Court Opinion

ID: 9403183
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-20 17:07:59.492387+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:05.263478
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Doors On-Line v. Chandra, 2023-Ohio-2018.]

                     IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                         THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                              SHELBY COUNTY

DOORS ON-LINE INC.,

        PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,                             CASE NO. 17-22-11

        v.

ROHIT CHANDRA,                                          OPINION

        DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

                         Appeal from Sidney Municipal Court
                            Trial Court No. 21CVF01181

                      Judgment Reversed and Cause Remanded

                            Date of Decision: June 20, 2023

APPEARANCES:

        Jared B. Chamberlain for Appellant
Case No. 17-22-11

ZIMMERMAN, J.

       {¶1} Defendant-appellant,     Rohit Chandra (“Chandra”), appeals the

September 26, 2022 judgment of the Sidney Municipal Court granting judgment in

favor of plaintiff-appellee, Doors On-Line, Inc. (“Doors On-Line”). For the reasons

that follow, we reverse.

       {¶2} This case stems from Chandra’s, a resident of California, purchase of a

garage door from Doors On-Line. Doors On-Line, an Ohio corporation, “is an

online dealership for a manufacturer of a couple different lines of doors, a

nationwide dealership * * * .” (Sept. 20, 2022 Tr. at 12). Importantly, once a

purchase is completed, an out-of-state manufacturer, not Doors On-Line, schedules

the installation and ships the product. (See id. at 53).

       {¶3} Here, Chandra initially purchased a garage door from Doors On-Line

on May 28, 2020. Significantly, because Chandra’s order “was a very customized

order [, it] had to [be] placed by phone.” (Id. at 15). As a result of Chandra’s order,

a “sight check by the installer” was scheduled for July 8, 2020 to “verify that

everything on the order [would] allow [the garage door] to be installed properly.”

(Id. at 16). (See also Plaintiff’s Ex. 2). However, because Chandra requested

“various changes that needed to be made to the order for the installer to complete

the work,” “a new order [was] placed on July 29, 2020 to incorporate the various

changes.” (Doc. No. 8). The garage door was installed in October 2020.

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       {¶4} Nevertheless, since Chandra was not satisfied with the installation of

the garage door, he filed a complaint with his credit-card company, which

“reversed” the charge. (See Sept. 20, 2022 Tr. at 39). As a result, Doors On-Line

did not receive payment for the garage door or installation costs. Consequently, on

November 1, 2021, Doors On-Line filed a small-claims complaint in the Sidney

Municipal Court seeking a judgment in the amount of $3,253.51, plus interest, from

Chandra.

       {¶5} Chandra filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for a lack of personal

jurisdiction on February 11, 2022. On February 25, 2022, Doors On-Line filed a

memorandum in opposition to Chandra’s motion to dismiss. On May 23, 2022, the

trial court denied Chandra’s motion to dismiss without a hearing after concluding

that Doors On-Line satisfied its burden of proving that the trial court has personal

jurisdiction over Chandra since he had minimum contacts in Ohio. Specifically, the

trial court concluded that Doors-Online proved that Chandra had minimum contacts

in Ohio since Doors-Online “has [its] own website which [Chandra] used to contact

[Doors On-Line] for materials and services” and such “website * * * clearly

indicates [Doors On-Line’s] address in Russia, Shelby County, Ohio.” (Doc. No.

22).

       {¶6} On August 5, 2022, Chandra filed his answer along with counterclaims

for breach of contract, a violation of Ohio’s consumer sales practices act, and design

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defect. Doors On-Line filed its answer to Chandra’s counterclaims on August 19,

2022.

        {¶7} The case proceeded to a bench trial on September 20, 2022. On

September 26, 2022, the trial court, again concluding that it had personal jurisdiction

over Chandra, awarded judgment in favor of Doors On-Line for $2,528.51—the cost

of only the garage door. (Doc. No. 34).

        {¶8} Chandra filed his notice of appeal on October 24, 2022. He raises one

assignment of error for our review.

                               Assignment of Error

        The Trial Court incorrectly determined it had personal
        jurisdiction over Defendant/Appellant, a California resident
        with no minimum contacts with Ohio.

        {¶9} In his sole assignment of error, Chandra argues that the trial court erred

by concluding that it had personal jurisdiction over him because “[h]e has no

connection to Ohio, except a single online consumer purchase of a garage door from

an Ohio corporation known as Doors On-Line” that he “purchased * * * via Internet

transaction on May 28, 2020.” (Appellant’s Brief at 1). Specifically, Chandra

contends that he “had absolutely no reason – other than the obscurely located

address on the bottom/left corner of [Doors On-Line’s] website – to know he was

dealing with an Ohio corporation, and” his “single online purchase” “falls well short

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of the threshold whereby Ohio could exercise personal jurisdiction over him.” (Id.

at 3). We agree.

