Court Opinion

ID: 9769527
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 14:53:26.569354+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:37:55.156531
License: Public Domain

*650OPINION ON PETITION TO REHEAR
HARBISON, Justice.
Seven days after the release of the opinions of this Court in the above cases, the Governor of the State commuted the death sentences of petitioner Collins and respondent Morgan to life imprisonment, and this action was duly called to the attention of the Court by a timely petition for rehearing.
The State contends that the order of commutation substitutes ab initio a judgment of life imprisonment in the cases at bar, rendering unnecessary and inappropriate remands for resentencing. It relies primarily upon Bowen v. State, 488 S.W.2d 373 (Tenn.1972); Hodges v. State, 491 S.W.2d 624 (Tenn.Cr.App.1972); and Rose v. Hodges, 423 U.S. 19, 96 S.Ct. 175, 46 L.Ed.2d 162 (1975).
In Bowen, the order of commutation was issued following the decision by the United States Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972), and prior to release of the opinion of the Tennessee Supreme Court.
We do not consider the fact that our opinion was released on January 24, 1977, prior to the order of commutation, materially distinguishes these eases from Bowen. The State’s petition to rehear is properly before us in compliance with Rule 32 and presents as an issue the validity and effect of the executive action in commuting punishment from death to life imprisonment. The purpose of a petition to rehear is to request the Court to modify or set aside its opinion. It is fundamental that no final judgment can be entered on an opinion of the Court until the time expires for the filing of a petition to rehear or until disposition of such a petition which was timely filed. Accordingly no final judgment had been entered on our opinion of January 24, 1977, and we had not finally vacated the death sentence at the time of the Governor’s action.
We conclude that the validity of the Governor’s commutations of the death sentences imposed upon Collins and Morgan by the verdict and judgment of the respective trial courts is properly before us for decision, in a posture indistinguishable in principle from the issue presented in the Bowen case.
In Bowen, Mr. Justice McCanless, writing for the Court, discussed the following principles and reached the conclusion that the commutation was constitutionally permissible and lawfully imposed: (1) the Governor, in exercising the constitutional power to grant reprieves and pardons, which includes commutation, can no more be controlled by courts than by the legislature; (2) while a pardon is not complete without an acceptance, consent of a defendant is not necessary to sustain the validity of a commutation; (3) a commutation of a sentence is a substitution of a less for a greater punishment, and after commutation, the sentence has the same legal effect as though it had originally been pronounced for the commuted term.
We concur in these conclusions.
The commutation was exercised within the constitutional power of the executive, and we cannot refuse to recognize its validity. Life imprisonment is a less severe penalty than death, and an accused has no basis for complaint.
In a criminal case it is the right of the jury to determine the law and the facts.1 In these cases each jury was instructed as to first degree murder, second degree murder, and all lesser included offenses. The two juries had the opportunity and authority to impose a lesser sentence but declined to do so. Since the defendants received the maximum penalty of death at the hands of juries, there is nothing in our statutory or constitutional law or the decisions of -this Court requiring that they be given a second jury trial as to punishment under the circumstances presented here.
*651Other questions are raised in the petition for rehearing which were not involved in these cases and which would, in our opinion, be inappropriate for us to consider at this time.
The result is that the judgments of the respective trial courts are affirmed, as commuted to life imprisonment.
FONES, J., concurs.
HENRY, J., files concurring opinion.
COOPER, C. J., dissents.
BROCK, J., files dissenting opinion.

. Tennessee Constitution, Article I, § 19; Scott v. State, 207 Tenn. 151, 338 S.W.2d 581 (1960); Dykes v. State, 201 Tenn. 65, 296 S.W.2d 861 (1956).