Court Opinion

ID: 9892736
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-24 18:05:43.801624+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:37:12.829842
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/24/23 Mapp v. Viejas Band of Kumeyaay Indians CA4/1

                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

TIMOTHY MAPP,                                                        D081152

         Plaintiff and Appellant,

         v.                                                          (Super. Ct. No.
                                                                      37-2022-00005995-CU-NP-CTL)
VIEJAS BAND OF KUMEYAAY
INDIANS et al.,

         Defendants and Respondents.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Gregory W. Pollack, Judge. Affirmed.
         Timothy Mapp, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
         Higgs, Fletcher & Mack, John Morris, Phillip C. Samouris, Steven M.
Brunolli and Molly E. Humphreys, for Defendants and Respondents.
         Plaintiff and appellant Timothy Mapp, a self-represented litigant,
appeals from a judgment entered after the trial court granted the motion of
defendants and respondents Viejas Band Of Kumeyaay Indians (the Band or
at times the tribe) and Band employees Sandra Ortmeier and Michele
Tollison to quash service of summons of Mapp’s complaint based on principles
of sovereign immunity. In his complaint, Mapp alleged that defendants
threatened to terminate his employment if he did not obtain a gaming license
conditioned on him arranging to satisfy unpaid child support, which violated
Family Code section 5290 and his constitutional Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination. The court rejected Mapp’s effort to allege
jurisdiction under title 18 United States Code (U.S.C.) section 1162 and title
28 U.S.C. section 1360, ruling neither law abrogated the Band’s immunity. It
ruled the immunity extended to the Band’s individual employees Ortmeier
and Tollison, who were sued for enforcing tribal gaming regulations and not
for any personal conduct.
      Mapp contends the trial court has jurisdiction over the Band regarding
family law issues and specifically child support enforcement. Citing portions
of the Family Code relating to support and title 42 U.S.C. section 654, he
argues we should reverse the judgment and he should be allowed to amend
his complaint to allege these laws apply. Because Mapp’s arguments give us
no basis to reverse the judgment, we affirm.
              FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      In February 2022, Mapp, representing himself, filed a verified Judicial
Council complaint alleging an “intentional tort” cause of action against the
Band, Ortmeier and Tollison. The Band is a federally recognized Indian
tribe. Mapp alleged Ortmeier, a gaming official, and Tollison, an
investigator, were “agents for the Department of Child Support Services”
whose function was to compel employees to increase child support payments
by threatening adverse effects on their employment. He alleged the Band
hired him as a hotel front desk clerk, but on his first day Ortmeier and
Tollison threatened termination of his employment unless he agreed to obtain
a gaming license containing a condition that he satisfy unpaid child support.

                                       2
He alleged the conduct violated Family Code section 5290 as well as his Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination.
      The Band, Ortmeier and Tollison demurred and moved to quash service
of the summons (Code Civ. Proc., § 418.10, subd. (a)(1)) on grounds sovereign
immunity barred suit against both the Band and the individuals, who were
sued in their capacity as Band employees enforcing gaming regulations, and
thus the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Mapp’s claims. They
argued the Band had not waived its immunity. They further argued Mapp’s
complaint was subject to demurrer for lack of subject matter jurisdiction as
well as its failure to state viable claims under Family Code section 5290 and
the Fifth Amendment.
      In opposition, Mapp argued in part that “[w]hen the defendants decided
to engage in child support enforcement, and commit tortious employment
interference to do it, they waived their sovereign immunity.” He argued the
court had jurisdiction over the Band and the individuals under title 18 U.S.C.
section 1162, as well as title 28 U.S.C. sections 1360 and 1605. Mapp argued
Family Code section 5290 created an implied right of action, and he had
adequately alleged defendants’ acts violated that statute. Mapp argued he
stated a Fifth Amendment claim by allegations that he could face criminal
contempt charges if he were to agree to satisfy his child support debt as the
Band requested but then fail to make payments. Pointing to the principles
that a pleading must be liberally construed and a complaint will be held
sufficient if it appears a plaintiff is entitled to any relief, Mapp finally
asserted that the defendants had not denied his allegations, which entitled
him to a $500 fine for a Family Code section 5290 violation and were
sufficient to state a cause of action.

