Court Opinion

ID: 9375401
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-27 17:07:33.257943+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:58.505061
License: Public Domain

J-A02015-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    IN RE: ADOPTION OF: G.F.                   :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
    APPEAL OF: P.P., MOTHER                    :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 889 WDA 2022

               Appeal from the Decree Entered August 4, 2022
      In the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County Orphans' Court at
                           No(s): 17 Adopt 2022

BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and MURRAY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:                            FILED: FEBRUARY 27, 2023

       Appellant, P.P. (“Mother”), appeals from the orphans’ court decree dated

July 21, 2022, and entered August 4, 2022, in the Court of Common Pleas of

Fayette County, involuntarily terminating her parental rights to her daughter,

G.F. (“Child”), born in October 2020.1 After careful review, we affirm.

       The Fayette County Children and Youth Services (“CYS” or “the Agency”)

became involved with this family on November 16, 2020, after receiving a

report alleging that Child, who was discharged from the hospital on November

4, 2020, lost two pounds in ten days, and after Child stopped breathing, the

____________________________________________

1  The orphans’ court terminated the parental rights of putative father, D.M.
(“Father”), and any unknown father. See Orphans’ Court Opinion, 10/11/22,
at 1. Neither Father nor any unknown father has filed a separate appeal, and
they are not participants in the instant appeal.
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family had to perform CPR on her but failed to seek medical attention.2 N.T.,

6/2/22, at 15-16.        Upon investigation, CYS validated the allegations of

inadequate health care, inadequate basic needs, and inadequate housing

because Child had not been seen by a pediatrician since she was discharged

from the hospital, Mother failed to seek medical treatment for Child for the

initially reported incident, and Mother did not have necessities for Child,

including diapers, wipes, bottles, and formula. Id. at 16-17. Additionally, on

November 19, 2020, Mother, who had been residing with a cousin, was evicted

from the home and unwilling to stay in a shelter apart from her paramour.

Id. at 8, 16-17.

       Pursuant to an emergency order, on November 19, 2020, CYS obtained

custody of Child and placed Child with foster parents, E.S. and R.S. Id. at

5-6. The court adjudicated Child dependent on December 3, 2020. Id. at 6.

CYS established the following family service plan objectives for Mother in

furtherance of reunification, including: (1) obtaining a mental health

evaluation and following recommendations; (2) attending all mental health

appointments; (3) attending all scheduled visits with Child; (4) attending

parenting classes; (5) obtaining and maintaining appropriate housing;

____________________________________________

2 According to CYS caseworker, Jessica Roberts, “[t]he allegations were later
unfounded by the medical records that show that [Child] had . . .
cardiopulmonary abnormalities and [Child]’s weight had been initially logged
incorrectly.”    N.T., 6/2/22, at 16.     However, CYS ultimately validated
allegations of inadequate health care, inadequate basic needs, and inadequate
housing. Id.

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(6) signing releases; (7) meeting with the caseworker and notifying her of any

address change; and (8) providing for Child’s basic needs. Id. at 7-8.

      Mother was offered in-person visits twice a week, supervised by Justice

Works Youth Care. Id. at 20-21, 23, 33-34. Between November 2020 and

March 2021, Mother resided in various motels and hotels in West Virginia. Id.

at 9. During that time span, Mother attended a total of six in-person visits

with Child. Id. at 20-21.

      In March 2021, Mother obtained housing in Westmoreland County,

Pennsylvania. Id. at 9. However, before CYS could assess the home, Mother

was arrested on March 31, 2021, due to a “domestic situation” and was held

at the Westmoreland County Jail. Id. at 9-10. On an unspecified date after

her arrest, Mother was extradited to Virginia because of an outstanding

warrant, and she remained incarcerated until she was released on bail on May

28, 2021. Id. at 10-11. Upon her release, Mother was prohibited from leaving

Virginia for another “couple [of] months” until her case came to a close. Id.

at 11, 52.

      During Mother’s period of incarceration, visits did not occur as CYS was

unsuccessful in contacting Mother when she was in Westmoreland County Jail,

and they did not know her whereabouts after she was extradited to Virginia.

