Court Opinion

ID: 9391413
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-02 12:06:23.874891+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:42.165065
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

                                         No. COA22-483

                                        Filed 02 May 2023

Burke County, No. 18 JT 177

IN THE MATTER OF: N.D.M.

      Appeal by Respondent-Father from order entered 3 March 2022 by Judge

Burford A. Cherry in Burke County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 3

April 2023.

      Amanda C. Perez for Appellee Burke County Department of Social Services.

      Manning, Fulton & Skinner, P.A., by Michael S. Harrell, for Appellee Guardian
      ad Litem.

      Parent Defender Wendy C. Sotolongo, by Assistant Parent Defender Jacky L.
      Brammer, for Appellant Respondent-Father.

      COLLINS, Judge.

      Respondent-Father appeals from the trial court’s order terminating his

parental rights to his son, Nathan.1 The dispositive issue on appeal is whether the

trial court erred by finding and concluding that Burke County Department of Social

Services (“DSS”) provided active efforts toward reunification in compliance with the

Indian Child Welfare Act (“ICWA”).2 Because DSS failed to provide active efforts

      1   We use a pseudonym to protect the juvenile’s identity. See N.C. R. App. P. 42.
      2   This appeal does not involve the termination of Nathan’s Mother’s parental rights.
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                                 Opinion of the Court

toward reunification within the meaning of ICWA, we reverse the order terminating

Father’s parental rights to Nathan and remand the matter to the trial court for

further proceedings.

                  I.   Procedural and Factual Background

      DSS filed a petition on 19 August 2018 alleging that Nathan was a neglected

and dependent juvenile. Supporting these allegations, the petition further alleged

that on 18 August 2018, DSS received a report that Nathan had been abandoned by

Mother’s boyfriend at a public safety office at Mother’s direction; Mother was

suffering from substance abuse and could not identify an alternate safety provider

for Nathan; Mother was a member of the Monacan Indian Tribe; and Nathan’s

putative father, Father, was incarcerated.      DSS obtained nonsecure custody of

Nathan on 19 August 2018.

      The trial court held adjudication and disposition hearings on 18 October 2018.

The trial court found, in part, that Nathan was eligible for membership in the

Monacan Tribe and ICWA applied to his case, and that Father had “submitted to

DNA testing which confirmed that he is the biological father of the juvenile.” The

trial court further found that DSS had made active efforts to prevent the breakup of

the family by, among other things, communicating with respondent parents and

monitoring their status. Upon facts stipulated to by the parties, including Father,

the trial court adjudicated Nathan neglected and dependent by written order entered

1 November 2018. The trial court ordered that Father not have visitation during his

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                                 Opinion of the Court

incarceration and that he enter into an out-of-home family services agreement and

complete the following:

             a. Submit to a comprehensive clinical assessment and
             follow recommendations;
             b. Submit to a substance abuse assessment and follow
             recommendations;
             c. Submit to random drug screens;
             d. Complete a parenting class and demonstrate skills
             learned;
             e. Obtain and maintain a legal means of income;
             f. Obtain and maintain transportation;
             g. Obtain and maintain stable housing.

Custody of Nathan was continued with DSS.

      After a review hearing on 7 February 2019, by written order entered 7 March

2019, the trial court found that Father was currently incarcerated and had not

entered into a case plan or engaged in any services, and that DSS had made active

efforts to prevent the breakup of the family by, among other things, DNA testing,

communicating with respondent parents, and monitoring their status. Father was

ordered to enter into an out-of-home family services agreement and complete certain

requirements, and was awarded no visitation.

      After a permanency planning review hearing on 30 May 2019, by written order

entered 27 June 2019, the trial court found that Father had been released from

incarceration but had yet to enter into a case plan or engage in services. The trial

court found that DSS had made active efforts to prevent the breakup of the family by,

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among other things, communicating with respondent parents and monitoring their

status. The trial court again ordered Father to enter into an out-of-home family

services agreement and complete certain requirements, and again ordered that

Father have no visitation.

