Court Opinion

ID: 9412700
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-01 14:11:30.970594+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:31.589457
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
UNPUBLISHED

              Present: Judges Raphael, White and Senior Judge Petty
              Argued at Richmond, Virginia

              MUNIR MA’MOUN HUSSEIN, SOMETIMES KNOWN AS
               MUNIR MA’MOUD HUSSEIN
                                                      MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
              v.   Record No. 0779-22-2                JUDGE STUART A. RAPHAEL
                                                            AUGUST 1, 2023
              COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

                                FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF SPOTSYLVANIA COUNTY
                                               Ricardo Rigual, Judge1

                              James J. Ilijevich for appellant.

                              Rebecca M. Garcia, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares,
                              Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

                     A jury convicted Munir Ma’moud Hussein of possession of a Schedule II controlled

              substance, felony eluding, driving a commercial motor vehicle under the influence, failing to

              obey a traffic signal, and failing to use flares. Hussein argues that the evidence failed to prove

              felony eluding or driving a commercial vehicle under the influence. He argues that the trial court

              erred when it denied his Fourth Amendment suppression motion. And he claims that the trial

              court erred in failing to treat him as a first-time offender and in imposing a sentence exceeding

              the sentencing guidelines.2 Finding none of those claims meritorious, we affirm the judgment.

                     *
                         This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A).
                     1
                         The Honorable Joseph Ellis presided over the motion to suppress hearing.
                     2
                       Hussein also appeals his convictions for the two traffic infractions, but he made no
              reference to them in his brief, so any argument concerning those convictions is waived. See Rule
              5A:20(e); Jay v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 510, 520 (2008).
                                            BACKGROUND

        On appeal, we recite the facts “in the ‘light most favorable’ to the Commonwealth, the

prevailing party in the trial court.” Hammer v. Commonwealth, 74 Va. App. 225, 231 (2022)

(quoting Commonwealth v. Cady, 300 Va. 325, 329 (2021)). Doing so requires that we “discard”

the defendant’s evidence when it conflicts with the Commonwealth’s evidence, “regard as true

all the credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth,” and read “all fair inferences” in the

Commonwealth’s favor. Cady, 300 Va. at 329 (quoting Commonwealth v. Perkins, 295 Va. 323,

324 (2018)).

        Spotsylvania County Sheriff’s Deputy Yekaterina Lecarpentier was on her way to work

when she heard a report of a disabled tractor-trailer on Partlow Road. Partlow Road is a long,

winding road with one lane of travel in each direction and a very narrow shoulder. Lecarpentier

was nearby, so she headed that way and found the tractor-trailer stopped in the travel lane, with

cars lined up behind it. The road was dark, and Hussein—the tractor-trailer’s driver—had failed to

use flashing hazard lights, flares, or emergency triangles so others could see that his truck was

obstructing the roadway.

        Lecarpentier parked her squad car behind the tractor-trailer, engaged her emergency

lights, and approached Hussein. When she asked if he was all right, Hussein responded in the

affirmative. Hussein said that his tractor-trailer had broken down and that he “need[ed] twenty

more minutes to finish his research.” Lecarpentier asked Hussein what he meant, but he did not

respond. He refused to engage his hazard lights and told Lecarpentier that he did not need flares

behind his tractor-trailer.

        Hussein then “became erratic.” He repeatedly yelled “no” at the “top of his lungs” and told

Lecarpentier that she needed to leave. Lecarpentier suspected that Hussein was either under the

influence of narcotics or experiencing a “psychotic mental breakdown,” so she directed him to turn

                                                 -2-
on his hazard lights and pointed to her badge to convey that it was not just a request. She also asked

Hussein for his driver’s license. Hussein responded by rolling up the window. When Lecarpentier

tried to open the driver’s-side door, Hussein closed it, locked it, started the engine, and drove off

slowly. Lecarpentier returned to her squad car, activated her siren, and drove after Hussein,

notifying her dispatcher that she was in pursuit.

