Court Opinion

ID: 9965004
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-01 15:04:29.94474+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:53.888324
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

                                      Docket No. 50701-2023

 STATE OF IDAHO,                                      )
                                                      )
      Plaintiff-Respondent,                           )    Boise, December 2023 Term
                                                      )
 v.                                                   )    Opinion filed: May 1, 2024
                                                      )
 CYRUS WOLF BUEHLER,                                  )    Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
                                                      )
      Defendant-Appellant.                            )
                                                      )

        Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District of the State of Idaho,
        Bannock County. Robert C. Naftz, District Judge.

        The judgment of conviction is affirmed.

        Erik R. Lehtinen, State Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for Appellant. Andrea
        W. Reynolds argued.

        Raúl R. Labrador, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, for Respondent. Kale Gans
        argued.

ZAHN, Justice.
        Cyrus Wolf Buehler appeals his judgment of conviction for aggravated driving under the
influence. Buehler argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motions in
limine because the evidence he sought to present established that the victim’s conduct was a
superseding, intervening cause of the collision. Buehler also challenges the district court’s decision
to admit evidence of his blood alcohol concentration (“BAC”) because the officer who tested his
BAC was not certified to operate the breathalyzer device at the time the breath tests were
administered.
        We affirm the district court because it did not err in concluding that the evidence Buehler
sought to introduce was irrelevant to the determination of whether Buehler’s act of driving while
under the influence had some causal connection to Hanson’s injuries for purposes of Idaho Code
section 18-8006(1). We hold that, while a defendant charged with violating Idaho Code section
18-8006(1) may dispute the element of causation by presenting evidence of an intervening,
superseding cause, Buehler’s evidence failed to establish such a cause. We also hold that the
officer’s lapsed certification did not require exclusion of evidence concerning Buehler’s BAC at
the time of the collision because the State may establish the foundation for the admission of the
evidence through expert testimony.
                  I.    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
        On December 31, 2017, at around 5:30 p.m., Buehler was driving his pickup truck
northbound on Harrison Avenue in Pocatello, Idaho. At the same time, Raymond Hanson was
riding his motorized bicycle southbound on Harrison Avenue. As Buehler turned left across the
southbound lane of Harrison Avenue, Hanson collided with the right front of Buehler’s truck. As
a result of the collision, Hanson suffered severe injuries.
        Police responded to the scene and administered field sobriety tests to Buehler, which he
failed. Officer Christ then arrested Buehler for driving under the influence. Following the arrest,
Christ asked Buehler to provide a breath sample. Buehler agreed to do so. Christ then administered
two breath tests to Buehler using a LifeLoc FC200 breathalyzer device. Unbeknownst to Christ,
his certification to operate the LifeLoc device had expired one week prior to the date he
administered the tests to Buehler. Buehler’s breath samples indicated a BAC of .181 and .179.
        The State charged Buehler with aggravated driving under the influence (“DUI”) under
Idaho Code section 18-8006(1). That code section provides that “[a]ny person causing great
bodily harm, permanent disability or permanent disfigurement to any person other than himself
in committing a violation of the provisions of section 18-8004(1)(a) or (1)(c), Idaho Code, is
guilty of a felony . . . .” I.C. § 18-8006(1).
        In advance of trial, Buehler disclosed two expert reports to the State, which were prepared
by a mechanical engineer. Buehler’s expert opined that Hanson was the cause of the collision
because he was speeding, he had a BAC of .208 and therefore was under the influence at the time
of the collision, and his motorized bicycle did not have a headlight. The expert noted that Buehler
said he did not see Hanson prior to the collision and that the collision occurred after sunset. The
expert opined that the primary cause of the collision was that Buehler could not see the bicycle as
he approached the intersection and, therefore, Buehler’s BAC was not the cause of the collision.
        The State filed a motion in limine to exclude Buehler’s expert from testifying. The State
argued that Buehler’s expert “fail[ed] to state an actual opinion,” and that his testimony was

