Court Opinion

ID: 9475916
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:42:36.950555+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:39:23.628371
License: Public Domain

CYNTHIA HOLCOMB HALL, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
The majority holds today that a prosecutor’s comment in closing argument on the defendant’s laughter during the testimony of other witnesses is reversible error. Because I believe that the courtroom demean- or of the defendant in this case is evidence that the jury could properly consider, I respectfully dissent from Section II.A of the majority’s opinion.
I
The principle that a defendant’s courtroom demeanor is evidence is well-settled. In Russell v. United States, 288 F.2d 520 (9th Cir.1961), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 926, 83 S.Ct. 296, 9 L.Ed.2d 234 (1962), this court observed that a trial court is in a much better position than an appellate court to determine whether the evidence in a particular case warrants a new trial. We noted that
[t]he trial judge can see in the conduct and demeanor of one who testifies (or even in the conduct and demeanor of defendants who never take the witness stand, as the defendants did not here) a thousand and one matters impossible for a reviewing court to glean from a printed page.
Id. at 522. Likewise, in Reagan v. United States, 157 U.S. 301, 15 S.Ct. 610, 39 L.Ed. 709 (1895), the Supreme Court quoted with approval instructions that specifically advised a jury to consider the defendant’s “demeanor and conduct upon the witness stand and during the trial.” Id. at 308, 15 S.Ct. at 613 (emphasis added).1 See also Waller v. United States, 179 F. 810, 812 (8th Cir.1910).
Sound policy reasons exist for allowing a jury to consider the courtroom demeanor of a defendant. As Wigmore noted: “[I]t is as unwise to attempt the impossible as it is impolitic to conduct trials upon a fiction; and the attempt to force a jury to become mentally blind to the behavior of the accused sitting before them involves both an impossibility in practice and a fiction in theory.” 2 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 274 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1979).2 Taken to its logical conclusion, the majority’s opinion would require a court to instruct a jury to reach its verdict as if the accused had not been present before it.
The majority relies on United States v. Wright, 489 F.2d 1181 (D.C.Cir.1973), United States v. Carroll, 678 F.2d 1208 (4th Cir.1982), and United States v. Pearson, 746 F.2d 787 (11th Cir.1984), for the proposition that it is reversible error for a prosecutor to comment on a defendant’s courtroom behavior. To the extent that these cases stand for the broad principle that a defendant’s courtroom demeanor is never relevant evidence, I believe they were incorrectly decided. However, a careful reading of the cases demonstrates that they are simply restating the standard contained in Fed.R.Evid. 404(a), namely, that “[ejvidence of a person’s character ... is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion.”
In Wright, the defendant was charged with bank robbery. During his closing argument, the prosecutor commented on the defendant’s unruly courtroom behavior. The District of Columbia Circuit held that *984the defendant’s behavior off the witness stand was not “legally relevant to the question of his guilt or innocence of the crime charged.” 489 F.2d at 1186 (emphasis added). Similarly, in Carroll, a bank robbery case, the prosecutor commented on the fact that the defendant had examined bank surveillance photographs with his attorney during trial. The Fourth Circuit held that a defendant’s courtroom demeanor could not be introduced “solely to prove guilt.” 678 F.2d at 1210 (emphasis added).3 Finally, in Pearson, the defendant was charged with possessing an unregistered silencer and possessing a silencer without a serial number. In closing argument, the prosecutor commented on the defendant’s nervousness off the witness stand. The Eleventh Circuit held that “the defendant’s behavior off the witness stand in this instance was not evidence subject to comment.” 746 F.2d at 796 (emphasis added).
The majority incorrectly assumes that Schuler’s laughter is evidence of his character offered solely to prove guilt. In fact, Schuler’s laughter is relevant to another material issue in the case, Schuler’s mental state. As such, the laughter is admissible under Fed.R.Evid. 404(b).4 Cf. Commonwealth v. Louraine, 390 Mass. 28, 34, 453 N.E.2d 437, 442 (1983) (“[I]t is an established and universally accepted rule that, when a defendant’s sanity is at issue, the trier of fact is entitled to consider the defendant’s demeanor in court.”).
Fed.R.Evid. 404(b) provides for the admission of other acts of the defendant in order to prove that he had the requisite intent for a crime. In this case, Schuler’s intent at the time of the alleged threat was at issue; the defense asserted that Schuler’s remark was an expression of anger at law enforcement personnel and not a serious threat to the President. Schuler’s behavior in the courtroom was relevant evidence on the issue of intent and, hence, was admissible under Fed.R.Evid. 404(b).
The Ninth Circuit has consistently upheld the admission into evidence of other acts of a defendant where, as here, that defendant’s mental state is at issue. For example, in United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331 (9th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1000, 98 S.Ct. 1656, 56 L.Ed.2d 90 (1978), this court affirmed the conviction of Patricia Hearst for robbing a bank in San Francisco. At trial, the defense claimed that Hearst was acting under duress at the time she committed the robbery. The trial court admitted evidence of subsequent criminal activities of the defendant in Los Angeles which undercut the defense. This court upheld the admission of the evidence under Fed.R.Evid. 404(b), noting that
[ajppellant’s state of mind during the San Francisco robbery was the central issue in the case. State of mind is usually difficult to prove, and the evidence on the issue was sharply divided. The timing and other circumstances of the Los Angeles incidents made evidence of them highly probative on this critical issue.
563 F.2d at 1337.
Likewise, in United States v. McCollum, 732 F.2d 1419 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 920, 105 S.Ct. 301, 83 L.Ed.2d 236 (1984), this court affirmed the conviction of the defendant for bank robbery. At trial, the defense claimed that the defendant was acting under hypnosis at the time of the robbery. This court upheld the trial court’s admission into evidence of a twelve year old conviction for armed robbery under Fed.R.Evid. 404(b): “Such a prior act can be probative of intent because the fact *985that the defendant had an unlawful intent at the time he committed the extrinsic offense makes it less likely that he had a lawful intent when he performed the acts charged as the present offense.” 732 F.2d at 1424. We then proceeded to state the general rule of law as follows: “Where the mental state to be inferred from undisputed overt acts of a defendant is the crucial issue, evidence of past criminal acts has generally been found insufficiently prejudicial to warrant exclusion.” Id. at 1425.
In this case, Schuler’s bizarre behavior in the courtroom lends credence to the government’s claim that his threat was indeed serious. Moreover, the admission of Schuler’s laughter is certainly less prejudicial than the admission of the criminal acts in Hearst and McCollum. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the jury to consider Schuler’s laughter.5
II
Even if the majority is correct in its holding that the prosecutor’s remark during closing argument was improper, the statement must be evaluated in the context of other prejudicial statements made by overzealous prosecutors in their closing arguments. In Darden v. Wainwright, — U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 2464, 91 L.Ed.2d 144 (1986), the Supreme Court established the standard for reviewing prejudicial remarks made by the prosecution during closing arguments: “The relevant question is whether the prosecutors’ comments ‘so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.’ ” Id. 106 S.Ct. at 2472 (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643, 94 S.Ct. 1868, 1871, 40 L.Ed.2d 431 (1974)). See also United States v. Patel, 762 F.2d 784, 795 (9th Cir.1985). This is a question of law reviewed de novo, United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1201 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 824, 105 S.Ct. 101, 83 L.Ed.2d 46 (1984), though we give considerable deference to the district court’s evaluation of the impact of the prosecutor’s remarks on the jury, United States v. McWilliams, 730 F.2d 1218, 1222 (9th Cir.1984).
In Darden, the prosecutors made a series of prejudicial remarks to the jury concerning the defendant during their closing arguments. The prosecution stated, among other things, that: (1) the defendant was an “animal” who should not be “out of his cell unless he has a leash on him and a prison guard at the other end of that leash”; (2) “I wish I could see [the defendant] sitting here with no face, blown away by a shotgun”; and (3) “[t]he only thing [the defendant] hasn’t done [to change his appearance] that I know of is cut his throat.” 106 S.Ct. 2471-72 nn. 11 & 12. The Supreme Court stated that these comments “undoubtedly were improper.” Id. at 2471-72. Yet, despite the highly personal and emotional nature of the prosecution’s remarks, the Court held that the prosecutors committed no constitutional error and therefore that the defendant was not deprived of a fair trial under the due process clause. Id. at 2473.
I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that Schuler was denied his fifth amendment right to a fair trial. Comparing the many offensive remarks made in Darden to the single comment made by the prosecutor here concerning the defendant’s laughter, I conclude that there was no due process violation. Surely the majority does not hold that the introduction of inadmissible evidence is a per se violation of the fifth amendment. To so hold would be to elevate a single violation of the Federal Rules of Evidence into a constitutional violation.
I therefore dissent from Section II.A. of the majority’s opinion.

