Court Opinion

ID: 9678100
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:11:43.347823+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:54:51.209874
License: Public Domain

APPENDIX (NUMBER 2277cr) NUMBER 13-81-266-CR COURT OF APPEALS THIRTEENTH SUPREME JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI * * * * * * MONTY CHARLES PICHON, Appellant, V. STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee. * * * * * * On appeal from the 182nd District Court of Harris County, Texas. * * * * * * Before Gerald T. Bissett; Norman L. Utter; and Noah Kennedy, J.J. * * * * * * OPINION
Appeal is perfected from conviction for possession of methamphetamine for which punishment was assessed at three and one half years. Appellant's single ground of error complains of the admission into evidence of the substance seized from him at the time of his arrest, and of testimony as to the chemical analysis of that material, his contention being that such was tainted by the illegality of the arrest itself. We agree.
The facts contained in the following recitation were developed at the hearing on appellant's motion to suppress the evidence. On January 20, 1979, Detectives Kent and Yanchak of the Houston Police Department, Homicide Division, became involved in the investigation of the recent murder of one John David Tedesco, who had been bludgeoned to death. Detectives Kent and Yanchak were approached at approximately 5:30 to 5:45 p.m. on that day by Detective Donovan who told them that two persons, a Mr. Richard Gordon and a Ms. Vicki Sue Gowen, had come to his office with information regarding the Tedesco murder. Mr. Gordon and Ms. Gowen related that a woman named Carol Dorrity had told them that she had witnessed her boyfriend, a man named "Monty," beat Tedesco to death; that Carol Dorrity had taken a cab out to see "Monty"; and that they (Gordon and Gowen) were afraid for her life. Mr. Gordon and Ms. Gowen had no personal knowledge of the crime, and their feelings of concern regarding Carol Dorrity's potential danger were pure speculation on their parts.
Based on this, Detective Donovan was able to get an address from the Yellow Cab Company. He then dispatched Detectives Kent and Yanchak to that address to see if they could find Ms. Dorrity and to see if she was, in fact, in any danger. Upon arriving at the address given, the two officers discovered it to be a trailer park. However, when they saw a cab leaving the trailer park, they stopped it and questioned its driver and occupant. Based on information derived thereby, they proceeded to Trailer No. 130. Detective Kent knocked at the front door. When appellant answered, Detective Kent identified himself and asked appellant for his name. When appellant responded, he was immediately placed under arrest for suspicion of murder and frisked, first by Detective Kent, then by Detective Yanchak. The second search produced the substance here in issue.
If appellant's arrest was unlawful, so too was the search incident to it, and the fruits thereof must be excluded.Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. [471], 473, 484, 83 S.Ct. 407, 416 [9 L.Ed.2d 441] (1963); Irvin v.State, 563 S.W.2d 920, 924 (Tex.Crim.App. 1978). We are here concerned with the instances in which one is subject to arrest without a warrant as set out by Articles 14.01 through 14.04 of our Code of Criminal Procedure. If the situation claimed to authorize an arrest without a warrant does not come squarely within one of the classifications therein, authority does not exist. Heath v. Boyd, 141 Tex. 569, *Page 431 175 S.W.2d 214, 216 (1943). See United States v.Hall, 468 F. Supp. 123, 131 n. 16 (E.D.Tex. 1979).
We limit our discussion to Article 14.04, supra, since there is no evidence whatever that the facts as they existed at the time of appellant's arrest fell into a category provided for by Articles 14.01,1 14.02,2 or 14.03.3
Article 14.04 reads:
 "Where it is shown by satisfactory proof to a peace officer, upon the representation of a credible person, that a felony has been committed, and that the offender is about to escape, so that there is no time to procure a warrant, such peace officer may, without warrant, pursue and arrest the accused." (Emphasis supplied.)
We find the record to be totally devoid of evidence that appellant was about to escape. Ward v. Texas,316 U.S. 547, 552-53, 62 S.Ct. 1139, 1142 [86 L.Ed. 1663] (1942);Green v. State, 594 S.W.2d 72, 74 (Tex.Crim.App. 1980). No representations to that effect were made by either Mr. Gordon or Ms. Gowen to Detective Donovan. Indeed, the testimony was to the effect that Mr. Gordon had initially called the police for the purpose of passing on the statements made to him by Ms. Dorrity on January 19, the day before he came in to make a statement. Similarly, there is no evidence to support a reasonable conclusion on the part of the arresting officer, Detective Kent, that appellant was about to flee, and no such suspicion on his part was claimed. In this the case at bar is readily distinguishable from Tarpley v. State,565 S.W.2d 525 (Tex.Crim.App. 1978), relied upon here by appellee. That case was replete with evidence upon which a belief that the arrestees were preparing to escape could be based. Id. at 530.
We hold that the evidence does not demonstrate the existence of circumstances justifying the warrantless arrest of appellant, and that the fruits of the search incident thereto should have been excluded upon appellant's motion. The conviction is REVERSED and the cause REMANDED.
 NOAH KENNEDY Associate Justice
Opinion not to be published. Tex.Cr.App.R. 207
Opinion delivered and filed this the 30th day of June, 1982.
1 Article 14.01 permits a warrantless arrest by an officer when an offense is committed in his presence or within his view.
2 Article 14.02 authorizes a warrantless arrest upon the verbal order of a magistrate when a felony or breach of the peace has been committed in the presence of or within the view of the magistrate.
3 Article 14.03 licenses a warrantless arrest by an officer under two circumstances: First, when the arrestee is found in a suspicious place under suspicious circumstances. Here, appellant was in his living room. Second, when the officer has probable cause to believe that the arrestee has committed an assault upon a person and there is an immediate danger that such offense will be repeated. Here, the informants' fears for the well-being of Ms. Dorrity were admittedly founded upon pure speculation which, of course, cannot form the basis for probable cause. See Leighton v. State, 544 S.W.2d 394, 397 (Tex.Crim.App. 1976); Talbert v. State, 489 S.W.2d 309, 311 (Tex.Crim.App. 1973).