

          by  Doulamis' case and squarely presented in the briefs:  whether

          a sex discrimination claim  based on state law is preempted if it

          arises out  of a course of events  that also may give  rise to an

          unfair labor practice charge.

                    The  Supreme Court in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego
                                          ____________________    _________

          County District  Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180 (1978), held
          ______________________________________

          that  even if  a case  may come  within the  scope of  the Garmon
                                                                     ______

          preemption doctrine  when applied in a  "mechanical fashion," id.
                                                                        ___

          at  188,  there is  still  no  preemption over  conduct  arguably

          prohibited by the  NLRA unless the  controversy before the  state

          court  is identical to the dispute that could have been presented
                    _________

          under  the NLRB.   Id.  at  197.8   Doulamis' MCAD  claim is  not
                             ___
                              
          ____________________

          8  At  issue in Sears was conduct  that could be analyzed  in two
                          _____
          distinct  ways.  The  conduct was  both "arguably  protected" and
          "arguably  prohibited" by the NLRA.  The Court drew a distinction
          between those two categories  of conduct (although in that  case,
          the same conduct  happened to  qualify as both)  and imposed  two
          distinct  lines of  analysis.    If  the  activity  at  issue  is
          "arguably protected,"  a finding of preemption  is required where
          an aggrieved party  has a reasonable opportunity of  invoking the
          NLRB jurisdiction or of inducing his adversary to do so.   Id. at
                                                                     ___
          207.  If an activity is "arguably prohibited," state jurisdiction
          is preempted only if  the issues presented to the state court are
          identical to  those that  could be  presented to  the NLRB.   The
          latter rubric leaves much more room for state regulation.  Id. at
                                                                     ___
          200.   Since sex discrimination  is clearly not  protected by the
          NLRA,  the conduct  at issue  in this case  falls under  the more
          generous "arguably prohibited" rubric.

             The majority appears to apply to this case criteria that Sears
                                                                      _____
          made applicable to "arguably protected" conduct.  For example, in
          determining that the controversy here is identical  to that which
          could have been  put to  the NLRB the  majority says,  "[p]lainly
          this is not a case where the NLRB declined to exercise its lawful
          jurisdiction over a labor controversy, or where the NLRB's actual
          exercise  of  jurisdiction  remains  a  matter  of  speculation."
          Majority  Op.  at  typescript  12;  see  also  Majority   Op.  at
                                              ___  ____
          typescript  10 n.4.   While  this  consideration is  important to
          cases  involving  "arguably  protected"  conduct, it  is  not  to

                                         -30-

          identical to that which could have been heard by the NLRB.

                    To  make  out her  claim  on  her chapter  151B  action

          Doulamis needs to show  (1) a prima facie case  of discrimination

          and (2)  "either that  the employer's  articulated reasons are  a

          pretext or  by  direct evidence  that the  actual motivation  was

          discrimination."  Blare, 419 Mass. at 444.  The action before the
                            _____

          NLRB could  not have  turned on  such an inquiry.   Further,  the

          terms of the employer's settlement agreement with the NLRB do not

          establish that Doulamis' claim before the MCAD is not a bona fide

          sex discrimination claim.9

                    On the alleged facts of this case -- where Doulamis and

          Burgess  were  engaged in  the  same  activity (co-authoring  the

          letter) -- the  MCAD will not have  to decide as a  matter of law

          whether one of the two  was engaged in union activity, while  the

          other was not.   In other words, insofar as  Doulamis and Burgess

          were  doing the  same  thing (yet  only  one was  harassed),  the

                              
          ____________________

          "arguably prohibited" conduct.

          9  There also seems to be an absence of record support for either
          the proposition that the  sex discrimination action was addressed
          before  the  NLRB  or  the  proposition that  the  settlement  is
          "comprehensive."  The settlement agreement, dated March 22, 1995,
          does not refer to alleged sex discrimination.  Also, according to
          its terms, the  agreement applies "only  [to] the allegations  in
          the above captioned cases and does not constitute a settlement of
          any other cases  or matters."   The "above  captioned cases"  are
          docket numbers "1-CA-31196, 31945(2), 32267, 32378, 32504, 32534,
          32645,  32661."   Only one  of those docket  numbers, 1-CA-31196,
          filed  December  9,  1993,  involves Doulamis.    Apparently  not
          included  in the settlement are  the other two  claims that were,
          according  to Chaulk,  made  by Doulamis:   docket  numbers 1-CA-
          31157, filed November 29,  1993, and 1-CA-31181-2, filed December
          6, 1993.

                                         -31-

          question  of   whether  the   activities  were   protected  union

          activities cancels out of the equation.

                    This  is why  the  MCAD, when  presented with  Chaulk's

          claim of preemption, said:

                        In  the  Complainant's presentation  of
                      her   discrimination  case   before  this
                      Commission,    the   'merits'    of   the
                      underlying  labor  dispute  need  not  be
                      resolved.  It is  not necessary for  this
                      Commission  to  find that  the Respondent
                      did,   in   fact,   interfere  with   the
                      Complainant's  efforts to  organize union
                      activities;  nor is  it  necessary for  a
                      determination  to  be made  regarding the
                      Respondent's  anti-union  animus, if  one
                      should  exist.   Rather,  the Complainant
                      must   show   that   she    was   treated
                      dissimilarly by the Respondent,  and that
                      the impetus for that dissimilar treatment
                      was due to her gender.  It is neither the
                      role nor the  goal of this  Commission to
                      assess the catalyst  of the  Respondent's
                      actions.      It   is,    however,   this
                      Commission's purpose to ensure  that such
                      actions are not gender motivated.

