Court Opinion

ID: 9750410
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 14:57:07.685159+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:26:09.459464
License: Public Domain

Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by
Judge Doyle:
While I concur with the majority in its determination that Section 402(a) of the Unemployment Compensation Law1 is the applicable provision, I cannot agree *418that Moss’ failure to notify the OES of its offer of employment within seven days is of no legal effect. Section 402(a) makes it clear that a claimant who refuses suitable employment is disqualified from receiving benefits unless the employer who offered the position notifies the OES of the offer within seven days after making it. It is undisputed that this notice provision was not met. Despite the clear language in Section 402(a), however,. the majority concludes, relying upon principles of statutory construction, that granting benefits under the existing factual situation would be a result not intended by the legislature.
It is axiomatic, however, that the plain words of a statute are npt to be disregarded where the statute’s language is clear and free from doubt. Hyser v. Allegheny County, 61 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 169, 434 A.2d 1308 (1981). I see no ambiguity present in Section 402(a) and the majority has not pointed out one; hence, utilization of Section 1921 of the Statutory Construction Act of 1972, 1 Pa. C. S. §1921, is improper. By concluding that a.claimant who is unemployed through his or her own fault should not be entitled to benefits where the proffering employer has not complied with the reporting requirement of Section 402(a), the majority has effectively read the reporting requirement out of the statute entirely. And, while I agree that in some circumstances the reporting requirement may be overcome, such as in Barillaro v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 36 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 325, 387 A.2d 1324 (1978), cited by the majority, these facts are readily distinguishable from that case.
Moreover, the majority’s attempt to “do equity” by vitiating the reporting requirement may have the opposite result. Under its position if an employee were furloughed and three months later were offered suitable work by another company and refused that work the *419employees benefits could be terminated months later merely because this offer was made although it was never reported. Additionally, in the instant case I am not in any way persuaded that Moss had no way of knowing that Claimant intended to collect benefits because the facts present here indicate a successor-employer situation. Therefore, certainly on the facts of this case at least, the result reached by the majority is unwarranted.
Because I would conclude that Moss’ failure to comply with the notice provision in effect excuses Claimant’s failure to accept suitable work, see Kiger v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 88 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 376, 489 A.2d 977 (1985), I would grant Claimant benefits.

 Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex. Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended, 43 P.S. §802(a).