Court Opinion

ID: 9882530
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-05 22:11:14.597024+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:00:09.344440
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Barnhart, 2023-Ohio-3488.]

                           IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                              FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                     ATHENS COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,                                  :
                                                :         Case No. 21CA13
        Plaintiff-Appellee,                     :
                                                :
        v.                                      :         DECISION AND JUDGMENT
                                                :         ENTRY
SHAYNE BARNHART,                                :
                                                :
        Defendant-Appellant.                    :         RELEASED 9/26/2023

                                           APPEARANCES:

Eric J. Allen, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellant.

Keller J. Blackburn, Athens County Prosecuting Attorney, and Merry M. Saunders,
Athens County Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Athens, Ohio, for Appellee.

Smith, P. J.

        {¶1} Shane Barnhart appeals the July 26, 2021 judgment entry of the Athens

County Common Pleas Court. After entering guilty pleas to three counts in two

separate criminal cases involving failure to comply with the order or signal of a

police officer and endangering children, the trial court imposed a total sentence of

fifty-four (54) months in prison. On appeal, Barnhart raises two assignments of

error challenging the maximum and consecutive nature of his sentence.

        {¶2} However, upon review of Barnhart’s assignments of error, we conclude

that the trial court did not err with regard to imposition of Barnhart’s sentence.
Athens App. No. 21CA13                                                        2

Thus, the sole assignment of error is without merit and overruled. The judgment of

the trial court is affirmed.

                                         FACTS

       {¶3} On August 14, 2019, Shayne Barnhart led law enforcement officers on

a high-speed pursuit in the Village of Albany. On July 27, 2020, Barnhart was

indicted by the Athens County Grand Jury for Failure to Comply with an Order or

Signal of a Police Officer, R.C. 2921.331(B), a felony of the third degree, and

Endangering Children, R. C. 2919.22(A), a misdemeanor of the first degree. This

indictment was assigned Case Number 20CR0318. During the August 14, 2019

incident, Barnhart fled from officers with his wife, Kayleigh Ryder, and her minor

daughter as passengers in his vehicle.

       {¶4} On October 19, 2020, Barnhart was indicted for another violation of

R.C. 2921.331(B) after another high-speed chase which began in the City of

Athens and continued through rural Athens County on September 5, 2020. This

indictment was assigned Case Number 20CR0407. During this incident, Kayleigh

Ryder was again a passenger in the vehicle operated by Barnhart.

       {¶5} Eventually, Barnhart was arraigned on both indictments on December

10, 2020, and entered pleas of not guilty to all counts. He was appointed counsel,

ordered held on a cash bond, and remained in jail. The trial court later granted

Barnhart a medical furlough effective December 16, 2020. However, on February
Athens App. No. 21CA13                                                             3

3, 2021, the trial court issued a warrant to arrest Barnhart for failing to report back

to the Southeastern Ohio Regional Jail as ordered upon release from his medical

treatment.

      {¶6} On April 21, 2021, the State of Ohio filed a motion to join both

indictments for trial. The trial court granted this request. However, on May 26,

2021, Barnhart entered guilty pleas to the three counts contained in both

indictments. Sentencing was delayed in order to obtain a pre-sentence

investigation report.

      {¶7} At sentencing on June 23, 2021, the prosecutor set forth the facts

underlying both pursuits. The prosecutor informed that the August 14, 2019

pursuit began when Albany police officers attempted to stop Barnhart for a minor

traffic violation. Barnhart stopped briefly, but then continued to drive through

Albany in a reckless manner, at times in excess of 90 miles per hour. Barnhart

went left of center, failed to observe stop signs, nearly struck two vehicles in

oncoming lanes of traffic, passed a large utility truck, and also nearly crashed into

a dirt bank during the 14-minute pursuit. The officers lost sight of him.

      {¶8} Barnhart was later identified as the driver. Kayleigh Ryder indicated to

officers that the three hid in an open field, at Barnhart’s insistence, during

Barnhart’s attempt to evade law enforcement. Ms. Ryder and her daughter both
Athens App. No. 21CA13                                                            4

indicated they were fearful during the pursuit. They held hands and the child

closed her eyes.

