Court Opinion

ID: 9669526
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 02:58:13.593549+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:57.615620
License: Public Domain

Levin, J.
(concurring). Marion B. Ingram’s plea of guilty of ouil was offered and accepted in 1982 before the court rules were amended to require that, before accepting a plea of guilty, the court shall advise the accused as now set forth in MCR 6.610(E)(3).
In Guilty Plea Cases, 395 Mich 96, 113; 235 NW2d 132 (1975), this Court ruled that whether a particular departure from compliance with a court rule specifying the procedure for taking a guilty *303plea requires reversal will depend on the nature of the noncompliance.
When Ingram’s plea of guilty was offered and accepted, the rule required that the defendant be advised that if his plea were accepted, he would not have a trial.1
I am not persuaded that Ingram’s 1982 plea-based conviction should be set aside simply because the court did not advise him when he pleaded guilty that he would not have a trial.
A different question might be presented if a court were to fail to advise an accused person in substantial compliance with MCR 6.610(E)(3), effective February, 1988.2
The 1988 amendment provides a procedure for challenging a plea.3 A person charged with a misdemeanor, who pleads guilty and is placed on probation, has little incentive to challenge his conviction, and therefore is not likely to challenge the plea or to appeal.
*304If a "failure of a plea-taking court to adhere to applicable plea-taking requirements during the plea proceeding”4 cannot be challenged unless a timely appeal has been filed, and is so far "unassailable,”5 that the writ will never run, we may see increasing noncompliance with the 1988 procedures in cases where the district court anticipates placing the accused on probation.
This Court, as well as a guilty pleading defendant, has an interest in assuring that the procedures required to be followed before a plea of guilty is accepted, are observed.
This Court does not have a method of monitoring noncompliance with plea-taking procedures, except providing persons convicted following a plea of guilty with an opportunity to seek to set aside their plea-based convictions at such times as they have an incentive to challenge the convictions.
This Court’s interest in assuring' substantial compliance with plea-taking procedures may outweigh the interest in finality in particular cases.
I agree in general with the observations of the Chief Justice, and would join him in an order remanding to the Court of Appeals to consider the issue not resolved.

 Former DCR 785.4(e)(1).

 MCR 6.610 provides:
(E) Pleas of Guilty and No Contest. Before accepting a plea of guilty or no contest the court shall in all cases comply with this rule.
(3) The court shall advise the defendant of the following:
(a) the mandatory minimum jail sentence, if any, and the maximum possible penalty for the offense,
(b) that if the plea is accepted he or she will not have a trial of any kind and that he or she gives up the following rights that he or she would have at trial:
(i) the right to have witnesses called for his or her defense at trial,
(ii) the right to cross-examine all witnesses called against him or her,
(iii) the right to testify or to remain silent without an inference being drawn from said silence,
(iv) the presumption of innocence and the requirement that his or her guilt be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

 MCR 6.610(E)(7).

 Ante, p 294.

 Id., p 295.