Court Opinion

ID: 9892200
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-20 21:05:51.548303+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:17:46.392723
License: Public Domain

2023 IL App (3d) 220198

                                Opinion filed October 20, 2023
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                    IN THE

                                    APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                                              THIRD DISTRICT

                                                     2023

      THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF                        )       Appeal from the Circuit Court
      ILLINOIS,                                         )       of the 18th Judicial Circuit,
                                                        )       Du Page County, Illinois,
             Plaintiff-Appellee,                        )
                                                        )       Appeal No. 3-22-0198
             v.                                         )       Circuit No. 17-CF-1474
                                                        )
      DION A. KNIGHT,                                   )       Honorable
                                                        )       Daniel Patrick Guerin,
             Defendant-Appellant.                       )       Judge, Presiding.
      ____________________________________________________________________________

            JUSTICE HETTEL delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
            Justices Brennan and Albrecht concurred in the judgment and opinion.
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                 OPINION

¶1          Defendant, Dion A. Knight, appeals the circuit court’s denial of his motion to correct

     errors in the calculation of his presentence custody credit. Defendant argues that the court erred

     in refusing to calculate sentencing credit for successfully completing several Du Page County

     programs while in custody. We vacate the circuit court’s order and remand for a new hearing

     under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 472 (eff. May 17, 2019) for the court to calculate the

     appropriate programming credit.

¶2                                          I. BACKGROUND
¶3          On February 3, 2017, officers arrested defendant during a traffic stop, which produced a

     number of controlled substances and firearms. The State charged him with armed violence and

     unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon. People v. Knight, No. 17-CF-225 (Cir. Ct. Du Page

     County) (hereinafter case No. 17-CF-225). Following arraignment, defendant did not post bond.

¶4          On August 22, 2017, while defendant was still incarcerated in the Du Page County jail,

     the State filed a complaint charging defendant with two counts of aggravated battery with a

     firearm, two counts of unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon, two counts of unlawful

     possession of a weapon by a street gang member, two counts of aggravated unlawful use of

     weapons, one count of armed violence, and one count of aggravated discharge of a firearm.

     People v. Knight, No. 17-CF-1474 (Cir. Ct. Du Page County) (hereinafter case No. 17-CF-1474).

     All charges in case No. 17-CF-1474 stemmed from a November 2016 shooting.

¶5          Both cases initially proceeded in consolidated hearings. On January 11, 2019, defendant

     entered an open plea to one count of aggravated battery in case No. 17-CF-1474 in exchange for

     the State’s dismissal of the remaining charges, including those in case No. 17-CF-225. The State

     presented the factual basis for the aggravated battery charge, and the trial court accepted

     defendant’s guilty plea, finding that he knowingly and voluntarily accepted the terms. The State

     subsequently dismissed case No. 17-CF-225.

¶6          On April 15, 2019, the court conducted a sentencing hearing. Defense counsel argued that

     several mitigating factors applied, noting that defendant attended more than 291 meetings and

     completed more than 400 hours of program services while awaiting sentencing in the Du Page

     County jail. In support, counsel tendered a letter from the director of JUST, 1 a non-profit

            1
             JUST stands for “Justice, Understanding, Service, Teaching.”

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     organization that offered courses at the correctional facility, indicating that defendant completed

     441 hours of JUST program services between February 4, 2017, and April 12, 2019. The services

     included courses on substance abuse, job readiness, parenting, social services, education, and

     religious studies. Following defendant’s statement in allocution, the trial court imposed a 15-year

     sentence. Defendant did not file a motion to reconsider sentence or withdraw his plea, nor did he

     appeal the judgment.

¶7           On June 22, 2020, defendant filed a petition for relief from judgment. The petition asked

     the court to void defendant’s plea and vacate his sentence because defendant was using

     psychotropic medication at the time of the plea and had no memory of it. The trial court denied

     the petition. Defendant appealed, and the appellate court dismissed his appeal. People v. Knight,

     No. 2-20-0646 (2021) (unpublished minute order).

¶8           On May 18, 2021, defendant filed a “Motion for Order Nunc Pro Tunc” as a self-

     represented litigant, alleging that he was entitled to credit for the time he served in jail prior to

     being charged with aggravated battery in case No. 17-CF-1474. Defendant claimed that he was

     arrested and charged with armed violence on February 3, 2017, an unrelated charge that was later

     dismissed by the State, and that while he was in custody awaiting trial on that charge, he was

     indicted for aggravated battery—the charge to which he pleaded guilty. He claimed that pursuant

     to section 5-4.5-100(c) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Code) (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-100(c)

     (West 2020)), he was entitled to approximately 150 days of additional sentencing credit. The trial

     court denied the motion, and defendant did not appeal.

