Court Opinion

ID: 9376719
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-03 17:07:41.053498+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:08.511734
License: Public Domain

J-S39031-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                :    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                             :         PENNSYLVANIA
                                             :
              v.                             :
                                             :
                                             :
 MARK A. IVIE, JR.                           :
                                             :
                      Appellant              :    No. 358 MDA 2022

     Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 22, 2021
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-36-CR-0003018-2020

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and NICHOLS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.:                            FILED: MARCH 3, 2023

      Appellant Mark A. Ivie, Jr. appeals from the judgment of sentence

entered   following    his   convictions   for   aggravated   assault,   recklessly

endangering another person (REAP), and related offenses.                 Appellant

challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his REAP conviction and

raises claims concerning the discretionary aspects of his sentence. We affirm.

      The trial court summarized the underlying facts and procedural history

of this matter as follows:

      In the early morning hours of July 5, 2020, Appellant opened fire
      into a group of six young men with a short-barrel AR-15 rifle.
      Earlier that evening, the victims were at a cookout, and one
      victim, Mr. Randy Brandt, uploaded a video of himself rapping
      onto the social media platform Snapchat. Appellant was able to
      see the video Mr. Brandt posted, and he was not a fan, so much
      so that Appellant left comments with his negative opinions on Mr.
      Brandt’s video. Appellant and Mr. Brandt then exchanged angry
      messages back and forth, followed by a screaming telephone call
      in which Appellant invited Mr. Brandt to his home at 6 Blackberry
J-S39031-22

        Lane in Ephrata Township for a fist fight. Despite the hour, around
        1:30 a.m., Mr. Brandt agreed and brought the other five victims
        with him to Blackberry Lane. While waiting for the victims’ arrival,
        Appellant asked his father to bring him a gun. Appellant asserted
        that having the gun would ensure a fair fight, and he waited for
        the victims with his father on the front porch, brandishing a loaded
        AR-15 short-barreled rifle.

        Mr. Brandt arrived with Devon Schaefer, Jeremy Ross-Gates, Billy
        Joe Varner, Josue Colon, and Joshua Norwood, and the first
        physical fight broke out between Appellant and Mr. Schaefer, while
        Appellant’s father beat Mr. Ross-Gates. When Appellant was able
        to break free, he then grabbed the rifle, disengaged the safety
        mechanism, and fired into the group of men fourteen times.      Mr.
        Varner was shot in the left side of his chest, Mr. Colon was shot in
        the face and the abdomen, Mr. Schaefer was shot through the
        arm, Mr. Brandt was shot in the earlobe, a bullet grazed Mr.
        Norwood’s arm, and Mr. Ross-Gates was severely beaten by the
        Appellant’s father.      Police later found several rounds of
        ammunition had hit neighboring homes, one of which was
        occupied by two people,[1] and also that the residents of 3
        Blackberry Lane had a security camera which had recorded the
        entire incident. Following Appellant’s admission to police that he
        was the person responsible for shooting the firearm, he was
        arrested and charged with six counts of attempted homicide [and]
        six counts of aggravated assault [for firing shots at the six men
        involved in the altercation. He was also charged with] two counts
        of discharging a weapon into an occupied structure and two counts
        of [REAP for firing shots into two nearby residences.]

____________________________________________

1   At trial, the parties entered the following stipulation:

        [O]n the night of July 4, 2020 through July 5, 2020, the residence
        at 6 Eastbrooke Drive was occupied by two individuals. These two
        individuals were asleep inside the residence at the time the gunfire
        occurred on the early morning hours of July 5, 2020. If these
        individuals were called to testify they would testify that the bullet
        strikes observed on their residence were not present prior to the
        discharge of gunfire on the early morning hours of July 5, 2020.

N.T. Trial, 10/25/21, at 393.

