Court Opinion

ID: 9480792
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:58:17.977697+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:47:54.256033
License: Public Domain

NATHANIEL R. JONES, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
The majority takes great pains to state that it is not “legislating from the bench” and that any remedy for reimbursement of the expenses of the official creditors committees “should be supplied by Congress, not the court.” However, when interpreting a Bankruptcy Code which is silent with respect to the reimbursement of such expenses, a court must formulate a rule which it believes most comports with the intent of Congress. It is a “red herring” and perhaps a bit disingenuous to suggest that allowance of reimbursement of expenses by official creditors committees is “legislating” while denial of such expenses is “interpreting.” The real question is which is the better interpretation.
I believe that the proper interpretation is allowance of reimbursement under section 503(b)(1)(A). The longstanding practice of such reimbursement under the old Bankruptcy Act, and the floor debate suggesting that the reimbursement continue, is indicative of Congressional intent. After all, we must interpret the Code not in a vacuum, but in the context of the many years of experience under the Act. Official committees had been reimbursed for years. Thus, it is an anomalous interpretation to suggest that the unofficial committees could now receive reimbursement under the Code for “substantial contribution” to the estate, while official committees no longer could receive any reimbursement. In addition, the use of the word “including” in section 503(b)(1)(A), which is not a word of limitation, gives some flexibility to bankruptcy courts in deciding which expenses are “actual, necessary costs and expenses of preserving the estate.” The majority’s reading of the Code is contrary to the best indication of Congressional intent that we can find — Congress’ construction of “including” as “not limiting” in section 102(3) of the Code. What other purpose did Congress have in mind in using the word “including” but to give leeway to courts in allowing “actual and necessary expenses”?
The majority notes that “[t]he decision as to what participants in the bankruptcy process may receive compensation is in the hands of Congress ...” The truth of this proposition is not in doubt. However, when Congress fails to explicitly either allow and disallow a specific compensation, it is up to the courts to interpret the law. In my opinion, a broad interpretation of the law is more in line with Congressional intent and the plain meaning of the word “including” in section 503(b)(1)(A).
ORDER
Nov. 30, 1990.
Before: JONES and MILBURN, Circuit Judges; and CONTIE, Senior Circuit Judge.
The petition of appellant, the official unsecured creditors’ committee of the George Worthington Co., for a rehearing is granted. The court will make final disposition of the case without reargument. The panel’s opinion of September 12, 1990, affirming the district court’s denial of reimbursement of administrative expenses to the official unsecured creditors’ committee of the George Worthington Co., is hereby vacated.