Court Opinion

ID: 9884831
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 03:16:01.478677+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:41.070042
License: Public Domain

ALLPORT, J.
I dissent.
In my opinion the information conveyed to Officer Machuszek by the reliable informant was legally sufficient to support the conclusion of the officer and the finding of the trial court that there existed probable cause for defendant’s arrest. In the recent case of People v. Love, 8 Cal.App.3d 23 [87 Cal.Rptr. 123], the court said at page 30: “Appellant argues that the test of Draper and Spinelli is not applicable in California. She contends that People v. Hamilton, 71 Cal.2d 176 [77 Cal.Rptr. 785, 454 P.2d 681], precludes a finding of probable cause based upon information from an informer unless the informer’s statements themselves establish that the informer ac¡ted from personal knowledge or an otherwise reliable source. The argument misconstrues the context in which Hamilton was decided. Hamilton does not discuss the issue present in the case at bench—the extent of independent corroboration necessary to validate probable cause based upon information from an informer who does not expressly purport to speak from his own knowledge or to disclose the source of his information. No corroboration is involved in Hamilton. The decision is, therefore, not controlling to the case at bench.”
I am impressed with the views expressed by Justice Mosk in People v. Hamilton, 71 Cal.2d 176, 183 [77 Cal.Rptr. 785, 454 P.2d 681], in People v. Scoma, 71 Cal.2d 332, 340-341 [78 Cal.Rptr. 491, 455 P.2d 419], *751and in People v. Sesslin, 68 Cal.2d 418, 431-435 [67 Cal.Rptr. 409, 439 P.2d 321]. As was said by Justice Mosk in Price v. Superior Court, 1 Cal.3d 836 at page 846 [83 Cal.Rptr. 369, 463 P.2d 721]: “In finding error, the majority now add another to the unfortunate congeries of cases that can only have an inhibiting effect upon law enforcement agencies which seek in good faith to comply with the public policy favoring reliance upon warrants instead of probable cause. (See my dissents in People v. Sesslin (1968) 68 Cal.2d 418, 431 [67 Cal.Rptr. 409, 439 P.2d 321]; People v. Hamilton (1969) supra, 71 Cal.2d 176, 183; People v. Scoma (1969) 71 Cal.2d 332, 339-340 [78 Cal.Rptr. 491, 455 P.2d 419].)” I do not believe that either Hamilton or Reeves compel the conclusion reached by the majority and I believe that a contrary result would be factually permissible, legally sound and in no way violative of defendant’s constitutionally guaranteed rights. (Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 [3 L.Ed.2d 327, 79 S.Ct. 329]; Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 [12 L.Ed.2d 723, 84 S.Ct. 1509]; Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 [21 L.Ed.2d 637, 89 S.Ct. 584]; People v. Love, supra, 8 Cal.App.3d 23.)
I would affirm the judgment of conviction.
Respondent’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied February 17,1971.