Court Opinion

ID: 9839685
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-13 19:04:10.437252+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:39:01.455812
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/13/23 P. v. Alexander CA4/3

                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                     FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                DIVISION THREE

 THE PEOPLE,

      Plaintiff and Respondent,                                        G061335

           v.                                                          (Super. Ct. No. 13NF1797)

 BYRON ALEXANDER,                                                      OPINION

      Defendant and Appellant.

                   Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Michael
J. Cassidy, Julian W. Bailey, and Kimberly K. Menninger, Judges. Affirmed in part,
reversed in part, and remanded with directions.
                   Kendall Dawson Wasley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
                   Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Melissa Mandel, Seth
Friedman and Joseph C. Anagnos, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
              Byron Alexander appeals from a judgment of conviction for false
imprisonment and second-degree robbery. He challenges the denial of a pretrial motion
to suppress evidence recovered from his vehicle. He also asks this court to independently
review the sealed transcript and materials concerning his Pitchess motion.1 We affirm
the denial of the suppression motion because the search was reasonable under the
automobile exception. But we conclude the court’s in-camera Pitchess hearing did not
conform with prescribed procedures and thus conditionally reverse the judgment of
conviction.
                                         FACTS
              On February 4, 2013, a payday-advance business in Anaheim was robbed.
Around 9:00 a.m., shortly after the manager opened the store, two men dropped from a
hole in the ceiling and grabbed her. They had on ski masks and gloves, and were dressed
in all black. They hit her repeatedly while looking for the safe. She gave them the
combination to open it, but their attempts were unsuccessful and caused the safe to go
into “delay,” a set time period in which it couldn’t be opened. They dragged the manager
to the safe and demanded she open it. She tried but failed because of the timed delay.
After each failed attempt, the men beat and tased her. She suggested they take the safe
with them. One man told the other to “kill her.” Eventually the men handcuffed then
pushed the manager into the bathroom, took the safe, and left.
              A worker from a bakery in the same strip mall as the payday-advance
business saw two masked men dressed in all black walking behind the building. The men
were struggling to carry a heavy item in a large bag. They headed toward a parking
structure and got into a black minivan. The bakery worker saw a black man in a security-
guard uniform “just observing, looking around.” This third man got into the driver’s seat
of the minivan and drove off. Upon seeing the manager emerge from the store

1             Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess).

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handcuffed, the bakery worker called 911. He provided dispatch with an Oregon license
plate number for the minivan.
              That same day, a black minivan was returned to a rental car company; it
had an Oregon license plate number nearly identical to the one reported by the bakery
worker (two of the numbers were transposed). According to the manager of the rental car
company, the contract for the minivan listed Alexander’s wife as the renter; Alexander
and his wife were regular customers; Alexander was there when they took possession of
the minivan; and the rental was charged to his credit card.
              About two months later, Ventura County Sheriff’s Deputy Jason
Christmann secured a warrant to search the homes of Alexander and Davion
McDaughtery and any vehicles “parked at or in the vicinity of the residence[s].” In his
affidavit, Deputy Christmann declared the men were suspects in three robberies of check
cashing stores in which the robbers entered through the ceiling tiles. When officers
executed on the warrant, Alexander fled from his home in a Dodge Journey.2 After
leading officers on a 10-mile pursuit, Alexander was ultimately arrested. Later that day,
officers searched another vehicle, a Chevrolet Tahoe registered to Alexander. It was
parked in Los Angeles, 31 miles from Alexander’s residence and 6.6 miles from
McDaughtery’s residence. Inside the Tahoe was a backpack and duffel bag. Inside those
bags were, among other things, a cordless saw, a cordless drill, a crowbar, a screwdriver,
a security uniform, baseball cap with “security” on it, black clothing, black boots, and
black rubber gloves.
              An amended information charged Alexander and McDaughtery with
kidnapping to commit robbery (§ 209, subd. (b); count 1); second-degree robbery
(§§ 211, 212.5, subd. (c); count 2); and assault with stun gun and taser (§ 244.5,

2             A Dodge Journey was the last vehicle Alexander rented from the company
that rented him the minivan. The Journey was never returned to the rental company.

