Court Opinion

ID: 9411817
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-28 00:01:07.523172+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:14.569678
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-60416         Document: 00516837126             Page: 1      Date Filed: 07/27/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit                                         United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                          Fifth Circuit

                                      ____________                                      FILED
                                                                                      July 27, 2023
                                        No. 21-60416                                  Lyle W. Cayce
                                      ____________                                         Clerk

   Israel Bile Mboba,

                                                                                  Petitioner,

                                             versus

   Merrick Garland, U.S. Attorney General,

                                                                                Respondent.
                      ______________________________

                         Petition for Review of an Order of the
                             Board of Immigration Appeals
                               Agency No. A203 564 016
                      ______________________________

   Before Haynes and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges, and Saldaña,
   District Judge. +
   Per Curiam: *
          Israel Mboba, a native of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
   (“DRC”), sought asylum and protection under the Convention Against
   Torture (“CAT”) in the United States. Finding him a non-credible witness,
   an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied his application. He appealed to the
          _____________________
          +
             United States District Judge for the Southern District of Texas, sitting by
   designation.
          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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                                    No. 21-60416

   Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), which affirmed the IJ’s decision. He
   now petitions this court for review of the BIA decision, claiming that his due
   process rights were violated in the review process and that the IJ and BIA’s
   decisions were incorrect. Additionally, in a second petition, he raises a
   challenge to both the propriety of a Temporary Appellate Immigration
   Judge’s (“TAIJ”) appointment and the merits of the TAIJ’s decision to deny
   a motion to reopen.
           For the reasons that follow, we GRANT the first petition as to the
   CAT claims and DENY the remainder of the first and all of the second peti-
   tion.
                 I. Factual Background and Procedural History
           As a teenager in the DRC, Israel Mboba allegedly faced political
   persecution perpetuated by DRC police. His father and uncle, both politically
   active and prominently involved in their local church, were persecuted by the
   local police. In his hearing with the IJ, Mboba identified three specific dates
   on which his family was harmed or threatened by the police. Of the first such
   date, January 22, 2016, Mboba told the IJ that his father and uncle were
   arrested and beaten. Mboba also said that his aunt was pushed on that day
   and that she eventually died as a result. Mboba’s second identified date was
   the day his aunt died, April 15, 2016. Mboba’s family determined that same
   day that they would continue protesting against the government. While this
   was the second date Mboba identified in his application for asylum, Mboba
   stated during the IJ’s interview that, besides his aunt, no member of his
   family was harmed or threatened on this day. Mboba’s family continued to
   protest against the government but faced no further threat or harm until
   January 13, 2019. On that day, the police came to Mboba’s house to bring a
   summons for his father and uncle to discuss their actions “against the work
   of the government.” As neither were home, the police left the summons with
   Mboba, his cousin, and some other relations. The police also warned Mboba

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   that “whoever is going to get involved” in the protests, “they’re going to do
   the same thing that we did to them”—a threat which Mboba interpreted as
   “promising death.”
           Mboba, his father, his uncle, and two of his aunts determined then that
   their lives were in danger. They secured passports in the DRC and fled the
   country. Mboba and his family arrived at a port of entry into the United States
   on June 9, 2019, having traveled from the DRC to Ecuador and up through
   Central America. As they had no entry documents, they were detained.
   Mboba’s father was removed back to the DRC on January 8, 2020. Mboba
   was informed by a friend that some of Mboba’s relatives heard that Mboba’s
   father was arrested immediately upon his return to the DRC. Mboba himself
   filed for asylum on February 10, 2020.
           In August, roughly two months after his entry into the United States,
   Mboba had a Credible Fear Interview (“CFI”) with an asylum officer. 1
   Though Mboba was found credible, the worksheet suggests that Mboba’s
   testimony did not establish fear of persecution or torture. Alongside the
   worksheet in the record is an untitled document which appears to be a
   summary or non-verbatim transcript of Mboba’s CFI. The veracity of the
   content in this document is, in part, at issue in this appeal. The interview was
   conducted in Mboba’s native language, Lingala, with the aid of an
   interpreter. Mboba apparently listed four occasions on which his father was
   threatened: the first in February of 2015 (which did not come up in the IJ’s
   interview), the next in February of 2016 (which corresponds in substance to
   the January 2016 event in the IJ’s interview), the next on April 22, 2016
   (which also corresponds in substance to the January 2016 event as described
           _____________________
           1
              As Mboba notes, it is unclear who actually conducted the interview. The
   “Credible Fear Worksheet” states that the officer’s name is Jose Soriano but the notes at
   issue in this appeal list an officer Girmai Kahsai.

