Court Opinion

ID: 9632258
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:07:54.019901+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:34:39.784689
License: Public Domain

MOSK, J.
I dissent.
I cannot agree with the majority’s reasoning. Bearing in mind that the workers’ compensation laws are to be liberally construed on behalf of employees (see post, p. 687), I agree with the view articulated by dissenting Court of Appeal Justice Yegan when that court issued its decision. I adopt Justice Yegan’s opinion and quote it immediately below. My own elisions and substitutions are indicated by brackets.
[. . .] Martin Massey turned 18 on December 15, 1985. During his minority, he was the dependent stepson of decedent Tommy Thompson. Thompson sustained an industrial injury on October 18, 1979, received workers’ compensation benefits, and died approximately 417 weeks later on October 28, 1987. Massey applied for workers’ compensation death benefits within one year of Thompson’s death, i.e., on April 21, 1988.
The Board and the [Court of Appeal] majority conclude that Massey is not entitled to a death benefit. The tolling provisions of Labor Code section 5408 and two Court of Appeal opinions indicate that he is entitled thereto. (Fisher v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 924, 928-929 [133 Cal.Rptr. 471]; Roblyer v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 574, 579-581 [133 Cal.Rptr. 246].)
I acknowledge a certain appeal to the [Court of Appeal] majority opinion. It seems generous that the Legislature would allow a 21-year-old to receive a death benefit because of his stepfather’s 1979 industrial injury. While the mere passage of time is not determinative, it has been over 15 years since the Court of Appeal decided the 2 apposite cases interpreting Labor Code section 5408. Since that time, no “corrective” legislation has been passed to supersede their effect. I presume that during this period, similarly situated dependents have received death benefits based on the same section 5408 *687tolling principle. The [Court of Appeal] majority [. . .] statutorily construe Labor Code section 5408 in favor of the Board, and hold that no dependent minor is entitled to a death benefit if the worker dies more than 240 weeks after the injury.
In construing Labor Code sections 5406 and 5408, it must be emphasized that dependency is determined at the time of the industrial injury, not date of death. (Lab. Code, §§ 3501, 3502; Granell v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1944) 25 Cal.2d 209, 214 [153 P.2d 358].) Because Massey sought death benefits within one year of his stepfather’s death, his application was timely. (Lab. Code, § 5406, subd. (c).) The 240-week period for accrual of death benefits was suspended during Massey’s minority by reason of Labor Code section 5408.
“Section 5408 focuses primarily on the disability claims of minor employees; it protects these employees from statutes of limitation until an adult guardian or trustee is available. By sheer force of its terms, it also encompasses the potential death benefit claims of minor dependents and the 240-week limitation which conditions their rights to death benefits.” (Fisher v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., supra, 62 Cal.App.3d at p. 928.)
Nothing in Ruiz v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1955) 45 Cal.2d 409 [289 P.2d 229] (Ruiz) compels a contrary result. There, the court conceded that a widow’s claim for a death benefit could be barred before it ever arose if the employee died more than 240 weeks from date of injury. Ruiz, however, did not involve a dependent minor or Labor Code section 5408 tolling.
Based on Ruiz, the [Court of Appeal] majority conclude that the “qualifying condition” or accrual period which makes a dependent eligible for a death benefit is not tolled [in this case]. Not so.
“Limitations provisions in the [workers’] compensation law must be liberally construed in favor of the employee unless otherwise compelled by the language of the statute, and such enactments should not be interpreted in a manner which will result in a right being lost before it accrues. [Citations.]” (Fruehauf Corp. v. Workmen’s Comp. App. Bd. (1968) 68 Cal.2d 569, 577 [68 Cal.Rptr. 164, 440 P.2d 236].) The same rule applies for dependent claimants. (Arndt v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 139, 147 [128 Cal.Rptr. 250].)
The second paragraph of section 5408 tolls “. . . all limitation periods prescribed by division 4 of the Labor Code, including the 240-week period *688mentioned in section 5406 Where, as here, the Legislature drafts an all-encompassing tolling provision in a remedial area of law, adherence to the “separation of powers” principle of government dictates that the dependent be given the benefit thereof. [End quote from dis. opn. of Yegan, 1]
Every criticism of the Court of Appeal’s decision applies to this court’s decision as well. Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal.