Court Opinion

ID: 9893389
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-26 20:04:16.889587+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:03:00.842676
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/26/23 Schrauwers v. Roy CA2/2
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION TWO

 JENNIFER SCHRAUWERS et                                      B318395
 al.,
                                                             (Los Angeles County
      Plaintiffs and                                         Super. Ct. No.
 Respondents,                                                BC630101)

           v.

 KEVIN THOMAS ROY,

      Defendant and
 Appellant.

     APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, H. Jay Ford III, Judge. Affirmed.

     Law Offices of Michelle T. LiVecchi-Raufi and Michelle T.
LiVecchi-Raufi for Defendant and Appellant.
     Traut Firm and Eric V. Traut for Plaintiffs and
Respondents.

                                ******
       Kevin Thomas Roy (Roy) is a Hollywood director who used
his skills to secretly record several videos and dozens of pictures
of his wife’s little sister and two of her friends in the bathroom,
capturing them undressing, showering, and using the toilet. The
women sued him for invasion of privacy and intentional infliction
of emotional distress. Following a five-day bench trial, the trial
court awarded them substantial damages. Roy challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence and the damages awards. His
challenges lack any merit, so we affirm.
         FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I.     Facts1
       A.     Roy and Michelle’s relationship
       Roy met Michelle Schrauwers (Michelle)2 in 2002, when
both were production assistants in Hollywood. They dated for
over five years before getting engaged in 2011 and married in
2013. During that time, both moved up to work as assistant
directors. They divorced in early 2015.

1      Consistent with the applicable standard of review, we set
forth the facts in the light most favorable to the judgment.
(Thompson v. Asimos (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 970, 981 (Thompson).)

2     Because Michelle and her sister, Jennifer Schrauwers
(Jennifer), are both involved in this case and share the same last
name, we use their first names for clarity. We mean no
disrespect.

                                 2
       B.    Roy secretly films Michelle’s little sister and
friends using the bathroom
       In November 2010, Roy and Michelle traveled to Las Vegas
with one of Michelle’s friends, Laura Twors (Twors), and Twors’s
husband. The two couples shared a hotel room. While there, Roy
hid a camera in the hotel room’s bathroom. The camera captured
two dozen partially nude photographs of Twors undressing.
       In January 2011, Roy and Michelle helped Michelle’s friend
Cintia Kumalo (Kumalo) drive to British Columbia, Canada.
While staying overnight at Kumalo’s parents’ home, Roy hid a
camera in the bathroom. The camera recorded 68 time-lapse
nude photographs of Kumalo showering.
       In September 2012, Roy and Michelle visited Michelle’s
sister Jennifer and Jennifer’s husband in Kauai, Hawaii, while
Jennifer and her husband were honeymooning. Roy hid a GoPro
camera in the bathroom of his and Michelle’s rented condo. The
GoPro camera recorded a video that starts by showing Roy
adjusting the camera’s aim, then depicts Jennifer and her
husband using the toilet, and ends with Roy returning minutes
later to shut off the camera.
       In April 2013, Roy and Michelle shared a hotel room with
Jennifer, while all three were in Louisiana to celebrate Roy and
Michelle’s engagement. Roy hid a camera in the hotel room’s
bathroom. The camera recorded a video of Jennifer undressing
and getting into and out of the shower.
       The videos and photos from these four incidents were part
of a larger stash of 40 videos and 400 photographs—all of women
“in bathrooms, dressing rooms, and elsewhere”—that Roy kept on
his portable computer hard drives.

                                3
       C.     Michelle finds Roy’s stash
       In 2013, while she and Roy were only engaged, Michelle
found the April 2013 video of her sister in the bathroom of the
Louisiana hotel room. When she confronted Roy, he began to cry
and inconsistently maintained that he had “accidentally recorded
it” and that he did not “know why [he] did it.” Roy purported to
delete the video, promised “never [to] do it again,” and agreed to
attend a few therapy sessions; Michelle believed Roy, did not
report the incident to her sister, and proceeded to marry Roy.
       During their first year of marriage in 2014, Michelle noted
Roy “acting odd” and suspected he was “lying to [her].” When she
searched his computer, she found photographs of Jennifer
changing clothes that looked like they were taken from under a
bathroom door. This prompted her to search several of Roy’s
hard drives. Those drives contained “hundreds” of videos and
photographs, including those detailed above. When Michelle
confronted Roy with his stash and “begged” him to seek help, Roy
became defiant, insisted there was “nothing wrong with him,”
demanded that she return his stash, and told her he would be
seeking a divorce. Michelle did not accede to Roy’s demand and
instead turned the hard drives over to law enforcement.
II.    Procedural Background
       In August 2016, Jennifer, Twors, and Kumalo (collectively,
plaintiffs) sued Roy for (1) invasion of privacy, (2) intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and (3) negligent infliction of
emotional distress.3
       In September and October 2021, the matter proceeded to a
five-day bench trial. For their case in chief, plaintiffs introduced

