Court Opinion

ID: 9779027
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 21:33:52.845859+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:19.599165
License: Public Domain

McCRAW, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent for two reasons. First, the majority has exceeded the scope of the Court of Criminal Appeals’ mandate in deciding this case on remand. Second, the state of the evidence does not support the majority’s conclusion that the charging error is harmless. I would reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for new trial.

The Mandate

The Court of Criminal Appeals, in twenty-six words, succinctly and specifically restricted the scope of review on remand: “The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is vacated and remanded to the Court of Appeals for consideration in light of Govan v. State, 682 S.W.2d 567 (Tex.Crim.App.1985), supra, and Brown v. State, 716 S.W.2d 939 (Tex.Crim.App.1986), supra.” Black v. State, 723 S.W.2d 674, 676 (Tex.Crim.App.1986).
I do not find this mandate confusing. Certainly, the Court of Criminal Appeals cited Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex.Crim.App.1984), in its opinion. The Court also cited six other cases in the brief opinion. In its direction to this Court, however, the Court of Criminal Appeals specifically directs us to consider the case sub judice in light of the standard enunciated in Govan and Brown. These cases hold that any error of the trial court in charging on the law of parties is harmless if the evidence clearly supports a defendant’s guilt as a principal actor. Brown, 716 S.W. 2d at 946; Govan, 682 S.W.2d at 571. I will, therefore, follow the Court of Criminal Appeals’ mandate by reviewing the evidence to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to support appellant’s conviction as a principal actor.

Sufficiency of the Evidence

Appellant was convicted of aggravated possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. The indictment alleged that appellant intentionally and knowingly possessed a controlled substance in an amount more than 400 grams with intent to deliver. When charging a defendant with unlawful possession of a controlled substance, the State must prove: (1) that the defendant exercised actual care, control, custody or management of the contraband; and (2) that the defendant knew that what he possessed was contraband. Humason v. State, 728 S.W.2d 363, 365 (Tex.Crim. App.1987); Payne v. State, 480 S.W.2d 732, 734 (Tex.Crim.App.1972); Baty v. State, 734 S.W.2d 62 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1987). See also TEX.REV.CIV.STAT.ANN. art. 4476-15, § 1.02(34) (Vernon Supp.1987).
The Texas Penal Code has abolished the distinction between “principals” and “accomplices.” See TEX. PENAL CODE *645ANN. § 7.01(c) (Vernon 1974). Instead, a person is criminally liable as a party to an offense if the offense is committed: 1) by his own conduct; 2) by the conduct of another for whom he is criminally responsible under TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 7.02 (Vernon 1974); or 3) by both. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 7.01(a) (Vernon 1974). The case law has preserved the traditional language of “principal” and lesser actors to a certain extent, referring to one who commits a crime by his own conduct as a principal, or primary actor. See, e.g., Black, 723 S.W.2d at 675; Brown, 716 S.W.2d at 946.
Under the Court of Criminal Appeals’ mandate, I must examine the evidence to determine whether appellant, by his own conduct, exercised actual care, custody, control or management of more than 400 grams of PCP with intent to deliver. My review of the record reveals that Cooper prepared the motor home registered in his name for a trip, and then drove to the house of “Black Willie” to pick up appellant and another man. Appellant loaded his suitcases into the van, and Cooper loaded two five-gallon drums which a person experienced in the illicit drug trade would know to contain ether used in the manufacture of PCP. I find no evidence in the record to suggest that appellant loaded the drums into the van, or that he directed Cooper to load them, so as to constitute actual care, custody, management or control over them. I note this fact in light of the majority’s emphasis on possession of the ingredients for PCP as dispositive evidence of guilt of possession of PCP. I am not convinced that such a connection can be drawn.
A police officer followed Cooper’s van for thirty-six hours, but at no time was he able to get close enough to the van to observe appellant’s conduct in the van. Again, the majority places great weight upon appellant’s presence in the van before the controlled substance was in the van. While such evidence may be relevant to appellant’s guilt under the law of parties, particularly if he drove the van, I am unwilling to place such importance upon this fact when examining appellant’s guilt as a principal actor. After thirty-six hours, the van arrived at Cooper’s brother’s house in Dallas. The police set up constant surveillance of the house and Cooper’s van, keeping well out of sight of the house. The police could not see people entering or leaving the house and could not see inside the house. One police officer, experienced in drug cases, testified that he could smell the distinctive odors associated with the manufacture of PCP emanating from the house.
Cooper, appellant and another, man left Cooper’s brother’s house in Cooper’s van and headed south on the expressway. The police stopped the van and could smell a strong odor when approaching the van. Cooper was driving the van and appellant was riding in the front passenger seat. A search of the vehicle revealed 1,519 grams of PCP. There is no evidence in the record that appellant attempted to flee, that he made furtive gestures toward the contraband, or that he was under the influence of drugs. No drugs were found on his person.
The majority correctly states that, in order to support a conviction for possession of a controlled substance as a principal actor, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant intentionally or knowingly exercised actual care, control, custody, or management of the illicit drugs, knowing that it is contraband. Humason, 728 S.W.2d at 365. It is not enough for the State to show that a defendant was merely in the vicinity of a controlled substance; instead, the State must provide evidence of “affirmative links” between a defendant and a controlled substance. Humason, 728 S.W.2d at 365; McGoldrick v. State, 682 S.W.2d 573, 578 (Tex.Crim.App.1985).
In Humason, the accused, the sole occupant of a truck, was stopped by the police for speeding. He was arrested for driving with a suspended license. A search of the truck revealed an unzipped gym bag on the passenger seat next to where appellant had been sitting. The bag contained clothing and a clear vial containing a white powder residue which testing revealed to be cocaine. The Court of Criminal Appeals held *646that the State had failed to meet its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Humason possessed the cocaine. The Court stated that the circumstantial evidence did not exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than guilt. Humason, 728 S.W.2d at 367.
I would hold that there is no evidence in the record showing appellant’s care, custody, management or control of the contraband. The evidence merely shows that appellant was in a van in which there was a great deal of contraband, that he had trav-elled for thirty-six hours in a van allegedly carrying the ingredients for making the illicit drugs, and that he stayed for part of the time he was in Dallas in a home where PCP was allegedly manufactured. It is not enough for the State to prove that appellant was merely present in the vicinity of the PGP. Humason, 728 S.W.2d at 365. The evidence also showed that PCP ingredients, PCP manufacture, and PCP itself have unique and distinct odors. There is no evidence showing that appellant knew the significance of these odors. See Humason, 728 S.W.2d at 367 (no proof in the record that defendant was aware of the properties of a particular controlled substance). In any event, evidence that appellant was aware that the smell was associated with PCP would be relevant to the issue of his knowledge that the items were contraband; however, that knowledge alone does not constitute care, custody, management or control of the illicit drugs.
Further, I must take issue with a statement of the majority. The majority avers that the evidence as to guilt of Cooper and as to guilt of appellant is not significantly different. I disagree. Cooper was seen loading the barrels of ether; the van was registered in Cooper’s name; Cooper was the only person the police saw driving the van; the men went to Cooper’s brother’s house. This evidence, together with the other evidence discussed in this opinion, shows Cooper’s culpability as a principal actor. This evidence is lacking as to appellant.
Because the evidence presented does not support appellant’s guilt as a principal actor, as required by Govan and Brown, I must conclude that the trial court’s error in failing to charge on law of parties was harmful beyond a reasonable doubt. Consequently, the judgment of the trial court should be reversed and the cause remanded for new trial.