Court Opinion

ID: 9796370
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:56:19.121002+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:50:10.673544
License: Public Domain

BAXTER, J., Concurring and Dissenting,
I concur fully with the lead opinion insofar as it requires a protective order barring use of Pitchess1 information in any “court proceeding” besides the one in which discovery was ordered. (Evid. Code, § 1045, subd. (e).) The statutory scheme denies participants in other actions privileged information where such information was disclosed after the trial court heard argument, held an in camera review, and made a specific finding of “relevan[ce].” (Id., subd. (a).)
However, I cannot join the lead opinion insofar as it concludes the prosecutor in the same case (1) is only entitled to notice of the defense Pitchess motion, and to answer any questions posed by the trial court, (2) is never allowed to see defense documents supporting the motion, even where such secrecy is unnecessary and where the trial court seeks input on the motion, (3) is never allowed to present the People’s litigation interests in the motion absent trial court questioning on the matter, and (4) is never allowed to request and receive copies of Pitchess material disclosed to the defense about peace officers who may testify at trial.
The reasoning behind this new rule is largely unexplained. It is also wrong. The lead opinion ignores controlling law and settled practice under the Pitchess scheme, which is now three decades old. Consistent with well-established general motion practice, prosecutors have always been afforded full notice and participation in the public phase of defense-initiated Pitchess hearings. Shared discovery, in appropriate circumstances, is simply an efficient means of allowing both parties to prepare their cases for trial. The lead opinion identifies no law or policy justification for denying the prosecution these rights in every case. I therefore dissent.
A. The People Are Entitled to Full Notice and a Hearing When the Defense Seeks Pitchess Discovery
Though it views the statutory scheme as silent on the issue, the lead opinion concedes the district attorney must receive notice “of the date and *1048place of the hearing on a defense Pitchess motion” consistent with the due process rights ordinarily afforded to adverse parties. (Lead opn., ante, at p. 1044; see id., at p. 1045.) However, for reasons the lead opinion does not explain, the same due process principles do not encompass a related right to see “the affidavits and/or any other information in support of the Pitchess motion” (lead opn., ante, at p. 1045, in. 5), or to fully “argue the prosecutorial point of view” (lead opn., ante, at p. 1045). According to the lead opinion, the prosecutor’s role at the hearing is apparently limited to answering specific trial court questions. Only the custodian of records and the concerned peace officer receive complete copies of the moving papers, and possess an unrestricted right to participate under the lead opinion’s approach.
The lead opinion overlooks statutory provisions providing the prosecutor with notice of the whole Pitchess motion, and with a meaningful opportunity to respond. The starting point is Evidence Code section 1043, subdivision (a) (Evidence Code section 1043(a)), which requires “written notice to the governmental agency [that] has custody and control of the records,” and which directs the agency to “immediately notify the individual whose records are sought.” The same section also incorporates the noticed motion rules in Code of Civil Procedure section 1005.
The latter statute confirms that its requirements govern any “Hearing for Discovery of Peace Officer Personnel Records pursuant to Section 1043 of the Evidence Code.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1005, subd. (a)(6).) Critical here is subdivision (b) of Code of Civil Procedure section 1005 (Code of Civil Procedure section 1005(b)). This provision—which the lead opinion never quotes or construes—states that “all moving and supporting papers shall be served and filed at least 21 calendar days before the hearing,” except as otherwise ordered or specifically provided by law. (Italics added.)
These requirements are embedded into California law. Former rule 249(c)(6) of the California Rules of Court2 (adopted eff. Jan. 1, 1949) states that “[t]he words ‘serve and file’ mean . . . proof of prior service ... on counsel for each adverse party who is represented by separate counsel.” (Italics added.) Rule 317(a) makes clear that the documents served on opposing counsel (here, the prosecutor) include “all moving and supporting papers.” (Italics added.)3
Here, the People are the “adverse party” (former rule 249(c)(6)) in any criminal case in which the defendant invokes the Pitchess scheme. (See Gov. *1049Code, § 100, subd. (b) [all criminal prosecutions conducted by and for the People]; Pen. Code, § 684 [the People and defendant are opposing parties]; Department of Corrections v. Superior Court (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 1087, 1091, fn. 2 [245 Cal.Rptr. 293] (Department of Corrections) [“the adverse party in these criminal proceedings is the People . . . not the . . . third party from whom documents have been subpoenaed” by defendant].) It follows that the district attorney must be “served and filed” with any defense Pitchess motion, including “all moving and supporting papers” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1005(b)), and must be allowed to appear and argue on the People’s behalf. (See Gov. Code, § 26500 [as public prosecutor, the district attorney represents the People in court].)
