Court Opinion

ID: 9898874
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-15 16:01:38.638211+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:36.090112
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-1434    Document: 35    Page: 1   Filed: 11/15/2023

        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                  ______________________

           TREK BICYCLE CORPORATION,
                    Appellant

                            v.

                  CHRISTINA ISAACS,
                         Appellee
                  ______________________

                        2022-1434
                  ______________________

     Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark
 Office, Trademark Trial and Appeal Board in
 No. 91232164.
                  ______________________

                Decided: November 15, 2023
                  ______________________

    MARY CATHERINE MERZ, Merz & Associates, PC, Oak
 Park, IL, for appellant.

      DAVID ALLEN LOWE, Lowe Graham Jones PLLC, Seat-
 tle, WA, for appellee.
                  ______________________

  Before STOLL, SCHALL, and CUNNINGHAM, Circuit Judges.
 CUNNINGHAM, Circuit Judge.
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 2                        TREK BICYCLE CORPORATION v. ISAACS

      Trek Bicycle Corporation (“Trek”) appeals from a deci-
 sion of the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“Board”)
 dismissing Trek’s opposition to Ms. Christina Isaacs’s reg-
 istration of the RANGER TREK standard character mark
 and the RANGER TREK design mark. Trek Bicycle Corp.
 v. Isaacs, Opp’n No. 91232164, 2021 WL 3468080 (T.T.A.B.
 Aug. 4, 2021) (“Decision”). The Board found that Trek
 failed to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, the ex-
 istence of a likelihood of confusion. See Decision at *17.
 Because substantial evidence supports the Board’s findings
 as to the challenged DuPont factors and the Board did not
 err in weighing the DuPont factors, we affirm.
                     I.   BACKGROUND
      In August 2016, Ms. Isaacs filed three trademark ap-
 plications. See J.A. 2257–61 (U.S. Trademark App. Serial
 No. 87/123,067), 2271–75, 2268 (U.S. Trademark App. Se-
 rial No. 87/123,082), 2285–89, 2282 (U.S. Trademark App.
 Serial No. 87/123,091); Decision at *1 & nn.1–3. Two of the
 applications are at issue in this appeal: U.S. Trademark
 Application Serial No. 87/123,067 for the RANGER TREK
 standard character mark and U.S. Trademark Application
 Serial No. 87/123,091 for the RANGER TREK design mark
 (collectively, the “RANGER TREK marks”). 1              See

     1  Trek does not appeal the Board’s decision as to U.S.
 Trademark Application Serial No. 87/123,082 for the
 RANGER TREK EXPEDITION JOURNALS design mark.
 See Appellant’s Br. 3; Appellee’s Br. 9–10; J.A. 2271.
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 TREK BICYCLE CORPORATION v. ISAACS                          3

 Appellant’s Br. 3; J.A. 2257, 2285. The RANGER TREK
 design mark is depicted below:

 J.A. 2279, 2282. Ms. Isaacs sought registration of the
 RANGER TREK marks for use with various international
 classes of goods and services, only some of which are now
 on appeal: namely, backpacks, hiking bags, sports bags,
 and travel bags in International Class 18 and hats, jackets,
 and shirts in International Class 25 (the “identified
 goods”). 2 See Appellant’s Br. 8, 24; J.A. 2257, 2259–60; J.A.
 2285, 2287; Decision at *1.
     Trek filed a Notice of Opposition, asserting that the
 RANGER TREK marks as used in connection with the
 identified goods would cause a likelihood of confusion with
 Trek’s previously used and registered TREK and TREK-
 formative marks and TREK trade name. See Decision at
 *2; J.A. 100–16. Some examples of Trek’s registered marks
 are Trademark Registration No. 2745442 for the TREK
 mark for various bicycling apparel in International Class
 No. 25, see J.A. 103–04, Trademark Registration
 No. 3053077 for the TREK mark for backpacks and other
 various bags in International Class No. 18, see J.A. 105,
 and Trademark Registration No. 3979036 for the TREK

