Court Opinion

ID: 9786315
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 23:53:16.666507+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:43:53.165533
License: Public Domain

Justice JONES,
Concurring in the Result.
I concur in the result reached by the Court. However, I disagree with Part IIIA insofar as it holds that the Plaintiffs have not made sufficient allegations to establish standing to challenge compliance with that part of Idaho Code § 1-2101(1) prohibiting the appointment of more than three permanent members of the Judicial Council from one political party. While I agree that this prohibition was not violated, T would hold that the Plaintiffs did make sufficient allegations to establish standing on this issue. I also disagree with the Court’s conclusion in Part IIIB. The second issue will be addressed first.
I. Part B
Idaho Code § 1-2101(1) provides for a Judicial Council with seven permanent members. The Legislature has provided for the appointment by the board of commissioners of the Idaho State Bar of three permanent attorney members, including one district judge, with the consent of the Senate. The Legislature calls for the appointment by the Governor of three permanent non-attorney members, with the consent of the Senate. The Legislature designates the chief justice of the Supreme Court as the seventh member. The statute requires that appointments “be made with due consideration for area representation and not more than three (3) of the permanent appointed members shall be from one (1) political party.” The Court holds that the Senate has sole authority to pass upon the qualifications of a gubernatorial appointee and that judicial review of the appointment would violate the doctrine of separation of powers. I disagree.
Restrictions of the sort contained in Section 1-2101 are not uncommon. The Legislature has limited the number of members of one political party that can serve on a number of governmental entities. For example, no more than two of the three members of the Idaho Public Utilities Commission can be from the same party (I.C. § 61-201); no more than two of the four members of the State Tax Commission can be from the same party (I.C. § 63-101(5)); no more than two of the three members of the Board of Tax Appeals can be from the same party (I.C. § 63-3802); no more than four of the seven members of the Idaho Fish and Game Commission can be from the same party (I.C. § 36 — 102(b)); no more than three of the five members of the Idaho Personnel Commission can be from the same party (I.C. § 67-5307(1)); no more than two of the three members of the State Board of Correction can be from the same party; and no more than three of the five members of the State Lottery Commission can be from the same party (I.C. § 67-7405). These provisions *395were enacted to maintain some political balance on the various governmental entities and to prevent any political party from gaining overwhelming control.
The Legislature routinely establishes qualifications for those offices it creates and has done so for the office here in question. In addition to the political party restriction, the Legislature has provided that three members of the Judicial Council be attorneys, one of them a district judge. Three other members are to be non-attorneys. In making appointments, the Governor and bar commissioners are to give due consideration to area representation.
The Legislature has clear authority to create offices not provided for in the Idaho Constitution and to establish qualifications for filling them. This Court correctly stated the law in Smylie v. Williams, 81 Idaho 335, 339-340, 341 P.2d 451, 453 (1959), as follows:
There is no question but that the legislature may, in the exercise of its plenary power, create an office or offices not established by the constitution and not prohibited by either the Federal or State Constitution. In the case of Ingard v. Barker, 27 Idaho 124, 147 P. 293, 295, this Court, after citing § 6, Art. 4, of the State Constitution, stated:
“Under this constitutional provision, the Legislature has the power to create an office and provide for the filling of the same whenever such office is not established by the Constitution, and to provide for the appointment of such officer either by the chief executive or in any other manner that in the wisdom of the Legislature it may deem proper; there being no inhibition in the Constitution as to the creation of other offices than those named therein, but, on the contrary, there being an express recognition of the power in the following terms: ‘or which may be created by law, and whose appointment or election is not otherwise provided for.’ ”
Where an office is of legislative creation the legislature can modify, control, or abolish it; and within these powers is embraced the right to change the mode of appointment to the office.
The Ingard Court made it clear that Art. 4, § 6 of the Constitution is a limitation on the Governor’s appointment power. The Court said, “That the legislature may limit the power of the chief executive in the matter of making appointments cannot be successfully refuted.” 27 Idaho at 132, 147 P. at 295. The Governor may not, therefore, make an appointment that contravenes the requirements or restrictions of an office created either by the Constitution or by act of the Legislature. Nor may the Senate confirm the appointment of an individual whose qualifications are not in keeping with the requirements of the law.
It is alleged by the Plaintiffs here that the Governor improperly appointed a fourth Republican member to the Judicial Council and that the Senate improperly confirmed such appointee. If that were truly the case, it would amount to a separation of powers problem but not the problem contemplated by the Court. Rather, the problem would be the Governor making an appointment in violation of a properly enacted statute. The Legislature, acting through both of its houses, has the authority to impose restrictions and qualifications for offices it establishes and such restrictions and qualifications have the force of law. Neither the Governor nor the Senate may disregard such statutory requirements. The Governor and Senate would be attempting to amend a properly enacted statute without the concurrence of the House of Representatives. If it is desired to depart from the appointment requirements provided by law, then both houses of the Legislature need to enact legislation to modify the requirements. Until that avenue is successfully pursued, an appointment and/or confirmation in violation of a statute creates a justiciable question. If the courts cannot entertain a challenge to an appointment that does not comply with the statutes, who is there to ensure that the dignity of the law is maintained?
