Court Opinion

ID: 9960994
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-17 17:12:24.7254+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:20:08.382123
License: Public Domain

J-S05018-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 IN THE INTEREST OF: E.D.G., A           :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 MINOR                                   :        PENNSYLVANIA
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 APPEAL OF: L.U., MOTHER                 :       No. 1142 WDA 2023

               Appeal from the Order Entered August 21, 2023
              In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
              Orphans' Court at No(s): CP-02-AP-0000166-2022

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., KING, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.:                               FILED: April 17, 2024

      Appellant, L.U. (“Mother”), appeals from the order entered in the

Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, which granted the petition of

Appellee, Allegheny County Office of Children, Youth and Families (“CYF”), for

involuntary termination of Mother’s parental rights to her minor child, E.D.G.

(“Child”). We affirm.

      The Orphans’ Court set forth the relevant facts and procedural history

of this case as follows:

         [CYF] first became involved with Mother and Child in July
         2014. CYF’s involvement began shortly after Child’s birth
         following an incident for which Mother was charged with and
         ultimately convicted of endangering the welfare of a child.
         Over the next several years, CYF continued to receive
         referrals alleging ongoing substance abuse, intimate partner
         violence, and lack of appropriate supervision for Child.
         Mother became incarcerated in 2018, at which time [Child’s]
         maternal grandmother assumed care of Child. On June 20,
         2019, Mother was released from jail and began having
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       contact with Child, though she was not permitted to be
       Child’s full-time caregiver due to the conditions of her
       probation.

       On August 26, 2019, CYF accepted the family for services
       due to concerns regarding substance abuse for both Mother
       and [the] maternal grandmother. In August of 2020, Child
       returned to Mother’s care in a household that included
       Mother’s partner, D.C. Although CYF did not initiate a
       dependency proceeding, CYF maintained contact with the
       family to ensure Mother was attending drug and alcohol
       treatment as both Mother and D.C. have a history of opioid
       addiction.

       On March 19, 2021, CYF received the referral that ultimately
       resulted in Child’s removal from Mother. CYF learned that
       Mother experienced severe injury and bruising to her arms
       and provided conflicting accounts regarding how the injuries
       occurred. The injuries themselves, along with observations
       of Mother’s interaction with D.C., raised significant concerns
       regarding intimate partner violence. Neither Mother nor
       D.C. could provide verification of their drug and alcohol
       treatment and Mother failed to follow through on a
       requested drug screen. After unsuccessful efforts to gain
       Mother’s cooperation and satisfy safety concerns, CYF
       obtained an emergency custody authorization[.]

       CYF placed Child in foster care on March 25, 2021, where
       she has since remained.      The court adjudicated Child
       dependent on May 19, 2021 and ordered that she remain in
       placement. The court found that the conditions requiring
       placement included Mother’s need to participate in the level
       of drug and alcohol treatment recommended to establish
       and maintain sobriety, her need to demonstrate appropriate
       parenting capacity, and her need to address intimate
       partner violence concerns.

                                *    *    *

       At the time of Child’s removal in March of 2021, Mother had
       been struggling with substance abuse and had failed to
       provide CYF with documentation of participation in any
       treatment program. The same remained true at both the
       time of the filing of the termination petition and at the

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          termination hearing.[1] Since Child’s removal, Mother has
          never provided any documentation confirming attendance
          at or completion of a drug treatment program.

          Mother has additionally failed to attend and complete drug
          screens, attending only 10 out of the 55 requested between
          Child’s removal and the filing of the termination petition. Of
          those 10 screens, Mother tested positive for illicit
          substances on 5 occasions, indicating continuing use.
          Indeed, during a home visit in July of 2022, the caseworker
          observed what appeared to be stamp bags outside Mother’s
          house. Upon making contact with Mother, the caseworker
          observed her to have glassy eyes and a freshly bleeding
          prick on a vein in her hand, again indicating active
          substance use. The evidence established that at no time
          over the life of the case has Mother been able to
          demonstrate any sobriety.

