Court Opinion

ID: 9586683
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:14:01.545038+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:32:47.470714
License: Public Domain

Spratley, J.,
dissenting:
I find myself unable to agree with the opinion of the majority. I think it contrary to the plain provisions of the statutes involved, and to the principles and precepts of Rudisill v. Rodes, (1877) 70 Va. (29 Gratt.) 147, which have been accepted and approved by eminent jurists, lawyers, legal writers and many courts.* The result of the majority opinion is to reverse the decision in the Rudisill case, supra, decided eighty years ago, after the adoption of provisions in Code of 1849, which have remained unchanged to this day.
Here we have a second will dated January 31, 1955, duly executed, wherein testatrix expressly declaring her intention to revoke all former wills by her made. It is clear that she did not intend her former will dated October 29, 1954, to stand, both by that declared intention and by her different property disposals in the two instruments. The execution of the second will was the last testamentary act of the testatrix. Thereafter, she told a friend that she intended to execute a new will, and on some unnamed date she presumptively destroyed the second instrument. She did not later make a new will, undertake to revise, or to re-execute either of the two wills she had made, in any of the methods provided by statute.
The facts present the question: Did the destruction of the second will destroy the declared intent of the testatrix therein to revoke her *959first will and thereby leave alive and vital the first will as her true last will and testament?
Code, §§ 64-59 and 64-60 are so intermingled that it is necessary to give consideration to each of them and to their historical background.
The prototype of Code § 64-59 has been on the statute books of Virginia almost since the birth of the State. Code § 64-60 first appeared as section 9, Chapter 122, Code of 1849, and next as section 9, Chapter 118, Code of 1873.
Prior to the general revisal of the laws of this State in 1849, it was generally held in the common law courts that the destruction, animo revocandi, of a will containing a revocatory clause, a former preserved uncancelled will was thereby revived, and no proof to the contrary was allowed. In the ecclesiastical courts, the revival or restoration of the former will was made to depend on the intention of the testator and parol evidence was admissible to show the intention. Rudisill v. Rodes, supra. 70 Va. 149.
In the Rudisill case, supra, decided after the enactment of statutes identical with Code §§ 64-59 and 64-60, the testator had executed three wills, the second and third containing clauses revoking former wills, and destroyed the last will with the intent to revoke it. The court held that the second will, though retained uncancelled by the testator, “had been revoked by the subsequent will of said decedent * * * and was not revived by the destruction, animo revocandi, of the last named will;”. 70 Va., supra, 152.
In that case the court cited Bates v. Holman, (1809) 13 Va. (3 Hen. & M.) 502, and in referring to the difference between the rule in the common law and ecclesiastical courts, said:
“The effect of the rule in the law courts was to exclude arbitrarily all extrinsic evidence of intention upon the question of revival, and thus oftentimes to set up a will contrary to the intention of the testator; while the rule in the ecclesiastical courts threw the door wide open to the admission of such evidence, and suffered the intention of the testator to be determined by ‘the uncertain testimony of slippery memory.’
“It was the object of the English statute by the 22nd section, (from which § 9 of Chapter 122, Code of 1849, now § 64-60, Code 1950, was taken) to abrogate both of these rules, which were attended with the mischiefs just indicated, and to establish in their stead a safer rule, by which the intention of the testator would be manifested *960with more certainty, and be less liable to be defeated by acts and circumstances of an equivocal character.”
Cited in support is an English case where testatrix executed a will, and subsequently two other wills, each containing a clause revoking all former wills, and later destroyed the last two wills, where it was held that the first will was revoked by the last two wills and was not revived by the destruction of the two wills.
In Bates v. Holman, supra, a testator made two wills at different times. He added a postscript to the second will, by which he “revoked all former wills” and signed the postscript. He can-celled the second will by cutting his name from the body of it; but left the signed postscript intact. The first will was preserved by the testator. The court held the signed holographic postscript to be a separate and independent instrument unconnected with the second will and operated to revoke the first will. There were vigorous dissents by two judges who considered the postscript to be a part of the will, and that it died when the second will was destroyed.
