Court Opinion

ID: 9676455
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:24:53.981297+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:48.735688
License: Public Domain

Michael J. Kelly, P.J.
(concurring). Plaintiff relied heavily on the unanimous opinion of the Supreme Court in Lingle v Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc, 486 US —; 108 S Ct 1877; 100 L Ed 2d 410 (1988), in which Justice Stevens expressed the view of the Court that § 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 USC 185(a), preempts the application of state law in an action only if such application requires interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement. Plaintiff contends that the sole issue we need decide is "why Mr. DesJardins was not recalled.” Plaintiff claims it is because defendant discriminated against him due to his handicap.
Plaintiffs contention ignores the deposition testimony of a union representative which indicates that union and management representatives met many times to discuss putting plaintiff back to work. They met in the context of the recall provi*604sion of the collective bargaining agreement (§ 47) set out in the majority opinion. Without interpreting that section, which interpretation federal law preempts, where does plaintiff get standing to challenge defendant’s recall motivation? From analogy to its hiring practices? Does defendant have an independent duty to accommodate plaintiff under the Michigan Handicappers’ Civil Rights Act? If plaintiff walked in off the street would defendant have to find him a job he could do? I think not.
I concur because I believe the interpretation of the contract is "inextricably intertwined” with plaintiff’s handicapper claim and is therefore preempted by the lmra.