Court Opinion

ID: 2965127
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Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:35:49.079007+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:02:03.538958
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USCA1 Opinion

	

                            United States Court of Appeals
                                For the First Circuit

                                 ____________________

        No. 96-2179

                             BATH IRON WORKS CORPORATION 
                          and LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE CO.,

                                     Petitioners,

                                          v.

                 DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION PROGRAMS,
                          UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,

                                     Respondent.

                                 ____________________

                         PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A FINAL ORDER

                             OF THE BENEFITS REVIEW BOARD
                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                               Boudin,  Circuit Judge,
                                        _____________

                           Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                     ____________________

                          and Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge.
                                      ____________________

                                 ____________________

            Kevin M. Gillis, with whom Troubh, Heisler & Piampiano, P.A.  were
            _______________            _________________________________
        on brief for petitioners.
            LuAnn  B. Kressley, with whom J. Davitt  McAteer, Acting Solicitor
            __________________            __________________
        of Labor, Carol A. De  Deo, Associate Solicitor for Employee Benefits,
                  ________________
        and  Janet  R.  Dunlop,  Counsel  for Longshore,  were  on  brief  for
             _________________
        respondent.
                                 ____________________

                                  February 12, 1998
                                 ____________________

                    BOWNES, Senior Circuit Judge.  The Longshore and Harbor
                    BOWNES, Senior Circuit Judge.
                            ____________________

          Workers' Compensation Act ("LHWCA" or "Act"), 33 U.S.C.A.     901

          -  950 (West Supp. 1997),  requires employers to pay compensation

          to certain maritime workers for disabling injuries resulting from

          their employment.   An exception from total liability is provided

          to employers under   8(f) of the LHWCA when the employer  proves,

          among other things,  that a permanent partial  disability existed

          prior  to the work-related  injury.   33 U.S.C.A.    908(f).   In

          construing this exception,  this court, along with  other circuit

          courts of appeals, has required the employer to come forward with

          proof,  which is  not specifically  elucidated  in the  statutory

          language, that the  pre-existing disability was "manifest  to the

          employer" before   8(f) relief can obtain.  See Part II, infra.  
                                                      ___          _____

                    In 1984  the LHWCA was  amended, inter alia,  to permit

          claimants to receive compensation when a long-latent occupational

          disease does  not become  apparent until after  the employee  has

          retired.  This appeal  presents a novel  question in the wake  of

          that amendment:  may an employer  obtain   8(f) relief  when both

          the claimed pre-existing  disability and compensable occupational

          disease do not become manifest until after the worker has retired

          from  employment  with   the  responsible  employer?     In  such

          instances, of  course,  the employer  cannot show  that the  pre-

          existing  disability  was  "manifest  to  the  employer"  because

          employment has ceased by the time both disabilities arise.

                    Because the  question before  us is  purely legal,  the

          facts  underlying  the  worker's  claim  need  only  be  sketched

                                         -2-
                                          2

          briefly.   Phillip  J. Reno  voluntarily retired  from Bath  Iron

          Works ("BIW")1 in  1985, after a total of  thirty-eight years2 in

          various  positions.  It is  uncontroverted that at various stages

          of his employment at BIW, Reno was exposed to asbestos.   In 1989

          or  1990,  several  years after  his  retirement,  Reno  began to

          experience shortness  of breath.   He was diagnosed at  that time

          with  chronic  obstructive   pulmonary  disease  (emphysema)  and

          interstitial lung disease.  Reno had been a cigarette smoker.  In

          June of  1991, Reno  was referred to  a pulmonary  specialist who

          diagnosed obstructive pulmonary disease,  primarily the result of

          cigarette smoking,  and restrictive  pulmonary disease  resulting

          from Reno's  asbestos  exposure.   Reno  was  assessed  a  twenty

          percent  whole person  impairment due  to  the overall  pulmonary

          impairments.  Reno filed a timely claim for workers' compensation

          benefits on the basis of his partial pulmonary disability.

                    BIW in  turn gave notice  of its intent to  seek relief

          from the compensation liability under   8(f) of the LHWCA on  the

          theory  that  Reno's smoking-related  emphysema  was  a permanent

          partial disability  which  predated the  work-related  injury  of

          asbestosis.   On December 3,  1993, the Administrative  Law Judge

          ("ALJ")  awarded benefits  to  Reno  and denied  BIW  the    8(f)

          relief.  Relying on our precedent, the ALJ held that in  order to
                              
          ____________________

          1.   We  refer to  Petitioners BIW  and Liberty  Mutual Insurance
          Company collectively as BIW.

          2.  We feel compelled to note that, contrary to BIW's description
          of  Reno's work  history,  thirty-eight  years  is  not  properly
          characterized  as "employ[ment]  for  several  years."    Br.  of
                                                _______
          Petitioner at 2 (emphasis added).

                                         -3-
                                          3

          obtain such  relief, an employer  must demonstrate that  the pre-

          existing  disability  was  manifest  to  the  employer  prior  to

          retirement.  

                    BIW appealed the legal basis  of the   8(f) decision to

          the  Department  of  Labor's Benefits  Review  Board.    After no

          action, the ALJ's decision became the final order of the Board on

          September 12,  1996.   See Omnibus  Consolidated Rescissions  and
                                 ___ ______________________________________

          Appropriations Act  of 1996,  Pub. L. No.  104-134, 110  Stat. at
          ___________________________

          1321-219 (April 26,  1996).  Our jurisdiction over  the appeal is

          proper under 33  U.S.C.A.   921(c).  Because the  issue before us

          is purely a question of law, we exercise de novo review.  Liberty
                                                                    _______

          Mut.  Ins. Co.  v. Commercial Union  Ins. Co., 978  F.2d 750, 757
          ______________     __________________________

          (1st Cir. 1992).

