Court Opinion

ID: 9603721
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:09:17.572956+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:11:59.341280
License: Public Domain

CHAVEZ, Judge (dissenting). I respectfully dissent. I interpret Sections 3-13-4 and 3-11-6(D) to mean that the discharge of Webb is dictated by the merit system ordinance adopted by the Village. Since the Village does not dispute that it failed to comply with the merit system ordinance in terminating Webb, I would affirm the trial court’s decision. The issue is whether the word “employees” as used in Section 3-13-4 includes “appointed officials.” “Employees” is not defined in this section and the statutory language of Section 3-13-4 provides little guidance as to its meaning. Words not statutorily defined should be given their ordinary meaning absent clear and express legislative intention to the contrary. See Whitely v. New Mexico State Personnel Bd., 115 N.M. 308, 311, 850 P.2d 1011, 1014 (1993); State v. Ruffins, 109 N.M. 668, 671, 789 P.2d 616, 619 (1990) (“When a statute does not define its terms, general rules of statutory construction dictate that we interpret those terms in the common, ordinary sense.”) The ordinary meaning of the word “employee” is “a person who works for another in return for financial or other compensation.” The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 428 (1973). Clearly, under the ordinary meaning of the word, Webb is an “employee.” Furthermore, Section 3-ll-6(D) addresses the removal of an appointed official by stating that such removal is “[sjubject to the limitation of a merit system ordinance adopted as authorized in Section 3-13-4.” The legislature would not have allowed Section 3-ll-6(D) to expound on how appointed officials are to be removed if it did not mean to give Section 3-ll-6(D) the authority to do so under Section 3-13-4. Therefore, I would conclude that the word “employee” under Section 3-13-4 is a general term which includes those that are also employed as appointed officials by the governing body. Additionally, in construing these statutes, the chief aim is to give effect to the intent of the legislature. Roth v. Thompson, 113 N.M. 331, 332, 825 P.2d 1241, 1242 (1992). Although a court should not extend a statute’s coverage beyond what was intended, the majority has narrowed the coverage of these statutes short of the point where I believe the legislature intended it should extend. As previously stated, I believe the legislature intended the word “employees” to include “appointed officials.” This interpretation of the legislature’s intent is consistent with my interpretation of the purpose of these statutes: to provide a reasonable approach to an appointed official’s removal. Webb argues that the municipal government system established by the legislature indicates that the spoils system is gone and “that it is the desire of the people of the State of New Mexico that those employees who do competent work not be replaced at the whim of a mayor and/or new city council.” On the other hand, the Village argues and the majority adopts the view that “[t]o force the winner of a political election to be saddled with a member of his immediate executive staff with whom he cannot work, is to block the efficiency of that political system.” Neither result would occur under this interpretation. .The mayor would not be saddled with a previous appointed official with whom he cannot work, since the appointed official may be discharged if the merit system ordinance is followed. However, mandatory compliance with the merit system ordinance also prohibits the mayor from discharging competent personnel at his whim. Simply put, these statutes provide a procedure, a middle ground so to speak, by which an appointed official may be removed from office. Because I believe this to be the correct interpretation of these statutes, I cannot concur in the opinion.