                                         3
      Following an unreported hearing, the court granted defendants’ motion
to quash. It ruled neither title 18 U.S.C. section 1162 nor title 28 U.S.C.
section 1360 abrogated immunity for the Band as opposed to the Band
members, and title 28 U.S.C section 1360 did not confer California
jurisdiction over Indian tribes, as contrasted with individual members of the
tribe. Citing authority that “[t]ribal sovereign immunity extends to tribal
officials when acting in their official capacity and within the scope of their
authority” (Miller v. Wright (9th Cir. 2013) 705 F.3d 919, 927-928), the court
ruled the individual defendants were being sued solely for enforcing the
Band’s tribal gaming regulations and not for any personal conduct, and thus
tribal immunity extended to the individuals. It ruled the companion
demurrer was moot as a result.

      Mapp filed this appeal from the ensuing judgment of dismissal.1

1     Mapp’s notice of appeal states he is appealing from a judgment of
dismissal after an order sustaining a demurrer. Because it is reasonably
clear he is appealing from the judgment of dismissal after the court granted
defendants’ companion motion to quash service of summons, we will construe
his appeal as from that order. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.100(a)(2) [notice of
appeal must be liberally construed]; In re Joshua S. (2007) 41 Cal.4th 261,
272 [“ ‘notices of appeal are to be liberally construed so as to protect the right
of appeal if it is reasonably clear what [the] appellant was trying to appeal
from, and where the respondent could not possibly have been misled or
prejudiced’ ”].)

                                        4
                                 DISCUSSION
      Mapp advances limited and cursory claims on appeal. He does not
challenge the principle—which he asserts was confirmed in Kiowa Tribe of
Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc. (1998) 523 U.S. 751, 757—
that absent waiver or Congressional action to the contrary, the Band has
sovereign immunity, at least over lawsuits arising from its commercial

activities.2 Rather, Mapp argues that during the hearing on defendants’
motion and demurrer, he advised the court of provisions of the Uniform
Interstate Family Support Act (Family Code, § 5700.101 et seq.) relating to
child support, which provides that the definition of a “ ‘State’ ” includes an
Indian nation or tribe, but that the court denied his request for leave to
amend his complaint to allege those statutes, as well as a federal statute,
title 42 U.S.C. section 654. He then asserts, “Because this matter involves
child support enforcement the trial court does have [j]urisdiction over the
[Band].”

2      The express holding in Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing
Technologies, Inc., supra, 523 U.S. 751 is narrow: “Tribes enjoy immunity
from suits on contracts, whether those contracts involve governmental or
commercial activities and whether they were made on or off a reservation.”
(Id. at p. 760, italics added; see also C & L Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizen Band of
Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma (2001) 532 U.S. 411, 418 [“Tribal
immunity, we ruled in Kiowa, extends to suits on off-reservation commercial
contracts”]; People v. Miami Nation Enterprises (2016) 2 Cal.5th 222, 234
(Miami Nation) [characterizing Kiowa as holding tribes are immune from
suit for breaches of contract involving off-reservation commercial conduct].)

                                        5
                             I. Appellate Principles
      In resolving Mapp’s contentions, we apply the “fundamental principle
of appellate procedure that a trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to
be correct and the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of
the record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court committed an
error that justifies reversal of the judgment.” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5
Cal.5th 594, 608-609.) To obtain reversal, Mapp as the appellant must
affirmatively demonstrate error. (Petrolink, Inc. v. Lantel Enterprises (2022)
81 Cal.App.5th 156, 165.) An appellate court is “ ‘not required to make an
independent, unassisted study of the record in search of error or grounds to
challenge a trial court’s action’ ” (Yazdi v. Dental Board of California (2020)
57 Cal.App.5th 25, 36) or “ ‘consider alleged error where the appellant merely
complains of it without pertinent argument.’ ” (Poway Royal Mobilehome
Owners Assn. v. City of Poway (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1460, 1480; see also
Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 836, 852 [“When an
appellant fails to raise a point, or asserts it but fails to support it with
reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as
waived”].) Absent these required matters, the point is forfeited. (People v.
Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793; Sims v. Department of Corrections &
Rehabilitation (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 1059, 1081.)
                  II. Legal Principles and Standard of Review
      The California Supreme Court in Miami Nation, supra, 2 Cal.5th 222
discussed the historical underpinnings and current principles of tribal
immunity. Originally, the United States Supreme Court “established that
‘states lack jurisdiction in Indian country, that tribes are “domestic

