Court Opinion

ID: 9449296
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 16:01:05.364951+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:37:20.896122
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION

     UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
          FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

RONALD HITTLE,                                    No. 22-15485

                 Plaintiff-Appellant,          D.C. No. 2:12-cv-
                                               00766-TLN-KJN
    v.

CITY OF STOCKTON, California;                       OPINION
ROBERT DEIS; LAURIE MONTES,

                 Defendants-Appellees.

         Appeal from the United States District Court
            for the Eastern District of California
          Troy L. Nunley, District Judge, Presiding

           Argued and Submitted March 27, 2023
                San Francisco, California

                      Filed August 4, 2023

    Before: Ronald M. Gould and Sandra S. Ikuta, Circuit
      Judges, and Edward R. Korman, * District Judge.

                   Opinion by Judge Korman

*
 The Honorable Edward R. Korman, United States District Judge for the
Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.
2                   HITTLE V. CITY OF STOCKTON

                          SUMMARY **

                 Employment Discrimination

   The panel affirmed the district court’s summary
judgment in favor of defendants in Ronald Hittle’s
employment discrimination action under Title VII and
California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act.
    Hittle alleged that he was terminated from his position as
Fire Chief for the City of Stockton based upon his religion
and, specifically, his attendance a religious leadership event.
    The panel held that, in analyzing employment
discrimination claims under Title VII and the California
FEHA, the court may use the McDonnell Douglas burden-
shifting framework, under which the plaintiff must establish
a prima facie case of discrimination. The burden then shifts
to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for the challenged actions. Finally, the burden
returns to the plaintiff to show that the proffered
nondiscriminatory reason is pretextual. Alternatively, the
plaintiff may prevail on summary judgment by showing
direct or circumstantial evidence of discrimination. Hittle
was required to show that his religion was “a motivating
factor” in defendants’ decision to fire him with respect to his
federal claims, and that his religion was “a substantial
motivating factor” with respect to his FEHA claims.
    The panel concluded that Hittle failed to present
sufficient direct evidence of discriminatory animus in

**
  This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
                 HITTLE V. CITY OF STOCKTON               3

defendants’ statements and the City’s notice of intent to
remove him from City service. And Hittle also failed to
present sufficient specific and substantial circumstantial
evidence of religious animus by defendants. The district
court’s grant of summary judgment in defendants’ favor was
appropriate     where    defendants’    legitimate,   non-
discriminatory reasons for firing Hittle were sufficient to
rebut his evidence of discrimination, and he failed to
persuasively argue that these non-discriminatory reasons
were pretextual.

                       COUNSEL

Elisabeth C. Butler (argued) and Aaron M. Streett, Baker
Botts LLP, Houston, Texas; Kelly J. Shackelford, Jeffrey C.
Mateer, and David J. Hacker, First Liberty Institute, Plano,
Texas; Stephanie N. Taub, First Liberty Institute, Cabot,
Arizona; Kayla A. Toney, First Liberty Institute,
Washington, D.C.; Alan J. Reinach and Jonathon Cherne,
Church State Council, Westlake Village, California; for
Plaintiff-Appellant.
Spencer J. Wilson (argued), Arthur A. Hartinger, Ryan P.
McGinley-Stempel, and Geoffrey Spellberg, Renne Public
Law Group, San Francisco, California, for Defendants-
Appellees.
David H. Thompson and Joseph O. Masterman, Cooper and
Kirk PLLC, Washington, D.C., for Amicus Curiae Global
Leadership Network.
Sue Ghosh Stricklett, American Hindu Coalition, Sterling,
Virginia; Nicholas M. Bruno, Charles R. Flores, Alyssa B.
McDaniel, Zachary T. Nelson, Beck Redden LLP, Houston,
4                HITTLE V. CITY OF STOCKTON

Texas; for Amici Curiae Sikh Coalition, Asma Uddin,
Jewish Coalition for Religious Liberty, American Hindu
Coalition, and Coalition for Jewish Values.

                        OPINION

KORMAN, District Judge:

    Plaintiff-Appellant Ronald Hittle (“Hittle”) was an at-
will employee of the City of Stockton, California (the
“City”) and served as the City’s Fire Chief from 2005
through 2011. During his tenure, Hittle engaged in conduct
that troubled his employer, and led ultimately to his
termination. The City hired an outside independent
investigator, Trudy Largent (“Largent”), to investigate
various allegations of misconduct. In a 250-page report
referencing over 50 exhibits, Largent sustained almost all of
the allegations of misconduct against Hittle.
    Largent’s Report specifically concluded that Hittle: (1)
lacked effectiveness and judgment in his ongoing leadership
of the Fire Department; (2) used City time and a City vehicle
to attend a religious event, and approved on-duty attendance
of other Fire Department managers to do the same; (3) failed
to properly report his time off; (4) engaged in potential
favoritism of certain Fire Department employees based on a
financial conflict of interest not disclosed to the City; (5)
endorsed a private consultant’s business in violation of City
policy; and (6) had potentially conflicting loyalties in his
management role and responsibilities, including Hittle’s
relationship with the head of the local firefighters’ union.
Based on the independent findings and conclusions set forth
                  HITTLE V. CITY OF STOCKTON                 5

in Largent’s report, the City removed Hittle from his position
as Fire Chief.
    Hittle sued the City, former City Manager Robert Deis
(“Deis”), and former Deputy City Manager Laurie Montes
(“Montes”) (jointly, “Defendants”) claiming that his
termination was in fact the result of unlawful employment
discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) and California’s Fair Employment
and Housing Act (“FEHA”). Hittle alleged that Deis and
Montes terminated his employment as Fire Chief “based
upon his religion.” Specifically, Hittle alleges that he was
fired for attending a religious leadership event.
    On February 18, 2021, Defendants moved for summary
judgment seeking dismissal of all of Hittle’s claims. Hittle
subsequently cross-moved for partial summary judgment as
to his federal and state religious discrimination claims on
April 1, 2021. On March 1, 2022, the district court denied
Hittle’s motion and granted Defendants’ motion as to all of
Hittle’s claims. Hittle timely appealed.
                     BACKGROUND
     In deciding a motion for summary judgment, we view
the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party, drawing all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.
See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Here, we recite the facts in the light
most favorable to Hittle. Hittle was the Fire Chief of the
Stockton Fire Department during the period relevant to this
appeal. In that capacity, Hittle initially reported directly to
Gordon Palmer, Stockton’s City Manager. After Palmer
retired in 2009, Hittle began reporting directly to Montes,
who had been appointed Deputy City Manager in 2008.
6                 HITTLE V. CITY OF STOCKTON

