Court Opinion

ID: 9939743
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-12 17:05:56.302556+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:41:52.882350
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                                       Feb 12 2024, 9:16 am

                                                                                           CLERK
                                                                                       Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                                          Court of Appeals
                                                                                            and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                     ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Alexander N. Moseley                                       Elizabeth Eichholtz Walker
Dixon & Moseley, P.C.                                      Becker Bouwkamp Walker, P.C.
Indianapolis, Indiana                                      Indianapolis, Indiana

                                            IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Lela Jo Boucher,                                           February 12, 2024
Appellant-Respondent,                                      Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                           23A-DN-1534
        v.                                                 Appeal from the Delaware Circuit
                                                           Court
Dennis J. Doyle,                                           The Honorable John Feick, Judge
Appellee-Petitioner.                                       Trial Court Cause No.
                                                           18C04-2112-DN-379

                                  Opinion by Judge Riley
                              Judges Crone and Mathias concur.

Riley, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DN-1534 | February 12, 2024                   Page 1 of 14
      STATEMENT OF THE CASE
[1]   Appellant-Respondent-Cross-Petitioner, Lela Jo Boucher (Wife), appeals the

      trial court’s Order dividing the marital estate in favor of Appellee-Petitioner-

      Cross-Respondent, Dennis Doyle (Husband).

[2]   We affirm.

      ISSUE
[3]   Wife presents this court with one issue, which we restate as: Whether the trial

      court’s deviation from the presumptive equal division of the marital estate was

      clearly erroneous.

      FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[4]   Husband and Wife wed on January 21, 2017. On the date of their marriage,

      Husband owned four bank accounts at Indiana Member’s Credit Union, stock

      in Southern Company, a timeshare in Tennessee, funds which were ultimately

      rolled into two Edward Jones IRAs, a retirement savings account at Fidelity,

      and certain personal property. On the date of their marriage, Wife owned the

      home that the parties shared during the marriage, an Edward Jones IRA, and

      certain personal property.

[5]   Husband has a high school diploma and some technical school training.

      Husband worked as a fleet and facility supervisor for thirty-six years at the same

      location under several different employers. Husband began working for

      Citizens Energy Group in 2016, and by the time of the final hearing was

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DN-1534 | February 12, 2024     Page 2 of 14
      making $85,000 per year. Wife holds a bachelor’s and a master’s degree in

      health science. In 1997, Wife began working in the home health care field.

      Prior to the parties’ marriage, Wife had been able to pay all her own expenses

      through her income. For the first eighteen months of the marriage, Wife

      worked for an in-home health care company making $59,000 per year. In June

      of 2018, Wife voluntarily left her employment. From June 2018 to the date of

      separation, Husband paid all the parties’ expenses. After Wife left her

      employment, she obtained her real estate license in 2020. Wife sold real estate

      in 2020 and 2021 but had an actual net loss in income.

[6]   On December 8, 2021, Husband filed a petition for dissolution of marriage, and

      on January 13, 2022, Wife filed a cross-petition which she amended once. On

      April 5, 2022, the trial court ordered the parties to participate in mediation,

      which was ultimately unsuccessful.

[7]   On April 21, 2023, the trial court held the final hearing. Wife was sixty-five

      years old as of the final hearing. As to her retirement account, Wife related that

      in 2017 she had rolled over approximately $150,000 in funds into her Edward

      Jones IRA. Wife testified that in 2022, she netted $12,000 from her real estate

      dealings but that she did not expect her income to increase because the real

      estate market in the area was low in stock and did not show any signs of

      improving. During the marriage and the pendency of the dissolution

      proceedings, Wife had not sought out any additional employment to

      supplement her earnings from her real estate dealings. Wife had hopes of using

      her real estate license to obtain employment managing real estate properties.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DN-1534 | February 12, 2024     Page 3 of 14
      Wife requested a 50/50 split of the marital estate. Husband testified that at the

      time of marriage, the approximate value of his bank and retirement accounts

      was $500,000. Husband essentially requested that each party be awarded the

      property and investments brought into the marriage, which would result in him

      receiving 62% of the marital estate, while Wife would receive 38%.

