Court Opinion

ID: 9556757
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-18 16:10:05.670891+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:01:18.395474
License: Public Domain

J-S24030-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellant               :
                                               :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  NAFEE ANTHONY DAVIS                          :   No. 1487 MDA 2022

              Appeal from the Order Entered October 20, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-22-CR-0001621-2021

BEFORE:      BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.:                            FILED: AUGUST 18, 2023

       The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania appeals from the order, entered in

the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County, granting Nafee Anthony Davis’

post-verdict motion for acquittal and dismissing all charges lodged against

him. Upon our careful review, we reverse the order of the trial court and

remand for sentencing.

       The trial court set forth the facts of this case as follows:

       On March 22, 2021, members of the Pennsylvania Board of
       Probation and Parole and Dauphin County Adult Probation and
       Parole went to 1401 N. 15th Street in the City of Harrisburg for
       the purposes of conducting a parole/probation search. [Davis]
       began residing at that address in January 2021, and was
       presumably approved by state parole and/or county probation.9
       Prior to March 22, 2021, Pennsylvania Board of Probation and
       Parole Agent Rob Gerrity (hereinafter “Agent Gerrity”) and APO

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S24030-23

     [Rick] Anglemeyer visited [Davis] at his residence on at least six
     [] different occasions.
        9 At the time of the search, [Davis] was serving house arrest

        and was required to remain at the approved residence. [At
        trial, the parties agreed to use the general term “law
        enforcement officers” to refer to the probation/parole
        officers so as not to alert the jury to Davis’ status.]

     Agent Gerrity’s first [] visit to [Davis’] residence was on February
     9, 2021. On direct-examination, Agent Gerrity testified that
     [Davis] was the only person at the residence on that date.
     However, during cross-examination, it was revealed that the state
     parole agents involved in this case did not turn over all of their
     notes of contacts to the Commonwealth, who then could not turn
     it over to [Davis]. As a result, this [c]ourt directed the state parole
     agents to provide the notes to both parties. Once the notes were
     provided, Agent Gerrity corrected his prior testimony and stated
     that there were three [] other occupants at the residence on
     February 9, 2021, but he did not record their names. Agent
     Gerrity was only in the living room, and the visit lasted
     approximately five [] to ten [] minutes.

     The next day, February 10, 2021, APO Anglemeyer visited [Davis]
     at 1401 N. 15th Street for the first time. APO Anglemeyer testified
     that he observed marijuana and drug paraphernalia on the living
     room coffee table. [Davis] informed APO Anglemeyer that he had
     a medical marijuana card, and APO Anglemeyer counseled him on
     the proper use of medical marijuana. During the visit, [Davis]
     consented to a search of his bedroom and vehicle, and there was
     no evidence of any violation(s). APO Anglemeyer testified that
     [Davis’] bedroom was on the second [] floor toward the rear of
     the house.

     On February 16, 2021, Agent Gerrity visited [Davis] at his
     residence. [Davis] was the only person present at that time and
     the visit lasted approximately five [] to ten [] minutes. Similar to
     the previous visit, Agent Gerrity testified that he was only in the
     living room.

     Agent Gerrity’s next visit to [Davis’] residence was on March 1,
     2021. On direct-examination, Agent Gerrity testified that [Davis]
     was the only person present. However, after the notes were
     provided, Agent Gerrity corrected his testimony and stated that a
     cohabitant was also present, but he did not record their name.

                                      -2-
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     Similar to previous visits, this visit lasted approximately five [] to
     ten [] minutes in the living room.

     Two days later, on March 3, 2021, APO Anglemeyer visited [Davis]
     at his residence. APO Anglemeyer testified that he spoke to
     [Davis] at the front door and does not believe he went inside the
     residence that day.

     Agent Gerrity’s last visit before the search was on March 8, 2021.
     [Davis] was the only person present, and the visit lasted
     approximately five [] to ten [] minutes in the living room. On
     cross-examination, Agent Gerrity stated that his note said, “no
     other members of the household were present.”

     On March 22, 2021, Agent Gerrity, APO Anglemeyer, Pennsylvania
     Board of Probation and Parole Agent Caleb Tyson (hereinafter
     “Agent Tyson”), and Dauphin County Adult Probation and Parole
     Officer Brandon Rigel (hereinafter “APO Rigel”) knocked on the
     door of 1401 N. 15th Street at around 9:40 A.M., and there was
     no response for approximately three [] to four [] minutes. When
     [Davis] opened the door, officers immediately smelled the odor of
     marijuana, and observed a grinder and a marijuana blunt in plain
     view. [Davis] was immediately detained and remained with Agent
     Gerrity while Agent Tyson, APO Anglemeyer[,] and APO Rigel
     performed a protective sweep of the residence for safety
     purposes, prior to conducting the planned search. No other
     individuals were in the residence at that time.

