Court Opinion

ID: 9917439
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-12 15:03:08.853725+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:03:09.134369
License: Public Domain

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                  STATE OF FLORIDA
                 _____________________________

                      Case No. 5D23-1062
                    LT Case No. 2022-015909
                 _____________________________

RAMSEY ZIMMERMAN,

    Appellant,

    v.

STATE OF FLORIDA, FLORIDA
GAMING CONTROL COMMISSION,

    Appellee.
                 _____________________________

Administrative appeal from the State of
Florida, Florida Gaming Control Commission.

David S. Romanik, of David S. Romanik, P.A., Ocala, for
Appellant.

Emily A. Alvarado, Deputy Chief Attorney, and Steven E. Woods,
Deputy Chief Attorney, of Office of the General Counsel, Florida
Gaming Control Commission, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

                        January 12, 2024

SOUD, J.

    Appellant Ramsey Zimmerman appeals the Florida Gaming
Control Commission’s final order denying his application for a
Pari-mutuel Wagering Professional Individual Occupational
License. We have jurisdiction. See Art. V, § 4(b)(2), Fla. Const.;
§ 120.68(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2021); Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(b)(1)(C). We
affirm.

                                 I.

     In January 2022, Zimmerman applied to the Commission for
a Pari-mutuel Wagering Professional Individual Occupational
License, which would allow him to work as a horse jockey. Prior to
this application, Zimmerman had twice been convicted of a felony
offense—a 2018 grand theft conviction in Marion County, Florida,
and a 2019 grand theft of a motor vehicle conviction in Broward
County, Florida. Each of these felony convictions is a disqualifying
felony offense. See § 550.105(5), Fla. Stat. (2021).

    Zimmerman sought a waiver of the disqualification. The
Commission issued its Letter of License Denial in June 2022,
whereby Zimmerman was notified that his request for waiver was
denied and that the Commission would deny his application.

     As permitted by Florida law, Zimmerman requested an
informal hearing to challenge the denial. Following the hearing,
the hearing officer rendered her Recommended Order providing
findings of fact and conclusions of law in support of the
recommendation that the Commission deny Zimmerman’s
application. The hearing officer found, inter alia, that the two
disqualifying crimes “occurred during a time where [Zimmerman]
was on a horrific diet, which ultimately led to an eating disorder”
and his “taking weight loss pills and . . . using illegal substances
in order to lower his weight . . . to improve as a jockey.” 1

     Based on all of the evidence presented, the hearing officer
determined that Zimmerman’s felony convictions were for serious
offenses that occurred only a few years prior to his application, and
that “[i]t is difficult for an applicant to prove rehabilitation from
such serious convictions in a short period of time.” As a result, she
concluded Zimmerman “failed to establish good moral character
and rehabilitation” as required by section 550.105(5)(c).

    1 These findings were based on Zimmerman’s own testimony.

                                 2
     The Commission denied Zimmerman a license, adopting in
toto the recommended order and its findings of fact and conclusions
of law. This appeal followed.

                                  II.

    Zimmerman argues that the Commission’s denial of his
application and request for waiver should be reversed because the
recommended order, adopted by the Commission, deviates from
the Commission’s precedent. Zimmerman’s argument fails.

                                  A.

     When, as here, the Commission’s determination is based on
findings of fact, we review the final order for competent substantial
evidence. See Kinlaw v. Unemplmt. App. Comm’n, 417 So. 2d 802
(Fla. 5th DCA 1982); see also § 120.68(7)(b), Fla. Stat. Questions of
law, however, are reviewed de novo. Fla. Dep’t of Bus. & Prof’l Reg.,
Div. of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco v. Walmart Inc., 323 So. 3d
786 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021).

     In our review, we are not permitted to substitute our
judgment for that of the Commission on disputed issues of fact, see
Kinlaw, 417 So. 2d at 802, or “the weight of the evidence on any
disputed finding of fact.” See § 120.68(7)(b), Fla. Stat. Further, “the
court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency on an
issue of discretion.” See §120.68(7)(e), Fla. Stat. So, when the
findings of an administrative agency are supported by competent
substantial evidence, and the record shows neither an abuse of
discretion nor a violation of law, the agency’s decision will not be
disturbed. See generally Cuenca v. State Bd. of Admin., 259 So. 3d
253 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018).

                                  B.

     Licensure as a pari-mutuel wagering professional is governed
by chapter 550, Florida Statutes, the Florida Pari-mutuel
Wagering Act. “[T]he granting of a pari-mutuel occupational
license is a privilege and not a right.” Cohen v. Dep’t of Bus. Reg.,
Div. of Pari-mutuel Wagering, 584 So. 2d 1083, 1086 (Fla. 1st DCA
1991) (citing State ex rel. Biscayne Kennel Club v. Stein, 178 So.

