Court Opinion

ID: 9460118
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 21:42:12.765117+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:36:29.518592
License: Public Domain

WINTER, Circuit Judge
(dissenting):
The majority concludes that the elements and concepts of the claimed Sprengel invention were all known prior thereto and that the “invention” was no more than an improvement obvious to one reasonably skilled in the art. Accordingly, Sprengel ’390 is held invalid for obviousness. I respectfully dissent.
I.
At the outset, some preliminary comments are in order. First, I am constrained to comment on the breadth of the opinion’s consideration of the prior art and to contrast it with the sole ground of obviousness urged on us in this appeal. The majority refers to Ashe ’664, Koh-nenkamp ’193, Lehmann ’222, Lehmann ’790, and Sparrow ’403. Mention of them, as well as technical texts including da Vinci’s notebooks, are appropriate to demonstrate the background of the prior art. But, while Prudential-Grace, on appeal, predicates its claim of obviousness solely on Lehmann ’222, the majority predicates its conclusion of obviousness on the prior art generally, with a startling lack of specificity of precisely what in the prior art made the Sprengel invention obvious. Indeed, the variety of the majority’s references to prior art suggests to my mind non-obviousness. I fear that the majority has given short change to the proposition that the mere fact that various elements of the Spren-gel patent may be found in the prior art is of little significance, because we deal here with a combination patent. It has long been settled that a combination patent may be valid when it represents a new combination of known elements having an effect greater than the sum of the several effects taken separately. Cantrell v. Wallick, 117 U.S. 689, 694, 6 S.Ct. 970, 29 L.Ed. 1017 (1886); United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 51-52, 86 S.Ct. 708, 15 L.Ed.2d 572 (1966); Anderson’s-Black Rock v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57, 60-61, 90 S.Ct. 305, 24 L.Ed.2d 258 (1969); Little Mule Corp. v. Lug All Company, 254 F.2d 268, 274 (5 Cir. 1958). See Brown v. Brock, 240 F.2d 723 (4 Cir. 1957). Of course, an appellate court may decide an appeal on the basis of anything in the record whether urged by counsel or not. But in the field of patent law, where our experience teaches us that the professional patent bar generally is in possession of *248more expertise than the average judge who is called upon to decide a patent case, I am loath; to decide a case on the basis of contentions not advanced by counsel without, at least, inviting the comments of counsel on what may seem to us to be determinative considerations not advanced in presentation of the appeal. I will therefore direct my attention to the patent in suit and Lehmann ’222.
My basic quarrel with the majority is its undertaking to act like a trial court, rather than an appellate court; and in so doing, to do violence to the accepted rules of appellate view. This is not a case where the district court’s factual finding of non-obviousness is clearly erroneous. It is a case where the majority has undertaken a de novo factual inquiry into the claim of obviousness. As I shall demonstrate, the proper scope of our review is more constricted than that exercised by the majority.
II.
The Sprengel patent ’390 basically describes a cargo boom and gear for the loading and unloading of cargo vessels. The patented boom is unique because it can, without rerigging, service hatches both fore and aft of it. It accomplishes this through two devices. First, the boom is attached to the ship’s deck by a universal joint which permits it to swing to the starboard or port sides of the ship, and to swing in an are from a position pointing toward the bow of the ship to one pointing toward the aft. This particular aspect of the boom is not original. The second and original device is a pendulum block, or blocks, attached to the top of the boom from which hang the boom’s cargo tackle and cargo purchase (the ropes, hooks, etc., which are used to lift the load). Since the device at the top of the boom is a pendulum block, the gear hanging from it will always follow a straight drop plumb line perpendicular to the ship’s deck regardless of the position of the boom. It is this effect — the perpetual perpendicular position of the cargo tackle hanging from the boom — which permits the boom to be swung fore and aft between the large kingposts without the necessity of rerigging the boom as was necessary on all prior operational booms. The benefit is that the same boom can load fore and aft hatches, alternatively or seriatim, without incurring delays for rerigging, the special delays and dangers of rerig-ging at night, or the hazards of rerig-ging in open water or while the ship is listing. Moreover, the boom is capable of lifting very heavy loads After its development, the patented boom enjoyed great commercial success. This success has since waned somewhat due to the trend toward containerization.