                    BIW  posits  that Reno's  emphysema  is a  pre-existing

          permanent disability which, when  combined with his  occupational

          disease  of asbestosis, created  a greater disability.   Based on

          this postulate, BIW points to both the plain language of    8(f),

          and the substance and legislative history of the 1984  Amendments

          to argue  that it is entitled to relief under   8(f).  In Newport
                                                                    _______

          News Shipbuilding  & Dry Dock  Co. v. Harris,  934 F.2d 548  (4th
          __________________________________    ______

          Cir. 1991), the  Fourth Circuit examined a similar situation, and

          concluded that  "adherence to the [manifestation] requirement [in

          instances of a long-latent occupational disease] would defeat the

          real purposes of the  [1984] amendments,"  id. at 553.   In cases
                                                     ___

          such   as  these,   the  Harris   court   determined  that   "the
                                   ______

          manifestation requirement will  not be applied."  Id.   BIW urges
                                                            ___

                                         -4-
                                          4

          adoption of the  Harris holding,3 as a basis  for overturning the
                           ______

          decision of the Board below.

                    We decline to  follow the Fourth Circuit  and therefore

          affirm  the decision  of the  Board.   We find  the manifestation

          requirement a  necessary prerequisite to   8(f) relief even where

          the  compensation claim is based on a post-retirement long-latent

          occupational disease.  Our analysis follows.

                                         I. 
                                         I. 

                    Under    8(f) of the Act, "the  liability for permanent

          partial and permanent  total disability, and death  benefits, [is

          shifted] from employer to the Special Fund when the disability or

          death is not due solely to the injury which is the subject of the

          claim."   A2 Benefits  Review Board  Service, Longshore  Reporter
                                                        ___________________

          Desk Book    D8.20,  at  248 (Matthew  Bender, 1996).   In  these
          _________

          instances, after  an initial  period of  employer liability,  the

          employee is "paid the remainder of the compensation that would be

          due out of the  special fund established  in section 944 of"  the

          LHWCA.  33 U.S.C.A.    8(f)(2)(A).  The Special Fund is currently

          financed by assessments  on all covered employers,  part of which

                              
          ____________________

          3.  Harris is the only circuit court of appeals decision to reach
              ______
          this issue as of yet.   In Ehrentraut v. Director, OWCP, 30  BRBS
                                     __________    ______________
          146 (1996), the Benefits Review  Board reached the question,  and
          decided  that  the  pre-existing  disability  need only  manifest
          itself to someone -- not necessarily the employer -- prior to the
          compensable injury, id.  at 150.  The Director  has contested the
                              ___
          Board's jurisdiction to issue the opinion on the basis of Pub. L.
          No. 104-134, supra, and the  case is currently pending before the
                       _____
          Third Circuit.   Director, OWCP  v. Sun Ship, Inc.,  No. 96-3648.
                           ______________     ______________
          Regardless, the  Board's Ehrentraut  decision is  entitled to  no
                                   __________
          special deference  here.   Potomac Elec.  Power Co.  v. Director,
                                     ________________________     _________
          OWCP, 449 U.S. 268, 278 n.18 (1980).
          ____

                                         -5-
                                          5

          is  prorated according  to the  extent to  which that  particular

          employer's compensated  employees  make  use  of the  Fund.    33

          U.S.C.A.   944(c).

                    We  turn initially  to the  words of  the statute.   If

          these are  not clear, "we  next examine the  legislative history,

          albeit  skeptically, in search  of an unmistakable  expression of

          congressional  intent."  Strickland v. Commissioner, Me. Dep't of
                                   __________    __________________________

          Human Servs., 48 F.3d 12, 17 (1st Cir. 1995).
          ____________

                    Section 8(f) currently reads, in relevant part:

                    Injury increasing disability:

                      (1)  In  any  case  in  which  an  employee
                                                     ____________
                    having   an   existing    permanent   partial
                    _____________________________________________
                    disability suffers injury, the employer shall
                    __________
                    provide compensation  for such  disability as
                    is found  to be attributable  to that  injury
                    based upon  the average  weekly wages  of the
                    employee  at  the  time of  the  injury.   If
                    following [certain statutorily scheduled] . .
                    . injur[ies] . . . , the  employee is totally
                    and permanently disabled,  and the disability
                    is found not to be due solely to that injury,
                    the employer  shall provide  compensation for
                    the  applicable  prescribed period  of  weeks
                    provided   for  in   that  section   for  the
                    subsequent  injury,  or for  one  hundred and
                    four weeks,  whichever is the greater . . . .
                    In  all   other  cases  of   total  permanent
                    disability or of  death, found not to  be due
                    solely to that injury, of an employee  having
                    an existing permanent partial disability, the
                    employer  shall  provide .  .  . compensation
                    payments or  death benefits  for one  hundred
                    and  four  weeks  only.    If,  following  [a
                    statutorily scheduled]  injury  . .  . ,  the
                    employee has  a permanent  partial disability
                    and the  disability is  found not  to be  due
                    solely to that injury, and such disability is
                    materially  and  substantially  greater  than
                    that  which  would  have  resulted  from  the
                    subsequent injury  alone, the  employer shall
                    provide  compensation   for  the   applicable
                    period of  weeks . .  . , or for  one hundred

                                         -6-
                                          6

                    and  four  weeks,  whichever is  the  greater
                    . . . .

                      In all  other cases in  which the  employee
                    has a permanent partial disability, found not
                    to be  due solely  to that  injury, and  such
                    disability  is  materially  and substantially
                    greater than that  which would have  resulted
                    from   the  subsequent   injury  alone,   the
                    employer   shall  provide   in  addition   to
                    [statutorily      mandated     compensation],
                    compensation for  one hundred and  four weeks
                    only.

          33 U.S.C.A.   908(f)(emphasis added).  

                    Thus two categories of resulting disability are covered

          under    8(f):  (1) total  permanent disability  found to  be the

          result  of  the   workplace  injury  (statutorily  scheduled   or

          otherwise) combined with the existing disability; and (2) partial

          permanent   disability found  to be the  result of  the workplace

          injury (statutorily  scheduled or  otherwise)  combined with  the

          existing   disability,   where   the   resulting  disability   is

          "materially and  substantially greater"  because of  the combined

          effect.  Reno's  situation falls under the latter  category.  The

          first sentence of  the section contains  the language crucial  to

          all  requests for relief:    8(f)  cases are  those "in  which an

          employee having an existing permanent partial disability  suffers
                             _____________________________________

          injury."

                    The  statute,  however,  is silent  on  the  meaning of

          "existing permanent partial disability."   See 33 U.S.C.A.    902
           ________                                  ___

          (definitions).  At  first blush then,  BIW's argument makes  some

          sense;  it is,  at least,  an  arguable reading  to suggest  that

          Reno's  emphysema was an  "existing permanent partial disability"

                                         -7-
                                          7

          by the  time the asbestosis made itself known.  Leaving aside the

          question  of when  injury  occurs  for  purposes  of  long-latent

          occupational diseases,4 the issue turns  to a large degree on how

          one interprets the word "existing."  For purposes of this appeal,

          does  it  mean  existing during  employment,  or  existing before

          another   disability   becomes  apparent?      The  manifestation

          requirement,  to which  we now  turn,  was in  large measure  the

          result of  courts' determinations  on the  meaning of  "existing"

          disability.

                                         II.
                                         II.

                    The font of the manifestation requirement can be traced

          to the  Supreme Court's opinion in Lawson v. Suwanee Fruit & S.S.
                                             ______    ____________________

          Co.,  336  U.S. 198  (1949).    There,  the  Court was  asked  to
          ___

          determine the proper meaning of  "disability" in the context of  

          8(f)'s  coverage  for  "previous disabilit[ies]."    Id.  at 200.
                                                               ___

          Because   the  definitional   portion   of   the  LHWCA   defined

          "disability" in relation to an injury "arising out of and in  the

          course  of  employment," id.  (quoting  LHWCA    2(2)),  a thorny
                                   ___

          question of statutory interpretation emerged: must  the "previous

          disability"  also  arise  out  of  an  employment-related injury?

          After a review  of the Act's legislative history,  id. at 201-04,
                                                             ___

                              
          ____________________

          4.   Our inquiry  would be simplified  if the  statutory language
          explicitly defined  the time of  injury in such cases.   Instead,
          the definition of "injury" includes "such occupational disease or
          infection  as  arises  naturally  out  of  such  employment,"  33
          U.S.C.A.   902(2), and as we examine infra, wage calculations for
                                               _____
          occupational disease reference  the onset of disabling  effect as
          the time of "injury," 33 U.S.C.A.   910(i).  There is, therefore,
          room for argument on the point.

                                         -8-
                                          8

          the Court  answered in the negative, id. at  206. "If we read the
                                               ___

          definition  [of  disability]  into     8(f)(1)  in  a  mechanical

          fashion, we create  obvious incongruities in the language, and we

          destroy one of the major purposes of the second injury provision:

          the  prevention of  employer  discrimination against  handicapped
          _________________________________________________________________

          workers."    Id.  at  201  (emphasis  added).      It  was Lawson
          _______      ___                                           ______

          generally, and this  emphasized language in particular  which the

          courts   of  appeals   have  seized   upon   in  developing   the

          manifestation requirement.  

                    In 1970, the D.C. Circuit interpreted   8(f) as it then

          existed,5 and formally extracted for the first time what has come

          to  be known as the  "manifestation" requirement -- requiring the

          employer to show that the pre-existing disability was manifest to

          the employer before   8(f) relief can obtain.  American Mut. Ins.
                                                         __________________

          Co. of Boston v. Jones, 426 F.2d  1263 (D.C. Cir. 1970).  Denying
          _____________    _____

            8(f) relief to the employer, the  court stated that "nothing in

          the record  gives any indication  that [the claimant], up  to the

          time of his  [work-related] injuries, showed a  sufficient degree

          of  social maladaption  due  to  limited  intelligence  that  his

          disability could be fairly classed  as 'manifest.'"  Id. at 1268.
                                                               ___

          The  American Mutual court's construction  of   8(f) was informed
               _______________

          by  what it determined  to be the  primary purpose of  the   8(f)

          exception: "to remove  that aspect of discrimination  against the

                              
          ____________________

          5.  At the time, the language was "combin[ation] with  a previous
                                                                   ________
          disability."  Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act
          __________
             8(f)(1), 44  Stat. 1424,  1429  (1927) (emphasis  added).   We
          examine the lack of import in the language change infra.
                                                            _____

                                         -9-
                                          9

          disabled which would otherwise be  encouraged by the very statute

          intended to protect  them."  Id. at 1267.  Thus, it was reasoned,
                                       ___

          "discrimination  .  .   .  must  rest   upon  knowledge  of   the

          characteristic upon which the discriminationis to be based."  Id.
                                                                        ___

                    It was  not long before other circuit courts of appeals

          adopted  the  same requirement.   See  e.g., Dillingham  Corp. v.
                                            _________  _________________

