Court Opinion

ID: 9488073
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:35:20.804103+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:40.400308
License: Public Domain

PAYNE, District Judge,
concurring:
I join the majority opinion except Part III which addresses the appellants’ challenge to the admission of: (1) Exhibit 19, a chart prepared by Detective Hudson to depict the organization of the conspiracy; and (2) Hudson’s summary of the testimony of preceding government witnesses. Detective Hudson was the DEA case agent who led the investigation that produced this prosecution. Much of Hudson’s testimony was properly admitted after he was qualified as an expert in the packaging, pricing, use and distribution of narcotics. In fact, there was no objection to his testimony on those subjects. There was, however, objection to Hudson’s summary of the testimony of other witnesses, most of whom were convicted or unindieted co-conspirators, and to Exhibit 19 which reflected Hudson’s interpretation of that testimony, admittedly filtered through his judgment on the credibility of the witnesses who gave it.
Part III A of the majority opinion accurately describes Exhibit 19, the foundational testimony offered to support it, the procedure by which it was admitted into evidence, and the limiting instructions given respecting its genesis and effect. In Part III B, the majority opinion recounts an example of Hudson’s testimonial summary which, as the majority correctly notes, was extensive. Two other examples are useful background.
Q: Detective Hudson, will you please relate to the jury from Detective Berry’s testimony what it was that Steve Lewis indicated about crack cocaine?
A: That specific conversation dealt with prices of different quantities of cocaine, kilograms of cocaine that were selling for $23,000, which is a very fair price.
(JA 974) (emphasis added). Hudson went on to state:
Mr. Lewis told Detective Berry that the next man could sell it for $1,400, which is an accurate representation of what on the street that would go for. So everybody was making about $200 an ounce.
(JA 975) (emphasis added). The objection lodged by counsel for Johnson was overruled, and Hudson was allowed to state his understanding of Berry’s testimony and then to comment upon the validity of the underlying statement attributed to Lewis by Berry.
A few questions later the prosecution asked Hudson:
Q: Could you relate in summary fashion what Detective Berry’s testimony was and then explain to the jury whether or not that is consistent with your experience as a narcotics investigator.
*1165(JA. 976) (emphasis added). In response, Hudson summarized what he understood Berry to have said about Lewis’ pretrial statements to Berry, and then was asked:
Q: Again, is that or is that not consistent with your experience?
A: Yes, sir, that’s consistent with my experience.
(JA 977).1
At trial, the proffered justification for this testimony and Exhibit 19 apparently was Hudson’s expertise. On appeal, the prosecution argues that Exhibit 19 and its foundational testimony are admissible under FRE 1006 which permits admission of summaries of voluminous documents. The majority opinion holds that Hudson’s testimony was not admissible as expert opinion under FRE 702 and that Exhibit 19 was not admissible under FRE 1006. I concur in those holdings and in the rationale on which they are based.
I also agree with the majority opinion’s fundamental premise that FRE 611(a)(1) affords a basis for permitting summary charts to be used at trial. I depart, however, from the majority’s view that FRE 611(a)(1) permits the receipt of such charts into evidence and allows one witness to summarize the testimony of others, as Hudson did here.
A. The Summary Chart — Exhibit 19
As the majority opinion explains, there is an irreconcilable conflict in the line of authority which applies FRE 611(a)(1) to charts such as Exhibit 19. The conflict occurs because many appellate decisions require the jury to be instructed that such a chart is not evidence and, at the same time, purport to sustain the trial court’s decision to “admit” the chart or to permit the jury to have it in the juiy room during deliberations. This phenomenon is reasonably demonstrated in United States v. Scales, 594 F.2d 558 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 946, 99 S.Ct. 2168, 60 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1979), wherein the Sixth Circuit reviewed a set of summary charts which, inter alia, summarized the Government’s proof count by count in a mul-ti-count indictment. The following oft-cited passage from Scales is instructive:
Entirely aside from Rule 1006, there would still be ample authority for the admission of Exhibit 145 into evidence. There is an established tradition, both within this circuit and in other circuits, that permits a summary of evidence to be put before the jury with proper limiting instructions. (emphasis added) [citations omitted]. These cases normally involve violations of income tax laws but there has never been any formal distinction between the use of summaries in that type of case and in other types of criminal cases, [citations omitted].
******
The purpose of the summaries in these cases is simply to aid the jury in its examination of the evidence already admitted. (emphasis added) [citation omitted]. Authority for such summaries is not usually cited, but would certainly exist under Fed.R.Evid. 611(a). See Weinstein’s Evidence ¶ 1006[03].
