Court Opinion

ID: 9856712
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:55:58.756169+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:40:25.696734
License: Public Domain

BOYLE, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I fully concur in Parts I, II and III of the majority opinion. However, I am unable to agree with Part IV relating to attorney fees, and accordingly I respectfully dissent.
After reviewing Stewart v. Rice, 120 Idaho 504, 817 P.2d 170 (1991), Ada County Highway Dist. v. Acarrequi, 105 Idaho 873, 673 P.2d 1067 (1983), and I.R.C.P. 54, relied upon in Part IV of the majority opinion, I am satisfied that the analysis followed by the Court is incorrect. In my view, the fundamental error of Part IV of the majority opinion is that it compares the amount sought by the property owners in this condemnation proceeding with the amount actually awarded. Because the amount sought was significantly higher than the amount awarded by the jury, the opinion essentially concludes that the property owner was not the prevailing party.
This analysis is directly contrary to the method suggested by the Court in Acarrequi. In that case the relevant comparison was not between the “result in relation to the relief sought,” as asserted by the majority, ante at 829, 820 P.2d at 699, but between the result and the offer of the government. In Acarrequi, we stated:
As a point of beginning, we postulate that a jury in a condemnation action, attempting to choose among highly divergent evidence as to value, can only be expected to arrive at the “real” just compensation to which a condemnee is entitled within a margin of error of plus or minus ten per cent. Hence, we would deem that in considering the award of attorneys’ fees to a condemnee, a condemnor should have reasonably made a timely offer of settlement of a least 90 per cent of the ultimate jury verdict.
Acarrequi, 105 Idaho at 878, 673 P.2d at 1072 (emphasis added). The reason the actual award should be compared to the government’s offer rather than to the amount sought by the property owner is that it is the unreasonably low government offer which forces a condemnee to seek relief in court. As we stated in Acarrequi, “any opportunity for the condemnee to prevail on the issue of attorneys’ fees would appear to lie only in the condemnor’s failure to make a reasonable offer of settlement, which inaction forces the condemnee to trial with the resultant expenses for attorneys’ fees.” Acarrequi, 105 Idaho at 877, 673 P.2d at 1071 (emphasis added). This is the comparison set forth in the holding of Acarrequi which the majority should follow today.
In holding that the relevant comparison is between the result and the relief sought, the majority also relies on I.R.C.P. 54 and Stewart v. Rice. However, this reliance is misplaced. By analogy to Rule 54 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Acarrequi makes clear that the normal prevailing party analysis under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure should not apply in condemnation cases. In Acarrequi we stated:
The general federal rule as to costs [Fed. R.Civ.P. Rule 54] does not apply to condemnation proceedings. Since the condemnor is normally the prevailing party and since [the government] should not recover [its] costs against the property owner, the general rule, which provides that costs shall go to the prevailing party, has been rendered inapplicable. The effect of the new rule is that costs are to be awarded in accordance with the law that has developed in condemnation cases.
*836Acarrequi, 105 Idaho at 877, 673 P.2d at 1071 (quoting 6A Julius L. Sackman, Nichols’ the Law of Eminent Domain § 27.6 (3d ed. 1981) (emphasis added). The reason the normal analysis under Rule 54 is inapplicable is that the issue in a usual condemnation case is not whether the government is entitled to condemn the property but whether the amount offered meets the constitutional requirement of just compensation. Because the relevant dispute concerns the value to be awarded the property owner, Acarrequi outlined the comparison that should be used to determine a prevailing party. While we indicated that our 90 percent rule was not a “rigid guideline[ ],” Acarrequi, 105 Idaho at 877, 673 P.2d at 1071, we meant only that the percentage used was flexible because we merely “postulated” that the jury would determine the fair value of the property within a ten percent margin of error. See Acarrequi, 105 Idaho at 878, 673 P.2d at 1072. While an offer within 80 percent of the jury award might be close enough for a trial court to disallow attorney fees depending on whether the other factors enumerated in Acarrequi are present, see Acarrequi, 105 Idaho at 878, 673 P.2d at 1072, we surely did not hold that the determination of a prevailing party was to be made by a comparison between the jury award with the amount sought by the property owner. Such a comparison would contradict the letter and spirit of our holding. As we indicated in Acarrequi,
The constitution requires that private property shall not be taken for public use, except on the payment of just compensation, and a man who is forced into court where he owes no obligation to the party moving against him, cannot be said to have received just compensation for his property if he is put to an expense appreciably important to establish the value of his property. He does not want to sell; the property is taken from him through the exercise of the high powers of the state, and the spirit of the constitution clearly requires that he shall not be compelled to part with what belongs to him without the payment, not alone of the abstract value of the property, but of all the necessary expenses incurred in fixing its value.
Acarrequi, 105 Idaho at 876, 673 P.2d at 1070 (quoting In re Board of Rapid Transit Comm’rs., 128 A.D. 103,112 N.Y.S. 619 (1908) (footnotes omitted)).
In setting forth “a new view” for determining a prevailing party in a condemnation case, see Acarrequi, 105 Idaho at 876, 673 P.2d at 1070, it is clear that the analysis of Stewart v. Rice is inapplicable. As we said in Acarrequi, only “the law that has developed in condemnation cases” should be used to determine a prevailing party. See Acarrequi, 105 Idaho at 877, 673 P.2d at 1071 (quoting 6A Julius A. Sackman, Nichols’ the Law of Eminent Domain § 27.6 (3d ed. 1981)). Because Stewart v. Rice is a personal injury case, it is inapplicable to these condemnation proceedings.
Because of what I perceive to be an incorrect analysis by the majority opinion, we are left with complete inequity between the holding of this case and the holding of Acarrequi. In that case, the facts indicate that the government made an offer of $40,-000 and the jury ultimately awarded the condemnee $48,000. Acarrequi, 105 Idaho at 874, 673 P.2d at 1068. There, the Court compared these two numbers, found the offer to be less than the jury award by more than 10 percent,4 and approved the award of attorney fees. Here, the government offered less than $17,000 and the jury awarded the property owner approximately $40,000. Obviously, the same calculation used in Acarrequi yields a much greater shortfall between the government’s offer and the jury award in the present case.5 Therefore, the same result should follow in both cases. Nevertheless, by comparing the actual award with the relief sought, rather than with the government’s meager *837offer, the majority concludes that no attorney fees should be awarded.
The majority opinion emphasizes that attorney fees are within the discretion of the district court. I agree, however, it is well settled that a “trial court abuses its discretion when it fails or refuses to properly apply the law.” Kirkham v. 4.6 Acres of Land, 100 Idaho 781, 785, 605 P.2d 959, 963 (1980). Recognizing this, the majority indicates that attorney fees are “a matter for the trial court’s guided discretion____” Ante at 829, 820 P.2d at 699 (quoting Acarrequi, 105 Idaho at 876, 673 P.2d at 1071). Because Acarrequi gave “guidelines, ” ante at 829, 820 P.2d at 699, that call for a comparison between the government’s offer and the jury’s award to determine a prevailing party, in my view the trial court abused its discretion by failing to “properly apply the law” and award attorney fees to the property owner. While there is discretion as to the percentage used in determining a prevailing party, “the law that has developed in our condemnation cases” is that the government’s offer and the jury award should be used to determine who is the prevailing party. Because the district court erred in its comparison, the judgment should be reversed on this issue.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent as to Part IV of the majority opinion.

. $48,000 x 10% = $4,800
$48,000 - $40,000 = $8,000
$8,000 > $4,800

. $40,000 x 10% = $4,000
$40,000 - $17,000 = $23,000
$23,000 > $4,000