Court Opinion

ID: 9425713
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:15:31.682536+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:57.125318
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Douglas,
dissenting in part.
While I agree that Puerto Rico is a State for purposes of the thrée-júdge court jurisdiction, I dissent on the merits.
The discovery of marihuana on the yacht took place May 6, 1972. The seizure of the yacht took place on July 11; 1972 — over two months later. In view of the long delay in making the seizure where is that “special need for very prompt action” which we eniphasized in Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U. S. 67, 91? The Court cites instances of exigent circumstances — seized .poisoned food, dangerous drugs, failure of a bank, and the like. But they are inapt. •
Fuentes v. Shevin, involved, a contest between debtor and creditor and a resolution of private property rights not implicated, in an important governmental purpose. Here important, governmental purposes are involved. As *692to that type- of ease we said in Fuentes': “First, in each case, the seizure has been directly necessary to secure an important governmental or general public interest. Second, there has been a special need for very prompt action. Third, the State has kept strict control over its monopoly of legitimate force: the person initiating the seizure has been a government official responsible for determining, under the standards of a narrowly drawn statute, that it was necessary and justified in the particular instance. Thus, the Coürt has allowed summary seizure of property to collect the internal revenue of the United States, to meet the needs of a national war. effort, to protect against the economic disaster of a bank failure, and to protect the public from misbranded drugs and contaminated food.” Id., at 91-92.
Postponement of notice and hearing until after seizure of the. vessel apparently was not needed here, as the District Court held. Yet after that two-month delay, forfeiture of the vessel is ordered without notice to the owner and without just compensation for the taking. On those premises this is the classic case of lack of procedural due process.
The owner on the récord before us was wholly innocent of knowing that the lessee was using the vessel illegally. To analogize this case to the old cases of forfeiture of property of felons is peculiarly inappropriate. Nor is this a case where owner and. lessee are “in cahoots” in a smuggling venture or negligent in any way. The law does provide for forfeitures Of property even of the innocent. But as Mr. Chief Justice Marshall said in Peisch v. Ware, 4 Cranch 347, 365: “[T]he law is not understood to forfeit the property of owners or consignees, on account of the misconduct of mere strangers, over whom such owners or consignees could have no control.”'
The lessee of the vessel was, of course, no stranger. *693Here unlike United States v. One Ford Coach, 307 U. S. 219, 238-239 (Douglas, J., dissenting), there is no sug-‘ gestión that the lessee was a mere strawman for runners of drugs. Even where such ambiguous circumstances •were present the Court refused to impose forfeiture of an auto running illegal whiskey and belonging to those who acted “in good faith and without negligence.” Id., at 236.
The present case is one of extreme hardship. The District Court found thsit the owner “did not know that its property was being used for an illegal purpose and was completely innocent of the lessee’s criminal act. After the seizure and within the time allowed by law, the Superintendent [of the Police] notified lessee. Plaintiff was never notified and, since lessee did not post bond, the yacht was forfeited to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. It was not until plaintiff attempted to recover possession of the yacht after lessee had defaulted in the rental payments that plaintiff learned of its forfeiture.” 363 F. Supp. 1337, 1340. Moreover, the owner had included in the lease a prohibition against use of the yacht for an unlawful project.
If the yacht had been notoriously used in smuggling drugs, those who claim forfeiture might have equity on their side. But no such showing was made; and so far as we know only one marihuana cigarette was found on the yacht. We deal here with trivia where harsh judge-made law should be tempered with justice. I realize that the ancient law is founded on the fiction that the inanimate object itself is guilty of wrongdoing. United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U. S. 715, 719-720. But that traditional forfeiture doctrine cannot at times be reconciled with the requirements of the Fifth Amendment;. Id., at 721. Such a case is the present one,
*694Sonie forfeiture statutes are mandatory, title vesting in the State when the forfeiting act occurs. United States v. Stowell, 133 U. S. 1, 19. Others are conditional, forfeiture occurring only if and when the State follows prescribed procedures. . One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U. S. 693, 699. Some forfeiture statutes exclude from their scope, property used m violation .of the law as to which the owner is not “a consenting party or privy.” See 19 U. S. C. § 1694. Some provide for discretionary administrative or judicial relief from forfeiture if the forfeiture was incurred without willful negligence or without'any intention on the . part of the owner, to violate the law, 19 U. S. C. § 1618, or if the owner had at no time any knowledge or reason to. believe that the property was used in violation of specified laws, 18 U. S. C. § 3617 (b); United States v. One Ford Coach, 307 U. S. 219.
Puerto Rico, however, has no provision for mitigation in case the owner of the seized property is wholly innocent of any wrongdoing. And, as the Court says, these absolute, mandatory forfeiture procedures have been. supported at least by much dicta in the cases.
But in my view, there was a taking of private property “for public use” under the Fifth Amendment, applied to the States by the Fourteenth, and compensation must be paid an innocent owner. Where the owner is in no way implicated in the illegal project, I see no way to avoid paying just compensation for property taken. I, therefore, would remand the case to the three-judge court for findings as to the innocence of the lessor of the yacht — whether the illegal use was of such magnitude or notoriety that the owner cannot be found faultless in remaining ignorant of. its occurrence.
*695The law of deodánds* was at one time as severe as, the rule applied this day by the Court. See Law of Deodands, 34 Law Mag. 188—191 (1845). Its severity was tempered by juries who were sustained <by the King’s Bench, id., at 191. The “great moderation” of the jurors in light of “the moral innocéñcé of the party ineurringthe penalty,” id., at 190, is an example , we should follow here. While the law of deodands does not obtain here (cf. Goldsmith-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U. S. 505, 510-511; United States v. One Ford Coupe, 272 U. S. 321, 333), the quality of mercy is no stranger to our equity jurisdiction, Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U. S. 321, 329-330; United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76, 95.

The law of deodands starting with Exodus 21:28 is related by O. Holmes, The Common Law 7 et seq. (1881). Deodand derives from Deo dandum (to be given to God). “It was to be given to God, that is to say to the church, for the king, to be expended for the good of his soul.” Id.; at 24.