Court Opinion

ID: 9660590
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:16:33.969288+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:20.114632
License: Public Domain

Carter, J.,
concurring.
I submit that the dissent is not tenable. The question for decision in this case, concisely stated, is: Can the owner of a vested estate in remainder maintain a suit in partition against his; remaining co-owners, where there is an outstanding estate for life vested in a third *68person in the whole of the premises for which partition is sought and the life tenant does not object to the partition and defaults when suit is brought for that purpose?
Under the common.law the answer would be simple for the reason that possession or the right to possession was a necessary element of the right to partition. The Legislature of this state, however, has enacted statutes in derogation of the common law dealing with the partition of real property of joint owners. • Consequently we must look to the statutes of this state as they have been construed by the courts in solving the question before us.
The precise question before us has not been previously decided by this court. The closest approach to it will be found in Weddingfeld v. Weddingfeld, 109 Neb. 729, 192 N. W. 227, and Bartels v. Seefus, 132 Neb. 841, 273 N. W. 485. In-each of those cases it was held that where there is an estate for life vested in a third person in the whole of the premises of which partition is sought, a remainderman cannot maintain an action in partition “over the objection of the holder of the life estate.” The fact that the court deemed it necessary to insert the limitation “over the objection of the- holder of the life estate” makes it clear that where the life-tenant did not object the court was of the opinion that a partition action could-be maintained. Unless this conclusion is valid I can see no reason for incorporating the limitation in the stated rule.
The proper solution of the problem must rest upon the correct interpretation of sections 25-2170, 25-2190, and 25-2193, R. R. S. 1943. The effect of these three sections was considered in Weddingfeld v. Weddingfeld, supra, which opinion, in my judgment, points out the result at which we should arrive in the case before us. In that opinion it was said, unqualifiedly, as follows: “It will be seen that an essential element requisite to the maintenance of the action is the possession, actual *69or constructive, or the immediate right to such possession of the lands sought to be partitioned.” After making the foregoing statement, .the court went on to say: “However, it is argued by plaintiff’s- attorneys that this action may be maintained by virtue of the provision of section 9238, Comp. St. 1922, which provides:
“ ‘When the object of the action is to effect the partition of real property among several joint owners, the petition must describe the property, and the several interests and estates of the several joint owners thereof, if known. All tenants in common, or joint tenants of any estate in land may be compelled to make or suffer partition of such estate or estates in the- manner hereinafter prescribed.’
“Counsel point out that, in this section, ‘nothing whatever is said about possession or the right of possession.’ And they argue that because of the absence of a reference to possession or the right of possession the legislature intended to say that partition might be had although the parties seeking the relief had neither the possession nor the right thereto. A reading of the statute, however, discloses that it provides for partition only among ‘tenants in common or joint tenants.’ Before it can be invoked to compel the holder of the life estate to submit to partition, a court must first hold that the holder of the life estate and the remaindermen are ‘tenants in common or joint tenants.’ It is plain that plaintiff and her two minor children whom she has made defendants are tenants-in common or joint tenants in remainder, but they are -not tenafits in common or joint tenants with the holder of the life estate. She holds her interest in severalty.- As to her it is not necessary that the statute make reference to possession, or the lack of possession, because she does not fall within its terms.”
It will be observed that the court uses the expression “tenants in common or joint tenants in remainder” and indicates that partition would be proper between them, but points out- and bases its decision upon the fact that *70the life tenant .was not a joint tenant or tenant in common with the. remaindermen. If this were not true, the court could have disposed of the matter by simply stating that possession or the right to possession was an essential element of a joint tenancy or. tenancy in common and that the action could not be maintained for that reason.
The court in the Weddingfeld case then said: “But counsel point to. two succeeding sections of the statute, namely, 9258, Comp. St. 1922, which provides for the payment of ineumbrances, if any are found to exist, and section 9261, which provides:
• “ Tf an estate for life or years be found to exist as an incumbrance upon any part of said property, and if the parties cannot agree upon the sum in gross which they will consider an equivalent for such estate, the court shall direct the avails of the incumbered property to be invested, and the proceeds to be paid to the incumbrancer during the existence of the incumbrance.’
