Court Opinion

ID: 9373132
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:02:56.709734+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:39.725636
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                   MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

TREVOR MCCARDLE, 1                                DOCKET NUMBER
            Appellant,                            SF-0752-15-0230-I-1

              v.

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT                                  DATE: January 6, 2023
  OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
            Agency.

        THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 2

       Cori M. Cohen, Esquire, Stephanie M. Herrera, Esquire and Holly V.
         Franson, Esquire, Silver Spring, Maryland, for the appellant.

1
  The Board took official notice that Mr. McCardle died on August 4, 2019, while the
petition for review and cross petition for review were pending, and it issued a show
cause order that invited the parties to file a motion for substitution. Petition for Review
(PFR) File, Tab 26. In response to the show cause order, the appellant’s attorney filed a
motion for substitution, which requests that Yolanda Acuna, Mr. McCardle’s sole
beneficiary, be substituted in his place. PFR File, Tab 27. The motion includes a
California death record from Lexis-Nexis, and a declaration made under penalty of
perjury from Ms. Acuna. Id. at 7-9. If an appellant dies, the processing of an appeal
will only be completed upon substitution of a proper party. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.35(a).
Motions to substitute must be filed with the Board within 90 days after the death of a
party except for good cause shown. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.35(b). The appellant’s attorney
filed the motion for substitution on March 24, 2022, which was more than 90 days after
Mr. McCardle’s death. However, in the absence of a timely substitution of a party, the
processing of an appeal may continue if the interests of the proper party will not be
prejudiced. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.35(c). No such prejudice exists here, and the agency has
not opposed the motion; thus, we find it appropriate to continue with the processing of
this appeal. Both Ms. Acuna and Mr. McCardle will be referred to as “the appellant.”
2
   A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                        2

           Neil C. Bonney, Esquire, Virginia Beach, Virginia, for the appellant.

           Leroy T. Jenkins, Jr., Washington, D.C., for the agency.

                                          BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                 Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                      FINAL ORDER

¶1         The agency has filed a petition for review and the appellant has filed a cross
     petition for review of an initial decision that reversed the imposition of the
     indefinite suspension and found that the appellant did not prove his affirmative
     defenses of a Fourth Amendment violation and reprisal for whistleblowing and
     equal employment opportunity (EEO) activity. Generally, we grant petitions such
     as these only in the following circumstances:         the initial decision contains
     erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous
     interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to
     the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of
     the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or
     involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of
     the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite
     the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5
     of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 ( 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115).
     After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that neither party
     has established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition or cross
     petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and the c ross
     petition for review. We MODIFY the initial decision to clarify the grounds for
     reversing the suspension, to address the agency’s argument regarding the
     appellant’s pending U.S. district court case, and to supplement the administrative
                                                                                     3

     judge’s analysis of the reprisal claims. Except as expressly MODIFIED by this
     Final Order, we AFFIRM the initial decision and REVERSE the suspension.

                                         BACKGROUND
¶2         The relevant background information, as recited in the initial decision, is
     generally undisputed. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 74, Initial Decision (ID).
     On September 5, 2014, the appellant, a Paralegal Specialist, stated to a coworker
     that he was “going to fucking kill someone.” ID at 1-2, 16. On September 19,
     2014, the appellant sent an email to the entire agency in which he criticized his
     supervisors and the agency’s processing of his EEO complaint, among other
     things. ID at 9; IAF, Tab 11 at 4-8. Management received complaints from the
     appellant’s colleagues who expressed fear and concern regarding his hostile,
     intimidating, and disruptive behavior. ID at 16 (citing IAF, Tab 10 at 207-08).
     On September 23, 2014, a Federal Protective Service (FPS) officer inspected the
     appellant’s office and discovered a box cutter in his backpack. ID at 16; IAF,
     Tab 10 at 207, 209.     On September 29, 2014, the agency placed him on paid
     administrative leave to obtain a psychological/psychiatric evaluation. ID at 2.
     The administrative leave notice advised the appellant that the agency “must
     receive documentation from a qualified medical professional verifying that [his]
     presence in the workplace does not pose a danger to [himself] or others,” and it
     included a medical questionnaire.     ID at 2, 8 (emphasis omitted); IAF, Tab 9
     at 63-66.    The appellant did not provide any documentation to the agency in
     response to this notice. ID at 3.
¶3         On October 17, 2014, the agency proposed to indefinitely suspend the
     appellant.   ID at 3.   The proposal notice stated that the appellant had been
     instructed to obtain a psychological or psychiatric evaluation before he could
     return to duty and advised that the agency would not return him to duty “pending
     the results from a qualified medical professional that his presence in the
                                                                                           4

     workplace does not pose a danger to [himself] or others.”             Id.; IAF, Tab 10
     at 207-08.
¶4         The appellant submitted a November 17, 2014 letter from his treating
     psychiatrist, who stated, among other things, that the appellant “does not pose any
     threat to himself or others from his medical condition.”           ID at 3 -4 (emphasis
     omitted). The agency determined that the information provided by the appellant
     failed to specifically address the questions in the medical questionnaire, and it
     indefinitely suspended him without pay, effective December 28, 2014, “pending a
     determination based on the results of the [m]edical [q]uestionnaire from a
     qualified psychologist/psychiatrist.” ID at 4; IAF, Tab 5 at 21-24.
¶5         The appellant filed a Board appeal challenging the imposition of the
     indefinite suspension and requested a hearing.        ID at 1. 3    The appellant later
     withdrew his hearing request. Id. The administrative judge did not sustain the
     indefinite suspension because he found that the appellant satisfied the condition
     subsequent for bringing the suspension to an end by submitting the Novem ber 17,
     2014 document from his psychiatrist (a qualified medical professional), who
     stated that the appellant’s presence in the workplace did not pose a danger to
     himself or others. ID at 5-7. The administrative judge alternatively found that,
     even if the agency proved the merits of the action, the action could not be

     3
       The appellant filed a second Board appeal in April 2015, challenging the improper
     continuation of the indefinite suspension after the agency received, among other things,
     a second letter from his psychiatrist. The administrative judge did not sustain the
     agency’s action, and both parties challenged the administrative judge’s decision on
     review. See McCardle v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, MSPB Docket
     No. SF-0752-14-0496-I-1. The agency subsequently removed the appellant and, after
     he appealed, the administrative judge sustained the agency’s action. McCardle v. Equal
     Employment Opportunity Commission, MSPB Docket No. SF-0752-16-0689-I-3. The
     appellant also filed an individual right of action appeal in which the administrative
     judge denied his request for corrective action. McCardle v. Equal Employment
     Opportunity Commission, MSPB Docket No. SF-1221-17-0270-W-2. The appellant
     petitioned for review of those initial decisions. The Board issued a decision on
     December 7, 2022, in MSPB Docket No. SF-0752-16-0689-I-3 and will issue separate
     decisions in the other two appeals.
                                                                                            5

     sustained on due process grounds because the agency failed to apprise the
     appellant that the indefinite suspension could be imposed without the completed
     medical questionnaire. ID at 8-9. The administrative judge further found that the
     appellant did not prove his affirmative defenses of a Fourth Amendment violation
     and reprisal. ID at 9-19. 4
¶6         The agency has filed a petition for review, the appellant has filed a
     response, and the agency has filed a reply brief. Petition for Review (PFR) File,
     Tabs 3, 13-14. The appellant has filed a cross petition for review, the agency has
     filed a response, and, with the Board’s permission, the appellant has filed a reply
     brief. PFR File, Tabs 15-16, 18, 20, 22.

