Court Opinion

ID: 9905609
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-29 20:05:02.361971+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:46.264951
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                        Nov 29 2023, 9:49 am

                                                                            CLERK
                                                                        Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                           Court of Appeals
                                                                             and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Timothy J. O’Connor                                       Theodore E. Rokita
O’Connor & Auersch                                        Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana                                     Tyler Banks
                                                          Deputy Attorney General
                                                          Indianapolis, Indiana

                                           IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Deshawn Luckett,                                          November 29, 2023
Appellant-Defendant,                                      Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                          23A-CR-1166
        v.                                                Appeal from the Marion Superior
                                                          Court
State of Indiana,                                         The Honorable Shatrese Flowers,
Appellee-Plaintiff.                                       Judge
                                                          Trial Court Cause No.
                                                          49D28-2210-F4-28899

                                 Opinion by Judge Riley.
                             Judges Crone and Mathias concur.

Riley, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1166 | November 29, 2023                           Page 1 of 14
      STATEMENT OF THE CASE
[1]   Appellant-Defendant, Deshawn Luckett (Luckett), appeals his convictions for

      two Counts of unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon, Level

      4 felonies, Ind. Code § 35-47-4-5(c); possession of a controlled substance, a

      Level 6 felony, I.C. § 35-48-4-7(a); and resisting law enforcement, a Class A

      misdemeanor, I.C. § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(3).

[2]   We affirm.

      ISSUES
[3]   Luckett presents this court with three issues, which we consolidate and restate

      as the following two issues:

              (1) Whether the trial court properly admitted text messages sent
                  to Luckett by a person who did not appear at trial; and

              (2) Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it denied
                  his motion to exclude texts and photographs that were late in
                  being disclosed to the defense.

      FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[4]   On August 23, 2022, the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department’s

      Violence Reduction Team was surveilling an apartment complex near 37th and

      Central Streets in Indianapolis. Officers observed a man driving a white Toyota

      Tundra pickup truck stop briefly at the complex, meet with someone, and then

      drive away. The truck was subsequently observed running a stop sign, and

      Officer Mollie Johanningsmeier (Officer Johanningsmeier) initiated a traffic
      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1166 | November 29, 2023       Page 2 of 14
      stop of the truck, which pulled over in the 3000 block of Ruckle Street. Officer

      Johanningsmeier was wearing a body camera which recorded the traffic stop.

      As Officer Johanningsmeier parked her cruiser behind the truck, the driver,

      later identified as Luckett, opened the driver’s side door, exited, and

      momentarily stood in the truck’s open doorway. Officer Johanningsmeier was

      approximately one car length away from Luckett as she gave several loud

      verbal commands to Luckett to get back into his truck. Luckett, who was

      looking straight at the officer while she issued these commands, began to walk

      and then to run away through the yard of a nearby home. Officer

      Johanningsmeier and Officer Frank Gunn (Officer Gunn), who had arrived as

      Officer Johanningsmeier was issuing her verbal commands to Luckett, gave

      chase but lost sight of Luckett. As the other officer continued her search for

      Luckett, Officer Gunn returned to the truck and observed in plain view a

      handgun on the driver’s side seat, a Draco “banana clip” firearm on the rear

      passenger side floorboard, and a baggie of what was later determined to be

      ADB-BUTINACA, a controlled substance analog of ADB-PINACA, in the

      doorhandle of the driver’s side door. (Transcript p. 136). The truck was towed

      from the scene.

[5]   Officer Robert Camphor (Officer Camphor), also with the Violence Reduction

      Team, discovered that the truck was a rental and learned from the rental

      company that it had been rented by Candyce Breedlove (Breedlove). Further

      investigation revealed that Breedlove was associated with Luckett. On August

      25, 2022, Officer Camphor procured Luckett’s photograph from the Bureau of

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1166 | November 29, 2023     Page 3 of 14
      Motor Vehicles (BMV) and showed it to Officer Johanningsmeier, who

      recognized Luckett as the man who had exited the white Toyota Tundra and

      fled from her two days prior. After making this identification, Officer

      Johanningsmeier found Luckett’s Facebook account which had photographs of

      him on it.

