Court Opinion

ID: 9566075
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:33:12.304276+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:03.212158
License: Public Domain

Carley, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
The majority affirms Bright’s convictions, but concludes that his death sentences must be reversed because the trial court refused to grant the motion seeking funds for psychiatric assistance pursuant to Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U. S. 68 (105 SC 1087, 84 LE2d 53) (1985). I concur in the affirmance of Bright’s convictions, but must respectfully dissent to the reversal of his death sentences.
Under Ake, supra at 83, funds for expert psychiatric assistance are available only to a defendant who has made a preliminary show*287ing in the trial court that his sanity will “be a significant factor at trial. . . .’’To facilitate this determination, “[t]he trial court is authorized to order a psychiatrist, or perhaps some other competent mental health expert, to examine the defendant. . . .” Lindsey v. State, 254 Ga. 444, 449 (330 SE2d 563) (1985) (Addendum). In addition to his motion seeking funds for expert assistance pursuant to Ake, Bright also filed notice of his intent to raise an insanity defense. Thus, pursuant to OCGA § 17-7-130.1, the trial court appointed a psychiatrist “to examine [him] and to testify at the trial.” Tolbert v. State, 260 Ga. 527, 528 (2) (b) (397 SE2d 439) (1990). Despite the majority’s reasoning, there is no authority which would preclude the trial court from ordering that the psychiatrist appointed to examine Bright pursuant to his notice under OCGA § 17-7-130.1 also address the additional issue of whether Bright’s sanity was likely to be a significant factor in his defense pursuant to his Ake motion. See Lindsey v. State, supra at 449 (Addendum). It necessarily follows that it was not error for the trial court to deny Bright’s Ake motion until such time as the court-appointed psychiatrist had addressed the issue of whether Bright’s sanity was likely to be a significant factor in his defense. State v. Grant, 257 Ga. 123, 126 (2) (355 SE2d 646) (1987).
Thus, Bright’s subsequent refusal to cooperate with the psychiatrist appointed pursuant to OCGA § 17-7-130.1 frustrated the trial court’s effort to make the preliminary determination whether the Ake motion should be granted and was, in effect, a voluntary waiver of that motion. Had the court-appointed psychiatrist been allowed to examine Bright, the trial court presumably would have used the psychiatric report in making the determination whether sanity was likely to be a significant factor in Bright’s defense. If, after considering the psychiatric report and all the other evidence, the trial court concluded that Bright’s sanity was likely to be a significant factor, it then would have been required to appoint, or provide Bright with funds for, an expert who would work for and report to the defense alone. If, however, the trial court concluded that sanity was not likely to be a significant factor, Bright’s motion would then have been denied and that ruling would be subject to review by this court. Brown v. State, 260 Ga. 153, 158 (7) (391 SE2d 108) (1990).
Citing no authority whatsoever, the majority nevertheless concludes that a defendant who seeks funds for expert assistance under Ake need not submit to an examination of a court-appointed expert until he has had an opportunity to decide whether to present expert testimony at trial. As the majority implicitly acknowledges, however, this conclusion is not required by any existing authority. Indeed, the majority’s conclusion is in direct conflict with a prior decision of this court. In State v. Grant, supra at 126 (2), the trial court denied a motion seeking funds for expert assistance in the guilt-innocence and *288sentencing phases of a death penalty case, after the defendant refused to submit to evaluation at Central State Hospital to determine whether his sanity would likely be a significant factor at trial. On appeal, this court affirmed the denial of the motion without examination, or even mention, of the evidence or lack of ex parte evidence presented by the defendant in support of his motion. Thus, what was dispositive in Grant was the defendant’s refusal to submit to an independent psychiatric examination so as to facilitate the trial court’s preliminary determination of whether sanity would likely be a significant factor at trial. Likewise, Bright’s refusal to submit to an independent examination so as to facilitate the trial court’s preliminary determination of whether sanity would likely be a significant factor at trial should be dispositive here.
Moreover, even assuming that Bright’s refusal to cooperate with the court-appointed psychiatrist was not a voluntary waiver of his Ake motion, the holding in Ake only requires that the State
provide a defendant with “psychiatric assistance in presenting mitigating evidence at his sentencing proceeding, where the [S]tate presents psychiatric evidence against the defendant” Bowden v. Kemp, 767 F2d 761, 763 (11th Cir. 1985).
(Emphasis supplied.) Christenson v. State, 261 Ga. 80, 83 (2) (c) (402 SE2d 41) (1991). Here, the State “presented no psychiatric (or expert psychological) testimony at the sentencing phase of the trial. [Cit.]” Christenson v. State, supra at 83 (2) (c). See also Walker v. State, 254 Ga. 149, 154-155 (5) (327 SE2d 475) (1985).
Ake only guarantees a defendant the right to a psychiatrist at the sentencing phase to oppose the government’s psychiatric testimony. ... In Bowden [v. Kemp, 767 F2d 761 (11th Cir. 1985)], the court stated that “unlike the sentencing situation in Ake, Bowden’s prosecutor had no need to present psychiatric evidence to show an aggravating factor, and he presented none. The dangers and inequities which concerned the Court in Ake consequently did not exist.” [Cit.] Nor do those dangers and inequities exist in this appeal. The [S]tate presented no psychiatric experts at the sentencing phase. ... As such, appellant was not constitutionally entitled to a state-funded psychiatrist under Ake.
Kordenbrock v. Scroggy, 919 F2d 1091, 1120 (6th Cir. 1990). See also Gore v. Dugger, 763 FSupp. 1110, 1120-1121 (M.D. Fla. 1989); Pruett v. Commonwealth, 351 SE2d 1, 7, fn. 3 (Va. 1986).
*289[T]his is not a case in which the defendant might be entitled to psychiatric assistance at the sentencing phase even where the [S]tate does not present psychiatric testimony. [Cit.]
Christenson v. State, supra at 83 (2) (c). Contrary to the majority’s holding, Bright presented no ex parte evidence from which the trial court could reasonably have inferred that the question of his sanity would be a significant mitigating factor at the sentencing phase of the trial. Bright’s ex parte evidence did “not show that [he] suffers from any serious mental disorder.” (Emphasis supplied.) Christenson v. State, supra at 83 (2) (c). To the extent that Bright’s ex parte evidence might have been mitigating, he was deprived of no constitutional right by virtue of the fact that he was not afforded public funds so as to present that evidence through the testimony of a psychiatrist.
Accordingly, I believe that Division 2 of the majority opinion misapplies Grant, supra, and Christenson, supra, and that the holding therein is, therefore, in conflict with existing Georgia law. By departing from that existing Georgia law, the effect of today’s holding is to insure that criminal defendants who assert the defense of insanity will have little, if any, motivation to cooperate with court-appointed psychiatrists in the preliminary determination of whether sanity will be a significant factor at trial. Accordingly, I must respectfully dissent to the reversal of Bright’s sentences.