Court Opinion

ID: 9408595
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-13 15:00:59.17593+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:45.013186
License: Public Domain

22-95
     Henry v. City of New York

                                 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                     FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                          SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL
APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY
CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL.

 1                At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
 2   Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square,
 3   in the City of New York, on the 13th day of July, two thousand twenty-three.
 4
 5   PRESENT:
 6              EUNICE C. LEE,
 7              MYRNA PÉREZ,
 8              SARAH A. L. MERRIAM,
 9                    Circuit Judges.
10   _____________________________________
11
12   Levar T. Henry,
13
14                        Plaintiff-Appellant,
15
16                   v.                                             22-95
17
18
19   The City of New York, Police Officer
20   Gary Perez, Shield No. 27357, in his
21   Individual Capacity, Police Officer
22   Randy Figuereo, Shield No. 19407, in
23   his Individual Capacity, Police Officer
24   Carlos Pimentel, Shield No. 07608, in
25   his Individual Capacity, Police Officer
26   Carlos Thomas, Shield No. 21295, in his
27   Individual Capacity, Police Officer
28   Juan Carrero, Shield No. 00160, in his
29   Individual Capacity,
30
31                    Defendants-Appellees,
32
33   Police Officer Willie Thompson, Shield
34   No. 15823, in his Individual Capacity,
35   Ravikala Puttamadu, MD, in his
36   Individual Capacity, FDNY EMT John
37   Doe, Lightskin, in his Individual
38   Capacity, FDNY EMT John Doe,
39   Darkskin, in his Individual Capacity,
40   New York City Department of
41   Corrections,      (NYCD),       Lieutenant
42   Christian Hernandez, of Transit Bureau
43   District 11, in his official and individual
44   capacity,
45
46                 Defendants. ∗
47   _____________________________________
48
49   FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT:                          Levar T. Henry, pro se, Valhalla,
50                                                     NY.
51
52   FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES:                         Devin Slack, Benjamin H. Pollak,
53                                                     Assistant Corporation Counsel, for

     ∗
      The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the official case caption as
     set forth above.

                                                   2
54                                                 Hon. Sylvia O. Hinds-Radix,
55                                                 Corporation Counsel of the City of
56                                                 New York, New York, NY.
57

58         Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the

59   Southern District of New York (Koeltl, J.).

60         UPON      DUE    CONSIDERATION,          IT   IS   HEREBY    ORDERED,

61   ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is

62   AFFIRMED.

63         Appellant Levar Henry, proceeding pro se, sued the City of New York and

64   numerous police officers and other City employees under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and

65   New York state law, alleging claims including false arrest, excessive force,

66   assault, battery, and malicious prosecution.        The district court granted

67   summary judgment to the defendants on all claims other than the excessive force,

68   assault, and battery claims. After a December 2021 jury trial, at which Henry

69   was represented by counsel, the jury found in favor of the defendants. Henry

70   appeals, again proceeding pro se.

71         On appeal, Henry argues, for the first time, that he was prejudiced during

72   the trial by a search of his home that occurred approximately six months before

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 1   his trial began. Specifically, he criticizes a search conducted in June 2021 by

 2   parole officers and Mount Vernon, New York police officers which led to Henry’s

 3   arrest for a parole violation. He hypothesized that the search and arrest were

 4   engineered by a specific parole officer, whom Henry contends was a defendant

 5   in his civil suit, to deliberately interfere with his trial preparation and tarnish his

 6   credibility as a witness. Henry additionally argues that he was prejudiced by

 7   the presence of a uniformed Westchester County corrections officer at the trial.

 8   He did not otherwise challenge the district court’s summary judgment decision

 9   or the evidentiary basis for the jury’s verdict. We assume the parties’ familiarity

10   with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on

11   appeal.

12         I.     Abandonment of Claims

13         We “liberally construe pleadings and briefs submitted by pro se litigants,

14   reading such submissions to raise the strongest arguments they suggest.”

15   McLeod v. Jewish Guild for the Blind, 864 F.3d 154, 156 (2d Cir. 2017) (internal

16   quotation marks omitted). However, pro se appellants must still comply with

17   Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(a), which “requires appellants in their

                                                4
 1   briefs to provide the court with a clear statement of the issues on appeal.”

 2   Moates v. Barkley, 147 F.3d 207, 209 (2d Cir. 1998).       We “normally will not[]

 3   decide issues that a party fails to raise in his or her appellate brief.” Id.; see also

 4   LoSacco v. City of Middletown, 71 F.3d 88, 93 (2d Cir. 1995) (“[W]e need not

 5   manufacture claims of error for an appellant proceeding pro se . . . .”). Nor will

 6   we decide issues that a pro se appellant raises in his brief only “in passing.”

 7   Gerstenbluth v. Credit Suisse Secs. (USA) LLC, 728 F.3d 139, 142 n.4 (2d Cir. 2013).

 8         Here, Henry’s opening brief fails to address the district court’s decision

 9   granting summary judgment on the majority of the claims, fails to attack the

10   evidentiary basis for the jury’s verdict for the defense with respect to the

11   excessive force, assault, and battery claims, and does not raise general issues of

12   trial error. These dispositive issues are thus abandoned, and we affirm on that

13   basis. See LoSacco, 71 F.3d at 92–93.

14         II.    2021 Search and Arrest

15         Henry’s principal argument on appeal is that the 2021 search and arrest

16   were engineered by a parole officer with the intent to prejudice Henry’s civil trial

17   preparation and credibility as a witness. But we cannot adjudicate this new

                                                5
 1   claim on appeal because doing so would require appellate factfinding—

 2   specifically, that the parole officer was the impetus behind the search and that

 3   the search and arrest occurred for the purpose of interfering with Henry’s trial.

 4   “Factfinding is the basic responsibility of district courts, rather than appellate

 5   courts, and the Court of Appeals should not resolve in the first instance a factual

 6   dispute which has not been considered by the District Court.”          Harrison v.

 7   Republic of Sudan, 838 F.3d 86, 96 (2d Cir. 2016) (alteration marks omitted)

 8   (quoting DeMarco v. United States, 415 U.S. 449, 450 n.* (1974)). Therefore, we

 9   cannot and do not reach Henry’s arguments regarding the 2021 search and his

10   subsequent arrest.

11         III.   Uniformed Corrections Officer

12         Finally, Henry contends that he was prejudiced by the presence of a

13   uniformed Westchester County corrections officer during the trial. But as the

14   defendants point out, there is nothing in the record suggesting that a uniformed

15   corrections officer was present during the trial. Instead, Deputy U.S. Marshals

16   were seated in the courtroom “in some proximity to the plaintiff,” but the trial

17   judge agreed to ensure that the parties would be “in their places when the jury

                                              6
 1   enters or leaves so that there is no association of the marshals specifically with

 2   the plaintiff.” Record on Appeal Trial Tr. at 3–4. Plaintiff’s counsel indicated

 3   that she understood, and neither counsel nor plaintiff raised any objection to this

 4   arrangement.    See id. at 4.   And even if there were uniformed corrections

 5   officers at trial whose presence caused Henry prejudice in the way he suggests,

 6   his failure to preserve this issue for the record renders it functionally

 7   unreviewable on appeal. See United States v. Mulvey, 232 F. 513, 519 (2d Cir.

 8   1916) (where “[t]here is no record” of a matter below, a court of appeals is

 9   “precluded from passing upon the merits” because of its absence).

10         We have considered Henry’s remaining arguments and find them to be

11   without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

12                                          FOR THE COURT:
13                                          Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
14

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