Court Opinion

ID: 9895833
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-08 20:04:32.169381+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:21.253908
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/8/23 P. v. Urteaga CA4/1
                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 THE PEOPLE,                                                          D081317

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.                                                         (Super. Ct. No. SCE409208)

 OSCAR NICHOLAS URTEAGA,

           Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Herbert J. Exarhos, Judge. Affirmed.
         Sheila O’Connor, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A.
Swenson and Heather M. Clark, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
         A jury convicted Oscar Nicholas Urteaga of, among other charges,
stalking. At trial, M.D. testified about her romantic yet turbulent
relationship with Urteaga. M.D.’s husband, J.D., testified that, from his
perspective, M.D. acted like someone with “battered woman syndrome.” On
appeal, Urteaga argues that J.D.’s “battered woman syndrome” testimony
was improperly admitted and prejudiced the outcome of the case.
      We agree that J.D.’s statement was improper expert testimony offered
by a lay witness that should have been excluded. J.D. was not qualified to
testify as an expert about battered women’s syndrome. Battered women’s
syndrome is not a common perception that lay witnesses can opine on. It
requires an expert’s specialized training or knowledge, which J.D. lacked.
      Nevertheless, J.D.’s “battered woman syndrome” testimony did not
unduly prejudice the verdict. There was sufficient evidence, aside from J.D.’s
testimony, that supported the stalking charge against Urteaga. Accordingly,
the error admitting J.D.’s statement was harmless.
      We therefore affirm the judgment.
                                        I.
      Urteaga was charged with stalking (Pen. Code, § 646.9, subd. (a);
count 1); corporal injury to spouse and/or roommate (Pen. Code, § 273.5,
subd. (a); count 2); false imprisonment (Pen. Code, §§ 236, 237, subd. (a);
count 3); simple battery upon a person of a previous or a current dating
relationship (Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (e)(1); count 4); dissuading a witness
from testifying (Pen. Code § 136.1, subd. (a)(1); count 5); and violation of a
protective order in a criminal proceeding involving domestic violence (Pen.
Code § 166, subd. (c)(1); count 6), all of which related to his treatment of M.D.
      M.D., her husband, J.D., and Urteaga testified at trial.
                                       A.
      M.D. testified that sometime in the summer of 2017, she met Urteaga
and they began a romantic relationship that lasted two years. Initially, M.D.
did not tell J.D. about the relationship.

                                        2
      According to M.D., Urteaga began physically abusing her in July 2018.
On one occasion, Urteaga became “angry and physical” with M.D. after she
declined to attend a party with him. Urteaga caused “bruises on [M.D.’s]
body” and “face.” Afterwards, M.D. filed a police report and did not speak
with Urteaga “for a couple of weeks.” Even so, the relationship continued.
      In September 2018, M.D. tried to break up with Urteaga. In response,
Urteaga texted her, “[Y]ou will always be mine. I own you.” M.D. felt
Urteaga “had control over [her].” He would send “loving” messages, ask for
forgiveness, and be kind. But Urteaga’s good behavior never lasted. He
called M.D. and threatened that “[her] life [was] over” at work, with her
family, friends, and children. M.D. testified she felt scared by Urteaga’s
threats and feared that he would “ruin [her] life.”
      By that winter, M.D. felt “stuck in a web where [she] couldn’t get out”
because Urteaga “kept texting and calling.” Urteaga continuously called
M.D., and he began sending sexual and private photographs to her mother
and sister. M.D. reported that Urteaga became “very vindictive” and
expressed that “he wanted revenge.”
      On June 13, 2019, M.D. obtained a temporary restraining order (TRO)
against Urteaga because he sent messages to her work email address and
began texting pornographic websites and dating websites to her underage
daughters. Despite being aware of the TRO, Urteaga nevertheless continued
contacting M.D. By July 2019, M.D. dismissed the TRO “by mistake.”
      On August 9, 2019, M.D. stayed at a local resort with her family. That
day, Urteaga video messaged M.D. to ask if she was at the resort and
demanded to see her. M.D. agreed to meet Urteaga to avoid “any bad”
incidents in front of her family. When M.D. met Urteaga by his car at the
resort’s valet, she “could see that he was angry.” Urteaga opened the car door