                      DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
¶7         In its petition for review, the agency argues that the administrative judg e
     made the following mistakes: (1) he erroneously concluded that the appellant met
     the condition subsequent specified in the proposal notice; (2) he failed to address
     the preclusive effect of the appellant’s subsequent U.S. district court matter; and
     (3) he erred when he found that the agency violated the appellant’s due process
     rights.   PFR File, Tab 3 at 4-6, 16-25.       In his cross petition for review, the
     appellant asserts that the administrative judge wrongly decided his reprisal

     4
       The appellant’s claim of a Fourth Amendment violation involved the search of his
     office and discovery of the box cutter in his backpack. ID at 18 -19. In the initial
     decision, the administrative judge noted that the Board has found that the exclusionary
     rule is inapplicable to situations where law enforcement officials seize evidence, and he
     found that FPS officers made the decision to search the appellant’s office and backpack,
     the search was executed, and the items were returned to the appellant. Id. (citing Delk
     v. Department of the Interior, 57 M.S.P.R. 528 (1993). The appellant does not
     challenge the administrative judge’s factual findings in this regard or the conclusion
     that he did not prove this claim. We affirm the administrative judge’s analysis and
     conclusion herein.      See, e.g., Fahrenbacher v. Department of Veterans Affairs,
     89 M.S.P.R. 260, ¶ 14 n.5 (2001) (noting that the exclusionary rule derived from the
     Fourth Amendment protection against unlawful search and seizure does not apply to
     administrative proceedings).
                                                                                         6

      affirmative defenses and failed to address his disability discrimination claim.
      PFR File, Tab 15 at 14-33.

      The indefinite suspension must be reversed.
¶8         The administrative judge made the following findings in the initial decision:
      (1) the only condition subsequent identified in the proposal notice was a
      statement from a qualified medical professional opining that the appellant’s
      presence in the workplace did not pose a danger to himself or to others; (2) the
      November 17, 2014 statement from the appellant’s treating psychiatrist satisfied
      this condition subsequent; and (3) the agency did not have a basis to impose the
      indefinite suspension.   ID at 5-7.     On review, neither party challenges the
      administrative judge’s use of the “condition subsequent” analytical standard.
      However, we find its use awkward here because the administrative judge
      essentially found that the appellant satisfied the condition subsequent prior to the
      imposition of the indefinite suspension.
¶9         Instead, we find it appropriate to utilize the analytical standard described in
      Moe v. Department of the Navy, 119 M.S.P.R. 555 (2013), because of the similar
      circumstances and chronology. The appellant in Moe was briefly hospitalized on
      June 3, 2011, because he was exhibiting odd behavior at work, and he was cleared
      by his personal psychiatrist to return to work without any restrictions on June 7,
      2011. Id., ¶ 2. On July 15, 2011, the agency ordered the appellant to report for a
      fitness-for-duty (FFD) psychiatric examination, and, based on the examining
      doctor’s report, the agency placed him on paid administrative leave, proposed to
      suspend him indefinitely, and ordered him to submit to an independent
      psychological evaluation. Id., ¶¶ 3-4. Ultimately, the appellant was indefinitely
      suspended on September 24, 2011, but the agency r estored him to duty on
      November 7, 2011. Id., ¶¶ 4-6.
¶10        In Moe, the Board found, in pertinent part, that the agency did not have a
      sufficient objective basis for indefinitely suspending the appellant because, prior
                                                                                            7

      to the decision to order him to take an FFD psychiatric evaluation, he had a
      medical release to return to work without restrictions, there were no other
      incidents upon his return to work, and his supervisor indicated that he had
      performed fully successful work and worked well with others during this period.
      Id., ¶ 14. 5 Therefore, the Board reversed the indefinite suspension. Id.
¶11           Applying the legal standard described in Moe, rather than the “condition
      subsequent” framework set forth in the initial decision, we find that a different
      outcome is not warranted.      We agree with the administrative judge’s ultimate
      conclusion that the agency did not have a basis to impose the indefinite
      suspension because, prior to imposing the suspension, it had the November 17,
      2014 documentation, which essentially indicated that the appellant was fit for
      duty.    We therefore affirm the administrative judge’s decision to reverse the
      indefinite suspension based on our finding that the agency failed to prove that it
      had a sufficient objective basis to suspend the appellant at the time it imposed the
      suspension. 6

      The appellant did not prove his affirmative defense of reprisal for whistleblowing
      disclosures or other protected activity under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)-(9).
¶12           Under the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012 (WPEA), a
      prohibited personnel practice affirmative defense asserted in a chapter 75 appeal
      that independently could form the basis of an individual right of action (IRA)
      appeal must be analyzed under the burden-shifting scheme set forth in 5 U.S.C.

