Court Opinion

ID: 9670327
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:19:00.453168+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:03.945803
License: Public Domain

Weaver, J.
(concurring). While I join without hesitation in the majority’s holding, that neither the discovery rule nor the insanity disability statute addresses repressed memory, I write separately because I disagree with certain portions of the majority’s analysis of the discovery rule.
The majority focuses on balancing the benefit of application of the discovery rule against the harm this exception would visit on the defendant and the policies underpinning the statute of limitations. Ante, p 66. My disagreement with this reasoning is that the majority has failed to make the initial determination whether the discovery rule is applicable in cases of repressed memory syndrome.
"The doctrine of contra non valentem agere nulla currit prescriptio, an exception to the prescription rules, tolls the prescriptive period when a party is unable to exercise his cause of action when it accrues.” 54 CJS, Limitations of Actions, § 86, p 122. The doctrine recognizes certain situations in which the prescriptive period is prevented from running, including where the cause of action is not known or reasonably knowable by the plaintiff. Id. Larson v Johns-Manville Sales Corp, 427 Mich 301; 399 NW2d 1 (1986).
*81Both plaintiffs allege that because of repressed memory syndrome, they were incapable of remembering the assaults until less than a year before the suits were filed. Therefore, the key question is whether an allegation of repressed memory syndrome would be deemed by the courts sufficient grounds to say that the plaintiff neither knew nor should have known of the claim.
In a case of alleged repressed memory, I would find that the plaintiff has not shown an inability to bring suit. There is no agreement on the viability and reliability of repressed memory syndrome within the American Medical Association or the American Psychiatric Association.* While I recog*82nize that childhood sexual abuse is a tragically common occurrence, in the absence of a consensus on this still-evolving theory from the appropriate medical experts, I feel it would be unwise and premature to recognize the repressed memory syndrome as a basis for applying the discovery rule.
Riley, J., concurred with Weaver, J.

 See, for example:
Person & Klar, Establishing trauma: The difficulty distinguishing between memories and fantasies, 42(4) J Am Psychoanalytic Ass’n 1055 (1994).
Brenneis, Belief and suggestion in the recovery of memories of childhood sexual abuse, 42(4) J Am Psychoanalytic Ass’n 1027 (1994).
Spiegel & Scheflin, Dissociated or fabricated? Psychiatric aspects of repressed memory in criminal and civil cases, 42(4) Int’l J Clinical & Experimental Hypnosis 411 (1994).
Lindsay & Read, Psychotherapy and memories of childhood sexual abuse: A cognitive perspective, 8(4) Applied Cognitive Psychology 281 (1994).
Loftus, The reality of repressed memories, 48(5) American Psychologist 518 (May, 1993).
American Medical Ass’n, Report of the Council on Scientific Affairs: Memories of childhood abuse, CSA Reports 5-A-94.
Herman & Harvey, The false memory debate: Social science or social backlash? 9(10) Howard Mental Health Newsletter 2b (April, 1993).
Freyd, Personal perspectives on the delayed memory debate, 3(5) Treating Abuse Today (1993).
Briere & Conte, Self-reported amnesia for abuse in adults molested as children, 6(1) Journal of Traumatic Stress (1993).
Williams, Adult memories of childhood abuse: Preliminary findings from a longitudinal study, APSAC Advisor (Summer, 1992).
Bannon, Recovered memories of childhood sexual abuse: Should the courts get involved when mental health professionals disagree? 26 Ariz St L J 835 (1994).
Ernsdorff & Loftus, Let sleeping memories lie? Words of caution about tolling the statute of limitations in cases of memory repression, 84 J Crim L & Criminology 129 (1993).