Court Opinion

ID: 9466000
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 01:02:26.504449+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:39:29.278379
License: Public Domain

SWYGERT, Circuit Judge,
concurring in the result.
I agree with the result reached in this case, but dissent in major part from the majority’s reasoning. In the first place, the majority does not address the threshold and crucial issue: subject matter jurisdiction as authorized by the Magistrates Act for a reference of this case to a magistrate.1 This appeal, in my judgment, requires us to interpret the meaning of the phrase “conditions of confinement” as that phrase is used in the Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).2 The district court, ruling sub silentio that plaintiff’s claim came within the provisions of the Act, referred this case to the magistrate for an evidentiary hearing. The reference *1260was outside the jurisdiction conferred by the Act. We should go no further and reverse for further proceedings before the district court judge.3
Congress has limited a magistrate’s jurisdiction over prisoners’ petitions to those which challenge “conditions of confinement.” Presumably, that phrase encompasses ongoing prison practices and regulations with regard to matters such as placement in maximum security, deadlocks, unhealthy living conditions, unnecessary exposure to violence-prone inmates, overcrowded physical environments, and cruel or unusual punishment by prison authorities. In the case at bar, the plaintiff is not challenging any conditions of his confinement; rather, he seeks damages for the loss of his property resulting from a single incident that occurred in the prison. To include this case under the statutory rubric of section 636(b)(1)(B) would require a strained interpretation that no logic could justify.
Furthermore, a reference of this case to the magistrate for trial was not authorized by section 636(b)(3) of the Act which permits the assignment to magistrates of “such additional duties as are not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.”4 The legislative history of the Act clearly shows that Congress intended this subsection to be restricted to administrative and other functions in aid of the business of the courts. See H.R.Rep.No.94-1609, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprinted in [1976] U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 6162, 6172. Muhich v. Allen, 603 F.2d 1247 (7th Cir., 1979), (Swygert, J., dissenting, p. 13). See also Taylor v. Oxford, 575 F.2d 152, 154 (7th Cir. 1978). Thus, Congress has not authorized a magistrate to accept subject matter jurisdiction over a case such as this. And it is axiomatic that parties cannot themselves confer subject matter jurisdiction. See, e. g., Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U.S. 237, 244, 55 S.Ct. 162, 79 L.Ed. 338 (1934); C. Wright, Federal Courts 17 (3d ed. 1976).
Since Congress has not authorized cases such as this one to be referred to a magistrate, the district court judge was without power to assign the case to a magistrate. Being without that power, no subsequent action of the district court could have validated that assignment.
Finally, I agree with my Brothers’ conclusion that the unorthodox procedures used by the district court judge were improper and would have compelled us to reverse in any event.

. This subject matter jurisdiction issue was the paramount issue presented by the plaintiff-appellant. It would seem that the failure of the majority to deal with that issue is the result of faulty logic. By referring to,this court’s holding in Muhich v. Allen, 603 F.2d 1247 (7th Cir., 1979), that a magistrate is authorized under the Magistrates Act to try a civil trial when the parties consent, the majority here constructs as a major premise the proposition that if the parties do not agree to a civil trial before a magistrate, a reference for such purpose is improper. Because there was no consent here, the majority concludes that the reference was improper. The flaw in this syllogism is that not all references to a magistrate under the Act must have the parties’ consent. The Act lists numerous instances in which a magistrate may preside over an evidentiary hearing or trial without consent as a precondition under the Muhich ruling. Therefore, the question remains — not answered by the majority’s syllogistic but faulty reasoning — when no consent is given, is the matter nonetheless referable?

. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) reads:
*1260A judge may also designate a magistrate to conduct hearings, including evidentiary hearings, and to submit to a judge of the court proposed findings of fact and recommendations for the disposition, by a judge of the court, of any motion excepted in subparagraph (A), of applications for post trial relief made by individuals convicted of criminal offenses and of prisoner petitions challenging conditions of confinement.

. The majority concludes that reference to a United States magistrate for purposes of conducting civil trials is constitutionally and statutorily permissible. Although the constitutional issue is of serious import, I must disagree with the majority without reaching that issue. As developed in my dissent in Muhich v. Allen, supra, I am of the firm belief that the Magistrates Act does not authorize magistrates to conduct civil trials, with or without consent of the parties, whether they be jury or bench trials.

. Section 636(b)(3) provides:
A magistrate may be assigned such additional duties as are not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States,