Court Opinion

ID: 9858963
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 17:49:29.462753+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:12:34.052672
License: Public Domain

HAWTHORNE, Justice
(dissenting).
The majority opinion in this case has concluded that there is merit in appellant’s-Bill of Exception No. 2 and has concluded that R.S. 14:92 does not include within its. terms a person under the age of 17 emancipated by marriage. I have serious doubt that the question of whether the statute includes or does not include a person emancipated by marriage is properly before the court under Bill of Exception No. 2.
*629This bill as signed by the trial judge re■cited testimony given by the mother of Vera Mae Mitchell, the juvenile involved in the case, to the effect that she had been ■a witness to her daughter’s two marriages •and had given and verified the age of her ■daughter as stated in the marriage license; .that according to the ages given in these ■certificates her daughter was over 17 years ■old when the offense was committed; that the mother later testified as to a different '.birthdate of the girl, which would establish that she was under 17 years on the date of ■the crime. The bill further recited:
“And thereupon the defendant, by his •counsel, moved the Court for a directed verdict, the State not having proven the -age of Vera Mae Mitchell; but the Court •overruled the defendant’s objection, relied ■on the testimony of Mrs. Geneva Stinson [the mother] as to her memory on the date ■of trial as to the birth date of Vera Mae Mitchell, [to] which ruling and decision of the Court the defendant, by his counsel, .then and there excepted.” (Italics ours.)
It is therefore apparent that the bill as perfected by appellant presents only a question of the sufficiency of the evidence, of •which this court is without jurisdiction under Article 7, Section 10, of the Constitution.
Moreover, the bill does not make the contention that a married person is not a child within the meaning of the statute, and I therefore seriously doubt that it was proper for the majority to raise and consider this question, particularly in view of Article 499 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which specifically provides, among other things, that the bill shall contain the objection. This bill does not give as the ground of the objection the ground upon which the majority has reversed the conviction.
In fairness to the majority, however, I must concede that when counsel orally moved for a directed verdict, he stated that he so moved because the girl involved was not a juvenile but a married woman and for that reason the defendant was not contributing to the delinquency of a juvenile; and I must also concede that when he excepted to the refusal of the judge to order a directed verdict, he reserved a bill of exception and said he was going to make the entire testimony a part of it. In perfecting the bill, however, he failed to do this, and for this reason I do not think we should look to the testimony, which is not a part of the bill, to afford him a ground of objection which he does not urge in the bill itself.
It should be further observed that the trial judge in his per curiam to this bill stated:
“ * * * Mr. Morgan urged that the said Vera Mae Mitchell was not a juvenile but a married woman and that ages, as giv*631en on the [marriage] certificates * * * would indicate that she should be over seventeen years of age * * * at the time the alleged offense occurred for which defendant was on trial. * * * ”
The judge concluded that there were inaccuracies in the marriage certificates, and accepted the testimony of the mother as the best evidence of the date of the girl’s birth. Obviously the judge himself did not consider that this bill raised the question of whether the word “child” in the statute includes a married woman under 17.
However, assuming that the court has properly before it the question of interpreting R.S. 14:92, I cannot agree with the majority that a married person under the age of 17 is not a “child” within the meaning of the statute. To me the statute is clear and free from ambiguity, and there is no reason or necessity for seeking the legislative intent; in fact, the courts are prohibited from doing so when the intent is clear. Had the Legislature intended the statute not to apply to a married person, it could have made its language read “any unmarried child under the age of seventeen”, as was done in the carnal knowledge statute, R.S. 14:80, in which the language “unmarried female person” is used.
The purpose of the statute is to protect the health and morals (morals in general and not just sexual morals, as clearly shown: by the various subsections of the statute) of juveniles — that is, children under the-age of 17; and why the morals and health of such juveniles should not be protected, simply because they are married I am unable to say. Of course, if the majority is. correct, a married person whether male- or female would not come within the provisions of the statute. If a married male-of 16 was enticed into committing a sexually immoral act contrary to nature, could, it be said that the person so enticing him,, if over the age of 17, was not contributing to the juvenile’s delinquency? Similarly, if an adult entices a married juvenile under 17, male or female, to associate with known* criminals, which is an offense under Subsection 2 of R.S. 14:92, would the fact of the marriage alone relieve the offender from prosecution thereunder?
Appellant argues in brief that if the statute is intended to apply to a married female under 17, the husband of such a person could be charged with violating the provisions of the law. This is not so. The offense is enticing, aiding, or permitting any child under the age of 17 to commit any sexually immoral act, and intercourse between husband and wife is not sexually immoral.
I respectfully dissent.