Court Opinion

ID: 9382736
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-28 16:11:35.678272+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:41.280434
License: Public Domain

J-S45018-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                            :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                            :
              v.                            :
                                            :
                                            :
 JONATHAN AYALA                             :
                                            :
                     Appellant              :   No. 1905 EDA 2021

          Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered September 13, 2021
            In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
             Criminal Division at No: CP-51-CR-0005085-2012

BEFORE: OLSON, J., STABILE, J., and MURRAY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.:                             FILED MARCH 28, 2023

      Appellant, Jonathan Ayala, appeals from the September 13, 2021 order

entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, denying his

petition for collateral relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act

(“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. Appellant contends the PCRA court

erred by denying him relief in light of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness for failing

to file a post-sentence motion based on weight of the evidence, for failing to

conduct proper pre-trial investigation, for failing to object to the trial judge’s

decision to close the courtroom during trial, and for failing to seek

reconsideration of Appellant’s sentence. Upon review, we affirm.

      Following trial in January 2015, Appellant was convicted of various

offenses, including attempted murder, conspiracy to commit murder, and

aggravated assault. He was sentenced to an aggregate term of 30 to 60 years
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in prison, followed by 15 years’ probation.          He did not file post-sentence

motions. On December 20, 2016, we affirmed his judgment of sentence. After

reinstatement of his appeal rights, Appellant filed a petition for allowance of

appeal nunc pro tunc, which our Supreme Court denied on October 18, 2019.

        On August 3, 2020, Appellant filed a timely pro se PCRA petition.

Counsel was appointed and filed an amended petition. The PCRA court issued

a notice of intent to dismiss the petition in accordance with Pa.R.Crim.P. 907

and subsequently dismissed the petition on September 13, 2021. This timely

appeal followed. Both Appellant and the PCRA court complied with Pa.R.A.P.

1925.

        Appellant presents four issues for our consideration:

        A. Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a post-trial motion
           that the verdict was against the weight of evidence.

        B. Trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by
           failing to conduct a proper pre-trial investigation which would
           have uncovered available exculpatory evidence.

        C. Trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object
           to the judge’s decision to close the courtroom.

        D. Trial counsel provided ineffective assistance for failing to file a
           motion for reconsideration of sentence.

Appellant’s Brief at 8.1
____________________________________________

1In his brief, Appellant suggests the PCRA court erred by failing to conduct
an evidentiary hearing before dismissing his petition. See Appellant’s Brief at
16-17. However, Appellant does not identify this issue in his statement of
questions presented for review, nor is it fairly suggested by the questions he
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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       The PCRA court summarized the underlying facts of this case as follows:

       On September 3, 2011, Philadelphia Police Officer Howard Lee was
       sitting inside his patrol car outside 4210 Whitaker Avenue in the
       city and county of Philadelphia. At that time, Officer Lee heard
       gunfire coming from the rear of a night club named Casa De
       España, which was situated at that location. Officer Lee exited his
       vehicle and ran to the rear of the club. [Officer Lee heard more
       gun shots and saw numerous people running from the rear parking
       lot while screaming that the shots were coming from the rear of
       the club. Based on information learned from one of those
       individuals, Jose Pagan, Officer Lee went to a driveway leading
       onto Hunting Park Avenue where he saw a dark-colored car
       leaving the driveway at a high rate of speed.] Officer Lee notified
       police radio of the description of the car and its direction of travel.
       After the vehicle sped away, Officer Lee returned to the rear of
       the club to secure the crime scene. Upon his return, he observed
       Edwin Santana, with blood visible on his clothing covering his
       abdomen, outside the club. Officer Lee later gave a statement to
       police detectives detailing his activities that evening.

       Police Officer Anthony Sampson was driving his patrol car
       eastbound on Whitaker Avenue at or about the time of the incident
       when he received a radio call informing him that shots had been
       fired at Whitaker and Hunting Park Avenues. He immediately
       proceeded to that location and upon arrival, he heard people
       screaming that there had been a shooting and three persons had
       been shot. Officer Sampson also observed a car traveling west on
       Hunting Park Avenue at a high rate of speed. The Officer made a
       u-turn after hearing several by-standers yell, “That’s the car.
       That’s the black car—an Acura.”     Officer Sampson, along with
       several other officers, pursued the vehicle. At one point, the
       driver of the car being pursued stopped briefly at Front and
____________________________________________

identified. Therefore, we shall not consider it. See Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a), which
provides in pertinent part, “No question will be considered unless it is stated
in the statement of questions involved or is fairly suggested thereby.”
Regardless, the right to an evidentiary hearing is not absolute and “[i]t is
within the PCRA court’s discretion to decline to hold a hearing if the petitioner’s
claim is patently frivolous and has no support either in the record or other
evidence.” Commonwealth v. Wah, 42 A.3d 335, 338 (Pa. Super. 2012)
(citations omitted).

