Court Opinion

ID: 9520170
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:32:32.201068+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:45:41.450256
License: Public Domain

*690Dissenting Opinion
Hunter, J.
— I respectfully dissent from the holding within Issue One of the majority opinion. The majority has concluded that Harrison’s confession was voluntary because the inducement made by the prosecutor was not improper in that the substance of the prosecutor’s comment was vague and ambiguous and, thus, not the sort of remark prohibited by Ashby v. State, (1976) 265 Ind. 316, 354 N.E.2d 192. However, I feel the evidence shows that the prosecutor’s comment was understood by the defendant as a promise even though it was stated in broad terms.
Harrison turned himself in. The evidence was uncontradicted that Harrison had inferior verbal comprehension skills, both reading and speaking. In fact, the trial judge suppressed Harrison’s written statement because he found that Harrison had not read the statement. There is no evidence in the record that Harrison ever understood the waiver of rights which was read to him. In fact, after an officer twice read defendant’s rights to him, the defendant still indicated that he did not understand. It was only after the defendant’s friend Lilly read the defendant his rights the third time and stated to the defendant that “the consideration and leniencies would come later,” that Harrison signed the waiver. Since the defendant was not represented by an attorney at this time, and since the officer was on notice that the defendant did not clearly understand his rights, the questioning should have been discontinued until Harrison consulted with an attorney. See Pirtle v. State, (1975) 263 Ind. 16, 323 N.E.2d 634. In addition, the officer should not have silently acquiesced in Lilly’s assurances to the defendant.
Under the test set out in Ashby v. State, supra, it is clear that a confession is inadmissible if it was obtained by a promise of immunity or mitigation of punishment. An implied promise may destroy the voluntariness of the confession in the same way as a direct promise. See: Shotwell Manufacturing Co. v. United States, (1963) 371 U.S. 341, 83 S.Ct. 448, *6919 L.Ed.2d 357; Smith v. United States, (1954) 348 U.S. 147, 75 S.Ct. 194, 99 L.Ed. 192; Sorenson v. United States, (8th Cir. 1906) 143 F. 820.
The burden is on the state to prove that the confession or waiver was voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt. Burton v. State, (1973) 260 Ind. 94, 292 N.E.2d 790.
Justice DeBruler pointed out in Ashby v. State, supra, that:
“[I]n considering whether the State has met its burden, ‘We will consider the evidence which supports the decision of the trier of fact in the case of contested evidence, and any uncontested evidence presented by the appellant.’ ”
Citing Magley v. State, (1975) 263 Ind. 618, 335 N.E.2d 811, 818. 265 Ind. 316, 321, 354 N.E.2d 192, 195.
The evidence before us in this case was uncontested in the following particulars:
1. The defendant at first stated to the police that he had been promised a deal in exchange for his statement.
2. Lilly stated, in front of police officers, that there was a deal made, but the police could not come right out and say it; the police officers did not correct Lilly or warn the defendant that Lilly had misinterpreted any “promises.” The police acquiesced.
3. Officer Bagbey told the defendant he expected that the defendant’s assistance in voluntarily coming forward would be taken into consideration at the time formal charges were filed.
4. Officer Bagbey said he was told by Chief Deputy Prosecutor Kissinger to tell the defendant he “could entertain reasonable expectations that your cooperation could benefit you . . . could be of benefit to you.”
5. Officer Bagbey read that statement to the defendant before the defendant’s statement was taken.
6. Chief Deputy Prosecutor Kissinger testified that he told Officer Bagbey to tell the defendant that “he could enter*692tain a reasonable expectation of his assistance to the police at this time would be of some benefit to him in the future.”
7. Chief Deputy Prosecutor Kissinger characterized the statement as “open ended”; Officer Bagbey was instructed to avoid making any specific statements or promises of leniency because it might taint the statement the defendant might make and thus render it useless at trial.
I am fully aware that Lilly’s presence at Harrison’s interrogation contributed to the confusion surrounding the voluntariness of the statement. However, I am also aware that the police were conducting an in-custodial interrogation of the defendant; they were bound to protect defendant’s constitutional rights, and still they acquiesced in Lilly’s expressed understanding that a deal was promised.
The defendant was entirely too trusting in this case; that is obvious. The case was unsolved when defendant came forth. But the state, instead of laying its cards on the table and saying, “We can make no promises,” appeared intentionally to utilize language which was open-ended at its best and misleading at its worst. Furthermore, the police were clearly aware that the defendant in this case had trouble understanding the written waiver form and that he had inferior verbal skills. Yet they made no extra efforts to insure that his confession was voluntarily given.
The majority points to the decision of this Court in Ortiz v. State, (1976) 265 Ind. 549, 356 N.E.2d 1188. In that case there were questionable inducing statements made, but in this case the evidence is uncontested that an inducing statement was made to the defendant in the presence of the police.
Our function is the administration of justice and our goal is the truth. But the truth must be obtained within the law. The defendant was not bound by our laws to incriminate himself, yet he did that in order partially to right the wrong that had been done. When the police stood silently by as Lilly “explained” to the defendant that deals and leniencies would *693result from his statement, the silent acquiescence provided a basis for defendant’s reliance upon the complicated statement of the prosecutor regarding the reasonable expectation that his cooperation would benefit him.
I fear that by decisions such as this one, we may be approaching a position that approves collusive conduct between police and the prosecutor’s staff to mislead and confuse defendants as to the existence of possible deals. In this case the police appear to have induced a confession with vague promises, the imprecise nature of which was beyond the comprehension of the defendant. The confession so induced was not voluntarily given, and it should have been suppressed.
I would reverse and order a new trial.
Note. — Reported at 382 N.E.2d 920.