                                         6
dependent nations” to whom the United States owes a fiduciary obligation,
and that Indian affairs are the exclusive province of the federal
government.’ ” (Id. at p. 242.) Later, the high court held that “ ‘Indian
Nations are exempt from suit without Congressional authorization.’ ” (Id. at
p. 234.) Tribal immunity from suit is “is now firmly established as a matter
of federal law ‘and [the rule] is not subject to diminution by the States.’ ”
(Ibid.) “Tribal immunity applies in both federal and state court and extends
to ‘suits arising from a tribe’s commercial activities, even when they take
place off Indian lands.’ [Citation.] Immunity can be abrogated by
Congress, but congressional intent to abrogate tribal immunity must be
‘ “ ‘unequivocally expressed.’ ” ’ [Citation.] Immunity may also be waived,
but ‘a tribe’s waiver must be “clear.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 235; see also In re Internet
Lending Cases (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 613, 628 [“The law is well established
that ‘a waiver of sovereign immunity “ ‘cannot be implied but must be
unequivocally expressed’ ” ’ ”].) These principles establish that “tribal
immunity is the rule, subject only to two exceptions: when a tribe has waived
its immunity or Congress has authorized the suit.” (Self v. Cher-Ae Heights
Indian Community of Trinidad Rancheria (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 209, 213;
California Parking Services, Inc. v. Soboba Band of Luiseño Indians (2011)
197 Cal.App.4th 814, 817-818.)
      As for tribal officials, “[t]he protection offered by tribal sovereign
immunity . . . is no broader than the protection offered by state or federal
sovereign immunity.” (Lewis v. Clarke (2017) 581 U.S. 155, 164.) The key
inquiry is whether the sovereign is the real party in interest. (Id. at pp. 161-
162.) “In making this assessment, courts may not simply rely on the
characterization of the parties in the complaint, but rather must determine in
the first instance whether the remedy sought is truly against the sovereign.

                                         7
[Citation.] If, for example, an action is in essence against a State even if the
State is not a named party, then the State is the real party in interest and is
entitled to invoke the Eleventh Amendment’s protection. . . . [L]awsuits
brought against employees in their official capacity ‘represent only another
way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent,’
and they may also be barred by sovereign immunity.” (Id. at p. 162; see also
Acres v. Marston (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 417, 430 [“A suit against a tribal
official is really against the sovereign (and considered an official-capacity
suit) if the plaintiff ‘must look to the [tribal] entity itself’ for relief”].)
      Defendants moved to dismiss Mapp’s complaint under Code of Civil
Procedure section 418.10, subdivision (a)(1), providing for a motion to quash
service of the summons on grounds the court lacks jurisdiction. “Typically, on
a ‘motion asserting sovereign immunity as a basis for dismissing an action
. . . the plaintiff bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of evidence
that jurisdiction exists.’ [Citation.] When a tribe asserts sovereign
immunity, the plaintiff must show that the tribe’s immunity has been
abrogated or waived; if not, the court lacks jurisdiction.” (Miami Nation,

supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 242.)3 “Whether tribal immunity bars suit is a
question of law that we review de novo.” (Id. at p. 250.)
      Though the trial court did not reach defendants’ demurrer, the review
standard is the same. Accepting the truth of properly pleaded factual

