Court Opinion

ID: 9719852
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:06:53.93946+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:33.453337
License: Public Domain

Edwards, J.
This is a suit under the wrongful death act brought by a father acting as special administrator of the estate of his deceased 15-year-old daughter.
The declaration alleged that the girl’s death was caused by the negligence of the defendant Ogemaw county board of road commissioners in failing to keep a county road reasonably fit and safe for travel, in violation of its statutory duty. See OLS 1956, § 242.1 (Stat Ann 1958 Rev § 9.591).
Evidence at the trial showed the existence of a large hole in the west half of Damon road, in Ogemaw county, south of the crest of Darling hill, that the hole had been there for some months prior to the date in question, and that defendant had actual knowledge of its existence.
Plaintiff’s daughter was a passenger in an automobile traveling south on Damon road on the night of November 6,1953. The car she was in struck the hole referred to, went out of control and swerved into the left-hand lane where it collided head-on with an automobile being driven in the opposite direction. Plaintiff’s daughter and 3 other persons in the car were killed.
The case was tried before an Ogemaw county jury which brought in a verdict of $12,072 in favor of plaintiff.
*485Subsequent to verdict, defendant-appellee sought and obtained a new trial on the ground that the judge incorrectly charged the. jury on the issue of damages by allowing the jury to consider loss of possible contributions, due to parental dependency, which the minor child might otherwise have made subsequent to her 21st birthday.
On appeal, the issue is presented to us thus:
“In the event of the wrongful death of a minor, may the jury consider and award damages for -pecuniary injuries’ suffered by the surviving parents after the period of the child’s minority?”
The testimony pertaining to pecuniary damages upon which the jury apparently based its award may. be summarized under 3 headings:
(1) Funeral expenses of $800.27 — stipulated.
(2) Loss of services. This item was estimated by plaintiff at $10,000 when asked for a bill of particulars pertaining to his $25,000 damage clause. The testimony presented in relation to the daughter’s services included the following:
At the time of death; decedent was 15 years old. She was an intelligent, healthy girl, completing her high school requirements. She earned money as a baby-sitter and contributed to her parents, on an average, $5 to $5.50 per week. Decedent’s father suffered from heart trouble, arthritis and hardening of the arteries, sufficiently incapacitating him so that he had been unemployed since 1948. The principal source of family income was derived from earnings of decedent’s mother, a cook in a restaurant. In order for the mother to retain this employment, the daughter performed cooking, washing and general housework for the family to the extent of 4 to 6 hours of work each day.
(3) Loss of prospective contributions beyond the age of 21,
*486In addition to the facts recited above, decedent’s-father testified:
“Q. Mr. Thompson, do you know what was planned' for yonr daughter after she would graduate from high school?
“A. She was going to take mother’s place and let. mother come home.
“Q. You mean she was going to work in the restaurant?
“A. Yes. * * *
“Q. Is that the present job that your wife holds?'
“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. Was Elda agreeable to that plan, sir?
“A. Yes, her and her mother used to talk about it. She used to tell her mother she could cook just as-good as she could.
“Q. Then your wife, what was she going to do at that time ?
“A. She was supposed to come home. * * *
“Q. At the time of the death of your daughter, Mr.. Thompson, were you in need of her help both services and contributions ?
“A. Yes. * * *
“Q. Now, Mr. Thompson, in your opinion, under the family circumstances as you have described them here, would you have been in need of your daughter’s services and money contributions even after she-reached the age of 21 years if she had lived ? * * *
“A. Yes.”
The court’s charge on the issue of damages concerned 3 elements: (1) Funeral expenses; (2) The loss of services of the deceased during her minority; and (3) The loss of her future contributions after the 21st birthday.
This appeal pertains to the claimed invalidity of the charge regarding this third element. The trial judge’s words follow:
“Now so far as damages that you may find after she would have reached the age of 21 years, they *487would be computed and allowed for such period of time as you may find a condition of dependency on the part of the parents to exist, taking into consideration the fact that she might he relieved of such dependency by inability after age 21 through her own death, sickness or otherwise to contribute to her parents ; and taking into consideration the fact that sueh dependency would cease in any event at such time as you may determine from the age, condition of health and life expectancy of her parents that they or the surviving survivor of them would die. Again I caution you that it is the present worth of these various amounts, as I have explained it to you, that it is essential to find.”
The trial judge’s charge also defined pecuniary injury:
“Pecuniary loss means the money loss, the money injury caused by such death. Now in that connection I might also say that the law does not provide for any damages for sentimental reasons. It uses the word ‘pecuniary’ which distinguishes it from those other matters which are matters of sentiment, of love and affection and of companionship, and those sort of things which are always present when anyone dies, but the law refers to pecuniary injury.”
