Court Opinion

ID: 9593890
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:25:36.210871+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:03:19.219447
License: Public Domain

Brickley, J.
(dissenting). Because I conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in not granting the defendant’s change of venue motion, I respectfully dissent.
i
We review the denial of a motion for change of venue under an abuse of discretion standard. See People v Swift, 172 Mich 473; 138 NW 662 (1912); People v DeLisle, 202 Mich App 658, 662; 509 NW2d 885 (1993). To establish that he was entitled to a change of venue, the defendant must show that there either was a pattern of strong community feeling against him and that the publicity was so extensive and inflammatory that jurors could not remain impartial when exposed to it, People v Passeno, 195 Mich App 91, 98; 489 NW2d 152 (1992), or that the jury was actually prejudiced or the atmosphere surrounding the trial created a probability of prejudice.
The right to a jury trial guarantees to an accused a fair trial by a panel of impartial, “indifferent” jurors. The failure to accord an accused a fair hearing violates even the minimal standards of due process. Tumey v Ohio, 273 US 510; 47 S Ct 437; 71 L Ed 749 (1927). “A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.” Irvin v Dowd, 366 US 717, 722; 81 S Ct 1639; 6 L Ed 2d 751 (1961), quoting In re Murchison, 349 US 133, 136; 75 S Ct 623; 99 L Ed 942 (1955).
*522This is true, regardless of the heinousness of the crime charged, the apparent guilt of the offender, or the station in life that he occupies. Irvin at 722. “The theory of the law is that a juror who has formed an opinion cannot be impartial.” Id., quoting Reynolds v United States, 98 US (8 Otto) 145, 155; 25 L Ed 244 (1878).
It is not required, however, that the jurors be totally ignorant of the facts and issues involved. In these days of swift, widespread, and diverse methods of communication, an important case can be expected to arouse the interest of the public in the vicinity, and scarcely any of those best qualified to serve as jurors will not have formed some impression or opinion regarding the merits of the case. Irvin, supra at 722.
To hold that the mere existence of any preconceived notion as to the guilt or innocence of an accused, without more, is sufficient to rebut the presumption of a prospective juror’s impartiality would be to establish an impossible standard. It is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict on the basis of the evidence presented in court. Id. at 723, citing Spies v Illinois, 123 US 131; 8 S Ct 21; 31 L Ed 80 (1887).
“The adoption of such a rule, however, ‘cannot foreclose inquiry as to whether, in a given case, the application of that rule works a deprivation of the prisoner’s life or liberty without due process of law.’ ” Id. “[Wjhether the nature and strength of the opinion formed are such as in law necessarily . . . raise the presumption of partiality. The question thus presented is one of mixed law and fact . . . .” Reynolds at 156.
*523The affirmative of the issue is upon the challenger. Unless he shows the actual existence of such an opinion in the mind of the juror as will raise the presumption of partiality, the juror need not necessarily be set aside .... If a positive and decided opinion had been formed, he would have been incompetent even though it had not been expressed. [Id. at 157.]
In United States v Wood, 299 US 123, 145-146; 57 S Ct 177; 81 L Ed 78 (1936), the Court stated:
Impartiality is not a technical conception. It is a state of mind. For the ascertainment of this mental attitude of appropriate indifference, the Constitution lays down no particular tests and procedure is not chained to any ancient and artificial formula.
Our Court of Appeals has held that “[t]he existence of pretrial publicity does not by itself require a change of venue.” People v Prast (On Rehearing), 114 Mich App 469, 477; 319 NW2d 627 (1982). When a juror, although having formed an opinion from media coverage, swears that he is without prejudice and can try the case impartially according to the evidence, and the trial court is satisfied that the juror will do so, the juror is competent to try the case. People v Furman, 158 Mich App 302, 321; 404 NW2d 246 (1987). When citizens have been sworn to tell the truth, and testify under oath that they can be impartial, the initial presumption is that they are honoring their oath and are being truthful. DeLisle, supra at 663.
A change of venue is not necessary if jurors can set aside their impressions or opinions and render a verdict on the basis of the evidence presented in court. Prast at 477. However, we have held that a change of venue should be granted if the defendant demon*524strates that there is a pattern of strong community feeling or bitter prejudice against him, and the publicity is so extensive and inflammatoiy that jurors could not remain impartial when exposed to it. Id.
n
