Court Opinion

ID: 9679208
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:44:34.394732+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:11.050850
License: Public Domain

MAJORITY OPINION ON REHEARING
ADELE HEDGES, Chief Justice.
We grant the motion for rehearing filed by appellants W & F Transportation, Inc., E.H. Wilhelm, Sr., and Margaret Wilhelm (collectively “appellants”). On rehearing, we hold that Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 34.6(c) and the precedent governing partial records does not apply in this ease, where the only omission from the record is (1) the nonevidentiary argument of counsel, (2) which was not recorded pursuant to the parties’ agreement to dismiss the court reporter, (3) where neither party has assigned error arising from counsel’s argument or otherwise suggested that those arguments are relevant to our analysis. We accordingly review the issues appellants have raised on appeal.
In eleven issues, appellants appeal a jury verdict awarding appellees Cindy and Ricky Wilhelm (“Cindy and Ricky” or “ap-pellees”) actual and punitive damages in the amount of $33,773.39, plus attorney’s fees, postjudgment interest, and costs. After reviewing appellants’ issues, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and render judgment dismissing the claims against E.H. Wilhelm, Sr. and Margaret Wilhelm. The opinion issued in this case on March 24, 2005 is withdrawn, and the following opinion is issued in its place.
I. Reheaking of Application of Rule 34.6(c)
In the opinion first issued in this case, we held that appellant’s failure to comply with Rule 34.6(c) in a case where the parties agreed not to record closing arguments waived appellants’ right to appeal. The opinion states:
Because appellants did not request a partial reporter’s record under this rule [34.6(c) ], and because we do not have a record of the closing arguments at trial, we must presume the omitted portion of the record is both relevant to the disposition of this appeal and that it supports the trial court’s judgment. Because we are unable to conduct a harm analysis without a record of the closing arguments, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
W & F Trans., Inc. v. Wilhelm, No. 14-03-00103-CV (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 23, 2004, no pet. h.) (mem.op.). This holding focused on compliance with Rule 34.6(c); in the absence of compliance with that rule, we applied the common law presumption that omitted portions of the record are both relevant to and support the judgment on appeal (hereinafter “common law presumption”). Appellants filed a motion for rehearing and rehearing en banc challenging this holding.1
*36On rehearing, we hold that appellants were not required to comply with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 34.6(c) in order to avoid the application of the common law presumption and thus preserve their right to appellate review.
A. The Proceedings in the Trial Court
The procedural issue in this case arises from a relatively innocuous agreement to dismiss the court reporter at the trial court’s suggestion after the close of the evidence. Apparently, the court’s customary court reporter was absent, and a deputy court reporter was working in her stead. This court reporter attended all of the evidentiary portions of the trial but was dismissed by the parties just prior to closing argument. She recorded all of the testimony introduced at trial and included all of the trial exhibits, and these materials have been included in the record on appeal. She also recorded the charge conference and the objections to the charge. It is not clear from the record whether the parties engaged in voir dire or opening statements; if they did, the court reporter did not record these portions of the trial either.
After the evidence closed and the court charged the jury, the trial judge asked counsel whether the court reporter could be dismissed prior to closing argument. Both parties agreed:
Court: At this time I will now turn the case over to the lawyers for their closing arguments. Can we release the court reporter at this time?
Mr. Bradie: Yes, your Honor.
Mr. Ferebee: Yes, your Honor.
The parties thereafter offered closing arguments off of the record.
The jury returned a verdict. Appellants moved for a new trial and ultimately filed a notice of appeal. Appellants raised several arguments relating to the court’s charge, the sufficiency of the evidence introduced at trial, and the judgment. Appellants have raised no issue relating to closing arguments, and appellees have not indicated that the content of closing argument is relevant to any of appellants’ issues.2
B. Agreed Nonevidentiary Omissions Pursuant to Rule 13.1(a)
We believe that this case is governed by Michiana Easy Livin’ Country, Inc. v. Holten, 168 S.W.3d 777, 782 (Tex.2005), in which the Texas Supreme Court held that a reporter’s record of a pretrial hearing is necessary for the appeal only if the hearing being challenged on appeal is evidentiary. In Holten, the court refused to apply the common law presumption that an unrecorded pretrial hearing supported the judgment on appeal. Id. The court explained that the clear intent of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 34.1 is to require a reporter’s record only where one is “necessary to the appeal.” Id. (citing Tex.R.App. P. 34.1). The court held that refusing to presume that all unrecorded hearings support the judgment on appeal avoids the inefficient circumstance of requiring parties to record everything in order to show nothing relevant occurred. Id.
As the court explained, if a pretrial hearing is “nonevidentiary” and is instead merely the argument of counsel, the common law presumption should not apply:
What is clear is that a reporter’s record is required only if evidence is introduced in open court; for nonevidentiary hearings, it is superfluous.
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[R]equir[ing] every hearing to be recorded — whether evidentiary (to show what was presented) or not (to show nothing was) [would be] wasteful, [and] would frustrate the intent of our appellate rule requiring a reporter’s record only “if necessary to the appeal.”
Id. (quoting Tex.R.App. P. 34.1). The court accordingly refused to “presume that evidence was presented that supported] the trial court’s order.” Id. at 781.
Holten’s ruling and rationale are persuasive in this case, which like Holten, involves a record omission of counsel’s arguments that is indisputably nonevidentiary.3 Otherwise, the reporter’s record before us is complete and contains all of the evidence introduced at trial.4 That record contains all of the witness testimony heard at trial and all of the exhibits that the parties introduced into evidence. Under these circumstances, we are not willing to dismiss the appeal by applying the presumption that unrecorded nonevidentiary portions of trial such as closing argument support the judgment on appeal.
The fact that Holten addressed a pretrial hearing instead of a trial does not change our analysis. Pretrial hearings, such as the hearing held on personal jurisdiction in Holten, can be and often are dispositive. Indeed, pretrial hearings commonly concern matters, such as subject matter jurisdiction, that are essential to a court’s power to act. See, e.g., Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex.2004) (advising early resolution of jurisdictional disputes). Nevertheless, the supreme court has held that these hearings do not need to be recorded and included in the record on appeal unless they are evidentiary. In Holten, the court stated that if “only arguments by counsel are presented in open court,” a reporter’s record of the proceeding is not needed. 168 S.W.3d at 782. We see no basis for treating the arguments of counsel that occur at trial after the evidence has closed any differently.
