Court Opinion

ID: 9364118
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-18 16:00:53.329562+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:35.861832
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 21-6118     Document: 010110799195        Date Filed: 01/18/2023      Page: 1
                                                                                   FILED
                                                                       United States Court of Appeals
                                        PUBLISH                                Tenth Circuit

                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        January 18, 2023

                                                                           Christopher M. Wolpert
                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                            Clerk of Court
                          _________________________________

  UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

        Plaintiff - Appellee,
                                                               No. 21-6118
  v.

  GERMAINE COULTER, SR., a/k/a Slim,

        Defendant - Appellant.
                       _________________________________

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                         for the Western District of Oklahoma
                             (D.C. No. 5:18-CR-00156-D-1)
                        _________________________________

 Bill Zuhdi, The Zuhdi Law Firm, Oklahoma City, OK, for Defendant-Appellant.

 Tiffany Noble, Assistant United States Attorney (Robert J. Troester, United States
 Attorney, with her on the brief), Oklahoma City, OK, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
                         _________________________________

 Before MATHESON, CARSON, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges.
                   _________________________________

 MATHESON, Circuit Judge.
                    _________________________________

       Defendant-Appellant Germaine Coulter, Sr., appeals his convictions for child

 sex trafficking and conspiracy to commit child sex trafficking. Exercising

 jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
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                                    I. BACKGROUND

                                    A. Factual History1

           For many years, Mr. Coulter was a pimp in the Oklahoma City area. Upon

 release from a five-year state prison term in 2017, he conscripted an underage girl,

 “Doe 2,” to recruit a schoolmate, “Doe 1,” to perform sex work for him. He gave

 Doe 1 a ride home from school, proposed that she work for him, and promised her

 money and gifts in return. After Doe 1 expressed interest, Elizabeth Andrade, one of

 Mr. Coulter’s longtime sex workers, took pictures of Doe 1 in various stages of

 undress and sent them to Mr. Coulter. He forwarded the photos to potential clients

 with messages suggesting that Doe 1 would perform sex acts for money. Ms.

 Andrade also sent the photos to potential clients and used one of the photos to

 advertise Doe 1’s services online.

           Doe 1 had sexual encounters with clients for money. Mr. Coulter gave her

 detailed instructions about how much she should charge and when to collect the

 money. He also told Ms. Andrade to teach Doe 1 how to perform various sex acts.

 Ms. Andrade took Doe 1 on a “call” with her, and both of them had sex with the

 client.

           Around the same time, Mr. Coulter attempted to recruit another underage girl,

 “Doe 3.” He gave Doe 3 a ride home from school and asked whether she wanted to

           1
          This factual summary derives from the evidence presented at trial, stated in
 the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict. See United States v. Kaspereit,
 994 F.3d 1202, 1207 (10th Cir. 2021).

                                                 2
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 earn money by “prostitut[ing] [her]self with the other girls.” ROA, Vol. III at 864.

 Doe 3 told Mr. Coulter she would “think about it,” but she had no interest in working

 for him and never did. Id. at 867.

                                 B. Procedural History

       A grand jury indicted Mr. Coulter and later issued a superseding indictment

 charging him with (1) conspiring with Ms. Andrade to commit child sex trafficking,

 (2) child sex trafficking with respect to Doe 1, and (3) child sex trafficking with

 respect to Doe 3. The grand jury also indicted Ms. Andrade for conspiracy to commit

 child sex trafficking. She pled guilty.

       The case against Mr. Coulter proceeded to a jury trial. The Government

 introduced testimony from (1) law enforcement agents who investigated Mr. Coulter;

 (2) Ms. Andrade and other women who had worked for Mr. Coulter; (3) Does 1, 2,

 and 3; and (4) the client who had the sexual encounter with Ms. Andrade and Doe 1.

 The Government also introduced into evidence Mr. Coulter’s cell phone records,

 which corroborated these witnesses’ testimony.

       We note three occurrences during trial that are relevant to this appeal. First,

 the Government elicited testimony from two witnesses about the deaths of two

 women associated with Mr. Coulter—Elizabeth Diaz and Jamie Biggers. Defense

 counsel objected to some questions about Ms. Diaz’s death, arguing they implied that

 Mr. Coulter was responsible.2 The district court sustained the objection and forbade

       2
          For example, Ms. Andrade testified on direct examination that Ms. Diaz died
 after being “given a hotshot”—a cocktail of drugs designed to induce an overdose.
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 the Government from “rais[ing] an inference that [Mr. Coulter is] responsible for

 th[e] girl’s death.” ROA, Vol. III at 427. During closing arguments, the Government

 briefly mentioned Ms. Diaz, but did not suggest that Mr. Coulter had killed her.

       Second, the district court appointed a guardian ad litem for each of the minors

 involved in the case. At one point during Doe 1’s testimony, defense counsel

 requested a bench conference and asserted that Doe 1’s guardian ad litem had

 mouthed “[y]ou’re doing a good job” to Doe 1 while she was on the stand.

 ROA, Vol. III at 690. The district court had not observed this conduct, but at defense

 counsel’s request, the court told the guardian ad litem to avoid signaling Doe 1

 during her testimony. The court also delivered a curative instruction to the jury.

       Third, the jury deliberated for about six hours before reporting it had reached a

 verdict. It filled out verdict forms finding Mr. Coulter guilty on Counts 1 and 2—the

 conspiracy charge and the child sex trafficking charge related to Doe 1—but said it

 was deadlocked on Count 3—the child sex trafficking charge related to Doe 3. When

 the district court polled the jury, one juror, Ms. Noland, said the verdict did not

 reflect her opinion and expressed that she did not want to return to the deliberations.

 ROA, Vol. III at 425. The Government asked Ms. Andrade, “[W]ho gave her a
 hotshot?” Id. Mr. Coulter objected on relevance grounds. Id. at 425-26. During a
 bench conference, the Government said it expected Ms. Andrade to testify that “Mr.
 Coulter was responsible for Ms. Diaz being given a hotshot.” Id. at 427.

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       The district court recessed for the weekend. On Monday morning, Mr. Coulter

 moved for a mistrial based on these events with the jury. The district court denied

 the motion.

       The judge then spoke with Ms. Noland in chambers. She said that she was

 willing to continue deliberating. The court next convened the jury and delivered an

 Allen instruction encouraging the jury to try to reach unanimity.3 After several more

 hours of deliberation, the jury again returned a guilty verdict on Counts 1 and 2 but

 reported it could not reach agreement on Count 3.4 All jurors confirmed their assent

 to the published verdict.

       Mr. Coulter later moved for a new trial under Federal Rule of Criminal

 Procedure 33(a), asserting that (1) the evidence against him was insufficient to

 support the jury verdict and (2) the district court erred in admitting testimony about

       3
          An Allen instruction is a “supplemental instruction given to a divided jury to
 encourage it to agree on a verdict.” United States v. Cornelius, 696 F.3d 1307, 1313
 n.1 (10th Cir. 2012) (quotations omitted). It is thus distinct from the standard
 instruction a court delivers at the close of evidence informing the jury how to
 deliberate and encouraging it to try to reach a unanimous verdict. United States v.
 Arrowgarp, 253 F. App’x 790, 795 (10th Cir. 2007) (unpublished) (“an explanation
 of the duty to deliberate and the unanim[ity] requirement” delivered with other jury
 instructions is “not a typical Allen charge” (quotations omitted)).
        Although not precedential, we find the reasoning of the unpublished cases
 cited in this opinion instructive. See 10th Cir. R. 32.1 (“Unpublished decisions are
 not precedential, but may be cited for their persuasive value.”); see also Fed. R. App.
 P. 32.1.
       4
         The district court therefore declared a mistrial as to Count 3 and dismissed
 that count.

