Court Opinion

ID: 9385897
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-10 17:02:18.103109+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:56.203499
License: Public Domain

Filed 4/7/23 P. v. Galindo CA5

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

           IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                     FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

    THE PEOPLE,
                                                                                            F0083606
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                               (Super. Ct. No. F21902032)
                    v.

    JESUS GALINDO, JR.,                                                                   OPINION
           Defendant and Appellant.

                                                   THE COURT *
         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Michael G.
Idiart, Judge.
         J. M. Malik, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Eric L. Christoffersen, and Ross
K. Naughton, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                                                        -ooOoo-

*        Before Hill, P. J., Detjen, J. and Meehan, J.
       Defendant, Jesus Galindo, Jr., challenges his arrest, arguing it resulted from an
illegal search and seizure. A recent opinion issued by the California Supreme Court
resolves an issue raised by defendant in both this appeal and in a prior writ filed with this
court on whether the use of a spotlight by an officer at night results in a detention
triggering certain constitutional rights. Our review of the totality of the circumstances in
this case in light of our Supreme Court’s recent opinion leads us to conclude the trial
court’s denial of the motion to suppress is supported by the record.
                              PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
       On March 9, 2021, a criminal complaint was filed charging defendant with
unlawfully possessing a machine gun (Pen. Code, 1 § 32625, subd. (a), a felony; count 1),
unlawfully possessing a concealed firearm in a vehicle (§ 25400, subd. (a)(1), a felony;
count 2), and unlawfully carrying a loaded firearm in public (§ 25850, subd. (a), a felony;
count 3). Special enhancements were also alleged for both counts 2 and 3 that the
firearms at issue were stolen (§§ 25400, subd. (c)(2), 25850, subd. (c)(2)), and that
defendant was not the registered owner of either weapon (§§ 25400, subd. (c)(6), 25850,
subd. (c)(6)).
       On June 24, 2021, defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence pursuant to
section 1538.5. A preliminary hearing was held on July 19, 2021, at which time
defendant’s motion to suppress evidence was also heard. At the conclusion of the
hearing, defendant was held to answer the allegations contained in the felony complaint,
and his motion to suppress evidence was denied. An information was thereafter filed
alleging the same three counts and enhancements.
       On August 19, 2021, defendant filed a motion to set aside the information, again
arguing his arrest was the result of an illegal search and seizure. Following a hearing
held on September 3, 2021, that motion was also denied. Defendant then filed a writ of

1      All further statutory references will be to the Penal Code.

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prohibition with this court on September 16, 2021, raising the same issue. Defendant’s
petition to this court was denied on October 21, 2021.
       Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant pled no contest to count 1, resulting in a
dismissal of counts 2 and 3, on October 28, 2021. On November 29, 2021, defendant
was sentenced to a prison term of one year four months. A notice of appeal was then
filed on December 2, 2021.
                                 FACTUAL SUMMARY
       This factual summary comes from the preliminary hearing testimony provided by
Clovis Police Officer Eric Curry. Around midnight on March 8, 2021, Curry was on
patrol in a fully marked police vehicle, driving through neighborhoods due to a recent
increase in thefts of catalytic converters. Curry saw a vehicle parked in an odd location,
in that it was not in front of any residence, but rather parked along a fence along the side
of a house next to the street. As he drove past, he saw four occupants in the vehicle.
Curry stated the occupants of the vehicle appeared to look down, either to avoid eye
contact or to avoid being seen. Curry then parked one car length behind the vehicle.
       As Curry approached the vehicle, he noticed the smell of marijuana and alcohol.
Curry also testified that the occupants appeared to be intoxicated. When he suspected
one of the occupants was a minor and it was now past curfew, Curry questioned the
minor who admitted he was 17 years old, intoxicated, and a Sureno gang member from
the Riverdale area.
       Curry asked defendant, who was the driver, to exit the vehicle. Curry testified he
decided to search for weapons because there were four occupants in the vehicle, one of
whom had admitted to being a gang member. During the pat down search when
defendant raised his arms, Curry observed a gun tucked in defendant’s waistband. Curry
retrieved the loaded firearm, a “Glock 9 mm” which had a “full automatic sear”
modifying the weapon to make it capable of firing in a fully automatic fashion. When
Curry ran the serial number on the firearm, he learned it was a stolen gun out of

