Court Opinion

ID: 9701024
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 21:59:29.783633+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:17.454995
License: Public Domain

Ekancis, J.
(dissenting). Workmen’s compensation is designed to be a substitute or partial substitute for wages during a period of temporary incapacity arising out of work-connected injuries and thereafter during the period of payment prescribed for any permanent disability which likewise resulted from such injuries. That beneficent social purpose, in order to have practical utility, must be administered with dispatch. “The desiderata in a system of compensation are quick payment and the reduction of administrative expense.” Jaffe, “The Bight to Judicial Review,” 71 Earn. L. Rev. 401, 408 (1958). The opinion of the majority seriously and, in my judgment, improperly dilutes the effectiveness of the remedy. The holding is that
“It is the duty of the reviewing court to weigh the evidence and determine whether the claimant has sustained the burden of proof of an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment by a preponderance of the evidence.”
Thus, in effect, a burden is imposed to review the record de novo at every stage of the appellate process from the County Court through the Supreme Court: There can be no doubt of the need for promulgation of a rule as to the nature and scope of the consideration to be given to appeals *455in workmen’s compensation cases. But the pronouncement of the majority conflicts with established notions of the place of the administrative agency in the scheme of government. The courts and the agencies within their respective spheres of governmental action are partners, not contestants for supremacy. The agency’s role is now reduced to that of a mere conduit through which the evidence gathered is passed on to the courts for effective determination. And in the field of workmen’s compensation, where expeditious resolution of controversy is so vital, a doctrine that in all cases a trial de novo on the record is required in the Appellate Division and in this court, serves to encourage appeals on the facts and to interfere unduly with the humane design of the Legislature. Due process calls for a trial in the judicial sense somewhere along the line—not two or three such trials.
Courts generally throughout the country have reached the viewpoint that a fact finding of administrative tribunals will not be interfered with when it is supported by substantial evidence on the whole record, in the absence of a statutory requirement for a completely independent review. Davis, Administrative Law (1951), p. 868, et seq.; Forkosch, Administrative Lamo (1956), §§ 254, 257; 42 Am. Jim., Public Administrative Jjaw, § 211; 2 Larson, Workmen’s Compensation Law (1952), § 80.20; Jaffe, “Judicial Review: ‘Substantial Evidence on the Whole Record/" 64 Harv. L. Rev. 1233 (1951); Jaffe, “Judicial Review: Question of Fact,” 69 Harv. L. Rev. 1020 (1956); and see the Federal Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. A. § 1009(e).
In the past, the appellate courts of this State have not followed a common pattern of expression in describing the nature of the judicial supervision of agency fact findings. But the trend in recent years, at least, has been away from independent review of the weight of the evidence. Jacobs i& Davis, A Report on the State Administrative Agency (Eighth Report of the Judicial Council of New Jersey, 1938), pp. 13-15. Illustrations of the movement are readily *456available. In unemployment compensation cases “[t]he test of judicial review is not whether we would come to the same conclusion [as the Board of Review] if the original determination was ours to make, but rather whether the fact-finder could reasonably” so conclude on the proof. Berry, Whitson & Berry v. Division of Employment Security, Department of Labor and Industry, 21 N. J. 73, 77 (1956); and see Curtis v. Liberty Restaurant, 4 N. J. Super. 13 (App. Div. 1949), affirmed 3 N. J. 1 (1949); on judicial review of a determination of the Board of Public Utility Commissioners “the court will not substitute its independent judgment for that of the board but will confine its inquiry to the ascertainment of whether the evidence before the board furnished a reasonable basis for its action.” In re Greenville Bus Co., 17 N. J. 131, 138, 139 (1954); the finding will not be reversed unless unwarranted in law or unfounded in fact or unless a discretionary power has been plainly abused. Hudson Bios Transp. Co. v. Board of Public Utility Com’rs, 131 N. J. L. 576 (Sup. Ct. 1944); “[i]t is now firmly settled in our system of jurisprudence that there must be sufficient or substantial competent and relevant evidence to support the findings of fact and reasonableness of the rates established by the Board.” Central R. Co. of New Jersey v. Department of Public Utilities, 7 N. J. 247, 260 (1951). A decision of the Department of Civil Service will not be set aside unless not reasonably supported by competent evidence or unless arbitrary or capricious, Dutcher v. Department of Civil Service, 7 N. J. Super. 156 (App. Div. 1950); nor of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Director if supported by substantial evidence, Traymore of Atlantic City, Inc., v. Hock, 9 N. J. Super. 47 (App. Div. 1950) (which means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support the conclusion, Hornauer v. Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 40 N. J. Super. 501 (App. Div. 1956)), or unless it clearly appears from the entire record that it is arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious. In re Gutman, 21 N. J. Super. 579 (App. Div. 1952). Uor will the court substitute its *457judgment for that of the Commissioner of the Department of Institutions and Agencies where there is substantial, competent and relevant evidence to support his conclusion, Holly v. Bates, 7 N. J. 191, 195 (1951); or for that of the State Board of Optometrists when supported by substantial evidence, In re Portugal, 44 N. J. Super. 