Court Opinion

ID: 9941220
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-16 06:07:05.330069+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:21.801791
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                          STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE CITY OF STERLING HEIGHTS,                              FOR PUBLICATION
                                                                     February 15, 2024
               Plaintiff-Appellee,                                   9:20 a.m.

v                                                                    No. 364264
                                                                     Macomb Circuit Court
ROBERT BAHNKE,                                                       LC No. 2022-000387-AV

               Defendant-Appellant.

Before: GADOLA, C.J., and BORRELLO and BOONSTRA, JJ.

GADOLA, C.J.

       Defendant appeals by leave granted1 an order of the circuit court denying his appeal and
affirming the district court. We reverse.

        This case arises out of a citation issued by plaintiff to defendant for violating a city
ordinance on July 13, 2020. The ordinance, Sterling Heights Code, § 20-115, requires fireworks
vendors to hand out a flyer to purchasers and display signs that provide notice to customers of city
and state laws regarding fireworks usage. Defendant, who manages the store Pro Fireworks, did
not hand out the required flyers and was issued a citation for failing to comply with the ordinance.

        Defendant appeared before a magistrate, who found defendant responsible for violating the
ordinance and ordered a fine of $150. Defendant appealed to the district court, arguing that the
ordinance was preempted by state law. The district court affirmed the magistrate’s ruling and held
that the ordinance was not preempted by state law because there was neither a direct conflict
between the state statute and the ordinance or field preemption in the area of fireworks regulation.
Defendant filed a claim of appeal with the circuit court. The circuit court affirmed the district
court’s order and determined that the ordinance was not preempted by state law for the same
reasons stated by the district court. Defendant was granted leave to appeal by this Court. People

1
 People of City of Sterling Heights v Robert Bahnke, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals,
entered June 14, 2023 (Docket No. 364264).

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of City of Sterling Heights v Robert Bahnke, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered
June 14, 2023 (Docket No. 364264).

        Defendant argues that the Michigan Fireworks Safety Act (MFSA), MCL 28.457, preempts
plaintiff’s ordinance because the ordinance directly conflicts with the statute and because the field
of fireworks sales was exclusively occupied by the state. We agree that the ordinance directly
conflicts with the statute and is therefore preempted by state law.

        “Whether a state statute preempts a local ordinance is a question of statutory interpretation
and, therefore, a question of law that we review de novo.” Ter Beek v City of Wyoming, 297 Mich
App 446, 452; 823 NW2d 864 (2012), aff’d 495 Mich 1 (2014). De novo review means that this
Court reviews the legal issue independently, without deference to lower courts. Wright v Genesee
Co, 504 Mich 410, 417; 934 NW2d 805 (2019).

        Local governments may generally regulate matters of local concern when this power is
conferred by the state. DeRuiter v Twp of Byron, 505 Mich 130, 140; 949 NW2d 91 (2020). A
local regulation, however, may be preempted by a state law either expressly or by implication. Id.
There are two types of implied preemption, field preemption and conflict preemption, both of
which defendant alleges in this case. Id. Field preemption occurs when the state “has occupied
the entire field of regulation in a certain area.” Id.

        Conflict preemption occurs “when a local regulation directly conflicts with state law.”
DeRuiter, 505 Mich at 140. A direct conflict occurs when “ ‘the ordinance permits what the statute
prohibits or the ordinance prohibits what the statute permits.’ ” Id., quoting People v Llewellyn,
401 Mich 314, 322 n 4; 257 NW2d 902 (1977). When an ordinance merely adds to regulations
that state law imposes, a direct conflict does not generally arise. USA Cash #1, Inc v City of
Saginaw, 285 Mich App 262, 267; 776 NW2d 346 (2009).

