Court Opinion

ID: 9396536
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-22 21:04:19.327146+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:17.704197
License: Public Domain

Filed 5/22/23 P. v. Rogers CA2/1
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION ONE

 THE PEOPLE,                                                       B321234

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                               (Los Angeles County
                                                                   Super. Ct. No. A383323)

           v.

 MORRIS ROGERS,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Henry J. Hall, Judge. Affirmed.
      Vanessa Place, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Stephanie A. Miyoshi and Kathy S.
Pomerantz, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
       Morris Rogers appeals from an order resentencing him
following a successful petition under Penal Code section 1172.6,1
to the extent the order imposed a term of parole following his
release from prison. Section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(1) provides
that after a resentencing court has vacated a conviction for
murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter under that section,
the court shall “recall the sentence and resentence the petitioner
on any remaining counts in the same manner as if the petitioner
had not previously been sentenced, provided that the new
sentence, if any, is not greater than the initial sentence.”
Section 1172.6, subdivision (h) further mandates that “[a] person
who is resentenced pursuant to this section shall be given credit
for time served. The judge may order the petitioner to be subject
to parole supervision for up to two years following the completion
of the sentence.”
       Here, the resentencing court vacated Rogers’s murder
conviction and resentenced him to a total of five years on the
remaining counts of conviction, credited him with over 39 years
of custody confinement, and placed him on parole for two years.
Rogers argues that section 1172.6 does not authorize placing
him on supervised parole for any amount of time after his release
from custody, because “if [he] had been resentenced ‘as if [he] had

      1Subsequent unspecified statutory references are to
the Penal Code.
      Rogers filed his petition for resentencing under
the predecessor to section 1172.6, which was codified as
section 1170.95. Effective June 30, 2022, the Legislature
renumbered section 1170.95 as section 1172.6 (Stats. 2022,
ch. 58, § 10) without changing the statute’s content. We
hereafter cite to section 1172.6 for ease of reference.

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not previously been sentenced,’ his entire time in custody—
approximately 40 years—should have counted as presentence
custody offsetting any period of parole.”
       Rogers acknowledges that two Court of Appeal decisions,
People v. Lamoureux (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 136 (Lamoureux)
and People v. Wilson (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 42 (Wilson) have
rejected the idea that a court must apply excess custody credits
to a period of parole imposed during resentencing under
section 1172.6. He argues, however, that these decisions
“[did] not consider the mandatory language of [section 1172.6,]
subdivision (d)(1)”—that a petitioner be resentenced “ ‘as if . . .
not previously . . . sentenced’ ”—“focusing instead on the
permissive language of [section 1172.6,] subdivision (h).”
(Capitalization omitted.)
       Because these decisions do not discuss the “as if . . .
not previously . . . sentenced” language of section 1172.6,
subdivision (d)(1), they do not necessarily speak to whether
that language requires a court to apply custody credits to a
period of parole imposed under section 1172.6. (See Styne v.
Stevens (2001) 26 Cal.4th 42, 57–58 & fn. 8.) Nevertheless, as
we explain below, at least some of the reasoning in Wilson and
Lamoureux applies equally to, and refutes, Rogers’s argument
based on the language of section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(1).
Accordingly, like the courts in Wilson and Lamoureux, we
interpret section 1172.6 as permitting the court to impose a
period of parole of up to two years, regardless of the excess
custody credits the petitioner may have earned.
       Both Wilson and Lamoureux use as a starting point for
their respective analyses People v. Morales (2016) 63 Cal.4th
399 (Morales). There, the Supreme Court considered whether

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excess custody credits automatically apply to reduce or eliminate
a person’s parole period when a person is resentenced under
section 1170.18, a statute put into effect via Proposition 47
(Prop. 47, as approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 4, 2014)) (the
Proposition 47 statute). (See Lamoureux, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th
at p. 142; Wilson, supra, 53 Cal.App.5th at pp. 48–50.) The
Proposition 47 statute contains some language regarding custody
credits similar to what appears in section 1172.6, subdivision (h),
namely: “A person who is resentenced [under the Proposition 47
statute] . . . shall be given credit for time served and shall be
subject to parole for one year following completion of his or
her sentence, unless the court, in its discretion, as part of its
resentencing order, releases the person from parole.” (§ 1170.18,
subd. (d).)
       In Morales, the Supreme Court found significant that the
Proposition 47 statute “[does] not state . . . that credit for time
served could reduce the period of parole” (italics omitted), unlike
“the statute concerning presentence credit in ordinary cases”
(Morales, supra, at p. 406), section 2900.5, which provides both
that “all days of custody of the defendant . . . shall be credited
upon his or her term of imprisonment” (§ 2900.5, subd. (a)),
and that “ ‘term of imprisonment’ includes . . . any period of
imprisonment and parole.” (§ 2900.5, subd. (c).) The Morales
court noted that the Proposition 47 statute states “the first part
but not the second.” (Morales, supra, at p. 406.) On this and
other bases, including a survey of the ballot materials regarding
Proposition 47, analysis of other language in the Proposition 47
statute, and policy concerns, the Supreme Court concluded the
Proposition 47 statute does not require excess custody credits
to be applied to a period of parole a court imposes when

