Court Opinion

ID: 9556981
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 13:03:48.73269+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:50.030798
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
 Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
 opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
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 official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

                                                   Decided: August 21, 2023

                    S23A0613. WHITTAKER v. THE STATE.

        PINSON, Justice.

        Appellant Steven Whittaker was convicted of malice murder

and related crimes in connection with the stabbing death of LeBron

Hankins. 1 On appeal, Whittaker contends that (1) the evidence was

insufficient to sustain his convictions for malice and felony murder;

(2) the trial court committed plain error by failing to instruct the

        1 Thecrimes occurred on August 17, 2018. On September 4, 2018, a
Walker County grand jury indicted Whittaker for malice murder (Count 1),
felony murder (Count 2), aggravated assault (Count 3), and possession of a
knife during the commission of a felony (Count 4). Whittaker was tried by a
jury from May 24 to 25, 2021. The jury found him guilty of all counts.
Whittaker was sentenced to serve life in prison without the possibility of parole
on Count 1 and five years on Count 4 to be served consecutively to Count 1.
The remaining counts were purportedly merged into Count 1. Whittaker filed
a motion for new trial on June 1, 2021, which he amended twice through new
counsel. Following a hearing, the court denied the motion for new trial on
November 22, 2022. Whittaker filed a timely notice of appeal. The case was
docketed to the April 2023 term of this Court and submitted for a decision on
the briefs.
jury that Whittaker had no duty to retreat; (3) trial counsel gave

constitutionally ineffective assistance in a number of ways; and (4)

the trial court erred by failing to enter an order vacating the

sentence for felony murder. But the evidence was sufficient to

support his malice-murder conviction, and his sufficiency challenge

as to his felony-murder conviction is moot because he was not

sentenced on that count. The trial court did not err by failing to

instruct the jury that Whittaker had no duty to retreat because

retreat was not placed at issue. Whittaker’s counsel did not perform

deficiently in any of the ways Whittaker asserts. And although the

felony-murder count should have been vacated by operation of law,

there is no sentencing error to correct because the error will have no

actual effect on Whittaker’s sentence. So we affirm Whittaker’s

convictions and sentence.

     1. Whittaker and Hankins had been friends for decades. But as

one of their neighbors put it, “they weren’t good for each other when

they were drinking.” When they were drinking liquor, “[t]hey’d just

get drunk and want to argue.” While they did not often fight

                                  2
physically, Whittaker would often “verbal[ly] abuse” Hankins when

drunk. Another neighbor noted that Hankins “was scared of

[Whittaker] when they were drunk.” A third neighbor said that

Whittaker was “[b]ad, he’s like Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde” when he

drinks liquor and he was often “bossy” to Hankins. That neighbor

also testified that she had seen Whittaker “slap[] [Hankins] upside

the head” before and that Hankins “was very passive.”

     On the evening of August 17, 2018, Whittaker and Hankins

were drinking beer and liquor at Whittaker’s house. Later in the

night, Whittaker called 911 to ask for an ambulance: he told the

operator that Hankins “stabbed me seven times in the d**n gut” and

“I killed him.” He said Hankins had been dead for about an hour.

     When Walker County Sherriff’s Deputy Charles Barrett

walked into the house in response to the call, he heard Whittaker

laughing in the kitchen and holding his side, and he saw Hankins

lying on the ground in “an extremely, extremely large pool of blood.”

He noted the blood had coagulated, “[s]o some time had passed

before the 911 call was made.” Deputy Barrett said Whittaker then

                                 3
“fell backwards due to [] being intoxicated.” As he applied pressure

to Whittaker’s wound, Whittaker began laughing again. He told

Deputy Barrett that he and Hankins had been drinking liquor, they

had an argument, and then Hankins stabbed Whittaker in the

stomach. Whittaker said he then blacked out “and when he came to

he disarmed Mr. Hankins and then defended himself.” Whittaker

claimed to have stabbed Hankins two to three times in his upper

body. Whittaker had two stab wounds: one around his navel and

another shallow wound to the left of his rib cage. Once EMS arrived,

Whittaker was taken by ambulance to the hospital for treatment.

