Court Opinion

ID: 9364116
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-18 16:00:39.64245+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:35.870198
License: Public Domain

21-1992
   Aberra v. City of New York

                             UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                          SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION
TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS
GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S
LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH
THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY
CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT
REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

         At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
   held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the
   City of New York, on the 18th day of January, two thousand twenty-three.

   PRESENT:
              DENNIS JACOBS,
              RICHARD J. SULLIVAN,
              MYRNA PÉREZ,
                    Circuit Judges.
   _____________________________________

   NATANYA ABERRA,

                            Plaintiff-Appellant,

                     v.                                                           No. 21-1992

   CITY OF NEW YORK,

                    Defendant-Appellee. ∗
   _____________________________________

   ∗
       The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the official case caption as set forth above.
For Plaintiff-Appellant:                              NATANYA ABERRA, pro se, New
                                                      York, NY.

For Defendant-Appellee:                               MACKENZIE FILLOW (Jamison
                                                      Davies, on the brief), for Hon.
                                                      Sylvia    O.     Hinds-Radix,
                                                      Corporation Counsel of the
                                                      City of New York, New York,
                                                      NY.

      Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern

District of New York (Lewis A. Kaplan, Judge).

      UPON      DUE     CONSIDERATION,           IT     IS   HEREBY     ORDERED,

ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

      Natanya Aberra, proceeding pro se, appeals from a judgment of the district

court granting summary judgment in favor of the City of New York (the “City”)

on his claims of false arrest and false imprisonment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and

New York law, following his arrest for making nonconsensual sexual contact with

a woman while attending a work-related conference.              On appeal, Aberra

challenges the district court’s determination that the police had probable cause to

arrest him. We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, Kee

v. City of New York, 12 F.4th 150, 157–58 (2d Cir. 2021), and will affirm when there

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is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).        We assume the parties’

familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal.

      We first turn to Aberra’s claims of false arrest and false imprisonment under

section 1983. For both claims, probable cause is a “complete defense.” Weyant

v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 852 (2d Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also

Betts v. Shearman, 751 F.3d 78, 82 (2d Cir. 2014). “Probable cause to arrest exists

when the officers have knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information of facts

and circumstances that are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in

the belief that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing a crime.”

Jenkins v. City of New York, 478 F.3d 76, 84 (2d Cir. 2007) (alterations and internal

quotations marks omitted).        Information from the putative victim or an

eyewitness that a crime was committed can establish probable cause “unless the

circumstances raise doubt as to the person’s veracity.” Betts, 751 F.3d at 82.

      Here, the undisputed facts support a finding of probable cause to arrest

Aberra.    When the police arrived, the complainant, whose account was

corroborated by an eyewitness, told officers that Aberra followed her and then

rubbed his body against hers from behind. The facts alleged by these witnesses

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were sufficient to establish the elements for sexual abuse in the third degree, in

violation of New York Penal Law section 130.55, and harassment in the second

degree, in violation of section 240.26. See People v. Perez, 131 N.Y.S.3d 485, 485

(1st Dep’t 2020) (affirming conviction under section 130.55 where the victim

testified that defendant “grazed” her buttocks with his hand on crowded train

(internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)); People v. Mohamed, 39 N.Y.S.3d

575, 578 (2d Dep’t 2016) (affirming conviction under section 250.26 where

defendant “followed the complainant” with “intent to harass”). While Aberra

denies that he ever did, in fact, make contact with the complainant, it is undisputed

that the officers were told that Aberra had made such contact. Therefore, even if

the witnesses’ statements turned out to be inaccurate, “probable cause exists even

where it is based upon mistaken information, so long as the arresting officer was

reasonable in relying on that information.” Bernard v. United States, 25 F.3d 98,

103 (2d Cir. 1994). Because Aberra points to nothing in the record to suggest that

it was unreasonable for the police to rely on the complainant’s and eyewitness’s

statements, the district court did not err in concluding that there was probable

cause to arrest Aberra.

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       Aberra’s arguments to the contrary are unavailing.               For starters, Aberra

complains that the police did not take his statement before arresting him. But

while there may be circumstances in which it would be better “for the officers to

investigate plaintiff’s version of events more completely,” we have held that an

“officer’s failure to investigate an arrestee’s protestations of innocence generally

does not vitiate probable cause.” Panetta v. Crowley, 460 F.3d 388, 396 (2d Cir.

2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). Similarly, while Aberra contends that

video of the incident proves he did not make contact with the complainant, the

probable-cause determination does not turn on whether the evidence may

ultimately result in a conviction. 1 Again, so long as the “facts available to the officer

at the time of the arrest and immediately before it” were sufficient to establish

probable cause to believe that the arrestee had committed a crime, that is enough

to justify an arrest. Betts, 751 F.3d at 83 (internal quotation marks omitted). As

such, the fact that the charges against Aberra were dropped is not relevant.

Because the district court properly found that there was probable cause to arrest

Aberra, it did not err in granting summary judgment to the City on Aberra’s

section-1983 claim. See Goe v. Zucker, 43 F.4th 19, 34–35 (2d Cir. 2022).

1 In any event, nothing captured on the video is inconsistent with the complainant’s statement to
the police; the video is merely inconclusive in spots, but never exculpatory.

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      We also affirm the district court’s exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over,

and dismissal of, Aberra’s state-law claims.        We review the district court’s

decision to exercise such jurisdiction for abuse of discretion. See Valencia ex rel.

Franco v. Lee, 316 F.3d 299, 305 (2d Cir. 2003). Considering that the district court

had already invested “substantial effort” in this case, Dist. Ct. Doc. No. 116 at 2,

that the state-law claims presented no “novel or unsettled issues of state law,”

Mauro v. S. New England Telecomms., Inc., 208 F.3d 384, 388 (2d Cir. 2000), and that

the existence of probable cause constituted an absolute defense to both the federal

and state claims, see Weyant, 101 F.3d at 852, we conclude that the district court’s

decision to adjudicate, and ultimately dismiss, the state-law claims on the merits

– rather than risk subjecting the City to duplicative, frivolous litigation in state

court – was entirely appropriate. And since probable cause is a complete defense

to Aberra’s state-law claims, see id., we also affirm the district court’s dismissal of

those claims on the merits.

      We have considered all of Aberra’s remaining arguments and find them to

be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

                                        FOR THE COURT:
                                        Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

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