      {¶9} The prosecutor further advised that the September 5, 2020 pursuit

began when Deputy Banks of the Athens County Sheriff’s Department observed

Barnhart at Kentucky Fried Chicken on Stimson Avenue in Athens, did a warrant

check, and learned there was an active warrant. Deputy Banks activated his

overhead lights and siren but Barnhart did not stop. This time, Barnhart traveled

onto Rock Riffle Road, a curvy and well-traveled rural road, again reaching

dangerous speeds. Eventually, Barnhart crashed into several trees and fled on foot.

Once again, Kayleigh Ryder was with him. She indicated she closed her eyes and

prayed during this chase.

      {¶10} At Barnhart’s initial sentencing on June 23, 2021, Barnhart requested

court ordered drug treatment. He indicated he had previously served, in its

entirety, a nine-year prison sentence. Upon his release he had been working for a

concrete business and properly reporting to his probation officer. Barnhart told the

court that after authorities found out Barnhart had been in a fist fight and he was

sent to jail for 90 days, he lost his job and his life thereafter spiraled into drugs and

alcohol. Barnhart’s attorney also requested treatment pursuant to a sentence of

community control.
Athens App. No. 21CA13                                                        5

      {¶11} Instead, in 20CR0318, the trial court sentenced Barnhart on count

one, failure to comply, to 36 months in prison, and on count two, endangering

children, to 180 days in jail, the sentences were ordered to be served concurrently.

On 20CR0407, the second failure to comply, the court imposed a 36-month prison

sentence to be served consecutively. The total prison sentence was 72 months.

      {¶12} During imposition of sentence, the trial court stated:

      So what’s in front of the Court, as you heard by the State, is him
      doing a hundred miles an hour on Fisher Road and getting
      airborne because he was scared, apparently going left of center
      on Marion Johnson Road, and it was a fourteen minute pursuit
      when he could have killed somebody, a family or families, in
      addition to himself. * * * [T]hat even happened with his wife *
      * * but also [a] young child in the car who could have been
      similarly killed at any long distance among a fourteen-mile
      chase. In 20CR0318, count one, the Court orders you to serve
      thirty-six months in prison. Count two, orders you to serve a
      hundred and eighty days in jail. Count two and one will run
      concurrent to one another. * * * You’re also ordered to a lifetime
      operator’s suspension, as you’ve demonstrated an inability to
      show that you can responsibly operate a motor vehicle and * * *
      the Court doesn’t see any future that you’ll be able to operate a
      motor vehicle with any reasonable adult responsibility after those
      antics of a fourteen-minute pursuit where you put the whole
      community in jeopardy in Albany, especially at 7:00 p.m. at
      night. It wasn’t like this was at two in the morning * * * when
      nobody’s on the road.

      {¶13} Regarding the second failure to comply incident and criminal case,

the court continued:

      So now we turn our attention to 20CR0407. * * * And this
      happened at 6:43 p.m. Again, early evening in the fall, people
      going to football games, going shopping. And again, where do
Athens App. No. 21CA13                                                                                        6

         we find Mr. Barnhart? Ninety miles an hour on Rock Riffle
         Road, which unlike most of Fisher or semi parts of Fisher, is not
         very straight. And he lost control and struck some trees. Again,
         could have killed somebody, could have killed another family.
         He had his wife in the car. Could have killed her. * * * Mr.
         Barnhart didn’t learn anything between times A and B . * * * But
         with all that in mind he’s had two incidents, with all that in the
         background. * * * The Court finds that he potentially could have
         caused serious physical harm by not obeying a simple signal
         from a police officer to pull over. * * * So, on the second case,
         20CR0407 the Court orders a thirty-six-month prison sentence
         on that as well and orders that consecutive.

         {¶14} However, the trial court conducted a resentencing hearing on July 13,

2021. As to the second indictment, Barnhart was sentenced to an 18-month prison

sentence, to run consecutive to the first case, 20CR0318, for a total of 54 months

instead of 72 months. This timely appeal followed.1

                                      ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

         I.       THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SENTENCING THE
                  APPELLANT TO THE MAXIMUM TERM OF
                  INCARCERATION FOR COUNT ONE.

         II.      THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE TWO
                  COUNTS BE SERVED CONSECUTIVELY.

                                        STANDARD OF REVIEW

         {¶15} We review felony sentences under the standard set forth in R.C.

