Court Opinion

ID: 9966179
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-06 12:01:52.547557+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:40.998156
License: Public Domain

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                                        Buzzard v. Fass

                  JOAN BUZZARD v. LAURA FASS ET AL.
                             (AC 46257)
                                  Elgo, Clark and Lavine, Js.

                                            Syllabus

         Pursuant to statute (§ 45a-731), ‘‘[a] final decree of adoption . . . shall have
            the following effect in this state . . . (4) The adopted person shall,
            except as hereinafter provided, be treated as if such adopted person
            were the biological child of the adoptive parent for purposes of the
            applicability of all documents and instruments, whether executed before
            or after the adoption decree is issued, which do not expressly exclude
            an adopted person in their operation or effect.’’
         Pursuant further to statute (§ 45a-731 (11), ‘‘[t]he provisions of subdivisions
            (1) to (9), inclusive, of this section shall apply to the estate or wills of
            persons dying prior to October 1, 1959, and to inter vivos instruments
            executed prior to said date and which on said date were not subject to
            the grantor’s power to revoke or amend, unless (A) a contrary intention
            of the testator or grantor is demonstrated by clear and convincing evi-
            dence, or (B) distribution of the estate or under the will or under the
            inter vivos instrument has been or will be made pursuant to court order
            entered prior to October 1, 1991.’’
         The plaintiff appealed to the Superior Court from an order of the Probate
            Court overruling her objection to the approval of a periodic accounting
            of a testamentary trust, which had provided for distributions to the
            defendants, F and W, the adopted great grandnieces of the testator,
            T. In 1946, T executed a will and two codicils. T’s will established a
            testamentary trust for the benefit of the descendants of his siblings. T’s
            sister and the living issue of T’s other siblings were designated as the
            original beneficiaries. T died in 1947, and, in 1949, the Probate Court
            issued a decree that transferred the ‘‘rest, residue and remainder’’ of
            T’s estate to the trustee, so that the trustee could make distributions
            in accordance with the trust. W was adopted as a child in 1948 by a
            descendant of one of the original beneficiaries and began receiving
            distributions under the trust upon the death of her parent in 1997. F
            was adopted in 2008 as an adult by one of the descendants of the original
            beneficiaries and began receiving distributions under the trust in 2014
            upon the death of her parent. In 2019, the plaintiff filed an objection in
            the Probate Court to the approval of a periodic accounting of the trust,
            arguing that the trust did not allow for distributions to F because she
            had been adopted as an adult. The Probate Court approved the periodic
            accounting, concluding that the presumption in favor of adopted persons
            in § 45a-731 (4) applied, and the plaintiff appealed to the Superior Court,
            where the defendants filed motions for summary judgment, arguing that
            they were included within the terms ‘‘issue’’ and ‘‘descendants’’ used in
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                                      Buzzard v. Fass
           the trust pursuant to § 45a-731 (4). The plaintiff filed a motion for sum-
           mary judgment, arguing that the exceptions to § 45a-731 (4) in § 45a-
           731 (11) applied and, therefore, the only persons permitted to receive
           distributions from the trust were the originally named beneficiaries
           and their lineal blood descendants. The Superior Court granted the
           defendants’ motions for summary judgment and denied the plaintiff’s
           motion for summary judgment, rejecting the plaintiff’s contention that
           the exceptions to § 45a-731 (4) delineated in § 45a-731 (11) applied.
           From the judgment rendered thereon, the plaintiff appealed to this
           court. Held:
       1. The plaintiff could not prevail on her claim that the Superior Court erred
           in rendering summary judgment for the defendants, which was based
           on her claim that the exception to the presumption in favor of adopted
           persons set forth in § 45a-731 (11) (B) applied: the 1949 decree, which
           transferred the rest, residue and remainder of the estate to the trustee,
           did not constitute a ‘‘distribution’’ for purposes of § 45a-731 (11) (B) so
           as to require the application of the outmoded ‘‘stranger to the adoption’’
           rule, which presumed that an adopted child was not within the intended
           bounty of a settlor who was not the adopting parent, because the 1949
           decree did not finalize the apportionment of the remainder of the estate
           under the will, as distributions to those who were entitled to share in
           the estate under the testamentary trust were still to occur into the future,
           with the beneficiaries under the trust continually changing upon the
           birth and death of T’s descendants, and the trust remained under the
           jurisdiction of the Probate Court; moreover, other than the plaintiff’s
           threadbare assertion that the 1949 decree fixed the identity of the distrib-
           utees under the trust, the plaintiff did not explain how that decree vested
           any interest in any beneficiary of the trust, rather, the record showed
           that the 1949 decree simply transferred to the trustee the residue of the
           estate so that the trustee could, in turn, make distributions to the proper
           beneficiaries; furthermore, although some distributions under the trust
           were made prior to October 1, 1991, other distributions were made and
           approved after that date, and, therefore, § 45a-731 (11) (B) applies only
           to trust distributions made or approved to be made pursuant to a court
           order entered prior to October 1, 1991, and does not apply to those
           distributions, such as the distribution challenged in this appeal, made
           after that date.
       2. The plaintiff’s claim that the exception to the presumption in favor of
           adopted persons set forth in § 45a-731 (11) (A) applied because there
           was clear and convincing evidence that T did not intend to include
           adopted persons as beneficiaries under the trust was unavailing: there
           was no rule of law at the time T’s will was executed in 1946 excluding
           adopted persons from the definition of ‘‘issue’’ or ‘‘descendants,’’ rather,
           under the common law, there existed a mere presumption against includ-
           ing an adopted person within those terms when a testator’s intent was
           unclear, and, although the presumption in effect when T executed his
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                                        Buzzard v. Fass
             will led some courts to interpret terms like the term ‘‘issue’’ to exclude
             adopted persons, that presumption no longer applies because, in 1991,
             the legislature altered that presumption, and, as a result, this court
             presumes that the terms ‘‘issue’’ and ‘‘descendants’’ include legally
             adopted persons when interpreting instruments that control distribu-
             tions made in accordance with a will or an estate of a person that died
             prior to October 1, 1959; moreover, the plaintiff’s argument that T’s use
             of the terms ‘‘issue’’ and ‘‘descendants’’ constituted clear and convincing
             evidence of an intent to exclude adopted persons because the old com-
             mon-law presumption excluded them conflated T’s actual intent with a
             rule of construction, and, although the terms ‘‘issue’’ and ‘‘descendants’’
             may have been presumed to exclude adopted persons at the time the
             will was executed, the use of these terms in a will or trust, in the absence
             of evidence that a testator actually considered the contingency of adop-
             tion, does not provide the requisite clear and convincing evidence of
             T’s intention that adopted persons be treated differently from biological
             children; furthermore, although T executed a first codicil in which he
             added the word ‘‘the’’ into the trust document, so that the trust as
             amended provides that the interest of any of the original beneficiaries
             shall be held upon the same terms for the benefit of ‘‘the other beneficiar-
             ies then living and/or their issue or successors,’’ the addition of that
             clarifying word did not imply anything with respect to T’s intent as to
             adopted persons and did not constitute clear and convincing evidence
             of an intention to exclude them.

