Court Opinion

ID: 9387697
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-18 18:02:32.683538+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:07.984581
License: Public Domain

Filed 4/18/23 In re N.C. CA2/6
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                         DIVISION SIX

 In re N.C. et al.,                                             2d Juv. No. B323780
 Persons Coming Under the                                     (Super. Ct. Nos. J072703,
 Juvenile Court Law.                                                  J072848)
                                                                 (Ventura County)

 VENTURA COUNTY HUMAN
 SERVICES AGENCY,

      Plaintiff and Respondent,

 v.

 M.V.,

      Defendant and Appellant.

      M.V. (Father) appeals from the juvenile court order
terminating his parental rights as to N.C. and T.V. He contends
the court erred in concluding the Indian Child Welfare Act of
1978 (ICWA, 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.; Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224 et
seq.)1 did not apply. We affirm.
            FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
       Mother and Father had two sons together, N.C. and T.V.
The Ventura County Human Services Agency (the agency) filed
dependency petitions regarding N.C. (§ 300, subds. (b)(1), (g), (j))
and T.V. (§ 300, subds. (b)(1), (j)).
       The juvenile court sustained both petitions. The court
found the ICWA did not apply, terminated parental rights, and
found adoption to be the permanent plan. (§ 366.26.)
                          ICWA investigation
       Both Mother and the maternal grandmother denied any
Native American ancestry.
       Father initially told the agency his great-grandfather had
“ ‘Indian tribal blood,’ ” but could not provide the name of the
tribe or any other information. Father later stated the children
may be members or eligible for membership in the White
Mountain Apache Tribe because his grandfather may have been
registered or eligible to register.
       The agency contacted two paternal great aunts, one of
whom stated her biological father’s family was associated with
the White Mountain Apache Tribe. She said her biological father
was not enrolled or registered with the tribe. She said her
father’s siblings attempted to register but were turned away.
Neither great aunt had any contact information for these family
members.

      1Subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the
Welfare and Institutions Code.

                                 2
      The agency contacted the paternal grandmother, who
stated the paternal great-grandfather was registered with the
Blackfeet Tribe. To her knowledge, the paternal grandfather was
not registered. She was unable to contact family members. The
paternal great-grandmother had no information regarding the
children’s membership or eligibility for enrollment.
      The agency sent letters entitled “ICWA INQUIRY Based on
REASON TO BELIEVE Finding” to the Bureau of Indian Affairs
(BIA), California Department of Social Services (CDSS),
Blackfeet Tribe, and White Mountain Apache Tribe. The letters
included the children’s and the parents’ names and dates of birth,
the names and reported tribal ancestry of the paternal
grandfather and great-grandfather, and the status of the juvenile
cases. The Blackfeet Tribe wrote back and confirmed the
children were neither enrolled, eligible for enrollment, nor
domiciled on a Blackfeet reservation. The White Mountain
Apache Tribe wrote back and confirmed the children were not
enrolled, and that no record of tribal lineage existed.
      The maternal grandfather later told the agency his
grandfather and great aunt were Cherokee and once lived on a
reservation in Oklahoma. In response, the agency sent letters to
the three federally-recognized Cherokee tribes. The letters
included the children’s and the parents’ names and dates of birth,
the names and reported tribal ancestry of the maternal
grandfather, great-great-grandfather, and maternal great-great
aunt, and the status of the cases. The Cherokee Nation
confirmed that neither the children nor their parents were
registered as tribal citizens. The United Keetoowah Band of
Cherokee Indians and the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians
confirmed the children were not registered or eligible to be

                                3
registered as members. All three tribes verified the children
were not Indian children in relation to the tribe.
       The agency included the information and correspondence
regarding its ICWA inquiries in its reports filed with the court.
       On August 3, 2022, the juvenile court continued the section
366.26 hearing and set an ICWA hearing. The court asked
whether there was “a reason to know this might be an Indian
child and we need to send out a notice of hearing?” The agency
responded, “I think it’s just—it will be safest to just have the
Agency go ahead and send out the notice so that we don’t delay
these proceedings.” The court responded, “Okay. Well, then the
ICWA-030[2] is going to need to be prepared.”
       At the section 366.26 hearing two months later, the agency
said it was not necessary to send ICWA-030 forms because “[t]he
Agency has heard . . . from all possible tribes, Blackfeet, White
Mountain Apache Tribe and all three Cherokee tribes all stating
that each child is not a member of the tribe and not eligible for
enrollment in the tribe.” The court responded, “I’m finding that
the Agency has satisfied its duty of further inquiry.” The court
found the ICWA did not apply.
                           DISCUSSION
       The ICWA serves “to protect the best interests of Indian
children and to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes
and families by the establishment of minimum Federal standards
for the removal of Indian children from their families.” (25
U.S.C. § 1902; Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.) When the facts are
undisputed, we independently review compliance with the ICWA.

      Judicial Council Forms, form ICWA-030, Notice of Child
      2

Custody Proceeding for Indian Child.

