Court Opinion

ID: 9725379
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 11:44:05.443188+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:12:08.250517
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE MILLER, concurring in part and dissenting in part: With the exceptions noted below, I agree with the majority’s resolution of the charges of professional misconduct brought against the respondent in this case, Paul Sveinbjorn Johnson. I do not agree with the sanction imposed by the majority in this case, however, and accordingly I dissent from that portion of the court’s opinion. The respondent and co-counsel, an attorney from a separate firm, agreed to represent the client, Walter Geldzahler, in a dispute involving a claim on a disability insurance policy. The matter was eventually settled. After endorsing the settlement check with the name of the other attorney, the respondent, who also served as the Icelandic consul general in Chicago, deposited the proceeds in the consulate’s bank account, where they remained for a lengthy period of time, commingled with consulate funds. Following the deposit of the funds in the consulate account, the respondent repeatedly misled co-counsel about the status of the settlement. At some point the respondent withdrew at least part of his share of the fee in the matter and distributed to Mr. and Mrs. Geldzahler their portion of the settlement proceeds. After further delay, the respondent eventually paid co-counsel his fee, once the second attorney consented to accept a share that was smaller than the division the attorneys had originally agreed upon. The respondent maintains that he deposited the proceeds of the settlement in the consulate account so that the funds would be protected from the Geldzahlers’ creditors. The respondent also assorts that Mrs. Geldzahler and the couple’s child, who were Icelandic citizens, were planning to return to that country, and that placement of the settlement proceeds in the consulate account was intended to facilitate disbursement of the funds to them. I agree with the majority that the respondent was implicitly authorized to endorse co-counsel’s name on the settlement check, for the purpose of depositing the proceeds in an appropriate account. Such conduct would be consistent with the two attorneys’ status as joint venturers in their representation of the client. Unlike the majority, however, I am not so ready to conclude in this case that the respondent’s conduct in endorsing the settlement check was not fraudulent. It is difficult to square the respondent’s claim of innocence with his decision to secret the funds in the consulate account and with his subsequent activity in misleading co-counsel about the status of the settlement. Moreover, I do not agree with the majority’s statement that the respondent’s deposit of the settlement proceeds in the Icelandic consulate account may have been technically proper under Rule 9 — 102(a) of the Code of Professional Responsibility (107 Ill. 2d R. 9 — 102(a)). This court has held that the requirement that an attorney hold client funds in a separate, identifiable client trust account is an absolute obligation and allows no exceptions. (In re Elias (1986), 114 Ill. 2d 321, 332.) The rule serves to limit the possibility of commingling and conversion and “insures the safety and integrity of clients’ funds while in the possession of an attorney.” (Elias, 114 Ill. 2d at 333.) As the majority goes on to point out, the consulate account contained a variety of funds, and it was accessible to others in the consul, who apparently were not associated with the respondent in the practice of law. Deposit of the settlement funds in the consulate account did not satisfy the mandate of Rule 9 — 102(a). The majority’s characterization of the present case as simply a fee dispute between two attorneys ignores the evidence of the respondent’s misconduct with respect to his treatment of the client funds. I would note that the respondent’s mishandling of the settlement proceeds is not attributable to careless bookkeeping or mere inadvertence; the majority correctly determines that the respondent’s hopes of thwarting the client’s creditors should not be condoned. Nor can the respondent’s improper deposit of the client’s funds in the consulate account be excused simply because the client acquiesced in that activity or was ignorant of what occurred. Contrary to the majority’s view, it is of no significance here that the client did not complain about the respondent’s representation and apparently was not harmed by it. The client had no reason to complain: he and his family were the intended beneficiaries of the respondent’s actions. The respondent’s misconduct was aggravated by his lack of cooperation in the present proceedings. The respondent failed to answer the Administrator’s complaint, did not appear before the hearing panel, and resisted the production of records pertaining to the matter. The Hearing Board recommended that the respondent be disbarred; the Review Board recommended that the respondent be suspended from practice for one year. The majority suspends the respondent for a period of six months. I believe that a six-month suspension is, on the present record, too lenient. Although the recommendations of the Hearing Board and Review Board are not binding on this court (see In re Kitsos (1989), 127 Ill. 2d 1, 10; In re Hopper (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 318, 323), I see no reason in the present case to impose a sanction that is less severe than the one-year suspension recommended by the Review Board.