Court Opinion

ID: 9531582
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:13:12.731677+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:32.046512
License: Public Domain

BIVINS, Judge (dissenting). Unable to agree with the disposition of the “single larceny doctrine” issue, I respectfully dissent. Based on my analysis of that issue, I would reverse and remand for a new trial. Thus, I would not reach the remaining issues, although I agree with the majority’s disposition of those issues. Relying primarily on State v. Pedroncelli, 100 N.M. 678, 675 P.2d 127 (1984), Defendant argues that under the proof, he should have been found guilty of only one count of embezzlement over $2500 but less than $20,000, a third degree felony. See NMSA 1978, § 30-16-8 (Cum.Supp.1992). Alternatively, Defendant argues that, if it is determined that single versus multiple embezzlements cannot be decided as a matter of law, then the jury should have been instructed as to both. It is with respect to this alternative argument that I address my concerns. The question presented is who should decide single versus multiple intent — the court, as a matter of law, or the jury, as a question of fact. I would hold that when reasonable minds could differ as to whether there was a single intent to embezzle or multiple intents to embezzle, then the jury should decide the question as a matter of fact under proper instructions. I start my discussion with Pedroncelli. In that case, the State charged the defendant with one count of embezzlement over $2500 in violation of Section 30-16-8, a third degree felony. The defendant appealed her conviction of that one count, arguing that there were multiple separate acts of embezzlement of over $100 but not more than $2500, all fourth degree felonies. The Court of Appeals concluded that the State could have charged the defendant with thirty-six counts, but chose to charge only one. This Court reversed on the basis that numerous embezzlements could not be aggregated to promote numerous fourth degree felonies to the status of a single third degree felony. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and affirmed the conviction on the one count of third degree felony. While noting distinctions between embezzlement and larceny, the Supreme Court in Pedroncelli utilized the “single larceny doctrine” and found but one crime. Notwithstanding, the Court recognized that “the factfinder may ... evaluate the evidence to determine if one protracted intention accompanies the several takings or conversions that may be implicated within a single charge.” Id. at 681, 675 P.2d at 130. But if the jury, as in the case before us, is not given the choice, how can it find that there was only one single embezzlement? Therein lies the problem. In State v. Brown, 113 N.M. 631, 830 P.2d 183 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 113 N.M. 636, 830 P.2d 553 (1992), this Court considered whether two convictions for larceny under $100 merged. We held they did and remanded so that the district court could vacate one of the defendant’s convictions for larceny under $100. In reaching that result, we relied on the factors set forth by the Supreme Court in Herron v. State, 111 N.M. 357, 805 P.2d 624 (1991), to determine whether the larcenies were separate and distinct. In refining those factors for application in a multiple larceny case, we said in Brown that the factors include: “the time between the criminal acts, the location of the property when it was taken, the existence of any intervening events, distinctions in the manner of committing the thefts, the defendant’s intent, and the number of victims.” Id. at 633, 830 P.2d at 185. Finding no evidence that the thefts were separated by a significant period of time, that the stolen items were taken from different locations in which the other victim had few rights, that the thefts were committed in different manners, that the defendant’s intent was different, or that the thefts were separated by an intervening event, we held that there was only a single larceny. This Court in Brown concluded that under either the single larceny doctrine or the Herron approach, the result reached would be the same. Did this Court in Brown reach its conclusion of a single larceny on the basis that reasonable minds could not differ so that the question could be decided as a matter of law? It would appear so. It would also appear that the Supreme Court in Herron reached the same conclusion. The Supreme Court reduced nineteen second degree criminal sexual penetration convictions to five. Similarity, this Court in State v. Mares, 112 N.M. 193, 812 P.2d 1341 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 112 N.M. 235, 814 P.2d 103 (1991), in reducing multiple batteries to one, concluded that reasonable minds could not differ as to the number of crimes committed. We did note in Mares, however, the question of what standard should apply if reasonable minds could differ. We said that “[pjerhaps retrial would be indicated, so the issue could be decided by the fact finder under proper instructions. Herron, however, did not address that issue.” Id., 112 N.M. at 200, 812 P.2d at 1348. Herron did not decide the issue, but I think this Court must, since it has been put squarely before us by Defendant. I read Brown and Mares as utilizing the Herron factors to determine whether, as a matter of law, reasonable minds could differ on the question of single versus multiple criminal impulses. At the trial level, it seems more appropriate to submit to the jury, if there is supporting evidence, a simple instruction that would allow the jury to find a single embezzlement if it finds a single, sustained criminal impulse or intent. I offer such an instruction later in this opinion. Given the criteria defined in Brown, I think that reasonable minds could differ, in this case, as to whether there was only one embezzlement or multiple embezzlements. The alleged embezzlements took place at different times from June 19, 1989, to July 26, 1989, a period of about five weeks. How can it be said, as a matter of law, that Defendant’s intent to embezzle stopped after each conversion and resumed anew with the next? Based on the record, it would not be unreasonable to find that there was but a single impulse to embezzle, and that this impulse was carried out in a series of conversions over a period of time. If reasonable minds can differ, there is an additional reason to allow the jury to decide the issue of single versus multiple embezzlements. Depending on the dollar amounts involved in each transaction, it may be to a defendant’s advantage to have either one conviction (this case) or several convictions {Pedroncelli). As long as there is evidence to support Defendant’s theory, he is entitled to an instruction on the issue. See State v. Castrillo, 112 N.M. 766, 769, 819 P.2d 1324, 1327 (1991) (if evidence supports theory of case, the defendant is entitled to instruction on that theory). That the existence of a single crime or multiple crimes should be decided by the fact-finder under proper instructions is supported by case law from other jurisdictions. See State v. Vining, 2 Wash.App. 802, 472 P.2d 564, 568 (1970) (whether successive takings result from multiple, independent criminal impulses, or result from a single, continuing criminal impulse, is a factual question which must be determined by the jury under appropriate instruction); see also State v. Johnston, 478 N.W.2d 281, 286 (S.D.1991) (Miller, C.J., dissenting) (dissent cites rule, well supported by authority, expressly recognizing that the existence of a continuous intent, scheme, or plan is a question for the jury (citing, among other cases, Pedroncelli and State v. Allen, 59 N.M. 139, 280 P.2d 298 (1955))). See generally Peter G. Guthrie, Annotation, Series of Takings Over a Period of Time as Involving Single or Separate Larcenies, 53 A.L.R.3d 398, 407-09 (1973). The Uniform Jury Instructions do not provide an instruction to guide the jury in determining whether multiple thefts constitute one embezzlement or multiple embezzlements. I think one could be fashioned along the following lines: Evidence has been presented that Defendant committed only one, as opposed to several, embezzlements. A defendant commits only one, as opposed to several, embezzlements when he is motivated by a single, continuing, sustained criminal impulse in execution of one general scheme. To find Defendant guilty of more than one embezzlement, the burden is on the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that each act was the result of a separate and independent criminal impulse. Defendant acknowledges he did not tender an instruction. He argues he should not be penalized because the case law on the issue is less than clear. I agree, but note that a tendered instruction was probably unnecessary. Defendant filed and argued a pretrial motion on this very issue, which the district court rejected. Thus, I would reverse and remand for a new trial so that the jury can, under proper instruction, decide whether there was one or several embezzlements. In making his argument for a single conviction, Defendant undoubtedly understands that by aggregating the several dollar amounts, it is possible that a conviction will result in a third degree felony. See § 30-16-8.