       After a permanency planning review hearing on 9 January 2020, by written

order entered 23 January 2020, the trial court found as follows: Father had been

released from incarceration on 8 February 2019, rearrested on 22 February 2019, and

reincarcerated on 19 June 2019; Father had not engaged in any services; and DSS

had engaged in active efforts to prevent the breakup of the family by, among other

things, communicating with respondent parents, “[i]dentifying appropriate services

to assist parents to overcome barriers,” and “[m]onitoring the parents’ status[.]” The

trial court concluded that a primary plan of adoption with a secondary plan of

reunification was the most appropriate plan and Father was ordered to have no

visitation.

       After a permanency planning review hearing on 23 July 2020, by written order

entered 20 August 2020, the trial court found that Father was incarcerated and had

not entered into an out-of-home family services plan and that DSS had made active

efforts to prevent the breakup of the family. Father was ordered to have no visitation.

       On 3 December 2020, DSS filed a termination of parental rights (“TPR”)

petition, alleging that grounds existed to terminate Father’s parental rights based on

the following: neglect; willfully leaving Nathan in foster care for more than twelve

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months without showing reasonable progress in correcting the conditions that led to

Nathan’s removal; being incapable of providing proper care and supervision such that

Nathan is a dependent juvenile; and willful abandonment. See N.C. Gen. Stat. §

7B-1111(a)(1), (2), (6), (7) (2022). Also on that date, DSS prepared and filed a Notice

of Termination of Parental Rights under the Indian Child Welfare Act.           On 21

January 2021, DSS filed an amended TPR petition to include the ground that Father’s

parental rights with respect to another child had been terminated and he lacked the

ability or willingness to establish a safe home. See id. § 7B-1111(a)(9).

      After numerous continuations for various reasons, the trial court held a

hearing on the TPR petition on 6 December 2021. By written order entered 3 March

2022, the trial court terminated Father’s parental rights. The trial court found,

among other things, that Father had not completed any of the court-ordered services

recommended by DSS; had failed to enter into a case plan; had not engaged in any

programs while incarcerated; and, “[d]espite his inability to engage in many services,

[]Father still had access to the social worker and failed in any respect to engage with

the Department during his incarceration or to otherwise establish or maintain a

parental relationship with the juvenile.” The trial court also found that DSS had

engaged in active and reasonable efforts to reunify Nathan with Father. The trial

court concluded that all five grounds alleged in the petition existed to terminate

Father’s parental rights and that termination was in Nathan’s best interests.

      Father timely appealed.

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                                        II.    Analysis

      Father first argues that the trial court erred by finding and concluding that

DSS provided active efforts to prevent the breakup of the family, as required by

ICWA.

      We review de novo the trial court’s determination that DSS provided active

efforts toward reunification within the meaning of ICWA. See In re A.P., 260 N.C.

App. 540, 818 S.E.2d 396 (2018), disc. review denied, 372 N.C. 296, 827 S.E.2d 99

(2019). Due to the paucity of North Carolina case law involving ICWA, we look for

guidance from jurisdictions such as Alaska, Montana, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and

Washington that regularly address issues involving ICWA.

      The decision to terminate parental rights in this case is governed by both state

and federal statutes. North Carolina standards for terminating parental rights are

provided in Chapter 7B of our General Statutes, which allows the trial court to

terminate parental rights if it finds by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that one

or more grounds for terminating a parent’s rights exist and that terminating the

parent’s rights is in the juvenile’s best interest. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 7B-1109–1111

(2022). In addition to the state requirements, Nathan’s case is governed by the more

stringent protections of ICWA.3 See 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1)(ii)(2022); 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4);

In re E.J.B., 375 N.C. 95, 100, 846 S.E.2d 472, 475 (2020). ICWA was passed

                to protect the best interests of Indian children and to

      3   The applicability of ICWA is undisputed in this case.

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                promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and
                families by the establishment of minimum Federal
                standards for the removal of Indian children from their
                families and the placement of such children in foster or
                adoptive homes which will reflect the unique values of
                Indian culture, and by providing for assistance to Indian
                tribes in the operation of child and family service
                programs.

25 U.S.C. § 1902 (2022). See In re E.J.B., 375 N.C. at 98-100, 846 S.E.2d at 474-76

(giving a detailed background on ICWA).

      ICWA provides that a party seeking to terminate an individual’s parental

rights must “satisfy the court that active efforts have been made to provide remedial

services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian

family and that these efforts have proved unsuccessful.” 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d) (2022).

The active efforts requirement applies in situations that involve the termination of

the rights of Indian and non-Indian parents alike. See 25 C.F.R. § 23.2 (2022)

(defining “active efforts” to include efforts to help the “Indian child’s parents”); In re

Adoption of T.A.W., 383 P.3d 492, 500 (Wash. 2016) (ICWA active efforts are

“premised not on the Indian status of the parents but is instead based on whether the

child is an Indian child.”); C.J. v. State, 18 P.3d 1214 (Alaska 2001) (ICWA applied

based on the tribal affiliation of the children’s mother).

      Although not defined by ICWA, the United States Department of the Interior,

through the Bureau of Indian Affairs,4 issued a final rule in 2016 providing the

      4   Pursuant to the statutory authority in 5 U.S.C. § 301; 25 U.S.C. §§ 2, 9, 1901-1952.

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following definition of “active efforts” and a non-exhaustive list of examples of what

may constitute active efforts:

             Active efforts means affirmative, active, thorough, and
             timely efforts intended primarily to maintain or reunite an
             Indian child with his or her family. Where an agency is
             involved in the child-custody proceeding, active efforts
             must involve assisting the parent or parents or Indian
             custodian through the steps of a case plan and with
             accessing or developing the resources necessary to satisfy
             the case plan. To the maximum extent possible, active
             efforts should be provided in a manner consistent with the
             prevailing social and cultural conditions and way of life of
             the Indian child’s Tribe and should be conducted in
             partnership with the Indian child and the Indian child’s
             parents, extended family members, Indian custodians, and
             Tribe. Active efforts are to be tailored to the facts and
             circumstances of the case and may include, for example:
                    (1) Conducting a comprehensive assessment of the
                        circumstances of the Indian child’s family, with a
                        focus on safe reunification as the most desirable
                        goal;
                    (2) Identifying appropriate services and helping the
                        parents to overcome barriers, including actively
                        assisting the parents in obtaining such services;
                    (3) Identifying,     notifying,    and      inviting
                        representatives of the Indian child’s Tribe to
                        participate in providing support and services to
                        the Indian child’s family and in family team
                        meetings, permanency planning, and resolution
                        of placement issues;
                    (4) Conducting or causing to be conducted a diligent
                        search for the Indian child’s extended family
                        members, and contacting and consulting with
                        extended family members to provide family
                        structure and support for the Indian child and
                        the Indian child’s parents;
                    (5) Offering   and employing          all available and

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                        culturally appropriate family preservation
                        strategies and facilitating the use of remedial
                        and rehabilitative services provided by the child’s
                        Tribe;
                     (6) Taking steps to keep siblings together whenever
                         possible;
                     (7) Supporting regular visits with parents or Indian
                         custodians in the most natural setting possible as
                         well as trial home visits of the Indian child
                         during any period of removal, consistent with the
                         need to ensure the health, safety, and welfare of
                         the child;
                     (8) Identifying community resources including
                         housing, financial, transportation, mental
                         health, substance abuse, and peer support
                         services and actively assisting the Indian child’s
                         parents or, when appropriate, the child’s family,
                         in utilizing and accessing those resources;
                     (9) Monitoring    progress     and    participation   in
                         services;
                     (10) Considering alternative ways to address the
                        needs of the Indian child’s parents and, where
                        appropriate, the family, if the optimum services
                        do not exist or are not available;
                     (11) Providing post-reunification services and
                        monitoring.

25 C.F.R. § 23.2. “[T]he sufficiency of ‘active efforts’ will vary case-by-case and the

final rule’s definition of active efforts retains a state court’s discretion to consider the

facts and circumstances of each case.” In re E.L., 502 P.3d 1049, 1068 (Kan. App.

2021) (citing 81 Fed. Reg. 38,778, 38,791 (2016)).

