Court Opinion

ID: 9678120
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:12:06.806752+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:02.037008
License: Public Domain

Karen R. Baker, Judge, dissenting. As noted by the majority, the question on appeal is whether appellant’s failure to provide support was without justifiable cause. While the majority recognizes the obligation to support one’s child exists in the absence of a support order, they go on to find such a failure to provide support justifiable in this case due to the absence of an order directing the appellant to support her child. I cannot agree. The child custody order at issue is not contained in the record and we are left to speculate as to what it contained. The majority concludes, based on the testimony, that the order was silent in regard to support. The majority notes specifically that Aaron Harrison testified that he did not ask for child support when he and Janie agreed to change custody in December 2000. The problem with this analysis is twofold. First, because the custody order is absent from the record, it is impossible for this court to know what it contained. In addition, even if the majority were correct in their assumption that the custody order is silent at to child support, its silence would not relieve appellant of her support obligation. A parent cannot simply turn a child’s care and support over to another and thereby be excused from the duty of providing support for the child, a duty exists whether ordered or not. In re Adoption of Glover, 288 Ark. 59, 702 S.W.2d 12 (1986) (citing Pender v. McKee, 266 Ark. 18, 582 S.W.2d 929 (1979)). Second, the majority emphasizes Aaron’s admission that he did not ask for child support at the time the change of custody was granted, yet fails to mention that both appellant and Aaron testified that he subsequently asked her for support. Appellant testified that she had provided no support for over a year and that it had been a year and a half since she had seen J.H. She admitted that in 2003 she made probably $550.00 every two weeks. Additionally, she stated that Aaron had asked her to help pay for daycare around Easter 2003, and went on to say that she “did not feel [she] should have had to pay child support to someone for not letting [her] do what they are supposed to let [her] do.” The majority relies on Glover, in holding that the mother’s consent was necessary because her failure to support J.H. was justifiable. In Glover, the father was ordered to pay child support and the original divorce complaint provided that the caretakers should remain responsible for the support and maintenance of the child while they had custody. Here, if the majority is correct that the custody order was silent as to support, no one was ordered to support J.H., nor were there other custodians responsible for her support and maintenance. In fact, there is no evidence that in granting Aaron Harrison’s ex parte petition to change custody the trial court even considered the issue of child support. Certainly there is no implication that appellant was relieved by the court of her duty to support her child. In Lovelace v. May, 278 Ark. 127, 644 S.W.2d 261 (1983), the appellant could not find employment, had no funds, and there was evidence of employment for only three months. In this case, appellant admitted to having employment and testified in regard to her income. In Tidsdale v. Seavey, 286 Ark. 222, 691 S.W.2d 144 (1985), the parents obligation of support was terminated by court order. Finally, in Dinkins v. Arkansas Dep’t of Human Servs., 344 Ark. 207, 40 S.W.3d 286 (2001), contributions for support were never requested. Here, appellant admitted that a request for support, specifically for childcare, was made. The trial court after hearing the testimony in this case found that appellant had for a period in excess of one year failed to support her child without justifiable cause. Based on the record before us this finding is not in error; yet the majority, relying on an order that is not before us, reverses the trial court and holds that appellant’s undisputed failure to support her child was justified. The majority’s holding abandons the longstanding principle that a parent has a duty to provide support for her child, whether or not she is ordered to do so by a court. Because the majority’s decision contravenes this basic principle, I must respectfully dissent. Gladwin, Griffen, and Crabtree, JJ., join.