¶9           On March 11, 2022, defendant filed another pro se “Motion for Order Nunc Pro Tunc,”

     seeking jail credit. Defendant claimed that he spent 785 days in the county jail prior to

     sentencing and was entitled to 1570 days of credit, which he calculated by multiplying the days

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       he spent in custody by a factor of 2. He also requested sentencing credit for the programs he

       participated in and completed while in the Du Page County jail and attached an updated letter

       from JUST indicating that he completed 445 hours of program services from February 4, 2017,

       through October 9, 2020.

¶ 10          Defendant was not present at the status hearing conducted on March 30, 2022. The State

       informed the court that defendant had filed another motion seeking sentencing credit but orally

       objected to it. The State argued that it did not understand defendant’s request and questioned

       defendant’s method of “double” credit calculation. The State further argued that the original

       sentencing credit calculation was correct and that the sentencing judge had considered the JUST

       letter during the original sentencing hearing. The trial court denied the motion.

¶ 11          Defendant requested a transcript of the proceedings for the purpose of filing a motion to

       reconsider, and the clerk placed the matter on the court’s status call. At the next hearing,

       defendant appeared via video conference and attempted to explain his March 11 motion. He

       argued that he was entitled to day-for-day credit while in custody and that he earned

       programming credits by attending and completing classes at the Du Page County jail. Defendant

       directed the court’s attention to the JUST letter and his Department of Corrections sentencing

       order showing he never received credit for the classes he attended. The trial court concluded that

       defendant received the appropriate sentencing credit for time spent in custody prior to

       sentencing, and defendant appeals.

¶ 12                                             II. ANALYSIS

¶ 13          Defendant argues that the trial court erred in refusing to calculate sentencing credit for

       the county jail programs he completed. Defendant requests that we remand the case for a new

       hearing pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 472 (eff. May 17, 2019) and the appointment of

                                                         4
       counsel. The State confesses error and agrees that the case must be remanded for further

       proceedings under Rule 472 but maintains that defendant is not entitled to counsel.

¶ 14          Under the applicable sentencing guidelines, section 5-4.5-100(c-5) of the Code instructs

       that the “trial court shall give the defendant credit for successfully completing county

       programming while in custody prior to imposition of sentence at the rate specified in [s]ection 3-

       6-3.” 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-100(c-5) (West 2020). Section 3-6-3 further provides that “[c]alculation

       of this county program credit shall be done at sentencing as provided in [s]ection 5-4.5-100 of

       this Code and shall be included in the sentencing order.” Id. § 3-6-3(a)(4)(A).

¶ 15          During the sentencing hearing, evidence was presented that defendant successfully

       completed several county program services while in pretrial custody. Although the trial court

       mentioned the county jail programs, it did not calculate any potential sentencing credit. In his

       March 2022 motion to correct the sentencing error, defendant requested jail credit for his

       participation in those programs and attached a copy of the letter verifying his participation to the

       motion. At the hearing, however, the court did not address defendant’s claim that he was entitled

       to programming credit. As the State concedes, defendant is entitled to a calculation of the

       presentence credit under section 5-4.5-100(c-5). See People v. McCall, 2022 IL App (3d)

       190780-U, ¶ 26 (finding circuit court erred in refusing to calculate and enter the sentencing credit

       defendant received for successful participation in a county jail program).

¶ 16          Illinois Supreme Court Rule 472(a) (eff. May 17, 2019) provides that the circuit court

       retains jurisdiction to correct errors in sentencing credit. Specifically, Rule 472 provides:

                      “(a) In criminal cases, the circuit court retains jurisdiction to correct the following

               sentencing errors at any time following judgment and after notice to the parties,

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               including during the pendency of an appeal, on the court’s own motion, or on motion of

               any party:

                               (1) Errors in the imposition or calculation of fines, fees, assessments, or

                      costs;

                               (2) Errors in the application of per diem credit against fines;

                               (3) Errors in the calculation of presentence custody credit; and

                               (4) Clerical errors in the written sentencing order or other part of the

                      record resulting in a discrepancy between the record and the actual judgment of

                      the court.” Id.

