Court Opinion

ID: 9942842
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-21 21:12:19.633298+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:44:45.047050
License: Public Domain

02/21/2024
                   IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
                               AT NASHVILLE
                               Assigned on Briefs February 1, 2024

                                        IN RE PANDORA G.

                    Appeal from the Juvenile Court for Davidson County
                            No. 273157 Sheila Calloway, Judge
                         ___________________________________

                                No. M2023-01223-COA-R3-PT
                            ___________________________________

This is a termination of parental rights case. The trial court terminated Appellant/Father’s
parental rights on the grounds of abandonment by failure to support, substantial
noncompliance with the permanency plan, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness
to assume custody, and on its finding that termination of parental rights was in the child’s
best interest. Father appeals. Because Appellee abandoned the ground of substantial
noncompliance with the permanency plan, we reverse the trial court’s termination of
Appellant’s parental rights on that ground. We affirm the trial court’s termination of
Appellant’s parental rights on all remaining grounds and on its finding that termination of
Appellant’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest.

         Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Juvenile Court
                  Affirmed in Part; Reversed in Part; and Remanded

KENNY ARMSTRONG, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ANDY D. BENNETT
and KRISTI M. DAVIS, JJ., joined.

Nick Perenich, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Michael K.1

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter, and Jordan K. Crews, Senior Assistant
Attorney General, for the appellee, Tennessee Department of Children’s Services.

1
 In cases involving minor children, it is the policy of this Court to redact the parties’ names to protect their
identities.
                                                OPINION

                             I. Background and Procedural History

       Appellant Michael K. (“Father”) and Candace G. (“Mother”) are the biological
parents of Pandora G. (d/o/b December 2020) (the “Child”).2 On December 29, 2020, the
Appellee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) received a referral alleging that the
Child was exposed to illegal drugs. On January 4, 2021, DCS interviewed Mother and
Father at the hotel room where they resided. Mother tested positive for multiple illegal
substances, and Father tested positive for THC. The Child was removed to DCS custody.
On January 5, 2021, DCS filed a dependency and neglect petition in the Juvenile Court for
Davidson County (“trial court”). The Child was found to be dependent and neglected, and
custody remained with DCS. The Child was placed with a foster family, where she has
lived since she was eight days old.

        On November 10, 2022, DCS filed a petition to terminate Mother and Father’s
parental rights. Following hearings on June 12 and June 14, 2023, Mother surrendered her
parental rights. By order of July 30, 2023, the trial court found that grounds existed to
terminate Father’s parental rights based on: (1) abandonment by failure to support; (2)
substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan; and (3) failure to manifest an ability
and willingness to personally assume custody or financial responsibility of the child.3 The
trial court also determined that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the Child’s
best interest. Father appeals.

                                          II. Issues Presented

        Father raises the following issues for review, as stated in his brief:

        I. Whether there was clear and convincing evidence to find grounds under
        T.C.A. § 36-1-113(g)(1) that [Father] abandoned the [C]hild by willfully
        failing to support the minor [C]hild in the four months prior to the filing of
        the petition to terminate parental rights.

        II. Whether there was clear and convincing evidence to find grounds under
        T.C.A § 36-1-113(g)(2) that [Father] was substantially noncompliant with
        the requirements on the permanency plan that were reasonable and related to
        remedying the conditions which necessitate foster care placement.

        2
          Mother surrendered her parental rights. She is not a party to this appeal.
        3
          In its petition, DCS also alleged grounds of abandonment by failure to visit and failure to establish
or exercise paternity. At trial, DCS voluntarily non-suited the ground of failure to visit, and the trial court
found that Father established paternity. DCS does not appeal that determination.
                                                    -2-
       III. Whether there was clear and convincing evidence to find grounds under
       T.C.A. 36-1-113(g)(14) that [Father] failed to manifest an ability or
       willingness to personally assume legal and physical custody or financial
       responsibility for the [C]hild and placing the [C]hild in his custody would
       pose a risk of substantial harm to the welfare of the [C]hild.

       IV. Whether there was clear and convincing evidence that termination of
       [Father’s] parental rights was in the [C]hild’s best interest.

