Court Opinion

ID: 9368681
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-06 17:07:19.320932+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:09.299898
License: Public Domain

J-S38002-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    TIMOTHY CAMPBELL                           :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    JENNIFER CAMPBELL                          :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1548 EDA 2022

                  Appeal from the Order Entered May 20, 2022
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Civil Division at No(s):
                                2015-03232-CU

BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., MURRAY, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.:                          FILED FEBRUARY 6, 2023

        Jennifer Campbell (“Mother”), files this appeal from the order awarding

Timothy Campbell (“Father”) primary physical custody of the parties’ minor

children, L.C., T.C., and V.C. (collectively, “Children”). We affirm.

        In 2015, Father filed a custody complaint requesting partial physical

custody of Children.1 The court2 awarded the parties shared legal custody of

their then four minor children.3 The court granted Mother primary physical

custody, and Father partial physical custody. See Order, 6/5/15 (“the 2015

____________________________________________

1 L.C. was born in December 2005, T.C. was born in September 2008, and
V.C. was born in November 2011.

2 Earlier proceedings in this case were conducted before other trial courts.
The court from whose order Mother appeals did not become involved in this
case until 2022. See Trial Court Opinion, 7/20/22, at 2.

3   E.C., the parties’ eldest child, is now emancipated.
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order”). At the time of the court’s order, Mother and Father both lived in West

Chester where Father works and still lives. See N.T., 3/29/22, at 16, 70.

      Mother bought a home in West Grove, Chester County to which she

moved in 2020, retaining primary physical custody of Children. See N.T.,

3/30/22, at 168.     Father filed a petition for primary physical custody of

Children and a petition for special relief to prevent Mother from removing

Children from the West Chester Area School District. See Trial Court Opinion,

7/20/22, at 1-2.

      Following a conciliation conference in December 2020, the court entered

a temporary order awarding the parties shared legal and physical custody of

Children. See id. at 2. Mother challenged the ruling, resulting in hearings

after which the court awarded Mother primary physical custody and Father

partial physical custody during the school year and shared physical custody

during the summer, and permitted Children to begin school in the Avon Grove

School District. See Order, 12/24/20 (“the December 2020 order”).

      In February 2021, L.C., then sixteen years old, ran away from Mother’s

home in the middle of the night and called paternal grandmother, who took

him to Father’s house. See N.T., 3/29/22, at 89-92, 189-192; N.T., 3/30/22,

at 176-179. After school the next day, Father returned L.C. to Mother’s home.

See N.T., 3/29/22, at 92; N.T., 3/30/22, at 179.

      Mother filed a temporary protection from abuse petition (“PFA”) that

day, alleging that Father had threated to kill her if she retrieved L.C. from his

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home.      See PFA Petition, 2/16/21.          Mother also alleged that Father had

previously abused her by attempting to intimidate her, backing her against a

wall, screaming in her face, and pushing her. See id. The court granted a

temporary PFA order against Father. See Order, 2/16/21.4

        In March 2021, Mother filed a petition for contempt of the trial court’s

December 2020 order alleging that Father had threatened to kill her. See

Petition, 3/3/21. Mother’s petition attached text messages between L.C. and

Father, which, she averred, showed that Father induced L.C. to run away and

spoke negatively about her and her mother.              See id.    The following day,

Mother filed a petition to modify custody and suspend Father’s physical

custody, citing text messages in which Father texted L.C. to “just run away to

me they will yell at me not you,” “nobody helps us white men anymore,” and

“women are the root of all evil.” See Petition, 3/4/21, at 3-4 (unnumbered).

        Following an April 2021 custody conciliation conference, the court issued

an order suspending Father’s physical custody and preventing him from

having unsupervised communications or contact with Children until further

order of court.        The court’s order further barred Father from texting,

telephoning, FaceTiming or otherwise contacting L.C. “until such time as

Father’s treating therapist recommends that Father understands the impact of

his    manipulative,     racist,   sexist,     and   destructive   behavior   on   the

____________________________________________

4   Mother filed a praecipe to withdraw her PFA petition on April 16, 2021.

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impressionable young minds of his children.” Order 4/16/21 (“the April 2021

order”).

