Court Opinion

ID: 9536181
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 06:56:01.814699+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:33:28.721589
License: Public Domain

RICHARDSON, J.
I respectfully dissent. In my view, a public member of a government agency has standing to challenge by petition for writ of mandate that agency action which fails to comport with its obligatory duties. There is no provision of law, constitutional, statutory, or decisional, which shuts the courthouse doors to such a person. The issue therefore becomes one of policy and, while arguable, I am unpersuaded by the majority that a citizen’s important right of access to the courts should thus be denied.
The general rule on standing for mandamus relief, as described in Code of Civil Procedure sections 1085 and 1086, limits standing to those “beneficially interested.”
The foregoing general principle, however, has been considerably extended by numerous court decisions which have subsequently recognized as “beneficially interested” a cluster of property owners, taxpayers, and voters in those cases in which the purpose of the proceedings is enforcement of a clear public duty and the public interest would suffer from a failure to perform such duty. (Hollman v. Warren (1948) 32 Cal.2d 351, 357 [196 P.2d 562]; Bd. of Soc. Welfare v. County of L. A. (1945) 27 Cal.2d 98, 100-101 [162 P.2d 627]; Coldwell v. Board of Public Works (1921) 187 Cal. 510, 520 [202 P. 879]; McDonald v. Stockton Met. Transit Dist. (1973) 36 Cal.App.3d 436, 440 [111 Cal. Rptr. 637]; American Friends Service Committee v. Procunier (1973) 33 Gal.App.3d 252, 256 [109 Cal.Rptr. 22]; Knoff v. City etc. of San Francisco (1969) 1 Cal.App.3d 184, 198 [81 Cal.Rptr. 683]; Fuller v. San Bernardino Valley Mun. Wat. Dist. (1962) 242 Cal.App.2d 52, 57 *803[51 Cal.Rptr. 120]; Kappadahl v. Alcan Pacific Co. (1963) 222 Cal. App.2d 626, 643 [35 Cal.Rptr. 354].)
Several of these cases both disclose the rationale and define the ambit of these judicial extensions. In Bd. of Soc. Welfare v. County of L. A., supra, 27 Cal.2d 98, Los Angeles County had cancelled certain welfare checks six months after their issue date pursuant to provisions of the Welfare and Institutions Code. The state Board of Social Welfare sought mandate on behalf of three needy welfare recipients to compel the issuance of duplicate checks. We held that the board had standing to seek such a writ, observing, “The rule is stated thus in 35 American Jurisprudence 73, section 320: ‘[B]y the preponderance of authority. . . where the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the relator need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, since it is sufficient that he is interested as a citizen in having the laws executed and the duty in question enforced. ... [P. 76, § 322.] Generally, when a power or duty is imposed by law upon a public board or officer, and in order to execute such power or perform such duty, it becomes necessary to obtain a writ of mandamus, it or he may apply for the same.’” (Bd. of Soc. Welfare v. County of L. A., supra, at pp. 100-101, italics added.)
Similarly, in Hoilman v. Warren, supra, 32 Cal.2d 351, an applicant for a notary commission sought a writ of mandate to compel the Governor to exercise his discretion regarding the appointment of notaries public for San Francisco. Apart from the fact that she was personally interested as an applicant, we held that, as a resident and taxpayer of San Francisco, the applicant had an interest in having a sufficient number of notaries commissioned therein. The law imposed a mandatory duty on the Governor to act on the appointment of notaries public. We noted that “[a]side from her character as an applicant for appointment as a notary it is alleged that she is a resident and taxpayer of the city and county of San Francisco. As such she is interested in having a sufficient number of notaries commissioned to act therein.” (Pp. 356-357, italics added.)
In Fuller v. San Bernardino Valley Mun. Wat. Dist., supra, 242 Cal.App.2d 52, petitioners obtained a peremptory writ of mandate ordering a municipal water district to terminate its proceedings for the annexation of lands underlying Big Bear Lake. The water district contended that petitioners lacked any beneficial interest. The Fuller court *804acknowledged that an exception to the general rule requiring the existence of a substantial right “is recognized where the question is one of public right and the object of the writ is to procure performance of a public duty.” (P. 57.)
In American Friends Service Committee v. Procunier, supra, 33 Cal.App.3d 252, several nonprofit corporations active in the area of prison reform brought suit to require the Department of Corrections and the Adult Authority to comply with the Administrative Procedure Act in the formulation of their rules and regulations. The Court of Appeal, in discussing plaintiffs’ standing to sue, stressed that the petition was one “for mandate alleging that a government department is not complying with the law and seeking a court order compelling such compliance.” (P. 256.) Relying on Bd. of Soc. Welfare, the Friends court in recognizing plaintiffs’ standing said: “Petitioner in a mandamus proceeding must demonstrate that the writ is necessary to enforce or protect a specific legal right that is clear, present, certain and substantial. (Parker v. Bowron (1953) 40 Cal.2d 344...; Monarch Cable-vision, Inc. v. City Council (1966) 239 Cal.App.2d 206.. .; 5 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1971) p. 3841.) Where, however, the question is one of public, as opposed to private, interest, and petitioner seeks performance of a public duty, it is said the foregoing requirements of petitioner’s rights and respondent’s duty have been ‘relaxed.’ (5 Witkin, supra, p. 3847; Cal. Civil Writs (Cont.Ed.Bar 1970) p. 73; Fuller v. San Bernardino Valley Mun. Wat. Dist. (1966) 242 Cal.App. 2d 52...).” (Ibid.)
