Court Opinion

ID: 9522723
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:31:35.0635+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:03:44.413211
License: Public Domain

MARING, Justice,
dissenting.
[¶27] I respectfully dissent. First, I am of the opinion that this declaratory judgment action is premature and, second, that, even if it is not premature, the Leflar choice-of-law factors have not been appropriately applied.
[¶ 28] In Midivest Med. Ins. Co. v. Doe, 1999 ND 17, 589 N.W.2d 581, a physician’s medical malpractice insurer brought a declaratory judgment action, requesting a declaration that it had no duty to indemnify Dr. Roe for damages that he may become obligated to pay for negligent mishandling of patient transference. Our Court held it was improper for the trial court to grant declaratory relief and vacated the summary judgment. Id. at ¶ 13. The medical malpractice insurer admitted it had an obligation to indemnify Dr. Roe for any damages that he may become obligated to pay the patient, Doe, upon her claims the doctor negligently prescribed medications and negligently failed to refer her to a psychiatrist. Id. at ¶ 6. The only obligation of the medical malpractice insurer at issue was its obligation to indemnify Dr. Roe for liability arising out of his sexual relationship with Doe. Id. We concluded that there were unresolved factual issues and that the insurer had conceded the duty to defend and potential obligation to indemnify. Id. at ¶ 12.
[¶ 29] In the present case, Nodak concedes it has an obligation to pay underin-sured motorist coverage to the Estate of Alan and Sharon Wamsley. The issue is not whether there is underinsured motorist coverage or whether there is a duty to defend. The only issue is whether the underinsured motorist coverage can be stacked: It is the amount of underinsured motorist coverage available that is at issue. The copersonal representatives of the Estate of Alan and Sharon Wamsley have brought an action in Montana against the other deceased driver’s estate and Nodak for damages exceeding $50,000 and for underinsured motorist coverage under all three of their policies with Nodak. Resolution of this declaratory judgment action will not settle the rights, Status, and other legal relations in that underlying action. The issue of the amount of damages, the resolution of which triggers underinsured motorist coverage, will not be eliminated in the underlying litigation by our resolution of this declaratory judgment action. Further, underinsured motorist coverage is first-party coverage and there is no duty to defend against a third-party action like there is when liability coverage is at issue.
[¶ 30] Finally, by deciding the declaratory judgment action, we encourage piecemeal litigation. An insured, who is injured in an automobile accident, should be able to bring one action against both the tort-feasor and the insurer with whom he has underinsured motorist coverage. In North Dakota,, the underinsured motorist insurer has the right to intervene in-the tort action. See Fetch v. Quam, 530 N.W.2d 337 (N.D.1995). This allows the *236insurer to protect itself on the issue of liability and damages arising under the provisions of the insurance policy.- In Montana, the plaintiff may bring an action against both the tortfeasor and the under-insured motorist insurance carrier in the same action. State ex rel. Gadbaw v. Mont. 8th Judicial Dist. Ct, 316 Mont. 25, 75 P.3d 1238. In the present case, the co-representatives of the Estate of Alan and Sharon Wamsley brought the tort action in Montana where the deceased defendant had resided and where the accident occurred and also named Nodak as a defendant. In the interests of justice, to avoid multiplicity of litigation, to conserve judicial time, and to avoid “the harassment of the insured by the necessity to litigate his rights twice,” both the tort action and insurance claim should be heard together. Fetch, at 338 (quoting Heisner v. Jones, 184 Neb. 602, 169 N.W.2d 606, 611-12 (1969)). Our Court pointed out that “[generally, courts favor intervention and joinder of all parties in one action as a convenient method of settling all related controversies on the same subject.” Fetch, at 338 (citation omitted).
[¶ 31] Therefore, I am of the belief that the majority opinion is an advisory opinion and that the summary declaratory judgment should be vacated.
[¶ 32] In Daley v. American States Preferred Ins. Co., 1998 ND 225, 587 N.W.2d 159, our Court affirmed our use of Leflar’s choice-influencing considerations when deciding a choice-of-laws issue. The majority opinion in the present case recognizes that this is the appropriate analysis. However, the majority opinion then proceeds to apply the Leflar considerations to the significant contacts in a manner that suggests an application of either the lex loci doctrine, which our Court abandoned in Issendorf v. Olson, 194 N.W.2d 750, 756 (N.D.1972), or a “strong territorial approach,” which we clarified in Daley, at ¶¶ 18-19.
[¶ 33] We specifically adopted the significant contacts test and the Leflar choice-influencing factors for application in contract cases. See Plante v. Columbia Paints, 494 N.W.2d 140 (N.D.1992). Importantly, we said, “A court’s obligation is to be true to the method rather than to seek merely factual analogies between cases and import wholesale the choice of law analysis contained in those cases.” Daley, 1998 ND 225, ¶ 21, 587 N.W.2d 159.
[¶ 34] I have no argument with the list of contacts in the majority opinion. I do, however, believe that the majority has failed to appropriately determine the significance of those contacts upon application of Leflar’s five choice-influencing factors and, thus, has failed to correctly determine which state has the more significant interest in the issues raised.
[¶ 35] Although our Court has applied the Leflar choice-of-law factors to questions involving commercial liability insurance and subrogation between insurers, it has never before applied the Leflar choice-of-law factors to a question arising under an uninsured motorist/underinsured motorist provision in an automobile policy. See Plante, 494 N.W.2d 140; Apollo Sprinkler Co., Inc. v. Fire Sprinkler Suppliers & Design, Inc., 382 N.W.2d 386 (N.D.1986); and Daley, 1998 ND 225, 587 N.W.2d 159.
[¶ 36] In concluding that North Dakota law is favored under this factor, the majority opinion relies exclusively on where the contract was negotiated, the policy delivered, and the premiums paid. If this mechanical approach is applied in every contract case, the outcome is predictable in most automobile policy disputes. I do not believe that these contacts are intended to be the exclusive determining contacts in all contract cases. -The majority fails to con*237sider other relevant contacts and state interests which favor the application of Montana law in this case.
[¶ 37] The majority opinion fails to recognize non-contract contacts, such as the nature of the insurance contract, the location medical bills were incurred, and the strong public policy of Montana protecting financially those injured within its borders in its application of the Leflar choice-of-law considerations and fails to give them proper weight. Under the majority opinion’s analysis, you do not need judges applying the Leflar factors to significant contacts in contract cases. All you need for a choice-of-law decision is to know where the parties entered into the automobile policy, where the premiums are paid, and where the vehicle is principally garaged. Our Court has never applied the “significant contacts” test and Leflar choice-of-law factors in that manner. Instead, it is our Court’s responsibility to consider not only the contract contacts, but the place of injury, the place of medical treatment, the foreseeability of the presence of the insured in another state, the adhesory and portable nature of automobile insurance contracts, the interests of the state where the accident occurred, and the purpose and policies underlying that state’s law. See Milkovich v. Saari, 295 Minn. 155, 203 N.W.2d 408 (1973); Hime v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 284 N.W.2d 829 (Minn.1979); Hague v. Allstate Ins. Co., 289 N.W.2d 43 (Minn.1978), ajfd on reh’g; Abramson v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 76 F.3d 304 (9th Cir.1996).
[¶ 38] I, therefore, respectfully dissent.