Court Opinion

ID: 9927264
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-26 17:03:37.977375+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:11.549312
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                                Jan 26 2024, 8:33 am

                                                                                        CLERK
                                                                                    Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                                       Court of Appeals
                                                                                         and Tax Court

      ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                     ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
      Alexander N. Moseley                                       Tara K.H. Rabiola
      Dixon & Moseley, P.C.                                      Jaimie L. Cairns
      Indianapolis, Indiana                                      Cairns Rabiola Vance, LLC
                                                                 Greenwood, Indiana

                                                  IN THE
          COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

      David Freed,                                               January 26, 2024
      Appellant-Respondent,                                      Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                                 23A-DC-129
              v.                                                 Appeal from the Johnson Circuit
                                                                 Court
      Elizabeth Freed,                                           The Honorable Andrew S.
      Appellee-Petitioner.                                       Roesener, Judge
                                                                 Trial Court Cause No.
                                                                 41C01-2203-DC-188

                                      Opinion by Judge Kenworthy
                                      Judges Foley and Felix concur.

      Kenworthy, Judge.

      Case Summary
[1]   During their marriage, David Freed (“Father”) and Elizabeth Freed (“Mother”)

      underwent in vitro fertilization (“IVF”) to attempt to have children. They

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-129 | January 26, 2024                               Page 1 of 30
      created and froze pre-embryos, 1 signing an agreement with a cryopreservation

      company. One of those pre-embryos resulted in the birth of a child.

[2]   The couple divorced and resolved all issues except the custody of a single

      remaining frozen pre-embryo. The issue of how to resolve the custody of a

      frozen pre-embryo has never appeared before our appellate courts, and the trial

      court looked to the approaches used by other jurisdictions, balancing the

      parties’ interests and ultimately awarding the pre-embryo to Mother.

[3]   Father appeals, raising the issue of whether the trial court’s award of the pre-

      embryo to Mother over Father’s objection violates Father’s fundamental right

      of procreation. Determining the trial court applied the appropriate test, we

      affirm.

      Facts and Procedural History 2
[4]   Mother and Father were married in June 2015. In the early stages of their

      marriage, Mother and Father discussed raising a family together. They hoped

      to have two children. When Mother and Father could not get pregnant, they

      visited a fertility doctor.

      1
       A human pre-embryo is a human ovum (egg) that has been fertilized by a human sperm and begun cell
      division. The pre-embryo at issue was frozen at six days old.
      2
       We held oral argument on October 26, 2023, at Purdue University. We thank counsel and those in
      attendance for their attentiveness and respect for the sensitivity of this issue.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-129 | January 26, 2024                         Page 2 of 30
[5]   Father went through testing first, and his results showed he did not have fertility

      issues. Mother was tested, and her results revealed she had low ovarian reserve.

      Her doctor recommended the couple try IVF. Mother took medication to

      stimulate her ovaries so they would release eggs. The eggs were collected and

      fertilized with Father’s sperm. This first cycle of IVF resulted in one pre-

      embryo. Mother and Father completed another cycle, which resulted in three

      pre-embryos.

[6]   After completing the IVF cycles, the couple had the first pre-embryo transferred

      to Mother’s uterus in April 2019. The transfer resulted in a pregnancy but

      ended in a miscarriage. Mother and Father transferred two more pre-embryos

      in November 2019. “[O]ne of the embryos took and the other did not.” Tr.

      Vol. 2 at 11. The successful pre-embryo resulted in the birth of a child, G.

[7]   The state of Mother and Father’s marriage when they conducted the second

      transfer “was definitely not good.” Id. “2019 had been a difficult year for

      [them] with . . . the miscarriage and then other . . . family loss and . . . the

      discussion of divorce had come up a few months prior to the transfer.” Id.

[8]   Mother filed for dissolution of marriage in March 2022. Mother and Father

      submitted a partial settlement agreement resolving all issues except disposition

      of the sole remaining pre-embryo. The trial court accepted the partial

      settlement agreement and dissolved the parties’ marriage.

[9]   Mother requested the trial court award her the pre-embryo. She said that if

      awarded the pre-embryo, she would transfer it to her uterus in hopes it would

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-129 | January 26, 2024          Page 3 of 30
       result in the birth of a second child. Mother said Father “could either be . . .

       not involved at all or he could . . . be in a co-parenting relationship like he is

       with our son, [G.]” if she were to have another child using the pre-embryo. Id.

       Mother earns a salary of $83,000 as a lab supervisor at Roche Diabetes Care,

       and stated she would be able to financially support herself, G., and another

       child.

[10]   Mother said, “[T]here’s very little chance that I could give [G.] a biological . . .

       sibling ever . . . just based on my previous infertility.” Id. at 12. She also

       acknowledged she was four years older than when she underwent her first

       round of IVF, and—because Mother was forty years old—a future pregnancy

       “may not even be . . . advised by a doctor.” Id. Completing another round of

       IVF would not be a “viable option for [her] to pursue” because she did not have

       enough coverage left on her insurance. Id. Mother acknowledged the chances

       of success with the pre-embryo transfer: “[A]s I get closer to menopause . . . my

       cycle could be off and then the [pre-embryo] doesn’t necessarily take if the

       timing is off when they do the implantation.” Id. at 17. When asked if she

       believed it was fair “at this point in time to make Mr. Freed a father of a second

       child if he . . . doesn’t want to be,” Mother responded “I don’t know.” Id. at

       19–20.

