Court Opinion

ID: 9891290
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-18 06:09:21.669946+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:56.118333
License: Public Domain

REVERSE AND REMAND and Opinion Filed October 12, 2023

                                   S  In The
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                               No. 05-22-01154-CR
                               No. 05-22-01155-CR
                      STATE OF TEXAS, Appellant
                                V.
                 CHRISTIAN BRUCE GONZALES, Appellee

              On Appeal from the 416th Judicial District Court
                           Collin County, Texas
          Trial Court Cause Nos. 416-82430-2022 & 416-81431-2022

                                   OPINION
                   Before Justices Carlyle, Smith, and Kennedy
                           Opinion by Justice Kennedy
      The State appeals the trial court’s orders granting Christian Bruce Gonzales’s

motions to suppress evidence seized without a warrant. The State contends the trial

court erred in concluding Allen Police Department officers did not have probable

cause to conduct the warrantless search. We reverse the trial court’s orders granting

Gonzales’s motions to suppress and remand the cases for further proceedings.
                                  BACKGROUND

      On December 5, 2021, at approximately 9:20 p.m., Allen Police Department

Officers Richard Caldwell and Joshua Robbins were on patrol in separate vehicles.

The officers were sitting in their parked vehicles conversing with each other through

open windows when a pickup truck drove past them. As the truck passed by, both

officers detected the strong odor of marijuana emanating from it.          The odor

dissipated as the truck drove away. The officers followed the truck to a nearby gas

station. When they arrived, the truck was parked at a gas pump. The driver and

front-seat passenger were still in the vehicle and the back-seat passengers, Gonzales

and his girlfriend, had exited the vehicle and were walking into the gas station’s

convenience store. Officer Robbins followed Gonzales and his girlfriend into the

store and ordered them to return to the truck. In the meantime, Officer Caldwell

approached the truck as the driver and the front-seat passenger exited the vehicle.

As he did so, he immediately detected a strong odor of marijuana. When Officer

Robbins returned to the truck with Gonzales and his girlfriend, he also detected the

odor of marijuana. Based on the odor, Officer Robbins searched the truck and, in

doing so, he found a green leafy plant in the backseat’s right-door pocket. He

believed the substance was marijuana. He also found a polymer 80 handgun in the

map pocket behind the front passenger seat. At some point during the encounter,

Gonzales told the officers he had been sitting in the backseat on the right side.

Officer Robbins then arrested Gonzales for unlawful possession and carrying of a

                                        –2–
firearm. During a search incident to the arrest, Officer Robbins found marijuana on

Gonzales’s person.

         A grand jury indicted Gonzales for the third-degree felony offense of unlawful

possession of a firearm by a felon and the second-degree felony offense of unlawful

carrying of a weapon with a felony conviction. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 46.04(e),

46.02(e)(1). Gonzales filed motions seeking to suppress evidence asserting the

officers lacked probable cause to conduct the warrantless search of the truck.

         The trial court held a hearing on Gonzales’s motions to suppress. At the

hearing, the State called Officers Caldwell and Robbins to testify. Gonzales did not

testify or call any witnesses. The officers indicated they conducted the warrantless

search based upon the odor of marijuana. Both officers established that they were

trained and experienced in detecting the odor of marijuana. They acknowledged that

they could not tell whether the substance they smelled was marijuana or hemp

without a lab test to differentiate the tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) concentration of

the substance.1 Gonzales challenged whether police officers could still rely on their

training and experience and senses of sight and smell to establish probable cause for

marijuana possession, as a basis to conduct a warrantless search, since hemp, which

comes from the same plant as marijuana, has become legal and can be easily

confused for marijuana. He urged there was insufficient probable cause to support

   1
       Marijuana and hemp come from the same plant, Cannabis sativa L.
                                                 –3–
a lawful search of the truck during which the officers discovered the firearm that led

to the charges against him in the unlawful possession and carrying cases.

      The trial court entered orders granting Gonzales’s motions to suppress and

issued the following findings of fact:

  1. On December 5, 2021 at 9:00 p.m., Allen Police Officers Richard Caldwell and
     Joshua Robbins were on patrol duty in the city of Allen, Collin County, Texas.
     Both officers are certified police officers and have training and experience in
     the detection of illegal drugs.

  2. While parked in an empty parking lot at 840 W. Stacy Road, both officers
     observed a moving vehicle drive by them from approximately 30-50 feet
     away. Both officers testified they smelled what they believed to be the odor of
     marijuana emanating from the vehicle.

  3. Both officers began following the vehicle in their separate patrol vehicles.
     Officer Robbins followed directly behind the vehicle and testified he detected
     the same odor while he and Defendants [sic] vehicles [sic] were still in transit.

