Court Opinion

ID: 9953631
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-22 16:05:13.816682+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:02:38.609677
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                        Mar 22 2024, 9:00 am

                                                                             CLERK
                                                                         Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                            Court of Appeals
                                                                              and Tax Court

                                            IN THE

            Court of Appeals of Indiana
                                    DeMarcus Hazelwood,
                                        Appellant-Respondent

                                                    v.

                            The Common Wealth Apartments,
                                          Appellee-Petitioner

                                           March 22, 2024
                                  Court of Appeals Case No.
                                        23A-EV-1404
                   Appeal from the Center Township Small Claims Court
                            The Honorable Brenda A. Roper, Judge
                                       Trial Court Cause No.
                                      49K01-2305-EV-001946

                                 Opinion by Judge May
                                  Judge Felix concurs.
                       Judge Bailey concurs with separate opinion.

May, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-EV-1404 | March 22, 2024      Page 1 of 14
[1]   DeMarcus Hazelwood appeals the trial court’s order granting The Common

      Wealth Apartments (“Common Wealth”) possession of Hazelwood’s

      apartment. Hazelwood raises two issues on appeal, but we find one dispositive:

      Whether the trial court erred in granting possession of the apartment to

      Common Wealth, which is a landlord that accepts federal housing subsidies,

      when Common Wealth failed to give Hazelwood a thirty-day notice to vacate.

      We reverse and remand.

      Facts and Procedural History
[2]   Common Wealth received federal subsidies to house eligible residents in its

      near eastside Indianapolis apartment complex, and Hazelwood was one of

      Common Wealth’s rent-subsidized residents. Hazelwood’s lease began on

      February 1, 2023, and the lease’s term was set to expire on January 31, 2024.

      On May 11, 2023, Common Wealth filed a notice of claim seeking a court

      order granting it possession of Hazelwood’s apartment. 1 On May 19, 2023,

      Common Wealth filed an amended notice of claim alleging it was entitled to

      possession of Hazelwood’s apartment because of “[n]on-payment of

      rent/behavior[.]” (App. Vol. II at 9.)

      1
       This initial notice of claim sought emergency possession of Hazelwood’s apartment and alleged Hazelwood
      was engaged in criminal activity and disturbing the neighbors. The trial court held an emergency eviction
      hearing on May 19, 2023. A transcript of that hearing is not in the record, but Common Wealth filed its
      amended notice of claim on the same day. The trial court then set a hearing on Common Wealth’s amended
      notice of claim for June 6, 2023.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-EV-1404 | March 22, 2024                           Page 2 of 14
[3]   On June 5, 2023, Hazelwood filed a motion to dismiss Common Wealth’s

      notice of claim. Hazelwood argued that federal law required Common Wealth

      to give Hazelwood a thirty-day notice before filing a claim to evict him from his

      apartment and that Common Wealth was required to make a grievance

      procedure available to Hazelwood before evicting him. Hazelwood argued

      that, because Common Wealth failed to meet either requirement, the trial court

      should dismiss Common Wealth’s claim.

[4]   On June 6, 2023, the trial court held a hearing on Common Wealth’s notice of

      claim. Common Wealth responded to Hazelwood’s motion to dismiss at the

      hearing by arguing that the provision of federal law requiring a thirty-day notice

      “appears to have terminated months ago. And with respect to the informal

      resolution issues, we’re here.” (Tr. Vol. II at 10.) Hazelwood and Common

      Wealth agreed Hazelwood was behind in paying his rent, but the parties

      disagreed about the total amount of Hazelwood’s arrearage. The trial court

      implicitly overruled Hazelwood’s motion to dismiss and found in favor of

      Common Wealth on its claim for possession of the apartment. Hazelwood filed

      a motion to stay the trial court’s order, which the trial court denied.