This open approach serves the aims of the Pitchess scheme. The special notice requirement in Evidence Code section 1043(a) is necessary because the individual officer whose records are sought and the government agency holding the records may not themselves be parties to the action, and may not otherwise have standing to appear. Their express inclusion through the Pitchess scheme ensures protection in every case of the privacy interests guarded by the Legislature. (See People v. Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216, 1227 [114 Cal.Rptr.2d 482, 36 P.3d 21] (Mooc) [noting the officer’s “strong privacy interest” in his personnel file and the need to prevent unnecessary access]; City of Santa Cruz v. Municipal Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 74, 84 [260 Cal.Rptr. 520, 776 P.2d 222] (Santa Cruz) [even where Pitchess motion is granted, courts “further safeguard” the private file by revealing only the dates of incidents and identifying information about complainants and witnesses].)
Contrary to what the lead opinion implies, Evidence Code section 1043(a)’s silence about notice to the People and the district attorney does not limit their participation at the hearing. Because the Pitchess scheme applies “in any criminal or civil proceeding” (Pen. Code, § 832.7, subd. (a)), the list of interested participants other than the records custodian and the individual officer differs in every case. Adverse parties like the People separately receive full notice and a hearing under Code of Civil Procedure section 1005(b), which appears in Evidence Code section 1043(a). Both statutes apply. Procedural rights afforded to the custodian and officer under the latter *1050statute exist in addition to, not in lieu of, parallel rights afforded to the People and district attorney under the former statute.
Moreover, notice to the adverse party of any motion, and that party’s corresponding right to appear and argue the motion, are “usually considered essential” even in the absence of express statutory authority. (6 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997) Proceedings Without Trial, § 6, p. 405; see Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial, supra, 9:2.2, p. 9(l)-2 (rev. #1 2001).) Exceptions may exist where the matter could not possibly “affect the rights of an adverse party” (McDonald v. Severy (1936) 6 Cal.2d 629, 631 [59 P.2d 98] [dictum]), or where there is an “overriding” need to hide the contents of the motion or hearing. (People v. Ayala (2000) 24 Cal.4th 243, 294 [99 Cal.Rptr.2d 532, 6 P.3d 193] (dis. opn. of George, C. J.) (Ayala).)
These principles reflect the disfavored nature of proceedings in which one party is denied a meaningful opportunity to appear and be heard. Such proceedings threaten both the evenhanded nature of judicial rulings, and the truth-seeking function of the courts. (Ayala, supra, 24 Cal.4th 243, 262.) 4
Not surprisingly, the parties followed the law before the lead opinion limited the People’s right to receive all moving papers and to meaningfully respond at the Pitchess hearing. Petitioner Maurice Alford and another man (defendants) were charged with transporting and possessing cocaine base for sale. Besides moving to suppress drugs allegedly found in their possession, defendants jointly sought Pitchess discovery of past dishonesty by the arresting officers. Defendants hoped to prove at both the suppression hearing and trial that they had been unlawfully stopped, searched, questioned, and arrested, and that the officers falsely reported and testified that the opposite was true. The district attorney received notice of the discovery motion and attended at least one of two discovery hearings.5 The issue of prosecutorial participation arose for the first time on appeal only because the trial court, absent any request by defendants, summarily prevented the district attorney from debating the scope of the Pitchess order. The Court of Appeal found *1051error, giving the People the full range of procedural protections now under review—the right to notice of the whole motion, to appear and argue the motion, and to receive copies of any Pitchess materials disclosed to the defense.
