Court Opinion

ID: 9946044
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-28 22:04:06.50376+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:21.973126
License: Public Domain

2024 IL App (1st) 210303-U
                                              No. 1-21-0303
                                      Order filed February 28, 2024
                                                                                          Third Division

 NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the
 limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
 ______________________________________________________________________________
                                                 IN THE
                                  APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
                                            FIRST DISTRICT
 ______________________________________________________________________________
 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,                             )   Appeal from the
                                                                  )   Circuit Court of
           Plaintiff-Appellee,                                    )   Cook County.
                                                                  )
     v.                                                           )   No. 20 CR 733
                                                                  )
 FERNANDO OLIVEROS,                                               )   Honorable
                                                                  )   Neera Walsh,
           Defendant-Appellant.                                   )   Judge, presiding.

           JUSTICE LAMPKIN delivered the judgment of the court.
           Presiding Justice Reyes and Justice D.B. Walker concurred in the judgment.

                                               ORDER

¶1        Held: Defendant’s first-stage petition for postconviction relief successfully stated the gist
                of a constitutional claim and the trial court’s judgment dismissing defendant’s
                petition is reversed.

¶2        Defendant Fernando Oliveros is currently serving a 90-year sentence in the Illinois

Department of Corrections (IDOC) subsequent to convictions for numerous counts of predatory

criminal sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual abuse, and aggravated child pornography.

Defendant now appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his pro se first-stage petition for
No. 1-21-0303

postconviction relief pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (the Act), 725 ILCS 5/122-1 et

seq. (West 2020).

¶3     For the reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for

second-stage proceedings and the appointment of counsel. 1

¶4                                      I. BACKGROUND

¶5     On January 11, 2013, defendant was charged by indictment with six counts of predatory

criminal sexual assault, seven counts of aggravated child pornography, seven counts of aggravated

sexual abuse of a child, and seven counts of child pornography, all taking place over a period of

approximately seven and a half years between May 7, 2005, and October 4, 2012. Following a

bench trial, the trial court found defendant guilty of all charges and subsequently sentenced

defendant to an aggregate term of 100 years in the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC). On

appeal, we vacated defendant’s conviction for one of the predatory criminal sexual assault counts,

but otherwise affirmed the judgment of the trial court. People v. Oliveros, 2019 IL (1st) 161096-

U, ¶ 2. Upon resentencing, defendant’s sentence was reduced to 90 years. Our prior decision set

forth the trial evidence in detail, so we will repeat only what is necessary for the instant appeal.

¶6     The trial court held a hearing on defendant’s motion to suppress evidence on October 26,

2015. That motion claimed that defendant’s cellphone had been unlawfully searched without a

warrant. Araceli Del Pilar, defendant’s girlfriend between 2003 and 2012, testified that she looked

at defendant’s cellphone on October 4, 2012, after retrieving it from his work briefcase. Del Pilar

retrieved the cellphone after her daughter, J.S., told her that defendant would take pictures and

       1
         In adherence with the requirements of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 352(a) (eff. July 1,
2018), this appeal has been resolved without oral argument upon the entry of a separate written
order.

                                                 -2-
No. 1-21-0303

videos of her. Upon examining the cellphone, Del Pilar found pictures of J.S. without clothes on

and videos of defendant performing various sex acts on her. She called 911 and was told to come

to the police station with her daughter. Del Pilar did so and left defendant’s cellphone with the

police. No police officer turned the cellphone on in Del Pilar’s presence.

¶7     Chicago Police Department (CPD) Detective Manuel De La Torre testified that he spoke

with J.S. and Del Pilar on October 10, 2012. Del Pilar told De La Torre that she went to the police

department and asked for advice, and she was told to bring J.S. with her and make a report. But

she was not told to get defendant’s cellphone and bring it with her. De La Torre testified that he

obtained a search warrant for the phone “on or after October 5, 2012.” The State then, prompting

De La Torre with the actual cellphone, asked him, “And is this the cellphone that you recovered

from CPD inventory after obtaining a search warrant on October 5, 2012?” and De La Torre

responded, “Yes.” De La Torre further testified that he brought the cellphone to the Regional

Computer Forensics Lab (RCFL) on an unspecified date to be forensically examined and that he

never turned the phone on himself. The trial court granted the State’s motion for a directed finding

and denied the motion to suppress evidence.

¶8     Defendant’s case proceeded to a bench trial on February 19, 2016. J.S., who was 14 years

old at the time of trial, testified that she lived with defendant between the ages of four and eleven.

Her earliest memory of defendant’s abuse was of defendant touching her chest under her shirt at

the age of four. When she was seven years old, the defendant began touching her other places,

including her vagina. The abuse eventually progressed to defendant penetrating her vagina with

his penis, which defendant sometimes filmed and would later show to J.S. Small excerpts from

sexually explicit videos were played at trial, and J.S. confirmed that each video accurately depicted

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No. 1-21-0303

what defendant had done to her between the ages of four and eleven. Defendant’s face was visible

in almost all of the videos. Del Pilar testified similarly to her testimony at the motion to suppress

evidence, except that she claimed the 911 operator “said I had to take my daughter and take the

evidence and that’s what I did.” The trial court found defendant guilty on every count and on

appeal, we affirmed defendant’s conviction with the one exception noted above.

¶9     On August 19, 2020, defendant filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief. Defendant,

citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959), alleged

that the State violated his due process rights by failing to disclose exculpatory evidence that

impeached De La Torre and by presenting false testimony. Defendant’s petition attached a number

of documents in support of his claim which were obtained through Freedom of Information Act

requests to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the City of Chicago. One document was

a letter defendant claims was sent from De La Torre to the RCFL on February 21, 2013, requesting

a forensic examination of defendant’s cellphone. 2 Defendant also attached a “Request for Service”

form for the RCFL, allegedly completed by De La Torre on February 21, 2013. 3 That form

contained a question that read, “Has this Evidence been previously viewed and/or accessed by

anyone?” The box that read, “No,” was checked. The form also noted that the cellphone was locked

with a password, but defendant alleged that the cellphone did not have a password while it was in

his possession. Subsequent to the cellphone being delivered to the RCFL, on April 23, 2013, the

RCFL sought the FBI’s assistance because “an application called application protection is

       2
           The letter is on CPD letterhead, but the name of the requesting detective is redacted.
       3
           The names on this form are also redacted.

                                                 -4-
No. 1-21-0303

encountered,” which “protects the settings and other parts of the phone making it unable to be

processed.”

¶ 10   Defendant also attached the search warrant that was issued for defendant’s cellphone on

December 7, 2012, not October 5, 2012, and a “Chain of Custody” log for defendant’s cellphone.

The log showed that defendant’s cellphone was checked out by De La Torre on December 5, 2012,

two days before the search warrant was issued, and there are no further entries until almost three

years later on November 5, 2015. Additionally, defendant attached a complaint for a search warrant

completed by De La Torre which sought authorization to search additional digital storage devices

found by Del Pilar in her home. That December 7, 2012, complaint stated that a December 6, 2012,

warrant to search defendant’s cellphone was approved, and that a subsequent search of the

cellphone revealed images of J.S. and defendant engaged in sexual acts. The complaint did not

state when the cellphone was searched or who did so. Finally, defendant attached a copy of a

portion of a report completed by De La Torre on February 4, 2013, approximately three weeks

before the request to RCFL was made, which noted that defendant’s cellphone was searched

pursuant to a warrant, though it, too, did not specify when the cellphone was searched or who did

so.

¶ 11   Based on these documents, defendant claimed that De La Torre perjured himself at the

hearing on the motion to suppress evidence when he claimed that he had never turned the cellphone

on prior to sending it to the RCFL, and that the State wrongfully suppressed the information in

these documents. Defendant further alleged that if these documents had been produced, the

outcome of his motion to suppress would have been different. Defendant also alleged that trial

counsel provided ineffective assistance for a number of reasons including, but not limited to, that

                                               -5-
No. 1-21-0303

trial counsel failed to perform a reasonable investigation, failed to call certain witnesses, and failed

to argue that defendant’s convictions violated the principle of one act, one crime. Defendant also

alleged the ineffectiveness of appellate counsel for failing to raise some of trial counsel’s errors

on direct appeal.

¶ 12   On October 29, 2020, the trial court dismissed defendant’s petition as frivolous and

patently without merit. This appeal followed.

¶ 13                                       II. ANALYSIS

¶ 14   The Act provides a mechanism by which a defendant may raise a collateral attack against

his or her conviction based on a claim of actual innocence or where there was a substantial denial

of his or her rights under the Constitution of the United States, the State of Illinois, or both. 725

ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2020). The purpose of postconviction proceedings is to allow inquiry

into constitutional issues involved in the original conviction and sentence that have not been, and

could not have been, adjudicated previously on appeal. People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 12.

Review of the trial court’s dismissal of a postconviction petition is de novo, meaning we afford no

deference to the trial court’s decision. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 12; People v. Randall, 2016 IL

App (1st) 143371, ¶ 44.

¶ 15   The Act sets out a three-stage process for the adjudication of postconviction petitions. Id.

at ¶ 45. At the first stage, the trial court is only required to determine whether a petition is

“frivolous or patently without merit.” 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 2020); Buffer, 2019 IL

122327 at ¶ 45. A petition is frivolous or patently without merit when it has no arguable basis in

law or in fact. People v. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d 1, 16 (2009). A petition which lacks an arguable basis

either in law or in fact is one which is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or a fanciful

                                                 -6-
No. 1-21-0303

factual allegation. Id. An example of an indisputably meritless legal theory is one which is

completely contradicted by the record. Id. Fanciful factual allegations include those which are

fantastic or delusional. Id. at 17. All well-pleaded facts in the petition are construed as true unless

affirmatively rebutted by the record. People v. Thomas, 2014 IL App (2d) 121001, ¶ 47

¶ 16    A first-stage petition does not have to demonstrate or prove a constitutional violation.

People v. Tate, 2012 IL 112214, ¶ 19. A pro se petitioner is not required to allege facts supporting

all elements of a constitutional claim. Thomas, 2014 IL App (2d) 121001, ¶ 48. Because a pro se

petitioner will likely be unaware of the precise legal basis for his claim, the threshold for survival

is low, and a pro se petitioner need only allege enough facts to make out a claim that is arguably

constitutional for purposes of invoking the Act. Id. However, the petition must clearly set forth the

respects in which petitioner’s constitutional rights were violated. Id. Petitions filed pro se must be

given a liberal construction and are to be viewed with a lenient eye, allowing borderline cases to

proceed. Id. But liberal construction does not mean that we distort reality. Id. To survive the first

stage, a petition shall attach “affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting its allegations or

shall state why the same are not attached.” 725 ILCS 5/122-2 (West 2020). Generally, the failure

to attach the necessary “affidavits, records, or other evidence,” or explain their absence, is fatal to

a postconviction petition and justifies its dismissal at the first stage. People v. Matthews, 2022 IL

App (4th) 210752, ¶ 63.

¶ 17    On appeal, defendant has abandoned many of the claims contained in his pro se petition

and instead asserts that he stated the gist of a constitutional claim for four issues only: (1) the State

violated his due process rights pursuant to Brady and Napue; (2) assuming trial counsel possessed

the purported Brady/Napue materials, trial counsel was ineffective for failing to use them; (3) trial

                                                  -7-
No. 1-21-0303

counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that the delay in searching defendant’s phone was

unreasonable; and (4) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to introduce evidence that defendant

did not purchase the cellphone in question until 2010. We note that the second and third of these

four claims do not appear to be contained in defendant’s petition. Nevertheless, given our holding

regarding the first issue, we need not address these other issues as we believe defendant has met

the exceptionally low hurdle at the first stage. See People v. Rivera, 198 Ill. 2d 364, 371 (2001)

(the Act does not contemplate dismissal of claims, but rather petitions, and if a defendant states

the gist of a constitutional claim, the entire petition must be docketed for second-stage

proceedings).

¶ 18                                      A. Brady/Napue

¶ 19   Defendant’s first argument is that he presented the gist of a constitutional claim because

documents he obtained reveal that De La Torre lied when he testified that he never turned on

defendant’s phone prior to submitting the phone to the RCFL, and that if these documents were

not suppressed, De La Torre’s credibility could have been impeached at the hearing on the motion

to suppress.

¶ 20   The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment obligates the State to tender

evidence favorable to a defendant so long as the evidence is material to guilt or punishment,

irrespective of the good or bad faith of the prosecution. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. The duty to disclose

this favorable information exists even absent a request for it from the defendant. United States v.

Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976). The State is also obligated to disclose impeachment evidence and

evidence known only to police investigators and not the prosecutor. Giglio v. United States, 405

U.S. 150, 154 (1972); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 438 (1995). To establish a Brady violation,

                                                -8-
No. 1-21-0303

a defendant must demonstrate that the evidence at issue: (1) was favorable to the defendant; (2)

was suppressed by the State; and (3) resulted in prejudice to the defendant. Strickler v. Greene,

527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999). The prejudice prong requires a defendant to show that the likelihood

of a different result is great enough to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial. Smith v.

