Court Opinion

ID: 9958498
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-09 15:15:40.756952+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:26.689615
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                       APRIL 9, 2024
                                                               In the Office of the Clerk of Court
                                                              WA State Court of Appeals Division III

            IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
                               DIVISION THREE

STATE OF WASHINGTON,                         )
                                             )         No. 39048-9-III
                     Respondent,             )
                                             )
       v.                                    )         UNPUBLISHED OPINION
                                             )
DUSTIN GENE ABRAMS,                          )
                                             )
                     Appellant.              )

       FEARING, J. — Dustin Abrams seeks, on appeal, a ruling striking a victim penalty

assessment (VPA) entered for six 2004 convictions and the vacation of the six

convictions. The latter request requires that we discern whether RCW 9.94A.640(2)

allows a vacatur when the offender is incarcerated for offenses other than the offenses

sought to be vacated. We grant Abrams’ request to remove the VPA. We read

RCW 9.94A.640(2) to permit a vacatur when the applicant remains in prison for other

offenses, but reject, without prejudice, Abrams’ request to vacate the 2004 convictions

because of no showing of rehabilitation.

                                           FACTS

       In April 2004, the State charged, under Grant County cause number 04-1-00255-1,

Dustin Abrams with four counts of possessing a stolen firearm, four counts of theft of a

firearm, and four counts of unlawful possession of a firearm in the second degree. Mike
No. 39048-9-III
State v. Abrams

Mallon, a 79-year-old man who lived in a remote area of Grant County, was the victim of

the thefts. In June 2004, the State amended the information to reduce the number of

charged crimes to six. Abrams pled guilty to those six charges: four counts of theft of a

firearm, one count of theft in the first degree, and one count of theft in the second degree.

We collectively refer to those six convictions as the 2004 convictions. The trial court

sentenced Abrams to thirty months in confinement and ordered him to pay the following

legal financial obligations: a $500.00 VPA, a $110.00 criminal filing fee, a $509.10

sheriff services fee, and a $500.00 fee for his court-appointed attorney.

       During Dustin Abrams’ time in prison for the theft convictions, Grant County

detectives unearthed evidence that Abrams killed Mike Mallon. Abrams remained

incarcerated, after completion of his sentence for the thefts, while awaiting trial for

murder. He later pled guilty to the murder charge. He remains in prison today and has

never been released since 2004.

       On November 29, 2021, Dustin Abrams filed a motion for an order waiving all of

his legal financial obligations from the 2004 prosecution. On December 6, 2021, the

superior court granted the motion in part. The order confirming the ruling declares: “[a]ll

discretionary LFO’s [sic] are waived and interest.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 82. We read

the order as retaining in effect all mandatory obligations. The order did not distinguish

between discretionary and nondiscretionary legal financial obligations.

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State v. Abrams

                                      PROCEDURE

       On June 1, 2022, Dustin Abrams filed another motion with the superior court for

an order waiving legal financial obligations. The motion did not identify the discrete

obligations that Abrams requested be stricken. The June 1 motion is one of two motions

now being reviewed by this court. Abrams filed with the motion a declaration that

avowed his financial inability to pay obligations.

       On June 15, 2022, the superior court denied, without any argument, Dustin

Abrams’ second motion to waive legal financial obligations. The written order explained

that the court denied the motion because “RCW 10.82.090(2) allows for waiver

‘following the offender’s release from total confinement.’ [sic] Defendant is in custody

at DOC.” CP at 89.

       On June 17, 2022, Dustin Abrams filed a motion and declaration for an order

vacating the record of his six 2004 felony convictions. This motion is the second motion

on review before this court. That same day, the trial court denied the motion on the

ground that, under RCW 9.94A.640(2), the offender may not gain a vacatur until five

years after the offender’s release from confinement.

       On August 15, 2022, Dustin Abrams filed, with the superior court, a motion for an

order of indigency, in which he certified:

              [(1)] That I am the named defendant and I wish to appeal the
       judgment that was entered in the above-entitled case; (2) I own no real
       property; (3) That I own no personal property other than my personal

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No. 39048-9-III
State v. Abrams

       effects; (4) No income whatsoever; (5) That I have undischarged LFOs in
       all Grant County Superior Court Cases; (6) That I am without other means
       to prosecute said appeal and desire that public funds are expended for that
       purpose; (7) That I can contribute $0.00; (8) That brief statement was
       already filed with this court; (9) I ask that the court to [sic] provide the
       following at public expense: All filing fees, attorney fees, preparation,
       reproduction, and distribution of briefs, preparation of verbatim report of
       proceedings, and preparation of necessary clerk’s papers; (10) I do not have
       the funds to pay for an appeal, I have been indigent since March 31, 2004
       to date and will always be indigent.

