Court Opinion

ID: 9391597
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-02 18:03:32.036053+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:42.715903
License: Public Domain

Filed 5/2/23 Man v. Franklin CA2/2
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION TWO

KHOEUTH MAN,                                                           B320726

         Plaintiff and Respondent,                                     (Los Angeles County
                                                                       Super. Ct. No. 22WHRO00272)
         v.

VALENTINA FRANKLIN,

         Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Faith F. Nuri, Judge Pro Tempore.
Affirmed.

         Kenneth H. Lewis for Defendant and Appellant.

      Law Office of Peacock & Le Beau and Jeffery O. Le Beau
for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                           ______________________________
       Khoeuth Man (Man) obtained a civil harassment
restraining order (Code Civ. Proc., § 527.6)1 against Valentina
Franklin (Franklin), who now appeals. She argues that (1) her
actions did not constitute either unlawful violence or a credible
threat of violence, and (2) her actions did not constitute a course
of conduct that constitutes harassment.
       We affirm.
       FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       On February 16, 2022, Man filed a request for civil
harassment restraining order. The petition alleged that he and
Franklin worked together; Josefina Santos (Santos) was his
supervisor. According to the petition, Franklin harassed him, his
wife, and Santos by calling him, texting him, impersonating him
on social media, complaining about him at work, spreading
rumors about him, and sending men to his home. Copies of the
text messages were attached to the petition.
       The trial court issued a temporary restraining order and
then set the matter for a hearing.
       At the March 10, 2022, hearing, the trial court confirmed
with Man that “everything [he] put in [his] petition [was]
accurate.” It then reviewed the printout of the text messages
that was attached to the petition with the parties.
       Thereafter, Man and Franklin testified. Man attested that
Franklin “text[ed him] unsolicited, call[ed him] unsolicited.” He
also stated that Franklin threatened to hurt him. He was afraid
that Franklin was going to get him fired from his job.

1
     All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure unless otherwise indicated.

                                 2
       Franklin testified that she sent unsolicited text messages
to Man based upon her belief that there was an “inappropriate
connection” between him and Santos. While she claimed that
Man’s relationship was not really her business, she also stated
that one of the reasons she sent the text messages to Man was
because she was in a relationship with Santos and was upset
about his perceived relationship with Santos.
       After considering all of the evidence and entertaining
argument from Franklin, the trial court issued a two-year civil
harassment restraining order against Franklin. It reasoned: “I
have heard both parties. Based on the information provided, I
find—based on trier of fact, I found [Man] to be credible. I have
noticed that [Franklin] was evasive when I was asking her about
the reasons for contacting and following up.
       “I also, based on the testimony given, have observed that
this issue has gone on for two years, and there are multiple
complaints filed, but there is one thing that [Man] was
consistent; that he didn’t want any more contact and he didn’t
want [Franklin] to contact him in any form or shape or even
communicate with his employer about things that were between
her and Ms. Santos.” Furthermore, there was no evidence that
Man tried to contact or communicate with Franklin.
       This timely appeal ensued.
                            DISCUSSION
I. Standard of review
       “We review issuance of a protective order for abuse of
discretion, and the factual findings necessary to support the

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protective order are reviewed for substantial evidence.”2 (Parisi
v. Mazzaferro (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 1219, 1226, overruled in part
on other grounds in Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989,
1010.) Substantial evidence is “evidence of ponderable legal
significance, evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid
value.” (Minnegren v. Nozar (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 500, 507.) The
testimony of one witness may constitute substantial evidence.
(In re Marriage of Mix (1975) 14 Cal.3d 604, 614.)
       “[W]hen reviewing a finding that a fact has been proved by
clear and convincing evidence, the question before the appellate
court is whether the record as a whole contains substantial
evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it
highly probable that the fact was true.” (Conservatorship of O.B.,
supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 995–996.)
       “But whether the facts, when construed most favorably in
[Man’s] favor, are legally sufficient to constitute civil harassment
under section 527.6, and whether the restraining order passes
constitutional muster, are questions of law subject to de novo
review.” (R.D. v. P.M. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 181, 188.)
       On appeal, we indulge implied findings. The doctrine of
implied findings “‘is a natural and logical corollary to three
fundamental principles of appellate review: (1) a judgment is
presumed correct; (2) all intendments and presumptions are
indulged in favor of correctness; and (3) the appellant bears the
burden of providing an adequate record affirmatively proving

2
       Some courts have held that we review the trial court’s
decision to grant a restraining order for substantial evidence.
(Schild v. Rubin (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 755, 762.) Our analysis is
the same under either standard.

