Court Opinion

ID: 9683323
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:26:40.704929+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:47.119580
License: Public Domain

CLINTON, Judge,
concurring.
The dissenting opinion is reminiscent of a recurring notion that a guilty verdict from an improperly charged jury may be upheld if somewhere in the court’s charge the jury is allowed to find guilt “as set forth [or charged] in the indictment.” But, as the Court stated in Bradley v. State, 560 S.W.2d 650 (Tex.Cr.App.1978):
“Were this the law, there would never be any need for a charge beyond requiring the jury to find that the defendant committed the offense as set forth in the indictment. [Citations omitted]” Id., at 652.
Implicit in the dissenting view is that the right of an accused to have a jury determine culpability beyond a reasonable doubt is satisfied once a verdict of guilty is returned — regardless of how egregiously erroneous was the court’s charge in allowing it to do so — if on appeal a reviewing court finds from all the evidence that a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, is cited, but carefully read it does support that view.
The context in which Jackson v. Virginia, supra, was decided must be recalled. Certiorari was granted to consider “under In re Winship, [397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970) ], a federal habeas corpus court must consider not whether there was any evidence to support a state-court conviction, but whether there was sufficient *717evidence to justify a rational trier of facts to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id., 443 U.S. at 313, 99 S.Ct. at 2785.1 Winship, of course, established that “the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects a defendant in a criminal case against conviction ‘except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged,’ 397 U.S., at 364 [90 S.Ct., at 1072] ....” Id., 443 U.S., at 315, 99 S.Ct., at 2786.
In coming to its resolution of the issue, the Supreme Court rejected the dissenting view in the cause at bar:
“The Winship doctrine requires more than simply a trial ritual. A doctrine establishing so fundamental a substantive constitutional standard must also require that the factfinder will rationally apply that standard to the facts in evidence. 8. * * * Yet a properly instructed jury may occasionally convict even when it can be said that no rational trier of fact could find guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.... * * * Under Winship ... it follows that when such a conviction occurs in a state trial it cannot constitutionally stand. * * *
8. The trier of fact in this case was a judge and not a jury. But this is of no constitutional significance. The record makes clear that the judge deemed himself ‘properly instructed.’”
Id., 443 U.S. at 317-318, 99 S.Ct. at 2788.
Then the Supreme Court made clear that its “rational trier of fact” standard assumed that the latter had been “properly instructed,” viz:
“After Winship the critical inquiry on review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction must not be simply to determine whether the jury was properly instructed, but to determine whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id., 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S.Ct. at 2789.
In the instant case only the State suggested there was error in the charge of the court to the jury — but not until its motion for rehearing. Essentially it was that contention that the Court then decided. We concluded:
“Finding no ‘trial error’ of which the State may at this point in the process avail itself to the end of a more desirable result, we must conclude the disposition of this cause made on original submission was correct.”
In short, the Court determined that under the evidence and procedure imposed by the law of this State appellant is not guilty of that which the prosecution tried him.
The opinion of the Court on the State’s unauthorized second motion for rehearing is correct, and I join it and the judgment of the Court.
McCORMICK, Judge.
The majority is correct in their analysis of the purpose of the indictment and the charge. It is true that the indictment gives the court jurisdiction over a case and provides notice to the defendant of that offense with which he is charged. It is also true that the purpose of the charge is to instruct the jury as to the law applicable to the ease. Article 36.14, V.A.C.C.P. It is an important tool for the jury. However, the majority is in error when it asserts that a reviewing court is to judge the sufficiency of the evidence by looking at how the court charged the jury. This erroneous assertion is based on the false premise that when an appellate court is reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence it is looking to determine whether this particular jury was correct in the verdict it reached. That is not the premise on which sufficiency of the evidence is to be determined. The purpose of an examination as to sufficiency of the evidence is not to determine whether this particular jury erred in their verdict, but whether “a rational trier of fact” could *718have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560. In other words, has the State met the burden of proving the allegations made in their indictment against the defendant?1
The indictment in the instant case alleged in pertinent part that appellant
“... did then and there intentionally and knowingly enter a habitation without the effective consent of Virgie Harris, the owner, having intent to commit the felony offense of retaliation.... ”
The application paragraph of the jury charge tracked the language of the indictment:
“Now, if you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that in McLennan County, Texas, on or about the 23rd day of January, 1978, Serlee Benson, did then and there intentionally and knowingly enter a habitation without the effective consent of Virgie Harris, the owner, having intent to commit the felony offense of retaliation, then you will find the defendant guilty of burglary of a habitation with intent to commit the felony offense of retaliation.”
The abstract portion of the charge discussed retaliation as follows:
“A person commits the offense of retaliation if he intentionally or knowingly harms or threatens to harm another by an unlawful act in retaliation for or on account of the service of another as a witness.” (Emphasis added)
The term “witness” was not defined. Neither was it defined in V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Section 36.06:
“(a) A person commits an offense if he intentionally or knowingly harms or threatens to harm another by an unlawful act in retaliation for or on account of the service of another as a public servant, witness, or informant.
