Court Opinion

ID: 2963638
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:13:22.9186+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:44.210918
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

          September 27, 1995

                            United States Court of Appeals
                                For the First Circuit

                            _____________________________

          No. 95-1023

                              FLANDERS & MEDEIROS, INC.,

                                 Plaintiff, Appellee,

                                          v.

                                ELIZABETH V. BOGOSIAN,

                                Defendant, Appellant.

                            _____________________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                           FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

                    [Hon. Ronald R. Lagueux, U.S. District Judge]
                                             ___________________

                            _____________________________

                                        Before

                               Torruella, Chief Judge,
                                          ___________
                                Stahl, Circuit Judge,
                                       _____________
                          and Dominguez, * District Judge. 
                                           ______________

                            _____________________________

                                     ERRATA SHEET
                                     ERRATA SHEET

               Please make the following correction:

                    Page 2, line 5 from bottom of page:

                         Delete "Woloohojian (now deceased) and Harry
          Woloohojian."

                         Insert "Woloohojian and Harry Woloohojian (now
          deceased)."

          _______________________________

          *Of the District of Puerto Rico, sitting by designation.

                            United States Court of Appeals
                            United States Court of Appeals
                                For the First Circuit
                                For the First Circuit
                                 ____________________

        No. 95-1023

                              FLANDERS & MEDEIROS, INC.,

                                 Plaintiff, Appellee,

                                          v.

                                ELIZABETH V. BOGOSIAN,

                                Defendant, Appellant.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                           FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

                    [Hon. Ronald R. Lagueux, U.S. District Judge]
                                             ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                Torruella, Chief Judge,
                                           ___________
                                Stahl, Circuit Judge,
                                       _____________
                           and Dominguez,* District Judge.
                                           ______________

                                 ____________________

            Keven A. McKenna with whom Bruce Hodge was on brief for
            ________________           ___________
        appellant.
            Matthew F. Medeiros and Erik Lund with whom Robert Karmen,
            ___________________     _________           _____________
        Flanders & Medeiros Inc., Cynthia C. Smith, and Posternak, Blankstein
        ________________________  ________________      _____________________
        & Lund were on brief for appellee.
        ______

                                 ____________________
                                  September 13, 1995
                                 ____________________

        _____________________
        *Of the District of Puerto Rico, sitting by designation.

                      STAHL, Circuit Judge.  This case arises from the
                      STAHL, Circuit Judge.
                             _____________

            representation of defendant-appellant Elizabeth Bogosian

            ("Bogosian") by plaintiff-appellee Flanders & Medeiros

            ("F&M") in hotly contested litigation involving family real-

            estate partnerships.  After Bogosian failed to endorse over

            to F&M checks made payable to Bogosian by the defendant in

            the underlying litigation and delivered to F&M as her

            counsel, F&M sued Bogosian for breach of contract.  Bogosian

            counterclaimed for malpractice and breach of the attorney-

            client contract.  The district court awarded summary judgment

            to F&M on all claims.  We now reverse the award of summary

            judgment on F&M's breach-of-contract claim, and affirm the

            district court's ruling on Bogosian's counterclaims.

                                          I.
                                          I.
                                          __

                      In  November  1989,  following  the  withdrawal  of

            Bogosian's prior counsel from the underlying litigation, F&M,

            a  Providence,   Rhode  Island,  law  firm,   took  over  the

            representation  of Bogosian,  a  citizen of  Florida, in  the

            ongoing lawsuits  stemming from  her involvement in  a family

            real estate empire created by her and her two brothers, James

            H.   Woloohojian  and   Harry  Woloohojian   (now  deceased).

            Bogosian had few liquid assets at  the time from which to pay

            her lawyers  but stood  to receive  substantial amounts  as a

            result of  her lawsuits.   In  a letter sent  to Bogosian  on

            November  24,  1989 (the  "November  24  letter"), and  which

                                         -2-
                                          2

            Bogosian then signed indicating her  agreement, F&M explained

            the terms of  its representation.   The firm  would obtain  a

            $25,000  retainer  from  Bogosian,  to  be  deposited  in  an

            interest-bearing account; it would   bill Bogosian each month

            at  its lawyers' hourly rates, with each bill due and payable

            within ten days after receipt; and interest would  accrue (at

            a local  bank's prime  rate) on  bills outstanding for  sixty

            days or more.  The letter further stated:

                      We  recognize that you  may be  unable to
                      pay our monthly statements  in full on an
                      ongoing basis.   To the  extent that  you
                                       ________________________
                      are unable to pay  those bills from other
                      _________________________________________
                      sources,  you have  agreed to  apply your
                      _________________________________________
                      first  proceeds  out   of  the   E  &   J
                      _________________________________________
                      receivership,   the  Woloohojian   Realty
                      _________________________________________
                      Associates   receivership    and/or   the
                      _________________________________________
                      federal  court  litigation,[1
                                                   ] until  all
                      _________________________________________
                      of our outstanding  bills, including  any
                      _________________________________________
                      accrued  interest,  are  paid   in  full.
                      _________________________________________
                      Appended to this  letter as Exhibit  A is
                      an Assignment that  we would  ask you  to
                      execute.   That  assignment gives  us  an
                      interest in the  proceeds of those  court
                      proceedings  up  to  the  amount  of  our
                      bills.   It is my  understanding that you

                                
            ____________________

            1.  The  "E &  J  receivership" and  the "Woloohojian  Realty
            Associates receivership" are  state court actions  concerning
            two  family real  estate  partnerships.   The "federal  court
            litigation"  (or  "valuation"  litigation)  was   brought  by
            Bogosian in the United States District Court for the District
            of  Rhode Island  to  dissolve the  family-owned  Woloohojian
            Realty   Corporation  ("WRC"),   pursuant  to   Rhode  Island
            corporations  law.   See R.I.  Gen. Laws    7-1.1-90.   After
                                 ___
            Bogosian filed her lawsuit,  WRC exercised its option to  buy
            out Bogosian's one-third share of the corporation rather than
            face dissolution.  In April 1995,  the district court adopted
            as its  findings  the  report  of a  special  master  valuing
            Bogosian's  WRC  stock  at   $4,901,801.    See  Bogosian  v.
                                                        ___  ________
            Woloohojian, 882 F. Supp. 258, 261, 266 (D.R.I. 1995).   
            ___________

                                         -3-
                                          3

                      have  reviewed  this  agreement with  Ted
                      Pliakas[2] and have found it acceptable.

