Court Opinion

ID: 7809925
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-09-07 17:11:37.696327+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:30:26.517440
License: Public Domain

WOOD, J., (after stating the facts). The record shows that the appellants filed in the court below the following motion: “That the defendants opposed the transfer of this cause from the law side of the docket and now and here object to the jurisdiction of the court to try said cause, wherefore defendants ask that the said action be dismissed.” The record further shows that, when this motion came on to be heard, the parties agreed in open court “that this cause was transferred to this court by order of the Boone Circuit Court over the objection of the defendants.” The record thus shows that the appellants duly objected to the jurisdiction of the chancery court, both when the transfer was made from the law court over their protest and again when they moved to dismiss after the cause had reached the chancery court, on the ground that the chancery court had no jurisdiction. The court can only look to the allegations of the complaint to determine whether or not the cause was properly transferred to the equity court. For it appears that the transfer was made over the objection of the appellants before the answer had been filed or the testimony adduced. The complaint does not state a single ground to give a court of equity jurisdiction. It states only a cause •of- action for the recovery of money which it is alleged had been obtained through the false representations of Harry Gore, for the firm of Rinehart & Gore, by which the appellees were induced to enter into a written contract with oné C. E. Sarber, who was representing the firm of Rinehart & Gore, and by which false representations appellees were induced to pay over their money which the appellants converted to their own use; that same was a fraudulent scheme, etc., by which appellees were deprived of their money. In Dillon v. McAllister et al., 40 Ark. 189-191, we said: “But, in the absence of other equitable elements for relief, courts of chancery do not entertain bills for compensation in money merely. Such relief, if it be all to which complainant is entitled, cannot be administered under a prayer for general relief. ’ ’ Appellants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that “the same is vague and uncertain in this, that it alleged a suit upon a contract without stating whether same was written or oral and if written not made an exhibit.” Appellees contend that appellants by filing this motion and by a failure to move the court specifically to transfer the cause to the circuit court waived the right to have the cause tried in that court. The appellees would be correct in their contention perhaps if the above motion had been the only one filed by. the appellants. But, as we haveo already stated, the record shows that the appellants at the inception also objected to the transfer of the cause to the chancery court. The name by which a pleader designates his pleading is immaterial. The pleading should be treated according to its legal effect. The motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint was vague and uncertain and that it did not set out the written contract should have been, and doubtless was, treated by the court as a motion to make the complaint more definite and certain. Both motions of the appellants were filed on the same day, September 5, 1917, and were overruled on the same day, October 19,1917. It, therefore, is conclusively established by the record that the appellants at the proper time challenged the jurisdiction of the court to hear this cause and that they have not waived their right to have the same reviewed here. But, notwithstanding the allegations of the complaint fail to show a cause of action in equity, inasmuch as the appellees selected their forum and adduced their testimony and submitted their cause to a hearing before the chancery court, they are not in an attitude to complain. Therefore, if the uncontroverted testimony or even a clear preponderance of the evidence proved that the appellees had no cause of action, the decree of the chancery court should be reversed and a decree should be entered here dismissing their complaint for want of equity. The finding of the trial court was not clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Therefore, appellants are not entitled to have a decree rendered here in their favor dismissing the complaint for want of equity. But appellants are entitled to have the cause transferred to the law court, and to have the issue of fact tried before a jury. It could serve no useful purpose to set out and comment in detail upon the evidence, and since the cause must be tried at law we refrain from so doing. There was testimony which tended to prove that the leases, on lands for the purpose of drilling for oil, designated in the record as the Sarber leases, though taken in Sarber’s name, were taken for the benefit of the appellants, and that in the making of the contracts for the drilling, as alleged in the complaint, Sarber acted for the appellants ; that Gore, of the firm of Rinehart & Gore, was present and made the representations when the last drilling contract was entered into with Sarber and made the alleged false representations set up in the complaint by which it is alleged the appellees were induced to enter into the contract and pay over their money. The principle applicable in the case of a vendor who by false representations induced one to enter into a purchase is, by analogy, applicable here. “It is well settled that one who has been induced to purchase property by the false representations of the vendor has the right to recover in the court of law any damages which he has sustained thereby.” Joyce v. McCord, 123 Ark. 492. In Grayling Lumber Co. v. Ebbitt, 134 Ark. 182, we said: “ It is not necessary for the relationship of agency to exist between a vendor and the party inducing or procuring the sale of lands through fraud and deceit in order to warrant relief against the vendor. A vendor will be held liable if he participates in the fraud; or if he had knowledge of the fraud and adopts or takes advantage of it.” While there was a decided conflict in the evidence on the issue of fraud, that was an issue for the jury which should have been sent to them under proper instructions in such cases. For the error in refusing to transfer the cause to the law court, the decree is reversed and the cause will be remanded with directions to transfer to the circuit court and for further proceedings according to law and not inconsistent with this opinion.