Court Opinion

ID: 9367591
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-01 08:10:18.434671+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:01.495196
License: Public Domain

In The
              Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

                   No. 06-22-00069-CR

        JACKIE WEBSTER DENNIS, Appellant

                            V.

           THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

          On Appeal from the 4th District Court
                 Rusk County, Texas
              Trial Court No. CR19-337

      Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.
       Memorandum Opinion by Justice van Cleef
                                MEMORANDUM OPINION

        A Rusk County jury convicted Jackie Webster Dennis of dating violence assault by

occlusion with a previous conviction for family violence, a second-degree felony. See TEX.

PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(b-3) (Supp.). After Dennis pled true to the State’s punishment

enhancement paragraphs, the jury assessed a sentence of fifty years’ imprisonment. The trial

court imposed the fifty-year sentence and assessed $450.00 in attorney fees for Dennis’s court-

appointed counsel. On appeal, Dennis argues that the evidence is legally insufficient to support

the jury’s verdict of guilt.

        Because we find that sufficient evidence supported the jury’s verdict, we overrule

Dennis’s sole point of error. Even so, we modify the trial court’s judgment to reflect the proper

statute of offense and by deleting the assessment of court-appointed attorney fees against Dennis,

who is indigent. As modified, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

I.      Legally Sufficient Evidence Supports the Jury’s Verdict of Guilt

        A.      Standard of Review

        “In evaluating legal sufficiency, we review all the evidence in the light most favorable to

the trial court’s judgment to determine whether any rational jury could have found the essential

elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Williamson v. State, 589 S.W.3d 292, 297

(Tex. App.—Texarkana 2019, pet. ref’d) (citing Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Hartsfield v.

State, 305 S.W.3d 859, 863 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2010, pet. ref’d)). “Our rigorous [legal

sufficiency] review focuses on the quality of the evidence presented.” Id. (citing Brooks, 323

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S.W.3d at 917–18 (Cochran, J., concurring)). “We examine legal sufficiency under the direction

of the Brooks opinion, while giving deference to the responsibility of the jury ‘to fairly resolve

conflicts in testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts

to ultimate facts.’” Id. (quoting Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)

(citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318–19; Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App.

2007))).

       “Legal sufficiency of the evidence is measured by the elements of the offense as defined

by a hypothetically correct jury charge.” Id. at 298 (quoting Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240

(Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). “The ‘hypothetically correct’ jury charge is ‘one that accurately sets

out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of

proof or unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the

particular offense for which the defendant was tried.’” Id. (quoting Malik, 953 S.W.2d at 240).

       Here, the State alleged that Dennis

       intentionally, knowingly, and recklessly cause[d] bodily injury to Victoria
       Hurtado . . . , a person with whom the defendant has or had had a dating
       relationship, as described by Section 71.0021(b) of the Texas Family Code, by
       intentionally, knowingly, and recklessly impeding the normal breathing or
       circulation of the blood of the complainant by applying pressure to the throat or
       neck of the complainant, and before the commission of the offense, the defendant
       had previously been convicted of an offense under Chapter 22 of the Texas Penal
       Code, against a member of the defendant’s family, as described by Section 71.003
       of the Texas Family Code, namely on the 24th day of January, 2011, in the Gregg
       County Court at Law of Gregg County, Texas, in cause number 2006-3485.

The language of this indictment tracks the language found in Section 22.01(b-3) of the Texas

Penal Code, which states, in relevant part, the following:

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            (a)     A person commits an offense if the person:

                    (1)    intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to
                    another . . . .

            ....

            (b-3)   . . . an offense under Subsection (a)(1) is a felony of the second degree if:

                    (1)    the offense is committed against a person whose relationship to or
                    association with the defendant is described by Section 71.0021(b) . . . ;

                    (2)    it is shown on the trial of the offense that the defendant has been
                    previously convicted of an offense under this chapter . . . against a person
                    whose relationship to or association with the defendant is described by
                    Section . . . 71.003 . . . Family Code; and

                    (3)    the offense is committed by intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly
                    impeding the normal breathing or circulation of the blood of the person by
                    applying pressure to the person’s throat or neck or by blocking the
                    person’s nose or mouth.

TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(a)(1), (b-3) (Supp.).

            B.      The Evidence at Trial

            Denise Padilla lived in a home shared with Victoria Hurtado. Padilla testified that

Hurtado was dating Dennis and that, on the day of the incident, Dennis and Hurtado were

arguing. When Padilla described the commotion heard coming from Hurtado’s room, she said it

sounded “[l]ike wresting around.” Padilla testified that she opened the door, saw Hurtado

crying, and witnessed Dennis with his hands around Hurtado’s neck.1 Padilla said that Hurtado

had marks on her neck, a busted lip, and tousled hair and that she “looked like she had been

tossed around like a rag doll.” Padilla called the police.

1
    During cross-examination, Padilla said that Dennis’s hands were below Hurtado’s neck in the “collarbone area.”
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       Body-camera footage from the responding officer showed that, when he arrived at

Padilla’s home, Hurtado told the officer that her boyfriend, Dennis, “pick[ed] [her] up by [her]

neck and was choking [her] on the bed,” threw her to the floor, and then “stomped” on her neck

with his boot. Hurtado said that she tried to scream but could not because she was unable to

breathe.

       Patrick Dooley, a deputy with the Rusk County Sheriff’s Office, authenticated a jailhouse

call between Dennis and Hurtado on the day of voir dire. On the call, Dennis attempted to

convince Hurtado not to appear for trial, but he was unable to sway her.