This patent has the benefit of a statutory presumption of validity, 35 U.S.C. § 282; Prudential-Grace therefore bore a heavy burden of proof to demonstrate invalidity. On appeal, Prudential-Grace’s burden is even greater for the determination of patent validity, insofar as it concerns the obviousness and oper-ability of the patent, is a factual issue, committed in the first instance to the district court and reversible only for clear error. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17, 86 S.Ct. 684, 15 L.Ed.2d 545 (1966). The clearly erroneous rule, although virtually ignored by the majority, should be applied with special vigor in patent litigation because of the highly technical nature of the facts in issue. See Graver Tank Co. v. Linde Air Prod. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 610, 70 S.Ct. 854, 94 L.Ed. 1097 (1948).
While 35 U.S.C. § 103 states that a patent may not be obtained “if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains,” John Deere, 383 U.S. at 17-18, 86 S.Ct. at 694, prescribed the proper analysis under § 103:
While the ultimate question of patent validity is one of law . . ., the § 103 condition . . . lends itself to *249several basic factual inquiries. Under § 103, the scope and content of the prior art are to be determined; differences between the prior art and the claims at issue are to be ascertained; and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art resolved. Against this background, the obviousness or nonob-viousness of such subject matter is determined. Such secondary considerations as commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure of others, etc., might be utilized to give light to the circumstances surrounding the origin of the subject matter sought to be patented. As indicia of obviousness or nonobviousness, these inquiries may have relevancy. (Emphasis added).
See United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 86 S.Ct. 708, 15 L.Ed.2d 572 (1966); Note, Subtests of “Nonobviousness; ” a Non-technical Approach to Patent Validity, 112 U.Pa.L.Rev. 1169 (1964).
At the trial, all of the prior art recited by the majority was pressed on the district court to sustain the contention that the patent was obvious. The district court analyzed prior art and rejected Prudential-Grace’s contentions with respect to each item. In this appeal, defendant’s claim of obviousness focuses on Lehmann ’222, called the “gallows boom.” Not only was this claim rejected by the district court, but it had been considered and rejected by the patent office. See Reynolds v. Whitin Mac. Works, 167 F.2d 78, 83 (4 Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 844, 68 S.Ct. 1513, 92 L.Ed. 1768 (1948).
Prudential-Grace’s boom was designed to accomplish the same result achieved by Sprengel ’390, but Lehmann differed from Sprengel in several structural respects. While the Sprengel boom is a single cylindrical leg-like structure located between two vertical kingposts, the gallows boom is comprised of two cylindrical structures, or two legs, located between the two vertical kingposts and connected at the top by a rigid brace. In the Sprengel boom, the pendulum block and tackle gear is attached to one or both sides of the boom by a pin which runs through it and the boom. In the Lehmann boom, the analogous block gear is attached to the rigid brace between the two legs of the boom and hangs from it; hence, the “gallows” nickname. Another structural difference of import is the method by which the booms are attached to the deck. The Sprengel boom is attached by a pivotal joint which permits it to swing right and left and fore and aft. The Lehmann boom is connected to a rotary platform and the platform rotates to permit the boom to swing right or left in an 180 degree arc. The fore and aft swing of the Lehmann boom is not accomplished by rotation of the platform.
The district court found that the Leh-mann device did not render the Sprengel boom obvious for the following reasons: (1) the method of. mounting the boom on the deck differed; (2) it was a two-legged boom; and (3) it was impractical and was never used.
With regard to its first reason, I have no doubt that the district court was partially in error. It mistakenly understood that the fore and aft swing of the Lehmann boom was accomplished by rotation of the platform on which it was mounted. 346 F.Supp. at 1126, 1128. But the district court was correct that, because of its gallow structure, the Leh-mann two-legged boom could not be mounted on the deck for universal movement as could Sprengel. Lehmann has a rigid connection between the two legs of the boom and thus it must be mounted on a turntable for movement between port and starboard.
