Court Opinion

ID: 9895357
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-06 20:13:01.689665+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:11.658080
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA

                              September 2023 Term                           FILED
                            _____________________                   November 6, 2023
                                                                         released at 3:00 p.m.

                                 No. 21-0831                         EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK
                                                                     SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
                            _____________________                         OF WEST VIRGINIA

                KANAWHA COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION,
                      Respondent Below, Petitioner,

                                       v.

                 BRENDA HALL AND ANTONIA VAUGHAN,
                      Petitioners Below, Respondents.

       ___________________________________________________________

                 Appeal from the Circuit Court of Kanawha County
                      Honorable Kenneth D. Ballard, Judge
                     Civil Action Nos. 21-AA-3 & 21-AA-4

              REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
        _________________________________________________________

                          Submitted: October 10, 2023
                           Filed: November 6, 2023

Lindsey D. C. McIntosh, Esq.                  Andrew J. Katz, Esq.
General Counsel                               The Katz Working Families’
Kanawha County Board of Education             Law Firm, LC
Charleston, West Virginia                     Charleston, West Virginia
Attorney for Petitioner                       Attorney for Respondents

JUSTICE HUTCHISON delivered the Opinion of the Court.
                              SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

              1.     “When reviewing the appeal of a public employees’ grievance, this

Court reviews decisions of the circuit court under the same standard as that by which the

circuit court reviews the decision of the administrative law judge.” Syl. Pt. 1, Martin v.

Barbour Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 228 W. Va. 238, 719 S.E.2d 406 (2011).

              2.     “Grievance rulings involve a combination of both deferential and

plenary review. Since a reviewing court is obligated to give deference to factual findings

rendered by an administrative law judge, a circuit court is not permitted to substitute its

judgment for that of the hearing examiner with regard to factual determinations. Credibility

determinations made by an administrative law judge are similarly entitled to deference.

Plenary review is conducted as to the conclusions of law and application of law to the facts,

which are reviewed de novo.” Syl. Pt. 1, Cahill v. Mercer Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 208 W. Va.

177, 539 S.E.2d 437 (2000).

              3.     “The presumption is that a statute is intended to operate prospectively,

and not retrospectively, unless it appears, by clear, strong and imperative words or by

necessary implication, that the Legislature intended to give the statute retroactive force and

effect.” Syl. Pt. 4, Taylor v. State Comp. Comm’r, 140 W. Va. 572, 86 S.E.2d 114 (1955).

                                              i
             4.      “The primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give

effect to the intention of the Legislature.” Syl. Pt. 8, Vest v. Cobb, 138 W. Va. 660, 76

S.E.2d 885 (1953).

             5.      “In ascertaining legislative intent, effect must be given to each part of

the statute and to the statute as a whole so as to accomplish the general purpose of the

legislation.” Syl. Pt. 2, Smith v. State Workmen’s Compensation Comm’r, 159 W. Va. 108,

219 S.E.2d 361 (1975).

             6.      “Where a particular construction of a statute would result in an

absurdity, some other reasonable construction, which will not produce such absurdity, will

be made.” Syl. Pt. 2, Newhart v. Pennybacker, 120 W. Va. 774, 200 S.E. 350 (1938).

             7.      “‘That which is necessarily implied in a statute, or must be included

in it in order to make the terms actually used have effect, according to their nature and

ordinary meaning, is as much a part of it as if it had been declared in express terms.’

Syllabus point 14, State v. Harden, 62 W.Va. 313, 58 S.E. 715 (1907).” Syl. Pt. 4, Smith

v. State Workmen’s Compensation Comm’r, 159 W. Va. 108, 219 S.E.2d 361 (1975).

