Court Opinion

ID: 9561525
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:11:09.222064+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:51.095997
License: Public Domain

*650MOSK, J.
I concur in the judgment. After review, I have found no reversible error or other defect.
I write separately to comment on the majority’s treatment of defendant’s claim under Stringer v. Black (1992) 503 U.S._[117 L.Ed.2d 367, 112 S.Ct. 1130] (Stringer). As I stated in my dissenting opinion in People v. Proctor, ante, page 499 [15 Cal.Rptr.2d 340, 842 P.2d 1100]:
“In Stringer, the United States Supreme Court held that ‘if a State uses aggravating factors in deciding who shall be eligible for the death penalty or who shall receive the death penalty, it cannot use factors which as a practical matter fail to guide the sentencer’s discretion’ in contravention of the Eighth Amendment. [Citation.] It explained: ‘Although our precedents do not require the use of aggravating factors, they have not permitted a State in which aggravating factors are decisive to use factors of vague or imprecise content. A vague aggravating factor employed for the purpose of determining whether a defendant is eligible for the death penalty fails to channel the sentencer’s discretion. A vague aggravating factor used in the weighing process is in a sense worse, for it creates the risk that the jury will treat the defendant as more deserving of the death penalty than he might otherwise be by relying upon the existence of an illusory circumstance.’ [Citation.] Of course, California uses ‘aggravating factors’—labeled ‘special circumstances’ [citation]—to determine death eligibility. It also uses ‘aggravating factors’—bearing that very label [citation]—to decide between life and death.
“A narrow Stringer challenge could specifically attack any one or more of the factors set out in the standard jury instruction on the determination of penalty as vague and, for that reason, likely to invite an arbitrary and capricious choice of punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment....
“A broader Stringer challenge could generally attack the standard jury instruction on the determination of penalty as vague at its very core and, for that reason, highly likely to invite an arbitrary and capricious choice of punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.” (People v. Proctor, supra, ante, at pp. 566-567 (dis. opn. of Mosk, J.); accord, People v. Tuilaepa, ante, 569, 596-597 [15 Cal.Rptr.2d 382, 842 P.2d 1142] (conc, opn. of Mosk, J.).)
Defendant’s Stringer challenge is narrow. He attacks factor (a), the “circumstances of the crime,” and factor (i), the “age of the defendant at the time of the crime.”
*651The majority reject the claim. They do so because they themselves do not find factors (a) and (i) to be vague. But “[wjhat is dispositive is not what jurists on appellate courts may announce, but what laypersons on juries may understand.” (People v. Proctor, supra, ante, at p. 567 (dis. opn. of Mosk, J.); accord, People v. Tuilaepa, supra, ante, at p. 597 (conc. opn. of Mosk, J.).) In this regard, consider factor (i). “We have held that ‘age’ can be aggravating or mitigating or neither depending on the peculiar facts of the individual case. (E.g., People v. Lucky (1988) 45 Cal.3d 259, 302 [247 Cal.Rptr. 1, 753 P.2d 1052].) Whether a juror would come to the same conclusion, however, is another matter." (People v. Tuilaepa, supra, ante, at p. 597 (conc. opn. of Mosk, J.).)
In the course of their analysis, the majority appear to suggest that if a factor is not vague, it necessarily passes muster under the United States Constitution, even if it “ *leave[s] the sentencer free to evaluate the evidence in accordance with his or her own subjective values.’ ” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 649, quoting People v. Tuilaepa, supra, ante, at p. 595.) Such a proposition would be too broad. “The requirements imposed by the federal charter are substantive as well as formal. Thus, a factor, no matter how clearly defined, is constitutionally invalid if, for example, it authorizes or allows a juror to ‘attach[] the “aggravating” label to’ matters ‘that are constitutionally impermissible or totally irrelevant to the sentencing process, such as . . .the race, religion, or political affiliation of the defendant’ or ‘to conduct that actually should militate in favor of a lesser penalty, such as perhaps the defendant’s mental illness.’ ” (People v. Tuilaepa, supra, ante, at pp. 597-598 (conc. opn. of Mosk, J.), quoting Zant v. Stephens (1983) 462 U.S. 862, 885 [77 L.Ed.2d 235, 255, 103 S.Ct. 2733].)
A successful Stringer challenge, it must be noted, does not automatically result in reversal. “As Stringer itself makes plain, an instruction incorporating a vague factor is subject to harmless-error analysis.” (People v. Tuilaepa, supra, ante, at p. 598 (conc. opn. of Mosk, J.).) On this record, even if one or both of the factors defendant attacks are deemed vague, no prejudice appears.
In conclusion, having found no reversible error or other defect, I concur in the judgment.
Appellant’s petition for a rehearing was denied March 10, 1993.