Court Opinion

ID: 9759930
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:33:13.950445+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:06.247327
License: Public Domain

CAPPY, Justice,
concurring.
I join the majority except to the extent that the majority limits this court’s decision in Muhammad v. Strassburger, McKenna, Messer, Shilobod and Gutnick, 526 Pa. 541, 587 A.2d 1346 (1991) to the facts of that case. I write separately to emphasize the continuing need for, and validity of, this court’s decision in Muhammad.
Today, the majority holds that when counsel fails to advise a client as to the controlling law applicable to a settlement contract, he may be subject to a malpractice claim based on a theory of negligence. In doing so, the court properly draws the legally relevant distinction between a challenge to an attorney’s professional judgment regarding an amount to be accepted or paid in settlement of a claim, and a challenge to an attorney’s failure to correctly advise his client about well established principles of law in settling a case. This is a reasonable and justifiable distinction. However, in addressing this issue, the majority steps beyond merely distinguishing Muhammad, and limits Muhammad to the facts of that case. To the contrary, while the case sub judice may be distinguishable from Muhammad, Muhammad is as necessary and valid today as it was when rendered only five years ago, and deserves no such limitation.
In Muhammad, plaintiffs Pamela and Abdullah Muhammad accepted a settlement agreement terminating their medical *133malpractice action against, inter alia, Children’s Hospital for the death of their son. Subsequently, the Muhammads became dissatisfied with the settlement agreement and believed that the monies recovered pursuant to the agreement were insufficient. After a failed attempt to renegotiate the settlement, the Muhammads sued their attorneys for, inter alia, negligence and breach of contract. This court held that dissatisfied plaintiffs may not file a suit against their attorneys following a settlement to which they agreed, based on negligence and/or contract principles, unless the plaintiffs can establish that they were fraudulently induced to settle the original action.
Our decision in Muhammad was based on this Commonwealth’s strong and historic public policy of encouraging settlement. Muhammad was also forged with the similarly desirable policies of reducing litigation and encouraging an end to disputes in mind. These public policies, set forth in more detail in Muhammad, are as of equal import today as they were five years ago, and, in light of our overcrowded courtrooms, are perhaps of even greater significance. It is axiomatic that allowing plaintiffs to challenge their attorneys’ professional judgment regarding settlement amounts, after accepting a settlement agreement, would erode our policy of encouraging settlements, validate client second guessing, promote “litigation concerning litigation,” and lead to interminable disputes. Moreover, to allow plaintiffs to sue their attorneys because they are not satisfied with the amounts obtained in settlement would enable plaintiffs to obtain monies from a party, and in a manner in which they were previously unable to secure such funds. To permit such an action is unfair, and, for purposes of judicial economy, unsound. Finality and closure in these situations are not only laudable goals, but after settlement, they become paramount.
In light of these policies and principles, the majority’s attempt to limit Muhammad to the facts of that case must fail. The policy rationales pronounced in Muhammad may offer room for the exception that the majority carves out today; however, the prohibition against suit where a delicien*134cy is alleged in a lawyer’s exercise of his or her professional judgment remains steadfast and stalwart against the tide of unreasonable and unnecessary legal malpractice litigation.
To reiterate, today the majority draws a needed distinction between holding an attorney accountable to inform a client about the ramifications of existing law and allowing the second guessing of an attorney’s professional judgment in an attempt to obtain additional monies, once a settlement agreement has been reached. However, this decision merely creates one exception to this court’s otherwise necessary and valid determination in Muhammad.
CASTILLE and NEWMAN, JJ., join in this concurring opinion.