Court Opinion

ID: 995305
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2013-07-04 00:35:24.004356+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:18:45.808561
License: Public Domain

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

PENNY MCCRIMMON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.                                                                    No. 97-2343

GLOBE BOOK COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.
Catherine C. Blake, District Judge.
(CA-96-1356-CCB)

Submitted: April 30, 1998

Decided: June 16, 1998

Before MURNAGHAN, WILKINS, and WILLIAMS,
Circuit Judges.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

John H. Morris, Jr., Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. Barrett W.
Freedlander, WEINBERG & GREEN, L.L.C., Baltimore, Maryland,
for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).
OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Penny McCrimmon ("McCrimmon") appeals the district court's
order granting summary judgement to Globe Book Company
("Globe") on her breach of contract claim. Finding no error, we
affirm.

I.

Globe, a publisher and distributor of educational text books,
employed McCrimmon as a sales representative under a one-year
contract in November 1992. McCrimmon was responsible for gener-
ating book sales in a defined territory that included Delaware, Mary-
land, Northern Virginia, and Washington, D.C. Globe agreed to pay
McCrimmon a base salary of $35,000, plus commission if she gener-
ated sales equaling eighty percent of her designated performance
quota. McCrimmon's quota was $1,050,000, which included her per-
sonal quota of $750,000 and a $300,000 additional quota for an inde-
pendent sales agent assigned to her territory.

In April 1993, Globe discharged McCrimmon. At that time, her
sales production was $100,395 and the independent sales agent had
generated $13,363. McCrimmon brought suit against Globe for
unpaid commissions, claiming that she was entitled to commissions
for the balance of the contract year, despite the fact that she was no
longer employed by Globe during that time. In August 1997, the dis-
trict court granted Globe's motion for summary judgment, finding
that McCrimmon had failed to dispute Globe's evidence that she had
not met her sales quota at the time of her discharge and was not other-
wise entitled to any unpaid commissions. McCrimmon appeals the
district court's order.

II.

We review the district court's granting of summary judgment de
novo.1 Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, depo-
_________________________________________________________________
1 See United States v. Leak, 123 F.3d 787, 791 (4th Cir. 1997).

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sitions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law."2 The court must "view the facts and draw reason-
able inferences in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party."3

With this in mind, we hold that the district court properly granted
Globe's motion for summary judgment. McCrimmon failed to dispute
Globe's evidence that sales representatives are only entitled to com-
missions for months during which they are employed by Globe.
Globe submitted the affidavit of Allan Blondell ("Blondell"),
McCrimmon's supervisor, which stated that McCrimmon was com-
pensated in accordance with Globe's "Sales Representatives' Com-
pensation Plan." That Plan, which was attached to Blondell's
affidavit, states that upon discharge of a sales representative, whether
voluntary or involuntary, commissions will be paid through "the last
shipping day of the month."4 In McCrimmon's case, her entitlement
to commissions was properly calculated through the end of April
1993, at which time she had only generated approximately one-
seventh of her personal quota. In addition, through Blondell's affida-
vit, Globe offered credible evidence that, even if McCrimmon
received production credit for sales through the end of her contract
year, she still would not have met the threshold triggering her com-
mission.

To dispute this evidence, McCrimmon submitted an affidavit stat-
ing that she was never told that her right to commissions was depen-
dent on her continued employment with Globe and that she never
signed an agreement containing the terms of Globe's commission
structure. Rather, she contended that under prevailing standards in the
industry, the company generally pays a sales representative for sales
generated in her territory even after the representative leaves the com-
pany's employ. In addition, McCrimmon submitted the declaration of
Maria Harris ("Harris"), who worked for Globe from 1987 to 1989,
several years before McCrimmon's employment. Harris's recollection
_________________________________________________________________
2 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
3 Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 798 (4th Cir. 1994).

4 J.A. at 34.

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of Globe's commission structure was consistent with McCrimmon's
assertion about industry standards. However, "[t]he party opposing a
properly supported motion for summary judgment may not rest upon
mere allegations or denials of [its] pleading, but must set forth spe-
cific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."5 McCrim-
mon presented no evidence of any agreement by Globe to pay her
commission other than a general assertion of an oral contract, the
terms of which she could not recall.6 The existence of an industry
standard simply is not sufficient to create a contractual agreement
between Globe and McCrimmon. In the absence of specific facts
showing that there was a genuine issue for trial, the district court
properly determined that McCrimmon had not presented a genuine
issue of material fact.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court's order awarding sum-
mary judgment to Globe. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
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5 Rivann Trawlers Unltd. v. Thompson Trawlers, Inc., 840 F.2d 236,
240 (4th Cir. 1988).
6 J.A. at 44, 55.

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