Court Opinion

ID: 9477348
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:21:11.395851+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:45:49.995238
License: Public Domain

WILKINS, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur in the affirmance of Hooker’s convictions on Counts I and II, but I do not agree that Count III of the indictment was fatally defective. Although not a model *1234indictment, it was constitutionally sufficient. And significantly, any possible deficiency in Count III was harmless error and Hooker suffered no prejudice. Therefore, I respectfully dissent from reversal of the conviction on Count III for the reasons briefly stated below and discussed more fully in my dissent in the companion case of United States v. Pupo, 841 F.2d 1235, No. 86-5151.
I.
Hooker was charged in Count III with conspiracy to violate 18 U.S.C.A. § 1962(c) (West 1984) (RICO). Section 1962(c) provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.
The indictment set forth the circumstances of the alleged offense and charged that Hooker was part of an “enterprise” that conspired “to violate Title 18, United States Code, Section 1962(c),” but it did not allege explicitly that the enterprise affected interstate commerce. The majority holds that omission of the words “affecting interstate commerce” rendered Count III fatally defective. In my view, citation to the applicable statute sufficiently alleged this requisite element. In any event, Hooker undeniably was given a fair trial with adequate notice and proper jury instructions.
A.
To meet the guarantees of the fifth and sixth amendments, an indictment must (1) contain the elements of the offense charged and fairly inform a defendant of the charge against him, and (2) enable him to plead double jeopardy in defense of future prosecutions for the same offense. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 2907, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974); Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 763-64, 82 S.Ct. 1038, 1046, 8 L.Ed.2d 240 (1962). It is generally sufficient for an indictment to allege an offense in the words of the statute, if those words “fully, directly and expressly, without any uncertainty or ambiguity, set forth all the elements necessary to constitute the offense.” United States v. Carll, 105 U.S. 611, 612, 26 L.Ed. 1135 (1882), quoted in Russell, 369 U.S. at 765, 82 S.Ct. at 1047. Specifically, an indictment following the language of section 1962 adequately charges an effect on interstate commerce in a RICO conspiracy; an indictment may simply recite this term without further specificity. United States v. Diecidue, 603 F.2d 535, 547 (5th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946, 100 S.Ct. 1345, 63 L.Ed.2d 781, 446 U.S. 912, 100 S.Ct. 1842, 64 L.Ed.2d 266 (1980).
In view of these premises, I find no reasonable distinction between recitation of the terminology “affecting interstate com-' meree,” and the specific allegation of violation of section 1962(c) which contains those words. A defendant’s understanding of the offense is not aided by repetition of this statutory language when the statute allegedly violated is cited in the indictment. Of course, citation to the statute, or even recitation of the statutory language, is not an adequate allegation for every element of an offense, for some elements require greater detail or description of the alleged conduct of a defendant.
B.
Following prior decisions from this circuit and others, the indictment against Hooker sufficiently alleged the offense charged by citing the statute. See United States v. Duncan, 598 F.2d 839 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 871, 100 S.Ct. 148, 62 L.Ed.2d 96 (1979); United States v. Stefan, 784 F.2d 1093 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 107 S.Ct. 193, 93 L.Ed.2d 125 (1986); United States v. Arteaga-Limones, 529 F.2d 1183 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 920, 97 S.Ct. 315, 50 L.Ed.2d 286 (1976); United States v. Johnson, 414 F.2d 22 (6th Cir.1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 991, 90 S.Ct. 1112, 25 L.Ed.2d 399 (1970). *1235In contrast, cases cited by the majority are either distinguishable or unpersuasive.
II.
Hooker did not contend that he had inadequate notice of the charge or that his defense was hampered by the absence of an express allegation that the enterprise “affected interstate commerce.” Nor was there an assertion that Hooker would have been unable to plead double jeopardy as a defense in any future prosecution for the same offense. Despite a total lack of prejudice, the majority holds that Count III was fatally defective, stressing form over substance. This conviction should be affirmed, for even assuming deficiency in Count III, Hooker clearly received a fair trial.
Applying the rationale of the recent Supreme Court decision in United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 70, 106 S.Ct. 938, 941, 89 L.Ed.2d 50 (1986), the guilty verdict of the petit jury shows that there was probable cause to charge Hooker with the offense of which he was convicted, and “any error in the grand jury proceeding connected with the charging decision was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” The majority maintains that the harmless error analysis of Mechanik cannot be applied here because the court had no jurisdiction to try Hooker on the count which failed to expressly allege an effect on interstate commerce. Jurisdiction would have been lacking only if the indictment did not allege a federal crime through failure to allege by some means a connection with interstate commerce. United States v. Silverman, 430 F.2d 106, 112 (2d Cir.1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 953, 91 S.Ct. 1619, 29 L.Ed. 2d 123 (1971), modified on other grounds, 439 F.2d 1198 (2d Cir.1970). In Silverman, the defendant was charged with embezzlement of union funds in violation of 29 U.S. C. § 501(c). The court held that the jurisdictional element of a nexus with interstate commerce was sufficiently alleged by use of the term of art “labor organization” which is defined in 29 U.S.C. § 402(i) as “a labor organization engaged in an industry affecting commerce.” Although there was no indication that the grand jury was provided a copy of section 402(i) and the indictment did not refer to the definitional statute, the court held that use of the term of art sufficiently alleged the essential element of interstate commerce. Id. at 112. If, as in Silverman, the jurisdictional interstate commerce element could be alleged by use of a term of art defined in a statute not supplied to the grand jury nor even cited in the indictment, it could clearly be alleged by specifically charging a violation of section 1962 which contains the jurisdictional language “interstate commerce.”
Certainly, it is preferable for an indictment to specify in' detail each essential element, including recitation of boiler plate language taken from the applicable statute. But, in the instances where the preferred approach is not followed, reversal should not be automatically mandated in the total absence of any prejudice to a defendant whom all concede was afforded a fair trial.
Circuit Judges K.K. HALL and WILKINSON have asked to be shown as joining in this separate opinion.