Court Opinion

ID: 9700853
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 21:51:11.686965+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:15.232271
License: Public Domain

Cavanagh, C.J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I concur with the majority’s conclusion that neither the United States nor the Michigan Constitution barred the subsequent prosecutions of the defendants.1 Furthermore, I agree that upon a proper conviction, the double jeopardy clause would compel vacating the defendants’ convictions arising from the first trial.2 I write separately, however, because I would hold that the prosecutor failed to present sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants proximately caused the victim’s death.
I
At the close of the state’s proofs, both defendants unsuccessfully moved for a directed verdict. In the Court of Appeals, defendant Harding *736claimed that his conviction for felony murder was against the great weight of the evidence. The Court of Appeals denied appellate review of this issue because Harding failed to preserve the issue by moving for a new trial.3 The Court of Appeals, nevertheless, addressed whether the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction, and concluded that the prosecution fulfilled its burden. 187 Mich App 316, 329-330; 466 NW2d 736 (1991). On appeal to this Court, Harding challenges the Court of Appeals determination.
A
This Court announced the standard for determining whether the prosecution has introduced sufficient evidence to avoid a directed verdict in People v Hampton, 407 Mich 354, 368; 285 NW2d 284 (1979):
[T]he trial judge when ruling on a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal must consider the evidence presented by the prosecution up to the time the motion is made, view that evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, and determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. [Emphasis . added, citations omitted.]
When the Court disposed of the common-law year-and-a-day rule, it specifically noted that abrogation of the rule did not diminish the prosecutor’s burden.
Of course, abolition of the rule would not relieve *737the prosecution of its duty to prove all of the elements of the crime, including proximate causation, beyond á reasonable doubt. A murder conviction which rests upon uncertain medical speculation as to the cause of death is not a case which has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Fears about murder convictions for death 5, 10 or even 20 years after the injury are therefore unfounded where proximate cause is proven beyond a reasonable doubt. If such proof is available, the conviction is justified. [People v Stevenson, 416 Mich 383, 392-393; 331 NW2d 143 (1982).]
In order to secure a felony murder conviction, the state must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendants’ acts proximately caused the victim’s death. Obviously, if Mr. Dudley would have died in the sewer or later at the hospital, proximate or legal causation would not present a problem. However, the case at bar is problematic because almost four and one-half years had passed between the assault and the victim’s death. During this time Mr. Dudley returned to steady employment, married, fathered a child, and resumed a seminormal life. Furthermore, Mr. Dudley’s death followed his participation in ninety minutes of strenuous physical activity and a physical altercation, activities which Mr. Dudley knew were forbidden. The relevant question is whether any of these events constitute a superseding cause that negates proximate cause.
The proximate cause standard requires a sufficient causal connection between the defendant’s conduct and the result of that conduct. "[I]t [must] appear[] that the death resulted as the natural, direct, and necessary result of the unlawful act . . . .” People v Barnes, 182 Mich 179, 196; *738148 NW 400 (1914). See also LaFave & Scott, Criminal Law (2d ed), § 3.12, p 279. As evidenced by our criminal jury instructions,4 the criminal standard for proximate cause requires a more direct causal connection than the tort concept of proximate cause. A more demanding standard is warranted because the potential deprivation of personal rights is obviously much more extreme in criminal, as opposed to tort, actions.5
*739B
A review of the medical evidence reveals the following:
1. A bullet, shot by defendant Bush, lacerated Mr. Dudley’s heart. Dr. Kaplan performed emergency surgery. Dr. Kaplan reported that Mr. Dudley was eventually discharged in good condition.
2. There are two types of heart failure. One is chronic heart failure, a continued, progressive disease of the heart. Chronic heart failure is evidenced by edema or swelling of the heart, as well as thickening of the ankles, and fluid in the lungs. The autopsy of Mr. Dudley did not show signs indicative of chronic heart failure. The other type of heart failure is acute, or sudden, heart failure.
3. Dr. Kanluen, the medical examiner who performed the autopsy, opined that Mr. Dudley’s death was due to an acute heart attack, which was the consequence of the permanent damage to the heart from the previous gunshot wound.
4. Dr. Petinga concluded that the cause of . death was acute congestive heart failure caused by the gunshot wound.
5. Dr. Kanluen failed to perform a full examination of Mr. Dudley’s brain. The results from the missing examination may have supported the defendants’ theory of brain death.
On the basis of the testimony, a rational trier of fact could have concluded, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the initial attack contributed to the victim’s death. But for the gunshot wound, Mr. Dudley would not have died. The problem with *740this conclusion, however, is that this is not evidence of proximate cause, but actual cause.6 Thus, the Court of Appeals conclusion that the required proof of proximate cause was established because the medical testimony was sufficient to establish the cause of death was erroneous. The medical testimony proved actual cause. The question regarding proximate cause remains.
C
Intervening or superseding causes negate proximate cause. A series of events, immediately preceding Mr. Dudley’s death, are relevant to the proximate cause inquiry.
Mr. Dudley’s testimony acknowledged the limitations his doctor placed on his physical activities. Yet he chose to disregard his doctor’s instructions.7 The events that transpired immediately before his death evidenced Mr. Dudley’s deviation from his recommended lifestyle:
. 1. Mr. Dudley participated in a game of two-on-two basketball for ninety minutes. The other participants were young men in good health.
2. Despite experiencing shortness of breath and tiredness during the basketball game, Mr. Dudley continued to play following a brief break.
3. The disclosed wager between two of the players, as well as the testimony of the wit*741nesses, revealed that this was not a slow leisurely game but a game of elevated competition.
4. Following the game, Mr. Dudley initiated a fight with his eighteen-year-old brother-in-law. Mr. Dudley swung at his brother-in-law, Monte, because of his mistaken belief that Monte had hit Mrs. Dudley. After Monte hit Mr. Dudley in the nose, Mr. Dudley chased after Monte, leaping on him. When the two men hit the ground, Mr. Dudley landed underneath Monte, who weighed between 165 and 170 pounds. Another man joined in the fight, placing Mr. Dudley under the weight of two grown men. Monte testified to striking the victim while he was on the ground. The altercation continued for three to five minutes, ending when Mr. Dudley began to convulse.
The victim was advised not to participate in strenuous activity. Nevertheless, he played basketball for ninety minutes. The victim also initiated a physical altercation, leaving him pinned beneath two grown men. Mr. Dudley’s disregard for his recommended physical activities is a superseding cause, negating proximate cause.8
If a wounds b with the intent to kill, but thereafter c shoots b with intent to kill and does kill him instantly, we know that a is not the cause of b’s death. If, instead, b takes his own life, we again have a deliberate act directed- toward killing b which was intervened, so one might expect the same result. Such a result is certainly appropriate when b commits suicide from some motive uncon*742nected with the fact that he is wounded, but suicide is not abnormal when b acts out of the extreme pain of wounds inflicted by a or when the wound has rendered him irresponsible. [LaFave & Scott, supra, § 3.12(f)(4), p 290.]
The prosecutor’s proofs do not reveal a victim who was so distraught as a result of his injuries or resulting limitations that he committed suicide. Instead, the victim returned to steady employment, married, fathered a child and resumed a seminormal life. Mr. Dudley, fully aware of his limitations, participated in strenuous physical activities. Furthermore, he failed to slow down when he began to experience shortness of breath and tiredness. While unfortunate, the victim, by participating in activities that would be taxing to a healthy individual, proximately caused his own demise.
Mr. Dudley acted contrary to his physician’s orders. His participation in a ninety-minute game of basketball and a fistfight was certainly not motivated by his assault over four years earlier. The autopsy revealed that Mr. Dudley did not die because of a chronic, progressive heart condition, but because of acute or sudden heart failure. When reviewing this fact, along with the forbidden physical activities that immediately preceded his death, I am convinced that the prosecutor failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants’ acts were the proximate cause of Mr. Dudley’s death. The intervening factors, as chronicled above, proximately caused Mr. Dudley’s death.
II
On the basis of the evidence and the intervening events negating proximate cause, I would hold that the prosecutor failed to prove all the elements *743of felony murder beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, I would vacate the Court of Appeals action in its entirety,9 and reverse the defendants’ convictions of felony murder and Bush’s accompanying conviction of felony-firearm.
Levin, J., concurred with Cavanagh, C.J.

 Ante, part II(A).

 Ante, parts II(b), III and IV.

 See People v Powers, 272 Mich 303, 310; 261 NW 543 (1935).

 Following CJI 16:1:01 and CJI 16:1:04, Judge Kuhn instructed the juries regarding the criminal standard for proximate cause:
In order to find that the death was caused by the defendant, you must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the death of the decedent was the natural or necessary result of the act of the defendant.
Unlike civil cases, it is not enough that the defendant’s act made it possible for death to occur.
There may be more than one cause of death. Before a person can be found guilty of having caused a death, the evidence must convince you beyond a reasonable doubt that the death of the decedent was the natural or necessary result of the act of the defendant.
You must consider any negligence on the part of the deceased in determining whether the defendant was at all responsible.
The more demanding standard is likewise evidenced by the Michigan Criminal Jury Instructions, 2d ed. See CJI2d 16.15.

 The criminal standard for proximate cause applies in both involuntary manslaughter and murder cases. The Pennsylvania court in Commonwealth v Root, 403 Pa 571, 575; 170 A2d 310 (1961), persuasively reasoned:
[T]he distinction between murder and involuntary manslaughter does not rest upon a differentiation in causation; it lies in the state of mind of the offender. If one kills with malice aforethought, he is chargeable with murder; and if death, though unintentional, results directly from his unlawful or reckless conduct, he is chargeable with involuntary manslaughter. In either event, the accused is not guilty unless his conduct was a cause of death sufficiently direct as to meet the requirements of the criminal, and not the tort, law. [Emphasis in original.]

 For actual cause, "it is almost always sufficient . . . that 'but for’ the antecedent conduct the result would not have occurred.” LaFave & Scott, supra, § 3.12(b), p 279.

 As the majority noted: Gladys Dudley testified that in 1986 her son " 'could tell that he wasn’t improving and he decided that whatever he did he had to live as normal a life as possible . . . .’” Ante, p 697, n 4.

 This position is consistent with the testimony of Dr. Lee, Mr. Dudley’s cardiologist. Dr. Lee characterized Mr. Dudley’s participation in the forbidden acts as commensurate with suicide.

 While defendant Harding failed to raise a sufficiency of the evidence argument on appeal, I would nevertheless grant him relief to avoid a miscarriage of justice. See Napier v Jacobs, 429 Mich 222, 234-235; 414 NW2d 862 (1987).