Court Opinion

ID: 9481809
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 08:32:27.95759+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:48:35.403255
License: Public Domain

JERRE S. WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge,
with whom POLITZ, Circuit Judge, joins, concurring:
As the author of the panel opinion at issue, I explain my concurrence with the holding in this en banc decision. The concurrence is occasioned by the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Coleman v. Thompson, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991). At the time of the oral argument before the en banc court in this case, Coleman v. Thompson had not been decided.
The Coleman case, as the en banc opinion shows, held in accordance with the analysis of the en banc opinion that the “clearly and expressly states” requirement of Hams v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 109 S.Ct. 1038, 103 L.Ed.2d 308 (1989), needs to be met only in those cases in which the state court relies upon a state procedural bar in the face of an overt consideration by that court of the application of federal law to the question at issue. The Court’s divided decision in Coleman constituted a change in the law, as the Court admitted in its opinion. The panel majority in our second Young decision had held otherwise. Young v. Herring, 917 F.2d 858 (5th Cir.1990). This recent change now leads to the concurrence of the judges who were the panel majority in the decision of the en banc court.
It is not useful to spin an intricate web of the Supreme Court case authority which precedes the conclusion it reached in Coleman. I endeavor only with brevity to state the key developments.
The seminal case in developing the law was Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 83 S.Ct. 822, 9 L.Ed.2d 837 (1963). Fay v. Noia held a procedural default in state court did not bar federal habeas review unless the petitioner deliberately bypassed state procedures by intentionally foregoing an opportunity for state review. This conclusion resulted in a strong presumption in favor of federal habeas review against state procedural bars.
Since Fay v. Noia, the Supreme Court in a number of cases gradually whittled down the broad sweep of Fay. The Court did it largely through the development and application of the “cause and prejudice” standard. Thus, to avoid the impact of the state procedural bar, the petitioner had to prove “cause” as to why the procedural requirements had not been met and “prejudice” as a result of their not having been met. The leading case was Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977).
In Young’s case there was never any doubt when the case came to the Court for the second time that the cause and prejudice requirement had not been met. We had so held in the first Young v. Herring decision, 777 F.2d 198 (5th Cir.1985). Both of the judges who made up the majority in the second Young decision also had been on the panel in the first Young decision. We agreed in the first Young decision that the cause and prejudice standard had not been met. Thus, a procedural bar existed if the state court had relied upon it.
But between the time of the decision of the district court on remand and the second appeal of the Young case to this Court, the Supreme Court decided Harris v. Reed. Instead of a further weakening of the federal habeas power in cases involving state procedural default, Harris tightened the *555requirement of state reliance on a procedural default by establishing the clear and express statement requirement. Admittedly, there is language in the Harris opinion which can be interpreted to support the position of the en banc opinion, but there is also language which supports the position of the panel — language in which the Court did not condition the requirement on overt consideration of the federal law. Thus, the Court said, “a procedural default does not bar consideration of a federal claim on either direct or habeas review unless the last state court rendering a judgment in the case ‘clearly and expressly’ states that its judgment rests on state procedural bar.” Hams, 489 U.S. at 263, 109 S.Ct. at 1043. Further, the Court said: “Requiring a state court to be explicit in its reliance on a procedural default does not interfere unduly with state judicial decision making.” 489 U.S. at 264, 109 S.Ct. at 1044.
In the Young case, there was no clear and express statement. In my view the panel properly read the clear and express statement requirement as not relevant to the cause and prejudice standard. The cause and prejudice inquiry tests the existence of a valid state procedural bar upon which the court can rely. But the second requirement of a clear and express statement was to insure that the court did actually rely solely upon the state procedural bar in spite of looming and significant federal questions. The panel, thus, saw Harris as returning at least a short step toward the Fay v. Noia willingness more broadly to air serious federal constitutional issues in spite of state assertions of procedural default.
But the decision in Coleman goes the other way. It holds that the state court must have overtly intertwined consideration of the federal issue with its state procedural bar before the clear and express statement of reliance upon the procedural bar is required. Of course, I must accept the effectual overruling of Fay v. Noia. I must accept the Coleman conclusion that the clear and express statement requirement is to be applied narrowly — only in those eases where the state court considers both the procedural bar and explicitly the federal constitutional issue on the merits. The fact that the court is fully aware of the presence of the federal constitutional issue is not enough even though the court does not “clearly and expressly” rely upon the procedural bar. This is now the rule.
But, I do not accept the statement in the opinion for the Court in Coleman which concludes that a distinction between Fay v. Noia and the later cases requiring the cause and prejudice standard is “irrational.” The dissenting justices of the Supreme Court certainly saw the distinction as rational. As I show above, the distinction has sound justification. It is directed at different issues. The existence of the procedural bar is not enough, and “cause and prejudice” is directed solely at that issue. The state court must also have relied upon the bar, and it is this necessary inquiry that led to the clear and express statement holding in Harris v. Reed.
In any event, the law is now settled (again), at least for the time being, and, joined by my brother, Politz, I now concur in the decision of the en banc court.
Before POLITZ, KING, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.