       Four months later, Father filed a petition to modify custody, asserting

that Mother had stopped taking L.C. to the therapist they had found for him,

and that Father had: undertaken therapy, been found not to present a current

risk of harm to himself or others, continued to receive treatment, and had not

any contact with Children for four months. See Father’s Petition, 8/25/21, at

2-4. Father sought an order similar to the 2015 order that would permit him

to coordinate his partial custody time with his work schedule. See Father’s

Petition, 8/25/21, at 4.

       In November 2021, after a conciliation hearing, the court granted Father

“therapeutic supervised visitation”5 one day every other weekend for three

hours and directed that L.C. begin therapy. The order stated that “Father

shall have no unsupervised communications or contact with [Children] until

either the agreement of the parties or further order of court.” See Order,

11/19/21 (“the November 2021 order”). Father challenged the rulings, and

the court scheduled a custody trial.

____________________________________________

5 The Child Custody Act (“the Act”), 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 5321-5340, does not
provide for an award of therapeutic supervised visitation. See 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 5323(a). Rather, the Act provides for “supervised physical custody,” 23
Pa.C.S.A. § 5323(a)(5), which is defined as “[c]ustodial time during which an
agency or an adult designated by the court or agreed upon by the parties
monitors the interaction between the child and the individual with those
rights.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5322(a). We deem the court’s order as a grant of
supervised physical custody and refer to it as such.

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       The trial court conducted a custody trial over multiple days in March and

April 2022, at which it heard the testimony of the parties and multiple other

witnesses,6 and also interviewed each child separately in camera.                 The

evidence showed that at times Father used inappropriate language towards

Mother and spoke inappropriately with and/or around Children about her. See

N.T., 3/29/22, at 27-30, 81-83, 185-186; N.T., 4/13/22, at 11, 31, 40. The

evidence also showed that, Mother spoke negatively about Father in front of

at least one child. See N.T., 4/13/22 Court Child Interviews (“CCI”), at 11.7

Father, his treating therapist, Joseph Peter Francisco (“Francisco”), and Dr.

Thomas Haworth, Ph.D. (“Dr. Haworth”), who performed a clinical forensic

examination      of   Father,   testified      that   Father   acknowledged   behaving

inappropriately at times during the course of the custody litigation, including

making some comments to L.C. inappropriate to his age or mental status.

See N.T., 3/29/22, at 22-24, 82-83, 123-26, 185-86.                 Francisco and Dr.

Haworth testified that Father had made significant progress in understanding

how his previous behavior negatively affected Children, showed openness to

learning, and learned appropriate methods to deal with triggering events. See

N.T., 3/29/22, at 22-24, 82-83, 123-126, 135. Father testified that Mother

____________________________________________

6 The witnesses included Father’s treating therapist and doctor, two of his
work colleagues, his best friend, and paternal grandmother, as well as the
couple’s emancipated son, E.C.

7Other testimony presented on April 13, 2022 appears in a different transcript
with the same date.

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has ignored or declined his frequent requests to talk to Children, including on

Father’s Day in 2021. See N.T., 3/29/22, at 107-108.

       During his in camera interview, L.C., then sixteen years old, stated that

Mother sometimes drinks and drives. See N.T., 4/13/22 (CCI) at 8-9. L.C.

said he initially believed this behavior to be normal but became concerned.

See id. L.C. stated that Mother drinks “a few drinks, pretty much every day”

and at least as much on weekends, and that “when she drinks a lot more, she

usually gets more short-tempered.” See id. at 10. L.C. also testified that

both parents speak ill of one another: when she is drunk, Mother tells L.C.

that Father is a “deadbeat,” “manipulative,” and “aggressive,” and Father has

said similar things regarding Mother. See id. at 11-12. L.C. said that he ran

away in the middle of the night in sleet and rain in February 2021,8 and walked

for three hours due to the extreme stress of living with Mother, who drank a

lot and yelled at and confronted him frequently. See id. at 12-13. L.C. said

that Father joked about him running away, but he did not take Father

seriously. See id. at 13.

       L.C. told the court that he learned in approximately April 2021 that

Father had been ordered not to see him, or, as L.C. understood it, text or call.