7 (App. Div. 1957); or for that of the State Aviation Commission unless it clearly appears that no evidence was before the Commission reasonably in support of the finding. Pennsylvania R. Co. v. New Jersey State Aviation Commission, 2 N. J. 64, 71 (1949). Judgments of the Division of Tax Appeals as to valuations of properties will not be set aside unless it is entirely clear that the evidence will not fairly support them. City of Jersey City v. Lehigh Valley Railroad Co., 9 N. J. 362 (1952); Peter Doelger Brewing Corp. v. Division of Tax Appeals, 137 N. J. L. 129 (Sup. Ct. 1948); affirmed Artaserse v. Division of Tax Appeals, 1 N. J. 130 (1948); “* * * the better appellate practice in eases presenting complex questions of value such as this is not to exercise the power conferred by Article VI, Section V, paragraph 3 of the Constitution of 1947 and Buie 3:81-13 independently to review the facts and make the assessment. * * * Appellate courts should not inject themselves into the field of original valuation in such cases except in very exceptional circumstances.” Delaivare, L. & W. R. Co. v. City of Hoboken, 10 N. J. 418, 424 (1952). These declarations are obviously inconsistent with the principle now announced that the appraisal of a workmen’s compensation judgment in the Appellate Division and in this court is for the purpose of determining whether the workman sustained his case by the preponderance of the evidence.
In support of the position taken, the majority refer to B. B. l:5-4(&) and 4:88-13. The former provides that “new or amended findings of fact may be made [on appeal], but due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses”; and the latter, relating to review of proceedings in lieu of prerogative writs, says that the court “shall have power to *458review the facts and make independent findings thereon, .which power may be exercised by it to such extent as the interests of justice may require.” It is not necessary to decide whether, under our present system, the review of workmen’s compensation judgments beyond the County Court is in the nature of -a prerogative writ proceeding under B. B. 4:88 et seq., as it was under the former practice, or simply by the ordinary process of appeal as established by the rules of this court. 1947 Constitution, Article VI, See. Ill, par. 3; B. B. 1:2—12; 2:2-l; 5:2-5. The important fact to notice is that no mandate is imposed on this court or the Appellate Division of the Superior Court to engage in an independent review of the facts; no right is bestowed on an appellant to have or to demand such a study. Ho one challenges the authority of the two courts to make such findings. But the word “may” in both rules is significant. Manifestly, in context its force is intended to be permissive and discretionary in character. So the basic question is not one of authority but whether and when the authority should be exercised. Simply stated, the problem is, should the Supreme Court and the Appellate Division as a matter of course review the facts and decide independently whether the party who has the burden of proof sustained his position by the preponderance of the evidence? I think not. In my judgment, the authority should become known and should make itself felt in workmen’s compensation proceedings by the restraint and not by the universality of its exercise.
Ordinarily, review of an order or determination of a state administrative agency is by direct appeal to the Appellate Division. B. B. 4:88-8. However, at an early date in the life of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, the Legislature established a unique review mechanism, i. e., an appeal to the County Court where the matter was to be reviewed de novo on the record made in the Workmen’s Compensation Division. L. 1918, c. 149, p. 436. Thereafter the section went through successive changes of form and substance. L. 1921, c. 229; L. 1931, c. 280; L. 1932, c. 25. In 1953, *459the duty of the County Court was to decide the merits of the controversy in a summary manner. N. J. 8. A. 34:15-66. In that year the Legislature-eliminated all of the procedural aspects of the appeal and at the present time the statute simply authorizes an appeal to the County Court and ordains that the judgment entered there shall be “conclusive and binding.” The nature of the review is not prescribed. In the same year, the rules of this court were amended to set out the procedural steps of the appeal to the County Court. B. B. 5 :2-5. However, no express requirement was made for an appeal to be heard de novo on the Tecord. The rule says “[t]he trial of the appeal shall be based exclusively on the exhibits and the transcript of the record and testimony. * * * Upon the determination of the appeal, the court shall file a memorandum stating the facts and its opinion on the law.” The majority opinion in this case is to the effect that that language was intended to retain the de novo review in the County Court and I accept the statement. However, continuance of the unique additional intermediate review—as distinguished from the direct appeal to the Appellate Division from other state agencies— furnishes additional reason for a more limited review than that which is espoused by the majority. If the appeal from the Workmen’s Compensation Division were directly to the Appellate Division, I believe that the weight of authority throughout the country supports the view that the test of the legal propriety of the judgment, so far as the fact finding is concerned, should be whether it is supported by substantial evidence on the whole record. And when the judgment comes to the Appellate Division after having gone through the crucible of the County Court, can there be any reasonable justification for another decision as to whether the original determination is supported by the greater weight of the evidence—where, as in this case, both lower tribunals have reached concordant results?
