Court Opinion

ID: 9736128
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 18:44:51.166456+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:27:04.569650
License: Public Domain

CIRILLO, Judge,
concurring:
I agree with the decision upholding the trial court’s suppression of evidence upon failure of the Commonwealth to produce a confidential informant in camera. However, I wish to call attention to the distinction between an order to produce a confidential informant in camera, and an order to disclose the informant’s identity to the defendant.
An in camera hearing protects the confidentiality and safety of the informant to the greatest degree practicable while still providing a means of verifying police allegations that they relied on an informant’s information to establish probable cause for a search or arrest. The in camera procedure is in effect a neutral course between complete confidentiality and full disclosure that in most cases would render it unnecessary to sacrifice either the government’s informer privilege or the defendant’s rights on the scales of a “balancing test.”
The New York Court of Appeals instituted and described a regular in camera hearing procedure for that State in *358People v. Darden, 34 N.Y.2d 177, 181, 313 N.E.2d 49, 52, 356 N.Y.S.2d 582, 585-86 (1974); while upholding an order affirming a refusal to disclose an informant’s identity, the Court said:
In any event the court regards it as fair and wise, in a case such as this, where there is insufficient evidence to establish probable cause apart from the testimony of the arresting officer as to communications received from an informer, when the issue of identity of the informer is raised at the suppression hearing, for the suppression Judge then to conduct an in camera inquiry. The prosecution should be required to make the informer available for interrogation before the Judge. The prosecutor may be present but not the defendant or his counsel. Opportunity should be afforded counsel for defendant to submit in writing any questions which he may desire the Judge to put to the informer. The Judge should take testimony, with recognition of the special need for protection of the interests of the absent defendant, and make a summary report as to the existence of the informer and with respect to the communications made by the informer to the police to which the police testify. That report should be made available to the defendant and to the People, and the transcript of testimony should be sealed to be available to the appellate courts if the occasion arises. At all stages of the procedure, of course, every reasonable precaution should be taken to assure that the anonymity of the informer is protected to the maximum degree possible.
The Court of Appeals also demonstrated the advantage of the in camera procedure over a rule requiring outright disclosure:
The weighty considerations countervailing against disclosure of the identity of police informers are evident— “the furtherance and protection of the public interest in effective law enforcement” (Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59, 77 S.Ct. 623, 627, 1 L.Ed.2d 639). Assuring the desirable flow of useful information to the police *359will, of course, depend on predictable and reliable assurances that anonymity of informers will be preserved. The question as to when and in what manner, if at all, identity of the informer and verification of his communication should be established calls for a sensitive and wise balancing of the rights of the individual defendant and the interests of the public. Such a procedure as we have described would be designed to protect against the contingency, of legitimate concern to a defendant, that the informer might have been wholly imaginary and the communication from him entirely fabricated. At the same time the legitimate interests of the police in preserving the anonymity of the informer would be respected.
Id. at 181-82, 313 N.E.2d 49, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 586.
In Commonwealth v. Miller, 334 Pa.Super. 374, 483 A.2d 498 (1984), a panel of this Court followed the lead set in the Darden case. At issue was an order requiring a Commonwealth witness at a suppression hearing to answer questions tending to reveal the identity of a confidential informant whose information allegedly provided probable cause for a search of the defendant’s home. Finding that disclosure of the informant’s identity would jeopardize his safety, we reversed the order requiring disclosure. We pointed out that
the most persuasive case for disclosure is where the examination of the informant is necessary to vindicate a defense on the merits and where the withholding of the information will thereby compromise the truth finding function of the trial. Conversely, ... the need for disclosure is far less compelling when it is sought in connection with pre-trial issues, such as the propriety of search or seizure, which do not bear upon the ultimate question of guilt or innocence.
Miller, 334 Pa.Superior Ct. at 385-386, 383 A.2d at 503 (quoting United States v. Manley, 632 F.2d 978, 985 (2d Cir.1980), cert. denied sub nom. Williams v. United States, 449 U.S. 1112, 101 S.Ct. 922, 66 L.Ed.2d 841 (1981)). See also People v. Goggins, 34 N.Y.2d 163, 313 N.E.2d 41, 356 N.Y.S.2d 571, *360cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1012, 95 S.Ct. 332, 42 L.Ed.2d 286 (1974).
We further held, however, that on remand the suppression court could conduct a Darden-type hearing to insure the legitimacy of police reliance on the informant for probable cause.
