Court Opinion

ID: 9749357
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 16:40:05.398931+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:47.379880
License: Public Domain

*358Collins, J.,
filed the following dissenting opinion.
The appellants contend that the lot in question and all of the finger or strip of land, hereinafter designated as the strip, is a part of the Poplar Hill Development. The strip was included in the deed of July 7, 1927, by Gilbert to Fenwick, and in the plat recorded at the time of the conveyance. On the Sutton-Britcher plat none of Section C is divided into lots and numbered, although all of Sections A and B are so divided and numbered. In fact, on none of the plats either recorded or offered in evidence has the strip been divided into lots and numbered. The appellants further contend that Fenwick subjected all land in Section C, including the strip, to Poplar Hill restrictions as part of a general plan of development for the mutual benefit of all the lot owners in Sections A, B and C. All of the deeds to lots in Section C, except those to lot No. 86 now owned by one of the appellants, and to the strip if in Section C, contain specific restrictions against commercial use. It is stipulated that there are thirteen deeds which contain the reservation that the restrictions therein would not bind the remaining land of the grantor.
The appellants also contend that the appellees had actual notice of restrictions on their lot. They rely on the fact that a sign was erected on the lot in question in 1929 and remained there for many years, which read “Poplar Hill”. Underneath were the words “a restricted residential development.” They also rely on the fact that sales plats were distributed to the same effect, and on the close personal contact of the appellees, in their cleaning business in the vicinity, with the residents of Poplar Hill. However, the appellees testified that they did not see the sign and that they received no information that their lot was subject to restrictions. The chancellor saw and heard the witnesses. We cannot say he was clearly wrong in finding no actual notice. Appellants also rely on the fact that at the time the lot in question was purchased, the Maryland Title Company expressly excepted from the effect of the policy the *359“Poplar Hill Restrictions”. However, we must note that that title company later amended the policy without any restrictions. It is hardly likely that the appellees, intending to build a commercial property on the lot conveyed, would have bought the lot if they had actual notice of restrictions against such construction. That they had actual notice is certainly at least doubtful and any doubt should be resolved in favor of the unrestricted use of the property. Matthews v. Kernewood, Inc., 184 Md. 297, 40 A. 2d 522; Scholtes v. McColgan, 184 Md. 480, 41 A. 2d 479; Oak Lane Corporation v. Duke, 196 Md. 136, 75 A. 2d 80.
As to constructive notice to the appellees of the restrictions, the appellants rely on what they claim is a uniform plan of development throughout Poplar Hill. They rely strongly on approximately four deeds to particular lots in Section C and approximately six deeds to particular lots in Section B which contained substantially the following: “Subject, however, to the following covenants, agreements, restrictions, reservations and easements which are hereby entered into by the said parties of the second part and said party of the first part, for themselves, their respective heirs, successors and assigns.” Some of these deeds to particular lots in Section B contained the clause: “Subject to the usual and customary general restrictions applicable to the development known as Poplar Hill * * Appellants contend that, although these deeds were of particular lots, these placed restrictions on all of the Fenwick property and not alone on the land thereby conveyed by the particular deeds. They point to the Rianhard deed aforesaid in which there were ten restrictions. Restriction No. 9 contained the following: “Similar restrictions with the exception of the set back of the garage from the front line which set back may be fifty feet if plans are approved to that effect by the party of the first part shall apply to all lots to be laid out in Section A of the plat of Poplar Hill recorded or intended to be recorded among the Land Records of Baltimore City prior hereto but shall not apply to the *360remaining property belonging to the party of the first part.” Restriction 9A contained the following: “The party of the the first part, his heirs, assigns or personal representatives hereby expressly reserves the right at any time to change or modify any of the restrictions, conditions, covenants, agreements or provisions contained in Nos. 4, 5 and. 6 hereof as to any part of said tract then owned by the party of the first part, his heirs, assigns or personal representatives.” A clause similar to 9A was also included, in deeds to other lots in Sections lA and B. The appellants contend that this, language shows a uniform general scheme or plan of development and use which affects not only the land granted but also the land retained by Fenwick.. They contend that because Fenwick reserved the power to change paragraphs 4, 5 and 6, that paragraphs 1, 2 and 3, which prohibit commercial establishments, were thereby imposed on all the land owned by Fenwick including the strip. If the restrictions were so imposed, it was at the most by a very indirect manner by inference.
