Court Opinion

ID: 9367012
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-30 17:07:32.331559+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:56.681496
License: Public Domain

J-S35024-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    KHIRY LAMAR BOSTON                         :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 636 MDA 2022

         Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 24, 2022
       In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Criminal Division at
                        No(s): CP-06-CR-0001189-2021

BEFORE:      BENDER, P.J.E., McLAUGHLIN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.:                         FILED JANUARY 30, 2023

        Khiry Lamar Boston appeals from the judgment of sentence entered

following his guilty pleas to multiple drug-related offenses. Boston argues the

court abused its discretion at sentencing. We affirm.

        Boston entered an open guilty plea to three counts of delivery of a

controlled substance (fentanyl), one count of possession with intent to deliver

a controlled substance, and one count of conspiracy.1 At the guilty plea and

sentencing hearing, the Commonwealth gave a factual basis for the charges.

It explained that an undercover police officer purchased fentanyl from Boston

in Reading on three occasions between January and March 2021, and from his

associate, Miguel Bonez-Gomez, on five occasions during that same period.

____________________________________________

*   Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1   See 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30) and 18 Pa.C.S.A § 903(a), respectively.
J-S35024-22

The two men lived in the same apartment building and shared a phone, which

they used to arrange the drug deliveries, and a pickup truck. The police

searched Boston’s apartment and discovered multiple items utilized for

packaging and distributing heroin and fentanyl, a bag containing 9.51 grams

of heroin and fentanyl, and $1,001 in cash. The police also searched Bonez-

Gomez’s apartment and discovered additional items for packaging and

distributing fentanyl, approximately seven grams of fentanyl, and $2,852,

some of which was from the controlled buys by the undercover police officer.

       The Commonwealth argued that Boston had sold drugs “over a period

of some time,” had conspired with Bonez-Gomez, and had sold drugs purely

for financial gain, as opposed to support a drug habit. N.T., 3/24/22, 15-16.

The Commonwealth also pointed out that Boston had a previous criminal

history including convictions for aggravated assault and drug delivery. Id. at

17. The Commonwealth recommended the court use a higher offense gravity

score for the conspiracy conviction, to account for the fentanyl the police found

in both Boston’s and Bonez-Gomez’s apartments.2 The Commonwealth

recommended the court impose standard-range sentences, but that it impose

a consecutive sentence for the conspiracy count.

       Boston argued that because he pleaded guilty, among other things, the

court should not hold him responsible for the drugs found in Bonez-Gomez’s
____________________________________________

2 Conspiracy to commit possession with intent to deliver between 10 and 50
grams of fentanyl carries an offense gravity score of 11, whereas conspiracy
to commit possession with intent to deliver between 1 and 10 grams of
fentanyl carries an offense gravity score of 10. See 204 Pa. Code § 303.15.

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apartment when imposing sentence on the conspiracy charge. Id. at 36-37.

Boston also asked the court to impose concurrent sentences falling in the

mitigated or standard range.

      Seven witnesses testified on Boston’s behalf. They attested that Boston

was very involved with his community and has coached youth football and

softball. Boston has helped with community drives for book bags, raising funds

for little leagues, and in giving away food at Thanksgiving. Several people also

described him as an advocate for community members. According to their

testimony, Boston owns his own business as an independent contractor and

has helped over 30 homeowners restore their properties using their

homeowner’s insurance benefits. Boston is a single father and very active in

the lives of his and others’ children. Several people testified they believed

Boston only resorted to criminal activity after facing financial trouble. See id.

at 18-36. Boston also exercised his right to allocution, apologizing for his

actions, asking for leniency, and expressing his desire to continue mentoring

children and helping the community. See id. at 40-41.

      Prior to imposing sentence, the court made the following statement:

      In fashioning my sentence, I have taken into consideration the
      Commonwealth’s arguments. I have taken into consideration
      defense arguments. Mr. Boston’s statement. I have taken into
      consideration all of the people who came to support you this
      morning. I have taken into consideration the photographs that you
      have provided for the [c]ourt to review of your community
      involvement.

      I have looked at the sentencing factors under Title 42, Subsection
      9721(b), Protection of the Public. I have considered the nature of
      the offense. The nature of this offense is egregious. There is just

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     nothing else to describe the sale of fentanyl. The amount of
     fentanyl that was put out on the street. The amount of the fentanyl
     that was put out on the street by the conspiracy between you and
     Mr. Gomez was enormous. The fact that you pled to, and I’m
     taking only the facts that were placed onto the record that you
     admitted to was on January 19th, 20 packets; January 21st, 20
     packets; January 25th, 40 packets; January 28th, 40 packets;
     February 4th, 40 packets; February 12th, 40 packets; February
     23rd, 60 packets; March 1st, 40 packets. And those were only to
     one person, an undercover police officer.

