Court Opinion

ID: 9492212
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:35:03.971025+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:51:45.967075
License: Public Domain

BOGGS, Circuit Judge,
concurring and dissenting.
I concur with the judgment and the opinion of the court, except as to the issue of the absolute immunity of Defendant Brush. I therefore dissent from the reasoning and judgment of Part II.A.2 of the court’s opinion.
I
Judges and other court officers are absolutely immune from suit on claims arising out of their performance of judicial or quasi-judicial functions, Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967); Bush v. Rauch, 38 F.3d 842, 847 (6th Cir.1994), but not from suits that arise out of other conduct, Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 228, 108 S.Ct. 538, 98 L.Ed.2d 555 (1988); Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 694-95, 117 S.Ct. 137 L.Ed.2d 945 (1997). Absolute immunity is determined by a functional analysis that looks to “ ‘the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it.’ ” Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 269, 113 S.Ct. 2606, 125 L.Ed.2d 209 (1993) (quoting Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486, 111 S.Ct. 1934, 114 L.Ed.2d 547 (1991)). The official seeking absolute immunity bears the burden of showing that immunity is justified in light of the function he was performing with the acts complained of. Burns, 500 U.S. at 486, 111 S.Ct. 1934.
Holloway alleges that she informed Brush of her address and her intent to assert her parental rights before those rights were severed, and that Brush (1) failed to notify the trial court that Holloway, a party in the action, had made contact and wished to assert her parental rights; (2) told Holloway that her rights had already been severed when, in fact, they had not been; and (3) withheld information from Holloway that would have enabled her to raise the issue in court before her rights were severed. Holloway argues that her claim does not arise out of Brush’s performance of quasi-judicial functions. I agree.
It is uncontested that Brush received a letter from the Washington Department of Social and Health Services, mailed on May 12, 1993, containing Holloway’s contact information; that Brush received a letter from Holloway on May 20, 1993, asking Brush to put the children on an airplane to Kansas, where she was living at the time; that Holloway and Brush spoke by phone on May 21, 1993, at which time Brush advised Holloway to retain counsel; and that Brush wrote to Holloway on June 2, 1993, indicating her understanding that they had an adversarial relationship and once again advising Holloway to retain counsel. The fact that Brush recognized the existence of an adversarial relationship raises a strong inference that she not only had been informed, but clearly understood that Holloway wished to assert her parental rights. It is a matter of public record that Holloway’s parental rights were not severed until June 16,1993, when the Cler-mont County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, adopted the report of the referee. See In re Holloway, No. CA93-*44908-057, 1994 WL 18161 at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 24, 1994) (unpublished); In re Holloway, No. CA95-09-064, 1996 WL 227481 at *1 (Ohio Ct.App. May 6, 1996) (unpublished).
II
This court has held that under certain circumstances, social workers are entitled to absolute immunity. See Kurzawa v. Mueller, 732 F.2d 1456, 1458 (6th Cir.1984) (holding that social workers are entitled to absolute immunity when prosecuting child delinquency petitions); Salyer v. Patrick, 874 F.2d 374, 377-78 (6th Cir.1989) (recognizing the functional orientation of the absolute immunity doctrine and holding that social workers are entitled to absolute immunity when filing child abuse petitions); but see Achterhof v. Selvaggio, 886 F.2d 826, 830 (6th Cir.1989) (holding that social workers are not entitled to absolute immunity when deciding whether to open or continue an investigation, or when deciding to enter a parent’s name in a central register of abusers, all of which are administrative or investigative by nature rather than prosecutorial). In ah three of these cases, this court has explicitly analogized the social workers to prosecutors for purposes of the functional analysis.1 Thus, to determine the scope of the immunity extended to social workers, we look to the scope of prosecutorial immunity.