The danger of permitting presentation of a summary of some of the evidence in a criminal case is plain. The jury might rely upon the alleged facts in the summary as if these facts had already been proved, [citations omitted] or as a substitute for assessing the credibility of witnesses, [citations omitted]. This danger has led to the requirement of “guarding instructions” to the effect that the chart is not itself evidence but is only an aid in evaluating the *1166evidence, (emphasis added) [Citations omitted].
Despite the danger, however, most summaries are routinely admitted.
Id. at 563-64. Having concluded that the jury must be told that the exhibit was not evidence, the Sixth Circuit then inexplicably added that: “[f]or essentially the same reasons we rule that the exhibit was properly admitted, we conclude that no right of appellant was prejudiced by its submission to the jury.” Id. at 564, n. 3 (emphasis added).
Clearly, there is a conflict between: (i) the text of the decision wherein the court permitted “a summary of the evidence to be put before the jury” with the limiting instruction that it was not evidence; and (ii) the footnote wherein the court observed that the chart had been properly “admitted” and approved its use by the jury during deliberations. Consequently, as the majority opinion observes, Scales has been cited as requiring an instruction that a summary chart is not evidence and as authority for “admitting” such charts.
The evolution of the rule in the Second Circuit further illustrates the point. In United States v. Goldberg, 401 F.2d 644 (2d Cir.1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1099, 89 S.Ct. 895, 21 L.Ed.2d 790 (1969), the Second Circuit sustained the “admission” of summary charts, id. at 648, upon the instruction that they “were not themselves independent evidence, but ‘only visual representations of information or data as set forth in the testimony of a witness or in documents that are exhibits in evidence.’ ” Id. at 647. Then, in United States v. Baccollo, 725 F.2d 170 (2d Cir.1983), the court, citing Goldberg, sustained the decision of the district court permitting “the prosecution to introduce as evidence charts on which there was represented primary evidence....” Id. at 173 (emphasis added). Five years later, the Second Circuit, citing Goldberg, Baccollo and Scales, summarily sustained admission of summary charts and their use in jury deliberations without referring to the absence of an instruction that the charts were not evidence. United States v. Pinto, 850 F.2d 927 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, Vence v. United States, 488 U.S. 867, 109 S.Ct. 174, 102 L.Ed.2d 143 (1988). The court, however, observed: “With due regard for the possibility that the jury would accept such summaries as documentary fact, the trial court repeatedly reminded the jurors of their responsibility to determine whether the charts accurately reflected the evidence presented.” Id. at 935.
The following year, in United States v. Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141 (2d Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1081, 110 S.Ct. 1138, 107 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1990), the Second Circuit, without analyzing the apparent differences between Goldberg, Baccollo and Pinto, applied those decisions to require, as the condition to permitting the use of a summary chart, the instruction that the chart was not evidence holding that:
This court has long approved the use of charts in complex trials, and has allowed the jury to have the charts in the jury room during its deliberations, [citing Pinto ] so long as the judge properly instructs the jury that it is not to consider the charts as evidence, [citing Baccollo and Goldberg ]. Here, the judge gave the jury the required instruction . We conclude that the court’s rulings permitting the jury’s use of the government’s summary charts was not improper.
Id. at 1151 (emphasis added).
The majority opinion here wisely declines to perpetuate the ambiguity reflected in the decisions of the Sixth and Second Circuits. Instead, the majority adopts the view that summary charts are admissible in evidence and, in so doing, eliminates the need for an instruction to the contrary so long as the district court properly explains the limitations on the use to which the chart may be put.
This, I respectfully submit, misperceives the nature of a summary chart which is only a vehicle by which evidence may be presented, not evidence in its own right. This vehicle may be used upon a finding that its use will “make the interrogation [of witnesses] and presentation [of evidence] effective for the ascertainment of truth.” However, the fact that the vehicle for presenting evidence may be used does not convert it into evi-*1167denee. For that reason and to avoid the possibility of prejudice adequately explained in Scales, it is important to tell the jury that the vehicle is not evidence and to circumscribe its use with instructions that require the jury to focus, not on the summary chart, but on the underlying evidence. Accordingly, as in Casamento, I would interpret FRE 611(a)(1) to permit the use of a summary chart and to require an instruction that it is not evidence and instructions that circumscribe its use. If those instructions are given, it is within the discretion of the district court to permit the jury to have the chart during deliberations.
Here, the District Court’s instructions explaining the limits on the use of Exhibit 19 were more than adequate. However, under the rule, as I understand it, Exhibit 19 should not have been admitted into evidence.
