Court Opinion

ID: 9911270
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-19 19:07:03.931425+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:57:04.355507
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-1667-21

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

DAWAN INGRAM,

     Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________

                   Submitted December 12, 2023 – Decided December 19, 2023

                   Before Judges Haas and Puglisi.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Essex County, Indictment No. 14-03-0827.

                   Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
                   appellant (Steven M. Gilson, Designated Counsel, on
                   the brief).

                   Theodore Stephens, II, Acting Essex County
                   Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Frank J. Ducoat,
                   Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant
                   Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

                   Appellant filed a pro se supplemental brief.
PER CURIAM

      Defendant Dawan Ingram appeals from the Law Division's November 5,

2021 order denying his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) following an

evidentiary hearing. We affirm.

      We incorporate the procedural history and facts set forth in our decision

on defendant's direct appeal of his conviction for first-degree murder and

weapons offenses. State v. Ingram, Docket No. A-0463-16 (App. Div. Apr. 12,

2019), certif. denied, 240 N.J. 12 (2019). After his appeal, defendant filed a

timely petition for PCR.     Among other things, defendant asserted his trial

attorney provided him with ineffective assistance because she: (1) presented an

alibi defense to the jury after he instructed her not to do so; (2) failed to

adequately investigate the alibi defense before presenting it; and (3) did not

move for reconsideration of the denial of his suppression motion related to

certain identification evidence or move for a mistrial because of the faulty

identification procedure he alleges was employed by the police.

      The trial judge conducted an evidentiary hearing concerning defense

counsel's decision to raise the alibi defense. Defendant claimed he sent a letter

to his attorney several months before the trial began advising her not to put forth

an alibi defense.   Defense counsel testified she did not recall ever receiving

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such a letter. She stated that defendant agreed with her decision to present the

defense and he gave her contact information for his mother and sister who

testified at trial in support of that defense.    Defense counsel testified that

defendant never objected to the decision to proceed with the alibi testimony.

      In her written decision, the trial judge found that defense counsel's account

was credible, while defendant's claims were not.         Accordingly, the judge

rejected defendant's argument that his trial attorney provided him with

ineffective assistance by pursuing the alibi defense.

      The trial judge also rejected defendant's argument that his attorney should

have conducted a more in-depth investigation of the alibi defense before

presenting it at trial. According to defendant, the potential success of the

defense was predicated on his ability to return from the murder scene to his

home in nine minutes or less. However, defendant's investigator presented a

report in support of his PCR petition stating that this trip took almost sixteen

minutes. Defendant argued that his attorney was ineffective because she failed

to conduct a similar investigation before raising the defense.

      However, the trial judge found that one of the State witnesses had testified

that it was possible to make the trip in five minutes if the person drove the car

in excess of the posted speed limit. With that favorable testimony in hand, the

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judge determined that defense counsel was not required to present additional

evidence on the travel time issue at the trial.

      Finally, defendant argued that the police improperly showed one of the

eyewitnesses the same set of photographs during two separate photographic

arrays. Defendant asserted that his attorney should have moved for a mistrial or

for reconsideration of the denial of his suppression motion as soon as this

testimony was presented at trial.

      However, the trial judge found that the witness's testimony did not clearly

establish that the photographs were the same in both arrays. Instead, the witness

stated several times that she could not remember what photographs the police

showed her. Because defense counsel lacked a factual basis for the motions

defendant believed she should have filed, the judge held that his attorne y's

decision not to proceed with any motions at that juncture was appropriate.

      In sum, the trial judge concluded that defendant failed to satisfy the two-

prong test of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), which

requires a showing that defense counsel's performance was deficient and that,

but for the deficient performance, the result would have been different. This

appeal followed.

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      In the brief filed by his appellate counsel, defendant repeats the same three

contentions he unsuccessfully raised before the trial court. Defendant asserts:

            POINT I

            DEFENDANT'S    CONVICTIONS   MUST   BE
            REVERSED BECAUSE TRIAL COUNSEL WAS
            INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO COMPLY WITH
            DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTIONS NOT TO PURSUE
            AN ALIBI DEFENSE.

            POINT II

            IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THIS MATTER MUST BE
            REMANDED FOR AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING
            BECAUSE DEFENDANT ESTABLISHED A PRIMA
            FACIE CASE OF ADDITIONAL CLAIMS AS TO
            TRIAL COUNSEL'S INEFFECTIVENESS.