Absolute prosecutorial immunity is justified “only for actions that are connected with the prosecutor’s role in judicial proceedings, not for every litigation-inducing conduct.” Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 494, 111 S.Ct. 1934, 114 L.Ed.2d 547 (1991). “Prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity for conduct ‘intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.’ ” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976). Prosecutors are not absolutely immune when they perform administrative, investigative, or other functions; for example, when they give legal advice to the police, hold a press conference, or fabricate evidence. Ibid. “[T]he actions of a prosecutor are not absolutely immune merely because they are performed by a prosecutor. Qualified immunity represents the norm.... The question, then, is whether the prosecutors have carried their burden of establishing that they were functioning as ‘advocates’ ” when they performed the actions complained of. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273-74, 113 S.Ct. 2606, 125 L.Ed.2d 209 (1993) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court has extended absolute immunity to prosecutors only where their challenged acts were performed while serving as an advocate in legal proceedings. Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 118 S.Ct. 502, 507, 139 L.Ed.2d 471 (1997).
This Circuit has followed the Supreme Court closely. Prosecutorial immunity extends to “ ‘[a] prosecutor’s decision to file a criminal complaint and seek an arrest warrant and the presentation of these materials to a judicial officer.’ ” Manetta v. Macomb County Enforcement Team, 141 F.3d 270, 274 (6th Cir.1998) (quoting Ireland v. Tunis, 113 F.3d 1435, 1446 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 118 S.Ct. 560, 139 L.Ed.2d 401 (1997)). Prosecutors are not absolutely immune, however, when they perform administrative, investigative, or other functions. Manetta v. Macomb County Enforcement Team, 141 F.3d 270, 274 (6th Cir.1998) (denying absolute immunity to a prosecutor for investigating a couple and holding them on extortion charges without probable cause). “Sixth Circuit precedent has established that ‘the critical inquiry is how closely related is the *450prosecutor’s challenged activity to his role as an advocate intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.’ ” Pusey v. City of Youngstown, 11 F.3d 652, 658 (6th Cir.1993) (emphasis added) (quoting Joseph v. Patterson, 795 F.2d 549, 554 (6th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1023, 107 S.Ct. 1910, 95 L.Ed.2d 516 (1987)).
The analytical key to prosecutorial immunity, therefore, is advocacy — whether the actions in question are those of an advocate. See Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273-74, 113 S.Ct. 2606; Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 118 S.Ct. at 507, 139 L.Ed.2d 471; Pusey, 11 F.3d at 658. By analogy, social workers are absolutely immune only when they are acting in their capacity as legal advocates — initiating court actions or testifying under oath — not when they are performing administrative, investigative, or other functions. The case before us turns on whether the actions of which Holloway complains were taken by Brush in her capacity as a legal advocate.
Ill
Brush is unquestionably entitled to absolute immunity for many of her actions in this case^ — in particular, filing two semiannual reports with the court and testifying that the children’s best interests would be served by awarding permanent custody to the state. These actions were those of a legal advocate and, therefore, entitled Brush to absolute immunity under this circuit’s controlling law. The actions of which Holloway complains, however — failing to notify the trial court that Plaintiff had made contact and wished to assert her parental rights, telling Plaintiff that her rights had been severed when they had not yet been, and withholding information that would have enabled Plaintiff to raise her rights in court before her rights were severed — are not those of a legal advocate under the law of this circuit, and do not entitle Brush to absolute immunity.2
Despite what I take to be canonical law to the contrary, the court bases its decision on several implausible holdings. First, the court holds that the actions of which Holloway complains “are analogous to a prosecutor’s evaluation of evidence and presentation of the same in a criminal prosecution.” Supra p. 442. However, the information withheld by Brush in the case before us was the fact that a party long sought by the court had appeared and wished to address the court to assert her legal rights. This is not evidence in the case, but rather administrative information about the case and its posture. Furthermore, the court’s analogy can, at best, only apply to Brush’s failure to inform the court that Holloway had appeared and wished to assert her parental rights. Lying to Holloway3 about the termination of *451her parental rights and failing to inform her about the upcoming court date have nothing whatever to do with evaluating and presenting evidence.
