Court Opinion

ID: 9950063
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-13 14:02:30.716576+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:35:15.471374
License: Public Domain

Cite as 2024 Ark. App. 197
                   ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
                                       DIVISION III
                                       No. CV-23-658

                                               Opinion Delivered   March 13, 2024
 CARISSA SHIPP
                               APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE WASHINGTON
                                         COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
                                         [NO. 72JV-22-84]
 V.
                                               HONORABLE DIANE WARREN,
 ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF                        JUDGE
 HUMAN SERVICES AND MINOR
                               AFFIRMED
 CHILDREN
                     APPELLEES

                         WENDY SCHOLTENS WOOD, Judge

       Carissa Shipp appeals from a Washington County Circuit Court order terminating

her parental rights to her three children—Minor Child 1 (MC1), born on February 27, 2022;

Minor Child 2 (MC2), born on January 3, 2018; and Minor Child 3 (MC3), born on

November 2, 2016.1 On appeal, Shipp challenges only the circuit court’s finding that

termination is in the children’s best interest. We affirm the termination order.

       On February 27, 2022, the Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS) received

a Garrett’s Law report that Shipp tested positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine

at the time of MC1’s birth, and on March 2, it exercised a seventy-two-hour hold on the

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        The parental rights of Alfonso Vaca were also terminated, but he is not a party to
this appeal. Vaca was found to be a parent of MC2 and MC3 because he is listed as the father
on their birth certificates and to be a putative parent of MC1 whose rights had attached.
children. On March 7, DHS filed a petition for emergency custody and dependency-neglect.

The affidavit in support of the petition set out the previous history with the family, including

Garrett’s Law reports when Shipp tested positive for methamphetamine when MC2 and

MC3 were born. When the family service worker (FSW) made contact with Shipp at the

hospital on February 28, Shipp admitted using methamphetamine several days prior to

MC1’s birth. The ex parte order for emergency custody was granted on March 7.

       In an April 12 order, the circuit court found that probable cause existed and

continued to exist and that it was in the best interest of the children to remain in DHS

custody. The circuit court also found that DHS had been involved with the family since 2016

and provided numerous services but that the services did not prevent removal because Shipp

tested positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine at the time of the MC1’s birth, DHS

had a history of being unable to locate Shipp, and Shipp had not demonstrated stability and

sobriety to safely parent. The circuit court found that Shipp’s drug use “seriously impairs her

ability to supervise, protect, and care for the children.”

       In a May 23 order, the circuit court adjudicated the children dependent-neglected

due to parental unfitness because Shipp tested positive for methamphetamine and

amphetamine following MC1’s birth, noting the prior Garrett’s Law reports and DHS’s

involvement with the family. The court set a goal of reunification and ordered Shipp to

comply with the approved case plan. The order also provided that Shipp had an untreated

substance-abuse issue and was currently in inpatient treatment.

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       On August 7, the circuit court entered an agreed review order and continued the goal

of reunification, finding that safety concerns prevented a trial placement with, or return of

custody to, Shipp because she was detained in the Washington County jail and awaiting

court. A permanency-planning hearing was held on January 10, 2023. The circuit court

found that Shipp had made significant progress in completing services; however, the circuit

court changed the goal of the case to adoption in light of Shipp’s recent sentence of seventy-

two months in the Arkansas Department of Correction (ADC), which the circuit court

found to be a significant portion of the children’s lives. The circuit court further found that

it was unlikely that the children would be able to be returned within a reasonable amount

of time. DHS filed a petition for termination of parental rights on February 24, asserting

multiple statutory grounds—failure to remedy, subsequent factors, aggravated circumstances,

and incarceration.

       A termination hearing took place on March 28. Whitney Patterson, the FSW assigned

to the case, testified that Shipp was in partial compliance with the case plan. Patterson said

that Shipp had been incarcerated in West Memphis since August 2022 and was serving a six-

year sentence. Prior to August 2022, Shipp had been detained at the Washington County

jail since April 2022. Patterson testified that the children had been placed together in a foster

home since May 2022 and had developed a significant bond with their foster parents, who

expressed an interest in adopting them. Patterson said that the children are adoptable.

