Court Opinion

ID: 9376789
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-03 21:00:50.265683+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:09.263399
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                              FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

 JOHN M. QUINN,

                Plaintiff,

        v.                                                Civil Action No. 21-1824 (RDM)

 KREINDLER & KREINDLER, et al.,

                Defendants.

                             MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

       In this breach of contract action, Plaintiff John M. Quinn (“Quinn”) alleges that

Defendants Kreindler & Kreindler, LLP and James P. Kreindler (collectively, “K&K”) have

failed to pay him the compensation that he is due for assisting with K&K’s representation of

family members and representatives of the victims of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.

Quinn alleges that he was engaged to assist K&K in obtaining compensation for K&K’s clients

by, among other things, helping to remove barriers posed by foreign sovereign immunity to the

K&K plaintiffs’ ability to recover damages from “the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and other nation

states,” Dkt. 19 at 5-6 (Am. Compl. ¶ 19); ensuring that K&K’s clients would have access to the

Victims of State Sponsored Terrorism Fund (“VSSTF”), id. at 13 (Am. Compl. ¶ 45); and

resisting “efforts on the part of the Government of Sudan and the Department of State to . . .

include[] in the Sudan Claims Resolution Act . . . language that would [have] effectively erase[d]

the 9/11 families’ claims against Sudan,” id. at 13 (Am. Compl. ¶ 44).

       The parties’ agreements regarding what Quinn characterizes as “eight years [spent]

laboring on legal, political and media activities,” id. at 10 (Am. Compl. ¶ 38), are remarkably

scant. Their first agreement, which they entered in June 2013, barely occupies half a page and is
four sentences long. Dkt. 19-1 at 2 (Am. Compl. Ex. 1). Roughly a year later, they entered into

a second agreement, which is a comparatively robust six sentences long. Dkt. 19-2 at 2 (Am.

Compl. Ex. 2). Those agreements were superseded by two agreements in May 2017, one of

which governs services rendered to K&K relating to the firm’s representation of clients who had

“filed cases in the litigation as of” July 10, 2014, Dkt. 19-3 at 2 (Am. Compl. Ex. 3), and one of

which governs services rendered to K&K relating to the firm’s representation of clients who

“filed claims on or after July 10, 2014 or with respect to” certain other claims or proceedings,

Dkt. 19-4 at 2 (Am. Compl. Ex. 4). Finally, in August 2017, the parties amended the May 2017

agreements by, among other things, providing that Quinn is entitled to compensation relating to

recoveries by those K&K clients who filed claims and by those who did “not file[] [claims] in

the litigation but who have retained K&K to assist in recovering compensation whether through

the filing of claims or otherwise and who in fact receive a recovery.” Dkt. 19-5 at 2 (Am.

Compl. Ex. 5).

       The crux of the dispute between Quinn and K&K, at least at this point, is one of timing.

K&K does not dispute that Quinn is entitled to compensation for the services he provided, but it

maintains that Quinn’s demand for payment is premature because each iteration of the retainer

agreement bases Quinn’s compensation on the “net recovery” that K&K receives, and because

the 9/11 litigation is ongoing and K&K thus continues to accrue costs, rendering the amount of

its “net recovery” inchoate. Dkt. 21-1 at 6. Quinn disagrees and maintains that K&K has

received fees for portions of its work, and it is obligated to share those fees with him. Dkt. 22 at

5.

       Quinn’s complaint contains six counts: (I) Breach of Contract – 2013/2014 Agreements;

(II) Breach of Contract – 2017 Agreements; (III) Breach of Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing;

                                                 2
(IV) Accounting; (V) Quantum Meruit; and (VI) Constructive Trust. See Dkt. 19 (Am. Compl.).

K&K moves to dismiss all but Claim II, which it concedes survives the motion to dismiss stage.

See Dkt. 21-1 at 7-8. Quinn opposes the motion to dismiss in its entirety. Dkt. 22 at 9. For the

reasons explained below, the Court is unpersuaded by K&K’s arguments respecting Counts I, III,

and V, but is persuaded by its arguments respecting Counts IV and VI.

       The Court will, accordingly, GRANT in part and DENY in part Defendants’ Motion to

Partially Dismiss the First Amended Complaint.

                                       I. BACKGROUND

       The following factual allegations are drawn from the complaint, as well as documents

attached to or incorporated in Quinn’s pleadings or are subject to judicial notice. See Hamilton

v. United States, 502 F. Supp. 3d 266, 273 (D.D.C. 2020). For purposes of K&K’s motion to

dismiss, the Court accepts Quinn’s factual allegations as true. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 554, 555 (2007).

A.     Factual Background

       On September 11, 2001, al-Qaeda launched a series of coordinated terrorist attacks on the

United States. Dkt. 19 at 4 (Am. Compl. ¶ 13). The attacks “immediately resulted in 2,977

fatalities and, to date, tens of thousands of injuries.” Id. at 5 (Am. Compl. ¶ 14). K&K

represents family members whose relatives were killed or injured in these attacks, the estates of

the deceased, and first responders and others who were injured. Id. at 5 (Am. Compl. ¶ 15). As

part of this effort, K&K has served as counsel for a large group of plaintiffs in the consolidated

multi-district litigation in the Southern District of New York for almost two decades. See In re:

Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 392 F. Supp. 2d 539, 546 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Dkt. 19 at 7, 15-

17 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 24, 51-69).

                                                 3
       The plaintiffs in the 9/11 litigation faced significant legal hurdles, including the doctrine

of sovereign immunity, which, at the time of the attacks, barred suits against foreign nations that

were not “‘state sponsors’ of terrorism.” Dkt. 19 at 5 (Am. Compl. ¶ 17). To help address some

of these legal issues, K&K sought Quinn’s assistance. Id. at 6 (Am. Compl. ¶ 21). Quinn is a

D.C. resident and attorney whose career has spanned government, private practice, and public

affairs work. Id. at 3-4 (Am. Compl. ¶ 10).