                        In the present case, the Commission may
                      decide  the  issue  in   dispute  without
                      making   a  threshold   determination  of
                      whether the employer had  interfered with
                      the employee's union activities.  It need
                      only determine whether the  treatment the
                      Complainant received, rightly or wrongly,
                      was  different  from  that  of  her  male
                      counterparts and motivated by her gender.

                    It  is in  this context  that the  MCAD's interrogatory

          must be understood.   While it  is true that  the MCAD has  asked

          Chaulk questions relating to union organizing activities (and has

          perhaps   shown   insufficient   sensitivity  to   the   possible

          jurisdictional  problem),  it  has done  so  for  the purpose  of

          determining  factually whether  Doulamis was  treated differently

                                         -32-

          than men for doing the same thing, and not to define legally what

          is or is  not a union activity  under the NLRA.  As  the MCAD has

          recognized,   Doulamis'   sex    discrimination   claim    exists

          independently of any labor  law claim.  Chaulk's conduct  was not

          wrongful only by virtue of, or with reference to, the labor laws.

          Cf. Tamburello  v. Comm-Tract Corporation, No.  95-1295, slip op.
          ___ __________     ______________________

          at 10-11 (1st Cir.  October 2, 1995) (RICO claim  preempted under

          Garmon  where reviewing court  would be forced  to decide whether
          ______

          some portion  of defendant's conduct violated  federal labor laws

          to  determine  whether  the  plaintiff  had  established  a  RICO

          predicate act).10

                    The Sears inquiry suggests that the MCAD claim does not
                        _____

          fall within the scope  of Garmon preemption.  There  is, however,
                                    ______

          an  even  more  compelling  consideration that  yields  the  same

          conclusion.   Of paramount importance in  any preemption inquiry,

          including  one  under  Garmon,  is  congressional  intent.    See
                                 ______                                 ___

          Metropolitan  Life Ins. Co.  v. Massachusetts, 471  U.S. 724, 747
          ___________________________     _____________

                              
          ____________________

          10    Significantly, particularly  with  respect  to the  Younger
                                                                    _______
          issues raised in Part  II, any issue concerning whether  Doulamis
          was or was not engaged in union activity will arise in this case,
          if at all, by way of Chaulk's potential defense to  the action --
          that Doulamis was treated differently than Burgess and other male
          organizers because the male  organizers were engaged in protected
          union  activity, while Doulamis was  not.  The  Supreme Court has
          said in the analogous context of   301 preemption under the Labor
          Management Relations Act that a defense of preemption is not even
          a  sufficient basis for removal  of the action  to federal court.
          See Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 399 (1987)  ("[A]
          ___ ________________    ________
          defendant cannot, merely by injecting  a federal question into an
          _________
          action that asserts what is plainly  a state-law claim, transform
          the action into one arising under federal law,  thereby selecting
          the forum in which  the claim shall be litigated.")  (emphasis in
          original).

                                         -33-

          (1985) (stating, in discussing  NLRA preemption, including Garmon
                                                                     ______

          preemption, that "as in any preemption analysis, [t]he purpose of

          Congress  is  the   ultimate  touchstone")  (internal  quotations

          omitted).  If Congress  has clearly evidenced its intent  one way

          or the  other on the question  of whether states may  regulate an

          area of conduct,  federal courts  must follow it.   Congress  has

          clearly  evidenced  its  belief  that  state  anti-discrimination

          statutes do not unduly interfere with federal labor policy.

                    Doulamis' claims  not only come under  chapter 151B but

          also  come within the scope of Title  VII, 42 U.S.C.A.   2000e to

          e-17 (West 1994 & Supp. 1995), and are within the jurisdiction of

          the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC").  She has in

          fact alleged a violation  of Title VII and  has indicated in  her

          MCAD complaint that she wishes to have her charges filed with the

          EEOC.

                    The  Supreme Court has said that the NLRA and Title VII

          provide  concurrent  remedies.   See Alexander  v. Gardner-Denver
                                           ___ _________     ______________

          Co.,  415 U.S.  36, 47-48 (1974);  see also Beverly  v. Lone Star
          ___                                ___ ____ _______     _________

          Lead  Construction  Corp., 437  F.2d  1136, 1140  n.22  (5th Cir.
          _________________________

          1971); cf. Britt  v. Grocers Supply  Co., Inc., 978  F.2d   1441,
                 ___ _____     _________________________

          1447 (5th Cir. 1992) ("[W]e have held that claims under Title VII

          are not preempted by the NLRA.  [Our] cases hold that a remedy is

          available  under  both  the  NLRA  and  Title VII  and  recognize

          concurrent  jurisdiction  between   Title  VII  and  the   NLRA."

          (footnote omitted)), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2929 (1993); Morgan
                               _____ ______                          ______

          v. Massachusetts General Hosp., 901 F.2d 186, 194 (1st Cir. 1990)
             ___________________________

                                         -34-

          ("Clearly,  if  an employee  has  engaged  in expression  against

          employer policies,  even within the context  of union activities,

          which  violate  the  Civil  Rights Act,  such  as  discriminatory

          treatment of  minorities or  sexual harassment, and  the employee

          alleges  discharge for  that expression,  section 704(a)  [of the

          Civil Rights  Act] would be implicated for the narrow expression-

          related claims.").11

                    Thus,  even  accepting  the majority's  view  that  the

          factual basis for the sex  discrimination claim provides the same

          basis for the unfair  employment practice claim and that  the sex

          discrimination  claim  is  identical  to that  before  the  NLRB,

          Doulamis  is still entitled to  pursue her claim  under Title VII

          before the  EEOC.  See Alexander,  415 U.S. at 47-48.   Since the
                             ___ _________

          conduct  prohibited by  Title  VII is  nearly  the same  as  that

          proscribed  by chapter  151B and  Congress intended Title  VII to

          provide a concurrent  remedy to the NLRA in areas  of overlap, it

          would be difficult  to impute  to Congress any  hostility to  the

          enforcement of  chapter 151B with  respect to areas  of potential

          overlap with the NLRA.

