Court Opinion

ID: 9622371
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:16:07.988593+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:11.881521
License: Public Domain

KELLER, Justice,
concurring.
I agree with the majority that the trial court erred when it vacated Appellee’s convictions and sentences of death and granted Appellee a new trial. As to Ap-pellee’s contention that he was entitled to a new trial because of a newly-discovered impeachment witness, I agree with the analysis in Part II of the majority opinion. *471With respect to Appellee’s argument that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his trial counsel misinterpreted this Court’s opinion1 on appeal from his first trial, however, I cannot agree with the majority’s Part I conclusion that Ap-pellee’s trial counsel correctly interpreted Tamme I as prohibiting the defense from introducing any evidence concerning Ap-pellee’s drug cultivation and trafficking operations. I nevertheless concur in the result reached by the majority because Appellee has failed to demonstrate that his trial counsel rendered him ineffective assistance of counsel under the standards set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington.2, Accordingly, I again3 write separately from a majority that improperly applies the law of the case doctrine.
In Tamme I, this Court considered Ap-pellee’s allegations of error concerning his 1985 trial by jury, and the Court reversed Appellee’s convictions and sentences of death because of errors committed during the prosecution’s capital sentencing voir dire and because the trial court allowed the Commonwealth to introduce irrelevant, prejudicial evidence concerning Appellee’s criminal conduct.4 With regard to the evi-dentiary errors, the Court stated:
Appellant also argues that the repeated references to other unconvicted bad acts violated his right to a fair trial. Appellant claims that the prosecutor erroneously dwelt upon his marijuana farming operation and the allegation that he was a heavy user and supplier of cocaine. The prosecutor also presented evidence of appellant’s alleged insurance fraud to the jury. The Commonwealth maintains that such evidence is relevant and necessary to explain the motive and circumstances surrounding the murders. We disagree. Although appellant has a right only to a fair trial, not a perfect one, he is entitled to be tried for the crimes charged in the indictment and no others. Holland v. Commonwealth, Ky., 703 S.W.2d 876, 879 (1985). Evidence that appellant is a drug user and cultivator is highly prejudicial, and only marginally probative in determining who killed Maddox and Sutherland. The evidence of motive, what little there was, tended to prove some sort of jealous-lover scenario, not a drug deal gone sour. The farming of marijuana had virtually nothing to do with the crime other than to produce the scene. On retrial, the jury only needs to be told that the victims were occasional employees of appellant, shot in a field where they worked.5
The language in this paragraph — which, although apparently dispositive to the majority, is not quoted in the majority opinion — leads today’s majority to its conclusion that the Tamme I Court prohibited the defense from introducing evidence that Sutherland and Maddox were murdered as a direct result of their involvement in the drug trade with the primary prosecution witnesses. I have previously expressed my belief that this Court should exercise greater discretion in its invocation of the law of the case doctrine.6 I see no reason to repeat those views here, however, be*472cause I believe the doctrine is inapplicable to this case for an even more fundamental reason — Tamme I addressed an allegation of error regarding the introduction of this evidence at the first trial, but did not finally adjudicate whether Appellee could introduce the evidence for some other relevant purpose. I simply cannot agree with the majority’s interpretation of the Tam-me I holding,7 and I thus write separately as to Part I of the Majority Opinion.
The majority’s application of the law of the case doctrine rests on its conclusion that Tamme I’s observation that “[o]n retrial, the jury only needs to be told that the victims were occasional employees of appellant, shot in a field where they worked” constitutes a prohibition against the introduction of any evidence relating to Appellee’s marijuana cultivation activities by any party for any purpose. While the majority is correct that a trial court must follow an appellate court order that remands a matter with specific instructions,8 “a trial court taking a case on remand may generally consider or decide any matter left open by the remanding appellate court”9 and “parties are entitled to introduce additional evidence, supplement pleadings and expand issues in the trial on remand from a reversed judgment, unless there are specific limitations imposed [in the opinion remanding.]”10 Tamme I’s statement regarding what evidence the jury “needs to be told” upon retrial does not even contain traditional prohibitory language,11 and is not a “specific limitation” prohibiting the introduction of the evidence for the purpose Appel-lee identified in his RCr 11.42 petition.
Certainly, application of the law of the case doctrine, much like cases where issue or claim preclusion is alleged, “must rest upon a more solid basis than mere speculation as to what was actually adjudicated in the prior action.”12 In order to properly interpret whether an appellate court’s opinion imposes a specific limitation, therefore, we must consider both the context of the proceedings and the rationale supporting the opinion.13 Finally, “[a]n appellate court’s decision should be read with the understanding that it is an error-correcting court.”14
In accordance with this inquiry, I would observe that the error addressed In Tam-me I was Appellee’s allegation that the trial court erred when it denied Appellee’s motion in limine to exclude evidence of other possible crimes committed by Appel-lee. Appellee argued that evidence of his participation in a marijuana cultivation operation was not relevant to the Commonwealth’s case because the Commonwealth’s proposed motive had nothing to do with drug cultivation. The Commonwealth argued both that the evidence supplied a secondary motive for the murders and that it was “inextricably intertwined”15 with *473the other evidence in the case because the victims’ bodies were found in a marijuana field. This Court rejected the Commonwealth’s arguments as to the alleged pro-bativeness of the evidence and explained how the Commonwealth could present its case without making reference to Appel-lee’s marijuana cultivation operations. Tamme I thus found that the evidence was neither relevant to, nor inseparable from, the prosecution’s case-in-chief. ’ This finding, however, would not preclude introduction of the evidence for some other relevant purpose.
The entire concept of evidentiary relevance is defined by, and is contingent upon, the purpose for which the evidence is offered.16 Accordingly, “[i]t is not uncommon for an item of evidence to be admissible for one purpose but not another,” 17 and the fact that evidence may not be admissible to prove one proposition does not preclude its introduction to prove another proposition.18 In accordance with KRE 408, trial courts must assess “multiple admissibility” or “limited admissibility” evidence to determine whether its prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its probative value.19 If a trial court does not exclude the evidence under KRE 403, however, it “upon request, shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and admonish the jury accordingly.”20
In my opinion, the majority’s conclusion divorces itself from the inherent context-driven relevancy inquiry when it holds that Tamme / — which considered the relevance of the marijuana cultivation evidence in only one context — held that the evidence was inadmissible for any purpose. While Appellee still maintains that evidence relating to his participation in marijuana cultivation is irrelevant to the Commonwealth’s case against him, he argues that the evidence directly relates to his defense — -that his accusers, themselves participants in the drug operations, killed the victims for reasons relating to those drug operations.
None of the cases cited by the majority in support of its application of the law of the case doctrine involve a question of evidentiary relevance, and only one of those cases even involves an evidence issue.21 Simply put, the law of the case *474doctrine is not applicable when a subsequent trial presents different facts, issues, or evidence.22 As Appellee argues that he wished to introduce evidence of the drug operation for a purpose different from the one considered by this Court in Tamme I, I believe this Court errs in holding that the Tamme I decision resolved the question of the admissibility of the evidence for that purpose.
I nevertheless concur in the result reached by the majority because I agree with the majority’s Part III holding that “it was error for the trial judge to conclude that Tamme had received ineffective assistance of counsel based solely on the interpretation of Tamme I by defense counsel.”23 While I happen to disagree with the interpretation of Tamme I reached by both Appellee’s trial counsel and today’s majority, I recognize that the issue is debatable.24 Given the fact that members of this Court disagree as to the correct interpretation of Tamme I, I do not believe the fact that Appellee’s trial counsel interpreted Tamme I one way rather than the other demonstrates deficient performance.25
Accordingly, I would reverse the Fay-ette Circuit Court’s order granting Appel-lee post-conviction relief and a new trial and I would remand the case for eonsider-ation of the other issues raised in Appel-lee’s RCr 11.42 petition.
LAMBERT, C.J., joins this concurring opinion.

