Court Opinion

ID: 9546334
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:27:44.563835+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:16:18.296957
License: Public Domain

Finley, J.
(dissenting)—The majority opinion, among other things, poses the question of whether misrepresentations regarding property assessments were made prior to the execution of the real-estate contract involved in this case. In this connection, the opinion points out.that the findings of the trial court state that misrepresentations of the kind alleged were made and relied upon “in connection with the negotiations for the sale of the above-described prop*185erty.” The opinion reaches the conclusion that the findings are not explicit as to whether the misrepresentations were made before or after consummation of the real-estate contract involved in the case. The opinion then states it is necessary to turn to the evidence to ascertain the significance of the trial court’s finding No. VI, and points out that the testimony of the purchaser was in direct conflict with that of the seller respecting the matter of property assessments. It is then said that the burden was upon the purchaser to prove his case by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence; that, in view of the conflict in the evidence, the majority cannot say that the purchaser proved by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that actionable misrepresentations were made prior to the execution of the. contract. It seems to me that in working out this line of reasoning the majority entirely by-pass the trial court and its functions in this matter.
If the findings of the trial court are not sufficiently explicit, I think that the case should be sent back for adequate, clear-cut, specific findings, and that it should not be assumed here that the findings must be construed in a manner that they do not support the ultimate result reached by the trial judge. Bowman v. Webster, 42 Wn. (2d) 129, 135, 253 P. (2d) 934. Actually, disposition of the matter on this basis Would require granting a new trial, because the Honorable Hugh J. Rosellini, who tried the case in the superior court, has been elected and is now a member of the supreme court of this state.
If, as the majority point out, the testimony of the purchaser and the seller was in direct conflict, it seems to me that, unless something more can be said about the testimony of the parties, it is a somewhat violent assumption to conclude that the purchaser failed to prove his case by clear, cogent, convincing evidence. In view of the conflict in the testimony, it is essentially a matter of which witness the trial judge thought was telling the truth. Mathewson v. Carlson, 13 Wn. (2d) 363, 368, 125 P. (2d) 272. The purchaser’s testimony was certainly quite positive that the seller told him before the sale, and before execution of the *186contract, that improvements were in and that no improvements would be forthcoming, unless sewer improvements were undertaken in the future. I think that the purchaser was referring to liability for the payment of assessments in connection with property improvements, that his testimony was clear; that it was cogent and convincing, depending solely on whether he or the seller was to be believed,—furthermore, it seems to me that the trial court was entitled to believe the purchaser.
At the conclusion of the purchaser’s case, a motion was made by the seller for nonsuit on the ground that it had not been proved that the misrepresentations had been made prior to the consummation of the real-estate contract. The statement of facts shows that there was some reference to the fact that a McKelvey case was controlling on the legal question involved. (The case, if it exists, was not cited by either party in the briefs on appeal.) The motion in behalf of the seller was denied. This clearly indicates that the trial court was well aware of the significance of the testimony as to whether there had been any misrepresentation prior to the execution of the contract, and the theory of appellant respecting this aspect of the case.
Error is assigned to the refusal of the trial court to enter certain findings proposed in behalf of the seller. Seller’s proposed, but rejected, finding No. VI reads as follows:
“That no representations were made by the said Harry S. Rinker that all improvements then in place for which local improvement district assessments had been or would be made, were paid, and that no representation was made that there were no local improvements in the area for which the above described property could be assessed, and that plaintiff does not contend that any such representations were made until after execution of the earnest money agreement for the purchase and sale of the same; that the plaintiff had an opportunity to observe and did observe construction work on the streets adjoining said property on the day prior to the execution of the said earnest money agreement.” (Italics mine.)
Seller’s proposed, but rejected, finding No. VIII reads as follows:
*187“That the plaintiff knew prior to purchase of said property that the same was subject to assessment for local improvements which had not then become a lien against said property.”
Error is assigned to finding of fact No. VI, which actually was made or entered by the trial court.
The refusal of the trial court to enter the above-quoted, proposed findings of fact of the seller clearly indicates to me the meaning to be ascribed to finding of fact No. VI, as made and entered by the trial court. The first portion of this latter finding reads:
“That in connection with the negotiations for the sale . . . it was represented by the said Harry S. Rinker that all improvements then in place for which local improvement district assessments had been or would be made were paid . . . ” (Italics mine.)
This language means to me that the misrepresentations were made in connection with “the negotiations for the sale,” or in anticipation, of the sale. The sale obviously did not occur or was not consummated until a binding contract was executed. If the finding referred to negotiations after the sale (consummation of the real-estate contract), it would have referred to “negotiations after,” or “following the sale.” Furthermore, the language of finding No. VI, emphasized above, considered together with the language of the findings refused by the trial court, convinces me that finding of fact No. VI clearly related to misrepresentations made prior to the execution of the real-estate contract; that the parties discussed and that misrepresentations were made regarding liability for the payment of assessments for property improvements. This reasoning is strengthened considerably by the fact that the seller had previously attempted to make a sale of the particular property to the same purchasers (respondents) but had been unsuccessful in his efforts. Respondent Miller testified that he told appellant Rinker that he did not want his total expense to exceed fifteen thousand dollars, that to meet this condition the seller absorbed some costs which normally would be paid by the purchaser. Apparently, the seller reduced the price, negotiations were *188resumed, and a sale was consummated. In other words, price or total cost to the purchaser was a very significant matter, and both parties knew this. The conclusion I would reach in this matter seems inescapable to me considering (a) the findings refused, and those entered by the trial court, (b) the record made in trial court and now before us, (c) the theories of the case presented to the trial court by the seller, the trial court’s decision thereon, and (d) denial of the motion for nonsuit.
As indicated hereinbefore, if there is doubt about the meaning of the crucial finding of fact No. VÍ of the trial court, ordinarily the case should be sent back for more adequate and specific findings. Aside from this, the contentions of respondent are quite compelling that finding No. VI relates to the matter of the making of significant misrepresentations prior to the consummation of the real-estate contract; that the evidence relative to the finding is in conflict; that the trial court had a right to believe the testimony of the purchaser; that the evidence cannot be said clearly to preponderate against the trial court’s finding. For the foregoing reasons, I am compelled to dissent.
Schwellenbach, J., concurs with Finley, J.
Rosellini, J., did not participate.
[En Banc. May 9, 1955.]
Per Curiam.
Upon a second rehearing En Banc, a majority of the court adheres to the En Banc opinion heretofore filed herein.