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 the deaths of Ms. Diaz and Ms. Biggers. The court denied the motion. It sentenced

 Mr. Coulter to 360 months in prison. This appeal followed.

       We set out additional facts and procedural history as needed in reviewing the

 issues Mr. Coulter raises.

                                    II. DISCUSSION

       On appeal, Mr. Coulter argues:

           A. The evidence was insufficient to support the guilty verdict;

           B. The district court improperly admitted testimony about the deaths of
              Ms. Diaz and Ms. Biggers;

           C. The behavior by Doe 1’s guardian ad litem was improper bolstering;

           D. The district court erred in its post-trial interactions with the jury; and

           E. The convictions should be reversed based on cumulative error.5

       As discussed below, Mr. Coulter failed to raise a contemporaneous objection

 to preserve several of these issues. When a party fails to preserve an issue, we

 review only for plain error. United States v. Mullins, 613 F.3d 1273, 1283

 (10th Cir. 2010). “A plain error that affects substantial rights may be considered

 even though it was not brought to the court’s attention.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). We

 provide a brief overview of plain error here.

       Under plain error review, the appellant bears the burden to “show the district

 court committed (1) error (2) that is clear or obvious under current law, and which

       5
         Mr. Coulter lists seven issues in his brief, Aplt. Br. at 2, but after eliminating
 duplication, we identify the five issues presented above.

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 both (3) affected [his] substantial rights and (4) undermined the fairness, integrity, or

 public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Mullins, 613 F.3d at 1283.

       “In general, for an error to be [clear or obvious and] contrary to well-settled

 law”—the second prong of plain error—“either the Supreme Court or this court must

 have addressed the issue.” United States v. DeChristopher, 695 F.3d 1082, 1091

 (10th Cir. 2012) (quotations omitted).

       To establish that an error affects a defendant’s “substantial rights”—the third

 prong—the appellant must show “there is a reasonable probability that, but for the

 error claimed, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” United States

 v. Bustamante-Conchas, 850 F.3d 1130, 1138 (10th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (quotations

 omitted). An appellant facing “overwhelming evidence of his guilt” usually “cannot

 establish a reasonable probability” that an alleged error “affected the outcome of the

 trial.” See United States v. Ibarra-Diaz, 805 F.3d 908, 926 (10th Cir. 2015).

       Finally, the fourth prong of plain error review—whether an error “seriously

 affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings”—is a

 “case-specific and fact-intensive” inquiry. Bustamante-Conchas, 750 F.3d at 1141

 (quotations omitted). Generally, “the seriousness of the error must be examined in

 the context of the case as a whole,” and the error must be “the kind [] that

 undermines the fairness of the judicial process.” Id. at 1141-42 (quotations omitted).

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                              A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

       Mr. Coulter argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his

 convictions. In particular, he contends that Ms. Andrade and Doe 1 were not credible

 witnesses. Aplt. Br. at 38-39. We reject his argument and affirm.

    Standard of Review

       “We review [an] insufficiency-of-the-evidence claim de novo.” United States

 v. Benford, 875 F.3d 1007, 1014 (10th Cir. 2017) (quotations omitted). “Evidence is

 sufficient to support a conviction if, viewing the evidence and the reasonable

 inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the government, a reasonable jury

 could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. “In

 reviewing the evidence, we do not weigh conflicting evidence or consider witness

 credibility, as these duties are delegated exclusively to the jury.” United States v.

 Evans, 318 F.3d 1011, 1018 (10th Cir. 2003).

    Analysis

       The Government presented more than sufficient evidence to support Mr.

 Coulter’s two convictions.

       a. Child sex trafficking

       To convict Mr. Coulter of child sex trafficking, the jury had to find that Mr.

 Coulter:

            (1) “by means affecting interstate commerce,

            (2) knowingly recruited, enticed, harbored, transported, provided, obtained,
                or maintained [a minor] or benefitted in a venture which involved [a
                minor], and

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           (3) knew or recklessly disregarded the fact that [the minor] was younger
               than 18, and

           (4) knew or recklessly disregarded the fact that [the minor] would engage
               in a commercial sex act.”

 United States v. Brinson, 772 F.3d 1314, 1325 (10th Cir. 2014) (numbers added)

 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)).

       Elements (1), (2), and (4) - In addition to the testimony of Doe 1 and Ms.

 Andrade about the recruitment and preparation of Doe 1 for sex work, the

 Government introduced Mr. Coulter’s phone records, which contained (1) explicit

 pictures of Doe 1, (2) text messages soliciting clients for Doe 1, and (3) instructions

 directing Doe 1 to take money from clients in exchange for sex. Suppl. ROA, Vol. II

 at 16, 19-21 [Redacted]; ROA, Vol. III at 453-56. The Government also presented a

 client who had a sexual encounter with Doe 1 and Ms. Andrade in exchange for

 money. ROA, Vol. III at 731-32. This evidence was sufficient to establish that Mr.

 Coulter used means affecting interstate commerce to knowingly recruit Doe 1 to

 perform commercial sexual transactions and facilitated those transactions. A

 reasonable jury could find elements (1), (2), and (4) of child sex trafficking beyond a

 reasonable doubt.

       Element (3) - According to both Ms. Andrade and Doe 1, Mr. Coulter first

 suggested that Doe 1 perform sex work for him while driving her home from high

 school. ROA, Vol. III at 443. Ms. Andrade also testified that she told Mr. Coulter

 that Doe 1 was a minor. Id. at 456. And Doe 1 testified that Mr. Coulter promised

 her “a place to stay when she’s old enough.” Id. at 446. A reasonable jury could find

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  beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Coulter knew or recklessly disregarded the fact

  that Doe 1 was a minor—element (3) of child sex trafficking.

        b. Conspiring to commit child sex trafficking

        To convict Mr. Coulter on the conspiracy count, the jury had to find:

            (1) “that ‘two or more persons agreed to violate’ the child-sex-trafficking
                laws;

            (2) that [Mr. Coulter] ‘knew at least the essential objectives of the
                conspiracy’;

            (3) that he ‘knowingly and voluntarily became part of it’; and

            (4) that the ‘alleged coconspirators were interdependent.’”

  United States v. Anthony, 942 F.3d 955, 971 (10th Cir. 2019) (numbers added)

  (quoting United States v. Serrato, 742 F.3d 461, 467 (10th Cir. 2014)).

        In addition to the evidence discussed above, Ms. Andrade testified that she and

  Mr. Coulter worked together to recruit Doe 1 and that they both facilitated her

  participation in commercial sex transactions. For example, Ms. Andrade took

  explicit pictures of Doe 1, and Mr. Coulter used those pictures to entice potential

  clients. ROA, Vol. III at 608-09. The evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury

  to find beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) Mr. Coulter and Ms. Andrade agreed to

  violate the child sex-trafficking laws, (2) Mr. Coulter knew the objective of the

  conspiracy with Ms. Andrade was to traffic Doe 1, (3) he knowingly and voluntarily

  participated in the conspiracy, and (4) he worked interdependently with Ms. Andrade

  to implement their agreement.

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        c. Mr. Coulter’s arguments against sufficiency

        Mr. Coulter’s arguments are unavailing. He focuses primarily on the

  credibility of Ms. Andrade and Doe 1. But on review of the sufficiency of the

  evidence, we do not “consider witness credibility,” a task “delegated exclusively to

  the jury.” Evans, 318 F.3d at 1018. And as discussed above, the Government

  corroborated both witnesses’ testimony with ample supporting evidence.