CP at 95. On August 16, the superior court granted the motion and entered an order of

indigency.

                                 LAW AND ANALYSIS

                               Legal Financial Obligations

       Before addressing the merits of Dustin Abrams’ motion to strike legal financial

obligations, we entertain the State’s argument that Abrams lacks a right to appeal as a

matter of right the superior court’s denial of the second motion to strike. The State may

be correct in accordance with State v. Wilson, 198 Wn. App. 632, 635, 393 P.3d 892

(2017). But, in accordance with State v. Abrams, No. 39050-1-III (Wash. Ct. App. Aug.

22, 2023) (unpublished), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/390501_unp.pdf,

wherein Dustin Abrams sought the striking of legal financial obligations for convictions

other than his 2004 convictions, we exercise our discretion to grant discretionary review

on our own motion. RAP 1.2(c); State v. Blazina, 182 Wn.2d 827, 832, 344 P.3d 680

(2015).

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No. 39048-9-III
State v. Abrams

       Dustin Abrams filed two motions for an order waiving legal financial obligations

entered in the 2004 prosecution: first on November 29, 2021 and again on June 1, 2022.

On December 6, 2021, the trial court granted the November 29 motion and struck all

“discretionary” legal financial obligations with interest. The order did not identify those

obligations deemed discretionary.

       In 2018, the Washington Legislature amended the law to prohibit charging the

$200 criminal filing fee to defendants who are indigent at the time of sentencing. LAWS

Of 2018, ch. 269, § 17; State v. Ramirez, 191 Wn.2d 732, 748, 426 P.3d 714 (2018). The

legislature also revoked, for indigent offenders, imposition of expenses incurred by the

State in prosecuting the defendant, such as sheriff’s fees. RCW 10.01.160(2); State v.

Landrum, No. 33812-6-III (Wash. Ct. App. June 20, 2017) (unpublished),

https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/338126_unp.pdf. Finally, court-appointed

attorney fees became discretionary. State v. Glover, 4 Wn. App. 2d 690, 695, 423 P.3d

290 (2018). Thus, when the superior court signed the December 6 order, only the $500

VPA remained as a judgment against Dustin Abrams.

       When Dustin Abrams filed, on June 1, 2022, his second motion for waiver of legal

financial obligations, Washington law still deemed the VPA to be a mandatory

obligation. Nevertheless, in April 2023, the Washington Legislature adopted Engrossed

Substitute House Bill 1169, and this law became effective on July 1, 2023. LAWS OF

2023, ch. 449, § 27. Under this bill, the superior court may no longer impose a VPA if

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No. 39048-9-III
State v. Abrams

the court adjudges the defendant to be indigent at the time of sentencing. LAWS OF 2023,

ch. 449, § 1. RCW 7.68.035(4) now reads:

               The court shall not impose the penalty assessment under this section
       if the court finds that the defendant, at the time of sentencing, is indigent as
       defined in RCW 10.01.160(3).

       Dustin Abrams argues that RCW 7.68.035(4) applies to his case because the 2023

bill went into effect while this direct appeal was pending. We agree. Changes in the law

with regard to legal financial obligations apply to cases pending on direct review and not

yet final at the time the new law became effective. State v. Ramirez, 191 Wn. 2d 732,

747 (2018).

       We still must decide whether Dustin Abrams was indigent at the time of

sentencing in 2004. RCW 10.01.160 states, in relevant part, that

               a defendant is “indigent” if the defendant:
               (a) Meets the criteria defined in RCW 10.101.010(3) (a) through (c);
               (b) is homeless or mentally ill as defined in RCW 71.24.025;
               (c) has household income above 125 percent of the federal poverty
       guidelines and has recurring basic living costs, as defined in RCW
       10.101.010, that render the defendant without the financial ability to pay; or
               (d) has other compelling circumstances that exist that demonstrate an
       inability to pay.

RCW 10.01.160(3). RCW 10.101.010(3) provides that

              “[i]ndigent” means a person who, at any stage of a court proceeding,
       is:
              (a) Receiving one of the following types of public assistance:
       Temporary assistance for needy families, aged, blind, or disabled assistance
       benefits, medical care services under RCW 74.09.035, pregnant women
       assistance benefits, poverty-related veterans’ benefits, food stamps or food

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No. 39048-9-III
State v. Abrams

      stamp benefits transferred electronically, refugee resettlement benefits,
      medicaid, or supplemental security income; or
             (b) Involuntarily committed to a public mental health facility; or
             (c) Receiving an annual income, after taxes, of one hundred twenty-
      five percent or less of the current federally established poverty level.

