Court Opinion

ID: 9809090
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 21:00:38.803838+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:24:51.364800
License: Public Domain

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                                            UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                              No. 22-4085

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                            Plaintiff - Appellee,

                     v.

        JOHN WEBB POWELL,

                            Defendant - Appellant.

                                              No. 22-4094

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                            Plaintiff - Appellee,

                     v.

        JOHN WEBB POWELL,

                            Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeals from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina,
        at Asheville. Martin K. Reidinger, Chief District Judge. (1:10-cr-00050-MR-WCM-1;
        1:21-cr-00045-MR-WCM-1)

        Submitted: May 16, 2023                                       Decided: August 30, 2023
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        Before WYNN and RUSHING, Circuit Judges, and KEENAN, Senior Circuit Judge.

        Dismissed in part, affirmed in part by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: George E. Crump, III, Rockingham, North Carolina, for Appellant. Dena J.
        King, United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, Amy E. Ray, Assistant United
        States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Asheville, North
        Carolina, for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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        PER CURIAM:

               John Webb Powell appeals from his 270-month sentence imposed pursuant to his

        guilty plea to receiving child pornography (No. 22-4094) and his 24-month sentence

        imposed pursuant to the revocation of his supervised release (No. 22-4085). On appeal, he

        challenges the reasonableness of both sentences. The Government asserts that Powell’s

        appellate waiver in his plea agreement waived appeal from his 270-month sentence. We

        agree, and we dismiss the appeal in No. 22-4094. We affirm the revocation sentence.

               “[A] plea agreement allocates risk between the two parties as they see fit,” and we

        will “enforce a plea agreement’s plain language in its ordinary sense” to “ensure that each

        party receives the benefit of the bargain.” United States v. Under Seal, 902 F.3d 412, 417,

        420 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A defendant may waive the right

        to appeal his conviction and sentence [in a plea agreement] so long as the waiver is knowing

        and voluntary.” United States v. Copeland, 707 F.3d 522, 528 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal

        quotation marks omitted). “Generally . . . if a district court questions a defendant regarding

        the waiver of appellate rights during the Rule 11 colloquy and the record indicates that the

        defendant understood the full significance of the waiver, the waiver is valid.” United

        States v. McCoy, 895 F.3d 358, 362 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted).

        This court “review[s] an appellate waiver de novo to determine whether the waiver is

        enforceable.” United States v. Boutcher, 998 F.3d 603, 608 (4th Cir. 2021). When the

        Government invokes an appeal waiver and has not breached its obligations under the plea

        agreement, we will enforce the waiver if the defendant knowingly and voluntarily agreed

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        to waive his right to appeal and the issues raised on appeal fall within the waiver’s scope.

        Id.

               Powell does not suggest that his waiver of appeal rights was anything other than

        knowingly and voluntarily made, and the record makes plain that his appeal waiver is valid.

        The terms of the waiver are clear, and Powell confirmed under oath at the plea hearing that

        he understood the terms of the plea agreement, including the appeal waiver. Powell also

        was under the close advice of counsel at his guilty plea hearing, raising a strong inference

        that the plea agreement (and, consequently, the appeal waiver) is valid. See United States v.

        Attar, 38 F.3d 727, 731 (4th Cir. 1994) (noting significance of being represented by counsel

        during a guilty plea hearing). At no point during the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 hearing did Powell

        suggest he did not understand the appeal waiver or the import or effect of the waiver on his

        right to take a direct appeal of his sentence. Therefore, we find that the waiver is valid.

               “[A] defendant who waives his right to an appeal does not subject himself to being

        sentenced entirely at the whim of the district court.” United States v. Cornette, 932 F.3d

        204, 209 (4th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). An appeal waiver does not

        bar the appeal of a sentence exceeding the statutory maximum or the right to appeal a

        sentence based on a constitutionally impermissible factor. Id.; see United States v. Archie,

        771 F.3d 217, 223 (4th Cir. 2014) (noting that knowing and voluntary waiver cannot

        prohibit appeal where sentencing court violated “fundamental” constitutional or statutory

        rights established at time of sentencing, but waiver will bar broad argument that

        proceedings affected constitutional rights and fundamental fairness); United States v.

        Thornsbury, 670 F.3d 532, 539 (4th Cir. 2012) (clarifying that challenges to sentence as

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        “illegal” that can be raised on appeal despite appeal waiver involve “fundamental issues,”

        such as claims that “a district court exceeded its authority,” premised its sentencing

        decision “on a constitutionally impermissible factor such as race,” or violated the

        “post-plea [constitutional] right to counsel”). In addition, we will refuse to enforce an

        otherwise valid waiver “if to do so would result in a miscarriage of justice,” such as a

        cognizable claim of actual innocence. United States v. Adams, 814 F.3d 178, 182 (4th Cir.

        2016).

