Court Opinion

ID: 9901295
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-21 17:01:17.104524+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:30.162200
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 23-2011     Document: 010110956444      Date Filed: 11/21/2023   Page: 1
                                                                            FILED
                                                                United States Court of Appeals
                                       PUBLISH                          Tenth Circuit

                   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS November 21, 2023
                                                                    Christopher M. Wolpert
                            FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                       Clerk of Court
                          _______________________________________

  UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

         Plaintiff - Appellant,

  v.                                                         No. 23-2011

  STACEY YELLOWHORSE,

         Defendant - Appellee.
                   ___________________________________________

        APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
               FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
                  (D.C. No. 1:20-CR-01566-DHU-2)
                 _________________________________________

 Emil John Kiehne, Assistant United States Attorney, Office of the United
 States Attorney, District of New Mexico, Albuquerque, New Mexico
 (Alexander M.M. Uballez, United States Attorney, with him on the briefs),
 for Plaintiff-Appellant.

 Carey C. Bhalla, Rothstein Donatelli, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for
 Defendant-Appellee.
                   __________________________________________

 Before HOLMES, BACHARACH, and EID, Circuit Judges.
                ___________________________________________

 BACHARACH, Circuit Judge.
              ___________________________________________

       Although hearsay is generally inadmissible, an exception exists for

 statements that are self-inculpatory. Fed. R. Evid. 802, 804(b)(3). But how
Appellate Case: 23-2011   Document: 010110956444   Date Filed: 11/21/2023   Page: 2

 do we apply this exception when a statement incriminates not only the

 declarant but also a third-party? The district court answered this question

 by treating any references to a third-party’s participation in the crime as

 outside the exception. In our view, the district court’s approach contradicts

 our precedent.

 1.    Mr. Chischilly confessed to his family that he and
       Ms. Yellowhorse had killed a woman.

       The issue arose when Mr. Timothy Chischilly gathered five relatives

 to get something “off his chest.” Appellant’s App’x vol. II, at 173. To the

 shock of the relatives, Mr. Chischilly confessed that he and his girlfriend,

 Ms. Yellowhorse, had killed a woman.

       The relatives told law enforcement about Mr. Chischilly’s

 confession, and the accounts were largely consistent. They said that

 Mr. Chischilly had admitted that

             he held the woman down while Ms. Yellowhorse bludgeoned
              the woman with a sledgehammer or mallet and

             he and Ms. Yellowhorse pinned the woman down with nails and
              a hammer.

 Mr. Chischilly added that after the killing, he and Ms. Yellowhorse burned

 the body.

       Authorities later found parts of the woman’s skeletal remains

 “charred and fragmented” in various locations, including a fire pit next to

 Mr. Chischilly’s house. Appellant’s App’x vol. III, at 426, 428, 433.

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 According to a forensic report, two nails lay close to the woman’s remains

 and matched a hole in her skull. But most of her facial bones were missing.

 2.    The government seeks to use Mr. Chischilly’s statements in
       Ms. Yellowhorse’s trial.

       Despite confessing to the murder, Mr. Chischilly pleaded not guilty.

 That plea led the district court to set Mr. Chischilly’s trial after

 Ms. Yellowhorse’s.

       At Ms. Yellowhorse’s upcoming trial, the government wants

 Mr. Chischilly to testify about what he told his relatives. Because his

 statements were self-incriminating, however, the government expects

 Mr. Chischilly to invoke the Fifth Amendment if he is called as a witness.

 So the government asked the district court to allow the relatives to testify

 at Ms. Yellowhorse’s trial about three of Mr. Chischilly’s statements:

       1.     He and Ms. Yellowhorse killed the woman.

       2.     Ms. Yellowhorse used a sledgehammer or mallet to bludgeon
              the woman.

       3.     Mr. Chischilly and Ms. Yellowhorse burned the body after the
              killing.

 3.    The hearsay exception applies only if Mr. Chischilly’s statements
       harmed his penal interest and had corroboration.

        Mr. Chischilly made his admissions outside of court, and the

 government wants to use them for the truth of the matters asserted (that

 Mr. Chischilly and Ms. Yellowhorse killed the woman and burned the

 body). So Mr. Chischilly’s statements to his relatives would ordinarily

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 constitute inadmissible hearsay. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(c) (defining

 hearsay); Fed. R. Evid. 802 (stating that hearsay is inadmissible in the

 absence of an exception).

        An exception exists when declarants make out-of-court statements

 that harm their own penal interests. Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3). This hearsay

 exception “is founded on the commonsense notion that reasonable people,

 even reasonable people who are not especially honest, tend not to make

 self-inculpatory statements unless they believe them to be true.”

 Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 599 (1994).

        The party seeking introduction of a self-inculpatory, out-of-court

 statement must establish three elements:

       1.     The declarant is unavailable.

       2.     The statement is against the declarant’s penal interest.

       3.     Corroborating circumstances sufficiently and clearly indicate
              the trustworthiness of the statement.

 United States v. Lozado, 776 F.3d 1119, 1122 (10th Cir. 2015).

 4.    The district court excludes parts of Mr. Chischilly’s statements
       because they referred to Ms. Yellowhorse.

       The district court found unavailability 1 and corroboration. But the

 district court concluded that the statements about Ms. Yellowhorse’s

 1
      The district court found unavailability based on an expectation that
 Mr. Chischilly would avoid incriminating himself by refusing to testify.
 Ms. Yellowhorse argues that the government could force Mr. Chischilly to

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 participation would not have harmed Mr. Chischilly’s penal interest. Based

 on this conclusion, the court paraphrased the relatives’ expected testimony

 and struck through the inadmissible parts:

       1.     Mr. Chischilly’s statement that he and Ms. Yellowhorse killed
              the woman,

       2.     Mr. Chischilly’s statement that Ms. Yellowhorse used a
              sledgehammer or mallet to bludgeon the woman, and

       3.     Mr. Chischilly’s statement that he and Ms. Yellowhorse burned
              the body after the fact. 2

 Appellant’s App’x vol. I, at 142.

       The government argues that the district court applied the wrong test

 by assuming that Mr. Chischilly’s statements about Ms. Yellowhorse’s

 involvement were not self-inculpatory. Ms. Yellowhorse disagrees, adding

 that the excluded parts were also inadmissible because the court shouldn’t

 have found corroboration.

 testify by offering use immunity. But Ms. Yellowhorse doesn’t question
 Mr. Chischilly’s unavailability. So we need not address Ms. Yellowhorse’s
 argument that the government could offer use immunity to Mr. Chischilly.
 Cf. United States v. Lang, 589 F.2d 92, 95–97 (2d Cir. 1978) (stating that a
 declarant was unavailable under Rule 804(b)(3) even if the government
 could have offered use immunity).
 2
       The district court allowed the government to use two other types of
 statements that Mr. Chischilly had made: (1) that he held the woman down
 and (2) that he used a hammer and nail to pin the woman down. The parties
 don’t address the admissibility of these statements.

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 5.    The district court applied the wrong test by treating anything
       about Ms. Yellowhorse’s involvement as outside the hearsay
       exception.

       In addressing the government’s challenge, we consider whether the

 district court abused its discretion. United States v. Smalls, 605 F.3d 765,

 767 (10th Cir. 2010). A district court abuses its discretion by making an

 error of law. Id. at 773.

       A.     Statements incriminating someone else may be self-
              inculpatory.

       Under the hearsay exception, the court considers whether the

 statement inculpates the declarant. Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S.

 594, 599 (1994). To determine whether the statement is self-inculpatory,

 the court must view the context. Id. at 603. For example, the court might

 decline to apply the hearsay exception when the declarant deflects

 responsibility by shifting the blame to a third-party. Id. at 604. But a

 statement might be self-inculpatory when the declarant admits guilt while

 implicating someone else in the crime. See id. at 606 (Scalia, J.,

 concurring) (“A declarant’s statement is not magically transformed from a

 statement against penal interest into one that is inadmissible merely

 because the declarant names another person or implicates a possible

 codefendant.”), quoted with approval in United States v. Smalls, 605 F.3d

 765, 782 (10th Cir. 2010); see also Williamson, 512 U.S. at 603 (majority

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 op.) (illustrating the potential applicability of the hearsay exception to a

 statement that implicates a third-party).

       We addressed this issue in United States v. Smalls, concluding that

 out-of-court statements could be self-inculpatory even though they

 implicated a third-party. 605 F.3d 765, 785–86 (10th Cir. 2010). There the

 declarant was a prisoner who admitted that he, the defendant, and another

 prisoner had participated in the strangulation of another prisoner. Id. at

 768–69. While admitting his participation, the declarant said that he and

 the defendant had held the victim down while the third prisoner suffocated

 the victim with a plastic bag. Id. at 769. We characterized the declarant’s

 statements as self-inculpatory even though they had implicated someone

 else. Id. at 782–86. We noted that the declarant was talking to a fellow

 prisoner, not a law-enforcement official. Id. at 768–72. So we reasoned

 that the declarant was likely not trying to “curry favor with authorities . . .

 or seeking to shift or spread blame to his alleged co-conspirators so as to

 engender more favorable treatment from authorities.” Id. at 783.