See id. at 17-18. He stated that Mother had never told him after November

2021 (when the court modified the April 2021 order) that he could have

____________________________________________

8 L.C. described this as “[n]ot my smartest move.” See N.T., 4/13/22 (CCI)
at 13.

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supervised contact or communication with Father, and that she did not tell

him until one and one-half months before the hearing that he could pick up

the phone when Father called. See id. L.C. became aware that Father made

daily calls to the house.    See id.   L.C. said that Mother never directly

prevented Children from speaking with Father, but she never encouraged

Children to do so. L.C. told the court that he “felt awkward because I didn’t

want to ask if I could [speak with Father] and then [have her] say [‘]no[’].”

See id. at 18. L.C. said that when Father would call, some days Mother would

permit Children to answer, but the majority of times she would ignore the call,

hang up on Father, not tell L.C. about the call, or not put him on the phone;

as a result, he spoke to Father once per week or less.     See id. L.C. stated

that he preferred to live with Father and return to the West Chester Area

School District. See id. at 15, 18.

      Thirteen-year-old T.C. told the court that he gets along with Father and

has good times with him, including on a recent visit, as did his sister, V.C.

See id. at 35, 41-42. T.C. told the court that when prevented from seeing or

speaking to Father in the first half of the past year, “I didn’t even know

[Father] was calling” because Mother did not tell him. See id. at 32, 36. T.C.

had only spoken to Father ten or twelve times in the preceding year although

he wanted to speak to Father whenever he called. See id. at 36. T.C. also

stated that he had heard Father say bad things about Mother a few times

years ago, but that in T.C.’s experience, it got better over time. See id. at

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39-40. When asked which parent he would choose to live with, T.C. indicated

some uncertainty but declared “probably [Mother]” because “[he didn’t] really

want to move schools again.” Id. at 42.

      Eleven-year-old V.C. stated that she heard Father say Mother is not a

good person. See N.T., 4/13/22, at 22, 28. V.C. also testified that she had

fun visiting Father on a day in the week prior to the interview with the court.

See id. at 29. V.C. confirmed that she had seen Mother drink wine at night,

and Mother’s boyfriend drank beer. See id. at 30. V.C. stated that she has

spoken with Father when he said negative things about Mother, and he

“reacted fine . . . and . . . did stop most of the time” and has now stopped

entirely. See id. at 31.

      Mother asserted that Father encouraged L.C. to run away in February

2021 and had a history of sending abusive messages to her. See, e.g., N.T.,

3/29/22, at 9; N.T., 3/30/22, at 84-85. Mother alleged that Father told her

he would kill her if she came to retrieve L.C. Father denied saying this, and

paternal grandmother, who heard his end of the conversation, testified she

did not hear him say that. See id. at 92, 192; N.T., 3/30/22, at 178-179.

      The trial court also heard testimony about Mother’s and her boyfriend’s

drinking. In June 2021, the office of Child Protective Services (“CPS”) received

a report, later determined to be unfounded, that Mother drank alcohol and

then drove Children, a report Mother believed Father encouraged L.C. to

make. See N.T., 3/29/22, at 180-184; N.T., 3/31/22, at 7-8; Father’s Exhibit

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H. Mother testified that she drinks alcohol most nights, as does her boyfriend.

See N.T., 4/13/22, at 59-60, 65-66.

        During the custody trial, the trial court awarded Father supervised

physical custody of Children for two hours one night per week. At the end of

the trial, the trial court ordered that Father have supervised physical custody

of Children and supervised telephone calls with Children for one-half hour on

Tuesday nights, and directed the parties to file briefs regarding the sixteen

custody factors set forth in 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a). See N.T., 4/21/22, at 47,

66.9

        On May 20, 2022, the trial court entered an order and an accompanying

memorandum awarding Father primary physical custody of Children.               See

Trial Court Opinion, 7/20/22, at 3. Mother timely filed a notice of appeal and

a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.

1925(a)(2)(i) and (b), and the trial court filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion.

        On appeal, Mother presents the following questions for our review:

        1.    Did the . . . [t]rial [c]ourt abuse its discretion and commit
              reversible error in awarding primary custody to Father, who
              had not requested primary custody at any time prior to or
              during the trial[?]

        2.    Did the . . . [t]rial [c]ourt abuse its discretion and commit
              an error of law in its findings and application of the custody
              factors which resulted in the custody order issued by the
              court[?]