That Lehmann was a two-legged boom is manifest. As a result, it is not susceptible of having pendulum block fittings mounted on either side of the boom, and hence it cannot teach or foreshadow that possibility. It is true that since the Lehmann boom swings fore and aft on a pin which runs through its legs, the cargo purchase which hangs from the top cross bar of its boom, like the purchase hanging from the Sprengel *250boom, always hangs straight down regardless of the position of the boom. But the Lehmann boom admittedly does not employ Sprengel’s novel pendulum gear to achieve this effect. I therefore can find nothing in the Lehmann boom to suggest the structure of the Sprengel boom. To state my conclusion otherwise, I think that the most that can be said is the concept of a boom capable of being swung fore and aft was recognized and attempted in Lehmann, but the mechanical means sought to accomplish this purpose were different from Sprengel and moreover were unworkable.
Coupled with the structural and conceptual differences between Lehmann and Sprengel, which to my mind are sufficient alone to demonstrate that the district court’s finding of non-obviousness was not clearly erroneous, the record establishes that Lehmann’s boom was generally recognized as impractical. It was never manufactured, sold, or used. It could not, even in theory, lift the heavy loads of which the Sprengel boom is capable. Only one boom prior to Sprengel ’390 achieved in actual practice the degree of fore and aft mobility, with ease and safety, that Sprengel ’390 achieved. It was a prior Sprengel invention, the fork-type gear. It, however, operated on a different concept — a fact found by the district court and not challenged on appeal — and it was substantially slower and more dangerous than Sprengel ’390.
Another indicia of non-obviousness was the skeptical reception which Spren-gel ’390 received. Adams, 383 U.S. at 52, 86 S.Ct. 708. At least one sophisticated purchaser required an undertaking that a proven forklift gear, which previously dominated the market, would be provided should the new Sprengel device “fail.” Significant also is the fact that the Sprengel application was filed in the U.S. patent office in 1964 (a German application was made in 1963), and Leh-mann ’222, filed in 1959, had issued two years earlier. In the time which elapsed between Sprengel and Lehmann, no other person skilled in the art hit upon the Sprengel concept. Another more important indication was the financial and commercial success which the Sprengel boom received. It virtually superseded all prior booms on new shipbuilding. Deere; Adams; Reynolds, 167 F.2d at 83. Although commercial success alone does not resolve the issue of obviousness, it is nevertheless proper to consider it. Compton v. Metal Products, Inc., 453 F. 2d 38 (4 Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U. S. 968, 92 S.Ct. 2414, 32 L.Ed.2d 667 (1972). Finally, although obviousness is determined predominantly by examining what the claims in prior patents taught on paper, it is proper to consider whether the claims made in prior patents were ever operational and to discount the inoperable ones. Adams, 383 U.S. at 51-52, 86 S.Ct. 708; Reynolds, 167 F.2d at 84. Lehmann ’222, the principal basis of defendant’s claim of obviousness, has never been used on any ship.
The district court’s specific conclusions that “no one . . . prior to Sprengel came up with a pendulum gear for a boom handling 120 tons or heavier loads, capable of servicing two hatches without rerigging” and that “unhesitatingly . . . even apart from commercial success, Sprengel’s Patent ’390 is valid under . . . Section 103” to me are unassailable under the clearly erroneous doctrine, or as legal conclusions. I think we should affirm that the invention covered by Sprengel patent ’390 was not obvious.
III.
In an effort to defeat recovery, defendant has asserted that the Sprengel patent is invalid for failure to recite a necessary structure, that it was not infringed, and that in any event it was misused. The district court concluded otherwise on all issues. Since I disagree with the majority on the basis of its decision, I would be brought to a consideration of these issues, all of which are pressed on appeal. In view of the basis of the majority’s decision, however, a *251full expression of my views on these issues would constitute nothing more than an academic exercise. I will therefore content myself merely by saying that I have considered them, and I find no merit in them, so that I cannot concur in the judgment of the majority even on different grounds.