Court Opinion

ID: 9896489
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-13 10:10:54.402546+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:03.707869
License: Public Domain

In the
         Court of Appeals
 Second Appellate District of Texas
          at Fort Worth
       ___________________________

            No. 02-22-00090-CR
       ___________________________

         CARLOS CHAVEZ, Appellant

                      V.

            THE STATE OF TEXAS

    On Appeal from the 462nd District Court
            Denton County, Texas
         Trial Court No. F22-717-462

Dissenting Memorandum Opinion by Justice Walker
                  DISSENTING MEMORANDUM OPINION

      I respectfully dissent. In my view, the trial court erred by precluding Chavez

from cross-examining Mother1 about her U-Visa status, and this error was not

harmless. Accordingly, I would reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand for

further proceedings.2

          I. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO CROSS-EXAMINATION

      The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States

Constitution provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the

right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. Const. amend. VI.

This fundamental right secures for the accused “more than being allowed to confront

the witness physically.” Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315, 94 S. Ct. 1105, 1110

(1974). Indeed, “‘[t]he main and essential purpose of confrontation is to secure for

the opponent the opportunity of cross-examination’ . . . because that is ‘the principal

means by which the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are

tested.”’ Johnson v. State (Thaxton D. Johnson), 433 S.W.3d 546, 551 (Tex. Crim. App.

2014) (quoting Davis, 415 U.S. at 315–16, 94 S. Ct. at 1110). In exercising this right,

“a defendant is allowed great latitude to show any fact which would tend to establish

      1
       Because the majority opinion refers to the complainants as Shelly and Tonya
and their mother as Mother, I do the same.
      2
        While I agree with the majority’s resolution of Chavez’s second issue, I would
hold that it need not be resolved due to the trial court’s reversible error as to his first
issue. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.

                                            2
ill feeling, bias, motive[,] and animus on the part of the witness testifying against him.”

Hurd v. State, 725 S.W.2d 249, 252 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).                 Essentially, the

Confrontation Clause ensures a holistic cross-examination of State’s witnesses on

relevant matters, as opposed to limited piecemeal cross-examinations.

       The majority focuses primarily on an evidentiary analysis rather than the more

essential Constitutional concerns raised by Chavez. Thus, the foundation of my

complaint with the majority opinion is that it starts at the wrong place—by granting

the trial court undue discretion. It is true that we normally apply an abuse of

discretion standard to a trial court’s evidentiary rulings, giving it “wide latitude” to set

boundaries related to the cross-examination of witnesses. Arnold v. State, No. 02-18-

00022-CR, 2019 WL 165995, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 10, 2019, pet. ref’d)

(mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing Thaxton D. Johnson, 433 S.W.3d at

555). But, in the context of a Sixth Amendment confrontation objection, a trial

court’s discretion “simply does not come into play” until “it can be determined”

through de novo review “that the cross[-]examination satisfied the Sixth

Amendment.”       Thaxton D. Johnson, 433 S.W.3d at 551 (internal quotations and

punctuation omitted); see Wall v. State, 184 S.W.3d 730, 743 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)

(“Although we defer to a trial court’s determination of historical facts and credibility,

we review a constitutional legal ruling . . . de novo.”); Jordan v. State, No. 02-19-00148-

CR, 2020 WL 5666559, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept. 24, 2020, no pet.) (mem.

op., not designated for publication) (“We review the exclusion of defensive evidence

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for an abuse of discretion, but review any unsuccessful confrontation objections de

novo.”); see also Wilson v. State, 151 S.W.3d 694, 697 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004,

pet. ref’d) (“Therefore, the first issue we must address is not whether [appellant’s]

statements should have been admitted under the rules of evidence but whether the

admission violated Appellant’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. In deciding

this constitutional issue, we review the trial court’s ruling de novo.”).