Rule 13.1 requires court reporters to “make a full record of the proceedings” unless “excused by agreement of the parties.” Tex.R.App. P. 13.1(a). As the court stated in Holten, because Rule 13.1 permits parties to dismiss the court reporter by agreement, it “implies an agreement that no record was made because none was needed.” 168 S.W.3d at 782. In this case, we believe that no record was made because both parties agreed that none was needed. We will not now penalize appellants for making this agreement.
C. The Common Law Presumption and Rule 34.6(c)
Historically, “[t]he burden [has been] on the appellant to see that a sufficient record [is] presented to show error requiring reversal.” See Christiansen v. Prezelski, 782 S.W.2d 842, 843 (Tex.1990) (citing former Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 50(d)). As a corollary to Rule 50(d), courts applied the common law presumption that whatever was omitted from the record was relevant to and supported the judgment on appeal.5 As one court explained, “[i]t is *38the appellant who has the burden of bringing forward a statement of facts. Unless the record [on appeal] shows to the contrary, every reasonable presumption must be indulged in favor of the findings and judgment of the trial court.” Wright v. Wright, 699 S.W.2d 620, 622 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1985, writ ref d n.r.e.).
Rule 34.6(c) was developed in order to avoid the common law presumption. See Schafer v. Conner, 813 S.W.2d 154, 155 (Tex.1991); Christiansen, 782 S.W.2d at 843. The rule specifies a set of procedures that apply when “the appellant requests a partial reporter’s record.” Tex.R.App. P. 34.6(c)(1). In relevant part, Rule 34.6(c)(1) provides:
(1) Effect on Appellate Points or Issues. If the appellant requests a partial reporter’s record, the appellant must include in the request a statement of the points or issues to be presented on appeal and will then be limited to those points or issues.
(2) Other Parties May Designate Additions. Any other party may designate additional exhibits and portions of the testimony to be included in the reporter’s record.
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(4) Presumptions. The appellate court must presume that the partial reporter’s record designated by the parties constitutes the entire record for purposes of reviewing the stated points or issues.
Tex.R.App. P. 34.6(c)(1)-(2), (4). The rule mandates a codified presumption—“that the partial reporter’s record ... constitutes the entire record”—to replace the common law presumption.
The purpose of Rule 34.6(c) is to protect an appellee from having to defend an appeal without parts of the record that support its defense. The statement of points or issues mandated by Rule 34.6(c) gives an appellee notice of the issues to be appealed, so that it can designate additional portions of the record that may be necessary for its case. “Compliance with the rule ... affords the opposing party an opportunity to designate additional material to be included in the statement of facts which it deems relevant to the issues on appeal, as defined by appellant.” Superior Packing, Inc. v. Worldwide Leasing & Fin., Inc., 880 S.W.2d 67, 70 (TexApp.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied). “Absent such a specific statement [of points or issues], the Appellee is left to guess which additional portions of the evidence should be included in the statement of facts.” Gardner v. Baker & Botts, L.L.P., 6 S.W.3d 295, 296-98 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. denied).
Non-compliance with Rule 34.6 and application of the common law presumption ordinarily has the practical effect of destroying an appellant’s right to appeal. “The application of this presumption often triggers very severe consequences.” Middleton v. Nat’l Family Care Life Ins. Co., No. 14-04-00428-CV, 2006 WL 89503, at *2 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 17, 2006, no pet. h.) (mem.op.); see also Superior Packing, 880 S.W.2d at 70 (“Over the years, limiting the record on appeal has become hypertechnical, risky, and a close encounter with malpractice. This is because of the disastrous consequences which result if an appellant does not follow the procedures explicit and implicit within the rule.” (citations omitted)).
*39Courts, including this one, routinely apply the common law presumption when an appellant has filed a partial record but has failed to give the appellee notice of the points and issues to be appealed in compliance with Rule 34.6(c). See Mason v. Our Lady Star of the Sea Catholic Church, 154 S.W.3d 816, 818 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.); Coleman v. Carpentier, 132 S.W.3d 108, 111 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2004, no pet.); Superior Packing, 880 S.W.2d at 70. Applying the common law presumption as a sanction is appropriate in these cases, because in each, the appellant omitted from the record evidence introduced at trial, potentially prejudicing the appellee in defending the issues on appeal. See, e.g., Mason, 154 S.W.3d at 820 (discussing inadequacy of notice of appellate issues that an appellant filed “four months after appellees’ briefing had been completed”). It is not fair to let an appellant create a record containing only the portions of the evidence and transcript that support its arguments. Employing the common law presumption to require an appellant to either designate a complete record or provide notice of the issues it intends to appeal guards against this possibility.
The Texas Supreme Court, however, has rejected an approach of “strict compliance” with Rule 34.6 in order to avoid the effect of the common law presumption. See Bennett v. Cochran, 96 S.W.3d 227, 229 (Tex.2003) (evaluating compliance with rule in terms of whether the appellee had been prejudiced). While acknowledging that the statement of points and issues remained necessary under the rule, the court approved a statement that had been filed two months late, holding:
Here, the objective behind Rule 34.6(c)(1) was fully served. [Appellee] does not allege that he was deprived of an opportunity to designate additional portions of the reporter’s record, nor does he assert that [appellant’s] delay otherwise prejudiced the preparation or presentation of his case. Under these circumstances, we hold that Rule 34.6 does not preclude appellate review of [appellant’s] legal and factual sufficiency issues.
Id. at 230. The court “reiterated [the] commitment to ensuring that courts do not unfairly apply the rules of appellate procedure to avoid addressing a party’s meritorious claim” and refused to apply the common law presumption. Id. at 229.
D. Rule 34.6(c) Does Not Apply In This Case.
Compliance with Rule 34.6(c) was unnecessary and would have served no purpose in this case. Because the material had been omitted by the agreement of both parties, appellees did not need notice of the points and issues on appeal or an opportunity to designate omitted parts of the record. See id. Even if appellants had provided notice of the points and issues as mandated by the rule, appellees could not have responded with a counter-designation. The omitted material simply did not exist to be included in the record because the trial court had dismissed the court reporter. This situation differs markedly from that contemplated by Rule 34.6(c), in which one party designates and submits only certain portions of an existing reporter’s record when considering the issues it will appeal.
