Court Opinion

ID: 9954129
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-25 18:10:39.0683+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:11:51.289352
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Malorni, 2024-Ohio-1122.]

                 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                           ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                PORTAGE COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,                                   CASE NO. 2023-P-0050

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,
                                                 Criminal Appeal from the
        - vs -                                   Court of Common Pleas

DEANNA L. MALORNI,
                                                 Trial Court No. 2022 CR 00969
                 Defendant-Appellant.

                                              OPINION

                                     Decided: March 25, 2024
                                  Judgment: Reversed; remanded

Victor V. Vigluicci, Portage County Prosecutor, and Pamela J. Holder and Kristina K.
Reilly, Assistant Prosecutors, 241 South Chestnut Street, Ravenna, OH 44266 (For
Plaintiff-Appellee).

Jay M. Schlachet, 55 Public Square, Suite 1600, Cleveland, OH 44113 (For Defendant-
Appellant).

EUGENE A. LUCCI, P.J.

        {¶1}     Appellant, Deanna L. Malorni, appeals the judgment sentencing her to an

aggregate term of 8 to 12 years of imprisonment on three felony offenses to which Malorni

had entered guilty pleas. We reverse the sentencing entry, vacate Malorni’s pleas, and

remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

        {¶2}     In 2022, the Portage County Grand Jury indicted Malorni on three felony

counts: involuntary manslaughter, a first-degree felony, in violation of R.C. 2903.04;

corrupting another with drugs, a second-degree felony, in violation of R.C. 2925.02; and
aggravated drug trafficking, a fifth-degree felony, in violation of R.C. 2925.03. These

charges stemmed from allegations that Malorni was involved in a drug transaction that

led to a fatal overdose.

        {¶3}    Malorni initially entered not-guilty pleas to the charges. However, following

plea negotiations, on March 13, 2023, Malorni entered guilty pleas to amended counts of

involuntary manslaughter, a second-degree felony, and attempted corrupting another with

drugs, a third-degree felony, together with the count of aggravated drug trafficking as

originally charged in the indictment.1 The trial court accepted Malorni’s pleas, ordered a

presentence investigation and report, ordered Malorni to be evaluated for NEOCAP and

PARC, and continued Malorni’s bond with modifications pending sentencing. Four days

after the trial court accepted Malorni’s pleas, a magistrate issued an order finding that

Malorni violated the terms of her bond by absconding after submitting a drug test, and the

magistrate ordered the clerk to issue a warrant for her arrest to the sheriff’s department.

        {¶4}    Thereafter, Malorni was apprehended. The matter proceeded to sentencing

on June 20, 2023. At commencement of the sentencing hearing, Malorni moved to

withdraw her plea, with defense counsel stating, “I understand the State and the Court

has had some concern based on some things that may or may not have transpired

subsequent to the -- the plea during the pendency of the PSI.” The state responded in

opposition to withdrawal of the plea, stating that it believed Malorni was having “buyer’s

remorse” because “she knows she’s in trouble with the Court and with the State of Ohio.”

1. Malorni specifically acknowledges in her brief that she is not challenging the “attempted involuntary
manslaughter” plea on the basis that such does not constitute an offense under Ohio law. See State v.
Toms, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2000 CA 64, 2001 WL 1018441, *1 (Sept. 7, 2001) (Where defendant negotiated
a plea agreement to “attempted involuntary manslaughter,” any error in accepting the plea would be invited
error.)

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Case No. 2023-P-0050
The trial court denied the motion and proceeded to sentencing. The trial court sentenced

Malorni to an indefinite sentence of 8 to 12 years of prison on the attempted involuntary

manslaughter count, 36 months of imprisonment on the corruption count, and 12 months

of imprisonment on the aggravated drug trafficking count, with all sentences to run

concurrently with each other but consecutively to cases in “Judge Doherty’s” court.