                                  III. Standard of Review

         “Because the stakes are so profoundly high[ ]” in a termination of parental rights
case, the statute “requires persons seeking to terminate a . . . parent’s parental rights to
prove the statutory grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence.” In re
Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d 838, 861 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005). This Court has observed that
“[t]his heightened burden of proof minimizes the risk of erroneous decisions.” Id.
(citations omitted). “In light of the heightened burden of proof in termination proceedings
. . . [we] must make [our] own determination as to whether the facts, either as found by the
trial court or as supported by a preponderance of the evidence, amount to clear and
convincing evidence of the elements necessary to terminate parental rights.” In re
Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d 507, 524 (Tenn. 2016). The trial court’s conclusion that clear
and convincing evidence supports termination of parental rights is a conclusion of law that
we review de novo with no presumption of correctness. Id.

       We review the trial court’s best-interest analysis under the standard of review
applicable to mixed questions of fact and law. In re Taylor B.W., 397 S.W.3d 105, 112-
113 (Tenn. 2013). Accordingly, we will affirm the trial court’s factual findings unless they
are not supported by a preponderance of the evidence. In re Neveah M., 614 S.W.3d 659,
674 (Tenn. 2020). Whether the court’s factual findings amount to clear and convincing
evidence that termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interest is a question of
law that we review de novo with no presumption of correctness. Id.

                                       IV. Analysis

       It is well-settled that:

       A parent’s right to the care and custody of [his or] her child is among the
       oldest of the judicially recognized fundamental liberty interests protected by
       the Due Process Clause of the federal and state constitutions. Troxel v.
       Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651
       (1972); In re Angela E., 303 S.W.3d 240, 250 (Tenn. 2010); In re Adoption
       of Female Child, 896 S.W.2d 546, 547-48 (Tenn. 1995); Hawk v. Hawk,
                                            -3-
       855 S.W.2d 573, 578-79 (Tenn. 1993). But parental rights, although
       fundamental and constitutionally protected, are not absolute. In re Angela
       E., 303 S.W.3d at 250. “‘[T]he [S]tate as parens patriae has a special duty
       to protect minors. . . .’ Tennessee law, thus, upholds the [S]tate’s authority
       as parens patriae when interference with parenting is necessary to prevent
       serious harm to a child.” Hawk, 855 S.W.2d at 580 (quoting In re Hamilton,
       657 S.W.2d 425, 429 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983)); see also Santosky v. Kramer,
       455 U.S. 745 (1982); In re Angela E., 303 S.W.3d at 250.

In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d at 522-23 (footnote omitted).

       In Tennessee, termination of parental rights proceedings are governed by statute, In
re Kaliyah S., 455 S.W.3d 533, 541 (Tenn. 2015), and the statutes identify “those situations
in which the state’s interest in the welfare of a child justifies interference with a parent’s
constitutional rights by setting forth grounds on which termination proceedings can be
brought.” In re Jacobe M.J., 434 S.W.3d 565, 568 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting In re
W.B., Nos. M2004-00999-COA-R3-PT, M2004-01572-COA-R3-PT, 2005 WL 1021618,
at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2005) (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g))) (internal
quotation marks omitted).

        Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113 governs the termination of parental
rights in Tennessee. The statute provides, in relevant part:

       (c) Termination of parental or guardianship rights must be based upon:

       (1) A finding by the court by clear and convincing evidence that the grounds
       for termination of parental or guardianship rights have been established; and

       (2) That termination of the parent’s or guardian’s rights is in the best interests
       of the child.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(c). Therefore, every termination of parental rights case
requires the trial court “to determine whether the parent has engaged in a course of action
or inaction that constitutes one of the statutory grounds for termination[ ]” and whether
termination of the parent’s rights is in the child’s best interest. In re Emarie E., No. E2022-
01015-COA-R3-PT, 2023 WL 3619594, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 24, 2023) (quoting In
re Donna E.W., No. M2013-02856-COA-R3PT, 2014 WL 2918107, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App.
June 24, 2014)). Although the petitioner needs to establish only one of the statutory
grounds set out in section 36-1-113(g) to establish grounds, In re Angela E., 303 S.W.3d
240, 250 (Tenn. 2010), we must review the trial court’s findings and conclusions as to each
ground. In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d at 525-26. We turn first to the trial court’s
finding of grounds for termination of Father’s parental rights.