     The residence at 1401 N. 15th Street is a two-story row home
     with a finished basement, connected only on one [] side to another
     row home. In the basement, there was an in-home recording
     studio in the common area, and a separate bedroom. During the
     protective sweep, officers observed a jar of medical marijuana on
     the desk of the recording studio, suitcases in the open closet, and
     three [] firearms laying on the floor in the basement bedroom in
     plain view. While officers were still at the residence, [Kyle] Oliver
     approached APO Anglemeyer and requested permission to enter.
     APO Anglemeyer denied him permission to enter. [] Oliver then
     informed APO Anglemeyer that he resided in the basement
     bedroom. There was an exterior door that led from the basement
     to the rear of the residence, where [Davis’] vehicle was parked.
     APO Anglemeyer did not know whether [Davis] had a valid driver’s
     license or not.

     The first floor consisted of the kitchen and living room. [No
     contraband] was found in the kitchen. As previously stated,

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     officers observed a marijuana grinder, a blunt wrapper, and an
     ashtray in plain view on the living room table. During the
     protective sweep, officers removed all the items from the closet
     by the front door and searched through a pink backpack, as well
     as a box that was in the closet. Inside the pink backpack was a
     plastic grocery bag filled with what appeared to be drug packaging
     materials. The box was located on the top shelf of the closet that
     contained a composit[ion] notebook, a firearm, a digital scale box,
     and a guilty plea colloquy for an individual known as William
     Davis.12     The composit[ion] notebook contained numerous
     writings in various handwritings. There was no attempt to obtain
     a handwriting exemplar to investigate the various handwritings
     found in the notebook. None of [Davis’] personal belongings were
     found in the living room closet.
        12 William Davis has no relation to [the defendant].

     On the second floor, there were three [] bedrooms—front, rear,
     and north—and a bathroom. During the protective sweep of the
     second [] floor, officers observed a box of 9mm ammunition on a
     side night table in the front bedroom, consistent with the Glock
     9mm found in the living room closet. While officers were still on
     scene, [] Oliver handed his phone to APO Anglemeyer to speak
     with a female on the other end. The female identified herself as
     Melina Mendoza [] and informed APO Anglemeyer that she resided
     in the second-floor front bedroom, and legally owned a firearm
     (the Glock 9mm) that would be found in the living room closet.

     As a result of the evidence observed in plain view, as well as
     evidence that was secreted in a bookbag and a box in the living
     room closet, APO Anglemeyer contacted Officer Jeremy Crist [] of
     the City of Harrisburg Bureau of Police. Officer Crist arrived on
     scene and was provided information by APO Anglemeyer. Based
     on the information provided to him, Officer Crist applied for four
     [] separate search warrants [for]: (1) the common areas; (2) the
     basement bedroom[,] which [was] identified [as belonging to]
     Oliver[;] (3) [the] second[-]floor front bedroom (belonging to []
     Mendoza); and (4) [the] second[-]floor rear bedroom[,] which
     [was] identified [as belonging to Davis].

     [The search of Davis’ residence yielded an abundance of evidence
     of marijuana trafficking. In the basement bedroom, identified as
     belonging to Oliver, the search uncovered, inter alia: three one-
     pound bags of marijuana, multiple firearms, ammunition, and
     $1,396 in cash. In the basement common area, the search

                                    -4-
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     uncovered, inter alia: Davis’ expired identification card, two
     medical marijuana containers, a grinder, rolling papers, and
     luggage containing plastic bags with marijuana residue. The living
     room closet contained, inter alia: a backpack containing drug
     packaging materials, a shoebox containing a digital scale, a
     composition notebook, a firearm, and a backpack containing
     $2,000. Recovered in plain view in the living room was a
     marijuana grinder on a coffee table. The “futon room” [on the
     second floor] contained a grinder with marijuana residue and
     vacuum sealed bags with marijuana residue. In the second-floor-
     front bedroom, purportedly belonging to Mendoza, the search
     uncovered, inter alia: ammunition, a composition book containing
     a drug ledger, seven amphetamine pills, a total of $65,000 in
     cash, and labels used to package marijuana.          Nothing was
     recovered from Davis’ bedroom.]

     Detective John Goshert [] testified on behalf of the
     Commonwealth as an expert in street[-]level drug trafficking. He
     opined that the marijuana recovered from 1401 N. 15th Street
     was possessed with the intent to distribute it. However, Detective
     Goshert also testified that[,] based on the evidence he reviewed,
     it appeared that the marijuana was being sold by the pound[,] as
     opposed to the typical street-level dealing where it[ is] sold by the
     gram. He further opined that it was a “very sophisticated
     operation” and likely involved more than one [] person.

     Officers recovered a total of five [] firearms from [] Oliver’s
     basement bedroom: (1) a 9mm pistol inside a backpack; (2) a
     semiautomatic shotgun (Citadel) on the floor; (3) a bolt-action
     rifle (Creedmoor) on the floor; (4) a semiautomatic AR-15 on the
     floor; and (5) a Mossberg shotgun in a case behind the TV. During
     the investigation, Officer Crist was informed by [] Oliver that Jlynn
     McDonald [] was his girlfriend. Two [] of the firearms recovered
     from the basement bedroom were registered to [] McDonald—the
     9mm pistol and bolt-action rifle. Inside the backpack with the
     9mm pistol were medical records and a prescription bottle for Ms.
     McDonald.