    In May 2010, the City received an anonymous letter
purporting to be from an employee of the Stockton Fire
Department. The letter described Hittle as a “corrupt, racist,
lying, religious fanatic who should not be allowed to
continue as the Fire Chief of Stockton.” In her subsequent
affidavit in support of her motion for summary judgment,
Montes stated that the source of this information was not an
anonymous individual but a high-ranking Fire Department
manager, who had told her that “Hittle favored members of
that coalition—who all shared his Christian faith,” and that
her concern was that “Hittle was providing favorable
treatment and assignments” to these other employees. About
one month after the City received this letter, Montes told
Hittle in a meeting that she had “heard [he] was part of a
group of folks, a Christian Coalition, and that [he] shouldn’t
be involved in that.” When Hittle stated that “[a]s a
supervisor, you can’t tell me I can’t practice my faith when
I’m off duty,” Montes asked him about his “off duty
Christian activities.” Hittle told her that “there was no
Christian clique within the fire department that was meeting
together, nor did she have any right to tell [Hittle] what [he]
could or could not do with respect to [his] religion while off
duty.” According to Hittle, during this conversation, Montes
said that Hittle should not “be a part of anything like that as
the fire chief, and [he] should refrain from doing any of those
types of activities” with other firefighters. Montes did not
specifically explain what “those type of activities”
comprised, but Hittle thought “the inference was the fact that
I may have meetings with them, I might pray with them, I
may have opportunity to speak to them about God,
leadership in that respect.” Hittle and Montes are in apparent
agreement that Montes did not initiate the “Christian
Coalition” term herself.
                  HITTLE V. CITY OF STOCKTON                 7

     On July 1, 2020, Bob Deis became City Manager. At
Hittle’s and Deis’s first meeting, Hittle expressed to Deis
that he is “a religious man” and that he is “a Christian.” Deis
responded with “a blank stare, and there was a long pause.”
Deis’s “body language and stare made [Hittle] very
uncomfortable.” Hittle felt that Deis’s “coldness and
rejection” was because Hittle had expressed that he was a
Christian, and that Deis had heard about the anonymous
letter and the “Christian Coalition.” Hittle had the “distinct
impression” that Deis’s “mind was already made up about”
Hittle.
    In her oversight of Hittle, Montes became concerned
about Hittle’s performance as Fire Chief in other ways
unrelated to Hittle’s alleged religious favoritism.
Specifically, Montes claimed that Hittle worked against the
City’s plans to cut public budget costs and expenses, unlike
all of the other City Department heads during that time who
were cooperating with the City Manager’s office in an
ultimately unsuccessful effort to avoid the City declaring
bankruptcy. As another example, in 2010, a proposition
referred to as “Measure H” was slated for the ballot that
November. Some members of the City’s Fire Department
opposed Measure H because they believed that it would
undermine Fire Department autonomy and authority. In
response, several off-duty firefighters visited nursing homes
wearing their on-duty Fire Department clothing and told the
residents that Measure H, if passed, would prevent the Fire
Department from providing timely services to seniors in the
event of an emergency. When the City Manager’s office
received complaints about on-duty firefighters advocating
against Measure H, Deis and Montes raised the issue with
Hittle. Montes claimed that Hittle agreed that the conduct
was not acceptable but did not make an effort to stop it from
8                 HITTLE V. CITY OF STOCKTON

occurring. Hittle disputes this allegation, and states that
“Local 456 owned an antique fire engine that displayed a
banner: ‘Stockton Professional Firefighters,’” which had
been used for many years for campaigning off-duty prior to
the termination of Hittle, with no objection from
management. The union used the antique fire truck without
objection from Human Resources, Deis, or Montes for
holidays and community events for many years and Hittle
had not been disciplined for the union using the antique fire
truck on off-duty time until 2010, when it was raised by Deis
and Montes for the first time.
    In light of these and other issues, including what Deis
believed was Hittle’s failure to “assure that proper decorum
and ethical parameters were in place and enforced in his
Department,” Deis instructed Montes to continue directly
supervising Hittle.
    According to Montes, during the fall of 2010, due to
what she “believed was a clear lack of leadership and
management skills displayed by Chief Hittle,” Montes
directed Hittle “to find and attend a leadership training
program.” Montes states that she specifically directed Hittle
to “find a program intended for Fire Chiefs, or at least
designed for the upper management of public entities,” and
was clear to Hittle that she wanted the leadership training to
be related specifically to public sector service. Montes
claims that she suggested to Hittle that the League of
California Cities may provide such training, and that she was
aware that the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Post
Officers Standards and Training offered upper management
training programs to police departments through that group.
Hittle stated that he reviewed various leadership training
programs, but was unable to find any that were in California,
or at a cost that the Fire Department could afford. Hittle
                  HITTLE V. CITY OF STOCKTON                 9

