Court Opinion

ID: 9364768
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-20 06:04:05.675311+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:40.123028
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                  revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                            STATE OF MICHIGAN

                             COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,                                        UNPUBLISHED
                                                                        January 19, 2023
                Plaintiff-Appellee,

v                                                                       No. 359128
                                                                        Van Buren Circuit Court
JOHN HEMBRICK HUTTO,                                                    LC No. 2021-023044-FH

                Defendant-Appellant.

Before: M.J. KELLY, P.J., and BOONSTRA and SWARTZLE, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        The police received an alert from a home-security system, and when they arrived at the
house, they discovered defendant inside with a tampered alarm system, forcefully opened storm
door, and a hole in the side of the wall of the house. Defendant was convicted of second-degree
home invasion. Defendant now appeals that he was denied a fair trial because defense counsel
failed to remove a specific juror during voir dire and the prosecutor allegedly asked defendant an
improper question for which the trial court did not grant a mistrial. We affirm.

        During voir dire, defense counsel asked the jurors if, “in an ideal world,…the state should
have to prove someone is guilty or that, maybe, a person should have to prove that they are
innocent?” A juror replied that they thought “the person has got to prove they’re innocent.”
Defense counsel then used all of her peremptory challenges on other jurors, and she also challenged
a different juror’s presence for cause. The juror that replied to defense counsel’s question stayed
on the jury. The trial court explained, during the beginning of the trial, that a person accused of a
crime is presumed to be innocent.

         Defendant testified regarding the circumstances of his presence in the house, and during
direct examination he stated that he “didn’t have intentions on going in there and stealing
nothing…I’m not some big thief, you know.” The prosecutor then asked the trial court if it may
ask defendant about his prior convictions involving theft to impeach his statement that he was not
a thief, and the trial court stated that it would allow the prosecutor “to ask if there is an (inaudible)
conviction on it.” Defense counsel originally objected, but later agreed that the prosecutor could
ask about theft convictions generally.

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        On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked “as a matter of fact, sir, you’ve been convicted
of armed robbery in 2008?” Defense counsel objected, but not before defendant answered, “That
was 15 years ago.” The trial court sustained the objection because it only authorized the prosecutor
to ask about defendant’s theft conviction in a general manner, without reference to the “armed”
aspect. Defendant moved for a mistrial, and the trial court denied his motion.

       Defendant first argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel when defense
counsel did not remove the specific juror during voir dire.

        Defendant’s right to counsel is guaranteed by the United States and Michigan
Constitutions. US Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art 1, § 20. This right includes the right to the
effective assistance of counsel. People v Cline, 276 Mich App 634, 637; 741 NW2d 563 (2007).
“Whether a defendant has been denied the effective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of
fact and constitutional law.” People v Solloway, 316 Mich App 174, 187; 891 NW2d 255 (2016).

        To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must show that: (1)
defense counsel’s performance was deficient; and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the
defense. People v Taylor, 275 Mich App 177, 186; 737 NW2d 790 (2007). Defense counsel’s
performance is deficient if it fell below an objective standard of professional reasonableness.
People v Jordan, 275 Mich App 659, 667; 739 NW2d 706 (2007). Defendant bears a heavy burden
to show that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not performing as guaranteed by the
Sixth Amendment, and defendant must overcome a strong presumption that counsel’s performance
constituted sound trial strategy. People v Carbin, 463 Mich 590, 599-600; 623 NW2d 884 (2001),
citing Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984); People v
Rockey, 237 Mich App 74, 76-77; 601 NW2d 887 (1999). The performance will be deemed to
have prejudiced the defense if it is reasonably probable that, but for counsel’s error, the result of
the proceeding would have been different. Jordan, 275 Mich App at 667. “An attorney’s decision
whether to retain witnesses, including expert witnesses, is a matter of trial strategy.” People v
Payne, 285 Mich App 181, 190; 774 NW2d 714 (2009).