                                             -4-
                       V. Grounds for Termination of Parental Rights

                              A. Abandonment by Failure to Support

       Under Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(1), abandonment, as defined
by section 36-1-102, is a ground for termination of parental rights.4 The version of section
36-1-102(1)(A)(i) in effect when DCS filed its petition to terminate Father’s parental rights
in November 2022 defines abandonment, in relevant part, as follows:

        (i) For a period of four (4) consecutive months immediately preceding the
        filing of a proceeding, pleading, petition, or any amended petition to
        terminate the parental rights of the parent or parents or the guardian or
        guardians of the child who is the subject of the petition for termination of
        parental rights or adoption, that the parent or parents or the guardian or
        guardians either have failed to visit or have failed to support or have failed
        to make reasonable payments toward the support of the child[.]

Section 36-1-102(1)(D) provides:

        (D) For purposes of this subdivision (1), “failed to support” or “failed to
        make reasonable payments toward such child’s support” means the failure,
        for a period of four (4) consecutive months, to provide monetary support or
        the failure to provide more than token payments toward the support of the
        child. That the parent had only the means or ability to make small payments
        is not a defense to failure to support if no payments were made during the
        relevant four-month period;

        It is undisputed that Father made no child support payments. In his brief, Father
submits that he was not ordered to pay child support. Specifically, “he believed a plan or
court order for child support would be set up. He was never told how much to pay or who
he was supposed to pay.” He also asserts that DCS’ documents were “misleading and
contradictory” with respect to his duty to pay child support and with respect to the burden
of proof regarding whether the lack of support was “willful.” He argues that the “Criteria
and Procedures for Termination of Parental Rights” provided by DCS suggests that “paying
support is predicated on establishing that the parent has the ability to pay for support, prior
to starting payments.”

4
  Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-102 was amended twice after DCS filed its petition in November
2022. The current version of the statute became effective on July 1, 2023. The version in effect on the date
the petition was filed is the applicable version. In re Braxton M., 531 S.W.3d 708, 732 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2017).

                                                   -5-
        As Father acknowledges in his brief, “[e]very parent who is eighteen (18) years of
age or older is presumed to have knowledge of a parent’s legal obligation to support such
parent’s child or children[.]” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(H). At trial, Father testified
that he was aware of his requirement to pay child support but “there was never a plan set
up.” He also testified that a child-support hearing was scheduled; he “knew the court date,”
“but we never went.” Father further testified that he has not been employed since the Child
entered DCS custody. He testified that he has “no excuse” for not being employed and that
he “really didn’t apply” for employment. He also testified that he lost his driver’s license
for failing to support an older child, who is not the subject of this appeal. The trial court
found that Father knew that he had an obligation to support, failed to attend the child-
support hearing, and “so he didn’t know that there was any child support order.”

       Under Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-102(1)(I), as amended in 2018, the
parent or guardian bears the burden of proof to demonstrate that the failure to pay child
support was not willful. Additionally, the “absence of willfulness” must be pleaded as an
affirmative defense as provided by Rule 8.03 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure.
As Father submits in his brief, the “Criteria and Procedures for Termination of Parental
Rights” provided to Father were not updated to reflect the 2018 amendment. However, in
December 2022, the trial court appointed counsel to represent Father, and Father was
represented at the hearings on June 12 and June 14. From the record, it appears that Father
did not file an answer or affirmatively plead the absence of willfulness. Additionally, it is
clear that Father knew that he had an obligation to pay child support, was voluntarily
unemployed, and made no effort to pay any child support. From the totality of the
circumstances, there is clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court’s
termination of Father’s parental rights on the ground of abandonment by failure to provide
support. We affirm the trial court’s judgment on this ground.

                B. Substantial Noncompliance with the Permanency Plan

       In his brief, Father argues that the four permanency plans entered by DCS were
inconsistent and misleading. In its brief, DCS acknowledges that the plans were
inconsistent and states that it “does not defend the trial court’s termination of Father’s
rights on this ground.” Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s termination of Father’s
parental rights on the ground of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans.