Second, the court holds that the actions of which Holloway complains are analogous to a prosecutor’s request that police not question a witness about his suspected criminal activity until he had testified in another case, which the Supreme Court held was an acceptable effort of the prosecutor to control the testimony of his witness. Supra pp. 443-44 (citing Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430 n. 32, 96 S.Ct. 984). However, “[t]he simple fact that acts may ultimately lead to [or, as here, prevent] witness testimony does not serve to cloak these actions with absolute testimonial immunity.” Spurlock v. Satterfield, 167 F.3d 995, 1001 (6th Cir.1999) (citing Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 20 F.3d 789, 796 (7th Cir.1994)). Furthermore, whatever latitude a prosecutor has to control the testimony of his witness is beside the point in the case before us. Witnesses other than the defendant generally have no right to testify in criminal proceedings. Holloway was not Brush’s witness, and this is not a situation of a prosecutor controlling Brush’s actions. Holloway was an adverse party, analogous to the defendant in a criminal proceeding, whose right to be heard in court was denied by Brush’s actions under color of law.
Third, the court holds that the actions of which Holloway complains are entitled to immunity because they were “ ‘intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal!, or custody as the case may be,] process.’ ” Supra p. 444 (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430, 96 S.Ct. 984). The court does not explain just how the actions of which Holloway complains were “intimately associated with the judicial process,” other than through the two misplaced analogies just discussed. Its argument is the naked assertion: “Clearly, Brush’s failure to ... notify Plaintiff was prosecu-torial in nature in that it was ‘intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.’ ” Ibid. But this reasoning is clearly circular — an' example of what is known in formal logic as a petitio prin-cipa Furthermore, an intimate association with the judicial process is not, by itself, sufficient for absolute immunity. The Supreme Court has explicated the Im-bler standard on several occasions. “The question ... is whether the prosecutors have carried their burden of establishing that they were functioning as ‘advocates’ ” when they performed the actions complained of. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273-74, 113 S.Ct. 2606, 125 L.Ed.2d 209 (1993); see also Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 118 S.Ct. 502, 507, 139 L.Ed.2d 471 (1997) (the Supreme Court has extended absolute immunity to prosecutors only, where their challenged acts were performed while serving as an advocate in legal proceedings); Pusey v. City of Youngstown, 11 F.3d 652, 658 (6th Cir.1993) (immunity turns on the prosecutor’s role as an advocate intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process). Even if Brush could successfully explain how failing to tell the court that Holloway had appeared and wished to assert her parental rights, lying to Holloway about her rights, and failing to inform Holloway about the upcoming court date were intimately connected with the judicial process, she has not explained how they were the function of an advocate.
Suppose that a pro se criminal defendant was unsure of his court date, which is actually scheduled for next Monday. Suppose he called the prosecutor who, knowing the actual court date, told him either that he had already been convicted in absentia or that he should appear the Monday after next, thereby procuring the defendant’s absence from trial. Finally, *452suppose that the prosecutor failed to inform the court that he had advised the defendant about when to appear, and that adverse action was taken against the defendant. When the defendant brings his § 1983 action against the prosecutor, on the reasoning of the court today it must fail due to prosecutorial immunity. But this is contrary to established law. The prosecutor in our hypothetical was not functioning as an advocate when he acted, and would not be immune under Buckley, Kalina, or Pusey. Brush was not functioning as an advocate when she performed essentially the same acts, and she is not immune either.
Finally, the court holds that the actions of which Holloway complains are analogous to recommendations made by caseworkers to the court, and the “ ‘formulation of professional judgments that served as the basis for’ ” such recommendations, which the Third Circuit held were entitled to immunity. Supra p. 445 (quoting Ernst v. Child & Youth Servs., 108 F.3d 486 (3rd Cir.1997)). In Ernst, the court had the opportunity to evaluate the caseworkers’ actions and to accept or reject their suggestions. In the case before us, Brush’s, actions denied the court the opportunity to accept or reject the results of her judgment. In effect, she appropriated the entire judicial process to herself by hiding Holloway and the court from each other and feeding them inaccurate information by act (in Holloway’s case) and omission (in both cases). Even granting arguendo that Brush’s actions were motivated by her “formulations of professional judgment,” the actions themselves bear no resemblance to recommendations made to the court. They were, rather, usurpations of the court’s authority. Even if such motivations could legitimate Brush’s actions, it would be through qualified immunity, not absolute immunity, and she has not claimed qualified immunity.
