Court Opinion

ID: 9756708
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 21:49:01.359108+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:28.493088
License: Public Domain

FARRELL, Associate Judge,
concurring:
Although I agree with the court that appellant did not satisfy the Cuyler test for conflict of interest, I have strong doubts that that analysis even applies in this context of a defendant’s motion for a mistrial. To see why, assume a case where the trial judge has allowed a defendant to go to trial representing himself without an adequate waiver-of-counsel inquiry under Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). Mid-trial the judge realizes his mistake, and also genuinely believes that the unrepresented defendant is headed for conviction, so he gives the defendant the choice of continuing with trial, now “made aware [by the judge] of the dangers” of self-representation, id. at 885, 95 S.Ct. 2525, or a mistrial and possible appointment of counsel to begin again. (Assume even, with our dissenting colleague, that the judge tells the defendant his view “that continuing to verdict will surely result in conviction.” Post at 780.) It cannot be, I believe, that the defendant’s choice to accept the mistrial is invalid, and must be disregarded for double jeopardy purposes, because it was made without advice of counsel — the equivalent of the putatively conflicted counsel in this case. It might well be invalid if the mistrial election had to be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary under Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938), but we know that is not the case. See United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 609 n. 11, 96 S.Ct. 1075, 47 L.Ed.2d 267 (1976). Thus, the defendant’s request for a mistrial “will simply be taken at face value,” Sundel v. Justices of Superior Court of Rhode Island, 728 F.2d 40, 44 (1st Cir.1984) (Breyer, J.), as Dinitz requires.1 Otherwise the defendant, forced to go to verdict against his choice, would be “imprison[ed] ... in his privileges.” Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 280, 63 S.Ct. 236, 87 L.Ed. 268 (1942).
Were it necessary to decide the issue in this case, and unless persuaded differently, I would so hold.

. In a different case, of course, where the prosecutor — or perhaps the judge — had deliberately "goaded” the defendant into requesting a mistrial to avoid a possible acquittal, the motion would be disregarded. See Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 102 S.Ct. 2083, 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982). Randall v. Rothwax, 78 N.Y.2d 494, 577 N.Y.S.2d 211, 583 N.E.2d 924 (1991), bears little resemblance to this case, beginning with the fact that the judge there coerced a guilty plea mid-trial, a decision plainly governed by the Johnson v. Zerbst standard.