                                       3
and told M.D. to get inside. M.D. did so because she felt she was “protecting”
her children by “trying to keep [Urteaga] calm.” As soon as M.D. got in the
car, Urteaga began questioning what she was doing at the resort and with
whom she was spending her time. Urteaga drove into a nearby parking lot
and began punching M.D.’s arms, legs, and face repeatedly, leaving bruises.
M.D. was initially unable to exit the car because it was still moving. Once
M.D. eventually got out of the car, she ran out of the parking area and back
to the resort. Afterward, M.D. filed a report of the incident with the police.
Later that month, M.D. obtained a criminal protective order and a new
restraining order against Urteaga.
      During a follow-up investigation with the police, M.D. mentioned that
“Urteaga seemed to know where [she was] a lot.” An officer asked M.D. to
check her cellphone and car for tracking devices. M.D. found an application
installed on her cellphone “with the location being tracked.” Once she
discovered the tracking application, M.D. “decided to get rid of the phone
completely,” after which Urteaga “didn’t know where [she] was at all times.”
      On August 20, 2019, Urteaga violated the criminal protective order and
restraining order by texting M.D. Around the same time, Urteaga placed
M.D.’s cut up underwear in M.D.’s mailbox.
      In early September 2019, Urteaga emailed M.D. a prewritten
statement and asked her to approve it. The prewritten statement expressed
M.D.’s “desire to drop all charges” against Urteaga related to the criminal
matter and claimed that she had not “been hurt or threatened in any way.”
M.D. did not sign the statement. A few days later, Urteaga left M.D. a
voicemail playing countdown music. M.D. understood Urteaga’s voicemail as
a warning that her time was running out to sign the prewritten statement.

                                       4
      In early August 2021, M.D. was in her car with two of her daughters
while the third was playing soccer. Urteaga drove to M.D.’s parked car and
asked if he could get in the car to apologize to her daughters. M.D. let him,
even though one of her daughters was “afraid.” After apologizing, M.D. told
Urteaga “he needed to walk away,” and he did.
      A week later, Urteaga parked in front of M.D.’s car while she was at
her oldest daughter’s soccer game. M.D.’s daughter “got really scared,” so
M.D. told her to go in the opposite direction while M.D. retrieved the car.
Urteaga “was angry” when he approached M.D. at her car. M.D. “kept asking
him to walk away,” but Urteaga “continued to say that he was going to make
sure that [M.D.’s daughter] wouldn’t play” soccer at that field “anymore.”
M.D.’s oldest daughter stopped playing soccer because “[s]he was afraid to go
back to the field.”
                                       B.
      At trial, J.D. supported M.D.’s telling of the events. He testified that
M.D. was “terrified” of Urteaga. He described her as being “stuck in a web”
where Urteaga would “scare and then manipulate her”—“almost like battered
woman syndrome.” When J.D. mentioned “battered woman syndrome,”
defense counsel objected to his testimony as an expert opinion. The trial
court overruled the objection. J.D. explained that M.D. would “cry all night
long” yet “give in and go” back to Urteaga after he sent “all these amazing
texts.” Her relationship with Urteaga, in J.D.’s view, would vacillate between
being a “great situation” and a “horrible situation,” with M.D. giving into
Urteaga and “regret[ting] it the second” she went back to him.
      J.D. testified that “if you look at the definition of battered woman
syndrome, it was— [M.D.] was a textbook—.” Defense counsel again
objected. After the court overruled the objection, J.D. finished his sentence:

                                       5
“Textbook case. And that’s where every therapist we went to was saying the
same exact thing.” Defense counsel did not object to J.D.’s statement about
“every therapist.”
                                       C.
      Urteaga denied M.D. and J.D.’s allegations. He testified that he never
physically abused M.D., “[n]ever” “put a hand” on her. Urteaga classified the
testimony about him placing cut-up underwear in the mailbox as “not true.”
He denied leaving M.D. the voicemail with countdown music. Urteaga
claimed that M.D.’s first TRO came as a “complete surprise” to him. Urteaga
further claimed that he “was in fear of [his] safety,” not the other way
around.
                                       D.
      The jury found Urteaga guilty of stalking (Pen. Code, § 646.9, subd. (a);
count 1); simple battery upon a person from a previous or a current dating
relationship (Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (e)(1); lesser included offense for
count 2); misdemeanor false imprisonment (Pen. Code, §§ 236, 237, subd. (a);
lesser included offense for count 3); simple battery upon a person from a
previous or a current dating relationship (Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (e)(1);
count 4); dissuading a witness from testifying (Pen. Code § 136.1, subd. (a)(1);
count 5); and violation of a protective order in a criminal proceeding involving
domestic violence (Pen. Code § 166, subd. (c)(1); count 6).
      The trial court imposed a suspended sentence of 270 days of local
custody subject to three years of formal probation.
                                       II.
      On appeal, Urteaga contends the trial court erred by allowing J.D. to
testify that M.D. acted like someone with “battered woman syndrome”