       Thus, in the face of a confrontation objection, rather than jumping straight to

whether    Mother’s     U-Visa    testimony       was   relevant—a    purely   evidentiary

determination—we must first determine whether the whole-hog exclusion of that

testimony violated Chavez’s Sixth Amendment right to cross-examination. See Wilson,

151 S.W.3d at 697. I believe that it did.

       While a trial court has the latitude to “impose reasonable limits” on cross-

examination, it exceeds this latitude when it “exercises its discretion to so drastically

curtail the defendant’s cross-examination as to leave him unable to make a record

from which to argue why [the witness] might have been biased or otherwise lacked

that degree of impartiality expected of a witness at trial.” Thaxton D. Johnson, 433

S.W.3d at 555 (internal quotations omitted). This kind of error is most obvious

“when the trial court entirely forecloses the defense from exposing—‘prohibit[s] all

inquiry into’—a ‘prototypical form of bias.”’ Id. at 556 (quoting Delaware v. Van

Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 680, 106 S. Ct. 1431, 1436 (1986)); see Austin v. State, No. 02-18-

00484-CR, 2019 WL 6205247, at *9 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 21, 2019, pet.

                                              4
ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“The test to determine the scope of

cross-examination demanded by the Confrontation Clause is whether the defendant

could present a vital defense theory without the evidence, not whether the defensive

theory is as strong as it could be with the evidence.”). Put differently, a trial court

violates the Confrontation Clause when it “cut[s] off all questioning about an event

that the State conceded had taken place and that a jury might reasonably have found

furnished the witness a motive for favoring the prosecution in his testimony.” Van

Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679, 106 S. Ct. at 1435.

       Within this framework, the testimony sought by the defense must still have

some “causal” or “logical” connection to the bias or motive alleged. Thaxton D.

Johnson, 433 S.W.3d at 552–53. In Thaxton D. Johnson, 3 the Texas Court of Criminal

Appeals explained the causal or logical connection requirement this way:

       Given that our “causal connection’ requirement is ultimately rooted in
       the concept of relevance, however, it must also be borne in mind that
       the failure to affirmatively establish the fact sought does not prevent the

       3
        Thaxton D. Johnson involved two State’s witnesses who faced pending felony
charges. 433 S.W.3d at 548. At trial, the appellant had sought to show that these
witnesses were prone to offer biased testimony in favor of the State by cross-
examining them about their pending felony charges. Id. The trial court limited this
cross-examination “to exposing the fact that the witnesses stood accused only of
certain unspecified felonies.” Id. (internal punctuation omitted). The appellant argued
that the trial court violated his confrontation rights by not allowing a more granular
look into the “nature, degree, and punishment ranges” of each witnesses’ specific
charges. Id. at 550. Despite holding that the punishment ranges of the witnesses’
charges met the causal connection requirement showing potential bias, the Court of
Criminal Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court had set a reasonable limit on
cross-examination because even a general discussion of the witnesses’ felony charges
served to sufficiently present their alleged biases to the jury. Id. at 557.

                                                5
      cross-examination from having probative value in regard to the
      witness’[s] credibility. This sensibility is aptly expressed in an oft-
      repeated legal aphorism: “A brick is not a wall.” To be considered
      “relevant,” the proffered evidence need not definitively prove the bias
      alleged—it need only “make the existence” of bias “more probable or
      less probable than it would be without the evidence.” The question in
      this case is whether the Confrontation Clause guarantees that the
      accused be permitted to use every brick at his disposal—no matter how
      incrementally it may serve to reinforce the wall.

Id. at 552 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Tex. R. Evid. 401).

      I believe that the trial court committed constitutional error here because—by

prohibiting all evidence related to Mother’s U-Visa application—it entirely foreclosed

Chavez from presenting any facts to the jury related to a vital defensive theory. In

fact, one might say that the trial court foreclosed Chavez from presenting his only

viable defense in this typical sexual assault case where the believability of the

complainants formed the foundation of the State’s case. As a result, Chavez was

prevented from exposing jurors to significant prototypical motive or impeachment

evidence showing that Mother stood to gain a benefit from the State in return for her

cooperation in Chavez’s prosecution. See id. at 556.