       The first contract between the parties was prepared by K&K and signed by the parties in

June 2013. Id. at 6 (Am. Compl. ¶ 22); see also Dkt. 19-1 at 2 (Am. Compl. Ex. 1). That

contract entitled Quinn Gillespie & Associates (Quinn’s then-existing public affairs firm) and

Nelson Mullins (another public affairs firm) to “receive a fee of 1% of the net recovery on each

decedent’s wrongful death case and each personal injury case where [K&K] has or receives a fee

in the consolidated 9/11 Terrorist Litigation.”1 Dkt. 19-1 at 2 (Am. Compl. Ex. 1). The June

2013 Agreement further specified that Quinn Gillespie and Nelson Mullins’s “1% fee shall be

paid from the attorneys’ fees in all said cases where [K&K] has or receives a fee.” Id. The

entire agreement consisted of a mere four sentences. Id.

       The parties amended the June 2013 Agreement on July 10, 2014. Dkt. 19-2 at 2 (Am.

Compl. Ex. 2). The new agreement tracked the first but substituted Quinn for Quinn Gillespie.

Id. It also clarified that “[t]he term ‘net recovery’ shall mean the amount awarded to each

plaintiff of [K&K] less out-of-pocket costs to [K&K], exclusive of legal fees paid to [K&K] or

1
  “Nelson Mullins” refers to the firm Nelson, Mullins, Riley & Scarborough. Dkt. 19 at 7 (Am.
Compl. ¶ 24). Although that firm was part of Quinn’s initial Agreement with K&K, “[a]ll of
Quinn’s Agreements with Defendants from May 2017 forward were on his behalf only and not
that of” Nelson Mullins. Id. at 8 (Am. Compl. ¶ 31).

                                                 4
others.” Id. Neither agreement contained an expiration date, and neither specified when Quinn

would receive payment for his services. Dkt. 19 at 7 (Am. Compl. ¶ 25).

       On May 19, 2017, the parties executed two new agreements. Id. at 7 (Am. Compl. ¶ 26).

The first May 2017 Agreement “relat[ed] to services rendered and to be rendered by Quinn to

K&K in support of the representation by K&K of approximately 2000 clients who are plaintiffs

in litigation whose claims were filed as of [July 10, 2014] . . . in the Southern District of New

York.” Dkt. 19-3 at 2 (Am. Compl. Ex. 3). This agreement was “effective nunc pro tunc,

January 1, 2017,” and it “extinguishe[d], supersede[d] and replace[d] . . . any and all prior

agreements or understandings . . . including but not limited to those dated July, 2013.” Id. The

agreement also provided that “K&K agrees to pay to Quinn a fee of 0.775 percent (seventy-seven

and one half basis points) of the net recovery on each decedent’s wrongful death and each

personal injury claim with respect to which K&K receives a fee, whether by judgment,

settlement or otherwise, for its representation of the Clients on whose behalf it filed cases in the

litigation as of the date of the Earlier Agreement.” Id. The agreement, once again, defined “net

recovery” to “mean the amount realized by each client less out-of-pocket costs to K&K and

exclusive of legal fees paid to K&K.” Id.

       The second May 2017 Agreement related to K&K’s “representation of clients on whose

behalf K&K filed claims on or after July 10, 2014.” Dkt. 19-4 at 2 (Am. Compl. Ex. 4). That

agreement was “effective nunc pro tunc, January 2, 2017.” Id. The agreement provided that

“K&K shall pay to Quinn a fee of 1% of the net recovery on each wrongful death, injury or any

other claim for which K&K receives a fee, whether by judgment, settlement or otherwise, for its

representation of clients on whose behalf K&K filed claims on or after July 10, 2014.” Id. This

                                                  5
agreement defined “net recovery” in the same way as the other May 2017 Agreement and the

July 2014 Agreement. Id.

       Finally, on August 26, 2017, the parties amended the May 2017 Agreements to clarify

that references in those agreements “to ‘the litigation’ contemplate and include the provision of

services in cases filed, to be filed[,] or for which [K&K] is retained to file or otherwise provide

services in connection with matters arising out of the [9/11] attacks.” Dkt. 19-5 at 2 (Am.

Compl. Ex. 5). The August 2017 Amendment further provided that

       [i]n addition to other bases for compensation, Quinn . . . shall receive
       compensation as specified in each of the May [2017] Agreements for the
       representation of each client on whose behalf K&K has filed claims and receives
       fee[s] and shall also receive the same level of compensation for the
       representation of clients on whose behalf claims are not filed in the litigation but
       who have retained K&K to assist in recovering compensation whether through
       the filing of claims or otherwise and who in fact receive a recovery with respect
       to which K&K receives a fee.

Id. Finally, the August 2017 Amendment entitled Quinn to an additional “amount represented by

0.225 of the net recoveries contemplated by” the initial contract should Nelson Mullins be

“unable or ineligible or otherwise fail to receive all or part of the fees contemplated by [its]

contract with K&K.” Id.

        Quinn alleges that he “has vigorously and effectively worked, and continues to work, on

behalf of the clients he shares with [K&K].” Dkt. 19 at 11 (Am. Compl. ¶ 39). A significant

part of Quinn’s work “involved analysis of and advocacy for the legal and policy bases justifying

enactment of” the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (“JASTA”), “as well as subsequent

work to help formulate and articulate arguments to defeat efforts to reverse all or part of that

important statute in the years after its enactment.” Id. (Am. Compl. ¶ 40); see also Dkt. 19-3 at 2

(Am. Compl. Ex. 3) (“Quinn’s important contribution to date to the litigation and to the

enactment of JASTA is hereby acknowledged.”). In addition, Quinn has lobbied against efforts

                                                  6
to “erase the 9/11 families’ claims against Sudan” and worked with K&K to ensure that K&K

clients have access to the United States Victims of State Sponsored Terrorism Fund (“VSSTF”).

Dkt. 19 at 13-15 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 44-49). “In total, Quinn [has] devoted thousands of hours and

the bulk of his professional practice to this effort.” Id. at 15 (Am. Compl. ¶ 50).