        C. Ability and Willingness to Assume Custody or Financial Responsibility

         Under section 36-1-113(g)(14), parental rights may be terminated on the ground
that:

         A parent or guardian has failed to manifest, by act or omission, an ability and
         willingness to personally assume legal and physical custody or financial
         responsibility of the child, and placing the child in the person’s legal and
                                             -6-
       physical custody would pose a risk of substantial harm to the physical or
       psychological welfare of the child[.]

If clear and convincing evidence demonstrates that a parent “has failed to manifest either
ability or willingness, then the first prong of the statute is satisfied.” In re Neveah M., 614
S.W.3d at 677.

       Father is a convicted felon and, in October 2022, he was arrested again and charged
with five drug-related offenses (three felonies and two misdemeanors). Although Father
posted bond and was released from jail, the charges against him were pending at the time
of the hearing on the petition to terminate his parental rights. Again, in January 2023,
Father was arrested and charged with four additional drug-related offenses (three felonies
and one misdemeanor), and two firearms-related offenses (both felonies). Unable to post
bond, Father was incarcerated and was awaiting trial when this matter was heard in June
2023. As noted above, Father was willfully unemployed during the custodial period and
paid no child support. Additionally, it is undisputed that he did not have stable housing for
most of the custodial period. On November 2, 2022, Father completed a psychological
assessment, and the assessors recommended therapy and a medication consult for anxiety
disorder, ADHD, and cannabis-use disorder. Although an appointment was arranged,
Father testified that he was unable to begin therapy because he was incarcerated.

     Incarceration alone is not a ground for the termination of parental rights. In re
Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d 838, 866 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005). We have observed:

       [A] parent’s incarceration serves only as a triggering mechanism that allows
       the court to take a closer look at the child’s situation to determine whether
       the parental behavior that resulted in incarceration is part of a broader pattern
       of conduct that renders the parent unfit or poses a risk of substantial harm to
       the welfare of the child.

Id. However, “[a] parent’s decision to engage in conduct that carries with it the risk of
incarceration is itself indicative that the parent may not be fit to care for the child.” Id.

        As Father asserts in his brief, at the time of trial, he had not been convicted of the
charges leading to his arrest and incarceration. However, at trial, Father was advised of his
Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination and was further informed that, in a civil
matter, a negative inference may be drawn when those rights are invoked. Father invoked
his Fifth Amendment rights in response to questioning relating to whether he sold drugs or
was in possession of drugs when arrested. Father also testified that he has no plans with
respect to where he will live if he is acquitted or released on bond. He further testified that
he has no funds with which to post bond. He stated that, if he is sentenced, it would be
preferable for the Child to remain in foster care.

                                             -7-
        Clear and convincing evidence supports the trial court’s determination that “[Father]
does not have the ability to provide stable housing [] or [] basic necessities for the child in
order to assure she is taken care of and provided for.” It also supports the trial court’s
determination that Father “has repeatedly engaged in behaviors, resulting in his multiple
incarcerations, that would place the child in unsafe situations if she were in his care.” From
the totality of the circumstances, we affirm the trial court’s termination of Father’s parental
rights on this ground and proceed to review of the trial court’s best interest analysis.

                                      VI. Best Interest

       Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(i)(1) contains a non-exclusive list of
factors applicable to the court’s best-interests analysis. The statute provides:

       (i)(1) In determining whether termination of parental or guardianship rights
       is in the best interest of the child, the court shall consider all relevant and
       child-centered factors applicable to the particular case before the court.

The statutory factors are not exclusive but “illustrative . . . and any party to the termination
proceeding is free to offer any other factor relevant to the best[-]interests analysis.” In re
Gabriella D., 531 S.W.3d 662, 681 (Tenn. 2017) (citation omitted). Whether termination
is in the child’s best interest must be “‘viewed from the child’s, rather than the parent’s,
perspective.’” Id. (quoting In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 878). “[W]hen the best interests
of the child and those of the adults are in conflict, such conflict shall always be resolved to
favor the rights and the best interests of the child[.]” Id. (quoting Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-
101(d) (2017)). The court’s “‘focus on the perspective of the child is the common theme’
evident in all of the statutory factors.” In re Neveah M., 614 S.W.3d 659, 679 (Tenn.
2020) (quoting In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 878).

