Court Opinion

ID: 9469170
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 02:34:04.986999+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:41:15.796972
License: Public Domain

J. BLAINE ANDERSON, Circuit Judge:
Regner appeals from his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1341 for mail fraud. We affirm.
In February, 1974, Regner purchased a health insurance policy from the CNA Insurance Company of Chicago, Illinois. Five months later, Regner, an American citizen, travelled to his native Hungary. Upon his return to this country, he submitted a claim to CNA based on alleged hospitalization in Hungary. Regner stated in that claim that an injury sustained in a taxicab accident placed him in a Hungarian hospital from July 26 to August 10, 1974.
The insurance company requested documentation of Regner’s claim. Regner had his insurance agent send CNA bills from the Gyor County Hospital in Romand, Hungary. After numerous demands from Regner and his attorney, CNA mailed Regner a check for $3,600 in satisfaction of his claim.
In February, 1980, Regner was indicted on one count of mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1341. A jury trial ensued, and Regner was found guilty.
On this appeal, Regner raises the following issues: (1) that the district court abused its discretion by admitting certain evidence *756of Regner’s prior insurance claims because the evidence was irrelevant, that inquiry about the prior insurance claims was beyond the scope of direct examination of Regner, and that the district court should have given a contemporaneous limiting instruction upon admission of the evidence; (2) that the district court abused its discretion in granting defendant a continuance limited to five weeks while defendant had requested a six-months’ continuance; and (3) that the admission of certain certified foreign public documents violated defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation of witnesses. None of the above contentions merit reversal of Regner’s conviction. We therefore affirm.
I. Evidence of Regner’s Prior Insurance Claims and Benefits
On cross-examination of Regner, the Government was permitted, over Regner’s objections, to inquire into Regner’s historical claims for and receipt of various insurance benefits. Regner proposes three errors regarding this inquiry. He argues that evidence of his past insurance claims was irrelevant, that such questioning exceeded the scope of direct examination and, once admitted, the district court erred by not giving a limiting instruction to the jury.
Regner’s claim of irrelevance is founded upon Fed.R.Evid. 401, 402, and 403, especially the latter which provides that all relevant evidence is to be admitted unless “its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, ... or misleading the jury....” Regner argues that any probative value of evidence of his prior insurance claims was outweighed by the prejudice that resulted from its receipt, that the evidence cast Regner as a “scourge upon society” in the eyes of the jury.
The trial court’s determination under Fed.R.Evid. 403 is to be given great deference and this court will reverse only when there is an abuse of discretion. United States v. Larios, 640 F.2d 938, 941 (9th Cir. 1981), and cases cited therein. The district court admitted the inquiry for the limited purpose of rebutting Regner’s testimony on direct exam to the effect that he lacked knowledge of filing insurance claims. The Government argued for admissibility also on the grounds that the evidence was probative of prior similar acts, presumably under Rule 404(b) as proof of motive, intent, plan, etc., However, the district court, in a sidebar conference, reserved judgment upon the admissibility of the inquiry under 404(b), and apparently was never called upon to provide a specific determination of that question. We will reserve judgment on that issue as well.
At least to the extent that the evidence was probative of Regner’s credibility regarding his testimony that he was unfamiliar with insurance claims, we find no abuse of discretion in admitting this inquiry. For this same reason, we must reject Regner’s argument that the examination of Regner’s prior insurance claims was beyond the scope of his direct examination.1 The examination was related to and probative of Regner’s familiarity with filing insurance claims, an inquiry directly related to Regner’s credibility. The district court did not abuse its discretion. See United States v. Carlson, 423 F.2d 431, 440 (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 400 U.S. 847, 91 S.Ct. 93, 27 L.Ed.2d 84 (1970).
*757Regner also claims that the district court erred in not giving an immediate instruction to the jury which would have informed them of the limited admissibility, for credibility purposes, of the evidence of Regner’s prior insurance claims. This argument fails for a number of reasons. First, a district court is not required to give a limiting instruction to the jury unless counsel requests one. Fed.R.Evid. 105; United States v. Drebin, 557 F.2d 1316, 1325 (9th Cir. 1977), cert, denied, 436 U.S. 904, 98 S.Ct. 2232, 56 L.Ed.2d 401 (1978), reh. denied, 438 U.S. 908, 98 S.Ct. 3127, 57 L.Ed.2d 1150 (1978). During the sidebar conference initiated by defense counsel’s objections to the admissibility of evidence of Regner’s prior insurance claims, defense counsel only requested that the record reflect that the evidence was being introduced for a limited purpose. Defense counsel did not request a limiting instruction at that time, and the court acknowledged that the record reflected the limited admissibility. In addition, any failure to give a limiting instruction in the absence of the request does not rise to “plain error” under the circumstances of this case. Cf. Drebin, supra, at 1325.
