Court Opinion

ID: 9766692
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:56:42.849162+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:37:34.493761
License: Public Domain

DIES, Chief Justice,
concurring.
I concur with the majority for these reasons:
First, there is no positive contention by anybody — my colleagues, the testimony, or the pleadings — that the contract in question is ambiguous. The jury found, in effect, it is unambiguous, and that is so. If any Court of Appeals was ever made aware of the legal consequences of this fact, our court was. In Sun Oil Company (Delaware) v. Madeley, 626 S.W.2d 726 (Tex.1981), reversing our 610 S.W.2d 798, written by this writer,1 the parties had interpreted an oil lease a certain way for years. Then, some years later, Sun decided it had been making an incorrect interpretation all those years, and sued to reform. The Su*927preme Court held the contract was unambiguous, therefore it mattered not the interpretation given and followed by the parties all those years; that the interpretation was one for the court. The Supreme Court then followed Sun’s trial contentions, resulting in a reduction of the value of the contract for the Madeleys, saying, inter alia (at 727-728):
“In construing this lease, it is our task to seek the intention of the parties as that intention is expressed in the lease, [citing authority] The courts will enforce an unambiguous instrument as written; and, in the ordinary case, the writing alone will be deemed to express the intention of the parties [citing authorities].” (emphasis added)
The terms of the contract at bar are quite clear and specific. “The ownership interests of the parties, including their right to participate in the profits thereof ... shall be as follows: Jack Truly [appel-lee], 40%; ...” Of course appellee would pay or owe (if financed) his pro rata share of the cost of building.
Then what is the finder of the facts to determine on remand?
One clause grants Truly $2,000 per month beginning January 1, 1982, through December 31, 1983, for supervision of the development and construction. The fact finder must determine what portion of this is due appellee. Since the parties have an unambiguous contract, appellee may not recover on quantum meruit. Woodard v. Southwest States, Inc., 384 S.W.2d 674 (Tex.1964). Even an unambiguous written contract may be reinforced by a side oral agreement, which is a fact issue. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Waste Systems, Inc., 703 S.W.2d 386 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 1986, writ ref d n.r.e.). Arts. 2226 to 2226b were repealed by Acts of 1985, 69th Leg., effective September 1, 1985, which Act creates the Civil Practice and Remedies Code. TEX.CIV.PRAC. & REM.CODEsec. 38.001 (Vernon 1986). Appellee’s ability to obtain attorneys’ fees will depend on the fact findings. I would reverse and remand this case.

. Two of the present members of this court were not on the court when either our decision or its reversal by the Supreme Court was handed down.