Court Opinion

ID: 9594131
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:27:24.131388+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:23.014374
License: Public Domain

STEWART, Justice,
dissenting:
I dissent. The majority, in a decision unparalleled in Utah jurisprudence, refuses to enforce the plain meaning of Article I, section 4 of the Utah Constitution and instead rewrites that provision to reach a result directly contrary to the unambiguous language and intent of that provision.1
I.
Article I, section 4 of the Utah Constitution states (bracketed numbers are added for ease of reference to specific provisions therein):
The rights of conscience shall never be infringed. [1] The State shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; no religious test shall be required as a qualification for any office of public trust or for any vote at any election; nor shall any person be incompetent as a witness or juror on account of religious belief or the absence thereof. [2] There shall be no union of Church and State, nor shall any church dominate the State, or interfere ivith its functions. [3] No public money or property shall be appropriated for or applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction, or for the support of any ecclesiastical establishment. No property qualification shall be required of any person to vote or hold office, except as provided in this Constitution.
(Emphasis added.) The critical language is “No public money ... shall be appropriated for ... any religious ... exercise.”
Article I, section 4 provides greater clarity and specificity in protecting religious freedom in this state than do the religion clauses in the United States Constitution. When Utah became a state, the First Amendment did not apply to the states. Indeed, the Framers of the United States Constitution contemplated that state constitutions, rather than the federal constitution, would provide the legal basis for protecting civil liberties from invasion by state action. The Framers of the Utah Constitution, most of whom were devoutly religious, were particularly concerned with providing effective protection for freedom of religion, especially with respect to the separation of church and state, in light of the overwhelming influence of the predominant church. The Framers no doubt recognized that freedom of religion was an indivisi*942ble right and that the prohibitions on the establishment of religion and the guarantee of the free exercise of religion were not two different rights, but separate ways of ensuring the fundamental right of freedom of religion. Thus, in writing Article I, section 4, the Framers sought to make clear the line that should separate church and state. That line was especially important in this state because of the unique issues of church-state relationships that existed in the territory and, indeed, that continue to exist to a considerable extent today. Because the broad establishment clause language taken from the First Amendment to the United States Constitution was vague, the drafters of the Utah Constitution provided additional, more specific provisions to prevent state power and influence from being used to establish or further the interest of any or all religious denominations.
The language in section 4 following “[1]” in the text set out above adopts verbatim the establishment and the free exercise language of the First Amendment. The language following “[2]” is not found in the First Amendment but was deemed appropriate given the unique circumstances in the state. It prohibits the union of church and state and prohibits any church from dominating the state or interfering with its function. The language following “[3]” provides that “no public money or property shall be appropriated for or applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction, or for the support of any ecclesiastical establishment.” That language makes specific that public money and property shall not be used for the purpose of establishing any one or all religious groups.
The Framers of the Utah Constitution, most of whom were Mormon, well knew that they dealt with a society unique in the United States in its religious character. They also knew from the Mormon experience in Ohio, Missouri, Illinois, and elsewhere that freedom of religion was not easily protected from invasions by those who, in presuming to act in defense of their own religion and pursuant to divine sanction, as they supposed, suppressed the religious freedom of others. With that background, and with knowledge of the intense criticism and concern that the United States Congress and minority groups in the Utah Territory had for the political power of the predominant church, the Framers undertook to guarantee freedom of religion and conscience (even of nonbelievers) with specificity and particularity. It was because of the greater protection afforded freedom of religion to citizens of this state that Justices Crockett, Ellett, and Henriod, who earlier sat on this Court, expressed the view that the language in Article I, section 4 of the Utah Constitution was superior to the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. Manning v. Sevier County, 30 Utah 2d 305, 310, 517 P.2d 549, 552-53 (1973) (Crockett, J., concurring with Ellett, J., and Henriod, J., concurring in Justice Crockett’s opinion). I believe they were correct.
