Court Opinion

ID: 9474758
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:07:57.963651+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:44:19.038433
License: Public Domain

ROSS, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. In my view the majority has ignored the clear import of the record and, in a decision that pays lip service to our prescribed standard of review, substituted its judgment for that of the district court. I take this position for the following two reasons.
First, in my opinion, the majority has reversed the district court’s decision based on an assumption not supported by the record. The majority writes: “[t]he record reveals that the success of the government’s case against Pruett relied in part on drawing an inference from the presence of a gun on a table in Pruett’s apartment to indicate Pruett’s dominion and control over that gun sufficient to. constitute constructive possession of the weapon.” Ante at. 1397. I read the record quite differently.
The government’s case consisted of the testimony of three witnesses; the two arresting officers and a third officer who testified, without any cross-examination, that the gun in question was operational. Both of the arresting officers testified that Pruett made a statement after he was arrested and after he had been read his Miranda rights. Each officer testified separately that Pruett said he had the gun “because some people were after him.” Tr. 12; 21; 30. Upon cross-examination, Pruett’s attorney attempted to impeach the officers’ testimony on this point, but met with little apparent success. Both officers stated that they had no doubt that Pruett made the statement.
It seems clear to me that the success of the government’s case resulted from the evidence of Pruett’s own statement, as testified to by both arresting officers. Pruett’s statement was the linchpin of the government’s case and the credibility of the officers’ testimony was the focus of the prosecutor’s closing statement. This was not a conviction based only on an inference drawn from finding the gun on a table in Pruett’s apartment as suggested by the majority. This was a case built on the testimony of two police officers who swore under oath that Pruett said he had the gun because some people were after him.
Second, I cannot agree with the majority’s re-balancing of the Little factors or its conclusion that the district court’s denial of Pruett’s motion constituted an abuse of discretion. In Little this court advised that “[t]he evaluation and balancing of these factors, as well as other additional factors that may arise, rest with the district judge, and he must be afforded a substantial amount of discretion in his decisionmaking in this area of the law.” 567 F.2d at 349. Given this standard of review, I have no trouble concluding that the district court should be affirmed, based upon my review of the record in this case.
At the time the motion was made the district court stated the following:
*1399Let’s let the record show that the Court has met informally with Counsel in chambers on a pre-trial conference and the Defendant’s attorney indicated that he would apply for a continuance for the reason that one of the witnesses subpoenaed by the Defendant has indicated by telephone call this morning to Counsel for the Defendant that his father has just died and that it is necessary that he go to the State of Kentucky for the funeral. The witness was under subpoena, as we understand it, and even though he has had this problem, he is not appearing in Court and is simply telling Counsel that he’s not coming. Counsel is unsure at this stage, as the Court understands it, as to when the witness will return to the State of Missouri or whether he’s actually gone at this time. We’ve done some preliminary consideration as to what the testimony of that witness would be and it appears that it might be somewhat cumulative and that possibily [sic] some of that testimony would be corroborated in other ways, in any event.
The Court feels, as a result of this conversation, that the witness is not an indispensable witness to the Defendant and that his testimony in all probability will be covered by that of other witnesses, and for this reason the motion for the continuance will be denied.
Tr. 2-3.
A fair reading of this ruling reflects that the primary basis for the district court’s pre-trial decision was its understanding that Nix’s testimony would be cumulative. There can be no doubt that this appraisal was correct. The district court’s assessment that it would be cumulative is borne out by a review of Veasey’s trial testimony and Nix’s subsequent testimony at the remand hearing. It is not necessary to repeat their accounts, for even the majority agrees that Nix’s intended testimony “was substantially similar to Veasey’s account.” Ante at 1397.
However, the majority proceeds to deem the district court’s assessment of Nix’s testimony to be prejudicial error; a conclusion I cannot adopt. The majority errs, in my view, by interjecting its own view that this admittedly cumulative testimony was so crucial, and its absence so prejudicial that the denial of the continuance warrants a reversal of Pruett’s conviction and a whole new trial. I would be inclined to agree with the majority had Veasey not testified and had the jury not heard the testimony of the two arresting officers regarding Pruett’s own statement. But, as I read the record, the jury was presented with the substance of Pruett’s defense by way of Veasey’s testimony, but chose, instead, to believe the arresting officers’ testimony.
For these reasons, I cannot join in a reversal and I would affirm Pruett’s conviction in all respects.