3      Miami Nation changed that burden of proof in cases where an entity
that is formally distinct from an Indian tribe seeks to establish it is an “arm
of the tribe.” (Miami Nation, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 242, 244.) In that event,
the burden is placed on the entity asserting immunity to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that it is an arm of the tribe, which, among
other things, comports with the idea that a party in possession of facts
tending to support its claim should come forward with that information. (Id.
at p. 244.) We are not presented with such facts here, so the standard burden
of proof on the plaintiff applies.
                                            8
allegations, we determine de novo whether the complaint alleges facts
sufficient to state a cause of action or discloses a complete defense. (Mathews
v. Becerra (2019) 8 Cal.5th 756, 768; T.H. v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp.
(2017) 4 Cal.5th 145, 162.) On review of a demurrer a plaintiff may attempt
to prove an amendment would cure a legal defect for the first time on appeal.
(See Ko v. Maxim Healthcare Services, Inc. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 1144,
1150.) Even on de novo review, “ ‘ “[t]he plaintiff has the burden of showing
that the facts pleaded are sufficient to establish every element of the cause of
action and overcoming all of the legal grounds on which the trial court
sustained the demurrer, and if the defendant negates any essential element,
we will affirm the order sustaining the demurrer as to the cause of action.
[Citation.] We will affirm if there is any ground on which the demurrer can
properly be sustained, whether or not the trial court relied on proper grounds
or the defendant asserted a proper ground in the trial court proceedings.” ’
[Citation.] It is the trial court’s ruling we review, not its reasoning or
rationale.” (Kahan v. City of Richmond (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 721, 730.)
                                  III. Analysis
      As stated, Mapp does not deny that sovereign immunity applies
generally to lawsuits arising from a tribe’s commercial activities. However,
he disputes application of immunity in this particular context, which he
characterizes as one of “child support enforcement,” on the basis of the laws
he cites.
      While Mapp’s brief follows most procedural requirements and attempts
to address the question of subject matter jurisdiction with some citation to
case law and statutes, it nevertheless misses the mark in certain respects
and lacks cogent legal analysis. For example, rather than addressing the
court’s order quashing service of summons, Mapp directs his arguments to

                                        9
the court’s asserted refusal to permit him to amend his complaint, a point the
court did not address having ruled the demurrer was moot. Additionally,
while Mapp suggests the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act somehow
applies to Indian nations or tribes, he does not explain with meaningful and
reasoned legal analysis how that act’s definition of a state as including an
Indian tribe permits his lawsuit against defendants. And on appeal, Mapp
relies on statutes that he did not mention in his papers below, which would
normally allow us to reject his contentions as improperly raised for the first
time on appeal. (Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Oracle Corp. (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th
506, 548 [“ ‘ “As a general rule, theories not raised in the trial court cannot be
asserted for the first time on appeal” ’ ”].)
      Because Mapp’s appeal—including whether his complaint states a
cause of action—ultimately presents a pure question of law (Miami Nation,
supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 250; Mathews v. Becerra, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 768), we
will examine his contentions, but in view of the above-mentioned appellate
principles. The question we decide is whether the laws Mapp relies upon
contain an unequivocal expression of congressional intent to abrogate tribal

                                         10
immunity. (Miami Nation, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 234-235.)4 Ultimately, as
we explain, neither Mapp’s arguments nor the laws he cites present any
reason to disturb the judgment.
A. Immunity as to the Band
      On appeal, Mapp does not argue that the Band waived its immunity or
that he can allege such facts. Such a waiver must be clear and unequivocal
in any event to be effective. (California Parking Services, Inc. v. Soboba
Band of Luiseño Indians, supra, 197 Cal.App.4th at p. 818.) Mapp does not
overcome the “strong presumption” (ibid.) against any such waiver.
      Nor do any of the laws Mapp cites establish Congress has either
abrogated the Band’s immunity or authorized his suit. In his complaint,
Mapp alleged the court possessed jurisdiction under title 18 U.S.C. section
1162 and title 28 U.S.C. section 1360, commonly known as Public Law 280.
(See United Auburn Indian Community of Auburn Rancheria v. Newsom

4      In Miami Nation, the California Supreme Court observed that
California appellate courts have characterized tribal immunity in terms of
subject matter jurisdiction. (Miami Nation, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 243.) It
explained that because sovereign immunity is subject to waiver and courts
have no obligation to sua sponte raise it, the immunity is actually “not ‘a true
jurisdictional bar’ that automatically divests a court of the ability to hear and
decide the case.” (Id. at pp. 243-244.) For these reasons, it said, “ ‘whatever
its jurisdictional attributes,’ tribal immunity ‘does not implicate a . . . court’s
subject matter jurisdiction in any ordinary sense.’ ” (Id. at p. 244.) In
Greenville Rancheria v. Martin (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 466, the court
distinguished Miami Nation, explaining that state courts are empowered to
decide whether a state statute was violated, which was the question in Miami
Nation, but that fundamental subject matter jurisdiction is implicated where
a court is asked whether it is “empowered to decide a particular subject that
is reserved to the sole authority of a tribe.” (Greenville Rancheria, at p. 477.)
Whether we view the issue in terms of the court lacking subject matter
jurisdiction or a bar of suit based on sovereign immunity, Mapp has given us
no basis to reverse the judgment.

