Court Opinion

ID: 9571125
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:29:12.462408+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:28:17.755322
License: Public Domain

LeGRAND, Justicet
(dissenting).
I must dissent from the conclusion reached by the majority because, despite protestations to the contrary, I believe the opinion does remake decedent’s will by determining — unjustifiably—that section 633.-436 of The Code should be shunted aside in favor of section 633.437.
In doing so the majority not only circumvents the clear legislative purpose set out in the abatement statutes but also defeats the testator’s expressed intent. The legislature provided that section 633.436 should govern the order of abatement unless “the provisions of the will, the testamentary plan, or the express or the implied purpose of the devise would be [thereby] defeated.” In other words, abatement under 633.436 is to be the rule and the application of section 321.437 the exception. In my opinion the majority completely reverses this priority.
I agree with the majority’s statement that the language of the will is unambiguous. I agree, too, that the testator undoubtedly knew all debts and charges must be paid from the assets of his estate whether he so specified or not; but that is not the point. The issue is not whether he knew those items must be paid, but rather his intention as to the source from which payment should come.
Actually when the majority refers to the testator’s knowledge of the law concerning the liability of his estate to pay existing debts and charges, it is making an argument against the result reached rather than for it. Once it is assumed he knew these items must be paid out of his estate, his failure to make the residuary bequest subject to them, while at the same time being careful to state what that provision was subject to, strongly suggests the omission was not inadvertent.
The majority disregards the preference which the legislative plan gives the surviving spouse in each step of the abatement statute. In re Estate of Twedt, Iowa, 1970, 173 N.W.2d 545, 547. Such preference is not dependent alone on the fact that ordinarily a testator’s first desire is adequate provision for his surviving spouse above all others, but results also from the rule that the terms of a will in favor of a surviving spouse are not gratuitous. The survivor gives up the statutory dower right by consenting to take under the will and is considered a purchaser for value. In re Estate of Hartman, 233 Iowa 405, 409, 9 N.W.2d 359, 362; Nolte v. Nolte, 247 Iowa 868, 880, 76 N.W.2d 881, 888; In re Estate of Twedt, Iowa, 1970, 173 N.W.2d 545, 548.
We are considering here a residuary bequest to a surviving spouse. Under the plain provisions of section 633.436 this abates last. The statute provides that “shares of the distributees shall abate * * * in the following order:
“1. Property not disposed of by the will;
“2. Property devised to the residuary devisee, except property devised to a surviving spouse who takes under the will;
“3. Property disposed of by the will, but not specifically devised and not devised to the residuary devisee, except property devised to a surviving spouse who takes under the will;
“4. Property specifically devised, except property devised to a surviving spouse who takes under the will;
“5. Property devised to a surviving spouse who takes under the will.” (Emphasis added.)
It seems indisputable that all the property described in subsections two, three and four (which specifically exclude property devised to a surviving spouse who takes under the will) must be exhausted before *634property devised to the surviving spouse abates under subsection five. There is simply nothing in this will to indicate the testator intended this statutory preference in favor of his widow should not apply. To hold, as the majority does, that section 633.437 controls is to emasculate, if not virtually repeal, the provisions of subsection two of section 633.436.
The insurmountable difficulty, it seems to me, is that the testator explicitly sets out what the residuary bequest was subject to — the specific bequests in favor of his children and nothing else. The majority says that because his debts and charges must be paid he must have intended payment to come from the residuary bequest. This is a non sequitur arrived at by doing violence to well established principles of testamentary construction.
The majority spends some considerable time in defining the meaning of “subject to” as used in Paragraph 4 of the will; but that isn’t what causes the trouble. “Foregoing”, not “subject to”, is what requires explanation.
Simply stated, “foregoing” means that which has gone before. The Random House Dictionary (1966); Webster’s International Dictionary, (Third Ed.). The majority, however, enlarges its meaning to include a provision which is not in the will at all; and, having judicially supplied the missing language, it then goes on to decide what the testator would have meant had he used it in the first place. I find it impossible to agree with such a free interpretation of this will.
Specifically, I cannot accept the conclusion of the majority that “it is apparent testator intended the paragraph 4 residuary bequest stand totally or entirely subordinate to all impressed debts, charges, and prior bequests specifically declared.”
None of the authority cited by the majority supports this view. In re Estate of Twedt, supra, mentioned in both the majority opinion and in this dissent is easily distinguishable on its facts. There the provision in favor of certain charitable beneficiaries would have been nullified from the very moment the will was prepared if the abatement rules of section 633.436 were applied. We held that under those circumstances the testator must be presumed not to have intended a useless and futile bequest. Zion Lutheran Church v. Lamp, 260 Iowa 363, 149 N.W.2d 137, held there was insufficient evidence to defeat the abatement provisions of section 633.436. If anything, it is helpful to this dissent. The other cases do not touch the particular problem facing us here.
I would affirm the trial court.
STUART and UHLENHOPP, JJ., join in this dissent.