Court Opinion

ID: 9703044
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:38:08.071289+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:43.772101
License: Public Domain

*387STEIN, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
This appeal as of right based on the dissent below, see Rule 2:2-1(a)(2), is limited to the validity of two amendments to the Manalapan Zoning Ordinance adopted in July 1991. Specifically, Judge Wefing’s dissent disagreed with the Appellate Division’s holding that the amendments were not arbitrary and capricious and were not substantially inconsistent with Manalapan’s Master Plan. 272 N.J.Super. 1, 19-21, 639 A.2d 318 (App.Div.1994) (Wefing, J., dissenting). Although the Court’s opinion acknowledges that Manalapan has subsequently adopted a new zoning ordinance that affects the substance of the two amendments implicated in this appeal, ante at 386, 658 A.2d at 1241, the Court does not address adequately the likelihood that the issues before us are partially or entirely moot.
I write separately to express my concern about the appropriateness of the Court’s determination to decide and uphold in their entirety the validity of amendments to the Township of Manalapan’s (Township) zoning ordinance that have since been superseded. Those amendments no longer will control the application by Home Depot USA, Inc. (Home Depot) to erect a home improvement center in the Township’s C-l regional commercial shopping-center district, which is what provoked this litigation in the first place. Indeed, as the Court’s opinion observes, ante at 386, 658 A.2d at 1241, the most recent amendments to the Township’s zoning ordinance, which under the time-of-decision rule, Lizak v. Faria, 96 N.J. 482, 495, 476 A.2d 1189 (1984), will determine the outcome of Home Depot’s application, not only address the issue of arbitrariness and overbreadth that divided the Appellate Division panel, but also appear specifically to authorize Home Depot’s proposed use in a zoning district other than the C-l district. In other respects the most recent ordinance is more restrictive. Specifically, the Ordinance’s Schedule of Permitted Uses prohibits the operation of forklifts to load customer vehicles by any retail store in the C-l zone, Manalapan Development Regulations, at 5-*38839 (Dec. 14, 1994), a provision that may directly affect the proposed Home Depot store.
We have often emphasized that the doctrine of mootness does not deprive the Court of the jurisdiction or obligation to decide issues that substantially affect the public interest. See Busik v. Levine, 63 N.J. 351, 363-64, 307 A.2d 571 (1973). To the extent that this appeal encompasses such an issue, it might be framed as the extent of a municipality’s zoning power to exclude from a general-retail zoning district uses such as a Home Depot that engage in a “warehouse format of selling,” a merchandising format significantly different from the operational methods used by conventional retail establishments. Cf. Lusardi v. Curtis Point Property Owners Ass’n, 86 N.J. 217, 227, 430 A.2d 881 (1981) (“Ordinarily municipal officials have wide discretion in determining what uses are suitable for each district, and they need not provide for a particular use in a specified vicinity or for every appropriate use within the borders of the municipality.”) In my view, however, the public-interest exception to the general rule requiring dismissal of moot appeals does not justify the Court’s decision to consider and uphold the validity of the superseded amendments to the Manalapan zoning ordinance, an issue that not only is debatable but is no longer determinative of Home Depot’s application.
I
That this appeal is moot can be demonstrated by reference to the underlying facts and procedural history. In October 1990, Manalapan Realty, L.P. (Realty) applied to the Township’s Planning Board for approval of a site plan contemplating a substantial expansion of its existing shopping mall located in Manalapan’s C-l regional-commercial shopping-center district. The expanded mall was to include a number of anchor stores, one of which was to be a home-improvement center operated by Home Depot. Although “[rjetail stores, shops and markets” were then among the permitted uses in the C-l district, opponents of Home Depot’s inclusion in the plan contended that that proposed use was a “warehouse” *389rather than a retail store. Prompted by strong public opposition to the Home Depot proposal, the Township adopted two amendments to the zoning ordinance in July 1991. One amendment excluded from the definition of “[rjetail stores” in the C-l zone any “establishment engaged in the sale of lumber or building materials or storing, displaying, or selling materials outside a completely enclosed building.” Manalapan Code § 130-94. The other amendment defined the term “building materials” as
[m]aterials that can be arranged, united or joined to construct a building or structure. Such materials include, but are not limited to, rough or dressed lumber, millwork, roofing, shingles, wallboard, molding, plywood, sheetrock, bricks, doors, windows, paneling, concrete block, tiles, cabinets, or plumbing fixtures.
[Manalapan Code § 130-52.]
Prior to their adoption, the Township Planning Board determined that the amendments were substantially consistent with the Township’s Master Plan, which had been adopted shortly before enactment of the amendments.
