Court Opinion

ID: 9629780
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:49:10.444511+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:23.663579
License: Public Domain

Madsen, J.
(dissenting in part) — I must dissent because the majority misunderstands the "res gestae” exception for the admission of uncharged "crimes, wrongs or acts” and as a result reverses a thorough and well-reasoned decision by the Court of Appeals involving evidence of six unrelated incidents of prior misconduct admitted by the trial court. Moreover, I dissent because the majority misapplies the test for harmless error to the judge’s comment on the evidence in connection with Defendant Lane.
Res Gestae Rule
In State v. Saltarelli, 98 Wn.2d 358, 361, 655 P.2d 697 (1982) this court stated that when considering the admission *842of prior bad acts under ER 404, the trial court must first consider the logical relevance of such evidence to the charged crime. If evidence meets this threshold requirement, the trial court must determine whether it is necessary to prove an important issue related to the crime charged. If the first two prongs are met, the evidence must still be weighed by the court to insure that the probative value of the prior bad act evidence outweighs the prejudice to the defendant.
Nothing in Washington jurisprudence or rules of court suggests that evidence of prior bad acts admitted under the "res gestae” or "same transaction” exception to ER 404(b) is to be treated in any different manner. As this court stated in State v. Tharp, 96 Wn.2d 591, 596, 637 P.2d 961 (1981), "the true test of admissibility of unrelated crimes is not only whether they fall into any specific exception, but whether the evidence is relevant and necessary to prove an essential ingredient of the crime charged”.
By its very description as the "same transaction” rule, it is clear that the res gestae exception is intended for situations where the prior bad acts relate to the charged crime. It is not sufficient that the acts occur in close time proximity. The evidence must also be admitted to complete the picture of the crime charged. Tharp, at 594. To hold otherwise would open the door to any act which occurred within the days preceding the crime regardless of the relationship to the crime.
The six prior incidents under consideration in this case were, on their face, unrelated to the charged crime and, as the Court of Appeals observed, the State failed to make a record adequate to show relevance. State v. Lane, cause 13439-0-II, unpublished opinion noted at 69 Wn. App. 1001 (1993), slip op. at 19. The Court of Appeals correctly held that it is insufficient to simply state that evidence of prior bad acts is relevant because of the proximity in time of those acts to the crime. As that court said, "[w]hether or not that is true, the court must still find a relevant purpose for admitting the evidence . . . the court must determine whether the evidence has *843a tendency to make more or less probable a fact of consequence to the action. . . . Here, the State did not request and the court did not make the necessary determinations.” Lane, slip op. at 16.
The majority attempts to justify the trial judge’s decision by stating that the judge admitted the prior bad acts evidence because it showed the degree of participation of the various Defendants. Majority, at 835. That assertion is simply not supported by the record. In announcing his decision to admit the evidence of prior bad acts, the trial judge stated that the evidence should be admitted "primarily just on the basis of the calendar and the clock and this was proximity in time and at least somewhat in proximity and place at least in Tacoma”. Verbatim Report of Proceedings vol. 16, at 8. Only in passing did the judge comment that "[A]ny participation or the degree of participation is very much in issue”. He did not indicate that the prior acts in question were relevant to the degree of participation nor did he state that he was admitting the evidence on that basis. Verbatim Report of Proceedings vol. 16, at 7-8.
Although the majority criticizes the Court of Appeals for substituting its own analysis, it is the majority, not the Court of Appeals, which is guilty of precisely that by supplying the missing basis for admissibility. As demonstrated above, the trial court here believed that the prior bad act evidence was relevant because of the proximity of those acts in time and place, not because the acts related to the charged crimes. This court should not now supply an unjustified basis for the trial judge’s decision to admit otherwise inadmissible evidence and then support that basis under an abuse of discretion standard. Majority, at 835.
After supplying what it considers an adequate basis for admission of the bad acts evidence, the majority then skips blithely over the balancing requirements of ER 403. Its treatment of that issue in this manner is necessary, of course, since the trial court did not engage in any balancing. The trial judge did not mention undue prejudice or probative value in his ruling. Rather, he stated that "I am not going to *844spend a lot of time sorting out and editing May 1st”. Verbatim Report of Proceedings vol. 4, at 140. Although a trial court’s decision to admit may be affirmed in the absence of an explicit, on the record, balancing, to do so the weighing must be clear from the record as a whole. State v. Gogolin, 45 Wn. App. 640, 645, 727 P.2d 683 (1986). In this case, it is the absence of weighing which is clear from the record. By not only supplying the basis for admissibility under ER 404(b), but also exempting the trial court from its balancing requirements under ER 403, the majority departs from the well-established requirements for admissibility.