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     Luzerne Streets but then sped away when Officer Sampson
     stepped out of his vehicle. Police finally stopped the vehicle when
     it crashed into a pole during the pursuit in the 4000 block of Front
     Street after a ten block high speed chase.

     [Santana, who suffered multiple gunshot wounds, was taken to a
     nearby hospital for treatment. While there, he gave a statement
     to Philadelphia Police Detective James Perfidio, indicating that he
     had been in an altercation inside the club that spilled outside
     where he was approached by two individuals, one of whom shot
     him.] In his statement, Santana gave a description of the two
     males, the guns they used, and said that they fled in a black
     vehicle he believed was a Honda down Whitaker Avenue to
     Hunting Park Avenue. At trial, Santana completely disavowed
     having given the statement stating that he was high when he was
     shot and when he was interviewed by police. Detective [Perfidio]
     testified that Santana was awake and alert, did not appear to be
     under the influence, and that he signed his statements. He added
     that he recorded Santana’s responses verbatim.             Santana
     described his assailants as follows: One was a short Hispanic male
     with long braids wearing a blue shirt. The second guy was 5’11”,
     Hispanic male, with short braids and a turquoise shirt.

     Pagan was present when the shooting occurred. He related that
     he was inside the club with Santana, an acquaintance he knew as
     Chio, who got into a fight with a male after the male and Santana’s
     girlfriend became involved in a dispute. After the fight, Pagan told
     Santana to leave because the person Santana fought with had
     been escorted from the club and he did not know who he was.
     Pagan and Santana then left the club to smoke a cigarette. When
     they got outside, two men approached from behind the building
     armed with a handguns. When Santana saw the two men, he told
     one of them to put his gun down and fight him “like a man.” The
     men did not put down the guns but instead began firing at
     Santana. When they stopped shooting, the two males walked
     behind the building after [which] Pagan saw a dark sporty Honda
     speed out of the lot.

     Shortly after the shooting, police transported Pagan to the location
     where the fleeing vehicle had crashed. Pagan identified the
     vehicle as the one he saw drive from the lot and told police that
     the two males police had in custody were the males he saw shoot
     Santana. Pagan also gave police a statement describing the
     person who shot Santana as having on a teal shirt with his hair in

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       braids. Pagan, however, could not identify where each individual
       was seated in the vehicle because they were already outside when
       he was brought to the location to identify them.

       Police Sergeant David Pinkerton participated in the pursuit of the
       vehicle and prevented it from leaving after it became disabled.
       Sgt. Pinkerton approached the vehicle and observed its driver,
       later identified as [Appellant’s] Co-defendant, who had braids and
       was wearing a teal greenish colored shirt, climbing from the
       driver’s seat into the rear seat. Sgt. Pinkerton immediately placed
       Co-defendant in custody as other officers apprehended the front
       seat passenger, Appellant, who also was wearing a teal greenish
       colored shirt. The sergeant then secured the vehicle for later
       examination. As he did so he observed a black automatic handgun
       behind the driver’s seat. The gun was secured and found empty
       of ammunition. Sgt. Pinkerton was present when Pagan arrived
       at the scene to identify Appellant and Co-defendant. Although the
       sergeant could not hear what Pagan said, he observed him
       shaking his head “yes” while pointing to Appellant, Co-defendant,
       and the vehicle.       After Pagan identified Appellant and Co-
       defendant, Sgt. Pinkerton retraced the route of the pursuit. While
       doing so, he recovered a Glock in the general area where the . . .
       vehicle struck a utility pole as it fled police. He conceded that
       during the pursuit, he did not see the gun thrown from the vehicle.

       Police obtained a search warrant for the vehicle. Upon executing
       the warrant, they seized the handgun, a .45 caliber Colt MK4, from
       the backseat. They also collected the Glock received by Sgt.
       Pinkerton on the highway as well as ten .45 caliber fired cartridge
       cases and a projectile in the rear parking lot of the club. Police
       observed bullet holes in the door of the club and recovered a bullet
       fragment inside the club.       The ballistic evidence was later
       examined by Police Firearms Examiner Ann Marie Barnes. Her
       examination revealed that the ten (10) fired cartridge cases and
       the spent projectile had been fired from the Colt .45 recovered
       from the rear of the vehicle.