3     The complaint also alleged three additional causes of
action, but plaintiffs elected not to pursue those claims.

                                 4
the relevant videos and photographs and, as witnesses, called
themselves, Michelle, and a law enforcement investigator.
       Roy took the stand in his defense. He admitted to
recording the GoPro video in Kauai that depicted him at the
beginning and end of the footage, but maintained that he did so
to film himself and Michelle having sex in the bathroom;
capturing Jennifer and her husband was just an unfortunate
“accident.” He flatly denied creating any of the other videos or
photos, instead insisting that Michelle had done so to get
“revenge” for his decision to get a divorce (even though those
videos and photos were all created before he and Michelle were
even married).
       The trial court issued a tentative decision and proposed
statement of decision, which became final when neither party
objected. In that decision, the court found the plaintiffs’
witnesses to be “credible” and, on that basis, ruled that plaintiffs
had sustained their burden of proof on their claims for invasion of
privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress.4 With
regard to the invasion of privacy claim, the court found that
plaintiffs had a “reasonable expectation of privacy in the
bathrooms where they were photographed or filmed” and that
Roy’s placement of cameras in those bathrooms was “highly
offensive to a reasonable person” because he captured plaintiffs
“while nude and doing the most private acts a person would do in
a bathroom.” With regard to the emotional distress claim, the
court found that Roy’s filming of plaintiffs in the bathrooms was
“outrageous,” that Roy acted “with reckless disregard in causing

4      The court viewed the negligent infliction of emotional
distress claim as an alternative to the intentional infliction claim;
its finding of the latter obviated its need to reach the former.

                                 5
each of the [p]laintiffs emotional distress because he gave little or
no thought to the probable effects of his conduct,” and that Roy’s
conduct caused plaintiffs “severe” “emotional distress” in the form
of their feelings of betrayal and “continuing anxiety” about being
filmed in the future. The court rejected Roy’s testimony that one
video was created by accident and the remaining videos were
created by Michelle to be “not credible,” “wholly unbelievable,”
“creatively contrived” “to generate sympathy for him,” and
without any corroboration whatsoever.
       The court fixed the amount of damages at $350,000 for
Jennifer, $250,000 for Twors, and $250,000 for Kumalo.
       Roy filed this timely appeal.
                            DISCUSSION
       Although Roy raises a multiplicity of challenges to the trial
court’s ruling, they boil down to two contentions—namely, (1) the
trial court’s ruling is not supported by the evidence, and (2) the
damages are excessive. As we explain, neither contention is well
taken.5
I.     Sufficiency of the Evidence
       When reviewing a “judgment based upon a statement of
decision following a bench trial,” we review the trial court’s
findings of fact for substantial evidence. (Thompson, supra, 6
Cal.App.5th at p. 981.) Our task is therefore limited to asking
whether the whole record, construed in the light most favorable
to those findings, contains any “reasonable, credible evidence of

5      In his reply brief, Roy further argues that plaintiffs’
appellate brief is an “unethical” “tactic to twist this case around
by misrepresentation” and “another convoluted misuse of the
litigation process.” Roy’s hyperbole is unhelpful and
unnecessary; we will not address it.

