Court Opinion

ID: 9442568
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 18:51:55.58618+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:29:08.308844
License: Public Domain

PICKETT, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
Section 341 of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938 1 gives the Federal Security Administrator authority tO' promulgate regulations fixing and establishing for any food a reasonable definition and standard of identity. The government’s position in this case is that “irrespective of what an article of food may consist or the nature of its labeling,” it violates the Act “if it purports to be a food for which a definition and standard of identity * * * has-been prescribed and does not conform thereto.” It says “the fact that the article may or may not be an imitation, or labeled as-such, has no bearing * * * upon the question as to whether or not it violates-Section 343(g).” It frankly stated to the-court that the purpose of this libel was to-establish a principle which would bar from interstate trade all substandard or imitation foods regardless of the label if they purported to be foods for which standards had been prescribed. It construed the word “pur*1019port” to mean any food which looks and tastes like and is sold and used for the same purpose as that food for which standards are fixed.
If the Government’s construction of the statute is correct, then no form of label would permit entry of the seized product into the channels of interstate trade. If its sale is permitted under any form of label it would still look and taste like standard jam, it would be sold and used for the same purpose as standard jam, it would still be purchased and served as jam by hotels and restaurants, it would still be purchased and ■used as jam by ranchers, logging camps and large families looking for a cheaper but nutritious and wholesome food. To me ■there is no middle ground; we either accept or reject the government’s position. If the product is permitted to be sold under some descriptive label or by a distinctive name, although not meeting the standards, •the same objections will be advanced as they were to the “Bred Spred” case. U. S. v. Ten Cases, more or less, Bred Spred, 8 Cir., 49 F.2d 87.2
It is clear to me that the very purpose of Section 343(c) 3 is to permit on the market a wholesome and nutritious food which is within the means of a great mass of our people who are unable to purchase the standard products. At the time the bill was being considered by Congress, the Food and Drug Administration so recognized the necessity for such products.4 Senator Copeland who sponsored the bill recognized the right to sell substandard foods, said, “It should be noted that the operation of this provision will in no way interfere with the marketing of any food which is wholesome but which does not meet the definition and standard, or for which no definition and standard has been provided.” Dunn, Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, page 246. The administrator construed the Act to permit a substandard article to be labeled *1020as an “imitation” at least as late as 1941 and took no different view until 1945. Kleinfeld & Dunn, Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act 1938-1949, pp. 627, 712. Until this action was brought the label on products of the claimant was never questioned by the Administrator, in fact it is the label suggested by him. He does not question its sufficiency now. It was designed to meet the requirements of 343(c) by showing that the product did not meet the standards but was an imitation. No other word or combination of words in the English language could be used which would so well call to the attention of the purchasing public the fact that the labeled food was not a standard product. It is a word of common usage and understanding. Webster defines it to mean: “the form of something regarded as a pattern or model * * * an artificial likeness * * * simulating something superior, esp. something more costly.” Necessarily any imitation would have the appearance of that which it imitates. In this case the jam did look and taste like that which meets the prescribed standard but it is labeled “imitation” in the manner required by the statute. If the section is not given this construction it is meaningless.
The government relies strongly upon the Quaker Oats decision in the Supreme 'Court5 and the Catsup case in the Second Circuit.6 These cases involved foods which were being sold as standard products. Each recognized that informative labeling could be used “where the food did not purport to comply with a standard.”
A large portion of the food consumed today comes within the provisions of the Act. To sustain the government’s position here gives the Federal Security Administrator absolute control over the ingredients of all such foods. He will have the right to standardize the same, which will mean virtually a standardization of the price. It will remove from the market a nutritious and wholesome food which sells for approximately one-half the price of the standard product. The purchasing public, regardless of their ability to pay, will be forced to purchase the same quality of food. I cannot believe Congress had any such, intent. I would affirm the trial court.

. Title 21 U.S.C.A. § 341.

. The distinctive name provision was left out of the 1938 Act because of this and similar decisions. H. Rep. No. 2139, 75th Cong. 3 Sess., p. 5.

. Title 21 U.S.C.A. § 343(c): “If it is an imitation of another food, unless its label bears, in type of uniform size and prominence, the word ‘imitation’ and, immediately thereafter, the name of the food imitated.”

. Walter 6. Campbell, Chief of the Food ■ and Drug Administration, testifying be- • fore a subcommittee in the House of Representatives in connection with this identical type of product, said:
“Blr. Kenney. What is the other ingredients besides the fruit?
“Mr. Campbell. There is fruit, sugar, and pectinous material acquired from fruit, which is just a gelatinizing agent, that enables you to incorporate large quantities of water, all in lieu of the one-fourth amount of fruit deficient in that product as compared with the standard preserve. So that water and pectin have been substituted. * * *
“Mr. Chapman. What effect would the provision of Senate 5 have on the manufacture and sale of a product like that?
“Mr. Campbell. Senate 5 provides for standards. That product would be a substandard article and its marketing as a preserve would be proscribed.
“Mr. Chapman. That would be shown on the label?
“Mr. Campbell. It would have to be shown on the label just what it was, and enable the consumer to buy it for what it was.
“There can be no objection to the philosophy that any article that is wholesome and has food value and is sold for what it is, without deception, should be permitted the channels of commerce. There can be no objection to that article with its deficiency of fruit if every consumer knows exactly what he is buying.
“There can be no objection to the sale of skimmed milk if the buyer knows that it is skimmed milk when he is buying it.
“Mr. Chapman. It contains no injurious ingredient?
“Mr. Campbell. It contains no injurious ingredient. But the point that it illustrates, Mr. Chairman, is that the distinctive trade name proviso, which I read to you in the present act, offers a means by which a complete circumvention of the requirements of that law can be effected.
“S.5 is silent on distinctive names. It eliminates that particular provision which, as I said, is a sin of commission.” Hearing before a Subcommittee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, House of Representatives, 74th Congress, 1st Session, H.R. 6906, H.R. 8805, H.R. 8941 and S. 5.
Dunn, Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, page 1239.

. Federal Security Administrator v. Quaker Oats Co., 318 U.S. 218, 63 S.Ct. 589, 596, 87 L.Ed. 724, 158 A.L.R. 832.

. Libby, McNeill & Libby v. U. S., 2 Cir., 148 F.2d 71.