ON REMAND FROM EN BANC COURT
KING, Circuit Judge:
Yet once again we consider Jerry Lynn Young’s (Young’s) appeal from the district court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus. In our en banc opinion in Young v. Herring, 938 F.2d 543 (5th Cir.1991), we remanded to the panel to consider certain of Young’s claims on appeal that, because of the original panel’s disposition of the case, we had not addressed. Finding no merit to those claims, we affirm the district court’s denial of Young’s habeas petition.
I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURE
A Mississippi court convicted Young of the robbery of the Bank of Mississippi in Tupelo, Mississippi, and the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed that conviction. *556Young subsequently filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi. In his petition, Young alleged, inter alia, that his conviction had been based upon an impermissibly suggestive photographic array. Young moved for summary judgment on his habeas petition, and the district court referred the petition to a magistrate.1
The magistrate found that the identification procedure had been impermissibly suggestive and recommended granting the writ. The magistrate did not reach any other claims in Young’s motion for summary judgment (which did not include all of the claims in Young’s petition). The district court adopted the magistrate’s report, granted the writ, and the state appealed. On appeal, a panel of this court reversed, reasoning that the Mississippi Supreme Court based its rejection of Young’s identification claim on an adequate and independent state procedural bar. The panel remanded, however, for the district court to consider the other claims in Young’s petition. Young v. Herring, 777 F.2d 198 (5th Cir.1985) (Young I).
On remand, the district court once again referred the petition to a magistrate, who recommended denying Young’s petition. The district court adopted the magistrate’s recommendation, denied the petition, and Young appealed. On appeal, Young argued, inter alia, that the law of the case doctrine did not prevent reconsideration of the identification issue because the Supreme Court’s decision in Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 109 S.Ct. 1038, 103 L.Ed.2d 308 (1989), amounted to an intervening change in the law. Young also argued that the trial judge’s ex parte communication with the jury during its deliberations caused him to be deprived of his right to be present at every critical stage of his trial, and that the district court should not have denied the other claims in his petition without an evidentiary hearing.
A second panel of this court agreed with Young that the Supreme Court's decision in Harris amounted to an intervening change in the law that allowed it to reconsider the identification issue. Young v. Herring, 917 F.2d 858 (5th Cir.1990) (Young II). Reaching the merits of that issue, the panel found that the pretrial identification procedure had been impermissibly suggestive and granted the writ, again without reaching any other claims in Young’s petition. The court granted rehearing en banc, thereby vacating the panel opinion. On rehearing, the en banc court concluded that the identification issue had been procedurally barred and remanded for the panel to consider Young’s other claims. We now find those claims to be without merit and affirm the district court’s denial of Young’s petition.2
II. ANALYSIS
A. Ex parte communication with the jury
During its deliberations, the jury sent a message to the trial judge advising him that they were unable to reach a verdict. The judge did not inform the parties of this message and responded by directing the bailiff to tell the jury to “continue your deliberations.” Young learned of this incident after the jury returned its verdict, and he moved for a new trial. At a hearing on Young’s motion, the parties stipulated to the facts without calling witnesses. Following argument, the trial judge denied Young’s motion, reasoning that Young had not been “prejudiced in any way by what occurred.” The judge observed that the “record shows that the jury didn’t ask for any instructions, didn’t ask what should they do, they just made a statement to the Court and the Court told the bailiff to repeat a statement made by the Court back *557to the jury and it was three words, ‘continue your deliberations.’”
On direct appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning:
We are of the opinion the instruction was neither a substantive instruction on a question of law nor indicative of a requirement that the jury must continue deliberating until a verdict was reached. We approved the admonition “Please continue your deliberations” in Sharplin v. State, 330 So.2d 591, 596 (Miss.1976), and we therefore think Young was not prejudiced by his absence at the time the instruction was given.
Young v. State, 420 So.2d 1055, 1058 (Miss.1982). In his habeas petition, Young argues that this ex parte exchange between the trial judge and the jury deprived him of his right to be present at critical stages of his trial. The magistrate rejected this claim, reasoning that the exchange did not prejudice Young and that any error that may have occurred did not rise to constitutional dimensions. We agree.
In Fillippon v. Albion Vein Slate Co., 250 U.S. 76, 81, 39 S.Ct. 435, 436, 63 L.Ed. 853 (1919), the Supreme Court found, based on the common law and the Court’s supervisory power over the lower federal courts, that “the orderly conduct of a trial by jury” requires that the defendant be present when the court gives supplementary instructions to the jury. See also Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35, 39, 95 S.Ct. 2091, 2094, 45 L.Ed.2d 1 (1975); United States v. Cowan, 819 F.2d 89, 94 (5th Cir.1987). Rule 43 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure now guarantees this right to criminal defendants in the federal courts. The sixth amendment’s confrontation clause and the due process clause of the fifth and fourteenth amendments also may guarantee this right. United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 526, 105 S.Ct. 1482, 1484, 84 L.Ed.2d 486 (1985). Rule 43, however, provides a broader right to be present than the right recognized under the Constitution. See id. at 526, 105 S.Ct. at 1484; United States v. Brown, 571 F.2d 980, 986 (6th Cir.1978) (“the right of presence stated in the Rule [43] is more far-reaching than the right of presence protected by the Constitution”).