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   to the IJ), and the last on January 13, 2019. In the CFI, Mboba reportedly
   conceded that the police never harmed him physically but said that he
   personally was threatened twice. He also stated that he believed he would be
   targeted because he was the son of his father and not because of any religious
   or political beliefs. He was apparently read and agreed to this summary of his
   testimony: “You testified that the police in Kinshshasa [sic] city in Congo
   harmed and threatened your father for participating in protests against the
   government. You testified that the police would tell you to shut up and
   threaten to harm you whenever they come to harm your father. You testified
   that you didn’t report the threat to anyone in your country. You testified that
   you were targeted by the police because you are the son of your father. Is all
   of this accurate?”
          The IJ on the case appears to have used this untitled document in
   Mboba’s asylum hearing and, in any case, took issue with certain
   inconsistencies between Mboba’s testimony in the CFI and testimony before
   the IJ. After confirming with Mboba that he was sure the dates given in the
   hearing before the IJ were correct, the IJ asked why the dates given at the
   hearing did not match the dates on Mboba’s application for asylum. Notably,
   there are three sets of dates at issue in this case, no set of which matches up
   precisely. Mboba’s application for asylum lists four dates on which he and/or
   his family were harmed by the DRC: January 2015, February 22, 2016, April
   15, 2016, and January 13, 2019. The CFI notes contain discussions of these
   four dates: February 2015, February 2016, April 22, 2016, and January 13,
   2019. And Mboba provided these three dates to the IJ: January 22, 2016, April
   15, 2016, and January 13, 2019.
          The IJ initially questioned Mboba regarding his inconsistencies
   relative to the application dates rather than relative to the CFI dates. The IJ
   also asked Mboba whether he had ever personally protested against the
   government, to which Mboba said no. The IJ followed up by asking why

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   Mboba had stated on his application that “I did protest[] against the
   Government.” Mboba stated that he had only intended to claim that his
   family had protested. The IJ then questioned Mboba regarding
   inconsistencies between his testimony to the IJ and his testimony to the
   asylum officer during the CFI. For one, the IJ asked why Mboba claimed to
   the asylum officer that he arrived with his father and his sisters when the
   women were, according to Mboba’s testimony before the IJ, his father’s
   sisters. Mboba admitted to lying to the asylum officer and said his father had
   advised him to do so. The IJ then turned to the CFI dates and pressed Mboba
   on the inconsistencies: he asked Mboba why the CFI notes read that Mboba’s
   uncle’s leg was broken on April 22, and Mboba contended that he had told
   the asylum officer that this incident occurred on January 22. The IJ then
   asked why Mboba said his father was arrested on February 22, and Mboba
   again contended that he had stated that the arrest occurred on January 22.
   But when asked why he told the asylum officer that he had been threatened
   twice, Mboba conceded that he had lied “because I really, really need
   protection” and that he had never been threatened “because I was a minor.”
   At the close of the interview, the IJ found that Mboba was not a credible
   witness because he “admitted lying to the asylum officer several times under
   oath” and because he “contradicted [his] application.” The IJ also denied
   Mboba’s CAT application because Mboba had not “established that it’s
   more likely than not that you will be tortured in your country with your
   government’s acquiescence or participation.” Mboba indicated his intent to
   appeal.
          Mboba appealed to the BIA. In a two-page decision, the BIA affirmed
   the IJ’s decision “on the basis of the adverse credibility finding.” Mboba filed
   a petition for review in this court. Mboba subsequently filed a motion to reo-
   pen with the BIA, claiming, inter alia, that the BIA should consider new evi-
   dence, that he was not mentally competent, and that his due process rights

