Court Opinion

ID: 9605323
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:33:44.606179+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:27.534580
License: Public Domain

BROWN, Justice,
dissenting, joined by ROSE, Chief Justice.
I am not entirely satisfied that § 6-3-124, W.S.1977, does not violate the equal protection clause, § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Neither am I convinced that this statute does not violate Art. 1, § 5 of the Wyoming Constitution, prohibiting imprisonment for debt. I will not address those issues, however, because I think the statute should be declared unconstitutional as being so vague and indefinite as to the time the offense is committed that it violates the due process clauses of the Wyoming and United States Constitutions.1
Section 6-3-124(a), W.S.1977, provides: “Any person who deceitfully issues a check which is not paid because the drawer has insufficient funds with the drawee, has issued a fraudulent check and commits fraud by check unless the check Is paid by the maker within ten (10) days of receiving notice, sent to the address shown on the instrument of dishonor or non-payment.” (Emphasis added.)
I believe that the modifying language, “unless the check is paid by the maker *1230within ten (10) days of receiving notice, sent to the address shown on the instrument of dishonor or non-payment,” is so vague and indefinite that it is impermissible under the federal and state constitutions. The emphasized language in the statute first appeared in Ch. 18, § 1, S.L. of Wyoming, 1980. Likewise, the prima facie evidence rule in § 6-3-125, W.S.1977, first appeared in its present form in the fraudulent check statute in Ch. 18, § 1, S.L. of Wyoming, 1980.2
I have difficulty determining under the statute when the crime is committed. It seems that there are two possibilities. The first possibility is that the crime is committed when the check was actually issued. If this is the date, then it appears a person issuing a fraudulent check could get absolution by paying the check after being notified. The second possibility is that the crime is committed when the check is not paid within 10 days after notice of dishonor or nonpayment. If this is the time the crime is committed, then there is a minimum of ten days between the physical act of issuing the check and the fraudulent intent. The time between the physical act and forming the intent could be weeks, months, or years. It all depends on when notice is given. Perhaps if notice cannot be given, no intent is ever formed.
I do not suppose anyone would contend that the fraudulent check statute is a ma-lum prohibitum statute and that intent is therefore not an element of the crime. I proceed, consequently, on the assumption that intent is an element of the crime of issuing a fraudulent check. The majority has determined that the final act of committing the crime is no sooner than ten days after “notice of dishonor or nonpayment.” According to the majority, then, the crime is committed piecemeal. The first segment is committed when the check is issued and the second segment, the intent to defraud, occurs ten days or more later.
The majority says, “The crime is obviously not ripe for prosecution until ten days after notice of dishonor or nonpayment, and the maker has failed to pay the check.” If the crime is not ripe for prosecution, that can only mean that an element is missing. It logically follows, according to the majority, that the missing element is the intent to defraud. This may be supplied ten days or more later; then the crime is ripe to prosecute. This concept flies in the face of general criminal law. An intent acquired after the act has been committed is not the intent that controls. Under this statute a person could write a check lacking the intent to deceive, and only decide to deceive when he receives notice that the check was bad. The court in Gay v. United States, 408 F.2d 923 (8th Cir.1969), quoted:
“ * * * ‘An act done without criminal intent does not become a crime by virtue of the fact that the defendant thereafter had the necessary intent.’ ” 1 Wharton’s Criminal Law and Procedure, § 63, pp. 139-140 (1957 ed.).
By the same token, an act done with criminal intent, in this case the deceitful writing of the check, should not become a nullity because thereafter the check writer makes it good. Repentence is not a criminal law concept; it is a theological phenomenon. Restitution is part of repentence, but not a factor nullifying crime. Restitution may have some relevance with respect to sentence or granting probation, but has no bearing on guilt.
