Court Opinion

ID: 9362919
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-13 15:09:04.230917+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:26.748924
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: JANUARY 6, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                         NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                  Commonwealth of Kentucky
                             Court of Appeals

                                NO. 2021-CA-1053-MR

SARA ELIZABETH KOTZBAUER                                                   APPELLANT

                   APPEAL FROM FAYETTE FAMILY COURT
v.                  HONORABLE TRACI H. BRISLIN, JUDGE
                          ACTION NO. 19-CI-00269

BRADFORD RAYMOND SOHNLEIN                                                     APPELLEE

                                        OPINION
                                       AFFIRMING

                                      ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: CLAYTON, CHIEF JUDGE; CALDWELL AND K. THOMPSON,
JUDGES.1

THOMPSON, K., JUDGE: Sara Elizabeth Kotzbauer appeals the Fayette Family

Court’s decision to award sole custody of their children to her former husband

1
 Judge Kelly Thompson authored this Opinion before his tenure with the Kentucky Court of
Appeals expired on December 31, 2022. Judge Denise G. Clayton concurred in this Opinion
prior to her retirement from the Court of Appeals. Release of this Opinion was delayed by
administrative handling.
Brad Sohnlein. As the record amply supports the family court’s decision based on

Sara’s own behavior which was detrimental to the children and prevented effective

joint custody, we affirm.

             Brad and Sara were married in 2009 and have two minor children,

M.K.S. (born in 2010) and Q.E.S (born in 2014) (collectively the children). On

January 24, 2019, Brad petitioned the family court to dissolve his marriage with

Sara. Ultimately, the family court entered a decree dissolving the marriage and

dividing their marital estate. While they were provided equal timesharing with the

children, the family court awarded Brad sole custody.

             Sara argues the family court erred in its custody award, in large part

because she believes the family court’s findings and the underlying evidence were

insufficient to rebut the statutory presumption of joint custody set forth in

Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 403.270(2). Upon review, we affirm.

             The family court based its findings relevant to custody upon testimony

and other evidence adduced by the parties over the course of a hearing held on

December 10, 2020, March 12, 2021, and March 19, 2021. As set forth in its April

27, 2021 decree, the family court’s findings relevant to the custody issue were as

follows:

             15. There are no agreements between the parties about
             custody. . . .

             ...

                                          -2-
17. The evidence presented in this case strongly
overcomes the statutory presumption in favor of joint
custody and the Court finds the best interests of the
children will be served by an award of permanent sole
custody to Brad and visitation between the children and
Sara.

18. There are numerous examples of behavior by Sara
which has undermined her ability to co-parent and which
has negatively impacted the children, either directly or
indirectly. She accosted Brad in the presence of the
children in January, 2019. She assaulted Brad in
California in 2018. She contacted Brad’s employer
shortly after he arrived in Lexington to disparage him
without regard for the potential impact on his ability to
financially provide for the children. On one occasion,
Sara took the kids to Brad’s house even though she knew
he wasn’t going to be there. This was done as an act of
defiance without regard to the resulting confusion for the
kids. On another occasion, she insisted on exchanging
the kids when Brad was in a meeting and unavailable.
She disapproved of the Christmas gifts Brad purchased
for the children to give to her last Christmas and showed
her disapproval to the children. She threatened to tell
[M.K.S.] that he could not go to Space Camp because
Brad would not agree to pay for it. She told the children
the reason the elf on the shelf couldn’t come with them at
Christmastime is because Brad and his girlfriend said no.
She texted Brad from [M.K.S.’s] iPad, pretending to be
[M.K.S.] to trick Brad into communicating with her.
[M.K.S.] could have later discovered and been confused
by the conversation. Sara tried to sabotage or prevent
Brad from coaching [M.K.S.’s] soccer team. She
attempts to control the children’s time when they are with
their father; one example is her attempt to coax [M.K.S.]
to her house during Brad’s timesharing on Thanksgiving
Day. Some of the inappropriate texts Sara has sent to the
parties’ son include “I’m sorry Dad is putting you kids in
this situation again,” “I hope your Dad doesn’t force you

                           -3-
back into not being able to see friends,” and “That sucks.
Can’t Dad pay attention to you.”

