Court Opinion

ID: 9544479
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:55:56.852035+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:13:03.646340
License: Public Domain

*527Utter, J.
(dissenting) — 'This state violates the equal protection of laws by requiring fees for candidate declaration and ballot appearance and also for inclusion in the candidates’ pamphlet.13 To require the fees excludes those candidates who cannot afford to pay and denies the voters the opportunity to vote for candidates so excluded. Such laws do not promote any compelling state interest, or provide a rational basis by which any legitimate state interest may be advanced.
The only authority cited by the majority which permits the operation of such a fee scheme is our 1-page per curiam opinion in State ex rel. Boomer v. Nichols, 50 Wash. 529, 97 P. 733 (1908). Boomer is not authority for this case because it did not face or dispose of the issue we decide here and it could not make a choice between the legitimate state interest or compelling state interest tests inasmuch as the compelling state interest test was not then part of the equal protection doctrine.
The majority also attempts to distinguish Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 31 L. Ed. 2d 92, 92 S. Ct. 849 (1972), the recent decision of the United States Supreme Court forbidding a substantially similar filing fee scheme, on grounds that are, in fact, not distinguishable. This case compels a result different from that announced by the majority.
The majority fails to either cite or discuss the cases decided subsequent to Bullock, all of which hold fee schemes, substantially identical to ours, to be forbidden. The majority also fails to discuss Sorenson v. Bellingham, 80 Wn.2d 547, 496 P.2d 512 (1972), a recent decision by this court directly in point on the question of the appropriate standard of review, and our recent decisions which establish under what circumstances we will apply the compelling interest standard. Hsieh v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 79 Wn.2d 529, 535-36, 488 P.2d 515 (1971); Moen v. Erlandson, 80 Wn.2d 755, 498 P.2d 849 (1972); Herriott v. Seattle, 81 *528Wn.2d 48, 60, 500 P.2d 101 (1972); Sorenson v. Bellingham, supra; Eggert v. Seattle, 81 Wn.2d 840, 505 P.2d 801 (1973); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82 Wn.2d 11, 507 P.2d 1169 (1973).
The clause of the Fourteenth Amendment which declares “No state shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws” is the source of the standard of review for this case. U.S. Const, amend. 14, § 1. This equal protection clause has a long history of case law application which has developed two standards of review — the “rational basis” test and the stricter scrutiny of the “compelling interest” test.14
In this case, the majority determines the rational basis test (McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26, 6 L. Ed. 2d 393, 81 S. Ct. 1101 (1961)) is the appropriate standard, citing our 1908 Boomer case. This is the wrong test to be used, as the compelling interest standard is necessary because fundamental rights are affected herein. Bullock v. Carter, supra.
The fundamental rights affected by the state action are those of voting and association. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 9 L. Ed. 2d 405, 83 S. Ct. 328 (1963); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 16 L. Ed. 2d 169, 86 S. Ct. 1079 (1966); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 21 L. Ed. 2d 24, 89 S. Ct. 5 (1968); Sorenson v. Bellingham, supra. In such instances we have consistently adhered to the judicial duty of strict scrutiny as previously indicated.
In Sorenson, where we struck down a Bellingham ordinance which conditioned qualification for office on. property ownership, we recognized, at page 550, that “courts have given special treatment to interests they deem fundamental and have required the state to show a ‘compelling interest’ to justify classification in these areas.” There we set forth *529numerous grounds which require the use of the stricter judicial scrutiny under equal protection. Among the grounds was the effect the ordinance had on the exercise of the fundamental interest of voting, both in its actual use and in its effective use.
The majority opinion fails to explain why the grounds we announced in Sorenson for use of the compelling interest standard are not found in this case, and is devoid of any discussion of the fundamental citizen interests of voting and association.
Instead of this necessary evaluation, the majority simply cites Boomer, alone, as authority for its holding. As I previously stated, the Boomer case is not controlling here because it did not face or dispose of the issue we presently decide, and it did not employ the compelling interest test of the current equal protection doctrine because the strict scrutiny test was not yet part of our jurisprudence.
