Court Opinion

ID: 9909739
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-13 22:01:13.975496+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:19.460461
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-12022    Document: 56-1      Date Filed: 12/13/2023   Page: 1 of 24

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-12022
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
        versus
        KEVIN DUANE BYRON,

                                                    Defendant-Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of Florida
                     D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cr-20553-PCH-1
                           ____________________
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        2                       Opinion of the Court                   22-12022

        Before ROSENBAUM, GRANT, and HULL, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
              After a jury trial, defendant Kevin Byron appeals his
        conviction for possession of a firearm and ammunition by a
        convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).
               On appeal, Byron argues that at trial, the district court erred
        by: (1) admitting evidence of texts and pictures of firearms found
        on his cell phone; (2) denying Byron’s motion for a judgment of
        acquittal; (3) allowing the government to refer to Byron as a drug
        dealer, an inflammatory characterization; and (4) demonstrating
        bias against him. After review, we affirm.
                             I. EVIDENCE AT TRIAL
        A.     Traffic Stop and Arrest
               On June 30, 2021, while on patrol with other officers, police
        detective Alejandro Gomez observed a blue Lincoln with heavily
        tinted windows. Defendant Byron, a convicted felon, was the sole
        occupant and driving.
               Believing the window tinting to be illegal, the officers
        activated their patrol car’s lights and sirens to conduct a traffic stop.
        Byron travelled four blocks and made a left turn before stopping.
        Once Byron finally stopped, Detective Gomez approached and
        asked Byron to roll down the windows for safety purposes. Byron
        rolled down only the driver’s side window. As Byron did so,
        Detective Gomez observed Byron lean forward “in a manner kind
        of reaching toward the floorboard of the driver’s side of the
        vehicle.” Detective Gomez had Byron roll down all the windows
        and place his hands on the steering wheel.
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        22-12022              Opinion of the Court                        3

               Detective Gomez immediately smelled a strong odor of
        marijuana emitting from the Lincoln. After obtaining Byron’s
        driver’s license, which Byron said was suspended, Detective
        Gomez asked Byron to exit the Lincoln and placed him in
        handcuffs.
               Once Byron was outside the Lincoln, Detective Gomez
        noticed in plain view an empty gun holster underneath the center
        console. Detective Gomez also saw a box of Popeyes chicken
        stuffed underneath the driver’s seat, with chicken inside it.
        Detective Gomez found this “very unusual,” noting that he had
        never seen a box of fast food stuffed under a driver’s seat in that
        manner. There also was a Popeyes drink cup on the center console
        with condensation on it, indicating it was a fresh drink.
               Once the box of chicken caught his attention, Detective
        Gomez, from outside the car, angled himself and saw an extended
        magazine protruding from underneath the box. Detective Gomez
        angled himself a little more and saw that the magazine was
        attached to a firearm. The firearm was a Glock 19 semiautomatic
        pistol loaded with 29 live rounds of ammunition. A subsequent
        search of the Lincoln revealed Byron’s cell phone and, on the
        passenger’s side, a backpack containing a “large amount of
        marijuana,” packages of THC edibles, and digital scales.
                The firearm in the Lincoln was later determined to be
        stolen. No latent fingerprints were recovered from the firearm, the
        ammunition, or the extended magazine. A crime scene
        investigator explained that it was very rare to do so because of the
        texture of firearms and ammunition and the way they are used and
        cleaned. While detectives learned Byron’s mother owned the
        Lincoln, subsequent surveillance indicated Byron drove the car as
        if it was his own.
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                 22-12022

               Detective Onassis Perdomo obtained a search warrant for
        Byron’s cell phone. Detective Perdomo found on the cell phone:
        (1) text messages; (2) pictures of two firearms Byron sent to
        multiple individuals in 2019, offering to sell the firearms; (3) a
        picture of Byron sitting in a car with a Glock handgun in his lap; (4)
        a picture of a Glock handgun with an extended magazine next to a
        bag of marijuana; and (5) a picture of a Glock handgun with an
        extended magazine and a rifle.
               A crime gun investigator examined these latter three
        pictures and determined: (1) the firearms displayed were authentic,
        rather than toys or replicas; and (2) the Glock 19 displayed was the
        same firearm recovered from the Lincoln during the June 30 traffic
        stop. The crime gun investigator based his latter opinion on a
        partial serial number and other markings and wear and tear visible
        in the pictures.
        B.    Indictment and Pretrial Proceedings
               A federal grand jury charged Byron with possession of a
        firearm and ammunition by a convicted felon, in violation of 18
        U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e)(1).
              The government filed a notice of intent to introduce
        evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). The notice listed
        the text messages and firearm pictures extracted from Byron’s
        cellphone, which reflected his attempts to sell those firearms. The
        government contended this Rule 404(b) evidence was probative of
        Byron’s knowing possession of the firearm in the present case.
               Prior to trial, Byron moved to suppress all the evidence
        stemming from the June 30 traffic stop and his subsequent arrest,
        including the firearm and evidence from his cell phone. At an
        evidentiary hearing, the district court asked Byron whether,
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        22-12022              Opinion of the Court                       5

