Court Opinion

ID: 9394145
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-12 15:00:25.531123+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:57.526350
License: Public Domain

21-6144
    Prajapati v. Garland
                                                                                  BIA
                                                                            Nelson, IJ
                                                                          A200 006 951

                           UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                               FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007 IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL
APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY
CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL.

           At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
    Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley
    Square, in the City of New York, on the 12th day of May, two thousand twenty-
    three.

    PRESENT:
               JOSEPH F. BIANCO,
               WILLIAM J. NARDINI,
               SARAH A. L. MERRIAM,
                     Circuit Judges.
    _____________________________________

    HARSHAD KUMAR BABABHAI
    PRAJAPATI,
             Petitioner,

                     v.                                         21-6144
                                                                NAC
    MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
    STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
               Respondent.
    _____________________________________
FOR PETITIONER:                     Jaspreet Singh, Esq., Law Office of Jaspreet
                                    Singh, Jackson Heights, NY.

FOR RESPONDENT:                     Brian Boynton, Acting Assistant Attorney
                                    General; Jessica A. Dawgert, Senior Litigation
                                    Counsel; Giovanni B. Di Maggio, Trial
                                    Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation,
                                    United States Department of Justice,
                                    Washington, DC.

      UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of

Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

DECREED that the petition for review is GRANTED.

      Petitioner Harshad Kumar Bababhai Prajapati, a native and citizen of India,

seeks review of a February 16, 2021 decision of the BIA, affirming a September 6,

2018 decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”), which denied asylum, withholding

of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).           In re

Harshad Kumar Bababhai Prajapati, No. A200 006 951 (B.I.A. Feb. 16, 2021), aff’g No.

A200 006 951 (Immigr. Ct. N.Y. City Sept. 6, 2018).       We assume the parties’

familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history.

      Under the circumstances we have reviewed the decision of the IJ as

supplemented by the BIA, Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 2005),

but without considering the portions of the IJ’s decision that the BIA did not

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“explicitly adopt,” Yu Sheng Zhang v. U.S. Dep't of Just., 362 F.3d 155, 159 (2d Cir.

2004) (per curiam). An asylum applicant has the burden to establish either past

persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution.                   8 U.S.C. §

1158(b)(1)(B)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(a), (b). “The testimony of the applicant may be

sufficient to sustain the applicant’s burden without corroboration, but only if the

applicant satisfies the trier of fact that the . . . testimony is credible, is persuasive,

and refers to specific facts sufficient to demonstrate that the applicant is a refugee.

In determining whether the applicant has met the applicant’s burden, the trier of

fact may weigh the credible testimony along with other evidence of record.” 8

U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii). “Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all

relevant factors, a trier of fact may base a credibility determination on the

demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of the applicant . . . , the inherent plausibility

of the applicant’s . . . account,” and inconsistencies within and between an

applicant’s statements “without regard to whether” they go “to the heart of the

applicant’s claim.” Id. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).

      Prajapati, who is a Hindu and a member of the Bharatiya Janata Party

(“BJP”) alleged that he was attacked by both Muslims and members of the rival

Congress Party. The agency concluded that Prajapati was not credible and did

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not otherwise meet his burden of proof with documentary evidence. We review

an adverse credibility determination for substantial evidence and treat the

agency’s findings of fact as “conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would

be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see Hong Fei

Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018). However, an adverse credibility

determination must “be supported by reasonable, substantial and probative

evidence in the record when considered as a whole.” Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 76

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). We remand because the agency

did not identify substantial evidence for the adverse credibility determination.

      The BIA affirmed the IJ’s conclusion that Prajapati was not credible based

solely on the IJ’s finding that Prajapati “had difficulty answering the question

regarding what his injuries were” because he answered that he was “hit with a

stone rather than indicating what the injury was.”       Certified Administrative

Record (“CAR”) at 60. The BIA found no clear error in the IJ’s conclusion that

Prajapati’s responses were “hesitant and evasive” and that his arguments that he

did not understand what was being asked were insufficient to overturn the IJ’s

credibility finding “particularly given the sheer number and varied formulations

of the question.” CAR at 4 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). An

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examination of the record undermines the BIA’s conclusion.