A careful reading of Boomer shows it does not control here on the issue before the court. In it, the appellants argued “the fee required is based on a per centum of the salary of the office for which the person is a candidate, instead of a fixed fee for all candidates alike, and it is this feature that is thought to render the requirement void.” The court found this manner of determining the fee amount was reasonable and denied the relief requested. However, no equal protection challenge to the fee scheme itself was raised in that case and this court did not discuss or answer such a question. All that was challenged was the method of fixing the fee, not the fee scheme itself. Boomer is totally inappropriate to cite as authority to dispose of the constitutional challenge currently before us.
The same reasoning used in Sorenson is exercised in Bullock. In Bullock, at page 149, a unanimous United States Supreme Court struck down the Texas filing fee system under the strict standard of review because it
erected a system that utilizes the criterion of ability to pay as a condition to being on the ballot, thus excluding some candidates otherwise qualified and denying an un*530determined number of voters the opportunity to vote for candidates of their choice.
The court began its analysis, as we did in Sorenson, by recognizing the effect of the legislation under challenge on the people’s right to vote and on the effectiveness of that exercise. In Bullock, at page 142, Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, supra, was recognized as requiring a compelling state interest before the state poll tax of $1.50 could be sustained because “even a minimal price on the exercise of the right to vote constituted an invidious discrimination.” In Sorenson, we found limitation on the free and effective use of the franchise impermissible absent a compelling state interest.
Bullock and Sorenson involved state action primarily directed at candidates, but both decisions found the rights of voters and the rights of candidates do not lend themselves to neat separation. Recognizing that legislation pertaining to candidates inherently affects the voters and the exercise of their rights, the Bullock court proceeded to determine the fee scheme’s impact on voters and found it significant and demanding of strict judicial scrutiny. Such a conclusion is inevitable once it is agreed that “where a candidate representative of a viewpoint of affected voters is prevented from running, those voters who support him have lost an opportunity to cast their votes effectively.” Soren-son v. Bellingham, supra at 552. This dilution of the vote is no different when the legislation burdens placement on the ballot rather than qualification of the candidate.
In Bullock, it was found that the voters were denied the opportunity to vote for a candidate of their choosing because of the fee scheme and that this dilution of voter power rested more heavily on the less affluent. This exact effect is undeniable in this case.
Nevertheless, the majority opinion would have us dismiss the Bullock finding and holding on the grounds that the Texas fee was larger than ours, thereby making the Texas fee impermissible and the Washington fee reasonable and constitutional. The court warned against denying rights *531under the law by discrete reasoning regarding dollar amounts. Though “there are doubtless some instances of candidates representing the views of voters of modest means who are able to pay the required fee” an emphasis on this ignores the reality that the fee system nevertheless “falls with unequal weight on voters, as well as candidates, according to their economic status.” 405 U.S. at 144.
The reference to the fee amounts under the Texas system was intended to show the “patently exclusionary character” of the system, and cannot be understood as a limitation of the rule or reasoning to only those fee systems which are patently defective. The Texas fee scheme found unconstitutional ranged from $50 to $8,900, whereas the Washington fees under challenge range from $150 to $425. Though the Texas fee range had a modest lower limit, below that of Washington, the lower ranges were not saved.
Fee systems, not so patently defective as the upper limits of the Texas scheme, have been struck down subsequent to Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 31 L. Ed. 2d 92, 92 S. Ct. 849 (1972). Dillon v. Fiorina, 340 F. Supp. 729 (D.N.M. 1972) (6 percent of first-year salary); Chote v. Brown, 342 F. Supp. 1353 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (1 percent of first-year salary); Jennes v. Miller, 346 F. Supp. 1060 (S.D. Fla. 1972) (10 cents per name on certification petition); Harper v. Vance, 342 F. Supp. 136 (N.D. Ala. 1972) (2 percent of first-year salary). These courts in essence found that “In practical effect the fee here involved is indistinguishable from the filing fees struck down by the United States Supreme Court in Bullock v. Carter . . .” Dillon v. Fiorina, supra at 730. The fee scheme struck down in Chote v. Brown, supra, involved a formula identical to the one we presently face — 1 percent of the first year’s salary.
Whether the fee scheme involves patently exclusionary fees or those of our system, the conclusion is the same:
Many potential office seekers lacking both personal wealth and affluent backers are in every practical sense precluded [from a benefit obtainable by the affluent], no *532matter how qualified they might be and no matter how broad or enthusiastic their popular support.
