Court Opinion

ID: 9630598
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 10:15:14.733585+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:40.764377
License: Public Domain

Manoukian, J.,
concurring:
The majority opinion, in which I concur, is a modification of a draft which I previously distributed and which reached the identical result. The only difference I perceive is that the majority seems now to be unnecessarily preoccupied with a discussion of executive responsibility for State Bar finances.
The disciplinary panel’s purported pecuniary interest in the proceedings, if existent, is remote and insubstantial. I believe that the majority opinion inappropriately suggests that any executive function or responsibility for the State Bar finances would automatically preclude participation in bar disciplinary matters.1 For example, the majority states that “executive responsibility for the finances of the Bar . . . would be inconsistent with the due process requirements of Tumey and Ward.” Not only is that conclusion unnecessary for the resolution of this case, in which the hearing panel has no executive functions, it overlooks and improperly circumvents the Supreme Court’s careful analysis of the directness and substantiality of the financial interest in those cases in which executive responsibility and institutional gain are at issue. See Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972).
Of course, active participation in bar disciplinary matters by one with executive responsibility for bar finances would necessarily require close scrutiny of the temptation to partiality. However, “[t]he mere union of executive power and the judicial power in [an adjudicator] cannot be said to violate due process of law.” Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 534 (1927). The Supreme Court has looked to many factors, including the substantiality of the adjudicator’s purported interest in the outcome of the proceeding and the institutional arrangements for distributing any remuneration obtained. See Marshall v. Jerrico, 446 U.S. 238 (1980); Ward v. Village of Monroeville, supra. See also, Tumey v. Ohio, supra. I do not read the pertinent Supreme Court cases as precedent for finding, as the majority opinion implies, that the prospect of institutional gain *148from adjudicative proceedings per se bars the participation of one who may have some responsibility for the financial integrity of the institution.

Contrary to the majority’s statement, SCR 103(10) expressly provides that members of the State Bar’s board of governors are also ex-officio members of the disciplinary panels, albeit without the right to vote or to receive remuneration for costs incurred by their participation.