Court Opinion

ID: 9769910
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 15:07:47.111356+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:09.186149
License: Public Domain

Leflar, J. (dissenting). The facts of this case have been fully set out in the majority opinion, as have also the relevant rules of law. They will be restated here only to the extent necessary to present my views. Peaceful picketing is lawful in Arkansas, at least when used as a means for publicizing efforts to achieve lawful ends against the party picketed. Local No. 802 v. Asimos, 216 Ark. 694, 227 S. W. 2d 154. The communication of information by such picketing is a part of the freedom of speech which is guaranteed by the Constitution. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 60 8. Ct. 736, 84 L. Ed. 460. But picketing may be forbidden when it is used to achieve unlawful ends. Giboney v. Empire Storage Co., 336 U. S. 490, 69 S. Ct. 684, 93 L. Ed. 834; Building Service Union v. Gazzam, 339 U. S. 532; 70 S. Ct. 784. A collective bargaining contract calling for a closed shop is unlawful in Arkansas. Constitution of Arkansas, Amendment 34; Ark. Stats., §§ 81-201 to 81-205. There is no law in Arkansas, however, that requires contracts of employment to he entered into for any specific period of time, such as one year, and it is altogether lawful for employers and employees to contract voluntarily for a period of employment covering sixty days only, or more, or less. We have no law that requires a workman to promise by contract that he will work for more than sixty days if he does not choose to do so. Furthermore, the National Labor Relations Act does not apply to intrastate employment. There is no contention that it applies in the present case. That federal enactment creates the concept of “unfair labor practices” which, according to the opinion of the National Labor Relations Board quoted in the majority opinion herein, (86 N. L. R. B. Reports 1041) includes conduct similar to that involved in the present case. As to that it suffices to say that no similar law has been enacted in Arkansas to create the statutory concept of “unfair labor practices,” and there is no common law rule in Arkansas making it unlawful for laborers to seek a sixty-day contract rather than a one year contract of employment, regardless of their reasons. The contract sought by defendants here would obligate them to work for at least sixty days in an open shop. The contract would not automatically terminate at the end of sixty days, of course, but the reserved right in either party to terminate it by sixty days written notice would produce at least a theoretical possibility that the contract might not last longer than sixty days (though experience shows that many contracts made by skittish and suspicious parties with sixty-day or thirty-day termination clauses actually last for years.) I therefore refer to it as a sixty-day contract merely. Our Amendment 34, and its enabling act, do not say that employees must contract to work in an open shop for at least a year at a time. A contract for sixty days of open shop employment is a completely valid contract under onr law. The evidence quoted in the majority opinion indicates that if this sixty-day contract is signed the defend- , ants will not work more than sixty days under it. That would be their privilege under the contract. It is also their privilege under the law of Arkansas. If the contract and the defendants’ employment under it are terminated at the end of sixty days a new problem will obviously have arisen. It may be assumed that the employer will offer a new contract containing the same open shop provisions and the same sixty-day notice clause. If the defendants accept it, work will continue without interruption. If they reject it on the ground that the wage scale provided by it is too low they will be within their rights and no law will be violated. If they reject it because of the open shop provisions, and insist upon closed shop provisions, they will be asking for an illegal contract, and picketing to achieve it may be lawfully enjoined. Giboney v. Empire Storage Co., supra; Building Service Union v. Gazzam, supra; Local No. 802 v. Asimos, supra. At that stage, but not until that stage, the picketing will be used to achieve unlawful ends. It may be said that this merely postpones an inevitable outcome, that by the evidence the unlawful end will surely be sought sixty days hence in any event, and that we might as well assume its inevitability and enjoin it now. The difficulty with this is that the assumedly inevitable outcome is not what we are enjoining now. What we are enjoining now is something else, something that is lawful. Apart from that, we do not really know that an effort to secure an unlawful closed shop contract will surely be the inevitable outcome of a sixty-day contract executed now. There is testimony from which it is inferred that this effort will ensue. But minds and motives change as time passes. New bargaining techniques may be developed, new incentives may arise. It is at least conceivable that the problem may not exist at all after the men have been back at work for sixty days. The action now being taken by the majority of this Court appears to me to be a serious and a dangerous one. It is not limited in its impact or effect to labor union cases. It may apply in any case where any group, or any individual, seeks to engage in lawful conduct which, in the minds of some or all, may create a later opportunity for unlawful conduct. It is the motive, the hope, the uncertain expectation that is feared, and because of the fear a lawful act is enjoined. This is too tenuous. It goes a step beyond our past decisions in seeking to control the minds of men by law, in seeking to prevent the peaceful communication of ideas upon a subject of legitimate public interest. I do not want to take that step.