                    There  is, however, no need  to rely on  such a general

          proposition  in this  case  because  Congress  has  affirmatively

          stated in the  language and  through the structure  of Title  VII

          itself that  state anti-discrimination laws may  provide a remedy

          that overlaps with the NLRA.  Not only did Congress affirmatively
                              
          ____________________

          11  It is clear also that jurisdiction is concurrent  between the
          EEOC and NLRB over claims that may fall within each statute.  See
                                                                        ___
          Beverly, 437 F.2d at 1140, n.22.
          _______

                                         -35-

          preserve the operation of state anti-discrimination laws in Title

          VII,  see 42  U.S.C.A.    2000e-7, but  it made  the  state anti-
                ___

          discrimination statutes  an integral  component of the  Title VII

          enforcement structure.   See  42 U.S.C.A.    2000e-5(c) ("section
                                   ___

          706(c)").  Section 706(c) of  Title VII explicitly provides  that

          in  states  like  Massachusetts (which  have  anti-discrimination

          statutes and an agency charged with  enforcing the state statute)

          jurisdiction in the state  administrative agency is exclusive for
                                                              _________

          the first  60 days  after a claim  is filed.   See 42  U.S.C.A.  
                                                         ___

          2000e-5(c).

                    The importance of state anti-discrimination statutes in

          the  enforcement  scheme of  Title VII  was  of major  concern to

          Congress in enacting Title VII.  Isaac v. Harvard University, 769
                                           _____    __________________

          F.2d 817, 822 (1st Cir.  1985)  ("The issue reflected in  section

          706(c), the  relationship between federal and  state remedies for

          employment discrimination, received much attention throughout the

          legislative  process.").    The  legislative history  shows  that

          section  706(c)  of Title  VII  was  enacted "'to  keep  primary,

          exclusive jurisdiction in the hands of the State commissions  for

          a  sufficient  period of  time  to let  them  work out  their own

          problems at the local level.'"  Id. (quoting 110 Cong. Rec. 13087
                                          ___

          (1964)  (comments of  Senator Dirksen)).12   It  was  critical to
                              
          ____________________

          12   The  EEOC has  recognized the  importance of  allowing state
          anti-discrimination statutes to  operate in  order to  effectuate
          Congress'  purposes  for  Title  VII.     See,  e.g.,  29  C.F.R.
                                                    ___   ____
            1601.13(a)(3)(i) (1995) ("In order  to give full weight  to the
          policy  of section 706(c) of  title VII, which  affords State and
          local fair employment practice  ["FEP"] agencies that come within
          the  provisions of that section  an opportunity to remedy alleged

                                         -36-

          the passage of  Title VII that  the federal government  initially

          defer  to   the  states  in  matters   involving  discrimination.

          Moreover,  Congress  did not  devise  this  enforcement structure

          simply for administrative convenience (i.e., to avoid duplication

          of  effort).  As this  court has previously  said, section 706(c)

          "was  first, and foremost, a  statute of deference."   Isaac, 769
                                                                 _____

          F.2d at 824; see also id. at 824 n.9 (citing Oscar Mayer & Co. v.
                       ___ ____ ___                    _________________

          Evans,  441  U.S. 750  (1979)  and  stating  that "[t]he  Court's
          _____

          implicit  message   appears  to   be  that  deference,   and  not

          duplication,  was  at  the  heart  of  section  706(c)").13   And

          Congress  clearly  had the  NLRA in  mind  when it  mandated this

          principle of deference to the state anti-discrimination statutes.

          See Alexander, 415 U.S.  at 48 n.9 (quoting  110 Cong. Rec.  7207
          ___ _________

          (1964)  (where Senator Joseph Clark,  one of the  sponsors of the

          bill,   introduced   an   interpretive  memorandum   specifically

          mentioning the relationship between Title VII and the NLRA)).

                    If  Congress  believed  that state  anti-discrimination

          statutes could  not regulate  coextensively with Title  VII, then

          perhaps preemption would  be appropriate.   But that  is not  the

          case.  Nothing  in Title VII says  that state anti-discrimination
                              
          ____________________

          discrimination concurrently regulated by title VII or the ADA and
          State  or   local  law,  the  Commission   adopts  the  following
          procedures with  respect to allegations  of discrimination  filed
          with the Commission.").

          13    Under  the  EEOC's  regulations the  MCAD  is  not  only  a
          designated FEP agency, see 29 C.F.R.   1601.74  (1995), but it is
                                 ___
          a certified designated FEP agency, see   1601.80 (1995), to which
            _________                        ___
          the EEOC gives a higher level of deference than it otherwise does
          to designated FEPs.  See 29 C.F.R.   1601.75(a) (1995).
                               ___

                                         -37-

          statutes  cannot  apply  coextensively  with  Title  VII.    More

          significantly,  there  clearly  is  nothing that  says  that  the

          exclusive  jurisdiction of  state  administrative agencies  under

          section  706(c) is limited to  cases under Title  VII that do not

          overlap with the NLRA.     

