Court Opinion

ID: 992059
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2013-07-03 23:46:17.622637+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:21:40.430369
License: Public Domain

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.                                                                    No. 96-4443

ARTHUR ANTHONY BAXTER,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of West Virginia, at Elkins.
Robert Earl Maxwell, Senior District Judge.
(CR-95-8)

Submitted: April 17, 1997

Decided: May 1, 1997

Before NIEMEYER and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and
BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

James R. Fox, JORY & SMITH, L.L.C., Elkins, West Virginia, for
Appellant. William D. Wilmoth, United States Attorney, Sherry L.
Muncy, Assistant United States Attorney, Elkins, West Virginia, for
Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Arthur Anthony Baxter was convicted by a jury of armed bank rob-
bery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d) (1994). On appeal,
he alleges the district court erred by allowing into evidence: (1) a note
written by Baxter and (2) evidence that Baxter had registered at a
hotel under another name. Because we find no reversible error, we
affirm.

At trial the Government planned to present witnesses who would
identify Baxter as having robbed a bank in Keyser, West Virginia on
September 8, 1994. The defense strategy was to present evidence that
Baxter, who lived near Baltimore, Maryland, was in Baltimore the
day of the robbery. Accordingly, the Government entered into evi-
dence a handwritten note, authored by Baxter, which read:* "Bits
[nickname of friend], needed $380. Hope you're happy when I get
back Wednesday night." Testimony from the friend showed that the
note had been left at his house on Labor Day and that the Wednesday
night referred to in the letter was the night before the robbery. The
Government also presented evidence that Baxter had registered, under
another name, in a motel near Keyser three nights before the robbery.

Baxter alleges that the district court should have granted his
motions to exclude the evidence based upon Fed. R. Evid. 403. A dis-
trict court may exclude evidence if "its probative value is substan-
tially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading. . . ." Fed. R. Evid. 403. We review the district
court's evidentiary rulings for a clear abuse of discretion. United
States v. Whittington, 26 F.3d 456, 465 (4th Cir. 1994). A district
court's Rule 403 decision will not be overturned except under "the
_________________________________________________________________
*The redacted portion of the note indicated that money was needed for
drugs. The Government voluntarily offered to have this portion redacted.

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most extraordinary of circumstances, where that discretion has been
plainly abused." United States v. Simpson, 910 F.2d 154, 157 (4th Cir.
1990) (citations and internal quotation omitted)."Because the evi-
dence sought to be excluded under Rule 403 is concededly probative,
the balance under Rule 403 should be struck in favor of admissibility,
and evidence should be excluded only sparingly." United States v.
Aramony, 88 F.3d 1369, 1378 (4th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted).

We do not find the district court abused its discretion. See
Whittington, 26 F.3d at 465. With respect to the note, the Government
stipulated that Baxter had $4500 in his savings account at the time of
the robbery, so that the jury would not infer that Baxter robbed the
bank because he was in need of money because he borrowed $380
from his friend. The note's probative value was substantial because
it showed Baxter planned to be in the area the night before the rob-
bery; conversely, the danger of unfair prejudice was minimal. Like-
wise, evidence that Baxter had stayed in a local motel three nights
prior to the robbery again helped establish his whereabouts just prior
to the robbery. Although Baxter claims that the evidence showing he
registered using a false name was prejudicial to him, such prejudice
is hardly unfair because the jury could logically infer that Baxter used
an alias to avoid detection because he planned to rob the bank three
days later. Fed. R. Evid. 403. Finally, Baxter's claim that this evi-
dence should have been excluded under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) is sim-
ply without merit because the evidence was not offered for the
purpose of showing action in conformity with Baxter's character, but
rather, to show that he had the opportunity to plan and commit the
robbery. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(b).

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal conten-
tions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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