A defendant’s constitutional right to be present derives, in essence, from the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment. Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 526, 105 S.Ct. at 1484. An ex parte communication with the jury, however, also may violate the defendant’s right to due process “in some situations where the defendant is not actually confronting witnesses or evidence against him.” Id. Such a communication amounts to a due process violation, however, only to “the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by [the defendant’s] absence, and to that extent only.”3 Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 526, 105 S.Ct. at 1484 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105-06, 54 S.Ct. 330, 332-33, 78 L.Ed. 674 (1934)). When not secured by a specific constitutional provision, the defendant has a constitutional right to be present only when his presence “bears, or may fairly be assumed to bear a relation, reasonably substantial, to his opportunity to defend.”4 Snyder, 291 U.S. at 106, 54 S.Ct. at 332. Because the ex parte instruction in the instant case does not implicate a specific constitutional provision, Young must demonstrate that, based on all the circumstances, the instruction prevented *558him from receiving a fair and just hearing.5 See Snyder, 291 U.S. at 116-17, 54 S.Ct. at 336 (the due process clause requires us to examine the particular conditions and results to determine whether the hearing was unfair).
In essence, Young argues that the hearing was unfair because, if he had been present when the judge gave the instruction, he would have requested the judge to admonish the jury not to surrender their honestly held convictions in order to reach a majority verdict. He correctly observes that the Mississippi Supreme Court approved of such a charge in Sharplin v. State, 330 So.2d 591, 596 (1976). The Mississippi Supreme Court, however, also approved the simple statement “Please continue your deliberations.”
We recognize that “[w]hen an ex parte communication relates to some aspect of the trial, the trial judge generally should disclose the communication to counsel for all parties.” Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 119, 104 S.Ct. 453, 456, 78 L.Ed.2d 267 (1983) (per curiam).6 If the court had followed this practice, however, it could have given precisely the instruction that it gave through the bailiff. In these circumstances, Young has not demonstrated that he failed to receive a fair and just hearing because of the ex parte contact.7
An instruction that coerces the jury to reach a unanimous verdict, however, may violate the defendant’s right to due process of law without regard to the defendant’s right to be present. See Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 237-41, 108 S.Ct. 546, 550-53, 98 L.Ed.2d 568 (1988). In the instant case, however, the state trial and appellate courts found that the judge’s ex parte statement did not require the jury to continue to deliberate until it reached a verdict.8 On habeas review, these state *559court findings must be presumed correct under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). In Rushen v. Spain, the Supreme Court held:
The substance ot ... ex parte communications and their effect on juror impartiality are questions of historical fact entitled to this presumption [of correctness under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)]. Thus, they must be determined, in the first instance, by state courts and deferred to, in the absence of “convincing evidence” to the contrary by the federal courts. See Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 431-32 [103 S.Ct. 843, 849, 74 L.Ed.2d 646] (1983).... This finding of “fact”—on a question the state courts [are] in a far better position than the federal courts to answer — deserves a “high measure of deference,” Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591, 598 [102 S.Ct. 1303, 1307, 71 L.Ed.2d 480] (1982), and may be set aside only if it “lack[s] even ‘fair support’ in the record.” Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S., at 432 [103 S.Ct. at 850].
Id., 464 U.S. at 120, 104 S.Ct. at 456. In other words, unless the state court finding lacks even fair support in the record, we must presume that the state court correctly determined the effect of an ex parte communication on the jury. Because no convincing evidence exists to the contrary, we conclude that we must defer to the findings of the state trial and appellate courts that the ex parte instruction in the instant case was not coercive.
B. Young’s right to a federal evidentiary hearing
Young contends that the district court erred by denying certain of his claims pertaining to prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel without conducting an evidentiary hearing. Young alleges that his attorney, the Chief of Police, the prosecutor, the trial judge, and others conspired to falsely convict him of the bank robbery in Tupelo, Mississippi. These allegations, if true, entitled him to relief, Young contends. Therefore, Young argues, the district court erred by denying his petition without granting him an evi-dentiary hearing at which he could attempt to prove these conspiracy allegations. See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 312, 83 S.Ct. 745, 756, 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963). Because Young fails to show that his allegations of a grand conspiracy to convict unjustly are other than frivolous or incredible, we conclude that he has not established his right to a federal evidentiary hearing.
1. Prosecutorial misconduct
Young contends that the prosecution violated his right to due process of law by suppressing material exculpatory evidence. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 91, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 1198-99, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). Young alleges, inter alia, that the prosecution failed to provide the photographs viewed by Barbara Hoard, the only witness who identified Young as the bank robber, after a pre-trial request by Young to inspect any photographs that were used by the police during their investigation. The magistrate, however, observed that the prosecution turned over the photographs before Young presented his case. Because Brady does not require pretrial disclosure, the magistrate concluded that Young had not been denied material exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady.
On appeal, Young argues that the magistrate noted and then ignored certain other alleged Brady violations, and that he was entitled to a federal evidentiary hearing at which he could attempt to prove these allegations. The Tupelo Chief of Police, Young alleges, suborned perjury by persuading Barbara Hoard to identify Young at trial. Furthermore, Young contends that the prosecution knew that Hoard’s testimony was false when it presented this evidence. Young argues that because he alleged specific facts that, if true, entitled him to relief, the federal district court erred by denying his petition without granting him an evidentiary hearing. See Townsend, 372 U.S. at 312, 83 S.Ct. at 756.
