Court Opinion

ID: 9398336
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-30 21:01:11.932456+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:32.858287
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-11626      Document: 44-1     Date Filed: 05/30/2023   Page: 1 of 16

                                                               [PUBLISH]
                                     In the
                  United States Court of Appeals
                           For the Eleventh Circuit

                             ____________________

                                   No. 22-11626
                             ____________________

        CHEWY, INC.,
                                                                Petitioner,
        versus
        U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,

                                                              Respondent.

                             ____________________

                      Petition for Review of a Decision of the
                 Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
                                 Agency No. 19-0868
                             ____________________
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                22-11626

        Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and LUCK and HULL, Circuit
        Judges.
        WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge:
               This appeal concerns the Secretary of Labor’s authority to
        fine an employer for failing to prevent an occupational hazard
        when the employer has complied with the Secretary’s specific
        safety standard for that hazard. The Secretary of Labor cited and
        fined Chewy, Inc., for inadequately protecting its warehouse em-
        ployees from “under-rides,” a kind of forklift accident. The Secre-
        tary found that no specific standard covered the under-ride hazard
        and that Chewy had a general duty to protect its workers from that
        hazard. An administrative law judge upheld the citation and ruled
        that the standard Chewy cited, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.178, did not cover
        the under-ride hazard. We disagree. Because Chewy complied with
        the safety standard that specifically addresses under-rides, the Sec-
        retary cannot cite Chewy for failing to protect its workers from that
        hazard. We grant Chewy’s petition for review, set aside the Com-
        mission’s order, and vacate the citation.
                                I. BACKGROUND
               The Secretary cited Chewy after two of its warehouse work-
        ers had under-ride accidents within a six-month period, one in July
        2018 and one in December 2018. The employee in the ﬁrst incident
        was injured, and the employee in the second incident was killed.
        An under-ride occurs when the rear part of a forklift is short
        enough that it can pass under warehouse shelves without colliding
        with them. If the forklift can pass under the shelving, the operator
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        22-11626                Opinion of the Court                          3

        can hit or be crushed by the shelving, as happened to Chewy’s
        workers.
               Before the 2018 accidents, Chewy had two measures in place
        to prevent under-rides. First, according to a Chewy safety oﬃcer,
        the company trained its forklift operators to “look[] in the direction
        of travel, maintain[] full control of the fork[lift], [and] operat[e] at
        safe speeds.” Second, Chewy maintained warehouse aisles signiﬁ-
        cantly wider than the minimum safe width for its forklifts. But
        Chewy did not implement a third strategy, modifying the shelving
        or forklift to ensure that the forklift hits a shelf before it can pass
        under that shelf, until after the fatal accident in December 2018.
               The Secretary delivered a “Citation and Notiﬁcation of Pen-
        alty” to Chewy in May 2019 after the Department of Labor’s inves-
        tigation of the 2018 accidents. The Secretary found that Chewy vi-
        olated its statutory general duty to provide a safe workplace, 29
        U.S.C. § 654(a)(1), because Chewy had not adopted the third strat-
        egy, which the Secretary found feasible and helpful, before the ac-
        cidents. Cf. Ga. Elec. Co. v. Marshall, 595 F.2d 309, 320–21 (5th Cir.
        1979) (explaining the elements of a general-duty-clause violation).
        Chewy contested the citation before an administrative law judge
        on the ground that an existing Department of Labor safety stand-
        ard for forklift operation addressed under-rides and preempted any
        statutory general duty regarding under-rides.
               The administrative law judge upheld the citation. Chewy,
        Inc., No. 19-0868 (OSHRC Feb. 22, 2022) (ALJ), 2022 WL 1009607.
        She concluded that because the promulgated forklift operation
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                  22-11626