For almost 30 years, other courts and litigants have assumed that the People are entitled to rights similar to those explicitly recognized on appeal here. (E.g., City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (Brandon) (2002) 29 Cal.4th 1, 6 [124 Cal.Rptr.2d 202, 52 P.3d 129] (Brandon) [defendant served Pitchess motion on both prosecutor and police department]; Mooc, supra, 26 Cal.4th 1216, 1222 [both prosecutor and police department litigated defendant’s Pitchess motion in trial court]; People v. Memro (1985) 38 Cal.3d 658, 675 [214 Cal.Rptr. 832, 700 P.2d 446] (Memro) [prosecutor litigated defendant’s Pitchess motion in trial court]; Garden Grove Police Department v. Superior Court (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 430, 432 [107 Cal.Rptr.2d 642] [both prosecutor and police department opposed defendant’s attempt to avoid compliance with Pitchess scheme]; Larry E. v. Superior Court (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 25, 28-29 [239 Cal.Rptr. 264] [prosecutor opposed Pitchess motion made by juvenile accused of crime]; Kelvin L. v. Superior Court (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 823, 826 [133 Cal.Rptr. 325] [juvenile accused of crime served Pitchess motion on both prosecutor and police department, each of whom participated in the hearing].) The lead opinion does not acknowledge existing law and practice, or adequately explain its adoption of a new rule at this late date.
B. The People Have Legitimate Interests in Responding to Defense Attempts to Obtain Privileged Pitchess Information
The lead opinion insists the People have no direct stake in the proceeding, and that any opposition to defense Pitchess discovery would merely “advance the interests of the third party custodian and police officer.” (Lead opn., ante, at p. 1045.) This argument is used to reject the People’s claim that their due process rights encompass both notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. The lead opinion also implies the Legislature could not possibly have contemplated prosecutorial involvement in defense Pitchess hearings any more extensive than what the lead opinion allows.
Preliminarily, I agree that the chief guardians of a peace officer’s right to privacy are the officer himself, and the government agency holding the personnel file and charged with asserting any attendant privilege. Under the special notice provisions of Evidence Code section 1043(a), both the officer and custodian can resist unwarranted attempts by criminal defendants to penetrate the private file.
*1052However, the People have independent adversarial concerns that the lead opinion unfairly discounts. In general, the Pitchess scheme “carefully balances” the moving party’s interest in relevant information against the privacy interests identified above. (Santa Cruz, supra, 49 Cal.3d 74, 84.) Barriers to discovery include failure to show “good cause” for in-chambers review (Evid. Code, § 1043, subd. (b)(3)), a finding that the material is not “relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending litigation” (id., § 1045, subd. (a)), and the application of certain “exclusions] from disclosure” (id., § 1045, subd. (b)). By creating such finely tuned procedures and standards, and by requiring the balancing of such important competing concerns, the Legislature obviously intended a full and meaningful debate. To the extent it limits or bars the People’s participation in the Pitchess process, the lead opinion risks depriving trial courts of information “ ‘essential’ ” to a fair and proper decision. (Ayala, supra, 24 Cal.4th 243, 262.)
District attorneys have long joined record custodians, peace officers, and criminal defendants in litigating defense access to police personnel files. Much like the facts of this case, Pitchess disputes typically involve officers who played a significant role in investigating the charged crime. Their character, training, and experience could affect the weight and admissibility of incriminating evidence. (E.g., Brandon, supra, 29 Cal.4th 1, 5-6 [officers arrested defendant and interviewed child molestation victim]; People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 329-330 [116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401, 39 P.3d 432] [officers questioned defendant at murder scene and then interviewed and arrested him at police station]; Mooc, supra, 26 Cal.4th 1216, 1221-1222 [officer was the victim of an alleged jailhouse battery by defendant]; People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1219-1220 [56 Cal.Rptr.2d 49, 920 P.2d 1254] [officers arrested and questioned defendant and seized evidence of murder]; Memro, supra, 38 Cal.3d 658, 674; see id. at pp. 669-672 [officers elicited defendant’s confession to multiple murder].)
The People have an interest in ensuring that an erroneous Pitchess determination does not unfairly jeopardize their ability to obtain a valid conviction at trial, and to prevent reversal on appeal. The lead opinion conflicts with both settled law and practice insofar as it denies the People a meaningful opportunity to protect genuine interests in the underlying case.
C. Nothing Prevents the Trial Court from Sharing Defense Pitchess Discovery with the Prosecution upon Request
A related issue is whether the trial court may ensure adequate and efficient preparation for trial by granting a prosecutorial request for contemporaneous copies of Pitchess items disclosed to the defense. The Court of Appeal said *1053“yes,” but the lead opinion says “no.” I am not persuaded by my colleagues’ analysis.
The lead opinion finds no statute “compelling]” the fruits of a successful Pitchess motion to be shared with the prosecution. (Lead opn., ante, at p. 1046.) This conclusion is based solely on the reciprocal discovery laws in Penal Code section 1054 et seq., adopted by voters as Proposition 115 in June 1990. The lead opinion insists any information obtained by the defense through court-ordered Pitchess discovery need not be divulged until it “ripens into the intent to call a witness.” (Lead opn., ante, at p. 1045.)
This analysis is incomplete. By its own terms, Proposition 115 governs discovery in criminal cases “except as provided by . . . other express statutory provisions.” (Pen. Code, § 1054, subd. (e).) One such provision is the Pitchess scheme, which regulates privileged information that must be sought by court order from disinterested third persons. (Albritton v. Superior Court (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 961, 963 [275 Cal.Rptr. 314] [holding Pitchess scheme coexists with Prop. 115 as an independent discovery measure]; see People v. Superior Court (Barrett) (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1305, 1315 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d 264] (Barrett) [noting subpoena duces tecum statutes regulate discovery from nonparties independent of Prop. 115].) Aside from defense discovery obligations under Proposition 115, the question is whether the Pitchess scheme precludes shared trial court discovery of the kind at issue here.
As the lead opinion explains (lead opn., ante, at pp. 1040-1043), the statutory scheme protects privileged information after it has been found relevant and ordered disclosed in a particular case. Evidence Code section 1045, subdivision (e) requires issuance of an order preventing use of Pitchess material outside the “court proceeding” in which it was obtained. This provision effectively prevents litigants in one action from sharing Pitchess discovery with litigants in other actions. However, no similar provision blocks a court-supervised exchange of Pitchess information in the same case.
Indeed, the lead opinion seems to concede that the People are virtually guaranteed access to Pitchess information obtained by the defense if the district attorney later brings his own Pitchess motion. (Lead opn., ante, at p. 1046. ) The reason is that relevance is a two-way street. Meritorious defense claims that Pitchess material might impeach prosecution witnesses or undermine their factual accounts necessarily implies that the prosecution could use the same material to defend the credibility of its witnesses and support its theory of the case.
*1054The lead opinion’s suggestion—unsupported by authority—that each party must separately file a Pitchess motion targeting the same records defies common sense. Such duplication risks unnecessary delay of the underlying action and wastes the time and resources of (1) the government agency holding the disputed records, (2) the peace officer whose records are sought, (3) counsel for these two participants (here, the city attorney), and (4) the trial court. In analogous situations where an accused obtains in camera review of privileged records subpoenaed from a third person, and where the trial court reveals the content of such records over the People’s objection, “counsel on both sides” have received copies in order to prepare for trial. (People v. Webb (1993) 6 Cal.4th 494, 516 [24 Cal.Rptr.2d 779, 862 P.2d 779].) The lead opinion has not shown that the trial court lacks discretion to authorize a similar exchange here. (Cf. Pen. Code, § 1054, subds. (b)-(d) [reciprocal discovery must save court time and prevent unnecessary delay].)6
In any event, the lead opinion’s elaborate efforts to shield these materials from the prosecution are, in the end, pointless. Nothing in the lead opinion or elsewhere in the law precludes the prosecutor, upon receiving notice of a defense Pitchess motion, from noticing his own motion for court-ordered access to the same materials. Such overlapping discovery requests can be consolidated for hearing in the trial court, allowing each side to appear and argue their respective interests in the material. Police personnel information is relevant to both sides in a criminal case where it might lead to evidence impeaching prosecution witnesses or undermining the People’s theory of the case. To extent the defense obtains Pitchess material on this ground, the prosecution has an equal right to receive the same material after a consolidated hearing on mutual motions.
D. The People’s Involvement in Pitchess Discovery Does Not Threaten the Defendant’s Constitutional Rights and Statutory
Privileges
The lead opinion seeks to promote the Sixth Amendment right to counsel by restricting prosecutorial participation in Pitchess hearings, and by denying access to “affidavits and/or any other information in support of the Pitchess motion.” (Lead opn., ante, at p. 1045, fn. 5.) The lead opinion purports to rely on principles and authorities arising under the subpoena *1055duces tecum statutes. (Lead opn., ante, at pp. 1045-1046, citing Pen. Code, §§ 1326-1327, and Barrett, supra, 80 Cal.App.4th 1305, 1320-1321.) The implication seems to be that subpoena hearings are routinely conducted in the prosecutor’s absence so as to protect defense strategy and work product. Without citation to authority, the lead opinion insinuates, though it does not hold, that the defense has a constitutional right to such secrecy. Whatever the nature of those rights, the majority overstates any threat to defense rights and privileges posed by either the Pitchess or subpoena process.