PCRA Court Opinion, 5/5/22, at 1-5.2
____________________________________________

2 The factual summary provided by the PCRA court is consistent with the trial
court’s summary as set forth in its January 21, 2016 opinion and adopted by
this Court on direct appeal. See Commonwealth v. Ayala, No. 1313 EDA
2015, unpublished memorandum at 1-5 (Pa. Super. filed December 20, 2016).

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      As this Court has explained:

      When reviewing the propriety of an order pertaining to PCRA
      relief, we consider the record in the light most favorable to the
      prevailing party at the PCRA level. This Court is limited to
      determining whether the evidence of record supports the
      conclusions of the PCRA court and whether the ruling is free of
      legal error. We grant great deference to the PCRA court’s findings
      that are supported in the record and will not disturb them unless
      they have no support in the certified record. However, we afford
      no such deference to the post-conviction court’s legal conclusions.
      We thus apply a de novo standard of review to the PCRA [c]ourt’s
      legal conclusions.

Commonwealth v. Diaz, 183 A.3d 417, 421 (Pa. Super. 2018).

      In each of his four issues, Appellant contends trial counsel was

ineffective.

      [T]o prove counsel ineffective, the petitioner must show that: (1)
      his underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) counsel had no
      reasonable basis for his action or inaction; and (3) the petitioner
      suffered actual prejudice as a result. If a petitioner fails to prove
      any of these prongs, his claim fails.

Commonwealth v. Spotz, 84 A.3d 294, 311 (Pa. 2014) (internal citations

and quotations omitted).    See also Commonwealth v. Pierce, 527 A.2d

973, 975 (Pa. 1987).

      To prevail on a claim of trial counsel ineffectiveness, “a petitioner must

prove the existence of an arguable meritorious underlying claim, unreasonably

deficient performance, and prejudice.”      Commonwealth Brief at 8 (citing

Commonwealth v. Cox, 983 A.2d 666, 678 (Pa. 2009) and Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)). “By definition, counsel cannot be found

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ineffective for failing to raise a claim that lacks merit.” Id. (citing, inter alia,

Commonwealth v. Jones, 912 A.2d 268, 278 (Pa. 2006)).

      In his first issue, Appellant argues trial counsel was ineffective for failing

to file a post-sentence motion claiming the verdict was against the weight of

the evidence. In its Rule 1925(a) opinion on direct appeal, the trial court

recognized that a weight of the evidence claim must be raised in a post-

sentence motion, by a written motion before sentencing, or orally prior to

sentencing. Trial Court Opinion, 1/31/16, at 12 (citing Commonwealth v.

Lofton, 57 A.3d 1270, 1273 (Pa. Super. 2012)). Failure to preserve the claim

results in waiver. Id.

      Although the trial court recognized that the issue was not preserved and

was therefore waived on direct appeal, the court explained that no relief would

be due, even if the issue had been preserved. As the court explained:

      Accepting for the sake of argument that the sergeant’s testimony
      contradicted testimony given by other witnesses, the verdicts do
      not shock the conscience because the evidence showed that
      Appellant[ and his co-defendant] were positively identified as
      having jointly participated in the attack on the victim Santana.
      This evidence coupled with the evidence showing that Appellant[
      and his co-defendant] were both inside the fleeing vehicle seen
      speeding from the scene from which police seized weapons
      conclusively establishing that they were fired at the scene of the
      incident supports the jury’s verdict. The evidence of guilt in this
      case was frankly overwhelming.

Trial Court Opinion, 1/31/16, at 12.

      The PCRA court acknowledged that “[a] challenge to the weight of the

evidence is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court.” PCRA Court

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Opinion, 5/5/22, at 6 (citing Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745,

751-52 (Pa. 2000)). Further, “[t]he weight of the evidence is exclusively for

the finder of fact, who is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence and

to determine the credibility of the witnesses.” Id. (citing Commonwealth v.

Johnson, 668 A.2d 97, 101 (Pa. 1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 827 (1996)).

