Court Opinion

ID: 9753802
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 19:29:56.614436+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:42.518692
License: Public Domain

Concurring Opinion by
Mr. Justice Roberts:
As to the issues involving appellant’s confession, I agree with the majority that Jackson v. Denno requires a new trial but that is the only thing I agree with. At least in my opinion, an examination of the events culminating in Herbert Heekathorn’s confession reveals that this confession was involuntary and, if not involuntary, procured under circumstances violative of Escobedo.
Assuming for the moment that Herbert was given the required Escobedo warnings, a chronology is necessary.1 Clair Heckathorn was shot and killed some *547time during-the day of October 5, 1965. The Pennsylvania State Police were initially informed of the shooting in the early morning hours of the 6th and the first ■officer arrived at the scene at approximately 9 :00 a.m. Appellant’s original contact with the police was that evening when he.was taken into custody by two state troopers at 9:30 p.m. He was, at the time of arrest, 16 years old, a poor student, and a freshman in high school having repeated two grades. Herbert was told by the police that his uncle was dead but not that he was in any way suspected.
Taken immediately to a state police substation, he was' searched and questioned. Appellant was seated in a swivel chair, which he had to move to face various officers when questioned. After this period of questioning, Herbert was driven to the Mercer County jail and placed in the custody of the prison authorities at 11:00 p.m. The two arresting officers then proceeded to the home of Herbert’s parents (also his residence) to search for the murder weapon. Unsuccessful, they returned to the county jail. A second period of questioning began at 1:00 on the morning of the 7th. The record contains no indication of the length of either of these two periods of questioning.
At 8:45 on the morning of the 7th Herbert was removed from jail and taken to the chambers of Judge Rodgers. The judge was informed that appellant was a truant from school but not that he was a murder suspect. He was returned to jail and then, at 11:15 a.m., was again, removed, taken to his parents’ home for a second weapon’s search at which time a gun (not the murder weapon) was found. Herbert was then transported to decedent’s house and finally back to jail.
*548According to the record, appellant’s next police contact was 7:25 a.m. on the 8th when he was taken to a state police substation to be fingerprinted (the fingerprints were obtained for comparison with another weapon which had been found by the police); he was then returned to jail. Appellant’s brother, James, arrived at the substation approximately 8:45 a.m., apparently after Herbert had left. James confessed that he was a lookout and that his brother was the killer. After this statement was completed, two state policemen proceeded to the Mercer County District Attorney’s office and informed an assistant district attorney that James had given a statement implicating Herbert. Judge Rodgers was informed of this development and advised the police to file charges against Herbert. Charges were not filed; the state police instead, in an admitted attempt to obtain evidence against appellant, at 11:25 a.m. again removed him from jail and transported him to the substation.
Herbert was confronted with his brother in the presence of five state policemen and the county coroner. James related his version of the events surrounding the murder. Asked if this version was true, appellant answered yes. He was then further questioned and an oral statement obtained (no written statement was taken) adding details not covered in James’ statement. Two officers then took Herbert for another automobile ride since appellant had promised during this interrogation period to show the officers where decedent’s wallet had been disposed of. The wallet was located and Herbert returned to the substation at 1:40 p.m. The first formal charge was filed at some time prior to 2:20 p.m., although Judge Rodgers began his attempts to obtain counsel for appellant at about 12:45 p.m.
Mrs. Heckathorn testified that the state police had visited her home over three times but not once prior *549to the filing of charges were the parents informed of their son’s predicament. She stated that, she first learned of these charges from her mother at 5:30 p.m. on the 8th and that this information .was confirmed by a telephone call from the police later that evening. She emphatically testified that, had she known of the extent of her son’s involvement, she would have obtained an attorney; no action was taken because she believed that Herbert was being held as a truant from school.
In sum, appellant was in police custody for over 40 hours before any formal action was taken. His parents were not informed, he was questioned at least three times, searched and fingerprinted. He was removed from jail at the will of the police and, despite judicial admonition to file charges, was not charged until after the crucial confession was obtained. These facts must be placed against the cases establishing standards to be applied in determining the voluntariness of a confession procured from an accused of sixteen.
I.
