Court Opinion

ID: 9394739
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-16 13:12:47.787689+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:02.244008
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
UNPUBLISHED

              Present: Chief Judge Decker, Judges Huff and Callins
              Argued at Richmond, Virginia

              CHRISTIAN ARPAD PETROVICS
                                                                            MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
              v.     Record No. 0393-22-2                                  JUDGE DOMINIQUE A. CALLINS
                                                                                  MAY 16, 2023
              COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

                                FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF SPOTSYLVANIA COUNTY
                                              William E. Glover, Judge

                              Michelle C. F. Derrico, Senior Appellate Attorney (Virginia Indigent
                              Defense Commission, on briefs), for appellant.

                              Jason D. Reed, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares,
                              Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

                     The trial court convicted Christian Arpad Petrovics of rape and domestic assault and battery

              of a family member, third offense. On appeal, Petrovics contends that the trial court improperly

              limited his ability to use a transcript to impeach witnesses with prior inconsistent statements. He

              also argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions because the victim’s

              testimony was inherently incredible as a matter of law. For the following reasons, we affirm the

              trial court’s judgment.

                     *
                         This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1 413.
                                          BACKGROUND1

        On November 29, 2020, C.P. was living in a tent in an area near Route 1. Approximately

one week earlier, her husband, Petrovics, had arrived from Florida to visit her. Petrovics was

originally supposed to stay only one night until a friend could pick him up, but the friend never

arrived. C.P. asked Petrovics to leave but he refused, asserting that he was entitled to remain

because “it was his campsite[,] too.”

        The next morning, Petrovics “tr[ied] to get” C.P. to have sex with him. Both had been

drinking liquor, and C.P. “didn’t feel good.” Rebuffing his request, C.P. told Petrovics to “leave

[her] alone” and that she “didn’t want him to ever touch [her] again.” Petrovics nevertheless began

tugging her pants “until he got them down.” He then lifted C.P.’s left leg and “proceeded to have

sex” as she lay on her right side. Nauseated, C.P. began to “choke” and repeatedly told Petrovics to

stop until he finally relented. She told him to leave.

        Petrovics briefly departed before returning in a rage. Ignoring C.P.’s commands to leave, he

began choking her with one hand while pinning her arms above her head with the other. He

eventually stopped and left the tent. Before leaving, he accused C.P. of hitting him and yelled,

“[Y]ou’re going to jail today, bitch.” C.P. called a friend and asked the friend to come get her.

Petrovics called the police.

        Spotsylvania Sheriff’s Deputy Nathan Stocking arrived at the tent to investigate the alleged

domestic assault. When Deputy Stocking arrived, C.P. was on the phone. After interviewing

Petrovics, who had an injury resembling a “knuckle mark” on the right side of his head, Deputy

        1
          We recite the facts “in the ‘light most favorable’ to the Commonwealth, the prevailing
party in the trial court.” Hammer v. Commonwealth, 74 Va. App. 225, 231 (2022) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Cady, 300 Va. 325, 329 (2021)). Doing so requires us to “discard the evidence
of the accused in conflict with that of the Commonwealth, and regard as true all the credible
evidence favorable to the Commonwealth and all fair inferences to be drawn therefrom.” Cady, 300
Va. at 329 (quoting Commonwealth v. Perkins, 295 Va. 323, 324 (2018)).
                                                   -2-
Stocking handcuffed C.P. and told her that she was “going to jail.” While speaking to her, Deputy

Stocking saw that C.P.’s right arm was bleeding. C.P. told Deputy Stocking that Petrovics had

assaulted, strangled, and raped her. She rejected the claim that she had struck Petrovics, explaining

that he bumped his head in the woods. Deputy Stocking removed her handcuffs, and Deputy Brielle

Walker transported C.P. to a hospital for treatment. Deputy Walker interviewed C.P. along the way

and at the hospital.

        Shannon Scott, a forensic nurse, interviewed C.P. at the hospital and prepared a forensic

nurse examiner report and strangulation exam. Describing the attack to Scott, C.P. said that

Petrovics had threatened, “You’re my wife, I get what I want,” before forcibly raping her.

