Court Opinion

ID: 9646140
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 12:50:21.816874+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:29.564406
License: Public Domain

DAVIS, J.
On May 8 and 9, 2002, appellant Charles Lee Pitt was tried by a jury in the Circuit Court for Harford County and was convicted of first degree burglary, theft over $500, and malicious destruction of property. Subsequently, on July 9, 2002, appellant was sentenced to a twenty-year term of imprisonment for first degree burglary and a concurrent sixty-day term for destruction of property. The count for theft over $500 merged into the count for first degree burglary.
Appellant noted his timely appeal on July 15, 2002, presenting four questions, which we restate as follows:
I. Did the trial court err by denying the motion to suppress appellant’s statements to the police?
II. Did the trial court err by admitting into evidence State’s Exhibit Number Five?
*447III. Is the evidence insufficient to sustain the conviction for theft over $500?
IV. Did the trial court err by ordering appellant to pay $400,000 in restitution?
We answer question I in the affirmative, and questions II, III, and IV in the negative. Although we shall reverse the judgment of the trial court, we nonetheless address issues II through IV for the guidance of the lower court on remand.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In September 2001, Rosalie Rawle owned a house at 2708 Franklinville Road in Joppa. While vacationing in Florida, she received a telephone call from her neighbor, David Winni.1 Winni informed Ms. Rawle that, on September 3, 2001, he discovered that someone had broken into her house. Ms. Rawle returned to her house and discovered that some of her property was missing, including jewelry and a checkbook for an account that she owned jointly with her son, James Rawle.
James Rawle and his wife, Renata Ramsburg-Rawle, also discovered that some of their property had been stolen. The couple operated an antique business that sold jewelry and, in the early part of the summer 2001, Rawle and his wife had put some of the jewelry in a basement closet in Ms. Rawle’s house. Rawle testified that the jewelry, receipts and records for the jewelry, a handgun, and a shotgun collection were missing after the burglary.
On September 19, 2001, Trooper John Wilson executed a search and seizure warrant at 3912 Red Deer Circle in Randallstown. Appellant was located in a bedroom inside the residence. Because there was an arrest warrant on file for appellant prior to the execution of the search warrant, Trooper Wilson arrested appellant.
Trooper Gary Kulik transported appellant to the State Police Barracks in Bel Air. According to Trooper Kulik’s *448testimony, while in route to the barracks, appellant stated that he had “knowledge or information that [ ] the investigators would be interested in and that he was interested in speaking to ... someone from the State Police in regard to relaying that information to us.” Trooper Kulik further testified that, in return for this information, appellant “wanted reassurance that he could get some type of deal or some type of better sentence.” Rather than respond directly, Trooper Kulik encouraged appellant to “hold off on [the] information” and told him that his request for a “deal” would be relayed -to the lead investigator, Trooper Wilson. Moreover, Trooper Kulik testified he advised appellant that a representative from the Harford County State’s Attorney’s Office would have to be involved in any type of agreement. Accordingly, when Trooper Kulik arrived at the barracks, he informed Trooper Wilson that appellant had indicated that he wanted “some kind of deal worked out” before he would cooperate.
Upon his arrival at the Bel Air Barracks, appellant was temporarily placed in a cell and then moved to a polygraph room where the officers conduct interviews. Trooper Wilson testified that he read a Miranda2 form to appellant and that appellant placed his initials next to each Miranda warning, indicating that he understood them, and then signed his name at the bottom of the page. Next, Trooper Wilson advised appellant that a significant amount of property, including jewelry, was missing. Appellant once again stated that he had information concerning the burglary and the property, but he wanted a written agreement regarding the information he would provide. Consequently, an agreement was drafted and, after re-administering the Miranda warnings, Trooper Wilson read the agreement to appellant and both parties signed the agreement.
After appellant signed the agreement, Troopers Kulik and Wilson began questioning appellant about the Franklinville Road burglary. They informed appellant that they had recov*449ered a cellular telephone at 8912 Red Deer Circle that was purchased from Office Depot using one of the checks stolen in the burglary. The cellular telephone had been activated in appellant’s name. Appellant told them that an acquaintance, Jerome Bagley, purchased the cellular telephone. According to appellant, Bagley wrote a check to pay for the cellular telephone and then gave appellant the telephone. Appellant’s description of Bagley matched an Office Depot employee’s description of the cellular telephone purchaser.
Additionally, appellant informed the officers that Bagley still had the checkbook of one of the burglary victims in his possession and was keeping it in Bagley’s 1999 Chevrolet Malibu. Appellant then reviewed a list of jewelry that had been stolen in the burglary and, after reviewing the list, stated that Bagley had a gold watch hanging from the rear view mirror of his Malibu.
Appellant further informed the officers that he was with Bagley a second time in Office Depot and, on that occasion, Bagley bought more items with another check from the victims. According to appellant, the items were in the basement of Bagley’s residence. Appellant also stated that he had traveled with Bagley to Anne Arundel County and, while there, Bagley took jewelry to pawn at a pawnshop. Appellant, however, denied knowing from where the jewelry had come and, although he admitted that he performed burglaries in the past, he denied having knowledge of who had committed this burglary.