          Massey,  505 F.2d  1126, 1128  (9th Cir.  1974); Atlantic  & Gulf
          ______                                           ________________

          Stevedores, Inc.  v. Director, OWCP,  542 F.2d 602, 606  (3d Cir.
          ________________     ______________

          1976); Duluth, M.  and I. R.  Ry. Co. v.  United States Dep't  of
                 ______________________________     _______________________

          Labor, 553 F.2d 1144, 1148-51 (8th Cir. 1977). 
          _____

                    This  court has  required  the  employer  to  meet  the

          manifestation  requirement  since   General  Dynamics  Corp.   v.
                                              ________________________

          Sacchetti, 681  F.2d 37, 39-40  (1st Cir.  1982).  We  required a
          _________

          showing of "manifest[ation] to the employer," because we observed

          that    8(f)  "was designed  to  encourage employers  to hire  or

          continue  to  employ  handicapped workers  by  ensuring  that the

          employer would not have to  compensate in full for a subsequently

          incurred   permanent   disability   when   that  disability   was

          attributable in part to a  previously existing handicap." Id.  We
                                                                    ___

          have steadfastly adhered to this requirement.  Director,  OWCP v.
                                                         _______________

          General   Dynamics   Corp.,   980   F.2d   74,   76   (1st   Cir.
          __________________________

          1992)(Lockhart);6  Bath Iron Works  Corp. v. Director,  OWCP, 950
                ________     ______________________    _______________

          F.2d 56,  58 (1st Cir.  1991); CNA Ins.  Co. v. Legrow,  935 F.2d
                                         _____________    ______
                              
          ____________________

          6.   Because  of the  fact that  the parties  litigating disputes
          under the LHWCA are frequently the same, courts generally use the
          last  name of the individual  claimant for purposes of short-form
          citation, regardless of  whether that claimant is a  party to the
          appeal.  We do so here.

                                         -10-
                                          10

          430,  435 (1st  Cir. 1991); White  v. Bath Iron  Works Corp., 812
                                      _____     ______________________

          F.2d 33, 35  (1st Cir. 1987); Director, OWCP  v. General Dynamics
                                        ______________     ________________

          Corp., 787 F.2d  723, 725 (1st Cir. 1986)(Fantucchio).   See also
          _____                                     __________     ________

          Director, OWCP v.  Bath Iron Works Corp. (Johnson),  129 F.3d 45,
          ______________     _____________________  _______

          50 (1st Cir. 1997)(reiterating non-discrimination purpose  behind

            8(f)).  Our  current jurisprudence therefore dictates  that, in

          order "[t]o prove that  it is entitled to Section 8(f) relief, an

          employer must show that, (1) the employee had a permanent partial

          disability  that  existed prior  to  the second  injury;  (2) the

          second injury contributed  to that disability; and  (3) the prior

          disability  was 'manifest' to the employer."   Lockhart, 980 F.2d
                                                         ________

          at 76.

                    As  we  have  noted,  we   turned  to  what  has   been

          consistently  elucidated  as  the  core  purpose  of     8(f)  --

          prevention of discrimination  -- to  inform our  adoption of  the

          manifestation requirement.   Sacchetti, 681 F.2d at 40.   Indeed,
                                       _________

          our most extensive  analysis of the manifestation  requirement to

          date reiterated that the "crucial issue [in   8(f) relief], . . .

          is  the  potential  for  discrimination  against  the  disabled."

          Lockhart,  980 F.2d at 81.   We stated  that "[t]he centrality of
          ________

          this issue  is  emphasized  in all  our  cases  interpreting  the

          [LHWCA]."  Id.  The challenged standard employed by  the Board in
                     ___

          Lockhart's  case,  which  involved   a  question  concerning  the

          permanency of the pre-existing  disability, queried whether there

          was  "sufficient information regarding the existence of a serious

          lasting  problem  which  would motivate  a  cautious  employer to

                                         -11-
                                          11

          consider  terminating the  employee." Id.  at  80.   We held  the
                                                ___

          standard  proper because  "[i]t effectuates  the  purpose of  the

          manifest  requirement and Section  8(f) by making  only potential

          discriminators eligible for Section 8(f) relief." Id. at 82.
                                                            ___

                    To date, eight  other circuits besides ours  apply this

          requirement:   the Second,  Third, Fourth, Fifth,  Eighth, Ninth,

          Eleventh  and District of  Columbia.  Sealand  Terminals, Inc. v.
                                                ________________________

          Gasparic, 7 F.3d  321, 323 (2d Cir.  1993)(per curiam); Director,
          ________                                                _________

          OWCP v. Universal Terminal & Stevedoring Corp., 575 F.2d 452, 455
          ____    ______________________________________

          (3d Cir. 1978); Director, OWCP v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry
                          ______________    _______________________________

          Dock  Co. (Langley),  676 F.2d  110, 114  (4th Cir.  1982); Ceres
          _________  _______                                          _____

          Marine Terminal  v. Director, OWCP,  118 F.3d 387, 392  (5th Cir.
          _______________     ______________

          1997);  Duluth, 553 F.2d  at 1149-51  (8th Cir.  1977); Director,
                  ______                                          _________

          OWCP v.  Cargill, Inc., 709  F.2d 616, 618-19 (9th  Cir. 1983)(en
          ____     _____________

          banc); C.G.  Willis, Inc. v.  Director, OWCP, 31 F.3d  1112, 1115
                 __________________     ______________

          (11th Cir. 1994); C & P Tel. Co. v. Director, OWCP, 564 F.2d 503,
                            ______________    ______________

          512-15 (D.C. Cir. 1977).  Only the Sixth Circuit has rejected the

          manifestation  requirement,  substituting instead  the  directive

          that the  pre-existing disability be  manifest to someone  -- not

          necessarily the  employer --  prior to  the work-related  injury.