            (emphasis added).  The referenced assignment (the "assignment

            document") included the following language:

                      1.    Assignee  has agreed  to  represent
                      Assignor in said actions at  hourly rates
                      set  forth in a  letter from  Assignee to
                      Assignor dated November 24, 1989.

                      2.   Assignor  anticipates that  she will
                           ____________________________________
                      receive substantial sums in  said actions
                      _________________________________________
                      (the  "Recoveries"),  out  of  which  she
                      _________________________________________
                      expects and  agrees to pay the legal fees
                      _________________________________________
                      and  out-of-pocket  expenses  payable  to
                      _________________________________________
                      Assignee.
                      _________

                      3.   To  the  extent  that Assignor  owes
                           ____________________________________
                      Assignee  any   money  for  out-of-pocket
                      _________________________________________
                      expenses and legal  services rendered  by
                      _________________________________________
                      Assignee in connection with said actions,
                      _________________________________________
                      Assignor  hereby   assigns  to  Assignee,
                      _________________________________________
                      effective as  of the  day and  year first
                      _________________________________________
                      above  written,  that   portion  of   the
                      _________________________________________
                      Recoveries which is necessary to  pay all
                      _________________________________________
                      of  Assignee's  then unpaid  bills.   The
                      ___________________________________
                      remainder  of  the  Recoveries  shall  be
                      payable to Assignor.

                      4.  In the event that there is a recovery
                      in fewer  than all of  said actions,  and
                      Assignee  is paid  in full,  and Assignor
                      later incurs additional legal  expense to
                      Assignee which is  not paid on a  current
                      basis,  Assignee  shall   be  paid   such
                      additional    legal   expense    out   of
                      additional amounts, if any,  recovered by
                      Assignor in the remaining actions.

                      5.   Nothing  contained herein  shall  be
                      construed  so as  to  limit  Assignee  to
                      payment  of  its   legal  expenses   from
                      amounts  recovered  by  Assignor in  said
                      actions.

                                
            ____________________

            2.  Bogosian's personal attorney.

                                         -4-
                                          4

            (emphasis added).   Both parties  signed the  document.   F&M

            filed an  appropriate financing statement with  the office of

            the  Secretary of  State, asserting  F&M's rights  as secured

            party to "[a]ll of Debtor's rights to the recoveries received

            by Debtor arising from" Bogosian's various lawsuits.

                      F&M  represented  Bogosian  pursuant to  the  above

            terms in at least ten different matters between late 1989 and

            the  end of 1992,  with the bulk  of its time  devoted to the

            valuation litigation.   In July  1990, the district  court in

            that case ordered  WRC (1)  to grant Bogosian  a $10  million

            mortgage  on one of WRC's properties as security to guarantee

            eventual payment  of her  shares' value  once that  value had

            been determined,  and (2)  to provide Bogosian  with "interim

            distribution" payments  of an  initial $100,000  plus $10,000

            per  month, to continue until  the entry of  a final judgment

            determining the fair value of her shares.3

                      On December  23,  1992, without  -- so  far as  the

            record shows -- any solicitation from either Bogosian or F&M,

            WRC delivered two  checks to F&M  made payable to  Bogosian.4

                                
            ____________________

            3.  F&M  asserted  no  claim  to  these payments,  presumably
            because it had argued to the district court that the payments
            were necessary  for Bogosian to meet  her day-to-day expenses
            and  demands of other  creditors.  WRC  appealed the district
            court's  order, and  we  affirmed.   Bogosian v.  Woloohojian
                                                 ________     ___________
            Realty Corp., 923 F.2d 898 (1st Cir. 1991).
            ____________

            4.  The voluntary payment  followed on  the heels  of a  jury
            verdict in  Bogosian's favor  in a Massachusetts  state court
            lawsuit  initiated by  WRC, in  which  WRC sought  damages in
            excess of  $20 million  for Bogosian's alleged  usurpation of

                                         -5-
                                          5

            The checks, one for $900,000 and the other for $100,000, were

            accompanied by a letter stating the following:

                           Enclosed   please   find   two   (2)
                      Woloohojian  Realty Corp.  ("WRC") checks
                      totalling $1 Million  Dollars payable  to
                      Elizabeth   V.   Bogosian.     This   sum
                      represents a  voluntary principal payment
                      made by WRC on account of Mrs. Bogosian's
                      former shareholder interest.  This entire
                      sum shall constitute an  immediate credit
                      toward  any  principal  sums   which  may
                      become  due and owing to Mrs. Bogosian in
                      the federal court  proceeding on  account
                      of  WRC's purchase  of her  shares and/or
                      WRC's liquidation.