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        On August 11, 2021, Appellant filed a pretrial motion in limine to
        preclude the Commonwealth from introducing video evidence of a
        firearm demonstration from being admitted as substantive
        evidence at trial.    After briefings from both parties, Judge
        Margaret Miller denied the motion, and the video was admitted at
        trial. On October 27, 2021, Appellant was convicted of five counts
        of attempted voluntary manslaughter, five counts of aggravated
        assault, two counts of discharging a firearm into an occupied
        structure, and two counts of REAP.[2]

        On December 22, 2021, the court imposed an aggregate sentence
        of 24 to 50 years’ incarceration.[3] On December 31, 2021,
        Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion, arguing that the
        court abused its discretion in sentencing because the sentence is
        manifestly    excessive,   it   is  not   consistent    with   the
        Commonwealth’s interest in protecting the public, it is not
        necessary to address “the nature and circumstances of the crime”
        considering Appellant’s lack of prior record, it fails to consider
        mitigating factors, and Appellant asserted that the sentences for
        aggravated assault should not be consecutive due to Appellant’s
        lack of opportunity for “cool reflection.” This court denied
        Appellant’s post sentence motion on January 21, 2022.

Trial Ct. Op., 4/25/22, at 2-4 (record citations omitted).

        Appellant subsequently filed a timely notice of appeal and a court-

ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. The trial court issued a Rule 1925(a)

opinion addressing Appellant’s claims.
____________________________________________

2   18 Pa.C.S. §§ 901(a), 2702(a)(1), 2701.1(a), and 2705, respectively.

3 With respect to the convictions for aggravated assault, the trial court
imposed consecutive terms of five to ten years’ incarceration for counts seven
through ten and four to ten years’ incarceration for count eleven. Appellant’s
convictions for attempted voluntary manslaughter merged for sentencing
purposes.

The trial court also imposed concurrent terms of six months to two years’
incarceration for each of the two counts of REAP and two to five years’
incarceration for each count of discharging a firearm into an occupied
structure.

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      On appeal, Appellant raises the following issues for review:

      1. Was the evidence presented by the Commonwealth insufficient
         to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [Appellant]
         committed either offense of [REAP], where the Commonwealth
         did not prove that [Appellant’s] actions placed either inhabitant
         of 6 Eastbrooke Drive in danger of death or serious bodily
         injury?

      2. Was the imposition of five consecutive sentences, for an
         aggregate sentence of 24 to 50 years’ incarceration, manifestly
         excessive under the circumstances, and an abuse of the court’s
         discretion?

Appellant’s Brief at 15.

      In his first claim, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence

supporting his convictions for REAP.         Id. at 26.      Initially, Appellant

acknowledges that two individuals were sleeping inside of 6 Eastbrooke Drive

when one bullet traveled through the garage attached to the residence and

two other bullets struck an exterior light post located in the front yard of the

property.   Id.   at 29-30.   However, Appellant argues that there was no

evidence “regarding where the residents . . . were located at the time the

bullets struck the light post and the garage, only that they were sleeping inside

the residence.” Id. at 30. Further, Appellant contends that “it is apparent

that the residents were not in the front yard in the vicinity of the light post

and they were not in the garage” and “there was no indication that the

bedroom where they were sleeping was near the garage.” Id. Therefore,

Appellant concludes that “there was no evidence that there was any danger

to the residents, or that either projectile could have struck them” or that the

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bullets “came anywhere near the residents” and “thus, there is no evidence

that they were in danger of death or serious bodily injury.” Id. at 26, 30.

       In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, our standard

of review is as follows:

       Because a determination of evidentiary sufficiency presents a
       question of law, our standard of review is de novo and our scope
       of review is plenary. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence,
       we must determine whether the evidence admitted at trial and all
       reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, viewed in the light most
       favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, were sufficient
       to prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
       [T]he facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth
       need not preclude every possibility of innocence. It is within the
       province of the fact-finder to determine the weight to be accorded
       to each witness’s testimony and to believe all, part, or none of the
       evidence. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving
       every element of the crime by means of wholly circumstantial
       evidence. Moreover, as an appellate court, we may not re-weigh
       the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the
       factfinder.