     2   Trek does not appeal the Board’s decision as to the
 goods and services in other international classes. See Ap-
 pellant’s Br. 8, 24.
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 4                        TREK BICYCLE CORPORATION v. ISAACS

 design mark for various cycling apparel in International
 Class No. 25 that is depicted below:

 J.A. 110; see Decision at *5.
     In August 2021, the Board dismissed Trek’s opposition.
 See Decision at *17. The Board concluded that “[t]he sub-
 ject applications and [Trek]’s registrations contain identi-
 cal and legally identical goods in International Classes 18
 and 25”—i.e., the identified goods. See id. at *7. The Board
 evaluated the likelihood of confusion between the parties’
 marks under the factors set forth in In re E.I. DuPont
 DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (CCPA 1973) (“the
 DuPont factors”) for which there were argument and evi-
 dence. 3 See Decision at *6; see also id. at *7–17. The Board

     3   “The thirteen factors are as follows: (1) similarity
 of the marks; (2) similarity and nature of goods described
 in the marks’ [applications or] registrations; (3) similarity
 of established trade channels; (4) conditions of purchasing;
 (5) fame of the prior mark; (6) number and nature of similar
 marks in use on similar goods; (7) nature and extent of ac-
 tual confusion; (8) length of time and conditions of concur-
 rent use without evidence of actual confusion; (9) variety of
 goods on which mark is used; (10) market interface be-
 tween applicant and owner of a prior mark; (11) extent to
 which [the] applicant has a right to exclude others from use
 of its mark; (12) extent of potential confusion; and (13) any
 other established probative fact on effect of use.” Zheng
 Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., 901 F.3d 1367, 1371 n.2 (Fed.
 Cir. 2018) (citing DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361).
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 found that “the differences between the marks [were] suf-
 ficient to avoid likely confusion despite the identical goods
 and trade channels and the fame of [Trek’s] marks for bi-
 cycles, in particular given the differences in overall com-
 mercial impression.” Id. at *16. Accordingly, the Board
 concluded that Trek failed to show the existence of a likeli-
 hood of confusion by a preponderance of the evidence. See
 id. at *17.
     Trek subsequently filed a Request for Reconsideration
 and challenged the Board’s dismissal with respect to the
 RANGER TREK marks for the identified goods. See J.A.
 6000–07. The Board denied the request. J.A. 46–52 at 52
 (“Reconsideration Decision”).
     Trek appeals. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
 § 1295(a)(4)(B).
                       II. DISCUSSION
      Section 2(d) of the Lanham Act prohibits the registra-
 tion of a mark if it is “likely, when used on or in connection
 with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion” with
 another registered mark. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d); see QuikTrip
 West, Inc. v. Weigel Stores, Inc., 984 F.3d 1031, 1034 (Fed.
 Cir. 2021). “Likelihood of confusion is a question of law
 based on underlying factual findings regarding the DuPont
 factors.” Spireon, Inc. v. Flex Ltd., 71 F.4th 1355, 1362
 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (citing In re I.AM.Symbolic, LLC, 866 F.3d
 1315, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2017)). “We review the Board’s fac-
 tual findings on each relevant DuPont factor for substan-
 tial evidence, but we review the Board’s weighing of the
 DuPont factors de novo.” QuikTrip, 984 F.3d at 1034 (cita-
 tion omitted). “Substantial evidence is such relevant evi-
 dence as a reasonable mind would accept as adequate to
 support a conclusion.” Zheng Cai, 901 F.3d at 1371 (inter-
 nal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Not all of the
 DuPont factors are necessarily relevant or of equal weight
 in a given case, and any one of the factors may control a
 particular case.” Tiger Lily Ventures Ltd. v. Barclays
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 6                       TREK BICYCLE CORPORATION v. ISAACS