                                  6
solid value” to support them. (Ferguson v. Yaspan (2014) 233
Cal.App.4th 676, 682; People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 57.)
       A.     Analysis
              1.    Intentional infliction of emotional distress
       To prevail on a claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress, a plaintiff must establish “‘“(1) [(a)] extreme and
outrageous conduct by the defendant . . . causing[] emotional
distress,”’” either (b)(i) “‘“with the intention of causing . . .
emotional distress,”’” or (b)(ii) with “‘“reckless disregard of the
probability of causing[] emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff's
suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and
proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant's
outrageous conduct.”’” (Christensen v. Superior Court (1991) 54
Cal.3d 868, 903 (Christensen); Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th
1035, 1050 (Hughes); Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (1993)
6 Cal.4th 965, 1001 (Potter).) As pertinent here, a defendant acts
with “reckless[] disregard [of] the probability of causing[]
emotional distress” if he gave “‘little or no thought’ to the
probable consequences of his conduct.” (KOVR-TV, Inc. v.
Superior Court (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1023, 1031-1032 (KOVR-
TV), quoting Miller v. National Broadcasting Co. (1986) 187
Cal.App.3d 1463, 1487 (Miller); CACI No. 1603.) Emotional
distress is “severe or extreme” when it is “‘“‘of such substantial
quality or enduring quality that no reasonable [person] in
civilized society should be expected to endure it.’”’” (Hughes, at p.
1051; Jackson v. Mayweather (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1240, 1265.)
       Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s judgment for
plaintiffs on the intentional infliction of emotional distress
claims. Roy’s conduct was outrageous: A bathroom “is perhaps
the epitome of a private place” (In re M.H. (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th

                                  7
699, 706 (M.H.)), and Roy’s placement of cameras in bathrooms to
record his then-girlfriend’s sister and friends certainly
“‘“‘exceed[s] all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized
community’”’” (Hughes, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 1051). Roy also
engaged in this conduct with a reckless disregard of causing
emotional distress. Roy testified that he knew that being
“secretly videotaped or photographed in the nude” “could be
emotionally distressing” to his victims, and yet despite that
knowledge gave “little or no thought” to the probable
consequences of videotaping Michelle’s sister and friends.6
Plaintiffs testified that Roy’s conduct was a “betrayal of trust”
from a close friend and family member that made it harder for
them “to trust anybody else,” and they felt that “no one can take .
. . away” the “anxiety of having to live with the fact that” the
photos and videos could be further disseminated. They now
check for cameras, examine the walls for “odd hole[s],” and check
“vents” and “air returns” when they have to disrobe in public
places like hotel rooms and bathroom stalls. Two of the plaintiffs
still worry that they could lose their jobs if the recordings come to
light, two sought counseling, and the third started practicing
yoga and meditation to deal with the anxiety.
              2.    Invasion of privacy
       To prevail on a claim for invasion of privacy, a plaintiff
must establish (1) intentional intrusion “into a place,
conversation, or matter as to which the plaintiff has a reasonable
expectation of privacy,” (2) “in a manner highly offensive to a

6     Given sufficient evidence of recklessness, we need not reach
the question of whether the judgment on this claim could be
upheld on the alternative ground that Roy intended his actions to
cause emotional distress.

                                  8
reasonable person.” (Hernandez v. Hillsides, Inc. (2009) 47
Cal.4th 272, 286; Shulman v. Group W Productions, Inc. (1998)
18 Cal.4th 200, 231; accord, Cal. Const., art. I, § 1 [inalienable
rights include “pursuing and obtaining . . . privacy”].) To satisfy
the first element, the plaintiff must show that the defendant
“penetrated some zone of physical or sensory privacy” where the
plaintiff “had an objectively reasonable expectation of seclusion
or solitude.” (Shulman, at p. 232; Belen v. Ryan Seacrest
Productions, LLC (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 1145, 1163.) Damages
for an invasion of privacy include compensation for the plaintiff’s
“mental suffering and anguish.” (Miller, supra, 187 Cal.App.3d
at p. 1484.)
       Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s judgment for
plaintiffs on the invasion of privacy claims. As noted above, a
bathroom is “the epitome of a private place.” (M.H., supra, 1
Cal.App.5th at pp. 706, 711 [“privacy intrusions” include “the
indignity and embarrassment of being electronically recorded” in
the bathroom]; People v. Triggs (1973) 8 Cal.3d 884, 891,
disapproved on other grounds by People v. Lilienthal (1978) 22
Cal.3d 891, 896, fn. 4 [“[t]he expectation of privacy a person has
when he enters a restroom is reasonable”]; Britt v. Superior Court
of Santa Clara County (1962) 58 Cal.2d 469, 472
[“constitutionally protected right of personal privacy” extends to
public bathrooms].) What is more, reasonable people would find
a hidden camera recording their private bathroom activities to be
highly offensive.
       B.    Roy’s arguments
       Roy offers a plethora of arguments challenging the trial
court’s rulings. None of them has any merit.

