Court Opinion

ID: 9943139
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-22 19:00:48.779634+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:13.712523
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        FEB 22 2024
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

EDVIN JOSUE XILOS,                              No. 22-1853
                                                Agency No.
             Petitioner,                        A206-418-167
 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,

             Respondent.

                     On Petition for Review of an Order of the
                         Board of Immigration Appeals

                           Submitted February 14, 2024**
                               Pasadena, California

Before: W. FLETCHER, NGUYEN, and LEE, Circuit Judges.

      Petitioner Edvin Josue Xilos, a native and citizen of Guatemala, seeks review

of a decision from the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming the

Immigration Judge’s (IJ) denial of his requests for asylum, withholding of removal,

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). We have jurisdiction under

8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition.

      We review for substantial evidence the BIA’s factual findings. Plancarte

Sauceda v. Garland, 23 F.4th 824, 831 (9th Cir. 2022). We review de novo due

process claims, Reyes-Melendez v. I.N.S., 342 F.3d 1001, 1006 (9th Cir. 2003),

questions of law, and mixed questions of law and fact, Mendoza-Pablo v. Holder,

667 F.3d 1308, 1312 (9th Cir. 2012).

      Xilos states he fears he will be persecuted and/or tortured if removed to

Guatemala because “his family has suffered past persecution,” and he belongs to a

particular social group, as defined in various ways throughout the record. In support

of his claims for relief, Xilos testified that in 2014, extortionists came to a sundry

store he owned and asked him to join their group so that they could use the store for

their illegal activities. When he declined their invitation, they beat him. Xilos

reported the incident to the police and filed a complaint, but the police did not do

anything. On another occasion, the extortionists visited his store and destroyed

everything there. They hit him and warned him that, if he continued to decline their

invitation, they would kill him. Xilos again reported the incident to the police, but

they did nothing. The threats continued, forcing Xilos to flee Guatemala. About

two years after Xilos left, his father, who remained in Guatemala, told Xilos that

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extortionists had asked where he was. His father also stated that the police had

“found” some of the extortionists.

      1. We decline to consider those issues for which Xilos failed to exhaust his

administrative remedies. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1).

      “Exhaustion requires a non-constitutional legal claim to the court on appeal

to have first been raised in the administrative proceedings below.” Bare v. Barr, 975

F.3d 952, 960 (9th Cir. 2020) (citations omitted). Where the BIA has addressed an

issue, the issue has been exhausted. See Parada v. Sessions, 902 F.3d 901, 914 (9th

Cir. 2018) (noting court may review any issue addressed on the merits by the BIA,

regardless of whether petitioner raised it before the agency). A petitioner’s failure

to raise an issue to the BIA, though, will generally constitute a failure to exhaust.

See Zara v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 927, 930 (9th Cir. 2004) (“A petitioner cannot satisfy

the exhaustion requirement by making a general challenge to the IJ’s decision, but,

rather, must specify which issues form the basis of the appeal.”), abrogated in part

by Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 598 U.S. 411, 419 (2023); Barr, 975 F.3d at 960 (9th

Cir. 2020) (noting exhaustion requires the BIA to have had sufficient notice as to

what is being challenged that it has the opportunity to “pass on this issue”).

      First, we decline to review whether Xilos is eligible for asylum or withholding

on account of his membership in a particular social group comprised of “returning

Guatemalans from the United States perceived to pose a threat of filing criminal

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allegations for past crimes.” This proposed social group was raised for the first time

on appeal to the BIA. Accordingly, the IJ did not have an opportunity to address the

issue and the BIA declined to address it. Moreover, even if we were to consider this

argument, it would likely fail under our precedent. Conde Quevedo v. Barr, 947

F.3d 1238 (9th Cir. 2020).

      Second, we decline to review the IJ’s determination that Xilos failed to

establish (1) a nexus between the harm he suffered in Guatemala and his family

membership; (2) that any of his other proposed groups are cognizable social groups

for purposes of asylum and withholding; and (3) that the Guatemalan government

was unable or unwilling to protect him from persecution. Our review of Xilos’s

counseled brief to the BIA confirms what the BIA concluded—that Xilos waived

any challenge to the IJ’s determination on these dispositive issues. Although the

brief Xilos submitted in support of his appeal to the BIA states that the IJ erred in

denying him asylum and withholding, it fails to present any argument as to where or

how the IJ erred. Instead, the brief pivots to offer a wholly new social group that

was not presented to the IJ. See Alanniz v. Barr, 924 F.3d 1061, 1069 (9th Cir. 2019)

(“[T]he BIA is entitled to look to [a petitioner’s] brief for an explication of the issues

that petitioner is presenting to have reviewed.”).

      Third, we decline to consider the IJ’s denial of relief under CAT. Again, our

review of Xilos’s brief to the BIA confirms that although Xilos stated he was

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appealing the IJ’s denial of CAT, he failed to present any argument as to where or

how the IJ erred. Thus, the BIA did not err in considering the issue waived. See

Alanniz, 924 F.3d at 1069 n.8 (concluding a petitioner failed to exhaust his

administrative remedies where “CAT was mentioned only twice in [his] brief to the

BIA, in the introduction and in the conclusion” and “[t]he brief contained no

argument for relief under the CAT”).

      2. Finding no error in the BIA’s waiver determinations, we conclude there

was no due process violation. See Vargas-Hernandez v. Gonzales, 497 F.3d 919,

926 (9th Cir. 2007) (no due process violation absent showing of a denial of a full

and fair hearing and prejudice).

      PETITION DENIED.

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