 Capital Inc., 35 F.4th 1352, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (internal
 quotation marks and citation omitted). We only need to
 consider the DuPont factors of significance to the particular
 mark in the likelihood of confusion analysis. Id. (citation
 omitted).
     On appeal, Trek challenges the Board’s factual findings
 that: (1) the differences between the parties’ marks sup-
 port a finding of no confusion (DuPont factor one);
 (2) Trek’s TREK mark is not famous as to the identified
 goods (DuPont factor five); (3) Trek’s TREK mark is not
 commercially strong as to the identified goods and is some-
 what conceptually weak as to the identified goods (DuPont
 factor six); 4 and (4) the prosecution of Trek’s application,
 U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 87/565,645, which
 matured into Trademark Registration No. 6036046 (“the
 87/565,645 prosecution”), J.A. 99, supports a finding of no
 confusion (DuPont factor thirteen). 5 See Appellant’s Br. 9,
 12, 22–25, 42; see also Decision at *9–16; Reconsideration
 Decision at J.A. 49–52. Trek also challenges the Board’s

     4    Although Trek raises commercial and conceptual
 strength arguments, it does not present such arguments
 under DuPont factor six as it should. See Appellants’ Br.
 22–25, 42; Spireon, 71 F.4th at 1362–63 (explaining that
 commercial and conceptual strength are analyzed under
 DuPont factor six). We address Trek’s commercial and con-
 ceptual strength arguments under DuPont factor six.
     5    Trek contends that the Board erred by failing to
 consider the argument and evidence concerning DuPont
 factor eight raised during the 87/565,645 prosecution. See
 Appellant’s Br. 25–30. The Board analyzed and made its
 factual findings as to the 87/565,645 prosecution under
 “other established facts,” i.e., DuPont factor thirteen. See
 Decision at *15–16; Reconsideration Decision at J.A. 50–52.
 We similarly address the arguments concerning the
 87/565,645 prosecution under DuPont factor thirteen.
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 weighing of the DuPont factors. See Appellant’s Br. 9; see
 also Decision at *16. We address each argument in turn.
                   A. DuPont Factor One
      Under DuPont factor one, we consider “whether the
 marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial
 impression such that persons who encounter the marks
 would be likely to assume a connection between the par-
 ties.” I.AM.Symbolic, 866 F.3d at 1323 (citation omitted).
 “Commercial impression” refers to “the ultimate conclusion
 of similarity or dissimilarity of marks resulting from a com-
 parison of their appearance, sound, and meaning.” Palm
 Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee
 En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citations
 omitted).
      The Board found that DuPont factor one weighed
 against a likelihood of confusion because the RANGER
 TREK marks are dissimilar from Trek’s marks “in appear-
 ance, sound, connotation and commercial impression.” De-
 cision at *14. Trek unpersuasively argues this finding is
 not supported by substantial evidence for multiple reasons.
 First, Trek contends that the Board erred by conflating, ra-
 ther than independently evaluating, the RANGER TREK
 marks. See Appellants Br. 9. We disagree. The Board con-
 sidered both of the RANGER TREK marks and their re-
 spective attributes in reaching its conclusion that DuPont
 factor one weighs against finding likely confusion. See De-
 cision at *11–14.
     Second, Trek argues that the Board incorrectly found
 that the addition of “RANGER” to “TREK” in the RANGER
 TREK marks resulted in the parties’ marks having “a dif-
 ferent overall commercial impression, sufficient to avoid
 likely confusion.” Decision at *14; see Appellant’s Br. 9, 15,
 19. Trek contends that the word “TREK” is “the dominant
 portion” of the RANGER TREK marks, and the Board thus
 erred in failing to assign greater weight to the word
 “TREK” present in both parties’ marks. See Appellant’s Br.
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 8                        TREK BICYCLE CORPORATION v. ISAACS

