Court Opinion

ID: 9749562
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 16:50:57.657166+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:51.952510
License: Public Domain

WHITE, P. J.
I respectfully dissent.
It is my view that the rebuttable presumption contained in Vehicle Code section 231521 is inapplicable to administrative hearings.
In Burge v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1992) 5 Cal. App,4th 384, 391 [7 Cal.Rptr.2d 5], Division One of this court held the section 23152 presumption was applicable to administrative proceedings. Although I followed the reasoning of Burge in several unpublished opinions, I now believe the reasoning of the Burge court was incorrect.
Department of Motor Vehicle’s (DMV) administrative per se procedure of immediately suspending driving privileges is authorized by section 13353.2. Subdivision (a) of that section provides that the DMV “shall immediately suspend the privilege of any person to operate a motor vehicle if the person was driving or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle when the person had 0.08 percent or more, by weight, of alcohol in his or her blood.” Thus, the subdivision makes suspension of driving privileges dependent on a specific finding of an individual’s blood-alcohol level rather than the fact that she or he may have been driving while intoxicated. One of the critical questions in DMV administrative per se suspension and revocation actions is whether the presumption contained in section 23152 is applicable to actions under section 13353.2.
In determining the intent of the Legislature on this matter I first turn to the words of the statute being construed; that is, courts must interpret the statute according to the usual, ordinary import of the language used in framing it. (Fontana Unified School Dist. v. Burman (1988) 45 Cal.3d 208, 218 [246 *316Cal. Rptr. 733, 753 P.2d 689]; Palos Verdes Faculty Assn. v. Palos Verdes Peninsula Unified Sch. Dist. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 650, 658 [147 Cal.Rptr. 359, 580 P.2d 1155].) The presumption contained in section 23152 is specifically applicable to “any prosecution under this subdivision,” i.e., a criminal prosecution under section 23152, subdivision (b). The majority view notwithstanding, to make the presumption applicable to administrative hearings would violate the cardinal rule that a statute “is to be interpreted by the language in which it is written, and courts are no more at liberty to add provisions to what is therein declared in definite language than they are to disregard any of its express provisions.” (People v. Campbell (1902) 138 Cal. 11, 15 [70 P. 918]; see also Wells Fargo Bank v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1082, 1097 [282 Cal.Rptr. 841, 811 P.2d 1025].)
The legislative history of section 23152 also reinforces my view that the Legislature did not intend to make the section’s presumption applicable to administrative actions under section 13353.2. The presumption was added to the statute in 1982. (Stats. 1982, ch. 1337, § 1, p. 4961.) Thereafter, in 1989, the same year section 13353.2 was enacted, section 23152 was amended to substitute “0.08 percent” instead of “0.10 percent” wherever it appeared in subdivision (b). (Stats. 1989, ch. 479, § 3, p. 1691.) However, the limitation of the presumption to prosecutions under that subdivision was not altered. After the statute was amended again in 1990 (Stats. 1990, ch. 708, § 1, pp. 2870-2871), legislation was introduced in March of 1991 to amend section 23152 in order to make its presumption applicable to administrative hearings.2 (Sen. Bill No. 1186 (1991-1992 Reg. Sess.).) The proposed bill, which included the amendment to section 23152, was passed by the Legislature but was returned unsigned by the Governor. (_Sen. J. (1991-1992 Reg. Sess.) p. 4516.) Given the fact section 23152 was never amended to reflect its application to administrative hearings either at the time or after section 13353.2 was enacted, and the 1991 attempt to do so was vetoed by the Governor, we must conclude it was not the intent of the Legislature to make the statute’s presumption applicable to administrative hearings.
The Burge court relies on Webster v. Superior Court (1988) 46 Cal.3d 338, 344 [250 Cal.Rptr. 268, 758 P.2d 596], and Love v. Superior Court (1990) *317226 Cal.App.3d 736, 745 [276 Cal.Rptr. 660], to justify its expanded reading of section 23152. Both cases stand for the proposition that courts will look beyond the literal words of a statute when their plain meaning leads to results which are inconsistent with the intent of the legislators. Here, the language of section 23152 does not conflict with the purpose of the legislation; it merely limits its application. Thus, on the basis of the clear language of the statute, its legislative history and inapplicability of Webster and Love, I find the section 23152 presumption unavailable in administrative hearings.
A petition for a rehearing was denied December 23, 1992, and respondent’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied March 18, 1993.

All statutory references are to the Vehicle Code.

The proposed amendment in no way claimed to be a mere clarification of existing law. (See Tyler v. State of California (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 973, 977, fn. 2 [185 Cal.Rptr. 49].) The Legislative Counsel’s Digest which accompanied the bill stated: “Existing law prohibits driving a motor vehicle under the influence of an alcoholic beverage or drug, or both, and creates a rebuttable presumption that the driver had more than the permissible amount of alcohol in the blood if a chemical test of the blood, breath, or urine performed within 3 hours of the driving shows a blood alcohol concentration of more than the permissible limit, [f] This bill would make this rebuttable presumption applicable also in an administrative hearing.” (Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Sen. Bill No. 1186 (1991-1992 Reg. Sess.).)