The petitioner bears the burden of establishing his right to a federal eviden-tiary hearing. Under Townsend, a federal habeas court has the power to conduct an evidentiary hearing if the petitioner’s “alie-*560gations, if proved, would establish the right to habeas relief.” Id. at 307, 83 S.Ct. at 754. The exercise of that power is mandatory, however, only “if the habeas applicant did not receive a full and fair eviden-tiary hearing in a state court,” and if the failure to obtain such a hearing did not result from the petitioner’s inexcusable neglect. See id. at 312-13, 317, 83 S.Ct. at 756-57, 759.
A petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing, however, if his claims are merely “conclusory allegations unsupported by specifics” or “contentions that in the face of the record are wholly incredible.” 9 Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 1629, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977). In Young’s habeas petition, he purports to know the details of private conversations that allegedly took place among the conspirators.10 Young offers no explanation for his knowledge of these conversations, however, and does not explain what evidence he has or hopes to produce at a federal evidentiary hearing in support of these allegations.11 Young makes specific allegations, but because Young alleges facts of which he could not have personal knowledge, and because he does not explain such uncanny knowledge, his specific allegations are nonetheless speculative and incredible.12 We conclude, therefore, that the district court did not abuse its discretion by deciding Young’s claim without an evidentiary hearing.
2. Ineffective assistance of counsel
Young also asserts that he should have a federal evidentiary hearing in order to prove his trial attorney’s involvement in the alleged conspiracy. Because of his trial attorney’s alleged involvement in that conspiracy, Young argues that he need not establish prejudice in order to prevail on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 1718, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980).
The magistrate rejected Young’s ineffective assistance claim based on the two prong test in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). In Strickland, the Supreme Court held that a petitioner must demonstrate: (1) that counsel’s performance fell so far below an objective standard of reasonable professional service “that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment,” and (2) that these errors were so prejudicial “as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Id. The magistrate concluded that Young failed to establish either the *561identifiable errors or prejudice prong of the Strickland test. Young, the magistrate reasoned, did not specify an “identifiable lapse in the performance of the attorney,” and also failed to show how he had been prejudiced by his attorney’s performance at trial.
On appeal, Young contends that the magistrate erred by applying the Strickland test. Young argues that his attorney’s participation in the conspiracy amounted to a conflict of interest, and that the magistrate therefore should have applied the standard of ineffective assistance of counsel applicable to conflict of interest cases. See Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 348, 100 S.Ct. at 1718.
In order to find a Sixth Amendment violation based on a conflict of interest, the reviewing court must find (1) that counsel actively represented conflicting interests, and (2) that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected the attorney’s performance. Id. at 348, 100 S.Ct. at 1718. Under Cuyler, the court must presume prejudice if the conflict of interest adversely affected the attorney’s performance. Id. Although Cuyler involved a conflict of interest between clients, the presumption of prejudice extends to a “conflict between a client and his lawyer’s personal interest.” Mannhalt v. Reed, 847 F.2d 576, 580 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 908, 109 S.Ct. 260, 102 L.Ed.2d 249 (1988). Because Young alleges numerous occasions during the trial of his case in which his counsel’s actions adversely affected his interests, Young argues that under the Cuyler standard that he alleged facts that, if true, entitled him to relief.13 He contends, therefore, that he should receive a federal evi-dentiary hearing on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim as well as his Brady claims. See Townsend, 372 U.S. at 312, 83 S.Ct. at 756.
We reject Young’s contention that he must receive a federal evidentiary hearing in order to prove his ineffective assistance of counsel claims for the same reasons that we rejected his similar contention that he must receive a federal evidentiary hearing in order to prove his prosecutorial misconduct claims. Young is not entitled to a federal evidentiary hearing on the basis of frivolous or incredible allegations. Because Young fails to suggest any basis for his conspiracy allegations, the district court did not abuse its discretion by deciding Young’s Brady and ineffective assistance claims without an evidentiary hearing.
C. Notice requirement
Young also contends that the district court’s summary denial of his Brady and ineffective assistance of counsel claims violated the notice requirements of Rules 12(b) and 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Young observes that he did not move for summary judgment on these claims and argues that the district judge should not have decided those issues without first giving him notice.
The notice requirements of Rules 12(b) and 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply to § 2254 cases only “to the extent that they are not inconsistent with [the rules governing § 2254 cases].” Rule 11 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases. The Rules Governing § 2254 cases specifically provides for summary dismissal “after the answer and the transcript and record of state court proceedings are filed.” Rule 8(a) of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases. At such time, “[i]f it appears that an evidentiary hearing is not required, the judge shall make such disposition of the petition as justice shall require.” Id.; see generally Advisory Committee Note to Rule 8 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases. Young’s petition was ripe for disposition, therefore, without regard to *562his motion for summary judgment, and the district court did not err by deciding those claims.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of Young’s habe-as petition.