        standard, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.178, did not prevent all under-rides,
        Chewy was not excused from its general duty to protect workers
        from them. Chewy, 2022 WL 1009607, at *19–22. And the adminis-
        trative law judge ruled that Chewy failed to fulﬁll its general duty
        because under-rides are a known hazard in the industry and Chewy
        declined to adopt the feasible preventative measures of modifying
        either its forklifts or its shelving. Id. at *36, *38. The Occupational
        Safety and Health Review Commission denied discretionary re-
        view, so the administrative law judge’s decision became a ﬁnal or-
        der of the Commission. See 29 U.S.C. § 661(j).
                           II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
                  This Court “will set aside an order of the Commission only
        if it is arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
        not in accordance with the law.” C&W Facility Servs., Inc. v. Sec’y of
        Lab., 22 F.4th 1284, 1287 (11th Cir. 2022) (citing 5 U.S.C.
        § 706(2)(A)). Federal courts have historically deferred to the Secre-
        tary’s interpretation of her own regulations before the Commis-
        sion, see Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Rev. Comm’n, 499 U.S.
        144, 157–58 (1991), but we defer only if that interpretation is “rea-
        sonable,” U.S. Dep’t of Lab. v. Tampa Elec. Co., 38 F.4th 99, 101 n.2
        (11th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted).
                                 III. DISCUSSION
              Chewy challenges the Commission’s order on several
        grounds, but we address only one because it is dispositive. Chewy
        argues that it cannot be held liable under the general-duty clause
        because it complied with a speciﬁc standard, see 29 C.F.R.
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        22-11626               Opinion of the Court                         5

        § 1910.178, that already addresses the under-ride hazard. See id.
        § 1910.5(f ). We agree.
                The Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 651 et
        seq., “impose[s] dual obligations on employers.” ComTran Grp., Inc.
        v. U.S. Dep’t of Lab., 722 F.3d 1304, 1307 (11th Cir. 2013). Employers
        have a “general duty,” id., to provide their employees “employment
        and a place of employment which are free from recognized haz-
        ards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical
        harm,” 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1). An employer fails to comply with this
        requirement if he has “failed to render [the] work place free of a
        hazard; . . . the hazard was recognized; . . . the hazard caused or
        was likely to cause death or serious physical harm”; and “the hazard
        [was] preventable.” Ga. Elec. Co., 595 F.2d at 320–21 (internal quota-
        tion marks and citation omitted). Employers “also have a ‘special
        duty’ to comply with all mandatory health and safety standards.”
        ComTran Grp., 722 F.3d at 1307; see 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(2). The Secre-
        tary of Labor promulgates those standards through a notice-and-
        comment process, see 29 U.S.C. § 655(b), and has the authority to
        investigate employers for violations of their duties under the Act,
        issue citations, and assess monetary penalties. ComTran Grp., 722
        F.3d at 1307.
               Under Department of Labor regulations, “[a]n employer
        who is in compliance with any” speciﬁc safety standard “shall be
        deemed to be in compliance with” the general-duty clause, “but
        only to the extent of the condition, practice, means, method, oper-
        ation, or process covered by the standard.” 29 C.F.R. § 1910.5(f ).
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                 22-11626

        The Commission was obliged to abide by this preemption regula-
        tion in its decision. See Simmons v. Block, 782 F.2d 1545, 1550 (11th
        Cir. 1986) (“The failure of an agency to comply with its own regu-
        lations constitutes arbitrary and capricious conduct.”). The princi-
        ple that compliance with an applicable safety standard bars general-
        duty liability is also reﬂected in Commission precedent that states
        that the general-duty clause is inapplicable for a failure to prevent
        a hazard “if a standard speciﬁcally addresses the hazard cited.” Ac-
        tive Oil Serv., Inc., 21 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1184 (No. 00-0553, 2005),
        2005 WL 3934873, at *2. And we have already equated the phrase
        “condition, practice, means, method, operation or process” with
        “hazard” in the context of an adjacent Department of Labor
        preemption regulation that establishes the relationship between
        general and speciﬁc safety standards. See Brock v. Williams Enters. of
        Ga., Inc., 832 F.2d 567, 570 (11th Cir. 1987) (citing 29 C.F.R.
        § 1910.5(c)).
               The Secretary has promulgated a safety standard that ad-
        dresses safe forklift operation. Section 1910.178 governs “[p]owered
        industrial trucks,” including forklifts. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.178(a)(1).
        This standard addresses the Secretary’s concerns about the risk that
        a forklift could “run into a column or other part of the building.”
        Powered Industrial Truck Operator Training, 63 Fed. Reg. 66,238,
        66,242 (Dec. 1, 1998). The standard requires that forklift operators
        receive safety training. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.178(l). Speciﬁcally, opera-
        tors must be trained to “look in the direction of, and keep a clear
        view of the path of[,] travel” and maintain the vehicle at a safe
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        22-11626               Opinion of the Court                          7

