Court Opinion

ID: 9600399
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:26:40.588696+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:09:04.873887
License: Public Domain

SMITH, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I agree with the majority’s determination that Winspear asserted a hostile work environment claim independent of a constructive discharge claim. But I dissent from its holding that genuine issues of material fact remain as to whether Win-spear was subject to hostile work environment discrimination based on his religious beliefs. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Winspear, the alleged harassment did not affect a term, condition, or privilege of Winspear’s employment.
“Title VII[ ] prohibits an employer from subjecting its employees to a hostile work environment because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” Al-Zubaidy v. TEK Indus., Inc., 406 F.3d 1030, 1039 (8th Cir.2005) (internal quotations and citation omitted).
To establish a prima facie hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff must prove: (1) that [he or] she was a member of a protected group;2 (2) the occurrence of unwelcome harassment; (3) a causal nexus between the harassment and [his or] her membership in the protected group; (4) that the harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment; and (5) that the employer knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt and effective remedial action.
*610Vajdl v. Mesabi Acad. of KidsPeace, Inc., 484 F.3d 546, 550 (8th Cir.2007). “[Conduct must be extreme to amount to a change in the terms and conditions of employment. ...” Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 141 L.Ed.2d 662 (1998). “[Standards for judging hostility are sufficiently demanding to ensure that Title VII does not become a general civility code.” Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted).
As noted supra, the fourth element of the prima facie case requires the plaintiff to prove that the “harassing conduct subjectively and objectively affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment.” Vajdl, 484 F.3d at 551. “Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment — an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive— is beyond Title VII’s purview.” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993). An employer violates Title VII “[w]hen the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment.” Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted). “We can determine ‘whether an environment is ‘hostile’ or ‘abusive’ ... only by looking at all the circumstances [, which] may include the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.’ ” Al-Zubaidy, 406 F.3d at 1038 (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 23, 114 S.Ct. 367) (alterations in Al-Zubaidy).
Here, Winspear’s proof does not establish that the harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment. First, as to the frequency of the conduct, Winspear admits that “[a]fter about three[-]and[-]a[-]half weeks of this pretty ongoing deal, Lana’s direct daily harassment somewhat subsided and it became an occasional have you thought any more about the religion-type of question she would ask me.” Winspear Deposition at 111 (emphasis added). Thus, according to Winspear, the conversations between he and Sierra started around January 31, 2005, and continued on “almost [a] daily basis” for “approximately three[-]and[-]a[-]half weeks.” Id. at 112. When asked during his deposition whether Sierra kept talking to him on a daily basis after that time, Winspear responded, “Like I said. For a few days.” Id. at 113. When asked whether “[i]t went away,” Winspear stated, “It went away almost completely in mid to late March 2005.” Id. (emphasis added). Subsequently, when Winspear was asked whether Sierra would approach him on a “daily basis” and ask him if he had thought any more about finding a religion and attending church with her, Winspear responded, “After the middle of March, it happened approximately one to two weeks.” Id. at 136 (emphasis added). Even in his complaint, Winspear stated that “Sierra’s harassment of plaintiff continued, but eventually ceased.” Appellant’s Appendix at 27 (emphasis added).
Not until Winspear filed his declaration in opposition to CDI’s motion for summary judgment did Winspear aver that
[ojver the final 1-5 months of my employment at GDI, I experienced ongoing pressure from Sierra to choose a religion, to look into finding God, fixing my life, and researching the supernatural. Although Sierra’s direct references to Logan had subsided, her constant pressure on me to find religion reminded me of all of the horrible things that Sierra had said about Logan, his suffering in Hell, and my inability to contact him *611because I had not found religion. In light of the ongoing harassment [,] Schneider’s refusal to remedy the situation!,] and in fact condoning Sierra’s behavior, I lost hope for my job.
(Emphasis added.)
But a plaintiff “cannot create an issue of material fact merely by contradicting [his] earlier statements.” Planned Parenthood of Minn./S.D. v. Rounds, 372 F.3d 969, 973 (8th Cir.2004). The district court found, and the record demonstrates, that Sierra’s daily comments about Winspear’s need to find God only lasted three-and-a half weeks in 2005. Thereafter, the comments were only occasional. Furthermore, in his complaint, Winspear admitted that Sierra’s conduct “eventually ceased.” Winspear waited four to five months between when Sierra allegedly stopped harassing him before he resigned in August 2005. Cf. Konstantopoulos v. Westvaco Corp., 112 F.3d 710, 715-16 (3d Cir.1997) (seven-month gap between harassing incidents allowed effects of prior incidents to dissipate).
Second, we have rejected hostile work environment claims in circumstances potentially more offensive than the present case. See, e.g., Duncan v. Gen. Motors Corp., 300 F.3d 928, 933-34 (8th Cir.2002) (finding five harassing incidents — including a relationship proposition, improper touching, a request that plaintiff draw a sexually objectionable picture, and posting of offensive posters — did not meet the standard necessary to be actionable); Tuggle v. Mangan, 348 F.3d 714, 722 (8th Cir.2003) (holding that although the plaintiff “was clearly subjected to harassing conduct,” it was not “actionable conduct” where a coworker made a number of comments based on the plaintiffs sex and posted a photograph showing the plaintiffs “clothed rear end”); Ottman v. City of Independence, Mo., 341 F.3d 751, 760 (8th Cir.2003) (concluding that the district court erred in finding a triable issue for the jury where the conduct consisted of belittling and sexist remarks on almost a daily basis); Meriwether v. Caraustar Packaging Co., 326 F.3d 990, 993 (8th Cir.2003) (holding sexual harassment claim failed where a coworker grabbed the plaintiffs buttock and then confronted her about it the next day); Alagna v. Smithville R-II Sch. Dist., 324 F.3d 975, 977-78, 980 (8th Cir.2003) (concluding the coworker’s conduct was inappropriate, but not sufficiently severe or pervasive, where it included calls to the plaintiffs home, frequent visits to her office, discussions about relationships (not including sexual details) with his wife and other women, touching the plaintiffs arm, saying he “loved” her and she was “very special,” placing romance novels in her faculty mailbox, and invading her personal space).
Third, Winspear does not maintain that Sierra’s alleged harassment occurred in front of others in an attempt to ridicule or demean him. In fact, the record demonstrates that Sierra always relayed her comments to Winspear in private and not around other coworkers. Sierra and Schneider even urged Winspear not to tell others about Sierra’s “gift” as a clairvoyant. While understandably offensive, the record reflects the conduct probably resulted from a misguided attempt to help Winspear rather than harass him and negatively impact his job status or job performance.
Finally, as to whether Sierra’s harassment unreasonably interfered with Win-spear’s work performance, Winspear asserts in his brief that, after Sierra’s “harassment” began
Winspear dreaded going into the office. He was overloaded with work as it was, but he could not concentrate on anything. Winspear would leave work at CDI and go right to bed, only to lie *612there for hours in solitude considering suicide and crying himself to sleep.
When Winspear was at work, he would hide out in his office trying to stay professional, but feeling overwhelmed and humiliated. It got to the point where he would try to avoid even going to the bathroom or break room because he knew that Sierra would inevitably have more comments about Logan or religion. Winspear tried to enter and exit the office at times when he thought he might not run into Sierra. He felt trapped in the office — looking for any excuse to go to an off-site meeting or perform a neighborhood inspection. Winspear kept his office door closed as much as possible. Whenever someone came to the door, he feared it was Sierra. Winspear became distant and short-tempered. He spent the entire week counting down the hours to the weekend and then spent the weekends dreading returning to work on Monday morning.
Appellant’s Brief at 13-14.
Winspear alleged that Sierra’s harassment affected him at work, but he acknowledged that he was already “overloaded” at work before the harassment began. He also made no allegation that he could not complete his work or that he received discipline for performance deficiencies.
Reviewing the facts in the light most favorable to Winspear, I conclude that he has failed to demonstrate conduct so severe or pervasive as to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the district court.