The reality of this case is that appellants requested that all of the existing reporter’s record be included in the record on appeal. Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 34.6(a)(1) defines the reporter’s record, providing that “[i]f the proceedings were stenographieally recorded, the reporter’s record consists of the court reporter’s transcription of so much of the proceedings, and any of the exhibits, that *40the parties to the appeal designate.” The entire record that the deputy court reporter transcribed is before this court. That record contains all of the witness testimony heard at trial and all of the exhibits that the parties introduced into evidence. It contains a transcription of the charge conference and the parties’ objections to the jury charge. Under these circumstances, it was not necessary for appellants to comply with Rule 34.6(c)’s provisions governing “partial records.” See, e.g., 3519 McKinney, Inc. v. Sheets, No. 05-95-00044-CV, 1996 WL 14080, at *3 (Tex.App.-Dallas Jan.2, 1996, no writ) (not designated for publication) (“What constitutes a ‘partial statement of facts’ [under Rule 34.6(c)’s predecessor, Rule 53(d) ] is not defined in the rules.”).
We are not aware of any cases requiring compliance with Rule 34.6, or applying the common law presumption, when the only omission from the record is nonevidentia-ry.6 To the contrary, other courts have refused to apply the common law presumption when a party failed to comply with Rule 34.6(c) but omitted a nonevidentiary portion of the reporter’s record. In Tovar v. Mazza, No. 04-98-00387-CV, 1999 WL 174064, at *2 (Tex.App.-San Antonio Mar.31, 1999, no pet.) (not designated for publication), for example, the court distinguished between nonevidentiary omissions such as voir dire and closing argument and evidentiary omissions such as exhibits, stating that “[bjecause the [non-recorded] voir dire and closing statements are not evidence, it is doubtful they would have added anything to our decision.” The court declined to presume that the nonevi-dentiary portions of the record supported the judgment. Id.; see also Sheets, 1996 WL 14080, at *1-2 (declining to presume that omitted voir dire, opening statements, and closing arguments supported judgment where “no evidence was omitted in this case”); John Hill Cayce, Jr. & Anne Gardner, Civil Appeals in Texas: Practicing Under the New Rules of Appellate Procedure, 49 BayloR L.Rev. 867, 924 & n. 377 (1997) (“Voir dire and jury argument may be safely omitted from the request [for a reporter’s record] if unchallenged on appeal.”).
E. The Common Law Presumption Should Not Be Applied.
We will not apply the common law presumption that closing argument, omitted from the record because it was not recorded by agreement of the parties, is relevant to and supports the judgment on appeal. Holten compels this result, see 168 S.W.3d at 783, which is also consistent with the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Tex.R.App. P. 13.1(a) & 34.1. *41Moreover, this holding is the only way to honor the Texas Supreme Court’s admonition to interpret the rules in a manner that preserves a court’s ability to review the merits of a party’s claim. See Bennett, 96 S.W.3d at 229; Schafer, 813 S.W.2d at 155 (disapproving “hypertechnical” interpretation of Rule 53(d)). As the court stated in Holten, “[o]ur appellate rules are designed to resolve appeals on the merits, and we must interpret and apply them whenever possible to achieve that aim.” 168 S.W.3d at 784.
Contrary to the dissent’s discussion, we do not believe that Rule 34.6(c) and the precedent developed when a party fails to comply with that rule are controlling in this case.7 For the reasons we have discussed, Rule 34.6(c) does not contemplate the circumstance where the parties have agreed to dismiss the court reporter. Moreover, the rule does not provide a remedy for addressing parts of the proceedings that were not recorded. Although the dissent seems to agree on rehearing that Rule 34.6(c) does not apply to this case, the dissent continues to rely on precedent developed under that rule, which applies the common law presumption when a party has failed to comply with Rule 34.6(c)’s requisites.
The primary problem with the dissent’s approach is that it threatens to establish a precedent essentially preventing parties from ever agreeing not to record a nonevi-dentiary portion of trial. The dissent would hold that any nonevidentiary omission from the reporter’s record must be presumed to support the judgment, because it is possible that counsel invited the argument of which he complains on appeal.8 This approach would have the practical effect of denying an appellant the right to an appeal merely for agreeing that the court reporter need not record every aspect of trial proceedings.
This approach is neither fair nor efficient, and it ignores certain express provisions of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. Our appellate rules give the parties a measure of control over the contents of the reporter’s record. For example, only the clerk’s record is essential to the appeal; the reporter’s record need only be included in the appellate record “if necessary to the appeal.” Tex. R.App. P. 34.1. The dissent’s approach ignores this particular provision, essentially holding that a record of everything that occurred at trial must be recorded and produced to preserve a party’s rights on appeal.
The dissent’s approach also compromises the flexibility apparent in the rules. The appellate rules provide many mechanisms for the parties to create the record on appeal. The record may be the product of the parties’ agreement, or it may consist of an agreed statement of the case in lieu of a record. Tex.R.App. P. 34.2 & 34.3. Any inaccuracies in the reporter’s record may be corrected by agreement of the parties or referred to the trial court for resolution. Tex.R.App. P. 34.6(e). Finally, as occurred in this case, pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 13.1(a), the court reporter may be “excused by agreement of the parties” from recording every aspect of the proceedings.9 The dissent’s *42approach undermines this provision by threatening the complete loss of appellate rights.10
The dissent’s approach would also foster unfairness. As a practical matter, when both parties agree not to record the argument of counsel, it is not fair to later deprive one party of its right to appellate review. Fairness is implicated because the rules do not warn that a waiver of appellate rights may occur if a party agrees to dismiss the court reporter under Rule 13.1(a). In this case, for example, if appellants had imagined that a summary dismissal awaited them on appeal, they certainly never would have agreed that the deputy court reporter could leave after the close of the evidence. In addition, although we do not suggest impure motives on the part of appellees in this case, the dissent’s approach would invite a party to “game the system” by agreeing with a hapless opponent to forgo a reporter’s record of nonevidentiary proceedings, knowing full well that the omission would guarantee affirmance on appeal.
This is not the result contemplated by the current rules. See Tex.R.App. P. 13.1(a). It also fails to reflect the reality of modern trial practice. In some cases, for example, it is judicially efficient to forgo recording of nonevidentiary proceedings such as discussions with the court or voir dire of prospective jurors. Under the dissent’s ruling, a party could no longer follow this practice with any confidence that the agreement would not later be used to the party’s detriment.