          American Ship Bldg. Co. v. Director, OWCP, 865 F.2d 727, 732 (6th
          _______________________    ______________

          Cir. 1989).

                    To  say that the  requirement is by  now well-ensconced

          within the  rubric of the LHWCA  would be an understatement.   We

          must  note, however,  that despite  the  Benefits Review  Board's

          description  of the manifestation  requirement as a "well-settled

                                         -12-
                                          12

          concept,"  Caudill v. Sea Tac Alaska Shipbuilding, 25 BRBS 92, 99
                     _______    ___________________________

          (1991), the Supreme Court has not yet decided its validity.

                                         III.
                                         III.

                    The   manifestation  requirement   has  been   properly

          characterized as   "a  'judicial gloss'  which  Congress has  not

          acted to erase."   American Shipbuilding, 865  F.2d at 730.   Nor
                             _____________________

          could we  erase it  if we wanted  to.   It is well  settled that,

          "[i]n a  multi-panel circuit, newly constituted panels, generally

          speaking, are bound by prior panel decisions on point." Metcalf &
                                                                  _________

          Eddy, Inc. v. Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Auth., 991 F.2d 935,
          __________    ____________________________________

          939 n.  3 (1st Cir.  1993).  We  are, however, confronted  with a

          situation  made  novel  by  congressional  amendment,   and  must

          therefore determine whether those amendments should effectuate  a

          change in our traditional analysis of requests for   8(f) relief.

                    As  an  initial  matter,   we  remain  convinced   that

          application  of the manifestation  requirement to requests  for  

          8(f) relief is the  proper way to  give the Section its  intended

          meaning.  We  think the LHWCA's legislative history  shows that  

          8(f) was  designed to serve  a very specific and  limited purpose

          with regards  to the  operation of the  compensation scheme  as a

          whole.   Because  the manifestation requirement  effectuates this

          limited purpose, we affirm our adherence to it.

                                          A.
                                          A.

                    The original LHWCA was passed  in 1927 in response to a

          series of Supreme Court decisions that invalidated prior attempts

          to  cover  maritime  workers  under  existing state  compensation

                                         -13-
                                          13

          structures.  See G. Bober & M. Wible, Compensable Injury or Death
                       ___                      ___________________________

          Arising Under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act,
          ________________________________________________________________

          35 Loyola  L. Rev.  1129, 1131  (1990).   "It was  held that  the

          matter [of maritime  compensation] was  outside state  cognizance

          and  exclusively within  federal maritime  jurisdiction . .  . ."

          Calbeck    v.   Travelers   Ins.   Co.,   370   U.S.   114,   117
          _______         ______________________

          (1962)(discussing  Southern  Pac.  Co. v.  Jensen,  244  U.S. 205
                             ___________________     ______

          (1917)).7   Around the  time the LHWCA  was debated  and crafted,

          workers'  compensation schemes had  become so popular  that "[b]y

          1920, all  but eight states  had adopted Compensation Acts."   A.

          Larson,  The Nature  and Origins  of  Workmen's Compensation,  37
                   ___________________________________________________

          Cornell L. Q. 206, 233 (1952).

                    One  of   the  major  problems   with  state   workers'

          compensation  schemes,  however,   was  the  effect   that  "non-

          apportionment" of the  cost of  compensation had  on the  already

          disabled worker.   By  holding the last  employer liable  for the

          results of  accumulated injury,  it was  argued, employers  had a

          significant  incentive  to  discriminate  against  those  workers

          already physically disabled.8  Johnson, 129 F.3d at 50.  The most
                                         _______

          commonly  reiterated  example  of this  effect  derives  from the

          Oklahoma experience.  As stated in Lawson,
                                             ______

                              
          ____________________

          7.  Justice Brennan's opinion in Calbeck provides a comprehensive
                                           _______
          discussion of the judicial  decisions and legislative maneuvering
          which led to passage of the Act.  370 U.S. 117-124.

          8.   "Non-apportionment" is  also described  as the  "aggravation
          rule," because it holds one employer liable for the results of an
          aggravating injury.  

                                         -14-
                                          14

                    Nease v. Hughes Stone Co., 114 Okla. 170, 244
                    _____    ________________
                    P. 778 [(1925)], held the employer liable for
                    total  compensation for  loss  of the  second
                    eye.    After  the  decision,  Mr.  Huber [of
                    Oklahoma]  reports,  "thousands  of one-eyed,
                    one-legged, one-armed, one-handed  men in the
                    State  of Oklahoma were  let out and  can not
                    get  employment  coming under  the  workmen's
                    compensation  law of Oklahoma.  . . .   Those
                    . . .   court  decisions   put   us  in   bad
                    shape. . . . The  decision displaced  between
                    seven  and eight thousand men in less than 30
                    days in Oklahoma."

          336  U.S.  at  203-04  (quoting United  States  Bureau  of  Labor

          Statistics,  Bull.  No.   536  at  268,  272   (1931))(first  two

          alterations added).  As one example  of the flavor of the debate,

          it was  stated that  compensation systems  without second  injury

          provisions, "would become  an instrument of persecution .  . . of

          men  who  are  physically  handicapped."    Id. at  203  (quoting
                                                      ___

          testimony  of Joseph  Parks of Massachusetts  Industrial Accident

          Commission, United States  Bureau of Labor Statistics,  Bull. No.

          564 at 278 (1932)).

