Court Opinion

ID: 9954356
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-25 22:15:48.468749+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:12:06.451056
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

 STATE OF WASHINGTON,                          No. 84771-6-I

                        Appellant,             DIVISION ONE

               v.
                                               UNPUBLISHED OPINION
 LUIS RUBEN IBARRA,

                       Respondent .

       SMITH, C.J. — Luis Ibarra, a registered nurse, was charged with and

convicted of rape in the second degree after he assaulted a patient while she

was nearly immobile and recovering from spinal surgery. He was sentenced to

102 months to life. On appeal, Ibarra asserts that the trial court erred in denying

his motion for mistrial based on irrelevant and prejudicial testimony by his ex-wife

and in determining that he opened the door to evidence that he had been

previously counseled or warned about sexual contact with patients. He also

alleges cumulative error and asks for the court to remand to strike a victim

penalty assessment, DNA1 collection fees, and community custody conditions.

       In a statement of additional grounds, Ibarra argues that the trial court

erred in improperly refusing to dismiss a juror and by placing improper time

restraints on the trial. Ibarra asserts ineffective assistance of counsel and a lack

of sufficient evidence to support his conviction. Finding the majority of his

       1 Deoxyribonucleic acid.
No. 84771-6-I/2

arguments unpersuasive we affirm the conviction, however, we remand for the

court to strike the victim penalty assessment, DNA collection fee, and community

custody conditions.

                                      FACTS

                                    Background

       In October 2020, Luis Ibarra was a registered nurse working in the

neuroscience-epilepsy unit of Swedish Hospital (Swedish) in Seattle,

Washington. The unit mostly houses patients receiving pre- or postoperative

care. I.W. was one such patient, recovering from spinal surgery. The surgery

was intensive, resulting in titanium screws in her spine and 17 staples in her back

to keep the incisions closed. I.W. needed assistance for even slight adjustments

in position. She was also in a significant amount of pain. Ibarra was I.W.’s night

nurse for the second night of her hospital stay.

       Over the course of the night, I.W.’s pain remained intense, despite having

received as much pain medication as was allowed. She informed Ibarra that the

medication was not working and Ibarra offered ice packs. I.W. declined. In the

early hours of the morning, she asked about additional medication but Ibarra

offered alternative methods instead. He began with aromatherapy, pinning

cotton balls soaked in orange oil to I.W.’s hospital gown, which smelled nice but

did not alleviate any pain. Ibarra then offered reflexology, which is a form of

massage that targets pressure points in the hands and feet. Ibarra was aware

that, per Swedish’s rules, he was prohibited from performing reflexology on a

patient without a third-party present. He nevertheless offered the massage and

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No. 84771-6-I/3

I.W. agreed. Ibarra massaged each hand which again failed to reduce I.W.’s

pain. Ibarra next offered a foot massage and I.W. agreed. Ibarra began by

putting lotion on I.W.’s left foot, before moving his hands all the way up her leg.

When Ibarra reached the top of I.W.’s left thigh, his hand bumped her groin. He

then moved to I.W.’s right foot, worked his way up her right leg, and when Ibarra

reached the top of I.W.’s right thigh, moved his hand between her legs, inserted

his fingers into her vagina, and began to rub her clitoris. He was not wearing

gloves. Eventually, Ibarra asked I.W. if she had an orgasm and she replied that

she had. I.W. later testified that she lied so he would stop touching her. Ibarra

then left the room.

       I.W. left the hospital a few days later and immediately began taking care of

her husband, three dogs, and a friend, despite remaining in acute pain. In early

November, as she started to more fully recover, I.W. started having “flashbacks”

of the experience. She took notes on these memories and, about three weeks

after the incident, called both the police and Swedish’s hospital security.

Swedish fired Ibarra in November 2020.

                           Arrest and Pre-Trial Motions

       In December 2020, the Seattle Police Department interviewed I.W. and

opened a case, assigning Detective Matt Atkinson as an investigator. Detective

Atkinson reached out to Ibarra, who went to the police station to be interviewed.

In contrast to I.W.’s account, Ibarra stated that he had not touched I.W.’s

genitals. He recounted that he had performed reflexology only on I.W.’s hands

and feet, never moving up her legs. Ibarra then described that, while he was

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No. 84771-6-I/4

touching her, I.W. masturbated herself to orgasm. He acknowledged that he did

not discourage the behavior, framing it as pain relief. Detective Atkinson

repeatedly asked Ibarra if he was telling the truth, noting the differences between

his description and I.W.’s account. Ibarra confirmed that he was telling the truth.

