Court Opinion

ID: 9703136
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:42:06.263735+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:45.941736
License: Public Domain

NIX, Justice,
concurring.
In this case the majority correctly states the question to be whether an intervening negligent act of a second actor will discharge a first actor’s liability for antecedent negligence. The basic question is whether the first tortfeasor’s action was in fact a legal cause of the resultant injury. If in fact it was, as is the case here, the fact that a second actor may also have contributed to the injury does not relieve the initial tortfeasor of responsibility.
In determining whether an act of negligence is a legal cause, we have stated the test to be whether it is a substantial factor in bringing about this injury. Ross v. Vereb, 481 Pa. 446, 392 A.2d 1376 (1978); Miller v. Checker Yellow Cab Co., 465 Pa. 82, 348 A.2d 128 (1975); Estate of Flickinger v. Ritsky, 452 Pa. 69, 305 A.2d 40 (1973). Under these circumstances, this Court has stated that the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 447 (1965) provides the criteria to be employed in ascertaining whether the actor’s negligent conduct is a substantial factor. Miller v. Checker Yellow Cab Co., supra.
I agree with the majority that applying § 447 to the instant facts requires a conclusion that the appellees, M. O’Herron Co. and Peoples Natural Gas Co. can also be held accountable for the injuries sustained.
It is for that reason that I join in the mandate of the majority opinion.