Court Opinion

ID: 9570680
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:25:10.690335+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:13:37.436186
License: Public Domain

GILBERT, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion and would affirm the court of appeals. The majority has mischaracterized the issue. The issue is the rate of interest, not when interest ceases to accrue on deposited funds. The respondent in this case has merely requested its statutory interest on a judgment or award pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 549.09, subd. 1 (2000), with due credit given for all interest accumulated on deposited funds, and that is what respondent should receive. The majority opinion nullifies the statutory judgment/award rate of interest provision, Minn-Stat. § 549.09, subd. 1, requiring a condemning authority to pay a property owner interest on the commissioners’ damage award from the date that petitioner takes possession of the condemned property, in favor of the statutory provision providing for interest earned on a quick-take deposit. See Minn. Stat. § 117.042(b) (2000).
The majority’s conclusion does not conform with the basic rules of statutory construction. Apparently conflicting laws are to be construed together, if possible, to give effect to both provisions. Minn.Stat. § 645.26, subd. 1 (2000); State ex rel. Beaulieu v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 624, 533 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Minn.1995). Contrary to what the majority opinion holds, interest continues to accrue even after deposit. Section 117.042(b) provides in part that “[a]ll interest credited to the amount deposited from the date of deposit shall be paid to the ultimate recipient of the amount deposited.” Thus, we must determine if the judgment or award interest rate is displaced by the deposit rate of interest rather than determine if all interest ceases to accrue upon deposit.
The majority supports its opinion with a new construction of the phrase “until the money becomes available to the landowner,” contained in Ford Motor Co. v. City of Minneapolis, 143 Minn. 392, 395, 173 N.W. 713, 715 (1919). In Ford, we decided only the narrow question of whether interest is allowed on the final award from the date of the original award. Ford did not decide the issue before us now, nor did Ford hold as the majority states that “interest ceased accruing when the funds became available.” In fact, Ford implies just the opposite. We stated in Ford that “[sjuch interest could not well be included in the final award as the full amount of interest could not be determined at that time.” Id. at 396, 173 N.W. 713, 173 N.W. at 715.
Furthermore, the offset of value for the use of the premises against the interest found to be due in Ford would be similar to the offset of the interest earned on deposit from the total statutory judgment/award interest due on the final award due in this case. However, the majority holds that because of the above language in Ford, the statutory judgment/award interest ceases to accrue on money that the condemning authority elects to deposit with the clerk of the district court in an eminent domain proceeding pursuant to the quick-take statute, Minn.Stat. § 117.042, even though the property owner cannot access the quick-take portion of the damages until the district court directs the deposited funds to be disbursed.
*596The majority opinion avoids addressing the controlling part of Minn.Stat. § 117.195, subd. 1 (2000), which specifies the rate of interest to be determined according to section 549.09, subd. 1, and the interplay between that rate and the interest earned on deposit as provided in Minn. Stat. § 117.042(b) of the quick-take statute.1 The statutory judgment/award interest section governs the interest calculation on condemnation awards and importantly, neither Minn.Stat. § 117.195, subd. 1, nor section 549.09 indicate that interest shall either be diminished or enhanced by the deposit of funds with the court administrator. When the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we should follow the plain meaning of the statutes. Minn.Stat. § 645.16 (2000).
All damages allowed under this eminent domain proceeding were determined to be $520,000 by the commissioners, pursuant to an award dated May 19, 1999. On May 27, 1999, the respondent petitioned the court for release of these funds, and the funds were released at the hearing date on June 10, 1999. Therefore, the respondent argues that he is entitled to statutory interest on the entire award of $520,000 from November 4, 1998, the day following the condemning authority’s possession date and date of the quick-take deposit with the court of $425,000, until June 10, 1999 (with credit for amounts earned on deposit).2
The majority opinion digresses into policy considerations of why money is deposited in the court on a quick-take to support its conclusion that interest then abates. The majority then concludes that “a district court need not order disbursement of deposited quick-take funds for those funds to be considered available for purposes of the Ford rule allowing judgment interest until the funds become available to the property owner.” There is no present authority cited for such a notion, and it does not make practical sense. In the practical sense, this means that even though a respondent does not have use of the funds, statutory judgment/award interest would not accrue on the quick-take deposit. I would suggest that a delayed payment without full statutory judgmenVaward interest is in violation of both our constitutional and statutory requirements of just compensation.3 The majority substitutes interest earned on deposit for the currently mandated statutory judgment/award interest without legislative authority to make that switch.
