Court Opinion

ID: 9632812
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:25:43.301507+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:00:11.301849
License: Public Domain

HALL, Justice
(dissenting):
I interpret the facts of this case quite differently than does the majority opinion.
Defendant's sole contention on appeal is that he did not "voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently" choose to proceed pro se. He does not contend that his retained counsel quit, nor does he register any complaint against him for any reason whatsoever.
The episode giving rise to his contention occurred outside the presence of the jury and is reflected in the following excerpts from the record:
MR. LOW: I think for the record, Your Honor, I've talked to my client in light of the testimony produced and the fact that I do not feel that it's wise to put him on the stand at this time, nor his mother, because of the circumstances. I've explained to both my client and to his mother and I have advised him that rather than proceed with the trial and continue the expense of the litigation that it would be wise for him to enter a plea of guilty. I explained it to him not only now but an hour and a half ago. His decision in the hall is to discharge me as counsel and continue his defense himself, and I'm willing to do that, that's fine, and I want the record to reflect that that's my advice to him, to plead guilty, I will continue with the trial. I want the record to indicate though that I have no witnesses to call at this time, and I don't think it's in the best judgment to call any witnesses at this time, certainly not the defendant nor his mother, nor do I have a viable closing argument in view of the State versus Cox on the question of time. [Emphasis added.]
I have no inclination to go forward with it. He's now indicated to me he wishes to change and plead guilty, but he's being railroaded into it. I'd like to protect myself on this thing to let the record show that it's his choice entirely, I'm not forcing him to plead guilty. I would continue the case, but I don't have testimony to present nor a viable closing argument in my opinion. The decision is yours. [Emphasis added.]
THE COURT: May I explain the things you can do, of course. We can't *877continue the trial, we have to go forward with it. We've started and the State has put on their evidence. You have certain options and it's up to you, no one else. You have to decide it. Whether you want to change your plea to guilty, whether you want to proceed with the trial with Mr. Low to represent you in whatever manner he feels he can, or you may proceed on your own with the trial.
In the event you elect to do that, I would have Mr. Low there at the counsel table, because I think it's highly prejudicial before a jury to see that he's left, just the fact that he would leave, would be at the counsel table available for questions-you know, that you want to ask him, you know, like if you want to do it yourself. There's no cross examination because the State's all through.
MR. RUPLE: Okay.
THE COURT: If you proceed yourself then you can call whoever you want and ask whatever questions you want.
MR. RUPLE: Right.
* * * * * *
THE COURT: Now what is it you'd like to do?
MR. RUPLE: Well, I'll go in there and represent myself.
THE COURT: Okay. Now do you want to give your own closing statement to the jury?
MR. RUPLE: Yeah.
THE COURT: Okay. But Mr. Low will be there sitting by you and if you want to ask him any questions he'll be available for questions.
MR. RUPLE: Okay. [Emphasis added.]
It is to be seen from the foregoing that counsel did not quit. On the contrary, defendant discharged him rather than follow his advice not to testify in his own behalf and not to call his mother as a witness.
Defendant then determined that he would plead guilty, but that he was "being railroaded into it." This attitude on the part of the defendant readily explains counsel's statement that "I have no inclination to go forward with it" ("it" being a "railroaded" guilty plea), without making the record clear that he was not "forcing him to plead guilty," but was leaving the choice to him entirely.
The trial judge appropriately advised defendant of other options available to him. This prompted him not to change his plea to guilty. He asked for no continuance to obtain other counsel, nor did he request substitute counsel. Instead, he opted to take charge of his own defense with defense counsel standing by to assist upon request.
The record in this case belies defendant's contention that he acted other than voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. This was not his first experience with the law. In fact, he had served a period of probation on an identical charge. Also, his record of slowness in school was of a nature that does not reflect the absence of intelligence.
Having seen fit to retain counsel initially, defendant was obviously aware of the benefits to be derived from representation by counsel. Conversely, he could not but have been aware of the hazards of going it alone. In the midst of trial that obviously is not going well for him, he concludes that his concept of trial strategy is superior to that of counsel and opts to present his own defense. This he had a constitutional right to do. Nevertheless, the court insisted that he do so only with defense counsel standing by to assist.
I deem the trial judge to have exercised sound discretion in permitting the trial to go forward, and with the precautions taken by the court, that the defendant received a fair trial and was not deprived of any constitutional protections.
I would affirm the conviction and judgment.
MAUGHAN, C. J., concurs.