Court Opinion

ID: 9910763
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-18 16:00:40.725618+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:54:13.741177
License: Public Domain

22-6507
     Pierre v. Garland
                                                                                           BIA
                                                                                     Conroy, IJ
                                                                                   A059 579 627

                              UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                  FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                   SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL
APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY
CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL.

 1         At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
 2   Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley
 3   Square, in the City of New York, on the 18th day of December, two thousand
 4   twenty-three.
 5
 6   PRESENT:
 7                       GERARD E. LYNCH,
 8                       JOSEPH F. BIANCO,
 9                       BETH ROBINSON,
10                    Circuit Judges.
11   _____________________________________
12
13   STANLEY PIERRE,
14            Petitioner,
15
16                       v.                                              22-6507
17                                                                       NAC
18   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
19   STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
20              Respondent.
21   _____________________________________
22
23   FOR PETITIONER:                         Craig Relles, Law Office of Craig Relles,
24                                           White Plains, NY.
1    FOR RESPONDENT:                     Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant
2                                        Attorney General; Stephen J. Flynn, Assistant
3                                        Director; Anna Juarez, Senior Litigation
4                                        Counsel, Office of Immigration Litigation,
5                                        United States Department of Justice,
6                                        Washington, DC.
7
8          UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of

 9   Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

10   DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED.

11         Petitioner Stanley Pierre, a native and citizen of Haiti, seeks review of a

12   September 29, 2022, decision of the BIA affirming a February 8, 2022, decision of

13   an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying his application for withholding of removal

14   and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Stanley Pierre,

15   No. A 059 579 627 (B.I.A. Sept. 29, 2022), aff’g No. A 059 579 627 (Immig. Ct. N.Y.

16   City Feb. 8, 2022). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts

17   and procedural history.

18         We have considered both the IJ’s and the BIA’s decisions. See Wangchuck v.

19   Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). Our jurisdiction to review

20   an order of removal based on an aggravated felony is limited to constitutional

21   claims and questions of law. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C), (D). This jurisdictional

                                              2
1    limitation does not apply to review of CAT claims, and the Supreme Court has left

2    open whether it applies to withholding of removal. See Nasrallah v. Barr, 140 S.

3    Ct. 1683, 1690–94 (2020). Because Pierre’s challenge to the denial of withholding

4    of removal relates to whether the agency applied the proper framework in

5    determining that his aggravated felony conviction was a particularly serious

 6   crime, we reach that determination. See Ojo v. Garland, 25 F.4th 152, 165 (2d Cir.

 7   2022). We find no error in the particularly serious crime determination or the

 8   denial of CAT relief.

 9      I.     Particularly Serious Crime Determination

10           A person convicted of a particularly serious crime is ineligible for

11   withholding of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B).          For withholding of

12   removal, “an aggravated felony (or felonies) for which the alien has been

13   sentenced to an aggregate term of imprisonment of at least 5 years” is per se

14   particularly serious.   Id. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(iv).   Pierre does not dispute that his

15   conviction is an aggravated felony. Because he was sentenced to less than five

16   years’ incarceration, his conviction was not per se particularly serious. But the

17   agency has the authority to make an individualized inquiry as to whether a

18   conviction is for a particularly serious crime regardless of the length of sentence.

                                               3
1    See Nethagani v. Mukasey, 532 F.3d 150, 155 (2d Cir. 2008); see also 8 U.S.C.

2    § 1231(b)(3)(B)(iv).

3          The agency applied the correct legal standard. The agency follows a “two-

4    step analysis.” Ojo, 25 F.4th at 165.     First, the agency considers whether the

5    elements of the offense “potentially bring the crime into a category of particularly

6    serious crimes.” In re N-A-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 336, 342 (B.I.A. 2007). The IJ

7    engaged in this first step.     Pierre was convicted under 18 Pa. Cons. Stat.

8    § 2702(a)(4). That section provides that “[a] person is guilty of aggravated assault

9    if he . . . attempts to cause or intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury to

10   another with a deadly weapon.” “Bodily injury” is defined as “[i]mpairment of

11   physical condition or substantial pain.” Id. § 2301. “Deadly weapon” is defined

12   as “[a]ny firearm, whether loaded or unloaded, or any device designed as a

13   weapon and capable of producing death or serious bodily injury, or any other device

14   or instrumentality which, in the manner in which it is used or intended to be used, is

15   calculated or likely to produce death or serious bodily injury.” Id. (emphasis added).

