Court Opinion

ID: 9498515
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 17:19:42.221728+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:58:52.866908
License: Public Domain

KOZINSKI, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
If ever there was a case where a Jewell instruction was proper, this is surely it. This is a much stronger case than Jewell itself, or any of our other deliberate ignorance cases, because we have here what *831we almost never get — defendant’s admission that her suspicions were aroused and eventually matured into a belief that there may be drugs in the car. The jury could easily have found that defendant suspected the drugs were there and should have discovered them before trying to run the law enforcement checkpoint.
There are three ways the jury could have done this:
First, defendant was aware of a suspicious circumstance — the strong smell of fabric softener or detergent in the car— before she even commenced her trip, yet she failed to check where the odor was coming from. It is true, as the majority points out, that an odor without more is not sufficient to support a Jewell instruction. See maj. at 826 (citing United States v. Baron, 94 F.3d 1312, 1316-18 (9th Cir. 1996), and United States v. Sanchez-Robles, 927 F.2d 1070, 1075 (9th Cir.1991)). The reason for this is simple and well explained by the majority: Not everyone knows that a strong scent is a clue to possible drug smuggling; to make that connection, defendant would have to know that smugglers sometimes use scents to mask drug odors.
Here we have much more than the odor. According to the testimony of the DEA agent who interviewed Heredia, she found the presence of the strong odor — an “overwhelming scent” according to the Border Patrol agent, Tr. of Trial at 90 (No. CR-02-777-TUC-JMR) (March 11, 2003) [hereinafter March 11 Tr.] — suspicious: “She said she got in the vehicle and the odor was so strong that something seemed wrong, so she asked her Aunt Belia about it.” Tr. of Trial at 45 (No. CR-02-777TUC-JMR) (March 12, 2003) [hereinafter March 12 Tr.] (testimony of DEA Agent Birney) (emphasis added). The aunt explained that she had “spilled some detergent in the vehicle a couple of days prior and that was the reason for the smell,” but Heredia “didn’t believe her aunt.... She said that she [Heredia] had spilled detergent in her own vehicle in the past and the smell dissipated within a couple of days and it shouldn’t have smelled that strong.” Id. Despite her suspicion, despite her feeling that “something was wrong,” Heredia didn’t bother to pop the trunk to check where the odor was coming from.
So far, this is pretty much on all fours with Jewell, where the defendant had noted a secret compartment in the vehicle, but failed to look in it, even though his companion stated that “[i]t didn’t sound right” from the beginning. United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 699 nn. 1 & 2 (9th Cir.1976) (en banc). Here, Heredia knew of the strong detergent smell, didn’t believe her aunt’s explanation for it and thought that “something seemed wrong.” Why would a strong smell of detergent cause Heredia to suspect that there was something “wrong”? The jury could have inferred that it was because Heredia knew that strong odors are used to mask the smell of concealed drugs.
But we have more than that here. In Jeivell there was no evidence that the defendant associated the presence of the secret compartment with the concealment of drugs; the Jewell court was satisfied that a jury could infer such a connection as a matter of common sense. Here, Heredia disclosed that she did associate strong scents in the car with an effort to conceal the smell of contraband. She testified that she eventually figured out that drugs might be in the car, and that she did so based on a number of clues, two of which were the fact that her mother sprayed the inside of the car with air freshener and that she opened the window, even though it was a cold night. March 12 Tr. at 138-39. Neither opening the window nor the use of air freshener are inherently suspi*832cious; people often open car windows when they are smoking, and an entire automobile air freshener industry caters to people who wish to mask odors such as cigarette smoke. Certainly, nothing about opening a window or spraying ah’ freshener suggests drug transportation, unless one is aware that concealed drugs emit odors that must be covered up or dissipated. To Heredia, however, the use of air freshener and the opening of the window were clues; they told her that there might be drugs in the car.
The jury could have inferred from this testimony that Heredia did have the specialized knowledge that heavy scents are used to cover up drug odors. And, the jury could have reasoned, someone who has that knowledge would infer that the strong odor was put there in order to conceal contraband. This would explain why Heredia didn’t accept at face value the aunt’s “spilled detergent” story and why it caused her to suspect that “something was wrong.”
