Court Opinion

ID: 9471118
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:25:21.847814+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:42:16.610246
License: Public Domain

*492FAGG, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the result reached by the majority on Mrs. Rodgers’ claim for loss of consortium but I do not agree with the remittitur imposed on the jury award to Mr. Rodgers at the first trial.
In a run-of-the-mill, low-key final argument that drew no objection or interference from opposing counsel or the trial court, Rodgers’ attorney gave the jury his request on each item of damage, asking $2,215,-320.68 for future nursing care, $1,000,000 for pain, suffering, mental anguish, and physical injury, and $580,465 for loss of income, personal household services and medical expenses. When the jury returned a general verdict for $3.3 million, the judge assumed that the jury had included in its verdict the full amount requested by counsel for future nursing care. Consequently, he made an analysis of the evidence bearing upon future nursing care only, then calculated what he deemed to be a reasonable award for this item of damage, $228,082.85, and ordered a remittitur consistent with his perception of the jury’s allocation for this category within the general verdict. As far as I can determine, however, there is no support in the record for the trial court’s arbitrary and unfounded assumption that the jury allocated $2,215,320.68 for future nursing care.
It is my belief that the judge failed properly to apply the applicable legal standard. First, he failed to consider Rodgers’ verdict as a whole. Second, because he isolated one item of damage to the exclusion of the others, there is simply no way that it can fairly be said that the judge made a reasoned judgment concerning the maximum limit of a reasonable range within which the jury could have returned its verdict comprising the several categories of general damage submitted to it. Absolutely no consideration was given to the possibility that the jury may have awarded Rodgers more for pain, suffering, mental anguish, personal injury, or one of the other categories of loss than had been requested by counsel. Of necessity, these items of damage had to be considered, otherwise the judge was not in a position properly to determine if the remittitur was for an amount less than the jury could reasonably find. See Slatton v. Martin K. Eby Construction Co., 506 F.2d 505, 508-09 (8th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 931, 95 S.Ct. 1657, 44 L.Ed.2d 88 (1975). Notwithstanding a passing conclusory statement to the effect that he considered “all factors and elements of damage claimed,” it is self-evident from the judge’s analysis that he did not consider the verdict as a whole. Instead, the judge’s calculation of the highest reasonable figure for nursing care directly determined the amount of the remittitur.
In reality, all the judge did in the course of his analysis was make his own calculation for future nursing care, shrug off other substantial items giving rise to general unliquidated damages that are incapable of precise calculation but capable of generating a substantial award, and unjustifiably intrude upon the jury as a consequence. For instance, it has been estimated that awards for pain and suffering account for 72% of damages in personal injury litigation. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Pfeifer,-U.S.-, 103 S.Ct. 2541, 2558 n. 35, 76 L.Ed.2d 768 (1983). If this percentage had been applied to Rodgers’ verdict, the judge’s calculations for a maximum allowable jury award would have closely approximated the jury’s verdict:
Pain, suffering, mental anguish, physical injury ($3.3 million x .72) $2,376,000
Loss of income, personal services, etc. per Rodgers’ final argument request 580,465
Future nursing care as calculated by the trial court 228,082
Total $3,184,547
Admittedly, the jury awarded Rodgers a substantial sum; however, generosity of the jury’s award does not alone justify trial court interference. The jury’s verdict must be examined in the light of the real life facts: Rodgers, a working, married, family man, with a 30.5 year life expectancy, suffered a devastating injury and has been rendered a permanent quadriplegic. When the verdict is considered as a whole and in view of the totality of the evidence, I can*493not say that Rodgers’ award was “so grossly excessive as to shock the conscience of [the] court.”
Thus for the reasons stated above, I would reinstate the jury award for Mr. Rodgers.