Finally, Regner fails to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the court’s failure to give the limiting instruction. When ruling on defense counsel’s objections to the admissibility of the inquiry into the past insurance claims, the district court declared in open court that “[t]he matter is material because of the defendant’s earlier testimony about seeming lack of knowledge of filing insurance claims, and only for that purpose am I allowing it in.” R.T. at 122. We do not suggest that the court’s response to counsel’s objection would suffice as a limiting instruction where a specific request for such is made. However, under the circumstances of the trial in this case, the court’s statement stood as a limiting admonition of sorts and serves to weaken Regner’s claim of prejudice from the lack of any limiting instruction. Moreover, Regner’s guilt was established by evidence independent of the evidence of the prior insurance claims. As will be set forth more fully below, the Government’s evidence indicated that Regner had sent CNA fictitious hospital records and a receipt which was not for his own medical treatment, but for his stepson’s. Such evidence was in and of itself sufficient to support the jury’s verdict.
II. The Continuance
Regner argues that the district court erred in not granting his April 10, 1980, request for a six-month continuance, receiving instead a continuance for only five weeks — to May 28, 1980. Regner claims that under the circumstances of this case, especially the fact that much of the prosecution’s evidence was derived in Hungary and, consequently, attempts to interview Government witnesses would be met with delay in obtaining visas, etc., that the district court abused its discretion in granting less than the continuance requested. We disagree.
As for the suggestion that defense counsel needed the full continuance in order to contact and interview Hungarian witnesses, defense counsel conceded at the hearing on the continuance motion that he could probably accomplish those objectives in less time than the six months he had requested. Supp. R.T. at 3.
In addition, defense counsel never requested a further continuance of the trial date. At no time did defense counsel inform the district court that he had been unable to obtain evidence from Hungary or that he had been unable to obtain a visa. The record indicates that, until the guilty verdict was returned, Regner was content to be tried on May 28,1980. Regner cannot now claim that he was prejudiced by proceeding to trial on that date.
III. Confrontation Issues
Regner acknowledges that authenticated foreign public documents are admissible through a combination of Fed. Rules of Evid. 803(10) and 902(3),2 yet he argues for *758the first time on this appeal that his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation of witnesses was violated by the admission of certain foreign public documents at his trial.3 Usually, errors not raised below will not be considered on appeal unless the proper resolution is beyond any doubt or where “injustice might otherwise result.” Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 2877, 49 L.Ed.2d 826 (1976), quoting Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 557, 61 S.Ct. 719, 721, 85 L.Ed. 1037 (1941). See also, Jaffe v. Alexis, 659 F.2d 1018, 1022 (9th Cir. 1981), and Michael-Regan Co., Inc. v. Lindell, 527 F.2d 653 (9th Cir. 1975). While we recognize that this court may discretionarily review questions not raised in the district court, Singleton, supra, we decline to do so here because Regner fails to convince us that a clear violation of the Confrontation Clause existed and sufficient evidence is presented in the record to support Regner’s conviction regardless of any assumed prejudicial admission of the foreign public documents. These observations require further elaboration.
Regner would have this court believe that even though the documents were prepared by the certified custodian of records of the agencies involved, that although the officials declared that they were authorized under the laws of Hungary to attest to the genuineness of records maintained by the particular agencies, and even though these documents were accompanied by a final cer*759tificate executed by an American Embassy official, that the substance of the documents should be suspect because of the “possible motives of communist Hungarian officials to fabricate documents affecting the rights of an ex-Hungarian citizen.” Regner’s Brief at 25. The record, however, is devoid of any evidence that the particular Hungarian officials harbored any ill will against Regner or that they were biased or prejudiced against him or would be motivated to prepare false documents. Without such facts, we are in no position to conclude that every document executed by public officials of communist countries is a fabrication and presumptively unreliable. Regner has simply failed to prove to this court that the admission of the foreign public documents in this case was beyond doubt a violation of his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation.
Likewise, no clear prejudice or injustice resulted from the admission of the documents. Even if we were to concede that a Confrontation Clause violation was present, sufficient evidence was presented by the Government at trial, unrelated to the foreign public documents, that would support the jury’s guilty verdict under 18 U.S.C. § 1341. Regner himself admitted in his testimony that he had not been hospitalized in the Gyor County Hospital, although the evidence showed that he had submitted a claim to CNA accompanied by documents purporting to be evidence of his hospitalization at the facility. The evidence also suggested that Regner submitted his stepson’s Gyor County Hospital bill as his own. These facts provided probative evidence of Regner’s fraudulent representation to CNA that he had been hospitalized in Romand, Hungary, from July 26, 1974, to August 10, 1974, as charged in paragraph 2 of the indictment. The Government, in closing arguments, adequately and properly informed the jury that a violation of the mail fraud statute could be demonstrated by this single false representation of hospitalization,4 and the court properly instructed the jury that they could convict Regner on this evidence alone.5
We, therefore, find no basis for reversal of Regner’s conviction and, accordingly,
AFFIRM.