        The trial court’s best-interest analysis requires “more than a ‘rote examination’ of
the statutory factors.” In re Neveah M., 614 S.W.3d at 679 (quoting In re Audrey S., 182
S.W.3d at 878). Further, it “consists of more than tallying the number of statutory factors
weighing in favor of or against termination.” Id. (citing White v. Moody, 171 S.W.3d 187,
193-94 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004)). Although the court must consider all the statutory factors
and other relevant proof, some factors may weigh more heavily than others in light of the
circumstances surrounding the particular child and parent. Id. (quotation omitted). Indeed,
the trial court “may appropriately ascribe more weight—even outcome determinative
weight—to one statutory factor or rely upon fewer than all of the statutory factors.” Id.
(citation omitted).

         The trial court’s factual findings relevant to the best-interest analysis must be
supported by a preponderance of the evidence. In re Kaliyah S., 455 S.W.3d at 555
(citation omitted). Additionally, the court must determine whether the combined weight
of the facts amounts to clear and convincing evidence that termination of parental rights is
                                            -8-
in the child’s best interest. Id. (citation omitted). As noted above, we review the trial
court’s best-interest analysis under the standard of review applicable to mixed questions of
fact and law. In re Taylor B.W., 397 S.W.3d at 112-113. We will affirm the trial court’s
factual findings unless they are unsupported by a preponderance of the evidence. In re
Neveah M., 614 S.W.3d at 674 (citations omitted). Whether the court’s factual findings
amount to clear and convincing evidence that termination of parental rights is in the child’s
best interest is a question of law that we review de novo with no presumption of correctness.
Id. (citations omitted).

        In terminating Father’s parental rights, the trial court considered the statutory factors
set out below and made the following findings concerning each:

       (A) The effect a termination of parental rights will have on the child’s critical
       need for stability and continuity of placement throughout the child’s
       minority; [Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i)(1)(A)]

Concerning this factor, the trial court found:

       It is in the [C]hild’s best interests for termination to be granted, as to [Father]
       as the [C]hild has a critical need for stability and continuity of placement
       through her minority. [Father] cannot provide the [C]hild any type of
       permanency, will be unavailable to take custody of the [C]hild at an early
       date, and the [C]hild would be unsafe if placed in [Father’s] care. In contrast
       the [C]hild is in a foster home where she is stable, loved, and she can receive
       permanency expeditiously once placed in full guardianship.

       (B) The effect a change of caretakers and physical environment is likely to
       have on the child’s emotional, psychological, and medical condition; [Tenn.
       Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i)(1)(B)]

As to this factor, the trial court found:

       It is in the [C]hild’s best interests for termination to be granted, as to [Father]
       because a change in caretakers and physical environment is likely to have a
       negative effect on the [C]hild’s emotional, psychological and or medical
       condition. The [C]hild has been in the same foster home since she entered
       foster care shortly after her birth. The [C]hild is bonded with her foster family
       and has not had any visitation with [Father] in a significant period of time.
       The [C]hild has only ever resided with [Father] for just a few days following
       her birth. Removing the [C]hild from the only home and family she has ever
       really known would have devastating consequences for her well-being.
       [Father] is incarcerated and does not have the availability or any stability to
       meet the [C]hild’s basic needs. In contrast, the [C]hild is receiving exemplary
                                                -9-
       care in her foster home where she is loved, thriving, and deeply bonded with
       her foster family.

       (C) Whether the parent has demonstrated continuity and stability in meeting
       the child’s basic material, educational, housing, and safety needs; [Tenn.
       Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i)(1)(C)]

Here, the trial court found:

       [Father] has failed to demonstrate continuity and stability in meeting the
       [C]hild’s basic material, educational, housing and safety needs. [Father] is
       currently incarcerated, unavailable to take custody of the [C]hild, and is
       facing a multi-year sentence as a result of his pending criminal charges.
       Additionally, he has no plans for housing or employment if and when he is
       released from incarceration.

