Court Opinion

ID: 9809165
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 21:02:40.584938+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:25:21.291273
License: Public Domain

Reads, J.
Dissenting. No nation can make laws for-another nation. Each is independent and makes its own laws. But by common consent of all nations, certain, rules-have been established for their intercourse, and these rules constitute the law of nations. And their observance is compelled by force if necessary. This is denominated public international law. Wheaton’s International Law, § 77.
As distinguished from public international law for the-conduct of nations as nations, there are private international laws for the conduct, not of nations as nations, but of the-people of different nations, by which it is tacitly agreed that rights acquired, privileges enjoyed, and relations formed in one nation, shall be recognized in another nation. But it is expressly laid down that' this is Only by comity,. and is never allowed where it contravenes a prohibitory enactment. Ibid, § 79.
No nation is bound to admit the laws and customs off another nation within its borders. It is independent in its Legislation and can by positive enactments refuse the operation of any law or custom of any other nation or people. I speak of the power and not of the propriety. If a nation-should deny to the people of other nations just and reasonable privileges, it would find' its punishment in having the-same privileges denied to its citizens. And therefore comity, courtesy, is allowed to govern. A marriage formed in-Scotland where nothing is required but the consent of the-parties, we allow to bo valid here, although it would be invalid if formed here; because it is a mere matter of form; and we courteously recognize it. It inflicts no harm upon our people. But suppose Scotland were to allow children often years of age to marry, would we allow the.marriage to be good here ?
*249Probably we might allow it in the absence of a positive enactment ; but we require our own people to be, the male sixteen and the female fourteen years of age ; or else the marriage is void ; and why may we not prohibit it in foreigners ? We prohibit it among our own people, not out of caprice,, but to prevent improvident marriages to the degradation and injury of the community. I give this illustration because Prance which has fixed ages for marriages as we have will not recognize a marriage celebrated elsewhere within the ages, although valid where celebrated. Wheat. § 98. The rule is thus laid down in Wheaton, § § 90-1. “A contract valid by the law of the place where it is made is generally speaking valid everywhere; The general comity and mutual convenience of nationshave established the rule, that the law of that place governs in everything respecting the-form, interpretation, obligation and effect of the contract wherever the authority, rights and interests of other States- and their citizens are not thereby prejudiced. * * . * * It cannot apply where it would injuriously conflict with the-laws of another State relating to its police, its public health, its commerce, its revenue, and generally its sovereign authority and the rights and interests of its citizens.”
In other words comity is secondary to the public good of any given nation, and subject to be contravened by its positive enactments. I timidly but very positively deny what a great Judge (Ruffin) has said, that a Turk with his many wives, or a Mormon, can have his rights which he has in his own country recognized here, because it is revolting to our people and against their best interests. Our law prohibits the intermarriage of whites and blacks and declares-such marriages “void.”
If such a marriage solemnized here between our own people is declared void, why should comity require the evil to-be imported from another State ? Why is not the relation severed the instant they set foot upon our soil ? It is. *250-answered, that we would thereby bastardize the issue and «disturb the rights of property. Not at all. That does not follow. If they have issue before they come here, the status -of the issue may not be changed ; and by separating them we prevent issue here. Nor need their rights of property be •affected. However that is not before us. And at any rate ■ the public good is paramount. And individuals who have formed relations which are obnoxious to our laws can find ’their comfort in stajdng away from us. We give to comity ■all the force of a constitutional provision when we allow it ’to annul a statute. Indeed we put it above the Constitution Itself; as I believe one of the late amendments prohibits the Intermarriage of white and colored. It is inherent in every nation to prohibit whatever is an evil to its society. And It must be its own judge of what is an evil. Self-preservation requires it. State v. Reinhart and Love, 63 N. C. 547.
That provision in the Constitution of the United States, ■““The citizens of-each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States” does not mean that a citizen of South Carolina removing here may bring Avith him his South Carolina privileges and immunities ; but that when he comes here he may have the same privileges and immunities which our citizens have. Nothing more and nothing less. It is courteous for neighbors to visit and it is handsome to allow the visitor family privileges and even to give him the favorite seat; but if he bring his pet rattlesnake or his pet bear or spitz dog famous for shy drophobia, he must leave them outside the door. And if he bring small pox the door may be shut against him.
I am of the opinion that a prohibitory statute is paramount to what might otherwise be allowed as comity, and vthat the defendants are guilty.
Per Curiam. Judgment affirmed.