Commonwealth v. Palmer, 192 A.3d 85, 89 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation

omitted).

       This Court has explained:

       A person is guilty of REAP, “a misdemeanor of the second
       degree[,] if he recklessly engages in conduct which places or may
       place another person in danger of death or serious bodily
       injury.”[4] 18 Pa.C.S. § 2705. To sustain a conviction for REAP,
       “the Commonwealth must prove that the defendant had an actual
       present ability to inflict harm and not merely the apparent ability

____________________________________________

4 Serious bodily injury is defined as “[b]odily injury which creates a substantial
risk of death or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement, or protracted
loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.” 18 Pa.C.S.
§ 2301.

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     to do so. Danger, not merely the apprehension of danger, must
     be created.” Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 747 A.2d 910, 915
     (Pa. Super. 2000) (internal citation omitted).

Commonwealth v. Headley, 242 A.3d 940, 944 (Pa. Super. 2020)

(emphases added).

     Additionally, this Court has stated:

     This Court has held that both a handgun and a BB gun are capable
     of causing serious bodily injury or death. Commonwealth v.
     Peer, 684 A.2d 1077, 1081 (Pa. 1996); Commonwealth v.
     Ramos, 920 A.2d 1253, 1257 (Pa. Super. 2007). However, the
     mere act of discharging a firearm does not on its own constitute
     recklessly endangering another person. See Commonwealth v.
     Kamenar, 516 A.2d 770 (Pa. 1986) (finding evidence insufficient
     to support conviction where the accused fired a single gunshot
     away from the direction of other people, into a wooded hillside
     behind his home); Commonwealth v. Smith, 447 A.2d 282 (Pa.
     1982) (finding evidence insufficient where no evidence indicated
     that the rifle was fired at the witness, and it was just as likely that
     the accused safely fired the rifle into the air). However,
     Discharging a firearm near another person is sufficient to support
     such a conviction. Commonwealth v. Hartzell, 988 A.2d 142
     (Pa. Super. 2009).

Commonwealth v. Shaw, 203 A.3d 281, 284 (Pa. Super. 2019).

     In Hartzell, the defendant was convicted of REAP after he fired a semi-

automatic rifle from his property and into a creek approximately 30 yards

away from a bridge on which two men were standing. Hartzell, 988 A.2d at

142. On appeal, the defendant argued that the Commonwealth failed to prove

that the two men were placed in danger by the defendant’s actions. Id. at

143. In rejecting the defendant’s arguments, this Court explained:

     Although [the defendant] may not have pointed the weapon
     directly at the two men, it was pointed in their general direction.
     Moreover, the evidence established that the water was rather

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        shallow and there were rocks in the stream. Thus, it is hardly
        inconceivable that a bullet fired into the stream nearby could have
        struck a rock or other object and deflected up and hit one of the
        two men. The act of merely pointing a loaded gun at another has
        been deemed sufficient to support a conviction for REAP,
        Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 835 A.2d 720 (Pa. Super. 2003),
        as has the brandishing of a loaded handgun during the commission
        of a crime. Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 747 A.2d 910 (Pa.
        Super. 2000). Given these two examples, it is not difficult to
        conclude that the actual discharging of a weapon numerous times
        in the vicinity of others constitutes a sufficient danger to satisfy
        the REAP statute.

Id. at 143-44.

        In Shaw, the defendant was convicted of REAP after he fired a handgun

at the ceiling of his front porch of his row home at 57th Street and Girard

Avenue in Philadelphia. Shaw, 203 A.3d at 282. At the time of the shooting,

a witness was hiding behind her vehicle approximately fifteen to thirty feet

away.     Id.   On appeal, this Court concluded that the defendant’s “actions

recklessly endangered another person because it is possible that the shot

could have ricocheted off the porch ceiling toward [the witness] as she hid

behind her car, creating a risk of serious bodily harm.” Id. at 286. In reaching

that conclusion, the Court explained that the defendant “discharged his

weapon into the ceiling of his porch in an urban residential area” and “[h]e

was in close vicinity to both [the witness] and other people who lived in nearby

row homes.” Id. Therefore, the Court found that it was “feasible that the

projectile could have struck [the witness] or another person” which “created

a sufficient danger of serious bodily injury.” Id. at 286-87.