                     Argued January 9—officially released May 7, 2024

                                      Procedural History

           Appeal from the decree of the Probate Court for the
         district of Hartford approving the periodic accounting
         of a testamentary trust, brought to the Superior Court
         in the judicial district of Hartford, where the court,
         Sicilian, J., granted the defendants’ motions for sum-
         mary judgment, denied the plaintiff’s motion for sum-
         mary judgment, and rendered judgment thereon, from
         which the plaintiff appealed to this court. Affirmed.
           John F. Carberry, with whom, on the brief, were
         Kelley Galica Peck and M. Juliet Bonazzoli, for the
         appellant (plaintiff).
           Steven L. Katz, with whom was Alan J. Rome, for
         the appellee (named defendant).
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                                       Buzzard v. Fass

         Patrick M. Fahey, for the appellee (defendant Pamela
       Baker Weiss).
                                           Opinion

         CLARK, J. The dispositive issue in this appeal is
       whether the defendants, Laura Fass and Pamela Baker
       Weiss, the adopted great grandnieces of Joseph Mer-
       row, the testator, are included within the terms ‘‘issue’’
       and ‘‘descendants’’ used in a testamentary trust exe-
       cuted by the testator in 1946. The plaintiff, Joan Buz-
       zard, claims that the only persons permitted to receive
       distributions under the subject trust are the originally
       named beneficiaries and their lineal blood descendants,
       not the adopted defendants. The plaintiff claims that
       the Superior Court improperly granted the defendants’
       motions for summary judgment and denied her motion
       for summary judgment because it erroneously con-
       cluded that General Statutes § 45a-731 (4),1 which pro-
       vides that the terms ‘‘issue’’ and ‘‘descendants’’ when
       used in a will or trust shall include legally adopted
       persons, applied to the trust at issue in this case. She
       claims that the definitions set forth in § 45a-731 (4) do
       not apply to the subject trust because the exceptions
       to their application that are set forth in § 45a-731 (11)
       (A) and (B)2 apply in this case. For the reasons that
          1
            General Statutes § 45a-731 provides in relevant part: ‘‘A final decree of
       adoption, whether issued by a court of this state or a court of any other
       jurisdiction, shall have the following effect in this state . . . (4) The adopted
       person shall, except as hereinafter provided, be treated as if such adopted
       person were the biological child of the adoptive parent for purposes of the
       applicability of all documents and instruments, whether executed before or
       after the adoption decree is issued, which do not expressly exclude an
       adopted person in their operation or effect. The words ‘child’, ‘children’,
       ‘issue’, ‘descendant’, ‘descendants’, ‘heir’, ‘heirs’, ‘lawful heirs’, ‘grandchild’
       and ‘grandchildren’, when used in any will or trust instrument shall include
       legally adopted persons unless such document clearly indicates a contrary
       intention. . . .’’
          2
            General Statutes § 45a-731 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(11) The provisions
       of subdivisions (1) to (9), inclusive, of this section shall apply to the estate or
       wills of persons dying prior to October 1, 1959, and to inter vivos instruments
       executed prior to said date and which on said date were not subject to the
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                                        Buzzard v. Fass

         follow, we disagree with the plaintiff and affirm the
         judgment of the Superior Court.
            We begin with the relevant undisputed facts and pro-
         cedural history of the case. The testator died on or
         about March 27, 1947. He never had children and he
         had no living siblings at the time of his death. The
         testator executed a will on March 19, 1946, and later
         executed two codicils, one on July 1, 1946 (first codicil),
         and another on September 6, 1946 (second codicil). The
         will established three testamentary trusts for the benefit
         of the descendants of his siblings: the Article Fifth Trust,
         the Article Sixth Trust, and the Article Eighth Trust.
         The Article Eighth Trust (trust) is the subject of the
         present dispute.
            The trust provides for a contingent, outright distribu-
         tion of a portion of the interests in the trust proceeds
         to the testator’s nephew, John Merrow Washburn, but
         it otherwise designated the testator’s sister, Mary W.
         Merrow, who had no children, and the living issue of
         the testator’s other two siblings, George W. Merrow
         and Martha Belden Washburn, as original beneficiaries.3
         Relevant for present purposes, the testator’s brother,
         George W. Merrow, had nine children, four of whom,
         John Merrow, Oliver Wolcott Merrow, Pauline M. Baker,
         and Harriet M. Landon, also had children. John Merrow
         had three biological children, all of whom had biological
         children, and Oliver Wolcott Merrow had three children,
         all of whom had biological children. Pauline M. Baker
         grantor’s power to revoke or amend, unless (A) a contrary intention of the
         testator or grantor is demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence, or
         (B) distribution of the estate or under the will or under the inter vivos
         instrument has been or will be made pursuant to court order entered prior
         to October 1, 1991 . . . .’’
           3
             The testator’s sister, Mary W. Merrow, who was living at the time that
         the testator executed his original will, predeceased the testator. The testator
         expressly noted in the first codicil that he had taken that unfortunate contin-
         gency into account when he drafted his will and noted that her death resulted
         in an adjustment to the beneficiaries’ respective interests.
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                              Buzzard v. Fass

       had three biological children. One of Pauline M. Baker’s
       children, William Baker, adopted Weiss, who was born
       in April, 1946, and was placed for adoption with William
       Baker and his wife in or around February, 1947. Weiss’
       adoption was approved by the Hartford Probate Court
       on March 19, 1948. Harriet M. Landon had one biological
       daughter, Elizabeth M. Landon, who had no biological
       children. Elizabeth M. Landon adopted Fass in 2008,
       when Elizabeth M. Landon was eighty-five years old
       and Fass was fifty-three years old.
          The trust provides in relevant part: ‘‘If any of the
       original beneficiaries or their successors in interest as
       herein determined shall die either before or after my
       death leaving issue, the interest of the one so dying
       shall thereafter be held upon the same terms for the
       benefit of such issue, per stirpes. If any of the original
       beneficiaries or their successors in interest as herein
       determined shall die either before or after my death
       leaving no issue, the interest of the one so dying shall
       thereafter be held upon the same terms for the benefit
       of [the] other beneficiaries then living and/or their issue
       or successors . . . in the same proportions in which
       they would inherit from the one so dying without issue
       if he or she were unmarried under the laws covering
       the distribution of intestate estates then in force in the
       State of Connecticut; it being my intention that the
       beneficial interests from the institution of this trust
       until its termination shall devolve through the line of
       descent or inheritance without including husbands or
       wives of any of the beneficiaries so that at the termina-
       tion hereof the distributees shall all be descendants of
       one or more of the original named beneficiaries . . . .’’
       (Emphasis in original.)
          Upon the death of William Baker in 1997, Weiss suc-
       ceeded to his interest. She began receiving distributions
       under the trust whenever the trustee made distribu-
       tions. Specifically, as her father’s only child, Weiss
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                                      Buzzard v. Fass