16   Pierre’s conviction fell within the ambit of particularly serious crimes because the

17   statute requires intent to cause bodily injury to another person. See Nethagani, 532

18   F.3d at 155 (“[C]rimes against persons are more likely to be particularly serious

                                               4
1    than are crimes against property.”); see also Singh v. Barr, 939 F.3d 457, 462–64 (2d

2    Cir. 2019) (upholding BIA’s decision that New York assault provision requiring

3    intent to cause physical injury, physical injury, and use of “deadly weapon or

4    dangerous instrument” was an aggravated felony and a particularly serious

5    crime).

6          Second, the IJ considered the factors set out in Nethagani: “(1) the nature of

7    the conviction, (2) the circumstances and underlying facts of the conviction, [and]

8    (3) the type of sentence imposed.” Nethagani, 532 F.3d at 155 (quotation marks

9    omitted); see also Ojo, 25 F.4th at 165 (“[T]he agency examine[s] the nature of the

10   conviction, the type of sentence imposed, and the circumstances and underlying

11   facts of the conviction to determine if [a crime] is particularly serious.”). The IJ

12   considered the nature and circumstances of the conviction—that the conviction

13   required intent to cause injury and a deadly weapon, and that Pierre intentionally

14   hit the victim with his car with enough force to throw him onto the hood,

15   continued to accelerate while the victim was on the hood, and made a right turn

16   which threw the victim onto the pavement. And the IJ considered the length of

17   the sentence, noting that Pierre had no evidence to corroborate his claim that he

18   served his sentence at a halfway house and on probation. Because the agency

                                              5
 1   considered the relevant factors and the facts reflect an intentional act of violence

 2   against another, the agency did not err in concluding that the crime was

 3   particularly serious. 1 See Nethagani, 532 F.3d at 155.

 4       II.      CAT Relief

 5             Pierre’s conviction does not bar deferral of removal under the CAT. A CAT

 6   applicant has the burden to establish that he would “more likely than not” be

7    tortured by or with the acquiescence of a public official. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c)(2),

8    1208.17(a), 1208.18(a)(1); see Khouzam v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 161, 168 (2d Cir. 2004).

 9   A CAT claim is “too speculative” if “it involves a chain of assumptions”; an

10   applicant is required to show that each “link in the chain . . . [is] more likely than

11   not to occur.” Savchuck v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 119, 123–24 (2d Cir. 2008) (quotation

12   marks omitted). We review factfinding for substantial evidence and questions of

     1 To the extent that Pierre asserts that the evidence was insufficient to establish his
     conviction, his argument is unavailing. The record contains the Superior Court
     of Pennsylvania’s denial of Pierre’s appeal, which confirms that Pierre “appeals
     from the judgment of sentence imposed following his conviction of aggravated
     assault, recklessly endangering another person, reckless driving, and failure to
     stop and render aid.” See Matter of J. R. Velasquez, 25 I. & N. Dec. 680, 686 (B.I.A.
     2012) (noting that “other documents such as an appellate court decision affirming
     or otherwise referencing a conviction would appear to fall within the catch-all
     regulatory provision” of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.41(d)); Ojo, 25 F.4th at 157 (“all reliable
     information may be considered in making a particularly serious crime
     determination, including the conviction records and sentencing information”).
                                                 6
 1   law and application of law to fact de novo. Quintanilla-Mejia v. Garland, 3 F.4th

 2   569, 583 (2d Cir. 2021).

 3         As an initial matter, Pierre’s challenge to the agency’s determination that his

 4   denial of involvement in a gang was not credible lacks merit. “A trier of fact may

 5   base a credibility determination on the demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of the

 6   applicant or witness” and inconsistencies within and between an applicant’s

 7   statements and other evidence.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). “We defer . . . to an

 8   IJ’s credibility determination unless, from the totality of the circumstances, it is

 9   plain that no reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility

10   ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2008).

