Court Opinion

ID: 9735409
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 18:13:53.808062+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:58.114017
License: Public Domain

Cooper, J.
This is an appeal from the Clark Circuit Court wherein the appellee brought an action for an absolute divorce from the appellant, alleging cruel and inhuman treatment. The complaint prayed also for the custody of certain minor children and alimony.
The record before us reveals that after trial the court rendered judgment for the appellee on her complaint, granting an absolute divorce, the custody of the minor children and alimony. Thereafter, within the time allowed, the appellant filed a proper motion for new trial, the said motion was overruled and, as the result of that ruling, this appeal followed.
The assigned error is the overruling of the appellant’s motion for a new trial which averred, among other things, that the decision was not sustained by sufficient evidence and was contrary to law.
In support of the aforesaid averments, the appellant, in substance, urges that the court erred in rendering the particular judgment for divorce, custody and alimony because of the failure of the statutory proof as *506to the appellee’s residence under §3-1203, Burns’, 1959 supplement, and, further, because of the failure of the statutory proof as to the appellee’s residence under the statute the decision of the trial court was not sustained by sufficient evidence, and, therefore, contrary to law.
The appellant raises in this court for the first time the question of the trial court’s jurisdiction to render the particular judgment the court rendered because of the lack of the mandatory proof as to the residence of the appellee by two resident householders, as required by §3-1203, Burns’, supra.
In 1 Freeman, Judgment (5th Ed.), 444, 445, §226, we find:
“There are in general three jurisdictional elements in every valid judgment, namely, jurisdiction of the subject matter, jurisdiction, of the person, and the power or authority to render the particular judgment.
“This well-established doctrine that a judgment beyond the court’s power is invalid, is not limited in its application to any particular kind of judgment nor is it peculiar to the judgment of any particular court. Irrespective of the character or dignity of the tribunal pronouncing the decision, whether of inferior, limited or superior general jurisdiction, it must confine its determination within the authority it possesses under the law and the case.” 1 Freeman, Judgments (5th Ed.), 735, §354.
A review of authorities reveals that our Supreme Court follows the foregoing doctrine. Underhill v. Franz (1951), 230 Ind. 165, 173, 101 N. E. 2d 264; State ex rel. Public Service Comm. v. Marion Circuit Ct. (1951), 230 Ind. 277, 293, 103 N. E. 2d 214; Witte v. Dowd, Warden (1951), 230 Ind. 485, 102 N. E. 2d 630.
It is the appellee’s contention that under the authority of Sims v. Sims (1957) (T. D. 1958), 128 Ind. App. 408, 146 N. E. 2d 111, it was incumbent upon the appellant to raise such jurisdictional question the first *507time in the trial court. A review of the Sims case, swpra,, reveals that our court in that case directly contravenes the holding of our Supreme Court in the case of Wedmore v. State (1954), 233 Ind. 545, 549, 122 N. E. 2d 1, wherein the Supreme Court stated:
“When there is a lack of jurisdiction of the subject-matter in the trial court, the jurisdictional question may be raised at any time before final decision and in any manner and if not raised by a party it is our duty sm sponte to raise and determine it. State ex rel. Ayres v. Ewing, Judge (1952), 231 Ind. 1, 10, 106 N. E. 2d 441, and cases there cited.”
However, we need not discuss or decide this question now since this cause must be reversed for other error and such specific issue, we feel sure, will not recur in the re-trial. Flowers v. Estate (1956), 236 Ind. 151, 170, 139 N. E. 2d 185; Tribune Star Publishing Co., Inc. v. Fortwendle (1954), 124 Ind. App. 618, 115 N. E. 2d 215.
