Court Opinion

ID: 9625679
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:47:35.719656+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:13.170859
License: Public Domain

WAINWRIGHT, Justice.
On 19 April 1999, Joel Matías (defendant) was indicted for possession of cocaine. On 14 September 1999, a jury found defendant guilty of this charge. The trial court sentenced defendant to a term of four to five months imprisonment, suspended the sentence, and placed defendant on supervised probation for eighteen months. The majority of the panel in the Court of Appeals concluded defendant received a trial free from error. State v. Matias, 143 N.C. App. 445, 550 S.E.2d 1 (2001). Judge Hunter dissented. We affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The evidence presented at trial tends to show as follows: On 28 March 1999, Burlington Police Officers Jesse Qualls and Sam Epps were working as off-duty security guards at the Creekside Apartments. The officers’ duties at the apartments include “maintaining] the peace.” Around 9:00 p.m. on 28 March, the officers, who were in a patrol car, saw a car with a Tennessee license plate driving through the parking lot at approximately five miles per hour. After the car passed the officers, Qualls detected an odor of marijuana. When the car turned right into a parking space, the officers pulled in behind the car and initiated a stop.
*551When the officers approached the car, Epps also smelled marijuana. The officers questioned the occupants and determined the driver did not have an operator’s license. The officers removed the driver from the car, conducted a pat-down search, arrested the driver, and instructed the other three occupants to exit the car one at a time. Defendant exited last from the right rear seat of the car.
During a search of the car incident to arrest, the officers found “a small clear plastic [bag] with a green leafy substance, vegetable material, and a small piece of tin foil that was kind of balled up inside of that.” The green, leafy substance was identified as marijuana. The plastic bag was located between the seat pad and back pad in the back right seat where defendant had been sitting. A white, powdery substance, later identified by the State Bureau of Investigation as cocaine, was found inside the tin foil. According to Officer Epps, defendant was the only person who could have placed the plastic bag in the space between the seat pads. The officers also observed marijuana seeds in the car’s carpet and found rolling papers, an unopened beer can, and a cigar inside the car.
Defendant’s father testified defendant left home that evening around 8:40 p.m. when a car blew the horn. Defendant testified he left home to go to a dance and rode in the back right seat of the car. Defendant’s father did not recall any discussion about his son going to a dance that evening.
The sole issue defendant presents to this Court is whether the trial court erred in denying his motions to dismiss at the close of the State’s evidence and at the close of all the evidence.
“When considering a motion to dismiss, ‘[i]f the trial court determines that a reasonable inference of the defendant’s guilt may be drawn from the evidence, it must deny the defendant’s motion and send the case to the jury even though the evidence may also support reasonable inferences of the defendant’s innocence.’ ” State v. Alexander, 337 N.C. 182, 187, 446 S.E.2d 83, 86 (1994) (quoting State v. Smith, 40 N.C. App. 72, 79, 252 S.E.2d 535, 540 (1979)), quoted in State v. Grigsby, 351 N.C. 454, 456-57, 526 S.E.2d 460, 462 (2000). In analyzing a motion to dismiss, the trial court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. State v. Davis, 325 N.C. 693, 696, 386 S.E.2d 187, 189 (1989). Moreover, the State is given every reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence. Id. If substantial evidence exists, whether direct, circumstantial, or both, supporting a finding that the offense charged was committed by the *552defendant, the case must be left for the jury. Id. at 696-97, 386 S.E.2d at 189. “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” State v. Brown, 310 N.C. 563, 566, 313 S.E.2d 585, 587 (1984).
“[I]n a prosecution for possession of contraband materials, the prosecution is not required to prove actual physical possession of the materials.” State v. Perry, 316 N.C. 87, 96, 340 S.E.2d 450, 456 (1986). Proof of nonexclusive, constructive possession is sufficient. Id. Constructive possession exists when the defendant, “while not having actual possession, . . . has the intent and capability to maintain control and dominion over” the narcotics. State v. Beaver, 317 N.C. 643, 648, 346 S.E.2d 476, 480 (1986). “Where such materials are found on the premises under the control of an accused, this fact, in and of itself, gives rise to an inference of knowledge and possession which may be sufficient to carry the case to the jury on a charge of unlawful possession.” State v. Harvey, 281 N.C. 1, 12, 187 S.E.2d 706, 714 (1972). “However, unless the person has exclusive possession of the place where the narcotics are found, the State must show other incriminating circumstances before constructive possession may be inferred.” Davis, 325 N.C. at 697, 386 S.E.2d at 190; sée also Brown, 310 N.C. at 569, 313 S.E.2d at 588-89.
In the present case, since defendant did not have exclusive possession of the car in which the cocaine was found, the critical issue is whether the evidence discloses other incriminating circumstances sufficient for the jury to find defendant had constructive possession of the cocaine. See Davis, 325 N.C. at 697, 386 S.E.2d at 190. When the evidence is examined in the light most favorable to the State, we find such additional incriminating circumstances do exist and the trial court therefore properly denied defendant’s motions to dismiss. See id. at 697-99, 386 S.E.2d at 190-91; see also Brown, 310 N.C. at 569-70, 313 S.E.2d at 589.
At the time of his arrest, defendant had been in the car approximately twenty minutes. According to both officers, there was an odor of marijuana in the car. The officers also found marijuana seeds and rolling papers inside the car. Accordingly, a juror could reasonably determine defendant knew drugs were in the car. A juror could also reasonably conclude the drugs came from the package hidden in the car seat under defendant. Finally, Officer Epps testified defendant was the only person in the car who could have shoved the package containing the cocaine into the crease of the car seat.
*553We hold this evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, supports the charge of possession of cocaine. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in submitting that charge to the jury. The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.