Court Opinion

ID: 9786023
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 23:45:34.078293+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:39.972415
License: Public Domain

*23OPALA, V.C.J.,
with whom KAUGER, J., joins, dissenting.
¶ 1 The court vacates today the Court of Civil Appeals’ (COCA) opinion and affirms the trial court’s sanction order, declaring that the safe-harbor clause in the provisions of 12 O.S.2001 § 2011(c)(1)(a)1 was not intended to be included in the terms of 57 O.S.2002 Supp.
§ 566.2 Because the court’s pronouncement fails to reach the dispositive issues in this public-law controversy,3 I dissent and suggest for the court’s consideration my own analysis of the critical issues to be resolved.
¶ 2 In this controversy the court is not only entirely free, but also bears the duty, to make its own formulation of the issues that must be decided. Two issues, both having a constitutional dimension, appear absolutely necessary for today’s pronouncement. One of the two is whether an inconsistent procedural approach for § 2011 and for § 566 offends the state constitution’s prohibition against disuniform procedure; the other is whether singling out prisoners for application of a different process in imposing court sanctions for litigation-related misconduct offends the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Today’s opinion addresses neither of these two questions.
I.
DOES DICHOTOMIZING THE APPLICABLE NORMS OF SANCTIONING PROCEDURE INTO THOSE GENERALLY PRESCRIBED BY § 2011 AND THOSE OF § 566 WHICH APPLIES SOLELY TO PRISONERS OFFEND THE OKLAHOMA CONSTITUTION’S PROHIBITION AGAINST DISUNIFORM COURT PROCEDURE?
¶ 3 The terms of Art. 5, § 46, Okl. Const.,4 command that court procedure be symmetrical and apply across the board.5 The terms *24of § 46 mandate in absolute terms statewide procedural uniformity for an entire class of similarly situated persons or things.6 Its relevant terms expressly prohibit the legislature from regulating court procedure by disuniform rules.7 Although directed to the legislature, the terms of § 46 are equally binding on the courts.8 This court’s own jurisprudence, no less than the legislature’s enactments, must faithfully conform to the fundamental law’s prohibition against disuni-form laws on all subjects prohibited in § 46.
II.
DOES SINGLING OUT PRISONERS FOR DIFFERENT PROCEDURAL TREATMENT WHEN THEY ARE PROCEEDED AGAINST FOR IMPOSITION OF COURT SANCTIONS OFFEND THE XIVth AMENDMENT’S EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE?
¶ 4 The XIVth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States9 has been a part of this Nation’s fundamental law since 1868. It has served as a basis for articulated national public policy for all the states.10 The Supreme Court’s XIVth Amendment jurisprudence constitutes law that is enforceable against all the states.11
¶ 5 The terms of the XIVth Amendment guarantee that all similarly situated persons receive the same treatment. Here, the court has failed to inquire into whether, in the context of Oklahoma’s sanctioning process, it may, without offending the Equal Protection Clause, apply to a prisoner procedural norms that are markedly different from those which stand accorded to similarly situated persons at large. A legislative classification which, without any rational basis, sets apart a subclass for different treatment may be offensive to the Equal Protection Clause.12 If a legislative classification is declared to be im-permissibly narrow, it is subject to judicial condemnation as “underinclusive.”13
¶6 In Mehdipour14 the trial court dismissed a prisoner’s lawsuit for failure to pay *25a filing fee prescribed by § 566. On at least three prior occasions the prisoner filed lawsuits which were dismissed either as frivolous or for failure to state a claim. On certiorari, this court held that because the provisions of the pertinent legislation did not implicate any fundamental rights and were rationally related to a legitimate state interest in deterring frivolous prisoner lawsuits, the statute imposing court costs did not offend due process. The enactment hence was declared free of constitutional taint under both the Federal and State constitutions. I did not give Meh-dipour my unqualified concurrence. This is so because there the court resolved a federal constitutional issue that was neither tendered for its testing nor was necessary for the decision. Resolving the two fundamental-law questions in this case is critical to deciding the constitutional validity of Oklahoma’s dichotomous regime of procedure for sanctioning the same or like litigation-related abuse or misconduct.
¶ 7 Because the court today neither resolves (1) the impact of the uniformity-of-procedure mandate imposed by § 46, nor (2) deals with a prisoner’s federal constitutional claim to receiving treatment that is not unequal to that accorded persons at large, I recede from its opinion.
HI.
THE DISSENT’S RESPONSE TO THE COURT’S CRITIQUE
¶8 In response to the dissent the court suggests that because in Woodivard15 the court did not reach the constitutional issue urged upon it, it should not do so here. Woodivard does not raise an impediment to resolving the issues I tender by the dissent. The court has a clear and absolute duty to determine all issues dispositive of a public-law controversy. In Woodward the court follows that very mandate by saying that neither its opinion there nor in Northwest Datsun16 presents the “public interest and welfare required ... to entertain the equal protection challenge on appeal ... ”, Today’s refusal to resolve what the dissent counsels will give the winner no more than Pyrrhic victory to be followed by utter chaos in the courthouses for the ensuing years of time-consuming litigation.