  4. The vehicle pulled into a nearby gas station. Both officers parked near the
     vehicle and began an encounter with the vehicle’s four occupants, including the
     defendant. Both officers testified they detected the same odor of what they
     believed to be marijuana while next to the vehicle.

  5. The officers testified there were no other factors of criminality present, and
     [they] had no reason to perform a traffic stop.

  6. Based on his belief the odor of marijuana was emanating from the vehicle,
     Officer Robbins performed a warrantless search of the vehicle. He found a
     polymer SS80 firearm with no serial number and approximately 0.8 ounces of
     a substance he believed to be marijuana. These objects were found in close
     proximity to the seat the Defendant was understood to have been seated in.

  7. While searching the Defendant’s person, Officer Robbins found what the
     Defendant admitted to be marijuana in his sock.

  8. The Defendant was then placed under arrest for Unlawful Possession of a
     Firearm by a Felon, Unlawful Carrying of a Weapons with a Felony
                                         –4–
        Conviction, and Possession of Marijuana.

  9. Both officers testified that they are unable to discern the difference between the
     odor of marijuana and the odor of hemp and a lab test was required to
     differentiate the THC concentration of either substance.

In addition, the trial court issued the following conclusions of law:

  1. The encounter occurred in Collin County, State of Texas.

  2. An officer has probable cause to perform a warrantless search if reasonably
     trustworthy facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the officer on the
     scene would lead a man of reasonable prudence to believe that the
     instrumentality of a crime or evidence of a crime will be found. Courts have
     previously held that the odor of marijuana is sufficient probable cause for a
     peace officer to perform a warrantless search of the vehicle from which the
     odor came.

  3. These holdings were abrogated by Texas House Bill 1325, signed into law
     June 2019, which changed the definition of “marihuana” and excluded
     “hemp.”

  4. Based on the testimony and evidence admitted at the hearing, the court finds
     Officer Joshua Robbins did not have probable cause to perform a warrantless
     search of the vehicle.

This appeal followed. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.01(5) (State entitled

to appeal an order of a court in a criminal case if the order grants a motion to

suppress evidence, a confession, or an admission, if jeopardy has not attached in

the case and if the prosecuting attorney certifies to the trial court that the appeal is

not taken for purpose of delay and that the evidence, confession, or admission is of

substantial importance in the case).2

   2
       The State made the required certifications in both of the cases.
                                                     –5–
                                      DISCUSSION

   I.       Standard of Review

         In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, an appellate court

applies a bifurcated standard of review. See State v. Hardin, 664 S.W.3d 867, 871

(Tex. Crim. App. 2022). An appellate court gives almost total deference to the trial

court’s determination of historical facts. See id. Likewise, an appellate court affords

almost total deference to a trial court’s ruling on mixed questions of law and fact if

the resolution to those questions turns on the evaluation of credibility and demeanor.

See id. at 872. And an appellate court reviews the trial court’s legal ruling on a

motion to suppress de novo, unless its specific fact findings that are supported by

the record are also dispositive of the legal ruling. See Abney v. State, 394 S.W.3d

542, 548 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). Here, the State challenges the trial court’s

conclusion of law with respect to the effect of the legislature’s enactment of the

Texas Hemp Farming Act and its impact on probable cause and warrantless searches.

Thus, our review of the issue presented is de novo.

   II.      Warrantless Searches and Probable Cause

         The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures

conducted by governmental officials. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Wiede v. State, 214

S.W.3d 17, 24 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Generally, a warrantless search is per se

unreasonable unless it falls within one of the few specifically defined and well

established exceptions to the warrant requirement. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412

                                           –6–
U.S. 218, 219 (1973); McGee v. State, 105 S.W.3d 609, 615 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).

      One exception to the warrant requirement is the automobile exception. See

Marcopoulos v. State, 538 S.W.3d 596, 599 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017).             The

automobile exception allows police officers to conduct a warrantless search of an

automobile if the vehicle is readily mobile and the officer has probable cause to

believe that the vehicle contains contraband. Id. The two justifications for the

automobile exception are the automobile’s ready mobility and the lower expectation

of privacy in an automobile because it is subject to government regulation. See

Keehn v. State, 279 S.W.3d 330, 335 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). Unlike warrantless

searches of residences, the automobile exception does not require exigent

circumstances. Neal v. State, 256 S.W.3d 264, 283 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).

Accordingly, an officer may search a vehicle on the basis of probable cause to

believe that it contains contraband, although exigent circumstances do not exist.