       {¶5}   After Malorni noticed an appeal from the sentencing entry, she sought a

limited remand, which this court granted, for purposes of the trial court clarifying the cases

to which her sentence was to run consecutively. On remand, the trial court issued a nunc

pro tunc entry, indicating as follows:

              Sentencing in Judge Doherty’s Court for Case No. 2021CR87
              and Case No. 2021CR302 is as follows:

              The Defendant shall be sentenced to the Ohio Department of
              Rehabilitation and Corrections in Case No. 2021CR87 for a
              period of Twelve (12) months to be served for the offense of
              “Aggravated Possession of Drugs”, which shall run
              consecutively to Case No. 2021CR302 for a period of Twelve
              (12) months to be served for the offense of “Receiving Stolen
              Property”, for an aggregate total of Twenty-Four (24) months,
              or until legally released.

(Bold typeface omitted.)

       {¶6}   In her first assigned error, Malorni argues:

       {¶7}   “Appellant’s plea must be vacated in violation of Crim. R. 11 as not being

entered knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily.”

       {¶8}   In her first assigned error, Malorni raises two issues for our review: (1)

whether the trial court erred by failing to advise her that a guilty plea could result in the

violation or revocation of her community control and that prison sentences imposed in

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Case No. 2023-P-0050
each case could be run consecutively, and (2) whether the trial court erred by incorrectly

advising Malorni as to when she would be eligible to file for judicial release.

       {¶9}   As we find the second issue raised by Malorni to be dispositive of the

appeal, we address only the issue pertaining to the misinformation provided to Malorni

regarding judicial release.

       {¶10} “‘When a defendant enters a plea in a criminal case, the plea must be made

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.       Failure on any of those points renders

enforcement of the plea unconstitutional under both the United States Constitution and

the Ohio Constitution.’” State v. Veney, 120 Ohio St.3d 176, 2008-Ohio-5200, 897 N.E.2d

621, ¶ 7, quoting State v. Engle, 74 Ohio St.3d 525, 527, 660 N.E.2d 450 (1996). “‘In

considering whether a guilty plea was entered knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily, an

appellate court examines the totality of the circumstances through a de novo review of

the record to ensure that the trial court complied with constitutional and procedural

safeguards.’” State v. Siler, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2010-A-0025, 2011-Ohio-2326, ¶

12, quoting State v. Eckler, 4th Dist. Adams No. 09CA878, 2009-Ohio-7064, ¶ 48.

“Crim.R. 11 was adopted in 1973, giving detailed instruction to trial courts on the

procedure to follow when accepting pleas.” Veney at ¶ 7. Crim.R. 11 “‘ensures an

adequate record on review by requiring the trial court to personally inform the defendant

of [her] rights and the consequences of [her] plea and determine if the plea is

understandingly and voluntarily made.’” State v. Dangler, 162 Ohio St.3d 1, 2020-Ohio-

2765, 164 N.E.3d 286, ¶ 11, quoting State v. Stone, 43 Ohio St.2d 163, 168, 331 N.E.2d

411 (1975); see also State v. Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 107, 564 N.E.2d 474 (1990).

       {¶11} Crim.R. 11(C)(2) provides:

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Case No. 2023-P-0050
              In felony cases the court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty
              * * * and shall not accept a plea of guilty * * * without first
              addressing the defendant personally * * * and doing all of the
              following:

              (a) Determining that the defendant is making the plea
              voluntarily, with understanding of the nature of the charges
              and of the maximum penalty involved, and if applicable, that
              the defendant is not eligible for probation or for the imposition
              of community control sanctions at the sentencing hearing.

              (b) Informing the defendant of and determining that the
              defendant understands the effect of the plea of guilty * * *, and
              that the court, upon acceptance of the plea, may proceed with
              judgment and sentence.

              (c) Informing the defendant and determining that the
              defendant understands that by the plea the defendant is
              waiving the rights to jury trial, to confront witnesses against
              him or her, to have compulsory process for obtaining
              witnesses in the defendant’s favor, and to require the state to
              prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a
              trial at which the defendant cannot be compelled to testify
              against himself or herself.

       {¶12} Here, Malorni acknowledges that a trial court is not required to advise a

defendant about the potential for judicial release prior to accepting a defendant’s guilty

plea pursuant to Crim.R. 11(C)(2). See State v. Mitchell, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2004-

T-0139, 2006-Ohio-618, ¶ 14 (“Unless incorporated into a plea agreement, the trial court

is not under an obligation to inform a defendant regarding his eligibility for judicial release.”

(Citations omitted.)). However, Malorni maintains that when a defendant is misinformed

by the court or counsel on this issue and relies on the misinformation in entering a plea,

the plea may be vacated as having not been knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily

entered. In support, Malorni cites the several cases noted in this court’s decision in State

v. Brownlee, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2022-L-075, 2023-Ohio-1090, ¶ 17, appeal not allowed,

170 Ohio St.3d 1482, 2023-Ohio-2236, 211 N.E.3d 1216, ¶ 17.
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Case No. 2023-P-0050
       {¶13} In Brownlee at ¶ 17, we noted that the appellant there relied on several

appellate cases holding that a plea was invalid where the defendant was misinformed

regarding judicial release. Id. Included in such cases were State v. Davner, 2017-Ohio-

8862, 100 N.E.3d 1247, ¶ 57 (8th Dist.), State v. Williams, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos.

104078 and 104849, 2017-Ohio-2650, ¶ 15, and State v. Ealom, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.

91455, 2009-Ohio-1365, ¶ 26-28. We noted that “the point of this principle is ‘[w]hen a

defendant is induced to enter a guilty plea by erroneous representations as to the

applicable law, the plea has not been entered knowingly and intelligently.’” Brownlee at ¶

17, quoting Mitchell at ¶ 15, citing State v. Engle, 74 Ohio St.3d 525, 527, 660 N.E.2d 450

(1996).

       {¶14} We further explained, in distinguishing Davner from the circumstances

present in Brownlee, that, “[i]n Davner, the trial court informed the defendant of the

potential maximum sentences he could receive during the plea colloquy.” Brownlee at ¶

18.   “The defendant, however, represented he did not understand, based upon his

attorney’s representations regarding judicial release, that if he received a sentence of five

or more years, he would not be eligible for judicial release until he served five years of

that sentence.”   Id., citing Davner at ¶ 56.     In Davner, “[t]he record supported the

defendant’s claim that his attorney failed to provide him with complete and accurate legal

advice regarding his eligibility for judicial release before entering his guilty pleas.”

Brownlee at ¶ 18, citing Davner at ¶ 56. “To wit, his attorney advised the defendant he

would be eligible for judicial release after serving six months of his sentence; the attorney

did not explain, however, that if he received a sentence of five years or longer, he would

not be eligible for judicial release until after five years.” Brownlee at ¶ 18, citing Davner

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Case No. 2023-P-0050
at ¶ 56. “The Eighth Appellate District determined, under the circumstances before it, the

defendant presented credible evidence establishing a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s incomplete advisements regarding judicial release, he would not have entered

his plea.” Brownlee at ¶ 18, citing Davner at ¶ 57.

       {¶15} Here, with respect to judicial release, the following exchanges occurred on

the record prior to Malorni entering her plea:

              THE COURT: This is 22 CR 969, State of Ohio versus Deanna
              M[a]l[or]ni. * * *

              We’re set today for a pre-trial status conference.

              [The prosecutor], it’s my understanding that you have made
              an offer, and I’d like you to put that on the record.

              [THE PROSECUTOR]: Thank you, Your Honor.

              The State has made a final offer to plead to an Amended
              Count One, Attempted Involuntar[y] Manslaughter, Felony of
              the Second Degree, as well as Attempted Corrupting Another
              with Drugs, a Felony of the Third Degree and Aggravated
              Trafficking for a PSI and victim impact statement. We
              certainly would be indicating her level of cooperativeness. I
              know that that would make her potentially available for judicial
              release after six months.

              THE COURT: Okay.

              [Defense counsel], is that your understanding of the
              negotiations?

              [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: It is, Your Honor.

