Court Opinion

ID: 9364572
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-19 17:08:53.244271+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:39.099303
License: Public Domain

J-S33038-21

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA              :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                           :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                           :
              v.                           :
                                           :
                                           :
 TODD ASTILLERO                            :
                                           :
                    Appellant              :   No. 1067 EDA 2021

      Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 12, 2017
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-51-CR-0009058-2016

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA              :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                           :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                           :
              v.                           :
                                           :
                                           :
 TODD ASTILLERO                            :
                                           :
                    Appellant              :   No. 1068 EDA 2021

      Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 12, 2017
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-51-CR-0009059-2016

BEFORE: BOWES, J., NICHOLS, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.:                      FILED JANUARY 19, 2023

      Todd Astillero was found guilty of numerous offenses that occurred on

two dates approximately six months apart. The first incident, which gave rise

to charges at CP-51-CR-0009058-2016 (“First Case”), resulted in convictions

for robbery, possessing a firearm prohibited, criminal mischief, carrying a

firearm without a license, carrying a firearm on a public street in Philadelphia,

possessing instruments of crime, terroristic threats, simple assault, and
J-S33038-21

recklessly endangering another person.1 The charges from the second incident

were docketed at CP-51-CR-009059-2016 (“Second Case”), and ended in

convictions for possession of a firearm by a prohibited person, carrying a

firearm without a license, and carrying a firearm on a public street in

Philadelphia.2 The two dockets were joined for trial.

        During the pendency of this appeal, Astillero’s counsel passed away and

we remanded for appointment of counsel. The trial court appointed counsel,

who filed a supplemental Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement and a supplemental

brief in this Court.

        Astillero’s initial brief challenged the denial of his motion to sever the

cases, the failure to decide his pretrial motions before the start of trial, and

the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding that he possessed the

firearm at issue in the Second Case. In his supplemental brief, Astillero claims

that his sentence was excessive and that the prosecutor in his case committed

misconduct. We conclude each of these issues lack merit.

        The facts and procedural background of this case, as gleaned from the

trial court’s opinion and the certified record, are as follows. The incident giving

rise to the First Case occurred on January 30, 2016, when Astillero and a

second male were inside Celebrity Vape Lounge (“Celebrity Vape”), on Market

Street in West Philadelphia. Celebrity Vape is owned by Astillero’s cousin,
____________________________________________

118 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3701(a)(1), 6105(a)(1), 3304(a)(2), 6106(a)(1), 6108,
907(a), 2706(a)(1), 2701(a), and 2705, respectively.

2   18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6105(a)(1), 6106(a)(1), and 6108, respectively.

                                           -2-
J-S33038-21

Kareem Astillero (“Kareem”). There, Astillero became agitated and brandished

a handgun that he waved in the direction of a Celebrity Vape employee, Dustin

Sullivan. Astillero shouted, “Fuck you, fuck this, fuck Kareem and fuck the

white boy,” referring to Sullivan. Astillero then went behind the counter, stole

an iPad, and attempted to take a stereo receiver.

      Once Astillero and the other male left, Sullivan called not only the police

but also Kareem. Both arrived at Celebrity Vape shortly thereafter. Kareem

received a call from Astillero, whom he placed on speaker phone so

Philadelphia Police Officer Anthony Britton could hear. Astillero then said, “I

really wish you didn’t call the cops; I got to kill you and the white boy.” Kareem

showed police detectives a text exchange between himself and Astillero in

which Astillero accused him of being a “rat” and threatened repercussions.

Ultimately, Philadelphia police detectives obtained a warrant for Astillero’s

arrest.

      The events leading to the Second Case occurred approximately six

months later, on June 17, 2016, when police executed the arrest warrant.

Philadelphia Housing Authority Police Officer Ralston Thomas and other law

enforcement personnel went to the home of Astillero’s girlfriend, Chrystal

Richmond, who let the officers into her apartment and advised that Astillero

was in a back bedroom. The officers knocked on the bedroom door, and

Astillero opened it voluntarily. Officers then took him into custody without

incident. Richmond consented to a search of the apartment, and in a closet in

the bedroom in which police had found Astillero – the closet had no doors –

                                      -3-
J-S33038-21

officers spotted a red bag on the top shelf. The bag contained a black firearm.