        Hussein failed to stay in his lane for more than 30 seconds at a time. He drove over the

double-yellow lines and the fog line; sometimes all of his tires were in the wrong lane. Oncoming

traffic had to swerve to avoid being hit. More deputies arrived to assist, setting down spike strips,

closing off roads and parking lots, and engaging in “tandem jumping,” meaning police cars tried to

get ahead of Hussein to close off adjoining roads at intersections.

        Hussein drove through three red lights without engaging his brakes. Even after his front

tires deflated from the spike strips, he disregarded repeated commands from Lecarpentier and other

deputies to stop. He drove at speeds from 9 to 15 miles per hour for about 80 minutes. The pursuit

ended when Hussein’s tractor-trailer “jackknifed” off the road and into a ditch as Hussein failed to

negotiate a tight left-hand turn.

        Hussein retreated to the sleeper cab of his tractor-trailer, precipitating a three-hour standoff

with SWAT and tactical officers. The standoff ended when officers forcibly entered the tractor-

trailer and arrested Hussein.

        When Lecarpentier asked if he knew where he was, Hussein’s first answer was New Jersey.

His second guess was Pennsylvania. Upon learning he was in Virginia, Hussein expressed surprise.

Lecarpentier observed that Hussein’s pupils were constricted, he was unsteady on his feet, and he

spoke rapidly.

        A search of Hussein’s wallet revealed a small baggie containing a white, powdery substance

that Lecarpentier suspected was methamphetamine. After Hussein failed several field sobriety tests,

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Lecarpentier arrested him for driving under the influence of a controlled substance and transported

him to Mary Washington Hospital for a blood sample. Hussein’s blood tested positive for

methamphetamine and amphetamine. The contents of the baggie also tested positive for

methamphetamine.

        Before trial, Hussein moved to suppress the Commonwealth’s evidence, arguing that

Lecarpentier lacked reasonable suspicion at the outset to detain him. But the trial court denied

his motion. At the jury trial that followed, the Commonwealth presented several witnesses,

including Lecarpentier, Lieutenant Barbra Harvey, who was on the scene during the pursuit, and

Robyn Amos-Kroohs, a toxicologist who described the effects of methamphetamine on the human

body and on driving behavior. The jury found Hussein guilty of felony eluding and driving under

the influence.3

        The court held a sentencing hearing where it considered the presentence report, the

discretionary sentencing guidelines, and Hussein’s letters of support. Hussein asked the trial court

to treat him as a first-time offender under Code § 18.2-251. The court declined, sentencing Hussein

to 6 years and 12 months’ incarceration (with 4 years and 24 months suspended) and a $1,150 fine.

                                             ANALYSIS

        Hussein raises four assignments of error challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, the

denial of his suppression motion, and the terms of his sentence. We address them in order.

            A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

        “When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, ‘[t]he judgment of the trial court is

presumed correct and will not be disturbed unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to

support it.’” McGowan v. Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 513, 521 (2020) (alteration in original)

        3
        The jury also found Hussein guilty of failure to use flares, failure to obey a traffic light,
and possession of a Schedule II controlled substance.
                                              -4-
(quoting Smith v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 450, 460 (2018)). “In such cases, ‘[t]he Court does

not ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Secret v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 204,

228 (2018)). “Rather, the relevant question is whether ‘any rational trier of fact could have

found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Vasquez v.

Commonwealth, 291 Va. 232, 248 (2016) (quoting Williams v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 190, 193

(2009)).

                   1. Felony Eluding (Assignment of Error 1)

       To obtain a conviction under Code § 46.2-817(B), the Commonwealth had to prove that

Hussein (1) “received a visible or audible signal from any law-enforcement officer to bring his

motor vehicle to a stop” and (2) drove “such motor vehicle in a willful and wanton disregard of

such signal so as to” (3) “interfere with or endanger the operation of the law-enforcement vehicle

or endanger a person.” Hussein argues that the Commonwealth failed to prove the third element.

       The element of endangerment differentiates felony eluding from misdemeanor eluding.