“When these sections are read in connection with 9238 they cannot be construed to confer upon the remainderman the right to force partition upon the holder of. the life estate. • Section 9261, upon which chief reliance is placed, does not authorize the court to ascertain the value of the life estate and pay it over to the holdér of the life estate, but, on the other hand, it directs the court to have the entire fund created by the sale invested, ‘and the proceeds to be paid to the incumbrancer during the existencé of the incumbrance.’ It is clear, we think,-that the provisions of the last two mentioned sections are meant only to apply, first, to cases where there is an ordinary incumbrance, such as a mortgage; and, second, where there is an estate for life or for years and the holder of such estate voluntarily submits to the partition, but, having gone thus far, fails to agree with the other parties in interest upon the value of the life estate. In that event the court orders the *71investment of the entire amount realized from the sale.” The sections referred to are now sections 25-2190 and 25-2193, R. R. S. 1943. If partition cannot be maintained at all where there is an outstanding life estate in a third person in the whole of the premises, the very basis of the dissenting opinion, no reason exists for any reference to a life estate in section 25-2193. It might be argued that it applies only where there is a life estate in a part of the property. The same reasoning that would deny partition to all of the property would certainly apply to a part and the absence of the right of possession of the part would bar a partition proceeding as to it. Even more significant is the statement in the Weddingfeld case as to what happens where the holder of a life estate voluntarily submits to the partition but fails to agree with the other parties in interest upon the value of the life estate. It there states: “In that event the court orders the investment of the entire amount realized from the sale.” This refers to something more than a life estate in a part of the property. The direction that the court shall invest the whole amount de- . rived from the sale clearly, indicates that- it was a life estate in the whole of the property that was within the legislative intent. During the life of the life tenant the income from the investment is paid to the life tenant, and at the death of the life tenant the proceeds of the sale are divided among the remaindermen.
This poses the question as to how the two statements in the Weddingfeld case can be reconciled — the one that possession is an essential requisite to the maintenance of the partition suit and the other that the property can be sold and the entire amount realized from the sale invested. There can be only one answer. Possession is an essential element to the maintenance of a partition action. If the life tenant does not object to the maintenance of the proceedings, or if he defaults after service of process in such proceedings, the “tenants in common or joint tenants in remainder,”- to use the words of the *72Weddingfeld case, become entitled to the possession for the purposes of the partition action.
It is true as pointed out in the dissenting opinion that possession is generally deemed to be an essential element to the existence of a joint tenancy or a tenancy in common. The language contained in section 25-2170, R. R. S. 1943, in relation thereto is followed and qualified by the words “of any estate in land” and comprehends what the Weddingfeld case called “tenants in common or joint tenants in remainder.”
In further support of this position I point out that Restatement, Property, c. 11, pp. 656, 657, classifies the various state statutes on partition into three classes. The third class includes those statutes which authorize “any joint tenant or tenant in common in an unconditional and indefeasible future interest” to compel partition of a future interest thus held in co-ownership. In the 1948 Supplement to Restatement, p. 427, the Nebraska statute is cited as one probably falling within class 3, as the majority opinion holds.
In summarizing, it is my view that possession or the right to possession is necessary to the maintenance but not to the commencement of a partition action. Where a “tenant in common or joint tenant in remainder” commences a partition suit without having the possession or right to possession of the property, and the life tenant defaults or fails to object, the “tenants in common or joint tenants in remainder” thereupon are constructively in possession for the purposes of the action. The possession thus attained becomes as effective for the purposes of the action as if it had existed when the action was commenced.
This construction is amply supported by our statutes on the subject and is consistent with the previous decisions of this court. It makes unnecessary a more specific discussion of the meaning of- the words “all tenants in common, or joint tenants of any estate in land” contained in section 25-2170, R. R. S. 1943.
*73In the case at bar the life tenant did not object to the partition. He defaulted in the action. For the purposes of the suit the “tenants in common or. joint tenants in remainder” thereupon became constructively entitled to the possession. But, unless agreement is reached as to the value of the life estate, the entire proceeds of the sale must be invested and the income from the investment paid to the life tenant. The intent of the statute must be followed.
I therefore concur with the majority opinion and agree that the judgment should be reversed with directions to overrule the demurrers to the petition.