Astillero was charged in both cases.

      After several delays, the parties appeared for trial on June 23, 2017.

Astillero’s counsel informed the court that there was an outstanding a motion

to suppress evidence of the gun found upon Astillero’s arrest. See N.T.,

6/23/17, at 12. The trial judge determined that another judge should hear the

motion in order to avoid prejudice. Id. at 34. The trial judge nevertheless also

determined that he would first hear the testimony of a Commonwealth

witness, Officer Britton, because the officer was in court that day, the cases

had been pending for some time, and the officer’s testimony did not involve

the firearm found at the time of Astillero’s arrest. Before Officer Britton could

begin his testimony, however, the defense stated that it also had an

outstanding motion to sever the two cases. After a conference in chambers,

the trial judge decided to allow the officer to testify because his testimony

would only concern the First Case. Thereafter, another judge would preside

over both the suppression motion and severance motion. Astillero noted his

objection for the record, without explanation, and Officer Britton testified.

      The motions then went before another judge on June 27, 2017, who

denied severance because evidence of the circumstances surrounding the

execution of the arrest warrant was admissible in both cases. The judge also

noted that because Astillero had decided to proceed with a bench trial, if both

cases were tried together, the possibility of unfair prejudice was significantly

                                       -4-
J-S33038-21

reduced. Citing the interest in judicial economy, she then declined to entertain

the motion to suppress and returned it to the trial judge.

        The trial judge held a hearing on the suppression motion on July 5,

2017, and denied it. The court then proceeded to a bench trial on both cases,

incorporating the testimony from the motion to suppress into the trial record.3

        Relevant to this appeal, Celebrity Vape employee Dustin Sullivan

testified that during events leading to the First Case, he saw Astillero with

“either a .9 millimeter or .45 in his right hand.” N.T., 7/5/17, at 99. There was

no other testimony about the description of the gun involved in the First Case.

Regarding the Second Case, Officer Thomas testified about his discovery of

the firearm in the red bag. He described the gun as “a black firearm” and said

he “believe[d]” it was “a Glock 19, with an extended magazine.” Id. at 25,

28. Officer Thomas said he could not be sure if any men’s clothing was in the

bedroom closet.

        In defense, Astillero presented the testimony of his girlfriend, Richmond.

Richmond testified that she had been in a relationship with Astillero for over

a year prior to his arrest. Id. at 56. Richmond explained that Astillero stayed

at her home “[a] few nights here and there throughout the year,” and that he

would stay between two and four nights at a time and sleep in her bedroom.

Id. at 49, 58, 77. She said that Astillero brought “food, stuff like that, DVDs,”

____________________________________________

3   See N.T., 7/5/17, at 150.

                                           -5-
J-S33038-21

when he came to visit, and that he kept a toothbrush at her apartment, but

no clothing. Id. at 75, 77.

      When asked whether it was Astillero’s bag from in which the firearm was

found, Richmond responded, “I never seen [Astillero] with a bag.” Id. at 65.

However, Richmond denied that the bag containing the firearm was hers, that

she had ever seen the firearm before, or that she had known there was a

firearm in her home. Id. at 49, 64, 75. She stated she noticed the bag the

night before Astillero’s arrest. Id. at 65-66, 76-77. According to Richmond,

the only other occupants of the home are her three-year-old son and 16-year-

old daughter, and the bag does not belong to her daughter. Id. at 60, 65.

      Richmond also testified that there was “a lot of traffic coming in and

out” of her apartment because she sold food. Id. at 75. However, Richmond

testified that Astillero did not have any visitors and that her daughter, who

has a key, does not allow anyone into the apartment. Id. at 49-50, 65.

      The court found Astillero guilty of all charges, and sentenced him on

October 12, 2017. On the First Case, the court imposed an aggregate sentence

of 10 to 20 years’ incarceration to be followed by 10 years of probation.

