Court Opinion

ID: 9421912
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:00:28.321529+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:33.093996
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Stewart,
dissenting.
I.
In this wrongful death action it was incumbent upon the Court of Appeals to apply the substantive law of West Virginia. The Court today finds it “highly doubtful” whether the Court of Appeals did so. I entertain no such doubt for the following reasons: (1) This Court’s *349“intervening decision” 1 in The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U. S. 588, announced no new principle, but simply restated a doctrine well established in this Court. (2) Long before the decision in The Tungus, this doctrine had been specifically recognized as the law in the Fourth Circuit, (3) The express language of the Court of Appeals’ opinion in the present case makes clear that the court understood that its function was to' apply West Virginia law, and that it did so.
Our decision in The Tungus simply reaffirmed a principle articulated in many decisions of this Court. This principle, compendiously stated, is that admiralty enforces “the obligatio” created by a state wrongful death action “as it would one originating in any foreign jurisdiction.” Levinson v. Deupree, 345 U. S. 648, 652. See The Harrisburg, 119 U. S. 199; The Hamilton, 207 U. S. 398; La Bourgogne, 210 U. S. 95; Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U. S. 233.2 Under this weight of authority, it could be presumed that the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit would recognize, as other federal courts *350have recognized whenever the specific question has arisen, that the right to recover for wrongful death occurring on the navigable waters of a State is to be determined by reference to state law.3
But there is no need to indulge in such a presumption, because the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, several years before the present case was decided, manifested a thorough understanding of the controlling doctrine exactly in accord with the principles confirmed by this Court last Term in The Tungus. In Continental Casualty Co. v. The Benny Skou, 200 F. 2d 246 (C. A. 4th Cir. 1952), a suit to recover for a death occurring on board a ship in the territorial waters of Virginia, the court held that the action was barred by the one-year limitation contained in the Virginia Wrongful Death Act. The court’s reasoning was unambiguous: “The right of action which appellant has sought to enforce is one created solely by 'the Virginia statute. . . . ‘Virginia has bestowed upon admiralty a right to grant a recovery not previously possessed by admiralty. The endowment must be taken cum onere.’ As appellant grounds his action upon the Virginia statute, he is obliged to accept;the statute in its entirety as construed by the Virginia court of last resort.” 200 F. 2d, at 250.
Even if the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit had not previously expressed such a clear understanding that cases like these are controlled by the substantive law of the State, I think that its opinion in the present case, standing alone, unambiguously shows a recognition of the duty to apply the substantive law of West Virginia. *351What the court said seems to me quite clear: “The maritime law does not allow recovery for wrongful death. . . . The right to maintain such a suit can be enforced in admiralty only in accordance with the substantive law of the state whose statute is being adopted. The endowment must be taken cum onere.” 256 F. 2d, at 453. 'This Court’s suggestion that the above language was confined to the issue of the monetary limitation upon damages in the West Virginia statute is to me entirely unconvincing, because the Court of Appeals never reached the question of damages.
II.
Even if I were able to agree that it. is uncertain whether the Court of Appeals decided this case under standards of state or federal law, } still could not join in the Court’s judgment. For even if the Court of Appeals mistakenly applied substantive standards of federal maritime law, no purpose could be served by remanding this case unless it were shown that the state law is somehow more favorable to the' petitioner. But there has been no. showing— nor any suggestion — that the law of West Virginia is in any way more favorable to plaintiffs than the general maritime law.4 Contrast Hess v. United States, ante, p. 314.
A remand of this case is equally pointless on the issue of whether, as a matter of West Virginia law, the state •death statute incorporates the maritime duty of providing a seaworthy vessel. The district judge found that the barge was unseaworthy, but went on to hold that “this case is not one for the applicability of the doctrine *352of liability without fault.” The' Court of Appeals expressly refrained from deciding whether the West Virginia Wrongful Death statute has imported the maritime concept of unseaworthiness, finding that the circumstances of this case were not such as to impose liability under that concept, even if incorporated in the state statute. The court found as a fact that the barge was not unsea-worthy, and held as a matter of law that in any event there could be no warranty of seaworthiness with respect to a vessel withdrawn from navigation and delivered into the sole custody and control of a dry dock company for the purpose of major repairs. Only last month we unanimously held that this view of the scope of unseaworthiness liability is correct. West v. United States, ante, p. 118, There is no point in requiring, the Court of Appeals to make what would therefore be so completely irrelevant an inquiry into an elusive question of state law,
I would affirm.

 The judgment of the Court of Appeals in the present case was entered May 27, 1958. The decision of this Court in The Tungus was announced February 24, 1959.

 The law took a different turn with respect to state workmen’s compensation laws. See Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205. Such legislation was differentiated from state wrongful death statutes because of the greater burden imposed on shipowners by “heavy penalties and onerous conditions” of the compensation statutes, and because of the “novel remedies incapable of enforcement by an admiralty court.” Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U. S. 149, 166. More than 15 years ago this Court pointed out that “[T]he Jensen case has already been severely limited, and has no vitality beyond that Vrhich may continue as to state workmen’s compensation laws.” Standard Dredging Co. v. Murphy, 319 U. S. 306, 309. Cf. Davis v. Department of Labor, 317 U. S. 249; Hahn v. Ross Island Sand & Gravel Co., 358 U. S. 272.

 See, e. g., Turner v. Wilson Line of Massachusetts, 242 F. 2d 414 (C. A. 1st Cir.); Halecki v. United Pilots Assn., 251 F. 2d 708 (C. A. 2d Cir.), judgment vacated and cause remanded, 358 U. S. 613; Curtis v. A. Garcia y Cia., 241 F. 2d 30 (C. A. 3d Cir.); Graham v. A. Lusi, Ltd., 206 F. 2d 223 (C. A. 5th Cir.); Lee v. Pure Oil Co., 218 F. 2d 711 (C. A. 6th Cir.).

 Indeed the case was submitted to us upon the contrary assumption. The petitioner's argument was pitched upon his contention that we should overrule The Harrisburg, 119 U. S. 199, so that his rights.could be determined under federal law. The respondent relied upon West Virginia decisions in urging affirmance.