        speed. Id. § 1910.178(n)(6), (8). All agree that the Secretary did not
        ﬁnd that Chewy violated this standard.
               Compliance with this speciﬁc standard addresses the under-
        ride hazard, so the Commission erred in upholding the Secretary’s
        citation under the general-duty clause. The Secretary concedes and
        has long maintained that section 1910.178 requires employers to
        address the under-ride hazard. In a 2009 bulletin, for example, the
        Occupational Safety and Health Administration recommended
        that employers “[t]rain employees to operate forklifts safely as re-
        quired by paragraph (l) of 29 C.F.R. 1910.178” because that training
        “will reduce the risk of under-ride hazards.” In 2018, the Secretary
        argued before the Commission that an employer violated section
        1910.178(l) because it “failed to inform employees about ‘crushed
        by’ or ‘underride hazards’ they faced while operating [forklifts.]”
        Pharmasol Corp., 2018 O.S.H.D. (CCH) ¶ 33,692 (No. 16-1172, 2018)
        (ALJ), 2018 WL 5013447, at *25. And at Chewy’s hearing, the Sec-
        retary’s expert witness testiﬁed that “proper” training under the
        standard would address the under-ride hazard, which would be at
        the “top of the list” of forklift operation hazards. See 29 C.F.R.
        § 1910.178(l) (requiring operator training). Another of the Secre-
        tary’s witnesses testiﬁed that the standard “speciﬁcally addresses
        the hazard of [forklift] operators striking structures in a ware-
        house,” including “the hazard of a [forklift] operator striking a stor-
        age rack,” which is precisely what is dangerous about an under-ride
        event.
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        8                       Opinion of the Court                  22-11626

               The Secretary argues that the general-duty clause is not
        preempted because training cannot completely eliminate the un-
        der-ride hazard, so “no speciﬁc standard . . . entirely covers the haz-
        ard alleged.” (emphasis added.) The administrative law judge
        agreed and explained that “even adhering to section 1910.178, the
        under-ride hazard would still exist in the workplace due to inatten-
        tion and inadvertence.” Chewy, 2022 WL 1009607, at *22. Under
        this logic, section 1910.178 may “cover” forklift collisions in gen-
        eral, but it does not cover the hazards that occur when forklifts have
        already passed under shelving. So the general-duty clause, the ad-
        ministrative law judge reasoned, still required Chewy to address
        “what happens in the event of an under-ride.” Id. at *20. But this
        interpretation of the preemption regulation is unreasonable, and,
        even if it were correct, it was unreasonably applied to Chewy.
               The Secretary’s distinction between a standard that prevents
        the under-ride hazard and a standard that addresses the hazards
        that arise in the event of an under-ride, if accepted and extended to
        other cases, would upend the regulatory scheme. The Secretary
        could avoid preemption of any standard by distinguishing between
        the hazards the standard addresses and the hazards that occur when
        the standard fails. Instead, as amicus curiae the Retail Litigation Cen-
        ter, Inc., explains, if the Secretary determines that current stand-
        ards “are inadequate to address the under-ride hazard, the [Occu-
        pational Safety and Health] Act provides the agency with legal au-
        thority to impose new requirements on the industry.” The Secre-
        tary can modify the safety standards through public notice and
        comment. See 29 U.S.C. § 655(b). That process, as the Retail
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        22-11626                Opinion of the Court                          9

        Litigation Center explains, provides the Secretary with critical in-
        put from interested parties about the “feasibility, potential risk re-
        duction, and/or unintended impacts” of proposed standard revi-
        sions. But if the inadequacy of the existing standards precludes
        preemption, the Secretary can use the general-duty clause to up-
        date speciﬁc safety standards without the required procedural safe-
        guards.
               The administrative law judge’s interpretation of section
        1910.5(f ) is also unreasonable because it requires that compliance
        with the speciﬁc standard eliminate the hazard for preemption to
        occur. Section 1910.5(f ) nowhere requires that compliance with the
        standard “eliminate” a hazardous condition. Nor does Commission
        precedent require that the standard eliminate the hazard. See Active
        Oil, 2005 WL 3934873, at *2; see also, e.g., Armstrong Cork Co., 8
        O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1070 (No. 76-2777, 1980), 1980 WL 10754, at *4
        (“[T]he standard must be addressed to the particular hazard for
        which the employer has been cited under the general duty
        clause.”). Neither the Secretary nor the administrative law judge
        has explained why we should insert that requirement into the test
        for preemption, beyond a stray statement from a non-binding 1981
        Commission decision that the hazard must be “entirely” covered.
        See Ted Wilkerson, Inc., 9 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 2012 (No. 13390, 1981),
        1981 WL 18797, at *3; see also Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Lab. v. Action Elec.
        Co., 868 F.3d 1324, 1331 & n.2 (11th Cir. 2017) (“[Commission prec-
        edent] is in no way binding on this Court’s decision . . . .”).
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        10                      Opinion of the Court                    22-11626