IV
What Brush did was not the evaluation and presentation of evidence. It was not controlling the testimony of her witness. It was not intimately associated with the judicial process, nor was it the function of an advocate. Finally, it was not a recommendation to the county court. It was a blatant usurpation of the entire judicial process that denied Holloway her right to be heard in court. The proper test is whether Brush has carried her burden of establishing that she was functioning as an advocate when she performed the actions complained of. See Buckley, 509 U.S. at 274, 113 S.Ct. 2606. She was not. I would apply the law of this circuit to the facts of the case before us, and reverse the judgment of the district court granting absolute immunity to Defendant Brush. I respectfully dissent.
V
Finally, I cannot convey strongly enough my disapproval of and concern with the careless fashion in which Clermont County has proceeded in this action. I note that over three years ago the Court of Appeals of Ohio set aside the order of the Clermont County Court of Common Pleas granting permanent custody of the Holloway children to the government, and remanded the case for further proceedings. In re Holloway, No. CA95-09-064, 1996 WL 227481 at *3 (Ohio Ct.App. May 6, 1996) (unpublished). Holloway pursued the matter by moving for reunification, and on October 11, 1996, CCDHS stated on the record its intention to serve her with a complaint seeking permanent custody. However, after lengthy investigation, I see no indication that the remand order has been obeyed.
Either CCDHS has been derelict in failing to pursue permanent custody, or the Clermont County Court of Common Pleas has allowed the case to languish on remand. In either case, the effect has been to deny Holloway her parental rights without severing them judicially. The Supreme Court has long recognized that “[a] parent’s interest in the accuracy and injus*453tice of the decision to terminate his or her parental status is ... a commanding one.” Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27, 101 S.Ct. 2153. Clermont County is under a clear obligation to comply with the edict of the Ohio Court of Appeals and to afford Ms. Holloway the hearing on her parental rights to which she is entitled.

. Justice Thomas doubts that social workers “can ever function as prosecutors for purposes of § 1983 immunity analysis.” See Hoffman v. Harris, 511 U.S. 1060, 1060, 114 S.Ct. 1631, 128 L.Ed.2d 354 (1994) (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari where a father challenged the grant of immunity to social workers who initiated a court proceeding resulting in a court order suspending his visitation rights; Hoffman v. Harris, 1993 WL 369140 (6th Cir. Sept.21, 1993) (unpublished).).

. The court states that today's decision is based exclusively on the proposition that Holloway limited her argument on appeal "solely to the issue of whether the CCJC acted without jurisdiction.” See supra at 439 n. 4 and associated text; 24. While this assertion has the virtue of rendering the court's discussion of the substantive issue of absolute immunity in Part II.A.2, pp. 14-25, mere dicta, the assertion is incorrect. Holloway attacked the substantive issue of absolute immunity, on which Brush triumphed below, at each opportunity. It is true that the arguments in her main brief focused on the alleged lack of jurisdiction in the CCJC. However, in her reply brief she argued that “plaintiff would urge that [absolute immunity] should not be available to ... Brush, as a ... social worker,” Reply Br. for Appellant at 11; see also id. at 13-14, and that "[Brush's] actions would not qualify for absolute immunity under analysis of the functionality test ... as described in Buckley," id. at 16. Indeed, the cases cited by Holloway are the very cases discussed by the court in its analysis of the substantive issue: Kurzawa, Achterhof, Scarso, Salyer, and Hoffman. See id. at 11, 14; supra at 441.

. The court views Brush's misrepresentations as "a careless mistake attributable to a heavy workload.” Supra p. 444. Holloway's complaint alleges that she was told that her parental rights had been severed and that her children were going to be adopted out "whether she liked it or not.” J.A. at 7. The district court made no findings of fact regarding Brush’s communication. See J.A. at 20-21. Holloway has alleged facts that consti*451tute lying, and the objective evidence indicates that Brush told her things that were not true. Taking the facts and making all reasonable inferences in the best light for Holloway, as we are required to do when deciding Defendants' motion for summary judgment, we must premise our decision upon the supposition that Brush lied.