[6]   On October 25, 2022, the State filed an Information, charging Luckett with two

      Counts of Level 4 felony unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent

      felon, Level 6 felony possession of a controlled substance, and Class A

      misdemeanor resisting law enforcement. On October 26, 2022, Luckett’s initial

      hearing took place at which time the trial court set his jury trial for January 11,

      2023. On January 3, 2023, the trial court granted Luckett’s motion to continue

      his jury trial, and his trial was reset for February 22, 2023.

[7]   On January 5, 2023, investigators obtained a search warrant for the Toyota

      Tundra. A search of the truck uncovered no additional firearms or drugs, but

      two cellphones were recovered from the middle console area. Investigators did

      not submit the cellphones to the digital forensics unit for a complete data

      extraction, as there was an approximately six-month delay in obtaining results

      from the unit. On February 3, 2023, the trial court granted Luckett’s motion for

      a speedy trial. The trial court noted in the chronological case summary that

      Luckett’s speedy trial deadline was April 25, 2023. Luckett’s previously

      scheduled trial date of February 22, 2023, was not rescheduled after the trial

      court granted his speedy trial motion.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1166 | November 29, 2023     Page 4 of 14
[8]   On February 22, 2023, the trial court convened Luckett’s one-day jury trial.

      Officer Johanningsmeier testified that she had a good view of Luckett’s face

      before he fled, and she identified Luckett in open court as the man she had

      encountered on August 23, 2022. Images from Luckett’s Facebook account of

      Luckett’s face and body and an image of Luckett and Breedlove hugging were

      admitted during Officer Johanningsmeier’s testimony, and the officer testified

      that she recognized Breedlove in the image. The officer confirmed that the man

      seen in the Facebook images was the same man who she had encountered on

      August 23, 2022. Officer Gunn related that he had seen Luckett’s profile before

      Luckett had fled the scene of the traffic stop, and Officer Gunn identified

      Luckett in open court as the man he had seen flee.

[9]   During trial, Luckett moved to exclude certain photographs and text messages.

      The photographs were of the screens of the two cellphones recovered from the

      Toyota Tundra which showed the identification screens for the two phones,

      both of which exhibited “Deshawn Luckett” therein, a CashApp account

      logged into “De Luck”, a Facebook account logged into under the name of

      “Deshawn Luckett”, Instagram accounts on both cellphones logged into the

      account “og_luck, with one login page displaying images of Luckett, and an

      image of Luckett which had been taken twelve days before the traffic stop.

      (Exh. Vol. pp. 37-43). Luckett also moved to exclude text messages from

      Breedlove to Luckett arranging for Breedlove to rent Luckett a truck for August

      23, 2022. Luckett objected to the admission of Breedlove’s texts, arguing that

      because Breedlove was not a witness, the admission of her hearsay statements

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1166 | November 29, 2023    Page 5 of 14
       violated his right to confrontation. Luckett also objected to the admission of

       both the photographs and the Breedlove/Luckett texts on the basis that the

       photographs had only been discovered to the defense the day before trial and

       that the texts had been discovered to the defense on the first day of trial after

       lunch. Luckett’s counsel argued that there was no time to look through the

       contents of the cellphones and that it was “unreasonable” for Luckett to request

       a continuance, as the jury had been empaneled and the defense was prepared to

       go forward with Luckett’s trial. (Tr. p. 151).

[10]   In arguing for the admission of the photographs and the texts, the deputy

       prosecutor cited the backlog at the digital forensics unit and represented to the

       trial court that he had only learned the day before trial that investigators had

       gained access to the two cellphones by correctly guessing Luckett’s password.

       The deputy prosecutor further represented that the State had only discovered

       the texts between Luckett and Breedlove arranging the rental of the truck while

       looking through the cellphones at lunch on the first day of trial. As to Luckett’s

       hearsay/confrontation objection, the prosecutor argued that the admission of

       the texts was necessary to show the context of Luckett’s non-hearsay texts to

       Breedlove arranging the rental of the truck.