                    It  is  possible  to  draw  at  least  two  conclusions

          relevant to congressional intent from Title VII.  First, Congress

          affirmatively  intended  that state  anti-discrimination statutes

          would operate to  regulate conduct  covered by Title  VII to  the

          same extent as  Title VII itself and,  thus, in areas  that might

          also be covered  by the NLRA.   Second,  Congress could not  have

          intended to eliminate the operation of state  anti-discrimination

          statutes  over claims  covered by  Title VII  because  that would

          actively impair  the  operation of  Title VII  and frustrate  the
                   ______

          enforcement  scheme   Congress  envisioned.     Not   even  ERISA

          preemption,   which  is   arguably  much   broader  than   Garmon
                                                                     ______

          preemption, see Metropolitan Life  Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471
                      ___ ___________________________    _____________

          U.S. 724,  747 (1985) (distinguishing ERISA  preemption from NLRA

          preemption  by  stating  that  ERISA  preemption  is  statutorily

          mandated), allows preemption where  it would impair the operation

          of Title VII.  See Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 102
                         ___ ____    ____________________

          (1983)  (where ERISA  preemption of  a state  anti-discrimination

          statute  would impair  the operation  of Title  VII, there  is no

          preemption).  The reasonable conclusion is that Congress intended

          to allow  state anti-discrimination statutes to  overlap with the

          NLRA.

                                         -38-

                    The Supreme  Court's decision in Alexander  v. Gardner-
                                                     _________     ________

          Denver Co., 415 U.S.  36 (1974), reinforces this conclusion.   In
          __________

          Alexander the Court was called upon to determine the relationship
          _________

          between   the  federal   courts  and   the  grievance-arbitration

          machinery of  collective bargaining agreements  in the resolution

          and enforcement of an individual's rights under Title VII.  There

          an  employee  had a  claim  for discrimination  that  was clearly

          covered by  a collective  bargaining agreement.14   At issue  was

          whether  the  employee's remedies  provided  in  the   collective

          bargaining  agreement  (and subject  to arbitration)  precluded a

          suit   in  federal  court  based  on  Title  VII.15    The  Court

          unanimously held that it did not, saying:

                      [L]egislative  enactments  in  this  area
                      have  long evinced  a  general intent  to
                      accord  parallel or  overlapping remedies
                      against  discrimination.    In the  Civil
                      Rights Act of 1964,  42 U.S.C.   2000a et
                                                             __
                      seq.,   Congress    indicated   that   it
                      ____
                      considered     the     policy     against
                      discrimination  to  be  of  the  "highest
                      priority."      Newman  v.   Piggie  Park
                                      ______       ____________
                      Enterprises, [390 U.S. 400,  402 (1968)].
                      ___________
                      Consistent  with  this  view,  Title  VII
                      provides for consideration of employment-
                      discrimination claims  in several forums.
                      See  42 U.S.C.     2000e-5(b) (1970  ed.,
                      ___
                      Supp. II) (EEOC); 42 U.S.C.    2000e-5(c)
                      (1970  ed.,  Supp. II)  (state  and local
                                               ________________
                      agencies); 42 U.S.C.    2000e-5(f)  (1970
                      ________
                      ed., Supp. II) (federal courts).  And, in
                      general,  submission  of a  claim  to one
                              
          ____________________

          14   The right  to bargain  collectively is, of  course, an  NLRA
          conferred right.   Allis-Chalmers Corp.  v. Lueck, 471  U.S. 202,
                             ____________________     _____
          213 n.8 (1985).

          15  In Alexander, as here,  there had been no waiver of statutory
                 _________
          rights.   See Gilmer  v. Interstate/Johnson Lane  Corp., 500 U.S.
                    ___ ______     ______________________________
          20, 35 (1991).

                                         -39-

                      forum   does   not   preclude   a   later
                      submission  to  another.   Moreover,  the
                      legislative   history    of   Title   VII
                      manifests a congressional intent to allow
                      an individual to pursue independently his
                      rights under  both  Title VII  and  other
                                                          _____
                      applicable state and federal statutes.
                      _____________________________________

          Alexander,  415  U.S.  at  47-48  (emphasis  supplied;  footnotes
          _________

          omitted);16  see also  Brown  v. Hotel  and Restaurant  Employees
                       ___ ____  _____     ________________________________

          and Bartenders Intern. Union, Local 54, 468 U.S. 491 (1984).17
          ______________________________________
                              
          ____________________

          16    The  Court has  applied  a  similar  analysis in  analogous
          situations.   See Lingle v.  Norge Division of  Magic Chef, Inc.,
                        ___ ______     ___________________________________
          486 U.S. 399, 412 (1988) (suggesting that "  301 does not preempt
          state anti-discrimination  laws, even  though a suit  under these
          laws,  like a  suit  alleging retaliatory  discharge, requires  a
          state court  to determine whether  just cause existed  to justify
          the discharge." (citation omitted)); Colorado Anti-Discrimination
                                               ____________________________
          Commission  v.  Continental Air  Lines, Inc., 372  U.S. 714,  724
          __________      ____________________________
          (1963) (rejecting  a claim  that a state  anti-discrimination law
          was  preempted by the Railway Labor Act,  which is similar to the
          National Labor Relations Act).