Subsequently, appellant accompanied Troopers Kulik and Wilson to 1617 North Port Street in Baltimore City—where Bagley’s vehicle was located. Trooper Wilson approached Bagley’s vehicle and drew a sketch of the watch that appellant had described. Appellant then identified Bagley’s residence for the officers. The officers showed the sketch to the victims and they identified the watch as one of their stolen possessions. Shortly thereafter, Trooper Wilson obtained an arrest warrant for Bagley and a search warrant for Bagley’s vehicle and house.
*450On September 19, 2001, the search warrant was executed and Bagley was arrested and questioned by Trooper Wilson. According to Trooper Wilson’s testimony, “from the information I got from Mr. Bagley it appeared that [appellant] may not have told us everything as he was required to do by the agreement. He may have knowledge concerning where the property was and additional information concerning the burglary....” Thus, the next afternoon, Trooper Wilson and Trooper Jody Ressin went to the Detention Center to talk to appellant.
Trooper Wilson testified:
I told [appellant] that we don’t think he had been completely truthful with us the day before and that I felt that he hadn’t completely disclosed the knowledge he had of this case as required by his contract and that we were going to request he submit to a polygraph test as required by his contract.
According to Trooper Wilson, appellant immediately responded that “he hadn’t told us everything” and “he went on to say that he had committed the burglary of the [Rawle’s] residence along with an accomplice.” Appellant continued, stating that the victims had overstated the jewelry that was stolen, that a gun taken in the burglary had been sold in Aberdeen or Edgewood, that “he wanted to keep his earlier deal [the officers] had made with him,” and that “he knew more information, but he was going to hold back and he wanted us to honor this deal.... ” Trooper Wilson informed appellant that he would relay the information to Michael Sanger, the Assistant State’s Attorney who had signed the plea agreement.
Thereafter, Trooper Wilson telephoned Sanger and was later informed that Sanger considered appellant’s contract “null and void due to him not completely disclosing the information.” Sanger further stated that he wished to schedule a polygraph and told Trooper Wilson to inform appellant that the agreement had been terminated.
Appellant’s statements from September 19 and 20 were admitted at trial and the jury ultimately found him guilty of *451first degree burglary, theft over $500, and malicious destruction of property. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
I
Appellant first contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress his statements to the police. According to appellant, the statements that he made on September 19 and 20, 2001 are the product of an inducement and, therefore, are involuntary. Relying upon Wright v. State, 307 Md. 552, 515 A.2d 1157 (1986), and Allgood v. State, 309 Md. 58, 522 A.2d 917 (1987), appellant avers that, because the State rescinded the plea agreement, his statements are inadmissible per se in the State’s case-in-chief. Appellant also asserts that the September 20, 2001 statement “was made without [the] benefit of Miranda warnings.” The State contends that appellant’s statements are admissible because he breached the plea agreement.
In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, this Court will look exclusively to the record of the suppression hearing. Jackson v. State, 141 Md.App. 175, 187, 784 A.2d 670 (2001). We extend great deference to the suppression hearing judge’s findings of fact and determinations of credibility, accepting the court’s factual findings unless they are clearly eironeous. Facon v. State, 144 Md.App. 1, 19-20, 796 A.2d 101 (2002), rev’d on other grounds, 375 Md. 435, 825 A.2d 1096 (2003). Although we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, this Court must make its own independent constitutional determination as to the admissibility of the confession, by examining the law and applying it to the facts of the case. White v. State, 374 Md. 232, 249, 821 A.2d 459 (2003).
In Wright, co-defendant Coley entered a plea agreement, promising to give a full statement and to testify before the grand jury and at trial in return for the State’s promise to accept a plea of guilty to second degree murder. The plea *452agreement additionally provided that, if Coley broke his promise, the State could use his statements against him at trial. Coley testified before the grand jury. Wright, 307 Md. at 579, 515 A.2d 1157.
Thereafter, Coley elected to stand trial pursuant to a not guilty plea and moved to suppress all of his statements on grounds of involuntariness, thereby reneging on his part of the plea agreement. Id. He argued that his confession was induced by the State’s promise to drop the first degree murder charge and accept a plea to second degree murder. The suppression hearing judge denied Coley’s motion and, at trial, Coley’s plea agreement, confession, and grand jury testimony were admitted into evidence despite repeated objections. Id.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals briefly discussed Maryland cases in which it had held statements inadmissible due to inducement and, quoting Judge Digges, set forth the inducement rule announced in Hillard v. State, 286 Md. 145, 406 A.2d 415 (1979):
[I]t clearly emerges that under Maryland criminal law, independent of any federal constitutional requirement, if an accused is told, or it is implied, that making an inculpatory statement will be to his [or her] advantage, in that he [or she] will be given help or some special consideration, and he [or she] makes remarks in reliance on that inducement, his [or her] declaration will be considered to have been involuntarily made and therefore inadmissible. In examining the facts of this case with this principle in mind, there can be little doubt that Detective Jones[, who told the defendant . that he would “go to bat for him” with the State’s Attorney,] made an improper promise to the defendant in exchange for his statement.
