Court Opinion

ID: 9895367
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-06 21:03:36.477013+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:14.781699
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/6/23 P. v. Johnson CA5

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

           IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                     FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

    THE PEOPLE,
                                                                                             F084543
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                               (Super. Ct. No. BF183062A)
                    v.

    RENALDO JOHNSON,                                                                      OPINION
           Defendant and Appellant.

                                                   THE COURT*
         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. John D.
Oglesby, Judge.
         Kristine Koo, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Kimberley A. Donohue and
Annabella Yousif, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                                                        -ooOoo-

*        Before Detjen, Acting P. J., Meehan, J. and Snauffer, J.
                                    INTRODUCTION
       Defendant Renaldo Johnson asks the court to independently review the materials
considered by the lower court in the in camera Pitchess1 hearing. Defendant also claims
the trial court erred when it imposed the upper term without complying with the
requirements under Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (b)(2).2 We uphold the trial
court’s ruling on the Pitchess motion, deny defendant’s claim and affirm the judgment.
                               PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
       Defendant was charged with one count of reckless evading of a police officer
(Veh. Code, § 2800.2, count 1) and it was alleged that defendant was convicted of a prior
felony offense (§ 136.1, subd. (c)(1)) within the meaning of the “Three Strikes” law
(§§ 667, subds. (c)–(j), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(e)). A jury convicted defendant of the
reckless driving, and the trial court found the prior felony allegation true. On June 21,
2022, the trial court sentenced defendant to the upper term of three years, doubled to
six years due to the strike.
                                 FACTUAL SUMMARY
       Officers initiated a traffic stop of defendant by activating their vehicle lights and
sirens, but defendant fled and drove away. Defendant drove at a high rate of speed,
entering and exiting the highway, and ran through several red traffic lights. After driving
through another red light, defendant pulled his vehicle over and was arrested.
                                       DISCUSSION
I.     Pitchess Motion
       Defendant asks this court to review the documents from the in camera Pitchess
hearing to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion

1      Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531.
2      All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

                                              2.
for discovery. The People do not object. Upon review of the record we conclude the trial
court did not abuse its discretion and we uphold the ruling.
       A.     Relevant Factual and Procedural Background
       Defendant filed a Pitchess motion seeking discovery of information from the
personnel file of Bakersfield Police Officer Seth Palmer for dishonesty. Specifically,
defendant sought evidence or complaints related to: “(1) false statements in reports,
(2) fabrication of witness testimony in reports, (3) false testimony, (4) falsification of
probable cause and/or reasonable suspicion, (5) acts involving moral turpitude, [and]
(6) any other evidence of or complaints of dishonesty[.]” (Bold omitted.)
       After a hearing on the Pitchess motion, the trial court granted the motion for an in
camera hearing. After the in camera hearing, the motion for discovery was denied. The
court found “none of the records [were] relevant to this case” and ordered no disclosure.
       B.     Applicable Law and Standard of Review
       In Pitchess, the Supreme Court “recognized that a criminal defendant may, in
some circumstances, compel the discovery of evidence in the arresting law enforcement
officer’s personnel file that is relevant to the defendant’s ability to defend against a
criminal charge.” (People v. Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216, 1219 (Mooc).) “ ‘In 1978,
the California Legislature codified the privileges and procedures surrounding what had
come to be known as “Pitchess motions” … through the enactment of Penal Code
sections 832.7 and 832.8 and Evidence Code sections 1043 through 1045.’ ” (Id. at
pp. 1219–1220.) “A criminal defendant has a limited right to discovery of a peace
officer’s personnel records. [Citation.] Peace officer personnel records are confidential
and can only be discovered pursuant to Evidence Code sections 1043 and 1045.”
(Giovanni B. v. Superior Court (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 312, 318.)
       The procedure for obtaining discoverable information from law enforcement
personnel files is well established. Pursuant to Evidence Code section 1043,
subdivision (b), “on a showing of good cause, a criminal defendant is entitled to