It will be here observed that there was no revocation of the revoking instrument as in the case before us, and it can hardly be said that the holding there supports the theory that the destruction of a revoking instrument leaves alive a former preserved uncancelled instrument.
In Barksdale v. Barksdale, (1842) 39 Va. (12 Leigh) 535, also decided before the 1849 Code, there was a second writing intended by the testator to be his last will. It contained a clause revoking all other wills. It was attested by only one witness, whereas wills disposing of property had to be witnessed at that time by two persons. It was held that the second writing not having been executed properly as a will was invalid and inoperative, and not being effective as a testamentary disposition, it was not effective as a. revocation of the first will. In that case there was no second will and consequently no question of the effect of revoking a subsequent instrument.
The case of Spinks v. Rice, (1948) 187 Va. 730, 47 S. E. 2d 424, is not in point here. In that case there was no second will. There was a second instrument which contained no revocation clause, but the instrument was not executed in the manner required by law and the maker thereof never destroyed it.
In Bell v. Timmins, 190 Va. 648, 58 S. E. 2d 55, the court held that a second instrument had not been established as a last will and that the evidence was insufficient to establish such a will, and relying upon *961the Barksdale case, supra, permitted the first will to stand. In addition, in discussing a theoretical problem, it was held that in order for the revocation to be effective, it was necessary to be shown that the revocation contemplated by the testator was “not a subsidiary conditional exercise of power,” but an independent subsequent substantive act without reference to the character of the instrument employed.
In Poindexter v. Jones, (1958) 200 Va. 372, 106 S. E. 2d 144, it is sufficient to say that neither of the last two of four wills made by the testatrix contained a revoking clause, “nor did either declare an intention to revoke any previous wills.” In distinguishing the Rudisill case, supra, Mr. Justice Miller pointed out that the will in the Rudisill case “contained a revoking clause; it was a writing ‘declaring an intention to revoke * * ” 200 Va., supra, page 380.
In Hugo v. Clark, (1919) 125 Va. 126, 99 S. E. 521, there was evidence that the testator had duly executed a second will containing an express revocation clause, but the will could not be found. The court held that evidence of its existence should have been admitted in the trial court. On the merits, the decision was based on the principles of the Rudisill case, supra, 125 Va., page 126. Upon the rehearing of that case, Clark v. Hugo, (1921) 130 Va. 99, 107 S. E. 730, the court in extending the rule in the Rudisill case, supra, said: “The legal rules and purposes which must control are decisive and clear. A will is revoked by a subsequent inconsistent will; and after such revocation the destruction of the latter will does not have the effect of reviving the former, even though the testator so intends. Code 1919, § 254, Rudisill v. Rodes, 29 Gratt., (70 Va.) 147.”
It is everywhere recognized that the purpose of the law of wills is to give effect to the last valid testamentary act of the testator. That is true when a testator makes a will and subsequently executes a second valid will, whether the two wills are or are not reconcilable; and I submit that it ought also be true where a testator duly executes a subsequent will declaring an intention to revoke a former will, and then destroys the latter writing.
As Mr. Justice Eggleston, now Chief Justice, said in In Re Will of Bentley, (1940) 175 Va. 456, 462, 463, 9 S. E. 2d 308, 311, where there were two inconsistent wills executed on different dates.
“It is true that both instruments cannot stand. But the first will is revoked by the act of the testator in executing a subsequent will, and not by the judgment of the court in admitting the later will to *962probate. The result flows not from any proceeding attacking the probate of the first will, but from the law which gives vitality and force to the last testamentary act of the testator.” 175 Va., pages 462 and 463. (Emphasis added.)
If the foregoing statement of Justice Eggleston be said to be dictum, “it was the dictum of a distinguished judge, concurred in by the entire court, and is entitled to much respect.” Kent v. Kent, 106 Va. 199, 204, 55 S. E. 564, 566, and Adams v. Cowan, (1933) 160 Va. 1, 168 S. E. 750.
