Court Opinion

ID: 9720929
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:44:55.794445+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:22.369654
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE McDADE, specially concurring: I completely concur with the analysis set forth in the opinion and write separately only to state my belief that the use of stun belts such as the one used on defendant in this case should be completely prohibited in the courtrooms of Illinois. In People v. Boose, 66 Ill. 2d 261, 362 N.E.2d 303 (1977), the Illinois Supreme Court found that shackling should be avoided because it tends to prejudice the jury against the accused, restricts the ability of the accused to assist his counsel, and offends the dignity of the judicial process. Boose, 66 Ill. 2d at 265, 362 N.E.2d at 305. The court then set out a 13-factor test for assessing the “manifest need” for restraints in the presence of a jury. Boose, 66 Ill. 2d at 266, 362 N.E.2d at 305. The dissent argues that defendant must establish “actual prejudice,” citing People v. Peeples, 205 Ill. 2d 480, 531 (2002). 347 Ill. App. 3d at 1007. However, Boose controls this issue and provides the trial court with a clearly defined analysis it must use before shackling a defendant in every case. Nowhere does Boose require the defendant to show actual prejudice. Later that same year, in In re Staley, 67 Ill. 2d 33, 364 N.E.2d 72 (1977), the court considered the propriety of handcuffing a juvenile during an adjudicatory hearing. The State argued that the juvenile was not prejudiced because there was no jury to be affected by seeing him in handcuffs. The court rejected that argument as too narrow, concluding instead that, even where there is no jury, any unnecessary restraint is impermissible because it hinders the defendant’s ability to assist his counsel, runs afoul of the presumption of innocence, and demeans both the defendant and the proceedings. Staley, 67 Ill. 2d at 36-37, 364 N.E.2d at 73-74. Shackling and handcuffing are benign forms of restraint when compared with 50,000 volts of electricity jolting through the human body for a period of eight seconds. If, as the supreme court has found, shackling and handcuffing can impede the defendant’s ability to assist in his defense, run afoul of the presumption of innocence, and demean the defendant and the judicial proceedings, how much more offensive to those rights is a restraint that, when activated, incapacitates the wearer for up to 45 minutes and causes immediate and uncontrollable defecation and urination? I have no trouble at all understanding how a defendant, crippled by the fear that any movement, however harmless, might cause a guard, intentionally or accidentally, to electrify him with the above-described results, would be incapable of focusing on the trial and assisting counsel in presenting a meaningful defense. Surely less draconian restraints have previously proven adequate to control even the most aggressive defendant. Should there be one for whom more measured restraint is completely ineffective, however, it would, in my opinion, be less offensive to due process to have a defendant participate by closed-circuit television or be tried in absentia than to have him or her writhing in agony (and feces and urine) on the courtroom floor. I believe that fundamental principles of due process require a general ban on the use of stun belts in Illinois courts.