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discovery of relevant documents or information in the confidential personnel records of a
peace officer accused of misconduct against the defendant. [Citation.] Good cause for
discovery exists when the defendant shows both ‘ “materiality” to the subject matter of
the pending litigation and a “reasonable belief” that the agency has the type of
information sought.’ [Citation.] A showing of good cause is measured by ‘relatively
relaxed standards’ that serve to ‘insure the production’ for trial court review of ‘all
potentially relevant documents.’ [Citation.] If the defendant establishes good cause, the
court must review the requested records in camera to determine what information, if any,
should be disclosed. [Citation.] Subject to certain statutory exceptions and limitations
[citation], ‘the trial court should then disclose to the defendant “such information [that] is
relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending litigation.” ’ ” (People v. Gaines
(2009) 46 Cal.4th 172, 179 (Gaines).)
       “When a trial court concludes a defendant’s Pitchess motion shows good cause for
discovery of relevant evidence contained in a law enforcement officer’s personnel files,
the custodian of the records is obligated to bring to the trial court all ‘potentially relevant’
documents to permit the trial court to examine them for itself.” (Mooc, supra, 26 Cal.4th
at pp. 1228‒1229; City of Santa Cruz v. Municipal Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 74, 84.) “A
law enforcement officer’s personnel record will commonly contain many documents that
would, in the normal case, be irrelevant to a Pitchess motion, including those describing
marital status and identifying family members, employment applications, letters of
recommendation, promotion records, and health records.” (Mooc, at p. 1229; see
§ 832.8.) Irrelevant documents need not be presented to the trial court for an in camera
review. However, “if the custodian has any doubt whether a particular document is
relevant, he or she should present it to the trial court” and “be prepared to state in
chambers and for the record what other documents (or category of documents) not
presented to the court were included in the complete personnel record, and why those
were deemed irrelevant or otherwise nonresponsive to the defendant’s Pitchess motion.”

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(Mooc, at p. 1229.) “A court reporter should be present to document the custodian’s
statements, as well as any questions the trial court may wish to ask the custodian
regarding the completeness of the record.” (Ibid.)
       “The trial court should then make a record of what documents it examined before
ruling on the Pitchess motion” and the transcript of the in camera hearing and all copies
of the documents should be sealed. (Mooc, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1229; see People v.
Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 825 [after ruling on the Pitchess motion, “[t]he
magistrate ordered that all remaining materials be copied and sealed”].) “Such a record
will permit future appellate review.” (Mooc, at p. 1229.)
       The trial court’s decision as to whether the contents of a police personnel file are
discoverable is subject to review under the abuse of discretion standard. (See Mooc,
supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1228.) When the trial court reviews an officer’s file in camera and
then denies disclosure of information, the reviewing court must examine the record of the
documents examined by the trial court to determine whether the trial court abused its
discretion. (Id. at pp. 1228, 1229, 1232; see People v. Castain (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d
138, 144‒145.) “A trial court is afforded wide discretion in ruling on a motion for access
to law enforcement personnel records. The decision will be reversed only on a showing
of abuse of discretion.” (People v. Yearwood (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 161, 180, citing
People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 330.)
       Any error by the trial court in denying a Pitchess motion is reviewed under the
Watson3 harmless error standard. (See People v. Samuels (2005) 36 Cal.4th 96, 110;
Gaines, supra, 46 Cal.4th at pp. 181‒185.)
      C.      Analysis
       Defendant filed a Pitchess motion concerning Palmer, seeking discovery of
complaints for any false statements or testimony, fabrication of witness testimony,

3      People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818.

                                             5.
fabrication of probable cause or reasonable suspicion, acts of moral turpitude, or any
other evidence or complaints of dishonesty. We conducted an independent review of
both the in camera proceeding and Palmer’s personnel file. We conclude the trial court
complied with the proper procedural requirements as set forth in Mooc, and created an
adequate record of the in camera hearing. (Mooc, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1228.) After
examining the personnel files of Palmer, we further conclude the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in denying the release of the personnel files. (See id. at pp. 1228‒1229;
People v. Samayoa, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 827.) We, therefore, uphold the trial court’s
ruling.
II.  The Trial Court Did Not Violate Section 1170, Subdivision (b) When It
Imposed the Upper Term
          Defendant contends the trial court erred when it did not require a trial by jury or
court to find the factors in aggravation true in its decision to impose the upper term. As
such, defendant contends that a remand for resentencing is necessary. The People
initially argue defendant forfeited his claim of error by not objecting at sentencing. The
People also claim the trial court properly based the upper term on defendant’s recidivism
and parole status, but that even if the court erred, any error was harmless. Defendant
replied that the issue was not forfeited since it was raised before the court at sentencing
and that he made his position clear that he should receive the middle term under the new
law. We conclude that defendant did not forfeit his claim, but we affirm the sentence.
          A.     Relevant Factual and Procedural Background
          At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel stated: “I would request the mid-term
on this matter, especially considering the new law that took place this year as of
January 1st, which is retroactive, where factors in aggravation have to be proved up in
front of the jury or found to be true by a judge. [¶] This crime does not involve any
violence. [Defendant] did eventually pull over and surrender peacefully. And did not
run. He was fairly cooperative once the chase ended. [¶] And I don’t believe that upper

