Court Opinion

ID: 9808748
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 20:49:35.686164+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:18:15.189983
License: Public Domain

■MekrimoN, C. J.
dissenting: The petitioner has two tracts of land, each adjoining the other, and for the purposes of a way from a point or particular place on either of these tracts to points or places on the other, or to a public road situate across either of them, they must be treated as one, because the petitioner may make his ways from one point on his own land to another on the same as he may please to do. A public road is situate on and across his- land near the center thereof. If he can reach this road from any point on either of his tracts referred to by a way situate altogether *67on his own land he must do so, although it might be more convenient for him to reach it by a way across the land of the respondent. This is so, because to allow him to have a cart-way across the respondent’s land would be in derogation of the latter’s rights of property. It is settled that he will not be allowed to have such cart-way, unless because of real necessity. Warlick v. Lowman, 103 N. C., 122, and cases there cited.
The respondent contended on the trial that the petitioner might have a sufficient way wholly situate on his own land from his tract alleged to be inaccessible from the public road, and there was evidence tending to prove that he might. The respondent requested the Court to instruct the jury, in substance, that the plaintiff’s two adjoining tracts of land, for the purpose of this proceeding-, must be treated as one, and if the public road could be reached from the tract alleged to be inaccessible by a way wholly situate on his own land, then they should render a verdict upon the issue adverse to the petitioner. A material part of this instruction was that the two tracts should be treated as one, and the Court should have so told the jury, particularly as it was requested to do so.
It is true that the Court told the jury “ that if it is practicable for the petitioner to have the outlet desired over his own land, then he is not entitled to have a cart-way laid out over the lands of another,” but it did not explain to them, in that connection, or at all, that the two tracts adjoined each other and were to be treated as one; that if the petitioner could go from the “ Munrne Cobb” place across part of his other tract to the public road, then he could hot have the cart-way, etc. As the Court was requested to direct the attention of (lie jury to the fact that the two tracts adjoined each other, the public'road passing across one of them, and it failed, and refused to do so, the jury may have concluded that the petitioner could not get from the “Mun-*68roe Co.bb ” place to the public road by passing over part of the petitioner’s other tract referred to. It is possible the jury took a proper view of the merits of the issue; they may have done otherwise, and 'this because the Court failed to give so much of the special instruction asked for as it failed to give. The refusal to give the instruction was the more serious, as the Court failed to explain to the jury what is meant by a “practicable route,” and b\r the terms “necessary, reasonable and just.” They were loft to determine and apply the meaning of these important terms in view of 'what the Court had refused to tell them.
Per Ov/riam. No error.