                                 Standard of Review

       {¶10} “Whether personal jurisdiction exists is a question of law that we

review de novo.” Wedemeyer v. U.S.S. F.D.R (CV-42) Reunion Assoc., 3d Dist.

Allen No. 1-09-57, 2010-Ohio-1502, ¶ 37. “De novo review is independent and

without deference to the trial court’s determination.” ISHA, Inc. v. Risser, 3d Dist.

Allen No. 1-12-47, 2013-Ohio-2149, ¶ 25.

                                       Analysis

       {¶11} In this case, the trial court concluded that Doors On-Line presented

sufficient evidence for reasonable minds to conclude that it could exercise personal

jurisdiction over Chandra. Specifically, the trial court found that Doors On-Line

“has their [sic] own website which [Chandra] used to contact [Doors On-Line] for

materials and services” and that the website “clearly indicates [Doors On-Line’s]

address in Russia, Shelby County, Ohio.” (Doc. No. 22).

       {¶12} However, Chandra argues that the trial court erred by concluding that

it had personal jurisdiction over him because its assertion of personal jurisdiction in

this case does not comport with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment. In particular, Chandra contends that the trial court does not have

specific jurisdiction over him since he did not have “minimum contacts with the

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State of Ohio * * * .” (Appellant’s Brief at 8). That is, Chandra argues that (1) he

“did not purposely avail himself of any privilege of doing business in the State of

Ohio where he merely used a publicly available website to complete a single

consumer transaction”; (2) “the cause of action does not arise from [his] activities

in Ohio”; and (3) he does not have a “substantial connection to Ohio * * * .”

(Emphasis sic.) (Id.).

       {¶13} Doors On-Line did not respond to Chandra’s appellate argument

because it failed to file a brief in this case. Under such circumstances, App.R. 18(C)

provides that this court “may accept the appellant’s statement of the facts and issues

as correct and reverse the judgment if appellant’s brief reasonably appears to sustain

such action.” See Spinner v. Barger, 3d Dist. Shelby No. 17-16-27, 2017-Ohio-

1489, ¶ 5, fn. 1. After reviewing the record, and for the following reasons, we

conclude that Chandra’s brief reasonably appears to sustain a reversal.

       {¶14} “This Court applies a two-part inquiry when deciding whether an out-

of-state defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction in an Ohio court.” Magnum

Asset Acquisition, LLC v. Green Energy Techs., LLC, 9th Dist. Summit No. 29789,

2022-Ohio-2247, ¶ 7. “‘First, the court must determine whether the defendant’s

conduct falls within Ohio’s long-arm statute or the applicable civil rule.’” Id.,

quoting Fraley v. Estate of Oeding, 138 Ohio St.3d 250, 2014-Ohio-452, ¶ 12. “If

it does, then the court must consider whether the assertion of jurisdiction over the

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nonresident defendant would deprive the defendant of due process of law under the

Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” Id., quoting Fraley at ¶

12.

      {¶15} “Once a defendant moves to dismiss a complaint for lack of personal

jurisdiction under Civ.R. 12(B)(2), the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish

jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant.” Wedemeyer, 2010-Ohio-1502, at ¶ 37.

“[T]he trial court has the discretion to rule upon the motion with or without a

hearing.” Magnum at ¶ 7. “When a court determines personal jurisdiction without

an evidentiary hearing, it must ‘view allegations in the pleadings and documentary

evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party’ and ‘resolv[e] all

reasonable competing inferences’ in favor of the non-moving party.” Wedemeyer

at ¶ 37, quoting Goldstein v. Christiansen, 70 Ohio St.3d 232, 236 (1994) and

Giachetti v. Holmes, 14 Ohio App.3d 306, 307 (1984) (8th Dist.).

      {¶16} “Where * * * the trial court determines personal jurisdiction without

an evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff need only establish a prima facie showing of

personal jurisdiction, which requires sufficient evidence to allow reasonable minds

to conclude that the trial court has personal jurisdiction.” Austin Miller Am.

