Court Opinion

ID: 9497251
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 16:46:52.529044+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:58:05.159930
License: Public Domain

HANSEN, Circuit Judge.
After the district court1 denied Karen Elaine Cash’s motion to suppress evidence seized from her residence, she conditionally pleaded guilty to possessing methamphetamine with intent to distribute, reserving the right to appeal the denial of her suppression motion. The district court sentenced her to seventy-two months in prison and four years of supervised release. Cash appeals the district court’s denial of her motion to suppress, and for the reasons discussed below, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
I.
After an evidentiary hearing, the district court found the following facts to be true. On November 29, 2001, an unidentified caller telephoned the Des Moines Police Department and spoke to Officer Mike McBride. The caller reported that he had just picked up his child from 2765 NE 52nd Court, the residence of his child’s babysitter, a woman named Karen. The caller advised that while in Karen’s residence, he had seen a brick of white powder and a brick of what he believed to be marijuana. According to the caller, when he confronted her about the alleged drugs, Karen said she “had to make a living.” Officer McBride called the Pleasant Hill Police Department and relayed this information to Officer Daniel Edwards. Edwards determined from his dispatcher that Karen Cash lived at the address in question and that there was a valid arrest warrant outstanding for Cash for violating a no-contact order. Edwards then relayed this information to Polk County Sheriffs Department Deputies Jeffrey Funaro and Matt Davenport.
Around 6:30 p.m., Edwards, Funaro, and Davenport traveled to Cash’s residence. They knocked on the door, and Cash answered. Funaro told her that there was an outstanding warrant for her arrest, and she responded that her attorney had arranged for the warrant to be recalled. Funaro contacted his dispatcher to reconfirm the validity of the warrant. While Funaro awaited a response, he and the other officers monitored Cash as she located a copy of the document purportedly *747recalling the warrant, unsuccessfully attempted to contact her attorney, and made arrangements for someone to take care of her five-year-old daughter, who was present at the residence. Edwards saw Cash move a shopping bag behind the kitchen island so that it would be out of the officers’ line of sight. Edwards noted that Cash was extremely nervous and continually interrupted herself when speaking to the officers.
After the officers had been at Cash’s residence for about ten minutes, Funaro’s dispatcher reconfirmed the validity of the arrest warrant. Funaro therefore disregarded the document Cash had proffered and told her that she would be taken into custody. Edwards then made a protective sweep of the residence. Based on his training and experience, he was concerned that because Cash was allegedly involved with large amounts of drugs, there could be someone else present at the residence who could pose a danger to the officers as they attempted to take her into custody.
Edwards walked through the residence’s three bedrooms, laundry/utility room, living room, and kitchen. In plain view atop the kitchen island, Edwards saw what he believed to be marijuana, marijuana seeds, and marijuana stems. He asked Cash about this material, and she denied that it was marijuana. Edwards then retrieved a field-test kit from his car and returned to the kitchen island to test the material, which tested positive as marijuana. While conducting the field test, Edwards looked down toward his feet and saw the open shopping bag Cash had earlier concealed from the officers behind the kitchen island. In it, he saw a baggie containing what he believed to be more marijuana. The officers then arrested Cash, secured the residence, and obtained a search warrant. In executing the search warrant, the officers retrieved methamphetamine, marijuana, pills, a large amount of cash, items related to drug consumption and distribution, and a pistol.
Cash moved to suppress the evidence, challenging the protective sweep of her residence. Applying Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 110 S.Ct. 1093, 108 L.Ed.2d 276 (1990), the district court upheld the validity of the protective sweep based on the anonymous tip that Cash possessed large quantities of white powder and marijuana, Cash’s extreme nervousness in talking to the officers, her furtiveness in concealing the shopping bag, and Edwards’s training and experience regarding the danger posed to officers when dealing with individuals involved with large drug quantities. Cash appeals the district court’s denial of her motion to suppress.
II.
Cash does not contest the district court’s factual findings, only its legal conclusion that the protective sweep was justified. We review this question of law de novo. See United States v. Boyd, 180 F.3d 967, 975 (8th Cir.1999).