                                             ii
HUTCHISON, Justice:

              The petitioner, the Kanawha County Board of Education, appeals the

September 14, 2021, final order of the Circuit Court of Kanawha County that reversed a

decision of the West Virginia Public Employees Grievance Board and found that the

respondents, Brenda Hall and Antonia Vaughan, educational sign language interpreters

who work with hearing-impaired students in high school classrooms, are full-time special

education teachers and, therefore, qualify for the pay increase provided by West Virginia

Code § 18A-4-2(e) (2019). In this appeal, the petitioner contends that the circuit court

erred by (1) failing to find that the respondents’ appeal of the Grievance Board’s decision

was mooted by the July 5, 2021, amendment to West Virginia Code § 18A-4-2(e); (2)

applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel and finding that respondents are “teachers”

pursuant to a 2014 decision of the Grievance Board; and (3) independently determining

that the respondents are teachers. Upon consideration of the parties’ briefs and oral

argument, the submitted record, and applicable authorities, we find merit to the petitioner’s

arguments and, accordingly, reverse the final order and remand this matter with directions

for the circuit court to enter an order reinstating the Grievance Board’s decision.

                          I. Facts and Procedural Background

              In 2019, the Legislature amended West Virginia Code § 18A-4-2, which sets

forth the State minimum salaries for teachers, and added subsection (e) providing a three-

step salary increase for certain employees, as follows:

                                             1
                      Effective July 1, 2019, each classroom teacher certified
              in special education and employed as a full-time special
              education teacher shall be considered to have three additional
              years of experience only for the purposes of the salary schedule
              set forth in subsection (b) of this section: Provided, That for
              any classroom teacher who satisfies these requirements and
              whose years of experience plus the three additional years due
              to them exceeds the years of experience provided for on the
              salary schedule shall be paid the additional amount equivalent
              to three additional years of experience notwithstanding the
              maximum experience provided on the salary schedule.

W. Va. Code § 18A-4-2(e) (2019). The above subsection was in effect from June 24, 2019,

to July 4, 2021. The statute was then amended to add the phrase “as defined by the State

Superintendent” to subsection (e) and, effective July 5, 2021, provided as follows:

                     Effective July 1, 2019, each classroom teacher certified
              in special education and employed as a full-time special
              education teacher, as defined by the State Superintendent, shall
              be considered to have three additional years of experience only
              for the purposes of the salary schedule set forth in subsection
              (b) of this section: Provided, That for any classroom teacher
              who satisfies these requirements and whose years of
              experience plus the three additional years due to them exceeds
              the years of experience provided for on the salary schedule
              shall be paid the additional amount equivalent to three
              additional years of experience notwithstanding the maximum
              experience provided on the salary schedule.

W. Va. Code § 18A-4-2(e) (2021) (emphasis added). Since then, West Virginia Code §

18A-4-2 has been amended two more times. See W. Va. Code § 18A-4-2 (2022) and West

Virginia Code § 18A-4-2 (2023). While the above provision has been moved to subsection

(d) of the statute, the language has remained the same since 2021 except for the reference

to the salary schedule, which is now located in subsection (a). Id.

                                             2
              Soon after West Virginia Code § 18A-4-2(e) became effective in 2019, the

respondents were informed that they did not qualify for the pay increase. Consequently,

on August 29, 2019, the respondents filed separate grievances 1 maintaining that they are

full-time special education teachers, and, therefore, eligible to receive the pay increase. As

educational sign language interpreters, the respondents spend their workdays in high school

classrooms with hearing-impaired students interpreting the teachers’ materials and content

for them. Ms. Hall has been employed in this capacity for twenty-five of the twenty-six

years she has worked for the petitioner. She is licensed as an associate member of the

Registry of Interpreters for the Deaf (“RID”), which satisfies the requirements of the West

Virginia Commission for the Deaf and Hard of Hearing. Likewise, Ms. Vaughan has her

state licensure and, in addition, national certification. Ms. Vaughan has held her current

position for seven of the twenty-seven years she has been employed by the petitioner. The

respondents have been assigned the Professional Position Code of 330 2 by the West

Virginia Department of Education (hereinafter “Department”).

