Court Opinion

ID: 9855337
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:23:00.228085+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:25:44.081257
License: Public Domain

Chandler, Justice:
Appellant Reginald Geddis challenges his convictions for *38criminal sexual conduct and kidnapping, contending that the state violated Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S 79,106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed. (2d) 69 (1986). We affirm.

FACTS

Geddis, a black man, objected to the State’s use of peremptory strikes against black jurors. The dispute here centers upon the State’s strike of Juror Number 3, a black female, 23 years old. During the Batson hearing, the Solicitor explained that she struck Juror Number 3 because of her young age: “I try to avoid putting women especially that young on my juries.”
The Solicitor further explained that she seated two young white women, both 20 years old, despite their youth, since they spent the prior day watching another trial: “To me that overcame the normal procedure of striking because they showed great interest in watching the other trial.” She stated that Juror Number 3 had not displayed a similar interest in the proceedings.
The trial judge himself stated that he had observed one of these white jurors, Ms. McFarland, in the audience of an earlier trial. He then held that there was a sufficient distinction between the young white women and Juror Number 3, concluding that the jury panel was not constitutionally defective.

ISSUE

Was the State’s strike of Juror Number 3 racially discriminatory?

DISCUSSION

Geddis argues that inasmuch as the judge made no specific findings with respect to the second young white woman seated, the Solicitor’s explanation as to this juror was mere pretext. We disagree.
It is well settled that Batson proscribes the State from exercising its preemptive strikes in a racially discriminatory manner. In analyzing Batson issues, the Court has adopted a three-prong inquiry:
First, the defendant must make a prima facie showing that the solicitor exercised such challenges on the basis of race.
*39Second, if the requisite showing is made, the burden shifts to the Solicitor to articulate a race-neutral explanation for the strikes in question.
Third, the trial court must determine whether the defendant has met his burden of proving purposeful discrimination.
State v. Green, 306 S.C. 94, 409 S.E. (2d) 785 (1991), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 112 S.Ct. 1566, 118 L.Ed. (2d) 212 (1992).
The State’s explanation for striking a black juror “must be examined in light of the circumstances under which it is exercised, including an examination of the explanation offered for other strikes.” State v. Oglesby, 298 S.C. 279, 280, 379 S.E. (2d) 891, 892 (1989). The State’s reason for striking a juror must be applied in a racially neutral manner. Id.; State v. Adams, 307 S.C. 368, 415 S.E. (2d) 402 (1992). The trial judge’s findings of whether there was purposeful discrimination are accorded great deference on appeal. Green, supra.
In State v. Wilder, 306 S.C. 535, 413 S.E. (2d) 323 (1992), we held that the Solicitor’s strike of a black juror on the basis of lateness was racially neutral even though a white juror, who was also late, was not struck. The white juror’s expressed willingness to serve on the jury overcame the presumption that her tardiness conveyed disrespect for the court.
We find Wilder dispositive. The Solicitor stated that the interest of both young, white jurors in courtroom proceedings overcame their young age and distinguished them from Juror Number 3. The fact that the judge noted seeing only one of the two jurors in the courtroom is irrelevant; it is the Solicitor, not the trial court, who must articulate a racially neutral reason for striking the juror.
Based upon this record, we find no purposeful discrimination in the striking of Juror Number 3.
Affirmed.
Harwell, C.J., and Moore, J., concur.
Finney and Toal, JJ., dissent in a separate opinion.