The question presented by this appeal requires interpretation of the meaning of the Michigan wrongful death act. CL 1948, §§ 691.581, 691.582 (Stat Ann 1957 Cum Supp §§ 27.711, 27.712).* The controlling *488statutory language in relation to this case is, “in every such action the court or jury may give such damages, as, the court or jury, shall deem fair and just, with reference to the pecuniary injury resulting from such death.”
■ The trial judge in granting defendant’s motion for new trial .held that he had erred in his jury instruction by allowing consideration of possible future contributions to her parents by this minor after the age of 21.
The statute and Michigan case law interpreting it allow consideration of loss of services of a minor in determining pecuniary injury of a parent. Black v. Michigan Central R. Co., 146 Mich 568; Sceba v. Manistee R. Co., 189 Mich 308 (LRA1918C, 1090) ; Morris v. Radley, 306 Mich 689; Rajnowski v. Detroit, Bay City & Alpena R. Co., 74 Mich 20; Hurst v. Detroit City Railway, 84 Mich 539.
There is, however, a clear distinction between the services of a minor and the contributions of an adult son or daughter to a dependent parent. Such contributions are more than a moral obligation. Under proper circumstances an adult son or daughter may be ordered to contribute such support. CL 1948 and CLS 1956, § 401.1 et seq. (Stat Ann 1950 Rev and 1957 Cum Supp § 16.121 et seq.).
The pecuniary value of such obligation, voluntarily assumed, has been recognized in Michigan case law. *489In the ease of a dependent parent, proofs that a son 23 years of age had voluntarily undertaken and continued support were held to allow the jury to consider whether or not there was reasonable expectation of continued support in determining damages arising from the son’s death. Judis v. Borg-Warner Corporation, 339 Mich 313. See, also, MacDonald v. Quimby, 350 Mich 21.
A large majority of State courts hold that recovery may be had for the loss of benefits reasonably to be expected after the majority of the deceased. Inspiration Consolidated Copper Co. v. Bryan, 35 Ariz 285 (276 P 846); Bohrman v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 23 NJ Super 399 (93 A2d 190); Foerster v. Direito, 75 Cal App2d 323 (170 P2d 986). See, also, Van Cleave v. Lynch, 109 Utah 149 (166 P2d 244); annotation, 14 ALR2d 485, Measure and elements of damages for personal injury resulting in death of infant.
We do not believe that the age of the child at death (whether before or after majority) is decisive as to consideration of loss of possible future support after the 21st birthday. Nothing in the Michigan statute pertaining to wrongful death suggests such a distinction. CL 1948, § 691.581 et seq. (Stat Ann 1957 Cum Supp § 27.711 et seq.). The language of the Judis and MacDonald Cases suggest that the test is reasonable expectation of support rather than any particular age at the time of death.
We note that the trial judge felt that the language contained in Covell v. Colburn, 308 Mich 240, required him to grant the motion for new trial. Although we read the facts therein as quite different from these, to the extent that the Covell Case suggests a different conclusion, it is overruled.
While this decides the basic legal question presented in this appeal some comment may be desirable in this case upon the most difficult of all questions involved in wrongful death cases — how definite must *490the evidence bearing upon pecuniary injury be to support a jury award?
It must be recognized at this point that some uncertainty of proof is implicit in the terms of the statute we seek to interpret. The pecuniary injury contemplated by the act requires consideration of the probability of the happening of events which, as of the date of trial, have been permanently barred by the intervention of death.
Briefly put, there can be no such thing as direct evidence of future support when the supporter is dead. This fact alone guarantees that no testimony can be offered in proof of otherwise probable future support or contribution which completely avoids speculation. Indeed the only certainty in relation to such testimony is that no one will ever be able to prove or disprove its validity. It is perhaps for this reason that the statute places emphasis upon “such damages as the court or jury shall deem fair and just.”