                                9
              1.    Arguments applicable to both the invasion of
privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims
       Roy launches two groups of challenges at both claims.
       First and foremost, Roy asserts that the trial court’s
findings that plaintiffs were credible witnesses and he was not—
findings that underlie its ruling on both of plaintiffs’ claims—are
“rash, presumptuous, [and] speculative” and “based . . . on an
isolated bit of evidence” rather than the “whole record.” More
specifically, he makes three subsidiary assertions—namely, that
(1) the court “arbitrarily disregarded” Roy’s explanation that he
“accidentally” turned on the GoPro camera when he recorded
Jennifer and her husband in Kauai, and on appeal asks us to
reopen the record to consider his testimony in light of online
reports of how easy it is to accidentally turn on a GoPro camera;
(2) the court erred in not treating Michelle as “akin” to an
“accomplice as a matter of law,” such that her testimony cannot
be credited unless it was corroborated; and (3) the court misused
Evidence Code section 1101 in rejecting his testimony as not
credible because the court impermissibly used his accidental
placement of the camera in the Kauai condo bathroom as
evidence that he intentionally placed cameras in the other
bathrooms. These arguments border on the frivolous.
       As a general matter, the assessment of witness credibility
lies within the “‘“‘exclusive province’”’” of the trier of fact (People
v. Beck and Cruz (2019) 8 Cal.5th 548, 627), and we may
overturn a credibility finding only if the credited testimony was
“‘“physically impossible or inherently improbable”’” (People v.
Prunty (2015) 62 Cal.4th 59, 89 (conc. & dis. opn. of Cantil-
Sakauye, C. J.)). Applying this test, we have no basis to
disregard the trial court’s credibility finding regarding Michelle

                                  10
because her testimony was neither physically impossible nor
inherently improbable. We also have no basis to disregard the
trial court’s “no credibility” finding as to Roy because his
testimony was inherently improbable—he testified that
Michelle’s purpose in recording plaintiffs in the bathrooms
between 2010 and 2013 was to seek revenge for Roy’s decision to
divorce her in 2014; but unless Michelle had access to a time-
traveling DeLorean (which, as far as we know, is “physically
impossible”), this argument makes absolutely no sense.
       Roy’s subsidiary arguments do not alter our analysis.
       We decline to impeach the trial court’s credibility findings
on the basis of evidence that Roy elected not to present to that
court and to present to us for the first time. (Code Civ. Proc., §
909; City of Claremont v. Kruse (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1153,
1167 [noting reluctance to allow 13th hour attacks on the
evidence]; People v. Gonsalves (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 1, 12.)
       We also decline Roy’s invitation to apply the accomplice
doctrine. It is a creature of the criminal law (Pen. Code, § 1111
[convictions cannot be based “upon the testimony of an
accomplice,” or “one who is liable to prosecution for the identical
offense charged against the defendant,” without corroboration]);
importing this doctrine into the civil arena would enable any civil
party to accuse his opponent of the conduct at issue, thereby
requiring corroboration and thus effectively eviscerating the
usual rule that the testimony of a single witness will suffice in
civil cases. (Accord, Evid. Code, § 411 [except when otherwise
required by statute, evidence of one witness is sufficient to prove
a fact]; Vollaro v. Lispi (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 93, 102 [same];
Mazik v. Geico General Ins. Co. (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 455, 463,
fn. 2 [testimony of one witness can be sufficient to support

                                11
verdict].) What is more, this doctrine would not help Roy in this
case. Corroboration is an absolute requirement only if a person is
an accomplice “as a matter of law,” but a witness meets that
standard only “‘“‘when the facts regarding the witness’s criminal
culpability are “clear and undisputed”’”’” and thus “‘“‘“permits
only [the] single inference”’”’” that the witness is an accomplice.
(People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 606, quoting People v.
Riggs (2008) 44 Cal.4th 248, 312.) Where, as here, there is
contrary testimony about whether the witness completed the
crime, it is up to the trier of fact to decide whether the person is
an accomplice (and hence whether corroboration is required).
(People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 432;
People v. Sternberg (1896) 111 Cal. 3, 9; People v. Boyce (1980)
110 Cal.App.3d 726, 736.) Here, the trial court determined that
Michelle was not an accomplice, such that no corroboration would
have been required even if we accept Roy’s argument—and this is
true as to the substantive offense as well as to authentication of
the videos and photos.
       And we decline to give any weight to his argument based on
Evidence Code section 1101. That provision erects a general
prohibition against using one instance of a person’s conduct to
prove that person’s propensity to engage in such conduct and
thus prove he “did it again.” (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (a); People
v. Daveggio and Michaud (2018) 4 Cal.5th 790, 822-823.) But it
also has an express exception that allows a prior instance to be
used to prove that person’s intent and absence of mistake or
accident. (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (b).) Here, the trial court
rejected as not credible Roy’s testimony that he “accidentally”
turned on the camera in the Kauai condo bathroom, found that
Roy’s taping on that occasion was intentional and not accidental,