        Mr. Coulter also claims he “had nothing to do with [a] sexual transaction

  between [a client] and Doe 2.” Aplt. Br. at 39. But his convictions stem from his

  conduct toward Doe 1, not Doe 2. He also disputes a law enforcement officer’s

  testimony that Mr. Coulter was a member of the “Crip” gang. Aplt. Br. at 40. This

  testimony was not relevant to the child sex trafficking offense.

              B. Testimony about the Deaths of Ms. Diaz and Ms. Biggers

        Mr. Coulter contends that the admission of testimony about the deaths of Ms.

  Diaz and Ms. Biggers violated the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause,

  Aplt. Br. at 16, or constituted inadmissible hearsay, id. at 33-34. He also suggests

  the Government engaged in prosecutorial misconduct by eliciting this testimony and

  referencing Ms. Diaz’s death in its closing argument. Id. at 28.

     The Challenged Testimony and Closing Argument

        Two witnesses testified about the deaths of Ms. Diaz and Ms. Biggers: Megan

  Mullins, who formerly worked for Mr. Coulter, and Ms. Andrade, his alleged

  co-conspirator.

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        a. Ms. Mullins’s testimony

        During the direct examination of Ms. Mullins, the Government asked about how

  Mr. Coulter disciplined women when they disobeyed him. In response, Ms. Mullins said

  that when “Lizzy”—Elizabeth Diaz—refused to turn over her earnings, Mr. Coulter

  physically abused Ms. Diaz and locked her in a closet. ROA, Vol. III at 169.

        On cross-examination, Mr. Coulter’s attorney asked, “[H]ave you seen that girl

  since?” Id. at 200. Ms. Mullins replied, “She’s dead.” Id. Mr. Coulter’s attorney asked

  when Ms. Diaz died. Id. Ms. Mullins responded, “I think 2011, 2012.” Id.

        On redirect, the Government and Ms. Mullins had the following exchange:

               Q: You mentioned that Elizabeth Diaz passed away.

               A: Yes.

               Q: What happened to her?

               A: I was incarcerated. From my understanding, she went on
               a call and she was --

               Defense counsel: Objection. Hearsay.

               District court: Overruled. You opened the door to this . . . so
               I’m going to let her follow up. Go ahead.

               A: She was found fully clothed like ten days later. They said
               it was a drug overdose.

               Q: All right. What do you believe happened to her?

               Defense counsel: Objection. Speculation.

               District court: Overruled. I’ll listen to the answer first.

               A: I mean, she was killed.

               Q: Do you know who killed her?

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                 A: I don’t know.

                 Q: Do you have someone in mind that you believe was
                 responsible?

                 A: I don’t know.

                 ...

                 Q: What did Mr. Coulter say about Ms. Diaz dying?

                 ...

                 A: We shouldn’t let bad things happen to daddy.6

  ROA, Vol. III at 204-06.

        Later in the redirect examination of Ms. Mullins, while discussing other women

  who were associated with Mr. Coulter, the Government asked about Jamie Biggers. Ms.

  Mullins said that Ms. Biggers had “passed away.” Id. at 210. When the Government

  asked how this occurred, Ms. Mullins stated that Ms. Biggers “got pushed out of a car on

  the highway and got hit head on.” Id. at 210. The Government asked, “Who pushed

  her?” Id. Ms. Mullins responded, “I don’t know.” Id. Defense counsel did not object to

  the questions regarding Ms. Biggers’s death. Id.

        b. Ms. Andrade’s testimony

        During direct examination, the Government asked Ms. Andrade about several

  women associated with Mr. Coulter, including Ms. Diaz and Ms. Biggers.

  Ms. Andrade said Ms. Diaz “passed away” because “[s]he was given a hotshot,”

  ROA, Vol. III at 425, a cocktail of drugs designed to induce an overdose. Id. at 427.

        6
            “[D]addy” is a reference to Mr. Coulter.

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  The Government asked, “[W]ho gave [Ms. Diaz] a hotshot?” Id. at 425-26. Defense

  counsel objected on relevance grounds. Id. The district court sustained the objection

  and forbade the Government from eliciting any testimony that “might raise an

  inference that [Mr. Coulter is] responsible for this girl’s death.” Id. at 427.

  Ms. Andrade also testified that Ms. Biggers had “passed away,” but Mr. Coulter did

  not object to that testimony. Id. at 425.

         c. The Government’s closing argument

         During the closing argument, the prosecutor briefly referenced Ms. Diaz’s

  death, saying “Lizzie Diaz died while [Mr. Coulter] was in jail, and Mr. Coulter told

  Ms. Mullins, according to her, ‘We shouldn’t let bad things happen to daddy.’”

  ROA, Vol. III at 928. Mr. Coulter did not object to this statement. Id. at 928-29.

     Analysis

         a. Confrontation Clause

         Mr. Coulter contends that the testimony from Ms. Mullins and Ms. Andrade

  about Ms. Diaz’s and Ms. Biggers’s deaths violated the Confrontation Clause.

  Aplt. Br. at 16. Mr. Coulter has waived this argument.

                i. Standard of review and waiver

         “[W]here a Confrontation Clause objection is not explicitly made below we

  will not address the constitutional issue in the absence of a conclusion that it was

  plain error for the district court to fail to raise the constitutional issue sua sponte

  . . . .” United States v. Perez, 989 F.2d 1574, 1582 (10th Cir. 1993) (en banc);

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  see also Ibarra-Diaz, 805 F.3d at 919-20 (applying plain error review to an

  unpreserved Confrontation Clause argument).

         When a defendant fails to preserve a Confrontation Clause challenge in the

  district court and also fails to “argue for the plain error standard in his opening

  brief,” he has generally waived the issue. United States v. MacKay, 715 F.3d 807,

  834 (10th Cir. 2013); see also United States v. Leffler, 942 F.3d 1192, 1196

  (10th Cir. 2019) (“When an appellant fails to preserve an issue and also fails to make

  a plain-error argument on appeal, we ordinarily deem the issue waived (rather than

  merely forfeited) and decline to review the issue at all—for plain error or

  otherwise.”). We have exercised our discretion to consider plain error arguments

  raised for the first time in an appellant’s reply brief, but seldom do so if (1) the

  appellant clearly forfeited the issue below and (2) the appellant’s failure to argue for

  plain error review in the opening brief appears to be intentional. Leffler, 942 F.3d

  at 1198.

                ii. Application

         Mr. Coulter did not make a Confrontation Clause objection in district court.

  Instead, he objected to Ms. Mullins’s testimony on hearsay and speculation grounds

  and to Ms. Andrade’s testimony on relevance grounds. See ROA, Vol. III at 204-06;

  425-26. Because “a Confrontation Clause objection [was] not explicitly made

  below,” we review for plain error. Perez, 989 F.2d at 1582.

         Mr. Coulter makes no plain error arguments in his opening brief. He instead

  asserts that we should review his Confrontation Clause claim de novo. Aplt. Br.