      5
        The Board in Moe also concluded that the agency did not have the authority to order
      the appellant to undergo an FFD evaluation because his Rigger Apprentice position did
      not have medical standards or physical requirements, nor was it par t of an established
      medical evaluation program. Moe, 119 M.S.P.R. 555, ¶¶ 10-13. To the extent that the
      appellant argues on review that the agency’s medical inquiries were improper, e.g., PFR
      File, Tab 15 at 20-24, Tab 22 at 4 n.1, we need not address this argument because we
      have reversed the indefinite suspension on other grounds.
      6
        Because we affirm the administrative judge’s decision to reverse the imposition of the
      indefinite suspension, we need not address the agency’s arguments regarding the
      alternative due process analysis. PFR File, Tab 3 at 20 -21.
                                                                                                8

      § 1221(e). Alarid v. Department of the Army, 122 M.S.P.R. 600, ¶ 12 (2015); see
      5 U.S.C. § 1221(e), (i). Prior to the WPEA, a covered employee could only bring
      an IRA appeal for personnel actions taken or proposed to be taken as a result of a
      prohibited personnel practice described in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8), concerning
      reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures.         Alarid, 122 M.S.P.R. 600, ¶ 12. The
      WPEA expanded the grounds on which an IRA appeal may be filed with the
      Board.      Id.    Post-WPEA, an employee also may file an IRA appeal based on
      reprisal for certain other classes of protected activity as defined in 5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), and (D). Id.
¶13           An appellant asserting such an affirmative defense of reprisal for
      whistleblowing or other protected activity must show, by preponderant evidence, 7
      that he made a protected disclosure pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or engaged
      in protected activity as defined in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), and (D) 8
      and the disclosure or protected activity was a contributing factor in the personnel
      action(s).        Ayers v. Department of the Army, 123 M.S.P.R. 11, ¶ 12 (2015);
      Alarid, 122 M.S.P.R. 600, ¶ 12; see 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(1).                If the appellant
      establishes a prima facie case of such reprisal, then the burden of persuasion
      shifts to the agency to show by clear and convincing evidence that it would have
      taken the same personnel action(s) absent any whistleblowing disclosure or
      protected activity. Ayers, 123 M.S.P.R. 11, ¶ 12; Alarid, 122 M.S.P.R. 600, ¶ 12;
      see 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(2).
¶14           The appellant asserted below that his September 19, 2014 email, entitled
      “Help Needed–EEOC Los Angeles Legal Unit Under Poor Management,”
      contained protected disclosures.        IAF, Tab 54 at 6.      The administrative judge
      determined that the email was related to his EEO matters, was covered by

      7
        Preponderant evidence is the degree of relevant evidence that a reasonable person,
      considering the record as a whole, would accept as sufficient to find that a contested
      fact is more likely to be true than untrue. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(q).
      8
          Subsections 2302(b)(9)(B), (C), and (D) are not implicated by the facts of this appeal.
                                                                                             9

      5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(1) and (b)(9), and therefore was excluded from coverage
      under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8).        ID at 9-11 (citing Spruill v. Merit Systems
      Protection Board, 978 F.2d 679 (Fed. Cir. 1992), and Applewhite v. Equal
      Employment Opportunity Commission, 94 M.S.P.R. 300 (2003)). 9 It is true that
      several of the appellant’s allegations in the September 19, 2014 email appear to
      overlap with the allegations in his EEO matter. Compare IAF, Tab 11 at 4-8,
      with IAF, Tab 68 at 107-19.        However, the administrative judge should have
      considered whether the appellant established reprisal for protected activity under
      5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), which prohibits reprisal for the exercise of any
      appeal, complaint, or grievance right granted by any law, rule, or regulation
      regarding remedying a violation of 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). 5 U.S.C. § 1221(a),
      (e); see Colbert v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 121 M.S.P.R. 677, ¶ 7
      (2014). 10   Because the administrative judge did not discuss the potential
      applicability of the WPEA, and section 2302(b)(9)(A)(i) in particular, we modify
      the initial decision to supplement his analysis of this claim.
¶15         To determine whether the appellant’s September 19, 2014 email is activity
      protected by 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), we must determine if it constitutes the
      “exercise of any appeal, complaint, or grievance right.” The Board has held that
      an employee’s initial step toward taking legal action against an agency for a
      perceived violation of employment rights constitutes the exercise of any appeal,

      9
        Relevant to this matter, before the enactment of the WP EA, 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)
      made it a prohibited personnel practice to retaliate against an employee or an applicant
      for employment “because of . . . the exercise of any app eal, complaint, or grievance
      right granted by any law, rule, or regulation.” A claim of reprisal for such activity did
      not fall under the Board’s IRA appeal jurisdiction. Linder v. Department of Justice,
      122 M.S.P.R. 14, ¶ 7 (2014).
      10
         Although the appellant did not explicitly assert below that this email constituted
      protected activity pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), he argues in his cross
      petition for review that the administrative judge should have determined whethe r the
      statements in his email were covered by section “2302(b)(9)(A).” PFR File, Tab 15
      at 28 n.10. We agree that he alleged sufficient facts below to warrant consideration of
      such a claim.
                                                                                       10

      complaint, or grievance right.    See Graves v. Department of Veterans Affairs,
      123 M.S.P.R. 434, ¶¶ 11-18 (2016) (finding that an investigation by an agency’s
      Administrative Investigation Board was outside of the procedures that fall within
      the protection of section 2302(b)(9)(A)(i)); see also Von Kelsch v. Department of
      Labor, 59 M.S.P.R. 503, 508-09 (1993) (concluding that the submission of a
      workers’ compensation claim—in contrast to filing a Board appeal, an EEO
      complaint, an unfair labor practice complaint, or a grievance —did not constitute
      an initial step toward taking legal action against an employer for the perceived
      violation of an employee’s rights), overruled on other grounds by Thomas v.
      Department of the Treasury, 77 M.S.P.R. 224 (1998), overruled by Ganski v.
      Department of the Interior, 86 M.S.P.R. 32 (2000). 11 We find that the appellant’s
      September 19, 2014 email, which he sent unsolicited to the entire agency and
      which chronicles his various complaints against the agency and certain agency
      officials, did not constitute an initial step toward taking legal action against the
      agency for the perceived violation of his rights. Accordingly, we find that the
      appellant’s email did not constitute the “exercise of any appeal, comp laint, or
      grievance right,” and it is not protected under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i).
¶16        We now turn to whether the email contained disclosures protected by
      5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8), which includes a disclosure of information by an employee
      that he reasonably believes evidences any violation of any law, rule, or
      regulation, gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority,
      or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety. The proper test for
      determining if an employee had a reasonable belief that his disclosures were
      protected is whether a disinterested observer with knowledge of the essential facts
      known to and readily ascertainable by the employee could reasonably conclude

