Court Opinion

ID: 9791127
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:06:17.267202+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:34.305952
License: Public Domain

MOSK, J.
I dissent.
Statutes prohibiting possession of what are broadly designated as dangerous or deadly weapons are not uncommon. In that category have been placed weapons which in their intended or readily adaptable use are likely to produce death or serious bodily injury. As this court stated in People v. Grubb (1965) 63 Cal.2d 614, 620 [47 Cal.Rptr. 772, 408 P.2d 100] : “The Legislature obviously sought to condemn weapons common to the criminal’s arsenal. . . . The Legislature’s understandable concern with the promiscuous possession of objects dangerous to the lives of members of the public finds manifestation in section 12020.” In Grubb this court held that the prohibition against possession of a billy included those objects comparable to a billy and readily susceptible of criminal use.
The word “dagger” is also a generic term, covering the dirk, stiletto, poniard, etc. (Words and Phrases, p. 418 ; People v. Ruiz (1928) 88 Cal.App. 502 [263 P. 836] ; People v. Shah (1949) 91 Cal.App.2d 716 [205 P.2d 1081].) “Dagger” is not susceptible of exact definition, or at least has not been defined in the statute with precision, nor have the other prohibited instruments: blackjacks, slung shots, sandclubs, sandbags, metal knuckles. (Pen. Code, § 12020.)
The absence of a mathematically precise definition of a dagger in terms of locking in place, straightness, length, width, tapering, etc., suggests the Legislature was unwilling or unable to predict developing refinements in the macabre art of weaponry. It sought, by the use of generic terms, to proscribe weapons “common to the criminal’s arsenal,” and left to the trier of fact to ascertain whether a seized object comes within the category of contraband.
*483A trial judge and three appellate court justices examined the instrument involved in this case. They could have found it to be merely a long knife adaptable for such lawful purposes as stripping a deer or fileting a halibut. Instead they found this chilling lethal weapon to be a “ dirk or dagger ’ ’ as those terms are used in section 12020 of the Penal Code. This was a factual determination.
Without citing any authority, the majority propound a rule that, as a matter of law, an object cannot be a dagger if it folds like a poeketknife. I would hold that whether an instrument is a dirk or dagger is purely and simply a question of fact, and that the determination here should not be disturbed on appeal.
The judgment should be affirmed.
McComb, J., concurred.