Court Opinion

ID: 9885831
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 15:09:56.894247+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:23:36.271855
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania                 :
                                             :
              v.                             :
                                             :   No. 180 C.D. 2022
Stephanie Fields,                            :
                        Appellant            :
                                             :   Submitted: July 1, 2022

BEFORE:       HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
              HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
              HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION
BY JUDGE McCULLOUGH                                       FILED: October 6, 2023

              Stephanie Fields (Appellant) appeals from an order of the Court of
Common Pleas of Butler County (trial court) finding her guilty of two summary counts
of harboring a dangerous dog under Section 502-A(a)(1)(iii), 3 P.S. § 459-502-
A(a)(1)(iii), of the Dog Law.1        Appellant contends that the trial court erred in
determining that her two dogs “pursued” Barbara Lamendola (Victim) and,
accordingly, that the Commonwealth met its burden of proof. Upon careful review, we
reverse.
                   I.      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
              This case stems from an incident that occurred on June 29, 2021.
(Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 011a.) The testimony presented in the trial court can be

       1
        Act of December 7, 1982, P.L. 784, as amended, 3 P.S. §§ 459-101 - 459-1206. Section
502-A(a)(1)(iii) was added by the Act of May 31, 1990, P.L. 213, 3 P.S. § 459-502-A(a)(1)(iii).
summarized as follows. During the incident, Victim was on her property with her dog,
Colby. Appellant’s two dogs, Lucy and Charlie, approached from behind, passed
Victim on both sides, and “came right onto [Colby].” (R.R. at 012a.) Victim stated
that Appellant’s dogs put their mouths on Colby and pushed him down. Colby freed
himself of his harness, which prompted Lucy and Charlie to attempt to get back on top
of him again. (R.R. at 012a-013a.) Victim testified that she was between two to three
feet away from Colby during the incident. (R.R. at 022a-23a.) A construction worker
working at Victim’s residence intervened by taking Lucy by the collar, which allowed
Victim to pick up Colby. (R.R. at 013a.) After Victim picked up Colby, Charlie
approached but stopped and retreated when Victim repeatedly yelled “no.” (R.R. at
013a, 023a.) Victim and Colby retreated into the house, where Victim promptly called
the police. (R.R. at 012a-013a, 023a.)
               Victim inspected Colby for any injuries and found no blood or puncture
wounds. (R.R. at 014a.) She noticed a limp in Colby’s walk and scheduled a
veterinarian appointment for the next day. Victim later canceled the appointment
because the limp went away by that evening. (R.R. at 014a-015a.) Victim stated that
neither of Appellant’s dogs bit Victim nor jumped up on her but “went right for
[Colby.]” (R.R. at 018a.) Victim also stated that Colby survived the incident and did
not suffer any severe injuries, broken bones, disfiguring lacerations, or wounds
requiring stiches or surgery. (R.R. at 018a.)
               Appellant was charged with two summary citations, one for each dog,
under Section 502-A(a)2 of the Dog Law for harboring dangerous dogs. (R.R. at 006a.)

       2
          A conviction for the offense of harboring a dangerous dog requires proof of three elements:
(1) the individual is the owner or keeper of the dog; (2) the dog has committed one of four enumerated
acts, one of which is attacking a human being without provocation; and (3) the dog has either or both
a history of attacking human beings and/or domestic animals without being provoked and/or a
(Footnote continued on next page…)

                                                  2
On September 2, 2021, a magisterial district judge (MDJ) found Appellant guilty of
both citations. On December 8, 2021, the trial court affirmed the MDJ’s guilty verdict,
finding that the Commonwealth established that Appellant’s dogs “attacked” Victim.
(R.R. at 002a, 038a.) The trial court fined Appellant $100.00 for each count plus court
costs.
               Appellant appealed on January 7, 2022.3 (R.R. at 001a.) On January 20,
2022, the trial court ordered Appellant to file a Concise Statement of Errors
Complained of on Appeal (Concise Statement) pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of
Appellate Procedure (Pa.R.A.P.) 1925(b).                  Appellant timely filed her Concise
Statement on February 10, 2022. On March 4, 2022, the trial court issued its opinion
pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a). (Trial Court 1925(a) Opinion.)4
                                             II.     ISSUES
               On appeal, Appellant raises two issues, which can fairly be combined into
one issue. Appellant argues that the trial court erred in finding Appellant guilty of
violating Section 502-A(a) because the Commonwealth did not carry its burden of
proof to establish that Appellant’s dogs “pursued” Victim.

propensity to attack human beings and/or domestic animals without provocation, which may be
proven by a single incident. See 3 P.S. § 459-502-A(a).