Reviewing the pertinent part of said section of our statute, we find it provides, in part, the following:
“Divorces may be decreed by the circuit, superior or other courts of this state upon which such jurisdiction has been or may be conferred on petition filed by either the wife or the husband, where at the time of the filing of such petition either the petitioner or her or his spouse, the defendant, is and shall have been a bona fide resident of the state for one (1) year previous to the filing of said petition and a bona fide resident of the county at the time and for six (6) months immediately preceding the filing of such petition, which bona fide residence shall be duly proven by such petitioner to the satisfaction of the court trying said petition by at least two (2) witnesses each of whom shall be either a resident householder or the wife of a resident householder of this state; provided however, . . .”
*508Thus, it appears from the express provisions of the statute that (1) courts of competent jurisdiction may grant divorces on petitions of the husband or wife where at the time of the filing of the peition either of them, or the defendant is a bona fide resident of the state (Indiana) for a period of at least one year prior to said filing; (2) that the petitioner is a bona fide resident of the county at the time of the filing of the petition and has been for at least six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition; (3) that the bona fide residence of such petitioner shall be duly proven by the petitioner to the satisfaction of the court trying said petition by two witnesses, each of whom shall be a resident householder or the wife of a resident householder of this state.
We are bound by the general rule of law that a statute must be reasonably and fairly interpreted so as to give it efficient operation, and to give effect if possible to the expressed intent of the legislature. It should not be wantonly narrowed, limited or emasculated and rendered ineffective, absurd or nugatory. If possible it should be allowed to perform its intended mission as shown by the existing evils intended to be remedied. Balzer v. Waring (1911), 176 Ind. 585, 590, 95 N. E. 257; 48 L. R. A. (N. S.) 834; Walters v. Bank of America (1937), 9 Cal. 2d 46, 52, 69 P. 2d 839, 110 A. L. R. 1259, 1264; DeTarr v. State (1906), 37 Ind. App. 323, 327, 76 N. E. 897; Perry Twp. v. Indianapolis Power & Light Co. (1946), 224 Ind. 59, 69, 64 N. E. 2d 296; Davis Coal Co. v. Polland (1902), 158 Ind. 607, 617, 62 N. E. 492; Smith v. Indianapolis St. R. Co. (1902), 158 Ind. 425, 427, 63 N. E. 849. See also State v. Griffin (1948), 226 Ind. 279, 284, 79 N. E. 2d 537.
*509We are of the opinion that the foregoing phrase, “to the satisfaction of the court,” does not mean that he can dispense with the required statutory proof as to the resident requirements. The phrase, “duly proven,” means in a proper way, or regularly or according to law. Haverell Distributors v. Haverell Mfg. Corp. (1944) (T. D. 1945), 115 Ind. App. 501, 507, 58 N. E. 2d 372.
Our Supreme Court has said: “Courts cannot act upon the assumption that a state of facts exists which has not been proven. . . .” Muncie Building Trades Council v. Umbarger (1938), 215 Ind. 13, 16, 17 N. E. 2d 828.
The court must see that the requisite principle of proof has been observed and duly applied since such proof is mandatory. In reviewing the authorities, we find that both the Supreme Court and our court have held that the statutory proof of residence by at least two witnesses who are resident householders of the state is mandatory before judgment may be rendered for a party seeking a divorce under §3-1203, Burns’, supra. Wharton v. Wharton (1941), 218 Ind. 345, 32 N. E. 2d 695; Davidson v. Davidson (1950), 120 Ind. App. 253, 90 N. E. 2d 821; Adkins v. Adkins (1947), 117 Ind. App. 189, 70 N. E. 2d 750; Berghean v. Berghean (1943), 113 Ind. App. 412, 48 N. E. 2d 1001; Coulter v. Coulter (1937), 103 Ind. App. 565, 9 N. E. 2d 141; Blauser v. Blauser (1909) (T. D. 1909), 44 Ind. App. 117, 87 N. E. 152.
The entire evidence of the proof of residence of the appellee in the record before us is as follows:
“MR. PRENTICE: Your Honor, I would like to testify as a resident witness.
“THE COURT: All right.