“[C]onduct that raises the specter of endangerment is the evil contemplated and proscribed by”

Code § 46.2-817(B). Tucker v. Commonwealth, 38 Va. App. 343, 347 (2002). “To ‘endanger’ is

to ‘expose to danger, harm, or loss.’” Coleman v. Commonwealth, 52 Va. App. 19, 24 (2008)

(quoting Webster’s New World Dictionary 448 (3d coll. ed. 1988)). The person endangered “can

be the driver himself, the police officer, or anyone else on the road [who] could be put at risk

from the driver’s eluding.” Id. The statute does not require an eluding defendant to pose an

imminent threat. Requiring an “imminent” threat “would engraft an [additional] element to the

offense, thereby permitting the dangerous operation of motor vehicles until a person is actually

imperiled, an absurd result that subverts the salutary purposes of the statute.” Tucker, 38

                                                 -5-
Va. App. at 347. “That the exposure to danger does not result in any actual harm is a welcome

fortuity, but not a legal defense.” Coleman, 52 Va. App. at 24.

        The endangerment element was satisfied here. Hussein endangered other motorists when

he repeatedly crossed into the opposite lane going the wrong direction and ran three red lights.

Oncoming traffic had to swerve to avoid being struck. Hussein’s refusal to stop endangered the

officers who had to engage in a “very dangerous,” “tandem jumping” maneuver. And Hussein

endangered himself. He drove over spike strips that deflated his tires and continued driving while

the rims of his tires threw off sparks. Ultimately, Hussein lost control of the tractor-trailer,

driving it off the road and into a ditch.

        The question for this Court is “whether ‘any rational trier of fact,’” Vasquez, 291 Va. at

248 (quoting Williams, 278 Va. at 193), could have found that Hussein “endanger[ed] a person,”

Code § 46.2-817(B). Even though Hussein drove at slow speeds throughout the incident, the

trial court could reasonably conclude that Hussein endangered himself, the officers, and the

motorists he encountered along the way.

                    2. Driving Under the Influence (Assignment of Error 2)

        To convict Hussein of driving under the influence, the Commonwealth was required to

prove that he drove or operated the tractor-trailer either (1) while “under the influence of any

narcotic drug . . . to a degree which impair[ed] his ability to drive or operate any commercial

motor vehicle safely,” or (2) while he had “a blood concentration of . . . 0.1 milligrams of

methamphetamine per liter of blood.” Code § 46.2-341.24(A)(iii), (v)(b). Instruction 13, which

Hussein does not contest, tracked those elements.

        The Commonwealth introduced a certificate of analysis showing that, after his arrest,

Hussein’s blood contained 0.18 milligram of methamphetamine per liter of blood, thus exceeding

the 0.1 limit in Code § 46.2-341.24(A)(v)(b). He also possessed a baggie of methamphetamine

                                                 -6-
when he was arrested. But he argues that the Commonwealth failed to prove that he ingested

methamphetamine before driving or operating the tractor-trailer, rather than afterward, during the

standoff with police. He says the Commonwealth did “not exclude every reasonable theory of

innocence,” including that he ingested methamphetamine when he was in the tractor-trailer’s

sleeper cab and out of sight of the officers.

          “Whether an alternate hypothesis of innocence is reasonable is a question of fact and,

therefore, is binding on appeal unless plainly wrong.” Holloway v. Commonwealth, 57 Va. App.

658, 666 (2011) (en banc) (quoting Emerson v. Commonwealth, 43 Va. App. 263, 277 (2004)).

“[I]n considering an appellant’s alternate hypothesis of innocence in a circumstantial evidence case,

we must determine ‘not whether there is some evidence to support’ the appellant’s hypothesis of

innocence, but, rather, ‘whether a reasonable [juror], upon consideration of all the evidence, could

have rejected [the appellant’s] theories in his defense.’” Id. at 665 (third alteration in original)

(quoting Emerson, 43 Va. App. at 277); see also Commonwealth v. Hudson, 265 Va. 505, 513

(2003).

