Court Opinion

ID: 9785621
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 22:14:16.208495+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:30.709118
License: Public Domain

BRYNER, Justice,
with whom EASTAUGH, Justice,
joins, concurring.
I agree with the court's decision to afﬁr‘J-rn the summary judgment but would rely on a narrower ground for affirming.
In the present case, counsel for CSRS substituted for the attorney general's office as plaintiff's counsel of record and, contemporaneously, substituted CSRS for CSED as the nominal plaintiff, In so doing, counsel for CSRS made it clear that CSRS was serving in the capacity of a private collection agency representing the obligee parent, Nancy Bowen. And counsel represented that "[the State of Alaska has always been merely a nominal party in this matter, prosecuting on behalf of the custodial parent and the dependant [sic] child. This substitution of parties is intended only to replace the nominal party."
The attorney general's office confirmed the narrow scope of the substitution, indicating that this case was one of "several collection cases" prosecuted by CSED with the attorney general's representation, that CSED had instructed the attorney general's office to cooperate with CSRS and CSRS's attorney "in turning collection of the child support arrearages in this case over to CSRS," and that the attorney general's office agreed, "Itloward that end," that substitution of counsel and of the nominal party was appropriate "in this instance."
By the explicit and unambiguous terms of this substitution agreement, the state authorized CSRS to replace CSED and to assert the agency's legal interests only to the extent that CSED had acted in Bowen's stead to collect her past due child support; the stipulation unequivocally contemplated that CSRS would only assert Bowen's right to collect "child support arrearages."
Assuming, then, that AS 25.27.260(a) goes beyond creating joint and several liability and literally holds noncompliant employers liable for a penalty equivalent to the amount of outstanding child support arrearages, CSRS simply had no authority to prosecute an action to enforce this penalty. Any penalty authorized by AS 25.27.260(a) under joint and several employer liability could not plausibly be characterized as "child support ar-rearages." Under AS 25.27.260(a), this penalty would be payable to the state, and would not be due or owed to Bowen. CSED's right to recover the penalty for the state thus differs markedly from its right to recover past due child support for Bowen. Accordingly, I would affirm on this narrow basis: no matter how broad AS 25.27.260(a)'s penalty might be, the penalty action belonged to the state, the state never assigned it to CSRS, and CSRS had no right to pursue it under the substitution agreement.'1
Interpretation of AS 25.27.260(a) presents a close and difficult question that we need not answer here. In my view, we would best leave the question open for a case in which we must decide it.2

. As the court correctly notes, CSRS has disclaimed reliance on AS 25.27.260(b)'s provision giving Bowen the right to maintain a direct penalty action. See Opinion at 64.

. The court's decision to resolve this question when it could be readily avoided seems particularly unfortunate because the question is one of great significance to CSED, which is not a party here. Although CSED has filed an amicus brief forcefully arguing that the superior court's inter*74pretation of the statute is unduly narrow, and although the superior court did not have the benefit of this briefing when it ruled, this court today adopts by reference the superior court's decision without addressing CSED's arguments, thus precluding full consideration of the agency's position.