Court Opinion

ID: 9371082
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-15 16:01:18.4072+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:25.307500
License: Public Domain

20-4010
     Sherpa v. Garland
                                                                               BIA
                                                                          Cassin, IJ
                                                                       A208 927 545
                              UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                  FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                    SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION
TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED
AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS
COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX
OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A
PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

 1        At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
 2   for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
 3   United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
 4   New York, on the 15th day of February, two thousand twenty-
 5   three.
 6
 7   PRESENT:
 8            ROBERT D. SACK,
 9            DENNY CHIN,
10            RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,
11                 Circuit Judges.
12   _____________________________________
13
14   NGADOMA SHERPA,
15            Petitioner,
16
17                       v.                                  20-4010
18                                                           NAC
19   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
20   STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
21            Respondent.
22   _____________________________________
23
24   FOR PETITIONER:                     Khagendra Gharti-Chhetry, Esq.,
25                                       New York, NY.
26
27   FOR RESPONDENT:                     Brian Boynton, Acting Assistant
28                                       Attorney General; Brianne Whelan
 1                                 Cohen, Rebecca Hoffberg Phillips,
 2                                 Senior Litigation Counsel, Office
 3                                 of Immigration Litigation, United
 4                                 States Department of Justice,
 5                                 Washington, DC.

 6          UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a

 7   Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby

 8   ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review

 9   is DENIED.

10          Petitioner Ngadoma Sherpa, a native and citizen of Nepal,

11   seeks review of an October 29, 2020 decision of the BIA

12   affirming a July 27, 2018 decision of an Immigration Judge

13   (“IJ”) denying her application for asylum, withholding of

14   removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture

15   (“CAT”).    In re Ngadoma Sherpa, No. A208 927 545 (B.I.A. Oct.

16   29, 2020), aff’g No. A208 927 545 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City July

17   27, 2018).      We assume the parties’ familiarity with the

18   underlying facts and procedural history.

19          We have reviewed the decisions of both the IJ and the

20   BIA.    See Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 524,

21   528 (2d Cir. 2006).     The applicable standards of review are

22   well    established.    See   8 U.S.C.   § 1252(b)(4)(B)   (“[T]he

23   administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any

24   reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the
                                  2
 1   contrary.”); Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d

 2   Cir.    2018)   (reviewing   adverse    credibility   determination

 3   “under the substantial evidence standard”).

 4          “Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all

 5   relevant factors, a trier of fact may base a credibility

 6   determination on the demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of

 7   the applicant . . . , the consistency between the applicant’s

 8   or witness’s written and oral statements . . . , the internal

 9   consistency of each such statement, [and] the consistency of

10   such statements with other evidence of record . . . without

11   regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood

12   goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim, or any other

13   relevant    factor.”     8 U.S.C.      § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).   “We

14   defer . . . to an IJ’s credibility determination unless . . .

15   it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder could make such an

16   adverse credibility ruling.”         Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534

17   F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2008); accord Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d

18   at 76.      Here, substantial evidence supports the adverse

19   credibility determination.

20          As an initial matter, the agency did not err in relying

21   on the record of Sherpa’s credible fear interview because it

                                      3
 1   bears    sufficient     indicia    of       reliability:     while   not     a

 2   transcript, the interview is “memorialized in a typewritten

 3   document setting forth the questions put to [Sherpa] as well

 4   as her responses”; the interview was conducted with a Nepali

 5   interpreter, whom Sherpa stated she could understand; and the

 6   asylum officer not only explained the purpose of the interview

 7   and the fact that Sherpa could seek clarification at any

 8   point, but also asked Sherpa questions about past and future

 9   harm that were designed to elicit an asylum claim.                        Ming

10   Zhang v. Holder, 585 F.3d 715, 725 (2d Cir. 2009).                Thus, the

11   agency   reasonably relied        on       inconsistencies between that

12   interview and Sherpa’s in court testimony that call into

13   question the basis of Sherpa’s claim.

14          Sherpa stated in her credible fear interview that she

15   had been married twice, that she and her first husband were

16   threatened by Maoists and fled to Kathmandu together, and

17   that    she   married   her   second        husband   a   year   before    the

18   interview.     She also told the asylum officer that she owned

19   a shop in Nepal and worked as a housekeeper and a nanny.