               Even if the line between preventing under-rides and address-
        ing the hazards that under-rides cause were tenable, the adminis-
        trative law judge did not reasonably apply the distinction. See Fed.
        Commc’ns Comm’n v. Prometheus Radio Project, 141 S. Ct. 1150, 1158
        (2021) (explaining that the “arbitrary-and-capricious standard re-
        quires that agency action be reasonable and reasonably explained”).
        The administrative law judge rejected Chewy’s “attempts to re-
        frame the issue in terms of preventing an under-ride.” Chewy, 2022
        WL 1009607, at *21. But the administrative law judge acknowl-
        edged that the Secretary’s proposed abatement measures—the
        measures she determined were required by the general-duty
        clause—addressed the under-ride hazard by “preventing an under-
        ride from occurring.” Id. at *29–30. The Secretary contended that
        Chewy was required to install a metal structure behind a driver that
        would block an under-ride or to modify shelves so that forklifts
        would crash into shelving before they could pass under them. Id.
        These measures, like the operator training section 1910.178(l) re-
        quires, do not protect a worker in the event of an under-ride. They
        instead prevent under-rides. So the administrative law judge acted
        arbitrarily and capriciously by failing to abide by the principle on
        which she purported to rest her decision. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs.
        Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43
        (1983) (“[A]n agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the
        agency . . . oﬀered an explanation for its decision that runs counter
        to the evidence before the agency . . . .”).
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        22-11626            Opinion of the Court                   11

                             IV. CONCLUSION
               We GRANT the petition for review, SET ASIDE the order
        of the Commission, and VACATE the citation.
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        22-11626                HULL, J., concurring                        1

        HULL, Circuit Judge, concurring:
              I concur in the result of the majority opinion because (1) the
        Secretary’s specific safety standard in 29 C.F.R. § 1910.178 covers
        and applies to the under-ride hazard in this case, (2) the Secretary
        did not charge, much less find, that Chewy violated this § 1910.178
        standard, and (3) the general duty clause is inapplicable here
        because that specific safety standard covers and applies to the
        under-ride hazard in this case.
                An under-ride hazard and injury can occur (1) when a
        forklift operator is backing up and the backing up continues while
        the rear of the forklift passes underneath a horizontal crossbar or
        shelving rack, (2) the crossbar or shelving rack thus enters the area
        where the forklift operator is standing with his back to the crossbar
        or shelving rack, and (3) the crossbar or shelving rack crushes the
        operator as he continues to back up. The warehouse aisles here
        are wide enough to allow a forklift driver to turn, back up, and
        maneuver without going under the shelving rack.1
               Section 1910.178 contains safety requirements relating to
        the use of “[p]owered industrial trucks,” which include forklifts. 29
        C.F.R. § 1910.178(a)(1). Section 1910.178(l) requires employers to
        “ensure that each [forklift] operator is competent to operate a
        powered industrial truck safely, as demonstrated by the successful
        completion of the training and evaluation specified in this

        1 The aisles in Chewy’s warehouse were 127 inches wide—12 inches wider
        than the 115-inch aisle width required by the forklift manufacturer.
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        2                        HULL, J., concurring                  22-11626

