Court Opinion

ID: 9373425
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:04:56.694956+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:47.987498
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     FELICIA L. JACKSON-FISHER,                      DOCKET NUMBER
                    Appellant,                       CH-0752-15-0492-I-1

                  v.

     UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE,                   DATE: September 13, 2022
                   Agency.

             THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Glenn L. Smith, Esquire, Grand Rapids, Michigan, for the appellant.

           Deborah W. Carlson, Chicago, Illinois, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                 Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                       FINAL ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     sustained her demotion.     Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only
     when: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; t he initial
     decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                        2

     erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative
     judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were
     not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and
     the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence
     or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner ’s due diligence, was not
     available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations,
     section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this
     appeal, and based on the following points and authorities, we conclude that the
     petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the
     petition for review.   Therefore, we DENY the petition for review.        Except as
     expressly MODIFIED by this Final Order to clarify the basis for weighing the
     testimony and hearsay evidence, we AFFIRM the initial decision.

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2         The agency proposed the appellant’s removal based upon one charge of
     improper conduct. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 5, Part 1 at 30-34. The charge
     included four specifications, best summarized as follows:        (1) behaving in a
     threatening manner towards L.D. (Senior Sales Executive, Shipping); (2) coercing
     a subordinate employee into taking an online biology class; (3) engaging in
     unethical conduct when asking a subordinate to assist in getting the appellant’s
     husband a job with the coworker’s husband’s company; and (4) selling Mary Kay
     products to subordinate employees in the workplace. Id. at 30-33. The deciding
     official sustained the charge, but he mitigated the penalty to a demotion from a
     Manager of Sales, EAS-25, to a Field Account Representative, EAS-18.              Id.
     at 23-27.
¶3         The appellant filed the instant appeal challenging her demotion and
     requesting a hearing. IAF, Tab 1. After holding the hearing, the administrative
                                                                                           3

     judge issued an initial decision that affirmed the agency’s action. 2 IAF, Tab 56,
     Initial Decision (ID). In sustaining the charge, the administrative judge sustained
     only specifications 1 and 4. ID at 2-4. The appellant has filed a petition for
     review, the agency has responded, and the appellant has replied.           Petition for
     Review (PFR) File, Tabs 5, 7-8.

                      DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
     We affirm the administrative judge’s initial decision to sustain specification 1,
     but we modify the decision to clarify the basis for weighing testimony and
     hearsay evidence.
¶4         The appellant argues that the administrative judge should not have sustained
     specification 1 because the agency has not proven that she behaved in a
     threatening manner under the test for establishing a threat set forth by the U.S.
     Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Metz v. Department of the Treasury,
     780 F.2d 1001, 1002-03 (Fed. Cir. 1986). PFR File, Tab 5 at 10-12; ID at 2 n.2.
     To the contrary, we find that, because the specification contains a detailed
     narrative description of the misconduct that gave rise to the charge, the agency
     was entitled to charge the appellant with the broad label of “improper conduct”
     rather than a more specific label. Otero v. U.S. Postal Service, 73 M.S.P.R. 198,
     202-03 (1997).
¶5         Here, specification 1 charged the appellant with behaving in a threatening
     manner towards L.D. IAF, Tab 5, Part 1 at 30. The proposal notice includes a
     narrative that further describes the appellant’s actions. Id. at 30-31. In short, the
     proposing official stated that L.D. informed her that the appellant argued with

     2
       The appellant has not challenged, and we see no reason to disturb , the administrative
     judge’s finding that there was no due process violation or harmful procedural error
     regarding the agency’s decision to communicate only with her representative or
     concerning the deciding official’s Douglas factors analysis. ID at 14-19; see Broughton
     v. Department of Health & Human Services, 33 M.S.P.R. 357, 359 (1987). The
     appellant also does not challenge the administrative judge’s finding of nexus , and we
     see no reason to disturb this finding. Broughton, 33 M.S.P.R. at 359; ID at 19-20; PFR
     File, Tab 5.
                                                                                           4

