Court Opinion

ID: 9782336
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 18:22:57.142355+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:34:56.535669
License: Public Domain

MULLARKEY, C.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I respectfully dissent from part V of the majority opinion and its judgment reversing the defendant’s convictions.
This ease turns on the effect of an error in a jury instruction describing the state of mind required to commit the crime of theft. Because the defendant did not object to the jury instruction, the trial court had no opportunity to correct the instruction, and the error was not properly preserved for review on appeal. Crim. P. 30 (requiring party to object to instructions before they are given to the jury and stating that only such objections will be considered on review). Consequently, this error can be considered on appeal only if it rises to the high standard of plain error “affecting substantial rights.” Crim. P. 52. To constitute plain error, the error must be so obvious and serious that there is a reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the defendant’s conviction. People v. Stewart, 55 P.3d 107, 120 (Colo.2002). ' When the claimed plain error involves a jury instruction, we must evaluate it in the context of all of the jury instruction's and the trial record as a whole. Id.
The majority finds in part V of its opinion that the theft instruction is plain error. It then reverses the defendant’s convictions for second degree burglary and felony murder and remands the case for a new trial. In my opinion, the instruction error does not amount to plain error, and the defendant’s convictions should be affirmed. I reach this conclusion by considering the error in the theft instruction together with the other jury instructions and the verdicts returned by the jury. I analyze the instructions and verdicts in light of the evidence before the jury and the parties’ theories of the case, as argued to the jury.
As relevant to this part of the case, the amended complaint charged the defendant, Lisl Auman, with four crimes: first degree burglary, conspiracy to commit first degree burglary, second degree burglary, and conspiracy to commit second degree burglary. The burglary charges alleged that the defendant feloniously, unlawfully and knowingly entered a structure occupied by Shawn Cheever with the intent to commit the crimes of theft or theft by receiving against Cheever. The conspiracy charges alleged that the defendant and four other people (Mattheus Jaehnig, Demetria Soriano, Steven Duprey, and Dion Gerze) unlawfully and feloniously agreed to commit the crimes of burglary or *672attempted burglary and committed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.
The case was submitted to the jury with instructions on the four crimes charged in the information and on two additional crimes: first degree criminal trespass and conspiracy to commit first degree criminal trespass. The trespass charges were added at the defendant’s request.
The jury rejected the defendant’s criminal trespass theory and convicted the defendant of second degree burglary and conspiracy to commit first degree burglary.
As charged, theft and theft by receiving were the crimes underlying both first and second degree burglary. As instructed, however, theft and theft by receiving were the predicate crimes for first degree burglary but only theft was the predicate crime for second degree burglary. Turning to the theft instruction, I agree that the elements of the crime are not correctly stated. Jury Instruction 32 reads as follows:
The elements of the crime of Theft are:
(1) That the Defendant,
(2) In the State of Colorado, on or about November 12,1997,
(3) Knowingly
(a) obtained or exercised control over,
(b) anything of value,
(c) which is the property of another,
(4) without authorization, or by deception, and
(5) with intent to deprive the other person of the use or benefit of the thing of value.
The culpable mental states are defined in Instruction 34. “Knowingly” is explained as follows:
A person acts “knowingly” with respect to conduct or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when she is aware that her conduct is of such a nature or that such a circumstance exists. A person acts “knowingly” with respect to a result of her conduct when she is aware that her conduct is practically certain to cause the result.
The crime of theft, now codified at section 18-4-401(1), C.R.S. (2004), provides in relevant part: “A person commits theft when he knowingly obtains or exercises control over anything of value of another without authorization, or by ... deception, and (a) Intends to deprive the other person permanently of the use or benefit of the thing of value.”
Comparison of Instruction 32 and the statute shows that the instruction did not track the statutory language accurately. The instruction does not connect “without authorization or by deception” with the mental state of “knowingly.” Under our case law, “knowingly” could have been placed in its own numbered paragraph and it would have applied to all conduct described in the succeeding numbered paragraphs. People v. Bossert, 722 P.2d 998, 1011 (Colo.1986). Under the format used in Instruction 32, “knowingly” was placed in paragraph (3). It applies to the conduct described in subparagraphs (a), (b), and (c) but it does not expressly apply to the “without authorization, or by deception” conduct contained in paragraph (4). The error could have been corrected easily if it had been brought to the court’s attention. But we know it was not, and the issue before us is the likely effect of the error.
I doubt that the error had any direct effect on the jury’s determination that a theft occurred. A proper theft instruction would have required the jury to determine whether the defendant obtained Cheever’s property “knowingly without authorization or by deception.” With respect to whether the defendant acted “knowingly without authorization,” there was no factual dispute. Before the theft occurred, defendant knew that Cheever had not authorized her to take his property and she knew that the tripod and the sound system were his property. A few days earlier, Cheever had broken off his relationship with the defendant and padlocked his room to exclude the defendant from his room and its contents. The addition of the word “knowingly” would not have changed the jury’s reliance on “without authorization.”