         received the entirety of what previously had been her
         father’s share of each distribution from the trust.4
            After the death of Elizabeth M. Landon in 2014, the
         distributions that were payable to her under the trust
         were paid to Fass. An accounting listing Fass as a bene-
         ficiary of the trust was approved by the Probate Court
         in 2015. Fass received distributions from the trust from
         2014 to 2019.
            On or about December 5, 2019, the plaintiff filed an
         objection in the Probate Court to the approval of a
         periodic accounting of the trust. On January 6, 2020, a
         hearing was held by the Probate Court on the approval
         of the periodic accounting and the objection filed by
         the plaintiff. At the hearing, the plaintiff’s counsel
         argued that the trust document did not allow for distri-
         butions of the trust proceeds to Fass because she was
         adopted by Elizabeth M. Landon in 2008, when Fass was
         an adult. Notwithstanding § 45a-731, which generally
         provides that an adopted person shall have the same
         rights of inheritance as a biological child, the plaintiff’s
         counsel argued that the trust document did not allow
         for a descendant not related to the testator by blood
         to receive distributions from the trust. Counsel for Fass
         and for the other beneficiaries under the trust, including
         Weiss, opposed the plaintiff’s objection during the hear-
         ing. The hearing on the periodic accounting was
         adjourned and the court ordered the parties to submit
         briefs on the plaintiff’s objection.
            On June 9, 2020, the Probate Court rejected the plain-
         tiff’s argument that the narrow exceptions to § 45a-731
             When Weiss’ aunt, Ellen E. Baker, died in 2005 without issue, Weiss also
             4

         received the entirety of what previously had been her aunt’s share of the
         distributions from the trust. The testator made specific provisions for a
         beneficiary dying without issue. In such a circumstance, distributions would
         be paid under the laws covering the distribution of intestate estates then
         in effect in Connecticut. Weiss was the only person who inherited from
         Ellen E. Baker under Connecticut’s intestacy laws.
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                                    Buzzard v. Fass

       (4) that are set forth in § 45a-731 (11) were applicable.
       Accordingly, the Probate Court approved the periodic
       accounting presented to it, thereby allowing Fass and
       Weiss to continue receiving distributions under the
       trust.
          On July 9, 2020, pursuant to General Statutes § 45a-
       186,5 the plaintiff appealed to the Superior Court. In
       her complaint, the plaintiff alleged that the Probate
       Court erroneously concluded that there was insufficient
       evidence of the testator’s intent to exclude adopted
       persons. She also argued that a 1949 Probate Court
       decree (1949 decree) ‘‘definitively established that the
       beneficiaries entitled to distribution under the will were
       those individuals expressly named in the will and their
       descendants of the blood and not by adoption, whether
       then living or thereafter born, prior to the final termina-
       tion of the continuing trust under the will.’’
          On February 28 and March 18, 2022, Fass and Weiss,
       respectively, filed motions for summary judgment. They
       claimed that § 45a-731 (4), which provides that the
       terms ‘‘issue’’ and ‘‘descendants,’’ when used in a will
       or trust, are to include legally adopted persons, applied
       to the testator’s will that created the subject trust. They
       claimed that the exceptions to § 45a-731 (4) set forth
       in § 45a-731 (11) did not apply. Specifically, they argued
       that the plaintiff failed to establish by clear and convinc-
       ing evidence that the testator had intended to exclude
       adopted persons from taking under the trust or that the
       trust had been distributed prior to October 1, 1991.
         On April 6, 2022, the plaintiff filed a motion for sum-
       mary judgment. She argued that subdivisions (1)
       through (9) of § 45a-731 were inapplicable because the
       exceptions to their application, set forth in § 45a-731
         5
           General Statutes § 45a-186 (b) provides in relevant part: ‘‘Any person
       aggrieved by an order, denial or decree of a Probate Court may appeal
       therefrom to the Superior Court. . . .’’
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                                Buzzard v. Fass

         (11), applied. In particular, she claimed that the excep-
         tion set forth in § 45a-731 (11) (B) was satisfied because
         the testator died before October 1, 1959, and the 1949
         decree was a ‘‘court order entered prior to October 1,
         1991,’’ that distributed the estate. The plaintiff further
         claimed that the exception set forth in § 45a-731 (11)
         (A) also was satisfied because the testator’s intent to
         exclude adopted persons was clear and unequivocal.
         As a result, the plaintiff argued that § 45a-731 (4) was
         inapplicable to the distributions at issue and that the
         court was required to give the words in the testator’s
         will their ordinary meaning at the time the will was
         written and when the testator died. The plaintiff argued
         that the law at the time the will was written and when
         the testator died required the court to construe the will
         to exclude adopted persons as potential beneficiaries
         because the testator used the terms ‘‘issue’’ and
         ‘‘descendants’’ without any expression of an intent to
         include adopted persons. The plaintiff claimed that
         those terms, as they were ordinarily understood in 1946
         and 1947, meant only ‘‘ ‘lineal blood relationships’
         . . . .’’ (Citation omitted.)
            On January 24, 2023, the court, Sicilian, J., issued
         a memorandum of decision granting the motions for
         summary judgment filed by Fass and Weiss, and denying
         the motion for summary judgment filed by the plaintiff.
         The court concluded that the exceptions set forth in
         § 45a-731 (11) did not apply to the undisputed facts of
         this case and, therefore, Fass and Weiss were entitled
         to distributions under the trust. The court rejected the
         plaintiff’s contention that § 45a-731 (11) (B) applied
         by its plain terms because the testator’s estate was
         distributed to trusts pursuant to the 1949 decree. The
         court stated that, ‘‘[p]lainly, there has been no final
         distribution of the assets of the estate to the beneficiar-
         ies of the trusts, and the testamentary trust has
         remained under the jurisdiction of the Probate Court
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                              Buzzard v. Fass

       and, as evidenced by the decree challenged in this pro-
       bate appeal, the Probate Court has been presented with
       periodic accountings seeking approval of distributions
       to be made.’’
           The court further explained that, contrary to the
       plaintiff’s contention, § 45a-731 (11) (B) does not unam-
       biguously require a court to apply the outmoded
       ‘‘ ‘stranger to the adoption’ ’’ presumption to exclude
       adopted children from the class of beneficiaries of the
       trust for purposes of distributions neither made nor
       approved prior to October 1, 1991. The court reasoned
       that ‘‘[t]he legislature has made clear that its intent is
       to have adopted children treated equally with biological
       children, absent a clearly expressed contrary intent and
       except where doing so would disrupt distributions pre-
       viously made pursuant to a court order. Section 45a-
       731 (11), if interpreted to exempt every testamentary
       trust that was subject to a probate decree prior to Octo-
       ber 1, 1991, from the application of the modern pre-
       sumption favoring adopted persons would significantly
       undermine the legislature’s clearly expressed inten-
       tion.’’ The court thus concluded that § 45a-731 (11) (B)
       ‘‘applies, in the context of testamentary trusts estab-
       lished prior to October 1, 1991, only to trust distribu-
       tions made or approved to be made pursuant to court
       order entered prior to that date.’’
         With respect to the exception set forth in § 45a-731
       (11) (A), the court concluded that the plaintiff had failed
       to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the
       testator intended to exclude adopted persons from the
       class of beneficiaries created under the trust. Specifi-
       cally, the court was not persuaded by the plaintiff’s
       argument that a testator’s failure to expressly include
       adopted persons in the trust constituted clear and con-
       vincing evidence of an intention to exclude them. The
       court concluded that such a ‘‘proposition [was] untena-
       ble’’ and ‘‘would contravene the legislature’s intention
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                                 Buzzard v. Fass

