Court Opinion

ID: 9676374
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:23:08.383156+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:48.154353
License: Public Domain

VANDE WALLE, Justice,
concurring specially.
I concur in the majority opinion.
I write separately in response to the dissenting opinion which concludes we should overrule Mauch v. Manufacturers Sales & Service, Inc., 345 N.W.2d 338 (N.D.1984). Were we so faint of heart as to capitulate each time a question of jury confusion arises it is probable that we either would have no tort law because the requirement of proximate cause is too difficult to explain,1 and for the jury to understand, or we would have liability for negligence without the necessity of proximate cause for the same reason. Indeed, because, as the dissent concedes, there is a distinction to be drawn between a negligent failure to warn and a strict-liability failure to warn, a conclusion that the jury should not be instructed, and thus not able to consider, both *519theories, not only inhibits the growth of the law but it is elitist and denigrates the competence of the jurors. We should not promote a philosophy that only judges are capable of determining “difficult” issues.
I do not intend to engage in a battle of citations. It is sufficient to note that there are decisions which appear to justify all positions. Because the products-liability law has exploded on the scene in the last two decades, it should come as no surprise that there is considerable disarray among the various jurisdictions on this and other issues involved in that rapidly developing field of law. The California Supreme Court explained the problem this way:
“Part of the problem, of course, is that over the years a considerable body of law has been developed as to negligence permitting definitive instructions based upon tested and settled principles; whereas the same development has not as yet occurred with respect to the more recent doctrine of strict liability in tort.” Jiminez v. Sears, Roebuck & Company, 4 Cal.3d 379, 93 Cal.Rptr. 769, 482 P.2d 681, 684 (1971).
The position of our court as set forth in Mauch is supported by citations therein to other jurisdictions, which will not be repeated here. There are more since that opinion was issued. Other jurisdictions simply refuse to recognize a strict-liability cause of action arising from allegations of inadequate warning, holding that any torts arising from a failure to warn are, in essence, negligent acts. E.g., Hardiman v. Zep Mfg. Co., 14 Ohio App.3d 222, 470 N.E.2d 941 (1984). Yet other jurisdictions have chosen what appears to be a middle ground embraced by, for example, the Minnesota Supreme Court in cases the dissent finds persuasive. Thus in Hauenstein v. Loctite Corp., 347 N.W.2d 272, 275 (Minn.1984), the Minnesota Supreme Court concluded that the jury’s finding that Loc-tite was negligent could not be reconciled with its finding that the product was not defective and, without further rationale, stated:
"Inherent in this case is the problem of mixing ordinary negligence and strict liability where the only basis for liability is failure to warn. To avoid this problem in the future, we hold that hereafter, where a plaintiff seeks damages for both negligence and strict liability based solely upon failure to warn, the plaintiff may submit the case to the jury on only one theory. The plaintiff can plead and prove at trial either or both theories, but by the time the parties rest, the plaintiff must announce whether the case will be submitted to the jury on negligence or strict liability.”
So, too, the special concurrence in Bilotta v. Kelley Co., Inc., 346 N.W.2d 616, 623 (Minn.1984), arrives at that conclusion citing as its only authority a law-review article, The Anatomy of Products Liability in Minnesota: The Theories of Recovery, 6 Wm. Mitchell L.Rev. 1 (1980).2 The dissent in Holm v. Sponco Mfg., Inc., 324 N.W.2d 207, 213 (Minn.1982), also concludes that although “fine distinctions” can be made between the various theories, they are of little help to the trial bench. But help to the trial bench cannot be the only standard or even the most important one.
Some courts have concluded that a strict-liability theory is more favorable to protect plaintiff’s rights and refused to instruct on a negligence theory. E.g., Randall v. Warnaco, Inc., Hirsch-Weis Div., 677 F.2d 1226 (8th Cir.1982) [District Court decision refusing to instruct on negligence theory because it would only confuse jurors and strict liability was a more favorable theory to protect plaintiff’s rights reversed applying North Dakota law].3
*520I agree with those jurisdictions which hold that there is no valid reason to require a plaintiff to elect whether to proceed on the theory of strict liability in tort or on the theory of negligence. E.g., Jiminez v. Sears, Roebuck & Company, supra. The position is set forth succinctly in a failure-to-warn case in Ilosky v. Michelin Tire Corp., 307 S.E.2d 603, 613 (W.Va.1988):
“Product liability actions may be premised on three independent theories— strict liability, negligence, and warranty. Each theory contains different elements which plaintiffs must prove in order to recover. No rational reason exists to require plaintiffs in product liability actions to elect which theory to submit to the jury after the evidence has been presented when they may elect to bring suit on one or all of the theories.
[[Image here]]
“The appellant proposes that we restrain the common law development of the strict liability cause of action.
[[Image here]]
“... To permit plaintiffs to plead alternative causes of action, but to force them to choose one theory to submit to the jury after the taking of evidence would force some plaintiffs to forego the strict liability cause of action if they believed they had stronger negligence or warranty cases. We decline to adopt this view of the law.”