       See W. Va. Code §§ 6C-2-1 to -8 (setting forth West Virginia Public Employees
       1

Grievance Procedure).
       2
        According to the record, for school year 2019-20, the Department’s Professional
Position Code 330 was defined as:

              Professional Educational Interpreter – A staff member who
              meets the definition of professional personnel in WVC § 18A-
              1-1; possesses at least a bachelor’s degree from an accredited
              institution of higher learning; is registered with the West
              Virginia Commission for the Deaf and Hard of Hearing;
              possesses a National Interpreter Certificate (NIC) issued by the
              Registry of Interpreters for the Deaf, Inc., has passed the
                                              3
              West Virginia Code § 18A-1-1(b) (2009) defines “[p]rofessional person” or

“professional personnel” as “those persons or employees who meet the certification

requirements of the state, licensing requirements of the state, or both, and includes a

professional educator and other professional employee.” Under West Virginia Code §

18A-1-1(c):

                     “Professional educator” has the same meaning as
              “teacher” as defined in section one, article one, chapter
              eighteen of this code. 3 Professional educators are classified as
              follows:

              (1) “Classroom teacher” means a professional educator who
              has a direct instructional or counseling relationship with
              students and who spends the majority of his or her time in this
              capacity;

              (2) “Principal” means a professional educator who functions as
              an agent of the county board and has responsibility for the
              supervision, management and control of a school or schools
              within the guidelines established by the county board. The
              principal’s major area of responsibility is the general
              supervision of all the schools and all school activities involving
              students, teachers and other school personnel;

              (3) “Supervisor” means a professional educator who is
              responsible for working primarily in the field with professional
              and other personnel in instructional and other school
              improvement. This category includes other appropriate titles or
              positions with duties that fit within this definition; and

              Educational Interpreter Performance Assessment exam with a
              performance assessment score of 3.6 or higher, or holds the
              Quality Assurance Screen (QAS) level III or above; and is
              employed to provide interpreter services to students.
      3
         West Virginia Code § 18-1-1 (2008) defines “[t]eacher” as “a teacher, supervisor,
principal superintendent, public school librarian, or any other person regularly employed
for instruction purposes in a public school in this state[.]”
                                              4
              (4) “Central office administrator” means a superintendent,
              associate superintendent, assistant superintendent and other
              professional educators who are charged with administering and
              supervising the whole or some assigned part of the total
              program of the countywide school system. This category
              includes other appropriate titles or positions with duties that fit
              within this definition[.]

Under subsection (d) of the statute, “‘[o]ther professional employee’ means a person from

another profession who is properly licensed and who is employed to serve the public

schools.” W. Va. Code § 18A-1-1(d). While the respondents have paraprofessional

licenses as interpreters, neither has a teaching certificate.

              The three-step salary increase provided in West Virginia Code § 18A-4-2(e) 4

is paid through reimbursements to the counties from the Department. After West Virginia

Code § 18A-4-2(e) first became effective, the Department issued a document titled “HB

206 - Frequently Asked Questions – July 30, 2019” to provide guidance on who would be

eligible for the pay increase. That document indicated,

                     [I]n order to receive the three-step salary increase, a
              classroom teacher must be fully certified in the content area.
              They must therefore hold a Certificate Code of 21 (Initial
              Professional Teaching Certificate), 22 (Professional Teaching
              Certificate), 23 (Provisional Professional Certificate) or 65
              (Permit for Non-US Citizen).

       4
         Although the statutory language at issue is now found in subsection (d) of the
current version of the statute, West Virginia Code § 18A-4-2 (2023), we will refer to its
former location in subsection (e) because that is where it was placed in the 2019 and 2021
versions of the statute which are at issue in this appeal.
                                               5
In a subsequent guidance document titled “Instructions for Preparing and Submitting the

Professional Personnel Employment Reports for the 2019-2020 School Year,” the

Department provided specific “endorsement codes” for special education teachers

recognized as being eligible for the three-step pay increase, specifying that the endorsement

code could only be associated with a certificate code of 21, 22, 23, or 65, which are the

licenses for classroom teachers.

