Court Opinion

ID: 9927795
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-30 01:00:27.860056+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:25:19.261330
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-50745        Document: 00517047876             Page: 1      Date Filed: 01/29/2024

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit
                                     ____________
                                                                               United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                        Fifth Circuit
                                      No. 22-50745
                                     ____________                                     FILED
                                                                               January 29, 2024
   United States of America,                                                     Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                      Clerk
                                                                      Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                            versus

   James Mitchell Phillips,

                                              Defendant—Appellant.
                     ______________________________

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                          for the Western District of Texas
                              USDC No. 7:21-CR-344-1
                     ______________________________

   Before Wiener, Willett, and Douglas, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam: *
         Defendant–Appellant James Mitchell Phillips appeals the district
   court’s denial of his motion to suppress and its refusal to apply the
   acceptance-of-responsibility reduction to his sentence. For the reasons
   below, we AFFIRM.

         _____________________
         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-50745      Document: 00517047876          Page: 2   Date Filed: 01/29/2024

                                    No. 22-50745

                                          I
          After the Upton County Sheriff’s Office dispatched a deputy to
   investigate an erratic driver, the responding officer quickly identified the
   vehicle: A speeding white truck, driven by Phillips, weaving in and out of
   lanes and crossing over the road’s shoulder. The deputy triggered his lights
   to get Phillips’s attention, but Phillips continued driving unphased. In
   response, the deputy activated his siren and positioned the patrol car
   alongside the moving truck. Phillips took note of this maneuver and slowed
   down, eventually parking his truck on the shoulder, where the deputy could
   conduct a traffic stop.
          The deputy approached the truck and requested that Phillips exit the
   vehicle. As Phillips opened the driver-side door to comply, the deputy
   observed a cold beer can wedged inside the door’s interior. Phillips
   acknowledged the beer but explained it was his “first one.” The deputy
   continued conversing with Phillips, explaining that he had concerns about
   Phillips’s sobriety and erratic driving. Phillips responded nervously. When
   asked where he was traveling, for example, Phillips explained that he was
   trying to “round up some money” because of a “financial hitch [that]
   morning”; he called himself a “dumb ass” and began talking about a 30-day
   loan. He also made conflicting statements about where he lived, whether he
   had a job, and whether he was able to use his phone.
          The deputy asked Phillips for consent to search the truck. Phillips
   refused but permitted the deputy to open the vehicle’s rear door. After the
   deputy did so, he surveyed the back seat and observed nothing except
   scattered tools and strewn objects. The deputy then administered a field
   sobriety test, which offered mixed results: Although the deputy denied
   smelling alcohol on Phillips, Phillips was unable to keep his head still as the
   deputy requested.

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          Ultimately, Phillips’s performance during the sobriety check failed to
   assuage the deputy’s suspicions. So, to further investigate, the deputy
   requested a K-9 unit to the scene. In the meantime, the deputy conducted a
   second field sobriety test and remarked that he saw “a little bit” of
   involuntary eye jerking—a telltale sign of intoxication. Once the K-9 and his
   deputy handler arrived, the K-9 sniffed the perimeter of Phillips’s truck, but
   the search revealed nothing. Even without a K-9 alert, the deputies
   proceeded to search Phillips’s truck anyway, and within minutes, found a
   bottle of methamphetamine in the passenger’s seat. The discovery led to
   Phillips’s arrest and his indictment in federal court.
          During his subsequent criminal proceedings, Phillips raised concerns
   about the officers’ conduct during the stop. He specifically alleged that the
   deputies lacked probable cause to search his vehicle and unconstitutionally
   prolonged the traffic stop to conduct the dog sniff. Phillips moved to suppress
   the methamphetamine found during the search, but the district court denied
   the motion, concluding that the officers obtained the evidence lawfully. As
   for the length and method of detention, the court determined that the officers
   had reasonable suspicion to prolong the traffic stop and investigate further.
          Following the court’s ruling, the parties stipulated to the facts
   necessary for Phillips’s conviction, and the district court found Phillips guilty
   in a bench trial. 1 Even though Phillips never denied the criminal charges, the
   presentence report (PSR) did not provide for a downward adjustment for
   acceptance of responsibility when calculating Phillips’s sentencing range.
   The reason was based on a physical altercation between Phillips and another

          _____________________
          1
             Phillips was convicted of one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to
   distribute five grams or more of methamphetamine.