        Defendant argues that plaintiff’s ordinance, Sterling Heights Code, § 20-115, directly
conflicts with the MFSA, specifically MCL 28.457(1), which states, “Except as provided in this
act, a local unit of government shall not enact or enforce an ordinance, code, or regulation
pertaining to or in any manner regulating the sale, display, storage, transportation, or distribution
of fireworks regulated under this act.” Plaintiff’s ordinance states, in relevant part:

       Every fireworks vendor advertising consumer fireworks for sale within the city
       shall provide notice, as set forth in this subsection, to every purchaser of consumer
       fireworks by including an 8½” x 11” flyer with every purchase and by displaying a
       sign affixed to each side of any display area or temporary facility or consumer
       fireworks retail stand, as both are defined by the Michigan Administrative Code,
       where fireworks are sold at retail. To be in compliance with this subsection, the
       font on a flyer shall be no smaller than 14-point boldface type, and the lettering on
       a sign shall be visible and discernible from every point of sale and, for temporary
       facilities, from a distance of at least 20 feet outside the footprint or boundaries of
       the facility. Each day that a vendor remains out of compliance with the
       requirements of this subsection shall be chargeable as a separate offense. At a
       minimum, each flyer and/or sign shall contain any information required by the City

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Manager, the Police Chief, or the Fire Chief, as well as all of the following
information:

NOTICE OF CITY AND STATE LAWS

1. STATE LAW PERMITS, UNDER MCL 28.457, THE IGNITION,
DISCHARGE, AND USE OF CONSUMER FIREWORKS (IN GENERAL, THE
TYPE THAT LEAVE THE GROUND) AT THE FOLLOWING TIMES, AND
SUCH ACTIVITIES ARE PROHIBITED IN STERLING HEIGHTS ON ANY
DAYS AND TIMES OTHER THAN THE FOLLOWING TIMES: BETWEEN
11:00 A.M. AND 11:45 P.M. ON THE SATURDAY AND SUNDAY
IMMEDIATELY BEFORE MEMORIAL DAY AND LABOR DAY, JUNE 29TH
TO JULY 4TH, AND JULY 5TH IF THAT DATE IS A FRIDAY OR
SATURDAY, AND BETWEEN 11:00 A.M. ON DECEMBER 31ST UNTIL 1:00
A.M. ON JANUARY 1ST (A TOTAL OF 12 OR 13 CALENDAR DAYS PER
YEAR).

2. FIREWORKS THAT MAKE NOISE THAT CAN BE HEARD FROM ANY
PUBLIC PLACE MAY NOT BE USED AFTER 11:00 P.M.

3. FOR FIREWORKS THAT LEAVE THE GROUND, ONLY THE PERSON
IGNITING THE FIREWORKS MAY BE WITHIN 25 FEET, AND MINORS
MAY NOT BE WITHIN 50 FEET.

4. FIREWORKS THAT LEAVE THE GROUND MAY NOT BE DISCHARGED
ON GOVERNMENT PROPERTY, INCLUDING PARKING AREAS, STREETS,
AND SIDEWALKS, OR ON PROPERTY OWNED BY ANOTHER UNLESS
YOU HAVE EXPRESS PERMISSION FROM THE GOVERNMENT OR THE
PROPERTY OWNER TO DISCHARGE FIREWORKS.

5. FIREWORKS THAT LEAVE THE GROUND MAY NOT BE USED BY A
PERSON WHO IS UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOLIC LIQUOR
AND/OR     ANY    CONTROLLED    SUBSTANCE    (INCLUDING
PRESCRIPTIONS).

6. DISTURBING THE PEACE, NOISE AND NUISANCE VIOLATIONS, AND
LITTERING ARE MISDEMEANORS. YOU ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR
CLEANING UP ANY FIREWORKS DEBRIS THAT ENDS UP ON PROPERTY
THAT IS NOT YOUR OWN.

7. POLICE AND FIRE OFFICIALS MAY CITE YOU FOR MISDEMEANOR
OR CIVIL INFRACTION VIOLATIONS OF STATE LAWS AND CITY
ORDINANCES, WITH FINES RANGING FROM $150 TO $1,000 FOR EACH
CIVIL INFRACTION VIOLATION. OFFICIALS MAY ALSO CONFISCATE
ILLEGAL FIREWORKS AND FIREWORKS BEING USED UNLAWFULLY.
YOU WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE COST OF DISPOSING OF THOSE
FIREWORKS.

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        The reverse side of every flyer shall depict a standard calendar for the applicable
        year, with each day on which consumer fireworks may be used highlighted for easy
        reference. The title on the calendar side of the flyer shall read: “Consumer
        fireworks may only be used on 12 or 13 calendar days each year, subject to the rules
        on the reverse side. Permitted days are highlighted on the calendar below.”

