Court Opinion

ID: 9386505
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-12 19:02:44.918237+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:06.930277
License: Public Domain

Filed 4/12/23 P. v. Powell CA2/7
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE,                                                      B321035

         Plaintiff and Respondent,                               (Los Angeles County
                                                                 Super. Ct. No. TA101113)
         v.

MICHAEL ANTHONY POWELL,

         Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court
of Los Angeles County, Laura R. Walton, Judge. Affirmed.
      Jonathan E. Demson, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal; and Michael Anthony Powell, in pro. per., for Defendant
and Appellant.
      No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                                 _______________________
        A jury convicted Michael Anthony Powell in October 1999
of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a))1 under the
provocative act doctrine and found true the special-circumstance
allegation he had committed the murder during an attempted
robbery (§§ 211, 664) within the meaning of section 190.2,
subdivision (a)(17). Powell was sentenced to a state prison term
of life without parole plus 10 years for a related firearm
enhancement (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)).
        On May 20, 2022 the superior court denied Powell’s second
postjudgment petition for resentencing pursuant to
section 1172.6 (former section 1170.95). The court ruled Powell
could still be convicted of first degree murder under a theory of
provocative act murder and was ineligible for resentencing relief.
        No arguable issues have been identified following review of
the record by Powell’s appointed appellate counsel. We also have
identified no arguable issues after our own independent review of
the record and analysis of the contentions presented by Powell in
his supplemental brief. We affirm.
      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      1. Powell’s Conviction for Provocative Act and Special-
         circumstance Murder
      In March 1999 Dennis Smith and Powell, armed with a
gun, entered a retail store intending to rob it. Once inside, Smith
and Powell fought with the store manager and one of her
grandsons. Another grandson retrieved a gun from his
grandmother’s purse and shot at the two would-be robbers,

1     Statutory references are to this code.

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killing Smith. (People v. Powell (July 16, 2001, B139146)
[nonpub. opn.] (Powell I).)2
      The jury at Powell’s trial was instructed with CALJIC
No. 8.12, which provided in part, “A homicide committed during
the commission of a crime by a person who is not a perpetrator of
such crime, in response to an intentional provocative act by a
perpetrator of the crime other than the deceased perpetrator, is
considered in law to be an unlawful killing by the surviving
perpetrator of the crime. [¶] An intentional provocative act is
defined as follows: [¶] 1. The act was intentional. [¶] 2. The
natural consequences of the act were dangerous to human life,
and [¶] 3. The act was deliberately performed with knowledge of
the danger to, and with conscious disregard for human life.”
      Powell’s jury was also instructed, pursuant to CALJIC
No. 3.40, “The criminal law has its own particular way of defining
cause. A cause of the death is an act that sets in motion a chain
of events that produces as a direct, natural and probable
consequence of the act the death of Dennis Smith and without
which the death of Dennis Smith would not have occurred.”
      The jury convicted Powell of provocative act murder and
attempted robbery, found true the special-circumstance
allegation the murder was committed during the attempted
robbery and also found true the allegation that Powell had
personally used a firearm during commission of the crimes.

2     This brief summary of facts is drawn from our prior opinion
in Powell’s direct appeal. We rely on that opinion solely for the
purpose of summarizing the background of this case. Our
consideration of whether Powell is entitled to relief under
section 1172.6 is based on our independent review of the record.
(See People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 222, fn. 2.)

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We affirmed the conviction on appeal, holding that substantial
evidence supported Powell’s murder conviction and that the trial
court properly sentenced Powell to life in prison without the
possibility of parole under section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17).
 (Powell I, supra, B139146.)
      2. Powell’s Original Petition for Resentencing
      In 2019 Powell, representing himself, filed a petition for
resentencing pursuant to former section 1170.95, averring he had
been convicted of first degree murder under a felony-murder or
natural and probable consequences theory and could not be
convicted of murder under current law.3 The superior court
found Powell had stated a prima facie case for relief, appointed
counsel to represent him and set the matter for an evidentiary
hearing under former section 1170.95, subdivision (d). Following

3      As is now well-known, Senate Bill No. 1437 (Stats. 2018,
ch. 1015) modified the law relating to accomplice liability for
murder, eliminating the natural and probable consequences
doctrine as a basis for finding a defendant guilty of murder
(People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842-843) and narrowing
the felony-murder exception to the malice requirement for
murder. (§§ 188, subd. (a)(3), 189, subd. (e); see People v. Strong
(2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 707-708; People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th
952, 957.) Section 188, subdivision (a)(3), now prohibits imputing
malice based solely on an individual’s participation in a crime
and requires proof of malice to convict a principal of murder
except under the revised felony-murder rule. Senate Bill
No. 1437 also authorized an individual convicted of felony murder
or murder based on the natural and probable consequences
doctrine to petition to vacate the conviction and be resentenced
on any remaining counts if he or she could not now be convicted
of murder because of these changes to the definitions of the
crime. (See Strong, at p. 708; Lewis, at p. 957; Gentile, at p. 843.)

