Court Opinion

ID: 9832416
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 21:53:43.384696+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:46.620725
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Appellant’s motion for rehearing largely repeats the arguments and authorities presented in its written argument filed in reply to appellees’ motion to dismiss. We read carefully all the authorities therein cited before announcing our opinion. We have been unable to find any other than the two cases cited by appellant. Morris v. Morris, 60 Mo. App. 86, and Hades v. Trowbridge, 76 P. 714, 143 Cal. 25, wherein the trial court had of his own motion granted a new trial. Neither of these is, however, parallel to the case at bar. The Missouri statute, under which the Morris Case was decided, authorized an appeal from “any order granting a new trial, or in arrest of judgment, etc.” See Ess v. Griffith, 30 S. W. 345, 328 Mo. 50, 3 C. J. 507, note 60, for statute. That statute is obviously broader in its scope than the Texas statute. ,
Under the California statute, governing Eades v. Trowbridge, the trial court was expressly authorized to vacate the jury’s verdict and grant a new trial on his own motion, under certain circumstances therein stated; and an appeal was authorized from “an order granting or refusing a new trial.” In.neither of these statutes was the term “motion for a new trial” used. And in none of the statutes of other states authorizing appeals from orders other than final judgments have we found such limitation as that contained in our statute.
Appellant earnestly insists, however, that the amendment in question is remedial in its nature, as evidenced by the emergency clause, and that it should be given a liberal construction, citing 2 R. O. L. pp. 29, 46, 100; 3 C. J. 505; Shelton v. Wade, 4 Tex. 148, 58 Am. Dec. 722; Stone v. Hill, 10 S. W. 665, 72 Tex. 540; Anderson v. Neighbors, 59 S. W. 543, 94 Tex. 236. The emergency clause of the amending act reads as follows;
“The fact that injustice is done in numerous cases by the erroneous granting of new trials creates an emergency, etc.”
Emergency clauses on bills, however, are not added for the purpose of clarifying or declaring the intention of the Legislature, nor to explain the express language of the act; but only for the purpose of setting forth the reasons for the suspension of the constitutional rule requiring the bill to be read on three separate days, and for putting into immediate effect such act, whatever be its scope and terms.
Nor do we think applicable here the rule laid down in 2 R. O. L. § 73, p. 100. That rule of construction relates to the methods of procedure in perfecting appeals, and not to the right of appeal. It has always been the policy of the courts to construe such statutes liberally.
But even if the amendment in question was intended to be remedial, it is, nevertheless, an exception to the general statute authorizing appeals from final judgments only, and must be construed as such. If the Leg-*328Mature liad meant to authorize an appeal from orders other than those “granting motions for new trials,” it could easily .have said so. Not having done so, we must conclude that no such appeals were intended to be authorized.
We considered all these matters and the authorities cited by appellant in, passing on this case originally, but did not deem it necessary to discuss them. We have seen fit to add this, however, because of appellant’s motion. The motion is overruled.
Overruled.