Court Opinion

ID: 9549604
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:22:04.65243+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:20:36.582577
License: Public Domain

McDonough, justice.
I concur. This case was submitted to the court below on the pleadings and upon a stipulation of the facts. There are no admissions in the pleadings which would in any way broaden the stipulation. The latter merely recites the dates *90of the various conveyances, the state of the tax title, and the recited consideration in the deeds. As noted in the opinion of the court, the recited consideration in the deed from the plaintiff to his grantee, the Doris Trust Company, was “$10.00 and other valuable consideration”. The conveyance was by quitclaim deed. There is no evidence in the record of any representation either by word or conduct upon the part of the plaintiff to indicate that he purported or intended to convey any right, title or interest in the property in question other than that he had received from the County by tax deed. There is no evidence in the record that the grantee paid for such quitclaim deed any amount other than the recited consideration. In this state of the record, in order to sustain appellant’s contention, we would in effect, whatever the dialectics employed to reach the result, convert a quitclaim deed into a conveyance which at least purports to convey a fee simple title absolute.
In the case of Duncan v. Hemmelwright, 112 Utah 262, 186 P. 2d 965, 968, Carbon County, after default by the record owner in the payment of taxes, conveyed its title by quitclaim to the plaintiff. Subsequent thereto it acquired from the trustee in bankruptcy of the defaulting tax-debtor owner a deed to the property in question. Thereafter, the county quitclaimed such property to defendant’s predecessor in interest. The successor in interest of the tax title purchaser brought suit to quiet title. Defendant counterclaimed asserting title in itself. The lower court quieted title in the defendant. We affirmed. In the course of the opinion, we stated:
“Plaintiff next contends that the answer shows title to the land in plaintiff by operation of the doctrine of after-acquired title. It is plaintiff’s contention that if the county acquired any interest in the land in question under the bankruptcy proceedings, such after-acquired title passed immediately to the plaintiff. The contention also is without merit. The deed from the county to plaintiff was a quitclaim deed. A quitclaim deed does not convey an after-acquired title. 7 Thompson on Real Property, Permanent Ed., Secs. 3845, 3846, pp. 310-312; 4 Tiffany Real Property, 3d Ed., Sec. 1231, p. 642. Under *9178-1-12, U. C. A. 1948, a quitclaim deed operates- to convey the estate of the grantor ‘at the date of such conveyance.’ The doctrine of after-acquired title is clearly not applicable to the facts of this case.”
. This doctrine is universally recognized. See annotation 26, 58 A. L. R. 360. Therein the annotator states:
“* * * if the conveyance is merely by quitclaim deed, and there are no covenants or recitals showing an intention to convey any definite interest or estate, the grantor is not thereby estopped from asserting an after acquired title or interest.”
Plaintiff then would not be here estopped by deed. Nor as shown above, would he be estopped by any representation or promise he had made in connection with the execution of the quitclaim. The doctrine of “clean hands” is, in my opinion, inapplicable. That doctrine supposes the hands of the party seeking equity to be polluted by some inequitable or unconscionable conduct upon his part. As stated hereinabove, the only things the records show that the plaintiff did was (1) he purchased a tax title from the county; (2) he conveyed such a title by quitclaim to defendant’s grantor; and (3) some years later he purchased the outstanding title of the tax debtor owner. As I understand the contention of appellant, he thereby soiled his hands so as to preclude obtaining the aid of the court of equity in quieting title in him as against the successor in interest of the tax title purchaser. If the mere fact that the quitclaim grantor subsequent to his conveyance acquired good title to the premises is unconscionable, then in practical effect we say that a quitclaim deed carries after-acquired title. At least the after-acquired title is subject to an outstanding title of record which cannot be adjudicated to be invalid.