Court Opinion

ID: 9739108
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:08:50.9094+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:10.041661
License: Public Domain

Fitzgerald, P.J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that there is a factual dispute regarding Angelas’ ability to represent Ficano in the receivership proceeding. MCL 49.73; MSA 5.826 requires the board of commissioners to employ an attorney to represent the sheriff when he is named as a defendant and corporation counsel and the prosecuting attorney are unable to represent him. Thus, the decision whether to employ counsel to defend the sheriff is made case by case. I do not believe that the full-time employment of *512in-house counsel satisfies the board’s duty to provide counsel where the board decides not to employ the in-house counsel in any given case. In this case, the board, which is the party that may ultimately be responsible for the payment of the outside legal fees, has conceded that Angelas’ employment as in-house counsel is irrelevant in the determination whether the board satisfied its statutory duty to defend.1
I concur with the remainder of the majority opinion.

 Only McNamara contends that the county’s statutory obligation to provide legal counsel to the sheriff was satisfied by the continued employment of Angelas.