      Hazelwood then filed a notice of appeal and an emergency motion to stay the

      trial court’s order before this Court, and this Court granted Hazelwood’s

      motion.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-EV-1404 | March 22, 2024        Page 3 of 14
      Discussion and Decision
[5]   Initially, we note Common Wealth chose not to file an appellee’s brief. “Under

      such circumstances, we will not develop an argument for the appellees but

      instead will reverse the trial court’s judgment if the appellant’s brief presents a

      case of prima facie error.” Inspire Outdoor Living v. Norris, 193 N.E.3d 428, 430

      (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). Prima facie error “means at first sight, on first

      appearance, or on the face of it.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

[6]   Hazelwood contends the trial court erred when it denied his motion to dismiss.

      He asserts Common Wealth violated federal law by evicting him without first

      giving him a thirty-day notice. 2 Because Hazelwood’s appeal presents a pure

      question of law, we review his claim de novo. Ramirez v. Wilson, 901 N.E.2d 1,

      2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied.

[7]   A provision of the Coronavirus Economic Stabilization Act (“CARES Act”)

      enacted in 2020 placed a temporary moratorium on eviction filings. 15 U.S.C.

      § 9058. The provision stated:

              (a) Definitions

              In this section:

                       (1) Covered dwelling

      2
        Hazelwood also asserts Common Wealth violated federal law by not providing a grievance process to him
      pursuant to 24 C.F.R. § 578.91. However, we need not address this issue because we find Common Wealth’s
      failure to provide a thirty-day notice before evicting Hazelwood dispositive. See, e.g., State v. Royer, 166
      N.E.3d 380, 402 n.18 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (declining to address issue when it was not necessary to resolve
      the appeal).

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-EV-1404 | March 22, 2024                              Page 4 of 14
                 The term “covered dwelling” means a dwelling that--

                          (A) is occupied by a tenant--

                                  (i) pursuant to a residential lease; or

                                  (ii) without a lease or with a lease terminable
                                  under State law; and

                          (B) is on or in a covered property.

                 (2) Covered property

                 The term “covered property” means any property that--

                          (A) participates in--

                                  (i) a covered housing program (as defined in
                                  section 12491(a) of Title 34); or

                                  *****

                 (3) Dwelling

                 The term “dwelling”--

                          (A) has the meaning given the term in section 3602
                          of Title 42; and

                          (B) includes houses and dwellings described in
                          section 3603(b) of Title 42.

                                  *****

        (b) Moratorium

        During the 120-day period beginning on March 27, 2020, the
        lessor of a covered dwelling may not--

                 (1) make, or cause to be made, any filing with the court of
                 jurisdiction to initiate a legal action to recover possession

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-EV-1404 | March 22, 2024               Page 5 of 14
                       of the covered dwelling from the tenant for nonpayment of
                       rent or other fees or charges; or

                       (2) charge fees, penalties, or other charges to the tenant
                       related to such nonpayment of rent.

              (c) Notice

              The lessor of a covered dwelling unit--

                       (1) may not require the tenant to vacate the covered
                       dwelling unit before the date that is 30 days after the date
                       on which the lessor provides the tenant with a notice to
                       vacate; and

                       (2) may not issue a notice to vacate under paragraph (1)
                       until after the expiration of the period described in
                       subsection (b).

      Id. (formatting in original).

[8]   Our first step in ascertaining whether the thirty-day notice provision outlined in

      15 U.S.C. § 9058(c) applied to Common Wealth is to determine whether

      Hazelwood’s apartment qualified as a “covered dwelling” under 15 U.S.C. §

      9058(a)(1). A “covered dwelling” is “a dwelling that . . . is occupied by a

      tenant . . . pursuant to a residential lease . . . and . . . is on or in a covered

      property.” 15 U.S.C. § 9058(a)(1). Hazelwood occupied his apartment

      pursuant to a residential lease, and the apartment was a “dwelling” because he

      used it as a residence. See 42 U.S.C. § 3602(b) (“‘Dwelling’ means any

      building, structure, or portion thereof which is occupied as, or designed or

      intended for occupancy as, a residence by one or more families[.]”). “Covered

      property” is “any property that . . . participates in . . . a covered housing

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-EV-1404 | March 22, 2024              Page 6 of 14
      program (as defined in section 12491(a) of Title 34)[.]” 15 U.S.C. §

      9058(a)(2)(A)(i). 34 U.S.C. § 12491(a)(3) lists various programs that meet the

      statute’s definition of “covered housing program,” including “the programs

      under title IV of the McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act (42 U.S.C.