The appellants also rely strongly on the deed of July 29, 1948, from Fenwick to Baldwin of Lot No. 87 in Section C, which placed the same restriction on that lot as in a former deed from Fenwick to Ingraham. The Baldwin deed contained the following: “Subject to the legal operation and effect of, and with the benefit of, the restrictions contained in a deed from the said Charles G. Fenwick, unmarried, to Aileen Dammann Ingraham, dated June 15, 1928 * * *.” The Ingraham deed contained the following: “Similar restrictions with the exception of the set back of the garage from the front line which set back may be forty feet if plans are approved to that effect by the party of the first part shall apply to all lots to be laid out in Section ‘A’ * * *.” Appellees contend that because the Baldwin deed was in Section C, that Section A in the Ingraham deed should be interpreted to be Section C and that such was the intent of the parties. If the Baldwin deed intended to put restrictions on all of Section C, it would have been very easy *361to do so. That such was the intent is at least doubtful.
The appellants rely on the case of Lowes v. Carter, 124 Md. 678, 93 A. 216, where a mortgage failed to mention any restrictions on the property covered thereby. However, in that case, deeds to the other lots in the development declared that each and every one of the lots should be subject to all of the restrictions whether the said lots should be sold or retained by the grantor. There is no such statement in any of the deeds here as to Section C.
The appellants stress the following quotation from Schlicht v. Wengert, 178 Md. 629, 635, 15 A. 2d 911: “If the restrictive covenant appears to have been adopted for the uniform development of the tract, as part of a general scheme, the unexpressed intention may be évident, and the covenant may be enforced at the suit of a neighboring owner aggrieved by its breachC McKenrick v. Savings Bank, 174 Md. 118, 128, 197 A. 580, 584. Tf in such a case it appears that it was the intention of the grantors that the restrictions were part of a uniform general scheme or plan of development and use which should affect the land granted and the land retained alike, they may be enforced in equity’.” That case involved a subdivision of 210 lots in Anne Arundel County. There were restrictive covenants in all the deeds except two against the sale of beer. The appellee, Wengert and wife, held their lots under three deeds, one from Tubman and Mace contained the covenant in full, and two, from vendees of Tubman and Mace, adopting it by express reference. In the instant case, no restrictions are contained in the deed in question. In the Schlicht case, Wengert sold beer on this property. Out of friendship for Wengert, Schlicht, owner of a neighboring lot, had tolerated the alleged violation for about five years. The Court there found: “On the main question, whether the covenant in the Wengert deed was intended for the benefit of other vendees in the tract, the conclusion of this court has differed from that of the court below. One large tract was being developed by division into lots for sale, a printed, uniform, deed was prepared and used for all, with the two exceptions men*362tioned, and the covenant on its face seems to evidence a design to give a character to the whole neighborhood, that is, to secure a residential neighborhood, free from occupations and structures which might disturb that character, ‘at any time hereafter.’ A uniform, general, scheme of development and use was adopted, and the benefit and advantages of the covenant seem plainly intended for buyers of other lots; after all the lots were sold, as the plan intended, it could benefit only the buyers and their assigns. Many residences have been built, and there is testimony that the complainants, at least, built in reliance on the assurance as to the character of the place.” In the instant case the plats are not uniform and there has been shown no uniform plan of development for the strip. Although it was stipulated that residents in Poplar Hill would testify that they purchased their properties “in reliance upon some restrictions being applicable to Poplar Hill,” there is no agreement as to just what land was covered by the restrictions. In fact, the appellants in their brief say as to the Somer’s parking space, which is a part of the strip and within approximately three hundred feet of the lot in question: “Few of the residents of Poplar Hill knew that this southernmost portion used by Somers as a parking space, was part of Poplar Hill. * * * Furthermore, none of these appellants wish any harm to Somers, whose store does no harm to Poplar Hill * * Although failure of the appellants to proceed against Somers for violations of alleged restrictions may not constitute laches, it is strong evidence that the strip, the lots of which were not numbered or subdivided on the plats, was never considered a part.of the Poplar .Hill Development or a part of the uniform scheme of development.