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                                           No. 22-50745

   inmate while Phillips awaited sentencing. The probation office determined
   that Phillips was the agitator and escalated the situation to physical violence.
          In objecting to the PSR, Phillips countered that he was not the first
   physical aggressor. 2 Defending himself, he argued, was an inadequate ground
   to deny the acceptance-of-responsibility reduction. At sentencing, however,
   the district court overruled Phillips’s challenge. In doing so, it declined
   defense counsel’s invitation to review video footage of the fight and instead
   relied on the probation office’s account that Phillips was the initial agitator.
   The court then sentenced Phillips to 168 months of imprisonment and five
   years of supervised release. Phillips now appeals that judgment, claiming that
   the district court committed two errors—one by denying his motion to
   suppress and the other by refusing to reduce his sentence based on his
   acceptance of responsibility.
                                                 II
          We begin with the motion to suppress. In reviewing the district
   court’s ruling, we view all facts for clear error and in the light most favorable
   to the prevailing party—in this case, the government. United States v. Shelton,
   337 F.3d 529, 532 (5th Cir. 2003). We review legal conclusions de novo and
   uphold the district court’s ruling if any rationale in the record supports it.
   United States v. Waldrop, 404 F.3d 365, 368 (5th Cir. 2005).
                                                 A
          Phillips first argues that the district court should have suppressed the
   methamphetamine found during his traffic stop because the deputies
   obtained it through an unlawful search. Even though Phillips concedes he
   committed traffic violations and unlawfully possessed an open container of

          _____________________
          2
              Phillips nevertheless conceded that an oral altercation preceded the fight.

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   alcohol, he says neither was a valid reason to believe his truck contained
   contraband. According to Phillips, the deputies improperly relied on their
   “hunch” that he was intoxicated by something other than alcohol. But
   Phillips says that hunch was baseless since the sobriety tests and dog sniff
   revealed nothing suspicious. Although the deputies eventually uncovered
   illicit drugs, Phillips argues that their search was unjustified from its
   inception.
          Among the protections guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment is
   the freedom from “unreasonable searches.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. The
   Supreme Court has interpreted this protection as prohibiting warrantless
   searches, deeming them “per se unreasonable.” Katz v. United States, 389
   U.S. 347, 357 (1967). Even so, that well-established precept is not without a
   few “narrow exceptions.” See United States v. Alvarez, 40 F.4th 339, 345 (5th
   Cir. 2022). Numbered among them is the “automobile exception,” a
   carveout from the Fourth Amendment’s safeguards, allowing police “to
   search a vehicle if they have probable cause” to do so. United States v. Ortiz,
   781 F.3d 221, 229 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Fields, 456 F.3d
   519, 523 (5th Cir.2006)). In this context, probable cause exists when
   “trustworthy     facts    and     circumstances     within     the    officer’s
   knowledge . . . would cause a reasonably prudent man to believe the car
   contains contraband.” United States v. Guzman, 739 F.3d 241, 246 (5th Cir.
   2014) (quoting United States v. Banuelos-Romero, 597 F.3d 763, 767 (5th Cir.
   2010)).
          Making the probable-cause determination requires courts to consider
   “the totality of the circumstances” rather than isolated factors. Id. So
   whether the deputies had probable cause here turns on what they knew before
   they searched Phillips’s truck. To answer that question, we turn to the
   record, which provides the following facts: A deputy observed Phillips
   speeding and driving erratically on a two-lane highway; Phillips failed to

