Court Opinion

ID: 9412902
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-01 22:00:30.041741+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:32.276628
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-51229         Document: 00516841935             Page: 1     Date Filed: 08/01/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit
                                                                                United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                         Fifth Circuit

                                      ____________                                     FILED
                                                                                  August 1, 2023
                                        No. 21-51229                              Lyle W. Cayce
                                      ____________                                     Clerk

   United States of America,

                                                                      Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                             versus

   Hae Yeong Song,

                                               Defendant—Appellant.
                      ______________________________

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                           for the Western District of Texas
                                USDC No. 5:19-CR-63-1
                      ______________________________

   Before Jones, Clement, and Haynes, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam: *
         The Government charged Hae Yeong Song with receipt and
   possession of child pornography after investigative agents found an illicit
   image on Song’s cellphone during an investigation into an unrelated incident.
   Song subsequently moved to suppress the child pornography evidence,
   asserting that the agents violated his Fourth Amendment rights when they
   seized and searched his cellphone. The district court denied Song’s motion

         _____________________
          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 21-51229       Document: 00516841935            Page: 2     Date Filed: 08/01/2023

                                       No. 21-51229

   and found him guilty after a bench trial. Song appealed. For the reasons set
   forth below, we AFFIRM.
                                 I.    Factual Background
          When he was a soldier in the United States Army, Song was accused
   of sexually assaulting another soldier, “PFC Kim,” and recording videos of
   the assault on his cellphone. PFC Kim reported the incident to Army
   investigative agents. She also stated that, days after the alleged assault, Song
   messaged her on the “Kakao Talk” app, sent her one of the video recordings,
   and told her he would use it as blackmail if she refused to have sex with him
   again. PFC Kim permitted the agents to review her cellphone, where they
   found a video associated with the incident.
          After receiving PFC Kim’s report and the video, Special Agent
   Andrew Cerean began an investigation.              He first arranged a standard
   interview with Song at an Army field office. Before the interview, Agent
   Cerean attempted to contact the on-duty military magistrate judge and a
   second military magistrate judge to obtain a search and seizure authorization
   for Song’s cellphone. 1 Despite several attempts to reach them, however,
   Agent Cerean did not receive a response. Song later arrived at the office for
   the interview, where he was instructed to follow the standard practice of
   placing his belongings in a locker, which he did.
          The interview began casually, and Song was generally responsive. He
   confirmed that he knew PFC Kim and that she had visited him. However,
   when Agent Cerean began questioning Song about his visit with PFC Kim,
   Song ceased responding and requested a lawyer. Based on PFC Kim’s
   report, the video from her phone, and his conversation with Song, Agent
          _____________________
          1
             A “search and seizure authorization” is another term for a “warrant” in the
   military context. See Mil. R. Evid. 315(a), (d)

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   Cerean determined he had probable cause that (1) Song had sexually
   assaulted PFC Kim and (2) evidence of that assault would be on Song’s
   cellphone. Accordingly, when the interview ended, Agent Cerean declined
   to return Song’s cellphone.
          Before Agent Cerean was able to seek a search and seizure
   authorization, his commanding officer ordered him to give his attention to a
   different matter. Three days later, Agent Cerean submitted an affidavit
   detailing the results of his investigation, and a magistrate judge issued a
   search and seizure authorization for Song’s cellphone. The authorization
   permitted a search of “any contacts; call logs; texts; SMS; MMS: videos;
   images; call & Application Data, including contents from the ‘Kakao Talk’
   application; as well as any deleted messages, content & application data
   between” Song and PFC Kim related to the sexual assault investigation.
          A different agent, Agent Jeffrey Cunningham, conducted the search.
   In his initial review, he was unable to find a particular video related to the
   sexual assault. So, he broadened his review. During this search, he stumbled
   upon an image of child pornography. He immediately ceased his review and
   obtained a second search authorization.         During the search conducted
   pursuant to that second authorization, Agent Cunningham discovered
   extensive images and videos of child pornography.
          The Government subsequently charged Song with receipt and
   possession of child pornography involving a prepubescent minor, in violation
   of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2) and § 2252A(a)(5)(B), respectively. Song moved
   to suppress the initial image, and all evidence stemming from that image, as
   fruit of the poisonous tree. He urged that Agent Cerean’s initial seizure of
   his cellphone and Agent Cunningham’s subsequent search violated his
   Fourth Amendment rights. After two evidentiary hearings, the district court