Wright, 307 Md. at 580, 515 A.2d 1157 (quoting Hillard, 286 Md. at 153, 406 A.2d 415)(alteration in original). Subsequently, the Court set forth the distinguishing features of Coley’s case:
Here, the inducement by the State took the form of promises under a negotiated plea agreement, made in exchange *453for Coley’s promises under that agreement. The agreement was sanctioned and regulated by Maryland Rule 4-243.3 The mutual promises were specifically authorized by Rule 4-243. The State neither rescinded nor breached the agreement. Finally, the agreement specified that if Coley reneged, his inculpatory statements could be used against him at trial. None of the Maryland cases relied upon involved circumstances like these.
Id. at 583-85, 515 A.2d 1157.
The Court noted that, in cases such as Nicholson v. State, 38 Md. 140 (1873)(holding that detective’s insistence that defendant should “let it out before [your co-defendant] squeals, for if you do not, [he] will squeal before you, and you will get the worst of it” qualified as an improper inducement), Hillard, and Stokes v. State, 289 Md. 155, 423 A.2d 552 (1980)(holding that a promise not to arrest a near relative of the defendant constituted an improper inducement and that the resulting confession was inadmissible), it has taken the position that “a promise or inducement by the State, in order to obtain a confession or causing a confession, was an ‘improper’ inducement.” Wright, 307 Md. at 585, 515 A.2d 1157. The *454Court opined, however, that such a general position is inapplicable to the case at hand because “[i]t would be anomalous ... to hold that the State’s actions were ‘improper’ when they are expressly authorized by law (ie., Rule 4-243) and when the State neither rescinds nor breaches the plea agreement.” Id. The Wright Court further opined that, “[o]bviously [Rule 4-243] does not contemplate that the defendant’s promises be deemed per se involuntary, under Hillard and other cases, on the ground that they were induced by the State’s promises” because the rule provides for judicial inquiry into the volun-tariness of the defendant’s plea bargain agreement. Id.
Addressing Coley’s argument that his statement should be deemed inadmissible based upon the public policy of encouraging plea bargaining, the Court asserted:
We agree that it would frustrate the policy encouraging plea bargaining to admit against a defendant offers or statements made during plea bargain negotiations. Here, however, the inculpatory statements were made pursuant to a valid consummated agreement in accordance with a rule of this Court, where the agreement provided for the admission of such statements if the defendant breached the agreement. We also agree that defendants would be reluctant to enter plea bargaining agreements if the State could thereafter rescind or breach the agreements, and then use at trail [sic] the defendant’s inculpatory statement made as part of the agreement or pursuant thereto. Here, however, the State neither rescinded nor breached the agreement.
In the situation now before us, we do not believe that it would foster the policy favoring plea bargain agreements to hold Coley’s statements inadmissible. On the contrary, it would likely have the opposite result, encouraging defendants to rescind consummated plea bargain agreements without justification.
Id. at 586-87, 515 A.2d 1157. Accordingly, the Court held that Coley’s statements were admissible.
*455One year later, in Allgood, the Court of Appeals refused to extend the Wright holding to a case in which the State rescinded a plea agreement and then sought to use the defendant’s statements at trial. Allgood v. State, 309 Md. 58, 82, 522 A.2d 917 (1987). Allgood was arrested and charged with the first degree murder of Marion Harris, robbery with a deadly weapon, and related offenses. Id. at 60, 522 A.2d 917. The Assistant State’s Attorney for Baltimore City, Warren Brown, believed that Michael Walker was also involved in the crimes. Consequently, Brown entered into plea negotiations with Allgood and the parties eventually reached an agreement. The agreement provided that Allgood would testify truthfully before a grand jury about Harris’s murder and reveal to the State’s Attorney’s Office “the truth concerning the murder of [ ] Harris leaving nothing out that he reasonably should remember.” In return, the State would proceed against All-good only on the manslaughter charge. Id. at 60-61, 522 A.2d 917.
Pursuant to the agreement, Allgood supplied a statement to Brown and testified before the grand jury. Id. at 61, 522 A.2d 917. The State became suspicious that Allgood was not telling the truth and requested that Allgood take a polygraph test and, when Allgood subsequently failed the test, the State withdrew from the agreement. Id. at 64, 522 A.2d 917. Moreover, the State used Allgood’s statements against him at trial, invoking Wright as legal authority. Allgood appealed.
In an unreported opinion, we upheld the trial court’s admission of Allgood’s grand jury testimony into evidence at the trial on the merits. Relying upon Ball v. State, 57 Md.App. 338, 470 A.2d 361 (1984), we held that Allgood’s grand jury testimony was voluntary and admissible because he “had been warned, prior to testifying before the grand jury, that he was not required to incriminate himself and that his testimony could be used against him if he subsequently went to trial on the pending charges.” Allgood, 309 Md. at 74-75, 522 A.2d 917.
