Court Opinion

ID: 9414601
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 06:11:58.082681+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:53.125549
License: Public Domain

AFFIRMED and Opinion Filed July 24, 2023

                                     S In The
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                No. 05-22-00307-CR

                   TARIQ MUSTAFAA MILLER, Appellant
                                 V.
                     THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

               On Appeal from the 416th Judicial District Court
                            Collin County, Texas
                   Trial Court Cause No. 416-82170-2021

                        MEMORANDUM OPINION
                Before Justices Pedersen, III, Garcia, and Kennedy
                            Opinion by Justice Garcia
      Appellant was convicted of two counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child

and three counts of indecency with a child by contact. The trial court assessed

punishment at thirty years in prison for each of the aggravated sexual assault charges

and ten years in prison for each of the indecency charges, with the sentences to run

concurrently. In a single issue, appellant now argues the trial court’s denial of his

motion for continuance deprived him of due process and the right to effective

assistance of counsel. Concluding appellant’s arguments are without merit, we

affirm the trial court’s judgment.
                                          I.    Background

        When the complaining witness MT was fourteen years old, she made a

delayed outcry against appellant for sexually assaulting her when she was three, four,

or five years old. Appellant was arrested for aggravated sexual assault of a child and

indecency with a child. He confessed to some of the actions underlying the charges.1

        In June 2021, the State provided defense counsel with discovery consisting of

about ninety-one pages. Four or five of those pages referred to an outcry MJ made

in 2010 against an eleven-year-old juvenile respondent, RJ, when she was three years

old.

        On January 21, 2022, defense counsel asked the prosecutor for more

information about the RJ case. Specifically, counsel asked how the RJ case was

handled and investigated and what the outcome had been. The prosecutor said she

did not believe RJ was ever prosecuted but would follow up after she met with MT.

        On March 17, 2022, four days before the scheduled trial, defense counsel sent

the prosecutor an email stating:

        One of the reports references [MT] outcried an aggravated sexual
        assault on 4/11/2010 that resulted in a juvenile arrest. There is a Plano
        offense report number 10-66432. I see call notes in the main offense
        report that an offense occurred right around that time, but there are no
        notes that it led to an arrest. I don’t believe I received any information
        on how that case was disposed.

    1
      Appellant admitted that he touched MT’s vagina for about two minutes when he was intoxicated and
had rubbed her vagina with his hand. He also said that MT often touched his penis and laughed about it. In
addition to his custodial confession, appellant also wrote MT a letter apologizing and saying he didn’t mean
to cause her problems by touching her.
                                                   –2–
      The next day, the prosecutor responded:

      Got these records released. This is the juvenile case. Our prosecutor
      remembered it as well. [MT], who was 3, got on the stand and would
      not testify, she froze. They tried to do it via closed circuit TV but she
      would not speak. [RJ], the 11 year old defendant in the case, gave a
      statement admitting to touching his penis to her vagina, but he stated it
      was an accident and his pants were on. The court found the victim to be
      not competent to testify because she couldn’t testify, so the court found
      the allegation not true. See attached records.

There were 372 pages of records attached to the email, but many pages were

duplicative, and only about 190 pages were unique. The documents included a

summary of MT’s forensic interview, copies of the SANE exam, offense reports,

witness statements, and notes from an interview with MT.

      On Monday morning, the parties convened for a hearing on a motion to

suppress appellant’s confession and to select a jury. Defense counsel informed the

court that he was “going to need some guidance from the court and maybe some

creative problem solving” in connection with the recently produced records. After

explaining the situation, defense counsel told the judge, “The bottom line is I don’t

have a copy of the order finding the allegation [against RJ] was found to be not true.”

      Counsel for both parties informed the court that they had been working on a

stipulation but could not agree. Defense counsel had requested that the State stipulate

that MT made an allegation against RJ when she was three, and after a hearing, the

allegation was found not true. The State agreed, as long as the defense would also

stipulate that RJ admitted to touching his penis to MT’s vagina, and the reason the

allegation was found not true was because MT was found not competent to testify.
                                         –3–
Defense counsel would not agree to these additional facts because he did not think

the State could prove them.

      The prosecutor advised the court that the State’s file included docket entries

stating MT was not competent to testify and the allegation was found not true. The

court told the prosecutor to provide copies of the docket sheet to defense counsel

and the court and told defense counsel, “I would love for you to have the certified

copy . . . but it appears that’s not going to happen today.”