                                        6
because such testimony requires an expert opinion.1 Urteaga also contends
that lay witnesses like J.D. cannot opine on a “particular mental state,”
which in this case refers to battered women’s syndrome.
      Respondent contends: (1) J.D.’s reference to “battered woman
syndrome” was permissible lay witness opinion testimony that was rationally
based on his perception and was helpful to a clear understanding of his
testimony; (2) J.D. testified about M.D.’s objective behavior and described it
as being consistent with M.D.’s state of mind; and (3) even if J.D.’s testimony
was erroneously admitted, any error was harmless considering the significant
independent evidence of Urteaga’s guilt.
      We agree that the trial court improperly admitted J.D.’s testimony
about battered women’s syndrome. Nonetheless, we find the error was
harmless.
                                       A.
      We evaluate a trial court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion.
(People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 437.)
                                       1.
      “[B]attered women’s syndrome is a series of characteristics which
appear in women who have been abused physically and psychologically over a
period of time.” (People v. Gomez (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 405, 416 (Gomez).)

1     Urteaga also argues the trial court improperly admitted J.D.’s
testimony that “every therapist” that he and M.D. went to “was saying the
same exact thing” about battered women’s syndrome. But Urteaga did not
object to that testimony during trial, and thus did not preserve the issue for
appeal. (People v. Williams (2008) 43 Cal.4th 584, 620.) Even if Urteaga had
objected, we conclude that he waived the point on appeal by not providing
any authority or supporting argument related to the statement about
therapists. (Badie v. Bank of America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779, 784-785
(Badie).)
                                       7
Testimony about battered women’s syndrome, also known as intimate
partner battering, requires expert qualifications. Evidence Code section 1107
“expressly authoriz[es] the admission of expert testimony regarding intimate
partner battering and its effects.” (In re Walker (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 533,
546.) Under section 1107, the offering party must establish the “proper
qualifications of the expert witness.” (Evid. Code, § 1107, subds. (a) & (b).)
Before someone can testify as an expert, the trial court must find that the
witness has “special knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education
sufficient to qualify him [or her] as an expert on the subject to which his [or
her] testimony relates.” (Evid. Code, § 720.)
      Expert testimony about battered women’s syndrome is helpful to
explain why “people who have been physically and mentally abused . . . act in
ways that may be difficult for a layperson to understand.” (People v. Riggs
(2008) 44 Cal.4th 248, 293 (Riggs).) For example, in Gomez, a licensed
clinical social worker and mental health professional explained at length the
dynamics between a woman who has been battered and the “male batterer.”
(Gomez, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at pp. 410-413.)
      Here, the testimony about battered women’s syndrome was given by
J.D., a layperson without special knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education on the syndrome and its effects. (Evid. Code, § 720.) Unlike the
expert in Gomez, J.D. was not a licensed clinical social worker or a mental
health professional. (Gomez, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at pp. 410-413.) J.D.
does not possess the background that would qualify him to offer expert
testimony about battered women’s syndrome. Respondent concedes that J.D.
was not an expert in this field.
      J.D.’s statement was improper expert testimony offered by a lay
witness and thus should have been excluded.

                                        8
                                          2.
      Nor was it appropriate for J.D. to testify about battered women’s
syndrome as a lay witness. Lay opinion testimony is admissible when it is
“[r]ationally based on the perception of the witness” and “[h]elpful to a clear
understanding of his [or her] testimony.” (Evid. Code, § 800.)
      Although Respondent contends that J.D.’s testimony on battered
women’s syndrome conveyed his perception of M.D.’s state of mind and
behavior consistent with that state of mind, his testimony went beyond the
proper scope of lay opinion. Battered women’s syndrome involves “a series of
characteristics” that make up a psychological condition over time. (Gomez,
supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at p. 416.) What constitutes battered women’s
syndrome is not a matter of common knowledge because one cannot rely on
their senses alone to perceive a psychological “series of characteristics” but
rather requires a special knowledge and expert experience. (See Riggs,
supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 293; Evid. Code, § 720.) As a result, battered women’s
syndrome is not like the commonly discernable perception that someone is
drunk or angry, which does not require expert knowledge to identify. (See
People v. Chapple (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 540, 547.) Thus, J.D. could not
opine on battered women’s syndrome as a lay witness.
      Therefore, the trial court erred when it allowed J.D. to testify about
battered women’s syndrome. Because we find error on this basis, we need not
reach Urteaga’s other argument that the “battered woman syndrome”
testimony was also improperly admitted because it was a “new theory”
introduced for the first time at trial.
                                          B.
      Nevertheless, J.D.’s “battered woman syndrome” testimony did not
prejudice the verdict. The parties agree that the Watson standard for