     her, and demeaned and humiliated her by “[getting] in her face” and yelling at her
     in a customer meeting. Id. at 30. The proposing official also stated that one
     customer at the meeting told her that the appellant told L.D. to “shut up” and
     jumped out of her seat, raising her hand at L.D.       Id.   Further, the proposing
     official recounted that the appellant called her the day of the incident, stated that
     she needed a “coaching moment,” and reported that she got up from her seat,
     went over to L.D., put her hand up, and loudly told L.D. to stop talking. Id. at 31.
     The proposing official concluded that the appellant’s actions violated the
     agency’s “Zero Tolerance” policy regarding threatening and/or intimidating
     behavior, tarnished the image of the agency, and were contrary to the appellant’s
     responsibility for setting the parameters for appropriate behavior in the unit. Id.
¶6         The administrative judge found that the agency was not required to prove
     that the appellant intentionally threatened L.D. under the Metz test, and instead
     she sustained the specification because the agency proved the facts outlined in its
     proposal. ID at 2-5 (citing Brough v. Department of Commerce, 119 M.S.P.R.
     118, ¶ 12 n.2 (2013)). We find no error in this respect. See Otero, 73 M.S.P.R.
     at 202-03.
¶7         Furthermore, even if we did apply the Metz analysis, we still would sustain
     this specification. In Metz, 780 F.2d at 1002-03, the Federal Circuit enumerated
     the following factors for deciding whether an employee threatened her
     coworkers: the listener’s reactions; the listener’s apprehension of harm; the
     speaker’s intent; any conditional nature of the statements; and attendant
     circumstances. First, the record reflects that L.D. felt threatened and that she
     experienced apprehension of harm. The administrative judge gave greater weight
     to L.D.’s statements that she perceived the appell ant’s behavior as threatening
     because the appellant approached L.D., raised her hand, and made L.D. feel that
     the situation would get physical. ID at 5; IAF, Tab 5, Part 2 at 32-33, Part 5
     at 5-6. Second, the two customers’ reactions, as recorded in their statements and
     reported to the business alliance manager and the appellant’s direct supervisor,
                                                                                       5

      also support the administrative judge’s finding that the appellant’s conduct was
      threatening.   ID at 5-6; IAF, Tab 53, Hearing Compact Disc (Sept. 29, 2015)
      (HCD 1) (testimony of the business alliance manager and the appellant’s direct
      supervisor); IAF, Tab 5, Part 2 at 38-41. Specifically, the fact that the customers
      reported the appellant’s conduct as aggressive and were concerned about how
      L.D. was doing after the incident supports a finding that L.D. acted in a scared or
      upset way and appeared to fear harm and that the appellant’s statements did not
      appear to be conditional. IAF, Tab 5, Part 2 at 38-41.
¶8          Next, the record demonstrates the threatening nature of the appellant’s
      comments and actions regarding L.D. Particularly when the statement at issue is
      made intentionally and maliciously and conveys a threatening action, the Board
      will find that the intent element is proven.       Rose v. U.S. Postal Service,
      109 M.S.P.R. 31, ¶ 24 (2007). The evidence supports such a finding here because
      the administrative judge found, and we agree, that the appellant jumped out of her
      seat, acted aggressively toward L.D., yelled at her, and told her to “shut up” and
      to stop talking. ID at 2-5.
¶9          Moreover, the evidence does not show that the appellant intended her
      statements and actions to be conditional or that attendant circumstances weigh
      against a finding that she threatened L.D. Accordingly, we find that, even if the
      agency was required to prove a threat charge under the Metz criteria, we still
      would sustain the specification. See Rose, 109 M.S.P.R. 31, ¶¶ 11-29.
¶10         The appellant next asserts that the administrative judge erred in finding not
      credible her testimony regarding this specification and incorrectly gave greater
      weight to hearsay in the form of written statements by two customers who
      witnessed the interaction, L.D.’s out-of-court statement, and third parties’
      testimony regarding L.D.’s description of the incident. PFR File, Tab 5 at 7-17.
      For the reasons discussed below, we modify the initial decision to properly weigh
      the testimony and hearsay evidence in the context of the factors set forth in
      Borninkhof v. Department of Justice, 5 M.S.P.R. 77, 87 (1981).
                                                                                          6

