Court Opinion

ID: 9581372
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:14:17.4387+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:53.902220
License: Public Domain

J. T. Kallman, J.
(dissenting). The proper standard of review by this Court in cases involving termination of parental rights is somewhat unclear. This Court has applied both a de novo and a clearly erroneous standard of review on appeal in termination cases. In the Matter of Bailey, 125 Mich App 522, 527; 336 NW2d 499 (1983). Applying either standard, however, I must dissent from the majority’s resolution of the issues raised in this case.
In my opinion, this matter must be reversed because the probate court improperly assumed jurisdiction over the minor child. The jurisdiction of the probate court over children is not inherent —the statutory requirements embodied in MCL 712A.2(b), subds (1) and (2); MSA 27.3178(598.2)(b), subds (1) and (2) must be complied with. See, also, In the Matter of Baby X, 97 Mich App 111, 113-114; 293 NW2d 736 (1980), and JCR 1969, 8.1(A) and (B).
In this case, the girl’s mother testified that Barbara’s father had left her when she was pregnant and he has not been heard from since this abandonment. At the conclusion of the jurisdictional hearing, the probate judge specifically found *666that there was insufficient evidence to establish that Barbara’s mother had neglected her. Nonetheless, the judge assumed jurisdiction, declaring the child neglected due to her father’s failure to pay support. The probate judge said:
"The Court is not convinced from the evidence that has been presented that mother has neglected the child sufficiently, under Michigan law, to establish that the child is neglected; however, it is clear to the Court that the father has, and, therefore, the finding of the Court is that Barbara is a neglected child within the meaning of the Michigan Probate Code and orders that she be made a temporary ward of the Court, and Barbara is continued in the custody of her maternal grandparents, pending further order of the Court.”
The court’s decision to assume jurisdiction based on the father’s failure to pay support is erroneous under any possible standard of review applicable to this case. Barbara’s mother, the custodial parent, is not obligated to bear responsibility for the actions of the girl’s father whom she has not seen for six years. To allow jurisdiction to attach in this factual scenario could lead to hypothetically incredible results and, I believe, state interference with the family far beyond that which was contemplated by the Legislature. The majority opinion in effect sanctions state intervention and interference with a single parent’s custodial rights based upon a lack of support from a missing or delinquent parent.
Jurisdiction over a child should only be assumed upon a showing of neglect by the custodial parent which impacts or bears on the child. There is nothing in this record to justify the assumption of jurisdiction based upon the failure of Barbara’s father to provide support for her care. The custo*667dial parent has provided for and made arrangements for the care of her child.
Despite the probate court’s explicit statement to the contrary, the majority concludes that the probate court really took jurisdiction in this case based upon the neglect of both parents. I deem it to be highly inadvisable for an appellate court to look beyond what the judge has said on the record in resolving a dispute, particularly when that appellate court concludes that the judge did not really mean what he said. I am particularly struck by the majority’s conclusion that the child’s mother has failed to show any "demonstrable prejudice” flowing from the court’s failure to specify her neglect as a basis for the assumption of jurisdiction. I find this to be an amazing assertion. Prejudice is manifest for the obvious reasons that the probate court was without legal authority to terminate the mother’s parental rights in the absence of a finding at the jurisdictional phase of the proceedings that she had neglected her daughter’s welfare.
Absent this showing of neglect by the custodial mother, the proper forum for the petitioner-grandparent’s action was the circuit court under the Child Custody Act, MCL 722.21 et seq.; MSA 25.312(1) et seq. Compare, Deel v Deel, 113 Mich App 556; 317 NW2d 685 (1982). See, also, In re Weldon, 397 Mich 225; 244 NW2d 827 (1976). Basically, the grandparent desired to formalize and stabilize the arrangement made with her daughter concerning the custody of Barbara.
Probate court proceedings which involve the termination of parental rights are intended to evaluate the fitness of a parent. The termination of parental rights due to unfitness is permissible only upon a showing of clear and convincing evi*668dence. JCR 1969, 8.3(B). In the Matter of LaFlure, 48 Mich App 377, 386; 210 NW2d 482 (1973), lv den 390 Mich 814 (1973). Proceedings in circuit court under the Child Custody Act are intended to resolve custody disputes with the "best interest” of the child as the paramount concern. The proceedings in probate and circuit court are distinguishable in nature, scope and evidentiary standards. Barbara’s mother should not have to bear the socially stigmatizing lable of "unfit parent” on the record in this case. Unlike a probate court’s decision that parental rights should be terminated, a determination made in the "best interest” of the child by the circuit court under the Child Custody Act does not carry the same blot on the parent’s good reputation. Moreover, parental rights are not completely terminated in a custody action brought under the Child Custody Act, and the non-custodial parent retains the right to visitation, to petition the court for a change of custody and to petition the court to vindicate the best interests of the child.
Barbara’s grandmother may be correct in believing that she should be awarded her custody (an issue on which I reach no conclusion). Clearly, however, on this record, Barbara’s grandmother is not entitled to custody and the complete termination of her natural mother’s rights.
I would reverse, and I urge the appellant mother to seek leave to appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court.