       (D) Whether the parent and child have a secure and healthy parental
       attachment, and if not, whether there is a reasonable expectation that the
       parent can create such attachment; [Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i)(1)(D)]

Regarding this factor, the trial court found:

       [Father] and [C]hild do not have a healthy and secure attachment and there
       is no reasonable expectation that [Father] can create such an attachment.
       [Father] has not visited the [C]hild in a significant period of time due to his
       incarceration.

       (E) Whether the parent has maintained regular visitation or other contact with
       the child and used the visitation or other contact to cultivate a positive
       relationship with the child; [Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i)(1)(E)]

Concerning this factor, the trial court found that Father “has failed to maintain visitation or
other contact with the [C]hild. [Father] has not visited the [C]hild in a significant period of
time due to his incarceration.”

                                                ***

       (H) Whether the child has created a healthy parental attachment with another
       person or persons in the absence of the parent; [Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-
       113(i)(1)(H)]

Here, the trial court found that the Child “has created a healthy parental attachment with
another person or persons in the absence of the parents. The [C]hild is thriving and loved
                                           - 10 -
in her foster home. She is deeply bonded with her foster mother who she has resided with
for the majority of her life.”

       (I) Whether the child has emotionally significant relationships with persons
       other than parents and caregivers, including biological or foster siblings, and
       the likely impact of various available outcomes on these relationships and
       the child’s access to information about the child’s heritage; [Tenn. Code Ann.
       § 36-1-113(i)(1)(I)]

As to this factor, the trial court found that “the [C]hild is without an emotionally significant
relationship with [Father] and the biological family and therefore there would not be a
significant impact on the outcomes of those relationships by terminating parental rights.”

       (J) Whether the parent has demonstrated such a lasting adjustment of
       circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it safe and beneficial for the
       child to be in the home of the parent, including consideration of whether there
       is criminal activity in the home or by the parent, or the use of alcohol,
       controlled substances, or controlled substance analogues which may render
       the parent unable to consistently care for the child in a safe and stable
       manner; [Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i)(1)(J)]

Concerning this factor, the trial court found that Father “has failed to demonstrate a lasting
adjustment of circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it safe and beneficial for the
[C]hild to be in his home. [Father] is currently incarcerated and unavailable to assume
custody of the [C]hild.”

       (K) Whether the parent has taken advantage of available programs, services,
       or community resources to assist in making a lasting adjustment of
       circumstances, conduct, or conditions; [Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-
       113(i)(1)(K)]

Here, the trial court found that Father

       continues to engage in criminal activity, which may render him unable to
       consistently care for the [C]hild in a safe and stable manner. [Father] is
       currently incarcerated for multiple charges related to the sale of drugs.
       [Father’s] charges have not been adjudicated and he is facing an eight-year
       sentence at thirty (30) percent as his best-case scenario. [Father] has placed
       himself in a position that he will be unavailable to take custody of the [C]hild
       any time in the immediate future.

                                             ***

                                             - 11 -
      [Father] continues to use alcohol and controlled substances, which may
      render him unable to consistently care for the child in a safe and stable
      manner. [Father] is currently incarcerated for drug related charges and
      admitted that he has continued to use THC.

                                          ***

      [Father] has failed to take advantage of available programs, services, or
      community resources to assist in making a lasting adjustment of
      circumstances, conduct or conditions. [Father] has not substantially
      completed any of the tasks set out for him on the permanency plans. . . .
      [Father] has failed to make a lasting adjustment of circumstances despite the
      efforts made by [DCS] to assist.

                                          ***

      (M) Whether the parent has demonstrated a sense of urgency in establishing
      paternity of the child, seeking custody of the child, or addressing the
      circumstance, conduct, or conditions that made an award of custody unsafe
      and not in the child’s best interest; [Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i)(1)(M)]

Concerning this factor, the trial court found that Father, “has failed to demonstrate any
sense of urgency in seeking custody of the [C]hild. Instead, [Father] has abandoned the
[C]hild to the foster care system.”