              The respondents’ grievances were denied at all three levels of the public

employees’ grievance process. 5 At the level three hearing before the Grievance Board,

Kimberly Olson, Human Resources Specialist for Professional Employees in Kanawha

County Schools, testified that the respondents were not included in the list of employees

eligible for the three-step salary increase because they do not hold a teaching certificate or

a special education endorsement with the Department, both of which are required pursuant

to the guidance documents issued by the Department. In its decision issued on November

24, 2020, the Grievance Board found:

                      The [Department] has interpreted W.Va. Code § 18A-
              4-2(e) to mean that the employee holds a certification in special
              education, which is also known as an endorsement. Grievants
              admit that they do not hold a certification with the
              [Department] in special education.

                      . . . [The Department] has made clear through the
              guidance documents, which explains the specific licenses a
              teacher must have, and corresponding endorsement codes that

       5
        From the outset, the respondents’ grievances were consolidated for purposes of
hearings and decisions.
                                              6
              must be attached to those licenses in order to qualify for the
              three-step pay increase. Neither Grievant has a teaching
              license and thus no special education endorsement. Neither
              Grievant is on the certified list for an employee certified in
              special education. Grievants are therefore, perceived and
              deemed by Respondent [petitioner herein] as not “certified in
              special education” (ineligible for the pay increase).

              Upon the denial of their grievances by the Grievance Board, the respondents

filed appeals with the Circuit Court of Kanawha County. By order entered September 14,

2021, the circuit court reversed the Grievance Board’s decision and found in favor of the

respondents. The circuit court concluded that the Grievance Board’s decision was “clearly

erroneous as it goes against the plain meaning of the statute.”

              The circuit court found that to be entitled to the salary increase provided by

West Virginia Code § 18A-4-2(e), an employee must satisfy three requirements: (1) be a

classroom teacher; (2) certified in special education; and (3) employed as a full-time special

education teacher. With respect to the first requirement, the circuit court found that the

respondents are “classroom teachers” pursuant to a prior decision of the Grievance Board

issued in 2014, which involved the same parties herein. The record indicates that in 2013,

the respondents were reclassified from service personnel to professional personnel.

Because the respondents were reclassified as professional personnel, the petitioner began

paying them under the teacher pay scale set forth in the statute at issue but denied them

increment pay for their previous experience. The respondents then filed grievances seeking

their increment pay and, ultimately, the Grievance Board ruled in their favor in its 2014

                                              7
decision in Hall and Vaughan v. Kanawha Cnty Bd. of Ed., ALJ Ruling No. 2014-0282-

CONS (2014).

              Based upon the 2014 Grievance Board decision, the circuit court found that

the petitioner was collaterally estopped 6 from relitigating the issue of whether the

respondents are “teachers.”      Therefore, the circuit court concluded that respondents

satisfied the first requirement for the salary increase under West Virginia Code § 18A-4-

2(e). With respect to the second requirement, the circuit court found that “[b]ecause the

[respondents] are classroom teachers that have a certification as Interpreters for the Deaf,

and education for the hearing impaired is recognized as part of special education, they hold

‘a certification in special education.’” Finally, the circuit court found that “it appears to be

undisputed that the [respondents] work full-time, and since the Court has already

determined they are certified in special education and classify as classroom teachers under

the statutory definition . . . the respondents are employed as full-time special education

teachers.” Thus, the circuit court reversed the Grievance Board’s decision. Upon entry of

the circuit court’s order, the petitioner filed its appeal with this Court.

