Court Opinion

ID: 9482194
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 08:43:03.360424+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:48:49.564193
License: Public Domain

LOUIS H. POLLAK, District Judge,
dissenting:
I subscribe to the court’s pronouncement that a trial judge’s decision to deny a continuance to permit a criminal defendant to secure new counsel should not be overturned unless the trial judge’s decision was an abuse of discretion. I also subscribe to the court’s conclusion that, in the case under review, a continuance should have been granted. But I respectfully dissent from the court’s further conclusion that the contrary judgment of the district court — i.e., its denial of the continuance requested, on defendant Yu Kikumura’s behalf, by his appointed counsel — did not constitute an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, I would vacate the sentence imposed by the district court and remand for a further resentenc-ing at which the defendant could be represented by counsel of his choice.
I.
On January 8, 1991, Ronald L. Kuby, Esq., and William M. Kunstler, Esq., the attorneys who had, pursuant to court appointment, represented Yu Kikumura (1) throughout the first district court phase of this case, and (2) on appeal from his initial sentence, filed a motion in this court to withdraw from their representation of the defendant. In their motion papers, Messrs. Kuby and Kunstler stated that “an irreconcilable conflict of interest has developed between counsel and Mr. Kikumura,” and that their client wished to petition for cer-tiorari from this court’s prior decision, a course of action which the attorneys said that they could not pursue “consonant with our professional obligations.” 1
This court granted the motion of Messrs. Kuby and Kunstler to withdraw on January 30, 1991.
Resentencing took place on March 1, 1991. At the outset of the proceedings, Assistant Federal Defender Thomas Higgins addressed the district judge as follows (App. at 3-5):
Your Honor, Mr. Kikumura, until the day before yesterday, was held at the United States correctional facility at Marion, Illinois. He was brought to MCC, New York in the afternoon of the day before yesterday.
I first visited him there yesterday and during that visit he indicated to me that he has talked to attorneys for the purpose of having them represent him for this proceeding and for further proceedings in regard to this matter.
He explained to me how he made contact with these attorneys from Marion. Apparently, a prisoner there can’t make a collect phone call to an attorney without first writing a letter to that attorney, asking that attorney to write a letter back to Marion telling the officials at Marion that they would authorize a collect phone call.
He gave me the names of the two attorneys, Jeffrey Haas, H-a-a-s, and Michael Deutch, D-e-u-t-c-h, and their phone numbers. (312) 235-0070.
I contacted those attorneys yesterday without success, but today Mr. Haas contacted me and advised me that, indeed, he was willing to enter an appearance on behalf of Mr. Kikumura.
He also indicated to me there was an attorney in New York, named Daniel Meyers who he, Mr. Haas, had spoken to about representing Mr. Kikumura. I’ve attempted to contact Mr. Meyers. His phone number is (212) 226-4106, but I have been unable to speak to him about this matter.
Mr. Kikumura asks me, your Honor, to ask the Court to adjourn this matter so that he can have further time to try and make arrangements for counsel of his own choice.
As I understand it, his ability to communicate with these lawyers is restricted because of his being confined in a maximum security institution and I don’t *81think it’s unreasonable, your Honor, for him to have additional time, in view of the fact that Mr. Kunstler and Mr. Kuby were relieved by the Court of Appeals at the end of January and between [sic ] the 28 days of February are the only days that he’s really had the opportunity to try and retain counsel or get counsel of his own choice.
Assistant United States Attorney John Lacey responded (App. at 5-6):
Your Honor, on February 5th we sent a letter to the Court, which outlined factors that we submit were not adequately considered by the sentencing commission in promulgating the guidelines applicable to this defendant.
We also believe those are facts that are in the record, that was adduced before this Court during the sentencing proceedings in early 1989.
If our arguments are accepted by this Court, the original sentence of 30 years that was imposed by your Honor might well be imposed again, and that would be more than simply the ministerially act of implementing the 21 year and ten month sentence that was suggested by the Third Circuit in its opinion.
Under those circumstances, if this defendant has acted expeditiously and intends to act expeditiously to obtain new counsel of his choice, he has that right.
At the same time we wonder where these attorneys are. I assume, based on Mr. Higgins’ comments, that these attorneys knew that there was going to be a resentencing. They knew your Honor was going to be the sentencing judge. Why was no inquiry made of chambers or the U.S. Attorney’s Office to find out when the resentencing was going to be held?
Under those circumstances, your Hon- or, we would submit to a or we would agree to an adjournment of this matter, which would permit all parties ample opportunity to prepare for the resentencing of this defendant and to address the arguments contained in our February 25, 1991 correspondence with the Court.
The judge then said (App. at 6-7):
This case was argued in the circuit September 7, 1989 and decided November 2, 1990.
Mr. Kikumura has been fully aware since November of 1990 that he would be resentenced.
To adjourn this now, really to a large extent, let’s [sic] the tail wag the dog. He sat back for months. Messrs. Kuby and Kunstler represented him.
We had this scheduled for sentencing at least two times before this. Each time adjourned at the request of Mr. Kuby and Mr. Kunstler.
The application of those two attorneys to be relieved went to the circuit back in January, as I recall, and that was one of the reasons for the requested adjournment here. It seems to me that Mr. Kikumura has had more than ample time to obtain counsel.
As I view the Circuit’s opinion, I don’t have much leeway. Whether I agree with this opinion is not the point.
To the extent this case stops at the Circuit, the Circuit is a policy court and makes a determination here. The obvious disagreement between me and the Circuit with regard to the amount of reasonableness of the departure is clear.
Mr. Higgins, I’m really not inclined to grant an adjournment.
Mr. Higgins replied (App. at 7-8):
Your Honor, I want to state that one of the comments made by Mr. Lacey concerning the attorneys that he’s contacted, the one I talked to this morning, Jeffrey Haas, asked me how I talked to Mr. Kikumura, did you go to Marion. I said no, Mr. Kikumura is here in New York. He was unaware of the fact that Mr. Kikumura had been moved from Marion to New York.
He indicated to me that they had been in touch with a New York attorney, and that name is Daniel Meyers, to represent Mr. Kikumura.
I think in a case such as this, where he had Mr. Kunstler and Mr. Kuby and they *82were relieved by the Court of Appeals and we were assigned, actually we received the assignment February 1st.
During the following four weeks until today, he’s been attempting to get the other counsel and as soon as he was able to talk to somebody, meaning me yesterday, he told me who the other counsel was. I immediately tried to correspond with the other counsel.
I don’t think his conduct can be considered to be negligent in attempting to obtain other counsel.
There are issues which probably should be raised in connection with this sentencing if it’s to go forward—
After further colloquy, in which the judge determined that he was not going to explore issues that lay outside the purview of this court’s remand order, the judge proceeded with resentencing without granting the continuance requested by Mr. Higgins.
II.
In concluding that denial of the motion for a continuance was not an abuse of discretion, the court notes that this court’s remand order was filed in early November of 1990, and that on January 30, 1991 Messrs. Kuby and Kunstler were granted permission to withdraw as defendant’s counsel. Therefore, the court states, “Ki-kumura was aware of a pending resentenc-ing for four months prior to its occurrence and knew, prior to January 30, 1991, that a request to withdraw had been made by his trial counsel.”2 Accordingly, the court finds “that Kikumura was given a reasonable amount of time in which to arrange for such counsel’s appearance at the resen-tencing, even under the restrictive conditions imposed at Marion Federal Prison.” 3
Assuming that the time afforded the defendant to get new counsel was not unreasonable, the question remains: What real cost to the criminal justice system would have been entailed by a continuance to permit the defendant to secure the services of an attorney who, as Mr. Higgins informed the district judge, had agreed to enter an appearance on the defendant’s behalf? The court says, citing United States v. Fischbach and Moore, Inc., 750 F.2d 1183, 1195 (3d Cir.1984), that a court deciding a motion for continuance “should consider: the efficient administration of criminal justice; the accused’s rights, including an adequate opportunity to prepare a defense; and the rights of other defendants awaiting trial who may be prejudiced by a continuance.” Maj.Op. at 78. In the present case — unlike Fischbach —there were no other defendants. And no suggestion has been made of any way in which a continuance for ten days — or even one— would have impaired “the efficient administration of criminal justice.”
It may well be that the defendant would have fared no better had he been represented by other counsel.4 But perhaps he *83would have. In any event, it is a basic tenet of our adversary system that a defendant is entitled to every reasonable opportunity to have an advocate of his own selection speak for him and make his best case. In my judgment, that reasonable opportunity was unreasonably withheld here.

