Court Opinion

ID: 9603651
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:08:33.989032+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:11:45.635724
License: Public Domain

DANN, Judge,** dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. This is a clear-cut case of the State violating a material term of a plea agreement. The agreement contained two terms regarding sentence. They are set forth verbatim in the majority’s opinion. The pertinent term required that the prosecutor “recommend that, if Mr. Sasak is sentenced to prison, he should not receive consecutive terms.” The record is clear that the prosecution failed to make any such recommendation, either to the probation department or to the sentencing judge. Sasak was sentenced to the maximum twenty-year term in prison, two consecutive ten-year sentences. Thus, had the State performed its part of the agreement, and had the judge been persuaded by its recommendation, the Defendant’s sentence would have been ten years in prison *192at the most, or one half of the sentence he received.
After finding that the issue is properly raised under rule 32, the majority first concludes that the record supports the sentencing judge’s finding that the State did in fact comply with the plea agreement. The record does not contain any basis for a finding that the State made the recommendation required of it. The only conclusion that one can possibly draw is that the State failed, orally or in writing, to recommend prior to sentencing that Sasak not receive consecutive prison sentences. Instead of making the sentencing recommendation required of him, the prosecutor recommended a form of consecutive sentences—a prison term on one count followed by consecutive probation on the other.
Even assuming that the prosecutor’s statements do not violate the plea agreement term regarding consecutive sentences, the Sell’s recommendation did. Mr. Sell, whom the court appointed as receiver of Defendant’s business in a civil proceeding brought by the State, wrote the probation department recommending that the court impose the maximum prison sentences available and that they be served consecutively. Whether or not a legal agent of the State, the prosecutor’s office was closely enough associated with Mr. Sell that there was a danger the court would associate Sell’s remarks with the State. The Sell’s recommendation, therefore, made it all the more important that the prosecutor recommend against consecutive prison terms. The prosecutor, however, did not disabuse the court of the notion of consecutive sentences, and, therefore, breached the plea agreement.
The majority relies upon Mabry v. Johnson and State v. Georgeoff to deny Sasak relief. These eases do not control here. In Mabry the question was whether an accepted plea offer may be withdrawn by the prosecution prior to any guilty plea being entered. The Supreme Court answered in the affirmative, holding that due process considerations are implicated only where, as here, a guilty plea occurs pursuant to a plea agreement. Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 507, 104 S.Ct. 2543, 2546, 81 L.Ed.2d 437 (1984). Nor is Georgeoff relevant to this case. There, the Arizona Supreme Court held that by failing to object at sentencing concerning what appeared to be a rather clear breach of a plea agreement term regarding sentencing, the defendant waived his right to raise the issue on appeal. State v. Georgeoff, 163 Ariz. 434, 437, 788 P.2d 1185, 1188 (1990). Furthermore, although the breach in Georgeoff did not rise to fundamental error review, the court noted that post-conviction relief provided an appropriate forum for relief. Id.
This case is controlled not by Mabry and Georgeoff, but by Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971) and cases such as State v. Ross, 166 Ariz. 579, 804 P.2d 112 (App.1990). Santobello, the seminal case on the subject of breach of plea agreement terms by the prosecution, held that due process requires remand for specific performance of the agreement before a new sentencing judge or for an opportunity for the defendant to withdraw from his plea when the State breaches material portions of the plea agreement’s stipulations regarding sentencing. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262-63, 92 S.Ct. at 498-99; see also Ross, 166 Ariz. at 584-85, 804 P.2d at 117-18 (relying on Santobello, vacating for re-sentencing).
Santobello also provides the standard to be applied in determining whether a sentence and guilty plea should be vacated following such a breach. According to the Court, a plea can not stand where it “rests in any significant degree” upon the promise breached or where the promise was “part of the inducement or consideration” for the plea. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262, 92 S.Ct. at 499. The majority has not clearly identified in this case what standard it applies in concluding that Sasak failed to prove that the consecutive sentence provision was of consequence to him. On the one hand the majority opinion suggests that the Defendant need only prove that he pled “in reliance” on the promise or that it was “an inducement” to his plea. The majority also refers to the Santobello test, that is, he must prove that the guilty plea “rests in any significant degree” upon the stipulation. Majority Opinion at 734. However, the majority also appear to hold defendant to too high a standard when they con-*193elude that Sasak is not entitled to relief because he failed to demonstrate that his plea “was induced by” the State’s promise and that “but for” the provision he would not have pled guilty. Majority Opinion at 734-735. Clearly, application of any standard or test more stringent than that announced in Santobello is improper.
I would conclude as a matter of law that the stipulation in question was a material inducement for the guilty plea and that the plea rested upon the stipulation to a significant degree. This record, including the evidence received at the Rule 32 hearing, does not support any other conclusion.
The State’s promise to recommend concurrent prison terms should Sasak be sentenced to prison was the sole affirmative agreement between the State and the defendant regarding sentencing. If the State had made such a recommendation so that the trial judge would have been aware of the State’s position prior to sentencing, one cannot assume that the recommendation would not have influenced the outcome. The cases do not permit such an assumption. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262, 92 S.Ct. at 498; Ross, 166 Ariz. at 585, 804 P.2d at 118. If the sentencing judge had been persuaded by the State’s recommendation, the defendant might have received a prison sentence half as long as the twenty-year sentence actually imposed.
As this court noted in Ross:
A prosecutor commits reversible error when he violates his plea agreement with the defendant. Breaking a promise which induced the defendant to plead guilty rather than exercise his right to a jury trial undercuts the essential fairness and integrity of our system of justice. The defendant therefore need not show actual prejudice. It is an essential component of fundamental fairness that, when a defendant and the state enter into a particular agreement, the state must comply with its promises.
166 Ariz. at 584, 804 P.2d at 117 (citations omitted).
To preserve the essential fairness and integrity of the plea bargaining and sentencing components of our criminal justice system, this sentence should not stand. In accordance with Santobello and Ross, the sentence should be vacated and the ease remanded for specific performance of the plea agreement before a new judge, or the defendant should be given an opportunity to withdraw from the breached agreement.

 The Honorable B. MICHAEL DANN, Judge of the Maricopa County Superior Court, was authorized to participate in this matter by the Chief Justice of the Arizona Supreme Court, pursuant to Ariz. Const, art. 6, § 31.