Court Opinion

ID: 9603428
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:06:10.184581+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:08:54.547607
License: Public Domain

Carley, Judge,
dissenting.
I agree with the majority’s conclusion in the first part of Division 4 of the opinion that “ [t] he trial Court erred in charging the provisions of OCGA § 13-2-2 (3), regarding the effect of certain business or trade customs upon contractual obligations, as there was no evidence of *792any such custom or practice in this case.” In this case, the only evidence relied upon by the appellee to support the charge was the testimony that this appellee paid to its own employees, severance pay as discussed in Division 3 of the majority opinion. “Individual habits of dealing do not make a universal custom which by implication enters into the contract and forms a part thereof...” Robertson v. Wilder & Co., 69 Ga. 340 (2a) (1882). Thus, the majority is correct in concluding that there was no evidence admitted which would support a charge under OCGA § 13-2-2 (3) (Code Ann. § 20-704).
However, the majority is incorrect, in my opinion, when it holds that the charge on this code section was harmless error. OCGA § 13-2-2 (3) (Code Ann. § 20-704) provides that: “The custom of any business or trade shall be binding only when it is of such universal practice as to justify the conclusion that it became by implication, a part of the contract...” Although the majority has held the testimony of two of the three former employees to be relevant and admissible for other reasons, such testimony was certainly not admissible to show that the “practice” of the company “became by implication, a part of the contract.” However, since the jury was charged as to this code section, I don’t see how we can say that the jury did not erroneously understand that it could consider the evidence of the payment to the other employees as being a custom which, by implication, became part of the contract between appellant and appellee. I believe that the error was harmful and that, therefore, the trial court erred in denying the motion for a new trial. I respectfully dissent.