Court Opinion

ID: 9613423
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:16:52.329382+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:28.942386
License: Public Domain

KENNARD, J.
Concurring and Dissenting. I agree with the majority that the complaint at issue does not state a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. I agree also that persons who have a right to control the disposition of a decedent’s remains, and who seek to recover damages for emotional distress caused by the negligent or intentional mishandling of the remains, need not allege or prove that they witnessed the mishandling.
I do not agree, however, that the class of persons who may recover damages, for emotional distress negligently caused by the mishandling of remains includes all of the decedent’s close family members who were aware that funeral or crematory services were being performed. That holding disregards the decisions of this court imposing limits on tort actions for intangible injuries. Those decisions compel the conclusion that the class of plaintiffs who may recover emotional distress damages for negligent or intentional mishandling of remains is limited to persons having a right to control the disposition of the remains and those members of the decedent’s immediate family who learned of the mishandling by observing it or its direct consequences.
I also disagree with this statement: “A plaintiff who is unable to establish . . . that the emotional distress was caused by a well-founded substantial certainty that his or her decedent’s remains were among those reportedly mistreated, may not recover damages.” (Maj. opn., ante, p. 902.) Under the particular facts of this case, imposing such a burden could unjustly prevent recovery by many plaintiffs. I would hold that a plaintiff may recover damages for emotional distress caused by knowledge that his or her decedent’s remains were entrusted to defendants for cremation during a period of time when the defendants frequently mishandled remains so entrusted to them, unless the defendants can prove that the remains of the plaintiff’s decedent were not mishandled.
I
When a mortuary or crematory negligently or intentionally mishandles a decedent’s remains, those persons having a right to control the disposition of the remains may sue in tort and recover damages for mental distress caused by the mishandling. This right of recovery is recognized in California and virtually every other state. (Allen v. Jones (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 207, 215 [163 Cal.Rptr. 445]; Rest.2d Torts, § 868; Annot., Civil Liability of Undertaker in Connection With Transportation, Burial, or Safeguarding of Body *911(1987) 53 A.L.R.4th 360.) The right’s existence is not at issue here. The main points in dispute are, first, whether a plaintiff must learn of the mishandling by observing it or its immediate consequences in order to recover, and, second, whether close family members or friends who have no legal right to control disposition of a decedent’s remains may also recover mental distress damages. As I shall explain, these points are related.
When a plaintiff whose only injury is emotional distress brings a tort action, courts impose restrictions not imposed in tort actions brought to recover damages for physical or financial harm. At one time, courts justified these restrictions by the need to prevent assertion of fraudulent claims. (See Dillon v. Legg (1968) 68 Cal.2d 728, 735-739 [69 Cal.Rptr. 72, 441 P.2d 912, 29 A.L.R.3d 1316].) More recently, this court has given a different explanation. Because a single negligent act may cause emotional distress to any number of people, unrestricted liability for emotional distress would be limitless and disproportionate to a negligent defendant’s moral blame. Through increased insurance premiums and increased prices for goods and services, the general public would ultimately bear the enormous burden of paying the damages. Through taxes, the public would also pay the substantial cost of providing a system to resolve disputes and enforce awards. (Thing v. La Chusa (1989) 48 Cal.3d 644, 661-667 [257 Cal.Rptr. 865, 771 P.2d 814].)
These considerations have led this court to carefully circumscribe liability for intangible injuries. Thus, although a spouse may recover damages for loss of consortium, a child, parent, or unmarried cohabitant may not. (See Elden v. Sheldon (1988) 46 Cal.3d 267 [250 Cal.Rptr. 254, 758 P.2d 582]; Baxter v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 461 [138 Cal.Rptr. 315, 563 P.2d 871]; Borer v. American Airlines, Inc. (1977) 19 Cal.3d 441 [138 Cal.Rptr. 302, 563 P.2d 858]; Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. (1974) 12 Cal.3d 382 [115 Cal.Rptr. 765, 525 P.2d 669].) And this court has held that a plaintiff may recover damages for emotional distress occasioned by negligent physical injury to a third person only if the plaintiff “(1) is closely related to the injury victim; (2) is present at the scene of the injury-producing event at the time it occurs and is then aware that it is causing injury to the victim; and (3) as a result suffers serious emotional distress—a reaction beyond that which would be anticipated in a disinterested witness and which is not an abnormal response to the circumstances.” (Thing v. La Chusa, supra, 48 Cal.3d 644, 667-668, fns. omitted.)