. Unlike the defendant in Reagan, Schuler chose not to testify. However, the Russell case, like this case, involved a non-testifying defendant. This court held that the demeanor of such a non-testifying defendant was relevant evidence.

. See also H. Underhill, Criminal Evidence § 125 n. 9 (5th ed. 1956) ("Practically it is impossible to prevent jurors from observing the appearance and behavior of the accused very closely while he is in court during the trial. They will naturally draw inferences therefrom either favorable or unfavorable to him. The information thus obtained is evidence, and, doubtless, many a verdict has been determined thereby.").

. The court in Carroll also relied on the fact that the prosecutor’s comment violated both the defendant's right not to testify and his right to assist his counsel in his own defense. 678 F.2d at 1209. Neither of these factors is present here. The majority concedes it is doubtful that the jurors construed the prosecutor's comment on Schuler’s laughter as referring to his failure to testify. Moreover, it is obvious that Schuler’s laughter was not an attempt to assist his counsel in his own defense.

. Fed.R.Evid. 404(b) provides as follows (emphasis added):
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.

. The majority erroneously applies a de novo standard of review. A trial court’s decision on the admissibility of evidence under Fed.R.Evid. 404 should be reviewed for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331, 1337 (9th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1000, 98 S.Ct. 1656, 56 L.Ed.2d 90 (1978).