 21. We disagree. When marks are structurally similar, a
 mark’s lead word may be the “dominant portion” of the
 mark and is “likely to make the greatest impression on con-
 sumers” because consumers typically notice the first word
 of a mark first. In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297,
 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing Palm Bay, 396 F.3d at 1372).
 Because “RANGER” is the lead word in the RANGER
 TREK marks, the Board reasonably found that “RANGER”
 was “more dominant” over “TREK,” which weighed against
 a likelihood of confusion. See Decision at *14; see Palm
 Bay, 396 F.3d at 1371–72 (finding that the word “VEUVE”
 in the VEUVE CLICQUOT mark was “a ‘prominent fea-
 ture’” as the first word in the mark and “the dominant fea-
 ture” in the commercial impression of the mark).
      As part of its DuPont factor one determination, the
 Board also reasonably concluded that the parties’ marks
 differed in their overall commercial impression because
 “TREK by itself simply references a journey or hike”
 whereas “RANGER TREK evokes . . . a specific type of per-
 son with a mission on a RANGER TREK.” Decision at *14.
 Trek appears to challenge this finding, arguing that “Trek’s
 presence of its TREK name and marks in parks in the
 United States is enormous [and] diminish[es] any mean-
 ingful distinction” between the parties’ marks. See Appel-
 lants Br. 16.       In support, Trek points to evidence
 concerning Trek’s bicycles designed for park and public
 trail use, dealers and bicycle shops located near parks that
 sell and rent Trek’s bicycles, and Trek’s various efforts sup-
 porting bicycling in parks. Id. at 16–19. However, this ev-
 idence generally concerns bicycles and bicycling services,
 not the identified goods on appeal. Trek’s argument is
 therefore unpersuasive.
     Lastly, with respect to the RANGER TREK design
 mark, Trek argues that the Board erred by assigning too
 much weight to the design rather than the words. See Ap-
 pellant’s Br. 9, 14–15. We disagree. While words are “nor-
 mally accorded greater weight” in a composite mark
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 containing both words and a design, “there is no general
 rule that the letter portion of the mark will form the domi-
 nant portion of the mark.” In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358,
 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). And contrary to
 Trek’s characterization of the Board’s analysis, the Board
 did not disproportionately weigh the RANGER TREK de-
 sign mark’s visual elements. See Decision at *14. Rather,
 the Board explained that the RANGER TREK design had
 a very different shape from Trek’s shield design and that
 the RANGER TREK design merely “amplifie[d] the
 RANGER connotation” by “depicting children heading out
 on a hike in ranger outfits.” Id. (emphasis added).
     Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the Board’s
 finding that the dissimilarities between the RANGER
 TREK marks and Trek’s marks for the identified goods
 weigh against a likelihood of confusion.
                B. DuPont Factors Five and Six
            i. Fame and Commercial Strength
     Under DuPont factor five, a famous mark has “exten-
 sive public recognition and renown.” Coach Servs., Inc. v.
 Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1367 (Fed. Cir.
 2012) (quoting Bose Corp. v. QSC Audio Prods. Inc., 293
 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). “Fame for purposes of
 likelihood of confusion is a matter of degree that ‘varies
 along a spectrum from very strong to very weak.’” Id.
 (quoting Palm Bay, 396 F.3d at 1375). “Relevant factors
 include sales, advertising, length of use of the mark, mar-
 ket share, brand awareness, licensing activities, and vari-
 ety of goods bearing the mark.” Id. (citations omitted); see
 also Bose, 293 F.3d at 1371; Spireon, 71 F.4th at 1362.
     And under DuPont factor six, “[t]here are two prongs of
 analysis,” one of which is commercial strength. Spireon, 71
 F.4th at 1362 (citations omitted). Commercial strength “is
 the marketplace recognition value of the mark” and “is a
 question of whether consumers in fact associate the mark
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 10                       TREK BICYCLE CORPORATION v. ISAACS

