Court Opinion

ID: 9951707
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-18 20:02:37.268077+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:42:08.485706
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/18/24 Porporato v. Unchained Labs CA1/1
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publi-
cation or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or or-
dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                    DIVISION ONE

 ROBERT W. PORPORATO,
              Plaintiff and Appellant,                                      A167144

 v.                                                                      (Alameda County
 UNCHAINED LABS,                                                         Super. Ct. No.
                                                                      21CV002916)
              Defendant and Respondent.

                                       MEMORANDUM OPINION1
          Plaintiff and appellant Robert W. Porporato appeals from a summary
judgment in favor of his former employer, defendant Unchained Labs (UL).
In August 2021, in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, UL adopted a
mandatory vaccination policy. In areas where vaccines were available,
employees were required to become vaccinated and to provide “vaccination
confirmation” to the Human Resources Department (HR) by August 31st.2

       This appeal is appropriately resolved by Memorandum Opinion
          1

pursuant to California Standards of Judicial Administration, section 8.1.
        It is undisputed that UL’s mandatory vaccine requirement was
          2

lawful. (See Department of Fair Employment and Housing “Information on
COVID-19” (Feb. 16, 2022), p. 7 (“DFEH Guidance”)
<https://calcivilrights.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/32/2023/03/DFEH-
Employment-Information-on-COVID-19-FAQ_ENG.pdf> [as of Mar. 18,
2024].)

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Porporato did not provide confirmation he was vaccinated by that date.
Accordingly, his employment was terminated a week later, on September 8th.
      In November, Porporato filed the instant lawsuit alleging one cause of
action—that UL and several of its employees had violated Civil Code section
56.20, subdivision (b), of the Confidentiality of Medical Information Act
(CMIA) (Civ. Code, § 56 et seq.)3 by asking for proof of vaccination status. UL
and the employees moved for, and were granted, summary judgment.4
      Waiver
      Porporato filed opening and closing briefs that do not contain a single
citation to the record, and UL asks that his appeal be dismissed. California
Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C) provides that each brief must “[s]upport
any reference to a matter in the record by a citation to the volume and page
number of the record where the matter appears,” and it is a “cardinal
principle[] of appellate review” that an “appellant who fails to cite accurately
to the record forfeits the issue or argument on appeal that is presented

      3 The Act consists of more than 40 separate statutes. All further
statutory references are to the CMIA unless otherwise indicated.
      4  In his appellant’s opening brief, Porporato expressly disclaimed any
challenge to the trial court’s ruling that the individually named employee
defendants could not be subject to liability under the CMIA, stating on page 8
of his opening brief that he “does not address issue [sic] of liability in regards
to the individually-named Defendants in Appellant’s Complaint unless the
court [sic] since Civ[il] Code [section] 56.36 remedies as applied to individuals
is only applicable after a finding of liability based upon the evidence
presented at trial. This appeal will focus only on the liability of
Defendant/Respondent Unchained Labs arising from its multiple violations of
the CMIA, codified as Civil Code [section] 56 et seq.” We disregard his effort
to raise the issue for the first time in his appellant’s closing brief. (See Starr
v. Mayhew (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 842, 854 [“ ‘ “arguments made for the first
time in a reply brief will not be entertained because of the unfairness to the
other party” ’ ”].)

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without the record reference.” (Alki Partners, LP v. DB Fund Services, LLC
(2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 574, 589; see City of Santa Maria v. Adam (2012)
211 Cal.App.4th 266, 287 [“Rather than scour the record unguided, we may
decide that the appellant has waived a point urged on appeal when it is not
supported by accurate citations to the record.”]; Duarte v. Chino Community
Hospital (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 849, 856 [“If a party fails to support an
argument with the necessary citations to the record, that portion of the brief
may be stricken and the argument deemed to have been waived.”].)
      Had Porporato made some effort to support his arguments with
appropriate record citations, we might be inclined to overlook this
fundamental deficiency in his briefing. However, he provided zero record
citations in his opening brief, including his factually laden, two-plus page
“Introduction” and his two-page “Factual Background.” (Some capitalization
& boldface omitted.) In his closing brief, Porporato made no attempt to
rectify the problem, even though UL pointed it out in its respondent’s brief.
To the contrary, Porporato made light of his failure to cite to the record,
inviting us to “ignore all of the procedural gripes opposing counsel has and
rule on the substantive issues, as this Court has the broad discretion to do.”
We decline Porporato’s invitation to overlook such flagrant disregard of the
rules on appeal.
      No Merit
      Even were we inclined to reach the merits of Porporato’s appeal, we
would conclude it is meritless. Porporato’s claim is based on a single
provision of the CMIA, specifically section 56.20, subdivision (b). This
statutory provision states, “No employee shall be discriminated against in
terms or conditions of employment due to that employee’s refusal to sign an
authorization under this part. However, nothing in this section shall prohibit

