Court Opinion

ID: 9555168
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-11 00:00:33.466259+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:41:36.525799
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-20586         Document: 00516853848             Page: 1      Date Filed: 08/10/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit                                         United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                          Fifth Circuit

                                      ____________                                      FILED
                                                                                  August 10, 2023
                                        No. 21-20586                                  Lyle W. Cayce
                                      ____________                                         Clerk

   United States of America,

                                                                      Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                             versus

   Jesus Leonardo Esquivel-Carrizales,

                                               Defendant—Appellant.
                      ______________________________

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                          for the Southern District of Texas
                               USDC No. 4:20-CR-161-1
                      ______________________________

   Before Richman, Chief Judge, and Stewart and Douglas, Circuit
   Judges.
   Per Curiam: *
          Jesus Leonardo Esquivel-Carrizales (Esquivel) appeals the denial of
   his motion to suppress controlled substances recovered during a traffic stop.
   The district court determined that the stop was justified by the officers’
   reasonable suspicion of drug trafficking. Esquivel agreed to proceed with a
   stipulated bench trial and did not contest the facts necessary to convict him.
   Because the Government agreed, for this case only and in light of the
          _____________________
          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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                                    No. 21-20586

   COVID-19 pandemic, Esquivel did not intentionally waive his appeal by not
   expressly reserving it, we consider the merits of that appeal. However,
   because the district court correctly determined that reasonable suspicion of
   drug trafficking existed, we affirm.
                                          I
          Esquivel was arrested as a passenger in a car in which officers
   discovered methamphetamine and cocaine. Prior to the stop of that car,
   Brownsville Homeland Security (HSI Brownsville) agents had an ongoing
   drug trafficking investigation which had “identified several people who were
   truck drivers or employed . . . in the commercial cargo business, driving 18-
   wheelers,” including Jose Santos-Esquivel (Santos). After a cooperating
   defendant told HSI Brownsville that Santos “was looking for a compartment
   to be specially produced for him that was presumably going to be used to
   conceal narcotics,” HSI Brownsville had the cooperating defendant build the
   “external diesel tank for like a diesel truck” located in the “back” or “bed”
   of a truck that Santos frequently drove, and HSI Brownsville obtained a
   warrant for a GPS tracker which they attached to the truck. HSI Brownsville
   suspected Santos was “trafficking narcotics from the Rio Grande Valley to
   Houston.”
          On the day of the stop in question, HSI Brownsville received an alert
   that the tracker “indicated” the truck “was heading towards Houston.” HSI
   Brownsville contacted the “point of contact” for HSI Houston, Agent
   Rogers, around 8 p.m., and conveyed that there was “a vehicle coming north
   from Brownsville that was possibly loaded with narcotics,” handed over the
   tracking information, and asked Houston to “proceed with surveillance.”
   Agent Rogers’s team located Santos’s truck at around 10 p.m. in a parking
   lot across the street from the Galleria mall. It was five days before Christmas,
   so the mall was open late. A white Volkswagen (VW) “pulled up about a

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                                    No. 21-20586

   space over from” the truck and two men, Esquivel and Alejandro Pena, had
   come from one of the stores with “a shopping cart, or a basket, or something”
   and were loading items into the VW. The men began talking with the driver
   of the pickup truck, “t[ook] something out of the truck,” and then “walk[ed]
   back and forth talking to [Santos].” It is not clear from the record what that
   “something” was.
          Agent Rogers arrived on scene after Esquivel and Pena were back at
   the VW and was informed by a member of his team what had occurred. Agent
   Rogers then saw Esquivel having a conversation with Santos and get inside
   the truck for “ten, fifteen minutes” while Pena “was on the phone and
   getting in and out of the car.” After Esquivel “got back out” of the truck,
   Esquivel and Pena “arranged some stuff in the trunk” of the VW.
          At this point, “based on the totality of the circumstances,” including
   that all of this was occurring in a dark parking lot, Agent Rogers and the other
   officers on scene “thought [they] were observing somebody transferring
   narcotics to another vehicle.” Esquivel and Pena then got into the VW (Pena
   driving and Esquivel in the passenger seat) and both vehicles left the parking
   lot. Agent Rogers relayed the information about the investigation to Harris
   County Sheriff’s officers and “request[ed] that they engage in a traffic stop
   of the [VW]” while he pursued Santos in the pickup truck. Deputy Sweeney
   pulled the VW over around 10:49 p.m. for speeding and twice failing to signal
   a lane change.
          Deputy Sweeney asked Pena for his license and proof of insurance,
   and Pena “was really nervous,” “fumbling for his wallet,” and “d[idn’t]
   want to make eye contact.” This “start[ed] to make [Deputy Sweeney]
   nervous,” so Deputy Sweeney had Pena sit in the back of the police car. As
   Deputy Sweeney went back to the VW, Esquivel started to get out of the car.
   Deputy Sweeney told him to get back in, took his identification, and went