In construing section 4, it is important to recognize that the anti-establishment provisions in the Utah Constitution and the free exercise provision do not protect two different rights; they protect one fundamental right, although both provisions are essential to accomplish the purpose. There is, unfortunately, a pervasive misconception in society generally, and in the majority opinion specifically, that the anti-establishment provisions are somehow hostile to religion. That is not true. While it is true that devout people often want government institutions to reflect the symbols of their deeply held views and commitments and, indeed, to reflect the deep Judeo-Christian roots that have nourished this nation and state, it is nonetheless the ease that the constitutional guarantees of freedom of religion, by enforcing a strict boundary between church and state, have made America the most amenable of all nations to religious freedom and, not coincidentally, one of the most religious nations in the world. Indeed, it is my view that in those countries where one or several religious denominations are established, religion is a much less vital force in the lives of the people. Coopting the state to promote religion is inimical to the state, to religion generally, and to all citizens, believers and nonbelievers alike.
Recently, the United States Supreme Court addressed the importance of the Establishment Clause in protecting religious freedom and its relationship to the Free Ex*943ercise Clause of the First Amendment. In Lee v. Weisman, — U.S. —, —, 112 S.Ct. 2649, 2657-58, 120 L.Ed.2d 467, 483 (1992), the Court stated:
The First Amendment protects speech and religion by quite different mechanisms. Speech is protected by insuring its full expression even when the government participates, for the very object of some of our most important speech is to persuade the government to adopt an idea as [its] own. The method for protecting freedom of worship and freedom of conscience in religious matters is quite the reverse. In religious debate or expression the government is not a prime participant, for the Framers deemed religious establishment antithetical to the freedom of all. The Free Exercise Clause embraces a freedom of conscience and worship that has close parallels in the speech provisions of the First Amendment, but the Establishment Clause is a specific prohibition on forms of state intervention in religious affairs with no precise counterpart in the speech provisions. The explanation lies in the lesson of history that was and is the inspiration for the Establishment Clause, the lesson that in the hands of government what might begin as a tolerant expression of religious views may end in a policy to indoctrinate and coerce.
(Emphasis added; citations omitted.) The danger that tolerant expression of religious views by the state “may end in a policy to indoctrinate and coerce” becomes greater as the dominance of one religious group increases.
Thomas Jefferson, the great sage of American religious freedom, understood, perhaps better than any other, the exigent necessity of preventing the entanglement of government and religious denominations, if freedom of religion was to be a reality. The principles articulated in Article I, section 4 are rooted in and ultimately derived from the principles espoused by Jefferson in his historic Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom in Virginia. That bill, which subsequently served as a basis for the First Amendment Religion Clause, stated:
Almighty God hath created the mind free.... [T]o compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves in and abhors, is sinful and tyrannical.... [TJruth is great and will prevail if left to herself.
Nathan Schachner, Thomas Jefferson: A Biography 159-60 (1957) (emphasis added).
Those who opposed the Bill for Religious Freedom and the disestablishment of the Anglican Church adopted the cynical but appealing tactic of arguing that to avoid “hostility” to religion, all Christian churches, except the Catholic church, should be established and receive state monetary support. Nathan Schachner, a biographer of Thomas Jefferson, wrote:
[The opponents] now insisted, .with but few honorable exceptions like the Baptists, that all Christian churches be considered as established and entitled to support; that toleration be extended only to those believing in “one God, and a future State of rewards and punishments;” and that every freeholder and possessor of tithables be compelled to enroll and declare to which of the established churches he chose to contribute. Not even the Roman Catholic Church would have come within the definition.
Id. at 160.
Today, a majority of this Court argues, not unlike those who opposed the disestablishment in Virginia, that the state may, contrary to the express language of Article I, section 4[3], use public money for promoting religious worship, exercise, and instruction if it is neutral as between religions in doing so. That is precisely the same argument that was urged against Jefferson’s bill for religious toleration and that, fortunately for this country, was rejected.
II.
The exact language in Article I, section 4 that controls the issue in this case is “No public money or property shall be appropriated for or applied to any religious ... exercise.” (Emphasis added.) The majority concedes, as it must, that Salt Lake City uses city funds to pay employees to supervise, monitor, and even, in effect, censor prayers *944by providing guidelines for what is not acceptable, such as proselytizing — a restriction that might well be highly offensive to a Jehovah’s Witness, for example. Indeed, a city employee was designated to recruit representatives of various faiths to attend Council meetings and offer prayers.2 While the City’s effort was laudable insofar as it sought the participation of a number of denominations, that does not mitigate the undisputable entanglement of religion and government and the use of tax funds to accomplish a religious purpose.3 That difficulty has long been a central concern of establishment cases, see Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971), in part because it so often gives rise to unseemly, divisive sectarian struggles for greater influence in governmental practices.
