Court Opinion

ID: 9631322
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 10:34:26.779484+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:29:00.930728
License: Public Domain

Concurring Opinion by
Mr. Justice Bell,
Mr. Justice Stearne has so ably and I believe convincingly stated and applied the rule of law in malicious prosecution cases that it would be superfluous to add anything thereto were it not for the basic error in the minority opinion which, unless more specifically pointed out, may lead to future misunderstandings in this class of case. The difference between the majority and minority on the vital issue of probable cause seems to be that the majority believe that all cases involving unconflicting and unimpeached oral testimony, whether offered by plaintiff, or by defendant, or by both, must be decided as a matter of law exclusively by the Court; while the minority believe such oral evidence, unless it be “actually” admitted by plaintiff, must be submitted to the jury under proper instructions from the Court.
The minority rely upon the case of Nanty-Glo Boro. v. American Surety Co., 309 Pa. 236, 163 A. 523 to support their position. This Court specifically decided in Altman v. Standard Refrigerator Co., 315 Pa. 465, 482, 173 A. 411, that the Nanty-Glo Boro, case and the general rule therein asserted, i.e., oral evidence, when sufficient to make out a prima facie case, must be submitted, even when uncontradicted, to the jury, does not apply or prevail in malicious prosecution cases. A similar ruling was made in Curley v. Automobile Finance Co., 343 Pa. 280, 290, 23 A. 2d 48, where this Court entered a judgment non obstante veredicto in an action for malicious prosecution where *329tlxe oral testimony of the defendant was uneontradicted, and said: “In the trial of cases the ‘general rule’ is that the jury is the trier of questions of fact. In cases of malicious prosecution this rule . . . does not prevail* for in such cases the trial judge and not the jury determines whether or not the prosecutor in the criminal case . . . had an honest and reasonable belief in the existence of a probable cause for the prosecution’s initiation”.
The reason for not applying the general rule (that oral evidence is for the jury) to malicious prosecution cases has often been stated by this Court. See Simpson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 354 Pa. 87, 92-93, 46 A. 2d 674; Curley v. Automobile Finance Co., 343 Pa. 280, 286, 23 A. 2d 48.
Furthermore, in a host of prior decisions, including the following cases, the principle so clearly set forth in the majority opinion has been unequivocally recognized and reiterated, viz., in a suit for malicious prosecution where there is no conflict in the oral testimony and only one inference can reasonably be drawn therefrom, want of probable cause is a question exclusively for the Court: Altman v. Standard Refrigerator Co., Inc., 315 Pa. 465, 173 A. 411; Stritmatter v. Nese, 347 Pa. 9, 31 A. 2d 510; Taylor v. Am. I. Shipbuilding Corp., 275 Pa. 229, 119 A. 130; Werner v. Bowers, 318 Pa. 518, 178 A. 831; Lipowics v. Jervis, 209 Pa. 315, 58 A. 619; Boyd v. Kerr, 216 Pa. 259, 65 A. 674; Roessing v. Pittsburg Rys. Co., 226 Pa. 523, 75 A. 724; Robitzek v. Dawv, 220 Pa. 61, 69 A. 96; McCoy v. Kalbach, 242 Pa. 123, 88 A. 879; Simpson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 354 Pa. 87, 46 A. 2d 674; Byers v. Ward, 368 Pa. 416, 84 A. 2d 307; Mitchell v. Logan, 172 Pa. 349, 33 A. 554; Sutton v. Anderson, 103 Pa. 151; Cooper v. Wm. R. Hart & Co., 147 Pa. 594, 23 A. 833; *330Bernar v. Dunlap, 94 Pa. 329; Smith v. Ege, 52 Pa. 419; Stratton v. Jordan, 77 Pa. Superior Ct. 596; Wolf v. Stern, 71 Pa. Superior Ct. 191; Sheldrake v. Rumpf, 68 Pa. Superior Ct. 546; Kuhns v. Ward-Mackey Co., 55 Pa. Superior Ct. 164; Bryant v. Kuntz, 25 Pa. Superior Ct. 102; Gow v. Adams Express Co., 61 Pa. Superior Ct. 115.
The fact that in nearly all of these eases involving as they did unconflicting oral testimony of both plaintiff and defendant, this Court entered or affirmed a judgment for defendant non obstante veredicto, demonstrates more clearly and irrefutably than any other words could, how fallacious and untenable is the position of the minority.
Where probable cause exists, malice is immaterial: Werner v. Bowers, 318 Pa. 518, 178 A. 831; McCoy v. Kalbach, 242 Pa. 123, 88 A. 879; Dietz v. Langfitt, 63 Pa. 234; McClafferty v. Philp, 151 Pa. 86, 24 A. 1042; Lipowicz v. Jervis, 209 Pa. 315, 58 A. 619. It is therefore unnecessary to discuss either malice or advice of counsel, or whether such matters are to be decided by the Court or by the jury.

 Italics mine.