. The certificate of service accompanying the motion to withdraw recites that a copy of the motion was mailed to Assistant United States Attorney John Lacey; the certificate is silent with respect to service on the defendant.

. It may well be the case that the defendant was apprised by Messrs. Kuby and Kunstler that they had filed a motion to withdraw — and hence that he was aware before receiving notice of this court's January 30, 1991 order granting the motion that he would probably need new counsel— but the record does not appear to establish that fact. See footnote 1, supra.

. Mr. Higgins’ recital of the difficulties encountered by a Marion inmate who tries to communicate with a lawyer was not controverted in the district court or here on appeal. The control measures in force at Marion appear to be comprehensive. As the Seventh Circuit has observed, in an opinion by Judge Posner, Marion "is the successor to Alcatraz as the prison designed to hold the most violent and dangerous prisoners in the federal system.... [I]t may be the most severe prison in the country_” Bruscino v. Carlson, 854 F.2d 162, 163-64 (7th Cir.1988). See J. Michael Olivero Si James B. Roberts, The United States Federal Penitentiary at Marion, Illinois: Alcatraz Revisited, 16 New Eng.J. on Crim. & Civ.Confinement 21 (1990).

.That appears to be the view of the United States, as reflected in its brief (at 23):
In addition, the district court made clear that it viewed its task at the resentencing hearing as essentially ministerial. The district court observed that this Court’s opinion left it without much "leeway” in resentencing Kikumura. (A6.) Both Kikumura (A8, A17) and the government (A5, A28) sought to bring new issues to the Court’s attention at the hearing, but the district court declined to address those issues. When the district court resen-tenced Kikumura, it adopted its prior opinion and this Court’s opinion "in their entirety as a *83basis for departure” (A27), and imposed a sentence within the guideline range calculated by this Court. (A28).
Simply stated, there was very little for counsel for Kikumura to do at such a ministerial hearing. The district court stated its intention to impose as lengthy a sentence as possible within the confines of this Court’s opinion (A19), and it did so. It considered no new legal claims and found no new facts. Given the narrow scope of his role, appointed counsel represented Kikumura as ably as any private attorney whom Kikumura might have retained.