                                        11
(2020) 10 Cal.5th 538, 545.) He also referred to those statutes in opposition
to defendants’ motion. But Mapp does not mention these laws on appeal,
explain how they permit the California court to exercise subject matter
jurisdiction over the tribe, or whether they are some clear indication of
Congressional authority for his lawsuit. In those laws, Congress expressly
granted California state courts jurisdiction over individual tribal members in
specified circumstances. (Rincon Band of Luiseño Mission Indians etc. v.
Flynt (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 1059, 1087-1088, citing 28 U.S.C. § 1360; see also
Corrales v. California Gambling Control Commission (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th
286, 301; People ex rel. Becerra v. Huber (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 524, 533.)
This includes criminal jurisdiction over Indian land (United Auburn, at p.
545), and civil litigation in limited circumstances, “involving ‘ “ ‘private
persons or private property’ ” ’ touching on, ‘ “the laws of contract, tort,
marriage, divorce, insanity, descent, etc.” ’ ” (Rincon, quoting Bryan v. Itasca
County, Minnesota (1976) 426 U.S. 373, 383-385, fn. 10; see Doe v. Mann (9th

Cir. 2005) 415 F.3d 1038, 1050-1051.)5 But “Public Law 280 does not provide
jurisdiction over disputes involving a tribe.” (Lamere v. Superior Court (2005)
131 Cal.App.4th 1059, 1064; see also Bryan, at pp. 388-389 [“there is notably
absent [in Public Law 280] any conferral of state jurisdiction over the tribes
themselves”].)
      In his opposition papers, Mapp referred to title 28 U.S.C. section 1605,
which is part of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976. (See Self v.
Cher-Ae Heights Indian Community of Trinidad Rancheria, supra, 60

5      The criminal and civil provisions appear in the separate cited titles.
(18 U.S.C. § 1162 (criminal) and 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (civil).) (See Native Village
of Venetie I.R.A. Council v. State of Alaska (9th Cir. 1991) 944 F.2d 548, 559,
fn. 15.)

                                        12
Cal.App.5th at pp. 217-218.) Again, he does not mention this law on appeal.
But “[t]ribes are not foreign sovereigns” (id. at p. 218) and “[t]he Supreme
Court has rejected the notion that tribal sovereign immunity must be
congruent with foreign sovereign immunity.” (Ibid.) As in Self, Mapp “do[es]
not explain why we should extend [a common law exception to foreign
sovereign immunity] to tribes.” (Ibid.)
      Mapp has not demonstrated that the cited provisions of the Uniform
Interstate Family Support Act or any other provision of California’s Family
Code somehow abrogate the Band’s immunity, constitute congressional
authorization for his suit, or impart subject matter jurisdiction over the
Band. And as stated, Mapp on appeal provides no reasoned argument as to
why the definition of a state as including an Indian nation or tribe in that law
(Fam. Code, § 5700.102 [the term “ ‘State’ . . . includes an Indian nation or

tribe”]), would compel those conclusions.6 On appeal, Mapp contends that he
told the trial court about the laws, but that the court improperly denied him
leave to amend his complaint. Because the hearing on defendants’ motion