      The court then conducted a hearing on the motion to suppress appellant’s

custodial statements and denied the motion. After conferring with his client, defense

counsel made an oral motion for continuance.

      The first part of the motion was based on appellant’s health. Appellant

testified about a poisonous spider bite he suffered in jail and his treatment for that

injury, including prescription pain killers. The court denied the motion based on

appellant’s health.

      Defense counsel then urged that the case be continued because of the late

production of the additional records. Counsel admitted that he had reviewed the

records, but argued he did not have time to investigate. He further argued that the

late production impeded his ability to cross-examine MT’s mother “to let the jury

know there’s other allegations that have been made and found not true.”

      The judge questioned counsel extensively about what he would do if he had

more time, noting “we’re not going to try an ancillary case . . . in the middle of this.”

                                          –4–
Counsel said he could not specify what he would do because he had not had time to

investigate. The oral motion for continuance was denied.

      But when appellant was arraigned, he did not enter a plea, and the court took

a recess. The court expressed concern about appellant’s injury and his ability to

understand the proceedings and assist in his defense and noted that the defense

wanted more time for discovery on the RJ case. As a result, the judge dismissed the

potential jurors and told them to come back the next day.

      Appellant was feeling better when the parties returned the next day. Defense

counsel advised the court that he had reviewed the records, issued a number of

subpoenas, moved to unseal a portion of the juvenile record in the RJ case, and

obtained an order from the juvenile court partially releasing the contents of the file.

Nonetheless, counsel advised that he had filed a sworn, written motion for

continuance based on the RJ issue. Noting that the juvenile case was “pretty much

an ancillary issue” the judge denied the motion.

      The parties selected a jury and proceeded to trial. When the State announced

that it would call MT and her mother to testify, the judge told defense counsel she

was going to allow him ask “pretty much anything you want” and give him as much

time as he wanted to cross-examine the witnesses. Specifically, the judge told

defense counsel that she wanted him to have enough time to go over everything he

needed to give over and if he wanted to go through the 400 pages of documents page

by page “we will sit here and do that.”

                                          –5–
      Defense counsel advised that he had obtained a copy of the juvenile court’s

“Order Finding Not True” in the RJ case. Counsel showed the order to MT’s mother

during cross-examination, and she agreed that the court had found the allegation

against RJ not true. MT testified that she did not recall the RJ incident.

      The defense rested immediately after the State and did not call any witnesses.

During closing argument, both parties argued about the RJ case and the juvenile

court’s finding that the allegation was not true.

      The jury found appellant guilty on all counts. After the jury was released, the

trial court admitted a timeline of events surrounding its ruling on the motion for

continuance and discussed the timeline with the parties on the record. Among other

things, the court noted that the case had already been reset once and when appellant

requested a continuance, the case was the oldest “jail case” on the court’s docket and

had been pending since appellant’s arrest in early 2021.

      The punishment phase was tried to the court. Upon conclusion, the trial court

assessed punishment at thirty years in prison on each of the aggravated sexual assault

charges and ten years in prison on each of the indecency charges, with the sentences

to run concurrently. Judgment was entered accordingly.

      Appellant subsequently filed a motion for new trial based on the denial of his

motion for continuance. Defense counsel testified about the investigation he would

have done had he been granted more time. Counsel acknowledged that the

prosecutor had turned over the additional documents as soon as she had them and

                                         –6–
that there were not 400 pages of new information. He further acknowledged that

both appellant and RJ admitted to abusing MT.

        The prosecutor also testified. She explained that there were duplicates in the

372-page file she produced and there were only about 190 unique pages. The

documents she turned over included a summary of MT’s forensic interview, copies

of the SANE exam, offense reports, witness statements, and notes from an interview

with RJ.

        When the hearing concluded, the court denied the motion for new trial. This

timely appeal followed.

                                            II.   Analysis

        Appellant argues the trial court erred by denying his motion for continuance

after the State’s production of new records shortly before trial. According to

appellant, the denial of a continuance deprived him of his rights to a fair trial and

effective assistance of counsel.2

        We review the denial of a motion for continuance for an abuse of discretion,

giving a wide degree of deference to the trial court. See Gallo v. State, 239 S.W.3d

757, 764 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Gonzales v. State, 304 S.W.3d 838, 842 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2010) (citations omitted); see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.

