Court Opinion

ID: 9844240
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 02:59:34.459225+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:30.865921
License: Public Domain

PETERS, J., Concurring and Dissenting.
I agree with the majority that the portion of the judgment finding defendant guilty of murder in the first degree is supported by substantial evidence and should be affirmed. But, in my opinion, the portion of the judgment imposing the death penalty should be reversed, because inadmissible evidence that was prejudicial was erroneously introduced on that phase of the trial.
Preliminarily it should be pointed out that the determination of whether the death penalty or life imprisonment shall be imposed rests solely in the discretion of the jury. The presence of aggravating circumstances is not necessary to impose the death penalty, nor need there be ameliorating circumstances to warrant the jury in imposing a life sentence. It follows that, if any major error on this phase of the trial in the introduction of evidence occurs that has any relationship to the character of defendant, such error must be held to have been prejudicial. Just such an error, in my opinion, here occurred.
On the guilt phase of the trial the prosecution produced evidence that the victim died after being brutally beaten and raped by defendant. Then, on the penalty phase of the trial, the prosecution, over objection, was permitted to introduce evidence that shortly after the offense here was committed, and while defendant was still at large, he brutally beat and tried to rape a woman in Mexico under circumstances remarkably similar to the beating and rape here involved. The prosecution was permitted to introduce full and complete evidence concerning the details of this claimed other offense. As pointed out by the majority this was the “principal evidence produced by the prosecution” on this phase of the trial. It permitted the prosecution to argue that if defendant committed this second offense he was the *194type of brutal and dangerous man that should never again be at liberty and should suffer the death penalty. If defendant had actually committed this offense in Mexico, the evidence would clearly have been admissible under the “common plan” exception to the general rule excluding evidence of other crimes. That is what most of the cases cited by the majority hold. But if defendant had not committed this crime in Mexico, permitting the prosecutor to argue and this jury to find that he had, and to use this fact as the basis of imposing the death penalty, was gravely prejudicial. The obvious purpose of this evidence was to show the jury that defendant was habitually the kind of man that went around beating and raping women, and should never again be at large. It permitted this jury to, in effect, find that defendant, in fact, had committed this other crime, and therefore should die.
Defendant denied having committed the Mexican offense. This created no more than a conflict in the evidence. But the real question is whether defendant had committed this crime. It had been judicially determined in Mexico that there was not sufficient evidence to show that defendant had committed the offense. As the majority correctly point out, “[defendant was brought to trial by a Mexican court on a charge of rape and released,” that is, acquitted. But, in the prosecution in Los Angeles, the two principals in the Mexican ease were permitted to testify to the very facts that had led the Mexican court and investigating officials to release the defendant. Defendant was compelled to rely on his version of the facts, unsupported by corroborating testimony. The credibility of the prosecution witnesses had already been judicially passed on adversely in Mexico. But now the defendant was called upon to once again face those very same witnesses. He was called to answer the argument of the prosecution that the Mexican court had “made a mistake” and “I ask you ladies and gentlemen not to perpetuate the error.” The prosecuting attorney several times told the jury that through his Mexican witnesses he had demonstrated that defendant had committed the offense in Mexico. The jury was told by the rulings on the evidence, and the arguments of the prosecutor, that it could not only believe these witnesses who testified as to the Mexican offense, but that it could, in effect, determine for itself whether the Mexican offense had been committed. They were told by the prosecutor that, if they came to the conclusion that the offense had been committed, they could consider that fact in *195determining what penalty to impose. This was unfair and deprived defendant of a fair trial on the penalty issue.
The general rule is, of course, that evidence of other offenses is not admissible. To this rule there are several exceptions—but all of them relate to “other offenses.” It is a far cry from the general rule to now hold, as do the majority, that, even though the defendant has been acquitted of the prior charge, evidence that he in fact committed the offense is now admissible. I realize that the rules of evidence and the proper scope of inquiry, on the penalty phase of the trial, are very broad. By section 190.1 of the Penal Code, on that phase of the trial, evidence “of the defendant’s background and history,” can be admitted. This court, quite properly, has interpreted this provision very liberally, both for defendant and the prosecution. Under the broad provisions of this section it is proper to inquire into all facets of the character of defendant and to show the jury just what kind of man he is. Under this liberal rule of admission it may be that the prosecution on the penalty phase of the trial could introduce the fact that defendant had been charged in Mexico with rape and that he had been acquitted. That is part of his background and history. But to detail the circumstances of the alleged crime through the mouths of witnesses that had not been believed in Mexico was to place the defendant in double jeopardy for the same offense in a very real sense. If there is to be a collateral estoppel against a defendant (Teitelbaum Furs, Inc. v. Dominion Ins. Co., Ltd., 58 Cal.2d 601, 604 [25 Cal.Rptr. 559, 375 P.2d 439]) there should also be a collateral estoppel in his favor.
Aside from this reason why detailed evidence of other crimes alleged to have been committed in a foreign country where defendant has been acquitted in that country should not be admitted, there is another sound practical consideration that compels the exclusion of such testimony. Indigent defendants who have to be represented by the public defender, as did defendant here, are not in a position of financial equality with the prosecution, nor do they have the same means of persuasion as does the prosecution. This court and the United States Supreme Court, in a whole series of recent eases, and properly so, have been quite zealous in protecting the rights of indigent defendants against improper invasion. The defense is in no position, as is the prosecution, to induce witnesses to come to this country to testify. In this very case, the record shows that the public defender’s office, with *196its limited resources, did send an investigator to Mexico to try and induce the Mexican trial judge, and the Mexican investigating officers, to come to Los Angeles to testify, even offering to pay their expenses. The witnesses would not come. There was no way to compel them to come. But the prosecution could and did induce the two principals in the Mexican court to come to Los Angeles to testify. Thus, these biased witnesses, who could not convince a court in their own country, who were not believed when the facts were fresh in their minds, were permitted to testify as to the circumstances of the ease, while the defense was required to rely on defendant’s unsupported and uncorroborated denial of these circumstances. Thus, the rule, approved by the majority, results in a denial of due process and a denial of that fair trial guaranteed by the state and federal Constitutions.
I would send the ease back for a retrial of the penalty issue.
Appellant’s petition for a rehearing was denied August 14,1963. Peters, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.