Court Opinion

ID: 9629208
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:39:06.918263+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:16.918202
License: Public Domain

RICHARDSON, J .
I concur in the judgment. Because of the close similarity in the applicable United States and California constitutional language, and to avoid insulating our decision from further review, I *278would rely on the federal due process clauses, and would apply recent and indistinguishable precedent of the United States Supreme Court. (See People v. Pettingill (1978) 21 Cal.3d 231, 254 [145 Cal.Rptr. 861, 578 P.2d 108] (dis. opn.); Serrano v. Priest (1976) 18 Cal.3d 728, 778 [135 Cal.Rptr. 345, 557 P.2d 929] (dis. opn.); People v. Disbrow (1976) 16 Cal.3d 101, 119 [127 Cal.Rptr. 360, 545 P.2d 272] (dis. opn.).)
When a state creates or recognizes rights and specifies the conditions of their forfeiture, it may not thereafter arbitrarily deny such rights. The state action must be guided by due process considerations. (Meachum v. Fano (1976) 427 U.S. 215, 225-226 [49 L.Ed.2d 451, 459-460, 96 S.Ct. 2532]; Wolff v. McDonnell (1974) 418 U.S. 539, 557-558 [41 L.Ed.2d 935, 951-952, 94 S.Ct. 2963]; see Morrisey v. Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471, 479, 482 [33 L.Ed.2d 484, 494-495, 92 S.Ct. 2593].)
Welfare and Institutions Code section 3053 permits exclusion from the benefits of CRC treatment for “excessive criminality or other relevant reason” rendering the patient unfit. As the majority quite properly observes, “the words ‘other relevant reason’ permit the Director [of the Narcotics Addict Evaluation Authority] broad discretion in making his decision, [but] that discretion is not unlimited.” (Ante, p. 266.) Procedural rights therefore arise under the federal Constitution. Upon similar facts, the Supreme Court has applied the interest-balancing test carefully described by the majority. (Wolff, supra, 418 U.S. at p. 560 [41 L.Ed.2d at p. 953]; Morrissey, supra, 408 U.S. at p. 481 [33 L.Ed.2d at p. 494]; see Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy (1961) 367 U.S. 886, 895 [6 L.Ed.2d 1230, 1236, 81 S.Ct. 1743].)
In my view, these authorities are dispositive, and we need not venture beyond them in deciding the instant case. Nor should we do so; recent Supreme Court decisions demonstrate understandable reluctance to recognize a generalized due process right against “arbitrary” governmental action. (See, e.g., Van Alstyne, Cracks in “The New Property”: Adjudicative Due Process in. the Administrative State (1977) 62 Cornell L.Rev. 445, 455 et seq.)
Clark, J., concurred.