[11]   The trial court ruled that the photographs of the cellphones were admissible.

       As to Breedlove’s texts, the trial court observed that, although they were late

       disclosed, Luckett had requested a speedy trial and that exclusion was an

       extreme remedy. The photographs and the texts were admitted over Luckett’s

       objections.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1166 | November 29, 2023      Page 6 of 14
[12]   At the close of the evidence, the jury found Luckett guilty, and Luckett

       subsequently admitted to being a serious violent offender. On April 27, 2023,

       the trial court held Luckett’s sentencing hearing. The trial court imposed an

       aggregate nine-year sentence, with two years suspended.

[13]   Luckett now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

       DISCUSSION AND DECISION
       I. Standards of Review

[14]   Luckett challenges the admission of the Breedlove/Luckett texts and the

       cellphone photographs. We generally review the trial court’s admission of

       evidence under an abuse of discretion standard. Speers v. State, 999 N.E.2d 850,

       852 (Ind. 2013). However, inasmuch as Luckett’s claims of error in the

       admission of evidence are based upon the violation of a constitutional right,

       those are matters that we review de novo. See id.

       II. Admission of the Texts and Photographs

       A. Confrontation Clause and Hearsay

[15]   Luckett first claims that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting

       Breedlove’s texts into evidence, arguing that doing so violated his right under

       Article 1, section 13 of the Indiana Constitution to confront the witnesses

       against him. Luckett also argues that the admission of Breedlove’s texts

       violated the prohibition against hearsay. We do not agree.

[16]   Article 1, section 13 of our state constitution provides that “[i]n all criminal

       prosecutions, the accused shall have the right . . . to meet the witnesses face to
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1166 | November 29, 2023      Page 7 of 14
       face.” Our supreme court has long recognized this basic trial right as having

       deep roots in the common law. Church v. State, 189 N.E.3d 580, 592 (Ind.

       2022). Our state’s Confrontation Clause permits the admission of an absent

       witness’s out-of-court statement only where the witness is unavailable and

       where the defendant has had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness.

       Galloway v. State, 188 N.E.3d 493, 498 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied. In

       addition, hearsay, which is an out-of-court statement offered for the truth of the

       matter asserted, is generally inadmissible. Indiana Evid. Rules 801(c), 802.

[17]   However, Indiana courts have recognized that out-of-court statements by a non-

       appearing witness are not hearsay if they are offered only to provide context for

       other admissible statements. See Williams v. State, 930 N.E.2d 602, 608-09 (Ind.

       Ct. App. 2010) (holding that the recorded statements of a confidential

       informant arranging drug deals with Williams were not hearsay because they

       only provided context for Williams’ own recorded statements), trans. denied; see

       also Williams v. State, 669 N.E.2d 956, 958 (Ind. 1996) (holding that Article 1,

       section 13 was not violated by the admission of the recorded statements of a

       confidential informant conversing with Williams because the informant’s

       statements were not admitted for the truth of the matters asserted and “[i]t was

       the statements made by Williams that really constituted the evidentiary weight

       of the conversation”).

[18]   The trial court admitted into evidence the following text stream between

       Luckett and Breedlove, which we present in toto and unaltered for spelling and

       punctuation:

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1166 | November 29, 2023    Page 8 of 14
        Luckett: Grl go check on that truck

        Breedlove: [Thumbs up emjoi] . . . What days are you tryna get it

        Luckett: Ig tmrw morning till next Tuesday

        Breedlove: Ok

        Luckett: How much is it

        Breedlove: Idk yet

        Luckett: Pick up truck

        Breedlove: Wat location

        Luckett: Keystone

        Breedlove: I have to clean at 11 . . . Tmrw

        Luckett: Ok make Reservation for the morning see how much it
        is first

        Breedlove: [Image of rental options]

        Luckett: U put the code n

        Breedlove: Yes . . . [Image of rental options]

        Luckett: Get the truck

        Breedlove: The pick up?

