Court Opinion

ID: 9445636
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 21:34:54.462489+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:30:21.409778
License: Public Domain

*759EDGERTON, Chief Judge
(dissenting).
Officers arrested Clifford Reed, for whom they had a warrant, about 1:35 a. m. March 26, 1955. He told them he had been buying narcotics from appellant Shepherd who got them from appellants Miller and Byrd. The police arranged with Reed that he would make a purchase from Shepherd. About 3 a. m. Reed, in the presence of a narcotics agent, handed Shepherd marked money which the agent supplied. Under police surveillance, Shepherd then went to 1337 Columbia Road N. W. and entered the basement. After he came out and got into a cab, the police stopped it and saw him put something under its front seat. They found narcotics there, and also found that Shepherd no longer had the marked money.
The officers then went to the basement apartment at 1337 Columbia Road, which was occupied by appellants Miller and Byrd. One of the officers testified: “Officer Wurms knocked on the door and a voice from inside asked ‘Who is there?’ Officer Wurms repeated the name ‘Blue,’ called ‘Blue’ [a name by which Miller was known]. Then he said in a very low voice, ‘Police’. The door was opened slightly, and it had a chain lock on it, and as the door was opened the man looked around the door, he tried to close the door. * * * he didn’t want to let us in. * * * We forced the door open and forced our way Into the room. * * I believe the chain latch on the door was broken.” The officers immediately arrested Miller and Byrd in the apartment. They took seme of the marked money from Byrd, searched the apartment, and found the rest of the money.
Miller and Byrd moved to suppress the money as evidence. The motion was overruled. Shepherd, Miller, and Byrd were all tried together and convicted.
In my opinion the search of the apartment was illegal and the motion to suppress should have been granted. The officers had no warrant of any sort. In my opinion they had no sufficient reason to suppose the evidence, which was money, would be destroyed if they waited till morning and got a warrant. “Where, as here, officers are not responding to an emergency, there must be compelling reasons to justify the absence of a search warrant.” McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 454, 69 S.Ct. 191, 193.
The arrests of Miller and Byrd do not excuse the search. “Of course, a search without warrant incident to an arrest is dependent initially on a valid arrest.” United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 60, 70 S.Ct. 430, 432. The arrests of Miller and Byrd were illegal for two reasons, even if the officers had probable cause to believe them guilty. (1) “Unless the necessities of the moment require that the officer break down a door, he cannot do so without a warrant; and if in reasonable contemplation there is opportunity to get a warrant, or the arrest could as well be made by some other method, the outer door to a dwelling cannot be broken to make an arrest without a warrant. The right to break open a door to make an arrest requires something more than the mere right to arrest. If nothing additional were required, a man’s right of privacy in his home would be no more than his rights on the street; and the right to arrest without a warrant would be precisely the same as the right to arrest with a warrant. The law is otherwise.” Accarino v. United States, 85 U.S.App.D.C. 394, 402, 179 F.2d 456, 464. McKnight v. United States, 87 U.S.App.D.C. 151, 152, 183 F.2d 977, 978. (2) Just as in Accarino, the officers did not make known their reason for demanding entry but merely identified themselves as police. One of the officers testified that Miller “wanted to know what we were doing there,” but it does not appear that they answered the question. I find no evidence, and the court cites no evidence, that supports an inference that Miller even recognized the officers as the narcotics squad.1 As we *760held in Accarino, “Before an officer can break open a door to a home, he must make known the cause of his demand for entry. There is no claim * * * that the officers advised the suspect of the cause of their demand before they broke down the door. Upon that clear ground alone, the breaking of the door was unlawful, the presence of the officers in the apartment was unlawful, and so the arrest was unlawful.” 85 U.S.App.D.C. at page 403, 179 F.2d at page 465. Gatewood v. United States, 93 U.S.App.D.C. 226, 209 F.2d 789.
The denial of the motion of Miller and Byrd to suppress the illegally seized evidence was error that was prejudicial to Shepherd as well. His conviction as well as theirs should therefore be reversed. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456, 70 S.Ct. 430.

. I do not suggest that if he had recognized them they would have been relieved of the obligation to make known the cause of their demand for entry.