Id. at 22. Visits resumed on June 14, 2021, at which time Mother was offered

supervised virtual visits, twice a week.   Id.   At the time of the subject

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proceeding, Mother was residing in a hotel in Virginia with a paramour. Id.

at 45, 57, 60, 64.

       On March 11, 2022, CYS filed a petition to involuntarily terminate

Mother’s parental rights, alleging grounds for termination pursuant to 23

Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b).     The orphans’ court held a

hearing on the petition on June 2, 2022, at which time Child was one year and

seven months old.        Child was represented by Kim Kovach, Esquire.3    CYS

presented testimony of its caseworker, Jessica Roberts, and Justice Works

Youth Care family resource specialist, Brittany Johnston. Mother testified on

her own behalf.

       CYS caseworker, Ms. Roberts, testified that Mother was previously

involved with the Family Services Agency in Virginia in relation to another

child. Id. at 17. Ms. Roberts testified CYS contacted Virginia’s Family Services

Agency to inquire about its involvement with the family, and CYS received

records which revealed that Mother “had some significant mental health

issues.” Id. at 15, 17. Ms. Roberts stated that Mother denied having any

mental health or anger management issues. Id. at 18.

____________________________________________

3 Insomuch as Child’s legal interests were incapable of ascertainment due to
her young age, the court did not appoint separate counsel for Child. See In
re T.S., 192 A.3d 1080, 1092-1093 (Pa. 2018) (holding that “if the preferred
outcome of a child is incapable of ascertainment because the child is very
young and pre-verbal, there can be no conflict between the child’s legal
interests and his or her best interests; as such, the mandate of Section
2313(a) of the Adoption Act” is satisfied.).

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      Ms. Roberts testified that Child has an umbilical hernia, but it did not

require any additional appointments outside of her routine appointments. Id.

at 19-20. Ms. Roberts testified that Child does not have any developmental

or emotional issues at this time. Id. at 25-26. She further testified that Child

is “doing fine” physically and that Child’s “bile issue has been improving[,] and

she has no issues from her umbilical hernia at this time.” Id. at 26.

      At the conclusion of the hearing, the orphans’ court involuntarily

terminated Mother’s parental rights to the Child by decree dated July 21,

2022, and entered August 4, 2022. On August 5, 2022, Mother timely filed a

notice of appeal and concise statement of errors complained of on appeal

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).       On October 11, 2022, the

orphans’ court filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion.

      Mother sets forth the following issue for our consideration:

      1.    Did the [orphans’] court abuse its discretion in terminating
            the parental rights of the natural [M]other, P.P., as Fayette
            County [CYS] failed to present sufficient evidence to sustain
            its burden of proof?

Mother’s Brief at 3 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

      “In cases concerning the involuntary termination of parental rights,

appellate review is limited to a determination of whether the decree of the

termination court is supported by competent evidence.” In re Adoption of

C.M., 255 A.3d 343, 358 (Pa. 2021).         When applying this standard, the

appellate court must accept the trial court’s findings of fact and credibility

determinations if they are supported by the record. Interest of S.K.L.R.,

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256 A.3d 1108, 1123 (Pa. 2021). “Where the trial court’s factual findings are

supported by the evidence, an appellate court may not disturb the trial court’s

ruling unless it has discerned an error of law or abuse of discretion.” In re

Adoption of L.A.K., 265 A.3d 580, 591 (Pa. 2021).

      “[A]n abuse of discretion does not result merely because the reviewing

court might have reached a different conclusion” or “the facts could support

an opposite result.” In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-27 (Pa. 2012).

Instead, an appellate court may reverse for an abuse of discretion “only upon

demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or

ill-will.” Id. at 826. This standard of review reflects the deference we pay to

trial courts, who often observe the parties first-hand across multiple hearings.

Interest of S.K.L.R., 256 A.3d at 1123-24.

      In considering a petition to terminate parental rights, a trial court must

balance the parent’s fundamental “right to make decisions concerning the

care, custody, and control” of his or her child with the “child’s essential needs

for a parent’s care, protection, and support.”       C.M., 255 A.3d at 358.

