Court Opinion

ID: 9735989
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 18:38:44.888711+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:27:03.117018
License: Public Domain

McEWEN, Judge,
dissenting:
The members of the majority enjoy such esteem by reason of their judicial scholarship that it is with apology that I differ with the splendid expression of the majority view. Moreover, I only proceed to so extended a dissent because this case touches upon issues which compose the most perplexing questions currently confronting the civil courts of this Commonwealth. The question presented by this appeal, however, is quite basic, namely, whether the trial court erred in its charge to the jury. Since I am convinced that the charge was error and that, contrary to the arguments of appellee, the error was not harmless, I must, respectfully, dissent.
*603Appellant commenced this action on February 23, 1982, seeking (1) compensation for bilateral pleural thickening and pleural plaques caused by exposure to asbestos, (2) compensation for his increased risk of contracting lung cancer; or mesothelioma in the future, (3) compensation for the emotional distress he has experienced and will continue to experience as a result of his fear of the cancer he may ultimately develop, and (4) compensation for the cost of the medical surveillance necessitated by his exposure to asbestos. Appellant conceded at trial that he was not presently suffering any physical disability as a result of the presence of pleural plaques and pleural thickening, but sought compensation for his increased risk of developing cancer as well as compensation for the suffering caused by his anxiety and fear of cancer. See: Walsh v. Brody, 220 Pa.Super. 293, 296, 286 A.2d 666, 668 (1971).
It is well settled that Pennsylvania law permits an award of damages for both (1) the increased risk of cancer, Giovanetti v. Johns-Manville Corp., 372 Pa.Super. 431, 437, 539 A.2d 871, 874 (1988); Doe v. Johns-Manville Corp. 324 Pa.Super. 469, 473, 471 A.2d 1252, 1254 (1984); and (2) the emotional distress caused by the fear of contracting cancer, so long as the plaintiff “is able to allege some physical injury or some medically-identifiable effect linked to [his or] her exposure to asbestos particles....” Cathcart v. Keene Industrial Insulation, 324 Pa.Super. 123, 153, 471 A.2d 493, 509 (1984) (emphasis supplied). Accord: Berardi v. Johns-Manville Corp., 334 Pa.Super. 36, 45 n. 3, 482 A.2d 1067, 1072 n. 3 (1984); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 436(a). The physical impact in the instant case, the existence of which enabled appellant to sue for emotional distress caused by his fear of cancer, was the pleural thickening and pleural plaques, medically-identifiable effects, which had been caused by his exposure to asbestos. The physical impact required to sustain a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional harm need not be such that it causes “compensable bodily harm” other than the emotional distress. See, e.g., Potere v. City of Philadel*604phia, 380 Pa. 581, 588, 112 A.2d 100, 104 (1955); Stoddard v. Davidson, 355 Pa.Super. 262, 266, 513 A.2d 419, 422 (1986); Zelinsky v. Chimics, 196 Pa.Super. 312, 175 A.2d 351 (1961); Plummer v. U.S., 580 F.2d 72, 76 (3rd Cir.1978). Thus, appellant was entitled to recover damages for his emotional distress caused by his fear of cancer if the jury accepted his evidence.1 See, e.g., Martin v. Johns-Manville Corp, 508 Pa. 154, 162, 494 A.2d 1088, 1093 (1985) (collecting cases).
The trial court, however, over objection by appellant, submitted the following special interrogatory to the jury:
“Is the plaintiffs pleural thickening or pleural plaques an asbestos related condition or disease allowing him to receive compensation resulting from exposure to asbestos?” 2
The court, in explanation of the interrogatory, then instructed the jury, in the absence of any appellate case law which would support such a charge, that:
Keep in mind, however, in determining whether or not you are going to award any sum of money under this category [damages for fear of and risk of cancer] that this is the plaintiffs only time to come into court; that is to say, if he should get cancer in the future, he can’t come back. However, if you should find that his pleural thickening or pleural plaques are not compensable by *605answering question one no, then if he gets cancer in the future, he can come back.
