Court Opinion

ID: 9954535
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-26 16:01:05.59604+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:12:58.719631
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 23-3129     Document: 010111022060      Date Filed: 03/26/2024   Page: 1
                                                                                 FILED
                                                                     United States Court of Appeals
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                        March 26, 2024
                          _________________________________
                                                                        Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                            Clerk of Court
  TOMMY MAY,

        Plaintiff - Appellant,

  v.                                                        No. 23-3129
                                                   (D.C. No. 5:22-CV-03198-JWL)
  (FNU) BUNTING; MELODY STRODA;                               (D. Kan.)
  DR. JODY PALMER,

        Defendants - Appellees.
                       _________________________________

                              ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
                          _________________________________

 Before TYMKOVICH, PHILLIPS, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges.
                  _________________________________

       Tommy May, a Kansas prisoner appearing pro se1 appeals the district court’s

 dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against various prison officials. Exercising

 jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.

       *
         After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
 unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
 this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
 ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
 precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
 estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
 Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
       1
        Because Mr. May proceeds pro se, we construe his arguments liberally, but
 we “cannot take on the responsibility of serving as [his] attorney in constructing
 arguments and searching the record.” Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer,
 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005).
Appellate Case: 23-3129    Document: 010111022060        Date Filed: 03/26/2024     Page: 2

       Mr. May suffered from cancer. He alleged in his complaint that, prior to his

 incarceration at Douglas County Detention Center (DCDC), he had a prescription for

 oxycodone pain medication to manage his chronic pain. But officials at DCDC

 refused to provide oxycodone to him. He brought a § 1983 action consisting of two

 claims: (1) denial of access to the courts related to COVID-19 policies that restricted

 his access to the prison law library; and (2) denial of appropriate medical care rising

 to the level of deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

       Because Mr. May proceeded in forma pauperis (IFP), the district court

 screened his complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The court dismissed the

 access-to-courts claim2 but ordered the prison to prepare a report under

 Martinez v. Aaron, 570 F.2d 317, 319 (10th Cir. 1978), to better evaluate the Eighth

 Amendment claim. Mr. May moved for the court to appoint counsel for him, but the

 court denied the motion. The court also denied multiple motions to reconsider its

 earlier denial of the motion to appoint counsel. Upon receipt of the Martinez report,

 the court dismissed the Eighth Amendment claim. This timely appeal followed.

       “We review de novo the district court’s decision to dismiss an IFP complaint

 under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim.” Kay v. Bemis,

 500 F.3d 1214, 1217 (10th Cir. 2007). In so doing, “[w]e apply the same standard of

 review . . . that we employ for Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motions to

       2
        Mr. May does not challenge the dismissal of his access-to-courts claim, so
 we do not consider it. See Folks v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 784 F.3d 730,
 737 (10th Cir. 2015) (deeming as waived arguments not addressed in opening brief).

                                            2
Appellate Case: 23-3129      Document: 010111022060         Date Filed: 03/26/2024      Page: 3

 dismiss.” Id. “Under this standard, we must accept all the well-pleaded allegations

 of the complaint as true and must construe them in the light most favorable to the

 plaintiff.” Waller v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 932 F.3d 1277, 1282 (10th Cir. 2019)

 (internal quotation marks omitted). “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual

 matter . . . to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). To meet this standard,

 the plaintiff must “plead[] factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

 inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

        Courts apply a deliberate indifference standard to determine whether prison

 staff violated a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual

 punishment. This standard includes an objective component, which “is met if the

 harm suffered is sufficiently serious to implicate the Cruel and Unusual Punishment

 Clause.” Callahan v. Poppell, 471 F.3d 1155, 1159 (10th Cir. 2006) (internal

 quotation marks omitted). Claims that “amount[] to merely a disagreement with

 [prison staff’s] medical judgment concerning the most appropriate treatment,” do not

 meet this standard. Gee v. Pacheco, 627 F.3d 1178, 1192 (10th Cir. 2010).

        Mr. May argues his allegations that DCDC refused to fill his prescription for

 oxycodone, an opioid, meet this test. But the district court concluded his allegations,

 at most, amounted to a disagreement with prison medical staff on the most

 appropriate treatment in his specific circumstance, and on de novo review of the

 record, we agree. To this end, we also reject Mr. May’s argument that the district

 court erroneously assumed DCDC had a policy prohibiting the prescription of opioids

                                               3
Appellate Case: 23-3129    Document: 010111022060        Date Filed: 03/26/2024    Page: 4

 to all prisoners. Regardless of whether DCDC had such a policy, the record reflects

 it reasonably decided against dispensing opioids to Mr. May specifically, and

 disagreement with that decision does not create an Eighth Amendment claim. See

 Gee, 627 F.3d at 1192.

       Mr. May also argues the district court should have granted him leave to amend

 his complaint before dismissing it, but he did not request such leave below, nor does

 he identify to this court what factual allegations he would have added to cure the

 deficiencies the district court identified. Under these circumstances, we discern no

 error in the failure to sua sponte grant leave to amend. See Glenn v. First Nat’l Bank

 in Grand Junction, 868 F.2d 368, 371 (10th Cir. 1989).

       Finally, we reject Mr. May’s argument that the district court erred in denying

 his motion for appointment of counsel. “We review the denial of appointment of

 counsel in a civil case for an abuse of discretion.” Rucks v. Boergermann,

 57 F.3d 978, 979 (10th Cir. 1995). “The burden is upon the applicant to convince the

 court that there is sufficient merit to his claim to warrant the appointment of counsel.

 This contemplates an examination of the state of the record at the time the request is

 made.” McCarthy v. Weinberg, 753 F.2d 836, 838 (10th Cir. 1985) (internal citation

 omitted). “Only in those extreme cases where the lack of counsel results in

 fundamental unfairness will the district court’s decision be overturned.” Id. at 839.

 Mr. May argues, as he did before the district court, that counsel would have assisted

 in him in reviewing the record and presenting his case, but this does not establish

 fundamental unfairness. “It is not enough that having counsel appointed would have

                                            4
Appellate Case: 23-3129    Document: 010111022060        Date Filed: 03/26/2024    Page: 5

 assisted the prisoner in presenting his strongest possible case, as the same could be

 said in any case.” Steffey v. Orman, 461 F.3d 1218, 1223 (10th Cir. 2006) (internal

 quotation marks and brackets omitted).

       We affirm the judgment of the district court. We grant Mr. May’s motion to

 proceed IFP on appeal.

                                             Entered for the Court

                                             Gregory A. Phillips
                                             Circuit Judge

                                            5