Court Opinion

ID: 9862236
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 01:04:34.520374+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:24:35.523810
License: Public Domain

HUNTER, Justice,
concurring in result.
I concur in the result reached by the majority, as well as its disposition of all allegations of error raised by defendant excepting issue “1(C).” In my opinion, the trial court erred in refusing to hear the testimony of J.H.’s aunts on the question whether she, a child nine years old, was competent to testify.
By statute, children under the age of ten years are presumed incompetent to testify in our courts of law. Ind.Code § 34 — 1-14-5 (Burns 1973); Martin v. State, (1969) 251 Ind. 587, 244 N.E.2d 100. Ind.Code § 34-1-14 — 5, supra, reads in pertinent part:
“The following persons shall not be competent witnesses:
* * * * * *
“Second. Children under ten [10] years of age, unless it appears that they understand the nature and obligation of an oath.”
Pursuant to Martin v. State, supra, the determination whether the child “understands the nature and obligation of the oath” sufficiently to overcome the statutory presumption may be based solely on the trial court’s examination of the child.
I do not think it wise to interpret Martin to provide the trial court with unfettered discretion to arbitrarily refuse to hear testimony from other witnesses which bears on the competency of a child to testify. It is one thing to permit the trial court to elevate the child’s testimony above that of other witnesses; it is another matter, however, to say that the court need not bother even to listen to witnesses whose testimony bears on the question. That is indeed a peculiar rule of law in view of the fact our legislature has deemed children less than ten years of age presumptively incompetent to testify.
Moreover, in the circumstances of this case, the rule is an affront to the numerous cases wherein this Court has emphasized that where evidence of guilt rests on the *1212testimony of one person, the testimony should be closely scrutinized. See, e. g., Richardson v. State, (1979) Ind. 388 N.E.2d 488; Lottie v. State, (1974) 262 Ind. 124, 311 N.E.2d 800; Gaddis v. State, (1969) 253 Ind. 73, 251 N.E.2d 658; Penn v. State, (1957) 237 Ind. 374, 146 N.E.2d 240. As we stated in Gaddis, “This court must be particularly vigilant where a conviction is supported by the testimony of one eyewitness.” 253 Ind. at 80, 251 N.E.2d at 661.
While our concern was expressed in the context of analyses of the sufficiency of the evidence in those cases cited, it would be anomalous to say the matter is of no consequence to whether a nine-year old child, as sole eyewitness to the alleged offense, should be adjudged competent to testify. Rather, the statutory presumption of incompetency warrants our vigilance. And it would not unduly burden trial courts to take the time necessary to implement that concern.
To be sure, trial courts should have discretion to refuse to hear irrelevant or repetitive testimony concerning a child’s competency to testify. The court’s discretionary powers should not embrace the capacity to bar evidence relevant to that matter which has not previously been offered. Here, the trial court should have permitted at least one aunt to testify concerning the alleged brain damage which rendered the nine-year old J.H. unable to appreciate the obligation of the oath. Whether any credibility could be attached to that claim is not the question; that determination would follow from the nature of the evidence presented to support the factual contention.
Notwithstanding the court’s failure to permit at least one aunt to testify, the error cannot be characterized as reversible. That is so by virtue of our decision in Martin v. State, supra, whereby the court may base its determination of competency or incompetency solely on its examination of the child. In the face of J.H.’s testimony, it cannot be said the court’s determination constituted the manifest abuse of discretion necessary to justify reversal. Morgan v. State, (1962) 243 Ind. 315, 185 N.E.2d 15.
Yet before any court adjudges any child younger than ten to be competent to testify, it is elementary that the court should expose itself to any relevant evidence the parties may wish to offer. Authority for that basic proposition does not seem necessary. It is, after all, simply a matter of how our criminal justice system should work; equally as significant, it is a matter of public confidence in the system. As Chief Justice Givan reiterated in Watson v. State, (1973) 261 Ind. 97, 99, 300 N.E.2d 354, 355:
“ ‘It is important for all segments of our society to believe that our court systems dispense justice. This includes the criminals themselves as well as the law abiding citizens . . .’” Id., quoting Dube v. State, (1971) 257 Ind. 398, 407, 275 N.E.2d 7, 11.
Unfettered discretionary power in our trial courts to arbitrarily exclude evidence concerning a nine-year old child’s competency to testify, where the child is the sole eyewitness, only serves to diminish confidence in the impartiality of our tribunals. That is both unnecessary and unfortunate.
For all the foregoing reasons, I concur in result.
Concur in result.