____________________________________________

9   Father filed a post-trial brief seeking primary custody of Children.

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         3.      Did the . . . [t]rial [c]ourt abuse its discretion and commit
                 reversible error by including Father’s prior conduct in its
                 findings, which were contrary to the findings of fact issued
                 by the court who heard testimony concerning that
                 conduct[?]

Mother’s Brief at 9-10.

         We review Mother’s issues according to the following scope and standard

of review:

         [T]he appellate court is not bound by the deductions or inferences
         made by the trial court from its findings of fact, nor must the
         reviewing court accept a finding that has no competent evidence
         to support it. . . . However, this broad scope of review does not
         vest in the reviewing court the duty or the privilege of making its
         own independent determination. . . . Thus, an appellate court is
         empowered to determine whether the trial court’s incontrovertible
         factual findings support its factual conclusions, but it may not
         interfere with those conclusions unless they are unreasonable in
         view of the trial court’s factual findings; and thus, represent a
         gross abuse of discretion.

R.M.G., Jr. v. F.M.G., 986 A.2d 1234, 1237 (Pa. Super. 2009) (internal

citation omitted). On matters concerning the weighing of evidence and the

credibility of witnesses, an appellate court accords deference to the trial court.

See id; see also A.V. v. S.T., 87 A.3d 818, 820 (Pa. Super. 2014) (stating

that this Court will affirm the decision of the trial court where the evidence of

record supports the trial court’s conclusions).

         The primary concern in any custody case is the best interests of the

child.        “The best-interests standard, decided on a case-by-case basis,

considers all factors that legitimately have an effect upon a child’s physical,

intellectual, moral, and spiritual wellbeing.” Saintz v. Rinker, 902 A.2d 509,

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512 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation omitted). This Court will not interfere with

the trial court’s consideration of a child’s best interests if the court conducts a

careful and thorough assessment and properly exercises its discretion. See

R.M.G., Jr., 986 A.2d at 1237.

      Child custody actions are governed by the Act. Trial courts are required

to consider “[a]ll of the factors listed in section 5328(a) . . . when entering a

custody order.”    J.R.M. v. J.E.A., 33 A.3d 647, 652 (Pa. Super. 2011)

(emphasis in original). Section 5328(a) provides as follows:

      § 5328. Factors to consider when awarding custody.

            (a) Factors. – In ordering any form of custody, the court
      shall determine the best interest of the child by considering all
      relevant factors, giving weighted consideration to those factors
      which affect the safety of the child, including the following:

           (1) Which party is more likely to encourage and permit
           frequent and continuing contact between the child and
           another party.

           (2) The present and past abuse committed by a party or
           member of the party’s household, whether there is a
           continued risk of harm to the child or an abused party and
           which party can better provide adequate physical safeguards
           and supervision of the child.

           (2.1) The information set forth in section 5329.1(a)(1) and
           (2) (relating to consideration of child abuse and involvement
           with protective services).

           (3) The parental duties performed by each party on behalf of
           the child.

           (4) The need for stability and continuity in the child’s
           education, family life and community life.

           (5) The availability of extended family.

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          (6) The child’s sibling relationships.

          (7) The well-reasoned preference of the child, based on the
          child’s maturity and judgment.

          (8) The attempts of a parent to turn the child against the
          other parent, except in cases of domestic violence where
          reasonable safety measures are necessary to protect the
          child from harm.

          (9) Which party is more likely to maintain a loving, stable,
          consistent and nurturing relationship with the child adequate
          for the child's emotional needs.

          (10) Which party is more likely to attend to the daily physical,
          emotional, developmental, educational and special needs of
          the child.

          (11) The proximity of the residences of the parties.

          (12) Each party’s availability to care for the child or ability to
          make appropriate child-care arrangements.

          (13) The level of conflict between the parties and the
          willingness and ability of the parties to cooperate with one
          another. A party’s effort to protect a child from abuse by
          another party is not evidence of unwillingness or inability to
          cooperate with that party.

          (14) The history of drug or alcohol abuse of a party or
          member of a party’s household.

          (15) The mental and physical condition of a party or member
          of a party’s household.