subsequently was gifted four tickets to an event called the
Global Leadership Summit (the “Summit”). The Summit
was sponsored by a church, and its registration materials
stated that: “The leadership summit exists to transform
Christian leaders around the world with an injection of
vision, skill Development and inspiration for the sake of the
LOCAL CHURCH.” However, according to a magazine
article in the record, the Summit is a “pop-up business
school” that “bring[s] a stellar faculty . . . to teach pastors
and laypeople leadership and management.” The Summit
had “over 60,000 leaders . . . gather” and was “broadcast
live . . . to more than 225 satellite sites across North
America.” Previous “speakers includ[ed] former President
Bill Clinton, former Secretary of State Colin Powell, Jack
Welch, and Carly Fiorina, former CEO of Hewitt-Packard.”
The same magazine referred to the Summit as “learning from
the business world’s best.” Hittle explained that his
“purpose in attending the leadership conference was to learn
leadership principles and enhance leadership skills that
would assist [him] to lead the” fire department. Hittle also
states that there was no policy that prohibited employees
from attending religious programs while on duty. Along
with three fellow firefighters, Hittle traveled in a City
vehicle to Livermore, California to attend the Summit on
August 5 and 6, 2010.
    On September 3, 2010, the City received a second
anonymous letter stating that Hittle and other fire department
personnel had “attended a religious function on city time”
using “a city vehicle.” Deis asked Montes to evaluate the
issues raised in the letter. According to Largent, Deis’s
“concern[] about Hittle attending this event on City time
[was] that ‘you cannot use public funds to attend religious
10                HITTLE V. CITY OF STOCKTON

events; even if under the guise of leadership development. It
is not acceptable.’”
    When Montes asked Hittle about the allegations in the
second letter, Montes alleges that Hittle confirmed that he
had attended the Summit on City time, accompanied by three
City firefighters, that they used a City vehicle to travel to the
Summit, and that they were paid their regular compensation
during their attendance.         Montes states that Hittle
“continually insisted that although this Willow Creek
Summit did contain a religious component, there were
several business oriented non-religious speakers,” and that
he “defended his conduct claiming that this was appropriate
leadership training.”
     Later, in a meeting with Hittle, Montes “again brought
up the subject of there being a Christian Coalition in
[Hittle’s] department, and that these are the people [he]
associate[s] with.” Montes “told [Hittle] this wasn’t good,
and that [he] should not be doing this.” She also told him he
should not have attended the leadership training. Hittle told
Montes that the leadership training was the best he had ever
attended, “there[ was] no Christian Coalition,” and “she
could not tell me I can’t practice my religious faith, or with
whom to associate.” Hittle “asserted [his] right to associate
with other Christians and told [Montes] she had no right to
tell [him] what [he] could do on [his] own time to practice
[his] faith.” Hittle stated that Montes “raised her voice when
accusing [him] of taking part in a Christian Coalition,” and
“[w]hen the term [‘]Christian Coalition[’] was used by
[Montes], it was clear [Montes] was saying it in a pejorative
way, making it clear this was wrong and distasteful to her.”
“Montes did not accept [Hittle’s] explanation” and
continued to ask about Hittle’s “religious activities including
                  HITTLE V. CITY OF STOCKTON                11

the [Summit].” This is the principal basis for Hittle’s
challenge to the adverse action against him.
    Subsequently, on October 15, 2010, the Stockton Record
reported that Hittle co-owned a vacation property with the
Firefighters’ Union President Dave Macedo (“Macedo”),
Fire Marshal Matthew Duaime (“Duaime”), and retired Fire
Captain Allen Anton. Montes claims that she learned of the
conflict only after the newspaper article was published
because Hittle had not previously disclosed this joint
ownership to City officials. In Montes’s view, this co-
ownership raised questions about Hittle’s impartiality with
respect to “balancing the interests of the union and the
taxpayers.”
    Montes issued a notice of a confidential investigation to
Hittle on November 1, 2010 (identifying five issues) because
of her perception that Hittle had “issues of non-cooperation
and poor management practices.” Montes stated that even
after she issued the notice of investigation, Hittle continued
to engage in conduct that she found troubling. For example,
Macedo (president of the fire department union) admitted to
providing Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act (HIPAA) protected information to the media in an
attempt to influence San Joaquin County to permit City
firefighters to provide advanced life support at emergency
scenes. Montes claims that Hittle imposed only minor
discipline on Macedo and defended Macedo’s conduct,
despite the fact that the leak resulted in the County suing the
City and obtaining a preliminary injunction.
    Montes also discovered that Duaime had falsified his
time records in two ways. First, he had attended the Summit
with Hittle. Second, he would work overtime and not submit
a request for the incurred compensation, instead “saving”
12               HITTLE V. CITY OF STOCKTON

that time and improperly submitting a request for
compensation on a day on which he had not worked
overtime.    Hittle defended Duaime’s practices in a
memorandum to Montes dated March 14, 2011, stating that
Duaime had worked all the hours submitted, and had held
accrued time off the books in order to avoid charging the
City overtime. Montes alleges that Hittle refused to
discipline Duaime until ordered to do so.
    In addition, at this time, the City was in the midst of a
fiscal crisis and on the verge of declaring bankruptcy, and
Deis and Montes “instructed all Department Heads to
prepare layoff plans in order to reduce costs which could
potentially help avoid the bankruptcy.” According to
Montes, all Department Heads complied with this order
except Hittle, who informed Montes that he could not agree
to any layoffs or recommend a cut in staffing. As a result of
Hittle’s failure to follow this directive, Deis and Montes
placed Hittle on administrative leave pending the outcome
of the investigation that had been initiated the previous
November.
    On March 25, 2011, the City retained Trudy Largent, an
outside investigator with human resources experience, to
investigate Hittle’s conduct. Largent interrogated Hittle at
length regarding his Christianity and about the Summit.
According to Hittle, the investigation was one-sided,
because Largent did not investigate the nature of the
leadership training provided by the Summit or contact the
witnesses identified by Hittle. Hittle claims that Largent’s
“demeanor and approach clearly communicated her lack of
impartiality.”
   On August 5, 2011, Largent submitted to the City her
Confidential Investigation Report (the “Largent Report”),
                  HITTLE V. CITY OF STOCKTON               13