We do not agree that it is necessary for the court of appeals to be able to access and review everything that occurred at trial. This is not how our adversarial system is organized. Our legal system is premised upon finding truth through the adversarial process. When one party omits something relevant from the record or from argument, we rely on the other party to point out the omission. We address problems arising from trial under a system of assigned error; as an appellate court, we do not scour the record to look for problems to which the parties have not directed our attention. See Pat Baker Co., Inc. v. Wilson, 971 S.W.2d 447, 450 (Tex. 1998) (“It is axiomatic that an appellate court cannot reverse a trial court’s judgment absent properly assigned error.”).
*43We do not believe that permitting the parties to agree to waive the transcription of nonevidentiary portions of trial threatens an appellate court’s power to render accurate decisions. Parties have every incentive to preserve their rights to appeal by recording any part of the proceedings that may influence the outcome of trial or provide a basis for establishing appellate error. It is therefore unlikely that parties will fail to record proceedings that they may later need to use.
Contrary to Holten, the dissent would require the appellant to produce a record of counsel’s argument in order to establish on appeal that he never invited the error of which he now complains. See Holten, 168 S.W.3d at 782 (requiring recording “would encumber thousands of routine hearings by requiring formal proof that no proof was offered”). We decline to endorse such an approach. In light of the flexibility apparent in the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure and the Texas Supreme Court’s admonition to “interpret and apply them whenever possible” to achieve the aim of “resolv[ing] appeals on the merits,” id. at 784, we will not presume that closing arguments are relevant to and support the judgment on appeal. Accordingly, we will review the merits of the claims that appellants raise on appeal.
II. Background
This case arises from business dealings between Cindy and Ricky Wilhelm, and Ricky’s father and stepmother, E.H. and Margaret Wilhelm. Cindy and Ricky first sued W & F Transportation, Inc., and then later amended their pleadings to add E.H. and Margaret as “individuals doing business as W & F Transportation.”
Cindy and Ricky asserted claims for fraudulent inducement, fraud, identity theft, and breach of contract against all three defendants. The case was tried to a jury, and over objection, the court submitted a charge that did not name any one of the individual defendants, but merely inquired into the liability of ‘W & F Transportation,” an entity that was not defined. The jury found that “W & F Transportation” breached the contract and committed fraud and identity theft, and awarded damages to Cindy and Ricky. Based on the jury’s verdict, the trial court entered judgment that Cindy and Ricky recover $33,773.39 in damages; $58,095.00 in attorney’s fees; plus interest and costs from W & F Transportation, Inc., E.H. Wilhelm, Sr., and Margaret Wilhelm, jointly and severally.
III. Issues for Review
In attempting to overturn this judgment, Appellants present the following issues for appellate review:
(1) Did the trial court err by submitting jury questions 1-5 because they are ambiguous?
(2) Did the trial court err by submitting jury questions 1-5 because they assume defendants are jointly and severally hable for one another’s actions?
(3) Did the trial court err in rendering judgment against E.H. and Margaret because there was no jury question regarding their liability?
(4) Did the trial court err in rendering judgment because the judgment does not conform to the jury’s verdict given that there was no liability question submitted for any one of the defendants?
(5) Did the trial court err in awarding judgment because Cindy and Ricky did not plead alter ego?
(6) Did the trial court err in rendering judgment against E.H. and Margaret under article 2.21 of the Texas Business Corporation Act?
*44(7) Did the trial court err by awarding punitive damages because Cindy and Ricky recovered no actual tort damages?
(8) Did the trial court err in submitting question 6 to the jury because there is no causal connection between question 6 on damages and question 2 on liability?
(9) Did the trial court err in rendering judgment against Margaret because there is no evidence as to her liability on any claim?
(10) Did the trial court err in denying the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict because there is no evidence of fraudulent intent?
(11) If Cindy and Ricky are arguing a partnership theory, then did the trial court err in rendering judgment based on a partnership because there is no evidence of a partnership?
We sustain issue three. We also sustain issue four with respect to E.H. Wilhelm, Sr. and Margaret Wilhelm, but overrule issue four with respect to W & F Transportation, Inc. Because of our disposition of issue four, it is not necessary to address issues one, two, five, six, nine, and eleven. We overrule issues seven, eight, and ten.
IV. Liability Findings
Appellants complain that the judgment imposing liability on E.H., Margaret, and W & F Transportation, Inc. is erroneous as to each defendant because appellees did not submit separate liability questions as to each of the three defendants. The jury charge in this case inquired only as to the liability of “W & F Transportation.” The jury charge neither defined the term ‘W & F Transportation” nor separately inquired about the liability of either E.H. or Margaret, individually, or “W & F Transportation, Inc.” Instead, the jury answered questions only with regard to the liability of “W & F Transportation.”
Specifically, the jury found that (1) “W & F Transportation fail[ed] to comply with the lease agreement that they entered into,” (2) “W & F Transportation committed] fraud against Ricky and Cindy Wilhelm,” (3) “W & F Transportation wrongfully [took] Ricky and Cindy Wilhelm’s identity,” and (4) exemplary damages “should be assessed against W & F Transportation,” considering among other things “[t]he degree of culpability of W & F Transportation.” E.H. and Margaret are not mentioned in the charge, and neither is “W & F Transportation, Inc.” The question presented by this appeal is to which defendant, if any, do the jury findings as to “W & F Transportation” refer.
When reviewing jury findings we must try to interpret the finding in a manner that supports the judgment. See First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Sharp, 359 S.W.2d 902, 903 (Tex.1962); see also Rice Food Mkts., Inc. v. Ramirez, 59 S.W.3d 726, 733-34 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2001, no pet.). To do so, we may examine the record in order to ascertain the jury’s intent. Carter v. Lee, 502 S.W.2d 925, 929 (Tex.Civ.App.-Beaumont 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see also Bender v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 600 S.W.2d 257, 260 (Tex.1980) (apparent conflicts in jury answers must be reconciled if reasonably possible in light of the pleadings and evidence, the manner of submission, and the other findings considered as a whole). We may not, however, speculate about what the jury intended in reaching a particular verdict or create certainty out of jury findings that are ambiguous. See Carter, 502 S.W.2d at 929 (“we cannot arrive at a conclusion with the certainty required of us”).