[11]   Mother concluded by saying:

                These embryos—I already feel like they’re my children. At this
                point, you can already identify whether they’re a boy or a girl.
                We didn’t get them tested, so I don’t know what the last one is.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-129 | January 26, 2024         Page 4 of 30
               Our first miscarriage was a little girl. And I just think of this
               embryo already as my child. And I can’t fathom, um, destroying
               it or donating it to science. (Crying). I just want the chance to
               see if it would result in a . . . child.

       Id. at 22.

[12]   Father requested the trial court award him the pre-embryo so he could ask the

       storage facility to dispose of it. He did not want to give the pre-embryo to a

       research facility because he did not “know enough of what would be . . . gained

       by any study or otherwise, so [he’s] not comfortable with that.” Id. at 27. He

       did not want to donate the pre-embryo to another couple because he “think[s]

       mentally [he] would struggle knowing that someone else is raising . . . what is

       essentially [his and Mother’s] child.” Id. He testified as follows:

               [I]t was hard enough to decide to leave the marriage and
               separate, um, knowing that I already had a child. . . . [B]ut then
               the thought of bringing another one in post divorce is not
               something I think would be a wise decision on either part. . . .
               [B]ut ultimately, my choice comes down to the fact that I would
               not be present . . . in that child’s life and while there would be
               some co-parenting, I wouldn’t be present overnights or early
               mornings[;] . . . just at the times where I was able to visit or then
               have custody on weekends and such . . . with the current
               situation with [G.], our son, . . . it’s hard on a regular basis—a
               daily basis (crying) to know that I don’t get to see him.

       Id. at 24.

[13]   When they began IVF, Mother and Father signed an agreement with the

       cryopreservation clinic—the facility storing the pre-embryos. In the Advanced

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-129 | January 26, 2024             Page 5 of 30
       Directives portion of the agreement, Mother and Father indicated that if either

       of them dies, sole ownership of the pre-embryos would be given to the surviving

       party. They indicated if they both die, the facility would discard the pre-

       embryos. The Advanced Directives also provides:

               If the Client Depositors’ relationship terminates and the
               disposition of the embryos is provided for by a divorce decree or
               other legally-binding document, the Company will comply with
               that document, upon receipt of a copy. Otherwise, the Company
               shall dispose of all embryos only as provided herein or in
               accordance with the Company’s Disposition Directive document.

       Ex. Vol. 3 at 7.

[14]   The agreement also contains the Conditions of Release of the pre-embryos,

       which states:

               A. If the recipient of the embryos is the Client Depositor, the
               embryos will be released:

                        i.       only to a licensed physician (who must execute a
                                 consent form provided by the Company), and

                        ii.      upon the express notarized authorization of both
                                 Client Depositors, and

                        iii.     upon the authorization of the Recipient’s Clinic,
                                 and

                        iv.      upon completion of serology/virology tests required
                                 by the Company.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-129 | January 26, 2024           Page 6 of 30
       Id. at 5.

[15]   The trial court found the contract offered no directive for the disposition of the

       pre-embryo if Mother and Father’s marriage was dissolved. Because Indiana

       lacks a statutory scheme or case law on this issue, the trial court looked to other

       jurisdictions for guidance. In its thorough and well-articulated order, the court

       found Mother’s interest in using the pre-embryo by attempting to implant it and

       bring a child to term outweighed Father’s interest in avoiding parenthood.

       Father now appeals.

       1. Assisted Reproductive Technology
[16]   Although pre-embryo disposition after the dissolution of a marriage is an issue

       of first impression in Indiana, we anticipate courts will encounter this issue

       again. There are eight IVF clinics in Indiana, and seven of those clinics

       cumulatively reported the births of over 1,000 infants in the year 2021 alone.

       Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART) Data, Centers for Disease Control and

       Prevention,

       https://nccd.cdc.gov/drh_art/rdPage.aspx?rdReport=DRH_ART.ClinicsList&

       SubTopic=&State=IN&Zip=&Distance=50 (last visited January 19, 2024)

       [https://perma.cc/52S2-WHSY]. And the issue of pre-embryo disposition is

       not limited to the desires of the genetic contributors—third parties can become

       involved and complicate the issue. See Marla Clark, Potential Parenthood: The

       Ownership of Frozen Embryos, 43 Res Gestae 24, 27 (Nov. 1999) (noting issues of

       inheritance when genetic contributors die). Establishment of public policy on

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-129 | January 26, 2024       Page 7 of 30
       this delicate issue would be better left to our General Assembly, but there is

       currently no legislative guidance. 3

       2. Standard of Review
[17]   Where—as here—the trial court makes special findings of fact and conclusions

       of law, we do not set aside the findings or judgment “unless clearly erroneous,

       and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the

       credibility of the witnesses.” Ind. Trial Rule 52(A). “Findings of fact are

       clearly erroneous only when they have no factual support in the record[.]”

