Court Opinion

ID: 9790739
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:58:52.057368+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:31.266601
License: Public Domain

Chief Judge, STERNBERG,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in Part II of the majority opinion but, because I believe that the “initial per*666mission rale” should apply in permissive user eases, I respectfully dissent as to Part I of the majority opinion.
In my view, particularly after the adoption of No Fault statutes by most states in this country over the last decade, it has become more and more apparent that an insurance policy exists for the benefit of members of the general public as well as for the benefit of the insured.
The Colorado Automobile Accident Reparations Act (No Fault Act) was adopted to avoid inadequate compensation of persons injured by motor vehicles. Section 10^4-702, C.R.S. (1994 Repl.Vol. 4A). To that end, liability coverage is mandated so as to assure that persons injured in vehicle accidents will be compensated for those injuries. However, adopting a rule which permits inquiry into the use made of the vehicle, the scope of permission, the purpose of use, etc., will necessarily lead to increased litigation and will result in inadequate and unpredictable compensation to persons injured in automobile accidents.
While criticized by treatise writers of several years ago, see, e.g., 6C J. Appleman, Insurance Law & Practice § 4366, the initial permission rale which I urge recognizes the need for certainty in permissive use cases: once permission is given and the keys handed over, that driver is covered under the owner’s policy, even if he deviates in the use, the scope, or the purposes of the initial grant of permission.
One difficulty with allowing inquiry into the scope of permission is that an innocent third party may find his or her recovery dependent upon the question whether it was “reasonable” for the driver to take a certain route, or to travel to one specific destination rather than to another. Indeed, here, Pierce could be faced with the formidable task of arguing that Wiglesworth could reasonably believe he had permission to engage in a drag race. As between the parties, the person who enabled the permissive user to be on the road in the first place, ie., the owner, should more appropriately bear the risk of loss than the member of the general public sharing the road with the permissive user.
Winscom v. Garza, 843 P.2d 126 (Colo.App.1992) does not require a different result than that which I am urging. Winscom holds that a permissive use exclusion in an automobile insurance policy does not violate or conflict with the intent of the No Fault Act. It does not address the question, what is “permission.” In Winscom, the vehicle was being driven by the boyfriend of the insured’s daughter. The insured had specifically forbidden the boyfriend from driving the vehicle. Winscom is a “no permission,” not an “initial permission” case.
Here, in distinction, the insureds gave the driver access to the vehicle and provided him with his own set of keys, thus permitting him to drive the vehicle without specifically asking for permission each time.
I understand the holding of the majority that the insurance policy in this case is broader than the statute; however, I do not agree with that rationale. The statute discusses “permission.” See § 10-4-703(6), C.R.S. (1994 Repl.Vol. 4A). There is no further refinement of this term in the statute, nor is there a discussion of the scope of permission. Inquiry into the reasonable belief of the permitted user is not required by the statute.
In my view, an injured party’s recovery should not turn on his ability to prove a driver’s reasonable belief in the extent of his permission. To do so will lead to a proliferation of litigation and to haphazard, capricious, and unpredictable compensation of innocent third parties who are injured by permissive users of motor vehicles.
For these reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.