[8]   On April 26, 2023, the trial court entered a summary decree of dissolution of

      marriage. On June 8, 2023, the trial court entered its Decree of Dissolution

      dividing the parties’ marital estate. The trial court entered the following

      relevant findings of fact and conclusions thereon:

              24. Because of the short-term nature of the marriage and the
              extent to which property was acquired by each spouse before the
              marriage, Husband has rebutted the presumption that an equal
              division of the marital estate is just and reasonable.

              ****

              26. Husband came into the marriage with the majority of the
              marital estate and 100% of the assets he now asks this court to
              award him. More specifically, Husband came into the marriage
              with the following funds and assets which have remained in his
              individual name for the duration of the parties’ relationship:

                       a. IMCU *3801-001, *3801-0010, *3801-0030, *3801-0106,

                       b. Southern Co. Stock;

                       c. Tennessee Timeshare;

                       d. Edward Jones *7017 IRA and *7103 IRA; and

                       e. Fidelity Citizens Energy Group.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DN-1534 | February 12, 2024     Page 4 of 14
        27. The combined value of two (2) of Husband’s premarital
        retirement account assets (See Edward Jones *7017 IRA and
        *7103 IRA following rollovers from his accounts Suez and
        Citizens Energy Group in 2017) exceed $636,000 on the date of
        filing of this action. Neither of which were contributed to during
        the course of the parties’ marriage.

        28. Wife’s earning capacity with a [b]achelor’s [d]egree plus
        hours toward her [m]aster’s [d]egree and real estate license is
        potentially far more than that of Husband, who only holds a high
        school diploma; therefore, her economic circumstances and
        earning ability can be superior to those of Husband.

        29. Husband has been employed by Citizens Energy Group for
        36 years. Wife left her employment in June of 2018. At the
        time, she earned approximately $59,000 working at an in-home
        health care company. Husband financially supported the
        household from June of 2018 until December 8, 2021, including
        making all mortgage, insurance, property tax, utilities payments
        on the Marital Residence. In addition, Husband made
        improvements to the Marital Residence, both financial and
        nonfinancial. Husband has made all automobile loan payments
        on the Toyota Rav4. Husband has proposed Wife keep both the
        Marital Residence and the Toyota Rav4.

        30. Wife obtained her real estate license during the marriage.
        Husband paid for Wife to obtain her real estate license as well as
        the start-up expenses for her real estate agency. Wife is currently
        underemployed and is looking to obtain employment as a
        property manager post-decree. Wife made no employment
        efforts during the 16 months this cause of action was pending.
        No reason was provided by Wife despite acknowledging she
        needed to change careers.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DN-1534 | February 12, 2024      Page 5 of 14
       (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, pp. 19-20) (record citations omitted). The trial court

       found that it had “considered all marital property and weighed all factors

       provided for in Indiana Code Section 31-15-7-5” and that Husband had

       rebutted the presumption of an equal division of the marital estate. (Appellant’s

       App. Vol. II, p. 20). The trial court awarded each party the assets, retirement

       accounts, and real property each had owned before the marriage and divided

       the parties’ other property, resulting in Huband receiving 62% of the marital

       estate and Wife receiving 38%.

[9]    Wife now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

       DISCUSSION AND DECISION
       I. Standard of Review

[10]   Wife challenges the division of the marital estate following the trial court’s sua

       sponte entry of findings of fact and conclusions of law. 1 We review a trial

       court’s sua sponte findings and conclusions under a two-tiered standard of

       review to determine whether the evidence supports the findings and whether the

       findings support the judgment. Kakollu v. Vadlamudi, 175 N.E.3d 287, 295 (Ind.

