Court Opinion

ID: 9884356
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 02:53:53.906695+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:37.886001
License: Public Domain

HANSON, Justice,
concurring.
I write separately because the majority’s discussion of Laine’s bifurcation requests is, perhaps, too abrupt to provide guidance when the issue of bifurcation arises in other contexts.
I conclude that Laine does raise a legitimate concern that the evidence of a past pattern of domestic abuse might unduly prejudice the jury’s decision on the other elements of first-degree domestic abuse murder. Although evidence of other acts of domestic abuse is relevant to the statutory element of a past pattern of domestic abuse, it does present a significant risk that it will be misused as character evidence to support the inference that the defendant was more likely to have committed the present crime because he has committed similar acts in the past. But I agree that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to bifurcate, for two reasons.
First, the district court gave a cautionary instruction to the jury concerning the limited use of the evidence of past domestic abuse, which mitigated the potential for prejudice. Second, because the past pattern of domestic abuse is an element of first-degree domestic abuse murder, it is not clear how bifurcation could be practically accomplished. Laine was not charged with any other crime that presented all of the elements of domestic abuse murder except the element of past pattern of domestic abuse. Thus, there was no practical way to obtain a verdict in a phase one trial that could serve as a predicate to a phase two trial on a past pattern.4
Although there might be some circumstances where the denial of á motion to *436bifurcate the trial of a highly prejudicial issue might be considered to be an abuse of discretion, the absence of any practical way to bifurcate the issue of past pattern of domestic abuse from the other elements of domestic abuse murder confirms that the denial of Laine’s motion was not an abuse of discretion.

. Although Laine was charged with second-degree intentional murder, a verdict on this charge would not serve as a predicate for a phase two trial on the past pattern element. A verdict of guilty of second-degree intentional murder would not cover one of the other elements of domestic abuse murder, that it occur "under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to human life.” See Minn.Stat. §§ 609.185(a)(6), 609.19, subd. 1(1) (2004). And a verdict of not guilty of second-degree intentional murder would not preclude a finding of domestic abuse murder because the latter does not require the "intent to effect the death.” See Minn.Stat. § 609.19, subd. 1(1). Similarly, the elements of second-degree felony murder do not precisely match all of the elements of domestic abuse murder except the past pattern element. See, Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 2(1) (2004).