Court Opinion

ID: 9588316
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:32:49.870813+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:07.898967
License: Public Domain

*173MR. JUSTICE ERICKSON
dissenting:
The Garretts’ appeal to the district court was premised on two grounds: (1) that the decision of the City Council in denying their requested change in zoning from R-2 to B-l was arbitrary and capricious; and (2) that the R-2 zoning ordinance was unconstitutional as applied to their property because it precluded the use of the property for any purpose to which it could be reasonably adapted.
Under the first claim for relief, the Garretts sought to have this Court compel the City Council to grant the requested change in zoning from R-2 to B-l. Under the second claim for relief, the Garretts sought to have this Court declare the R-2 zoning ordinance unenforceable as to their property.
The majority opinion has treated this case as if it only involved the issue of whether the decision of the City Council was arbitrary and capricious. In effect, the Court concluded that if the Garretts were not entitled to have their property rezoned B-l, then no relief could be granted. Upon determining that the Garretts failed to show that B-l zoning was the only zoning reasonable for their property under the circumstances, the Court reversed the judgment of the district court and dismissed the Garretts’ complaint.
It seems perfectly clear that the majority opinion has avoided answering the very issue that caused the case to be brought before this Court. Had the Garretts not challenged the constitutionality of the zoning ordinance as applied to their property, this case could and should have been decided by the Colorado Court of Appeals. 1969 Perm. Supp., C.R.S. 1963, 37-21-2. The allegations in the Garretts’ complaint were sufficient to raise the constitutional issue, and this Court was forced to either declare the R-2 zoning ordinance unconstitutional and unenforceable as applied to the Garretts’ property or sustain its validity.
In this case, the district court found that the evidence supported a conclusion that the R-2 zoning deprived the Garretts of any reasonable use of their property. That finding is unchallenged by the majority opinion of this Court. It follows that the R-2 zoning ordinance should have been *174declared unconstitutional and unenforceable as to the property in question. Francis v. City and County of Denver, 160 Colo. 440, 418 P.2d 45 (1966); accord, Stevens v. Huntington, 20 N.Y.2d 352, 229 N.E.2d 591 (1967); National Brick Co. v. County of Lake, 9 Ill.2d 191, 137 N.E.2d 494 (1956); see Huneke v. Glaspy, 155 Colo. 593, 396 P.2d 453 (1964); Baum v. City and County of Denver, 147 Colo. 104, 363 P.2d 688 (1961). See also, Manilow v. Miami Beach, 213 So.2d 589 (Fla. App. 1968), cert. discharged, 226 So.2d 805, cert. denied, 397 U.S. 972.
Under these circumstances, the property owner was entitled to have his property rezoned in accordance with constitutional and statutory requirements if the City Council desired to impose any limitations upon its use. National Brick Co. v. County of Lake, supra; Buono v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 143 Conn. 673, 124 A.2d 915 (1956); see Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963).