     Walker County Sherriff’s Office Investigator Eddie Hill

testified that when he arrived, Hankins was lying on his back in a

large pool of blood, and there was so much blood that his face was

unrecognizable. A “massive amount of coagulated blood” had pooled

around Hankins, including “a large amount of blood in the straddle-

type area” of Hankins’s shorts, which Hill determined was from

Whittaker having sat on Hankins’s stomach. He also saw a “large

gaping hole” in Hankins’s torso, likely a postmortem wound based

                                 4
on the lack of bleeding in that area. And he found a knife with a

black handle and a 3.5-inch partially serrated blade, which had

Hankins’s blood on it.

     The next day, Investigator Hill interviewed Whittaker at the

hospital. He testified that Whittaker was not in custody or under

arrest at that point, so he did not read Whittaker his rights under

Miranda. 2 Whittaker told Hill that he and Hankins had been

drinking beer since noon and later had a “stiff drink.” Whittaker

said he had no memories from after the time he spoke with a

neighbor around 7:00 p.m. until he woke up on the kitchen floor and

saw Hankins lying there, at which point he called 911. He then

remembered that Hankins “stabbed me, and I came unglued.” He

did not remember if he and Hankins argued that night. He said

Hankins “claimed he’s a fighter” and “in martial arts,” but that “I

don’t think the man can fight his way out of a paper bag” and that

“[a]nytime I ever scolded him . . . he ducked his head.” Two days

later, Whittaker was arrested.

     2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (86 SCt 1602, 16 LE2d 694) (1966).

                                    5
     A GBI forensic toxicologist testified that Hankins’s blood-

alcohol content (BAC) was 0.261. He explained that for an average

social drinker, a person with a 0.261 BAC would have a “rough time”

trying to speak clearly or stand up, but a more experienced drinker

“can appear perfectly sober until you start asking them to do

multiple things, divided attention.” He testified that a “more

experienced drinker” would be someone who drinks daily over the

course of several years.

     Dr. Keith Lehman performed Hankins’s autopsy. He testified

that Hankins suffered from 50 stab wounds, most of which were to

the face, neck, and scalp. The stab wounds penetrated all the way to

the bone, one punctured Hankins’s vocal box, one cut his heart, and

one cut his right lung. Patterned wounds on Hankins’s chin

suggested the use of a serrated blade. There were also blunt-force

injuries to the side of Hankins’s face, a fracture of his cervical spine

likely caused by a blow to the head, and evidence of strangulation.

Dr. Lehman determined the manner of death was homicide caused

by a combination of the strangulation, blunt-force injuries, and stab

                                   6
wounds. He explained that Hankins had “a number of injuries . . .

that have a significant lethal potential.”

      2. Whittaker contends that the evidence to support his malice-

murder conviction was insufficient. 3 In his view, the evidence at

most supported voluntary manslaughter because, according to

Whittaker, Hankins started the fight when he “told Whittaker that

Hankins could fight” while they were both drunk; Hankins

“introduced the knife into the fight by stabbing Whittaker first”; and

“Hankins’ excessive injuries further support that Hankins was

killed during a sudden heat of passion.” See OCGA § 16-5-2 (a) (“A

person commits the offense of voluntary manslaughter when he

causes the death of another human being under circumstances

which would otherwise be murder and if he acts solely as the result

of a sudden, violent, and irresistible passion resulting from serious

provocation sufficient to excite such passion in a reasonable

      3 Whittaker also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his

felony-murder conviction. But this challenge is moot because his felony-murder
conviction was vacated by operation of law. See Mills v. State, 287 Ga. 828, 830
(2) (700 SE2d 544) (2010). See Division 5, below.
                                       7
person.”).

     When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the

evidence presented in the light most favorable to the verdicts to

determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the

defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v.

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (III) (B) (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560)

(1979). We do not “weigh the evidence on appeal or resolve conflicts

in trial testimony.” Byers v. State, 311 Ga. 259, 266 (2) (857 SE2d

447) (2021) (citation and punctuation omitted). Instead, we defer “to

the jury’s assessment of the weight and credibility of the evidence.”

Jones v. State, 314 Ga. 692, 695 (878 SE2d 502) (2022) (citation and

punctuation omitted). And “[w]hether or not a provocation, if any, is

such a serious provocation as would be sufficient to excite a sudden,

violent, and irresistible passion in a reasonable person, reducing the

offense from murder to manslaughter, is generally a question for the

jury.” Id. (citation and punctuation omitted).

     Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence

at trial was sufficient to support Whittaker’s malice-murder

                                  8
conviction.

     A person commits the offense of murder when he
     unlawfully and with malice aforethought . . . causes the
     death of another human being. The State, of course, must
     prove malice beyond a reasonable doubt to convict
     someone of malice murder, as malice incorporates the
     intent to kill. Express malice is that deliberate intention
     unlawfully to take the life of another human being which
     is manifested by external circumstances capable of proof
     . . . . The malice necessary to establish malice murder may
     be formed in an instant, as long as it is present at the time
     of the killing. It is for the jury to determine from all the
     facts and circumstances whether a killing is intentional
     and malicious.

Benton v. State, 305 Ga. 242, 244 (1) (a) (824 SE2d 322) (2019)

(citations and punctuation omitted). See also OCGA § 16-5-1 (a).

     The evidence authorized the jury to find that Whittaker formed

the intent and malice necessary to convict him of malice murder.

Whittaker and Hankins were drinking alcohol at Whittaker’s home

and got into an argument; according to Whittaker, Hankins stabbed

Whittaker twice 4; and Whittaker stabbed Hankins 50 times,

strangled him, and broke his neck. Evidence of Whittaker’s brutal

     4 The State does not argue or suggest that Whittaker caused these stab

wounds himself.
                                    9
and excessive actions in connection with his argument with Hankins

supports the jury’s finding of the requisite malice and intent to

support his malice-murder conviction. See Rose v. State, 287 Ga.

238, 239 (1) (695 SE2d 261) (2010) (holding the evidence was

sufficient to support a malice-murder conviction when, after a

“trivial” argument, defendant stabbed victim 26 times); Campbell v.

State, 278 Ga. 839, 840 (1) (607 SE2d 565) (2005) (holding that the

evidence showing that the defendant initiated the fight, “tackled the

much smaller man as he attempted to flee[,] and repeatedly stabbed

his unarmed victim amply authorized the jury to find malice”);

Frezghi v. State, 273 Ga. 871, 871 (1) (548 SE2d 296) (2001) (holding

that the evidence was sufficient to support a malice-murder

conviction based on “the numerous stab wounds and the cruel and

deliberate nature of the final wound”).

     The evidence was also sufficient to authorize the jury to

conclude that the State disproved his affirmative defense of self-

defense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Pritchett v. State, 314 Ga.

767, 770 (1) (879 SE2d 436) (2022). “The use of excessive or unlawful

                                 10
force while acting in self-defense is not justifiable.” Willerson v.

State, 312 Ga. 369, 372 (1) (863 SE2d 50) (2021) (citation and

punctuation omitted). As an initial matter, the jury was authorized

to reject Whittaker’s claim that Hankins was the initial aggressor

given the evidence about their relationship and his bullying of

Hankins. And in any event, the jury was authorized to find that

Whittaker was not acting in self-defense when he killed Hankins

given the “brutality of the attack” and the “extent of the victim’s

injuries” in comparison to Whittaker’s relatively minor injuries. Id.

at 373 (1) (holding that the evidence was sufficient to support the

malice-murder conviction over the defendant’s claim of self-defense

“[g]iven the brutality of the attack against the victim, the extent of

the victim’s injuries, and the fact that [the defendant] suffered no

injuries in the altercation”); Jimmerson v. State, 289 Ga. 364, 367

(1) (711 SE2d 660) (2011) (holding that the evidence was sufficient

to overcome the defendant’s justification defense when the

defendant disarmed one victim, then shot both unarmed victims and

continued shooting them after they had fallen to the ground); Clark

                                 11
v. State, 271 Ga. 27, 29 (2) (518 SE2d 117) (1999) (jury was properly

instructed that “[t]he use of excessive force or unlawful force while

acting in self-defense is not justifiable”).

     Whittaker argues that the evidence supported only a conviction

for voluntary manslaughter, on which the jury had been instructed,

and not malice murder. But the evidence here authorized the jury to

reject his claim that he acted “solely as the result of a sudden,

violent, and irresistible passion resulting from serious provocation

sufficient to excite such passion in a reasonable person.” OCGA § 16-

5-2 (a) (voluntary manslaughter). The evidence authorized the jury

to reject Whittaker’s claim that Hankins was the initial aggressor,

and it in any event showed that Whittaker’s response to Hankins’s

statement about being a fighter and alleged initial stabbing of

Whittaker was disproportionate and brutal: he stabbed Hankins

more than 50 times (possibly sitting on Hankins while stabbing

him), strangled him, broke his neck, and laughed when police

officers responded. The evidence was not sufficient as a matter of

law to support a finding of serious provocation that would excite

                                   12
such passion in a reasonable person. See Merritt v. State, 292 Ga.