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   were violated. A TAIJ denied the motion to reopen and Mboba filed another
   petition for review in this court. Both petitions are before us in this appeal.
                              II. Standard of Review
          As a general matter, this court “only ha[s] authority to review the
   BIA’s decision, although we may also review the IJ’s decision when it has
   some impact on the BIA’s decision, as when the BIA has adopted all or part
   of the IJ’s reasoning.” Enriquez-Gutierrez v. Holder, 612 F.3d 400, 407 (5th
   Cir. 2010). “[T]he administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any
   reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8
   U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also Chen v. Gonzales, 470 F.3d 1131, 1134 (5th
   Cir. 2006) (“Under the substantial evidence standard, reversal is improper
   unless … [t]he applicant … show[s] that the evidence is so compelling that
   no reasonable factfinder could reach a contrary conclusion.”) (internal
   citation and quotations omitted). The Court reviews questions of law de novo.
   Miresles-Zuniga v. Holder, 743 F. 3d 110, 112 (5th Cir. 2014).
                               III. The First Petition
          Mboba’s first petition raises several points of error with the BIA’s
   analysis. While his due process challenges are not properly before this court,
   Mboba’s challenge to the BIA’s adverse credibility finding is reviewable, as
   is his challenge to the denial of his CAT claim. Each is addressed in turn.
          A. Exhaustion
          At the time this appeal was filed, this court’s precedent interpreted 8
   U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) to be a jurisdictional bar. The statute states in relevant
   part that “[a] court may review a final order of removal only if … the alien
   has exhausted all administrative remedies available to the alien as of right.”
   8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1). This court had previously read this to bar jurisdiction

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   where a petitioner “could have raised [an issue] in [a] motion to reconsider.”
   Ayala Chapa v. Garland, 60 F.4th 901, 905 (5th Cir. 2023) (.
          The Supreme Court disagreed. In Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 143 S.
   Ct. 1103 (2023), the Court held that “§ 1252(d)(1)’s exhaustion requirement
   is not jurisdictional [and] is subject to waiver and forfeiture.” Id. at 1116.
   Instead, the Court held that § 1252(d)(1) presents “a quintessential claim-
   processing rule.” Id. at 1112. A recent opinion in this Circuit, duly applying
   this new precedent, acknowledged the reversal of Ayala Chapa and its
   predecessors and likewise established that “an alien need not file a motion
   for reconsideration to exhaust arguments that arise as the result of a BIA
   opinion.” Carreon v. Garland, ---F.4th---, 2023 WL 4004120, at *2 (5th Cir.
   June 15, 2023).
          Nonetheless, the government urges us to apply the exhaustion
   requirement in § 1252(d)(1) because “[a] claim-processing rule may be
   ‘mandatory’ in the sense that a court must enforce the rule if a party
   ‘properly raises’ it.” Fort Bend Cnty., Texas v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 1843, 1849
   (2019) (alteration omitted) (quoting Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 19
   (2005) (per curiam)). And as the government points out, in the time since
   Santos-Zacaria was issued, two circuits have issued opinions that both cite
   Santos-Zacaria and decline to consider arguments on the basis that they were
   barred by § 1252(d)(1)’s claim-processing rule. See Umana-Escobar v.
   Garland, 69 F.4th 544, 550 (9th Cir. 2023) (“Because we agree with the
   government that Umana-Escobar failed to exhaust the alleged claim-
   processing violation as required under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1), we deny this
   portion of the petition.”), see also Odei v. Garland, ---F.4th---, 2023 WL
   4014048, at *3 n.1 (1st Cir. June 15, 2023) (“Because the government has
   raised the exhaustion requirement and because the petitioner failed to argue
   before the BIA that he was a member of some additional social group, we find
   that such an argument is unexhausted. We therefore decline to consider it.”).

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          The government has consistently and timely objected to Mboba’s
   alleged failure to exhaust certain arguments. Thus, we will apply the claim-
   processing requirements of § 1252(d)(1) to the extent that Mboba did, in fact,
   fail to exhaust his arguments.
          B. Mboba’s Due Process Claims
          The government contends that Mboba’s arguments concerning his
   procedural due process rights were insufficiently processed before the BIA
   and that they should thus be rejected. While “[c]laims of due process
   violations … are generally not subject to the exhaustion requirement,” this
   is subject to an exception “for procedural errors that are correctable by the
   BIA.” Roy v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 132, 137 (5th Cir. 2004). Roy itself concerned
   a petitioner’s claim that “his hearing before the IJ was fundamentally unfair
   such that it violated his due process rights … [because] the IJ failed to advise
   him of his rights and did not provide him with a reasonable opportunity to
   question his mother or to explain the dangers he would face if returned to
   India.” Id. at 136. While the petitioner admitted that he had not raised these
   issues directly to the BIA, he “maintain[ed] that he raised them indirectly by
   including a discussion of the IJ’s failure to elicit additional information from
   the applicants” Id. at 137. The court was unconvinced: “Although Roy’s
   argument is couched in terms of due process, it actually concerns ‘procedural
   error correctable by the BIA.’” Id. at 137 (quoting Anwar v. I.N.S., 116 F.3d
   140, 144 n.4 (5th Cir. 1997)).
          The issue Mboba raises concerning the IJ’s conduct fails according to
   the same analysis. In short, Mboba claims that the IJ failed to properly
   develop the record despite Mboba’s pro se status. Roy found that a similar
   issue was procedural error in light of the BIA’s decision in Matter of Exame,
   18 I. & N. Dec. 303, 305 (BIA 1982), in which the BIA remanded to an IJ for
   a new hearing a case where the IJ “improperly denied admission of the

