Court Opinion

ID: 9722214
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 09:20:31.317162+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:32.163000
License: Public Domain

ROSENN, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
I dissent because I believe that the plaintiffs’ pre-induction constitutional attack upon the Military Selective Service Act is interdicted by the provisions of the Act itself. In my opinion, Boyd v. Clark, 287 F.Supp. 561 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff’d, 393 U.S. 316, 89 S.Ct. 553, 21 L.Ed.2d 511 (1969), and Fein v. Selective Service System, 405 U.S. 365, 92 S.Ct. 1062, 31 L.Ed.2d 298 (1972), require that we hold this action barred by § 10(b)(3) of the Act.
The majority opinion states that “[t]he intent of [§ 10(b)(3)] was to prevent pre-induction judicial review of the classification and processing of registrants.” The majority would, nevertheless, make an “exception to the specific language of the Act” in “an action such as this which attacks the constitutionality of the Act itself. . . . ”
In Boyd, several registrants brought a pre-induction challenge to the constitutionality of the statutory provision granting student deferments. They contended, inter alia, that the deferment discriminated against those financially unable to attend college. Aside from their constitutional challenge to the deferment for which they were themselves concededly ineligible, the plaintiffs “did not otherwise contest their own I-A classifications.” 1
The three-judge district court held that the action for declaratory and injunctive relief was barred because the challenge could only be made either as a defense in a criminal prosecution for refusing induction or by a habeas corpus action after accepting induction.2 The Supreme Court summarily affirmed.
The plaintiffs in the instant case contend, in effect, that the Act unconstitutionally subjects males but not females to the draft, and that therefore males suffer an increased likelihood of being drafted because there are consequently fewer registrants in the draft-eligible pool. I see no significant difference between this case and Boyd. In both cases, a class of registrants eligible for induction under the Act challenges its constitutionality because another class of young persons is made ineligible for induction. They contend that the distinction between the two classes violates *773equal protection and unconstitutionally increases the likelihood that the plaintiffs themselves will be inducted. I therefore believe that the present action is barred by Boyd.3
The majority relies on the fact that in the instant case, “there is no discretion, no judgment, and no facts being challenged.” Precisely the same situation, however, existed in the Boyd challenge to the constitutionality of student deferments. That challenge was not allowed, and the majority in this case gives no basis for distinguishing Boyd, in this regard.4
It might be argued that the purpose of § 10(b)(3) was to prevent delay in the operation of the Selective Service System, and that the present constitutional challenge to the Act should be allowed on the ground that it does not present opportunity for delay. This rationale, however, appears to have been decisively rejected by the Supreme Court. In Fein, supra, a registrant brought a pre-induction suit for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that the procedure by which his conscientious objector claim had been denied was an unconstitutional violation of his due process rights. The Court, in holding the action barred by § 10(b)(3), recognized that Mr. Justice Harlan
would have allowed pre-induction judicial review of a procedural challenge on constitutional grounds if it presented no “opportunity for protracted delay” in the system’s operations, and if the issue was beyond the competence of the board to hear and determine.
405 U.S. at 375, 92 S.Ct. at 1070. Rejecting these criteria as the standards under which the applicability of § 10(b)(3) would be decided, the Court pointedly stated that “[t]his view . commanded the vote of no other member of the Court.” Id. Whether or not the instant case presents opportunity for delay is irrelevant, therefore, and the action is barred by § 10(b)(3) for reasons stated above.
I would therefore dismiss the instant action for lack of jurisdiction.

. Fein, supra, 405 U.S. at 374, 92 S.Ct. at 1069.

. The court relied not on § 10(b)(3) itself, but rather on case law which had developed prior to the enactment of § 10(b)(3). In Fein, supra, however, the Supreme Court treated Boyd as a case decided under § 10(b)(3). See 405 U.S. at 364, 92 S.Ct. 1062. The distinction is not significant; regardless of the theory upon which Boyd was decided, the Court in Fein expressly approved of the Boyd holding.

. I would not consider dispositive the distinction that Boyd involved the constitutionality of a statutory deferment, while the instant case involves the constitutionality of the exclusion of a group (females) initially from the scope of the Act. The case sub judice would be more analogous to Boyd if the Act required all females to register for the draft, but also granted deferments to all females by virtue of their gender. I find nothing in Boyd, Fein, or in the majority opinion in this case that is dependent upon a distinction between challenges to deferments and challenges to exclusions. The sole question in both situations is whether Congress may, consistent with equal protection requirements, subject to the draft only one of two statutorily defined groups.

. The majority quotes language from Fein which indicates that § 10(b) (3) bars pre-induction judicial review “where the board, authoritatively, has used- its discretion and judgment in determining facts and in arriving at a classification for the registrant.” The Court did not, however, by this language indicate that it was thus defining the only kind of suit that was barred by § 10(b)(3). In fact, the holding of Boyd, as well as the rejection in Fein of Mr. Justice Harlan’s position that constitutional challenges should be permitted, discussed infra, indicate that the § 10(b) (3) exclusion is broader than that suggested solely by the quoted language.
Moreover, the quoted language was used by the Court only to contrast that “more common situation” with the “rather rare” situation where “administrative action, based on reasons unrelated to the merits of the claim to exemption or deferment, deprives the registrant of the classification to which, otherwise and concededly, he is entitled by statute.” 405 Ü.S. at 374-375, 92 S.Ct. at 1069. This latter situation is clearly not involved in the instant ease, as the majority concedes, since the male plaintiffs are not claiming the right to a statutory classification. The Supreme Court, therefore, not faced with the instant case, described one kind of action barred by § 10(b) (3) and one kind of action not barred by § 10(b)(3). The facts of the instant case fall into neither category. One cannot conclude, as the majority does, that the present action is permitted simply because it falls outside the category that the Supreme Court stated is barred. Further analysis, which I have attempted, is required for this “middle” area.