“(b) For purposes of this section ‘informant’ means a person who has communicated information to the government in connection with any governmental function.
“(c) An offense under this section is a felony of the third degree.”
It is apparent that the abstract portion of the charge expanded on the allegations of the indictment by adding the phrase “as a witness.” As I will point out later, I do not believe this was error. However, for the purposes of discussion, assuming the addition of this phrase was error, it was not the type of error envisioned in the law to mandate a judgment of acquittal. Rather, it is what has become known as “trial error,” that is, error which renders a case reversible and ripe for a new trial. The United States Supreme Court in Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 16, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 2149, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978), recognized this distinction and included incorrect jury instructions under the category of trial error.
“In short, reversal for trial error, as distinguished from evidentiary insufficiency, does not constitute a decision to the effect that the government has failed to prove its case. As such, it implies nothing with respect to the guilt or innocence of the defendant. Rather, it is a determination that a defendant has been convicted through a judicial process which is defective in some fundamental respect, e.g., incorrect receipt or rejection of evidence, incorrect instructions, or prosecu-torial misconduct....” At page 2149. (Emphasis added)
*719The error which the majority finds in this case certainly has nothing to do with the guilt or innocence of the appellant. Clearly, the State proved each and every allegation in the indictment. A reading of the record shows that the appellant’s ex-wife, Mary Benson, had filed assault charges against appellant. She had been subpoenaed to appear in court as a witness against appellant. Two days before the trial date, appellant met with Mary Benson in his attorney’s office and tried to persuade her to drop the charges. She refused. Later that day, appellant broke into the house where Mary Benson was staying with her mother, Virgie Harris. Mrs. Harris testified that she heard three shots and heard her daughter scream, “MaMa, that’s him.” She walked into her living room and saw appellant armed with two rifles. He was pointing one rifle at Mary Benson and her child. Appellant told his victims that he could not go on under the pressure. When Virgie Harris began trying to talk to appellant, he attempted to hit Mrs. Harris with the butt of one of the guns. As this was occurring, Mary Benson ran out of the house and yelled at the neighbors to summon the police. Appellant followed her out of the house and told her he would shoot their child if she did not go back into the house. Mary Benson went back into the house with appellant. Appellant told Mary Benson that, since she did not listen to him at the attorney’s office, he was tired of talking. By this time, the police had arrived, but appellant refused to give up. As appellant held Mary Benson at gunpoint, the police tried to talk appellant out of the house. At one point, appellant told Mary Benson to go lock the back door. As she was locking the door, the telephone rang and, as appellant turned to answer it, Mary Benson grabbed her child and escaped.
Surely, the jury, upon hearing the allegations of the indictment and the evidence in this cause was correct in finding sufficient evidence to convict appellant. There is no doubt that appellant was guilty as charged in the indictment.
I am sure that the majority would have found the evidence sufficient in this case had the abstract portion of the charge set out above read either that:
“A person commits the offense of retaliation if he intentionally or knowingly harms or threatens to harm another by an unlawful act in retaliation for or on account of the service of another as a public servant, witness, or informant.” (Emphasis added)
or that:
“A person commits the offense of retaliation if he intentionally or knowingly harms or threatens to harm another by an unlawful act in retaliation for or on account of the service of another.”
Such changes in wording have nothing to do with the guilt or innocence of the appellant. Nor do they affect the substance of the evidence which the State was required to present in order to meet the allegations of the indictment.
The majority opinion as written is especially menacing when one considers the implications of much of its language. As a result of the majority’s statement that “[t]he statutory elements of an offense must be set out either in the application paragraph or in the definitional portion of the charge,” [page 714] fundamental error in the charge will no longer be confined to the application paragraph of the charge. Up until now the law has been that the jury charge in its application paragraph must require the jury to find all the elements of the offense, or if when applying the law to the facts, a trial court charges the jury on the component parts of an element of the offense rather than the element itself, the charge must require the jury to find all of the parts of that element in order to convict. Lewis v. State, 656 S.W.2d 472 (Tex.Cr.App.1983); Evans v. State, 606 S.W.2d 880 (Tex.Cr.App.1980).
As I noted above, I do not think that the court’s charge contained error. The term “witness” as used in the abstract portion of the charge was not defined. It has long been the rule that when a term is not defined in the jury charge, the jury is left to apply a layman’s definition of the term.
*720The majority mistakenly relies on Ulmer v. State, 544 S.W.2d 414 (Tex.Cr.App.1976), and Jones v. State, 628 S.W.2d 51 (Tex.Cr.App.1982), to support their assertion that “witness” means “one who has testified in an official proceeding” and thus does not include a “prospective witness.” Ulmer does not support the majority’s position. Ulmer was indicted for retaliating against “Oscar Hutchins, a witness in a Grand Jury proceeding in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, Midland Division.” 544 S.W.2d at 414.