          as reflected in § 45a-731 (4) and . . . (11).’’ In so con-
          cluding, the court noted that ‘‘[the plaintiff] herself
          appear[ed] to acknowledge the problem with her argu-
          ment when she [said]: ‘It is possible the legislature, in
          adopting [§ 45a-731 (11)] expected that there be some
          additional evidence beyond the isolated use of the
          words recited in [§ 45a-731 (4)].’ ’’ The court explained
          that ‘‘it is more than possible,’’ as ‘‘[t]he plain import
          of § 45a-731 (4) and . . . (11), and of its predecessor
          statutes dating back to 1959, was to change the pre-
          sumption of exclusion of adopted persons to a presump-
          tion of inclusion of adopted persons.’’
             The court went on to reject each of the plaintiff’s
          additional arguments. Specifically, the court was not
          persuaded by the plaintiff’s argument that the addition
          of the word ‘‘the’’ in the first codicil implied anything
          about adopted persons. Nor was it persuaded by the
          plaintiff’s contention that the provision of the will
          excluding spouses of the descendants of the testator’s
          siblings shed any light on the testator’s intention regard-
          ing adopted persons. Accordingly, the court concluded
          that the ‘‘[the plaintiff] fail[ed] to provide clear and
          convincing evidence that the testator intended to
          exclude adopted persons as beneficiaries of the trust
          at issue.’’ This appeal followed. Additional facts and
          procedural history will be set forth as necessary.
             As a preliminary matter, we set forth the appropriate
          framework for appellate review of a summary judgment
          determination. Practice Book § 17-49 provides: ‘‘The
          judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the
          pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted
          show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
          fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment
          as a matter of law.’’
             ‘‘In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the
          trial court must view the evidence in the light most
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                              Buzzard v. Fass

       favorable to the nonmoving party.’’ (Internal quotation
       marks omitted.) Doe v. New Haven, 214 Conn. App.
       553, 563, 281 A.3d 480 (2022). ‘‘[T]he moving party for
       summary judgment has the burden of showing the
       absence of any genuine issue as to all the material facts,
       which, under applicable principles of substantive law,
       entitle [her] to a judgment as a matter of law.’’ (Internal
       quotation marks omitted.) Ramirez v. Health Net of the
       Northeast, Inc., 285 Conn. 1, 11, 938 A.2d 576 (2008).
       ‘‘[W]e must determine whether the legal conclusions
       reached by the trial court are legally and logically cor-
       rect and whether they find support in the facts set
       out in the memorandum of decision of the trial court.’’
       (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cefaratti v. Ara-
       now, 321 Conn. 637, 645, 138 A.3d 837 (2016). Our review
       of the trial court’s rulings on the parties’ motions for
       summary judgment is plenary. See, e.g., Community
       Renewal Team, Inc. v. United States Liability Ins. Co.,
       128 Conn. App. 174, 177, 17 A.3d 88, cert. denied, 301
       Conn. 918, 21 A.3d 463 (2011). Because the resolution
       of this appeal requires us to interpret § 45a-731 (11),
       which sets forth the exceptions to § 45a-731 (4), we are
       presented with an issue of statutory interpretation over
       which our review also is plenary. See, e.g., Doe v. West
       Hartford, 328 Conn. 172, 181, 177 A.3d 1128 (2018)
       (‘‘[w]hen we are called upon to construe a statute that
       is implicated by a summary judgment motion, our
       review is plenary’’).