     Additionally, [] Oliver claimed ownership of the remaining three []
     firearms recovered from his bedroom, and informed Officer Crist
     that he purchased the Citadel shotgun and the AR-15. An
     additional firearm was recovered from the living room closet—a
     9mm pistol registered to [] Mendoza. [] Oliver was charged with
     possession of the marijuana found in his basement bedroom, but

                                     -5-
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     [] McDonald was not. Significantly, there was no evidence with
     [Davis’] name on it [] recovered from [] Oliver’s bedroom.

     In the basement studio, officers recovered [Davis’] expired
     identification card, as well as two [] medical marijuana containers.
     Despite the medical marijuana containers having labels with
     identifying information on them, apparently Officer Crist chose not
     to investigate [the identity of the patient].

     The only evidence in the second [] floor front bedroom ([identified
     as] Mendoza’s bedroom) that had [Davis’] name on it was a
     Dauphin County Treasury bill addressed to [Davis] and Charles
     Morrison [] for a property at 18 Evergreen Street. The bill was
     mailed to 929 Norwood Street. During the investigation, Officer
     Crist learned that [] Morrison is [Davis’] adopted brother, and that
     they jointly own the property at 18 Evergreen Street. Officer Crist
     did not check the Recorder of Deeds to obtain a copy of the deed
     for 18 Evergreen Street. At trial, Officer Crist was shown a copy
     of the deed and indicated that it was a quit claim deed—a brother
     to brother transfer from Joseph Davis to [] Morrison and [Davis].

     Officers also recovered the identification card and [S]ocial
     [S]ecurity card for Katiria Maldonado-Davila [] in the second []
     floor front bedroom ([]Mendoza’s bedroom).             During the
     investigation, Officer Crist learned that [] Maldonado-Davila was
     [Morrison’s] girlfriend[.] However, Officer Crist did not interview
     [] Morrison or [] Maldonado-Davila during the investigation to find
     out why her personal information was in [] Mendoza’s bedroom.
     Further, there was no evidence with [Davis’] name on it recovered
     from the second [] floor north bedroom ([“]futon room[”]).

     Of all the evidence that was collected—six [] firearms, numerous
     plastic bags, storage containers, ammunition boxes, notebooks,
     packaging labels, etc.—only the [two] 9mm pistols were
     processed for fingerprinting. No latent prints were found. Officer
     Crist explained that he did submit the other four [] firearms for
     fingerprinting, but there was a “packaging snafu” that made the
     firearms unable to be processed.

     Although Officer Crist had the capability to collect trace DNA from
     the firearms for analysis, he chose not to do so. He explained that
     he did not request them to be processed because: (1) it would
     not have be uncommon for [Davis’] DNA to be on the firearms
     since he resided at 1401 N. 15th Street; (2) the Pennsylvania
     State Police lab would not prioritize the testing because it was not
     a homicide or aggravated assault; and (3) it “doesn’t seem logical

                                    -6-
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       for the possibility for there to be actual reason for his DNA to be
       on the weapons.”

       Despite Officer Crist having evidence that at least six [] and
       possibly up to nine [] other individuals had access to 1401 N. 15th
       Street—[] Oliver, [] Mendoza, [] Morrison, [] Maldonado-Davila,
       [] McDonald, [] William Davis, the three [] unnamed occupants at
       the residence on February 9, 2021, and the unnamed cohabitant
       at the residence on March 1, 2021—he chose to only interview []
       Oliver and [] Mendoza, and did not investigate any of the other
       individuals to determine what level of access they may have had
       to the residence.

       At some point during the protective sweep or ultimate search,
       officers obtained possession of [Davis’] keyring and discovered
       that one [] of his keys opened the back door of the residence.
       That same key was not examined to see if it also opened the front
       door, nor was it collected as evidence. Additionally, four [] to five
       [] other sets of keys were photographed throughout the
       residence, but were not seized []or tested to see if they opened
       the front and/or back doors. Further, the only evidence testified
       to in [Davis’] bedroom w[as] a vape pen and loose marijuana,
       which were not collected as evidence.

Trial Court Opinion, 1/12/23, at 4-15 (citations to record and some footnotes

omitted).

       A jury trial was held from September 19-22, 2022. At the conclusion of

the Commonwealth’s case, the trial court granted Davis’ motion for judgment

of acquittal as to a charge of possession of a controlled substance

(amphetamine).1       The jury subsequently convicted Davis of person not to

possess firearm,2 possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance

____________________________________________

1 The Commonwealth does not challenge the trial court’s grant of judgment of

acquittal as to this charge.

2 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105.

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(“PWID”),3 and possession of drug paraphernalia.4         After the verdict was

announced, Davis moved for judgment of acquittal on the remaining charges.

After briefing by both parties, the trial court granted Davis’ motion on October

20, 2022, and dismissed the charges against him. The Commonwealth filed

a timely notice of appeal, and both the Commonwealth and the trial court have

complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

       The Commonwealth raises the following claim for our review:

       Whether the trial court erred in granting [Davis’] post-verdict
       motion for acquittal and dismissing all charges where [the
       Commonwealth] presented weighty and sufficient evidence to
       sustain [Davis’] convictions for persons not to possess firearms,
       possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance, and
       possession of drug paraphernalia[, and] the jury weighed the
       evidence and concluded that it established [Davis’] guilt beyond a
       reasonable doubt, and[, thus,] the trial court [] erred in
       reweighing the evidence[.]

