Court Opinion

ID: 9910009
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-14 18:02:38.998466+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:50:26.085133
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/13/23 P. v. Huezo CA2/5
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE,                                                B324331

     Plaintiff and                                         (Los Angeles County
Respondent,                                                Super. Ct. No. LA062282)

         v.

JUAN CARLOS HUEZO,

     Defendant and
Appellant.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Gregory A. Dohi, Judge. Affirmed.
      Marta I. Stanton, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Steven E. Mercer,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                      I. INTRODUCTION

      The trial court sentenced defendant Juan Huezo to life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole (LWOP) for first
degree special circumstances murder, a crime he committed when
he was 22 years old. Years later, the court denied defendant’s
motion for a youth offender parole hearing pursuant to Penal
Code section 3051.1 On appeal, defendant contends that section
3051, subdivision (h), which excludes defendants who were 18- to
25-years old at the time of their crimes and sentenced to LWOP
from eligibility for a youth parole hearing, denies him equal
protection of the laws. We affirm.

                II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

      In 2010, a jury found defendant guilty of the first degree
murder (§ 187, subd. (a)) of Filemon Cortez and found true the
allegation that he personally used a dangerous and deadly
weapon in the commission of the murder (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1))
and the special circumstance allegation that the murder was
committed during the commission of a robbery (§ 190.2, subd.
(a)(17)). The trial court sentenced defendant to LWOP.
      On August 8, 2022, defendant submitted a motion for a
hearing under People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261
(Franklin). He acknowledged appellate court authority holding
that the exclusion of 18- to 25-year old defendants sentenced to
LWOP from eligibility for such hearings does not violate a right
to equal protection under the laws, but sought to preserve his
equal protection claim for further review.

1     Further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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      On August 19, 2022, the trial court denied defendant’s
motion, finding that defendant was statutorily ineligible for a
youth offender parole hearing because of his age at the time of his
offense and his LWOP sentence.
      Defendant timely filed a notice of appeal.

                       III. DISCUSSION

A.    Youth Offender Parole Hearings

       Section 3051 requires the Board of Parole Hearings to
conduct a “youth offender parole hearing” during the 15th, 20th,
or 25th year of a defendant’s incarceration if the defendant was
25 years or younger at the time of the “controlling offense,” that
is, “the offense or enhancement for which any sentencing court
imposed the longest term of imprisonment.” (§ 3051, subds.
(a)(2)(B), (b)(1)–(3).) “A person who was convicted of a controlling
offense that was committed when the person was 25 years of age
or younger and for which the sentence is a life term of 25 years to
life shall be eligible for release on parole at a youth offender
parole hearing during the person’s 25th year of incarceration.”
(§ 3051, subd. (b)(3).) Several categories of offenders, however,
are excluded from eligibility pursuant to section 3051,
subdivision (h), including offenders, such as defendant, who were
“sentenced to [LWOP] for a controlling offense that was
committed after the person had attained 18 years of age.”
       Our Supreme Court has held that offenders who are
eligible for youth offender parole hearings are entitled to a so-
called Franklin hearing “to provide an opportunity for the parties
to make an accurate record of the juvenile [or youth] offender’s

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characteristics and circumstances at the time of the offense so
that the Board, years later, may properly discharge its obligation
to ‘give great weight to’ youth-related factors [at a hearing held
pursuant to section 3051].” (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at
p. 284.)

B.    Equal Protection

       Defendant’s sole contention on appeal is that section 3051’s
exclusion of defendants who were 18- to 25-year olds at the time
of their offense and sentenced to LWOP violates the equal
protection clause of the United States and California
constitutions. According to defendant, youth offenders who are
convicted of special circumstance murder and sentenced to LWOP
are similarly situated to parole-eligible youth offenders convicted
of first degree murder and sentenced to a determinate term, and
there is no rational basis for distinguishing between the two
groups. He therefore contends that he was entitled to a Franklin
hearing.
       As defendant acknowledges, there is a split in authority
regarding the merits of his argument, with all but one published
case holding that section 3051 does not violate equal protection
under the law by excluding youth offenders sentenced to LWOP
from eligibility for youth offender parole hearings. (Compare
People v. Hardin (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 273, 287–288, review
granted Jan. 11, 2023, S277487, with People v. Sands (2021) 70
Cal.App.5th 193, 204–205; People v. Morales (2021) 67
Cal.App.5th 326, 347–349; People v. Ngo (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th
116, 127, review granted May 17, 2023, S279458.) Our Supreme
Court will ultimately decide the issue before us. Until then, we

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follow this court’s determination in In re Williams (2020) 57
Cal.App.5th 427 that section 3051’s exclusion of 18- to 25- year
old offenders who have been sentenced to LWOP from youth
offender parole hearings does not violate equal protection
principles. As the panel in that case explained: “The Legislature
has prescribed an LWOP sentence for only a small number of
crimes. These are the crimes the Legislature deems so morally
depraved and so injurious as to warrant a sentence that carries
no hope of release for the criminal and no threat of recidivism for
society. In excluding LWOP inmates from youth offender parole
hearings, the Legislature reasonably could have decided that
youthful offenders who have committed such crimes—even with
diminished culpability and increased potential for
rehabilitation—are nonetheless still sufficiently culpable and
sufficiently dangerous to justify lifetime incarceration.” (Id. at
p. 436.) Accordingly, the trial court did not err when it denied
defendant’s motion for a Franklin hearing.

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                      IV. DISPOSITION

     The order is affirmed.

     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                    KIM, J.

We concur:

             RUBIN, P. J.

             BAKER, J.

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