       As of the filing of his Amended Complaint, K&K “ha[s] failed to provide [Quinn] with

any payment under either the 2013/2014 Agreement or the 2017 Agreements.” Id. at 22 (Am.

Compl. ¶ 95). Quinn alleges that K&K, in contrast, has received payment related to its work for

9/11 clients, at least through K&K’s efforts relating to the VSSTF and the September 11th

Victim Compensation Fund (“VCF”). Id. at 20-23 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 87, 92-94, 106). He also

alleges that K&K has “failed to provide [him] with any financial statements, accountings, or

information of any kind related to payments made to Defendants or their clients, or out-of-pocket

expenses incurred by K&K, or payments to a third party.” Id. (Am. Compl. ¶ 96).

B.     Procedural History

       Quinn initiated this action against K&K on July 8, 2021. See Dkt. 1 at 34 (Compl.).

After K&K moved to dismiss Quinn’s initial complaint, Dkt. 11, Quinn filed an Amended

Complaint, Dkt. 19 (Am. Compl.), mooting the first motion to dismiss. See Min. Order (Oct. 20,

2021). In his Amended Complaint, Quinn requests, among other things, (1) a declaratory

judgment that the Agreements are valid and enforceable, (2) actual and punitive damages, (3)

“[a]n accounting of Kreindler & Kreindler, LLP’s 9/11-related receipts, disbursements and other

expenses, and a review of its financial documents[,]” and (4) “[a] declaration that Defendants

hold all income, profits, commissions, fees, revenues, and other funds received by Defendants as

                                                 7
representatives of the 9/11 families in a constructive trust for the benefit of the Defendants’

clients with 9/11 claims and Plaintiff.” Dkt. 19 at 33-34 (Am. Compl.).

        K&K moves to dismiss five of the six counts asserted in the Amended Complaint, Dkt.

21, and Quinn opposes that motion, Dkt. 22. Count II of the Amended Complaint, which alleges

that K&K has breached the May 2017 Agreements, is not at issue for present purposes.

                                      II. LEGAL STANDARD

        A motion to dismiss brought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is designed

to “test[] the legal sufficiency of a complaint.” Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C.

Cir. 2002). In evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court “accept[s] facts alleged in the

complaint as true and draw[s] all reasonable inferences from those facts in the plaintiff[’s]

favor.” Humane Soc’y of the U.S. v. Vilsack, 797 F.3d 4, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2015). To survive a Rule

12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must contain “‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing

that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . .

claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Conley v.

Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)); accord Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per

curiam). In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court “may consider only the facts alleged

in the complaint, any documents either attached to or incorporated in the complaint[,] and

matters of which [the Court] may take judicial notice.” Trudeau v. FTC, 456 F.3d 178, 183

(D.C. Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).

        Although “detailed factual allegations” are not necessary, the complaint “must contain

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “Threadbare

recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not

                                                    8
suffice.” Id. Well-pleaded complaints include “factual content that allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Raising the

“sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully” is insufficient, id.; instead, the

complaint’s “[f]actual allegations,” accepted as true, “must be enough to raise a right to relief

above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Thus, while “a well-pleaded complaint

may proceed even if” it appears that “actual proof of those facts is improbable, and ‘that a

recovery is very remote and unlikely,’” id. at 556 (citation omitted), the complaint must

nevertheless “possess enough heft to ‘sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to relief,’” id. at 557,

(alteration in original) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).2

                                          III. ANALYSIS

A.     Count I: Breach of Contract – 2013/2014 Agreements

       In Count I of the Amended Complaint, Quinn alleges that K&K breached the June 2013

and July 2014 Agreements because (1) he performed his obligations under those contracts, and

(2) K&K has failed to compensate him for that work. Dkt. 19 at 23-24 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 99-113).

K&K moves to dismiss on the ground that the May 2017 Agreements extinguished the June 2013

and July 2014 Agreements and, thus, “no breach of those contracts could possibly have occurred

within the three-year statute of limitations.” Dkt. 21-1 at 15. Although the major premise of

K&K’s argument carries considerable force, the Court is unpersuaded that it can resolve K&K’s

statute of limitations defense at this early stage of the proceeding.

2
  The Court has assured itself of its jurisdiction in this diversity case. Per the Amended
Complaint, the Plaintiff is a resident of the District of Columbia, K&K is organized under the
laws of New York and has its principal place of business in New York, and Kreindler is also a
resident of New York. See Dkt. 19 at 3-4 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 10-12). There is therefore complete
diversity between the parties, and Quinn’s claims for relief “vastly exceed[] the $75,000
minimum.” Id. at 3 (Am. Compl. ¶ 7); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1).

                                                   9
       As an initial matter, the Court notes that Quinn and K&K agree that the May 2017

Agreements extinguished the June 2013 and July 2014 Agreements. See id.; see also Dkt. 22 at

5-6. In May 2017, the parties agreed that the new agreements “extinguishe[d], supersede[d] and

replace[d] . . . any and all prior agreements or understandings,” and they agreed upon revised

terms relating to Quinn’s entitlement to compensation with respect to both previously filed

claims and any future claims. Dkt. 19-3 at 2 (Am. Compl. Ex. 3); see also Dkt. 19-4 at 2 (Am.

Compl. Ex. 4). Taking this language at face value, it is difficult to understand how Quinn can

now invoke the June 2013 and July 2014 Agreements, which he agreed to “extinguish[].” But

that is not the argument that K&K makes, and the Court will not reach an issue that neither party

has raised.

       Instead, K&K argues that Quinn’s efforts to enforce the June 2013 and July 2014

Agreements fail because those agreements were extinguished “as of January 1, 2017,” Dkt. 21-1

at 15, and thus any breach must have occurred, if at all, before that date. That poses a problem

for Quinn, K&K continues, because the relevant statute of limitations is three years, and Quinn

did not bring suit until July 8, 2021, more than three years after January 1, 2017. Dkt. 21-1 at

15-17. The Court is unpersuaded.

