Court Opinion

ID: 9832977
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 22:20:48.773169+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:56.811739
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
[12-14] A typewritten paper, styled “Supplemental Brief of Appellant F. M. Peck,” was *920filed in this court on tlie day before tbe cause was submitted, and after the brief had been assailed by appellee on the ground of its failure to comply with the rules. We know of no authority for filing any such document, and, if such procedure is tolerated, amendments to cover disregard of the rules would cure every delinquency in briefing a ease, and the appellee be deprived of any benefit derived from such delinquency. However, this court was aware of the presence among the papers of the “supplemental brief,” but was of the opinion that it did not cure defects in assignments of error, which have never been held open to amendments in appellate courts. If the assignments of error do not “refer to that portion of the motion for a new trial in which the error is complained of,” it would seem clear that a “supplemental brief” could not supply the omission. That document amounts to nothing but a statement that the matters mentioned in the different assignments were called to the attention of the trial court in the motion for new trial. The Constitution gives authority to the Supreme Court to formulate rules for the government of the different courts of Texas, and in pursuance of that authority the rules have been adopted. With their wisdom and propriety we have nothing to do, but if they are not in conflict with the statutes, it is our duty to enforce them. With the expense of complying with them this court has nothing to do; but, in spite of the contention of appellant as to the expense connected with a compliance with them, we are constrained to the belief that compliance with the rules in the end will be less expensive than to ignore them.
Appellant fails to grasp the opinion of this court as to the note not being offered in evidence, but seems to think that the court held that it was offered in evidence. On the other hand, it was held that it was not necessary under the facts of this case to introduce the note in evidence, and ample authority was cited to sustain the proposition. There was no denial of the execution of the note mentioned in the petition which described it as “providing that in the default in the payment of said note at maturity, and same is placed in the hands of an attorney for collection after maturity, then the signer did agree to pay an additional ten per cent, of the principal and interest then due as attorney’s fees.” Mrs. Peck made no denial of that allegation, but admitted “the execution by defendants of one certain promissory note as described in plaintiff’s petition,” which rendered unnecessary putting the note in evidence. Bauman v. Chambers, 91 Tex. 108, 41 S. W. 471; Crosby v. Bonnowsky, 29 Tex. Civ. App. 455, 69 S. W. 212.
The motion for rehearing is overruled.