At the close of the interview, Detective Atkinson placed Ibarra under arrest for

rape in the second degree and indecent liberties.2

       Before trial, the State moved to admit another patient’s similar experience

with Ibarra under ER 404(b) as evidence of a common scheme or plan. This first

incident took place in 2005 at a different hospital and involved a patient alleging

that Ibarra inappropriately touched her genitals while checking a catheter

placement. Ibarra admitted to unprofessional behavior and his nursing license

was suspended but the patient did not press charges.

       The court initially ruled that the 2005 incident was admissible for the rape

charge because related sanctions tended to rebut Ibarra’s consent defense. The

court ruled that it was admissible for the indecent liberties charge as well to show

common scheme or plan and evidence of knowledge. The State later moved to

dismiss the indecent liberties charge3 and the court reevaluated whether to admit

the 2005 incident. On this second pass, the court ruled that the evidence was

       2  The indecent liberties charge arose out of a 2019 incident that had not
been investigated until after the 2020 allegation. This incident involved a patient
alleging that Ibarra had pinched her nipple during a massage while she was
recovering from surgery at Swedish.
       3 The State moved to dismiss the indecent liberties charge because the

patient from the 2019 incident was medically unavailable for the foreseeable
future and the State could not proceed without their testimony.

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No. 84771-6-I/5

not admissible to show a common scheme or plan but that the defense might

open the door to related evidence by presenting their own evidence of consent.

                                         Trial

       The case proceeded to trial in October 2022. While testifying in his own

defense, Ibarra gave a vastly different account of the incident than he did while

talking to the police. Ibarra stated that he offered reflexology as a “last resort,”

despite knowing that it violated hospital rules. He asserted that when he reached

I.W.’s groin, she told him to “go for it,” which he understood as a command to

touch her genitals. He then recounted touching I.W. as she had described, but

denied any penetration. He testified that after I.W. orgasmed, she thanked him

and promised it would stay “just between [them].” He also admitted that he had

lied to the police, stating that he did so to avoid being fired.

       Because Ibarra testified that he was aware he was not allowed to perform

reflexology without a third-party present, the State argued that he opened the

door to questions about any warnings or counseling he received following his

prior misconduct. Defense counsel objected, asserting that the evidence was not

relevant and was more prejudicial than probative. The court determined that

Ibarra had opened the door, but only as to warnings and counseling from the

hospitals, not patient allegations. The State proceeded to use evidence of prior

warnings to rebut Ibarra’s assertion of consent.

       Ibarra’s ex-wife Laura Ibarra testified.4 The State intended to use Laura’s

       4As the appellant and his ex-wife share the same last name, we will
address Laura by her first name. We intend no disrespect.

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No. 84771-6-I/6

testimony to establish that Ibarra had lied to the police about his interaction with

I.W. However, Laura’s responses to the questions presented by the State

involved seemingly irrelevant concerns about Ibarra’s relationship with his sons,

the large response law enforcement had mounted to find Ibarra, the fact that

Ibarra had been jailed, and that Ibarra had lied to the police about owning guns.

Defense counsel immediately objected to the statements and the court sustained

the objections. In a side-bar away from the jury, the court reprimanded the State

for eliciting the testimony. The State made clear that they had warned Laura

away from those statements and did not intend to produce the information.

Defense counsel moved for a mistrial, asserting that Ibarra was so prejudiced by

Laura’s statements that he required a new trial. The court denied the motion,

noting that the State did not intentionally elicit the evidence5 and that as the court

had immediately sustained any objections, the jury knew to disregard what they

heard.

         The jury found Ibarra guilty. The court sentenced Ibarra to 102 months to

life in prison. The court also waived most mandatory fees but imposed the then-

mandatory DNA collection fee and victim penalty assessment. It further required

Ibarra to submit to urine and breath analysis testing upon the request of his

corrections officer.

        At oral argument, the State argued briefly that it believed Laura’s
         5

testimony that Ibarra had lied about guns would be admissible. But the State
repeatedly asserted that it did not intend to elicit that evidence and had warned
Laura away from mentioning it. Given all of the State’s assertions, the former
does not constitute a concession that the State purposefully elicited the
testimony.

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No. 84771-6-I/7

       Ibarra appeals.

                                     ANALYSIS

                                 Motion for Mistrial

       Ibarra contends that the trial court erred in failing to grant a mistrial based

on several prejudicial and inadmissible statements during his ex-wife’s testimony.

He objected to the testimony at trial. The court did not err in denying the mistrial

because any irregularities were not serious and the statements were both

cumulative and able to be cured.

       We review a trial court’s denial of a motion for a mistrial for an abuse of

discretion. State v. Emery, 174 Wn.2d 741, 765, 278 P.3d 653 (2012). A trial

court abuses its discretion if its decision is manifestly unreasonable or exercised

on untenable grounds or for untenable reasons. State v. Lord, 161 Wn.2d 276,

283-84, 165 P.3d 1251 (2007). A mistrial is appropriate “ ‘only when the

defendant has been so prejudiced that nothing short of a new trial can insure that

the defendant will be tried fairly.’ ” State v. Rodriguez, 146 Wn.2d 260, 270, 45

P.3d 541 (2002) (quoting State v. Mak, 105 Wn.2d 692, 701, 718 P.2d 407, cert.

denied, 479 U.S. 995, 107 S. Ct. 599, 93 L. Ed. 2d 599 (1986)). The trial court is

in the best position to judge prejudice. State v. Garcia, 177 Wn. App. 769, 777,

313 P.3d 422 (2013).

       We use a three-part test to determine whether the defendant was so

prejudiced as to require a new trial. State v. Taylor, 18 Wn. App. 2d 568, 579,

490 P.3d 263 (2021). “We consider (1) the seriousness of the irregularity,

(2) whether the statement at issue was cumulative of other properly admitted

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No. 84771-6-I/8

evidence, and (3) whether the irregularity was able to be cured by an instruction

to disregard the improper testimony, which the jury is presumed to follow.”

Taylor, 18 Wn. App. 2d at 579.

       1. Seriousness of Irregularity

       When reviewing an irregularity at trial, we consider who was responsible

for the errant testimony. Taylor, 18 Wn. App. 2d at 581. “When trial irregularities

are brought about by one of the attorneys, as opposed to a noncompliant

witness, the seriousness increases.” Taylor, 18 Wn. App. 2d at 581.

       Here, the trial irregularities were the result of a noncompliant witness. The

State informed the court, in a side-bar away from the jury, that it had no intention

of eliciting Laura’s testimony about law enforcement’s search for Ibarra, that he

was ultimately jailed, that he might ruin his son’s birthday, or that he lied to the

police about owning guns. As evidenced by the State’s opening argument, the

State only intended to elicit the fact that Ibarra had lied to the police about sexual

conduct with I.W., a fact that Ibarra himself conceded. And Ibarra acknowledges

that lack of intent, noting in his opening brief that the prosecutor admonished

Laura to avoid those matters. Because the improper statements are the result of

a noncompliant witness, the seriousness of the irregularities decreases.

Ibarra asserts that the irregularities were serious because Laura’s volunteered

comments told the jury that Ibarra, whose defense depended on the jury

believing him, was a liar. But Ibarra testified that he lied to the police. His own

testimony, admitting that he lied to the police about the topic of the case at hand,

is much more likely to have an impact on Ibarra’s credibility than his ex-wife’s

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No. 84771-6-I/9

stricken testimony suggesting he lied about irrelevant information.

       In addition, while Laura’s description of the law enforcement response and

the fact that Ibarra was ultimately jailed may have painted Ibarra in a negative

light, neither statement was beyond the jury’s realm of assumption. Given the

subject matter of this case, it is not unlikely that jurors would assume that law

enforcement had been involved and that Ibarra had been jailed at some point in

the process. It does not follow that the jury would assume guilt as a result.

       And finally, Laura’s statements about their children, while clearly

irrelevant, are not likely to sway the outcome of the case. None of the trial

irregularities are serious enough to warrant a mistrial.

       2. Cumulative Statement

       Ibarra’s primary concern surrounding Laura’s testimony is that she makes

him out to be a liar. Laura did testify as such twice, stating that Ibarra lied to the

police when he told them he had not touched I.W. and that he had lied about

owning guns. But Ibarra explicitly testified that he lied to the police. In fact, he

testified that he lied to the police specifically about whether he touched I.W. So

Laura’s first statement was clearly cumulative of his own testimony. And while

Laura’s irrelevant testimony that Ibarra had lied about owning guns provided the

jury with more information that he had been dishonest, any impact it had on his

credibility was similarly cumulative.

