Court Opinion

ID: 9778960
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 21:28:17.299943+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:16.716889
License: Public Domain

DORSEY, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The Castillos admitted during oral argument that they had not proven the elements of a legal malpractice claim based on negligence. There was no evidence of a critical element of their cause of action against the defendant: that they would have won the underlying suit for medical malpractice had it been filed by the defendant. And yet, the Castillos assert that they have suffered compensable mental anguish due to their attorney’s misrepresentations and the resulting loss of their “day in *319court.” The Castillos should not be allowed to recover mental anguish damages for their lawyer’s negligent failure to file a medical malpractice claim without evidence they would have been successful had it been filed.
The majority states that a knowing violation of the DTPA is sufficient to support the recovery of mental anguish damages, even in the absence of other physical or economic damages. Lone Star Ford, Inc. v. Hill, 879 S.W.2d 116, 120 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no writ). However, “[w]e must look to the substance of the cause of action and not necessarily the manner in which it was pleaded.” Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Reed, 711 S.W.2d 617, 617-18 (Tex.1986). The case at bar is essentially a legal malpractice suit. Therefore, while I agree that a knowing violation of the DTPA is sufficient to support mental anguish damages in the absence of economic loss, it is not an appropriate rule of law in the present case.
An attorney malpractice suit requires proof of four elements: (1) the existence of a duty; (2) the breach of that duty; (8) that the breach was a proximate cause of damages; and (4) that the plaintiff was damaged. Cosgrove v. Grimes, 774 S.W.2d 662, 665 (Tex.1989). The law requires a necessary showing of a causal relation between the act complained of and the injury sustained. Brown v. Edwards Transfer Co., 764 S.W.2d 220, 223-24 (Tex.1988). The proper measure of damages in a legal malpractice case is those damages that would have been collectible but for the negligence of the attorney. Gibson v. Johnson, 414 S.W.2d 235, 238-39 (Tex.Civ.App.—Tyler 1967, writ refd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 946, 88 S.Ct. 1032, 19 L.Ed.2d 1135 (1968). Mental anguish damages are recoverable in legal malpractice actions. Cosgrove, 774 S.W.2d at 666. I do not think that mental anguish damages alone will support an award for legal malpractice under the common law.
When a client sues his attorney on the ground that the attorney by his malpractice caused the loss of the cause of action, the burden of proof is on the client to prove that his original suit would have been successful but for the negligence of the attorney and to show what amount would have been collectible had he recovered the judgment. Mackie v. McKenzie, 900 S.W.2d 445, 448-49 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1995, writ denied); Jackson v. Urban, Coolidge, Pennington & Scott, 516 S.W.2d 948, 949 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1974, writ refd n.r.e.).
I see no reason to allow mental anguish damages in the absence of economic loss under a DTPA action when it is not allowed at common law. The injury required for each cause of action should be the same. The only distinction between the DTPA action and one allowed at common law is that in the latter the defendant failed to file the action, and thus violated a duty, while under the DTPA he represented that he would file the action. That is no significant difference. The requirement of economic damage should be the same for both.
The Castillos produced no evidence that appellee’s malpractice or misrepresentation caused them any economic damages. Under these circumstances, where there has been no economic loss, mental anguish damages alone are inappropriate, both under the common law and the DTPA. I would therefore affirm the trial court’s instructed verdict in favor of appellee.