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                                    No. 21-20586

   back to the police car to start to run background checks. Deputy Sweeney
   “started to run” the information but Esquivel “started to get out on [him]
   again.” It is unclear based on the record what time the checks started or if
   the driver’s check or Esquivel’s check were completed. At some point,
   which Deputy Sweeney believes was after he spoke with Pena, Deputy
   Sweeney “asked for another unit” “because the driver was really nervous,
   and then the passenger kept getting out on me. He didn’t want to be in the
   car.” At 10:57 p.m., eight minutes after Deputy Sweeney was dispatched,
   Pena gave consent to search the car, in which the officers discovered
   narcotics.
          Esquivel was charged with possession and conspiracy to possess with
   intent to distribute 500 grams or more of a mixture containing
   methamphetamine and five kilograms or more of a mixture containing
   cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and 846, and 18
   U.S.C. § 2. He pleaded not guilty and filed a motion to suppress. After an
   evidentiary hearing and supplemental briefing, the district court granted the
   motion in part as to a different stop but denied it as to the Houston stop in
   question here. Thereafter, Esquivel proceeded to trial and a jury was selected
   and sworn. However, before opening statements, a juror tested positive for
   COVID-19.     The district court granted a mistrial based on “manifest
   necessity and the COVID crisis and the sickness of one of our jurors,” and
   explained that the court would proceed with “a stipulated bench trial, as
   agreed by the defendant and defendant’s counsel.”
          Esquivel waived his right to a jury trial and proceeded with the
   stipulated bench trial. The Government abandoned “the enhancement
   paragraphs” which would have subjected Esquivel to a ten-year mandatory
   minimum sentence. Esquivel did not “agree” with the facts as recited by the
   Government but did not “contest” them. He also did not express a desire to
   preserve an appeal of the adverse pretrial suppression ruling. Relying on the

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   uncontested facts, the district court determined that the elements of the
   offenses were satisfied and found Esquivel guilty on both counts. Esquivel
   waived the preparation of the presentence investigation report, and the
   district court sentenced him to time served, followed by three years of
   supervised release. Esquivel filed a timely notice of appeal.
                                                 II
          Ordinarily, because Esquivel “proceed[ed] to trial on an admission or
   a stipulation of the facts necessary for conviction” without “expressly
   reserving the right to appeal from [his] adverse suppression ruling,” he
   would have waived any appeal of the suppression issue or rendered any
   potential error harmless. 1               However, this case presents unique
   circumstances. Esquivel proceeded to a jury trial and a jury was selected and
   sworn in; it was only because of the COVID-19 pandemic, which was then in
   its beginning stages, that a mistrial was declared and he proceeded with a
   stipulated bench trial. Esquivel argues that any waiver of his right to appeal
   the suppression ruling was not knowing or intentional because of the
   confusion surrounding the early days of the pandemic and the fact that he did
   not “express ‘clear understanding’ that he was giving up that right.” The
   Government agrees that “[f]or this case only, and due to the COVID-related
   adjustments the parties made . . . Esquivel did not intend to waive his right to
   appeal.”        In light of the Government’s agreement and the unique
   circumstances of this case, we agree that Esquivel has not waived his right to
   appeal the suppression ruling.
                                                 III
          We turn to the merits of the suppression ruling. “When reviewing the
   denial of a motion to suppress, we review questions of law de novo and
          _____________________
          1
              See United States v. Najera, 915 F.3d 997, 1004 (5th Cir. 2019) (emphasis omitted).