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  at 15. In his reply brief, Mr. Coulter states that “reviewing the testimony . . . under

  the plain error standard” entitles him to relief, Aplt. Reply Br. at 8, but he does not

  address the elements of plain error. Because Mr. Coulter fails to argue for plain error

  in his opening brief or discuss the elements of the standard in his reply brief, he has

  waived the issue. MacKay, 715 F.3d at 834.7

        b. Hearsay

        Mr. Coulter argues that the testimony about Ms. Diaz’s and Ms. Biggers’s

  deaths was inadmissible hearsay. Aplt. Br. at 33-36. Mr. Coulter preserved only one

  hearsay argument: the overruling of his objection to the Government’s redirect

  examination of Ms. Mullins about the manner of Ms. Diaz’s death. ROA, Vol. III

  at 204-06.

               i. Waiver

        Mr. Coulter forfeited any hearsay challenge to the remaining portions of Ms.

  Mullins’s and Ms. Andrade’s testimony about Ms. Diaz’s and Ms. Biggers’s deaths.

  Mr. Coulter objected to Ms. Andrade’s testimony on relevance, not hearsay grounds.

  ROA, Vol. III at 425-26. The district court also sustained his objection and

  prevented the testimony from continuing. Id. Mr. Coulter failed to object to Ms.

        7
          The argument also fails on the merits because Mr. Coulter concedes in his
  reply brief that he “never claimed the hearsay testimony regarding the killing/deaths
  of Ms. Diaz and Ms. Biggers were testimonial statements.” Aplt. Reply Br. at 6. The
  Confrontation Clause applies only to “testimonial” statements by out-of-court
  declarants. Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 354 (2011); see also Hemphill v. New
  York, 142 S. Ct. 681, 690 (2022).

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  Mullins’s and Ms. Andrade’s testimony about Ms. Biggers’s death. ROA, Vol. III at

  210, 425.

        On appeal, Mr. Coulter fails to argue plain error in his opening brief.

  See Aplt. Br. at 35-36. In his reply brief, he asserts that “[e]ven reviewing the

  testimony about Ms. Bigger’s [sic] death . . . under the plain error standard,” he is

  entitled to relief. Aplt. Reply Br. at 8. But he still fails to show how he has satisfied

  the four elements of plain error review. See id. at 8-9. Thus, he waived the issue.

  Leffler, 942 F.3d at 1198. This leaves only Mr. Coulter’s hearsay challenge to

  Ms. Mullins’s testimony on redirect about the manner of Ms. Diaz’s death.

               ii. Ms. Mullins’s testimony about Ms. Diaz

                      1) Standard of review

        “We review the district court’s evidentiary rulings”—including decisions

  about hearsay—“for an abuse of discretion, considering the record as a whole.”

  United States v. Lovato, 950 F.3d 1337, 1341 (10th Cir. 2020) (quotations omitted).

        “Any error, defect, irregularity, or variance that does not affect substantial

  rights must be disregarded.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a); see United States v. Jones,

  818 F.3d 1091, 1101 (10th Cir. 2016). Under this standard, “[a]n error is harmless

  unless it had a substantial influence on the outcome or leaves one in grave doubt as to

  whether it had such effect.” Jones, 818 F.3d at 1101 (quotations omitted).

        “We ‘review[] the record as a whole de novo to evaluate whether the error

  [was] harmless, examining the context, timing, and use of the erroneously admitted

  evidence at trial and how it compares to properly admitted evidence.’” United States

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  v. Blechman, 657 F.3d 1052, 1067 (10th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v.

  Hanzlicek, 187 F.3d 1228, 1237 (10th Cir. 1999)). “A nonconstitutional error is

  reversible unless the Government can prove harmlessness by a preponderance of the

  evidence.” Jones, 818 F.3d at 1101.

                      2) Legal background

        “A witness may testify to a matter only if evidence is introduced sufficient to

  support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter.” Fed. R.

  Evid. 602. “If, however, the witness merely has personal knowledge of an out-of-

  court statement offered to prove the fact asserted in that statement—but not the

  underlying fact—then his or her testimony must comply with the hearsay rule.”

  United States v. Gutierrez de Lopez, 761 F.3d 1123, 1132 (10th Cir. 2014).

        “‘Hearsay’ means a statement that: (1) the declarant does not make while

  testifying at the current trial or hearing; and (2) a party offers in evidence to prove

  the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.” Fed. R. Evid. 801(c). Hearsay is

  generally inadmissible. Fed. R. Evid. 802.

                      3) Application

        Ms. Mullins’s testimony about Ms. Diaz’s death was hearsay. First, there was

  no “evidence [] sufficient to support a finding that” she “ha[d] personal knowledge

  of” Ms. Diaz’s death. Gutierrez de Lopez, 761 F.3d at 1132 (citation omitted).8

        8
          In his brief, Mr. Coulter mostly refers to the testimony about Ms. Diaz’s
  death as “hearsay,” but occasionally refers to it as “speculation.” See, e.g., Aplt.
  Br. at 16. Ms. Mullins’s testimony about Ms. Diaz’s death was hearsay rather than
  speculation because it was based on out-of-court statements rather than mere
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  Instead, Ms. Mullins “merely ha[d] personal knowledge of [] out-of-court

  statement[s]” about Ms. Diaz’s death. Id. Second, in context, the Government

  elicited this testimony to “prove the fact of the matter asserted in th[e]

  statement[s]”—namely, that Ms. Diaz had died due to a drug overdose. Id. Her

  testimony was therefore hearsay. See id.

         The district court overruled Mr. Coulter’s hearsay objection, concluding that

  defense counsel “opened the door” on cross-examination of Ms. Mullins to rebuttal

  testimony about the manner of Ms. Diaz’s death. ROA, Vol. III at 204-06. Mr.

  Coulter disagrees. Aplt. Br. at 16. On appeal, the Government argues that Mr. Coulter

  opened the door, but that even if he did not, any error was harmless. See Aplee. Br.

  at 18-19; id. at 37-38.

         We agree with the Government that it can prove by a preponderance that any

  hearsay error was harmless. We thus need not decide whether Mr. Coulter’s counsel

  opened the door to testimony about Ms. Diaz’s death. Based on the overwhelming

  evidence of Mr. Coulter’s guilt, we are not “in grave doubt as to whether” any such

  error “ha[d] a substantial influence on the outcome of the trial.” Blechman, 657 F.3d

  at 1067 (quotations omitted). We make that determination in light of “the record as a

  whole,” considering “the context, timing, and use of the erroneously admitted

  evidence.” Id. (quotations omitted). The testimony from Doe 1, Ms. Andrade, the

  guesswork: she testified that “[t]hey said” Ms. Diaz died of “a drug overdose.”
  ROA, Vol. III at 204-06. See Hayes v. SkyWest Airlines, Inc., 12 F.4th 1186, 1208
  (10th Cir. 2021).

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  former client, and other witnesses, as well as the cell phone records, showed that Mr.

  Coulter solicited clients for Doe 1 and instructed her on how to perform commercial

  sex transactions. No part of the Government’s case depended on Ms. Diaz’s death.

        In light of this evidence, any prejudice resulting from Ms. Mullins’s and

  Ms. Andrade’s references to Ms. Diaz’s death was comparatively insignificant.

  Ms. Mullins’s discussion of Ms. Diaz was a small fraction of her testimony.

  Moreover, when the Government attempted to connect Ms. Diaz’s death to

  Mr. Coulter during Ms. Andrade’s testimony later in the trial, the district court

  prevented the Government from eliciting testimony that Mr. Coulter was involved.

