Court Opinion

ID: 9516185
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 23:36:42.650101+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:51.112568
License: Public Domain

Smolenski, P.J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent and would reverse defendant’s conviction.
I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that defendant could not take advantage of the resale exemption in MCL 205.94(c); MSA 7.555(4) (subsection 4[c]) because the more specific section for vehicle transfers, MCL 205.93(2);MSA 7.555(3)(2) (subsection 3[2]) applied. On the contrary, I conclude that subsection 4(c), which creates a separate tax exemption for property purchased for resale, specifically applies to defendant’s transactions. I further conclude that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that defendant was exempt from paying use tax if he intended to resell the vehicles pursuant to the specific exemption set forth in subsection 4(c).
I also disagree with the majority’s interpretation of the trial court’s statement in the presence of the jury that defendant was “not a Michigan dealer, and that *575means he’s subject to the tax,” as an instruction to the jury that the exception set forth in subsection 3(2) did not apply because defendant was not a Michigan dealer. “There is a difference between commenting on the evidence and making a finding of fact for the jury.” People v Reed, 393 Mich 342, 351; 224 NW2d 867 (1975). When the court made this statement, it invaded the province of the jury. Id. at 351. Furthermore, if the trial court’s statement is construed to be an instruction, then the court committed an error requiring reversal because it instructed the jury that an essential element of the criminal offense exists as a matter of law. Id. at 349-351; People v Tice, 220 Mich App 47, 54; 558 NW2d 245 (1996).