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   findings of fact for clear error.” 2 “‘Whether an officer had reasonable
   suspicion to support a stop is treated as a question of law.’ Nonetheless, this
   Court views the evidence ‘in the light most favorable to the prevailing party
   in the district court—in this case, the Government.’” 3
           When analyzing the legality of an investigative stop, we engage in a
   two-part inquiry. “First, we consider whether the officer’s decision to make
   the stop was justified at its inception. Second, we determine whether or not
   the officer’s subsequent actions were reasonably related in scope to the
   circumstances that caused him to stop the vehicle in the first place.” 4
   Esquivel argues that no reasonable suspicion of drug trafficking arose, and,
   because of that, the stop was impermissibly prolonged to investigate the
   traffic violations.
           If there was reasonable suspicion of drug trafficking, we need not
   analyze whether the stop was impermissibly prolonged to investigate the
   traffic violations. 5 “For a traffic stop to be justified at its inception, an officer

           _____________________
           2
              United States v. McKinney, 980 F.3d 485, 491 (5th Cir. 2020).
           3
              United States v. Broca-Martinez, 855 F.3d 675, 678 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting United
   States v. Castillo, 804 F.3d 361, 364 (5th Cir. 2015)).
            4
              United States v. Bass, 996 F.3d 729, 737 (5th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted) (citing
   United States v. Pack, 612 F.3d 341, 349-50 (5th Cir.), opinion modified on other grounds on
   denial of reh’g, 622 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 2010)).
            5
              See United States v. Villafranco-Elizondo, 897 F.3d 635, 642 (5th Cir. 2018) (“The
   record before us does not reveal when the license check was complete because Woody
   exited his vehicle before receiving the results. While the check was running, Woody
   continued to question Villafranco-Elizondo, eventually securing his consent to search the
   truck and the trailer. Accordingly, we cannot determine whether the license check was
   complete when Villafranco-Elizondo consented to the search.
            Yet we need not answer that question if, when the license check began, Woody had
   already developed reasonable suspicion that another crime was afoot. Where an officer
   develops reasonable suspicion of another crime—e.g., drug trafficking—during the course
   of a traffic stop, he may prolong the suspect’s detention until he has dispelled that newly-
   formed suspicion.” (citing United States v. Brigham, 382 F.3d 500, 507 (5th Cir. 2004) (en
   banc))).

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                                           No. 21-20586

   must have an objectively reasonable suspicion that some sort of illegal
   activity, such as a traffic violation, occurred, or is about to occur, before
   stopping the vehicle.” 6           “Although a mere ‘hunch’ does not create
   reasonable suspicion . . . the level of suspicion the standard requires is
   ‘considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the
   evidence,’ and ‘obviously less’ than is necessary for probable cause.” 7 “Our
   assessment of reasonable suspicion is based on the totality of the
   circumstances.” 8 “We give due weight to the officer’s factual inferences
   because officers may ‘draw on their own experience and specialized training
   to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information
   available to them that ‘might well elude an untrained person.’’” 9
           Because there was “some degree of communication” between HSI
   Brownsville, Agent Rogers, and Deputy Sweeney, “reasonable suspicion can
   vest through [their] collective knowledge.” 10 At the time of the stop,
   evidence had shown that HSI Brownsville was conducting an ongoing
   investigation into drug trafficking with Santos as one of its targets. Santos
   had asked a cooperating defendant to modify his truck by building a hidden
   compartment, and the hidden compartment had been installed. On the day
   in question, Santos drove to Houston from Brownsville in the truck with the
   hidden compartment. When Santos had come to Brownsville in the past, “he

           _____________________
           6
              United States v. Andres, 703 F.3d 828, 832 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States
   v. Lopez–Moreno, 420 F.3d 420, 430 (5th Cir. 2005)).
            7
              Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 397 (2014) (citations omitted) (first quoting
   Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968); and then quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1,
   7 (1989)).
            8
               Bass, 996 F.3d at 737 (citing United States v. Powell, 732 F.3d 361, 369 (5th Cir.
   2013)).
            9
              United States v. Smith, 952 F.3d 642, 648 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting United States
   v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002)).
            10
               Bass, 996 F.3d at 737 (first citing Powell, 732 F.3d at 369; and then quoting United
   States v. Ibarra, 493 F.3d 526, 530 (5th Cir. 2007)).

