Court Opinion

ID: 9849691
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:44:25.647412+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:24.093494
License: Public Domain

Harrison, J.,
dissenting
I would affirm the conviction of the defendant for I do not interpret Aguilar or Nathanson as requiring the action here taken by the majority.
The search for narcotics was based upon a judicial determination that there was substantial basis to conclude that probable cause existed. The application for a search warrant was made by a Richmond police officer, and, in support thereof, the officer made to the justice of the peace a full and complete affidavit which recited the following facts:
*288(1) The offense involved — possession of narcotics;
(2) The name of the suspect — Henry Lee Wiles;
(3) The place where the narcotics were stored — the dwelling house of Wiles;
(4) The location and address of the dwelling house — 204 South Linden Street, Richmond, Virginia;
(5) The material facts constituting probable cause, to wit: (a) Information — from an informant who had given reliable information in the past — that Wiles had narcotics in his possession at this time; (b) That the Narcotics Division of the Richmond Police Department had previously received several complaints that Wiles was a user of drugs.
One distinguishing feature of the affidavit is that the police officer who made the affidavit specified the reason why his informant was a reliable person.
More important, the justice concluded that the informant was not just acting on suspicion that Wiles had narcotics in his possession. The informant made a flat, positive and unequivocal statement that Wiles had narcotics in his possession at this time. “At this time” means novo, presently, at this very moment. The only possible implication from such a statement is the informant was speaking and acting from personal knowledge.
The reliability of informant was established by his past satisfactory record of performance. When the search warrant was executed immediately after being issued, it developed that Wiles did have narcotics in his possession and “at that time”.
In Aguilar, the affidavit recited only that the affiant had “received reliable information” from a “creditable person” and “believed” that narcotics were being kept on the premises of a suspect. The difference between that affidavit and the one with which we are confronted is obvious. The affidavit in Aguilar represented only a conclusion and a belief by the officer that narcotics were stored. This conclusion was reached from information given by an informant. The nature and scope of the information and whether obtained by the informant from personal observance, or from another, are not recited.
In the instant case the officer recites in the affidavit why the informant is reliable. The affidavit given here was not because the officer suspected and concluded, from defendant’s reputation as a user, *289that narcotics were in his possession. It was for this, and because an informant, previously established as trustworthy, had stated unequivocally that narcotics were then stored in the defendant’s home, and were in his possession at the very moment the affidavit was made and the warrant was issued.
In Nathtmson a warrant was issued upon the sworn allegation that the “affiant had cause to suspect and does believe” that certain merchandise was in a specified location. There the affidavit was based upon “mere affirmation of suspicion and belief” without any statement of adequate supporting facts, and the court held that was not enough.
The affidavit which was the basis of the search warrant against Wiles indicated the source for the affiant’s belief, and it set forth the basis upon which a judicial finding of probable cause was made. The affidavit therefore met the test oi Giordenetto v. United States, 357 U. S. 480, 78 S. Ct. 1245, 2 L. ed. 2d 1503, quoted from so extensively in Aguilar.
The justice issuing the search warrant here was justified in concluding that the credibility of the informant for giving rehable information had been established, and that the iniormant spoke with personal knowledge since he made a positive assertion that the narcotics were then and there, and at that time, in the possession of Wiles.
Aguilar recognizes that an affidavit may be based on hearsay information and need not reflect the direct personal observation of the affiant. It is equally as well-established that informants may be, and are effectively, used by the police in the apprehension of criminals. To require that affidavits particularize, and be more detailed than is the affidavit in the instant case, would seriously curtail the use of informants for their identity would be disclosed. Here the informant might have been a relative of the accused, the person who sold the narcotics to him, a recent purchaser of narcotics from the defendant, a next door neighbor or a drinking companion. If the affidavit had disclosed the manner, means or method used by the informant to obtain his information, or the time it was obtained, it would have provided a clue by which his identity could have been determined by the defendant and the criminal element in the community. When this occurs, the usefulness of that particular informant to the police is ended.
*290Aguilar was decided by a divided court. Mr. Justice Clark, joined by Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Stewart, dissented, and observed as follows:
“Believing that the Court has substituted a rigid, academic formula for the unrigid standards of reasonableness and ‘probable cause’ laid down by the Fourth Amendment itself — a substitution of technicality for practicality — and believing that the Court’s holding will tend to obstruct the administration of criminal justice throughout the country, I respectfully dissent.” 378 U. S. 108, 122, 84 S. Ct. 1509, 1518, 12 L. ed. 2d 723, 733.
Any extension of Aguilar will further frustrate and obstruct law enforcement officers in their efforts to enforce the criminal laws. If such extension is to be made, I would not have it done by this court. I must therefore dissent.
Buchanan, J. and Carrico, J., join in this dissent.