Court Opinion

ID: 9883975
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 02:29:29.124631+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:38:19.748082
License: Public Domain

RANDALL, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent and would affirm the trial court’s grant of a writ of habeas corpus to respondent. The majority finds the trial court erred by basing its decision on the absence of evidence on administrative reviews. It also states appellant’s allegations cannot constitute proof of the facts he asserts. It finds the issue of frequency of hearings was not before the court. I do not agree. In his pro se petition, respondent specifically alleges that he was put in administrative segregation (“A-seg”) without being afforded due process. He also alleges:
[I was not afforded a] written report or hearing of any kind. [I] was not afforded the opportunity to look at any written reports, relating to * * * being placed in A-seg. * * * nor * * * afforded the opportunity to legal representation relating to [my] being placed in A-seg.
I think this allegation is sufficient to place the State on notice that, in order to rebut respondent’s claim, it needed to produce evidence that hearings were held. This evidence would necessarily show the frequency of hearings, enabling the court to determine whether Hewitt was complied with.
Because respondent drafted his own petition and appeared pro se, greater leeway should be afforded to the trial court interpreting and ruling on appellant’s petition. A liberal approach in construing appellant’s pleadings is necessary to ensure fairness and protection of a pro se applicant’s constitutional right to due process.
I concur with the trial court that respondent’s pro se petition in the posture of this case was sufficient to raise the issue of whether administrative policy was complied with and place the burden of proof on that issue with the State. I would have affirmed the trial court on its factual findings and the legal conclusions it drew therefrom.