       D.C. law provides that, “[e]xcept as otherwise specifically provided by law, actions for

the following purposes may not be brought after the expiration of the period specified below

from the time the right to maintain the action accrues: . . . (7) on a simple contract, express or

implied – 3 years.” D.C. Code § 12-301(7).3 “A cause of action for breach of contract accrues,

3
  Neither Quinn nor K&K addresses choice-of-law, but both parties apply D.C. law in their
briefs. See, e.g., Dkt. 21-1 at 15-16; Dkt. 22 at 14. “Because litigants may waive choice-of-law
issues, the Court need not challenge their evident assumption that District of Columbia law
applies.” Parker v. John Moriarty & Assocs. of Va., 332 F. Supp. 3d 220, 234 n.10 (D.D.C.

                                                 10
and the statute of limitations begins to run, at the time of the breach.” Eastbanc, Inc. v.

Georgetown Park Assocs. II, L.P., 940 A.2d 996, 1004 (D.C. 2008) (internal quotation omitted).

“[M]otions to dismiss based on a statute of limitations defense are generally disfavored,”

however, “and the D.C. Circuit has ‘repeatedly held [that] courts should hesitate to dismiss a

complaint on statute of limitations grounds based solely on the face of the complaint.’” Doe v.

Kipp DC Supporting Corp., 373 F. Supp. 3d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2019) (alteration in original) (quoting

Firestone v. Firestone, 76 F.3d 1205, 1208-09 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). “[D]ismissal is appropriate

only if the complaint on its face is conclusively time-barred.” Slate v. Pub. Def. Serv. for the

D.C., 31 F. Supp. 3d 277, 313 (D.D.C. 2014) (alteration in original) (quoting Firestone, 76 F.3d

at 1209).

       According to the Amended Complaint, the June 2013 and July 2014 Agreements

“remained in force through December 31, 2016,” Dkt. 19 at 23 (Am. Compl. ¶ 101), and, as

noted above, Quinn did not file suit in this case until July 8, 2021, Dkt. 1 at 34 (Compl.), well

past the three-year window for filing suit. Under ordinary circumstances, this delay might well

preclude Quinn from suing for breach of those agreements. So far, so good.

       The District of Columbia Court of Appeals, however, has recognized two exceptions to

the usual statute of limitations: the lulling doctrine and the discovery rule. See Roe v. Wilson,

365 F. Supp. 3d 71, 78 (D.D.C. 2019) (citing East v. Graphic Arts Indus. Joint Pension Tr., 718

A.2d 153, 156 (D.C. 1998)). Here, Quinn invokes the discovery rule, Dkt. 22 at 15-17, which

provides that “a ‘claim does not accrue until the plaintiff, exercising due diligence, has

2018); see also C & E Servs., Inc. v. Ashland, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 2d 242, 255 n.5 (D.D.C. 2007)
(citing CSX Transp., Inc. v. Com. Union Ins. Co., 82 F.3d 478, 482–83 (D.C. Cir. 1996)) (“[A]
party may waive a choice of law argument.”); In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983,
932 F.2d 1475, 1495 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (“[C]ourts need not address choice of law questions sua
sponte.”).

                                                 11
discovered or reasonably should have discovered all of the essential elements of her possible

cause of action.’” Wilson, 365 F. Supp. 3d at 78 (quoting Farris v. Compton, 652 A.2d 49, 54

(D.C. 1994)). He maintains that K&K has “never told [him] that any plaintiff it represented in

the SDNY [9/11] litigation has received any payment, much less when such payment was

received[] or the amount thereof.” Dkt. 22 at 17. Thus, in his view, his claim that K&K

breached the June 2013 and July 2014 Agreements has been tolled under the discovery rule.

       K&K offers two responses to this argument, neither of which is convincing. First, it

argues that “because Quinn pleads no facts of when or how he discovered the alleged breach at

all, let alone how or why he could not have discovered facts to put him on inquiry notice of a

breach until sometime after July 8, 2018, the discovery rule response is simply not plausible.”

Dkt. 24 at 8. That argument flips the applicable burden: “The statute of limitations is an

affirmative defense that defendant must prove.” Firestone, 76 F.3d at 1210; see also Lucas v.

D.C., No. 13-CV-143 (TFH), 2019 WL 4860730, at *8 (D.D.C. Oct. 2, 2019) (noting that the

defendant “has not demonstrated what evidence the plaintiff had of his breach of contract and/or

negligence claims” to defeat discovery rule); Kipp DC Supporting Corp., 373 F. Supp. 3d at 7

(“The statute of limitations is an affirmative defense and need not be negatived by the language

of the complaint.”) (citations omitted); FiberLight, LLC v. WMATA, No. CV 16-2248 (ESH),

2017 WL 2544131, at *9 (D.D.C. June 12, 2017) (“Taking the factual allegations of the

complaint as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in FiberLight’s favor, it is not apparent

from the face of the complaint that the discovery rule is inapplicable.”).

       Second, K&K argues that “[i]f Quinn claims that the receipt by a K&K client of monies

from one of the government administrative funds (either the VCF or VSST Fund) triggered a

breach . . . [,] then Quinn cannot plausibly claim he was unaware of those administrative fund

                                                 12
distributions because they were highly publicized government events, which Quinn claims he

lobbied on behalf of.” Dkt. 24 at 8. Again, K&K misunderstands the Court’s role in resolving a

motion to dismiss. See FiberLight, 2017 WL 2544131, at *9 (D.D.C. June 12, 2017); Butler v.