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   background evidence … and thereby precluded the applicant from making a
   full and fair presentation of his persecution claim.” Likewise, here, had
   Mboba presented the BIA with this argument, the BIA could easily have
   remanded the case to the IJ for more fulsome questioning and development.
          Moreover, this is not the type of claim for which this court has
   previously found that exhaustion is unnecessary. The division may be
   understood in terms of structural and non-structural issues. The Roy case
   presents a non-structural issue: the IJ allegedly acted inappropriately
   according to the system’s procedural guidelines. In simpler terms, the
   contention in Roy was that the IJ had not acted in accordance with the rules.
   Anwar, on the other hand, presents a structural issue: the court there found
   that “a challenge to the regulations regarding the submission of briefs … is
   not subject to an exhaustion requirement.” Anwar, 116 F.3d at 144 n.4. The
   Anwar petitioner was challenging the rules themselves. As the BIA cannot
   change these rules, exhaustion (or, in updated terms, claim-processing) is not
   required. Here, Mboba alleges that the IJ failed to adhere to the rules. This is
   the sort of challenge that the BIA is equipped to address.
          The issue regarding the CFI notes is less obviously a procedural error
   remediable by the BIA but fails according to the same analysis. In short,
   Mboba suggests that the IJ and BIA’s reliance on the CFI notes was reversible
   error as the notes are “not sufficiently reliable” to “form the basis for an
   adverse credibility determination.” It is unclear if the BIA could remand for
   a new CFI; Mboba’s reply brief suggests that it could not. In fact, Mboba
   claims (without citation) that “[t]he BIA cannot change the way credible fear
   interviews are conducted, or the way such ‘notes’ are created during that
   process, either in Mr. Mboba’s case, or generally.” That may be so, and given
   the absence of evidence either way we may assume as much. Nonetheless,
   had Mboba raised before the BIA this challenge to the IJ’s reliance on the
   CFI notes, the BIA could have remedied the issue (if it thought it necessary)

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   by rejecting any findings of the IJ that relied on those notes or otherwise
   disclaiming reliance on the notes. The BIA was not given a chance to do so.
   Again, a challenge to the reliability of materials relied upon by the IJ is
   squarely about whether the IJ and the BIA were following the rules; one need
   not make a structural attack on the CFI process in order to say that certain
   non-verbatim notes are not reliable for purposes of impeachment.
          For both issues, Mboba alternatively argues that he did, in fact, raise
   this issue before the BIA, albeit indirectly. Mboba contends that circuit
   precedent “has repeatedly set the bar low” for what constitutes raising an
   issue. He points to Omari v. Holder, in which the petitioner’s failure to
   exhaust was contrasted with other petitioners who had “made some concrete
   statement before the BIA to which they could reasonably tie their claims
   before this court,” 562 F.3d 314, 322 (5th Cir. 2009) (abrogated on other
   grounds by Santos-Zacaria, 143 S. Ct. 1103), and Carranza-De Salinas v.
   Gonzales, in which the court held that the petitioner’s issue was not
   unexhausted because she “raised th[e] argument, although in a less
   developed form, before the BIA,” 477 F.3d 200, 206 (5th Cir. 2007).
          For the “less developed” version of his arguments, Mboba points to
   statements that he “appeared pro se throughout the proceedings” and that
   “[t]he Immigration Judge denied Mr. Mboba’s application for asylum and
   withholding of removal based on the erroneous adverse credibility
   determination without engaging in any further analysis.” These statements,
   presented in the Procedural History and Summary of the Argument sections,
   respectively, could not reasonably have placed the BIA on notice of the
   argument that the IJ failed to properly develop the record. Mboba also
   submits that he raised a less developed version of his argument relating to the
   CFI notes by stating that “[t]he Immigration Judge based his adverse
   credibility determination on inconsistencies between Mr. Mboba’s testimony
   and his I-589 application and interview notes with the asylum officer.” Even