      11
         Although Von Kelsch discussed pre-WPEA statutory provisions, the Board has noted
      that nothing in the WPEA altered its previous analysis concerning the meaning of the
      terms “appeal, complaint, or grievance” in the statutory language.           Graves,
      123 M.S.P.R. 434, ¶ 18.
                                                                                           11

      that the actions evidenced one of the categories set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8).
      Linder, 122 M.S.P.R. 14, ¶ 12.
¶17         The appellant contends that the allegations in his email contained
      disclosures unrelated to his discrimination claims, including that someone
      “doctored” his personnel records to make his 7-month detail to the enforcement
      unit look like a 90-day detail, the agency violated the Fair Labor Standards Act
      and its own time and attendance policies regarding overtime, and his second -level
      supervisor “engaged in the arbitrary and capricious exercise of power.” PFR File,
      Tab 15 at 26-29. He further asserts that these allegations constitute disclosures
      involving a violation of laws, rules, and regulations, gross mismanagement, and
      an abuse of authority.     Id. at 27-28.     We agree with the appellant that his
      allegation of fraud or document tampering involving his personnel records
      constitutes a disclosure of a violation of law, rule, or regulation, and therefore it
      is protected under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). See, e.g., DiGiorgio v. Department of
      the Navy, 84 M.S.P.R. 6, ¶ 14 (1999) (explaining that some allegations of
      wrongdoing, such as theft of Government property or fraudulent claims for pay,
      so obviously implicate a violation of law, rule, or regulation, that an appellant
      need not identify any specific law, rule, or regulation that was violated). 12
¶18         To prove that a disclosure was a contributing factor in a personnel action,
      the appellant only need demonstrate that the fact of, or the content of, the
      protected disclosure was one of the factors that tended to affect the perso nnel
      action in any way. Carey v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 93 M.S.P.R. 676,
      ¶ 10 (2003). The knowledge/timing test allows an employee to demonstrate that

      12
        We are not persuaded that the appellant had a reasonable belief that he was disclosing
      gross mismanagement in the September 19, 2014 email. See White v. Department of the
      Air Force, 63 M.S.P.R. 90, 95 (1994) (explaining that gross mismanagement means a
      management action or inaction which creates a substantial risk of significant adverse
      impact upon the agency’s ability to accomplish its mission). Because we find that he
      made a protected disclosure of a violation of law, rule, or regulation, we need not
      evaluate whether his disclosure involving time and attendance issues also was protected
      and/or whether he disclosed an abuse of authority.
                                                                                               12

      the disclosure was a contributing factor in a personnel action through
      circumstantial evidence, such as evidence that the official taking the personnel
      action knew of the disclosure and that the personnel action occurred withi n a
      period of time such that a reasonable person could conclude that the disclosure
      was a contributing factor in the personnel action.             Id., ¶ 11; see 5 U.S.C.
      § 1221(e)(1).
¶19         The appellant has demonstrated that his email was a contributing factor in
      the agency’s decision to impose the indefinite suspension.               The knowledge
      element is satisfied because the email was sent to the entire agency and the
      deciding official specifically referenced the email in the decision letter.
      IAF, Tab 5 at 22.      The timing element also is satisfied because the agency
      proposed and effected the indefinite suspension approximately 1 month and
      3 months, respectively, after he sent the email. See Swanson v. General Services
      Administration, 110 M.S.P.R. 278, ¶ 12 (2008) (stating that a 2-3 month interval
      between the disclosure and personnel action is sufficiently brief that a reasonable
      person could conclude that the disclosure was a contributing factor).              Having
      found that the appellant satisfied his prima facie burden, we must now evaluate
      whether the agency proved by clear and convincing evidence 13 that it would have
      imposed the indefinite suspension absent the September 19, 2014 email.
¶20         In determining whether an agency has shown by clear and convincing
      evidence that it would have taken the same personnel action in the absence of
      whistleblowing, the Board typically will consider the strength of the agency’s
      evidence in support of its action, the existence and strength of any motive to
      retaliate on the part of the agency officials who were involved in the decision,
      and any evidence that the agency takes similar actions against employees who are
      not whistleblowers or who did not engage in protected activity but who are

      13
         Clear and convincing evidence “is that measure or degree of proof that produces in
      the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief as to the allegations sought to be established.”
      5 C.F.R. § 1209.4(e).
                                                                                        13

      otherwise similarly situated.      See Carr v. Social Security Administration,
      185 F.3d 1318, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Alarid, 122 M.S.P.R. 600, ¶ 14. Consistent
      with the guidance from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, we have
      considered all of the pertinent evidence.      Whitmore v. Department of Labor,
      680 F.3d 1353, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
¶21         Our examination of the evidence relating to the Carr factors favors the
      appellant. For example, we have found that the agency did not have a sufficient
      objective basis to impose the indefinite suspension, supra ¶¶ 8-11, and, therefore,
      the first Carr factor favors the appellant.       The Carr factor describing the
      existence and strength of the agency’s motive to retaliate also favors the appellant
      because the email identified the proposing official by name and made several
      disparaging comments about agency officials and the agency’s handling of his
      EEO matter and the deciding official specifically referenced the email in the
      decision letter. IAF, Tab 4 at 22, Tab 11 at 4 -8; see Whitmore, 680 F.3d at 1370
      (“Those responsible for the agency’s performance overall may well be motivated
      to retaliate even if they are not directly implicated by the disclosures, and even if
      they do not know the whistleblower personally, as the criticism reflects on them
      in their capacities as managers and employees.”). Finally, the parties agree that
      there is no evidence regarding the third Carr factor. PFR File, Tab 15 at 33,
      Tab 16 at 32. When the agency fails to introduce relevant comparator evidence,
      the third Carr factor cannot weigh in favor of the agency.        Smith v. General
      Services Administration, 930 F.3d 1359, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2019); Siler v.
      Environmental Protection Agency, 908 F.3d 1291, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
¶22         We find, however, that our analysis of the three Carr factors does not
      provide for adequate consideration of the unique contextual background that led
      to the agency’s decision to impose the indefinite suspension. Because the Federal
      Circuit has held that the Carr factors are “nonexclusive,” Smith, 930 F.3d
      at 1365, we have considered the totality of the circumstances. We find that the
                                                                                      14

      agency proved by clear and convincing evidence that it would have imposed the
      indefinite suspension absent the September 19, 2014 email.
¶23        Indeed, the decision to impose the indefinite suspension was ba sed on the
      appellant’s pattern of unprofessional, erratic, and hostile behavior to management
      and his coworkers over a relatively short span of time. IAF, Tab 5 at 22, Tab 69
      at 315-31 (deposition testimony of the deciding official).       Significantly, on
      September 5, 2014, the appellant told one of his coworkers, K.J., that he was
      “going to fucking kill someone.” IAF, Tab 8 at 272, Tab 69 at 317 (deposition
      testimony of the deciding official), 724 (deposition testimony of K.J.).       The
      appellant separately stated to K.J. that he was frustrated with being
      “disrespected” and “bullied” by A.P. and S.N., and he said that if he could “take
      anybody out,” it would be them.      IAF, Tab 8 at 272, Tab 69 at 704, 720 -24
      (deposition testimony of K.J.).    Additionally, the appellant became verbally
      combative during meetings, and disrespectful and unprofessional towards
      supervisors and coworkers. IAF, Tab 9 at 79-80; see, e.g., id. at 201 (stating in a
      September 12, 2014 email to A.P., S.N., and his coworkers that he would be using
      sick leave for the rest of the day and telling A.P. and S.N. not to “burden [his]
      coworkers with extra work, under the false pretense that [he] left some of [his]
      unfinished”), 202 (stating in a September 16, 2014 email to A.P., S.N., and his
      coworkers that he was using sick leave and telling A.P. and S.N. “not [to] burden
      [his] coworkers with extra work”), Tab 50 at 30-31 (deposition testimony of
      N.A.) (stating that the appellant came into her office, closed the door, and told
      her that he had filed a grievance against the agency because he believed that he
      should have been selected for the attorney position that she occupied).       K.J.,
      himself a military veteran, and someone who considered himself a “friend” to the
      appellant, testified that he became increasingly concerned that the appellant’s
      “frustration was building to a point to where [he was] no longer thinking
                                                                                            15

