Court Opinion

ID: 9489163
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 13:07:23.847882+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:53:21.782192
License: Public Domain

SAROKIN, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I agree with the majority’s carefully written opinion that Congress clearly intended the amendment to § 212(c), barring aliens convicted of aggravated felonies who have served five or more years from seeking a deportation waiver, to apply to pre-enactment convictions.
My concurrence is mandated by the unrealistic conclusion in longstanding Supreme Court precedent that deportation is not a form of criminal punishment, but rather a civil remedy aimed at excluding unwanted *1527aliens, and that therefore the Ex Post Facto Clause does not apply to legislation affecting deportation. Majority Opinion, at 1520 n. 4 (citing INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038, 104 S.Ct. 3479, 3483, 82 L.Ed.2d 778 (1984)); see also Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531, 74 S.Ct. 737, 742-43, 98 L.Ed. 911 (1954); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 594, 72 S.Ct. 512, 521, 96 L.Ed. 586 (1952).
The legal fiction that deportation following a criminal conviction is not punishment is difficult to reconcile with reality, especially in the context of this case. Mr. Scheidemann entered this country at age twelve; he has lived here for thirty-six years; he has been married to an American citizen for twenty-four years; he has raised three children all of whom are American citizens; his elderly parents are naturalized citizens; two of his four siblings are naturalized American citizens, and all four of them reside permanently in the United States; he has no ties to Colombia, the country to which he is to be deported; and he has fully served the sentence imposed upon him. If deportation under such circumstances is not punishment, it is difficult to envision what is.
I think the deportation of aliens for the commission of crimes is clearly punishment. If Mr. Seheidemann’s deportation could be characterized, as it should be, as punishment, I would conclude that the statutory bar to the discretionary waiver is a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution.
I.
The Constitution provides that “[n]o state shall ... pass any ... ex post facto law.” U.S. Const. Art. 1, § 10. This clause prohibits the government from applying laws that “ ‘retroactively alter the definition of crimes or increase the punishment for criminal acts.’” California Department of Corrections v. Morales, — U.S. -, -, 115 S.Ct. 1597, 1601, 131 L.Ed.2d 588 (1995) (quoting Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 43, 110 S.Ct. 2715, 2719, 111 L.Ed.2d 30 (1990)). “[A]ny statute ... which makes more burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its commission” has long been held to implicate the Ex Post Facto Clause, Collins, 497 U.S. at 42, 110 S.Ct. at 2719 (quoting Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 169-70, 46 S.Ct. 68, 69, 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925)), a provision concerned with “the lack of fair notice and governmental restraint when the legislature increases punishment beyond what was prescribed when the crime was consummated.” Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 30, 101 S.Ct. 960, 965, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981).
Various types of laws that serve to increase the punishment after an individual has committed an action have been found to violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. For example, the Supreme Court found that the Ex Post Facto Clause had been violated when defendants were sentenced under a statute requiring a sentence of fifteen years when the law in effect at the time of the offense gave the judge discretion to impose a lower sentence. Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397, 401, 57 S.Ct. 797, 799, 81 L.Ed. 1182 (1937). Even though the defendants conceivably could have been sentenced to fifteen years under the prior statute, the court found the Ex Post Facto Clause violated because “the measure of punishment prescribed by the later statute is more severe than that of the earlier.” Id. Similarly, in Weaver, the Supreme Court found that a Florida statute altering the availability of “gain time for good conduct” was a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. Weaver, 450 U.S. at 36, 101 S.Ct. at 968. In arriving at its conclusion, the Court explained that a statute may violate the Ex Post Facto Clause “even if it alters punitive conditions outside the sentence, ... [where the statute] substantially alters the consequences attached to a crime already completed and therefore changes ‘the quantum of punishment.’ ” Id. at 32-33, 101 S.Ct. at 966.