Dixon v. State, 206 S.W.3d 613, 619 n.25 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (“[A] finding of

probable cause ‘alone satisfies the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment

warrant requirement.’”) (citation omitted).

      Probable cause does not deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities.

Moreno v. State, 415 S.W.3d 284, 288 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). For probable cause

to exist, there must be a fair probability of finding inculpatory evidence at the

location being searched. Marcopoulos, 538 S.W.3d at 600. Probable cause is not a

high bar. Dist. of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 586 (2018). It requires more

                                        –7–
than bare suspicion but less than would justify conviction. Amador v. State, 275

S.W.3d 872, 878 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).

   III.   Basis for Search – Odor of Marijuana

      The officers testified, and the trial court found, the basis for their search of the

vehicle in which Gonzales was a passenger was their detection of the odor of

marijuana. Courts have long held that the odor of marijuana alone is sufficient to

constitute probable cause to search a defendant’s person, vehicle, and objects within

the vehicle. See, e.g., Moulden v. State, 576 S.W.2d 817, 819–20 (Tex. Crim. App.

1978); Deleon v. State, 530 S.W.3d 207, 211 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2017, pet. ref’d);

Bogan v. State, No. 02–15–00354–CR, 2016 WL 1163725, at *2–3 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth Mar. 24, 2016, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for

publication); Harris v. State, 468 S.W.3d 248, 255 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2015, no

pet.); Rocha v. State, 464 S.W.3d 410, 418 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015,

pet. ref’d); Jordan v. State, 394 S.W.3d 58, 64–65 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

2012, pet. ref’d). The issue presented here is whether the trial court erred in

concluding the Texas Hemp Farming Act eradicated this line of cases. The State

urges the Texas Hemp Farming Act did not eradicate these cases and that the trial

court erred in concluding it did. Before we determine whether the trial court erred

in reaching its conclusion, we briefly discuss the adoption and effect of the Texas

Hemp Farming Act.

                                          –8–
    IV.     Texas Hemp Farming Act

        The federal Agricultural Improvement Act of 2018 (2018 Farm Bill) classified

“hemp” as an agricultural product and generally authorized each state to decide

whether and how to regulate it within the state’s borders. Tex. Dep’t of State Health

Servs. v. Crown Distrib. LLC, 647 S.W.3d 648, 650 (Tex. 2022).                                Although

“marijuana” remains a Schedule 1 substance under the federal Controlled Substances

Act, the 2018 Farm Bill excludes “hemp” and hemp products that are cultivated,

produced, manufactured, and sold in compliance with federal regulations and the

relevant state’s federally approved plan. Id.

        In 2019, the Texas Legislature adopted a hemp plan, commonly referred to as

the Texas Hemp Farming Act. See Act of May 22, 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., ch. 764,

2019 Tex. Gen. Laws 2085. In doing so, the legislature enacted Chapters 121 and

122 of the Texas Agriculture Code, generally permitting and regulating the

cultivation and handling of hemp within this state.3 See TEX. AGRIC. CODE ANN.

§§ 121.001–122.404; see also Crown Distrib., 647 S.W.3d at 650. But the Texas

Hemp Farming Act expressly prohibits the manufacturing of products containing

hemp for smoking. AGRIC. § 122.301(b); Crown Distrib., 647 S.W.3d at 651. And

Chapter 443 of the Health and Safety Code requires the commissioner’s rules to

reflect the principle that the processing or manufacturing of a consumable hemp

    3
      Hemp is the plant Cannabis sativa L. with a delta-9 THC of not more than 0.3 percent on a dry weight
basis. AGRIC. § 121.001.
                                                  –9–
product for smoking is prohibited.                    TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.

§ 443.204(4). Based on this mandate, the commissioner adopted rule 300.104,

which prohibits the manufacturing and processing of consumable hemp products for

smoking. See 25 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 300.104; Crown Distrib., 647 S.W.3d at 651.4

The Texas Legislature also amended the Health and Safety Code to remove hemp

from the definition of marijuana. HEALTH & SAFETY § 481.002(26)(F); Smith v.

State, 620 S.W.3d 445, 448–49 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2020, no pet.).