327, 331 (2) (737 SE2d 673) (2013) (“[W]ords alone generally are not

sufficient provocation to excite the passion necessary to give rise to

voluntary manslaughter.” (citation and punctuation omitted)). And

the jurors also could have disbelieved Whittaker’s assertion that he

“came unglued” after he was stabbed, such that he contends he met

the legal requirements for voluntary manslaughter. See Moore v.

State, 314 Ga. 351, 354-355 (877 SE2d 174) (2022) (jury authorized

to discredit the defendant’s testimony). Moreover, Whittaker’s

contention that Hankins stated he was a fighter and stabbed

Whittaker first would support Whittaker’s justification defense

(which there was sufficient evidence to disprove) and not that he

reacted passionately. See Dugger v. State, 297 Ga. 120, 124 (7) (772

SE2d 695) (2015) (“The distinguishing characteristic between

[voluntary manslaughter and self-defense] is whether the accused

was so influenced and excited that he reacted passionately rather

than simply in an attempt to defend himself.” (citation and

punctuation omitted)). Thus, this claim fails.

                                 13
      3. Whittaker contends that the trial court erred by failing to

instruct the jury that he had no duty to retreat before using deadly

force in self-defense. See OCGA § 16-3-23.1.5 Because he did not

object to the trial court’s failure to give this instruction, he must

show that the omission amounted to plain error. See OCGA § 17-8-

58 (b). To show plain error, Whittaker must establish that “(1) the

alleged error was not affirmatively waived, (2) it was obvious beyond

reasonable dispute, and (3) it affected the appellant’s substantial

rights, which ordinarily means showing that it affected the outcome

of the trial.” Moore v. State, 315 Ga. 263, 272-273 (4) (882 SE2d 227)

(2022). If a defendant makes that showing, the appellate court has

the discretion to remedy the error only if the error “seriously affected

the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”

Id. at 273 (4) (citation and punctuation omitted).

      5 The instruction at issue provided:

     One who is not the aggressor is not required to retreat before being
     justified in using such force as is necessary for personal defense or
     in using force that is likely to cause death or great bodily harm if
     one reasonably believes such force is necessary to prevent death or
     great bodily injury to oneself or a third person or to prevent the
     commission of a forcible felony.
Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions, Vol. II: Criminal Cases (2020) § 3.10.13.
                                      14
     Whittaker has failed to show an obvious error here. The no-

duty-to-retreat instruction is required only when “the issue of

retreat is raised by the evidence or placed in issue.” See White v.

State, 291 Ga. 7, 8 (2) (727 SE2d 109) (2012) (“Where self-defense is

the sole defense, and the issue of retreat is raised by the evidence or

placed in issue, the defense is entitled to a charge on the principles

of retreat.” (cleaned up)); Higginbotham v. State, 287 Ga. 187, 189-

190 (4) (695 SE2d 210) (2010) (holding that the no-duty-to-retreat

instruction was not warranted when the issue of retreat was not

raised by the evidence). But the State never argued that Whittaker

should have retreated. Whittaker argues that the State “introduced

the ‘retreat’ concept” by presenting the evidence of his “bullying” of

and prior difficulties with Hankins, but he does not explain how this

evidence amounted to an argument—or even asked the jury to

infer—that Whittaker should have retreated. And that evidence had

a much more obvious purpose: it was relevant to show that

Whittaker bullied Hankins when the two were drinking, which

tended to undermine Whittaker’s theory of self-defense. In any

                                  15
event, nothing in the record suggests the State used this evidence to

argue that Whittaker should have retreated. Absent any indication

in the record that the duty to retreat was placed at issue, the trial

court did not commit any obvious error by not giving a no-duty-to-

retreat instruction. See Hoffler v. State, 292 Ga. 537, 542 (4) (739

SE2d 362) (2013) (“Without evidence to warrant the [no-duty-to-

retreat instruction], it cannot be said that the failure to give it was

error.”); White, 291 Ga. at 9 (2) (issue of retreat “not raised by the

evidence so as to support the giving of a charge on the subject” where

“the defendant testified and was not questioned as to why he did not

leave the scene”).