*456Refusing to extend the Wright exception to the Allgood fact pattern, the Court of Appeals remanded the case to this Court with instructions that it overturn Allgood’s conviction. Id. at 82, 522 A.2d 917. First, the Court upheld the trial court’s finding that, by failing the polygraph examination, Allgood was not entitled to the enforcement of the plea agreement. Id. at 71, 522 A.2d 917. The Court then distinguished the facts in Wright from those in the case at hand:
The decisive difference between Coley’s situation and that of Allgood is that the defendant reneged on the agreement in the former but the State terminated the agreement in the latter. In Coley’s case, “the State neither rescinded nor breached the agreement.” In Allgood’s case the State flatly rescinded the agreement in a letter to defense counsel, and thereafter refused to submit it to the court. It proceeded to try Allgood on the murder and robbery charges despite his desire to plead pursuant to the agreement. Furthermore, the Coley agreement “specified that if Coley reneged, his inculpatory statements could be used against him at trial.” The agreement with Allgood contained no such provision. Allgood answered “Yes” when he appeared before the Grand Jury to the question if he understood that “anything you say here can be used against you in a court of law.” But this is far from an agreement that his statements could be used against him at trial.
Id. at 77, 522 A.2d 917 (citations omitted).
The Court succinctly summarized the teachings of Wright:
1) When statements are obtained from a defendant upon promises made him by the State by way of a plea bargain agreement, the statements, in the light of Rule 4-243, are not inadmissible per se, under the inducement doctrine, in the State’s case[-]in[-]chief at trial on the merits.
2) When the State rescinds, repudiates, or breaches the plea bargain agreement, for whatever reason, after the statements are so obtained, the statements, as a matter of *457law, are inadmissible per se in the State’s case[-] in[-]chief at trial on the merits.
Id. at 78, 522 A.2d 917.
Furthermore, the Allgood Court held:
The reason for the State’s repudiation of the agreement is immaterial with respect to the admissibility of the statement. Whether its reason be sound or unsound, technical or substantial, in good faith or simply because the prosecutor had misgivings or a change of heart, or was utterly arbitrary, is of no matter. The justification vel non of the rescission, repudiation, or breach of the agreement by the State goes to whether the defendant is entitled to have the agreement enforced; it does not affect the admissibility of the statement obtained under it.
Id. at 79, 522 A.2d 917 (emphasis added). Accordingly, despite the fact that Allgood breached the plea bargain agreement, the Court held that Allgood’s statements should not have been admitted at trial because the State was the party responsible for rescinding the agreement.
In the case sub judice, appellant signed a plea agreement in which he agreed to “fully and truthfully disclose to the State any and all knowledge and information he may have concerning the investigation.” In return, the State agreed that, after appellant extended his full and truthful cooperation, it would schedule a bond review hearing and recommend personal recognizance and, that at a later date, all charges against appellant arising from the investigation would be nolle prossed. The agreement explicitly stated that appellant’s breach of the agreement by knowingly withholding evidence from the State or not being completely truthful would permit the State to “prosecute him for any offenses in which the State agreed not to prosecute in exchange for cooperation by [appellant] with the investigation” and “use against him in all prosecutions the information and documents that he has disclosed to the State during the course of his cooperation.”

*458
Voluntariness

Although the plea bargain in the case sub judice ineluctably induced the statements obtained, its mere existence makes the inducement proper. Allgood, 309 Md. at 78, 522 A.2d 917. In the absence of a plea bargain, appellant’s statements to the officers on September 19 and 20, 2001 would have unquestionably failed the two-part test for voluntariness set forth in Winder v. State, 362 Md. 275, 309, 765 A.2d 97 (2001), which deems statements involuntary if:
1) a police officer or an agent of the police force promises or implies to a suspect that he or she will be given special consideration from a prosecuting authority or some other form of assistance in exchange for the suspect’s confession, and 2) the suspect makes a confession in apparent reliance on the police officer’s statement.
However, a plea bargain confers a voluntary status upon such induced statements, albeit temporary under certain circumstances. For instance, the State in the instant case induced appellant’s statements by promising him that it would recommend his release on his personal recognizance and that it would nolle prosse all charges against him. Yet, when the State rescinded the plea agreement, statements obtained under it immediately lost their voluntary status and became inadmissible at trial.
We discussed the interaction between waiver given in reliance upon a promise made by the prosecution and the breach thereof in Jackson v. State, 120 Md.App. 113, 135, 706 A.2d 156 (1998):
Finally, the entry of a plea is a waiver of a criminal defendant’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury. Thus, where the waiver rests upon a promise that is breached by the State, the defendant’s constitutional rights are violated.
(Citations omitted.)