       Shipp confirmed that she was incarcerated at the East Arkansas Correctional

Detention Center and had been there since August 9, 2022. She said that she was

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participating in the year-long drug-treatment program and thought she would be released on

August 8, 2023. Shipp described an “intense” drug-treatment program in which she received

individual counseling with a licensed therapist, participated in peer counseling, and attended

NA meetings. Shipp testified that she was “progressing substantially” in the program. She

said that she was enrolled at Shorter College and had taken advantage of employment-related

opportunities while incarcerated, which included taking the National Career Readiness test

and obtaining her forklift certification and OSHA-10 safety certificate. Shipp visited weekly

with the children (by Zoom) and maintained contact with the foster parents.

       Shipp recognized that she has been incarcerated for most of the case and that she was

sentenced in July 2022 for possession of drugs, possession of drug paraphernalia, and forgery.

Shipp said that she expected to be released in four months and asked the court to give her

the opportunity once released to show that she could remain sober and be a stable parent

who could provide for her children. Although she admitted that her sentence was for six

years, Shipp claimed that her sentence “is up August 9th of this year because of the judicial

transfer,” and she would then be on parole. When asked what would happen if she did not

complete the one-year program, Shipp said that it was “not an option” for her but

acknowledged that some people fail. Shipp said that upon her release, she would voluntarily

enter a transitional-living facility for a period of time until she could find employment and

housing and become stable, which she thought would take four months.

       After taking the case under advisement, the court terminated Shipp’s parental rights

in a July 3 order, which was amended on July 7 and July 19. The court found that DHS had

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proved the incarceration ground by clear and convincing evidence and that termination was

in the best interest of the children, finding that the children are adoptable and that the

potential harm of returning the children to Shipp was exposure to illegal drugs. This appeal

followed.

       We review termination-of-parental-rights cases de novo. Bevell v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum.

Servs., 2023 Ark. App. 138, at 6, 662 S.W.3d 259, 264. We will not reverse the circuit court’s

decision unless its findings are clearly erroneous. Perry v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2023 Ark.

App. 323, at 10, 669 S.W.3d 865, 872. An order terminating parental rights must be based

on a finding by clear and convincing evidence that one of the grounds stated in the

termination statute is satisfied and that the sought-after termination is in the children’s best

interest. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341 (Supp. 2023). In making a best-interest determination,

the circuit court is required to consider two factors: (1) the likelihood that the child will be

adopted, and (2) the potential harm to the child if custody is returned to the parent. Brown

v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 725, at 4, 478 S.W.3d 272, 275. Credibility

determinations are left to the finder of fact. Kerr v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2016 Ark. App.

271, at 6, 493 S.W.3d 342, 346.

       The intent behind the termination-of-parental-rights statute is to provide permanency

in a child’s life when it is not possible to return the child to the family home because it is

contrary to the child’s health, safety, or welfare, and a return to the family home cannot be

accomplished in a reasonable period of time as viewed from the child’s perspective. Ark.

Code Ann. § 9-27-341(a)(3). Even full compliance with the case plan is not determinative;

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the issue is whether the parent has become a stable, safe parent able to care for his or her

child. Schaible v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 541, at 8, 444 S.W.3d 366, 371.

Moreover, a child’s need for permanency and stability may override a parent’s request for

additional time to improve the parent’s circumstances. Id., 444 S.W.3d at 371. Finally, a

parent’s past behavior is often a good indicator of future behavior. Id., 444 S.W.3d at 371.

       On appeal, Shipp challenges only the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the

circuit court’s best-interest finding, specifically the potential-harm prong. Shipp argues that

DHS failed to prove that she posed a risk of harm to her children. The circuit court found

that the “potential harm of returning the children to [Shipp] is that they would be exposed

to illegal drugs.” Although she acknowledges that the case was opened due to her substance

abuse, Shipp argues that there was no evidence presented that she continues to have a

substance-abuse issue that would expose her children to potential harm. She states that she

entered an inpatient treatment program soon after the case was opened; and after being

incarcerated, she began a one-year treatment program and attends counseling and support

groups. Shipp points to her testimony that she is committed to maintaining her sobriety

“once released.”