“MR. PRENTICE: My name is Dixon Prentice. I am a resident householder of Clark County, Indi*510ana, and head of a family. I have been personally acquainted with Mr. and Mrs. Bohannan, the parties to this suit, for approximately ten years, and I know they have been bona fide residents of Clark County, Indiana, continuously for more than one year immediately prior to the date this suit was filed.”
We are of the opinion that the testimony of Mr. Prentice, who was the attorney of record for the plaintiff below, may be sufficient to meet the mandatory requirements of the statute; however, the testimony of the other resident witness, Mr. Smith, the attorney of record for the defendant below, being as follows:
“MR. HOMER SMITH: Your Honor, I will . testify to the same facts. I have known the Bohannan family for a number of years prior to the date this suit was filed, and I know they lived in Clark County all of that time.”
contains the same defects as were set out in the case of Brown v. Brown (1894), 138 Ind. 257, 258, 37 N. E. 142, wherein our Supreme Court said:
“Another witness, William Call, testified that he was a freeholder and householder, but his place of residence was not disclosed. These two witnesses, with others, not shown to have been either freeholders or householders, testified to the appellees’ residence in the county and State the required period. The purpose of the statutory requirement that proof of residence shall be made ‘by at least two witnesses who are resident freeholders and householders of the State,’ is to give more than ordinary assurance that the proceeding is meritorious, and that citizens of other states are not resorting to the laws of our State to be relieved from the sacred contracts of marriage, through false testimony. Though we were permitted to take judicial cognizance that ‘Bainbridge, Monroe township,’ is in Indiana, we have no information that the witness Call was a freeholder and householder ‘of the State.’ If we may sanction the finding of residence *511upon the evidence of one witness, we may dispense with the requirement of the statute. To do this would be to abandon the good purposes of the statute, and return to the abuses which induced its enactment.”
We are of the opinion that the foregoing evidence does not comply with the strict proof of the residential requirements as mandated by our Legislature, and where there is a failure to comply with the mandatory statutory proof, such failure necessitates a reversal of the judgment. In Davidson v. Davidson, supra, at p. 255, this court held:
“There was a failure of the statutory proof as to appellee’s residence. Such proof is mandatory and a failure thereof requires a reversal of the judgment. State ex rel. Martin v. Eby, Judge (1947), 225 Ind. 283, 73 N. E. 2d 767; Adkins v. Adkins (1947), 117 Ind. App. 189, 70 N. E. 2d 750; Berghean v. Berghean (1943), 113 Ind. App. 412, 48 N. E. 2d 1001.”
We have heretofore pointed out that Mr. Smith, the attorney of record for the defendant below, testified as a witness for the plaintiff below. While it is true that there are no statutory provisions preventing an attorney for the defendant from testifying as to the residence of the plaintiff, it might be considered, if not illegal, highly unethical, for the reason that divorce actions under our law are contested matters. Even in cases where the defendant does not appear, the state must appear by the prosecutor and contest the action, and we feel that such procedure of defense counsel testifying as a witness for the plaintiff is bad practice, as it opens the door to collusion.
It has often been decided by the courts of this state that our state, as such, is a third party in every divorce action because the preservation of the family re*512lationship is a requisite to well-ordered society. If possible, this relationship should be preserved and the law should be strictly adhered to before courts dissolve this basic institution which is the very foundation of our society. This is necessary in order that we may avoid becoming known as a state in which a divorce is easy to secure and so that the citizens of our state will be secure in the knowledge that our courts will strictly enforce our statutes relating to divorce; that each divorce granted is meritorious and free from taint of any nature.
For the reasons given herein, the decision or the trial court was not sustained by sufficient evidence, and, therefore, the lower court erred in overruling the appellant’s motion for a new trial.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded, with instructions to sustain appellant’s motion for a new trial.
Bierly, C. J., Gonas, Kelley and Ryan, JJ., concur in majority opinion.
Ax, P. J., dissents with opinion, in which Myers and Smith, JJ., concur.