Court Opinion

ID: 9914949
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-03 20:00:52.188373+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:15:52.996260
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-11588    Document: 29-1     Date Filed: 01/03/2024   Page: 1 of 5

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 23-11588
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
       versus
       JACK PROTZMAN,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Middle District of Florida
                  D.C. Docket No. 3:22-cr-00100-BJD-PDB-1
                          ____________________
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       2                      Opinion of the Court                  23-11588

       Before BRASHER, ABUDU, and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Jack Protzman appeals his sentence of 24 months’ imprison-
       ment for conspiracy to distribute marijuana, which was reached by
       a downward variance from his guideline range of 27 to 33 months’
       imprisonment. On appeal, Protzman argues that: (1) his sentence
       is procedurally unreasonable because the district court did not con-
       sider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors relevant to his case on an indi-
       vidualized basis; and (2) his sentence is cruel and unusual, in viola-
       tion of the Eighth Amendment, because it is disproportionate to his
       offense due to his old age and medical conditions. In response, the
       government argues that any challenge to the procedural or sub-
       stantive reasonableness of the sentence is barred by the sentence-
       appeal waiver in Protzman’s plea agreement. After thorough re-
       view, we affirm.
              We review the validity of a sentence-appeal waiver de novo.
       United States v. Johnson, 541 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir. 2008). We also
       review constitutional challenges to a sentence de novo. United States
       v. Flanders, 752 F.3d 1317, 1342 (11th Cir. 2014). However, if a de-
       fendant fails to raise an argument before the district court, then we
       review it for plain error. Id. To establish plain error, the defendant
       must show (1) an error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that aﬀected his
       substantial rights. United States v. Turner, 474 F.3d 1265, 1276 (11th
       Cir. 2007). If the defendant satisﬁes these conditions, we may ex-
       ercise our discretion to recognize the error only if it seriously
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       23-11588               Opinion of the Court                         3

       aﬀects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial pro-
       ceedings. Id. An error is only plain if it is contrary to a federal
       statute or on-point precedent of this Court or the U.S. Supreme
       Court. United States v. Hoﬀman, 710 F.3d 1228, 1232 (11th Cir. 2013).
              First, Protzman is barred from challenging the reasonable-
       ness of his sentence because of the appeal waiver in his plea agree-
       ment. For an appeal waiver to be eﬀective, “it must be knowing
       and voluntary.” United States v. Bushert, 997 F.2d 1343, 1350–51 (11th
       Cir. 1993). “In order to prevail in its argument that this court
       should enforce a sentence appeal waiver, the government” must
       prove one of two things: “that either (1) the district court speciﬁ-
       cally questioned the defendant concerning the sentence appeal
       waiver during the [Fed. R. Crim. P. 11] colloquy, or (2) it is mani-
       festly clear from the record that the defendant otherwise under-
       stood the full signiﬁcance of the waiver.” Id. at 1351.
              Here, Protzman’s sentence-appeal waiver was eﬀective. He
       expressly waived all challenges to his sentence on appeal except for
       “(a) the ground that the sentence exceeds the defendant’s applica-
       ble guideline range as determined by the Court pursuant to the
       United States Guidelines; (b) the ground that the sentence exceeds
       the statutory maximum penalty; [] (c) the ground that the sentence
       violates the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution;” or (d) if the
       government appealed his sentence. Further, he made this waiver
       knowingly and voluntarily because the magistrate judge at his plea
       hearing “speciﬁcally questioned [him] concerning the sentence ap-
       peal waiver.” Id. The magistrate judge explained the nature of his
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       4                      Opinion of the Court                  23-11588

       right to appeal, all of the consequences of waiving it, and all of the
       exceptions to the waiver, and when it asked him if he understood
       all of this, Protzman replied, “I do, Your Honor.” On this record,
       Protzman made the appeal waiver knowingly and voluntarily.
              Because Protzman knowingly and voluntarily entered his
       sentence-appeal waiver, he is barred from appealing his sentence
       except in the case of the four exceptions described in the plea agree-
       ment. The four exceptions, as we’ve already detailed, involve situ-
       ations where his sentence exceeds the applicable guideline range or
       the statutory maximum, his sentence violates the Eighth Amend-
       ment, or the government appeals his sentence. Notably, none of
       those exceptions include a challenge to the procedural or substan-
       tive reasonableness of a downward-variance sentence within the
       statutory limits. Thus, Protzman has waived all of the arguments
       that he classiﬁes as challenging the procedural reasonableness of
       his sentence, which also includes arguments as to its substantive
       reasonableness. See id.
              As for Protzman’s remaining challenge to his sentence -- that
       it was cruel and unusual in violation of the Eighth Amendment --
       we are unpersuaded. “In non-capital cases, the Eighth Amendment
       encompasses, at most, only a narrow proportionality principle.”
       United States v. Brant, 62 F.3d 367, 368 (11th Cir. 1995). To determine
       that a non-capital sentence is cruel and unusual in violation of the
       Eighth Amendment, we “must make a threshold determination
       that the sentence imposed is grossly disproportionate to the oﬀense
       committed and, if it is grossly disproportionate, [we] must then
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       23-11588               Opinion of the Court                        5

       consider the sentences imposed on others convicted in the same
       jurisdiction and the sentences imposed for commission of the same
       crime in other jurisdictions.” United States v. Reynolds, 215 F.3d
       1210, 1214 (11th Cir. 2000). “Generally, sentences within the statu-
       tory limits are ‘neither excessive, nor cruel and unusual under the
       Eighth Amendment.’” United States v. Bowers, 811 F.3d 412, 432
       (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Moriarty, 429 F.3d 1012,
       1024 (11th Cir. 2005)).
              Here, the record reﬂects that Protzman did not argue that
       his sentence was cruel and unusual before the district court, so we
       must review this issue only for plain error, and can ﬁnd none. Flan-
       ders, 752 F.3d at 1342. Indeed, Protzman does not cite to any con-
       trolling precedent from this Court or the Supreme Court to sup-
       port his claim that it was plain error to impose a sentence of incar-
       ceration within the statutory limit for an elderly defendant with
       health problems. In fact, our controlling precedent holds the op-
       posite -- that is, that sentences within the statutory range set by
       Congress, like Protzman’s, which was well below the 20-year stat-
       utory maximum, will generally not violate the Eighth Amend-
       ment. See Bowers, 811 F.3d at 432.
               Because Protzman has failed to cite to on-point, controlling
       precedent supporting his claim, he has failed to show that the dis-
       trict court plainly violated the Eighth Amendment. See Hoﬀman,
       710 F.3d at 1232.
             AFFIRMED.