Court Opinion

ID: 9635887
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 14:09:25.737404+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:35:05.345501
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
POPE, Justice.
Relator’s motion for rehearing is overruled. The scant record before this court consists essentially of an affidavit by Cobra, two affidavits by the Land Commissioner, and some affidavits concerning collateral matters. The two controlling affidavits are discussed in the original opinion. On motion for rehearing, Cobra has advanced a number of additional reasons in support of its prayer for a mandamus, but it has not produced proof that meets the settled standards required for our issuance of a writ of mandamus.
Cobra has the burden to demonstrate clearly and unequivocally its right to compel the Commissioner to perform a ministerial as distinguished from a discretionary act. “It is elementary law that mandamus will not issue to compel a public official to perform an official act unless it is made to appear to the court that the relator’s right to have the act performed is clear.” Williams v. Pitts, 151 Tex. 408, 251 S.W.2d 148 (1952); City of McAllen v. Daniel, 147 Tex. 62, 211 S.W.2d 944 (1948); Stanford v. Butler, 142 Tex. 692, 181 S.W.2d 269, 153 A.L.R. 1054 (1944); City of Galveston v. Mann, 135 Tex. 319, 143 S.W.2d 1028 (1940); Wortham v. Walker, 133 Tex. 255, 128 S.W.2d 1138, 1151 (1939); Texas National Guard Armory Board v. McCraw, 132 Tex. 613, 126 S.W.2d 627 (1939); Denison v. Sheppard, 122 Tex. 445, 60 S.W.2d 1031 (1933); Holcomb v. Robinson, 118 Tex. 395, 15 S.W.2d 1027 (1929); Common School District v. Keeling, 113 Tex. 523, 261 S.W. 364 (1924); Kemp v. Wilkinson, 113 Tex. 491, 259 S.W. 912 (1924); Trinity Life & Annuity Soc. v. Love, 102 Tex. 277, 115 S.W. 26, 116 S.W. 1139 (1909) Wortham v. Sullivan, 147 S.W. 702 (Tex.Civ.App.1912, writ ref.).
“Mandamus is a writ which issues to require the execution of a matter whose merit is beyond dispute and it may not be employed as scales in which to balance the weight of evidence or bridge the gap between broken or disconnected facts.” Wortham v. Walker, 133 Tex. 255, 128 S.W.2d 1138, 1151 (1939). Cobra has called upon this court to settle a disputed question concerning the fact of forfeiture which we shall not undertake to do in this original proceeding.
The Commissioner’s affidavit states that all the Cobra awards “were declared forfeited on or before November 27, 1967,” which was the day before Cobra says its tender was made. That statement is made as well as the one mentioned in the original opinion that all of the awards “had been declared forfeited by me prior to November 28, 1967 * * The only dispute about this time of forfeiture comes from Cobra’s affidavit which attributes to a land office attorney the statement “that said awards had not been forfeited,” on November 28. This state of the record means that there is a negative hearsay statement about forfeiture from a Land Office employee and an affirmative statement that there was a forfeiture by the Commissioner. To grant a writ on such a record would require this court to pass upon the weight and credibility of these opposite statements. In an appropriate hearing in which the statements could be enlarged, the statements may be reconciled by explanation of the terms used. We are unable to do that upon the record before us.
Cobra argues that we should disregard the Commissioner’s statement because it is a mere conclusion. However, the statement upon which Cobra must rely is no *896less a conclusion, and it is made by an employee whose authority to speak for and bind the Land Office is not disclosed. Cobra would bind the State by a statement of the Land Office employee, though the Commissioner disregarded the very statement and immediately refused the late tender by Cobra.
The Commissioner in his affidavit swore that “the awards had been declared forfeited by me prior to November 28, 1967” and "were declared forfeited on or before November 27, 1967.” (Emphasis added). According to Black’s Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1951), the word, “declare,” means, “to make known, manifest, or clear”; “to signify, to show in any manner either by words or acts,” “to publish; to uttter; to announce clearly some opinion or resolution.” The word is illustrated by examples, such'as to “declare” a dividend, or to “declare” a document as one’s last will and testament. Webster’s New International Dictionary (2d ed. 1954) gives as synonyms for the word “declare,” such meanings as “announce, proclaim, promulgate.” It says: “To declare is to make known explicitly and plainly, esp. in a formal and public manner * *
A forfeiture under Article 5397, as distinguished from forfeitures authorized by other statutes which prescribe or limit the way for effecting forfeitures, may be officially declared orally, when the oral declaration is followed by prompt action to make a permanent record of the declaration. In this case, Cobra’s representative was in the Land Office on November 28, 1967, and was informed that its tender was refused because the tender was late. The Commissioner says that the record of the forfeiture was made on that same date.
