Court Opinion

ID: 9391179
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-01 15:00:27.751615+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:39.785522
License: Public Domain

21-2639
Navarro Carrillo v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ.

                     UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                         FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                SUMMARY ORDER

    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT.
    CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007,
    IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
    PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING
    A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY
    MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE
    (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY
    ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
    COUNSEL.

     At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States
Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 1st
day of May, two thousand twenty-three.

PRESENT:
               DENNIS JACOBS,
               MYRNA PÉREZ,
               SARAH A. L. MERRIAM,
                    Circuit Judges.
__________________________________________

MARIA NAVARRO CARRILLO, JOSE GARZON, *

             Plaintiffs-Appellants,

             v.                                       No. 21-2639

NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
CHANCELLOR DAVID C. BANKS,

             Defendants-Appellees,

NEW YORK STATE EDUCATION DEPARTMENT,

* The Clerk   of Court is respectfully directed to amend the caption
of the case   in two ways: first, to reflect the correct spelling of
“Carrillo”;    and second, to substitute David C. Banks for Richard
Carranza as   Chancellor of the New York City Department of Education
pursuant to   Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2).
          Defendant.
__________________________________________

For Plaintiffs-Appellants:        RORY J. BELLANTONI, Brain Injury Rights
                                  Group, Ltd., New York, NY.

For Defendants-Appellees:         AMY MCCAMPHILL, Assistant Corporation
                                  Counsel (Richard Dearing, Deborah
                                  A. Brenner, of counsel, on the
                                  brief), for Hon. Sylvia O. Hinds-
                                  Radix, Corporation Counsel of the
                                  City of New York, New York, NY.

     Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court

for the Southern District of New York (McMahon, J.).

     UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

DECREED that the judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED.

     Plaintiffs-appellants, individually and as the parents of

minor child M.G., brought this action under the Individuals with

Disabilities Education Act (the “IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. §1400 et seq.,

alleging that defendants-appellees, the New York City Department

of Education and the Chancellor of the New York City Department of

Education in his official capacity (referred to collectively as

the “DOE”), failed to provide M.G. with a free appropriate public

education (“FAPE”) for the 2018-2019 school year, as required by

the IDEA.

     M.G.   is   a   non-verbal   and   non-ambulatory    student   with

significant disabilities. On March 19, 2018, a Committee on Special

                                    2
Education (“CSE”) was convened of educators, service providers,

DOE   staff,       and    the   appellants,    to    develop     M.G.’s    2018-2019

Individualized           Education   Program   (“IEP”).    The     IEP    classified

M.G.’s disability as “multiple disabilities,” assigned special

education programs and services, and recommended that M.G. be

placed   in    a    12:1:4      classroom, 1 which    is   the    most    supportive

classroom environment contemplated by the applicable New York

regulations.        M.G.’s      parents   objected    to   the    CSE’s     proposed

placement for M.G., provided notice of their intent to unilaterally

place M.G. in a private institution, iBRAIN, and filed a due

process complaint seeking reimbursement of tuition and other costs

1 This shorthand is used by the parties to refer to a classroom
with a maximum of twelve students, at least one licensed special
education teacher, and at least four additional teachers or
paraprofessionals, that is, at least one additional teacher or
paraprofessional for every three students. See DOE Br. at 7; N.Y.
Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 8, §200.6(h)(4)(iii). This classroom
type is sometimes referred to as a “12:1+(3:1)” classroom. See DOE
Br. at 7 n.2. Likewise, the shorthand “6:1:1” refers to a classroom
with a maximum of six students, at least one licensed special
education teacher, and at least one additional teacher or
paraprofessional. See id. at 16. M.G.’s IEP also “recommended a
1:1 full-time health paraprofessional” be provided for M.G. in
addition to the classroom staff required by the regulations. App’x
at 111.

