Court Opinion

ID: 9555857
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-15 15:05:38.506337+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:35:55.102820
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
                                Docket No. 49099

STATE OF IDAHO,                     )
                                    )                 Boise, February 2023 Term
      Plaintiff-Appellant,          )
                                    )                 Opinion Filed: August 15, 2023
v.                                  )
                                    )                 Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
JONATHAN ELSTON BELL,               )
                                    )
      Defendant-Respondent.         )
____________________________________)

       Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the State
       of Idaho, Blaine County. Daniel Dolan, Magistrate Judge.
       Ned C. Williamson, District Judge.

       The district court’s opinion is affirmed.

       Raúl R. Labrador, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, attorney for Appellant.
       Kacey L. Jones argued.

       Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender, Boise, attorney
       for Respondent. Jenny Swinford argued.

                             _________________________________

BEVAN, Chief Justice.
       This appeal presents another examination of the scope of our holding in State v. Clarke,
165 Idaho 393, 446 P.3d 451 (2019). There, we held that an individual may not be arrested without
a warrant for a misdemeanor that was completed outside the arresting officer’s presence. The State
of Idaho brings this appeal asserting that the “in the presence of the arresting officer” requirement
under Clarke can be satisfied by the collective knowledge of more than one officer to establish
probable cause. Thus, though the arresting officer here did not witness Jonathan Bell’s driving
pattern for the DUI, the State argues he had sufficient “collective knowledge” from others to carry
out the arrest. The magistrate court agreed with this position below and denied Bell’s motion to
suppress. However, Bell appealed to the district court, which reversed the magistrate court’s
decision, concluding that the Idaho Constitution prohibits a police officer from making a
warrantless arrest for a DUI committed outside the officer’s presence, even if the officer had
                                             1
probable cause for that offense through his collective knowledge from another officer. For the
reasons set forth below, we affirm the district court’s decision.
                       I.      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
   A. Factual Background
       On May 16, 2019, Officer Pallas was off duty and not in uniform when he noticed Bell at
an Albertsons grocery store in Hailey, Idaho. Bell appeared to be unsteady on his feet, was having
difficulty walking, and appeared confused. Pallas also saw Bell struggle to find his car in the
parking lot once he exited the store. As Pallas watched Bell get into the driver’s seat of his vehicle
and begin to drive, he called Officer Murphy, who was Pallas’ training officer and on duty, to
report Bell as possibly driving under the influence. Murphy told Pallas to call dispatch, which he
did. Pallas gave dispatch a description of the vehicle, the license plate number, and reported that
the driver appeared to be intoxicated.
       Pallas then left the parking lot, continued onto McKercher Boulevard, and turned right onto
Main Street where he parked and waited for Bell to exit the parking lot so Pallas could follow him.
Bell, however, drove in a different direction than Pallas anticipated, so Pallas was forced to make
a U-turn and as a result could not find Bell’s vehicle for a few blocks. When Pallas later located
Bell, he did not see Bell violate any traffic laws, so Pallas reported Bell’s location to dispatch,
ended the call, and drove to the Hailey Police Station to begin his shift. After ending the call with
dispatch, Pallas had no further role in the investigation and later arrest of Bell.
       While en route to Albertsons after the call from Pallas, Murphy received information from
dispatch (that had been provided by Pallas) that there was an intoxicated driver near 911 North
Main and the Albertsons grocery store in Hailey. Dispatch stated that the vehicle was a white GMC
Acadia with Idaho license plate Y67E registered to an address on North Fourth Avenue. When
Murphy arrived at the address provided by dispatch, he saw a white Acadia parked outside.
Murphy felt the hood of the vehicle, which was still warm to the touch.
       Murphy activated his bodycam and knocked on the home’s front door. Bell’s minor son
answered and told Murphy that they had just returned from the grocery store. The child told
Murphy that Bell was driving the car. When Bell came to the door, Murphy asked him to step
outside so they could speak to one another. Bell agreed to step outside, and he admitted that he
had just returned home from a grocery store. Bell also admitted to consuming five alcoholic