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   under a generous interpretation of this factual statement, it is hard to see how
   the BIA could have understood Mboba to be challenging the veracity of those
   interview notes, especially given that the rest of Mboba’s brief simply
   attempts to explain away the inconsistencies as minor or immaterial rather
   than claim that they did not exist in the first place. 2
           In sum, Mboba neither properly raised these issues before the BIA nor
   presents arguments that need not be raised before the BIA to be considered
   by this court. Accordingly, we apply the claim-processing rule found in
   § 1252(d)(1) and decline to consider Mboba’s newly-raised arguments con-
   cerning the IJ’s conduct and the use of the CFI notes. 3
           C. Adverse Credibility Finding
           Mboba also challenges the BIA’s affirmance of the IJ’s factual finding
   that he was not a credible witness. When evaluating the credibility of a
   petitioner, “an IJ may rely on any inconsistency or omission in making an
   adverse credibility determination as long as the ‘totality of the
   circumstances’ establishes that an asylum applicant is not credible .... We
   defer therefore to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from the totality
   of the circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder could make
   such an adverse credibility ruling.” Wang v. Holder, 569 F.3d 531 (5th Cir.

           _____________________
           2
             It is worth noting that, while Mboba represented himself before the IJ, by the time
   of his appeal to the BIA he had been able to secure legal counsel. While the rules we discuss
   are not limited to pro se litigants, Mboba is not entitled to any extra-liberal construction of
   his BIA pleadings.
           3
              While we make no judgment concerning the merits of Mboba’s challenge to the
   CFI notes, we acknowledge that over-reliance on non-verbatim, essentially unverified
   notes from an interview could give rise to due process concerns. Nonetheless, as discussed
   in the following section, even had we thrown out all findings reliant on these notes, Mboba
   has not made a compelling showing of his credibility.

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   2009) (emphasis in original) (quoting Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d
   Cir. 2008)).
          The IJ identified several inconsistencies between Mboba’s
   application, CFI testimony, and testimony at his asylum hearing. Any one of
   these inconsistencies can be the basis for an adverse credibility finding. See
   Ghotra v. Whitaker, 912 F.3d 284, 289 (5th Cir. 2019) (upholding an adverse
   credibility ruling where the BIA identified “specific inconsistencies” and
   “crucial omissions” in the petitioner’s testimony).
          Mboba suggests that the identified inconsistencies were either minor
   or reliant on the CFI notes. More specifically, Mboba states that the BIA
   opinion only relied on two inconsistencies: (1) a discrepancy between the CFI
   notes and Mboba’s removal hearing testimony concerning whether he
   personally was threatened and (2) the date when the police broke his uncle’s
   leg. While these are the only two inconsistencies specifically identified by the
   BIA, Mboba’s description of the first inconsistency is incomplete: the BIA
   identifies “clear[]” discrepancies between “the respondent’s Credible Fear
   Interview[,] … his subsequently-filed application for asylum …[,] and his
   hearing testimony.” In other words, even if the BIA had disregarded the CFI
   notes, it would still have identified issues reliant only on a comparison of the
   application for asylum and Mboba’s testimony. In any case, the BIA’s
   opinion provides those inconsistencies only as examples and not as an
   exhaustive list of its concerns: the BIA “affirm[ed] the Immigration Judge’s
   denial of relief on the basis of the adverse credibility finding,” which clearly
   indicates that the BIA relied on the entirety of the IJ’s analysis.

          Moreover, the IJ—and, thus, the BIA—did not rely on the CFI notes
   as the only or most crucial evidence of inconsistency: instead, they relied on
   Mboba’s own testimony. As the BIA notes, “the respondent conceded at his
   … hearing that his Credible Fear Interview, when he told the asylum officer