Accordingly, although the State received credible information leading it to believe that appellant was being untruthful and that his untruthfulness constituted a breach of the agree*459ment, by rescinding the plea bargain, the State gave up all rights to use appellant’s statements at trial. Regardless of whether appellant breached the agreement and regardless of whether the State was indeed justified in rescinding the agreement, all statements obtained under the plea agreement are inadmissible per se simply because the State—and not appellant—rescinded the agreement. When appellant made the inculpatory statements on September 19 and 20, 2001, he was under the impression that his statements were protected by the plea agreement. Accordingly, statements made both days are protected and inadmissible at trial.4
Our holding is not altered by the provision in the plea agreement permitting the State’s Attorney to use any statements by appellant if appellant breached the agreement. The law is clear that, when the State rescinds a plea agreement for whatever reason, statements induced by it are inadmissible per se. Thus, the provision does not impact our holding.

Public Policy

In discussing the derivation of Maryland Rule 5-410(a) and the policy considerations of the Court of Appeals in its decision in Wright, this Court—in the only decision uncovered by our research not discussed herein—explained in Elmer v. State, 119 Md.App. 205, 213-14, 704 A.2d 511 (1998):
This rule was derived from Federal Rule of Evidence 410 and adopted by the Court of Appeals in 1993. Years prior to the adoption of the rule, the Court of Appeals expressed its agreement with the principle that statements made in the course of unsuccessful plea bargaining should not be introduced against a defendant at a later trial. Wright v. State, 307 Md. 552, 515 A.2d 1157 (1986). The Wright Court reasoned that such a rule would (1) facilitate the policy of encouraging plea bargaining and (2) effectuate the defen*460dant’s right subsequently to withdraw [from] a guilty plea. [Id.] at 586-87, 515 A.2d 1157.
(Emphasis added.)
In a footnote, however, as mentioned, supra, we observed: Interestingly, applying these principles to the facts of Wright, the Court declined to suppress the defendant’s statements. Wright had breached a plea agreement in which he had specifically agreed to the use of his statements in case of his breach. The Court reasoned, therefore, that effective plea bargaining would best be encouraged by holding Wright to his agreement and admitting his statements. 307 Md. at 586-87, 515 A.2d 1157.
Rule 5^410(a)(4) affords appellant no relief because, as the State has correctly pointed out, the rule only bars the introduction of evidence and no evidence was introduced in the instant case regarding any plea bargaining statement. The prosecutor merely asked whether an inconsistent statement had been made, and Brown responded with a firm denial. No attempt was made to prove the hypothetical statement. The judge, therefore, did not commit error with regard to appellant under Rule 5-410 by allowing the question of Brown.
Id. at 213-14, n. 2, 704 A.2d 511.
In Elmer, unlike the case at bar, no statement elicited during the process of plea bargaining was admitted against the defendant. In addressing appellant’s arguments based on public policy, we concluded, in Elmer:
Appellant also asks us to reverse out of concern for the public policies behind the inadmissibility of statements made in plea negotiations, because the prosecutor was obviously cross-examining Brown based on information the prosecutor learned during Brown’s plea negotiations. Appellant’s argument for extending the effect of the rule calls upon this Court to reach two separate conclusions: (1) that it violated the policies of Rule 5^410(a)(4) for the prosecutor to use the statement made in plea discussions as the basis for cross-examination on a prior inconsistent statement, and (2) that *461it furthers those policies to extend the protection of the rule to appellant, who was not a party to the negotiations at issue. In considering these two requested extensions, we notice that we do not have the benefit of a single reported Maryland case interpreting the scope of Rule 5-410, nor one delineating the extent of the specific policies first identified in Wright. We ascribe this lack of precedent to the relative clarity and simplicity of the rule, as well as to the high integrity of the prosecutorial bar in general. The Reporter’s Note to Rule 5-410 does not provide us with any guidance with regard to appellant’s argument either.
Id. at 214-15, 704 A.2d 511 (footnote omitted).
The Elmer Court finally concluded:
At this juncture we decline appellant’s first invitation to hold that the prosecutor’s question violated the spirit of the rule. First, we note that it is still an open question whether Maryland’s Rule 5-410 bars the State from introducing actual evidence of a prior statement made during plea negotiations once the defendant has taken the stand and testified in an inconsistent manner, although we are aware that the analogous federal rule has been so construed, and the structure of the Maryland rule supports such a reading.
Id. at 215, 704 A.2d 511 (footnote omitted).
Patently, Elm,er is inapposite because we are not presented, in the case at hand, with the introduction of evidence of statements inconsistent with a defendant’s trial testimony but, rather, with evidence of appellant’s statements made during plea negotiations introduced in the State’s case-in-chief. Moreover, appellant elected not to testify or present evidence in his behalf. Citing Wright, however, Elmer reiterates the policy consideration that a defendant is more likely to engage in plea bargaining and cooperate with an investigation if a defendant, aided by his or her counsel, did not have to be guarded in providing information which might later be used against him or her were he or she to be subsequently prosecuted for the offense under investigation. Regarding the role of plea bargaining in reducing burgeoning caseloads, we ob*462served in Jackson, quoting Butler v. State, 55 Md.App. 409, 425-26, 462 A.2d 1280 (1983):
In yet another significant regard, the plea bargain contrasts with other miscellaneous bargains. The interest of the courts in the plea bargaining process is based not so much on the equitable notion that every suspect citizen be treated fairly by the elected prosecutor but rather on the credibility of the plea bargaining process and the indispensable role that that process plays in the management of an otherwise overwhelming caseload.