Applying these principles in this case, it is clear to us that the jury’s findings as to “W & F Transportation” re*45ferred to W & F Transportation, Inc. Here, most of the documents in the record refer only to “W & F Transportation,” not to “W & F Transportation, Inc.” In addition, counsel for the parties and all of the witnesses referred to the corporate entity simply as “W & F Transportation.” This is true even though the trial testimony established that W & F Transportation had been incorporated since 1996. Under these circumstances, there is no real question that the jury intended at a minimum to impose liability on W & F Transportation, Inc. We accordingly hold that the judgment is proper as to W & F Transportation, Inc.11
We do not believe, however, that the term “W & F Transportation” can properly be understood to refer as well to E.H. and Margaret individually, along with also referring to the incorporated company. Appellees, as the parties seeking the liability finding, had the obligation to submit jury questions as to each individual defendant.12 See, e.g., Stewart & Stevenson Sens., Inc. v. Sen-Tech, Inc., 879 S.W.2d 89, 100-01 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied) (holding that in establishing liability, “it is the duty of the plaintiff to submit separate jury findings on damages” and it was error for damages issues not to be “separated as to defendant”). Individual questions were particularly important considering the elements of the various claims in this case. Appellees were pursuing claims such as fraud and also seeking exemplary damages. See St. Gelais v. Jackson, 769 S.W.2d 249, 260 (TexApp.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no writ) (“Texas courts have long recognized the propriety of separate findings regarding the amount of exemplary damages, if any, to be assessed against each defendant.”).
Appellees failed to submit individual questions, however, proceeding to verdict with a charge that inquired only into the liability of “W & F Transportation.” On appeal, appellees maintain that findings as to each defendant were unnecessary because of a 1992 assumed name certificate. See, e.g., A to Z Rental Ctr. v. Burris, 714 S.W.2d 438, 436 (TexApp.-Austin 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding that individuals doing business as an unincorporated entity are liable for the entity’s obligations); see also Salyers v. Tex. Workers’ Comp. Ins. Fund, No. 03-03-00011-CV, 2003 WL 22024670, at *2 (Tex.App.-Austin Aug. 29, 2003, pet. denied) (mem.op.) (“Because they do not enjoy the protection of corporate status, individuals who do business as *46an unincorporated entity are personally liable for the entity’s obligations.”); Old Republic Ins. Co. v. EX-IM Servs. Corp., 920 S.W.2d 393, 396 (Tex.3App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no writ) (“When an individual is doing business under an assumed name, a judgment rendered against the unincorporated association is binding on the individual.”). We disagree.
The assumed name certificate does not override the need for separate findings as to the individual defendants in this case. Here, the evidence at trial established that W & F Transportation had been incorporated in 1996 and was thus incorporated at all times relevant to this lawsuit, which centers upon a dispute beginning in 2000. Two witnesses testified to W & F Transportation’s incorporation, the 1996 certificate of incorporation was introduced into evidence, and there is no question that Cindy and Ricky were aware that W & F Transportation was incorporated.13 In light of this, the assumed name certificate does not necessarily establish the individual liability of E.H. and Margaret. See Negrini v. Plus Two Advertising, Inc., 695 S.W.2d 624, 631 (TexApp.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, no writ) (holding that an assumed name certificate did not provide a basis for establishing individual liability after an entity became incorporated). An assumed name certificate demonstrating how an entity may have operated in the past does not establish the liability for an indeterminate time in the future, even if it is misleading. See, e.g., Bailey v. Vanscot Concrete Co., 894 S.W.2d 757, 759 (Tex.1995) (“there is no authority for imposing tort liability on a party due to its failure to withdraw a misleading assumed name certificate”). The 1992 assumed name certificate has little significance considering the fact that W & F Transportation, Inc. became incorporated long before the parties in this case began the transactions at issue here.
Appellees also argue that E.H. and Margaret are precluded from objecting to individual liability because they failed to file a verified denial under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 93(14).14 This rule requires a verified denial “[t]hat a party plaintiff or defendant is not doing business under an assumed name or trade name as alleged.” Tex.R. Civ. P. 93(14); see also Rhodes v. City of Austin, 584 S.W.2d 917, 924 (Tex.Civ.App.-Tyler 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding failure to deny allegation that individual was doing business under an assumed name meant that this allegation was not in issue). E.H. and Margaret did, however, file verified denials under Rule 93(2), alleging that they were not liable in the capacity in which they had been sued. The pleading that E.H. and Margaret filed is not defective because it is clear that E.H. and Margaret were relying on the W & F Transportation’s corporate form to shield them from individual liabilit*47y.15
Because the verdict in this case does not establish the individual liability of either E.H. or Margaret, it does not support the judgment entered by the court.16 Under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 301, a judgment must conform to the pleadings, the nature of the case, and the verdict. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 301; American Ins. Co. v. Reed, 626 S.W.2d 898, 901 (Tex.App.-Eastland 1982, no writ) (judgment rendered against various insurance companies, absent separate findings of liability, “failed to conform to the nature of the case proved and to the verdict of the jury” under Rule 301). Here, the judgment entered fails to conform to the verdict insofar as it imposes liability on E.H. and Margaret. We therefore reverse and render judgment that appellees take nothing from E.H. and Margaret. See Reed, 626 S.W.2d at 901 (any recovery against defendants not named in charge was waived).
V. Evidence of Fraud
Because we have upheld the judgment against W & F Transportation, Inc., it is necessary for us to address some of appellants’ remaining issues. In their tenth issue, appellants assert that the evidence is legally insufficient to support a jury finding of fraudulent intent. The jury found that W & F Transportation committed fraud with respect to a transaction in which W & F Transportation induced Cindy and Ricky to pay $8,000 by requesting a loan that they promised to repay in two weeks, allegedly without any intention of doing so.
In reviewing a no evidence point, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and indulge every reasonable inference that supports it. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 821-22 (Tex.2005). The evidence is legally sufficient if it would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to reach the verdict under review. Id. at 827-28. We credit favorable evidence if reasonable jurors could, and disregard contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not. Id. The trier of fact is the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and the weight to be given their testimony. Id. at 819-21. We cannot substitute our judgment for that of the jury, as long as the evidence falls *48within the zone of reasonable disagreement. Id. at 821-22.