Afterward, Petrovics strangled her and said, “I will kill you, bitch[,] before I go to jail again.” C.P.

said that Petrovics also struck her left cheek bone. In addition, she reported that Petrovics had

previously strangled her.

        During the forensic examination, Scott found abrasions on C.P.’s left wrist and forearm that

were “consistent with” her “abrased tissue” as well as multiple wounds on C.P.’s right forearm

“consistent with bruising.” She also found an injury to C.P.’s “fossa navicularis,” an area near the

entrance to the vagina. Scott did not find any signs of trauma to C.P.’s cheekbone or neck marks

indicative of strangulation.

        Detective Earl Swift also interviewed C.P. and had the police officers prepare a “Physical

Evidence Recovery Kit” (“PERK”).2 Detective Swift later obtained a buccal swab of Petrovics’s

DNA. Petrovics could not be eliminated as an “additional contributor” to a DNA mixture found on

C.P.’s thighs and external genitalia.

        2
         The PERK comprised DNA samples obtained from C.P.’s mouth, “[v]aginal/cervical”
region, “[t]highs/external genitalia,” neck, and “perianal/buttocks” area.
                                                -3-
        Petrovics was subsequently indicted for rape and domestic assault and battery, third offense.

At trial, C.P. testified to the events detailed above. She added that she believed Petrovics had

ejaculated inside of her during the rape and that she did not have sex with him the previous night.

She admitted that she was uncertain whether Petrovics had caused her arm to bleed and that she

could not remember many details of the incident because it occurred approximately a year prior and

had been “a traumatic experience.” Acknowledging that she had been reluctant to undergo the

forensic examination and declined further confirmatory testing, she explained that she had been

“frantic” and felt that the process was “very degrading.” She also testified that she obtained a “CT

scan” the following week.

        Deputy Stocking testified that he had found several cutting implements throughout the

campsite but did not collect any for DNA testing. Detective Swift testified that police collected

C.P.’s clothing and the PERK for forensic analysis, and although Petrovics had “offered to have his

fingernails tested,” doing so was “beyond [Detective Swift’s] scope of investigation.” Deputy

Walker testified that C.P. eventually agreed to go to the hospital and that her initial account of the

incident was “all over the place” and “a little bit vague.”

        At the conclusion of the Commonwealth’s case-in-chief, Petrovics moved to strike the rape

charge, arguing that the evidence failed to prove that C.P. did not consent to sexual intercourse or

that he had used “force, threat, or intimidation” to accomplish it. He also moved to strike the felony

domestic assault and battery charge, asserting that the evidence failed to prove an “unwanted and

harmful touching” because C.P. could neither recall whether Petrovics had caused the injury to her

arm nor remember “how long the strangulation was.” The trial court denied the motion.

        Angelina Campbell, a forensic nurse, testified for the defense. After reviewing the medical

reports documenting the results of the forensic examination, Campbell concluded that either

consensual or non-consensual intercourse could have caused the injury to C.P.’s fossa navicularis.

                                                  -4-
She also affirmed that there were no physical signs of C.P.’s strangulation. She added, however,

that it is not uncommon for victims to “not have a single mark,” even if “strangled to

unconsciousness” or death.

        According to Petrovics’s testimony, he had consensual sex with C.P. on the morning in

question more than once, including after she had discovered that he had been texting another

woman. Later that morning, after C.P. brought up the earlier text messages, Petrovics attempted to

leave the tent. As the two squabbled, C.P., who had been drinking, grabbed at a liquor bottle that

Petrovics had wedged under his knee. Petrovics pushed C.P. several times as he attempted to leave

the tent. When Petrovics took the liquor bottle back from C.P., she then hit Petrovics in the head.