        Defendant argues that the ordinance regulates the sale of fireworks by prohibiting the sale
of fireworks if the vendor does not provide the required flyer. Defendant contends that this is in
direct conflict with the MFSA, which does not allow local governments to regulate the sale of
fireworks. Defendant accurately describes the flyer requirement as a condition of the sale of
fireworks in Sterling Heights.

         Plaintiff asserts that the ordinance does not directly conflict with the MFSA because it
complements the statute by requiring fireworks vendors to notify purchasers of local firework
restrictions after they have completed their fireworks purchase. Plaintiff argues that this does not
regulate the sale or display of fireworks, rather, it simply exacts additional requirements, which
are permitted as long as they do not permit what the statute prohibits or prohibit what the statute
permits, which is the sale of fireworks. Plaintiff contends that the ordinance in no way regulates
the sale or display of fireworks because it does not determine who can sell fireworks, where they
can be sold, the number of fireworks that may be sold, the times of the year that they may be sold,
or the types of fireworks which can be sold. Plaintiff asserts that the flyers are required only after
a purchase and they serve to inform the public of local laws.

         It would be difficult to conceive a more direct conflict between a state statute and a local
ordinance than the one appearing in this case. To begin, the statute prohibits a local unit of
government from enacting or enforcing an ordinance “pertaining to or in any way regulating the
sale . . . of fireworks regulated under this act.” The ordinance in question not only “pertains to”
the sale of fireworks, it directly regulates the sale of fireworks by requiring that sellers of fireworks
within the city provide customers a detailed, double-sided notice of local fireworks laws at the
point of each sale (not, as plaintiffs unpersuasively argue, “after” the sale). The ordinance further
requires that sellers of fireworks post notices containing the same detailed information at certain
locations in their retail venues. And the ordinance provides that each day a seller is out of
compliance with these requirements may be charged as a separate offense, subjecting the seller to
the imposition of a fine, as happened in this case.

        It simply cannot be said that an ordinance requiring that sellers of fireworks supply their
customers with detailed notices when selling fireworks, and imposing a fine upon them if they fail
to comply, somehow does not “regulate” the sale of fireworks. The ordinance certainly, at the
very least, “pertains to” the sale of fireworks, which in itself places it beyond the reach of the local
authorities.

        The City’s argument that the ordinance in question is merely an additional layer of
regulation of the use of fireworks and therefore not in conflict with the statute is simply not
persuasive. The fact that this particular ordinance does not determine who may sell fireworks,
where they may be sold, or the types of fireworks that may be sold, does nothing to persuade us
that this ordinance is somehow authorized. The fact that other ordinances might be more
egregiously in violation of the statute does not mean that an arguably less egregious violation

                                                  -4-
becomes acceptable. Subsection (2) of Section 7 of the Act, MCL 28.457(2), permits local units
of government to enact ordinances regulating such things as the ignition and discharge of consumer
fireworks, including setting the hours during which a person may use fireworks within the
municipality. Local ordinances addressing those matters would be in the nature of acceptable
additional layers of regulation the Act expressly permits. Subsection (1), however, clearly and
unambiguously prohibits an ordinance of the type at issue here, being as it is a regulation
“pertaining to” or “regulating” the sale, as opposed to the use, of fireworks.

        It is also worth noting that the requirements the ordinance imposes appear to be subject to
change without notice, as they are in addition to “any information required by the City Manager,
the Police Chief, or the Fire Chief” to be included in the notices (emphasis added). In theory, any
one of these officials could whimsically alter the requirements the ordinance spells out by
imposing requirements for additional information beyond those spelled out in the ordinance. This
aspect of the ordinance raises serious due process considerations, which are not raised in this
appeal and which we need not address given our conclusion that the ordinance directly conflicts
with state law.

       Defendant also argues that the ordinance has been field-preempted by the MFSA. Given
our conclusion that the statute preempts the ordinance on the basis of a direct conflict, we need not
address this additional basis for the requested relief.

       Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Defendant
having prevailed in full may tax costs. We do not retain jurisdiction.

                                                              /s/ Michael F. Gadola
                                                              /s/ Stephen L. Borrello
                                                              /s/ Mark T. Boonstra

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