As Miller illustrates, in camera production of an informant will often be appropriate where disclosure to the defendant manifestly would not be. . This brings me to my points of agreement and disagreement with the majority opinion. I endorse the majority’s position insofar as it is on common ground with Miller. Both decisions establish that it is within the discretion of the suppression judge whether to order the confidential informant produced so that his existence or the reliability or content of his communications to the police may be verified. Clearly a judge should have discretion to say whether the informant’s testimony is necessary, see State v. Luciow, 308 Minn. 6, 240 N.W.2d 833 (1976); State v. Burnett, 42 N.J. 377, 201 A.2d 39 (1964); People v. Huggins, 36 N.Y.2d 827, 331 N.E.2d 684, 370 N.Y.S.2d 904 (1975) (Darden proceeding discretionary); State v. Cofone, 112 R.I. 760, 315 A.2d 752 (1974); but cf. Schmid v. State, 615 P.2d 565 (Alk.1980) (in camera hearing mandated by procedural rule when search based on information obtained from confidential informant is challenged); moreover, the majority’s formulation of a threshold showing of misrepresentation by the police provides a useful standard to guide the courts in exercising their discretion.
However, I part ways with the majority in that I would vest less discretion in the court as to what type of production to order; in the probable cause context, I would mandate that the in camera proceeding be used in lieu of open-court disclosure unless the interests of justice clearly required otherwise. Where there are substantial allegations that disclosure would endanger an informant, compromise his usefulness, or impair ongoing police investigations, and there are no compelling reasons why the defendant should have access to the informant’s identity, then open-*361court disclosure should not even be considered as an alternative.
Of course,
The in camera hearing should not be viewed as a substitute for disclosure in all cases, for we rely upon an adversarial system of justice, and an ex parte proceeding can never supply the full equivalent of independent research and direct confrontation by the accused. However, in proper cases, such a hearing can avoid an otherwise irreconcilable conflict between the legitimate need for informant anonymity and the right of the defendant to be free of unfounded infringements of his privacy and liberty.
People v. Dailey, 639 P.2d 1068, 1077 n. 11 (Colo.1982).
Under the current state of Pennsylvania law, courts will have to deal with the contention that in camera hearings deprive the defendant of his right to pursue an attack on probable cause through vigorous cross-examination, a right recognized by our Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Hall, 451 Pa. 201, 302 A.2d 342 (1973). However, neither Hall nor any other case in this jurisdiction guarantees a right to confrontation of the informant. See Miller; Commonwealth v. Fox, 267 Pa.Super. 341, 406 A.2d 1072 (1979); see also Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978); McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 87 S.Ct. 1056, 18 L.Ed.2d 62 (1967); Colorado v. Nunez, 465 U.S. 324, 104 S.Ct. 1257, 79 L.Ed.2d 338 (1984) (White, J., concurring in dismissal of certiorari). Cf. Commonwealth v. Bradshaw, 290 Pa.Super. 162, 434 A.2d 181 (1981) (credibility of affiant, not informant, is issue of probable cause hearing); but cf. People v. Nunez, 658 P.2d 879 (Colo.1983), cert. dismissed, Colorado v. Nunez, supra.
Ordinarily, in camera interrogation of the police informant by an impartial finder of fact, under the conditions prescribed in Darden, supra, will be an adequate method to test the truth of probable cause allegations. On those *362infrequent occasions when open-court disclosure is imperative to allow for more probing cross-examination, a proceeding in camera in the first instance will put the court in a better position to make that determination.
The Commonwealth’s objection to in camera proceedings is that even they threaten the interests protected by the informer privilege. I find this objection for the most part unpersuasive. The prospect of having to meet in camera with a judge is unlikely in any given case to deter an informant from cooperating with the police. The informant’s role may be characterized as fairly dangerous in any event, and in camera hearings conducted with the proper circumspection will add little to the risks inherent in the informer’s enterprise. Indeed, institution of a regular practice of proceeding in camera will help to foster the expectation among informants that their identities will be shielded from the view of those informed upon.
I have little difficulty concluding that in this case Judge McGregor’s decision to order an in camera hearing was justified. The Commonwealth’s dark intimations of danger to its informant are completely without merit; Judge McGregor expressed his readiness to take extraordinary precautions for the informant’s protection, and yet the Commonwealth refused to produce him. The defendant contended that in fact no informant existed, and raised no objection to the in camera procedure. Moreover, the defendant established doubt about the informant’s existence sufficient to warrant an in camera hearing. Cf. Commonwealth v. Iannaccio, 304 Pa.Super. 307, 450 A.2d 694 (1982), aff'd by an equally divided court, 505 Pa. 414, 480 A.2d 966 (1984); Commonwealth v. Williams, 236 Pa.Super. 184, 345 A.2d 267 (1975).
Therefore, I concur in the majority’s judgment of affirmance.
WIEAND, J., joins.