. Young moved for summary judgment on his identification claim, and on claims that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support his conviction, and that the trial judge committed constitutional error by communicating ex parte with the jury during its deliberations. Young conceded that an evidentiary hearing would not be necessary on these specific issues.

. To the extent that Young may have appealed from the district court’s disposition of claims not otherwise addressed in this opinion, we find those claims also to be without merit.

. Unless an action violates a specific provision of the Constitution, the due process clause requires "only the most basic procedural safeguards.” Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 2327, 53 L.Ed.2d 281 (1977). Furthermore, only a trial fundamentally unfair in light of the entire proceedings results in a violation of the defendant’s general right to due process. Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 94 S.Ct. 1868, 40 L.Ed.2d 431 (1974).

. In Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 n. 15, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2533 n. 15, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975), the Supreme Court reasoned that the Constitution guarantees the "right to be present at all stages of the trial where [the defendant’s] absence might frustrate the fairness of the proceedings.” See also Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 526, 105 S.Ct. at 1484; United States v. Brown, 571 F.2d 980, 986 (6th Cir.1978).

. In United States v. Widgery, 778 F.2d 325 (7th Cir.1985), which was a direct appeal from a federal conviction, the jury foreman sent the judge two notes, one accusing another juror of intoxication, and the other asking what the jury was to do if it could not reach a verdict.
In response to the first note the judge told the bailiff to watch the juror in question closely; in response to the second he had the bailiff tell the foreman to "keep on trying.” Defense counsel did not learn about either note until the trial was over.
Id. at 327. Judge Easterbrook, writing for the Seventh Circuit, concluded that these ex parte communications did not violate the defendant’s right to counsel or right to a public trial. Because the ex parte communications did not violate a specific constitutional provision, and because the due process clause "does not require faultless adherence to rules that are not themselves part of the constitution,” the court concluded that no constitutional violation occurred. Id. at 330.