N.T., October 20, 1989 at 62-63.
The jurors in the instant case were instructed that if they found that appellant’s bilateral pleural thickening and pleural plaques alone did not warrant an award of compensatory damages, they could cease deliberating and return a verdict for the defendants, preserving appellant’s right to sue for damages for cancer, if and when he develops that disease. The instruction thus improperly precluded the jury from proceeding to a determination of each of the items which had been properly submitted to it. This was error.
The trial court undertook a painstaking effort to clarify for the jury a most difficult area of deliberation. Nonetheless, the court, while purporting to instruct the jury on the items of damage3 to which appellant would be entitled *606if the jury accepted the evidence presented on his behalf, incorrectly instructed the jury not to consider an award for such items as the cost of future medical surveillancé, or damages for emotional distress related to the fear of developing cancer or the increased risk of cancer, if they found that appellant’s pleural thickening and pleural plaques had not resulted in any “compensable” physical injury. This was clearly error and infringed upon appellant’s right to seek compensation for his injuries. That the trial court believed that a future action could be brought if appellant develops cancer does not mitigate the harm caused to appellant by the error in the charge.
The primary duty of a trial judge in charging a jury is to clarify the issues so that the jury may comprehend the questions they are to decide____ If the charge is wholly inadequate or not clear, or has a tendency to mislead and confuse rather than to clarify the issues, a new trial will be granted. The functions of a trial judge embrace not only the duty to state to the jury correct principles of law applicable to the pending case and to endeavor to make such principles understandable in plain language, but they also impose upon the judge the duty to assist the jury in applying those principles to the issues presented to them for determination.
Bressler v. Dannon Yogurt, 392 Pa.Super. 475, 484, 573 A.2d 562, 567 (1990) (en banc), quoting Spearing v. Starcher, 367 Pa.Super. 22, 29, 532 A.2d 36, 40 (1987) (citations omitted).
Nor is the error harmless as argued by appellee. While appellee allegedly agreed not to raise the defense of the *607statute of limitations4 if a subsequent action based upon the development of cancer is brought by appellant, the error in the instant case has wrongfully deprived appellant of the opportunity to have a jury determine whether he is presently entitled to be compensated for damages occasioned by his exposure to asbestos.
While the foregoing presents, in my view, ample grounds upon which to reverse and remand for a new trial of the claims of appellant, I am of the further view that the instruction was a fundamental misstatement of the law of Pennsylvania. Moreover, while the majority opinion commendably seeks to clarify the complex issues arising from the existing law, the majority, in my most respectful view, creates new law and thereby synergizes a myriad of problems in an area of the law already in crisis.
If we accept the proposition that where a jury finds that an alleged injury is not compensable and refuses to award damages, no cause of action has accrued, and that, as a result, the trial will not serve as a bar to future litigation, numerous problems arise, not the least of which are the statute of limitations and the prohibition against splitting causes of action. While compelling arguments exist for the adoption of the two disease rule, Pennsylvania has not yet accepted it. “[I]n Pennsylvania a plaintiffs claims for all injuries arising out of the same tortious conduct of a defendant must be brought within two years of the time that the plaintiff knows, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should know, of his initial injury and that the injury was caused by someone’s wrongful conduct.” Cathcart v. Keene, supra, 324 Pa.Superior Ct. at 150, 471 A.2d at 507 (emphasis supplied).