       3
        On January 11, 2023, House Bill 1267 was given its first reading and referred to the Committee on
       Judiciary. No further action has been taken regarding the bill. In relevant part, House Bill 1267 states:
             (a) In the event that two (2) legal owners of cryopreserved embryos are separating or divorcing
             and do not agree upon the disposition of any cryopreserved embryos, a court of competent
             jurisdiction shall first look to any existing agreement expressing the couple’s intent regarding the
             disposition of the couple’s remaining embryos in the event of divorce or separation. In the
             absence of an agreement or a dispute concerning the validity of an agreement, the court shall
             attempt to balance the parties’ interests when awarding the embryos.
             (b) A court shall consider the following factors when balancing the parties’ interests:
                (1) The intended use of the embryos by any party wishing to preserve them.
                (2) A party’s reason for wanting to procreate with the cryopreserved embryos.
                (3) The reason for the cryopreservation of the embryos.
                (4) Each party’s ability to have genetic children through other means.
                (5) The existence of a party’s need to preserve fertility.
                (6) Any burden or hardship that may be placed on a party wishing to avoid procreation.
                (7) Any prior verbal discussions that the party wishing to procreate may have relied upon.
                (8) Any bad faith attempt, by either party, to use the cryopreserved embryos as leverage
                during a divorce proceeding.
                (9) Any other consideration or occurrence deemed relevant by the court.
             (c) A party opposed to the use of a cryopreserved embryo for the purpose of procreation is not
             considered a legal parent to any child created from the use of a cryopreserved embryo unless the
             party agrees, in writing, to be a legal parent to the child.
       H. 1267, 2023 Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2023), https://billtexts.s3.amazonaws.com/_data/in/https-
       d37sr56shkhro8-cloudfront-net-pdf-documents-123-2023-house-bills-HB1267-HB1267-01-INTR-
       pdf.pdf (last visited January 16, 2024) [https://perma.cc/VS7W-49SY].

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-129 | January 26, 2024                                 Page 8 of 30
       Wysocki v. Johnson, 18 N.E.3d 600, 603 (Ind. 2014). “But the trial court’s

       conclusions of law and any constitutional challenges are reviewed de novo.” In

       re Adoption I.B., 32 N.E.3d 1164, 1169 (Ind. 2015) (internal citations omitted).

       3. Rights to Procreation and Parenthood
[18]   The United States Supreme Court has addressed the right to procreate in several

       instances. The Court upheld the sterilization of a woman in Buck v. Bell, 274

       U.S. 200, 207 (1927), but later struck down a statute authorizing the

       sterilization of certain classes of criminals, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535,

       541 (1942). In Skinner, the Supreme Court called procreation “one of the basic

       civil rights of man” and “fundamental to the very existence and survival of the

       [human] race.” 316 U.S. at 541. In Griswold v. Connecticut, the United States

       Supreme Court struck down a statute forbidding married couples’ use of

       contraceptives, describing the marital relationship as “lying within the zone of

       privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees.” 381 U.S.

       479, 485 (1965). And in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972), the

       Supreme Court said, “If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of

       the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental

       intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision

       whether to bear or beget a child.” The Indiana Supreme Court has explicitly

       recognized a fundamental right to procreation. See Members of Med. Licensing Bd.

       of Ind. v. Planned Parenthood Great Nw., Haw., Ala., Ind., Ky., Inc., 211 N.E.3d

       957, 969 (Ind. 2023); State v. Alcorn, 638 N.E.2d 1242, 1245 (Ind. 1994); State ex

       rel. Pollard v. Crim. Ct. of Marion Cnty., 329 N.E.2d 573, 585 (Ind. 1975).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-129 | January 26, 2024           Page 9 of 30
[19]   Under federal substantive due process analysis, the State may not “directly and

       substantially” interfere with fundamental rights. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S.

       374, 387 (1978). If the State’s action directly and substantially interferes with a

       fundamental right, the action is subject to strict scrutiny, meaning the action

       “must be a necessary means to a compelling governmental purpose and be

       narrowly tailored to that purpose.” Boultinghouse v. State, 120 N.E.3d 586, 590

       (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (quoting Ind. Dep’t of Env’t. Mgmt. v. Chem. Waste Mgmt.,

       Inc., 643 N.E.2d 331, 337 (Ind. 1994)), trans. denied. “Our Court has held that

       the ‘state and federal substantive due process analys[e]s [are] identical.’” Id.

       (quoting N.B. v. Sybinski, 724 N.E.2d 1103, 1112 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans.

       denied).

[20]   Pre-embryo disposition cases also implicate parenting rights, which spur

       additional considerations. Mother argues Father has already consented to

       procreation by contributing to the creation of the pre-embryos, which reframes

       Father’s procreation rights as parenting rights. See Tracey S. Pachman, Disputes

       over Frozen Preembryos & the “Right Not to Be a Parent,” 12 Colum. J. Gender & L.

       128 (2003). Parents have a constitutional right to raise their children as they see

       fit. Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510,

       535 (1925) (“The child is not the mere creature of the state; those who nurture

       him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to

       recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.”); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406

       U.S. 205, 233 (1972) (“The duty to prepare the child for ‘additional

       obligations,’ referred to by the [Pierce] Court, must be read to include the

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-129 | January 26, 2024          Page 10 of 30
       inculcation of moral standards, religious beliefs, and elements of good

       citizenship.”). The Indiana Supreme Court has also outlined the importance of

       the right to parenthood, stating a “parent’s interest in the care, custody, and

       control of his or her children is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty

       interests.” In re R.S., 56 N.E.3d 625, 628 (Ind. 2016) (quoting Bester v. Lake

       Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005) (internal quotation

       marks omitted)).

[21]   Some states 4 have adopted a version of Section 706 of the Uniform Parentage

       Act (2000). Section 706(a) provides:

                If a marriage is dissolved before placement of eggs, sperm, or an
                embryo, the former spouse is not a parent of the resulting child
                unless the former spouse consented in a record that if assisted
                reproduction were to occur after a divorce, the former spouse
                would be a parent of the child.

       Under such statutes, although the former spouse has procreated or consented to

       procreation, the former spouse may opt out of legal parenthood. But cf. Straub v.

