Court Opinion

ID: 9729129
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:27:00.474442+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:55.540116
License: Public Domain

*165Concussing Opinion by
Mb. Justice Bell, J.:
Cottom testified at the trial that Eishon had driven his automobile across the center line of the highway and had crashed head-on into Cottom’s car. He was asked on cross-examination whether he had not stated to Eisbon fifteen days after the accident that he had no recollection as to how the collision had happened. Cottom denied that he had ever made such a statement. Eisbon testified that Cottom had admitted to him that he had no recollection of the accident. The lower Court admitted in evidence the hearsay testimony of a State Police officer that Cottom at the hospital seven days after the accident had told him that as he “neared the top of the hill a car came over on my side and hit me”. The question is whether or not such testimony is admissible under the doctrine of consonant statements.
As President Judge Rice said in the leading case of Commonwealth v. Kay, 14 Pa. Superior Ct. 376, 387: “The subject of the admissibility in evidence of the previous statements of a witness consonant with his testimony is not free from difficulty; that is to say, it is not easy to harmonize all the decisions and to deduce therefrom a single general rule governing every case. ... a mere conflict of testimony ... is not, alone, a sufficient reason for the admission of the witness’s prior unsworn statements [made the day after the occurrence].” The consonant statement in that case was held to be inadmissible.
The eases seem to be in agreement that a mere conflict of testimony or the making of inconsistent statements is not alone a sufficient reason for the admission of the witness’s prior unsworn and frequently self-serving or false statements.
I am convinced that the doctrine of consonant statements is a dangerous one, and in accordance with the *166recent decisions of this Court should be narrowly restricted. Unless the doctrine of consonant statements is narrowly limited and strictly construed, the opportunity for easily manufacturing false or self-serving evidence is tremendous. For example, (a) if a party to an automobile accident stated sometime after the accident that he did not see the red light until too late, or made some other damaging statement, or indeed, (b) if such party decided sometime after the accident what version of the accident it would be advantageous to tell in order to exculpate himself, any self-serving hearsay statements he might make to a dozen or more of his friends would be admissible if his testimony was challenged as a recent fabrication or on the ground that he had made prior inconsistent statements. The practical effect of such a broad rule would be to permit, if not invite, manufactured testimony and often defeat justice, even though theoretically the consonant statement was limited to prove that the testimony at trial was not a recent fabrication. A similar result could be obtained by every criminal who sought to establish an alibi or who made incriminating statements which he could disavow and discredit by self-serving or false declarations to a dozen friends. As stated by the Court in Clever v. Hilberry, 116 Pa. 481, 9 A. 647, the Court said (page 440) : “Nor do they show that the same statements were made before their ultimate effect on the question trying could have been foreseen. ... It would be a very dangerous practice, in our opinion, to permit a party who is about to commence an action against another, to go about making declarations to third persons as to the substance of his cause of action, and then on the trial of that same action to give those declarations in evidence for any purpose. It looks too much like an attempt to manufacture im*167proper testimony for the very purpose of using it on the trial.”
A consonant statement should be admitted in rebuttal only to rebut a charge of recent fabrication and then only if made almost immediately after the occurrence and before any reason or motive to fabricate existed, i. e., under circumstances which make it unlikely that the statement would be fabricated. Cf: Commonwealth v. Patskin, 372 Pa. 402, 93 A. 2d 704; Lyke v. Lehigh Valley Railroad Co., 236 Pa. 38, 84 A. 595; Clever v. Hilberry, 116 Pa., supra; 58 Am. Jur., Witnesses, §829, page 465.
The recent cases cited by the majority support this principle.
In Lyke v. Lehigh Valley Railroad Co., 236 Pa., supra, there was testimony that the plaintiff had made statements to the effect that he was not on the railroad car at the time of the accident. The Court admitted evidence of a witness that within fifteen or twenty minutes after the accident (and nearly two years before suit) he saw plaintiff limping and asked him if he had been hurt, whereupon the latter replied that he had been thrown from the car to the ground and hit his knee or leg.
In Commonwealth v. Patskin, 372 Pa., supra, the notebook of a Pennsylvania State Police officer, which was written immediately after defendant made oral admissions, was admitted when the officer’s testimony was attacked as a recent fabrication.
In Commonwealth v. Westwood, 324 Pa. 289, 188 A. 304, a witness, Sophie Schar, testified that she looked out of her window and saw defendant at the scene of the murder right after she heard the shots. To rebut the charge of recent fabrication, evidence was admitted (in rebuttal) by Sophie’s husband that his *168wife had immediately told him that she had just seen defendant out of her window.
In all the aforesaid cases relied upon by the majority,* the application of the rule, as a practical matter, has been wisely restricted to those instances where the prior consonant statement was made immediately or almost immediately after the occurrence to which it related and before there was any reason or motive to fabricate.
In the present case the prior consonant statement was made a week after the accident during five days of which Cottom was under serious physical disability and most of the time in an oxygen tent. Under such exceptional circumstances his statement may be considered as having been made within the rule, especially since appellant’s counsel took no exception to the charge of the Court, although asked if he desired to point out any errors therein. For these reasons I concur in the affirmation of the judgment.

 Commonwealth v. Miller, 31 Pa. Superior Ct. 317, was cited although not discussed in the majority opinion. In that case defendant, charged with bribery, attempted to show motive and bias on the part of the witness. Rebuttal testimony was admitted to the effect that about the time the bribe was alleged to have been paid and before the imputed motive of bias could have existed, the witness narrated the facts to others substantially as he narrated them upon the witness stand.