B. Hudson’s Testimony Summarizing The Testimony Of Other Witnesses
The majority opinion relies upon United States v. Baker, 10 F.3d 1374, 1412 (9th Cir.1993), and United States v. Paulino, 935 F.2d 739, 753 (6th Cir.1991), to sustain the admission of Hudson’s summary testimony under FRE 611(a)(1). Baker and Paulino both hold that it is within the district court’s discretion under the rule to allow such testimonial summaries. Neither decision, however, considers the impact of FRE 602 (personal knowledge requirement), FRE 611(a)(2) (needless consumption of time) or FRE 403 (needless presentation of cumulative evidence).
Nor does either decision adequately address the prejudice — probative value balance required by FRE 403. Baker nodded in that direction by sanctioning a foundational hearing outside the presence of the jury and by permitting a one week mid-trial continuance. Paulino brushed it aside by finding that adequate cross-examination had alleviated “ ‘any danger of inaccuracy or unfair characterization.’ ” Id. at 753.
Wholly apart from the fact that solutions such as this constitute the “needless consumption of time” to allow the “needless presentation of cumulative evidence,” they do not satisfy the prejudice — probativity analysis required by FRE 403. This is because the prejudice from a testimonial summary comes from the inherent confusion that occurs during such a summary and from the inability effectively to cross-examine one witness about what another witness has said. Hence, the real prejudice is not alleviated by allowing extra time to prepare for cross-examination of the summarizing witness, as in Baker, or by permitting wide-ranging cross-examination, as in Paulino. In fact, solutions such as this tend to exacerbate the prejudice, rather than to minimize it because the focus becomes the accuracy of the summary rather than the reliability of the underlying testimony. The prejudice is further compounded when the summarizing witness is the prosecuting case agent whose summary is structured around his own credibility judgments.
Nor can evidence of this sort pass muster under the probative value component of FRE 403 because no significant probative value can be ascribed to a summary by one witness of the testimony given by other witnesses. As a result, a summary of that sort likely can never, and did not here, satisfy the balance required under FRE 403. That is especially true where, as here, the testimony that Hudson summarized came almost exclusively from convicted and unindicted co-conspirators and Hudson’s summary did not reflect the impeachment component of the co-conspirators testimony.
For the foregoing reasons, I am unable to construe FRE 611(a)(1) to permit the admission of Hudson’s testimonial summary.
C. The Harmless Error Analysis
The error in admitting Exhibit 19 and Hudson’s testimonial summary was not constitutional in scope and was properly preserved by timely objection at trial. It, therefore, is necessary to assess whether the error was harmless. United States v. Ince, 21 F.3d 576, 582 (4th Cir.1994).
Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(a) provides that “any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.” Ordinarily, an error that affects substantial rights must have been prej*1168udicial at trial in the sense that it must have affected the outcome of the district court proceedings. United States v. Olano, — U.S. —, —, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 1778, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). Under Olano, it is incumbent upon appellate courts to determine whether the error is prejudicial and, in that regard, “... Rule 52(a) saddles the Government with the burden of showing that the claimed error had no prejudicial impact on the jury’s deliberations.” Ince, 21 F.3d at 582.
The task on appeal, therefore, is to determine whether the judgment of the jury was substantially swayed by the error. To that end, the appellate court must determine “whether we believe it ‘highly probable that the error did not affect the judgment.’ ” Id. at 583 (citations omitted). Three factors guide the inquiry on appeal: “... (1) the centrality of the issue affected by the error; (2) the steps taken to mitigate the effects of the error; and (3) the closeness of the case.” (citations omitted). Id.
1. Centrality
The principal issues at trial were the extent to which, if any, and in what ways, if at all, Lewis and Johnson were involved in the very substantial conspiracy to which some 30 witnesses testified. Hudson’s testimonial summary and Exhibit 19 are directed to those core questions and, accordingly, the error relates to central issues at trial.
2. Mitigation
As the majority opinion points out, the District Court took a number of steps which can be considered as mitigation. First, it issued an instruction immediately after qualifying Hudson as an expert informing the jury that “... you are to accept it [Hudson’s opinions] just as you would accept any other evidence....” (JA 967-68). Second, the District Court provided a limiting instruction during the cross-examination of Hudson about Exhibit 19 in which the jury was told that the chart was intended to show things the way the government contends the proof to have been and that the jury was to resolve “any issues that may be in your mind concerning [the chart].” (Supp. JA 509). Finally, as part of the final charge, the District Court again focused on Exhibit 19 informing the jury that the exhibit was “... simply a summary of what the Government intends that the evidence shows. In the final analysis, however, it is your own recollection and interpretation of the evidence that controls in the case.” (Supp. JA 370).
