Court Opinion

ID: 9720976
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:45:54.435366+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:22.600188
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.
(concurring). I agree with the majority that the trial court’s refusal to give the identification instruction offered by the defendant does not constitute reversible error in this case, because the attention of the jury was significantly focused on the question of identity.
Nevertheless, I would urge circuit courts not to use as a model identification instruction, Wis. J I — Criminal, Part I, 141. Until the Criminal Jury Instruction Committee proposes a change, I suggest circuit court adapt for their use the following instruction set forth in United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552, 558, 559 (D.C. Cir. 1972), which was patterned after an instruction used in the state courts of Pennsylvania, United States v. Barber, 442 F.2d 517, 528 (3d Cir. 1971):

“Model Special Instructions on Identification

“One of the most important issues in this case is the identification of the defendant as the perpetrator of the crime. The Government has the burden of providing *466identity, beyond a reasonable doubt. It is not essential that the witness himself be free from doubt as to the correctness of his statement. However, you, the jury, must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the accuracy of the identification of the defendant before you may convict him. If you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was the person who committed the crime, you must find the defendant not guilty.
“Identification testimony is an expression of belief or impression by the witness. Its value depends on the opportunity the witness had to observe the offender_ at the time of the offense and to make a reliable identification later.
“In appraising the identification testimony of a witness, you should consider the following:
“(1) Are you convinced that the witness had the capacity and an adequate opportunity to observe the offender?
“Whether the witness had an adequate opportunity to observe the offender at the time of the offense will be affected by such matters as how long or short a time was available, how far or close the witness was, how good were lighting conditions, whether the witness had had occasion to see or know the person in the past.
“[In general, a witness bases any identification he makes on his perception through the use of his senses. Usually the witness identifies an offender by the sense of sight — but this is not necessarily so, and he may use other senses.]
“Sentence in brackets ([]) to be used only if appropriate. Instructions to be inserted or modified as appropriate to the proof and contentions.”
“(2) Are you satisfied that the identification made by the witness subsequent to the offense was the product of his own recollection? You may take into account both the strength of the identification, and the circumstances under which the identification was made.
“If the identification by the witness may have been influenced by the circumstances under which the defendant was presented to him for identification, you should scrutinize the identification with great care. You may also consider the length of time that lapsed between the *467occurrence of the crime and the next opportunity of the witness to see defendant, as a factor bearing on the reliability of the identification.
“[You may also take into account that an identification made by picking the defendant out of a group of similar individuals is generally more reliable than one which results from the presentation of the defendant alone to the witness.]
“[(3) You make take into account any occasions in which the witness failed to make an identification of defendant, or made an identification that was inconsistent with his identification at trial.]
“ (4) Finally, you must consider the credibility of each identification witness in the same way as any other witness, consider whether he is trustful, and consider whether he had the capacity and opportunity to make a reliable observation on the matter covered in his testimony.
“I again emphasize that the burden of proof on the prosecutor extends to every element of the crime charged, and this specifically includes the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator of the crime with which he stands charged. If after examining the testimony, you have a reasonable doubt as to the accuracy of the identification, you must find the defendant not guilty.”
I do not propose that the Telfaire instruction be used verbatim. It is a model which the trial court should use with revision and adaptation to fit the evidence and contentions in the case at hand.
I recognize that the giving of instructions on identification is largely within the discretion of the trial court; that defense counsel’s cross examination and summation can focus on the possibility of mistaken identification and can apprise the jury that the identification made by the witness is the underlying issue in the case; and that a number of instructions, including Instruction 141, Wis. J I — Criminal, Part I., clearly tell the jury of its duty to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was properly identified as the perpetrator of the crime. *468Nevertheless, I conclude that the Wisconsin instruction is too skeletal and that the trial court must, where appropriate, give a more exacting charge to emphasize the nature of the identification issue.
A special identification instruction is needed because identification testimony is at one and the same time notably convincing and notably fallible. Within recent months, newspapers across the country reported the case of a priest who was mistakenly identified as the perpetrator of the crime. In United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir. 1972), the court explained the problem of mistaken identification and the need for a special instruction when identification is a key issue as follows:
“The presumption of innocence that safeguards the common law system must be a premise that is realized in instruction and not merely a promise. In pursuance of that objective, we have pointed out the importance of and need for a special instruction on the key issue of identification, which emphasizes to the jury the need for finding that the circumstances of the identification are convincing beyond a reasonable doubt. This need was voiced in 1942 in McKenzie v. United States6 and it has been given vitality in our opinions of recent years — following the Supreme Court’s 1966 Wade-Gilbert-Stovall trilogy7 focusing on the very real danger of mistaken identification as a threat to justice. We refer to our post-Wade opinions in Gregory8 and Macklin.9 These opinions sought to take into account the traditional recognition that identification testimony presents special problems of reliability10 by stressing the importance of an identification instruction even in cases meeting the constitutional threshold of admissability.11
*469Several federal courts of appeal have either urged or required federal district courts to use the Telfaire model instruction with appropriate adaptations for the particular case. In United States v. Hodges, 515 F.2d 650, 653 (7th Cir. 1975), the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit stated “We now adopt what we labeled to be the better practice in Napue, supra [United States v. Napue, 401 F.2d 107, 112 (7th Cir. 1968)], as the required practice in this Circuit, and although it is not our intention to require that the Telfaire model be given verbatim, we hereby publish notice that we shall in the future view with grave concern the failure to give the substantial equivalent of such an instruction.”
I believe the circuit courts of this state should be on similar “notice.”

“6 75 U.S. App. D.C. 270, 126 F.2d 533.

“7 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S. Ct. 1926, 18 L. Ed.2d 1149 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 87 S. Ct. 1951, 18 L. Ed.2d 1178 (1967); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 87 S. Ct. 1967, 18 L. Ed.2d 1199 (1967); Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 88 S. Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968).

“8 Gregory v. United States, 125 U.S. App. D.C. 140, 369 F.2d 185 (1966). See Salley v. United States, 122 U.S. App. D.C. 359, 353 F.2d 897 (1965).

“9 Macklin v. United States, 133 U.S. App. D.C. 139, 409 F.2d 174 (1969).

“10 E.g., P. Wall, Eye-Witness Identification in Criminal Cases 8-11 (1965); 3 Wigmore, Evidence §786(a) (Chadbourn rev. 1970) (compendium of sources).

“11 We think that now, after the Supreme Court has focused on identification problems in its 1967 Wade-Gilbert-Stovall trilogy, it is even more imperative that trial courts include, as a matter of routine, an identification instruction. In cases where identification is a major issue the judge should not rely on defense counsel to request so important a charge. Macklin v. United States, supra note 9, at 143, 409 F.2d at 178. The quoted language was held non-retroactive in United States v. Washington, 134 U.S. App. D.C. 135, 413 F.2d 409 (1969).”