Court Opinion

ID: 9850368
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:56:14.082122+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:35.959454
License: Public Domain

SINGLETON, Judge,
joined by BRYNER, Chief Judge, concurring.
I agree with the court’s resolution of all issues. I believe a few further comments are necessary to explain our rejection of Rhodes’ contention that evidence of Ryan Rhodes’ death violated Alaska Rules of Evidence 403 and 404(b). Rhodes was convicted of assault in the first degree, on the theory that he intentionally performed an act that resulted in serious physical injury to another under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life. AS 11.41.200(a)(3). This theory of assault in the first degree is very similar to the theory of murder in the second degree discussed in Neitzel v. State, 655 P.2d 325 (Alaska App.1982), where we considered AS 11.41.110(a)(2) (a person commits the crime of murder in the second degree if ... the person intentionally performs an act that results in the death of another person under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to the value of human life). In Neitzel, we concluded that the state’s prima facie case must establish that the defendant knowingly engaged in conduct which caused the death of another and, in light of the circumstances, was reckless to the point that he or she manifested an extreme indifference to the value of human life. 655 P.2d at 332-33. Applying that concept to this case, in order to convict Rhodes, the state had to show that he was extremely reckless, almost to the point that he knew that his conduct was substantially certain to cause serious physical injury to his victim. Id., 655 P.2d at 336-39. In order to sustain this burden, the state was required to show that Rhodes had knowledge of the risk that his conduct posed to his victim’s safety.
The court properly concluded that Rhodes’ knowledge about the circumstances leading to Ryan Rhodes’ death was relevant to prove his knowledge of the risk to Amanda from throwing her on the bed. See, e.g., Shane v. Rhines, 672 P.2d 895, 899 n. 3 (Alaska 1983); Abruska v. State, 705 P.2d 1261, 1263-64 & n. 1 (Alaska App.1985); 2 J. Wigmore, Evidence §§ 2245-301 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1979) and C. Wright and K. Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure: Evidence § 5245 (1978). As Wright and Graham point out, where evidence is offered to show state of mind or knowledge, no inference as to character is required. The evidence is not being used to show that because the defendant acted in a particular way in the past, he acted in that same way in the present, and consequently, use of the evidence for this purpose is not precluded by Evidence Rule 404(b). Id., § 5245 at 505.