Court Opinion

ID: 2964802
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:31:20.560175+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:11:53.914844
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                               [NOT FOR PUBLICATION] 
                                ____________________
          No. 96-1353
                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                      Appellee,
                                         v.
                                   KENNETH RAPOSA,
                                Defendant, Appellant.
                                ____________________
                    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
                    [Hon. Ernest C. Torres, U.S. District Judge]
                                ____________________
                                       Before
                                Selya, Circuit Judge,
                       Coffin and Cyr, Senior Circuit Judges.
                                ____________________
               Edward 
                     J. 
                        Romano, by Appointment of the Court, for appellant.
               Margaret E. Curran,  Assistant United States Attorney,  with
          whom Sheldon Whitehouse, United States Attorney, James H. Leavey,
          Assistant 
                   United States Attorney, and Kenneth P. Madden, Assistant
          United States Attorney, were on brief for appellee.
                                ____________________
                                    July 3, 1997
                                 ___________________

               Per Curiam.  Appellant was convicted, after a jury trial, of
          participating  in the  collection of  an extension  of credit  by
          extortionate 
                      means, 
                            in 
                               violation of 18 U.S.C. SS 894, 2.  He raises
          three issues on appeal.  At this juncture, after a hard and  ably
          fought trial below, no issue merits extended discussion.
               Appellant first challenges the sufficiency of the  evidence.
          The 
             evidence 
                      as the jury could have found it was that (1) Duxbury,
          the 
             key 
                government 
                           witness, was confronted by co-defendant Ouimette
          and 
             accused 
                     of 
                       shaking 
                               down a friend; (2) Duxbury's response earned
          him a beating by a third defendant, Gellerman, who pleaded guilty
          and 
             testified as a cooperating witness at trial; (3) Ouimette then
          grabbed Duxbury by the  throat and announced that, as a  penalty,
          Duxbury must pay $5,000  by the following night; (4) after  this,
          Ouimette slapped Duxbury in the face and appellant kicked Duxbury
          in the  leg; and  (5) most importantly,  just before Duxbury  was
          escorted out of the room, appellant raised his hand, and pointing
          at 
            Duxbury, 
                     said, 
                          "Do 
                              not forget the five thousand dollars tomorrow
          night."
               Appellant 
                        asserted flaws and inconsistencies in the testimony
          of the various witnesses, but this comes down to a question as to
          which 
               witness 
                       the 
                          jury 
                               believed.  There is nothing to set this case
          apart from the general deference due a jury's verdict.  Not  only
          was there  Duxbury's unshaken testimony,  but the  jury also  had
          before  it nonverbal  evidence  of  appellant's  kicks  following
          Ouimette's announcement of the penalty.
                                         -2-

               The second issue  is whether the  district court abused  its
          discretion by refusing  the defense a  continuance to obtain  the
          testimony 
                   of 
                      a 
                       polygraph 
                                 examiner whose testing allegedly supported
          appellant's assertion that he had not reminded Duxbury about  the
          $5,000.  The colloquy below and the briefs on appeal discuss many
          facets of polygraph test admissibility, but we need rely on  only
          one ground particular to this case.
               A prior counsel for appellant, before his removal to avoid a
          conflict based on representation of a co-defendant, had  obtained
          the  test from  his expert.   The  attorney had  proposed to  the
          government that  it secure  an impartial  examiner to  administer
          another test,  "provided that you agree  that the results of  the
          polygraph 
                   examination will be admitted at the trial of this matter
          on the  issue of  Mr. Raposa's credibility,  should he choose  to
          testify at trial."  (Emphasis added.)  As it happened,  appellant
          decided not to testify  and the precondition to admission of  the
          results of the examination therefore did not materialize.
               Under 
                    these 
                          circumstances, we cannot fault the district court
          for 
             refusing 
                      a mid-trial continuance for the defense to locate the
          expert 
                so 
                   that 
                       he 
                          could 
                                attempt to justify admission of his report.
          Indeed, 
                 we 
                   read 
                        appellant's brief on appeal as implicitly conceding
          this with  the following  language:   "In the  present case,  the
          polygraph evidence  would  directly corroborate  the  defendant's
          testimony, if he chose to testify, regarding specific fact  [sic]
          alleged by the government  and denied by the defendant which  the
          jury 
              must 
                   determine . . . ."   It is also worthy of note that this
                                         -3-

          language 
                  is 
                     identical to that used in a "Motion to Admit Polygraph
          Evidence" 
                   filed 
                         in 
                           the 
                               district court by appellant's trial counsel.
               The third issue  concerns the court's refusal to strike  the
          testimony  of a dancer  who stated that  appellant had asked  her
          "something like, are you a cop  or something."  She was not  sure
          that  this was  said on  the  day after  the basic  incident  and
          appellant's 
                     counsel moved to strike on the ground that the witness
          did not remember on which day the statement was made.  The  court
          allowed 
                 the 
                     testimony to stand, saying that its weight was for the
          jury.
               We 
                 cannot 
                        say 
                           that 
                                this 
                                     was an abuse of discretion.  There was
          no objection that this was impermissible character evidence,  nor
          did this undercut appellant's defense that he did not participate
          in an extortionate activity (as opposed to some type of  criminal
          activity, such as an assault).
               Affirmed.
                                         -4-