Court Opinion

ID: 9456383
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 19:50:50.171897+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:34:57.171797
License: Public Domain

KILEY, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
I dissent. In my opinion the district court erred in modifying the July 1, 1969 judgment by imposing the specific timetable without the “proper notice and hearing” required by that judgment; and that the error is of sufficient substance to require a remandment to the district court for a “proper hearing” at whieh both sides may present evidence with respect to a timetable with a complete record upon which we may determine whether the court’s discretion had been soundly exercised.
I agree with Judge Duffy that the concurrence of both parties in the proceedings before the district court constituted a waiver of CHA’s right to complain of lack of “formal and open” hearings and a transcript. But I do not see how an agreement to have informal hearings without a reporter on one matter can constitute a waiver of the right to notice of a hearing on another matter. The scant record before us indicates that the purpose of the five informal “conferences” was to obtain information from CHA concerning what action it had taken to conform with the “best efforts” provision of the July 1, 1969 judgment.
Plaintiffs’ counsel’s July 13, 1968 letter to Judge Austin, with copies sent to counsel for the CHA, requested that CHA be ordered “to cooperate with us in preparing a factual report for the court.” Plaintiffs’ counsel submitted with the letter a proposed order form. Neither the letter nor the proposed order, however, made mention of a specific timetable, but rather concerned a “noncontroversial” report of CHA’s required “best efforts.” The letter stated that “perhaps everything is being done that can be done” but that could not be determined without further information from CHA.
Clearly in itself the letter and the proposed order submitted with it gave no notice that the imposition of a specific timetable was to be considered. No doubt CHA knew that its performance was under challenge and that in general the question of timing was involved, and it perhaps should have anticipated issuance of a rule to show cause why it had not complied with the order’s “best efforts” requirement by submitting the approved sites. But neither that knowledge nor that anticipation is a substitute for a “proper notice” that the July 1, 1969 order was to be modified by setting the specific timetable. There was no “proper notice,” as required by the 1969 judgment.
Plaintiffs’ counsel at the August 13 hearing on CHA’s motion to vacate the July 20, 1970 order recalled that he had made an oral motion at the July 13, 1970 conference that “the court express its view that it was high time CHA got down to brass tacks and submitted the already approved sites to the City Council”; and that the court “expressed the view that that was an appropriate thing *314for CHA to do.” But this was not a “proper notice” of a hearing upon a specific timetable and no. hearing was had with respect to a timetable. Counsel for CHA requested at the conference a continuance to present evidence of sociologist Dr. Greeley, but the continuance was denied on the basis that the proposed testimony would only be repetitive of what had already been said in written statements addressed to the district court by CHA Chairman Swibel and Commissioner Wade. Dr. Greeley’s letter, submitted with defendants’ motion to vacate, indicates it is not wholly “repetitive.”
I also think that the written statements did not constitute a “proper hearing” on the subject of a specific timetable. Commissioner Wade expressed the view that the submission of sites to the City Council at a time when it could be embroiled as a political campaign issue could result in “less housing.” Chairman Swibel stated that “timing” was an essential factor in implementing the 1969 order and that sites should not be submitted to the City Council until arrangements were reached with surrounding suburbs for establishing sites in these areas simultaneously with intracity sites to prevent flight to the suburbs; and expressed fear of increased racial tension in the city, and complete stoppage of the housing program. It is quite understandable why the CHA would want to present the testimony of experts unconnected with CHA, as “for instance” Dr. Greeley,1 backed up possibly with sociological data, to support the goals of the 1969 judgment and plans of the CHA. I think the district court erred in considering that proffered testimony irrelevant. And by excluding it from consideration the court, in my view, denied CHA a “proper hearing.”
My conclusion therefore is that CHA was denied the “proper notice and hearing,” required by the 1969 judgment, with respect to a specific timetable. The question now is whether the denial was of substantial prejudice to CHA. Having in mind that form must not be exalted over substance, my opinion is, nevertheless, that CHA might have been substantially prejudiced by the district court action.
The CHA goal, approved in the 1969 judgment, was a comprehensive Chicago and suburban public housing program. It must be of substantial interest to CHA, as well as to plaintiffs, whether embroilment of public housing sites in a heated political campaign would frustrate the comprehensive program. If that is so, the question of timing of submission of the sites is of importance. The sworn testimony of Swibel, Wade, and Dr. Greeley, as well as other expert testimony, would be relevant on that question. In my opinion, therefore, the CHA should have had an opportunity to persuade the district court, upon a proper record, of the wisdom of a less “rigid timetable” 2 than the one imposed without a “proper notice and hearing.”
I do not think this view exalts form over substance. This court, in its order granting a stay of the district court order on appeal, referred to CHA’s statement that compliance with the timetable “presents a clear danger that there will be no low income housing units built anywhere.” This court construed that statement to be “an assertion that there will be irreparable injury to the public." The stay order was granted “because of the importance of the public and constitutional issues involved.” This court expedited this appeal because of that “importance.”
*315I would retain jurisdiction and remand for an early hearing, with findings and conclusions certified to us on a complete record suitable for appellate review.

. Counsel for CHA also requested, in its motion to vacate, that the court hear the testimony of a “Washington expert who will testify that the precise form of procedure set in the July 20 order brought about a complete collapse of public housing efforts in Washington.”

. CHA, at the August 13 hearing on its motion to vacate, argued that plaintiffs’ July 13 letter and suggested order did not give it notice that plaintiffs were asking the court “to impose these rigid time limits.” It requested a new hearing to determine whether these timetables were too rigid.