       “[T]he practical circumstances surrounding a parent’s incarceration–the

difficulty of providing resources to inmates generally, the unavailability of specific

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resources, and the length of incarceration–may have a direct bearing on what active

remedial efforts are possible.” A.A. v. Dep’t of Family & Youth Servs., 982 P.2d 256,

261 (Alaska 1999) (citation omitted). However, “neither incarceration nor doubtful

prospects for rehabilitation will relieve the State of its duty under ICWA to make

active remedial efforts[.]” Id. (brackets and citation omitted).

      Furthermore, there is a distinction between passive and active efforts. See 81

Fed. Reg. 38,778, 38,790 (“[W]here an agency is involved in the child-custody

proceeding, active efforts involve assisting the parent through the steps of a case plan,

including accessing needed services and resources.           This is consistent with

congressional intent-by its plain and ordinary meaning, ‘active’ cannot be merely

‘passive.’”). On this distinction, the Alaska Supreme Court explained:

             Passive efforts are where a plan is drawn up and the client
             must develop his or her own resources towards bringing it
             to fruition. In contrast, active efforts are where the state
             caseworker takes the client through the steps of the plan
             rather than requiring that the plan be performed on its
             own.

Pravat P. v. Office of Children’s Servs., 249 P.3d 264, 271 (Alaska 2011) (brackets and

citation omitted).   Oklahoma appellate courts have drawn a similar distinction

between active and passive efforts, while also recognizing that a parent’s

incarceration significantly affects the scope of active efforts the State can provide.

See In re W.P., 516 P.3d 263, 269 (Okla. Civ. App. 2022); In re E.P.F.L., 265 P.3d 764,

772 (Okla. Civ. App. 2011); In re J.S., 177 P.3d 590, 593 (Okla. Civ. App. 2008).

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      Here the trial court made the following pertinent findings and conclusions

regarding the efforts made by DSS to prevent the breakup of the Indian family:

            123. [DSS] has worked with the family since August 19,
            2018 to reunify the family and return the juvenile to the
            home. The efforts have been unsuccessful due to the lack
            of progress of the respondents.

            ....

            170. [DSS] engaged in active and reasonable efforts to
            reunify the juvenile with the Respondent-Mother including
            referrals for parenting classes, requesting random drug
            screens, referrals for comprehensive clinical assessments,
            attempts to meet with Respondent-Mother on a monthly
            basis, [and] attempt[s] to locate service providers within
            the geographical area of her residence.

            ....

            174. [DSS] engaged in active and reasonable efforts to
            reunify the juvenile with the []Father including attempts
            to reach out to [Father] on a regular basis, complete DNA
            screening to establish paternity, formulating a case plan
            and requesting that he complete services.

            175. [DSS] also provided the additional active efforts to
            take the necessary steps to secure tribal membership for
            the juvenile and by using ICWA placement preference to
            conduct an ICPC on [tribe members] for potential
            placement. [DSS] also provided active efforts to secure
            approval for continued unlicensed placement for the
            juvenile in the placement chosen by the tribe after that
            placement’s foster care license expired.

            ....

            188. The court makes the following additional findings of
            fact beyond a reasonable doubt.

                         a. Active efforts, in the context of the

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                       prevailing social and cultural conditions and way of
                       life of the Monacan Indian Nation, have been made
                       by [DSS] and available family and tribal services
                       and been used to reunify the family; however, the
                       risk of serious emotional or physical damage to the
                       juvenile [ ] is still present if the child were returned
                       home.

Father challenges findings 123, 174, and 188.5

       Father first argues that the portion of finding 174 which states, “DSS

attempt[ed] to reach out to [Father] on a regular basis[,]” is unsupported. Regarding

DSS’s efforts to reach out to Father, the DSS Social Worker testified:

               [SOCIAL WORKER:] So we were trying to reach out to
               [Father] through the court system. It -- with his being
               incarcerated and then not knowing where he was when he
               was outside of it, it was more difficult. We did contact
               [Father] in the beginning and did DNA screening to ensure
               that [Nathan] was his child. . . . The only times that I’ve
               ever had contact with [Father] would happen at court.

The DSS Social Worker did not testify as to any attempts made by DSS to contact

Father outside of sending DNA testing materials to him and speaking to him in court.

There is no other record evidence as to DSS’s attempts to contact Father.

