Court Opinion

ID: 9681566
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:52:42.74491+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:34.456664
License: Public Domain

MEYERS, Judge,
concurring.
It is widely accepted that extraneous-offense evidence is not relevant unless, among other things, the defendant is shown to have been criminally responsible for the offenses proven. Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 689, 108 S.Ct. 1496, 1501, 99 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988); United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 912-13 (5th Cir.1978); Wyle v. State, 777 S.W.2d 709; 715 (Tex.Crim.App.1989). Although I have some doubt about the truth of this proposition generally, I do not doubt that it is actually true in most contexts or that it was true of the extraneous offenses with which we are concerned in the instant cause. Indeed, it is my understanding that the Texas Legislature has authorized receipt of extraneous-offense evidence at the penalty phase of trial only if “the court deems [it] relevant to sentencing” and it “is shown beyond reasonable doubt by evidence to have been committed by the defendant” or that he was “criminally responsible” for it. Tex.Code Crim Proc. art. 37.07 § 3(a). I therefore accept that the evidence of extraneous crimes introduced by the State in the instant cause would not be “relevant to sentencing” if the appellant did not actually *956participate criminally in the commission of those crimes.
The question presented on discretionary review is whether the defendant’s culpability for such extraneous offenses was, under article 37.07, section 3(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a necessary condition to admissibility of the evidence or merely a condition of its relevancy. If it was the former, then it was a preliminary question of fact to be decided by the trial judge before admitting the evidence. Tex.R.Crim. Evid. 104(a). If it was the latter, then it was a question of conditional relevancy which the judge had to submit for decision by the jury unless it was clear that the condition would not be proven at trial. Tex.R.Crim. Evid. 104(b). See generally 1 Steven Goode et al., Texas Practice, Guide to the Texas Rules of Evidence: Civil and Criminal §§ 104.1,104.2 (1993).
Although awkwardly drafted, it is clear to me from the plain language of section 3(a) that the Legislature meant to express a rule of relevancy only. The enumeration in that statute of evidence which might lawfully be “offered” by either litigant, including proof of other crimes and bad acts committed by the defendant, purports on its face only to be a nonexhaustive list of items considered “relevant to sentencing” by the Legislature. Accordingly, the condition that extraneous misconduct sought to be proven at the penalty phase of trial must be “shown beyond a reasonable doubt by evidence to have been committed by the defendant” is merely a legislative expression of the widely-accepted belief that extraneous-offense evidence is not relevant otherwise. It does not identify any preliminary questions of fact to be resolved by the trial judge under Rule 104(a) as a condition of admissibility. It merely affirms that, even during the penalty phase of a criminal trial, the relevance of extraneous-offense evidence “depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact” within the meaning of Rule 104(b).
Thus, in my opinion, this case does not differ significantly from, and is controlled by, our recent decisions in Harrell v. State, 884 S.W.2d 154 (Tex.Crim.App.1994) and George v. State, 890 S.W.2d 73 (Tex.Crim.App.1994). In Harrell, discussing the admissibility of extraneous-offense ' evidence at the guilt phase of trial, we acknowledged that proof of a defendant’s culpability for an extraneous crime is not a preliminary question of fact to be resolved by the trial judge under Rule 104(a), but is a condition of relevancy to be resolved by the jury under Rule 104(b). 884 S.W.2d at 159-60, relying on Huddleston, 485 U.S. 681, 108 S.Ct. 1496, 99 L.Ed.2d 771. Although we discerned a different standard associated with proof of conditional facts under Texas law than the United States Supreme Court did under federal law, we otherwise characterized the issue presented as being the same. Harrell thus stands for the proposition that Rule 104(b) of the Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence, like Rule 104(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, assigns questions of conditional relevancy to the jury so long as there is some evidence from which a rational juror could conclude that the condition has been fulfilled.
In George we reaffirmed the long-standing rule established by decisional law in Texas that, since the relevancy of extraneous-offense evidence depends upon the defendant’s criminal responsibility for the offense, admission of such evidence should be accompanied by an instruction from the trial judge that jurors not consider the evidence unless convinced beyond reasonable doubt of the defendant’s culpability for it. Since it is clear from article 37.07, section 3(a) that the same conditions of relevancy apply to extraneous-offense evidence offered at the punishment phase of trial as at the guilt phase, it follows that the rule requiring jurors to be informed of those conditions must also apply equally at both phases of trial.
Accordingly, it is my opinion that the trial judge in the instant cause should not have treated the question of appellant’s culpability for the extraneous offenses sought to be proven at his trial as a preliminary question of fact affecting admissibility under Rule 104(a). Rather, he should have admitted the evidence under Rule 104(b) upon condition *957that proof be adduced by the State sufficient to convince a rational juror beyond reasonable doubt that appellant was actually responsible for the extraneous offenses proven. And, under our extensive case law, culminating in George, he should also have instructed jurors of the conditions under which such evidence could be considered by them as relevant to sentencing.
For these reasons, I concur in the Court’s judgment to reverse the decision of the Tex-arkana Court of Appeals and to remand this cause for consideration of the harm arising from the trial court’s failure properly to instruct the jury as requested by appellant.
MALONEY, Judge, joins.