405 U.S. at 143. Additionally, it is no answer to require voter contribution for
To the extent . . . the system requires candidates to rely on contributions from voters in order to pay the assessments ... it tends to deny some voters the opportunity to vote for a candidate of their choosing; at the same time it gives the affluent the power to place on the ballot their own names or the names of persons they favor.
405 U.S. at 144. The application of the Bullock standard is compelled by those decisions which have used or recognized it for the rule that strict scrutiny is required where voters or candidates are affected by a classification. Mancuso v. Taft, 341 F. Supp. 574, 581 (D.R.I. 1972); Wellford v. Battaglia, 343 F. Supp. 143, 146 (D. Del. 1972); Fidell v. Board of Elections, 343 F. Supp. 913 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); Wilson v. Moore, 346 F. Supp. 635, 640 (N.D. W. Va. 1972); Zautra v. Miller, 348 F. Supp. 847, 850 (D. Utah 1972); Dillon v. Fiorina, supra; Jennes v. Miller, supra; Chote v. Brown, supra. See also The Constitutionality of Candidate Filing Fees, 70 Mich. L. Rev. 558 (1972); The Constitutionality of Qualifying Fees for Political Candidates, 120 U. Pa. L. Rev. 109 (1971).
Even if the compelling interest test is not used and the traditional equal protection test is the applicable standard for this case, the majority simply fails to apply it. The majority does decide a legitimate state interest for the fee exists, citing Boomer, but totally fails to discuss or decide the second element of the test, namely, whether the fee scheme is a rational basis by which the state interest may be advanced. Bullock compels a conclusion that the fee scheme we have is not a rational basis to advance any legitimate state interest, or necessary to advance any compelling interest.
The majority recites three state interests that are claimed to be justification for thé fee scheme. They are: *533(1) prevention of overcrowded ballots, (2) assuring seriousness of candidacy, and (3) partially defraying election costs. These interests were agreed to by the parties.
Bullock recognized that avoiding overcrowded ballots and assuring candidate seriousness are legitimate state interests but declared “To say that the filing fee requirement tends to limit the ballot to the more serious candidates is not enough.” (Italics mine.) 405 U.S. at 145. This mere pronouncement of legitimacy by the majority is thus not enough because, as stated in Bullock, at page 146, the fee scheme “is extraordinarily ill-fitted to that goal” of advancing state interests.
The fee scheme is ill-fitted because it excludes legitimate as well as frivolous candidates. The effect of the fee is to prevent impoverished candidates from getting onto the ballot, be they frivolous or serious, when persons with sufficient funds may receive ballot placement whether they are serious or frivolous. To those with money the fee scheme is no bar and the state interests of overcrowding and candidate frivolity may be disregarded. To the less affluent the requirement of a fee may foreclose name placement on the ballot. Such arbitrariness solely on the basis of wealth, which treats potential candidates differently, bears no relevance to the state objective, be it legitimate or compelling, and may not stand. Thus only the third state interest, collection of revenue, need be reviewed under the compelling interest standard, for the first two interests, though legitimate, are not advanced by the fee scheme and are thus disposed.
The use of filing fees as a subsidy to the state treasury for election costs is a legitimate state objective and a fee scheme may be a rational basis for such an interest. However, under the standard of review we consider applicable to this case, the compelling interest test, there must be a showing of necessity and necessity did not exist. The United States Supreme Court reasoned in Bullock, at page 149:
Without making light of the State’s interest in husbanding its revenues, we fail to see such an element of neces*534sity in the State’s present means of financing ... as to justify the resulting incursion on the prerogatives of voters.
The court concluded that the Texas financing scheme ought to “spread the cost among all of the voters in an attempt to distribute the influence without regard to wealth.” 405 U.S. at 148.
The state makes no showing here that the financing of election costs was in actuality the purpose of the filing fee. The contrary is indicated by the method by which the filing fee amount is determined. It is not related to the costs of elections, nor the costs of ballot production, but is arbitrarily tied to the first year’s salary of the office sought by tne candidate. This is enough to defeat this ground under either the compelling interest or rational basis test.
It is no longer good law and is now too late to assert, as the majority does, that “the candidates derive some greater benefit from the elective process than do the people at large” and thus may be assessed a fee to use the process. Bullock disposed of such a claim and our 1908 decisions (State ex rel. Boomer v. Nichols, 50 Wash. 529, 97 P. 733 (1908) and State ex rel. Zent v. Nichols, 50 Wash. 508, 97 P. 728 (1908)), seeming to support such a rule, are no longer authority.
