Court Opinion

ID: 9791136
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:06:32.770973+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:34.397238
License: Public Domain

CROCKETT, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
There are several salient considerations which impel me to a firm conviction that the opinion of the court is in error.
1. It upsets the determination which it is the prerogative of the trial court to make, that the vital evidence was reasonably and lawfully obtained.
2. On what I believe is a misconceived and overstrained technicality, it overturns the conviction of a defendant, about whose guilt there can be no doubt, and who is of (jthe character which the opinion itself refers to as being an “iniquitous malefactor re*10sponsible for such nefarious trade,” i. e., in narcotic drugs.
3. It does this by the shocking conclusion that a peace officer (who was where he had a lawful right to be, without any physical trespass or invasion into the domain of the defendant, and without the use of any extrasensory aids, simply observed what he could with his eyes and ears,) made an “unreasonable search” of the defendant’s premises.
4. Its effect is to set such unrealistic restrictions upon police work as to seriously impair their effectiveness in the control of narcotics and the investigation of other crimes, most of which are carried on in secret.
5. In doing 1, 2, 3 and 4 above, it ignores the time-honored precedent requiring survey of the evidence in the light favorable to the findings of the trial court and of indulging credit to his determination. On the contrary, it selects aspects of the evidence to suit what impresses me as a labored effort to arrive at a preconceived and desired result.
The sole and controlling issue in this case is whether the observations made by Officer H. W. Patrick into the defendant’s motel room constituted “an unreasonable search” prohibited by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. I declaim this with the utmost possible emphasis because the' court’s opinion does not seem to me to meet that issue squarely, but on the contrary, leaves it somewhat obscure by discussing a number of other matters about which there is no dispute.
To avoid misunderstanding I concede that the Fourth Amendment applies to the states; that when one rents a hotel room it becomes for most purposes his home or his castle. Similarly I agree with the desirability of safeguarding the rights of people to be secure in their persons and in their homes from any unwarranted or highhanded intrusions into their rights of privacy. Nor do I disagree with the standard definitions of certain terms given. But inasmuch as there is no disagreement about those matters, I am somewhat at a loss to understand what discussing them has to do with what I insist is the only disputed and the controlling issue here, whether there was an unreasonable search.
A proper application of the United States Constitution, as with any law, requires reflection upon the circumstances which produced it and the intent with which it was adopted. It will be remembered that there had indeed been highhanded and ruthless intrusions into and searches of private homes, which facts were well known to the founders. Those are the abuses that the Bill of Rights was intended to guard against. What is important is that these protections be employed as intended and not become so detached from their reasons for existence that where there is no such abuse, *11they provide a cloak of protection to enable lawbreakers to carry on criminal activities against the law-abiding citizenry and escape detection and punishment, and thus obstruct rather than promote the good order of society. It requires but little reflection to see that the very right to be secure in person, home and property which the defendant prates about for his protection is dependent upon competent and efficient law enforcement. This in turn depends upon not imposing undue restrictions upon officers in the detection and prosecution of crime so that they will have reasonable freedom of action in the investigating process.1 The public is entitled to protection as well as those suspected of crime.
This purpose is not served by inquiring whether there may have been a technical misstep or irregularity against some hyper-technical interpretation of the letter of the law in circumstances where it was not intended to apply. It neither serves that objective, nor is it in harmony with my sense of justice, to regard the rules as some sort of game in which a person engaged in crime has a “sporting chance” to beat the law. The critical question is whether, under the particular circumstances, it can fairly and justly be said that the search was a highhanded or oppressive intrusion against the defendant’s rights. It was undoubtedly for this reason that the founders in the language of the Fourth Amendment did not assure against all searches, but only against those which are “unreasonable.” 2