Antiques, Inc. v. Cavallaro, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 11AP-400, 2011-Ohio-6670, ¶

7. See also Wedemeyer at ¶ 37 (“In order to make a prima facie showing of personal

jurisdiction, ‘the plaintiff must provide sufficient evidence to allow reasonable

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minds to conclude that personal jurisdiction exists over the defendant.’”), quoting

Parshall v. PAID, Inc., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 07AP-1019, 2008-Ohio-3171, ¶ 9.

“If the plaintiff demonstrates a prima facie case for personal jurisdiction, the trial

court shall not dismiss the complaint before it holds an evidentiary hearing.” Austin

Miller at ¶ 7.

       {¶17} The determination of whether an Ohio court has personal jurisdiction

over a nonresident defendant, depends on “(1) whether R.C. 2307.382(A), Ohio’s

long-arm statute, and Civ.R. 4.3 permit the court to assert personal jurisdiction; and,

if so, (2) whether bringing the defendant within the jurisdiction of the Ohio courts

would violate traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice under the Due

Process Clause.” Wedemeyer at ¶ 38. “Ohio’s long-arm statute, R.C. 2307.382,

outlines specific activities that allow Ohio courts to exert personal jurisdiction over

a nonresident defendant.” Id. at ¶ 39. Specifically, “‘R.C. 2307.382 and Civ.R.

4.3(A) allow Ohio courts to exercise jurisdiction over nonresident defendants in

causes of action arising from several enumerated circumstances,’ including a

nonresident’s ‘[t]ransacting any business in this state.’” Figley v. Ivex Protective

Packaging, Inc., 3d Dist. Shelby No. 17-16-02, 2016-Ohio-3501, ¶ 18, quoting

Cincinnati Equine v. Sandringham Farm, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-150067, 2016-

Ohio-803, ¶ 12, and citing R.C. 2307.382(A)(1) and Civ.R. 4.3(A)(1).

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       {¶18} “The Ohio Supreme Court has recognized ‘transacting any business’

as ‘a broad statement of jurisdiction’ and questions concerning the application of

R.C. 2307.382(A)(1) are resolved upon ‘highly particularized fact situations, thus

rendering any generalization unwarranted.’” Magnum at ¶ 9, quoting U.S. Sprint

Communications Co. Ltd. Partnership v. Mr. K’s Foods, Inc., 68 Ohio St.3d 181,

185 (1994). “Thus, a court must determine, case-by-case, whether a nonresident is

transacting business in the state of Ohio.” Id., quoting U.S. Sprint at 185.

       {¶19} “[T]he term ‘transact’ as utilized in the phrase ‘transacting any

business’ means ‘to carry on business’ and ‘to have dealings’ and is broader than

the word ‘contract.’” Id. at ¶ 10, quoting Morgan Adhesives Co. v. Sonicor

Instrument Corp., 107 Ohio App.3d 327, 332 (9th Dist.1995), quoting Goldstein, 70

Ohio St.3d at 236. “Therefore, the term encompasses more than just the creation of

a contract and can include business negotiations.” Ashton Park Apts., Ltd. v.

Carlton-Naumann Constr., Inc., 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-08-1395, 2009-Ohio-6335,

¶ 15. Furthermore, “‘[t]ransacting business in Ohio does not require the nonresident

party to have a physical presence in Ohio.’” Magnum at ¶ 10, quoting MJM

Holdings Inc. v. Sims, 9th Dist. Summit No. 28952, 2019-Ohio-514, ¶ 14. “One

factor that may be considered, but is not determinative as to transacting business, is

whether the nonresident initiated the business dealing.” Id.

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       {¶20} Importantly, “[u]se of the internet to ‘transact business’ in Ohio can

result in application of Ohio’s long-arm statute.” Ashton Park Apts. at ¶ 15, quoting

Parshall, 2008-Ohio-3171, at ¶ 16. However, “[t]he determination of when internet

use constitutes ‘transacting business’ depends upon the type of internet activity

involved.” Id., quoting Parshall at ¶ 16.

       {¶21} “If it is determined that the defendant is subject to Ohio’s long-arm

statute, we proceed to ask whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction by an Ohio

court comports with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at

¶ 11. See also Kauffman Racing Equip., L.L.C. v. Roberts, 126 Ohio St.3d 81, 2010-

Ohio-2551, ¶ 45 (noting that “Ohio’s long-arm statute is not coterminous with due

process”). However, if “‘a court decides that jurisdiction is improper under Ohio’s

long-arm statute, it need not address whether due-process requirements have been

met.’” Figley, 2016-Ohio-3501, at ¶ 17, quoting Starks v. Choice Hotels Internatl.,

175 Ohio App.3d 510, 2007-Ohio-1019, ¶ 10 (1st Dist.).

       {¶22} “In order to comport with the due process requirement, a defendant

must ‘have certain minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that the

maintenance of the suit does not offend “traditional notions of fair play and

substantial justice.”’” Magnum at ¶ 12, quoting Internatl. Shoe Co. v. Washington,

326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945), quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940).