       In its brief, Commonwealth recognizes that “the trial court may award

relief [on a weight of the evidence claim] only when the jury’s verdict is so

contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice and the award of

a new trial is imperative so that right may be given another opportunity to

prevail.” Commonwealth Brief at 7 (quoting Commonwealth v. Clemons,

200 A.3d 441, 463 (Pa. 2019) (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted)). Here, the trial court’s statements, while dicta, establish that the

trial court found the evidence of guilt overwhelming,3 refuting any contention

that the court’s sense of justice was shocked or that a post-sentence motion

based on weight of the evidence, if one had been presented to the trial court,

would have been granted.

       The PCRA court determined that Appellant’s weight of evidence claim

lacked arguable merit.4 PCRA Court Opinion, 5/5/22, at 7. We find no error

____________________________________________

3The PCRA court reached a similar determination regarding evidence of guilt,
noting that “[t]he evidence presented at trial was extremely compelling.”
PCRA Court Opinion, 5/5/22, at 7.

4 The court also concluded that Appellant failed to satisfy the prejudice
requirement of the Pierce test. See PCRA Court Opinion, 5/5/22, at 7.

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in that conclusion. Because failure to prove any prong of the ineffectiveness

test defeats the claim, see Spotz, 84 A.3d at 311, Appellant’s first claim fails.

      In his second issue, Appellant contends that trial counsel failed to

conduct a proper pre-trial investigation that would have uncovered available

exculpatory evidence.     “Specifically, Appellant alleges there was a police

officer at the scene that would have provided exculpatory evidence had he

been investigated.” PCRA Court Opinion, 5/5/22, at 7. However, Appellant

fails to identify the officer, fails to provide an affidavit, fails to explain the

exculpatory testimony the unnamed officer would have provided, and fails to

provide evidence that the individual was willing or able to appear.

      More importantly, in the course of a colloquy during trial, Appellant

stated that he did not intend to testify, that he was neither forced nor

threatened to make that decision, and that he made the decision of his own

free will.   Notes of Testimony, Trial, 1/26/15, at 14-15.         The following

exchanges then took place:

      THE COURT: I have been advised by counsel you do not intend
      to call any witnesses, including character witnesses to testify on
      your behalf; is that correct?

      APPELLANT: Yes.

      THE COURT:       Have you spoken with your attorney about that
      decision?

      APPELLANT: Yes.

      THE COURT: Are you satisfied with the representation of your
      attorney?

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     APPELLANT: Yes.

     THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

     TRIAL COUNSEL: May I ask one more question of Mr. Ayala. Mr.
     Ayala, at any time have you provided me with the names of
     any witnesses that you wanted to call in your trial that we
     have not?

     APPELLANT: No.

Id. at 15-16 (emphasis added).

     In Commonwealth v. Pander, 100 A.3d 626 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en

banc), this Court explained:

     “Neglecting to call a witness differs from failing to investigate a
     witness in a subtle but important way.” [Commonwealth v.
     Stewart, 84 A.3d 701, 712 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc), appeal
     denied, 93 A.3d 463 (Pa. 2014)]. The failure to investigate
     “presents an issue of arguable merit where the record
     demonstrates that counsel did not perform an investigation.”
     Id. “It can be unreasonable per se to conduct no investigation
     into known witnesses.” Id. Importantly, a petitioner still must
     demonstrate prejudice. Id. To demonstrate prejudice where the
     allegation is the failure to interview a witness, the petitioner must
     show that there is a reasonable probability that the testimony
     the witness would have provided would have led to a different
     outcome at trial. Commonwealth v. Dennis, 597 Pa. 159, 950
     A.2d 945, 961 (2008).

     In this respect, a failure to investigate and a failure to interview a
     witness overlaps with declining to call a witness since the
     petitioner must prove: (i) the witness existed; (ii) the witness was
     available to testify; (iii) counsel knew of, or should have known
     of, the existence of the witness; (iv) the witness was willing to
     testify; and (v) the absence of the testimony was so prejudicial as
     to have denied the defendant a fair trial. See Commonwealth
     v. Dennis, 609 Pa. 442, 17 A.3d 297, 302 (2011) [following
     remand] (discussing failure to interview and call and alibi
     witness).

Id. at 638-39.

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      Here, while Appellant alleges trial counsel ineffectiveness for failure to

interview the unnamed police officer, Appellant testified that he had not

provided counsel with the name of any witness that Appellant wanted to call

at trial.   Again, as this Court in Pander recognized, while the failure to

investigate a known witness can be unreasonable per se, “[i]mportantly, a

petitioner must still demonstrate prejudice [by showing] that there is a

reasonable probability that the testimony the witness would have provided

would have led to a different outcome at trial.” Pander, 100 A.3d at 638-39.