As indicated in the court’s opinion, the officers set about to keep watch on the goings to and from and the goings on in the defendant’s motel unit. They were acting on information from what they regarded as a “reliable” source. It related to drugstore burglaries in which narcotics had been taken. From this information and the fact that the landlady had observed through the window the defendant’s wife putting portions of a white powder into little bits of paper, there was good reason to believe that they were engaged in trafficking in narcotics. Officer Patrick requested of the manager of the Tower Motel and was given permission to go into the open area above the motel units.
Because of the issue here raised, and the applicable law, it is important to visualize as clearly as possible from the rather sparse record the area from which the observation was made and its relationship to the defendant’s motel unit.
*12There was a stairway leading from the office through a door up to the second story or attic area which extends over the whole area over the motel units. The officer testified :
She took me to [the] overhead area, which is where all the heating and air conditioning ducts, all the wires and the access to the boiler room was, above the unit area. It encompasses the whole upstairs story of the units or of the motel. And in the area above the defendant’s apartment we had access to an open [louvered] vent to the bathroom through which we felt we could make visual and verbal observations.
It was from this overhead or open attic area, by observing and listening at this louvered vent, that the officer maintained surveillance of the defendant’s motel unit. The main opinion correctly recites: that “the officer did not have to take any affirmative action, such as removing a cover or vent, but rather merely observed what was open to observation”; and further, that “it was possible .for someone in the bathroom * * * to readily ascertain he was being observed through the vent.” It was two days later, while continuing such observation, that the officer saw the defendant enter the bathroom with materials for preparing a dose of narcotics.
The statement in the main opinion that “no emergency was present” shows a singular lack of appreciation of the problems involved in the seeking out and convicting those who traffic in narcotics. The nefarious nature of narcotic drugs and the evils ramifying from their use and trafficking therein by enticing victims into its toils are well known. The many and ingenious ways of disguising and concealing dope, and the quick and easy disposal of it, have been the subject of so much literature and drama that the difficulties involved in apprehending and convicting those who use and traffic therein need no further exposition here.
It should be here stated with the greatest of emphasis, to avoid diversion from the true issue, that no one, not even the defendant, contends otherwise than when Officer Patrick had good reason to believe a felony was being committed, as he learned from his observation here, the entry, the arrest and seizure of the evidence was justified; and at that point no search warrant was necessary.3 I confess my inability to understand how anyone could conclude otherwise than that under those circumstances the officer did that which was absolutely *13necessary in the line of his duty. He quickly made contact by two-way radio with other officers who immediately entered the apartment, made the arrest, and seized the narcotics and other materials which are the subject of the motion to suppress evidence.4 The fallacy of the main opinion is compounded by the statement “if he had attempted to leave, the police would have been fully aware of his attempt, and would have been able to stop him.” There of course, would have been no evidence, and what a plight the police would have been in, under the hypertechnical attitude of the main opinion against police activities.
In cases dealing with the question it is almost invariably affirmed that whether a search is unreasonable depends upon the particular circumstances.5 The responsibility for making this détermination is initially upon the trial court. As the authority in charge of the trial he must make determinations of fact upon which admissibility of evidence depends. It is to be assumed that he is learned in the law and in rules of evidence and that he is motivated by a de-. sire to apply them in the interests of justice. Furthermore, he is able to make firsthand observation of the parties and the witnesses, and is thus in a position of advantage to make the essential determination: whether the conduct of the officers has so transgressed standards of common decency and fairness that the search is “unreasonable.” 6 For these reasons his ruling thereon should be indulged with a presumption of correctness and validity,7 and should not be disturbed unless it clearly appears that he was in error.8
In considering whether looking or listening through an opening into an accused’s “abode” runs counter to the Fourth Amendment, some courts have taken the view that such .an observation is not a “search” at all. But where it is assumed to be a search,-the problem of vital concern is whether it is unreasonable. A fundamental doctrine which will be found in all .of the leading *14cases dealing with this subject is that.where there is no trespass and no physical invasion of the defendant’s abode there is no unreasonable search. The doctrine was announced in Goldman v. United States,9 and On Lee v. United States.10
