Court Opinion

ID: 9698620
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:56:02.070317+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:42.272272
License: Public Domain

SABERS, Justice
(dissenting).
I would affirm the habeas court because the offensive testimony went to McCafferty’s guilt or innocence. The habeas court determined and stated:
[S.F.] indicated in out-of-court statements to Haugland and Curran that McCafferty had sexually abused her. [S.F.] was unavailable as a witness; consequently, any decision by the jury as to her credibility would have necessarily been based on statements of other wit*599nesses. Specifically, Haugland and Cur-ran testified directly as to [S.F.] ’s truthfulness. Typically, the truthfulness of the victim or the accused bears heavily upon, and is intertwined with the guilt or innocence of the defendant. State v. Myers, 382 N.W.2d ... [91,94 (Iowa 1986)]. The statements that [S.F.] was honest and believable, of course, indicated that McCafferty was lying about the alleged sexual abuse and therefore was guilty. [S.F.j’s credibility was an important issue in this case. There can be no doubt that the believability of [S.F.] ’s story was bolstered by the testimony of Dr. Curran and Haugland. As aforementioned, [S.F.] did not testify at the trial. Other than some clinical findings and somé statements made by Petitioner, her testimony came to the jury in the form of hearsay statements from Dr. Curran and Mrs. Haugland. In United States v. Azure, ... [801 F.2d 336 (8th Cir.1986) ], the alleged victim testified at trial and in front of the jury, and this testimony was then declared to be honest and truthful via the expert testimony of Dr. ten Bensel. Here, in this case, the jury never did have an opportunity to judge [S.F.j’s credibility. The jury had nothing to rely on other than the testimony of Dr. Curran and Mrs. Haugland. The trial court gave the pattern jury instruction on expert witness’ testimony, presumably because of the testimony given by Dr. Curran. Additionally, it is noted that when Dr. Curran first took the stand, the prosecutor elicited the fact that not only was she a well qualified clinical psychologist, but also that she was a sister in the Sacred Heart Convent in Yankton, South Dakota. Thus, with this background established, any testimony relating to [S.F.j’s credibility would be greatly enhanced in the eyes of the jury. Since the guilt or innocence of McCafferty inherently turned on the question of [S.F.j’s credibility, it cannot be said that beyond a reasonable doubt the jury would have convicted even in the absence of the error.
This court finds that the error in admission of the testimony of [S.F.j’s truthfulness was not harmless error. Rather, the admission of this evidence constituted a due process violation as the error was of such magnitude as to deny the Petitioner fundamental fairness at his criminal trial.
The habeas court was clearly correct in concluding that “the testimony did go to McCafferty’s guilt or innocence.”
The fatal defect in the majority opinion is its conclusion that the cases relied upon by the habeas court constitute a retrospective “refinement of an evidentiary rule.” * Just the opposite is true; Conclusory opinion testimony concerning the truthfulness of a witness was always prohibited and inadmissible. The majority errs in asserting that expert opinions about the believability of children were generally admissible at the time of McCafferty’s trial. In fact, at the time of trial, only one court had allowed such testimony. • The majority cites two cases, State v. Kim, 64 Haw. 598, 645 P.2d 1330 (1982), and State v. Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604 (Minn.1984), but Myers was decided in 1984 well after McCafferty’s trial and could not provide support for the trial court’s decision.
In contrast, numerous courts considering child sexual abuse cases prior to McCafferty’s trial found such testimony to be inadmissible. E.g., Commonwealth v. Carter, 9 Mass.App. 680, 403 N.E.2d 1191 (1980) (Trial court erred in failing to strike doctor’s testimony that child was telling the truth.), aff'd 383 Mass. 873, 417 N.E.2d 438 (1981); People v. Fogarty, 86 A.D.2d 617, 446 N.Y.S.2d 92, 93 (1982) (Child psychiatrist’s testimony about infant complainant’s veracity “improperly bolstered the complainant’s credibility and unduly colored the jurors’ assessment of his veracity.”); Black v. State, 634 S.W.2d 356, 358 (Tex.*600Ct.App.1982) (“[EJxpert testimony regarding the complainant’s propensity to tell the truth was impermissible.”); People v. Sergill, 138 Cal.App.3d 34, 39, 187 Cal.Rptr. 497, 500 (1982) (“We find no authority to support the proposition that the veracity of those who report crimes to the police is a matter sufficiently beyond common experience to require the testimony of an expert.”); State v. Middleton, 294 Or. 427, 438, 657 P.2d 1215, 1221 (1983) (“We expressly hold that in Oregon a witness, expert or otherwise, may not give an opinion on whether he believes a witness is telling the truth.”).
The clear weight of authority has always been against admission of “an expert’s opinion that a child sexual abuse complainant is telling the truth.” McCord, Expert Psychological Testimony about Child Complainants in Sexual Abuse Prosecutions: A Foray into the Admissibility of Novel Psychological Evidence, 77 J.Crim.L. & Criminology 1, 43 (1986). As a result, McCafferty’s claim does not require the trial judge to have foreseen a shift in the law, since there has been no shift. McCafferty merely seeks the application of the correct law to his case. Indeed, it was not until recently that the state strained against the rule to urge admissibility. In its brief, the State does not argue that in 1983 courts were admitting expert testimony regarding a witness’ veracity, but instead attempts to argue that courts are beginning to admit such testimony. Thus, even the State recognizes that in August of 1983 the testimony of Haugland and Cur-ran was generally inadmissible.
The final irony is that the majority mistakenly reverses the habeas court by applying incorrect law retrospectively.

 The majority opinion is also defective in concluding that overturning McCafferty's conviction "would have disastrous effects on the criminal justice system.” This argument is pure conjecture on the part of the majority as there is no evidence of any other person whose trial included expert testimony about the truthfulness of the victim. In fact, since such testimony has always been inadmissible it is unlikely that there is another person.