              Obviously, that was based upon cooperation. That’s as far as
              I’ll go about that for my client. I don’t want to put much on the
              record. But with that being said, that is a correct
              understanding. I’ve talked to [Malorni] on several occasions
              regarding that. I -- of course, I’d ask the Court to inquire at
              this point. We would like to try to continue negotiations, but I
              understand the State is going to be limiting that time frame,
              obviously, to go forward on a trial. We’ve reached out to Dr.
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Case No. 2023-P-0050
            Hunter, to see if he can provide any expert testimony. We’re
            in the process of resolving that. Once we know that for sure,
            if we cannot resolve it, then we’ll be asking to secure a trial
            date.

            THE COURT: [The prosecutor], it’s my understanding you are
            leaving this offer open until the end of the day; is that correct?

            [THE PROSECUTOR]: That is correct, Your Honor.

            THE COURT: Ma’am, you understand what you're looking at
            here?

            [MALORNI]: Yes.

            THE COURT: If you’re convicted of these crimes you are
            looking at close to 5 years in prison. Do you understand that?

            [MALORNI]: Yes.

            THE COURT: And, ma’am, do you understand the State is
            offering you what is basically a gift?

            [MALORNI]: Yes.

            THE COURT: I’ve done a lot of these cases, and told that to
            [defense counsel] and I told that to [the prosecutor]. When
            people hear that there are drugs involved, that someone died,
            even -- no matter what your participation is, that you were
            there or with it, within the realm of maybe providing these
            drugs, that’s all they listen to. It’s very difficult to overcome
            that. Do you understand that?

            [MALORNI]: Yes.

            THE COURT: I mean, anything to do with drugs anymore the
            jury just shuts down.

            And I don’t know what your involvement was, or if you were
            involved, but no matter what involvement you have you’re
            liable. Do you understand that?

            [MALORNI]: (Indicating.)

            THE COURT: Are you rejecting that offer?

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Case No. 2023-P-0050
            [MALORNI]: He said to me it was an -- the three -- attempted
            manslaughter, two F3s I would be pleading to, not an F2.

            [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, correct me if I’m wrong,
            I think the Prosecutor said two F3s, Your Honor.

            [THE PROSECUTOR]: No, no. The attempted involuntarily
            manslaughter is a felony two as well as the aggravated
            trafficking, and an attempted corrupting another with drugs. If
            we were going to do the felony of the third degree involuntary,
            that would mean she'd have to plead to something that is non-
            probational.

            [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay.

            [THE PROSECUTOR]: Corrupting Another with Drugs, which
            is a Felony of the Second Degree.

            THE COURT: So the way she worked it out is she would be
            eligible for judicial release.

            [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay. She’s eligible for probation.
            But the felony -- the involuntary becomes a felony two, not a
            felony three. Okay. That’s correct. I misquoted that.

            [THE PROSECUTOR]: If she is found guilty of a felony of the
            second degree she's looking at up to 12 years, which is actual
            time. There is no judicial release.

            [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: That’s on the --

            [THE PROSECUTOR]: Felony of the second degree,
            corrupting.

            [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: The corrupting, correct.

            THE COURT: And that’s the one that is going -- the corrupting,
            they may not be able the (sic.) prove one, but those are pretty
            easy to prove.

            [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Right. And I believe that has
            mandatory prison time with that if convicted.

            THE COURT: Yes. Yes.

            [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: As it stands as the felony two.
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Case No. 2023-P-0050
            THE COURT: Right. Right.

            [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: So they’re amending that to the
            felony three, which means mandatory prison.

            [MALORNI]: Mandatory prison; isn’t it?

            [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: If you’re convicted. They’re offering
            to amend it to a felony three. The felony two that they’re
            talking about is not mandatory. It’s probationable.

            THE COURT: Right now what you’re facing, looking at the
            corrupting another with drugs, if you are convicted of that one,
            is mandatory. You don’t get a judicial release.

            But she is willing to amend it to an attempted. And I'm not
            trying to twist your arm, but I just want you to know the real
            facts about what’s going on here, because you have been
            cooperative, and from what the Prosecutor has told me, and I
            just would hate to see you go in for mandatory and that I can’t
            do a judicial.

