Court Opinion

ID: 9677771
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:59:13.815007+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:22:22.125963
License: Public Domain

*366DEAN, J.
(concurring). I join in the majority opinion except as it reaches the overbroad holding that its decision “furthers a necessary state policy of encouraging traffic violators to submit to lawful arrests.” [Majority opinion p. 365]. The majority opinion chooses not to inform its readers of the issue that Brunette raises. Brunette, draws the court’s attention to sec. 66.31, Stats., which authorizes municipal police officers to engage in “fresh pursuit” beyond the border of their municipality. Brunette argues that because the statute authorizes pursuit to adjoining municipalities, the statute only authorizes such pursuit into physically contiguous municipalities and implicitly does not authorize pursuit to farther municipalities. Brunette reasons that the police exceeded their jurisdiction; i.e., pursued him without acting under color of law, in pursuing him beyond the townships adjoining Algoma. Brunette concludes that the trial court committed prejudicial error when it permitted the case to be tried on the assumption that Officer Gardner was acting under color of law.
The majority opinion suggests that it would accept Brunette’s hypertechnical reading of sec. 66.31; I would not. In enacting sec. 66.31, the legislature clearly intended to authorize municipal peace officers to act beyond the traditional border of their jurisdiction. The purpose of the extended jurisdiction is specific: It permits the officer to act in “fresh pursuit.” Breaking the only municipal boundary that has any meaning to the municipal officer, the statute functions to permit the completion of a pursuit, if possible. Brunette’s strained and literal reading of the statute to end the pursuit, whether completed or not, at the next municipal border outside the officer’s home municipality makes the statute dysfunctional. I would choose to reject this result in favor of the better reading, which authorizes pursuit until completion or abandonment.
*367Instead of rejecting Brunette’s wrongheaded statutory construction, the majority opinion articulates an over-broad statement of public policy.' The policy is over-broad because, if applied, it would justify denying recovery in cases where an officer intentionally injures a party who fails to submit to an arrest. Even though the jury found that Robert Gardner did not intentionally hit Brunette, that finding is merely a circumstance in this case. Nothing in the logic of the policy suggests that the policy is not applicable in other cases where intentional injury occurs.
The majority opinion consistently overstates the appropriateness of its policy in the context of this case. The majority states that its policy is to promote lawful arrest; yet, it admits that the officer acted without jurisdiction. If the officer was without jurisdiction, the lawfulness of the arrest is doubtful.
The majority opinion states that Brunette seeks to recover for his intentionally wrongful conduct. Brunette seeks to recover for his injuries. Such wrongful conduct should not bar recovery because such conduct may not be causally related to the injuries or because in other circumstances the hitting may be intentional.
The majority reasons that any jurisdictional limit on the officer’s authority is irrelevant. If officers who act without jurisdiction are acting uulawfully, the question of jurisdiction must be relevant to a policy promoting “lawful” arrests.
The majority speculates that the jurisdictional boundaries were unmarked. The majority would suppose that the officers did not know when they left their city and county. It is far more reasonable to believe the officers knew the boundaries and continued the pursuit to completion in spite of passing into other jurisdictions.
The majority states: “[T]his court will not hold that . . . [Brunette’s possible correct speculation on the juris*368diction of the pursuing officers] gives rise to a right of recovery.” [Majority opinion p. 365]. This statement misstates the majority’s holding. In actuality the majority holds that Brunette’s acts preclude a right of recovery regardless of any jurisdictional defect undermining the municipal police officer’s right to act.
The majority opinion disposed of the remaining claimed errors when it held that Brunette’s negligence exceeded Gardner’s as a matter of law because Brunette intentionally and without cause placed himself in a position of known danger. The policy of denying recovery to promote arrest is unnecessary to the outcome of the decision. I join in the majority opinion, except for this last, unnecessary and overbroad exercise of judicial lawmaking.