Brief of Appellant, at 4.

       Our standard of review when considering the Commonwealth’s claim

that the trial court erred in granting a motion for judgment of acquittal is as

follows.

       A motion for judgment of acquittal challenges the sufficiency of
       the evidence to sustain a conviction on a particular charge, and is
       granted only in cases in which the Commonwealth has failed to
       carry its burden regarding that charge.

       The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence
       is whether[,] viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light
____________________________________________

3 35 P.S. § 780-113 (a)(30).

4 Id. at § 780-113(a)(32).

                                           -8-
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      most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence
      to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond
      a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh
      the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In
      addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by
      the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of
      innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be
      resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and
      inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be
      drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth
      may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime
      beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial
      evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record
      must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be
      considered. Finally, the trier of fact[,] while passing upon the
      credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced,
      is free to believe all, part[,] or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Hutchinson, 947 A.2d 800, 805–06 (Pa. Super. 2008)

(citation omitted).

      Here, Davis was convicted of PWID, possession of drug paraphernalia,

and person not to possess firearm. To sustain a conviction for PWID, “the

Commonwealth must prove both the possession of the controlled substance

and the intent to deliver the controlled substance.”      Commonwealth v.

Roberts, 133 A.3d 759, 767 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation omitted).

      Possession of drug paraphernalia is defined as:

      The use of, or possession with intent to use, drug paraphernalia
      for the purpose of planting, propagating, cultivating, growing,
      harvesting, manufacturing, compounding, converting, producing,
      processing, preparing, testing, analyzing, packing, repacking,
      storing, containing, concealing, injecting, ingesting, inhaling or
      otherwise introducing into the human body a controlled substance
      in violation of this act.

35 P.S. § 780–113(a)(32). Drug paraphernalia is defined as:

                                     -9-
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      all equipment, products and materials of any kind which are used,
      intended for use or designed for use in planting, propagating,
      cultivating, growing, harvesting, manufacturing, compounding,
      converting, producing, processing, preparing, testing, analyzing,
      packaging, repackaging, storing, containing, concealing, injecting,
      ingesting, inhaling or otherwise introducing into the human body
      a controlled substance in violation of this act. . . .

      In determining whether an object is drug paraphernalia, a court
      or other authority should consider, in addition to all other logically
      relevant factors, statements by an owner or by anyone in control
      of the object concerning its use . . . the proximity of the object, in
      time and space, to a direct violation of this act, the proximity of
      the object to controlled substances, the existence of any residue
      of controlled substances on the object, direct or circumstantial
      evidence of the intent of an owner, or of anyone in control of the
      object, to deliver it to persons who he knows, or should reasonably
      know, intend to use the object to facilitate a violation of this act
      . . . the existence and scope of legitimate uses for the object in
      the community, and expert testimony concerning its use.

35 P.S. § 780–102.

      “To sustain a conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia[,] the

Commonwealth must establish that items possessed by defendant were used

or intended to be used with a controlled substance so as to constitute drug

paraphernalia and this burden may be met by Commonwealth through

circumstantial evidence.” Commonwealth v. Little, 879 A.2d 293, 300 (Pa.

Super. 2005).

      Finally, the Crimes Code defines persons not to possess firearms, in

pertinent part, as follows:

      (a) Offense defined.

         (1) A person who has been convicted of an offense
         enumerated in subsection (b), within or without this
         Commonwealth, regardless of the length of sentence or
         whose conduct meets the criteria in subsection (c) shall not

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          possess, use, control, sell, transfer or manufacture or obtain
          a license to possess, use, control, sell, transfer or
          manufacture a firearm in this Commonwealth.

                                          ***

       (c) Other persons.--In addition to any person who has been
       convicted of any offense listed under subsection (b), the following
       persons shall be subject to the prohibition of subsection (a):

                                          ***

          (2) A person who has been convicted of an offense under
          the act of April 14, 1972 (P.L. 233, No. 64), known as The
          Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act, or
          any equivalent Federal statute or equivalent statute of any
          other state, that may be punishable by a term of
          imprisonment exceeding two years.[5]

18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6105(a)(1) & (c).

       Davis was convicted of three possessory offenses. It is well-settled that

in the context of such prosecutions, “the Commonwealth may meet its burden

by showing actual, constructive, or joint constructive possession of the

contraband.” Commonwealth v. Vargas, 108 A.3d 858, 868 (Pa. Super.

2014) (en banc) (quotation and quotation marks omitted).

       Constructive possession is a legal fiction, a pragmatic construct to
       deal with the realities of criminal law enforcement. Constructive
       possession is an inference arising from a set of facts that
       possession of the contraband was more likely than not. We have
       defined constructive possession as “conscious dominion.” We
       subsequently defined “conscious dominion” as “the power to
       control the contraband and the intent to exercise that control.” To
       aid application, we have held that constructive possession may be
       established by the totality of the circumstances.