      rationally” and he talked to A.P. about his concerns. 14 IAF, Tab 69 at 712-13,
      719-20, 724, 740-41 (deposition testimony of K.J.); see IAF, Tab 50 at 71
      (deposition testimony of S.N.) (stating that she “considered not parking where
      [she] normally park[ed] because of [the appellant’s] bizarre behavior, his
      belligerence, [and his] open hostility,” which also made her “look over [her]
      shoulder when [she walked] to [her] car at night”).
¶24           Then, on September 19, 2014, the appellant sent the unsolicited
      agency-wide email, which was sent in violation of agency policies and which
      contained details about his personal grievances against various agency empl oyees.
      IAF, Tab 11 at 4-8. As described in the decision letter and the testimony of the
      deciding official, as a result of this email, several of the appellant’s coworkers
      “reported their concerns, fears, and anxiety over the content of [his] email as wel l
      as [his] recent erratic and disruptive behavior” and requested to be out of the
      office when the appellant was present.          IAF, Tab 5 at 22, Tab 69 at 373 -74
      (deposition testimony of the deciding official); see, e.g., IAF, Tab 69 at 248-49
      (deposition testimony of A.P.) (stating that four female employees, N.A., L.W.,
      R.W., and S.N., contacted her after the appellant sent the email, and describing
      these coworkers as “afraid or apprehensive,” “highly agitated,” “afraid,” and
      “express[ing] apprehension and fear,” respectively). 15 Taken together, the serious

      14
           A.P. later became the proposing official. IAF, Tab 10 at 207-08.
      15
         There appeared to be nearly universal concern in the appellant’s work unit after he
      sent this email. For example, N.A. testified that the appellant’s email was “alarm[ing]”
      because he called the legal unit a “little girl’s club” and she was a petite woman, and
      other details in the email indicated to her that he was “at the end of [his] rope,” he
      “seemed extremely desperate,” and he “was out of options.” IAF, Tab 50 at 31
      (deposition testimony of N.A.). S.N. testified that the appellant’s “manifesto” was
      “disturbing” and made her “afraid.” Id. at 71 (deposition testimony of S.N.).
      A.P. testified that she was “concerned” by the email because of how it affected her staff
      and she was also concerned that the appellant seemed “helples s.” IAF, Tab 69
      at 243-44 (deposition testimony of A.P.). R.W. testified that the appellant’s demeanor
      earlier that day coupled with the agency-wide email made her “afraid.” Id. at 639-43
      (deposition testimony of R.W.). K.J. also testified that the ema il “solidified” his
      concerns about the appellant. Id. at 741 (deposition testimony of K.J.). Finally, L.W.
                                                                                              16

      nature of these allegations and the fear and concerns expressed by numerous
      employees in the appellant’s work unit regarding the appellant’s behavior and
      actions justifies the agency’s concern about the appellant’s continued presence in
      the workplace, notwithstanding the flawed execution of its action. 16 We are left
      with a firm belief that the agency would have indefinitely suspended the appellant
      absent the September 19, 2014 email. 17
¶25         For the first time on review, the appellant asserts that a January 2, 2014
      email sent by an agency administrative judge to the Inspector General “on [his]
      behalf” constituted “protected whistleblowing activity.” PFR File, Tab 15 at 13
      n.3, 27. The appellant did not specifically identify this correspondence as part of
      his whistleblowing reprisal claim in his prehearing submission or closing brief
      below, IAF, Tabs 54, 69, and we could not independently find this
      correspondence in the record. The Board generally will not consider an argument
      raised for the first time in a petition for review absent a showing that it is based
      on new and material evidence not previously available despite the party’s due
      diligence. Banks v. Department of the Air Force, 4 M.S.P.R. 268, 271 (1980).
      The appellant has not met this burden, and we will not further consider this
      argument on review.

      The appellant did not prove his affirmative defens e of reprisal for EEO activity.
¶26         In his analysis of the claim of reprisal for EEO activity, the administrative
      judge only discussed the appellant’s July 12, 2013 formal EEO complaint, in

      testified that she was “uncomfortable” and “overwhelmed” because of the conflict in the
      office. Id. at 779-80 (deposition testimony of L.W.).
      16
         Importantly, the deciding official testified that she considered the fact that FPS found
      a box cutter in the appellant’s possession at work, but it was not critical to her decision
      because the appellant’s explanation, that he may need it for his bicycle, “ made some
      sense” and was “a legitimate reason.” IAF, Tab 69 at 363 -67 (deposition testimony of
      the deciding official). Likewise, we accord the discovery of the box cutter little weight
      in our analysis.
      17
        We have reviewed the relevant legislation enacted during the pendency of this appeal
      and have concluded that it does not affect the outcome of the appeal.
                                                                                      17

