Court Opinion

ID: 9943520
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-23 18:02:27.663286+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:10.867949
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/23/24 In re E.P. CA2/2

   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION TWO

 In re E.P., a Person Coming                                      B330861
 Under the Juvenile Court Law.                                    (Los Angeles County
                                                                  Super. Ct. No.
                                                                  19CCJP04934A)

 LOS ANGELES COUNTY
 DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
 AND FAMILY SERVICES,

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.

 J.M.,

           Defendant and Appellant.

 In re E.P., a Person Coming                                      B331617
 Under the Juvenile Court Law.                                    (Los Angeles County
                                                                  Super. Ct. No.
                                                                  19CCJP04934A)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

        Plaintiff and Respondent,

        v.

C.P.,

        Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Philip L. Soto, Judge. Affirmed.
      Patricia K. Saucier, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant J.M.
      Katie Curtis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant C.P.
      Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Kimberly Roura, Senior Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

      In these consolidated juvenile dependency appeals, J.M.
(mother) and C.P. (father) appeal the juvenile court’s order
terminating their parental rights to their young son, E.P. (son).
Mother raises one issue on appeal. She argues the juvenile court
and the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family

                                2
Services (Department) failed to comply with the Indian Child
Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) and related
California law. Mother seeks a conditional reversal of the
juvenile court’s order terminating parental rights and remand so
that the juvenile court can ensure compliance with ICWA.
Father joins in mother’s arguments.
       We conclude that any noncompliance with the duty of
initial inquiry by the Department or the juvenile court is
irrelevant, and that any noncompliance with their duty of further
inquiry was not prejudicial. We accordingly affirm.
                          BACKGROUND
1.     The Family
       Son is mother and father’s only child together.1 Mother
was 19 years old when son was born and she herself had been a
dependent of the court as a minor. When the underlying
proceedings began, she and father were married but separated
and not living together. Father recently had been released from
the Marine Corps and was staying with his mother (paternal
grandmother).
       Mother was raised primarily by her maternal great
grandmother Teresa M. and her husband. Mother’s mother
(maternal grandmother) and father (maternal grandfather) were
in and out of prison. Mother’s relationship with maternal
grandmother was not positive. Mother was not in contact with
maternal grandfather. At the start of the proceedings below,
mother and son were living with maternal great grandmother

     1 Mother gave birth to her second child during the
pendency of the underlying proceedings. That child and his
father are not involved in this appeal.

                                3
Ruth G.2 Mother has several siblings, some of whom are step
siblings, as well as cousins who visited mother “on weekends and
barbecue[d].”
2.     Brief Case Summary
       Beside their ICWA arguments, mother and father do not
challenge the merits of the juvenile court’s rulings.
Consequently, we include only a brief summary of them and the
underlying facts here.
       In August 2019, when son was 10 months old, the
Department filed a Welfare and Institutions Code section 300
petition on son’s behalf (petition), alleging father physically
abused son by biting his shoulder.3 Mother was not named in the
petition. Son was detained from father and released to mother
under Department supervision. At the September 2019
adjudication, father filed a waiver of rights and pleaded no
contest to the petition. The juvenile court sustained the petition
as pleaded, declared son a dependent of the court, removed him
from father, and ordered services for father and mother.
       Son remained in mother’s care under Department
supervision until late 2020. Until that time, mother had been
cooperative and son was thriving in her care. However, after
great grandmother Ruth G. passed away in October 2020, mother
became overwhelmed, depressed, and homeless. She began
associating with gang members, and in late 2020 and early 2021,

      2 A few times in the record, great grandmother Ruth G. is
referred to as a step relative. However, those references appear
to be in error because she shares the same last name with
maternal grandmother.
      3 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.