        assuming his motion to suppress was denied, he had any argument
        that the text messages and pictures discussing the firearms sale
        were inadmissible under Rule 404(b). Byron responded, “No,
        there’s – I have no argument about it.” The district court
        ultimately denied Byron’s motion to suppress. On appeal, Byron
        raises no issue as to this evidentiary ruling.
        C.    Government’s Case at Trial
              As recounted above, the government presented trial
        evidence from Detective Gomez, Detective Perdomo, and other
        law enforcement officers about the June 30 traffic stop of the
        Lincoln driven by Byron and their subsequent investigation.
               In addition, Detective Perdomo testified about an affidavit
        Byron’s mother, Joyce Byron, prepared and submitted to the State
        Attorney General’s office while Byron still faced state charges. In
        her affidavit, Ms. Byron attested that she put the firearm in the
        Lincoln and that the firearm belonged to Byron’s brother who
        passed away in 2011. As part of his investigation, Detective
        Perdomo concluded her affidavit could not be true. Detective
        Perdomo explained that the firearm could not have belonged to
        Byron’s brother because it did not arrive in the United States from
        Austria until 2015, years after the brother’s 2011 death.
              On cross examination, Detective Perdomo was asked
        whether he obtained the search warrant for Byron’s cell phone
        because of the marijuana found in the car. Detective Perdomo
        responded that he sought a search warrant based on both the
        marijuana and the firearm found in the car. Defense counsel then
        asked if this was because “historically drug dealers seem to have
        evidence on a cellphone,” and Detective Perdomo agreed.
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                 22-12022

               On redirect examination, Detective Perdomo testified that,
        based on his experience, the evidence found in the Lincoln with
        Byron—a large amount of high-grade, expensive marijuana,
        several packages of THC edibles, digital scales, and a firearm—
        indicated that Byron was selling marijuana. Byron objected to this
        testimony as “[c]onclusory” and was overruled.
               Detective Perdomo further testified that, in his experience,
        people trafficking marijuana often have a firearm as protection
        from others who might rob them. Byron objected again,
        “[m]ove[d] to strike,” and asked the district court to instruct the
        jury to “disregard that,” without giving any basis for the objection.
        The district court overruled the objection.
               The prosecutor then asked Detective Perdomo, “[i]n your
        training and experience, do drug dealers use their phone as part of
        their drug dealing?” Detective Perdomo answered yes, and then
        explained that drug traffickers use their phones “like a regular job,”
        taking orders, calling suppliers, and arranging meeting locations,
        and that he almost always obtained a search warrant to review
        phones in drug-related offenses.
        D.   District Court’s Questions About Possible Defense
        Witnesses
                After the first day of trial, outside the jury’s presence, the
        district court called a sidebar conference and asked defense counsel
        if Byron was planning to testify. Defense counsel answered in the
        affirmative and assured the district court that he had reviewed with
        Byron the pros and cons of taking the stand, including that his six
        prior felony convictions could be used to impeach him. The
        district court asked if defense counsel wanted the court “to do an
        inquiry to make sure he understands,” and defense counsel agreed.
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        22-12022               Opinion of the Court                         7

               The district court addressed Byron directly about his
        decision whether to testify. Byron stated he understood it was his
        decision, and that he would talk again with his attorney about the
        pros and cons before deciding. The district court advised Byron
        that he should consult with his attorney, but that it was Byron’s
        decision whether or not to testify. The district court also advised
        Byron that, if he did not testify, the jury would be instructed not to
        consider that in deciding whether he was guilty.
                The district court also asked if Byron’s mother was going to
        testify, and defense counsel indicated that she was. The district
        court pointed out Detective Perdomo’s testimony that the firearm
        was not in the country until after her son died and asked whether
        Byron’s mother needed counsel. When defense counsel answered
        in the negative, the district court stated that Byron’s mother “could
        be charged with perjury” and suggested defense counsel should
        discuss it with Byron. The district court said it was “not getting
        further involved,” but observed, “[i]f I were a defendant, I would
        be concerned about my mother.”
                The government also read into evidence several stipulations
        of the parties, including that Byron’s previous felony convictions
        included convictions for offenses related to the knowing possession
        of firearms.
              After the government rested, Byron moved for a judgment
        of acquittal, arguing the government had failed to prove he
        knowingly possessed the firearm in the Lincoln. The district court
        denied the motion.
        E.    Byron’s Defense
               Joyce Byron, Byron’s mother, testified that she co-owned
        the Lincoln with Byron’s girlfriend, who usually drove the car. A
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                22-12022

