Court Opinion

ID: 9428258
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:23:16.732239+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:58.238557
License: Public Domain

Justice Marshall,
with whom Justice Brennan joins, dissenting.
A summary reversal is a rare disposition, usually reserved by this Court for situations in which the law is settled and stable, the facts are not in dispute, and the decision below is clearly in error. Because this is not such a case, I dissent from the majority’s summary reversal of the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and would instead grant the petition and set the case for plenary consideration.
The issue here is important, not only in economic terms to respondent Hansen, but in constitutional terms as well. The question of when the Government may be equitably estopped has divided the distinguished panel of the Court of Appeals in this case, has received inconsistent treatment from other Courts of Appeals, and has been the subject of considerable ferment. See, e. g., Corniel-Rodriguez v. INS, 532 F. 2d 301 (CA2 1976); United States v. Lazy FC Ranch, 481 F. 2d 985 (CA9 1973); United States v. Fox Lake State Bank, 366 F. 2d 962 (CA7 1966); Walsonavich v. United States, 335 F. 2d 96 (CA3 1964); Simmons v. United States, 308 F. 2d 938 (CA5 1962); Semaan v. Mumford, 118 U. S. App. D. C. 282, 335 F. 2d 704 (1964); Eichelberger v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 88 F. 2d 874 (CA5 1937). See generally K. Davis, Administrative Law of the Seventies § 17.01 (1976); Note, Equitable Estoppel of the Government, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 551 (1979). Indeed, the majority today recognizes that “[t]his Court has never decided what type of conduct by a Government employee will estop the Government from insisting upon compliance with valid regulations governing the distribution of welfare benefits.” Ante, at 788. The majority goes on to suggest that estoppel may be justified in some circumstances. Yet rather than address the issue in a compre*792hensive fashion, the Court simply concludes that this is not such a case.1 The apparent message of today’s decision — that we will know an estoppel when we see one — provides inadequate guidance to the lower courts in an area of the law that, contrary to the majority’s view, is far from settled.
Indeed, the majority’s attempt to distinguish conflicting decisions of other courts itself demonstrates the impropriety of today’s summary disposition. The majority declines to “consider the correctness of these cases” and instead simply notes that they are distinguishable on their facts from the present case. Ante, at 789, n. 4. Yet the majority fails to explain why or how these purported factual distinctions affect the legal question of when the Government may be equitably estopped. Thus, the lower courts are left guessing whether the factual differences cited by the majority are of any real consequence. For example, the majoritv distinguishes Semaan v. Mumford, supra, on the ground that “es-toppel did not threaten the public fisc.” Ante, at 789, n. 4. Even accepting this characterization as correct,2 I am unable to discern from the majority’s opinion why the rules governing estoppel should differ depending on whether the party as*793serting an estoppel seeks monetary benefits from the Government instead of some other form of Government action or inaction. Similarly, the majority distinguishes United States v. Fox Lake State Bank, supra, on the ground it involved a claim of estoppel by “a bank [that] had erred in certain applications because it had to file before the Government would provide it with necessary information.” Ante, at 789, n. 4. I trust that the majority does not intend to suggest that a claim of estoppel is more likely to prevail when raised by a bank rather than by a person eligible for Social Security benefits, but I do not believe that the majority's other basis for distinguishing that case — that the Government failed to provide the information necessary to file correct applications — is substantively different from the Government’s failure in this case to supply respondent with correct information when she sought to apply for benefits. The third distinction offered by the majority — one that apparently differentiates between written statements by the Government and oral ones — might be relevant to the proof of the Government’s conduct in some cases. However, estoppel against the Government has not been restricted in the past to written misrepresentations, see, e. g., Simmons v. United States, supra, and today’s decision leaves unclear whether or when such a limitation will apply in the future. Thus, I believe that the majority, in its haste to reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, has simply added confusion to an already unsettled area by hinting, but not deciding, that various factual nuances may be dispositive of estoppel claims against the Government.
Moreover, in summarily reversing the judgment of the Court of Appeals, the majority glosses over the sorts of situations — such as that presented by this case — that have increasingly led courts to conclude that in some cases hard and fast rules against estoppel of the Government are neither fair nor constitutionally required. The majority characterizes Con-nelly’s conduct in this case as little more than an innocent mistake, based possibly on his unfamiliarity with a “recent *794amendment” rendering respondent eligible for benefits, or possibly, the majority speculates, on respondent’s failure to give Connelly sufficient “information ... to know that he was in error.” Ante, at 789. The majority further concludes that this error was essentially harmless, because, in the majority’s view, it “did not cause respondent to . .. fail to take action .. . that respondent could not correct at any time.” Ibid.
While these characterizations certainly facilitate the summary disposition the majority seeks, they do not fit this case. The “recent amendment” had been in effect for a year and a half when respondent was incorrectly informed that she was not eligible. Moreover, it is quite clear that respondent provided Connelly with sufficient information on which to make a correct judgment, had he been so inclined.3 Finally, to conclude that Connelly’s incorrect assessment of respondent’s eligibility did not cause her to act to her detriment in a manner that she “could not correct at any time” is to blink in the face of the obvious. Connelly, and not respondent, had the legal duty to meet with Social Security applicants and advise them concerning their eligibility for benefits. While not necessarily free of error, such preliminary advice is inevitably accorded great weight by applicants who — like respondent— are totally uneducated in the intricacies of the Social Security *795laws. Hence, the majority’s effort to cast respondent as the architect of her own predicament is wholly unpersuasive. Instead, the fault for respondent’s failure to file a timely application for benefits that she was entitled to must rest squarely with the Government, first, because its agent incorrectly advised her that she was ineligible for benefits, and, second, because the same agent breached his duty to encourage to file a written application regardless of his views on her eligibility.
In my view, when this sort of governmental misconduct directly causes an individual’s failure to comply with a purely procedural requirement established by the agency, it may be sufficient to estop the Government from denying that individual benefits that she is substantively entitled to receive. Indeed, in an analogous situation, we concluded that before an agency “may extinguish the entitlement of . . . otherwise eligible beneficiaries, it must comply, at a minimum, with its own internal procedures.” Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U. S. 199, 235 (1974). At the very least, the questioñ deserves more than the casual treatment it receives from the majority today.