This Court in Doe v. Johns-Manville Corp., supra, held that because the Declaratory Judgment Act could not be used as “a vehicle for changing the law ...” the trial court *608had properly refused to rule that no cause of action accrues, and thus the statute of limitations does not begin to run, until a plaintiff becomes “disabled”. The Doe Court believed the reason for its ruling, affirming the trial court, to be “clear”:
Pennsylvania law as it applies to plaintiffs claim is clear. The seminal case was decided in 1959 when our Supreme Court in Ayers v. Morgan, 397 Pa. 282, 154 A.2d 788 (1959) held:
[t]he injury is done when the act heralding a possible tort inflicts a damage which is physically objective and ascertainable.
Ayers v. Morgan, supra, 397 Pa. at 290, 154 A.2d at 792. Appellant concedes that in April of 1980 he was advised that he had a pleural thickening (‘damage which is physically objective’) and that it could be identified by chest x-ray (‘and ascertainable’). Thus, without more, any attempt to delay the operation of the statute of limitations would involve a change in the law
Doe v. Johns-Manville Corp., supra, 324 Pa.Superior Ct. at 473, 471 A.2d at 1254 (emphasis supplied).
It is, with undiminished deference, that I fail to comprehend the reasoning by which the majority characterizes the opinion in Doe as inapplicable to the instant case where the injuries claimed by appellant Manzi were pleural thickening and pleural plaques. The majority finds the opinion in Doe inapplicable based upon its characterization that:
The Doe Court was not asked to render a decision on all definitions of injury. Rather, it was asked to rule upon the propriety of a denial of a declaratory judgment that would have been impossible to render correctly without a factual determination of whether the plaintiff had suffered compensable injury. See: Howell v. Celotex, supra. Thus, Doe cannot be read to mean that thickening is a per se statute triggering compensable injury.
Majority Op. at p. 601.
I would submit that the Doe opinion simply “cannot be read to mean” anything other than that pleural thickening, *609of which a plaintiff has knowledge, “is a per se statute-triggering ... injury.” See: Howell v. Celotex Corporation, supra, 904 F.2d at 5. See also: Cowgill v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 832 F.2d 798, 802 (3rd Cir.1987). The question of whether pleural thickening is “compensable” is simply (and unfortunately for plaintiffs such as Howell) not relevant to the inquiry concerning the triggering event for purposes of the statute of limitations. See: Staiano v. Johns-Manville Corp., 304 Pa.Super. 280, 450 A.2d 681 (1982) (“Similarly, we do not read the complaint as alleging a claim for a ‘different disease of pleural thickening.’ But if we assume that the complaint should be read as alleging such a claim, the claim is nevertheless barred, for a new limitation period does not start each time a new disease develops from the same tortious conduct of the defendant.”)
The trial court in the instant case included in its order dismissing post-verdict motions, the following:
In the event that Plaintiff shall suffer from a disease or a condition other than pleural thickening, which is asbestos related, the jury’s verdict in this case shall not act as a bar against maintaining a subsequent action.
While appellee asserts that the order is meant to preclude the statute of limitations being raised as a defense if plaintiff develops cancer, it is equally plausible that the order was meant to avoid the prohibition against splitting causes of action.5 However well intentioned, the attempt of the trial court to provide a more certain justice than is currently available to individuals in the circumstances of the *610appellant, falls short of the goal.6 While cases and articles describing the procedures utilized in other jurisdictions provide potential solutions, see, e.g. Eagle-Picher Industries Inc. v. Cox, 481 So.2d 517 (Fla.App. 3rd Dist.1985), cert. denied, 492 So.2d 1331 (1986); Pierce v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 296 Md. 656, 464 A.2d 1020 (1983), selection of the procedure to be employed in this Commonwealth is the precise role of the Supreme Court or the legislature.

