Court Opinion

ID: 9493673
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:14:54.567327+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:57.767928
License: Public Domain

NYGAARD, Circuit Judge, concurring:
While I agree with the majority’s conclusion that Hector cannot recover the ex*162penses he incurred as a result of his criminal prosecution, I would reach this disposition more directly via a causation analysis.
I must first recount the relevant facts. Officers Watt, Diaz, Davy, and Scott unlawfully detained Hector, his companion, and his personal aircraft at the Dubois/Jef-ferson County airport for several hours without a warrant. The officers did, however, ultimately obtain a warrant from a magistrate and it was only after they secured this warrant that they searched Hector’s aircraft and recovered eighty-one pounds of hallucinogenic mushrooms. Based exclusively on this seized contraband, Hector was charged in state court with possession with the intent to distribute the controlled substance. The charges were withdrawn in state court after a federal grand jury indictment, and Hector filed a motion to suppress the seized mushrooms based on the officers’ violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The District Court granted Hector’s motion to suppress after a four day hearing, and the charges against Hector were withdrawn.
Hector commenced a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to recover the expenses incurred pursuing his Fourth Amendment claim. The District Court granted summary judgment against the officers’ attempts to shield themselves from Hector’s claim with the doctrine of qualified immunity, and we affirmed. Hector v. Watt, 203 F.3d 817 (3d Cir.1999) (per curium). With the officers’ liability for violating Hector’s Fourth Amendment right established, and their entitlement to qualified immunity blocked, the § 1983 claim was remanded to the District Court to determine damages. The District Court filed a one paragraph order granting the officers’ motion for summary judgment and stating that “as a matter of law ... the damages recoverable by plaintiff for defendant’s violation of his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are limited to nominal damages of $1.00.”
Individuals may bring civil claims for damages resulting from violations of their Fourth Amendment rights under § 1983. See Parkhurst v. Trapp, 77 F.3d 707 (3d Cir.1996); Gillard v. Schmidt, 579 F.2d 825 (3d Cir.1978). We have recognized that “Section 1983, Title 42 U.S.C.A., is completely silent as to the kind of damages which may be awarded an injured plaintiff in a civil right suit,” Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74, 85 (3d Cir.1965), and the Supreme Court has held that § 1983 damages “may include ... out-of-pocket loss and other monetary harms.” Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 307, 106 S.Ct. 2537, 2543, 91 L.Ed.2d 249 (1986). Actions brought under § 1983 are reviewed like common law tort claims and require a proximate cause analysis. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978); Olsen v. Correiro, 189 F.3d 52 (1st Cir.1999); Gierlinger v. Gleason, 160 F.3d 858 (2d Cir.1998).
The dispositive question, therefore, is whether the officers’ illegal search and seizure of Hector’s aircraft proximately caused the expenses related to Hector’s suppression hearing. The first stage of a causation analysis requires a finding that the violation caused the damages in fact, and I need not belabor this portion of the analysis since “but for” the officers’ illegal search Hector would not have been detained, searched, and prosecuted. Because the charges against Hector rested entirely upon the illegally seized drugs, without the officers’ violation of his Fourth Amendment rights none of the subsequent criminal proceedings would have occurred.
The issue of proximate cause, however, requires closer analysis. Unlike causation in fact, proximate causation is a legal construct fashioned according to policy considerations. As Justice Andrews stated in his classic dissent in Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99, 103 (1928), “[wjhat we mean by the word ‘proximate’ is that, because of ... public policy *163... the law arbitrarily declines to trace a series of events beyond a certain point.” The causal chain traced by a proximate cause analysis can be broken by an intervening or superceding cause, which Pros-ser and Keeton describe as “an act of a third person or other force which by its intervention prevents the actor from being liable for harm to another which his antecedent negligence is a substantial factor in bringing about.” Restatement (Seoond) of Torts § 440 (1965).
The majority eschews this issue, stating that “[g]iven that the cases on intervening causes are legion and difficult to reconcile ... and that we have other, sufficient grounds for resolving this case, we will not reach the issue of intervening cause.” Considering the facts before us, I find the causation analysis less daunting.