2953.08(G)(2):

1
 During the appellate proceedings, the court ordered the parties to engage in supplemental briefing of the issue of a
possible Crim.R. 11 violation and whether the court can sua sponte raise the issue. The parties complied, agreeing
that the trial court fulfilled its duty with regard to the requisites of Crim.R. 11 and further agreeing that Barnhart’s
plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntarily given.
Athens App. No. 21CA13                                                         7

        The appellate court may increase, reduce, or otherwise modify a
        sentence that is appealed under this section or may vacate the
        sentence and remand the matter to the sentencing court for
        resentencing. The appellate court's standard for review is not
        whether the sentencing court abused its discretion. The appellate
        court may take any action authorized by this division if it clearly
        and convincingly finds either of the following:

   (a) That the record does not support the sentencing court's findings
       under division (B) or (D) of section 2929.13, division (B)(2)(e)
       or (C)(4) of section 2929.14, or division (I) of section 2929.20 of
       the Revised Code, whichever, if any, is relevant;

   (b) That the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.

See State v. Hughes, 41th Dist. Adams No. 21CA1127, 2021-Ohio-3127, at

¶ 37.

                              LEGAL ANALYSIS

   1. Maximum Sentence.

        {¶16} Under the first assignment of error, Barnhart asserts that the

maximum sentence as to Count One was not justified because the trial court

erroneously deemed his conduct as a “substantial risk.” Barnhart concedes that he

violated R.C. 2921.331(B), failure to comply with an order or signal of a police

officer. However, Barnhart points out that neither his wife nor the child or any

other individuals were killed or injured in the chase. Barnhart concludes that his

conduct did not constitute a worst form of the offense. Barnhart requests this court

to vacate the sentence of the trial court and remand for a hearing. Based upon our
Athens App. No. 21CA13                                                             8

review of the case law and facts herein, we find this assignment of error has no

merit.

          {¶17} Barnhart pled guilty to a third-degree felony commonly referenced as

“failure to comply” under R.C. 2921.331(B). This provision states that “[n]o

person shall operate a motor vehicle so as willfully to elude or flee a police officer

after receiving a visible or audible signal from a police officer to bring the person's

motor vehicle to a stop.” A violation of R.C. 2921.331(B) rises to the level of a

third-degree felony if a jury or judge finds proof beyond a reasonable doubt that

either:

          (i) The operation of the motor vehicle by the offender was a
          proximate cause of serious physical harm to persons or property.
          (ii) The operation of the motor vehicle by the offender caused a
          substantial risk of serious physical harm to persons or property.

          ¶18} R.C. 2921.331(C)(5)(a)(i)-(ii). “The plea of guilty is a complete

admission of the defendant's guilt.” Crim.R. 11(B)(1). A guilty plea allows the

state to obtain a conviction without following the otherwise difficult process of

proving his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Day, 2019-Ohio 4816, 149

N.E.3d 122, at ¶ 22 (4th Dist.). “ ‘ More is not required; the court has nothing to

do but give judgment and sentence.’ ” Day, supra, quoting State v. Morgan, 181

Ohio App.3d 747, 2009-Ohio-1370, 910 N.E.2d 1075, ¶ 23-24 (1st Dist.). “ ‘[A]

counseled plea of guilty is an admission of factual guilt which removes issues of

factual guilt from the case * * *.’ ” Day, supra, quoting State v. Wilson, 58 Ohio
Athens App. No. 21CA13                                                            9

St.2d 52, 388 N.E.2d 745 (1979), paragraph one of the syllabus. Thus, while there

is no evidence that Barnhart caused actual serious physical harm to any person or

property, by entering a plea to this count, Barnhart admitted that his criminal

conduct caused a substantial risk of serious physical harm to people or property.

See State v. Harper, 2017-Ohio-8693, 101 N.E.3d 628, at ¶ 19 (1st Dist.); State v.

Costello, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104456, 2017-Ohio-294, at ¶11.