Enter. Integration Corp., 459 F. Supp. 3d 78, 95 (D.D.C. 2020) (“Further evidence about the

timeliness of the claims may arise at summary judgment, but at this point, the Court cannot

conclusively determine that any count is time-barred.”). At the motion to dismiss stage, the

Court does not—and may not—engage in fact finding, and the plaintiff has no obligation to

plead facts in anticipation of an affirmative defense or to offer declarations or other evidence in

response to a motion under Rule 12(b)(6). Nor is it at all obvious that Quinn knew that any of

K&K’s clients received payments before January 1, 2017—or July 8, 2018—from either the

VCF or the VSST Fund. See Dkt. 19 at 19 (Am. Compl. ¶ 79) (“VCF does not make public

either the name of claimants or the amount awarded.”); id. at 21 (Am. Compl. ¶ 90) (“VSSTF

does not make public either the names of claimants or the amount awarded.”). Even if Quinn

knew that some funds were disbursed to some victims, the Court cannot assume that he knew

that any of these funds were received by any K&K clients more than three years before he

brought that suit. Ultimately, K&K may be able to show that Quinn knew, but that is a question

for another day.

       The Court will, accordingly, deny K&K’s motion to dismiss Count I as time-barred.

B.     Count III: Breach of Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

       In Count III of the Amended Complaint, Quinn alleges that K&K breached the duty of

good faith and fair dealing by failing to provide him with an accounting and thus keeping him in

the dark regarding the fees that K&K allegedly owes him. See Dkt. 19 at 27-28 (Am. Compl.

                                                 13
¶¶ 132-140). K&K moves to dismiss Count III on the ground that “Quinn has no contractual

right to any financial disclosure.” Dkt. 21-1 at 17-20.

       Under D.C. law, “all contracts contain an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing,

which means that ‘neither party shall do anything which will have the effect of destroying or

injuring the right of the other party to receive the fruits of the contract.’” Ihebereme v. Cap. One,

N.A., 730 F. Supp. 2d 40, 49 (D.D.C. 2010) (quoting Paul v. Howard Univ., 754 A.2d 297, 310

(D.C. 2000)). “This duty prevents a party from evading the spirit of the contract, willfully

rendering imperfect performance or interfering with the other party’s performance.” Id. (quoting

Hais v. Smith, 547 A.2d 986, 987-88 (D.C. 1988)). K&K argues that Quinn fails adequately to

plead a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing for several

reasons: (1) Quinn has not alleged that K&K’s actions were arbitrary and capricious or that K&K

acted in bad faith; (2) Quinn has no contractual right to any financial disclosure; (3) K&K’s

refusal has not prevented Quinn from performing under the contract; (4) Quinn’s request is a

“fishing expedition” to support his breach of contract claim; and (5) Quinn’s requested

accounting would be overly burdensome. Dkt. 21-1 at 17-20. The Court concludes that each of

K&K’s arguments is either unfounded or premature.

       First, although the Amended Complaint does not use the phrases “bad faith” or “arbitrary

and capricious,” “the Court must construe the complaint in favor of the plaintiff, who must be

granted the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.” Hettinga v.

United States, 677 F.3d 471, 476 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted) (per

curiam). Read in this light, the Court has no difficulty concluding that the Amended Complaint

avers that K&K has acted in bad faith. It alleges that the implied covenant ensures that parties

deal with one another in “good faith” to “prevent[] a party from evading the spirit of the

                                                 14
contract,” Dkt. 19 at 27 (Am. Compl. ¶ 134); that K&K maintains “sole possession of all the

information necessary to determine fees due to Quinn,” id. (Am. Compl. ¶ 135); that “Quinn has

asked K&K” for that information, id. (Am. Compl. ¶ 136); that K&K has refused Quinn’s

requests, id. (Am. Compl. ¶ 137); and that by doing so, K&K has denied Quinn the information

that he needs to determine what he is owed and has “evad[ed] the spirit of the contract,” id. at 28

(Am. Compl. ¶ 138). Under D.C. law, “a plaintiff must allege either bad faith or conduct that is

arbitrary and capricious,” but “bad faith” includes a “lack of diligence, purposeful failure to

perform, and interference with the other party’s ability to perform,” and “fair dealing” requires

“reasonable conduct that is not arbitrary and capricious.” Wright v. Howard Univ., 60 A.3d 749,

754 (D.C. 2013). Although it premature to consider whether K&K has, in fact, acted in bad faith

or unreasonably, Quinn has plausibly alleged that K&K has intentionally left him in the dark to

evade its contractual obligation to pay Quinn what he is due.

       Second, K&K is correct that “parties do not breach the implied covenant [of good faith

and fair dealing] ‘by failing to do something they had no obligation to do’ under their written

agreement.” Chambers v. NASA Fed. Credit Union, 222 F. Supp. 3d 1, 13 (D.D.C. 2016)

(quoting Brown v. Sessoms, 774 F.3d 1016, 1025 (D.C. Cir. 2014)). Here, the agreements do not

expressly require K&K to provide Quinn with an accounting or other financial report, and thus,

according to K&K, its failure to do so did not violate the implied covenant. Dkt. 21-1 at 18. For

present purposes, however, the Court must assume that K&K, in fact, owes Quinn compensation

for work he has performed, and he has plausibly alleged that K&K’s refusal to provide him with

information about the fees that it has collected has, in effect, “destroy[ed] or injur[ed]” his right

“to receive the fruits of the contract.” Abdelrhman v. Ackerman, 76 A.3d 883, 891 (D.C. 2013)

(quoting Hais, 547 A.2d at 987); see also Paul, 754 A.2d at 310. Quinn’s fees are tied to the

                                                  15
“net recovery . . . with respect to which K&K receives a fee, whether by judgment, settlement or

otherwise.” Dkt. 19-3 at 2 (Am. Compl. Ex. 3). If K&K is unwilling to provide Quinn the

information he needs to calculate his fee, that conduct at least arguably contravenes the “spirit of

the contract,” Paul, 754 A.2d at 310, even if providing an accounting or otherwise sharing

financial information is not an explicit term in the contract.