       Errors in the calculation of presentence custody credit encompasses a denied-credit claim under

       section 5-4.5-100(c-5). See People v. Ford, 2020 IL App (2d) 200252, ¶ 15; see also McCall,

       2022 IL App (3d) 190780-U, ¶ 27.

¶ 17          Here, as defendant argues and the State agrees, defendant’s motion must be remanded for

       the court to address defendant’s claim regarding programming credit. We therefore vacate the

       trial court’s denial of the Rule 472 motion and remand for the court to calculate the amount of

       credit owed to defendant.

¶ 18          While both parties agree that a remand is appropriate, they disagree as to the appointment

       of counsel on remand. Whether a defendant has a right to counsel in Rule 472 proceedings is an

       issue of first impression to which we apply a de novo standard of review. See People v.

       Abernathy, 399 Ill. App. 3d 420, 426 (2010) (whether a defendant was denied the right to

       counsel is reviewed de novo).

¶ 19          “A defendant has the right to counsel only if the constitution or a statute provides it.”

       People v. Love, 312 Ill. App. 3d 424, 426 (2000). Under the United States and Illinois

                                                         6
       Constitutions, criminal defendants are entitled to counsel at any “ ‘critical stage’ ” of the

       proceedings. People v. Anderson, 2021 IL App (2d) 190128, ¶¶ 21-22; see also U.S. Const.,

       amend VI; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 8. A critical stage is any stage where substantial rights of a

       criminal defendant may be affected or, in other words, when the defendant requires assistance in

       coping with legal problems or issues. People v. Moore, 2014 IL App (1st) 112592, ¶ 39 (citing

       People v. Vernón, 396 Ill. App. 3d 145, 153-54 (2009)). The right to counsel under the sixth

       amendment and our state constitution applies to every critical stage of a criminal prosecution,

       “ ‘including pretrial, trial, and sentencing.’ ” Vernón, 396 Ill. App. 3d at 153 (quoting People v.

       Allen, 220 Ill. App. 3d 772, 781 (1991)). However, “[i]t is well settled that the constitutional

       right to counsel [citation] applies during a defendant’s trial and first appeal of right, and no

       further.” Love, 312 Ill. App. 3d at 426. A defendant seeking to collaterally attack a judgment

       does not have a constitutional right to the assistance of counsel. People v. Stoecker, 2020 IL

       124807, ¶ 35 (citing Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987)). As the Stoecker court

       explained:

               “[A]t trial, an attorney serves as a ‘shield’ for defendants to protect them from being

              ‘ “haled into court” ’ and ‘stripped of their presumption of innocence.’ [Citation.] In

              contrast, petitioners seeking collateral review have already been stripped of the

              presumption of innocence and have failed to obtain relief on appellate review. [Citation.]

              Counsel appointed in a collateral proceeding works to advance a petitioner’s claim rather

              than to protect him from prosecution by the State.” Id.

¶ 20          In this case, defendant moved for sentencing credit long after the guilty plea proceedings

       concluded and the first appeal was dismissed. His motions for an order nunc pro tunc asked the

                                                         7
       court to issue additional sentencing credit against his Department of Corrections sentence,

       seeking collateral review of his judgment. As such, there is no constitutional right to counsel.

¶ 21          Moreover, a plain reading of Rule 472 reveals that it, too, conveys no right to counsel.

       Where statutory language is clear and unambiguous, it must be given effect without resort to

       other aids of interpretation. Village of Chatham v. County of Sangamon, 216 Ill. 2d 402, 429

       (2005). “We interpret supreme court rules in the same manner as statutes, applying the cardinal

       rule of construction in which we ascertain and give effect to the intent of the drafter, using the

       plain and ordinary language of the rule.” People v. Calabrese, 398 Ill. App. 3d 98, 120 (2010).

       Because the clear language of Rule 472 does not provide for the assistance of counsel, defendant

       has no statutory right to counsel on his motion either.

¶ 22          Defendant urges us to hold that Rule 472 proceedings require the appointment of counsel

       by characterizing his nunc pro tunc motions as a motion to reconsider sentence. His argument

       seeks to extend the well-settled principle that a motion to reconsider sentence is a critical stage of

       a criminal proceeding for which a defendant is entitled to counsel (People v. Bailey, 364 Ill. App.

       3d 404, 408 (2006)) to Rule 472 postjudgment motions. However, the procedural distinctions

       between a motion to reconsider sentence and a Rule 472 motion are significant and defeat

       defendant’s claim.