¶11        In general, to resolve credibility issues, an administrative judge must
      identify the factual questions in dispute, summarize the evidence on e ach disputed
      question, state which version she believes, and explain in detail why she found
      the chosen version more credible. Hillen v. Department of the Army, 35 M.S.P.R.
      453, 458 (1987). 3 However, in weighing hearsay evidence, the administrative
      judge must consider the following factors: (1) the availability of persons with
      firsthand knowledge to testify at the hearing; (2) whether the statements of the
      out-of-court declarants were signed or in affidavit form, and whether anyone
      witnessed the signing; (3) the agency’s explanation for failing to obtain signed or
      sworn statements; (4) whether declarants were disinterested witnesses to the
      events, and whether the statements were routinely made; (5) consistency of
      declarants’ accounts with other information in the case, internal consistency, and
      their consistency with each other; (6) whether corroboration for statements can
      otherwise be found in the agency record; (7) the absence of contradictory
      evidence; and (8) the credibility of the declarant when he made the statement
      attributed to him. Borninkhof, 5 M.S.P.R. at 87. Generally, the Board favors live
      testimony over hearsay. Bledsoe v. Department of Justice, 91 M.S.P.R. 93, ¶ 7
      n.4 (2002).    However, the Federal Circuit has stated that “hearsay may be
      accepted as preponderant evidence even without corroboration if, to a reasonable
      mind, the circumstances are such as to lend it credence. ” Kewley v. Department
      of Health & Human Services, 153 F.3d 1357, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (citing Hayes
      v. Department of the Navy, 727 F.2d 1535, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1984)). To determine
      whether hearsay evidence alone is sufficient to sustain the specification depends

      3
        In weighing witness credibility, the administrative judge considers the following
      factors: (1) the witness’s opportunity and capacity to observe the event or act in
      question; (2) the witness’s character; (3) any prior inconsistent statement by the
      witness; (4) a witness’s bias, or lack of bias; (5) the contradiction of the witness’s
      version of events by other evidence or its consistency with other evidence; (6) the
      inherent improbability of the witness’s version of events; and (7) the witness’s
      demeanor. Hillen, 35 M.S.P.R. at 458.
                                                                                          7

      on its reliability and trustworthiness.     Social Security Administration v. Long,
      113 M.S.P.R. 190, ¶ 7 (2010), aff’d, 635 F.3d 526 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
¶12         Here, the administrative judge found that the appellant’s testimony was not
      credible because it was in her self-interest to characterize her interaction as not
      aggressive or threatening, her testimony was contradicted by the statements of the
      two customers who had witnessed the interaction, and he found that the witnesses
      who testified about L.D.’s conflicting statements were credible. ID at 5-6; IAF,
      Tab 54, Hearing Compact Disc (Sept. 30, 2015) (testimony of the appellant); IAF,
      Tab 5, Part 1 at 41-43, Part 2 at 42-46. Conversely, the administrative judge
      found that L.D.’s characterization that she perceived the appellant as aggressive
      and threatening, as recounted by the testimony of others at the hearing, was more
      credible than that of the appellant.      ID at 6.   Specifically, she found that the
      testimonies of the appellant’s direct supervisor, the human resources liaison, and
      the business alliance manager supported L.D.’s version of events and were
      credible because they testified in a straightforward manner and they did not have
      any reason to be less than truthful or biased against the appellant. ID at 4 -6.
¶13         The administrative judge also found that the information from the two
      customers who witnessed the incident was even more important in supporting
      L.D.’s version of events.      ID at 5.      Specifically, the administrative judge
      considered the appellant’s direct supervisor’s testimony that she called one of the
      customers the day after the meeting, couching the call as a c ustomer feedback
      request, and the customer reported that the appellant approached L.D., raised her
      hand, and told her to shut up. Id. The administrative judge also considered the
      business alliance manager’s testimony that on the day after the incident, the first
      customer asked how L.D. was doing, that the second customer said that the
      appellant had threatened “fisticuffs” and wished he had recorded the interaction
      on his iPhone, and that, when discussing the incident with agency investigators,
      both customers described the appellant’s conduct as aggressive.          Id.; HCD 1
      (testimony of the business alliance manager); IAF, Tab 5, Part 2 at 28-29, 58-59.
                                                                                         8