Cain, 565 U.S. 73, 75-76 (2012).

¶ 21    Similarly, the Due Process Clause also forbids a conviction obtained through evidence

which the State knows to be false. Napue, 360 U.S. at 269. Under this standard, the conviction

must be reversed if there is “any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected

the judgment of the jury.” People v. Lucas, 203 Ill. 2d 410, 422 (2002). This standard is equivalent

to the harmless error standard and applies even if the State did not elicit the false testimony, but

left it to go uncorrected. Id.

¶ 22    Of course, at this stage, defendant need not conclusively establish a due process violation

pursuant to Brady or Napue, but instead must only allege facts that make out a claim that is

arguably constitutional. Thomas, 2014 IL App (2d) 121001, ¶ 48. Indeed, the bar at the first stage

is so low that a defendant need not even set forth a claim in its entirety or include legal arguments

or citations to legal authority. People v. Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d 239, 244 (2001).

¶ 23                             B. Lack of an Affidavit from Trial Counsel

¶ 24    The State first argues that defendant’s petition cannot survive the first stage because

defendant has not attached an affidavit from trial counsel averring that none of these purportedly

suppressed documents were ever produced during discovery. While the Act requires defendants to

attach “affidavits, records, or other evidence,” supporting the petition’s allegations, or state why

the same are not attached, 725 ILCS 5/122-2 (West 2020), the purpose of this requirement is not

                                                 -9-
No. 1-21-0303

to require defendant to prove every element of his claim at the first stage. Instead, the purpose is

to determine if defendant’s claims are capable of objective or independent corroboration. People

v. Reed, 2014 IL App (1st) 122610, ¶ 40. Defendant’s petition identified and attached documents

that he alleged were suppressed; those facts do not exist solely in his head, incapable of

substantiation. Thus, the question of whether these documents were ever produced to defense

counsel is one that is capable of independent corroboration. Additionally, when a first-stage

petition alleges the ineffective assistance of counsel, as defendant did here alongside his

Brady/Napue claims, the “difficulty or impossibility of obtaining such an affidavit [from trial

counsel] is self-apparent.” People v. Hall, 217 Ill. 2d 324, 333-34 (2005) (quoting People v.

Williams, 47 Ill. 2d 1, 4 (1970)). Therefore, we do not find that the failure to include an affidavit

from trial counsel is fatal here.

¶ 25                                 C. Res Judicata/Forfeiture

¶ 26    The State additionally argues that this claim is barred by the doctrine of res judicata

because defendant already raised this claim on his direct appeal or, alternatively, that defendant

forfeited this argument by failing to raise it on direct appeal. We disagree.

¶ 27    On direct appeal, defendant argued that he received ineffective assistance of counsel

because trial counsel should have pursued a motion to reconsider the motion to suppress evidence

ruling after Del Pilar testified that the 911 operator told her “to bring the evidence to the police

station.” Oliveros, 2019 IL App (1st) 161096-U, ¶ 37. We held that the record clearly reflected

that Del Pilar was not acting as an agent of the State, and therefore trial counsel was not ineffective

by failing to make a motion to reconsider the suppression ruling. Oliveros, 2019 IL App (1st)

161096-U, ¶ 40. The issue now before us is plainly different with distinct facts. The direct appeal

                                                - 10 -
No. 1-21-0303

argument was grounded in ineffective assistance of counsel, while defendant’s petition puts forth

a Brady/Napue due process violation. The claim is also based on information that did not appear

in the record on direct appeal, and for that reason, it could not have been raised on direct appeal.

¶ 28                              D. Gist of a Constitutional Claim

¶ 29   The question, then, is whether defendant’s petition sets out a claim that is arguably

constitutional. If we take defendant’s petition at face value as we are required to do, except where

contradicted by the record, it paints the following picture. De La Torre testified at the motion to

suppress evidence hearing that he obtained a search warrant, confusingly, both “on or after October

5, 2012,” and on October 5, 2012. The search warrant itself, appended to defendant’s petition,

disagrees with that accounting. Handwriting near the top of the search warrant appears to say

“ASA” with a redacted name, followed by “12/6/2012 @ 1325.” The authorizing judge’s signature

at the bottom, in different handwriting, is dated “12-7-12 @ 12:45 p.m.” De La Torre’s subsequent

December 7, 2012, complaint for a warrant to search the additional digital storage found by Del

Pilar incorrectly stated that the warrant for defendant’s cellphone was approved on December 6,

2012. It also stated that, “A search of offender’s cellular phone revealed images of J.S. and offender

engaged in an act of sexual conduct and/or penetration.”