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resentencing a defendant under that statute. (See Morales,
supra, at pp. 406-409.)
       In Wilson, the First Appellate District concluded that
the reasoning in Morales applied to the issue of whether
excess custody credits must be applied to a period of parole
imposed under section 1172.6, subdivision (h).2 (Wilson,
supra, 53 Cal.App.5th at p. 50.) Wilson noted specifically that
section 1172.6, subdivision (h), like the Proposition 47 statute,
uses the language “credit for time served” but “does not state—
as section 2900.5 states—that the credit may be used to reduce
or eliminate any parole period the court may impose.” (Wilson,
supra, at p. 50.) The Wilson court concluded that, just as the
“the words ‘credit for time served’ in the Proposition 47 statute
do not mandate the use of excess credit to reduce or eliminate
the parole period” under Morales, the words “credit for time
served” contained in section 1172.6, subdivision (h) do not,
standing alone, mandate an excess credit offset against a
person’s parole supervision period. (Wilson, supra, at p. 50.)
On this and other bases, the Wilson court concluded that,
under section 1172.6, subdivision (h), a “court is not required to
mechanically apply excess custody credits to reduce or eliminate
the parole period imposed at a resentencing pursuant to
section [1172.6]. Instead, and notwithstanding excess custody
credits, the court may exercise its discretion when deciding
whether to order a period of parole.” (Wilson, supra, at p. 46.)
       In Lamoureux, the Fourth Appellate District “agree[d]
with, and adopt[ed], the Wilson court’s reasoning.” (Lamoureux,
supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 145.) Lamoureux further “bolster[ed]”

      2 See footnote 1, ante, regarding our use of the renumbered
section 1172.6 to refer to its predecessor, section 1170.95.

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its holding in accord with Wilson by noting that “ ‘[w]hen
legislation has been judicially construed and subsequent
statutes on a similar subject use identical or substantially
similar language, the usual presumption is that the Legislature
intended the same construction, unless a contrary intent clearly
appears.’ [Citations].” (Ibid.) Given the similarities in the
language of section 1172.6, subdivision (h) and the Proposition 47
statute, Lamoureux “presume[d] the Legislature was aware of
the Morales decision and its analysis of the Proposition 47
statute” and “intended section [1172.6, subdivision (h)] to receive
the same construction the Morales court previously gave to the
Proposition 47 statute.” (Lamoureux, supra, at p. 145.) On
these and other bases, Lamoureux adopted the interpretation
of section 1172.6 set forth in Wilson.
       Rogers correctly notes that neither Wilson nor Lamoureux
expressly considers whether the “as if . . . not previously . . .
sentenced” language in section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(1) can
be interpreted as requiring excess custody credits to be counted
toward any period of parole a court imposes under section 1172.6.
Nevertheless, at least one of the reasons the court in Lamoureux
provided for interpreting section 1172.6 as it did applies equally
to Rogers’s argument regarding the subdivision (d)(1) language
and is dispositive of the issue Rogers raises on appeal. Namely,
Lamoureux noted that we must assume the Legislature was
aware of the interpretation Morales gave to language that
appears in the Proposition 47 statute when the Legislature
chose to employ this same language in section 1172.6, and
that this signals the Legislature intended that language in
section 1172.6 be interpreted as it was in Morales. Rogers
argues the Legislature’s decision to employ additional language

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elsewhere in section 1172.6—namely, the “as if . . . not
previously . . . sentenced” language that does not appear in the
Proposition 47 statute at issue in Morales—reflects an effort
by the Legislature to differentiate section 1172.6 from Morales’s
approach to parole and excess custody credits. But in Morales,
the Supreme Court also identified specific language that would
have led to a different interpretation of the Proposition 47
statute—namely, the language appearing in section 2900.5,
but not in the Proposition 47 statute, expressly stating that
any “credit for time served” applies to the parole portion of any
sentence. (See Morales, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 406; see also
§ 2900.5, subd. (c) [defining “ ‘term of imprisonment’ ” to which
excess custody credits would be credited as “includ[ing] . . . any
period of imprisonment and parole”].) That the Legislature
presumptively was aware of this aspect of Morales as well, yet
chose not to add the language from section 2900.5 regarding
custody credits and parole, reflects a legislative intent not to
stray from the approach to excess custody credits and parole
described in Morales. In sum, we cannot fairly interpret the
“as if . . . not previously . . . sentenced” language as reflecting
the Legislature’s intent to achieve an outcome the Morales court
specifically held would have been achieved via other language the
Legislature chose not to employ in section 1172.6. Rather, the “as
if . . . not previously . . . sentenced” language—particularly when
considered in the context of it being included in a subdivision
that does not address parole—is most consistent with the general
directive that a successful section 1172.6 petitioner receive
an entirely new sentence, something which remains the case,
regardless of how custody credits apply to the period of parole
discussed elsewhere in the statute.

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                         DISPOSITION
     The trial court’s order is affirmed.
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                     ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
We concur:

                 BENDIX, J.

                 WEINGART, J.

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