Because the amendments effectively prohibited the proposed Home Depot use in the C-l zone, Realty deleted the Home Depot store from its site plan, which was then preliminarily approved by the Planning Board in September 1991. Simultaneously, Realty filed suit challenging the validity of the two amendments to the zoning ordinance, and shortly thereafter filed a second suit challenging the Planning Board’s failure to resolve whether Home Depot was a permitted use in the C-l district prior to enactment of the two amendments. The Law Division consolidated the two actions. After a trial, the Law Division invalidated both amendments on the ground that they were arbitrary and capricious, and also determined that Home Depot was a permitted use in the C-l district under the ordinance in effect prior to the amendments.
As the Court’s opinion explains, ante at 376-377, 658 A.2d at 1235-1236, the Township and Planning Board appealed to the Appellate Division in November 1992 from the Law Division’s judgment entered October 16, 1992. (Cross-appeals concerning counsel fees were filed by Realty and Home Depot.) While the appeals were pending in the Appellate Division, the Planning *390Board in December 1993 denied Realty’s final site-plan-approval application that included the proposed Home Depot store. No stay of the trial court’s judgment having been obtained, Realty and Home Depot applied to the Law Division, purportedly pursuant to Rule 1:10-3, for relief in aid of litigant’s rights. On February 18, 1994, the Law Division issued a written opinion in which it determined that the Planning Board’s denial of site-plan approval was inconsistent with its judgment invalidating the two amendments to the Manalapan zoning ordinance. The Law Division ordered that Realty’s application for final site-plan approval, including the Home Depot store, be approved. The effective date of the Law Division’s order was March 16, 1994, see R. 4:47, two days after the date of the Appellate Division’s judgment reversing the Law Division and upholding the validity of the two amendments.
The Court questions, but does not decide, whether the Law Division had jurisdiction to enter the order of March 16, 1994. Ante at 376-77, 658 A.2d at 1236. If the Law Division’s order were to constitute a valid exercise of that court’s jurisdiction, this appeal would not be moot; a decision by this Court reversing the Appellate Division would in that circumstance have the effect of reinstating the Law Division’s order granting final site-plan approval, which would have protected the applicant from zoning-ordinance amendments for two years from the effective date of site-plan approval. N.J.S.A. 40:55D-52.
Rule 2:9-l(a) controls proceedings on appeal prior to their disposition and provides:
Except as otherwise provided by R. 2:9-3, 2:9-4 (bail), 2:9-5 (stay pending appeal), 2:9-7 and 3:21-10(d), the supervision and control of the proceedings on appeal or certification shall be in the appellate court from the time the appeal is taken or the notice of petition for certification filed. The trial court, however, shall have continuing jurisdiction to enforce judgments and orders pursuant to R. 1:10 and as otherwise provided. The appellate court may at any time entertain a motion for directions to the court or courts or agencies below or to modify or vacate any order made by such courts or agencies or by any judge below.
Accordingly, “[ejxeept to the extent of enforcement and except as otherwise expressly provided for by rule, the ordinary effect of the filing of the notice of appeal is to deprive the court below of *391jurisdiction to act further in the matter under appeal unless directed to do so by the appellate court.” Pressler, Current N.J. Court Rules, comment 1 on R. 2:9-1(a) (1995). The obvious purpose of the Rules is to protect the subject matter of the appeal from adverse action by any inferior court until the appeal has been decided. Although limited by subsequent decisions, the Court of Errors and Appeals opinion in Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. National Docks & New Jersey Junction Connecting Railway Co., 54 N.J.Eq. 647, 35 A. 433 (1896), set forth the basic principle:
The entire purpose and object of the appeal is to preserve such rights and property from the ill effects of the decision that is challenged. * * * In fine, the very essence of the remedy by appeal is to prevent, for the time being, the appellant from this execution of the existing decree 11 * *. A decree cannot be used detrimentally to the appellant, pending appeal, for the plain reason that such a use will, for every practical purpose, defeat the appellate procedure.
[Id. at 653, 35 A. 433.]
Ashby v. Yetter, 78 N.J. Eq. 173, 78 A. 799 (Ch. 1911), which acknowledged that the National Docks holding had been qualified by later cases, id. at 176-83, 78 A. 799, nevertheless reaffirmed that no order could be entered by a lower court pending appeal “that would destroy or impair the subject of the appeal.” Id. at 188, 78 A. 799. The more recent decisions appear to approve of or be consistent with the Ashby court’s formulation. See, e.g., In re Plainfield-Union Water Co., 14 N.J. 296, 302, 102 A.2d 1 (1954); Rolnick v. Rolnick, 262 N.J.Super. 343, 365-67, 621 A.2d 37 (App.Div.1993); Carlucci v. Carlucci, 265 N.J.Super. 333, 335-43, 626 A.2d 1124 (Ch.Div.1993); Morrison v. Morrison, 93 N.J.Super. 96, 100-04, 225 A.2d 19 (Ch.Div.1966); see also North Bergen Action Group v. North Bergen Township Planning Bd., 122 N.J. 567, 574, 585 A.2d 939 (1991) (observing that where appellant appealed to Appellate Division from Law Division holding that Planning Board lacked authority to grant height variances and simultaneously applied to Board of Adjustment for same height variances, Appellate Division possessed inherent authority to restrain Board of Adjustment proceeding).