Rather than relying on the mental state of “without authorization,” the jury in this case could have found that the defendant acted *673“by deception.” Omission of “knowingly” from the phrase “by deception” seems -to have little practical effect. The concept of acting “by deception” carries with it an inherent requirement of knowledge. One cannot accidentally or unknowingly act by deception. The common dictionary definition of deception is “the act of deceiving, cheating, hoodwinking, misleading, or deluding.” Deception is described as “a general term for any sort of deceiving by whatever method for whatever purpose.” Webster’s Third New International Unabridged Dictionary 585 (1986). For these reasons, it seems highly unlikely that the error in Instruction 32 affected the jury’s finding that the defendant committed theft, the predicate crime for burglary.1
The majority, however, finds the theft instruction to be a fatal error requiring reversal of the defendant’s second degree burglary conviction and, ultimately, the defendant’s felony murder conviction. Maj. Op. at 663-665. The majority notes that the crime of burglary required the defendant to unlawfully enter the premises with the intent to commit theft, and the defendant’s intent when she entered Cheever’s room was hotly contested. The prosecution contended that the defendant and her co-conspirators planned to steal Cheever’s property from the time they first met on the night before the crimes and that they did steal his property. The defendant contended that she only intended to retrieve her belongings, and that the theft of Cheever’s property happened spontaneously after they entered Cheever’s room.
The majority reasons that the jury may have convicted the defendant of burglary without finding that she entered Cheever’s room with the intent to commit theft, as properly defined, because the faulty instruction did not require the jury to determine that Auman knowingly acted without authorization or by deception. I acknowledge that there is a theoretical possibility that one or more of the jurors may have been misled by Instruction 32. But that possibility did not ripen into plain error. The record as a whole, especially the other instructions and the verdicts returned by the Jury, demonstrate that the jury understood the decisions it was required to make. The verdicts show that the jury carefully differentiated among the charges against the defendant. It accepted the prosecution’s theory in part and rejected it in part, and it rejected the defendant’s defense. The error in Instruction 32 did not contribute to the defendant’s convictions.
I turn first to the evidence and the parties’ theories. The following facts are undisputed. The defendant, Soriano, Duprey, Gerze, and Jaehnig were all at Soriano’s apartment in Denver on the evening of NovemberTl, 1997. On the next day, the five drove to the Lodge. The defendant, Soriano, Duprey, and Gerze cut a padlock on Cheever’s door and entered his room while Jaehnig waited in a car outside the Lodge. Various items were taken from Cheever’s room including property that belonged to the defendant, property that belonged to Cheever, and property that the defendant had given to Cheever but claimed was rightfully hers. Cheever’s property taken-from his room included a tripod and a sound system consisting of an amplifier and two large speakers.
The prosecution’s theory was that, on November 11, the defendant and the four others entered into a conspiracy to commit burglary. They agreed to break into Cheever’s room in order to recover the defendant’s property and to steal Cheever’s property as revenge for Cheever’s mistreatment of the defendant. They agreed to use force, including deadly force, against Cheever if necessary to accomplish their plan. On November 12, the .conspirators carried out their plan. *674Although they were armed with deadly weapons, they did not encounter Cheever. They broke into his room and took various items including Cheever’s tripod and sound system.
The defense theory was that the defendant only intended to retrieve her belongings from Cheever’s room, and that the other four persons agreed to help her. There was no agreement to steal Cheever’s property. In her view, Duprey and Gerze spontaneously decided to steal Cheever’s sound system and tripod after they entered Cheever’s room.
As evidence to support its theory, the prosecution relied on the undisputed evidence that Cheever’s tripod and his sound system were stolen by the conspirators, that Jaehnig had several loaded guns in his car, and that Soriano and Gerze pled guilty to burglary. To prove motive and intent, the prosecutors relied on the defendant’s videotaped statements to the police. In the tapes, Auman described her anger at Cheever and her desire for “revenge,” saying she had been “screwed over,” “insulted,” and “treated like a piece of shit” by Cheever. She told the police that she sought help from the others because she needed some “muscle” to retrieve her stuff from Cheever’s room.
Describing what happened on the evening of November 11, the defendant said she had asked the men not to kill Cheever but they refused to give her that assurance. One of the men asked her if Cheever had anything of value. Explaining her response, the defendant said, “I should never have opened my big mouth, but it’s too late now, but I opened my big mouth and told him that he [Cheever] had a couple of big speakers.” In its closing argument, the prosecution argued that this conversation on November 11, “is the Conspiracy. They’re sitting around discussing it ... The plan is set that night. That’s the conspiracy.”
Another indication that the defendant was aware that the planned trip to the Lodge involved criminal conduct that went far beyond mere retrieval of her property, occurred on the morning of November 12, Au-man told Soriano that she did not want to go through with the plan and Soriano replied “Well, it’s a little too late now.”
The defendant supported her theory by emphasizing other parts of her videotaped statements in which she repeatedly stated that her intent was only to move her things out of Cheever’s room. The testimony of Soriano and Gerze also supported the defense. Although both had pled guilty to burglary, each testified that there had been no plan to steal Cheever’s property. Their only reason for breaking into Cheever’s room was to help Auman get her things.