    V.      Analysis

         The State contends that the trial court erred in granting Gonzales’s

 suppression motions because the court’s conclusions of law and ruling directly

 conflict with (1) this Court’s decision in Cortez v. State, (2) the legislative intent

 that law enforcement continue to enforce the marijuana laws after the enactment

 of the Texas Hemp Farming Act, and (3) the well-settled Fourth Amendment

 probable cause standard. The State aptly notes that when the trial court reached

 its conclusion the Texas Hemp Farming Act eradicated the line of cases holding

 that the odor of marijuana alone establishes probable cause to support a warrantless

 search of a vehicle and its occupants, it did not have the benefit of this Court’s

    4
     The hemp companies in the Crown Distribution case sought an injunction prohibiting the enforcement
of Section 443.204(4) and rule 300.104. The trial court granted a temporary injunction against enforcement
of the rule but not against Section 443.204(4). The court of appeals affirmed the temporary injunction
against enforcement of the rule’s prohibition of the distribution and retail sale of smokable hemp products.
Tex. Dep’t of State Health Servs. v. Crown Distrib. LLC, No. 03-20-00463-CV, 2021 WL 3411551, at *8
(Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 9, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.). The status or the effect of that injunction is not
germane to our resolution of the State’s issue here.
                                                  –10–
decision in Cortez v. State, in which we affirmed the validity of the line of cases

holding that the odor of marijuana alone is sufficient to constitute probable cause

to search a defendant’s person, vehicle, and objects within the vehicle, after the

enactment of the Texas Hemp Farming Act. See Cortez v. State, No. 05-21-00664-

CR, 2022 WL 17817963, at *6–8 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 20, 2022, pet. ref’d)

(mem. op., not designated for publication).

      Cortez, like Gonzales, argued that because it is impossible to distinguish

marijuana from hemp by smell, the odor of Cannabis sativa L. alone is insufficient

to establish probable cause to permit a warrantless search. The trial court and this

Court rejected that argument. In doing so, this Court stated:

     The “touchstone” of the [F]ourth [A]mendment, of course, is
     “reasonableness.” Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 60 (2014).
     “To be reasonable,” however, “is not to be perfect, and so the Fourth
     Amendment allows for some mistakes on the part of government
     officials, giving them ‘fair leeway for enforcing the law in the
     community’s protection.’” Id. at 60-61. An error of fact or law, if
     reasonable, will not render the officer’s judgment on the scene as
     invariably unreasonable. Id. at 61-68. Thus, if an officer, while
     conducting an otherwise permissible inventory search of a vehicle
     comes across bales of white powder wrapped tightly in plastic and duct
     tape, determines on the scene that seizure and arrest appear appropriate,
     the decision is not retroactively rendered “unreasonable” because later
     laboratory testing reveals the substance to be something other than
     cocaine. Were it otherwise, our drug laws would become practically
     unenforceable.

Id. at *7. Further, in addressing Cortez’s argument that, because marijuana and

hemp come from the same plant, it is impossible to distinguish between the two by

smell and, therefore, the possibility of error was invariably present and, thus, the

                                       –11–
odor of Cannabis sativa L. is insufficient by itself to establish probable cause to

search, we stated:

      But the possession of marijuana is still a criminal offense under Texas
      law and a reasonable, even if ultimately erroneous conclusion by an
      officer on the scene as to the identity of the substance, would be
      permitted under the Fourth Amendment.

Id. We then concluded that the odor of Cannabis sativa L. emanating from Cortez’s

vehicle gave the officer probable cause to search the vehicle, as well as its occupants,

and the trial court did not err when it concluded there was probable cause to support

the officer’s warrantless search of Cortez’s vehicle based on the officer’s belief that

he smelled Cannabis sativa L. Id. at *7–8.

      In addition to this Court, several courts throughout the United States, in

jurisdictions where hemp is legal and marijuana remains illegal, have arrived at

the conclusion that officers may still rely on the odor of marijuana to establish

probable cause to investigate marijuana possession. See, e.g., State v. Moore, 408

Wis. 2d 16, 991 N.W.2d 412, 417 (2023); Moore v. State, 211 N.E.3d 574, 579–

81 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (first citing United States v. Vaughn, 429 F. Supp. 3d 499

(E.D. Tenn. 2019); and then citing United States v. Boggess, 444 F. Supp. 3d 730,

737 (S.D.W. Va. 2020)); State v. Teague, 286 N.C. App. 160, 879 S.E.2d 881, 896

(2022); State v. Tillman, 203 N.E.3d 71, 77 (Ohio Ct. App. 2022) (citing State v.