        The case on which K&K principally relies is readily distinguishable. In Chambers, the

issue was whether a credit union would assess overdraft fees based on customers’ actual account

balance or their available account balance. 222 F. Supp. 3d at 5. Because the relevant

agreements “unambiguously link[ed] overdrafts to the available balance,” not the actual balance,

id. at 11, the Court concluded that “[t]he Credit Union had no contractual obligation . . . to base

overdraft fees on Chambers’ actual balance” and “[i]ts failure to do so, therefore, [was] not in

bad faith, arbitrary, or capricious,” id. at 13. In this case, unlike in Chambers, the information

that Quinn requests bears a direct connection to the contractual rights that he asserts. His request

for an accounting—or, perhaps, something short of a full accounting but still sufficient to permit

him to protect his contractual rights—is arguably necessary to prevent K&K from depriving him

of the “fruits of the contract.” See Doe v. George Washington Univ., 366 F. Supp. 3d 1, 8

(D.D.C. 2018) (“[T]he duty of good faith and fair dealing is an interpretive lens through which

courts evaluate the parties’ reasonable expectations for the fulfillment of the terms of the

contract.”).

        Third, although K&K’s failure to provide Quinn with information regarding the fees it

has obtained has not prevented Quinn from performing under the contract, interfering with the

plaintiff’s ability to perform is just one example of a violation of the duty of good faith and fair

                                                 16
dealing. See Ihebereme, 730 F. Supp. 2d at 49. Because Quinn does not premise his claim on

that theory, K&K’s argument is inapposite.

       Fourth, K&K attempts to recast Quinn’s claim as a “fishing expedition” in support of his

contract claims. Dkt 21-1 at 19. To be sure, some or all of the information he seeks may be

available in discovery, and some of it may provide a necessary predicate for all or some of his

breach of contract claims. But K&K’s argument ignores the fact that Quinn’s rights to payment

will likely continue long past the resolution of this case, and, without the type of information that

he argues K&K is bound to provide him, he will continue to have one hand (and perhaps two)

tied behind his back in protecting his contractual rights. That, of course, does not mean that he

will necessarily prevail on this claim. But the claim is more than a mere “fishing expedition.”

       K&K argues that because Quinn cannot “plead any distinct damage from th[e] so-called

breach of the covenant,” the Court should dismiss this Count. Dkt. 21-1 at 19. As K&K

observes, other decisions from this Court have concluded that a “breach of the implied covenant

is not an independent cause of action when the allegations are identical to other claims for relief

under established cause[s] of action.” WMATA v. Quik Serve Foods, Inc., No. CIV. 04-687

(RCL), 2006 WL 1147933, at *5 (D.D.C. Apr. 28, 2006); see also Jacobsen v. Oliver, 201 F.

Supp. 2d 93, 98 n.2 (D.D.C. 2002). But Quinn’s contract claims are distinct from his claim that

K&K breached the implied covenant: Quinn’s claims that K&K owes him money (i.e., his

breach of contract claims) are distinct in both substance and remedy from his claim that K&K

has wrongfully withheld financial information (i.e., his breach of the duty of good faith claim).

       The cases on which Quinn relies are inapposite. In Capitol Just., LLC v. Wachovia

Corp., No. CV 07-2095 (RCL), 2008 WL 11388566, at *6-*7 (D.D.C. June 11, 2008), the Court

dismissed a claim for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing where the claim was

                                                 17
“patently identical to other established causes of action” and where the claims “merely duplicate

other substantive claims made by plaintiffs.” The same was true in Quik Serve Foods. 2006 WL

1147933, at *5 (concluding that where “[t]hese claims of bad faith are identical to” other claims,

the plaintiff is merely “attempting to get two bites at the same apple”); see also George

Washington Univ., 366 F. Supp. 3d at 8 (“[B]ecause the count for breach of the duty of good

faith and fair dealing is duplicative of the count for breach of contract, the issues will be

consolidated and addressed together; the independent claim for breach of the duty of good faith

and fair dealing will be dismissed.”).

       Walsh Constr. Co. II v. United States Sur. Co., 334 F. Supp. 3d 282, 298-99 (D.D.C.

2018), is somewhat closer to this case. There, the surety claimed that a construction company

breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing by (1) “refusing to pay the [s]urety the

balance of the [s]ubcontract price;” (2) “hindering the [s]urety’s investigation of the alleged

default;” and (3) “overstating its alleged damages.” Id. at 298. Of those allegations, the one

most like the claim at issue here is that the company hindered the surety’s investigation of the

alleged default. The court rejected that claim because, due to a performance bond, the surety

would receive the fruits of the contract with or without the investigation. Id. at 299. Here, by

contrast, K&K’s refusal to give Quinn financial information from which he could calculate his

fee at least arguably interferes with his ability to receive payment under the contract.

       Finally, K&K’s arguments about the burdens associated with providing Quinn the

requested financial information are better addressed at summary judgment or trial. At this stage,

no facts regarding K&K’s accounting and recordkeeping practices are before the Court, and,

thus, the Court has no basis to evaluate K&K’s argument. But even beyond that, it is far from

clear that the burden alone provides a sufficient ground to defeat the claim. The amount of

                                                  18
information needed to determine how much Quinn is owed is a product of the deal the parties

struck, regardless of the wisdom of that deal. As a result, at some point, K&K will need either to

reach a new agreement with Quinn or to pull together what it characterizes as a mountain of

information in order to calculate what Quinn is owed. The only questions are when K&K will

need to do so and whether Quinn will receive access to that same information—or whether he

will just need to take K&K’s word for what he is owed. Thus, far from being an “accounting

exercise that the contracts nowhere even intimate,” Dkt. 21-1 at 20, it seems inevitable that K&K

will need undertake the burden that, in its view, defeats Count III of the Amended Complaint.

       The Court will, accordingly, deny K&K’s motion to dismiss Count III for failure to state

a claim.