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   denied Song’s suppression motion. Song proceeded to a bench trial, in which
   the district court found him guilty. After sentencing, Song timely appealed.
                                II.     Standard of Review
          Our review of a district court’s denial of a suppression motion is two-
   fold: we review conclusions of law de novo and factual findings for clear error.
   United States v. Robinson, 741 F.3d 588, 594 (5th Cir. 2014). “[T]he clearly
   erroneous standard is particularly strong” where, as here, the district court
   heard oral testimony and “had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of
   the witnesses.” United States v. Gibbs, 421 F.3d 352, 357 (5th Cir. 2005)
   (quotation omitted). Accordingly, under that standard, we defer to the
   district court’s factual findings unless we are left with “a definite and firm
   conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. Scroggins,
   599 F.3d 433, 440 (5th Cir. 2010). Importantly, we view the evidence “in the
   light most favorable to the prevailing party,” here, the Government. Gibbs,
   421 F.3d at 357.
                                      III.   Discussion
          The district court concluded that neither the seizure nor the
   subsequent search violated Song’s Fourth Amendment rights. Therefore,
   suppression of the child pornography evidence was not warranted. As
   discussed below, we agree.
          A. Seizure
          We begin with Agent Cerean’s seizure of Song’s cellphone. Song
   makes two main challenges. First, he urges that Agent Cerean violated the
   Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable seizures when he
   confiscated Song’s cellphone without a warrant. While seizures generally
   must be conducted pursuant to a warrant, see United States v. Place, 462 U.S.
   696, 701 (1983), there are exceptions. For instance, “the exigencies of the

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   situation [may] make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that [a]
   warrantless search is objectively reasonable.” Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452,
   460 (2011) (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and
   citation omitted).       Accordingly, under this “exigent circumstances
   exception,” an agent does not need a warrant to seize property if he has
   (1) probable cause to believe that a suspect might destroy evidence, and
   (2) exigent circumstances demand it. See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326,
   330–31 (2001); Place, 462 U.S. at 701.
          Here, the Government urges that its warrantless seizure of Song’s
   cellphone was justified by exigent circumstances. We agree. First, there is
   no real debate that Agent Cerean had probable cause that Song’s cellphone
   contained evidence of a sexual assault. PFC Kim’s report, the video on her
   cellphone, and Song’s interview provided ample basis for that conclusion,
   and Song’s counsel agreed as much at oral argument. That requirement is
   easily satisfied.
          Second, we are also satisfied with the district court’s determination
   that exigent circumstances existed. At the conclusion of the interview, Song
   was aware that he was under investigation for sexual assault. See United
   States v. Mata, 517 F.3d 279, 287 (5th Cir. 2008). Therefore, it was
   reasonable for Agent Cerean to believe that Song would remove evidence
   from his phone, which could be readily deleted. See id; see also United States
   v. Diaz, 435 F. App’x 329, 332 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (concluding that
   the warrantless seizure of a computer was justified under the exigent
   circumstances exception because the “digital images” it contained were
   “easily destructible”). That observation is bolstered here by the fact that
   Agent Cerean did not place Song under arrest at the conclusion of the
   interview. So, it was reasonable for Agent Cerean to assume that Song would
   have had the opportunity to delete incriminating evidence, had Agent Cerean

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                                         No. 21-51229

   not kept the cellphone. All of these factors weigh in favor of exigency. See
   Mata, 517 F.3d at 287.
           Song challenges the application of the exception because he says that,
   if any “exigency” existed, it was “manufactured” by Agent Cerean. We
   disagree.     It’s true that an agent who deliberately “creates” exigent
   circumstances cannot later claim the benefit of the exception. King, 563 U.S.
   at 462, 471–72. But, under guiding Supreme Court precedent, an agent
   “creates” an exigency only when he “engag[es] or threaten[s] to engage in
   conduct that violates the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 462, 469.
           Here, Agent Cerean’s pre-warrant conduct plainly did not violate, or
   threaten to violate, the Fourth Amendment. Song fails to cite to anything
   about the lead-up to the interview or the interview itself that would cause us
   to pause. 2 There’s no indication, for example, that Agent Cerean unlawfully
   required him to appear for the interview; unconstitutionally coerced Song to
   bring his cellphone to the Army office; or violated Song’s rights by requesting
   that Song place his belongings in a locker. Rather, Song concedes that such
   a request is “routinely done.” Moreover, the Supreme Court has expressly
   rejected the notion that an agent “manufactures” exigency if he conducts an
   interview without a seizure authorization. 3 See id. at 458, 466–67 (rejecting
   lower court tests that considered whether an officer could have obtained a
   search warrant prior to the development of the exigent circumstances).

           _____________________
           2
             In fact, his counsel conceded at oral argument that nothing about the interview
   violated the Fourth Amendment.
           3
            The Court observed that “[f]aulting the police for failing to apply for a search
   warrant at the earliest possible time after obtaining probable cause imposes a duty that is
   nowhere to be found in the Constitution.” Id. at 467. It therefore concluded that those
   tests were “unsound” and would “unjustifiably interfere[] with legitimate law
   enforcement strategies.” Id. at 464, 466.

