Court Opinion

ID: 9736312
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 18:51:19.504501+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:27:05.829026
License: Public Domain

*253Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Benjamin R. Jones:
I concur with the majority opinion in all respects save one. The majority opinion, relying on Wirkman v. Wirkman, 392 Pa. 63, 66, 139 A. 2d 658, states that a declaratory judgment should not be granted where a more appropriate remedy is available. Such a statement is contrary to both the provisions of the Act of May 26, 1943, P. L. 645, §1, 12 PS §836 and our decisional law since the passage of the 1943 statute: Johnson Estate, 403 Pa. 476, 486, 171 A. 2d 518; Burke v. Pittsburgh Limestone Corp., 375 Pa. 390, 391, 100 A. 2d 595; Philadelphia Manufacturers Mutual Fire Insurance Company v. Rose, 364 Pa. 15, 70 A. 2d 316.
The decisional point in Wirkman, supra, was that the parties, having contractually bound themselves to pursue arbitration to the exclusion of prior judicial relief, were concluded from seeking declaratory judgment. The statement quoted by the majority from Wirkman was dicta and, in my opinion, founded on authority nullified by the passage of the 1943 Act.
Unless the Bench and Bar are to be confused it should be made clear that declaratory judgment may lie even though there be another available remedy. Such was the legislative mandate embodied in the 1943 Act and such mandate we must follow.