Court Opinion

ID: 9529533
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:51:48.239297+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:50.358601
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE BOWMAN, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. The critical issue, in my view, is whether the police had a reasonable suspicion to warrant the detention and questioning of defendant. Under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968), an officer may conduct an investigatory stop without probable cause when he reasonably infers from specific facts that a person is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a crime. People v. Ertl, 292 Ill. App. 3d 863, 868 (1997). While I agree with the majority’s position that “mere presence,” without more, in a “crack house” is insufficient to justify a Terry stop (see People v. Harper, 237 Ill. App. 3d 202 (1992)), I believe that in this case the facts justified the Terry stop. In People v. Graves, 281 Ill. App. 3d 386 (1996), we distinguished Harper in a manner applicable here. There, as in Harper, police officers saw the defendant enter a known drug house, remain for a short time, and leave. The officer observed nothing to indicate what the defendant did inside. Nevertheless, we upheld the stop of the defendant, distinguishing Harper, because of two additional facts. First, less than a week before the stop, the police conducted controlled purchases at the house. Second, less than three hours before the stop, the police arrested four other people who exited the building with drugs in their possession. Graves, 281 Ill. App. 3d at 388, 391. Thus, the mere presence of a person within a known drug house will not support a Terry stop of that person. However, knowledge of recent drug activity occurring within the house may constitute reasonable suspicion that a person is present therein for the purpose of engaging in such activity. Although Officer Greathouse testified he suspected defendant only because “[s]he was in a crack house,” Officer Granger’s “complaint for search warrant” shows that the police conducted a controlled purchase at the apartment only a few days earlier. Therefore, as in Graves, the police in the case before us knew not only that the apartment generally was a “crack house” but also that drugs likely were being sold there on the day of the search. As a result, the police had reasonable suspicion that defendant, who was alone in the apartment, was involved with drug activity. They did not have probable cause to arrest or search her (see People v. Simmons, 210 Ill. App. 3d 692, 700-01 (1991)), but they had sufficient grounds to stop and question her, and there is no doubt that the stop produced grounds for a valid arrest. It was the recency of the drug activity in the apartment that permitted the police to stop and question defendant. Additionally, the totality of the circumstances dictates whether there exists an articulable basis to believe a crime had been committed, or was about to be committed. People v. Lockett, 311 Ill. App. 3d 661, 667 (2000). Other facts which lend support for a Terry stop in this case were defendant’s sole occupancy of the apartment, her failure to respond to the police announcement for entry, and her location in a closed door bathroom at the toilet. The fact that defendant was alone in the apartment would lead a police officer to believe she had more than a visitor status. Also, it is common knowledge that, in the face of a police drug raid, occupants will attempt to flush illegal drugs down the toilet. Finally, I note that the recency of drug activity and the activities of defendant were not the bases on which the trial court denied defendant’s motion to suppress. The trial court ruled that, because the police issued Miranda warnings to defendant, no constitutional violation occurred. As the majority notes, Miranda warnings protect only a defendant’s fifth amendment right against coerced incrimination. U.S. Const., amends. V, XIV; Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 600-01, 45 L. Ed. 2d 416, 425, 95 S. Ct. 2254, 2260 (1975). They do not purge automatically the taint of an unreasonable seizure in violation of the fourth amendment. People v. Townes, 91 Ill. 2d 32, 39 (1982). Nevertheless, because we may affirm a ruling on a motion to suppress for any reason supported by the record (People v. Buss, 187 Ill. 2d 144, 205 (1999)), I would affirm the trial court’s ruling on the ground that no fourth amendment violation occurred here.