Termination of parental rights has “significant and permanent consequences

for both the parent and child.” L.A.K., 265 A.3d at 591. As such, the law of

this Commonwealth requires the moving party to establish the statutory

grounds by clear and convincing evidence, which is evidence that is so “clear,

direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable a trier of fact to come to a clear

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conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” C.M.,

255 A.3d at 359 (citation omitted).

       Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the

Adoption Act.        “Subsection (a) provides eleven enumerated grounds

describing particular conduct of a parent which would warrant involuntary

termination.”      Id.; see 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1)-(11).       In evaluating

whether the petitioner proved grounds under Section 2511(a), the trial court

must focus on the parent’s conduct and avoid using a “balancing or best

interest approach.” Interest of L.W., 267 A.3d 517, 524 n.6 (Pa. Super.

2021). If the trial court determines the petitioner established grounds for

termination under Section 2511(a) by clear and convincing evidence, the court

then must assess the petition under Section 2511(b), which focuses on the

child’s needs and welfare. In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013).

       Here, we review the orphans’ court’s decree pursuant to Section

2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide as follows:4

       (a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child
       may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
       grounds:

                                           ...

____________________________________________

4 We need only agree with any one subsection of Section 2511(a), along with
Section 2511(b), to affirm the termination of parental rights. In re Adoption
of K.M.G., 219 A.3d 662, 672 (Pa. Super. 2019) (en banc) (citation omitted).
In this case, we analyze the court’s decree pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2).

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           (2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,
           neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child
           to be without essential parental care, control or
           subsistence necessary for his physical or mental
           well-being and the conditions and causes of the
           incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not
           be remedied by the parent.

                                     ...

     (b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights
     of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
     physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
     of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
     environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
     income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
     control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
     to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
     efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
     which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
     filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (b).

     With regard to termination of parental rights pursuant to Section

2511(a)(2), we have indicated:

     In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A.
     § 2511(a)(2), the following three elements must be met
     (1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal;
     (2) such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the child
     to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence
     necessary for his physical or mental well-being; and (3) the
     causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will
     not be remedied.

In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation

omitted). “The grounds for termination due to parental incapacity that cannot

be remedied are not limited to affirmative misconduct. To the contrary, those

grounds may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental

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duties.” In re S.C., 247 A.3d 1097, 1104 (Pa. Super. 2021), quoting In re

Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1216 (Pa. Super. 2015) (internal citation

omitted).    “Parents are required to make diligent efforts towards the

reasonably prompt assumption of full parental responsibilities.” Matter of

Adoption of M.A.B., 166 A.3d 434, 443 (Pa. Super. 2017), quoting In re

N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 100 (Pa. Super. 2011). As such, “[a] parent’s vow to

cooperate, after a long period of uncooperativeness regarding the necessity

or availability of services, may properly be rejected as untimely or

disingenuous.” In re S.C., 247 A.3d at 1105, quoting In re Z.P., 994 A.2d

1108, 1118 (Pa. Super. 2010).

      In S.P., our Supreme Court addressed the relevance of incarceration in

termination decisions under Section 2511(a)(2).       The S.P. Court held that

“incarceration is a factor, and indeed can be a determinative factor, in a court’s

conclusion that grounds for termination exist under § 2511(a)(2) where the

repeated and continued incapacity of a parent due to incarceration has caused

the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence and that

the causes of the incapacity cannot or will not be remedied.” S.P., 47 A.3d at

828. Further, the Court explained,

      [I]ncarceration, while not a litmus test for termination, can be
      determinative of the question of whether a parent is incapable of
      providing “essential parental care, control or subsistence” and the
      length of the remaining confinement can be considered as highly
      relevant to whether “the conditions and causes of the incapacity,
      abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the
      parent,” sufficient to provide grounds for termination pursuant to
      23 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 2511(a)(2).

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Id. at 830.

     On appeal, Mother asserts that CYS failed to present clear and

convincing evidence to establish grounds for termination under Section

2511(a)(2).   Mother’s Brief at 16.     She claims that despite the obstacles

imposed by her incarcerations in Pennsylvania and Virginia, she “exercised

reasonable firmness by continuing to make progress on her goal plan and by

managing to stay in contact with the [C]hild.” Id.