Regarding the Second Case, it sentenced Astillero in total to five to 10 years’

incarceration with a concurrent period of seven years of probation, all to be

served concurrently with the sentence on the First Case. Astillero filed a

motion to reconsider his sentence, which the court denied.

      In November 2017, Astillero filed a timely appeal to this Court, but this

Court ultimately dismissed it due to Astillero’s failure to ensure the inclusion

                                     -6-
J-S33038-21

of necessary transcripts in the certified record. See Commonwealth v.

Astillero, 1355 EDA 2018 (Pa.Super. filed February 23, 2021) (unpublished

memorandum). Astillero filed a timely Post Conviction Relief Act petition and

the trial court reinstated Astillero’s direct appeal rights on May 21, 2021. This

timely appeal followed. However, in March 2022, this Court was informed that

defense counsel could not continue and therefore we ordered new counsel to

be appointed. The trial court appointed present counsel on March 17, 2022.

Counsel filed a supplementary Rule 1925(b) statement which incorporated

previous counsel’s initial issues and added two additional issues.

      Through his his initial counsel, Astillero raised the following issues:

         A. Did the trial court commit an abuse of discretion by denying
            [Astillero’s] motion to sever the two cases because the evidence
            in one case was not admissible in the other case and vice versa
            and because the evidence constituted propensity evidence?

         B. Did the trial court commit reversible error by overruling trial
            counsel’s objection to commencing the trial before ruling on
            [Astillero’s] motion to sever and motion to suppress in violation of
            Pa.R.Crim.P. 580?

         C. Was the evidence [in the Second Case] insufficient to prove
            [Astillero] committed the crimes possession of a firearm by a
            prohibited person, carrying a firearm without a license, and
            carrying a firearm on a public street as the required element of
            possession was not established either in actuality or constructively
            because the authorities found the gun not on [Astillero’s] person
            but in a residence that was not [Astillero’s] where other persons
            resided who had access to the gun and the power to exercise
            dominion and control of the firearm and because evidence failed
            to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [Astillero] had the intent
            to possess the gun?

         D. Was the evidence [in the Second Case] insufficient to prove
            [Astillero] committed the crime of carrying a firearm on a public
            street because the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a

                                      -7-
J-S33038-21

            reasonable doubt that [Astillero] possessed the gun on a public
            street?

         E. Was the evidence on docket [in the Second Case] insufficient to
            prove [Astillero] committed the crime of carrying a firearm
            without a license because the Commonwealth failed to prove
            beyond a reasonable doubt that [Astillero] carried a firearm
            concealed on or about his person?

See Astillero’s initial Br. at 3-4 (reordered).

      Current counsel also raises the following issues:

         A. Did the [trial] court abuse its discretion by fashioning a sentence
            that greatly exceeded that which is necessary to protect the
            public, greater than that requested by the prosecutor and seems
            not to have taken into consideration [Astillero’s] familial and
            community support, remorse and where the sentencing court
            incorrectly said that [Astillero] had no remorse?

         B. Did the Commonwealth commit prosecutorial misconduct by
            divulging to the waiver Judge prior to a waiver trial that [Astillero]
            had a prior record score of “5” and that he had multiple criminal
            “convictions,” and should such reckless prosecutorial misconduct
            bar retrial pursuant to Article I, Section 10 of the Pennsylvania
            Constitution, as [Astillero] was deprived of a fair trial?

See Astillero’s supplemental Br. at 5.

      In his first issue, Astillero contends that the trial court erred by denying

his motion to sever. He argues that the only common element between the

two incidents was his alleged possession of a gun, and that there is no

evidence that the gun found in the Second Case was the same as the one

allegedly used in the First Case. Thus, according to Astillero, joinder did not

serve judicial economy and only resulted in unnecessary prejudice due to the

nature of the handgun evidence. He asserts that the trial judge erroneously

                                       -8-
J-S33038-21

considered his “propensity” to carry a gun when concluding he was guilty of

possessing a gun in both the First Case and the Second Case.

      We review an order denying a motion for severance for a manifest abuse

of discretion. Commonwealth v. Renninger, 269 A.3d 548, 563 (Pa.Super.