                                                   2
beverages but stated that he had not consumed any alcohol since he returned home. As Bell spoke
with Murphy, he was unsteady on his feet and smelled of alcohol.
           With this information, Murphy decided to investigate whether Bell had driven under the
influence and asked Bell to perform field sobriety tests. Murphy administered the Horizontal Gaze
Nystagmus (“HGN”) test, which Bell failed. Murphy next had Bell attempt a walk and turn test;
however, Bell could not stand in the starting position and attempted to walk before being told to
begin. Bell told Murphy he could not complete the walk and turn test and chose not to complete
it. Next, Murphy attempted to administer the one leg stand test, which Bell also said he could not
complete. Murphy placed Bell under arrest for misdemeanor driving under the influence and
transported him to Blaine County Jail to administer a breath alcohol test. Bell provided samples of
0.326 and 0.330.
       B. Procedural Background
           Bell was arrested for misdemeanor excessive DUI under Idaho Code section 18-8004(1)(c)
and injury to a child under Idaho Code section 18-1501(3)1. Bell pleaded not guilty and moved to
suppress the evidence, arguing he had been unlawfully seized when Murphy ordered him to exit
his residence. Bell also argued that Murphy’s request for him to perform standard field sobriety
tests constituted a seizure and rendered his subsequent arrest a warrantless arrest for a completed
misdemeanor,2 which this Court ruled (subsequent to Bell’s arrest) is impermissible under State v.
Clarke, 165 Idaho 393, 446 P.3d 451 (2019).3 Following two hearings, the magistrate court issued
its memorandum decision and order denying Bell’s motion to suppress. In its decision, the
magistrate court reasoned:
                    In this case it is clear that Pallas, a Hailey Police Officer, observed Bell
           driving a motor vehicle on a public roadway. Previous to this driving Pallas
           observed Bell having difficulty walking and finding his vehicle[.] Pallas believed
           that [] Bell’s motor skills where [sic] an indication of intoxication.
                   It is recognized by this [c]ourt that the observations of Pallas standing alone
           did not give Pallas a basis to conduct a traffic stop.

1
  The facts that led to the injury to a child charge are not developed in the record, though we presume the charge stems
from Bell driving under the influence with his minor child in the vehicle.
2
 “A completed misdemeanor is one which is no longer in progress when the officer arrives on the scene.” State v.
Clarke, 165 Idaho 393, 396 n.6, 446 P.3d 451, 454 n.6 (2019).
3
    Following Bell’s arrest, this Court issued its decision in Clarke.
                                                              3
              The State argues that the collective knowledge of the police is sufficient to
       allow Murphy to use the additional information of Pallas witnessing Bell driving
       the motor vehicle on the roadway.
                In this case there was direct communication between Pallas and Murphy as
       to Pallas’s concern of Bell’s intoxication. This direct communication was
       supplemented with the additional information provided by Pallas through dispatch.
       It is clear in this matter that Pallas and Murphy where [sic] working together and it
       was the collective knowledge of the two officers that gave rise to Murphy
       contacting Bell and the subsequent arrest of Bell for DUI.
       ....
              In this matter Pallas observed Bell driving a motor vehicle on a public
       roadway and observed that Bell had difficult [sic] with his balance and appeared
       intoxicated.[ ] Murphy assisted Pallas in the investigation which started with a
       consensual encounter at the residence where Bell was contacted. This consensual
       encounter evolved into an investigative detention when Murphy confirmed that Bell
       was the driver of the vehicle, that Bell had consumed 5 alcoholic drinks earlier in
       the day and that Murphy observed the odor of alcohol and [sic] on Bell’s person.
               After Bell failed the field sobriety test[,] Murphy had probable cause to
       arrest Bell for a [DUI] that had occurred in the presence of Officer Pallas and
       Murphy collectively.
       ....
              In this case the misdemeanor of [e]xcessive DUI did occur in the collective
       presence of Officers Pallas and Murphy of the Hailey Police Department.
       Bell then entered a conditional guilty plea to both misdemeanors, reserving the right to
appeal the magistrate court’s denial of his motion to suppress. Bell then appealed to the district
court. Applying Clarke and Reagan v. Idaho Trans. Dept., 169 Idaho 689, 502 P.3d 1027 (2021),
the district court reversed the magistrate court’s order and granted Bell’s motion to suppress. The
district court explained:
       The Clarke and Reagan Courts recognize the ramifications of the decision to
       prohibit warrantless arrests for misdemeanors committed outside the presence of
       an officer. . . . Many aspects of misdemeanor[ ] crimes have been impacted by these
       decisions, but the Idaho Supreme Court has concluded that state laws and law
       enforcement tactics must yield to the Idaho Constitution. Protections under []
       Article I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution are designed to protect Idaho citizens’
       reasonable expectations of privacy against unreasonable searches and seizures.
       Simply put, there is no authority to make a warrantless arrest for a completed
       misdemeanor committed outside of the presence of an officer.
The State timely appealed from the district court’s decision.