 with a unique source.” Id. at 1363 (cleaned up). Similar to
 fame, commercial strength can be shown by “advertising
 and marketing, and sales.” Id. (citation omitted); see also
 FocusVision Worldwide, Inc. v. Info. Builders, Inc., 859 F.
 App’x 573, 577–78 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (analyzing same sales
 and marketing expenditures evidence for fame and com-
 mercial strength determinations).
      The Board found that Trek’s TREK mark “is famous for
 bicycles and bicycle accessories” and that Trek “demon-
 strate[d] the commercial strength of the TREK mark for
 bicycles,” Decision at *10, but that such fame and commer-
 cial strength did not extend to the identified goods. See id.;
 Reconsideration Decision at J.A. 49–50, 52. Trek argues
 that the Board erred by discounting its evidence of sales
 and marketing expenditures that allegedly show the fame
 and commercial strength of Trek’s TREK mark for the
 identified goods. See Appellant’s Br. 9, 30; see also id. at
 31–43.
     We disagree. The Board explained that Trek proffered
 evidence of “the length of time it has sold clothing (since
 1988) and bags (1993), the amount of sales in dollar figures,
 and total marketing expenditures.” Reconsideration Deci-
 sion at J.A. 49–50. Specifically, Trek provided its sales fig-
 ures for bags and clothing products sold in the United
 States in 2011 through 2018, see J.A. 6232; J.A. 3068–75,
 and its marketing expenditures for North America during
 the same time period. See J.A. 6234; J.A. 3075–77. The
 Board properly discounted this evidence, explaining that
 “raw numbers of product sales and advertising expenses”—
 like Trek’s evidence—“may have sufficed in the past to
 prove fame of a mark, but raw numbers alone in today’s
 world may be misleading.” Reconsideration Decision at
 J.A. 50 (quoting Bose, 293 F.3d at 1375).
     Trek correctly recognizes that although raw numbers
 of product sales and advertising expenses may be mislead-
 ing, the opposer can introduce evidence to contextualize
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 these numbers. See Appellant’s Br. 31–32 (citing Bose, 293
 F.3d at 1375); see also Omaha Steaks Int’l, Inc. v. Greater
 Omaha Packing Co., 908 F.3d 1315, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
 (explaining that the opposer “provided considerable contex-
 tual evidence of the type of advertisements and promotions
 it uses to gain sales”). Trek argues that the Board’s analy-
 sis was “legally flawed” because the Board disregarded
 Trek’s “considerable contextual evidence for the type of ad-
 vertisements and promotions it has used to gain sales.” Ap-
 pellant’s Br. 31–32, 35; see also id. at 33–34, 38. However,
 we have reviewed Trek’s briefing before the Board, and it
 appears that Trek never raised this specific argument be-
 low and thus forfeited it. See J.A. 6290–341 (Trek’s Open-
 ing Trial Brief); J.A. 5947–71 (Trek’s Reply Trial Brief);
 J.A. 6000–06 (Trek’s Request for Reconsideration); Califor-
 nia Ridge Wind Energy LLC v. United States, 959 F.3d
 1345, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (“We may deem an argument
 forfeited when a party raises it for the first time on ap-
 peal.”) (citations omitted). Regardless, if we consider
 Trek’s argument, it does not detract from the Board’s con-
 clusion that “[t]he evidence does not support a finding that
 TREK is famous for the types of goods identified in the sub-
 ject applications.” Decision at *10. For example, the Board
 noted that Trek’s evidence of marketing expenditures was
 “not broken down by product and [did] not appear to be for
 only clothing and bags.” Reconsideration Decision at J.A.
 50. Accordingly, Trek has failed to show that the Board’s
 findings on fame and commercial strength with respect to
 the identified goods are not supported by substantial evi-
 dence.
                   ii. Conceptual Strength
      The other prong of the DuPont factor six analysis is
 conceptual strength, which “is a measure of a mark’s dis-
 tinctiveness.” Spireon, 71 F.4th at 1362 (citations omitted).
 “[D]istinctiveness is often classified in categories of gener-
 ally increasing distinctiveness: (1) generic; (2) descriptive;
 (3) suggestive; (4) arbitrary; or (5) fanciful.” Id. (cleaned
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 12                       TREK BICYCLE CORPORATION v. ISAACS