          In addition to Mother’s failure to demonstrate recovery from
          substance abuse, Mother also failed to address CYF’s and
          the court’s concerns regarding intimate partner violence
          between herself and D.C. Although Mother completed an
          intimate partner violence course in December of 2021, she
          has remained in a relationship with D.C. and has continued
          to deny the existence of any physical or verbal violence
          between the two even when reported by Child. Further,
          Mother has demonstrated no understanding of or
          accountability for the impact … Mother’s relationship with
          D.C. [has on Child]. Child has repeatedly expressed her
          desire to have no contact with D.C. Despite Child’s express
          wishes, Mother continued to discuss D.C. during visits and
____________________________________________

[1] Katie Baumgarten, the CYF caseworker assigned to Child’s case, testified

that Mother completed a drug and alcohol assessment prior to September of
2021 and no treatment was recommended. However, due to concerns of
substance abuse that arose subsequently, Mother was ordered to complete an
updated drug and alcohol evaluation. Mother was referred to a provider on
four separate occasions to complete the evaluation and the provider made
multiple unsuccessful attempts to complete a phone screening and schedule
a level of care screening with Mother. Despite these efforts, Mother had not
completed an updated drug and alcohol assessment to date and Ms.
Baumgarten had no knowledge or documentation indicating that Mother had
completed a drug and alcohol evaluation with another provider.

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          attempt to contact            him    making   Child   extremely
          uncomfortable….

          While Mother has been unable to demonstrate sobriety or
          address the concerns regarding intimate partner violence,
          Child has thrived in her pre-adoptive foster home. Both [Ms.
          Baumgarten and Amber Dornin, a caseworker at Every Child
          Foster Care,] have observed Child to be comfortable in [the]
          foster parents’ care with all her needs being met. [Dr. Beth
          Bliss,   Ph.D.   Licensed     Psychologist,   conducted   a]
          interactional evaluation between [the] foster parents and
          Child. Dr. Bliss observed Child to be bonded and attached
          to [the] foster parents and further observed that they
          interacted as a family unit.

          Notably, Dr. Bliss also observed a bond between Mother and
          Child during their interactional evaluation in June of 2022.
          [Ms. Dornin] made similar observations. However, since the
          time of Dr. Bliss’s evaluation, Child has become less willing
          to see Mother. Indeed, at the time of the termination
          hearing, Child’s visitation with Mother had decreased to the
          point [that] it was solely at Child's discretion.[2] Given
          Child’s strong bond with her foster parents, Dr. Bliss opined
          that their relationship, as well as Child’s on-going
          participation in weekly counseling, could mitigate any
          potential detriment to Child from termination of Mother’s
          parental rights. Dr. Bliss further testified that maintaining
          a relationship with Mother could cause detriment to Child if
          Mother appeared under the influence at visits, brought D.C.
          to visits, or visited inconsistently. These circumstances, Dr.
          Bliss opined, could be harmful and retraumatize Child.

(Orphans’ Court Opinion, filed 11/27/23, at 2-8) (footnotes omitted).

____________________________________________

[2] Ms. Baumgarten testified that Child typically had two supervised, in person

visits and one virtual visit with Mother on a weekly basis. Mother never
progressed to unsupervised visits with Child. Around January of 2023, the
frequency of Mother’s visits with Child decreased due to several instances
where Mother failed to confirm her visits or appeared late. After this point,
visits were scheduled at Child’s discretion. Child elected to cancel several
visits with Mother immediately prior to the termination hearing.

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       Additionally,    Child’s   legal   counsel   testified   that   she   has   been

representing Child for almost two years and had seen Child twice within 30

days of the termination hearing.3 Counsel testified that Child initially wanted

to return to Mother’s care but later qualified her preference that she only

wanted to return to Mother’s care if D.C. was not present. In the months

immediately preceding the termination hearing, Child indicated that she

wanted to be adopted and understood that terminating Mother’s parental

rights is necessary to bring about that outcome.            Based on Child’s stated

preference and counsel’s observations of Child’s welfare, counsel opined that

termination of Mother’s parental rights would best protect Child’s interests.