Three events might be considered to breach the chain of causation between the initial illegal detention (occurring before the issuance of the warrant) and the damages Hector subsequently incurred defending his Fourth Amendment rights and successfully suppressing the seized contraband: 1) the magistrate’s issuance of a warrant; 2) the prosecutor’s decision to pursue the charge; and 3) the federal grand jury’s indictment. Admittedly, the causation analysis would be difficult if we were to consider only the decision to prosecute and the grand jury indictment as possible intervening causes since parallel and contradictory jurisprudence has developed on this issue. Compare Townes v. City of New York, 176 F.3d 138, 147 (2d Cir.1999) (stating that “[i]t is well settled that the chain of causation between a police officer’s unlawful arrest and a subsequent conviction and incarceration is broken by the intervening exercise of independent judgment”), Barts v. Joyner, 865 F.2d 1187, 1195 (11th Cir.1989) (finding that intervening decisions of prosecutor, grand jury, judge, and jury supervene), Hand v. Gary, 838 F.2d 1420, 1427-28 (5th Cir.1988) (finding that a decision of a magistrate or grand jury supervenes), Smiddy v. Varney, 665 F.2d 261, 266-68 (9th Cir.1981), Ames v. United States, 600 F.2d 183, 185 (8th Cir.1979) (finding that a decision of a grand jury supervenes), and Duncan v. Nelson, 466 F.2d 939, 943 (7th Cir.1972) (finding that a ruling of a sentencing judge supervenes), with Sherwin Manor Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. McAuliffe, 37 F.3d 1216 (7th Cir.1994), Hale v. Fish, 899 F.2d 390 (5th Cir.1990), Borunda v. Richmond, 885 F.2d 1384 (9th Cir.1988) (en banc) (stating that a “plaintiff who establishes liability for deprivations of constitutional rights actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is entitled to recover compensatory damages for all injuries suffered as a consequence of those deprivations” and holding that the decision to prosecute the charge did not supervene), Kerr v. City of Chicago, 424 F.2d 1134, 1142 (7th Cir.1970) (stating that a “plaintiff in a civil rights action should be allowed to recover the attorneys’ fees in a ... criminal action where the expenditure is a foreseeable result of the acts of the defendant.”), Carter v. Georgevich, 78 F.Supp.2d 332, 334 (D.N.J.2000) (stating that “[rjather than the acts of a prosecutor and judge being considered intervening causes which interrupted or destroyed the causal connection between the wrongful act and injury to the plaintiff, it appears to the Court that such subsequent acts were reasonably foreseeable by the officer. A tortfeasor is not relieved from liability for his wrongful conduct by the intervention of third persons if these acts are reasonably foreseeable”), Schiller v. Strangis, 540 F.Supp. 605, 621 (D.Mass.1982), Lykken v. Vavreck, 366 F.Supp. 585 (D.Minn.1973), Brooks v. Moss, 242 F.Supp. 531 (W.D.S.C.1965), and McArthur v. Pennington, 253 F.Supp. 420 (E.D.Tenn.1963). We need not reconcile this caselaw, however, because the magistrate issued a search warrant before the officers recovered the contraband, and this act of independent judgment breaks the chain of causation between the illegal detention and Hector’s subsequent legal costs.
*164As the majority recognized, the most directly pertinent Supreme Court decision is Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986). In Malley, the Court considered an officer’s liability under § 1983 for presenting an insufficient affidavit to a judicial officer who issued a warrant resulting in the plaintiffs arrest. The Court rejected the District Court’s reasoning that the judicial officer’s decision to issue the warrant, despite lacking necessary information, broke the “causal chain between the application for the warrant and the improvident arrest.” The Court stated that “a reasonably well-trained officer in [the same] position would have known that his affidavit failed to establish probable cause,” and an “officer then cannot excuse his own default by pointing to the greater incompetence of the magistrate.” Id. at 345, 346 n. 9, 106 S.Ct. 1092. Three points should be taken from Malley.
