Court Opinion

ID: 9852591
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:33:25.265622+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:30.325065
License: Public Domain

BERNES, Judge,
dissenting.
Because Omar Miller failed to present any evidence that the state knew of the potentially exculpatory or useful nature of the cell phone at the time of its disposal — a critical element of bad faith — the trial court erred in granting his motion to dismiss. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the majority decision in this case.
When the state disposes of evidence potentially exculpatory or useful to a defendant, a due process violation is established only if the defendant carries his burden of showing that the state acted in bad faith. Illinois v. Fisher, 540 U. S. 544, 547-548 (124 SC 1200, 157 LE2d 1060) (2004) (per curiam). See Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U. S. 51, 56-58 (109 SC 333, 102 LE2d 281) (1988); California v. Trombetta, 467 U. S. 479, 488 (II) (104 SC 2528, 81 LE2d 413) (1984); Swanson v. State, 248 Ga. App. 551 (1) (a) (545 SE2d 713) (2001). That the state acted negligently or handled the evidence in a manner indicating “careless, shoddy and unprofessional investigatory procedures” is insufficient to establish bad faith. Walker v. State, 264 Ga. 676, 681 (3) (449 SE2d 845) (1994). See State v. Brawner, 297 Ga. App. 817 (678 SE2d 503) (2009); Jackson v. State, 258 Ga. App. 806, 810 (3) (575 SE2d 713) (2002). Rather,
the presence or absence of bad faith by the police for purposes of the Due Process Clause must necessarily turn on the police’s knowledge of the exculpatory value of the evidence at the time it was lost or destroyed. A finding of bad faith is reserved for those cases in which the police themselves by their conduct indicate that the evidence could form a basis for exonerating the defendant.
(Punctuation and footnotes omitted; emphasis supplied.) State v. Blackwell, 245 Ga. App. 135, 141 (2) (d) (537 SE2d 457) (2000) (whole court). See Youngblood, 488 U. S. at 56; Brawner, 297 Ga. App. at 819-820. Therefore, a due process violation is established only in the limited circumstance where the state made a deliberate effort to destroy evidence which it knew to be exculpatory, potentially exculpatory, or useful to the defendant. See Trombetta, 467 U. S. at 488 (II); Walker, 264 Ga. at 681 (3); Brawner, 297 Ga. App. at 819; Doyal v. State, 287 Ga. App. 667, 671 (6) (653 SE2d 52) (2007).
Here, Miller presented no evidence of a due process violation as *593defined under this standard. There was no evidence that the cell phone was exculpatory on its face. Moreover, no testimony was presented at the hearing which would indicate that the evidence custodian, arresting officer, or any other state official knew that the cell phone had any potentially exculpatory or useful value to Miller at the time of its disposal. Finally, because Miller did not call to the stand the state official who verified the OCGA § 17-5-54 application, the record was silent as to whether the official’s inaccurate verification was the result of anything beyond mere negligence. Cf. Davis v. State of Ga., 256 Ga. App. 299, 303 (1) (568 SE2d 161) (2002) (noting that in search warrant context, the veracity of the affiant can be successfully impeached only if the defendant alleges and produces evidence that an inaccurate or omitted statement in the affidavit was not simply the result of negligence or innocent mistake).
Given this record, the trial court erred in finding that Miller met his burden of proving bad faith and should not have dismissed the charges. See Walker, 264 Ga. at 680 (3); Brawner, 297 Ga. App. at 821; Jackson, 258 Ga. App. at 810 (3). See also Henry v. Page, 223 F3d 477, 480-481 (II) (7th Cir. 2000) (no due process violation where evidence custodian mistakenly destroyed evidence in response to civil forfeiture order before case had been completed). Compare Blackwell, 245 Ga. App. at 138-141 (2) (b)-(d) (bad faith established by the state’s destruction of urine sample in a DUI case when the state had tested the sample and knew of its exculpatory value and destroyed the sample in violation of a court order granting the defendant access to it for independent testing). I am sympathetic to the trial court’s concern that the state obtained an order authorizing the disposal of Miller’s cell phone based upon an inaccurate verification provided to the court. Nevertheless, under the longstanding precedent of the United States Supreme Court and the appellate courts of this state, the burden was upon Miller to prove that state officials acted in bad faith, not simply negligently or carelessly. And the bad faith requirement serves the important purpose of “limit[ing] the extent of the police’s obligation to preserve evidence to reasonable bounds and confin[ing] it to that class of cases where the interests of justice most clearly require it.” Youngblood, 488 U. S. at 58. In the absence of any evidence of the state’s knowledge as to the potentially exculpatory or useful nature of the evidence, Miller failed to meet his burden of showing bad faith, necessitating reversal of the trial court.
I further question whether there was any evidence to support a finding of conscious wrongdoing. Significantly, the record establishes that Miller had previously resided at the address to which the notice was sent. Moreover, the incorrect verification stating that Miller’s property had been unclaimed for more than 90 days was contained in *594an omnibus application, which listed over 600 items of personal property from a multitude of cases, and did not in and of itself establish official animus toward Miller. Finally, contrary to the trial court’s ruling, the state’s failure to call the arresting officer in the traffic case to testify at the pretrial hearing in the robbery and battery case does not evidence bad faith. The record reflects that the state did not receive Miller’s motion to dismiss until the day set for trial, and that the arresting officer was not available to testify at the ensuing hearing because he was on leave in California and the state had not planned on calling him as a witness at trial. In any event, the burden was on Miller to affirmatively prove bad faith, not on the state to prove its absence, and so the state had no obligation to call the officer.
Decided June 29, 2009
Daniel J. Porter, District Attorney, William C. Akins, Assistant District Attorney, for appellant.
Jack E. Harrell, Jr., Sharon L. Hopkins, for appellee.
Because the record in this case does not authorize a finding of bad faith, I believe that the trial court’s decision was erroneous.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Andrews and Presiding Judge Johnson join in this dissent.