Court Opinion

ID: 9385671
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-07 19:02:41.072217+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:03.739699
License: Public Domain

Filed 4/7/23 In re G.Z. CA2/2
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION TWO

 In re G.Z. et al., Persons                                    B320543
 Coming Under the Juvenile                                     (Los Angeles County
 Court Law.                                                    Super. Ct. No.
                                                               20CCJP02356C, E–H)

 LOS ANGELES COUNTY
 DEPARTMENT OF
 CHILDREN AND FAMILY
 SERVICES,

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.

 Y.L.,

           Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County. Tara L. Newman, Judge. Affirmed.
     Jesse F. Rodriguez, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
     Dawyn R. Harrison, Interim County Counsel, and Kim
Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, and Jacklyn Kim Louie,
Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

      __________________________________________

       Y.L. (mother) and D.Z. (father) (collectively parents) have
nine children together, all of whom are dependents of the juvenile
court. In March 2022, the juvenile court terminated parents’
parental rights to five of their children. In this appeal, mother
challenges the juvenile court’s termination of her parental rights
as to two of those five children—her six-year-old daughter, G.Z.
(daughter) and her almost four-year-old son, M.Z. (son). Father
did not appeal the court’s orders terminating parental rights. On
appeal, mother argues the juvenile court erred because it failed to
apply the beneficial parental relationship exception to adoption.
We find no error and affirm.
                          BACKGROUND
1.     Previous Appeals, Proceedings, and Events
       The instant appeal is not the first time this family has been
before us. Parents have filed five separate appeals. First,
mother and father appealed the juvenile court’s December 2020
removal order as to their oldest son. In a nonpublished opinion,
we affirmed the removal order. (In re W.Z. (Mar. 11, 2022,
B309689) (first appeal).) Second, mother and father appealed the
juvenile court’s August 2021 jurisdictional findings and removal
order as to their youngest child. In a nonpublished opinion, we
affirmed the court’s findings and order. (In re M.Z. (Dec. 2, 2022,

                                 2
B314485) (second appeal).) Third, mother and father appealed a
November 2021 order regarding educational and developmental
rights as to their youngest child (B317258). Those appeals were
dismissed in accordance with In re Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th
835. Fourth, mother filed the instant appeal regarding
termination of parental rights to two of her children. Fifth,
following the instant appeal, mother and father also appealed the
juvenile court’s July 2022 order terminating parental rights to
their youngest child (B322390). Those most recent appeals were
dismissed (mother’s appeal was dismissed under In re Phoenix
H., supra, 47 Cal.4th 835, and father’s appeal was dismissed for
failure to file an opening brief). The parents also filed a joint writ
petition in pro per challenging the juvenile court’s order setting a
permanency planning hearing (B318240). That petition was
dismissed.
       Rather than repeat the facts of this case up to the point of
parents’ second appeal (challenging the juvenile court’s August
2021 order), we incorporate by reference our opinions in both the
first and second appeals and summarize here the most pertinent
facts from those opinions.
       The underlying dependency proceedings began in April
2020. In December 2020, the juvenile court declared mother and
father’s eight older children dependents of the court and removed
them from mother and father’s custody. The court’s findings and
orders were based both on father’s egregious sexual abuse,
including rape, of his oldest daughter (the children’s half sister)
when she was a minor, which abuse resulted in half sister giving
birth to father’s daughter, and mother’s failure to protect the
children from father. Later, the juvenile court also declared
mother and father’s youngest child, born during the pendency of

                                  3
the underlying proceedings, a dependent of the court and ordered
him removed from parents as well.
       At the disposition hearing held in December 2020, the
juvenile court ordered mother to complete a parenting program,
individual counseling (which was to include sexual abuse
awareness and child protectiveness), conjoint counseling with the
children if recommended by their therapists, and a mental health
evaluation. The court ordered father to complete sexual abuse
counseling for perpetrators, individual counseling (which was to
include parenting), and a mental health evaluation. Both
parents were ordered not to post information on-line about the
case or anyone involved with the case. Parents were granted
monitored visits with the children. In March 2021, mother and
father each completed a 15-hour parenting program.
       Mother and father also each submitted to a mental health
evaluation performed by court-appointed expert Dr. Johnny Wen.
Dr. Wen reported there was “no doubt” father “suffers from a
serious personality disorder.” Among other things, Dr. Wen
noted father lacked both remorse for and insight into his past
conduct. As to father, Dr. Wen stated he had no “evidence of
change, regret, remorse, responsibility, concern, reparations,
active pursuit of counseling and classes, or quite frankly, any
progress towards some level of improvement.” As to mother, Dr.
Wen noted she was wholly dependent on father, was in denial
about father’s past conduct, and did not display independent
thinking. Dr. Wen concluded father “should not have a minor
under his care” and opined mother was “unable to independently
care for her children without relying on her husband” and “[t]he
impedance by [father] will likely pose mental health and safety
concerns for any minors under their care.”

