Court Opinion

ID: 9463532
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 23:09:33.935666+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:38:09.720929
License: Public Domain

EUGENE A. WRIGHT, Circuit Judge,
specially concurring:
In a recent decision, Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), the Supreme Court relied on many of the same factors we mention today to determine that the due process clause does not require that, prior to the termination of social security disability benefit payments, the recipient be afforded an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing. The Court noted that the following factors are to be considered in assessing the validity of any administrative decisionmaking process:
1. The degree of potential deprivation that may be created by the decision. Id. at 341, 96 S.Ct. 893.1
*12042. The fairness and reliability of the existing pretermination procedures, and the probable value, if any, of additional procedural safeguards. Id. at 343, 96 S.Ct. 8932
3. The public interest involved, including the administrative burden and other societal costs. Id. at 347, 96 S.Ct. 893.3
The Court also noted that written submissions could be adequate in the pretermination phase under certain conditions.4
The Court mentioned another factor which is often overlooked:
In assessing what process is due in this case, substantial weight must be given to the good-faith judgments of the individuals charged by Congress with the administration of social welfare system that the procedures they have provided assure fair consideration of the entitlement claims of individuals.
Id. at 349, 96 S.Ct. at 909.
Although I express no opinion on the adequacy of the postal regulations themselves, I feel that in the factual context of this case, consideration of the factors enumerated by the Court in Eldridge, combined with an examination of the opportunities that Sierra Club had to present evidence prior to the termination of its preferred status, indicate that it was afforded due process of law.
Even though Eldridge was entitled to judicial review before the administrative determination of his claim became final, id. at 349, 96 S.Ct. 893, this distinction is not controlling where Sierra Club had adequate opportunity to present its case between the tentative and final determinations and where the final action of the Postal Service is subject to judicial review. Cf. American Bible Society v. Blount, 446 F.2d 588, 596-97 (3rd Cir. 1971).

. The Court appeared to concentrate on financial need and the recipient’s ability to continue in gainful activity or otherwise be provided with sufficient resources. It also noted that length of wrongful deprivation could be a fac*1204tor. The delay in Eldridge’s case was approximately 10 to 11 months.

. The Court noted that central to the evaluation of the administrative process was the nature of the relevant inquiry, citing Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 617, 94 S.Ct. 1895, 40 L.Ed.2d 406 (1974). For a good discussion of the balancing process undertaken by the Court in its creditor cases see Comment, “Justice White’s Chemistry: The Mitchellization of Fuentes,” 50 Wash.L.Rev. 901 (1975). Analogies can be drawn from these cases to determine what interests should be taken into account.

. Part of the most visible burden, according to the Court, would be the incremental cost re-suiting from the increased number of hearings. The Government’s interest in conserving scarce fiscal and administrative resources was a factor to be weighed.

. Specifically, the Court thought that the conclusions of physicians, supported by X-rays and lab reports, was information typically more amenable to written than to oral presentation. It compared these professional sources to welfare recipients and lay witnesses supporting their cases. Arguably, the individuals providing information for the Sierra Club were more akin to the former than the latter.