                           WRC,   James  Woloohojian   and  the
                      Estate   of   Harry  Woloohojian   remain
                      willing to negotiate a  global settlement
                      with  Mrs. Bogosian  which covers  all of
                      the  substantive  areas  detailed in  the
                      offer of settlement  dated September  30,
                      1992 which  I sent  to Mr. Prentiss.   If
                      Mrs. Bogosian  is interested in  a global
                                                         ______
                      settlement,  kindly  forward her  written
                      counterproposal on or before December 31,
                      1992.      We   are  prepared   to   meet
                      immediately  thereafter  to  negotiate  a
                      final resolution.

                           Kindly  acknowledge your  receipt of
                      this letter and the two checks by signing
                      and returning  the enclosed copy  of this
                      letter. . . .

                      When WRC  delivered  the checks  to F&M's  offices,

            Bogosian owed the  law firm $999,957  in accrued legal  fees,

            expenses and  interest.   F&M  contacted Bogosian's  attorney

                                
            ____________________

            corporate  opportunities.   WRC had  previously held  out the
            prospect of obtaining substantial damages from this and other
            lawsuits -- thus offsetting the value of Bogosian's  stock in
            WRC  --   in  contesting  Bogosian's   request  for   interim
            distributions in the valuation litigation.

                                         -6-
                                          6

            (Pliakas)5  and asked  that Bogosian  indorse the  two checks

            over to F&M pursuant to their assignment agreement.  Bogosian

            refused,  and  that  same  day faxed  to  F&M  the  following

            handwritten letter:

                      Please be  advised that  I do not  accept
                      nor  do I authorize  the acceptance  of a
                      check  from  Woloohojian Realty  Corp. or
                      any affiliates as partial payment  of any
                      kind for any purpose.

                      I  have  been advised,  as your  firm has
                      represented to Judge Boyle, by Eustace T.
                      Pliakas, Esq., my primary counsel, that a
                      355  division  of  the corporation  would
                      have no adverse  tax consequences for  me
                           __                                __
                      or WRC and that  if his Honor Judge Boyle
                         ___
                      so  decides as to effect that result that
                      it would be very favorable to me.

                      As you know, WRC has purported that there
                      will  be major  tax consequences  for the
                      liquidation of  property in order  to pay
                      for  my  shares  which  sale  Judge Boyle
                      stated in the  last hearing would  "never
                      happen."

                      If by  some means,  at the time  of Judge
                      Boyle's  final decision,  I am  forced to
                      take  dollars   instead  of  mortgageable
                      property,  I question whether or not such
                      principal of tax effecting does not apply
                      to me. [sic]

                      In any event I do not wish to prematurely
                      determine   Judge   Boyle   [sic]   final
                      [unreadable]  decision.    I   will  only
                      accept, as  I have requested  you pursue,
                      similar interim relief as I have received
                      in  the  past   to  meet   my  on   going
                      obligations.

                                
            ____________________

            5.  F&M  explained  that  it contacted  Pliakas  rather  than
            Bogosian  directly  because  it  recognized  that  it  had  a
            conflict of interest with Bogosian regarding the checks.

                                         -7-
                                          7

                      I  will  not  in  my  present  health  or
                      circumstances accept any coercive tactics
                      or any actions taken which is directed to
                      creating fear of retribution to myself or
                      any members of my family.

            WRC   eventually  dropped   its  requirement   that  Bogosian

            acknowledge in  writing receipt  of the checks  (and possible

            acknowledgment  that the  checks were  payments of  principal

            rather than interest), but  Bogosian still refused to indorse

            them.   F&M  and Pliakas  discussed over  the next  couple of

            weeks whether  the parties  could share  the  money,6 but  no

            agreement  was  reached.   Thus,  on  January  14, 1993,  F&M

            initiated the present action  in the district court, alleging

            that  Bogosian  had  breached  the  assignment  agreement  by

            refusing  to indorse the checks over to F&M.  Bogosian denied

            the breach, arguing that the  checks were not "proceeds" from

            the  litigation  because  neither   the  court  nor  she  had

            authorized such payment,  and counterclaimed, alleging  legal

            malpractice  and  breach  of  contract  by  F&M.    Following

            discovery,  both parties  moved  for summary  judgment.   The

            district  court  ruled  that  F&M  was  entitled  to  summary

            judgment on all claims, and Bogosian appealed.    

                                
            ____________________

            6.  Bogosian claims that she neither knew  of nor approved of
            these negotiations,  but that  Pliakas undertook them  on his
            own  because he  feared  that F&M's  abandonment of  Bogosian
            could severely harm her position in the ongoing litigations.

                                         -8-
                                          8

                                         II.
                                         II.
                                         ___

            A.  Standard of Review
            ______________________

                      We  review a  grant  of summary  judgment de  novo,
                                                                __  ____

            reading  the  record  in  the  light  most  favorable  to the

            nonmovant.  See,  e.g., Byrd  v. Ronayne, ___  F.3d ___  (1st
                        ___   ____  ____     _______

            Cir.  1995).    Summary   judgment  is  appropriate  if  "the

            pleadings,  depositions,  answers  to   interrogatories,  and

            admissions  on file,  together with  the affidavits,  if any,

            show that there is no  genuine issue as to any material  fact

            and  that the  moving party  is entitled to  a judgment  as a

            matter of law."  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

            B.  F&M's Breach-of-Contract Claim
            __________________________________

                      The district court granted  F&M summary judgment on

            its   breach-of-contract   claim   because   the   assignment

            agreement, the court  reasoned, was an "absolute  assignment"

            of Bogosian's  "entire interest  in any future  proceeds from

            those  litigations to F&M up to the outstanding amount of the

            legal bills.  Having  so assigned the proceeds, Bogosian  had

            no power to reject  them.  She was  obligated to indorse  the

            checks and pay them over to F&M."   Flanders & Medeiros, Inc.
                                                _________________________

            v.  Bogosian, 868 F. Supp.  412, 421 (D.R.I.  1994).  Whether
                ________

