Court Opinion

ID: 9925322
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-19 15:03:29.591207+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:56.780530
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
                        SECOND DISTRICT

                           ASLEYS ACOSTA,

                                Appellant,

                                    v.

                   DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,

                                Appellee.

                              No. 2D23-324

                            January 19, 2024

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Sarasota County; Lee Haworth, Senior
Judge.

Asleys Acosta, pro se.

David Ellis, Assistant Attorney General, Department of Corrections,
Tallahassee, for Appellee.

KHOUZAM, Judge.
     Asleys Acosta timely appeals from a civil restitution lien order
entered in favor of the Florida Department of Corrections. Mr. Acosta
raises multiple challenges to the entry of the order. But because Mr.
Acosta's legal arguments apply to criminal restitution, whereas the order
on appeal was entered under a different civil statutory scheme, we affirm.
      In response to "increasing financial burdens on the state . . .
caused by the expenses of incarcerating convicted offenders," the
legislature sought to "impose a long-term civil liability for the costs of
incarceration, by means of the civil restitution lien, against a convicted
offender." Smith v. Fla. Dep't of Corr., 27 So. 3d 124, 126 (Fla. 1st DCA
2010) (quoting § 960.29(1)(d), Fla. Stat. (2005)). Under the resulting
remedy crafted by the legislature, "[a]n offender's liability for the costs of
incarceration exists as a matter of law upon the offender's conviction."
Id. (citing §§ 960.292(1), 960.293(2)).
      To that end, section 960.292(2), Florida Statutes (2019), grants the
court in which a person is convicted "continuing jurisdiction over the
convicted offender for the sole purpose of entering civil restitution lien
orders for the duration of the sentence and up to 5 years from release
from incarceration or supervision, whichever occurs later." The same
subsection authorizes the state to seek civil restitution by motion, after
which the court "shall enter civil restitution lien orders in favor of . . . the
state . . . and other aggrieved parties." Id. (emphasis added).
      Here, while Mr. Acosta was still serving his sentence of
incarceration, the State, through its Department of Corrections, moved
under several provisions of chapter 960 for the imposition of a civil
restitution lien order. The resulting order expressly acknowledges the
court's continuing jurisdiction under section 960.292(2) and awards the
Department the amount provided under section 960.293(2)(b).
      On appeal, Mr. Acosta asserts several legal errors, two of which we
discuss here. First, he claims that the lien is impermissible where his
plea agreement did not mention it. As a threshold matter, the record
does not contain any materials from Mr. Acosta's underlying plea or
sentencing proceedings to substantiate his characterization of them.

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Absent record support for what occurred below, Mr. Acosta has not
presented an adequate basis to review this claim. See Applegate v.
Barnett Bank of Tallahassee, 377 So. 2d 1150, 1152 (Fla. 1979).
      More important, however, even accepting Mr. Acosta's assertion
that this lien was not addressed during his criminal sentencing, that
would not be a basis to invalidate it. As the Fifth District has explained,
this "contention is based upon a misperception of the primary purpose of
restitution." Bunch v. State, 745 So. 2d 400, 401 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999).
      In furtherance of the goal of "mak[ing] victims of crime whole by
restoring to them the value of that which they have lost as a result of the
crime," Florida law is settled that the "civil restitution lien act rests upon
the principle of remediation and not punishment." Id. at 401-02 (second
quotation quoting § 960.29(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (1997)). Consistent with that
framing, our supreme court has expressly held "that imposing a civil
restitution lien pursuant to sections 960.293 and 960.297 to recover the
incarceration costs of convicted offenders is a civil remedy that is not so
punitive in nature as to constitute criminal punishment." Goad v. Fla.
Dep't of Corr., 845 So. 2d 880, 884-85 (Fla. 2003).
      Thus, where the requirements of chapter 960 are satisfied, the
absence of a civil restitution lien from plea discussions is immaterial.
See Bunch, 745 So. 2d at 400 (affirming civil restitution lien order even
though "[r]estitution was never discussed nor made a part of the written
plea agreement or sentence"). Mr. Acosta has not identified any
requirements of chapter 960 that were not observed here.
      Second, Mr. Acosta also contends that the court erred by failing to
consider his financial resources before entering the civil restitution lien
order. But, similar to his prior contention about the plea agreement, Mr.
Acosta relies entirely on authorities addressing criminal restitution.

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Whereas the criminal restitution statute does at times require the court
to consider the defendant's financial resources, the civil restitution
statute at issue here contains no such requirement, instead setting a
fixed amount based on type of crime and length of incarceration.
Compare § 775.089(6)(b), Fla. Stat. (2019) ("The criminal court, at the
time of enforcement of the restitution order, shall consider the financial
resources of the defendant . . . ."), and § 775.089(7) ("The burden of
demonstrating the present financial resources and the absence of
potential future financial resources of the defendant and the financial
needs of the defendant and his or her dependents is on the defendant."),
with § 960.292(1) ("Upon conviction, the convicted offender shall incur
civil liability for damages and losses to . . . the state . . . as set forth in s.
960.293."), and § 960.293(2)(b) (setting the amount of restitution "for an
offense other than a capital or life felony" at "$50 per day of the convicted
offender's sentence"). Accordingly, the trial court's failure to consider Mr.
Acosta's financial resources in entering the civil restitution lien here is
not a basis to invalidate it.
      Affirmed.

LUCAS and LABRIT, JJ., Concur.

                         __________________________

Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.

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