Court Opinion

ID: 9375844
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-28 23:05:42.512359+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:01.706262
License: Public Domain

02/28/2023

                                          DA 20-0471
                                                                                           Case Number: DA 20-0471

              IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
                                          2023 MT 37N

STATE OF MONTANA,

               Plaintiff and Appellee,

         v.

STEVEN LEE STRIKE, Sr.,

               Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL FROM:           District Court of the Twelfth Judicial District,
                       In and For the County of Hill, Cause No. DC 19-95
                       Honorable Olivia Rieger, Presiding Judge

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

                For Appellant:

                       Caitlin Boland Aarab, Boland Aarab PLLP, Great Falls, Montana

                For Appellee:

                       Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Christine Hutchison,
                       Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana

                       Lacey Lincoln, Hill County Attorney, Timothy Jeffrey, Deputy County
                       Attorney, Havre, Montana

                                                   Submitted on Briefs: January 18, 2023

                                                              Decided: February 28, 2023

Filed:

                                 Vir-6A.-if
                       __________________________________________
                                         Clerk
Justice Ingrid Gustafson delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1     Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating

Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion, shall not be cited and does not serve

as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this Court’s

quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana Reports.

¶2     Steven Lee Strike, Sr. (Strike) appeals from the Judgment issued by the Twelfth

Judicial District Court on July 28, 2022, following his convictions for Aggravated

Burglary, Partner or Family Member Assault, and Violation of a No Contact Order,

claiming he received ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm in part, reverse in part,

and remand for further action consistent with this Opinion.

¶3     On June 18, 2019, the Hill County District Court issued a no contact order pursuant

to § 45-5-209, MCA, naming Strike’s former partner, Danae Infante (Infante), as the

protected person, and prohibiting Strike from contacting Infante or coming within 1,500

feet of her. After an altercation between Strike and Infante on June 29, 2019, Strike was

charged by Information on July 26, 2019, with two offenses: Partner or Family Member

Assault, a felony, in violation of § 45-5-206, MCA, and Burglary, a felony, in violation of

§ 45-6-204, MCA. The Burglary charge was premised on his commission, within an

occupied structure, of the offense of Violation of a No Contact Order in violation of

§ 45-5-209, MCA. Before trial, the District Court twice granted the State leave to amend

its Information, first to a single charge of Burglary, then, eight days before trial, to three

charges: Aggravated Burglary (Count I), Partner or Family Member Assault (Count II),

and Violation of a No Contact Order (Count III). Strike entered pleas of not guilty to all
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three charges in the Second Amended Information. After a jury trial on June 18, 2020,

Strike was convicted of all three charges and on July 28, 2020, the District Court issued its

Judgment and sentences for all three counts.

¶4     On appeal, Strike contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his

counsel, upon completion of the State’s case at trial, failed to move to dismiss Counts I and

II for insufficient evidence of bodily injury and, at sentencing, failed to object to restitution

amounts that were not substantiated by evidence in the record. The State argues Strike has

not demonstrated his counsel’s failure to move to dismiss Counts I and II for insufficient

evidence was ineffective under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052

(1984), because there was sufficient evidence of bodily injury for consideration by the jury

and for conviction. Regarding restitution, the State concedes the Judgment should be

vacated with regard to the restitution imposed and this matter should be remanded to the

District Court to address restitution.

¶5     This Court analyzes ineffective assistance of counsel claims under the two-part test

articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland. Whitlow v. State, 2008 MT

140, ¶ 10, 343 Mont. 90, 183 P.3d 861. “Under Strickland, a defendant bears the burden

of proving: ‘(1) that counsel’s performance was deficient; and (2) that counsel’s deficient

performance prejudiced the defense.’” State v. Ugalde, 2013 MT 308, ¶ 66, 372 Mont.

234, 311 P.3d 772 (quoting Whitlow, ¶ 10).

¶6     Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are mixed questions of law and fact,

which this Court reviews de novo. State v. Dineen, 2020 MT 193, ¶ 8, 400 Mont. 461, 469

P.3d 122 (citing Garding v. State, 2020 MT 163, ¶ 12, 400 Mont. 296, 466 P.3d 501).
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“Only record-based ineffective assistance of counsel claims are considered on direct

appeal.” Ugalde, ¶ 28 (citations omitted). “To the extent such claims are reviewable, they

present mixed questions of law and fact that we review de novo.” Ugalde, ¶ 28 (citations

and internal quotation marks omitted).

¶7     This Court reviews questions about the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal

matter to determine whether, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime

beyond a reasonable doubt. City of Helena v. Strobel, 2017 MT 55, ¶ 8, 387 Mont. 17, 390

P.3d 921 (citation omitted). Whether sufficient evidence existed to convict a defendant is

an application of the law to the facts, which we review de novo. Strobel, ¶ 8 (citation

omitted).

¶8     The appropriate measure of restitution is a question of law, which this Court reviews

for correctness. State v. Brave, 2016 MT 178, ¶ 6, 384 Mont. 169, 376 P.3d 139 (citing

State v. Aragon, 2014 MT 89, ¶ 9, 374 Mont. 391, 321 P.3d 841). We review a district

court’s finding of fact as to the amount of restitution for clear error, and a “factual finding

is clearly erroneous if it is not supported by substantial evidence, if the court

misapprehended the effect of the evidence, or if our review of the record convinces us that

the court made a mistake.” Brave, ¶ 6.

¶9     A person commits the offense of partner or family member assault (PFMA) if the

person purposely or knowingly causes bodily injury to a partner. Section 45-5-206(1)(a),

MCA.     “‘Bodily injury’ means physical pain, illness, or an impairment of physical

condition and includes mental illness or impairment.”           Section 45-2-101(5), MCA.
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“‘Partners’ means spouses, former spouses, persons who have a child in common, and

persons who have been or are currently in a dating or ongoing intimate relationship.”