            Bogosian  had a good faith basis for refusing the checks, the

            court held, is "irrelevant."  Id.
                                          ___

                      The  district  court's  analysis contains  a  fatal

            flaw:    It  assumes  that,  because  Bogosian  assigned  her

                                         -9-
                                          9

            interest in future  litigation proceeds up  to the amount  of

            any  outstanding legal bills, she  also gave up  her right to

            reject  any  offer  of  partial  payment.    But  the  latter

            proposition does  not necessarily  follow from the  former; a

            litigant may (and often  does) assign expected proceeds while

            retaining  the right to accept or reject any offer of payment

            or settlement.  None of the cases cited by the district court
                            ____

            in support of its construction of the assignment agreement --

            and subsequently adopted by F&M as authority for its position

            in  its appellate brief -- stands for the proposition that an

            assignment   of  expected  litigation   proceeds  deprives  a

            litigant  of his  or  her  right  to  control  the  terms  of

            settlement.    For  example,  the court  cited  Berkowitz  v.
                                                            _________

            Haigood,  606 A.2d 1157, 1160 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1992)
            _______

            (holding that assigned  proceeds in attorney's trust  account

            belong to  client's  assignee  and client  has  no  right  to

            receive  them), for  the  proposition that  Bogosian,  having

            assigned the proceeds, had  no power to reject the  proffered

            checks.  But the funds the assignee was claiming in Berkowitz
                                                                _________

            were part of  a settlement  to which Haigood  had agreed  and
                                        ____________________________

            which  had  already  been  paid  into  his  attorney's  trust

            account.  Id. at 1159-60.   The court's reliance on Herzog v.
                      ___                                       ______

            Irace,  594 A.2d  1106  (Me. 1991),  is similarly  misplaced.
            _____

            That decision's  holding that a  "client is  not entitled  to

            receive  funds once he has  assigned them to  a third party,"

                                         -10-
                                          10

            id.  at 1109, is predicated on the client's acceptance of the
            ___                                ________ __________

            settlement offer from which the funds in question derive, id.
                                                                      ___

            at  1108.   In  neither  of  these  cases  did  the  assignee

            challenge  the assignor-litigant's  rejection of an  offer of

            settlement or partial payment.

                      Nothing  in the  assignment  agreement purports  to

            transfer  Bogosian's fundamental  right  to  control her  own

            litigation and  accept or reject a  settlement offer, whether

            in whole or in part.  See R.I.  Rules of Professional Conduct
                                  ___

            Rule 1.2(a) ("A  lawyer shall  abide by  a client's  decision

            whether  to accept  an offer  of  settlement of  a matter.").

            Whether a  contract that abrogated this  axiomatic duty would

            even be upheld under Rhode  Island law is a question  we need

            not  reach,   for  the  assignment  contains   no  indication

            whatsoever  that  the  parties  intended   such  a  contract.

            Without  a   clear  expression   of  intent  to   abrogate  a

            fundamental  rule  of  the  attorney-client  relationship, we

            would be loath to find such intent.  Thus, the assignment  of

            "recoveries"  or "proceeds"  by  Bogosian  to  her  attorneys

            presumes  her  prior  acceptance   of  a  proffered  payment.
            ________       _____

            Otherwise, the  proffered payment  remains nothing  more than

            just  that; until  it  has been  accepted  by the  client  or

            ordered by  the court, it constitutes  neither "proceeds" nor

            "recoveries"  but  only  an   offer  of  payment  or  partial

            settlement.

                                         -11-
                                          11

                      Nor   does  F&M  seriously  dispute  that  Bogosian

            retained  the right to accept or reject any settlement offer.

            In  fact,  F&M concedes  in  its  brief that  the  assignment

            agreement operated  as a  security  agreement, with  Bogosian

            retaining control over  her cause  of action, and  not as  an

            absolute assignment of litigation rights:

                      The agreement did  not assign  Bogosian's
                      causes  of action  to F&M (F&M  could not
                      have sued WRC on those causes of action),
                      but only assigned the first proceeds from
                      the  litigation; it did  not give  F&M an
                      interest  in  the  litigation beyond  the
                      amount  of its  earned  fees  and  costs.
                      Moreover,   the    assignment   was   not
                      absolute: it would have  been ineffective
                      if Bogosian had simply paid her bills.7

            Brief  of  Plaintiff-Appellee  at  20.8    These  concessions
            _____________________________

                                
            ____________________

            7.  A few  pages further along  in its brief,  F&M apparently
            decided  that  it  had   better  argue  that  the  assignment
            agreement was in fact an absolute  assignment.  Responding to
            Bogosian's attempt  to distinguish In  re Apex  Oil Co.,  975
                                               ____________________
            F.2d 1365 (8th Cir.  1992) -- which the district  court cited
            for the  proposition that an assignment  transfers all rights
            in the assigned property -- on the ground that the assignment
            in  that  case  was  absolute rather  than  conditional,  F&M
            informed  this  Court  that  "the  assignment  here  was  not
            conditioned upon  anything."  Brief of  Plaintiff-Appellee at
                                          ____________________________
            28 n.13.  We find F&M's first interpretation more convincing.

