Court Opinion

ID: 9626734
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:22:31.273776+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:32.596423
License: Public Domain

HUNSTEIN, Presiding Justice,
dissenting.
Because I believe that the decision below both conforms to existing precedent and avoids the concededly harsh result reached by the majority, I hereby respectfully dissent.
I agree with the majority that the two-year statute of limitations applicable to those claims by Canas regarding the initial misdiagnoses by Drs. Kaminer and Al-Jabi began to run as of the date these alleged misdiagnoses were rendered. See Stafford-Fox v. Jenkins, 282 Ga. App. 667, 669 (639 SE2d 610) (2006) (for statute of limitation purposes, injury in misdiagnosis case occurs at time of misdiagnosis). However, I do not agree with the majority’s holding that, as a matter of law, there can be only a single, indivisible injury flowing from serial misdiagnoses of the same condition.
As the majority notes, “[subsequent failures on the part of Dr. Kaminer and Dr. Al-Jabi to recognize that Canas’ additional or increased symptoms were indicative of AIDS may well constitute new and separate instances of professional negligence.” Maj. Op., p. 834. The majority goes on to hold that, as a matter of law, Canas did not suffer any new injury as a result of any subsequent acts of malpractice because the deterioration in his condition was the inevitable result of his previously misdiagnosed illness. However, given that the initial injury in a misdiagnosis case is the pain and expense caused by *839the untreated condition, the majority opinion overlooks the possibility that there may be a separate injury after a later misdiagnosis, in the form of the continued pain and expense caused by the untreated condition which, but for the later misdiagnosis, would not have occurred. This possible factual scenario renders inappropriate the majority’s ruling as a matter of law.
Thus, in holding that subsequent misdiagnoses may constitute new acts of negligence resulting in new injury, the Court of Appeals merely recognized that, as the majority acknowledges, it is possible for a doctor to misdiagnose a patient more than once in the course of treatment, where new or more severe symptoms would, under the relevant standard of care, require a reassessment of the initial diagnosis.1 The Court of Appeals did not, as the majority contends, effectively revive the continuing treatment doctrine, which effects an extension of the statute of limitation with respect to the initial diagnosis. See Young v. Williams, 274 Ga. 845, 846 (560 SE2d 690) (2002). Instead, the Court of Appeals simply held that a new act of negligence, with its concomitant new injury, carries with it a new limitations period.2 Likewise, the Court of Appeals did not undermine “the long-standing interpretation given to the term ‘injury’ as it appears in OCGA § 9-3-71 (a).” Maj. Op., p. 837. None of the cases cited by the majority in support of its narrow interpretation squarely addressed the issue presented in this case, that is, whether, where the patient’s symptoms change or worsen so dramatically as to render the physician’s continued failure to properly diagnose the patient an independent act of negligence, such subsequent misdiagnosis may be deemed to give rise to a new “injury” in the form of additional pain, suffering, and expense suffered after the subsequent misdiagnosis.
The majority justifies its notion of the single, indivisible injury as fostering “[sjtability and certainty” in the law by fixing an easily determinable date on which the statute of limitations in a misdiagnosis case will begin. Maj. Op., p. 836. However, merely because the Court of Appeals’ holding might make it more difficult for medical malpractice defendants to obtain dismissal on statute of limitations *840grounds does not mean that it fosters unpredictability in the law. Moreover, curtailing the rights of the injured in the name of stability in the law is misguided where, as here, neither the letter nor the intent of the statute in question requires such a harsh result.
Decided October 29, 2007
Reconsideration denied December 14, 2007.
Scherffius, Ballard, Still & Ayres, William L. Ballard, Michael G. Regas II, Smith Moore, J. Robert Persons, for Canas.
Oliver, Maner & Gray, Leslie P. Sheehan, William P. Franklin, Jr., Christopher L. Ray, for Al-Jabi.
Carlock, Copeland, Semler & Stair, Adam L. Appel, Kim M. Ruder, for Kaminer.
Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, KathleenM. Pacious, Deputy Attorney General, Bryan F. Dorsey, for Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia.
Hull, Towill, Norman, Barrett & Salley, James S. V. Weston, for MCG Health, Inc.
Temple Sellers, Donald J. Palmisano, Jr., Owen, Gleaton, Egan, Jones & Sweeney, H. Andrew Owen, Jr., Roger E. Harris, Shannon C. Shipley, Huff, Powell & Bailey, Daniel J. Huff, Pope & Howard, J. Marcus E. Howard, Charles M. Cork III, amici curiae.
In sum, I would hold that in those cases where a subsequent misdiagnosis is not merely a continuation of/failure to remedy a prior misdiagnosis but is instead (because of new or more severe symptoms that under the applicable standard of care would require a reevaluation of the prior diagnosis) a distinct negligent act in its own right, a new injury, i.e., additional pain, suffering, and expense due to the untreated condition, has occurred, giving rise to an independent cause of action for negligence accruing on the date of the subsequent misdiagnosis. This is precisely what the Court of Appeals held, and, therefore, I would affirm.3
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Sears and Justice Thompson join in this dissent.

 This factual situation is distinguishable from that where the doctor simply fails to correct a prior misdiagnosis, the validity of which was never called into serious question by additional or enhanced symptoms. For this reason, the Court of Appeals’ holding does not conflict with this Court’s decision, cited by the majority, in Jankowski v. Taylor, Bishop & Lee, 246 Ga. 804 (273 SE2d 16) (1980), in which we held that the mere failure to correct a prior act of negligence was not, under the facts presented, a new act of negligence giving rise to a new claim with a new limitations period. Id. at 806 (1). Nothing in Jankowski precludes our holding that subsequent instances occurring in a series of negligent acts may give rise to new actionable claims.

 Thus, the majority’s assertion that under the Court of Appeals’ approach, “the statute of limitations will not commence until the error in the original diagnosis is discovered,” Maj. Op., p. 835, is simply incorrect.

 Because under this holding only negligent acts occurring within two years of the filing of the complaint would be potentially actionable, the five-year statute of repose, OCGA § 9-3-71 (b), would not prevent the pursuit of claims based on such acts.