Court Opinion

ID: 9865379
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 16:33:29.892098+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:38:38.853412
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Bouck,
dissenting.
When the majority opinion was announced, my dissent therefrom was noted without giving my reasons, the *486available time not then permitting* the writing* of a dissenting opinion. In justice to the litigants, but more especially to the trial court which is to retry the case, I now restate in substance the arguments I made to my colleagues in conference.
1. The majority opinion lists what it calls the elementary constituents of fraud as follows: “(1) A false representation of a material existing* fact, or a representation as to a material existing fact made with a reckless disregard of its truth or falsity; or a concealment of a material existing fact, that in equity and good conscience should be disclosed. (2) Knowledge on the part of the one making the representation that it is false; or Tmoivledge that he is concealing a material fact that in equity and good conscience he should disclose. (3) Ignorance on the part of the one to whom representations are made or from ivhom such fact is concealed, of the falsity of the representation or of the existence of the fact concealed. (4) The representation or concealment made or practiced with the intention that it shall be acted upon. (5) Action on the representation or concealment resulting in damage.” (Italics are mine.) The opinion is obviously built up on the italicized portion of the statement, which deal with concealment. In support of the statement there is cited only one case, Wheeler v. Dunn, 13 Colo. 428, 22 Pae. 827. However, the Wheeler case is not authority therefor. It does not deal at all with concealment as the equivalent of a false representation. In fact, that case — -which, incidentaly, was a suit in equity for rescission and not an action of deceit — expressly adopts the well-recognized analysis of false representation as found in Bigelow on Frauds: “(1) A false representation. (2) Knowledge by the person who made it of its falsity. (3) Ignorance of its falsity by the person to whom it was made. (4) Intention that it should be acted upon. (5) Acting upon it, with damage.” The Wheeler opinion then proceeds: “An action at law for damage for deceit requires all these elements.” It then *487mentions that the requirements are less rigorous in equity. There is no doubt that in certain kinds of cases in equity — of which kinds the Wheeler case itself was not an instance — a concealment of facts would justify rescission. The case at bar, however, is purely an action at law. It is the ordinary tort action of deceit, that is, to recover damages for an alleged fraudulent representation. Indeed, the complaint here demands exemplary damages and a body execution, two remedies which are accorded by Colorado statute to actions at law only and among those to tort actions alone. ’35 C. S. A., vol. 2, page 1192, ch. 50, sec. 6; id., vol. 3, page 1085, ch. 73, sec. 74. The plain truth is that an unequivocal election of remedies was effected by bringing this action of deceit, and the plaintiff of course thereby waived her right to proceed in equity, whether for rescission or otherwise. Nothing' in the record before us leaves the slig’htest doubt on this point. The instructions given, as well as the instructions refused, clearly exclude altogether the contention that the case is in equity, or that there was fraudulent concealment within any recognized rule for the remedy here chosen.
Notwithstanding the sharp cleavage between equity cases and actions at law like the one under review, the majority opinion’s discussion of fraud proceeds wholly in relation to a form of fraud sometimes applying in equity. According to a familiar rule, then that discussion is therefore to be considered as mere dictum..
2. Alleged undisclosed insolvency of the Traylor corporation is mentioned in the opinion as if this, of itself, constitutes fraud here. The law is otherwise. 26 O. J. 1194, sec. 100, and cases cited. Nor was alleged undisclosed lack of ownership on the date of the contract either material or relevant. Exhibit 4 expressly provided that delivery of the stocks might be made on finally paying the balance of the purchase price. That balance was never paid. It is idle to speculate whether the plaintiff might have successfully sought rescission and re*488covered the portion already paid, for she deliberately affirmed the contract instead.
3. At all events, the evidence which will appear at the new trial, as applied to and measured by the particular allegations of the complaint itself, must be the determining factor in considering- the propriety of any instruction that may then be given or refused. We cannot prejudge the future situation by an academic declaration that such or such constitutes a technically correct or incorrect statement of the law, since it will be the duty of the trial court to declare the law actually applicable to the evidence in the trial then before it. It is presumed that the trial court, in performing that duty, will disregard any mere dictum of this or any other court.
In the light of what I have said above, I need not elaborate on other portions of the majority opinion. Personally, I am convinced that the judgment sustaining the verdict of the jury in the district court should have been affirmed.