Court Opinion

ID: 9757264
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 22:28:23.575207+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:37.486357
License: Public Domain

Jim Hannah, Chief Justice, dissenting. I must respectfully dissent. Cox asserts correctly that he was sentenced on February 24, 2003, and was not subject to be sentenced a second time on September 5, 2003. The majority is wrong in stating that “[n]o sentence was imposed on Cox, as he was sentenced to four years’ probation and fined.” The majority relies on Rickenbacker v. Norris, 361 Ark. 291, 296, 206 S.W.3d 220, 224 (2005), where this court stated, “In the instant case, appellant was sentenced to five years’ probation and fined; accordingly, there was no sentence imposed.” The analysis in both the majority opinion and in Rickenbacker is based on Act 1569 of 1999, which according to the opinion in Rickenbacker, “allows a trial court to modify an original sentence once it is executed.” Sentencing certainly is a matter of statute. Meadows v. State, 320 Ark. 686, 899 S.W.2d 72 (1995). Prior to the enactment of Act 1569, a court could not modify a valid sentence once put into execution. Bangs v. State, 310 Ark. 235, 835 S.W.2d 294 (1992). Now with the passage of Act 1569, the courts purportedly have the authority to modify a sentence already put into execution. However, more than a statute is at issue in this case. As the court noted in Cooper v. State, 278 Ark. 394, 400, 645 S.W.2d 950, 953 (1983), a second sentence was not only void based on the then existing statutes, but “[t]he increased punishment at a second sentencing is void for yet another reason. As Justice Douglas stated in discussing double jeopardy, ‘A person need run the gauntlet only once.’ North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969).” Multiple punishments for the same offense violate the protection afforded by double jeopardy.1 Cummings v. State, 353 Ark. 618, 110 S.W.3d 272 (2003). The majority opinion and Rickenbacker rely on statutes and fail to consider double jeopardy. Rickenbacker cites Gates v. State, 353 Ark. 333, 107 S.W.3d 868 (2003), a case which Rickenbacker correctly notes held that Act 1569 was inapplicable in that case. Therefore, if Rickenbacker relies on the statement in Gates that “[p]rior to Act 1569 of 1999, a trial court lost subject-matter jurisdiction to modify or amend an original sentence once it was put into execution,” then Rickenbacker is based on dicta. In any event, the statement in Gates is nothing more than a characterization of the statute. Rickenbacker also relies on Lewis v. State, 336 Ark. 469, 986 S.W.2d 95 (1999); however, Lewis involved the First-Offender’s Act of 1975, “under which no adjudication of guilt or sentence is imposed.” Lewis, 336 Ark. at 475, 986 S.W.3d at 98. The sentence complained of in Lewis was the first sentence imposed, not a second sentence as in the present case. Likewise, the reliance in Rickenbacker on Diffee v. State, 290 Ark. 194, 718 S.W.2d 94 (1986), is misplaced. In Diffee, as Rickenbacker notes, the plea of guilty was taken under advisement and Diffee was placed on probation under the court’s supervision. There was no conviction of guilt by the “Judgment and Disposition Order” entered March 4, 2003. The order reflects that on each charge Cox was found guilty, and that he was sentenced by the court. On each charge, Cox was sentenced to 48 months’ probation, and in addition, he was fined $3000. Whereas in Diffee it was only when Diffee violated the conditions of probation that she was convicted and sentence was imposed. Again, as in Lewis, in Diffee, there was no second sentence imposed as has been imposed in the present case. I have no doubt based on the transcript of the hearing on February 24, 2003, that the State, the circuit court, and Cox believed that if he violated probation, he could be sentenced to prison. Flowever, the subjective beliefs of those present in the courtroom do not alter the law. In Gates, supra, this court noted the agelong rule that a circuit court losses subject matter jurisdiction to modify a sentence once it is put into execution. The rule long predates the present criminal code upon which the court relied in Rickenbacker, and upon which the majority now relies. In Shipman v. State, 261 Ark. 559, 563, 550 S.W.2d 424, 426 (1977), this court stated that “when a valid sentence had been put into execution, the trial court was without jurisdiction to modify, amend or revise it, either during or after the term at which it was pronounced.” (citing Charles v. State, 256 Ark. 690, 510 S.W.2d 68 (1974); Williams v. State, 229 Ark. 42, 313 S.W.2d 242 (1958); Emerson v. Boyles, 170 Ark. 621, 280 S.W. 1005 (1926)). This court in Emerson v. Boyles, 170 Ark. 621, 624, 280 S.W. 1005, 1006 (1926), quoted Ex Parte Lange, 85 U.S. 163, 164 (1874), where the United States Supreme Court stated, “If there is anything settled in the jurisprudence of England and America, it is that no man can twice be lawfully punished for the same offense.” What this court did in Rickenbacker was implicitly hold that a recently enacted statute purporting to allow modification of sentences put into execution abolishes the United States Constitutional protection against double jeopardy, the Arkansas Constitutional protection against double jeopardy, and the common law protection against double jeopardy that long predates either constitution. The circuit court lost jurisdiction to revoke the sentence once it was imposed and put into execution. This case is very simple. Cox pled guilty. He was convicted and the court sentenced him to 48 months’ probation on each charge and a $3000 fine. When sentence was pronounced in a case where the defendant pled guilty, subject matter jurisdiction ended on March 4, 2003, when the order was entered. Where punishment is a fine, it is payable and put in execution upon entry of the order. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-202(b)(2) (Repl. 2006). To allow the outcome allowed by the majority nullifies one of the three protections afforded under double jeopardy through the United States Constitution, the Arkansas Constitution, and the common law.   Double jeopardy provides protection against: (1) a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense. Cummings v. State, 353 Ark. 618, 110 S.W.3d 272 (2003).