____________________________________________

5 On May 28, 2020, Davis entered a guilty plea to one count of PWID
(marijuana). See N.T. Trial, 9/22/22, at 572.

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Commonwealth v. Brown, 48 A.3d 426, 430 (Pa. Super. 2012) (quotation

omitted). “The Commonwealth may sustain its burden by means of wholly

circumstantial evidence, and we must evaluate the entire trial record and

consider all evidence received against the defendant.” Id. (citation omitted).

      Nevertheless, “where more than one person has equal access to where

drugs are stored, presence alone in conjunction with such access will not prove

conscious dominion over the contraband.” Vargas, 108 A.3d at 868, quoting

Commonwealth v. Davis, 480 A.2d 1035, 1045 (Pa. Super. 1984)

(emphasis omitted).    Rather, for the Commonwealth to prove constructive

possession where more than one person has access to the contraband, “the

Commonwealth      must    introduce    evidence   demonstrating    either   [the

defendant’s] participation in the drug[-]related activity or evidence connecting

[the defendant] to the specific room or areas where the drugs were kept.”

Vargas, 108 A.3d at 868, quoting Commonwealth v. Ocasio, 619 A.2d 352,

354–355 (Pa. Super. 1993).

      [A]lthough “mere presence” at a crime scene cannot alone sustain
      a conviction for possession of contraband:

         a jury need not ignore presence, proximity and association
         when presented in conjunction with other evidence of guilt.
         Indeed, presence at the scene where drugs are being
         processed and packaged is a material and probative factor
         which the jury may consider. Drug dealers of any size and
         [illegal drug] manufacturers probably are reticent about
         allowing the unknowing to take view of or assist in the
         operation.

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Vargas, 108 A.3d at 869, quoting United States v. Robinson, 978 F.2d

1554, 1557–58 (10th Cir. 1992) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

       In reaching its conclusion that Davis’ convictions were not supported by

the evidence, the trial court reviewed numerous constructive possession cases

and concluded that “[t]his case is significantly different.” Trial Court Opinion,

1/12/23, at 19. Specifically, the court noted, inter alia, the following factors:

(1) the lack of fingerprint or DNA evidence connecting Davis to the

contraband; (2) clear evidence that others resided in the bedrooms where the

vast majority of the contraband was found; (3) the lack of any contraband in

Davis’ bedroom; (4) Oliver’s statement to Officer Anglemeyer that everything

in the basement bedroom belonged to him; (5) Oliver’s PennDOT change of

address, which pre-dated Davis’ presence at the residence, identifying 1401

N. 15th Street as his address; and (6) the items recovered from the front

bedroom were consistent with Mendoza’s ownership of the room. Moreover,

the court noted that the Commonwealth’s emphasis on the fact that Davis was

the sole person present in the residence during each of the visits made by law

enforcement was disingenuous, as Davis was on house arrest and was

required to be there.6
____________________________________________

6 The trial court stated in its opinion:

       By repeatedly exploiting the reality that [Davis] was unable to
       leave his residence, the Commonwealth placed [him] in an unfair
       position—violate his constitutional rights by informing the jury he
       was on state parole and required to be on house arrest or say
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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The court concluded:

       In sum, this [c]ourt finds that the Commonwealth’s case rests on
       inferences upon inferences, and that the inferences the
       Commonwealth asks this [c]ourt to draw do not flow from the
       facts and circumstances presented at trial. [T]hey are not of the
       volume and quality to overcome the presumption of innocence.
       This [c]ourt does not take this issue lightly, nor does it desire to
       substitute its conclusions for the jury’s. Instead, we must follow
       the guidance of our appellate courts, and objectively analyze the
       evidence without unsupported conjecture.           The two [] co-
       defendants, to which the evidence points [] directly, have not
       been brought to trial to answer on their charges, nor were they
       joined for trial with this case. Nevertheless, we are constrained
       to conclude that the evidence is insufficient, as a matter of law, to
       support the convictions against [Davis].

Id. at 29-30.

       In its brief, the Commonwealth relies on two cases in which our Supreme

Court found constructive possession and argued that the facts underlying the

instant matter are “more compelling.”              Brief of Appellant, at 23.   In

Commonwealth v. Macolino, 469 A.2d 132 (Pa. 1983), the defendant was

convicted of PWID and criminal conspiracy based on the following factual

scenario:

       Armed with a search warrant, police searched [Macolino’s] home
       on October 29, 1979. In the first[-]floor dining room, the police
       seized various items linking Carl and Gae Macolino[, Macolino’s
       wife and co-defendant,] together as a couple, including bank
       checks, deposit slips, a bank passbook in both their names[,] and
       photographs of the couple. Large sums of money were also
       seized. In the master bedroom[,] which was equipped with a
       double bed, there was a clothes closet with the clothing of both a
____________________________________________

       nothing and allow the Commonwealth to argue that he had to be
       in control of the entire residence.

Trial Court Opinion, 1/12/23, at 25.