                                                 4
                                    II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
        “When a district court issues a decision while acting in its intermediate appellate capacity,
this Court directly reviews the district court’s decision.” State v. Guerra, 169 Idaho 486, 491–92,
497 P.3d 1106, 1111–12 (2021) (citing State v. Chernobieff, 161 Idaho 537, 539, 387 P.3d 790,
792 (2016)). “This Court reviews the magistrate court record to determine whether: (1) there is
substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate court’s findings of fact; and (2) the
magistrate court’s conclusions of law are consistent with those findings.” Id. (citing Pelayo v.
Pelayo, 154 Idaho 855, 858, 303 P.3d 214, 217 (2013)). “If those findings are so supported and
the conclusions follow therefrom and if the district court affirmed the magistrate’s decision, we
affirm the district court’s decision as a matter of procedure.” Id. at 492, 497 P.3d at 1112 (quoting
Pelayo, 154 Idaho at 858, 303 P.3d at 217). This Court does not review decisions rendered by the
magistrate court. State v. Phipps, 166 Idaho 1, 4, 454 P.3d 1084, 1087 (2019) (quoting Pelayo, 154
Idaho at 858, 303 P.3d at 217). Rather, this Court is procedurally bound to affirm or reverse the
district court’s decision. Id.
        Where we review a decision on a motion to suppress evidence, we apply a bifurcated
standard of review. Clarke, 165 Idaho at 396, 446 P.3d at 454. This Court “gives deference to the
trial court’s findings of fact, which will be upheld so long as they are not clearly erroneous.” State
v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 810, 203 P.3d 1203, 1209 (2009). “Findings of fact are not clearly
erroneous if they are supported by substantial and competent evidence.” Id. Likewise, “[d]ecisions
regarding the credibility of witnesses, weight to be given to conflicting evidence, and factual
inferences to be drawn are. . . within the discretion of the trial court.” Id. That said, “this Court
freely reviews the trial court’s application of constitutional principles in light of the facts found.”
Clarke, 165 Idaho at 396, 446 P.3d at 454.
                                           III. ANALYSIS
        Bell’s arrest occurred before this Court decided Clarke. Even so, this Court recognized that
Clarke “merely memorialized what the framers of the Idaho Constitution initially intended in
limiting an officer’s arrest powers for completed misdemeanors” and consequently “the law as
clarified therein was binding.” State v. Amstutz, 169 Idaho 144, 147, 492 P.3d 1103, 1106 (2021).
In Clarke, we determined that the “framers of the Idaho Constitution understood that Article I,
[s]ection 17 prohibited warrantless arrests for completed misdemeanors.” 165 Idaho at 399, 446
P.3d at 457. As a result, while Bell’s arrest occurred before Clarke was decided, the prohibition