To decide whether to apply these or similar limits in an action seeking emotional distress damages for the negligent or intentional mishandling of decedents’ remains, it is helpful to examine the statutory scheme governing the disposition of a decedent’s remains.
*912Under the statutory scheme (Health & Saf. Code, § 7100), one or more family members of a decedent hold the right to control disposition of the decedent’s remains. The holder or holders of the right, in person or through another, may contract for funeral-related services that are contrary to the wishes and expectations of other close family members. It sometimes happens that a decedent’s spouse and parents, for example, will have differing views on whether the remains should be cremated or buried and, if buried, whether they should be embalmed and where they should be buried. (See, e.g., Sinai Temple v. Kaplan (1976) 54 Cal.App.3d 1103, 1113, fn. 15 [127 Cal.Rptr. 80].) Because the spouse has the statutory right, the spouse’s directions must be followed. The spouse may even exclude the parents from the funeral services. The parents have no right to be compensated for any distress they experience as a result of disposition of their child’s remains in accordance with the spouse’s directions.1 If, on the other hand, the parents procure a disposition of the remains against the spouse’s wishes, the spouse may sue the parents and the mortuary for tortious interference with the spouse’s right to control disposition of the remains. (Id. at p. 1112.)
When a mortuary or crematory undertakes to provide funeral-related services, it assumes a duty to the person or persons holding the statutory right of control and to anyone who contracts for the services on behalf of the holder of the statutory right. Although it is generally foreseeable that a breach of this duty will cause emotional distress to other family members (and also to the decedent’s close personal friends), this court has warned that foreseeability of injury is not an adequate criterion by which to define a duty to avoid inflicting intangible injuries. For example, although it is foreseeable that a doctor’s negligent treatment of a patient will cause emotional distress to the patient’s family, this court has declined to recognize that a doctor who undertakes to treat a patient thereby assumes a duty to avoid emotional harm to the patient’s family. (See Marlene F. v. Affiliated Psychiatric Medical Clinic, Inc. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 583, 589-590 [257 Cal.Rptr. 98, 770 P.2d 278].) Here too, we should distinguish between those for whom a mortuary or crematory undertakes to provide funeral-related services, and who therefore would be entitled to enforce the agreement, and others who may be affected by the manner in which those services are performed, but who would not be entitled to enforce the agreement.
*913Because a mortuary’s mishandling of remains violates the express or implied plan of disposition, those who hold the right to establish and enforce the plan of disposition are the direct victims of the mortuary’s wrongful acts. Other family members and friends are, at best, third party or “bystander” victims.
I consider first the direct victims of a mortuary or crematory’s negligent or intentional mishandling of remains. When a plaintiff possessing a legal right to control the disposition of a decedent’s remains sues a mortuary or crematory for negligent or intentional interference with that right, the policy concerns discussed above do not support imposition of a requirement that the plaintiff have been present to observe either the wrongful act or its consequences.
First, the danger of fraudulent claims is minimal. Under the statutory scheme (Health & Saf. Code, § 7100), the right to control disposition of a decedent’s remains belongs to the decedent’s spouse or nearest surviving relation. The mishandling of a corpse is so likely to result in substantial mental distress to a decedent’s spouse or close relations that the situation provides its own guarantee that the claim is genuine. Whatever additional assurance of genuineness a “presence” requirement would provide is not needed.
Second, the class of persons having a legal right to control disposition of a decedent’s remains is defined and limited by statute and contract. Therefore, a negligent defendant’s liability will not be indefinitely multiplied, out of all proportion to fault. Because the plaintiff class is limited, the resulting societal costs—in the form of increased insurance premiums for purveyors of funeral and cremation services, increased prices for those services, and increased costs to the court system and taxpayers—will not be unreasonably or unacceptably high.