            So are you rejecting this offer or accepting it?

            [MALORNI]: I could apply for a judicial in six months?

            THE COURT: You’d be eligible in six months.

            [MALORNI]: Would I be released ‘til my sentencing where I
            was at?

            [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: That was one of the things we
            discussed.

            THE COURT: That's something you will have to argue.

            [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: There’s one more component to
            what we’ve negotiated. If maybe we can work that out with
            that happening?

            [THE PROSECUTOR]: You mean if she were to plead guilty
            to let her out on house arrest during the pendency of the PSI?

            [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: That’s basically where she’s going.

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Case No. 2023-P-0050
             [THE PROSECUTOR]: Yes, I would do that.

             THE COURT: She would like to make arrangements for her
             daughter.

             [THE PROSECUTOR]: So long as the other part is complied
             with.

             [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Correct.

             THE COURT: So you can make up your mind now, but she’s
             leaving it on the table until Friday, but I don’t think it’s going to
             get any better.

             [Defense counsel], I know that you've gone over this.

             He’s a very good attorney. He’s very seasoned, so listen to
             him, his advice. He knows what the evidence is; I don’t.
             Okay? But I can tell you that juries don’t like these cases, so
             -- all right? You want to take the offer?

             [MALORNI]: I will accept the offer.

      {¶16} Thereafter, a discussion occurred regarding arranging house arrest for

Malorni pending sentencing. After a recess, the court came back on the record and stated

its understanding as to Malorni entering her plea, after which the following exchange then

occurred:

             THE COURT: * * *. Anything else, Mr. -- or [the prosecutor]?

             [THE PROSECUTOR]: Other than what’s stated in the sum
             and substance of the plea negotiations regarding the PSI,
             there will be prison time, and the State will be arguing against
             early release at the appropriate time, but the Court has made
             some statements regarding that.

             THE COURT: And the Defendant would be eligible to file for
             judicial release after six months.

             [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Six months. Correct, Your Honor.
             Thank you.

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Case No. 2023-P-0050
        {¶17} Thereafter, the court addressed Malorni and conducted a Crim.R. 11(C)(2)

plea colloquy. During the colloquy, the court inquired of Malorni:

              Do you understand that the felony of the second degree may
              bring with it from three years in prison up to 12 years in prison
              because it's a qualifying count, up to a $15,000.00 fine and
              court costs; the felony of the third degree may bring with it up
              to 36 months in prison, up to a $10,000.00 fine and court
              costs; and the felony of the fifth degree, up to 12 months in
              prison, up to a $2,500.00 fine and court costs and a license
              suspension?

Malorni affirmed her understanding.      Malorni further affirmed that she had carefully

reviewed the written guilty plea with counsel and had no questions regarding anything

contained in the document. The written guilty plea provides that the plea agreement is

stated entirely as follows: “PSI, VIS, Prison 4 years & 11 months, free to argue against

early release.” The written guilty plea further provides that the defendant understands

that the trial court is not bound to the prosecutor’s recommendation.         Moreover, the

written guilty plea contains a section regarding judicial release, which states, in relevant

part:

              I understand that if my prison sentence includes a mandatory
              prison term, the time for filing my motion for judicial release
              does not begin to run until the expiration of the mandatory
              prison term. (R.C. 2929.20 (C)).

              I understand that while I may file a motion for judicial release,
              there are no guarantees that the court will grant my request,
              unless there is a negotiated plea agreement that a judicial
              release motion will be granted, which is noted on this form.

              I understand that if my aggregated non-mandatory prison
              sentence is less than 2 years, I am eligible to file for judicial
              release after I am delivered to prison.

              I understand that if my aggregated non-mandatory prison
              sentence is 2 years or more but less than 5 years, I am eligible

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Case No. 2023-P-0050
               to file for judicial release 180 days after I am delivered to
               prison.

               I understand that if my aggregated non-mandatory prison
               sentence is 5 years, I am eligible to file for judicial release 4
               years after I am delivered to prison.

