Court Opinion

ID: 9680389
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:31:22.349039+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:27.889148
License: Public Domain

John I. Purtle, Justice, concurring. I concur in the result reached in this case but for what I believe to be a different reason. I am unable to determine from the majority opinion the exact reason for affirmance. The exclusionary rule is discussed in general terms; however, I cannot understand its exact application to the facts of this case. The Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Art. 2 §§ 8 through 15 of the Arkansas Constitution provide generally for the protection of the rights and lives of citizens. These rights were not, generally speaking, strictly enforced until such decisions as Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964); and Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968), were handed down by the United States Supreme Court. We are bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States. Based upon the more recent decisions of Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979) and Payton & Riddick v. New York, 455 U.S. 579 (1980), it may be stated that a person’s home cannot be invaded without a search warrant or arrest warrant, absent exigent circumstances, even if probable cause is absolutely known to exist. Neither may a person ordinarily be seized without probable cause. Therefore, if the officers had probable cause to arrest the appellant before they went to his home, they were required to obtain a warrant. Although both the state and the appellant appear to agree that probable cause existed prior to the trip to appellant’s home, I do not believe the record supports this statement. On the other hand, if they did not have probable cause at the time they took custody of the appellant, then the arrest was likewise illegal. Violation of the above rules of law would exclude all evidence and statements obtained by such illegal seizure as it would be in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Even if the Miranda warning and all implications of the Fifth Amendment were fairly and accurately given to the appellant, the confession would not be legalized and therefore would not be admissible if the arrest was in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Supplemental Opinion on Denial of Rehearing delivered December 21, 1981 In my opinion, the statement given by appellant was properly admitted only because probable cause developed when the officers went to appellant’s house and discovered a pistol which fit the description of the murder weapon. This discovery, along with other prior suspicious circumstances, gave rise to probable cause. The only reason the arrest is not in violation of the Fourth Amendment is because of the exigent circumstances which existed at the time. The officers were 25 miles from the nearest magistrate and it was in the middle of the night. It was very probable that if they left to obtain a warrant the suspect would not have been there when they returned. Thus, we have an exception to the exclusionary rule. Had the probable cause been developed as a result of seizing the appellant or taking him into custody then the exclusion would still apply. See Dunaway v. New York, supra.