Court Opinion

ID: 9565361
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:19:35.125123+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:35.129416
License: Public Domain

Justice Branch
concurring.
In her dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Sharp condemns the holding of the Court in Causey v. Railroad, 166 N.C. 5, 81 S.E. 917, to the effect that the statute of limitations does not begin to run against a personal representative until the death of his decedent notwithstanding the fact that the action for the personal injuries which caused decedent’s death was barred when he died. I agree. I am also in accord with that portion of Justice Moore’s dissent in which he concluded that “the exclusion of wrongful death actions from the operation of G.S. 1-15 (b) was intended only to preserve the two-year statute of *193limitations . . . for wrongful death actions.” However, for reasons hereinafter stated, I do not believe that the questioned holding in Causey or the wrongful death exclusion of G.S. 1-15 (b) is before us on this appeal.
I am in agreement with the principal reasoning and the result reached in the majority opinion because, in my view, the provisions of G.S. 1-15(h) have no application whatever to the facts of this case.
For more than 144 years it has been recognized in this jurisdiction that a statute of limitations does not begin to run until after the cause of action has accrued and the plaintiff has a right to maintain a suit. City of Reidsville v. Burton, 269 N.C. 206, 152 S.E. 2d 147; Miller v. Shoaf, 110 N.C. 319, 14 S.E. 800; Godley v. Taylor, 14 N.C. 179. If the demanding party is under no disability, the statute begins to run at the time the plaintiff suffers some injury, however slight, such as entitles him to maintain an action. It then continues to run until stopped by appropriate judicial process. This rule is subject to certain exceptions such as torts grounded on fraud or mistake. Matthieu v. Piedmont Natural Gas Co., 269 N.C. 212, 152 S.E. 2d 336; B-W Acceptance Corp. v. Spencer, 268 N.C. 1, 149 S.E. 2d 570. In each of the above-cited cases there was a wrong committed and some injury suffered by each plaintiff which resulted in an immediate right to bring the action.
The rule that the appropriate statute of limitations begins to run from the accrual of the action, i.e., the time when the plaintiff is initially injured, became so firmly embedded in our case law that we rigidly applied the rule even when the plaintiff was without knowledge as to the facts constituting the cause of action. Lewis v. Shaver, 236 N.C. 510, 73 S.E. 2d 320; Shearin v. Lloyd, 246 N.C. 363, 98 S.E. 2d 508; Matthieu v. Piedmont Natural Gas Co., supra; Sellers v. Refrigerators, Inc., 283 N.C. 79, 194 S.E. 2d 817. The enforcement of this unyielding and rigid rule often produced harsh and inequitable results. It, therefore, seems apparent that the legislature enacted G.S. 1-15 (b) to relieve the harsh results flowing from the existing case law.
G.S. 1-15(b) provides:
(b) Except where otherwise provided by statute, a cause of action, other than one for wrongful death, having as an essential element bodily injury to the person or a *194defect in or damage to property which originated under circumstances making the injury, defect or damage not readily apparent to the claimant at the time of its origin, is deemed to have accrued at the time the injury was discovered by the claimant, or ought reasonably to have been discovered by him, whichever event first occurs; provided that in such cases the period shall not exceed 10 years from the last act of the defendant giving rise to the claim for relief. [Emphasis ours.]
The provisions of G.S. 1-15 (b) relate to causes of action which originate under circumstances making the injury, defect or damage not readily apparent to the claimant. The ten-year limitation contained in the proviso of the statute, therefore, must refer only to cases in which the injury was not readily apparent. Obviously, under the facts of instant case, the injury was readily apparent. Plaintiff had no privity or contractual relationship with defendant and was not injured in any way when the crane was manufactured, sold or assembled. His initial injury occurred on 14 January 1972 and at that time his cause of action accrued.
Had the legislature intended to apply the ten-year proviso of the statute to all cases, it could have easily so provided without resorting to the cumbersome language of G.S. 1-15 (b).
For the reasons stated, I concur in the majority opinion.
Justice Huskins joins in this concurring opinion.