. As the Rushen Court observed, "undisclosed instructions from judge to jury violate non-constitutionally based rules of orderly trial procedure.” Rushen, 464 U.S. at 119 n. 4, 104 S.Ct. at 456 n. 4 (citing Shields v. United States, 273 U.S. 583, 588-89, 47 S.Ct. 478, 479, 71 L.Ed. 787 (1927); Fillippon, 250 U.S. at 81, 39 S.Ct. at 436) (emphasis added).

. Young argues, however, that a presumption of prejudice exists and that the state did not rebut this presumption. Young relies principally upon Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 74 S.Ct. 450, 98 L.Ed, 654 (1954). In Remmer, the Court stated:
In a criminal case, any private communication, contact, or tampering, directly or indirectly, with a juror during a trial about the matter pending before the jury is, for obvious reasons, deemed presumptively prejudicial, if not made in pursuance of known rules of the court and the instructions and directions of the court made during the trial, with full knowledge of the parties.
Id. at 229, 74 S.Ct. at 451. In Remmer, however, the Supreme Court was exercising its supervisory powers over the lower federal courts rather than ruling on the Constitution. Furthermore, as the Supreme Court clarified in Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 102 S.Ct. 940, 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982), the Remmer Court appears to have characterized the contact in Remmer as "presumptively prejudicial” out of deference to the seriousness of the contact — an attempted bribe of the juror and an FBI investigation of the juror prior to the return of the jury’s verdict.

.In the context of federal trials, we have acknowledged that the trial judge has broad discretion to determine whether an instruction to a jury to continue deliberating is coercive. See United States v. Gordon, 780 F.2d 1165, 1177 (5th Cir.1986) (no coercion when trial judge gave modified Allen charge after jury indicated several times it was deadlocked because trial judge has broad discretion to determine coercive effect). The trial judge observes the jury throughout the trial and is aware of the evidence presented and defenses asserted. He is, therefore, uniquely qualified to appraise the prejudicial effect of a communication on the jury. See United States v. Bagnariol, 665 F.2d 877 (9th Cir.1981).

. Young does not contend that he has newly discovered evidence of this conspiracy. We observe, however, that a federal district judge has no obligation "to grant a hearing upon a frivolous or incredible allegation of newly discovered evidence.” Townsend, 372 U.S. at 317, 83 S.Ct. at 759.

. Young could not have personal knowledge of the conspiracy, and he does not state what his basis for his allegations might be. We do not affirm the district court’s denial of an evidentia-ry hearing, however, merely because Young’s allegations appear improbable. Furthermore, we do not suggest that a habeas petitioner must prove the allegations in his habeas petition before receiving an evidentiary hearing on those allegations. Young, however, had the burden of presenting allegations that were not frivolous or incredible. He could not meet that burden without providing some reason for the district court to conclude that the allegations had a basis in fact.

. Young does make some allegations of which he could have personal knowledge. For example, Young contends that the Chief of Police of Tupelo disliked and harassed him, and he contends that his trial attorney promised him that he could obtain a postponement of his trial date and that his attorney did not defend on the basis that Young had been framed for the robbery. The allegations of which Young could have personal knowledge, even if accepted as true, fall far short of suggesting a massive conspiracy to obtain his unjust conviction.

. A district court need not ‘"blindly accept speculative and inconcrete claims' as the basis upon which to order a hearing.” Lavernia v. Lynaugh, 845 F.2d 493, 501 (5th Cir.1988) (quoting Baldwin v. Blackburn, 653 F.2d 942, 957 (5th Cir.1981)). Furthermore, a petitioner need not receive an evidentiary hearing if it would not develop material facts relevant to the constitutionality of his conviction. See Pennington v. Housewright, 666 F.2d 329, 332 (8th Cir.1981) ("A hearing can be denied if there is no indication that material facts would be developed at a hearing.") (citing Harris v. Tahash, 353 F.2d 119, 122 (8th Cir.1965)).

. Young contends, inter alia, that his trial counsel failed to obtain a continuance of the trial after assuring Young that he could do so, failed to prepare adequately for trial, failed properly to object to Hoard’s identification testimony, and failed to call certain witnesses. Young also contends that his trial counsel failed to object to improper bolstering testimony of one of the state’s witnesses, failed to allow Young to testify, failed to submit proper jury instructions, failed to raise certain issues that Young thought should have been raised in support of his motion for a new trial, and conducted an inadequate pretrial investigation.