         3
         Appellant initially appealed to the Superior Court, which transferred the case to this Court.
(R.R. at 001a.)

         4
           Because the trial court judge who found Appellant guilty retired, another trial court judge
wrote the Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, wherein he essentially stated that because he did not preside
over the summary appeal trial or render the findings/final decision, he deferred to this Court to
determine “whether the Commonwealth has met its burden of establishing the violations of the [Dog
Law] beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Trial Court Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion at 3.) However, our
review of the trial court’s finding of guilt following a de novo summary trial is limited to whether the
trial court’s findings are supported by substantial evidence, the trial court erred as a matter of law, or
the trial court abused its discretion. Commonwealth v. Hake, 738 A.2d 46, 47 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999).

                                                    3
                                   III.   DISCUSSION
             Appellant argues that the Commonwealth failed to establish one of the
required elements of the offense, specifically Section 502-A(a)(1)(iii). Section 502-A
of the Dog Law requires the Commonwealth prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, the
following three elements:
             (1) The dog has done any of the following:
                       (i) Inflicted severe injury on a human being without
                        provocation on public or private property.
                       (ii) Killed or inflicted severe injury on a domestic
                        animal, dog or cat without provocation while off
                        the owner’s property.
                       (iii) Attacked a human being without
                             provocation.
                       (iv) Been used in the commission of a crime.
             (2) The dog has either or both of the following:
                        (i)A history of attacking human beings and/or
                           domestic animals, dogs or cats without
                           provocation.
                        (ii) A propensity to attack human beings and/or
                           domestic animals, dogs or cats without
                           provocation. A propensity to attack may be
                           proven by a single incident of the conduct
                           described in paragraph (1)(i), (ii), (iii), or (iv).
             (3) The defendant is the owner or keeper of the dog.

3 P.S. § 459-502-A (emphasis added). In considering the plain language of the Dog
Law, we look to its defined terms. “Attack” is defined as “[t]he deliberate action of a
dog, whether or not in response to a command by its owner, to bite, to seize with its
teeth or to pursue any human, domestic animal, dog or cat.” 3 P.S. § 459-102.
             Here, the charges averred that Appellant’s dogs pursued and attacked the
Victim. Appellant argues that the trial court erred in concluding that her dogs attacked
Victim without provocation by “pursuing” Victim, and, thus, the Commonwealth did
not establish this necessary element for a conviction.

                                            4
             “The object of all interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain
and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly.” 1 Pa. C.S. § 1921(a). In
construing the language of a statute, we must construe words and phrases according to
the rules of grammar and according to their common and approved usage. 1 Pa. C.S.
§ 1903(a). When the words of a statute are clear and free from ambiguity, its letter is
not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit. 1 Pa. C.S. § 1921(b). It
is well settled that “[o]ne way to ascertain the plain meaning and ordinary usage of
terms is by reference to a dictionary definition.” In re Beyer, 115 A.3d 835, 839 (Pa.
2015) (citing Commonwealth v. Hart, 28 A.3d 898, 909 (Pa. 2011) (explaining that
“common and approve usage [of a term undefined by the legislature] may be
ascertained by examining its dictionary definition”)). Pursue, Black’s Law Dictionary
defines “pursue” as such: “To follow persistently in order to seize or obtain; to chase
or hunt.” Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).
             In Commonwealth v. Hake, 738 A.2d 46, 49-50 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999), the
dog owner was charged and convicted with harboring a dangerous dog. The incident
was described as follows:
             On January 13, 1998, seven-year[-]old Katie Blankenstein
             (Child) was returning home from school at 4:00 p.m. when a
             male Pit Bull Terrier (Dog) ran out of a house and bit the
             Child on the leg. Norma Hendricks ([v]ictim), an adult
             passerby taking her daily walk, observed the commotion and
             crossed the street toward the scene. Realizing that she was
             not physically capable of managing the Dog, she turned away
             and ran back across the street to get help for the Child. The
             Dog pursued the [v]ictim across the street, seizing her leg,
             and causing her to fall on the ground.