         Before we turn to the merits of the plaintiff’s claims,
       we begin with a brief history and overview of the law
       governing the inheritance rights of adopted persons
       in Connecticut. Prior to 1959, ‘‘[w]here the grantor or
       testator [was] the adopting parent, it [was] reasonable
       to presume that the adopted child was within the
       intended bounty of such grantor or testator.’’ (Internal
       quotation marks omitted.) Middletown Trust Co. v.
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          Gaffey, 96 Conn. 61, 71, 112 A. 689 (1921). That presump-
          tion, however, did not apply to a grantor or testator
          who was not the adopting parent. See Mooney v. Tolles,
          111 Conn. 1, 9, 149 A. 515 (1930). Connecticut courts
          ‘‘presumed that an adopted child [was] not within the
          intended bounty of a settlor who, as a nonadopting
          parent, [was] a stranger to the adoption.’’ Schapira v.
          Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 204 Conn. 450, 455, 528
          A.2d 367 (1987). ‘‘[T]he common law favor[ed] ancestral
          blood and [would] presume that the settlor did not
          intend that a stranger to his blood take.’’ Connecticut
          Bank & Trust Co. v. Bovey, 162 Conn. 201, 207, 292 A.2d
          899 (1972). This has become known as the ‘‘stranger
          to the adoption’’ doctrine. Mooney v. Tolles, supra, 9.
             In 1959, the legislature enacted No. 106 of the 1959
          Public Acts (P.A. 106),6 a predecessor of § 45a-731,
          which effectively abrogated the ‘‘stranger to the adop-
          tion’’ rule by replacing the common-law presumption
          against including adopted persons as beneficiaries of
          a will or trust with a presumption that adopted persons
          were intended to be included as beneficiaries. By the
          plain terms of P.A. 106, which was codified at General
          Statutes (Cum. Supp. 1961) § 45-65a, however, the legis-
          lature limited that statute’s application to wills and
          trusts executed ‘‘subsequent’’ to October 1, 1959. See,
          e.g., Parker v. Mullen, 158 Conn. 1, 5 n.1, 255 A.2d 851
          (1969); Connecticut Bank & Trust Co. v. Hills, 157
          Conn. 375, 378 n.1, 254 A.2d 453 (1969). Our courts
          therefore declined to apply § 45-65a retroactively to
          instruments executed prior to October 1, 1959. See, e.g.,
             6
               ‘‘Number 106 of the 1959 Public Acts provided in pertinent part: ‘The
          words ‘‘child’’, ‘‘children’’, ‘‘issue’’, ‘‘descendant’’, ‘‘descendants’’, ‘‘heir’’,
          ‘‘heirs’’, ‘‘lawful heirs’’, ‘‘grandchild’’, ‘‘grandchildren’’, when used in the
          singular or plural in any will or trust instrument, shall, unless such document
          clearly indicates a contrary intention, include legally adopted persons. . . .
          The provisions of this act shall apply to wills and trust instruments executed
          subsequent to the effective date hereof.’ ’’ Connecticut National Bank &
          Trust Co. v. Chadwick, 217 Conn. 260, 264 n.2, 585 A.2d 1189 (1991).
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       Connecticut Bank & Trust Co. v. Bovey, supra, 162
       Conn. 209 (‘‘we once again must refuse to hold . . .
       [§] 45-65a applicable retrospectively’’). In 1973, the leg-
       islature enacted No. 73-156, § 21, of the 1973 Public Acts
       (P.A. 73-156), which repealed § 45-65a but specifically
       retained the statutory presumption in favor of adopted
       persons; see P.A. 73-156, § 14; which was subsequently
       codified at General Statutes (Rev. to 1975) § 45-64a (4).
          For more than thirty years, the statutory presumption
       in favor of adopted persons continued to apply only to
       wills and trust instruments executed after October 1,
       1959. In 1991, however, the legislature transferred the
       provisions of § 45-64a to § 45a-731 and made substan-
       tive changes to the law. Specifically, No. 91-83 of the
       1991 Public Acts (P.A. 91-83) provides in relevant part
       that ‘‘[t]he provisions of subdivisions (1) to (9), inclu-
       sive, of [§ 45a-731]’’ shall apply ‘‘to the estate or wills
       of persons dying prior to October 1, 1959 . . . .’’
       (Emphasis added.) Although the legislature expanded
       the presumption in favor of adopted persons to estates
       or wills of persons dying prior to October 1, 1959, it
       created two exceptions to this new rule. See P.A. 91-
       83. Specifically, P.A. 91-83 provides that subdivisions
       (1) through (9) of § 45a-731 would apply to the estate
       or wills of persons dying prior to October 1, 1959,
       ‘‘unless (A) a contrary intention of the testator or
       grantor is demonstrated by clear and convincing evi-
       dence or (B) distribution of the estate or under the will
       or under the inter vivos instrument has been or will be
       made pursuant to court order entered prior to October
       1, 1991 . . . .’’
          As previously explained in this opinion, P.A. 91-83
       transferred the statutory provisions governing the rights
       of adopted persons to § 45a-731. The relevant provisions
       of § 45a-731 for purposes of this appeal are located at
       § 45a-731 (4), (10), and (11). To that end, § 45a-731
       provides in relevant part: ‘‘A final decree of adoption,
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          whether issued by a court of this state or a court of
          any other jurisdiction, shall have the following effect
          in this state . . . (4) The adopted person shall, except
          as hereinafter provided, be treated as if such adopted
          person were the biological child of the adoptive parent
          for purposes of the applicability of all documents and
          instruments, whether executed before or after the adop-
          tion decree is issued, which do not expressly exclude
          an adopted person in their operation or effect. The
          words ‘child’, ‘children’, ‘issue’, ‘descendant’, ‘descen-
          dants’, ‘heir’, ‘heirs’, ‘lawful heirs’, ‘grandchild’ and
          ‘grandchildren’, when used in any will or trust instru-
          ment shall include legally adopted persons unless such
          document clearly indicates a contrary intention. . . .’’
             Section 45a-731 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(10)
          Except as provided in subdivision (11) of this section,
          the provisions of law in force prior to October 1, 1959,
          affected by the provisions of this section shall apply to
          the estates or wills of persons dying prior to said date
          and to inter vivos instruments executed prior to said
          date and which on said date were not subject to the
          grantor’s power to revoke or amend . . . .’’
             Section 45a-731 (11) instructs that ‘‘[t]he provisions
          of subdivisions (1) to (9), inclusive, of this section shall
          apply to the estate or wills of persons dying prior to
          October 1, 1959, and to inter vivos instruments executed
          prior to said date and which on said date were not
          subject to the grantor’s power to revoke or amend,
          unless (A) a contrary intention of the testator or grantor
          is demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence, or
          (B) distribution of the estate or under the will or under
          the inter vivos instrument has been or will be made
          pursuant to court order entered prior to October 1, 1991
          . . . .’’ General Statutes § 45a-731 (11).
            With this background and overview of the relevant
          statutory provisions in mind, we turn to the plaintiff’s
          claims on appeal.
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                                      I
          The plaintiff first claims that the court erred in render-
       ing summary judgment for the defendants because it
       improperly concluded that § 45a-731 (4) applies to the
       trust. Specifically, she directs this court to the 1949
       decree, which she claims ‘‘ascertained the distributees
       under the will and directed that the ‘rest, residue and
       remainder of said estate be distributed, transferred and
       paid over to and among the distributees above named
       according to law and the provisions of the will of said
       decedent.’ ’’ (Emphasis omitted.) She contends that,
       ‘‘[u]pon issuance of the 1949 decree, the class of poten-
       tial distributees under this will was fixed by order of
       the Probate Court,’’ and that ‘‘adopted persons could
       not be added to the class of potential beneficiaries after
       the 1949 decree was issued.’’ In the plaintiff’s view, once
       the Probate Court issued its 1949 decree identifying the
       distributees under the will, and once distribution was
       made to the trust pursuant to that decree, ‘‘the rights
       of the biological descendants were fixed and vested
       . . . .’’ (Citation omitted.) Accordingly, the plaintiff
       argues that the 1949 decree clearly falls within the
       exception set forth in § 47a-731 (11) (B) because that
       decree constitutes a court order entered ‘‘prior to Octo-
       ber 1, 1991’’ pursuant to which ‘‘distribution of the
       estate or under the will . . . has been or will be
       made . . . .’’
          The defendants disagree. Weiss takes issue with the
       plaintiff’s contention that all the interests in the trust
       were ‘‘vested’’ by operation of the 1949 decree. Weiss
       points out that the 1949 decree did not vest any interest
       in the plaintiff or in any of the original beneficiaries of
       the trust, rather, that the distribution in the 1949 decree
       was only a distribution to the trustee of the trust. Weiss
       notes that the trust remains subject to the jurisdiction
       of the Probate Court and the beneficiaries of the trust
       continue to receive distributions. She argues that the
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          trial court properly construed the exception in § 45a-
          731 (11) (B) in the context of a testamentary trust to
          apply ‘‘ ‘only to trust distributions made or approved
          to be made pursuant to a court order entered prior to
          [October 1, 1991].’ ’’
             Fass similarly argues that it is clear that the trust
          was not distributed for purposes of the exception set
          forth in § 45a-731 (11) (B) by virtue of the 1949 decree
          because future trust distributions remained subject to
          the ongoing jurisdiction and accounting approvals of
          the Probate Court. Fass argues that the plaintiff’s con-
          tention that the 1949 decree constitutes a distribution
          for purposes of § 45a-731 (11) (B) runs counter to the
          legislature’s clear intent to make § 45a-731 (4) retroac-
          tive to all estates or wills of persons dying prior to
          October 1, 1959. She further contends that the plaintiff’s
          interpretation would result in an extremely narrow
          application of the statute’s retroactive presumption in
          favor of adopted persons. The better and more logical
          interpretation of § 45a-731 (11) (B), Fass argues, is that
          it applies only to a final distribution to a beneficiary
          that was made prior to October 1, 1991, not to distribu-
          tions to a testamentary trust that, by the terms of the
          trust, will result in future distributions to beneficiaries
          occurring after October 1, 1991. For the reasons that
          follow, we agree with the defendants and conclude that
          the presumption in favor of adopted persons set forth
          in § 45a-731 (4) applies to the trust and distributions at
          issue in this appeal.
             ‘‘When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objec-
          tive is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent
          of the legislature. . . . In other words, we seek to
          determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the
          statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case,
          including the question of whether the language actually
          does apply. . . . The meaning of a statute shall, in the
          first instance, be ascertained from the text of the statute
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       itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after
       examining such text and considering such relationship,
       the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and
       does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratex-
       tual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be
       considered. General Statutes § 1-2z.’’ (Citation omitted;
       internal quotation marks omitted.) Seramonte Associ-
       ates, LLC v. Hamden, 345 Conn. 76, 83–84, 282 A.3d
       1253 (2022).
          Section 45a-731 provides in relevant part that ‘‘(11)
       [t]he provisions of subdivisions (1) to (9), inclusive, of
       this section shall apply to the estate or wills of persons
       dying prior to October 1, 1959 . . . unless . . . (B)
       distribution of the estate or under the will or under
       the inter vivos instrument has been or will be made
       pursuant to court order entered prior to October 1, 1991
       . . . .’’ The term ‘‘distribution’’ is not defined in § 45a-
       731 or elsewhere in chapter 803 of the General Statutes.
       As such, we must construe the term according to its
       commonly approved usage, mindful of any peculiar or
       technical meaning it may have assumed in the law. See
       General Statutes § 1-1 (a). Indeed, in the absence of
       statutory definitions, we often ‘‘find evidence of such
       usage, and technical meaning, in dictionary definitions,
       as well as by reading the statutory language within
       the context of the broader legislative scheme.’’ State v.
       Menditto, 315 Conn. 861, 866, 110 A.3d 410 (2015); see
       also Ledyard v. WMS Gaming, Inc., 338 Conn. 687,
       697, 258 A.3d 1268 (2021) (‘‘in the absence of statutory
       definitions, we look to the contemporaneous dictionary
       definitions of words to ascertain their commonly
       approved usage’’).
         Contemporary to the 1991 amendment of § 45a-731,
       the word ‘‘distribution,’’ in the probate context, was
       defined as ‘‘[t]he apportionment and division, under
       authority of a court, of the remainder of the estate of
       an intestate, after payment of the debts and charges,
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          among those who are legally entitled to share in the
          same.’’ (Emphasis added.) Black’s Law Dictionary (6th
          Ed. 1990) p. 475. More generally, the term ‘‘distribution’’
          meant ‘‘the act or process of distributing’’ or ‘‘something
          distributed . . . .’’ Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dic-
          tionary (1990) p. 368.
              We conclude that the plain language of § 45a-731 (11),
          in the context of the entire statute, evinces a clear
          legislative intent that adopted persons are to be pre-
          sumptively treated the same as biological children for
          purposes of inheritance under estates or wills of per-
          sons dying prior to October 1, 1959. Indeed, subdivision
          (11) makes clear that the substantive provisions of the
          statute that require equal treatment of adopted persons
          (i.e., subdivisions (1) through (9) of § 45a-731) shall
          apply to the estates or wills of those dying prior to
          October 1, 1959, unless one of two narrow exceptions
          apply. As to the exception in § 45a-731 (11) (B), we
          conclude that the language makes clear the legislature’s
          intent that subdivisions (1) through (9) of § 45a-731
          shall apply to the estates or wills of those dying prior
          to October 1, 1959, but not to the extent that such
          an application of those subdivisions would disturb or
          otherwise invalidate a final distribution to a beneficiary
          that occurred prior to October 1, 1991, the effective
          date of the provision. See Black’s Law Dictionary, supra,
          p. 475 (defining ‘‘[d]istribution’’ in probate context as
          ‘‘[t]he apportionment and division, under authority of
          a court, of the remainder of the estate of an intestate,
          after payment of the debts and charges, among those
          who are legally entitled to share in the same’’ (emphasis
          added)).
            In applying § 45a-731 to the facts of this case, we
          must reject the plaintiff’s argument that the 1949 decree,
          which transferred the ‘‘rest, residue and remainder’’ of
          the estate to the trustee (i.e., so that the trustee could
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       later make distributions in accordance with the testa-
       mentary trust), constitutes a distribution for purposes
       of § 45a-731 (11) (B) so as to require application of the
       outmoded ‘‘stranger to the adoption’’ rule to all trust
       distributions occurring after October 1, 1991. Although
       the 1949 decree in this case transferred to the trustee
       the ‘‘rest, residue and remainder’’ of the estate, that
       decree did not finalize the apportionment and division
       of the remainder of the estate under the will, as distribu-
       tions to those who would be entitled to share in the
       remainder of the estate under the testamentary trust
       were still to occur into the future. As the trial court
       aptly noted, ‘‘the testamentary trust has remained under
       the jurisdiction of the Probate Court and, as evidenced
       by the decree challenged in this probate appeal, the
       Probate Court has been presented with periodic
       accountings seeking approval of distributions to be
       made.’’