First, as we just noted, plea bargains serve an indispensable role in our criminal justice system by disposing of a large percentage of our criminal cases. [State v.] Parker, 334 Md. [576,] 597-98, 640 A.2d 1104 [1994]; Allgood v. State, 309 Md. 58, 66, 522 A.2d 917 (1987); [State v.] Brockman, 277 Md. [687,] 692-93, 357 A.2d 376 [(1976)]. The agreement at issue, while serving the convenience of the prosecutor in this particular case, is not a type of agreement that serves a similar systemic purpose.
Jackson, 120 Md.App. at 133-35, 706 A.2d 156.
The uncompromising language of the Court of Appeals, in Allgood, that “the reason for the State’s repudiation of the agreement is immaterial with respect to the admission of the statement ... [w]hether its reason be sound or unsound, technical or substantial, in good faith or simply because the prosecutor had misgivings or a change of heart, or was utterly arbitrary” is clearly grounded in the public policy role of the Court. As such, the unequivocal pronouncement of a consequential policy issue is to be accorded great deference until or unless abandoned or modified by the Court or legislative enactment. As we observed in Owens Corning v. Bauman, 125 Md.App. 454, 496, 726 A.2d 745 (1999):
Alternatively, matters of policy in the judicial arena are relegated to Maryland’s highest court—the Court of Appeals. As we have noted, the Court of Appeals has been presented with several opportunities to revisit its decision *463construing “arises” in Armstrong II and has declined to do so. The manner in which to determine the point in time the statutory cap applies was spelled out in clear and unmistakable terms in 1992 in Armstrong II. Until and unless either avenue of redress available to appellant and amicus Maryland Defense Counsel is pursued, it is not within our purview to usurp the legislative function of the General Assembly or to overrule a decision of the Court of Appeals.
(Emphasis added.)
Thus, our holding in the case sub judice is supported by the public policy of encouraging defendants to enter plea bargains. The practice of plea bargaining speeds up the administering of justice. To permit the State to enter into a plea agreement with appellant, induce inculpatory statements under the agreement, later rescind the agreement, and ultimately use the statements at trial against the defendant would have a chilling effect on a defendant’s willingness to enter plea bargains. Appellant’s statements, in our view, should not have been admitted at trial.
II
Appellant next contends that the trial court erred by admitting State’s Exhibit Number Five (Exhibit Five), which consists of a written list of items, compiled by Rawle and his wife, that were taken at the time of the burglary. According to appellant, the list of missing property constituted inadmissible hearsay. The State responds that appellant failed to preserve this argument for appeal and, regardless, it is meritless.
When a party specifies particular grounds for an objection, it is deemed to have waived all other grounds not mentioned. Bell v. State, 118 Md.App. 64, 93-94, 701 A.2d 1183 (1997), rev’d on other grounds, 351 Md. 709, 720 A.2d 311 (1998). At trial, when the State offered the list of missing property as Exhibit Five, appellant objected as follows:
Your Honor, I must—my first problem is that him [sic] and his wife prepared the list. I don’t know what extent he *464prepared, his wife prepared. I have a problem with the list compiled by two people, only one has testified.
Also, the list contained values, he said something speculative. Exactly what the value is is speculative. I can’t cross-examine his wife with regard to the value she put on the items, she has not testified. So I object to this coming in, at this point.
Appellant asserts that,
[although defense counsel did not use the words “hearsay” or “confrontation,” it is clear from his comments that the bases for his objection were that [Exhibit Five] is hearsay and that its admission denied his right of confrontation as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article 21 of the Md. Declaration of Rights.
We agree with appellant that, although counsel did not specifically use the word “hearsay” in his objection, the substance of his objection is sufficient to preserve the issue for our review.
Maryland Rule 5-801 defines hearsay as “a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” A “statement” refers to “(1) an oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person as an assertion.” Rule 5-801(a). Generally, hearsay is inadmissible, unless the statements fall within a recognized exception to the rule excluding hearsay. Kapiloff v. Locke, 276 Md. 466, 471, 348 A.2d 697 (1975).
The writing at issue is clearly inadmissible hearsay. Rawle testified that “[m]y wife and I compiled the list,” that they did so from “[r]eceipts we had” and “[r]ecollection of what was in the box because my wife had worked with the material,” and that some of the items were from his wife’s personal collection. Thus, the writing is offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, namely that the listed items were stolen and had the values indicated in the writing. The document was a joint product of both Rawle and his wife, containing opinions and conclusions of both individuals; however, only Rawle was available for cross-examination. Both *465parties must bo available to testify in order for the document to be admitted into evidence.
Nonetheless, “the erroneous admission of evidence will not justify reversal unless the complaining party can show that the admission was prejudicial to him [or her].” Kapiloff, 276 Md. at 472, 348 A.2d 697. According to the State, “there was no unfair prejudice to the defense ... [because] even without [Exhibit Five], there was no question but that the value of the property far exceeded the $500 required to establish felony theft.”
