Court Opinion

ID: 9476189
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:49:30.271026+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:45:10.315662
License: Public Domain

ANDERSON, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur in all of Judge Hatchett’s opinion for the majority, except his resolution of the procedural due process claim based on Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). I agree with Judge Hatchett that the Georgia statutory scheme creates a liberty interest which would be protected by procedural due process. However, I conclude that plaintiff has not stated a viable procedural due process claim. Plaintiffs brief to the en banc court makes it clear that plaintiff is pursuing a substantive due process claim (which the majority opinion, following Doe v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 649 F.2d 134 (2d Cir.1981), finds to be viable in this case), and that plaintiff is not pursuing a procedural due process claim. In any event, for the reasons expressed by Judge Tjoflat in the last two paragraphs of Part III of his opinion, a predeprivation denial of procedural due process makes no sense in the context of this case. Any procedural due process claim based on a post-deprivation denial of due process would fail for failure to establish the inadequacy of Georgia’s general tort remedies. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981); Rittenhouse v. DeKalb County, 764 F.2d 1451 (11th Cir.1985).