Court Opinion

ID: 9646200
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 12:52:11.427814+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:35.380754
License: Public Domain

W.H. “Dub” Arnold, Chief Justice, dissenting. I respectfully disagree with the majority opinion that the arrest of appellant was illegal and that the statement made after being apprised of his Miranda rights should have been suppressed. First, it is my opinion that the arrest was a lawful arrest. Secondly, even if the arrest was illegal, the statement made by Henderson should not have been suppressed. Detective Ernie Bush testified that he is a detective with the Pulaski County Sheriffs Department, a deputized U.S. Marshall, and a Deputized Special Agent with the F.B.I. Detective Bush is assigned to MetRock, the Metropolitan Little Rock Violent Crimes Task Force. He further testified that often his duties take him out of Pulaski County, so he was deputized with authority to act throughout the state. In this case, Special Agent Peatross of the F.B.I., Detective Bush’s supervisor, authorized him to use a body recording device on Gary Harris in Lonoke County. Detective Bush was present with other Pulaski County officers in Lonoke County when the device was used and appellant was arrested. At the time of the arrest, Deputy Bush was a duly sworn law enforcement officer with the authority to arrest appellant in any county in Arkansas. He was authorized by his supervisor to participate in the investigation, and his presence along with the Pulaski County officers made the arrest legal following Logan v. State, 264 Ark. 920, 576 S.W.2d 203 (1979). According to Logan, the mere presence of an officer with a commission entitling him to make an arrest legitimizes an arrest even if that officer is not the person who actually makes the arrest. The presence and acquiescence of a duly authorized officer is the key to determining whether an arrest is authorized. In this case, Detective Bush was duly commissioned to make arrests in any county in Arkansas. As the majority noted, his presence and participation in Henderson’s arrest certainly give an inference that he participated in the arrest. This inference validates the arrest and makes it a permissible arrest pursuant to Logan. Secondly, even if the arrest was unlawful, the statement given by Henderson should not be suppressed. Before Henderson gave any statement, he was advised of his Miranda rights at least an hour after his arrest. Henderson then gave the incriminating statement that he fired the gun that killed Billy Little. In New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 18 (1990), discussed supra by the majority, the United States Supreme Court based its ruling upon the fact that the police had probable cause to arrest Harris, so he was not unlawfully in custody when he was taken to the police station, given his Miranda warnings, and interrogated. The Court noted that the existence of probable cause was the defining factor in whether evidence should be suppressed as fruits of an illegal search. In Harris, the Court noted: ‘We have declined to adopt a ‘per se’ or ‘but for’ rule that would make inadmissible any evidence, whether tangible or live-witness testimony, which somehow came to light through a chain of causation that began with an illegal arrest.’ citing United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 276 (1978). Additionally, the Court concluded that Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) “was designed to protect the physical integrity of the home . . . not to grant criminal suspects . . . protection for statements made outside their premises where the police have probable cause to arrest the suspect for committing a crime.” Harris, 435 U.S. at 17. Once officers have probable cause to arrest, a suspect is not unlawfully detained when taken into custody, regardless of whether the actual arrest was legal. Id. at 18. In Harris, the Court examined the cases of Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979); and Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687 (1982) and determined that these cases stand for the proposition that “indirect fruits of an illegal search or arrest should be suppressed when they bear a sufficiently close relationship to the underlying illegality.” Harris, 435 U.S. at 19. Such a close relationship occurs when the police wrongly have control of a defendant’s person in the absence of probable cause. In an instance where probable cause exists prior to arrest, the police have justification to question a suspect prior to arrest, so “subsequent statement^] [are] not an exploitation of an illegal entry” into a home or an exploitation of an illegal arrest. Id. at 19. It is undisputed that Henderson was given his Miranda warnings and waived those rights. In the case before us, the police did have probable cause to detain Henderson. There is no evidence that the detention violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The majority bases the suppression of Henderson’s statement on the fact that the police should not be sanctioned in effectuating arrests beyond their territorial borders. Despite the fact that I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the arrest was illegal, this should not affect the legitimacy of a statement made once Henderson was in custody. The statement made while Henderson was in custody was not the outcome of an exploitation of his rights guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion and contend that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. Glaze, J., joins. Thornton, J., joins to the extent that the opinion expresses that Henderson’s arrest was lawful.