                                4
       When the underlying proceedings began in April 2020, and
the children were removed from parents, daughter was four years
old and son was two years old. Although they have been placed
in a few different homes, the children remained removed from
their parents’ custody for the entirety of the underlying
proceedings. In April 2021, because father had posted
confidential information on-line about daughter and son’s
caregiver at the time, that caregiver requested the children be
removed from her home. In late-April 2021, daughter and son
were placed with Mr. and Mrs. L. (caregivers), with whom they
have remained.
       Both daughter and son displayed signs of needing special
services. Daughter was referred to her school district for speech
therapy. Son was referred to the Regional Center for
developmental delays and later to his school district. In both
instances, mother and father refused to consent to an assessment
or treatment. Eventually, daughter’s speech improved and she
no longer needed services. However, although not yet school age,
son qualified for an Individualized Education Plan (IEP) for
“special education with speech therapy.”
2.     Events Since the Second Appeal
       a.    Continuation of Reunification Period
       In August 2021, although the juvenile court found mother
and father’s progress with their case plans had not been
substantial, the court continued reunification services for
parents.
       In September and October 2021, the Los Angeles County
Department of Children and Family Services (Department)
reported mother and father had visited consistently with the
children. The Department noted mother and father “attended

                                5
the family’s visitations regularly. They maintained proper
communication and interaction with their children. The mother
missed 4 visits while the father missed 2 visits between April and
May, as they took turn to stay home to care for newborn [their
youngest child]. [Department social workers] and HSA
monitored all visits.” Mother and father brought food and clean
clothes for the children, corrected them appropriately, and
cleaned them before the conclusion of their visits. The children
enjoyed the visits and looked forward to them. The Department
reported, “In general, both parents have had quality time with
their children during the visitations.”
       Besides visits with her children, however, and especially
after the removal of her newborn son, mother was not
particularly involved in the dependency proceedings. She refused
to participate in court proceedings or meetings with Department
staff. Father often answered her telephone. Sometimes mother
referred case workers to speak with father instead of her. Father
continued to insist the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was
spying on him and his family and wanted to hurt them. He
believed the CCP had infiltrated all aspects of this dependency
case. Father stated neither he nor mother had mental health
issues, and neither needed mental health services. They did not
believe they had done anything wrong.
       In October 2021, parents filed multiple Welfare and
Institutions Code section 388 petitions for modification, seeking
return of their children and for the juvenile court to terminate its
jurisdiction.1 The juvenile court summarily denied the petitions.

      1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.

                                 6
       In November 2021, the Department reported father
continued to deny he or mother had mental health issues,
insisted they did not need help, refused to allow an alleged
service provider to release information to the Department,
rejected any suggestion he had done anything wrong, and
continued to claim “the Department was sent to go after” him and
his family. One therapist who spoke with father stated “father
did not have any insight as to his issues or concerns over his
capability to care for his children. [The therapist] felt that she
would not be able to help or improve the father on his conditions.”
The Department also reported its social workers repeatedly
advised father not to allow his children to play near an active
driveway during visits. Father rejected their advice. The
Department also noted one of its social workers had invited the
parents to attend a meeting regarding their family’s case issues.
Mother and father declined to attend or participate in the
meeting.
       Throughout the proceedings, and despite multiple
admonitions to stop, father continued to post confidential
information on-line about both the case and individuals involved
in the case. Father continued to espouse his paranoid and
delusional beliefs. Mother voiced no opposition to father but
instead stated she shared his beliefs. Mother showed no
independence or indication that she would deviate from father.
       b.    Termination of Reunification Services
       The 18-month review hearing was held on November 19,
2021. Counsel for parents’ oldest son noted the oldest son wanted
to reunify with his parents. Similarly, counsel for the oldest
daughter indicated the oldest daughter wanted to return to
mother’s care. Neither attorney, however, joined in or supported