2022) (en banc). Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 582 governs the

joinder of separate informations for trial. It provides:

      (1) Offenses charged in separate indictments or informations may
      be tried together if:

           (a) the evidence of each of the offenses would be admissible
           in a separate trial for the other and is capable of separation
           by the jury so that there is no danger of confusion; or

           (b) the offenses charged are based on the same act or
           transaction.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 582(A)(1).

      When charges are not based on the same act or transaction, courts

considering whether joinder is proper first ask if the evidence of each of the

offenses would be admissible in a separate trial for the other, and whether

such evidence is capable of separation by the jury so as to avoid danger of

confusion. If the answers to these questions are in the affirmative, the court

then must decide whether the defendant will be unduly prejudiced by the

joinder of charges for trial. Commonwealth v. Thomas, 879 A.2d 246, 260

(Pa.Super. 2005).

      Thus, the court “must first determine if the evidence of each of the

offenses    would   be   admissible   in   a   separate    trial   for   the   other.”

                                       -9-
J-S33038-21

Commonwealth v. Collins, 703 A.2d 418, 422 (Pa. 1997). Evidence of other

crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove that the defendant acted

“in conformity with those acts or to demonstrate a criminal propensity.”

Commonwealth v. Brown, 52 A.3d 320, 325 (Pa.Super. 2012); Pa.R.E.

404(b). However, evidence of “bad acts” is admissible for another, proper

purpose, such as “to prove motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,

knowledge, identity, and absence of mistake or accident.” Brown, 52 A.3d at

325.

       If criminal charges joined for trial are distinguishable in time, place, and

participants, a factfinder is considered to be capable of separating the

evidence. See Collins, 703 A.2d at 423. This is particularly so if the factfinder

is a judge. A judge is “presumed to disregard inadmissible evidence and

consider only competent evidence.” Commonwealth v. Kearney, 92 A.3d

51, 61 (Pa.Super. 2014) (citation omitted). See also Commonwealth v.

Gribble, 863 A.2d 455, 462 (Pa. 2004). The consolidation of charges is

encouraged,     as   a   general    policy,    to   promote   judicial   economy.

Commonwealth v. Patterson, 546 A.2d 596, 600 (Pa. 1988).

       In the instant case, we find no abuse of discretion in the denial of

Astillero’s motion to sever. Evidence of Astillero’s possession of a gun in the

First Case was probative as to Astillero’s potential possession of a similar gun

during his resulting arrest in the Second Case, and vice-versa. The time

between the two incidents bears upon the weight of that evidence, not its

admissibility. Moreover, any claim of undue prejudice fails. The trial judge,

                                      - 10 -
J-S33038-21

sitting as factfinder, was well equipped to disregard any confusion or prejudice

that a jury might have experienced from the joinder of Astillero’s two cases.

See Kearney, 92 A.3d at 61; Gribble, 863 A.2d at 462. Astillero’s first issue

lacks merit.

      Next, Astillero contends that the trial court erred when it failed to rule

on his motions to sever the cases and to suppress evidence before trial. He

points to Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 580, which states, “Unless

otherwise provided in these rules, all pretrial motions shall be determined

before trial.”

      The trial court concluded that Astillero had waived this claim and, in any

event, it at most constituted harmless error. We agree on both scores. When

the trial judge spoke with the parties about his hearing Officer Britton’s

testimony before the other judge would hear the pretrial motions, Astillero

lodged a general objection, stating, “Just note my objection for the record.”

See N.T., 6/23/17, at 35. He did not state a basis for the objection, and in

view of the judge’s statement shortly beforehand that he was referring the

pretrial motions to the other judge, it reasonably would have been understood

as an objection to his not hearing the motions there and then. Astillero failed

to give the trial judge a reasonable opportunity to correct any alleged error,

and in so doing, he failed to preserve a challenge to the timing of the pretrial

motions. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised in the lower court are

waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal”).