        “[T]his Court has been disinclined to find ineffective assistance of counsel on the basis of
an attorney’s failure to challenge a juror,” because “[p]erhaps the most important criteria in
selecting a jury include a potential juror’s facial expressions, body language, and manner of
answering questions,” and this Court does not have the benefit of seeing or listening to the jurors
as they answer questions. People v Unger, 278 Mich App 210, 258; 749 NW2d 272 (2008).
Defense counsel used all the preemptory challenges available to her, and she challenged a different
juror for cause. Defendant has not demonstrated that defense counsel’s use of peremptory
challenges on other jurors was not strategic. Moreover, defendant has not demonstrated that
defense counsel was ineffective for choosing to use all peremptory challenges on other jurors.

        Furthermore, the trial court instructed the jury several times that they were to presume that
defendant was innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and “[i]t is well established
that jurors are presumed to follow their instructions.” People v Graves, 458 Mich 476, 486; 581
NW2d 229 (1998). In fact, it is not at all clear to this Court what defense counsel was even asking
the potential juror, as whether one lives in an “ideal world” has no obvious implication or
connection to which burden of proof would be appropriate. In any event, defendant has not

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demonstrated that the juror in question was biased, nor that the outcome of the trial would have
been different but for the juror remaining on the jury given these instructions.

        Defendant also argues that he was provided ineffective assistance when defense counsel
originally agreed to allow the prosecutor to ask generally about his prior conviction. But, defense
counsel did in fact object to the prosecutor’s more specific questioning and also moved for a
mistrial after the trial court sustained her objection. Furthermore, the original question that the
trial court would have allowed from the prosecutor, regarding defendant’s prior convictions
generally, was permissible under MRE 404(b)(1). Our Supreme Court explained in People v
Wilder, 502 Mich 57, 64; 917 NW2d 276 (2018):

       MRE 404(b)(1) provides that “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not
       admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity
       therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes . . . ” Generally
       speaking, impeachment by contradiction can be a proper purpose for the admission
       of other-acts evidence. Impeachment of this kind usually occurs when a prosecutor
       seeks to cross-examine a defendant about prior convictions in order to impeach a
       defendant’s blanket denial on direct examination of ever engaging in conduct
       similar to the charged conduct. [cleaned up.]

        In this case, the prosecutor was not asking to use the defendant’s previous conviction to
impeach defendant’s credibility in general or to show that he acted in conformity with a prior act.
Instead, the prosecutor asked the trial court for permission to use defendant’s previous conviction
to impeach defendant on his specific statement that he is not “some big thief.” Therefore, evidence
of defendant’s prior conviction was admissible under MRE 404(b)(1), and defense counsel was
not ineffective for agreeing to the line of questioning in the first place. For this same reason, the
trial court did not err in allowing the prosecutor to ask the question about defendant’s prior theft
conviction.

        Lastly, defendant argues that the trial court erred by not granting a mistrial once the
prosecutor asked about his prior conviction of armed robbery. “Whether to grant or deny a mistrial
is within the discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of
discretion resulting in a miscarriage of justice.” Veltman v Detroit Edison Co, 261 Mich App 685,
688; 683 NW2d 707 (2004).

       A motion for a mistrial should be granted only for an irregularity that is prejudicial
       to the rights of the defendant and impairs the defendant’s ability to get a fair trial.
       For a due process violation to result in reversal of a criminal conviction, a defendant
       must prove prejudice to his or her defense. Further, the moving party must establish
       that the error complained of is so egregious that the prejudicial effect can be
       removed in no other way. [People v Dickinson, 321 Mich App 1, 18; 909 NW2d
       24 (2017) (cleaned up).]

         The trial court instructed the jurors that the attorneys’ questions cannot be used as evidence
in their deliberations, and it struck the prosecutor’s question regarding defendant’s armed robbery
conviction from the record. Defendant argues that this instruction was not adequate because he
answered the prosecution’s question, and his answer was evidence that was still able to be

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considered by the jury. Defendant ignores, however, the other evidence and testimonies that were
presented at trial. This included evidence regarding defendant being found in the house, with a
tampered security system, and a hole in the wall. Given this and all of the other evidence submitted
at trial, the prosecutor’s question and defendant’s partial answer were not so egregious that the
prejudicial effect could only be removed by granting a mistrial. Therefore, it was not outside the
range of principled outcomes for the trial court to deny defendant’s motion for a mistrial.

       Affirmed.

                                                             /s/ Michael J. Kelly
                                                             /s/ Mark T. Boonstra
                                                             /s/ Brock A. Swartzle

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