      which he alleged that he was a victim of harassment based on race and sex
      discrimination and reprisal for participating in a mediation with his supervisors.
      IAF, Tab 11 at 4-8, Tab 68 at 107-19; ID at 11-18. The administrative judge
      determined that the appellant failed to present any direct evidence to support his
      contention that his EEO complaint was a motivating factor in the agency’s
      decision, he did not show a “convincing mosaic” of reprisal, and he did not
      provide comparator evidence or other circumstantial evidence of pretext.
      ID at 11-18 (discussing Savage v. Department of the Army, 122 M.S.P.R. 612,
      ¶¶ 36-37, 41-42, 48-49, 51 (2015), overruled on other grounds by Pridgen v.
      Office of Management & Budget, 2022 MSPB 31, ¶ 25).
¶27        On review, the appellant acknowledges that the administrative judge
      “correctly articulated the ‘motivating factor’ standard applicable to retaliation
      claims before the Board,” but he asserts that the administrative judge disregarded
      evidence and erred in his analysis of this standard. PFR File, Tab 15 at 24 -26.
      We modify the initial decision to clarify the proper analytical framework and to
      supplement the administrative judge’s analysis of this claim.
¶28        Since the initial decision was issued, the Board has clarified that Savage
      does not require administrative judges to separate direct from circumstantial
      evidence or to require appellants to demonstrate a convincing mosaic to support a
      retaliation claim. Gardner v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 123 M.S.P.R. 647,
      ¶¶ 29-30 (2016), clarified by Pridgen, 2022 MSPB 31, ¶¶ 23-24.          Rather, in
      Gardner, the Board reiterated that the dispositive inquiry was whether the
      appellant proved by preponderant evidence that the prior EEO activity was a
      motivating factor in the contested personnel action. Id., ¶ 30.
¶29        Because the deciding official mentioned his EEO complaint in the decision
      letter, IAF, Tab 4 at 22, we find that his complaint was a motivating factor in the
      agency’s decision to impose the indefinite suspension, Gardner, 123 M.S.P.R.
      647, ¶ 30; Savage, 122 M.S.P.R. 612, ¶ 51.
                                                                                        18

¶30         Now we turn to the next part of our analysis. Title VII of the Civil Rights
      Act of 1964, as amended, requires that such actions “shall be made free from any
      discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C.
      § 2000e-16(a). As noted above, the appellant may prove an affirmative defense
      under this subsection by showing that prohibited discriminatio n or reprisal was a
      motivating factor in the contested personnel action, meaning that discrimination
      or reprisal played “any part” in the agency’s action. Pridgen, 2022 MSPB 31,
      ¶ 21. In Pridgen, the Board clarified that an appellant who proves motivating
      factor and nothing more may be entitled to injunctive or other “forward -looking
      relief,” but to obtain the full measure of relief under the statute, including status
      quo ante relief, compensatory damages, or other forms of relief related to the end
      result employment decision, he must show that discrimination or reprisal was a
      “but-for” cause of the action. Id., ¶¶ 20-22 (citing Babb v. Wilkie, 140 S. Ct.
      1168, 1171, 1177-78 (2020)).
¶31         The U.S. Supreme Court has explained that “a but-for test directs us to
      change one thing at a time and see if the outcome changes. If it does, we have
      found a but-for cause.” Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia, 140 S. Ct. 1731,
      1739 (2020). Here, if we eliminate the agency’s considerati on of the appellant’s
      EEO complaint, it is apparent that the agency would have indefinitely suspended
      the appellant because of, among other things, his statement that he wanted to kill
      someone and the concerns and fear expressed by his supervisors and cowo rkers
      regarding his erratic and increasingly hostile behavior towards them. Because we
      find that the outcome would be the same without considering his prior EEO
      complaint, we further conclude that the appellant has failed to prove that his EEO
      complaint was a but-for cause of the indefinite suspension. 18

      18
         The administrative judge noted in the initial decision that the Standard Form 50
      effecting the indefinite suspension indicated that the reason for th e suspension was
      “pending results of investigation,” and he discussed the agency’s subsequent
      investigation of potential misconduct by the appellant, which ultimately led to his
      removal. ID at 13-18; IAF, Tab 5 at 19. We do not consider any subsequent
                                                                                             19

¶32         The appellant asserted below that his September 19, 2014 email, discussed
      above, was also “protected under EEO . . . laws,” IAF, Tab 54 at 6, and he
      appears to reassert this claim on review, PFR File, Tab 15 at 25. We further
      modify the initial decision to consider this email as protected EEO activity.
¶33         On review, the appellant asserts that the administrative judge failed to
      mention that the deciding official testified in her deposition that the email wa s the
      “tipping point” in her decision to suspend him. PFR File, Tab 15 at 9 -10, 25;
      IAF, Tab 69 at 374-75. This argument is not persuasive because it is based on a
      misunderstanding of the deciding official’s testimony.           The deciding official
      testified that “some employees got concerned” after reading the appellant’s email ,
      and she affirmed that the “fact of their concern” was a basis for her decision.
      IAF, Tab 69 at 373-74 (deposition testimony of the deciding official).
      She explained that the email “sort of highlighted or sort of set in motion or
      brought to the forefront the fact that people were concerned.”               Id. at 374
      (deposition testimony of the deciding official).        The deciding official further
      explained that the email “tipped the scale and made people more concerned”
      because “people [who] were concerned or [who] may have not been quite as
      concerned about some of the things he said until the email, which made them
      think back on some of the things he had said.”              Id. at 374-75 (deposition
      testimony of the deciding official). The deciding official emphasized that some
      of the appellant’s female coworkers were so concerned after reading the email
      that they requested to go home.         Id. at 375-77 (deposition testimony of the
      deciding official). Thus, the deciding official’s testimony, in context, reveals that
      the email itself was not the tipping point; rather, it was the concern and/or fear

      investigation because the deciding official testified in her deposition that she did not
      learn of this investigation until approximately June 2015, nearly 6 months after the
      indefinite suspension was imposed, IAF, Tab 69 at 527 -29 (deposition testimony of the
      deciding official), and therefore, the investigation does not appear to have been a factor
      in the agency’s decision to impose the suspension.
                                                                                          20

      expressed by other agency employees after reading the appellant’s email that was
      the tipping point in her decision to suspend the appellant.
¶34         We find, however, that the reference in the decision letter to the
      September 19, 2014 email and the negative effect that it caused in the workplace
      satisfies the appellant’s burden to show that the email was a motivating factor in
      the agency’s decision to indefinitely suspend him.            See, e.g., Southerland
      v. Department of Defense, 119 M.S.P.R. 566, ¶ 22 (2013) (finding that the
      deciding official’s statements regarding the effect of the appellant’s inability to
      fulfill his duties on the efficiency of the organization constituted evidence of a
      discriminatory motive), overruled on other grounds by Pridgen, 2022 MSPB 31,
      ¶ 47. However, for the reasons described above, we find that the appell ant failed
      to prove that his EEO activity was a but-for cause of the indefinite suspension. 19

      We supplement the initial decision to address the agency’s assertion regarding the
      appellant’s U.S. district court complaint, but a different outcome is not
      warranted.
¶35         On review, the agency asserts that it is being forced to litigate identical
      claims in two separate legal fora based on the appellant’s decision to file a
      complaint in U.S. district court in August 2015, seven months after he filed this
      appeal.   PFR File, Tab 3 at 21-25 (discussing Williams v. Equal Employment
      Opportunity Commission, 75 M.S.P.R. 144 (1997)). This argument is unavailing.
      In Williams, the Board “[a]ssum[ed]” that under some circumstances it would be
      appropriate to dismiss an appeal because of a later-filed Title VII action in
      district court.    Williams, 75 M.S.P.R. at 149.           Without identifying the
      circumstances when it would be appropriate, the Board in Williams concluded