          The jury could reasonably reject Hussein’s hypothesis of innocence and convict him of

driving under the influence under subsection (A)(iii) of Code § 46.2-341.24, rather than subsection

(A)(v)(b). Subsection (A)(iii) does not impose a minimum threshold for methamphetamine in the

blood while driving; it simply prohibits driving “under the influence of any narcotic drug or any

other self-administered intoxicant or drug of whatsoever nature . . . to a degree which impairs his

ability to drive or operate any commercial motor vehicle safely.” Lecarpentier recounted in detail

her first interaction with Hussein, which took place before the chase. She described Hussein as

“erratic” and uncooperative, recalling that he repeatedly yelled “no” at the “top of his lungs” when

she requested that he turn on his hazard lights. She told the jury that at that point she suspected

Hussein was under the influence or experiencing a “psychotic mental breakdown.” The jury heard

                                                   -7-
expert testimony about the effects of methamphetamine on driving, and during the pursuit, Hussein

drove on the wrong side of the road, ran three red lights, continued driving after his tires deflated,

and drove off the road into a ditch. He was found in possession of methamphetamine and tested

positive for having ingested it. Lecarpentier explained that, when Hussein was arrested, his pupils

were constricted, he was unsteady on his feet, and he spoke rapidly. He was confused about which

State he was in. Considering the totality of the evidence, the jury could reasonably conclude that

Hussein operated the tractor-trailer while under the influence of methamphetamine “to a degree

which impair[ed] his ability to drive or operate [it] safely.” Code § 46.2-341.24(A)(iii).

            B. Suppression (Assignment of Error 3)

        “When challenging the denial of a motion to suppress evidence on appeal, the defendant

bears the burden of establishing that reversible error occurred.” Street v. Commonwealth, 75

Va. App. 298, 303-04 (2022) (quoting Mason v. Commonwealth, 291 Va. 362, 367 (2016)).

“Appellate review of a suppression ruling involving a Fourth Amendment challenge presents a

mixed question of law and fact.” Id. at 304 (citation omitted). “This Court is ‘bound by the trial

court’s findings of historical fact unless plainly wrong or without evidence to support them.’

However, the Court reviews de novo the overarching question of whether a search or seizure

violated the Fourth Amendment.” Moreno v. Commonwealth, 73 Va. App. 267, 274 (2021)

(citation omitted) (quoting Williams v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. App. 462, 475 (2020)). “[O]ur

review includes evidence presented at both the suppression hearing and the trial.” Id. (quoting

Williams, 71 Va. App. at 475).

        Hussein argues that when he drove away from the scene and Lecarpentier pursued him,

he was illegally seized. But “[a] Fourth Amendment seizure of a person occurs either by

physical force or submission of the person to the assertion of law enforcement authority.” Hill v.

Commonwealth, 297 Va. 804, 811 (2019) (citing California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626

                                                  -8-
(1991)). To determine when Hussein was seized, we must therefore consider his actual response

to the officer’s show of authority and when he “actually submitted” to that show of authority.

Beasley v. Commonwealth, 60 Va. App. 381, 392 (2012).

        Hussein’s Fourth Amendment argument fails because he was not seized until officers

removed him from the tractor-trailer, by which point they had ample suspicion that Hussein had

committed several offenses. Before then, Hussein had not been physically restrained and had not

submitted to Lecarpentier’s show of authority. See Hill, 297 Va. at 811. His tractor-trailer was

already stopped when Lecarpentier arrived. He disregarded Lecarpentier’s command to turn on

his hazard lights and, in response to her request for his driver’s license, he rolled up his window,

locked the door, and drove away. Thus, Hussein was not seized when the pursuit began, so his

Fourth Amendment rights were not violated regardless of the level of suspicion Lecarpentier had

at that time.4

            C. Sentencing (Assignment of Error 4)

        Hussein’s last assignment error challenges two aspects of his sentence. Neither challenge

is meritorious.

                     1. Deferred Disposition

        Hussein argues that the trial court erred when it declined to grant him first-offender status

under Code § 18.2-251. That statute provides:

                  Whenever any person who has not previously been convicted of
                  any criminal offense under this article . . . enters a plea of not
                  guilty to possession of a controlled substance under § 18.2-250, the
                  court, upon such plea if the facts found by the court would justify a
                  finding of guilt, without entering a judgment of guilt and with the
                  consent of the accused, may defer further proceedings and place
                  him on probation upon terms and conditions.

