Court Opinion

ID: 9537007
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:11:08.903665+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:55:44.224626
License: Public Domain

SERDAHELY, Superior Court Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I generally agree with the majority’s treatment of, and conclusions regarding, the issues of the admissibility of T.M.W.’s prior inconsistent statements, confrontation clause and cross-examination considerations regarding such statements, and the claimed excessiveness of Van Hatten’s sentence. On the question of the effect of Trooper Adams’ testimony, however, I am compelled to respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusions.
More specifically, I generally agree with the majority that “the question of plain error is extremely close” and that pursuant to Gunnerud v. State, 611 P.2d 69 (Alaska 1980), “if a timely objection had been made, the error in referring to Van Hatten’s silence could not be deemed harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” I further agree with the majority that Dorman v. State, 622 P.2d 448 (Alaska 1981) (wherein the prosecutor commented during final argument upon the defendant’s invocation of his right to remain silent) is distinguishable from the instant ease. And, I also agree with the majority’s conclusion that in the absence of a timely objection at trial, a defendant seeking to establish plain error for the first time on appeal should meet a standard more stringent than the “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” test, i.e., should show some prejudice or that the alleged error could well have affected the jury’s verdict.
Given the foregoing, however, I am unable to conclude that the challenged testimony in the instant case was not prejudicial to the defendant or did not, in some meaningful way, affect the jury’s verdict. Rather, I believe that the Alaska Supreme Court’s comment in Gunnerud applies with equal force to this case:
We can see no reason why it was necessary for the prosecution to introduce the portion of the recording into evidence other than to show an inference of guilt at the expense of the appellant’s rights to counsel and to remain silent.
611 P.2d at 76 (footnotes omitted).
Accordingly, consistent with the policy and holding of Gunnerud, I would reverse the judgment of the lower court on this issue and remand the case for a new trial.