An owner of goods is presumptively qualified to provide testimony regarding the value of his goods. Cofflin v. State, 230 Md. 139, 142, 186 A.2d 216 (1962); Christian v. State, 65 Md.App. 303, 308, 500 A.2d 341 (1985); Wallace v. State, 63 Md.App. 399, 410-11, 492 A.2d 970 (1985). Although the test for the value of stolen goods is market value, “proof of market value ‘may be indirect as well as direct.’ ” Wallace, 63 Md.App. at 410, 492 A.2d 970 (quoting Vucci v. State, 13 Md.App. 694, 701, 284 A.2d 646 (1971)).
In Wallace, we held that the owner’s recollection of “the respective purchase prices, including installation costs, of the items stolen from the vacant apartment” was “circumstantially relevant to present market value.” Id. Thus, although no direct evidence of market value was presented valuing the stolen items in excess of $300, we concluded that such direct evidence was unnecessary because “the court could draw a fair inference, from evidence of the original purchase prices, that the items were worth more than $300[ ].” Id. at 411, 492 A.2d 970.
On cross-examination in the case sub judice, Rawle testified that he was familiar with the description of a rare Egyptian necklace and recalled paying “about $10,000” for it. Moreover, in response to appellant’s questions, Rawle described a two-carat loose diamond that was stolen as amethyst and “[v]ery slightly included.” He recalled paying approximately $7,000 for the diamond. Consequently, as an owner of the property, his testimony was sufficient to permit the court to *466draw an inference that the stolen goods were worth more than the statutory requirement of $500, thereby rendering harmless any error committed by the introduction of Exhibit Five into evidence.
Ill
Appellant next contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for theft over $500. Specifically, appellant avers that, although count two charges theft of jewelry jointly owned by Ms. Rawle and her son, “[t]he only property taken that was shown to be jointly owned by [Ms. Rawle and her son] is the checkbook that was admitted as State’s Exhibit [Number Four].” Asserting that both Ms. Rawle and her son were “owners” of the property for the purposes of Maryland’s theft provisions, the State argues that, even if they were not joint “owners,” the single larceny doctrine states that thefts from multiple owners on a single occasion constitute a single theft.
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, our task is to determine “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Taylor v. State, 346 Md. 452, 457, 697 A.2d 462 (1997)(quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)). We do not measure the weight of the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses, as that is the responsibility of the trier of fact. Dawson v. State, 329 Md. 275, 281, 619 A.2d 111 (1993); see Bryant v. State, 142 Md.App. 604, 622, 791 A.2d 161 (2002). Instead, although we do not re-weigh the evidence, “we do determine whether the verdict was supported by sufficient evidence, direct or circumstantial, which could convince a rational trier of fact of the defendant’s guilt of the offenses charged beyond a reasonable doubt.” Bryant, 142 Md.App. at 622-23, 791 A.2d 161 (quoting White v. State, 363 Md. 150, 162, 767 A.2d 855 (2001)).
*467At the conclusion of the State’s case-in-chief, appellant’s counsel moved for judgment of acquittal as to count two and the following ensued:
[APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: With regard to the theft count. The indictment reads ... Property of Rosalie Rawle and James Rawle was taken.
Now if the charge—if the charge by the State is of theft of Ms. Rosalie Rawle’s property that should be a count in the indictment. If it is the theft of Mr. James Rawle, that should be a count in the indictment. Otherwise it is duplicitous. If there is property owned by both [Ms. Rawle and her son], that is fíne, what the indictment charges; but the only evidence of any jointly owned property, property of both those people is the checkbook. The checking account is in both names.
[Ms. Rawle] testified about some rings, most of which are not her things. They don’t have to bp, under the law. They are in her possession or are hers, that is fine. But [Ms. Rawle] put no value on those rings. The value is based on the property which is owned by [Mr. Rawle] and Ms. Ramsburg, which they testified is business property, partnership property. We know the value of that. There is no allegation that partnership property was charged in this case.
So what we have is no value on the property of [Rawle] and [Ms. Rawle]. No allegation of theft of the partnership property of Ms. Ramsburg. There is no evidence of theft in this case.
THE COURT: Why? Mr. Rawle testified Ms. Ramsburg was his wife [and] it is their joint legal property.
[APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: Partnership property. It was not alleged that property was stolen.
THE COURT: That is what the indictment says.
[APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: Indictment says Ms. [Rawle’s] property was stolen, [Ms. Rawle and her son.]
*468[PROSECUTOR]: As to the value, Your Honor, there is a charge of one theft, one event where he took property. The property happens to belong to a couple of people. The value, there is evidence in as to the value. The list that we put in compiled by [ ] Rawle certainly if you add that up it is substantially over $500.
Generally, the single larceny doctrine arises in three principal contexts:
(1) whether a count in a charging document alleging that the defendant stole the property of several persons at the same time charges more than one offense and is therefore duplicitous; (2) whether a prosecution, conviction, or sentencing for stealing the.property of one person bars, under double jeopardy principles, the prosecution, conviction, or sentencing for having stolen the property of another person at the same time; and (3) whether, when the property of different persons is stolen at the same time, the values of the separate items of property may be aggregated to raise the grade of the offense or the severity of the punishment, to the extent that either is dependent on the value of the property taken.
