Court Opinion

ID: 9776027
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:16:50.700577+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:32.988460
License: Public Domain

P.A. Hollingsworth, Justice, dissenting. I dissent from the Court’s affirmance of this case. This Court has stated that it would re-examine the employment-at-will doctrine in light of the trend to soften its harshness as adopted by other jurisdictions. Jackson v. Kinark Corp., 282 Ark. 548, 669 S.W.2d 898 (1984). The reason this Court has not dealt with the new trend previously is due to the summary disposal of the cases. The Court believed the facts were not properly developed for consideration of this issue. Once again in this instance the maj ority is avoiding dealing with the doctrine by upholding the trial court’s granting of a motion to dismiss for failure to state facts upon which relief can be granted. Ark. R. Civ. P. Rule 12 (b)(6). I believe the appellant did allege facts in his amended complaint upon which relief could be granted. Appellant informed the appellee that he might not be able to make the run the next morning due to his illness. This was sufficient notice to the appellee. The granting of the motion to dismiss should be reversed so that this Court can reconsider the rigid employment-at-will doctrine. This issue is of extreme importance to the citizens of this state. Our economic hard times require that employees be informed as to what infractions can cause them to lose their jobs. It is highly unconscionable that an employee can be fired at the employer’s whim. This Court must examine again its construction of the employment-at-will doctrine in order to alleviate this atrocity. This case was ripe for this determination. I would reverse the lower court’s decision.