The Law Division unquestionably lacked jurisdiction to issue an order granting final site-plan approval to a plan that included the *392Home Depot store because the validity of that order depended on the correctness of the Law Division’s prior ruling invalidating the two amendments to the Manalapan zoning ordinance, the very issue that was pending on appeal before the Appellate Division. The Law Division’s order granting site-plan approval, if it were valid when issued, would significantly have “impair[ed] the subject [matter] of the appeal,” Ashby, supra, 78 N.J.Eq. at 188, 78 A. 799, not only because it would have substantially advanced the approval process but because it would have protected Realty against future zoning amendments. N.J.S.A 40:55D-52.
Nor did the provision in Rule 2:9 — 1(a) granting to a trial court “continuing jurisdiction to enforce judgments and orders pursuant to R. 1:10 and as otherwise provided” authorize the Law Division to enter an order granting site-plan approval while the appeal was pending. Rule 1:10 is entitled “Contempt of Court and Enforcement of Litigants’ Rights Related Thereto,” and Rule 1:10-3 provides: “Notwithstanding that an act or omission may also constitute a contempt of court, a litigant in any action may seek relief by application in the action.” Although the Law Division characterized Realty’s application as “a motion to enforce litigant’s rights,” that characterization plainly was erroneous. The motion to enforce litigant’s rights described in Rule 1:10-3 is addressed to a court’s “inherent right to invoke coercive measures designed to compel a recalcitrant party to comply with a court order.” S.S. v. E.S., 243 N.J.Super. 1, 8, 578 A.2d 381 (App.Div.1990). A proceeding to enforce litigant’s rights “is essentially a civil proceeding to coerce the defendant into compliance with the court’s order for the benefit of the private litigant. In such proceeding the judge, before ordering any sanction, must determine that defendant has the ability to comply with the order [that] he has violated * * Essex County Welfare Bd. v. Perkins, 133 N.J.Super. 189, 195, 336 A.2d 16 (App.Div.1975).
The Law Division’s purported exercise of its power pending appeal to grant relief in aid of litigant’s rights pursuant to Rule 1:10-3 was manifestly inappropriate. Neither the Township nor *393its Planning Board failed to comply with the court’s prior order. That order simply declared invalid the two zoning amendments, and further declared that Home Depot was a permitted use under the prior ordinance. The validity of that order was the issue pending on appeal before the Appellate Division. Having filed a notice of appeal from the Law Division’s order, the Planning Board could not properly have granted site-plan approval to Home Depot without directly interfering with the subject of its own appeal. The Law Division’s attempted exercise of its Rule 1:10-3 power to compel the grant of site-plan approval was a nullity because the pendency of the appeal divested the Law Division of jurisdiction to take any action inconsistent with preserving the issues on appeal.
II
The Court appears to acknowledge that based on the time-of-decision rule, Lizak, supra, 96 N.J. at 495, 476 A.2d 1189, the zoning ordinance amendments adopted by the Township in December 1994, rather than the amendments upheld by the Appellate Division, will determine the eventual outcome of Home Depot’s application. Ante at 386, 658 A.2d at 1241. The validity of the most recent amendments is not before us, but their substantive content constitutes an added reason why the Court should exercise caution in its evaluation of the validity of the two original amendments.
The first of the original amendments redefined the permitted uses in the C-l zone to exclude “establishment[s] engaged in the sale of lumber or building materials or storing, displaying, or selling materials outside a completely enclosed building.” Manalapan Code § 130.94. The Court now holds that amendment is substantially consistent with Manaiapan’s Master Plan, adopting the Appellate Division’s conclusion that “[tjhere is no inconsistency between this designation [of the C-1 zone as a regional shopping-center district] and the exclusion of retail stores [that] sell lumber or other building materials.” Ante at 386, 658 A.2d at 1240 (quoting 272 N.J.Super. at 13, 639 A.2d 318). I agree with *394the Court’s reasoning on that specific issue. Arguably, the Court’s disposition of the issue of consistency with the Master Plan would be relevant as well to Manalapan’s latest zoning ordinance, which retains the same exclusion in the description of permitted uses in the C-l zone. However, as noted, the latest ordinance also' prohibits the use of forklifts to load customer vehicles in the C-1 zone, permits the sale of lumber and building materials in the Limited Business-Millhurst District, and permits lumberyards to be located in the C-3 district. Manalapan Development Regulations, supra, at 5-39, 5-25, 5-40. Accordingly, that the question of the most recent ordinance’s consistency with the Master Plan may pose questions different in context from the one resolved by the Court is not unlikely. For example, the question posed by the latest amendments might encompass whether permitting the sale of building materials in the Limited BusinessMillhurst District — described in the Master Plan as “a place of early settlement in Manalapan * * * [that] contains some landmark buildings and lies between the rural and corridor areas of the township” — is reconcilable and consistent with the Township’s Master Plan.
