Court Opinion

ID: 9617051
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:51:29.892002+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:04:04.870937
License: Public Domain

Littlejohn and Ness, Justices
(dissenting) :
We respectfully dissent and would affirm the trial court order.
Rowell and Harleysville entered into a binding agreement establishing their rights and duties in October of 1973. As a valid property right and asset, this contract was protected by the impairment clauses of both the state and federal constitutions.
We readily recognize the right of the legislature to regulate certain industries in the public interest; however, this authority is confined to prospective contracts and does not empower the legislature to alter existing contracts. Contractual rights, once solemnly bargained for and attained, should not be prey to legislative recision.
Many courts have examined and interpreted the impairment of contract limitation. As stated by the Connecticut Court in O'Connor v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 115 A. 484, 486 (1921):
“The Legislature may regulate the remedy and the methods of procedure under a past as well as a future contract, but it cannot impose new restrictions upon the enforcement of a past contract, so as materially to lessen its value and benefit to either party.”
There is nothing in Act 1177 to evince an intent by the legislature to disturb existing contracts. In any event, legislative law must succumb to the superiority of constitutional law, and the clear import of the impairment of contracts provision is that an individual’s property right, acquired in the form of a contract, will not be subject to alteration, cancellation or enlargement by the legislature.
*116In Federal Land Bank of Columbia v. Garrison, et al., 185 S. C. 255, 193 S. E. 308 (1937), the Court struck down a statute which attempted to circumscribe the right of a lending institution to foreclose a mortgage. It was argued that the legislature, as a valid exercise of the police power, could enact appropriate legislation to prevent lenders from receiving a windfall. The court rejected the arguments that the police power could be exercised to abrogate existing contractual rights. Likewise rejected was the claim that the U. S. Supreme Court decision of Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 54 S. Ct. 231, 78 L. Ed. 413 (1934) created any change in constitutional doctrine. The Blaisdell opinion clearly has not recast the S. C. Constitution’s prohibition against impairment of contractual rights.1
More recently in Pulliam v. Doe, 246 S. C. 106, 142 S. E. (2d) 861 (1965), this Court considered the power of the legislature to regulate the insurance industry. In Pulliam, the plaintiff sought recovery under his uninsured motorist coverage as the result of an accident where there was no physical contact between the vehicles. During the coverage period and prior to the accident, the legislature amended the uninsured motorist statute to require physical contact was a condition precedent to recovery. The Court in Pulliam held the statutory amendment could not be applied to alter the terms of coverage of a pre-existing contract without contravening the prohibitions of the impairment of contracts clause. See also, Travelers Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., et al., 249 S. C. 592, 155 S. E. (2d) 591 (1967); Henderson v. Evans, et al., 268 S. C. 127, 232 S. E. (2d) 331 (1977).
The facts in this appeal are even more compelling. The trial judge correctly held that the right to terminate without cause was a bargained for right that formed the basis for the original consent. Additionally, he found that respondent *117would continue to sustain enormous losses unless it exercised its right to terminate. Hence, he reasoned that prohibiting the termination destroyed the value of the original contract.
Moreover, we do not believe Act 1177 was primarily designated to subserve a public purpose. In G-H Ins. Agency, Inc. v. The Travelers Ins. Co., 270 S. C. 147, 241 S. E. (2d) 534 (1978), we held that the public purpose of the act was “to assure non-discriminatory automobile insurance coverage.” Id., 241 S. E. (2d) at page 536. This purpose is achieved prospectively by comprehensive reform in the premium rating system, not retrospectively by interfering with existing contracts. Additionally, statutory penalties provided by the Act authorize the Insurance Commissioner to suspend or revoke an insurance company’s certificate for not less than six months for violation of the Act. The primary public purpose of the Act, to assure non-discriminatory automobile insurance coverage, can be achieved through enforcement provisions existing in the statute. Accordingly, interference with the right of contract cannot be justified by asserting Act 1177 is in the public interest. Treigle v. Acme Homestead Association, 27 U. S. 189, 196, 56 S. Ct. 408, 80 L. Ed. 575 (1936).
The two most recent cases of the U. S. Supreme Court, U. S. Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U. S. 1, 97 S. Ct. 1505, 52 L. Ed. (2d) 92 (1978), and Allied Structural Steel Company v. Spannaus, et al., . . . U. S. . . . , 98 S. Ct. 2716, 57 L. Ed. (2d) 727 (1978), hold, “ [1] egislation adjusting the rights and responsibilities of contracting parties must be upon reasonable conditions and of a character appropriate to the public purpose justifying its adoption.” Id. at 22, 97 S. Ct. at 1518.
Act 1177 nullifies express terms of respondent’s contractual obligations and imposes an unexpected liability in disabling amounts. It cannot be applied to alter preexisting *118contracts without violating the impairment of contract clause of both constitutions.
We would affirm judgment of the trial court.

 Also see Comment of Professoar Wright, author of the Contract Clause of the Constitution, page 119.