       B.     The district court erred by excluding statements just
              because they had incriminated Ms. Yellowhorse.

       The statements by the declarant in Smalls resemble the statements by

 Mr. Chischilly:

       1.     There the declarant made the statements to a fellow prisoner,
              not a law-enforcement officer. 605 F.3d 765, 768–72 (10th Cir.

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              2010). Mr. Chischilly similarly made the reported statements to
              his relatives rather than to law enforcement.

       2.     In Smalls, the declarant said: “We killed [the victim].” Id. at
              784. Mr. Chischilly’s relatives similarly said that he had
              confessed to his role with Ms. Yellowhorse in killing the
              woman and burning her body.

       3.     In Smalls, the declarant stated that he and another individual
              had held the victim while someone else put a bag over the
              victim’s head. Id. at 785. Mr. Chischilly’s relatives similarly
              said that he had confessed to pinning the woman so that Ms.
              Yellowhorse could use a sledgehammer or mallet to inflict the
              beating. See pp. 2–3, above.

       Despite the similarities with Smalls, the district court excluded

  everything that Mr. Chischilly had said about Ms. Yellowhorse’s

  involvement. Under Smalls, however, the court needed to analyze the

  content and context of each statement to determine whether it was self-

  inculpatory. Smalls, 605 F.3d at 780–87. The statement might not be self-

  inculpatory if the declarant had been trying to shift blame. But the district

  court treated anything about Ms. Yellowhorse’s involvement as outside

  the hearsay exception. This approach cannot be squared with Smalls.

       Ms. Yellowhorse argues that the district court properly parsed

 Mr. Chischilly’s statements during the oral argument. There the district

 court expressed concern that Mr. Chischilly’s statements harmed not only

 his interests, but also Ms. Yellowhorse’s. Appellant’s App’x vol. I, at 95.

 After expressing this concern, the court took the matter under advisement.

 Id. at 110. The court later issued a written order, categorically regarding

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 any statement about Ms. Yellowhorse’s involvement as outside the hearsay

 exception: “Therefore, the Government may not offer into evidence the

 portions of Chischilly’s statements to his family members that are non-

 self-inculpatory in that they refer to Yellowhorse’s alleged participation in

 the charged crime.” Id. at 137–38. Given the written explanation for the

 decision, we have little basis to speculate about what the district court

 might have thought during the oral argument. See SEC v. Lincoln Thrift

 Ass’n, 557 F.2d 1274, 1278 n.2 (9th Cir. 1977) (stating that the court of

 appeals should rely on the district court’s written order rather than draw

 inferences from the district court’s comments at an earlier hearing). That

 written explanation erred by straying from the approach we had required in

 Smalls.

 6.    The district court did not clearly err when it found
       corroboration.

       Even when an out-of-court statement is self-inculpatory, the hearsay

 exception applies only when “corroborating circumstances . . . clearly

 indicate . . . trustworthiness.” Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3)(B). The district

 court found corroborating circumstances, but excluded parts of

 Mr. Chischilly’s statements on other grounds. Ms. Yellowhorse urges us to

 affirm even if the district court had otherwise erred, arguing that the

 district court shouldn’t have found corroboration.

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        A.     We apply the clear-error standard when reviewing the
               district court’s finding on corroboration.

        Though Ms. Yellowhorse is the appellee, she’s the challenger with

  respect to the finding on corroboration. To decide her challenge, we must

  apply the standard of review. “[W]hile the ultimate issue of the admission

  or exclusion of evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion,

  preliminary foundational determinations . . . are factual findings, reviewed

  for clear error.” United States v. Alcorta, 853 F.3d 1123, 1137–38 (10th

  Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted).

        The foundational determination here involves corroboration, which is

  primarily a factual question. In similar circumstances, other courts of

  appeals have thus applied the clear-error standard when reviewing findings

  on corroboration. E.g., United States v. Bagley, 537 F.2d 162, 165 (5th Cir.

  1976) (applying the clear-error standard in reviewing a district court’s

  assessment of the trustworthiness of a statement); United States v. Price,

  134 F.3d 340, 348 (6th Cir. 1998) (“[A] trial court’s determination of the

  trustworthiness of an out-of-court statement should be upheld unless the

  finding is clearly erroneous.”); United States v. Henderson, 736 F.3d 1128,

  1130 (7th Cir. 2013) (stating that determinations of trustworthiness, for

  purposes of the hearsay exception, are reviewable for clear error); United

  States v. Cole, 525 F.3d 656, 660 (8th Cir. 2008) (“Whether the

  corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the

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  statement is a question of fact reviewed for clear error.”); United States v.

  Hendrieth, 922 F.2d 748, 750 (11th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (reviewing a

  finding on corroboration under the clear-error standard). We will do the

  same given the factual nature of a finding on corroboration.

