Court Opinion

ID: 9691454
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 20:32:35.004701+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:20.193846
License: Public Domain

*981Caporale, J.,
concurring.
I write separately because the Nebraska Court of Appeals not only correctly reversed the judgment of the trial court, it properly remanded the cause for a new evidential hearing.
I respectfully suggest that our rule placing the burden upon an appellant to present a record which supports the errors assigned presupposes that the trial court fulfilled its duties to the appellant by, at a minimum, making available the record required by our rules. Here, the trial court failed in its duties not once, but twice.
Not only did the trial court not see to it that its reporter made the nonwaivable record required by Neb. Ct. R. of Prac. 5A(1) (rev. 1996), but after the reporter revealed on June 5, 1996, her dereliction in that regard, the trial court itself failed to supervise the preparation of and certify the bill of exceptions as required by rule 5B(3)c. It must be remembered, after all, that although under the provisions of rule 5B(l)a a copy of the request for the preparation of a bill of exceptions is to be delivered to the court reporter, the request is filed with the clerk of the trial court. An appellant ought not be required to request a bill of exceptions from a trial court more than once.
I understand that, here, the Court of Appeals entered a show cause order, which the appellants ignored. But by the time of its January 13, 1998, opinion, the trial court judge presiding over the summary judgment proceeding was no longer available to fulfill the requirements of rule 5B(3)c. (Nebraska Supreme Court order of November 5,1997, regarding suspension of John C. Whitehead, a district court judge.)
The only valid response the appellants could have made to the order to show cause was that they had filed a request for a bill of exceptions as required by rule 5B(l)a. I respectfully submit that under that circumstance, the Court of Appeals was free to conclude that the orderly administration of justice would be best served by, in effect, rescinding its order and remanding the cause for a new evidential hearing.