As to the contention that the covenant by Fenwick, in placing restrictions on particular lots, placed restrictions on all the Fenwick property, appellants rely on the following quotation from Raney v. Tompkins, 197 Md. 98, 101, 78 A. 2d 183: “It appears to be well settled that ‘a grantor may impose, a restriction, in the natu*363re of a servitude or easement, upon the land that he sells or leases, for the benefit of the land he still retains; and if that servitude is imposed upon the heirs and assigns of the grantee, and in favor of the heirs and assigns of the grantor, it may be enforced by the assignee of the • grantor against the assignee, with notice, of the grantee.’ Halle v. Newbold, 69 Md. 265, 270, 271, 14 A. 662, 663. The same principle applies where the condition is imposed upon the land retained in favor of the land sold.” However, it was said in Wood v. Stehrer, 119 Md. 143, 148, 149, 86 A. 128: “The covenant does not provide that the grantors will use or hold the remainder of the property subject to the same restrictions imposed on the lot conveyed to the appellant. There is nothing in it which would have prohibited the grantors from erecting such improvements as Stehrer was about to erect. If it was intended to attach to the land remaining in the grantors the restrictions, conditions and limitations imposed on the lot conveyed to appellant, surely it would have been so stated, but they only covenanted that ‘they will not grant, convey, assign or lease any of the ground,’ etc., except under and subject to the aforesaid restrictions, etc. As the covenant does not attempt to regulate the use of the remaining property by the grantors, and does not bind or refer to their heirs and assigns, it is not to be presumed that it was intended to include them.” It was also said in Bealmear v. Tippett, 145 Md. 568, 571, 125 A. 806: “The essential inquiry is whether there is any existing interest on behalf of which the restrictive covenants we have mentioned can be enforced in regard to the property with which we are concerned in this case. In order to answer that inquiry in the affirmative we should have to discover in the terms of. the deeds, or in satisfactory proof of a uniform plan of development, an intention that the covenants should bind all portions of the land. Beetem v. Garrison, 129 Md. 664. The provisions of the deeds failed to reveal such a purpose. They omit any agreement that the restrictions should bind the grantor’s remaining land, or should apply to property *364other than that granted in each instance, and the covenants on the part of the grantor, in every deed, are strictly individual. Safe Deposit Company v. Flaherty, 91 Md. 489; Wood v. Stehrer, 119 Md. 143; Lowes v. Carter, 124 Md. 678.” See also Kleis v. Katcef, 160 Md. 627, 631, 154 A. 558.
Fenwick undoubtedly directly placed restrictions on all of Sections A and B. If restrictions are placed against all of Section C and the strip, it can be done only on the theory that such restrictions are created by equitable servitude. The doctrine of equitable servitude apparently originated in this State with the case of Thruston v. Minke, 32 Md. 487, as assumed in Ringgold v. Denhardt, 136 Md. 136, 141, 110 A. 321, and McKenriek v. Savings Bank, 174 Md. 118, 121, 197 A. 580. In the Thruston case, supra, Thruston and Minke owned as tenants in common a lot of ground in Cumberland, a part of which was improved by the St. Nicholas Hotel. Thruston leased to Minke for a term of ninety-nine years, renewable forever, his undivided interest in the vacant or unimproved part of the lot. In that lease were express restrictions authorizing the use of the hotel wall up to the third floor level for an adjoining building, and prohibiting the construction of any building on the vacant part higher than the level of the third floor of the hotel. As in the instant case with respect to the lot in question, there was no language as to these restrictions running with the land for the benefit of the lessor’s remaining land. Thruston sold the ground rent and reversion created, but retained the hotel property: Thereafter Minke violated the restrictions. In an action for an injunction this Court found that the written contract, although not expressly so providing, was clearly for the benefit of the hotel. Being written and recorded it constituted an equitable servitude enforceable by Thruston as the hotel owner. This in no way involved the Statute of Frauds as the contract was in writing and recorded. The language in the restrictions on the specific lots in the instant case is by no means so clearly made for the *365benefit of the remaining land of Fenwick, not specifically restricted. See Scholtes v. McColgan, 184 Md. 480, 41 A. 2d 479, VIII Md. L. Rev., page 307, where it was held that the filing of a plat without restrictions on it does not indicate the adoption of any uniform restricted plan of development, but that the absence of a plat may indicate the lack of a plan. See also Matthews v. Kernewood, Inc., 184 Md. 297, 40 A. 2d 522. The appellants rely on the following quotation in Ringgold v. Denhardt, supra, from Nottingham Brick & Tile Co. v. Butler, 15 Q. B. Div. 268, that, if the restrictions “are meant for the common advantage of a set of purchasers, such purchasers and their assigns may enforce them inter sese for their own benefit.” In the instant case the restrictions imposed by Fenwick are not entirely uniform in Section C. Different expiration dates were imposed. There are several different plats. In some of the deeds, as hereinbefore pointed out, the grantor reserved the right to change certain restrictions. In Ringgold v. Denhardt, supra, it was said: “Mr. Ringgold was asked: ‘Now, as a matter of fact, was not it originally intended by you that the property now called the church lot, as well as lot B and D, to the extreme rear or eastward, end of the development, should be part of the development’’ and he made this significant reply: ‘We had it plotted out. We could not tell you what we were going to do. Many changes are made in a plat.’ If the vendor had the right to sell off lots without imposing restrictions, and to make changes in the plat as she saw proper, it cannot be said that it was the intention of the parties that her remaining property was to be subject to the restrictions.” In the case of Oak Lane Corporation v. Duke, 196 Md. 136, 75 A. 2d 80, in each deed, unlike those in the case now before us, similar restrictions were included. None of the deeds contained any statement that similar restrictions bound the lots retained, or subsequently to be sold by the developing company. It was there said: “Where restrictions are imposed upon property sold for the benefit of the property retained, and *366upon the property retained for the benefit of the property sold, or upon both for the benefit of both, such restrictions are held to constitute a uniform general scheme or plan of development, to run with the land, and to be valid and enforceable. McKenrick v. Savings Bank, 174 Md. 118, 197 A. 580. Such restrictions may be shown otherwise than by the deeds, if there is clear and satisfactory proof that the common grantor intended that they should affect the land retained. [Williams Realty Co. v. Robey, 175 Md. 532, 2 A. 2d 683]. This is a question of fact which may be considered from all the evidence produced in the case. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the unrestricted use of the property. Scholtes v. McColgan, 184 Md. 480, 41 A. 2d 479. There is nothing in the case before us which indicates any common scheme, except the restrictions in the deeds of the ■ lots sold. The Park Manor Realty Company did not obligate itself tó convey all of the lots in the plat with these restrictions on them when it acquired the property in 1907, and subdivided it, and started to sell lots.”