Petrovics denied that C.P. ever told him to stop having sex with her and asserted that she drinks

heavily, including on the morning in question and during the night before. Petrovics admitted that

he had refused to leave the tent despite C.P.’s demand but maintained that his refusal was due to the

cold, rainy weather outside. Petrovics testified that he called the police because he was “tired of her

always hitting” him.3

        At the conclusion of the evidence, Petrovics renewed his motion to strike, which the trial

court denied. During closing argument, Petrovics argued that the evidence was insufficient to

support either charge because C.P.’s testimony lacked credibility. Petrovics argued that the physical

evidence conflicted with C.P.’s account of the assault “because they needed more follow-up . . . if

they had followed up . . . [they would have] realized, no, these aren’t injuries.” Although he

conceded that nothing in the medical reports from the forensic examination contradicted her

testimony, Petrovics argued that C.P.’s motive to fabricate, inability to recall details, and

inconsistencies in her account rendered her testimony inherently incredible.

        3
          On cross-examination, Petrovics was impeached by his criminal record. Petrovics
admitted that he had been previously convicted of at least three felonies and one misdemeanor
theft offense.
                                              -5-
        The trial court found that there was “no question” that Petrovics “assaulted his wife, again,”

and there is “absolutely no reason to believe [C.P.] harmed herself.” Continuing, the trial court

found that “both the parties” had been drinking, an argument had occurred, and the “marks” on

C.P.’s wrist were “consistent with it being grasped very hard” as she had alleged. The trial court

found Petrovics’s testimony incredible and determined that C.P.’s account of the assault was

credible. Accordingly, the trial court convicted Petrovics of rape and domestic assault and battery,

third offense. Petrovics appeals.

                                              ANALYSIS

                              I. Limitation of Impeachment Evidence

        Before trial, defense counsel had an employee transcribe an audio recording of C.P.’s

testimony from the preliminary hearing. When C.P. testified on cross-examination that she did not

recall making certain statements at the preliminary hearing, defense counsel confronted her with his

“transcript” in an apparent attempt to impeach her using a prior inconsistent statement.4

Specifically, defense counsel asked C.P. questions that appeared to lay a foundation for admission

of the “transcript”:

                [Defense counsel]:     Ma’am, first off, I want to make sure you
                                       understand what this document is. Can you
                                       identify what it is based off of the title?

                [C.P.]:                Complete transcript of all of the evidence and
                                       other incidents, blah, blah, blah, that part?

                [Defense counsel]:     Yes, ma’am.

                [C.P.]:                Yes.

        4
          The trial court specifically found that the “transcript” defense counsel sought to produce
was “a typed-up iteration of a tape that was made by defense counsel, which [he had] a statutory
right to do during the preliminary hearing.”
                                                  -6-
                [Defense counsel]:      So the last page, can you identify what’s on
                                        that last page?

                [C.P.]:                 Last page. The certification.

The Commonwealth objected, arguing that defense counsel could not use the unauthenticated

“transcript” to impeach C.P. and that C.P. was incapable of authenticating it. Defense counsel

countered that although a court reporter had not prepared the document, a “member of [his] staff”

had done so and “certified” its accuracy.

        The trial court found that defense counsel was “attempting to authenticate a document

through a witness who is manifestly incapable” of doing so. Accordingly, the trial court ruled that

defense counsel could not use the unauthenticated document to impeach the witness by admission

of a prior inconsistent statement. Defense counsel then proceeded to use the document to refresh

the recollection of witnesses.5

        Petrovics contends that the trial court erroneously ruled that he could not use a “transcript”

to impeach C.P. or Deputy Walker at trial. He asserts that the trial court incorrectly ruled that “only

a court reporter could produce a transcript it would accept.” Citing Virginia Rule of Evidence 2:903