                                7
the older children’s wishes to reunify. Instead, counsel argued
the juvenile court should terminate reunification services for the
parents. Although counsel acknowledged parents had “been
consistently visiting and the children enjoy their visits,” counsel
also explained parents had “been hesitant to engage with the
Department in services and have repeatedly told service
providers that they do not need any help.” Moreover, counsel
pointed out father suffered from a delusional disorder and had
failed to take responsibility or show insight into his behaviors,
which had brought the family to the Department’s attention.
Also, mother could not separate from father or independently
care for the children. Counsel for the Department similarly
argued the juvenile court should terminate reunification services
for parents. Counsel noted parents had not participated in
services and took no responsibility for, and had no insight
concerning, the Department’s involvement with their family.
       On the other hand, attorneys for mother and father both
argued the juvenile court should return the children to their
parents’ custody and care. Counsel noted visits with the parents
were consistent and appropriate, and the children were bonded to
their parents. Counsel for father also argued the Department
had failed to offer reasonable services. At the least, counsel for
mother requested the court find exceptional circumstances to
extend reunification services.
       After hearing argument, the juvenile court found “father
denies responsibility and is not accountable for the actions which
have resulted in this case beginning in the first place. Both
parents demonstrate a lack of insight and understanding of the
impact of their own behaviors, as well as the issues that need to
be addressed in this case. [¶] They have not cooperated or

                                 8
substantially participated in their case plans and continue to
minimize the issues that the court is asking them to address.
Additionally, it appears that mother is dependent on her husband
and influenced by him for a variety of reasons, making it really
not reasonable to return children to her separately, if that were
even an option, because of the nature of their relationship.” The
court further found the parents’ progress toward alleviating or
mitigating the causes necessitating placement had not been
substantial. The court terminated reunification services for the
parents as to five of their children, including daughter and son.
       Following termination of reunification services, mother and
father filed section 388 petitions for modification asking the
juvenile court to terminate jurisdiction and return five of the
children to the parents. The juvenile court summarily denied the
petitions, finding they did not state new evidence or a change of
circumstances.
       c.     Permanency Planning Hearing
       Shortly before the permanency planning hearing, the
Department submitted a report for the court. The Department
noted the parents had been compliant with their monitored
visitation and, although both had completed their mental health
evaluation (performed by Dr. Wen) as previously ordered by the
court, neither parent had enrolled in individual counseling and
father had not enrolled in sexual abuse counseling.
       In contravention of repeated and explicit court orders,
father continued to post information about the case on-line. Most
concerning, in a March 2022 on-line post, father mentioned the
“murder of” and killing of a Department social worker involved in
the case. For example, father posted, “The murder of
[Department social worker] is the only option!”

                                9
       As to the parents’ visits with the children, the Department
reported the visits had been “regular and consistent,” and the
parents were “attentive and nurturing to the children during the
visits.” The parents visited with all their children at a public
park for six hours every Saturday and every other Sunday.
Daughter and son were eager each week for their visits.
However, in addition to father’s stubbornness in allowing the
children to play in what the monitors believed to be an unsafe
area (an active driveway), the Department noted parents brought
mostly sugary and snack foods to each visit. The caregivers
reported the children were hyper and dirty after their visits with
parents. The caregivers also expressed fears that father might
post information about them on-line. Thus, the caregivers were
careful not to disclose their names to the children. The
caregivers asked that visits with parents stop if parental rights
were terminated.
       The Department also reported daughter and son were
thriving in their placement with caregivers. The children
referred to their caregivers as “auntie” and “uncle.” Daughter
was happy and enjoyed kindergarten. She said she liked her
caregivers, was happy living with them, and was loving toward
them. Son was described as “smart and grumpy.” Son described
the caregivers as “nice and fun.” He displayed “happiness and
comfort in the home.” Both children were enrolled in individual
therapy. The caregivers wanted to adopt daughter and son and
had completed all necessary paperwork to do so. The
Department reported as to the caregivers for daughter and son,
the case was “adoption ready” and there were “no impediments”
to adoption.

