Court Opinion

ID: 9671078
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:30:43.760955+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:08.094073
License: Public Domain

Weaver, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I concur with the majority’s holding that pregnancy is not a handicap under the HCRA because a normal and healthy pregnancy is not a substantial limitation of a major life activity. Further, I concur with the majority’s holding that the trial court properly rejected plaintiff’s requested jury instructions.
I dissent from the majority’s holding that negative comments regarding a woman’s pregnancy necessarily give rise to a claim of sexual harassment. Although I believe negative comments regarding pregnancy certainly can be considered gender-based, such comments are not necessarily of a sexual nature so as to amount to sexual harassment.
*21The Court of Appeals reversed a jury verdict in favor of plaintiff Koester’s sexual harassment claim. The Court of Appeals considered the Civil Rights Act (CRA) definition of sexual harassment as “unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct or communication of a sexual nature when . . . [s]uch conduct or communication has the purpose or effect of substantially interfering with an individual’s employment . . . environment.” MCL 37.2103(i)(iii); MSA 3.548(103)(i)(iii). Applying the rule of ejusdem generis,1 the Court of Appeals determined that the words “other . . . conduct of a sexual nature” must include things similar to sexual advances or sexual favors. The Court of Appeals concluded that the remarks at issue,2 though insensitive, were not of a “sexual nature.” Because the conduct challenged by plaintiff was gender-based, as opposed to “overtly sexual,” the Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court should have granted defendant’s motions for summary disposition and directed verdict with regard to plaintiff’s sexual harassment claim. For this and the additional reasons *22below, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.3
The majority claims to find support for its holding that comments regarding pregnancy, though not overtly sexual, may amount to sexual harassment by analogy to federal title vn law. A closer look at federal and Michigan law offers the majority little support.
The majority relies heavily on a principle it found in Hunt-Golliday v Metropolitan Water Reclamation Dist of Greater Chicago, 104 F3d 1004, 1006 (CA 7, 1997), to the effect that sexual harassment is a “subset” of sex discrimination. The majority finds this principle express within the CEA, where the statute states, “[discrimination because of sex includes sexual harassment . . . .” MCL 37.2103(1); MSA 3.548(103)(i). However, the CRA goes on to define sexual harassment specifically as “unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct or communication of a sexual nature . . . .” MCL 37.2103(1); MSA 3.548(103)(i). I would find that, while the CRA includes pregnancy in its definition of “sex,” MCL 37.2201(d); MSA 3.548(201)(d), conduct or communication about pregnancy is not necessarily “sexual” in nature. While sex*23ual harassment technically may be a “subset” of sexual discrimination, a claim for sexual harassment requires different proofs including proof of “unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct or communication of a sexual nature.” Thus, while sexual harassment is always a form of sex discrimination, all cases of sex discrimination do not necessarily amount to sexual harassment.
More importantly, the federal cases relied on by the majority for the proposition that comments about pregnancy need not be overtly sexual to amount to sexual harassment do so by disavowing an EEOC regulation that defines sexual harassment with substantially the same language the Michigan Legislature adopted by statute. The EEOC guidelines define sexual harassment as “[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature . . . .” 29 CFR 1604.11(a). Mentch v Eastern Savings Bank, FSB, 949 F Supp 1236 (D Md, 1997), a case relied on by the majority, does appear to hold that comments need not be overtly sexual to constitute sexual harassment. However, the cases relied on by Mentch for this proposition expressly recognize that the term “sexual” in the regulation means “explicitly sexual behavior.” McKinney v Dole, 246 US App DC 376, 385, n 20; 765 F2d 1129 (1985); Hall v Gus Construction Co, Inc, 842 F2d 1010, 1014 (CA 8, 1988). Further these cases go on to conclude that the eeoc guidelines do not control the interpretation of the statute. Id. In effect, the courts rely on what it found to be broader statutory protections than that afforded by the regulation. In Hall, the court explained:
*24Intimidation and hostility toward women because they are women can obviously result from conduct other than explicit sexual advances. Title vil “evinces a Congressional intention to define discrimination in the broadest possible terms. ...” Although appellants correctly note that the definition of sexual harassment in the eeoc regulation emphasizes explicitly sexual behavior, the regulations do not state that other types of harassment should not be considered. Furthermore, an enforcing agency’s guidelines are not controlling upon the courts. [Citations omitted.]
Unlike title vn, the Michigan Legislature chose to separately and more specifically define sexual harassment. This definition evinces an intent to address a form of misconduct distinct from sex discrimination and should control the resolution of this issue. Instead, the majority subverts the CRA definition of sexual harassment, thereby subverting the Legislature’s intent.
I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Brickley and Taylor, JJ., concurred with Weaver, J.

 “[W]here general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same general kind or class as those specifically mentioned.” Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed), p 517.

 The pregnancy-related remarks alleged by plaintiff were: (1) “You should have thought about having a family before you made your career choice,” (2) “A woman should stay home two to three years with her child,” (3) “How can I give you more [benefits] for an intentional act [getting pregnant] than I give for an officer who is accidentally injured,” (4) “Gee, thanks,” made in response to being informed of the second pregnancy, and (5) being told that she could “grow into [them],” when she outgrew her uniform and was issued a huge pair of men’s pants.

 Even were I to conclude that comments relating to pregnancy could amount to sexual harassment under the cra, I would find that plaintiff has failed to establish a hostile work environment. This Court has stated that
[t]he essence of a hostile work environment action is that “one or more supervisors or co-workers create an atmosphere so infused with hostility toward members of one sex that they alter the conditions of employment for them.” [Radtke v Everett, 442 Mich 368, 385; 501 NW2d 155 (1993).]
While the comments made were insensitive, see n 2 supra, I would not find that they would create an atmosphere infused with hostility so as to alter the conditions of employment.