     II. U-VISAS OFFER SUBSTANTIAL BENEFITS AND PROVIDE
               POWERFUL IMPEACHMENT EVIDENCE

      As the majority explained, U-Visas provide an opportunity for victims of sexual

abuse and their qualifying family members—such as Mother—who are not legally in

the United States to obtain nonimmigrant status. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(15)(U)(ii), (iii),

1184(p).   This legal status is offered to the victims and their qualifying family

                                           6
members who “have been helpful, [are] being helpful, or [are] likely to be helpful” to

law enforcement in the prosecution of those crimes. Id. § 1101(a)(15)(U)(i). To apply

for a U-Visa, the applicant must obtain a certification from law enforcement

confirming such helpful cooperation; and eligibility can be lost, or an already

approved U-Visa can be revoked, if the person fails “to provide information and

assistance reasonably requested.” 8 C.F.R. §§ 214.14(a)(12), (b)(3), (h)(2)(i)(A). U-

Visas generally entitle their holders to four years of nonimmigrant status—which can

be extended—and holders may be eligible for legal permanent residence (i.e., a “green

card”) after three years. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1184(p)(6), 1255(m)(1)(A); see Cazorla v. Koch Foods

of Miss., L.L.C., 838 F.3d 540, 545 (5th Cir. 2016). U-Visa applicants with pending

applications may also be eligible to obtain work authorization. 8 U.S.C. § 1184(p)(6).

      In light of these benefits, a number of courts have held that U-Visa evidence is

the type of prototypical impeachment evidence that can show a witness’s motive or

bias and is, thus, appropriate for cross-examination.

      In Cazorla, employees sued their employer for sexual harassment and abuse,

and the employer claimed that the employees fabricated the allegations to obtain U-

Visa benefits. Cazorla, 838 F.3d at 544. The employer sought discovery related to the

employees’ U-Visa applications; the employees argued that it was irrelevant and

prejudicial. Id. The trial court partially allowed the discovery. Id. The Fifth Circuit

Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court did not err in allowing the discovery,

explaining that it was

                                            7
       plausible that some undocumented immigrants might be tempted to
       stretch the truth in order to obtain lawful status—and perhaps even
       lawful permanent status—for themselves and their families. U[-V]isa
       applicants are analogous to testifying informants in criminal trials, and in
       that context, as one court has pithily observed, “[a]ny competent lawyer
       would . . . know[] that . . . special immigration treatment by [law
       enforcement agencies] [is] highly relevant impeachment material.”

Id. at 559 (footnotes omitted) (quoting United States v. Blanco, 392 F.3d 382, 392 (9th

Cir. 2004)).

       In State v. Juan A. G.-P.—a recent case out of Connecticut—the defendant was

charged with sexually assaulting multiple children. 287 A.3d 1060, 1068 (Conn. 2023).

The children’s mothers testified at trial and the defendant sought to cross-examine

them both about their U-Visa applications to show that they may have been

motivated to offer testimony beneficial to the State due to those applications. Id. at

1077. Outside the presence of the jury, both mothers testified that they (1) did not

learn about the existence of U-Visas until after their children’s sexual abuse had been

reported and (2) did not complete their U-Visa applications until years after the abuse

had been reported. Id. at 1078–79. And, though not entirely clear, it appears that at

least one of the mothers’ applications was still pending at the time of trial. Id. at 1079.

The trial court prohibited the defendant from cross-examining either mother about

their immigrant status or U-Visa applications. Id. It reasoned that such evidence was

irrelevant and that “no nexus” existed between the mothers’ U-Visa applications and

any “possible interest [in] the outcome of the case” because neither mother knew of

                                            8
the existence of U-Visas until after the outcries of abuse had been made. Id. Thus,

said the trial court, they had no incentive to fabricate their testimony. Id.

       Relying in part on the Fifth Circuit’s “apt” comparison in Carzola of U-Visas to

cooperation agreements, the Connecticut Supreme Court held that the trial court had

violated the defendant’s confrontation rights. Id. at 1081. It first pointed out that, by

concluding that the defendant had failed to establish a nexus between the mothers’ U-

Visa applications and any possible motive, the trial court had made impermissible

findings concerning the mothers’ credibility—a determination that should have been

left to the jury. Id. at 1081–82. It then explained that the mothers’ testimonies about

when they learned about U-Visas did not render that evidence irrelevant:

       It is well established that jurors are free to believe some, all, or none of a
       witness’[s] testimony. Even if the jury believed [the mothers’]
       testimon[ies], it would not render the U[-V]isa evidence irrelevant. “One
       can readily see how the [U-Visa] program’s requirement of ‘helpfulness’
       and ‘assistance’ by the [witness] to the prosecution could create an
       incentive to [witnesses] hoping to have their [U-Visas] granted. Even if
       the [witness] did not outright fabricate the allegations against the
       defendant, the structure of the program could cause a [witness] to
       embellish [his or her] testimony in the hopes of being as ‘helpful’ as
       possible to the prosecution.”