In Adams v. Cowan, supra, 160 Va., the testatrix made two wills. In the first she left the residue of her property to her nephew. In the second she left the residue “to go to the relief of the poor * * Both wills were probated. In a suit for the construction of the two wills it was held that the residuary gift in the second will revoked the residuary gift in the first will, and this resulted in the testatrix dying intestate as to the residue in the second will. Thus, apparently, the court rejected the principle in the Barksdale case, supra (39 Va. 535, 542) with respect to the presumption that “no man * * # has made provision * # * for dying intestate.”
In summary, it should be borne in mind that in the Bates case, supra, there was a subsequent inconsistent will which was cancelled by the testator, and that there was a duly signed postscript to that will which revoked all former wills, but there was no revocation of the postscript. In the Barksdale case, supra, there was no valid second will, and consequently no question of revocation involved. In the Bell case, supra, the making of the second will was not established, and consequently there was no question involving the revocation of the first will. The Bates and Barksdale cases, supra, were decided before the revision of the Code in 1849. Moreover, since in the Bates case there was no revocation of the revoking instrument, it cannot be said to support the view that the revocation of a revoking instrument restores a revoked instrument.
In the case before us the trial court gave no consideration to § 64-60, which section was expressly held in the Rudisill case, supra, to have changed the rules of law in effect prior to the revisal of the general laws in force before 1849.
The provisions of § 64-59 and § 64-60 are simple, clear, and positive. Section 64-59 provides how a will may be revoked. Section 64-60 provides how and when a will “in any manner revoked” may be revived. The latter section eliminates any distinction between *963the effect of a testamentary act of revocation and a separate and independent act.
In § 64-59 no difference is made between a will, or a codicil, or a writing, containing a revocation clause, as to the time when such a clause and either type of instrument becomes effective; and there is no indication that the legislature intended to make a difference. There is no provision that the revocation of a prior will is conditioned upon the existence of a subsequent will containing a revocation clause at the death of the testator, or that the second will be admitted to probate in order that its revocation clause can be made effective. If that condition had been provided, a revival statute such as § 64-60 would be useless because the potential survivor, himself, would be past reviving. The act declaring the intention to revoke is the essence and heart of the revocation process, an act which has immediate effect at the time of commission. In Re Will of Bentley, supra, 175 Va.
Moreover, § 64-60, in the employment of the language “in any manner revoked” encompasses all types of revocation in writing, whether by testamentary act or by a separate and independent instrument, duly executed.
A will being ambulatory in its provisions from its very nature constitutes a recognition that a testator may revoke any of its provisions, make a new instrument with new dispositions, or re-execute or republish a former will, in accordance with statutory requirements.
Code, § 64-62 has no application, as I see it, to the question involved in this case. It deals “with reference to the real and personal estate comprised” in a will.
It is all very nice to say that the testatrix here could have destroyed her first will, and that since she did not do so that will remained alive and vital. That she desired the first will to remain alive is contrary to the evidence as declared by her in the execution of the second will, and by her statement that she intended to make a third will. She changed her mind when she made the second will, she changed her mind when she destroyed the second will, and we have no means of knowing whether she subsequently changed her mind again, preferring that her property be disposed of according to the laws of intestacy. May it not be as well presumed that in destroying the subsequent will and in failing to make a new will she elected to die intestate? The intentions of the testatrix with respect to disposal of her property are as ambulatory as are the pro*964visions of a will. I am not inclined to believe that she had any knowledge of the doctrine of dependent relative revocation.
I would reverse the judgment of the trial court and hold that the testatrix revoked her first will on January 31, 1955, when she so declared her intention in her second will. .The first will thus became null and void, and there has been no life breathed into it by a revival thereof under the provisions of § 64-60.
Any doubts as to the wisdom of the rules enacted by statute, and adopted in the Rudisill case, supra, are questions for the legislature to resolve.
I’Anson, J., concurs in this dissent.

 See Volume 1, University of Richmond Law Notes, No. 3, page 147, et seq., “Revocation and Revival of Wills in Virginia,” by James H. Barnett, Jr.; and cf. Note, “Revocation of Wills by Subsequent Instrument,” 46 Virginia Law Review, No. 2, pages 373, et seq.