                                4
was arrested multiple times for possession of methamphetamine
and weapons.
       In December 2020, son was removed from mother’s custody
and placed with great grandmother Teresa M. and her husband,
both of whom had raised mother and some of her siblings.4 Great
grandmother Teresa M. reported she had a “host of relatives” she
could contact for assistance, including a maternal great aunt and
a maternal aunt. Great grandmother Teresa M. became son’s
prospective adoptive parent.
       In early 2021, the Department filed a subsequent petition
under section 342, alleging mother was unable to care for son,
and a supplemental petition under section 387, alleging mother
failed to comply with juvenile court orders. The section 342
petition was amended to include allegations of mother’s
substance abuse and mental and emotional issues. In March
2021, the juvenile court sustained both petitions and ordered
services for mother.
       In November 2021, the juvenile court terminated services
for mother and father. More than one year later, on July 13,
2023, the court found son was adoptable and no exception to
adoption applied. The court terminated mother’s and father’s
parental rights to son. Mother and father each appealed the
court’s ruling. We granted father’s motion to consolidate the
appeals.
3.     Facts Relevant to ICWA
       During the Department’s initial investigation, prior to
filing the petition, mother and father both reported they had no

     4 Sometime later, great grandmother Teresa M. separated
from her husband.

                                5
Indian ancestry. In connection with filing the petition, mother
stated she had no Indian ancestry as far as she knew.
       At the August 2019 detention hearing, mother and father
each filed an ICWA-020 form, stating they had no Indian
ancestry as far as they knew. At that hearing, the juvenile court
stated it did not have a reason to know that son was an Indian
child. Again, in September 2019, prior to the adjudication and
disposition hearing, mother denied Indian heritage.
       In March 2021, for the first time, mother reported she had
“Native American Heritage with the Navajo and Cherokee Tribe.”
Mother stated she was “not registered to any tribe” and “she was
not eligible because she did not have a certain percentage of
blood.” Mother said great grandmother Teresa M. would have
more information.
       A few days later, a Department social worker spoke with
great grandmother Teresa M. Great grandmother Teresa M.
believed “her family might be Cherokee.” However, she said
neither she, her parents, nor her grandparents resided on an
Indian reservation, had been wards of a tribal court, or possessed
identification cards indicating tribal membership. Great
grandmother Teresa M. also reported her ex-husband (great
grandfather) “might be Navajo.” She believed his great great
grandmother was Navajo. Great grandmother Teresa M. said
great grandfather currently lived in Albuquerque, New Mexico,
did not live on an Indian reservation, and was not registered with
a tribe. She did not know how to contact him. Great
grandmother Teresa M. also told the social worker her family and
great grandfather’s family had done “their own investigation
regarding possible Native American Heritage and there were no
documentations of any family members being registered with any

                                6
Native American tribes.” The Department concluded, “[B]ased on
the ICWA inquiry provided by the maternal great-grandmother
[Teresa M.],” there was no “reason to believe that there is any
Native American Heritage” and ICWA did not apply. In March
2021, the juvenile court found ICWA did not apply.
      More than one year later, in September 2022, father,
paternal grandmother, and great grandmother Teresa M., denied
Indian ancestry. Father stated his family was Salvadoran.
      In October 2022, the juvenile court ordered the Department
to “Re-interview father and mother” regarding potential “ICWA
heritage” and to “Interview any family members who may have
known of ICWA heritage and give statement; if there is any
identified tribe, notice such tribe, BIA and Department of
Interior.” In November 2022, father and great grandmother
Teresa M. again denied Indian ancestry. Great grandmother
Teresa M. also stated mother had no Indian ancestry.
      In early 2023, father, mother, paternal grandmother, and
great grandmother Teresa M. each reported they “did not have
any affiliation of American Indian Ancestry.” However, great
grandmother Teresa M. also reported “the family does have
American Indian Heritage.” She stated, “[W]hen she adopted her
granddaughter about 15 years ago, the Department looked into
ICWA and they could not find their Indian Heritage.” In
February 2023, mother told a Department social worker “she was
part Navajo and Cherokee.” Subsequently, the social worker filed
an ICWA-010 form indicating she had questioned mother and
great grandmother Teresa M., both of whom gave the social
worker reason to believe son was or may be an Indian child.
      In early March 2023, the juvenile court ordered the
Department to “Meet and confer with the parents within the next

                               7
14 days and obtain any information re: eligibility on any
recognized tribes[;] Obtain names/addresses/phone numbers of all
paternal and maternal relatives and contact them to determine
eligibility[; and] If eligible, give notice to tribes, BIA and
Department of Interior.”
       In a May 2023 report, the Department stated it had
“provided notice” to the Navajo Nation, the Cherokee Nation, the
Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, and the United Keetoowah
Band of Cherokee Indians in Oklahoma. The Department did not
state it had provided notice to the Bureau of Indian Affairs or the
Department of the Interior. No notices were included with the
report, but the Department attached “certified receipts” to its
report. The United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians in
Oklahoma did not respond to the Department’s notice. The
remaining three tribes responded either they could not verify
son’s eligibility to register with the tribe (Navajo Nation), son
was not an Indian child (Cherokee Nation), or son was not
registered and not eligible to register with the tribe (Eastern
Band of Cherokee Indians). The Department attached the tribes’
responses to its report.
                             DISCUSSION
1.     Applicable Law and Standard of Review
       ICWA establishes minimum standards courts must follow
before removing an Indian child from his or her family. Under
California law implementing ICWA, the juvenile court and the
Department “have an affirmative and continuing duty to inquire
whether” a dependent child “is or may be an Indian child.”
(§ 224.2, subd. (a); In re Austin J. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 870,
883.) For these purposes, an “Indian child” is a child who (1) is “a
member of an Indian tribe,” or (2) “is eligible for membership in

                                 8
an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an
Indian tribe.” (25 U.S.C. § 1903(4); Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.1,
subd. (a) [adopting federal law definition].)
       Under ICWA as implemented in California, “the
Department and juvenile court have ‘three distinct duties.’
[Citations.] The first duty is the initial ‘duty’ of the Department
and the juvenile court ‘to inquire whether [a] child is an Indian
child.’ (§ 224.2, subds. (a) & (b).) The Department discharges
this duty chiefly by ‘asking’ family members ‘whether the child is,
or may be, an Indian child.’ (Id., subd. (b).) This includes
inquiring of not only the child’s parents, but also others,
including but not limited to, ‘extended family members.’ (Ibid.)”
(In re Dezi C. (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 769, 780, review granted
Sept. 21, 2022, S275578 (Dezi C.).) “Extended family members”
include the dependent child’s adult “grandparent, aunt or uncle,
brother or sister, brother-in-law or sister-in-law, niece or nephew,
first or second cousin, or stepparent.” (25 U.S.C. § 1903(2); Welf.
& Inst. Code, § 224.1, subd. (c) [adopting federal law definition].)
“For its part, the juvenile court is required, ‘[a]t the first
appearance’ in a dependency case, to ‘ask each participant’
‘present’ ‘whether the participant knows or has reason to know
that the child is an Indian child.’ ([§ 224.2], subd. (c).)” (Dezi C.,
supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 780, rev.gr.)
       “The second duty is the duty of the Department or the
juvenile court to ‘make further inquiry regarding the possible
Indian status of the child.’ ([§ 224.2], subd. (e).) This duty of
further inquiry is triggered if the Department or court ‘has
reason to believe that an Indian child is involved’ because the
record contains ‘information . . . suggesting the child is Indian’
(ibid.; [citations]), and, once triggered, obligates the Department

                                  9
to conduct further interviews to gather information, to contact
the Bureau of Indian Affairs and state department of social
services for assistance, and/or to contact the relevant Indian
tribe(s). (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2).)” (Dezi C., supra, 79 Cal.App.5th
at pp. 780–781, rev.gr.) “Reason to believe” is defined as
“information suggesting that either the parent of the child or the
child is a member or may be eligible for membership in an Indian
tribe.” (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(1).)
       “The third duty is the duty to notify the relevant Indian
tribe(s). (§ 224.3, subd. (a); 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a).) This duty is
triggered if the Department or the court ‘knows or has reason to
know . . . that an Indian child is involved.’ (§ 224.3, subd. (a).)”
(Dezi C., supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 781, rev.gr.)
       We review the juvenile court’s ICWA findings under the
substantial evidence test. (In re D.S. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1041,
1051.)
2.     Analysis
       Mother makes no claim that son is an Indian child based on
father’s heritage. Rather, mother urges she is entitled to a
conditional reversal because the juvenile court and the
Department (1) did not discharge their duty of initial inquiry into
whether son is an Indian child based on mother’s heritage, and
(2) did not discharge their duty of further inquiry based on
mother’s heritage.
       We agree with mother that the juvenile court and the
Department did not discharge their ICWA duty of initial inquiry.
Although the Department repeatedly asked mother and great
grandmother Teresa M. about son’s heritage (and often got
conflicting answers from both), the Department did not inquire of
any of mother’s other relatives, including then-living great