     Instantly, the orphans’ court found:

     Mother has shown a repeated and continued incapacity [and]
     neglect starting at the very beginning of [Child]’s life in failing to
     attend to a very serious condition wherein the [C]hild had to have
     CPR. She failed to seek immediate medical attention.

     Mother has been transient and/or homeless throughout the course
     of the case. She has lived for a few months here and there with
     friends, public housing, incarceration, and various hotel/motel
     rooms. There is a pattern of instability in living arrangements and
     in changing paramours. . . .

     Mother has no verifiable history of evaluation or treatment of any
     mental health disorder as she has not complied with the Agency’s
     request for an evaluation and treatment nor has she provided
     proof of any such treatment to the [c]ourt. In addition, Mother
     has not provided signed releases for treatment to be verified by
     using the flimsy excuse that she has no access to the mail.
     Throughout the hearing, Mother would use profanity directed to
     the caseworker testifying and interrupted the proceedings. At the
     conclusion of testimony, Mother left the courtroom. Mother has
     been non-compliant in communicating regularly with the Agency
     and with her [C]hild. She has missed the majority of scheduled
     visits.

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 10/11/22, at 9-10.

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      The record provides ample evidence in support of the orphans’ court’s

decision to terminate Mother’s parental rights.     Mother’s permanency goal

objectives to reunify with Child included, inter alia: completing a mental health

evaluation; attending all mental health appointments; attending all scheduled

visits with Child; attending parenting classes; obtaining and maintaining

appropriate housing; and signing releases. N.T., 6/2/22, at 7-8, 19.

      With respect to Mother’s mental health and parenting objectives, CYS

caseworker, Ms. Roberts, testified that while Mother denied having any mental

health issues, Mother informed Ms. Roberts that she was on “mental health

medication” but did not provide any further information. Id. at 14, 18. Ms.

Roberts testified that she e-mailed Mother a letter and a dependency court

order, requesting verification of Mother’s medication. Id. at 14. However,

Mother did not provide any verification. Id. at 14, 18. Ms. Roberts testified

that Mother did not complete a mental health evaluation, did not sign any

releases for CYS, has not enrolled in parenting classes in Pennsylvania or

Virginia, and has not provided any documentation showing she completed a

parenting class. Id. at 11-12, 14.

      Significantly, on cross-examination, Mother testified she believed she

had depression in 2014 or 2015 and, at the time, she had taken Depakote,

Seroquel, Abilify, Zoloft, and Prozac. Id. at 62. Mother also testified that she

was voluntarily hospitalized for mental health reasons twice, in 2014 and

2015. Id. at 63. Mother explained that she presently attends therapy to cope

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with the loss of her family members, but she is not taking any medications.

Id. at 63-64. Mother testified that she began therapy three months before

the subject proceeding and attends sessions every two or three weeks. Id.

at 47, 64. Mother also testified that she underwent a mental health evaluation

in January 2022 but denied having been diagnosed with any conditions. Id.

at 46, 48. Mother further testified that she began attending a virtual parenting

class in February 2021, but she has attended only nine classes thus far and

has not yet completed the program. Id. at 49-50

      In asserting that she made progress on the family service plan, Mother

relies on her own testimony that she underwent a mental health evaluation in

2022 and has been attending therapy. Mother’s Brief at 15-16; N.T., 6/2/22,

at 46-47. However, as the orphans’ court found, Mother failed to sign any

releases for CYS to verify the evaluation or her participation in therapy.

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 10/11/22, at 9; N.T., 6/2/22, at 45. Mother testified

that she could not provide CYS with a release because she was unable to send

the release by mail.    N.T., 6/2/22, at 45-46.    Mother explained that the

mailman refused to send out her mail because her name was not on the lease

of her residence. Id. at 46, 54. When asked why she did not simply drop her

mail in a mailbox, Mother testified, “Transportation.”    Id. at 55.   Notably,

despite claiming transportation posed an obstacle for her, Mother testified that

she takes a bus twice a week to donate plasma. Id. at 66.

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      Ultimately, the orphans’ court found that Mother was not credible.

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 10/11/22, at 6.          The court was well within its

discretion to find Mother’s testimony not credible. See In the Interest of

D.F., 165 A.3d 960, 966 (Pa. Super. 2017) (“The [o]rphans’ [c]ourt is free to

believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented and is likewise free to

make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence.”)