This Court has acted in the past to ensure compliance with appointment requirements established by the Legislature. In Ingard, the Court was presented with a situation where the Governor had appointed three individuals to the State Board of Horticultural *396Inspection. The Secretary of State refused to issue commissions to two of the appointees, claiming the appointments were void and of not effect because the Governor had not complied with section 1310 of the Revised Codes of Idaho, as amended by chapter 58 of the Session Laws of 1911, which, among other things, required that, “in making said appointments, the Governor shall consider any recommendations made by the State Horticultural Association as the proper person to be so appointed.” 27 Idaho at 128-129, 147 P. at 294. Ingard, one of those appointees, sought a writ of mandate requiring the Secretary of State to issue his commission. The Court declined to do so, holding that the Governor had failed to fully comply with the statute by not having considered any recommendations made by the Horticultural Association.
The Court first noted:
The act provides no other appointive power, and in express terms places the appointment with the Governor____The statute fails to fix the number of persons that shall be recommended, the time or place when the recommendations shall be made, the qualifications of the persons so recommended, or that the Governor shall appoint said board from those recommended.
27 Idaho at 136, 147 P. at 297. The Court then observed:
The statute clearly imposes two duties upon the chief executive — first, to appoint a state board of horticultural inspectors; second, to consider any recommendations made by the State Horticultural Association as the proper persons to be so appointed.
27 Idaho at 138, 147 P. at 298. The Court continued:
The act, neither in direct terms nor by implication, requires the Governor to appoint said board from the recommendations so made, but it does impose upon him the duty of considering any recommendations made by the State Horticultural Association, and from a reasonable construction of the statute, it is incumbent upon the Governor, not only to consider any recommendations that are made of persons recommended to be appointed by the horticultural association, but to carefully to consider such person or persons so recommended before appointing the members of said board.
27 Idaho at 139, 147 P. at 298. The Court concluded that the State Horticultural Association should be allowed 60 days from and after the date the opinion was handed down in which to make recommendations so that the Governor could consider that Association’s recommendations. The Court did not require that the Governor make his appointments from the list of persons recommended by the Association since there was no such requirement in the statute. 27 Idaho at 140, 147 P. at 298.
Thus, where I.C. § 1-2101(1) clearly prohibits more than three members of one political party from serving on the Judicial Council, an appointment either by the Governor or bar commissioners which contravenes the restriction presents a justiciable question. If the bar appointed three attorneys, one* of whom was not a district judge, a justiciable question would be presented. If the Governor appointed an attorney, a justiciable question would be presented. If the Governor appointed a person as director of the Idaho Department of Resources who was not “familiar with irrigation in Idaho,” as required by I.C. § 42-1701(2), a justiciable question would be presented. If the Governor appointed a person to the Idaho Board of Registration of Professional Engineers and Professional Land Surveyors who did not have the 12 years of practice required by I.C. § 54-1204, a justiciable question would be presented. Whether or not the Legislature requires Senate confirmation of a particular office, the appointment must be made in compliance with the applicable laws and a failure by the Governor to observe the requirements or, where confirmation is provided for, an attempt by the Senate to confirm a person whose qualifications don’t comply, gives rise to a justiciable controversy.
II. Part A
However, in order to bring an action challenging a noncompliant appointment, a litigant must have standing. I disagree that the Plaintiffs have not alleged sufficient facts *397to give them standing with regard to their contention that the appointment contravenes the statutory limitation on party membership. The Plaintiffs have alleged that they are members of the Democratic Party and that they are injured by virtue of the fact that more members of an opposing party were appointed to serve on the Judicial Council than Section 1-2101 permits. Because the statute is designed to prevent any political party from gaining overwhelming control of the governmental entity in question, it stands to reason that any aggrieved political party, or possibly an independent concerned about the concentration of power, would have the ability to challenge the action.
The argument of the Plaintiffs is not entirely on point, however, as the main thrust of their argument is couched in terms of the Governor and Senate usurping an opportunity that would be theirs but for a violation of the statute. In other words, because too many Republicans were appointed, the Democrats suffered because one of their own was not appointed to the position. There is nothing in the statute that indicates the purpose of the restriction is to provide opportunities for members of the Democratic Party or for any other party. The purpose of the statute is to prevent a concentration of power by any one party. Certainly the Idaho Democratic Party, the Constitution Party, the Libertarian Party of Idaho, and the Natural Law Party of Idaho, all of whom are recognized by the State of Idaho, would all have an interest in seeing that the Judicial Council, as well as every other governmental entity subject to a statutory party membership limitation, would not be weighted too heavily by an opposing party. Any of those parties would obviously have a dog in this fight and would have standing to pursue it. That said, however, even though I would hold that the Plaintiffs, pursuing their claim on behalf of the Democratic Party, do have standing, their complaint was properly dismissed because no violation of the party limitation occurred here.
The Plaintiffs contend that Reberger’s appointment violates the party limitation because three other members of the Judicial Council, including the Honorable Randy Smith, a district judge, were members of the Republican Party. Judge Smith was appointed to the Judicial Council by the board of commissioners of the Idaho State Bar in June of 2001. Prior to his appointment to the district court bench in 1996, Judge Smith had served as Bannock County Republican Chairman and Chairman of the Idaho Republican Party. The Plaintiffs allege that Judge Smith “remains a member of the Republican Party despite his service on the district court bench.” However, they offer no evidence to support such allegation. Indeed, at oral argument their counsel conceded that in the data sheet Judge Smith filled out when appointed to the Judicial Council, he did not claim affiliation with any political party. Since his appointment in 1996, Judge Smith has successfully run for reeleetion on a nonpartisan ticket. Therefore, the district court properly dismissed the complaint insofar as it alleged the improper appointment of a fourth member of the same political party to the Judicial Council.
Justice BURDICK concurs.