Court Opinion

ID: 9824708
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 11:10:09.871999+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:39:59.410309
License: Public Domain

HARWOOD, Judge.
Appellant was indicted for murder in the first degree. Her jury trial resulted in a verdict of guilty of manslaughter in the first degree and a penalty of imprisonment in the State penitentiary for a term of ten years.
Appellant was the wife of deceased, having been married to him about eight years.
The state’s evidence tends to show that on 31 January 1947, the appellant stabbed the deceased in the lower part of the neck with a pocket knife, from which wound the deceased died within a few minutes.
According to the testimony of state’s witness, Frank Cornelius, who was a visitor in the home of appellant and deceased a short while before the stabbing, the appellant and deceased had become embroiled in an argument. The deceased had threatened to hurt appellant and she had threattened him by stating she could beat him cutting. Appellant had an open knife in the fold of her sweater at this time.
Cornelius left the house and walked a short distance away. He was engaged for about five minutes in conversation with two acquaintances when he heard the deceased say “you done cut me.” He- then saw appellant lead the deceased out of their back door and place him on the porch of a nearby house. Appellant then began hollering “Oh, somebody done killed my husband.”
When the coroner arrived he found the deceased on the porch dead. A trail of blood ran from the porch on which deceased was lying to the kitchen of deceased’s home.
Appellant told the officers that Frank Cornelius had killed her husband.
The next morning however the appellant made a voluntary written statement admitting that she had stabbed the deceased on the night in question.
Testifying in her own behalf the appellant gave testimony which if believed by the jury under the required rule tended to establish self defense. '
In the indictment, which is in Code form for murder in the first degree, this appellant is designated as Joseph Levert, instead of Josephine Levert, and the deceased is designated as Epriam Levert, alias Ephron Levert.
The evidence is clear that appellant’s name is Josephine Levert. However, the accused plead not guilty to the indict*526ment without interposing any appropriate objection. By such action she consented to the jurisdiction of the court below, and an alleged mistake in her given name will not, under such conditions, be considered on appeal. Benton v. State, 24 Ala.App. 441, 136 So. 428; Bryant v. State, 28 Ala.App. 363, 184 So. 288.
The deceased is referred to as Ephriam in the testimony of the witnesses. However in the written confession signed by the appellant the deceased is referred to as Ephron. Merely leaving the “h” out of Ephriam in no way tended to mislead, or leave in doubt to a person of common understanding who appellant was charged with killing. In addition, whether one name .is idem sonans with another, notwithstanding a difference in the spelling of the two, is a question of fact for the jury when it arises on the evidence under a p'lea of the general issue, and not a matter of law for the court. Frazer v. State, 29 Ala.App. 204, 195 So. 287; Espey v. State, 31 Ala. App. 351, 17 So.2d 430; McCoy v. State, 232 Ala. 104, 166 So. 769.
Mr. T. J. McCollum, deputy coroner of Jefferson County, testified that he had been deputy coroner for about sixteen years, was a licensed embalmer, and had been an undertaker for forty years. During this time he has examined hundreds of bodies, and estimated he had examined between two' and three hundred bodies where death had resulted from knife wounds.
Under this predicate it is clear that this witness was competent to express an opinion that deceased’s death resulted from the wound inflicted by appellant, and was also competent to testify as to the location of arteries near or in the wound. Phillips v. State, 248 Ala. 510, 28 So.2d 542; Gunn v. State, 24 Ala.App. 494, 136 So. 870.
Over the objection of appellant the clothes worn by her on the night of the killing, which had on them stains appearing to be blood were received in evidence. Likewise, a pocket knife taken that night by the coroner from the hip pocket of the deceased. The knife did not appear to have - any stains on it.
No error resulted from the admission into evidence of these articles.
Under appellant’s claim of self defense these articles shed light on a material inquiry and tended to throw light on the transaction at issue. They were therefore material and relevant evidence in this cause. Moore v. State, 30 Ala.App. 552, 9 So.2d 146; Allford v. State, 31 Ala.App. 62, 12 So.2d 404; Hicks v. State, 247 Ala. 439, 25 So.2d 139.
During the examination of the witness Cornelius he testified that he had bought some whiskey from the appellant while he visited there on the night of the affray.
On motion of appellant this testimony was excluded and the court instructed the jury not to consider it.
Cornelius then testified that he and Josephine drank some liquor that night, and in connection with how much he drank the record shows the following:
“Q. How much did you drink? A. Well, I drank a dollar shot.
“Q. How much did Josephine drink?
“Mr. Ewing: We move to exclude that.
“The Court: Overruled.
“Mr. Ewing: We except.”
We assume the motion to exclude “that” was aimed at the answer preceding the question “How much did Josephine drink?” The motion is unsupported by any assigned grounds. It is therefore insufficient to justify a reversal based on the ruling of the court in the premise. Ellison v. State, Ala.App., 34 So.2d 185; Walker v. Jones, Ala.Sup., 34 So.2d 614.
In view of the court’s rulings and instructions to the jury in connection with Cornelius’ testimony, and the abundance of evidence tending to justify the verdict of guilty rendered in this case, we are unwilling to say that the jury disregarded the court’s instructions and' that the. verdict resulted from passion and prejudice engendered during Cornelius’ examination.
The verdict rendered by the jury in this, case and on which the judgment was based read as follows:
“We, the jury, find the defendant guilty of first degree manslaughter and penalty fixed at 10 years in the penitentiary. W„ D. Banks, Foreman.”
*527 It is clear from the language of the above verdict that it was the intention •of the jury to find the defendant guilty of manslaughter in the first degree and fix her punishment at imprisonment in the penitentiary for a term of ten years. It was in our opinion amply sufficient to support the judgment entered. Strict adherence to form or language in the rendition of verdicts by petit juries is not required.
There is no merit in appellant’s contention that the verdict is insufficient to support the judgment entered in this case.
The evidence below presented a ■question of fact for the jury. The state’s ■evidence clearly tended to support the verdict rendered. No error therefore resulted from the court’s refusal of appellant’s written request .for the affirmative charge.
Likewise no error resulted from the court’s refusal of appellant’s written requested charge No. 4. This charge is misleading, confused, and not predicated on the evidence.
Other points are argued in appellant’s brief. The court’s rulings in connection therewith are however so palpably correct and based on principles long settled by cases in this jurisdiction that we have omitted discussion thereof.
Affirmed.