                                                6.
term is appropriate in this matter. I would ask that mid-term be applied here and, of
course, we did request a Romero, understanding the nature of that strike, and when it last
occurred. But that would be our request at this time.”
       The People submitted on the probation office’s report. The probation officer
testified that the upper term could be reached since “the aggravating factors that have
been presented to the [c]ourt are related to the defendant and not specifically this case.
The new law requires that aggravating factors be pled and proven when they specifically
relate to the offense and that aggravating factors would be applied to determining the
upper term for enhancements specifically.… [A]ggravating factors that relate to the
defendant, can be used to determine and recommend or justify the upper term in
sentencing.” After the probation officer’s statement, defense counsel had no further
comment.
       The trial court stated that “imposition of the upper term does present an interesting
issue. I don’t think we’ve had an appellate case on this. I’ve seen arguments both way[s]
on whether or not the [c]ourt can impose an upper term based upon factors in aggravation
that are not found true by [p]robation in light of the language that is used in the statute
itself. Having said that, the [c]ourt recognizes that there is a—to me, a very logical and
compelling argument for the use of them when they are really not in dispute and are
factors that have either been determined already by a conviction of the defendant or the
defendant having entered a plea or admission, that is, prior convictions. [¶] And the
[c]ourt can look at the defendant’s prior convictions based upon the report of the
[p]robation [d]epartment and the [c]ourt believes that the upper term in this case would
be justified. [¶] With that the [c]ourt does believe that the [p]robation [d]epartment’s
[p]robation [o]fficer’s report lists numerous terms and convictions which the [c]ourt can
simply by reviewing make the following findings.”
       The trial court listed three factors in support of its decision to impose the
upper term: (1) defendant’s convictions as an adult were numerous; (2) defendant served

                                              7.
multiple prior prison terms; and (3) defendant was on state parole when the crime was
committed. The court stated that “[b]ased upon the dates of the offenses and his parole
revocation status, the defendant’s prior performance on misdemeanor and felony
probation, and the … Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation [(CDCR)], parole
was unsatisfactory in that he failed to abide by the terms and continued to re-offend and
he was a parolee at large. These are all when he committed the instant offense. [¶] All
these factors in and of themselves [are] aggravated and all of them, in [the court’s]
opinion individually, justify the impositions of the upper term.”
       B.     Applicable Law and Standard of Review
       Under the former version of section 1170, subdivision (b), when a judgment of
imprisonment was to be imposed, and the statute specified three possible terms (lower,
middle, and upper), the trial court had broad discretion to select the term that best served
the interests of justice and was required to specify the reasons for its sentencing decision.
(§ 1170, former subd. (b); Cal. Rules of Court,4 former rule 4.420(e); People v. Sandoval
(2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 846–847.) In making its selection, the trial court could consider
the circumstances in aggravation or mitigation (as defined by rules 4.421 & 4.423) “and
any other factor reasonably related to the sentencing decision.” (Former rule 4.420(d).)
The court could rely on “the case record, the probation officer’s report, other reports and
statements properly received, statements in aggravation or mitigation, and any evidence
introduced at the sentencing hearing.” (Ibid.)
       Effective January 1, 2022, section 1170, subdivision (b) was amended by Senate
Bill No. 567 to create a “presumption of sentencing judgment not to exceed the middle
terms.” (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis of Sen. Bill
No. 567 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 20, 2021, p. 3.) As amended, a trial
court may only impose an upper term when the facts underlying the aggravating