       After confirming that she and Dennis had been dating for approximately one year before

the incident, Hurtado testified that Dennis choked her with his hands, which caused difficulty

breathing. She said, “After [Dennis] choked me, he put his foot on me.” Hurtado added, “I was

trying to get him off of me because he was choking me out.” A closeup of Hurtado’s injuries,

including marks on her neck and collarbone, were shown to the jury. Hurtado said that she was

bruised for a week.

       The State introduced a certified judgment showing that Dennis had pled guilty to, and

was previously convicted of, family violence assault on January 24, 2011, in the County Court at

Law #1 of Gregg County, Texas, in cause number 2006-3485.               Craig Allen Sweeney, an

investigator with the Rusk County District Attorney’s Office, testified that fingerprint analysis

showed that Dennis’s thumbprint was on the prior judgment.

       After hearing this evidence, the jury rendered a verdict of guilt.

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       C.      Analysis

       Dennis acknowledged the proof of his prior offense for family violence and that the State

proved he caused bodily injury to Hurtado with the requisite intent. Even so, he argues that there

was insufficient evidence to establish that he impeded Hurtado’s normal breathing or circulation

by applying pressure to her neck. We disagree.

       The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has interpreted the term “‘impeding’. . . to include

any degree of impediment to one’s normal breathing or circulation of blood flow.” Philmon v.

State, 609 S.W.3d 532, 537 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020). As a result, “evidence of the complainant

simply being unable to take deep breaths” will support the jury’s finding on the occlusion

element. Id. “This is an exceptionally low bar,” since “[i]t takes very little effort or force to

slightly hinder another’s breathing or circulation, and there is notably no injury or threat of injury

requirement aside from the impediment, however minimal.” Id.

       Here, Padilla witnessed Dennis with his hands around Hurtado’s neck. The audio from

body camera footage showed that Hurtado told officers that Dennis picked her up by her neck

and choked her and later “stomped” on her neck area with his boot. The jury was shown

photographs of the injuries to Hurtado’s neck and heard Hurtado’s testimony that she was

bruised for a week. By this evidence, the jury could see that Dennis had applied some force or

pressure to Hurtado’s neck. The jury was also able to conclude that Dennis impeded Hurtado’s

normal breathing when she testified that Dennis was “choking [her] out” and said that it was

difficult for her to breathe. The body camera footage revealed that Hurtado told the responding

officer that she tried to scream but was unable to do so because she could not breathe.

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       When viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that a rational juror

could reasonably infer from the evidence that all essential elements of the offense were met,

including that Dennis impeded Hurtado’s normal breathing by applying pressure to her neck.

II.    We Must Modify the Trial Court’s Judgment

       A.      We Correct the Statute of Offense

       The trial court’s judgment correctly states that Dennis was convicted of family violence

assault by occlusion with a prior conviction for family violence assault. Under Section 22.01(b-

3) of the Texas Penal Code, this offense is classified as a second-degree felony. See TEX. PENAL

CODE ANN. § 22.01(b-3). While the judgment properly reflects conviction of a second-degree

felony, it mistakenly states that the statute of offense is Section 22.01(b-2), which does not apply

since it relates to assaults against peace officers or judges.       See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.

§ 22.01(b-2) (Supp.).

       “We have the authority to modify the judgment to make the record speak the truth.”

Minter v. State, 570 S.W.3d 941, 944 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2019, no pet.) (citing TEX. R. APP.

P. 43.2(b); French v. State, 830 S.W.2d 607, 609 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992); Rhoten v. State, 299

S.W.3d 349, 356 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2009, no pet.)). Accordingly, we modify the trial

court’s judgment to reflect that the proper statute of offense is Section 22.01(b-3).

       B.      We Delete the Assessment of Attorney Fees Because Dennis Is Indigent

       Because the trial court found Dennis indigent, he was presumed to remain indigent absent

proof of a material change in his circumstances.        See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts.

26.04(p), 26.05(g) (Supp.); Walker v. State, 557 S.W.3d 678, 689 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2018,

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pet. ref’d). Even so, the trial court, who also found Dennis indigent after trial for purposes of

appeal, assessed $450.00 in attorney fees against him.

            Under Article 26.05(g) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, a trial court has the

authority to order the reimbursement of court-appointed attorney fees only if “the judge

determines that a defendant has financial resources that enable the defendant to offset in part or

in whole the costs of the legal services provided . . . , including any expenses and costs.” TEX.

CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.05(g). “[T]he defendant’s financial resources and ability to pay

are explicit critical elements in the trial court’s determination of the propriety of ordering

reimbursement of costs and fees” of legal services provided. Armstrong v. State, 340 S.W.3d

759, 765–66 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (quoting Mayer v. State, 309 S.W.3d 552, 556 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2010)). A finding under Article 26.05(g) must be supported by sufficient evidence. Mayer

v. State, 309 S.W.3d 552, 556 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).

            We have scoured the appellate record and conclude that nothing showed that Dennis had

the ability to pay attorney fees. Here, the trial court’s judgment recited that Dennis was indigent;

however, the trial court nevertheless assessed attorney fees against him.2                             We delete the

assessment of attorney fees from the judgment.

2
    The bill of costs correctly shows that nothing is owed for attorney fees because Dennis is indigent.
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III.   Conclusion

       We modify the trial court’s judgment (1) to reflect that the proper statute of offense is

Section 22.01(b-3) and (2) by deleting the $450.00 assessment for court-appointed attorney fees.

As modified, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                            Charles van Cleef
                                            Justice

Date Submitted:       January 19, 2023
Date Decided:         January 31, 2023

Do Not Publish

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