            8.  F&M  also cited  numerous cases  as  upholding agreements
            "such  as  the  one  between  F&M  and  Bogosian,"  Brief  of
                                                                _________
            Plaintiff-Appellee  at   20,  all  of  which   construed  the
            __________________            ___
            agreements  as security  for  an attorney's  unpaid fees  and
            expenses  rather than  as absolute  assignments of  proceeds.
            E.g.,  Skarecky & Horenstein, P.A.  v. 3605 N.  36th St. Co.,
            ____   ___________________________     _____________________
            825 P.2d 949, 952 (Ariz. App. 1991); In re Conduct of Taylor,
                                                 _______________________
            878 P.2d 1103, 1110  (Or. 1994); Burk v. Burzynski,  672 P.2d
                                             ____    _________
            419,  423  (Wyo.  1983).    Although   the  language  of  the
            agreements in  some of  these cases more  clearly established
            that  they were  intended to  operate as  security agreements
            than  the assignment  agreement  here, both  the November  24

                                         -12-
                                          12

            notwithstanding, F&M argues that  Bogosian still had no right

            to reject WRC's  $1 million voluntary payment because  it was

            not an offer  of settlement.  At least after  WRC dropped the

            requirement that  Bogosian stipulate that the  money would be

            applied  to  principal  and  not interest,  F&M  argues,  WRC

            imposed no conditions on  Bogosian's acceptance of the money.

            Therefore, so this argument goes, Bogosian could not have had

            any valid reason for rejecting the checks.

                      This  argument  also  misses  the  mark,   for  the

            proffered payment did in  fact contain an implicit condition:

            namely, that  the $1  million portion of  Bogosian's ultimate

            award represented by the two checks would be paid in cash and

            not property.   Bogosian, in accepting  the checks, would  be

            forgoing  her right to attempt in the future to structure the

            payment  of that  portion  of her  award  in an  advantageous

            manner.  Thus, while WRC's offer of payment may not have been

            a  partial  "settlement  offer"   in  the  usual  sense,  its

            acceptance nevertheless could  have limited Bogosian's future

            options, and she  may well  have had  legitimate reasons  for

            refusal.

                                
            ____________________

            letter  and   the   assignment  document   limit   Bogosian's
            assignment of proceeds  to the extent  that Bogosian has  not
            paid F&M's  bills.   Thus, F&M  would have  no rights to  any
            proceeds unless and only to the extent that Bogosian fails to
            pay her attorney's bills.  This is an assignment for purposes
            of security.  See In  re Apex Oil, 975 F.2d at 1369  ("We see
                          ___ _______________
            no meaningful  difference between a security  interest and an
            assignment for purposes of security.").

                                         -13-
                                          13

                      Moreover, there is evidence that the possibility of

            Bogosian  ultimately receiving property  rather than  cash in

            exchange  for  her  shares  is no  pipedream.    The  statute

            governing  the valuation  litigation provides that,  once the

            value of  Bogosian's shares have been  determined, "the court

            shall set forth in its order . . . the purchase price and the

            time within which the  payment shall be made, and  may decree
                                                          _______________

            such other terms and  conditions of sale as it  determines to
            _____________________________________________________________

            be  appropriate . .  . ."  R.I.  Gen. L. 7-1.1-90.1 (emphasis
            _______________

            added).  The  district court in  the valuation case  recently

            stated:

                      What   [Bogosian's]   judgment  will   be
                      remains to be seen.   It may be that  the
                                            ___________________
                      court  will  order  satisfaction  of  the
                      _________________________________________
                      purchase   price   by  the   transfer  of
                      _________________________________________
                      particular  parcels  of  real estate,  at
                      ____________________________________
                      least  in part, a result contended for by
                      Plaintiff.      What   is  clear   beyond
                      peradventure is that it is for this Court
                      to  determine, under the precise terms of
                      the statute, the "terms and conditions of
                      sale   as  it   determines  appropriate."
                      Until  this Court has had the opportunity
                      to do  so,  Plaintiff  does  not  have  a
                      definable   interest   in  any   specific
                      property.    There  is  no  judgment  for
                      Plaintiff which may be levied upon.

            Bogosian v. Woloohojian,  C.A. No. 88-0373B, slip. op. at 7-8
            ________    ___________

            (D.R.I. Aug. 4, 1995) (emphasis added).

                      Nevertheless, F&M  argues that, even  assuming that

            Bogosian eventually could receive property instead of cash as
                                _____

            payment for her shares,  she could not have had  a good-faith

            reason  for  rejecting  the  checks because:  (1)  she  would

                                         -14-
                                          14

            eventually  have to  pay  the law  firm  in cash,  so even  a

            disposition  of property  by the  court would  necessitate an

            eventual sale of  assets, and (2) any payments made  to F & M

            would be tax-deductible, so a cash payment from WRC would not

            have  any  adverse  tax   consequences.    This  argument  is

            similarly unpersuasive: Bogosian  could conceivably  mortgage

            any  property she receives and  pay F&M from  those funds, or

            perhaps F&M would even acquire  an interest in the  property.

            And even if a  cash payout would be tax-deductible,  Bogosian

            might prefer  a disposition of  property for  non-tax-related

            reasons,  e.g., because  she believes  the property  is worth

            more  than  its  court-assigned  valuation,  or  because  she

            believes its  appreciation rate  and income stream  will more

            than compensate  for interest costs she  incurs in mortgaging

            it to  pay off F&M.   In any event, Bogosian  asserted in her

            faxed response to F&M, on the same day that F&M requested her
                                   _______________

            indorsement of  the checks, that she did not want to do so in

            part  to avoid  foreclosing the  possibility of  the district

            court awarding her "mortgageable property" instead of cash.