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subd. (b); count 3). It further alleged Alexander suffered three prior serious felony
convictions within the meaning of the three-strikes law (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)).
                In 2014, Alexander moved to suppress evidence seized from the Tahoe.
(Pen. Code, § 1538.5.)3 The trial court (Judge Michael Cassidy) denied the motion.
                In 2018, Alexander filed a Pitchess motion for information of excessive
force, bias, and prior instances of dishonesty by Deputy Christmann and Anaheim Police
Detective Rodney Celello. The trial court (Judge Julian Bailey) found good cause for an
in-camera review of both records but ultimately found no discoverable information.
                In 2021, Alexander and McDaughtery waived their right to a jury trial and
were tried together. The trial court (Judge Kimberly Menninger) found Alexander not
guilty of kidnapping to commit robbery (count 1) but guilty of the lesser-included offense
of false imprisonment (§§ 236–237, subd. (a)); guilty of second-degree robbery (count 2);
and not guilty of assault with a stun gun or taser (count 3). The court also found true the
prior convictions alleged against him. Alexander was sentenced to 12 years in state
prison.
                                        DISCUSSION
    I.       Motion to Suppress
                Alexander argues the search of the Tahoe violated his Fourth Amendment
rights because the search warrant didn’t cover that vehicle and there was no probable
cause to believe evidence of criminal activity would be found in it. We disagree on the
second point. As argued by the prosecution, there was probable cause to justify the
search under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.
                At the outset of the hearing, the trial court ruled the search warrant did not
extend to the Tahoe. The warrant permitted officers to search vehicles “parked at or in
the vicinity of” the two identified residences. The court determined that the Tahoe,

3               All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise
indicated.

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parked 6.6 miles from the closer residence, was too far away to be considered “in the
vicinity.” At that point, the prosecution had the burden to justify the warrantless search
of the vehicle.
              Deputy Christmann was the sole witness at the hearing. He testified that on
January 10, 2013, he was helping to investigate a robbery at a check-cashing business in
Thousand Oaks. In that robbery, the perpetrator, masked and wearing all black, fell
through a hole in the ceiling shortly after the business opened, grabbed an employee, and
stole money. A tarp, glove and cell phone were left at the scene. The deputy was
“verbally told” that DNA records showed the phone was “positive to Mr. McDaughtery,”
with a “lower positive proof for the glove.” A search warrant for the records of
McDaughtery’s phone revealed a series of calls to a number, made a few hours before the
Thousand Oaks robbery. The second number was associated with “Jimmy Cagle.” A
“CII index search” for “Jimmy Cagle . . . came up as an aka for Mr. Alexander with a
moniker of Kid.” McDaughtery’s phone had three numbers stored under the name “Kid.”
Information obtained from another search warrant showed that Alexander’s phone was in
the area of the Thousand Oaks robbery when it occurred. Both phones had been used
near two other robberies, one on November 21, 2012, and the other on January 4, 2013,
in Oxnard.
              On April 9, 2013, a team conducting surveillance on Alexander at his
Anaheim residence reported he was driving the Tahoe, parked it near his house, and went
inside. That same day, Alexander drove the Tahoe to the Woodlawn address. According
to Deputy Christmann, Alexander did not drive the Tahoe after parking it there.
              On or before April 12, Deputy Christmann discovered a text between
Alexander’s and McDaughtery’s phones with a link to a news article about the Anaheim
robbery; the text was sent five days after the robbery. There were also texts about “saws,
blades, and tarps.”

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              From a review of the records for McDaughtery’s phone, Deputy
Christmann discovered McDaughtery had a second phone. The deputy reviewed texts
between McDaughtery’s second phone and the numbers he frequently texted. That in
turn led to the discovery of a second phone number connected to Alexander. On April
12, wiretaps went “live” on the second phones of Alexander and McDaughtery. That
same day, Deputy Christmann obtained the search warrant to search their residences and
nearby vehicles.
              From the wiretap surveillance, Deputy Christmann learned that the men
talking on the second phones (presumably Alexander and McDaughtery) were discussing
what the deputy believed to be an upcoming robbery. The deputy testified that on April
16 or 17 the men were talking about wind conditions and Alexander’s payment to
someone to either “cut the hole in the roof of a check cashing company or scout out a
location that they were going to eventually hit.” Later, the deputy clarified that there was
no specific mention of cutting a hole in the roof or check cashing businesses being
robbed. Alexander and McDaughtery didn’t commit any robberies that night. According
to the deputy, someone on the wiretap indicated, more or less, that “it is too windy
tonight, we cannot do the job.”
              On April 18, the police executed on the search warrant for the residences
and vehicles. At Alexander’s residence, they found a key to the Tahoe. Deputy
Christmann was hoping to find in the Tahoe “evidence related to their typical MO of
breaking or forcing entry into these check cashing companies.” But the Tahoe was not
identified as being associated with the Thousand Oaks robbery. Deputy Christmann
acknowledged that he had “[n]o specific information” that any property associated with
the robberies would be inside the Tahoe. But he also testified that, in his experience,
people “who commit robberies frequently use their vehicles to transport and secret the
items stolen and the tools used in the course of the robbery.” He later repeated: “[I]n my
experience, based on long-term investigations of individuals who engage in this type of

