Court Opinion

ID: 9383828
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-31 14:04:53.473612+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:48.211368
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: MARCH 24, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                          Court of Appeals

                             NO. 2021-CA-0463-MR

EDWARD BOWLES                                                       APPELLANT

                APPEAL FROM CHRISTIAN CIRCUIT COURT
v.                HONORABLE ANDREW C. SELF, JUDGE
                        ACTION NO. 94-CR-00438

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                              APPELLEE

                                   OPINION
                                  AFFIRMING

                                  ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: COMBS, EASTON, AND MCNEILL, JUDGES.

MCNEILL, JUDGE: Edward Bowles appeals from an order of the Christian

Circuit Court denying his motion for relief pursuant to Kentucky Rule of Civil

Procedure (“CR”) 60.02. We affirm.
               In 1996, a Christian County jury convicted Bowles of murder and

sentenced him to life in prison. On direct appeal, the Kentucky Supreme Court

summarized the facts thusly,

               [t]he murder victim was a woman by the name of Jackie
               Leavell. [Bowles’] brother, James Bowles, was a key
               Commonwealth witness and was Ms. Leavell’s neighbor.
               According to the Commonwealth’s evidence, Ms.
               Leavell, James Bowles, and [Bowles] “partied” at James’
               home on the night Ms. Leavell was murdered. They all
               smoked cocaine. Ms. Leavell offered sex in return for
               the cocaine the men were supplying. The three of them
               had sex. During the evening, however, things became
               contentious, and the partying turned into arguing.
               [Bowles] accused James and Ms. Leavell of stealing
               $100 from him. Although both denied taking the money,
               they promised to repay him as soon as possible.
               [Bowles] found a butcher knife and poked Ms. Leavell
               with it to scare her. The two began to struggle. James
               claimed to have left the house when the struggle moved
               into a different room. When James returned, Ms. Leavell
               was dead. James testified that he and [Bowles] loaded
               her body into a car and dumped it off Interstate 24 near
               Clarksville, Tennessee. Appellant did not testify at trial.

Bowles v. Commonwealth, No. 1996-SC-000940-MR at 1-2 (Ky. Apr. 16, 1998).1

               Additional facts are germane to this appeal. First, James told police

and also testified at trial that Bowles had admitted to “choking out” Ms. Leavell

and bragging that he could “take somebody out” with his bare hands. Ms.

1
 The memorandum opinion of the Court is unpublished and, due to age, does not have a
Westlaw citation. It is not being cited for persuasive or precedential value. As the facts were
adjudicated long ago, we take judicial notice of the opinion of the Kentucky Supreme Court
pursuant to Kentucky Rule of Evidence (“KRE”) 201(b).

                                               -2-
Leavell’s body was discovered on the roadside in Tennessee several weeks after

the murder took place. Her body was in a state of decomposition. A postmortem

examination of her remains was conducted by Dr. Charles Harlan, who testified at

trial. Dr. Harlan testified at the time he conducted the autopsy, he was the

consulting forensic pathologist for Montgomery County, Tennessee, the medical

examiner for Montgomery County, and the Chief Medical Examiner for

Tennessee. Dr. Harlan testified that Ms. Leavell’s death was due to asphyxiation,

but due to decomposition of the body, he could not opine whether it was due to

strangulation or suffocation. On cross-examination, defense counsel asked Dr.

Harlan only if Ms. Leavell had alcohol and cocaine in her system and Dr. Harlan

responded in the affirmative. Defense counsel did not question Dr. Harlan about

any other findings in the report and did not call an expert in rebuttal. Dr. Harlan’s

autopsy report was not admitted into evidence at the trial.

             Following affirmation of his conviction and sentence by the Kentucky

Supreme Court, Bowles filed a motion pursuant to Kentucky Rule of Criminal

Procedure (“RCr”) 11.42 alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court

denied relief, but this Court reversed. However, the Kentucky Supreme Court

granted discretionary review and reversed this Court, denying relief to Bowles.

Commonwealth v. Bowles, 237 S.W.3d 137 (Ky. 2007).

                                         -3-
             In 2009, Bowles filed a motion to vacate his sentence pursuant to CR

60.02. The trial court denied relief, finding the motion was untimely. This Court

affirmed. Bowles v. Commonwealth, No. 2009-CA-001207-MR, 2010 WL

2218674 (Ky. App. Jun. 4, 2010).

             In 2019, Bowles filed the underlying motion pursuant to CR 60.02.

He argued he was entitled to relief because, in 2005, Dr. Harlan’s medical license

was revoked by the Tennessee Board of Medical Examiners (“the Board”). The

final order of the Board, contained in the record before us, contained numerous,

often horrific, findings against Dr. Harlan related to postmortem examinations he

performed, many of which were used in criminal prosecutions. Bowles alleged the

Commonwealth committed a violation pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.

83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963), which held that “the suppression by

the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due

process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective

of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Id. at 87, 83 S. Ct. at 1196-97.

Bowles argued investigations into Dr. Harlan began in approximately 1995, and

this information was favorable to him, material, and withheld by the

Commonwealth. In response, the Commonwealth asserted it was not in possession

of information related to any disciplinary action against Dr. Harlan in Tennessee,

favorable or unfavorable to Bowles.

                                          -4-
             The trial court held an evidentiary hearing. Bowles retained Dr.

George Nichols, forensic pathologist and former Chief Medical Examiner in

Kentucky, to testify regarding Dr. Harlan’s autopsy report. Dr. Nichols testified

that the cause of death (asphyxiation) was not substantiated by Dr. Harlan’s

findings contained in the report. Specifically, Dr. Nichols described the type of

tissue damage/trauma expected in a case of strangulation or suffocation and no

such findings were contained in Dr. Harlan’s report. Dr. Nichols concluded that,

based on the report, the cause of death should have been undetermined. He also

testified that nothing in the report indicated a homicide occurred.