  ROA, Vol. III at 427. Indeed, Ms. Mullins testified that Mr. Coulter was in jail at the

  time of Ms. Diaz’s death. ROA, Vol. III at 204-06. When the Government

  referenced Ms. Diaz’s death in its closing argument, it stated that “Lizzie Diaz died

  while [Mr. Coulter] was in jail,” ROA, Vol. III at 928, weakening any inference that

  Mr. Coulter was involved in her death. Given the “context, timing, and use” of the

  evidence about Ms. Diaz’s death, any erroneous admission of the evidence did not

  have “a substantial influence on the outcome of the trial.” Blechman, 657 F.3d

  at 1067 (quotations omitted).

        c. Prosecutorial misconduct

        Mr. Coulter argues the prosecution engaged in misconduct by asking about

  Ms. Diaz’s and Ms. Biggers’s deaths and referencing Ms. Diaz’s death in closing

  argument. Aplt. Br. at 24. We disagree.

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                 i. Standard of review

        Mr. Coulter did not raise a contemporaneous prosecutorial misconduct

  objection when the Government asked about Ms. Diaz’s and Ms. Biggers’s deaths,

  ROA, Vol. III at 204-06, 210, 425-26, nor when it mentioned Ms. Diaz’s death in

  closing argument, ROA, Vol. III at 928, so we “review the district court’s failure to

  grant a mistrial sua sponte based on prosecutorial misconduct for plain error.”

  United States v. Anaya, 727 F.3d 1043, 1059 (10th Cir. 2013).

                 ii. Legal background

        A prosecutor may commit misconduct by eliciting improper and prejudicial

  witness testimony. See, e.g., United States v. Green, 435 F.3d 1265, 1268-69

  (10th Cir. 2006). A prosecutor’s questions to witnesses are not improper if the

  questions elicit testimony for a “permissible purpose.” United States v. Shamo,

  36 F.4th 1067, 1080 (10th Cir. 2022); see also United States v. Lonedog, 929 F.2d

  568, 573 (10th Cir. 1991).

        A prosecutor may also commit misconduct by making improper comments

  during closing argument. United States v. Christy, 916 F.3d 814, 824-25

  (10th Cir. 2019). In assessing a misconduct claim on this ground, “(1) the court first

  decides whether the prosecutor’s comments were improper, and (2) if so, it examines

  their likely effect on the jury’s verdict.” Id. at 824. A prosecutor’s comments are

  generally improper if they distort the record or encourage the jury to base its decision

  on irrelevant considerations. Id. at 824-25 (summarizing categories of improper

  statements).

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         If a prosecutor acted improperly, we must then assess “whether the c[onduct]

  affected the jury’s verdict” in light of “the trial as a whole.” Id. at 826 (citations

  omitted).

                iii. Application

         Mr. Coulter asserts he has shown plain error stemming from (1) the

  Government’s questions about the deaths of Ms. Diaz and Ms. Biggers and (2) the

  prosecution’s reference to Ms. Diaz’s death during its closing argument. Aplt. Br.

  at 32. His arguments are lacking.

         Mr. Coulter has not shown that the Government acted improperly in

  questioning Ms. Mullins and Ms. Andrade about the deaths of Ms. Diaz and Ms.

  Biggers. The Government argues it asked Ms. Mullins and Ms. Andrade about Ms.

  Diaz’s death to “provide[] context to the dynamic of the relationship between Coulter

  and the victims he employed.” Aplee. Br. at 35. It contends that Mr. Coulter used

  Ms. Diaz’s death to “intimidate[] his victims” by implying that “had [Ms. Diaz]

  protected Coulter from going to prison, he might have been able to protect Ms. Diaz

  and prevent her death.” Id. As for Ms. Biggers, the Government argues that

  testimony about her death provided additional context about Mr. Coulter’s

  relationship with the women who worked for him, and points out that none of its

  questions about Ms. Biggers suggested that Mr. Coulter was involved in her death.

  Id. at 28-29. We find these points persuasive, and Mr. Coulter does not refute them.

  He thus has not shown that the Government elicited this testimony for an

  impermissible purpose. Shamo, 36 F.4th at 1080.

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        Similarly, Mr. Coulter has not shown that the prosecutor’s closing argument

  comments about Ms. Diaz were improper. Christy, 916 F.3d at 824-25. The

  Government explains that in quoting Mr. Coulter as saying “[w]e shouldn’t let bad

  things happen to Daddy,” ROA, Vol. III at 928, it “illustrate[d] his callous treatment

  of the women who worked for him,” Aplee. Br. at 35. The Government’s use of

  Mr. Coulter’s statement neither distorted the record nor encouraged the jury to base

  its decision on irrelevant considerations. Christy, 916 F.3d at 824-25.

        And even if the Government acted improperly in examining Ms. Mullins and

  Ms. Andrade or referencing Ms. Diaz’s death in closing argument, Mr. Coulter fails

  at the second and third prongs of plain error review. He has not demonstrated that

  the alleged error was “clear or obvious under current law,” Mullins, 613 F.3d at 1283

  (quotations omitted), by citing Tenth Circuit or Supreme Court precedent.

  DeChristopher, 695 F.3d at 1091. And he has not shown “a reasonable probability

  that, but for the error claimed, the result of the proceeding would have been

  different,” Bustamante-Conchas, 850 F.3d at 1138 (quotations omitted), given the

  “overwhelming evidence of his guilt,” Ibarra-Diaz, 805 F.3d at 926. Any prejudice

  here was minimal because the evidence did not suggest that Mr. Coulter was involved

  in the deaths. Ms. Mullins testified that Mr. Coulter was in prison when Ms. Diaz

  died, ROA, Vol. III at 205-06, and Ms. Andrade said nothing to indicate that Mr.

  Coulter was responsible for Ms. Biggers’s death.

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                              C. Doe 1’s Guardian Ad Litem

         Mr. Coulter argues that the guardian ad litem’s mouthing “you’re doing a good

  job” to Doe 1 during her testimony constituted improper bolstering in violation of his

  “Sixth Amendment rights to an impartial jury” and his right to a fair trial. Aplt. Br.

  at 47. We disagree.

     Standard of Review

         Mr. Coulter objected to the guardian ad litem’s conduct when it occurred.

  ROA, Vol. III at 690. The district court sustained the objection and delivered a

  curative jury instruction. Id. at 697-89. Because Mr. Coulter “fail[ed] to object to

  the adequacy of the curative action or ask for a mistrial, we review for plain error.”

  United States v. Anaya, 727 F.3d 1043, 1052 (10th Cir. 2013).9

     Legal Background

         “‘Vouching,’ or ‘an assurance by the prosecuting attorney of the credibility of

  a government witness through personal knowledge or by other information outside of

  the testimony before the jury,’ amounts to improper prosecutorial conduct.”

  Littlejohn v. Trammell, 704 F.3d 817, 837 (10th Cir. 2013) (quoting Lam v. Kelchner,

  304 F.3d 256, 271 (3d Cir. 2002)). This improper conduct “can result in

  constitutional error” in two ways: (1) “prejudice a specific right . . . [so] as to

         9
          Both Mr. Coulter and the Government agree that plain error review applies
  despite Mr. Coulter’s contemporaneous objection to the guardian ad litem’s conduct.
  Aplt. Br. at 47; Aplee. Br. at 59.

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  amount to a denial of that right” or (2) “render a [defendant’s] trial so fundamentally

  unfair as to deny him due process.” Littlejohn, 704 F.3d at 837 (quotations omitted).

        A statement about a witness’s credibility is improper bolstering only if the

  prosecutor “explicitly or implicitly guarantee[s] that the witness[’s] statements were

  true.” United States v. Brooks, 736 F.3d 921, 935 (10th Cir. 2013). We have applied

  the prohibition on bolstering to statements by prosecutors and individuals affiliated

  with the prosecution. For example, in Brooks, we considered whether a law

  enforcement officer improperly bolstered cooperating witnesses by testifying “about

  how [they] conferred with the government on the scope and substance of their

  testimony.” Id. at 934.

