Court Opinion

ID: 9698804
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 20:00:21.773823+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:43.379444
License: Public Domain

SAND, Justice
(concurring specially).
I concur in the result.
In my opinion, actual notice as defined in § 1-01-23, NDCC, satisfies the notice requirement of subsection (1) of § 4, Ch. 295 of the 1975 Session Laws, which is set out in the majority opinion. The notice requirement set out in subsection (1) is not a statute of limitations provision limiting the time within which an action may be brought but rather can be characterized as a condition precedent. The true statute of limitation specifying the time within which an action may be brought is found in subsection (2) which provides:
“An action brought under this Act [Ch. 295, 1975 S.L.] must be commenced within three years after the cause of action has accrued.”
*76Even this limitation in itself can or could have created a problem because the Act expired on its own on 30 June 1977, whereas an action may be brought within three years which could be some time after the Act expired on its own. A further issue could arise whether the fund created by § 3 went out of existence on the expiration date of the Act or continued if an action had been brought. We, however, do not need to resolve these issues.
I view a condition precedent as found in subsection (4) not as a statute of limitations but as a means of compelling notice to be given to the political subdivision. The object of the notice is to give the political subdivision an opportunity to begin investigations, arrange for defense counsel, etc. In my opinion, actual notice accomplishes this and is sufficient to apprise the political subdivision of the nature of the claim which may be filed against it. My opinion in this respect, that actual notice is sufficient, is supported by the fact that the county auditor under the Act is not required to give notice to the political subdivision. Also, should the county auditor fail to inform the political subdivision, I do not believe that the political subdivision could challenge an action on the ground that it had not received notice of the claim from the county auditor1 prior to the bringing of the action. This fact also makes a good argument that the notice requirement should be treated as directory rather than mandatory, but even treated as mandatory, actual notice constitutes notice for purposes of subsection (1) of § 4, Ch. 295.
I would rely upon Kossak v. Stalling, 277 N.W.2d 30 (Minn.1979), Kelly v. City of Rochester, 304 Minn. 328, 231 N.W.2d 275 (1975); and Matey v. Bethlehem Central School District, 89 Misc.2d 390, 391 N.Y.S.2d 357 (S.Ct.1977), that actual notice satisfies the notice requirement of subsection 1 of § 4 of Ch. 295, 1975 S.L.
The facts in this case are not in dispute on the question whether or not the school district had actual notice of the incident. The school principal, as pointed out in the majority opinion, was aware of the injury and had discussed it with the child’s mother, and even informed her that the district would be paying part of the cost of the hospital and doctor bills. Contents of the medical bills resulting from Christine’s injury were presented to the principal of the school district. Therefore, the action on behalf of Christine Besette is timely and should not have been dismissed.
As to the claim and action of Donald Besette, the school district had no such actual notice. Consequently, Donald Besette may not take advantage of § 1-01-23, NDCC, in that there was no actual notice. Furthermore, the claim of Donald Besette is of a different nature and unless a specific amount is stated and conveyed to the party deemed liable, in this instance the school district, would have no knowledge of what the claim may be or how much, or anything of that nature.
I do not believe that Kitto v. Minot Park District, 224 N.W.2d 795 (N.D.1974), has any legal significance to the resolution of the issues involved here. If anything at all, it has only historical significance as to why the Legislature enacted Ch. 295.

. The Act also states that the claimant shall give notice to the political subdivision and to the Attorney General within ten days of filing such claim with the county auditor.