. The pertinent terms of 12 O.S.2001 § 2011(C)(1)(a) are:
a. By Motion. A motion for sanctions under this rule shall be made separately from other motions or requests and shall describe the specific conduct alleged to violate subsection B of this section. It shall be served as provided in Section 2005 of this title, but shall not be filed with or presented to the courts unless, within twenty-one (21) days after service of the motion or such other period as the court may prescribe, the challenged paper, claim, defense, contention, allegation, or denial is not withdrawn or appropriately corrected.

. The pertinent terms of 57 O.S.2002 Supp. § 566 are:
A. Any action initiated against any person, party or entity, the state, the Department of Corrections, another state agency, or political subdivision, or an original action in appellate court, or an appeal of an action whether or not the plaintiff was represented in the district court, by an inmate may be:
2. Dismissed with prejudice ... on a motion of the defendant, if the court is satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious.
* ⅜ ⅜
C. If the court determines before or at trial that one or more of the causes of action are frivolous or malicious, any one or more of the following sanctions may be imposed:
* * ⅜
2. Court costs not to exceed Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00) per cause of action;

. The distinction between public and private law is well recognized in the Anglo-American legal system. Blackstone acknowledged the distinctness of these two bodies of law. Blackstone’s Commentaries of The Laws of England, Vol. III, p. 1 [private wrongs], Vol. IV, p. 1 [public wrongs] (Wendell's ed. 1859). He defined a. private wrong as an infringement or privation of the private or civil rights belonging to individuals, considered merely as individuals, and therefore termed civil injuries, while public wrongs were described as a breach and violation of public rights and duties affecting the entire community, considered as a community. Notwithstanding Blackstone’s late eighteenth-centuiy teachings, the term "public law" is not commonly used in the United States. Cappalli, The American Common Law Method (1997), pg. 177.

. The pertinent terms of Art. 5, § 46, Okl. Const., are:
The Legislature shall not, except as otherwise provided in this Constitution, pass any local or special law authorizing: * ’! *
Regulating the practice or jurisdiction of ... in judicial proceedings or inquiry before the courts ... or other tribunals ...
(emphasis supplied).

. Brown v. Ford, 1995 OK 101, ¶ 7, 905 P.2d 223, 228; Simpson v. Dixon, 1993 OK 71, ¶ 15, 853 P.2d 176, 183; Tate v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 192 OK 72, V 18, 833 P.2d 1218, 1229; Reynolds v. Porter, 1988 OK 88, ¶ ¶ 13-19, 760 P.2d 816, 822; Johnson v. District Court of Oklahoma County, *241987 OK 47, 112, 738 P.2d 151, 154 (Opala, J., concurring). Special laws are those which single out less than an entire class of similarly affected persons or things for different treatment. If a rule of law is special, § 46 absolutely and unequivocally prohibits its passage as law. Reynolds at V1J 13-21, 821-824.

. See Johnson v. Tony’s Town Mister Quik, 1996 OK 138, ¶ 5, 915 P.2d 355, 355, 357-358; Reynolds, supra note 5 at 822; Maule v. Independent School Dist. No. 9, 1985 OK 110, 1112, 714 P.2d 198, 203-204.

. Maule, supra note 6 at 203-204; Reynolds, supra note 5 at 822; Great Plains Federal S & L Assn. v. Dabney, 1993 OK 4, ¶ 12, 846 P.2d 1088, 1095-1096 (Opala, J., concurring). "Fundamental fairness cannot be afforded except within a framework of orderly procedure.” Joiner v. Brown, 1996 OK 112, ¶ 6, 925 P.2d 888, 890, citing Piyse Monument Company v. District Court of Kay County, 1979 OK 71, 595 P.2d 435, 438. "... It is procedure that spells much of the difference between rule by law and rule by whim or caprice. Steadfast adherence to the strict procedural safeguards is our main assurance that there will be equal justice under law.” Joiner, supra note 7 at 890, quoting from Joint AntiFascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 179, 71 S.Ct. 624, 652, 95 L.Ed. 817 (1951) (Douglas, J., concurring).

. Reynolds, supra note 5 at 822.

. The pertinent terms of § 1 of the XIVth Amendment to the United States Constitution are:
"... No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
(emphasis supplied).

. Clinton v. State ex rel. Logan County Election Bd., 2001 OK 52, ¶ 6, 29 P.3d 543, 548 (Opala, J. concurring).

. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 1691, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081, 1090 (1961).

. Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 86 S.Ct. 760, 15 L.Ed.2d 620 (1966); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 240, 90 S.Ct. 2018, 2022, 26 L.Ed.2d 586 (1970); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 92 S.Ct. 1048, 31 L.Ed.2d 394 (1972). These cases identify Equal Protection jurisprudence that does not allow placing prisoners and persons at large into two separate classes.

. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 272, 99 S.Ct. 1102, 1108, 59 L.Ed.2d 306 (1979); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 13-14, 95 S.Ct. 1373, 1377, 43 L.Ed.2d 688 (1975); see also Wilson v. Foster, 1979 OK 45, 595 P.2d 1329, 1332.

. Mehdipour v. State ex rel. Department of Corrections, 2004 OK 19, ¶ 22, 90 P.3d 546.

. Johnson v. City of Woodward, 2001 OK 85, ¶ 21, 38 P.3d 218, 226-227.

. Northwest Datsun v. Oklahoma Motor Vehicle Com’n, 1987 OK 31, ¶ 16, 736 P.2d 516, 520.