                    As  originally enacted, an  employer was entitled  to  

          8(f)  relief  "[i]f an  employee  receive[d] an  injury  which of

          itself would only  cause permanent partial disability  but which,

          combined with a previous disability, does in fact cause permanent

          total disability."  44 Stat. at 1429.  The legislative history of

          the  Act demonstrates that  Congress responded to  the unintended

          effect of non-apportionment  by including a "second  injury fund"

          in  the statute.    See Johnson,  129 F.3d  at  50 (stating  that
                              ___ _______

          conclusion); Ceres Marine, 118 F.3d at 389 (same).   Although the
                       ____________

          legislative history of  the original Act is  not voluminous, what

                                         -15-
                                          15

          does exist  drives our conclusion that   8(f) was included in the

          LHWCA   specifically   to   ameliorate  the   effects   of   non-

          apportionment.  Discriminatory  effect  was  certainly  seriously

          considered.  For instance, Representative Bowling stated during a

          colloquy on a potential apportionment scheme that even under such

          a system, the disabled employee was likely to remain jobless.  To
                                                                         __

          Provide  Compensation  for Employees  Injured  and Dependents  of
          _________________________________________________________________

          Employees  Killed in  Certain Maritime  Employments:  Hearings on
          _________________________________________________________________

          H.R.  9498  Before the  House  Committee on  the  Judiciary, 69th
          ___________________________________________________________

          Cong., 1st Sess. at 74  (1926) ("Well, that sounds like 'good-by'

          [sic] for the [disabled employee]").  

                    Perhaps the  most  telling exchange  on point  occurred

          during hearings over the Senate  version of the bill, which would

          later  be enacted.    Mr.  E.  M. Braxton  of  the  Newport  News

          Shipbuilding & Dry Dock  Company reiterated his concern  that the

          Act would require employers to "examine every man who applies for

          work; and the  poor dog that is suffering  from some disease will

          be turned away from our  plant because . . . as a  matter of life

          and death financially we will  have to turn him down."   Hearings
                                                                   ________

          on  S.3170 Before  the  House Committee  on  the Judiciary,  69th
          __________________________________________________________

          Cong., 1st Sess. at 196 (1926).   In rebuttal, a witness in favor

          of the legislation testified as follows:

                    The second  injury proposition is as  much to
                    the  advantage   of  the  employer   and  his
                    interests as  it is  for the  benefit of  the
                    employee.   It protects that employer who has
                    hired, say, a  one-eyed worker  who goes  and
                    loses  his other  eye  and  becomes  a  total
                    disability.   The employer without  this sort
                    of thing  would have  to pay  total permanent

                                         -16-
                                          16

                    disability compensation.   Then, on the other
                    hand, this also protects the worker  with one
                    eye from  being denied employment  on account
                    of  his being an  extra risk.   Now by simply
                    taking this up  in this way it is possible to
                    protect  both the employer and to protect the
                    one-eyed employee  also.   It is  one of  the
                    best  social  inventions  in  legislation  of
                    which I have knowledge.

          Id. at 208 (testimony of Mr. Andrews).  See also Lawson, 336 U.S.
          ___                                     ________ ______

          at 202 (quoting same).

                    We  think   the   foregoing   demonstrates   that   the

          development  of  the  manifestation requirement  rests  on  solid

          ground.   Because  the legislative  history of  the original  Act

          demonstrates that   8(f) was specifically designed to  reduce the

          incentive for discrimination,  it makes logical sense  that "only

          potential discriminators [are] eligible for Section 8(f) relief."

          Lockhart, 980 F.2d at 82.
          ________

                                          B.
                                          B.

                    In 1972, the LHWCA was amended,9 see Longshoreman's and
                                                     ___
                              
          ____________________

          9.   There were, of course, other amendments  to the Act prior to
          1972.   According to  one Report  generated as  part of the  1984
          Amendments,
                      [O]ther  employee  groups   were  [eventually]
                 covered  under the Act.   The District  of Columbia
                 Workmen's Compensation Act (1928) extended coverage
                 to  employees of  private employers  in Washington,
                 D.C.  The Defense Base Act (1941) extended coverage
                 to  employees of  federal  contractors at  military
                 bases or on public works contracts performed in any
                 place  outside the continental  United States.  The
                 Nonappropriated Fund  Instrumentalities Act  (1952)
                 applied   the  LHWCA   to  civilian   employees  of
                 nonappropriated fund instrumentalities of the Armed
                 Forces  (such as  post exchanges).    In 1953,  the
                 Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act extended coverage
                 to employees  on the  U.S. Outer Continental  Shelf
                 involved in  exploring for  and developing  natural
                 resources.

                                         -17-
                                          17

          Harbor Workers' Compensation Act Amendments  of 1972, Pub. L. 92-

          576, 86  Stat. 1251  (1972), "[t]he  principle purpose  of .  . .

          [which was] to  . . .  upgrade the benefits,  extend coverage  to

          protect additional workers,  provide a specified cause  of action

          for  damages against third  parties, and to  promulgate necessary

          administrative reforms,"   S. Rep. No. 92-1125, at  1 (1972).  As

          part of the 1972  Amendments, the language of   8(f) was changed,

          substituting  the  language  of  "previous  disability"  for  the

          current  language of "existing permanent partial disability."  86

          Stat. at 1257.  The Amendments also opened the door for employers

          to   8(f) relief where  the resulting combined disability was not

          total, but partial.  Id.
                               ___

                    There is nothing in the legislative history of the 1972

          Amendments to  suggest that the core purpose  of   8(f) was being

          altered along with  its language.  See  Duluth, 553 F.2d  at 1149
                                             ___  ______

          (making that  determination); C  & P Telephone,  564 F.2d  at 512
                                        ________________

          (same).  To the contrary, both the Senate and House Report stated

          that the chosen "method of spreading the risk among all employers

          is  intended by  the  committee to  encourage  the employment  of

          handicapped workers."  S.  Rep. No. 92-1125, at 7;  H.R. Rep. No.