Petitioner is a citizen and taxpayer, presumably endowed with all of the constitutional and procedural rights of every other citizen. She alleges that the committee is violating a statutory command contained in Business and Professions Code section 2942, namely, in connection with applicants’ examination “a grade of 75 percent shall be a passing grade.” The mandate is clear. It may be wise or unwise but it is explicit. The case is one which involves a public interest. The careful licensure of psychologists directly affects the quality of that aspect of medical practice in California. Were petitioner not a member of the Psychology Examining Committee (PEC) there would be no question concerning her right, as a member of the general public, to seek mandate relief. In my view, there is no logical distinction which would embrace the foregoing cases and yet bar the plaintiff.
*805Nor, contrary to the majority, do I find anything “advisory” in the relief which petitioner seeks. She asks for an affirmative mandate from this court directing PEC to comply with its statutory obligation. If the prayer of her petition is granted, no one is “advised” of anything, not PEC, nor petitioner. That is not the petition’s mission. “The common law prerogative writ of mandamus has developed into a remedy to compel performance of a ministerial duty. ...” (Cal. Civil Writs (Cont.Ed. Bar 1970) § 2.5, p. 9.) That is the purpose of the petition for mandate before us. Authority to issue the relief is constitutionally conferred (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 10) upon us and our issuance of the writ is so common as to require no further explanation.
In similar fashion, and with due deference, I suggest that the majority’s contention that petitioner is “suing herself” withers under closer inspection. The defendant is a committee, statutorily created (§ 2920), as a constituent element of the Board of Medical Examiners of the Department of Consumer Affairs. Petitioner is a member of the committee appointed by the Governor and serving a four-year term. It is self-evident that she is not the agency, but is only one of the members thereof, and that only temporarily. Her target is the agency, the legal entity, not its members.
The majority must rely on policy considerations alone. Why should courts strip “citizen-taxpayer” status from an entire section of the public composed of persons who also happen to be public members of a government agency? The majority’s reasons are insufficient.
In my opinion the majority substantially exaggerates the judicial “burdens” that would be imposed were we to permit access to the courts to petitioner, and others similarly situated. The majority, fearing an explosion of lawsuits, conjures a litigation disaster that would engulf us were petitioner’s rights as a citizen to be honored. It is overreaction to anticipate that the entire administrative process will thus be transported, wholesale, to the courts. I predict that the dreaded, and overused, Pandora’s box would prove to be comparatively empty. Taxpayers and aggrieved persons generally have been permitted for years to bring suits challenging certain government actions. While I have no statistics either way, I doubt that the volume of such types of actions has become unmanageable. Nor is there any proof that such proceedings have become notoriously triggered by bad faith. Trial courts have shown themselves fully capable of weeding out those disputes which are not the proper subjects of judicial intervention.
*806Moreover, this proceeding and the other illustrative cases previously described can readily be distinguished from Holtzman v. Schlesinger (2d Cir. 1973) 484 F.2d 1307, on which the majority principally relies. In Holtzman, a United States Congresswoman sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the Secretary of Defense in an attempt to bring to a halt military activities in Cambodia during the Vietnam War. The Holtzman court found that the legality of the fighting posed a “political” question and accordingly was nonjusticiable. There is an obvious distinction between litigating the legality of a war and litigating the propriety of administrative action on the ground that the action deviates from legislatively mandated licensing procedures. The former invades the constitutionally endowed power of an equal and coordinate branch of government. The latter addresses compliance with one of the myriad of statutory requirements of one of our state agencies.
The issue herein presented is not “political.” Rather, it concerns the enforced compliance with a professional grading standard which the Legislature has clearly, and with full authority, explicitly fixed. No deference is due another branch. The only issue is whether the challenged grading procedure of PEC complies with the legislative mandate of section 2942. Petitioner seeks only to enforce the statute.
The efficacy of limiting standing of agency members in order to avoid administrative complications is equally doubtful, as shown by a mere consideration of the available alternatives. If petitioner herself is denied standing, she could readily have a friend or family member as a representative citizen indirectly bring the action on her behalf. If challenged, our courts would then have to resolve the question of who is the “real” party behind the suit. In such case, the identical “intra-mural” agency conflict which the majority fears would arise as would the same potential “threat” of an internecine quarrel. In the alternative, petitioner could resign her government position and then seek mandate. In either case, I see no net administrative gain in stripping from petitioner her status as a citizen taxpayer thereby denying to her the precise relief which we might well have to give her proxy or, alternatively, forcing her to resign from public service. We would thus be honoring the shadow while rejecting the substance.
A firmly established series of cases has held that petitioner’s standing to pursue her remedy is based on a generally recognized right and not on any exception that need be drawn in her case. A holding by this *807court to the contrary should only be compelled by strong countervailing legal or policy arguments. None appears.
The right of access to our law courts is a very important attribute of citizenship. Petitioner is a citizen and taxpayer as well as an agency board member. She, and others like her, may be particularly well informed and uniquely suited to assure that public agencies conform their procedures to statutory duty. Petitioner as an interested citizen devotes substantial amounts of time and energy toward the stated objectives of the committee. The public interest is not advanced when her willingness to serve is penalized by forfeiture of one of her important civil rights.
I would reverse the judgment of dismissal.
Bird, C. J., and Tobriner, J., concurred.
Appellant’s petition for a rehearing was denied October 3, 1980. Bird, C. J., Tobriner, J., and Richardson, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.