Court Opinion

ID: 9551250
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:50:07.253366+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:23:24.199957
License: Public Domain

Hamilton, J.
(concurring in part, dissenting in part) — I concur with the view of the majority opinion and of the Court of Appeals that the trial court properly granted a new trial upon the grounds asserted. I am likewise in accord with the majority determination that in Ulmer v. Ford Motor Co., 75 Wn.2d 522, 452 P.2d 729 (1969), we adopted *468the language, and the import thereof, found in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, comment g at 351 (1965), which places the burden of proof upon a plaintiff, alleging injury from a defective product, that the product was in the defective condition when it left the hands of — in this case — the manufacturer.
I am unable to subscribe, however, to the seeming import of the majority opinion as interpreted by the concurring opinion that the burden of proof shifts to the manufacturer to the extent that the manufacturer’s evidence must “overturn” plaintiff’s evidence. This concept approaches absolute rather than strict liability. Rather than get into the confusing area of shifting burdens of proof, it would be my thought that it is sufficient to say that an injured .plaintiff has met his burden, insofar as nonsuit is concerned, when he has produced credible evidence — as in this case — to the effect that: (1) the apparatus or device involved was manufactured or assembled by the defendant manufacturer; (2) it was delivered to the user or an intermediate party; (3) no significant change was made in the product before injury from it; and (4) the product was dangerously and injuriously defective.
The burden of going forward with the evidence then falls upon the defendant manufacturer, his responsibility being to produce evidence to the effect that the device or apparatus was not in the asserted defective condition when it left his hands. Unless his evidence in this respect is either absolutely conclusive, or totally insufficient, it ordinarily becomes a question for resolution by the trier of the facts as to whether or not the plaintiff has sustained the burden of proof normally resting upon a plaintiff’s shoulders. To hold otherwise, as the majority opinion would appear to do, is to render our adoption of Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, comment g, in Ulmer v. Ford Motor Co., supra, meaningless. Such a result inevitably casts the trial and appellate courts into the position of seeking to unravel and reconcile our former implied warranty cases and moves the burden of proof back and forth on a case-by-case basis. I *469am convinced that, with the deliverance of the Ulmer decision, this court sub silentio superseded and overruled those implied warranty cases insofar as they held or implied that the burden of proof, as distinguished from the burden of going forward with exculpatory evidence, shifted in strict liability cases from one party to another, e.g., Pulley v. Pacific Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 68 Wn.2d 778, 415 P.2d 636 (1966).
Unfortunately, in my opinion, the trial court in granting plaintiff’s motion for a directed verdict on liability as to defendant Premier Athletic Products Corporation (hereafter referred to as Premier), erroneously relied upon the Pulley case and its shifting burden of proof theory. This, then, brings me to a second departure from the result of the majority opinion, which is to the effect that the cause must be remanded for a new trial on the issue of liability as well as damages.
Before discussing the evidentiary pattern, it is interesting to review briefly the pleading and procedural aspects as the case progressed to verdict. Plaintiff, by her complaint, proceeded against both defendants Premier and the YMCA on a theory of negligence and against Premier also under the doctrine of strict liability. The YMCA answered denying negligence and cross-claimed against Premier alleging negligent design and manufacture. Premier answered denying generally plaintiff’s and cross-complainant’s allegations. Premier asserted no affirmative defense.
With commencement of the trial, plaintiff’s counsel announced he was proceeding against Premier on the theory of strict liability only and against the YMCA on the theory of negligence. At the conclusion of all of the evidence, the YMCA moved for dismissal on the basis that the evidence was insufficient to establish negligence on its part and that it was not subject to the doctrine of strict liability. Plaintiff virtually joined the YMCA’s motion by conceding that the evidence was insufficient on the issue of negligence and that the YMCA’s liability under a theory of strict liability *470was questionable. Plaintiff reserved only the contention that, if the trial court believed the evidence concerning the actions of the YMCA sufficient to create a jury question as to the liability of Premier, then it was sufficient to retain the YMCA as a party defendant on the theory of negligence. No reference appears to have been made to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. In granting the YMCA’s motion, the trial court stated with respect to the issue of negligence:
I am going to eliminate the claim of negligence against the YMCA. I feel I have been invited to do that. I feel that this is a decision of the plaintiff which it has a right to make. She has indicated that this is her position in light of all the evidence, every bit of which she, through her counsel, is as well aware of as I am, and I will eliminate that issue on the basis of the statements of counsel.
In granting the same motion with respect to the issue of strict liability, the trial court concluded that the doctrine did not extend to the YMCA because it was an eleemosynary corporation.
In granting the plaintiff’s motion for a directed verdict on liability against Premier, the trial court seized upon language in the Pulley opinion relative to a manufacturer’s burden of proof and to a requirement that such burden be met by direct evidence establishing an intervening source of a claimed defect in a defective product, and concluded that the circumstantial evidence adduced by Premier failed to meet such a test.
As heretofore indicated, I believe the Ulmer decision modified the burden of proof theory of Pulley, and implicitly carried with it the proposition that a defendant manufacturer in a strict liability situation may show by appropriate circumstantial evidence that the product involved left its hands in a safe, nondefective condition.
In undertaking a review of the evidence presented for evaluation in connection with plaintiff’s motion for directed verdict on the issue of liability, it must be recognized, as *471the majority opinion purports to do, that plaintiff’s motion
admits the truth of the opponent’s evidence, together with all reasonable inferences arising therefrom, and requires a most favorable interpretation thereof.
Holdcroft v. Hahn Truck Co., 71 Wn.2d 410, 429 P.2d 204 (1967).