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confusing to the jury and irrelevant. At a subsequent hearing on the motion, the State argued that
the expert failed to cite a factual basis for many of his opinions and that the expert was opining on
the issue of comparative fault, which was irrelevant in a prosecution for aggravated DUI. In
response, Buehler argued that his expert’s opinion was relevant to whether Hanson’s conduct was
an intervening, superseding cause of the collision, which would render Hanson responsible for his
own injuries.
        Following the hearing, the district court granted the State’s motion and excluded Buehler’s
expert from testifying. In its written decision, the district court noted that the plain language of
Idaho Code section 18-8006 only requires that the State establish some causal connection between
Buehler’s driving while under the influence and Hanson’s injuries. The district court observed that
the State was not required to prove that Buehler was negligent or that he was more than 50%
responsible for Hanson’s injuries. The district court rejected Buehler’s argument that his expert’s
testimony established that Hanson’s conduct was an intervening, superseding cause of the
collision. The district court observed that this Court’s caselaw has held that, to relieve a defendant
of criminal liability, an intervening cause must be an unforeseeable and extraordinary
circumstance. The district court concluded that Hanson’s conduct was not an unforeseeable and
extraordinary circumstance because a known risk of driving while intoxicated is being involved in
a traffic accident.
        Buehler filed a motion to reconsider along with several motions in limine related to his
theory that Hanson caused the collision. Some of Buehler’s motions sought orders permitting his
expert to testify that, at the time of the collision, Hanson was speeding and therefore was violating
the law and that Hanson’s motorized bicycle was a motorcycle for purposes of Idaho’s DUI statute.
        While Buehler’s other motions were titled as motions in limine, they did not concern the
admission of evidence but instead requested the district court to instruct the jury that (1) Hanson’s
motorized bicycle was a motorcycle; (2) Hanson’s motorized bicycle was a vehicle; (3) every
vehicle on a highway after sunset is required to display headlights; (4) on the date of the collision,
Hanson was operating a motorcycle in violation of law because he had a BAC of .208; (5) Hanson’s
intoxication was the cause of the collision and his injuries; and (6) Buehler could not be guilty of
the crime charged because Hanson was the cause of his own injuries.
        The State filed its own motions in limine to exclude evidence that Hanson was the cause
of the collision, including motions to exclude (1) comparative fault arguments; (2) evidence of the

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lighting function, speed, or motorization of Hanson’s bicycle; and (3) evidence of Hanson’s BAC
at the time of the crash.
       The district court held a hearing on the motions, at the conclusion of which it determined
that Hanson’s conduct was irrelevant to the causation element of the aggravated DUI charge. The
district court denied Buehler’s motion for reconsideration, denied his motions in limine concerning
causation and Hanson’s conduct, and granted the State’s motions in limine concerning those issues
for the reasons expressed in its decision excluding the testimony of Buehler’s expert witness.
       Buehler also filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence of Buehler’s BAC because
Officer Christ’s certification to operate the LifeLoc breathalyzer device had expired one week
before Christ administered the BAC tests. The district court held an evidentiary hearing on the
motion, at which Christ testified concerning the procedures he employed in utilizing the LifeLoc
Device to obtain BAC readings from Buehler. The State also presented expert testimony from
Rachel Cutler, a forensic scientist and laboratory manager employed by the Idaho State Police.
Cutler testified concerning her expertise with the LifeLoc breathalyzer device and opined that the
procedures that Christ utilized to obtain Buehler’s BAC were proper and reliable and therefore
Buehler’s breath samples were valid. As a result, she opined that the lapse in Christ’s certification
to operate the device did not affect the validity of the BAC results. The district court denied
Buehler’s motion after concluding that Christ’s and Cutler’s testimony established sufficient
foundation to admit Buehler’s BAC test results.
       Buehler subsequently entered a conditional guilty plea to aggravated DUI, reserving the
right to appeal the denial of his motions in limine. Buehler timely appealed. The Court of Appeals
affirmed Buehler’s judgment of conviction. Buehler filed a petition for review, which this Court
granted.
                                    II.     ISSUES ON APPEAL
   1. Whether the district court erred in declining to admit evidence and testimony concerning
      Hanson’s conduct on the night of the collision.
   2. Whether the district court erred in denying Buehler’s motion in limine to exclude evidence
      of Buehler’s BAC.
                             III.         STANDARDS OF REVIEW
       “When considering a case on review from the Court of Appeals, this Court gives serious
consideration to the views of the Court of Appeals; however, this Court reviews the trial court’s

