Court Opinion

ID: 9957310
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-04 14:00:52.901278+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:15.668802
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-10122      Document: 26-1      Date Filed: 04/04/2024   Page: 1 of 4

                                                   [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                      In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                          For the Eleventh Circuit

                            ____________________

                                   No. 23-10122
                            Non-Argument Calendar
                            ____________________

       ANDRE DENHARIO WILSON,
                                                        Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
       versus
       CARNIVAL CORPORATION,
       d.b.a. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc.,

                                                      Defendant-Appellee.

                            ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of Florida
                     D.C. Docket No. 1:22-cv-22492-RNS
USCA11 Case: 23-10122         Document: 26-1         Date Filed: 04/04/2024         Page: 2 of 4

       2                          Opinion of the Court                       23-10122

                               ____________________

       Before GRANT, LAGOA, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Andre Denhario Wilson asserted claims under Panama law
       against his employer, Carnival Corporation, after suffering a
       workplace injury. Pursuant to his employment contract, Wilson’s
       claims were resolved in an arbitration proceeding in Panama under
       the Panama Convention.1 Concluding that Wilson’s personal
       injury claims were time-barred, the arbitrator found in favor of
       Carnival. Wilson filed an action in the Southern District of Florida
       challenging that decision and seeking to vacate the arbitral award.
       Carnival moved to dismiss Wilson’s claims, which the district court
       granted after concluding that it lacked the power to vacate the
       arbitral award. Wilson appeals, arguing that the district court had
       jurisdiction to vacate the award, and that dismissing his case denies
       him equal protection of the right of access to courts.

       1 While Wilson originally argued that the foreign arbitration proceedings were

       governed by the New York Convention, the district court construed it as being
       governed by the Panama Convention because both parties’ home countries
       have ratified the Panama Convention. See 9 U.S.C. § 305; see also Técnicas
       Reunidas de Talara S.A.C. v. SSK Ingeniería y Construcción S.A.C., 40 F.4th 1339,
       1344 (11th Cir. 2022). Wilson does not seem to contest that construction on
       appeal. And even if he did, the result would be the same as the enforcement
       and recognition provisions of the Panama Convention “are ‘substantively
       identical’ to those in the New York Convention.” Corporación AIC, SA v.
       Hidroeléctrica Santa Rita S.A., 66 F.4th 876, 889 (11th Cir. 2023) (en banc)
       (quotation omitted).
USCA11 Case: 23-10122      Document: 26-1      Date Filed: 04/04/2024     Page: 3 of 4

       23-10122               Opinion of the Court                          3

               We review a district court’s ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion
       to dismiss de novo, “accepting the allegations in the complaint as
       true and construing them in the light most favorable to the
       plaintiff.” Hill v. White, 321 F.3d 1334, 1335 (11th Cir. 2003). A
       complaint properly states a claim if the factual allegations, taken as
       true, “plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” McCullough v.
       Finley, 907 F.3d 1324, 1333 (11th Cir. 2018) (quotation omitted).
               This Court has held that under the New York Convention,
       which has “substantively identical” enforcement and recognition
       provisions as the Panama Convention, “only courts in the primary
       jurisdiction can vacate an arbitral award.” Corporación AIC, SA v.
       Hidroeléctrica Santa Rita S.A., 66 F.4th 876, 883, 889 (11th Cir. 2023)
       (en banc) (quotation omitted). Primary jurisdiction refers to the
       “country which is the legal seat of the arbitration (or whose law
       governs the conduct of the arbitration).” Id. at 883. Because the
       district court in this case does not sit in Panama, the legal seat of
       the arbitration, it did not have primary jurisdiction and could not
       vacate Wilson’s arbitral award.
              This conclusion does not deny Wilson of his right to equal
       protection. It is well settled that agreements to arbitrate will be
       enforced notwithstanding the contractual relinquishment of the
       right of access to courts. See Caley v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 428
       F.3d 1359, 1371 (11th Cir. 2005). By entering into a valid
       employment contract with an arbitration agreement, Wilson
       voluntarily agreed to resolve his claims before an arbitral forum,
       limiting his right of access to courts. See id. at 1371–72.
USCA11 Case: 23-10122     Document: 26-1      Date Filed: 04/04/2024    Page: 4 of 4

       4                      Opinion of the Court                23-10122

                                  *     *      *
               Because the district court did not have primary jurisdiction,
       it lacked the power to vacate Wilson’s arbitral award. Accordingly,
       it properly dismissed Wilson’s claims. We AFFRIM.