In the instant case, there can be no question but that plaintiff’s injuries were occasioned by an improper fastening of the parallel bar to the metal saddles upon which it rested. This improper fastening consisted of the four screws of each saddle (one at each end of the parallel bar) being inadequately threaded into the bar a fraction of an inch from the four predrilled pilot holes. Whether the screws could be forced into the bar without lead holes was in question by virtue of the fact that such bars are made of hickory. In any event, if lead holes were drilled they would have been substantially smaller than the predrilled pilot holes.
Thus, the critical factual question in the case is: Who affixed the saddles in such a manner? Premier, the manufacturer, or someone at the YMCA in whose exclusive custody the bars were from the latter part of November, 1967, to the date of the accident, June 9,1968?
Plaintiff, in her case in chief, called Mr. Claude Bare, presumably as an adverse witness. Mr. Bare, an ironworker by occupation, was a member of the Board of Directors of the YMCA and a part-time volunteer instructor in or supervisor of the YMCA’s gymnastic program. In essence, he testified that: at his urging the YMCA ordered, through its national organization, a set of parallel bars; the parallel bars in question arrived in slightly roughed-up cartons in the latter part of November, 1967; the saddles upon which the bars or rails rest when attached to the uprights were attached to the bars; he examined and tested with his hands the saddle attachments and deemed them to be in good condition; around Christmas time, 1967, he first assembled the bars and uprights and tested the assembly with the bars in an even, or men’s, position by performing *472a “kip” upon them; although this was his first experience in assembling a parallel bar apparatus, he paid scant attention to the assembly instructions; he experienced some difficulty with a brace which is utilized when the bars are placed in an uneven, or girl’s, position and, at his request, the factory modified the brace to overcome his problem; the plaintiff, Charlene Curtiss, was the first girl to use the bars in the uneven, or girl’s, position since the acquisition of the bars and on the evening of the accident, June 9, 1968; the bars, when not in use, were customarily stored in a locked storeroom provided for gymnastic equipment to which he and one other person had keys; and he did not remove, change, or alter the saddle 'mountings at any time after receipt of the bars and before the accident.
On cross-examination, Mr. Bare admitted that he had previously testified by way of deposition that the bars had been tested sometime before the accident in both the even and uneven positions; the bars had been used by both boys and girls; and, on the evening of the accident, another girl gymnast may have performed some movements on the bars prior to Charlene Curtiss’ tragic maneuver.
By way of corroboration of Mr. Bare, plaintiff called an expert witness, who testified he had examined the bar in question both visually and by radiograph and, in his opinion, the main pilot holes were devoid of any indication of ever having any screws threaded into them.
Defendant Premier’s evidence in response consisted of the testimony of the company president, an employee, a former employee and an expert witness. In substance, the president and the two employee witnesses testified that: during the developmental and production stages of Premier’s entry into the marketing of parallel bars in 1967, the two employee witnesses were the only persons in the plant who attached saddles to parallel bars; the saddles were always attached by and through the use of the predrilled pilot holes; neither of the employees had ever, either in the experimental or production stages, attached a saddle in *473the manner revealed in the instant case; to the best of the witnesses’ knowledge, no parallel bar had ever left the factory with saddles attached other than by way. of the predrilled pilot holes; and, unless the uprights were properly located on the base according to the instructions, difficulty in matching the saddles thereto could be encountered.
As with Mr. Bare, the company president’s testimony was impeached to the extent of an admission that the bar in question could possibly be an experimental bar and that it did not meet NCAA standards in the sense that the distance between the saddles was some 2 inches less than that specified by the standards.
The expert witness called by the defendant stated that, from his examination of the offending bar and the radi-ograph pictures in evidence, the predrilled holes indicated that screws had theretofore been threaded into them. He further testified that the screw heads had the appearance of being driven in and backed out, and that some of the driving and backing had been done by an improperly-sized screwdriver.
The trial court, as well as the majority opinion, places great emphasis on the testimony of Mr. Bare to the effect that he did not alter the saddle assembly between November, 1967, and June, 1968. Overlooked, however, is the fact that Mr. Bare can be characterized as an interested witness who, under all of the circumstances, would indeed be most reluctant to admit that any alteration in the saddle attachment had been made by him or anyone else at the YMCA, if in fact such alteration had occurred. Likewise minimized is the fact that Mr. Bare’s testimony was impeached concerning the extent and nature of the use to which the parallel bars had been subjected prior to the accident. Even if Mr. Bare’s testimony stood uncontradicted and unim-peached,
it was the function of the jury to determine whether or not they believed any particular witness, and they are not obligated to believe any testimony even though there *474be no contradiction or impeachment of the witness. [Citing cases.]
Scanlan v. Smith, 66 Wn.2d 601, 603, 404 P.2d 776 (1965).
In any event, the direct testimonies of the employee and former employee of Premier were to the effect that at the time in question: (a) they were the only two men in the plant who affixed saddles to parallel bars; (b) they had never affixed any saddles in the manner revealed by the accident, and (c) to their knowledge no bars had left the plant with saddles so attached. This testimony, coupled with that of the defendant’s expert witness, concerning the appearance of the predrilled holes and the screwheads, would appear to contradict inferentially, if not directly, the gist of Mr. Bare’s testimony. Certainly, the admission of Premier’s president in response to a leading question that it was possible that the parallel bar in question may have been an experimental bar is subject to more than one interpretation with respect to candidness and credibility.
The cases are legion which point out that in jury trials it is the exclusive province of the jury to resolve conflicts and inconsistencies in the evidence and to determine the weight and credibility to be attached to the testimony of the various witnesses.
As deeply sympathetic as I feel over the horrendous injury inflicted upon the minor plaintiff, I am, nonetheless, compelled under the evidence, as I view it, to conclude that the new trial should be had upon the issue of liability as well as damages.
Rosellini and Utter, JJ., concur with Hamilton, J.
Petition for rehearing denied October 18, 1973.