       On August 21, 2023, the court entered an order terminating Mother’s

parental rights to Child.4 On September 19, 2023, Mother timely filed a notice

of appeal and a contemporaneous concise statement pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.

1925(a)(2)(i).

       Mother raises the following issues for our review:

          Did the [Orphans’ C]ourt abuse its discretion and/or err as
          a matter of law in granting the petition to involuntarily
          terminate Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A.
          § 2511(a)(2) and (8)?

          Did the [Orphans’ C]ourt abuse its discretion and/or err as
____________________________________________

3 The court had appointed a separate guardian ad litem for Child prior to the

termination hearing.

4 The court also terminated Child’s father’s parental rights in the same order.

Child’s father did not participate in the termination proceedings and is not a
party to this appeal.

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         a matter of law in concluding that CYF met its burden of
         proof by clear and convincing evidence that termination of
         Mother’s parental rights would best serve the needs and
         welfare of the child pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b)?

(Mother’s Brief at 6).

      In her issues combined, Mother contends that she undertook steps to

eliminate the conditions that led to Child’s removal and substantially complied

with the court ordered goals. Mother asserts that she successfully completed

an intimate partner violence program.        Mother further claims that she

underwent a drug and alcohol evaluation after which no substance abuse

treatment was recommended. Mother argues that she submitted to a portion

of the scheduled drug screens and only failed to appear at the others because

of transportation barriers, conflicts with her work schedule, and illness.

Mother insists that the results of her drug screen on November 29, 2022 show

that she was negative for all illicit substances, demonstrating that she was

able to maintain sobriety. Mother further asserts that she regularly visited

Child and maintained a parental relationship with her.       As such, Mother

contends that there was insufficient evidence to show that Mother was unable

and unwilling to provide essential parental care to Child or that Mother failed

to address all the concerns that led to Child’s removal.

      Mother further avers that the evidence demonstrated that Child enjoys

spending time with Mother and has a comfortable and easy relationship with

her. Mother asserts that she has a strong bond with Child and terminating

that bond would have a serious detrimental effect on Child. Mother concludes

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that the court erred in terminating her parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A

§ 2511(a)(2), (8), and (b). We disagree.

      Appellate review of termination of parental rights cases implicates the

following principles:

         In cases involving termination of parental rights: “our
         standard of review is limited to determining whether the
         order of the trial court is supported by competent evidence,
         and whether the trial court gave adequate consideration to
         the effect of such a decree on the welfare of the child.”

In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1115 (Pa.Super. 2010) (quoting In re I.J., 972

A.2d 5, 8 (Pa.Super. 2009)).

            Absent an abuse of discretion, an error of law, or
            insufficient evidentiary support for the trial court’s
            decision, the decree must stand. … We must employ
            a broad, comprehensive review of the record in order
            to determine whether the trial court’s decision is
            supported by competent evidence.

         In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 383 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en
         banc), appeal denied, 581 Pa. 668, 863 A.2d 1141 (2004)
         (internal citations omitted).

            Furthermore, we note that the trial court, as the finder
            of fact, is the sole determiner of the credibility of
            witnesses and all conflicts in testimony are to be
            resolved by the finder of fact. The burden of proof is
            on the party seeking termination to establish by clear
            and convincing evidence the existence of grounds for
            doing so.

         In re Adoption of A.C.H., 803 A.2d 224, 228 (Pa.Super.
         2002) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The
         standard of clear and convincing evidence means testimony
         that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable
         the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without
         hesitation, of the truth of the precise facts in issue. In re
         J.D.W.M., 810 A.2d 688, 690 (Pa.Super. 2002). We may

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           uphold a termination decision if any proper basis exists for
           the result reached. In re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201
           (Pa.Super. 2000) (en banc). If the court’s findings are
           supported by competent evidence, we must affirm the
           court’s decision, even if the record could support an opposite
           result. In re R.L.T.M., 860 A.2d 190, 191-92 (Pa.Super.
           2004).

In re Z.P., supra at 1115-16 (quoting In re Adoption of K.J., 936 A.2d

1128, 1131-32 (Pa.Super. 2007), appeal denied, 597 Pa. 718, 951 A.2d 1165

(2008)).

