Court Opinion

ID: 9854555
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:09:08.380099+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:09.027832
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Judge,
dissenting.
I concur fully in the other dissent.
1. At first, it appears that the suit was premature because of the pendency of defendant’s “innocent spouse” claim which she filed by petition in the United States Tax Court in March 1985. If that were resolved in her favor, she would not be indebted to plaintiff for the contribution he seeks.
However, it is her defense which is premature, or more accurately perhaps, inchoate. She has not established that she has been absolved of the joint and several liability imposed by 26 USC § 6013 (d) (3). She may be relieved of liability as provided in subsection (e) “[u]nder regulations prescribed by the Secretary [of the Treasury], . . .” by a procedure which she has commenced but not completed. After her case was referred back to the IRS Appellate Division and subsequently returned to the court, it was twice scheduled for trial and continued, the second time “generally,” in March 1987.
And there it sits. The burden in that case is on the taxpayer to prove she satisfies every element of the exception to joint liability provided in section 6013 (e) (1). Shea v. C.I.R., 780 F2d 561, 565 (2) (6th Cir. 1986); Ratana v. C.I.R., 662 F2d 220, 224 (1) (4th Cir. 1981). Not having done this in the forum which the law provides for resolution of such an issue, plaintiff’s claim in the court below remains governed by the joint and several liability imposed by section 6013 (d) (3).
I have found no authority for the proposition that Mr. Klausman, *673plaintiff below, would have to first ask to be added as a party plaintiff in Mrs. Klausman’s Tax Court suit and then seek to have it adjudicated to a conclusion that she is not excepted as an “innocent spouse,” in order to bring his claim for contribution. Thus I agree that the defendant was not entitled to summary judgment.
Decided March 18, 1988
Rehearing denied March 31, 1988
Martin L. Fierman, for appellant.
Donald W. Gettle, for appellee.
2. Even if I agreed with the majority’s substantive position, I would have to dissent as to a procedural aspect. The propriety of the denial of plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is not before us.
Whether right or wrong as to appealability, appellant states in his brief that, as respects the order in regard to plaintiffs motion, “no appeal is being taken as the denial of such a motion is not appealable.” At the end of his brief, his “Final Conclusion” is that: “For the reasons stated above, the appellant urges this Court to review the Trial Court’s granting of Defendant/Appellee’s Motion for Summary Judgment.”
While it is true that appellant appealed from the order which also contained the ruling on plaintiff’s motion, that is the order which contained the ruling complained of. We may not reach beyond the issues properly brought before us. Clark v. Bandy, 196 Ga. 546, 558 (27 SE2d 17) (1943); Bouldin v. Contran Corp., 173 Ga. App. 823 (328 SE2d 424) (1985); Continental Nut Co. v. Savannah Bank, 142 Ga. App. 509, 515 (3) (236 SE2d 501) (1977).