The inference would be strengthened by the fact that, in her testimony, Heredia twice denied that she had told the agent about the “spilled detergent” incident. March 12 Tr. at 143, 164-65. The jury could have believed the DEA agent that Heredia did tell this highly incriminating story the day after her arrest but, recognizing how damaging it was to admit that she suspected something was wrong before she started her trip, she lied about it on the stand.
Second, the jury could simply have accepted Heredia’s testimony that she came to suspect there were drugs in the car while she was driving on Interstate 19 toward the checkpoint. Id. at 138-39, 149-50. Heredia testified that she developed this suspicion based on the fact that her mother and aunt were nervous, that they were drinking and smoking heavily, that her mother sprayed air freshener in the car and opened the window, and that her mother and aunts had plenty of money, even though her mother was not working at the time. Id. at 139,149.
Heredia claims that she did not put these pieces together until she had passed the last freeway exit prior to the checkpoint, but the jury was not bound to believe this. The jury was entitled to believe all of her story, none of her story or part of her story. In particular, we have held, in the Jewell context, that the jury is not required to believe defendant’s self-serving testimony. See, e.g., United States v. Perez-Padilla, 846 F.2d 1182, 1183 (9th Cir. 1988) (per curiam); United States v. Nicholson, 677 F.2d 706, 709 (9th Cir.1982). Perez-Padilla relied on Nicholson for this self-evident proposition, and Nicholson relied on our earlier case United States v. Cisneros, 448 F.2d 298 (9th Cir.1971), where we said:
A trier of fact is not compelled to accept and believe the self serving stories of vitally interested defendants. Their evidence may not only be disbelieved, but from the totality of the circumstances, including the manner in which they testify, a contrary conclusion may be properly drawn.
Id. at 305 (quoted in Nicholson, 677 F.2d at 709).
The jury here was entitled to accept as true the fact of Heredia’s epiphany — -which was contrary to her interest, and therefore likely to be true — but disbelieve her as to the timing of that realization. Indeed, as Cisneros makes clear, the jury could properly draw precisely the opposite inference from her testimony — i.e. that she figured out there were drugs in the car long before the point of no return.
The majority’s figment that the jury was somehow bound to believe Heredia on this *833key point not only conflicts with Nicholson, it creates a very dangerous precedent. Jurors are not Immigration Judges; we have traditionally given them wide latitude whether to believe or disbelieve evidence: “The jury may conclude a witness is not telling the truth as to one point, is mistaken as to another, but is truthful and accurate as to a third.” Elwert v. United States, 231 F.2d 928, 934 (9th Cir.1956). This makes perfect sense: As we are all aware, witnesses seldom tell an entirely false story; it is very common for witnesses to try to gain the trier of fact’s trust by hewing as closely as possible to the truth, but then add a fact or explanation that casts their conduct in a positive light. This additional fact or explanation is sometimes true, but often it’s not. Juries, employing their common sense, as they are instructed to do, understand this, and thus may reject the exculpatory or self-serving portion of a witness’s story, even as they accept the rest.
The jury here could reasonably have rejected the exculpatory part of Heredia’s story. According to the record, the trip from Nogales to the checkpoint took some 90 minutes. See March 11 Tr. at 83; March 12 Tr. at 136. Given the evidence that Heredia was aware that there was “something wrong” as soon as she took possession of the car, that her suspicions about her mother’s finances long preceded the trip, March 12 Tr. at 139 (“I would always ask myself where she got the money.”); id. at 149 (“[M]y mom and my aunts — they always had money, but my mom wasn’t working at the time.”), and that the detergent smell in the car was “overwhelming,” the jury could have found that Heredia developed her suspicions long before she got to the checkpoint, yet chose not to investigate so she could later claim that she didn’t know there were drugs in the car.
