Court Opinion

ID: 9585293
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:58:40.61269+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:37:57.517911
License: Public Domain

HENDERSON, Justice
(dissenting).
Appellant, a doctor, suffers from a permanent, progressively disabling disease known as multiple sclerosis. He is but 44 years of age but, with great courage, battles on in life and continues to try to maintain the practice of medicine.
Appellee, a college graduate, enjoys excellent health and is employed full-time in South Dakota’s largest daily newspaper, the Argus Leader, in Sioux Falls. Her representations of ill health (bad back, as an example — two treatments per year) ring hollow. Her phobia is in no way disabling and does not prevent her from holding down a full-time job. Her “severe neck injury” is totally unsupported by any medical testimony or supporting affidavit. In view of her uninterrupted and permanent employment, and not demonstrating large medical expense or corroboration by medical expertise, it is highly suspect that ap-pellee truly suffers serious physical ailments which prevent her from living a normal life. One notes that she builds her required expenses by a showing in her affidavit that she gives gifts of $50 per month and spends $125 per month for “miscellaneous and entertainment.” One cannot discern from any showing that she must maintain an office or has a continual education pursuit of any kind; yet, she claims $35 per month for “educational and office expenses.” This aggregates $210 per month of, out and out, puffing and exaggeration.
For 16 years, the parties have been divorced; lo, these many years, appellant has paid her smart money, i.e., alimony, but the load in life grows heavy and the yoke of pain intensifies. Rest? Peace? Appellant supplicates. For 16 years hath he paid her alimony; for six years only was he married unto her. If alimony was a necessity as a by-product of this marriage, has not time sown a new moral consciousness?
Appellant’s earning capacity is changed and impaired. A diminishment in income of over 40% exists. Still, appellee would remain in the army of alimony drones.
Due to this continued deterioration in appellant’s health, all alimony should be terminated. By her brow, let her toil for her own bread. An affidavit of Dr. Wilde, one of appellant’s attending physicians, revealed:
[A] deterioration in [appellant’s] state from previous examinations. That deterioration included a marked worsening of the following:
(1) ataxia (balance);
(2) hyperreflexia (which is an indication of new nerve damage within the brain);
(3) marked neurologically induced rectal dysfunction (no ability to control bowel movements);
(4) a neurogenic bladder (this requires manual pressing on the lower stomach in order to urinate);
(5) marked hearing defect (he has hearing aids for both ears and he uses a special stethoscope with an amplifier in his practice of medicine);
(6) fatigue inducing speech defect (when he is tired even though his thought processes are good he cannot follow through with a complete sentence without stopping and restarting);
*905(7) severe episodic vertigo (dizziness— this is different than the condition stated in number 1 above which is a staggering condition as opposed to this which is dizziness);
(8) marked limitation of walking and stair walking;
(9) marked heat intolerance (heat fatigues his nerves; an example, if he is in a hot bathtub, he has difficulty climbing out because of the heat fatiguing his nerves);
(10) bilateral Raynaud’s (when he is out in the cold both his hands will turn white rather than retain.their natural color. The arteries spasm because of nerve damage to the hands from multiple sclerosis);
(11) patient voluntarily has quit driving at night because of vertigo and dysmetria (he has problems with dizziness and depth perception).
Does this read like a man who should pay alimony? Ought he to pay alimony? See Straub v. Straub, 381 N.W.2d 260 (S.D.1986); and Grant v. Grant, 5 S.D. 17, 57 N.W. 1130 (1894).
Dr. Koob has strongly advised appellant to reduce his workload indicating that to continue to work as he has been will hasten the progressive nature of the disease. Appellant’s physical and economic condition, present and future, appear bleak. His doctor affirms his condition will only worsen. Must he drive his ravaged body to total destruction to pay alimony? God forbid that the law, a beautiful conduit to heal wrong, does hereby create wrong. Appellant’s affidavit reflects that he has borrowed time and time again on his life insurance; he turned in his car because he could not make payments on it; he drives a 1973 pickup truck and leases another vehicle. Lacking stamina, he has given up all recreation and his doctors advise him to rest. Biit, can he rest when he is faced with alimony payments? Alimony, employed as it is here, is an instrument of servitude and oppression.
Employing my eighth-grade arithmetic, supplied by the affidavits, I note that appellant’s expenses total $5,206.86. Each itemization of expense appears to be totally valid; one hobby or recreational pursuit does entail $234 for “recreation (horses).” If one were to subtract this, still the money is not there for the alimony payment. Appellant’s expenses exceed his salary. And, as he continues to disintegrate, which is totally predictable by his doctors’ statements as reflected by the file, his income will diminish. There only must be a. change of circumstances to sustain a change in alimony. Lambertz v. Lambertz, 375 N.W.2d 645 (S.D.1985). A change of circumstances doth here exist. It is undisputed and is so recognized under Conclusion of Law 2, which provides: “That there has been a substantial material change in circumstances since the divorce in that the Defendant’s health has seriously deteriorated resulting in his taking a forty-one percent (41%) pay cut.” Therefore, let us harken unto the teaching of Lambertz. Notwithstanding this finding, the trial court found in Conclusion of Law 3: “That the Defendant still has sufficient funds to pay his alimony obligation and despite the change of circumstances the sum of $300.00 per month is a reasonable amount for alimony and alimony shall continue.” With Conclusion of Law 3, I respectfully disagree under the rationale of this dissent. A body of law exists for, the general proposition that, in a case such as we have here, alimony should abate and/or terminate. This is founded upon the justice of the case and where an obligor spouse has suffered a serious impairment of health or physical condition which results in a decrease or cessation of income, thus obviously impairing payment of alimony. See 24 Am.Jur.2d Divorce and Separation § 713 (1983).
Appellant’s gross income seems to attract great attention by the majority. It is respectfully suggested that it is the net income which is paramount, not the gross income. First the son came to live with the father and he did support his son; then the daughter came to live with the father and he did support her, also. This record sug*906gests a courageous struggle to maintain a personal existence of the appellant and his two children. Laboring under insurmountable odds, he has generously and graciously also supported his ex-wife. Now, with his doctors advising him, essentially, to recede from his practice and rest or die, he lays his cards on the table and implores the Lady of Equity for amelioration. She should hear his supplication.
We have here before us a continuation of the punishment of the male species — in law. See collection of numerous dissents by this author on alimony in Cole v. Cole, 384 N.W.2d 312, 318 (S.D.1986) (Henderson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Appellee can work, does work, enjoys good health, and a good life. Why must she flog, by alimony payments, this seriously ill man — further shortening his life? Appellant has met his burden of proof of “change of circumstances”; deeming an abuse of discretion (survival, life itself, should be elevated over alimony payments), I respectfully dissent. I fully appreciate the trial court’s discretion is a broad one but it is not uncontrolled. It must be soundly and substantially based upon the evidence. Owen v. Owen, 351 N.W.2d 139 (S.D.1984).
Seven pages exist by way of request for appellee’s attorneys fees; four pages are contained in appellee’s brief. Not for this isolated reason, but for the principal reason that appellee would not be the prevailing party, I would accordingly deny attorneys fees. Let those who trumpet the horn of alimony — hear an echo of dismay.