 up). “[S]uggestive marks suggest, but do not directly and
 immediately describe, some aspect of the goods[.]” Id.
 (cleaned up). Marks that are “highly suggestive are enti-
 tled to a narrower scope of protection, i.e., are less likely to
 generate confusion over source identification, than their
 more fanciful counterparts.” Id. (citations omitted).
      The Board found that Trek’s TREK mark is somewhat
 conceptually weak and somewhat suggestive as to the iden-
 tified goods. See Decision at *11, *14. Trek argues that
 “[t]here simply is nothing in the record to support the
 Board’s reasoning” on this point. Appellant’s Br. 24; see
 also id. at 22–23. We do not agree. The Board’s conclusion
 is supported by dictionaries defining “trek” as “an arduous
 journey” or “difficult journey, hike or trip,” as well as third-
 party registrations containing the word “TREK” for the
 identified goods. See Decision at *10–11. Dictionary defi-
 nitions and third-party registrations can show that a mark
 is suggestive. See QuikTrip, 984 F.3d at 1035 (finding that
 “kitchen” is a “highly suggestive, if not descriptive” word
 based on evidence of dictionary definitions and third-party
 registrations, among other evidence); see also Juice Gener-
 ation, Inc. v. GS Enters. LLC, 794 F.3d 1334, 1339 (Fed.
 Cir. 2015). Moreover, third-party registrations “show the
 sense in which a mark is used in ordinary parlance, that is,
 some segment that is common to both parties’ marks may
 have a normally understood and well-recognized . . . sug-
 gestive meaning, leading to the conclusion that that seg-
 ment is relatively weak.” Jack Wolfskin Ausrustung Fur
 Draussen GmbH & Co. KGAA v. New Millennium Sports,
 S.L.U., 797 F.3d 1363, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (cleaned up).
 Accordingly, the Board reasonably relied on and found that
 certain dictionary definitions and third-party registrations
 showed that Trek’s TREK mark is somewhat conceptually
 weak and somewhat suggestive for the identified goods.
 See Decision at *11, *14.
     Trek argues that any reliance on third-party registra-
 tions is improper because two third-party registrations on
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 TREK BICYCLE CORPORATION v. ISAACS                          13

 which the Board based its conclusion have been canceled
 since the Board’s decision and asks us to take judicial no-
 tice of these canceled registrations. See Appellant’s Br. 24–
 25; ECF No. 12. We deny Trek’s motion for judicial notice.
 Even if we took judicial notice of the canceled registrations,
 such notice would not change the outcome or discount the
 dictionary definitions and at least one other third-party
 registration for the identified goods on which the Board re-
 lied and which provide substantial evidence for the Board’s
 finding. See Decision at *11; J.A. 3467 (third-party regis-
 tration of the STAR TREK SKELE-TREKS mark for cloth-
 ing including shirts in International Class 25). Regardless,
 any alleged error by the Board in finding that Trek’s TREK
 mark is somewhat conceptually weak and somewhat sug-
 gestive for the identified goods would be harmless because
 it appears that the Board concluded there was no likelihood
 of confusion without accounting for this finding. See Deci-
 sion at *14 (“[E]ven ignoring the somewhat conceptually
 weak nature of the word TREK in connection with the var-
 ious Class 18 and 25 goods . . . to the extent it suggests they
 are for trekking or simply evokes the idea of trekking, we
 find the marks are not confusingly similar when used on
 the [identified] goods[.]”). Accordingly, we find Trek’s ar-
 guments on conceptual strength under DuPont factor six
 unpersuasive.
                 C. DuPont Factor Thirteen
     Under DuPont factor thirteen, courts consider “any
 other established fact probative of the effect of use.” Quik-
 Trip, 984 F.3d at 1036 (quoting DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361).
 Trek contends that the Board erred in finding that the
 87/565,645 prosecution for the TREK standard character
 mark supports a finding of no confusion. See Appellant’s
 Br. 9, 25–30; J.A. 99 (TREK standard character mark).
 Specifically, Trek argues that the Board erred by failing to
 consider the argument and evidence concerning actual con-
 fusion (DuPont factor eight) raised during the 87/565,645
 prosecution. See Appellant’s Br. 27–30. We disagree.
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 14                       TREK BICYCLE CORPORATION v. ISAACS