        few weeks before Byron’s arrest, Ms. Byron found the firearm in a
        closet in her deceased son’s room and assumed the firearm
        belonged to him. Without telling Byron or his girlfriend, Ms.
        Byron put the firearm under the Lincoln’s driver’s seat, intending
        to get rid of it, and then forgot about it.
               On cross-examination, Ms. Byron admitted that she was
        “just speculating” when she stated under oath in her prior affidavit
        that the firearm belonged to her deceased son and that she did not
        know to whom the firearm belonged. She did not remember
        finding a holster with the firearm and could not explain how the
        holster got into the Lincoln.
                Following Ms. Byron’s testimony, the district court held
        another sidebar conference outside the jury’s presence. The
        district court discussed again with defense counsel whether Byron
        planned to testify, explaining to defense counsel, who said he was
        a “state court guy,” that in federal court the government would be
        able to explore the nature of Byron’s six prior convictions on cross-
        examination. Defense counsel responded that he would “have a
        chat” with Byron about that. A United States Marshal then
        announced that Byron just informed him that he was not going to
        testify. The district court responded, “Okay. Time out. Go back
        and talk to him again. Probably a good decision.” After a brief
        recess, defense counsel advised the district court that Byron had
        decided not to testify.
                Once the jury returned, Byron called Brooke Moreno, his
        girlfriend, to testify. Moreno said she was the registered owner and
        primary user of the Lincoln, even though she also owned a Jaguar.
        Moreno claimed Byron usually did not drive the car.
              After Byron rested, he renewed his motion for a judgment
        of acquittal. The district court again denied the motion, finding
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        22-12022               Opinion of the Court                         9

        there was plenty of evidence to support a jury finding that Byron
        knowingly possessed the firearm and ammunition found in the
        Lincoln on June 30, 2021.
        F.     Prosecutor’s Comments During Closing Argument
               Before closing arguments, the district court instructed the
        jury that the statements of counsel are not evidence. During
        closing argument, the government argued its theory that Byron
        possessed the firearm on June 30, 2021 as protection because he
        was selling marijuana, as follows:
                     And why would Mr. Byron have a Glock 19
              handgun with an extended magazine and 29 bullets in
              it? Well, Detective Perdomo testified that based on
              his training and experience, the defendant was
              involved in selling drugs since he had more than a
              pound of marijuana on him, a digital scale and THC
              edibles. Detective Perdomo also testified that in his
              training and experience, drug dealers arm themselves
              with firearms to protect themselves and their drugs.
        Byron raised no objection to the prosecutor’s closing argument.
                During the jury charge, the district court instructed the jury
        to consider only the evidence admitted at trial and reminded the
        jury that the lawyers’ statements were not evidence. The district
        court also instructed the jury that, apart from its instructions about
        the law, it should disregard any of the court’s comments and arrive
        at its own decision about the facts.
        G.    Conviction and Sentence
              The jury returned a guilty verdict.
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                22-12022

               The probation officer prepared a presentence investigation
        report (“PSI”) that recommended an advisory guidelines range of
        262 to 327 months’ imprisonment. The PSI did not recommend an
        obstruction of justice enhancement, and the government did not
        seek such an enhancement. The district court notified the parties
        to be prepared to respond to whether to apply an obstruction of
        justice enhancement under the Sentencing Guidelines.
                At sentencing, defense counsel objected to the district court
        sua sponte considering an obstruction of justice enhancement.
        Defense counsel argued the court was “put[ting] itself almost as an
        advocate.” The district court overruled the objection, explaining
        that it had an obligation to consider the guidelines and determine
        the appropriate sentence. It seemed clear to the court from the trial
        evidence that “there was a real issue with regard to obstruction of
        justice.”
               The government explained that it had not sought an
        obstruction enhancement because it was unclear whether Ms.
        Byron’s testimony was suborned perjury. The district court
        pointed out that to convict, the jury must have found that Ms.
        Byron was not telling the truth and expressed its own view that her
        testimony was false and that Byron had asked her to give false
        testimony. Nonetheless, the district court withdrew its notice and
        stated it would not pursue the obstruction of justice enhancement.
               Byron also objected to the district court considering, as a
        sentencing factor, the marijuana found in the Lincoln, arguing it
        was uncharged conduct. The district court overruled the
        objection, stating that it was uncontested at trial that marijuana
        was found in the car. The district court observed that the
        “Eleventh Circuit [has] said, from time to time, and I think
        common knowledge tells us, guns and drugs go hand in thug [sic].
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        22-12022               Opinion of the Court                        11