                               10
       At the permanency planning hearing held on March 17,
2022, the Department sought the termination of parental rights
as to five of parents’ children, including daughter and son. The
Department argued the beneficial parental relationship exception
to adoption did not apply. Counsel for those five children agreed
the juvenile court should terminate parental rights and that the
beneficial parental relationship exception to adoption did not
apply.
       On the other hand, mother’s counsel argued the court
should not terminate her parental rights. Additionally, counsel
argued the beneficial parental relationship exception applied.
Counsel noted visits with the children had been consistent and
positive, and the children enjoyed their time with parents.
Counsel argued the children and parents shared a bond, which, if
broken, would be detrimental to the children and not in their best
interests. Counsel for father also argued against termination of
parental rights and noted the existence of a bond not only
between parents and children but also between the siblings.
       After hearing argument, the juvenile court terminated
mother and father’s parental rights as to five of their children,
including daughter and son. The court held the beneficial
parental relationship exception to adoption did not apply.
Although the court found parents visited with the children
regularly and appropriately, the court further found terminating
the parental relationship would not be detrimental to the
children and the benefits of adoption outweighed continuing the
parental relationship. Additionally, after hearing argument
concerning what father meant in recent on-line statements
concerning the “murder” of a Department social worker, the
juvenile court found at least some of those statements to be

                               11
“threatening,” not to mention a further violation of the court’s
repeated orders not to post on-line about the case. The court
ordered no further visits for parents with the five children for
whom parental rights had been terminated. However, the court
ordered a referral so that the siblings could continue to visit each
other. The court designated caregivers the prospective adoptive
parents of daughter and son.
       d.     Appeal
       On May 16, 2022, mother appealed the juvenile court’s
March 17, 2022, orders. Although mother’s notice of appeal lists
all five children who were subject to the court’s March 17, 2022,
orders terminating parental rights, on appeal mother challenges
those orders only as they relate to daughter and son. Father did
not appeal the March 17, 2022, orders.
       While mother’s appeal was pending, mother and father
jointly submitted a letter to this court requesting self-
representation on appeal. In their letter, parents continued their
allegations of the CCP’s large-scale campaign of fraud and
deception against them. We denied parents’ request for self-
representation.
                           DISCUSSION
1.     Applicable Law
       At the permanency planning hearing, the juvenile court
may terminate parental rights only upon finding the child is
likely to be adopted and no statutory exception to adoption
applies. (§ 366.26, subds. (b) & (c)(1).) Here, it is undisputed the
children were likely to be adopted. Thus, our focus is whether a
statutory exception to the termination of parental rights applies.
       The exception mother raises is the beneficial parental
relationship exception. This exception is set forth in section

                                 12
366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i), which provides: “[T]he court shall
terminate parental rights unless . . . [¶] . . . [¶] (B) The court
finds a compelling reason for determining that termination would
be detrimental to the child due to one or more of the following
circumstances: [¶] (i) The parents have maintained regular
visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit
from continuing the relationship.”
       To establish this exception, the parent must prove the
following three elements: “(1) regular visitation and contact, and
(2) a relationship, the continuation of which would benefit the
child such that (3) the termination of parental rights would be
detrimental to the child.” (In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614,
631 (Caden C.).) “[I]n assessing whether termination would be
detrimental, the trial court must decide whether the harm from
severing the child’s relationship with the parent outweighs the
benefit to the child of placement in a new adoptive home.
[Citation.] By making this decision, the trial court determines
whether terminating parental rights serves the child’s best
interests.” (Id. at p. 632.) “ ‘If severing the natural parent/child
relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive
emotional attachment such that,’ even considering the benefits of
a new adoptive home, termination would ‘harm[]’ the child, the
court should not terminate parental rights.” (Id. at p. 633.) The
“ ‘statutory exceptions merely permit the court, in exceptional
circumstances [citation], to choose an option other than the norm,
which remains adoption.’ ” (Id. at p. 631.)
2.     Standard of Review
       When reviewing an order terminating parental rights and
rejecting application of the beneficial parental relationship
exception, we apply a hybrid standard of review. On the one