          17  At issue in Brown was whether     86 and 93 of the New Jersey
                          _____
          Casino Control Act (which set qualifications for union officials)
          were preempted by    7 of the NLRA.   It was argued that  the New
          Jersey statute was preempted because it interfered with the right
          protected under   7 of employees to choose their union officials.
          The Supreme Court held that   7 did not  completely preempt    86
          and 93 of the New Jersey statute.  In the  Court's view, Congress
          had, through  the passage  of the Labor-Management  Reporting and
          Disclosure Act  ("LMRDA"), disclaimed any intent  to pre-empt all
          state  regulation  which  touched  upon  the  specific  right  of
          employees to  decide which individuals will serve as officials of
          their bargaining  representatives.  The  LMRDA had imposed,  in  
          504(a),    federal    qualification    standards     for    union
          representatives.  Because the  LMRDA affirmatively preserved  the
          operation of  state  laws  in    603  and  made    504(a)  itself
          dependent  in part on state  laws for its  enforcement, the Court
          held that state laws could impose their own similar qualification
          standards on union officials.  Id. at 509.
                                         ___

             Brown is highly instructive  on the type of approach  required
             _____
          for this  case.  In Brown,  the Court focussed on  the indicia of
                              _____
          congressional  intent that could be  found not just  in the NLRA,
          but also in  a parallel  federal statute.   The parallel  federal
          statute there specifically reserved  a place for state regulation
          over the conduct coming within its  scope.  While the LMRDA  does

                                         -40-

                    National labor relations policy  does not begin and end

          with the  NLRA.  Title VII  is as much  a part of the  network of

          labor relations  law  as is  the  NLRA.   Where Congress  has  so

          clearly indicated  that  state anti-discrimination  laws  are  to

          operate hand in hand with Title VII (indeed, for a limited period

          to  the exclusion  of  Title VII)  it  is difficult  to  conclude

          Congress intended  preemption under  the circumstances here.   In

          the  words  of Garmon,  preemption  should  not  be found  absent
                         ______

          "compelling congressional  direction."  Garmon, 359  U.S. at 244.
                                                  ______

          Here, all the congressional direction is to the effect that state

          anti-discrimination   statutes   may  supplement   federal  laws,

          including federal labor laws,  and Garmon preemption is therefore
                                             ______

          inappropriate.

                                         II.

                    Having  stated  my  disagreement  with  the  view  that

          Doulamis' sex discrimination  claim is preempted  by the NLRA,  I

          consider  what perhaps  may be  a  conceptually prior  issue, the

          issue  of abstention.  By seeking an injunction against the state

          proceedings, Chaulk  has effectively  asked the federal  court to

          enjoin  the state courts from  deciding the Garmon  issue.  Thus,
                                                      ______

          the potentially dispositive question,  apart from whether  Garmon
                                                                     ______

          preemption is  appropriate, is whether this  federal court should
                              
          ____________________

          not bear on this case, Title VII does, and Title  VII makes clear
          that   Congress   intended  federal   and  state   regulation  of
          discrimination  to overlap.   The  differences between  Brown and
                                                                  _____
          this case do not affect the central instruction of Brown:  that a
                                                             _____
          federal court  must defer to  congressional intent in  making any
          preemption analysis, even one  involving the NLRA and even  if it
          is expressed in another federal statute.

                                         -41-

          bar  the state fair employment agency from hearing this claim and

          so bar Massachusetts state courts  from deciding the Garmon issue
                                                               ______

          themselves, or, to the contrary, abstain from decision  and allow

          the state agency and  courts to proceed.  As  with the preemption

          issue, this issue is difficult, but  on balance I would hold here

          under Younger v.  Harris, 401  U.S. 37 (1971),  and its  progeny,
                _______     ______

          that abstention is appropriate.

                    Younger  prevents  interference   with  pending   state
                    _______

          administrative  proceedings if  they  are of  a judicial  nature,

          implicate an  important state  interest, and provide  the federal

          plaintiff an adequate opportunity to litigate  his constitutional

          claim.  Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Dayton Christian Schools,
                  ____________________________    _________________________

          Inc.,  477 U.S.  619, 627  (1985).   Although Chaulk  claims that
          ____

          Younger abstention is a  principle of "discretionary  deference,"
          _______

          the Supreme Court has  stated that where a case  falls within the

          Younger parameters, a district court has no discretion to provide
          _______

          injunctive relief  and must  abstain.  See  Colorado River  Water
                                                 ___  _____________________

          Conservation District  v. United States,  424 U.S. 800,  816 n.22
          _____________________     _____________

          (1976) ("Where  a case is properly within  [the Younger] category
                                                          _______

          of cases, there  is no discretion to  grant injunctive relief.");

          see also Sun Refining & Marketing  Co. v. Brennan, 921 F.2d  635,
          ___ ____ _____________________________    _______

          639  (6th Cir. 1990) ("[U]nlike other forms of abstention, when a

          case is properly within  the Younger category of cases,  there is
                                       _______

          no  discretion  on  the  part  of  the  federal  court  to  grant

          injunctive  relief.");  Seneca-Cayuga  Tribe  v.  State  ex  rel.
                                  ____________________      _______________

          Thompson,  874 F.2d 709, 711 (10th Cir. 1989) (Younger abstention
          ________                                       _______

                                         -42-

          not discretionary  once conditions are met,  absent extraordinary

          circumstances that render a state  court unable to give litigants

          a full and fair hearing on their federal claims).18

                    There  is no  question that  the MCAD  proceedings were

          ongoing at the time Chaulk's district court  complaint was filed,

          see Bettencourt  v. Board of  Registration in Medicine,  904 F.2d
          ___ ___________     __________________________________

          772, 777 (1st Cir. 1990) (in determining interference "the proper

          point  of  reference is  the  date  plaintiff  filed his  federal

          complaint"),  and that  the proceedings  are judicial  in nature.