¶14        Considering these findings in the context of the Borninkhof factors, we
      agree with the administrative judge that L.D.’s version of events has significant
      probative value.    Specifically, the agency’s statement that L.D. was unable to
      testify at the hearing weighs in favor of crediting her written statement, the
      memorandum of interview, and the testimony of others about her statements to
      them. PFR File, Tab 7 at 8. Additionally, the fact that L.D.’s written statement is
      a sworn affidavit and that the memorandum of interview was obtained during the
      Office of Inspector General (OIG) investigation into the matters at issue in this
      appeal supports a finding of reliability of the hearsay evidence.       IAF, Tab 5,
      Part 2 at 32-33, Part 5 at 4-6; see Gardner v. U.S. Postal Service, 44 M.S.P.R.
      565, 569 (1990) (finding that the administrative judge properly considered signed
      grievance appeal forms in considering evidence of a threat), aff’d, 983 F.2d 1087
      (Fed. Cir. 1992) (Table).
¶15        Although the two customers declined to give written sworn statements, their
      interviews were conducted in the context of the formal OIG investigation. IAF,
      Tab 5, Part 2 at 38-41. Additionally, as the administrative judge found, these
      individuals were disinterested parties. ID at 5. Thus, we find that their interview
      statements further support favoring L.D.’s account of the interaction with the
      appellant.
¶16        In giving great weight to the statements of the two customers, the
      administrative judge also considered the fact that one of the customers asked how
      L.D. was doing and the other wished that he had recorded the interaction with his
      iPhone.      ID at 5.   We agree that the customers’ negative reactions to the
      appellant’s actions further support the weight given to the hearsay evidence of
      L.D.’s version of events. 4    Id.; HCD 1 (testimony of the business alliance
      manager and the appellant’s direct supervisor); IAF, Tab 5, Part 2 at 38-41.

      4
        The appellant’s direct supervisor’s and the business alliance manager’s respective
      testimony indicates their impressions of the customers’ negative reactions to the
      appellant’s actions, as opposed to the truth of their statements. HCD 1 (testimony of
                                                                                             9

¶17         We have considered the possibility that L.D. may have been biased against
      the appellant because she was her subordinate and had filed an equal employment
      opportunity complaint against her. IAF, Tab 5, Part 5 at 4 -59. We also have
      considered the appellant’s arguments on review that the customers were biased
      against her because they were under investigation for allegedly defrauding the
      agency and that they believed L.D. “was on their side” during the meeting. PFR
      File, Tab 5 at 6-7. However, based upon our discussion above, our review of the
      remaining Borninkhof factors, and our review of the record as a whole, we agree
      with the administrative judge’s determination that L.D.’s account of the meeting
      is more credible than that of the appellant.          Accordingly, we find that the
      administrative judge properly weighed the evidence in support of sustaining this
      specification.   See Seeley v. Department of Transportation, 17 M.S.P.R. 139,
      142-43 (1983) (finding that hearsay evidence comprised sufficient evidence to
      sustain the agency’s adverse action based on the record taken as a whole), aff’d,
      795 F.2d 1010 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (Table).
      The appellant has not shown error in the administrative judge ’s decision to
      sustain specification 4.
¶18         On review, the appellant challenges the administrative judge’s decision to
      sustain specification 4, which charged her with selling Mary Kay products to
      subordinates in the workplace. PFR File, Tab 5 at 17-24. The administrative
      judge found that the appellant admitted she was a Mary Kay consultant but denied
      making sales at work. ID at 12. Instead, the appellant asserted that she was on
      her cousin’s sales team, her coworkers (including subordinates) asked that she
      obtain specific products for them, and she collected payments that she forwarded
      to her cousin. Id.

      the business alliance manager and the appellant’s direct supervisor). Thus, the
      testimony is not hearsay, and it was proper for the administrative judge to give it great
      weight. Taylor v. U.S. Postal Service, 75 M.S.P.R. 322, 325 (1997) (citing Fed. R.
      Evid. 801(c)).
                                                                                       10