        5
         By stipulation, the Commonwealth later consented to defense counsel reading two
portions of the document into evidence “for the purposes of impeachment.” The first established
that C.P. had previously testified that Petrovics had not “overstayed his welcome” before the
incident. The second established that Deputy Walker had described C.P.’s account as “vague”
and had to “persuade” her to go to the hospital. Contrary to Petrovics’s assertion at oral
argument, there is no evidence that the Commonwealth withdrew its objection to the admission
of the entire document. Although the Commonwealth did not object, and indeed stipulated, to
the authenticity of those two portions of the document, the trial court was not required to find
that those statements were authenticated. Insofar as Petrovics asserts that the trial court erred by
accepting the stipulation without revisiting its authenticity ruling, Petrovics did not make that
argument to the trial court, nor did he raise it in his opening brief. We will not consider it on
appeal. See Rule 5A:18 (“No ruling of the trial court . . . will be considered as a basis for
reversal unless an objection was stated with reasonable certainty at the time of the ruling . . . .”).
Although there are two exceptions to Rule 5A:18, Petrovics did not invoke them, and we will not
invoke them sua sponte. See Edwards v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 752, 761 (2003) (en
banc).
                                                  -7-
and Code § 47.1-2, Petrovics argues that the transcript he produced was “self-authenticating.”

Petrovics is wrong.

       “[W]e review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence using an abuse of

discretion standard and, on appeal, will not disturb a trial court’s decision to admit evidence

absent a finding of abuse of that discretion.” Kenner v. Commonwealth, 299 Va. 414, 423 (2021)

(alteration in original) (quoting Avent v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 175, 197 (2010)). “In

evaluating whether a trial court abused its discretion, . . . we do not substitute our judgment for

that of the trial court. Rather, we consider only whether the record fairly supports the trial

court’s action.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Carter v. Commonwealth, 293 Va. 537, 543

(2017)). “The abuse-of-discretion standard [also] includes review to determine that the

discretion was not guided by erroneous legal conclusions.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting

Carter, 293 Va. at 543-44).

       The use of prior inconsistent statements to impeach a witness “is fundamental to the right of

cross-examination.” Hall v. Commonwealth, 233 Va. 369, 374 (1987) (citing Thornton v. Downes,

177 Va. 451, 459 (1941)). In general, a prior inconsistent statement is admitted solely to attack the

credibility of a witness who has offered conflicting testimony at different times and “not as

substantive evidence of its content.” Id. at 369. The procedure for impeaching a witness using prior

inconsistent statements is well-established. See Code § 19.2-268.1. First, counsel must call the

witness’s attention to the circumstances of the occasion on which the alleged prior statement was

made. Waller v. Commonwealth, 22 Va. App. 53, 58 (1996). Next, counsel must ask the witness

whether she previously made a particular statement and “[i]f the witness denies or is unable to recall

having made the statement, counsel must then prove the statement actually was made.” Patterson v.

Commonwealth, 222 Va. 612, 616-17 (1981).

                                                 -8-
        In Patterson, our Supreme Court recognized that “[i]t is one thing . . . to say that counsel

may read a witness’ prior statement from a transcript in framing a question and quite a different

matter to say that the mere reading constitutes proof the statement actually was made.” Id. at 617.

Thus, a litigant may read a statement from an unauthenticated transcript of a prior proceeding in

framing cross-examination questions, but she must authenticate the transcript if she intends to use it

to prove that the witness actually made that specific statement in a prior proceeding. See Roberts v.

Commonwealth, 230 Va. 264, 269 (1985) (observing that authentication of transcript is required

only if it is used as “substantive evidence” to prove that the witness made the statement).

        Although not the exclusive means of laying an impeachment foundation, a certified

transcript prepared by a court reporter has the advantage of being “self-authenticating.” See Waller,

22 Va. App. at 60 n.1 (observing a duly certified transcript by a court reporter is

“self-authenticating” under Code § 8.01-420.3); see also Newton v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. App.

433, 443 (1999) (quoting Edwards v. Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 568, 571-72 (1995) (observing

that a court reporter’s transcript is the preferred, but not exclusive means of impeachment)). To

authenticate a transcript of prior testimony prepared by someone other than a court reporter, counsel

must call “another witness to prove the first witness had testified as reported in the transcript.”

Patterson, 222 Va. at 617.

