Court Opinion

ID: 9401566
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-13 16:09:45.351279+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:53.517629
License: Public Domain

June 13, 2023                                    Supreme Court

                                                 No. 2021-337-C.A.
                                                 (P1/99-4291A)

            State                 :

                v.                :

        John Davis.               :

      NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision
      before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers
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      Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence,
      Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone (401) 222-3258 or
      Email opinionanalyst@courts.ri.gov, of any typographical
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      made before the opinion is published.
                                                         Supreme Court

                                                         No. 2021-337-C.A.
                                                         (P1/99-4291A)

                  State                    :

                    v.                     :

               John Davis.                 :

      Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ.

                                  OPINION

      Chief Justice Suttell, for the Court. The defendant, John Davis, appeals

from a Superior Court order denying his motion to correct an illegal sentence. The

defendant argues that the ten-year nonparolable sentence he received under

G.L. 1956 § 12-19-21 is in contravention of the plain language of the statute. This

case came before the Supreme Court pursuant to an order directing the parties to

appear and show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not be summarily

decided. After considering the parties’ written and oral submissions and reviewing

the record, we conclude that cause has not been shown and that this case may be

decided without further briefing or argument. For the reasons set forth herein, we

affirm the order of the Superior Court.

                                          -1-
                                          I

                                  Facts and Travel

      In October 2001, a jury found defendant guilty of two counts of assault with

a dangerous weapon in a dwelling house.1 For the first count, defendant was

sentenced to forty years with twenty-five years to serve and fifteen years suspended,

with probation. For the second count, he received a ten-year suspended sentence

with ten years of probation, to be served consecutively to the first sentence. In

addition, and at issue in this appeal, defendant received a ten-year nonparolable

sentence enhancement as a habitual offender pursuant to § 12-19-21, which was to

be served consecutively to the first sentence.

      On March 26, 2021, defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence

pursuant to Rule 35(a) of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure. 2 The

defendant did not dispute that he was properly deemed a “habitual criminal”; instead,

he argued that the ten-year nonparolable habitual offender sentence enhancement

was illegal because “there is no provision in the habitual criminal statute which

allows for a wholly non-parolable sentence.” The state submitted a response to

1
  This Court affirmed defendant’s convictions in State v. Davis, 877 A.2d 642 (R.I.
2005).
2
  The defendant initially appeared pro se to challenge his sentence, but he was
ultimately represented by court-appointed counsel at the hearing on the motion
before the trial justice and is represented by the public defender’s office before this
Court.

                                         -2-
defendant’s motion suggesting that the trial justice deny defendant’s motion based

upon this Court’s holding in State v. Paiva, 200 A.3d 665 (R.I. 2019).

      On November 5, 2021, the trial justice heard defendant’s motion. At the

hearing, defendant argued that the language in § 12-19-21(b) requires the trial justice

to identify a time period “before which [defendant is] not eligible for parole and after

which he would be eligible for parole.”         The state asserted that defendant’s

interpretation of the statute essentially requires the trial justice to set a date that

defendant be eligible for parole, which requirement this Court expressly rejected in

Paiva.

      The trial justice then rendered a bench decision denying defendant’s motion,

stating, “I’m satisfied that I have acted within the authority vested in me by the

legislature under the habitual statute, on the plain language of it. I’m satisfied that

the Paiva case is controlling, and I deny the motion.” That same day, an order

denying defendant’s motion was entered, and defendant filed a timely notice of

appeal.

                                          II

                                Standard of Review

      “This Court follows a ‘strong policy against interfering with a trial justice’s

discretion in sentencing matters.’” State v. Mattatall, 219 A.3d 1288, 1292-93 (R.I.

2019) (quoting State v. Barkmeyer, 32 A.3d 950, 952 (R.I. 2011)). “Therefore, this

                                         -3-
Court’s ‘review of a trial justice’s decision on a Rule 35 motion is extremely

limited.’” Id. at 1293 (quoting Barkmeyer, 219 A.3d at 952).

      Nevertheless, the disposition of the issue presented on appeal requires us to

construe a certain subsection of the habitual offender statute, § 12-19-21(b). “This

Court reviews [such] questions of statutory construction and interpretation de novo.”

State v. Wray, 101 A.3d 884, 886 (R.I. 2014) (quoting National Refrigeration, Inc.

v. Capital Properties, Inc., 88 A.3d 1150, 1156 (R.I. 2014)).