¶ 30   De La Torre’s February 4, 2013, report, completed weeks before the cellphone was given

to the RCFL, stated that “The alleged phone was viewed pursuant to a search warrant and digital

images were retrieved in which victim and alleged offender are seen engaging in sexual acts.” But

De La Torre insisted at the motion to suppress hearing that he never turned the cellphone on prior

to turning it over to the RCFL.

                                                - 11 -
No. 1-21-0303

¶ 31   There is a clearly identifiable and arguable claim of prejudice that flows from this. At a

minimum, there is an indication that an actual search of the phone took place long before it was

sent to the RCFL, while, according to the property logs, De La Torre was in possession of it. This

arguably contradicts and impeaches his testimony at the hearing that he never turned the cellphone

on prior to turning it over to the RCFL. Defendant’s exhibits also suggest that De La Torre’s

testimony about when the search warrant was issued was also vulnerable to impeachment. Indeed,

defendant’s exhibits raise the specter that the search of the cellphone may have actually taken place

prior to the warrant’s issuance. At a minimum, these irregularities and inconsistencies would have

permitted an argument that De La Torre was not credible, and perhaps, an argument that a

warrantless search of the cellphone took place.

¶ 32   In its brief, the State offers that De La Torre “may have also been mistaken or misspoke

when he said he did not open the cellphone before dropping it at the RCFL.” While it is certainly

a possibility that De La Torre’s testimony contained nothing more than innocent mistakes, it is not

for us to weigh credibility or perform fact-finding about De La Torre’s motives or intent at this

stage. People v. Morales, 2019 IL App (1st) 160225, ¶ 26. Furthermore, given that multiple

documents created by De La Torre state unequivocally that the cellphone was searched, and that

sexually explicit materials were recovered, this is not simply a question of whether De La Torre

forgot whether he turned the cellphone on. Based on his own writings, he knew the cellphone had

been searched long before it went to the RCFL. Therefore, the issue implicated by defendant’s

exhibits is when the phone was first searched by law enforcement.

¶ 33   The State further suggests that “it is also possible that it was another officer who did so

[searched the phone] pursuant to the search warrant so that the detective was correct in his answer

                                               - 12 -
No. 1-21-0303

that he did not open the phone.” This is purely speculative, but it also does the opposite of

dispelling the potential for prejudice. De La Torre’s references to the search of the cellphone in

his report and the December 7, 2012, complaint for a warrant for the additional digital storage

contained no details about who searched defendant’s cellphone and when, despite the fact that his

report contained many other chronological specifics of the investigation including names, dates,

and even times. But the custody log defendant produced showed that no one but De La Torre was

in possession of defendant’s cellphone at all relevant times on or after December 7, 2012, when

the search warrant was approved. The State now suggests that maybe some other unknown CPD

officer had possession of and searched defendant’s cellphone at an unknown date and time,

apparently unbeknownst to the detective tasked with investigating the case. If that were so, it would

only support the arguable nature of defendant’s claim that information relevant to the search of

defendant’s cellphone was never tendered.

¶ 34    At the first stage, we are not required, nor permitted, to weigh evidence or contemplate the

likelihood of whether defendant can prove all the elements of his claims. We need only decide

whether it is arguable that the potential impeachment of De La Torre could have impacted the

outcome of the motion to suppress, and thus the rest of the trial, under either the Brady or Napue

standard. The answer is yes, and that is all that is required at the first stage.

¶ 35    The first-stage review is meant to screen out those petitions that are without legal substance

or obviously without merit. Tate, 2012 IL 112214, ¶ 9. But most first-stage petitions, like the one

in this case, are drafted by pro se defendants who lack the guiding hand of counsel, and thus the

threshold for survival is a low one. Id. Whether defendant can make the necessary showings to

survive the second stage and beyond is a question for another day that we need not and cannot

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No. 1-21-0303

address. For now, it is enough to say that he has articulated the mere gist of a constitutional claim

and is entitled to proceed to the second stage with the appointment of counsel.

¶ 36                                    III. CONCLUSION

¶ 37   For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for

second-stage proceedings and the appointment of counsel.

¶ 38   Reversed and remanded.

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