Court Opinion

ID: 9445719
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 21:37:09.283817+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:30:23.464637
License: Public Domain

TUTTLE, Circuit Judge.
Upon a motion for rehearing of the judgment of this Court1 entered on February 27, 1957, one judge dissenting, this Court determined to consider such motion en banc on the briefs and record with additional briefs requested and supplied by the parties.
The original opinion sufficiently sets out the facts except as to those matters which will be added here.
We conclude that the dissenting opinion correctly expressed the relevant definition of voluntariness2 which if applied to the facts of this case makes it necessary to affirm the decision of the trial court. All agree that for a plea of guilty to be binding on an accused it must be voluntarily made. Whether it was so must, of course, be viewed as of the time it was submitted to the court. As stated by the appellant himself in his supplemental brief “a plea of guilty is either voluntary or involuntary, either good or bad at the time it is entered, and does not retroactively change character thereafter.”
The trial judge on the 28 U.S.C.A. Section 2255 hearing expressly concluded that the defendant “fully and voluntarily entered a plea of guilty and received a sentence of one year, upon the recommendation of himself and the assistant United States Attorney, concurred in by the judge.” (emphasis added) and that he “expressed gratitude to the Court for the sentence.”
It is Shelton’s contention that this finding either cannot be subsequently made to support the action of the court in receiving the plea or if it can be made subsequently, then it is not here supported by the record of the hearing. In effect it is his contention that if a motivating cause which impelled him to enter the plea was a promise by the Government to seek the dismissal of an additional count in the pending indictment and the dismissal of an indictment pending in another district and to recommend a sentence of a year the plea could not, as a matter of law, be voluntary. As we read the opinion of the majority previously entered in this ease, it seems to accept this thesis.
The requirement of Rule 11, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 18 U.S.C.A., that a trial court “shall not accept the plea [of guilty] without first determining that the plea is made voluntarily * * * ” is mandatory. However, there is nothing in the rule or in the protection it seeks to afford an accused that a certain form of finding must be entered in the record to support the court’s discharge of this duty if later questioned. United States v. Swaggerty, 7 Cir., 218 F.2d 875. We think that where in a later inquiry the court finds *573that the plea was actually made voluntarily this later finding is entitled to the same weight and respect on appeal as is any other fact determination which it is the court’s duty to make.
Here the trial record discloses ample facts and circumstances that would fully warrant a finding by the trial court at the hearing that the plea had been voluntarily made. The hearing record also contains facts which when considered with those introduced by Shelton from outside the trial record, warranted the finding here appealed from that the plea had been “voluntarily entered.” These facts are set out in the majority opinion previously published, including the statement of Shelton’s expression of thanks to the court immediately following the imposition of the one year sentence. In light of the full record, showing that the accused was not only willing but anxious to have his plea accepted by the court, the present claim of involuntariness after he has fully enjoyed the benefit of the dismissal of an additional count in the Atlanta indictment and the nolle prossing of the “more serious federal indictment” (as characterized by Shelton) in Miami—the reinstatement of which is now barred by statutes of limitations—and the imposition of the sentence requested by him in the principal case, cannot deprive the plea thus given of its character of voluntariness.
Moreover, in considering the bona fides of this belated claim it is relevant to note that a month after the entry of the plea now asserted to have been involuntary, Shelton wrote to the assistant district attorney who had handled the prosecution a letter relative to the lifting of the detainers in Atlanta and Miami to which the Government had agreed; he concluded: “Thanking you for your efforts in my behalf, and trusting that the entire transaction can be wound up soon, I am respectfully yours, J. Paul Shelton.” It was only after the entire “transaction” was “wound up” thereafter and Shelton had reaped the full benefit of his agreement that he claimed for the first time that he had been coerced or overreached.
There is not a line of evidence to sustain a finding that he was in any way misled or imposed on. There was evidence that as a result of his plea he expected to receive favorable treatment. It was for the trial court to decide whether this expectation was so induced as to make the plea of guilty involuntary as a matter of law. It seems to us that on this record it would be almost a contradiction in terms for the trial court to have held that it was. In any event the court found to the contrary. Such finding was certainly not clearly erroneous.
The motion for rehearing is granted; the previous judgment of this Court is. set aside and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
CAMERON, Circuit Judge not participating.

. 242 F.2d 101.

. “A correct statement of the applicable rule might be: a plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences, including the actual value of any commitments made to him by the court, prosecutor, or his own counsel, must stand unless induced by threats (or promises to discontinue improper harassment) , misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises), or perhaps by promises that are by their nature improper as having no proper relationship to the prosecutor’s business (e. g. bribes).” 242 F.2d at page 115.