which totaled over 250 pages and referenced more than 50
exhibits. In Largent’s interview with Montes, Montes
negatively referred to Christians.           Montes stated:
“Incidentally when I told [Hittle] to go get some leadership
training he asked if he [c]ould use George Liepart and I told
him no, he’s one of the church clique, and I said you know
we need to get away from . . . you know going, going around
the same mountain all the time.” The Largent Report
characterized Hittle’s “use of City time and a City vehicle to
attend a religious event” as the first “most serious act[] of
misconduct.” The Largent Report repeated the term
“religious event” over 15 times, and stated that “it [was]
clear that the primary mission of the Global Leadership
Summit was to specifically provide for the benefit of those
of a particular religion, Christianity.” Indeed, the Largent
Report makes clear that one of the key issues of the Fire
Department’s investigation was on “[w]hether the Global
Leadership Summit was a religious event,” and dedicated
five pages to discussing its religious nature. In these pages,
the Largent Report concluded that when Hittle “arrived at
the Summit location . . . and observed where it was being
held [(a church)] this should have alerted Hittle that his
participation and that of his managers would not be
appropriate.”
    In the investigation of whether Hittle engaged in
misconduct and violated City policy or Fire Department
Procedures, the Largent Report made the following findings
(in summary) as to each issue, and determined whether the
City’s allegations were sustained or not sustained:

       1.The lack of effectiveness of Chief Hittle’s
         ongoing supervision and leadership of the
         Fire Department, judgment as a department
14              HITTLE V. CITY OF STOCKTON

        head, and his contributions to the
        management team; “Sustained.”
     2. Chief Hittle’s failure to maintain proper
        discipline and order within the Department,
        contributing to a delay in investigating
        potential misconduct is “Not Sustained.”
        The allegation that Hittle has delayed in
        making recommendations as to appropriate
        level of discipline; “Sustained in part and
        Not Sustained in part.”
     3.Use of City time and City vehicle by Chief
        Hittle to attend a religious event; his failure
        to properly report time off, and Hittle
        potentially approving on-duty attendance at
        a religious event by Fire Department
        managers; “Sustained.”
     4.Potential favoritism of employees by Chief
        Hittle and conflict of interest based on
        financial interest not disclosed to the City;
        “Sustained.”
     5.Apparent endorsement of [a] private
        consultant’s business by Chief Hittle as an
        official of the City and potential conflict of
        interest by Hittle not disclosed to the City;
        “Sustained.”
     6.Failure by Chief Hittle to comply with
        management directions and his capability
        in respect to budget development; [“]Not
        Sustained.”
     7.Potentially conflicting loyalties by Chief
        Hittle     in    his    management        role,
        responsibilities, and his relationship with
                 HITTLE V. CITY OF STOCKTON               15

         the Firefighters     Local    456    Union;
         “Sustained.”

    After reviewing the Largent Report, Deis and Montes
concluded that Chief Hittle should be removed from his
position. In particular, Montes was concerned about the
various findings that were sustained against Hittle in the
Largent Report, and she and Deis did not believe that Hittle
had provided them with any indication that he would attempt
to correct his behavior or improve his management skills.
Deis and Montes met with Hittle and offered to appoint
Hittle to a Battalion Chief position so that he could remain
at the fire department until he reached the retirement age of
50, to which he was relatively close at that time. Hittle did
not accept this offer, and informed Deis and Montes that he
intended to retain counsel and bring a lawsuit. Hittle stated
that “Deis got very angry,” “raising his voice and
threaten[ing]” that if Hittle did not accept a demotion, he
would face “a long expensive legal battle,” and his
“reputation would suffer irreparable harm.”
    On August 24, 2011, the City sent Hittle a notice of its
intent to remove him from City service (the “Removal
Notice”) for the reasons stated in the Largent Report, which
was attached, and which included the following detailed
descriptions of its findings:

       1) On August 5 and 6, 2010, you used City
       time and resources to attend a religious
       leadership event. This conduct violated City
       Manager Directive No.         FIN-08     and
       Article C, Section 11 of the Fire Department
       Procedures Manual.
16             HITTLE V. CITY OF STOCKTON

     2) On August 5 and 6, 2010, you approved
     the attendance on City time of Deputy Chief
     Paul Willette, Division Chief Matt Duaime,
     and Fire Marshal Jonathan Smith at the same
     religious leadership event. This conduct
     violated City Manager Directive No. FIN-08
     and Article C, Section 11 of the Fire
     Department Procedures Manual.
     3) From 2004 through 2008, the City
     retained Integrated Services Group to provide
     consulting services to the fire department. At
     no time did you disclose to the City your
     personal relationship with the firm’s owner,
     George Liepart, or the fact that the two of you
     were engaged in a project to build a church
     school. Nor did you properly investigate
     complaints that in 2005 Liepart solicited
     donations from fire department employees
     for the church school project. This conduct
     violated City policy against conduct adverse
     to the welfare and/or good reputation of the
     City.
     4) Despite receiving information in 2009 that
     the Integrated Services Group website
     contained an endorsement by you under a
     photograph of you in your Fire Chief
     uniform, you failed to investigate whether the
     information was true. This tacit endorsement
     of Liepart’s firm violated City policy against
     conduct adverse to the welfare and/or good
     reputation of the City.
          HITTLE V. CITY OF STOCKTON              17

