Court Opinion

ID: 9522014
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:16:51.188344+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:02:12.596777
License: Public Domain

Robinson, J.,
¶ 11. concurring. If the trial court had sentenced defendant to two more years of minimum time for violating an abuse-prevention order than actually authorized by law, I could not agree that the court’s sentence did not amount to plain error. If incarcerating someone two years longer than actually permitted by law is not the kind of “exceptional circumstance[ ] where a failure to recognize error would result in a miscarriage of justice, or where there is glaring error so grave and serious that it strikes at the very heart of the defendant’s constitutional rights,” it’s hard to imagine what would be. See State v. Carpenter, 170 Vt. 371, 375, 749 A.2d 1137, 1139-40 (2000) (quotation omitted).
¶ 12. That is true even if the legal error leading to the extra two years of minimum confinement was not patently apparent from the language of the statute. And the fact that defendant’s total minimum sentence pursuant to his plea agreement could have been higher than the sentence he received does not mean that justice is not offended if the sentence actually assigned is unlawful.
¶ 13. I agree with the majority that there is no plain error in this case for a different reason: The court’s sentence was not in error at all. As the majority rightly notes, the habitual-offender statute replaces the statutory term for the fourth and subsequent felony convictions. Ante, ¶ 8. Nothing in the language or purpose of 13 V.S.A. § 11 limits the effect of habitual-offender sentencing to the maximum term only. Ante, ¶ 7. Rather than suggesting that confining defendant on a charge for two years longer than allowed by statute would not strike at the heart of defendant’s constitutional rights, I would decide the pivotal question squarely.