       6
         See Syl. Pt. 1, State v. Miller, 194 W. Va. 3, 459 S.E.2d 114 (1995) (“Collateral
estoppel will bar a claim if four conditions are met: (1) The issue previously decided is
identical to the one presented in the action in question; (2) there is a final adjudication on
the merits of the prior action; (3) the party against whom the doctrine is invoked was a
party or in privity with a party to a prior action; and (4) the party against whom the doctrine
is raised had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior action.”).
                                               8
                                II. Standard of Review

             This is an appeal of a circuit court order reversing a decision of the West

Virginia Public Employees Grievance Board. “When reviewing the appeal of a public

employees’ grievance, this Court reviews decisions of the circuit court under the same

standard as that by which the circuit court reviews the decision of the administrative law

judge.” Syl. Pt. 1, Martin v. Barbour Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 228 W. Va. 238, 719 S.E.2d 406

(2011). Under West Virginia Code § 6C-2-5(b) (2007):

                    A party may appeal the decision of the administrative
             law judge on the grounds that the decision:

             (1) Is contrary to law or a lawfully adopted rule or written
             policy of the employer;
             (2) Exceeds the administrative law judge’s statutory authority;
             (3) Is the result of fraud or deceit;
             (4) Is clearly wrong in view of the reliable, probative and
             substantial evidence on the whole record; or
             (5) Is arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of
             discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.

We have explained:

                    Grievance rulings involve a combination of both
             deferential and plenary review. Since a reviewing court is
             obligated to give deference to factual findings rendered by an
             administrative law judge, a circuit court is not permitted to
             substitute its judgment for that of the hearing examiner with
             regard to factual determinations. Credibility determinations
             made by an administrative law judge are similarly entitled to
             deference. Plenary review is conducted as to the conclusions
             of law and application of law to the facts, which are reviewed
             de novo.

Syl. Pt. 1, Cahill v. Mercer Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 208 W. Va. 177, 539 S.E.2d 437 (2000).

With these standards in mind, we consider the parties’ arguments.

                                            9
                                      III. Discussion

              The petitioner first contends that the circuit court erred by not considering

the 2021 amendment to West Virginia Code § 18A-4-2(e), which added language providing

that the State Superintendent determines who is entitled to the pay increase. The petitioner

argues that this amendment to the statute rendered moot the respondents’ argument that

they qualify for the pay increase because the State Superintendent issued guidance after

West Virginia Code § 18-A-4-2(e) was enacted in 2019 making it clear that employees like

the respondents who do not hold a teaching certificate with a special education

endorsement do not qualify for the pay increase. Conversely, the respondents argue that

the 2021 amendment to the statute should not be considered because their grievances were

filed when the 2019 version of West Virginia Code § 18A-4-2(e) was in effect and there is

no indication that the 2021 amendment was meant to apply retroactively. 7

       7
         We note that from our review of the record, it appears that the 2021 amendment
was not brought to the attention of the circuit court by the petitioner. The record indicates
that the briefing was completed by the parties and submitted to the lower court before the
2021 amendment became effective, but the circuit court’s decision was issued afterward.
Although the amended version of the statute was not considered below, we are not
precluded from determining its impact in this appeal as our review is plenary. See Syl. Pt.
1, Cahill; see also State v. Blake, 197 W. Va. 700, 706 n.10, 478 S.E.2d at 550, 556 n. 10
(1996) (“‘“When an issue or claim is properly before the court, the court is not limited to
the particular legal theories advanced by the parties, but rather retains the independent
power to identify and apply the proper construction of governing law.”’ United States
National Bank of Oregon v. Independent Ins. Agents of America, Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 446,
113 S.Ct. 2173, 2178, 124 L.Ed.2d 402, 412 (1993), quoting Kamen v. Kemper Financial
Services, Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 99, 111 S.Ct. 1711, 1718, 114 L.Ed.2d 152, 166 (1991)).”
                                             10
              We have a long established “presumption of prospective application of

statutes unless the intent for retroactive application is expressed within the statute.” Foy v.