5) You failed to disclose to the City that you
co-owned a cabin with Captain Dave
Macedo, also President of International
Association of Firefighters Local 456
(Union), and Division Chief Duaime. This
violated your duty as a department head to
disclose any actual or potential conflict of
interest. Furthermore, this relationship raises
questions as to why you failed to investigate
Duaime’s       improper       reporting      of
compensatory time on his timesheets for May
and August 2010.
6) On March 29 and 30, 2011, you presented
Deputy City Manager Laurie Montes with a
Union proposal to put firefighters on a leave
of absence instead of laying them off. This
conduct was contrary to a department head’s
duty to further the goals and policies of the
City.
7) Your failure to recommend appropriate
discipline for misconduct by Captains Tony
Moudakis       [for     authorizing     on-duty
firefighters to assist his wife with a personal
matter] and John Loverin [for falsifying dates
on the Department’s official pay records]
violated Article 3, section 9 of the Fire
Department Rules and Regulations, which
requires you to “see that proper discipline is
maintained.”
8) After the Union released confidential
patient information to the media in 2007, you
failed to address the issue with employees to
18                HITTLE V. CITY OF STOCKTON

       prevent a recurrence. When confidential
       patient information was again released by the
       Union on September 9, 2010 you failed to
       address     preventative   measures     with
       employees. This conduct violated Article 3,
       section 9 of the Fire Department Rules and
       Regulations.
       9) Between July 13, 2010 and October 2010
       you failed to prevent members of the public
       from perceiving that firefighters were
       engaged in Union activities while on-duty.
       These activities included: wearing Union t-
       shirts that closely resembled official City
       firefighter shirts while riding on a fire engine
       owned by the Union; using City equipment to
       clean the Union hall while on-duty; and
       asking permission for on-duty personnel to
       set up for a Union-sponsored retirement
       dinner. This conduct raises doubts about your
       ability to be an effective department head and
       to further the goals and policies of the City.
       10) In the fall of 2010, you told Fire
       Department Internal Affairs Investigator
       Mark Lujan that firefighters were “upset”
       with him for displaying a “Yes on Measure
       H” sign on his lawn. This conduct raises
       doubts about your ability to be an effective
       department head and to further the goals and
       policies of the City.

    The City provided Hittle the opportunity to meet with a
City official and respond to the notice of intent to terminate.
On September 28, 2011, Hittle, joined by his attorney, met
                  HITTLE V. CITY OF STOCKTON                19

with then-Deputy City Manager Michael Locke and
Assistant City Attorney Michael Roush. During that
meeting, Hittle’s attorney argued that the investigative report
was not objective and that the meeting did not comport with
due process. Hittle claims that the hearing was a sham,
because he was not given an opportunity to call witnesses or
obtain evidence and was locked out of his email system and
files, and so had no opportunity to meaningfully defend
himself. According to Locke, neither Hittle nor his attorney
“provided any substantive reasons why [Hittle] should not
be removed as Fire Chief.” Following the meeting, Locke
sent a memo to Deis stating that, based on his review of the
Largent Report and its findings, and because Hittle had not
refuted any of the findings, Locke recommended that Hittle
be removed as Fire Chief. On September 30, 2011, the City
sent Hittle a formal notice of separation from City service,
removing Hittle from his position as Fire Chief effective as
of October 3, 2011.
                STANDARD OF REVIEW
    Summary judgment is warranted when “there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 250 (1986). We review grants of summary judgment
de novo. Maner v. Dignity Health, 9 F.4th 1114, 1119 (9th
Cir. 2021). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party, we must determine whether there
are any genuine issues of material fact, and whether the
district court correctly applied the relevant substantive law.
See Ass’n des Éleveurs de Canards et d’Oies du Québec v.
Bonta, 33 F.4th 1107, 1113 (9th Cir. 2022).
20                HITTLE V. CITY OF STOCKTON

                       DISCUSSION
    We analyze employment discrimination claims under
Title VII and the California FEHA using the McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green burden-shifting test. See 411 U.S.
792 (1973); Merrick v. Hilton Worldwide, Inc., 867 F.3d
1139, 1145 (9th Cir. 2017) (“Because state and federal
employment discrimination laws are similar, California
courts apply the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
framework to analyze disparate treatment claims under
FEHA.”). Under this framework, a plaintiff alleging that an
employer engaged in discriminatory conduct adversely
affecting plaintiff’s employment must establish a prima
facie case by demonstrating that: “(1) he is a member of a
protected class; (2) he was qualified for his position; (3) he
experienced an adverse employment action; and (4)
similarly situated individuals outside his protected class
were treated more favorably, or other circumstances
surrounding the adverse employment action give rise to an
inference of discrimination.” Fonseca v. Sysco Food Servs.
of Ariz., Inc., 374 F.3d 840, 847 (9th Cir. 2004). A plaintiff
may demonstrate an inference of discrimination “through
comparison to similarly situated individuals, or any other
circumstances surrounding the adverse employment action
[that] give rise to an inference of discrimination.” Hawn v.
Exec. Jet Mgmt., Inc., 615 F.3d 1151, 1156 (9th Cir. 2010)
(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Similarly, California courts applying this test in the FEHA
context have characterized the fourth element as a showing
that “some other circumstance suggests discriminatory
motive.” Guz v. Bechtel Nat’l Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 317, 355
(2000).
   Should the plaintiff set forth a prima facie case, the
burden shifts to the defendant to articulate “a legitimate,
                  HITTLE V. CITY OF STOCKTON                  21

nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged actions.” Freyd
v. Univ. of Or., 990 F.3d 1211, 1228 (9th Cir. 2021). If the
defendant does so, the burden “returns to the plaintiff, who
must show that the proffered nondiscriminatory reason is
pretextual.” Id. A plaintiff meets his or her burden “either
directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason
more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing
that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of
credence.” Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450
U.S. 248, 256 (1981).
     Alternatively, a plaintiff can prevail merely by showing
direct or circumstantial evidence of discrimination; he or she
does not need to use the McDonell Douglas framework. See
McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1122 (9th Cir.
2004) (holding that a plaintiff “may proceed by using the
McDonnell Douglas framework, or alternatively, may
simply produce direct or circumstantial evidence
demonstrating that a discriminatory reason more likely than
not motivated” the employer). Under Title VII, the plaintiff
need only “demonstrate[] that race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin was a motivating factor for any employment
practice, even though other factors also motivated the
[unlawful employment] practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)
(emphasis added). Thus, Hittle must demonstrate that his
religion was “a motivating factor” in Defendants’ decision
to fire him with respect to his federal claims, see id., and that
his religion was “a substantial motivating factor” for his
firing with respect to his FEHA claims, Harris v. City of
Santa Monica, 56 Cal. 4th 203, 232 (2013).
                               1
    On summary judgment, direct evidence of
discrimination is that which, “if believed, proves the fact [of
22                HITTLE V. CITY OF STOCKTON