      CYF filed a petition for the involuntary termination of Mother’s parental

rights to Child on the following grounds:

           § 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

           (a) General Rule.―The rights of a parent in regard to a
           child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the
           following grounds:

                                    *    *    *

              (2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,
              neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child
              to be without essential parental care, control or
              subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-
              being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity,
              abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be
              remedied by the parent.

                                    *    *    *

              (8) The child has been removed from the care of the
              parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement
              with an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from
              the date of removal or placement, the conditions
              which led to the removal or placement of the child
              continue to exist and termination of parental rights
              would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.

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                                    *    *        *

           (b) Other considerations.―The court in terminating the
           rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
           developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare
           of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated
           solely on the basis of environmental factors such as
           inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and
           medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent.
           With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection
           (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by
           the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which
           are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
           filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (8), and (b). “Parental rights may be involuntarily

terminated where any one subsection of Section 2511(a) is satisfied, along

with consideration of the subsection 2511(b) provisions.” In re Z.P., supra

at 1117.

           Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
           seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing
           evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory
           grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only
           if the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants
           termination of her…parental rights does the court engage in
           the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b):
           determination of the needs and welfare of the child under
           the standard of best interests of the child.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007) (internal citations omitted).

      The    grounds    for   termination    of       parental   rights   under   Section

2511(a)(2), due to parental incapacity that cannot be remedied, are not

limited to affirmative misconduct; to the contrary those grounds may include

acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental duties. In re Z.P.,

supra at 1117. “Parents are required to make diligent efforts towards the

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reasonably prompt assumption of full parental responsibilities.” Id. at 1117-

18.   Under Section 2511(a)(2), “the petitioner for involuntary termination

must prove (1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal;

(2) that such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal caused the child to be

without essential parental care, control or subsistence; and (3) that the causes

of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied.”

In Interest of Lilley, 719 A.2d 327, 330 (Pa.Super. 1998).

      “[T]o terminate parental rights under Section 2511(a)(8), the following

factors must be demonstrated: (1) [t]he child has been removed from

parental care for 12 months or more from the date of removal; (2) the

conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist;

and (3) termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare

of the child.” In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1275-76 (Pa.Super.

2003).   “Section 2511(a)(8) sets a 12-month time frame for a parent to

remedy the conditions that led to the children’s removal by the court.” In re

A.R., 837 A.2d 560, 564 (Pa.Super. 2003). Once the 12-month period has

been established, the court must next determine whether the conditions that

led to the child’s removal continue to exist, despite the reasonable good faith

efforts of CYF supplied over a realistic time. Id. Termination under Section

2511(a)(8) does not require the court to evaluate a parent’s current

willingness or ability to remedy the conditions that initially caused placement

or the availability or efficacy of CYF’s services. In re Adoption of T.B.B.,

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835 A.2d 387, 396 (Pa.Super. 2003); In re Adoption of M.E.P., supra.

      Under Section 2511(b), the court must consider whether termination

will meet the child’s needs and welfare.        In re C.P., 901 A.2d 516, 520

(Pa.Super. 2006). “Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability

are involved when inquiring about the needs and welfare of the child. The

court must also discern the nature and status of the parent-child bond, paying

close attention to the effect on the child of permanently severing the bond.”

Id. Significantly:

         In this context, the court must take into account whether a
         bond exists between child and parent, and whether
         termination would destroy an existing, necessary and
         beneficial relationship.

         When conducting a bonding analysis, the court is not
         required to use expert testimony. Social workers and
         caseworkers can offer evaluations as well. Additionally,
         Section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding
         evaluation.

In re Z.P., supra at 1121 (internal citations omitted).

      “The statute permitting the termination of parental rights outlines

certain irreducible minimum requirements of care that parents must provide

for their children, and a parent who cannot or will not meet the requirements

within a reasonable time following intervention by the state, may properly be

considered unfit and have … her rights terminated.” In re B.L.L., 787 A.2d

1007, 1013 (Pa.Super. 2001). “A parent’s basic constitutional right to the

custody and rearing of his or her child is converted, upon the parent’s failure

to fulfill his or her parental duties, to the child’s right to have proper parenting

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and fulfillment of his or her potential in a permanent, healthy, safe

environment.” Id. at 1013-14.