Withrow, ––– Ohio App. –––, 194 N.E.3d 804, 810–11 (2022)); Owens v. State,

317 So. 3d 1218, 1220 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2021).

                                         –12–
      Moreover, our decision in Cortez is supported by the plain language of the

Texas Hemp Farming Act, which indicates that the legislature did not intend to

infringe on the enforcement of laws regulating marijuana and the probable cause

standard. See AGRIC. § 122.358(d) (“This subchapter does not limit or restrict a

peace officer from enforcing to the fullest extent the laws of this state regulating

marihuana and controlled substances, as defined by Section 481.002, Health and

Safety Code.”); see also Ryan Golden, Dazed & Confused; The State of

Enforcement of Marijuana Offenses After the Texas Hemp Farming Act, 72

BAYLOR L. REV. 737, 753–54 (2020) (“These provisions [§§ 122.356(b) and

122.358] evidence the legislature’s clear intent that law enforcement continue to

enforce Texas law by searching, and if necessary, seizing suspected illegal

substances, including marijuana.”).

      Notwithstanding the fact that industrial hemp is now legal and may be

indistinguishable from marijuana without a lab test, marijuana remains illegal, and

the probable cause standard for police to detect it remains the same: “Probable cause

‘exists when reasonably trustworthy facts and circumstances within the knowledge

of the officer on the scene would lead a man of reasonable prudence to believe that

the instrumentality of a crime or evidence pertaining to a crime will be

found.’”   Hyland v. State, 574 S.W.3d 904, 910 (Tex. Crim. App.

2019) (citing Washington v. State, 660 S.W.2d 533, 535 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983)).

Officers are not required to be absolutely certain or have actual confirmation that a

                                       –13–
substance they believe to be marijuana is marijuana and not hemp. See Lewis v.

State, No. 01-09-00530-CR, 2010 WL 3450246, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] Aug. 31, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“[T]he

U.S. Supreme Court has held that an officer need not have actual confirmation of the

illegality of a substance in order to have probable cause.”) (citing Tex. v. Brown, 460

U.S. 730, 741–42 (1983)). As stated supra, probable cause does not deal with hard

certainties, but with probabilities. See Moreno, 415 S.W.3d at 288. Probable cause

merely requires that the facts available to the officer would warrant a person of

reasonable caution in the belief that certain items may be contraband; it does not

demand any showing that such a belief be correct or more likely true than false.

Brown, 460 U.S. at 742.

      Officers Caldwell and Robbins testified regarding their training and

experience detecting the odor of marijuana. Officer Caldwell testified that he had

come into contact with marijuana on a “pretty regular basis” but that he had never

seen anyone smoking hemp out in public and that, as far as he had seen, hemp is

not regularly smoked out in public. Officer Robbins testified similarly. Officers

Caldwell and Robbins both indicated that they smelled a strong odor of marijuana

emanating from the truck in which Gonzalez was a passenger. As marijuana

possession is a crime, its odor may evidence criminal activity. HEALTH & SAFETY

§ 481.121 (a person commits an offense if the person knowingly or intentionally

possesses a usable quantity of marijuana); see also Cortez, 2022 WL 17817963, at

                                        –14–
*7; Stringer v. State, 605 S.W.3d 693, 697 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2020,

no pet.). We conclude the odor of Cannabis sativa L. emanating from the vehicle

in which Gonzales was an occupant gave the officers probable cause to search the

vehicle as well as its occupants. Cortez, 2022 WL 17817863, at *8; Stringer, 605

S.W.3d at 697. Thus, the trial court erred in concluding Officer Robbins did not

have probable cause to perform a warrantless search of the vehicle. We sustain the

State’s sole issue.

                                  CONCLUSION

      We reverse the trial court orders granting Gonzales’s motions to suppress and

remand the cases for further proceedings.

                                            /Nancy Kennedy/
                                            NANCY KENNEDY
Publish                                     JUSTICE
Tex. R. App. P. 47

221154F.P05

                                      –15–
                                   S
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                  JUDGMENT

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellant                 On Appeal from the 416th Judicial
                                              District Court, Collin County, Texas
No. 05-22-01154-CR          V.                Trial Court Cause No. 416-81430-
                                              2022.
CHRISTIAN BRUCE GONZALES,                     Opinion delivered by Justice
Appellee                                      Kennedy. Justices Carlyle and Smith
                                              participating.

      Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the trial court’s October 12, 2022
order granting appellee’s motion to suppress is REVERSED and the cause
REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Judgment entered this 12th day of October, 2023.

                                       –16–
                                   S
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                  JUDGMENT

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellant                 On Appeal from the 416th Judicial
                                              District Court, Collin County, Texas
No. 05-22-01155-CR          V.                Trial Court Cause No. 416-81431-
                                              2022.
CHRISTIAN BRUCE GONZALES,                     Opinion delivered by Justice
Appellee                                      Kennedy. Justices Carlyle and Smith
                                              participating.

      Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the trial court’s October 12, 2022
order granting appellee’s motion to suppress is REVERSED and the cause
REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Judgment entered this 12th day of October, 2023.

                                       –17–