                      If  Bogosian did not  in fact reject  the checks in

            good faith,9 but rather simply because she wanted the cash in

                                
            ____________________

            9.  F&M  is correct, of course, in stating that good faith is
            not a defense to a breach-of-contract claim.  See Restatement
                                                          ___ ___________
            (Second) of Contracts   11, introductory note (1979).   We do
            _____________________
            not  hold that a  good-faith belief that she  did not have to
            assign the checks to F&M would absolve Bogosian of liability;
            rather,  we hold that if Bogosian rejected the checks in good
                                              ________
            faith  -- i.e., for some legitimate reason not connected to a

                                         -15-
                                          15

            her hands rather  than in  F&M's coffers, then  she may  well

            have  breached the  covenant of  good  faith implicit  in all

            contracts under Rhode Island  law.  See Crellin Technologies,
                                                ___ _____________________

            Inc. v. Equipmentlease Corp.,  18 F.3d 1, 10 (1st  Cir. 1994)
            ____    ____________________

            ("Rhode  Island  recognizes  that  virtually  every  contract

            contains  an implied covenant of good  faith and fair dealing

            between the parties."); Ide Farm & Stable, Inc. v. Cardi, 297
                                    _______________________    _____

            A.2d  643, 645 (R.I.  1972) (stating that  purpose of implied

            covenant  of   good  faith  and  fair  dealing  is  "so  that

            contractual objectives may be  achieved").  We find, however,

            that a  rational jury, presented with  the evidence contained

            in the summary judgment  record, could conclude that Bogosian

            rejected the  checks for  a legitimate reason,  and therefore

            summaryjudgment
                          onF&M'sbreach-of-contractclaim
                                                       isinappropriate.10

                                
            ____________________

            desire  to keep the money  herself and avoid  the dictates of
            the assignment  agreement --  then she has  not breached  the
            contract.

            10.  A  rational jury  might also  conclude, of  course, that
            Bogosian only had an  aversion to receiving cash when  it was
            going  into F&M's pocket,  as counsel for F&M  put it at oral
            argument.  The fact  that Pliakas tried to negotiate  a share
            of the $1  million for Bogosian,  and Bogosian's argument  to
            the  district court that F&M should not have asserted a claim
            to  the money when  it knew that  she needed the  cash to pay
            other creditors, support this view.  Divining Bogosian's true
            intent requires an assessment of  her credibility, a task for
            the factfinder, not the court.
                      We have also considered, and found meritless, F&M's
            assertion that  comments by Bogosian's attorney  in a related
            interpleader  action estops  her  from arguing  now that  the
            proffered $1 million were  not "proceeds."  In the  course of
            arguing  against  the  interpleading  of  WRC's  $1  million,
            Bogosian's  attorney  told  the  court that  the  funds  were
            "proceeds" of the valuation  litigation and their disposition

                                         -16-
                                          16

                      Although  we  remand  for  trial on  the  issue  of

            liability,  we leave intact that part of the district court's

            summary judgment ruling establishing the amount Bogosian owed

            F&M  as  of  the  date  of  alleged  breach,  plus  interest.

            Bogosian argues that this  would be inappropriate because F&M

            never  specifically  asked  for  "partial  summary  judgment"

            pursuant to  Fed. R.  Civ.  P. 56(d).   We  know  of no  such

            requirement; Rule 56(d) states that a court,  "[i]f on motion
                                                           ______________

            under this rule (Rule  56) judgment is not rendered  upon the
            _______________            __________________________________

            whole case[,] . . . shall if practicable" specify those facts
            __________          ____________________

            that  are without  substantial controversy.   F&M's pleadings

            and  affidavits made  clear that  it was  asserting that  the

            legal fees  and expenses  detailed in its  billing statements

            were  fair  and  reasonable  in  light  of  the  services  it

            performed  for  Bogosian.    Bogosian   never  contested  the

            accuracy or truthfulness  of any of those statements, nor did

            she adduce any expert testimony that the  requested fees were

            excessive.   Bogosian offered her  own opinion that  the fees

            charged  for   certain  portions   of  the  litigation   were

                                
            ____________________

            should  be determined in that  action.  We  do not understand
            his  comments to amount to an assertion of rights by Bogosian
            to  the money,  and we  therefore hold  that Bogosian  is not
            estopped  from  arguing  that  the  funds  were  not in  fact
            "proceeds" or "recoveries."

                                         -17-
                                          17

            excessive,11 but her  generalized assertions  are not  enough

            to create a "substantial controversy" about the amount she is

            obligated to pay  under her contract with  F&M, assuming that

            she is found  to have breached  that contract.   See Fed.  R.
                                                             ___

            Civ.  P. 56(e) ("When a  motion for summary  judgment is made

            and  supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may

            not  rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse

            party's  pleading,  but  the  adverse  party's  response,  by

            affidavits or  as otherwise provided  in this rule,  must set

            forth specific facts  showing that there  is a genuine  issue

            for  trial."); see  also  Bennett v.  Martin-Trigona, 686  F.
                           ___  ____  _______     ______________

            Supp.  6,  9  (D.D.C.  1988) (awarding  summary  judgment  to

            plaintiff-attorney after defendant-client  failed to  provide

            evidence of specific errors in  bills); cf. Pfeifer v. Sentry
                                                    ___ _______    ______

            Ins.,  745 F. Supp. 1434, 1443 (E.D. Wis. 1990) (stating that
            ____

            when  amount  of attorney  fee  is  challenged, attorney  has

            burden of  proving reasonableness of fee,  but opposing party

            has responsibility to state objections with particularity and

            clarity).

                      This  is not a  fee-award case, where  the court is

            called on  to determine  a reasonable  attorney's fee  in the

                                
            ____________________

            11.  For example, Bogosian asserted  that she was billed more
            than   $200,000  for   work   concerning   her   "Section   8
            partnerships" yet no lawsuit was ever  filed.  Bogosian never
            bothered to direct us (or the district court) to the specific
            billing  entries that  she  claims represent  this work,  let
            alone those entries that she deems excessive.