                 Powell does not claim—nor could he do so successfully—that his sentence exceeds

        the statutory maximum term applicable to his count of conviction. He also has raised no

        claim that race or any constitutionally impermissible factor influenced his sentence, that

        the district court violated his constitutional right to counsel after the plea, or that post-plea

        proceedings were not conducted in accordance with constitutional limitations. Instead, he

        asserts that the district court’s “setting aside the advisory guidelines” and imposing an

        upward variance sentence was fundamentally unfair. However, Powell’s challenges to his

        270-month sentence—claiming that the district court erred in calculating his Guidelines

        range and did not give appropriate weight and deference to the Guidelines—fall squarely

        within the bargained-for provision of the appeal waiver of the plea agreement, and

        enforcing the waiver here comports with the directive that we enforce the language of the

        plea agreement to ensure each party receives the benefit of the bargain they struck. See

        United States v. Mikalajunas, 186 F.3d 490, 496-97 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding misapplication

        of the Guidelines does not constitute a miscarriage of justice); Sotirion v. United States,

        617 F.3d 27, 38 (1st Cir. 2010) (finding miscarriage of justice in appellate waiver situation

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        would require a sentence in excess of the statutory maximum or violation of a material

        term of the plea agreement). Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal from Powell’s 270-month

        sentence.

               Turning to his revocation sentence, “[a] district court has broad discretion when

        imposing a sentence upon revocation of supervised release.” United States v. Webb, 738

        F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013). Thus, we will “affirm a revocation sentence so long as it is

        within the prescribed statutory range and is not plainly unreasonable.” United States v.

        Coston, 964 F.3d 289, 296 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). When

        reviewing whether a revocation sentence is plainly unreasonable, we first determine

        “whether the sentence is unreasonable at all.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

               “A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district court adequately

        explains the chosen sentence after considering the Sentencing Guidelines’ nonbinding

        Chapter Seven policy statements and the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors,” Coston,

        964 F.3d at 297 (internal quotation marks omitted), and the explanation indicates “that the

        court considered any potentially meritorious arguments raised by the parties,” United

        States v. Patterson, 957 F.3d 426, 436-37 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks

        omitted). “A court need not be as detailed or specific when imposing a revocation sentence

        as it must be when imposing a post-conviction sentence, but it still must provide a statement

        of reasons for the sentence imposed.” United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th

        Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). Similarly, the court “must address the

        parties’ nonfrivolous arguments in favor of a particular sentence, and if the court rejects

        those arguments, it must explain why in a detailed-enough manner that this [c]ourt can

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        meaningfully consider the procedural reasonableness of the revocation sentence.” United

        States v. Slappy, 872 F.3d 202, 208 (4th Cir. 2017).           “[A] revocation sentence is

        substantively reasonable if, in light of the totality of the circumstances, the court states an

        appropriate basis for concluding that the defendant should receive the sentence imposed.”

        Coston, 964 F.3d at 297 (internal quotation marks omitted).

               Powell contends that his revocation sentence is procedurally unreasonable because

        the district court failed to consider or explain its rejection of his arguments that he would

        be nearly 70 upon release and would be under a life term of supervised release. Beginning

        with the argument that Powell would be under a life term of supervised release, the district

        court’s assertion that a long prison term was the only way to deter Powell sufficiently

        addressed Powell’s argument that his lifetime term of supervised release supported a lower

        sentence. The court specifically noted that supervision had not deterred Powell in the past

        and that, in fact, his criminal conduct had worsened on supervision. Accordingly, while

        the district court did not explicitly state that it considered Powell’s argument, the context

        of the sentencing hearing makes it clear that the court considered and rejected the argument.

               Turning to the age argument, Powell made several distinct arguments in mitigation.

        He asserted was that he would be “very close to 70” upon release, would not have “the

        same type of future that you would have had he been younger,” and would not “be able to

        find work.” Counsel also stated that Powell might not have any friends or family left upon

        his release. (J.A. 102-03).

               We find that these arguments are frivolous, and as such, the district court was not

        required to separately address them. Notably, Powell did not explicitly argue in district

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        court that his advanced age would make similar criminal conduct difficult or less likely,

        nor does he argue such on appeal. Instead, his argument focused on the difficulties he

        would face with family and work on release and presumably averred that his personal

        circumstances would be even worse given his advanced age. However, his supervised

        release sentence was 24 months, and he did not provide any support for a conclusion that

        his situation would be different if released a year earlier. * Moreover, his arguments were

        irrelevant to the district court’s main concerns of deterrence and protection of the public.

        Given the frivolous nature of his arguments, the district court did not commit procedural

        error by failing to address them.

               Powell asserts conclusorily that his sentence was substantively unreasonable but

        provides no argument in support. Here, the court relied primarily upon the needs to deter

        Powell and to protect the public.      Because the district court based its sentence on

        appropriate sentencing factors, Powell’s sentence was substantively reasonable.

               Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal in No. 22-4094 and affirm the district court’s

        judgment in No. 22-4085. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

        contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would

        not aid the decisional process.

                                                                              DISMISSED IN PART,
                                                                              AFFIRMED IN PART

               *
                   Powell argued for a 12-month sentence.

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