Id. at 46 (emphasis added). On appeal, we considered whether propensity to attack
may be proven by a single incident. We concluded that the single incident of the
conduct sufficed to prove a dog’s propensity to attack. Id. at 50. In stating the facts

                                            5
and conducting its analysis, this Court implicitly recognized that where a dog changed
its focus from one victim to another, deliberately followed the second victim, and had
the intent and purpose of seizing the targeted second victim, the dog had “pursued” her.
Id. at 49.
             Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Little (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1723 C.D. 2012,
filed March 27, 2013), slip op. at 3-4, this Court used “pursue” to characterize the dogs’
conduct when recounting the testimony of the victim’s mother:
             According to Ms. Brown’s testimony, she heard her son yell
             for help[,] and she ran to aid hi[m]. When she first
             approached the scene, she observed the dog[] biting at his
             face. Ms. Brown attempted to pick up her son, and the dog[]
             continued to pursue Ms. Brown and the victim. The two
             fell to the ground, and Ms. Brown covered the victim with her
             own body and was bitten by one or both of the dogs. The
             victim ran into the house.

Id., slip op. at 5 (emphasis added). In Little, this Court noted that the dogs deliberately
followed the child up the stairs to the gate and continued to do so after Ms. Brown’s
intervention. Additionally, the trial court engaged in some degree of examination of
the dogs’ state of mind when it noted that when the child victim “raised his arms up
and [] was getting nervous . . . the dogs sensed his discomfort and fear at that point and
that’s when they attacked him.” Id., slip op. at 5. This Court again implicitly
recognized that a reasonable person would observe that the dogs acted with intent by
targeting the victims and with a purpose. Thus, as we have interpreted the term
“pursue,” it requires that the dog make both a conscious decision via its “deliberate
action . . . to pursue” and have an identifiable target. 3 P.S. § 459-102.
             Here, the trial court relied upon Victim’s testimony in determining that
Appellant’s dogs “attacked” her. The trial court explained its findings as follows:

                                            6
            Based upon what has been presented, I find that the third
            element of attack on a human being without provocation on –
            with [Victim] as the victim[--] has been sufficiently
            established by the Commonwealth. The fact that it took place
            on her property. The fact that she took appropriate action. The
            fact that the worker who was there and took appropriate action
            prevented what[,] in my mind[,] would most likely have
            ended up in either a severe injury to her or her dog[,] is not a
            defense to the statute. So[,] I’ll find the [Appellant] [g]uilty
            of both counts, and the fines and costs imposed by the [MDJ]
            will be reaffirmed.
(R.R. at 034a, 038a.) The trial court clarified that the Commonwealth established only
the third enumerated act of Section 502-A(a)(1), namely that the dogs “attacked”
Victim without provocation. The trial court stated its reasoning as follows:

            And let me be very specific, [Appellant], in case you intend
            to file an appeal. The specific reasons for my finding is that
            I find from the evidence presented that element three of attack
            on a human being without provocation has been established,
            and that the other three initial elements of infliction of severe
            injury, killed or inflicted severe injury on a domestic animal,
            and has been used in the commission of a crime[,] have not
            been established.

(R.R. at 038a.)   The trial court concluded that Appellant’s dogs “attacked” Victim
because they “pursued” her via a delineated action of “attack.” However, given our
construction of “pursue,” we disagree with the trial court’s conclusion that there is
sufficient evidence in the record establishing that Charlie and Lucy “attacked” Victim.
As Victim testified, Appellant’s dogs entered her property to “push [Victim’s dog]
down.” (R.R. at 012a.) Appellant’s dogs ran past Victim and did not acknowledge her
until she picked up Colby. Id. While Victim was picking up Colby, she yelled “no” at
the dogs. Victim thereafter was able to retreat to her home, ending the incident. (R.R.
at 015a, 011a-017a.) There is no additional objective evidence in the record that

                                           7
Appellant’s dogs made a deliberate action to pursue Victim or that Appellant’s dogs
came after Victim or “attacked” Victim.
            Therefore, we conclude that the trial court erred in determining that
Appellant’s dogs “attacked” Victim pursuant to Section 502-A(a)(1)(iii).
                                IV.   CONCLUSION
            Because the trial court specifically concluded that the Commonwealth did
not establish any of the other enumerated acts under Section 502-A(a)(1)(iii) of the
Dog Law, the Commonwealth did not carry its burden of proof to establish the
summary offense. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order.

                                          ________________________________
                                          PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

                                          8
            IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania          :
                                      :
            v.                        : No. 180 C.D. 2022
                                      :
Stephanie Fields,                     :
                    Appellant         :

                                  ORDER

            AND NOW, this 6th day of October, 2023, the December 8, 2021 order
by the Court of Common Pleas of Butler County is hereby REVERSED.

                                       ________________________________
                                       PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge