Court Opinion

ID: 9531772
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:14:26.865296+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:34.730099
License: Public Domain

TURSI, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
The record in this matter shows that Johnson commenced this action in the district court of Adams County on August 26, 1982, by filing a verified petition. The petition contained a request for ex parte appointment of a receiver. The trial court granted the request finding exigent circumstances existing requiring the appointment of a receiver. On September 8, 1982, Johnson commenced his proceedings to foreclose the deed of trust with the Public Trustee of Adams County. On September 9, 1982, Ja*224caranda entered its special appearance challenging the jurisdiction of the trial court to appoint a receiver because no action was pending in that court. A forthwith hearing was held at which hearing evidence of the commencement of the foreclosure proceeding was submitted to the court. The trial court denied the challenge.
In his petition, Johnson alleged that McCaughan, Carter & Scharrer had executed an all inclusive deed of trust covering certain real estate to secure a loan in the principal amount of $750,000, and that McCaughan, Carter & Scharrer and its assigns were in multiple serious defaults under the terms of the note and deed of trust. He incorporated the note and the deed of trust into his petition by reference, and by virtue of the expressed provisions of the deed of trust and the defaults thereon, Johnson claimed that he was entitled to the immediate and ex parte appointment of a receiver. He prayed for the appointment of a receiver to take possession of the premises, and to collect the rents and profits during these proceedings pending foreclosure of the deed of trust.
The deed of trust provides that in case of default the holder of the note is entitled to immediate possession of the property and to appointment of a receiver for collection of the rents and profits. The deed of trust also provides that:
“[Sjuch Receiver may be appointed by any Court of competent jurisdiction upon ex parte application and without notice— notice being hereby expressly waived.... ”
I
On appeal, Jacaranda seeks to have this court hold that the trial court is without jurisdiction to proceed with the receivership. Although an order overruling a motion to discharge a receiver is an appealable order if it relates- to the exercise of jurisdiction rather than the existance of jurisdiction, C.A.R. 1(a)(4), see McLeod v. Provident Mutual Life Insurance Co., 186 Colo. 234, 526 P.2d 1318 (1974), here, it is not a final judgment nor a challenge to the exercise of jurisdiction and therefore is not within the jurisdiction of this court. See § 13-4-102, C.R.S.1973. See also Bill Dreiling Motor Co. v. Court of Appeals, 171 Colo. 448, 468 P.2d 37 (1970), in which it was held that statutes creating remedies take precedence over judicial rules of procedure. Thus, this matter is not properly before the court of appeals. Jacaranda’s appellate remedy, if any, is in the Supreme Court pursuant to C.A.R. 21.
II
Because I also disagree with the reasoning of the majority as it relates to the merits of Jacaranda’s appeal, I address that matter. Although Johnson might have more aptly captioned his claim for relief a complaint rather than a petition, C.R.C.P. 2 and C.R.C.P. 3, the trial court concluded that he had stated a claim upon which the relief requested could be granted. To hold that by captioning his claim a petition rather than a complaint Johnson failed to commence an action is indeed'slavish adherence to form over substance. C.R.C.P. 8. See Industrial Commission v. Riley, 653 P.2d 723 (Colo.1982).
III
Phillips v. Webster, 162 Colo. 315, 426 P.2d 774 (1967), is dispositive of Jacaranda’s contention that relief under C.R.C.P. 66 cannot be granted in an action of this nature. There, the Websters were holders of a note and deed of trust with the same language found in the instruments here. They filed their notice of election and demand with the public trustee and then filed their application for appointment of a receiver with the trial court. The court held “the Websters were entitled to the appointment of a receiver, both under the terms of the deed of trust and under the terms of the statute.” (emphasis supplied)
Further, although the proceeding to foreclose in Phillips was instituted before the ex parte application for a receiver, the failure to do so is not fatal under the statute where, as here, the proceeding is commenced prior to a contested challenge *225thereto. See Boyd v. Brown, 79 Colo. 568, 247 P. 181 (1926).
The issue of the propriety of the trial court’s decision is not before us. Jacaranda, if it wishes to contest the appointment on the merits, may do so by entering a general appearance.
I would therefore either transfer this matter to the Supreme Court pursuant to § 13-4-110(l)(a), C.R.S.1973, or affirm the trial court’s appointment of a receiver and remand for further proceedings.