      Appellant has not only failed to identify the officer, but he has also failed

to demonstrate any prejudice.      In fact, while claiming prejudice, Appellant

concedes, “we cannot predict with certainly whether the outcome would have

been different.” Appellant’s Brief at 22. We find no error in the PCRA court’s

rejection of Appellant’s claim of ineffectiveness for failure to investigate an

unknown, unnamed witness. Appellant’s second issue fails.

      In his third issue, Appellant alleges trial counsel ineffectiveness for

failing to object to the trial court’s decision to close the courtroom. As the

trial court explained, the courtroom was briefly closed after a juror was

approached by an unidentified individual in the hallway outside the courtroom.

That individual told the juror that one of the defendants was innocent.

      The trial court found the issue waived for direct appeal based on lack of

objection. Nevertheless, the court addressed it in its Rule 1925(a) opinion,

rejecting Appellant’s claim and stating:

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         Here, this Court took no such actions, as described by Appellant.
         To the contrary, upon being advised of the ascribed comment, the
         court simply conducted a colloquy of each juror on the record and
         with Counsel present to determine what, if any comment was
         made, to which Juror, by who[m] and what effect it may have had
         on the Juror.4 Case law supports the closing of the court room
         when someone attempts to influence a juror and the Court has no
         other way to assure that similar attempts to influence the jury
         would not recur. See [Commonwealth v. Berrigan, 509 Pa.
         118, 501 A.2d 226, 234 (Pa. 1985)] (“unmanageable,”
         “boisterous,” and “disruptive” members of the public can be
         barred to guarantee the orderly administration of justice).
         Accord Commonwealth v. Phillips, 946 A.2d 103, 109 (Pa.
         Super. 2008), allocatur denied, 964 A.2d 895 (Pa. 2009) (trial
         courts may always place reasonable restrictions on access to the
         courtroom where they perceive a threat to the orderly
         administration of justice by an unmanageable public). Therefore,
         no error occurred here and it is respectfully suggested that if the
         Court deems that the issue had been preserved, no relief should
         be forthcoming.
               4
                Following the colloquy of the jurors, the court room was again
               opened to the public and remained so for the duration of the trial.
               That is likely the reason counsel never lodged an objection. Had
               the Court known that one of the Appellants was going to raise as
               an issue on appeal a claim that his client’s right to a public trial
               had been violated, the Court would have made it clear on the
               record the reason why the public was excluded during the
               colloquy and that the exclusion was of limited duration.

Trial Court Opinion, 1/21/16, at 14.

         The PCRA court similarly rejected Appellant’s argument, noting “this was

a temporary, reasonable limitation on access, in accord with Berrigan. As a

result, Appellant fails to show that this claim has arguable merit and as a

result cannot satisfy the first prong of Pierce.” PCRA Court Opinion, 5/5/22,

at 8. We find no error in the PCRA court’s conclusion. Appellant’s third issue

fails.

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      In his fourth issue, Appellant argues that trial counsel provided

ineffective assistance for failing to file a motion for reconsideration of

sentence.   Appellant does not assert his sentence was illegal.     Rather, he

contends it was “harsh and unreasonable” and points to the fact his co-

defendant received a lesser sentence of incarceration. Appellant’s Brief at 24.

He claims he wanted trial counsel to file a post-sentence motion regarding his

sentence but his counsel withdrew from the case without filing the motion.

Id. He contends the issue was raised in his Rule 1925(b) statement on direct

appeal but was deemed waived because it was not preserved in a post-

sentence motion.     A review of the Rule 1925(b) statement filed on direct

appeal belies his contention. See Commonwealth v. Ayala, 1313 EDA 2015

(Appellant’s Brief, 5/25/16, at Exhibit B).

      Regardless, Appellant is not entitled to relief on this claim. As the PCRA

court observed, “For all intents and purposes, this is a challenge to the

discretionary aspects of sentencing.    . . . ‘Challenges to the discretionary

aspects of sentencing are not cognizable under the PCRA.’ Commonwealth

v. Fowler, 930 A.2d 586, 593 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citing 42 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 9543(a)(2)(vii)).” PCRA Court Opinion, 5/5/22, at 9 (footnote omitted).

      Because the PCRA court properly recognized that a discretionary aspects

of sentence claim is not cognizable under the PCRA, Appellant is not entitled

to relief on his fourth issue.

      Order affirmed.

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 3/28/2023

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