RCW 10.101.010(3)(a)-(c).

      The record establishes that Dustin Abrams has been incarcerated since before his

2004 convictions, is unemployed, has no income or assets, and cannot afford counsel. He

receives public assistance. He owns no property. The superior court signed an order of

indigency on August 16, 2022. Although the superior court did not expressly find

Abrams to be indigent at the time of the June 2004 sentencing, Abrams averred that he

has been indigent since March 2004. No facts contradict that Abrams was indigent at the

time of sentencing in June 2004. Therefore, we remand to the trial court with instructions

to strike the $500.00 VPA.

                              Vacatur of 2004 Convictions

      Dustin Abrams assigns error to the superior court’s denial of his motion to vacate

his 2004 convictions. The superior court denied the motion after reading the controlling

statute, RCW 9.94A.640(2)(e)(ii), as demanding that the applicant be released from all

confinement, including confinement for other convictions, for at least five years. Abrams

has been incarcerated continuously since his 2004 convictions.

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No. 39048-9-III
State v. Abrams

      The 2019 New Hope Act, codified in RCW 9.94A.640, seeks to promote

successful reentry into society by offenders. LAWS OF 2019, ch. 331, § 3.

RCW 9.94A.640 declares, in relevant part:

               (1) Every offender who has been discharged under RCW 9.94A.637
      may apply to the sentencing court for a vacation of the offender’s record of
      conviction. If the court finds the offender meets the tests prescribed in
      subsection (2) of this section, the court may clear the record of conviction
      by: (a) Permitting the offender to withdraw the offender’s plea of guilty and
      to enter a plea of not guilty; or (b) if the offender has been convicted after a
      plea of not guilty, by the court setting aside the verdict of guilty; and (c) by
      the court dismissing the information or indictment against the offender.
               (2) An offender may not have the record of conviction cleared if:
               (a) There are any criminal charges against the offender pending in
      any court of this state or another state, or in any federal court;
               (b) The offense was a violent offense as defined in RCW 9.94A.030
      or crime against persons as defined in RCW 43.43.830. . ..
               ....
               (e) The offense is a class B felony and less than ten years have
      passed since the later of: (i) The applicant’s release from community
      custody; (ii) the applicant’s release from full and partial confinement; or
      (iii) the applicant’s sentencing date.
               (f) The offense was a class C felony, other than a class C felony
      described in RCW 46.61.502 or 46.61.504, and less than five years have
      passed since the later of: (i) The applicant’s release from community
      custody; (ii) the applicant’s release from full and partial confinement; or
      (iii) the applicant’s sentencing date.

(Emphasis added.) Theft of a firearm and theft in the first degree, two of Dustin Abrams’

crimes, are class B felonies subject to section (2)(e) of RCW 9.94A.640. RCW

9A.56.030, RCW 9A.56.300. Second degree theft, the other 2004 offense, constitutes a

class C felony subject to subsection (2)(f) of RCW 9.94A.640. RCW 9A.56.040.

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No. 39048-9-III
State v. Abrams

       RCW 9.94A.640 takes a step forward to remedy the problem of an offender facing

obstacles when released from incarceration. Under public policy, a deserving offender

should be restored to his preconviction status as a full-fledged citizen. State v. Hawkins,

200 Wn.2d 477, 495, 519 P.3d 182 (2022). This legislative intent aligns with the overall

purposes of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981, ch. 9.94A, RCW, which include

protecting the public and offering the offender an opportunity to improve himself or

herself. RCW 9.94A.010(4), (5); State v. Hawkins, 200 Wn.2d 477, 495 (2022).

       RCW 9.94A.640 addresses the myriad of debilitating problems felons face when

attempting to reintegrate into society. State v. Hawkins, 200 Wn.2d 477, 489 (2022).

Long after serving their sentences, people with criminal histories face severe collateral

consequences that can include barriers to voting, serving on a jury, holding public office,

securing employment, obtaining housing, receiving public assistance, owning a firearm,

getting a driver’s license, qualifying for financial aid and college admission, qualifying

for military service, and deportation for noncitizens. State v. Hawkins, 200 Wn.2d 477,

489 (2022).

       Vacatur entitles an individual to rejoin society free of all penalties and disabilities

resulting from the offense. RCW 9.94A.640(4)(a). In fact, the statute allows an offender,

whose conviction has been vacated, to state that he has never been convicted of that

crime for all purposes, including responding to questions on employment applications.

State v. Hawkins, 200 Wn.2d 477, 489-90 (2022). A conviction vacated under

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No. 39048-9-III
State v. Abrams

RCW 9.94A.640 is removed from the offender’s criminal history.