The defense theory that the defendant did not intend to steal Cheever’s property was put before the jury in the defendant’s opening statement and in the defendant’s closing argument. The defense specifically argued that Auman was not guilty of burglary because she did not enter Cheever’s room with the intent to steal his property. The defendant argued that, at most, she had committed criminal trespass by breaking into Cheever’s room in order to retrieve her property. Indeed, defense counsel argued in closing arguments
There was no First Degree Burglary at all. Lisl went into the room. Things were taken. She probably should not have been in there, we probably would all agree, but that’s Criminal Trespass. Going in someplace where you don’t have a right to be, that’s not First Degree Burglary and its not Conspiracy to Commit First Degree Burglary or Complicity to Commit First Degree Burglary. There is nothing, nothing that she intended, that her conscious objective was to commit the burglary. There is nothing that said that with that knowledge, she intended to aid and abet and assist these people in anything.
Consistent with the defense theory, the jury was instructed on first degree criminal trespass and conspiracy to commit first degree criminal trespass. Instruction 28 informed the jurors that second degree burglary and first degree criminal trespass are lesser included offenses of first degree burglary. It stated that, if the jurors were not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had committed first degree burglary, the defendant could be convicted of a lesser offense. The instruction concluded by advising the jury that, while it could acquit *675the defendant of all three offenses, it could convict the defendant of only one of the three offenses. Jury Instruction 28 reads as follows:
If you are not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of the offense charged, she may, however, be found guilty of any lesser offense, the commission of which is necessarily included in the offense charged if the evidence is sufficient to establish his guilt of the lesser offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
The offense of First Degree Burglary as charged in the Information in this case necessarily includes the lesser offense(s) of Second Degree Burglary and First Degree Criminal Trespass.
The elements of the crime of second degree burglary are:
1. That the defendant
2. in the State of Colorado, at or about the date and place charged,
3. knowingly,
4. broke an entrance into a dwelling or a building or occupied structure other than a dwelling
5. with an intent to commit therein the crime of theft.
The elements of first degree criminal trespass are:
1. That the defendant,
2. in the state of Colorado, at or about the date and place charged,
3. knowingly and unlawfully entered or remained in a dwelling.
You should bear in mind that the burden is always upon the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt each and every material element of any lesser included offense which is necessarily included in any offense charged in the information; the law never imposes upon a defendant in a criminal case the burden of calling any witnesses or producing any evidence.
After considering all the evidence, if you decide that the prosecution has proven each of the elements of the crime charged or of a lesser included offense, you should find the defendant guilty of the offense proven, and you should so state in your verdict.
After considering all the evidence, if you decide that the prosecution has failed to prove one or more elements of the crime charged or of a lesser included offense, you should find the defendant not guilty of the offense which has not been proved, and you should so state in your verdict.
While you may-find the defendant not guilty of any or all of the crime(s) charged, or of any or all lesser included offenses; you may not find the defendant guilty of more than one of the following offenses:
First Degree Burglary
Second Degree Burglary
First Degree Criminal Trespass
Instruction 31 similarly instructed the jury that conspiracy to commit second degree burglary and conspiracy to commit first degree criminal trespass are lesser included offenses of conspiracy to commit first degree burglary. It likewise advised the jury that it could acquit the defendant of all three conspiracy offenses but it could only convict her of one conspiracy offense.
On the verdict form for the substantive crime, the jury convicted the defendant of second degree burglary and rejected first degree burglary and first degree criminal trespass. On the conspiracy verdict form, the jury convicted the defendant of conspiracy to commit first degree burglary and rejected conspiracy to commit second degree burglary and conspiracy to commit criminal trespass.
From the evidence, arguments, instructions and verdicts, I conclude that the jury considered and rejected the defendant’s claim that she did not intend to steal Cheever’s property when she entered his room. By convicting the defendant of conspiracy to commit first degree burglary, the jury accepted the prosecution’s theory that the defendant and her four acquaintances agreed to break into Cheever’s room and steal his property. Convicting the defendant of conspiracy to commit first degree burglary also required the jury to find that the conspirators planned to use a deadly weapon or commit an assault in carrying out the crime.
*676By convicting the defendant of second degree burglary and rejecting first degree burglary, the jury necessarily found that a deadly weapon or assault was not used in the actual commission of the burglary. By rejecting first degree criminal trespass, the jury rejected the defendant’s argument that she did nothing more than commit criminal trespass by knowingly and unlawfully entering or remaining in Cheever’s room.
For all of these reasons, I do not agree that the error in the theft instruction was plain error. This jury was not misled. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from part V of the majority opinion and from the court’s judgment.

. Theft by deception does not require that the victim be deceived. Rather, the crime requires the actor to obtain the property of another by deception.
Here, the jury could have found that Auman's stated reason for going to the rooming house in the mountains where she had lived and where Cheever rented a room (the Lodge) and breaking into Cheever's room — that she only' wanted to retrieve her "stuff” — was a ruse designed to conceal her- true intent to take Cheever's property. The jury may have found that Auman used this ruse to recruit the other four people to help her or to lull the Lodge residents into complacency when they saw Auman and the others removing items from Cheever's room.