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   was meeting with other people who were documented as being involved in
   drug trafficking” and who “either had been arrested before the . . . incident
   in question, or have since been arrested for narcotics trafficking and/or bulk
   cash smuggling.” “[F]rom Brownsville to Houston is pretty much the main
   destination for narcotics” and a “drug trafficking corridor.” Further, it is
   “very” common for drug traffickers to use a hidden compartment while
   travelling up from the Rio Grande Valley. As to the specifics of the night in
   question, Santos met with Pena and Esquivel, who were driving a VW, in a
   dark parking lot. Santos, Esquivel, and Pena talked and walked back and forth
   between the truck and the VW, and Pena took “something” from the back of
   the truck and put it in the trunk of the VW. Esquivel got into the truck for
   ten or fifteen minutes while Pena “was on the phone and getting in and out
   of the [VW].” After Esquivel got out of the truck, he and Pena “arranged
   some stuff in the trunk” of the VW and drove off. Right after the stop began
   but before any checks were run, Deputy Sweeney observed that Pena “was
   really nervous,” “fumbling for his wallet,” and “d[idn’t] want to make eye
   contact,” which made Deputy Sweeney nervous. In addition, Esquivel kept
   getting out of the VW and “didn’t want to be in the [VW].” “[T]hese
   factors” and the “reasonable inferences” that “may be drawn from them,
   would allow a reasonable person to suspect that [Esquivel] was engaging in
   illegal activity.” 11
           Further, “[i]n determining whether reasonable suspicion exists, an
   officer’s inferences based on knowledge gained through specialized training
   and experience routinely play a significant role in law enforcement
   investigations.” 12 The HSI Brownsville officer working this case received
   training on narcotics trafficking, including “the whole tactical side of

           _____________________
           11
                See Lopez-Moreno, 420 F.3d at 433.
           12
                Bass, 996 F.3d at 738 (citing Kansas v. Glover, 140 S. Ct. 1183, 1189-90 (2020)).

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   electronic surveillance, then going forward through, like, interviewing, drug
   recognition, general history of different trafficking methods and drug
   trafficking organizations.” When asked what else the hidden compartment
   could be used for besides transporting drugs from Brownsville to Houston,
   he testified: “I can’t think of anything. The only—only other scenario would
   be taking an empty compartment and bringing back bulk cash currency.”
   Agent Rogers, the Houston officer who surveilled the parking lot, had sixteen
   years’        experience     working      for   HSI     including     “many      narcotics
   investigations.” On the night in question, based on the totality of the
   circumstances, Agent Rogers and the other members of law enforcement
   thought they had “observ[ed] somebody transferring narcotics to another
   vehicle.” Agent Rogers watched the stop of Esquivel and Pena from a
   distance after losing track of Santos because he was “just making sure
   that . . . everything was okay, and that they found what they—what we
   thought was narcotics.”
            Esquivel objects to many of the factors outlined above. For instance,
   he argues that it was five days before Christmas and the mall was open late,
   so the exchange could have been shoppers exchanging gifts. However, “we
   have consistently recognized that reasonable suspicion ‘need not rule out the
   possibility of innocent conduct.’” 13 Further, he argues his route is not
   dispositive, but, as we have explained, while “‘the probativeness of a
   particular defendant’s route is minimal,’ . . . we have consistently considered
   travel along known drug corridors as a relevant—even if not dispositive—
   piece of the reasonable suspicion puzzle.” 14 Finally, Esquivel objects to
   considering demeanor, but though “[n]ervousness, standing alone, generally
            _____________________
            13
                 Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 403 (2014) (quoting Arvizu, 534 U.S. at
   277).
            14
             Smith, 952 F.3d at 649 (quoting United States v. White, 584 F.3d 935, 952 (10th
   Cir. 2009)).

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                                          No. 21-20586

   is not sufficient to support reasonable suspicion,” 15 it “is indeed supportive
   of a reasonable suspicion,” 16 especially because Deputy Sweeney explained
   the driver was more nervous than Deputy Sweeney thought appropriate.
   Because there was reasonable suspicion of drug trafficking, we do not
   consider whether the traffic stop might have been unreasonably prolonged to
   investigate only traffic violations.
                                      *        *         *
           For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM.

           _____________________
           15
            United States v. Macias, 658 F.3d 509, 520 (5th Cir. 2011).
           16
            United States v. McKinney, 980 F.3d 485, 495 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing Illinois v.
   Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000)).

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