        And that’s what I think we had in this case. So I am going to
        consider it.” The court stressed that the marijuana found in the car
        was “not going to change” the sentence it imposed, but concluded
        that it was proper to consider it.
               The district court ultimately varied downward from the
        advisory guidelines range of 262 to 327 months and imposed a 240-
        month sentence. While Byron does not appeal his sentence, he
        contends the district court’s comments about the obstruction-of-
        justice enhancement show bias.
                                 II. DISCUSSION
                On appeal, Byron raises four issues, which we address in
        turn.
        A.      Rule 404(b) Evidence of Prior Firearm Possession
             Byron contends the district court erred in admitting the text
        messages and photographs of firearms extracted from his cell
        phone under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b).
               We ordinarily review a district court’s evidentiary rulings
        under Rule 404(b) for “a clear abuse of discretion.” United States v.
        Elysee, 993 F.3d 1309, 1347 (11th Cir. 2021) (quotation marks
        omitted), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 2782 (2022). Here, however, at the
        suppression hearing, the district court asked whether Byron had an
        objection to the admissibility of cellphone texts and pictures based
        on Rule 404(b), and defense counsel responded that Byron did not.
        Under such circumstances, we have held that the defendant has
        invited error and appellate review is precluded. See United States v.
        Thayer, 204 F.3d 1352, 1355 (11th Cir. 2000).
              Even if Byron did not invite error, he did not object to the
        admission of the texts and pictures extracted from his cellphone in
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        12                     Opinion of the Court                  22-12022

        the district court, and there is no error here, much less plain error.
        See United States v. Edouard, 485 F.3d 1324, 1343 (11th Cir. 2007).
                Rule 404(b) prohibits evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or
        acts to prove a person’s character in order to show action in
        conformity therewith. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). Such evidence
        “may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive,
        opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,
        absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2).
        Evidence is admissible under Rule 404(b) if: (1) the evidence is
        relevant to an issue other than the defendant’s character; (2)
        sufficient evidence is presented to allow a jury to find that the
        defendant committed the extrinsic act; and (3) the probative value
        of the evidence substantially outweighs its undue prejudice. United
        States v. Sterling, 738 F.3d 228, 238 (11th Cir. 2013).
                Where the mens rea element of an offense is at issue, extrinsic
        evidence of the defendant’s prior engagement in acts similar to the
        charged offense is highly probative. See United States v. Ramirez, 426
        F.3d 1344, 1354 (11th Cir. 2005). A district court does not abuse its
        discretion when it admits evidence that a defendant knowingly
        possessed a firearm on a prior occasion to prove that the same
        defendant knowingly possessed a firearm on a later occasion. See
        United States v. Taylor, 417 F.3d 1176, 1182 (11th Cir. 2005).
        Moreover, a district court’s limiting instruction mitigates the unfair
        prejudice posed by evidence admitted under Rule 404(b). United
        States v. Diaz-Lizaraza, 981 F.2d 1216, 1225 (11th Cir. 1993).
               Here, as to the first prong of the Rule 404(b) test for
        admissibility, the texts and photographs of Byron possessing
        firearms in the past, including the same or a similar Glock 19 with
        an extended magazine, are relevant to whether he knowingly
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        22-12022               Opinion of the Court                        13

        possessed the Glock 19 with the extended magazine found under
        the driver’s seat on June 30, 2021. See Taylor, 417 F.3d at 1182.
               As to the second prong, the record supports a finding by a
        preponderance of the evidence that Byron possessed the firearms
        in the photographs because the accompanying text messages
        indicated Byron was attempting to sell the firearms to another
        person. See United States v. Bowe, 221 F.3d 1183, 1192 (11th Cir.
        2000) (“The prosecution can introduce evidence of a defendant’s
        otherwise admissible acts if the jury could find by a preponderance
        of the evidence that the acts did in fact occur.”).
               As for the third prong, the prejudicial effect of the
        photographs did not substantially outweigh their probative value.
        Byron’s mens rea was the primary issue at trial. Thus, evidence of
        his prior knowing possession of similar firearms was highly
        probative of his knowing possession of the firearm found under his
        driver’s seat on June 30, 2021. See Ramirez, 426 F.3d at 1354.
                Furthermore, the district court gave a limiting instruction to
        the jury, which mitigated any unfair prejudice stemming from the
        photographs. See Diaz-Lizaraza, 981 F.2d at 1225. Specifically, the
        district court instructed the jury that it could consider the text
        messages and photographs only for the limited purpose of
        determining whether Byron “had the state of mind or the intent
        necessary to commit the crime” or whether Byron “committed the
        acts charged in the indictment by accident or by mistake.” For
        these reasons, the district court did not abuse its discretion, much
        less plainly err, in admitting the texts and photographs of the
        firearms.
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        14                     Opinion of the Court                 22-12022