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decisions directly and acts as though it is hearing the matter on direct appeal from the decision of
the trial court.” State v. Robinett, 141 Idaho 110, 111–12, 106 P.3d 436, 437–38 (2005).
         “ ‘Trial courts have broad discretion when ruling on a motion in limine.’ Thus, ‘[t]his Court
reviews the trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion in limine under an abuse of discretion
standard.’ ” Wilson v. Mocabee, 167 Idaho 59, 64–65, 467 P.3d 423, 428–29 (2020) (quoting
Gunter v. Murphy’s Lounge, LLC, 141 Idaho 16, 25, 105 P.3d 676, 685 (2005)). Under the abuse
of discretion standard, this Court examines “whether the trial court: ‘(1) correctly perceived the
issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted
consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4)
reached its decision by the exercise of reason.’ ” State v. Sarbacher, 168 Idaho 1, 4, 478 P.3d 300,
303 (2020) (quoting Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018)).
                                              IV.      ANALYSIS
         Buehler argues that the district court erred when it denied his motions in limine and granted
the State’s motions in limine, excluded his expert from testifying, and excluded evidence of
Hanson’s conduct on the day of the collision. 1 Buehler argues that the excluded evidence
established that Hanson’s conduct was an intervening, superseding cause of the collision, thus
establishing that Buehler’s driving while under the influence was not the cause of Hanson’s
injuries. Buehler also argues that the district court erred by admitting evidence of his BAC because
doing so rendered meaningless the administrative regulation requiring that officers be certified to
operate the breathalyzer device. We will address each argument in turn.
A. The district court did not err in its rulings excluding evidence concerning Hanson’s
   conduct on the day of the collision.
         Buehler contends that evidence he sought to introduce concerning Hanson’s conduct and
his expert’s opinion concerning the cause of the collision was sufficient to establish that Hanson
was a superseding, intervening cause of the collision. Buehler argues that the issue of causation is
typically one for the jury and therefore the jury could not properly determine the cause of the
collision without considering evidence of Hanson’s conduct and the role it may have played in the
collision. Buehler argues that, if the jury concluded that Hanson was a superseding, intervening

1
  We recognize that many of Buehler’s motions were captioned “motion in limine” but actually requested that the
district court instruct the jury on a specific issue. A motion in limine, however, generally addresses evidentiary issues.
See State v. Diaz, 170 Idaho 79, 83, 507 P.3d 1109, 1113 (2022) (“A motion seeking a pretrial ruling on the
admissibility of evidence is known as a motion in limine.”). However, the district court addressed the motions
according to the titles that Buehler used and, to avoid confusion, we will do the same.

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cause of the collision, then Buehler would not be guilty under Idaho Code section 18-8006(1). The
State argues that Hanson’s conduct is irrelevant to the causation element because the fact that
Buehler was driving while intoxicated and failed to yield to Hanson while making a left turn was
sufficient to establish the causation element of section 18-8006(1).
       “Whether evidence is relevant is a question of law and is subject to de novo review.” State
v. Ochoa, 169 Idaho 903, 912, 505 P.3d 689, 698 (2022). “Evidence is relevant if ‘(a) it has any
tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence[,] and (b) the
fact is of consequence in determining the action.’ ” Id. at 913, 505 P.3d at 699 (quoting I.R.E.
401). “Whether a fact is ‘of consequence’ or material is determined by its relationship to the legal
theories presented by the parties.” State v. Garcia, 166 Idaho 661, 670, 462 P.3d 1125, 1134 (2020)
(citation omitted).
       Idaho Code section 18-8006(1) provides that “[a]ny person causing great bodily harm,
permanent disability or permanent disfigurement to any person other than himself” in committing
the crime of driving while intoxicated is guilty of a felony. I.C. § 18-8006(1) (emphasis added).
We analyzed the causation element of Idaho Code section 18-8006(1) in State v. Johnson, 126
Idaho 892, 894 P.2d 125 (1995). There, we concluded that section 18-8006 only requires that there
be “some causal connection between the defendant’s driving while under the influence and the
victim’s injuries.” Id. at 895, 894 P.2d at 128 (emphasis added). “The State need only prove that
the defendant operated a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and that such conduct caused
serious bodily harm to one other than the driver.” Id. at 895–96, 894 P.2d at 128–29. We further
held that the statute did not require the State to prove either negligence on the part of the defendant
or that the defendant was more than 50% responsible for causing the victim’s injuries. Id.
       In Buehler’s case, the district court determined that the proffered expert testimony and
evidence regarding Hanson’s conduct prior to the collision were irrelevant. The district court
determined that Buehler’s proffered evidence went to the issues of comparative fault or Buehler’s
negligence rather than establishing that Hanson’s conduct was an intervening, superseding cause
of the collision. Buehler argues this was error because causation is typically an issue for the jury
and his proffered evidence was relevant to that determination. We disagree.
       The State’s evidence established that, on the night in question, Buehler was driving a motor
vehicle while under the influence when he made a lefthand turn across oncoming traffic, at which
point the collision occurred and Hanson was injured. Thus, the evidence established that Buehler’s

