Court Opinion

ID: 9808284
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 20:32:46.452713+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:10:42.983115
License: Public Domain

Hoxe, J.
We are of opinion that the judge below has correctly construed the contract or ordinance and that the rights of the parties thereunder have been properly determined. The defendant company having dedicated its property to the public service, it thereby became the subject of reasonable regulation and control for the public benefit and by the public agencies properly designated for the purpose. Subject to this principle the municipal corporation had the power to fix upon a maximum charge reasonable in its terms and which defendant would have no right to disregard. Even with such maximum rates properly established, our decisions are to the effect that the charges must be reasonable and without discriminations as between citizens receiving the same kind and degree of service, and that in the absence of more specific legislative regulation the rates may *539under some circumstances be made the subject of judicial scrutiny and control. Griffin v. Water Co., 122 N. C., p. 206; Rushville v. Gas Co., 132 Ind., 5. It is shown that the charge made against plaintiff in this instance according to meter rates is reasonable. So far as appears then from the findings of fact or the proof the ordinance is a valid regulation fixing the maximum rates stated and requiring defendant company to supply electricity within the rate to all persons living within the corporation who should apply for it, but we agree with his Honor in holding that as to the method of rating, the said ordinance not improperly left and referred this question to be determined by the contract of the parties. This not only appears from a perusal of the ordinance by which “H. L. Millner, his successors and assigns, are authorized to charge and collect the following maximum rates for light and power furnished by them, etc., specifying the flat and meter rates,” but in so far as the ordinance expresses a contract between the company and the municipality, and both parties to this controversy seem to have so treated it, the same is subject to the principle of interpretation generally applicable, “That when a promise is in the alternative, as to do a thing one way or another, the right of election is with the promiser in the absence of an express provision to the contrary.” 7 A. & E. (2 Ed.), p. 125; Holmesly v. Elias & Cohen, 75 N. C., p. 573; Exchange and Building Co., 90 Va., p. 83; Powell v. City of Duluth, 91 Minn., p. 53; Paige on Contracts, sec. 1391; 1 Farnham Water and Water Eights, sec. 163. We find no evidence in the record supporting the suggestion made that defendant’s assignor, as an inducement, had given assurance that he would furnish electricity according to the method of rating selected by the householder or purchaser, and if there had been, it should not in our opinion, be allowed to affect the plain and explicit terms of the ordinance. Nor do we think that the action of the company should be held to discriminate unjustly against the plaintiff in view of the facts in evidence; that the charge made against the plaintiff is a fair and reasonable charge for the electricity actually consumed and correctly measured; that the company is endeavoring to furnish a full service of twenty-fomr hours, a change made from the original method of half time *540with the desire and intent to benefit the entire public, and that the flat rate originally provided for under this measure of service would speedily bankrupt the company; that no flat rate contract had been made since May, 1907, and since June, 1908, no one had been furnished electricity except by meter rates. In Powell v. City of Duluth, supra, on facts not dissimilar to those presented here, the Court said: “The only ground upon which appellants can assail the act of the commissioners in refusing to place them upon the flat rate basis is that it resulted in a discrimination between them and other consumers who pay at flat rates or that the meter rates were unreasonable; but according to the evidence and the findings, the meter rates were reasonable. If it appeared that other consumers, upon the flat rate system, had an advantage and were enjoying a privilege not accorded those using meters, and that the commissioners were arbitrarily making such discrimination, there might be some ground for complaint. But such is not the case. On the contrary, the evidence and findings are to the effect that a large majority of those using meters save money by so doing. The fact that according to appellant’s experience with a meter prior to the time it was taken out showed their water bills to be more than the flat rate, does not establish discriminatioñ, nor prove that the rate by the meter is unreasonable. It is Pound by the court that all consumers situated as appellants have been similarly treated, and it does not appear that the method adopted by the board to gradually bring consumers upon the meter basis is illegal or arbitrary, or that it resulted in discrimination.”
Upholding as we do the decision of the judge below that under the ordinance and the facts in evidence, the plaintiff may be lawfully subjected to the meter rate, we further concur in the position of his Honor that the question whether plaintiff could be charged under the flat rate as domestic or commercial, is no longer material, and for that reason is not considered or passed upon.
We are of opinion that there was no error in dissolving the injunction, and the judgment to that effect is
Affirmed.