The majority also admits that the City’s sponsorship of prayer is sponsorship of “a religious exercise” as that term is used in section 4. And the majority admits that “public money” is “appropriated” for that purpose. Indeed, the majority concedes that the City’s use of funds for the sponsorship of prayer is not de minimus. As the majority recognizes, such an exception would “fundamentally alter the ban of Article I, section 4 by replacing the word ‘no’ with the words ‘no more than the courts think reasonable.’ ”4 I agree that prayer is a “religious exercise” and that the City Council’s use of funds to finance the practice of opening council meetings with prayer is not a “de minimis” exception to the “no public money” language. The inevitable conclusion that follows from those concessions and the plain language of section 4 is that the City Council’s program for establishing prayers is unconstitutional, and the majority does not deny that.
The majority refuses, however, to enforce the plain and unambiguous meaning of section 4, despite its sworn duty to uphold the language of the constitution. The Court not only shrinks from its duty, but, worse, it ascribes a completely contrary meaning to section 4 under the guise of a constitutional “interpretation” that it argues is necessary to avoid “hostility” toward religion. The majority argues that “our analysis should [not] be limited to the literal reading of two sentences of that provision (i.e., section 4), particularly when ... such a literal reading produces practical consequences that seem at odds with other provisions in the constitution.”
The majority is flatly wrong; other provisions in the constitution are not at odds with section 4, and the majority fails to prove that proposition. The Court also seeks to justify its abandonment of the plain language of the constitution on the ground that “to refuse to permit religion to benefit from public expenditures would be to adopt an absolutist reading of ‘no’ public money or property.” (Emphasis added.) Thus, according to the Court, to say that the word “no” in the constitution means “no” is to take an unacceptable “absolutist” position, a position from which the Framers did not shrink.
Having decided that the word “no” does not mean “no,” the majority rewrites the constitution in favor of a so-called “middle ground” by concocting a distinction between public expenditures and uses of property that provide a “direct” benefit to religion and *945those that provide only an “indirect” benefit. This contrived “middle ground” is devised, so the Court unblushingly states, to avoid the “hostility toward religion ... which is fundamentally at odds with all our history.”
To assert that the plain language of Article I, section 4 is hostile to religion demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding of the doctrine of separation of church and state as it was intended to apply in Utah and of the purpose and effect of Article I, section 4. Beyond that, the Court’s asserted examples of “hostility” are simply contrived and would not, in fact, occur under a proper reading of section 4.
The language of section 4 precludes public expenditures for “any religious worship, exercise or instruction.” For the majority to assert that that language would not allow religion to benefit “from [any] public expenditures” is absurd. Asserting such an erroneous argument and extreme position appears to be for the purpose of making the departure from the language of section 4 seem justified. Section 4 simply and plainly does not prohibit religion from benefiting in general from public expenditures or public property, as do all other entities and persons. This Court has never construed section 4 in a fashion that supports the majority’s in terro-rem argument. Doing so would clearly run afoul of not only the language of section 4, but also numerous other constitutional provisions, both state and federal. It is simply wrong that section 4, read literally, would prohibit government from allowing religion to benefit from general public expenditures and property used by the public. The Court’s “governmental neutrality” among religions in the use of “public money or property” for purposes other than religious worship, exercises, or instruction adds nothing to what the law is now and always has been.
The plain language of section 4 cannot reasonably be read to provide that religious denominations cannot benefit from public safety and fire protection, public parks, roads, and utilities, or other government properties established for furthering the health, safety, and welfare of the public generally. See Manning v. Sevier County, 30 Utah 2d 305, 309-10, 517 P.2d 549, 552 (1973). Nor does section 4, reasonably construed, bar any religious group from using a public park that is open to the public generally, or from using a microphone or soapbox outside city hall to speak on political or social issues.
The literal language of section 4 requires the Court to look to the purpose for which tax money and government property are used. Only government appropriations for worship, religious exercises, and instruction are banned, as is the exclusive use of government property for such practices. Pratt v. Arizona Board of Regents, 110 Ariz. 466, 520 P.2d 514 (1974) (en banc). Government property available to the public generally is available for religious activities within appropriate limitations that make clear that government is not a sponsor of such activities. Id.; see also Manning v. Sevier County, 30 Utah 2d 305, 517 P.2d 549 (1973); Thomas v. Daughters of Utah Pioneers, 114 Utah 108, 197 P.2d 477 (1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 930, 69 S.Ct. 739, 93 L.Ed. 1090 (1949); Gubler v. Utah State Teachers’ Retirement Bd., 113 Utah 188, 192 P.2d 580 (1948).
