Court Opinion

ID: 9466081
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 01:05:17.4607+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:39:32.208039
License: Public Domain

SWYGERT, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
In all cases the constitutional safeguards are to be jealously preserved for the benefit of the accused, but especially is this true where the scales of justice may be delicately poised between guilt and innocence. Then error, which under some circumstances would not be ground for reversal, cannot be brushed aside as immaterial since there is a real chance that it might have provided the slight impetus which swings the scales toward guilt.
Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 67, 62 S.Ct. 457, 464, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942) (emphasis added).
The records before us recently have too often disclosed prosecutorial arguments which, while not rising to the level of plain error, were nevertheless improper. If this continues, this court may find it necessary in appropriate cases to exercise its supervisory authority, even in the absence of plain error. In the future all federal prosecutors in this circuit will *1015conform their arguments to the standards set by the Supreme Court in the Berger case.
United States v. Spain, 536 F.2d 170, 176 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 833, 97 S.Ct. 96, 50 L.Ed.2d 97 (1976) (emphasis added).
The above quotations should be the text for this court to reverse the conviction in this case. The assistant United States attorney flagrantly abused the precepts of Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 55 S.Ct. 629, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935), in his summation to the jury. Not only did he twice misstate the charge for which defendant was on trial, but he also twice appealed to the pecuniary interests of the jurors. The Government now concedes the prosecutor’s misstatement that Falk evaded taxes (even though he was not charged with tax evasion), but it contends this impropriety was cured by the trial court’s general instructions. Yet, the record shows that the trial court did nothing specifically to cure the gross impropriety when it occurred. Indeed, the judge abetted it, as the record clearly demonstrates. The summation reads in relevant part:
[Prosecutor:] There is obviously a law enforcement interest as determines to tax evasion and everytime that a person was caught evading taxes and they said “okay, we will pay you back”, well then, tax evasion becomes a no risk business; you evade it as long . until you get caught . . . and then you just pay what you owe. A great business!
That’s why the case is being prosecuted, because that is no way to run a society and it is no way to run a government.
Defense counsel: Object to that.
The court: Well counsel may make his comments , . . (Tr. 270) (emphasis added).
And the rebuttal reads:
[Prosecutor:] [Defense counsel] talks about a Supreme Court case and his legal right to decrease or avoid his taxes. He exercised those legal rights from 1969 until 1972 when he could get a gain from a deduction . . . but did he exercise that right in 1973 when he made $10,000.00? No. He didn’t avoid taxes, that’s not against the law, he evaded them in 1973.
Defense counsel: Object again, your Honor. That is not the charge in the indictment.
The court: Counsel may make the comment that he avoided the payment of them at that time. (Tr. 294) (emphasis added).
Similarly, there can be no question that the assistant United States attorney appealed directly to the pecuniary interests of the jurors as taxpayers when he said:
[Prosecutor:] We all file returns
Defense counsel: Object your Honor.
The court: Overruled.
Assistant United States attorney: There are millions of us every year that stay within the confines of the law. We report our income. (Tr. 291).
And again:
[Prosecutor:] O.K., if I may conclude, Judge, the fact that if there are people who are not paying their fair share, the rest of us have to make up .
Defense counsel: I will object again, your Honor.
The court: Well, counsel may make a general comment. (Tr. 273).
Such an appeal is clearly improper, United States v. Trutenko, 490 F.2d 678 (7th Cir. 1973); United States v. Lotsch, 102 F.2d 35, 37 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 307 U.S. 622, 59 S.Ct. 793, 83 L.Ed. 1500 (1939); Taglianetti v. United States, 398 F.2d 558, 566 (1st Cir. 1968), aff’d, 394 U.S. 316, 89 S.Ct. 1099, 22 L.Ed.2d 302 (1969); Buttermore v. United States, 180 F.2d 853, 856 (6th Cir. 1950); United States v. D’Anna, 450 F.2d 1201, 1206 (2d Cir. 1971), and alone calls for reversal.
The improprieties of the assistant United States attorney in this trial cannot be dismissed as the “ordinary” trial errors of a conscientious prosecutor. See United States v. Castenada, 555 F.2d 605, 610 (7th *1016Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 847, 98 S.Ct. 152, 54 L.Ed.2d 113 (1977). The majority opinion reads like an apologetic litany for the prosecutor’s transgressions; it is difficult to believe that his improper actions, often repeated after objection from defense counsel, were honest mistakes.
Unfortunately flagrant abuses of professional standards, such as the foregoing, seem to be occurring more frequently in this circuit. I believe that the reasons include the fact that competitive and ambitious prosecutors (perhaps reflecting the ethos of the 1970’s) think that to win by any means is the “name of the game.” Further they are emboldened to flaunt the Berger admonition by the inaction of trial judges who fail to stop such improper advocacy conduct in its tracks and this court’s bark— scoldings and warnings — with no bite.