Court Opinion

ID: 9588539
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:35:26.523447+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:37:31.474297
License: Public Domain

Benham, Judge,
concurring specially.
Although I agree with the majority that appellant’s conviction must be affirmed, I cannot agree with the legal analysis employed to reach that result or with the need to import into Georgia law the broad statements of law quoted by the majority from AmJur2d.
“Statutes imposing criminal liability are to be construed strictly; and although there is not, in the Act of 1914 [Acts 1914, p. 86; Park’s Annotated Code, Vol. 6, § 718 (d)] an express statement that its provisions as to the drawing and uttering of checks and other papers therein mentioned are confined to and refer only to such papers as are drawn or uttered with intent to defraud, it is plain that such fraudulent intent must exist and be operative before the drawing or uttering of the papers named in the statute would be criminal. The concept of a fraudulent intent must be read into the statute; otherwise the law would contravene the general provision that, to constitute crime, intent must concur with the act. [Cit.] . . . [T]he act would be in effect nothing more than a means of enforcing promises and other civil obligations, and of collecting debts by the process of the criminal law; which is utterly abhorrent to public policy as announced by the courts and as embodied in the constitution of our State. [Cit.]” Neidlinger v. State, 17 Ga. App. 811, 814 (88 SE 687) (1916).
The requirement of an intent to defraud before criminal sanctions attach has its basis in the constitutional provision prohibiting imprisonment for debts. Ga. Const. 1976, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XX (see new Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XXIII; Cobb v. State, 246 Ga. 567 (272 SE2d 299) (1980).
The majority cites cases from foreign jurisdictions authorizing conviction for postdated checks. However, I must point out that some states specifically prevent prosecution for postdated checks. State v. Downing, 488 P2d 112 (NMCA 1971); State v. Beard, 416 P2d 783, (Kan. SC 1966). The overriding consideration in determining if the law has been violated is whether there was a present intent to defraud. Berry v. State, 153 Ga. 169 (111 SE 669) (1922); Brooks v. State, 146 Ga. App. 626 (247 SE2d 209) (1978); Crain v. State, 78 Ga. App. 806 (52 SE2d 577) (1949); Barnes v. Gossett Oil Co., 56 Ga. App. 220 (192 SE 254) (1937).
Rather than import foreign law, we can rely on present Georgia law to punish criminally fraudulent check transactions. The Georgia cases cited by the majority make it clear that the effect of postdating a check is to destroy the implied promise that there is currently *417money on deposit to cover a check tendered for a present consideration. Where there is nothing but the implied promise on which to rely to show fraudulent intent, a postdated check will prevent conviction. “[A]t best, there is implied in the issuance of the checks a promise to cover the drafts when they were presented in the future. Such a promise of future performance cannot serve as a basis for a bad check charge. [Cit.] . . . [I]f a check is postdated, or if the giver of the check states that he has not enough money in the bank to cover it though he expects to have it by the time the check is presented for payment, there can be no implied representation that there is now enough on deposit to cover the check.” Bivens v. State, 153 Ga. App. 631, 632 (266 SE2d 304) (1980). In the present case, however, as the majority correctly points out, there was more than that implication: there was evidence that appellant expressly represented that there were sufficient funds to cover the $4,000 check at the time of its tender, and there was evidence that appellant’s account did not have $4,000 in it at the time the check was tendered. Thus, there was sufficient evidence to show that appellant had a fraudulent intent when he tendered the check.
Decided November 6, 1989.
Charles J. Vrono, for appellant.
Robert E. Wilson, District Attorney, Michael D. Thorpe, Robert M. Coker, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee.
Finally, the majority’s heavy emphasis on the requirement that the payor of the check specifically make known to the payee that the check is postdated is an extension of Georgia law and one which inappropriately relieves the payee of its responsibility to exercise reasonable caution in commercial transactions. Under present Georgia law, the burden is placed on the receiver of a check to examine it, especially the date, to determine if it meets the requirement of the law. To do otherwise would be to open the floodgates for testimony to contradict the written instrument. While the majority approach has appeal in this case, it unfortunately provides us a blurred vision for the future. Each of the cases decided under the bad check law displays a commendable concern for drawing a line between criminality and civil wrongs. This common sense approach gives the law a sense of definition and direction.
For the reasons stated, I concur in the affirmance of appellant’s conviction, but not with the majority’s efforts to change the law in this area.