          92-1441, at 8 (1972).  

                              
          ____________________

                      Since  original enactment,  the  Act has  been
                 amended ten times.  Amendments in 1934, 1938, 1948,
                 1956,  1960, 1961,  and 1969  revised or  increased
                 benefits.  In 1958, the Act was amended  to require
                 employers  to  maintain   a  reasonably  safe  work
                 environment.

          S. Rep. No. 97-498, at 20 (1982).

                                         -18-
                                          18

                                         IV.
                                         IV.

                    BIW's primary argument  is that the 1984  Amendments to

          the  Act, Pub.  L. No.  98-426,  98 Stat.  1639 (1984),  required

          abolishing  the application of the manifestation requirement to  

          8(f) requests  in cases where  an occupational disease  or injury

          does not appear until  after employment has  ceased.  One of  the

          principles   of  statutory  interpretation  is  that  a  "settled

          construction  of an  important  federal  statute  should  not  be

          disturbed unless and until Congress  so decides."  Reves v. Ernst
                                                             _____    _____

          & Young,  494 U.S.  56, 74 (1990)(Stevens,  J., concurring).   We
          _______

          recognize  that "considerations of stare decisis weigh heavily in
                                             _____ _______

          the area  of statutory  construction, where  Congress is free  to

          change   [the  courts']   interpretation  of   its  legislation."

          Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736 (1977).  
          __________________    ________

                    Although the  Amendments added  a provision  permitting

          such  claims "if  filed within  two years  after the  employee or

          claimant becomes aware, or . .  . should have been aware, of  the

          relationship between the employment" and the disease, 98 Stat. at

          1649 (codified at  33 U.S.C.A.   913(b)(2)), we  can find nothing

          in the  text of the  Amendments, nor its legislative  history, to

          suggest that Congress  intended to alter  the application of  the

          manifestation requirement to requests for   8(f) relief.  

                    The Harris  court seized upon,  and BIW directs  us to,
                        ______

          language in a  House Report as  a basis for  its argument that   

          8(f)  applies to a  pre-existing disability not  manifested until

          after the employee has stopped working.  Harris, 934 F.2d at 552.
                                                   ______

                                         -19-
                                          19

          As  part of  the introductory  summary  of the  bill, the  Report

          stated that the  Amendments were "intended to reduce  the cost of

          Longshore  coverage for employers in  the covered industries in a

          manner which will disturb, to  the most limited extent  possible,

          the rights and benefits which  the Longshore Act provides."  H.R.

          Rep.  No.  98-570, at  3 (1983),  reprinted in  1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
                                            ____________

          2734, 2736.  Thus,  the Harris court deduced that an expansion of
                                  ______

          an  individual's right  to file  a claim  should be  coupled with

          corresponding relief  for the employer.   934 F.2d  at 552.   But

          review  of  the   entirety  of  that  House   Report,  and  other

          legislative documents,  demonstrates  that  the  quoted  language

          cannot support the weight ascribed to it.

                    First, there  is compelling evidence  that Congress was

          well  aware   of,  and  in  fact  endorsed,  application  of  the

          manifestation  requirement  to    8(f)  cases.   A  Senate Report

          states  that "[a]n employer able to demonstraate [sic] actual or,
                                                                 ______

          in some cases, constructive knowledge  that an injured worker had
                         ______________________

          a  permanent disability which  pre-dated a compensable  injury is

          often able  to shift to  the Special Fund the  responsibility for

          paying a very  substantial portion of the amounts  payable to the

          worker."  S.  Rep. No. 97-498, at 35  (1982)(emphases added); see
                                                                        ___

          also  S. Rep.  No.  98-81, at  34  (1983)(same).   We think  this
          ____

          language is  most reasonably read  as referring to the  manner in

          which courts of appeals had analyzed disputes concerning   8(f) -

          - by requiring a showing of actual or constructive knowledge with

          evidence of  "manifestation."   Similarly, the  House and  Senate

                                         -20-
                                          20

          Reports on  the 1984  bill expressly  recognized that  "[s]ection

          8(f) of the  Act was designed to encourage employers  to hire and

          retain  disabled workers by  distributing much of  the additional

          cost of industrial injury attributable  to pre-existing permanent

          disabilities  among all  employers and  carriers  subject to  the

          Act."  S. Rep.  No. 97-498, at  34-35; S. Rep.  No. 98-81, at  34

          (same  language).  Thus  "[t]he goals of  Section 8(f) remain[ed]

          valid," S.Rep.97-498, at35, aspartand parcelofthe 1984Amendments.

                    Ultimately  fatal   to  BIW's   position  is   evidence

          concerning  how Congress  conceptualized  its amendment  allowing

          claims  for  long-latent  occupational  diseases.   Consider  the

          following language from the House Report:

                    The first  change to the  body which  results
                    from exposure to a  harmful physical agent or
                    a  toxic substance  often  is not  disabling.
                    Since  it  is  the  disability  which  should
                    trigger the compensation claim, the Committee
                    notes that unlike  traumatic occurrences, the
                                                              ___
                    period of  time between the 'injury'  and the
                    _____________________________________________
                    arising  of a  compensation  claim in  such a
                    __________________________________
                    long-latency occupational disease case may be
                    so long as  to make the requirement  that the
                    employee  file  a  Notice  of  Injury  within
                    thirty days  of the 'injury' nonsensical. . .
                    .