“‘This due process requirement may be satisfied where the forum state has either

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specific or general jurisdiction over a nonresident.’” Id., quoting State ex rel.

DeWine v. 9150 Group, L.P., 9th Dist. Summit No. 25939, 2012-Ohio-3339, ¶ 18.

       {¶23} “‘Specific jurisdiction exists when a plaintiff’s cause of action is

related to, or arises out of, the defendant’s contact with the forum state.’”

Wedemeyer, 2010-Ohio-1502, at ¶ 40, quoting Parshall, 2008-Ohio-3171, at ¶ 23.

“‘Conversely, general jurisdiction exists when a court exercises personal

jurisdiction over a defendant in a cause of action that does not arise out of or relate

to the defendant’s contacts with the forum state.’” Id., quoting Parshall at ¶ 23. In

this case, we are concerned with whether the trial court had specific jurisdiction over

Chandra. Accord Magnum at ¶ 12.

       {¶24} To establish specific jurisdiction, three requirements must be met:

       “First, defendant must purposely avail himself of the privilege of
       acting in the forum state or causing a consequence in the forum state.
       Second, the cause of action must arise from the defendant’s activities
       there. Finally, the acts of the defendant or consequence caused by the
       defendant must have a substantial enough connection with the forum
       state to make the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant
       reasonable.

Id. at ¶ 13, quoting 9150 Group at ¶ 19. See also Wedemeyer at ¶ 39.

       {¶25} “The first two requirements establish a defendant’s ‘minimum

contacts’ with the forum.” Magnum at ¶ 13, quoting 9150 Group at ¶ 19. “The last

requires the court to determine if exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant

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comports with the ideas of ‘fair play and substantial justice.’” Id., quoting 9150

Group at ¶ 19.

       {¶26} “The first requirement of ‘purposeful availment’ looks to ‘whether the

defendant purposely availed himself of the privilege of acting in the forum state or

causing a consequence in the forum state.’” Id. at ¶ 14, quoting Kauffman, 126 Ohio

St.3d 81, 2010-Ohio-2551, at ¶ 51. “‘Purposeful availment’ is present when the

defendant’s contacts with the forum state proximately result from actions by the

defendant that create a ‘substantial connection’ with the forum State.” Id., quoting

Kauffman at ¶ 51.

       Where a defendant has “deliberately” engaged in significant activities
       within a State or has created “continuing obligations” between
       [himself] and residents of the forum, [he] has manifestly availed
       [himself] of the privilege of conducting business there, and because
       [his] activities are shielded by “the benefits and protections” of the
       forum state’s laws, it is presumptively not unreasonable to require
       [him] to submit to the burdens of litigation in the forum as well.

Id., quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475-476, 105 S.Ct. 2174

(1985). “The defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum state must be such

that it ‘should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there’ and not solely as

a result of ‘random,’ ‘fortuitous,’ or ‘attenuated’ contacts.” Id., quoting Kauffman

at ¶ 51. “This likewise ensures the defendant will not be subjected to another state’s

jurisdiction based on the unilateral activity of another party or a third person.” Id.

“‘Courts must examine the quality and nature of all the contacts a nonresident

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defendant makes with the forum during the course of the parties’ contractual

relationship.’” Id., quoting Barnabus Consulting Ltd. v. Riverside Health Sys., Inc.,

10th Dist. Franklin No. 07AP-1014, 2008-Ohio-3287, ¶ 22.

       {¶27} “The second prong requires the plaintiff’s cause of action arise from

the defendant’s contacts with Ohio.” Id. at ¶ 15. “‘If a defendant’s contacts with

the forum state are related to the operative facts of the controversy, then an action

will be deemed to have arisen from those contacts.”’” Id., quoting Kauffman at ¶

70, quoting CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1267 (6th Cir.1996).

“The cause of action needs to have a substantial connection with the defendant’s in-

state activities.” Id. See also Wedemeyer, 2010-Ohio-1502, at ¶ 41 (“‘“Minimum

contacts” has been defined as conduct which creates a substantial connection to the

forum state, creates continuing obligations between a defendant and a resident of

the forum, or conducting significant activities within a state.’”), quoting Hercules

Tire & Rubber Co. v. Murphy, 133 Ohio App.3d 97, 101 (3d Dist.1999).