4      All further references to rules are to the California Rules of Court.

                                             8.
circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant or found true beyond a reasonable
doubt by the jury or the court acting as the fact finder. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(2); People v.
Dunn (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 394, 402, review granted Oct. 12, 2022, S275655 (Dunn);
People v. Lewis (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1125, 1131, review granted May 17, 2023,
S279147.) Under section 1170, subdivision (b)(3), the trial court “may consider the
defendant’s prior convictions in determining sentencing based on a certified record of
conviction without submitting the prior convictions to a jury.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(3);
Dunn, at p. 402.)
       C.     Forfeiture
       Our Supreme Court has required parties to raise certain issues at the time of
sentencing and held the lack of a timely and meaningful objection forfeited or waived the
claim. (People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 352 [defendant cannot challenge trial
court’s sentencing choice for the first time on appeal because “defects in the court’s
statement of reasons are easily prevented and corrected if called to the court’s attention”
at the time of sentencing]; People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 234–235 [lack of
objection forfeits claims regarding probation conditions]; see also People v. Anderson
(2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 233, 242, review granted April 19, 2023, S278786 [§ 1170,
subdivision (b) issue was forfeited where defendant not only failed to object but
suggested the court impose the upper term]; People v. Flowers (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th
680, 683–684, review granted Oct. 12, 2022, S276237 (Flowers) [§ 1170 issue was
forfeited because appellant did not object to the upper term when the sentence was
imposed].)
       Defendant was sentenced after the amendment to section 1170, subdivision (b)
became effective on January 1, 2022. A review of the record shows all parties were
aware of the changes in the law and the court’s newly limited discretion, which was
discussed at sentencing. Although defendant did not object to the trial court’s imposition
of the upper term, he did raise the issue “ ‘in such a way as to alert the trial court to the

                                               9.
nature of the anticipated’ ” issue and afford the People an opportunity to establish its
response. (See People v. Williams (1988) 44 Cal.3d 883, 906; People v. Partida (2005)
37 Cal.4th 428, 435 [“A party cannot argue the court erred in failing to conduct an
analysis it was not asked to conduct.”].) Therefore, the purpose for requiring an
objection was served in this case. (See Partida, at p. 434 [“to further these purposes, the
requirement must be interpreted reasonably, not formalistically”].)
       Further, claims regarding an unauthorized sentence can be raised at any time.
(People v. Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 354.) “[A] sentence is generally ‘unauthorized’
where it could not lawfully be imposed under any circumstance in the particular case.”
(Ibid.; People v. Brach (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 571, 578 [sentence “ ‘could not lawfully
be imposed under any circumstance in the particular case,’ ” for example, “ ‘where the
court violates mandatory provisions governing the length of confinement’ ”].) Here,
defendant claims that the imposition of the upper term violates section 1170,
subdivision (b), which if true, would be an unauthorized sentence. Therefore,
defendant’s claim is not forfeited.
       D.     Analysis
       As amended, section 1170, subdivision (b)(2) provides that in order “to increase
the punishment beyond this middle term maximum, a trial court must now rely on
separate aggravating-circumstance findings that it concludes justify upward departure
from the presumptive maximum middle term.” (People v. Falcon (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th
911, 933, review granted Sept. 13, 2023, S281242.) “Sixth Amendment jury-trial-right
principles attach to all facts legally essential to imposing an increased sentence” beyond
the middle term maximum. (Ibid.; Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296, 313 [the
constitutional requirement of a jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt applies to a
fact that is “legally essential to the punishment”].) We note amended section 1170,
subdivision (b)(2) “incorporates this jury trial right by requiring that all