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Washington State. He was also able to confirm the firearm was not registered to
defendant and that he did not have a permit to carry it.
       On cross-examination, Curry admitted the vehicle had been parked legally. Curry
explained that while he called for backup, the other officer arrived after he had already
approached the vehicle to talk to the occupants. Curry also confirmed that he turned on
his patrol vehicle spotlight once he parked behind the suspects. No evidence was
provided on the length of time before Curry approached the vehicle, or his demeanor
when approaching the vehicle.
                                      DISCUSSION
       The question of whether defendant’s rights under the Fourth Amendment were
violated was addressed twice in the trial court. First, defendant sought to suppress the
evidence of the firearm obtained during the pat down search through a motion to suppress
under section 1538.5 during the preliminary hearing. When that motion was denied and
the trial court found probable cause supported the charges against defendant, an
information was filed against defendant. Defendant then challenged the sufficiency of
the allegations supporting the information pursuant to section 995, by again raising the
validity of the pat down search.
I.     The Applicable Standard of Review
       Relying on section 995, defendant challenged the evidence supporting the issuance
of the information, arguing it was obtained through a search that violated his
Fourth Amendment rights. Section 995, subdivision (a)(2), requires the trial court to set
aside an information where “the defendant had been committed without reasonable or
probable cause.” Defendant contends that without the “inadmissible” evidence, the
remaining evidence does not support the charges alleged in the information.
       “Where, as here, a suppression motion is made before a magistrate in conjunction
with a preliminary hearing and no new evidence is presented in superior court, we are
‘concerned solely with the findings of the [magistrate].’ [Citation.] We defer to the

                                             4.
magistrate’s express and implied findings of fact if supported by substantial evidence.
[Citations.] We independently assess whether the challenged search or seizure violates
the Fourth Amendment, applying federal constitutional standards.” (People v. Tacardon
(2022) 14 Cal.5th 235, 242 (Tacardon).) “Appellate review is confined to the correctness
or incorrectness of the trial court’s ruling, not the reasons for its ruling.” (People v.
Superior Court (Chapman) (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1011.)
       The questions we must resolve in this case revolve around whether defendant was
“detained” when first contacted by Curry, and if not, whether Curry developed sufficient
“reasonable suspicion” when he finally conducted the pat down search of defendant
resulting in the discovery of the firearm.
II.    Was Defendant Detained When Curry Parked Behind Defendant’s Vehicle
and Turned on His Spotlight?
       Consensual encounters are considered to be the least intrusive contact between an
individual and a law enforcement officer, and do not automatically trigger
Fourth Amendment scrutiny. (Caskey, Cal. Search & Seizure (2022) § 4:41.) An officer
may initiate a consensual encounter without suspecting the individual has committed or is
about to commit a crime. (Ibid.) However, once a “detention” occurs, that will be
considered a seizure, even if a limited one, for which reasonable suspicion is required.
(See People v. Souza (1994) 9 Cal.4th 224, 231.)
       While this case was pending, there was a recognized split among the district courts
of appeal on whether the use of a spotlight on its own results in a detention by law
enforcement. In December 2022, the California Supreme Court issued its opinion in
Tacardon, supra, 14 Cal.5th 235 providing more guidance on this issue.
       “The outcome here turns on the distinction between a consensual encounter and a
detention.” (Tacardon, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 241.) As in Tacardon, defendant was
detained at some point. The Tacardon court specifically addressed the question of
whether the arrival of a law enforcement officer to the location of a vehicle at night, who

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then uses a spotlight to illuminate the area before approaching the vehicle, has detained
the occupants of the vehicle at that particular moment. A comparison of the facts
between this case and Tacardon provides some clarity.
       The officer in Tacardon was patrolling a residential neighborhood known for
narcotics sales and weapons possession around 8:45 p.m. The officer was driving a
marked car and had both his headlights and high beams on for “ ‘extra visibility.’ ”
When the officer drove past a car which was legally parked in front of a residence and
near a streetlight, he made eye contact with one of the occupants. While noting the car’s
engine and headlights were off, the officer also noticed smoke coming through the
slightly open windows. The officer then made a U-turn and parked 15 to 20 feet behind
the car and turned on his spotlight. The officer did not activate the siren or emergency
lights and did not issue any commands to the car’s occupants. When the officer finally
left his patrol car, he walked toward the car without drawing a weapon. (Tacardon,
supra, at pp. 238–239.)
       Over time, different courts of appeal have reached different conclusions on
whether similar facts constituted a detention. In the long-standing case of People v.
Perez (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1492, the Sixth District Court of Appeal discussed the
significance of a spotlight versus the use of the red and blue emergency lights. In Perez,
the officer parked facing the defendant’s car, but left room for the defendant to drive
away. The officer then activated the patrol car’s high beams and spotlights, before
walking up to the car. The officer knocked on the window, identified himself, then
shined a flashlight into the car, and asked the defendant to roll the window down, upon
which he immediately smelled marijuana. (Id. at pp. 1494–1495.) The Perez court did
not believe these facts supported the conclusion defendant had been detained, explaining,
“[w]hile the use of high beams and spotlights might cause a reasonable person to feel
himself the object of official scrutiny, such directed scrutiny does not amount to a
detention.” (Id. at p. 1496.)