        B.    Motion for Judgment of Acquittal
               To obtain a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), the
        government must prove that: (1) the defendant knew that he
        possessed (2) a firearm (3) that had travelled in interstate commerce
        (4) with knowledge of his status as one prohibited from possessing
        a firearm. See United States v. Johnson, 981 F.3d 1171, 1179, 1181
        (11th Cir. 2020); see also Rehaif v. United States, 588 U.S. ____, 139
        S. Ct. 2191, 2200 (2019). “Possession of a firearm may be either
        actual or constructive.” United States v. Perez, 661 F.3d 568, 576
        (11th Cir. 2011).
               “Actual possession exists when a person has direct physical
        control over a thing.” United States v. Ochoa, 941 F.3d 1074, 1104
        (11th Cir. 2019) (quotation marks omitted). “Constructive
        possession of a firearm exists when a defendant does not have
        actual possession but instead knowingly has the power or right,
        and intention to exercise dominion and control over the firearm.”
        Perez, 661 F.3d at 576. Mere proximity to a firearm is insufficient
        to establish constructive possession. Ochoa, 941 F.3d at 1104.
        Rather, “the government [must] prove, through direct or
        circumstantial evidence, that the defendant was aware or knew of
        the firearm’s presence and had the ability and intent to later
        exercise dominion and control over the firearm.” Id.
               We review de novo the denial of a motion for a judgment of
        acquittal, “viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
        government and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the
        jury’s verdict.” United States v. Martin, 803 F.3d 581, 587 (11th Cir.
        2015). “The issue is not whether a jury reasonably could have
        acquitted but whether it reasonably could have found guilt beyond
        a reasonable doubt.” Id. (alteration adopted and quotation marks
        omitted).
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        22-12022              Opinion of the Court                       15

                Here, the government presented ample evidence from
        which the jury could reasonably find that Byron knowingly
        possessed the Glock 19 found underneath the driver’s seat of the
        car he was driving. Detective Gomez testified that Byron failed to
        pull over for four blocks while being pursued by a patrol car with
        lights and sirens activated. Once he finally stopped, Byron reached
        toward the floorboard beneath his seat, the same area where
        moments later Detective Gomez found the firearm. A box of
        Popeyes chicken was shoved underneath the driver’s seat and on
        top of the firearm in an unusual manner. Condensation on the
        Popeyes drink in the cupholder indicated the chicken was Byron’s
        and recently purchased. Meanwhile, the firearm’s holster was in
        plain view inside the center console. From this evidence, the jury
        could reasonably infer that Byron knew the firearm was in the
        Lincoln and attempted to hide it under his driver’s seat using the
        box of chicken before pulling over.
               In addition, the presence of the backpack containing a large
        amount of marijuana and drug dealing paraphernalia in the car
        near the firearm and the holster, along with Detective Perdomo’s
        testimony of the common connection between drug dealing and
        firearms, was circumstantial evidence that Byron knowingly
        possessed the firearm to protect himself while selling the
        marijuana. See United States v. Thomas, 242 F.3d 1028, 1031-33 (11th
        Cir. 2001) (concluding evidence of drug trafficking found inside a
        home in close physical and temporal proximity to weapons was
        relevant to proving knowing possession of the weapons and thus
        properly admitted).
                Finally, the government’s firearms identification expert
        testified that the Glock 19 found underneath Byron’s seat was likely
        the same Glock 19 Byron was holding in his lap in one of the
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        16                     Opinion of the Court                22-12022