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   that [he] had been threatened twice in his home country, was inconsistent
   with his testimony at his subsequent removal hearing that he [was] never
   directly threatened or harmed in his home country.” The CFI notes were not
   the essential evidence of inconsistency: Mboba’s own words were. The
   BIA’s opinion refers to this exchange between the IJ and Mboba, reproduced
   here in relevant part:
          [IJ]: Why did you tell the asylum officer you were threatened two
          times in your country?
          [Mboba]: I’ve never been threatened physically. I was just, the threat
          was just mentally.
          [IJ]: In total how many times were you threatened, and how many
          times were you harmed in your country is what the asylum officer
          asked you. You responded I was threatened two times. Why would
          you say that when you told the Court today you were never
          threatened?
          [Mboba]: The thing I’m telling you today, that’s the story. I’ve never
          been threatened because I was a minor.
          [IJ]: Well then why did you tell the asylum officer you’d been
          threatened two times?
          [Mboba]: It’s because I really, really need protection. That’s why I
          said that. But I[’ve] never been threatened because I was a minor.
          [IJ]: Okay. So you lied to the asylum officer? Is that correct?
          [Mboba]: Yes, sir.
   In other words: the inconsistency is not reliant on the CFI notes. Mboba
   admitted that he told the asylum officer that he had been threatened and that
   his statement was a lie. Whether or not the CFI notes are reliable, Mboba’s
   own testimony is that he lied about a crucial element of his asylum claim to
   the asylum officer. This in itself is sufficient to uphold an adverse credibility
   determination.
          We are not asked whether “we might have viewed the evidence dif-
   ferently” but whether “no reasonable factfinder could come to the same con-
   clusion as the IJ.” Wang, 569 F.3d at 540. The evidence does not compel such

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   a finding. Thus, we uphold the adverse credibility determination, and on that
   basis DENY the petition for review as to the request for asylum.
          D. Denial of CAT Relief
          The BIA relied exclusively on Mboba’s adverse credibility finding in
   order to deny his CAT application. Under our precedent, “CAT claims are
   ‘distinct from asylum and withholding-of-removal claims and should receive
   separate analytical attention.’” Arulnanthy v. Garland, 17 F.4th 586, 598 (5th
   Cir. 2021) (quoting Santos-Alvarado v. Barr, 967 F.3d 428, 436 (5th Cir.
   2020)). See also Efe v. Ashcroft, 293 F.3d 899, 907 (5th Cir. 2002) (warning
   against “overreliance on an adverse credibility ruling”). The BIA failed to
   give Mboba’s claims the requisite analytical attention. Thus, we will
   GRANT Mboba’s first petition as to the CAT claims and remand for further
   proceedings on that ground.
                             IV. The Second Petition
          Mboba’s second petition for review challenges (1) the legitimacy of
   the appointment of the TAIJ who denied Mboba’s motion to reopen and (2)
   the merits of that decision. Each is addressed in turn.
          A. Appointment of the TAIJ
          Mboba’s motion to reopen was considered and denied by a TAIJ.
   Mboba raises a challenge to the TAIJ’s appointment. He claims that because
   the TAIJ was improperly appointed, her denial of the motion to reopen is
   invalid. Under 8 C.F.R. §1003.1(a)(4), the Director of the Executive Office
   for Immigration Review (“EOIR”) has authority to “designate … temporary
   [BIA] members for terms not to exceed six months.” These temporary board
   members are known as TAIJs. Id. The Board members more generally are
   “appointed by the Attorney General.” Id. at §1003.1(a)(1).

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                 1. Exhaustion
          The government contends that Mboba’s argument concerning the
   validity of the TAIJ’s appointment was subject to the same claim-processing
   requirement as his other claims and was not raised in his motion to
   reconsider. The government thus submits that we should decline to consider
   Mboba’s arguments on this issue. “Certainly,” the government states, “one
   would be hard pressed to find a more suitable issue requiring exhaustion than
   one regarding the regulatory scheme concerning members of the [BIA].” We
   disagree. Mboba’s arguments directly implicate structural concerns. It is
   absurd to suggest that Mboba should be forced to ask a TAIJ whether or not
   her commission is valid in order for this court to consider that question. See
   Goonsuwan v. Ashcroft, 252 F.3d 383, 389 (5th Cir. 2001) (internal quotations
   and citations omitted) (“Even when exhaustion is a jurisdictional bar, this
   Court recognizes an exception when administrative remedies are inadequate.
   Similarly, … where statutes impose an exhaustion requirement …
   [exceptions are made] where resort to the agency would be futile because the
   challenge is one that the agency has no power to resolve in the applicant’s
   favor.”). This accords with the decision in Carreon, 2023 WL 4004120 at *2,
   in which a similar argument was heard despite alleged failure to raise before
   the BIA. Mboba did not need to raise this argument before the BIA in order
   that we may hear it.
                 2. Merits
          Mboba suggests that the entire TAIJ scheme is either unconstitutional
   or barred by relevant statutes and regulations. The BIA members, as
   “Inferior Officers” in the constitutional sense, must be appointed by “the
   President alone, … the Courts of Law, or … the Heads of Departments,” as
   determined by Congress. U.S. Const. Art. II, §II, Cl. II. The EOIR
   Director therefore cannot appoint BIA members or TAIJ members. This is