Appellants argue that there is no evidence of fraudulent intent to support the jury’s finding of fraud arising from appellants’ agreement to repay a loan within two weeks. A promise to do an act in the future is actionable fraud when made with the intention, design and purpose of deceiving and with no intention of performing the act.17 Spoljaric v. Percival Tours, Inc., 708 S.W.2d 432, 434-35 (Tex.1986); Wingate v. Acree, No. 14-01-00851-CV, 2003 WL 1922569, at *3-4 (Tex.App.Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 24, 2003, no pet.) (mem.op.). Though a party’s intent is determined at the time of the representation, this intent may be inferred from the party’s acts after the representation is made. Spoljaric, 708 S.W.2d at 434. Failure to perform, standing alone, is no evidence of the promisor’s intent not to perform when the promise was made. Id. at 435. However, that fact is a circumstance to be considered with other facts to establish intent. Id. Because intent to defraud is not usually susceptible to direct proof, in most cases it must be proven by circumstantial evidence. Id. “Slight circumstantial evidence” of fraud, when considered with the breach of promise to perform, is sufficient to support a finding of fraudulent intent. Id. If a party denies ever having made the promise in question, that is a factor showing no intent to perform at the time the promise was made. Id. The fact that the defendant makes no pretense of performance may also be considered in showing a lack of intent. Id.
We conclude that the evidence is legally sufficient to support the jury’s finding in this case. The evidence introduced at trial established that E.H. requested a loan in the amount of $11,000 from Cindy and Ricky. Cindy testified that E.H. told her that $8,000 of the loan would be used for payroll and repaid within two weeks, and that $3,000 of the loan would be used for chains, binders, and tarps for the truck on which they shared profits. Based on these promises, Cindy sent a wire transfer to W & F Transportation in the amount of $11,000. The $8,000 was not repaid within two weeks, and in fact has never been repaid. With respect to the $3,000, Cindy later learned that the tarps for the truck cost only $150.
E.H. denied making any promise to Cindy regarding the money. E.H. maintains that the $11,000 was not a loan, but was instead intended to be used as a down payment to purchase a second truck for Ricky. The evidence at trial demonstrated that E.H. purchased a truck in the name of Cindy’s and Ricky’s company and made several payments on that truck. Cindy maintained that this purchase occurred without their permission and that neither she nor Ricky gave W & F Transportation permission to purchase a truck on their behalf.
This evidence is sufficient to support the finding that W & F Transportation promised to repay the money within two weeks without intending to do so. The jury obviously credited Cindy’s testimony and disbelieved E.H., finding, among other things, that W & F Transportation both committed fraud and misused Cindy’s and Ricky’s identity to purchase the truck. It is undisputed that W & F Transportation has never repaid the money and thus, has breach*49ed the promise. It is true that the mere failure to perform a contract is not evidence of fraud. Southern Union Co. v. City of Edinburg, 129 S.W.3d 74, 92 (Tex.2003). However, if a promise is breached, only slight circumstantial evidence of fraud — including a denial of making the promise in question — is necessary to support the jury’s finding. See Spoljaric, 708 S.W.2d at 435. In this case, E.H. denied ever promising to pay this money back and maintained that it was actually forwarded for the purchase of a second truck. Considering the facts of this case, this denial and testimony regarding a different purpose for the money provides the necessary evidence that W & F transportation never intended to repay the loan as it had promised. See Wingate, 2003 WL 1922569, at *4 (use of assets for other purpose established intent not to repay); Yeldell v. Goren, 80 S.W.3d 634, 638 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2002, no pet.) (denial that money was owed and withdrawal of money for different purpose established intent not to repay). We accordingly overrule the tenth issue.
VI. Issues Relating to Damages
In their eighth issue, appellants assert that the trial court erred in submitting question six to the jury because there was no causal connection between question six on damages and question two on liability. Question six required findings as to damages for all causes of action. However, question six was predicated only on an affirmative finding to question two, liability for breach of contract. Although question six inquired about damages for fraud, it did not predicate an award of damages for fraud on the liability finding for fraud.
“To determine whether an alleged error in the jury charge is reversible, the reviewing court must consider the pleadings of the parties, the evidence presented at trial, and the charge in its entirety. Alleged error will be deemed reversible only if, when viewed in the light of the totality of these circumstances, it amounted to such a denial of the rights of the complaining party as was reasonably calculated and probably did cause the rendition of an improper judgment.” Island Recreational Dev. Corp. v. Republic of Tex. Sav. Ass’n, 710 S.W.2d 551, 555 (Tex.1986); see Byrne v. Harris Adacom Network Servs., Inc., 11 S.W.3d 244, 250 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1999, pet. denied) (following standard set forth in Island Recreational); see also Tex.R.App. P. 44.1(a).
Although the conditioning language in question six on damages was erroneous, this oversight was not harmful and did not cause the rendition of an improper judgment. The jury found that W & F Transportation both breached the contract and committed fraud, and the jury awarded damages both for breach of contract and for fraud. Even though question six was predicated only on an affirmative finding for breach of contract, the question specifically asked the jury a question relating to the fraud damages, requiring the jury to find “[t]he sum of money W & F Transportation agreed to repay Ricky and Cindy Wilhelm.” This language makes it clear that the jury did in fact find the damages attributable to the fraud claim, which was premised upon the fraudulent promise to repay the loan. Because it is clear from the language of the instruction that the jury found these damages as a result of finding fraud, any error in the conditioning language was harmless. We accordingly overrule the eighth issue.
In their seventh issue, appellants assert the trial court erred in awarding $3,000 in punitive damages because they claim that Cindy and Ricky recovered no actual tort damages. As discussed above, the jury expressly found fraud regarding the $8,000 loan and awarded Cin*50dy and Ricky $8,000 in damages on account of that fraud. This finding of fraud and award of damages arising from the fraud is sufficient to support the award of punitive damages. “If a plaintiff presents legally sufficient evidence on each of the elements of a fraudulent inducement claim, any damages suffered as a result of the fraud sound in tort.” See Formosa Plastics Corp. USA v. Presidio Eng’rs & Contractors, Inc., 960 S.W.2d 41, 47 (Tex.1998) (“[T]ort damages are recoverable for a fraudulent inducement claim irrespective of whether the fraudulent representations are later subsumed in a contract or whether the plaintiff only suffers an economic loss related to the subject matter of the contract.”). We accordingly overrule the seventh issue.
VII. Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court against W & F Transportation, Inc., and we reverse and render judgment that appellees take nothing from E.H. Wilhelm, Sr., and Margaret Wilhelm.
FROST, J., dissents.