      {¶ 19} R.C. 2921.331(C)(5)(b) sets forth factors a trial court must consider

when sentencing an offender for failure to comply if R.C. 2921.331(C)(5)(a)

applies. Under this provision, trial courts must not only consider the factors set

forth in sections 2929.12 and 2929.13 of the Revised Code when determining the

seriousness of an offender's conduct in committing failure to comply, they must

also consider additional factors set forth in R.C. 2921.331(C)(5)(b) to determine

the seriousness of the offender's conduct. Pursuant to R.C. 2921.331(C)(5)(b), the

trial court was required to consider the following factors when determining what

sentence to impose on Barnhart’s offenses:

      (i) The duration of the pursuit;

      (ii) The distance of the pursuit;

      (iii) The rate of speed at which the offender operated the motor vehicle
            during the pursuit;

      (iv) Whether the offender failed to stop for traffic lights or stop signs during
      the pursuit;
Athens App. No. 21CA13                                                        10

     (v) The number of traffic lights or stop signs for which the offender failed to
         stop during the pursuit;

     (vi) Whether the offender operated the motor vehicle during the pursuit
          without lighted lights during a time when lighted lights are required;

     (vii) Whether the offender committed a moving violation during the pursuit;

     (viii) The number of moving violations the offender committed during the
            pursuit;

     (ix) Any other relevant factors indicating that the offender's conduct is more
          serious than conduct normally constituting the offense. R.C.
          2921.331(C)(5)(b)(i)-(ix).

     {¶20} At sentencing, the prosecutor stated:

     I think it is appropriate to again relay those facts to the Court
     because of the severity of the actions of Mr. Barnhart. The first
     is the August 14th of 2019 fourteen-minute pursuit in Albany. He
     was attempted to be pulled over for a traffic violation based on
     the fact that his vehicle was missing both a front and rear
     bumper.*** The police report goes into detail about the reckless
     manner in which Mr. Barnhart was driving through Albany. He
     was on Marion Johnson Road in excess of ninety miles per hour.
     He went left of center a number of times. He went through stop
     signs at a high rate of speed and nearly missed two vehicles in
     the oncoming lanes of traffic. He did not stop at the intersection
     of Baker road and Radford Road, which I’m sure the court is well
     aware of the travel on Radford Road. ***This was, I believe,
     7:00 p.m. He did not (inaudible) the intersection at that
     point***going approximately forty to forty-fie miles per hour.
     An oncoming vehicle was actually forced off the road and landed
     into a ditch at that point. He traveled onto Fisher Road reaching
     speeds upwards of a hundred miles per hour. He went around a
     large utility truck, almost colliding with a large dirt bank.
     ***[T[he passengers in the vehicle did admit that they were both
     the front seat passenger as well as the child in the rear seat. That
     is the sum and substance of the fleeing part of that.
Athens App. No. 21CA13                                                            11

      {¶21} As previously indicated, Kayleigh Ryder and her daughter expressed

their fearfulness to the officer, and the fact that Barnhart made them hide in the

field with him.

      {¶22} After reviewing the entire record, we find that the record supports the

trial court’s maximum sentence of 36 months on the failure to comply offense

charged in Case No. 20CR0318. As the trial court and the prosecutor observed, the

duration of the high-speed pursuit was 14 minutes through the community of

Albany. Barnhart was traveling in excess of 90 m.p.h. Barnhart committed

numerous moving violations during the pursuit, which appear to have included

reckless operation, traveling left of center, failure to control, stop sign violations,

and improper passing. Regarding “any other factor that indicates the offender's

conduct is more serious than conduct normally constituting the offense,” the court

noted that it was approximately 7:00 p.m., not 2:00 a.m., where less traffic would

be likely, and that the entire community of Albany was placed at risk.

      {¶ 23} Barnhart, as in Costello, supra, argues that although he could have

caused serious damage during the pursuit, he did not. Thus, he claims that his

failure to comply was not the worst form of the offense. We disagree. The failure-

to-comply statute makes the offense a third-degree felony if either of two

conditions are found—that the offender caused serious physical harm to persons or

property, or that the offender caused a substantial risk of serious physical harm to
Athens App. No. 21CA13                                                         12

persons or property. R.C. 2921.331(C)(5)(a)(i)-(ii). As previously discussed, by

pleading guilty to the count, Barnhart admitted that he caused a substantial risk of

serious physical harm to persons or property. Moreover, based on the factors

discussed by the trial court indicating Barnhart caused a substantial risk of serious

physical harm to people or property, we cannot find that the 36-month maximum

sentence is clearly and convincingly unsupported by the record or otherwise

contrary to law.