                                           3
related to M.G.’s attendance at iBRAIN. 2 After a four-day hearing,

an Impartial Hearing Officer (“IHO”) issued a thorough Findings of

Fact and Decision, ruling that the CSE’s proposal did in fact

provide M.G. with a FAPE for the 2018-2019 school year. M.G.’s

parents administratively appealed that decision; on appeal the

State Review Officer (“SRO”) issued a detailed thirty-four-page

decision finding that the IHO had correctly determined that M.G.

was offered a FAPE.

     Plaintiffs-appellants filed a complaint in District Court,

asking   the   Court     to   vacate    the    SRO’s   decision   and    to    order

reimbursement       of   tuition     and   other   costs   related      to    M.G.’s

attendance     at   iBRAIN.    The     District    Court   affirmed     the    SRO’s

decision, denying plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and

granting defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs

then timely filed this appeal.

2 If parents are dissatisfied with the placement recommended in
their child’s IEP, they may challenge that placement. The parents
may also unilaterally enroll their child in a private school and
seek retroactive tuition reimbursement, “at their own financial
risk.” Ventura de Paulino ex rel. R.P. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ.,
959 F.3d 519, 526 (2d Cir. 2020) (citation and quotation marks
omitted); see also 20 U.S.C. §1412(a)(10)(C). Under the
Burlington-Carter test, parents are reimbursed for tuition only if
“(1) the school district’s proposed placement violated the IDEA
by, for example, denying a FAPE to the student because the IEP was
inadequate; (2) the parents’ alternative private placement was
appropriate;    and    (3)    equitable    considerations    favor
reimbursement.” Ventura de Paulino, 959 F.3d at 526-27 (citation
and quotation marks omitted).

                                           4
      We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts,

procedural history, and issues on appeal.

      We engage in a “circumscribed de novo review of a district

court’s grant of summary judgment in the IDEA context because the

responsibility    for     determining       whether   a   challenged    IEP    will

provide a child with a FAPE rests in the first instance with

administrative hearing and review officers.” M.W. ex rel. S.W. v.

N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 725 F.3d 131, 138 (2d Cir. 2013) (citation

and   quotation   marks    omitted).    Federal       courts   reviewing      state

administrative proceedings under the IDEA “are required to give

‘due weight’ to the findings of” those proceedings. Muller ex rel.

Muller v. Comm. on Special Educ. of E. Islip Union Free Sch. Dist.,

145 F.3d 95, 101 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick

Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley ex rel. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176,

206 (1982)). “Requiring the federal courts to defer to the findings

of the state administrative proceedings ensures that the federal

courts do not impose their view of preferable educational methods

upon the States.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted).

“Deference   is   particularly     appropriate        when[]   ...     the    state

hearing officers’ review has been thorough and careful.” Walczak

                                        5
v. Fla. Union Free Sch. Dist., 142 F.3d 119, 129 (2d Cir. 1998). 3

     Appellants argue that M.G.’s IEP incorrectly classified her

disability as “multiple disabilities” rather than “traumatic brain

injury,” leading   to   inappropriate   recommendations   for   special

education programs and services. We agree with the District Court

that this is a “red herring.” Navarro Carrillo ex rel. M.G. v.

Carranza, No. 20CV04639(CM), 2021 WL 4137663, at *15 (S.D.N.Y.

Sept. 10, 2021). “Disability classification is used for one and

only one purpose: to ascertain whether a child [falls] into one of

the 13 categories that render her eligible for special education

services.” Id. There is no dispute that M.G. is eligible for

special education services, so the question before us is whether

the special education programs and services offered to M.G. denied

her a FAPE.

     To assess whether M.G.’s recommended placement in a 12:1:4

classroom denied her a FAPE, we turn to the regulations describing

3 Appellants contend that deference to the administrative officers
is not warranted because the dispute “concerns an issue of law;
namely, the proper interpretation of the federal statute and its
requirements.” Mrs. B. ex rel. M.M. v. Milford Bd. of Educ., 103
F.3d 1114, 1122 (2d Cir. 1997). However, this case presents a
straightforward question of whether the IEP developed for M.G.
provided her a FAPE, in contrast to the cases cited by appellants.
See Muller, 145 F.3d at 102 (Deference was not required because
the question was interpretation of “the definition of ‘emotionally
disturbed’ set forth in the relevant state and federal
regulations.”); Mrs. B., 103 F.3d at 1122 (finding usual deference
not necessary because the administrative agency’s decision was
based on an interpretation of law regarding funding for residential
treatment).