     Moreover, Whittaker has not shown that the failure to include

that charge affected his substantial rights, particularly where the

trial court thoroughly instructed the jury on the general principles

of self-defense. See Shaw v. State, 292 Ga. 871, 873-874 (2) (742

SE2d 707) (2013) (holding that, in light of the court’s extensive

instructions on self-defense, including circumstances in which force

is justified, the reasonableness of a belief that force is necessary, and

                                   16
threats or menaces that may lead to such a reasonable belief, the

defendant failed to show that the failure to charge on duty to retreat

probably affected the outcome of the trial); Edmonds v. State, 275

Ga. 450, 453 (4) (569 SE2d 530) (2002) (“[E]ven assuming that

retreat was in issue and [defendant’s] sole defense was self-defense,

the failure to charge on the lack of duty to retreat would not require

reversal because [defendant’s] defense of self-defense was fairly

presented to the jury,” and the trial court fully instructed the jury

on the law of justification and self-defense.). So this claim fails.

     4. Whittaker argues that his counsel provided ineffective

assistance in a number of ways. To prevail on a claim of ineffective

assistance, a defendant must show that his counsel’s performance

was deficient and that he suffered prejudice as a result. See

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-694 (III) (A)-(B) (104

SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984). A claim of ineffective assistance fails

if the defendant does not establish either deficient performance or

prejudice. See Lee v. State, 314 Ga. 724, 727 (1) (879 SE2d 416)

(2022).

                                   17
     To establish that counsel’s performance was deficient, a

defendant “must demonstrate that the lawyer performed his duties

in   an   objectively   unreasonable   way,    considering   all   the

circumstances and in the light of prevailing professional norms.”

Washington v. State, 313 Ga. 771, 773 (3) (873 SE2d 132) (2022)

(citation and punctuation omitted). There is a “strong presumption

that counsel performed reasonably,” and to overcome that

presumption, a defendant must show “that no reasonable lawyer

would have done what his lawyer did, or would have failed to do

what his lawyer did not.” Id. (citation and punctuation omitted). In

particular, “[d]ecisions regarding trial tactics and strategy may form

the basis for an ineffectiveness claim only if they were so patently

unreasonable that no competent attorney would have followed such

a course.” Id. (citation and punctuation omitted).

     To establish prejudice, a defendant must show “a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result

of the proceeding would have been different.” Evans v. State, 315 Ga.

607, 611 (2) (b) (884 SE2d 334) (2023) (citation and punctuation

                                 18
omitted). “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to

undermine confidence in the outcome.” Lee, 314 Ga. at 727 (1)

(citation and punctuation omitted).

     (a) Whittaker contends that his counsel provided ineffective

assistance by failing to pursue a motion to suppress the statement

he gave at the hospital on the grounds that he was in custody and

should have been advised of his rights under Miranda. 6

     Trial counsel did not render deficient performance by not

pursuing suppression of Whittaker’s hospital statement because the

motion would have failed. See Williams v. State, 315 Ga. 797, 806

(2) (884 SE2d 877) (2023) (“[F]ailing to file a meritless motion is not

deficient performance.”). “Miranda warnings are required only

when a person is interviewed by law enforcement while in custody.”

Drake v. State, 296 Ga. 286, 288 (2) (766 SE2d 447) (2014) (citation

and punctuation omitted). And a person is only “in custody” for

     6  Before trial, defense counsel moved to exclude any “confessions,
admissions or statements” made by Whittaker. But the record does not show
an order granting or denying this motion, and the transcripts do not show a
Jackson-Denno hearing. See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (84 SCt 1774, 12
LE2d 908) (1964).
                                    19
Miranda purposes “if he has been formally arrested or his freedom

of movement has been restrained to the degree associated with a

formal arrest.” Id. (citation and punctuation omitted). But the record

shows that when Whittaker was at the hospital, he was being

treated for his injuries, there was no evidence that he was restrained

in any way, the investigator asked questions about the incident

without isolating him, and there is no indication from the record that

he was either told he had to answer those questions or that he could

not leave. And Whittaker does not argue that he was restrained or

unable to leave. These circumstances do not amount to the degree of

restraint associated with a formal arrest. See, e.g., Jennings v. State,

282 Ga. 679, 681 (3) (653 SE2d 17) (2007) (concluding that the

defendant was not in custody when he “was in a medical, rather than

an investigative, setting” and when he was questioned by police

officers in the hospital while unable to leave for medical reasons but

not isolated by the police).