First, it seems unlikely that the defense will be forced to disclose its own confidences in seeking Pitchess discovery. Defendants commonly investigate police officers who search for physical evidence, or who conduct arrests and interrogations. Competent counsel can be expected to look for any pattern of aggression, untrustworthiness, or other misconduct documented in the officer’s work files. This avenue of defense investigation is now so embedded in our criminal practice that its pursuit in appropriate cases is a foregone conclusion. Thus, defense theories of impeachment revealed during the Pitchess process can most likely be inferred from information already in the People’s possession.7
Second, similar assumptions are at work under the analogous subpoena scheme—a scheme the lead opinion implicitly misconstrues. The general rule is that requests for subpoenaed records must be served on the prosecutor, who must be allowed to appear and argue whether the requisite showing has been made. (City of Alhambra v. Superior Court (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1118, 1130-1131 [205 Cal.App.3d 1556d, 252 Cal.Rptr. 789] (Alhambra); Department of Corrections, supra, 199 Cal.App.3d 1087, 1092-1093.) As a practical matter, the defendant is rarely required to disclose privileged information in order to obtain subpoenaed material. (Department of Corrections, supra, 199 Cal.App.3d at p. 1094; Alhambra, supra, 205 Cal.App.3d at p. 1130.)
Moreover, courts are not “bound by [a] defendant’s naked claim of confidentiality” in the subpoena context. (Alhambra, supra, 205 Cal.App.3d *10561118, 1130.) Nor are such claims used to “totally exclude” the district attorney from the discovery process. (Department of Corrections, supra, 199 Cal.App.3d 1087, 1094.) At most, trial courts review any information the defense presents ex parte, and withhold from the prosecution only those “specific” items necessary to protect the defendant’s constitutional rights and statutory privileges. (Ibid.) The trial court then “proceed[s] to the merits of [the] defendant’s discovery motion giving every reasonable notice and opportunity to participate to any opposing party.” (Alhambra, supra, 205 Cal.App.3d at p. 1132, fn. omitted.) In other words, proceedings on defense subpoena requests remain open to the prosecutor. (Department of Corrections, supra, 199 Cal.App.3d at p. 1094.)
The lead opinion ignores this authority and instead cites Barrett, supra, 80 Cal.App.4th 1305. In Barrett, however, the Court of Appeal distinguished its own prior decision in Department of Corrections, supra, 199 Cal.App.3d 1087, and summarily upheld a trial court ruling allowing the defendant to prove his need for subpoenaed correctional records on both an in camera and ex parte basis. (Barrett, supra, 80 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1320-1321.) The lead opinion errs in suggesting that Barrett’s subpoena procedures were not extraordinary, and that courts generally exclude the People from these proceedings.
Applying these rules here, the trial court may withhold specific moving papers from the prosecutor, and excuse the prosecutor from selected portions of the Pitchess hearing, where such secrecy is necessary to protect the defendant’s constitutional rights and statutory privileges. However, such extraordinary steps should occur only on a case-by-case basis where the defendant first makes a compelling showing that a particular right or privilege would otherwise be impaired. Hence, no constitutional or other purpose is served insofar as the lead opinion withholds materials supporting defense Pitchess motions in every case, and bars the prosecutor from participating in the hearing absent a trial court request to answer questions. 8
*1057E. Conclusion
Ignoring relevant authority, the lead opinion overturns 30 years of law and practice under the Pitchess scheme. This is the first and only decision depriving the People of full notice and adversarial participation in defense Pitchess motions, and denying access to Pitchess materials disclosed to the defendant. I disagree, and would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
Chin, J., and Brown, J., concurred.

 Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 [113 Cal.Rptr. 897, 522 P.2d 305], as codified by Penal Code sections 832.7 and 832.8, and Evidence Code sections 1043 through 1045. (See Stats. 1978, ch. 630, §§ 1-3, 5, 6, pp. 2082-2083.)

A11 further unlabeled rule references are to the California Rules of Court.

