Court Opinion

ID: 9898621
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 20:11:01.577382+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:17.487084
License: Public Domain

J-S33037-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  SOMMER BERNARD                               :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1033 WDA 2022

           Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered August 16, 2022
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-02-CR-0001650-2016

BEFORE:      BENDER, P.J.E., McCAFFERY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:                     FILED: NOVEMBER 14, 2023

       Appellant, Sommer Bernard, appeals from the August 16, 2022, order

entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County dismissing her

petition under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-

9546 on alternate bases of ineligibility for PCRA relief and waiver of issues.

After finding upon careful review that Appellant is ineligible for PCRA relief, we

affirm.

       The PCRA court has authored a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion setting forth

the pertinent procedural history, as follows:

       On December 15, 2015, the Pittsburgh Police Department charged
       [Appellant] with one count of Receiving Stolen Property, 18
       Pa.C.S.A. § 3925(a), which was charged as a Felony 3. On August
       1, 2016, the Honorable Jeffrey Manning entered an Order for
       Involuntary Treatment due to [Appellant’s] mental illness. After
       multiple postponements and the appointment of new counsel, on
____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S33037-23

     January 15, 2019, [Appellant entered a guilty plea and was
     sentenced to 2.5 to 5 years, with credit for time served of 1,063
     days, to run concurrent with a sentence from an unrelated third-
     degree murder case (CP-02-CR-2092-2017).

     On February 22, 2022, [Appellant] filed what was docketed as a
     “Request for Discovery”, and then shortly thereafter, on March 15,
     2022, filed her first PCRA Petition. On April 28, 2022, [the PCRA
     court] appointed Jacob McCrea, Esquire, to represent the
     [Appellant] in her first PCRA Petition. After reviewing the file, on
     May 11, 2022, Attorney McCrea submitted a Motion for Leave to
     Withdraw as Counsel Pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner
     (“Motion to Withdraw”), along with a No Merit Letter. In his No
     Merit Letter, Attorney McCrea explained that [Appellant’s] PCRA
     Petition lacked merit because it was filed after the one-year
     deadline, as set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1) and because
     she was no longer serving the sentence associated with this case,
     as set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(1)(i), (iii).

     On July 6, 2022, after reviewing [counsel’s] No Merit Letter, [the
     PCRA court] granted [his] Motion to Withdraw and advised
     [Appellant] that she had 20 days to respond regarding the options
     available to her if she wished to proceed with her PCRA Petition
     without counsel. On July 20, 2022, [Appellant] filed an Objection
     to Counsel’s Motion for Leave to Withdraw and No Merit Letter.
     On August 16, 2022, [the PCRA court] issued an “Order of Court
     Dismissing Defendant’s PCRA Petition” pursuant to Rule 907 of the
     Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure.

     On September 1, 2022, Appellant filed what was docketed as a
     Notice of Appeal (“Appeal”). The Appeal was docketed at 1033
     WDA 2022.

     ....

PCRA Court Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion, 1-3.

     On appeal, Appellant raises multiple claims of ineffective assistance of

prior counsel and contends, additionally, that her patently untimely PCRA

petition qualifies for review under certain exceptions to the PCRA’s one-year

time bar. Preliminarily, however, we address whether Appellant was no longer

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serving a sentence of imprisonment at the time she filed the present petition,

as this issue proves dispositive.

      It is well-settled that “[t]he [PCRA] shall be the sole means of obtaining

collateral relief and encompasses all other common law and statutory

remedies for the same purpose.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9542. To be eligible for relief

under the PCRA, a petitioner must either be “currently serving a sentence of

imprisonment, probation or parole for the crime,” “awaiting execution of a

sentence of death for the crime,” or “serving a sentence which must expire

before the person may commence serving the disputed sentence.” 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(1)(i)-(iii).

      Our Supreme Court and this Court consistently have interpreted Section

9543(a) to require that a PCRA petitioner be serving a sentence while relief is

being sought. Commonwealth v. Ahlborn, 699 A.2d 718, 720 (Pa. 1997);

Commonwealth v. Matin, 832 A.2d 1141, 1143 (Pa. Super. 2003). As our

Supreme Court explained in Ahlborn, the plain language of the PCRA statute

requires the denial of relief for a petitioner who has finished serving his

sentence, as eligibility for relief depends upon the petitioner’s presently

serving a sentence of imprisonment, probation, or parole. Ahlborn, 699 A.2d

at 720. To grant relief at a time when an appellant is not currently serving

such a sentence would be to ignore the language of the PCRA. Id.

      Moreover, we have explained that “the [PCRA] preclude[s] relief for

those petitioners whose sentences have expired, regardless of the collateral

consequences of their sentence.” Commonwealth v. Fisher, 703 A.2d 714,

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716 (Pa. Super. 1997). In this regard, the PCRA court loses jurisdiction the

moment an appellant's sentence expires. See Commonwealth v. Turner,

80 A.3d 754, 769 (Pa. 2013) (holding that when a petitioner's sentence

expires while his PCRA petition is pending before the PCRA court, the PCRA

court loses jurisdiction to rule on the merits of the petition).

      Here, based upon our review of the record, we agree with the PCRA

court's opinion and the Commonwealth's analysis that Appellant finished her

two and one-half to five-year sentence for Receiving Stolen Property—the

crime for which she now seeks relief—more than one year before she filed the

instant PCRA petition. As a result, she does not meet any of the foregoing

eligibility requirements outlined in Section 9543(a) of the PCRA. Under

Ahlborn, therefore, she is ineligible for collateral relief. Accordingly, we do

not have jurisdiction over this appeal.

      Order affirmed.

DATE: 11/14/2023

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