Court Opinion

ID: 9951553
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-18 14:08:48.88819+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:41:30.800884
License: Public Domain

RECORD IMPOUNDED

                             NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                            APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
     This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
  internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                     SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                     APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                     DOCKET NO. A-1049-22

IN THE MATTER OF
REGISTRANT W.C.
___________________________

                Argued February 27, 2024 – Decided March 18, 2024

                Before Judges Gooden Brown and Puglisi.

                On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                Division,   Cumberland      County,    Docket     No.
                ML-19060034.

                Joseph J. Rodgers argued the cause for appellant W.C.

                Kimberly Page Will, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the
                cause for respondent State of New Jersey (Jennifer
                Webb-McRae, Cumberland County Prosecutor,
                attorney; Holly Ann Fanelle, Assistant Prosecutor, of
                counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

       Registrant W.C. appeals from the October 24, 2022 Law Division order

denying his motion to terminate his obligation to register under Megan's Law,

N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1 to -23, and for release from Community Supervision for Life
(CSL), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4. We affirm, substantially for the reasons set forth in

Judge Kevin T. Smith's well-reasoned written opinion.

        In January 1997, registrant's aunt, who lived in California, reported her

fifteen-year-old foster daughter T.W.1 missing. T.W. also had run away from

home the prior September to be with registrant, who was twenty-eight years old.

They had known each other since T.W.'s foster placement into the aunt and

uncle's home six years before.

        The aunt believed T.W. was staying with registrant in his mother's house

in New Jersey, but law enforcement learned he had been arrested at a motel in

Delaware, where T.W. was staying with him. T.W. provided a statement to

detectives confirming they had engaged in sexual intercourse on more than one

occasion between November 1996 and January 1997. Registrant was charged

with sex offenses and child endangerment in both New Jersey and Delaware.

        A Gloucester County grand jury indicted registrant on charges of second-

degree sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(c)(4); and third-degree endangering the

welfare of a child, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1). On December 2, 1997, registrant

pleaded guilty to third-degree endangering the welfare of a child by sexual

conduct.     On February 20, 1998, he was sentenced to thirty months' non-

1
    Initials are used to protect the identity of the victim. R. 1.38-3(c)(12).
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custodial probation, concurrent with his Delaware sentence, and to comply with

Megan's Law and CSL. He completed his probationary term in August 2000.

      On June 10, 2022, registrant filed a motion to terminate his Megan's Law

registration obligations pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(f) and for release from CSL

pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4(c).          The motion was supported by a

psychological evaluation conducted by Dr. Kelly White and was opposed by the

State. The judge heard arguments of counsel and denied the motion in a written

opinion and order dated October 24, 2022.

      After considering the nature and circumstances of the underlying

conviction, the judge noted registrant's current Registrant Risk Assessment

Scale (RRAS) score was a twenty-one, which placed him in the mid-range of

Tier One, low risk. The court then addressed Dr. White's report, noting her

findings on the assessments she administered to registrant:

            On the STATIC-99R test[,] which is designed to predict
            risk of future sexual offenses, [registrant] was placed in
            a moderate risk category. On the STABLE-2007,
            which predicts recidivism, [registrant] did not display
            sexual preoccupation or deviant sexual preference. On
            the ACUTE-2007, which predicts the risk of a sexual
            offense while on community supervision, [registrant]
            scored a low priority on the risk of sex/violence and
            moderate, regarding general recidivism risk. And on
            the PPI-R test, [registrant] was found to exhibit high
            emotional stability, low for stress intolerance. Based

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            on these four tests, Dr. White concluded [registrant] is
            not an ongoing threat to the community.

      The judge found Dr. White's recommendation to terminate Megan's Law

and for release from CSL "concerning" for several reasons. First, Dr. White

acknowledged "[registrant] describe[d] his offense and lack of responsibility for

his actions despite treatment completion. He minimized his role and placed

blame on the victim," which she found "indicative of his results on the

administered personality assessment." The judge found this concern echoed the

State's objection to the motion.

      The judge also found Dr. White's conclusion registrant did not pose a

threat to the safety of others was inconsistent with the assessment scores.

Although Dr. White characterized the scores to be a low or medium risk to re-

offend either sexually or violently, the judge noted the STATIC-99, STABLE-

2007 and general recidivism section of the ACUTE-2007 all indicated a

moderate risk. The only low score was the sex/violence risk of the ACUTE-

2007. In addition, while the PPI-R assessment was in normal limits, registrant

"scored close to the standard deviation for [c]old-heartedness."

      This cold-heartedness assessment was "most concerning" to the judge. As

the judge explained, "Cold-heartedness is defined as 'a person's inability to

experience either positive or negative emotions, measures closed mindedness to

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fantasies and non[-]traditional value systems and predicts one's ability to act in

a deviant or sneaky manner.'" The judge continued:

            This tendency to exhibit cold-heartedness is prevalent
            in a conversation between [registrant] and Dr. White.
            In the conversation, [registrant] stated his charge was
            "different than others, it was a one-time thing" . . .
            despite being reminded it was not a one-time
            occurrence. Moreover, [registrant] later stated he
            believed T.W. and [he] were in a relationship and did
            not accept responsibility for his actions, even after
            "successfully" completing treatment.

      Thus, the judge found Dr. White's positive findings and recommendation

conflicted with the assessments and the concerning statements he made during

the evaluation interview.

