Court Opinion

ID: 9756160
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 21:10:27.559394+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:15.124822
License: Public Domain

PAPADAKOS, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent for the reasons stated in the dissent of Mr. Justice Pomeroy in Commonwealth v. Clair, 458 Pa. 418, 326 A.2d 272 (1974). I cannot bring myself to believe that our sense of justice and fair play permits a waiver of basic and fundamental error to our appellate consideration on the merits. To permit such errors of a basic and fundamental nature to surface in post-conviction hearings under the guise of ineffective assistance of counsel, where the rules of review are more strictly applied against the defendant, is not, in my view, fair play.
The majority recognize the grievous error committed in this trial, but refuse to deal with it today. They prefer to wait another two years or so while a post-conviction proceeding winds its way through our appellate process and reaches us again for discretionary review. I prefer Superi- or Court’s handling of the matter and would, thus, affirm Superior Court.