There is a paradox quite incomprehensible to me in the main opinion’s citing the case of Silverman v. United States11 to support its conclusion. I join wholeheartedly in citing that case and say without fear of reasonable contradiction that a fair comparison with the instant one will clearly and unequivocally defeat the reversal of the conviction here. There in 1961, nine years after the On Lee case, the U. S. Supreme Court rejected a plea to overrule it ánd reaffirmed the requirement of a physical invasion to constitute an unreasonable search. The peace officers used what is called a “spike mike” driven into the wall to make contact with a heating system which was used as a sounding device. In the decision Justice Stewart discussed this fact and placed stress on the requirement of a physical intrusion into the defendant’s premises in accordance with the rule as established in the Goldman and On Lee cases, supra, which rule has never been departed from. He stated that, “the eavesdropping was accomplished by means of an unauthorized physical penetration into the premises occupied by the petitioners.” Incidentally, there was no dissent in that case. Justices Clark and Whittaker in concurring stated in part, “[T]he unauthorized physical penetration into petitioner's premises constituted sufficient trespass to remove this case from the coverage of earlier decisions, we feel obliged to join in the Court’s opinion.” 12
This physical invasion requirement has been adhered to with practically invariable uniformity even where the observation has been made by various types of sensory aids,13 in such circumstances as looking through a window,14 and even looking through keyholes, cracks and vents in walls *15and ceiling, so long as the policeman observes from a place where he has a right to be and does not physically invade the defendant’s premises.15
In the case of State v. Smith,16 in answer to the charge that peeking into a private residence through an aperture constituted an unreasonable search, the New Jersey Supreme Court made this very pertinent comment:
Peering through a window or a crack in a door or keyhole is not, in the abstract, genteel behavior, but the Fourth Amendment does not protect against all conduct unworthy of a good neighbor.
* * * [I]t is the duty of a policeman to investigate and we cannot say that in striking a balance between the rights of the individual and the needs of law enforcement, the Fourth Amendment itself draws the blinds the occupant could have drawn but did not. In the absence of a physical entry into premises secured by the Amendment, there is no unreasonable search. In such circumstances it has been held that the guaranteed right of privacy is not violated when a police officer;, by use of his senses,- detects a criminal event occurring in an area protected by the Amendment.
In the instant situation, if the officer had watched from outside a window, or from an adjoining room through an air vent or other aperture, and had thus learned of the defendant’s possession of narcotics, it surely could not be seriously contended that he would not have had the right to make the arrest and seizure. The fact that the vent was overhead rather than in a wall should make no material difference. It was necessary for the landlord and others to have access to the upstairs area from which the observation was made in order to take care of various services to all of the motel units. It was thus common to all of the motel units and had no exclusiye relationship to the defendant’s apartment. There can be no question about the landlord’s right to be in this upstairs area, nor of her right to give the officer permission to be there. It -therefore follows with indisputable certainty that there was no physical trespass or invasion into the defendant’s room.
*16A statement in the concurring opinion by Judge Pope in Smayda v. United States,17 is particularly appropriate:
There is nothing wrong with an officer detecting crime from a place where he has a right to be,
* * * the defendant’s lack of knowledge that the holes above the stalls were view windows is immaterial. I know of no rule of law that a person committing a crime must be alerted or warned that he is being watched. [Citing the Goldman and On Lee cases referred to above.]
That assertion is incontestable. I think that it is unfair, illogical and does violence to law and justice to suppress evidence and reverse a conviction under circumstances here shown, where a police officer was where he had a lawful right to be, used no extrasensory aids and simply observed that which he could observe by the use of his eyes and ears. The instant opinion gives lip service to the doctrine that “the processes of law have only one legitimate objective, to seek out the truth and to do justice,” but proceeds to defeat that very objective by an unwarranted suppression of evidence upon which the conviction of one known to be guilty must rest.
On the basis of the foregoing discussion of the facts and the application of law it is my conviction that there is no justification for suppressing this evidence and upsetting this conviction, nor more importantly, for setting an erroneous and dangerous precedent which will result in unreasonable restrictions upon police work in coping with traffic in narcotics and the investigation of other crimes. I would affirm the trial court. (All emphasis added.)
HENRIOD, J., dissents.