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133 (Fla. 1938); W. Flagler Assocs., Ltd. v. Bd. of Bus. Reg., 241 So.
2d 369 (Fla. 1970)).

     Pertinent here, the Act provides that the Commission may
deny an application if an applicant, such as Zimmerman, has been
“convicted” 2 of certain types and levels of crimes, see §
550.105(5)(b)–(c), Fla. Stat., including, inter alia, “a crime
involving a lack of good moral character.” § 550.105(b), Fla. Stat.
Zimmerman’s two “convictions” for grand theft and grand theft of
a motor vehicle are disqualifying felony offenses under this
statute. 3

    However, section 550.105(5)(c) further provides:

        If the applicant establishes that she or he is of good
        moral character, that she or he has been
        rehabilitated, and that the crime she or he was
        convicted of is not related to pari-mutuel wagering
        and is not a capital offense, the restrictions
        excluding offenders may be waived by the director
        of the division.

§ 550.105(5)(c), Fla. Stat.

     Accordingly, Zimmerman bore the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that he met the requirements for
licensure and waiver. See N.W. v. Dep’t of Child. & Fam. Servs.,
981 So. 2d 599, 601 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008); see also Fla. Dep’t of
Transp. v. J.W.C. Co., Inc., 396 So. 2d 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
Further, the plain language of section 550.105(5)(c) provides, in

    2 Adjudication was withheld in Zimmerman’s grand theft of a

motor vehicle case. However, the term “convicted” has been defined
by the Act as “having been found guilty, with or without
adjudication of guilt, as a result of a jury verdict, nonjury trial, or
entry of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere.” See § 550.105(5)(d),
Fla. Stat. (emphasis added).
    3 Zimmerman does not argue that grand theft and grand theft

of a motor vehicle are not “crime[s] involving a lack of good moral
character.”

                                  4
requesting a waiver of the felony disqualification, Zimmerman
bore the burden to establish (1) he is of good moral character, (2)
he has been rehabilitated, and (3) the crime of which he was
convicted was neither related to pari-mutuel wagering nor a
capital offense.

     We conclude there is competent substantial evidence
supporting the Commission’s denial of Zimmerman’s application
and its determination that he failed to show he was of good moral
character and rehabilitated. However, Zimmerman challenges the
denial of his application, arguing that its decision “doubly violates”
section 120.68(7)(e)(3) because the denial deviates from prior
agency practice and because “the Commission made no
attempt...to...explain the basis for its deviation from the Division’s
prior agency practice . . . .” His argument is founded entirely upon
three cases Zimmerman contends evidence the prior agency
practice of granting felony waivers in cases such as this one.

    Section 120.68(7), Florida Statutes, provides:

       (7) The court shall remand a case to the agency for
       further proceedings consistent with the court’s
       decision or set aside agency action, as appropriate,
       when it finds that:

            ....

       (e) The agency’s exercise of discretion was:

       1. Outside the range of discretion delegated to the
       agency by law;

       2. Inconsistent with agency rule;

       3. Inconsistent with officially stated agency
       policy or a prior agency practice, if deviation
       therefrom is not explained by the agency; or

       4. Otherwise in violation of a constitutional or
       statutory provision;

       but the court shall not substitute its judgment for
       that of the agency on an issue of discretion.

                                  5
§ 120.68(7)(e), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added).

     Zimmerman’s argument is simply without merit. The three
cases claimed by Zimmerman as “precedent” clearly do not
constitute “officially stated agency policy” contemplated by section
120.68(7)(e)(3). Likewise, these prior decisions, selected from
among many others, are insufficient to qualify as “prior agency
practice.” See § 120.68(7)(e)(3), Fla. Stat. Indeed, it is questionable
whether the three cases asserted by Zimmerman even constitute
“precedent.” Whether Zimmerman has proven he is of good moral
character and rehabilitated since his two theft convictions is a
distinctly factual inquiry. In arriving at her recommendation, the
hearing officer considered the evidence presented by Zimmerman.
The evidence, both as to quality and quantity, is distinguishable
from the prior cases presented by Zimmerman as precedent. 4

                                 III.

     There is competent substantial evidence to support the
Florida Gaming Control Commission’s findings and the exercise of
its discretion to deny Zimmerman’s application for a Pari-mutuel
Wagering Professional Individual Occupational License.
Accordingly, the Commission’s final order denying Ramsey
Zimmerman’s application is AFFIRMED.

    It is so ordered.

HARRIS and PRATT, JJ., concur.

    4 This is true even though Zimmerman claims the three prior

cases involve more serious crimes. Even assuming arguendo his
assertion, the nature of the crimes presented in this case, even
when compared to the three cases he cites, is not determinative of
his good moral character or rehabilitation required by section
550.105(5)(c).

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          _____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
           _____________________________

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