                                          ***

      (O) Whether the parent has ever provided safe and stable care for the child
      or any other child;

      (P) Whether the parent has demonstrated an understanding of the basic and
      specific needs required for the child to thrive;

      (Q) Whether the parent has demonstrated the ability and commitment to
      creating and maintaining a home that meets the child’s basic and specific
      needs and in which the child can thrive;

      (R) Whether the physical environment of the parent’s home is healthy and
      safe for the child;

      (S) Whether the parent has consistently provided more than token financial
      support for the child; and
                                        - 12 -
       (T) Whether the mental or emotional fitness of the parent would be
       detrimental to the child or prevent the parent from consistently and
       effectively providing safe and stable care and supervision of the child.

Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113(i)(1)(O)-(T). As to statutory factors O through T, the trial
court made the following findings:

       50. It is in the [C]hild’s best interests for termination to be granted, as to
       [Father], as [Father] has never provided a safe and stable environment to care
       for the [C]hild. The [C]hild has only ever resided with [Father]for a limited
       number of days following her birth.
       51. It is in the [C]hild’s best interests for termination to be granted, as . . .
       [Father] cannot demonstrate an understanding of the basic and specific needs
       required for the [C]hild to thrive. [Father]has no means or ability to provide
       for the [C]hild’s basic needs or even provide her with a home.
       52. It is in the [C]hild’s best interests for termination to be granted, as . . .
       [Father] has failed to demonstrate the ability and commitment to creating and
       maintaining a home that meets the [C]hild’s basic and specific needs in
       which the [C]hild can thrive. [Father] has never provided a home for the
       [C]hild and is currently incarcerated an unavailable to assume custody of the
       [C]hild.
       53. It is in the [C]hild’s best interests for termination to be granted. . . as the
       physical environment of the [Father’s] home is unhealthy and unsafe.
       [Father] Kennedy is currently incarcerated and cannot assume custody of the
       child.
       54. It is in the [C]hild’s best interests for termination to be granted. . . as
       [Father] has failed to consistently provide support to the [C]hild. [Father]
       admitted that he has willfully never paid support towards the care of the
       [C]hild.
       55. It is in the [C]hild’s best interests for termination to be granted. . . as the
       mental or emotional fitness of [Father] would be detrimental to the [C]hild
       and would prevent [Father] from consistently and effectively providing safe
       and stable care and supervision of the [C]hild. [Father] continues to engage
       in criminal behaviors which render him an unfit and unsuitable custodian as
       well as him unavailable to assume custody of the [C]hild.

        From our review, the trial court’s findings are supported by the record. Since she
was eight-days old, the Child has lived in the same foster home, and the record supports
the trial court’s finding that she does not have a parental bond with Father. It is undisputed
that Father has no means to support or house the Child. This situation will likely continue
as Father was arrested twice while this matter was pending and is now incarcerated. In fact,
Father testified that it would be in the Child’s best interest to remain in foster care for the
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duration of his incarceration. There is no indication as to how long Father’s incarceration
will last. Meanwhile, the Child has thrived in her foster home, where she has found love
and stability. All of the Child’s needs are met, and she has bonded with the foster family.
The foster mother testified that the foster family “absolutely” wishes to adopt the Child.
Early integration into the only stable home the Child has ever known would only be
stymied by the continuation of Father’s parental rights. In view of the circumstances,
including Father’s ongoing incarceration, and the lack of any bond between the Child and
Father, we conclude that there is clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court’s
findings as to each of the foregoing factors. The combined weight of those findings clearly
and convincingly supports the trial court’s ultimate determination that termination of
Father’s parental rights is in the Child’s best interest.

                                     VII. Conclusion

        For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court’s termination of Father’s
parental rights on the ground of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan. We
affirm the trial court’s termination of Father’s parental rights on the remaining grounds and
on its finding that termination is in the Child’s best interest. The case is remanded for
further proceedings as may be necessary and as are consistent with this Opinion. Costs of
the appeal are assessed to Appellant, Michael K. Because Appellant is proceeding in forma
pauperis in this appeal, execution for costs may issue if necessary.

                                                    S/ Kenny Armstrong
                                                    KENNY ARMSTRONG, JUDGE

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