Court Opinion

ID: 9627013
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:31:05.149674+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:25:31.757663
License: Public Domain

OLSZEWSKI, J„
Dissenting.
¶ 11 find the majority to have conducted both a thorough and persuasive analysis; however, for the following reasons I must respectfully dissent.
¶ 2 The majority has confused the concepts of intent and expectation as related to this case, and furthermore, improperly extended the concept of inferred intent found in the holdings of Aetna Cas. and Sur. Company v. Roe, 437 Pa.Super. 414, 650 A.2d 94 (1994) and Wiley v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 995 F.2d 457 (3d Cir.1993).
¶ 3 This case, complicated and troublesome, requires a strict review of the applicable law, an inquiry into the true nature and consequences of heroin use, and a balancing of the public policy concerns involved. The majority, in a zealous yet commendable condemnation of drug use, strayed from these requirements as their position endeavors to sacrifice established case law, the contracted insurance policy between the parties, and an understanding *631of the realities of this tragic situation. Therefore, I must respectfully dissent.
¶ 4 The majority bases its conclusion on the doctrine of inferred intent stated in the aforementioned Aetna and Wiley holdings. In Aetna, we adopted the doctrine of inferred intent from the Third Circuit’s Wiley decision for limited use in liability insurance cases that involve sexual abuse of a child by an insured adult. Aetna, 650 A.2d at 102. Otherwise, the Third Circuit properly concluded that “in adjudicating general liability insurance cases, as opposed to those exceptional cases involving sexual child abuse, Pennsylvania courts presently follow the [Superior Court] decision of United Services Auto. Ass’n v. Elitzky, 358 Pa.Super. 362, 517 A.2d 982 (1986).” Wiley, 995 F.2d at 461 (emphasis added).
¶ 5 In Elitzky, we stated that “for the purposes of the insurance policy provision excluding coverage for expected or intended injuries by the insured, ‘an insured intends injury if he desired to cause such consequences of his act or if he acted knowing that such consequences were substantially certain to result.’ ” Id. (quoting Elitzky, 517 A.2d at 989 (emphasis added)). The Wiley court concluded that in Pennsylvania, “for an injury to be excluded from [insurance] coverage, the insured must have specifically intended to cause harm.” Id.
¶ 6 The Wiley court, itself, ultimately limited the applicability of the inferred intent rule stating that “inferring intent to harm is strong medicine ... it has narrow applicability.” Aetna Life and Cas. Co. v. Barthelemy, 33 F.3d 189, 192 (3d Cir.1994).
¶ 7 Even if it could be applied in this case, the threshold requirements of intent and substantial certainty of injury must be met; and the rule is then only to be applied when the degree of certainty that injury will result is sufficiently great. Id. I do not believe Greenfield intended and was substantially certain that Smith’s death was forthcoming after he handed her the heroin. Had the threshold requirements been satisfied, however, I further believe that the degree of certainty that Greenfield’s conduct would cause Smith’s death is not sufficiently great enough to justify inferring intent to injure as a matter of law. The sale of heroin, although repugnant, does not rise to the level of the exceptional cases of sexual abuse of children.
¶ 8 The case at bar does not involve sexual molestation of children, or even sexual assault, and as such, is not amenable for the application of the inferred intent rule. Greenfield, in supplying Smith with heroin, cannot be said to have specifically intended to cause the resulting harm in this ease, i.e., Smith’s death.
¶ 9 The fact that Greenfield intentionally supplied Smith with heroin is not disputed. From that, however, I cannot find that he intended Smith’s death, or that it was obvious that death would result. National statistics support the conclusion that heroin use does not consistently produce death to the point that it could be logically expected and intended amongst addicts. The fact alone that heroin has “addicts” flies in the face of the majority’s reasoning.
¶ 10 In 1998, DEA officials testified to members of Congress that only four thousand (4,000) of the close to one million (1,000,000) heroin addicts in the United States die each year from heroin related causes. DEA CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY OF THOMAS A. CONSTANTINE, DEA ADMINISTRATOR, 1998. Statistically, this represents a lower percentage than those Americans who die from tobacco related causes. Id. This seems to belie the majority’s claim that *632death can be or should be expected from heroin use. Surely, someone who provides a friend with a cigar cannot be said to have intended or expected the friend’s death should the friend eventually die of heart disease; a result, notably, more likely to occur than death from heroin use. CANCER FACTS AND FIGURES, AMERICAN CANCER SOCIETY, 1999; DEA CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY OF THOMAS A. CONSTANTINE, DEA ADMINISTRATOR, 1998.
¶ 11 Adverse effects of heroin use certainly can be expected and are widely known, including the short-term effects of depressed respiration, clouded mental functioning, nausea and vomiting; as well as the long-term effects of collapsed veins, bacterial infection, abscesses, arthritis, and infection of heart lining and valves. HEROIN INFOFAX, NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON DRUG ABUSE. Death, however, is not listed among the expected results. In fact, the National Institute on Drug Abuse does not include death as an effect of heroin. HEROIN INFOFAX, NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON DRUG ABUSE.
¶ 12 Greenfield knew that Smith would ingest the heroin and come under its powerful, disabling effects. He even may have been aware of or anticipated the possible contraction of potential infections and various vein disorders by Smith. It cannot be said, however, that because Greenfield intended that Smith use the heroin and was aware of the potential dangers, that he intended or was “specifically certain” that her death would result. Actually, the record only reveals that Greenfield intended and expected that Smith lock the house when she left.
¶ 13 The majority extensively analogizes heroin use to Russian Roulette, yet such a comparison is unfounded and invalid. In Russian Roulette, if the player survives to the sixth round, death can be expected with absolute certainty. That certainty does not hold true with continued heroin use. A more fitting analogy is a tobacco-related death. While death remains a possibility, there exist far more short-term and long-term effects that are substantially certain to occur.
¶ 14 The events of that evening were tragic, negligent, and a testimony to the perils of heroin use. Yet, as such, they constitute an occurrence under the terms of the insurance policy. No exclusion applies, because while the sale of heroin by Greenfield was intentional, the injury in question, the death of Smith, was neither expected nor intended. The insurance policy’s business pursuit exception does not apply either, as the continuity of activity and profit motive requirements are both lacking.
¶ 15 Additionally, Minnesota Fire and Casualty sold an insurance policy that did not comprehensively articulate the parameters of its coverage, specifically lacking a criminal conduct exception. Such conduct should not be encouraged; and to avoid defending in such cases, insurance companies should directly address criminal conduct.
¶ 16 The majority proposes to disregard the insurance policy provisions and case law in an attempt to further expose the evils of drug use. While a noble goal, this case is not the proper means for accomplishing such ends.
¶ 17 Therefore, I respectfully dissent.