19. Sara’s behavior predates the introduction of Brad’s
now live-in girlfriend, Amanda, in March, 2020 but it has
gotten worse since. Sara has assaulted Amanda. She
reported Amanda’s employer to health officials over
COVID protocols. Sara bad-mouths Amanda to the
children. The court finds this is an effort to turn the
children against their father by sending them the message
that Amanda is bad therefore Dad is wrong or bad to be
with her. She continually refers to Amanda as “that girl”
to the children, thereby projecting her admitted “total
lack of respect” for Amanda onto them. This negatively
impacts their relationship with their father. Without
finding any fault on the part of Brad or Amanda, the
Court recognizes that [M.K.S.] is having a hard time
when he is at their home. Sara has convinced him he
shouldn’t like Amanda because she is “evil,” she is “that
girl,” she is a “white trash whore,” she is “irresponsible,”
“disrespectful,” “mean,” and “stupid,” all Sara’s words.

20. Even more concerning than Sara’s behavior is her
apparent lack of awareness of the wrongfulness of it or
its effect on the children. Sara continually blames others
rather than taking responsibility for her actions.

21. Sara is wholly unable to communicate constructively
with Brad or work together and she is unable to set aside
her anger to make good decisions on behalf of the
children at this point in time. Sara’s decisions thus far
have been motivated by a desire to hurt Brad rather than
by a desire to do what is best for the children. While the
Court shares Sara’s hope and belief that dynamic can
improve with therapy, the Court finds it is just as likely it
will not and any therapeutic effort will likely take a long
time. Sara has already had two years of individual
therapy and she has completed a program designed to
help with cooperative parenting, all to no avail. The
Court cannot allow this toxic environment to continue

                             -4-
             any longer in the hopes Sara’s behavior will improve.
             [M.K.S.], who has special needs, has been particularly
             affected by Sara’s behavior and [Q.E.S.] is at risk for
             developing adjustment issues if the situation does not
             improve.

             ...

             24. Brad shall consult with Sara over significant
             decisions about the children, in an effort to reach
             consensus. Absent consensus, Brad shall be the decision
             maker.

             As indicated, the primary focus of Sara’s appeal is upon the substance

of the family court’s findings. Before proceeding to that issue, however, we will

briefly address a number of procedural arguments Sara also raises regarding why,

in her view, the family court erred in awarding Brad sole custody of the children.

             Sara first argues that she “was not provided with any notice of

[Brad’s] request for sole custody until days before the final hearing.” The record,

however, negates Sara’s argument that she had no previous notice that Brad

planned to seek sole custody. Sara’s own counsel acknowledged during closing

arguments, that Brad informed her about his intention in “November of 2020.” As

discussed, the first date of the evidentiary hearing was December 10, 2020. It

concluded on March 19, 2021.

             Between November 2020 and March 2021, Sara could have sought a

continuance if she believed she needed more time to address this issue. Sara has

also failed to allege that she was prejudiced by not receiving notice earlier.

                                          -5-
             Next, Sara argues that “[t]here was no request for a custodial

evaluation [or] appointment of a Friend of the Court[.]” Sara clarifies in her reply

brief that she is not “stat[ing] the Court was required to enlist these services” or

“the services of mental health professionals, custodial evaluators, or investigators

before making a custody decision.” Sara’s clarification is correct. See, e.g., Krug

v. Krug, 647 S.W.2d 790, 792-93 (Ky. 1983) (explaining, “We do not think [KRS

403.270(2)] intended to require the testimony of a child psychologist or a social

worker that certain conduct had affected, or would adversely affect, the child as an

absolute prerequisite to the consideration of the conduct by the trial judge.”). As

such, we need not address this issue further as Sara could have requested such

services but failed to do so.

             Next, Sara points out that in ascertaining the children’s best interests,

the family court did not quote or otherwise conform its findings to KRS 620.023.

She is correct. This is unsurprising because KRS 620.023 was irrelevant to the

underlying proceedings. As Brad notes, KRS 620.023 applies to “all proceedings

conducted pursuant to KRS Chapter 620[.]” KRS 620.023(1). KRS Chapter 620,

in turn, governs dependency, neglect, and abuse proceedings; whereas this

proceeding – which involved child custody in the context of a marital dissolution

proceeding – was governed by KRS Chapter 403.