The defendant here has established that, under the totality of the circumstances, the trial court abused its discretion in not granting the change of venue motion. The members of the venire expressed that everyone in the community had opinions regarding the case and the subject was discussed frequently. Before the start of voir dire, one prospective juror was dismissed for contacting the prosecuting attorney. The juror was attempting to get out of jury duty because she knew just about everyone involved in the case. She stated to the court that, while the prospective jurors were waiting for voir dire to begin, they were discussing different reasons to eliminate jury trials. She also stated that the other prospective jurors stated “the area is a small area, people talk and they read.”
There is little doubt that this defendant’s trial was affected by not only the media coverage, but by community gossip. Several members of the jury panel stated that they had formed an opinion in the matter after discussing the matter with the victim’s family members. As the Court of Appeals stated:
Of the jurors who were actually seated on the jury, a number had admitted to exposure to the pretrial publicity, with varying opinions being formed. One juror stated that she was frustrated with the number of cases in Gogebic County because it was costing so much money, that she was leaning towards defendant being guilty, but that she could set aside her opinions and what she had read.1 *525Another juror stated that she had read something of the events when the murder occurred, but that she had not formed an opinion. However she did state that it “was a good thing that somebody had been apprehended so they could get to the bottom of it.” A third juror, while stating that he had not formed any opinion about the case, admitted that he had spoken about the murders with the father of one of the victims.[1] A fourth juror was the wife of a minister who had counseled a member of one of the victim’s family after the murder, but she said that she did not believe that would pose a problem but “one can never know.”[2] A fifth juror stated that he had read the pretrial reports, had not formed an opinion, but did state that “there doesn’t seem to be any other avenues. I mean it’s not like we have three suspects in this case.” A sixth juror stated that they had read some articles prior to trial, had been listening to his police scanner on the day the sheriffs were searching for defendant, but that he had not formed an opinion. Another juror stated she had read about the case, that there had been a large number of articles in the paper, but that she had not formed an opinion. The remaining jurors denied any extensive knowledge of the case or having formed an opinion.
[Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued April 6, 1995 (Docket No. 168041), slip op at 2.]
A seventh juror was related to the district judge who conducted the preliminary examination. An *526eighth juror stated that several members of her family were police officers.
Additionally, the prosecution in this case has conceded that twenty-nine of 119 members of the jury pool indicated they could not remain unbiased. However, thirty-three members were dismissed for a presumed bias because they knew the victims, the defendant, or their families. That means out of the 119 members summoned, sixty-two, or fifty-two percent, were dismissed for actual or presumed prejudice.
When looked at under the totality of the circumstances, I believe that the defendant proved that the venire was prejudiced not only because of the local media reports, but on the basis of the jurors’ previous relationship with the decedents or their family members. Despite their best intentions to do so, the jurors would have had a difficult time setting aside preconceived notions of guilt. In this case, the community conversations did not revolve around the defendant’s guilt or innocence; they revolved around the defendant’s motive and sanity. Consequently, I believe that defendant has shown that his right to an impartial jury was prevented because of the strong community sentiment that he committed the crimes with which he was charged.
in
The majority erroneously holds that the degree of pretrial publicity was not excessive and that its contents were not of a prejudicial nature.
First, I believe that the majority fails to take into account the television and radio reports regarding this case. The lower court file includes an affidavit of *527defense counsel noting the numerous television and radio reports of the murders and of the court proceedings.3 It is evident from the statements of the prospective jurors that they had been exposed to not only the newspaper reports, but the radio and television reports as well.
Second, I believe the majority underestimates the effect of the articles printed in the Ironwood Globe. One article was particularly prejudicial. It relates that Judge Gotham had to disqualify himself because he had previously sentenced the defendant in an unrelated incident. The Ironwood Globe reported:
Judge Gotham, in disqualifying himself from the double homicide, noted that Bette Vemetti could have been injured in the 1991 incident. Jendrzejewski assaulted a male companion of Vemetti’s at that time, according to court officials.
Judge Gotham said, in reference to the Dec. 5, 1991 sentencing, “I said he was a dangerous human being. The sentencing guidelines were inadequate.” He indicated the guidelines did not recommend enough jailtime for this crime. “He wasn’t kept in jail long enough. Jendrzejewski got out of jail and he is now charged with the Nov. 22 murders.” [Ironwood Globe, March 1, 1993, pp 1-2.]