       B.M.T. by Todd, 645 N.E.2d 597, 598 (Ind. 1994) (holding a contract absolving

       the father of child support was void and unenforceable because it would deprive

       the child of parental support). 5

       4
        These states include Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Maine, New Mexico, North
       Dakota, Rhode Island, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, and Wyoming.
       5
        In its order, the trial court states, “Mother has unequivocally stated that she will require no financial
       support from [Father], so he is relieved of this burden.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 29. We note Indiana law

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-129 | January 26, 2024                              Page 11 of 30
[22]   Mother contends Father’s right to procreation “is moot given the fact that he

       already consented to it when providing his sperm to fertilize [Mother’s] egg.”

       Appellee’s Br. at 11. Father argues the trial court’s award of the pre-embryo to

       Mother for implantation strips Father of his right to decide whether to

       procreate. Father’s argument assumes but does not provide legal authority to

       explain how the trial court’s order amounts to state action.

[23]   According to the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution:

                No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
                privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
                any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
                due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
                the equal protection of the laws.

       “Because the Amendment is directed at the States, it can be violated only by

       conduct that may be fairly characterized as ‘state action.’” Lugar v. Edmondson

       Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 924 (1982). To be considered “state action,” the conduct

       causing the deprivation of a federal right must be “fairly attributable to the

       State.” Id. at 937. In determining whether the right is fairly attributable to the

       State, courts conduct a two-step analysis. First, the deprivation must be caused

       by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of

       conduct imposed by the State or a person for whom the State is responsible. Id.

       indicates otherwise. See Schwartz v. Heeter, 994 N.E.2d 1102, 1107 (Ind. 2013) (“[C]hild support payments are
       for the benefit of children . . . [and] [m]other could not bargain them away, . . . even at [f]ather’s urging.”).
       Neither party raises the issue of child support on appeal.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-129 | January 26, 2024                                Page 12 of 30
       Second, the party charged with the deprivation must be a person who may

       fairly be said to be a “state actor.” Id. Without this second inquiry, “private

       parties could face constitutional litigation whenever they seek to rely on some

       state rule governing their interactions with the community surrounding them.”

       Id.

[24]   The two inquiries “collapse into each other when the claim of a constitutional

       deprivation is directed against a party whose official character is such as to lend

       the weight of the State to his decisions.” Id. The inquiries “diverge when the

       constitutional claim is directed against a party without such apparent authority,

       i.e., against a private party.” Id. Action by a private party pursuant to a statute,

       without something more, does not justify a characterization of that party as a

       “state actor.” Id. at 939.

[25]   Here, the trial court resolved a family law dispute between private parties—

       indeed, on an issue the parties chose to leave open to judicial determination

       through their cryopreservation agreement. 6 It is the trial court’s role to divide

       property and determine child custody when dissolving marriages. See Ind.

       Code §§ 31-15-7-5 & 31-30-1-12. 7 In this role, the trial court must balance

       parties’ competing fundamental rights. The trial court here merely provided a

       6
        We urge parties signing cryopreservation agreements to carefully consider the consequences of such
       agreements should they later separate.
       7
        Trial courts also determine child custody for unmarried parents, I.C. § 31-14-10-1, and provide relief in
       property disputes when unmarried couples separate, Neibert v. Perdomo, 54 N.E.3d 1046, 1051–52 (Ind. Ct.
       App. 2016).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-129 | January 26, 2024                             Page 13 of 30
       neutral forum to resolve a private dispute. This is insufficient state action to

       implicate Fourteenth Amendment protections. The disposition of a pre-

       embryo—which we will categorize below as being between a person and

       property—may therefore properly be determined by the trial court.

       4. Pre-Embryos Are Entitled to Special Respect
[26]   The ways courts have classified pre-embryos—as property, persons, or an

       interim category—impacts the outcome of pre-embryo disposition cases.

       Jurisdictions that find pre-embryos are personal property can treat the pre-

       embryos as any other marital property and apply their states’ property division

       regimes. See In re Marriage of Dahl and Angle, 194 P.3d 834, 841 (Or. Ct. App.

       2008) (“[In the context of pre-embryo dispositions,] we review de novo the trial

       court’s division of marital property, [and] we review the award itself for the

       proper exercise of discretion.”); Kotkowski-Paul v. Paul, 204 N.E.3d 66, 76 (Ohio

       Ct. App. 2022) (“[T]he trial court did not err in concluding the subject embryos

       are marital property subject to allocation as part of the division of such

       property.”).

[27]   Louisiana classifies an “in vitro fertilized human ovum” as “a biological human

       being which is not the property of the physician which acts as an agent of

       fertilization, or the facility which employs him or the donors of the sperm and

       ovum.” La. Stat. Ann. § 9:126 (1986). “A court in the parish where the in vitro

       fertilized ovum is located may appoint a curator upon motion of the in vitro

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-129 | January 26, 2024      Page 14 of 30
       fertilization patients, their heirs, or physicians who caused in vitro fertilization

       to be performed, to protect the in vitro fertilized human ovum’s rights.” Id.

[28]   Most courts that have addressed this issue, following the approach taken by the

       Tennessee Supreme Court in Davis v. Davis, find pre-embryos “occupy an

       interim category that entitles them to special respect because of their potential

       for human life.” 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied. Under this

       rationale, pre-embryos cannot be valued and divided as other marital property.

[29]   Here, neither party argues the trial court erred in classifying the pre-embryo as

       deserving “special respect.” But Father argues the trial court erred in finding

       the embryos deserved special respect to the extent it did so because of the

       State’s interest in them, which Father claims is not supported by outside

       jurisdictions. At oral argument, Father’s counsel drew this Court’s attention to

       Indiana Code Section 16-34-1-0.5, which explicitly excludes IVF from Indiana’s

       statute prohibiting abortion.

