Court Opinion

ID: 9780780
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 02:53:19.449181+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:34:13.589517
License: Public Domain

THOMPSON, Justice,
dissenting.
Sharon Tudor filed a caveat to the will of her mother, Roselyn Waller Jones, contending her mother lacked testamentary capacity and was unduly influenced by caveator’s sister, Donna Bradford, the will’s propounder. The will was admitted to probate, and caveator appealed to superior court. When the case was called for trial, caveator asked that the case be returned to probate court so that she could “see an original will.” In that regard, caveator argued that propounder submitted a copy of the will to probate and that her “main complaint is that there is no original will.” The superior court denied the request, pointing out that caveator did not raise that issue *33previously; it also denied caveator’s request for a continuance. I see no error and would affirm the judgment of the superior court. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
Decided March 25, 2011
Reconsideration denied April 12, 2011.
John T. Garcia, for appellant.
When a copy of a will is offered for probate, the burden is on the propounder to rebut a presumption that the original will is lost and the testator intended to revoke it. OCGA § 53-4-46. However, probate courts are courts of record. Cochran v. McCollum, 233 Ga. 104 (210 SE2d 13) (1974); Bragg v. Bragg, 225 Ga. 494, 495 (170 SE2d 29) (1969). Thus, the provisions of the Civil Practice Act govern the procedure used in probate courts, unless they conflict with specific rules of practice of a special statutory proceeding. OCGA §§ 9-11-1; 9-11-81. Because no specific rule of practice requires1 a propounder to plead that the testator did not intend to revoke a will offered for probate, the general rules of pleading, including amendments, are applicable to probate courts and to de novo appeals from probate courts to superior courts. It follows that the propounder of a will need not rebut the presumption that the original will was lost unless the caveator first makes the absence of an original will an issue in the case. As it is said: “ ‘No ground of a caveat will be considered which does not appear in the pleadings, either in the original allegations against the will or in an amendment to the same. [Cits.]’ Redfearn, Wills, Ga., § 6-16 (6th ed.).” Kale v. Wilson, 284 Ga. 536 (668 SE2d 729) (2008).
Here, the caveator did not raise the “original will” issue in a timely or proper manner because she did not raise it in her caveat and, although caveator could have amended her caveat on appeal in the superior court “as to any issue which could have been raised in the [probate court],” Payne v. Payne, 229 Ga. 822 (1) (194 SE2d 458) (1972), the amendment had to have been made in writing. See OCGA § 15-9-88 (“[a]ll objections or caveats to an order sought shall be in writing, setting forth the grounds of such caveat”). Compare Horton v. Burch, 267 Ga. 1 (471 SE2d 879) (1996), in which a caveat was filed on the ground that the will was not the original.
I am authorized to state that Justice Benham joins in this dissent.
*34Johnston, Wilkin & Williams, Wendell E. Johnston, Jr., for appellee.

 By its own terms, the use of Georgia Probate Court Standard Form (GPCSF) 5 is permissible, not mandatory.