                                                  5
against warrantless arrests for completed misdemeanors has been part of Idaho’s law since our
State’s founding, even if it was not clearly enunciated until Clarke. Accordingly, its holding
applies here.
       The State asks this Court to reverse the district court’s order on intermediate appeal, which
reversed the magistrate court’s denial of Bell’s motion to suppress. The State contends that the
collective knowledge doctrine satisfies the “in the presence of an officer” requirement recognized
by this Court in Clarke. Bell argues, alternatively, that while the collective knowledge doctrine
allows an officer to develop probable cause from multiple sources, or for authority to be delegated
for a lawful felony arrest through information gathered collectively, that doctrine does not apply
to the presence requirement from Clarke when the “present” officer did not witness the conduct
that would justify the arrest for a misdemeanor. Put simply, the dispositive issue here is whether a
police officer violates Article I, section 17 of the Idaho Constitution, as interpreted in Clarke, when
making an arrest for a misdemeanor offense supported by probable cause that did not occur in the
officer’s presence. For the reasons below, we hold that officers cannot bifurcate the presence and
probable cause requirements recognized in Clarke.
       In Clarke, this Court relied on precedent and the arresting authority of an officer at the time
our Constitution was adopted, explaining that “an officer, at common law, was not authorized to
make an arrest without a warrant, for a mere misdemeanor not committed in his presence.” Id. at
399, 446 P.3d at 457 (quoting John Bad Elk v. United States, 177 U.S. 529, 534 (1900)). From that
history, this Court determined that “based upon the state of the common law in 1889,” the framers
intended Article I, section 17 of the Idaho Constitution to prohibit warrantless arrests for completed
misdemeanors. Id. Thus, for misdemeanors, a warrantless arrest may occur only if the offense was
committed in the arresting officer’s presence. See id. at 399–400, 446 P.3d 457–58.
       This Court revisited Clarke two years later to decide whether its holding extended to
administrative proceedings and the suspension of driving privileges for a DUI. In Reagan v. Idaho
Transp. Dep’t., a concerned citizen reported a possible intoxicated driver to the local police
department. 169 Idaho 689, 692, 502 P.3d 1027, 1030 (2021). The citizen followed the driver
through town and eventually to the driver’s residence. Id. An officer came to the residence,
confirmed that the driver was in fact intoxicated, and then arrested her for a misdemeanor DUI. Id.
at 692–93, 502 P.3d at 1030–31. This Court determined that “inasmuch as Reagan was arrested
without a warrant for a misdemeanor DUI completed outside the officer’s presence, section 49-
                                                  6
1405(1)(b) did not provide a legal basis for the arrest.” Id. at 696, 502 P.3d at 1034. Therefore, we
held that the arrest violated Article I, section 17 of the Idaho Constitution. See id.
        The collective knowledge doctrine allows an officer to gather information from various
sources—bulletins, dispatch, fellow officers, and so forth—to support a finding of probable cause.
“The United States Supreme Court has articulated that[,] although the collective knowledge
doctrine eliminates the requirement of personal knowledge, it does not eliminate the requirement
of some knowledge.” Amstutz, 169 Idaho at 149, 492 P.3d at 1108 (citing United States v. Hensley,
469 U.S. 221, 232-33 (1985)). But under the collective knowledge doctrine, an arrest must still
reflect the protections afforded under Article I, section 17 of the Idaho Constitution:4
        The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
        against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant
        shall issue without probable cause shown by affidavit, particularly describing the
        place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized.
IDAHO CONST. art. I. § 17 (emphasis added).
        The State argues that under the collective knowledge doctrine, and considering the
observations and knowledge of both Pallas and Murphy, Bell committed a crime in “the presence
of the Hailey Police department”; therefore, his warrantless arrest was lawful. The State attempts
to distinguish the facts here from Clarke and Reagan by suggesting the district court overlooked a
defining aspect of this case: Bell committed a crime in the presence of an officer—Reagan and
Clarke did not. The dissent also tries to distinguish Reagan from Bell, pointing out that Reagan
concerned a citizen’s report, which rendered the collective knowledge doctrine inapplicable. But
these distinctions are of no moment to the constitutional requirement prohibiting warrantless
misdemeanor arrests that occur outside the presence of the arresting officer.
        Indeed, the problem with this premise is that the off-duty officer who observed Bell’s
apparent markers of intoxication did not complete the arrest. While “presence” of an officer is one
required element of Clarke and the cases applying it, the same officer who is present must also
personally observe the alleged illegal conduct that subjects one to a warrantless arrest for a
misdemeanor. The State’s proposed application of Reagan and Clarke misconstrues this limiting
principle from these cases. We made clear in both cases that Article I, section 17 of the Idaho

