Court Opinion

ID: 9694301
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 17:35:24.011449+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:12:09.093931
License: Public Domain

Schreiber, J.,
dissenting. The petitioner employee, who chose to eat lunch at a luncheonette about two blocks away from the hospital where he was working, was shot and robbed. The Judge of Compensation, the Appellate Division and the majority of this Court, each relying on Hornyak v. The Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., 63 N. J. 99 (1973), have held *173the petitioner’s injuries are compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Act, N. J. S. A. 34:15-1 et seq.
The language prescribing compensability criteria expressed in the Workers’ Compensation Act when first enacted in 1911 remains the same today. Compare L. 1911, c. 95, § 7 with N. J. S. A. 34:15-7. Compensation is payable for personal injuries “by accident arising out of and in the course of” employment. Interpretation of the phrases “arising out of and in the course of” employment was first enunciated in Bryant, Adm’x v. Fissell, 84 N. J. L. 72 (Sup. Ct. 1913). This Court has continued through the years to acknowledge the Bryant pronouncement. See Hornyak v. The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 63 N. J. 99, 101 and 108 (1973); Bergman v. Parnes Brothers, Inc., 58 N. J. 559, 563 (1971); Hammond v. The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 56 N. J. 7, 11 (1970).
In Bryant the court wrote that “[f]or an accident to arise out of and in the course of employment, it must result from a risk reasonably incidental to the employment.” 84 N. J. L. at 76. The court further elucidated that an accident arises in the course of employment “if it occurs while the employe is doing what a man so employed may reasonably do within a time during which he is employed, and at a place where he may reasonably be during that time.” Id. at 77. And so the question becomes: Did the accident occur at such a time and place that the employee’s activity may be considered to be so reasonably incidental and related to the employment' that the accident should be compensable ? Put another way, is the cost of that accident reasonably includable in the price to be charged for the employer’s product or service? Ricciardi v. Damar Products Co., 45 N. J. 54, 60 (1965). Justice Proctor reminded us of this consideration in Hammond v. The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., supra:
Workmen’s compensation legislation is designed to place the cost of accidental injuries which are work-related upon the employer who can make these funds available out of his operating expenses, and *174this legislative goal must always be kept in mind when considering factual patterns presented. [56 N. J. at 14]
The economic reality is that consumers will probably be called upon to pay in whole or in part for the employer’s operating expenses. In Morris v. Hermann Forwarding Co., 18 N. J. 195, 197-198 (1955), this Court quoted approvingly from Glasser v. Youth Shop, 54 So. 2d 686, 687 (Fla. 1951), that the purpose of a workers’ compensation act is
‘to shoulder on industry the expense incident to the hazards of industry ; to lift from the public the burden to support those incapacitated by industry and to ultimately pass on to the consumers of the products of industry such expense.’ Since industry must carry the burden, there must then be some causal connection between the employment and the injury, or it must have had its origin in some risk incident to or connected with the employment, or have followed from it as a natural consequence.
Thus we should ask whether the cost of a particular accident is one that should be imposed upon the consuming public as an appropriate production expense. To resolve the problem, attention should be directed to determine and consider, inter alia, whether the accident occurred outside regular work hours, and, if so, whether that was due to the employer’s demand or request; whether the accident happened on the employer’s premises, and, if not, whether the employer had directed that that activity be held elsewhere; and what relationship, if any, the event had with the employment.
The courts have frequently adverted to the beneficent purpose of the Workers’ Compensation Act to support judicial interpretations which have imposed the cost of employee injuries on institutions which presumably will pass those expenditures on to consumers. Another equally important consideration, however, is that the costs of workers’ compensation insurance have become a substantial factor in some enterprises to such an extent that some have departed from this state and others have been deterred from establishing plants here. The Report of the Governor’s Economic Recovery *175Commission, noting the high cost of workers’ compensation insurance,1 has recommended that the Legislature consider the cost factor when revising the act “with the objective of becoming competitive with other states.” 1 Governor's Economic Recovery Commission Report 43 (1976). See Kalter, New Jersey’s Business Climate, Sunday Star-Ledger, June 26, 1977, at 1, col. 1, in which it was reported that New Jersey’s competitive position for industry has deteriorated substantially in relation to other states due in part to a “costly workers’ compensation program.” Accord, The Fantus Company, A Research Program to Strengthen New Jersey’s Competitive Position for Business and Industry 36-38 (1976). Robert R. Heckman, Chairman of the Compensation Rating and Inspection Bureau of New Jersey, reported that insurance company underwriting losses for workers’ compensation coverages in New Jersey increased from $30 million in 1975 to $53 million in 1976. One cause of that increase is the ever broadening scope of workers’ compensation benefits applied by the courts in marginal cases. Star-Ledger, July 1, 1977, at 30, col. 1. So-called beneficent purposes of the act may not in fact be in the best interests of employees, particularly if costs of production become such that the work force must be reduced.
Turning to the facts of this case, it is indisputable that the shooting happened some two city blocks away from the employee’s work area, at a place not under the employer’s control. The employee, having punched out at the job site before leaving, was not engaged in his work at the time of the incident. He was not acting under the direction or supervision of his employer. He voluntarily decided to eat at a luncheonette in no way related to his employment. To contend that the employment relationship was established because the employee’s nourishment benefitted the employer is a thin *176thread indeed — for almost anything, including a good night’s sleep or a warm bath, would have that effect.
The ultimate issue, as Justice Jacobs, relying upon Bryant, Adm’x v. Fissell, stated in Hornyak, is whether the employer’s enterprise should absorb the costs with- respect to such injuries. 63 N. J. at 102. Is the shooting of the petitioner at a luncheonette, during the lunch break, some distance away from the place of employment, so intimately related to his employment as a porter at a hospital that these expenses should be borne by the Martland Medical Center and its patients ? In my opinion those injuries do not have a sufficient work connection to be deemed to be employment related. See Strzelecki v. Johns-Manville, 65 N. J. 314, 321 (1974) (dissenting opinion).
It may be contended that logically following Eornyah leads to compensability in this case. That may be so, although some factual differences exist. Functionally and logically Eornyah, although paying lip service to the going and coming rule, has obliterated it. I cannot agTee with its holding.2
I would reverse.
Justice Clifford joins in this opinion.
For affirmance — Chief Justice Hughes and Justices Mountain, Sullivan, Pashman and Handler- — 5.
For reversal — Justices Clifford and Schreiber — 2.

New Jersey ranks third highest in the nation in cost of Workers’ Compensation Insurance. 2 Governor's Economic Recovery Commission Report app., at C-52, D-65 (1976).

For a vigorous criticism of Hornyak, see 1 Larson, The Law of Workmen’s Compensation § 15.53 (Supp. 1977).