The majority states that only one juror remembered the article specifically at the time of voir dire. However, most jurors did know that the judge had disqualified himself. I believe that this type of statement is one that could leave a preconceived notion regarding *528guilt in the mind of a juror even though the juror may not remember the specific wording of the article.
Additionally, several other articles conveyed the fact that the defendant’s attorney was court appointed and the state was challenging whether Jendrzejewski was actually indigent. The fact that the jurors knew that they were trying a man with court-appointed counsel may have affected their judgment because many of the jurors expressed their disdain over the costs of juiy trials. In fact, one member of the actual panel stated that it was frustrating because “it’s costing so blasted much money.”
Further, the articles mentioned several pieces of evidence, including portions of an answering machine tape found by the police at Ms. Vemetti’s home.
The record shows that the trial judge and the prosecutor recognized that the potential jurors had been influenced by the local media. The trial judge stated near the end of the first day of voir dire:
I am becoming more and more concerned that the folks that we have out there, that are coming as prospective jurors, have been blitzed by the local media insofar as this case is concerned.
The prosecutor admitted that he was unsure that they could seat an impartial jury:
Judge, the State is growing increasingly concerned as to what’s going to happen down the road. This was one sample. Perhaps we could — I don’t know, perhaps we could initially begin by bringing in a juror at a time and determining whether or not in twenty minutes or a half an hour we are spinning our wheels.
Further, he stated:
*529So far two out of the four that we’ve questioned have left me with a distinct impression that they have been strongly influenced by the media. I am as well quite concerned about that.
I guess though that if I had my choice in the matter I would prefer to, at the very least exhaust the one panel. And if we are at a pace that has not picked up beyond that at which we currently find ourselves, then maybe we should revisit the motion for change of venue with some serious consideration.[4]
However, the majority ignores the statements of the judge and prosecutor when it states:
The Court of Appeals asserted that “[i]t is undisputed that there was an enormous amount of pretrial publicity concerning this case . . . .” Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued April 6, 1995 (Docket No. 168041), slip op at 1. We disagree. Our independent review of the pretrial publicity does not lead to the conclusion that it was either extensive or prejudicial. [Ante at 502.]
My review of this case leads me to believe that there was not only extensive, prejudicial pretrial publicity through the media, but that there was also extensive and prejudicial pretrial gossip. The majority fails to recognize the effect that the oldest form of communication — the grapevine — can have on a jury. There were numerous comments from the prospective jurors that the murders and the defendant’s trial were subject to extensive gossip and rumors. Further, *530the majority ignores the fact that members of the jury pool and at least one actual juror listened to the police scanner while the police were looking for the defendant in order to question him.
Therefore, while a change of venue is not necessary if jurors can set aside their impressions or opinions and render a verdict on the basis of the evidence presented in court, this defendant has demonstrated the existence of strong prejudicial community feelings, based on extensive publicity, community supposition, and rumors so pervasive and inflammatory that jurors could not expect to remain impartial when exposed to it. Therefore, a change of venue should have been granted.
I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Cavanagh, J., concurred with Brickley, J.

Defendant challenged her for cause, but that challenge was denied.

1 In fact, this juror had worked with the victim’s father. At the time of the murder, and sometime thereafter, they worked side by side.

2 Moreover, a member of the victim’s family taught Sunday school at her husband’s church.

 Defense counsel submitted an affidavit because he was unable to obtain transcripts of the television and radio reports. The affidavit states that “WLUC Television, Marquette, Michigan has broadcast at least three separate news accounts, including in court video tape,” and that the three radio stations in Gogebic County — wüpm, wmi, and wjms — all broadcast similar news accounts.

 One of the reasons that the prosecutor and judge alluded to for denying a change of venue was the Fourth of July holiday. Apparently, the town of Bessemer has a large Fourth of July celebration. The prosecutor stated that it would be inconvenient for the police officers who were witnesses in the trial to be in another county because they would have to testify during the festival. His hope was to try the case as soon as possible so that it could end before the holiday.