      {¶24} The underlying facts in this case persuade us that Barnhart’s conduct

created a strong possibility that harm could occur. While fortunately it appears no

serious physical harm to persons or property did occur, “[i]t is only the strong

possibility that harm could occur that creates culpability under R.C.

2921.331(C)(3). It is clear that simply because an offender is fortunate enough not

to actually cause harm is of no consequence.” State v. Gasioworowski, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 80000, 2002-Ohio-976, at *3 (Mar. 7, 2001), citing State v.

Semenchuk, 122 Ohio App. 3d 30, 701 N.E.2d 19 (8th Dist.1997). Based on the

foregoing, we find no merit to Barnhart’s first assignment of error. Accordingly, it

is hereby overruled.

   2. Consecutive Sentence.

      {¶25} Under the second assignment of error, Barnhart asserts that the
Athens App. No. 21CA13                                                                                     13

court “manufactured” an indictment with two separate charges under R.C.

2921.331, and then claims it must impose mandatory consecutive terms. Barnhart

argues that the legislature did not intend that people who run from law enforcement

officers should be sentenced more harshly than people who run from criminal

activities. Barnhart cites the trial court’s statement at the initial sentencing: “[T]he

court believes it has to run consecutive as a matter of, as a matter of law.”

Barnhart asks this court to vacate the consecutive sentence of the trial court and

remand for a hearing.

        {¶26} The State of Ohio points out that Barnhart was sentenced for conduct

which occurred on two different dates with two differing facts.2 The State directs

us to State v. Harper, supra, which held that by operation of law the trial court is

not required to make the findings usually required for consecutive sentences prior

to sentencing a defendant to consecutive terms for two counts of failure to comply.

Id. at ¶ 16. The State concludes that even though the trial court made the usual

required consecutive sentence findings, Barnhart’s sentences must be served

consecutively as a matter of law. At the outset, we again observe that Barnhart

entered knowing, intelligent, and voluntary pleas to three counts contained in two

2
 This is the incident which began in Athens when Appellant was spotted at a Kentucky Fried Chicken Restaurant in
Athens and failed to stop for Deputy Banks, traveled over 90 m.p.h. on Rock Riffle Road, a well-traveled wooded
area, went into oncoming traffic and struck several trees. This time only Kayleigh Ryder was with him but the
airbag deployed on her side and Appellant fled on foot. She advised officers she shut her eyes and prayed. At
sentencing, the prosecutor showed the trial court a video from the officer’s vehicle showing Appellant jump over the
hood of the car, flee on foot, and leave his possibly injured wife.
Athens App. No. 21CA13                                                         14

separate indictments. Alleging a “manufactured” indictment is nonsensical and

disingenuous.

      {¶27} R.C. 2929.41(A) establishes a statutory presumption in favor of

concurrent sentences. State v. Schumacher, 4th Dist. Adams No. 21CA1145, 2022-

Ohio-2934, at ¶ 11; State ex rel. Hunley v. Wainright, 163 Ohio St. 3d 301, 2021-

Ohio-803, 170 N.E.3d 16, at ¶ 13. Ordinarily, we would analyze Barnhart’s

consecutive sentence argument under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a) for compliance with

R.C. 2929.14(C). State v. Gwynne, 158 Ohio St. 3d 279, 2019-Ohio-4761, 141

N.E.3d 169, at ¶ 16. As interpreted in Gwynne, an appellate court reviews

consecutive sentences under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), which permits a reviewing court

to “increase, reduce, modify, or vacate and remand a challenged felony sentence if

the court clearly and convincingly finds * * * ‘that the record does not support the

sentencing court's findings,’ under [R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)] or ‘the sentence is

otherwise contrary to law.’ ” State v. Hughes, 4th Dist. Adams No. 21CA1133,

2022-Ohio-107, ¶ 9, quoting State v. Cot trill, 4th Dist. Ross No. 20CA3704, 2020-

Ohio-7033, ¶ 11. R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) provides for the imposition of consecutive

sentences:

      (4) If multiple prison terms are imposed on an offender for
      convictions of multiple offenses, the court may require the
      offender to serve the prison terms consecutively if the court finds
      that the consecutive service is necessary to protect the public
      from future crime or to punish the offender and that consecutive
      sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the
Athens App. No. 21CA13                                                         15

      offender's conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the
      public, and if the court also finds any of the following:

      (a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses
          while the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was
          under a sanction imposed pursuant to section 2929.16,
          2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised Code, or was under post-
          release control for a prior offense.