        pictures extracted from his cell phone. And the pictures of firearms
        found on Byron’s cell phone—which, as already discussed, were
        properly admitted under Rule 404(b)—support a finding that his
        proximity to the firearm under the seat was not a mistake.
                Byron emphasizes that there was no DNA or fingerprint
        evidence tying him to the firearm. But the government’s evidence
        did not need to rule out conclusively every reasonable hypothesis
        of innocence, so long as a jury could reasonably find Byron guilty
        beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Toler, 144 F.3d 1423,
        1433 (11th Cir. 1998). The government’s evidence was more than
        sufficient for a jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Byron
        knowingly possessed, either actually or constructively, the firearm
        found under his seat.
        C.    Claim of Prosecutorial Misconduct
               Byron contends prosecutorial misconduct occurred when
        the prosecutor solicited testimony from Detective Perdomo on
        redirect examination that Byron was a “drug dealer” and then
        referred to Byron as a “drug dealer” during closing argument.
               We first point out that Byron does not raise any evidentiary
        issue as to Detective Perdomo’s testimony. That is, Byron does
        not argue that Detective Perdomo’s testimony—that the quantity
        of marijuana and the presence of a digital scale in the Lincoln
        indicated that Byron was selling marijuana—was inadmissible
        under the Federal Rules of Evidence.
              Instead, Byron argues that the prosecutor’s questions to
        Detective Perdomo and comments during closing argument using
        the inflammatory characterization “drug dealer” amounted to
        prosecutorial misconduct. He also argues the prosecutor’s
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        22-12022                  Opinion of the Court                               17

        questions about Byron being a drug dealer were beyond the scope
        of redirect examination.
                Ordinarily, we review a claim of prosecutorial misconduct
        de novo. United States v. Flanders, 752 F.3d 1317, 1332 (11th Cir. 2014).
        However, where, as here, “a defendant fails to make a
        contemporaneous objection to the alleged misconduct in the
        district court, we review such claims for plain error.” Id. at 1332-33
        (quotation marks omitted). 1 Under plain error review, the
        defendant must show that there is (1) error, (2) that is plain, (3) that
        aﬀected his substantial rights, and (4) that seriously aﬀected the
        fairness of the judicial proceedings. Id. at 1333.
               “To ﬁnd prosecutorial misconduct, a two-element test must
        be met: (1) the questions or comments must be improper, and
        (2) the questions or comments must prejudicially aﬀect the
        substantial rights of the defendant.” United States v. Schmitz, 634
        F.3d 1247, 1267 (11th Cir. 2011). Here, we ﬁnd nothing improper
        or unduly prejudicial in the prosecutor’s questions or comments.
              During redirect examination, the prosecutor solicited
        testimony from Detective Perdomo that—based on his training
        and experience in law enforcement—the quantity and quality of
        the marijuana and presence of a digital scale indicated to him that
        Byron was selling the marijuana and had the firearm for protection.

        1 Byron objected to Detective Perdomo’s testimony as conclusory. But he did

        not object to the prosecutor’s questions to Detective Perdomo—about
        whether the evidence found in the Lincoln indicated Byron was selling
        marijuana and how drug dealers use their cell phones to conduct drug deals—
        as improper or inflammatory or otherwise give the district court notice that
        Byron believed the prosecutor had engaged in misconduct. See United States
        v. Madruga, 810 F.2d 1010, 1014 (11th Cir. 1987) (stating that to preserve an
        objection, a party must state the specific ground that underlies the objection).
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        18                     Opinion of the Court                  22-12022

        The prosecutor properly solicited this testimony as circumstantial
        evidence of Byron’s knowledge of the firearm found underneath
        his driver’s seat and in close proximity to the marijuana. The
        prosecutor’s questions were relevant, did not go outside the
        evidence, and did not impugn Byron’s character without any
        evidentiary basis.
              The prosecutor then asked Detective Perdomo whether
        “drug dealers use their phone as part of their drug dealing,” the
        prosecutor’s only use of the phrase “drug dealer” during redirect
        examination. This question was not improper given Byron’s cross
        examination of Detective Perdomo.
                 On cross examination, Byron questioned Detective
        Perdomo’s reasons for obtaining a search warrant for Byron’s cell
        phone, including asking about the marijuana found in the Lincoln.
        Byron also asked if Detective Perdomo sought the search warrant
        because “historically drug dealers seem to have evidence on a
        cellphone,”—using the phrase “drug dealer” Byron now claims was
        inflammatory even before the prosecutor did. Moreover, Byron’s
        questioning of Detective Perdomo’s investigative rationale and the
        marijuana found in the Lincoln opened the door to the
        government to ask Perdomo about the conclusions he had drawn
        from the drugs and firearm found together in Byron’s car and how
        that shaped his application for a search warrant. See United States v.
        Elliott, 849 F.2d 554, 559 (11th Cir. 1988) (concluding the trial court
        was correct to allow the government on redirect examination to
        go into evidence of other drug activity because defense counsel’s
        cross-examination first elicited testimony about that drug activity).
               Similarly, we see no impropriety in the prosecutor’s
        statements during closing argument. To explain why Byron had a
        firearm in the Lincoln, the prosecutor pointed to Detective
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        22-12022               Opinion of the Court                         19

