Court Opinion

ID: 9940337
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-13 23:17:53.409544+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:44:47.007863
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                                February 13, 2024
                                                                                   C. CASEY FORBES, CLERK
                             STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA                              SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS

                           SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS                                   OF WEST VIRGINIA

In re M.S., K.C., and B.W.

No. 23-66 (Kanawha County 22-JA-195, 22-JA-196, and 22-JA-198)

                               MEMORANDUM DECISION

        Petitioner Mother T.S. 1 appeals the Circuit Court of Kanawha County’s January 5, 2023,
order terminating her parental rights to M.S., K.C., and B.W., 2 claiming her parental rights were
erroneously terminated based on drug possession alone or that a less restrictive dispositional
alternative was proper. Upon our review, we determine that oral argument is unnecessary and that
a memorandum decision affirming the circuit court’s order is appropriate. See W. Va. R. App. P.
21.

        In May 2022, the DHS filed a petition alleging that law enforcement responded to a call
that C.M., the father of M.S., was unresponsive in a vehicle with petitioner and M.S. According to
the petition, C.M. “had injected an unknown substance” and was transported to the hospital by
ambulance. The petition further alleged that “after [petitioner] witnessed [C.M.] become
unresponsive from having injected the unknown substance, she decided not to inject the substance
and hid the syringe and drugs in her bra.” Law enforcement recovered the drugs and syringe and
arrested petitioner for crimes related to child neglect. According to the petition, shortly before the
filing of the current matter, petitioner was party to a prior abuse and neglect proceeding concerning
K.C. and B.W. predicated on her substance abuse problem, which had not been remedied. Based
on the foregoing, the DHS alleged that petitioner abused and neglected the children.

       1
        Petitioner appears by counsel Sandra K. Bullman. The West Virginia Department of
Human Services appears by counsel Attorney General Patrick Morrisey and Assistant Attorney
General Jason Trautwein. Counsel Bryan B. Escue appears as the children’s guardian ad litem.

       Additionally, pursuant to West Virginia Code § 5F-1-2, the agency formerly known as the
West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources was terminated, effective January 1,
2024, and is now three separate agencies—the Department of Health Facilities, the Department of
Health, and the Department of Human Services. For purposes of abuse and neglect appeals, the
agency is now the Department of Human Services (“DHS”).
       2
       We use initials where necessary to protect the identities of those involved in this case. See
W. Va. R. App. P. 40(e).

                                                  1
         At the subsequent preliminary hearing, the DHS presented testimony from a Child
Protective Services (“CPS”) worker who responded to the incident giving rise to the petition.
According to the CPS worker, petitioner admitted that C.M. overdosed in the car before she was
arrested. During the hearing, the court also noted that there was “an active [domestic violence
protective order] already in effect” barring petitioner from contact with K.C. Ultimately, the court
ordered the DHS to provide petitioner services and directed that she could participate in supervised
visitation with the children “contingent upon random and negative drug screens.”

        In anticipation of the adjudicatory hearing, the DHS filed a court summary that indicated
petitioner was not properly drug screening, as she had missed seventeen out of twenty-one screens
and was “not drug screening randomly she is choosing what days she goes.” In June 2022, the
court held an adjudicatory hearing, during which the CPS worker again testified to the incident
giving rise to the petition, include law enforcement removing objects from petitioner’s bra upon
her arrest. According to the CPS worker, law enforcement indicated that they removed drugs from
petitioner and arrested her for “child abuse,” although the worker stated she did not believe
petitioner was under the influence at the time. Petitioner then testified and confirmed she was
arrested for her conduct and that the substance police took from her was methamphetamine.
Despite this admission, petitioner claimed that she did not have a substance abuse problem. In
regard to C.M.’s overdose, petitioner claimed not to have seen it because she “wasn’t looking at
him” and that he must have injected the drugs “[w]hen [she] reached to grab . . . food.” Finally,
petitioner confirmed that she had recently received “six or seven months” of services in the prior
abuse and neglect proceeding. After the presentation of evidence, the court took judicial notice
that petitioner had been charged with the felony offense of child neglect resulting in the risk of
injury. Based on the evidence, the court adjudicated petitioner of abusing and neglecting the
children. The court ordered petitioner to continue participating in drug screens and was explicit
that any missed screens would be considered failed.

         In November 2022, the court held a dispositional hearing, during which a CPS worker
testified that petitioner failed to cooperate with the required drug screens. According to the witness,
petitioner missed forty-five screens during the proceedings. Based on petitioner’s history of
adjudication for substance abuse and refusal to screen as directed, the DHS requested the
termination of petitioner’s parental rights. Petitioner testified, disputed the number of missed
screens, and claimed that the screens she missed were because she “was sick and . . . had car
issues.” Based on petitioner’s failure to participate in services, the court found that there was no
reasonable likelihood she could substantially correct the conditions of abuse and neglect in the
near future and that termination of her parental rights was in the children’s best interests.
Accordingly, the court terminated petitioner’s parental rights. 3 It is from the dispositional order
that petitioner appeals.