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      man and woman. On the top shelf of the closet[,] police seized
      two plastic bags containing a white powder, testified at trial to be
      thirty-percent cocaine. Two smaller plastic packages were found
      in the closet as well, containing what was testified to be two
      percent cocaine, along with a Tupperware container holding four
      empty plastic bags. Copies of “The Pleasures of Cocaine” and “The
      Pill Book” were seized from a bookshelf in the bedroom. On top
      of the bedroom dresser, the officers seized a pocket memo book,
      containing pages of numbers, a machine called a “Daisy Seal-a-
      Meal,” an appliance used in the drug trade to seal packages of
      cocaine in order to prevent seepage of the drug, and a device used
      to detect eavesdropping equipment on a telephone called an
      “Eavesdropper Stopper.” In the attic, police seized two one-pound
      containers of mannitol, a substance used as a cocaine “cutting”
      agent.

Id. at 133-34.

      This Court reversed Macolino’s convictions on the basis that there was

insufficient evidence to establish constructive possession, as Macolino’s “wife

had equal access to the drugs, and . . . the inference was just as strong that

the drugs belonged to her as to her husband.” Id. at 135 (quotation marks

omitted).   The Supreme Court granted the Commonwealth’s petition for

allowance of appeal as to the PWID charge and noted that the issue of

constructive possession of contraband seized in an area jointly controlled by

husband and wife was an issue of first impression in Pennsylvania.           After

reviewing similar cases from other jurisdictions, the Court concluded that

“constructive possession can be found in one defendant when both the

husband and wife have equal access to an area where the illegal substance or

contraband is found.” Id. at 135. The Court stated that “[t]he facts of this

case involve a husband and wife who had joint and exclusive control of a

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residence, who alone were present at the time of the police search, in

conjunction with other evidence sufficient to establish a link between []

Macolino and the illegal substance.” Id. at 136.

      [T]he fact-finder, examining all of the evidence in its totality, could
      reasonably conclude that [Macolino] was aware of the cocaine,
      along with the items found in his bedroom[,] which are commonly
      used in cocaine use and trafficking, that he exercised a conscious
      dominion over the illegal substance[,] and that he intended to
      possess it.

Id.

      The Commonwealth also relies on Commonwealth v. Mudrick, 507

A.2d 1212 (Pa. 1986). The charges there arose when police arrived at the

residence of the defendant’s paramour, Sandra Dietz, to serve a New Jersey

fugitive warrant on Dietz.

      They knocked; [Mudrick] answered the door. After the officers
      explained their purpose, [Mudrick] told them that [] Dietz was
      sleeping in the bedroom and directed them to it. [Mudrick] was
      wearing only a pair of blue jeans. Some of the officers entered
      the bedroom, woke [Dietz], and placed her under arrest. [] Dietz
      was taken to the District Magistrate after dressing and using the
      bathroom. [Mudrick] told another officer that he lived with []
      Dietz and they were going to be married. He also mentioned that
      one of the dogs on the premises was his. The officers saw a box
      of what they believed to be marijuana on the living room coffee
      table. [Mudrick] was ordered to sit down; he sat within two feet
      of the contraband. One officer remained on the premises with
      [Mudrick] while others obtained a search warrant. While waiting
      for the officers to return, [Mudrick] got up, walked into the kitchen
      and helped himself to a cold drink from the refrigerator. At about
      3:00 P.M. the officers returned with a search warrant for the
      residence. In addition to the box on the coffee table, they found
      what proved to be cocaine in the bedroom and the study. The
      suspected contraband was confiscated and [Mudrick] was
      arrested. He retrieved his clothes from the bedroom in which

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      Dietz had been sleeping. This was the only room in the residence
      in use as a bedroom. Subsequent chemical analysis showed that
      the substances seized were marijuana and cocaine.

      At trial, [Mudrick] presented evidence that he actually lived in
      Blakeslee in the home of one Patrick Simonik, and that he paid
      room and board to Simonik and took meals there.

Id. at 1212-13.

      This Court reversed Mudrick’s judgment of sentence on the basis that

“the Commonwealth proved no more than [Mudrick’s] presence at the scene,

and the evidence was insufficient to establish constructive possession.” Id.

at   1213.   The   Supreme    Court   granted   allowance    of   appeal   to   the

Commonwealth and reinstated Mudrick’s convictions, holding that “even in the

absence of a marital relationship[,] constructive possession may be found in

either or both actors if contraband is found in an area of joint control and

equal access.” Id. at 1214. The Court concluded that the fact that Mudrick

exclusively shared the residence, in which contraband was found in the

bedroom, study, and living room, was sufficient to enable a factfinder to find

joint control and equal access to the contraband, thus establishing

constructive possession.

      In response, Davis argues that there was no direct or circumstantial

evidence proving any connection between him and the contraband or drug

activity related thereto.   No firearms, marijuana, or other contraband was

found in Davis’ bedroom, or in any area over which Davis had “exclusive

control.” Brief of Appellee, at 28. Davis argues that there was no evidence

of his intent to exercise control over the contraband. “At best . . . the evidence

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J-S24030-23

presented at trial, as to Davis, was equally consistent with his innocence as it

was with any guilt.” Id., citing In Interest of J.B., 189 A.3d 390, 415 (Pa.

2018) (where evidence of record, viewed in light most favorable to

Commonwealth with all reasonable inferences, is, at most, equally consistent

with guilt and innocence, Commonwealth has not sustained burden of proof

beyond reasonable doubt). Davis argues that it is unreasonable to infer that

he was the only resident of the home, as Officer Crist “conceded that there

were possibly ten other individuals living in the residence, or had equal access

to the contraband . . . as Davis.” Id. at 30.

