Court Opinion

ID: 9497462
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 16:51:50.314991+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:58:12.475573
License: Public Domain

GILMAN, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
After reading Judge Norris’s majority opinion and Judge Merritt’s dissent, I am convinced that we are faced with a real-life murder mystery, an authentic “who-done-it” where the wrong man may be executed. Was Carolyn Muncey killed by her down-the-road neighbor Paul House, or by her husband Hubert Muncey? The evidence at House’s state-court trial clearly pointed to him as the perpetrator, highlighted by the physical evidence of the semen and the blood. But the evidence at House’s habeas corpus hearing before the district court just as clearly pointed to Hubert Muncey as the guilty party, highlighted by Mun-cey’s confession of guilt to two female acquaintances, the uncontroverted fact that the semen found on his wife’s clothing turned out to be his own, and the considerable doubt cast on how the victim’s blood came to appear on House’s blue jeans.
At the end of the day, I am in grave doubt as to which of the above two suspects murdered Carolyn Muncey. I am also puzzled as to why more of my colleagues are not similarly in doubt after evaluating the well-written but diametrically opposed opinions by Judges Norris and Merritt. Be that as it may, the question becomes what is a federal judge to do when faced with such grave doubt? The United States Supreme Court, fortunately, has provided an answer in the case of O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 115 S.Ct. 992, 130 L.Ed.2d 947 (1995), a case that incidentally arose out of the Sixth Circuit. Its key holding is as follows:
We repeat our conclusion: When a federal judge in a habeas proceeding is in grave doubt about whether a trial error of federal law had “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict,” that error is not harmless. And, the petitioner must win.
Id. at 436,115 S.Ct. 992.
The Court in O’Neal also defined the term “grave doubt,” stating that “[b]y ‘grave doubt’ we mean that, in the judge’s mind, the matter is so evenly balanced that he feels himself in virtual equipoise as to the harmlessness of the error.” Id. at 435, 115 S.Ct. 992. Finally, the Court noted that
our conclusion is consistent with the basic purposes underlying the vrait of ha-beas corpus. As we have said, we are dealing here with an error of constitutional dimension — the sort that risks an *710unreliable trial outcome and the consequent conviction of an innocent person.
Id. at 442,115 S.Ct. 992.
The risk of an unreliable trial outcome is precisely what we are dealing with in the case before us. For the reasons well-documented in Judge Merritt’s dissenting opinion, I believe that House has passed through the Schlup “actual innocence” gateway and is entitled to our consideration of his constitutional claims on their merits. On the other hand, I disagree with Judge Merritt’s conclusion that the proof in favor of House is so strong that we should issue an unconditional writ of habeas corpus.
The proper disposition of this case, in my opinion, is to issue a conditional writ that would free House unless he is provided a new trial by the state of Tennessee. See Castleberry v. Brigano, 349 F.3d 286, 294 (6th Cir.2003) (granting a conditional writ of habeas corpus to vacate the defendant’s conviction and sentence unless the state commenced a new trial against the defendant within 90 days). A new trial would allow the jury to assess House’s guilt or innocence free from the erroneous introduction of the semen evidence, with full knowledge of the controversy surrounding the blood evidence, and with the benefit of the testimony implicating Hubert Muncey. Under circumstances where we face the execution of a man who might well be innocent, I believe that our system of justice demands no less.