                                10
grandmother Ruth G., mother’s cousins, mother’s siblings, and
maternal grandmother. However, the juvenile court ultimately
ruled it had “reason to believe” son was an Indian child. That
ruling supplants any deficiencies with the initial inquiry. The
question then becomes: Was the Department’s further inquiry
deficient?
       We once again agree with mother that the juvenile court
and the Department did not discharge their ICWA duty of further
inquiry. Mother points to three deficiencies in particular—
namely, (1) the same failure to inquire of mother’s relatives that
underlies the breach of the duty of initial inquiry, (2) the failure
to keep records of the informal notices the Department sent to
the Navajo and Cherokee tribes, and (3) the apparent failure to
send those same notices to the Bureau of Indian Affairs or the
Secretary of the Interior. However, mother has not demonstrated
that these deficiencies were prejudicial.
       In Dezi C., supra, 79 Cal.App.5th 769, review granted, we
held that “[a]n agency’s failure to discharge its statutory duty of
initial inquiry is” not prejudicial—and hence, “harmless”—
“unless the record contains information suggesting a reason to
believe that the child[] at issue may be [an] ‘Indian child,’ in
which case further inquiry might lead to a different ICWA
finding by the juvenile court.” (Id. at p. 774, italics added.) Dezi
C. adopted this “reason to believe” standard because (1) whether
an error is prejudicial as a general matter turns on whether the
outcome of the proceeding would have been different absent the
error; (2) an error in undertaking the initial inquiry under ICWA
would lead to a different outcome only if the Department were
required to conduct a further inquiry into the child’s heritage;
and (3) the trigger for the duty of further inquiry is whether the

                                11
information in the Department’s possession creates a “reason to
believe” the child at issue is an Indian child. (Id. at pp. 779–781.)
       Although Dezi C.’s specific holding assesses whether a
deficiency in an ICWA initial inquiry is prejudicial, Dezi C.’s logic
applies to deficiencies in an ICWA further inquiry. Because an
error in undertaking the duty of further inquiry under ICWA will
lead to a different outcome only if the Department were required
to give formal notice to the pertinent Indian tribes, and because
the trigger for giving formal notice is whether the juvenile court
or Department has “reason to know” that the child at issue is an
Indian child, the standard for assessing whether the deficiencies
in further inquiry are prejudicial is whether the record indicates
that, absent those deficiencies, there would be a “reason to know”
the child is an “Indian child.”
       Mother and father have not satisfied that burden.
Although mother has identified maternal relatives who might be
asked about son’s Indian heritage, the record does not indicate
they would provide any information beyond what is already
known. Moreover, mother stated she was not “registered to any
tribe” and maternal great grandmother Teresa M. explained the
family investigation into Indian heritage revealed no
documentation of family members registered with any tribes.
And while the finding in the prior dependency case that there
was no Indian heritage on mother’s side of the family is not
dispositive because ICWA has been amended since then, it tends
to refute any notion mother has Indian heritage she would pass
on to son such that ICWA would be implicated. The missing
notices to the tribes, Bureau of Indian Affairs, and Secretary of
the Interior ultimately are insignificant here given the other facts

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just recited. Finally, mother proffers nothing on appeal that
would give rise to a reason to know that son is an Indian child.
                          DISPOSITION
       The juvenile court’s July 13, 2023 order is affirmed.
       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                          LUI, P. J.
We concur:

      ASHMANN-GERST, J.

      HOFFSTADT, J.

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