Court Opinion

ID: 9828738
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 18:40:28.595451+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:52.430317
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
In rehearing motion, appellant contends that, even granting that proof of the derailment and wreck established a prima facie case of negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, such case was completely overthrown by the- evidence appellant produced. to the effect that it was not negligent in the particular found by the jury, namely, the operation of its train. In support of this contention, appellant quotes the first portion of section 784 of the article on “Negligence,” 45 C. J. 1221, 1222, which includes the following: “The presumption or inference is overcome and rebutted if defendant’s explanation sufficiently establishes that he was not guilty of negligence in connection with the injury complained of.” (Emphasis ours.)
It is clear from the following unquoted portion of this section that “establishes” was used in the sense of “proves conclusively as a matter of law,” and not in the sense merely of adducing evidence, which, if true, will rebut the presumption: “The mere fact that defendant has introduced evidence which, if accepted by the jury, would exonerate defendant, does not ordinarily destroy the presumption of negligence raised by plaintiff’s proof so as to authorize a finding of the absence of negligence as a matter of law or warrant an affirmative direction for defendant.”
*1056As further pointed out in this section, the doctrine does not affect the general rule that, where the evidence admits of but one reasonable conclusion, the question becdmes one of law.
We agree with appellant’s contention to the effect that the burden did not rest upon it to rebut the presumption by a preponderance of the evidence. The burden of proof which originally was upon plaintiffs to make out their case, including actionable negligence of defendant, was not shifted to the latter by evidence that raised the presumption. For a discussion of this subject, see Thetford v. Woodmen (Tex. Civ. App.) 273 S. W. 666, and authorities there cited. We have not here, however, the- question of the burden of proof, but only that of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury finding of negligence in the operation of the train; and, while appellant’s evidence was sufficient to support a verdict in its favor on that issue, it was not of such conclusive character as to establish want of negligence on its part as a matter of law. It is true appellant’s witnesses testified to a proper handling of the train; but these witnesses were all in its employ, and therefore not disinterested, and the facts they testified to were not established as a matter of law by their testimony. The jury could disregard their evidence, even though it was not contradicted.
In Kohner v. Traction Co., 22 App. D. C. 181, 62 L. R. A. 875, the proposition is stated thus: “Unless, therefore, we are to adopt the theory that the plaintiff’s prima facie case only lasts until the defendant has offered some explanation, and that such explanation, whether true or false, destroys the presumption of negligence raised by the plaintiff’s proof, and casts upon the plaintiff the necessity of proving by additional testimony in rebuttal that, notwithstanding the explanation, there was in fact negligence on the part of the defendant, there is no escape from the conclusion that the case must be submitted to a jury.”
The court say they find no warrant in reason or in adjudicated cases for such a theory. We quote further: “It does not follow that, because an explanation is sufficient in law, therefore it is true; nor does it follow that, because it is true, it is sufficient to exonerate the defendant. The explanation may be true as far as it goes, and yet it may not be sufficient to overcome the presumption of negligence raised from the circumstances of the accident. The case is not one of uncontroverted testimony on the one side and no testimony, or no sufficient testimony, on the other side. It is a case of testimony of circumstances on the one side from which negligence may be inferred, and testimony of circumstances on the other side from which it may be inferred that there was no negligence. This undoubtedly makes a case for submission to the jury, with proper instructions from the court, which would not permit a proper defense to be ignored.”
The following is from Warren v. Telegraph Co., 196 Mo. App. 549, 196 S. W. 1030: “The credibility of the explanation and its sufficiency were questions for the jury, and the prima facie case of the plaintiff is not necessarily overthrown by uncontradieted evidence that the appliahces were constructed and operated in a proper manner.”
While there is some authority for appellant’s contention (see 45 C. J. p. 1224, note 66), the above decisions we think announce the correct rule. The issue of negligence in the operation of the train was under the evidence a fact question for the jury.
The motion is overruled.
Overruled.