                                     - 11 -
J-S33038-21

          Moreover, we perceive no prejudice, and Astillero has failed to explain

even on appeal how any error in the court’s hearing the testimony of Officer

Britton prior to the disposition of his pretrial motions harmed him. See

Commonwealth v. Hamlett, 234 A.3d 486, 492 (Pa. 2020) (holding

appellate courts may affirm on alternate basis that error was harmless beyond

a reasonable doubt). Accordingly, Astillero’s second issue also warrants no

relief.

          Turning to Astillero’s third issue, he challenges the sufficiency of the

evidence supporting his convictions on the firearms charges in the Second

Case. He maintains that the Commonwealth failed to prove that he

constructively possessed the firearm found in his girlfriend’s closet. He

contends that the Commonwealth presented no evidence to connect him with

that particular gun, only showing his mere presence in the room in which it

was found. He asserts he “did not reside in the apartment and there is no

testimony that he did anything that he suggested that he was aware of the

presence of the gun.” Astillero’s initial Br. at 21.

          When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we are

“required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict winner

giving the prosecution the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn

from the evidence.” Commonwealth v. Neysmith, 192 A.3d 184, 189

(Pa.Super. 2018) (citation omitted). Our standard of review is de novo, and

our scope of review is plenary. Id. “Evidence will be deemed sufficient to

support the verdict when it establishes each material element of the crime

                                        - 12 -
J-S33038-21

charged and the commission thereof by the accused, beyond a reasonable

doubt.” Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 751 (Pa. 2000). The

Commonwealth may sustain its burden by means of wholly circumstantial

evidence. Commonwealth v. Dix, 207 A.3d 383, 390 (Pa.Super. 2019). The

trier of fact is free to believe all, some, or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Beasley, 138 A.3d 39, 45 (Pa.Super. 2016). When

performing sufficiency review, “this Court may not substitute its judgment for

that of the factfinder, and where the record contains support for the

convictions, they may not be disturbed.” Commonwealth v. Smith, 146 A.3d

257, 261 (Pa.Super. 2016).

      Each of the firearms offenses for which Astillero was found guilty in the

Second Case has a possessory element. To sustain a conviction for Possession

of a Firearm by a Prohibited Person the Commonwealth must prove a person

possessed, used, controlled, sold, transferred, or manufactured a firearm and

had been adjudicated delinquent for a disabling offense. 18 Pa.C.S.A. §

6105(a)(1), (c)(7). The offense of Firearms Not to be Carried Without a

License makes it a crime for “any person” to carry “a firearm in any vehicle or

any person who carries a firearm concealed on or about his person, except in

his place of abode or fixed place of business, without a valid and lawfully

issued license . . . .” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6106(a)(1). Carrying a Firearm on a Public

Street prohibits any person from carrying a firearm, rifle or shotgun on the

public streets or any public property in a city of the first class unless: (1) such

                                      - 13 -
J-S33038-21

person is licensed to carry a firearm; or (2) such person is exempt from

licensing under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6106(b). See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6108.

      Because Astillero was not found in physical possession of a firearm, the

Commonwealth had to establish constructive possession. Commonwealth v.

Hopkins, 67 A.3d 817, 820 (Pa.Super. 2013). Constructive possession is a

conclusion from the totality of the evidence that the defendant had “conscious

dominion” over an object. “Conscious dominion” is “the power to control the

contraband and the intent to exercise that control.” Id. at 820. “Mere presence

or proximity to the contraband is not enough to prove constructive

possession.” Commonwealth v. Peters, 218 A.3d 1206, 1209 (Pa. 2019).

Rather, “[t]he evidence must show a nexus between the accused and the item

sufficient to infer that the accused had the power and intent to exercise

dominion and control over it.” Id. The intent to exercise dominion and control

over contraband in turn requires proof that the defendant had knowledge of

the existence and location of the contraband. Commonwealth v. Parrish,

191 A.3d 31, 37 (Pa.Super. 2018).

      The evidence was sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that

Astillero constructively possessed the firearm. The police found Astillero in

Richmond’s bedroom, and Richmond testified that Astillero frequently stayed

there for days at a time, bringing and leaving some of his personal effects.