[30]   The United States Supreme Court has afforded recognition and some State

       protection to human embryos at the earliest stages of development. In vitro pre-

       embryos and in utero pre-embryos share a potential for human life that sets them

       apart from property. We agree with the trial court that Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.

       113 (1973) and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833

       (1992)—though overruled by Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 597 U.S.

       215, 215 (2022)—continue to offer helpful discussions about how the law views

       nascent human life. The Roe court acknowledged the State has an “important

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-129 | January 26, 2024        Page 15 of 30
       and legitimate interest in protecting the potentiality of human life.” Roe, 410

       U.S. at 162. The Casey court decided “the State may take measures to ensure

       that the woman’s choice is informed” in order to “promote the State’s profound

       interest in potential life, throughout pregnancy[.]” Casey, 505 U.S. at 878.

[31]   Indiana law supports the trial court’s determination that pre-embryos deserve

       special respect. The Indiana Supreme Court has found “our laws have long

       reflected that Hoosiers, through their elected representatives, may collectively

       conclude that legal protections inherent in personhood commence before birth,

       so the State’s broad authority to protect the public’s health, welfare, and safety

       extends to protecting prenatal life.” Members of Med. Licensing Bd. of Ind., 211

       N.E.3d at 961. And Indiana Code Section 16-34-2-1.1 requires a woman

       seeking a legal abortion to sign a consent form acknowledging “human physical

       life begins when a human ovum is fertilized by a human sperm.” But that

       definition of human life “does not apply to in vitro fertilization.” I.C. § 16-34-

       1-0.5. Therefore, although Indiana law attributes “human physical life” to

       fertilized eggs in utero, it sets pre-embryos in vitro apart. As such, we cannot say

       in vitro frozen pre-embryos are entitled to personhood under Indiana law. 8

[32]   Thus, pre-embryos, as neither property nor persons, are in a separate category

       that entitles them to special respect. Father and Mother do not have a true

       8
         We discuss abortion caselaw and statutes in this section only to the extent they illustrate courts’
       understandings of prenatal existence. As is apparent from Indiana Code Section 16-34-1-0.5, Indiana law
       treats pregnancy and abortion, which occur in utero, differently from IVF, which occurs in vitro—ex utero.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-129 | January 26, 2024                             Page 16 of 30
       property interest in the pre-embryos, but “they do have an interest in the nature

       of ownership, to the extent they have decision-making authority concerning

       disposition of the preembryos, within the scope of policy set by law.” Davis,

       842 S.W.2d at 597.

       5. Other Jurisdictions’ Approaches to Pre-Embryo
       Disposition
[33]   Generally, states have taken three approaches in pre-embryo disposition cases:

       the contract approach, the balancing test approach, and the contemporaneous

       mutual consent approach. In practice, courts do not strictly adhere to just one

       of these approaches, generally applying some combination.

[34]   The contract approach is the preferred method of deciding pre-embryo

       disposition cases, but in many cases, courts find nothing in the contract

       revealing the parties’ preference for pre-embryo disposition in the case of

       separation or dissolution. When contracts do not contain such a provision,

       most states adopt the balancing approach, weighing the parties’ interests against

       each other. This weighing usually involves one party’s interest in using the pre-

       embryo to attempt to bring a child to term and one party’s interest in avoiding

       procreation by discarding the pre-embryos or leaving the pre-embryos frozen.

       Finally, a few states have adopted the contemporaneous mutual consent

       approach, which maintains the status quo indefinitely (leaving the pre-embryos

       frozen) until the parties agree on the disposition of the pre-embryos.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-129 | January 26, 2024      Page 17 of 30
       5.1 The Contract Approach

[35]   Appellate courts in other jurisdictions generally attempt to honor the agreement

       between the couple and the pre-embryo storage facility. Most of these courts

       prescribe the contract approach first and explain that only after determining

       there is not an applicable agreement should courts move on to another

       approach. By enforcing the terms of the parties’ agreement with the

       cryopreservation clinic, courts can ensure predictability and honor the original

       intent of the parties. See Szafranski v. Dunston, 993 N.E.2d 502 (Ill. App. Ct.

       2013).

[36]   Courts following the contract approach treat the contract for the disposition of

       the pre-embryos no differently than other contracts, leaving open the same

       defenses and interpretation regimes. See, e.g., Bilbao v. Goodwin, 217 A.3d 977,

       980 (Conn. 2019) (holding the checkbox nature of the cryopreservation

       agreement did not render it insufficient); see also McQueen v. Gadberry, 507

       S.W.3d 127, 156 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016) (holding the party seeking to enforce a

       cryopreservation directive did not prove by clear and convincing evidence the

       directive was a valid and enforceable agreement between the parties). Indeed,

       such courts have reasoned “[t]he subject of this dispute may be novel but the

       common-law principles governing contract interpretation are not.” Kass v. Kass,

       696 N.E.2d 174, 180 (N.Y. 1998).

[37]   But the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, like other critics of the

       contract approach, noted the approach does not leave room for one or both

       parties’ change of heart. A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1059 (Mass. 2000)
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-129 | January 26, 2024      Page 18 of 30
       (“[P]rior agreements to enter into familial relationships (marriage or

       parenthood) should not be enforced against individuals who subsequently

       reconsider their decisions.”).

       5.2 The Balancing Approach

[38]   Most jurisdictions, if they cannot resolve the issue by enforcing the

       cryopreservation agreement, follow the balancing approach taken in Davis.