C.     Count V: Quantum Meruit

       In Count V, Quinn alleges that to the extent that K&K maintains that no enforceable

contractual relationship exists with respect to the services he provided “or that any portion of the

net recoveries [K&K] obtained on behalf of family members and representatives of the victims

of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks fall outside of” that contractual relationship, he “is

entitled to be paid for the value of his services for the period of the relationship” he had with

K&K. Dkt. 19 at 31 (Am. Compl. ¶ 153). Put more simply: to the extent necessary, Quinn

“seeks recovery in quantum meruit for the reasonable value of the unpaid services provided to”

K&K. Id. at 32 (Am. Compl. ¶ 163). K&K moves to dismiss this claim on the ground that

“District of Columbia law does not permit Quinn to plead an alternative, quasi contract claim for

quantum meruit based on factual allegations of an express contract.” Dkt. 21-1 at 21.

       “The District of Columbia recognizes” a cause of action for “quantum meruit as [an]

implied contract claim[]” where “there is no express contract between the parties but contractual

                                                 19
obligations are implied . . . in fact.” Plesha v. Ferguson, 725 F. Supp. 2d 106, 111 (D.D.C.

2010). “A party asserting a quantum meruit claim must demonstrate that the parties’ conduct

implied the existence of a contractual relationship by establishing: (1) valuable services rendered

by the plaintiff, (2) for the person for whom recovery is sought; (3) which services were accepted

and enjoyed by that person, and (4) under circumstances which reasonably notified the person

that the plaintiff, in performing such services, expected to be paid.” Id.; see also Alemayehu v.

Abere, 298 F. Supp. 3d 157, 166 (D.D.C. 2018).

       Notably, K&K does not argue that Quinn has failed to plead any of those elements.

Instead, it maintains that because Quinn also asserts a claim for breach of contract and because

K&K does not dispute that a contract exists, Quinn’s quantum meruit claim fails as a matter of

law. For support, K&K points to Plesha v. Ferguson, a case in which the plaintiff, also a

lobbyist, alleged that he performed services for the defendant pursuant to a written contract and

that the defendants had failed to pay him in full. 725 F. Supp. 2d at 109. In his complaint, he

alleged four causes of action, including a claim for breach of contract and a claim for quantum

meruit. Id. The Court dismissed the quantum meruit claim on the ground that “[c]laims for

quantum meruit are . . . unavailable when there is an actual contract between the parties because

there is no need to consider whether the parties’ conduct implies a contractual relationship.” Id.

at 112. Although the plaintiff argued that he should be allowed to plead in the alternative, the

Court disagreed, concluding that the claims at issue “clearly involve[d] promises contained in an

express written contract” and the defendant did “not dispute the existence of a contract.” Id.

       Plesha is distinguishable in relevant respects. Most significantly, in Plesha there was no

dispute that the written contract covered the activities for which the plaintiff sought

compensation; instead, the defendant merely argued that it had already paid the plaintiff in full.

                                                 20
Id. Here, in contrast, although “K&K is not moving to dismiss Quinn’s express breach of

contract claim (Count II) for failure to state a claim,” Dkt. 21-1 at 22, it does dispute the “merits”

and scope of that claim, id. Quinn, for example, maintains that he is entitled to a portion of the

compensation that K&K’s receives based on its clients’ recoveries from the VCF and VSSTF,

Dkt. 19 at 25-26 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 120-129), while K&K maintains that the scope of the parties’

contracts reaches only recoveries obtained in the consolidated 9/11 litigation, Dkt. 21-1 at 10;

Dkt. 24 at 7. If K&K is correct that payment from the VCF and VSSTF are not covered under

the contracts, Quinn is entitled to pursue a quantum meruit claim, alleging that he provided

separate (and uncompensated) services in support of K&K’s efforts to obtain those recoveries.

Nor does K&K disavow the right to argue that the contracts are unenforceable, perhaps on the

ground that they are insufficiently definite or that there was not a meeting of minds. In short,

K&K’s decision to forgo a motion to dismiss Count II is a far cry from a concession that an

enforceable contract exits, eliminating the “need to consider whether the parties’ conduct implies

a contractual relationship” that can be enforced by a claim in quantum meruit. Plesha, 725 F.

Supp. 2d at 112.

        In any event, Rule 8 permits a plaintiff to plead in the alternative, and it is premature to

conclude that Quinn’s breach of contract claim precludes him from asserting, in the alternative, a

claim for quantum meruit. Rule 8(d) is clear: “A party may set out 2 or more statements of a

claim . . . alternatively or hypothetically, either in a single count . . . or in separate ones,” and

“[a] party may state as many separate claims . . . as it has, regardless of consistency.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 8(d)(2)-(3). At the end of the day, of course, Quinn cannot recover for the same work

under both a breach of contract and a quantum meruit theory of relief. See Ellipso, Inc. v. Mann,

460 F. Supp. 2d 99, 104 (D.D.C. 2006) (Quantum meruit “is [not] available when there is an

                                                   21
actual contract between the parties.”). But K&K offers no explanation for why the normal rule

allowing pleading in the alternative is unavailable here.

          Other decisions from this Court have permitted plaintiffs to plead claims for breach of

contract and quantum meruit in the alternative. In Rothberg v. Xerox Corp., No. CV 12-617

(BAH), 2013 WL 12084543, at *6 (D.D.C. Jan. 4, 2013), for example, the Court rejected the

argument that a plaintiff’s quantum meruit claim must “necessarily fail because the plaintiff

incorporated his contract claim allegations into those causes of action,” stressing that parties can

plead alternative, inconsistent theories of liability. See also, e.g., McWilliams Ballard, Inc. v.

Broadway Mgmt. Co., 636 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9 n.10 (D.D.C. 2009) (“While defendants are

correct . . . that plaintiff ultimately cannot recover under both a breach of contract claim and an

unjust enrichment claim pertaining to the subject matter of that contract, . . . at this juncture,

plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim is an alternate theory of liability which is may pursue.”);

Nevius v. Afr. Inland Mission Int’l, 511 F. Supp. 2d 114, 122 n.6 (D.D.C. 2007) (“The court is

not persuaded by AIM’s contention that Nevius cannot allege an express contract while asserting

a claim for unjust enrichment, a remedy designed for the absence of a contract. Pleading in the

alternative is permissible under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . . . .”). The reasoning

contained in those decisions is persuasive.