                                             6.
       Although this conclusion in Perez has been generally accepted for many years,
several more recent opinions have created confusion on the question of whether the use
of a spotlight alone rendered the “contact” a detention. For example, the Fourth District
Court of Appeal in People v. Kidd (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 12, reached a different
conclusion on the use of spotlights.2 In Kidd, an officer saw two men inside a parked car
on a residential street with the car’s fog lights on at 1:30 in the morning. The officer
decided to check to see if the occupants were stranded, “ ‘or what exactly they[ were]
doing.’ ” (Id. at p. 15.) The officer made a U-turn and parked 10 feet behind the vehicle,
then turned on two spotlights. As he approached the vehicle, the officer smelled
marijuana smoke and observed the passenger attempting to hide bags of what he
suspected were marijuana. The Kidd court first acknowledged the long-standing
principles expressed and adopted in cases like Perez, but then concluded the defendant
was detained without reasonable suspicion “as soon as the officer pulled in behind him
and turned his spotlights on him,” given the totality of the circumstances. (Kidd, at
pp. 21–22.)
       The Tacardon court seemed especially concerned about the potential confusion
created by the following language in Kidd:

       “[T]he ‘officer’s “show of authority” was so intimidating as to
       communicate to any reasonable person that he or she was “ ‘ “not free to
       decline [his] requests or otherwise terminate the encounter.” ’ ” ’
       [Citation.] As for the significance of the spotlights, the court reasoned:
       ‘motorists are trained to yield immediately when a law enforcement vehicle
       pulls in behind them and turns on its lights. Regardless of the color of the
       lights the officer turned on, a reasonable person in [the defendant’s]

2      Again, several other cases addressing the use of spotlights were discussed by the
Tacardon court and were distinguished on the facts. (See discussion, Tacardon, supra,
14 Cal.5th at pp. 243–247) The focus of the Kidd opinion, however, appears to be the
most relevant to the court’s eventual decision to reiterate the “totality of the
circumstances” standard because the Kidd court relied so heavily on the use of the
spotlight alone.

                                             7.
       circumstances “would expect that if he drove off, the officer would respond
       by following with red light on and siren sounding.” ’ (Kidd[, supra, 36
       Cal.App.5th] at p. 21.)” (Tacardon, supra, at pp. 245–246.)
       While discussing past case law recognizing the utility of using spotlights in given
situations, the Tacardon court recognized the use of a spotlight could potentially be used
in an authoritative manner when combined with other factors. The Tacardon court also
noted, however, “individuals frequently have alternatives for asserting their
Fourth Amendment rights, such as refusing to answer the officer’s questions or otherwise
declining to act in the manner the officer has requested. [Citation.] And while many
law-abiding citizens will choose to cooperate with the police ‘because [they] know that
their participation enhances their own safety and the safety of those around them,’ that
fact alone does not negate the consensual nature of their response.” (Tacardon, supra, 14
Cal.5th at p. 253, citing United States v. Drayton (2002) 536 U.S. 194, 205.) As a result,
the Tacardon court was unwilling to deviate from a principle recently restated in People
v. Brown (2015) 61 Cal.4th 968, that a bright-line rule was unnecessary, and as a result
held the “use of a spotlight, standing alone, does not necessarily effect a detention.”
(Tacardon, at pp. 258–259 [specifically disapproving Kidd].)
       Curry testified that around midnight he was driving a fully marked police vehicle,
during a time in which there had been an increase in thefts of catalytic converters. Curry
noticed defendant’s vehicle because it was not parked in front of a residence, but along a
fence next to the street. As he drove past the vehicle, Curry saw four occupants in the
vehicle, who looked down, either to avoid eye contact or to avoid being seen. Curry then
parked one car length behind the vehicle and turned on his patrol vehicle spotlight.
       Up to this point, the totality of the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing
did not support the conclusion the occupants of the vehicle were detained. No evidence
was presented at the hearing on the motion to suppress that Curry approached the vehicle
in an aggressive manner or took any other action, such as turning on the emergency
lights, that would have caused the court to conclude a detention had already occurred.