Finally, imposing a “presence” requirement would be tantamount to granting an immunity from civil liability for many forms of mishandling that by their nature occur out of the view of the bereaved relatives. Civil liability not only compensates injuries, it also serves society as a whole by encouraging high standards of care to avoid injuries. Society has a compelling interest in assuring that those who are entrusted with the bodies of our dead exercise the greatest of care. (See Quesada v. Oak Hill Improvement Co. (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 596, 610 [261 Cal.Rptr. 769].) Because it furthers this societal interest, an award of tort damages “is a useful and necessary means to maintain the standards of the profession . . . .” (Allen v. Jones, supra, 104 Cal.App.3d 207, 214.) Because the person or persons having the right to control disposition of the decedent’s remains are in the best position to vindicate society’s interests, their actions should not be restricted by imposing a “presence” requirement.
*914The balance of societal costs and benefits must be reassessed when the plaintiff seeking recovery is one who has no legal right to control the disposition of the decedent’s remains. Allowing close relatives or friends to recover makes the litigation more complex, increasing the burden on the courts and ultimately the taxpayers. Each additional claimant multiplies the defendants’ potential liability, thus leading ultimately to increased prices for all purchasers of funeral services. Finally, allowing all close relatives to sue is not necessary for deterrence: fear of suits by the statutory right holders and contracting parties provides a sufficient incentive to ensure due care by purveyors of mortuary and crematory services.
For these reasons, third party claims for negligent or intentional mishandling of a decedent’s remains should be carefully circumscribed. They should not be barred entirely, however. As the comment to section 868 of the Restatement Second of Torts observes, it would be incongruous to bar recovery by a close family member of the decedent, such as a daughter, who witnessed a mishandling of the remains, while permitting recovery by another family member, such as the decedent’s widow, who did not observe the mishandling but who possessed the exclusive right to control disposition of the body. (See also Quesada v. Oak Hill Improvement Co., supra, 213 Cal.App.3d 596.)
Adapting the requirements this court has imposed on third party claims in an analogous situation, I would hold that a plaintiff who has no right to control a decedent’s remains may recover for emotional distress occasioned by the negligent or intentional mishandling of the remains only if the plaintiff (1) is a close family member of the decedent (as defined by the Court of Appeal and the majority); (2) learns of the mishandling by observing it or its direct consequences (the wrong body in the casket, an empty container of cremated remains, and so forth); and (3) suffers serious emotional distress as a result.
The majority reaches a different conclusion. It treats all the decedent’s close family members, not just the statutory right holders and contracting parties, as the direct victims of an alleged negligent or intentional mishandling of remains, and it recognizes no class of third party victims. The majority offers various reasons for its conclusions. None is persuasive.
The majority first argues that recovery should not be limited to statutory right holders and contracting parties because other family members may suffer greater emotional distress. This court has rejected similar arguments in other cases. Thus, we have limited recovery for loss of consortium to spouses, even though in a particular case a child, parent, or unmarried cohabitant may have suffered greater loss, arid we have held that only close *915family members may recover for emotional distress occasioned by negligent physical injury to a third person, even though others may suffer greater emotional distress.
The majority asserts that the order of priority set forth in Health and Safety Code section 7100 is “not a reliable indicator” of the likelihood of emotional distress. (Maj. opn., ante, p. 887.) This assertion constitutes an unfounded attack on the wisdom of the statutory scheme. Under section 7100, the right to control the disposition of a decedent’s remains, “unless other directions have been given by the decedent,” passes in the following order: the surviving spouse, the surviving child or children, the surviving parent or parents, “the person or persons in the next degrees of kindred” who would inherit from the decedent, and the public administrator. This order evidently reflects a legislative judgment as to the person or persons the decedent would most likely have chosen to control the disposition of the remains, and thus the person or persons to whom the decedent was most strongly and intimately related. Without doubt, the persons closest to the decedent will be the most severely distressed by a mishandling of the remains. Thus, the statutory scheme, although not intended to identify those persons most likely to be distressed by a mishandling of the remains, effectively performs that function. I would accept the statutory scheme as a rational method for determining the individual or individuals most closely related to the decedent and thus most likely to be affected by any mishandling of the decedent’s remains.
The majority next asserts that a mortuary or crematory assumes a duty to all close family members, and not merely to those having a legal right to control disposition of the decedent’s remains. To support this assertion, the majority looks to decisions of California courts and of the courts of other jurisdictions.