        But we have never applied the doctrine to statements by third parties

  unaffiliated with the prosecution. Instead, when a defendant claims a third party

  acted inappropriately at trial, we typically assess whether the third party’s behavior

  violated the defendant’s Fifth Amendment right to due process. In United States v.

  Dixon, for example, a witness mouthed “I am sorry” to the defendant after giving

  testimony against him. 268 F. App’x 767, 770 (10th Cir. 2008) (unpublished). The

  defendant argued that this violated due process because it unfairly reinforced the

  witness’s credibility. Id. We disagreed, holding that “[e]ven if the jury may have

  viewed [the witness’s] apology as enhancing her credibility to some degree, it

  certainly did not bolster it so much as to warrant a new trial.” Id.; see also United

  States v. Encinias, 123 F. App’x 924, 942 (10th Cir. 2005) (unpublished) (rejecting a

  defendant’s due process claim based on a victim’s mother’s outburst).

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        When the district court issues a curative instruction, “we presume the jury

  followed the instruction.” Abuan v. Level 3 Commc’ns, Inc., 353 F.3d 1158, 1175

  (10th Cir. 2003).

     Application

        We discern no error, let alone plain error. We have never held that a statement

  by a third party unaffiliated with the prosecution can constitute improper bolstering.

  Mr. Coulter presents no argument or authority suggesting that a guardian ad litem or

  a similarly situated third party may commit improper bolstering. See Littlejohn,

  704 F.3d at 837 (bolstering is “an assurance by the prosecuting attorney of the

  credibility of a government witness” (quotations omitted)).

        Even if the bolstering doctrine applies to third parties, the guardian ad litem’s

  conduct was not improper bolstering, which occurs only with “explicit[] or implicit[]

  guarantee[s] that the witness[’s] statements were true.” Brooks, 736 F.3d at 935. In

  context, the guardian ad litem’s “doing a good job” message was an attempt to

  reassure Doe 1 rather than a guarantee that Doe 1 was telling the truth. See State v.

  Smith, 780 N.E.2d 221, 232 (Ohio 2002) (a prosecutor did not bolster a witness by

  “telling her she was doing a good job,” because he “was simply reassuring [the

  witness] in the midst of her difficult testimony”). The guardian ad litem’s conduct

  thus did not violate Mr. Coulter’s Sixth Amendment rights.

        Although some of our cases have discussed due process challenges based on a

  third party’s inappropriate or distracting conduct during a trial, see Dixon,

  268 F. App’x at 770; Encinias, 123 F. App’x at 942, Mr. Coulter does not cite these

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  cases, nor does he use the phrase “due process” in connection with the guardian ad

  litem. See Aplt. Br. at 46-48. Thus, although Mr. Coulter claims that “the [guardian

  ad litem’s] actions . . . caused his trial to be fundamentally unfair,” Aplt. Br. at 47, he

  does not develop a due process fairness argument.

         But even if he had, the guardian ad litem’s conduct did not render Mr.

  Coulter’s trial unfair. It appears that Mr. Coulter’s attorney was the only person who

  saw the alleged interaction between the guardian ad litem and Doe 1. ROA, Vol. III

  at 690. If any jurors saw the interaction, it is unlikely that it affected the outcome of

  the trial. As we held in Dixon, “[e]ven if the jury may have viewed” the guardian’s

  conduct “as enhancing [Doe 1’]s credibility to some degree, it certainly did not

  bolster it so much as to warrant a new trial.” 268 F. App’x at 770.

         Finally, the district court delivered a curative instruction telling the jury to

  disregard any communication between the guardian ad litem and Doe 1. We

  “presume the jury followed th[at] instruction,” Abuan, 353 F.3d at 1175, and Mr.

  Coulter has presented nothing to suggest otherwise.

                    D. The District Court’s Interactions with the Jury

         Mr. Coulter challenges the district court’s post-trial interactions with the jury

  on various grounds. Because we find the court did not abuse its discretion, we

  affirm.

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     Additional Procedural History

         After the parties’ closing arguments, the district court delivered the jury

  instructions, which included a standard instruction encouraging the jury to try to achieve

  unanimity.

         The jury retired to deliberate at 12:36 p.m. on Friday, July 19. At 5:21 p.m., the

  district court received the following written question from the jury: “[W]hat do we do if

  we are unable to vote a unanimous verdict for Count 3?” ROA, Vol. III at 973. The

  district court responded in writing that the jury should review the instruction on how to

  deliberate, and that “[i]f you cannot reach a unanimous verdict on any particular count

  and believe you are hopelessly deadlocked, you may return a partial verdict on other

  counts on which you unanimously agree.” Id. at 973-74.

         At 6:45 p.m., the jury signaled it had reached a verdict. The foreperson said that

  the jury could not reach agreement on Count 3 but found Mr. Coulter guilty on Counts 1

  and 2. The district court announced the verdict on the first two counts and asked the

  jurors to “indicate by raising [their] hands” whether “the verdict constitute[s] [their]

  unanimous verdict.” Id. at 979. One juror, Ms. Noland, did not raise her hand. Id.

  When the court questioned her about whether the verdict on Counts 1 and 2 represented

  her vote, she responded, “No.” Id. at 979-80.

         The district court, after consulting with both parties, told the jury, “I’m going to

  give you an instruction fairly quickly with respect to what we’re going to do for the rest

  of the evening.” Id. at 980. He then sent the jury back to the jury room to continue its

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  deliberations. Ms. Noland, however, became “emotional” and refused to return to the

  jury room. Id. at 982. The court decided to send the jury home for the weekend.

         On Monday morning, Mr. Coulter filed a motion for a mistrial, arguing that (1) the

  jury’s deliberations were no longer secret and (2) the district court pressured the jury to

  reach a unanimous verdict when it answered the jury’s written question about deadlock

  by directing its attention to the instruction on how to deliberate. ROA, Vol. I at 480-82.

  The court denied the motion for a mistrial and decided—over Mr. Coulter’s objection—

  to talk with Ms. Noland outside the presence of the remaining jurors to determine

  whether she would be willing to continue deliberating. ROA, Vol. III at 1000.

         The district court brought Ms. Noland into chambers. The judge assured her that

  she “didn’t do anything wrong” and was “not in trouble.” Id. at 1006-07. He also

  reminded her that she should not discuss “how anybody is voting in the deliberation

  room.” Id. at 1007. Then the judge asked her whether she was “ready, willing, and able

  to continue to deliberate with the other jurors” and “able to follow [the court’s]

  instructions on the law.” Id. at 1007-08. Ms. Noland said she was. Id. The judge

  reminded her that “there is a process for the jury to communicate with me that you can’t

  reach a unanimous agreement,” and asked her to return to the courtroom. Id. at 1008. As

  she was leaving, Ms. Noland remarked that she “felt like [she] was at the principal’s

  office.” Id.

