Court Opinion

ID: 9772985
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:34:29.887587+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:49.586085
License: Public Domain

EVANS, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
I agree with the majority that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in controlling the time and general scope of the voir dire examination. However, I believe the trial court did exceed the bounds of its discretion when it refused to permit appellant’s counsel to examine prospective jurors about the content of the painted message.
The record shows that the appellant’s counsel made an adequate explanation to the trial court of the purpose of his line of questioning, and that notwithstanding such explanation, the trial court, on two separate occasions, prevented him from asking the jury panel whether they would be improperly influenced by the contents of the painted message:
All right. Now, I think the evidence is also going to show that the painting on the side of the Exxon Building was not just a big blob of paint. I think it’s going to show that the paint was a written message. And the reason I want to ask people this is I want to know what influence the contents of that written message on the side of the Exxon Building would have on your deliberations if your’re selected as a juror in this case. I think the evidence is going to show that the—
MR. CARLSON: Objection, Your Honor; going into the facts of the case on voir dire.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. VAN SLYKE: Your Honor, could I approach the bench?
THE COURT: Yes, sir.
(Whereupon the following proceedings were had out of the hearing of the jury panel:)
MR. VAN SLYKE: Your Honor, if I could, I think it’s necessary for us to briefly ask the jury about their attitude as to what it was that was painted on the side of the Exxon Building. We have every reason to believe that. As a matter of fact, that is one of the theories of our case, Your Honor — that the State’s witnesses are biased or prejudiced; that their testimony against our client will not be truthful; that their motivation for testifying untruthfully will be that they disagree with the content of the political message on the side of the building and they also disagree with the client’s political feelings and philosophy. The slogan on the side of the building was a slogan denouncing the red, white, and blue flag of the United States and discouraging people to fly the red, white, and blue flag on May Day; that our client is a supporter of the Revolutionary Communist Party; that this is a very sensitive issue that will come out in the evidence. And I think we’re entitled to know if the jurors have a bias or prejudice as to the content of the message.
THE COURT: Is that all?
MR. VAN SLYKE: Yes, Your Honor.
MR. CARLSON: May I respond, Your Honor?
THE COURT: Yes, sir.
MR. CARLSON: Ms. Sullivan is not on trial for what she painted on the building but for the fact that she painted — not the content of what was written there but the fact that she wrote it there in spray paint. I don’t see any need to go into, during voir dire, her political affiliations with the jurors, to this point, know nothing about the facts of the case other than it was criminal mischief because of the painting on the side of the building. I don’t think it’s necessary they know any more than that, because, as I say, Judge, she’s being tried for the act of writing and not the content. And I would urge that the Court not allow Mr. Van Slyke to go into her political affiliations at this point.
MR. VAN SYLKE: Your Honor, it’s my understanding, furthermore, that the State did call Officer Blair as a witness to authenticate a photograph of the slogan, which will be introduced into evidence, and that the photograph will show *171that the slogan printed on the side of the Exxon Building was, “RED, WHITE, & BLUE — WE SPIT ON YOU! FLY THE RED FLAG MAY 1.” And the content of that photograph could reasonably influence the emotions and opinions of the jurors. And I think we’re entitled to know if that photograph and the content of that message would be so highly prejudicial or emotional that a person might not be able to sit in judgment on the case, Your Honor, without having that influence their decision on deliberations as to Ms. Sullivan.
THE COURT: Motion is overruled.
(Whereupon the following proceedings were had in the hearing of the jury panel:)
MR. VAN SLYKE: I think some of the evidence in this case will be a photograph of the painting on the side of the Exxon Building that will depict what was painted on the side of the Exxon Building there. Now, if that photograph showed what was painted on the side of the Exxon Building—
MR. CARLSON: I would object once again, Your Honor, to going into the facts of the case on voir dire.
THE COURT: Let’s let him finish the question first.
MR. VAN SLYKE: If that photograph showed what was painted on the side of Exxon Building was “RED, WHITE & BLUE — WE SPIT ON YOU!”—
MR. CARLSON: Objection, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Mr. Van Slyke, approach the bench.