        4
          We need not consider the legality of the seizure that followed the chase. Hussein does
not challenge it, and at oral argument, he conceded that as long as Lecarpentier “observed
activity that she could cite him for” during the pursuit, the later seizure was justified.
                                                 -9-
(Emphases added). Code § 18.2-251 thus authorizes courts to defer disposition of drug-

possession convictions “without entering a judgment of guilt.” Hussein assigns error to the trial

court’s denial of his request for a deferred disposition.

          But the statute permits a deferred disposition when the trial court finds that the facts

“would justify a finding of guilt” but the court has not yet “enter[ed] a judgment of guilt.” Code

§ 18.2-251. A deferred disposition was not permissible here because the conviction order was

entered before Hussein requested first-offender status.5 “Implicit in this statutory language is

that the court has the discretion to permit a deferred disposition if it finds that the facts ‘would

justify a finding of guilt’ but has not yet actually pronounced the defendant guilty on those

facts.” Vandyke v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. App. 723, 733 (2020) (construing parallel language in

Code § 18.2-258.1(H)). In other words, this statute “very clearly does not permit a trial court to

grant a deferred disposition after a trial court has entered a judgment of guilt.” Sullivan v.

Commonwealth, No. 1039-19-4, slip op. at 7, 2020 WL 6139904, at *3 (Va. Ct. App. Oct. 20,

2020).6

          Even if the trial court had the power to defer disposition under Code § 18.2-251, doing so

would be permissive, not mandatory. The statute provides that the trial court “may” defer further

proceedings, not that it shall or must do so. Courts “will apply the ordinary meaning of the word

‘may’ in construing a statute unless a contrary legislative intention plainly appears.” Sauder v.

Ferguson, 289 Va. 449, 457 (2015). “Unless it is manifest that the purpose of the legislature was

to use the word ‘may’ in the sense of ‘shall’ or ‘must,’ then ‘may’ should be given its ordinary

meaning—permission, importing discretion.” Id. (quoting Masters v. Hart, 189 Va. 969, 979

        The conviction order was entered on March 1, 2022. Hussein’s sentencing hearing—
          5

where he asked for first-offender status—took place two months later, on May 16, 2022.

          “Although not binding precedent, unpublished opinions can be cited and considered for
          6

their persuasive value. Rule 5A:1(f).” Otey v. Commonwealth, 61 Va. App. 346, 350 n.3 (2012).
                                             - 10 -
(1949)). Code § 18.2-251 uses may six times and shall eleven times, confirming that the

legislature was “well aware of the difference,” id. at 458, intending to give trial courts discretion

to defer a disposition, not to force courts to do so.

                   2. Sentencing Guidelines

       We likewise reject Hussein’s claim that the trial court erred when it imposed a sentence

that exceeded the one recommended in the sentencing guidelines. The guidelines are “advisory

only and do not require trial courts to impose specific sentences.” Runyon v. Commonwealth, 29

Va. App. 573, 577-78 (1999). “[T]he recommended sentencing ranges contained in these

discretionary guidelines are not binding on the trial judge but, rather, are mere tools to be used

by the judge in fixing an appropriate sentence within the limitations established by the statute

governing punishment for the particular crime.” Luttrell v. Commonwealth, 42 Va. App. 461,

465 (2004). A trial court’s decision about whether to follow the discretionary sentencing

guidelines is “not . . . reviewable on appeal.” Code § 19.2-298.01(F). We consider instead

whether the sentence fell outside the permissible statutory range. See Smith v. Commonwealth,

26 Va. App. 620, 626 (1998); Valentine v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 334, 339 (1994).

       Here, Hussein was sentenced within the permissible ranges for the statutes under which

he was convicted. See Code §§ 18.2-250, 46.2-817(B), 46.2-341.24, 46.2-833, 46.2-111.

“[O]nce it is determined that a sentence is within the limitations set forth in the statute under

which it is imposed, appellate review is at an end.” Thomason v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App.

89, 99 (2018) (quoting Minh Duy Du v. Commonwealth, 292 Va. 555, 565 (2016)).

                                             CONCLUSION

       In sum, Hussein’s arguments do not warrant reversing his convictions or his sentence.

                                                                                              Affirmed.

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