Decisions of other jurisdictions do not support the majority’s holding. To the contrary, the courts of other states have recognized that a cause of action for emotional distress caused by the mishandling of human remains is premised on interference with a right to control the disposition of those remains. As one court remarked, quoting an earlier case, “ ‘The damages recoverable . . . are not for the injury done to the dead body, but are for the wrong or trespass on the . . . right to the undisturbed possession and control of the body, measured by the mental anguish and suffering of the plaintiff occasioned thereby . . . .’” (Golston v. Lincoln Cemetery, Inc. (Mo.Ct.App. 1978) 573 S.W.2d 700, 705, italics added.)2 The following authorities are to *916the same effect: Burns v. Anchorage Funeral Chapel (Alaska 1972) 495 P.2d 70,73 (“a claim for relief for wrongful interference with the right to preserve a dead body belongs exclusively to the surviving spouse or to the next of kin of the decedent”); Allinger v. Kell (1981) 102 Mich.App. 798 [302 N.W.2d 576, 579] (“Under tort law, recovery for the intentional or negligent mutilation of a dead body is based upon infringement of the right of the plaintiffs to have the body delivered for burial and interred without mutilation, other than that present at the time of death. [Citation.] Where a person has the right to bury a body, interference with that right is generally actionable.”); Sworski v. Simons (1940) 208 Minn. 201 [293 N.W. 309, 311] (recognizing a cause of action for interference with the “legal right to the possession of the corpse for purposes of preservation and burial”); Galvin v. McGilley Memorial Chapels (Mo.Ct.App. 1987) 746 S.W.2d 588, 591 (recognizing a cause of action for breach of “the common law right of sepulchre—the right of the next of kin to perform a ceremonious and decent burial of the nearest relative”); Strachan v. John F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital (1988) 109 N.J. 523 [538 A.2d 346, 350] (recognizing a tort cause of action for emotional distress occasioned by infringement of “ ‘the right to bury the dead and preserve the remains’ ”); Baumann v. White (N.Y.Sup.Ct,Spec.Term 1962) 234 N.Y.S.2d 272, 273 (recognizing that a cause of action for an undertaker’s negligent preparation of a body may be asserted by “the next of kin charged with its burial” and by those who engaged the undertaker); Thompson v. Duncan Bros. Funeral Homes, Inc. (1982) 116 Misc.2d 227 [455 N.Y.S.2d 324, 326] (same); Cercelli v. Wein (1969) 60 Misc.2d 345 [303 N.Y.S.2d 316, 317] (same); and Scarpaci v. Milwaukee County (1980) 96 Wis.2d 663 [292 N.W.2d 816, 820] (“The basis for recovery of damages is found not in a property right in a dead body but in the personal right of the family of the deceased to bury the body.”).3
*917California authorities are similarly unhelpful to the majority. The majority cites only two cases in support of the proposition that a mortuary’s duty of care runs to all close family members of the decedent. Draper Mortuary v. Superior Court (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 533 [185 Cal.Rptr. 396], was a lawsuit brought by a plaintiff who was both the contracting party and, as the decedent’s husband, the statutory right holder. The court had no occasion to discuss standing by persons who were neither statutory right holders nor contracting parties. A decision is not authority for a proposition not considered in the court’s opinion. (People v. Myers (1987) 43 Cal.3d 250, 265, fn. 5 [233 Cal.Rptr. 264, 729 P.2d 698]; see also Brown v. Kelly Broadcasting Co. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 711, 734-735 [257 Cal.Rptr. 708, 771 P.2d 406].) In Quesada v. Oak Hill Improvement Co., supra, 213 Cal.App.3d 596, tiie family members witnessed the mishandling of the decedent’s remains. They were therefore entitled to recover as “bystanders,” as I have explained.
Finally, the majority seeks to justify its conclusion by weighing foreseeability, moral blame, the burden on the community, and disproportionate culpability. The analysis is inconsistent with this court’s prior decisions.
Certainly it is foreseeable that the mishandling of a decedent’s remains will cause emotional distress to the decedent’s close family members (and close personal friends as well) who learn of the mishandling. Yet this court has denied standing in other cases where emotional distress is no less foreseeable. Parents who learn that their child has been permanently disabled in an automobile collision or as a result of a negligently performed surgical procedure have no standing to seek emotional distress damages from the person who negligently caused the injury. As this court has explained,* “foreseeability of the injury alone is not a useful ‘guideline’ or a meaningful restriction on the scope of the NIED [negligent infliction of emotional distress] action” (Thing v. La Chusa, supra, 48 Cal.3d 644, 663), and “[e]ven if it is ‘foreseeable’ that persons other than closely related percipient witnesses may suffer emotional distress, this fact does not justify the imposition of what threatens to become unlimited liability for emotional distress on a defendant whose conduct is simply negligent” (id. at p. 667).