Section 45-5-206(2)(b), MCA. Here, Strike was charged with assaulting his partner,

Infante. Thus, to convict Strike of PFMA, the State was required to prove Strike purposely

or knowingly caused bodily injury to Infante. Strike contests only the State’s proof of the

“bodily injury” element of the offense.

¶10    From our review of the record, sufficient evidence was presented by the State to

establish that Strike purposely or knowingly caused bodily injury to Infante. Infante gave

a prior statement to law enforcement at the scene that she did not suffer pain, but gave

conflicting and inconsistent testimony at trial, first characterizing the interaction between

herself and Strike as a chest bump. When asked by Strike’s counsel if she suffered any

pain she answered, “I don’t know. No.” On redirect by the State, she testified that she told

the responding officers she was not in physical pain, but to the State’s follow-up question

of, “[w]ere you actually in physical pain?” she answered, “[y]es.” During the State’s

case-in-chief, Valerie Moreni (Moreni) testified to hearing “loud thumps and someone

screaming” coming from Infante’s home on June 29, 2019, while Moreni was visiting and

smoking outside her mother’s home, who lived next door to Infante. Moreni said she saw

“a door open and [Infante] made it out on her hands and knees,” saw Infante “trying to

straddle out on her hands and knees,” and described seeing Strike “dragging her back in

and hitting her” before Infante “looked up and saw [Moreni] and screamed to call 911.”

Moreni testified that after she called 911, Strike left, and she then observed Infante had “[a]

couple of lumps on her head, her neck,” and was “crying and she was telling [Moreni] and
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[Moreni’s] mom she was in pain and how bad it hurt.” Although Infante presented

conflicting testimony as to whether she experienced bodily injury, the jury was free to

believe her testimony that she had suffered pain and disregard any contrary assertion by

her. The jury was also free to believe Moreni’s testimony of Infante crying and exclaiming

she was in pain as well as Moreni’s testimony as to her observations of lumps on Infante’s

neck and head from which the jury could infer Infante suffered bodily injury.

¶11    Strike relies on Strobel to support his argument that he received ineffective

assistance of counsel, but Strobel turned on legal issues not applicable in Strike’s case. In

Strobel, a recanting witness’s prior inconsistent statement rendered the evidence presented

insufficient as “[w]hile [a prior inconsistent] statement may be admitted as substantive

evidence, it is insufficient, standing alone, to prove a necessary element of a criminal

offense. Instead, prior inconsistent statements must be corroborated by other evidence in

order to sustain a conviction.” Strobel, ¶ 11 (internal citations omitted). Here, no witness

recanted a prior inconsistent statement. Although conflicting evidence was presented at

trial—the testimony of Infante at trial compared with her prior statements to law

enforcement—neither Infante nor Moreni recanted their prior statements. If anything, the

conflicting evidence presented at trial serves to underscore the correctness of the District

Court in putting the question of the element of bodily injury before a jury to decide.

¶12    Our review of the record shows Strike’s appeal ignores relevant and critical parts of

the trial testimony from Moreni and Infante—testimony that, while inconsistent and

conflicting, was sufficient evidence to put the element of bodily injury to a jury to decide.

Based on Moreni’s observations and Infante’s inconsistent testimony, a jury could
                                             6
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Infante experienced pain and bodily injury as a

result of Strike’s conduct. In light of the evidence presented by the State in its case-in-chief

at trial, Strike has failed to establish his counsel’s performance for failing to seek dismissal

for lack of sufficient evidence as to bodily injury was either deficient or prejudicial. As

such, we affirm Strike’s convictions as to Counts I and II.

¶13    Infante submitted an Affidavit of Victim’s Pecuniary Loss in which she requested

$895.00 in restitution for damage done to her property, including two kayaks, a windshield,

a driver’s side mirror, a washer, and a door. The Montana Department of Health and

Human Services (DPHHS) likewise submitted an Affidavit of Victim’s Pecuniary Loss

setting forth “Claims paid by Montana Medicaid for [] Infante,” seeking reimbursement of

$6,849.35 and indicating the date of incident to be December 10, 2019—but the date Strike

committed the PFMA against Infante was June 29, 2019. The District Court ordered Strike

to pay restitution of $8,518.79—the total claimed by Infante and DPHHS together with a

10% administration fee. Strike asserts there was no testimony at trial or sentencing

supporting the restitution amounts claimed or imposed. He asserts his counsel was

ineffective for failing to object to the claimed restitution and failing to cross-examine

Probation Officer Dibblee about the basis for these restitution requests and the

documentation that supports these requests. Johnson also faults his counsel for failing to

cross-examine Infante about the nexus between her alleged property damage and medical

expenses and Strike’s criminal conduct on June 29, 2019. Strike asserts as there is no

plausible justification for counsel’s failures with regard to the restitution issue, review of

Strike’s IAC claim on direct appeal is appropriate.
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¶14    The State asserts that while there are plausible justifications for Strike’s counsel’s

failure to object to some of the requested restitution, there is no plausible justification under

the facts of this case to fail to object to others. The State concedes this Court should vacate

the restitution imposed and remand this matter to the District Court for resentencing to

address the restitution amounts. We agree with the State and vacate the restitution amounts

imposed by the District Court and remand for resentencing to address the restitution

amounts.

¶15    We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of our

Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. In the opinion of the

Court, the case presents a question controlled by settled law or by the clear application of

applicable standards of review.

¶16    Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings in

accordance with this Opinion.

                                                    /S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON

We concur:

/S/ MIKE McGRATH
/S/ LAURIE McKINNON
/S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA
/S/ DIRK M. SANDEFUR

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