         Back in the courtroom, the district court delivered the following Allen instruction:

                 Members of the jury, I’m going to ask that you return to the
                 jury room and deliberate further. I realize that you are having
                 some difficulty reaching a unanimous agreement but that is

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                not unusual. Sometimes, after further discussions, jurors are
                able to work out their differences and agree. This is an
                important case. If you should fail to agree upon a verdict, the
                case is left open and must be tried again. Obviously, another
                trial would require the parties to make another large
                investment of time and effort, and there is no reason to
                believe that the case can be tried again by either side better or
                more exhaustively than it has been tried before you . . . . In
                the course of your deliberations, do not hesitate to re-examine
                your own views and change your opinion if you are
                convinced it is erroneous. But do not surrender your honest
                conviction as to the weight or effect of the evidence solely
                because of the opinion of your fellow jurors or for the mere
                purpose of returning a verdict. What I have just said is not
                meant to rush or pressure you into agreeing on a verdict.
                Take as much time as you need to discuss things. There is no
                hurry. I will now ask that you retire once again and continue
                your deliberations with these additional comments in mind to
                be applied, of course, in conjunction with all of the
                instructions I have previously given to you.

  ROA, Vol. III at 1012-13. Mr. Coulter did not object to this instruction. See id.

  at 1010-11. The jury resumed deliberating at 10:34 a.m.

         At 2:07 p.m., the jury again indicated that it had reached a verdict. It reported a

  deadlock on Count 3, but said it had reached a unanimous guilty verdict on Counts 1 and

  2. The district court declared a mistrial as to Count 3, and announced the verdict on the

  first two counts. The court again polled the jury. All jurors, including Ms. Noland,

  raised their hands to manifest agreement with the published verdict. Id. at 1016-17.

     Standard of Review

         We review the district court’s management and decisions about jury

  deliberations for abuse of discretion. This includes whether to poll the jury sua

  sponte, to declare a mistrial or direct the jury to continue to deliberate, to investigate

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  potential problems with jury deliberations, and to deliver an Allen instruction

  encouraging the jury to try to reach unanimity. See United States v. Shamo,

  36 F.4th 1067, 1080 (10th Cir. 2022); United States v. Cornelius, 696 F.3d 1307,

  1321 (10th Cir. 2012); United States v. Zabriskie, 415 F.3d 1139, 1147

  (10th Cir. 2005).

     Analysis

        Mr. Coulter argues that the district court abused its discretion by placing

  improper pressure on the jury to reach a unanimous verdict in violation of his Sixth

  Amendment right to an impartial jury. Aplt. Br. at 44; see Zabriskie, 415 F.3d

  at 1148.10 He contends that the court should instead have granted his motion for a

  mistrial. Aplt. Br. at 40. We disagree.

        a. Jury poll and numerical inquiry

        Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 31(d) provides:

                After a verdict is returned but before the jury is
                discharged, the court must on a party’s request, or may on
                its own, poll the jurors individually. If the poll reveals a
                lack of unanimity, the court may direct the jury to
                deliberate further or may declare a mistrial and discharge
                the jury.

        Mr. Coulter suggests on appeal that the district court should not have polled

  the jury. See, e.g., Aplt. Br. at 44-45. Specifically, he contends the district court

  violated Brasfield v. United States, 272 U.S. 448 (1926), in which the Supreme Court

        10
            We address challenges to the district court’s post-trial interactions with the
  jury that Mr. Coulter appears to raise on appeal.

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  held that a trial court may not “inquire[] how [the jury] was divided numerically”

  during jury deliberations. Id. at 449.11 The Court reasoned that such numerical

  inquiries exert a “coercive . . . [and] improper influence upon the jury” to reach a

  unanimous verdict. Id. at 450.

        Because the jury poll revealed that only one juror did not acquiesce in the

  verdict, Mr. Coulter suggests that the poll was an improper “numerical inquiry”

  under Brasfield. Aplt. Br. at 44. We disagree. In Brasfield, after the jury said it was

  deadlocked, the trial court inquired about the number of votes for guilt and for

  acquittal. 272 U.S. at 449. Here, by contrast, the district court polled the jury only

  after it rendered a verdict, and the court had no reason to suspect the verdict was not

  unanimous. Once the poll revealed that Ms. Noland did not agree with the verdict,

  the court conducted no further inquiries about Ms. Noland’s position or that of other

  jurors. As far as the district court was aware, Ms. Noland could have disagreed with

  the verdict as to Count 1, Count 2, or both, or could have wished to continue

  deliberating on Count 3. The court did not conduct a “numerical inquiry” and thus

  did not violate Brasfield.

        The Supreme Court and our circuit have repeatedly rejected efforts to expand

  the Brasfield principle to standard jury polls. See, e.g., Lowenfield v. Phelps,

        11
           Mr. Coulter alluded to this argument in his motion for a mistrial, though he
  did not cite Brasfield. See ROA, Vol. I at 480-81. He argued that the jury poll
  revealed Ms. Noland’s vote, making the jury’s deliberations no longer secret and
  imposing pressure on her to assent to the verdict. Id.

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  484 U.S. 231, 239-40 (1988) (an Allen charge, combined with non-numerical jury

  polling, did not violate the Brasfield rule); Gafford v. Warden, U.S. Penitentiary,

  Leavenworth, Kan., 434 F.2d 318, 319 (10th Cir. 1970) (declining to extend Brasfield

  to jury polls); United States v. Alvarez-Pasillas, 159 F. App’x 42, 45 (10th Cir. 2005)

  (unpublished) (district court has discretion to direct further deliberations after polling

  the jury); United States v. Smith, 562 F.2d 619, 622 (10th Cir. 1977) (same). This

  precedent is consistent with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 31(d), which gives

  the district court the discretion to poll the jury and, if the poll reveals a lack of

  unanimity, to declare a mistrial or direct further deliberations.12 Mr. Coulter’s

  argument based on Brasfield thus lacks merit.

         The district court therefore acted within its discretion when it polled the jury.

  If a poll shows that the jurors are not unanimous, “Rule 31(d) vests in the trial court

  broad discretion whether to declare a mistrial or order the jury to resume

  deliberations.” Alvarez-Pasillas, 159 F. App’x at 45. This is because “[t]he trial

  judge ‘is in a better position than the appellate court to determine the effect of a

  dissenting or uncertain vote upon the likelihood that further deliberations will yield a

  freely given verdict.’” Id. (quoting Smith, 562 F.2d at 622).

         12
           Brasfield “makes no mention of the Due Process Clause or any other
  constitutional provision.” Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 240 n.3. We thus have interpreted
  Brasfield as “an exercise of [the appellate court’s] supervisory powers . . . not a
  constitutional holding.” Gilbert v. Mullin, 302 F.3d 1166, 1176 (10th Cir. 2002)
  (quotations omitted).

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         Here, when the poll “reveal[ed] a lack of unanimity,” the court acted within its

  discretion by “direct[ing] the jury to deliberate further” rather than declaring a

  mistrial. Id. The court was in “a better position” than we are “to determine the effect

  of” Ms. Noland’s dissent on the likelihood that the jury could reach a unanimous

  verdict. Smith, 562 F.2d at 622. Mr. Coulter presents no argument that the district

  court acted unreasonably when it polled the jury and decided that further

  deliberations could be productive.

         b. Pressure on Ms. Noland from other jurors

         Mr. Coulter suggests that when the district court ordered the jury to return to

  deliberations after Ms. Noland revealed her dissenting vote, she may have faced

  pressure from the other jurors to reach a unanimous verdict. Aplt. Br. at 44

  (Ms. Noland’s unwillingness to return to the deliberations “indicates she was feeling

  undue pressure from the other jurors”). This argument is speculative. Also, when

  addressing arguments that a juror felt pressured to reach a verdict, we typically focus

  on the behavior of the trial court—not other jurors. In Crease v. McKune, 189 F.3d

  1188 (10th Cir. 1999), for example, a juror reported that she “finally voted to convict

  after feeling pressure from other jurors.” Id. at 1194. We nonetheless denied relief

  to the defendant because there was no evidence that the juror “felt [] pressure from

  the judge to vote to convict.” Id. Mr. Coulter presents no authority suggesting that

  the possibility of pressure from other jurors on Ms. Noland, without more, violated

  his constitutional rights.