     Even if a motion to suppress Whittaker’s statement could have

succeeded, trial counsel had a reasonable strategic basis for not

                                  20
seeking to suppress the statement. Counsel testified that he believed

that Whittaker’s statement at the hospital that “[Hankins] stabbed

me and I came unglued” supported his voluntary manslaughter

defense, and that “manslaughter was the only shot we had.” Opting

not to pursue a motion to suppress, even if it had merit, to ensure

that key evidence in support of his defense would be available was a

reasonable trial strategy that does not amount to deficient

performance. See Thomas v. State, 311 Ga. 280, 286 (2) (857 SE2d

223) (2021).

     (b) Whittaker contends that his counsel should have requested

a jury instruction on mutual combat. “Mutual combat occurs when

there is combat between two persons as a result of a sudden quarrel

or such circumstances as indicate a purpose, willingness, and intent

on the part of both to engage mutually in a fight.” Ramirez v. State,

307 Ga. 550, 552 (2) (837 SE2d 328) (2019) (citation and punctuation

omitted). Whittaker contends that the mutual-combat instruction

should have been requested because it was part of his defense theory

and strategy to pursue the lesser-included offense of voluntary

                                 21
manslaughter.

     The decision to request—or not request—a jury instruction is

a strategic decision and will not constitute deficient performance

unless such decision was “so patently unreasonable that no

competent attorney would have chosen [it].” Ramirez, 307 Ga. at 553

(2). At the motion-for-new-trial hearing, trial counsel testified that

“we hoped to be able to show the jury that this was mutual combat,”

but he did not request the instruction “[b]ecause that defense eroded

very quickly once the trial started.” He also explained that a mutual-

combat defense “would have hurt our ability at the time we did

closing argument because I would be making an argument to the

jury which was totally ridiculous.” This explanation finds support in

the record, which shows that Whittaker claimed that Hankins

attacked him first—not that the two agreed to fight—and that he

killed Hankins in self-defense. “Evidence that the victim attacked

the defendant, such that would give rise to justification based on

self-defense, is not a basis for an instruction on mutual combat.”

Moore v. State, 307 Ga. 290, 296 (4) (835 SE2d 610) (2019). And even

                                 22
if the evidence might have supported an argument that the fight and

resulting death happened as the result of a “sudden quarrel,”

Ramirez, 307 Ga. at 552 (2), declining to advance a relatively weak

theory (or, as trial counsel put it, a “totally ridiculous” one) to

preserve credibility with the jury was a reasonable strategic

decision, and thus not deficient performance.

     (c) Whittaker contends that his counsel should have objected to

the court’s instruction on alcoholism because no evidence supported

the charge, which he says generally prejudiced him.

     At the request of the State, the trial court included in its charge

to the jury Georgia Pattern Jury Instructions § 3.60.10: Voluntary

Intoxication, No Excuse and § 3.60.30 Voluntary Intoxication:

Alcoholism, No Defense for Crime. Trial counsel did not object. As to

alcoholism, the court instructed:

     Ladies and gentlemen, alcoholism is not involuntary and
     it’s no defense to any criminal act. A person who knows
     that he suffers from a chronic alcohol drinking problem or
     knows that he or she suffers from alcoholism may not
     intentionally and voluntarily induce or bring on a state of
     intoxication and then be excused from the commission of

                                    23
     a criminal act during the voluntarily induced intoxicated
     state.

     Assuming without deciding that trial counsel performed

deficiently, Whittaker has failed to establish prejudice. He offers

nothing more than a conclusory argument that the instruction was

prejudicial, and in light of the strong evidence of Whittaker’s guilt,

omitting the instruction would not have given rise to a reasonable

probability of a different outcome. See Mangold, 253 Ga. App. at 372

(2) (explaining that “even assuming that the court improperly

charged the jury [on alcoholism], we find that this instruction was

not prejudicial to Mangold,” where undisputed evidence showed that

the defendant shot the victim after waving a gun around); Green v.