The United States Supreme Court, in Bullock at page 149, indicates that “in other contexts” a reasonable filing fee scheme might be valid if there were “reasonable alternative means of access to the ballot.” (Italics mine.) I find no such reasonable alternative under our election statutes and disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the write-in provides the “access to the ballot” alternative.
The majority opinion is misled by the write-in possibility as an alternative because it fails to comprehend the particular purpose to which the alternative must provide a remedy. The purpose here is placement on the ballot and not merely another method of receiving votes. A focus on this issue of placement on or access to the ballot is conceded by the state in its brief, at page 20, where it states “What *535really is at issue is a mere name upon a ballot . . The write-in may permit a candidate to continue campaigning for office, but it does not provide access to name placement on the ballot and thus cannot serve as a reasonable alternative to the filing fee.
The alternative methods referred to in Bullock as possible valid alternatives to the fee are: nominating petitions, primary elections, or pauper’s affidavit. By such methods, legitimate state interests might be advanced without imposing unconstitutional burdens on the indigent candidate. Washington provides none of these.
The majority, without citation of any authority whatsoever, would have us believe that “the election history of this state shows many occasions when sticker candidates have not only made a good showing, but have won the office.” This claim, with support, would be surprising, and it is all the more astonishing because of its unsupported character. Occasionally, candidates may have succeeded by this method, but it could hardly be claimed that a write-in or sticker candidate is in as favorable a position as one with his name printed on the ballot. This is even more apparent as the number of voters increases.
The more sensible conclusion would be that “even where operative, the write-ins are no substitute for a place on the ballot.” Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 37, 21 L. Ed. 2d 24, 89 S. Ct. 5 (1968) (Douglas, J., concurring). It is inescapable that “to force a candidate to seek election in this fashion is to throw too many hurdles in his path solely because he is without funds to qualify.” Jenness v. Little, 306 F. Supp. 925, 929 (N.D. Ga. 1969), appeal dismissed, 397 U.S. 94, 25 L. Ed. 2d 81, 90 S. Ct. 820 (1970).
The filing fee scheme for name placement on the election ballot is therefore unconstitutional because it denies equal protection of the laws. The fee scheme is not supported by any compelling state interest and no reasonable alternative exists by which an indigent may have access to the ballot.
For many of the reasons given for the unconstitutionality of the filing fee scheme for name placement on the ballot, *536the flat $200 fee, under RCW 29.80.050, for space in the candidates’ pamphlet, is likewise a denial of equal protection. The pamphlet space is closely tied with the fundamental rights of speech, and the derivative interests of association and political organization. Given the fundamental interests involved, a classification burdening such interests is subject to strict scrutiny under equal protection.
The only interest suggested in support of the fee for space in the pamphlet is to reimburse the state for its costs. This very reimbursement argument was rejected in Bullock, as applied to placement on the ballot. There is no good reason to reach any other result on any other analysis when considering the fee for inclusion in the candidates’ pamphlet.
The important reason given in Bullock, at page 148, for rejecting such contention is:
[T]he costs do not arise because candidates decide to enter a primary or because the parties decide to conduct one, but because the State has, as a matter of legislative choice, directed that party primaries be held. The State has presumably chosen this course more to benefit the voters than the candidates.
In this case the costs arise because of the state’s determination to assist voter decision-making by introducing the candidates to the electorate through a candidates’ pamphlet. The financial burden for elections is carried by all taxpayers and the state has not 'argued a basis for distinguishing the costs of ballots from the costs of candidates’ pamphlets. This state, by legislation, has determined that both items are significant to the democratic process and may not invidiously burden access to either. The state heavily subsidizes this candidate information source for the benefit of the voter (see RCW 29.80.010) and may not make its benefits available only to those able to afford the state fee. Such discrimination frustrating only some voter assistance is forbidden by the equal protection clause unless it is necessary to promote a compelling state interest. No such necessity or compelling interest has been demonstrated.

 RCW 29.18.050, 29.21.060, 29.24.070 and 29.80.050.

 See Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 Calif. L. Rev. 341 (1949) (for pre-1950 equal protection developments) ; Developments in the Law — Equal Protection, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1065 (1969) (for developments through the 1960’s); Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a New Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1972) (for developments of the 1971 term of the United States Supreme Court).