          See Dayton Christian Schools, 477 U.S. at 629 (finding Ohio Civil
          ___ ________________________

          Rights  Commission proceedings sufficiently  judicial in nature).

          The significant questions here are whether the state  interest in

          deciding sex discrimination claims is important and whether there

          will  be an adequate opportunity  for Chaulk to  raise the Garmon
                                                                     ______

          preemption question in the Massachusetts state forum.

                    The  Supreme   Court  has   said  that   remedying  sex

          discrimination  is  a sufficiently  important  state  interest to

          trigger Younger.  See  Dayton Christian Schools, 477 U.S.  at 628
                  _______   ___  ________________________

          ("We  have  no  doubt  that  the  elimination  of  prohibited sex

          discrimination  is  a sufficiently  important  state interest  to

          bring  the  present case  within the  ambit  of [Younger  and its
                                                           _______

          progeny].").   Although Chaulk has suggested that there can be no

          significant state interest in this case because  it is preempted,
                              
          ____________________

          18   The majority quarrels with this proposition stating that the
          Colorado  River case  was  discussing criminal  cases.   Colorado
          _______________                                          ________
          River,  however, was  discussing Younger  abstention and  Younger
          _____                            _______                  _______
          clearly applies to non-criminal state administrative proceedings.
          See Dayton Christian Schools, 477 U.S. at 627 & n.2. 
          ___ ________________________

                                         -43-

          such an argument,  I believe,  is most likely  foreclosed by  New
                                                                        ___

          Orleans Public Service, Inc.  v. Council of City of  New Orleans,
          ____________________________     _______________________________

          491 U.S. 350, 365 (1989) ("NOPSI").  In NOPSI the Court said that
                                     _____        _____

          in determining the importance of the state interest courts should

          "not  look narrowly  to  its  interest  in  the  outcome  of  the

          particular  case  --  which   could  arguably  be  offset  by   a

          substantial  federal  interest in  the  opposite  outcome."   Id.
                                                                        ___

          Courts rather  must  look  to  the  "importance  of  the  generic

          proceedings  to  the  State."     Id.  (citing  Dayton  Christian
                                            ___           _________________

          Schools).      As  Dayton   Christian   Schools   made  explicit,
          _______            ____________________________

          Massachusetts has  a legitimate  and important state  interest in

          preventing sex discrimination.  Thus the important state interest

          prong of Younger is satisfied in this case.
                   _______

                    Where there is an important state interest, the Supreme

          Court  has noted that a federal court should abstain unless state

          law  clearly bars  the interposition  of the  federal plaintiff's

          constitutional  claim.    Middlesex  County Ethics  Committee  v.
                                    ___________________________________

          Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S.  423, 432 (1982).  Here, we have
          ______________________

          no  reason  to doubt  that  the Massachusetts  state  courts will

          provide  Chaulk with  a full  and fair  opportunity to  raise the

          Garmon  preemption   question.    Chaulk  raised  the  preemption
          ______

          argument before the MCAD  and will have a further  opportunity to

          pursue  it before  the  Massachusetts appellate  courts.   Dayton
                                                                     ______

          Christian Schools,  477 U.S. at 629   ("[I]t is sufficient  . . .
          _________________

          that constitutional claims may  be raised in state-court judicial

          review of the administrative proceeding.") (citation omitted).

                                         -44-

                    If federal  law barred  the Massachusetts  state courts

          from deciding the Garmon  preemption question, then the "adequate
                            ______

          opportunity" prong would not  be met.  Indeed such  a proposition

          appears  to be at the heart of Chaulk's argument.  Chaulk argues:

          "[W]here conduct is arguably protected or prohibited by the NLRA,

          jurisdiction over  that conduct is preempted in the labor context

          and is exclusively  federal.   The determination  of whether  the
                                         __________________________________

          case arguably falls within the preempted field is also to be made
          _________________________________________________________________

          by  the federal  courts,  not State  courts  or State  tribunals"
          ________________________________________________________________

          (emphasis supplied).

                    But that proposition is untenable and inconsistent with

          the  Supreme  Court's case  law.   Although  state courts  may be

          deprived  of jurisdiction to decide  a case once  it is preempted
                                                      ____

          under  Garmon, they are  not deprived  of jurisdiction  to decide
                 ______

          whether a case  is so  preempted.  State  courts have  concurrent
          _______

          jurisdiction to decide federal preemption issues.   See Chick Kam
                                                              ___ _________

          Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140, 149-50 (1988) ("[W]hen a state
          ____    ___________

          proceeding presents  a federal  issue, even a  pre-emption issue,

          the proper  course is  to seek  resolution of  that issue  by the

          state court."); see also  Turnbow v. Pacific Mut. Life  Ins. Co.,
                          ___ ____  _______    ___________________________

          934 F.2d 1100,  1103 (9th  Cir. 1991) (no  jurisdictional bar  to

          state court  deciding ERISA preemption question);  Sun Refining &
                                                             ______________

          Marketing  Co.  v. Brennan,  921 F.2d  635,  641 (6th  Cir. 1990)
          ______________     _______

          (discussing  possibility   of  Younger  abstention   question  in
                                         _______

          situation involving state action that was arguably subject to the

          exclusive   jurisdiction  of   Occupational  Safety   and  Health

                                         -45-

          Administration  ("OSHA")  and  stating, "it  is  undisputed  that

          concurrent jurisdiction exists in the Ohio state courts to decide

          the federal pre-emption issue").