Finally, even if the jurors believed every jot and tittle of Heredia’s story, they could still have concluded that she failed to take reasonable steps to disassociate herself from the criminal conduct before the drugs were discovered by the Border Patrol. The government suggests two ways she might have done this. She might, first of all, have stopped the car and pulled to the side of the road. The majority rejects this possibility on the theory that this would have been “an unsafe act.” Maj. at 828. According to the majority, doing so would have required Heredia to “abandon her aunt’s vehicle on the side of the interstate with another aunt, her mother, and her two infant children either stranded inside or walking with her along the interstate shoulder....” Id. at 829. Nothing of the sort. Cars occasionally have mechanical problems and are forced to pull over and await help; this is a normal part of highway driving, and most motorists experience it from time to time. Motorists also stop on highway shoulders to check unexplained vehicle noises, batten down loose cargo, water the tumbleweeds, let the engine cool on a steep uphill grade and for dozens of similar reasons. Shoulders are built alongside highways precisely to allow motorists to stop safely in case of urgent need.
Once Heredia stopped the car on the shoulder, she would neither have been stranded, nor had to hike. Instead, she could have checked the trunk and, if there was nothing there, she could have continued her trip. If, on the other hand, she found contraband — as she certainly would have — she could have used her mother’s cell phone, see March 12 Tr. at 140, to summon her husband to fetch her and her passengers. But Heredia had an even better alternative: According to her own testimony, Aunt Belia was traveling in close proximity to them in a separate car — -a maroon Cavalier. Id. When Heredia real*834ized that she might be carrying drugs, she could have signaled her aunt visually (or instructed her by cell phone) to pull over, and transferred the occupants of Heredia’s car to Belia’s. When two cars caravan, as happened here, it seems perfectly safe and appropriate to switch vehicles when, for whatever reason, one of the vehicles can no longer be driven safely — that’s often the very reason cars travel in tandem. My colleagues’ scenario of three vulnerable women hiking on the shoulder of a busy interstate while carrying little children is pure fantasy.
Alternatively, Heredia could have proceeded to the checkpoint and informed the border agents of her suspicions. The majority rejects this possibility out of hand, maj. at 829, but I have no clue why the majority doesn’t consider this a “reasonable opportunity to abstain from, or discontinue, the suspected criminal activity.” Id. at 830. What better way to discontinue suspected criminal activity than by reporting it to the police? By voicing her suspicions, Heredia wouldn’t have admitted guilt; she would have proclaimed her innocence and distanced herself from the criminal conduct. And, by spilling the beans, she would have unequivocally disassociated herself from the criminal enterprise; indeed, by calling attention to the possibility that drugs were present, she would have ensured that the car would be searched and that any criminal enterprise to which she had unwittingly become a party would be thwarted.
Instead, Heredia played possum when she was stopped at the checkpoint. By doing so, she continued to aid the criminal enterprise even though she suspected she was carrying drugs. Had the Border Patrol agents been less alert, she might well have rolled past the checkpoint and delivered her valuable cargo safely to its unlawful destination. I can’t imagine why my colleagues believe that Jewell entitles an individual who suspects she has unwittingly become entangled in criminal activity to continue abetting the criminal enterprise and helping ensure its success. I find this proposition perfectly absurd.
Finally, even where a Jewell instruction is improperly given, the court must engage in harmless error analysis, and a number of our cases have found the erroneous giving of a Jewell instruction harmless. See, e.g., United States v. Fulbright, 105 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir.1997); United States v. Alvarado, 838 F.2d 311, 316-17 (9th Cir.1988). The majority seems to recognize this, maj. at 830, but concludes the error is not harmless, citing another case — Sanchez-Robles, 927 F.2d at 1075. But the fact that the error was found prejudicial in another case tells us nothing about whether the error is prejudicial here. This is because harmless error analysis requires a review of this record, to determine whether this defendant would nevertheless have been convicted, had this error not been committed. By purporting to conduct harmless error analysis in the abstract, without looking at the record or discussing the evidence, the majority contradicts a long line of authority, turning a Jewell error into structural error.
It’s clear that if there was Jewell error here — which there was not — it was entirely harmless. The evidence that Heredia actually knew about the drugs in the car was overwhelming. Unlike many other cases involving drug couriers, everyone here who might have planted the drugs was Heredia’s close relative — her husband, her mother, her aunts. While a mule might plausibly claim he was not told what he was carrying, this was a family business. It defies credulity to suggest that Heredia was entrusted with 350 pounds of marijuana by a close relative, without being told what she was transporting. I *835can’t imagine that the jury would have been fooled by the self-contradictory and confused stories told by Heredia and her various family members. On this record, I have no trouble concluding that any Jewell error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. I would affirm.