6      The Uniform Interstate Family Support Act is codified in California as
Family Code section 5700.101 et seq. (In re Marriage of Sawyer (2020) 57
Cal.App.5th 724, 733; Cima-Sorci v. Sorci (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 875, 878, fn.
1.) A federal mandate requires California to adopt the act, which “ ‘ “governs,
inter alia, the procedures for establishing, enforcing and modifying child
support orders in cases in which more than one state is involved.” ’ ”
(Sawyer, at p. 733; Fam. Code, § 5700.101, subd. (b) [“There is a federal
mandate set forth in Section 666(f) of Title 42 of the United States Code
requiring California to adopt and have in effect the Uniform Interstate
Family Support Act, including any amendments officially adopted by the
National Council of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws as of September
30, 2008”].) Family Code section 5700.102 sets out definitions, and provides
that “ ‘State’ means a state of the United States, the District of Columbia,
Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, or any territory or insular
possession under the jurisdiction of the United States. The term includes an
Indian nation or tribe.”
                                       13
was unreported, we do not know what Mapp told the court about the effect of
that act on his complaint. Mapp has not met his burden in this court to
demonstrate how his proposed amendments will cure the deficiencies.
(Schifando v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1074, 1081; Kahan v. City
of Richmond, supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at p. 730.)
      Mapp also contends he advised the trial court about title 42 U.S.C.
section 654, federal legislation that requires states to create or designate an
organizational unit devoted to collection and distribution of child support
payments. (42 U.S.C. § 654(3), (4).) He quotes a provision of that federal
statute that states: “Nothing in paragraph (33) [of title 42 U.S.C. section
654] shall void any provision of any cooperative agreement entered into
before [August 22, 1996], nor shall such paragraph deprive any State of
jurisdiction over Indian country (as so defined) that is lawfully exercised

under section [1322 of Title 25].”7 Apart from citing portions of the
legislation, he provides no reasoned analysis as to how that law authorizes
this suit against the Band or abrogates its immunity. It is not our role to

7      Title 25 U.S.C. section 1322 provides in part: “The consent of the
United States is hereby given to any State not having jurisdiction over civil
causes of action between Indians or to which Indians are parties which arise
in the areas of Indian country situated within such State to assume, with the
consent of the tribe occupying the particular Indian country or part thereof
which would be affected by such assumption, such measure of jurisdiction
over any or all such civil causes of action arising within such Indian country
or any part thereof as may be determined by such State to the same extent
that such State has jurisdiction over other civil causes of action, and those
civil laws of such State that are of general application to private persons or
private property shall have the same force and effect within such Indian
country or part thereof as they have elsewhere within that State.” (25 U.S.C.
§ 1322(a), italics added.) The import of the above-italicized language is that
the state may not exercise jurisdiction unless the tribe consents.

                                       14
make these arguments for Mapp. (Coast Community College Dist. v.
Commission on State Mandates (2022) 13 Cal.5th 800, 823, fn. 10.)
B. Individual Defendants
      In his appellate briefing, Mapp does not address individual defendants
Ortmeier and Tollison or whether sovereign immunity extends to them. Our
conclusions about the statutes he cited below and on appeal stands for these
defendants as well. And, under fundamental appellate review principles, we
presume the court’s judgment is correct as to the individual defendants, and
Mapp has forfeited any arguments challenging the judgment as to them,
allowing us to affirm on this basis alone.
      But under the applicable test discussed in Lewis v. Clarke, supra, 581
U.S. 155, we would conclude as a matter of law sovereign immunity bars the
action against them as well. Mapp alleges that when he reported to the
Band’s gaming commission office on his first day of work, Tollison told him he
was required to obtain a gaming license, but due to his child support
obligation, he would receive a conditional license that required termination of
his employment on violation of any condition. He alleges Ortmeier told him
the conditions were standard and he had to agree to them in order to work,
and also agree to satisfy his unpaid child support within 90 days or pay the
balance in two years by wage assignment. Mapp alleges: “The defendants
have threatened [him] with termination of employment. The t[er]mination
will happen, unless he signs an agreement with the Department of Child
Support Services to increase payment. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] Any issue between
[him] and [Department of Child Support Services] is not the business of the
defendants.” (Capitalization omitted.) Mapp requested equitable relief and
punitive damages “in the amount of $250,000.00 plus $500.00 as per
California Family Code [section] 5290.” Mapp alleges he was suing Ortmeier

