Court Opinion

ID: 9846999
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:52:04.579318+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:58.523417
License: Public Domain

Pope, Senior Appellate Judge,
concurring specially.
I concur in the judgment and most of the reasoning of the majority opinion. I disagree, however, with the reasoning that the judgment must be reversed because a reasonable person would not believe that he or she caused an accident resulting in damage to another vehicle where there was only “superficial damage.”
If an accident causes superficial damage, there is an inference that there may be costs involved to repair the damage. For instance, scratched paint. Where the trier of fact draws that inference from facts showing superficial damage, we may not reverse because we must construe the evidence in a light most favorable to support the trial court’s judgment.
In this case, there is simply no evidence of damage, and more importantly, no evidence that Lawrence was aware of any damage. Accordingly, no rational finder of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Lawrence had the intent to leave the scene of an accident that caused damage.
*595Decided September 26, 2002.
Hillman J. Toombs, for appellant.
Joseph J. Drolet, Solicitor-General, Richard R. Burris III, Assistant Solicitor-General, for appellee.