     In addition, the amount of fentanyl that was found during the
     search warrants. I disagree with defense counsel. A conspiracy –
     for the charge of conspiracy you’re responsible for those actions
     of your co-conspirator whether you know the extent of their
     actions or not. So, therefore, I do believe that the OGS as stated
     by the Commonwealth is appropriate . . . as I believe that under
     the law, he is responsible for what was found in his house and that
     of his co-defendant’s house. . . .

     In any event, my recitation of those facts is that for January 19 th
     through March 1st, that’s 280 packets that were put out on the
     street just by the deliveries to the undercover officer. In addition,
     there, as indicated by the prosecutor, during the search warrant
     of the defendant’s house, there were two empty boxes containing
     a total of 1200 packets along with the grinder and the other
     materials made for processing fentanyl. Within the co-defendant’s
     house there were 500 packets that were found.

     As indicated, I took into consideration the Commonwealth’s
     arguments. I have – I have taken into consideration the defense
     arguments. I have considered the risk of recidivism, which I do
     find to be great, considering on May 29th of 2008 he did plead
     guilty and serve several years in prison for a possession with the
     intent to deliver. As indicated, a sentence on that date was one
     year to four years under Berks County Docket 975 of 2009.

     I’ve considered the gravity of the offense as it relates to the
     impact on the life of the victim in this case, the victim would be
     that of the community. I have listened to all of the people that
     have come before you. I hear what you’re saying. I question what
     your involvement was with the community. Was your involvement
     truly that you were trying to help? All these good people here were
     doing good things for the community with the book bag drives,
     with the youth football, with the softball. All of these. Were you

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     doing those good things or were you integrating and infiltrating
     the system so that you knew where you could pedal your poison?
     That is the question that I have in my head.

     I have considered the effect of your family. I have, truly. It’s -- to
     have to come here and have your children here, I feel for them. I
     feel for the fact that their father is not going to be a part of their
     life in the same way that he has been a part of their life. Not that
     you certainly can’t still be a part of their life.

     I have considered, obviously, the factors in favor of the probation
     under title 42 subsection 9721, to which I find none. I have
     considered the rehabilitation needs of the defendant. I did
     consider his statement, obviously, his prior criminal record, which
     was available to me by the PSI, as I have already mentioned,
     indicates a prior possession with intent to deliver. It also
     references an aggravated assault which was committed shortly
     thereafter the [possession with intent to deliver]. The other
     indications are minor offenses with a -- some other indications as
     a juvenile.

     I have considered his age, which I believe at this point he is 31
     years of age. I have, as I indicated, considered all of the witnesses
     that have testified. I have considered the Sentencing Guidelines.
     And I believe that there is a basis for total confinement of which
     is warranted.

     I believe that the Commonwealth’s recommendation is generous
     in the fact that, quite honestly, you could have -- the
     Commonwealth could have, as [defense counsel] referenced, the
     Commonwealth could have taken all of these deliveries, every
     single packet, combined it in one and they could have added that
     total. They could have, during the course of that conspiracy of
     what actually the estimate had been put out on the street between
     January and March.

Id. at 41-46.

     On the first four counts, the court sentenced Boston to three terms of

two-and-a-half to 10 years’ incarceration and one term of five to 10 years’

incarceration, all to be served concurrently. On the fifth count—conspiracy—

the court imposed a sentence of six and a half to 15 years’ incarceration, to

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be served consecutively to the other sentences. The court used the higher

offense gravity score for the conspiracy charge, and each sentence was within

the standard range of the sentencing guidelines. The aggregate sentence was

11½ to 25 years’ incarceration.

      Boston filed a post-sentence motion in which he asked for concurrent

sentences on all counts. Boston argued “that the sentencing guidelines impose

a higher offense gravity score for fentanyl compared to every other controlled

substance.” Post-Sentence Motion to Modify and Reduce Sentence, 4/5/22, at

¶ 6. He also argued that the imposition of a consecutive sentence for the

conspiracy charge “suggests he would have received a shorter sentence if had

acted alone in his crimes while distributing and/or possessing a larger quantity

of fentanyl.” Id. at ¶ 7. The court denied the motion. Boston appealed.

      Boston’s Statement of Questions Involved poses his issue as follows:

      Whether the Sentencing Court abused its discretion and imposed
      a sentence in violation of the Sentencing Code as the sentence
      was unreasonable, based upon facts other than those presented
      at plea and sentencing, lacking sufficient basis in reasons placed
      on the record, and based upon improper factors, to wit: (a) that
      [Boston]’s risk of recidivism was great based upon a conviction
      more than 12 years prior; (b) that [Boston]’s involvement in the
      community service efforts was done with the intent to “infiltrate
      the system so that you knew where you could pedal your poison;”
      and (c) that the Commonwealth could have estimated a larger
      quantity of controlled substances distributed during the course of
      the conspiracy?

Boston’s Br. at 6.

