Court Opinion

ID: 9479810
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:29:32.489522+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:47:17.579056
License: Public Domain

NORRIS, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I disagree with the majority opinion in only two respects, but my disagreement compels me to reach a different conclusion. First, when the writ of execution names a corporation while the account stands in the name of an individual, I do not agree that we can consider the discrepancy merely technical. Second, I find that the clear and explicit language of § 700.160 of the Code of Civil Procedure requires that we read it literally. Because I read the statute as meaning what it says, I respectfully dissent.
Section 700.160 of the Code of Civil Procedure makes it explicit that a judgment creditor cannot levy on a bank account standing in the name of someone other than the judgment debtor, unless he gets a court order.1 Because Da-Green’s original writ of execution named only the corporation as a judgment debtor, it was ineffective as to the account held in the name of “Ronald Simonton, dba Sun Electronics Distribution.” The writ of execution authorized Da-Green to levy only upon accounts held in the corporate name, “Sun Electronics Distribution, Inc.” Thus, the Bank was plainly correct in taking the posi*1400tion that the original writ of execution did not subject the “dba” account to levy.
The majority, however, examines the underlying purpose of § 700.160 and concludes that this strict reading of the statutory language is unwarranted. I agree with the majority that the operation of the statute may seem unfair in these particular circumstances; however, I disagree that the solution is to reinterpret its explicit command.
Section 700.160 expressly provides that a bank account “standing in the name of a person other than the judgment debtor ... is not subject to levy ... unless the levy is authorized by the court order.” As Da-Green’s original writ named only the corporation as the judgment debtor, an account held in the name of an individual doing business under the same name as the corporation, was patently not an account standing in the name of the judgment debt- or. Only when Da-Green obtained a court order adding names “Ronald Simonton and his dba Sun Electronics Distribution” as judgment debtors did the account held in the name of “Ronald Simonton, dba Sun Electronics Distribution” become subject to levy.
Moreover, during the period that Da-Green was obtaining a court order adding “Ronald Simonton and his dba Sun Electronics Distribution” as judgment debtors, the Bank was under no obligation to place a hold on the “dba” account. Section 700.-160(c) requires that if a third-party account is subject to levy, a bank must wait 15 days before releasing the funds in order to give the third party notice of the levy. This provision is inapplicable to the present case, because the account in question was not subject to levy until Da-Green obtained the court order adding the names of judgment debtors.
On appeal, Da-Green argues that at the time of the original levy, no court order was required because the name on the printed checks drawn on the “dba” account was “Sun Electronics Distribution, Inc.” In essence, Da-Green’s argument is that it substantially complied with § 700.160(a) by ensuring that the name of the judgment debtor was the same as the name written on the checks drawn on the account, even though the account itself stood in a different name. Da-Green contends that it had no way of knowing whose name the account stood in, and that it did “everything reasonably prudent and possible” under the statute by naming the party whose name appeared on the checks. The majority adds to this argument that the Bank had actual knowledge that the account holder and the judgment debtor were the same.
I believe these arguments must fail. Section 700.160(c) explicitly states that any time a judgment creditor seeks to levy on an account “standing in the name of a person other than the judgment debtor,” the account is not subject to levy unless the levy is authorized by court order. It is irrelevant whose name is on the checks drawn from the account; the question is the name on the account. The requirement is designed to protect the rights of third-party account-holders “whose rights have not yet been adjudicated and who may not have any relationship to the judgment debt- or.” Legislative Committee Comment to § 700.160, 17 Cal.L.Rev.Comm.Rep. 975 (1984). The statute creates a court-supervised mechanism for ensuring both that the judgment creditor gets his money, and that the third party account-holder has a chance to be heard. I cannot imagine that the legislature intended to substitute the institutional knowledge of a bank for the due process protection of a court. In the present case, the operation of § 700.160 may seem unfair, because it enabled the Bank to deplete the account while Da-Green was taking steps to comply with the statute’s technical requirements. Nonetheless, the statute establishes those requirements quite explicitly, and I do not believe we are free to relax them. >
I would reverse the judgment of the district court.