4
  Because Bell does not challenge the constitutionality of his arrest under the Fourth Amendment, we do not consider
the United States Constitution here.
                                                         7
Constitution prohibits an arrest for a misdemeanor offense that occurs outside the presence of the
arresting officer—not merely an officer or his “department.” See Reagan, 169 Idaho at 696, 502
P.3d at 1034 (“Reagan was arrested without a warrant for a misdemeanor DUI completed outside
the officer’s presence”) (emphasis added). The State proposes that this Court adopt “an
interpretation of the presence requirement that permits warrantless misdemeanor arrests where the
offense was committed in the presence of an officer and that officer’s observations were
communicated to the arresting officer.” Under its proposed rule, the State argues there is no need
for an additional requirement that the arresting officer observe the offense. Rather, the State
contends that when a misdemeanor is committed in the presence of a police officer and that
information is relayed to dispatch, the arrest of the misdemeanant by another police officer within
a reasonable time of receipt of that information satisfies both prongs of Clarke. We disagree. The
State relies on a series of persuasive authorities from other jurisdictions in support of its position,
but we are bound by the Idaho Constitution, and how other jurisdictions have interpreted the
collective knowledge doctrine is of little consequence to its application in Idaho. Clarke—as we
have explained—was a memorialization of what the framers intended, and under that requirement,
a warrantless arrest is permissible only when the misdemeanor was committed in the arresting
officer’s presence. Clarke, 165 Idaho at 399–400, 446 P.3d at 457–58.
       The State relies on authorities from outside Idaho, primarily State v. Lyon, 706 P.2d 516,
520 (N.M. Ct. App. 1985), to support its position here. The Lyon court held that
       when a misdemeanor is committed in the presence of a police officer and
       information of such is promptly placed on the police radio or otherwise
       communicated and a description of the misdemeanant given, the arrest of the
       misdemeanant by another police officer within a reasonable time of receipt of the
       information is valid.
Id. While this statement may be correct under New Mexico law, and “presence” may be interpreted
broadly, New Mexico has not adopted the same requirement that exists under Idaho’s constitution–
that to be arrested for a misdemeanor that crime must have occurred in the arresting officer’s
presence. And the State has not pointed to anything in Idaho’s history that suggests a law
enforcement officer could arrest an individual for a completed misdemeanor if that misdemeanor
was committed in the presence of any officer. The other non-Idaho authorities cited by the State
suffer from the same infirmity.