     During the 87/565,645 prosecution, the United States
 Patent and Trademark Office refused registration for the
 TREK standard character mark for apparel due to likely
 confusion with five registered marks containing the word
 “TREK” for various footwear and clothing. See J.A. 3791–
 95; Decision at *16. Trek overcame this objection, arguing
 in part that if the five registered marks containing the
 word “TREK” can coexist with one other, then the proposed
 TREK standard character mark can also coexist with the
 five registered marks. See J.A. 3774–77; Decision at *16;
 J.A. 3772 (Trek arguing that “years of peaceful coexistence
 (according to the 8th DU PONT [sic] factor . . .) weigh
 strongly in favor of the registration of TREK”); see also J.A.
 3766, 3769. The 87/565,645 prosecution was presented to
 the Board below as evidence for no likely confusion be-
 tween Trek’s marks and the RANGER TREK marks, and
 the Board agreed, finding that “given the various ‘trek’
 marks registered for similar or related goods, it would seem
 [that the RANGER TREK] marks, where the addition of
 ‘RANGER’ creates a sufficient distinction, may coexist as
 well.” Decision at *16; see also Reconsideration Decision at
 J.A. 50–52.
     Contrary to Trek’s arguments raised on appeal, we find
 that the Board sufficiently considered the argument and
 evidence concerning actual confusion (DuPont factor eight)
 raised during the 87/565,645 prosecution and that substan-
 tial evidence supports the Board’s interpretation of the
 87/565,645 prosecution. Moreover, even if the Board did
 err in its interpretation, this error would be at most harm-
 less because the Board explained that “the absence of these
 ‘other established facts’ [under DuPont factor thirteen]
 would not change the result” of no likely confusion. Recon-
 sideration Decision at J.A. 52. Trek’s arguments on
 DuPont factor thirteen are unpersuasive.
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            D. Weighing of the DuPont Factors
     The Board weighed the DuPont factors and determined
 that “the differences between the [parties’] marks [were]
 sufficient to avoid likely confusion despite the identical
 goods and trade channels and the fame of [Trek’s] marks
 for bicycles, in particular given the differences in overall
 commercial impression.” Decision at *16. In other words,
 the Board gave DuPont factor one decisive weight. See id.
 Trek challenges such weighing, arguing that the Board
 erred by placing too much weight on the dissimilarities be-
 tween the marks (DuPont factor one) and by failing to give
 sufficient weight to the fame and commercial strength of
 Trek’s mark as to the identified goods (DuPont factors five
 and six). See Appellant’s Br. 3, 9, 30–31, 34–35, 43. We
 are unpersuaded.
      First, in order to give any favorable weight to DuPont
 factors five and six, we must find that the fame and com-
 mercial strength of Trek’s TREK mark does extend to the
 identified goods, which it does not. Second, we do not agree
 with Trek’s argument that the Board gave DuPont factor
 one undue weight. “One DuPont factor may be dispositive
 in a likelihood of confusion analysis, especially when that
 single factor is the dissimilarity of the marks.” QuikTrip,
 984 F.3d at 1037 (internal quotation marks and citation
 omitted). We see no error in the Board’s determination
 that “the differences between the [parties’] marks [were]
 sufficient to avoid likely confusion,” Decision at *16, “espe-
 cially given the Board’s findings that the marks noticeably
 differed in appearance, sound, connotation, and commer-
 cial impression.” QuikTrip, 984 F.3d at 1037; see Decision
 at *14 (finding the marks to be “dissimilar[] in appearance,
 sound, connotation and commercial impression”). There-
 fore, the Board did not err in weighing the DuPont factors.
Case: 22-1434   Document: 35    Page: 16   Filed: 11/15/2023

 16                     TREK BICYCLE CORPORATION v. ISAACS

                     III. CONCLUSION
     We have considered Trek’s remaining arguments and
 find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing reasons, we af-
 firm the Board’s decision.
                       AFFIRMED