      In support of his argument, Davis relies on this Court’s decision in

Ocasio, supra, in which we set forth the facts as follows:

      On February 2, 1989[,] the Philadelphia Police Department
      executed a search warrant for 2128 North Second Street in
      Philadelphia. During the search, the officers required the five
      occupants of the house, including Abel Ocasio (hereinafter “co-
      defendant”), to remain in the living room. While the officers were
      searching the first floor, Officer Ralph Perez overheard co-
      defendant state in Spanish, “it’s in the trash.” Officer Perez then
      directed another officer to search the trash can in the kitchen. The
      police discovered twelve baggies containing a total of 567 vials of
      crack cocaine hidden in the trash can. In a third[-]floor bedroom,
      the officers found a baggie containing a large chunk of crack
      cocaine laying out in the open and $5,882 in cash. In addition,
      the officers recovered from the basement a triple beam scale, one
      baggie containing numerous empty clear plastic vials with gray
      and black caps, two strainers, and one baggie containing
      numerous empty clear smaller packets.

      The 567 vials found in the kitchen contained approximately 56.7
      grams of crack cocaine and the baggie found in the third[-]floor
      bedroom contained 113.2 grams of crack cocaine. The black
      plastic grinding apparatus recovered during the search contained
      residue of cocaine and the glass bottle confiscated during the

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      search contained 5.35 grams of Tetracaine, a substance
      commonly used to dilute or “cut” cocaine before selling it.

      Appellant returned home while the search was in progress and he
      was subsequently arrested. During a search of appellant, police
      recovered $422 in cash and a current driver’s license listing his
      residence as 2128 North Second Street.

Id. at 353.

      Ocasio was convicted of possession of drug paraphernalia and

conspiracy. On appeal, he argued, inter alia, that the evidence was insufficient

to convict, and this Court agreed, finding that the Commonwealth failed to

introduce evidence demonstrating either Ocasio’s participation in the drug-

related activity or connecting him to the specific room or areas where the

drugs were kept. The Court stated:

      After carefully examining all of the circumstances in the instant
      action, we find that the Commonwealth has established no more
      than a mere suspicion that appellant agreed to participate or aid
      in the drug distribution. As a resident of the house, appellant’s
      presence at the scene of the crime was not out of the ordinary.
      In fact, he was one of six individuals present during the search.
      Moreover, there is no evidence that appellant even knew of the
      criminal activity in the house. See Commonwealth v. Fortune,
      [] 318 A.2d 327, 329 ([Pa.] 1974) (a defendant’s residence at the
      house where contraband is found does not establish that he had
      knowledge of any criminal activity). Nothing connecting appellant
      to the drugs or the drug paraphernalia was found anywhere in the
      house. As stated above, the $422 in small denominations could
      suggest that appellant was involved in drug sales. However, this
      inference is not supported by any other evidence. In light of the
      lack of direct and circumstantial evidence connecting appellant to
      any drug related activity, the evidence introduced at trial is
      insufficient to support appellant’s conviction of criminal
      conspiracy.

Id. at 355.

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      Here, while we are sympathetic to the trial court’s evident frustration

with the Commonwealth regarding certain aspects of its investigation and

prosecution of this matter, we are constrained to conclude that the court erred

in granting Davis’ motion for acquittal. Contrary to Davis’ argument, the jury

need not have found that Davis had exclusive possession of the areas in

which contraband was found, or that he was the only resident of the dwelling,

to conclude that he was guilty of possessing the contraband. Similarly, the

fact that no contraband was found in Davis’ bedroom is not dispositive.

Indeed,   the   facts   of   this   case     are    closely   analogous   to   those   in

Commonwealth v. Aviles, 615 A.2d 398, 402 (Pa. Super. 1992) (en banc).

      In Aviles, appellant was convicted of possession of a controlled

substance, PWID, and possession of drug paraphernalia on the following facts:

      [A]t 7:30 p.m. on the 23rd of January, 1989, Police Officer Daniel
      McEwen, in the company of five other officers, arrived at 181 West
      Wishart Street, Philadelphia, to execute a search warrant obtained
      on the strength of a first-time informant’s account of drug activity
      and follow-up surveillances by Officer McEwen.

      Once at the site, Officer McEwen knocked on the front door and
      announced, “Police.” [] Aviles opened the door and was informed
      that the police were requesting entry into the house. Consent was
      given. All those present were advised to remain calm and that
      the police had a search warrant. At this time, [] Aviles addressed
      Officer McEwen: “She said don’t talk to anyone else, talk to me.
      This is my place.”

      A team of officers conducted a search of the premises. Within 10
      minutes of their arrival, Officer McEwen was called to the second
      floor, rear bedroom and Officer Tames pointed to an open dresser
      drawer containing a brown metal box. The box was found to
      contain [drugs and drug paraphernalia, including plastic packets
      containing white powder and sealed with gold tape, sandwich bags

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     containing white powder, a glass bottle containing white powder,
     and grinders and a screen containing white residue].