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   no issue in itself as it is undisputed that the Attorney General appoints TAIJs,
   including TAIJ Brown, who was appointed by Attorney General Merrick
   Garland. However, Mboba states that the regulations governing the
   designation of TAIJs leave “no role … for the Attorney General to make an
   ‘appointment’ of a TAIJ.” As “one under investigation with a view to
   deportation is legally entitled to insist upon the observance of rules
   promulgated by the Secretary pursuant to law,” Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S.
   135, 153 (1945) (quoting Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 155 (1923)), Mboba
   suggests that he can properly insist that the TAIJ scheme as a whole is invalid
   because the Attorney General is making appointments in the absence of
   regulatory or statutory authority to do so.
          In addition, Mboba contends that this TAIJ’s designation was invalid
   because Acting Attorney General Monty Wilkinson, who appointed the
   EOIR Director who in turn designated the TAIJ at issue in this case, was not
   validly in his position as Acting Attorney General. President Biden appointed
   Wilkinson to the post of Acting Attorney General by making use of the
   provisions of the Federal Vacancies Reform Act (FVRA). That act provides
   the “exclusive means for temporarily authorizing an acting official … for
   which appointment is … made by the President, by and with the advice and
   consent of the Senate, unless,” inter alia, “a statutory provision expressly …
   designates an officer … to perform the functions and duties of a specified
   office temporarily.” 5 U.S.C. §3347(a)(1)(B). As Mboba notes, there is such
   a statutory provision in play for the appointment of an Acting Attorney
   General. See 28 U.S.C. 508(b). However, that the FVRA “is not exclusive
   does not mean that it is unavailable.” Auth. of the President to Name an Acting
   Att’y Gen., 31 U.S. Op. Off. Legal Counsel 208 (2007). The FVRA does not,
   by its terms, prohibit use where another statute provides a mechanism for

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   appointment. It merely provides that it is not the only means by which an
   appointment may be made in such circumstances. 4
           Unfortunately, the government’s brief spends very little time dealing
   with the merits of Mboba’s claims, preferring instead to argue that Mboba’s
   claims are unexhausted. In two lengthy footnotes, the government suggests
   (1) that Mboba has no standing to bring his claims, and (2) that the Attorney
   General properly appointed TAIJ Brown. It is not contested that the
   Attorney General appointed TAIJ Brown, though the propriety of that
   appointment is of course disputed. On standing, Mboba replies, first, that the
   government’s arguments are waived because they were raised in footnotes, 5
   and second, that the Bridges doctrine, described above, provides for standing.
   We agree with his latter contention.
           Nonetheless, Mboba’s argument that the TAIJ scheme is barred by
   regulation fails on one crucial detail: while the relevant regulations do not
   provide in the section on TAIJs that the Attorney General is the one to
   appoint TAIJs, a contextual reading of the regulations demonstrates that the
   Attorney General is recognized therein as the one who appoints TAIJs.
   Mboba suggests that language in other regulations which grants the Attorney
   General a particular role—such as the language in 8 C.F.R. §1003.1(a)(2)
   that “[T]he Attorney General shall designate one of the Board members to
   serve as chairman”—implies that the lack of such language in the TAIJ

           _____________________
           4
             Finally, Mboba submits that the TAIJ schema is invalid under Office of Personnel
   Management regulations. However, he fails to demonstrate that the regulations in question
   do, in fact, apply to TAIJs. Given this failure, we deem this argument waived.
           5
            For this proposition, Mboba cites Bridas S.A.P.I.C. v. Gov’t of Turkmenistan, 345
   F.3d 347, 356 n.7 (5th Cir. 2003) (“Bridas attempted to appeal, in a footnote, the district
   court’s determination [on an issue]. Arguments that are insufficiently addressed in the
   body of the brief, however, are waived.”). Though a strong quote, it applies only to
   arguments in an appellant’s brief.