          Furthermore, the plaintiff’s contention that the 1949
       decree ‘‘affirm[ed] the identity of the distributees . . .
       and distribution was made pursuant to that [decree]
       [and] that the rights of the biological descendants were
       fixed and vested’’ at that time must also be rejected.
       Other than these threadbare assertions, the plaintiff
       has not sufficiently explained or demonstrated how the
       decree vested any interest in any beneficiary of the
       trust, let alone named or otherwise vested any interest
       in her. Rather, the record shows that the 1949 decree
       simply transferred to the trustee the rest, residue and
       remainder of the estate so that the trustee, in turn,
       could make distributions from the estate to the proper
       beneficiaries. Although the plaintiff attempts to support
       her arguments by pointing to a few cases; see, e.g.,
       Middletown Trust Co. v. Gaffey, supra, 96 Conn. 61;
       those authorities are inapposite to the facts of the pres-
       ent case and the question presented in this appeal.
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             The trust at issue, like many testamentary trusts,
          provides that distributions are to be made on a periodic
          basis into the future, with the beneficiaries under the
          trust continually changing upon the birth and/or death
          of the testator’s descendants. Although various distribu-
          tions ‘‘of the estate or under the will’’ were made prior
          to October 1, 1991; General Statutes § 45a-731 (11) (B);
          other distributions were made and approved after that
          date, including the distribution that the plaintiff chal-
          lenges in this appeal. Given the nature of a testamentary
          trust so described, we agree with the Superior Court
          that, in a case like this, § 45a-731 (11) (B) applies only
          to trust distributions made or approved to be made
          pursuant to a court order entered prior to October 1,
          1991. In other words, pursuant to the exception, subdivi-
          sions (1) through (9) of § 45a-731 do not apply to trust
          distributions made or approved to be made to a benefi-
          ciary pursuant to a court order entered prior to October
          1, 1991. However, subdivisions (1) through (9) of § 45a-
          731 are generally applicable to trust distributions of a
          person who died prior to October 1, 1959, that occur
          after October 1, 1991.
              Although the plaintiff would have us interpret the
          statute to mean that subdivisions (1) through (9) of
          § 45a-731 have no application to a testamentary trust
          of a person dying prior to October 1, 1959, if any transfer
          is made from an estate to a testamentary trust prior to
          October 1, 1991, so as to exempt from the modern
          presumption favoring adopted persons any and all testa-
          mentary trust distributions made after October 1, 1991,
          such an interpretation effectively would render the ret-
          rospective provision in § 45a-731 (11) a nullity. Under
          the plaintiff’s interpretation, there effectively would be
          no retrospective application of subdivisions (1) through
          (9) to an estate or under a will of a person dying prior
          October 1, 1959, except in instances in which adminis-
          tration of the estate or under the will remained in limbo,
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       until at least October 1, 1991—a period of not less
       than thirty-two years after such person’s death. It is
       axiomatic, however, that the legislature does ‘‘not
       intend to promulgate statutes . . . that lead to absurd
       consequences or bizarre results’’; (internal quotation
       marks omitted) Dias v. Grady, 292 Conn. 350, 361, 972
       A.2d 715 (2009); and ‘‘that reviewing courts should not
       construe statutes in disregard of their context and in
       frustration of the obvious legislative intent or in a man-
       ner that is hostile to an evident legislative purpose . . .
       or in a way that is contrary to common sense.’’ (Internal
       quotation marks omitted.) State v. Banks, 321 Conn.
       821, 842, 146 A.3d 1 (2016). Accordingly, we conclude
       that the Superior Court properly determined that the
       exception set forth in § 45a-731 (11) (B) was inapplica-
       ble in this case.7
                                             II
          The plaintiff next claims that, even if the exception
       in § 45a-731 (11) (B) does not apply, the exception in
       § 45a-731 (11) (A) applies because there is clear and
       convincing evidence that the testator did not intend to
       include adopted persons as beneficiaries under the
       trust. In support of that claim, she argues that the testa-
       tor’s use of the terms ‘‘issue’’ and ‘‘descendants’’ in the
       trust, without any reference to adopted persons, is clear
           7
             In her appellate brief, the plaintiff makes a passing reference to a claim
       that she has been deprived of property without due process of law. Although
       the plaintiff asserted in her appeal to the Superior Court that the Probate
       Court’s interpretation of § 45a-731 rendered that statute unconstitutional,
       she did not pursue a constitutional claim in her motion for summary judg-
       ment, her objection to the defendants’ motions for summary judgment, or
       in her appellate brief before this court. Because this claim was neither
       decided by the Superior Court nor adequately briefed before this court, we
       deem that constitutional claim abandoned. See, e.g., JPMorgan Chase Bank,
       National Assn. v. Virgulak, 192 Conn. App. 688, 720 n.9, 218 A.3d 596 (2019)
       (‘‘[t]o the extent that the plaintiff’s few passing references in its appellate
       brief about the court’s decision . . . can be read to challenge that decision,
       we conclude that the plaintiff abandoned such argument as a result of an
       inadequate brief’’), aff’d, 341 Conn. 750, 267 A.3d 753 (2022).
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          and convincing evidence that he intended to exclude
          such persons as beneficiaries. She also argues that the
          testator’s addition of the word ‘‘the’’ in the first codicil
          to the trust demonstrates a clear intent by the testator
          to exclude adopted persons as beneficiaries under the
          trust. We are not persuaded.
             Section 45a-731 provides in relevant part that ‘‘(11)
          [t]he provisions of subdivisions (1) to (9), inclusive, of
          this section shall apply to the estate or wills of persons
          dying prior to October 1, 1959, and to inter vivos instru-
          ments executed prior to said date and which on said
          date were not subject to the grantor’s power to revoke
          or amend, unless (A) a contrary intention of the testator
          or grantor is demonstrated by clear and convincing
          evidence . . . .’’
             Here, the parties dispute the retroactive application
          of the definitions set forth in § 45a-731 (4). That subdivi-
          sion provides in relevant part that the words ‘‘ ‘issue’ ’’
          and ‘‘ ‘descendants,’ ’’ ’’when used in any will or trust
          instrument shall include legally adopted persons unless
          such document clearly indicates a contrary intention.’’
          General Statutes § 45a-731 (4).
              In order for the exception set forth in § 45a-731 (11)
          (A) to apply, therefore, the plaintiff must show that
          there is clear and convincing evidence that the testator
          did not intend for adopted persons to be included as
          beneficiaries under the testator’s trust. Our courts have
          explained that ‘‘[c]lear and convincing proof is a
          demanding standard denot[ing] a degree of belief that
          lies between the belief that is required to find the truth
          or existence of the [fact in issue] in an ordinary civil
          action and the belief that is required to find guilt in a
          criminal prosecution.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
          ted.) Blackwell v. Mahmood, 120 Conn. App. 690, 700,
          992 A.2d 1219 (2010). A plaintiff may sustain her burden
          ‘‘if evidence induces in the mind of the trier a reasonable
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       belief that the facts asserted are highly probably true,
       that the probability that they are true or exist is substan-
       tially greater than the probability that they are false
       or do not exist.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
       Notopoulos v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 277
       Conn. 218, 226, 890 A.2d 509, cert. denied, 549 U.S. 823,
       127 S. Ct. 157, 166 L. Ed. 2d 39 (2006).
         The plaintiff argues that the testator’s use of the
       words ‘‘issue’’ and ‘‘descendants,’’ alone, is clear and
       convincing evidence that the testator did not intend for
       adopted persons to be included as beneficiaries under
       the trust because an adopted person was not among the
       class of persons constituting ‘‘issue’’ or ‘‘descendants’’
       when the testator executed his will in 1946. The plaintiff
       contends that ‘‘the testator was a knowledgeable busi-
       nessman, with a keen and sophisticated understanding
       of the law, and a savvy and careful reviewer of legal
       documents,’’ and that ‘‘the testator’s intent to include
       only lineal blood descendants is clear beyond peradven-
       ture.’’ (Emphasis omitted.)
           Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, there was no
       rule of law at the time the will was executed in 1946
       excluding adopted persons from the definitions of
       ‘‘issue’’ or ‘‘descendants.’’ Under the common law, there
       existed merely a presumption against including an
       adopted person within the definitions of ‘‘issue’’ or
       ‘‘descendants’’ when a testator’s intent with respect to
       that question was unclear. See, e.g., Trowbridge v.
       Trowbridge, 127 Conn. 469, 473–74, 17 A.2d 517 (1941);
       Ansonia National Bank v. Kunkel, 105 Conn. 744, 751,
       136 A. 588 (1927). Indeed, ‘‘[w]here no intent to include
       the adopted child [could] be ascertained, the common