                                          9
assessing prejudice applies here. Under Watson, we reverse only if it is
“reasonably probable” that Urteaga would have obtained a “more favorable”
result absent the error. (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.)
      Urteaga contends that J.D.’s testimony about battered women’s
syndrome amounted to prejudicial error. Although Urteaga argues that
J.D.’s testimony could have swayed “at least one juror” on “some or all of the
counts,” he provides support and analysis only for the stalking conviction.
Urteaga failed to support his prejudice claim for “all” other convictions “with
reasoned argument and citations to authority.” (Badie, supra,
67 Cal.App.4th at pp. 784-785.) Consequently, we treat his prejudice claim
on his other convictions as “waived” and address only his stalking conviction.
(Ibid.)
      Even without J.D.’s “battered woman syndrome” testimony, it is not
reasonably probable that the jury would have decided the stalking charge
more favorably to Urteaga. In assessing what a jury is likely to have done
absent an error, we “may consider, among other things, whether the evidence
supporting the existing judgment is so relatively strong, and the evidence
supporting a different outcome is so comparatively weak, that there is no
reasonable probability the error of which the defendant complains affected
the result.” (People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 177, italics omitted.)
      Stalking requires evidence that the defendant “willfully, maliciously,
and repeatedly follow[ed] or willfully and maliciously harasse[d] another
person” and made “a credible threat with the intent to place that person in
reasonable fear for his or her safety, or the safety of his or her immediate
family.” (Pen. Code, § 646.9, subd. (a).) “For the purposes of this section,
‘harasses’ means engages in a knowing and willful course of conduct directed
at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, torments, or terrorizes the

                                       10
person, and that serves no legitimate purpose.” (Pen. Code, § 646.9,
subd. (e).) “ ‘[C]redible threat’ ” means “a verbal or written threat . . . made
with the intent to place the person that is the target of the threat in
reasonable fear for his or her safety or the safety of his or her family.” (Pen.
Code, § 646.9, subd. (g).) “It is not necessary to prove that the defendant had
the intent to actually carry out the threat.” (Ibid.) A defendant cumulatively
“must do more than just cause alarm, annoyance, torment or terror; [they]
must communicate a willingness to resort to violence.” (People v. Lopez
(2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 436, 449, italics omitted.)
      Here, strong evidence supports Urteaga’s stalking conviction
independent of J.D.’s “battered woman syndrome” testimony.
      Urteaga willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly followed M.D. by placing
a tracking application on M.D.’s phone and showing up to her location to
harass her. In one instance, Urteaga tracked and followed M.D. to a local
resort for no other purpose than to confront and physically abuse her. In
another instance, Urteaga tracked and followed M.D. to a soccer field where
M.D. and two of her daughters were and confronted them in their car. A
week later, Urteaga again tracked and followed M.D. to the soccer field with
her daughter and confronted her and started an argument.
      In addition, Urteaga made credible threats in the form of voice and text
messages that placed M.D. in fear for her and her family’s safety. He
threatened to “ruin [M.D.’s] life” at work and with her family, children, and
friends through a phone message. Those threats scared M.D. Urteaga then
took steps to carry out his threat when he sent sexual and private
photographs to M.D.’s mother and sister. Urteaga also left M.D. a voicemail
with countdown music to warn her that time was running out to sign his
prewritten statement to drop all charges. Although Urteaga denied sending

                                        11
the voicemail and asserts that the messages M.D. identified “never
threatened any physical harm to her or her family”, a jury could reasonably
find that Urteaga’s “very vindictive” behavior placed M.D. in reasonable fear
for her safety, not the least because he had physically abused her before.
      In short, J.D.’s “battered woman syndrome” testimony was harmless
because even without it, strong evidence in the record supports the jury’s
finding that Urteaga stalked M.D.
                                      III.
      We affirm the judgment.

                                                                CASTILLO, J.
WE CONCUR:

HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

O’ROURKE, J.

                                      12