       Ct. App. 2021) (citing Steele-Giri v. Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 123 (Ind. 2016)), trans.

       denied. We will not set aside the trial court’s findings or its judgment unless it is

       clearly erroneous, giving due regard to the trial court’s opportunity to judge

       1
        Neither party requested Indiana Trial Rule 52 findings of fact and conclusions thereon. Although the trial
       court permitted the parties to submit proposed decrees, the chronological case summary does not reflect that
       any were filed.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DN-1534 | February 12, 2024                            Page 6 of 14
       witness credibility. Id. Findings of fact are only clearly erroneous where the

       record lacks any evidence or reasonable inferences to support them. Wyzard v.

       Wyzard, 771 N.E.2d 754, 756-57 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). When determining

       whether a finding or judgment is clearly erroneous, we consider only the

       evidence most favorable to the judgment, along with all reasonable inferences

       therefrom, neither reweighing the evidence nor assessing witness credibility. Id.

       at 757. Issues not covered by the findings are reviewed under the general

       judgment standard, which means that, as a reviewing court, we should affirm

       based on any legal theory that is supported by the evidence. Kakollu, 175

       N.E.3d at 295.

[11]   We review a trial court’s division of marital assets and debts for an abuse of its

       discretion, which only occurs if its decision is clearly against the logic and effect

       of the facts and or reasonable inferences, if its misapplies the law, or if it

       overlooks evidence of applicable statutory factors. Ivankovic v. Ivankovic, 205

       N.E.3d 1061, 1064 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). The appellant “bears the burden of

       overcoming a strong presumption that the trial court considered and complied

       with the applicable statute, and that presumption is one of the strongest

       presumptions applicable to our consideration on appeal.” Crider v. Crider, 26

       N.E.3d 1045, 1047 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (internal quote omitted). To succeed

       on appeal, it is not enough for the appellant to demonstrate that the evidence

       might support some other conclusion; rather, the appellant must show that the

       evidence positively requires the desired conclusion. Kirk v. Kirk, 770 N.E.2d

       304, 307 (Ind. 2002).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DN-1534 | February 12, 2024        Page 7 of 14
       II. Division of the Marital Estate

[12]   Wife contends that the trial court’s unequal division of the marital estate is

       clearly erroneous. In Indiana, a presumption exists that an equal division of the

       marital estate is “just and reasonable.” Ind. Code § 31-15-7-5. However, the

       presumption may be rebutted through “relevant evidence[,]” including evidence

       of the following factors:

               (1) The contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of the
               property, regardless of whether the contribution was income
               producing.

               (2) The extent to which the property was acquired by each
               spouse:

                        (A) before the marriage; or

                        (B) through inheritance or gift.

               (3) The economic circumstances of each spouse at the time the
               disposition of the property is to become effective . . . .

               (4) The conduct of the parties during the marriage as related to
               the disposition or dissipation of their property.

               (5) The earnings or earning ability of the parties as related to:

                        (A) a final division of property; and

                        (B) a final determination of the property rights of the
                        parties.

       Id. The list of statutory factors is non-exclusive, but when dividing the marital

       estate, a trial court must consider all the relevant factors. Id.; Smith v. Smith,

       136 N.E.3d 275, 282 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). All of the factors are to be

       considered together, and no single factor is dispositive. In re Marriage of Marek,

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DN-1534 | February 12, 2024       Page 8 of 14
       47 N.E.3d 1283, 1290-21 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied. Our supreme court

       has recently clarified that

                [s]o long as it expressly considers all assets and liabilities, and so
                long as it offers sufficient findings to rebut the presumptive equal
                division, a trial court need not follow a rigid, technical formula in
                dividing the marital estate and we will assume that it applied the
                law correctly.

       Roetter v. Roetter, 182 N.E.3d 221, 229 (Ind. 2022).

[13]   Here, the trial court found that it had “considered all marital property and

       weighed all factors provided for in Indiana Code section 31-15-7-5[.]”

