Court Opinion

ID: 9808488
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 20:39:39.937393+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:14:02.058723
License: Public Domain

Clark:, 0. J.,
dissenting: Margaret Barnhardt died in 1898, seized ■of an undivided one-third interest in a tract of land in which her sisters, Minnie Ellis and Loula Gibbs, were the other tenants in common. The land was subject to the life interest of their father, who died 11 April, 1917. This life interest had been bought in by her sisters, Mrs. Gibbs and Minnie Ellis, in 1895. Margaret died in 1898, leaving no children, and having had none. The husband was, therefore, not entitled to tenancy by the curtesy, and there being no notice of a will, the two surviving sisters, who were her heirs at law in 1908, sold the land, including the life ■estate, to the defendant, an innocent purchaser for value, who has been in possession since that time.
On 9 March, 1915, the General Assembly enacted chapter 219, Laws 1915, which is as follows: “Provided, that the probate and registration •of any last will and testament shall not affect the rights of innocent purchasers for value from the heirs at law of the testator, when such purchase is made more than two years after death of the testator, unless said last will and testament has been fraudulently withheld from probate.” On 12 February, 1917, twenty-three months and three days after the enactment of the statute of 1915 above recited, the plaintiff, the husband of Margaret Barnhardt, probated her will, which purports to devise to him her interest in said land.
It is true that the purchaser is not protected by his adverse possession since 1908, because the statute did not run until the falling in of the life estate, which he had bought as a part of his title. But after the passage of the statute of 1915 it was incumbent upon the plaintiff, claiming *570under the will of Margaret Bamhardt, to probate the same within a reasonable time, for the two years therein allowed had already elapsed. The Legislature being the judge of what is a reasonable time, a statute of' limitation prescribed by it is conclusively a reasonable time, and binding on the Courts. The only exception is that where the statute shortens the-time the Courts hold that the party who would be barred is entitled to a reasonable time after the passage of the act in which to bring his action, but it has never been held that he must have the full time allowed by the statute. In this case, there is no exception in the statute, and the-plaintiff, under the letter of the act, can assert no title under a will not probated within two years after the death of the testator.
He was fixed by law with notice-of the statute, and it was incumbent upon him within a reasonable time to take himself out of the bar put upon his claim, but such reasonable time was not two years. In Matthews v. Sallie Peterson, 150 N. C., 132, it was held that the administrator did not move within a reasonable time when he waited for more-'than a year after the passage of the statute shortening the limitation.. In Matthews v. Hawnah Peterson, ib., 134, the Court held that in such case, if the action was brought within one year, it would be within a reasonable time.
These two cases hold: “When a limitation of time for bringing an-, action is shortened by statute, there must be a reasonable time, notwithstanding the statute in which to bring the action, but this by no means; requires that the party who would be barred by the statute is entitled to-the full time allowed by the statute in which to bring his action.”
The defendant bought, in good faith, without notice, and for value,, from the heirs at law, who, by this statute, it was intended should be-protected by. the failure to probate the will within two years after the-death of the testator. There being no exception in the statute, to prevent any hardship where the two years has already expired, or less than that: time remains, the Courts hold that in such case, notwithstanding the-letter of the statute, a devisee shall have a reasonable time. He is not. entitled, however, to two years from the passage of the act, but two years-from the death of the testator and a reasonable time for him in which to-probate this will was less than the twenty-three months and three days-after passage of the act, and the defendant ought not to be disturbed in his possession. This action was not brought by the plaintiff till 14 September, 1917, nineteen years after the death of his wife, during all of' which time he had withheld the will from probate.