In addition, several courts of appeals, including our own, have found that the Ex Post Facto Clause is violated when a defendant’s eligibility for parole release is adversely affected under a statute that was not in effect at the time of the defendant’s crime. See, e.g., Geraghty v. United States Parole Commission, 579 F.2d 238, 265 (3d Cir.1978) (“[W]e conclude that were a statute to deprive already incarcerated or sentenced pris*1528oners of the possibility of parole for the first 26 months of their sentence, when such was not the situation at the time of the sentence, the statute would [violate the Ex Post Facto Clause]”), vacated on other grounds, 445 U.S. 388, 100 S.Ct. 1202, 63 L.Ed.2d 479 (1980); United States v. Paskow, 11 F.3d 873, 879 (9th Cir.1993) (explaining that “the ex post facto clause is violated when a defendant’s eligibility for release is adversely affected under a statute that was not in effect at the time of the defendant’s underlying crime” and collecting cases); Fender v. Thompson, 883 F.2d 303, 305 (4th Cir.1989) (collecting cases); Rodriguez v. United States Parole Comm’n, 594 F.2d 170, 176 (7th Cir.1979) (treating “possibility of parole as an element of ‘punishment’ ”); Shepard v. Taylor, 556 F.2d 648, 654 (2d Cir.1977) (“Since parole eligibility is considered an integral part of any sentence ..., official port-sentence [sic] action that delays eligibility for supervised release runs afoul of the ex post facto prescription.”). The Supreme Court itself, while never having ruled explicitly on this issue, has strongly cautioned in dicta that “a re-pealer of parole eligibility previously available to imprisoned offenders would clearly present the serious question under the ex post facto clause ... of whether it imposed a ‘greater or more severe punishment than was prescribed by law at the time of the offense.’ ” Warden v. Marrero, 417 U.S. 653, 663, 94 S.Ct. 2532, 2538, 41 L.Ed.2d 383 (1974) (quoting Rooney v. North Dakota, 196 U.S. 319, 325, 25 S.Ct. 264, 265, 49 L.Ed. 494 (1905)) (emphasis in original). As the Court explained, “only an unusual prisoner could be expected to think that he was not suffering a penalty when he was denied eligibility for parole.” Id. at 662, 94 S.Ct. at 2538.
I am convinced that if a statute repealing the eligibility of an inmate for parole would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause if applied to prisoners who committed their crimes before the enactment date of the statute, the Ex Post Facto Clause likewise should prohibit the application of the section 212(c) waiver bar to aliens who committed an aggravated felony before the bar was enacted.
A defendant who is sentenced to seven years in prison with eligibility for parole after five years is much like an alien convicted of a crime for which he may be deported who is eligible to apply for a waiver under section 212(c). Parole is not guaranteed, nor is the waiver of deportation. A Parole Board makes a decision whether to grant parole based on issues such as good behavior, prognosis for rehabilitation and family and community ties, just as an immigration judge assessing whether to waive deportation under 212(c) weighs issues of rehabilitation and family and community ties. Both decisions are discretionary; however, as noted by the Eleventh Circuit in summarizing Supreme Court jurisprudence, “the mere presence of some discretion both before and after the change in law does not in and of itself foreclose an ex post facto claim.” Jones v. Georgia State Board of Pardons and Paroles, 59 F.3d 1145, 1149 (11th Cir.1995) (citing Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 432-33, 107 S.Ct. 2446, 2452-53, 96 L.Ed.2d 351 (1987)). “[A] law may [violate the Ex Post Facto Clause] not only if it alters the length of the sentence, but also if it changes the maximum sentence from discretionary to mandatory.” Weaver, 450 U.S. at 32 n. 17, 101 S.Ct. at 966 n. 17. Thus,- although an inmate may fail in his efforts to persuade a Parole Board to exercise its discretion to grant him parole— just as an alien may fail in his efforts to persuade an Immigration Judge to exercise her discretion to grant him a deportation waiver — the removal of that discretion would constitute a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause.
Furthermore, given that parole eligibility is “considered an integral part of any sentence,” Shepard, 556 F.2d at 654; see also Warden, 417 U.S. at 658, 94 S.Ct. at 2535-36, I think that the availability and likelihood of a deportation waiver should also be so considered.1 In explaining the basis for its con-*1529elusion that parole eligibility or gain time should be considered part of the sentence for a crime, the Supreme Court noted that a defendant may consider gain time or parole eligibility in deciding whether to enter a plea bargain. See Weaver, 450 U.S. at 32, 101 S.Ct. at 966 (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2975, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974); Warden, 417 U.S. at 658, 94 S.Ct. at 2535-36). An alien defendant, in addition to considering factors such as parole eligibility, would likely consider his or her eligibility to apply for a deportation waiver as well in deciding whether to plead or contest the charges. Just as the Supreme Court has found that “only an unusual prisoner could be expected to think that he was not suffering a penally when he was denied eligibility for parole,” Warden, 417 U.S. at 662, 94 S.Ct. at 2538, only an unusual alien defendant could be expected to think he was not suffering a penalty when he was rendered deportable and then deprived of any eligibility to seek a waiver of deportation.
II.
The Supreme Court, however, has long held that deportation is not a punishment, but rather a mere administrative action:
A deportation proceeding is a purely civil action to determine eligibility to remain in this country, not to punish_ The deportation hearing looks prospectively to the respondent’s right to remain in this country in the future. Past conduct is relevant only insofar as it may shed light on the respondent’s right to remain.
Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1038, 104 S.Ct. at 3483. Therefore, deportation laws are not subject to the Ex Post Facto Clause. See Galvan, 347 U.S. at 531, 74 S.Ct. at 743 (holding that “the ex post facto Clause ... has no application to deportation”); Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 594, 72 S.Ct. at 521 (1952) (holding that the Ex Post Facto Clause does not apply to deportation orders because “[d]eportation, however severe its consequences, has been consistently classified as a civil rather than a criminal procedure”); Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 39, 44 S.Ct. 283, 286, 68 L.Ed. 549 (1924) (“It is well settled that deportation, while it may be burdensome and severe for the alien, is not a punishment.”); Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 591, 33 S.Ct. 607, 608, 57 L.Ed. 978 (1913) (holding that the determination that an alien is an undesirable person “is not a conviction of crime, nor is the deportation a punishment; it is simply a refusal by the Government to harbor persons whom it does not want”) (citing Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 707, 728, 730, 13 S.Ct. 1016, 1019-20, 1027-28, 1028-29, 37 L.Ed. 905 (1893); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 231, 16 S.Ct. 977, 979-80, 41 L.Ed. 140 (1896); Zakonaite v. Wolf, 226 U.S. 272, 275, 33 S.Ct. 31, 32, 57 L.Ed. 218 (1912); Tiaco v. Forbes, 228 U.S. 549, 33 S.Ct. 585, 57 L.Ed. 960 (1913)).
If not bound by these precedents, I would reject this distinction. While there is certainly a line to be drawn between adverse consequences of a conviction and actual “punishment” for purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause, I think that it is plain that deportation falls on the “punishment” side of the line, as made clear by this court’s recent decision, Artway v. Attorney General of the State of New Jersey, 81 F.3d 1235 (3d Cir.(N.J.)). There we engaged in a lengthy analysis of Supreme Court case law concerning the definition of “punishment” for purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause, the Bill of Attainder Clause, and the Double Jeopardy Clause. Id. at 1254-64. We synthesized the case law and articulated a three-part analytical framework for determining whether legislative measures should be considered “punishment.” Under this framework, each prong of the test must be met in order for a measure to be found not punitive.
First, we consider whether the legislature intended the legislation to be punishment, “i.e., retribution was one of its actual purposes.” Id. at 1262-63 (citing De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 160, 80 S.Ct. 1146, 1155, 4 L.Ed.2d 1109 (I960)). If so, the legislation should be considered to create a *1530punishment. If, however, “ ‘the restriction of the individual comes about as a relevant incident to regulation,’ the measure will pass this first prong.” Id. (citing De Veau, 363 U.S. at 160, 80 S.Ct. at 1155).
Second, we look to the “objective” purpose of the legislature. In doing so, we consider whether the law can be explained “solely by a remedial purpose.” Id. (citing United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448, 109 S.Ct. 1892, 1902, 104 L.Ed.2d 487 (1989)). If not, it is punishment. If it can be fully explained by a remedial purpose, we consider whether historically, the measure has nonetheless been considered punishment and whether any deterrent purpose it might have overwhelms its salutary purpose. If either is true, the legislation is considered punishment. Id.2
Third, even if the legislation is not found to be punishment under the above two prongs, we consider the “effects of the measure.” Id at 1263. “If the negative repercussions— regardless of how they are justified — are great enough, the measure must be considered punishment.” Id. (emphasis added). Thus, regardless of whether the legislature truly intended only to serve a remedial purpose such as alleviating this country of the burden of hosting unwanted aliens, a legislative measure should be considered punishment if it has “great enough” “negative repercussions.”
Under this scheme, there can be little doubt that the statutory bar to 212(c) waivers of deportation is a punishment. Even if it is accepted that Congress’s intent in creating the bar was purely remedial and that any deterrent purpose it serves does not overwhelm its “salutary” effect of ensuring that aliens convicted of aggravated felonies are deported — no matter how strong their family ties are and how young they were when they first arrived in the United States — it is clear that the bar has “great enough” “negative repercussions” to warrant its classification as “punishment.”
In Artway, we explained that, while “[t]he caselaw does not tell us where the line falls that divides permissible from impermissible effects, ... we know the ‘matter of degree’ is somewhere between imprisonment and revocation of citizenship on the one hand, and loss of a profession or benefits on the other.” Id. at 1266 (comparing Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 107 S.Ct. 2446, 96 L.Ed.2d 351 ... (1987) (increasing incarceration is “punishment”) and Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 78 S.Ct. 590, 2 L.Ed.2d 630 (1958) (revoking citizenship is “punishment”) with De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 80 S.Ct. 1146, 4 L.Ed.2d 1109 (1960) (forbidding work as union official is not “punishment”); Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 18 S.Ct. 573, 42 L.Ed. 1002 (1898) (revoking medical license is not “punishment”) and Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 80 S.Ct. 1367, 4 L.Ed.2d 1435 (1960) (terminating social security benefits is not “punishment”)).
Deportation of an alien who has resided in this country for thirty-six years to a country which he has not visited since he left it at age twelve has enormous negative repercussions, perhaps even more so than increased incarceration, which is clearly considered “punishment.” See id. (citing Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 107 S.Ct. 2446, 96 L.Ed.2d 351 (1987)). At the times when Mr. Scheide-mann committed his crime, when he was convicted, and when he was sentenced, he was eligible to apply for a waiver of deportation; the facts presented indicate there was a fair possibility of such a waiver being grant*1531ed. With the passage of the statutory bar to the waiver, however, deportation became inevitable. As noted by the Second Circuit, deportation is a “sanction which in severity surpasses all but the most Draconian criminal penalties.” Lok v. INS, 548 F.2d 37, 39 (2d Cir.1977).
Even the Supreme Court has recognized the incredibly harsh punitive nature of deportation, see, e.g., Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10, 68 S.Ct. 374, 376, 92 L.Ed. 433 (1948) (explaining that “ ‘deportation is a drastic measure and- at times the equivalent of banishment or exile_ It is the forfeiture for misconduct of a residence in this country. Such a forfeiture is a penalty”’), but it has felt constrained by its prior decisions as we are. As explained at great length by Justice Frankfurter:
[S]ince the intrinsic consequences of deportation are so close to punishment for crime, it might fairly be said also that the ex post facto Clause, even though applicable only to punitive legislation, should be applied to deportation.
But the slate is not clean.... [T]here is not merely a page of history ... but a whole volume.... [W]hatever might have been said at an earlier date for applying the ex post facto Clause, it has been the unbroken rule of this Court that it has no application to deportation.
Galvan, 347 U.S. at 531, 74 S.Ct. at 742-43.
The Supreme Court, of course, may revisit its own precedents. If it could not, Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 16 S.Ct. 1138, 41 L.Ed. 256 (1896), would still be good law. See also Adarand, Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, — U.S. -, -, 115 S.Ct. 2097, 2113, 132 L.Ed.2d 158 (1995) (overruling Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 110 S.Ct. 2997, 111 L.Ed.2d 445 (1990)). I suggest that now is the time to wipe the slate clean and admit to the long evident reality that deportation is punishment. To conclude that it is not punishment for a person to be banished from the country in which he has lived for thirty-six years, to be denied the love and presence of his wife, children and parents, and to be sent to a country to which he has no ties, is to deny reality. Given the choice, I would imagine most persons would choose prison. As Justice Brewer once commented in dissent, “If banishment of this sort be not a punishment, and among the most severest of punishments, it would be difficult to imagine a doom to which the name can be applied.” Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 741, 13 S.Ct. at 1033 (1893) (Brewer, J. dissenting) (quoting Madison in 4 Elliot’s Deb. 554, 555).
III.
For the foregoing reasons, I conclude that the longstanding rule that the Ex Post Facto Clause does not apply to deportation laws should be revisited to reflect the harsh reality that deportation is punishment. Because I am bound to follow precedent, however, I have no option but to concur in the opinion of my colleagues affirming the decision of the Board that deportation is not subject to the Ex Post Facto Clause and that, accordingly, Mr. Scheidemann is not eligible to apply for a § 212(c) waiver.

. I note that it is not critical that the availability of a deportation waiver be considered part of the sentence to be invalidated by the Ex Post Facto Clause. The Ex Post Facto Clause has been found to be violated by statutes that alter the punitive conditions outside a sentence. Weaver, 450 U.S. at 32, 101 S.Ct. at 966. For example, the Supreme Court has concluded that a statute requiring solitary confinement before an execution is ex post facto when applied to someone *1529who committed a capital offense before it was enacted. Id. (comparing In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 10 S.Ct. 384, 33 L.Ed. 835 (1890) with Holden v. Minnesota, 137 U.S. 483, 11 S.Ct. 143, 34 L.Ed. 734 (1890)).

. This second prong actually has three subparts: First, can the law be explained solely by remedial measures? ... If not, it is punishment. Second, even if some remedial purpose can fully explain the measure, does a historical analysis show that the measure has traditionally been regarded as punishment? ... If so, and if the text or legislative history does not demonstrate that this measure is not punitive, it must be considered "punishment.” Third, if the legislature did not intend a law to be retributive but did intend it to serve some mixture of deterrent and salutary purposes, we must determine (1) whether historically the deterrent purpose of such a law is a necessary complement to its salutary operation and (2) whether the measure under consideration operates in its "usual’’ manner, consistent with its historically mixed purpose.... Unless the partially deterrent measure meets both of these criteria, it is "punishment.” If the measure meets both of these criteria and the deterrent purpose does not overwhelm the salutary purpose, it is permissible.
Artway, 81 F.3d at 1263 (citations omitted).