                      To the same effect, triggering the  statute
                    of limitations for the filing of compensation
                    claims on the  date of 'injury'  makes little
                    sense  in  the  context  of  an  occupational
                               __________________________________
                    disease in  which the disabling  condition or
                    _____________________________________________
                    the death does not follow immediately  on the
                    _____________________________________________
                    "injury."
                    ________

          H.R. Rep. No. 98-570, at 10-11 (emphases added).  

                    What  is  important  here  is  that  in  crafting  this

          particular  amendment concerning  occupational disease,  Congress

                                         -21-
                                          21

          conceptualized the "injury" as occurring  at the time of exposure

          to the  causative agent, which  would necessarily  have to  occur

          during  employment.   At  the  very least,  this  Report language

          precludes   the   argument  that   Congress   was   removing  the

          manifestation  requirement  in  instances  involving  these   new

          occupational  disease claims.  Because the "injury" was conceived

          as occurring  during  employment,    8(f)  retained  its  regular

          meaning   --  applying  when  "an  employee  having  an  existing

          permanent  partial  disability  suffers injury."  33  U.S.C.A.   

          8(f)(1). 

                    This  Report  language  is  affirmed   by  the  amended

          statutory language itself; and we  must read statutes as a whole,

          rather than focus  on isolated phrases.  Conroy  v. Aniskoff, 507
                                                   ______     ________

          U.S.  511, 515  (1993).    As part  of  the occupational  disease

          amendment, there also had to be a determination made as to how to

          calculate the amount of compensation paid in such cases.  Because

          the  existing   formula  generally  calculated   compensation  in

          reference  to "the average weekly  wage . . .  at the time of the

          injury," 33  U.S.C.A.    910, there was  concern that  very long-

          latent  diseases would  leave  disabled  retirees  in  an  unfair

          economic situation because  wages increased over time,  H.R. Rep.

          No. 98-570,  at 11-12.   It was  therefore decided  that in  such

          instances, "the time  of injury shall be deemed to be the date on
                                                   ______

          which  the  employee  becomes aware,  or  . . . should  have been

          aware, of the  relationship between the employment,  the disease,

          and the death or disability."   98 Stat. at 1647-48 (codified  at

                                         -22-
                                          22

          33 U.S.C.A.   910(i))(emphasis added).  Thus, by establishing the

          time of  injury at a  time closer to  the onset of  the disabling

          symptoms for  purposes of  wage calculation,  Congress implicitly

          recognized  that the injury-in-fact to the physical body occurred

          during  the occupational exposure,  but did not  become disabling

          until later.   Although the 1984  Amendments were most  certainly

          designed  in part  to "reduce  the  cost of  . .  .  coverage for

          employers in  the covered industries,"   H.R. Rep. 98-570,  at 3,

          quoted in Harris, 934 F.2d at 552,  they did so in a multitude of
          _________ ______

          ways.10  Providing   8(f) relief to employers under facts such as

          these was simply not one of them. 

                    We point out additional authority for our ruling.  Just

          after  the 1984 Amendments,  the Department of  Labor amended the

          regulations  interpreting the  LHWCA to  include,  for the  first

          time, the manifestation  requirement.  50  Fed. Reg. 401  (1985),

          amended, 51  Fed.  Reg.  4285  (1986)(codified  at  20  C.F.R.   

          702.321(a) (1)(1997)).   Thus, if  we found that  the legislative

          history provided guidance less clear  than it does, we would have

          little  trouble  deferring  to the  Department's  interpretation,

          given our finding -- in Part III, supra -- that the manifestation
                                            _____

          requirement  "is based  on  a  permissible  construction  of  the

          statute."    Chevron  U.S.A. Inc.  v.  Natural  Resources Defense
                       ____________________      __________________________

          Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
          _____________

                              
          ____________________

          10.   For example, the  definition of "employee" was  modified to
          exclude  clerical workers and others  whose "work does not expose
          them to traditional maritime hazards."   H.R. Rep. No. 98-570, at
          3; see 98 Stat. at 1639.  
             ___

                                         -23-
                                          23

                    The argument has also been made that, in instances such

          as  these, the manifestation requirement serves no useful purpose

          because  there is  no  potential  for  discrimination  where  the

          employee  has  already  retired.     It  is  not,  however,   the

          manifestation   requirement  that   has  an   anti-discrimination

          purpose, but   8(f) which has such a purpose.  The requirement is

          only  a  judicially created  tool,  developed  in  order to  help

          determine when  the purpose of    8(f) is  being served.   As our

          analysis demonstrates,    8(f) was designed  for a very  specific

          reason  --  to  remove the  discriminatory  incentive  created by

          holding   the  last  employer  liable  for   the  results  of  an

          aggravating  injury.  The  manifestation requirement ensures that

          requests for    8(f) relief  remain within the intended  scope of

          the Section.   The requirement  is not an additional  hurdle, but

          rather an  integral part  of    8(f).   We are  therefore not  at

          liberty to either  apply or discard the requirement  as different

          facts are presented,  especially in the absence  of congressional

          directive.  

                    We do not think it  is either unreasonable or unfair to

          preclude access  by the  employer to the  Special Fund  under the

          facts of this  case.   There can  be little doubt  that Reno  was

          exposed to asbestos during his working career at BIW, and BIW has

          not  contested  that  Reno's  exposure  to  asbestos  during  his

          employment  at  BIW caused  his asbestosis.   They  are therefore

          properly  liable for  the results  of  this work-related  injury.

                                         -24-
                                          24

          Because they have not met their burden of establishing a right to

            8(f) relief, the decision of the Board is affirmed.  
                                                      affirmed.
                                                      _________

                                         -25-
                                          25