Id. at 1082 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Romero-Perez v. Commonwealth, 492

S.W.3d 902, 906 (Ky. Ct. App. 2016)).

       In Romero-Perez, a domestic-assault victim had applied for a U-Visa, and the

defendant sought to use that evidence to show her motive or bias. 492 S.W.3d at 904.

The trial court—citing fears about turning the case “into an immigration trial”—

                                             9
excluded the evidence but allowed the witness to be asked whether she had been

promised anything or received a benefit in exchange for her testimony, which she

answered in the negative. Id. at 905. The Kentucky Court of Appeals held that the

trial court erred in excluding the U-Visa evidence, stating that “[t]he ability to

transform oneself from illegal immigrant, to legal visa holder, to permanent legal

resident in a relatively short amount of time without ever having to leave the United

States, could provide a strong motive for fabrication or embellishment.” Id. at 907.4

      I agree with the reasoning in these cases. Though Mother’s testimony may not

have definitively proved that she was motivated to offer embellished or biased

      4
        Still more courts agree with the reasoning that a trial court errs by prohibiting
all mention of U-Visa evidence for impeachment purposes. See, e.g., People v. Anguiano,
No. B304946, 2021 WL 3732619, at *10 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 24, 2021) (not designated
for publication) (“To the extent that [the witness] was made aware that her
cooperation in the investigation or prosecution of certain enumerated offenses could
provide an avenue towards permanent residence and citizenship [via a U-Visa], such
knowledge would have provided a strong ulterior motive to fabricate or exaggerate
any criminal charges leveled against [the defendant].”); State v. Zapata-Grimaldo, No.
117,831, 2018 WL 6071478, at *5 (Kan. Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2018) (mem. op., not
designated for publication) (“[Although the victim] applied for a U-Visa well after
reporting [the defendant] to law enforcement . . . a jury could conclude [that she]
believed [that] she needed to testify against [him] to be helpful to the certifying agency
in its investigation or prosecution against him.”); State v. Del Real-Galvez, 346 P.3d
1289, 1294 (Or. Ct. App. 2015) (“Because [the victim’s] mother had applied for an
opportunity to stay in the United States on the ground that her daughter had been
sexually abused and coerced, a jury could reasonably infer that [the victim], out of a
desire to help her mother obtain a U[-][V]isa, had a personal interest in testifying
against the defendant.”); State v. Dickerson, 973 N.W.2d 249, 261 (S.D. 2022)
(“[A]lthough [the witness] had not yet applied for a U-Visa, a jury could infer from his
knowledge of the program and his indication that ‘if it comes to that point’ he would
‘of course’ apply for one, that he had an incentive to embellish or exaggerate his
testimony against [the defendants] in order to be perceived as the victim in the events
in question.”).

                                           10
testimony for U-Visa purposes, it undoubtedly would have made the existence of that

motive “more probable” than it would have been otherwise. See Thaxton D. Johnson,

433 S.W.3d at 552. There is no dispute that Mother (1) did not have full legal status

to remain in the United States, (2) knew about the existence of U-Visas before the

allegations were made against Chavez, (3) knew that a U-Visa “could get [her] some

sort of legal status” to remain in the United States, and (4) actually applied for a U-

Visa after the outcries were made because she “want[ed] to stay here and stay with

[her] daughters.” The majority—persuaded only by Mother’s testimony about her

knowledge of U-Visas and the timing of her application for a U-Visa in relation to the

outcries—concludes “that the evidence of Mother’s U-Visa application cannot meet

the ‘causal connection’ requirement.” But the problem with this conclusion is that it

rests entirely on a factual finding that Mother’s testimony was credible—a

determination that should have been put to the jury. See Davis, 415 U.S. at 317, 94 S.

Ct. at 1111 (“We cannot speculate as to whether the jury, as sole judge of the

credibility of a witness, would have accepted [the] line of reasoning [related to the

witness’s prior placement on juvenile probation] had counsel been permitted to fully

present it. But we do conclude that the jurors were entitled to have the benefit of the

defense theory before them so that they could make an informed judgment as to the

weight to place on [the witness’s] testimony . . . .”). For these reasons, I would hold

that evidence of Mother’s U-Visa application was proper for cross-examination and

                                          11
that the trial court violated Chavez’s confrontation rights by wholly prohibiting him

from presenting such evidence to the jury.