                                  6
the “Continuum of services[]” New York offers.                      N.Y. Comp. Codes

R. & Regs. tit. 8, §200.6. As required by the IDEA, the New York

regulation details how an “appropriate special education[]” should

be   determined      based     on    each      “student’s        unique    needs.”     Id.

§§200.6(a),       (a)(2).    Section       200.6(h)(4)         lists      the   different

special education classroom structures available, describing, as

to each such classroom: the student needs accommodated; the maximum

number of students; and the minimum number of staff required.

Section 200.6(h)(4) provides, as the regulation’s title suggests,

a continuum of class compositions, with each successive category

of classroom increasing the level of support provided.

      Section 200.6(h)(4)(ii)(a) provides that a 6:1:1 classroom —

appellants’ preferred placement — is appropriate for “students

whose management needs are determined to be highly intensive, and

requiring     a    high      degree       of       individualized       attention      and

intervention[.]” Id. §200.6(h)(4)(ii)(a). The 12:1:4 classroom

recommended       for   M.G.    is    described           in   §200.6(h)(4)(iii)        as

appropriate for “students with severe multiple disabilities, whose

programs consist primarily of habilitation and treatment[.]” Id.

§200.6(h)(4)(iii).

      In the continuum of classroom options, the 12:1:4 is the most

supportive classroom available. Rochelle Flemister, the supervisor

of   school   psychologists         for   the       New   York   City     Department    of

Education, testified before the IHO that the 12:1:4 classroom is

                                               7
“the most restrictive[.]” App’x at 521. Ms. Flemister further

testified that a 12:1:4 classroom is appropriate for “students

that really have a lot of management needs” and that it gives those

students “the attention and support that they need[,]” including

attending to “whatever their medical needs are in addition to

provid[ing] education.” Id.

       The CSE found, based on M.G.’s individual needs, that M.G.

should    be   placed   in   a   12:1:4   classroom.   The   IHO   and   SRO

appropriately considered the options available under §200.6(h)(4)

and agreed that a 12:1:4 classroom complied with the IDEA and with

New York regulations. The SRO found that the “12:1+4 special class

ratio for students with severe multiple disabilities, called for

in [§200.6(h)(4)(iii)], is precisely the type of programming that

will address this student’s unique needs[.]” App’x at 113. The

CSE, the IHO, and the SRO all concluded that M.G.’s IEP was

“tailored to meet the unique needs of” M.G. Walczak, 142 F.3d at

122.

       The District Court found that there “is absolutely no question

that M.G. has highly intensive management needs that require a

high degree of individualized attention and intervention.” Navarro

Carrillo, 2021 WL 4137663, at *16. Appellants argue that because

M.G. has highly intensive management needs she requires a 6:1:1

classroom, and that it was error for the CSE to place her in a

12:1:4 classroom. But this argument is not supported by the plain

                                      8
language of the regulation. The needs of students described in the

subparagraphs of §200.6(h)(4) are not mutually exclusive. M.G. has

“highly     intensive[]”         management     needs    and    “severe         multiple

disabilities,”       and    receives      programming        that    is    focused    on

“habilitation and treatment[.]” N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit.

8,     §§200.6(h)(4)(ii)(a),          (iii).    The     regulation,        as    noted,

describes a continuum of classroom environments, and students,

like    M.G.,    whose     needs     justify    placement      in    a    high-support

classroom under §200.6(h)(4) would also be expected to have needs

sufficient for placement in a lower-support classroom.

