Court Opinion

ID: 9890967
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-17 00:00:33.150742+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:37:29.235276
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-50686    Document: 00516932346       Page: 1    Date Filed: 10/16/2023

          United States Court of Appeals
               for the Fifth Circuit                              United States Court of Appeals
                                                                           Fifth Circuit

                              ____________                               FILED
                                                                  October 16, 2023
                               No. 22-50686                         Lyle W. Cayce
                              ____________                               Clerk

   Darren Lubbe,

                                                        Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                    versus

   Mark Milanovich; Christopher Mulch; Brandon Negri;
   Jeoff Williams; Thomas G. Ruocco; Steven C. McCraw;
   Christopher Brock,

                                                     Defendants—Appellees,
   ______________________________

   Darren Lubbe,

                                                        Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                    versus

   Steven McCraw, Director of DPS, Austin, Texas

                                           Defendant—Appellee.
                 ______________________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Western District of Texas
                   USDC Nos. 1:18-CV-1011, 1:19-CV-1073
                 ______________________________

   Before Smith, Southwick, and Higginson, Circuit Judges.
Case: 22-50686         Document: 00516932346             Page: 2      Date Filed: 10/16/2023

                                          No. 22-50686

   Per Curiam: *
          Darren Lubbe had been a special agent in the Criminal Investigation
   Division of the Texas Department of Public Safety (“DPS”). He sued
   various individuals within DPS alleging First Amendment retaliation and
   Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection claims under
   42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of
   all defendants. We AFFIRM.
          We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.
   Lewis v. Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch at Galveston, 665 F.3d 625, 629–30 (5th
   Cir. 2011). Summary judgment is proper when “there is no genuine dispute
   as to any material fact.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). Lubbe presents five issues on
   appeal.
          First, Lubbe argues that DPS Director Steven McGraw violated his
   First Amendment rights by constructively discharging him. Second, he
   argues that all the defendants engaged in retaliation violative of the First
   Amendment after Lubbe reported conduct that was allegedly criminal. To
   establish a First Amendment retaliation claim, Lubbe “must show that (1) he
   suffered an adverse employment action; (2) his speech involved a matter of
   public concern; (3) his interest in speaking outweighs the employer’s interest
   in promoting efficiency in the workplace; and (4) his speech motivated the
   employer’s adverse employment action.” Gibson v. Kilpatrick, 838 F.3d 476,
   481 (5th Cir. 2016) (quotation marks and citation omitted). We agree with
   the district court that Lubbe did not show that he spoke “as a citizen on a

          _____________________

          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.

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Case: 22-50686      Document: 00516932346          Page: 3    Date Filed: 10/16/2023

                                    No. 22-50686

   matter of public concern.” Johnson v. Halstead, 916 F.3d 410, 422 (5th Cir.
   2019). Lubbe’s failure to satisfy that part of the claim allows dismissal.
          Qualified immunity is appropriate either when the constitutional right
   being asserted was not violated or the allegedly violated right was not clearly
   established at the time of the claimed violation. Benfield v. Magee, 945 F.3d
   333, 337 (5th Cir. 2019). We hold that all the defendants were properly
   granted qualified immunity from Lubbe’s First Amendment claims.
          Third, Lubbe asserts the defendants violated his substantive due
   process rights when he was discharged. To succeed on a substantive due
   process claim, Lubbe must prove “(1) that he had a property interest/right
   in his employment, and (2) that the public employer’s termination of that
   interest was arbitrary or capricious.” Lewis, 665 F.3d at 630 (quotation marks
   and citation omitted). We find the evidence demonstrates beyond any
   genuine dispute that Lubbe’s removal was neither arbitrary nor capricious.
   We have authority to affirm a district court on any basis supported by the
   record. United Sates v. Barlow, 17 F.4th 599, 602 (5th Cir. 2021). Thus,
   independent of qualified immunity on which the district court dismissed the
   claim, we conclude this claim fails on its merits.
          Fourth, Lubbe argues the defendants violated his equal protection
   rights through religious discrimination. On appeal, Lubbe insists he is not
   bringing a “class-of-one” claim. That being conceded, this claim was
   properly dismissed because Lubbe offered no evidence of any similarly
   situated employee who was treated differently. See Taylor v. Johnson, 257
   F.3d 470, 473 (5th Cir. 2001).
          Fifth and finally, Lubbe seeks reversal of the denial of his deliberate
   indifference   claim   against    Director   McCraw       and   various      DPS
   commissioners. Lubbe’s notice of appeal, though, only referenced the
   district court’s summary judgment order, which did not address any claim

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Case: 22-50686     Document: 00516932346          Page: 4    Date Filed: 10/16/2023

                                   No. 22-50686

   for deliberate indifference. “[W]here the notice of appeal is from a final
   judgment, we have held that an appeal from a final judgment sufficiently
   preserves all prior orders intertwined with the final judgment.” Jordan v.
   Ector Cnty., 516 F.3d 290, 294 (5th Cir. 2008) (quotation marks and citation
   omitted). Because Lubbe did not appeal from a final judgment but from a
   summary judgment order, “we are without jurisdiction to hear challenges to
   other rulings or orders not specified in the notice of appeal.” Id. (quotation
   marks and citation omitted).
          AFFIRMED

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