      In Boston’s Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement, he similarly claims the

sentence “was issued without sufficient reasons being placed on the record

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and is so disproportionate as to implicate the fundamental norms that underlie

the sentencing process.” Id. at 14. He also contends the court abused its

discretion in concluding he had a high risk of recidivism, as his prior drug

conviction was over 12 years old. Id. He further claims the court abused its

discretion “by suggesting that all of [Boston’s] years of community service

efforts were nothing more than a ruse to benefit his 46 days of distributing

controlled substances.” Id. at 14-15. Boston also posits the court based the

sentence upon “the supposition that the Commonwealth could have estimated

a higher weight of controlled substances distributed during the course of the

conspiracy.” Id. at 14. In addition, he argues the court imposed a consecutive

sentence “simply because [he] conspired to distribute controlled substances

with one other individual.” Id.

      The discretionary aspects of a sentence are not appealable as of right.

Commonwealth v. Green, 204 A.3d 469, 488 (Pa.Super. 2019), aff’d, 265

A.3d 541 (Pa. 2021). We will only review a discretionary sentencing claim if

the appellant (1) preserved the issue in the court below, (2) filed a timely

notice of appeal, (3) included in his brief a Rule 2119(f) concise statement of

the reasons for the appeal, and (4) has raised a substantial question whether

the sentence is appropriate under the Sentencing Code. Id.

      The issues included in Boston’s Questions Presented and Rule 2119(f)

statement are waived. In his post-sentence motion, Boston only argued (1)

that the sentencing guidelines are disproportionately harsh regarding the

delivery of fentanyl, as compared to other drugs, and (2) that “he would have

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received a shorter sentence if had acted alone in his crimes.” He did not argue

that the court failed to state sufficient reasoning or that it based his sentence

on improper factors related to his prior record, his community service, or the

amount of drugs involved in the case. Nor did he raise these issues at the

sentencing     hearing.3     He    has    therefore    waived      these   issues.    See

Commonwealth           v.   Griffin,     65    A.3d   932,   935     (Pa.Super.      2013)

(discretionary sentencing issues must be preserved at the time of sentencing

or in a post-sentence motion).

       The only claim that Boston both preserved below and includes in his

Rule 2119(f) statement4—that the court should not have increased his

sentence based on a conviction for conspiracy—is not included in Boston’s

Statement of Questions Presented. He has therefore waived this issue as well.

See Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a).

       Furthermore, this issue does not raise a substantial question. A

challenge to consecutive sentences raises a substantial question only “in the

most extreme circumstances, such as where the aggregate sentence is unduly

____________________________________________

3 At the sentencing hearing, Boston contested the offense gravity score used
for the conspiracy charge, on the basis that it should not be based on the
drugs found in Bonez-Gomez’s apartment. That is significantly different to the
instant challenge that the court abused its discretion in observing that the
Commonwealth could have also included the weight of the drugs involved in
the controlled buys. This issue is also waived by Boston’s failure to include any
discussion of it in the argument section of his brief.

4 Boston has abandoned his claim that the sentencing guidelines treat those
convicted of dealing fentanyl unfairly.

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harsh, considering the nature of the crimes and the length of imprisonment.”

Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 171-72 (Pa.Super. 2010).

      In his Rule 2119(f) statement, Boston argues that the court improperly

imposed “a consecutive 78[-]month minimum sentence” for conspiracy

“simply because [he] conspired to distribute controlled substances with one

other individual.” Boston’s Br. at 14. This does not raise a substantial question.

Boston pleaded guilty to conspiracy, which is a separate offense based on an

agreement between two or more people to commit a crime. See 18 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 903(a). The court had discretion in sentencing for this crime, and Boston

has not claimed that this represents an extreme case, such as that the

aggregate sentence was unduly harsh given the facts of the crime.

      He does contend in the argument section of his brief that the court

abused its discretion in imposing a consecutive sentence for conspiracy,

thereby greatly increasing the aggregate sentence, because his crime was not

particularly egregious. Boston’s Br. at 21. However, we may not consider

arguments outside the Rule 2119(f) statement in determining whether Boston

presents a substantial question. See Commonwealth v. Radecki, 180 A.3d

441, 468 (Pa.Super. 2018) (“[W]e cannot look beyond the statement of

questions presented and the prefatory [Rule] 2119(f) statement to determine

whether a substantial question exists”) (citation omitted).

      Even if Boston had raised a substantial question, his claim would fail.

We will not grant relief on a discretionary sentencing claim absent a manifest

abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Shull, 148 A.3d 820, 831-32

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(Pa.Super. 2016) (citing Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 760

(Pa.Super. 2014)).

     The court below concluded that Boston had not had a trivial, passing

involvement with drug dealing, but rather was responsible for putting an

“enormous” amount of fentanyl on the street. See N.T. at 42. The court

counted 280 packets of fentanyl distributed to an undercover officer and

another 1,700 found at Boston’s and the co-defendant’s homes. See id at 43.

     Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 1/30/2023

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