Court Opinion

ID: 9748775
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 16:12:37.30811+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:39.301701
License: Public Domain

LARSEN, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent to the portion of the majority opinion which addresses the issue of whether the arbitrator had jurisdiction to fashion a remedy which extended beyond the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement.
The majority initially frames this issue in terms of jurisdiction. Later, the majority reframes this issue as whether the arbitrator’s award was too narrowly or broadly designed. Finally, the majority reframes this issue in terms of “reasonability” as set forth in the “essence test.”
This Court has held that the appropriate standard to apply when reviewing arbitration awards is the “essence test,” and as we stated in Community College of Beaver County v. Community College of Beaver County, Society of the Faculty (PSEAJNEA):
[T]he arbitrator’s award ... is to be respected by the judiciary if “the interpretation can in any rational way be derived from the agreement, viewed in light of its language, its context, and any other indicia of the parties’ intention .... The arbitrator’s interpretation of the contract must be upheld if it is a reasonable one.”
473 Pa. 576, 594, 375 A.2d 1267, 1275 (1977).
The United States Supreme Court, in United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 80 S.Ct. 1358, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424 (1960), acknowledged the authority of labor arbitrators to craft remedies which extend beyond the expiration dates of the collective bargaining agree*543ments. That Court held that “the appropriate remedy, along with the determination of whether the collective bargaining agreement authorized the arbitrator to fashion a remedy extending beyond its expiration date, was for the arbitrator. ” [emphasis added] 363 U.S. at 599, 80 S.Ct. at 1362.
This Court also has upheld arbitration awards which extended beyond the expiration of collective bargaining agreements in Appeal of Cumberland Valley School District, 483 Pa. 134, 394 A.2d 946 (1978) and Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board v. Williamsport Area S.D., 486 Pa. 375, 406 A.2d 329 (1979).
The majority attempts to distinguish these cases from the within case by applying the nebulous and unworkable “narrow-broad” test. As a result of the majority’s holding which creates rather broad standards/loopholes (i.e., jurisdiction, narrow-broad test, reasonable/essence test), arbitration awards will tend to be less final and hence more appealable by dissatisfied parties.
In order to preserve “finality,” arbitration awards should be reviewed only in limited circumstances. When parties to a collective bargaining agreement have contracted for binding arbitration, they have done so precisely because they seek to resolve their conflicts outside of the judicial system. As we create broader language in defining “finality,” we encourage appeals. Thus, when arbitration is chosen by the parties, the courts should not interfere with the authority of the arbitrator in his role as final decisionmaker.
As stated by the United States Supreme Court in Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp., supra:
It is the arbitrator’s construction which was bargained for; and so far as the arbitrator’s decision concerns construction of the contract, the courts have no business overruling him because their interpretation of the contract is different from his.
Id. 363 U.S. at 599, 80 S.Ct. at 1362. Leechburg Area School District v. Dale, 492 Pa. 515, 520, 424 A.2d 1309, 1312 (1981).
*544The arbitrator’s interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement is reasonable in the present case. Therefore, I would reinstate the arbitrator’s award.
Additionally, the Third Circuit recently adopted a narrower test involving interpretation of grievance arbitration to determine arbitrability in United Steelworkers of American, et al. v. Lukens Steel Co., 969 F.2d 1468 (3rd Cir.1992). That Court stated:
... where the contract contains an arbitration clause, there is a presumption of arbitrability in the sense that “[a]n order to arbitrate the particular grievance should not be denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage.”
#**#**
The presumption of arbitrability may be overcome if the collective bargaining agreement contains an express provision excluding a particular grievance from arbitration ... or the existence of “strong and forceful” evidence of an intention to exclude it from arbitration.
Id., 969 F.2d at 1474, 1475.
I would adopt the Third Circuit test. This test provides more predictability for all parties and further narrows the arbitrariness of the judiciary in its interpretation of arbitrator’s awards. In this case, the silence of the collective bargaining agreement would result in affirming the arbitrator’s award under the Third Circuit test.
For all of the foregoing reasons, I would reinstate the arbitrator’s award.