The declaration of a forfeiture is a discretionary act; the act of recording the declaration is ministerial in nature. “Mandamus lies to enforce the performance of a non-discretionary act or duty and will issue only when the act or duty is ministerial in character.” 37 Tex.Jur.2d, Mandamus, Sec. 18; Lowe and Archer, Texas Practice, Injunctions and other Extraordinary Proceedings, Sec. 471; Shamrock Fuel & Oil Sales Co. v. Tunks, 416 S.W.2d 779 (Tex.Sup.1967); Turner v. Pruitt, 161 Tex. 532, 342 S.W.2d 422 (1961); Wortham v. Walker, 133 Tex. 255, 128 S.W.2d 1138, 1150, 1151 (1939). According to the Commissioner’s affidavit, the awards had been declared forfeited prior to November 28, 1967, and on that date he was in the process of mechanically stamping and noting this declaration upon each award.
The duties of a county clerk or other recorder of public documents are ministerial in nature. Hollis v. Parkland Corporation, 120 Tex. 531, 40 S.W.2d 53 (1931); Turrentine v. Lasane, 389 S.W.2d 336 (Tex.Civ.App.1965). Once the Commissioner exercises his discretion by declaring a forfeiture under Article 5397, the matter of promptly making a public record of the act is ministerial. Cobra in this case, is in the position of asking this court to order the Commissioner to reverse a forfeiture order which was an exercise of his discretion.
Cobra’s motion for rehearing presents new arguments in support of its prayer for a mandamus. It relies upon some cases which arose under different statutes, and upon other cases in which the proof was clear and unequivocal. However, the precedents relied upon afford no basis for our ordering a mandamus. In Fristoe v. Blum, 92 Tex. 76, 45 S.W. 998 (1898), the Commissioner exercised his discretion and declared a contract to purchase a section of land forfeited. The purchaser, who was delinquent on a single interest payment, (42 S.W. 656) challenged this exercise of discretion, but the Commissioner’s decision was upheld. The mandamus was denied in that case. Underwood v. Robison, 109 Tex. 228, 204 S.W. 314 (1918) held that the 1913 mineral act did not authorize an ipso facto termination of a permit. The court held, under the relevant statutes, that a forfeiture or rescission required the *897Commissioner to perform the overt act of writing “forfeiture” on the file. Again, the court upheld the Commissioner’s discretionary act and the mandamus was denied. Island City Savings Bank v. Dowlearn, 94 Tex. 383, 60 S.W. 754 (1901) requires a close examination of the relevant dates. The Commissioner declared a forfeiture on January 20, 1892, for a purchaser’s failure to make a timely payment. The payment was not due until April 1892. The case is not relevant to the problem in this case.
The record shows that Cobra has never paid anything to the State on its awards. Its tender was several months late. Under the law of rescission, upon which Cobra relies, a purchaser who has paid no part of the purchase money and has made no improvements on the property, has no equities that entitle him to defeat a rescission by the vendee. McBride v. Banguss, 65 Tex. 174 (1900); Smith v. Owen, 49 Tex.Civ.App. 51, 107 S.W. 929 (1908, writ ref.); 59 Tex.Jur.2d, Vendor and Purchaser, § 543.
In our opinion, the grant of a writ of mandamus in favor of Cobra against the Commissioner would require us to (1) ignore our former precedents, (2) decide a disputed fact question, (3) misplace the burden of proof upon the Commissioner to prove he had forfeited the awards, (4) require the Commissioner to reverse a discretionary declaration of forfeiture, and (5) rewrite Article 5397 by adding words that are contained in statutes that are irrelevant to this action.
We overrule the motion for rehearing. The parties will have fifteen days within which to file a second motion for rehearing.
SMITH, J. concurring.
GREENHILL, J., dissenting, joined by HAMILTON, REAVLEY and McGEE, JJ-