       {¶28} “If the court determines that the defendant has the necessary minimum

contacts within the forum state for specific jurisdiction, the court must then

determine whether asserting personal jurisdiction over the defendant would ‘offend

“traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”’” Wedemeyer at ¶ 42,

quoting Parshall, 2008-Ohio-3171, at ¶ 25, quoting Internatl. Shoe, 326 U.S. at 320,

quoting Milliken, 311 U.S. at 463. To do so, the trial court must evaluate five

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factors: (1) the burden on the defendant; (2) the forum State’s interest in resolving

the dispute; (3) the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief;

(4) the interstate-judicial system’s interest in obtaining an efficient resolution to the

controversy; and (5) “‘the shared interest of the several States in furthering

fundamental substantive social policies.’” Burger King at 477, quoting World-Wide

Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292, 100 S.Ct. 559 (1980).

       {¶29} Generally, “‘[i]f the first two prongs are satisfied, there is an inference

the third prong is also satisfied.’” Magnum, 2022-Ohio-2247, at ¶ 16, quoting MJM

Holdings, 2019-Ohio-514, at ¶ 42. “‘Only in unusual circumstances is the third

element left unsatisfied, and it is the burden of the defendant to show it.’” Id.,

quoting MJM Holdings at ¶ 42.

       {¶30} “The development and advances in technology have required Federal

and State Courts to tackle unique situations such as the one presented in the instant

action.” Kauffman Racing Equip., L.L.C. v. Roberts, 5th Dist. Knox No. 07-CA-14,

2008-Ohio-1922, ¶ 27. “‘Traditionally, when an entity intentionally reaches beyond

its boundaries to conduct business with foreign residents, the exercise of specific

jurisdiction is proper.’” Id. at ¶ 31, quoting Burger King at 475. Importantly,

“[d]ifferent results should not be reached simply because business is conducted over

the Internet.” Id., quoting Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F.Supp. 1119,

1124 (W.D.Pa.1997).       “A non-resident defendant who avails himself of the

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expansive reach of the Internet should not be able to use his non-residency as a

shield against defending tortious activity against a plaintiff harmed in a different

state.” Id. at ¶ 32.

       {¶31} Even assuming without deciding that Chandra transacted business in

Ohio, we conclude that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over him is not

permissible under the Due Process Clause. Accord Austin Miller, 2011-Ohio-6670,

at ¶ 21; Parshall, 2008-Ohio-3171, at ¶ 22. That is, based on our review of the

record, we conclude that Chandra had insufficient contacts with Ohio to justify the

exercise of personal jurisdiction. Accord Austin Miller at ¶ 21. Indeed, the record

reflects that Chandra did not purposely avail himself of the privilege of acting or

causing a consequence in Ohio.

       {¶32} Importantly, several courts have “recognized that a single, isolated act

is generally insufficient to establish the requisite minimum contacts.” Id. at ¶ 18.

See also Barnabus, 2008-Ohio-3287, at ¶ 23 (“Generally, ‘“a one-shot deal” or a

single, isolated act’ is insufficient to establish the necessary minimum contacts for

the exercise of jurisdiction”), quoting Ricker v. Bobcat of Orlando, Inc., 10th Dist.

Franklin No. 04AP-481, 2004-Ohio-6070, ¶ 17. Stated another way, a contract for

a single-consumer purchase in a forum state, standing alone, “‘cannot be

constitutionally subject to the exercise of personal jurisdiction by the courts of the

forum state.’” Austin Miller at ¶ 16, quoting Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp. v.

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Lovett & Tharpe, Inc., 786 F.2d 1055, 1059 (11th Cir.1986). Instead, to determine

whether a party’s contacts constitute purposeful availment, courts must examine the

quality of the contacts, not the number or status of such contacts. Ricker v.

Mercedes-Benz of Georgetown, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 21AP-43, 2022-Ohio-1860,

¶ 32.

        {¶33} Based on the facts presented, we conclude that the “quality” of the

contacts in this case to constitute the purposeful availment of Chandra to Ohio is

missing. Accord Reynolds at 1119. Importantly, the parties’ agreement amounted

to “a single contract for the sale of goods.” Barnabus at ¶ 23. Accord Hwy. Auto

Sales, Inc. v. Auto-Konig of Scottsdale, Inc., 943 F.Supp. 825, 831 (N.D.Ohio 1996)

(“Advertising in a nationally circulated publication, negotiating the sale of a single

vehicle over telephone and fax lines, and arranging the delivery of the vehicle to the

forum state involve contacts of a short and fleeting character—contacts which are

insufficient to create a ‘realistic and foreseeable impact’ on the commerce of Ohio”).