                                13
hand, “[a] substantial evidence standard of review applies to the
first two elements [of the exception]. The determination that the
parent has visited and maintained contact with the child
‘consistently,’ taking into account ‘the extent permitted by the
court’s orders’ [citation] is essentially a factual determination.
It’s likewise essentially a factual determination whether the
relationship is such that the child would benefit from continuing
it.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 639–640.)
        On the other hand, the juvenile court’s determination on
the third element is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. As to the
third element, the juvenile court “makes the assessment by
weighing the harm of losing the [parent-child] relationship
against the benefits of placement in a new, adoptive home. And
so, the ultimate decision—whether termination of parental rights
would be detrimental to the child due to the child’s relationship
with his parent—is discretionary and properly reviewed for abuse
of discretion.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 640.)
        “In reviewing factual determinations for substantial
evidence, a reviewing court should ‘not reweigh the evidence,
evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or resolve evidentiary
conflicts.’ [Citation.] The determinations should ‘be upheld if . . .
supported by substantial evidence, even though substantial
evidence to the contrary also exists and the trial court might have
reached a different result had it believed other evidence.’ ”
(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 640.) “Review for abuse of
discretion is subtly different, focused not primarily on the
evidence but the application of a legal standard. A court abuses
its discretion only when ‘ “ ‘the trial court has exceeded the limits
of legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently
absurd determination.’ ” ’ [Citation.] But ‘ “ ‘[w]hen two or more

                                 14
inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the
reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for
that of the trial court.’ ” ’ ” (Id. at p. 641.)
      “At its core,” this hybrid standard of review “embodies the
principle that ‘[t]he statutory scheme does not authorize a
reviewing court to substitute its own judgment as to what is in
the child’s best interests for the trial court’s determination in
that regard, reached pursuant to the statutory scheme’s
comprehensive and controlling provisions.’ ” (Caden C., supra, 11
Cal.5th at p. 641.)
3.    No Error
      It is undisputed mother visited regularly with the children,
both of whom appeared to enjoy their time with mother, father,
and their siblings. Thus, we conclude mother met the first
element of the beneficial parental relationship exception—
regular visitation and contact with the children. We assume
mother met the second element; i.e., the children would benefit
from continuation of their relationship with mother. (Caden C.,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.)
      Nonetheless, the beneficial parental exception to adoption
does not apply because mother failed to prove its third element.
In other words, it was not an abuse of discretion to conclude the
benefits to the children of an adoptive home outweighed any
harm from terminating mother’s parental rights. (Caden C.,
supra, 11 Cal. 5th at pp. 631–632.)
      Here, daughter and son were removed from their parents’
custody and care at a young age. When they were first removed,
daughter was four years old and son was two years old. By the
time of the permanency planning hearing, daughter and son had
been removed from their parents’ custody for almost two years.

                               15
They had been living with caregivers (their prospective adoptive
parents) for close to one year. Daughter and son were bonded
with caregivers and “thriving” in their care. Caregivers were
providing the nurturing and care daughter and son required,
including support for son’s developmental delays and need for an
IEP. Caregivers were dedicated to the children.
       Mother points to her record of consistently positive
monitored visits with daughter and son, claiming this
demonstrates her strong bond with the children.
Notwithstanding her positive visits, however, mother has not
established that termination of her parental rights would be
detrimental to daughter and son. Although mother visited with
all her children once or twice a week and everyone enjoyed their
time together, this does not rise to the level of “ ‘a significant,
positive, emotional attachment’ ” the protection of which would
warrant maintaining mother’s parental relationship with
daughter and son. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 632, 633.)
       Rather, the record amply supports the finding that
termination of mother’s parental rights was in fact in daughter
and son’s best interests. Mother does not address Dr. Wen’s
expert opinion and his safety concerns for any minors in her care.
As noted above, Dr. Wen opined mother was “unable to
independently care for her children without relying on her
husband” and “[t]he impedance by [father] will likely pose mental
health and safety concerns for any minors under their care.” The
juvenile court also recognized mother’s dependence on father.
Like father, mother has a history of refusing help because of
father’s influence and her own paranoia. For example, when
services were suggested for both daughter and son, mother
refused her consent. She also did not address, or even try to

                                16
address, her own mental health issues. Parents’ paranoid and
delusional world view continued unabated throughout the
underlying proceedings.
       We conclude the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion
when it found the benefits and security of adoption by caregivers
outweighed any harm from terminating mother’s parental
relationship with daughter and son. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th
at p. 640.) Thus, the juvenile court did not err when it held the
beneficial parental relationship exception to adoption did not
apply.
                           DISPOSITION
       The juvenile court’s March 17, 2022, orders are affirmed.
       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                          LUI, P. J.
We concur:

      ASHMANN-GERST, J.

      HOFFSTADT, J.

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