Court Opinion

ID: 9595869
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:43:51.222778+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:45.658064
License: Public Domain

Goolsby, Judge
(concurring and dissenting):
Like the majority, I view the complaint at issue here as failing to allege a cause of action for the tort of outrage. I otherwise dissent, but respectfully so.
*70At the center of this controversy is a “residence” purchased by the respondent H. Harold Gainey and occupied by the appellant Bonnie J. Dye during a time Gainey and Dye allegedly engaged in a “personal relationship”
I would not reach the question of whether Dye stated facts sufficient to constitute causes of action against Gainey for a constructive trust and for promissory or equitable estoppel. Another unappealed alternative ground supports the judgment below regarding these two causes of action. The trial court cited the defense of unclean hands in barring Dye’s claims and nowhere in her brief does Dye attack this ruling.1 See Charleston County Sch. Dist. v. South Carolina State Dairy Comm’n, 274 S.C. 250, 262 S.E. (2d) 901 (1980) (a party who does not appeal from an adverse decision is bound by the decision); Burton v. County of Abbeville, 312 S.C. 359, 440 S.E. (2d) 396 (Ct. App. 1994) (an unchallenged ruling by the trial court is the law of the case); Dwyer v. Tom Jenkins Realty, Inc., 289 S.C. 118, 344 S.E. (2d) 886 (Ct. App. 1986) (unchallenged alternative findings can support a judgment); 76 Am. Jur. (2d) Trusts § 710, at 695-96 (1992) (“A plaintiff seeking the imposition of a constructive trust must escape the defense of unclean hands. . . .”); cf. Stauffer v. Stauffer, 351 A. (2d) 236, 244 (Pa. 1976) (“The bar of unclean hands is applicable .. . only where the wrongdoing of the plaintiff directly affects the equitable relationship subsisting between the parties and is directly connected with the matter in controversy.”).
The majority in a footnote discounts Dye’s failure to appeal the trial court’s reliance on the doctrine of unclean hands, implying this reliance was improper because Gainey had not yet filed a responsive pleading and never raised the doctrine as an affirmative defense. Even if, however, the trial court erred in prematurely dismissing Dye’s causes of action for constructive trust and estoppel on an unpled affirmative defense, Dye’s failure to make this point in her appellant’s brief precludes *71this court from addressing it on appeal. See Mack v. Edens, 306 S.C. 433, 436, n. 1, 412 S.E. (2d) 431, 433, n. 1 Ct. App. 1991), cert. denied, May 6, 1992 (“Although a court may not enter judgment on a ground that was neither pleaded nor proved by the party having the affirmative of the issue, [the appellant] did not raise this error by an exception on appeal. Therefore, we do not address it.”).
In any event, Dye bases her effort to acquire the residence from which Gainey allegedly evicted her on the allegation that she and Gainey maintained a “confidential relationship” from March 13, 1989, until December 24, 1993, the date Gainey allegedly ousted her. According to her complaint, Dye was married during 1989, and most of 1990, the year she divorced her husband. The complaint suggests Gainey was also married during the entire period.
Unlike the majority, I am not prepared to hold an adulterous,2 “personal relationship” involving cohabitants who are both lawfully married to others can constitute a “confidential relationship” so as to permit the imposition of a constructive trust or the plea of estoppel in an action brought by one party to the relationship against the other for a share of property acquired by the other during their illicit cohabitation. To make Gainey, a married man, subject to the financial claims of Dye, who was also married during most of the time she and Gainey cohabitated together, would offend this State’s public policy and would encumber the property rights and standard *72of living of Gainey’s lawful wife. See S.C. Code Ann. § 16-15-60 (1976) (statute declaring adultery and fornication a crime); § 16-15-70 (statute defining “adultery”); Peoples Nat’l Bank v. Manos Bros., Inc., 266 S.C. 257, 283, 84 S.E. (2d) 857, 870 (1954) (“The doctrine of estoppel cannot be invoked to thwart the public policy of the State thus declared.”); Thomas v. LaRosa, 400 S.E. (2d) 809 (W.Va. 1990) (wherein the court disallowed a financial claim of an unmarried cohabitant against a married cohabitant based on their adulterous relationship because the claim would adversely impact the property rights of the married cohabitant’s spouse and the support rights of the married cohabitant’s children).
I would affirm.

 In her reply brief, Dye criticizes Gainey’s reference in his brief to the doctrine of unclean hands; however, at no point does she ever extend her criticism to the trial court’s reliance on this ground. At any rate, this argument comes too late to constitute a ground for reversal. See Rule 207(b)(1)(B), SCACR (“Ordinarily, no point will be considered which is not set forth in the statement of the issues on appeal.”); Bochette v. Bochette, 300 S.C. 109, 386 S.E. (2d) 475 (Ct. App. 1989) (an appellant may not use the reply brief or oral argument to argue issues not argued in the appellant’s brief).

 In her complaint, Dye alleges she “provided various services for [Gainey], including personal companionship, advice, entertainment, and consortium.” She further alleges Gainey “assured her that he was going to obtain a divorce and marry [her],” “[Gainey] spent endless days, weeks, and months with [her]” at the home that she alleges Gainey purchased for her, and “[she and Gainey] spent untold times together at [Gainey’s] beach home, taking annual vacations and otherwise seeing each other on a constant and continuing basis.” Not suprisingly, the trial court found the relationship between Dye and Gainey was adulterous. See Prevatte v. Prevatte, 297 S.C. 345, 351, 377 S.E. (2d) 114, 118 (Ct. App. 1989) (“A finding of adultery is allowed where there is evidence of both the opportunity to commit adultery and the disposition to commit adultery. . . . For example, where a married man is observed going upstairs in a bawdyhouse, unless something to the contrary appears, no other evidence is required to warrant a finding of adultery.”). Because Dye offers no challenge to that finding on appeal, it becomes the law of the ease. See Stone v. Salley, 244 S.C. 531, 137 S.E. (2d) 788 (1964) (the unappealed portion of a trial court’s judgment presents no issue for determination by the reviewing court and constitutes to such extent the law of the case).