In weighing the factor of moral blame, the proper focus is not on the egregious misconduct alleged in this particular case, but on the minimum *918requirements for the cause of action under consideration. As the majority observes, “the tort with which we are concerned is negligence.” (Maj. opn., ante, p. 884.) The decision in this case will become the “bright line” rule for all similar negligence actions involving the provision of mortuary and crematory services. I am unable to conclude that negligence is significantly more blameworthy in this than in other contexts, such as the driving of a motor vehicle or the performance of surgical procedures. For example, it is not obvious to me, although apparently it is to the majority, that commingling the ashes of the dead, at the risk of emotional distress to the decedents’ survivors, is significantly more blameworthy than driving at high speed while intoxicated, at the risk of death to other highway users.
The majority’s holding will impose a substantial burden on the community in the form of higher costs for mortuary and crematory services. As this court stated in a related context: “We cannot ignore the social burden of providing damages for loss of parental consortium merely because the money to pay such awards comes initially from the ‘negligent’ defendant or his [or her] insurer. Realistically the burden of payment of awards for loss of consortium must be borne by the public generally in increased insurance premiums or, otherwise, in the enhanced danger that accrues from the greater number of people who may choose to go without any insurance. We must also take into account the cost of administration of a system to determine and pay consortium awards; since virtually every serious injury to a parent would engender a claim for loss of consortium on behalf of each of his or her children, the expense of settling or litigating such claims would be sizable.” (Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., supra, 19 Cal.3d 441, 447.)
In Borer, nine children asserted claims for loss of parental consortium. This court commented: “Even in the context of a consolidated action, the assertion of nine independent causes of action for the children in addition to the father’s claim for loss of consortium and the mother’s suit for ordinary tort damages, demonstrates the extent to which recognition of plaintiffs’ asserted cause of action will multiply the tort liability of the defendant.” (Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., supra, 19 Cal.3d 441, 449.) The majority’s holding in this case, permitting all close family relatives (including parents, sisters, brothers, children, and grandchildren) to recover for emotional distress occasioned by learning of, without witnessing, the negligent mishandling of a decedent’s remains, will multiply liability far beyond what the plaintiffs proposed (and this court rejected) in Borer. If, for example, a decedent had nine children (as in Borer) and each child in turn had nine children, the class of children and grandchildren would number ninety plaintiffs, each possessing an independent cause of action for a single negligent act.
*919This poses the problem of disproportionate culpability4 that has caused this court to restrict standing in past cases: “The number of family members who might seek damages on the basis of a single incident could unreasonably enlarge the defendant’s burden.” (Thing v. La Chusa, supra, 48 Cal.3d 644, 665.) The problem is no less significant here than in the “bystander” and loss-of-consortium contexts.
In my view, a weighing of the relevant policy considerations in light of this court’s past decisions compels the conclusion that for the tort of negligence based on the mishandling of a decedent’s remains the class of direct victims should be defined as those possessing a legal right to control disposition of the decedent’s remains, and that outside this class of direct victims the right of recovery should be subject to limitations similar to those imposed by this court on recovery for emotional distress occasioned by negligent physical injury to a third person.
II
What the majority gives with one hand, it takes with the other. After opening the prospect of recovery to all close family members of the decedents, the majority shuts the door by restricting recovery to those plaintiffs who can show that their emotional distress was caused by “a well-founded substantial certainty” that their decedents’ remains were “among those reportedly mistreated.”5 (Maj. opn., ante, p. 902.) The burden thus imposed by the majority may preclude all recovery for many plaintiffs who would otherwise qualify. Plaintiffs will be forced to rely on defendants’ records to determine which bodies were mishandled. If those records are inadequate (and it seems unlikely the crematory defendants kept records detailing their misdeeds), many plaintiffs will never be able to determine whether the remains of their decedents were mistreated.