        Under the standard for clear error, we reverse only if the finding

  lacks “factual support in the record” or if we are “left with a definite and

  firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” United States v. Craine,

  995 F.3d 1139, 1157 (10th Cir. 2021). We lack such a conviction when the

  factfinder can choose between two permissible views of the evidence.

  Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985).

        B.     The district court didn’t clearly err by finding
               corroboration.

        The district court found corroboration based on the forensic report,

  the existence of a family connection between Mr. Chischilly and the

  witnesses, and the internal consistencies between the relatives’ accounts of

  what Mr. Chischilly had said. The court’s finding reflected a reasonable

  view of the evidence.

        First, the court reasoned that the forensic report had been consistent

  with Mr. Chischilly’s admissions that he held the woman down, used nails

  to keep her down, and burned the body after the killing. Ms. Yellowhorse

  argues that the forensic report didn’t show bludgeoning of the woman’s

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  head. But the forensic examiner didn’t have most of the woman’s facial

  bones.

        Though the forensic examiner couldn’t examine most of the facial

  bones, her report noted charring of the woman’s skeleton and a hole in the

  skull. The district court could reasonably infer that

             Mr. Chischilly had created the hole by using nails to keep the
              woman down and

             the charring resulted when Mr. Chischilly burned the body.

        Second, the district court relied on a family connection between

  Mr. Chischilly and the witnesses. This family connection led the district

  court to infer that Mr. Chischilly had likely been telling the truth.

        Ms. Yellowhorse downplays the relatives’ credibility. The court

  didn’t have to credit the relatives’ account. But Ms. Yellowhorse doesn’t

  say why the relatives would finger Mr. Chischilly with a fictitious

  confession. 3

        Third, the district court reasoned that the relatives had been

  consistent about what Mr. Chischilly had said. Ms. Yellowhorse doesn’t

  question the consistency of the relatives’ accounts; she instead points out

  that Mr. Chischilly later recanted what he had told his relatives. But the

  3
       In district court, Ms. Yellowhorse argued that the relatives should
  have known that Mr. Chischilly was capable of murder. But Ms.
  Yellowhorse doesn’t renew this argument on appeal.

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  court could reasonably put greater weight on Mr. Chischilly’s confession

  to his relatives. At the time, the relatives had little reason to suspect

  Mr. Chischilly. So the district court could reasonably infer that

  Mr. Chischilly had

             confessed solely to relieve his guilty conscience and

             recanted to soften the punishment because he was then facing a
              murder charge.

        Because the district court acted reasonably in interpreting the

  record, 4 we don’t regard the finding on corroboration as clearly erroneous.

  7.    We remand for the district court to reconsider the applicability of
        the hearsay exception.

        Because the district court applied the wrong test, we reverse the

  court’s exclusion of any statements implicating Ms. Yellowhorse. But we

  must decide whether to go further.

  4
       The record supplies three other plausible reasons to find
  corroboration:

        1.    Mr. Chischilly confessed not only to his relatives but also to a
              fellow inmate.

        2.    Ms. Yellowhorse complained to Mr. Chischilly that he
              shouldn’t have disclosed what they had done.

        3.    Ms. Yellowhorse told her stepmother that she had hurt
              someone.

  But the district court didn’t rely on these reasons.

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        The government asks us to instruct the district court that all of the

  disputed statements fall within the hearsay exception. For this request, the

  government relies on the similarity of Mr. Chischilly’s alleged statements

  to the statements that we addressed in Smalls. But in Smalls, we remanded

  for the district court to reconsider admissibility; we didn’t decide

  admissibility in the first instance. United States v. Smalls, 605 F.3d 765,

  786 (10th Cir. 2010). We take the same approach here, remanding for the

  district court to reconsider the admissibility of Mr. Chischilly’s statements

  to his relatives. On remand, the district court should revisit whether

  Mr. Chischilly’s statements were self-inculpatory even though they

  incriminated Ms. Yellowhorse. 5

  5
         In a heading, Ms. Yellowhorse states that introduction of the
  disputed statements would violate her right to due process. She doesn’t
  develop this statement into a distinct argument. See Sierra Club v. Bostick,
  787 F.3d 1043, 1060 n.18 (10th Cir. 2015) (stating that the petitioner
  waived an argument by failing to develop it beyond a heading); see also
  United States v. Beckstead, 500 F.3d 1154, 1164–65 (10th Cir. 2007)
  (stating that two section headings, a single sentence, and two phrases don’t
  constitute adequate development of an argument). So we don’t consider
  Ms. Yellowhorse’s undeveloped reference to due process.

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