Court Opinion

ID: 9627979
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:02:18.42851+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:54.400509
License: Public Domain

MARTONE, Justice,
concurring, and dissenting in part.
I agree with the court that there is a separation of powers problem here and write separately to state my understanding of the limited nature of our holding. I also write to express my disagreement with the court’s resolution of the standing issue.
1. The problem with this statute is that it creates an entity that performs essentially executive functions but remains subject to legislative control. The absence of set terms or other removal provisions for members of the CDC provides the Legislature indirect, yet substantial control over the members it appoints. The same problem existed before the statute was amended. This is the heart of the case. Ante, at 435-436.
The separation of powers problem would not have arisen had the statute accorded the Executive Branch of government the majority of appointments on the commission. The Attorney General acknowledged this at oral argument. In the alternative, the statute could have allowed the Legislature to make a majority of the appointments, but given them secure tenure. This alternative would not create an appointments clause violation because, as the court notes, there is no appointments clause in the Arizona Constitution.
2. While I believe there is standing in this case, I do not believe there is standing under either of the statutes upon which the court relies. I believe that the scope of A.R.S. § 35-212 is limited to enjoining the illegal payment of public monies directly. It does not extend to an attack on the constitutionality of an entire state agency, where the expenditure of funds is merely an indirect by-product of a declaration of unconstitutionality. The expenditure of state funds in an action which directly attacks the existence of an agency is too attenuated to support a claim under § 35-212, and therefore, I do not believe there is standing under it.
By extending the scope of the remedy under § 35-212 to support standing here, the court greatly expands the scope of taxpayer suits under A.R.S. § 35-213. If the Attorney General does not bring an action under § 35-212, any taxpayer can bring an action under § 35-213. Thus, by broadening the substantive reach of § 35-212, the court necessarily broadens the substantive reach of § 35-213. A taxpayer can now bring an action to challenge the constitutionality of any state agency even if the taxpayer has no personal stake in the outcome. This undesirable consequence militates against the majority’s interpretation of § 35-212.
Nor do I believe there is standing under a quo warranto action. An action under A.R.S. § 12-2041 is to be brought against any person who usurps, intrudes, or unlawfully holds a public office. It is a very narrow action against the person holding office, not an action to declare the entire agency unconstitutional. Under A.R.S. § 12-2044, a judgment in quo warranto must show who is entitled to the office. The inference is that it is a legitimate office, being held by an illegitimate office holder. By holding that there is standing under quo warranto here, the court turns that around and allows a quo warranto action to lie against a legitimate office holder holding an illegitimate office. There is no question in this case that Block, Pew, and Twist legitimately hold office. The question is whether the agency in which they hold office is constitutionally valid. I do not believe § 12-2041 supports standing here.
Now having said all of this, I do believe the Attorney General has standing in this case. AR.S. § 41-192 describes the powers and duties of the Attorney General, and A.R.S. § 41-193 describes the powers and duties of the department of law he runs. Under § 41-192(A)(1), the Attorney General is to render such legal services as the departments require. His department of law is one of the departments that may require legal services. Under § 41-193(A)(1), the legal department shall prosecute in the supreme court all proceedings in which a state officer is a party in his official capacity. This action is essentially one by the Attorney General, not by the State of Arizona, to vindicate the interests of *280the Attorney General qua Attorney General. In short, the Attorney General is the client. He has standing to assert what he believes to be the proper contours of his office. This is entirely compatible with the proposition that the Attorney General has no standing generally to assert claims under the constitution. Here the claim is a specific one related solely to his office.
The purpose of the standing requirement is to ensure that there is a true controversy between the parties and potential harm-in-fact. Where, as here, the Attorney General brings an action involving the scope of his office qua office, and where, as here, a separation of powers claim is accompanied by a claim under article V, § 9 of the constitution, standing exists. This is true even though we do not reach the merits of the article V argument. Its good faith assertion ensures standing. Nor would my view give the Attorney General carte blanche to bring actions on behalf of the state without a true client. He would be limited to those instances in which his office is the true client and where he is attempting to vindicate the interests of his own office, not those of the public.
In all other respects, I concur in the opinion and the judgment of the court.