                                         -18-
                                          18

            first  instance;  it  is  a  contract  case,  and  Bogosian's

            obligations to F&M are defined by that contract.  See Laverty
                                                              ___ _______

            v.  Pearlman,  654  A.2d  696, 703  (R.I.  1995)  ("[W]hat  a
                ________

            plaintiff may be bound to pay and what an attorney is free to

            collect under a fee agreement are not necessarily measured by

            the  'reasonable attorney's  fee' that  a defendant  must pay

            pursuant to a court order." (quoting Venegas v. Mitchell, 495
                                                 _______    ________

            U.S. 82,  90 (1990)); see also A Sealed Case, 890 F.2d 15, 17
                                  ___ ____ _____________

            (7th Cir.  1989) ("Fees are  matters of contract,  and unless

            the  fee  is  so   exorbitant  that  its  collection  offends

            [professional   conduct  rules],  disputes   about  that  are

            resolved under  that body of  law.").  A  $1 million  fee for

            extensive  work  performed  in a  number  of  bitterly-fought

            lawsuits  is not  on its  face exorbitant,  and Bogosian  has

            utterly failed  to provide evidence  that any of  the claimed

            fees   and  expenses   were   in  fact   not  incurred,   are

            unreasonable, or exorbitant.  Thus, the amount owed to F&M on

            its   breach-of-contract   claim   is  not   in   substantial

            controversy and is deemed established upon remand.12

            C.  Bogosian's Counterclaims
            ____________________________

                      Bogosian's  counterclaim,  by the  district court's

            count,   alleged  thirty-four  instances  of  malpractice  or

            breach-of-contract  by F&M.    Flanders &  Medeiros, Inc.  v.
                                           __________________________

                                
            ____________________

            12.  Subject,  of  course,  to appropriate  recalculation  of
            interest and  fees incurred under the  contract subsequent to
            the district court's summary judgment order.

                                         -19-
                                          19

            Bogosian,  868  F. Supp.  at 417  n.4  (D.R.I. 1994).13   The
            ________

            district  court granted  F&M summary  judgment on  each claim

            because Bogosian had failed  to adduce competent evidence, in

            the form of  expert testimony,  on the standard  of care  and

            scope of  duty to  which F&M should  be held, or  on damages.

            Id.   Bogosian  now  argues  that the  district  court  erred
            ___

            because (1)  merely identifying  an expert witness  who would
                                ___________

                                
            ____________________

            13.  The   district   court's    characterization   of    the
            allegations, with which we largely agree, was as follows:

                      (a)  F&M's  failure to  obtain sufficient
                      interim relief in the WRC litigation; (b)
                      F&M's   failure  to   properly  supervise
                      expert  witness  Eric  Berenson   in  the
                      appraisal  proceeding before  the Special
                      Master;  (c) F&M's  failure to  insist on
                      certified  income and  expense statements
                      from WRC in the valuation proceeding; (d)
                      F&M's  failure to  object to  the Special
                      Master's  report on  the basis  of, inter
                      alia,   the    appropriateness   of   the
                      comparables  relied  upon by  the Special
                      Master to  arrive at the value of certain
                      real  estate,  his  valuation   of  WRC's
                      management business based upon two years'
                      management  contracts,  and the  issue of
                      whether there  was a waterway  on another
                      site;   (e)   F&M's  withdrawal   of  its
                      representation  of  Bogosian  in the  WRC
                      litigation, and its failure to bring suit
                      to   enjoin   Bogosian's   brother   from
                      entering  into  unauthorized   management
                      contracts; (f) F&M's numerous failures to
                      take  action  in  relation  to   the  two
                      receiverships; and (g)  F&M's failure  to
                      take  action  to have  Bogosian's brother
                      declared incapacitated  and terminated as
                      a   general  partner  of  the  Section  8
                      limited partnerships.

            886 F. Supp. at 417 n.4.

                                         -20-
                                          20

            testify  in support  of her  claims was  enough to  survive a

            summary  judgment motion,14  and  (2) certain  of her  claims

            did not require expert testimony.

                      Bogosian's first  argument is  plainly  wrong.   We

            stated  in Focus Inv. Assocs. v. American Title Ins. Co., 992
                       __________________    _______________________

            F.2d 1231, 1239 (1st Cir. 1993), that under Rhode Island law,

            "a legal malpractice plaintiff  must present expert testimony

            establishing  the  appropriate standard  of  care  unless the

            attorney's  lack of  care and  skill is  so obvious  that the

            trier of  fact can resolve  the issue as  a matter of  common

            knowledge."  We further explained that claims that "fall into

            the  'common   knowledge'  category   are  those  where   the

            negligence is  'clear and palpable,' or where  no analysis of

            legal  expertise  is  involved."    Id.    Virtually  all  of
                                                ___

            Bogosian's claims require  analysis of  legal expertise,  and

            therefore the  mere identification  of an expert  expected to
                                ______________

            testify  at trial would in no way demonstrate the standard of

            care applicable to F&M, an essential element of her case.

                                
            ____________________

            14.  Bogosian   filed  a   supplemental  response   to  F&M's
            interrogatories  identifying an  expert  witness prepared  to
            testify on  her  behalf on  February  15, 1994,  almost  five
            months after  the September 24, 1993,  discovery closure date
            and only  a week  before the  summary  judgment motions  were
            argued before  a magistrate-judge.  The supplemental response
            contained  no  indication  of  the  nature or  basis  of  the
            expert's  expected testimony other than to  say that he would
            testify    "in   support   of"    Bogosian's   defenses   and
            counterclaims.

                                         -21-
                                          21

                      Summary  judgment is  "mandate[d] .  . .  against a

            party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the

            existence of an  element essential to that  party's case, and

            on which that party will bear the burden of proof  at trial."

