Court Opinion

ID: 9853529
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:49:55.933097+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:50.755252
License: Public Domain

SMITH, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Because I believe that the district court placed an impermissibly rigid time constraint on the plaintiffs case, I respectfully dissent.
As the majority notes, this court has discouraged district courts from setting the types of rigid time constraints imposed here. Johnson v. Ashby, 808 F.2d 676, 678 (8th Cir.1987); Life Plus Intern. v. Brown, 317 F.3d 799 (8th Cir.2003) (“We reemphasize our disapproval of rigid hourly time constraints at trial.”). A district court may impose time constraints to prevent undue delay, waste of time, or the needless presentation of cumulative evidence. Id. These mischiefs, however, were absent in the instant case. In fact, the record shows that the district court sought to expedite the case, viewing it not as unusually time consuming but instead as rather routine. The court stated:
The time limitations imposed in this case [ ] were imposed exercising my judgment after ten years as a trial judge and 35 years of practicing law. That when you strip away everything else, this case is a garden variety race discrimination case which should be tried in 3 or 4 days.
(Trial Transcript, P. 68).
The district court imposed these rigid time constraints before the conclusion of discovery and six months before trial had begun. (Doc. 162).We have discouraged such strict and apparently arbitrary time limits. In First National Bank and Trust Co. v. Hollingsworth, 931 F.2d 1295, 1305 (8th Cir.1991), where the district court sought “to bring the trial to a rapid conclusion,” we held that the district court abused its discretion because the record suggested an improper motive and the record failed to indicate a proper basis for the time constraint. Id. (“In the absence of some proper basis in the record, or, more preferably, some explanation from the district court for its blanket prohibition of the defendant’s testimony, we must conclude that the district court abused its discretion.”); see also Johnson, 808 F.2d at 678 (“It may be an abuse of the trial court’s discretion to exclude probative, non-cumulative evidence simply because its introduction will cause delay, and any time limits formulated in advance of trial must be fashioned with this in mind.”). Here, the time constraints prevented the plaintiff from offering proof crucial to the cause of action, not mere cumulative testimony. Therefore, I conclude that the district court abused its discretion.
Harris preserved this issue by objecting, telling the court that “[t]he time [constraint] has been so prejudicial that the decision maker and the actual harasser or whatever you want to name him, were [not] presented to testify.” Further, it appears that Harris attempted to make offers of proof. “Your Honor, in addition *1145to that I also want to make a record on a couple of items specifically limiting it to two days.... ” And also, “I think that, one, it’s important that I make a record that the plaintiff has not been able to zealously advocate her position.” No offer of proof appears to have been permitted. A district court clearly errs when it refuses to allow a party to make an offer of proof. Gray v. Lucas, 677 F.2d 1086, 1100 (5th Cir.1982). Therefore, I believe Harris sufficiently objected and made a reasonable effort to make an offer of proof.
Additionally, I believe the district court’s time limitations prejudiced a substantial right. Fed.R.Evid. 103. Specifically, although Harris was able to elicit testimony from Chand and Wenk,6 the record does not show why the testimony of Harris’s three other proposed witnesses would have lacked probative value. Harris claims that these three ADT employees would have discredited ADT’s reason for her termination — the unauthorized possession and use of confidential QA codes. In fact, one of these witnesses’ declaration states that, “There was also never any policy in effect stating that the QA codes were confidential nor was there a policy refraining the managers from possessing the QA codes.” The jury may not have believed Harris’s witnesses but she should have been given the opportunity to present them.
Lastly, the district court noted that pri- or to the forced conclusion of her case, Harris had been inefficient and presented issues that were not germane. Assuming this to be true, it would still not justify foreclosing three witnesses without a showing that their presentation would have caused undue delay, wasted time, or needlessly presented cumulative evidence. If the court had held an evidentiary hearing or given some indication that these witnesses’ testimony would have impermissibly lengthened the trial, then the district court might have been justified in its observation. Hollingsworth, 931 F.2d 1295, 1305 (stating that the trial court should have held an evidentiary hearing to determine the effect of the evidence excluded by its desire to bring the trial to a quick conclusion).
For these reasons, I dissent.

. I agree with the majority that our analysis is complicated by the inexplicable absence of a complete trial record.