¶19        The appellant asserts that the administrative judge improperly sustained this
      specification under 5 C.F.R. § 7001.102(a)(2), which prohibits sales activity,
      because she was not actually selling the Mary Kay products. She also challenges
      the application of 5 C.F.R. § 2635.702, which prohibits the use of her public
      office for private gain. PFR File, Tab 5 at 20-24; ID at 12-13. First, we agree
      with the administrative judge that 5 C.F.R. § 7001.102(a)(2) forbids sales both for
      oneself and for any other person and thus, regardless of whether the appellant was
      selling the products on behalf of her cousin, she still violated the regulation . ID
      at 13. Second, pursuant to 5 C.F.R. § 2635.702, an employee may not “use his
      public office for his own private gain, for the endorsement of any product, service
      or enterprise, or for the private gain of . . . relatives,” among others. We agree
      with the administrative judge that this regulation prohibits the appellant’s
      activities on behalf of her cousin and that, as part of her cousin’s sales team, she
      improperly derived personal gain from the sales of the Mary Kay products. ID
      at 13-14.
¶20        The appellant challenges the application of the agency’s ethics regulations
      because she asserts that she was unaware of her ethical obligations. PFR File,
      Tab 5 at 23-24.      However, she violated the regulations when she sold the
      products, regardless of whether she knew of her ethical responsibilities or
      intended to violate them. See Perdue v. V.A. Medical Center, 20 M.S.P.R. 86, 88
      (1984).     Further, we agree with the administrative judge’s finding that the
      appellant actually knew the regulations and that it defies common sense and
      prudence to engage in the charged business conduct with her subordinates. ID
      at 13; HCD 1 (testimony of the deciding official); IAF, Tab 5, Part 4 at 6-11.
      Accordingly, we find that the appellant breached her ethical obligation s when she
      sold the Mary Kay products to her subordinates and thus, we agree with the
      administrative judge’s decision to sustain this specification. See Vargas v. U.S.
      Postal Service, 83 M.S.P.R. 695, 697-99 (1999).
                                                                                       11

¶21         The appellant’s remaining arguments constitute mere disagreement with the
      administrative judge’s factual findings, which are supported by the record
      evidence, and thus do not provide a basis for disturbing the initial decision .
      Crosby v. U.S. Postal Service, 74 M.S.P.R. 98, 105-06 (1997). Accordingly, we
      agree with the administrative judge that specification 4 is sustained.
      We affirm the administrative judge’s decision to defer to the agency’s penalty
      determination.
¶22         The appellant asserts that the imposed penalty exceeds the tol erable bounds
      of   reasonableness,   whether   or not    the Board sustains specification       1,
      specification 4, or both, and that the penalty should be mitigated to, at most, a
      demotion to an EAS-23 position. PFR File, Tab 5 at 24-29. For the reasons
      discussed below, we disagree.
¶23         We agree that the appellant’s over 20 years of service free of previous
      discipline constitutes a significant mitigating factor. See Raco v. Social Security
      Administration, 117 M.S.P.R. 1, ¶ 15 (2011); Hanna v. Department of Labor,
      80 M.S.P.R. 294, ¶ 16 (1998), aff’d, 18 F. App’x 787 (Fed. Cir. 2001). However,
      her potential for rehabilitation is diminished as a mitigating factor by her failure
      to admit that her conduct was improper. See Singletary v. Department of the Air
      Force, 94 M.S.P.R. 553, ¶ 15 (2003), aff’d, 104 F. App’x 155 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
      Additionally, the appellant was on notice that her conduct was improper , but she
      still continued to engage in the conduct regarding the Mary Kay products.
¶24         On review, the appellant asserts that the administrative judge erred in
      finding that her proffered comparators were not similarly situated to her because
      they were not charged with the same misconduct. ID at 22-23; PFR File, Tab 5
      at 25-29. The administrative judge relied on the standard set forth in Lewis v.
      Department of Veterans Affairs, 113 M.S.P.R. 657, ¶ 6 (2010), in finding that the
      appellant did not meet her burden of identifying a similarly situated employee.
      ID at 22. Since the initial decision was issued, the Board has overruled Lewis to
      clarify that, when analyzing a disparate penalty claim, broad similarity between
                                                                              12

employees is insufficient to establish that they are appropriate comparators, and
the relevant inquiry is whether the agency knowingly and unjustifiably treated
employees who engaged in the same or similar offenses differently. Singh v. U.S.
Postal Service, 2022 MSPB 15, ¶¶ 11-14. The administrative judge distinguished
the appellant from the proffered comparators because, although the agency
charged each comparator with behavior deemed threatening or harassing by their
subordinates, the appellant was charged with additional misconduct. ID at 22.
The administrative judge erred in so finding because one of the proffered
comparators was similarly charged with behavior deemed threatening or harassing
by a subordinate and additional misconduct.        IAF, Tab 37 at 4-9.       The
administrative judge’s finding was not prejudicial to the appellant, however,
because this comparator was not charged with additional misconduct that was the
same or similar to that of the appellant. See Singh, 2022 MSPB 15, ¶ 17 (opining
that the Board should not attempt to weigh the relative seriousness of various
offenses in order to determine whether two employees who committed different
acts of misconduct were treated disparately); Reid v. Department of the Navy,
118 M.S.P.R. 396, ¶¶ 22-23 (2012) (finding that the appellant did not establish
that employees engaged in conduct similar to his when their conduct was only
similar with respect to one charge). The appellant thus has not established that
the proffered comparators engaged in the same or similar offenses as those at
issue here. In any event, it appears that the penalty imposed on the comparator
who was charged with additional misconduct resulted from a settlement
agreement. IAF, Tab 37 at 4-12. The Board has held that, “if another employee
receives a lesser penalty, despite apparent similarities in circumstances, as the
result of a settlement agreement, the agency is not required to explain the
difference in treatment.” Davis v. U.S. Postal Service, 120 M.S.P.R. 457, ¶ 10
(2013).   Here, therefore, even assuming a similarity in circumstances, the
appellant did not show a disparity in penalties.
                                                                                      13