      19
        If the appellant wishes to pursue any “injunctive or other forward-looking relief” he
      believes the Board may be authorized to order because we have found that he proved by
      preponderant evidence that his EEO activity was a motivating factor in the agency’s
      decision, Babb, 140 S. Ct. at 1178, he should file a request with the Western Regional
      Office.
                                                                                         21

      that such circumstances were not present in that matter. Id. The Board’s decision
      in Williams, therefore, provides little guidance.
¶36         We have reviewed the appellant’s pro se district court complaint and his
      two amended complaints, which involve claims of employment discrimination,
      due process violations, and defamation.         IAF, Tab 48; PFR File, Tab 14
      at 14-153. Based on our review of these submissions, it appears that the appellant
      is asserting that the indefinite suspension is one of several agency actions that
      supports his hostile work environment claim, but it does not appear that he is
      specifically pursuing a claim involving his indefinite suspension i n the district
      court matter. In fact, he specifically informed the court in his original complaint
      that “[t]he MSPB is adjudicating [his] unlawful[]suspension claims.”             IAF,
      Tab 48 at 15.     Moreover, in a footnote in the first and second amended
      complaints, the appellant advised the district court of the initial decision in this
      matter and stated that the “illegal suspension and related claims are not within
      [the] court’s jurisdiction.”   PFR File, Tab 14 at 69, 139.        Additionally, the
      U.S. District Court for the Central District of California issued a decision
      granting the agency’s motion for summary judgment on claims involving the
      Equal Pay Act and claims that the appellant’s various nonselections were based
      on discrimination and/or retaliation. McCardle v. Yang, No. CV 15–6236 DSP
      (Ex), 2017 WL 2312998, at *1-*7 (C.D. Cal. May 25, 2017), aff’d sub nom.
      McCardle v. Lipnic, 738 F. App’x 464 (9th Cir. 2018). The court of appeals, in
      its decision, affirmed the district court’s decision to dismiss for failure to state a
      claim the appellant’s due process, hostile work environment, retaliation, and
      defamation claims. McCardle, 738 F. App’x at 464. There is no indication in
      either of these decisions that the indefinite suspension was before the court. In
      the absence of any persuasive evidence that the appellant was attempting to
      relitigate his indefinite suspension appeal before the court, it is not appropriate to
      dismiss this matter.
                                                                                       22

      We do not consider the appellant’s claim of disability discrimination because he
      did not raise it below or show that it is based on new and material evidence that
      was not previously available despite his due diligence.
¶37        In his Order and Summary of Conference Call, the administrative judge
      noted that the appellant raised defenses of reprisal, a due process violation, and a
      violation of the Fourth Amendment. IAF, Tab 66 at 2. The administrative judge
      also stated that the appellant “confirmed that he is not pursuing any other
      affirmative defense claims and/or confirmed that he is withdrawing any
      affirmative defense and/or other claims not specifically identified above.”      Id.
      at 4. The administrative judge therefore concluded that, “[w]ith regard to other
      affirmative defenses not raised in this appeal, the affirmative defenses not
      specifically memorialized above will not be further addressed by the Board
      absent a specific timely motion requesting otherwise followed by an order.” Id.
      (emphasis in original). The appellant, who was represented by counsel, did not
      challenge the administrative judge’s rulings at any time below, including in his
      closing brief, nor did he otherwise indicate that he was raising a claim of
      disability discrimination. Because the appellant has not shown that this argument
      is based on new and material evidence that was not available before the record
      closed below, Banks, 4 M.S.P.R. at 271, we do not consider this claim on review,
      Ronso v. Department of the Navy, 122 M.S.P.R. 391, ¶ 3 n.1 (2015); Burge v.
      Department of the Air Force, 82 M.S.P.R. 75, ¶ 31 (1999).
¶38        We have considered the appellant’s assertion that the Board should consider
      his disability discrimination claim on its own motion. PFR File, Tab 15 at 16
      (citing Mitchell v. Department of the Navy, 6 M.S.P.R. 364 (1981)). In Mitchell,
      6 M.S.P.R. at 365, the Board stated that it was “more amenable to considering
      allegations of discrimination prohibited by statute raised for the first time in a
      petition for review than other allegations of error.” Here, however, we are not
      persuaded that Mitchell warrants a different outcome. There is no mention that
      the appellant in Mitchell was represented by counsel before the administrative
                                                                                        23

      judge. By contrast, the appellant was represented by counsel below, and he is
      responsible for the errors of his chosen representative. Sofio v. Internal Revenue
      Service, 7 M.S.P.R. 667, 670 (1981).
¶39         We have considered the parties’ remaining arguments, but we find that they
      are unavailing.

                                             ORDER
¶40         We ORDER the agency to rescind the indefinite suspension and to restore
      the appellant effective December 28, 2014. See Kerr v. National Endowment for
      the Arts, 726 F.2d 730 (Fed. Cir. 1984). The agency must complete this action no
      later than 20 days after the date of this decision.
¶41         We also ORDER the agency to pay the appellant the correct amount of back
      pay, interest on back pay, and other benefits under the Office of Personnel
      Management’s regulations, no later than 60 calendar days after the date of this
      decision. We ORDER the appellant to cooperate in good faith in the agency’s
      efforts to calculate the amount of back pay, interest, and benefits due, and to
      provide all necessary information the agency requests to help it carry out the
      Board’s Order. If there is a dispute about the amount of back pay, interest due,
      and/or other benefits, we ORDER the agency to pay the appellant the undisputed
      amount no later than 60 calendar days after the date of this decision.
¶42         We further ORDER the agency to tell the appellant promptly in writing
      when it believes it has fully carried out the Board’s Order and of the actions it has
      taken to carry out the Board’s Order. The appellant, if not notified, should ask
      the agency about its progress. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.181(b).
¶43         No later than 30 days after the agency tells the appellant that it has fully
      carried out the Board’s Order, the appellant may file a petition for enforcement
      with the office that issued the initial decision on this appeal if the appellant
      believes that the agency did not fully carry out the Board’s Order. The petition
      should contain specific reasons why the appellant believes that the agency has not
                                                                                         24

      fully carried out the Board’s Order, and should include the dates and results of
      any communications with the agency. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.182(a).
¶44           For agencies whose payroll is administered by either the National Finance
      Center of the Department of Agriculture (NFC) or the Defense Finance and
      Accounting Service (DFAS), two lists of the information and documentation
      necessary to process payments and adjustments resulting from a Board decision
      are attached. The agency is ORDERED to timely provide DFAS or NFC with all
      documentation necessary to process payments and adjustments resulting from the
      Board’s decision in accordance with the attached lists so that payment can be
      made within the 60‑day period set forth above.