“Since the indictment alleged and the evidence showed that the retaliation was for Hutchins’ service as a witness before a federal grand jury, the legal issue before this Court is whether the term ‘witness’ as used in Y.T.C.A.Penal Code, Sec. 36.06(a), supra, includes a person who has appeared and given testimony before a federal grand jury. Appellant says that ‘the alleged victim does not fulfill the elements of the Code to be a witness. He did not testify in an official proceeding of the State government, as defined in the Code.’” 544 S.W.2d at 414
The Court in Ulmer went on to note that the term “witness” was not defined in the Penal Code:
“We do not agree with appellant’s contention that the term ‘witness’ as used in Section 36.06(a), supra, was meant to be limited to one who testifies in an official proceeding of the State government as the term government is defined in the Code.... We conclude that as applied to the facts in the instant case, ‘witness’ applies to one who testifies before a federal grand jury or federal official proceeding in the same manner as it would apply to one who testifies in a State court or before a State grand jury or other official State governmental agency. This is so because the term is not limited by the statute and because the gravamen of the crime is the unlawful act causing or threatening harm committed in retaliation for or on account of the victim’s service as a witness. If the Legislature had intended to limit the term ‘witness’ to one who testified before an official proceeding of State government, ‘witness’ would have been so limited in the same manner as was the term ‘informant’ in Subsection (b) of Section 36.06, supra.” (Emphasis in original) (footnote omitted) 544 S.W.2d at 415, 416.
The definition of “witness” upon which the majority relies was not recognized until this Court’s decision in Jones v. State, 628 S.W.2d 51, supra, some two and one half years after the trial of this case occurred. How was anyone involved in the trial of this case — judge, prosecutor, appellant, jur- or-expected to know that this Court would severly restrict the definition of witness in Section 36.06 to apply only to “one who has testified in an official proceeding?” Surely, that was not the commonly accepted definition of the term, at the time of the trial in this case. I submit that under the law as it was known to the parties in 1978 when this case was tried the evidence was clearly sufficient to show that Mary Benson was a “witness” within the meaning of the trial court’s charge. Indeed, the record shows that at the time of trial the appellant himself believed that the State had to prove that Mary Benson was a “witness” under Section 36.06.
This is demonstrated in his requested jury charge where the appellant asked that the judge charge the jury as follows:
“(4) The essential elements of the offense of the offense (sic) of retaliation must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt and these are:
(1) Serlee Benson
(2) intentionally or knowingly
(3) harms or threatens to harm
(4) another
(5) by an unlawful act
(6) in retaliation
(7) for service as a witness.”
(Emphasis added)
To reverse the case now because the jury charge in effect was worded just as appellant requested seems ludicrous.
In Burks, the Supreme Court, in discussing the occurrence of trial error, noted:
*721“When this occurs, the accused has a strong interest in obtaining a fair readju-dication of his guilt free from error, just as society maintains a valid concern for insuring that the guilty are punished.” (Emphasis added)
Even if the charge were erroneous (which .1 do not concede under the facts presented by this record), the State has met the eviden-tiary burden placed upon it by the indictment. The holding of the majority flies directly in the face of the Supreme Court language quoted above — society’s valid concerns are hereby invalidated!
Thus, I must dissent to the denial of the State’s second motion for rehearing. First, no appellate court should reverse and acquit when the evidence clearly proves up the allegations in the indictment, but the abstract portion of the jury charge contains a defect which has no bearing on the guilt or innocence of the appellant. Secondly, even if the jury charge should be considered when discussing sufficiency of the evidence, the evidence in this ease was clearly sufficient to find that appellant had the intent to retaliate against a witness — witness being properly defined at the time of trial by a layman’s definition.
For the above reasons, I dissent.
CAMPBELL, J., joins in this dissent.

. Emphasis by Supreme Court. All other emphasis is added throughout by the writer of this opinion unless otherwise indicated.

. This Court’s practice has been to review sufficiency of the evidence by examining the allegations in the indictment and the evidence presented at trial. If there is no variance between the indictment and evidence, the evidence is sufficient. See: Salazar v. State, 643 S.W.2d 953 (Tex.Cr.App.1983); Windham v. State, 638 S.W.2d 486 (Tex.Cr.App.1982); Alfaro/Kinser v. State, 638 S.W.2d 891 (Tex.Cr.App.1982); Gallegos v. State, 635 S.W.2d 527 (Tex.Cr.App.1982) (on rehearing); Jean Pierre, Inc. v. State, 635 S.W.2d 548 (Tex.Cr.App.1982); Wiley v. State, 632 S.W.2d 746 (Tex.Cr.App.1982); Sewell v. State, 629 S.W.2d 42 (Tex.Cr.App.1982): Herrera v. State, 623 S.W.2d 940 (Tex.Cr.App.1981); Jones v. State, 620 S.W.2d 129 (Tex.Cr.App.1981).