          The Court will, accordingly, deny K&K’s motion to dismiss Count V for failure to state a

claim.4

4
  The Court does agree with K&K, however, that Quinn’s reliance on United States for Use &
Benefit of Am. Civ. Constr., LLC v. Hirani Eng’g & Land Surveying, P.C., 263 F. Supp. 3d 99,
117 (D.D.C. 2017), is misplaced. True, the court there stated that, “the law in the District of
Columbia plainly allows for recovery in quantum meruit, as an alternative to contract damages.”
Id. But, as the D.C. Circuit later clarified, under D.C. law, it is “restitution, not quantum meruit,
[that] is the proper remedy where there is an express contract between the parties.” United States

                                                  22
E.     Count Counts IV and VI: Accounting and Constructive Trust

       Finally, the Amended Complaint asserts claims for Accounting (Count IV) and

Constructive Trust (Count VI). The Court treats these together because they fail for the same

reason: Both are equitable remedies, not standalone claims for relief.

       “‘An accounting is a detailed statement of the debits and credits between parties arising

out of a contract or fiduciary relation.’” Butler, 459 F. Supp. 3d at 109 (internal quotation marks

omitted) (quoting Bates v. Nw. Hum. Servs., Inc., 466 F. Supp. 2d 69, 103 (D.D.C. 2006)). An

accounting is not a freestanding claim, however, but rather is a remedy that may be obtained at

the close of litigation should a plaintiff succeed. Id. (citing Haynes v. Navy Fed. Credit Union,

52 F. Supp. 3d 1, 10 (D.D.C. 2014)); Chin-Teh Hsu v. New Mighty U.S. Tr., No. CV 10-1743

(JEB), 2020 WL 588322, at *12 (D.D.C. Feb. 6, 2020) (“Neither a constructive trust nor an

accounting constitutes a free-standing claim.”); Wilson v. On the Rise Enters., LLC, 305 F. Supp.

3d 5, 19 (D.D.C. 2018) (“[A]ccountings are not freestanding causes of action . . . .”).

       Similarly, “[a] constructive trust is a remedy that a court devises after litigation to redress

the injustice that would otherwise occur when one person has fraudulently or wrongfully

obtained the property of another.” Macharia v. United States, 238 F. Supp. 2d 13, 31 (D.D.C.

2002) (cleaned up) (citations omitted). Like an accounting, “a constructive trust is not an

independent cause of action.” Id.; see also Chin-Teh Hsu, 2020 WL 588322, at *12; Hedgeye

Risk Mgmt., LLC v. Heldman, 271 F. Supp. 3d 181, 191 (D.D.C. 2017) (“The Court will grant

for Use & Benefit of Am. Civ. Constr., LLC v. Hirani Eng’g & Land Surveying, PC, 26 F.4th
952, 960 (D.C. Cir. 2022). And in United States for Use & Benefit of Am. Civ. Constr., LLC v.
Hirani Eng’g & Land Surveying, PC, 58 F.4th 1250, 1251 (D.C. Cir. 2023), the D.C. Circuit
again explained that D.C. law “does not permit recovery in quantum meruit where there is an
express contract,” even though “no such limit applies to the claim against [a] surety under the
Miller Act.”

                                                 23
Defendants’ motion to dismiss this count for failure to state a claim and will treat the request for

a constructive trust as part of Hedgeye’s request for relief.”); Alemayehu v. Abere, 199 F. Supp.

3d 74, 87 (D.D.C. 2016) (“Because a constructive trust is not an independent cause of action, the

Court will dismiss Count IV.”).

          Decisions from this Court have, on occasion, allowed accounting claims to survive a

motion to dismiss. As the court observed in Butler, “it is not unusual to leave such counts in

place at the [m]otion-to-[d]ismiss stage and then to resolve them only at summary judgment or

later, depending on whether Plaintiffs can establish both liability on the breach of contract and

insufficiency of legal damages.” 459 F. Supp. 3d at 109 (emphasis in original) (citing Bates, 466

F. Supp. 2d at 104). Here, however, the Court sees no benefit (based on judicial efficiency or

otherwise) in maintaining Counts IV and VI in the face of clear law establishing that neither

count asserts a standalone claim for relief. As in Chin-Teh Hsu, “[t]his litigation remains many

leagues from the finish line,” and it would “be premature for the Court to opine as to the

hypothetical availability of these equitable remedies.” 2020 WL 588322, at *12 (emphasis

added). Quinn requests an accounting and a constructive trust in his prayer for relief, Dkt. 19 at

33-34 (Am. Compl.), and dismissing Counts IV and VI will have no bearing on that request for

relief.

          Finally, Quinn argues that he needs an accounting as a tool of litigation and not just as a

remedy. Dkt. 22 at 7. But he does not explain why the usual tools of discovery will not suffice,

nor does he address whether or how the Court might accelerate litigation of his accounting claim,

so that he could then use any relief he might obtain on that claim to pursue his remaining claims.

Finally, he fails to explain how his “claim” for an accounting differs from his claim based on the

implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, which might—if successful—provide the same

                                                   24
relief that he seeks in his standalone claim for an accounting. To the extent the claims are

duplicative, the Court sees no reason to permit both to proceed.

       The Court will, accordingly, dismiss Counts IV and VI as freestanding claims, “but it

does so without prejudice to [Quinn] ultimately seeking [an accounting and constructive trust] as

remedies in the event [he] prevail[s]” on one of his surviving claims for relief. Chin-Teh Hsu,

2020 WL 588322, at *12.

                                         CONCLUSION

       For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Partially Dismiss the First Amended

Complaint Under Fed. R. Civ P. 12(b)(6), is hereby GRANTED in part and DENIED in part,

and Counts IV and VI are hereby DISMISSED for failure to state a claim.

       SO ORDERED.

                                                     /s/ Randolph D. Moss
                                                     RANDOLPH D. MOSS
                                                     United States District Judge

Date: March 3, 2023

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