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        c. The district court’s meeting with Ms. Noland

        Mr. Coulter contends that the district court’s separate meeting with Ms.

  Noland placed “undue coercion and pressure” on her to reach a unanimous verdict.

  Aplt. Br. at 43. He points to her statement that she “felt like [she] was at the

  principal’s office.” Id. (quoting ROA, Vol. III at 1008). We disagree.

        If the district court identifies a potential problem with jury deliberations, it has

  “broad discretion in investigating,” including “separately interviewing” jurors.

  Zabriskie, 415 F.3d at 1147. But the court must not “impose[] such pressure on the

  [members of the] jury such that the accuracy and integrity of their verdict becomes

  uncertain.” Id. at 1148.

        Here, the district court properly exercised its “broad discretion in

  investigating” when it “separately interview[ed]” Ms. Noland. Zabriskie, 415 F.3d

  at 1147.13 The judge told Ms. Noland that she was “not in trouble” and cautioned her

  not to reveal “how anybody is voting.” ROA, Vol. III at 1006-07. He asked Ms.

  Noland only whether she was willing to continue deliberating and follow the law.

  Id. at 1007-08. Although Ms. Noland may have felt nervous—hence the “principal’s

  office” comment—the record fails to show inappropriate pressure to reach a

  unanimous verdict.

        13
           In Zabriskie, we affirmed the district court’s decision to speak separately
  with an individual juror. But we ultimately reversed the conviction because, during
  the one-on-one meeting with the juror, the court gave an individualized Allen
  instruction just to that juror. See 415 F.3d at 1148.

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         d. Allen instruction

         Mr. Coulter suggests that the district court’s giving the Allen instruction was

  coercive and deprived him of his right to a unanimous verdict. Aplt. Br. at 43-46.14

                i. Legal background – Allen instructions

         A district court may deliver an Allen instruction to encourage deliberation.

  See Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896) (approving an instruction

  encouraging a deadlocked jury to continue deliberating). An Allen instruction

  “urg[es] deadlocked jurors to review and reconsider the evidence in the light of the

  views expressed by other jurors so as to avoid a mistrial.” Cornelius, 696 F.3d

  at 1321 (quoting United States v. LaVallee, 439 F.3d 670, 689 (10th Cir. 2006)).

         A district court must not deliver an “improperly coercive” Allen instruction.

  Cornelius, 696 F.3d at 1321. We consider four factors to assess whether an Allen

  instruction is improperly coercive: “(1) the language of the instruction, (2) whether

         14
           In his motion for a mistrial, Mr. Coulter “respectfully submit[ted] his
  objection to another giving and/or instructing to go to a modified Allen instruction
  and/or an Allen instruction,” which “would be impermissibly coercive.” ROA, Vol. I
  at 482 (citation and quotations omitted). In its brief, the Government addresses this
  argument, stating “[i]t is not entirely clear that Coulter is challenging the trial court’s
  decision to give the modified Allen instruction. However, to the extent that the
  coercive nature of Allen instructions was addressed in his motion for mistrial, it
  seems necessary to address this issue.” Aplee. Br. at 54; see id. at 54-57. Although
  Mr. Coulter agreed with the wording of the instruction, ROA, Vol. III at 1010, we
  address his coerciveness objection to the district court’s decision to give it. See
  United States v. Ellzey, 936 F.2d 492, 500 (10th Cir. 1991) (noting a distinction
  between a “general ‘coercion’ objection to [an] Allen instruction” and a specific
  objection to “certain language in the instruction”).

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  the instruction is presented with other instructions, (3) the timing of the instruction,

  and (4) the length of the jury’s subsequent deliberations.” Id. (quotations omitted).

         We elaborated on these factors in Cornelius. The language of an Allen

  instruction is not improperly coercive if it “urge[s] all jurors, not just those in favor

  of acquittal, to reconsider their views” and “stresse[s] the importance of integrity in

  being an impartial, deliberate fact-finder.” Cornelius, 696 F.3d at 1322. When the

  district court presents an Allen instruction after other jury instructions, it should

  inform the jury “to apply the Allen instruction in conjunction with all of the

  instructions the court ha[s] previously given.” Id. If the district court delivers an

  “Allen instruction after the jury informed the court that it was unable to reach a

  verdict,” this “weighs against a determination of improper coercion.” Id. (quotations

  omitted). After the district court delivers the instruction, a “relatively long period of

  further deliberation tends to negate an inference of improper coercion.” Id. at 1323.

  Relatedly, if the jury remains deadlocked on some issues after receiving an Allen

  instruction, that fact “demonstrates that [the jury] was not compelled or coerced to

  reach a unanimous verdict.” United States v. Ailsworth, 138 F.3d 843, 852

  (10th Cir. 1998) (quotations omitted).

                ii. Application

         The district court did not abuse its discretion by delivering the Allen

  instruction. First, like the Allen instructions we have upheld in other cases, the

  court’s instruction “urge[d] all jurors, not just those in favor of acquittal, to

  reconsider their views” and “stresse[d] the importance of . . . being an impartial,

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  deliberate fact-finder.” Cornelius, 696 F.3d at 1322. And Mr. Coulter agreed to the

  language. ROA, Vol. III at 1010. Second, the district court told the jury to apply the

  Allen instruction in conjunction with all its previous instructions, which reduces the

  likelihood of coercion. Id. at 1322. Third, the court delivered the instruction only

  after the jury indicated it was deadlocked, which “weighs against a determination of

  improper coercion.” Id. (quotations omitted). Fourth, the jury deliberated for several

  hours after the district court delivered the Allen instruction. See ROA, Vol. III

  at 1013-14. This “relatively long period” “tends to negate an inference of improper

  coercion.” Cornelius, 696 F.3d at 1323; see also LaVallee, 439 F.3d at 689 (“several

  hours of deliberation” following an Allen instruction indicates that the instruction did

  not coerce the jury to reach a verdict). Finally, although the jury reached a

  unanimous verdict on the first two counts, it remained deadlocked on Count 3, which

  “demonstrates that it was not compelled or coerced to reach a unanimous verdict.”

  Ailsworth, 138 F.3d at 852 (quotations omitted).

                                         *    *   *     *

         The district court handled its post-trial jury interactions without abusing its

  discretion.

                                     E. Cumulative Error

         Mr. Coulter argues that the cumulative effect of the errors he alleges deprived

  him of due process. Aplt. Br. at 49. We disagree.

         A defendant is entitled to reversal on cumulative error grounds if the cumulative

  effect of the errors he identifies rendered “the trial [] so fundamentally unfair as to deny

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  [him] due process.” United States v. Christy, 916 F.3d 814, 840 (10th Cir. 2019)

  (quotations omitted). “We consider cumulative error only if the appellant has shown at

  least two errors that were harmless.” Id. at 827. Then the “question [becomes] whether

  the two or more harmless errors together constitute prejudicial error.” Id.

         Based on the discussion above, we have identified only one putative error that

  we resolved as harmless: the district court’s admission of hearsay testimony from

  Ms. Mullins regarding Ms. Diaz’s death. Because Mr. Coulter has failed to show “at

  least two errors that were harmless,” Christy, 916 F.3d at 827, we need not progress

  further in the cumulative error analysis.

                                    III. CONCLUSION

         We affirm the district court.

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