        Perdomo’s testimony that Byron “was involved in selling drugs
        since he had more than a pound of marijuana on him, a digital scale
        and THC edibles,” and that “drug dealers arm themselves with
        firearms to protect themselves and their drugs.” Given Detective
        Perdomo’s testimony outlined above, the government was not
        forbidden from using the “drug dealer” language, even if colorful,
        in closing argument because the evidence supported it. See United
        States v. Cooper, 926 F.3d 718, 739 (11th Cir. 2019). In addition, the
        prosecutor was entitled to urge the conclusions he thought the jury
        should draw from the evidence. See United States v. Calderon, 127
        F.3d 1314, 1336 (11th Cir. 1997).
               Byron relies on United States v. Blakey, 14 F.3d 1557 (11th Cir.
        1994), but Blakey is materially distinguishable. In Blakey, the
        prosecutor’s characterization of the defendant as a “professional
        criminal” during closing arguments was improper because there
        was no evidence at trial to support that characterization. 14 F.3d
        at 1559-60. “Thus, the prosecutor’s comment went outside the
        evidence, and impugned Blakey’s character with an inaccurate
        characterization.” Id.
               In contrast, here the prosecutor’s description of Byron as
        “involved in selling drugs” and a “drug dealer” was supported by
        the trial evidence, including the photographs of, and testimony
        about, the marijuana and drug trafficking paraphernalia found in
        Byron’s car. Unlike in Blakey, the prosecutor here did not go
        outside the evidence or impugn Byron’s character with an
        inaccurate characterization.
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        20                          Opinion of the Court                          22-12022

        D.      Constitutional Claim of Judicial Bias
              Finally, Byron contends the district court demonstrated
        improper bias against him in violation of his due process rights
        under the Fifth Amendment. 2
               The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
        “guarantees an absence of actual bias on the part of a judge.”
        Williams v. Pennsylvania, 579 U.S. 1, 8 (2016) (quotation marks
        omitted); Norris v. United States, 820 F.3d 1261, 1265 (11th Cir. 2016).
        Additionally, “[t]he Supreme Court has decided that in at least
        some situations the probability of actual bias is enough to violate
        due process.” United States v. Rodriguez, 627 F.3d 1372, 1382 (11th
        Cir. 2010) (citing Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009),
        in which a judge accepted from a litigant signiﬁcant contributions
        to his campaign for oﬃce). However, neither this Court nor the
        Supreme Court has held that the mere appearance of bias violates
        the Due Process Clause. Id. at 1381-82.
               While the “Due Process Clause demarks only the outer
        boundaries of judicial disqualiﬁcations,” the federal recusal statute,
        28 U.S.C. § 455, “sets a higher bar,” requiring a judge to recuse
        where the judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party.
        Norris, 820 F.3d at 1265 (quotation marks omitted). On appeal,

        2 In the district court, Byron did not move for the judge’s recusal or raise an

        explicit bias objection. On appeal, the parties disagree about whether we
        should review Byron’s due process claim for plain error or structural error.
        See Norris v. United States, 820 F.3d 1261, 1266 (11th Cir. 2016) (stating that
        “structural error occurs when a judge with actual bias against a defendant pre-
        sides at his trial”); United States v. Rodriguez, 627 F.3d 1372, 1379 (11th Cir. 2010)
        (stating that “if a party does not move to recuse a judge on actual bias grounds,
        review is only for plain error”). Because we find no constitutional error at all,
        we do not reach that issue.
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        22-12022               Opinion of the Court                         21

        Byron raises only a due process challenge and thus has abandoned
        any claim based on the federal recusal statute. See United States v.
        Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 871 (11th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 143 S.
        Ct. 95 (2022) (“Typically, issues not raised in the initial brief on
        appeal are deemed abandoned.”).
               Nonetheless, we look to our decisions in the context of the
        federal recusal statute for guidance because judicial conduct that
        does not meet even those stricter recusal standards will not amount
        to a due process violation. See Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904-
        05 (1997) (noting that most questions of judicial disqualiﬁcation are
        not constitutional ones because the Due Process Clause merely
        “establishes a constitutional ﬂoor”). In that stricter context, we
        have applied a general rule “that bias suﬃcient to disqualify a judge
        must stem from extrajudicial sources and must be focused against
        a party to the proceedings.” United States v. Ramos, 933 F.2d 968,
        973 (11th Cir. 1991) (quotation marks omitted); see also Liteky v.
        United States, 510 U.S. 540, 554 (1994). An exception to this rule
        exists where the judge’s remarks demonstrate such pervasive bias
        and prejudice that it unfairly prejudices one of the parties. Ramos,
        933 F.2d at 973.
               Further, “opinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts
        introduced or events occurring in the course of the current
        proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis for
        a bias or partiality motion unless they display a deep-seated
        favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment
        impossible.” Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555. Finally, a judge’s statements
        made outside the presence of the jury are less likely to result in
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        22                         Opinion of the Court                       22-12022

