Court Opinion

ID: 9621346
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:56:40.407514+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:02.741774
License: Public Domain

HOWARD, Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusions, and I would affirm the trial court.
First and foremost, I do not believe Hendricks presented a viable claim for damages. As the majority points out in Part IV of the opinion, Hendricks asserted three categories of damage. The first claim is that he was damaged in the amount he expended for tuition, room, board, and other living expenses while at Clemson. However, nowhere does he allege that Clemson gave him an athletic scholarship whereby they contractually agreed to pay these college related expenses. He attended Clemson and paid the normal tuition and related costs, receiving the education he contracted to receive. Clemson provided the courses he enrolled in, and there is no allegation that Clemson withheld any benefit which he paid to receive. Consequently, I believe this element of damage fails as a matter of law.
Second, he claims his tuition and related costs at St. Leo when he returned to complete his education because he had foregone his scholarship to attend Clemson. However, he does not allege Clemson contractually agreed to allow him to *567play on the varsity baseball team. Under his view of the facts, Clemson only agreed that he could try out for the team, and play if he was good enough. This was merely an expectation of a chance in the future to play, with no contractual right to insist upon playing. Consequently, under Hendricks’s own view of the facts, he merely had a future expectation of an increased chance to play baseball at Clemson. Our supreme court has clearly stated that there is no cause of action in such circumstances. Cf. Jones v. Owings, 318 S.C. 72, 456 S.E.2d 371 (1995) (there is no cause of action in South Carolina for a decrease in chance of survival caused by mis-diagnosis in a claim for medical malpractice).
The third claimed category of damage is for a loss of an opportunity to play on the 1995-6 Clemson team and in the college world series, implicating his loss of the added exposure to professional baseball scouts and the experience that opportunity would have provided. Again, by their very nature, these allegations do not give rise to a cause of action. Cf. Owings, 318 S.C. 72, 456 S.E.2d 371.
I also disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the evidence, taken in a light most favorable to Hendricks, gives rise to an inference of recklessness. I believe the trial court was correct in its analysis on this issue.
For these reasons, I would affirm the trial court, and would not address the other issues discussed in the majority opinion.