Without repeating the Mauch analysis of the distinctions between strict-liability and negligence theories, I note that at least one court has observed that in a strict-liability case the plaintiff need not prove the scien-ter of the defendant, i.e., that he knew of or should have known of the harmful characteristics of the product without a warning. Lancaster Silo & Block v. Northern Propane Gas, 75 A.D.2d 55, 427 N.Y.S.2d 1009, 1015 (1980). See also Jiminez, supra [in strict liability need not prove defect in product due to negligence of defendant].
It is conceivable that the plaintiff may desire instructions on both theories in order to argue to the jury those unreasonable acts of the defendant which the plaintiff believes prove the negligence theory and further to argue that if the jury determines those acts not unreasonable, and thus not negligent, it should turn its focus from those acts to the product and the danger it poses to the public. The theories are alternative and permit the plaintiff to argue to the jury a second choice, not entirely unlike the opportunity provided by a lesser-included-offense instruction in a criminal case. I do not believe the plaintiff should be denied that right because of the possibility of jury confusion. The plaintiff has as much to risk as the defendant if the jury is confused. The plaintiff should retain the right to present all theories to the jury for which there is support in the evidence.
I do not so quickly despair, as does the dissent, of our holding in Mauch. The cases cited to prove the problem do not justify so rapid and abrupt a discard of the Mauch holding. Hoerr v. Northfield Foundry and Mach. Co., 376 N.W.2d 323 (N.D.1985), while it involved an issue of alleged inconsistent verdict, which was easily disposed of, was most difficult because of the statutorily immune tortfeasor and the settlement by the plaintiff with yet other tortfeasors. Hoerr, supra, at 335 (VandeWalle, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Nor do I believe the instant case proves the problem. We have had other cases of inconsistent verdicts and we have not suggested we abandon a theory of the law simply because of them. In some instances the inconsistencies are the result of the problem in correctly instructing the jury; in other instances the problems appear to be the result not of the difficulty of the law but the preparation of the special verdict form by the trial attorneys and the court. As the use of special verdict forms becomes more popular, and their use has increased greatly in recent years, we can on appeal expect even more allegations of inconsistent answers to the special interrogatories. E.g., Massey-Ferguson Credit Corp. v. Orr, 420 N.W.2d 1 (N.D.1988). Presumably we will not abandon the theory of the law because of those challenges nor will we recommend the abandonment of the special interrogatories, although there are *521times when they may appear to be overly complicated.
Finally, I question what dichotomy the dissent would create between those cases in which theories of negligence and strict liability are alleged, and in support of which evidence is introduced, but the plaintiff must choose one or the other before submission to the jury, and those cases in which the same theories are alleged and evidence submitted but the case is tried to the court rather than to a jury. Are we to assume that the plaintiff must also choose one theory or the other before the court takes the case under submission lest the trial court, too, become confused? I assume not. But will we, on appeal, require findings of fact and conclusions of law which dispose of each theory individually? It is a rare case in which a plaintiff entitled to a jury trial is denied the right to present all the recognizable theories to the jury but is permitted to submit those same theories to the court sitting without a jury. If the dissent were to prevail, the fateful decision to be made by the plaintiff may not be upon which theory the case should be presented to the jury but rather whether it should be presented to the jury at all. If the plaintiff determines to not demand a jury trial in order to preserve the right to have both theories of the case considered individually by the trial court, will not the defense demand a jury trial in order that the plaintiff will be forced to select one theory or the other before submission to the trier of fact? These are issues which arise when an attempt is made to disrupt the orderly development of the law. Conceding there are difficulties in properly instructing the jury on the various theories, I nevertheless believe the cure suggested by the dissent may be worse than the disease. As the old saw states, “The cure was a success but the patient died.”
It is too early to halt the development of the law in this field as the dissent would have us do. The law should be permitted to take its normal course and the plaintiff should be permitted to submit to the jury all accepted theories which a plaintiff entitled to a jury trial is entitled to plead and prove.

. See, e.g., the dissent in Hauenstein v. Loctite Corp., 347 N.W.2d 272, 276 (Minn.1984) [convinced jury misunderstood instruction on causation].

. Other writers have reached a contrary conclusion. See, e.g., Prosser, Strict Liability to the Consumer in California, 18 Hastings L.J. 9, 50-58.

. A common thread running through the cases which hold that the action should be submitted to the jury on only one theory is that the strict-liability theory, although explained in negligence terms, nearly always will be broad enough to encompass all plaintiffs right to recovery. But that is not always true. See, e.g., Jiminez v. Sears, Roebuck & Company, 4 Cal.3d 379, 93 Cal.Rptr. 769, 482 P.2d 681 (1971) [in many cases plaintiff might well be benefited by resort to settled negligence principles and approved jury instructions].