          (16) Any other relevant factor.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a). A child’s preference in a custody case, when based

on good reasons, merits careful consideration.      See E.A.L. v. L.J.W., 662

A.2d 1109, 1117-18 (Pa. Super. 1995). See also Wheeler v. Mazur, 793

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A.2d 929, 937 (Pa. Super. 2002) (stating that as a child grows older, more

weight must be given to his custodial preference).

      Pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5323(d), a trial court shall delineate the

reasons for its decision on the record in open court or in a written opinion or

order. Additionally, section 5323(d) requires the trial court to set forth its

mandatory assessment of the sixteen section 5328 custody factors prior to

the deadline by which a litigant must file a notice of appeal. There is, however,

no required amount of detail for the trial court’s explanation:

      all that is required is that the enumerated factors are considered
      and that the custody decision is based on those considerations. A
      court’s explanation of reasons for its decision, which adequately
      addresses the relevant factors, complies with [s]ection 5323(d).

A.V., 87 A.3d at 823 (internal citations and brackets omitted).               After

considering the factors set forth in section 5328, the court may award any of

the following types of custody if it is in the best interests of the child:

      (1)   Shared physical custody.
      (2)   Primary physical custody.
      (3)   Partial physical custody.
      (4)   Sole physical custody.
      (5)   Supervised physical custody.
      (6)   Shared legal custody.
      (7)   Sole legal custody.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5323(a).

      In her first issue, Mother asserts that the trial court erred in awarding

Father primary physical custody when he did not seek that relief prior to, or

during, the trial. See Mother’s Brief at 15-17. Mother contends that “Father’s

failure to provide notice that a change of custody was at issue is a violation of

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[her] due process rights.”    See id. at 17 and 18 (citing Langendorfer v.

Spearman, 797 A.2d 303 (Pa. Super. 2002)). Mother further argues that

trial courts are only required to weigh the sixteen Section 5328(a) custody

factors when assessing a petition that requests a change in the type of

custody. See Mother’s Brief at 18 (citing M.O. v. J.T.R., 85 A.3d 1058, 1062

(Pa. Super. 2014). Mother contends that because Father’s petition requested

less time with Children than he had under the 2015 order, see Father’s

Petition, 8/25/21, and did not request primary physical custody until his post-

trial brief, she did not present evidence about the effect on such an order on

Children. See Mother’s Brief at 25-26. Mother also asserts, as part of her

claim of deficient notice, that Father failed to present evidence that his work

schedule would allow him to assume primary custody, or that he has stability

in his rented home, and, further, that Children have flourished in her sole care

and that Father has misogynistic and racist views that the court should have

acted to prevent him from imparting to Children. See id. at 21-25.

      Mother did not assert a violation of her due process rights at trial, in her

concise statement of matters complained of on appeal or her statement of

questions involved. The trial court did not address that issue. Mother thus

waived review of that assertion.     See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (stating that issues

not raised in the trial court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time

on appeal); see also Pa.R.A.P. 2116 (stating that no questions will be

considered “unless it is stated in the statement or questions involved or is

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fairly suggested thereby”); In re M.Z.T.M.W., 163 A.3d 462, 466 (Pa. Super.

2017) (holding that issues not included in an appellant’s statement of

questions involved and concise statement of errors complained of on appeal

are waived.)

      Langendorfer would not, in any event, support Mother’s due process

claim. The Langendorfer Court found a due process violation when a lower

court modified a custody order although the only issue before it was a

contempt petition. See Langendorfer, 797 A.2d at 309. Here, by contrast,

the parties knew that the five-day trial – which included in camera interviews

of Children soliciting the custodial preference of the two eldest – centered on

Father’s petition to modify custody. See, e.g., N.T., 3/29/22, at 53 (Mother’s

attorney makes reference to “the [custody] factors”); N.T., 3/30/22, at 132

(trial court states that “I understand there are 16 [custody] factors and the

court will consider all of them”); N.T., 3/31/22, at 77 (Mother’s counsel asks

Mother why she “think[s] it’s not in the best interest of the Children to have

50/50 custody now”). When notice of a proceeding adequately advises a party

that custody will be in issue, a court may entertain a request to modify a

custody order after a hearing in that proceeding. See C.A.J. v. D.S.M., 136

A.3d 504, 507 (Pa. Super. 2016). Moreover, a court considering custody has

all seven options at its disposal, including primary physical custody where that

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is in the best interests of the child. 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5323(a). Accordingly,