In Buie, six or seven police officers entered the defendant’s residence to execute a warrant for his arrest. The defendant emerged from the basement and was taken into custody. One officer then entered the basement “in case there was someone else” present, and he seized evidence he found in plain view. 494 U.S. at 328, 110 S.Ct. 1093. The Supreme Court held that this type of protective sweep is permissible without a search warrant or probable cause, noting that the officers’ legitimate interest “in taking steps to assure themselves that the house in which a suspect is being, or has just been, arrested is not harboring other persons who are dangerous and who could unexpectedly launch an attack” is “sufficient to outweigh the intrusion such procedures may entail.” Id. at *748333-34, 110 S.Ct. 1093. The Court required that there be “articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, would warrant a reasonably prudent officer in believing that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene,” the same level of suspicion required for a stop and frisk under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Id. at 334, 88 S.Ct. 1868. Applying this standard, we conclude that the district court correctly upheld the protective sweep of Cash’s residence.
Cash’s extreme nervousness toward the officers and her furtiveness in concealing the shopping bag from the officers were significant factors which we have previously held may establish reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop and frisk. See, e.g., United States v. Atlas, 94 F.3d 447, 451 (8th Cir.1996) (“[m]ost significant ]” in establishing reasonable suspicion were the facts that the suspect’s eyes grew wide when he saw the officer, he threw down a bag he was holding, he began to walk away, and he exhibited nervousness in responding to the officer’s questions), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1130, 117 S.Ct. 1276, 137 L.Ed.2d 352 (1997); United States v. Condelee, 915 F.2d 1206, 1210 (8th Cir.1990) (reasonable suspicion was established by the suspect’s “appearance, demeanor[,] and actions”: her hands shook and her voice accelerated while talking to the officer, and she attempted to conceal the contents of her purse). We see no reason why this analysis should not be extended from the Terry context to the Buie context, given that the level of suspicion “is no more and no less than was required in Terry,” see Buie, 494 U.S. at 334, 110 S.Ct. 1093, and given that other circuits have identified an occupant’s nervousness and furtiveness as factors justifying a protective sweep, see, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 248 F.3d 506, 514 (6th Cir.) (one factor justifying a protective sweep was the occupant’s nervous demeanor), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 981, 122 S.Ct. 414, 151 L.Ed.2d 315 (2001); United States v. Meza-Corrales, 183 F.3d 1116, 1124 (9th Cir.1999) (one factor justifying a protective sweep was the occupants’ furtive actions).
Since an officer confronting a nervous and furtive suspect on the street has an articulable reason to be concerned for his safety and may therefore conduct a Terry stop and frisk, it follows that an officer arresting a nervous and furtive suspect in an unfamiliar residence has an articulable reason to be concerned for his safety and may therefore conduct a Buie sweep. See generally Buie, 494 U.S. at 333, 110 S.Ct. 1093 (“The risk of danger in the context of an arrest in the home is as great as, if not greater than, it is in an on-the-street or roadside investigatory encounter.... [Ujnlike an encounter on the street or along a highway, an in-home arrest puts the officer at the disadvantage of being on his adversary’s ‘turf.’ An ambush in a confined setting of unknown configuration is more to be feared than it is in open, more familiar surroundings.”)
It was also a significant factor that the officers had been advised that Cash was in possession of large quantities of drugs. In upholding a Terry stop and frisk, we have previously held that “[i]t is reasonable for an officer to believe that an individual may be armed and dangerous when that individual is suspected of being involved in a drug transaction because weapons and violence are frequently associated with drug transactions.” United States v. Robinson, 119 F.3d 663, 667 (8th Cir.1997) (quoted source and internal marks omitted). We have also previously noted that “[t]he possible danger presented by an individual approaching and entering a structure housing a drug operation is obvious. In fact, it would have been foolhardy for an objectively reasonable officer not to con*749duct a [Terry] frisk under the circumstances.” United States v. Patterson, 885 F.2d 483, 485 (8th Cir.1989). Again, we see no reason why this analysis should not be extended from the Terry context to the Buie context.
Since an officer approaching a suspected drug trafficker in the open is justified in conducting a Terry stop and frisk out of concern that the suspect may resort to violence to thwart the encounter, it follows that an officer arresting a suspected drug trafficker in one room of a multi-room residence is justified in conducting a Buie sweep out of concern that there could be individuals lurking in the other rooms who may resort to violence to thwart the arrest. See generally United States v. Horne, 4 F.3d 579, 586 (8th Cir.1993) (upholding a Buie sweep because “[wjhen the law enforcement officers entered the house ..., they had no way of knowing how many people were there”), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1138, 114 S.Ct. 1121, 127 L.Ed.2d 430 (1994).
III.
In sum, the district court correctly concluded that a rational and prudent police officer could reasonably suspect that the residence harbored one or more potentially dangerous individuals based on (1) the tip that Cash possessed large quantities of drugs, coupled with Edwards’s training and experience regarding the danger involved in dealing with individuals associated with large drug quantities; and (2) Cash’s extreme nervousness in interacting with the officers and her furtive concealment of the shopping bag. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

. The Honorable Ronald E. Longstaff, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa.