Court Opinion

ID: 9736056
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 18:42:01.134611+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:27:03.720080
License: Public Domain

HOLLOWELL, Bankruptcy Judge,
concurring.
I agree with the majority that Hoskins cannot assert an aiding and abetting claim under § 544(a)(2) because the estate has no claim against the Appellees. The rights of a hypothetical lien creditor are dependent on the rights of its debtor. Smith v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 421 F.3d 989, 1002 (9th Cir.2005) citing Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. v. Wagoner, 944 F.2d 114, 118 (2d Cir.1991). Here, because the deposits at issue were not made by Viola, the Citi defendants did not become the obligors of Viola.1 Certified Grocers, 150 Cal.App.3d at 286, 197 Cal.Rptr. 710 (“When a bank receives deposits, it becomes the debtor of the depositor and its implied contract with him is to discharge that indebtedness by honoring such checks as he may draw upon it; the bank is not entitled to debit his account with payments not made by his order or direction.”). Even if Viola had been the depositor, the facts do not indicate that Viola had a claim against the Appellees. Accordingly, the equitable remedies made available to a judgment creditor whose execution is returned unsatisfied, such as the right to bring a creditor’s bill, or seek a receivership, or bring an action for aiding and abetting, could not be exercised by Hoskins against the Ap-pellees.
If, however, Viola had a valid claim against the Appellees, then the holding in *11Williams v. Cal. 1st Bank, 859 F.2d 664 (9th Cir.1988), and its progeny, barring claims against third parties by a trustee would not apply. Smith, 421 F.3d at 1002 (“If the debtor suffered an injury, the trustee has standing to pursue a claim seeking to rectify such injury.”). For example, in such a case, defendants would not necessarily be able to assert an in pari delicto defense if state law bars such a defense against receivers. See Mosier v. Stonefield Josephson, Inc., 2011 WL 5075551, at *4 (C.D.Cal. Oct. 25, 2011). Nor, if the debtor had a claim, independent of the claims of its creditors, would a trustee be prohibited from pursuing the claim just because the creditors might have similar claims. In Smith, the court recognized that while acts of mismanagement by an insolvent corporation indirectly injured creditors, the trustee for the debtor corporation still had standing to bring an action for breach of duty or misconduct to the debtor. 421 F.3d at 1004.
There are other important rights a trustee may assert under § 544(a) which would be unavailable under § 544(b), such as defenses to a claim that the statute of limitations has expired. Collins v. Kohlberg & Co. (In re Sw. Supermarkets, LLC.), 325 B.R. 417, 427 (Bankr.D.Ariz.2005).
I note the differences between § 544(a) and (b) not because the majority’s analysis is incorrect. On the facts of this case, no other result is possible. Nevertheless, the difference between a trustee’s § 544(a) and (b) powers is worth noting because, depending on the facts of a particular case, that difference may significantly impact a trustee’s ability to recover assets.

. The deposits were either in the name of the Napolitano Trust or a Delaware “shell” corporation. While Viola had signing authority for the accounts, the Appellees were authorized "to honor withdrawals from an account on the signatures authorized by the signature card, which serves as a contract between the depositor for the handling of the account.” Certified Grocers of Cal., Ltd. v. San Gabriel Valley Bank,, 150 Cal.App.3d 281, 287, 197 Cal.Rptr. 710 (Cal.Ct.App.1983).