       3
         K.C. and B.W. were placed in the custody of their nonabusing fathers. According to
respondents, M.S.’s father is participating in drug court, and the permanency plan for M.S. is
reunification with the father with a concurrent plan of adoption in the current placement.

                                                  2
        On appeal from a final order in an abuse and neglect proceeding, this Court reviews the
circuit court’s findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo. Syl. Pt. 1, In re
Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011). Before this Court, petitioner first argues that it
was error to adjudicate her because “drug possession alone does not constitute child abuse and
neglect.” Despite admitting that she “was in a bad situation” when C.M. overdosed in the vehicle,
petitioner argues that she was not under the influence. These arguments, however, cannot entitle
petitioner to relief because she ignores the fact that her admitted possession of methamphetamine
and presence in the vehicle while C.M. injected drugs is clear evidence of her ongoing substance
abuse, especially in light of her recent adjudication for substance abuse and remedial services to
address the same in a prior proceeding. This evidence, coupled with petitioner’s arrest for child
neglect creating risk of injury and the active domestic violence protective order, clearly
demonstrates that petitioner posed a threat to the children’s welfare. As set forth in West Virginia
Code § 49-1-201, a “neglected child” is, among other things, one “[w]hose physical or mental
health is . . . threatened” by a parent’s “refusal, failure or inability . . . to supply the child with
necessary supervision.” As set forth above, petitioner’s ongoing substance abuse issues resulted in
her inability to properly supervise the children. Accordingly, we find that the DHS presented
sufficient evidence to support petitioner’s adjudication for neglecting the children. 4 See Syl. Pt. 1,
In re Joseph A., 199 W. Va. 438, 485 S.E.2d 176 (1997) (“[West Virginia Code § 49-4-601(i)],
requires the [DHS] . . . to prove ‘conditions existing at the time of the filing of the petition . . . by
clear and convincing [evidence].’ The statute, however, does not specify any particular manner or
mode of testimony or evidence by which the [DHS] is obligated to meet this burden.”).

         Finally, petitioner argues that because two of the children were placed with their
nonabusing fathers, termination of her parental rights was unnecessary and did not constitute the
least restrictive dispositional alternative. It must first be noted that petitioner raises no argument
regarding the termination of her parental rights to M.S., the lone child who was not placed with a
nonabusing father at the outset. Further, petitioner’s argument concerning K.C. and B.W. ignores
our prior direction that West Virginia Code § 49-4-604 “permits the termination of one parent’s
parental rights while leaving the rights of the nonabusing parent completely intact, if the
circumstances so warrant.” In re Emily, 208 W. Va. 325, 344, 540 S.E.2d 542, 561 (2000).
Moreover, “simply because one parent has been found to be a fit and proper caretaker for [the]
child does not automatically entitle the child’s other parent to retain his/her parental rights if his/her
conduct has endangered the child and such conditions of abuse and/or neglect are not expected to
improve.” Id. Accordingly, this argument cannot entitle petitioner to relief. Based upon our review
of the record, the evidence overwhelmingly supports the circuit court’s findings in support of
termination of petitioner’s parental rights, and we find no error in the court’s decision not to impose
a less restrictive dispositional alternative. See W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6) (permitting circuit
court to terminate parental rights upon finding no reasonable likelihood that conditions of neglect
can be substantially corrected in the near future and when necessary for child’s welfare); see also
Syl. Pt. 5, In re Kristin Y., 227 W. Va. 558, 712 S.E.2d 55 (2011) (permitting termination of
parental rights “without the use of intervening less restrictive alternatives when it is found that
there is no reasonable likelihood . . . that conditions of neglect . . . can be substantially corrected”).

        4
       We note that the circuit court additionally adjudicated petitioner of abuse. However,
because we find that petitioner’s adjudication for neglecting the children was sufficient, it is
unnecessary to address the court’s ruling concerning abuse.
                                                    3
       For the foregoing reasons, we find no error in the decision of the circuit court, and its
January 5, 2023, order is hereby affirmed.

                                                                                          Affirmed.

ISSUED: February 13, 2024

CONCURRED IN BY:

Chief Justice Tim Armstead
Justice Elizabeth D. Walker
Justice John A. Hutchison
Justice William R. Wooton

DISSENTING:

Justice C. Haley Bunn

BUNN, Justice, dissenting:

        I dissent to the majority’s resolution of this matter because I would vacate, in part, and
remand this case for the circuit court to make the findings required to exercise subject matter
jurisdiction over the children K.C. and B.W. pursuant to Syl. pt. 3, in part, In re B.V., 248 W. Va.
29, 886 S.E.2d 364 (2023) (“To exercise subject matter jurisdiction, the court must make specific
factual findings explaining how each child’s health and welfare are being harmed or threatened by
the allegedly abusive or neglectful conduct of the parties named in the petition. Due to the
jurisdictional nature of this question, generalized findings applicable to all children named in the
petition will not suffice; the circuit court must make specific findings with regard to each child so
named.”). Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

                                                 4