Court Opinion

ID: 9428982
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:25:22.544017+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:16.643552
License: Public Domain

Justice Rehnquist,
dissenting.
I have joined Parts I, II, and III of Justice White’s opinion. However I have some doubt about the proposition advanced by Part IV of that opinion and by the Court, ante, at 217-218, n. 7.
The District Court entered judgment for Bowen in the amount of $52,954. It apportioned $80,000 of this amount against the Union, and $22,954 against the Postal Service. When it reversed the judgment against the Union, the Court of Appeals declined to increase the award against the Postal Service or to remand for a new trial. Because this Court has reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, its assertion that Bowen “should not have been deprived of the full amount of his compensatory damages because of his failure to cross-appeal,” ante, at 218, n. 7, is dictum. Although the issue is not before us, I am writing separately to express my doubts about the soundness of this proposition.
The District Court observed that “there is authority suggesting that only the employer is liable for damages in the form of back pay,” 470 F. Supp. 1127, 1130 (WD Va. 1979), and the decisions of the Courts of Appeals discussed both in Justice White’s opinion and in the Court’s opinion show at the very least that there was substantial doubt that a union could be held liable for damages such as those awarded by the District Court. Under these circumstances, Bowen could not reasonably think that he was in the sort of “safe harbor” which the Court’s opinion and Justice White’s opinion suggest. Appellate courts review judgments, and Bowen’s judgment against the Postal Service was for $22,954.
Prudent plaintiff’s counsel would have filed a conditional cross-appeal, seeking to increase the amount of that judgment if the Union were held not liable. This is because an “appellee may not attack the decree with a view either to en*247larging his own rights thereunder or of lessening the rights of his adversary, whether what he seeks is to correct an error or to supplement the decree with respect to a matter not dealt with below.” United States v. American Railway Express Co., 265 U. S. 425, 435 (1924).
It is not clear to me, and in light of the Court’s disposition of the case I need not decide, whether the Court of Appeals acted properly in refusing to alter the judgment against the Postal Service, or whether it should have remanded to the District Court for further proceedings on the damages issue. It seems to me, however, that the disposition suggested by the Court and by Part IV of Justice White’s opinion would permit plaintiffs to “attack” the judgment of the Court of Appeals in a way prohibited by authorities such as American Railway Express, supra.