Court Opinion

ID: 9864861
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 16:14:39.636912+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:32:17.026881
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Stone
dissenting.
In Colorado the owner or person having charge of property subject to taxation is required by statute to make return of a schedule in which shall be set down all real estate situate within the county by him owned or controlled with proper description thereof. In January 1918, Henry L. Doherty and Company acquired a large acreage of land in Morgan county by deed of conveyance which did not describe the land by legal subdivision but as a certain “system of irrigation works' together with all reservoir sites -and all rights of way for canals, ditches and laterals.” Beginning in 1925 Doherty’s agent in Colorado returned to the county assessor of Morgan county schedules describing this property for taxation. Notwithstanding the fact that he had been in charge of the acquiring of this property, he included in the property returned for taxation certain state lands upon which easement only had been obtained for reservoir sites and rights of way and which were not in fact owned by Doherty. These easement *605lands continued to be returned by Doherty for taxation for the succeeding years and taxes thereon were voluritarily paid by him for thirteen years, whereafter Doherty made demand for repayment of the taxes so paid on the parcels of state land and brought this action to recover.
The defendant county pleaded the six-year statute of limitations as to the first eight years’ taxes. Such claims are universally deemed contractual. Miller v. Schloss, 218 N.Y. 400, 113 N.E. 337; Byram v. Thurston County, 141 Wash. 28, 251 Pac. 103. Accordingly, unless by statute otherwise provided, the general statute of limitations applicable to contracts is held to apply in actions brought under statutes providing for recovery of taxes erroneously, paid. Neilson v. San Pete County, 40 Utah 560, 123 Pac. 334; Lonsdale v. Carroll County, 105 Ia. 452, 75 N.W. 332. In the latter case it was so held notwithstanding a statute of limitations providing that in'actions for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake the cause of action would not be deemed to have accrued until the mistake should have been discovered by the party aggrieved. We have no such statute in Colorado. This court in harmony with the general rule held in Antero Co. v. Commissioners, 75 Colo. 131, 225 Pac. 269, in an action brought to recover taxes paid on nontaxable property, that the six-year statute of limitations applied. In a contract action the statute of limitations runs from the time the cause of action accrues, unless there has been fraud or concealment preventing knowledge thereof, and no such fraud or concealment is here suggested. Mere ignorance of the facts does not postpone the statute. In discussing actions to recover taxes paid,. 3 Cooley, Taxation (4th ed.), §1304, the rule is stated: “As the cause of action accrues at the time of the payment, the statute of limitations begins to run from that time, even though the illegality may not then have been known.” “When a party pays an unlawful tax under protest, a cause of action * * * at once accrues in favor of such party to recover such tax, and the stat*606ute of limitations begins to run from the date of such payment.” Centennial Eureka Min. Co. v. Juab County, 22 Utah 395, 62 Pac. 1024. The majority opinion in this case establishes the rule that in an action contractual in nature the statute of limitations does not begin to run until discovery of the contract right. This doctrine is not only novel; under it taxes, at least, will never be at rest, and I fear that in the future it may return to plague us.
But is plaintiff entitled to recover regardless of the statute of limitations? The right to recover an illegal tax existed at common law. The need of legislation arose from the fact that as a prerequisite to recovery at common law it must be shown not only that the assessment was absolutely void, but, unjustly, it was believed, that the money sued for had been received by the corporation for its own use and that the payment had been made upon compulsion. Richardson v. Denver, 17 Colo. 398, 30 Pac. 333; 3 Cooley, Taxation (4th ed.), p. 2554. Our statute eliminated both of these requirements. As to the former, see Union Pacific R. Co. v. Board of Commissioners, 217 Fed. 540, quoted in the majority opinion, and as to the latter, Union Pacific R. Co. v. Commissioners, 222 Fed. 651, where the court said, speaking through Lewis, J.: “In the absence of , a statute, the payment of a tax, with few exceptions, is held to be voluntary, and, though the tax may be invalid, the money paid cannot be recovered. This is especially true of taxes upon real property. * * * The statute of Colorado here under consideration changes that law.” A third evil was the frequency of interference by injunction suits with the process of collecting taxes and of this we have said that, “appreciating the necessity of prompt payment of the public revenue as an essential prerequisite to efficient government,” the general assembly enacted this law, which in most cases furnishes an adequate remedy and prevents necessity of equitable actions. Bent County v. Santa Fe Co., 52 *607Colo. 609, 125 Pac. 528. So far as I find from judicial interpretation, those were the evils sought to be remedied by the statute, and the statute does remedy those evils and give rise to a claim against the county in all cases where any person shall have paid an illegal tax.
However, the objection raised here goes not to the extent of the right, but to the conduct of the party seeking to enforce it. Both statutory and contract rights may be lost by the statute of limitations or by laches or by estoppel. Under the common law, even where all the prerequisites for recovery were shown, it was held that there could be no recovery of taxes where payment had been made under mistake of the taxpayer due to his own neglect. “Payment under a mistake of fact is generally held to be recoverable, at least where a mistake on the part of the tax officers, but not where the mistake is that of the taxpayer and due to his own neglect. Mistake or ignorance of fact is not ground where the public records show the facts, since public policy requires that taxpayers be presumed to know facts appearing of record. Mistake of fact is sometimes defined by statute as one not caused by the neglect of a legal duty.” 3 Cooley, Taxation (4th ed.), p. 2582, §1295.