                                              10.
aggravating-circumstance findings relied on to impose a sentence beyond the middle term
be found true by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Falcon, at p. 933; Blakely, at
p. 313.) However, the statute creates two types of exclusions from this constitutional jury
trial right: aggravating facts stipulated to by the defendant may be considered without a
jury finding (§ 1170, subd. (b)(2); Falcon, at p. 933; see Blakely, at p. 303 [facts admitted
by the defendant excepted]) and the sentencing court may also consider prior convictions
based on certified records of conviction (§ 1170, subd. (b)(3); Falcon, at p. 933; see
People v. Sallee (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 330, 337, review granted April 26, 2023,
S278690; Flowers, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 685, review granted; Apprendi v. New
Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 490 [fact of a prior conviction excepted].) Additionally, we
note defendant concedes that “section 1170 permits the trial court to consider the
defendant’s prior convictions based on a certified record.”
       Here, it is not disputed that the aggravating factors relied upon by the trial court
were neither stipulated to by defendant nor found true beyond a reasonable doubt by a
jury or judge in a court trial. The question then is whether the aggravating factors relied
upon by the court fell within the exception under section 1170, subdivision (b)(3), which
allows the court to consider defendant’s prior convictions based on the certified record of
conviction. Appellate courts have affirmed such sentences where the aggravating factors
were proven by the certified record of conviction. (See Flowers, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th
at p. 686, review granted [“appellant’s criminal history, prior prison terms, and prior poor
performance on probation, are supported by the certified records of convictions”]; Dunn,
supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 404–405, review granted [no error in the trial court’s reliance
upon the aggravating circumstance of defendant’s numerous prior convictions; that
defendant was on probation at the time the charged offense was committed was unable to
be proven by the certified record of conviction].) Moreover, as it relates to the
Sixth Amendment, findings that a defendant’s prior convictions are numerous or of
increasing seriousness, prior prison term, parole status, and prior unsatisfactory

                                             11.
performance on probation or parole may be determined by the record of prior
convictions. (See People v. Towne (2008) 44 Cal.4th 63, 79–82; People v. Black (2007)
41 Cal.4th 799, 815, 819–820 [“determinations whether a defendant has suffered prior
convictions, and whether those convictions are ‘numerous or of increasing seriousness’
[citation], require consideration of only the number, dates, and offenses of the prior
convictions alleged” and a jury determination on these aggravating factors is not
necessary if a record of prior convictions support them].)
       Although defendant recognizes that a certified record of conviction was entered
into evidence, he erroneously argues that the court had “only one prison packet” proving
only the one prior strike conviction true. A review of the record shows the trial court had
the CDCR’s certified record of convictions for defendant, which was received into
evidence as Exhibits 5 through 7. The court relied on this certified record when it found
true defendant’s prior strike conviction of intimidating a witness by force or threat of
force (§ 136.1, subd. (c)(1)). However, the certified record was not limited to the one
conviction, but includes defendant’s entire adult criminal history, as well as prior prison
sentences and parole violations.
       We note that initially the trial court only mentioned the probation report when it
set forth the facts supporting the aggravating circumstances. However, the certified
record of conviction had already been entered into evidence and had already been
reviewed and considered by the court. When the court stated its basis for the aggravating
circumstances, it referenced the “Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation,” which
further demonstrates the court had and relied on the CDCR certified record when it
determined the facts in support of the aggravating circumstances in order to impose the
upper term.
       Our independent review of defendant’s certified record of conviction confirms that
it does in fact support and prove the three aggravating circumstances relied on by the trial
court in imposing the upper term. Defendant had over 10 convictions as an adult, which

                                            12.
qualifies as numerous (see People v. Searle (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1091, 1098
[three prior DUI convictions are “ ‘numerous’ ”]); defendant served at least five prior
prison terms, which qualifies as “multiple”; and the certified record shows defendant
would have been on state parole when the present crime was committed (see People v.
Towne, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 82 [“defendant’s unsatisfactory performance on probation
or parole is proved by evidence demonstrating that, while previously on probation or
parole, he committed and was convicted of new offenses”]). The aggravating
circumstances were sufficiently proven by the certified record of conviction and did not
need to be submitted to a jury. (See § 1170, subd. (b)(3); see also rule 4.421(b)(2), (3),
(4).) Nor did we consider the probation report as it is not a certified record of conviction.
(See Dunn, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 403, review granted; see also Evid. Code,
§ 452.5, subd. (b)(1).)
       Additionally, even if the certified record of conviction was insufficient to prove all
three of the factors in aggravation, the trial court made clear its intention to impose the
upper term even if it had only one of the aggravating factors. The court stated, “[a]ll
these factors in and of themselves [are] aggravated and all of them, in [the court’s]
opinion individually, justify the impositions of the upper term.” Consequently, we
conclude the trial court did not err in imposing the upper term under these circumstances.
                                      DISPOSITION
       We affirm the judgment.

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