Court Opinion

ID: 9665732
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:55:38.714863+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:18.231452
License: Public Domain

*644J. H. Gillis, P. J.
This is an appeal from a decision of the Genesee county circuit court,1 where it was held that a back-to-work payment under § 27 (c)(2) of the Michigan Employment Security Act, MOLA § 421.27(c)(2) (Stat Ann 1968 Rev § 17.529 [c] [2]), is due a claimant whose termination from employment resulted from “unsatisfactory job performance.”
Briefly, the undisputed facts are that, after two years of employment with Chevrolet Division of General Motors Corporation, Richard W. Foster’s employment was terminated for “unsatisfactory job performance” on February 29, 1968. He filed for, and received, unemployment benefits based on the Michigan Employment Security Commission’s determination that his separation from employment was not a disqualifying one under the terms of the act as it was for reasons other than misconduct connected with his work. On April 1,1968, the claimant obtained employment, whereupon he filed for and received a back-to-work payment from the Michigan Employment Security Commission pursuant to § 27 (c)(2), MCLA § 421.27(c) (2), supra, of the Michigan Employment Security Act. Though the Chevrolet Division of the General Motors Corporation never opposed payment of weekly unemployment benefits, the company timely protested the claimant’s receipt of the back-to-work payment under § 27(c)(2).
*645Section 27(c)(2) of the Michigan Employment Security Act states that:
“When an individual has had a period of unemployment: (i) for which he has been paid benefits for 1 or more weeks or has received credit for a waiting week, (ii) which commenced with a layoff by an employing unit that continued with such employing unit for more than 3 weeks, and (iii) which has been terminated by his accepting and engaging in full-time work with any employing unit within the 13 weeks immediately following his last week of employment with such employing unit, such individual shall be paid, for the most recent week in such period for which benefits are payable or were paid to him or for which he was entitled to credit for a waiting week, an amount equal to his currently applicable weekly benefit rate in addition to any benefits otherwise payable or paid to him for such week. Benefits shall be payable under this paragraph only for 1 week in an individual’s benefit year and only to the extent that the individual is otherwise entitled to benefits under subsection (d) of this section. An individual shall be deemed to be engaged in full-time work for an employing unit if he has earned with such employing unit within any period of 7 consecutive days commencing within such 13 week period an amount equal to his currently applicable weekly benefit rate. To be eligible for benefits under this subsection, an individual shall file therefor within 13 calendar weeks after the end of the week for which benefits are payable in accordance with this subsection.”
Thus, the narrow issue before us requires an application and interpretation of undisputed facts in determining what is meant by a “layoff” as that word is used in the above-quoted section. That both the circuit court and this Court have jurisdic*646tion over this issue is evident in § 38 of the Act,2 MCLA § 421.38 (Stat Ann 1968 Rev § 17.540). Interpretation of legislative intent in enacting a statute is a judicial function;3 it is the decision of the appeal board4 which must be analyzed to determine if it had a reasonable basis in fact and law. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc. (1944), 322 US 111, 131 (64 S Ct 851, 861, 88 L Ed 1170, 1185).
Words are to be interpreted according to their ordinary usage and in the sense in which they are understood when employed in common language. See Reetz v. Schemansky (1937), 278 Mich 626; American Telephone & Telegraph Company v. Employment Security Commission (1965), 376 Mich 271; Ford Motor Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Commission (1947), 316 Mich 468. It should not be necessary to restate here that, “We eschew the insertion of words in statutes unless necessary to give intelligible meaning or to prevent absurdity, *647without regard to our own estimate of the wisdom of the legislation” Great Lakes Steel Corporation v. Employment Security Commission (1967), 6 Mich App 656, 661, 662, affirmed 381 Mich 249. Since the Michigan Supreme Court has ruled that when the Legislature uses a certain phrase or word in a statute, the Court must “presume it was used in its normally accepted meaning * * # ”, American Telephone & Telegraph Company, supra, p 279, we look to the ordinary meaning of the word “layoff”.
In this regard, we begin by saying that a “layoff” is not; it is not a dismissal, a discharge, a permanent termination or, necessarily, a final release from employment.5 The United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, Handbook of Labor Statistics, 1936, pp 803, 804, states that:
“A ‘layoff’ is a termination of employment at the will of the employer, without prejudice to the worker. Layoffs may he due to lack of orders, technical changes, or the failure of flow of parts or materials to the job, as needed.”
The United States Supreme Court touched upon this issue in the case of Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corporation (1945), 328 US 275, 286, 287 (66 S Ct 1105, 1112, 90 L Ed 1230, 1241), and stated:
“Discharge normally means termination of the employment relationship or loss of a position. In common parlance and in industrial parlance a person who has been laid off by operation of a seniority system and put on a waiting list for reassignment would hardly be considered as having been ‘discharged’. * * * A furlough is not considered *648a discharge. It is a form of lay-off. So is a leave of absence. And whether either results from unilateral action by the employer or otherwise, consequences are quite different from termination of the employment relationship.”
The Missouri Supreme Court in the case of Irwin v. Globe-Democrat Publishing Company (1963), 368 SW2d 452, 455, stated that the term “layoff” is to be specifically defined:
“A ‘layoff’, as distinguished from a discharge, contemplates a period during which a working man is temporarily dismissed, Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 2 Cir., 154 F2d 785, 788, and it also refers to that suspension of work or employment during a part or season of the year when business activity is partly or completely suspended [citing cases]. An employee ‘laid off’ does not have his employment status completely and finally terminated. He ordinarily is entitled to re-employment when the temporary situation calling for the layoff has been corrected or eliminated.”
Therefore, we conclude, that the definition of the word “layoff” does not encompass a discharge for “unsatisfactory job performance.” Our analysis of this matter convinces us that there was a “basis in law” for the Michigan Employment Security Commission Appeal Board to hold:
“The entitlement to a back-to-work payment under sub-section 27(c)(2) requires that a claimant be laid off for lack of work and is not applicable in circumstances wherein a claimant is discharged even if his discharge is found to be under nondisqualifying circumstances.”6
The decision of the Genesee County Circuit Court is, therefore, reversed; the decision of the Appeal *649Board of the Michigan Employment Security Commission is reinstated.
R. B. Burns, J., concurred.