                        NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT REGARDING
                              YOUR RIGHT TO REQUEST
                             ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS
              You may be entitled to be paid by the agency for your reasonable attorney
      fees and costs. To be paid, you must meet the requirements set forth at Title 5 of
      the United States Code (5 U.S.C.), sections 7701(g), 1221(g), or 1214(g). The
      regulations may be found at 5 C.F.R. §§ 1201.201, 1201.202, and 1201.203. If
      you believe you meet these requirements, you must file a motion for attorney fees
      and costs WITHIN 60 CALENDAR DAYS OF THE DATE OF THIS DECISION.
      You must file your motion for attorney fees and costs with the office that issued
      the initial decision on your appeal. The initial decision, as supplemented by this
      Final    Order,   constitutes   the   Board’s   final   decision   in   this   matter.
      5 C.F.R. § 1201.113.
                                                                                     25

                         NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 20
      The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the
Board’s final decision in this matter.      5 C.F.R. § 1201.113.      You may obtain
review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of
your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate
forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following
summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not
provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation an d
the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule
regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of
this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your
claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failu re to file
within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your
chosen forum.
      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.              5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).

20
  Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                       26

      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit    your   petition    to   the   court   at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or    EEOC    review     of   cases      involving    a   claim    of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.      5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017).                 If you have a
representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before
you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days
after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of
                                                                                27

discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling
condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and
to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                  P.O. Box 77960
                             Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant   to   the   Whistleblower    Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
                                                                                     28

other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in
section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or
2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial
review either with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court
of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 21 The court of appeals must receive your
petition for review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.
5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                               U.S. Court of Appeals
                               for the Federal Circuit
                              717 Madison Place, N.W.
                              Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
21
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115 -195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                           29

Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                                    /s/ for
                                          Jennifer Everling
                                          Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.
                                 DEFENSE FINANCE AND ACCOUNTING SERVICE
                                           Civilian Pay Operations

                          DFAS BACK PAY CHECKLIST
The following documentation is required by DFAS Civilian Pay to compute and pay back pay
pursuant to 5 CFR § 550.805. Human resources/local payroll offices should use the following
checklist to ensure a request for payment of back pay is complete. Missing documentation may
substantially delay the processing of a back pay award. More information may be found at:
https://wss.apan.org/public/DFASPayroll/Back%20Pay%20Process/Forms/AllItems.aspx.

NOTE: Attorneys’ fees or other non-wage payments (such as damages) are paid by
vendor pay, not DFAS Civilian Pay.

☐ 1) Submit a “SETTLEMENT INQUIRY - Submission” Remedy Ticket. Please identify the
       specific dates of the back pay period within the ticket comments.

Attach the following documentation to the Remedy Ticket, or provide a statement in the ticket
comments as to why the documentation is not applicable:

☐ 2) Settlement agreement, administrative determination, arbitrator award, or order.

☐ 3) Signed and completed “Employee Statement Relative to Back Pay”.

☐ 4) All required SF50s (new, corrected, or canceled). ***Do not process online SF50s
       until notified to do so by DFAS Civilian Pay.***

☐ 5) Certified timecards/corrected timecards. ***Do not process online timecards until
       notified to do so by DFAS Civilian Pay.***

☐ 6) All relevant benefit election forms (e.g. TSP, FEHB, etc.).

☐ 7) Outside earnings documentation. Include record of all amounts earned by the employee
       in a job undertaken during the back pay period to replace federal employment.
       Documentation includes W-2 or 1099 statements, payroll documents/records, etc. Also,
       include record of any unemployment earning statements, workers’ compensation,
       CSRS/FERS retirement annuity payments, refunds of CSRS/FERS employee premiums,
       or severance pay received by the employee upon separation.

Lump Sum Leave Payment Debts: When a separation is later reversed, there is no authority
under 5 U.S.C. § 5551 for the reinstated employee to keep the lump sum annual leave payment
they may have received. The payroll office must collect the debt from the back pay award. The
annual leave will be restored to the employee. Annual leave that exceeds the annual leave
ceiling will be restored to a separate leave account pursuant to 5 CFR § 550.805(g).
                                                                                                     31

NATIONAL FINANCE CENTER CHECKLIST FOR BACK PAY CASES
Below is the information/documentation required by National Finance Center to process
payments/adjustments agreed on in Back Pay Cases (settlements, restorations) or as ordered by the Merit
Systems Protection Board, EEOC, and courts.
1. Initiate and submit AD-343 (Payroll/Action Request) with clear and concise information describing
   what to do in accordance with decision.
2. The following information must be included on AD-343 for Restoration:
       a.   Employee name and social security number.
       b.   Detailed explanation of request.
       c.   Valid agency accounting.
       d.   Authorized signature (Table 63).
       e.   If interest is to be included.
       f.   Check mailing address.
       g.   Indicate if case is prior to conversion. Computations must be attached.
       h.   Indicate the amount of Severance and Lump Sum Annual Leave Payment to be collected
            (if applicable).
Attachments to AD-343
1. Provide pay entitlement to include Overtime, Night Differential, Shift Premium, Sunday Premium,
   etc. with number of hours and dates for each entitlement (if applicable).
2. Copies of SF-50s (Personnel Actions) or list of salary adjustments/changes and amounts.
3. Outside earnings documentation statement from agency.
4. If employee received retirement annuity or unemployment, provide amount and address to
   return monies.
5. Provide forms for FEGLI, FEHBA, or TSP deductions. (if applicable)
6. If employee was unable to work during any or part of the period involved, certification of the type of
   leave to be charged and number of hours.
7. If employee retires at end of Restoration Period, provide hours of Lump Sum Annual Leave to
   be paid.
NOTE: If prior to conversion, agency must attach Computation Worksheet by Pay Period and required
data in 1-7 above.
The following information must be included on AD-343 for Settlement Cases: (Lump Sum Payment,
Correction to Promotion, Wage Grade Increase, FLSA, etc.)
        a. Must provide same data as in 2, a-g above.
        b. Prior to conversion computation must be provided.
        c. Lump Sum amount of Settlement, and if taxable or non-taxable.
If you have any questions or require clarification on the above, please contact NFC’s Payroll/Personnel
Operations at 504-255-4630.