    2
      Here, there was both an oral motion for continuance and a written motion. We consider only the trial
court’s denial of the sworn, written motion for continuance. See Blackshear v. State, 385 S.W.3d 589, 591
(Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
                                                  –7–
29.06(6) (sufficiency of a motion for continuance shall be addressed to “sound

discretion” of court and “shall not be granted as matter of right”). We consider the

circumstances of the case and the reasons given to the trial court at the time the

request is made, and we bear in mind the general interest in the prompt and efficient

administration of justice. Rosales v. State, 841 S.W.2d 368, 374 (Tex. Crim. App.

1992).

      The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that reversible error predicated

on the denial of a pretrial motion for continuance requires showing both that the trial

court abused its discretion by denying the motion and that the lack of a continuance

caused harm. Gonzales, 304 S.W.3d at 842–43. The requirements to establish an

abuse of discretion and prejudice apply when, as here, the appellant attempts to

infuse the denial of a continuance with special constitutional significance. See id.;

Gallo, 239 S.W.3d at 764 (holding same as to alleged deprivation of effective

assistance and due process through denial of continuance); Lewis v. State, No. 05-

93-00871-CR, 1995 WL 479631, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 11, 1995, pet. ref’d)

(mem. op. not designated for publication) (no abuse of discretion therefore no federal

constitutional violation); Rosales, 841 S.W.2d at 374 (denial of request for more

time does not always violate due process).

         To show an abuse of discretion, an appellant must demonstrate “that the case

made for delay was so convincing that no reasonable trial judge could conclude that

scheduling and other considerations as well as fairness to the State outweighed the

                                         –8–
defendant’s interest in delay of the trial.” Gonzales, 304 S.W.3d at 843; Nichols v.

State, No. 02-13-00566-CR, 2014 WL 7779272, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb.

5, 2014, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication). To show prejudice,

the appellant should show “with considerable specificity how the defendant was

harmed by the absence of more preparation time than he actually had,” such as by

demonstrating “what additional information, evidence [,] or witnesses the defense

would have had available if the motion for delay had been granted.” Gonzales, 304

S.W.3d at 842–43; Kerr v. State, Nos. 02-20-00034-CR, 02-20-00035-CR, 2021 WL

3793817, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 26, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op. on reh’g,

not designated for publication). “That counsel merely desired more time to prepare

does not alone establish an abuse of discretion.” Janecka v. State, 937 S.W.2d 456,

468 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); see also Heiselbetz v. State, 906 S.W.2d 500, 512 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1995) (assertion that counsel did not have time to adequately investigate

medical records for potential mitigating evidence without any showing of harm

failed to establish an abuse of discretion).

        Appellant’s motion for new trial did not raise the due process and ineffective

assistance claims, nor does appellant adequately brief the issues on appeal.3

Accordingly, the issues have not been preserved for our review. See TEX. R. APP. P.

    3
     There was also no evidence adduced concerning ineffective assistance of counsel. Although defense
counsel testified at the hearing on the motion for new trial that he “felt like” his representation of appellant
had been compromised by the court’s continuance ruling, he did not specify how.
                                                     –9–
38.1. But even if the issues had been preserved, the record does not reflect that the

trial court abused its discretion or that appellant was harmed.

      Appellant did not establish that production of the additional records shortly

before trial impaired his ability to present an effective defense. See Phifer v. State,

No. 05-18-01232-CR, 2020 WL 1149916, at *12 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 10, 2020,

pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (concluding, based on similar

considerations, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying a

continuance for further inquiry into 850 pages of newly produced documents);

Reichle v. State, No. 06-14-00073-CR, 2015 WL 392846, at *8–9 (Tex. App.—

Texarkana Jan. 30, 2015, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication)

(same, 250 pages); Suazo v. State, No. 03-08-00460-CR, 2010 WL 5018971, at *3–

4 (Tex. App.—Austin Dec. 10, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for

publication) (same, 110 pages); Baxter v. State, No. 07-99-0412-CR, 2001 WL

360677, at *1 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Apr. 11, 2001, no pet.) (mem. op. not

designated for publication) (same, 216 pages). Indeed, counsel acknowledged that

he was aware of MT’s outcry against RJ when he received the State’s initial

discovery nine months prior to the trial. Appellant does not explain why he failed to

investigate and follow up on this issue at that time.

      Appellant selectively quotes the trial judge’s observations that the case had

been pending for a long time and needed to be tried to argue the trial court

“elevate[ed] an expeditious proceeding over a fundamentally fair trial.” These select

                                        –10–
passages, however, lack context and ignore the other factors the court had to balance

against appellant’s rationale for further delay.