      The judge also addressed counsel's offer during oral argument to have

registrant return to Dr. White for re-evaluation to address the State's concerns:

            During oral argument, counsel stated, "unfortunately,
            my client now gets how he should have handled some
            of these things." This suggests [registrant] should have
            answered certain questions or inquiries in a way that
            may have painted him in a better light. Counsel further
            indicated, "since the report came out, he . . . gets it."

      The judge noted that "[t]rained and experienced professionals like Dr.

White, with the benefit of the actuarial tools utilized, attempt to get an accurate

picture of the status of individuals" they are evaluating. "Honesty on the part of

those being evaluated is critical although there are certain parts of these tools

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designed to ferret out efforts to make those being evaluated look better in the

eyes of the evaluator." The judge found that the evaluation showed registrant's

"unguarded moments of truth," which included placing "blame on the victim"

and "see[ing] himself as having been in a relationship with T.[W.], a [fourteen]-

year-old child half his age at the time." These candid statements underpinned

Dr. White's concerns about his lack of responsibility. Based on those concerns,

the judge determined that, despite his purportedly successful treatment and the

years that had elapsed since the offense, registrant "still doesn't get it."

      Accordingly, the judge found registrant remained a threat to the safety of

others and therefore failed to meet his burden to terminate his Megan's Law

registration obligation by a preponderance of the evidence and for release from

CSL by clear and convincing evidence.

      Because there is no dispute it has been more than fifteen years since

registrant's conviction and he remained offense-free during that period, the sole

issue on appeal is whether he met his burden to prove he was "not likely to pose

a threat to the safety of others." We agree with Judge Smith that he failed to do

so.

      We review the judge's determination on a motion to terminate Megan's

Law registration and CSL for abuse of discretion. See In re J.W., 410 N.J. Super.

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125, 130 (App. Div. 2009). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial judge's

"decision is 'made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from

established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis.'" Jacoby v. Jacoby,

427 N.J. Super. 109, 116 (App. Div. 2012) (quoting Flagg v. Essex Cnty.

Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002)).

      A registrant may apply to terminate the Megan's Law registration

obligations "upon proof that the person has not committed an offense within

[fifteen] years following conviction or release from a correctional facility . . .

and is not likely to pose a threat to the safety of others." N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(f).

"Relief from Megan's Law registration may be granted upon proof by a

preponderance of the evidence that a person is not likely to pose a threat to the

safety of others." In re J.M., 440 N.J. Super. 107, 116 (Law Div. 2014).

      Likewise, a defendant may be relieved of CSL where "the person has not

committed a crime for [fifteen] years since the last conviction or release from

incarceration, whichever is later, and that the person is not likely to pose a threat

to the safety of others if released from parole supervision." N.J.S.A. 2C:43-

6.4(c). "However, a person requesting termination from CSL . . . obligations

must demonstrate the same evidence by satisfying the court by the higher burden

of 'clear and convincing evidence.'" J.M., 440 N.J. Super. at 116.

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      The RRAS was "designed to provide prosecutors with an objective

standard on which to base the community notification decision mandated by

[Megan's Law] and to assure that the notification law is applied in a uniform

manner throughout the State." In re C.A., 146 N.J. 71, 100-01 (1996). The

RRAS "is used to assess whether a registrant's risk of reoffending is low,

moderate or high." In re A.D., 441 N.J. Super. 403, 407 (App. Div. 2015); see

also In re V.L., 441 N.J. Super. 425, 429 (App. Div. 2015) ("An overall score of

0 to 36 places an offender in Tier 1; 37 to 73, in Tier 2; and 74 to 111, Tier 3.").

"Although the Scale has not been empirically validated through scientific field

studies, the factors that comprise the Scale have been shown to be the best

indicators of risk of re-offense." C.A., 146 N.J. at 107. The RRAS is, however,

"only one possible consideration" of many in determining a registrant's risk of

re-offense. In re G.B., 147 N.J. 62, 78 (1996).

      Registrant argues the judge erred in giving insufficient weight to both the

RRAS and a psychological evaluation conducted in 1997, and in affording too

much weight to the assessment scores in Dr. White's evaluation. However, the

trial judge may accept or reject an expert report and decide the weight to afford

it. Maison v. N.J. Transit Corp., 460 N.J. Super. 222, 232 (App. Div. 2019); see

also State v. S.N., 231 N.J. 497, 514-15 (2018) ("[R]egardless of whether the

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evidence is live testimony, a videotaped statement, or documentary evidence,

deference is owed to the trial court's determinations of fact and credibility."

(citing State v. S.S., 229 N.J. 360, 379 (2017))). Accordingly, we defer to the

judge's credibility determination and the weight he assigned to the information

and evaluation before him.

      Based on this record, we conclude the judge's well-supported denial of

registrant's request to terminate his Megan's Law obligations and for release

from CSL was not an abuse of discretion. After fully considering the record, he

determined registrant failed to prove he was not likely to pose a threat to the

safety of others. The judge cited assessment scores which largely indicated a

moderate risk of recidivism, the score nearing cold-heartedness and,

significantly, despite completing treatment and having years to reflect on his

conduct, registrant's candid display of minimizing his role and blaming the

victim. We discern no basis to overturn that decision.

      We have carefully considered registrant's remaining arguments and

conclude they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion.

See R. 2:11-3(e)(2).

      Affirmed.

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