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   Thus, for all these reasons, we conclude the exigent circumstances exception
   justified the warrantless seizure.
           We now turn to Song’s second challenge, which involves Agent
   Cerean’s post-seizure conduct. Song asserts that it was constitutionally
   unreasonable for Agent Cerean to wait three days to obtain a warrant after
   seizing Song’s cellphone. Therefore, suppression was warranted. While a
   delay could possibly become unreasonable, Song has no authority that the
   brief delay at issue here was unreasonable, particularly since Agent Cerean
   had a more pressing emergency in the few intervening days. See United States
   v. Martinez, 25 F.4th 303, 308–09 (5th Cir. 2022); see also United States v.
   Mitchell, 565 F.3d 1347, 1353 (11th Cir. 2009) (noting that delay may be
   reasonable where “some overriding circumstances arose, necessitating the
   diversion of law enforcement personnel to another case”); accord United
   States v. Stabile, 633 F.3d 219, 236 (3d Cir. 2011) (“[S]uch overriding
   circumstances were present because [the agent] was assigned to what was
   obviously important security work.”). In any event, “police imperfection is
   not enough to warrant reversal,” particularly when a delay is relatively brief.
   United States v. Burgard, 675 F.3d 1029, 1034 (7th Cir. 2012).
           We therefore conclude that Agent Cerean did not unreasonably
   interfere with Song’s possessory interests, and the three-day delay did not
   amount to a Fourth Amendment violation. 4

           _____________________
           4
             We recognize that Song undoubtedly has a possessory interest in his cellphone,
   which likely holds personal and confidential information. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S.
   373, 393–94 (2014). But Agent Cerean’s overall diligence simply outweighs that possessory
   interest.

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                                        No. 21-51229

          B. Search
          Song next asserts that suppression was warranted because Agent
   Cunningham violated the Fourth Amendment’s protection against
   unreasonable searches. Song advances two challenges.
          First, Song contends that Agent Cunningham impermissibly exceeded
   the scope of the search authorization. We disagree. As we have noted,
   “Fourth Amendment reasonableness is the bedrock principle that guides
   computer as well as physical searches.” United States v. Triplett, 684 F.3d
   500, 505 (5th Cir. 2012). With a physical search, an officer executing a search
   warrant may look anywhere evidence described in the warrant might
   conceivably be located. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820–21 (1982).
   Similarly, in the digital context, a “search may be as extensive as reasonably
   required to locate the items described in the warrant based on probable
   cause.” Triplett, 684 F.3d at 505 (quotation omitted).
          Here, the purpose of the search authorization was to locate
   conversations and media related to the alleged sexual assault;5 and Agent
   Cunningham “followed a reasonable protocol toward that end,” starting
   narrowly and expanding only as needed to find responsive data. See id.
          There’s no indication that Agent Cunningham freely roamed through
   all the contents of Song’s cellphone, as Song protests. He did need to
   broaden his search at some point. But that was not unreasonable. Rather, as
   we have advised, agents “should limit [their] exposure to innocent files”; but
   “in the end, there may be no practical substitute for actually looking in many

          _____________________
          5
            Recall that the search authorization permitted Agent Cunningham to examine
   Song’s cellphone for “texts; SMS; MMS; videos; images; call [and] [a]pplication data”
   from the Kakao Talk App, “as well any deleted messages, content, and [a]pplication data
   between” Song and PFC Kim “related to the alleged” sexual assault.

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   (perhaps all) folders and sometimes at the documents contained within those
   folders.” Id. at 506 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Because
   Agent Cunningham, “followed a reasonable protocol toward” locating the
   “items described in the warrant,” we conclude that he did not “violate[] the
   Fourth Amendment in a way requiring suppression.” 6 Id. at 505–06.
           We now turn to Song’s second challenge, which asserts that the
   search authorization was impermissibly broad. We again disagree. It’s true
   that an overly broad warrant may violate the Fourth Amendment, and
   therefore, warrant suppression. See United States v. Sanjar, 876 F.3d 725, 735
   (5th Cir. 2017). But a warrant is sufficiently tailored—and therefore, not
   overbroad—when (1) it “provide[s] sufficient notice” of the particular areas
   an agent may search, and (2) “probable cause exist[s] to justify listing” those
   areas as being subject to search. See id. at 735–36. The search authorization
   here satisfied both requirements.
           First, the authorization provided specific notice of the types of data
   (i.e., areas) Agent Cunningham could search: SMS, MMS, videos, images,
   calls, and application data related to the sexual assault.                  Even if that
   authorization was “somewhat generic,” it nevertheless “provided sufficient
   notice of what items” Agent Cunningham could view. See id. at 736; Triplett,
   684 F.3d at 504–05. Song concedes as much, recognizing that “the warrant
   restricted” Agent Cunningham “to discrete and limited categories of
   information on Song’s phone.”

           _____________________
           6
             We also find unpersuasive Song’s argument that Agent Cunningham should have
   ceased his investigation after locating some of the relevant videos. “[L]aw enforcement
   officers are under no constitutional duty to call a halt to criminal investigation the moment
   they have the minimum evidence to establish probable cause.” King, 563 U.S. at 467
   (quotation omitted).

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          Second, as discussed above, there’s no debate that the agents had
   probable cause to believe that Song’s cellphone contained videos, images,
   and conversation related to the alleged sexual assault. The authorization here
   constrained Agent Cunningham’s search to only content related to the
   incident. Accordingly, we conclude the authorization was not overly broad,
   and suppression was not warranted.
                                 IV.     Conclusion
          For all these reasons, we AFFIRM.

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