Court Opinion

ID: 9538090
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:30:15.647368+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:57:29.327138
License: Public Domain

CARTER, J.
I dissent.
The majority opinion holds that habeas corpas is not the proper remedy where a person is in the custody, of the wrong person or institution. It mentions various possible reasons for that holding, such as an adequate remedy by appeal, and that every .failure of a court to proceed in the manner required by law is not an act in excess of its jurisdiction, that habeas corpus has been expanded to give relief where the question is not jurisdictional, but not to the point of enlarging the concept of jurisdiction. It does not base its holding on any of those grounds, however, for it concedes that thej writ is available where a person is held under a sentence tp a custodian other than the one authorized by law (In re Wilson, 196 Cal. 515 [238 P. 359]), where the wrong kind of sentence is imposed (In re Lee, 177 Cal. 690 [171 P. 95S]), and where a person is improperly confined as an habitual criminal (In re McVickers, 29 Cal.2d 264 [176 P.2d 40] A In re Seeley, 29 Cal.2d 294 [176 P.2d 24]), and then concludes that no effective relief can now be given to petitioner because he is over 25 years and we cannot know what the Youth/ Authority would have done if he had been placed under their jurisdiction by the court. \
It is conceded that it was the mandatory jduty of the trial court to commit petitioner to the authority, j It had no power to do otherwise. In essence, its order of eounmitment was a mere ministerial act, for it had no choice in tlije matter. There is nothing, however, in the law that prevents^ an effective cor*883rection of the court’s action in habeas corpus proceedings as was done in the cases above cited. The law provided: “A court shall commit to the Authority any person convicted of a public offense whom the Authority believes can be materially benefited by the procedure herein provided for, and for whose care and maintenance there exists, in the opinion of the Authority, proper and adequate facilities, and who (a) Is found to be less than 23 years of age at the time of apprehension (b) Is not sentenced to death, imprisonment for life, imprisonment for not more than 90 days, or the payment of a fine.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 1731.5.) Petitioner was less than 23 years when he was apprehended. Therefore, he still qualifies even though he is now over 25. This court need not speculate what the Authority would have done with petitioner because he can now be committed to the Authority for its action, but as he is over 25 the Authority may either discharge him (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 1771) or “If the date of discharge occurs before the expiration of a period of control equal to the maximum term prescribed by law for the offense of which he was convicted, and if the Authority believes that unrestrained freedom for said person would be dangerous to the public, the Authority shall petition the court by which the commitment was made.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 1780.) The court which hears the petition may discharge the prisoner, admit him to probation, or commit him to prison as prescribed by the statute. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 1781-82.) The Authority is still in a position to ascertain from the previous and present custodians of petitioner matters to guide its disposition of his case and he should be afforded the right to have his case considered by it.
I would therefore grant relief to the extent of requiring that petitioner be committed to the Youth Authority for whatever determination it may see fit to make, under the law, as to his future custody.
Petitioner’s application for a rehearing was denied November 19, 1951.