Court Opinion

ID: 9678291
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:15:54.825132+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:02.801490
License: Public Domain

HOWELL, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent. In stating that a party “has no right” to default his opponent’s action *401and thereafter litigate his counterclaim at “a time and place of his own choice,” the majority infers that the Idaho default was a conscious and deliberate strategic man-uever of Signgraphics, the Texas signmaker. The trial court made no such finding, the Idaho signmaker makes no such claim, and the record does not warrant this court to so hold sua sponte.
Likewise, the majority holds by inference that the failure of the Texas signmaker to cite authority “supporting the rule that the compulsory counterclaim rule does not apply to a default judgment” is a sufficient ground for an affirmance. The decision harkens back to the medieval rule that if there be no writ, there be no right. Where the law upon a point has not been decided, it is our obligation to declare the law, not to simply affirm because the appellant has no case directly in point.
Sound legal analysis leads to the conclusion that neither the compulsory counterclaim rule, nor any theory of res judicata should be applied to default judgment situations. The courts of our nation enter a myriad of defaults against the impecunious. The most frequent reason, by far, that a defaulting defendant fails to meet his underlying obligation is that he has no money; the reason that he defaults is that he has neither a defense, nor funds to retain counsel to present a defense. That class of default is easily distinguishable and is of little present concern because, once a default of that class is entered, it is rarely contested and, more often than not, the plaintiff ultimately realizes little or nothing upon his judgment.
The class of default which is subsequently contested almost always involves mistake, oversight, misunderstanding, and other human failing. In the majority of instances, the failing which leads to the default is not the personal failing of the defaulting defendant but is the failing of the defendant’s agent, generally a member of the bar certified as competent to protect the rights of the public by the very court system which has exacted the default.
Defaults are necessarily punitive. In every instance, they represent the forfeiture of the right to present evidence and to be heard as to the merits of the opposing party’s claim. Of course, every system for the regulation of human conduct must have its sanctions; experience demonstrates that without reasonable sanctions and the reasonable application thereof, our judicial system would collapse. This case squarely presents the question of what is a reasonable sanction for the Texas signmaker’s Idaho default. Regrettably the majority has avoided rather than answered the core question presented by this record.
The question, having been properly outlined and placed in its proper context is easily answered: The compulsory counterclaim rule is not applicable to default judgments. Neither should a default judgment be granted res judicata effect over and beyond the actual res awarded to the plaintiff who prevails upon default.
The law has long recognized the harsh and punitive effect of defaults. Upon default, the plaintiff may not amend; he may not make additional claims, not unless he serves those claims upon the defaulting defendant and obtains subsequent default thereon; he may not recover more than that for which he has sued; he may not state additional grounds for recovery; and if his evidence will not support all relief granted, the default will not as a rule be modified — it will be set aside in its entirety.
These rules have been fashioned by the courts to ameliorate the punitive effect of defaults. The within majority decision violates them. The Idaho signmaker is being given relief that it did not plead; relief to a dollar value in excess of the defaulted Idaho petition is being awarded; relief different in kind is being granted; relief not supported by evidence received at the default hearing is being assessed. The well established law of Texas pertaining to defaults has been traversed sub silentio.
The only theoretical justification advanced by the majority is that which it has gleaned from Professor Wright’s statement that the law of compulsory counterclaim reduces the volume of litigation and pro*402motes “the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of controversies_ (emphasis added).” Texas has long held that it is not “just” to assess against a defaulting defendant anything over and beyond that which was precisely claimed and precisely put in evidence in the case wherein the default occurred. Professor Wright’s analysis, while persuasive as a general proposition, must yield to the Texas concept of proper sanctions against a defaulting defendant. It is to be further noted that the Professor’s stated goal of an inexpensive determination is largely inapplicable to defaults. Default hearings are short and summary proceedings; defaults are often granted upon the pleadings or upon affidavit. To exempt defaults from the compulsory counterclaim rule and from the rule of res judicata still only requires but one full blown trial upon the merits. The judgment below should be reversed.
Finally, the majority has neither reached nor ruled upon the Idaho signmaker’s conditional cross-point urging that its special appearance was improperly overruled. The cross-point should be sustained and this action should be dismissed. U-Anchor Advertising, Inc. v. Burt, 553 S.W.2d 760 (Tex.1977).