Court Opinion

ID: 9352454
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-06 16:00:49.381348+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:02:57.363541
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
                            FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
                                     ____________
No. 21-5287                                                September Term, 2022
                                                                     1:21-cv-01184-TNM
                                                      Filed On: January 6, 2023
Hasseh El Bey, Chief,

             Appellant

      v.

Kenneth Michael Mead, et al.,

             Appellees

            ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                      FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

      BEFORE:       Millett, Pillard, and Pan, Circuit Judges

                                    JUDGMENT

        This appeal was considered on the record from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia and on the briefs filed by the parties. See Fed. R. App. P.
34(a)(2); D.C. Cir. Rule 34(j). Upon consideration of the foregoing, and the motion for
leave to file an appendix, it is

       ORDERED that the motion for leave to file an appendix be granted. The Clerk is
directed to file the lodged appendix. It is

       FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the district court’s orders filed on
May 20, 2021, August 27, 2021, October 26, 2021, and December 8, 2021 be affirmed.
Appellant has not demonstrated that the district court erred in denying his motion for
recusal. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994) (“judicial rulings alone
almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion”); Rafferty v. NYNEX
Corp., 60 F.3d 844, 848 (D.C. Cir.1995) (no bias shown where party failed to offer
evidence to support his inferred bias from unfavorable judicial rulings and from court
delays).

        Additionally, the district court correctly dismissed the complaint for lack of
standing because appellant failed to demonstrate that he suffered an injury-in-fact that
was causally connected to appellees’ conduct and was likely to be redressed by the
relief he requested. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992);
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342 (2006). Appellant has also failed to
establish the right to sue on behalf of a third party. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400,
                 United States Court of Appeals
                             FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
                                       ____________
No. 21-5287                                                 September Term, 2022

411 (1991) (certain plaintiffs have standing to protect a third party’s rights when plaintiff
has suffered an “injury in fact,” plaintiff “has a close relationship” to the third party, and
there is “some hindrance to the third party’s ability” to protect its own interests).

       Before reaching the issue of appellant’s standing, the district court dismissed the
Federal Bureau of Investigation and Blake Vogt for ineffective service of process. The
dismissal as to those defendants is affirmed on the alternative ground that appellant
lacks standing, for the reason stated above. See Chambers v. Burwell, 824 F.3d 141,
143 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (this court “may affirm the district court on any ground supported
by the record”).

        In addition, appellant has shown no error in the district court’s decision to dismiss
the complaint with prejudice. Appellant raises no argument challenging the district
court’s conclusion that any amendment of his complaint would be futile. Accordingly,
he has forfeited any such argument. See United States ex rel. Totten v. Bombardier
Corp., 380 F.3d 488, 497 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (arguments not raised on appeal are
forfeited). Although appellant challenges the district court’s alternative conclusion that
the District of Columbia would not be a proper venue, the dismissal of the complaint
with prejudice did not depend on that determination.

      Finally, appellant has failed to demonstrate that the denial of his motion for
reconsideration was an abuse of discretion. See Firestone v. Firestone, 76 F.3d 1205,
1208 (D.C. Cir. 1996).

        Pursuant to D.C. Circuit Rule 36, this disposition will not be published. The Clerk
is directed to withhold issuance of the mandate herein until seven days after resolution
of any timely petition for rehearing or petition for rehearing en banc. See Fed. R. App.
P. 41(b); D.C. Cir. Rule 41.

                                        Per Curiam

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