. Members of the appellate bar also filed a Brief of Amici Curiae to argue that Rule 34.6(c) and the precedent relating to partial records should not be applied.

. The issue of the need to comply with Rule 34.6(c) was first raised by this court. On rehearing, appellees have also taken this position.

. Although it is not clear from the record, it is also probable that the parties agreed not to record voir dire and opening statements. Assuming this is the case, our analysis applies to these nonevidentiary omissions from the record as well.

. Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 34.6(a)(1) defines the reporter’s record as "the court reporter’s transcription of so much of the proceedings, and any of the exhibits, that the parties to the appeal designate.”

.One commentator has stated that "[t]his [common law] presumption appears to be carried forward by implication despite the repeal of former Rule 50(d), which expressly *38placed the burden on an appellant or other party seeking review to see that a sufficient record is created to show reversible error.” John Hill Cayce, Jr. & Anne Gardner, Civil Appeals in Texas: Practicing Under the New Rules of Appellate Procedure, 49 Baylor L.Rev. 867, 922 (1997).

. The cases upon which the dissent relies largely involve the omission of the entire reporter's record on appeal. See Middleton, 2006 WL 89503, at *1 (“There is no reporter’s record of any part of the trial.”); Mason, 154 S.W.3d at 818 (appellant "did not request any of the testimony or evidence received at trial” be included in the reporter's record); Patel v. State, No. 14-03-01082-CR, 2003 WL 22976186, at *1 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 18, 2003, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (“No record was made of trial in municipal court.”); Hiroms v. Scheffey, 76 S.W.3d 486, 489 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.) ("We are unable to address the merits of this claim because ap-pedants did not ask the court reporter to type the trial proceedings transcribed.”). All of the cases upon which the dissent relies involve the omission of some evidence. See, e.g., Gardner, 6 S.W.3d at 296 (reporter’s record omitted testimony of three witnesses, among other things); Robertson v. Tex. Dep’t of Transp., No. 03-00-00167-CV, 2000 WL 1228025, at *1 (Tex.App.-Austin Aug.31, 2000, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (noting that evidence was presented during first day of trial when court reporter was not present). We do not find any of these cases persuasive in a circumstance where the only omission from the record is nonevidentiary.