                       III. ERROR WAS NOT HARMLESS

      The inquiry does not end there, though, as we must also determine whether the

trial court’s error was harmful. See Haggard v. State, 612 S.W.3d 318, 328 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2020). I would hold that it was.

      The denial of a defendant’s confrontation right is reviewed for harmless error.

Id. The State bears the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did

not contribute to the conviction. Id. When conducting a harmless-error review of the

improper denial of a defendant’s right to impeach a witness for bias, “the correct

inquiry is whether, assuming that the damaging potential of the cross-examination

were fully realized, a reviewing court might nonetheless say that the error was

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 684, 106 S. Ct. at

1438. In doing so, we consider the following factors: the importance of the witness’s

testimony to the prosecution’s case, whether the testimony is cumulative, the presence

or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on

the material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and the

overall strength of the prosecution’s case. Id. at 684, 106 S. Ct. at 1438.

      The State argues that any error here was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt

because (1) Mother’s testimony was “important but not essential” as it was “largely

cumulative,” (2) Mother’s testimony was corroborated by her daughters’ testimonies,

                                            12
(3) Chavez was permitted to extensively cross-examine Mother, which included asking

her about other possible motives that she might have had to lie (e.g., jealousy of other

women that Chavez spent time with or lack of financial support from Chavez), and

(4) the State’s case was strong.

       As the State concedes, Mother’s testimony was important, though somewhat

cumulative. It is also not disputed that Chavez was otherwise able to freely cross-

examine her. However, because there was no physical evidence here, the relative

strength of the State’s case hinged solely on the credibility of its witnesses—

particularly that of Shelly, Tonya, and Mother. This is a fact that the State used as a

battering ram in securing a conviction of Chavez.          At closing, the State spent

considerable time arguing to the jury that Shelly and Tonya had no motive to fabricate

the allegations against Chavez, that they were credible witnesses, and that their

testimonies alone were sufficient to support a guilty verdict:

   • “[Shelly] and [Tonya]’s testimony alone is enough to convict [Chavez].”

   • “I want to talk to you briefly about witness credibility. . . . I want you to think
     about what these two girls had to gain by lying, and I want you to think about
     everything that they lost.”

   • “I’m asking you - - I’m telling you to believe these girls because they’re telling
     the truth . . . .”

   • “It is absolutely ridiculous to think that [Mother] concocted a story for her
     daughters to outcry years ago that [Chavez] was having sexual relations with
     them because she was jealous that he had another relationship.”

                                           13
   • “Let’s talk about what you didn’t hear. Not one witness came in here and said
     that the girls had a character for untruthfulness. Not a single human said that
     they don’t tell the truth. . . . Not a single person came in here and said that
     [Mother] has a character for untruthfulness. Because they have a character for
     truthfulness.”

   • “It makes no sense for the girls to make up a story about [Chavez]. There’s no
     evidence that these were false allegations, that the girls benefited in any
     way . . . .”

   • “Why would you make up a story that doesn’t benefit you?”

   • “[Chavez] gave no reason on why the girls would make this up. Because there
     is no reason.”

   • “I’m asking you to believe those girls. Please believe those girls. They have no
     reason to lie.”

      But the fact of the matter is that Shelly, Tonya, and Mother did have a

powerful reason to fabricate or embellish their testimony for the State: to aid Mother

in obtaining a U-Visa which could lead to her permanent, legal residence in the

country. The jury, though, heard no evidence relevant to this inquiry. The trial

court’s error deprived Chavez of the opportunity to meet the State’s arguments and

deprived the jury of considering all of the information relevant to weighing the

credibility of Mother and her daughters. In light of this, I cannot conclude beyond a

reasonable doubt that the trial court’s error was harmless and did not contribute to

Chavez’s conviction. I think it is reasonable to infer that, had the jury been privy to

the U-Visa evidence, they may have drawn different conclusions about the credibility

                                          14
of Mother’s and her daughters’ testimonies.        And this could have affected the

outcome of the trial.

      For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

                                                           /s/ Brian Walker

                                                           Brian Walker
                                                           Justice

Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: November 9, 2023

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