It is true in this case that, when the assessor discovered that Doherty had long failed to return a large acreage of property for taxation, the assessor sent to Doherty’s resident agent proper assessment schedules as required by law and that on these schedules he noted property descriptions of land which appeared to be included within the irrigation project which had been deeded to Doherty. This action on the part of the assessor was merely a voluntary courtesy on his part for the assistance of the taxpayer; it was no part of his legal duty; his action in doing it was in no wise an official action, and it in no wise relieved the taxpayer from his legal duty correctly to describe his property as required by statute. The facts as to what lands were actually *608owned by plaintiff were matters of public record or matters within his reach and of which he should have been advised. Plaintiff’s resident agent had himself attended to the purchase of these lands in behalf of the district. It was not the duty of the assessor to search the title records in behalf of the owners. The assessor’s duty is only in behalf of the public to ascertain that property does not escape just taxation. Plainly then, both the error as to ownership and the error in scheduled descriptions were solely the result of negligence of legal duty on the part of plaintiff. The finding of the trial court to the contrary has no evidence to support it, and the payment of taxes was made under a mistake of fact where the mistake was that of the taxpayer and due to his own neglect. It is more than that. We may even determine that the defense, that payment was due to the negligence of the taxpayer, has been eliminated by the statute, and still we have not disposed of the issue. The defense here raised is not only that the payment was negligent, but that the very laying and imposition of the tax was by the act of the taxpayer. He listed the property on the records as his own; he caused it to be assessed, and now, long after it has been paid and the proceeds distributed to the state, school district and county funds, he asks that a levy be made against other property, much of it to be paid by new owners, to repay the tax long since spent, which he imposed on himself. . '
As was said in People v. Illinois Central R. Co., 273 Ill. 220, 112 N.E. 700: “The public has an interest in the collection of taxes from every property owner. The rule that the property owner cannot question the correctness of his schedule is not grounded upon the doctrine of estoppel as that doctrine is ordinarily applied. The decisions in the cases cited do not rest upon the usual principles of estoppel nor contain the elements usually required in courts of equity in the application of that doctrine. They seem to rest rather upon the *609principle that it is the duty of the taxpayer to see that the list of property is furnished to the proper officers, and that it is against public policy to permit him to make such schedule and then question its accuracy, whether the failure to certify the proper list of property was intentional or unintentional * *
There is no indication in the statute of any intent on the part of the legislature to do away with this defense of negligence in the very laying of the tax any more than of intent to do away with the defense of the statute of limitations. Under a similar statute in Iowa, providing for refund to the taxpayer* of any tax or portion thereof “found to have been erroneously or illegally exacted or paid,” the court denied plaintiff relief where the property, although not assessable in that county, had been listed for assessment by the taxpayer’s agent, and said: “It is the almost universal voice of authority that where one voluntarily submits his property to the jurisdiction of the assessing officer, asking that it be assessed by him, he is thereafter estopped, especially when action has been taken by the county or any of the assessment districts on the strength thereof, from denying that the property was assessable, or from saying that the authorities had no jurisdiction thereof.” Slimmer v. Chicasaw County, 140 Ia. 448 (1908), 118 N.W. 779.
However, we are not required to look to other jurisdictions for assistance on this question; we have already determined it. In the case of Boyer Bros. v. Commissioners, 87 Colo. 275, 288 Pac. 408, wherein action was brought to recover taxes paid, we said: “Having been, in part at least, responsible for the assessment in the manner described, and having failed to file a schedule required by law, the plaintiff is in no position to urge, as a ground for recovering the taxes paid by it, the method of assessment followed in this case.” And still more explicitly, in Stephens & Co. v. Commissioners, 104 Colo. 556, 92 P. (2d) 732, where action was brought to recover taxes paid, we said: “From paragraph 4 of *610the complaint, hereinbefore set out, it appears that plaintiff in error voluntarily paid the taxes in question; that the error involved was due solely to calculations contained in plaintiff in error’s own tax schedule; that the schedule was voluntarily made by it; that the error was due solely to plaintiff in error’s own negligence and not to any action of the taxing agencies; that the facts which show the mistake were in the. sole possession of the taxpayer. Under these circumstances plaintiff in error is barred from any recovery.” And in that case we further said: “It was the duty of plaintiff in error to file a correct schedule and to know what elements of value and property were listed in that schedule prepared by it. Its failure in that regard was the neglect of a legal duty resting solely upon it. To permit recovery under the facts and circumstances in the instant case would endanger the entire tax structure of the state and lead to a multiplicity of suits for refund of taxes. In reaching the conclusion announced we believe our holding to be in harmony with the great weight of authority.”
The majority opinion in this case overrules our own pronouncement in the Stephens case and departs from the salutary rule established by the great weight of authority. Accordingly I must dissent.
Mr. Justice Burke concurs in this dissent.