Court Opinion

ID: 9746057
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 13:54:52.453236+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:26:20.400685
License: Public Domain

KING, J., Concurring and Dissenting.
I agree with the majority in affirming defendant’s convictions. I further agree that if in fact the trial court erred in allowing defendant to testify over his attorney’s objection, the error would be harmless. I disagree in the first instance, however, that the trial court erred in allowing defendant to testify.
Based primarily on the reasoning in People v. Allen (2008) 44 Cal.4th 843 [80 Cal.Rptr.3d 183, 187 P.3d 1018] (Allen), I would hold that defendant has a right under the due process clauses of the federal and state Constitutions to testify over the objection of his counsel.
As with the majority, I find no case directly on point. While in People v. Harris (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 984 [18 Cal.Rptr.2d 92], the court did indicate *1088that a defendant should be allowed to testify in a competency proceeding over the objection of his attorney, the issue itself was not squarely before the court. In People v. Bolden (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 375 [160 Cal.Rptr. 268], where the defendant did testify over the objection of his attorney, the issue on appeal was whether his counsel was inadequate in pursuing a finding of incompetency over the objection of the defendant himself; the court found that counsel was not. Moreover, the primary case relied upon by the majority, People v. Masterson (1994) 8 Cal.4th 965 [35 Cal.Rptr.2d 679, 884 P.2d 136], is not on point and is clearly distinguishable; it deals with counsel’s ability to waive a jury composed of 12 persons over the objection of the defendant.
The majority, in concluding the court erred in allowing defendant to testify over the objection of counsel, frames its position around the following quote from People v. Masterson, supra, 8 Cal.4th 965: “The sole purpose of a competency proceeding is to determine the defendant’s present mental competence, i.e., whether the defendant is able to understand the nature of the criminal proceedings and to assist counsel in a rational manner. [Citations.] Because of this, the defendant necessarily plays a lesser personal role in the proceeding than in a trial of guilt. How can a person whose competence is in doubt make basic decisions regarding the conduct of a proceeding to determine that very question?” (Id. at p. 971, italics added.)
Within the context of the “conduct of the proceeding,” i.e., whether to have a jury trial, the above may be true. (See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania (1971) 403 U.S. 528, 543-544 [29 L.Ed.2d 647, 91 S.Ct. 1976] [a jury is not a necessary component of accurate factfinding]; People v. Samuel (1981) 29 Cal.3d 489, 505 [174 Cal.Rptr. 684, 629 P.2d 485] [“the right to a jury in [Penal Code] section 1368 hearings is a creature of statute . . .”]; People v. Montoya (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 825, 832 [103 Cal.Rptr.2d 579] [Fourth Dist., Div. Two] [defendant’s statutory right to a jury trial in a mentally disordered offender proceeding is a matter of “ ‘state procedural law’ ”].)
Such reasoning, however, does not apply to an individual’s right to testify where a liberty interest is at stake. In addressing a finding of incompetency and the granting of letters of guardianship of the appellant’s person and estate, the court in Guardianship of Waite (1939) 14 Cal.2d 727 [97 P.2d 238] stated: “[I]t is the general rule that the right of a party to testify in his own behalf is fundamental. [Citations.] [][] It is difficult to conceive of a situation in which a party has a greater right to, or need for, his own testimony than in the type of proceeding considered here. The right to control her own person and ¿fairs was taken from appellant upon the testimony of two strangers whose conclusions were based upon acts and circumstances she was not permitted to explain or controvert, and she was denied the opportunity to show by testimony her capacity for rational thought and intelligent action.” (Id. at p. 730.)
*1089And in discussing the inapplicability of a defendant’s right against self-incrimination in a civil commitment proceeding, the court in Cramer v. Tyars (1979) 23 Cal.3d 131 [151 Cal.Rptr. 653, 588 P.2d 793] stated: “Reason and common sense suggest that it is appropriate under such circumstances that a jury be permitted fully to observe the person sought to be committed, and to hear him speak and respond in order that it may make an informed judgment as to the level of his mental and intellectual functioning. The receipt of such evidence . . . may in fact be the most reliable proof and probative indicator of the person’s present mental condition.” (Id. at p. 139; see also People v. Pretzer (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1078, 1084 [11 Cal.Rptr.2d 860], disapproved on another point in People v. Anzalone (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1074, 1083 [81 Cal.Rptr.2d 315, 969 P.2d 160].) The same rationale is applicable here.