discriminatory animus] without inference or presumption.”
Coghlan v. Am. Seafoods Co., 413 F.3d 1090, 1095 (9th Cir.
2005). We have concluded that derogatory comments made
by        a    decisionmaker     are    “direct     evidence
of . . . discriminatory animus” and “can create an inference
of discriminatory motive.” Cordova v. State Farm Ins. Cos.,
124 F.3d 1145, 1149 (9th Cir. 1997). Chief among Hittle’s
examples of direct evidence of discriminatory animus is
Montes’s reference to Hittle being part of a “Christian
coalition,” and Montes’s and Deis’s statements that Hittle
was part of a “church clique” in the Fire Department.
Montes responds to this characterization by noting that a
high-ranking Fire Department manager had complained to
her that there was a “Christian coalition” within the Fire
Department, and that Hittle improperly favored members of
that so-called coalition. Hittle acknowledged that the term
“Christian coalition” came from the anonymous letters sent
to the City criticizing Hittle’s management of the Fire
Department, and not from Montes herself.
    Montes’s comments—whether taken in the context of
one conversation with Hittle or during Hittle’s tenure as Fire
Chief as a whole—do not constitute discriminatory animus.
As previously observed, Hittle and Montes are in apparent
agreement that Montes did not initiate the “Christian
coalition” term herself, and that it originated from other
members of the Fire Department who expressed unhappiness
over Hittle allegedly engaging in favoritism. Cf. Vasquez v.
County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 640 (9th Cir. 2003),
as amended (Jan. 2, 2004) (finding no direct evidence of
animus where discriminatory remarks were attributed to a
non-decisionmaker employee). Montes’s repetition of other
persons’ use of pejorative terms does not provide evidence
of Montes’s own animus, but rather shows concerns about
                  HITTLE V. CITY OF STOCKTON               23

other persons’ perceptions. See id.; cf. Godwin v. Hunt
Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d 1217, 1221 (9th Cir. 1998), as
amended (Aug. 11, 1998) (discussing that there is no direct
evidence of animus if a remark would require an inference
or presumption in an employee’s favor). And although
Hittle suggests that Montes engaged in discrimination by
informing him that the City was not “permitted to further
religious activities” or “favor one religion over another,”
these observations do not constitute direct evidence of
discrimination. Rather, they reflect Montes’s legitimate
concern that the City could violate constitutional
prohibitions and face liability if it is seen to engage in
favoritism with certain employees because they happen to be
members of a particular religion. See Noyes v. Kelly Servs.,
488 F.3d 1163, 1172 (9th Cir. 2007) (concluding that a fact
finder could reasonably determine that an employer engaged
in discrimination by promoting employees because they
were members of a certain religion). In short, because
Montes and Deis did not use derogatory terms to express
their own views, or focus on the religious aspect of Hittle’s
misconduct to express their own animus, but rather
referenced other legitimate constitutional and business
concerns, their terminology does not give rise to a genuine
issue of discriminatory animus. See Davis v. Chevron
U.S.A., Inc., 14 F.3d 1082, 1085–86 (5th Cir. 1994) (per
curiam) (indicating that where remarks had an innocent
explanation, they were not evidence of gender
discrimination).
    Hittle also claims that the Removal Notice issued by the
City demonstrates direct evidence of discrimination because
of its repeated references to Hittle’s attendance at a
“religious event” (i.e., the Summit) and his approval of other
Fire Department employees to attend. But this does not
24                HITTLE V. CITY OF STOCKTON

suggest discrimination, because the undisputed record shows
that the Removal Notice relied on the findings in the Largent
Report, which concluded that Hittle engaged in misconduct
by attending a two-day event that did not benefit the City
because it was not the sort of leadership conference aimed at
public sector leadership, all while on paid City time, and
approving three others to do likewise. In other words, the
references to Hittle’s misconduct by attending the Summit
are due to a legitimate non-discriminatory reason—lack of
benefit to the City—rather than to religious animus. It is
undisputed that the Summit, even if a “pop-up business
school,” did not constitute the type of upper management
public sector leadership training that Montes directed Hittle
to seek out, as it did not provide any focus on the
management of public agencies. Montes and Deis could
conclude (whether correctly or incorrectly) that the skills
that the Summit sought to impart were not of any value or
relevance to the three other firefighters whom Hittle invited
to attend the event with him, all of whom also participated
while on City time. Such a view is supported by the
registration materials for the Summit, stating that the
purpose of the leadership summit was to benefit the local
church. An employer’s conclusion that an activity does not
benefit the employer is not discriminatory even if the activity
has some relationship to a protected characteristic, such as
religion or race. See Davis, 14 F.3d at 1085–86. “We cannot
infer [religious] discrimination based on factual allegations
that are ‘just as much in line with’ the non-discriminatory
explanation we have identified.” Frith v. Whole Foods Mkt.,
Inc., 38 F.4th 263, 276 (1st Cir. 2022) (citation omitted).
Where there are “obvious alternative explanations for the
purportedly unlawful conduct and the purposeful invidious
discrimination plaintiff asks us to infer, discrimination is not
                     HITTLE V. CITY OF STOCKTON                       25

a plausible conclusion.” Id. (cleaned up) (citation and
internal quotations omitted).
    Because the employer could discipline Hittle for
attending an event of no benefit to the City (the “obvious
alternative explanation” for identifying the Summit as
problematic), the employer’s discipline of two of the other
Fire Department employees who attended the Summit with
Hittle—both of whom were also Christian—by “forfeit[ing]
two days of vacation to reimburse the City for the time spent
attending the leadership conference,” is also not
discriminatory on the basis of religion. 1 More important,
Hittle did not point to similarly situated people who attended
events of no benefit to the City who were not disciplined,
and so did not establish that part of his prima facie case.
    Finally, Hittle contends that Deis’s declaration in
support of Defendants’ motion for summary judgment
contains statements that are proof of Deis’s animus towards
Hittle’s religion. Deis describes Hittle’s attendance at the
Summit as exercising “poor judgment,” and that Hittle
engaged in an “inappropriate activity” that was simply “for
[Hittle’s] own personal interests.” But, as discussed above,
Deis, like Montes, had legitimate, non-discriminatory
reasons to be critical of Hittle inappropriately using City
resources to attend an event for his personal benefit, and
inviting other City personnel to do the same. 2

