Court Opinion

ID: 9714124
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:31:20.807581+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:23.641842
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE QUINN, specially concurring: I agree that the trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress his statements to the police and in sentencing the defendant to 20 years in prison. I also agree that Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 165 L. Ed. 2d 557, 126 S. Ct. 2669 (2006), is dispositive of the defendant’s argument based on Article 36 of the Vienna Convention. I write separately to address a concern raised by justices of our supreme court in their decision in People v. Madej, 193 Ill. 2d 395 (2000). In that case, the court upheld the defendant’s death sentence based on his conviction for first degree murder and rape. The defendant was a Polish national. After arresting the defendant, the police failed to advise the defendant of his rights pursuant to Article 36 of the Vienna Convention. Defendant’s death sentence was affirmed on direct appeal (People v. Madej, 106 Ill. 2d 201 (1985)). In 1998, the defendant filed a petition for relief from judgment pursuant to section 2—1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2—1401 (West 1998)) and a petition for writ of mandamus. The Consul General for the Republic of Poland was granted leave to intervene in the mandamus proceeding. People v. Madej, 193 Ill. 2d at 398-400. On appeal from the denial of his section 2—1401 petition and his petition for mandamus, defendant argued that the denial of his right to consular notification under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention rendered his conviction and death sentence void. The supreme court held that the defendant’s claims were procedurally barred as they were made some 14 years after the expiration of the two-year limitation mandated by section 2—1401. People v. Madej, 193 Ill. 2d at 402. Justices McMorrow, Harrison and Heiple dissented, Justice Heiple writing: “What is cavalierly dismissed here is that the consular notification requirement is meant to ensure that foreign nationals imprisoned abroad have adequate legal representation and that they should be tried in accordance with principles of justice generally recognized in the international community by allowing consular officials to consult with the defendant and with attorneys, court officials and prosecutors. It is important to note that this protection is designed for Americans abroad as well as for foreign nationals in the United States. In the instant case, however, the Polish Consul General was not even aware of defendant’s situation until 1998, some 16 years after his conviction and sentence.” People v. Madej, 193 Ill. 2d at 412 (Heiple, J., dissenting, joined by McMorrow and Harrison, JJ.). Clearly, the judges and lawyers who deal with the issue of consular notification treat it very seriously. Unfortunately, this concern is not shared by everyone. The Mexican Consulate of Chicago has a listed phone number of 312-855-1380. A person dialing that phone number at any time of the day or night will hear an automated message directing the caller to push a button to receive more information regarding specific topics. These include obtaining vehicle permits, BancoMex, tourism, customs, hours of the consulate, importing household appliances, transportation of corpses or ashes of deceased individuals and visas. Contacting the consulate in connection with a Mexican national being in the custody of a law enforcement agency is not one of the menu choices. No human being answers the phone and the phone number does not provide any method for leaving a message. This information played no part in my decision to concur in this opinion. As I said in the beginning, Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 165 L. Ed. 2d 557, 126 S. Ct. 2669 (2006), is dispositive of the issue of the effect of a violation of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention. I provide this information for the benefit of those people who will read this opinion and conclude that this court is improperly sanctioning the actions of law enforcement officers who are trampling on the rights of foreign nationals. I also provide this information for the benefit of all foreign consulates in Illinois. The defendant argues that the consulate notification requirement of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention is meaningless without the “hammer” of the exclusionary rule to back it up. As discussed by the majority, the Supreme Court has rejected this argument. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. at 350, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 579, 126 S. Ct. at 2680.1 believe that it is patently obvious that the consular notification requirement is indeed meaningless when the consulate does not provide a means to be contacted. While the Mexican consulate’s failure to provide a means for anyone to contact them has not played a part in the decision of this case, it may properly be considered when made part of the record in future cases. It would appear to be relevant to the issue of whether a defendant can establish that he was prejudiced by the failure to advise him of his right to contact his national consulate. See People v. Villagomez, 313 Ill. App. 3d 799, 811 (2000).