                                                  8
       The problem for the State here is that neither officer had both presence and probable cause
to arrest. Pallas may have suspected Bell was intoxicated, but he did not smell alcohol, hear Bell
speak, witness driving errors, or observe other signs of intoxication. Indeed, Pallas conceded that
his observations of Bell amounted only to reasonable suspicion, and the State has not challenged
this conclusion on appeal. In short, Pallas acknowledged he lacked probable cause that Bell
committed a crime. While he was near Bell in the Albertsons parking lot, Pallas’s observations do
not satisfy the “presence” requirement under Clarke; Pallas did not have probable cause that Bell
committed a crime. This does not mean, as the dissent postulates, that officers can no longer rely
on information provided by dispatch to develop probable cause to make an arrest. Officers can
rely on that information to seek an arrest warrant from a magistrate.
       Turning then to Murphy, after Pallas observed Bell drive away and communicated that
information to dispatch, dispatch gave Murphy the description of Bell’s vehicle along with the
vehicle’s license plate and its registered address. Murphy responded to that address, where he
found Bell’s vehicle. Murphy did not observe Bell driving. Murphy knocked on the door and asked
Bell to step outside to speak with him, which Bell did. On exiting the house, Murphy, like Pallas,
observed Bell unsteady on his feet and noted the smell of alcohol. Murphy investigated further and
asked Bell to perform field sobriety tests, which Bell agreed to do. Bell subsequently failed the
Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus test, could not complete a walk and turn test, and could not complete
a one leg stand test. After failing these field sobriety tests, Murphy told Bell he was under arrest
for misdemeanor DUI. Murphy’s interaction with Bell is the converse of Pallas’s. Murphy
developed probable cause that Bell was intoxicated after Bell’s unlawful driving had been
completed. Thus, Murphy was not present when Bell committed the misdemeanor.
       Relying on Amstutz, the dissent points out that we have previously specified that an
arresting officer may rely on the information received from dispatch. We do not depart from that
view now, but by the time Murphy arrived, and probable cause was developed, the misdemeanor
was complete. Bell was already inside his residence. No amount of after-the-fact information
sharing can overcome the Article I, section 17 prohibition against warrantless arrests for
misdemeanors. A warrant is necessary for a completed misdemeanor, even when—as the dissent
frames it—the investigation was good police work.
       Bell had likely driven while intoxicated, given the excessive level of his breath alcohol test,
his warm car, and the other information and behavior that led to the collective knowledge for
                                                 9
probable cause, but that is no different than Clarke, who likely committed a battery, or Reagan,
who likely committed a DUI. See Clarke, 165 Idaho at 394–95, 446 P.3d at 452–53; Reagan, 169
Idaho at 692, 502 P.3d at 1030. For all three of these individuals, the constitutional principle
requiring the arresting officer to observe the misdemeanor conduct was absent. Thus, Murphy had
probable cause but no presence; Pallas had presence but no probable cause. These are distinct
requirements stemming from different constitutional sources. A surplus of one cannot make up for
a deficit of the other. Both are required under Article I, section 17. Clarke, 165 Idaho at 399, 446
P.3d at 457.
        Below, the district court concluded that “the collective knowledge doctrine may provide
sufficient facts to justify a warrantless arrest but Article I, section 17 of the Idaho State Constitution
prohibits such a warrantless arrest.” Indeed, the district court explained, “in light of the Idaho
Supreme Court’s recent decisions. . . the [c]ourt finds that the collective knowledge doctrine does
not allow a peace officer to make a warrantless arrest for a DUI committed outside of the officer’s
presence.” This was the proper conclusion, and it aligned with the holdings from both Clarke and
Reagan, applying Idaho’s Constitution that prohibits a warrantless arrest for a misdemeanor
completed outside the presence of the officer. See, e.g., Reagan, 169 Idaho at 698, 502 P.3d at
1036 (explaining that the Idaho Constitution does not permit an arrest for a misdemeanor DUI that
the officer did not witness); see also Amstutz, 169 Idaho at 150, 492 P.3d at 1109 (holding that a
warrantless arrest of Amstutz for a completed misdemeanor that occurred outside the officer’s
presence violated Amstutz’s constitutional rights).
        While the dissent voices concern over the “legion” of repercussions this holding will have
for law enforcement, we disagree. “Exceptions to the warrant requirement are ‘few in number and
carefully delineated,’ and . . . police bear a heavy burden when attempting to demonstrate [that]
an urgent need. . . justif[ies] warrantless . . . arrests.” State v. Blancas, 170 Idaho 631, 515 P.3d
718, 721 (2022) (alterations original) (quoting Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749–50 (1984)).
To effectuate an immediate arrest for a misdemeanor crime without a warrant, the arresting officer
must witness the unlawful conduct personally. Collective knowledge, such as information from
officers going off duty, from dispatch, or from concerned citizens, may undeniably fashion
probable cause for a misdemeanor arrest. But an officer, such as Murphy here, or any other in the
future, who relies on collective knowledge to establish probable cause for a misdemeanor must
obtain a warrant to perform such an arrest.
                                                   10
                                         IV. CONCLUSION
       The district court’s decision reversing the denial of Bell’s motion to suppress is affirmed.
       JUSTICES BRODY, STEGNER, and ZAHN CONCUR.

