Court Opinion

ID: 9576646
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:26:46.704629+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:11:04.505126
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Presiding Judge,
concurring specially.
I concur for the reason that the record does not establish that defendant was aware of the consequences of trial without counsel, trial with self-representation. Waiver of the constitutional right to counsel must be “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege. ... [It must be] an intelligent waiver.”2 In order for the waiver to be intelligent, defendant must be aware of the right to counsel in the first place, which as described below is evident of record. In that regard I differ with the majority opinion. But the right-waiving defendant must also be aware of “the dangers of proceeding without counsel.”3 As to that, I agree with the majority; there is nothing in the record to show that he understood the consequences of proceeding through a jury trial without professional assistance. The court did not so inform him and, according to the record, he had not been through a trial before. His prior convictions were all based on guilty pleas, so far as I can tell, so he would not have had personal trial experience.
As to his knowledge of the right to appointed counsel, as well as of the nature of the charge, the difference between the offenses of possession and possession with intent to distribute, and the potential penalty, defendant’s prior experience conveyed this to him. Heard had four prior drug convictions, including a recent one on the same charge:
* 1985 drug offense — record does not show whether trial or plea; probation in this 1985 case was revoked in next case, revoked portion to be served concurrent with that next one.
* November 17, 1989 possession of cocaine — guilty plea with appointed counsel entered June 4, 1990. Sentenced to five years, serve six months, balance probated plus fine. (As stated above, court also revoked probation on the 1985 case and permitted service to be concurrent.)
* December 5, 1990 possession of cocaine — guilty plea with appointed counsel entered February 15, 1991. Sentenced to five years, serve three, balance probated. Revoked probation on the 1989-1990 case and permitted service to be concurrent.4
*628* January 18, 1997 possession of cocaine with intent to distribute — negotiated guilty plea with employed counsel entered June 6, 1997. Sentenced to five years to serve.
The current possession with intent to distribute occurred on October 30, 1995, after Heard served time for the 1990 possession and before the 1997 identical offense to which he pleaded guilty in advance of the trial in this instant case. That 1997 identical offense occurred while he was out on bond in this case, two months after he was arraigned pro se in this case and had told the court he would hire an attorney. He failed to appear for trial in this case on May 12, 1997, but a few weeks later pleaded guilty to the identical 1997 charge.
Since at the time of the trial in this case Heard had previously pleaded guilty to the identical charge with counsel, he knew the maximum penalty, the nature of the charge, his right to counsel and other trial rights. This is shown by the guilty plea transcripts, wherein the court so informed him. Background, experience and conduct are particular relevant facts and circumstances in determining whether there is a waiver.5 In addition, the court did tell the jury in his presence at the very beginning of this trial that every defendant has a right to an attorney but also a right to represent himself and if he chooses to represent himself that should not be held against him. Defendant sat silent.
Heard started out with an attorney in this case, who appeared with him at the commitment hearing and again to set bond. He did not obtain new counsel, although he announced he would, from the date of arraignment November 13, 1996, to time of trial January 12, 1998, even though he was at liberty until about the end of May 1997. He knew enough to insist on a speedy trial by filing a demand for such himself, even citing the applicable statute, OCGA § 17-7-170.
At the time of this trial Heard was 36 years old, had an eleventh grade education, and could read and write. He received discovery from the state. He announced at the call of the case for trial that he was unrepresented by counsel, had previously had counsel, and would represent himself.
It is abundantly evident that Heard knew he had a right to counsel. But there is nothing to show he knew the consequences of proceeding alone. And he took very little active part in defending himself, other than participating in the voir dire, listening, and making a closing argument. After the jury found him guilty, the State offered evidence in aggravation of punishment but Heard had nothing to say *629and offered no mitigating circumstances. He made no opening statement, although the State did. He did not cross-examine the witnesses or challenge any exhibits, and he did not present any defense or request any jury charge. We do not know the nature of his closing argument because it was not reported. The trial in effect constituted a guilty plea. The court did not make a record to show that the defendant knew about the potential dangers of representing himself at a jury trial.
Decided February 23, 1999.
Saia, Richardson & Meinken, Joseph J. Saia, for appellant.
William T McBroom III, District Attorney, James E. Hardin, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
I concur only because the record does not affirmatively show that defendant waived appointed counsel based on a knowledge of all the relevant factors.6
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Pope joins in this special concurrence.

 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 464-(58 SC 1019, 82 LE 1461) (1937).

 Clarke v. Zant, 247 Ga. 194, 197 (275 SE2d 49) (1981); Rutledge v. State, 224 Ga. App. 666, 670 (3) (482 SE2d 403) (1997).

 This crime occurred six months after he received a five-year sentence with six months to serve.

 Taylor v. Ricketts, 239 Ga. 501, 503 (238 SE2d 52) (1977), citing Johnson v. Zerbst, supra.

 See Rutledge v. State, supra at 669 (3), which recites once again what it is defendant must know in order for the waiver of the right to counsel to be “knowing” and “intelligent.”