. “Title VII has [] been found to encompass situations in which an employee suffers an adverse employment action because he or she does not conform to the religious expectations of his or her employer.” Sarenpa v. Express Images, Inc., No. Civ. 04-1538, 2005 WL 3299455, at *3 (D.Minn.2005) (unpublished) (citing Campos v. City of Blue Springs, Mo., 289 F.3d 546, 550-51 (8th Cir.2002) (upholding jury verdict finding that employee was constructively discharged because she was not a Christian); Venters v. City of Delphi, 123 F.3d 956 (7th Cir.1997) (recognizing Title VII claim that employee was discharged because she did not measure up to her supervisor's religious expectations); Shapolia v. Los Alamos Nat’l Lab., 992 F.2d 1033, 1036 (10th Cir.1993) (“Title VII has been interpreted to protect against requirements of religious conformity and as such protects those who refuse to hold, as well as those who hold, specific religious beliefs.”); Backus v. Mena Newspapers, Inc., 224 F.Supp.2d 1228 (W.D.Ark.2002)). In such a “nonadherence” case, “the ‘protected class’ showing required in a traditional race or sex discrimination case does not apply ... because 'it is the religious beliefs of the employer, and the fact that [the employee] does not share them, that constitute the basis of the [religious discrimination] claim.' " Noyes v. Kelly Serv., 488 F.3d 1163, 1168-69 (9th Cir.2007) (quoting Shapolia, 992 F.2d at 1038) (alterations, in part, in Noyes).