      Significantly, as the court noted on several occasions, the juvenile case

involving MT’s outcry against RJ in 2010 when she was three years old was ancillary

to this 2020 case against appellant. Moreover, both appellant and RJ confessed to

portions of MT’s allegations of abuse.

      The primary reason appellant advanced when seeking a continuance was the

need for a certified copy of the order finding the allegations in the RJ case not true.

But counsel was able to obtain the order, use the order to cross-examine MT’s

mother, and argue about the order to the jury.

      Appellant also fails to address the inconvenience to the witnesses, opposing

counsel, and the trial court that would result from further delay. See Harrell v. State,

No. 08-13-00031-CR, 2014 WL 1259399, at *3 (Tex. App.—El Paso Mar. 26, 2014,

no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). The trial court reminded defense

counsel of the negative psychological impact delay can have on a witness who has

been preparing to testify about sexual abuse. The court also expressed concern for

appellant, who had been incarcerated for a year, and also had an interest in the

expeditious resolution of the case.

      Nonetheless, appellant argues that his testimony at the hearing on the motion

for new trial showed the denial of a continuance prevented him from:

                                         –11–
          Following up with several witnesses, including speaking with RJ or his
           attorney;

          Retaining a behavioral expert to compare the outcries and opine about
           whether MT was conflating events or merging details;

          Retaining a medical expert to compare the SANE exam in 2010 to the
           SANE exam in 2020; and

          Consulting with an expert concerning the presence or absence of bodily
           fluids collected and whether they would implicate or exculpate
           appellant.

      Appellant did not identify any of these areas of potential investigation when

he argued the motion, see Rosales, 841 S.W.2d at 374 (we consider the reasons given

at the time the continuance is requested), and his rationale is not persuasive now.

Having inadequate time to interview witnesses and hire experts does not establish

an abuse of discretion. See Janecka, 937 S.W.2d at 468. As we have noted, the RJ

case was ancillary to this matter, and appellant had partially confessed to the

allegations against him in this case. RT had also confessed, and the reason the

allegation was found not true was because three-year-old MT was unable to testify.

      MT had no recollection of the RJ incident. When she testified about having

nightmares about appellant’s abuse, defense counsel questioned her extensively

about her memories and dreams of the sexual assault. In closing argument, counsel

argued about MT’s inability to remember and that “dreams turning into daydreams

. . . is just not evidence.” Nothing prevented appellant from further arguing that MT

was confusing the RJ incident with her allegations against appellant.

                                       –12–
       Despite the ancillary nature of the RJ matter, the court afforded appellant

complete latitude to cross-examine witnesses about the matter. Moreover, although

appellant issued several subpoenas after the additional documents were received, he

does not argue that the subpoenas could not be served or that he was unable to solicit

testimony from these witnesses. Indeed, the record reflects that appellant was able

to present and argue the fact he deemed significant—that the RJ allegation was found

to be not true.

       All the additional investigation appellant asserts he could have undertaken

pertains to further development of the ancillary matter. But appellant fails to explain

how an inability to compare the two SANE exams and retain an expert concerning

bodily fluids impaired his defense, particularly considering his confession. Although

it is conceivable that appellant may have been able to retain an expert to opine about

whether MT merged details or conflated events, something more than speculation

about what might have been accomplished is required. See Renteria v. State, 206

S.W.3d 689, 702 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)4.

       Under these circumstances, we conclude that appellant did not make such a

convincing case for delay that a reasonable trial judge could not have concluded that

fairness and scheduling outweighed appellant’s interest in delay. See Gonzales, 304

S.W.3d at 843. The record does not demonstrate an abuse of discretion or that

   4
     In addressing appellant’s argument, we do not opine about whether any of the evidence appellant
wanted to develop would have been admissible.
                                               –13–
appellant was harmed. See id. at 842–43. Appellant’s issue is resolved against him

and the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

                                              /Dennise Garcia/
                                              DENNISE GARCIA
                                              JUSTICE
Do Not Publish
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b)
220307F.U05

                                        –14–
                                   S
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                 JUDGMENT

TARIQ MUSTAFAA MILLER,                        On Appeal from the 416th Judicial
Appellant                                     District Court, Collin County, Texas
                                              Trial Court Cause No. 416-82170-
No. 05-22-00307-CR          V.                2021.
                                              Opinion delivered by Justice Garcia.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee                  Justices Pedersen, III and Kennedy
                                              participating.

    Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered July 24, 2023

                                       –15–