       There, the Tennessee Supreme Court stated:

               [D]isputes involving the disposition of preembryos produced by
               in vitro fertilization should be resolved, first, by looking to the
               preferences of the progenitors. If their wishes cannot be
               ascertained, or if there is dispute, then their prior agreement
               concerning disposition should be carried out. If no prior
               agreement exists, then the relative interests of the parties in using
               or not using the preembryos must be weighed. Ordinarily, the
               party wishing to avoid procreation should prevail, assuming that
               the other party has a reasonable possibility of achieving
               parenthood by means other than use of the preembryos in
               question. If no other reasonable alternatives exist, then the
               argument in favor of using the preembryos to achieve pregnancy
               should be considered. However, if the party seeking control of
               the preembryos intends merely to donate them to another couple,
               the objecting party obviously has the greater interest and should
               prevail.

       842 S.W.2d 588 at 604.

[39]   Courts following the approach in Davis have outlined several considerations for

       trial courts balancing the parties’ interests:

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-129 | January 26, 2024        Page 19 of 30
               (1) the intended use of the frozen pre-embryos by the party
               seeking to preserve them; (2) the reasonable ability of a party
               seeking implantation to have children through other means; (3)
               the parties’ original reasons for undergoing IVF, which may
               favor preservation over disposition; (4) the potential burden on
               the party seeking to avoid becoming a genetic parent; (5) either
               party’s bad faith and attempt to use the frozen pre-embryo as
               leverage in the divorce proceeding; and (6) other considerations
               relevant to the parties’ unique situation.

       Jocelyn P. v. Joshua P., 250 A.3d 373, 380 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2021); see also In re

       Marriage of Rooks, 429 P.3d 579, 593 (Colo. 2018), cert. denied.

[40]   Father, like other critics of the balancing test approach, claims the approach

       puts the court in the position to make reproductive decisions for the parties—

       thereby inevitably violating one of the parties’ right to procreation. And courts’

       determinations under the balancing test are fact-specific, leading to less

       predictable results for the parties.

       5.3 The Contemporaneous Consent Approach

[41]   A few courts have adopted the contemporaneous mutual consent approach—

       the approach Father suggests we take. Under this approach, neither party may

       determine pre-embryo disposition without the present consent of the other

       party. As discussed earlier, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

       adopted the contemporaneous consent approach, finding the agreement at issue

       was “not a separation agreement that is binding on the couple in a divorce

       proceeding pursuant to [Massachusetts’ alimony statute].” A.Z., 725 N.E.2d at

       1057. The court said its “Legislature has already determined by statute that

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-129 | January 26, 2024        Page 20 of 30
       individuals should not be bound by certain agreements binding them to enter or

       not enter into familial relationships.” Id. at 1158.

[42]   The Iowa Supreme Court has determined cryopreservation agreements are not

       enforceable when one of the parties later changes his or her mind. In re

       Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 777 (Iowa 2003). The Witten court

       reasoned “it may be impossible to make a knowing and intelligent decision to

       relinquish a right in advance of the time the right is to be exercised.” Id.

       (internal quotation omitted). The Witten court also noted the contemporaneous

       consent approach adheres to Iowa law by allowing the parties “to make family

       and reproductive decisions based on their current views and values” with an

       “awareness that such decisions are highly emotional in nature and subject to a

       later change of heart.” Id. at 782.

[43]   The Davis court explicitly decided against the contemporaneous consent

       approach in part because when the case was decided in 1992, frozen pre-

       embryos could only survive for two years. The Davis court determined applying

       the contemporaneous consent approach would grant the party seeking to avoid

       procreation “the inherent power to veto any transfer of the preembryos . . . and

       thus to insure their eventual discard or self-destruction.” Davis, 842 S.W.2d at

       598.

[44]   Although cryopreservation clinics can now store pre-embryos indefinitely, the

       concern about granting one party a de facto veto persists. In Jocelyn P., the

       Maryland Court of Special Appeals criticized the contemporaneous consent

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-129 | January 26, 2024       Page 21 of 30
       approach as creating a de facto veto over the party seeking to use the pre-

       embryo by avoiding any resolution until the issue is mooted and as a way to

       punish soon-to-be ex-spouses. 250 A.3d at 397. The Pennsylvania Superior

       Court called the approach “totally unrealistic” because if the parties could come

       to an agreement, they would not be before the court. Reber v. Reiss, 42 A.3d

       1131, 1135 n.5 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012).

       5.4 Deference to Trial Court

[45]   Some appellate courts, rather than explicitly adopt one of the three approaches,

       defer to the decision of the trial court. See Reber, 42 A.3d at 1136 (determining

       without explicitly adopting a test that the balancing approach used by the trial

       court was the most suitable); see also McQueen, 507 S.W.3d at 157 (“Multiple

       decisions from our Court indicate that [the statute governing the division of

       marital property] does not prohibit courts from awarding property to parties

       jointly in unusual circumstances where the property cannot be justly divided.”).

       6. Application
       6.1 The cryopreservation agreement is inconclusive about the disposition of the
       pre-embryo

[46]   We agree with the courts that first look for an enforceable agreement regarding

       the disposition of the pre-embryos in the event of divorce. This approach

       allows trial courts to attempt to honor both parties’ interests and rights

       regarding procreation: “[B]inding agreements ‘minimize misunderstandings

       and maximize procreative liberty by reserving to the progenitors the authority

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-129 | January 26, 2024      Page 22 of 30
       to make what is in the first instance a quintessentially personal, private

       decision.’” Rooks, 429 P.3d at 592 (quoting Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 180).

[47]   Mother and Father do not challenge the trial court’s finding that the contract

       does not contain a directive on the disposition of the pre-embryo if Mother and

       Father’s marriage dissolves. And we agree with the trial court’s conclusion that

       Mother and Father offered no directive in the cryopreservation contract

       regarding the disposition of the pre-embryo upon the dissolution of the parties’

       marriage. Thus, we must resolve this dispute some other way.

