Court Opinion

ID: 9707840
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 02:22:58.485707+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:42.485397
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Watkins, J.:
I would arrest the judgments of sentence and discharge the defendants on the ground that although the indictment found alleges a corrupt conspiracy within the statutory period in that the last overt act was committed on September 19, 1957, the evidence of the Commonwealth shows that the last overt act that extended the existence of the alleged conspiracy took place on September 16, 1957, which was beyond the statutory period. The proof of the Commonwealth is that a check was made by the Union to Joseph E. Grace, one of the defendants, since deceased, on September 16, 1957 and that it was presented for payment and paid *76by the Broad Street Trust Company, the drawee, on September 19, 1957 and that this payment was the overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy and within the statute of limitations.
The check in question was dated September 16, 1957 payable to Joseph E. Grace, drawn on the Broad Street Trust Company, Philadelphia, Pa., in the amount of $2500. The maker was Highway Truck Drivers & Helpers, Local 107, Raymond Cohen, Secretary, Joseph E. Grace, President, and delivered to Grace on the date it was made. The check which was introduced into evidence was indorsed in blank by Joseph E. Grace and was paid by the bank on September 19, 1957.
We agree with the majority opinion that a check or draft does not operate as an assignment of funds in the hands of the drawee bank but we are not interested in the drawee, we are only interested in the maker and the payee. The delivery of this negotiable instrument into the hands of Grace became a completed transaction and, if a part of this alleged corrupt conspiracy, a completed overt act, a completed crime. This check was a thing of value, a negotiable instrument that could be negotiated at any time by delivery. He could do this by indorsing it in blank and delivering it to anyone. If, as contended by the Commonwealth, the convention payments constituted illegal acts, and part of the conspiracy, the crime was completed on the delivery of the check.
The Commonwealth proved the making and the delivery of the check to Grace on September 16, and from then on what happened to this “bearer” instrument is pure conjecture, even if material. The evidence shows that the Broad Street Trust paid out the money on a bearer instrument but there is no evidence to whom it was paid and it is pure guesswork to argue that it was paid to Grace.
*77There is no statute, regulation or duty which prevents a bank from making payment of a check to someone other than the indorser where the check is a bearer instrument without requiring the indorsement of the person who presents it. Uniform Commercial Code, 12A PS §4-101 et seq., Bank Deposits — Collections. “An indorsement in blank specifies no particular indorsee and may consist of a mere signature. An instrument payable to order and indorsed in blank becomes payable to bearer and may be negotiated by delivery alone until specially indorsed.” Uniform Commercial Code, 12A PS §3-204.
The delivery of the negotiablé instrument in the form of this check is exactly the same as if it were cash or a negotiable bearer bond. A check is a chattel, a valuable security. Com. v. Rosicci, 199 Pa. Superior Ct. 609-616, 186 A. 2d 648 (1962). The overt act was then complete and what happened when the check was negotiated is immaterial, exactly the same as evidence of what was done with the cash or the bond or its proceeds, unless, of course, there was evidence that the proceeds were divided among conspirators, which doesn’t appear in this case.
This Court held in Com. v. Petrosky, 194 Pa. Superior Ct. 94, 166 A. 2d 682 (1960), that a delivery of a check by the State Treasurer to the Postmaster in Dauphin County was sufficient delivery to the defendant to establish the commission of a crime in that county so that the overt act was complete at that time. We specifically held that the overt act was the delivery of the check, the postmaster being the agent of the defendant and the fact' that the check’s ultimate delivery and cashing took place in another county was not material.
This Court held that a prosecution for criminal conspiracy could be brought in the county where the unlawful combination took place or in any county where *78an overt act was committed by any of the conspirators in furtherance of that unlawful conspiracy. Com. v. Prep, 186 Pa. Superior Ct. 442, 142 A. 2d 460 (1958) : “An overt act is distinguished from that which rests merely in intention or design; and as used- in the law of conspiracy it means an act done in furtherance of the object of the conspiracy.” Com. v. Mezick, 147 Pa. Superior Ct. 410, 413, 24 A. 2d 762 (1942). The overt act in the Prep case was the delivery of a Commonwealth check, payable to Prep, to the postmaster; that the postmaster was the agent of Prep so that delivery to him was delivery to Prep. And we said at page 449, “This relationship between Prep and the Commonwealth as parties to the cinder contract forms the basis for the only logical conclusion that the transaction was completed when the checks were mailed.”
The overt act in the instant case was the delivery of the check to the defendant on September 16, so that an indictment handed down on September 18, charging a conspiracy that depended on the overt act of the Grace check to extend the conspiracy was too late.
It should be pointed out that with all the charges that have been bandied about for months through the communications media concerning the gross corruption of Cohen in Local 107, it is regretful, to say the least, that the successful prosecution of this conspiracy depends on the acceptance of alleged excessive convention expenses within the statutory period and that requiring a judicial determination whether within or without by one day.
As we said in Com. v. Fabrizio, 197 Pa. Superior Ct. 45, 58, 176 A. 2d 142 (1961) : “Conspiracy, because of its peculiarly broad application, has come to be used as a catch-all crime, especially in those cases where the prosecution has great difficulty in proving a specific crime . . . Because of the nature of the crime of conspiracy, it is, therefore, necessary that indictments *79charging it should be strictly construed as to the dates and incidents of the conspiracy, especially as to the application of the statute of limitations.”