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      More recently, in Headley, the defendant was convicted of REAP after

he fired a gun through the floor of his apartment during an argument with his

paramour. Headley, 242 A.3d at 944. The bullet traveled through the floor

of the defendant’s apartment and into a downstairs unit occupied by the

victim. Id. Although the victim was unharmed, the bullet traveled within

three to four feet of the victim before penetrating a wall in her apartment. Id.

On appeal, this Court found that the defendant’s “reckless conduct of firing a

bullet into [the victim’s] home, in her direction, and within three or four feet

from where [the victim] was seated, placed [the victim] in danger of death or

serious bodily injury.” Id. (citation omitted). Further, the Court explained

that the defendant “disregarded the risk of death or injury and could have

seriously wounded or killed [the victim]” and “created actual danger and not

merely the apprehension of danger.” Id. Therefore, the Court concluded that

there was sufficient evidence to establish REAP. Id.

      Here, the trial court addressed Appellant’s sufficiency claim as follows:

      The stipulated facts establish the material element of REAP, that
      Appellant placed two sleeping people in danger of death or serious
      bodily injury. Appellant was not merely present and able to shoot
      a firearm into the residences at 6 Eastbrooke Drive . . . but did so
      without thought or regard for who may be inside. The surveillance
      video showed Appellant shooting his gun into the group of victims,
      and then the stipulated facts remove doubt regarding who shot
      the weapon and when.

      Firing into the occupied house at 6 Eastbrooke Drive put both
      sleeping residents in actual danger of serious bodily injury
      pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 2706. Appellant disregarded all risk
      when he discharged his weapon. He could have not only ended
      the lives of the six men he was trying to shoot, but he endangered
      all of the lives in the immediate area, more so true for the

                                     -8-
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       residents at 6 Eastbrook[e] Drive. The jury agreed and made the
       reasonable inference that the bullet holes in the homes, which
       were not present before the night in question, were from the gun
       Appellant had shot fourteen times that same night. Appellant’s
       claim that there was insufficient evidence to support conviction of
       REAP is without merit and must be denied.

Trial Ct. Op. at 10.

       Following our review of the record, and viewing the evidence in the light

most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, we find no error in

the trial court’s conclusion. See Palmer, 192 A.3d at 89.

       As noted by the trial court, Appellant was on a residential street when

he fired fourteen rounds from an AR-15 rifle during a dispute with six other

men.     At trial, the parties entered a stipulation regarding the victims’

testimony, which reflected that the victims were asleep inside their bedroom

at 6 Eastbrooke Drive at the time of the shooting and that the bullet marks on

their front light post and inside the attached garage were not present before

the shooting occurred. See N.T. Trial, 10/25/21, at 393. From this evidence,

the jury could conclude that by firing a semi-automatic weapon in the direction

of the victims’ residence, Appellant recklessly disregarded the risk that the

bullet could have struck someone inside of 6 Eastbrooke Drive. See Hartzell,

988 A.2d at 142; see Shaw, 203 A.3d at 286; Headley, 242 A.3d at 944; cf.

Kamenar, 516 A.2d at 771-72 (finding that the discharge of a handgun out

of the rear window of a home into a wooded hillside did not place anyone in

danger of death or serious bodily injury because the shot was not fired towards

a location “where any dwelling, other structure, or any other person was

                                      -9-
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known to be located”).      Further, we will not re-weigh the evidence and

substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. See Palmer, 192 A.3d at 89.

Accordingly, Appellant is not entitled to relief.