 On June 25, 1968 the Michigan Employment Security Commission reaffirmed its original determination that the claimant was eligible to receive a back-to-work payment; thereafter, on August 1, 1968 the referee of the commission affirmed the decision of the commission. The appeal board, however, on December 16, 1968, reversed the decision of the referee and held claimant not to be entitled to a back-to-work payment. The commission then appealed the appeal board’s decision under the provisions of § 38 of the act. The circuit court, on March 20, 1970, rendered its decision reversing the opinion of the appeal board and adopting that of the commission and referee.

 Section 38 of the Michigan Employment Security Act states: “the circuit court of the county in which the claimant resides, or, if no claimant is a party to the case, the circuit court of the county in which the employer’s principal place of business in Michigan is located, or in any ease the circuit court for the county of Ingham, shall have power to review questions of fact and law on the record made before the referee and the appeal board involved in any such final order or decision of said appeal board, and to make such further orders in respect thereto as justice may require, but said court may reverse such order or decision only if it finds that such order or decision is contrary to law or is not supported by competent, material and substantial evidence on the whole record. Application for such review must be made within 15 days after mailing of a copy of the order or decision by any method permissible under the rules and practices of the circuit courts of this state. The commission shall be deemed to be a party to any judicial action involving any order or decision of the appeal board. An appeal may be had from the decision of said circuit court in the same manner as provided by the laws of this state with respect to appeals from circuit courts.” MOLA § 421.38 (Stat Ann 1968 Rev § 17.540).

 Paye v. City of Grosse Pointe (1937), 279 Mich 254; Bolles v. Employment Security Commission (1960), 361 Mich 378; McAnallen v. Employment Security Commission (1970), 26 Mich App 621.

 Peaden v. Employment Security Commission (1959), 355 Mich 613; Bedwell v. Employment Security Commission (1962), 367 Mich 415.

 Random House Dictionary of English Language (1966); Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1966); Oxford English Dictionary (Supp); Eunk and Wagnales New Standard Dictionary (1945).

 Rendered December 16, 1968.