Court Opinion

ID: 9884917
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 03:24:26.113346+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:42.280236
License: Public Domain

GARDEBRING, Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion, for two reasons. First, while I believe the critical impact standard is relevant here, I do not believe that the standard has been met. The record below is scanty, and does not allow us to understand fully the judge’s basis for his ruling. Nevertheless, it is clear that his ruling is preliminary in nature, and there is no demonstrated threat to the state’s case at this point. Further, the ruling does not affect the ability of the state to present its own case, as in a more typical critical impact case involving the suppression of evidence. Here, the evidentiary ruling only affects the theory of the defendant.
Second, I believe there may indeed be theories under which the I.Q. evidence may be admissible. The Bouwman decision identifies exceptions to the general rule that evidence of diminished' capacity is not admissible on the issue of intent. The exceptions include intoxication, medication, epilepsy, infancy or senility. See State v. Bouwman, 328 N.W.2d 703, 706 (Minn.1982). The justification for these exceptions is that they are “susceptible to quantification and lay under standing.” Id. I believe that evidence of limited intelligence, or borderline mental retardation, is analogous to the Bouwman exceptions in that it is not an issue of esoteric psychiatric analy*669sis, but rather a matter of common, lay experience.
One common way of expressing mental retardation is by mental age.1 Therefore, I conclude that I.Q. may be, in the instance of mental retardation, closely aligned to the Bouwman exception for infancy. If Bouwman allows admission of evidence that a defendant is a child, shouldn’t evidence that one’s mental capacity is that of a child also be relevant?
Furthermore, the trial court at this point has allowed only evidence of Barsness’ level of intelligence, without allowing expert testimony on the effect of that I.Q. on her mental state. Even those cases strictly applying Bouwman have not criticized trial courts for allowing the bare evidence of a mental or emotional condition. See State v. Fratzke, 354 N.W.2d 402, 408-09 (Minn.1984) (expert who had also been allowed to express an opinion on defendant’s ability to exercise good judgment, should not have been allowed to theorize whether defendant had the ability to plan); State v. Lindberg, 408 N.W.2d 589, 593 (Minn.Ct.App.1987) (expert who testified preliminarily on defendant’s prior experiences of physical and sexual abuse, was properly prevented from testifying as to his “particular vulnerability to being provoked”).
Relevancy of the I.Q. evidence may also exist insofar as it may bear on the weight and credibility of Barsness’ statement to police. See Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 106 S.Ct. 2142, 90 L.Ed.2d 636 (1986) (defendant was denied a fair trial where the trial court excluded evidence bearing on credibility of his confession). The vol-untariness of a confession is an issue to be resolved by the court. State v. Orscanin, 283 N.W.2d 897, 901 (Minn.1979), cert, denied, 444 U.S. 970, 100 S.Ct. 464, 62 L.Ed.2d 385 (1979). The jury determines the weight and credibility of the confession, using many of the same factors:
the age, maturity, intelligence, education, and experience of the defendant and the ability of the defendant to comprehend; the lack of or adequacy of warnings; the length and legality of the detention; the nature of the interrogation; whether the defendant was deprived of any physical needs; and whether the defendant was denied access to friends.
State v. Jungbauer, 348 N.W.2d 344, 346 (Minn.1984) (emphasis added) (factors bearing on voluntariness).
This theory was not argued to the trial court, but may provide an alternative basis for admission.
Finally, I would note that the rule in Minnesota is that evidentiary rulings rest in the discretion of the trial judge, and will not be reversed on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Anderson, 370 N.W.2d 653, 664 (Minn.Ct.App.1985). See also State v. Olkon, 299 N.W.2d 89, 101 (Minn.1981), cert, denied, 449 U.S. 1132, 101 S.Ct. 954, 67 L.Ed.2d 119 (1981). Under the facts in the case, I find no abuse of discretion, and therefore would affirm the trial court’s ruling.

. Classification in Mental Retardation 32-34, 183 (H. Grossman ed.1983).