        Luckett: Yes

        Breedlove: [Image of reservation information]

        Luckett: What was the total

        Breedlove: [Image of reservation information]

        Luckett: Plus the 200 deposit

        Breedlove: [Shrugging shoulders emoji . . . I don’t rent cars idk
        lol

        Luckett: Lol yea so wt time
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1166 | November 29, 2023       Page 9 of 14
               Breedlove: 9:30

[19]   (Exh. Vol. pp. 45-49). On appeal, Luckett does not contend that his own texts

       were inadmissible hearsay or that Breedlove’s texts were irrelevant. Luckett’s

       identity was the primary issue at trial, and the State offered this text stream to

       show that he was the person driving the Toyota Tundra truck that Officer

       Johanningsmeier stopped on August 23, 2022. In the text stream, Luckett

       guides the rental of the truck through Breedlove, and therefore, his statements

       truly “constituted the evidentiary weight of the conversation.” Williams, 669

       N.E.2d at 958. Breedlove’s responses merely showed the context of Luckett’s

       own statements arranging for the rental of the truck, and, therefore, we

       conclude that her statements were admissible for a reason other than for the

       truth of the matter asserted. See id.; Williams, 930 N.E.2d at 608-09. Luckett’s

       argument that Breedlove’s texts were inadmissible as part of the abolished

       doctrine of “res gestae” is unpersuasive. See Swanson v. State, 666 N.E.2d 397,

       398 (Ind. 1996) (holding that the doctrine of res gestae, allowing the admission

       of evidence of uncharged bad acts to complete the story of the charged offense,

       was abolished by the adoption of the Indiana Rules of Evidence). We have

       concluded that Breedlove’s texts were nonhearsay and so were not inadmissible

       under the Indiana Rules of Evidence, and Luckett provides no authority for his

       proposition that the concept of res gestae applies to hearsay which does not

       involve uncharged bad acts.

[20]   However, even if the trial court’s admission of Breedlove’s texts had been in

       error, we would still not reverse Luckett’s convictions. “The improper
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1166 | November 29, 2023     Page 10 of 14
       admission [of evidence] is harmless error if the conviction is supported by

       substantial independent evidence of guilt satisfying the reviewing court there is

       no substantial likelihood the challenged evidence contributed to the

       conviction.” Hoglund v. State, 962 N.E.2d 1230, 1238 (Ind. 2012). Officers

       Johanningsmeier and Gunn identified Luckett in open court as the man who

       was driving the Toyota Tundra and fled from their presence on August 23,

       2022. In addition, Officer Johanningsmeier’s body camera footage which

       showed Luckett’s face and physique as well as his BMV photograph and

       Facebook images of his face and body were admitted into evidence, all of which

       permitted the jury to make its own independent assessment of Luckett’s

       identity. The jury also heard evidence that Breedlove had rented the truck

       Luckett was seen driving on August 23, 2022, and that Breedlove and Luckett

       were associated.

[21]   We are aware that where, as here, no limiting instruction was provided to the

       jury that it should only consider Breedlove’s texts as context for Luckett’s own

       statement, we presume that the jury considered the evidence as substantive

       evidence. See Jethroe v. State, 262 Ind. 505, 511, 319 N.E.2d 133, 138 (1974)

       (holding that where the jury received no limiting instruction on its

       consideration of hearsay “the assumption must be that the jury considered the

       testimony as evidence of the truth of the matters asserted”). However, Luckett

       did not request any limiting instruction at trial, and, on appeal, he makes no

       claim of prejudice relative to the admission of the challenged evidence. In light

       of the substantial independent evidence in the record pointing to Luckett’s

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1166 | November 29, 2023   Page 11 of 14
       identity and his failure to demonstrate any prejudice flowing to him as the result

       of the admission of Breedlove’s texts, we conclude that any claimed error was,

       at best, harmless. See Hoglund, 962 N.E.2d at 1238.