MOELLER, J., dissenting.
       I write briefly to register my dissent. Because I had not yet joined the Court when it heard
State v. Clarke, 165 Idaho 393, 446 P.3d 451 (2019), I did not participate in that decision. However,
I later authored Reagan v. Idaho Transportation Department, 169 Idaho 689, 502 P.3d 1027
(2021), where we followed the holding in Clarke and applied it to the suspension of driving
privileges for a DUI in an administrative proceeding. Likewise, I joined the majority in three other
decisions where we cited Clarke with approval: State v. Plata, 171 Idaho 833, 526 P.3d 1003
(2023); State v. Amstutz, 169 Idaho 144, 492 P.3d 1103 (2021); and State v. Sutterfield, 168 Idaho
558, 484 P.3d 839 (2021). While I have accepted the constitutional premise of Clarke, and
comfortably applied it to the cases noted above, I have had reservations about how far the holding
reaches and how it is to be applied by law enforcement. This case confirms many of my concerns.
In short, while I have been on board the Clarke train for almost four years, it is here that I must
disembark.
       The facts of this case provide an ideal scenario for applying the “collective knowledge
doctrine,” which has long been recognized by appellate courts of both the United States and Idaho.
For example, the Ninth Circuit has followed this doctrine, noting:
       [The collective knowledge doctrine] allows courts to impute police officers’
       collective knowledge to the officer conducting a stop, search, or arrest. It generally
       applies in two situations. The first is “where law enforcement agents are working
       together in an investigation but have not explicitly communicated the facts each has
       independently learned.” United States v. Ramirez, 473 F.3d 1026, 1032 (9th Cir.
       2007). The second occurs “where an officer . . . with direct personal knowledge of
       all the facts necessary to give rise to reasonable suspicion . . . directs or requests
       that another officer . . . conduct a stop, search or arrest.” Id. at 1033. In both
       situations, collective knowledge may be imputed only if there has been some
       “communication among agents.” Id. at 1032.
United States v. Villasenor, 608 F.3d 467, 475 (9th Cir. 2010) (emphasis omitted); see generally
United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 232 (1985).
       Likewise, the Idaho Court of Appeals invoked the collective knowledge doctrine in State
v. Rubio where it held: “The arresting officers need not have personal knowledge of all the items
of information used to assess the probable cause to arrest Rubio. It is enough that the collective
                                                 11
knowledge and information of all the officers involved in the investigation, when taken together,
be sufficient to constitute probable cause.” 115 Idaho 873, 876, 771 P.2d 537, 540 (Ct. App. 1989)
(citations omitted); see also State v. Carr, 123 Idaho 127, 130, 844 P.2d 1377, 1380 (Ct. App.
1992) (“An officer in the field may rely on information supplied by other officers, and the
collective knowledge of police officers involved in the investigation—including dispatch
personnel—may support a finding of probable cause.”).
        In State v. Amstutz, this Court recently distinguished its facts from State v. Carr, where
collective knowledge permitted a warrantless misdemeanor arrest. 169 Idaho at 148, 492 P.3d at
1107. We explained:
        Amstutz correctly argues Carr is distinguishable because dispatch spoke with the
        officer who arrested Carr and notified him that Carr’s license had been suspended
        or revoked, providing the officer with probable cause to arrest Carr for driving
        without privileges. Conversely here, Officer White did not speak to dispatch
        personnel regarding Amstutz’s criminal history . . . .
Id. (emphasis added). This Court clarified the correct application of the collective knowledge
doctrine: “While officers can rely on information they are told, such as the information dispatch
officers made known to the arresting officer in Carr, an arresting officer must be personally aware
of that information, rather than simply having it at his disposal in a State-created document or
database.” Id. While the majority is correct that the Amstutz decision focused on the arresting
officer’s lack of knowledge, we specified that the arresting officer may rely on the information
they receive from dispatch. Id. It appears that the majority now has elected to depart from this
view.
        The facts in this case fit within the scenarios described in Villasenor because Officer Pallas
and Officer Murphy were working together and sharing information in a coordinated fashion.
While off duty, Pallas became concerned when he observed Bell departing from an Albertsons
grocery store. Pallas noted from his appearance and demeanor that Bell appeared intoxicated. As
Pallas followed Bell as he drove away, Pallas immediately called Murphy, who directed Pallas to
contact dispatch, which he did. As noted by the majority, Pallas gave dispatch “a description of
the vehicle, the license plate number, and reported that the driver appeared to be intoxicated.”
When Pallas later passed the investigation to the on-duty officer, Murphy, with whom he had been
communicating, he notified dispatch of Bell’s location. Murphy received the information from
dispatch and, acting upon that information, went to Bell’s home, noticed that the car identified by