(citation omitted). By relying on her own self-serving testimony to bolster her

claim, Mother essentially asks this Court to reweigh the evidence, and this we

cannot do.

      In addition, the orphans’ court noted that Mother has not found a stable

living arrangement.    Orphans’ Court Opinion, 10/11/22, at 9.       The record

reveals that, after her eviction in November 2020, Mother had stayed in

various motels and hotels, was incarcerated for two months, and was living in

a hotel in Virginia at the time of the subject proceeding. N.T., 6/2/22, at 9-10,

57, 60.    On cross-examination, when asked if she has ever had a stable

residence while in Virginia, Mother testified:

      Q.     Alright, is it fair to say that you have not really had stable
             residence since you have been in Virginia, the
             [Commonwealth] of Virginia?

      A.     I have been stable maybe once. That was my choice to
             leave due to the person I was staying with. So I never got
             kicked out of a spot since I’ve been in Virginia.

Id. at 57-58.

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      Further, Mother has failed to maintain consistent contact with Child.

Family resource specialist, Ms. Johnston, testified that Mother attended only

six in-person supervised visits between November 2020 and March 2021. Id.

at 35. After Mother’s release from prison in May of 2021, Mother was afforded

supervised virtual visits with Child beginning on June 14, 2021. Id. at 22.

Between June 14, 2021, and August 18, 2021, Mother attended only five out

of eighteen virtual visits.   Id. at 36-37.   Mother was removed from the

visitation schedule between August 18, 2021, and September 15, 2021, due

to her failure to confirm four consecutive visits. Id. at 37. From September

15, 2021, to November 25, 2021, Mother participated in nine out of nineteen

virtual visits. Id. Mother was removed from the schedule again on November

25, 2021, due to missing four consecutive visits.     Id.   Her virtual visits

resumed on January 27, 2022, and since that time, she attended twenty out

of approximately thirty-two virtual visits offered. Id. Ms. Johnston further

testified that she ended one of Mother’s virtual visits early because Mother

was not paying attention to Child. Id. Rather, during that visit, Mother was

yelling while reportedly babysitting her friend’s children. Id. Ms. Johnston

also testified that when Justice Works scheduled a special visit for Child’s

birthday in October 2021, Mother canceled at the last minute because she

reported she was at a “church function.” Id. at 38-39.

      Notably, the testimonial evidence shows that even after her release from

prison in May 2021, Mother has not returned to Pennsylvania to participate in

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any in-person visits with Child.      Id. at 11, 52-53.      Specifically, Mother

testified:

      Q.     After you got bonded out, were you allowed to return to
             Pennsylvania?

      A.     Yes. I was allowed after a couple of months with pre-trials
             and made sure that the charges were dropped and I didn’t
             have to continue to go to [c]ourt. I am allowed to leave. . .

                                       ...

      Q.     Why did you not return to Pennsylvania after you were able
             to?

      A.     Because I have everything down here. I have a job, I have
             a home. I think everything was doing great down her[e]
             now. So I decided I did not want to go back and it wasn’t
             because I don’t want to get my daughter, it wasn’t because
             I don’t want to see her. I’ve always wanted to get her back
             and I always want to see her. It’s just, Pennsylvania was
             too much for me and I have no family there but her and I
             didn’t want to be there by myself so I just stayed in Virginia.
             But, I will always care about getting my daughter back and
             seeing her. I just didn’t want to go back to Pennsylvania
             because there was nothing there for me.

Id. at 52-53. Mother later clarified that she “just started” her employment at

7-11 the “Tuesday after Memorial Day.” Id. at 67.

      Accordingly, the record reveals that Mother’s repeated and continued

incapacity, neglect or refusal has caused Child to be without essential parental

care, control or subsistence necessary for her physical or mental well-being,

and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, neglect or refusal cannot or

will not be remedied by the parent. During the eighteen months that Child

was in CYS custody, Mother saw then one-year-old Child in-person only six

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times, and she sporadically attended virtual visits. Mother failed to obtain

stable or suitable housing. Despite Mother’s self-serving testimony that she

underwent a mental health evaluation that rendered no diagnoses and that

she is attending therapy sessions, Mother failed to provide CYS with a release

to verify her claims, and the orphans’ court found Mother not fully credible.