      (b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part
          of one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by
          two or more of the multiple offenses so committed was so
          great or unusual that no single prison term for any of the
          offenses committed as part of any of the courses of conduct
          adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender's conduct.

      (c) The offender's history of criminal conduct demonstrates that
          consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public
          from future crime by the offender.

      {¶28} Here, the trial court determined that a consecutive sentence was

necessary to protect the public from future crime by Barnhart and to punish him.

The court also found that a consecutive sentence was not disproportionate to the

seriousness of Barnhart’s conduct and to the danger Barnhart poses to the public.

The court further found that Barnhart’s history of criminal conduct demonstrated

that a consecutive sentence was necessary to protect the public from future crime

by Barnhart. The court noted Barnhart was on post-release control at the time of

his offenses.
Athens App. No. 21CA13                                                            16

      {¶29} However, Barnhart was sentenced on his guilty pleas to two separate

counts of R.C. 2921.331(B), failure to comply with order or signal of police

officer. As previously noted, R.C. 2921.331(B) provides that “[n]o person shall

operate a motor vehicle so as willfully to elude or flee a police officer after

receiving a visible or audible signal from a police officer to bring the person's

motor vehicle to a stop.” R.C. 2921.331(C)(5) further provides that, “ (a) [a]

violation of division (B) of this section is a felony of the third degree if the jury or

judge as trier of fact finds any of the following by proof beyond a reasonable

doubt: * * * (ii) [t]he operation of the motor vehicle by the offender caused a

substantial risk of serious physical harm to persons or property.” Both indictments

used this language and the trial court cited this language at sentencing.

      {¶30} Furthermore, R.C. 2921.331(D) provides, “ [if]f an offender is

sentenced pursuant to division (C)(4) or (5) of this section for a violation of

division (B) of this section, and if the offender is sentenced to a prison term for that

violation, the offender shall serve the prison term consecutively to any other prison

term or mandatory prison term imposed upon the offender.” (Emphasis added.)

Thus, R.C. 2921.331(D) requires that any sentence imposed for failure to comply

with an order or signal of a police officer would be served consecutively, and not

concurrent with any other sentence imposed. This requirement arising by

operation of law was discussed in Harper and Costello, supra.
Athens App. No. 21CA13                                                            17

      {¶31} The trial court was not required to make consecutive sentence

findings in order to sentence Barnhart to consecutive sentences for failure to

control. It did. Even if Barnhart’s argument was that his sentence was not

supported by the record, we would be unable to agree. Based on the underlying

facts in this case as discussed above at length, we cannot find that Barnhart’s

sentence is clearly and convincingly not supported by the record or that his

sentence is otherwise contrary to law. The trial court did not err with regard to

imposition of the consecutive sentence. Barnhart’s second assignment of error is

also without merit and is hereby overruled.

                                                 JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
Athens App. No. 21CA13                                                          18

                               JUDGMENT ENTRY

     It is ordered that the JUDGMENT BE AFFIRMED and costs be assessed to
Appellant.

      The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

     It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the
Athens County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.

        IF A STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE AND RELEASE UPON
BAIL HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT OR
THIS COURT, it is temporarily continued for a period not to exceed 60 days upon
the bail previously posted. The purpose of a continued stay is to allow Appellant
to file with the Supreme Court of Ohio an application for a stay during the
pendency of proceedings in that court. If a stay is continued by this entry, it will
terminate at the earlier of the expiration of the 60-day period, or the failure of the
Appellant to file a notice of appeal with the Supreme Court of Ohio in the 45-day
appeal period pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of the Supreme
Court of Ohio. Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses the appeal
prior to expiration of 60 days, the stay will terminate as of the date of such
dismissal.

       A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule
27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Abele, J., & Hess, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.

                                              For the Court,

                                              ____________________________
                                              Jason P. Smith
                                              Presiding Judge

                             NOTICE TO COUNSEL

      Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final
judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the
date of filing with the clerk.