Court Opinion

ID: 9538429
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:36:22.169045+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:57:52.131315
License: Public Domain

CROCKETT, Justice:
(Concurring, but dissenting in part). I agree with all that is said in the main opinion, except that I dissent from those portions dealing with the reversal of the award of $35,000 to the defendant as an occupying claimant. That reversal appears to be based upon the statement that “no recovery can be had for improvements made with the knowledge of the existence of an adverse claim which subsequently proves to be superior to that of the occupant.” That statement is too broad. If literally applied, it would in many instances defeat the purpose of the occupying claimant statute. It is submitted that an examination of the cases cited in support thereof1 will reveal that the rule as stated is all right as applicable to the particular facts therein, but is not necessarily inconsistent with what is said in this dissent.
It requires little reflection to realize that if a claimant must have title which ulti*1251mately proves to be superior, he would have no need to recover for improvements placed on the land. It is only when he has a bona fide claim, constituting color of title, and in good faith places improvements on the land, and his. claim of title later proves to be inferior to some other claim, that he needs that protection.
Consistent with the foregoing is the language of the statutes themselves. Secs. 57-6-1 and 2 indicate that the occupant can recover if “in good faith” he makes valuable improvements on the property and is afterwards “found not to be the owner.” It is obvious that this contemplates a situation where there is an outstanding “adverse claim which subsequently proves to be superior to that of the occupant.”
The main opinion correctly states that the doctrine is based on unjust enrichment of the person who proves to be the true owner. This enrichment entails something which is a benefit to the land and thus to the true owner.
Whether recovery may be had may well depend upon several circumstances, including the nature of the improvement placed on the property. Conceivably it could be a dam, or a bridge or some other improvement essential to preserve the land itself, as contrasted with something which would improve it only for the purpose and use of the occupying claimant. In this case the view of the trial court was that the leveling and clearing of the land, installation of ditches and culverts, grading of roads and remodeling of the house were such improvements of the land itself as to constitute an unjust enrichment to the plaintiff.
The critical questions for determination in this case: whether the defendant as an occupying claimant placed the improvements thereon in good faith, and whether they unjustly enriched the plaintiff by improving his land, are necessarily questions of fact the determination of which should be left to the trial court. This is affirmed by Sec. 57-6-2 which states that “the issues joined thereon must be tried as in law actions . . . .”
Inasmuch as those critical issues have been tried and determined by the trial court, and there is a reasonable basis in the evidence to support his finding and judgment, it is my opinion that under the standard rule of review they should not be overturned.
I would affirm the judgment in its entirety-

. See footnote 18 main opinion.