                    Garmon  preemption is no  exception to  this principle.
                    ______

          Cf. International  Longshoremen's Ass'n,  AFL-CIO v.   Davis, 476
          ___ _____________________________________________      _____

          U.S.  380,  393 (1985)  ("when a  claim  of Garmon  preemption is
                                                      ______

          raised  [in state court], it  must be considered  and resolved by
                                    _______________________________________

          the state court" (emphasis supplied)).  Because the Massachusetts
          _______________

          state courts  have concurrent  jurisdiction to decide  the Garmon
                                                                     ______

          preemption  issue, Chaulk  will have  an adequate  opportunity to

          raise its  Garmon preemption  claim in the  Massachusetts courts,
                     ______

          and  thus the "adequate opportunity" prong of Younger is also met
                                                        _______

          here.

                    Perhaps recognizing  that Younger applies to this case,
                                              _______

          Chaulk  has  argued  that  preemption  cases  should  be  treated

          differently than typical Younger abstention cases.   It says that
                                   _______

          "[t]he real  issue in this  case is whether a  doctrine of comity

          should be applied in a  Garmon preemption case."  It  argues that
                                  ______

          treating this  case under Younger "confuses  two federal concepts
                                    _______

          which  are rooted in very different soil"; and that while Younger
                                                                    _______

          "is  predicated  upon  discretionary  deference  by  the  federal

          government   to  fundamental  State  interests,"  preemption  "is

          mandatory and  arises under  the Constitution,  specifically, the

          Supremacy  Clause."    According  to  Chaulk  "[t]o  elevate  the

          equitable doctrine of abstention over the Constitutional doctrine

          of preemption would truly be to elevate form over substance."

                                         -46-

                    Whatever the merits of Chaulk's argument in theory, the

          Supreme Court has  apparently rejected  it.  In  NOPSI the  Court
                                                           _____

          said  that preemption  issues  do not  involve a  greater federal

          interest than other constitutional challenges:

                      There  is no greater  federal interest in
                      enforcing   the   supremacy  of   federal
                      statutes than in enforcing  the supremacy
                      of  explicit  constitutional  guarantees,
                      and  constitutional  challenges to  state
                      action,  no  less than  pre-emption-based
                      challenges,   call   into  question   the
                      legitimacy of the State's interest in its
                      proceedings  reviewing or  enforcing that
                      action.   Yet it  is clear that  the mere
                      assertion of a substantial constitutional
                      challenge to state  action will not alone
                      compel    the    exercise   of    federal
                      jurisdiction. . . .    [P]reemption-based
                      challenges merit a similar focus . . . .

          Id. at 365.  Thus, courts are to analyze Younger abstention cases
          ___                                      _______

          involving preemption claims no differently than any other Younger
                                                                    _______

          abstention  case, see Sun Refining,  921 F.2d at  639, and even a
                            ___ ____________

          substantial  claim of  federal  preemption is  not sufficient  to

          overcome Younger.  See NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 365-66.19
                   _______   ___ _____
                              
          ____________________

          19  A distinction exists between preemption involving a choice of
          forum and preemption involving a choice  of law.  Cf. Violette v.
                                                            ___ ________
          Smith &  Nephew  Dyonics, Inc.,  62 F.3d  8, 11  (1st Cir.  1995)
          ______________________________
          (choice  of  forum preemption  is  jurisdictional  and cannot  be
          waived,  while choice  of law  is not  and may  be waived).   The
          argument might  be made that  because Garmon  involves choice  of
                                                ______
          forum preemption there  is a greater federal interest  to protect
          than in a  case involving  choice of law  and that,  accordingly,
          abstention here might not be  appropriate here even if abstention
          for choice of law preemption would be.  NOPSI, however, says that
                                                  _____
          the  federal  interest is  not to  be  weighed against  the state
          interest.  See  Sun Refining, 921 F.2d at 641.   Thus even if the
                     ___  ____________
          federal interest in Garmon preemption is weightier than in choice
                              ______
          of law preemption cases,  that consideration does not  affect the
          Younger  inquiry;  abstention  is   appropriate  as  long  as  an
          _______
          important state interest is identified and the other requirements
          are  met.    See    Middlesex County,  457  U.S.  at  431-32; Sun
                       ___    ________________                          ___

                                         -47-

                    The exception to Younger  that provides that abstention
                                     _______

          may  be improper  where  the plaintiff  might suffer  irreparable

          injury  absent  equitable  relief  is  not  applicable  here.   A

          sufficient  risk  of  irreparable  injury  may  exist  where  the

          challenged state statute is "flagrantly and patently violative of

          express constitutional prohibitions. . . ."  Younger, 401 U.S. at
                                                       _______

          53-54.   But chapter  151B is hardly  flagrantly unconstitutional

          and, given  the complexities  of the preemption  question, it  is

          difficult  to  describe  the  MCAD's  actions  as  flagrantly  or

          patently violative of the Garmon preemption principle.
                                    ______

                    Further, although the Supreme  Court in NOPSI left open
                                                            _____

          the  question  of  whether  a  "facially  conclusive"  claim  for

          preemption might fall within the exception to Younger, see NOPSI,
                                                        _______  ___ _____

          491  U.S. at  367,  the preemption  claim  here is  not  facially

          conclusive.    For  Chaulk's  preemption  claim  to  be  facially

          conclusive the federal courts must be able to determine the state

          action  is  preempted "without  further  factual  inquiry."   Id.
                                                                        ___

          Chaulk cannot meet this standard.