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an employer from taking such action as is necessary in the absence of medical
information due to an employee’s refusal to sign an authorization under this
part.” (§ 56.20, subd. (b).)
      Thus, by its plain terms, section 56.20, subdivision (b) requires, as a
threshold matter, that an employee be asked to sign an “authorization” for
the release of the employee’s medical records. “Authorization,” for purposes
of the CMIA, “means permission granted in accordance with Section 56.11 or
56.21 for the disclosure of medical information.” (§ 56.05, subd. (a).) Section
56.11, subdivision (b), in turn, specifies that an “authorization for the release
of medical information by a provider of health care, health care service plan,
pharmaceutical company, or contractor” is “valid” if it is “handwritten” or “in
a typeface” of 14-point font or larger, is set apart from any other writing on
the document, has a signature line pertaining solely to the authorization, and
is signed and dated by “[t]he patient” or a designated representative.
(§ 56.11, subd. (b)(1)–(3)(A)–(B).) Section 56.21 imposes the same
requirements for a “valid” authorization for “an employer to disclose medical
information.”
      It is undisputed that Porporato was not presented with, nor asked to
sign, any “authorization” for the release of his medical records from any
health care provider. He maintains he was effectively asked to do so,
however, because he was required to provide proof of compliance with UL’s
mandatory COVID-19 vaccination policy.
      To begin with, the CMIA is directed at requests made by third parties
to health care providers or to employers for copies of a patient’s or employee’s
medical records. (See Loder v. City of Glendale (1997) 14 Cal.4th 846, 861
(Loder) [“An employer ‘discriminates’ against an employee in violation of
section 56.20, subdivision (b), if it improperly retaliates against or penalizes

                                        4
an employee for refusing to authorize the employee’s health care provider to
disclose confidential medical information to the employer or others (see Civ.
Code, § 56.11), or for refusing to authorize the employer to disclose
confidential medical information relating to the employee to a third party (see
Civ. Code, § 56.21).”].) The Act is not directed at, and does not control, the
choice—to disclose or not to disclose—made by the person whose medical
information is sought.
      Thus, as the Court of Appeal observed in Rossi v. Sequoia Union
Elementary School (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 974, 990, footnote 11 (Rossi),
regardless of whether “a literal authorization form is required,” “what is
important is that there be allegations that the employer was actually seeking
the [employee’s] permission to obtain [his/]her medical information from a
healthcare provider. (See §§ 56.05, subd. (a), 56.11.)” What the plaintiff
alleged in Rossi was that “she was instructed to personally provide proof of
vaccination to her employer.” (Id. at p. 990, fn. 11, italics added.) While
“that document would include medical information derived from a health care
provider, there [was] no allegation that the . . . defendants ever requested
that plaintiff authorize her health care provider to disclose that information
to defendants.” (Ibid.) The facts of the instant case are the same—UL never
sought to obtain Porporato’s vaccination record from a health care provider.
For this reason, alone, Porporato has no claim under section 56.20,
subdivision (b).5