It was said in Matthews v. Kernewood, Inc., supra: “Implied restrictions have never been favored by this Court. It was said in the case of Baltimore Butchers Abattoir & Livestock Co. v. Union Rendering Co., 179 Md. 117, at page 123, 17 A. 2d 130, at page 133: ‘It is also a fundamental rule that since restrictions are in derogation of conveyances and repugnant to trade and commerce, restrictive covenants are not favored by thé Courts, but should be strictly construed against the parties seeking to enforce them. [McKenrick v. Savings Bank, supra.] A restrictive covenant should not be extended by implication beyond its original intent to include anything not clearly expressed in the conveyance, and if there is ambiguity in its meaning, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the unrestricted use of the property, if it reasonably can be done. The burden rests upon the party relying on a restrictive covenant to bring himself within its terms.’ [Clem v. Valentine, 155 Md. 19, 141 A. 710; Levy v. Dundalk Co., 177 Md. 636, 648, 11 A. 2d 476] * * * *367Even if language used to express a restrictive covenant involves a doubt as to construction, the rule is that such covenants are to be construed strictly against those seeking to enforce them and all doubts must be resolved in favor of the natural and free use of the property. Bartell v. Senger, 160 Md. 685, 693, 155 A. 174; Himmel v. Hendler, 161 Md. 181, 187, 155 A. 316; Ferguson v. Beth-Mary Steel Corp., 166 Md. 666, 672, 172 A. 238; McKenrick v. Savings Bank, 174 Md. 118, 128, 197 A. 580; Yorkway Apts. v. Dundalk Co., 180 Md. 647, 650, 26 A. 2d 398; Gulf Oil Corp. v. Levy, 181 Md. 488, 30 A. 2d 740.”
In the instant case, the strip of which the lot in question is a part, is not subdivided or numbered on any of the plats filed or offered in evidence. The strip touches only one lot of Section C, being separated from Section C on the north by Bellemore Road and bounded on the east by Falls Road, on the south by the lot still owned by Fenwick which is not restricted, and on the west by the Penniman land and lot 79. There is not a single deed here which expressly binds all land retained by Fenwick. In fact the Rianhard deed, suyra, the first deed from Fenwick, and thirteen other deeds, expressly provided that the restrictions should not apply to the remaining Fenwick land. No search of the records of the land, conveyed to Fenwick, would reveal any restrictions on appellee’s land. Hancock v. Gumm, (Ga.), 107 S. E. 872; Buffalo Acad. of Sacred Heart v. Boehm Bros., 276 N. Y. 242, 196 N. E. 42, 45; Finley v. Glenn, 303 Pa. 131, 151 A. 299; Lowes v. Carter, supra. See Limits of Record Search and Notice, 93 Univ. of Pa. Law Review 125, 171-175. The title company evidently reached this conclusion. The majority opinion in this case holding that the restrictions apply to the lot in question goes much further than any previous decision of this Court. The facts and language relied on for the restrictive covenants here are certainly not free from doubt. There is testimony here from experts that the lot upon which appellees intended to build the cleaning establishment, *368zoned commercially, could not be used for residential purposes, it being very precipitous. The view across Falls Road is not that desired in a residential area. The lot can be seen from only a few homes in the development. If the intent existed to put the restrictions on all of Section C, including the strip, it would have been easy to do so in the same manner in which the restrictions were unquestionably placed on Sections A and B. Brady v. Farley, 193 Md. 255, 66 A. 2d 474. This method was not followed. The writer is of the opinion that the strip-of land here is not included in any general scheme of development and that the decree should be affirmed.

Decree reversed, appellees, other than M. & C. C. of Balto. and Paul A. Cohen, to pay the costs, and case remanded for passage of a decree in conformity with the views expressed herein.