                     Discretionary Aspects of Sentence

      In his final claim, Appellant argues that the trial court abused its

discretion by imposing a “manifestly excessive” aggregate sentence of twenty-

four-to-fifty years’ incarceration.    Appellant’s Brief at 35.    In support,

Appellant argues “that the trial court focused exclusively on the seriousness

of the offense, and did not seriously consider any of the mitigating factors.”

Id. at 37. Specifically, Appellant argues that the trial court “ignored the fact

that [Appellant] was sexually molested by his stepbrother,” and that

Appellant’s father instigated the incident and provided Appellant with the gun.

Id. at 37-38. Appellant also emphasizes that he was only twenty years’ old

at the time of the offense, “acknowledged that he had a drug and alcohol

problem, and he had begun treatment with medication for depression and

anxiety since being incarcerated.” Id. at 40. Appellant claims that “[d]espite

significant mitigating circumstances, the court imposed a sentence that does

not allow [him] to be eligible for parole until he is 44 years old” and “was

manifestly excessive, clearly unreasonable, and an abuse of the trial court's

discretion.” Id. Therefore, Appellant requests that we vacate his judgment of

sentence and remand for resentencing. Id.

      “[C]hallenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not entitle

an appellant to review as of right.” Commonwealth v. Derry, 150 A.3d 987,

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991 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation omitted). Before reaching the merits of such

claims, we must determine:

      (1) whether the appeal is timely; (2) whether Appellant preserved
      his issues; (3) whether Appellant’s brief includes a [Pa.R.A.P.
      2119(f)] concise statement of the reasons relied upon for
      allowance of appeal with respect to the discretionary aspects of
      sentence; and (4) whether the concise statement raises a
      substantial question that the sentence is inappropriate under the
      sentencing code.

Commonwealth v. Corley, 31 A.3d 293, 296 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations

omitted).

      “To preserve an attack on the discretionary aspects of sentence, an

appellant must raise his issues at sentencing or in a post-sentence motion.

Issues not presented to the sentencing court are waived and cannot be raised

for the first time on appeal.” Commonwealth v. Malovich, 903 A.2d 1247,

1251 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citations omitted); see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a)

(stating that “[i]ssues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be

raised for the first time on appeal”).

      Here, the record reflects that Appellant preserved his sentencing claims

in his post-sentence motion, filed a timely notice of appeal, and included the

issues in his Rule 1925(b) statement.     Appellant has also included a Rule

2119(f) statement in his brief. Therefore, we must consider whether Appellant

has raised a substantial question for review.

      “The determination of what constitutes a substantial question must be

evaluated on a case-by-case basis.” Commonwealth v. Battles, 169 A.3d

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1086, 1090 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted).             “A substantial question

exists only when the appellant advances a colorable argument that the

sentencing judge’s actions were either: (1) inconsistent with a specific

provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms

which underlie the sentencing process.” Commonwealth v. Grays, 167 A.3d

793, 816 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted).

      “Generally, Pennsylvania law affords the sentencing court discretion to

impose its sentence concurrently or consecutively to other sentences being

imposed at the same time or to sentences already imposed. Any challenge to

the exercise of this discretion ordinarily does not raise a substantial question.”

Commonwealth v. Prisk, 13 A.3d 526, 533 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation and

quotation marks omitted). This Court has also stated that “ordinarily, a claim

that the sentencing court failed to consider or accord proper weight to a

specific   sentencing   factor   does     not    raise   a   substantial   question.”

Commonwealth v. Swope, 123 A.3d 333, 339 (Pa. Super. 2015) (emphasis

in original).

      However, “an excessive sentence claim—in conjunction with an

assertion that the court failed to consider mitigating factors—raises a

substantial question.” Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 117 A.3d 763, 770 (Pa.

Super. 2015) (en banc).      Further, this Court has held that an appellant’s

“challenge to the imposition of his consecutive sentences as unduly excessive,

together with his claim that the court failed to consider his rehabilitative needs

                                        - 12 -
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and mitigating factors upon fashioning its sentence, presents a substantial

question.” Swope, 123 A.3d at 340.