                                         III

                                     Discussion

      On appeal, defendant argues that the entirety of his ten-year habitual offender

sentence “is an illegal sentence and the trial justice’s denial of the Rule 35 motion

must be reversed.” He argues that his ten-year nonparolable habitual offender

sentence is illegal because § 12-19-21(b) “requires that a defendant be eligible for

parole during some portion of their habitual offender sentence.” The particular

statutory language to which defendant directs this Court’s attention provides:

             “If it appears by a preponderance of the evidence
             presented that the defendant is a habitual criminal under
             this section, he or she shall be sentenced by the court to an
             additional consecutive term of imprisonment not
             exceeding twenty-five (25) years; and provided further,
             that the court shall order the defendant to serve a
             minimum number of years of the sentence before he or she
             becomes eligible for parole.” Section 12-19-21(b)
             (emphasis added).

                                         -4-
According to defendant, “[i]f the legislature had intended that an entire habitual

offender sentence could be non-parolable, it would not have included the language[,]

‘before he or she becomes eligible for parole.’” (Quoting § 12-19-21(b).)

      In addressing defendant’s argument, “we are guided by the following

important axiom: ‘It is a fundamental principle that, when the language of a statute

is clear and unambiguous, this Court must interpret the statute literally and must give

the words of the statute their plain and ordinary meanings.’” Paiva, 200 A.3d at 667

(quoting State v. Diamante, 83 A.3d 546, 548 (R.I. 2014)). “[I]n abiding by the plain

meaning rule, we remain mindful of the corollary principle that we ‘will not construe

a statute to reach an absurd result.’” State v. Santos, 870 A.2d 1029, 1032 n.5 (R.I.

2005) (quoting Kaya v. Partington, 681 A.2d 256, 261 (R.I. 1996)). As we have

stated before, the plain-meaning approach “is not the equivalent of myopic

literalism, and it is entirely proper for us to look to the sense and meaning fairly

deducible from the context.” Wray, 101 A.3d at 886-87 (quoting National

Refrigeration, Inc., 88 A.3d at 1156).

      We have previously stated that the statutory clause at issue “is clear and

unambiguous” and that nothing in the statutory language requires a sentencing

justice to announce a specific eligibility date. Paiva, 200 A.3d at 667. Furthermore,

§ 12-19-21(b) does not require that a defendant be eligible for parole at all during

the habitual offender sentence. See State v. Tejeda, 171 A.3d 983, 1002-03 (R.I.

                                         -5-
2017) (affirming a twenty-five-year nonparolable habitual offender sentence, the

maximum sentence under § 12-19-21(b)). Rather, the statutory language simply

requires that a defendant who is deemed to be a habitual criminal be ordered to serve

an additional period of nonparolable incarceration. See § 12-19-21(b); see also G.L.

1956 § 13-8-9(a) (excluding individuals serving habitual offender sentences from

being subject to the parole board’s vote to grant parole). The statute does not

preclude the sentencing justice from ordering the entire sentence to be served,

provided that the habitual offender sentence does not exceed twenty-five years.

Section 12-19-21(b).

      The defendant’s contrary reading of the statute is mistaken. The defendant

abscises the phrase “before he or she becomes eligible for parole[,]” from the rest of

the habitual offender statute, and in doing so, he asks this Court to constrain a

sentencing justice’s discretion to craft an adequate sentence to “deter and punish

* * * persistent violators who have not responded to the restraining influence of

conviction and punishment.” Tejeda, 171 A.3d at 1002 (quoting State v. Burke, 811

A.2d 1158, 1168 (R.I. 2002)); see § 12-19-21(b).

      In the case at bar, the trial justice determined that ten nonparolable years to

serve was an adequate sentence to “deter and punish” the defendant’s habitual

criminal behavior. Tejeda, 171 A.3d at 1002 (quoting Burke, 811 A.2d at 1168). In

so doing, the trial justice correctly complied with the habitual offender statute, and,

                                         -6-
thus, we perceive no error on the part of the trial justice in denying the defendant’s

motion to correct his sentence.

                                           IV

                                    Conclusion

      For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the order of the Superior Court. The

record may be returned to that tribunal.

                                           -7-
                                              STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
                                         SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE
                                               Licht Judicial Complex
                                                 250 Benefit Street
                                               Providence, RI 02903

                                     OPINION COVER SHEET

Title of Case                            State v. John Davis.

                                         No. 2021-337-C.A.
Case Number
                                         (P1/99-4291A)

Date Opinion Filed                       June 13, 2023

                                         Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and
Justices
                                         Long, JJ.

Written By                               Chief Justice Paul A. Suttell

Source of Appeal                         Providence County Superior Court

Judicial Officer from Lower Court        Associate Justice Robert D. Krause

                                         For Plaintiff:

                                         Leslie M. Ocean
                                         Department of Attorney General
Attorney(s) on Appeal
                                         For Defendant:

                                         Michael G. Ewart
                                         Rhode Island Public Defender

SU-CMS-02A (revised November 2022)