Court Opinion

ID: 9542860
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:39:33.219498+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:09:06.964303
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE MILLS, dissenting: A valid arrest. I quarrel not with the law cited by the majority, but we most assuredly part ways when it comes to applying that law to the factual backdrop of this case. Here, Gabbard was walking alone on a U.S. highway, and the policy of the Illinois State Police is to investigate everyone who is found walking along a public thoroughfare of this nature. At the time of the apprehension, there existed a dispatch circulated out of both the Springfield and Pontiac State Police District Headquarters for a Federal prisoner-escapee, who was believed to be on Peoria Road just north of Springfield, or on 1-55 north of Springfield. Now — with these elements in mind — Trooper Acup investigates Gabbard, who says he’s going to Springfield but that he had just come from Springfield and says that the only identification he had was a checkbook. When the checkbook is opened and shown to the trooper, Acup sees an Illinois driver’s license in the corner of the checkbook. Acup then asks if Gabbard has any further identification. The defendant says, “No,” folds the checkbook up and puts it back into the bag that he is carrying. He is then placed under arrest. I find probable cause. The majority has become bogged down in a morass of details — height, weight, scars, eyes, hair, pants, jacket, what he was carrying, etc. The fact still remains that there was a common similarity between the description broadcasted in the dispatch and the general appearance of the defendant. And I cannot justify throwing out an arrest simply because the officer may not have looked for a scar on the left ring finger of the subject. There are innumerable instances where insufficient time and opportunity is afforded police officers to stop and take an inventory, or consult a checklist, or study and compare, or to ascertain if there is exactness in all of the minutiae of a description. And to require such action by law enforcement officers would do severe violence to common sense. In People v. Robinson (1976), 82 Ill. 2d 273, 276-77, 342 N.E.2d 356, 358, the Illinois Supreme Court said: “In considering whether probable cause existed, we stated in People v. Clay, 55 Ill. 2d 501, 504-05, ‘Whether or not probable cause for an arrest exists in a particular case depends upon the totality of the facts and circumstances known to the officers when the arrest was made. [Citations.] In deciding the question of probable cause in a particular case the courts deal with probabilities and are not disposed to be unduly technical. These probabilities are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable men, not legal technicians, act. Draper v. United States, 385 U.S. 307, 3 L. Ed. 2d 327, 79 S. Ct. 329; People v. Fiorito, 19 Ill. 2d 246.’ Also it is proper to recognize in judging whether there was probable cause that ‘[pjolice officers often must act upon a quick appraisal of the data before them, and the reasonableness of their conduct must be judged on the basis of their responsibility to prevent crime and to catch criminals.’ People v. Watkins, 19 Ill. 2d 11, 19.” And as the trial judge observed in this case — when he found probable cause and denied the motion to quash and suppress — we must recognize that when the police officers ° * are in the field they do not have time to review all the cases on reasonable search and seizure. They have to work from the so-called pits.” In short, considering the totality of the circumstances here, I believe: that there was probable cause that Gabbard had committed a crime; that the motion to quash and suppress was properly denied; that Gabbard was convicted after a fair trial; that he was properly sentenced to 20-40 years’ imprisonment; that he should be serving that sentence right now; and that this appeal should be affirmed. I dissent.