Court Opinion

ID: 9724006
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:40:55.282874+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:54.185204
License: Public Domain

STEINMETZ, J.
(concurring). The majority has ignored both the plain meaning of sec. 895.04(7), Stats., and this court's proper interpretation of that statute in Rineck v. Johnson, 155 Wis. 2d 659, 667-68, 456 N.W.2d 336 (1990). Nonetheless, based on the facts in this case, the majority has reached the correct conclusion. Hence, I concur with the opinion of the majority.
Section 895.04(7) provides as follows:
Damages found by a jury in excess of the maximum amount specified in sub. (4) shall be reduced by the court to such maximum. The aggregate of the damages covered by subs. (4) and (5) shall be diminished under s. 895.045 if the deceased or person entitled to recover is found negligent.
This statute clearly mandates a specific procedure for courts to follow in wrongful death cases. First, if the jury award for loss of society and companionship exceeds the damage cap provided under sec. 895.04(4), Stats., a court must reduce the award to this statutory maximum. Then, if the party recovering these damages was contributorily negligent, the court must further reduce the award pursuant to sec. 895.045, Stats., the contributory negligence statute. This court properly interpreted sec. 895.04(7) as mandating this procedure in Rineck, 155 Wis. 2d at 667-68: "Under sec. 895.04(7), reduction of noneconomic damages to the statutory limit precedes reduction for comparative *580fault." (Emphasis added.) We went on, in Rineck, to provide an example where the results differ if a court applies the two reductions in the opposite order.
The majority has ignored the language of the statute and our analysis in Rineck and held that courts should apply the two reductions in the opposite order. According to the majority, a court should first reduce a jury award due to the claimant's contributory negligence pursuant to sec. 895.045, Stats. Only then, the majority holds, should a court apply the damage cap in sec. 895.04(4), Stats. The majority has switched the order mandated by sec. 895.04(7), Stats., under the guise of merely withdrawing the relevant language from Rineck. Withdrawing language from Rineck does not change the plain meaning of the statute. The majority offers no compelling reason to change this court's earlier, correct interpretation of sec. 895.04(7).
However, in this case, both the majority's interpretation and the interpretation mandated by the plain meaning of the statute — as expressed in Rineck — produce the same result. According to the majority, both the mother, Sae Lor Chang, and the father, Vang Chang, are in the class of possible beneficiaries under sec. 895.04(4), Stats. Applying the contributory negligence statute first, as the majority suggests, a court would hold that Vang Chang's claim is barred by sec. 895.045, Stats. Because Sae Lor Chang was not negligent, her claim would not be reduced at all in this first step. By stipulation, the parties have agreed that Sae Lor Chang would be entitled to "the maximum damages allowed to her under Wisconsin's Wrongful Death Statute ... for loss of society and companionship of her son." At the time of the accident, the statutory maximum was $50,000. A court would next apply the damage cap provision in *581sec. 895.04(4) and hold that Sae Lor Chang is entitled to recover the full $50,000.
The proper analysis would produce the same result. Only one party, Sae Lor Chang, is claiming damages in this case. First, her damages should be reduced to the statutory maximum, $50,000, pursuant to sec. 895.04(4), Stats. Second, pursuant to sec. 895.045, Stats., a court should reduce this award based on her negligence. Sae Lor Chang was not negligent. Hence, she is entitled to the full $50,000.
In cases in which a contributorily negligent party brings a claim for loss of society and companionship, the majority's analysis will produce different results from the analysis properly described in Rineck. For the purpose of the following example, assume the $50,000 damage cap is in place. If a jury finds that a plaintiff was 50 percent negligent and finds that $100,000 would compensate the plaintiff for her loss of society and companionship, the majority would award the plaintiff $50,000. First, the majority would reduce the $100,000 jury award to $50,000 based on the plaintiffs contributory negligence. Then, the majority would apply the $50,000 damage cap and award the plaintiff the entire $50,000.
Under the analysis clearly intended by the legislature, the plaintiff would recover $25,000. First, a court must reduce the $100,000 to $50,000 pursuant to the damage cap in sec. 895.04(4), Stats. Then, the court must apply the contributory negligence statute and reduce this $50,000 to $25,000 because of the plaintiffs 50 percent negligence. This analysis would produce the appropriate recovery based on these facts, $25,000.
The majority also needlessly addresses a second issue, the allocation of damages among the members of a class of beneficiaries defined in sec. 895.04(4) Stats. *582In this case, only one party claimed damages pursuant to sec. 895.04(4). Hence, no allocation is necessary and this second issue is not before the court. The majority's holding as to the first issue disposes of this entire appeal. The majority's analysis regarding this second issue is unnecessary dicta that should be left for another day.
The majority ignores the clear legislative mandate of sec. 895.04(7), Stats. In addition, the majority addresses an issue that is not properly before the court. However, because the majority does come to the proper conclusion, I concur with the opinion of the majority.
I am authorized to state that Mr. Justice Jon P. Wilcox joins this concurring opinion.