Court Opinion

ID: 9776564
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:39:10.768471+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:39.683499
License: Public Domain

BLACKMAR, Chief Justice,
concurring.
Once again the Court terminates a post-conviction application on procedural grounds. It does so even though the trial court has held a full hearing on the grounds assigned in the 29.15 motion. I am confident that future courts the defendant may call upon will not find that the procedural delicts described in the principal opinion bar him from a ruling on the merits *152of his claims. I only hope that these courts will realize that he has been afforded a full evidentiary hearing, and will give appropriate deference to the findings of fact as determined by Judge Saitz.
This defendant started out under Rule 27.26, but was denied relief because he was not incarcerated in the state of Missouri. The problem is similar to State v. Rodden, 795 S.W.2d 393 (Mo. banc 1990). Rodden was, of course, incarcerated in the state and this defendant is not, but the Rodden opinion furnishes ample precedent for applying the 27.26 rules and affording this defendant a review of the points raised.
The case also has some similarities to Smith v. State, 798 S.W.2d 152 (Mo. banc 1990) (decided today), in which an evidentia-ry hearing was held. I suppose that, technically, the option I suggested in Smith is not available in this case because the defendant is not detained in Missouri. Therefore, we would not be able to treat the papers as a petition for habeas corpus. When and if the defendant is returned to Missouri, he would be entitled to pursue habeas corpus remedies to the extent that he could establish cause for not following procedural remedies. Kilgore v. State, 791 S.W.2d 393 (Mo. banc 1990).
Perhaps the defendant will not return. I understand that he is subjected to two death sentences in California, and I doubt that that state will be very much disposed to let him go. But, I cannot condone a situation in which the state provides counsel for a movant, as required by our rules, and then seeks to impose a procedural default because of the failure of appointed counsel to do what should be done within the time required. The principal opinion’s discourse about the plain meaning of Rule 29.15 is unconvincing. We made that rule rather recently, and we are entitled to give it a reasonable interpretation. Cases in other areas hold that a requirement of verification may be relaxed if opposing counsel proceeds to hearing without raising the point. There is no reason why Rule 29.15 could not be construed in a similar manner.
Our Court would best serve the interest of speedy justice if we would insure that factual questions which arise in post-conviction proceedings are speedily disposed of, with evidentiary hearings when required, and then finally reviewed in the appellate process.
I have examined the merits of the petitioner’s arguments and find them to be without merit. Inasmuch as the majority does not reach the merits, I see no need for detailed discussion. I would affirm on the merits.