Court Opinion

ID: 9605648
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:39:58.741019+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:29.497300
License: Public Domain

DON BURGESS, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The majority treats this as a “no evidence” summary *806judgment, as styled by the movants, even though the movants referenced and attached lengthy evidence in support of the motion.1
When determining whether undue influence exists in a particular case, the following factors are considered:
(1) the nature and type of the relationship existing between the testator, the contestants and the party accused of exerting such influence;
(2) the opportunities existing for the exertion of the type of influence or deception possessed or employed;
(3) the circumstances surrounding the drafting and execution of the testament;
(4) the existence of a fraudulent motive;
(5) whether there has been an habitual subjection of the testator to the control of another;
(6) the state of the testator’s mind at the time of the execution of the testament;
(7) the testator’s mental or physical incapacity to resist or the susceptibility of the testator’s mind to the type and extent of the influence exerted;
(8) words and acts of the testator;
(9) weakness of mind and body of the testator, whether produced by infirmities of age or by disease or otherwise;
(10) whether the testament executed is unnatural in its terms of disposition of property.
In re Estate of Graham, 69 S.W.3d 598, 609-10 (Tex. App. — Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.).
The majority, in the “Background” segment, alludes to the relationship between Ruth Irons and Hazel Butts and refers to an agreement between the ladies as to the dispositions of their respective estates, but this “Background” leaves out several relevant facts.2 They had lived together for many years and were lifelong Mends. Their permanent residence was in Beaumont, but for many years had spent then-summers in Maine. Neither had children but had an agreement that their combined estates would provide a “catastrophic fund” for the survivor. Upon the surviv- or’s death, the remaining estate would be divided among their respective families. *807As part of their estates, Ruth and Hazel owned an annuity through Sun America. After Ruth learned of her terminal illness, in keeping with their agreement, Ruth transferred her interest in the annuity to Hazel. As previously noted, Ruth died in 1996 in Maine and left her entire estate to Hazel. After Ruth’s death, Hazel exchanged the Sun America annuity for an annuity with American Enterprise and designated Ruth’s family as beneficiaries of that annuity. Hazel was diagnosed with terminal cancer in August of 1997 and decided to return to Maine to live out her remaining days. In October, 1997, Hazel changed the beneficiaries of the annuity to her family and friends and executed a will leaving her estate to Ruth’s family, thus fulfilling both ladies’ original intent. Hazel went from Beaumont to Maine with Evelyn Lee and in less than three weeks decided to execute a new will excluding Ruth’s family as beneficiaries and designating Ms. Lee, among others, as beneficiaries.
While Hazel was still in Beaumont, she was satisfied with the disposition of her estate and had nothing negative to say about Michael Stephenson. It was only after her move to Maine that she became irritated with Michael and changed her will. During this time, Hazel’s disease was progressing and she openly spoke of increasing weakness. Ms. Lee provided for her care and made the arrangements for the changing of Hazel’s will.
The contestant may prove these elements by circumstantial as well as direct evidence. Our Supreme Court stated in Rothermel v. Duncan, 369 S.W.2d 917, 922 (Tex. 1963):
The exertion of influence that was or became undue is usually a subtle thing and by its very nature usually involves an extended course of dealings and circumstances. Thus, it is settled that the elements establishing undue influence may be proved by what is known as circumstantial, as well as by direct, evidence. In the absence of direct evidence all of the circumstances shown or established by the evidence should be considered; and even though none of the circumstances standing alone would be sufficient to show the elements of undue influence, if when considered together they produce a reasonable belief that an influence was exerted that subverted or overpowered the mind of the [person] and resulted in the execution of the [document] in controversy, the evidence is sufficient to sustain such conclusion.
Id. (citation omitted). It is an ultimate question for the fact finder as to whether a beneficiary under a will exerted undue influence on a testator. See Green v. Earnest, 840 S.W.2d 119, 123 (Tex. App. — El Paso 1992, writ denied).
The jurors are in the best position to sift through the direct and circumstantial evidence presented concerning this subtle concept. The jury is vitally important in the determination of whether undue influence was exerted to the degree required and with the result alleged when probative evidence is introduced which tends to show undue influence.
Cobb v. Justice, 954 S.W.2d 162, 166 (Tex. App. — Waco 1997, pet. denied).
The contestants, in this case, have met their burden of showing there is more than a scintilla of evidence on each of the elements of undue influence to the point that a jury should decide the question. I would reverse the summary judgment and remand for a trial on the merits.

. It can be argued, from a policy standpoint, that such motions should be treated as a traditional summary judgment, as these "hybrid” motions tend to confuse where the burden is placed. The standard of review for a traditional summary judgment is well established. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); Black v. Victoria Lloyds Ins. Co., 797 S.W.2d 20, 23 (Tex. 1990). To prevail on summary judgment under rule 166a(c), a movant must establish that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); Cathey v. Booth, 900 S.W.2d 339, 341 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam). In reviewing a no-evidence summary judgment under rule 166a(i), a court applies the same legal sufficiency standard as in reviewing directed verdicts. See Stephan v. Baylor Med. Ctr. at Garland, 20 S.W.3d 880, 891 (Tex. App.— Dallas 2000, no pet.). The court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and disregards all contrary evidence and inferences. Id. If the nonmovant brings forth more than a scintilla of probative evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact, a no-evidence summary judgment is improper. Id. When analyzing both traditional and no-evidence summary judgments, a court considers the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. See General Mills Restaurants, Inc. v. Tex. Wings, Inc., 12 S.W.3d 827, 833 (Tex. App. — Dallas 2000, no pet.).

. Many of these facts may be opinions but, under Tex. R. Evid. 701 and 704, a lay witness may be permitted to express an opinion if it is rationally based on the perception of the witness and would be helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony or the determination of a fact in issue, including an ultimate fact. See Chase Commercial Corp. v. Datapoint Corp., 774 S.W.2d 359, 368 (Tex. App.— Dallas 1989, no writ).