Court Opinion

ID: 9707580
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 02:16:00.526619+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:35.352391
License: Public Domain

White, J.,
dissenting.
I agree that this court in Winter v. Peterson, 208 Neb. 785, 787, 305 N.W.2d 803, 806 (1981), directly held that “[a] single request to submit to a test is sufficient. There is no requirement that a second request be made if the person arrested refuses to submit to the test.” I am convinced that this is too harsh a result.
The Supreme Court of Hawaii in State v. Moore, 62 Hawaii 301, 307, 614 P.2d 931, 935 (1980), observed: “It is true that many courts have held that there is a binding ‘refusal to submit’ where a motorist is offered a chemical test and at first refuses or delays in consenting but subsequently changes his mind and requests a test. [Citations omitted.] We, however, decline to hold with a rule of law which would rigidly and unreasonably bind an arrested person to his first words spoken, no matter how quickly and under what circumstances those words are withdrawn. We consider the better rule to be one which takes into consideration the fairness to all parties of permitting an arrested person later to change his mind.” The Hawaii court then quoted at 307-08, 614 P.2d at 935, the North Dakota Supreme Court in Lund v. Hjelle, 224 N.W.2d 552 (N.D. 1974): “ ‘Since the accuracy of a chemical test under [the Implied Consent Law] does not depend upon its being administered immediately after an arrest, accident or other event, and thus a delay for a reasonable period of time while an arrested person considers or reconsiders a *260decision whether or not to submit to a chemical test will not frustrate the object of the Legislature in enacting [the Implied Consent Law], we hold that where, as here, one who is arrested for driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor first refuses to submit to a chemical test to determine the alcoholic content of his blood and later changes his mind and requests a chemical blood test, the subsequent consent to take the test cures the prior first refusal when the request to take the test is made within a reasonable time after the prior first refusal ; when such a test administered upon the subsequent consent would still be accurate; when testing equipment or facilities are still readily available; when honoring a request for a test, following a prior first refusal, will result in no substantial inconvenience or expense to the police; and when the individual requesting the test has been in police custody and under observation for the whole time since his arrest.’ ”
The Hawaii court concluded at 308, 614 P.2d at 935: “We adopt the criteria of the North Dakota Supreme Court. We hold that unless a delay would materially affect the test results or prove substantially inconvenient to administer, a subsequent consent may cure a prior refusal to be tested.”
A total of 7 minutes elapsed between the first refusal and the change of mind. That first mistaken refusal produces for the appellant here disastrous consequences, subjecting him not only to the underlying charge, if meritorious, but to an additional charge of refusing to submit to a chemical test. We think this is both on its face patently unfair and unreasonable. The majority cites in support of this position the case of Wohlgemuth v. Pearson, 204 Neb. 687, 285 N.W.2d 102 (1979). The facts of the case are distinguishable here. In Wohlgemuth the only question was not whether there was a manifestation of an intent to refuse, but whether or not the defendant *261was, in fact, capable of making a refusal at all. See the dissent of Boslaugh, J., at 692.
As there was no harm to the state’s position by allowing the defendant to change his mind and to take the test within a reasonable period after the first refusal, I would reverse the decision of the trial court.
Boslaugh, J., joins in this dissent.