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   section was deliberate. Moreover, Mboba reads the language in 8 C.F.R.
   §1003.1(a)(1) that “[t]he [BIA] members shall be attorneys appointed by the
   Attorney General” to exclude the Attorney General’s appointment power
   over TAIJs. This argument is neither mandated by a reading of the
   regulations nor consistent with a fair reading of the whole regulatory scheme
   surrounding the BIA. To put it simply: TAIJs, though only temporarily
   appointed, are nonetheless BIA members. See 8 C.F.R. §1003.1(a)(4)
   (emphasis added) (“The Director may in his discretion designate [certain
   individuals] … to act as temporary Board members for terms not to exceed six
   months. … A temporary Board member shall have the authority of a Board
   member… [except with regard to en banc matters].”). Section 1003.1(a)(1)
   states that BIA members shall be appointed by the Attorney General. Thus,
   a contextual reading of the regulations clearly indicates that the Attorney
   General appoints TAIJs.
          B. Merits of the Denial
          On the merits, “we review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen or
   to reconsider under a highly deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Zhao
   v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 295, 303 (5th Cir. 2005). Moreover, “motions to
   reopen are disfavored in deportation proceedings.” I.N.S. v. Abudu, 485 U.S.
   94, 107 (1988). “A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless
   it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was
   not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former
   hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2.
          Mboba’s motion to reopen was premised on three grounds: (1) that
   his previously-undiagnosed mental health conditions made him unable to
   present credible testimony, (2) that his newly secured corroborating evidence
   presents material evidence in his favor, and (3) that the IJ deprived Mboba of

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   his right to a fair hearing (for the reasons identified in the petition for review
   before this court).
          The TAIJ denied Mboba’s motion to reopen in full. First, she held
   that Mboba had “not demonstrated that the evidence that he seeks to present
   on reopening … [is] new and [was] previously unavailable.” She also found
   that neither Mboba’s argument regarding mental incompetency nor his
   argument regarding the IJ’s conduct found “support in the record.” The
   TAIJ noted that “there were no indicia of incompetency presented to the
   Immigration Judge.” Moreover, she noted that Mboba had not demonstrated
   that evidence of his mental incompetence was “new and … previously
   unavailable.” Finally, the TAIJ held that a motion to reopen was not the
   proper avenue for an appeal regarding the IJ’s conduct, and that, in any
   event, Mboba’s arguments on the issue were without merit.
          Mboba contends on appeal that the evidence on which he relies was,
   in fact, new and previously unavailable at the time of the motion to reopen.
   In relevant part, Mboba’s motion relied on: (1) an affidavit from a doctor
   concerning a psychological evaluation conducted regarding Mboba, (2) an
   affidavit from Mboba’s uncle concerning the political persecution from
   which he and Mboba fled, (3) Mboba’s uncle’s medical records, (4) an article
   concerning the relationship between trauma and disordered memories,
   (5) newly created country conditions reports regarding the DRC, and (6) an
   affidavit from Mboba himself. Mboba submits that “essentially all the
   evidence did not exist anywhere in the world at the time of the hearing
   [because] [t]he documents simply had not been created and could not have
   been created because of the conditions surrounding Mr. Mboba.” However,
   in making this argument, Mboba confuses the vehicles by which evidence is
   presented for the evidence itself. More bluntly: the relevant evidence is not
   the documents themselves but that to which the documents testify. C.f.
   Luna-Garcia De Garcia v. Barr, 921 F.3d 559, 566 (5th Cir. 2019) (emphasis

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   added) (“the pertinent information contained in [the] affidavit was not
   previously unavailable”). For example, Mboba’s contention is not that he
   developed PTSD after the hearing before the IJ, but that his PTSD was not
   yet diagnosed. 6 This evidence is not of the sort that “could not have been
   discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2. There
   was thus no abuse of discretion in denying the motion to reopen.
                                      V. Conclusion
           For the foregoing reasons, we GRANT Mboba’s first petition as to
   his CAT claims and remand for further proceedings on that issue. We
   DENY the first petition as to all other claims and likewise DENY his second
   petition.

           _____________________
           6
              As a side note, the government suggests that Mboba’s psychological evaluation
   was “effectively generated to explain away the agency’s largely unchallenged adverse
   credibility determination.” Such a suggestion is at best unnecessary and has no support in
   the record beyond speculative linkage.

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