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failure to yield had “some causal connection” to Hanson’s great bodily harm. Hanson’s conduct at
the time of the collision did not make it more or less probable that Buehler’s lefthand turn and
failure to yield was causally connected to Hanson’s injuries. We share the district court’s
observation that Buehler’s proffered evidence attempts to demonstrate comparative negligence on
Hanson’s part or the lack of negligence on Buehler’s part. We held in Johnson that both were
irrelevant to the determination of guilt under Idaho Code section 18-8006. See id. at 895–96, 894
P.2d at 128–29. Therefore, we hold Hanson’s conduct was not relevant to the determination of
whether Buehler’s act of driving while under the influence had some causal connection to
Hanson’s injuries for purposes of Idaho Code section 18-8006(1).
       We disagree with Buehler’s contention that the evidence was relevant to establish that
Hanson’s conduct was an intervening, superseding cause of the collision. “An intervening,
superseding cause generally refers to an independent act or force that breaks the causal chain
between the defendant’s culpable act and the victim’s injury.” State v. Lampien, 148 Idaho 367,
374–75, 223 P.3d 750, 757–58 (2009) (emphasis added). “The intervening cause becomes the
proximate cause of the victim’s injury and removes the defendant’s act as the proximate cause. To
relieve a defendant of criminal liability, an intervening cause must be an unforeseeable and
extraordinary occurrence.” Id. “The defendant remains criminally liable if either the possible
consequence might reasonably have been contemplated or the defendant should have foreseen the
possibility of harm of the kind that could result from his act.” Id.
       Buehler’s proffered evidence was only relevant to the issue of an intervening, superseding
cause if it established that Hanson’s conduct was an “unforeseeable and extraordinary occurrence.”
In this case, there is nothing unforeseeable or extraordinary about the fact that Buehler collided
with a bicyclist in the oncoming lane of travel while turning left. In fact, the circumstance is
foreseeable enough that Idaho law prescribes that drivers intending to turn left within an
intersection must “yield the right-of-way to any vehicle approaching from the opposite direction
which is within the intersection, or so close as to constitute an immediate hazard.” I.C. § 49-641.
The reference to “vehicle” in section 49-641 includes bicycles. See I.C. §§ 49-103(1), 49-714.
Buehler’s proffered evidence failed to establish that there was anything unforeseeable and
extraordinary about the fact that Hanson was traveling toward Buehler in the oncoming lane of
travel. We therefore affirm the district court’s decision excluding the evidence as irrelevant to the
issue of an intervening, superseding cause.

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        Our decision today is consistent with our holding in State v. Robinett, 141 Idaho 110, 106
P.3d 436 (2005), in which the defendant made arguments similar to those that Buehler raises here.
Robinett was charged with aggravated DUI and vehicular manslaughter after his car went off the
road and collided with several trees, killing one passenger and injuring another. 141 Idaho at 111,
106 P.3d at 437. Robinett argued that his intoxication was not the cause of the accident, but instead
the accident was caused when one of the passengers became angry and grabbed Robinett, causing
him to lose control of the car. Id. A jury convicted Robinett of both charges. Id. On appeal, Robinett
argued that the district court erred by refusing to give jury instructions for an intervening,
superseding cause. Id. at 113, 106 P.3d at 439. We affirmed the district court’s decision not to
instruct the jury on intervening, superseding cause because “Robinett’s theory required the jury to
choose one of two alternative causes; not to assess whether a second action occurred subsequent
to the first which intervened or superseded to actually result in the accident.” Id. The evidence that
Buehler sought to introduce below similarly sought to have the jury choose one of two alternative
causes and was therefore irrelevant to the question at hand: whether Buehler’s driving while under
the influence had “some causal connection” to Hanson’s injuries or not.
        To sum up, nothing in Idaho Code section 18-8006(1) prevents a defendant from presenting
evidence of an intervening, superseding cause for purposes of disputing the element of causation.
There may be circumstances when an unforeseeable and extraordinary occurrence breaks the chain
of causation required under Idaho Code section 18-8006(1). However, we hold that the facts of
Buehler’s case do not constitute an intervening, superseding cause.
        Lastly, Buehler argues that the district court’s exclusion of Hanson’s conduct denied
Buehler his constitutional right to present a complete defense. This argument is unpersuasive in
light of our holding affirming the district court’s decision excluding Buehler’s proffered evidence
as irrelevant. As the evidence was properly excluded, there was no violation of Buehler’s
constitutional rights.
B. The district court did not err in admitting evidence of Buehler’s BAC.
        Buehler also appeals the district court’s decision denying his motion in limine seeking to
exclude evidence of his BAC test results. Buehler argued below that the evidence should be
excluded because Idaho administrative rules required that Officer Christ hold a valid certification
to operate the breathalyzer device used to obtain the test results and Christ’s certification had
lapsed approximately one week before he administered the tests to Buehler. The district court