Lack of proofs of an exact quality should not, however, be allowed to defeat the legislative purpose. The Michigan wrongful death act is a remedial measure designed to alleviate the harsh provisions of the common law which has generally been interpreted as forbidding compensation for wrongful death.* Mr. *491Justice Cardozo, writing for the United States supreme court in relation to a similar enactment, offered this guide for judicial interpretation:
“Death statutes have their roots in dissatisfaction with the archaisms of the law which have been traced to their origin in the course of this opinion. It would be a misfortune if a narrow or grudging process of construction were to exemplify and perpetuate the very evils to he remedied. There are times when uncertain words are to be wrought into consistency and unity with a legislative policy which is itself a source of the law, a new generative impulse transmitted to the legal system. ‘The legislature has the power to decide what the policy of the law shall be, and if it has intimated its will, however indirectly, that will should be recognized and obeyed.’ Its intimation is clear enough in the statutes now before us that their effects shall not be stifled, without the warrant of clear necessity by the perpetuation of a policy which now has had its day.” Van Beeck v. Sabine Towing Co., 300 US 342, 350, 351 (57 S Ct 452, 81 L ed 685).
Fortunately for purposes of our present decision, this case does not present the wrongful death problem in its most difficult form as did Courtney v. Apple, 345 Mich 223, which recently divided this Court. There is no need here to consider a presumption as to damages. There is substantial evidence tending to prove the pecuniary injury present in the instant case.
Among the important facts we note these’: The father of the family was unemployable. The deceased was a healthy and intelligent 15-year-old. She had proved to be a willing worker. She earned money outside the home and contributed it to the family support. She performed household work which freed the mother as a wage earner. The need of this family *492could reasonably be forecast into the future as could a continuation of the daughter’s help and contribution.
It may, of course, be suggested that coincident with or preceding her majority would come a probability of marriage and other responsibilities which would tend to decrease her opportunity to help. This possibility was, we are certain, as much available to the minds of the jurors as it is to ours. Another consideration equally clear from human experience, and equally available to the jurors, is the probability of increased need for and possibility of assistance in the later years of paternal life when a son’s or daughter’s circumstances are likely to be more stable than in the days of early marriage.
The jury awarded $12,072. Much of this sum is justified by the funeral expenses plus the value of the services of the girl up to majority.
It is obvious that the trial judge felt that if consideration could legally be given to possible contributions beyond the 21st birthday the evidence was sufficient to support the jury award.
We agree with him in this regard. We do not think the award went beyond the stated purpose of the statute or the legitimate limits of the evidence. What the jury deemed “fair and just” compensation for pecuniary injury to this plaintiff finds support in this record.
Reversed and remanded for entry of judgment based on the jury verdict. Costs to appellant.
Smith, Black, Voelker, and Kavanagh, JJ., concurred with Edwards, J.

 The relevant portions of the statute follow:
“Be it enacted by the senate and house of representatives of the State of Michigan, whenever the death of a person or injuries resulting in death, shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect or default, and the act, neglect or default is sueh as would (if death: had not ensued) have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages, in respect thereof, then and in every sueh; case, the person who, or the corporation whieh would have been: liable, if death had not ensued, shall be liable to an action fori damages, notwithstanding the death of the person injured, and although the death shall have been caused under sueh eireumstanees as amount in law to felony. All actions for such death, or injuries *488resulting in deatli, shall hereafter be brought only under this aet.” CL 1948, § 691.581 (Stat Ann 1957 Cum Supp § 27.711).
“Every sueh action shall be brought by, and in the names of, the personal representatives of sueh deceased person, and in every sueh action the court or jury may give sueh damages, as, the court or jury, shall deem fair and just, with reference to the pecuniary injury resulting from sueh death, to those persons who may be entitled to such damages when recovered and also damages for the reasonable medical, hospital, funeral and burial expenses for which the estate is liable and reasonable compensation for the pain and suffering, while conscious, undergone by such deceased person during the period intervening between the time of the inflicting of such injuries and his death.” CL 1948, § 691.582 (Stat Ann 1957 Chm Supp § 27.712).

 The source of the rule is usually attributed to a statement made by Lord Chief Justice Ellcnborough in a ease decided in 1808. In Baker v. Bolton, 1 Camp 493 (170 Eng Rep 1033), he said: “In a civil court the death of a human being could not be complained of as an injury; and in this ease the damages as to the plaintiff’s wife must stop with the period of her existence.”
Indeed, the preamble to Lord Campbell’s act, 9 and 10 Vict c 93, begins with this language: “Whereas no action at law is now maintainable against a person, who by his wrongful act, neglect, or default, may have caused the death of another person.”
The historic origin of this strange rule apparently lay in exclusively criminal nature of actions for wrongful death. One of the penalties was forfeiture to the crown of all goods and chattels of the wrongdoer — thus effectively eliminating any civil action on the part of survivors.
Eor an interesting discussion of historic background, see Simp*491son v. Beardsley, Muskegon county circuit court No 14,769, Noel Fox, circuit judge. (Opinion available in State law library.)