Court Opinion

ID: 9819443
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 06:25:21.187497+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:25:20.403079
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE COOK, dissenting: I respectfully dissent and would affirm the decision of the trial court. The petition for wardship in this case was filed in December 1997. At that time, the family residence was filthy, with floors covered with cat feces and litter, doors unable to be opened because of clutter, and old food along the walls. T.K. was thin, her hair was dull, and Family First personnel were concerned about the children’s dirty clothes, body odor, and lack of hygiene. A doctor diagnosed D.F. as suffering from nonorganic failure to thrive. E.K., failing in school, was performing parental functions. In May 1998, the trial court conducted a dispositional hearing. Family First personnel reported the family “just minimally made” the minimal parenting standards and expressed grave concerns about the family remaining stable. Respondent was rated unsatisfactory on the goals of maintaining a stable environment and understanding child and family development. She did not attend counseling on a regular basis and did not adhere to all the trial court’s orders. Following the May 1998 hearing, the trial court appointed DCFS temporary custodian of the three children. In August 1998, D.E was placed in a foster home, and E.K. and T.K. were placed with their father in Wisconsin. Respondent’s progress on minimum parenting standards was unsatisfactory from February 1999 to August 1999. Respondent had reached no successful resolution of the issues and had not progressed to the level needed for true change. Respondent was unwilling to change and failed to do counseling assignments. Dr. Marty Traver evaluated respondent in December 1999 and concluded that respondent had the psychological and intellectual capacity to meet minimal parenting standards but had not done so because of her continuing denial about the issues. She concluded that respondent’s prognosis was poor based on her failure to acknowledge her past deficits as a parent and the amount of time remaining for her to remedy deficiencies. In December 1999, the State filed a petition to terminate respondent’s parental rights. Following a May 2000 hearing, the trial court found the State had proved respondent unfit on a number of grounds, including “[substantial neglect of the child if continuous or repeated.” 750 ILCS 50/1 (D)(d) (West Supp. 1999). The majority concludes that decision of the trial court, on the basis of the facts set out above, is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. The majority bases its conclusion on the following: (1) neglect cannot be “substantial” simply because it is “continuous or repeated”; (2) “substantial” means “considerable” or “significantly great”; (3) “substantial neglect” means something like depriving a child of nourishment to the point of near starvation or forcing a child to live in a cardboard box in the wintertime; (4) “substantial neglect” would have to fall somewhere beyond the midpoint on a continuum from minor to extreme; and (5) the State cannot rely on “substantial neglect” when the more appropriate ground would be failure to make “reasonable progress” or “reasonable efforts.” The majority is confident that the incidents of neglect contained in this record are of a kind frequently found in neglect cases, and nothing about this case suggests the extreme circumstances in which remediation should not even be appropriately considered. I disagree with the suggestion that a child has to be near death before the trial court can find substantial neglect. “Substantial” is primarily defined as “consisting or relating to substance, not imaginary or illusory.” Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary 1161 (1976). Trivial matters cannot be the basis of substantial neglect. There must be some substance to the matters, and there certainly was that here. The majority’s rule that the continuous nature of the neglect cannot be considered in determining whether neglect is substantial is not supported by the statute, by case law, or by logic. Even comparatively mild neglect can be catastrophic when it is continuous or repeated. When the legislature listed alternate grounds for finding unfitness, it intended to avoid locking the State into a few theories which might not fit the infinite number of factual situations with which it would be presented. I do not understand why the majority would hamstring the State with a requirement that a finding of substantial neglect must be reversed where failure to make reasonable progress or reasonable efforts would have been better alleged. The question here is not whether the petition to terminate could have been better pleaded. The question is whether “substantial neglect” has been proved. I believe it was. This case was pending from December 1997 until August 1998 before the children were taken from respondent. The case was pending from August 1998 until May 2000 before respondent’s parental rights were terminated. This was not a case where remediation was not even considered. The majority recites the standard of review in this case and then ignores it. A finding of unfitness will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. A trial court’s finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence only if the opposite conclusion is clearly apparent. In re C.M., 305 Ill. App. 3d 154, 163, 711 N.E.2d 809, 815 (1999). Great deference is afforded the trial court, given its far superior opportunity to view and evaluate the witnesses and their testimony. The fact that the majority might have found there was no substantial neglect if it had been the trial court is irrelevant. Because the trial court properly terminated parental rights on the basis of substantial neglect, I would not address the other issues raised by the majority. I would suggest, however, that it is a major step on the part of an appellate court to declare an act of the legislature unconstitutional. The words “other neglect” should be read, in pari materia with the other language of the statute, not to include neglect which is comparatively minor. Finally, I disagree with the proposition that, when the State files a motion to terminate parental rights in a juvenile proceeding, “an entirely new proceeding” is commenced which allows the respondent to substitute, as of right (735 ILCS 5/2—1001(a)(2) (West 1998)), the judge who has been presiding over the juvenile proceeding and has made rulings with which the respondent disagrees. The majority’s decision is contrary to the substitution statute, which follows the policy that a litigant should not be allowed to test the waters before he exercises a substitution as of right. 735 ILCS 5/2—1001(a) (2) (ii) (West 1998) (“application for substitution of judge *** shall be granted if it is presented before trial or hearing begins and before the judge to whom it is presented has ruled on any substantial issue in the case”). The majority’s decision that separate proceedings are involved is at odds with the Juvenile Court Act, which provides that the parties are not entitled to additional notice upon the filing of an amended petition or a motion to terminate parental rights. 705 ILCS 405/2—15(3) (West 1998). The legislature has expressly provided that there is no right to automatic substitution if the judge has made a substantive ruling in a proceeding involving the minor’s sibling. 705 ILCS 405/1—5(7) (West 1998). Before today’s decision, the legislature could not have anticipated that it needed to be concerned with automatic substitution where the judge had made a substantive ruling in a proceeding involving the minor herself.