                    The  MCAD has  not sought  directly to  regulate unfair

          labor practices nor has  it questioned the authority of  the NLRB

          to adjudicate the unfair  labor practices claim.  Cf.  NOPSI, 491
                                                            ___  _____

          U.S.  at 367.   It  has in  fact said  that "the  issue of  union

          interference is  properly  left to  the provinces  of the  NLRB."

          Neither has it challenged the  non-admission settlement agreement

          that Chaulk has entered, nor does it appear  that the MCAD action
                              
          ____________________

          Refining, 921 F.2d at 641.    
          ________

                                         -48-

          will  undermine that agreement.20   Even if there  were reason to

          doubt  whether   Doulamis  has   a  bona   fide  claim   for  sex

          discrimination or whether the MCAD should adjudicate the dispute,

          it would be impossible "conclusively [to] say [the MCAD] is wrong

          without  further factual  inquiry  -- and  what requires  further

          factual inquiry  can hardly  be deemed 'flagrantly'  unlawful for

          purposes of  a threshold  abstention determination."   NOPSI, 491
                                                                 _____

          U.S. at 367.21 

                    Finally, the fact that the union filed a complaint with

          the NLRB before Doulamis filed her complaint before the MCAD does

          not resolve the  matter.22   To begin with,  Chaulk never  raised

                              
          ____________________

          20   There is nothing  in the record to  show that the  NLRB even
          considered Doulamis' claims for sex discrimination in the context
          of the unfair labor practice  charges.  Moreover, the  settlement
          agreement itself "does not  preclude persons from filing charges,
          the General Counsel from prosecuting complaints, or the Board and
          the courts from finding violations  with respect to matters which
          __________
          precede  the date of the approval of this Agreement regardless of
          whether  such matters  are known  to the  General Counsel  or are
          readily discoverable" (emphasis supplied). 

          21  There may be  situations in which the preemption  claim could
          be facially  conclusive and abstention would  not be appropriate.
          For example,  this case  would  be viewed  quite differently  had
          Doulamis alleged  before the MCAD that  the discrimination Chaulk
          engaged in was simply  based on her potential affiliation  in the
          union, as  opposed to her gender.   In such a  case, the question
          whether the  claim was within  the exclusive jurisdiction  of the
          NLRA would not turn on  deciding whether her claim was a  case of
          artful  pleading.   No more  facts would  need be  determined and
          under  such  circumstances  abstention  would  probably  not   be
          appropriate.   Moreover,  were  the MCAD  to assert  jurisdiction
          under such circumstances, there would be a good argument that the
          MCAD was  behaving in flagrant disregard of the Garmon preemption
                                                          ______
          principle.     

          22  Although  Doulamis' complaint  before the MCAD  was filed  on
          December 1,  1993  the  proceedings  before  the  MCAD  began  on
          November 23, 1993 when Doulamis underwent her intake interview.

                                         -49-

          such a  theory as  a basis to  prevent abstention.   Its  initial

          brief, its  reply brief,  and the supplemental  letter memorandum

          requested  by  the  panel at  oral  argument  are  devoid of  any

          argument  that  abstention  is  inappropriate  because  the  NLRB

          proceeding was  pending at the time of the MCAD complaint.  It is

          therefore waived.  See Grella v. Salem Five Cent Savings Bank, 42
                             ___ ______    ____________________________

          F.3d 26, 36 (1st Cir. 1994).

                    Moreover, there does not appear to be case law squarely

          supporting  such a theory.   Indeed, such a  theory of abstention

          appears to be at odds with the treatment of the issue in at least

          one  other circuit.    See  Sun  Refining,  921  F.2d  at  639-42
                                 ___  _____________

          (abstention  was appropriate  despite  claim that  the state  law

          action violated  the exclusive  jurisdiction of OSHA  and despite

          fact that  OSHA  action had  been  pending and  concluded  months

          before the state action was brought).  As a matter of policy, the

          existence  of  a  NLRB  action  at  the  time  a  parallel  state

          proceeding  is filed  should not  control the  matter here.   The

          NLRB, if it so chose, could have sought an injunction against the

          state proceedings if it  thought the state proceedings conflicted

          with its  exclusive jurisdiction.   NLRB  v. Nash-Finch  Co., 404
                                              ____     _______________

          U.S. 138,  142-44 (1971).23   The fact that  the NLRB did  not so
                              
          ____________________

          23  Even the cases cited for the proposition that a federal court
          may enjoin  a  state court's  intrusion into  a federal  agency's
          exclusive jurisdiction do not stand for such a broad proposition.
          In the only  labor case  cited, American Federation  of Labor  v.
                                          _____________________________
          Watson, 327 U.S. 582 (1946), the court specifically said that for
          ______
          such an injunction to issue there must be  an immediate threat of
          irreparable  injury, such  as  an "imminent  threat to  an entire
          system of collective  bargaining."   Id. at 595.   No  comparable
                                               ___
          threat exists here.  In fact, in Watson the Court explicitly said
                                           ______

                                         -50-

          move speaks volumes.

                    I respectfully dissent.

                              
          ____________________

          that  the  threat of  multiple prosecutions  under the  state law
          would not be  sufficient to justify an injunction.   See id.  The
                ___                                            ___ ___
          Court also abstained under the doctrine of Railroad Commission of
                     _________                       ______________________
          Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).  See id. at 599.    
          _____    ___________                        ___ ___

                                         -51-