11         Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that Pierre was

12   not credible on this point. He testified that he was not a member of a gang. But

13   the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) filed a report documenting an

14   investigation that revealed, among other things, that Pierre was arrested in 2016

15   alongside two known Hyena Crip members. When questioned about these facts,

16   Pierre first stated that he was not familiar with a gang named “Hyena Crew”; but

17   moments later, he confirmed that he was aware that the individuals he was

18   arrested with were a part of the Hyena Crew. Given Pierre’s own inconsistent

                                              7
1    statements and the DHS report connecting him to the gang, substantial evidence

2    supports the IJ’s determination that Pierre’s denial of gang membership was not

3    credible. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Likai Gao v. Barr, 968 F.3d 137, 145 n.8

4    (2d Cir. 2020) (“[E]ven a single inconsistency might preclude an alien from

5    showing that an IJ was compelled to find him credible.”).

6          The agency did not otherwise err in denying the CAT claim.                  In

7    determining the likelihood of torture, the agency considers evidence of past

 8   torture and evidence of human rights violations in the country of removal among

 9   any other relevant information. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3). Pierre did not allege

10   past torture. Instead, he alleged that he would more likely than not be tortured

11   by government officials on account of his criminal deportee status and the length

12   of time he has lived in the United States. He also alleged that he would face a

13   higher risk of torture from gangs due to his connections with his mother’s voodoo

14   practice, his father’s kidnapping, and his cousin’s murder.

15         The agency found that Pierre did not establish a likelihood of torture or that

16   if he were detained that Haitian officials would have a specific intent to torture

17   him. Pierre’s expert witness concluded that “[a]ll criminal deportees from the

18   United States are detained for at least hours upon their arrival” and that these

                                              8
1    deportees face a “sharply increased risk of arrest” after release due to the

2    perception that they are career criminals and gang members. The expert’s report

3    goes on to explain that Haitian prison conditions are “brutal and inhumane” and

4    “beating and other torture” is commonplace.          However, this possibility of

5    detention for a few hours or an increased risk of future detention does not establish

6    that Pierre is more likely than not to be tortured while detained for those few hours

7    or that he will more likely than not be detained in the future. See Savchuck, 518

8    F.3d at 124.

9          Moreover, a CAT claim based on prison conditions requires a showing of

10   government intent to torture. See Pierre v. Gonzales, 502 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 2007).

11   The dire conditions in Haitian prisons do not alone demonstrate the “specific

12   intent” necessary to constitute torture under the CAT.       Id.   We left open the

13   possibility that a prisoner with “certain histories, characteristics, or medical

14   conditions” might be “more likely to be targeted not only with . . . individual acts

15   but also with particularly harsh conditions of confinement.” Id. Pierre argues

16   that the agency failed to account for his criminal history and his time spent in the

17   United States, however, he produced no evidence that anyone would intend to

18   torture him for those reasons.     See Pierre, 502 F.3d at 121–22 (“The failure to

                                              9
1    maintain standards of diet, hygiene, and living space in prison does not constitute

2    torture under the CAT unless the deficits are sufficiently extreme and are inflicted

 3   intentionally rather than as a result of poverty, neglect, or incompetence.”).

 4         To the extent Pierre relies on his mother’s voodoo practice, father’s

 5   kidnapping, or his cousin’s murder, he has not shown how these factors would

 6   materially increase his likelihood of torture. “In the absence of solid support in

 7   the record . . . [applicant’s] fear is speculative at best.” Jian Xing Huang v. U.S.

 8   INS, 421 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir. 2005). And although Pierre claims that the agency

 9   failed to consider these risks in the aggregate, the BIA specifically considered this

10   argument and noted that the IJ “thoroughly considered the array of different

11   sources from whom the respondent asserted a risk of torture and the various

12   reasons for his fear of harm, and determined that they do not amount to a

13   likelihood of torture based on the entirety of the record.” See Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S.

14   Dep’t of Just., 471 F.3d 315, 337 n.17 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[W]e presume that [the agency]

15   has taken into account all of the evidence before [it], unless the record

16   compellingly suggests otherwise.”).

17         Accordingly, on this record, the agency did not err in concluding that Pierre

18   failed to satisfy his burden of proof for CAT relief. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c)(2),

                                              10
1    1208.17(a), 1208.18(a)(1); see also Quintanilla-Mejia, 3 F.4th at 593–94 (“[S]ubstantial

2    evidence review does not contemplate any judicial reweighing of evidence.

3    Rather, it requires us to ask only whether record evidence compelled . . . [a] finding

4    different from that reached by the agency.”).

5          For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. All pending

6    motions and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED.

 7                                           FOR THE COURT:
 8                                           Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
 9                                           Clerk of Court
10

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