Court Opinion

ID: 9542468
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:34:41.396998+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:08:01.210253
License: Public Domain

Cox, J.
(concurring) — I concur with the majority. But I write separately to emphasize that the State’s harmless error analysis is not supported by this record. We must reverse.
The comments by the prosecutor in this case during closing were clearly intended to inflame the passions and prejudices of the members of the jury. Thus, they were totally improper.
*677The central question here is whether there was a substantial likelihood that those comments affected the verdict.8 The record shows that there was such a substantial likelihood.
The majority focuses on the adverse effect of the prosecutor’s comments on the credibility of Rivers’ witnesses. But in reviewing the entire record, as we must in order to determine whether the improper comments warrant reversal,9 there is an additional problem. The State’s chief witness was the only neutral observer of the incident. He was the one who called the police when he witnessed the assault. He also identified Rivers and his accomplices by their clothing and vehicle when the police apprehended them shortly after the assault. In short, without that witness, the State would likely not have had either a suspect or a case.
But there were some problems with the testimony of this witness. During cross-examination, Rivers challenged the witness’s identification of Rivers as one of those involved in the assault. Moreover, the witness admitted during trial that he had earlier pleaded guilty to two counts of felony theft.10 During closing, the defense argued that these prior convictions affected the witness’s credibility. Finally, the jury could not reach a verdict on the robbery count arising out of the same incident.
It is entirely reasonable, on this record, that some jurors may have been inclined to disbelieve the State’s chief witness. Thus, the State’s argument that the misconduct was harmless error because the evidence supporting a finding of guilt was overwhelming is simply not supported by this record.
A statement from our Supreme Court is particularly appropriate for this case:
*678In spite of our frequent warnings that prejudicial prosecuto-rial tactics will not be permitted, we find that some prosecutors continue to use improper, sometimes prejudicial means in an effort to obtain convictions. In most of these instances, competent evidence fully sustains a conviction. Thus, we are hard pressed to imagine what, if anything, such prosecutors hope to gain by the introduction of unfair and improper tactics.
It has been thoughtfully observed that
“(i)f prosecutors are permitted to convict guilty defendants by improper, unfair means, then we are but a moment away from the time when prosecutors will convict innocent defendants by unfair means.”[11]
On this record, the only proper action for this court to take here is to reverse. Accordingly, I concur.

 State v. Belgarde, 110 Wn.2d 504, 508, 755 P.2d 174 (1988) (citing State v. Charlton, 90 Wn.2d 657, 664, 585 P.2d 142 (1978)).

 Charlton, 90 Wn.2d at 664.

 ER 609.

 Charlton, 90 Wn.2d at 665.