. On direct examination, Regner was questioned about the filing of the CNA claim for the alleged injuries sustained in the taxi accident in Hungary:
“Q. Did you give Mr. Bomka [the insurance agent] or anybody else your son’s doctor bills, your hospital bill and tell them it was your hospital bill?
A. I give Mr. Bomka all the papers, all the doctor bills, my son’s and mine, because I don’t know who I supposed to send the bill, you know, for the hospital bill.”
On cross-examination, Regner was again asked:
“Q. Now, when you came back from Hungary, you testified that Mr. Bomka filled out all the insurance claims and you just signed, is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. Were you very familiar with insurance claims?
A. No.
Q. Had you filed any insurance claims in the past?
MR. RANDALL [Counsel for Regner]: Objection, your honor, irrelevant.
THE COURT: No. You may answer.
THE WITNESS: Yes, I filed.”

. Rules 803(10) and 902(3) read as follows:

“Rule 803. Hearsay Exceptions; Availability of Declarant Immaterial

The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness:
*758******
(10) Absence of public record or entry. To prove the absence of a record, report, statement, or data compilation, in any form, or the nonoccurrence or nonexistence of a matter of which a record, report, statement, or data compilation, in any form was regularly made and preserved by a public office or agency, evidence in the form of a certification in accordance with rule 902, or testimony, that diligent search failed to disclose the record, report, statement, or data compilation, or entry.

Rule 902. Self-Authentication

Extrinsic evidence of authenticity as a condition precedent to admissibility is not required with respect to the following:
******
(3) Foreign public documents. A document purporting to be executed or attested in his official capacity by a person authorized by the laws of a foreign country to make the execution or attestation, and accompanied by a final certification as to the genuineness of the signature and official position (A) of the executing or attesting person, or (B) of any foreign official whose certificate of genuineness of signature and official position relates to the execution or attestation or is in a chain of certificates of genuineness of signature and official position relating to the execution or attestation. A final certification may be made by a secretary or embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent of the United States, or a diplomatic or consular official of the foreign country assigned or accredited to the United States. If reasonable opportunity has been given to all parties to investigate the authenticity and accuracy of official documents, the court may, for good cause shown, order that they be treated as presumptively authentic without final certification or permit them to be evidenced by an attested summary with or without final certification.

. Over Regner’s objections, the Government offered three certified Hungarian public documents at trial. Each document was accompanied with an English translation and the signatures of the public officials who executed the documents were certified as genuine by the Vice Consul of the United States Embassy in Budapest, Hungary. The district court admitted the documents presumably under Fed.Rules of Evid. 803(10) and 902(3). As mentioned, Regner does not now contest the admissibility of the documents under the Fed.Rules of Evidence.
One document had been prepared by the superintendent of official records of Fovarosi Autotaxi Vallalat, the state-owned taxicab company of the Hungarian People’s Republic. The document certified that the company is required by law to maintain records of all accidents involving taxis and that “a diligent search” failed to disclose any record of a taxi accident involving Regner.
The deputy head physician of the Gyor County Hospital supplied the second document. It certified that the hospital is required by law to maintain records of all persons hospitalized there and that a diligent search of the records had failed to produce any indication that Regner was hospitalized from July 26 to August 10, 1974. Further, the document certified that no official hospital records corresponded to the treatment records which defendant had submitted to the insurance company.
The final document was also from the deputy head physician of the Gyor County Hospital. It certified that services were performed on defendant’s stepson and paid for by Regner. The certificate explained that Regner’s name appeared on the bill as the payer, not the recipient, of the treatment described on the bill.

. The closing argument included the following:
“And, ladies and gentlemen, you don’t have to rely only on those hospital certificates to return a guilty verdict against Mr. Regner. You can rely on the defendant Sandor Regner’s testimony, his own testimony. He admitted to you yesterday when he testified that he was not hospitalized at the County of Gyor Hospital. He said he was treated, that he received some treatment over there and stayed in some doctor’s home, but he admitted that he was never in that hospital. And yet, he submitted the phony hospital records to the CNA Insurance Company.”
Closing Argument of prosecution. RT at 221-22.

. The pertinent excerpt from the district court’s instructions reads:
“The indictment in this case alleges several false and fraudulent representations. It is not necessary for the Government to prove each and every false representation alleged to have been made. Rather, to establish the existence of the scheme to defraud charged, it is only necessary that the proof show beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant made, or caused to be made one false representation.”