       law favor[ed] ancestral blood and [would] presume that
       the settlor did not intend that a stranger to his blood
       take.’’ (Emphasis added.) Connecticut Bank & Trust
       Co. v. Bovey, supra, 162 Conn. 207. Our Supreme Court
       made clear, though, that this presumption was ‘‘merely
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          an aid to construction’’; id.; ‘‘which cannot prevail over
          an intent fairly deducible from the terms of the will
          read in the light of the surrounding circumstances.’’
          Trowbridge v. Trowbridge, supra, 474.
             Although the presumption in effect around the time
          the testator executed his will led to some courts inter-
          preting terms, like the term ‘‘issue,’’ to exclude adopted
          persons; see, e.g., Bankers Trust Co. v. Pearson, 140
          Conn. 332, 356, 99 A.2d 224 (1953); that presumption
          is no longer the lens through which we review the
          testamentary language. The statutory amendment that
          the legislature adopted in 1991 altered that presump-
          tion. See P.A. 91-83. As a result of that amendment, we
          now presume that the terms ‘‘issue’’ and ‘‘descendants’’
          include legally adopted persons when we are interpre-
          ting instruments that control distributions made in
          accordance with a will or an estate of a person that
          died prior to October 1, 1959. In light of that statutory
          change and the legislature’s clear intent to reverse and
          replace the old presumption that treated adopted and
          biological children differently, we are not persuaded
          that the legislature intended for its new presumption
          to be rebutted by virtue of an instrument’s mere refer-
          ence to terms such as ‘‘issue’’ or ‘‘descendants’’ that,
          under the prior common-law presumption, excluded
          adopted persons.
             Moreover, the plaintiff’s argument that the testator’s
          use of the terms ‘‘issue’’ and ‘‘descendants’’ in the trust
          constitutes clear and convincing evidence of an intent
          to exclude adopted persons because the old common-
          law presumption excluded them conflates the actual
          intent of a testator with a rule of construction. The
          decision in Purifoy v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust
          Co., 398 F. Supp. 1075, 1079 (D. Md. 1974), aff’d, 567
          F.2d 268 (4th Cir. 1977), speaks directly to this point.
          In Purifoy, the court addressed a nearly identical issue,
          namely, whether the term ‘‘descendants,’’ as well as the
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       terms ‘‘child’’ and ‘‘children,’’ included an adopted child
       in various testamentary instruments that were at issue.
       (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 1077. The defen-
       dants, like the plaintiff in this case, argued that the
       testator clearly intended to exclude an adopted child
       from the terms ‘‘child’’ or ‘‘children’’ because the law
       in place when the testator executed the testamentary
       instruments excluded such persons and the testator
       was presumed to know the law when he executed the
       will at that time. Id., 1079.
          The court rejected that claim, noting that the defen-
       dants’ argument ‘‘fail[ed] to properly distinguish
       between the actual intent of the testator in employing
       the words in question and the meaning that a rule of
       construction assigns to them. . . . [F]or these words
       to reflect a clear actual intention, this [c]ourt would
       have to make the unwarranted assumption that the
       testator actually considered the contingency of adop-
       tion in choosing the words. The defendants, though, find
       actual intention in a combination of the terms ‘child,’
       ‘children,’ etc. and the rule of construction prior to 1947,
       which excluded adopted children of one other than the
       testator. In other words, the defendants would have
       an earlier rule of construction, without anything else,
       become part of the testator’s actual intent so as to
       defeat the retroactive application of a subsequent and
       conflicting rule of construction. By definition, a rule of
       construction is not synonymous with or a part of the
       actual intent of the testator. Its function is to assign a
       meaning to the words when the testator’s actual inten-
       tion cannot be determined, and only after the failure
       to find an intention can a rule of construction be consid-
       ered. . . . Therefore, since the testators used only the
       words ‘child,’ ‘children,’ and ‘descendants’ and since
       the will and surrounding circumstances fail to reveal
       that the contingency of adoption was ever considered,
       no actual intention of the testator concerning adopted
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          children is present. The meaning to be ascribed to the
          words in question is to be found in one of the two
          applicable rules of construction.’’ (Citations omitted;
          emphasis added; footnote omitted.) Id.
             The court in Purifoy was addressing competing rules
          of construction created by statute—the defendants in
          that case advocated for the earlier rule of construction,
          whereas the plaintiff argued that the later rule of con-
          struction must be applied. Id. Here, by contrast, the
          plaintiff pits a prior common-law presumption against
          a more recent, statutory presumption. The rationale of
          Purifoy, however, applies equally. The plaintiff
          attempts to equate the common-law presumption about
          the meaning of the terms ‘‘issue’’ and ‘‘descendants’’
          with the actual intention of the testator. In the words
          of the Purifoy court, this ‘‘[she] clearly cannot do.’’ Id.,
          1079 n.3.
             Section 45a-731 (11) changed the lens through which
          the terms at issue here must be examined. Although
          the terms ‘‘issue’’ and ‘‘descendants’’ may have been
          presumed at the time the will was executed in 1946 to
          include only lineal descendants when no contrary intent
          could be discerned from the instrument, the use of
          these terms in a will or trust, in the absence of evidence
          that the testator actually considered the contingency
          of adoption, does not provide the requisite quantum
          of proof (i.e., clear and convincing evidence) that the
          testator actually intended to treat adopted persons dif-
          ferently from biological children. In other words, the
          use of the terms ‘‘issue’’ or ‘‘descendants’’ in a will or
          trust, without more, does not suffice to satisfy the new
          statutory burden of showing, by clear and convincing
          evidence, the testator’s actual intention that adopted
          persons be treated differently from biological children.
            In a final effort to show by clear and convincing
          evidence that the testator in this case intended to
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       exclude adopted persons from receiving distributions
       pursuant to the trust, the plaintiff points to the testator’s
       first codicil, in which the testator added the word ‘‘the’’
       into the trust document. The language so amended pro-
       vides in relevant part: ‘‘If any of the original beneficiar-
       ies or their successors in interest as herein determined
       shall die either before or after my death leaving no
       issue, the interest of the one so dying shall thereafter
       be held upon the same terms for the benefit of the other
       beneficiaries then living and/or their issue or successors
       . . . in the same proportions in which they would
       inherit from the one so dying without issue if he or she
       were unmarried, under the laws covering the distribu-
       tion of intestate estates then in force in the State of
       Connecticut . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.)
          The plaintiff argues that the addition of the word
       ‘‘the,’’ which did not appear in the original will but was
       considered of such importance by the testator that it
       was added in the first codicil, ‘‘clearly define[s] the
       connecting words ‘other beneficiaries then living and/
       or their issue or successors,’’ evincing an intent by the
       testator to limit the class of distributees under the will
       to the originally named ten individuals that he named
       and their lineal blood descendants. We are not per-
       suaded. As the trial court correctly noted, the addition
       in the first codicil of the clarifying word ‘‘the’’ implies
       nothing about adopted persons and certainly does not
       constitute clear and convincing evidence of an intention
       to exclude them. Although the plaintiff attempts to
       show the testator’s intent to exclude adopted persons
       by pointing to other areas of the will, those attempts
       fall short for the same reasons. Nothing to which the
       plaintiff points us speaks to the testator’s intention
       regarding adopted persons.8
         8
           The plaintiff makes numerous references throughout her briefing to this
       court suggesting that Fass’ adult adoption was a sham or otherwise improper.
       The plaintiff made no such claim in her complaint and presented no evidence
       to the Probate Court or to the Superior Court in support such a claim. In
       addition, she fails adequately to brief any such claim on appeal. We therefore
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            On the basis of the foregoing, we conclude that nei-
          ther of the exceptions in § 45a-731 (11) are satisfied
          in this case and, therefore, the interpretation of the
          testamentary trust at issue is governed by § 45a-731 (4),
          which provides that the terms ‘‘issue’’ and ‘‘descen-
          dants’’ as used in the trust include legally adopted per-
          sons. Accordingly, we conclude that the Superior Court
          properly granted the defendants’ motions for summary
          judgment and denied the plaintiff’s motion for summary
          judgment.
               The judgment is affirmed.
               In this opinion the other judges concurred.