       (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 20). In addition, it found that the parties’ less than

       five-year marriage was of short duration, Husband brought the majority of the

       assets into the marriage, during the marriage neither party had contributed to

       the major marital asset–Husband’s Edward Jones IRAs–, and that Wife had

       substantial earning capability. Thus, the trial court entered specific findings and

       conclusions on the statutory factors of the contributions of the parties, the

       premarital nature of the parties’ assets, and the earning capabilities of the

       parties. 2 Once the trial court considered all the statutory factors, it was not

       required to enter findings and conclusions regarding each factor. See Israel v.

       2
         The trial court also detailed the history of various motions filed by Husband seeking compliance with discovery
       requests and documentation requirements provided for in the provisional orders, found that Husband had incurred
       additional attorney’s fees, and noted that it had “considered [H]usband’s excess payment of attorney fees in the
       division of the property.” (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 25). Neither party mentioned these findings on appeal, so
       we exclude them from our analysis.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DN-1534 | February 12, 2024                                Page 9 of 14
       Israel, 189 N.E.3d 170, 176 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (noting that after considering

       all the statutory factors, a trial court “is not required to explicitly address all the

       factors in every case”), trans. denied. In addition to the statutory factors, the trial

       court properly considered the short duration of a marriage, which “may rebut

       the presumption favoring equal division, especially if one party brought

       substantially more property into the marriage.” Roetter, 182 N.E.3d at 227

       (citing Houchens v. Boschert, 758 N.E.2d 585, 591 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001)).

[14]   Despite the evidence, findings, and conclusions supporting the trial court’s

       judgment, Wife argues that “the trial court erred by giving considerable weight

       to the extent of assets that Husband brought into the marriage, while failing to

       recognize that Wife also brought a significant amount of assets into the

       marriage.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 12). Wife contends that this is illustrated by the

       fact that the assets she brought into the marriage were valued at $446,000 when

       the parties separated. However, the trial court necessarily considered the

       amount and value of Wife’s premarital assets when it found that Husband

       brought the “majority” of the assets into the marriage, a finding that Wife does

       not specifically dispute, and the value of Wife’s assets at the time of marriage,

       not separation, is the relevant value for purposes of this issue. (Appellant’s

       App. Vol. II, p. 19). We observe that at the time of marriage, Wife’s Edward

       Jones account had a value of approximately $150,000, while Husband brought

       at least $500,000 into the marriage, and there was no evidence presented at the

       final hearing regarding the value of Wife’s other major premarital asset, the

       marital home, at the time of marriage. Wife’s argument on this point is merely

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DN-1534 | February 12, 2024        Page 10 of 14
       a request that we reweigh the evidence, which, pursuant to our standard of

       review, we will not do. Wyzard, 771 N.E.2d at 757.

[15]   Next, Wife asserts that the trial court failed to consider evidence of the

       economic circumstances of the parties, a factor which she maintains weighed in

       her favor, and she contends that the trial court clearly erred when it found that

       she was in a superior economic position to Husband. However, Wife’s

       argument mischaracterizes the trial court’s findings, which emphasized the

       short duration of the marriage, the premarital nature of the majority of the

       parties’ assets, and their earning capabilities. The trial court found that, given

       her education, Wife’s economic circumstances “can be superior to those of

       Husband[,]” not that they were superior. (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 20)

       (emphasis added). Wife does not argue that this was an improper

       consideration. In addition, the trial court also expressly found that it had

       “weighed all factors provided for in Indiana Code section 31-15-7-5[.]”

       (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 20). Having done so, it was not required to enter

       findings and conclusions regarding the parties’ economic circumstances at the

       time of dissolution. See Israel, 189 N.E.3d at 176. In addition to the trial court’s

       express finding that it had considered all the statutory factors, we indulge a

       strong presumption that the trial court did so and applied the law correctly.

       Crider, 26 N.E.3d at 1047; Montgomery v. Faust, 910 N.E.2d 234, 239 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 2009) (“[W]e presume that the trial court considered these factors.”).