RCW 9.94A.030(11)(b).

       RCW 9.94A.640(1) outlines a two-step process for vacating an offender’s

convictions. First, a trial court must determine whether the convictions meet the legal

requirements identified in RCW 9.94A.640(2). If the court determines that the

conviction satisfies subsection (2) of the statute, the court engages in the second step and

exercises its discretion to determine whether or not to clear the record of conviction.

RCW 9.94A.640(1). In line with the statutory purpose, the trial court must focus on

whether the applicant has demonstrated sufficient postconviction change to show

rehabilitation. State v. Hawkins, 200 Wn.2d 477, 495 (2022).

       Because some of Dustin Abrams’ crimes were class B felonies, ten years must

have passed from some event in order to qualify him for vacation of all 2004 convictions.

RCW 9.94A.640(2)(e). The State argues that the ten years has not even begun to

commence because Abrams remains incarcerated. The State maintains that interpreting

RCW 9.94A.640(2)(e)(ii) to mean that ten years have passed since the offender’s release

from full or partial confinement for the specific Class B felony at issue and interpreting

RCW 9.94A.640(2)(f)(ii) to mean that five years have passed since the offender’s release

from full or partial confinement for the specific Class C felony would defeat the purposes

of the statute, place the statute in conflict with related statutes, and lead to absurd results.

Abrams reads the statute to only demand that ten years have passed since his

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No. 39048-9-III
State v. Abrams

incarceration for the 2004 crimes, which confinement ended sometime around 2006. We

must decide whether RCW 9.94A.640(2)(e) and (f)’s references to release from

community custody, release from confinement, and sentencing date relate only to the

crimes sought to be vacated or extend to other crimes.

       The court’s primary duty in statutory interpretation is to discern and implement the

legislature’s intent. Lowy v. PeaceHealth, 174 Wn.2d 769, 779, 280 P.3d 1078 (2012).

In so doing, the court relies on many tested, commonsensical, and intelligent principles to

divine the meaning of the statute, principles employed when interpreting other important

and even sacred texts. State v. Jimenez, 200 Wn. App. 48, 52, 401 P.3d 313 (2017). We

discern legislative intent from the plain language enacted by the legislature, considering

the text of the provision in question, the context of the statute in which the provision is

found, related provisions, amendments to the provision, and the statutory scheme as a

whole. Association of Washington Spirits & Wine Distributors. v. Washington State

Liquor Control Board, 182 Wn.2d 342, 350, 340 P.3d 849 (2015). We also apply basic

rules of grammar. In re Forfeiture of One 1970 Chevrolet Chevelle, 166 Wn.2d 834, 839,

215 P.3d 166 (2009).

       We note that RCW 9.94A.640(2) repeatedly refers to “the offense,” presumably

the offense that the applicant seeks to vacate. Thus, the statute employs the definite

article “the.” We focus on RCW 9.94A.640(2)(e), which controls Class B felonies.

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No. 39048-9-III
State v. Abrams

RCW 9.94A.640(2)(f), governing Class C felonies, uses the same critical language.

Subsection 2(e) reads:

              The offense is a class B felony and less than ten years have passed
       since the later of: (i) The applicant’s release from community custody; (ii)
       the applicant’s release from full and partial confinement; or (iii) the
       applicant’s sentencing date.

(Emphasis added.) We note that the subsection lists all three triggering events for the

commencement of the ten years in the same sentence as “the offense.” We recognize that

subsections (i), (ii), and (iii) do not specifically mention release from custody or

confinement or the sentencing date as a result of any specific offense. Nevertheless,

based on ordinary sentence structure, those three events relate to “the offense.” Nowhere

does the sentence structure suggest that any of the operative dates connect to other or

later crimes. The applicant’s sentencing date would likely not refer to sentencing for

another offense since it refers to one date only. We should read the qualifying events in

subsection (i) and (ii) accordingly.

       Use of a definite article is a recognized indication of statutory meaning.

Guardado v. Guardado, 200 Wn. App. 237, 243, 402 P.3d 357 (2017); Department of

Ecology v. City of Spokane Valley, 167 Wn. App. 952, 965, 275 P.3d 367 (2012). The

use of the definite article “the” often signifies a narrowing intent, a reference to

something specific, either known to the reader or listener or uniquely specified. Hickey v.

