Court Opinion

ID: 9668736
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 02:24:14.350333+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:47.786433
License: Public Domain

BUTTS, Justice,
dissenting.
On Appellee’s Motion for Rehearing, it has been brought to the court’s attention that article 4590i § 6.02 (abolishing the cause of action for battery) was before the trial court in the summary judgment pleadings of the parties, if not in the specific grounds alleged in the Hospital’s motion for summary judgment.
TEX.R.CIV.P. 166a(c) plainly states that the trial court may consider all the summary judgment evidence in making its determination whether to grant the judgment. The court is not limited to consideration of only the grounds alleged in the Hospital’s motion for summary judgment. In the present case that “issue,” which precluded the cause of action as a matter of law, was considered by the trial court because it was raised in the summary judgment pleadings and proof.
The failure of this court to recognize that is error. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The Hospital conclusively showed there could be no suit on this claim; Roberts is now precluded by statute from recovery based on a battery cause of action. The issue was squarely presented in the Hospital’s response to Roberts’ motion for summary judgment and in Robert’s pleadings. Under article 166a(c) the trial court had a duty to consider that in denying Roberts’ motion and in granting that of the Hospital. A summary judgment is proper if the facts alleged establish the absence of a right of action or create an insuperable barrier to recovery. Swilley v. Hughes, 488 S.W.2d 64, 67 (Tex.1972).
Therefore, I respectfully dissent. The Hospital’s motion for rehearing should be granted on this point.