Court Opinion

ID: 9828255
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 18:14:27.679028+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:46.642477
License: Public Domain

On Appellee’s Motion for Rehearing.
[1,2] Upon re-examination of the record, and consideration of authorities cited in ap-pellee’s motion for rehearing, we have reached the conclusion that we erred in our former opinion in this case in holding that there was no evidence to support the finding of the jury that appellee suffered total incapacity, as a result of the injuries complained of in this suit, for the number of days found by the jury. After stating in our former opinion that for 33 days during the period of time from July 1, 1916, to December 16, 1916, the plaintiff was only partially incapacitated, and performed work for which he received wages, we say that—
“These 33 days covered periods of from 1 to 15 days’ duration, with intervals of several weeks or months intervening, and there is nothing in the evidence to show that his condition during these intervals was different from what it was on the days he worked.”
We do not now think that we were justified in concluding that because plaintiff was able to perform some kind of work during these 33 days the finding of the jury that he was totally incapacitated during the remainder of the period mentioned could not be sustained. The plaintiff testified:
“This injury hurt me so that I have not been able to demand any salary since. I have attempted to work, but every job that I got I lost because the employers would say that my disabilities were of such a nature that my services were not of use to them.”
There was other testimony corroborative of this statement of the plaintiff. It seems to be settled by the authorities that—
“The phrase ‘total incapacity for work,’ as used in Workmen’s Compensation Act, does not imply an absolute disability to perform any kind of labor, but a person disqualified from performing the usual tasks of a workman in such a way as to enable him to procure and retain employment is ordinarily regarded as ‘totally incapacitated.’ ” Moore v. Peet Bros., 99 Kan. 443, 162 Pac. 295.
The same general rule is announced in the following cases: In re Lacione, 227 Mass. 269, 116 N. E. 485; In re Sullivan, 218 Mass. 141, 105 N. E. 463, L. R. A. 1916A, 378; Deprey’s Case, 219 Mass, 189, 106 N. E. 686.
[3] Our employé’s compensation act is largely copied from the Massachusetts Act, and should receive the same construction as that given the latter act by the courts of that state. In the Sullivan Case, supra, the court, referring to some of the cases above cited, say:
“In our opinion these decisions are correct in principle.. The object of our statute was to give compensation for a total or partial loss of the capacity to earn wages. Gillen’s Case, 215 Mass. 96, 99, 102 N. E. 346 [L. R. A. 1916A, 371]. If, as in this case, the injured employs by reason of his injury is unable, in spite of diligent efforts, to obtain employment, it would be an abuse of language to say that he was still able to earn money, that he still had a capacity for work, even though his physical powers might be such as to enable him to do some kinds of work if practically the labor market were not thus closed to him. He has become unable to earn anything; he has lost his capacity to work for wages and to support himself, not by reason of any change in market conditions, but because of a defect which is personal to himself, and *467•which is the direct result of the injury that he has sustained. He is deprived of the benefit which the statute promises to him if he is told that because he could do some work if he could get it, he is not under an incapacity for work, although by reason of his injury he can obtain no opportunity to work. But we said in Donovan’s Case, 217 Mass. 76, 104 N. E. 431, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 778, 4 N. C. C. A. 549, that the statute was to be construed broadly for the purpose of carrying out its manifest purpose.”
[4] We further think we erred in our former holding that plaintiff could not recover for total disability for the time allowed him by the jury because of the fact that he had for a portion of said time received compensation for total incapacity from a different insurance company, and for an injury sustained subsequent to the injury of which he complains in this suit. The fact that he may have obtained compensation for the subsequent injury to which he was not entitled cannot defeat his right to recover in this suit.
[5] There is, however, an error in the judgment in this case which requires the reformation of the judgment. The jury found that plaintiff was totally incapacitated for a period of 504 days or 72 weeks. On this finding the court rendered judgment for plaintiff, allowing him compensation for said period at the rate of $6.30 per week. This judgment is for $1.30 per week more than is claimed in plaintiff’s petition. The allegations of the petition setting out the amount claimed by plaintiff are as follows:
“That the Industrial Accident Board for the state of Texas heard and adjudicated the plaintiff’s rights and compensation as against the defendant, and found in favor of plaintiff, finding that he was entitled to the compensation of $5 per week, beginning on the 7th day of May, 1916, on account of the injuries sustained by the plaintiff while engaged by the Kirby Lumber Company.
“That since sustaining the said injury, as alleged by plaintiff and found by the Industrial Accident Board, plaintiff’s leg and foot have continued to pain him, and he is unable to work, being unable to walk without crutches, and plaintiff alleges that he is entitled to have and receive of the defendant the sum of $5 per week for a period of 300 weeks, as plaintiff will be unable to work and earn a living, as he was prior to sustaining said injury, and has been totally disabled by reason of sustaining said injuries as hereinbefore alleged.
“Wherefore, plaintiff prays that the defendant be cited, and that upon a hearing hereof plaintiff recover of defendant the sum of $1,000, at the rate of $5 per week from and after the 8th day after said injury, and for all such other general and special relief as he may be entitled to, and for costs of court.”
It goes without saying that the plaintiff cannot recover compensation at a greater rate per week than that alleged in his petition.
It follows from what we have said that the motion for rehearing should be granted, judgment of the court below reformed, as above indicáted, and affirmed; and it has been so ordered.
Reformed and affirmed.