Mother’s due process claim, even if preserved, would not merit relief.10

       In her second issue, Mother asserts the trial court did not analyze or

weigh the factors, but rather “recited [F]ather’s complaints, without any

reference to [M]other’s explanations for her actions or the documentary

evidence that supports [M]other’s testimony.” Mother’s Brief at 27. Mother

further contends that the trial court’s findings regarding the custody factors

lack evidentiary support and are unreasonable in light of the evidence

presented. See id. Mother challenges, inter alia, the trial court’s weighing of

section 5328(a)(1) because she more likely encourages contact between

Children and the other party, see id. at 28-33; section 5328(a)(7) because

Father manipulated L.C.’s custody preference, see id. at 33-40, 53-55;

section 5328(a)(8) because Father attempted to alienate her from Children,

____________________________________________

10 Mother asserts, citing M.O., that a trial court is only required to weigh the
sixteen factors when the petition for modification requests a change in the
type of custody, see Mother’s Brief at 18-19 (emphasis added). She asserts
that there was no such request here, and therefore the court was only required
to consider the best interests of the child. That the trial court awarded Father
more custody than he had originally requested does not demonstrate error.
The trial court made its ruling in the best interest of the Children. As Mother
acknowledges, the best interest of the child is the determinative factor in
considering custody. See Mother’s Brief at 19. See also Trial Court Opinion,
7/20/22, at 7 (concluding that the best interests of the child is “[t]he polestar
of any child custody dispute”).

Mother’s additional assertions concerning Father’s allegedly bad character do
not support her claim that she lacked proper notice and cannot serve as the
basis for relief on her first issue.

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see id. at 33-45, 53-55; section 5328(a)(13) because Father is alienated from

her, see id. at 52-53; and section 5328(a)(14) because Father falsely accused

her of drug and alcohol abuse, see id. at 46-47.11

       The trial court found that custody factors (1), (7), (8), (13), and (14)

weighed in Father’s favor. See Trial Court Memorandum, 5/20/22, at 1-8.12

Regarding section 5328(a)(1), the parent more likely to encourage contact

between Children and the other party, the court found that Father had not

discouraged or denied frequent contact between Children and Mother but that

“the same may not be said for Mother.” Trial Court Memorandum, 5/20/22,

at 1. The trial court faulted Mother for not telling Children that Father had

attempted to call them in the nearly one year between the April 2021 order

and the trial and found “[o]f particular note . . . Father’s Day of 2021, when

Father requested an opportunity to speak with . . . [Children]. Mother never

responded to that request and, in fact, did not respond[] in any way for nearly

20 days.” See id. at 3. The trial court also credited Father’s “acknowledgment

____________________________________________

11Mother also asserts that the court improperly blamed her for difficulties in
setting up therapy for L.C., see Mother’s Brief at 57-58, and faulted her for
not having Children vaccinated. See id. at 59-60.
12 A fair review of the trial court’s Memorandum shows that it weighed all
sixteen factors and determined that factors (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (9), (10),
(11), (12), and (15) carried neutral weight, and that it had no additional
information concerning factor (16). See A.V., 87 A.3d at 823 (stating that
the court need only articulate its consideration of all of the relevant custody
factors without any particular level of detail).

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of his transgressions, subsequent treatment, and his significant progress in

addressing the issues[] which gave rise to . . . prior problems.” Id.

      Regarding section 5328(a)(7), the well-reasoned preference of the child,

the trial court found L.C. to be “bright, mature and well spoken. The [c]ourt

also found L.C. to be credible. L.C. expressed a preference to live with Father

to get away from the stress placed on him by . . . Mother. . ..” See id. at 5.

Additionally, the court noted that T.C. stated his desire to continue living with

Mother because he does not want to change schools again but found T.C.’s

affect flat and apparently the product of “resignation rather than enthusiasm.”

See id.