State, 190 Ga. App. 130, 130 (2) (378 SE2d 178) (1989) (holding that

the alcoholism and voluntary intoxication instructions “were not

prejudicial to defendant” in light of the trial court’s full charge to the

jury).

     (d) Whittaker contends that his counsel performed deficiently

by failing to request a jury instruction that he had no duty to retreat.

                                   24
As discussed in Division 3 above, the no-duty-to-retreat instruction

was not warranted because retreat was not raised by the evidence

or put in issue. See White, 291 Ga. at 8-9 (2); Higginbotham, 287 Ga.

at 189-190 (4). Because the instruction was not supported by the

evidence, the failure to request the instruction was not deficient

performance. See Morton v. State, 306 Ga. 492, 499 (4) (c) (831 SE2d

740) (2019); Higginbotham, 287 Ga. at 192 (5) (e) (“Since it was not

error to fail to give a charge on no duty to retreat . . . trial counsel’s

failure to object to the lack of such a charge was not deficient

performance.”).

     (e) Whittaker contends that counsel should have objected to the

verdict form. The verdict form was printed with the counts of the

indictment and blanks where the jury could write “guilty” or “not

guilty.” To the right of Counts 1 and 2 for malice murder and felony

murder, the trial court handwrote “voluntary manslaughter”

followed by a blank. Whittaker contends that the handwritten lines

for voluntary manslaughter to the right of the indicted counts

violated Edge v. State, 261 Ga. 865, 867 (2) (414 SE2d 463) (1992),

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by requiring the jury to improperly reach a verdict on the murder

count before considering voluntary manslaughter. He argues that no

Georgia precedent says that a handwritten blank for a lesser-

included offense for consideration only after the jury has reached a

verdict on the murder count is appropriate.

     Trial counsel was not deficient for failing to object to the verdict

form because the verdict form was not improper. “In deciding

whether a verdict form accurately presented the law and properly

guided the jury, this Court reviews the language of the form along

with the trial court’s instructions to the jury.” Atkins v. State, 310

Ga. 246, 252 (3) (850 SE2d 103) (2020). So long as the trial court

properly instructs the jury on the lesser offenses and how to fill in

the verdict form, there is no error merely because the verdict form

does not expressly list the lesser offenses. See id. at 252-253 (3);

Jones v. State, 303 Ga. 496, 503-504 (V) (813 SE2d 360) (2018). Here,

the trial court properly instructed the jury on how to read and fill

out the verdict form, including the handwritten portion. The court

explained, “[B]efore you would be authorized to return a verdict of

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guilty of malice murder or felony murder, you must first determine

whether mitigating circumstances, if any, would cause the offense

to be reduced to voluntary manslaughter.” The court also noted that,

when filling out the verdict form, the jury should “[take] into

consideration the lesser included offenses on Counts 1 and 2 for

voluntary manslaughter.” While Whittaker is right that we have not

specifically addressed a verdict form with handwritten lines for

lesser offenses to the right of the charged counts, we have upheld

verdict forms that did not include any lines for lesser offenses when

the trial court properly instructed the jury on the lesser offenses and

how to complete the verdict form. See Jones, 303 Ga. at 503-504 (V);

Buttram v. State, 280 Ga. 595, 599 (13) (631 SE2d 642) (2006).

     (f) Finally, Whittaker asks the Court to consider the

cumulative prejudicial effect of his counsel’s errors. But because

Whittaker has not established more than one instance of deficiency,

we need not address cumulative prejudice. See Scott v. State, 309

Ga. 764, 771 (3) (d) (848 SE2d 448) (2020) (“Assessing cumulative

prejudice is necessary only when multiple errors have been shown,

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and [the appellant] has not established even one instance in which

trial counsel was deficient.”).

     5. Finally, Whittaker contends that the trial court erred by

failing to enter a separate order vacating his sentence for felony

murder after it orally granted his motion to modify the sentence. The

State correctly concedes that the felony-murder count should have

been recorded as vacated by operation of law rather than merged.

See Manner v. State, 302 Ga. 877, 890-891 (IV) (808 SE2d 681)

(2017). But the incorrect nomenclature does not affect Whittaker’s

sentence, so there is no sentencing error to correct. See Washington,

313 Ga. at 772-773 (2).

     Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

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