             The trial court denied relief to Bowles, finding no evidence was

presented to support Bowles’ assertion the Commonwealth had knowledge of any

disciplinary proceedings against Dr. Harlan in Tennessee (i.e., there was no

evidence of a Brady violation by the Commonwealth). The trial court also held

that there was no reason to vacate Bowles’ conviction because Dr. Nichols

disagreed with the autopsy report, reasoning that Bowles had the opportunity to

cross-examine Dr. Harlan at trial. Finally, the trial court found there was other

substantial evidence introduced at trial in support of Bowles’ guilt. This appeal

followed.

            The denial of a CR 60.02 motion is reviewed under an abuse of

discretion standard. Stoker v. Commonwealth, 289 S.W.3d 592, 596 (Ky. App.

                                         -5-
2009) (citations omitted). The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial

judge’s decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal

principles. Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999). Further,

because the trial court held an evidentiary hearing, this Court “is only entitled to

set aside the trial court’s findings if those findings are clearly erroneous, that is,

when the findings are not supported by substantial evidence.” Commonwealth v.

Crumes, 630 S.W.3d 630, 648 (Ky. 2021) (citation omitted).

                   We begin by noting the Commonwealth urges us to affirm the trial

court, in part, because Bowles’ current CR 60.02 motion is successive and

untimely. The Commonwealth is correct that Kentucky law is clear that a

successive CR 60.02 motion is impermissible upon any ground that could have

been raised in a prior CR 60.02 proceeding. Stoker, 289 S.W.3d at 597. Stated

differently, “CR 60.02 does not permit successive post-judgment motions[.]”

Foley v. Commonwealth, 425 S.W.3d 880, 884 (Ky. 2014). Bowles counters by

arguing that (1) he brought the motion as soon as he became aware Dr. Harlan lost

his medical license; and (2) the relief he seeks is extraordinary in nature because it

relates to perjured testimony of an expert witness.2 In its discretion, the trial court

addressed Bowles’ motion on the merits and did not make findings related to

2
    CR 60.02(f).

                                             -6-
whether the CR 60.02 motion was timely or successive. Accordingly, we also

review Bowles’ argument on the merits.

             On appeal, Bowles all but abandons his original argument there was a

Brady violation. Rather, the theme throughout his brief is that Dr. Harlan’s

testimony at trial was perjured and/or fraudulent, and he is entitled to relief even

though the alleged fraudulent nature was unbeknownst to the Commonwealth.

Bowles asks this Court to presume the findings of the Board against Dr. Harlan,

combined with Dr. Nichols’ testimony disagreeing with the autopsy report,

necessarily mean Dr. Harlan gave false testimony at trial. We decline to do so.

             In order to obtain relief for false testimony under CR 60.02, a

defendant must “show both that a reasonable certainty exists as to the falsity of the

testimony and that the conviction probably would not have resulted had the truth

been known before he can be entitled to such relief.” Commonwealth v. Spaulding,

991 S.W.2d 651, 657 (Ky. 1999) (footnote omitted).

             Bowles cannot demonstrate with reasonable certainty the falsity of Dr.

Harlan’s testimony at trial. Bowles does not deny he had access to the autopsy

report at the time of trial. It is not new evidence. Bowles had an opportunity to

dispute Dr. Harlan’s report at the time. However, he did not call an expert witness

in rebuttal and his cross-examination of Dr. Harlan was limited to just two

questions. It was clear that the defense’s theory of the case was not to dispute the

                                          -7-
cause of death, but rather to blame James for Ms. Leavell’s murder. In fact, in

closing arguments, defense counsel referred to Dr. Harlan’s testimony to remind

the jury that Dr. Harlan could not say who killed Ms. Leavell. Although Dr.

Nichols later disagreed with Dr. Harlan’s conclusion regarding the cause of death,

Dr. Nichols’ testimony does not automatically render Dr. Harlan’s testimony false.

Bowles submitted no evidence that demonstrated with reasonable certainty – or

any certainty at all – that the testimony given at Bowles’ trial was false.

              We also agree with the trial court that there was substantial evidence

of Bowles’ guilt presented throughout the trial. James testified at length about the

night of Ms. Leavell’s murder, including his role in helping Bowles dispose of the

body and Bowles’ statements that he had “choked out” Ms. Leavell. Bowles’

cross-examination of James was extensive and focused on his changing version of

events on the night of the murder.3 As a result, Bowles cannot demonstrate that,

without Dr. Harlan’s testimony, the trial would not have resulted in his conviction.

We discern no error.

              There is no question that the findings of the Board against Dr. Harlan

were extremely disturbing. The final order detailed at least twenty-two cases in

Tennessee containing “acts or omissions [that] would constitute unprofessional

3
 The jury is the “sole determiner of [witness] credibility.” Duncan v. Commonwealth, 322
S.W.3d 81, 87 (Ky. 2010).

                                             -8-
conduct,” and resulted in revocation of his medical license. However, there was

simply no evidence that Dr. Harlan’s testimony at Bowles’ trial was fraudulent.

Accordingly, the order of the Christian Circuit Court is affirmed.

             ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:                     BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Jacquelyn Bryant-Hayes                    Daniel Cameron
La Grange, Kentucky                       Attorney General of Kentucky

                                          Bryan D. Morrow
                                          Assistant Attorney General
                                          Frankfort, Kentucky

                                         -9-