      The crux of the issue stems from brief questioning during the hearing in

which the IJ asks four times some variation of “what was the injury.” CAR at

103–04 (Tr.). The IJ is correct that Prajapati seemed to have difficulty answering

the question. However, the agency fails to acknowledge that––in the span of this

line of questioning––at one point the IJ cuts off counsel to ask her own question

and at another point the interpreter interjects. Moreover, contrary to the BIA’s

reading, the IJ did not vary her questioning, rather she used the same language in

four separate questions and, not surprisingly, received the same answer. Id. at

104 (Tr.) (IJ asking, “what was your injury,” “what was the injury,” “[w]hat was

the injury,” and “what the injury was”).

      The first time the IJ asked “And what was your injury caused by the stone?”

she interrupted counsel from asking “Can you say where on your body ––,” and

Prajapati responded “I was injured in my forehead and in my back.” Id. at 103–

04 (emphasis added). The second time the IJ asked “[a]nd what was the injury to

your forehead,” the interpreter did not comprehend the question, so the IJ simply

repeated “[w]hat was the injury to your forehead?” Id. at 104 (emphasis added).

At that point Prajapati hesitated, saying “[i]t was a, a, I was hit by stone in my

                                           5
forehead.” Id. The IJ asked again “I understand that, sir, I’m asking what the

injury was” and Prajapati responded, “[i]t, it was the, the a -- I mean, a stone thrown

at me and injured me.”         Id. (emphasis added).      While this answer is not

responsive to the detail the IJ wanted, in a colloquial sense it does answer the

question: there is only one plausible injury that could occur from a rock hitting a

head––a head injury. At that point the IJ rephrased the question and asked, “how

did it injure you,” to which Prajapati responded, “Yes, I, I, I was bleeding, and I, I

had to bandage it and also, I, I was hit in the back.” Id.

      Moreover, if the lack of detail Prajapati provided about the scope of his

injuries caused the IJ to “wonder whether the testimony [was] fabricated,” she

could have “probe[d] for incidental details, seeking to draw out inconsistencies

that would support a finding of lack of credibility.” Jin Shui Qiu v. Ashcroft, 329

F.3d 140, 152 (2d Cir. 2003) overruled in part on other grounds by Shi Liang Lin v. U.S.

Dept. of Just., 494 F.3d 296, 305 (2d Cir. 2007) (en banc). Without so probing,

however, this finding alone is insufficient support for an adverse credibility

determination. See Jin Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 426 F.3d 104, 114 (2d Cir. 2005)

(holding that the record did not support adverse credibility determination in the

absence of additional questioning).

                                           6
      The BIA affirmed the adverse credibility determination solely based on this

interaction citing Second Circuit caselaw “granting particular deference to

credibility findings based on demeanor.” CAR at 4 (BIA Decision) (citing Li Hua

Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 453 F.3d 99, 109 (2d Cir. 2006)). However, given the issues

with the finding discussed above, this finding alone is not substantial evidence for

an adverse credibility determination. We require “specific, cogent reasons for the

adverse credibility finding” and the deference due to the IJ “cannot insulate the

decision from review.” Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 76–77 (internal quotation marks

and citations omitted).

      We remand to the BIA because the adverse credibility determination was

central to the agency’s denial of relief.       Although the BIA also addressed

Prajapati’s documentary evidence and concluded that it did not otherwise meet

his burden of proof, that conclusion relies on the adverse credibility determination

because the agency determined the amount of corroboration needed based on the

absence of credible testimony.      See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii) (agency weighs

credibility and corroboration in determining whether an applicant has met his

burden of proof). This error in the analysis of past persecution warrants remand

because a finding of past persecution would result in a presumption of future

                                          7
persecution, and the burden would then be on the Department of Homeland

Security (not Prajapati) to establish by a “preponderance of the evidence” that

there had been a fundamental change in circumstances in India or that Prajapati

can safely relocate. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(ii). Whether Prajapati has failed to

meet his burden of proof even if credible is not for us to determine in the first

instance. See INS v. Orlando Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16 (2002) (“A court of appeals is

not generally empowered to conduct a de novo inquiry into the matter being

reviewed and to reach its own conclusions based on such an inquiry. Rather, the

proper course, except in rare circumstances, is to remand to the agency for

additional investigation or explanation.” (internal quotation marks and citations

omitted)).

      For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is GRANTED, the BIA’s

decision is VACATED, and the case is REMANDED for further proceedings

consistent with this order.

                                      FOR THE COURT:
                                      Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
                                      Clerk of Court

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