. See supra note 6.

. This speculative possibility was implicitly rejected in Holten. A special appearance like that in Holten is fraught with procedural death traps, and counsel is much more likely to waive his client's jurisdictional challenge than is counsel likely to invite error during closing argument at the end of trial.

.Contraiy to the dissent’s claim, this court did not hold that Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 13.1 was void in Nabelek v. District Attorney of Harris County, No. 14-03-00965-CV, *42—S.W.3d —, 2005 WL 2148999 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Sept. 8, 2005, no pet.). This court did not reach the issue of whether Rule 13.1 was void, but held instead that the appellant had failed to preserve for review the question of what Rule 13.1 required from court reporters. Id. *5, —• S.W.3d at-("By failing to request that the court reporter record the hearing or object to the reporter’s failure to record ... Nabelek has failed to preserve these issues for review. See Tex.R.App. P. 33.1(a).” (emphasis added)). On the facts of the current case, reliance on Rule 13.1 is appropriate and is not precluded by a prior holding of this court.

. It is not credible to suggest that a party may protect itself on appeal by complying with Rule 34.6(c). As this case demonstrates, Rule 34.6(c) simply does not address the circumstance where the parties agree not to make a record in the first place. Requiring compliance with that rule would accomplish nothing. When the parties have agreed that a nonevidentiary part of the trial need not be recorded, a transcript of proceedings will not exist. Accordingly, the appellee would need no notice of what issues will be appealed, because the appellee could not counter-designate omitted portions of the record even if it wanted to. The appellee has already once agreed that those proceedings did not need to be recorded. On a related note, even if a party were to comply with Rule 34.6(c), it would not cure the problems of which the dissent complains. A court cannot order the record supplemented under Rule 34.6(d) when a record of the proceedings does not exist.

. We reject any claim by appellants that these findings do not support the verdict against W & F Transportation, Inc. At the charge conference in the trial court, counsel for W & F Transportation, Inc. asserted that "W & F Transportation” as used in the charge meant defendant W & F Transportation, Inc. Counsel even requested that the parties enter a stipulation to this effect, or that the jury be instructed “that W & F Transportation means W & F Transportation, Inc.” After taking this position in the trial court, appellant cannot now maintain that ”W & F Transportation” should not be understood to refer to the incorporated defendant. In general, a party cannot take a position on appeal that is inconsistent with the position that it took in the trial court. See, e.g., Rylander v. Bandag Licensing Corp., 18 S.W.3d 296, 302 (Tex.App.-Austin 2001 pet. denied) ("A litigant may not take one position at trial, and then take an inconsistent position on appeal.”).

. We reject appellees’ claim that appellants waived any objection to the charge. Our review of the charge conference reveals that counsel for E.H. and Margaret properly objected to the failure to inquire separately as to each defendant. This issue was discussed in the charge conference, including the existence of the assumed name certificate, the fact that the current charge referred to W & F Transportation, Inc. as the corporate defendant, and the need for separate questions for E.H. and Margaret.

. The pleadings indicate that appellees had actual knowledge of W & F’s corporate status. The original petition asserted claims only against “W & F Transportation, Inc.,’’and ap-pellees alleged that the incorporated company had participated in all of the facts underlying their causes of action, including entry into the lease agreement upon which many of the claims were based. (See Original Petition ("Wilhelms then entered into a lease agreement with W & F where for the use of their tractor and trailer in W & F business, W & F would pay the Wilhelms a portion of the rates W & F received for hauling freight.”).) Later petitions, including the petition upon which appellees went to trial, alleged facts involving merely "W & F,” a defined term which also included the corporate entity.

. We do not address any allegation that E.H. and Margaret were partners in a W & F partnership entity because appellees have conceded on appeal that they did not pursue liability under a partnership theory.

. A verified denial is not necessary if it is obvious in context that "the truth of such matters appear of record.” Tex.R. Civ. P. 93. By filing a verified denial as to capacity, E.H. and Margaret were denying that they were liable as individuals because at all times relevant to this lawsuit W & F Transportation, Inc. was incorporated. See, e.g., Pledger v. Schoellkopf, 762 S.W.2d 145, 146 (Tex.1988) (“When [corporate] capacity is contested, Rule 93(2) requires that a verified plea be filed anytime the record does not affirmatively demonstrate the ... defendant’s right to ... be sued.”). E.H. and Margaret likely did not file a verified denial as to the allegation that they were doing business as individuals under an assumed name because they in fact had done business under that name at one point in time but now their company was incorporated. See, e.g., Lambert v. Dealers Elec. Supply, Inc., 629 S.W.2d 61, 64 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1981, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (Guittard, C.J., dissenting) (stating that " 'd/b/a' does not indicate a separate legal capacity, and an individual doing business in an assumed name may be sued as an individual on any debt incurred in that name. The assumed name is only a matter of identification.”).

. Appellees have tried to establish a single business enterprise as a matter of law on appeal. Neither this theory nor any other theory for disregarding the corporate form was pled or submitted to the jury. Under these circumstances we will not address it. See Schott Glas v. Adame, 178 S.W.3d 307, 314 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. denied) ("In Texas, corporate entities are presumed to be separate ... each basis for disregarding this presumption of corporate separateness must be specifically pleaded or it is waived.” (citations omitted)).

. Establishing fraud requires (1) a material misrepresentation that was false, (2) that was either known to be false when made or was asserted without knowledge of its truth, (3) that was intended to be relied upon, (4) that was relied upon, and (5) that caused injury. Formosa Plastics Corp. USA v. Presidio Eng’rs & Contractors, Inc., 960 S.W.2d 41, 47 (Tex.1998).