The second of the original amendments prohibited the sale of “building materials” in the C-l zone, defined to include not only typical structural materials such as lumber, roofing, sheetrock, bricks and concrete block but “tiles, cabinets, or plumbing fixtures.” The Appellate Division majority, expressing concern that the inclusion of tiles, cabinets, and plumbing fixtures rendered the ordinance overbroad, remanded the matter to the trial court to take testimony on that issue. 272 N.J.Super. at 14-15, 639 A.2d 318. The dissenting member, observing that the ordinance would prohibit (or render non-conforming) in the C-l zone even a small store selling ceramic tile or kitchen cabinets, opposed the remand, noting with approval the trial court’s conclusion that “there was no rational relationship between the ordinance amendments and the alleged evils sought to be addressed.” Id. at 20, 639 A.2d 318. Addressing the Township’s concerns over truck traffic and safety hazards, Judge Wefing observed that those serious concerns were
*395not addressed, however, by an ordinance which bans the sale of faucets or tiles. If the Township wishes to address and alleviate those concerns, it should do so by an ordinance which focuses upon those problems, rather than an outright ban of the sale of certain prescribed goods in the area it has denominated as appropriate for regional commercial shopping centers.
[Id. at 20-21, 639 A.2d 318.]
The December 1994 amendments, however, redefine building materials to eliminate any reference to “tiles, cabinets, or plumbing fixtures,” the very items in the original amended ordinance that prompted the Appellate Division majority to order a remand and persuaded the dissenting member that the ordinance was arbitrary. Without expressing any view on the validity of the original amendments to the Manalapan zoning ordinance, I note that perhaps their most vulnerable aspect has been addressed by the Township’s latest amendments. Our zoning cases have consistently required a substantial connection between a municipality’s zoning objectives and the means chosen to achieve them. “The restrictions placed on the land use must be justified by the legitimate purpose sought to be accomplished and the means used to attain that purpose must be reasonably related to accomplishing it.” McNeill v. Township of Plumsted, 215 N.J.Super. 582, 537, 522 A.2d 469 (App.Div.1987). Although the “goal sought to be furthered by that provision is entirely legitimate, the means chosen [must] bear a substantial relationship to the effectuation of that goal.” State v. Baker, 81 N.J. 99, 103, 405 A.2d 368 (1979). “Although some arbitrariness in line-drawing may be countenanced when necessary to achieve a legitimate goal, it is not to be tolerated where, as here, more precise methods of reaching the desired end are available.” Id. at 107 n. 1, 405 A.2d 368. We considered an analogous issue in Baker, supra, involving a local zoning ordinance that sought to preserve the “family” character of a neighborhood by prohibiting more than four unrelated persons from sharing a single housing unit. In invalidating the ordinance on the ground that the ordinance did not bear a sufficient relationship to the zoning purpose, we observed:
The fatal flaw in attempting to maintain a stable residential neighborhood through the use of criteria based upon biological or legal relationships is that such *396classifications operate to prohibit a plethora of uses which pose no threat to the accomplishment of the end sought to be achieved. Moreover, such a-classification system legitimizes many uses which defeat that goal. Plainfield’s ordinance, for example, would prohibit a group of five unrelated “widows, widowers, older spinsters or bachelors — or even of judges” from residing in a single unit within the municipality. On the other hand, a group consisting of 10 distant cousins could so reside without violating the ordinance. Thus the ordinance distinguishes between acceptable and prohibited uses on grounds which may, in many cases, have no rational relationship to the problem sought to be ameliorated.
[Id. at 107, 405 A.2d 368 (citation and footnote omitted).]
The dissenting member in the Appellate Division advanced a similar objection to the original amendments in observing that the Township, in an effort to exclude Home Depot from the C-1 zone, had also prohibited or rendered non-conforming uses that were entirely appropriate in that zone. 272 N.J.Super. at 19-20, 689 A.2d 318 (Wefing, J., dissenting). That Manalapan has addressed that specific problem by narrowing the definition of building materials in its latest zoning amendments suggests that the Court would be well advised to resist the temptation to resolve the validity of the original amendments.
I would dismiss the appeal as moot.
For affirmance — Chief Justice WILENTZ and Justices HANDLER, POLLOCK, O’HERN, GARIBALDI and COLEMAN — 6.
Concurring in part; dissenting in part — Justice STEIN — 1.