(Whereupon the following proceedings were had out of the hearing of the jury panel:)
THE COURT: Mr. Van Slyke, I have just ruled on this matter, and I thought you understood my ruling.
MR. VAN SLYKE: Your Honor, I did as to the message but not as to—
THE COURT: I don’t want this message given to the jury, and I’m telling you that now. Now, you can do whatever you like as part of pursuing your case, but that’s the way it’s going to be. And let’s not do it.
MR. VAN SLYKE: Your Honor, I do except to the Court’s ruling.
THE COURT: All right. You’ll object. It’s in the record.
The appellant never contested the fact that the message was painted on the building, and as the state pointed out in its argument, the content of the message had nothing whatsoever to do with the offense charged. Thus, the only question concerning the text of the message was whether it was of such a nature as to improperly prejudice the prospective jurors against the accused.
In Ransom v. State, 630 S.W.2d 904 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 1982, no pet.), a similar situation was presented. There, on voir dire examination, the trial court permitted the prosecutor to outline some of the pre-arrest activities of the law enforcement officers, and to ask if any juror would be so offended by such conduct that he or she would find appellant not guilty “regardless of whether or not the state had met its burden.” On appeal, the defendant contended that a member of the jury panel was erroneously excused “after the state had improperly committed her to the specific fact situation that existed in this case.” 630 S.W.2d 904. Affirming the trial court’s judgment, the Court of Appeals concluded that the state’s questions did not constitute an improper attempt to commit the juror to a specific set of facts, concluding that the state “was simply attempting to ascertain the jury panel’s reaction to the events preceding the arrest.” There, as in the instant case, the subject matter of the inquiry was not an issue in the case, and it related only to the question of whether the jurors would be improperly influenced in their attitude toward the accused and the prosecution.
Thus, there is authority which suggests that if the message in the instant case had been in the nature of a national patriotic slogan, the prosecutor would have been entitled to inquire whether the content of the message would unduly prejudice any prospective juror in favor of the accused. *172Ransom, supra. On this same rationale, the appellant’s counsel in the instant case, should have been permitted to examine the prospective jurors regarding any prejudice they might have because of the content of the message in question.
It seems to me that the circumstances of the case at bar are analogous to those in Abron v. State, 523 S.W.2d 405, 409 (Tex.Crim.App.1975). In that case, the defendant’s counsel sought to ask questions of the jury panel as to whether a prospective juror would be prejudiced by the fact that the defendant was black and the complaining witness was a white woman. This inquiry would- obviously have assumed the existence of facts, i.e., the race of the victim, that would normally be developed during the course of trial. Concluding that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to permit defendant’s counsel to make such inquiry of the jury panel, the Court of Criminal Appeals found that the answers to such questions were valuable to the defendant because they could have furnished a basis for the intelligent exercise of his peremptory challenges, and that deprivation of such valid right necessitated a reversal of the case. 523 S.W.2d at 409. In a concurring opinion, Judge Morrison set forth the trial court’s stated reasoning for its ruling. The trial court stated that it had instructed defendant’s counsel not to predicate his questions with phrases such as “if the evidence should show,” thereby setting up different fact situations and asking the jurors to compare them, and whether the jurors would give certain punishment if certain facts were shown to be true. Id. at 409. Thus, the trial court in Abron obviously considered, albeit erroneously, that appellant’s inquiry was an attempt to commit the venire to a course of conduct based upon a specific set of facts. In the instant case, the appellant’s counsel quite adequately explained the purpose of his inquiry. As a predicate to his questions, he advised the court that the state had called a witness to authenticate a photograph of the slogan painted on the wall and that he needed to let the prospective jurors know of the content of the slogan in order to determine whether the message itself was so “highly prejudicial or emotional” that one or more of the jurors would not be able to impartially decide the facts as presented at trial.
In my opinion, the appellant was not permitted to examine the jury panel on a matter which would have enabled him to intelligently exercise his peremptory challenges, and the denial of that right requires that we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand the cause for a new trial. Abron v. State, supra.