First, a magistrate’s issuance of a warrant, generally, does not necessarily insulate an officer from damages that occur as a result of illegal activity that takes place before the receipt of the warrant. Second, the operative determination for the Court was whether the officer should have foreseen that his violation would produce the damage to the plaintiff, and in Malley this question was specifically whether the officer should have known that his submission of the insufficient affidavit would result in the arrest. For the officers here, surely they could have foreseen that their violation (illegally detaining Hector) could result in the damages (legal fees).
Third, Malley is distinguishable from the facts here because the officer’s violation in Malley pertained directly to the magistrate’s inability to make an independent judgment regarding the warrant. The warrant in Malley was not the result of a truly independent decision by a magistrate, but rather was contaminated and compromised by the officer’s misinformation. This requirement that a decision of a prosecutor, sentencer, or other court officials will only constitute an intervening cause if the decision is genuinely free from deception or coercion is enforced by several Courts of Appeal. See Townes, 176 F.3d at 147 (stating that an exercise of independent judgment breaks chain of causation “in the absence of evidence that the police officer misled or pressured the official who could be expected to exercise independent judgment”); Myers v. County of Orange, 157 F.3d 66, 74 (2d Cir.1998); Barts v. Joyner, 865 F.2d 1187, 1197 (11th Cir.1989) (finding intervening acts break chain of causation “in the absence of a showing that the police officers deceived the court officials or unduly pressured them or that the court officials themselves acted with malice and the police joined with them.”); Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985, 994 (7th Cir.1988) (“[A] prosecutor’s decision to charge, a grand jury’s decision to indict, a prosecutor’s decision not to drop charges but to proceed to trial — none of these decisions will shield a police officer who deliberately supplied misleading information that influenced that decision.”); Lanier v. Sallas, 777 F.2d 321, 325 (5th Cir.1985); Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 167 (D.C.Cir.1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 916, 98 S.Ct. 3146, 57 L.Ed.2d 1161 (1978). Although here the warrant arrived too late to excuse the initial detention, Hector has suffered no damages as a result of that detention. Otherwise, the independence of the magistrate’s judgment was not compromised in any way. Malley is therefore materially distinguishable.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals offers two persuasive opinions holding that “if the facts supporting an arrest are put before an intermediate such as a magistrate or grand jury, the intermediate’s decision breaks the causal chain,” Rodriguez v. Ritchey, 556 F.2d 1185, 1193 (5th Cir.1977) (en banc); Smith v. Gonzales, 670 F.2d 522 (5th Cir.1982), and a third stating that “even an officer who acted with malice in procuring the warrant ... will not be liable if the facts supporting the warrant or indictment are put before an impartial *165intermediary.” Hand v. Gary, 838 F.2d 1420, 1427 (5th Cir.1988). The Hand Court also emphasized, in accordance with Malley, that the chain of causation is only broken where all the facts are presented to the independent intermediary or where an officer’s indiscretion does not cause any relevant information to be withheld from the independent intermediary. As Hand summarized, any “misdirection of the magistrate or the grand jury by omission or commission perpetuates the taint of the original official behavior.” Id. at 1428. Several district courts have followed these three Fifth Circuit opinions on this issue. See Johnson v. Davenport, 2000 WL 341255 (N.D.Tex.2000); Paddio v. City of Hammond, 1997 WL 289704 (E.D.La.1997); Hamrick v. City of Eustace, 732 F.Supp. 1390 (E.D.Tex.1990); Taylor v. City of Nederland, Tex., 685 F.Supp. 616 (E.D.Tex.1988); Von Williams v. City of Bridge City, Tex., 588 F.Supp. 1187 (E.D.Tex.1984); Farmer v. Lawson, 510 F.Supp. 91 (N.D.Ga.1981).
There is nothing in the record to indicate, nor have the parties claimed, that the officers undermined the magistrate’s independence of judgement and autonomous determination to issue the warrant. Absent any such subterfuge, and in conjunction with the decision of the prosecutor, the grand jury indictment, and the general policy concerns expressed in the majority opinion, I would find that the officers do not bear legal responsibility for the costs accrued after the initial illegal detention.