      Here, in his Rule 2119(f) statement, Appellant argues that his

“cumulative sentence of 24 to 50 years [of] incarceration was clearly

unreasonable, and so manifestly excessive as to constitute an abuse of

discretion.”     Appellant’s Brief at 23.   He also argues that his mitigating

circumstances “were not adequately considered, or considered at all, by the

court in imposing sentence.” Id. at 24. Therefore, we conclude that Appellant

has raised a substantial question for our review. See Swope, 123 A.3d at

340. Accordingly, we will review the merits of Appellant’s underlying claim.

      Our well-settled standard of review is as follows:

      Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the
      sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal
      absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse
      of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather,
      the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the
      sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its
      judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or
      arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.

Commonwealth v. Raven, 97 A.3d 1244, 1253 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation

omitted).      Additionally, “[w]e cannot re-weigh the sentencing factors and

impose our judgment in the place of the sentencing court.” Commonwealth

v. Macias, 968 A.2d 773, 778 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citation omitted).

      “When imposing a sentence, the sentencing court must consider the

factors set out in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b), [including] the protection of the public,

[the] gravity of offense in relation to impact on victim and community, and

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[the] rehabilitative needs of the defendant.” Commonwealth v. Fullin, 892

A.2d 843, 847 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation omitted and formatting altered).

      “[T]he trial court is required to consider the particular circumstances of

the offense and the character of the defendant,” including the defendant’s

“prior criminal record, age, personal characteristics, and potential for

rehabilitation.”   Commonwealth v. Ventura, 975 A.2d 1128, 1135 (Pa.

Super. 2009) (citations omitted).      This Court has held that “where the

sentencing judge had the benefit of a [PSI report], it will be presumed that he

or she was aware of the relevant information regarding the defendant’s

character and weighed those considerations along with mitigating statutory

factors.” Id. (citation omitted). This Court may only disturb a standard range

sentence if we find that the circumstances of the case rendered the application

of the guidelines “clearly unreasonable.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(c)(2).

      It is well settled that “Pennsylvania law affords the sentencing court

discretion to impose its sentence concurrently or consecutively to other

sentences being imposed at the same time or to sentences already imposed.”

Commonwealth v. Austin, 66 A.3d 798, 808 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation

omitted).   Further, this Court has explained that “defendants convicted of

multiple offenses are not entitled to a ‘volume discount’ on their aggregate

sentence.” Commonwealth v. Foust, 180 A.3d 416, 434 (Pa. Super. 2018).

      Here, the trial court addressed Appellant’s sentencing claim as follows:

      In the present case, the court relied on all information contained
      in the [PSI] report before imposing sentence, including Appellant’s
      character, family history, and rehabilitative needs.         Thus,

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     pursuant to [Commonwealth v. Fowler, 893 A.2d 758, 767 (Pa.
     Super. 2006)], there is a presumption that the court was aware
     of all relevant information regarding Appellant’s character and
     weighed those considerations before imposing sentence. The
     court considered the arguments of counsel and comments of
     Appellant, the victims, and police, the penalties authorized by the
     Pennsylvania legislature, as well the Pennsylvania sentencing
     guidelines.

     Specifically, the court considered Appellant’s family history and
     history of substance abuse. Appellant reported he began smoking
     marijuana at age 14 and continued until his recent incarceration,
     first consumed alcohol at age 13, drank every day at age 18 until
     his current incarceration, and experienced multiple blackouts. A
     drug and alcohol evaluation was performed on November 12,
     2021, which states that Appellant accepts he may have a
     substance abuse disorder. The sentencing court asserted that
     Appellant is a very high risk of relapsing into alcohol and drug
     abuse and into anti-social and/or criminal behaviors after he is
     released from jail. As such, Appellant was recommended to
     attend any available drug and/or alcohol counseling programs
     while incarcerated.