          deem her claim, to the extent she is making one to that effect, abandoned.
             We further note that, to the extent the plaintiff’s arguments can be read
          as calling into question the validity of adult adoptions in general, Connecticut
          law expressly permits them. See General Statutes § 45a-734. Furthermore,
          to the extent that the plaintiff suggests that Fass’ adoption as an adult
          supports her claim concerning the testator’s intention to exclude adopted
          persons, that argument also lacks merit. Fass’ adoption in 2008, as an adult,
          is not evidence of the testator’s intent to exclude adopted persons when
          he executed his will and codicils more than fifty years earlier. This is espe-
          cially true in light of the fact that Connecticut has recognized adult adoptions
          since as early as 1918, many years prior to the testator’s death. See General
          Statutes (1918 Rev.) § 4882 (‘‘Any person of full age may, by written agree-
          ment with another person of full age younger than himself, unless such
          other person is his or her wife, husband, brother, sister, uncle or aunt of
          the whole or half blood, adopt such other person as his child, provided,
          such written agreement be approved by the court of probate for the district
          in which the adopting parent resides or, if such adopting parent is not an
          inhabitant of this state, for the district in which adopted person resides.
          . . . Such child by virtue of such adoption shall inherit estate from its
          adopting parent or parents, or the relatives of such adopting parent or
          parents, the same as though such adopted child were the natural child of
          such adopting parent or parents, and shall not inherit estate from his or
          her natural parents or relatives . . . .’’ (Emphasis in original.))