Scott, 370 Or. 97, 107, 515 P.3d 368 (2022). Whereas definite articles like “the” restrict

                                              12
No. 39048-9-III
State v. Abrams

the noun that follows as particularized in scope or previously specified by context, the

indefinite “a” has generalizing force. Nielsen v. Preap, 586 U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 954,

965, 203 L. Ed. 2d 333 (2019) (citing Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 1294

(11th ed. 2005)). The articles in a statutory text—the definite articles and the indefinite

articles—should not be overlooked or discounted, but should be treated as being chosen

by design and as intending a particularizing effect. In re A.P., 245 W. Va. 248, 858

S.E.2d 873, 879 (2021).

       In Guardado v. Guardado, 200 Wn. App. 237 (2017), this court highlighted the

placement of the article “the” before the noun “cause” in CR 60(e)(1), which demanded

that any motion to vacate a judgment be filed in “the cause.” Based on a plain reading of

the entire rule, the rule’s language referenced the cause of action in which the judgment

from which the movant sought relief was entered. This court reversed the superior

court’s vacation of a judgment because the movant filed her motion in a different cause.

       In RCW 9.94A.640(2)(a), the legislature disqualified an offender from a vacatur if

“any criminal charges” are pending against the offender. This subsection of the

controlling statute illustrates that the legislature knew when it wished to reference other

offenses. The legislature could have, but chose not to, insert the phrase “for any criminal

charges” in RCW 9.94A.640(2)(e) and (f) when referencing community custody,

confinement, and sentencing for purposes of triggering the five- and ten-year waiting

periods.

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No. 39048-9-III
State v. Abrams

          We adopt Dustin Abrams’ reading of RCW 9.94A.640(2)(e). The statute’s

reference to release from community custody or confinement extends only to release by

reason of the offense or offenses sought to be vacated, not other offenses that may keep

the offender incarcerated.

          The State highlights that Dustin Abrams’ interpretation of RCW 9.94A.640 would

create a conflict between crimes that have community custody and those that do not. The

offender serves community custody time at the end of all confinement time, including

that time imposed on unrelated charges. RCW 9.94A.171(3)(a). Under Abrams’

interpretation, crimes that require community custody would be ineligible for vacation

until after the offender’s ultimate release, and crimes that do not have community custody

would be eligible for vacation years, if not decades, earlier, while the offender remains in

prison.

          The State makes an excellent point that almost persuades us to adopt its

interpretation. But, the continued use of the phrase “the offense” in the statute convinces

us of the correctness of our exegesis. We note that crimes that do not demand

community custody typically entail less harm to the general public such that the

legislature could legitimately distinguish for purposes of vacatur between those offenses

that demand community custody and those that do not.

          We also note that entry of a vacatur before the offender leaves prison affords little

benefit to the offender. This recognition also almost persuades us to adopt the State’s

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No. 39048-9-III
State v. Abrams

interpretation of RCW 9.94A.640. The offender will later need to seek a vacatur of the

convictions for which he remains incarcerated in order to claim being conviction free.

But, under RCW 9.94A.640 and the policy of promoting and furthering rehabilitation

while in prison, the offender should still be able to gain what little profit is available

while in prison from the opportunity to gain vacatur of old crimes.

       Our adoption of Dustin Abrams’ reading of RCW 9.94A.640(2) does not

necessarily lead to vacation of his 2004 convictions. The court must meaningfully

consider evidence of mitigation and rehabilitation since the time of the crime and

exercise its discretion based on its assessment of the extent of rehabilitation. State v.

Hawkins, 200 Wn.2d 477, 481 (2022). The legislature’s use of the word “may” in

RCW 9.94A.640 constitutes a clear grant of discretion to the trial court. State v.

Hawkins, 200 Wn.2d 477, 495 (2022).

       When filing his vacatur motion, Dustin Abrams supplied the superior court with

no evidence of rehabilitation that the superior court could weigh in exercising its

discretion when determining vacatur. Therefore, we do not reverse the superior court’s

denial of the vacatur. Abrams remains free to file a new motion for vacatur with

evidence of any rehabilitation.

       The State emphasizes that Dustin Abrams has not reentered the community.

According to the State, a person serving a murder sentence in state custody is not

someone the legislature would wish have restored to his preconviction status as a full-

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No. 39048-9-III
State v. Abrams

fledged citizen. We disagree. Someone convicted of murder can gain rehabilitation,

return safely to society, and benefit from restoration of full citizen status. The 2019 New

Hope Act recognizes the possibility of redemption.

                                     CONCLUSION

       We affirm the superior court’s denial of Dustin Abrams’ petition for vacatur of his

2004 convictions without prejudice to Abrams filing a new petition with evidence of

rehabilitation.

       A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the

Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to

RCW 2.06.040.

                                             _________________________________
                                             Fearing, J.

WE CONCUR:

______________________________
Lawrence-Berrey, C.J.

______________________________
Cooney, J.

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