     The court considered Appellant’s mental health history, where
     Appellant reported that he has never been officially diagnosed
     with any mental health diagnosis but believes he has depression
     and anxiety. A psychiatric evaluation conducted on November 29,
     2021, states that Appellant started psychiatric medication for the
     first time while in prison and he has remained on the medications;
     at sentencing he was taking Seroquel, Zoloft, and Vistaril.
     However, it was noted that Appellant’s ability to continue
     psychiatric medication and remain in mental health counseling in
     the community setting is unclear, and while his substance abuse
     needs are of primary concern, a lack of mental health treatment
     may lead to his relapse.

     Appellant’s age was considered, and he was 20 years of age when
     the offenses occurred, an age of sufficient maturity to understand
     the significance of his acts. His character and history as disclosed
     in the PSI, along with the opportunity of the sentencing court to
     observe Appellant at various court proceedings, was considered
     by the sentencing court. Appellant’s level of education was also
     reviewed, noting he graduated from high school in 2019, and
     denies ever being diagnosed with any learning disabilities that
     would prevent him from understanding the difference between

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      right and wrong. While the court noted that Appellant did not
      have any prior criminal record, great weight was given to the
      nature and circumstances of the crimes, as well as the gravity of
      the crimes as they relate to impact on the life of the victims and
      on the community. Appellant initiated this confrontation by
      posting negative comments about another person on Snapchat,
      invited that person to come to his house to fight, sent the victim
      his address, recruited his father to get an assault rifle so they
      could confront the victims, went outside and waited for an
      extended amount of time for the victims to arrive, initiated a fist-
      fight with one of the victims, grabbed an assault rifle from his
      father, turned the safety off, and fired indiscriminately at the
      victims as they attempted to flee.

      The court also considered the facts that none of the victims were
      armed, Appellant made no attempt to call the police, even though
      he had plenty of time to do so, and he made no attempt to retreat
      back into his home, even though he had an opportunity to do so.
      Appellant also did not fire warning shots, rather, he pointed the
      assault rifle directly at the victims and shot 14 rounds, moving
      around to get the best angle. Appellant also struck two homes
      with bullets, and one of the homes was occupied by two sleeping
      people. Significantly, the court noted Appellant’s lack of accepting
      responsibility for his actions because Appellant initially admitted
      he acted on impulse and knew he should not have shot the
      victims, but at trial, Appellant stated he fired the gun in self-
      defense, which jury did not find credible.

      Finally, the court considered the rehabilitative needs of Appellant
      and confinement that is consistent with protection of the public.
      For all of these reasons, the court found that a sentence of total
      confinement was necessary, because Appellant is an extreme
      danger to society and society needs to be protected. Therefore,
      the court imposed standard range guideline sentences on each
      count, with consecutive sentences for each of the five victims. The
      court noted that consecutive sentences were warranted based on
      the facts of this case, and Appellant should not be given a volume
      discount for shooting so many people at one time. Appellant’s
      claim that his sentence is manifestly excessive is without merit.

Trial Ct. Op. at 13-16 (record citations omitted).

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J-S39031-22

      Based on our review of the record, we discern no abuse of discretion by

the trial court. See Raven, 97 A.3d at 1253. The record reflects that the

trial court considered the PSI report, the appropriate sentencing factors, and

the mitigating evidence presented at the sentencing hearing. See Ventura,

975 A.2d at 1135. Ultimately, the trial court concluded that an aggregate

sentence of twenty-four to fifty years of incarceration was necessary in light

of the circumstances of this case and the number of victims. See Trial Ct. Op.

at 16. Under these circumstances, we have no basis upon which to conclude

that the trial court’s application of the guidelines was “clearly unreasonable”

or that the trial court abused its discretion in structuring Appellant’s sentences

consecutively. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(c)(2); Austin, 66 A.3d at 808; Foust,

180 A.3d at 434. Therefore, Appellant is not entitled to relief. Accordingly,

we affirm.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 3/3/2023

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