     Officer Tames stated that the door to the rear bedroom was open
     and he “did not break any lock.” With regard to the metal box,
     Officer Tames testified: [“W]hen I got the box out of the drawer
     . . . it was closed and I just pulled this [latch] up like that and
     opened it. . . . I didn’t pry it open. I just opened it.[”]

     Then, Officer McEwen proceeded to the second bedroom, which
     was the middle bedroom on the same floor. There[, Officer]
     McEwen observed Sergeant Perez “on his hands and knees
     removing floorboards . . . from the eastern-most wall of that
     room.” Retrieved from under the floor was an “open toolbox”
     containing $10,538 in cash. [Officer] McEwen also found a second
     box in the middle bedroom which contained[ a scale, an electric
     heat-sealer with a plug, two strainers, a screen, hundreds of
     empty, clear plastic packets, and twelve rolls of gold tape.]

     Sergeant Perez was the first officer to enter the middle bedroom,
     and, in respect thereto, he stated that he did not have to force the
     door open to get in: “The door [he] went into, to get into the
     room, [he] didn’t break.”

     The police found proof that Aviles resided at the stated address.
     Likewise, [] Aviles admitted being the lessee and that, for
     approximately 5 years prior to the search, she had rented the rear
     and middle bedrooms for $35 a week to supplement her receipt
     of $474 a month from the Department of Public Welfare. She and
     her [three] children slept on the second floor, front bedroom[,]
     next to the middle and rear bedrooms[ in which the drugs and
     paraphernalia were found].

     [] Aviles testified that the rear and middle bedrooms had been
     rented to her sister [] and brother-in-law [] from the beginning of
     December, 1988 until the police arrived. She denied having any
     knowledge of the drugs, the location of the drug paraphernalia[,]
     or the sawed-out floor-compartment wherein the money was
     hidden.

     It was [the belief of Aviles’ son,] Jorge[,] that the sawed-out floor-
     boards in the middle bedroom had been perpetrated by the police
     during their search since, he claimed, no such opening existed
     prior thereto. This was confirmed by Aviles' sister[,] who rented
     the same two bedrooms from 1987 until 1988 and noticed no
     floorboards having been sawed through and used as a storage

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J-S24030-23

      area. On the other hand, the police testified to the contrary:
      [Officer] McEwen “didn't observe any sawdust or fresh type
      markings [in the floorboards]. They appeared to be well worn[,
      i.e., he] wouldn’t say it was recently cut.”

      Lastly, Aviles testified that locks were placed on the doors to the
      rear and middle bedrooms by her sister immediately upon renting
      the rooms; she denied having any keys to the locks; she denied
      selling drugs; and she did not know about the metal boxes or the
      hole in the floor in the middle bedroom or its contents.

Id. at 399–401.

      A three-judge panel of this Court, with one dissent, reversed Aviles’

judgment of sentence. On petition of the Commonwealth, we granted en banc

review. Applying the principles enunciated in Mudrick, supra, the Court en

banc concluded that, “when viewed under the totality of the circumstances

and drawing all reasonable inferences therefrom[,] bounded only by the

‘realities’ of drug activity and its attendant variables,” the evidence was

sufficient to prove that Aviles had joint control over, and equal access to, the

areas where the contraband was found. Aviles, 615 A.2d at 403.

      The factfinder could properly find that [] Aviles and her sub-
      lessees not only had control and access to all the bedrooms[,] but
      the whole residence. Thus, analyzing all the circumstances, the
      trial court could infer [] Aviles’ constructive possession of the
      cocaine, drug paraphernalia[,] and money[,] which were openly
      accessible to her in the rear and middle bedrooms.

Id. (emphasis in original)

      Here, as in Aviles, no contraband was discovered in the bedroom

identified as belonging to the defendant.     Nevertheless, in both cases, the

defendant had unrestricted access to all of the areas in which contraband was

found.   Indeed, the facts here are more compelling than in Aviles, as

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contraband was found not only in unlocked, freely accessible bedrooms

belonging to other residents, but throughout the other common areas of the

house. In the matter sub judice, Davis had unfettered access to the two other

second-floor bedrooms adjacent to his, in which large amounts of cash,

ammunition, drug paraphernalia, a drug ledger, and drug packaging materials

were found. He had similarly free access to the living room and its closet, in

which cash and drug paraphernalia were found, some in plain view on the

coffee table.   Finally, property belonging to Davis, including an expired

identification card and medial marijuana containers, was found in the

basement common area, in which marijuana and luggage containing plastic

bags with marijuana residue were also found. And, although evidence tended

to show that the basement bedroom belonged to Kyle Oliver, Davis also had

unfettered access to that room, in which firearms, ammunition, approximately

$1,400 in cash, and at least three pounds of marijuana were uncovered.

      In light of the foregoing, viewed in the light most favorable to the

Commonwealth and drawing all reasonable inferences therefrom, “bounded

only by the ‘realities’ of drug activity and its attendant variables,” id. at 403,

the jury could have reasonably concluded that Davis had joint control and

equal access to the areas in which the contraband was found and intent to

exercise that control and, thus, that he was in constructive possession of the

contraband. See Mudrick, supra.

      Order reversed. Convictions reinstated. Case remanded for sentencing.

Jurisdiction relinquished.

                                     - 23 -
J-S24030-23

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 8/18/2023

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