       The CSE determined based on M.G.’s individual needs that she

should    be    placed     in    a   12:1:4    classroom.      Nothing      about     the

regulation prohibits this. The CSE met its obligation to carefully

consider the student’s needs, and developed a plan that would

provide her with a FAPE; M.G.’s parents’ preference for a different

placement       is   not   controlling.        The    IDEA    “guarantees       ...   an

appropriate education, not one that provides everything that might

be thought desirable by loving parents.” Walczak, 142 F.3d at 132

(citation and quotation marks omitted). Therefore, the District

Court did not err in upholding the SRO’s determination that a

12:1:4 classroom would provide M.G. with a FAPE.

       Deference     to    the    local   decision-makers           “is   particularly

appropriate” in this case because both the IHO and SRO issued

“thorough and careful[]” decisions agreeing that the IEP offered

                                          9
M.G. a FAPE for the 2018-2019 school year. Id. at 129. We must

always   be   “mindful   that     the    judiciary    generally    lacks   the

specialized    knowledge    and     experience       necessary    to   resolve

persistent and difficult questions of educational policy.” Id.

(citation and quotation marks omitted). Applying these standards,

the District Court properly affirmed the SRO’s decision. The Court

observed that the “SRO, like the IHO before him, concluded that

the child suffered from so many different disabilities that her

needs were best served by being in the 12:1+4 classroom. And [the

SRO] specifically found that the presence of additional adults in

the classroom was most likely to provide precisely the type of

programming   that   will   address      this   student’s   unique     needs.”

Navarro Carrillo, 2021 WL 4137663, at *17 (citation and quotation

marks omitted). We find no error in this conclusion. 4

4 To the extent appellants contend that M.G.’s IEP was procedurally
inadequate because the CSE improperly “predetermined” the outcome,
the record does not support such a contention. Appellants’ Br. at
43. “Predetermination is inconsistent with the goals of the IDEA,
which envision a collaborative process in developing a uniquely
suitable educational placement for each child. ... However, where
a Parent has actively and meaningfully participated in the
development of an IEP, courts have rejected predetermination
claims.” E.H. ex rel. M.K. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 164 F. Supp.
3d 539, 551 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). The March 2018 meeting, in which
appellants participated, lasted nearly three hours, and the IEP
expressly   noted   appellants’   concerns  regarding    the  class
placement. See App’x at 99, 1277. As the District Court observed,
“the record actually suggests that it was the parents, not the
district, who lacked an open mind about the process.” Navarro
Carrillo, 2021 WL 4137663, at *12.

                                        10
      Appellants also argue that the District Court improperly

denied their motion for reconsideration. “We review a district

court’s    denial   of   a    motion     for   reconsideration   for       abuse   of

discretion.” Simon v. City of New York, 727 F.3d 167, 171 (2d Cir.

2013). “A court abuses its discretion when (1) its decision rests

on an error of law or a clearly erroneous factual finding; or (2)

cannot be found with[in] the range of permissible decisions.” Id.

(citation and quotation marks omitted). The District Court was not

required    to   reconsider        its   decision   in   light   of    IEPs,       IHO

decisions, and SRO decisions from school years other than 2018–

2019, because they are not determinative of the adequacy of M.G.’s

2018–2019 IEP. See M.C. ex rel. Mrs. C. v. Voluntown Bd. of Educ.,

226 F.3d 60, 67 (2d Cir. 2000); see also J.R. ex rel. J.R. v.

N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 748 F. App’x 382, 386 (2d Cir. 2018). Thus,

the   District   Court       did   not   abuse   its   discretion     by    denying

appellants’ motion for reconsideration.

                                          11
     We have considered appellants’ remaining arguments and find

them to be without merit. 5 Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of

the District Court.

                      FOR THE COURT:

                      Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

5 We need not reach the question of which party at the District
Court level bears the burden of persuasion at Prong I of the
Burlington-Carter test. See M.W., 725 F.3d at 135. This question
would become significant only “if the evidence was in equipoise[,]”
which it was not in this case. Id. at 135 n.1 (citation and
quotation marks omitted).

                                 12