1
 Paul Willette, the third member of the Fire Department to attend the
Summit with Hittle, retired prior to the issuance of the Largent Report.
2
  Nor does Hittle provide evidence of discrimination—direct or
otherwise—by describing a subjective and self-serving “long pause” and
Deis’s “blank stare” during their first meeting after Hittle mentioned to
26                   HITTLE V. CITY OF STOCKTON

    Nothing in our case law compels a different result. Hittle
cites to Dominguez-Curry v. Nev. Transp. Dep’t, 424 F.3d
1027, 1039 (9th Cir. 2005), Chuang v. Univ. of Cal. Davis,
Bd. of Trs., 225 F.3d 1115, 1128 (9th Cir. 2000), and
Cordova, 124 F.3d at 1149, in arguing that, in this Circuit,
“a single discriminatory comment is sufficient to preclude
summary judgment for the employer.” The decisionmakers
in those cases made “clearly sexist, racist, or similarly
discriminatory statements or actions by the employer”
related to protected characteristics of the employee.
Coghlan, 413 F.3d at 1095. In Dominguez-Curry, plaintiff
was told by a decisionmaker that “women have no business
in construction,” and that “women should only be in
subservient positions,” 424 F.3d at 1031; in Chuang, a
decisionmaker remarked at a meeting that “‘two Chinks’ in
the department were more than enough,” 225 F.3d at 1121;
and in Cordova, the decisionmaker referred to a non-plaintiff
employee as a “dumb Mexican.” 124 F.3d at 1147. None of
these cases are comparable to this case, where the
decisionmaker was making what could only be described as
reasonable inquiries based on allegations of misconduct that
she had concededly received from others in language
comparable to what they used. We are not prepared to hold
that such an inquiry constitutes evidence of direct
discrimination specifically or discrimination generally.
   Even if the quoted remarks are perceived as pejorative
by Hittle, our precedent does not dictate a contrary result.
The statements by Montes and Deis are more akin to “stray

Deis that he was a Christian. See, e.g., Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden,
532 U.S. 268, 271 (2001) (per curiam) (“[I]solated incidents (unless
extremely serious) will not amount to discriminat[ion].” (citation
omitted)).
                  HITTLE V. CITY OF STOCKTON               27

remarks that have been held insufficient to establish
discrimination.” Cordova, 124 F.3d at 1149. And this
evidence falls within the ambit of circumstantial evidence
that requires an additional logical leap that is not supported
by the record here. See Coghlan, 413 F.3d at 1095-96
(discussing the difference between direct and circumstantial
evidence, with circumstantial evidence requiring “specific
and substantial” evidence to defeat summary judgment).
Therefore, discriminatory remarks made by a decisionmaker
must be “clearly sexist, racist, or similarly discriminatory”
to create an inference of discriminatory motive. Here, the
decisionmaker was merely conducting an inquiry based on
complaints by third parties and the “obvious alternative
explanation,” Frith, 38 F.4th at 276, for using those
pejorative terms was that the decisionmaker was quoting the
third parties.
    Finally, because neither Montes nor Deis made any
remarks demonstrating their own hostility to religion, but
focused on the Summit’s lack of benefit to the City and other
evidence of Hittle’s misconduct, Hittle failed to demonstrate
that hostility to religion was even a motivating factor in his
termination.
                              2
    On summary judgment, circumstantial evidence of
discrimination “must be ‘specific’ and ‘substantial.’”
France v. Johnson, 795 F.3d 1170, 1175 (9th Cir. 2015)
(citation omitted), as amended on reh’g (Oct. 14, 2015).
Hittle merely offers conclusory and unsupported examples
of circumstantial evidence of religious animus by
Defendants.
    Hittle alleges that on the day he received the notice of
investigation from the City, he met with Deis, who angrily
28                 HITTLE V. CITY OF STOCKTON

threatened Hittle to accept a demotion or face a long,
expensive legal battle in which Hittle’s reputation would
suffer irreparable harm. Viewing Hittle’s account of this
meeting in the light most favorable to him still does not
suggest any reasonable inference of religious animus,
because there is no evidence in the record that Hittle’s
religion was discussed during this meeting.
     Nor does the timing of Hittle being placed on
administrative leave raise a showing of religious animus. As
noted above, Hittle was placed on leave on March 30, 2011,
shortly after the City retained Largent to conduct the
investigation. Hittle claims that this decision was a result of
an article published in a local newspaper on March 25, 2011,
stating that Hittle had attended the Summit and noting its
religious nature. But at the time Hittle was placed on leave,
he had already been on notice for almost five months that he
was under investigation for actions relating to attending the
Summit and other misconduct. During this time, the record
is replete with evidence that, despite knowledge of the City’s
impending investigation, Hittle continued to engage in
conduct that was of serious concern to the City, including
defending Union President Macedo’s leak of confidential
HIPAA data, refusing to discipline Duaime for improper
overtime practices, and refusing to prepare a layoff plan or
recommend staffing cuts for the Fire Department during the
City’s fiscal crisis, in spite of directives from Deis and
Montes to do so—the latter two issues both memorialized in
memoranda prepared by Hittle and sent to Montes on March
14, and 16, respectively. In short, Hittle fails to raise specific
or substantial facts regarding the timing of his being placed
on administrative leave that reasonably link that event to the
article noting Hittle’s attendance at the Summit, let alone
evidence of religious discrimination by Defendants.
                  HITTLE V. CITY OF STOCKTON                 29

