Court Opinion

ID: 9498079
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 17:07:37.45686+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:58:36.456576
License: Public Domain

DISSENT
MOORE, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
Because I believe that Luebbert’s plea agreement does not unambiguously waive Luebbert’s right to raise a Sixth Amendment challenge to his sentence on the basis of United States v. Booker, —U.S.-, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), I respectfully dissent.
Luebbert’s plea agreement explicitly provides that Luebbert has not waived his right to appeal “any sentence imposed in excess of the statutory maximum.” Joint Appendix at 12. The scope of this reservation of appellate rights is ambiguous, however, because the plea agreement does not explain when a sentence will be deemed to be “in excess of the statutory maximum.” While I agree with the majority that it is reasonable to interpret the “statutory maximum” exception as “refer[ring] to the upward limit of the statute charged in the indictment to which the defendant pled guilty,” Maj. Op. at 603, I disagree with the majority that this is the only reasonable interpretation of the “statutory maximum” exception.
In Booker and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), the Supreme Court explained that when a sentence rests on judge-found facts rather than facts found by a jury or admitted by the defendant, the sentence exceeds the relevant “statutory maximum.” See Booker, 125 S.Ct. at 749 (“Our precedents ... make clear ‘that the ‘statutory maximum’ for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.’ ”) (quoting Blakely, 124 S.Ct. at 2537). Thus, when a defendant raises a Soo&er-based Sixth Amendment challenge to his or her sentence based on judicial fact-finding, the defendant can be understood to be claiming that his or her sentence is “in excess of the statutory maximum.”
Unlike the majority, I believe that it is more appropriate to treat the statutory-maximum exception as ambiguous rather than to speculate about the parties’ intended meaning. See Smith v. Stegall, 385 F.3d 993, 999 (6th Cir.2004) (“One fundamental principle of contract interpretation is that primary importance should be placed upon the words of the contract. Unless expressed in some way in the writing, the actual intent of the parties is ineffective, except when it can be made the basis for reformation of the writing.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Because “[ajmbiguities in a plea agreement must be construed against the government,” United States v. Fitch, 282 F.3d 364, 367-68 (6th Cir.2002); see United States v. Johnson, 979 F.2d 396, 399-400 (6th Cir.1992) (“Both constitutional and supervisory concerns require holding the government to a greater degree of responsibility than the defendant ... for imprecisions or ambiguities in the plea agreements.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), the statutory-maximum exception in Luebbert’s plea agree*605ment should be construed as permitting Luebbert to appeal his sentence on Booker grounds. See United States v. Cortez, 120 Fed.Appx. 535 (5th Cir.2005) (“The waiver in Cortez’s plea agreement contained an exception for sentences imposed above the statutory maximum. Thus, out of an abundance of caution and because appellate-waiver provisions are to be construed against the Government, the court will consider Cortez’s Blakely argument.”) (citation omitted); see also Morris v. United States,-U.S.-, 125 S.Ct. 1959, 161 L.Ed.2d 769 (2005) (granting certiorari, vacating, and remanding for resentencing in light of Booker in case in which petition for certiorari argued that “statutory maximum” exception in defendant’s plea agreement allowed review of defendant’s Booker claim, notwithstanding plea agreement’s waiver-of-appeal provisions).
Thus, I respectfully dissent.