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   recognize the deputy’s initial attempts to pull him over; during the traffic
   stop, Phillips admitted to consuming alcohol and drinking from the open
   container inside the vehicle; during sobriety tests, Phillips was unable to
   follow directions and exhibited slight nystagmus, or eye jerking; and
   throughout the stop, Phillips made several contradictory statements. Given
   the totality of these facts, there was a “fair probability” that Phillips was
   driving while intoxicated. United States v. Garcia, 179 F.3d 265, 269 (5th Cir.
   1999). Accordingly, the officers had probable cause to search Phillips’s
   vehicle for evidence of his intoxication. See id.
          To the extent that Phillips disputes the deputy’s subjective intent to
   search for alcohol versus some other illicit substance, that challenge
   overlooks an essential aspect in our probable-cause inquiry: The operative
   analysis involves an objective test independent of an officer’s subjective
   belief. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (“Subjective
   intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment
   analysis.”). So whether the officers searched Phillips’s truck based on the
   open container or based on their hunch that he was on drugs is irrelevant.
   Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153 (2004) (“Our cases make clear that an
   arresting officer’s state of mind (except for the facts that he knows) is
   irrelevant to the existence of probable cause.”). Nor is it significant that some
   measures to establish probable cause, like the dog sniff, failed. What matters
   here is that the deputies had probable cause to search Phillips’s vehicle all
   along. See United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478, 484 (1985) (“There is no
   requirement     that   the    warrantless    search    of   a   vehicle    occur
   contemporaneously with its lawful seizure.”).
                                          B
          Having determined that the deputies engaged in a lawful search, we
   next consider whether the deputies improperly detained Phillips while

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   conducting that search. In Phillips’s view, the dog sniff extended his
   detention beyond the time needed to conduct the traffic stop and thus
   constituted an unreasonable seizure. He argues that the deputy should have
   instead issued an open container citation and finished the investigation
   following the sobriety test.
          Like unlawful searches, the Fourth Amendment also prohibits
   unwarranted seizures. And, when a seizure occurs during an investigatory
   stop, we review its legality with the two-part test established in Terry v. Ohio,
   392 U.S. 1 (1968). The first part of the test asks “whether the stop was
   justified at its inception”; the second part asks “whether the officer’s
   subsequent actions were reasonably related in scope to the circumstances
   that caused him to stop the vehicle in the first place.” United States v. Smith,
   952 F.3d 642, 647 (5th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks and citation
   omitted).
          Because Phillips does not challenge the traffic stop’s justification, we
   focus only on the second part. The pertinent question, then, is whether the
   officers’ actions after stopping Phillips “were reasonably related to the
   circumstances that justified the stop, or to dispelling [the officers’]
   reasonable suspicion developed during the stop.” United States v. Brigham,
   382 F.3d 500, 507 (5th Cir. 2004); United States v. Brigham, 382 F.3d 500,
   507 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc).
          Here, the purpose of the stop was to investigate whether Phillips was
   intoxicated. Brigham, 382 F.3d at 507. As the investigation unfolded, facts
   developed that tended to point away from alcohol intoxication and toward
   drug intoxication. Indeed, given Phillips’s conduct detailed above, the
   deputies were unable to dispel their suspicions after conversing with Phillips
   and conducting sobriety tests. See Smith, 952 F.3d at 647. Continuing the
   investigation by calling for a dog sniff to search for other substances was thus