If the Workmen’s Compensation Act and its administration by the Division are to serve the beneficent legislative purpose effectively, the Appellate Division as a matter of *460policy ought to refrain from weighing the evidence independently and should limit its appraisal of the record to a determination as to whether the fact finding which has been agreed upon by the two tribunals is supported by substantial evidence on the whole record. It should not reweigh in each case and substitute its judgment.
It has been suggested that in cases of concurrent findings the test should be whether they are supported by “sufficient” evidence. Presumably “sufficient” in this context excludes the idea of a de novo review and contemplates a study designed to ascertain only if there is adequate credible proof in the record from which the finding could have been made. Eor practical purposes, such proposal is the same as that sponsored by this opinion. However, the rule which calls for substantial evidence on the whole record has come into common use throughout the country and it has been incorporated in the Federal Administrative Procedure Act. Also, it has acquired a definite connotation, and in the interest of uniformity its adoption as a standard should prove more serviceable in discharging the judicial role, considered in relation to the purpose to be effectuated by the legislation. This is not to say that judges are automatons who will react uniformly to a given standard. The value of a common rule lies in the fact that in the process of reasoning toward the ultimate objective, their minds will be guided by the same test.
Substantial evidence on the whole record does not mean any evidence. Nor does it mean substantial evidence when considered in isolation from the record. It signifies more than evidence “which, considered by itself alone, would be sufficiently persuasive to induce the trier of fact to give it the credence and weight essential to support findings. It must have those characteristics to such an extent that in the setting made by the entire record the trier may reasonably find in accordance with it after giving due consideration to whatever else is shown both in opposition or in accord.” Gooding v. Willard, 209 F. 2d 913, 916 (2 Cir. 1954). And see Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Rela*461tions Board, 340 U. S. 474, 71 S. Ct. 456, 95 L. Ed. 456 (1951); Jaffe, “Judicial Review: Question of Fact,” 69 Harv. L. Rev. 10.20, 1027 (1956). But it does not mean that having found evidence of such probative force in support of the determination, the appellate court should then make its own independent choice between it and the evidence contra, even though a different decision would or might have been made if the matter were before the court de novo. Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, supra, 340 U. S. at page 488, 71 S. Ct. at page 465.
In the administration of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, for a long time we have had the rule that where two lower tribunals have considered the facts and have reached concurrent findings, neither the Supreme Court nor the Appellate Division will make new and independent determinations unless error appears which is so palpable that new findings are necessary in order to insure essential justice. Pfahler v. Eclipse Pioneer Division of Bendix Aviation Corp., 21 N. J. 486, 492 (1956); Mahoney v. Nitroform Co., Inc., 20 N. J. 499, 507 (1956); Lester v. Elliott Bros. Trucking Co., 18 N. J. 434, 437 (1955); Temple v. Storch Trucking Co., 3 N. J. 42, 48 (1949); Trusky v. Ford Motor Co., 19 N. J. Super. 100, 103 (App. Div. 1952); Ginter v. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Corp., 11 N. J. Super. 338, 341 (App. Div. 1951), certification denied 7 N. J. 81 (1951) ; and cf. Midler v. Heinowitz, 10 N. J. 123, 129 (1952) . Although these cases do not, in so many words, express the view which I feel is demanded in the interest of justice in this type proceeding, it is implicit in their holding. See Lester v. Elliott Bros. Trucking Co., supra, where this court affirmed, per curiam, the Appellate Division opinion which asserted the substantial evidence rule. Manifestly, a judgment which is based upon substantial evidence on the whole record, would not be palpably erroneous.
