Court Opinion

ID: 9375014
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-24 18:00:50.611964+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:54.925275
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        FEB 24 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SHAWN KELLY,                                    No. 22-15697

                Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 2:21-cv-01880-JJT-ESW

 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
JON MENNEN, Sgt.,

                Defendant-Appellee.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                            for the District of Arizona
                   John Joseph Tuchi, District Judge, Presiding

                          Submitted February 14, 2023**

Before:      FERNANDEZ, FRIEDLAND, and H.A. THOMAS, Circuit Judges.

      Arizona state prisoner Shawn Kelly appeals pro se from the district court’s

judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging excessive force. We

have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Byrd v. Maricopa

County Bd. of Supervisors, 845 F.3d 919, 922 (9th Cir. 2017) (dismissal of an

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)); Pouncil v. Tilton, 704 F.3d 568, 574 (9th

Cir. 2012) (dismissal of an action as time-barred). We vacate and remand.

      The district court concluded that Kelly’s action was time-barred because

Kelly did not file it within the applicable statute of limitations. However, Kelly

alleged in his second amended complaint that he was unable to file timely because

he was prevented from accessing necessary legal files, despite his diligence in

pursuing them. The district court failed to consider whether Kelly sufficiently

alleged a basis for equitable tolling or whether he could amend to do so. See Soto

v. Sweetman, 882 F.3d 865, 871 (9th Cir. 2018) (“Federal courts in § 1983 actions

apply the state statute of limitations from personal-injury claims and borrow the

state’s tolling rules.”); Supermail Cargo, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1204,

1206-07 (9th Cir. 1995) (explaining that complaints may be dismissed as time-

barred only if “it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts

that would establish the timeliness of the claim” and the factual and legal issues are

clear enough to allow the court to “determine with certainty whether the [equitable

tolling] doctrine could be successfully invoked”); Nolde v. Frankie, 964 P.2d 477,

480 (Ariz. 1998) (en banc) (explaining that Arizona recognizes equitable

exceptions to statutes of limitations “when necessary to prevent injustice”).

      We therefore vacate and remand for the district court to consider, in the first

instance, whether the allegations in Kelly’s second amended complaint are

                                          2                                     22-15697
sufficient to invoke equitable tolling, and if not, whether Kelly should be granted

further leave to amend.

      We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued

in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

      VACATED and REMANDED.

                                          3                                   22-15697