     Instantly, the court determined that termination was proper under

Section 2511(a)(2) and (8), explaining:

        In this matter, the court authorized Child’s removal from
        Mother’s care on March 24, 2021. Child was placed with her
        foster parents on March 25, 2021 and has remained in
        placement ever since. CYF filed its petition for termination
        on November 10, 2022, 19½ months after Child was placed.
        Thus, 19½ months had elapsed by the time the petition was
        filed, and almost 30 months had elapsed by the date of the
        termination hearing.

        At the time of adjudication, the court defined the conditions
        that required Child’s placement as Mother’s need to
        participate in the level of drug and alcohol treatment
        recommended to establish and maintain sobriety, her need
        to demonstrate appropriate parenting capacity, and her
        need to address intimate partner violence concerns. To
        address these conditions, the [c]ourt required Mother to
        participate in a drug and alcohol evaluation and follow all
        recommendations, comply with random urine screens,
        participate in domestic violence services, participate in
        coached or therapeutic visitation with Child, and attend
        supervised visits with Child. Over the subsequent months,
        the court held regular review hearings and consistently
        required Mother to engage in the same services identified at
        the time of adjudication.

        The evidence at the hearing revealed that Mother’s
        engagement in the specified services either did not occur or
        did not remedy the conditions requiring Child’s placement.
        Though Mother completed one drug and alcohol evaluation
        in the fall of 2021, she was continually referred for further
        evaluations due to evidence of continued use. Further,
        despite CYF’s concerns regarding ongoing drug use, Mother
        failed to attend and complete a treatment program.
        Mother’s attendance at drug screens was inconsistent and
        revealed that she continued to use illicit substances.
        Indeed, in July of 2022, the CYF caseworker observed

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          Mother under the influence with what appeared to be fresh
          marks on her skin from using drugs. At no time over the
          life of the case was Mother ever able to demonstrate her
          sobriety.

          Regarding intimate partner violence, although Mother
          completed a course through the Women’s Center & Shelter
          by December of 2021, Mother remained in a relationship
          with D.C. and refused to acknowledge the impact of his
          presence on Child.      The CYF caseworker had ongoing
          conversations with Mother regarding D.C.’s presence over
          the life of the case. Despite Child’s repeated requests that
          D.C. not be present and that she not be required to have
          contact with him, Mother refused to accept Child’s stated
          wishes and instead insisted that Child was being coached.
          Even during her June 2022 evaluation with Dr. Bliss, Mother
          exhibited limited insight regarding the impact witnessing
          intimate partner violence could have on Child and continued
          to deny its existence in her relationship with D.C. Given
          Mother’s relationship, the court continued to direct CYF to
          re-refer her for ongoing services as recently as July of 2023,
          though Mother never pursued further programming.

(Orphans’ Court Opinion at 11-13) (footnotes omitted). The record supports

the court’s findings. See In re Z.P., supra. Despite Mother’s assertions to

the contrary, the evidence demonstrates that Mother has been unable to

maintain sobriety throughout the pendency of this case.5 Ms. Baumgarten

testified that Mother failed to undergo an updated drug and alcohol

assessment despite repeated referrals and attempts to schedule an

assessment. Mother attended only 10 out of 55 drug screenings requested

____________________________________________

5 The fact that Mother attended one drug and alcohol assessment and tested

negative at some drug screenings does not establish that Mother was
maintaining sobriety, particularly in light of the overwhelming evidence to the
contrary.

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prior to the termination petition and tested positive for illicit substances on

five of the occasions where she presented.6          Additionally, Ms. Baumgarten

testified to witnessing evidence of present drug use at Mother’s residence

during a home visit in July 2022.

