Court Opinion

ID: 9374658
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-23 18:01:02.504897+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:52.221787
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                        FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        FEB 23 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                              FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

HECTOR VILLA GARCIA,                             No.   20-72847

                Petitioner,                      Agency No. A088-452-263

 v.
                                                 MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,

                Respondent.

                     On Petition for Review of an Order of the
                         Board of Immigration Appeals

                           Submitted February 14, 2023**
                               Pasadena, California

Before: O’SCANNLAIN, HURWITZ, and BADE, Circuit Judges.

      Petitioner Hector Villa Garcia, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for

review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) dismissal of his appeal

seeking an adjustment of his immigration status under 8 U.S.C. § 1255. Because

we lack jurisdiction, we dismiss the petition.

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
      Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), “no court shall have jurisdiction to

review . . . any judgment regarding the granting of relief” under § 1255. The only

exception is for “constitutional claims or questions of law.” Id. § 1252(a)(2)(D).

Although courts “retain jurisdiction to review due process challenges, a petitioner

may not create the jurisdiction that Congress chose to remove simply by cloaking

an abuse of discretion argument in constitutional garb.” Torres-Aguilar v. INS,

246 F.3d 1267, 1271 (9th Cir. 2001). The constitutional argument must at least be

“colorable.” Id. Reversal of an immigration court’s decision on due-process

grounds requires a showing that the “proceeding was so fundamentally unfair that

the alien was prevented from reasonably presenting his case” and that this

prevention resulted in prejudice, “which means that the outcome of the proceeding

may have been affected.” Colmenar v. INS, 210 F.3d 967, 971 (9th Cir. 2000).

1.    Petitioner first contends that the immigration judge (“IJ”) violated his due

process rights by using his juvenile record as a basis for denying the application for

status adjustment. This contention is belied by the record—although the IJ

enumerated certain charges that Petitioner faced while a juvenile and referred to

his “significant juvenile record,” the discussion around Petitioner’s negative

factors centered on his adult criminal record as well as his testimony at the merits

hearing,—and Petitioner does not provide any authority suggesting the IJ erred in

considering this record in exercising its discretion on Petitioner’s application for

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adjustment. Petitioner therefore fails to present a colorable argument that the IJ’s

references to his juvenile convictions prevented him from reasonably presenting

his case for status adjustment or how those references may have otherwise affected

his particular proceedings.

2.    Petitioner next argues that the IJ mischaracterized his testimony during the

merits hearing by ignoring that Petitioner admitted to pleading guilty for his

various crimes and by wrongfully imputing a conviction of grand theft to

Petitioner. Contrary to Petitioner’s arguments, admitting a guilty plea is not

necessarily “tantamount to accepting responsibility,” and the record reflects that

Petitioner consistently deflected or denied outright responsibility for many of his

arrests and convictions. Nor did the IJ impute any crime to Petitioner: the IJ

merely noted that Petitioner had been “repeatedly arrested for crimes involving

stolen vehicles and possession of burglary tools,” a finding that is amply supported

by the record.

3.    Petitioner also contends that the IJ uncritically relied on the police reports in

finding Petitioner not credible. But Petitioner’s only complaint about the police

reports is that they were based on hearsay, and an IJ may consider hearsay if it is

probative and its use is fundamentally fair. See In re Ponce-Hernandez, 22 I. & N.

Dec. 784, 785 (BIA 1999).

4.    Finally, Petitioner alleges that his hearing was fundamentally unfair because

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the IJ cross-examined Petitioner in “the role of a prosecutor.” However, an IJ may

“aggressively and sometimes harshly” question an alien, see Melkonian v.

Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 1061, 1072 (9th Cir. 2003), and Petitioner does not identify any

instance of overly harsh questioning from the IJ or anything to intimate that the IJ

was not impartial.

      Because Petitioner has failed to raise a colorable due process claim, we lack

jurisdiction to review the denial of his application for adjustment of status.

      DISMISSED.

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