                                 4
(In re A.M. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 303, 314.) We review the
juvenile court’s determination that the ICWA does not apply for
substantial evidence. (In re A.M., at p. 314; § 224.2, subd. (i)(2).)
       “ ‘Indian child’ means any unmarried person who is under
age eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b)
is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological
child of a member of an Indian tribe.” (25 U.S.C. § 1903(4);
§ 224.1, subd. (a).) Whether or not a child is a member or eligible
for membership is conclusively determined by the tribe. (§ 224.2,
subd. (h).)
                          Required inquiries
       Father does not contend the agency or the court failed to
contact any family members, tribes, or others who might have
had information about the minors’ status. (§ 224.2, subd.
(e)(2)(A), (C).) Instead, he contends the agency and the court
erred when they failed to send ICWA-030 forms to the Apache,
Blackfeet, and Cherokee tribes. There is no error.
       In dependency cases, the court and the agency “have an
affirmative and continuing duty to inquire whether a child . . . is
or may be an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (a).) The process is
divided into three phases: an initial duty to inquire in all cases, a
duty of further inquiry when there is reason to believe the child
may be a tribal member or eligible for membership, and a duty to
provide formal notice when there is reason to know the child is a
member or eligible for membership. (In re D.F. (2020) 55
Cal.App.5th 558, 566-567.)
       “There is reason to know a child . . . is an Indian child”
when: (1) “[a] person having an interest in the child . . . informs
the court that the child is an Indian child,” (2) the child, parent,
or Indian custodian lives on a reservation, (3) a designated

                                  5
person “informs the court that it has discovered information
indicating that the child is an Indian child,” (4) “[t]he child . . .
gives the court reason to know that the child is an Indian child,”
(5) the child has been a ward of a tribal court, or (6) the parent or
child has a tribal membership identification card. (§ 224.2, subd.
(d), italics added.)
       None of the circumstances constituting “reason to know”
apply here. Although the court and the agency did “not have
sufficient information to determine that there [was] reason to
know that the child[ren] [were] Indian child[ren],” there was
“reason to believe” they might be Indian children based on
“information suggesting that either the parent of the child or the
child is a member or may be eligible for membership in an Indian
tribe.” (§ 224.2, subd. (e), (e)(1), italics added.) Accordingly, the
court or agency was required to “make further inquiry” into the
children’s status, including interviewing family members,
contacting the BIA and CDSS, and contacting tribes who might
have information. (§ 224.2, subd. (e), (e)(2); Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 5.481(a)(4).) Formal notice (ICWA-030) was not required
because the inquiry was based on a reason to believe and not a
reason to know the children were Indian children. (§ 224.3; Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 5.481(c); In re A.M., supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 321-322; In re D.F., supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at pp. 568-572.)
Instead, the “further inquiry” required only “informal contact
with the tribe.” (In re T.G. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 275, 290.)
       At one point the juvenile court agreed with the agency’s
suggestion to send ICWA-030 forms to the tribes, but later agreed
the forms need not be sent. Because there was no reason to know
the children were Indian children, the law did not require formal
notice.

                                 6
                            Required filings
       Father contends the agency failed to provide sufficient
information to the court because it failed to execute and serve
ICWA-030 forms on the tribes. We disagree.
       “ ‘In order for the court to make a determination whether
the notice requirements of the ICWA have been satisfied, it must
have sufficient facts, as established by the Agency.’ ” (In re
Josiah T. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 388, 408.) “The petitioner must
on an ongoing basis include in its filings a detailed description of
all inquiries, and further inquiries it has undertaken, and all
information received pertaining to the child’s Indian status, as
well as evidence of how and when this information was provided
to the relevant tribes.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(5); In
re Josiah T., at p. 406.) The agency here provided the required
information in the reports and correspondence it filed with the
court.
       There are additional filing requirements when there is
“reason to know” the children are Indian children. (§ 224.3, subd.
(a); 25 C.F.R. § 23.111(a) (2022).) For example, section 224.3,
subdivision (c), provides, “[p]roof of the notice, including copies of
notices sent and all return receipts and responses received, shall
be filed with the court in advance of the hearing.” But these
requirements do not apply here because there was only “reason to
believe” Indian children might be involved.
                              Conclusion
       “If the court makes a finding that proper and adequate
further inquiry and due diligence as required in this section have
been conducted and there is no reason to know whether the child
is an Indian child, the court may make a finding that the [ICWA]
does not apply to the proceedings, subject to reversal based on

                                  7
sufficiency of the evidence.” (§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2).) Because
substantial evidence establishes the agency and the court
conducted a diligent good faith inquiry, the court did not err in
concluding the ICWA was inapplicable. (In re D.F., supra, 55
Cal.App.5th at pp. 570-571.)
                          DISPOSITION
       The order terminating Father’s parental rights is affirmed.
       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                         BALTODANO, J.

We concur:

             GILBERT, P. J.

             YEGAN, J.

                                8
                      Tari L. Cody, Judge

               Superior Court County of Ventura

                ______________________________

      Emery El Habibi, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Tiffany N. North, County Counsel, Joseph J. Randazzo,
Assistant County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.