Richmond also testified that she first noticed the bag the previous night and

that it did not belong to her or the only other occupants of the apartment, her

children. Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, this

                                    - 14 -
J-S33038-21

testimony would allow a factfinder to conclude that the firearm belonged to

Astillero. See Commonwealth v. Mudrick, 507 A.2d 1212, 1214 (Pa. 1986)

(concluding evidence sufficient to prove defendant constructively possessed

contraband where he and paramour shared bedroom where contraband was

found). The court, as fact-finder, was free to disbelieve any portion of

testimony to the contrary. Beasley, 138 A.3d at 45.

       Astillero further argues the evidence was insufficient to convict him for

Carrying a Firearm on a Public Street because there was no evidence that he

had possessed the firearm while on a public street. Astillero’s initial Br. at 38

(citing 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6108). He contends, “While someone had to have

carried the gun on a public street, there is no evidence that said person was

[Astillero]. . . . It is equally likely that someone other than [Astillero] carried

the gun into the apartment as it is that [Astillero] did so.” Id. at 38, 39.4

       Richmond’s testimony was sufficient to establish that Astillero not only

possessed the firearm while it was in her apartment, but that he was the one

that brought it there. Richmond testified that she first noticed the bag in the

closet the night before Astillero’s arrest. She stated that the bag did not belong

____________________________________________

4 Astillero does not argue that the someone could have accessed Richmond’s
apartment without traversing either a public street or public property. See 18
Pa.C.S.A. § 6108 (prohibiting an unlicensed person from carrying a firearm
“upon the public streets or upon any public property in a city of the first
class”). Such an argument would not likely be successful in this case, as
Richmond’s apartment was in a building owned by the Philadelphia Housing
Authority (“PHA”). See N.T., 7/5/17, at 60, 74; Commonwealth v. Goosby,
380 A.2d 802, 806 (Pa.Super. 1977) (holding common areas surrounding PHA
apartments are “public property” for purposes of Section 6108).

                                          - 15 -
J-S33038-21

to her daughter, and, while her daughter has a key to the apartment, she does

not let other people inside. Richmond also testified that Astillero did not have

any visitors. Although Richmond also testified that people entered her home

to purchase food, this does not make it “equally likely” that someone other

than Astillero would have transported the firearm to the apartment.

      The last of Astillero’s initial issues is also meritless. Astillero argues the

evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for Firearms Not to be

Carried Without a License (“Section 6106”) because there was no evidence

that he had concealed a firearm on or about his person. See Astillero’s initial

Br. at 40 (citing 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6106(a)(1)).

      The “concealed” element under Section 6106 is met when, “viewed in

the totality of the circumstances, [the defendant] carries the firearm in such

a manner as to hide the firearm from ordinary observation.” Commonwealth

v. Montgomery, 234 A.3d 523, 536 (Pa. 2020). Here, the evidence was

sufficient to allow the factfinder to conclude that Astillero brought the firearm

to Richmond’s apartment without her seeing it and secreted it in a bag in the

bedroom closet. The totality of the circumstances indicates that Astillero hid

the firearm from ordinary observation, thus violating Section 6106.

      In his first supplemental issue, Astillero argues that the trial court

abused its discretion by sentencing him above the recommended sentencing

guidelines. He points out that that his aggregate sentence of 10 to 20 years’

incarceration was an upward departure even from the aggravated range

sentence requested by the Commonwealth of 8 ½ to 20 years’ incarceration.

                                      - 16 -
J-S33038-21

Further, Astillero claims that the court erred by failing to consider mitigating

factors such as his need for rehabilitation due to marijuana use and his alleged

expressions of remorse.

      Astillero challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence. The right

to appellate review of the discretionary aspects of a sentence is not absolute,

and a criminal defendant’s assertion of such an issue on appeal “must be

considered a petition for permission to appeal.” Commonwealth v. Conte,

198 A.3d 1169, 1173 (Pa.Super. 2018).

      Before reviewing the merits of Astillero’s claim, we must determine

whether: “(1) the appeal is timely; (2) the appellant has preserved his issue;

(3) his brief includes a concise statement of the reasons relied upon for

allowance of an appeal with respect to the discretionary aspects of his

sentence; and (4) the concise statement raises a substantial question whether

the sentence is inappropriate under the Sentencing Code.” Commonwealth

v. Green, 204 A.3d 469, 488 (Pa.Super. 2019); see also Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f)

(stating that an appellant who challenges the discretionary aspects of a

sentence “shall set forth in a separate section of the brief a concise statement

of the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal with respect to the

discretionary aspects of a sentence”).

