Court Opinion

ID: 9679493
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:54:15.851147+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:14.077575
License: Public Domain

Coleman, C.J.
(to reverse). I agree with Part I of Justice Levin’s opinion, but not with Part II, and would reverse the Court of Appeals.
It is presumptuous to guess what the reasonable expectations of Gloria Carlson may have been. She does not allege that she was uninformed of the exclusion or of her choice to purchase additional coverage through another endorsement or policy, although the opinions of Justice Levin and the Court of Appeals leap to that conclusion.
The Court of Appeals found that, pursuant to Michigan’s financial responsibility act, MCL 257.501 et seq.; MSA 9.2201 et seq., such an exclusion to liability coverage as is the subject of this controversy is theoretically valid. Although the exclusionary language was not ambiguous, the Court said that it was not set forth obviously enough and so was unenforceable.
The reasoning seems to be that because some people do not read the contracts they sign, even if exclusions are explained, the contracts are, in effect, void as to some parts but not as to others.
I find the reasoning of the Court of Appeals unpersuasive and I am also unpersuaded by the argument of my colleagues that, despite the unambiguous wording of the contract and a failure by defendant Gloria Carlson to allege lack of information of the exclusion or of the possibility of obtaining additional coverage, the exclusion must fall. Nor am I persuaded by the "reasonable expecta*354tion” argument. I would neither find the policy ambiguous nor contrary to the "no-fault” act.
Therefore, I would reverse the Court of Appeals and remand to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Kavanagh and Ryan, JJ., concurred with Coleman, C.J.