      Regarding section 5328(a)(8), the attempts of a parent to turn a child

against the other parent, the trial court found on the one hand that both

parents had spoken ill of each other in front of Children but emphasized that

Father has “acknowledged his conduct in this regard and is taking active

measures, by going through therapy and additional work, to resolve how he

interacts and speaks about Mother.” See id. On the other hand, the trial

court found that Mother:

       has made every effort to separate Father from . . . Children since
      April of 2021, failed to respond to Father’s request for telephone
      calls, including Father’s Day of 2021, and according to L.C. and
      T.C., failed to advise them that Father was attempting to call
      them.     In the [c]ourt’s view, Mother’s conduct created the
      impression among . . . Children that Father is a bad person from
      whom they must remain distant.

See id. at 6. The trial court amplified this point in its opinion, where it stated:

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        Mother acknowledged that at no time did Father pose a threat to
        the safety of . . . Children. This finding was based upon Mother’s
        testimony and her allowing . . . Children to continue to have
        unsupervised visits with Father from the time of the filing of a PFA
        by Mother, until issuance of the [April 2021 order]. The [c]ourt
        found that despite Mother’s conclusion that Father was not a
        threat to the safety of . . . Children, she nonetheless filed a petition
        and, apparently, presented a case calling for Father to lose all
        custody/visitation with . . . Children.

Trial Court Opinion, 7/20/22, at 11.13

        Similarly, regarding section 5328(a)(13), the level of conflict between

the parties and the parties’ attempts to cooperate, the trial court

acknowledged the contentious nature of the parties’ relationship and lack of

maturity when co-parenting, but again recognized Father for accepting

responsibility and pursuing therapeutic assistance while Mother “does not

acknowledge any responsibility for the inability to cooperate with Father.” See

id. at 7.

        Finally, regarding section 5328(a)(14), the history of drug or alcohol

abuse of a party or member of a party’s household,14 the trial court

emphasized that Mother testified to drinking most days, and credited L.C.’s

testimony that Mother consumed alcohol then drove with Children and that

she gets “short-tempered the more she drinks.” See id.

____________________________________________

13We note that the April 2021 order was not premised on Father’s presentation
of a physical threat to Children. See April 2021 Order. However, the trial
court focused on the harmful effect to Children of Mother not telling them that
Father had asked to speak with them.

14   Father offered no evidence that Mother or her boyfriend used illegal drugs.

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      We conclude that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in

awarding Father primary custody of Children. Concerning related factors (1)

(8), and (13) which consider a party’s attempts to support Children’s

relationship with the other party and their attempts to cooperate with each

other, the record supports the trial court’s finding that Father did not impair

the parent-child relationship, but Mother did. Both L.C. and T.C. testified that

for a period of many months Mother did not tell them that Father had been

trying to speak to them on the phone. The court twice noted that Mother did

not grant Father’s request to speak to Children on Fathers’ Day 2021 and did

not respond to that request at all for nearly twenty days. See Trial Court

Memorandum, 5/20/22, at 2, 6.       Although the April 2021 order reflected a

concern that unsupervised contact with Father threatened to expose Children

to the abhorrent views he had expressed and, further, did not require Mother

to allow Children to speak to Father, nothing in that order or the subsequent

November 2021 order precluded Mother from permitting and supervising calls

between Children and Father or, failing that, from telling Children that Father

had been calling to speak to them. See N.T., 4/13/22 (CCI), at 17-18, 36.

Mother had no obligation to allow Children to speak to Father on the phone or

have unsupervised contact with him. However, she did not even tell them

their Father was calling. Mother’s conduct prevented T.C. from knowing that

Father had called and, after she belatedly gave them that information, only

inconsistently allowed Father to speak to Children, which left L.C. feeling

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awkward when he wanted to speak to Father. Mother’s discouragement of

Children’s contact with Father supports the trial court’s determination that

“Mother’s conduct create[d] the impression among . . . Children that Father is

a bad person from whom they must remain distant.”                     Trial Court

Memorandum, 5/20/22, at 6.

      Additionally, Dr. Haworth and Father’s treating therapist testified that

Father had acknowledged his prior misconduct that had hurt Children and was

making significant progress in changing his behavior. See N.T., 3/29/22, 22-

24, 82-83, 123-26. Father also acknowledged his prior mistakes of sharing

his frustrations with Children. See id. at 82. By contrast, Mother blamed

Father for L.C. running away, see N.T. 4/13/22, at 9, and also blamed him

for falsely reporting in June 2021 that she drank and drove, see N.T., 3/29/22,

at 180-84, even though Father had not spoken to Children for two months

before the report. See N.T., 3/31/22, at 7-8.