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concluded that evidence of Buehler’s BAC could be admitted through the expert testimony of
Idaho State Police Forensic Analyst Rachel Cutler because her testimony established the necessary
foundation to admit the evidence.
        Buehler now argues that the district court erred because its decision effectively nullified
the Idaho administrative rules requiring that Christ hold a valid certification to operate the
breathalyzer device. The State counters that the district court’s decision is consistent with this
Court’s prior decisions holding that similar evidence can be admitted through expert testimony.
        The district court did not err when it denied Buehler’s motion in limine. We have held that
the State can admit evidence of a defendant’s BAC through two methods: by showing the test was
administered in conformity with applicable test procedures or through expert testimony. See
Dachlet v. State, 136 Idaho 752, 757, 40 P.3d 110, 115 (2002); State v. Svelmoe, 160 Idaho 327,
334, 372 P.3d 382, 389 (2016). To admit evidence of a defendant’s BAC through expert testimony,
the State must prove both (1) reliability of the testing technique and (2) conformity with testing
procedure. See State v. Clapp, 170 Idaho 314, 327, 510 P.3d 667, 680 (2022).
        Here, Buehler does not allege that the State’s expert testimony failed to meet those
requirements, but instead hinges his argument on the fact that Christ’s certification to operate the
device had expired one week prior to the date of the collision. See IDAPA 11.03.01.014.03.a
(2015) (requiring that “[t]he breath alcohol test must be administered by an operator (BTO or BTS)
currently certified in the use of the instrument”). Buehler asserts that, in this specific circumstance,
the Idaho Court of Appeals’ decision in Masterson v. Idaho Department of Transportation requires
the evidence of Buehler’s BAC be excluded. 150 Idaho 126, 244 P.3d 625 (Ct. App. 2010). In
Masterson, the Court of Appeals vacated an order suspending Masterson’s license after he was
charged with a DUI because the administrative hearing officer erred in finding that the arresting
officer was certified to operate a BAC breathalyzer device. Id. at 130, 244 P.3d at 629.
        Buehler’s reliance on Masterson is misplaced. Masterson concerned an administrative
enforcement action regarding a license suspension, not a criminal action. In that setting, Masterson
challenged his license suspension under Idaho Code section 18-8002A(7)(d), which mandates that
a license suspension must be vacated if the BAC test was not administered in accordance with
Idaho State Police rules, including requirements of certification. See id. at 129, 244 P.3d at 628.
There is no equivalent statute that conditions the State’s ability to admit evidence of a defendant’s
BAC in a criminal case on compliance with rules promulgated by the Idaho State Police. Masterson

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did not address the admissibility of BAC results in a criminal action and therefore is inapplicable
to this case. See id. at 130, 244 P.3d at 629.
           Buehler’s argument conflates the Idaho administrative rules with the Idaho Rules of
Evidence. While the Idaho administrative rules provide procedures for administering BAC tests,
they are not rules of evidence and do not supersede our caselaw interpreting and applying the rules
of evidence. As noted above, we have held that there are two routes for admitting evidence of BAC
results. One of those is through expert testimony establishing both the reliability of the testing
technique and conformity with testing procedures. Buehler has not argued that the district court
erred in concluding that Cutler’s expert testimony met both requirements. We therefore affirm the
district court’s decision denying Buehler’s motion in limine to exclude evidence of his BAC test
results.
                                       V.    CONCLUSION
           For the reasons discussed herein, the district court did not err when it denied Buehler’s
motions in limine and granted the State’s motion in limine. We therefore affirm Buehler’s
judgment of conviction.

    Chief Justice BEVAN, Justices BRODY and MOELLER, and Pro Tem Justice TROUT
CONCUR.

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