Court Opinion

ID: 9847066
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:53:13.413474+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:00.125737
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE COMPTON,
with whom JUSTICE STEPHENSON joins, dissenting.
On brief, the former wife concedes, as she must, that antenuptial agreements “are subject to the same rules of construction and *662interpretation as other contracts.” In Virginia, we are committed to the “plain meaning” rule when interpreting contracts. Appalachian Power Co. v. Greater Lynchburg Transit Co., 236 Va. 292, 295, 374 S.E.2d 10, 12 (1988). Clear and explicit language in a contract is to be taken in its ordinary signification, and, if the meaning is plain when so read, the instrument must be given effect accordingly. Amos v. Coffey, 228 Va. 88, 92, 320 S.E.2d 335, 337 (1984). Where, as here, the intention of the parties has been stated plainly, a court may not fashion a different agreement for them under the guise of contract interpretation.
Contrary to the foregoing settled principles, the majority has refused to enforce the plain terms of the present agreement.
The agreement, after reciting that “each of the parties desires to retain their respective separate property rights in the real and personal property presently owned by him or her,” provides:
“SEPARATE PROPERTY - Except as otherwise specified in the Agreement, the parties shall separately retain all rights in his or her own property, both real and personal, tangible or intangible, whether now owned or hereafter acquired, and each of the parties shall have the full, absolute and unrestricted power and right to lease, manage, sell or dispose of his or her own property in any manner, and to receive all moneys and profits therefrom, free from any claim that may be made by the other party by reason of their marriage, and without molestation or interruption from the other party.” (emphasis added).
Obviously, the intention of the parties, as clearly expressed in the agreement, was to protect their respective separate assets from any claims of the other spouse that may have accrued as a result of the marriage. Manifestly, a claim for spousal support must be construed as a claim made by reason of the marriage between the parties. Given the fact that under the plain terms of the agreement the husband could “dispose of his . . . own property in any manner .■ . . free from any claim” of the wife “without molestation or interruption” from her, she had no legal basis to object to the disposition of the realty in question. Consequently, the husband was not guilty of fraud upon her when he disposed of his separate property.
*663In confirming the trial court’s action, the majority has placed an unwarranted gloss upon the parties’ agreement by saying that the disputed clause is “a mutual waiver of any property interests that might accrue ‘by operation of law’ to one party in the property of the other ‘by reason of their marriage.’ ” Building on that gloss, the majority then states that “the right to spousal support is not a property interest, and it does not accrue by operation of law but only upon proof of entitlement.” That is a nice theory, but one which is not expressed anywhere in the agreement. And, in placing this gloss on the agreement, the majority ignores the parties’ intent as expressed clearly and explicitly in the contract language.
Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the trial court and dismiss the former wife’s bill of complaint.