                                          -6-
             Sara substantively argues that the family court’s factual findings and

the evidence upon which they were based were insufficient to rebut the statutory

presumption favoring joint custody set forth in KRS 403.270(2). Before discussing

the specifics of this overarching argument, it is important to review the applicable

law.

             In making a final custody decree, the deciding court must apply KRS

403.270 to ascertain the children’s best interests. Frances v. Frances, 266 S.W.3d

754, 759 (Ky. 2008). If substantial evidence of record rebuts the statutory

presumption of joint custody set forth in KRS 403.270(2) and supports a finding

that it is in the children’s best interests for one parent to have sole custody, this

Court will not disturb that finding because “judging the credibility of witnesses and

weighing evidence are tasks within the exclusive province of the trial court.”

Moore v. Asente, 110 S.W.3d 336, 354 (Ky. 2003).

             KRS 403.270(2) denotes a non-exclusive list of factors to be

considered when making a best interests determination. Those factors include:

             (a) The wishes of the child’s parent or parents, and any
             de facto custodian, as to his or her custody;

             (b) The wishes of the child as to his or her custodian,
             with due consideration given to the influence a parent or
             de facto custodian may have over the child’s wishes;

             (c) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with
             his or her parent or parents, his or her siblings, and any

                                           -7-
other person who may significantly affect the child’s best
interests;

(d) The motivation of the adults participating in the
custody proceeding;

(e) The child’s adjustment and continuing proximity to
his or her home, school, and community;

(f) The mental and physical health of all individuals
involved;

(g) A finding by the court that domestic violence and
abuse, as defined in KRS 403.720, has been committed
by one (1) of the parties against a child of the parties or
against another party. The court shall determine the
extent to which the domestic violence and abuse has
affected the child and the child’s relationship to each
party, with due consideration given to efforts made by a
party toward the completion of any domestic violence
treatment, counseling, or program;

(h) The extent to which the child has been cared for,
nurtured, and supported by any de facto custodian;

(i) The intent of the parent or parents in placing the child
with a de facto custodian;

(j) The circumstances under which the child was placed
or allowed to remain in the custody of a de facto
custodian, including whether the parent now seeking
custody was previously prevented from doing so as a
result of domestic violence as defined in KRS 403.720
and whether the child was placed with a de facto
custodian to allow the parent now seeking custody to
seek employment, work, or attend school; and

(k) The likelihood a party will allow the child frequent,
meaningful, and continuing contact with the other parent
or de facto custodian, except that the court shall not

                             -8-
             consider this likelihood if there is a finding that the other
             parent or de facto custodian engaged in domestic
             violence and abuse, as defined in KRS 403.720, against
             the party or a child and that a continuing relationship
             with the other parent will endanger the health or safety of
             either that party or the child.

             Sara does not contend the family court misunderstood or

mischaracterized the evidence discussed in its findings of fact. Nor, as Sara writes

in her brief, does she “deny her behavior as outlined in the Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law was not acceptable[.]” Nevertheless, she asserts the family

court’s factfinding was deficient. She argues:

             The Court did not consider several relevant factors in
             determining the best interests of the minor children,
             including but not limited to: the wishes of the children’s
             parents, the wishes of the children as to their custodians,
             the interactions and interrelationships between the parent
             and the children, the children’s adjustment and
             continuing proximity to his or her home, school or
             community, and the extent that the children have been
             cared for, nurtured and supported.

             Sara further argues the family court failed to consider and give weight

to certain evidence. For example, she notes the family court did not mention in its

findings that: Brad had proposed and agreed to temporary joint custody and equal

timesharing of the children until he became involved with Amanda; the children

had primarily resided with her during the parties’ separation; Sara is an involved

parent, and that she was “the only parent who took action to have [M.K.S.] treated

following an incident where [M.K.S.] claimed he was going to harm himself; the

                                          -9-
children were doing well academically, and enjoy spending time with both parents;

and her mother, Connie Kotzbauer, testified that in her opinion, Sara was capable

of co-parenting with Brad.

             However, it was the family court’s prerogative in weighing the

evidence to find certain factors more relevant to its disposition. “The extent that

the children have been cared for, nurtured and supported” is not relevant in this

matter, as Sara omits from her analysis that this language originates from and

pertains to a factor applicable when, unlike here, de facto custodians are involved.