20   However, she testified before the IJ that she had never been

21   married, she was a Buddhist nun, and she had lived in a

                                            4
 1   monastery for 15 years, until 2009.                   The agency did not err

 2   in relying on these discrepancies, particularly as they call

 3   into question Sherpa’s claim that Maoists dragged her out of

 4   the monastery and beat her.           See Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167

 5   (noting    that    the    agency    “may       rely      on    any   inconsistency

 6   . . . as    long     as    the     ‘totality        of        the    circumstances’

 7   establishes       that    an    asylum       applicant         is    not    credible”

 8   (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii))).

 9       The agency also reasonably relied on Sherpa’s differing

10   accounts of her involvement in the Nepali Congress Party

11   (“NCP”) and her alleged physical harm.                    In her credible fear

12   interview, Sherpa told the asylum officer that she voted for

13   the NCP but was not a member and had not volunteered for the

14   party.     She also stated that she had never been physically

15   harmed by Maoists, adding that they tried their best to harm

16   her but that she had avoided them by living                           in hiding at

17   friends’ houses.          But Sherpa testified to the IJ that she

18   campaigned for the NCP in her village and was beaten by

19   Maoists on two occasions -- once at the monastery in 2008 and

20   again at her home in 2013.                   These discrepancies likewise

21   provide    substantial         support       for   the    adverse          credibility

                                              5
 1   determination.       See Xian Tuan Ye v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,

 2   446 F.3d 289, 295 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that a “material

 3   inconsistency in an aspect of [the] story that served as an

 4   example   of   the   very   persecution   from   which    [Petitioner]

 5   sought asylum . . . afforded substantial evidence to support

 6   the adverse credibility finding”); see also Likai Gao v. Barr,

 7   968 F.3d 137, 145 n.8 (2d Cir. 2020) (“[E]ven a single

 8   inconsistency might preclude an alien from showing that an IJ

 9   was compelled to find him credible. Multiple inconsistencies

10   would so preclude even more forcefully.”).               Moreover, the

11   agency was not required to accept Sherpa’s explanation that

12   her smugglers told her to lie in her credible fear interview.

13   See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A

14   petitioner must do more than offer a plausible explanation

15   for his inconsistent statements to secure relief; he must

16   demonstrate that a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled

17   to credit his testimony.” (quotation marks omitted)).

18       The adverse credibility finding is further bolstered by

19   the IJ’s demeanor finding, to which we defer, see Li Hua Lin

20   v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 453 F.3d 99, 109 (2d Cir. 2006),

21   and the absence of any reliable corroboration for Sherpa’s

                                       6
 1   testimony, Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir.

 2   2007) (“An applicant’s failure to corroborate . . . her

 3   testimony may bear on credibility, because the absence of

 4   corroboration     in    general   makes       an    applicant     unable    to

 5   rehabilitate testimony that has already been called into

 6   question.”).     The IJ did not err in affording minimal weight

 7   to Sherpa’s supporting letters because they were inconsistent

 8   with    her   testimony,   prepared     by    interested     witnesses      or

 9   witnesses not available for cross-examination, or they did

10   not confirm the alleged persecution.               See Likai Gao, 968 F.3d

11   at 149 (concluding that “the IJ acted within her discretion

12   in   according    . . . little     weight”         to   letters    from    the

13   applicant’s      wife    and   friend        “because     the     declarants

14   (particularly [the applicant’s] wife) were interested parties

15   and neither was available for cross-examination”); Y.C. v.

16   Holder, 741 F.3d 324, 332, 334 (2d Cir. 2013) (“We generally

17   defer to the agency’s evaluation of the weight to be afforded

18   an applicant’s documentary evidence.”).

19          In sum, the multiple inconsistencies and lack of reliable

20   corroboration provide substantial evidence in support of the

21   IJ’s adverse credibility determination.                 See Likai Gao, 968

                                        7
 1   F.3d at 145 n.8; Biao Yang, 496 F.3d at 273.           The adverse

 2   credibility   determination      is   dispositive    of     Sherpa’s

 3   application   for   asylum,   withholding   of   removal,   and   CAT

 4   relief because all three forms of relief were based on the

 5   same discredited factual predicate.         See Paul v. Gonzales,

 6   444 F.3d 148, 156–57 (2d Cir. 2006).

 7       For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is

 8   DENIED.   All pending motions and applications are DENIED and

 9   stays VACATED.

10                                  FOR THE COURT:
11                                  Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
12                                  Clerk of Court
13

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