This Court on numerous occasions has adhered to an interpretation of section 4 that belies the majority’s argument that public monies and property cannot be used for religions when the purpose is not to further religious worship, exercises, or instruction. For example, in Thomas v. Daughters of Utah Pioneers, 114 Utah 108, 197 P.2d 477 (1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 930, 69 S.Ct. 739, 93 L.Ed. 1090 (1949), the Court held that the construction of the Daughters of Utah Pioneers Museum with state funds did not violate Article I, section 4. The Court asked whether the construction of the museum would amount to religious exercise, worship, or instruction. The Court found no evidence of any such action and determined that before it could find violation of the Utah Constitution, it would need to find “proof of overt acts of proselytizing.” Id. 197 P.2d at 489. And in Manning v. Sevier County, 30 Utah 2d 305, 517 P.2d 549 (1973), the Court upheld the use of public funds to construct a hospital which was to be leased and operated *946by a church-owned corporation. Once again, the Court held that there was no violation of Article I, section 4 because there would be no religious domination, no proselytizing, or any other activities that could be characterized as religious exercise, worship, or instruction. See also Gubler v. Utah State Teachers’ Retirement Board, 113 Utah 188, 192 P.2d 580 (1948). In short, the “absurd results” posited by the majority as a basis for not applying the language of section 4 rest on an entirely contrived and erroneous interpretation of that section.
The majority also incorrectly asserts that its direct-indirect test is supported by Pratt v. Arizona Board of Regents, 110 Ariz. 466, 520 P.2d 514 (1974) (en banc). It is not. Pratt dealt with language in the Arizona Constitution that is exactly the same as the language at issue in section 4.5 The Arizona Supreme Court construed that language, consistent with our prior cases, to allow a state university to lease its stadium to the Reverend Billy Graham for a religious purpose. Pratt held that the Arizona Constitution did not prohibit the úse of public property by religious groups for religious purposes so long as the use did not interfere with state functions or imply state support or favor of a particular religious group. The court held that when the state makes its property available for use or rental by the public generally, the state could lease its property at the going rate to the Reverend Billy Graham for his own purposes. The transaction was a “straight commercial transaction” and nothing more. Id. 520 P.2d at 517.6 Not only does Pratt not support the majority’s direct-indirect test, but it makes clear that the language in section 4 would not create the hostility between church and state that the majority claims would occur if section 4 were given its plain meaning.
The Court’s deletion of the word “no” from the “no public money or property” for “religious worship, exercise or instruction” language in Article I, section 4 seriously undermines the non-establishment provisions of the Utah Constitution. The majority’s position now allows public money and property to be used for religious worship, exercises, and instruction for all religions. That is a stunning and revolutionary change in the meaning of Article I, section 4 and the law governing church-state relationships. Pursuant to the majority’s position, the citizens of the state of Utah may now be taxed to support religious worship, exercises, and education, just as the citizens of Salt Lake are now taxed to support prayers at city council meetings, so long as the funding is available to all religious denominations. If, for example, the churches in this state, or one of them, were to prevail upon the Legislature or a local unit of government to fund sectarian religious instruction in the schools or to fund public houses of worship, that would fit within the majority’s construction of section 4.7
The Framers of the Utah Constitution acted with a wisdom that reflected the conditions in this state and with a deep concern for preventing the state from interfering with churches and vice versa. They well knew that the inalienable right of freedom of religion and conscience could easily be eroded by well-meaning people who fervently believe that the truths that provide guidance and ultimate meaning in their lives ought to be promoted by the State, especially when they *947are in the majority and it is their beliefs that would be espoused by the State. For such people, it is altogether natural, in one sense, for them to think that the State should do what they deem consistent with God’s will. But in a pluralistic society, other people, equally committed and equally fervent, will inevitably disagree, and they will perceive God’s will to be quite different. Still others, who are nonbelievers, will insist that the State ought not violate their right not to believe at all. Therein lie the seeds of contention, disharmony, and indeed, the violation of the right of freedom of religion and conscience. The Utah Constitution sought to avoid those consequences. Today, the Court opens wide the door to such contention and strife, especially in smaller communities throughout the state where one'religion may overwhelmingly predominate and where people think that freedom of religion is a matter of majoritarian rule, not an inalienable right not subject to the beliefs and prejudices of the majority.
Today, the Court by its rewriting of Article I, section 4, sanctions a serious and highly regrettable erosion of freedom of religion.