       3. Able to be Cured

       “ ‘Courts generally presume jurors follow instructions to disregard

improper evidence.’ ” State v. Christian, 18 Wn. App. 2d 185, 199, 489 P.3d 657

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No. 84771-6-I/10

(2021) (quoting State v. Russell, 125 Wn.2d 24, 84, 882 P.2d 747 (1994)).

Defense counsel immediately objected and moved to strike the testimony. The

court sustained the objection and struck the testimony from the record. The court

then provided the jury with a clear instruction, stating “[w]hen I sustain an

objection, whether or not I tell you to disregard, you don’t consider whatever it

was I sustained the objection to.” And the court reiterated that instruction twice

before deliberations. With the extent of the court’s instruction to disregard the

improper statements and the presumption that juries follow those instructions,

any irregularity was able to be cured.

       The court did not err in denying Ibarra’s motion for mistrial.

                                 Evidentiary Ruling

       Ibarra asserts that the trial court erred in determining that he opened the

door to having been previously counseled or warned about sexual contact with

patients. Ibarra opened the door by testifying that I.W. consented to the contact.

We review a trial court’s ruling on admissibility for abuse of discretion. State v.

Jennings, 199 Wn.2d 53, 59-60, 502 P.3d 1255 (2022). A trial court abuses its

discretion if “ ‘no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial

court.’ ” Jennings, 199 Wn.2d at 59 (quoting State v. Atsbeha, 142 Wn.2d 904,

914, 16 P.3d 626 (2001)). Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make

the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action

more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” ER 401.

And the open-door doctrine is a theory of expanded relevance. State v.

Rushworth, 12 Wn. App. 2d 466, 474, 458 P.3d 1192 (2020).

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No. 84771-6-I/11

       “The open door doctrine permits trial courts to admit evidence on a subject

normally barred on policy or prejudice grounds, so long as the party who

otherwise stands to benefit from the exclusion has increased the subject’s

relevance through actions at trial.” Rushworth, 12 Wn. App. 2d at 475. A party

may waive protection from a usually “forbidden” topic by addressing the subject

themselves. Rushworth, 12 Wn. App. 2d at 473. At that point, the opposing

party is “entitled to respond.” Rushworth, 12 Wn. App. 2d at 473.

       Ibarra placed any prior admonishment informing him not to engage in any

sexual contact with patients before the jury as a matter of impeaching his

credibility, when he testified about being surprised by the sexual encounter with

I.W. He testified that the encounter was unusual and unexpected, stating

“[y]eah, I told her that that was kind of, you know, weird for me. . . . you know,

unusual, unpredicted.” That is belied by the fact that he had been trained about

such an encounter twice before.

       Ibarra also called his credibility into question when he testified that he

interpreted I.W.’s statement of “go for it,” which she denies saying, as a

“command” he had to obey. His prior training is relevant to establish that that

belief is unreasonable. Having been informed not to engage in any sexual

conduct with a patient, Ibarra knew not only that he could disobey that

“command,” but that he was required to refuse.

       Additionally, the court had specifically cautioned Ibarra that any education

or counseling he received following prior misconduct could become admissible

as rebuttal evidence if he introduced evidence of consent. Ibarra’s statement

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No. 84771-6-I/12

that I.W. had told him to “go for it,” suggests that she not only consented to the

encounter, but that she initiated it.

       Because Ibarra addressed the subject of I.W.’s consent as well as the

concept that this was an isolated incident he could not have anticipated, the court

did not abuse its discretion in determining that he opened the door to the State’s

cross-examination on prior education.

                                   Cumulative Error

       Ibarra argues that, even if either asserted error alone is not enough to

warrant reversal, the combined effects of both denied him a fair trial under the

cumulative error doctrine. There is no error to warrant reversal.

       The cumulative error doctrine applies when “several trial errors that

standing alone may not be sufficient to justify reversal but when combined may

deny a defendant a fair trial.” State v. Greiff, 141 Wn.2d 910, 929, 10 P.3d 390

(2000). “The test to determine whether cumulative errors require reversal of a

defendant’s conviction is whether the totality of the circumstances substantially

prejudiced the defendant and denied him a fair trial.” In re Pers. Restraint of

Cross, 180 Wn.2d 664, 690, 327 P.3d 660 (2014) (abrogated on other grounds

by State v. Gregory, 192 Wn.2d 1, 427 P.3d 621 (2018)). The defendant bears

the burden of proving cumulative error. In re Pers. Restraint of Lord, 123 Wn.2d

296, 332, 868 P.2d 835 (1994).