                                       15
and Tollison “in their official and unofficial capacity.” (Capitalization
omitted.) But, as explained in Lewis v. Clarke, supra, 581 U.S. 155, “courts
may not simply rely on the characterization of the parties in the complaint”
(id. at p. 162) when assessing whether sovereign immunity bars suit against
employees.
      In Lewis v. Clarke, supra, 581 U.S. 155, a negligence lawsuit was
brought against a tribal employee operating a vehicle within the scope of his
employment on state lands (an interstate highway within the State of
Connecticut). (Id. at p. 163.) The court observed that the “judgment [would]
not operate against the Tribe.” (Ibid.) Because the lawsuit was not against
the individual in his official capacity but “simply a suit against [the
individual] to recover for his personal actions, which ‘will not require action
by the sovereign or disturb the sovereign’s property,’ ” the individual was the

real party in interest and sovereign immunity was not in play. (Ibid.)8

8     Defendants rely on Brown v. Garcia (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 1198 to
argue that both Ortimeier and Tollison are immune from suit because they
were “carrying out the Band’s regulatory functions in investigating [Mapp]
and issuing a conditional license in conformity with the Band’s internal
governmental policy and discretionary, regulatory authority.” Brown held a
defamation action against individuals was an “ ‘official capacity suit’ ” subject
to sovereign immunity where “substantial evidence established that
defendants were tribal officials at the time of the alleged defamation and that
they were acting within the scope of their tribal authority when they
determined that . . . plaintiffs should be disenrolled from the Tribe pursuant
to a validly enacted tribal ordinance.” (Id. at p. 1206.) In Acres v. Marston,
supra, 72 Cal.App.5th 417, the court disagreed with Brown’s reasoning,
instead following Lewis v. Clarke, supra, 581 U.S. 155. (Acres v. Marston, at
p. 437; see also Acres Bonusing, Inc v. Marston (9th Cir. 2021) 17 F.4th 901,
914 [holding Brown’s analysis was “inconsistent with Lewis [v. Clarke] and
[other Ninth Circuit] precedents,” because Brown declined to apply a
“ ‘remedy-focused general rule’ ”].)

                                       16
      In Acres v. Marston, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th 417, the plaintiff sued
individual defendants (officials of a tribal casino, a judge, and multiple
attorneys), alleging they wrongfully filed or conspired to file a tribal lawsuit
and committed other torts against him, seeking monetary relief from them
directly for personal injury damages as well as to recover for himself
compensation the individuals had received from the tribe, the casino and
related entities. (Id. at pp. 427, 432.) On appeal from an order quashing the
complaint, the Court of Appeal held the individuals were not entitled to
sovereign immunity. (Id. at p. 432.) Applying the principles in Lewis v.
Clarke, it reasoned a judgment against them “would not obligate the Tribe or
the Casino to pay the relief [plaintiff] seeks” but “would only obligate the
individual respondents to pay the requested damages out of their own
pockets.” (Acres v. Marston, at pp. 432-433.) It rejected the notion that
because they were high ranking tribal officials or attorneys, they were
entitled to sovereign immunity as of right. (Id. at p. 435.)
      Mapp’s claims in this case relate to his employment by the Band and its
potential termination based on the Band’s provision of a conditional license
via its officials. He seeks to allege a violation of Family Code section 5290,
which permits assessment of a civil penalty against an “employer” for

specified conduct.9 That remedy and any judgment would be expressly
against the Band. Mapp’s other damages related to negative employment
decisions likewise would effectively obligate the Band, not personally the

9     Family Code section 5290 provides: “No employer shall use an
assignment order authorized by this chapter as grounds for refusing to hire a
person, or for discharging, taking disciplinary action against, denying a
promotion to, or for taking any other action adversely affecting the terms and
conditions of employment of, an employee. An employer who engages in the
conduct prohibited by this section may be assessed a civil penalty of a
maximum of five hundred dollars ($500).”
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individuals who were implementing the Band’s gaming license rules and
conditions. In short, the Band is the real party in interest, and sovereign
immunity extends to the individual defendants.
      In reaching these conclusions, we recognize Mapp represents himself.
But “the rules of civil procedure must apply equally to parties represented by
counsel and those who forgo attorney representation.” (Rappleyea v.
Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984-985.) An appellant “is not exempt from
[appellate] rules because he is representing himself on appeal in propria
persona. . . . ‘[S]uch a party is to be treated like any other party and is
entitled to the same, but no greater consideration than other litigants and
attorneys.’ ” (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246-1247.)
                                 DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed.

                                                       O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

DATO, J.

DO, J.

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