So it seems to me that where there are concurrent results in these cases, the Appellate Division should refrain from independent findings unless the substantial evidence test is *462not met. And with respect to the intrusion of this court, if the case is purely factual and that test is satisfied, there should be no certification at all, if we have proper regard for our function as intended by the Constitution, Article YI, Sec. Y, par. 1; and as defined by our rules, B. B. 1:2-1. But if certification is granted for any reason, then our consideration of the matter should be circumscribed as described herein. And even where the case is here as of right because of á dissent in the Appellate Division, it has been indicated that the rule should not be otherwise. Midler v. Heinowitz, supra, 10 N. J. at page 129.
A more difficult problem now presents itself. What should be the nature of the appeal in the Appellate Division when there are discordant findings in the Division and the County Court? Should there be an independent review of the facts as of course? The problem has disturbed the Division for some time. It has been said that in such situations the County Court judgment is entitled to “determinative” weight, Donofrio v. Haag Brothers, Inc., 10 N. J. Super. 258 (App. Div. 1950); to “great weight,” Augustin v. Bank Building and Equipment Corp., 44 N. J. Super. 242 (App. Div. 1957); will not be disturbed unless a study of the record' indicates that the interests of justice plainly call for it, Mewes v. Union Bldg. & Construction Co., 45 N. J. Super. 88 (App. Div. 1957), certif. den. 24 N. J. 546 (1957).
The situation is somewhat akin to that dealt with by the former Supreme Court and affirmed per curiam by the Court of Errors and Appeals in Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. v. State Board of Taxes and Assessments, 1 N. J. Misc. 596 (Sup. Ct. 1923), affirmed sub nom. Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Jersey City, 98 N. J. L. 283 (E. & A. 1922), where it was said that:
“* * * [valuations ordered by a unanimous board should not be set aside, unless it is entirely clear that the evidence will not fairly support them, and valuations by a divided board should be determined according to circumstances.” (At page 285)
Regardless of B. B. 1:5-4(b) which requires an appellate tribunal, in considering a factual issue, to give due regard *463to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses, it has always been a guiding principle of appellate review that the finding of the trier of the facts,whether court or administrative agency, will be accorded significant influence. Gilbert v. Gilbert Machine Works, Inc., 122 N. J. L. 533, 538 (Sup. Ct. 1939); Goldmann v. Johanna Farms, Inc., 26 N. J. Super. 550 (Cty. Ct. 1953); Yutterman v. Sternberg, 86 F. 2d 321, 111 A. L. R. 736 (8 Cir. 1936). On the other hand, the design of the de novo review in the County Court is to bring a new judicial mind to the evaluation of the proof, Gaeta v. Scott Paper Co., 14 N. J. Super. 261 (App. Div. 1951), and of course the emanation of that mind must have some force when the intervention of the Appellate Division is sought. The unusual nature of the additional appellate step in the County Court, which existed originally by virtue of the legislative prescription and now by B. B. 5:2-5, renders difficult the formulation of a standard to regulate the scope of the review in the Appellate Division when the other two tribunals have disagreed as to the proper factual conclusion. It seems reasonable to expect that in the ordinary case of that kind, an independent study and weighing of the evidence would be engaged in. Cf. Reynolds v. Public Service Coordinated Transport, 21 N. J. Super. 528, 530 (App. Div. 1952), certif. den. 11 N. J. 214 (1953). However, no hard and fast mandate should be laid down. Decision as to the nature of the review to be pursued in the particular case should be permitted to rest where the broad terms of B. B. 1:5 —i(b) and B. B. 4:88-13 seem to leave it, that is, as a permissive and discretionary matter in the hands of the Appellate Division.
In the case now before us there was a finding by the Deputy Director on conflicting proofs that the employment accident accelerated the course of the breast cancer. That finding was concurred in by the County Court after a de novo study of the controversy. The Appellate Division, after an exhaustive analysis, declared that there was substantial evidence in the record to support those views. How*464ever, it indicated that if it functioned as a trial court and substituted its judgment for that of the Deputy Director and the County Court, a conclusion would probably be reached that the evidence preponderated against the right to compensation. But it said, and rightly I think, that because substantial evidence in favor of the claim was present, “the interests of justice do not call for a reversal * * I agree that when evidence of the probative import mentioned was found to exist, the judicial function had exhausted itself.
Under the circumstances I vote to affirm the judgment.
Mr. Justice Jacobs joins in this dissent.
For reversal—Chief Justice Weintraub, and Justices Heher, Burling and Proctor—4.
For affirmance—Justices Jacobs and Prancis—2.