      5  Porporato’s reliance on Kao v. University of San Francisco (2014)
229 Cal.App.4th 437, is misplaced. As the court in Rossi pointed out, the
plaintiff in that case, who had refused to undergo a fitness-for-duty
examination, was, in fact, presented with a “ ‘consent form’ ” related to the
requested examination. And “in any event, the [court] was not deciding an
issue related to the prima facie elements of [a section 56.20, subdivision (b)]
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      Section 56.20, subdivision (b), further states that “nothing in this
section shall prohibit an employer from taking such action as is necessary in
the absence of medical information due to an employee’s refusal to sign an
authorization under this part.” In order to have a mandatory COVID-19
vaccination policy, an employer must, of course, be able to determine whether
an employee is vaccinated and remove an employee who chooses not to
provide proof of such from the workforce. As the Supreme Court observed in
Loder, in rejecting a section 56.20, subdivision (b) challenge to an employer’s
mandatory drug testing program, “an employer-mandated medical
examination or drug testing procedure obviously would be totally ineffective
if an employer could not treat an individual who refuses to permit the
employer to learn the ultimate results of the examination in the same fashion
as an individual who refuses to complete the test.” (Loder, supra, 14 Cal.4th
at p. 861.)
      As noted, there is no dispute that UL’s mandatory COVID-19
vaccination policy was lawful. In March 2021, the State Department of Fair
Employment and Housing ( now the Civil Rights Department) issued
guidance information advising private employers they could adopt a
mandatory COVID-19 vaccination policy so long as the policy did not
discriminate on the basis of a protected characteristic, provided reasonable
accommodations related to disability and sincerely held religious beliefs, and
did not retaliate against an employee for exercising a protected right, for
example, requesting reasonable accommodation. (See Department of Fair
Employment and Housing “Information on COVID-19” (Mar. 4, 2021), p. 7
<https://www.seiinc.org/uploads/1/1/2/6/11264215/dfeh_employment_informat

claim, but rather the sufficiency of the evidence to support the necessity
exception.” (Rossi, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 990, fn. 11.)

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ion_on_covid-19.pdf> [as of Mar. 18, 2024].) And in conjunction therewith,
employers could ask for proof of vaccination on providing assurance the
information would be kept confidential. (31 No. 10 Cal. Emp. L. Letter 1
(March 22, 2021) [summarizing guidance bulletins issued by the Department
of Fair Housing and Employment]; see DFEH Guidance, supra, at p. 10
<https://calcivilrights.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/32/2023/03/DFEH-
Employment-Information-on-COVID-19-FAQ_ENG.pdf> [as of Mar. 18, 2024]
[employer with mandatory vaccine policy may ask employees for proof of
vaccination].) It is undisputed that UL’s mandatory COVID-19 vaccination
policy allowed for bona fide religious and medical exemptions as required by
the FEHA guidance.
      In his appellant’s opening brief, Porporato made no reference to any
request for a religious or medical exemption, let alone provided record
citations of such. Nor, in his appellant’s closing brief, did he make any
reference to any exemption request in responding to UL’s brief, wherein UL
pointed out its mandatory vaccination policy allowed such exemptions.
      At oral argument, counsel stated Porporato requested a religious
exemption which was denied, although counsel provided no record citations to
such.6 Our own review of the record discloses that in his complaint Porporato
included the following allegation: That after notifying the HR department

      6 Counsel referred to the deposition testimony of Christine Lau but
provided no page reference. Furthermore, the trial court sustained UL’s
objection to this deposition testimony, and Porporato did not challenge this
evidentiary ruling in his briefs. We therefore disregard the testimony. (See
Provost v. Regents of University of California (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1289,
1294 [“we do not consider all of the loose and disparate arguments that are
not clearly set out in a heading and supported by reasoned legal argument”];
Roe v. McDonald’s Corp. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1107, 1114 [“[T]here is no
separate argument heading or analysis of the issue. That alone is grounds to
deem the argument waived.”].)
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that he “ ‘revoke[d] any consent I may or may not have provided you in the
past, express or implied’ ” to “ ‘ANY disclosure’ ” of his “ ‘medical
information,’ ” he received a response from employee Shelly Morales which
stated in pertinent part:
      “ ‘Bob, My attempted followup [sic] with you was regarding the
      accommodation that you are requesting in light of the religious
      exemption you have sought from [UL’s] vaccination policy. As you
      know, [UL] initially asked for further documentation pertaining to your
      request for a religious exemption, given that you initially request[ed]
      not to get the vaccine for what appeared to be purely secular reasons,
      following that you said you were going to explore obtaining a medical
      exemption but were unable to get one from your doctor, and you said
      that when it came to your religious beliefs, your religious faith is in
      God but not a church full of clergy men and women, even though you
      subsequently provided a statement from a clergy member apparently
      associated with a church. Nevertheless, we have reviewed your
      religious exemption request and asked what alternative
      accommodations you are requesting, to engage in a thorough
      interactive dialogue with you to determine whether we can grant an
      accommodation. We understand that your only request is to not get
      vaccinated against the COVID virus. You have also previously asked
      whether there were alternatives that [UL] would allow, and you gave
      examples of fever screening at the front door, completing a
      questionnaire before/upon entry to the facilities, and offsetting hours
      like working on the weekends. We have considered each of these
      potential alternatives to taking the vaccine, along with other potential
      measures, including remote work, social distancing, and changes to the
      workplace such as the insertion of plexiglass barriers in the lab. After
      detailed consideration of each of these potential accommodations, with
      respect to your position, we have concluded that we are unable to
      provide them without causing an undue hardship to [UL]. . . . Your
      role as Director of SW Test is a leadership role with [UL], requiring
      extensive in-person work in our lab and other facilities. It also requires
      you to interface directly with numerous employees and others, . . .
      Moreover, a significant portion of your job requires that you work
      closely together with other individuals on particular equipment and
      devices. . . . As you know this work requires close contact for extended
      periods of time. . . . This work cannot be performed remotely . . . ,
      cannot be performed alone, and individuals performing this work