The Supreme Court of the United States has explicitly stated that a defendant in his early teens is not to be judged by adult standards. Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 53-54, 82 S. Ct. 1209, 1212 (1962); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599-600, 68 S. Ct. 302, 304 (1948). Speaking of Robert Gallegos, a 14 year old suspect, that Court stated (370 U.S. at 54-55, 82 S. Ct. at 1212-13) : “He cannot be compared with an adult in full possession of his senses and knowledgeable of the consequences of his admissions. He would have no way of knowing what the consequences of his confession were without advice as to his rights—from someone concerned with securing him those rights—and without the aid of more mature judgment as to the steps *550he should take in the predicament in which he found himself. A lawyer or an adult relative or friend could have given the petitioner the protection which his own immaturity could not. Adult advice would have put him on a less unequal footing with his interrogators. Without some adult protection against this inequality, a 14-year-old boy would not be able to know, let alone assert, such constitutional rights as he had. To allow this conviction to stand would, in effect, be to treat him as if he had no constitutional rights.”
Fourteen years earlier, the Supreme Court had this to say about an accused of fifteen (332 U.S. at 599, 68 S. Ct. at 303-04) : “What transpired would make us pause for careful inquiry if a mature man were involved. And when, as here, a mere child—an easy victim of the law—is before us, special care in scrutinizing the record must be used. Age 15 is a tender and difficult age for a boy of any race. He cannot be judged by the more exacting standards of maturity. That which would leave a man cold and unimpressed can overawe and overwhelm a lad in his early teens. This is the period of great instability which the crisis of adolescence.produces.” In Haley, the accused was questioned for five hours. After having been shown the confessions of his alleged coconspirators, he confessed. This five hour period alone was sufficient for the Supreme Court to declare the confession unconstitutionally obtained.
Although the record does not indicate that Herbert was at any one point questioned continuously for five hours, I am convinced that this alone is not probative. For the Supreme Court in Haley, supra at 6ÓÓ-01, 68 S. Ct. at. 304, tells, us that the following factors are significant: “The age of petitioner, the hours when he was grilled, the duration of his quizzing, the fact that he had no friend or counsel to advise him, the callous *551attitude of the police towards his rights combine to convince us that this was a confession wrung from a child by means which the law should not sanction.” The police attitude in this litigation was callous. Not only did they misinform Herbert’s parents and Judgé Rod&eks as to the true reason for appellant’s detention but they also, in furtherance of their efforts to procure additional evidence, disregarded judicial advice to file charges. A youth of 16 of limited intelligence, held incommunicado by the police for 40 hours, searched^ questioned at least three times, fingerprinted, and’ then confronted with five policemen and his brother’s accusations cannot be presumed to have made a voluntary statement.
Nor does the fact that Herbert was warned of his constitutional rights change this picture. Haley was given similar warnings, yet the Supreme Court gave short shrift to any argument based upon the presence of warnings (332 U.S. at 601, 68 S. Ct. at 304) : “But we are told that this boy was advised of his constitutional rights before he signed the confession and that, knowing them, he nevertheless confessed. That assumes, however, that a boy of fifteen, without aid of counsel, would have a full appreciation of that advice and that on the facts of this record he had a freedom of choice. We cannot indulge those assumptions. Moreover, we cannot give any weight to recitals which merely formalize constitutional requirements.” With the burden upon the Commonwealth to convince this Court that Herbert’s confession was voluntary, see Commonwealth ex rel. Butler v. Rundle, 429 Pa. 141, 239 A. 2d 426 (1968), I am totally unconvinced. On this basis alone I would exclude the confession at appellant’s retrial.
*552II.
In an attempt to demonstrate that the warnings here given meet Escobedo standards, the majority has turned that decision upon its head. Its opinion states that the accused never requested counsel and that therefore Escobedo was not violated. However, our cases make clear beyond doubt that the initial inquiry is whether the accused was warned of his right to remain silent. If he was not, the lack of request for counsel is completely irrelevant and Escobedo has been violated.2 We thus said in Commonwealth v. Jefferson, 423 Pa. 541, 544, 226 A. 2d 765, 767 (1967) : “It is now settled that under Escobedo, an individual subject to police questioning is not deprived of his constitutional right to counsel unless such assistance is requested and denied. See, Commonwealth v. Schmidt, supra. Hence, since Jefferson made no request for counsel, the absence thereof, or an effective waiver of the right •thereto, did not ipso facto render testimony of the statements constitutionally inadmissible. But, Jefferson was also not advised of her right to remain silent and this, m our opinion, under the teaching of Escobedo precluded evidentiary use of the statements made to Officer Zevtchin.” (Emphasis supplied.) This concept, reiterated in Commonwealth v. Vivian, 426 Pa. 192, 231 A. 2d 301 (1967) and Commonwealth v. Medina, 424 Pa. 632, 227 A. 2d 842 (1967), is a simple one—the constitution demands that in any post-Escobedo case the accused at least have been warned of his *553right to remain silent; and if not so warned, his confession is constitutionally tainted.
