Court Opinion

ID: 9370447
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-13 18:00:38.890794+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:21.679072
License: Public Domain

FILED
                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION
                                                                               FEB 13 2023
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                            U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

                            FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

RENZO CHIARELLA-CERRON,                          No.   18-71261

              Petitioner,                        Agency No. A095-775-192

 v.
                                                 MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,

              Respondent.

                     On Petition for Review of an Order of the
                         Board of Immigration Appeals

                            Submitted February 9, 2023**
                               Pasadena, California

Before: SCHROEDER, TALLMAN, and IKUTA, Circuit Judges.

      Renzo Chiarella-Cerron seeks review of an order of the Board of

Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming the decision of an Immigration Judge (IJ)

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
denying his application for adjustment of status. We have jurisdiction under 8

U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), and we deny the petition.

      In Chiarella-Cerron’s first petition for review, we held (among other things)

that: (1) the BIA did not err in holding, based on the allegations in the felony

complaint, that Chiarella-Cerron was convicted of conspiracy under Section

182(a)(1) of the California Penal Code to commit assault with a deadly weapon in

violation of Section 245(a)(1) of the California Penal Code; and (2) we lacked

jurisdiction over Chiarella-Cerron’s argument that the BIA erred in determining

that he committed a “violent or dangerous” crime as defined in 8 C.F.R. §

212.7(d). Chiarella-Cerron v. Lynch, 610 Fed. App’x 623, 624–25 (9th Cir. 2015).

We granted the petition for the limited purpose of allowing the BIA to reconsider

its determination that Chiarella-Cerron’s conviction was for a crime involving

moral turpitude (CIMT) under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). Id. at 624.

      Given our conclusions in the prior decision, which are law of the case,1 the

only issue properly before us is Chiarella-Cerron’s challenge to the BIA’s

determination on remand that his conviction for conspiracy to commit a violation

      1
        None of the exceptions to the law of the case doctrine apply, see
Valenzuela Gallardo v. Barr, 968 F.3d 1053, 1062 n.5 (9th Cir. 2020), and we are
thus “precluded from reconsidering” the issues decided in our prior disposition,
United States v. Crooked Arm, 853 F.3d 1065, 1069 (9th Cir. 2017).
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of Section 245(a)(1) was a CIMT. The BIA did not err in reaching this conclusion,

because a violation of Section 245(a)(1) is “categorically” a CIMT, Safaryan v.

Barr, 975 F.3d 976, 981 (9th Cir. 2020), and “a conspiracy to commit an offense

involves moral turpitude . . . when the underlying substantive offense is a crime

involving moral turpitude,” Goldeshtein v. INS, 8 F.3d 645, 647 n.6 (9th Cir.

1993); see also Barragan-Lopez v. Mukasey, 508 F.3d 899, 903 (9th Cir. 2007).

Because Chiarella-Cerron was convicted of a CIMT, he was “inadmissible,” 8

U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), and therefore ineligible for adjustment of status in the

absence of a waiver, see 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(h), 1255(a), see also Safaryan, 975 F.3d

at 980, to which he is not entitled, see Chiarella-Cerron, 610 Fed. App’x at 625.

      PETITION DENIED.

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