                                             8.
       Our independent assessment of the evidence leads us to conclude Curry’s use of
the spotlight before he left the patrol car came within the federal constitutional standards
summarized in Tacardon. As a result, Curry’s approach to the vehicle after turning on
the spotlight was still in the category of a permissible consensual encounter. We must
now consider whether additional circumstances occurring after Curry left his patrol car
established the level of reasonable suspicion necessary to support the later pat down
search of defendant that is at issue here.
III.   Did The Eventual Pat Down Search Violate Defendant’s Fourth Amendment
Rights?
       The next question that must be resolved is whether the applicable legal standards
and facts support Curry’s eventual pat down search of defendant. The
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects citizens from unreasonable
searches and seizures by law enforcement. (Katz v. United States (1967) 389 U.S. 347,
353.) The pat down search of defendant could only be justified if Curry developed a
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity before actually conducting the search. Absent
reasonable suspicion, the discovery of the firearm here would be subject to a motion to
suppress. (See Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 12, 15, 21–22.)
       The court in Terry states the authority allowing a peace officer to conduct a
reasonable search of an individual exists if there is reason to believe the officer is dealing
with an armed and dangerous individual. (People v. Terry, supra, 392 U.S. 1 at p. 23.)
“ ‘The officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is
whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief
that his safety or that of others was in danger.’ ” (King v. State of California (2015) 242
Cal.App.4th 265, 283.) However, “ ‘the officer must be able to point to specific and
articulable facts together with rational inferences therefrom which reasonably support a
suspicion that the suspect is armed and dangerous.’ ” (People v. Pantoja (2022) 77

                                              9.
Cal.App.5th 483, 489.) An “ ‘ “unparticularized suspicion” ’ ” or “ ‘ “ ‘hunch’ ” ’ ” is not
enough. (Ibid.)
         The evidence presented in response to the motion to suppress showed when Curry
left his patrol vehicle he smelled marijuana. When he reached defendant’s car, Curry
suspected the four occupants were “highly intoxicated.” When he guessed at least one of
the occupants was a minor and it was at that point past curfew, Curry asked one of those
individuals his age. That individual admitted he was 17 years old, and later also admitted
he was a Sureno gang member from the Riverdale area. Curry also stated the minor
appeared to be “aggressive and upset.” Curry explained that while he first asked
defendant, who was the driver, to exit the vehicle, his intent was to “get them all out of
the vehicle and in an area where [he could] observe all four of them, while [he]
conducted [his] investigation, without unknowns in the vehicle.” Curry testified he
decided to search for weapons “[f]or officer safety” because there were four occupants,
and one had just admitted to being a gang member. It was when Curry asked defendant
“to put his hands behind his head to conduct [the] pat[ down ]search,” that he observed
the magazine portion of the firearm “protruding” from the back waistband of defendant’s
pants.
         Again, since Terry v. Ohio, courts have upheld the seizure and detention of an
individual on less than probable cause, as long as the officer reasonably suspects3
criminal activity, which is based on articulable facts. (Caskey, Cal. Search & Seizure
(2022) § 4:15.) An officer may initiate a brief investigative detention when he or she has
“a particularized and objective basis” to suspect legal wrongdoing. (U.S. v. Cortez
(1981) 449 U.S. 411, 417.)

3      The term “reasonable suspicion” is often used interchangeably with “reasonable
cause.” (See, for example, Adams v. Williams (1972) 407 U.S. 143, 147.)

                                             10.
       Our independent review of the record reveals evidence supporting the conclusion
Curry acted on a reasonable suspicion there was criminal activity and a risk someone in
the car could be armed. Curry’s decision to conduct a pat down search of defendant was
based on more than an unparticularized suspicion or hunch. 4 The implied findings of the
trial court are thus supported by substantial evidence and meet the relevant constitutional
standards. (See Tacardon, supra, 14 Cal.5th 235, 242.)
                                     DISPOSITION
       The motion to set aside the information was properly denied. The judgment is
affirmed.

4      Defendant suggests that race may have improperly influenced the decision to
conduct the pat down search. Because the record provides absolutely no evidence race
factored into any decisions made by Curry, we decline to speculate on its impact here.

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