. See State v. Seymour, 18 Utah 2d 153, 417 P.2d 655.

. See statement in Davis v. United States, 327 F.2d 301 (9th Cir. 1964). “It is no answer to say that the police could have obtained a search warrant, for ‘[t]he relevant test is not whether it is reasonable to procure a search warrant, but whether the search was reasonable.’ ” See also Ker v. State of California, 374 U.S. 23, 83 S.Ct. 1623, 10 L.Ed.2d 726 (1963).

. Por a statement as to the probable cause necessary to sustain an arrest and a search incidental thereto see McCray v. State of Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 87 S.Ct. 1056, 18 L.Ed.2d 62 (1967); see also Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 79 S.Ct. 329, 3 L.Ed.2d 327 (1959); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 70 S.Ct. 434, 94 L.Ed. 653 (1950); Ker v. State of California, supra note 2.

. As to right of police to enter and seize narcotics which can be quickly destroyed see Ker v. State of California, supra note 2; Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 78 S.Ct. 1190, 2 L.Ed.2d 1332 (1959); State v. Smith, 37 N.J. 481, 181 A.2d 761 (1962), cert. denied 374 U.S. 835, 83 S.Ct. 1879, 10 L.Ed.2d 1055 (1963).

. Cooper v. State of California, 386 U.S. 58, 87 S.Ct. 788, 17 L.Ed.2d 730 (1967); Ker v. State of California, supra note 2; Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253, 80 S.Ct. 1431, 4 L.Ed.2d 1688 (1960); United States v. Rabinowitz, supra note 3.

. “ ‘It is Hornbook law that this court cannot second-guess a trier of fact who has heard testimony, scrutinized the witnesses, and noted their demeanor and behavior on the witness stand * * * and had the opportunity * * * to place his reliance on those whom he believes to have been telling the truth.’ ” Davis v. United States, supra note 2.

. Ker v. State of California, supra note 2; United States v. Rabinowitz, supra note 3; Miller v. United States, 354 F.2d 801 (8th Cir. 1966).

. State v. Tuttle, 16 Utah 2d 288, 399 P.2d 580 (1965), cert. denied 382 U.S. 872, 86 S.Ct. 129, 15 L.Ed.2d 110 (1965).

. 316 U.S. 129, 62 S.Ct. 993, 86 L.Ed. 1322 (1942).

. 343 U.S. 747, 72 S.Ct. 967, 96 L.Ed. 1270 (1952). See also: Ker v. California, supra note 2; Davis v. United States, supra note 2; State v. Allred, 16 Utah 2d 41, 395 P.2d 535.

. 365 U.S. 505, 81 S.Ct. 679, 5 L.Ed.2d 734 (1961).

. This position was reaffirmed in Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 83 S.Ct. 1381, 10 L.Ed.2d 462 (1963). See also the recent case of Berger v. State of New York, 388 U.S. 41, 87 S.Ct. 1873, 18 L.Ed.2d 1040.

. This position was reaffirmed in Lopez v. United States, supra note 12, and Clinton v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 158, 84 S.Ct. 1186, 12 L.Ed.2d 213 (1964); United States v. Pardo-Bolland, 348 F.2d 316 (2nd Cir. 1965), cert. denied 382 U.S. 944, 86 S.Ct. 388, 15 L.Ed.2d 353 (1965). See also Katz v. United States, 369 F.2d 130 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. granted and pending 386 U.S. 954, 87 S.Ct. 1021, 18 L.Ed.2d 102 (1967).

. Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 46 S.Ct. 4, 70 L.Ed. 145 (1925); Burks v. United States, 287 F.2d 117 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied 369 U.S. 841, 82 S. *15Ct. 868, 7 LEd.2d 846 (1962), and Petteway v. United States, 261 F.2d 53 (4th Cir. 1958).

. The language of Justice Jackson’s concurring opinion in McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 458, 69 S.Ct. 191, 194, 93 L.Ed. 153 (1948), is frequently quoted: “Had the police been admitted as guests of another tenant, or had the approaches been thrown open by an obliging landlady or doorman, they would have been legally in the hallways. Dike any other stranger, they could then spy or eavesdrop on others without being trespassers. If they peeped through the keyhole or climbed on a chair or on one another’s shoulders to look through the transom, I should see no grounds on which the defendant could complain.”

. 37 N.J. 481, 181 A.2d 761 (1962), cert. denied 374 U.S. 835, 83 S.Ct. 1879, 10 LEd.2d 1055 (1963).

. 352 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied 382 U.S. 981, 86 S.Ct. 555, 15 L.Ed.2d 471 (1966).