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      cannot be separated by plexiglass or other barriers. . . . [W]hile we
      have considered fever and other screening measures at the door and
      pre-entry questionnaires, as well as proof of negative COVID tests, we
      do not believe any of those measures would adequately protect the
      safety of other employees. It is clear from CDC and other guidance that
      individuals who do not show any symptoms of the virus may still carry
      and transmit it. . . . Accordingly, we believe there would be a
      significant risk to the safety and health of our employees to grant any
      of these accommodations. . . .’ ”

      This allegation confirms that UL’s mandatory vaccination policy
included the exemptions required by the FEHA. More significantly, while
Porporato quoted this communication in the “preliminary summary of the
facts of [the] case” set forth in his complaint, he did not allege any cause of
action, under the FEHA or any other anti-discrimination law, that UL
engaged in unlawful discrimination in denying either a religious or medical
exemption. Rather, he advanced a single cause of action entitled “Violations
of the Confidentiality of Medical Information Act as codified within California
Civil Code [section] 56.20(b).” (Italics omitted.)
      Nor did Porporato make any discrimination claim in the trial court in
opposing UL’s motion for summary judgment. Indeed, such an argument
would have been improper in opposing UL’s motion for summary judgment.
(See Hutton v. Fidelity National Title Co. (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 486, 493
[plaintiff cannot defeat summary judgment by advancing claims not pled in
complaint].) Rather, Porporato argued UL had violated the CMIA in “four
main ways”—one, UL terminated his employment based on his “refusal to
authorize” UL to obtain “medical information about him”; two, UL’s
mandatory vaccination policy “ended up extorting medical information” based
on “medical information it had obtained about him without first seeking the
required authorization”; three, in the process of terminating his employment,

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UL employees “discussed” his “confidential medical information with each
other”; and four, by implementing its mandatory vaccination without
obtaining the required authorization under the CMIA. (Boldface & italics
omitted.) He also took issue with what he called UL’s “necessity” defense,
arguing there were “reasonable accommodations” that “could have been
made,” citing to his declaration in opposition wherein he generically asserted
the accommodations he had suggested to UL and UL had rejected were
feasible.
      In its reply memorandum, UL pointed out the pivotal issue was
whether Porporato had ever been asked to provide an “authorization” under
the CMIA and was “retaliated against” for not doing so. It further pointed
out, he had never advanced any failure to accommodate or other
discrimination claim.
      As we have discussed, UL’s position was well taken. Accordingly, there
was no reason for the trial court to consider Porporato’s generic assertion
that “accommodations” could have been extended. Nor did it.
                               DISPOSITION
      The judgment is AFFIRMED. Respondent to recover costs on appeal.

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                                            _________________________
                                            Banke, J.

We concur:

_________________________
Humes, P.J.

_________________________
Castro, J.*

**Judge of the Alameda County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

A167144, Porporato v. Unchained Labs

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