       Here, Ibarra failed to establish any trial errors. The court did not err in

denying Ibarra’s motion for mistrial or in determining that Ibarra opened the door

to evidence of prior warnings and education around sexual contact with patients.

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No. 84771-6-I/13

Although some of Laura’s testimony was improper, the court struck that

testimony from the record and Ibarra cannot establish that the statements she

made resulted in any prejudice.

       Because reversal under the cumulative error doctrine requires

circumstances that substantially prejudiced the defendant and Ibarra has failed to

show error or prejudice, reversal is not warranted.

                          Community Custody Conditions

       Ibarra asserts that the community custody requirement that he be

available for drug and alcohol testing at the request of his community corrections

officer (CCP) or treatment provider unconstitutionally invades his right to privacy.

His conviction did not involve drug or alcohol use. We remand to strike the

community custody conditions concerning drug and alcohol use.

       Constitutional challenges to community custody may be raised for the first

time on appeal. State v. Reedy, 26 Wn. App. 2d 379, 395, 527 P.3d 156 (2023).

Generally, sentencing courts may impose and enforce crime-related prohibitions

and affirmative conduction as a condition of community custody. State v.

Martinez Platero, 17 Wn. App. 2d 716, 725-26, 487 P.3d 910 (2021). That said,

there must be “a reasonable relationship between the condition and the

defendant’s behavior.” Martinez Platero, 17 Wn. App. 2d at 726.

       The State recognizes that alcohol and drug use did not contribute to

Ibarra’s offense. The State asserts, however, that the legislature has expressed

an intent that the rehabilitation of felony offenders may include alcohol and drug

prohibitions even if their use did not contribute to the crime. Pointing to a

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No. 84771-6-I/14

singular statute and a handful of unpublished cases, the State asks this court to

carefully consider those cases “anew,” and hold that the requirement to submit to

urinalysis and breath testing is sufficiently narrowly tailored regardless of whether

alcohol or drugs were involved in Ibarra’s crime. We decline to do so. Current

binding caselaw provides that there must be a reasonable relationship between

the alcohol or drug prohibition and the defendant’s behavior and the State cannot

establish such a relationship. We remand for the court to strike the community

custody conditions concerning drug and alcohol use.

               Victim Penalty Assessment and DNA Collection Fee

       Ibarra contends that the victim penalty assessment (VPA) should be

stricken because he is indigent. He also asserts that the DNA collection fee

should be stricken. The State does not object. We remand for the court to strike

the VPA and DNA collection fees from the judgment and sentence.

       In July 2023, the legislature amended RCW 7.68.035 to prohibit the

imposition of a VPA if the court finds a defendant indigent at the time of

sentencing. The legislature also eliminated DNA collection fees. Recently

amended RCW 43.43.7541 provides that the court shall waive any DNA

collection fee previously imposed upon a motion by the defendant. These

amendments apply retroactively in this case because Ibarra’s appeal was

pending when the amendments took effect. State v. Ellis,27 Wn. App. 2d 1, 17,

530 P.3d 1048 (2023).

       Here, neither party disputes that Ibarra was indigent at sentencing, and

that the VPA should be stricken. Likewise, neither party disputes that the DNA

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No. 84771-6-I/15

collection fee should be stricken. On remand, we instruct the court to strike both

fees.

                          Statement of Additional Grounds

        In a statement of additional grounds, Ibarra asserts that the trial court

improperly refused to excuse a juror based on their ethnicity, that the court put

improper time constraints on the length of the trial, that his counsel was

ineffective, and that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. We

disagree.

        A defendant may submit a pro se statement of additional grounds under

RAP 10.10. We only consider issues raised in that statement of additional

grounds if they adequately inform us of the “nature and occurrence of the alleged

errors.” State v. Calvin, 176 Wn. App. 1, 26, 316 P.3d 496 (2013). We do not

consider arguments repeated from the briefing. RAP 10.10(a).

        1. Improper Refusal to Excuse Juror

        Ibarra argues that the court denied dismissal of a juror based solely on her

desire for ethnic diversity and in violation of Ibarra’s right to challenge jurors for

cause during voir dire. We disagree.