       B. Late Disclosure

[22]   Luckett further contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to

       exclude and admitted the Breedlove/Luckett text stream and the cellphone

       photographs because that evidence was late disclosed to the defense. A trial

       court has broad discretion to manage discovery, and we presume that the court

       acted fairly and equitably. State v. Lyons, 211 N.E.3d 500, 505 (Ind. 2023). This

       court will reverse a trial court’s ruling on late disclosed evidence only where the

       trial court has committed clear error resulting in prejudice. Berry v. State, 715

       N.E.2d 864, 866 (Ind. 1999). “Exclusion of the evidence is an extreme remedy

       and is to be used only if the State’s actions were deliberate and the conduct

       prevented a fair trial.” Id. Five factors guide our review of a trial court’s

       rulings on late disclosed evidence, namely, “when the parties first knew of the

       evidence; the importance of the evidence; the prejudice resulting to the

       opposing party; the appropriateness of a less severe remedy such as a

       continuance; and whether the opposing party would be unduly surprised and

       prejudiced by admission.” Perryman v. State, 80 N.E.3d 234, 249 (Ind. Ct. App.

       2017).

[23]   In addressing Luckett’s claim, we first observe that Luckett did not request a

       continuance after being presented with the challenged evidence. The failure to

       request a continuance in conjunction with a motion to exclude evidence, where

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1166 | November 29, 2023     Page 12 of 14
       a continuance may be an appropriate remedy, results in the waiver of a claim of

       error due to a discovery violation. Warren v. State, 725 N.E.2d 828, 832 (Ind.

       2000) (finding Warren’s claim based on the State’s failure to comply with

       Marion County’s local automatic discovery deadlines to be waived because he

       did not request a continuance). Here, although Luckett claims the State

       committed a discovery violation by not tendering the challenged evidence in

       accordance with the Marion County Local Court Rules, he did not request a

       continuance, and, therefore, he waived his claim of error. See id.

[24]   Regardless of Luckett’s waiver of the issue, we do not agree with him that the

       trial court abused its discretion when it declined his motion to exclude the late

       disclosed text stream and photographs. While the State’s methods for obtaining

       the data on the cellphones found in the white Toyota Tundra may not represent

       the model of orderly trial preparation, the State disclosed the evidence as soon

       as it became aware of it. Luckett does not direct our attention to anything in

       the record demonstrating the State’s bad faith or deliberate misconduct meant

       to prejudice him, nor does Luckett assert that he was unduly surprised by the

       discovery of his texts with Breedlove on his cellphone. Luckett similarly fails to

       argue that the challenged evidence was of overwhelming significance to his

       conviction.

[25]   Luckett’s claim of prejudice is that he was forced into the untenable position of

       either going into trial unprepared or waiving his right to a speedy trial. We are

       not persuaded by this argument, as Luckett was in possession of all the

       challenged evidence as of his trial date, February 22, 2023, and his speedy trial

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1166 | November 29, 2023   Page 13 of 14
       deadline was April 25, 2023. Due to Luckett’s failure to seek a continuance,

       although the trial court referenced the fact that Luckett had made a speedy trial

       request in denying his motion to exclude, there is nothing before us in the

       record indicating that Luckett could not have had an adequate continuance to

       address the late disclosed evidence and still be brought to trial before his speedy

       trial deadline expired. Given these circumstances, we conclude that the trial

       court acted within its discretion when it declined to exclude the text stream and

       photographs. See Perryman, 80 N.E.3d at 249 (affirming the trial court’s denial

       of Perryman’s motion to exclude evidence and a witness disclosed for the first

       time during his trial, after the jury was empaneled).

       CONCLUSION
[26]   Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court’s admission of the

       State’s late disclosed exhibits did not violate Luckett’s confrontation right or the

       prohibition against hearsay and that the trial court acted within its discretion in

       denying Luckett’s motion to exclude that evidence.

[27]   Affirmed.

[28]   Crone, J. and Mathias, J. concur

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1166 | November 29, 2023    Page 14 of 14