 Ironically, the central caso relied on by the majority today, INS v. Hibi, 414 U. S. 5 (1973), was also a yier curiam decision rendered without the benefit of briefing and oral argument. Moreover, in that case the applicant applied for the soughl -after benefit — naturalization—-20 years after his substantive eligibility had expired, and the claim of estoppel arose solely from an alleged general failure of the Government to adequately inform noncitizens who served with the Armed Services of the United Plates during World War II of their possible eligibility for naturalization. Here, in contrast, respondent was eligible for the benefits at the time of her interview with Connelly and the claim of estoppel here arises from Connelly’s specific failures to answer correctly her questions concerning eligibility and to encourage her to file an application.

 In Semaan, the benefit ultimately sought by the party claiming estoppel was reinstatement in the job from which he was discharged. Thus, I believe that the majority errs in claiming that the estoppel “did not threaten the public fisc.” Ante, at 789, n. 4.

 The apparent basis for the majority’s speculation that respondent may not have informed Connelly of all the relevant facts is Judge Friendly’s assertion, in dissent, that Connelly did not know that respondent’s husband had died. This view is wholly implausible. Respondent asked Connelly whether she was eligible for mother’s insurance benefits. These benefits are only available to persons whose spouses have died, 42 U. S. C. § 402 (g), a fact that must have been known to Connelly. It is clear from the record that Connelly assumed that respondent’s husband had died, and instead focused his questions on respondent’s marital status at the time of her husband’s death, in the mistaken belief that she would be ineligible if she was divorced at that time. Thus, respondent testified before the Administrative Law Judge that Connelly “said I was not [eligible] because I was divorced at the time of my husband’s death.” App. to Brief in Opposition 2a. (Emphasis added.)