Court Opinion

ID: 9602634
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:58:06.135262+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:05.331833
License: Public Domain

BISTLINE, Justice,
dissenting.
Justice Johnson’s citation to the case of Webster v. Potlatch Forests, Inc., 68 Idaho 1, 187 P.2d 527 (1947), serves the salient purpose of bringing to the fore a revisit to the law as it was in 1947 and 1948, at which time in history the war was over and the law schools, including Idaho, were besieged with first and second year students.
After reviewing Webster, the conclusion is reached that there should be considerable concern prior to putting that case into service. Webster was not a law suit in the sense of the scenario which usually comes to mind. Mr. Webster was not plaintiff in a law suit, but rather a worker claiming a rather modest entitlement to benefits due him under the provisions of the Unemployment Compensation Law. Potlatch had discharged Webster after twenty-six years, doing.so on the grounds of supposed insubordination, which grounds were thereafter never established, as is well demonstrated over seventeen pages of majority opinion authored by Justice Holden, with concurrences by Justices Given, Miller, and Hyatt. Chief Justice Budge managed to contain his dissent to four pages, 68 Idaho at 17-20,187 P.2d at 537-539. Reading the same transcript as Justice Holden, Chief Justice Budge stated that he “could reach no other conclusion than that claimant’s discharge was wholly attributable to his own acts and conduct.”
The Session Laws of 1945, ch. 203 (S.B. No. 146) provided:
Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Idaho:
SECTION 1. That Title 43, Idaho Code Annotated, be and the same is hereby amended by adding a new chapter to be designated as chapter 22, containing the following sections, 43-2201 and 43-2202, and to read as follows:
43-2201. SHORT TITLE. — This Act shall be known and may be cited as the ‘Unemployment Compensation Law.’
Idaho Code § 43-2202 encompasses a declaration of state public policy and explains the need and concomitant expected benefits. Idaho Code § 43-2408, reads, in part, as follows:
43-2408. PERSONAL ELIGIBILITY CONDITIONS. — The personal eligibility conditions of a benefit claimant are [inter alia] that....
(e) His employment is not due to the fact that he left his last employment voluntarily without good cause connected with his employment, or that he was discharged for misconduct in connection with his employment: provided that if such separation from employment was not wholly attributable to the claimant, he may be determined to be eligible.
So that there might remain no doubt as to where this one member of the Court stands, it is clear that a good many of the Court’s recent opinions are disposing of *62appealed lower court decisions on the premise that the Court declines to address issues which were not first raised in the trial court. But, to be kept in mind is the probability that what appears to be an important issue which should be decided be cast aside as “not raised in the trial court.”
A better proposition for this Court, or for any court hearing appeals, would be to be less demanding of perfection in perfecting appeals. This is especially true in cases, like this one, where the Court is remanding the cause for further proceedings. Otherwise it seems that overuse of the “failure to have raised at trial” hypothesis may run rampant, to the dismay of law practitioners and to the detriment of lay clientele relying solely upon their chosen attorneys to protect them from all evil.
Input from members of the practicing bar would be welcome and could be of immense benefit. In turn, what may be best for the trial attorneys, and equally beneficial for the Idaho courts, would be for the Court to intimate what needs be done to assure that an issue is preserved. It would seem that where a relatively obscure issue may have eluded counsel in trial court proceedings, that, unless it presents a clear-cut case of sandbagging, the interests of achieving justice (Rule 1, Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure) will be best served by allowing that issue to be aired on further proceedings by way of appeal, absent any extreme prejudice actually be caused to an adverse party.
To avoid the question of whether I.C. § 72-719 permits the Commission to increase a prior award on the grounds that the claimant’s evidence is insufficient on the ground that the claim must be asserted in the first instance elevates form over substance. It is not readily understood why, especially in compensation law, wholly and purely an administrative proceeding, a worker should on such slim technicality thereby be deprived of his sure and certain monetary relief. One ought not forget that the worker has been, by the promise of certain and sure administrative relief, stripped of his right to seek monetary damages at a jury trial.1

. The circumstances giving rise to Edwards’ compensation claim are indeed concise and readily stated in Part I of the majority opinion. See at 59, 856 P.2d at 96.