Court Opinion

ID: 9578770
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:48:14.347471+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:33:23.273937
License: Public Domain

THORNTON, J.,
specially concurring.
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that reversal would be required because the circuit court did not afford defendant a trial de novo on the contested findings on which the municipal court’s order was purportedly based. However, I would not reach this issue for the following reason: Defendant was denied his right to counsel in municipal court at the time of sentence. Therefore, his sentence for contempt was a complete nullity in my view.
Defendant was charged in the Municipal Court of *337íe City of Klamath Falls with failing to stop at a stop gn. At 8:30 a.m. on the day of trial defendant ap-sared, accompanied by a nonlawyer friend, whom he ;ferred to as his "Christian counsel.” Defendant night to have the nonlawyer represent him, citing RS 52.060, which allows a nonlawyer to act as an btomey in justice of the peace courts. The municipal idge indicated that this statute had no application to íe municipal court of Klamath Falls, refused to per-it such representation, and ordered the trial to proved.1 Defendant strenuously objected, insisted that he as entitled to be represented by the nonlawyer, and ¡fused to be seated as ordered by the judge. The judge tereupon summarily ordered defendant incarcerated i the Klamath County jail until 4 p.m. the same day. t the appointed hour of 4 p.m., defendant was again 'ought before the court, and the court made the flowing order:
"IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Defendant be, and hereby is, found in contempt of Court and that he be punished by confinement in the Klamath County Jail from 8:30 a.m. December 19, 1977, to 4:00 p.m. December 19, 1977, and to further pay a fine to the City of Klamath Falls in the sum of $150.00.”
Defendant thereupon appealed his contempt convic-in to the Circuit Court for Klamath County. On ipeal to the circuit court, the contempt order was viewed on the record below and the circuit court itered an order affirming the contempt order.
Defendant now appeals to this court, again appear-g as his own attorney. He assigns as error the following:
"The court erred by not ruling on the motion for court appointed attorney before handing down the order affirming the municipal court order.
*338"The court erred in not trying the case on the facts.”
It appears that the municipal judge was proceeding under ORS 33.030, which deals with direct contempts.
Contrary to the majority, I do not believe that the municipal court proceeded according to law. For reasons which follow I would reverse and remand.
It may be that defendant, if indigent, was not entitled to an attorney at the time of his initial incarceration at 8:30 a.m.; however, as I read ORS 33.095,2 defendant, if indigent, was entitled to have counsel appointed for his defense when he was brought before the municipal judge the second time., i.e., at the further proceedings on the contempt charge at 4 p.m. While ORS 33.095 does not specifically mention ORS 33.030, it does refer to ORS 33.010, which, inter alia, defines direct contempts. Further, ORS 33.095 provides that the defendant is entitled to counsel when he is " * * * by any other means brought before a court to answer for any contempt * *
It is significant, I submit, that the circuit court, prior to proceeding with the appeal referred to above, advised defendant of his right to court appointed counsel if defendant were indigent.3
*339Further, and entirely apart from ORS 33.095, I slieve defendant had a right to counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United tates Constitution. See In Re Oliver, 333 US 257, 68 S Ct 499, 92 L Ed 682 (1948). See also Brown v. Multnomah County Dist. Ct., 280 Or 95, 570 P2d 52 (1977). (hile I have found authority for the proposition that a arson incarcerated for a direct contempt is not ititled to a hearing, I have found no case holding that i indigent contemnor is not entitled to counsel.
In Henkel v. Bradshaw, 483 F2d 1386 (9th Cir 1973), the court expressed the view that a defendant íould not be imprisoned under this section (ORS 1.020)4 without representation by counsel. Proceed-igs for the punishment of those accused of the violation of a decree are quasi-criminal and the statutory 'ovision relating thereto must be strictly complied ith. Trullinger v. Howe, 58 Or 73, 113 P 4 (1911); State ex rel. v. Mount, 139 Or 694, 10 P2d 606 (1932). Accord: In re Westerfield, 285 Or 615, 592 P2d 549 (1979).
Inasmuch as the municipal court failed to appoint unsel for defendant or make any inquiry as to his digency at the time of the sentencing on contempt, in y view the court was without jurisdiction to proceed; Lose proceedings were a nullity and should be vacated rthwith. ORS 33.095.
*340Lack of jurisdiction appearing on the face of the record may be raised on the court’s own motion at any time. City of Hermiston v. ERB, 280 Or 291, 570 P2d 663 (1977).

 So far as I can determine from the record, both the charter and linances of the City of Klamath Falls are silent on the right of nonlawyer >resentation in the municipal court. See Oregon State Bar v. Wright, 280 Or 693, 573 P2d 283 (1977); Balcom v. Municipal Court, 23 Or App 218, 541 P2d 1307, rev den (1975).

 ORS 33.095 provides:
"(1) A party cited to show cause why he should not be held for contempt of court or arrested to answer or by any other means brought before a court to answer for any contempt alleged pursuant to ORS 23.020, 23.785, 33.010 or 33.040 shall be entitled to be represented by counsel.
"(2) If the alleged contemnor is not represented by counsel when he comes before the court, the court shall inform him of the right to counsel, and of the right to appointed counsel if the alleged contemnor is indigent and the proceedings may result in any incarceration. If the alleged contemnor is indigent and the proceedings may result in his incarceration, the court, upon the alleged contemnor’s request, shall appoint counsel to represent him.”

 Defendant informed the court that he would represent himself. Four months later but before the court’s decision was handed down, defendant changed his mind and filed motions for court appointed counsel. The court did not, however, rule on those motions.

 ORS 33.020 provides:
"(1) Every court of justice and every judicial officer has power to punish contempt by fine or imprisonment, or both; but such fine shall not exceed $300 nor the imprisonment six months, except in the cases mentioned in subsection (2) of this section; and when the contempt is not one of those mentioned in paragraphs (a) and (b) of subsection (1) of ORS 33.010, or in subsection (1) of ORS 1.240, it must appear that the right or remedy of a party to an action, suit or proceeding was defeated or prejudiced thereby before the contempt can be punished otherwise than by a fine not exceeding $100.
"(2) In addition to the punishment provided for in subsection (1) of this section, the court or judge shall have power to constrain performance of any lawful order, judgment or decree of such court or judge, by imprisonment of the person failing or refusing to comply, until the order, judgment or decree has been complied with.”