Court Opinion

ID: 9950479
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-14 13:00:43.350605+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:37:18.515408
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-10760    Document: 42-1      Date Filed: 03/14/2024   Page: 1 of 5

                                                   [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                 No. 23-10760
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       STEPHANIE BENAVIDEZ BAKER,
                                                      Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
       versus
       CITY OF DELRAY BEACH,
       a Florida municipal corporation,
       JAVARO A. SIMS,
       individually,

                                                  Defendants-Appellees.

                          ____________________
USCA11 Case: 23-10760     Document: 42-1      Date Filed: 03/14/2024    Page: 2 of 5

       2                      Opinion of the Court                23-10760

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of Florida
                     D.C. Docket No. 9:21-cv-82076-DMM
                           ____________________

       Before JORDAN, BRASHER, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Stephanie Baker, a Mexican-American police officer with the
       City of Delray Beach, appeals the district court’s grant of summary
       judgment in favor of the City and its former Chief of Police, Javaro
       Sims, on her employment discrimination claims under 42 U.S.C. §
       1983, Title VII, the ADEA, and the FCRA. She argues that there is
       a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Chief Sims and
       the City discriminated against her on the basis of age, sex, or race
       by not promoting her to sergeant.
              We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de
       novo. See Jones v. UPS Ground Freight, 683 F.3d 1283, 1291 (11th Cir.
       2012). Summary judgment is proper if “there is no genuine dispute
       as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
       matter of law.” Fed R. Civ. P. 56(a). All submitted evidence is
       viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and all justi-
       fiable inferences are drawn in its favor. See Jones,
       683 F.3d at 1291-92. The party moving for summary judgment has
       the initial burden of demonstrating through evidence that there is
       no genuine issue of material fact. See id. at 1291. The nonmovant
       must then rebut the movant with evidence of a genuine dispute.
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       23-10760               Opinion of the Court                          3

       See id. If the nonmovant presents evidence that is merely colorable
       or not “significantly probative of a disputed fact,” the movant is
       entitled to summary judgment. See id.
               An employment-discrimination plaintiff must present direct
       evidence of discrimination, demonstrate a convincing mosaic of
       discrimination, or satisfy the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
       framework. See Lewis v. City of Union City, 918 F.3d 1213, 1220 &
       n.6 (11th Cir. 2019) (en banc); see generally McDonnell Douglas Corp.
       v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). When proceeding under McDonnell
       Douglas, if the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the defendant
       must then proffer a legitimate and non-discriminatory reason for
       its actions. See Lewis, 918 F.3d at 1220-21. If it does, the plaintiff
       must show that (or create an issue of fact on whether) the proffered
       reason was pretext for discrimination. See id. To survive summary
       judgment on a claim, a plaintiff must show that there is a genuine
       issue of material fact surrounding each of her employer’s stated
       reasons. See Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1024-25 (11th
       Cir. 2000). “Provided that the proffered reason is one that might
       motivate a reasonable employer, the employee must meet that rea-
       son head on and rebut it, and the employee cannot succeed by
       simply quarreling with the wisdom of that reason.” Id. at 1030.
              We do not “sit as a super personnel department” or analyze
       whether a stated reason is prudent, fair, or based on a mistaken be-
       lief by the employer. See Owens v. Governor’s Office of Student
       Achievement, 52 F.4th 1327, 1338 (11th Cir. 2022). An employer may
       act for “a good reason, a bad reason, a reason based on erroneous
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       4                       Opinion of the Court                   23-10760

       facts, or for no reason at all,” as long as it is not discriminatory. See
       id. If the employer was dissatisfied with the employee for non-dis-
       criminatory reasons, summary judgment should be awarded to the
       employer, even if those reasons were unfair or based on a mistaken
       belief. See id.
              When opposing a motion for summary judgment, a party
       must make arguments and/or prevent evidence in her favor, and
       may not merely rely on her pleadings. See Resolution Tr. Corp. v.
       Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d 587, 592 (11th Cir. 1995). Grounds not relied
       on at summary judgment are generally abandoned. See id.; see also
       Case v. Eslinger, 555 F.3d 1317, 1329 (11th Cir. 2009) (“A party can-
       not readily complain about the entry of a summary judgment order
       that did not consider an argument they chose not to develop for
       the district court at the time of the summary judgment motions.”).
              In the district court, Ms. Baker did not assert direct discrim-
       ination or present a convincing mosaic theory. As a result, she can-
       not present those theories for the first time on appeal. See id.
              That leaves the McDonnell Douglas methodology. Even if
       Ms. Baker could establish a prima facie case of discrimination under
       the relevant statutes, she has not shown that the defendants’ stated
       reasons for her non-promotion were pretextual. See Lewis, 918 F.3d
       at 1220-21.
              Ms. Baker faced an internal affairs investigation at the time
       of some of the challenged promotions regarding alleged misuse of
       her position, false overtime claims, and making false statements.
       Chief Sims stated that he did not feel it was appropriate to promote
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       23-10760              Opinion of the Court                        5

       Ms. Baker to sergeant given the nature of the allegations against
       her. He also explained why the officers he selected were chosen.
       He discussed individualized factors such as their experience, con-
       nections, skills, patience, intelligence, and standing in the commu-
       nity. Ms. Baker has not created an issue of fact as to whether those
       reasons were a pretext for discrimination. She merely argued at
       summary judgment that she was qualified for the sergeant position
       and that she was innocent of the allegations made against her. Alt-
       hough she was ultimately exonerated in the internal affairs investi-
       gation, she has not demonstrated that there is evidence in the rec-
       ord that the defendants’ stated reasons were pretextual, rather than
       mistaken or unfair. See Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1024-25; Owens, 52
       F.4th at 1338. The district court therefore correctly awarded sum-
       mary judgment to the defendants on her employment discrimina-
       tion claims. See Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1024-25. Given our decision,
       we need not address the district court’s ruling that Ms. Baker aban-
       doned her age discrimination and municipal liability claims.
              The district court also properly concluded that Ms. Baker
       had abandoned her claims relating to not being appointed as an act-
       ing sergeant. Her unusually perfunctory response to the defend-
       ants’ summary-judgment motion did not mention those claims. As
       a result, she abandoned them. See Resolution Tr., 43 F.3d at 592.
             AFFIRMED.