                                12
and then used that instance to prove that the other recordings
were also intentional and not accidental. This is entirely proper.
       Second, Roy argues that there is insufficient evidence that
plaintiffs suffered mental anguish (to support the invasion of
privacy claim) or severe emotional distress (to support the
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim). Specifically, he
argues that any anguish or distress they suffered is (1) too
speculative to be compensable because Roy did not ever intend to
disseminate his videos and photographs, (2) not related to
anything he did because one of the plaintiffs had pre-existing
anxiety, and (3) of insufficient severity because one of the
plaintiffs did not immediately seek therapy after learning of his
conduct. We are unpersuaded. What causes plaintiffs anguish
and distress is the very existence of the videos and photos,
plaintiffs’ feelings of being betrayed and violated, and their
inability to control how and when their nude images may be
circulated; their anguish and distress exists now, and is separate
from the additional anguish and distress that might be
occasioned should the videos and photos be disseminated more
widely. A tortfeasor takes his victim as he finds her; the
existence of any pre-existing trauma or distress is therefore
irrelevant. (See Golden v. Dungan (1971) 20 Cal.App.3d 295, 311
[tortfeasor “must take his victim as he finds [her]”]; People v.
Taylor (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 757, 764 [same].) And Roy’s
complaints that plaintiffs did not seek treatment for the anguish
and distress he inflicted in the manner in which he thinks is
appropriate is nothing more than a request that we reweigh the
evidence; that is an invitation we must decline. (Baral v. Schnitt
(2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384.)

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      2.     Arguments applicable only to the intentional infliction
of emotional distress
      With respect solely to the intentional infliction of emotional
distress claim, Roy argues there was insufficient evidence that he
acted in reckless disregard of the probability that his conduct
might cause plaintiffs emotional distress by giving little or no
thought to the probable consequences of that conduct. (Hughes,
supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 1050; KOVR-TV, supra, 31 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 1031-1032.) Specifically, Roy argues that there was
insufficient evidence that he acted recklessly because (1) he
created the videos and photos of plaintiffs in the bathroom as
part of a secret stash of self-produced pornography that was
never meant to see the light of day, such that dissemination—and
any resulting harm—would not be “probable”; and (2) his conduct
in creating his private stash had the “self-directed purpose of
secretly satisfying [his] own prurient interests,” such that it was
not directed at anyone but himself.
      These arguments lack merit.
      To begin, even if Roy did not intend the videos and photos
he created to become public, he testified that he knew that his
very act of bringing the videos and photos into existence by
“secretly videotap[ing] or photograph[ing]” plaintiffs “in the
nude” “could be emotionally distressing,” and gave that
consequence little or no thought since he did it anyway. Further,
we can reasonably infer that Roy knew that computers can be
hacked and that photos and videos intended to be private can
sometimes be disseminated: Roy admitted that he did nothing to
safeguard the recordings; although he blamed it on Michelle, he
never used any passwords or other protection on his computer,
and he was aware that “anybody coming through the house could

                                14
have access[ed]” the hard drives. Indeed, the very fact Michelle
was able to access the videos and photos shows that their
dissemination was not just a possibility, but a probable
eventuality.
       Next, Roy is correct that a defendant may be held liable for
intentional infliction of emotional distress only if he engages in
“‘conduct directed at the plaintiff, or [that] occur[s] in the
presence of a plaintiff of whom the defendant is aware.’” (Potter,
supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 1002.) This rule was fashioned to account
for situations in which a defendant’s conduct has an effect on an
unanticipated third party, such as when a mortuary’s reckless
treatment of remains of the deceased causes emotional distress to
the deceased’s surviving family. (E.g., Christensen, supra, 54
Cal.3d at pp. 903-906.) But Roy is incorrect, however, that the
rule applies here. We reject his self-serving proclamation that
his conduct in creating a secret stash of pornography was
directed at himself. That may have been his motive, but his
conduct was most assuredly directed at plaintiffs whom he
videotaped and photographed in the bathroom.
 II. Excessive Damages7
       Whether a damages award is “excessive” turns on whether
substantial evidence supports the amount that was awarded. As
noted above, our substantial evidence review is limited: We ask
only whether the amount awarded is supported by the record

7      Plaintiffs urge that Roy has forfeited his right to challenge
the excessiveness of damages by not raising it a motion for new
trial. Roy responds that his challenge is cognizable because it is
based more on questions of law than disputed factual issues. We
will sidestep this debate, as our analysis of the merits shows
Roy’s challenge to be without merit.

