Court Opinion

ID: 9544545
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:56:43.828208+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:13:09.234266
License: Public Domain

BOTTLER, J.,
dissenting.
Although I agree with the majority that evidence seized from defendant’s person was properly admitted in evidence, defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized in the search of the automobile should have been granted. Further, I disagree with the majority’s rationale for the arrest and search of defendant because it requires the conclusion that the automobile search was valid. That conclusion, in turn, is premised on defendant’s lack of standing to challenge the search of the car. With that premise, and the resulting conclusion, I disagree, and therefore respectfully dissent.
The majority relies on United States v. Salvucci, 448 US 83, 100 S Ct 2547, 65 L Ed 2d 619, (1980), which overruled Jones v. United States, 362 US 257, 4 L Ed 2d 697, 80 S Ct 725, 78 ALR2d 233 (1960), with respect to the automatic standing rule adopted in Jones as applied to a search of real property. In Salvucci, the police had obtained a warrant to search an apartment rented by defendant’s mother, and in executing the warrant had seized the evidence defendant sought to be suppressed. The rationale of the court in Salvucci is that if anyone’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated, they were defendant’s mother’s rights. The mere fact that he put his personal property in his mother’s home did not, without more, give him standing to *170complain that his mother’s premises were searched pursuant to an invalid warrant. That rationale has no application to the case at bar; as the court pointed out, in Rawlins v. Kentucky, 448 US 98, 100 S Ct 2556, 65 L Ed 2d 633 (1980) (decided the same day as Salvucci), "* * * Legal possession of a seized good is not a proxy for determining whether the owner had a Fourth Amendment interest for it does not invariably represent the protected Fourth Amendment interest.” 65 L Ed 2d at 628. In other words, the fact of ownership of the goods seized does not per se establish a Fourth Amendment interest protected by the Fourth Amendment. The court went on to make this point specifically by referring to Rakas v. Illinois, 439 US 128, 99 S Ct 421, 58 L Ed 2d 387 (1978), which the court characterized as holding that "* * * an illegal search only violates the rights of those who have 'a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place.’ ”
Here, it is not defendant’s possessory or property interest in the goods that were seized which gives him standing; rather, it is his reasonable expectation of privacy in the invaded place, namely the automobile, which does so. The majority points out that the only evidence at the suppression hearing with respect to defendant’s interest in the car was the officer’s testimony that defendant had told him the car belonged to an unidentified friend, and that the car was towed because the police were responsible for their prisoner’s property. That evidence, the majority holds, supports the trial court’s finding that defendant had not established his standing to challenge the search.
There are times when we must fall back to basics in order to get our thoughts straight. This is such a time. I start with the proposition that if defendant was in lawful possession of the automobile, he had a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to the passenger compartment, at least. The majority would say that it was his burden to establish that he was in lawful possession. Fair enough. But there are certain statutory presumptions which, while disputable, are satisfactory to establish the fact presumed. They may be controverted by other evidence, but unless so overcome, the fact finder is bound to find according to the presumption. ORS 41.360 provides:
*171"All presumptions other than conclusive presumptions are satisfactory, unless overcome. They are disputable presumptions, and may be controverted by other evidence, direct or indirect, but unless so overcome, the jury is bound to find according to the presumption. The following are of that kind:
" (1) A person is innocent of crime or wrong.
<<**** *
"(11) Things in the possession of a person are owned by him.
"(12) A person is the owner of property from exercising acts of ownership over it or from common reputation of his ownership.
* * * * »
It cannot be said that it was up to defendant to show that he had not stolen the automobile or was not guilty of unauthorized use of the automobile. He is presumed to have done neither of those things. Further, he was in possession of the automobile and was exercising acts of ownership over it, at least to the extent of operating it and keeping his personal property items in it. Unless those presumptions are overcome, and here they were not, the factfinder is bound to find in accordance with them. The officer’s testimony that defendant told him the car belonged to a friend would overcome the presumption of defendant’s ownership, but the majority say the trial judge did not have to believe that testimony. If it is not believed, the presumption would prevail; if believed, then defendant was using his friend’s car, presumably with permission. There is no evidence to the contrary. We cannot have it both ways. Accordingly, it follows that the trial court’s finding is not supported by the evidence.
I would hold, therefore, that defendant had standing to move to suppress evidence seized in the search of the automobile because he had a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to the passenger compartment, at least. When we reach this conclusion, the house of cards starts to fall. The search was invalid because there was no warrant and no consent; even if there was probable cause, exigent circumstances were lacking once the police had arrested both defendant and his passenger, seemed them in *172the police car and arranged to tow the vehicle for impoundment. State v. Fondren, 285 Or 361, 591 P2d 1374 (1979); cf. State v. Groda, 285 Or 321, 591 P2d 1354 (1979).
All is not lost, however, because the seizure of the pistol from the passenger was justified, as the majority points out, for the officers’ own protection. Once it was seized, the officers had probable cause to arrest defendant and the passenger, and the search of defendant, albeit sequentially confused, was inevitable as an incident to the arrest. Evidence seized as a result of that search need not be suppressed.
Because evidence seized in the unlawful search of the autmobile was not admissible, I would reverse.
Accordingly, I dissent.
Joseph, C. J., concurs in this dissent.