      Instantly, Astillero has complied with the first three requirements: his

appeal is timely, he preserved the issue in a post-sentence motion, and his

brief includes a statement of the reasons for allowance of appeal. We now turn

to whether Astillero has raised a substantial question.

                                     - 17 -
J-S33038-21

      A substantial question exists when the appellant makes a colorable

argument that the sentencing judge’s actions were either inconsistent with a

specific provision of the Sentencing Code or contrary to the fundamental

norms underlying the sentencing process. Commonwealth v. Moury, 999

A.2d 162, 170 (Pa.Super. 2010). Astillero’s Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement

asserts that the sentencing court imposed an excessive sentence by

sentencing him outside of the sentencing guidelines and by failing to consider

mitigating factors. Astillero’s Br. at 14-17. Such a claim raises a substantial

question. See Commonwealth v. Felmlee, 828 A.2d 1105, 1107 (Pa.Super.

2003) (en banc) (stating that a substantial question is raised where appellant

claims the sentencing court imposed an aggravated range sentence without

considering mitigating circumstances); Commonwealth v. Riggs, 63 A.3d

780, 786 (Pa.Super. 2012) (finding that appellant raised a substantial

question when he argued that “the trial court failed to consider relevant

sentencing criteria, including . . . the rehabilitative needs of [a]ppellant, as 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b) requires”). Thus, we proceed to the merits of Astillero’s

claim.

      “Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the sentencing

judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse

of discretion.” Commonwealth v. Edwards, 194 A.3d 625, 637 (Pa.Super.

2018), appeal denied, 202 A.3d 41 (Pa. 2019) (citation omitted). An abuse of

discretion occurs where “the sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law,

exercised its judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or

                                      - 18 -
J-S33038-21

arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.” Id. (citation omitted). In

imposing a sentence, the sentencing court must consider “the protection of

the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on the life of

the victim and on the community, and the rehabilitative needs of the

defendant.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b).

      The sentencing court must state its reasons for the sentence on the

record. Id. “A sentencing court’s indication that it has reviewed a presentence

report can satisfy the requirement of placing reasons for imposing the

sentence on the record.” Commonwealth v. Bullock, 170 A.3d 1109, 1126

(Pa.Super. 2017) (citation omitted). Indeed, “where the trial court is informed

by a [presentence] report, it is presumed that the court is aware of all

appropriate sentencing factors and considerations, and that where the court

has been so informed, its discretion should not be disturbed.” Id. (quoting

Commonwealth v. Ventura, 975 A.2d 1128, 1135 (Pa.Super. 2009)); see

also Moury, 992 A.2d at 171. Additionally, this Court should not reweigh the

sentencing factors considered by the trial court and impose our own judgment

in the place of the trial court. Commonwealth v. Macias, 968 A.2d 773, 778

(Pa.Super. 2009).

      In the instant case, the trial court reviewed a presentence report (“PSI”)

and provided legally sufficient reasons for sentencing Astillero. See N.T.,

10/12/17. Therefore, we presume that the trial court was aware of all

appropriate sentencing factors and considerations, including Astillero’s

character, rehabilitative needs, and mitigating factors or lack thereof. See

                                     - 19 -
J-S33038-21

Bullock, 170 A.3d at 1126- 1127. As the court emphasized in its

supplementary opinion, it considered the need to protect the public from

Astillero’s “bad character” and “dangerous propensities.” Trrial Ct. Sup. Op.,

5/19/22, at 26. The court noted “the severity of the crime, the fact that

[Astillero] threatened his own wheelchair bound cousin to the point that he

was terrified to come to court, and that he has prior crimes involving firearms.”