               I understand that if my aggregated non-mandatory prison
               sentence is more than 5 years but 10 years or less, I am
               eligible to file for judicial release 5 years after I am delivered
               to prison.

               I understand that if my aggregated non-mandatory prison
               sentence is more than 10 years, I am eligible to file for judicial
               release either 5 years after I have been delivered to prison or
               after serving half of my prison term, whichever is later.

       {¶18} Despite the oral statements made on the record to Malorni prior to her

entering her plea that she was eligible to file for judicial release in six months, the written

guilty plea correctly states that the time at which an offender may file for judicial release

is dependent upon the aggregate nonmandatory sentence the offender receives.

Compare R.C. 2929.20(C)(1)(b) (where an offender is not sentenced to any mandatory

prison term, if the aggregated prison term is at least two years but less than five years,

an eligible offender may file a motion for judicial release 180 days after the offender enters

prison) with R.C. 2929.20(C)(1)(d) (where an offender is not sentenced to any mandatory

prison term, if the aggregated prison term is more than five years but not more than ten

years, an eligible offender may file a motion for judicial release after serving five years).

As the trial court ultimately imposed an aggregate prison sentence of 8 to 12 years,

Malorni is not eligible to file for judicial release in six months.

       {¶19} However, the trial court orally informed Malorni that she would be eligible to

file for judicial release in six months, and the focus of our review of the validity of a plea

is “on whether the dialogue between the court and the defendant demonstrates that the
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Case No. 2023-P-0050
defendant understood the consequences of h[er] plea[.]” (Emphasis added.) Dangler,

2020-Ohio-2765, at ¶ 22. We recognize that “an alleged ambiguity during a Crim.R. 11

oral plea colloquy may be clarified by reference to other portions of the record, including

the written plea, in determining whether the defendant was fully informed of the right in

question.” State v. Barker, 129 Ohio St.3d 472, 2011-Ohio-4130, 953 N.E.2d 826, ¶ 25.

Thus, where a defendant has received notifications of the constitutional rights that she is

waiving by entering a plea, other parts of the record may be used in reviewing the totality

of the circumstances as to whether the plea was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently

entered. State v. Montgomery, 148 Ohio St.3d 347, 2016-Ohio-5487, 71 N.E.3d 180, ¶

43.

       {¶20} Nonetheless, here, there was no ambiguity in the trial court’s statements as

to judicial release. Nowhere on the record at the change of plea hearing did the court or

counsel indicate to Malorni that her eligibility to file for judicial release in six months was

contingent on the length of the sentence the trial court imposed. Despite the advisements

in the written plea agreement, the court and counsel repeatedly and clearly misinformed

Malorni that she would be eligible to file for judicial release in six months. Further, it is

evident on the face of the record that Malorni relied on these inaccurate oral advisements

when entering her plea.

       {¶21} Thus, we agree with Malorni insofar as she argues that the flat statements

of the trial court and counsel that she could file for judicial release in six months, and

Malorni’s reliance on these statements in entering her plea, render her plea invalid.

       {¶22} Accordingly, to this extent Malorni’s first assigned error has merit. As her

plea must be vacated for the reasons set forth above, relative to the second issue

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Case No. 2023-P-0050
presented in her first assigned error, we need not reach the basis for vacating the plea

addressed in the first issue.

       {¶23} In her second and third assigned errors, Malorni maintains:

              [2.] The trial court erred when it denied appellant’s pre-
              sentence motion to withdraw guilty plea.

              [3.] The trial court erred and imposed a consecutive prison
              sentence which was contrary to law and not supported by the
              record where the trial court failed to find all R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)
              factors and failed to determine and consider the aggregate
              prison sentence ordered.

       {¶24} Our disposition of Malorni’s first assigned error renders her second and third

assigned errors moot, and we decline to address them.

       {¶25} The judgment is reversed, Malorni’s pleas are vacated, and this matter is

remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

MARY JANE TRAPP, J.,

JOHN J. EKLUND, J.,

concur.

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