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error.’ [Citation.]” (Acquire II, LTD. v. Colton Real Estate Group
(2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 959, 970.) The substantial evidence
standard applies to both express and implied findings of fact.
(SFPP v. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe R Y. Co. (2004)
121 Cal.App.4th 452, 462.)
II. Relevant law
        As set forth in section 527.6, a person who has suffered
harassment may seek a temporary restraining order. After a
hearing, that person may obtain an order prohibiting
harassment. (§ 527.6, subd. (a)(1).) “‘Harassment’ is unlawful
violence, a credible threat of violence, or a knowing and willful
course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously
alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and that serves no
legitimate purpose.” (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(3), italics added.)
        Course of conduct harassment is defined in subdivision
(b)(1) as: “[A] pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over
a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of
purpose, including following or stalking an individual, making
harassing telephone calls to an individual, or sending harassing
correspondence to an individual by any means, including, but not
limited to, the use of public or private mails, interoffice mail,
facsimile, or email.” (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(1).) “The course of
conduct must be that which would cause a reasonable person to
suffer substantial emotional distress, and must actually cause
substantial emotional distress to the petitioner.” (§ 527.6, subd.
(b)(3).)
        An order shall issue if a judge finds clear and convincing
evidence that unlawful harassment exists. (§ 527.6, subd. (i).)

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III. Analysis
        Applying the foregoing legal principles, we conclude that
the trial court did not err in issuing a restraining order against
Franklin. “[T]he trial court’s decision granting the
. . . restraining order ‘necessarily implies that the trial court
found that [Franklin] knowingly and willfully engaged in a
course of conduct that seriously alarmed, annoyed or harassed
[Man], and that [Man] actually suffered substantial emotional
distress.’ [Citation.]” (Cooper v. Bettinger (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th
77, 92.) Those findings are supported by ample evidence. The
trial court confirmed that Man’s allegations in his petition were
accurate, and the trial court found him credible. This evidence,
coupled with Man’s testimony, established that Franklin made
unsolicited telephone calls and sent unwelcome text messages
admonishing him not to have contact with Santos. She also
opened a social media account impersonating Man. And, there
was circumstantial evidence that Franklin sent people to Man’s
home, scaring his wife.
        There was also evidence that the text messages served no
legitimate purpose. As Franklin herself testified, she sent the
text messages to Man because she believed that he and Santos
shared an “inappropriate connection.” But she also admitted that
“[t]hat wasn’t really [her] business.”
        Based upon all of this evidence, we find no fault in the trial
court’s implied determination that this course of conduct would
“cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional
distress,” as required under section 527.6, subdivision (b)(3), and
that Man in fact suffered anxiety and fear.
        Urging us to reverse, Franklin essentially reargues her
interpretation of the evidence, characterizing it as “not

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. . . creditable,” insubstantial, and based upon “unprovable leaps
of faith.” Such an argument does not warrant reversal. “It is
elementary that we will not engage in a reweighing of the
evidence.” (Tusher v. Gabrielsen (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 131, 143.)
        In light of the foregoing, we need not address Franklin’s
alternative arguments, namely that her conduct did not
constitute either unlawful violence or a credible threat of
violence. (Eddie E. v. Superior Court (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 319,
327 [the use of the word “or” in a statute is disjunctive and
indicates the Legislature’s intention to designate separate
categories].)
                             DISPOSITION
        The order is affirmed. Man is entitled to costs on appeal.
        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

                               _____________________, J.
                               ASHMANN-GERST

We concur:

________________________, P. J.
LUI

________________________, J.
CHAVEZ

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