Id. The court furthermore found that Astillero expressed no credible remorse,

and it found no mitigating factors. See id.

      Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court properly

considered all of the relevant sentencing factors, including the information

contained within the presentence report, the seriousness of the crime, the

need to protect the public, and Astillero’s need for rehabilitation, and did not

commit an abuse of discretion by imposing a sentence above the aggravated

range. Astillero’s first supplemental issue lacks merit.

      Turning to Astillero's second supplementary issue, he avers that the trial

court erred by failing to find that the Commonwealth committed prosecutorial

misconduct. He claims that the prosecutor committed misconduct by

mentioning Astillero’s prior record score to the court, prior to trial, in the

context of discussing a plea offer the Commonwealth had made to Astillero.

Astillero takes issue with the following exchange:

      [Prosecutor]: Based upon those charges, the offense gravity score
      in this case is a ten and prior record score, based upon your prior
      convictions, is a five, which means the guidelines in this case—

                                     - 20 -
J-S33038-21

      [Defense counsel]: Objection as to reference to his prior record
      score. It is my understanding that Your Honor is going to hear this
      case. He has a right basically to Your Honor not having any
      information as to his prior criminal record and you were just
      informed that he has a prior record score of a five.

      The Court: I think what she is attempting to do is let him know
      the gravity of the situation. Of course, I have not heard any facts,
      so that is not going to impinge upon me one way or the other. I
      think that is all she is attempting to do, colloquy him with regard
      to the offer. I have heard what you said. It has no impact upon
      my decision whatsoever, since I did not hear the facts.

(N.T., 6/23/17 at p. 24).

      Astillero maintains that the above exchange constituted prosecutorial

misconduct    because,   whether   intentionally   or   merely   recklessly,   the

Commonwealth prejudiced him by essentially informing the court that he was

a repeat criminal offender. To this end, Astillero cites Commonwealth v.

Johnson, 231 A.3d 807, 826-27 (Pa. 2020) (concluding prosecutor

committed misconduct by making misleading statements regarding evidence).

      A prosecutor’s remarks do not rise to the level of prosecutorial

misconduct unless their unavoidable effect would be to prejudice the

factfinder, “forming in [his] mind a fixed bias and hostility toward the

defendant such that they could not weigh the evidence objectively and render

a true verdict.” Commonwealth v. Bronshtein, 691 A.2d 907, 917 (Pa.

1997). We review a ruling on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct for abuse of

discretion. Commonwealth v. Rivera, 939 A.2d 355, 357 (Pa.Super. 2007).

Claims of prosecutorial misconduct are “evaluated under the harmless error

standard.” Commonwealth v. Cousar, 928 A.2d 1025, 1042 (Pa. 2007).

                                     - 21 -
J-S33038-21

      Here,   Astillero’s   contemporaneous    objection   to   the   prosecutor’s

statements was not sufficient to preserve his claim. Astillero’s objection had

to request specific relief, on pain of waiver. See Commonwealth v. Brown,

134 A.3d 1097, 1107, (Pa.Super. 2016) (finding defendant’s prosecutorial

misconduct claim waived when counsel made a contemporaneous objection

but failed to request any further action); Commonwealth v. Sandusky, 77

A.3d 663, 670 (Pa.Super. 2013). As Astillero failed to request the required

relief, his issue is waived.

      In any event, to the extent that the prosecutor’s reference to Astillero’s

offense gravity score and prior record score was inappropriate, we must

presume that the trial court, sitting as factfinder, was capable of disregarding

any prejudicial remarks in reaching its verdict. See Commonwealth v.

Thomas, 783 A.2d 328, 335 (Pa. Super. 2001). As noted, the prosecutor’s

reference was in the context of discussions regarding a plea offer and the

court specifically emphasized that the remark would not “impinge” upon his

ability to hear the case. Thus, Astillero failed to establish sufficient prejudice

to require reversal. See id. Accordingly, Astillero’s last supplemental issue

also warrants no relief.

      Judgments of sentence affirmed.

                                     - 22 -
J-S33038-21

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 1/19/2023

                          - 23 -