Court Opinion

ID: 9580346
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:04:15.672988+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:13.587042
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Judge,
concurring specially.
1. I concur fully in Division 1.
2. As to Division 2, I agree that, according to Mosley v. Lynn, 172 Ga. 193 (157 SE 450) (1931), plaintiff need not prove that the daughter was “virtuous.” This is contained in the Court’s headnote 1. The confusion may stem from the summary which the Court gives at the end of that decision: “As a civil injury, the term denominates an injury to the parent which arises out of any unlawful sexual intercourse in which the child is induced to participate by the arts or wiles of the seducer. ‘Seduction, as a civil injury, may generally be defined as the act of a man in inducing a virtuous woman to commit unlawful sexual intercourse with him.’ ” (Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 203. The Court did not give the source of the quotation.
Although it is true that the plaintiff does not have to prove that the daughter was virtuous in order to prove seduction, the circumstances of the daughter are not irrelevant. The word “seduction” is not defined in the statute. Mosley defines it in this way: “Properly construed, the word ‘seduction’ as used in § 4466, has reference to any and all cases in which a child is led astray and her morals destroyed, uprooted and extirpated, her social standing damaged, and she is thereby rendered an unfit associate for other children in the family, and a debased member of society; . . .” Id. at 194 (1) (b). The Court uses the word “debauchery” instead of “seduction” in headnote 3 and “debauched” in lieu of “seduced” in headnote (1) (b). Even if the identical definition as given in 1930 would be given today, the jury would have to find that the defendant “seduced” this particular person.
The majority refers in Division 2 to the daughter as “the alleged *728victim” of the tort. This may be true in fact but it is not true in law. The victim of this tort is the parent. That is why the virtue of the daughter is not an element. Whether the daughter has a cause of action for a different tort is not an issue in this case. See Kite v. Brooks, 51 Ga. App. 531, 534 (181 SE 107) (1935).
Decided March 20, 1992
Reconsideration denied April 2, 1992
Weinstock & Scavo, Michael Weinstock, Hillard J. Quint, for appellant.
Harben & Hartley, Phillip L. Hartley, Martha M. Pearson, for appellee.
3. Since “false and fraudulent means” is not an element of the tort, it is irrelevant to consider, as the majority has done, whether there are genuine issues of material fact “which could lead a reasonable jury to conclude that Hill employed other ‘false and fraudulent’ means in his alleged seduction of her.” That is not an issue.