Court Opinion

ID: 9582064
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:22:03.675078+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:37:25.285286
License: Public Domain

BURKE, Chief Justice,
with whom MATTHEWS, Justice, joins, dissenting.
I respectfully disagree with the court’s conclusion that AS 28.35.030(a)(3) is void for vagueness.
Implicit in the concept of driving while intoxicated is the requirement that one’s ability to operate a motor vehicle be impaired to some degree. I would read AS 28.35.030(a)(3) as requiring that alcohol, in all cases, be a substantial contributing factor to the defendant’s condition. So read, the statute passes constitutional muster since “(1) ... the offense charged falls squarely within its prohibitions and (2) ... its reach may be reasonably understood in *1333the future.” Crutchfield v. State, 627 P.2d 196, 200 (Alaska 1980).
The case at bar is clearly distinguishable from Crutchfield. There the statute in question prohibited the operation of a motor vehicle “while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, depressant, hallucinogenic or stimulant drugs, or narcotic drugs.” 627 P.2d at 197 (emphasis added). Also, “[s]ince the jury ... found Crutchfield guilty of driving under the influence of alcohol and/or stimulant, depressant or hallucinogenic drugs, it [was] impossible to determine whether the decision was based on evidence of impairment by alcohol, [a drug] or both.” 627 P.2d at 201. Thus, our holding in Crutchfield provides no support for the result reached here.1

. Williford may be entitled to a reversal if the court’s instructions failed to adequately inform the jury that alcohol had to be a substantial contributing factor to her condition. That question, however, is not addressed by the majority opinion, and I see no reason to comment on it separately.