Accordingly, the portion of finding 174 that “DSS attempt[ed] to reach out to [Father]

on a regular basis” is unsupported.

       5  Father also challenges corresponding findings “[t]hroughout the underlying court file.”
However, as Father did not appeal from those orders, we do not address those challenges. Father
further challenges findings not directly relevant to his argument on active efforts. We address only
necessary findings in relation to termination of parental rights orders. In re T.M.B., 378 N.C. 683,
687, 862 S.E.2d 632, 636 (2021).

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      Father further argues the trial court’s conclusion in Finding 188, subsection a,

that “[a]ctive efforts . . . have been made by [DSS],” is unsupported.          Father

specifically argues that DSS’s efforts in providing him with paternity testing,

formulating a case plan, and requesting that he complete services did not constitute

“active efforts.” Father also challenges Finding 123, wherein the trial court found

DSS’s efforts had been unsuccessful due to Father’s lack of progress, to the extent it

“states or implies DSS provided active or reasonable efforts to [Father] during the

case[.]” Because these findings relate to the determination of what constitutes active

efforts, they are more appropriately labeled conclusions of law and we review them

de novo. See In re M.R.D.C., 166 N.C. App. 693, 697, 603 S.E.2d 890, 893 (2004).

      At the termination hearing, the DSS Social Worker testified as follows:

             [DSS ATTORNEY:] And in the few periods of time when
             [Father] was not incarcerated, did he contact you in order
             to let you know that he wasn’t incarcerated and was ready
             to sign and enter into a case plan?
             [SOCIAL WORKER:] No he did not.
             [DSS ATTORNEY:] Did he ever contact you to ask for
             referrals?
             [SOCIAL WORKER:] No.
             [DSS ATTORNEY:] And during the time that he was
             incarcerated, did he ever ask or call and talk to you about
             potentially doing any of these services while he was
             incarcerated?
             [SOCIAL WORKER:] No.
             [DSS ATTORNEY:] To your knowledge did he ever attempt
             to reach out to prison officials to see if he could do any of
             these services while he was incarcerated?

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              [SOCIAL WORKER:] No.
              ....
              [DSS ATTORNEY:] Has he communicated with you
              regarding any programs that he could take while in prison
              to help his situation and assist him in providing
              appropriate care for the juvenile?
              [SOCIAL WORKER:] No.

      When asked about the availability of programs in prison that could have

satisfied his court-ordered obligations, Father testified he did not complete any such

programs in prison because none of them had been available to him, and that an

inmate “ha[s] to go through processes to be signed up for classes like that if [the prison

has] them.”

      Father’s incarceration for much of the history of this case surely had “a direct

bearing on what active remedial efforts [were] possible.” Dep’t of Family & Youth

Servs., 982 P.2d at 261 (citation omitted). However, his incarceration did not relieve

DSS “of its duty under ICWA to make active remedial efforts[.]” Id. Although DSS

was able to send Father a paternity test in prison, DSS made no other effort to contact

him via fax, mail, or in person while he was incarcerated.               Although DSS

“formulat[ed] a case plan,” the formulation of a plan is merely a passive effort. See

Pravat P., 249 P.3d at 271. There is no record evidence that DSS actively did

anything to assist Father through the steps of the plan and with accessing or

developing the resources necessary to satisfy the case plan. See 25 C.F.R. § 23.2.

While DSS cannot dictate what services Father may receive in prison, there is no

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record evidence that DSS communicated with Father or prison staff to ascertain the

availability of prison programs to help Father achieve the goals of the case plan.

Father was denied visitation with Nathan throughout the entire case and there is no

record evidence that DSS made any effort to facilitate telephone or written

communication between Father and Nathan. Furthermore, DSS made no effort to

locate or communicate with Father during the time he was not incarcerated.