. Although the majority opinion addresses a wide range of issues under Article I, section 4 of the Utah Constitution in dictum, the issue before the Court is narrow: Whether the City can expend public funds to establish a systematic program for providing formal prayers at official meetings of the Salt Lake City Council. This case does not involve the constitutionality of school prayers, graduation prayers, or prayers offered in sessions of the Utah Legislature. As far as I am aware, no public monies are appropriated for such purposes.

. The trial court ruled:
The inclusion of prayers in City Council meetings results in expenditure of public funds, assets and resources of Salt Lake City Corporation. City facilities (meeting rooms, etc.), City equipment (microphones, podiums, stages, etc.), City resources (electricity, printing of programs, etc.), and City employees' time (in supervising, attending, etc.), are used and expended in programming, witnessing and/or reciting said prayers. Said funds, assets and resources of Salt Lake City Corporation are utilized to aid in the recitation of said prayers with the knowledge, approval, concurrence and ratification of the defendants.

. At least two, and perhaps three, council members stated publicly that the asserted secular purpose of the city ordinance was false and that prayers were in part offered for religious purposes.

.Having rejected the de minimus exception on the ground stated, it is acutely ironic that the Court adopts in lieu thereof a "direct-indirect analysis” that leads to the conclusion that public money may in fact be used for religious worship or exercises. In truth, the determination of what is direct and what is indirect will be nothing more than what the courts think reasonable. In any event, I would fear less the adoption of a de minimus exception than I do a wholesale rewriting of the constitutional language at issue.

. Section 12 of the Arizona Constitution provides:
Section 12 ... [n]o public money or property shall be appropriated for or applied to any religious worship, exercise, or instruction, or to the support of any religious establishment. ...

. In Pratt, the court stated:
We believe that the framers of the Arizona Constitution intended by this section to prohibit the use of the power and the prestige of the State or any of its agencies for the support or favor of one religion over another, or of religion over nonreligion. The State is mandated by this constitutional provision to be absolutely impartial when it comes to the question of religious preference, and public money or property may not be used to promote or favor any public religious sect or denomination or religion generally.

.Article X, section 9 bans the state and its subdivisions from making "any appropriation for the direct support of any school or educational institution controlled by any religious organization.” That provision does not prohibit public funding of sectarian religious instruction in public schools. Article I, section 4, correctly read, would seem to do that.