Court Opinion

ID: 9746087
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 13:57:04.786013+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:08.650021
License: Public Domain

JOHNSON, J., Concurring and Dissenting.
I concur in all portions of the majority opinion, with the exception of part 3b. of that opinion which upholds imposition of upper term sentences despite the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in Cunningham v. California1 I do so for reasons recited previously in both majority and dissenting opinions and repeat here only because the California Supreme Court already has or is likely to grant review, as it appears to have done in all Cunningham cases.
In my view, on this record we cannot conclude the trial court would have imposed the high terms on each and all of these counts based solely on its *1518assumed, findings appellant had served a prior prison term and had “numerous” convictions. Indeed, because the trial court failed to put its findings on the record, we have to speculate whether it would have made those findings and also whether it would have considered them worthy of mention to say nothing of determinative of its decision to impose the high term sentences on these counts.
For purposes of this dissent, I accept the test the California Supreme Court announced in People v. Avalos.2 That is, in reviewing a sentence based on both proper and improper aggravating factors we “must . . . reverse where [we] cannot determine whether the improper factor was determinative for the sentencing court.”3
4It is not what could have been determinative if the trial court had known some of the factors it used would turn out to have been improper. Rather, it is what the sentencing court did use that “was determinative” in fixing the sentence the trial court actually meted out.
Here we have only speculation to guide us in seeking to divine which factors the trial court used at all and which of those factors were determinative in raising the sentences on these counts to the upper term. From the majority opinion itself, we do know most of the available aggravating factors were ones only a jury not a judge could properly find true under Cunningham.
The majority opinion cites a passage from the Supreme Court’s opinion in People v. Osband4 to the effect “[o]nly a single aggravating factor is required to impose the upper term.”5 But this pr&-Apprendi case has little relevance to the case before this court. After upholding the death sentence Osband received for a rape-murder, the court turned to the determinate prison sentences the trial court imposed for other offenses occurring during the crime. Finding the trial court violated the “dual use” prohibition by using one of the aggravating factors to both make the sentences consecutive and to impose the high term on one of those offenses, the court had to decide whether the high term could be affirmed on the basis of other aggravating factors. “ ‘Improper dual use of the same fact for imposition of both an upper term and a consecutive term or other enhancement does not necessitate resentencing if “[i]t is not reasonably probable that a more favorable sentence would have been imposed in the absence of the error.” ’ [Citation.] .... In this case, the court could have selected disparate facts from among those it *1519recited to justify the imposition of both a consecutive sentence and the upper term, and on this record we discern no reasonable probability that it would not have done so.”6
Osband and its statement saying a single aggravating factor will suffice is readily distinguishable. In that case, only Watson error was involved—dual use of an aggravating factor in violation of a statutory prohibition. Thus, the reviewing court only remands for resentencing if it finds a “reasonable probability” the trial court would not have imposed the. high term had the improper factor been unavailable. Furthermore, in Osband only one of several strong aggravating factors had been found improper. It was as if in the case before this court somehow only the trial court’s finding of victim vulnerability had violated Cunningham and its predecessors, while any of the several other aggravating factors relating to violence, appellant’s leadership position, and the planning, sophistication or professionalism of the crime had remained available to upgrade the sentences on these offenses. While it is true even a single legitimate aggravating factor can support an upper term, that is true only if the trial court indeed found that single legitimate factor sufficient by itself to impose the upper term sentence it did—or definitely would have if it were the only aggravating factor in the case. The mere presence of a legitimate aggravating factor does not justify upholding an upper term sentence.
In the case before this court, in contrast to Osband, the nonrecidivist factors the trial court, rather than the jury, found to be true were not just improper, but constitutionally improper. Consequently, the Chapman standard7 applies and we must remand for resentencing unless we can determine beyond a reasonable doubt the improper factor or factors were not determinative in the sense of tipping the scale toward the upper term. Here we have nothing but speculation about what the judge might have done to make that evaluation.
The majority suggests the presence of any prior conviction in a defendant’s past effectively negates Apprendi-Blakely-Cunningham. In this case, as long as the trial court had before it a prior conviction or some other recidivist factor which it might have used to elevate defendant’s punishment defendant is to be considered “exposed” to that aggravated term and thus it does not violate Cunningham and its predecessors. Furthermore, because appellant was “exposed” to the high term by the mere presence of a prior in his record (even though that prior may not have been determinative in the trial court’s imposition of the high term) the trial court was free to itself find and use other aggravating factors the jury otherwise would be required to find when *1520the court was making the court’s decision whether or not in fact to elevate the sentence from the midterm to the high term. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1514.)
According to this line of reasoning, a conviction or other recidivist factor a trial court did not consider serious enough by itself to warrant an upper term nonetheless trumps Cunningham and its predecessors. The mere presence of that prior conviction in a defendant’s record permits a trial judge rather than the jury to find the factors the court deems the true reason for raising the sentence beyond that permitted by the findings the jury made. The result? Apprendi-Blakely-Cunningham would only apply when trial courts are sentencing defendants who have no prior convictions. Even a single prior conviction, or a single juvenile adjudication many years in the past, would be enough to disable the requirement aggravating factors be decided by a jury not the sentencing judge.
In my view, this position represents the sort of narrow reading of Apprendi which would force the United States Supreme Court to once again emphasize it meant what it said in that opinion, as it did in Blakely and now in Cunningham. I find nothing in Apprendi, Blakely or Cunningham to suggest the requirement of jury findings as to aggravating factors other than prior convictions is disabled in any and all cases where the defendant had a prior conviction. Yes, a prior conviction can be used to elevate a sentence without a jury finding. Yes, a trial judge can use a prior conviction alone as the sole grounds for elevating a sentence—at least when that is appropriate. But this does not mean the prior conviction can serve as a smokescreen behind which the trial judge in fact employs other factors as the true reasons for determining the higher term is warranted.
Perhaps it will be helpful to clarify the limited point of this dissent in the context of the case before this court. I am not saying remand would necessarily be required had the trial judge expressly said he would elevate the sentence to the upper term based solely on the prior convictions and related behavior. (Such a statement would compel a reviewing court to determine whether this represented an abuse of discretion, however, something I need not address here.) Had the judge made this clear during the sentencing hearing, reversal might not be required even though he had gone on to say he also found the other aggravating factors to be enough by themselves to impose the high term.
But the trial judge here did something entirely different. He imposed the upper terms without stating why he was doing so, and without even making any findings as to any of those factors.
*1521Accordingly, I would remand for resentencing. At that hearing, without any further findings, the trial court could impose the midterm on any or all of the offenses on which it previously imposed the high term. As to any of the offenses on which it proposes to impose the high term once again, however, the trial court would be required to ignore the factors it improperly found true and determine whether it would still elevate the sentence to the high term as to that offense based solely on (1) the elements of the offense charged and found true beyond a reasonable doubt by the jury, and (2) appellant’s prior convictions for which no jury finding is required.
Appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied October 17, 2007, S155357. George, C. J., did not participate therein.

 Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270 [166 L.Ed.2d 856, 127 S.Ct. 856].

 People v. Avalos (1984) 37 Cal.3d 216 [207 Cal.Rptr. 549, 689 P.2d 121].

 People v. Avalos, supra, 37 Cal.3d at page 233, italics added.

 People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 26, 919 P.2d 640], upholding the death penalty as well as upper term and consecutive sentences for related crimes in a rape-murder case.

 People v. Osband, supra, 13 Cal.4th at page 728.

 People v. Osband, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pages 728-729, italics added.

 Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 [17 L.Ed.2d 705, 87 S.Ct. 824],