      11360 et seq.)[.]” 34 U.S.C. § 12491(a)(3)(D). 42 U.S.C. § 11381(2) states that

      one purpose of the McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act is “to provide

      funding for efforts by nonprofit providers and State and local governments to

      quickly rehouse homeless individuals and families while minimizing the trauma

      and dislocation caused to individuals, families, and communities by

      homelessness[.]” Hazelwood was housed at Common Wealth through a

      program called Permanent Supportive Housing, which was funded by the

      McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act. 3 24 C.F.R § 578.37(a)(1)(i). Thus,

      Hazelwood’s apartment met all the requirements for a “covered dwelling.”

[9]   Having determined that Hazelwood’s apartment qualified as a “covered

      dwelling” within the meaning of 15 U.S.C. § 9058(c), we must next determine

      whether that provision of the CARES Act was still in effect when Common

      Wealth initiated eviction proceedings against Hazelwood. Following

      expiration of the CARES Act’s 120-day statutory eviction moratorium in July

      2020, Congress did not renew it. Ala. Ass’n of Realtors v. U.S. Dep’t of Health &

      3
       The Permanent Supportive Housing program was funded by the McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance
      Act. 24 C.F.R. § 578.37(a)(1)(i). Hazelwood asserted at trial that he was housed through the Permanent
      Supportive Housing program, and Common Wealth did not challenge Hazelwood’s assertion at trial or
      provide contradictory evidence. We accordingly presume Hazelwood was housed through the Permanent
      Supportive Housing program.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-EV-1404 | March 22, 2024                           Page 7 of 14
       Hum. Servs., 141 S. Ct. 2485, 2486 (2021). When the Centers for Disease

       Control and Prevention (“CDC”) subsequently attempted to use its

       administrative power to extend the moratorium further, the United States

       Supreme Court held the CDC lacked the authority to do so without

       authorization from Congress. Id. at 2490.

[10]   Hazelwood nevertheless contends that, while the eviction moratorium

       authorized by 15 U.S.C. § 9058(b) has expired, the notice provision outlined in

       15 U.S.C. § 9058(c) remains in effect. He notes that “the continuing vitality of

       the 30-day notice requirement is shown by the logic of the statute, which states

       that the eviction moratorium expired after 120 days and that landlords could

       not provide the 30-day notice to vacate before the moratorium had ended.”

       (Appellant’s Br. at 12-13.) While Indiana courts have not specifically addressed

       this issue, courts outside of Indiana have analyzed the issue and concluded the

       notice provision remained in effect after expiration of the eviction moratorium.

[11]   In In re Arvada Vill. Gardens LP v. Garate, the Colorado Supreme Court held that

       the federal thirty-day notice provision is still in effect for covered properties.

       529 P.3d 105, 106 (Colo. 2023). Thus, the Court dismissed a landlord’s

       eviction action because the landlord failed to give the tenant a thirty-day notice

       before initiating eviction proceedings. Id. at 108. Likewise, the Washington

       Court of Appeals held the thirty-day notice provision is still in effect. Sherwood

       Auburn LLC v. Pinzon, 521 P.3d 212, 220 (Wash. Ct. App. 2022), rev. denied; see

       also, Watson v. Vici Cmty. Dev. Corp., No. CIV-20-1011-F, 2021 WL 1394477, at

       *11 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 12, 2021) (holding thirty-day notice provision extended

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-EV-1404 | March 22, 2024           Page 8 of 14
       beyond expiration of the moratorium provision in declining to dismiss

       declaratory judgment action). We follow the lead of our sister states and hold

       that the notice provision did not expire with the temporary eviction

       moratorium. Common Wealth failed to comply with 15 U.S.C. § 9058(c) when

       it did not give Hazelwood a thirty-day notice before initiating eviction

       proceedings. See Sherwood Auburn, LLC, 521 P.3d at 217-18 (holding notice

       must be given to tenant at least thirty days before filing eviction action).

       Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s judgment in favor of Common Wealth

       and remand with instructions to dismiss Common Wealth’s notice of claim.

       See, e.g., Johnson v. Hous. Auth. of South Bend, 204 N.E.3d 940, 947 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 2023) (reversing trial court’s order granting possession of apartment to

       landlord because tenant was not afforded sufficient due process).

       Conclusion
[12]   Common Wealth violated federal law by failing to give Hazelwood a thirty-day

       notice to vacate as required by 15 U.S.C. § 9058(c) before initiating eviction

       proceedings against him. We reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand

       with instructions to dismiss Common Wealth’s notice of claim.

[13]   Reversed and remanded.

       Felix, J. concurs.
       Bailey, J., concurs with a separate opinion.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-EV-1404 | March 22, 2024         Page 9 of 14
       ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
       Ann Harris Smith
       Indiana Legal Services, Inc.
       Indianapolis, Indiana
       Andrew Tyler Thomas
       Indiana Legal Services, Inc.
       Fort Wayne, Indiana

       Bailey, Judge, concurring with separate opinion.

[14]   I concur but write separately to note that the 30-day notice requirement expired

       when the national emergency concerning the coronavirus disease 2019

       (“COVID-19”) pandemic terminated on April 10, 2023. However, because

       Hazelwood’s non-payment of rent occurred before that date, Common Wealth

       was required to provide him with 30 days’ notice to vacate prior to beginning

       eviction proceedings.

[15]   On March 13, 2020, the President declared a national emergency concerning

       the COVID-19 pandemic. He did so pursuant to his authority under 50 U.S.C.

       § 1621. In response to the declaration of the national emergency, in March

       2020 Congress passed the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act

       (“CARES Act”) “to alleviate burdens caused by the burgeoning COVID-19

       pandemic.” Ala. Ass’n of Realtors v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 141 S.Ct.

       2485, 2486 (2021) (citing Pub. L. 116-136, 134 Stat. 281). Among other relief

       programs, the CARES Act imposed the 120-day eviction moratorium and the

       30-day notice to vacate requirement for properties that participated in federal

       assistance programs or were subject to federally backed loans. Coronavirus

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-EV-1404 | March 22, 2024       Page 10 of 14
       Aid, Relief, and Economic Securities Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134 Stat. 281, §

       4024, at 492-494 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 9058(b),(c)).

[16]   As the majority holds, the 30-day notice requirement did not expire at the same

       time the eviction moratorium expired. As recently noted by the Ohio Court of

       Appeals, to read the statute in any other way would make section (c) of the

       statute superfluous:

               Under 15 U.S.C. 9058(c)(2), lessors did not have an obligation to
               provide a 30-day notice to vacate pursuant to subsection (c)(1)
               until after the moratorium expired. Consequently, 15 U.S.C.
               9058(c)(1) did not become operative until July 25, 2020—the day
               after the moratorium expired. Under Olentangy Commons’
               interpretation of 15 U.S.C. 9058(b) and (c), the notice provision
               in subsection (c)(1) is meaningless, as it would have expired on
               July 24, 2020—a day prior to becoming operational. Thus,
               Olentangy Commons’ interpretation conflicts with the rule that
               “‘a statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its
               provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous,
               void or insignificant.’” Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314,
               129 S.Ct. 1558, 173 L.Ed.2d 443 (2009), quoting Hibbs v. Winn,
               542 U.S. 88, 101, 124 S.Ct. 2276, 159 L.Ed.2d 172 (2004)
               (further quotation omitted).