      The Guardian ad Litem (“GAL”) cites a string of cases involving incarcerated

parents to support its position that “[Father’s] contention that under ICWA

incarcerated parents are entitled to the same ‘level’ of effort at reunification as

parents who are not incarcerated has been flat out rejected by the majority of courts

that have addressed this precise issue.” However, the cases cited by the GAL are

readily distinguishable from the present case in that in every one of those cases,

despite the fact that the parent was incarcerated and the scope of available options

was narrowed, some active efforts were still undertaken. See In re D.A., 305 P.3d

824, 827, 829 (Mont. 2013) (Mother received parenting classes in two different

detention settings. The Department of Health and Human Services scheduled visits

between Mother and D.A., her younger child.             A Department child protection

specialist helped Mother receive services while in a pre-release program and met with

Mother to devise a plan to return D.A. to Mother’s care.); People ex rel. D.G., 679

N.W.2d 497, 502 (S.D. 2004) (“[W]hen assessing what options are available to prepare

the parent for the return of a child, incarceration narrows the available options.

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Father was referred to drug and alcohol classes, parenting courses, independent

living and management courses at the penitentiary and received regular contact from

the caseworker. Under these circumstances, which included father’s incarceration,

DSS’s efforts were active and reasonable. DSS cannot be faulted for father’s criminal

choice which limited its ability to return the child.”); In re E.P.F.L., 265 P.3d 764, 767,

770 (Okla. Civ. App. 2011) (Various assessments, referrals, classes, and services were

provided to father in prior case that “were designed to remedy the same problems

that are at issue in this case.” Furthermore, father received a gas voucher, a referral

to a substance abuse treatment program, and transportation of the children to the

jail to visit him.). See also People ex rel. S.H.E., 824 N.W.2d 420, 424 (S.D. 2012)

(“While he was incarcerated, Father attended two different therapy classes, took

antidepressants daily, and was on a waiting list for drug and alcohol treatment.

Father also wrote DSS five letters, requesting pictures and updates of the children

and teleconferencing so he could talk to the children. In response, DSS sent Father

court reports, three letters, and some pictures. DSS also sent Father a parenting

packet and postage-paid envelopes. As a result, Father sent thirty-four letters to the

children. Finally, DSS facilitated a visit between Father and the children while

Father was in the Pennington County jail, completed two case plan evaluations, and

included Father in concurrent planning meetings.”).

      Moreover, this is not a case where DSS’s efforts were frustrated by Father’s

“demonstrated lack of willingness to participate in treatment.” Bob S. v. Dep’t of

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Health & Soc. Servs., 400 P.3d 99, 107 (Alaska 2017) (citation omitted). To the

contrary, Father made some showing that he was engaged. When DSS faxed Father

his paternity results in prison, Father immediately signed and returned them as

instructed. Father attended almost every court date in this matter, as evidenced by

the trial court’s findings in its various orders and the numerous applications and

writs of habeas corpus ad testificandum in the record.           Additionally, Father

specifically requested current photographs of Nathan at the permanency planning

hearing in August 2021. Father was in court again for TPR continuances in late

August, late September, late October, and mid-November 2021. On 27 November

2021, Father wrote a letter to the trial court informing it that DSS still had not given

him current him pictures of his son. Father was finally given a photograph of Nathan

at the TPR hearing on 6 December 2021.

      Some states consider efforts provided to the non-incarcerated parent in

determining whether DSS provided active efforts to the family. For example, the

Montana Supreme Court reasoned, “Since ‘active efforts’ are designed to prevent the

breakup of the Indian family, it is appropriate for a court to consider efforts provided

to the other parent of the child when evaluating the total ‘active efforts’ and whether

they were unsuccessful.” In re A.L.D., 417 P.3d 342, 345 (Mont. 2018) (citation

omitted). Here, even considering the efforts provided to Mother, by excluding Father

from all active efforts, we cannot say that DSS provided active efforts to prevent the

breakup of Nathan’s family.

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      Accordingly, the trial court’s conclusion that DSS provided active efforts to

prevent the breakup of Nathan’s family is not supported by the trial court’s findings

of fact. The trial court thus erred by terminating Father’s parental rights to Nathan.

                               III.     Conclusion

      We conclude that the trial court erred by finding that DSS provided “active

efforts to prevent the breakup of the Indian family,” as required by 25 U.S.C. §

1912(d). Therefore, we reverse the termination of parental rights order as to Father

and remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings.

      REVERSED AND REMANDED.

      Judges CARPENTER and WOOD concur.

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