Court Opinion

ID: 9710114
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:02:16.359587+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:54.263259
License: Public Domain

NEWMAN, Justice,
dissenting.
Because I disagree with the Majority Opinion, which holds that a sibling lacks standing to seek visitation with his or her sibling(s), I dissent.
At the outset, I note that the concept of standing is not synonymous with a substantive “legal right” or a “cause of action.” William Penn Parking Garage, Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh, 464 Pa. 168, 346 A.2d 269 (1975). As this Court has recognized, courts frequently equate “standing” with the merits of the claim asserted. Id. at 200-201, 346 A.2d at 285. Here, I offer no opinion as to the ultimate resolution of this case. I would merely hold that C.R. be afforded the opportunity to be heard on the issue of whether visitation with her sisters serves the best interests of the children involved.
As stated by the Majority, in order to have standing, “a party must (a) have a substantial interest in the subject-matter of the litigation; (b) the interest must be direct; and (c) the interest must be immediate and not a remote conse*58quence.” South Whitehall Township Police Service v. South Whitehall Toumship, 521 Pa. 82, 86, 555 A.2d 793, 795 (1989).
A “substantial” interest is an interest in the outcome of the litigation which surpasses the common interest of all citizens in procuring obedience to the law. A “direct” interest requires a showing that the matter complained of caused harm to the party’s interest. An “immediate” interest involves the nature of the causal connection between the action complained of and the injury to the party challenging it and is shown where the interest the party seeks to protect is within the zone of interests sought to be protected by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question.
Id. at 86-87, 555 A.2d at 795 (citations omitted).
Applying the standard articulated in South Whitehall, here, the Majority holds that C.R. lacks an immediate interest to seek court ordered visitation. The Majority reasons that the statute, 23 Pa.C.S. § 5301 et seq., does not provide for sibling visitation; therefore, C.R.’s interest is not within the zone of interests that the statute seeks to protect.
Contrary to the Majority’s analysis, however, the “immediate interest” inquiry is not, in all cases, limited to the zone of interests protected by statutory or constitutional provisions. Instead, the immediate interest requirement encompasses the broader concept that the “protection of the type of interest asserted is among the policies underlying the legal rule relied upon by the person claiming to be ‘aggrieved.’ ” Upper Bucks County Vocational-Technical School Education Association v. Upper Bucks County Vocational-Technical School Joint Committee, 504 Pa. 418, 423, 474 A.2d 1120, 1122 (1984)(quoting William Penn Parking, 464 Pa. at 198, 346 A.2d at 284)(emphasis added).
I do not interpret the absence of sibling visitation rights from the statute as determinative, here, because I do not believe that the statute is the sole focus of our inquiry. As a matter of statutory interpretation, in determining legislative intent, “an implication alone cannot be interpreted as abrogating existing law. The legislature must affirmatively repeal *59existing law or specifically preempt accepted common law for prior law to be disregarded.” Metropolitan Property and Liability Insurance Company v. Insurance Commissioner, 525 Pa. 306, 310, 580 A.2d 300, 302 (1990). Thus, common law rights that existed before the enactment of a statute continue to exist unless the expressed legislative intent is to extinguish those rights. Schweitzer v. Rockwell International, 402 Pa.Super. 34, 586 A.2d 383 (1990), allocatur denied, 529 Pa. 635, 600 A.2d 954 (1991).
The legislature has set forth the purpose of the statute, in a non-limiting manner, to assure continuing contact of a child with his parents and/or grandparents when in the best interest of the child. 23 Pa.C.S. § 5301. The statute contains no expressed intent to limit third party rights to grandparents. Thus, the codification of grandparent custody and visitation rights did not alter the state of the law, but merely codified the law that had evolved through various appellate decisions concerning the rights of grandparents to continuing contact with a child when in the child’s best interest. Hughes v. Hughes, 316 Pa.Super. 505, 463 A.2d 478 (1983).1 I do not believe that by codifying grandparent visitation rights, the legislature intended silently to extinguish the rights of all other third parties. Absent a contrary indication, therefore, I believe that the statute does not abrogate sibling visitation rights founded on the common law concern for the best interests of the children involved.
*60As exemplified by the development of grandparent rights under our common law, Pennsylvania courts have long extended custody and visitation rights to third parties when in a child’s best interest. See, e.g., Albright v. Commonwealth ex rel. Fetters, 491 Pa. 320, 421 A.2d 157 (1980); Commonwealth ex rel. Williams v. Miller, 254 Pa.Super. 227, 385 A.2d 992 (1978).
In Albright, a custody dispute between grandparents and a parent, wé acknowledged the importance of maintaining the parental relationship. We, however, clarified that parenthood alone does not preclude the award of custody to a third party. A contrary view, we explained, would ignore the legislature’s intention to permit the removal of a child from the custody of a parent, Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 6301 et seq. (1978); Child Protective Services Law, P.L. 438, as amended, 11 P.S. § 2201 et seq. (1975)2 and the termination of parental rights, Adoption Act, Act of July 24, 1970, P.L. 620, No. 208, § 101, as amended, 1 P.S. § 101 et seq. (1971).3 Albright, 491 Pa. at 325-26, 421 A.2d at 160. We adopted the standard that a parent has a prima facie right to custody, which will be defeated, however, if the third party demonstrates that the child’s best interests will clearly be served by an award of custody to that party.
Likewise, in Williams, when Pennsylvania law on the visitation rights of grandparents was not clear, the Superior Court determined that a third party may establish a right to visitation by convincing the court that it is in the child’s best interest to “give some time” to the third party. Id. at 230, 385 A.2d at 994. Thus, as Albright and Williams demonstrate, it is well established under common law that, in custody and visitation disputes between a parent and a third party, the cardinal concern is the best interest and permanent welfare of the child.
In determining the best interest of a child, a court must consider all factors that legitimately affect the child’s physical, *61emotional, intellectual and spiritual well-being. Wiskoski v. Wiskoski, 427 Pa.Super. 531, 629 A.2d 996 (1993), allocatur denied, 536 Pa. 646, 639 A.2d 33 (1994). Accordingly, “[i]t has always been a strong policy in our law that in the absence of compelling reasons to the contrary, siblings should be raised together whenever possible.” Albright, 491 Pa. at 327, 421 A.2d at 160. See also Wiskoski, Ferencak v. Moore, 300 Pa.Super. 28, 445 A.2d 1282 (1982).4 The importance of maintaining the sibling relationship is not diluted by the fact that the children involved are half brothers or sisters. In re Davis, 502 Pa. 110, 465 A.2d 614 (1983); Wiskoski Courts also have recognized that an additional factor in determining the best interest of a child, is the child’s preference. E.A.L., Sr. v. L.J.W., 443 Pa.Super. 573, 662 A.2d 1109 (1995). Therefore, I conclude that a sibling, who desires to maintain a relationship with his or her sibling(s), has a sufficient legal interest to be heard on the issue of whether sibling visitation is in the best interest of the children involved. As this Court has previously stated, “a child’s interests are best served when *62all those who demonstrate an interest in his or her welfare are allowed to be heard.” In re Adoption of Hess, 530 Pa. 218, 227, 608 A.2d 10, 15 (1992).5
Resolution of this case will necessarily involve a conflict between the competing right of Mary Jane Z. and Arthur Z. to raise their family and C.R.’s interest in maintaining a relationship with her sisters. However, as in grandparent visitation disputes, the denial of visitation by a parent is not determinative. I again emphasize that here, as in all visitation matters, the best interest of the children involved is the primary concern.