    Hittle also contends that certain findings in the Largent
Report present evidence of pretext because the investigation
deemed as “not sustained” certain instances of Hittle’s
misconduct alleged by the City. But the fact that the Largent
Report sustained the findings relating to misconduct in
attending the Summit but did not sustain the City’s
allegations as to a few of the investigation’s numerous issues
does not show that the other allegations were pretexts and
the real reason was hostility to religion. Moreover, the
Largent Report itself explains that issues deemed “not
sustained” indicates that the “investigation disclose[d] that
there was insufficient evidence to sustain the complaint or
fully exonerate the employee” (emphasis added), as opposed
to concluding that the issue was “unfounded” (meaning that
the “investigation disclose[d] that the alleged act(s) did not
occur or did not involve department personnel”), or
“exonerat[ing]” Hittle on the issue (meaning that the
“investigation disclose[d] that the alleged act occurred, but
that the act was justified, lawful, and/or proper”). More
significantly, Largent Report sustained what it characterized
as the “most serious acts of misconduct” committed by
Hittle, namely Hittle’s inappropriate use of City time and a
City vehicle to attend the Summit (which it characterized as
a religious event) and Hittle’s failure to disclose his personal
relationships and corresponding financial interests with
respect to George Liepart and Union President Macedo.
    Simply put, the summary judgment record does not
contain evidence to raise genuine issues of material fact
sufficient for Hittle to meet his burden to demonstrate that
Defendants’ legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for firing
him were mere pretext for religious discrimination. Even
though the gravamen of Largent’s Report and the notice
terminating Hittle was the religious nature of the leadership
30                HITTLE V. CITY OF STOCKTON

event, a nexus to a protected characteristic is not enough to
preclude summary judgment for the employer. There is no
genuine issue of material fact that Montes and Deis were
motivated by religious hostility, as opposed to concern about
the perception of others. And the facts that Hittle identifies
as circumstantial evidence of discriminatory pretext are
neither specific nor substantial enough to support a finding
of unlawful employment discrimination.
                               3
    As Defendants observe, in addition to Hittle’s improper
attendance at the Summit as one justification for removing
him from City service, the City “articulated an
overwhelming number of [other] non-discriminatory reasons
for terminating Hittle’s employment, which were
independently verified by an outside investigator.”
    Hittle’s post hoc effort to cast the findings of misconduct
in the Largent Report as mere pretext for discriminatory
termination is unsupported by the record. For example,
Hittle claims that he had discussed his co-ownership of the
vacation cabin with a City attorney, who advised him that he
did not need to disclose it to the City. But the record is clear
that Hittle did not inform Largent about this conversation
during her investigation, and in his interview with Largent,
nor did he do so when he and his attorney were given the
opportunity at his pre-termination meeting on September 28,
2011. Hittle stated that he did not disclose to the City that
he was a co-owner of the cabin, together with three other Fire
Department officials, because he did not see a conflict of
interest.
    Nor does Hittle persuasively argue that the City’s
identification of his improper endorsement of Liepart’s
consulting business was pretextual. Hittle claims that the
                  HITTLE V. CITY OF STOCKTON                  31

City did not have a specific policy prohibiting such an
endorsement, but Hittle told Largent in an interview that he
understood it was City practice for its officials to not endorse
private businesses. And, as Defendants observe in their
brief, an employer does not need to identify a specific policy
violation to fire an at-will employee. See Guz, 24 Cal. 4th at
351–53.
     Hittle is no more successful in providing summary
criticism of the allegations that he did not cooperate with the
City during its financial crisis, promoted union interests at
the expense of City welfare, and failed to discipline
firefighters for misconduct. And, even viewing these facts
in the light most favorable to Hittle, it is not sufficient for a
plaintiff on summary judgment to merely “show the
employer’s [termination] decision was wrong, mistaken, or
unwise.” Dep’t of Fair Emp. & Hous. v. Lucent Techs., Inc.,
642 F.3d 728, 746 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Morgan v.
Regents of Univ. of Cal., 88 Cal. App. 4th 52, 75 (2000)).
    Similarly, Hittle’s challenging various findings in the
Largent Report as “unfounded” (or downplaying their
seriousness) is insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as
to pretext. In this respect, Hittle is simply offering his own
subjective viewpoint as to his ability to effectively manage
the Fire Department, but “an employee’s subjective personal
judgments of [his] competence alone do not raise a genuine
issue of material fact.” Bradley v. Harcourt, Brace & Co.,
104 F.3d 267, 270 (9th Cir. 1996); accord Buhl v. Abbott
Labs., 817 F. App’x 408, 410–11 (9th Cir. 2020)
(memorandum disposition) (noting that “technical
disagreements” with a manager and plaintiff’s “own
subjective belief that [his employer’s] concerns about his
performance were overblown are insufficient to raise a
genuine issue of fact”).
32                HITTLE V. CITY OF STOCKTON

                              4
    Because Hittle has not met his burden to overcome
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on his
affirmative discrimination claim, Hittle’s claim for the
City’s failure to prevent discrimination in violation of Cal.
Gov’t Code § 12940(k) likewise fails. There is no stated
claim for failure to prevent discrimination if no
discrimination occurred. See Trujillo v. N. Cty. Transit Dist.,
63 Cal. App. 4th 280, 288–89 (1998) (holding that the
statutory language of § 12940 does not “support[] recovery
on . . . a private right of action where there has been a
specific factual finding that [the alleged] discrimination or
harassment actually occurred at the plaintiffs’s workplace”).
                      CONCLUSION
    To summarize, we hold that, based on the record before
us, the district court’s granting of summary judgment in
Defendants’ favor was appropriate where Defendants’
legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for firing Hittle were,
in sum, sufficient to rebut Hittle’s evidence of
discrimination, and Hittle has failed to persuasively argue
that these non-discriminatory reasons were pretextual.
When discriminatory remarks are merely quoting third
parties and the real issue is public perception or other forms
of misconduct (such as engaging in an activity that does not
benefit the employer), there is no genuine issue of material
fact that the employer was discriminatory. For the foregoing
reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.