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criminal activity, that spans over a year and a half, then, yeah, I can say there is a very
high likelihood that there would be evidence in their vehicles.”
              After the deputy’s testimony, the trial court commented that there was
“probable cause for the warrant to search the house. If this Tahoe was parked in the
driveway, they would have probable cause to search the Tahoe.” Defense counsel
disagreed in part: “Based on the fact it is within the vicinity of the residence. But
separate and independent of that, I don’t believe there was probable cause to search the
vehicle, and that’s -- that’s the point.” The court denied the suppression motion. It
reasoned that “based on the totality of circumstances” the evidence connected Alexander
to “an ongoing conspiracy with regards to these robberies, which at one point involved
him moving this vehicle that was registered to him, although it was a week before the
search warrant was served.”
              “‘In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, we
defer to that court’s factual findings, express or implied, if they are supported by
substantial evidence. [Citation.] We exercise our independent judgment in determining
whether, on the facts presented, the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.’” (People v. Silveria and Travis (2020) 10 Cal.5th 195, 232.) We review
the ruling for correctness, regardless of the reasoning behind it. (People v. Session
(2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 723.)
              “Warrantless searches ‘are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Castro (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 314, 319.) One such
exception–the automobile exception–provides that “[w]hen the police have probable
cause to believe an automobile contains contraband or evidence they may search the
automobile and the containers within it without a warrant.” (People v. Superior Court
(Nasmeh) (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 85, 100.) This exception applies to “vehicles the
police stop on the highway and vehicles they find parked at the curb.” (People v. Dumas

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(1973) 9 Cal.3d 871, 883.) The search may be “‘as thorough (as to location and type of
container searched) as that which a magistrate could authorize by warrant[.]’” (People v.
Chavers (1983) 33 Cal.3d 462, 466.)
              “Probable cause is a ‘strong suspicion’ that what is being sought will be in
the location to be searched.” (People v. Deutsch (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1224, 1232.)
“The connection between the items to be seized and the place to be searched need not rest
on direct observation. It may be inferred from the type of crime involved, the nature of
the item, and the normal inferences as to where a criminal might likely hide incriminating
evidence.” (People v. Miller (1978) 85 Cal.App.3d 194, 201.) And an officer may rely
on training and experience to draw inferences from facts he or she observes, so long as
those inferences are “‘“grounded in objective facts and [ ] capable of rational
explanation.”’” (People v. Moore (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 291, 298.)
              We conclude probable cause supported a warrantless search of the Tahoe
under the automobile exception. Although the most recent robbery occurred two months
before the search, the phone records supported the belief that Alexander and
McDaughtery had previously robbed check cashing companies and that they were
planning another robbery soon. (See People v. Carrington (2009) 47 Cal.4th 145,
163–164 [explaining probable cause may exist “when there is reason to believe that
criminal activity is ongoing or that evidence of criminality remains on the premises”].)
Given the nature of the suspected robberies, it was a reasonable inference that either
Alexander or McDaughtery would have items such as black clothing and tools to cut
through the roof and ceiling. And because such items are not inherently incriminating, it
was reasonable to suspect the items would be found in their homes or vehicles. (See U.S.
v. Jacobs (9th Cir. 1983) 715 F.2d 1343, 1346 [probable cause to believe clothing worn
in robbery months earlier would remain at residence; clothes “were not unusual, nor
incriminating in themselves”].) In short, the police could reasonably conclude that
evidence of criminality would be found in the Tahoe.

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              In light of our conclusion, we need not consider the Attorney General’s
alternative argument that officers relied in good faith on the search warrant.
   II.    Pitchess Review
              As noted above, the court reviewed the files for Deputy Christmann and
Detective Celello but found no discoverable information. Alexander asks us to
independently review the sealed transcript and materials to determine if any records were
improperly withheld. We have done so and conclude the record is not sufficiently clear
to permit review of the court’s decision.
              Under Pitchess, a criminal defendant may move to discover law-
enforcement personnel records relevant to his or her defense. (People v. Mooc (2001)
26 Cal.4th 1216, 1225 (Mooc).) If the defendant has shown good cause for the discovery,
the court must conduct an in-camera hearing to determine if any relevant records must be
produced. (Id. at p. 1226.) At the hearing, the custodian of records must bring all
documents “‘potentially relevant’” to the motion for the court to review. (Id. at
pp. 1228–1229.) “[I]f the custodian has any doubt whether a particular document is
relevant, he or she should present it to the trial court. Such practice is consistent with the
premise of Evidence Code sections 1043 and 1045 that the locus of decisionmaking is to
be the trial court, not the prosecution or the custodian of records.” (Id. at p. 1229, italics
added.) And “where the custodian of records does not produce the entire personnel file
for the court’s review, he or she must establish on the record what documents or category
of documents were included in the complete personnel file. In addition, if it is not readily
apparent from the nature of the documents that they are nonresponsive or irrelevant to the
discovery request, the custodian must explain his or her decision to withhold them.”
(People v. Guevara (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 62, 69 (Guevara).)
              To “permit future appellate review,” the trial court must make a record of
the documents it examined. (Mooc, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1229.) To make this record,
the court can place copies of those documents in a confidential file, prepare a written list