        The record establishes that Petrovics failed to authenticate the “transcript” as required for

impeachment. The transcript had not been prepared by a court reporter and thus was not

“self-authenticating” under Code § 8.01-420.3. See Waller, 22 Va. App. at 60 n.1. Further,

Petrovics did not call “another witness to prove the first witness had testified as reported in the

transcript.” Patterson, 222 Va. at 617. Specifically, he did not call a witness to testify regarding the

document’s authenticity as a true and accurate transcription of C.P.’s testimony at the preliminary

hearing. Although Petrovics questioned C.P. about the document, C.P. had no direct knowledge of

                                                  -9-
its preparation and could not otherwise recall making a prior inconsistent statement. Accordingly,

the trial court correctly concluded that C.P. was “manifestly incapable” of authenticating the

transcript and properly ruled it inadmissible to prove that she had previously testified inconsistently.

Cf. Patterson, 222 Va. at 617 (holding that defense counsel was required to call a witness to

authenticate a transcript before reading from it to prove a prior inconsistent statement).

        The record belies Petrovics’s assertion that the trial court ruled that “only a court reporter

could produce a transcript it would accept.” To the contrary, the trial court ruled only that defense

counsel could not use the document to prove that a witness made a prior inconsistent statement

without first authenticating the document. The trial court did not bar Petrovics from calling a

witness to authenticate the document. Moreover, the trial court still permitted Petrovics to use the

document to refresh the recollection of witnesses during cross-examination. See Roberts, 230 Va. at

269 (affirming the trial court’s ruling allowing counsel to frame questions using unauthenticated

transcript without offering it as substantive proof of the statements); cf. Waller, 22 Va. App. at 60

(reversing the trial court’s ruling allowing counsel to frame questions using a properly authenticated

transcript but barring admission of transcript itself).6

        Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow

Petrovics to use an unauthenticated “transcript” to impeach a witness regarding prior inconsistent

statements.

        6
         In his reply brief, Petrovics contends that Rule 2:903 and Code § 47.1-2 made the
transcript “self-authenticating.” “No ruling of the trial court . . . will be considered as a basis for
reversal unless an objection was stated with reasonable certainty at the time of the ruling, except
for good cause shown or to enable this Court to attain the ends of justice.” Rule 5A:18.
Petrovics did not raise this argument in his opening brief, nor did he raise this argument at trial,
and thus it is waived under Rule 5A:18. Petrovics has not invoked the exceptions to Rule 5A:18,
and we will not do so sua sponte. See Edwards, 41 Va. App. at 761.
                                               - 10 -
                                   II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

       Petrovics next contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for rape

and domestic assault and battery, third offense. He does not dispute that C.P.’s version of events, if

believed, would prove the elements of each offense. Rather, Petrovics contends that C.P.’s

testimony was inherently incredible as a matter of law and that her description of the assault was

“demonstrably impossible based upon the physical facts.” In addition, he argues that the victim’s

intoxication, fear of arrest, and inconsistencies in her accounts demonstrate that she fabricated the

allegations against him. We disagree.

       “When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, ‘[t]he judgment of the trial court is

presumed correct and will not be disturbed unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to

support it.’” McGowan v. Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 513, 521 (2020) (alteration in original)

(quoting Smith v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 450, 460 (2018)). In such cases, “the relevant

question is whether ‘any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the

crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Vasquez v. Commonwealth, 291 Va. 232, 248 (2016)

(quoting Williams v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 190, 193 (2009)). “If there is evidentiary support

for the conviction, ‘the reviewing court is not permitted to substitute its own judgment, even if its

opinion might differ from the conclusions reached by the finder of fact at the trial.’” McGowan,

72 Va. App. at 521 (quoting Chavez v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 149, 161 (2018)).

       We have long held that witness credibility is a determination “within the exclusive

province of the [fact finder], which has the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of the

witnesses as they testify.” Dalton v. Commonwealth, 64 Va. App. 512, 525 (2015) (quoting Lea

v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 300, 304 (1993)). “[T]he conclusions of the fact finder on issues

of witness credibility may be disturbed on appeal only when we find that the witness’ testimony

was ‘inherently incredible, or so contrary to human experience as to render it unworthy of

                                                 - 11 -
belief.’” Ragsdale v. Commonwealth, 38 Va. App. 421, 429 (2002) (quoting Ashby v.

