Court Opinion

ID: 9634684
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:20:35.237832+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:43:05.025935
License: Public Domain

CIRILLO, Judge,
dissenting:
I most respectfully dissent. While I agree with the majority’s analysis regarding the rationale underlying a search under Michigan v. Long, supra, I cannot agree that it is dispositive of this case. We are bound by the reasonable factual findings of the suppression court, Commonwealth v. Hamlin, 503 Pa. 210, 469 A.2d 137 (1983); however, we must reverse if we find an error of law. Commonwealth v. Cortez, 507 Pa. 529, 491 A.2d 111, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 950, 106 S.Ct. 349, 88 L.Ed.2d 297 (1985).
A forcible stop of a motor vehicle by a police officer constitutes a seizure of a person and activates the protections of the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Commonwealth v. Swanger, 453 Pa. 107, 307 A.2d 875 (1973); Commonwealth v. Brown, 388 Pa.Super. 187, 565 A.2d 177 (1989). However, a forcible stop and seizure is not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment where the officer has articulable and reasonable grounds to suspect, or probable cause to believe that criminal activity may be afoot. Swanger, supra; see Commonwealth v. Richards, 458 Pa. 455, 327 A.2d 63 (1974). Here, the record establishes that the vehicle in which Fountain was a passenger *303was stopped for a violation of the Motor Vehicle Code. Such a stop under these facts is permissible under 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6308. The initial stop, therefore, was proper. Commonwealth v. Elliott, 376 Pa.Super. 536, 546 A.2d 654 (1988), alloc. denied, 521 Pa. 617, 557 A.2d 721 (1989); see also Swanger, supra.
A search without a warrant is generally unreasonable. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961); Commonwealth v. Bosurgi, 411 Pa. 56, 190 A.2d 304 (1963) cert. denied, 375 U.S. 910, 84 S.Ct. 204, 11 L.Ed.2d 149 (1963). Police may not search a home or any place in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy without a warrant. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 514, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). A warrant is obtained after a neutral magistrate finds that probable cause exists for a search for evidence of a crime. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 109, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 1511, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964). Probable cause is a product of a totality of the circumstances presented to the magistrate. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2328, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). See also Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 526 Pa. 268, 585 A.2d 988 (1991).
There are, however, exceptions to the warrant requirement. One is the automobile exception. The automobile exception is separate and distinct from a search to protect the safety of a police officer under Michigan v. Long, supra, and is based on a wholly different rationale. Commonwealth v. Baker, 518 Pa. 145, 149, 541 A.2d 1381, 1383 (1988). Automobiles are excepted from the warrant requirement because they are inherently mobile and citizens have a lower expectation of privacy in their cars than in their homes. Milyak, supra. Under the automobile exception an officer may search a car if he has independent probable cause to believe the automobile has been used in the furtherance of a felony or contains contraband or evidence of a crime. Id.
Thus, the question becomes did Officer Gibney have probable cause to believe the vehicle contained contraband or evidence of a crime. Probable cause is defined as “a substantial basis for concluding that a search would uncover evidence *304of wrongdoing.” Gates, 462 U.S. at 236, 103 S.Ct. at 2331. The level of probable cause needed to invoke the automobile exception to the warrant requirement is the same as the probable cause needed for a warrant. Milyak, 508 Pa. at 10, 493 A.2d at 1350.
I would find probable cause to search the vehicle under the automobile exception in the testimony of Officer Gibney, who had been a narcotics officer for eight years. Officer Gibney observed a vehicle in a high-crime area which sped off at his approach in an unmarked police car. The car veered around a grade level train crossing barrier in its effort to elude the officer. Officer Gibney turned on his siren and lights; five blocks later the car he was pursuing stopped. As the officer approached the car, he observed movement among the occupants, movement that he “didn’t like,” based on his training and experience. That movement drew Officer Gibney’s attention to the pouch behind the driver’s seat. There he saw a bulge which turned out to be the gun in question.
Using the Gates, supra, formulation of the totality of the circumstances, I would find that Officer Gibney had the requisite probable cause that contraband or evidence of a crime would be found in the vehicle in question, Milyak, supra, and that, therefore, his search of the vehicle was proper and the evidence should not be suppressed.