Court Opinion

ID: 9369250
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-08 16:01:09.205805+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:13.836171
License: Public Domain

21-6014
     Zhao v. Garland
                                                                             BIA
                                                                         Kolbe, IJ
                                                                     A209 163 282
                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                  SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION
TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED
AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS
COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX
OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A
PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

 1        At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
 2   for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
 3   United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
 4   New York, on the 8th day of February, two thousand twenty-
 5   three.
 6
 7   PRESENT:
 8            MICHAEL H. PARK,
 9            BETH ROBINSON,
10            SARAH A. L. MERRIAM,
11                 Circuit Judges.
12   _____________________________________
13
14   PING ZHAO,
15            Petitioner,
16
17                     v.                                  21-6014
18                                                         NAC
19   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
20   STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
21            Respondent. *
22   _____________________________________
23
24   FOR PETITIONER:                   Richard Tarzia, Esq., Belle Mead,
25                                     NJ.

           The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend
              *
     the caption as set forth above.
 1   FOR RESPONDENT:             Brian M. Boynton, Acting Assistant
 2                               Attorney General; Mary Jane
 3                               Candaux, Assistant Director; Remi
 4                               Da Rocha-Afodu, Trial Attorney,
 5                               Office of Immigration Litigation,
 6                               United States Department of
 7                               Justice, Washington, DC.

 8        UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a

 9   Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby

10   ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review

11   is DENIED.

12        Petitioner   Ping   Zhao,   a     native   and   citizen   of   the

13   People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a December 7,

14   2020 decision of the BIA denying his motion to terminate and

15   affirming a July 26, 2018 decision of an Immigration Judge

16   (“IJ”) that denied his application for asylum and withholding

17   of removal.   In re Zhao Ping, No. A 209 163 282 (B.I.A. Dec.

18   7, 2020), aff’g No. A 209 163 282 (Immigr. Ct. N.Y.C. July

19   26, 2018).    We assume the parties’ familiarity with the

20   underlying facts and procedural history.

21   I.   Motion to Terminate

22        Zhao’s   argument   that    the     immigration    court   lacked

23   jurisdiction because his Notice to Appear (“NTA”) omitted the

24   time and date of his hearing is foreclosed by our case law.

25   We have held that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Pereira v.
                                   2
 1   Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018), and Niz-Chavez v. Garland,

 2   141 S. Ct. 1474 (2021), are limited to the stop-time rule

 3   relating to cancellation of removal and are “not properly

 4   read to void jurisdiction in cases in which an NTA omits a

 5   hearing time or place.”      Banegas Gomez v. Barr, 922 F.3d 101,

 6   110 (2d Cir. 2019); see also Chery v. Garland, 16 F.4th 980,

 7   987 (2d Cir. 2021) (“Banegas Gomez remains good law even after

 8   the Supreme Court’s opinion in Niz-Chavez.”).             “[A]n NTA that

 9   omits information regarding the time and date of the initial

10   removal hearing is . . . adequate to vest jurisdiction in the

11   Immigration Court, at least so long as a notice of hearing

12   specifying       this   information       is   later      sent    to   the

13   alien.”    Banegas Gomez, 922 F.3d at 112.             Here, Zhao later

14   received     a   hearing   notice       that   provided     the   missing

15   information, and he appeared at his hearing.                Accordingly,

16   the agency did not err in denying his motion to terminate.

17   II. Asylum and Withholding of Removal

18       We have reviewed both the BIA’s and the IJ’s decisions

19   denying asylum and withholding of removal.             See Yun-Zui Guan

20   v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 391, 394 (2d Cir. 2005). The applicable

21   standards of review are well established.                  See 8 U.S.C.

                                         3
 1   § 1252(b)(4)(B) (“[T]he administrative findings of fact are

 2   conclusive       unless     any   reasonable       adjudicator     would     be

 3   compelled      to   conclude      to   the    contrary.”); Wei       Sun     v.

 4   Sessions, 883 F.3d 23, 27 (2d Cir. 2018) (reviewing factual

 5   findings for substantial evidence and questions of law de

 6   novo).

 7         “The testimony of the applicant may be sufficient to

 8   sustain the applicant’s burden without corroboration, but

 9   only if the applicant satisfies the trier of fact that the

10   applicant’s testimony is credible, is persuasive, and refers

11   to    specific      facts    sufficient      to    demonstrate     that     the

12   applicant    is     a   refugee. . . . Where         the   trier    of     fact

13   determines that the applicant should provide evidence that

14   corroborates otherwise credible testimony, such evidence must

15   be provided unless the applicant does not have the evidence

16   and   cannot     reasonably       obtain     the   evidence.”       8 U.S.C.

17   § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii); see also Wei Sun, 883 F.3d at 30–31.

18   Before denying a claim based on an applicant’s failure to

19   provide corroborating evidence, an IJ should “(1) point to

20   specific pieces of missing evidence and show that it was

21   reasonably available, (2) give the applicant an opportunity

                                            4
 1   to explain the omission, and (3) assess any explanation

 2   given.”    Wei Sun, 883 F.3d at 31.

 3          We find no error in the agency’s conclusion that Zhao

 4   failed to meet his burden of proof.                   The agency reasonably

 5   concluded that Zhao’s testimony on its own was insufficient

 6   given the lack of detail he provided about events in China

 7   and his practice of Christianity in the United States.                      See

 8   8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii); Wei Sun, 883 F.3d at 28; Yan

 9   Juan    Chen    v.   Holder,   658     F.3d    246,    252   (2d   Cir.   2011)

10   (agreeing that testimony lacked detail where the applicant

11   could     not   provide      details        about   treatment      by   alleged

12   persecutors).         Zhao     did   not      provide    any    corroborating

13   evidence, from China or the United States, to confirm his

14   alleged persecution or his practice of Christianity in either

15   country.

16          The IJ applied the correct framework by identifying the

17   missing evidence—letters from Zhao’s wife, mother, anyone in

18   China, or his church in the United States attesting to his

19   Christian practice or the alleged persecution—and asking Zhao

20   why he had not provided that evidence.                 Wei Sun, 883 F.3d at

21   31.     Zhao’s explanations that his wife and mother are not

                                             5
 1   well-educated,     that   church   members   in   China   have   gone

 2   elsewhere to work, and that people at his church in the United

 3   States “use[d] the work as excuse to refuse,” Certified Admin.

 4   R. at 138, do not compel a conclusion that written statements

 5   were unavailable particularly given the years that Zhao had

 6   to prepare for his hearing.        See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4) (“No

 7   court shall reverse a determination made by a trier of fact

 8   with     respect   to     the   availability      of   corroborating

9    evidence . . . unless . . . a reasonable trier of fact is

10   compelled to conclude that such corroborating evidence is

11   unavailable.”); Wei Sun, 883 F.3d at 31 (holding that an

12   applicant “bears the ultimate burden of introducing such

13   evidence without prompting from the IJ”).              The agency’s

14   conclusion that Zhao failed to meet his burden of proof is

15   dispositive of both asylum and withholding of removal.           See

16   Lecaj v. Holder, 616 F.3d 111, 119 (2d Cir. 2010).

17          For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is

18   DENIED.    All pending motions and applications are DENIED and

19   stays VACATED.

20                                   FOR THE COURT:
21                                   Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
22                                   Clerk of Court

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