Cnty. Comm’n of Berkley Cnty., 191 W. Va. 29, 32, 442 S.E.2d 726, 729 (1994). As

syllabus point four of Taylor v. State Comp. Comm’r, 140 W. Va. 572, 86 S.E.2d 114

(1955), provides: “The presumption is that a statute is intended to operate prospectively,

and not retrospectively, unless it appears, by clear, strong and imperative words or by

necessary implication, that the Legislature intended to give the statute retroactive force and

effect.” See also Syl. Pt. 4, Arnold v. Turek, 185 W. Va. 400, 407 S.E.2d 706 (1991) (“‘“A

statute is presumed to operate prospectively unless the intent that it shall operate

retroactively is clearly expressed by its terms or is necessarily implied from the language

of the statute.” Syllabus Point 3, Shanholtz v. Monongahela Power Co., [165 W.Va. 305],

270 S.E.2d 178 (1980).’ Syllabus Point 2, State ex rel. Manchin v. Lively, 170 W.Va. 672,

295 S.E.2d 912 (1982).”). We have recognized that Taylor “set outs two approaches to

determining whether a statute is to be applied retroactively.” Christopher J. v. Ames, 241

W. Va. 822, 829, 828 S.E.2d 884, 891 (2019). In that regard,

                      First, a determination of legislative intent can be made
              by examining the text of the statute to see if there are “clear,
              strong and imperative words” in the statute that show the
              legislative intent for retroactive application of a statute. . . .

                     The second manner in which syllabus point 4 of Taylor
              instructs that the legislative intent on retroactivity can be
              determined is if “it appears . . . by necessary implication.”

Id.

                                              11
              We agree with respondents that in amending West Virginia Code § 18A-4-

2(e) in 2021, the Legislature did not include any clear, strong, and imperative words

indicating the statute applies retroactively. However, our analysis does not end there.

When we utilize Taylor’s second approach for determining whether a statute should be

applied retroactively, we find that the Legislature by necessary implication intended the

2021 amendment of West Virginia Code § 18A-4-2(e) to have a retroactive effect.

              Our analysis under Taylor’s second approach is guided by our rules of

statutory construction. Christopher J., 241 W. Va. at 829, 828 S.E.2d at 891. “The primary

rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the

Legislature.” Syl. Pt. 8, Vest v. Cobb, 138 W. Va. 660, 76 S.E.2d 885 (1953). We have

explained that “[i]n ascertaining legislative intent, effect must be given to each part of the

statute and to the statute as a whole so as to accomplish the general purpose of the

legislation.” Syl. Pt. 2, Smith v. State Workmen’s Comp. Comm’r, 159 W. Va. 108, 219

S.E.2d 361 (1975); see also Syl. Pt. 7, State ex rel. Goff v. Merrifield, 191 W. Va. 473, 446

S.E.2d 695 (1994) (“‘“‘“A statute should be so read and applied as to make it accord with

the spirit, purposes and objects of the general system of law of which it is intended to form

a part; it being presumed that the legislators who drafted and passed it were familiar with

all existing law, applicable to the subject matter, whether constitutional, statutory or

common, and intended the statute to harmonize completely with the same and aid in the

effectuation of the general purpose and design thereof, if its terms are consistent therewith.”

Syllabus Point 5, State v. Snyder, 64 W.Va. 659, 63 S.E. 385 (1908).’ Syl.Pt. 1, State ex

                                              12
rel. Simpkins v. Harvey, [172] W.Va. [312], 305 S.E.2d 268 (1983).” Syl.Pt. 3, Shell v.

Bechtold, 175 W.Va. 792, 338 S.E.2d 393 (1985).’ Syl.Pt. 1, State v. White, 188 W.Va.

534, 425 S.E.2d 210 (1992).”). Therefore, “[w]here a particular construction of a statute

would result in an absurdity, some other reasonable construction, which will not produce

such absurdity, will be made.” Syl. Pt. 2, Newhart v. Pennybacker, 120 W. Va. 774, 200

S.E. 350 (1938). To that end, “‘[t]hat which is necessarily implied in a statute, or must be

included in it in order to make the terms actually used have effect, according to their nature

and ordinary meaning, is as much a part of it as if it had been declared in express terms.’

Syllabus point 14, State v. Harden, 62 W.Va. 313, 58 S.E. 715 (1907).” Smith, 159 W. Va.

at 109, 219 S.E.2d at 362, syl. pt. 4.