        prejudice to the defendant justifying a reversal on judicial bias
        grounds. See United States v. Cook, 461 F.2d 906, 912 (5th Cir. 1972). 3
                Byron points to the following comments the district court
        made at trial outside the presence of the jury, which he contends
        were improper and are objective proof the judge was biased: (1) the
        district court inquired into whether Byron would testify and later,
        when it was announced that he would not, stated “[p]robably a
        good decision”; and (2) the district court questioned whether
        Byron’s mother should testify, pointing out that Detective Perdomo
        already had testiﬁed that the ﬁrearm was not in the United States
        until after her son died and that she could be charged with perjury.
               The district court’s discussion with defense counsel about
        Byron’s decision to testify did not demonstrate bias at all but was
        instead primarily concerned with ensuring that Byron’s counsel
        had fully briefed Byron on the pros and cons of testifying, including
        the important distinction between the state and federal rules
        regarding impeachment. As for the district court’s comments
        related to Byron’s mother, these were permissible commentary on
        the evidence and expressions of concern that, based on the
        evidence, Byron might be exposing his mother to a perjury charge.
        See United States v. James, 510 F.2d 546, 550 (5th Cir. 1975) (“[A]
        federal trial judge is more than a moderator; in fulﬁlling his duty to
        see that the law is administered properly, he may question
        witnesses and comment on the evidence.”).
                We also reject Byron’s characterization of these comments
        (1) as an attempt to persuade Byron and his mother not to testify,

        3 This Court adopted as binding precedent all Fifth Circuit decisions prior to

        October 1, 1981. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981)
        (en banc).
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        22-12022                  Opinion of the Court                               23

        or (2) as an indication the district court “had pre-judged” guilt. And
        because the comments were made outside the presence of the jury,
        they certainly did not result in prejudice to Byron that would
        warrant reversal of his conviction. See Cook, 461 F.2d at 912.
               Byron also points to the district court’s statements before
        and during sentencing suggesting that an obstruction-of-justice
        enhancement may be warranted because Byron had suborned his
        mother’s perjury. These statements expressed the district court’s
        opinions formed based on the evidence presented at trial and on
        the jury’s verdict. These statements clearly do not “display a deep-
        seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment
        impossible.” See Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555; Ramos, 933 F.2d at 973.
                Nor did the district court impermissibly become “an
        advocate” for the sentencing enhancement or “insert[ ] himself into
        [the] process.” As the district court itself pointed out, at sentencing
        it is obliged to calculate correctly the sentencing range prescribed
        by the Sentencing Guidelines before determining the appropriate
        sentence. See United States v. Crawford, 407 F.3d 1174, 1178 (11th Cir.
        2005). Notably too, Byron’s claim ignores that the district court
        ultimately decided not to impose an obstruction-of-justice
        enhancement and then varied downward by 22 months from the
        low end of the advisory guidelines range it calculated without the
        proposed enhancement. Based on the record as a whole, we readily
        conclude the district court’s brief, sua sponte consideration of an
        obstruction-of-justice enhancement did not demonstrate bias at all,
        much less the kind of bias that violates due process. 4

        4 Byron also contends the district court “alluded to Byron being ‘a thug’ at

        sentencing.” Byron refers to the district court’s observation that the “Eleventh
        Circuit said, from time to time, and I think common knowledge tells us, guns
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        24                         Opinion of the Court                       22-12022

                                    III. CONCLUSION
              For these reasons, we aﬃrm Byron’s conviction for
        possession of a ﬁrearm and ammunition by a convicted felon.
                AFFIRMED.

        and drugs go hand in thug.” Byron admits the district court may have meant
        to say hand-in-glove and merely misspoke. We agree, as the phrase
        commonly appearing in our decisions is that guns and drugs go hand-in-hand.
        See, e.g., United States v. Hromada, 49 F.3d 685, 689 (11th Cir. 1995). When read
        in context, the district court’s comment appears to be a misstatement rather
        than a pejorative reference to Byron.