Court Opinion

ID: 9613360
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:16:24.177677+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:01.685369
License: Public Domain

KIRSHBAUM, Judge,
specially concurring.
As the majority opinion indicates, the offense for which defendant was punished occurred while defendant was under parole supervision in connection with a prior offense.
Because such fact may be considered an “extraordinary” aggravating circumstance, § 18-1-105(6), C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl.Vol. 8) (1980 Cum.Supp.); see People v. Barmore, *1316(No. 80CA1109, Dec. 26, 1980) (not selected for official publication), I agree with the majority’s decision affirming the sentence imposed by the trial court.
I disagree, however, with the majority’s conclusion — in my view wholly unnecessary to the resolution of this appeal — that the statute in question authorizes trial judges, at their absolute discretion, to impose sentence not within the presumptive range specified by the General Assembly for a particular offense solely because of the “record” of a particular defendant.
In the first place, such expansive construction of the presumptive penalty statute directly contravenes two of the stated purposes of the sentencing provisions of the Criminal Code: to punish an offender “by assuring the imposition of a sentence he deserves in relation to the seriousness of his offense,” and to “assure the fair and consistent treatment of all convicted offenders by eliminating unjustified disparity in sentences, [and] providing fair warning of the nature of the sentence to be imposed.” Section 18-1-102.5(a), (b), C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl.Vol. 8) (1980 Cum.Supp.). The rationale articulated by the majority emphasizes punishment in relation to other offenses and encourages the imposition of disparate sentences for identical criminal conduct. The General Assembly sought to prevent such anomalies by this statute.
The majority’s construction of the statute also fails to give effect to the precise words and phrases articulated by the General Assembly. Section 18-1—105(1)(b), C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl.Vol. 8) (1980 Cum.Supp.), which defines the factors to be considered for selecting a particular sentence within a presumptive range, specifically distinguishes the “record of the offender” from the phrase “all aggravating or mitigating circumstances surrounding the offense and the offender.” Thus, the General Assembly has made clear, linguistically, that a defendant’s “record” is a factor distinct from any aggravating or mitigating circumstances. See People v. Gonzales, Colo.App., 613 P.2d 905 (1980), dissenting opinion. A trial court may, solely on the basis of a defendant’s record, sentence such defendant to the maximum term permitted within the legislatively defined presumptive range. The trial court may also base a sentence falling within the presumptive range on some factor other than the defendant’s record — such as some aggravating or mitigating circumstance surrounding the offense or the offender.
The majority ignores this statutory definitional distinction on the theory that it would be ludicrous to conclude that a defendant’s record cannot be considered in imposing a sentence outside the presumptive range while it may be considered for purposes of sentencing within the presumptive range. To the contrary, such distinction makes practical good sense when viewed in light of the statute’s purpose of reducing sentence disparity by reducing trial court sentencing discretion. Whatever the merits of the debate as to whether sentencing statutes should mandate enhanced punishment for offenders with prior records, the General Assembly has made the determination in this statute that the prior record of an offender is a factor for consideration only as to where within the presumptive range a particular sentence for a particular offense may be imposed.