        We review a trial court’s decision to remove, or decline to remove, a juror

for abuse of discretion. State v. Hopkins, 156 Wn. App. 468, 474, 232 P.3d 597

(2010). A trial court abuses its discretion if its decision is manifestly

unreasonable or exercised on untenable grounds or for untenable reasons. Lord,

161 Wn.2d at 283-84.

        RCW 2.36.110 states, “it shall be the duty of a judge to excuse from

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No. 84771-6-I/16

further jury service any juror, who in the opinion of the judge, has manifested

unfitness as a juror by reason of bias, prejudice, indifference, inattention or any

physical or mental defect or by reason of conduct or practices incompatible with

proper and efficient jury service.”

       Defense counsel challenged the juror at issue on the basis that she was a

physician and may have been in a position to second-guess testimony about

healthcare standards and the varying responsibilities of doctors and nurses.

Defense counsel was also concerned that the juror had been given training “to

avoid exactly this type of thing.” The court noted, however, that the juror did not

have any particular awareness of nursing standards and that “doctors are given

training on this, just as lawyers are and every other professional.” The court also

pointed out that this juror, in contrast to a juror who had been excused, gave no

indication that she was unable to separate her position and responsibilities from

the allegations against Ibarra. The court concluded that there was no basis to

strike this juror as compared to any other witness. Because there was no

“cause” upon which to excuse the juror, the court did not violate Ibarra’s right to

challenge jurors for cause.

       2. Improper Time Restraints

       Ibarra asserts that the court put improper time restraints on the trial that

prevented defense counsel from addressing pertinent issues and that allowing

I.W. to take breaks during testimony portrayed a sympathetic and biased court.

This argument is unpersuasive.

       “The trial court has broad discretion to make trial management decisions

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No. 84771-6-I/17

. . . because the trial court is generally in the best position to perceive and

structure its own proceedings.” State v. Bejar, 18 Wn. App. 2d 454, 460-61, 491

P.3d 229 (2021). We will not reverse a trial court’s decision unless it is

manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds or reasons. State v.

Dye, 178 Wn.2d 541, 548, 309 P.3d 1192 (2013).

       Ibarra first points to the fact that the court casually stated timeline

expectations throughout the trial. He notes that the court made comments about

not wanting to lose time and promised the jury that they would be done by a

certain day. He does not, however, explain how this interfered with defense

counsel’s ability to present its case. He also does not articulate any of the

“pertinent issues and concerns” that were interfered with because of to the

court’s time constraints.

       Ibarra next argues that the court “coddled” I.W. by allowing her to take

breaks during testimony. This then supposedly cut into Ibarra’s time to present

his case while suggesting a bias in her favor. But again, Ibarra fails to establish

that allowing I.W. to take breaks during testimony prejudiced him in any way.

The court stated that it told I.W. she could take a break because I.W. was

beginning to cry. The court elaborated, stating “I do this for all witnesses who

appear to be getting emotional on the stand. . . . it wouldn’t, frankly, improve the

fairness of our proceedings for the Court to allow people to just burst into tears

and have emotional displays on the stand.” Ibarra has not shown how forcing

I.W. to testify through her emotional response, as opposed to allowing her a

break, would avoid a bias in her favor. And there is no evidence that the few

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No. 84771-6-I/18

minutes of respite had any impact, let alone a negative impact, on Ibarra’s time

before the court.

       The court did not impose any improper time restraints and did not abuse

its discretion in allowing I.W. to pause during her testimony.

       3. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

       Ibarra contends that defense counsel was ineffective in failing to introduce

evidence that Ibarra believed demonstrates I.W. had motive to fabricate an

assault. He argues that his chance at a fair trial was hindered “because [defense

counsel] wanted to maintain a professional, non-confrontational reputation.” This

is again unpersuasive.

       We review ineffective assistance of counsel claims de novo. State v.

Estes, 188 Wn.2d 450, 457, 395 P.3d 1045 (2017). The Sixth Amendment to the

United States Constitution and article I, section 22 of the Washington State

Constitution guarantee the right to effective assistance of counsel. Estes, 188

Wn.2d at 457. To prevail on an ineffective assistance claim, the defendant must

establish that (1) counsel’s performance was deficient, and (2) that deficiency

resulted in prejudice. State v. Kyllo, 166 Wn.2d 856, 862, 215 P.3d 177 (2009).