The Penal Code section 13681 proceeding is to adjudge a defendant’s immediate and present ability to understand the nature of the criminal proceedings and his or her ability to assist counsel. (§ 1367, subd. (a).) There is no person having a greater stake in the adjudication of his or her mental competence to stand trial than the defendant. The defendant is entitled to be heard. Presentation of the defendant and his or her testimony as to his or her understanding of the criminal proceedings is highly probative in the trier of fact’s assessment of present competency. The trier of fact is able to not only observe the defendant, but to also evaluate his or her credibility. (See People v. Lewis (2008) 43 Cal.4th 415, 524 [75 Cal.Rptr.3d 588, 181 P.3d 947] [“ ‘Evidence of incompetence may emanate from several sources, including the defendant’s demeanor . . . .’”].)
For example, in viewing the present record, defendant was able to tell “his side of the story.” His direct testimony consumes 17 pages of transcript; it is relatively rambling and does not directly touch upon the issue of his competency to stand trial. The prosecutor’s cross-examination spans seven pages of the reporter’s transcript. Defendant’s answers were, for the most part, responsive and, at least from our record, appear to support the trier of fact’s conclusion that defendant was competent to stand trial. While defendant’s testimony in this case would appear to support a conclusion of competency, it is equally possible that testimony from a defendant in a different case would support a contrary conclusion. I see no reason in logic or the law why a defendant should be precluded from providing such testimony.2 If a defendant’s testimony would lead the trier of fact to a determination that he or she is competent, then it would be a violation of the defendant’s due process rights to preclude him or her from testifying and thereby commit him or her to a mental health facility. Likewise, if a trier of *1090fact came to an opposite conclusion after hearing the defendant’s testimony, it would be a violation of his or her due process rights to subject him or her to criminal charges.
The majority’s approach to the present issue appears not only paternalistic but also does not strike the proper balance between the rights of defendant and the preservation of the integrity of the process.
“[Ijnvoluntary commitment is incarceration against one’s will regardless of whether it is called ‘civil’ or ‘criminal’ [citation] . . . .” (People v. Thomas (1977) 19 Cal.3d 630, 638 [139 Cal.Rptr. 594, 566 P.2d 228].) A “civil commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection.” (Addington v. Texas (1979) 441 U.S. 418, 425 [60 L.Ed.2d 323, 99 S.Ct. 1804].) In Allen, our Supreme Court held that a defendant in a sexually violent predator proceeding has the due process right to testify over the expressed objection of his counsel. The court’s analysis and conclusion are equally applicable to a civil commitment under section 1368.
In reaching its conclusion, the court in Allen discussed four relevant factors in evaluating whether a defendant has a due process right to testify; “ ‘(1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; (3) the government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail; and (4) the dignitary interest in informing individuals of the nature, grounds, and consequences of the action and in enabling them to present their side of the story before a responsible government official. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Allen, supra, 44 Cal.4th at pp. 862-863, fn. omitted; see In re Malinda S. (1990) 51 Cal.3d 368, 383 [272 Cal.Rptr. 787, 795 P.2d 1244]; People v. Otto (2001) 26 Cal.4th 200, 210 [109 Cal.Rptr.2d 327, 26 P.3d 1061].)
Here, as in Allen, the private interest affected in defendant’s being found incompetent to stand trial is the deprivation of liberty, the stigmatization of being found mentally incompetent, and the subjection to unwanted treatment.
As to the deprivation of liberty, the majority distinguishes Allen by indicating that the deprivation does not rise to the same level of restriction as exists for an individual committed as a sexually violent predator. For support, the majority relies on People v. Bye (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 569 [172 Cal.Rptr. 186], which dealt with a Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5000 et seq.) conservatorship. While in some instances this may be true, it *1091does not, however, diminish the deprivation of liberty involved in being found incompetent to stand trial and being placed in a state hospital. If an individual is committed as being incompetent to stand trial, an initial report relative to the defendant’s competence is not due to the court until 90 days following the initial commitment order. (Pen. Code, § 1370, subd. (b)(1).) Thereafter, and at six-month intervals, reports as to the defendant’s restoration of sanity are filed with the court. (Ibid.) Thus, even in the best of cases, placement in a mental facility will last for at least three months. And, as provided by Penal Code section 1370, subdivision (c)(1), the commitment may be extended for up to three years.3 After three years, a defendant who has not been restored to sanity is subject to having his commitment extended pursuant to Penal Code section 1370, subdivision (c)(2) and Welfare and Institutions Code section 5008, subdivision (h)(1)(A), (B), and (2), or 6500. A deprivation of a defendant’s liberty interest is patently present when there is a finding of incompetence to stand trial.4