                                 15
viewed in the light most supportive of that award. (Garcia v.
Myllyla (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 990, 999-1000; Major v. Western
Home Ins. Co. (2009) 169 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1208.) Indeed, our
review of emotional distress damages is even more deferential
because, by definition, “there is no fixed or absolute standard by
which to compute the monetary value” of this “extremely
subjective and individualistic” form of damages. (Merlo v.
Standard Life & Accident Ins. Co. (1976) 59 Cal.App.3d 5, 17;
Regan Roofing Co. v. Superior Court (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1685,
1707-1708.)
       Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s award of
$350,000 for Jennifer and $250,000 in damages for each of
Michelle’s friends. Each plaintiff testified that she felt extreme
“betrayal of trust” and felt “violated” upon learning that Roy, a
close friend or family member, had secretly recorded her most
private moments. Each plaintiff testified that this knowledge has
forever changed how she interacts with the world—she is “on
edge” in public bathrooms and changing rooms and continues to
check “odd hole[s],” “vents,” and “air returns” in public places for
cameras. And each plaintiff testified that, because digital images
are nearly impossible to un-make once made, her anxiety about
future dissemination of those images can never be “take[n] . . .
away.” Two of the plaintiffs further indicated that they are
afraid that dissemination of those images would impact their
careers.
       Roy marshals two arguments in response.
       First, he argues that the damages amounts are excessive
because plaintiffs’ counsel “inflamed the court” by (1)
“improperly” discussing a now-expunged misdemeanor conviction
Roy suffered for possessing some of the videos and photos found

                                16
on his hard drives; and (2) invoking a theme, in closing
argument, that “justice” and “fair[ness]” warrant holding Roy
responsible for his conduct. These arguments lack merit.
Although Roy and plaintiffs litigated whether Roy’s conviction
was admissible, the trial court ultimately ruled that it was not
and reported that it was not considering it.8 Contrary to what
Roy asserts on appeal, neither plaintiffs’ attorneys nor their
witnesses violated the court’s ruling by thereafter discussing the
conviction: Twors testified only that she tried to find out whether
she would be “included” in a California criminal case (but made
no mention of the outcome of that case), and that she filed an
unsuccessful criminal complaint in Las Vegas; Kumalo testified
that she attempted unsuccessfully to file a criminal complaint in
Canada; and Jennifer testified that she tried unsuccessfully to
pursue criminal charges in Hawaii and Louisiana. And plaintiffs’
thematic closing argument does not call into question the trial
court’s ruling on admissibility or its impartiality.
       Second, Roy argues that the damages award was excessive
because it was “so grossly disproportionate” to plaintiffs’ injuries
that it “‘shocks the conscience and suggests passion, prejudice or
corruption’” on the part of the trial court. In particular, Roy
argues that the awarded amounts are too high because one
plaintiff did not seek formal therapy, another did not present
sufficient evidence that she actually spoke to or paid her

8     Roy accuses plaintiffs of mentioning the conviction in their
complaint and trial brief to “blast the court with every shred of
inadmissible and prejudicial evidence that [they] so wanted,” but
these documents were filed before the trial court issued its ruling
excluding the conviction and thus could not have themselves
violated that ruling.

                                17
therapist, and the third waited too long before seeking therapy.
These facts do not call into question the reasonableness of the
awards. Awards of $250,000 and $350,000 do not shock the
conscience when assessed against the trauma of being secretly
recorded by a trusted friend and family member while engaging
in the most private activities in a bathroom, the very “epitome of
a private place.” (M.H., supra, 1 Cal.App.5th at p. 706.)
                          DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed. Plaintiffs are entitled to their
costs on appeal.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

                                      ______________________, J.
                                      HOFFSTADT
We concur:

_________________________, Acting P. J.
ASHMANN-GERST

_________________________, J.*
KWAN

*     Judge of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of
the California Constitution.

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