      Regarding section 5328(a)(7), the well-reasoned preference of the child,

the record supports the trial court’s characterization of L.C. as “bright, mature,

and well-spoken,” and finding that L.C. expressed a preference to live with

Father rather than Mother in part to avoid her short temper when she drank.

Trial Court Memorandum, 5/20/22, at 5. The law supports the trial court’s

decision to afford great weight to L.C.’s preference. See Wheeler, 793 A.2d

at 937; E.A.L., 662 A.2d at 1117-18. Further, on a cold record there is no

basis to find an abuse of discretion in the trial court’s determination that T.C.’s

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statement that he did not want to move schools again expressed resignation

rather than enthusiasm about living with Mother15 and that V.C. would fare

equally well in either home. See id.

        Finally, with regard to section 5328(a)(14), which addresses alcohol and

drug abuse by a party or a member of the party’s household,16 L.C.’s

testimony, T.C.’s testimony, and Mother’s own testimony established that

Mother drank almost every day as did her boyfriend, and that Mother became

more irritable when she drank. No evidence suggested that Father had an

alcohol problem. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in weighing this

factor in Father’s favor. See Trial Court Memorandum, 5/20/22, at 7-8.

        Mother challenges the trial court’s weighing, inter alia, of which parent

was more likely to encourage contact between Children and the other party,

and her assertions that Father manipulated L.C., attempted to alienate Mother

from Children and falsely accused Mother of drug and alcohol abuse. This

Court will not disturb a trial court’s findings of fact and determinations

regarding credibility and weight of the evidence absent an abuse of discretion.

See R.M.G., Jr. 986 A.2d at 1237; A.V., 87 A.3d at 820.             We are not

permitted “to determine whether the trial court reached the ‘right’ decision;

____________________________________________

15 See McMillen v. McMillen, 602 A.2d 845, 847 (Pa. 1992) (asserting that
to merit consideration a child’s custody preference must be based upon good
reasons).

16   Father presented no evidence of Mother’s or her boyfriend’s drug use.

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rather, we . . . consider whether, ‘based on the evidence presented, given

[sic] due deference to the trial court’s weight and credibility determinations,’

the trial court erred or abused its discretion in awarding custody to the

prevailing party.” King v. King, 889 A.2d 630, at 632 (Pa. Super. 2005)

(internal citations omitted). In light of our standards of review, we cannot

agree with Mother that the trial court abused its discretion in weighing the

evidence.

       In her third and final issue on appeal, Mother asserts that the trial court

must have disregarded section 5328(a)(10), the daily needs of the child,

regarding V.C.’s former peanut allergy, see Mother’s Brief at 60, a factor

Father admits a prior court weighed in Mother’s favor. See Father’s Brief at

22. Regarding this factor, Mother asserts that the trial court “failed to give

due weight to the factual findings of the trial court who issued her opinion less

than two months before L.C. ran away.” Id. at 62.17 Mother emphasizes that

“all themes addressed in the previous trial are repeated here.” Mother’s Brief

at 63. Mother appears to be asking this Court to reweigh the evidence from

this trial in light of the evidence at a prior trial. She may not have such review.

See M.J.M. v. M.L.G., 63 A.3d 331, 339 (Pa. Super. 2013) (stating that it is

within the trial court’s discretion to determine which factors are most salient).

____________________________________________

17  The trial court precluded the admission of evidence relating to previously-
litigated claims and conduct prior to its December 23, 2020 order. See Order,
3/7/22.

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     Upon review of the testimonial and documentary evidence, the trial

court’s memorandum, and its Rule 1925(a) opinion, and mindful of our scope

and standard of review, we conclude that the trial court carefully and

thoroughly considered Children’s best interests, and its award of primary

physical custody to Father constituted a proper exercise of discretion.

Accordingly, we affirm the order.

     Order affirmed.

     Judge Murray joins this memorandum.

     Judge Kunselman Concurs in the Result.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 2/6/2023

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