¶ 23          A motion to reconsider occurs during sentencing in a criminal proceeding and must be

       filed within 30 days of the date on which sentence is imposed. See People v. Reed, 177 Ill. 2d

       389, 395 (1997); Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(d) (eff. Sept. 18, 2023). Where, as here, judgment was entered

       on an open plea, a motion to reconsider is required to preserve sentencing issues for appellate

       review. See People v. Diaz, 192 Ill. 2d 211, 225 (2000) (applying motion to reconsider clause of

       Rule 604(d) to open plea cases); see also Ill. S. Ct. R. 605(b) (eff. Sept. 18, 2023). As such, a

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       motion to reconsider sentence is considered a “critical stage” of the proceedings and the right to

       counsel attaches. See People v. Williams, 358 Ill. App. 3d 1098, 1105 (2005) (citing People v.

       Brasseaux, 254 Ill. App. 3d 283, 288 (1996)).

¶ 24          By contrast, a Rule 472 motion is procedural in nature and can be filed at any time

       following judgment. See People v. Joyner, 2022 IL App (2d) 210045, ¶ 28. The purpose of the

       rule is to provide a clear mechanism for fixing technical errors and miscalculations in

       sentencing—specifically, errors in the imposition of fines and fees, per diem credits, and

       presentence custody credit and clerical errors in the sentencing order. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 472(a)

       (eff. May 17, 2019). A defendant is not required to file a Rule 472 motion in a timely manner to

       preserve his or her ability to challenge a sentencing credit error; the circuit court retains

       jurisdiction to correct the error at “any time” after sentencing. Id. Further, parties attempting to

       raise calculation errors covered by Rule 472 are protected from forfeiture by the rule’s automatic

       remand provision. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 472(e) (eff. May 17, 2019) (where defendant has attempted

       to raise sentencing credit errors on appeal, “the reviewing court shall remand to the circuit court

       to allow the party to file a motion pursuant to this rule”). Since Rule 472 does not affect

       defendant’s substantive rights or otherwise limit a party’s ability to correct sentencing credit

       calculations, defendant does not have a right to counsel on remand.

¶ 25          Defendant relies on Brasseaux, 254 Ill. App. 3d 283, but we find Brasseaux

       distinguishable. In that case, the defendant, who pleaded guilty, claimed that his right to effective

       assistance of counsel was violated where the trial court denied his pro se motion to reconsider

       sentence without appointing counsel. Id. at 285. The court noted that the motion filed by the

       defendant was not sufficient to raise any issue and preserved “absolutely nothing” for review on

       appeal. Id. at 290. Relying on Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d), the court held that defendant

                                                          9
       had a statutory right to counsel in filing a motion to reconsider sentence following a guilty plea

       and remanded to allow the defendant to file a new postplea motion, “this time with the effective

       assistance of counsel.” Id. Conversely, here, there is no enabling statutory language for a right to

       counsel when filing motions under Rule 472.

¶ 26          Last, we note defendant’s observation on appeal that he was in fact entitled to credit for

       the time he spent incarcerated on the charges in case No. 17-CF-225, which were ultimately

       dismissed as part of his plea, because the conduct in this case (case No. 17-CF-1474) predated

       his arrest on the former charges (case No. 17-CF-225). See 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-100(c) (West

       2020) (“An offender arrested on one charge and prosecuted on another charge for conduct that

       occurred prior to his or her arrest shall be given credit on the determinate sentence *** of

       imprisonment for time spent in custody under the former charge not credited against another

       sentence.”); see also People v. Clark, 2014 IL App (4th) 130331 (explaining the proper

       application of section 5-4.5-100(c)). While defendant did not appeal the trial court’s denial of the

       section 5-4.5-100(c) credit (see supra ¶ 8), the court may also consider this sentencing credit

       issue if raised by defendant at the Rule 472 hearing.

¶ 27                                           III. CONCLUSION

¶ 28          For the forgoing reasons, we vacate the judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County

       and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

¶ 29          Vacated and remanded.

                                                        10
                         People v. Knight, 2023 IL App (3d) 220198

Decision Under Review:       Appeal from the Circuit Court of Du Page County, No. 17-CF-
                             1474; the Hon. Daniel Patrick Guerin, Judge, presiding.

Attorneys                    James E. Chadd, Thomas A. Karalis, and Sean Conley, of State
for                          Appellate Defender’s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.
Appellant:

Attorneys                    Robert B. Berlin, State’s Attorney, of Wheaton (Lisa Anne
for                          Hoffman and Kristin M. Schwind, Assistant State’s Attorneys, of
Appellee:                    counsel), for the People.

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