Court Opinion

ID: 9387670
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-18 17:07:39.318938+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:14.952076
License: Public Domain

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA            :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                         :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                         :
              v.                         :
                                         :
                                         :
 SAHEED O. SAUNDERS                      :
                                         :
                   Appellant             :   No. 404 EDA 2022

           Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 28, 2018
 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-51-CR-0009795-2008

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., NICHOLS, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.:                          FILED APRIL 18, 2023

     Saheed O. Saunders appeals from the order, entered in the Court of

Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, dismissing his first petition filed

pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-

9546. After review, we dismiss the appeal.

     On January 18, 2008, at approximately 8:00 p.m., Saunders and two

other men were standing together on Huntingdon Street in Philadelphia. The

victim owed one of the three men $400.00. The group robbed the victim,

emptying the victim’s pockets, where they found, inter alia, $700.00 in cash.

They then drove in the victim’s car to an ATM machine and attempted to

withdraw cash using the victim’s bank card. Next, they drove to Chalmers

Recreation Center, where they asked the victim to call his wife to determine

if there was cash in their home, to which she responded in the negative.

Thereafter, Saunders pistol-whipped the victim and the other two individuals
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searched the victim’s car for valuables, at which point they found half an ounce

of cocaine. The three men decided to leave, and the victim began to yell

threats at the three men. Saunders then stated that “he wasn’t getting shot

no more,” returned to the car and shot the victim twice. The next morning,

the group burned the victim’s car, with him inside, to destroy the evidence.1

       On March 8, 2013, Saunders was convicted by a jury of one count each

of second-degree murder, conspiracy to commit robbery, robbery, kidnapping,

and carrying a firearm without a license.        He was represented by David

Rudenstein, Esquire, at trial. The court imposed a mandatory sentence of life

in prison for the murder charge with all other sentences to run concurrently.

Saunders filed post-sentence motions, which the court denied on June 28,

2013. On appeal to this Court, Saunders judgment of sentence was affirmed.

See Commonwealth v. Saunders, 105 A.3d 783 (Pa. Super. 2014) (Table).

Saunders’ petition for allowance of appeal was denied by the Supreme Court

of Pennsylvania on December 31, 2014. See Commonwealth v. Saunders,

106 A.3d 725 (Pa. 2014) (Table). Saunders did not seek review in the United

States Supreme Court.         See U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 13 (“A petition for a writ of

certiorari seeking review of a judgment of a lower state court that is subject

to discretionary review by the state court of last resort is timely when it is

filed with the Clerk within 90 days after entry of the order denying

____________________________________________

1 See Trial Court Opinion, 10/1/12, at 2-4, for a thorough recitation of the
facts.

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discretionary review). Saunders’ judgment of sentence became final on March

31, 2015, and, thus, he had until March 31, 2016, to file any and all PCRA

petitions.

       On February 23, 2015, Saunders filed a timely pro se PCRA petition and

Mitchell Strutin, Esquire, was appointed as counsel. On October 29, 2015,

Attorney Strutin filed a Turner/Finley no-merit letter2 and requested leave

to withdraw. On December 21, 2015, the court dismissed Saunders pro se

petition and granted Attorney Strutin’s motion to withdraw as counsel.

Saunders filed an appeal on January 22, 2016 and, while that appeal was

pending, a second pro se PCRA petition. On April 6, 2016, Sanders’ second

pro se petition was dismissed due to Saunders’ pending appeal in this Court.

       On April 6, 2017, this Court vacated the order dismissing Saunders’ first

PCRA petition and remanded for the PCRA court to conduct an evidentiary

hearing on Saunders’ claim that trial counsel, Attorney Rudenstein, was

ineffective for failing to call alleged alibi witness Sherry Lockett, Saunders’

cousin.      This Court also directed that PCRA counsel be appointed and, if

counsel      deemed    necessary,      an      amended   petition   be   filed.   See

Commonwealth v. Saunders, 308 EDA 2018 (Pa. Super. filed April 6, 2017)

(unpublished memorandum decision).

____________________________________________

2Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth v.
Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988).

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       On May 17, 2017, the PCRA court appointed Earl Kauffman, Esquire,

who filed an amended PCRA petition reasserting Saunders’ ineffective

assistance of counsel claim.3 On March 28, 2018, the PCRA court held an

evidentiary hearing on the sole issue of trial counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness

for failing to call Sherry Lockett as an alibi witness. Following the hearing, the

Court dismissed Saunders’ petition.4 Saunders did not file an appeal.

       On July 26, 2018, Saunders filed a third pro se PCRA petition claiming

that Attorney Kauffman failed to file a requested appeal of the March 28, 2018

dismissal of his first PCRA petition, and sought reinstatement of his collateral

appeal rights, nunc pro tunc. On August 20, 2018, before the PCRA court

ruled on Saunders’ third pro se PCRA petition, Saunders’ filed a pro se notice

of appeal. At a status hearing on September 28, 2018 before the PCRA court,

Attorney Kauffman stated that he would withdraw the pending pro se appeal.

On October 3, 2018, this Court granted the motion to withdraw the appeal.

____________________________________________

3 In the amended PCRA petition, Attorney Kauffman also averred that
Saunders wished to add an illegality of sentencing claim under Miller v.
Alabama, 567 U.S. 406 (2012). However, Attorney Kauffman noted that he
would not raise this claim at an evidentiary hearing because Miller does not
apply to a defendant who is 18 or older.
4 At the evidentiary hearing, Lockett testified that the last time she saw
Saunders that night was between 6:30 p.m. and 7:00 p.m., see N.T.
Evidentiary Hearing, 3/28/18, at 12, at least an hour before the murder
occurred. See also PCRA Court Opinion, 4/13/22, at 12 (“Because [Lockett]
did not actually provide [Saunders] with an alibi, [Attorney Rudenstein] had
no reason to call [Lockett] as a witness, and could not have been ineffective
for failing to do so.”).

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       On November 30, 2018, Saunders filed, though Attorney Kauffman, an

amended third PCRA petition requesting that his rights to appeal the March

28, 2018 dismissal of his first PCRA petition be reinstated, nunc pro tunc,

because Attorney Kauffman did not file Saunders’ requested appeal.         The

amended PCRA petition concedes, “[Saunders] advised counsel he wished to

appeal.” PCRA Petition, 11/30/2018, at 2. On December 7, 2018, the PCRA

court granted Saunders relief and, through Attorney Kauffman,5 Saunders

filed a notice of appeal, nunc pro tunc.

       On October 21, 2019, this Court dismissed Saunders’ appeal, finding

that his amended third pro se petition was untimely and therefore, the PCRA

court lacked jurisdiction to reinstate his right to appeal the dismissal of his

first pro se petition. See Commonwealth v. Saunders, 28 EDA 2019 (Pa.

Super. filed October 21, 2019) (unpublished memorandum decision). This

Court reasoned that pursuant to Commonwealth v. Ballance, 203 A.3d

1027 (Pa. Super. 2019), Saunders was required, but failed to, plead and prove

any of the timeliness exceptions in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). This

Court also permitted Attorney Kauffman to withdraw.

       Saunders filed a fourth pro se PCRA petition on November 15, 2019,

wherein he again requested reinstatement of his right to appeal the dismissal
____________________________________________

5 Although Saunders was still represented by Attorney Kauffman on appeal
and counsel could not raise his own ineffectiveness, “a defendant [who wishes]
to assert claims that PCRA counsel was ineffective can request to have new
counsel appointed to permit the assertion of such claims or can seek to
represent himself.” Commonwealth v. Stahl, 2023 PA Super 17, --- A.3d -
--, *3 (Pa. Super. 2023).

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of his first pro se PCRA petition and raised an ineffective assistance of counsel

claim based on Attorney Kauffman’s failure to file an appeal.          Saunders

claimed it was not until October 3, 2018 that he learned Attorney Kauffman

did not file an appeal of the PCRA court’s dismissal of Saunders’ first petition

and, thus, he met a timeliness exception. James Berardinelli, Esquire, was

appointed as PCRA counsel on July 24, 2020, but moved to withdraw on

September 1, 2020.         On September 18, 2020, Attorney Berardinelli was

relieved, and on September 22, 2020, the court appointed Coley Reynolds,

Esquire, as PCRA counsel.

       On April 5, 2021, Saunders filed a motion to proceed pro se. However,

before the court could rule on his motion, Saunders retained Teri Himebaugh,

Esquire, as counsel.       On December 1, 2021, Attorney Himebaugh filed an

amended fourth petition, raising claims of police misconduct and Brady6

violations and seeking reinstatement of Saunders’ right to appeal from the

March 28, 2018 dismissal of his first PCRA petition. Upon finding that it had

jurisdiction due to the newly-discovered fact exception to the PCRA time bar,

the PCRA court reinstated Saunders’ rights to appeal, nunc pro tunc, the

dismissal of his first PCRA petition.

____________________________________________

6 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (holding “the suppression by the
prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due
process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment,
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution”).

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      On December 18, 2021, Saunders filed a nunc pro tunc appeal from the

PCRA court’s December 21, 2015 order dismissing his first petition. However,

that order had already been vacated and the case remanded for an evidentiary

hearing. Thereafter, the docket was corrected to reflect that the appeal lies

from the March 28, 2018 order dismissing his first PCRA petition. Following

this correction, Saunders was directed to, and timely filed, a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)

concise statement of errors complained of on appeal.

      Saunders raises one question for our review: “Did the PCRA [c]ourt err

when it found that trial counsel was not ineffective, in violation of [Saunders’]

Sixth Amendment rights, for failing to present alibi witness Sherry Lockett?”

Appellant’s Brief, at 3.   Specifically, Saunders argues that the PCRA court

abused its discretion by not giving sufficient weight to the 2010 statement

Lockett made.    Saunders claims that the “last time [Lockett] had a clear

independent, personal memory of what took place was when she gave her

statement in 2010 to the private investigator.” Appellant’s Brief, at 19.

      However, “[b]efore [this Court] can address the merits of [this] issue,

[] we must determine if the PCRA court had jurisdiction to restore [Saunders’

collateral] appeal [rights] such that this appeal is properly before us for

review.” Ballance, supra at 1030-31. A petitioner must file a PCRA petition

within one year of the date his judgment of sentence becomes final. See 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1); id. at § 9545(b)(3) (stating that judgment of

sentence becomes final at conclusion of direct review or expiration of time for

seeking review). If a petitioner fails to file a PCRA petition within one year,

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he must plead and prove an exception to the one-year time bar listed in 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(i)-(iii).       This jurisdictional time bar is applied to all

petitions, including second or subsequent petitions. Ballance, supra at 1031.

       Here, Saunders’ judgment of sentence became final on March 31, 2015,

90 days after his petition for allowance of appeal was denied by the

Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Thus, he had one year, or until March 31, 2016,

to file any and all petitions. Id. The petition pursuant to which the PCRA

court granted the relief resulting in his nunc pro tunc appeal—Saunders’

fourth—was filed on November 15, 2019, almost four years after this

judgment of sentence became final. Thus, Saunders was required to plead

and prove a timeliness exception.

       Although Saunders’ fourth petition pleads an exception, he fails to prove

its merit. Saunders argues that “the Superior Court specifically stated in its

Order that the ‘new fact exception’ to the PCRA’s time-bar, 42 Pa.C.S.[A]. §

9545(b)(I)(ii), was applicable.”7 Fourth Amended PCRA Petition, 12/01/21, at

____________________________________________

7 In Saunders, 28 EDA 2019, while reviewing Saunders third PCRA petition,
this Court stated,

       The unjustified failure to file a requested appeal constitutes per se
       ineffectiveness. See Commonwealth v. Lantzy, 736 A.2d 654,
       572 (Pa. 1999). In Commonwealth v. Peterson, 192 A.3d 1123
       (Pa. 2018), our Supreme Court held that the petitioner's discovery
       of his counsel's per se ineffectiveness constituted a newly
       discovered ‘fact’ that satisfied the timeliness exception of section
       9545(b)(l)(ii), as the petitioner had pled applicability of the
       timeliness exception within 60 days of learning of his counsel's
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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6. Specifically, Saunders claims that he did not know Attorney Kauffman failed

to file a requested appeal of Saunders’ first PCRA petition following the March

28, 2018 evidentiary hearing until October 3, 2018. See Third Pro Se PCRA

Petition, 11/15/2019, at 11, 13 (unpaginated). Thus, Saunders claims he had

until October 3, 2019 to file a PCRA petition.

       Here, however, even accepting Saunders’ argument that counsel’s

ineffectiveness was a newly discovered fact, Saunders’ fourth petition, filed

on November 15, 2019, is still beyond his allotted time to file PCRA petition.

See 42 Pa.S.C.A. § 9545(b)(2) (“Any petition invoking a [timeliness

exception] in [42 Pa.S.C.A. § 9545(b)(1)] shall be filed within one year of the

date the claim could have been presented.”).8

____________________________________________

       ineffectiveness, and he demonstrated that he could not have
       discovered it sooner with the exercise of due diligence.

Id. at 10 n.5. We note that as of December 15, 2018, the 60-day time bar to
file a petition has been extended to one year. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b).
8  We are cognizant of our Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v.
Bradley, 261 A.3d 381 (Pa. 2021), where it determined that a petitioner is
permitted to raise claims of ineffective PCRA counsel at the first opportunity
to do so, even if on appeal. Id. at 401. However, Bradley does not create
an exception to the PCRA’s time bar. Id. at 404 n.18 (“We decline to adopt
[an] approach [] that would deem a petitioner’s ‘discovery’ of initial PCRA
counsel’s ineffective assistance to constitute a “new fact” that was unknown
to petitioner, allowing such petitioner to overcome, in a successive petition,
the PCRA’s time bar provision under the ‘new fact’ exception.”). See also
Stahl, supra at *4, citing Bradley, at 406 (Justice Dougherty concurring)
(“Importantly, our decision today does not create an exception to the PCRA’s
jurisdictional time-bar, such that a petitioner represented by the same counsel
in the PCRA court and on PCRA appeal could file an untimely successive PCRA
petition challenging initial PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness because it was his
’first opportunity to do so.’”).

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     Because Saunders failed to plead and prove a timeliness exception, the

PCRA court lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits of his petition.

Accordingly, the PCRA court’s reinstatement of Saunders’ collateral appeal

rights, nunc pro tunc, was in error. Ballance, supra.

     Appeal dismissed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 4/18/2023

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