. Tamme v. Commonwealth, Ky., 759 S.W.2d 51 (1988) (hereinafter "Tamme I ”).

. 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).

. See Taylor v. Commonwealth, 63 S.W.3d 151, 168 (2001) (Keller, J., dissenting).

. Tamme I, supra note 1 at 52-54.

. Id. at 54-54.

. Taylor v. Commonwealth, supra note 3 at 170 (Keller, J., dissenting).

. Majority Opinion at 83 S.W.3d 465, 468 (2002) ("The only reasonable and legally correct interpretation of Tamme I is that evidence regarding the marijuana farming was not to be allowed.”).

. 5 Am.Jur.2d Appellate Review § 787 (1995).

. Id. at § 792.

. Id. at § 788 (emphasis added).

. Cf. Osborne v. Commonwealth, Ky., 43 S.W.3d 234, 241 (2001) ("The improper admission of the grand jury testimony ... requires reversal for a new trial at which none of Reid’s statements inculpating Appellant shall be admitted." (emphasis added)).

. 47 Am Jur.2d Judgments % 727 (1995).

. 5 Am.Jur.2d Appellate Review § 782 (1995).

. Id.

. See KRE 404(b)(2).

. Robert G. Lawson, Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook (3rd Ed.) § 2.05 at 51 (Michie 1993) (hereinafter “Lawson'') (“Relevancy is the status (or the relationship) that must exist between a proposition to be established (ultimate fact) and material evidencing the proposition (evidentiary facts) before the latter may be admissible to prove the former.”).

. 1992 Kentucky Evidence Rules Study Committee's Commentary to KRE 105.

. Lawson, supra note 15 at § 1.05 at 16-17. See also 1 Wigmore, Evidence § 13 at 694 (Tiller rev. 1983):
In other words, when an evidentiary fact is offered for one purpose, and becomes admissible by satisfying all the rules applicable to it in that capacity, it is not inadmissible because it does not satisfy the rules applicable to it in some other capacity and because the jury might improperly consider it in the latter capacity. This doctrine ... is indispensable as a practical rule.

Id.

. See Id. at § 1.05(111) at 18-19.

. KRE 105(a).

. Sowders v. Coleman, 223 Ky. 633, 4 S.W.2d 731 (1928). And, in that case, our predecessor Court affirmed, in face of a law of the case doctrine challenge, the trial court’s decision to admit non-hearsay evidence on a topic, see Id. at 732, because, on a prior appeal, see Coleman v. Sowders, 206 Ky. 841, 268 S.W. 579 (1925), it had only prohibited the introduction of hearsay evidence on the topic at retrial. Id. at 581. These cases illustrate the importance of correctly interpreting the instructions given to a trial court upon remand.

. 5 Am.Jur.2d Appellate Review § 611 (1995).

. Majority Opinion, supra note 7 at 469 (Slip Op. at 6).

. While I find the issue as one which is subject to alternative interpretations, I note that the majority characterizes the interpretation of Tamme I reached by Appellee's appellate counsel, the trial court, and this concurring Justice as "absurd,” Majority Opinion, supra note 7 at 469 (Slip Op. at 7).

.See Haight v. Commonwealth, Ky., 41 S.W.3d 436, 448 (2001) ("We are at a loss to see how failure to move to admit evidence— the admissibility of which is still an open question — can ever sink below sufficient performance into deficiency.”).