Next, the majority acknowledges, but then ignores, the predicate that the State must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the uncharged crimes both occurred and were committed by the accused. Tharp, at 593-94. Here, the trial judge did not make any findings with regard to this requirement nor did he even mention the standard, making it clear that he did not consider the issue. In spite of this, the Court of Appeals painstakingly reviewed the evidence and persuasively concluded that the record could not support a finding that the preponderance standard was met with respect to a number of the challenged incidents. Lane, slip op. at 22-26.
The majority appears to forget that it is the role of the trial court to determine the relevancy of evidence, weigh the evidence to determine whether it satisfies the preponderance standard, and decide whether the probative value of the evidence outweighs the prejudice which the evidence may inject. This case should be remanded in accordance with the decision of the Court of Appeals.3 As that court concluded, the challenged prior bad acts evidence "served *845only to establish defendants’ bad character, a purpose forbidden under ER 404(a)”. Lane, slip op. at 20.
Comment On The Evidence
Although recognizing that the judge’s comment on the credibility of witness Blake was error, the majority declines to affirm the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the error requires reversal because it misapplies the test for harmless error. This court has adopted the "overwhelming untainted evidence” test to determine whether an error of constitutional magnitude requires reversal. State v. Guloy, 104 Wn.2d 412, 426, 705 P.2d 1182 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1020 (1986). Under this test, the reviewing court considers whether there is any reasonable possibility that the use of inadmissible evidence was necessary to reach a guilty verdict. Guloy, at 426. To find harmless error, the reviewing court must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that any reasonable jury would have reached the same result in the absence of the error. Guloy, at 425. The State bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the error was harmless. Guloy, at 425.
Despite the majority’s recognition of the overwhelming untainted evidence test as the correct analysis, the majority fails to analyze the probable effect of the tainted evidence on the jury’s verdict. As the Court of Appeals recognized, "Blake’s testimony provided the only direct evidence that Lane had aided Woods in murdering Wolfe, and that Lane had premeditated an intent to kill”. Lane, slip op. at 66. Blake provided the motive of revenge for Lane. The importance of this evidence is made clearer by contrasting the result in Anderson’s case. Assuming for the sake of this argument that the prior misconduct evidence was properly admitted, evidence was presented that both Anderson and Lane participated in the crime spree which culminated in the abduction of the murder victim. Both Anderson and Lane entered the victim’s home, assisted in the kidnapping, and drove the victim to the deserted road where she was killed by Defendant Woods. Neither Lane nor Anderson was *846present when Woods shot the victim. Yet the jury found that Lane committed premeditated murder while it found that Anderson did not. Aside from the prior burglary of the victim’s home by Lane and Woods several months earlier, the principal difference between the actions of Lane and Anderson is that Lane was attributed with a revenge motive through Blake’s statement that Lane admitted the killing was done in revenge. Thus, the difference in the jury’s verdict very probably resulted from Blake’s testimony.
Nor can the rest of the evidence be said to support a finding of premeditation. Lane and Anderson remained in the car during the murder. They heard several shots which prompted Anderson to ask Woods, when he returned to the car alone, if the victim was dead. The first six or more shots fired by Woods were aimed at the victim’s leg. This suggests that the initial intent was to disable the victim rather than to kill. It was when the victim attempted to rise that the single, fatal shot was fired. This evidence shows that the intent to kill may well have been formed by Woods in the moments before he fired the last shot. It is inescapable then that a very reasonable possibility exists that the tainted evidence was necessary to reach a guilty verdict in this case. Thus, it is certainly not clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have convicted Lane of premeditated murder absent this taintéd evidence.
Finally, it is disturbing that the majority, not the State, attempts to make the case. At trial, the State agreed with the Defendants that the comment was improper and urged the judge not to make it. In its brief to this court, the State fails to provide any meaningful analysis of the harmless error test as applied to the facts and instead offers a conclu-sory, 3-sentence argument which is insufficient to support a finding of harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt.
In contrast, the Court of Appeals in this case carefully analyzed the issue of harmless error as to each Defendant. The court considered the record and correctly concluded that "the trial court’s comment on the evidence cannot be labelled as *847harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”. Lane, slip op. at 67.1 agree and would affirm the decision by the Court of Appeals.
Utter, J., concurs with Madsen, J.

The Court of Appeals’ 69-page opinion is unpublished so it must be stated that Judge Morgan thoroughly analyzed each of the six incidents of prior misconduct as it related to each of the three individual Defendants. He also analyzed the effect of admitting evidence of each incident on each of the six counts against each of the three Defendants. Finding harmless error, the court affirmed all of Woods’ convictions and all of Lane’s convictions except count 4, first degree murder. As to Anderson, the court affirmed count 5, first degree robbery, but found reversible error as to the remaining counts.