Court Opinion

ID: 9582818
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:31:39.830826+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:38:33.860470
License: Public Domain

URBIGKIT, Justice,
concurring in the result.
I concur in the result of this decision, but have a concern that the opinion is directed beyond the certified question and may be clearly wrong in the context of the extended discussion.
The question presented, by certification from the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, was clearly limited to a legal malpractice claim based on a contractual theory of liability. I find no justification to extend our discussion into questions of legal malpractice that might be based on negligent theories of actionable wrong.
*1098Even worse, in my opinion, is the further mistake in opinion evaluation that legal malpractice proceedings must be contractual in nature. A review of the law demonstrates that either or both contract and tort theories have interchangeably been used by the client to pursue attempted recovery for the claimed wrong from his attorney. Even though I consider this portion of the decision pure dictum, I still find the possibility of confusion to be created for trial judges and the practicing bar.
The concept is stated in the standard authority, 2 Ronald E. Mallen & Jeffrey M. Smith, Legal Malpractice, § 27.4 (3rd ed. 1989), and similarly found in Irving J. Sloan, Professional Malpractice at 65 (1992), that “[cjourts disagree on the underlying theory of the attorney malpractice action.” See also Dennis J. Horan & George W. Spellmire, Jr., Attorney Malpractice: Prevention and Defense, ch. 11 (1989), which also recognizes the potential negligent theory basis of recovery. See Honorable Blanche M. Manning, Legal Malpractice: Is it Tort or Contract?, 21 Loy.U.L.J. 741 (1990). Further discussion is provided in Page Keeton, Professional Malpractice, 17 Washburn L.J. 445, 448 (1978); H.H. Henry, Annotation, What Statute of Limitations Governs Damage Action Against Attorney for Negligence in Performance of Professional Services, 49 A.L.R.2d 1216, 1219-21 (1956); and Joseph Timothy Kleespies, Comment, Liability of Lawyers to Third Parties for Professional Negligence in Oregon, 60 Or.L.Rev. 375 (1981). 1 Mallen & Smith, supra, § 8.10 (footnote omitted) describe in their final conclusion:
The most common form of a legal malpractice action is for negligence. The cause of action for legal malpractice involves the same basic elements as any ordinary negligence action: duty, negligent breach of duty, proximate cause and damage. Yet, one court, emphasizing the contractual nature of the attorney-client relationship, stated that a legal malpractice action is not an action in tort. That, however, is not the rule.
A valuable text, Duke Nordlinger Stern & Jo Ann Felix-Retzke, A Practical Guide to Preventing Legal Malpractice, § 1.01 (1983) (emphasis in original), delineates the definitional confusion:
Defining legal malpractice can be an exercise in frustration. The many courts that have addressed the question are prone to add their personalized verbiage to what has become many definitions. Some sound in tort while others are framed in terms of express or implied contract. Still others tend to combine both theories, and some courts have said that neither approach is correct. Yet, by whatever definition, legal malpractice is increasing in frequency of occurrences and severity of loss payments.
The more practical approach is to analyze attorney malpractice not in terms of theoretical definitions, but rather by the multitude of claims that have been made against members of the legal profession. The substantial majority of claims are never tried, and of those that are, even fewer are appealed. The body of case law pales by comparison to the body of claim law. Even the significant percentage of claims which result in no indemnity payments still can result in substantial sums being paid for defense. The cost in terms of damage to an attorney’s reputation can be still greater.
2 Mallen & Smith, supra, at § 27.4 (footnotes omitted), recognizes the significance of the selection of a legal theory which motivates my concern about the text of this majority decision:
On occasion, the legal theories available to a plaintiff may involve choice of law issues. The issue may concern the principle governing the underlying action or the legal malpractice action itself. For a federal court, choice of law principles are those of the forum in which it sits.
In most jurisdictions, the plaintiff in a legal malpractice action may have a choice between proceeding upon the theory of negligence, breach of contract, or a statutory remedy. Although the plaintiff may have facts available which constitute an express promise, the contract action can sometimes be based upon the *1099implied promise to exercise ordinary skill and knowledge. The implied promise usually has the same legal and practical result as a tort claim.
In some instances, however, a contract theory may not only be preferable, but also the only viable course of action. Thus, if either the attorney or client is deceased, survival of the cause of action can depend upon the theory of liability asserted. A statute of limitations applicable to tort actions usually expires well before a statute applying to an action founded upon a contract. A suit predicated upon a contract or statute may be preferable because it may not be subject to the contributory negligence defense. Interest may be recoverable for a breach of contract but not for negligence. Punitive damages, however, are not usually recoverable for breach of a contract.
Consequently, I concur in the majority decision, but would leave fpr another day, when the issue is directly presented, whether either or both contract or negligence confine or describe a legal malpractice proceeding.