       Wife has failed to overcome this presumption.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DN-1534 | February 12, 2024     Page 11 of 14
[16]   Wife’s final contention is that “the trial court’s finding that Wife has a higher

       earning ability than Husband is not supported by the evidence.” (Appellant’s

       Br. p. 13). This argument is unpersuasive. The trial court did not find that

       Wife’s earning capability was superior to Husband’s; rather, it found that, given

       her education, it “can be” superior to Husband’s, a consideration which Wife

       does not contend was improper, and it determined that Wife was

       underemployed. (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 20). A trial court may consider a

       party’s work history, occupational qualifications, prevailing job opportunities,

       and earning levels in the community to find that a party is underemployed for

       purposes of determining earning capability in a dissolution proceeding. See

       Hyde v. Hyde, 751 N.E.2d 761, 767-78 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (applying these

       factors from the Indiana Child Support Guidelines in evaluating the trial court’s

       determination that a party was underemployed when dividing the marital

       estate).

[17]   The evidence supporting the trial court’s judgment was that Wife is not disabled

       and that, since no children were born of the marriage, she had not absented

       herself from the workforce during the marriage for child rearing responsibilities.

       Wife has a bachelor’s and a master’s degree in health science, from which it can

       be inferred that she has earning capability. See Trost-Steffen v. Steffen, 772

       N.E.2d 500, 507 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (inferring from evidence that mother held

       a master’s degree and father held a Ph.D. that both parties were capable of

       earning), trans. denied. Although Wife makes much of Husband’s thirty-six-year

       work history at the same employment, the record reflects that Wife worked

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DN-1534 | February 12, 2024      Page 12 of 14
       from 1997 to 2018 in the home health care industry and that, prior to the

       marriage, she made up to $59,000 per year and was able to support herself from

       her labor in that field. Wife contends that in 2018, she was “forced to switch

       careers” when her employer closed, but Husband testified that Wife had left

       voluntarily due to frustration with the work and with the other people who

       worked there. (Appellant’s Br. p. 14). Inasmuch as Husband’s testimony

       supports the trial court’s judgment, it is the evidence we will credit. Wyzard,

       771 N.E.2d at 757. In addition, during the marriage, Wife obtained a real

       estate license which she planned to use to obtain employment in property

       management. Although Wife had failed to earn any significant income from

       her real estate dealings, she had never sought any other form of work to

       supplement her income.

[18]   Given this evidence, we conclude that the trial court’s determination that Wife

       was underemployed was supported by the evidence and, thus, that the trial

       court’s determination on this issue supported the judgment. Wife’s reliance on

       Gish v. Gish, 111 N.E.3d 1034, 1038-39 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied,

       wherein another panel of this court held that it was an abuse of the trial court’s

       discretion to award the husband his entire retirement account, resulting in an

       unequal division of the marital estate, is misplaced. Gish is factually

       distinguishable because the parties were married for twenty-six years, the

       husband’s earning capability was four times greater than the wife’s, the wife’s

       earning capability was limited by the solo nature of her hair styling business,

       and the wife had health issues. Id. at 1038. Gish is additionally distinguishable

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DN-1534 | February 12, 2024     Page 13 of 14
       because, despite this evidence, the trial court did not enter any findings and

       conclusions thereon regarding the earning capability of the parties. Id. Here,

       the trial court did enter findings of fact and conclusions thereon on this

       statutory factor. Wife’s argument on this issue otherwise consists of directing

       our attention to her version of events and to evidence that does not support the

       judgment, both of which are contrary to our standard of review. See Wyzard,

       771 N.E.2d at 757. Accordingly, we do not disturb the trial court’s judgment.

       CONCLUSION
[19]   Based on the foregoing, we hold that Wife has failed to demonstrate that the

       trial court’s deviation from the presumptive equal split of the marital estate was

       clearly erroneous.

[20]   Affirmed.

[21]   Crone, J. and Mathias, J. concur

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DN-1534 | February 12, 2024    Page 14 of 14