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of those documents, or “state for the record what documents it examined.” (Ibid.)
Without this record, “a party’s ability to obtain appellate review of the trial court’s
decision, whether to disclose or not to disclose, would be nonexistent.” (Ibid.)
              We begin with Deputy Christmann’s records. After the custodian of
records for the Ventura Sheriff’s Department was placed under oath, the court asked if
the custodian had brought documents he “felt were in response to this motion.” The
custodian confirmed he had and produced two files “[b]ased on the timeline when this
was filed.” When the court asked whether he considered information “that existed but
was outside of a time frame,” the custodian stated he had not. The custodian confirmed
that he brought all information the department had of allegations of dishonesty and
excessive force by the officer. The court then asked, “what names did you give those
files or the places that you search[ed]?” The custodian replied, “These are internal affairs
documents.” The court then inquired where such documents were kept, e.g. as part of a
personnel file, in the chief’s office, or elsewhere. The custodian answered, “They’re kept
separately independent of -- they’re kept with the internal affairs documents.” He
testified about the general complaint process. When the court asked if “the things that
you brought” were stored electronically, the custodian responded that “[t]here is a
database that is used for the complaint process to store certain documents digitally but not
the actual -- the whole file is here.” The court reviewed the two files and determined they
did not contain discoverable information. The two files were later submitted
electronically and sealed for future review.
              On this record, it is unclear what documents comprised Deputy
Christmann’s complete personnel file, what personnel files the custodian chose not to
bring with him, and how he made that determination. (See Guevara, supra, 148
Cal.App.4th at p. 69 [custodian must establish what documents were not produced and
why].) The custodian did not describe the categories of documents in the complete
personnel file. He did not list any categories or documents he reviewed but decided not

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to produce. Nor did he adequately explain the reasons for withholding any documents.
Although there was some discussion of the timeline or timeframe of the document
production, the court did not ask the custodian to state the specific date range for the
search. The court impermissibly deferred the decision-making to the custodian when it
accepted his representation that all responsive documents had been produced. We thus
are unable to conduct any meaningful review on appeal.
              We turn next to Detective Celello’s records. The custodian of records for
the Anaheim Police Department stated he brought three personnel files. He described the
first as the “main personnel file” and another as the “internal affairs file.” He stated the
internal affairs file was empty, which indicated Detective Celello had not had any
complaints within the last five years. According to the custodian, files older than five
years would have been destroyed, but nothing in the files would indicate whether or not
documents had been purged. The court expressed some concern about the empty file.4
The court looked at the “personnel file information” and determined it was not
discoverable. After prompting by the court reporter, the custodian of records was placed
under oath and testified that everything he had stated previously was truthful. The court
stated it was “troubling” that there may be information about the officer’s dishonesty
around the time of the investigation that led to the charges against Alexander.
Nevertheless, the court found that the custodian was credible, and the court determined
that “there’s no material that’s discoverable.”
              Again, on this record we cannot determine whether the custodian produced
the entire personnel file for Detective Celello. The court did not ask whether the three
files produced by the custodian comprised the entire file. In any event, the record reflects
that the court reviewed, at most, two of the three files produced: the main personnel file
and the empty internal affairs file. The record contains no description or discussion of

4             The in-camera review occurred in 2019; Alexander was initially charged in
2013.

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the third file. And unlike the review of Deputy Christmann’s file, the court did not ask
the custodian to submit under seal a copy of the documents he produced.
              Accordingly, we conditionally reverse the judgment and remand for the
trial court to conduct a new Pitchess hearing of both personnel files, where it must
personally review the records or obtain a list of their contents and confirm the conclusion
of the custodian of records.
                                      DISPOSITION
              The judgment is conditionally reversed, and the matter is remanded to the
court with directions to hold a new Pitchess hearing regarding Deputy Christmann’s and
Detective Celello’s records. If the court finds discoverable information, it shall
determine whether Alexander was prejudiced from the denial of discovery. If the court
confirms the lack of discoverable evidence or finds Alexander was not prejudiced from
the denial of discovery, the judgment shall be reinstated. In all other respects, the
judgment is affirmed.

                                                  DELANEY, J.

WE CONCUR:

SANCHEZ, ACTING P. J.

MOTOIKE, J.

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