Indeed, the parties’ agreement does not contemplate ongoing obligations. See Hwy.

Auto Sales at 831 (concluding that the “defendant’s contacts cannot be characterized

as creating ‘continuing obligations”’ to or an ongoing relationship with plaintiff”).

        {¶34} Furthermore, even though the trial court makes much about Doors On-

Line’s website, the record reflects that Chandra initiated his relationship with Doors

On-Line through a telephone call. However, that telephone communication is

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“‘insufficient to establish purposeful availment.’” Hwy. Auto Sales at 831 (“Even

though defendant advertised in a national publication and, through its General

Manager, initiated a phone call to Liber for purposes of explaining the condition and

quality of the automobile, such communications ‘are insufficient to establish

purposeful availment.’”), quoting Reynolds at 1119. Accord Joffe v. Cable Tech,

Inc., 163 Ohio App.3d 479, 2005-Ohio-4930, ¶ 33 (10th Dist.) (concluding that the

“telephone communications” in that case were “[in]sufficient to establish the

requisite ‘minimum contacts’”). Significantly, “the use of interstate facilities,

including telephone, mail, and e-mail, are secondary or ancillary factors and cannot

alone provide the ‘minimum contacts’ required by due process.” Magnum, 2022-

Ohio-2247, at ¶ 27.

       {¶35} Likewise, the record reflects that Chandra’s activities did not create a

substantial connection with Ohio for the trial court to exercise personal jurisdiction

over him. Rather, Chandra’s connection with Ohio is better characterized as

“‘random,’ ‘fortuitous,’ or ‘attenuated’ contacts.”      Magnum at ¶ 14, quoting

Kauffman, 126 Ohio St.3d 81, 2010-Ohio-2551, at ¶ 51. Critically, the record

reflects that the parties negotiated the contract for the garage door (over the

telephone) but that the manufacturer (in another state) coordinated construction,

shipment, and installation of the garage door in Chandra’s home state. Compare

Hammill Mfg. Co. v. Quality Rubber Prod., Inc., 82 Ohio App.3d 369, 371 (6th

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Dist.1992) (concluding that the trial court had personal jurisdiction over the

nonresident defendant because, in part, the product was designed and built in Ohio).

Further, the record reveals that even though Chandra and Doors On-Line exchanged

emails following the initiation with the project, the totality of those messages reflect

that Doors On-Line simply forwarded Chandra’s concerns to the manufacturer (in

another state) and that the manufacturer provided proposed resolutions to Chandra

in his home state. See Joffe at ¶ 33 (concluding that communications, originating in

the forum state, are “insignificant to the specific jurisdiction inquiry”). In other

words, based on the facts presented, there is insufficient evidence reflecting that

Chandra could reasonably anticipate being haled into court in Ohio.

       {¶36} For these reasons, we conclude that Chandra’s contacts with Ohio do

“not rise to the level of a ‘substantial connection’” with Ohio which would allow

him to “‘reasonably anticipate being haled into court’” here. XPX Armor & Equip.,

Inc. v. SkyLIFE Co., 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-20-1123, 2021-Ohio-2559, ¶ 35, quoting

Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474-475. Therefore, Doors On-Line failed to establish

that Chandra had the necessary minimum contacts with Ohio for the trial court to

exercise jurisdiction.

       {¶37} Accordingly, “[w]ithout the requisite ‘minimum contacts,’ our

specific jurisdiction inquiry ends, and we need not examine whether asserting

personal jurisdiction over appellees comports with ‘“fair play and substantial

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justice.”’” Joffe at ¶ 35, quoting Burger King at 477. Consequently, since Doors

On-Line failed to establish the requisite “minimum contacts” relevant to the contract

for the garage door executed with Chandra, “we conclude that the due process clause

preclude[s] the trial court from exercising personal jurisdiction over [Chandra]

through specific jurisdiction.” Id. Thus, we conclude that the trial court erred by

concluding that it had personal jurisdiction over Chandra.

       {¶38} Chandra’s assignment of error is sustained.

       {¶39} Having found error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the particulars

assigned and argued, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for

further proceedings.

                                                             Judgment Reversed and
                                                                  Cause Remanded

MILLER, P.J. and WILLAMOWSKI, J., concur.

/jlr

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