                                                 12
Pallas was parked in the driveway, observed that its engine was still warm, and knocked on Bell’s
front door. He met Bell who, in addition to being unsteady on his feet and smelling of alcohol,
admitted to (1) just returning from Albertsons and (2) drinking five alcoholic beverages. In other
words, Bell expressly confirmed to the officer the collective knowledge and reasonable suspicion
shared by the other officer. Only after confirming this did Murphy perform a field sobriety test,
which Bell failed. Bell was then arrested and later given a breath alcohol test, which showed his
blood alcohol content to be 0.326 and 0.330—over four times the legal limit. Frankly, it is hard to
characterize this as anything other than good police work.
       Although it is tempting to compare this case to Reagan, which the majority has done, this
matter turns on a significantly different fact. Reagan concerned a citizen’s report of a possibly
intoxicated driver. Reagan, 169 Idaho at 692, 502 P.3d at 1030. Importantly, no law enforcement
officers saw Reagan driving her vehicle while intoxicated. See id. Thus, the collective knowledge
doctrine was inapplicable because it only arises when an officer in the field supplies information
to other officers. Compare Reagan, 169 Idaho at 698, 502 P.3d at 1036, with Carr, 123 Idaho at
130, 844 P.2d at 1380. In the case at bar, law enforcement officers supplied all the information.
The first officer witnessed Bell possibly driving while intoxicated and the second officer, having
received this information directly from the first officer and from dispatch, went to the driver’s
home and confirmed everything that had been reported. I agree with the majority that even though
“the collective knowledge doctrine eliminates the requirement of personal knowledge, it does not
eliminate the requirement of some knowledge.” Amstutz, 169 Idaho at 149, 492 P.3d at 1108.
However, this is a case where the arresting officer possessed far more than just “some knowledge.”
In fact, he was informed of almost everything the initial officer investigating the case had
personally observed. Nevertheless, the majority concludes that because Murphy did not actually
see Bell driving, he could not effectuate a misdemeanor arrest.
       While I still respect Clarke as good law in the context in which it was decided, I do not
read it to abrogate the collective knowledge doctrine when applied to misdemeanor arrests. Yet,
the majority departs from our collective knowledge doctrine case law—even those cases decided
in the context of Clarke. I cannot join in such a departure. The implications of this ruling for law
enforcement are legion. For example, when an officer goes off duty at midnight and hands an
ongoing investigation to another, must the second officer have the first officer present if he later
makes an arrest based on information supplied by the first? Can officers no longer rely on
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information provided by dispatch to develop probable cause to make an arrest? Can an offender
who is seen vandalizing a public space by one officer evade arrest by a second—with knowledge
communicated from the first—simply because the offender had already dropped his paint can?
Such applications of the majority’s holding will not only undermine the collective knowledge
doctrine, but they will also impede law enforcement’s ability to protect the public.
       In sum, I am reluctant to follow the majority as it ventures into territory that may
significantly—and unnecessarily—interfere with the day-to-day operations of law enforcement
agencies throughout the state, without a constitutional compulsion to do so. Thus, while the Clarke
train may continue to roll onward, for me, this application of its holding is the end of the line.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

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