Equally present is the stigmatization of being confined to a mental hospital as a result of incompetency (see People v. Burnick (1975) 14 Cal.3d 306, 321 [121 Cal.Rptr. 488, 535 P.2d 352]; Conservatorship of Roulet (1979) 23 Cal.3d 219, 229 [152 Cal.Rptr. 425, 590 P.2d 1]), and the receiving of unwanted treatment, including psychotropic medication (see § 1370, subd. (a)(2)(B)(iii)).
The three remaining factors involved in the due process analysis also gravitate in favor of a defendant’s due process right to testify over the objection of his counsel. In the absence of a defendant’s testimony, the evidence relative to competency comes from one or more experts who have presumably examined the defendant. While not naysaying the relevance of such testimony, it is evident that opinion testimony can vary significantly and that diagnosis of a mental disorder can be very subjective, thereby leading to an erroneous conclusion and resultant deprivation of a defendant’s liberty interest. (In re Roger S. (1977) 19 Cal.3d 921, 929 [141 Cal.Rptr. 298, 569 P.2d 1286] [“we note again the uncertainties in psychiatric diagnosis and the divergence of expert views [citation] which render the possibility of mistake significantly greater than in diagnosis of physical illness”].) And, while a defendant’s testimony is not necessarily the cure-all, it nonetheless is highly *1092probative and there exists no reason why a defendant should not be entitled to testify relative to his or her mental competence.
And lastly, the government’s interest and the dignitary interest in allowing a defendant to tell his or her side of the story is furthered by providing the opportunity to the defendant to testify. Initially, it must be noted that both the government and the defendant have an interest in not subjecting an incompetent person to criminal proceedings. “ ‘Competence to stand trial is rudimentary, for upon it depends the main part of those rights deemed essential to a fair trial, including the right to effective assistance of counsel, the rights to summon, to confront, and to cross-examine witnesses, and the right to testify on one’s own behalf or to remain silent without penalty for doing so. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Cooper v. Oklahoma (1996) 517 U.S. 348, 354 [134 L.Ed.2d 498, 116 S.Ct. 1373].) On the flip side, a competent defendant has an equal stake in each of the above rights and must be afforded the opportunity to defend himself or herself against the charges in a timely fashion. Allowing a defendant the opportunity to weigh in on the determination of his or her competency is not only in his or her best interest, for it is his or her liberty that is at stake, but it is also in the government’s interest relative to providing all relevant evidence to the trier of fact.
Given the significance of the individual and governmental interests involved, placing the entire decision as to whether a defendant testifies in the hands of defense counsel is inappropriate. Certainly, counsel is in a good position to formulate an opinion as to a defendant’s competency. His opinion, however, is not the end-all; counsel is neither trained in psychology nor psychiatry. As well, counsel may be hard pressed to attribute a defendant’s actions and comments to incompetency as opposed to an unwillingness of a defendant to cooperate, or some other source. As an officer of the court, counsel who believes a defendant is incompetent may still assert the defendant’s incompetence over the objection of the defendant. (See People v. Bolden, supra, 99 Cal.App.3d at pp. 379-380; People v. Harris, supra, 14 Cal.App.4th at pp. 993-995.) Counsel’s ability to do so is in no way affected by affording a defendant the right to testify against the wishes of his attorney.
Lastly, it is clear that the prosecutor may call the defendant to testify as an adverse witness. And while testimony as to one’s present mental condition is not deemed to be self-incriminating, due process nonetheless dictates that if the prosecutor may elicit testimony from the defendant, the defendant must be able to testify on his behalf, over the dictates of his or her counsel. The probative value of the defendant’s testimony relative to the issue of competence cannot be questioned when the law allows the prosecutor to elicit testimony from the defendant.
*1093For the foregoing reasons, I believe defendant has a right to testify over the objection of his counsel, under the due process clauses of the federal and state Constitutions. I find no error.

 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.

 This assumes of course that the defendant is competent to testify. (Evid. Code, § 700 et seq.)

 The Allen decision is based on prior sexually violent predator law where the commitment was for two years, as opposed to the present law, wherein the commitment is indeterminate.

 The majority also attempts to distinguish Allen by stating: “[Sexually Violent Predator Act] proceedings, however, are unlike competency determinations. The main concern in a competency proceeding is protection of the accused from being tried in a criminal proceeding while he or she is incompetent, while a[] [Sexually Violent Predator Act] proceeding is initiated in order to protect society from sexually violent predators.” (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 1084—1085.) I fail to see this as a meaningful difference when discussing a defendant’s right to testify.