Court Opinion

ID: 9927596
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-29 16:01:14.873074+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:53.193245
License: Public Domain

23-649-pr
    Schlosser v. Kwak

                         UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                             FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                               SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL
APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY
CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL.

               At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the
    Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40
    Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 29th day of January, two thousand
    twenty-four.

    PRESENT:
               DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,
                     Chief Judge,
               RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,
               JOSEPH F. BIANCO,
                     Circuit Judges.
    _____________________________________

    Jeffrey Schlosser,

                          Plaintiff-Appellant,
                                                           23-649
                    v.

    Hunchu     Kwak,    Judge,  Individual
    Capacity, Kathleen McNamara, Judge,
    Individual Capacity, Ann Lynch, Judge,
Individual Capacity, Omar Williams,
Judge,    Individual    Capacity,   David
Carlucci, Prosecuting Atty, Individual
Capacity, Charity Hemingway, Assistant
Public Defender, Individual Capacity,
Sara Greene, Individual, Official Capacity,
Milton Walsh, Asst Supervisory Public
Defender, Individual Capacity, Pat
Callahan, Chief Probation Officer,
Individual Capacity, Channon Elzia,
Probation Office, Individual Capacity,
Miriam Mendoza, Probation Officer,
Individual Capacity, Jeffrey Mehias, Chief
Probation Officer, Individual Capacity,
Doe, Chief Public Defender, Dpty Chief
States Atty, States Atty, Individual
Capacity, Adam B. Scott, Asst. Supervisory
States Atty, Individual Capacity, Sarah
Greene, Prosecuting Atty, Individual
Capacity, Doe, Chief Public Defender,
Dpty Chief Public Defender, Public
Defender, Individual Capacity, Doe,
Executive Director CSSD, Director CSSD
Adult Probation, Dpty Director CSSD
Adult Probation, Regional Manager CSSD
Adult Probation, Official Capacity,
Individual,

                  Defendants-Appellees,

Adam B. Scott, Asst. Supervisory States
Atty, Individual Capacity, Cornell Scott,
Grant St Partnership, William Krahe,
                                       2
LCSW, Maura Fisher, APRN, Jason Spann,
LCSW, Dayna Djonne, Midwestern
Connecticut Council on Alcoholism,
(MCCA), Chevier, Ms., Individual, Official
Capacity, Jane Doe, Individual, Official
Capacity,   CSSD,    Adult    Probation,
Department of Corrections, Board of
Pardons and Paroles,

                   Defendants.

_____________________________________

FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT:                                  Jeffrey Schlosser,
                                                          pro se, Suffield, CT.

FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES:                                 No appearance.

      Appeal from an order of the United States District Court for the District of

Connecticut (Stefan R. Underhill, Judge).

      UPON      DUE     CONSIDERATION,          IT   IS   HEREBY       ORDERED,

ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the order of the district court is AFFIRMED.

      Because we write primarily for the parties, we assume familiarity with the

facts, issues, and procedural history, and recite only what is necessary to explain

                                            3
our disposition.    In 2020, plaintiff Jeffrey Schlosser, a Connecticut prisoner

proceeding pro se, sued various officials raising constitutional and statutory

violations claiming, among other allegations, that probation officers unlawfully

disclosed his private health information. The district court screened Schlosser’s

complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and dismissed for failure to state a claim.

Schlosser appealed, and we affirmed the dismissal in a published opinion. See

Schlosser v. Kwak, 16 F.4th 1078, 1081–83 (2d Cir. 2021).

      Almost a year and a half later, in March 2023, Schlosser moved to amend his

complaint and to reopen the judgment. In support, he argued that he had been

denied meaningful access to the state courts and that the district court had

improperly screened his complaint. The district court denied relief, reasoning

that the motion to reopen—which the court construed as arising under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6), and which was filed 32 months after the judgment

was entered—was not filed within a “reasonable time” and was otherwise without

merit. Schlosser v. Kwak, No. 3:20-cv-393, 2023 WL 2758352, at *1–2 (D. Conn. Apr.

3, 2023). Schlosser appealed.

                                          4
      As a threshold matter, we note that Schlosser’s appellate brief focuses at

length on his underlying substantive claims but fails to address the basis for the

district court’s denial of Rule 60(b) relief. We generally do not review the merits

of the underlying judgment in an appeal from a denial of a Rule 60(b) motion filed

more than 28 days after the entry of judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(vi); see

Browder v. Director, Dep’t of Corr., 434 U.S. 257, 263 n.7 (1978); “R” Best Produce, Inc.

v. DiSapio, 540 F.3d 115, 121–22 (2d Cir. 2008). Because Schlosser did not address

the district court’s decisions on the timeliness and merits of his Rule 60(b) motion,

any challenge has been abandoned, and we could affirm on that basis alone. 1 See

LoSacco v. City of Middletown, 71 F.3d 88, 92–93 (2d Cir. 1995) (pro se litigant

abandons issue by failing to address it in his appellate brief).

      Were we to give Schlosser’s brief an extremely liberal construction and

excuse his forfeiture, see Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474–75 (2d

1
  To the extent that his brief is intended to challenge the denial of leave to amend, “it
would be contradictory to entertain a motion to amend the complaint” without “a valid
basis to vacate the previously entered judgment.” Nat’l Petrochemical Co. of Iran v. M/T
Stolt Sheaf, 930 F.2d 240, 245 (2d Cir. 1991). Thus, Schlosser could not amend his
complaint unless the judgment is vacated.
                                           5
Cir. 2006) (per curiam), we would conclude that the district court did not abuse its

discretion by deciding that Schlosser’s Rule 60(b) motion was not timely. See

Thai-Lao Lignite (Thailand) Co. v. Gov’t of Lao People's Democratic Republic, 864 F.3d

172, 181–82 (2d Cir. 2017). A motion under Rule 60(b)(6) must be filed “within a

reasonable time.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1). Whether a motion was made in a

“reasonable time” is “determined based on the particular circumstances of the

case,” accounting for the “reason for any delay, the possible prejudice to the non-

moving party, and the interests of finality.”     Thai-Lao Lignite, 864 F.3d at 182

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

      Relying on several of our prior decisions, the district court concluded that

Schlosser’s motion, filed nearly three years after entry of judgment and sixteen

months after his appeal concluded, was not filed within a “reasonable” time.

Schlosser, 2023 WL 2758352, at *1. The court relied on, among other decisions,

Kellogg v. Strack, 269 F.3d 100, 104 (2d Cir. 2001) (per curiam), which deemed a 26-

month delay “patently unreasonable.” A finding that this 32-month delay was

unreasonable is thus “within the range of permissible decisions” and does not

                                          6
amount to an abuse of discretion. Thai-Lao Lignite, 864 F.3d at 181. 2

      Schlosser’s remaining arguments are unavailing or without merit.

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the order of the district court.

                                       FOR THE COURT:
                                       Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

2We otherwise agree with the district court that Schlosser’s motion was without
merit, for substantially the reasons stated by the district court. See Schlosser, 2023
WL 2758352, at *2.
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