Court Opinion

ID: 9736273
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 18:49:18.315647+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:27:05.428298
License: Public Domain

Murphy, J.
(dissenting). In the second paragraph of the majority opinion, it is conceded that the plaintiff met all of the formal requirements of General Statutes § 1.6-294 for the granting of a motor contract carrier’s permit and that “the only remaining question is whether the proposed operation is inconsistent with the public interest.” I have studied the opinion, as well as the finding of the commission, and fail to ascertain from either that the interest of the general public would be affected in the slightest degree if the permit were issued.
The majority opinion states that one of the common carriers who opposed the plaintiff’s application had the necessary certificates to transport the shipper’s products and was prepared to do so. While that carrier had the certificates, its president admitted on cross-examination that it did not have the equipment which was needed to service the shipper’s needs. It lacked meters, flow lines and tanks. Four other carriers had certificates for petroleum transportation but not for general commodities. At least three were willing to take on the business if the contract was of sufficient duration to warrant the investment in the necessary equipment. In other words, the common carriers were willing, but not one of them was able, to handle the business at the time of the hearing.
The majority opinion, near the end, states that the plaintiff contends that the commission imposed upon it the burden of proving that its services *690would “supplement and not supplant” those of motor common carriers and then proceeds to say that such a requirement would be contrary to the standards set by the legislature. That the commission imposed such an arbitrary burden on the plaintiff is evident in its finding, which states: “An applicant for Commission authority to provide motor contract carrier service has the burden of proof to demonstrate that the service which it proposes to render will supplement and not supplant that of motor common carriage. We have stated repeatedly that ‘an existing common carrier service should not be supplanted by the service of a motor contract carrier, which, under the statutes, appears to fill the role of supplementing rather than supplanting common carrier service, unless the needs of the shipper cannot be reasonably met by common carrier service.’ See Commission Finding in Application 8031, dated January 21, 1946, In the Matter of the Application of John F. and Frederich P. Mahr. Upon consideration of all the evidence, we are of the opinion that the available common carrier service is adequate to meet the transportation needs outlined in this proceeding. Accordingly, we find that the proposed contract carrier service would supplant rather than supplement existing common carrier service, and would have an adverse effect on common carriage, and would be inconsistent with the public interest. We find, therefore, that the application should be and it hereby is denied.”
The trial court, in its memorandum of decision, stated that the commission denied the plaintiff a permit for contract carriage because it would supplant common carriage and thus be inconsistent with the public interest. As none of the opposing carriers had the necessary equipment as well as the *691required certificates of authority, I fail to see how the granting of the permit would supplant something that did not exist. Even the carrier which had been making the bulk deliveries for the shipper since January, 1960, had to lease equipment from the shipper in order to do the work. It is significant to note that of the three authorities on carrier operation cited in the majority opinion, one is a textbook and the others are not the decisions of a court but of a commission. I find it difficult to reconcile the statements in the paragraph of the opinion in which these authorities are cited which at first says that “an applicant for a permit to operate as a contract carrier is not required to prove that his proposed operation will serve a useful public purpose, required or demanded by the public,” and then later on says that he must prove “that existing carriers are not rendering a type of service which satisfies the needs of the public and that the proposed service would tend to correct or substantially improve that condition.”
The finding of the commission is destitute of any facts. If attempts to summarize testimony and does not state the facts found from the evidence. Other than documents submitted by the plaintiff, the record consists of the transcript of the evidence before the examiner who conducted the hearing. It does not include the report of the examiner and his associates to the commission or any recommendations made therein. Nor does it contain any reference to the action of the commission in connection with the examiner’s report. As the transcript does not indicate that any of the members of the commission participated in the hearing upon this application but rather that the hearing was conducted by members of the commission’s staff, who are re*692qnired by General Statutes § 16-8 to make a report to the commission, it seems strange that the finding of the commission makes no mention of the personnel who conducted the hearing or of any report filed by them. In Waterford v. Connecticut State Board of Education, 148 Conn. 238, 246, 249, 169 A.2d 891, where an examiner conducted the hearing and reported to the board, the Superior Court and this court had the benefit of the examiner’s report in determining whether the board had acted illegally or arbitrarily. Such a report is pertinent to the appeal in this case and should have been filed in court for proper consideration in the equitable disposition of the appeal.
The only interest which would have been affected by the granting of the permit was the interest of certain common carriers in acquiring the business of transporting the shipper’s products. By no stretch of the imagination could it be said that the interest of the general public would suffer. Public interest means something in which the public, the community at large, has some pecuniary interest, or some interest by which its legal rights or liabilities are affected. State ex rel. Glenn v. Crockett, 86 Okla. 124, 126, 206 P. 816. The term “public interest” has application to the interests of the public as a whole and not to the private interests of competitors. In re Application of Paulson, 249 Minn. 236, 245, 81 N.W.2d 875. Fear that the granting of a motor contract carrier permit might undermine common carriage is pure speculation and is unsupported by the record in this case.
Either the action of the commission should be reversed on the record before us or the case should be remanded to the trial court with direction to refer it back to the commission for submission of *693a proper record in conformity with the provisions of General Statutes § 16-37. Wilson Point Property Owners Assn. v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 145 Conn. 243, 252, 140 A.2d 874.