. The Hughes court referred to the repealed Custody and Grandparent Visitation Act, Act of November 5, 1981, P.L. 322, No. 115, as amended, 23 P.S. § 1001 et seq., effective January 5, 1982. That Act provided visitation rights to grandparents upon a finding that visitation is in the best interest of the child under the following circumstances: (1) when a parent is deceased; (2) when the parents’ marriage is dissolved; and (3) when the child has resided with the grandparent for a period of twelve months or more. Herron v. Seizak, 321 Pa.Super. 466, 469, 468 A.2d at 803, 805 (1983).
The subsequently enacted statute, which is at issue here, similarly provides that, when in the best interest of the child, a grandparent may be granted reasonable visitation rights if (1) a parent of an unmarried child is deceased, 23 P.S. § 5311; (2) when the parents' marriage is dissolved or the parents are separated, 23 P.S. § 5312; and (3) if an unmarried child has resided with his grandparents (or great-grandparents) for twelve months or more, 23 P.S. § 5313.

. Repealed by 23 Pa.C.S. § 6301 et seq. (199.0).

. Repealed by 23 Pa.C.S. § 2101 etseq. (1981).

. Also, although I do not reach the issue, I note limited support for extending constitutional protection to the sibling relationship. Although the United States Supreme Court has not specifically addressed the issue, it has recognized that the Constitution protects certain highly personal relationships such as those that attend the creation and sustenance of a family. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 104 S.Ct. 3244, 82 L.Ed.2d 462 (1984)(denying constitutional protection to associational freedom of all-male Jaycees). The Court explained that "[flamily relationships, by their nature, involve deep attachments and commitments to the necessarily few other individuals with whom one shares not only a special community of. thoughts, experiences and beliefs but also distinctively personal aspects of one's life.” Id. at 619-20, 104 S.Ct. at 3250. See also Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 97 S.Ct. 1932, 52 L.Ed.2d 531 (1977)(extending due process protection for personal choice in family life). Lower federal courts have extended Roberts and Moore to specifically provide constitutional protection for the sibling relationship. See, e.g., Trujillo v. Board of County Commissioners, 768 F.2d 1186 (10th Cir.1985)(in wrongful death action, recognizing liberty interest in associational freedom with sibling); Rivera v. Marcus, 696 F.2d 1016 (2d Cir.1982)(where state removed child from foster home, extending due process protection to custodial half-sister); Aristotle P. v. Johnson, 721 F.Supp. 1002 (N.D.Ill.1989)(extending due process protection to siblings separated in foster care). But see, Bell v. Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir.1984)(denying constitutional protection to sibling relationship in wrongful death action).

. I cannot conceive of a contrary result that would permit grandparents, but not brothers and sisters, to visit a child where it is in the child’s best interest. In differentiating this case from the circumstances when grandparents’ visitation rights arise, i.e, where the family unit has become detached or broken, Appellees emphasize that their family unit, that of Arthur Z. and Mary Jane Z. and their children, is intact. I note, however, that Appellant C.R.’s biological family is not intact: her parents are divorced, she is unemancipated and living with her father; she is estranged from her mother and is prohibited from visiting her sisters.