In this situation, I would apply the rule that when a plaintiff establishes tortious conduct by a defendant under circumstances making it virtually *920impossible for the plaintiff to prove causation, the burden shifts to the defendant to establish a lack of causation. (See Haft v. Lone Palm Hotel (1970) 3 Cal.3d 756, 772-775 [91 Cal.Rptr. 745, 478 P.2d 465].) Accordingly, I would hold that a plaintiff may recover damages for emotional distress caused by knowledge that the remains of his or her decedent were entrusted to the defendants for cremation during a period of time when the defendants frequently mishandled remains so entrusted to them, unless the defendants can prove that the remains of the plaintiff’s decedent were not mishandled. This holding would not permit recovery “based on nothing more than a media report of misconduct.” (Maj. opn., ante, p. 902.) Rather, it would require the plaintiff to prove that the defendants actually engaged in a pattern or practice of mistreating human remains during the time that the remains of the plaintiff’s decedent were entrusted to them. Unlike the majority’s holding, however, it would allocate to the defendants, and not the plaintiff, the task of establishing which particular remains were or were not mistreated during the period of the established pattern or practice.
Petitioners’ application for a rehearing was denied January 23, 1992. Arabian, J., did not participate therein. Mosk, J., and Kennard, J., were of the opinion that the application should be granted.

The holders of the statutory right could have validly consented to all of the defendants’ alleged acts in this case, including harvesting organs, removing precious metals, multiple cremation, and commingling of ashes. Defendants’ alleged conduct in this case is tortious only because it was done without that consent. Had defendants obtained the consent of the holders of the statutory rights, other family members would have possessed no right of action for emotional distress damages, no matter how deeply they might have been offended.

In Golston, supra, the statutory right was held in common by the decedent’s minor children. The court permitted the decedent’s sister to sue, as well as the minor children, on the *916ground that she had made the funeral arrangements (that is, she was a contracting party) and that the cause of action she had pleaded was for intentional infliction of emotional distress rather than negligence. (573 S.W.2d 700, 709-710.) The sister was also a percipient witness of the immediate consequences of the defendant’s misconduct: returning to the grave site three months after the burial, she found an open hole in which her sister’s body lay partially exposed. (Id. at p. 703.)

In this paragraph I have intentionally cited the same out-of-state cases the majority cites. (Maj. opn., ante, pp. 887-888, fn. 17.) I leave it to the reader to judge which of the competing positions those cases actually support. In each case, it appears that the parties permitted to recover were statutory right holders, contracting parties, or both.
I have omitted only Papieves v. Lawrence (1970) 437 Pa. 373 [263 A.2d 118, 48 A.L.R.3d 233] and Carney v. Knollwood Cemetery Ass’n (1986) 33 Ohio App.3d 31 [514 N.E.2d 430], These cases do not discuss standing to assert claims for negligent mishandling of remains, but rather standing to assert claims for intentional or wanton misconduct. Papieves suggests, without deciding, that even in that context the plaintiff must be “the member of the decedent’s family who is entitled to the disposition of the body.” (263 A.2d 118, 120.) The plaintiffs in that case, as parents of the minor decedent, were clearly statutory right holders. Carney is the *917only case cited by the majority that permitted a party who was neither a statutory right holder nor a contracting party to recover for the mistreatment of remains. Indeed, the court granted standing to plaintiffs for the intentional mistreatment of the remains of their common ancestor who had died more than 20 years before 2 of the plaintiffs were bora. (514 N.E.2d 430, 438 [conc. opn. of Nahra, J.].)

The majority’s discussion of this factor is a classic example of circular reasoning. The majority first states it will consider various factors to determine whether a duty exists. When it reaches the factor of disproportionate culpability, it distinguishes the “bystander” cases on the ground that plaintiffs here seek relief “for an injury caused by the breach of a duty owed directly to each plaintiff.” (Maj. opn., ante, p. 899.) But for those plaintiffs who are neither statutory right holders nor contracting parties, and to whom the defendants therefore owe no statutory or contractual duty, the only potential source of duty is tort law, and the existence of a duty in tort is the very point at issue.

The majority’s use of the word “reportedly” in this statement is puzzling. Surely the majority does not mean that a plaintiff would be entitled to recover from the mortuary and crematory defendants upon proof that the media had reported mistreatment of the plaintiff’s decedent’s remains, even though the defendants presented proof that the report was false.