Court Opinion

ID: 9570190
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:20:50.761471+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:04:22.212584
License: Public Domain

*188Duckworth, Chief Justice,
concurring specially. There can be no bona fide contention that there is a sentence or word in Code § 26-2801 that requires that the property therein described belong to the government. The exact language of the section is: “Any officer, servant, or other person employed in any public department, station, or office of government of this State or any county, town, or city thereof, who shall embezzle, steal, secrete, or fraudulently take and carry away any money, paper, book, or other property or effects, shall be punished by imprisonment and labor in the penitentiary for not less than two years nor more than seven years.” In view of the numerous decisions of this court — a few of which are State v. Calvin, R. M. Charlton 151, p. 170, 1 Ga. Dec.; Studstill v. State, 7 Ga. 2 (11); Cook v. State, 11 Ga. 53 (56 Am. D. 410); Sweeney v. State, 16 Ga. 467; Ricks v. State, 16 Ga. 600; Hester v. State, 17 Ga. 130; Glover v. State, 126 Ga. 594 (55 S. E. 592); Snead v. State, 165 Ga. 44 (139 S. E. 812) — and the unambiguous provisions of Code § 27-701, this court can not, while remaining within the constitutional limitations of its powers (Code, Ann., § 2-3704), now rule contrary to the statutory law defining the requisite particularity of an indictment found in Code § 27-701, as follows: “Every indictment or accusation of the grand jury shall be deemed sufficiently technical and correct, which states the offense in the terms and language of this Code, or so plainly that the nature of the offense charged may easily be understood by the jury.” Nor can the duty of the Judiciary concerning unconstitutional laws, expressed in the Constitution (Code, Ann., § 2-402) —which is: “Legislative acts in violation of this Constitution, or the Constitution of the United States, are void, and the Judiciary shall so declare them” — be denied or escaped. To point, out that the law has stood for a long time or that countless persons have been convicted thereunder as excuses for failure to perform the judicial duty expressed in the Constitution, would constitute timidity and judicial cowardice unworthy of the Judicial Department. It can not be overlooked that the Constitution declares that all laws, not new laws, not old laws, not laws under which no persons have been convicted, but all laws that offend the Consti*189tution are void and the Judiciary shall so declare them. In Beall v. Beall, 8 Ga. 210, this court said: “To disregard the laws of the State, is a capital crime against society, and great vigilance is necessary to see to it, that they are equally respected, by those who govern, as well as those who are destined to obey.” As pointed out at the beginning, to commit the crime defined in Code § 26-2801, it is necessary only that one be an officer or agent of the government and embezzle, etc., the property therein described, irrespective of who may be the owner of such property. Anyone can clearly see that to thus subject those working for a government to prosecution, while excluding all other persons not so working, is the rankest sort of discrimination. This the Constitution forbids in the following language: “Protection to person and property is the paramount duty of government, and shall be impartial and complete.” Code (Ann.) § 2-102. Unless plain English can be deprived of meaning, the procedure provided in Code § 26-2801 is neither impartial nor complete protection. Then the Constitution renders judgment thereon, ■ declaring it void and directing this court to so declare. Code (Ann.) § 2-402.
It is neither sound argument nor valid judicial reason, after saying, as was done in Robinson v. State, 109 Ga. 564 (35 S. E. 57, 77 Am. St. R. 392), “It seems that it is necessary that the appropriation shall be made of property belonging to another, or, in case of a public officer, to the public, which rightfully came into the possession of the person charged with its appropriation,” then, in Carter v. State, 143 Ga. 632 (85 S. E. 884), to assert that this court adheres to that view, and at the same time hold that it is not essential to its constitutionality that the statute require that property of the employer be embezzled. It is provided in Code § 27-701 and countless decisions of this court that the indictment need only describe the crime in the language of the statute. Surely no court will so disregard the established law as to hold that it is ever necessary to prove more than the allegations of an indictment. Therefore, the only possible legal way it could be necessary, as held in Robinson v. State, 109 Ga. 564, supra, to show that the property bélónged to the public is for the law to say so. Since' Code § 26-2801 does not so provide, it subjects government employees to prosecution for embezzling any property of anyone whomsoever while exempting *190all others though they do the same thing. It is therefore the rankest kind of discrimination against government officials and agents and in favor of all other persons and is a denial of equal protection, as required by Code (Ann.) § 2-102, and is void.
While it may be competent for the legislature to enact a valid law making criminal the acts enumerated in this statute, such a law must apply to all persons alike in order to satisfy the equal-protection requirements of the State and Federal Constitutions. See Baugh v. City of LaGrange, 161 Ga. 80 (2a) (130 S. E. 69). This equal protection might be obtained, although the law does not apply to all persons, provided that a valid classification is made and the law is made applicable alike to all members of that class. Arthur v. State, 146 Ga. 827 (92 S. E. 637); Geele v. State, 202 Ga. 381 (43 S. E. 2d 254, 172 A. L. R. 196). Such a classification, however, must have a basis that bears a direct relationship to the object and purpose of the legislation. Woolworth Co. v. Harrison, 172 Ga. 179 (156 S. E. 904); Gibbs v. Milk Control Board of Georgia, 185 Ga. 844 (2) (196 S. E. 791); Geele v. State, 202 Ga. 381, supra; Moultrie Milk Shed v. City of Cairo, 206 Ga. 348 (2) (57 S. E. 2d 199). To illustrate, since the section here under consideration subjects to prosecution thereunder only persons having a connection with government, if the appropriated property under the statute is specifically required to be the property of the government employing that person, then the classification would be a valid one. The attack here is directed to the features of the statute which point out only those employed by government for prosecution thereunder, but place no restriction upon the ownership of the property appropriated.
The decision in Carter v. State, 143 Ga. 632, supra, is, for the reasons above stated, unsound and I would overrule it, but enough of my associates disagree with me on that to prevent this court from overruling it, since it has the. concurrence of all the Justices. Consequently, while holding the view that the statute is void and the indictment should have been dismissed on demurrer, and, for this reason, the judgment should be reversed, I dissent from the ruling in division one, but fully concur in the remaining divisions of the syllabus opinion and in the judgment of reversal. I am authorized to state that Mr. Justice Almand joins me in this special concurrence.