With this in mind, I now turn to an examination of exactly what the police told Herbert at the time he was confronted with James’ statements.3 Of the five officers present, only two testified. Trooper Lamberton stated on direct examination that he advised ap-. pellant “that anything he said could be used against him in court [and] that he could remain silent . . . (Record at 631.) On cross-examination, however, Trooper Lamberton insisted that “I told him that anything he said could be used against him or for him in court if this came to trial . . and added that he did not warn appellant of his right to remain silent. (Record at 638. Emphasis supplied.) Thus, this witness’ testimony is completely contradictory as to whether the crucial warning was in fact given. • ■ •
The other officer, Trooper Balchunas, was positive that he told appellant “that he could remain silent. . . .” (Record at 665.) Putting aside the age of the accused,4 I believe that Commonwealth v. Medina, supra, demonstrates that even for an adult the warnings given were not sufficient. Trooper Lamberton’s testimony is, as noted above, of little value; the best Trooper .Balchunas could offer was that Herbert was told that “he could remain silent.” We stressed in Medina (424 Pa. at 633, 227 A. 2d at 843) : “While the record in the instant case discloses uncontradicted testimony that *554on two occasions during the police questioning in which the statements were obtained, Medina was warned that he did not have to say anything unless he wanted to, this, in itself, was insufficient to constitute an effective warning of his right not to convict himself. It was also mandatory that he be advised that anything he said could and would be used against him in court, and admittedly no such explanation was given.” (Emphasis supplied.) Trooper Balchunas’ testimony contains no indication that Herbert was told that anything he said could be used against him. Nor can I accept as a sufficient warning Trooper Lamberton’s testimony that anything said would be used “for and against” appellant. This statement contains the clear implication that the police were attempting to aid Herbert, one which the record demonstrates is not warranted. It thus lacks the clarity and precision required in a situation of this type. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1625 (1966) : “The warning of the right to remain silent must be accompanied by the explanation that anything said can and will be used against the individual in court. This warning is needed in order to make him aware not only of the privilege, but also of the consequences of foregoing it. It is only through an awareness of these consequences that there can be any assurance of real understanding and intelligent exercise of the privilege. Moreover, this warning may serve to make the individual more acutely aware that he is faced with a phase of the adversary system—that he is not in the presence of persons acting solely in his interest.” (Emphasis supplied.). Not only does Trooper Lamberton’s testimony indicate that Herbert was not warned that his inquisitors were not acting solely in his interest but it further lacks the warning that the confession will (according to this witness, Herbert was told that it “could be used for him”) be used against appellant.
*555. Whether viewed as a voluntariness problem or an Escobedo problem, appellant’s confession is constitutionally tainted. I therefore believe that it must be excluded at his retrial, and . thus concur only in the. award of a new trial. .

 Given the fact that the court below found this confession to be voluntary, I have considered only “the evidence of the prosecution’s witnesses and so much of the evidence for the defense as, fairly read in the context of the record as a whole, remains un*547contradicted.” Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 604, 81 S. Ct. 1860, 1880 (1961). See generally Commonwealth ex rel. Butler v. Rundle, 429 Pa. 141, 239 A. 2d 426 (1968).

 The majority’s position ignores the very basic fact that the right to counsel is merely a derivative of the right to remain silent. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468-69, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1624-25 (1966). If an accused is not told of the basic right, it is folly to assume that he has knowledge of the derivative right sufficient to request the exercise of that derivative right.

 In a footnote, the majority cryptically notes: “The testimony is. ambiguous as to whether he was advised of his right to remain silent, and it is not as clear and as positive as it will have to be on a retrial.” The import of this observation' is nowhere explained.

 The rationale' of both Gallegos and Haley dictates that- stricter standards of clarity' aré required when examining the warnings given to an accused, youth. Yet I am convinced that stricter standards need not be applied here for even if Herbert was an adult this confession is invalid under Escobedo, See text, infra.