Performance is deficient if it falls “below an objective standard of reasonableness

based on consideration of all the circumstances.” State v. McFarland, 127

Wn.2d 322, 334-35, 899 P.2d 1251 (1995). To show prejudice, the appellant

must show a “ ‘reasonable probability’ ” that but for the deficient performance, the

outcome of the proceedings would have been different. State v. Jones, 183

Wn.2d 327, 339, 352 P.3d 776 (2015) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466

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No. 84771-6-I/19

U.S. 668, 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)). There is a strong

presumption that representation was effective. State v. Grier, 171 Wn.2d 17, 33,

246 P.3d 1260 (2011). And “[w]hen counsel’s conduct can be characterized as

legitimate trial strategy or tactics, performance is not deficient.” Kyllo, 166 Wn.2d

at 863.

       Ibarra provides four reasons that he contends establish I.W. had motive to

lie and that defense counsel was unwilling to argue at trial. He asserts that she

felt too guilty to face her husband after consenting to sexual behavior with

someone else, that her husband was older than she was so it had likely “been a

while” for I.W., that she had been assaulted before and had a “vindictive nature

towards men,” and that she was hoping for a big settlement from Swedish.

       Defense counsel’s choice not to pursue any of these theories does not fall

below an objective standard of reasonableness. Ibarra does not provide any

evidence to support any of the theories nor present any legal argument regarding

them. Rather, his proposed evidence centers on accusing I.W. of lying,

embarrassing her or exploiting her past trauma. And while Ibarra asserts that his

proposed reasons establish motive for I.W. to lie, they involve pure conjecture.

There is no evidence to support that I.W. lied for any of these reasons. It was not

unreasonable for defense counsel to choose not to raise these issues at trial.

       As to the second factor, Ibarra cannot establish that, had defense counsel

introduced the fact that her husband was older than she was or had cross-

examined I.W. on the fact that she had been sexually abused in the past, the

outcome of the proceedings would have been any different. Ibarra is correct in

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that this case centered on credibility. However, Ibarra’s proposed statements,

not backed by evidence, were unlikely to diminish I.W.’s credibility. In fact, it is

not unreasonable that Ibarra’s attorney may have determined that it would have

harmed Ibarra’s case or diminished his credibility to highlight irrelevant but highly

personal facts about I.W.

       Defense counsel was not deficient.

       4. Sufficient Evidence

       Finally, Ibarra asserts that there was insufficient evidence to support the

conviction of rape in the second degree because I.W.’s testimony was vague as

to penetration. We disagree.

       In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence, the inquiry is

whether by “viewing the evidence ‘in a light most favorable to the State, any

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of a crime beyond a

reasonable doubt.’ ” State v. Sweany, 174 Wn. 2d 909, 914, 281 P.3d 305

(2012) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Randhawa, 133

Wn.2d 67, 73, 941 P.2d 661 (1997)).

       RCW 9A.44.050(d) defines rape in the second degree as sexual

intercourse “[w]hen the perpetrator is a health care provider, the victim is a client

or patient, and the sexual intercourse occurs during a treatment session,

consultation, interview, or examination.” Sexual intercourse includes its “ordinary

meaning,” as well as “any penetration of the vagina or anus however slight, by an

object [including a body part] . . . except when such penetration is accomplished

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No. 84771-6-I/21

for medically recognized treatment or diagnostic purposes.” RCW

9A.44.010(14)(b).

       Ibarra asserts that there was insufficient evidence to establish that he

penetrated I.W.’s vagina, and that as there were no threats, coercion, or

violence, that he did not rape her. Because threats, coercion, or violence are not

required to establish rape in the second degree, that is irrelevant. And I.W.

consistently recounted that Ibarra had put his fingers inside of her body. She first

informed Detective Atkinson that Ibarra put his fingers inside her vagina. On

direct examination, I.W. reiterated multiple times that Ibarra put his fingers “right

inside of [her].” The fact that I.W. did not explicitly state that she was penetrated

does not mean there was insufficient evidence to determine that there was

penetration.

       Given I.W.’s testimony, the jury had sufficient evidence to convict Ibarra of

rape in the second degree.

       We affirm the convictions and remand for the court to strike the VPA, DNA

collection fee, and community custody conditions concerning drug and alcohol

use.

WE CONCUR:

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