Court Opinion

ID: 9660733
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:19:44.391537+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:21.668171
License: Public Domain

Connor, J.
(dissenting). Before the challenged testimony was given, defense counsel alerted the prosecutor that the arresting officer should be questioned carefully and cautioned in advance not to give testimony that defendant was committing another criminal sexual offense at the time of his arrest. Despite the prosecutor’s assurances that he did not intend to introduce evidence of another crime, he proceeded to ask the arresting officer a series of unnecessary questions that elicited responsive answers suggesting the defendant and a codefendant were committing another crime involving another victim at the time of their arrest under circumstances that were remarkably similar to those described by the complainant in the instant case.
Because the trial primarily involved a credibility *201contest between the complaining witness and the defendant, and in light of the jury verdict that found defendant guilty of a substantially reduced charge, I believe it is manifest that the prejudicial statements of the arresting officer deprived the defendant of a fair trial.
Law enforcement personnel have a special responsibility to ensure fairness in the conduct of criminal trials, and even unresponsive answers, which might be considered harmless if volunteered by a civilian, will be carefully reviewed if a police officer is the source. People v Holly, 129 Mich App 405, 415; 341 NW2d 823 (1983). In this case, the injection of the prejudicial testimony cannot be considered inadvertent. The prosecutor posed an open-ended question while delving into irrelevant matters, and either the police officer’s reference to another victim was intentionally elicited or the prosecutor was grossly negligent in failing to anticipate the response and in failing to caution the officer beforehand.
I do not agree with the majority opinion that the officer’s reference to another criminal act was innocuous, and I do not believe the damage to the defendant could have been dispelled by a curative instruction that would necessarily magnify the prejudice by highlighting the error.
I would find the failure to grant a mistrial amounted to a miscarriage of justice and would grant a new trial.