Commonwealth, 33 Va. App. 540, 548 (2000)). Testimony is inherently incredible only where it

is “so manifestly false that reasonable [people] ought not to believe it, or it must be shown to be

false by objects or things as to the existence and meaning of which reasonable [people] should

not differ.” Juniper v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 362, 415 (2006) (quoting Cardwell v.

Commonwealth, 209 Va. 412, 414 (1968)).

       Consistent with those principles, we have held that testimony “may be contradictory or

contain inconsistencies without rising to the level of being inherently incredible as a matter of law.”

Kelley v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 617, 626 (2019) (citing Juniper, 271 Va. at 415). Similarly,

a “motive[] to lie” does not per se render a witness’s testimony unworthy of belief. Id. at 627.

Instead, those circumstances are appropriately submitted to and resolved by the fact finder. Id. In

this case, Petrovics points to nothing that renders C.P.’s testimony inherently incredible as a matter

of law. After weighing her inconsistent statements and potential motive to lie against the balance of

the evidence, the trial court credited her testimony. Indeed, contrary to Petrovics’s assertion on

brief, the physical evidence corroborated rather than detracted from C.P.’s testimony. Lambert v.

Commonwealth, 70 Va. App. 740, 760 (2019) (holding that a witness’s testimony was not

inherently incredible when it was corroborated by other evidence). C.P. had abrasions on her left

forearm and wrist and wounds on her right forearm that were consistent with Petrovics grabbing her

arms during the assault. Moreover, C.P.’s fossa navicularis was injured, and Petrovic’s DNA was

inside her vagina, consistent with aggressive sexual contact. Although C.P. had no marks on her

neck, the forensic nurse whom Petrovics called as a witness testified that even in severe cases it is

common for victims to have no apparent signs of strangulation.

       In addition, C.P.’s description of the incident to Scott was consistent with her trial

testimony. See Anderson v. Commonwealth, 282 Va. 457, 464-65 (2011) (recognizing Virginia’s

                                                 - 12 -
adherence to the principle that a fact finder may consider a witness’s prior consistent statements in

assessing credibility). At the hospital, C.P. reported that Petrovics had said he was entitled to sex

and that he forcibly raped her; afterward, he pinned her arms above her head, strangled her, and

threatened to kill her to avoid imprisonment. She admitted that she had kicked Petrovics while

resisting the attack. That Deputy Stocking observed a “knuckle mark” on Petrovic’s head that

conflicted with C.P.’s denial that she had struck him does not render her testimony inherently

incredible. See Parham v. Commonwealth, 64 Va. App. 560, 565 (2015) (recognizing that a fact

finder is “not required to believe all aspects of the testimony of a witness”).

        Finally, Petrovics’s own testimony corroborated C.P.’s account. He admitted that he and

C.P. had been drinking and that he had disregarded her repeated commands to leave her property.

He also admitted to pushing C.P. during a quarrel and having sex with her. Although Petrovics

maintained that he had refused to leave because of foul weather, that C.P. drunkenly instigated the

quarrel, and that she never told him to stop having sex with her, the trial court “was at liberty to

discount [his] self-serving statements as little more than lying to ‘conceal his guilt,’” and “could

treat such prevarications as ‘affirmative evidence of guilt.’” Coleman v. Commonwealth, 52

Va. App. 19, 25 (2008) (first quoting Haskins v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. App. 1, 10 (2004); and

then quoting Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 296 (1992)).

        Viewing the foregoing evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, we

cannot say that C.P.’s testimony was either manifestly false or shown to be false, and thus

inherently incredible as a matter of law. It is well-settled that in sexual assault cases, the sole

testimony of the victim, if not inherently incredible, is sufficient to sustain a conviction. Wilson v.

Commonwealth, 46 Va. App. 73, 87 (2005). Because C.P.’s testimony was not inherently

incredible, the trial court was entitled to rely on it to convict. Id. Accordingly, we hold that the

evidence was sufficient to prove the charged offenses.

                                                  - 13 -
                                  CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                                   Affirmed.

                                        - 14 -