Court Opinion

ID: 9963929
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-26 16:00:58.399789+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:04.890330
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                   MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

NHI HA,                                         DOCKET NUMBER
                    Appellant,                  SF-0714-18-0033-I-1

             v.

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS                          DATE: April 25, 2024
  AFFAIRS,
            Agency.

             THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

      Debra D’Agostino , Esquire, and Sarah L. McKinin , Esquire, Washington,
        D.C., for the appellant.

      Thomas R. Beindorf , Los Angeles, California, for the agency.

                                      BEFORE

                           Cathy A. Harris, Chairman
                        Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman

                                 REMAND ORDER

      The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
sustained his removal under 38 U.S.C. § 714(a). For the reasons discussed below,
we GRANT the appellant’s petition for review, VACATE the initial decision , and

1
   A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                        2

REMAND the case to the regional office for further adjudication in accordance
with this Remand Order.

                                       BACKGROUND
         The appellant was a GS-13 Supervisory Veterans Service Representative
for the agency. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 6 at 12. On April 18, 2017, the
agency proposed the appellant’s reduction in grade and pay based on two
specifications of conduct unbecoming.           Id. at 75-77.     The first specification
pertained to the appellant’s ineffective handling of a subordinate’s allegation of
sexual harassment against another employee. Id. at 75. The second specification
pertained     to   the   appellant’s    inappropriate   comments     toward   this   same
subordinate.       Id. at 76.   The agency, however, rescinded the proposal the
following day. Id. at 73.
         Subsequently, the agency convened an Administrative Investigation Board,
which found that the appellant engaged in numerous other instances of
misconduct and recommended that the agency take appropriate administrative
action against him. Id. at 54-71. On September 19, 2017, the agency proposed
the appellant’s removal under 38 U.S.C. § 714 based on one charge of
“Inappropriate conduct in the workplace” (nine specifications) and one charge of
“Lack of Candor” (five specifications).           Id. at 36-39.     After the appellant
responded, the deciding official issued a decision sustaining both charges and
removing the appellant effective October 18, 2017.          Id. at 12, 14-17, 19-21,
23-33.
         The appellant filed a Board appeal, challenging the removal chiefly on due
process grounds. IAF, Tab 1 at 4, 6, Tab 20. He waived his right to a hearing.
IAF, Tab 17. After the close of the record, the administrative judge issued an
initial decision sustaining the removal. IAF, Tab 24, Initial Decision (ID). She
found that the agency proved both charges (although not all specifications) by
substantial evidence. ID at 3-12. She also considered the appellant’s due process
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affirmative defenses, but found that the agency did not violate his due process
rights. ID at 12-18.
      The appellant has filed a petition for review, contesting the penalty and
renewing his argument that the agency violated his due process rights in several
respects. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 3. The agency has not filed a
response.

                                    ANALYSIS
The appellant has not proven a due process violation.
      In an appeal of an adverse action taken under 38 U.S.C. § 714(a), the
agency bears the burden of proving its charge by substantial evidence. 38 U.S.C.
§ 714(d)(2)(a). Nevertheless, the Board must reverse the agency’s action if the
appellant shows that the agency violated his right to due process. See Stephen v.
Department of the Air Force, 47 M.S.P.R. 672, 681 (1991).             Minimum due
process of law entails prior notice and an opportunity to respond.         Cleveland
Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985). On petition for
review, the appellant does not contest the administrative judge’s finding that the
agency proved its charges.        He does, however, make several arguments
concerning an alleged violation of due process. PFR File, Tab 3 at 19-29. We
have considered these arguments, but for the reasons explained in the initial
decision, we agree with the administrative judge that the appellant has not proven
a due process violation based on the current record. ID at 12-18. 2
      The appellant also argues that the agency should not have considered his
prior alleged misconduct in its penalty determination because the misconduct was
unproven.   PFR File, Tab 3 at 22.       This is a challenge to the merits of the
agency’s penalty determination, which the administrative judge declined to

2
  Even if an improper ex parte communication does not amount to a violation of due
process, the Board still must determine whether it constituted harmful error. Ward v.
U.S. Postal Service, 634 F.3d 1274,1281 (Fed. Cir. 2011). We have considered this
issue, but we find insufficient evidence to conclude that any procedural error in this
regard likely affected the outcome of the agency’s decision.
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consider because the Board lacks the authority to mitigate a penalty under
38 U.S.C. § 714(d)(2)(A), (3)(C). ID at 14. However, after the initial decision
was issued, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that,
notwithstanding its lack of mitigation authority, the Board is nevertheless
required to review the agency’s penalty determination as part of its review of the
agency’s decision as a whole. Connor v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 8 F.4th
1319, 1323-27 (Fed. Cir. 2021); Brenner v. Department of Veterans Affairs,
990 F.3d 1313, 1322-27 (Fed. Cir. 2021); Sayers v. Department of Veterans
Affairs, 954 F.3d at 1375-79 (Fed. Cir. 2020). Therefore, we remand this appeal
for the administrative judge to review the agency’s penalty determination
according to the standard set forth in Douglas v. Veterans Administration,
5 M.S.P.R. 280, 306 (1981).      See Semenov v. Department of Veterans Affairs ,
2023 MSPB 16, ¶¶ 44-50.
        In addition, the record shows that the deciding official sustained the
charges under a substantial evidence standard of proof. IAF, Tab 1 at 31, Tab 23
at 6.    This was error.   Although the Board reviews a section 714 action by
substantial evidence, the agency’s deciding official may only sustain the charge if
he finds it proven by preponderant evidence.          Rodriguez v. Department of
Veterans Affairs, 8 F.4th 1290, 1298 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2021).           Therefore, on
remand, the administrative judge shall determine whether the agency’s
application of the substantial evidence standard of proof was harmful error. See
Semenov, 2023 MSPB 16, ¶¶ 21-25 & n.5.

                                      ORDER
        For the reasons discussed above, we remand this case to the regional office
for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order. On remand, the
administrative judge shall allow the parties to supplement the record with
additional evidence and argument on the issues of penalty and harmful error. She
shall then issue a new initial decision that addresses these issues. As to the issues
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of whether the agency presented substantial evidence to prove its charges before
the Board or violated the appellant’s right to due process, the administrative
judge may adopt the findings from her previous initial decision, as appropriate.

FOR THE BOARD:                        ______________________________
                                      Gina K. Grippando
                                      Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.