It seems to me that § 6-3-124(a), supra, contemplates a violation if a check is issued by a person intending to defraud. The in*1231tent, therefore, must precede or occur simultaneously with the overt act of issuing the check. The adjective “deceitfully” preceding the word “issuing” certainly suggests an intent to defraud. Up to this point the statute seems to conform to general criminal law, that is, intent precedes or is simultaneous with the physical act. The problem with the statute, as I see it, is that it goes on to nullify a completed criminal act by adding, “unless the check is paid by the maker within ten (10) days.” This is, in effect, an absolution clause, which is an anomoly in criminal law. Where in criminal law can restitution nullify a crime ab initio? What would we say about a larceny statute that nullified the crime if the property was returned within ten days, or an embezzlement statute that absolved the embezzler if he put the money back in the till within ten days? What would we say about a kidnapper who returned the kidnapped child within ten days?
The State in its brief says that virtually all states have a provision to redeem checks in their fraudulent check statute. The State cites State v. Haremza, 213 Kan. 201, 515 P.2d 1217 (1973); Patterson v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 556 S.W.2d 909 (1977), cert, denied, 435 U.S. 970, 98 S.Ct. 1609, 56 L.Ed.2d 61 (1978); Smithson v. State, 222 Tenn. 499, 438 S.W.2d 61 (1969). These cases are not authority for the problem. In State v. Haremza, supra, a Kansas statute (K.S.A.1971 Supp. 21-3703) provided for a prima facie evidence rule similar to Wyoming’s fraudulent check statute. Kansas had no provision in their law like the absolution clause provided for in § 6-3-124(a), supra. In Patterson and Smithson, each court was also concerned with a prima facie evidence rule rather than a nullification clause. The majority cites no cases that approve a statute which has an absolution clause like Wyoming’s statute.
The absolution clause in § 6-3-124(a), supra, does not seem to be compatible with § 6 — 3—125(a)(ii)(iii), supra. Arguably, § 6-3-124(a), supra, gives a check writer a substantive right to notice of dishonor or nonpayment. Section 6-3-125(a) is a rule of evidence to the effect that nonpayment after notice is prima facie evidence of intent at the time the check was issued. If the absolution clause in § 6-3-124(a), supra, has validity, then § 6 — 3—125(a)(ii)(iii), supra, has no purpose.
There are numerous possibilities for mischief under the fraudulent check statute. What happens if the check writer is playing • for time and intends to pay the check after notice, but when that time comes he cannot raise the money? Suppose notice cannot be given to the check writer. The absolution clause provides that notice is to be sent to the address, “shown on the instrument of dishonor or nonpayment.” Suppose that no address is shown, or that an incorrect address is shown. How, then, is notice given? Is notice a substantive right, and is proof that the writer received notice an element of the crime? Can a person be prosecuted if he has not received notice?
The majority refers to principles of due process set out in Sanchez v. State, Wyo., 567 P.2d 270, 274 (1977), and earlier Wyoming cases:
“ ‘1. The requirement of a reasonable degree of certainty in legislation, especially in the criminal law, is a well-established element of the guarantee of due process of law.
“ ‘2. No one may be required at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes.
“ ‘3. All are entitled to be informed as to what the state commands or forbids.
“ ‘4. A statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of due process of law.
“ ‘5. The constitutional guarantee of equal rights under the law (see Art. 1, §§ 2 and 3, Wyoming Constitution) will not tolerate a criminal law so lacking in definition that each defendant is left to the vagaries of individual judges and juries.’ ”
I do not believe § 6-3-124(a), supra, comports with the principles set out in Sanchez. *1232Courts and reasonable men must guess as to when a crime is committed, when the intent is formed, what the effect is of the prima facie evidence rule § 6-3-125, supra, and what is the effect of no notice to the issuer of dishonor or nonpayment. This leaves a defendant subject to the vagaries of individual law enforcement officers and courts, because “men must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.” Sanchez v. State, supra, at 274. For that reason, the part of the statute discussed here should be held to be unconstitutional.

. U.S.Constitution, amend. XIV, § 1:
“ * * * No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
Wyoming Constitution, art. 1, § 6:
“No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.”

. Ch. 18, § 1, S.L. of Wyoming, 1980:
“(a) Any of the following is prima facie evidence that the person at the time he issued the check or other order for the payment of money intended that it should not be paid:
“(i) Proof that at the time of issuance he did not have an account with the drawee;
“(ii) Proof that at the time of issuance he did not have sufficient funds with the drawee and that he failed within ten (10) days after receiving notice of nonpayment or dishonor to pay the check or other order; or “(hi) Proof that when presentment was made in a reasonable time the issuer did not have sufficient funds with the drawee and he failed within ten (10) days after receiving notice of nonpayment or dishonor to pay the check or other order.”