. "Asbestos-related pleural thickening is defined as a scar tissue ‘condition’ forming on the lungs as a result of asbestos contact.” Doe v. Johns-Manville, 324 Pa.Super. 469, 471, 471 A.2d 1252, 1253 (1974). Although pleural thickening itself “causes no physical damage, its presence signifies increased risk of harm, and the possibility of other latent asbestos-related injury.” Howell v. Celotex Corp., 904 F.2d 3, 4 (3rd Cir.1990). Cf. Berardi v. Johns-Manville Corp., supra, 334 Pa.Super. at 40, 482 A.2d at 1069. (" ‘X-rays’ indicated pleural thickening and plaques and the diagnosis was ‘probable asbestosis’.”)

. This interrogatory, drafted by appellee, blurs the pertinent issues since it could be understood to be asking whether the pleural thickening or pleural plaques was/were caused by asbestos exposure rather than by some other agent or factor. It appears from the court’s charge, however, that the interrogatory was directed to whether or not the "condition or disease” was “compensable”.

. The court’s charge on damages provided:
"Let’s proceed to the damage issue and, again, you would only reach the damage issue if you found that Mr. Manzi’s pleural thickening or pleural plaques are compensable. If you say no to that issue, then you wouldn’t reach the damage question.
Now, if you reach the damage question, then you should consider these factors in determining whether or not you are going to award damages to Mr. Manzi. You can consider each one and then determine whether it's worth anything or not, and if it is worth something, how much it is. First of all, the plaintiff would be entitled to fair and reasonable compensation for fair and reasonable medical bills for future checkups. What that amount would be and how long he would be entitled to the future checkups, that's up to you to decide.
Now, the plaintiff is also entitled to fair and reasonable compensation for what we call pain and suffering, and that would be as follows. The plaintiff, if you find, if you reach the damage issue, then you should consider whether to award the plaintiff compensation for pain and suffering, and the plaintiff would be entitled to fair and reasonable compensation both in the past, present and in the future for mental anguish, discomfort, inconvenience and distress.
In addition, the plaintiff would be entitled to fair and reasonable compensation for the loss, if any, of the ability to enjoy the pleasures of life.
If you reach the damage issue, you should consider the fear of cancer, and the plaintiff would be entitled to fair and reasonable compensation for a reasonable fear of cancer arising from his exposure to asbestos.
In addition, you should consider, and it’s up to you as to whether you would award anything or not, but you should consider in the *606damage area the increased risk of cancer arising from the plaintiffs exposure to asbestos. The plaintiff would be entitled to a fair and reasonable compensation for any reasonable statistical increase in the risk of cancer as a result of his asbestos exposure.
Keep in mind, however, in determining whether or not you are going to award any sum of money under this category that this is the plaintiffs only time to come into court; that is to say, if he should get cancer in the future, he can’t come back. However, if you should find that his pleural thickening or pleural plaques are not compensable by answering question one no, then if he gets cancer in the future, he can come back.”

. While appellee in its brief states that it ‘‘has agreed not to raise the statute in the event Manzi, in fact, files a subsequent action for asbestos-related cancer", citing page 43(b) of the reproduced record, no such agreement appears in the reproduced record submitted to this court.

. “It is a well-settled and familiar rule that a single claim, arising either in contract or in tort, cannot be divided and made the subject of several suits; and if actions are brought for different parts of a single demand, a judgment on the merits in one is available as a bar to the other’____ The purpose of the rule is worthy. It is intended to protect persons from being twice vexed with suits growing out of a single cause of action. It also serves to prevent the business of the courts from being encumbered by multiple actions when one will suffice.” Franklin Decorators Inc. v. Kalson, 330 Pa.Super. 140, 142, 479 A.2d 3, 4 (1984), quoting Saber v. Supplee-Wills-Jones Milk Co., 181 Pa.Super. 167, 168, 124 A.2d 620, 621 (1956) (citations omitted). See also: Giovanetti v. Johns-Manville, supra 372 Pa.Super. at 437, 539 A.2d at 874.

. The trial judges of our Commonwealth who constantly grapple with the difficulties attendant the asbestos litigation currently congesting their courts have eloquently appealed for major reform in this area. See: Blue v. Johns-Manville, 10 P.C.R. 23 (1983); Faix v. Johns-Manville Corp., 9 P.C.R. 341 (1983); In Re Asbestos Litigation, No. 89-90000-12, Civil Div., Bucks County; filed July 6, 1990).