KRS 403.270(2)(h). As to KRS 403.270(2)(a), the family court clearly understood

and acknowledged Brad’s and Sara’s respective wishes regarding custody in its

findings. Brad’s initial preference for joint custody did not estop him from seeking

sole custody later, nor did it otherwise bind the family court. See, e.g., Tilley v.

Tilley, 947 S.W.2d 63, 65 (Ky. App. 1997) (“[W]hile the parties are free to enter

into a separation agreement to promote settlement of the divorce, the court still

retains control over child custody, support, and visitation and is not bound by the

parties’ agreement in those areas.”).

             Regarding the wishes of the children per KRS 403.270(2)(b), the

evidence reflected the children love both their mother and father equally –

                                         -10-
something aptly reflected in the family court’s decree as it relates to timesharing.2

No evidence demonstrates the children’s preference for joint custody, but in any

event, the family court’s decision to largely ignore this factor was reasonable –

considering Q.E.S.’s very young age at the time of the hearing, and what the

family court determined was the “hard time” M.K.S. was having during his visits

with Brad and Amanda, due to Sara’s negative influence over him. As for the

remaining factors Sara believes the family court did not appropriately address (i.e.,

KRS 403.270(2)(c) and (e)), Sara fails to explain how the interactions and

interrelationships between the parents and the children, and the children’s

adjustment and continuing proximity to their home, school or community, has been

affected by the family court’s decision to appoint Brad their sole custodian,

considering Sara and Brad nevertheless maintain equal timesharing and live near

one another.

               Lastly, there is no dispute that Sara is a capable and competent parent

to the children. There is no dispute that Brad is, too. The dispositive issue is

whether they are capable of co-parenting. And, notwithstanding Sara’s mother’s

testimony to the contrary, substantial evidence supported they could not. The

2
  Sara asserts on the final page of her brief that the family court’s decision to permit the parents
equal timesharing with the children “is in direct conflict with the finding that sole custody was in
the best interest of the minor children.” To the extent this qualifies as an argument, we disagree.
Timesharing and custody are separate issues, and Sara cites no authority which indicates that a
trial court that awards one parent sole custody is prohibited from awarding both parents equal
timesharing.

                                               -11-
record amply supports the family court’s findings that Sara’s participation in the

underlying custody proceedings was motivated and overshadowed by her

emotional immaturity, rather than guided by the children’s best interests. See KRS

403.270(2)(d) and (f).

              Regarding this latter point, Sara also argues no evidence demonstrated

that her conduct “actually affected the minor children or their best interest.” Sara

ignores, however, the family court’s well-supported finding that her open

disrespect toward Amanda negatively impacted M.K.S.’s relationship with

Amanda. That aside, the family court was not required to wait for her conduct to

affect the children before awarding Brad sole custody. It was enough for the

family court to cite substantial evidence supporting that Sara’s emotional

immaturity was continuous and to infer from that evidence that it was likely to

continue and, if unchecked, affect the children. See Krug, 647 S.W.2d at 793

(citations omitted) (explaining, “a judge is not required to wait until the children

have already been harmed before he can give consideration to the conduct causing

the harm”).

              Sara’s arguments are without merit. Our Supreme Court has stated

that in assessing whether sole custody is appropriate:

              [A] trial court should look beyond the present and assess
              the likelihood of future cooperation between the parents.
              It would be shortsighted to conclude that because parties
              are antagonistic at the time of their divorce, such

                                         -12-
             antagonism will continue indefinitely. Emotional
             maturity would appear to be a dependable guide in
             predicting future behavior. By cooperation we mean
             willingness to rationally participate in decisions affecting
             the upbringing of the child.

Squires v. Squires, 854 S.W.2d 765, 769 (Ky. 1993) (emphasis added). Sara’s lack

of emotional maturity guided the family court’s decision to grant Brad sole

custody; the family court did not abuse its discretion in making this decision.

             Accordingly, we affirm the Fayette Family Court’s decision to grant

Brad sole custody and Brad and Sara joint timesharing.

             ALL CONCUR.

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:                       BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Martha A. Rosenberg                        Lori B. Shelburne
Lexington, Kentucky                        Lexington, Kentucky

                                         -13-