Court Opinion

ID: 9534340
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:38:43.5603+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:30:19.107220
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE GARCIA, dissenting: I cannot agree with the majority that “[t]he expert’s affidavit and deposition testimony created a material issue of fact about whether a shallow bottom in a ‘deep end’ section of the pool was a nonobvious danger.” 382 Ill. App. 3d at 10. In my judgment there is no factual support for the expert’s opinion. “An expert’s opinion is only as valid as the bases and reasons for the opinion. When there is no factual support for an expert’s conclusions, his conclusions alone do not create a question of fact.” Gyllin v. College Craft Enterprises, Ltd., 260 Ill. App. 3d 707, 715, 633 N.E.2d 111 (1994). Dr. Johnson’s opinion centers on his contention that the pool design created an “optical illusion of a deep end.” I am unpersuaded that a claimed “optical illusion” can be the basis either to create a material factual question or, to the extent the plaintiff means to suggest the existence or not of the “optical illusion of a deep end” was for the trier of fact to determine, to form a factual question itself. In my judgment, the claim of an “optical illusion of a deep end” is no different from the thought each unfortunate plaintiff must have had after the disastrous dive: “I thought the water was deeper.” The plaintiffs contention that a material question of fact remains based on Dr. Johnson’s conclusions transforms the objective inquiry in the duty-to-warn analysis into a subjective one. See Klen, 268 Ill. App. 3d 1031 (duty to warn is determined using an objective standard). With my apologies to all poets, it becomes no longer an objective inquiry but a subjective assertion: “The optical illusion is in the mind of the beholder.” See Glass v. Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., 238 Ill. App. 3d 355, 359, 606 N.E.2d 384 (1992) (liability claim founded on “optical illusion” that “steps [tended] to blend together visually” rejected because plaintiff’s position that landowner should have constructed steps differently goes beyond what the law requires for duty of reasonable care). I also disagree that the cases that have rejected an adult plaintiffs claim of liability based on a headfirst dive into a pool are all distinguishable on their facts. I agree with the Lederman court’s assessment that the Illinois cases finding against an adult plaintiff stand for the proposition that it is the very uncertainty of the depth of an in-ground pool that makes diving into one openly and obviously dangerous.12 Lederman, 119 F.3d at 555. I concur with the conclusion of the Lederman court: “Illinois’ highest court would hold that the risks associated with Mr. Lederman’s injurious dive would have been obvious to a reasonable adult in his position.” Lederman, 119 F.3d at 555. The Lederman court also implied that a reasonable adult would not have attempted such a dive because “the depth of the pool at any one point could not be ascertained from outside the pool.” Lederman, 119 F.3d at 555. This observation echos Dr. Johnson’s conclusion that the texture and pattern of the pool bottom made it “ ‘difficult if not impossible to judge [its depth].’ ” 382 Ill. App. 3d at 5. This, however, is not a basis to relieve the plaintiff of his responsibility; rather, it serves to reinforce his responsibility to make such a judgment before attempting a dive. The plaintiff here ignored the danger based on his unwarranted assumption that the ladder at the end opposite the descending steps into the pool suggested a deep end, safe for diving. I recognize our supreme court has held “[t]he existence of an open and obvious danger is not a per se bar to finding that a defendant who owns, occupies or controls land has a duty to exercise reasonable care.” Jackson v. TLC Associates, Inc., 185 Ill. 2d 418, 425, 706 N.E.2d 460 (1998). However, the analysis undertaken in Jackson has no application here. Our supreme court expressly noted that the issue in Jackson did not involve “the risk of injury from diving into water that is too shallow. [That] risk[ ] is [not] at issue here.” Jackson, 185 Ill. 2d at 426. The risk of injury involved striking a submerged pipe, which our supreme court noted “stemmed solely from TLC’s conduct.” Jackson, 185 Ill. 2d at 426. In other words, Jackson involved a risk of injury known to the owner but unknown to the invitee. Because the risk of injury differed from “the risk of injury from diving into water that is too shallow,” the court in Jackson invoked the traditional duty analysis of likelihood of injury and the foreseeability of such injury. In my judgment, we need not engage in such analysis in this case on the authority of Bucheleres. Finally, I reject out of hand any suggestion by the plaintiff that a mental image in the form of an “optical illusion” is analogous to a “submerged pipe.” The two are of different natures; they are not analogous. Because a reasonable adult in the plaintiff’s position would have appreciated the danger of diving into a pool of unknown depth, I conclude the circuit court correctly entered summary judgment. I would affirm as to each defendant.  These accidents occur even where the plaintiff is familiar with the depth of the pool, but takes an unfortunate dive nevertheless. See, e.g., Osborne, 266 Ill. App. 3d 434. I see no relief for similarly situated plaintiffs short of the disavowal of the open and obvious doctrine by our supreme court. See Ford v. Round Barn True Value, Inc., 377 Ill. App. 3d 1109, 1118 (2007) (Myerscough, J., specially concurring).