These measures, on their face and in context, would appear to have mitigated the effects of the error. However, that view of these measures is undercut by the importance which the prosecution ascribes to the evidence in claiming on appeal that it was “essential for the jury to hear” Hudson’s summary of the evidence as reflected in the chart. (Brief of Appellee, p. 38). The issue of mitigation is further complicated by the facts that: (1) as is often true in drug conspiracy cases, the prosecution’s case depended largely on evidence offered by witnesses who were subject to substantial credibility attack; and (2) the challenged evidence, by its nature, had the tendency to undercut the defendants’ principal line of defense: attacking the credibility of the prosecution’s witnesses. However, at least in the context of this case, it is not possible to divorce the mitigation factor from consideration of the final and “ ‘the single most important factor’ in a nonconstitutional harmless-error inquiry: whether the case was ‘close.’ ” United States v. Ince, 21 F.3d at 584.

3.Closeness

In assessing the closeness of the case, an appellate court necessarily engages in
... a highly judgmental process, involving much more of feel than of science.
* * * 5}! * *
The inquiry into “closeness” instead involves assessing whether the other evidence is not only sufficient to convict, but whether it is sufficiently powerful in relation to the tainted evidence to give “fair assurance” that the tainted evidence did not substantially sway “the jury.”
Id. The record establishes that there was an abundance of evidence upon which to sustain the convictions of Lewis and Johnson and to support the quantity findings necessary to affirmation of the sentences.
Numerous witnesses, including persons with first-hand knowledge because they func*1169tioned above, alongside and below Lewis and Johnson, clearly established that there was a conspiracy and that, by word and deed, Johnson and Lewis joined it, actively furthered its objectives and significantly directed others in achieving its illicit objectives. Indeed, notwithstanding the prosecution’s protestations to the contrary on appeal, neither Hudson’s testimonial summary nor Exhibit 19 was in the least “essential;” and, in my view, the prosecution needlessly complicated an otherwise strong case by presenting Hudson, under the guise of an expert, to summarize the evidence in the prosecution’s favor to use as a springboard for closing argument.
For the foregoing reasons, the case cannot be considered close because the evidence, as a whole, gives fair assurance that the jury, in perspective of the mitigating measures taken below, was not substantially swayed by the tainted evidence. Thus, on the unique facts of this case, the error was harmless.
Most often, however, a reviewing court will not be presented with a record as compelling as this. In that regard, I share the concerns expressed in Part III C of the majority opinion respecting the inherent dangers in permitting testimony such as that given here by Hudson. However, I also believe that this case is today’s ordinary federal drug prosecution, and that these lengthy, multi-witness, multi-defendant drug conspiracy cases present the greatest need to preclude testimonial summaries and exhibits reflecting the view of the evidence advanced by the prosecuting case agent.2
Beyond doubt, it is important in such cases that the jury be given help in pulling together the strands of evidence. That help is properly provided in the prosecution’s closing argument where, for example, it is entirely appropriate for the prosecution to summarize the testimony of witnesses and to do so with the aid of a chart such as Exhibit 19.
That help, I respectfully submit, cannot come from the prosecuting case agent precisely because of the complex nature of these drug conspiracy cases. For example, they present the very real prospect that the evidence will run together and that one defendant, therefore, will be confused with others. Moreover, it usually is true in these cases that the evidence is stronger against some defendants than others. And, the prosecution witnesses often are subject to impeachment because of previous felony convictions or because they are testifying under a grant of immunity or on the expectation of a reduced sentence.
For these reasons, it is especially important in complex conspiracy cases that members of .the jury make for themselves, as to each defendant, the credibility judgments and the connecting evidentiary links necessary for conviction. I respectfully submit that they are not in fact and may not in law be aided in that task by the prosecuting case agent’s summary of what has been said by the prosecution’s other witnesses or by the admission into evidence of a chart depicting his interpretation of that evidence.

. Neither Johnson nor Lewis lodged specific objections to that series of questions, but both defendants previously had objected to the same kind of questions. The record shows that the District Court and the parties understood that previous objections had been preserved with a standing objection.
Mr. Lawrence: May I, Your Honor, state so I don’t have to get up every time, we object to this witness being permitted to rehash the evidence. May I have a standing objection to that and not waive it by not—
The Court: In fact, you had it since we had a conference in chambers on this very issue yesterday.
Mr. Lawrence: Yes, sir.
The Court: You have it.
(JA 988) (emphasis added). Counsel for Lewis was also acknowledged to have made the same standing objection. Id.

. This, of course, will not preclude the admission into evidence of summaries of voluminous documentary evidence under FRE 1006 or the use, under FRE 611(a)(1), of organizational charts based on proper foundational testimony.