State v. White, 348 Md. 179, 182, 702 A.2d 1263 (1997)(emphasis added). Thus, even if no single stolen item is valued at $500 or more, the amounts can be aggregated in order to charge a defendant for theft over $500 as long as the items were stolen in the course of the same incident.
Regardless of the applicability of the single larceny doctrine, we perceive no material variance. In Burgess v. State, 89 Md.App. 522, 598 A.2d 830 (1991), we considered whether the trial court committed error by permitting a variance in the proof at trial with respect to the malicious destruction of property count (count ninety). Count ninety alleged that Burgess partially destroyed Scott’s car. At trial, however, a passenger in the vehicle indicated that the automobile belonged to Moody, not to Scott. The court denied the State’s motion to amend the count to reflect Moody as the vehicle’s owner. Subsequently, the State argued that “the change in *469the owner’s name did not change the character of the offense.” Id. at 540, 598 A.2d 830. The court ultimately convicted Burgess on count ninety.
On appeal, we held that, because proof of ownership is not a material element of the crime of “Malicious Destruction of Property,” “[pjroof that the subject property is that of ‘another’ is all that is required.” Id. at 541, 598 A.2d 830. Thus, we opined that no material variance existed because the charging document appropriately alleged that the automobile was the property of “another” and the evidence sufficiently established that the property was that of “another.” Id.
In the case sub judice, Md.Code Ann. art. 27, § 342, in effect at the time of the offense, provided in pertinent part:
(a) Obtaining or exerting unauthorized control.—A person commits the offense of theft when he [or she] willfully or knowingly obtains control which is unauthorized or exerts control which is unauthorized over property of the owner, and;
(1) Has the purpose of depriving the owner of the property; or
(2) Willfully or knowingly uses, conceals, or abandons the property in such manner as to deprive the owner of the property; or
(3) Uses, conceals, or abandons the property knowing the use, concealment, or abandonment probably will deprive the owner of the property.
(Emphasis added.) Moreover, article 27, § 340(h) provides that, for the purposes of the theft subheading, “ ‘[ojwner’ means a person, other than the offender, who has possession of or any other interest in the property involved, even though that interest or possession is unlawful, and without whose consent the offender has no authority to exert control over the property,” while “property of another” is defined under § 340(j) as “real or personal property in which a person other than the offender has an interest which the offender does not have authority to defeat or impair....”
*470Accordingly, similar to Burgess, the State in the case sub judice need only prove that the property stolen belonged to “another” and was taken from an “owner.” The evidence sufficiently proved that Rawle had an interest in the involved property, as a member of the partnership with his wife. Thus, there was no material variance between the allegations and the State’s proof.
IV
Appellant’s final contention is that the trial court erred by ordering him to pay $400,000 in restitution. According to appellant, “there is no reliable evidence that the stolen jewelry has a value of $400,000” and the court erroneously failed to base the restitution on fair market value. Appellant also asserts that the court erroneously ordered restitution because it failed to conduct a reasonable inquiry into appellant’s ability to pay the restitution. The State responds that we may not address appellant’s argument because appellant failed to preserve it. We agree.
Maryland Rule 8-131 (a) provides, in pertinent part, that [o]rdinarily, the appellate court will not decide any other issue unless it plainly appears by the record to have been raised in or decided by the trial court, but the Court may decide such an issue if necessary or desirable to guide the trial court or to avoid the expense and delay of another appeal.
Consequently, because appellant failed to object and give the trial judge an opportunity to rule upon the restitution issue, we decline to address the merits.
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR HAR-FORD COUNTY REVERSED; CASE REMANDED FOR PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION.
COSTS TO BE PAID BY HARFORD COUNTY.

. Winni lived next door to Rawle’s Joppa home and watched her house when she was out of town.

. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

. Maryland Rule 4-243 states in pertinent part:
(a) Conditions for agreement. (1) Terms. The defendant may enter into an agreement with the State’s Attorney for a plea of guilty or nolo contendere on any proper condition, including one or more of the following:
(A) That the State’s Attorney will amend the charging document to charge a specified offense or add a specified offense, or will file a new charging document;
(B) That the State’s Attorney will enter a nolle prosequi pursuant to Rule 4-247(a) or move to mark certain charges against the defendant stet on the docket pursuant to Rule 4-248(a);
(C) That the State's Attorney will agree to the entry of a judgment of acquittal on certain charges pending against the defendant;
(D) That the State will not charge the defendant with the commission of certain other offenses;
(E) That the State's Attorney will recommend, not oppose, or make no comment to the court with respect to a particular sentence, disposition, or other judicial action;
(F) That the parties will submit a plea agreement proposing a particular sentence, disposition, or other judicial action to a judge for consideration pursuant to section (c) of this Rule.

. We, therefore, need not address the Miranda issue regarding the statements obtained on September 20, 2001.