Court Opinion

ID: 9487474
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:17:16.773574+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:17.165771
License: Public Domain

DeMOSS, Circuit Judge,
with whom, GOLDBERG, Circuit Judge, joins, dissenting:
I join in all that Judge Goldberg has stated in his comprehensive dissent, and add these additional words of dissent because I feel so strongly that the district judge, and my colleagues in the majority opinion, are in error in their justification of the basis for, and quantum of, the upward departure by the district judge in this ease.
On page 8 of the government’s supplemental en banc brief, there is a verbatim quotation of the transcription of the district judge’s explanation at the sentencing hearing for why he was departing upward. As I read that text, it seems clear that the district judge relied on two sets of circumstances:
A. The robbery in December 1991 (count 1 of the indictment which was dismissed), the robbery in January 1992 (count 2 of the indictment which was dismissed), and the robbery in 1993 (un-indicted and the government agreed not to indict), which would add three criminal history points each “if he [Ashburn] had earlier been convicted of these robberies ” [emphasis added]; and
B. The robberies “that occurred back in the early 1980’s” which “if taken into account” would push Ashburn’s criminal history past category VI.
In approving the upward departure, the majority opinion relies primarily on Section 4A1.3(e) which permits consideration of “pri- or similar adult criminal conduct not resulting in a criminal conviction” in making such an upward departure.
I have serious doubts as to the propriety of the district judge’s reliance on the three robberies described in sub-paragraph “A” above. First of all, the robberies in 1991 and 1992 constituted counts 1 and 2 of the same indictment under which Ashburn is being sentenced. The plea agreement expressly provided that those two counts be dismissed, and to assume convictions on those counts as the district judge did, violates the express terms of the plea agreement. Secondly, if a sentencing judge assumes conviction on dismissed counts, you no longer have “conduct not resulting in a criminal conviction” as defined in sub-part (e). Rather you have additional convictions under a multi-count indictment which would necessitate processing under Section 3D 1.1 et seq. relating to multiple counts; and the effects of those additional convictions would show up, not in the criminal history table, but in the determination of “combined offense level” (see example 1 on page 246 of the 1993 Guidelines Manual ). In this case, the net result of including counts 1 and 2 in the determination of combined offense level would be to move the offense level up two steps from 25 to 27; with no change in the criminal history category of II, the guideline range would be 78 to 97.
Finally, to assume conviction as to the dismissed counts and then attribute three criminal history points for each assumed conviction, just as you would for an actual prior conviction, renders the point structure as defined by the guidelines for determining criminal history utterly meaningless. In short, if “prior similar adult conduct not resulting in a conviction” can be ascribed the same number of points as assigned to an actual prior conviction, there is no distinction between the two.
Under Rule 11(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the district judge may accept or reject a plea agreement which provides for dismissal of counts or charges. That Rule further gives the judge the right to “defer his decision as to the acceptance or rejection until there has been an opportunity to consider the presentence report.” It is apparent in this case that after reading the presentenee report, the district judge felt the defendant was getting off too light. In my view, the district judge’s remedy then is to reject the plea agreement and force the de*818fendant to plead guilty to all counts of the indictment or stand trial and risk conviction on all counts. In either of those alternative events, the multiple count analysis under section 3D1.1 et seq. would have been required to determine the resulting sentence, and that analysis focuses on the combined offense level and not criminal history. Instead, the district judge decided to upwardly depart on the basis of “assumptions,” which I find clearly erroneous, and to an extent that produces a sentence which is double what would have been the guideline sentence had the defendant in fact pleaded guilty to,all four counts.
These same criticisms are equally applicable to the district judge’s use of the “robberies back in the early 1980s” described in Subparagraph B. above as justification for taking Ashburn’s criminal history “past Category VI.” As in the instant prosecution, Ashburn pled guilty in 1984 to one count of a multi-count indictment charging various events of bank robbery and the remaining counts were dismissed. So, not only do we have dismissed counts of the current indictment but also dismissed counts of a prior indictment, which was the source of a prior conviction, being used as the basis for determination of “prior adult similar conduct.” Given the proclivity of prosecutors to file multi-count indictments and the frequency with which some of those counts get dismissed pursuant to plea bargains, there is a veritable “mother lode” of upward adjustments awaiting to be mined out of Section 4A1.3(e) if the district judge’s application is correct. The majority seeks to bless its af-firmance of the district judge’s interpretation in this case by stating that it is joining the Tenth Circuit and the Second Circuit in holding that prior criminal conduct related to dismiss counts of an indictment may be used to justify an upward departure. ■ That blessing is misplaced in this ease for nothing in Zamarripa (Tenth Circuit) nor Kim (Second Circuit) dealt with dismissed counts of prior indictments in the criminal history; and our court therefore is making completely new law as to the “robberies in the early 1980s” in this case. I respectfully suggest that such new law is not contemplated by the guidelines and will turn Section 4A1.3(e) into a Pandora’s box, the opening of which we will come to regret.
Furthermore, as indicated in Subpara-graph B. above, the district judge was even more cryptic in articulating his thought process as to the “early 1980s robberies” than he was as to the counts described in Subpara-graph A. He simply said “If taken into account”, these 1980s robberies would push the criminal history category past Category VI. He gave no indication of the number of robberies he “took into account” nor did he indicate the points per robbery he allocated as he did in describing the other robberies in Subparagraph A. above. He made no attempt to articulate any special circumstances about the “early 1980s robberies” which persuaded him to make an adjustment. So, simply by stating he took these early 1980 robberies into account, the district judge departed further upward from the guideline range of 100 — 125 months (O.L. 25 — C.H. V) to 151 — 188 months (O.L. 29 — C.H. VI) to reach the ultimate sentence of 180 months. The majority opinion rationalizes its approval of the district judge’s articulation of his reasons by citing portions of Lambert abjuring “ritualistic exercises” and by pointing out that on a percentage basis the upward departure in this case is not that different from the upward departure approved in Lambert. But in the real terms of months and years to be served in prison, the departure in this case from an initial guideline range of 63 — 78 months (5-6% years) to a final sentence of 180 months (15 years) is the very kind of departure we had in mind when we stated in Lambert:
“In a very narrow class of cases, we can conceive that the district court’s departure will be so great that, in order to survive our review, it will need to explain in careful detail, why lesser adjustments in the defendant’s criminal history score would be inadequate.” Page 663.
I respectfully dissent from the conclusion that the district judge satisfied Lambert.