       6.2 We reject the contemporaneous consent approach

[48]   Father proposes we adopt the contemporaneous consent approach, which

       “ensures that each of the Parties’ respective constitutional right to procreate, or

       not to procreate, is protected from government intrusion.” Appellant’s Br. at 21.

       But the facts of this case underscore the inequities of the contemporaneous

       consent model. Father’s participation in the IVF process indicates he decided

       to exercise his positive right to procreate in 2018. Mother and Father

       underwent IVF because Mother had low ovarian reserve. They both hoped for

       two children—two full biological siblings. Two rounds of IVF resulted in only

       four eggs. Rather than choosing to preserve Mother’s unfertilized eggs after

       retrieval, the parties decided to use Father’s sperm to fertilize all of them.

       Transfer of the first pre-embryo resulted in miscarriage. Then, at a time when

       their marriage “was definitely not good” and after they had discussed divorce,

       Mother and Father underwent a second transfer of two pre-embryos. One

       child, G., was born and one pre-embryo remains. The parties’ cryopreservation
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-129 | January 26, 2024        Page 23 of 30
       contract provides no advanced directive for disposition of this pre-embryo in the

       event the parties’ relationship ends. Now, after Mother has relied on Father’s

       consistent participation over a course of years, Father seeks to withdraw from

       the process and prevent Mother’s use of the pre-embryo, leaving Mother with

       little—if any—chance to conceive and give birth to another biological child.

       Meanwhile, Father remains physically able to procreate.

[49]   We must agree with courts that have found the contemporaneous consent

       approach “totally unrealistic.” Reber, 42 A.3d at 1135 n.5. If parties could

       agree on their own about the disposition of the pre-embryo upon divorce, they

       would have no need of the court’s intervention. Jurisdictions following this

       approach ignore any preexisting agreement between the parties if one or both

       parties has a change of heart. This creates legal uncertainty and eliminates any

       reason for parties to form an agreement regarding the disposition of pre-

       embryos upon divorce.

[50]   Contrary to honoring both parties’ interests and procreation rights, the

       contemporaneous consent approach promotes a clear winner: the party seeking

       to avoid procreation. The party seeking to avoid procreation may simply never

       agree to the use of the pre-embryos, which would remain frozen indefinitely.

       Such a solution would provide the party avoiding procreation with a de facto

       veto and an incentive to leverage this issue in bad faith.

[51]   The contemporaneous consent approach would require trial courts to abandon

       their role in dissolution proceedings for the issue of pre-embryo disposition.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-129 | January 26, 2024        Page 24 of 30
       Indiana Code Section 31-15-7-4(b) instructs courts to divide marital property

       “in a just and reasonable manner.” And the trial court has broad discretion

       both in “ascertaining the value of property in a dissolution action,” Quillen v.

       Quillen, 671 N.E.2d 98, 102 (Ind. 1996), and in determining equitable division

       of the property, In re Marriage of Perez, 7 N.E.3d 1009, 1010–12 (Ind. Ct. App.

       2014); I.C. § 31-15-7-5 (“The court shall presume that an equal division of the

       marital property between the parties is just and reasonable. However, this

       presumption may be rebutted by a party who presents relevant evidence . . . that

       an equal division would not be just and reasonable[.]”) Indiana Code Section

       31-30-1-12 describes the trial court’s jurisdiction to determine child custody in

       marriage dissolutions. 9 Pre-embryos are not common marital property nor are

       they children; they exist in an interim category between the two. This interim

       category is logically included in family law cases, so “[w]e cannot simply do

       nothing.” Rooks, 429 P.3d at 592.

       6.3 We adopt the balancing approach

[52]   If the contract approach does not resolve the parties’ dispute, the trial court

       should then seek to balance the parties’ interests. The balancing approach

       reflects Indiana trial courts’ role in dissolution proceedings: Mother and Father

       have an interest in disposition of the pre-embryo after their divorce, and the trial

       9
           Trial courts also resolve issues of child custody and property division for unmarried parties. See supra n.7.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-129 | January 26, 2024                                  Page 25 of 30
       court must weigh their interests and award the pre-embryo “in a just and

       reasonable manner.” I.C. § 31-15-7-4(b).

[53]   Because pre-embryos are entitled to special respect, certain factors must be

       considered when balancing the parties’ interests. We agree with the factors as

       listed in Jocelyn P. and Rooks and state them as: (1) the intended use of the pre-

       embryos by the party seeking to preserve them; (2) the reasonable ability of the

       party seeking implantation to have children through other means; (3) the

       parties’ original reasons for undergoing IVF, which may favor preservation over

       disposition; (4) the potential burden on the party seeking to avoid becoming a

       genetic parent; (5) either party’s bad faith attempt to use the pre-embryos as

       leverage in the dissolution proceeding; and (6) other considerations relevant to

       the parties’ unique situation.

[54]   When weighing the parties’ interests, trial courts should not consider “whether

       the party seeking to become a genetic parent using the pre-embryos can afford

       another child.” Rooks, 429 P.3d at 594. And “the sheer number of a party’s

       existing children, standing alone,” is not “a reason to preclude preservation or

       use of the pre-embryos.” Id. Finally, because genetic and gestational

       parenthood are distinct from parenthood through adoption, “courts should not

       consider whether a spouse seeking to use the pre-embryos to become a genetic

       parent could instead adopt a child or otherwise parent non-biological children.”

       Id.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-129 | January 26, 2024       Page 26 of 30
[55]   There is language within Davis that, though judicious for the facts therein,

       might stifle other trial courts’ abilities to fairly balance the parties’ interests.