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   reasonable. Id.; see also United States v. Johnson, No. 22-60080, 2022 WL
   13857898, 1 (5th Cir. Oct. 24, 2022) (unpublished) (“Since the officers’
   testimony shows they had a reasonable suspicion of impaired driving that was
   not dispelled by their initial questioning of Johnson, we reject Johnson’s
   argument that they unreasonably prolonged the stop.”).
          As for the time it took for the officers to investigate, there is no legal
   stopwatch for traffic stops. Instead, whether a detention is unreasonably
   prolonged turns on “whether the police diligently pursued a means of
   investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly.”
   Brigham, 382 F.3d at 511 (quoting United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686
   (1985)). Here, the deputy acted diligently by calling for the dog sniff
   immediately after Phillips refused to consent to a search of his vehicle. Id. To
   the extent that Phillips argues that it was unreasonable to wait twenty-one
   minutes for the dog to arrive or that the entire forty-minute stop itself was
   unconstitutionally long, this court has held otherwise. See United States v.
   Pack, 612 F.3d 341, 361–62 (5th Cir. 2010), opinion modified on denial of reh’g,
   622 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 2010) (35-minute stop); United States v. Galindo, 447
   F. App’x 633, 634, 636 (5th Cir. 2011) (45-minute delay before calling for K-9
   unit). For these reasons, we reject Phillips’s claim that his detention was
   unreasonably prolonged and conclude that the dog sniff was reasonably
   related in scope to the purpose of the initial stop.
          In sum, because the deputies lawfully searched and detained Phillips,
   the district court did not err in denying Phillips’s motion to suppress.
                                          III
          In his final challenge, Phillips argues that the district court improperly
   refused to apply the acceptance-of-responsibility reduction when calculating
   his sentence. When reviewing “[a] district court’s refusal to reduce a
   sentence for acceptance of responsibility,” we apply a standard of review

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   “even more deferential than a pure clearly erroneous standard.” United
   States v. Najera, 915 F.3d 997, 1002 (5th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks
   and citation omitted). To this end, we will not reverse the district court’s
   decision “unless it is without foundation.” Id. (internal quotation marks and
   citation omitted).
          Citing a physical altercation that Phillips had with another inmate, the
   district court refused to reduce Phillips’s sentence for acceptance of
   responsibility. Although Phillips says that he fought in self-defense, the
   probation officer concluded otherwise after studying the recording. Rather
   than reviewing the video footage firsthand, however, Phillips contends that
   the court improperly delegated its factual findings to the probation officer
   and erred in consequence.
          A defendant who “clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility
   for his offense” is usually entitled to a two-level reduction to his offense level,
   U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a), and potentially to an additional one-level reduction, id.
   § 3E1.1(b). Even so, a defendant is not entitled to a reduction for acceptance
   of responsibility merely because he truthfully admits his criminal conduct.
   See United States v. Hinojosa-Almance, 977 F.3d 407, 410 (5th Cir. 2020).
   Indeed, one relevant factor before applying the reduction is the defendant’s
   “voluntary termination or withdrawal from criminal conduct or
   associations.” U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, cmt. n.1(B).
          On several occasions, this court has affirmed the denial of the
   acceptance-of-responsibility reduction based on the defendant’s continued
   criminal conduct when the defendant was involved in a physical altercation
   while awaiting sentencing. See, e.g., United States v. McKissick, No. 22-50540,
   2023 WL 2366985, 1 (5th Cir. Mar. 6, 2023) (unpublished); United States v.
   Arteaga-Rios, 762 F. App’x 177, 177–78 (5th Cir. 2019). We see no reason to
   make an exception here. Review of the video shows that Phillips instigated an

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   oral confrontation and actively encouraged the other inmate to escalate the
   argument to physical violence. Because Phillips instigated and participated in
   the fight, the denial of the reduction for acceptance of responsibility was not
   without foundation. See Najera, 915 F.3d at 1002; U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, cmt.
   n.1(B).
             That the district court relied on the PSR rather than its individual
   review had neither an effect on “the outcome of the district court
   proceedings” nor on Phillips’s “substantial rights.” United States v. Munoz,
   150 F.3d 401, 412–13 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a)).
   This is principally because the video footage of the fight supports the PSR’s
   account of the altercation. Any alleged errors related to Phillips’s sentencing
   were thus harmless. See 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (instructing appellate courts to
   ignore “errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the
   parties”).
                                          IV
             Based on the foregoing, we AFFIRM.

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