Former rule 249 was renumbered and substantively amended effective January 1, 2003. (See now rule 299.) In the process, the definitions of various elementary legal terms were deleted, including the phrase “serve and file” appearing in former rule 249(c)(6). (Id., subd. *1049(c)(4) [“presiding judge"], (5) [“party”], (7) [“case”].) It appears that all of these maxims, including the one directing moving parties to “serve and file” all moving and supporting papers on the “adverse party,” were deemed so well understood and noncontroversial as to no longer require formal definition. (See Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2002) ^ 9:82.5, p. 9(l)-39 [confirming without citation to former rule 249(c)(6) that Code of Civil Procedure section 1005(b) requires service on counsel for “all parties who have appeared in the action, whether or not the motion seeks relief against such parties”].)

 According to Ayala, proceedings in which only one party participates can produce “ ‘a shortage of factual and legal contentions. Not only are facts and law from the [excluded party] lacking, but the moving party’s own presentation is often abbreviated because no challenge from the [excluded party] is anticipated at this point in the proceeding. The deficiency is frequently crucial, as reasonably adequate factual and legal contentions from diverse perspectives can be essential to the court’s initial decision.’ ” (Ayala, supra, 24 Cal.4th 243, 262.)

The record contains defendants’ Pitchess motion and counsel’s supporting declaration, but no proof of service is attached. Nonetheless, the Court of Appeal stated in its opinion that “the People were properly given notice of the Pitchess motion.” Defendants did not dispute this factual assertion in seeking rehearing and modification in the Court of Appeal. I therefore accept it as true. (See rule 28(c)(2).)

 Responding to a trial court question about the logistics of Pitchess discovery in the present case, the city attorney suggested that it is not uncommon for the People to receive copies of information ordered disclosed to the defense: “Based on what the court has ordered, the [custodian of records] prepares a list of names, addresses and phone numbers to [any] complaints that the court has ordered revealed. Those are made available to both the prosecution and the defense attorneys. So that means that both of those parties may come to [the custodian of records] and pick that up." (Italics added.)

It has been said that the “good cause” standard for obtaining in camera review of Pitchess material is “relatively relaxed.” (Santa Cruz, supra, 49 Cal.3d 74, 84, citing Evid. Code, § 1043, subd. (b)(3).) This threshold requirement is traceable to Pitchess v. Superior Court, supra, 11 Cal.3d 531, 537, which said that the “requisite showing may be satisfied by general allegations which establish some cause for discovery.” In fact, Pitchess adopted this standard in an abundance of caution to protect the moving party from unnecessary and impermissible disclosure of constitutionally protected or statutorily privileged material. (Id. at p. 536.) The lead opinion’s contrary assumption about the effect of complying with the Pitchess scheme seems to ignore its history and purpose. *1057Brady implications of allowing the prosecutor to request and receive Pitchess material disclosed to the defense—an issue not before us here—the competing considerations are the prosecutor’s alone to weigh, and are not a logical basis on which to impose a rule of law prohibiting shared discovery in every case. Also, the Brady implications of allowing the prosecutor to fully participate in defense Pitchess proceedings and to request shared discovery seem diluted by the availability of the Pitchess scheme itself. Under Brady, supra, 373 U.S. 83, and its progeny, courts seek to provide a means of discovering “material exculpatory evidence” known by the prosecution or “others acting on [its] behalf’ that would not otherwise be available to the defense in a particular case. (In re Brown (1998) 17 Cal.4th 873, 879 [72 Cal.Rptr.2d 698, 952 P.2d 715]; see id. at pp. 877, 880.) California solved this problem long ago with respect to the contents of police personnel files by establishing the Pitchess procedure and allowing court-ordered discovery where the information is relevant to the action.

 I note one final consequence of the lead opinion’s analysis. The conclusion that the prosecution cannot see the entire defense Pitchess motion, freely respond to it, or share materials discovered thereby, rests primarily on the assumption that reciprocal notice, participation, and sharing are not expressly provided under the applicable statutes. If the statutes do not afford such rights to the prosecution when the defendant pursues Pitchess discovery, it appears the defendant would lack similar rights when a Pitchess motion is filed by the prosecution. Either way, the result is irrational.
In a related vein, the lead opinion goes too far in prohibiting shared Pitchess discovery by assuming a contrary rule might render the prosecutor a “Brady vessel” in future cases for any police personnel information he thereby receives. (See lead opn., ante, at p. 1046, fn. 6, citing Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83 [83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215].) Whatever the