Court Opinion

ID: 9715769
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:13:48.484377+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:37.965192
License: Public Domain

NIX, Justice,
dissenting.
I cannot agree that it was prejudicial error or an abuse of discretion to have permitted the witness, Louis Jakubczyk, to read his entire prior statement on re-direct examination following re-cross examination.
The evidentiary matter addressed by the majority raises the question of the scope of re-direct examination. According to 6 Wigmore (Chadbourn Rev. 1976) § 1867:
... it is a cardinal doctrine, applicable generally to all of the ensuing rules [including those regarding redirect examination] that they are not invariable, that they are directory rather than mandatory, and that an alteration of the prescribed customary order is always allowable in the discretion of the trial court. ...” [Emphasis added.]
*454We have adopted the cardinal principle set forth in Wigmore, supra. Commonwealth v. Stokes, 475 Pa. 312, 380 A.2d 370 (1977) (“The scope of redirect examination is largely within the discretion of the trial court.”). We have further permitted new testimony “which could have been put in before, or of a repetition of matters already testified to,” 6 Wigmore (Chadbourn Rev.1976) § 1896, citing Curren v. Connery, 5 Binn. 488 (1813).1 Kline v. Kachmar, 360 Pa. 396, 61 A.2d 825 (1948), cited by the majority in its discussion on the scope of cross-examination, sheds no light here on the central issue of the scope of re-direct examination following cross-examination. Further, McCormick, Evidence § 32, Redirect and Subsequent Examinations (West 2nd Ed. 1972) concedes that
... the judge under his general discretionary power to vary the normal order of proof may permit the party to bring out on redirect examination some matter which is relevant to his case or defense and which through oversight he has failed to elicit on direct.
In the instant case there was no prejudice to appellant. The witness, Louis Jakubczyk, testified at the trial under oath that he did not see the accident. Anything contained to the contrary in his prior statement merely reflected negatively upon his credibility as a defense witness. We should not presume the jury incorrectly utilized his testimony.
Since I do not believe the learned trial judge abused his discretion, I would not have reversed the Superior Court.
HUTCHINSON, J., joined in this opinion.

. Federal courts have adopted the Wigmore cardinal principle also. See, United States of America v. Allain, 671 F.2d 248 (7th Cir. 1982); Murray v. Toyota Motor Distributors, Inc., 664 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir. 1982); United States of America v. Helmick, 652 F.2d 59 (6th Cir. 1981); United States of America v. Caudle, 606 F.2d 451 (4th Cir. 1979); United States of America v. Taylor, 599 F.2d 832 (8th Cir. 1979); United States of America v. Hodges, 480 F.2d 229 (10th Cir. 1973).