The testimony further reveals that, despite claiming that she wants her

daughter back, Mother has not returned to Pennsylvania to see Child in-person

after her release from prison in May 2021. Thus, we find no error or abuse of

discretion by the trial court in terminating Mother’s parental rights under

Section 2511(a)(2).

      Proceeding to Section 2511(b), Mother has waived any claim that the

orphans’ court erred by concluding that termination of her parental rights

would best serve Child’s needs and welfare because she fails to develop this

claim.   In re M.Z.T.M.W., 163 A.3d 462, 465 (Pa. Super. 2017) (“It is

well-settled that this Court will not review a claim unless it is developed in the

argument section of an appellant’s brief, and supported by citations to

relevant authority”). Mother cites no relevant authority and does not provide

any argument challenging the termination of her parental rights pursuant to

Section 2511(b).

      Even if this claim were not waived, we conclude that the record provides

competent evidence in support of the court’s decision to terminate Mother’s

parental rights under Section 2511(b). With respect to Section 2511(b), this

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Court has stated that the trial court “must . . . discern the nature and status

of the parent-child bond, with utmost attention to the effect on the child of

permanently severing that bond.” In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa.

Super. 2005) (citation omitted). Further,

      [I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can equally
      emphasize the safety needs of the child, and should also consider
      the intangibles, such as the love, comfort, security, and stability
      the child might have with the foster parent.

In re A.S., 11 A.3d 473, 483 (Pa. Super. 2010).          Our Supreme Court

explained, “[c]ommon sense dictates that courts considering termination must

also consider whether the [child is] in a pre-adoptive home and whether [the

child has] a bond with their foster parents.” In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 268.

The Court directed that, in weighing the bond considerations pursuant to

Section 2511(b), “courts must keep the ticking clock of childhood ever in

mind.” Id. at 269. The T.S.M. Court observed, “[c]hildren are young for a

scant number of years, and we have an obligation to see to their healthy

development quickly.    When courts fail . . . the result, all too often, is

catastrophically maladjusted children.” Id.

      The record here shows no evidence of a meaningful bond between

Mother and Child. The family resource specialist, Ms. Johnston, testified that

during the virtual visits, Mother communicates more with Ms. Johnston or the

caregiver than with Child. N.T., 6/2/22, at 39. Ms. Johnston testified that

even though Mother tries to get Child’s attention by calling her name, Child

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does not go to Mother on the phone. Id. at 39. When asked how Child refers

to Mother during the virtual visits, Ms. Johnston testified:

         Q.   How does [Child] refer to the [M]other during these zoom
              visits?

         A.   In my opinion, [Child] does not look at the phone, does not
              call her mother, does not interact with her. She interacts
              with the caregiver more, and call[s] her mom during the
              visits.

Id. at 40. While visits are scheduled for an hour, Ms. Johnston testified that

the visits “rarely” last the full hour. Id. She testified Mother would be “staring

at [Child] playing or talking to us, . . . the caregiver or myself.” Id. Ms.

Johnston testified that she tries to reengage Child into the visit, but

“sometimes, it just doesn’t work out that way” and Mother will end the visit

early. Id. at 40-41. On cross-examination, Ms. Johnson testified that Mother

has not shown improvement with interacting with Child during the visits. Id.

at 42.

         Moreover, the evidence demonstrates that Child is bonded with her

foster parents. Ms. Roberts testified that Child is doing “very well” with foster

parents, appears to be “very bonded” with the foster parents, and “appears

to be thriving.” Id. at 25. Ms. Roberts noted that Child does not have any

development or emotional issues and that Child is physically “doing fine.” Id.

at 25-26. She testified that foster parents are willing to “offer permanency”

for Child. Id. at 26. Similarly, Ms. Johnston testified that during Mother’s

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J-A02015-23

virtual visits, Child interacted more with the caregiver and called the caregiver

“mom.” Id. at 40.

      Accordingly, we conclude that the orphans’ court did not err or abuse its

discretion in terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 2511(a)(2) and (b).

      Decree affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 2/27/2023

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