            Celotex  Corp. v.  Catrett, 477  U.S. 317,  322 (1986).   The
            ______________     _______

            moving  party  discharges  his   or  her  initial  burden  of

            "showing"  the  absence of  a  genuine  issue concerning  any

            material  fact by pointing  out to  the district  court "that

            there is  an absence  of evidence  to  support the  nonmoving

            party's  case."  Id. at  325.  F&M  discharged this burden by
                             ___

            pointing in its summary judgment motion to Bogosian's absence

            of  expert  testimony  in  support  of  her  counterclaims.15

            Therefore, summary judgment was appropriate as to all of  her

            claims that required the analysis of legal expertise.16

                                
            ____________________

            15.  Bogosian argues that F&M  only complained of her failure
            to  identify an  expert witness,  and thus  she was  under no
                ________
            obligation  to do  any  more than  that.   F&M's  motion  for
            summary judgment, however, clearly states that Bogosian "must
            present  expert  testimony"  and  that  she  "has  no  expert
            testimony to support this claim."  Stating that Bogosian  had
            not  yet  even  identified an  expert  witness  was  simply a
            stronger way  of stating that she had  no hope of bearing her
            burden of proof at trial.

            16.  Bogosian also argues that  the district court abused its
            discretion  in denying her request,  pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
            P. 56(f), for more time to produce expert witness affidavits.
            She  bases this argument  on the notion  that the requirement
            that she adduce expert  testimony to survive summary judgment
            was  a "new rule" dreamed  up by the  magistrate-judge at the
            summary  judgment hearing,  and that  its application  to her
            case constitutes an  abuse of discretion.   This argument  is
            legal  poppycock;  the  requirement of  expert  testimony  in
            proving most types  of malpractice claims has been  so widely
            adopted  that "it may even be malpractice to litigate a legal

                                         -22-
                                          22

                      Bogosian  also argues  that not  all of  her claims

            were of  the  type  that  required  expert  testimony.    For

            example, she argues that the district court failed to realize

            that  her allegation that F&M breached its duty of loyalty to

            Bogosian  when it  placed its  own interest  in getting  paid

            ahead of Bogosian's possible interest in receiving a property

            distribution rather than cash, adequately limned a breach-of-

            fiduciary  duty  claim.    Similarly,  she  argues  that  her

            allegation  that  F&M  withdrew  from  ongoing litigation  in

            violation of their contract states a breach-of-contract claim

            (assuming  that  the contract  contains  an  implied term  to

            continue   representation  until   the   conclusion  of   the

            litigation) that  is completely  distinct from F&M's  duty to

            perform to the  appropriate standard of care.   These claims,

            Bogosian  argues,   as  well  as  a   smattering  of  similar

            allegations contained in her counterclaim, require  no expert

            testimony because they do not  require the analysis of  legal

            expertise.

                      We  need not  answer the  question  Bogosian poses,

            because even  assuming arguendo that Bogosian  has adequately
                                   ________

            stated claims that  do not require expert  testimony, she has
                                   ___

            failed to  introduce adequate evidence of  damages to support

            any  of her  claims.   See 1  Ronald E.  Mallen &  Jeffrey M.
            ___                    ___

                                
            ____________________

            malpractice case without expert  testimony."  Wilburn Brewer,
            Jr., Expert Witness Testimony  in Legal Malpractice Cases, 47
                 ____________________________________________________
            S.C. L. Rev. 727, 733 (1994). 

                                         -23-
                                          23

            Smith, Legal Malpractice    16.1 (1989) ("Since the objective
                   _________________

            of  a  legal malpractice  suit  is  usually  the recovery  of

            monetary compensation  for an  injury, pleading and  proof of

            damages  are essential to a cause of action."); cf. Moores v.
                                                            ___ ______

            Greenberg,  834 F.2d  1105, 1111  (1st Cir.  1987) ("Whatever
            _________

            form a legal malpractice action takes, the plaintiff  has the

            burden  of  introducing  evidence  to  justify  an  award  of

            consequential  damages.").    In  her  Counterclaim, Bogosian

            raised the  specter of having  to hire additional  lawyers to

            duplicate work  already performed by  her abandoning lawyers,

            yet  she never provides further  evidence of such  costs.  In

            answering  F&M's  interrogatories  regarding the  nature  and

            scope  of  her  damages,  Bogosian  repeatedly  answered  (or

            incorporated by reference) that  "[a]n expert will assess the

            value of  damages sustained from Flanders  & Medeiros' breach

            upon obtaining  further discovery."   Such an  assessment was

            never  forthcoming.  As for F&M's placing its own interest in

            getting   paid  ahead  of  Bogosian's  possible  interest  in

            obtaining a property distribution for the  full amount of her

            stock's  value, the $1 million was never received by F&M, and

            the  record  contains no  evidence  that  the possibility  of

            Bogosian receiving a  distribution entirely  in property  has

            been diminished  at all.17   Thus,  Bogosian had  not adduced

                                
            ____________________

            17.  The   checks  eventually   expired;  WRC   initiated  an
            interpleader action  in the  district court to  determine the
            rights of  various creditors  of Bogosian, including  F&M, to

                                         -24-
                                          24

            competent evidence sufficient  to prove an essential  element

            of her claim, namely,  that these alleged breaches by  F&M --

            whether or not proof thereof would require expert testimony -

            - have in fact damaged her.  Therefore, summary judgment must

            be granted for F&M on these claims.

                                         III.
                                         III.
                                         ____

                      For  the foregoing  reasons,  the  decision of  the

            district  court is reversed  in part,  affirmed in  part, and
                               __________________________________________

            remanded  for   further  proceedings  consistent   with  this
            _____________________________________________________________

            opinion.
            _______

                                
            ____________________

            funds WRC expected to pay to her.

                                         -25-
                                          25