Court Opinion

ID: 9567071
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:48:03.884911+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:53:32.228562
License: Public Domain

BISTLINE, Justice,
concurring in the result.
The majority opinion is well-reasoned, but I am unable to reach the same final conclusion that “the legislature must have intended that the remedies be alternative.” I am in accord with the trial judge wherein he noted that this Court in Goff had held that the additional fixed damages of I.C. § 45-615 were mandatory, but entertained his own view that to additionally impose the I.C. § 45-606 penalty was allowable, but not mandatory. He stated:
“The court does not believe, given all the circumstances of this case, that justice requires imposition of both the 45-606 penalty and the 45-615 treble damages.” (My emphasis.)
His view that he had discretion in the matter is the correct one, absent, as the majority notes, any clear indication from the legislature that the two provisions “were intended as alternative remedies.” I would leave the statutes as we find them, and accept the trial court’s view, and hold here that there was no abuse in his exercise of discretion.
In a thorough Memorandum Decision the trial court laid out a history of the dispute here which showed some ambiguity as to whether Lawless was discharged, or quit. The court found, however, that Lawless had made a valid demand for his wages, which were not forthcoming until he brought suit, following which the back wages due him of $453.33 were tendered into court. This payment was made nine days after suit was commenced. The trial court noted that Lawless, whether he quit or was discharged, having made demand, was in either event entitled to immediate payment. The statute so provides:
“45-606. Discharge of laborer without payment of wages — Penalty.—Whenever any employer of labor shall hereafter discharge or lay off his or its employees without first paying them the amount of any wages or salary due them, in cash, lawful money of the United States, or its equivalent, or shall fail or refuse on demand to pay them in like money, or its equivalent, the amount of any wages or salary at the time the same becomes due and owing to them under their contract of employment, . . . ” (Emphasis added.)
In exercising discretion in the matter, the trial court undoubtedly noted the mix-up between the parties and the relative alacrity with which payment was made after suit was filed. Had it been a clear-cut case of the employer discharging without paying, there is an inference to be drawn that the trial court might have also assessed the penalty of I.C. § 45-606.
The holding of the majority will preclude a trial court, or jury, from giving complete relief under both statutory provisions, and this I do not think this Court should do on mere surmise as to what the Court feels the legislature had in mind in 1967 in passing into law what is now I.C. §§ 45-609 through 45-615. What history of the legislation we have available shows that it was introduced in the Senate, and had the approval of the Committee for Industry, Labor, and Economic Development, suggesting to my mind that the legislature full well *179realized that it supplemented the previous statutory provisions.
While Lawless here chose to proceed on his own behalf, as is certainly permissible, the legislature also saw the need for helping unpaid laborers with the public office of the Department of Labor. Under provisions of the act the Department is authorized to investigate claims up to the amount of $450.00, and this investigation includes the holding of hearings and taking of testimony. While the Department cannot enter judgment based on its conclusions and decisions, it is then authorized to take an assignment of the wage claim, and bring suit thereon. As I read the act, with regard to claims over $450.00, the Department, while it cannot go through the investigatory decision-making process, can take assignments and pursue claims for the unpaid laborer.
Therefore, to my mind it is of significance that the Department, which very well may have sponsored the 1967 amendment, entertains the same conclusion regarding application of I.C. § 45-606 and § 45-615 as was reached by the trial court in this case. In Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Department of Labor and Industrial Services under the authority of I.C. § 45-613(1), Chapter 2 thereof, § 07-80-204, reads as follows:
“07-80-204. Assessment of Penalties.— When it has been determined that an employer has failed to pay wages due and owing to an employee and that said employer has failed to pay such wages immediately upon discharge or layoff, both the treble damage penalty provided in Section 45-615(4), Idaho Code, for failure to pay wages due and owing and the penalty for failure to pay wages immediately upon termination, contained in Section 45-606, Idaho Code, may be imposed by the department. The penalty imposed against an employer under Section 45-606, Idaho Code, shall not be trebled as unpaid wages pursuant to Section 45-615(4), Idaho Code, but shall be added to the wages due and owing and treble damages awarded pursuant to Section 45-615(4), Idaho Code. The department is authorized to enforce these penalty and damage provisions in a court of competent jurisdiction.” (My emphasis.)
In addition to emphasizing the word “may”, I call attention to the fact the Department in its Rules and Regulations has drawn a distinction between failing to pay after demand, and discharging without paying. In case of discharging without paying, I.C. § 45-606, as I see it, tells an employer that he can not terminate without paying— if he attempts to do so, the worker continues on the payroll until he is paid, up until 30 days. It should not be overlooked that back of all this is the proposition of the duty to mitigate damages. A worker who is so discharged without pay should not be entitled to draw the 30 days of pay where during that same 30 days he has obtained other employment. In this situation the fixed damages of I.C. § 45-615 are always there to help serve as an additional inducement to the employers.
The Court should reach a decision which is in harmony with the provisions which the Department of Labor has enacted thinking itself to be looking out for the welfare of the laboring man. At all times it should be kept in mind that if these penalties are thought to be stiff, the option is with the employer who owes the wages. If the employer has fallen onto hard times, and can not pay, fourteen times, or four hundred times, the wage is meaningless. But, to the working man, with his many fixed monthly obligations, the damage done him in not being paid what he has earned, is sometimes nothing short of disastrous.
The trial judge reached a sound determination. I see no reason for this Court to seek another resolution of the same problem, especially when doing so, admittedly on judicial surmise and conjecture, may be overturning specific remedial legislation which was enacted for the protection of the Idaho laboring man and his family.