       The Davis court determined although “women contribute more to the IVF

       process than men,” “[t]heir experience . . . must be viewed in light of the joys of

       parenthood that is desired or the relative anguish of a lifetime of unwanted

       parenthood.” 842 S.W.2d at 601. And the statement that “[o]rdinarily, the

       party wishing to avoid procreation should prevail” creates a rebuttable

       presumption against the party seeking to use the pre-embryo to procreate. Id. at

       604; see Benjamin C. Carpenter, Sperm is Still Cheap: Reconsidering the Law’s Male-

       centric Approach to Embryo Disputes After Thirty Years of Jurisprudence, 34 Yale J.L.

       & Feminism 1, 3–4 (2023).

[56]   These comparisons and presumptions proceed from the facts of Davis. There,

       the husband’s troubled and fatherless upbringing made him particularly

       sensitive to the prospect of creating a child he would be unable to raise. Even

       though the wife sought to donate the pre-embryos, the husband was worried the

       couple receiving the pre-embryos might give birth to a child and eventually

       divorce, leaving the child to suffer an upbringing like the husband’s. We

       decline to adopt a presumption in favor of either party.

[57]   Here, the trial court identified factors identical to those we have adopted and

       determined a consideration of the factors favors Mother. The trial court

       explained:

               83. Mother does not request that the embryo be awarded to
               another female or couple for uterine implantation nor does she
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-129 | January 26, 2024           Page 27 of 30
         seek to have the embryo donated for purposes of scientific
         research. She plainly seeks to have the embryo implanted in her
         uterus with the hope of producing a biological child. Her
         medical condition, the existence of which is unchallenged by
         Father, operates as a substantial impediment to natural
         conception, as does her advancing age. There is no evidence of
         bad faith by either party. The original reason for in vitro
         fertilization is consistent with the very purpose for which Mother
         seeks to use the embryo . . . to beget a biological sibling for [G.].
         Finally, Mother’s insurance will cover the cost of this final
         uterine implantation. Thereafter, the significant costs of any
         future in vitro fertilization will be borne by Mother without
         recompense by her health insurer.

         84. As it relates to Father, Mother has unequivocally stated that
         she will require no financial support from him, so he is relieved
         of this burden. There is, however, another burden . . . and a
         significant one . . . placed upon Father by way of Mother’s
         request. That burden comes in the form of an emotional weight
         he is forced to carry by being compelled to [f]ather a child he will
         not raise in the context of an intact, nuclear family. It was clear
         to this court that Father’s desire to avoid this very heartache was
         the principal basis for his request that the embryo be destroyed.
         This factor weighs heavily in favor of Father, but, in this court’s
         estimation, does not overcome the other factors which tilt in
         Mother’s favor.

Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 28–29. 10

10
   After weighing Mother’s and Father’s interests under the factors enunciated in Jocelyn P. and Rooks, the
trial court proposes the consideration of “how the parties’ competing requests impact the pre-embryo,” which
the trial court frames as “the termination of the pre-embryo” versus “the possibility of viability and life.” Id.
at 30–31. But this factor creates a presumption for the party seeking implantation, and we do not adopt it
here.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-129 | January 26, 2024                                Page 28 of 30
[58]   Father appeals the trial court’s use of the balancing test, not the trial court’s

       balancing of the factors in favor of Mother. And although we disagree with the

       trial court’s statement that Father is relieved of the potential burden of child

       support, the error is harmless. Father’s testimony focused on the emotional—

       not financial—burden of raising a child outside of marriage. He explained his

       preference for discarding the pre-embryo arises from “the fact that [he] would

       not be present . . . in that child’s life” because he and Mother would be

       divorced. Tr. Vol. 2 at 24. Father described how it was already difficult for him

       to raise G. in that context. Father did not provide evidence of—and the trial

       court placed little emphasis on—any financial burden an additional child would

       place on Father. Further, the pre-embryo has not resulted in the birth of a

       child, and any questions regarding support are hypothetical. The parties are

       litigating the disposition of the pre-embryo, not potential support of a potential

       child. That issue would require a separate hearing when the issue is squarely

       before the court.

[59]   At bottom, the trial court applied the appropriate test, balancing the parties’

       interests using the appropriate factors.

       Conclusion
[60]   On the issue of pre-embryo disposition, trial courts should first look to any

       existing agreement between the parties to determine whether the parties

       memorialized their intentions for the pre-embryos upon their separation or

       divorce. If there is no applicable provision, the trial court’s role and discretion

       in dividing marital property and determining child custody leads us to conclude
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-129 | January 26, 2024        Page 29 of 30
       that balancing the parties’ interests is the most appropriate way to address pre-

       embryo disposition upon divorce. But because pre-embryos are entitled to

       special respect, factors beyond those outlined in Indiana Code Chapter 31-15-7

       must be considered. These additional factors include: (1) the intended use of

       the pre-embryos by the party seeking to preserve them; (2) the reasonable ability

       of the party seeking implantation to have children through other means; (3) the

       parties’ original reasons for undergoing IVF, which may favor preservation over

       disposition; (4) the potential burden on the party seeking to avoid becoming a

       genetic parent; (5) either party’s bad faith attempt to use the pre-embryos as

       leverage in the dissolution proceeding; and (6) other considerations relevant to

       the parties’ unique situation.

[61]   Here, the trial court applied the appropriate test and considered the appropriate

       factors. Accordingly, we affirm.

[62]   Affirmed.

       Foley, J., and Felix, J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-129 | January 26, 2024     Page 30 of 30