       Shipp acknowledges that she was incarcerated at the time of the termination hearing

and custody could not be returned to her that day. However, she cites Friend v. Arkansas

Department of Human Services, 2009 Ark. App. 606, at 12, 344 S.W.3d 670, 677, in which

this court stated that “[a]lthough imprisonment imposes an unusual impediment to a normal

parental relationship, it is not conclusive on the issue of termination.” Recognizing that her

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incarceration did not toll her responsibilities as a parent, Shipp states that the court should

have determined that she utilized the resources available to maintain a close relationship

with the children. Shipp points to all the services that she took advantage of while

incarcerated and that she was diligent in advocating for appropriate visitation with her

children. Shipp states that her efforts show it is not an “unreasonable presumption” that she

could start a transition to reunification soon after she is released.

       Shipp’s reliance on Friend is misplaced because it addressed whether DHS failed to

provide services to the appellant while incarcerated and noted that a parent’s obligation to

comply with reunification orders was not tolled due to incarceration. Moreover, this court

has affirmed a potential-harm finding based on incarceration because the lack of stable

housing and employment due to incarceration are sufficient to prove potential harm. See,

e.g., Martin v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2022 Ark. App. 508, at 10, 657 S.W.3d 881, 887

(citing Brumley v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2015 Ark. 356, at 10−12).

       Inasmuch as Shipp is arguing that the circuit court’s finding is erroneous because

there was no evidence she continued to use drugs, the termination order noted that “[d]espite

participation in recovery programs, she has not yet demonstrated that she is able to maintain

sobriety outside of a controlled environment.” In addition, under a de novo review, the

entire record is open for our review. Myers v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2023 Ark. App. 46, at

16–17, 660 S.W.3d 357, 369. A review of the record reveals that the testimony established

that the circuit court had ample evidence of potential harm to support its best-interest

finding. Although Shipp testified that she was four months shy of completing the substance-

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abuse program, there was no evidence that she would be able to maintain her sobriety once

released. Everett v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 541, at 6, 506 S.W.3d 287, 291

(“[W]hile Everett had nearly completed a substance-abuse treatment program at the time of

the hearing, he attended the program while incarcerated, and there was no evidence that he

would be able to maintain his sobriety once released. A parent’s lack of stable housing or

employment can demonstrate potential harm to a child, as can a parent’s continued illegal-

drug usage.”).

       Shipp’s argument on appeal is essentially a request for more time. However, a child’s

need for permanency and stability may override a parent’s request for more time to improve

the parent’s circumstances. Kloss v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 389, at 8–9, 585

S.W.3d 725, 730. Here, the children had been out of the home for more than a year, and

Shipp was serving a six-year sentence. Although Shipp claimed that she would be released in

four months and that it was “not an option” for her not to complete the program, she

recognized failure was a possibility for some participants. Shipp acknowledged that, even if

she was released in four months, she would then have to obtain housing and employment.

A parent’s lack of stable housing or employment can demonstrate potential harm to a child,

as can a parent’s continued illegal-drug usage. See, e.g., Jung v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2014

Ark. App. 523, 443 S.W.3d 555 (holding that, while there was some evidence that Jung was

recently employed and sober at the time of the hearing, there was insufficient proof that,

given her history, she could maintain employment or sobriety). Given Shipp’s history and

circumstances, we cannot say the circuit court’s potential-harm finding is clearly erroneous.

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Affirmed.

HARRISON, C.J., and MURPHY, J., agree.

Jennifer Oyler Olson, Arkansas Commission for Parent Counsel, for appellant.

Ellen K. Howard, Ark. Dep’t of Human Services, Office of Chief Counsel, for appellee.

Dana McClain, attorney ad litem for minor children.

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