¶25        Moreover, the deciding official properly considered that he did not want the
      appellant to supervise her previous team, in particular because her misconduct
      involved her threatening a subordinate and thus went to the heart of her duties
      and responsibilities as a supervisor. HCD 1 (testimony of the deciding official);
      see Hanna, 80 M.S.P.R. 294, ¶ 17. We also considered that he did not want the
      appellant to interact with customers because two customers witnessed the
      appellant’s threatening behavior. HCD 1 (testimony of the deciding official); see
      Hutson v. Department of the Interior, 67 M.S.P.R. 432, 447 (1995). The deciding
      official testified that he wanted to impose a penalty that would allow the
      appellant to work at the same location in a position where by she could maintain
      her benefits and retirement.    HCD 1 (testimony of the deciding official).     He
      further testified that, although other managers had been demoted fewer steps than
      had the appellant, part of the difference in treatment was attributable to the
      availability of positions. ID at 21-22; HCD 1 (testimony of the deciding official).
      We find these to be reasonable and appropriate considerations under the
      circumstances.
¶26        For the first time at the hearing, the appellant testified that she would have
      been willing to relocate nationwide for reassignment to a nonsupervisory position
      of Small Business Sales Specialist at her former EAS-25 level.       ID at 21-22;
      HCD 1 (testimony of the appellant). She asserts that a demotion to an EAS-23
      level is the most severe reasonable penalty. PFR File, Tab 5 at 29. We agree
      with the administrative judge that the appellant’s alleged willingness to relocate
      did not provide a reason for disturbing the penalty, especially as there was no
      evidence that the position she identified was available.       ID at 23; HCD 1
      (testimony of the appellant).   On review, the appellant has not identified an y
      available position, particularly not a nonsupervisory position that does not
      involve interacting with the public.    The agency was in the best position to
      determine whether placement in an available position would address the deciding
      official’s concerns about the appellant’s duties. Based upon the above and our
                                                                                           14

      considering the record as a whole, we find that the administrative judge properly
      sustained the demotion, and we affirm the initial decision.              See Little v.
      Department of Transportation, 112 M.S.P.R. 224, ¶ 32 (2009) (finding that, given
      the multiplicity of charges, the serious nature of each of the charges, the
      appellant’s status as a supervisor, his admissions regarding his misconduct, and
      the deciding official’s proper consideration of the relevant Douglas factors, the
      administrative judge properly affirmed the demotion penalty).
¶27         Accordingly, we affirm the initial decision.

                               NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 5
            The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the
      Board’s final decision in this matter.      5 C.F.R. § 1201.113.     You may obtain
      review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of
      your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate
      forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following
      summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not
      provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation and
      the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule
      regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of
      this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to you r
      claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file
      within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your
      chosen forum.
            Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of revie w
      below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions

      5
        Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
      the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
      Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                        15

about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.                 5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit    your   petition    to   the   court    at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or    EEOC    review     of   cases      involving   a   claim      of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
                                                                                 16

judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court (not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.     5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017).           If you have a
representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before
you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days
after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling
condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and
to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respe ctive
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employme nt
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, th e
address of the EEOC is:
                         Office of Federal Operations
                  Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                               P.O. Box 77960
                          Washington, D.C. 20013
                                                                                     17

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant     to   the     Whistleblower     Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in
section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or
2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial
review either with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court
of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 6 The court of appeals must receive your
petition for review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.
5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                                U.S. Court of Appeals
                                for the Federal Circuit

6
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115 -195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                              18

                            717 Madison Place, N.W.
                            Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                                    /s/ for
                                          Jennifer Everling
                                          Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.