       Further, the record demonstrates that intimate partner violence

continues to be a concern in Mother’s life even after her completion of the

Women’s Center and Shelter course.             Mother has never acknowledged the

existence of intimate partner violence in her relationship with D.C., despite

presenting on multiple occasions with signs of physical violence and Child’s

statements that she witnessed instances of violence.           Multiple witnesses

testified that D.C. continues to be a present in Mother’s life. Additionally, Dr.

Bliss’s testimony demonstrated that Mother fails to fully comprehend or take

seriously Child’s repeated and expressed wish that D.C. no longer be present

in her life. On this record, we discern no error in the court’s determination

that Mother’s continuous refusal or inability to address substance abuse and

intimate partner violence issues for the duration of this matter supports

termination of Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2) and

(8). See In re Adoption of M.E.P., supra; In Interest of Lilley, supra.

       Regarding Section 2511(b), the court explained:

____________________________________________

6 Mother did not provide any proof of her claim that she was unable to attend

the drug screenings due to various barriers, nor did she establish that she
took any steps to address these issues so that she could comply with the court
order in a timely manner.

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       Given the testimony of both Dr. Bliss and the foster care
       caseworker that Mother and Child have continued to share
       a bond over the life of the case, the court assumed its
       existence in considering the evidence.            Despite the
       existence of the bond, Mother has demonstrated inability to
       prioritize Child’s needs for safety and security over her own.
       The evidence demonstrated that Mother has failed to
       adequately address her struggle with intimate partner
       violence and substance abuse. Dr. Bliss opined that, should
       Child return to an environment where these issues remained
       unaddressed, “it would be extremely physically dangerous
       for her as well as emotionally traumatic.”               [(N.T.
       Termination Hearing, 8/11/2023, at 95).] Dr. Bliss further
       opined that Mother’s continued relationship with D.C.
       despite Child expressing fear of him could have negative
       effects on her, testifying that there could be “internalization
       of the message that her mother [is] choosing the man over
       her and also, again, exposure to things that are causing her
       fear or trauma.” [(Id. at 94).]

       At the time of the termination hearing, Child had been in her
       pre-adoptive placement with [her] foster parents for over
       two years. During that time, Child has become strongly
       bonded and attached to her foster parents and has achieved
       stability in their care. Indeed, during an interactional
       evaluation in March of 2022, Dr. Bliss observed [that] Child
       and [her] foster parents [operated] as a family unit. Dr.
       Bliss made this same observation during a follow-up
       evaluation in February of 2023. At that time Dr. Bliss
       observed Child to have a “positive and secure attachment”
       to [her] foster parents. These conclusions were shared by
       both the CYF and Every Child caseworkers who observed
       Child to be comfortable in [her] foster parents’ care and that
       they continued to meet all her needs. This bond, Dr. Bliss
       opined, could mitigate any potential detriment to Child from
       termination of Mother’s parental rights.

       Mother continues to need drug and alcohol treatment and
       intimate partner violence counseling, per her court-ordered
       goals. Given Mother’s lack of progress toward her goals
       over the life of the case, the court justifiably concluded that
       Child’s need for safety, permanency, and stability outweighs
       the possible benefit to her of maintaining her relationship
       with Mother. While Child and Mother may share a bond as

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          observed by caseworkers and Dr. Bliss, the evidence
          demonstrated that this bond is neither necessary nor
          beneficial, and consequently, Child will not suffer extreme
          emotional consequences from termination of Mother’s
          parental rights. Accordingly, the evidence supports the
          [c]ourt’s conclusion that termination of Mother’s parental
          rights serves Child’s needs and welfare.

(Orphans’ Court Opinion at 18-19).

      The record supports the court’s analysis. See In re Z.P., supra. As

such, we discern no error in the court’s determination that termination is in

Child’s best interest under Section 2511(b). See In re Adoption of C.D.R.,

111 A.3d 1212 (Pa.Super. 2015) (affirming termination decision where court

acknowledged that Mother and Child were bonded, but reasoned that

termination would not be detrimental to Child and would serve Child’s best

interest and allow Child to find permanency with another family); In re

N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95 (Pa.Super. 2011) (explaining mere existence of emotional

bond does not preclude termination of parental rights).      Accordingly, we

affirm.

      Order affirmed.

DATE: 04/17/2024

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