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the hearing, the court denied the petition, ruling Powell was
ineligible for relief because he had been convicted under the
provocative act doctrine, not the felony-murder rule or the
natural and probable consequences doctrine.
       We affirmed the order denying the petition. (People v.
Powell (Aug. 18, 2021, B304587) [nonpub. opn.] (Powell II).) As
we explained, the record of conviction established (and Powell did
not dispute) the trial court did not instruct the jury on, the
prosecution did not argue Powell was guilty of, and the jury did
not convict Powell of, felony murder. And Powell did not argue
he had been convicted under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. We further held the fact that a second
degree provocative act murder could be elevated to first degree
murder pursuant to felony-murder principles, as in this case, did
not transform the former into the latter or make an otherwise
ineligible petitioner eligible for resentencing relief. (Ibid.)
      3. Powell’s Second Petition for Resentencing
        On April 6, 2022 Powell filed a second petition for
resentencing pursuant to section 1172.6. On May 20, 2022 the
superior court summarily denied the petition without appointing
counsel. The court noted that Powell’s prior petition had been
denied following an evidentiary hearing because Powell,
convicted of provocative act murder, was ineligible for
resentencing and that this court had affirmed the order in
Powell II. Powell could still be convicted of first degree murder,
the court ruled, and thus remained ineligible for resentencing
relief.
        Powell filed a timely notice of appeal.

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                          DISCUSSION
        In accord with the procedures described in People v.
Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 and People v. Cole (2020)
52 Cal.App.5th 1023, review granted October 14, 2020, S264278,
we appointed counsel to represent Powell on appeal. After
reviewing the record, appointed counsel did not identify any
arguable issues and so informed this court. Appointed counsel
advised Powell on February 1, 2023 that he was filing a brief
stating he was unable to find arguable issues, that Powell could
personally submit any contentions Powell believed the court
should consider, and that the appeal may be dismissed if no
supplemental brief or letter was submitted.
        After granting Powell’s request for an extension of time to
submit a supplemental brief, on March 8, 2023 we received from
Powell a multi-page, partially typed, partially handwritten
supplemental brief with exhibits that included several of the jury
instructions from his trial, an excerpt of the reporter’s transcript
covering a discussion of the jury instructions and the minute
order denying Powell’s initial petition for resentencing. Although
it is far from clear, it appears Powell contends the superior court
erred in summarily denying his second petition for resentencing
because his conviction for provocative act murder was based on a
now-improper finding of implied malice and because the
instructions at his trial included a definition of causation that
rested on the concept of natural and probable consequences.
Neither contention has any arguable merit.
        Powell is correct that provocative act murder is a form of
implied malice murder. (See, e.g., People v. Mancilla (2021)
67 Cal.App.5th 854, 867 [“[A] murder conviction under the
provocative act doctrine requires proof the defendant ‘personally

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harbored the mental state of malice.’ [Citations.] That is, the
defendant (or his or her accomplice) must have acted with
implied malice—the defendant knew his or her conduct
endangered the life of another and acted with conscious disregard
for life”].) But implied malice remains a viable theory of murder.
(§ 188, subd. (a) [“malice may be express or implied”]; see People
v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 850 [“notwithstanding Senate
Bill 1437’s elimination of natural and probable consequences
liability for second degree murder, an aider and abettor who does
not expressly intend to aid a killing can still be convicted of
second degree murder if the person knows that his or her conduct
endangers the life of another and acts with conscious disregard
for life”]; People v. Superior Court (Valenzuela) (2021)
73 Cal.App.5th 485, 499.) And the provocative act theory of
murder does not involve a prohibited imputation of malice: “A
murder conviction under the provocative act doctrine thus
requires proof that the defendant personally harbored the mental
state of malice, and either the defendant or an accomplice
intentionally committed a provocative act that proximately
caused an unlawful killing.” (People v. Gonzalez (2012)
54 Cal.4th 643, 655; accord, People v. Schell (2022)
84 Cal.App.5th 437, 444 [“provocative act murder requires a
showing that the defendant personally harbored malice”];
Mancilla, at p. 866.)
        Equally devoid of merit is Powell’s suggestion that his
conviction for provocative act murder was based on the natural
and probable consequences doctrine because instructions given at
his trial defined an act as a cause of the victim’s death if the
death was the direct, natural and probable consequence of the
act. “‘Murder includes both actus reus and mens rea elements.

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To satisfy the actus reus element of murder, the act of either the
defendant or an accomplice must be the proximate cause of
death.’ Consideration of the natural and probable consequence of
the defendant’s conduct in the context of provocative murder, as
with any case of implied malice murder, relates to proximate
cause—that is to the actus reus element of the crime, not the
mens rea element that was the focus of Senate Bill 1437.”
(People v. Mancilla, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 868, fn. omitted;
accord, People v. Swanson (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 604, 614, review
granted Feb. 17, 2021, S266262 [“analysis of proximate cause in
terms of foreseeability of the natural and probable consequences
of the defendant’s malicious conduct does not somehow bring a
provocative act killing within the malice-free natural and
probable consequences doctrine”].)
       Because no cognizable legal issues have been raised by
Powell’s appellate counsel or by Powell or identified in our
independent review of the record, the order denying his petition
for resentencing is affirmed. (See People v. Delgadillo, supra,
14 Cal.5th at pp. 231-232: see also People v. Cole, supra,
52 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1039-1040, review granted; People v.
Serrano (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 496, 503; see generally People v.
Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 118-119; People v. Wende (1979)
25 Cal.3d 436, 441-442.)
                         DISPOSITION
      The postjudgment order is affirmed.

                                            PERLUSS, P. J.
      We concur:

            SEGAL, J.                       FEUER, J.

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