            A.    Trial Counsel Failed to Adequately Investigate
                  the Alibi Defense.

            B.    Trial    Counsel     Failed    to   Move      for
                  Reconsideration of a Wade/Henderson Hearing
                  and/or a Mistrial, when it was Disclosed that the
                  State's Primary Eyewitness Had Been Shown the
                  Same Photo of Defendant on Two Different
                  Dates.

      In addition, defendant raises the following arguments in his pro se

supplemental brief:

            POINT I

            PCR COURT ERRED IN DENYING [PCR] FOR
            INEFFECTIVE TRIAL COUNSEL WHERE TRIAL

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COUNSEL PROCEEDED WITH A PREJUDICIAL
ALIBI DEFENSE.

POINT II

PCR COURT ERRED IN DENYING [PCR] FOR
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL COUNSEL
W[H]ERE TRIAL COUNSEL FAILED TO OBJECT
TO REMIND THE TRIAL COURT OF THEIR
POSITION TO CONDUCT A 104 HEARING.

POINT III

PCR COURT ERRED IN DENYING [PCR] WHERE
TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR
FAILING TO INVESTIGATE EVIDENCE THAT
CLEARLY    ESTABLISHED    DEFENDANT'S
INNOCENCE.

POINT IV

PCR COURT ERRED IN DENYING [PCR] FOR
NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE WHERE
EXPERT WITNESS WAS EXPOSED AS HAVING
RACIAL ANIMUS.

POINT V

DEFENDANT'S CREDIBILITY.

POINT VI

APPELLATE       REDETERMINATION     OF
CREDIBILITY ISSUE.

                                          A-1667-21
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       When petitioning for PCR, the defendant must establish, by a

preponderance of the credible evidence, that he is entitled to the requested relief.

State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 541 (2013); State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 459

(1992). To sustain that burden, the defendant must allege and articulate specific

facts that "provide the court with an adequate basis on which to rest its decision."

State v. Mitchell, 126 N.J. 565, 579 (1992).

       To establish a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the

defendant is obligated to show not only the particular manner in which counsel's

performance was deficient, but also that the deficiency prejudiced his right to a

fair trial. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987).

Under the first prong of this test, the defendant must demonstrate that "counsel

made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel'

guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Strickland, 466 U.S. at

687.

       Under the second prong, the defendant must show "that counsel's errors

were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is

reliable." Ibid. That is, "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different."

Id. at 694. There is a strong presumption that counsel "rendered adequate

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assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable

professional judgment." Id. at 690.

      Moreover, the acts or omissions of counsel of which a defendant

complains must amount to more than mere tactical strategy. Id. at 689. As the

Supreme Court observed in Strickland:

            [a] fair assessment of attorney performance requires
            that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting
            effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of
            counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the
            conduct from counsel's perspective at the time.
            Because of the difficulties inherent in making the
            evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption
            that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of
            reasonable professional assistance; that is, the
            defendant must overcome the presumption that, under
            the circumstances, the challenged action "might be
            considered sound trial strategy."

            [Ibid. (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101
            (1955)).]

      When a defendant asserts his attorney was ineffective by failing to file a

motion, he must establish that the motion would have been successful. State v.

O'Neal, 190 N.J. 601, 619 (2007). "It is not ineffective assistance of counsel for

defense counsel not to file a meritless motion." Ibid.

      Where, as here, the judge conducts an evidentiary hearing, we must

uphold the judge's factual findings, "so long as those findings are supported by

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sufficient credible evidence in the record." State v. Rockford, 213 N.J. 424, 440

(2013) (quoting State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 15 (2009)). Additionally, we

defer to a trial judge's findings that are "substantially influenced by [the trial

judge's] opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the 'feel' of the

case, which a reviewing court cannot enjoy."        Ibid. (alteration in original)

(quoting Robinson, 200 N.J. at 15).

      Having considered defendant's contentions in light of the record and these

well-established principles, we affirm the denial of defendant's PCR petition

substantially for the reasons detailed at length in the trial judge's thorough

written decision. We discern no abuse of discretion in the judge's consideration

of the issues. We are satisfied that the trial attorney's performance was not

deficient and defendant's arguments to the contrary in his counselled appellate

brief are unavailing.

      As to the issues presented by defendant in his pro se supplemental brief,

they largely parrot the points raised by his appellate counsel. To the extent they

do not, his arguments lack sufficient merit to warrant further discussion in a

written opinion. See R. 2:11-3(e)(2).

      Affirmed.

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