              As noted above, when the Legislature amended West Virginia Code § 18A-

4-2(e) in 2021, the only change it made was the addition of the phrase “as defined by the

State Superintendent.” No language was removed from the subsection and, most notably,

the effective date for implementation of the salary increase remained the same—July 1,

2019. Applying our rules of statutory construction, we find that by not changing the

effective date for implementation of the salary increase, the Legislature intended the 2021

amendment to operate retroactively. Indeed, it is impossible to give effect to each part of

the statute and to conclude otherwise. Furthermore, it would be absurd to conclude that

the State Superintendent had no authority to determine who was entitled to the pay increase

until two years after the raise was given.

                                             13
              The respondents counter that if the effective date for implementation of the

salary increase had also been amended to July 5, 2021, the date the new language—as

determined by the State Superintendent—became operable, “then all the individuals who

were given the increment pay thereunder, would have had to return the money as they

would not have been entitled to the increment pay until after the new effective date.”

Clearly, there is no merit to this argument as amendments to statutes do not nullify the

previous version of the law. If the Legislature had intended for the State Superintendent’s

determination of who qualifies for the pay increase to apply only after the operative date

of the 2021 amendment, it would have also changed the effective date for implementation

of the pay increase. By not doing so, we find that by necessary implication the 2021

amendment to West Virginia Code § 18A-4-2(e) applies retroactively. And, because the

State Superintendent has issued guidance that makes clear that the respondents do not

qualify for the salary increase because they do not hold teaching certificates with special

education endorsements, we agree with the petitioner that West Virginia Code § 18A-4-

2(e) (2021) is dispositive of the respondents’ grievances. Accordingly, we reverse the

circuit court’s order.

              As a final matter, we believe it necessary to briefly address the circuit court’s

misinterpretation of the Grievance Board’s 2014 decision. Upon review, we find, contrary

to the circuit court, that the Grievance Board did not determine in its 2014 decision in Hall

and Vaughan v. Kanawha County Bd. of Education, that the respondents are “classroom

teachers.” While that grievance decision does include some language indicating that the

                                             14
respondents could be deemed “teachers” under the broad definition of “teacher” in chapter

eighteen of the West Virginia Code, 8 the Grievance Board ultimately concluded that

respondents are “other professional employees,” not “teachers.”            In that regard, the

Grievance Board explained in its 2014 decision:

                        There are only two salary schedules for school
                personnel, the schedule at issue [i.e., the teacher schedule] and
                a schedule for service personnel. Compare W. VA. Code §
                18A-4-2 with W. VA. Code § 18A-4-8a. As professional
                employees, Grievants cannot be paid under the service
                personnel schedule, which leaves only the “teacher” schedule.
                If the “teacher” schedule was construed to exclude Grievants
                because they do not meet the definition of “teacher,” they, and
                the handful of like “other professional” positions, would be the
                only school personnel position not paid under a legislative
                salary schedule guaranteeing certain minimum payment. . . .

                       The only interpretation that fits within the definitions of
                the two chapters [Chapters 18 and 18A of the West Virginia
                Code] read as a whole, is that the “teacher” salary schedule is
                meant to be applied to Grievants as professional personnel, and
                that the experience increment is also meant to apply to their
                relevant experience.

Given that decision finding that the respondents are classified as “professional personnel,”

they are not “classroom teacher[s]” under any version of West Virginia Code § 18A-4-2(e),

now subsection (d). Therefore, they do not qualify for the salary increase provided therein,

even in the absence of the 2021 amendment.

       8
           See note 3, supra.
                                               15
                                    IV. Conclusion

             For the foregoing reasons, the September 14, 2021, order of the Circuit Court

of Kanawha County is reversed, and this case is remanded to the circuit court for entry of

an order reinstating the November 24, 2020, decision of the West Virginia Public

Employees Grievance Board denying the respondents’ grievances.

                                                Reversed and remanded with directions.

                                           16