        paragraph (l).” 29 C.F.R. § 1910.178(l)(1). The regulation specifies
        that forklift operators “shall receive initial training in the following
        topics,” which include “[s]urface conditions where the vehicle will
        be operated,” id. § 1910.178(l)(3)(ii)(A), and “[o]ther unique or
        potentially hazardous environmental conditions in the workplace
        that could affect safe operation,” id. § 1910.178(l)(3)(ii)(I).
        Operators also must be trained to “look in the direction of, and
        keep a clear view of the path of[,] travel” and maintain the vehicle
        at a safe speed. Id. § 1910.178(l)(3)(iii), (n)(6), (n)(8). The preamble
        to § 1910.178 reads:
               A vehicle that is out of control or being operated by a
               driver whose view in the direction of travel is
               restricted can strike an employee, run into a column
               or other part of the building, or strike stored material,
               causing the material to topple and injure employees
               in the area. Effective driver training teaches operators to
               act properly to minimize these hazards to themselves and
               other employees.
        Powered Indus. Truck Operator Training, 63 Fed. Reg. 66,238, 66,242
        (Dec. 1, 1998) (emphasis added).
               The Secretary’s main argument as to preemption is that the
        cited hazard in this case—the under-ride hazard—is not covered by
        § 1910.178(l) and is materially different from the hazard of running
        into or striking a storage rack that is referenced in the preamble to
        § 1910.178. But the evidence indicates the Secretary understood
        the under-ride hazard was also covered by the requirements in
        § 1910.178.
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        22-11626               HULL, J., concurring                       3

               For starters, the Secretary has published guidance advising
        employers that training on under-ride hazards should be included
        in the training program required by § 1910.178. This guidance is a
        Safety Health Information Bulletin entitled “Standup Forklift
        Under-ride Hazards.” The Bulletin describes and addresses the
        cited hazard in this case—namely, the under-ride hazard that
        occurs when a forklift passes beneath a horizontal crossbar, such
        that “the crossbar can enter the operator’s compartment and crush
        the operator inside the compartment.” Further, the stated
        purposes of this Bulletin are to: (1) “[a]lert standup forklift
        operators and employers to the crushing hazard to the operator
        associated with under-ride,” (2) “[r]ecommend work practices that
        can be implemented by the employer to eliminate the under-ride
        hazard,” and (3) “[s]tress the importance of training employees on
        the safe operation of standup forklifts.”
                The Bulletin also observes that proper operator training is
        “essential” to the safe operation of forklifts. It also states that:
        (1) § 1910.178(l) “contains training and certification requirements
        for the use of forklifts that are specific to the workplace,” and
        (2) § 1910.178(n)(1) and (n)(6) “require operators to keep the
        forklift under control at all times and to look in the direction of
        travel.”
                The Bulletin also offers various recommendations to
        employers to address the under-ride hazards associated with
        operating standup forklifts. One of these recommendations is to
        “[t]rain employees to operate forklifts safely as required by [29
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        4                       HULL, J., concurring                 22-11626

        C.F.R. § 1910.178(l)], including recognizing the hazards of the
        workplace created by the use of the vehicles.”
               Second, the Secretary previously has taken the litigation
        position that a failure to inform employees about the under-ride
        hazard violated § 1910.178(l). Specifically, in Pharmasol Corp., the
        Secretary argued that an employer violated § 1910.178(l) because it
        “failed to inform employees about ‘crushed by’ or ‘underride
        hazards’ they faced while operating stand-up reach trucks.”
        OSHRC Doc. No. 16-1172, 2018 WL 5013447, at *25 (OSHRC Sept.
        4, 2018). This litigation position is inconsistent with the Secretary’s
        position in this case that § 1910.178(l) does not address the under-
        ride hazard.
               Third, the Secretary conceded in its initial brief that training
        on the under-ride hazard should be included in the comprehensive
        training program required by § 1910.178(l).
               Fourth, the Secretary is primarily left to argue that the
        employer is required to prevent and wholly eliminate all under-ride
        hazards (1) by altering the manufactured forklift vehicle itself by
        adding bars in the back to prevent a highly trained operator from
        ever, no matter what, going under a horizontal shelving rack, or
        (2) by lowering the bottom shelves in warehouses, although
        striking those shelves (as opposed to passing a little under) might
        cause merchandise to topple over on the operator. There may well
        be additional work safety regulations worth adopting, requiring,
        and then enforcing against employers, but the Secretary has not
        done so to date.
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        22-11626              HULL, J., concurring                      5

               Given the Secretary’s regulatory text, the record evidence
        which includes the Secretary’s guidance, and certain relevant law
        discussed in the majority opinion, it was unreasonable for the ALJ
        to hold that § 1910.178 does not cover the under-ride hazard here
        and that instead the general duty clause applies to the cited
        under-ride hazard in this particular case.