Court Opinion

ID: 9829532
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 19:24:33.015401+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:02.682802
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
In our opinion on original hearing; we inadvertently stated that in Batson-Milholme Co. v. Faulk, 209 S. W. 837, by the Court of Civil Appeals of Galveston, it was held that notwithstanding the amendment of the Workmen’s Compensation Statutes of 1913, by the act of 1917, the employer, in order to escape common-law liability, is required to give to the employee notice that he is a subscriber as provided in article 5246 — 4. In the opinion of the court rendered in that case, there was a discussion of that amendment; but the accident in controversy happened before the adoption of the amendment, and hence, necessarily the effect 'of the amendment was not involved.
Appellant now calls attention to the fact that the amendment of 1917, embodied in article 5246 — 4, Vernon’s Ann. Civ. St. Supp. 1918, quoted in our original opinion, is substantially the same as section 5, pt. 1, of the Massachusetts Workmen’s Compensation Act (St. 1911, c. 751); and that according to legislative history that amendment was taken from the Massachusetts statutes. Appellant also cites the case of Young v. Duncan, 218 Mass. 346, 106 N. E. p. 1, decided in the year 1914, in which the Supreme Court of Massachusetts held that under and by virtue of the provisions of section 5, pt. 1, of the Massachusetts statutes, unless an employee gives to his employer notice in writing that he would claim his right of action at. common law for damages for personal injuries sustained during his employment, that right is waived, even in the absence of á compliance by the employer with another article of the same statute requiring him to give to his employee notice that he is a subscriber. It is insisted that since the amendment of 1917 is a substantial copy of the Massachusetts statute, the legal presumption obtains that the Legislature of our state was .informed of that interpretation of the Massachusetts statute, and that that interpretation by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts became as much a part of the amendment of 1917 as if it had been expressly written therein. In support of that contention, appellant cites Board of Water Engineers v. McKnight (Tex. Sup.) 229 S. W. 304; City of Tyler v. St. L. S. W. Ry. Co., 99 Tex. 498, 91 S. W. 1, 13 Ann. Cas. 911; Munson v. Hallowell, 26 Tex. 481, 84 Am. Dec. 582.
Prior to the enactment in 1917 of article 5246 — 4, it had been decided several times by our appellate courts, and correctly so we believe, that in order for a subscriber to claim the exemption from his common-law liability for injuries resulting to an employee, under the Workmen’s Compensation. Act of 1913, it was incumbent upon him to give notice to his employee, as required by articles 5246 — 77 and 5246 — 78, copied in our original opinion. There were no decisions of this state to the contrary when the amendment of 1917 was adopted. As pointed out in the original opinion, the act of 1913 was re-enacted in 1917 in its entirety with the amendment added. It must be presumed that in re-enacting articles 5246 — 77 and 5246 — 78 the Legislature was aware of our own judicial decisions relative to the requirements therein contained and noted above. According to those decisions, a compliance with those articles of the statutes was mandatory and not merely directory, as was held in the Massachusetts decisions. And if any presumption is to be indulged that the Legislature in re-enacting those articles in 1917, with the amendment added, had in view any judicial interpretation of them, such presumption would be referable to the construction adopted by our own appellate courts rather than that adopted by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts.
The different sections of the Workman’s Compensation. Act must be construed in the light of the. general purposes of the act as gathered from all its provisions. The article added by the amendment was a part and parcel of the entire act and cannot be construed separately and independently of other provisons of the same act. To adopt such a rule of construction article 5246 — 3, *504copied in our 'original opinion, would deny the right of an employee to sue a subscriber for. damages for personal injuries, independently of the question whether or not the subscriber had given him notice of the fact that he was a subscriber, and even though the employee had given him notice that he would claim his right of action at common law for such injuries, as prescribed in article 5246— 4, wliich was the amendment Qf 1917. This illustrates that different sections of the act must be construed in the light of each other. The construction placed upon the amended article in our original opinion is in accordance with the general rule of construction that every part of an act should be given effect if reasonably possible. The construction insisted on by appellant of following the strict letter of the amendment of 1917 would result in the rejection of the provisions of other articles ¡requiring the subscriber to give notice to his employees that he had taken out a policy of insurance for their benefit.
The motion for rehearing is overruled.