The majority also misconstrues Minn. Stat. § 117.155 (2000) in support of its reasoning. It interprets that statute to abate interest by stating “providing full or partial payment on an award pending appeal shall not draw judgment interest from date of ‘payment or deposit’ * * However, this abatement only occurs when a property owner “refuses to accept such payment” on appeal. Id. Here, the owner did not refuse to accept such payment but rather, the condemning authority deposited the money with the court. The majori*597ty’s reliance on Minn.Stat. § 117.155 under these facts is misplaced.
The majority opinion also cites Warren for the proposition that “interest ceased accruing when judgment was entered.” However, Warren addressed only prejudgment interest and required that interest computed from the date of filing the award to entry of judgment be added to the amount of the verdict. See 21 Minn, at 427. Warren does not support the majority’s conclusion that interest then ceases to accrue and “[t]hus, disbursing payment to the property owner was not necessary for interest to cease accruing.” Warren simply does not mention “disbursing payment” nor does it indicate when any payment was made to the landowner or whether funds were ever deposited in court.
The majority’s use of Fine v. City of Minneapolis4 to imply that there was some basis other than a written agreement to determine when deposited funds became available without the property owner actually receiving the funds is only another means used to rewrite Minn.Stat. § 117.195. In Fine, we specifically noted that “[n]o consideration or review was sought of the order directing the payment of [the quick-take deposit] without any added interest. Instead, * * * the Fines commenced this independent class action to recover interest on the funds originally deposited * * *.” 391 N.W.2d at 854. Our holding in Fine was limited to the issue of whether “ * * * the deposit with the court of an amount equal to the petitioner’s approved appraisal of value pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 117.042 ⅜ * * did not give rise to a separate cause of action for interest on the deposited fund.” 391 N.W.2d at 856. However, in this case, the respondent sought review of the precise issue not decided in Fine: accrued interest due on the quick-take deposit. In Fine, there was a settlement and no commissioners’ award like we have in this case. Id.
The payment, of statutory interest pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 117.195 on only the additional $95,000 awarded by the commissioners over and above the quick-take deposit does not eliminate the accrual of statutory interest on the quick-take deposit. In fact, our decision in Fine would require interest on the “final award from the date of the original award,” in this case, the date of the quick-take deposit. Ford, 143 Minn. at 396, 173 N.W. at 715. The trial court should then determine the amount earned on deposit similar to determining the value of the use of the lands in question in Ford and “offset the value of such use against the interest.” Id.
If there was a deposit, to the extent that there was interest earned on the deposit, the interest amounts paid to the ultimate recipient pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 117.042(b) would of course be an offset to the statutory interest rate mandated by Minn.Stat. § 117.195, subd. 1. That would require the court to make an equitable adjustment. If the city desired an earlier payout of the deposited funds, it also could have petitioned the court or paid them directly to respondent.5 Construing these statutes this way would not only eliminate the concern for the duplication of interest factor we mentioned in Fine, 391 N.W.2d at 856, but also validate both Minn.Stat. § 117.195, subd. 1, and. Minn.Stat. § 117.042(b), without having to choose one over the other. The legislature directs that when interpreting such potentially *598conflicting statutes, “the two shall be construed, if possible, so that effect may be given to both.” Minn.Stat. § 645.26, subd. 1.
Accordingly, I would affirm the court of appeals and remand this case to the district court to determine the statutory interest amount with credit for interest earned on deposit.

."All damages allowed under this chapter, whether by the commissioners or upon appeal, shall bear interest from the time of the filing of the commissioner's [sic] report or from the date of the petitioner’s possession, whichever occurs first. The rate of interest shall be determined according to section 549.09.” Minn.Stat. § 117.195, subd. 1.

. The city withheld disclosing its final appraisal value of $375,000, which was $50,000 less than the amount the city originally deposited with the court until March 2, 1999, the second day of the commissioners’ hearing.

. See Warren v. First Div. St. Paul & Pac. R.R. Co., 21 Minn. 424, 427 (1875) (emphasizing just compensation and delayed payment in terms of "if paid”).

. 391 N.W.2d 853 (Minn.1986).

. This case does not involve a situation as mentioned by the majority where a property owner has waited indefinitely, at public expense, to claim deposited funds.