       Olentangy Commons Owner LLC v. Fawley, -- N.E.3d --, 2023 WL 7327716 at *8

       (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 7, 2023).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-EV-1404 | March 22, 2024        Page 11 of 14
[17]   However, on April 10, 2023, in accordance with its authority under 50 U.S.C. §

       1622(a), 4 Congress passed H.J. Res. 7, a joint resolution terminating “the

       national emergency declared by the finding of the President on March 13,

       2020.” National Emergencies Act, Pub. L. No. 118-3, 137 Stat. 6. On that

       same date, the President signed H.J. Res. 7 into law. Thus, as of April 10,

       2023, there ceased to be a national emergency regarding COVID-19. At that

       point, the laws enacted by Congress specifically to address that national

       emergency also expired. See 50 U.S.C. § 1622(a) (“…any powers or authorities

       exercised by reason of said emergency shall cease to be exercised after such

       specified [termination] date…”). Therefore, 15 USC § 9058 and the related

       4
           50 U.S.C. § 1622(a) provides:

       Any national emergency declared by the President in accordance with this subchapter shall terminate if--

       (1) there is enacted into law a joint resolution terminating the emergency; or

       (2) the President issues a proclamation terminating the emergency.

       Any national emergency declared by the President shall be terminated on the date specified in any joint
       resolution referred to in clause (1) or on the date specified in a proclamation by the President terminating the
       emergency as provided in clause (2) of this subsection, whichever date is earlier, and any powers or
       authorities exercised by reason of said emergency shall cease to be exercised after such specified date, except
       that such termination shall not affect--

       (A) any action taken or proceeding pending not finally concluded or determined on such date;

       (B) any action or proceeding based on any act committed prior to such date; or

       (C) any rights or duties that matured or penalties that were incurred prior to such date.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-EV-1404 | March 22, 2024                                 Page 12 of 14
       rules and regulations—which were created specifically to address the COVID-

       19 national emergency—expired on April 10, 2023. 5

[18]   Nevertheless, to the extent the eviction action was based on non-payment of

       rent prior to April 10, 2023, it still required the 30-day notice to vacate. 50

       U.S.C. § 1622(a) provides, in pertinent part, that the termination of the national

       emergency “shall not affect-- … (B) any action or proceeding based on any act

       committed prior to such date; or (C) any rights or duties that matured or

       penalties that were incurred prior to such date.” Common Wealth’s eviction

       action filed on May 11, 2023, and amended on May 19, 2023, was based upon

       Hazelwood’s alleged non-payment of rent for April 2023 and for some

       unspecified preceding month. 6 Thus, the eviction proceeding was based, at

       least in part, on an act (i.e., failure to pay rent) committed prior to April 10,

       2023, and it involved Hazelwood’s right to a 30-day notice to vacate that

       “matured” prior to April 10, 2023. See 50 U.S.C. § 1622(a)(B), (C). Therefore,

       despite the April 10, 2023, expiration of the COVID-19 national emergency and

       5
         This reading of the law is supported by the language of the Department of Housing and Urban
       Development (“HUD”) rules and regulations interpreting 15 U.S.C. § 9058. See 24 C.F.R. § 247.4(c), and 24
       C.F.R. § 966.8 (emphasis added) (both noting that the 30-day notice requirement is applicable “if the
       Secretary determines that tenants must be provided with adequate notice to secure Federal funding that is
       available due to a Presidential declaration of a national emergency”); see also 30-Day Notice Requirement Prior to
       Termination of Lease for Nonpayment of Rent, 88 Fed. Reg. 83877-02 (proposed Dec. 1, 2023) (emphasis
       added) (proposing a rule under which “the 30-day notification requirement from the interim final rule would
       no longer be contingent on the existence of a national emergency…”).
       6
         The original notice of claim for possession filed on May 11, 2023, stated that Hazelwood owed more than
       one month’s worth of rent, i.e., “$1,784.40.” App. v. II at 8; see also id. at 7 (noting monthly rent was
       $897.00). Thus, Hazelwood allegedly owed rent for April 2023 and for most of an unspecified month prior to
       April 2023.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-EV-1404 | March 22, 2024                                  Page 13 of 14
the laws enacted pursuant to it, Hazelwood was entitled to a 30-day notice to

vacate prior to the implementation of eviction proceedings, pursuant to 15

U.S.C. § 9058.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-EV-1404 | March 22, 2024    Page 14 of 14