Court Opinion

ID: 9693909
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 17:09:36.807709+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:10:54.016892
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: AUGUST 18, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                           Court of Appeals

                              NO. 2022-CA-0852-MR

GREGGORY D. SEARS AND
GENEVA E. SEARS                                                    APPELLANTS

                APPEAL FROM CHRISTIAN CIRCUIT COURT
v.                HONORABLE JOHN L. ATKINS, JUDGE
                        ACTION NO. 22-CI-00183

ADDAM G. CLARK                                                         APPELLEE

                                       OPINION
                                      AFFIRMING

                                      ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: CALDWELL, DIXON, AND ECKERLE, JUDGES.

DIXON, JUDGE: Greggory D. Sears and Geneva E. Sears appeal from the order

granting judgment on the pleadings in favor of Addam G. Clark, entered by the

Christian Circuit Court on May 17, 2022, and the order denying their motion to

vacate or set aside, entered on June 22, 2022. Following a careful review of the

record, briefs, and law, we affirm.
          BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

             In February 2020, the Searses purchased two lots totaling 21 acres in

Oak Grove for $281,820. They also owned a four-acre tract in Oak Grove through

their business, Wolf Lick Properties, LLC. They used realtor Debra Butts to list

these properties for sale for $289,900 and $200,000, respectively, both with an

address of “0 Pembroke Oak Grove Road.”

             In February 2022, Clark made a written offer to buy “All that tract of

land known as: 0 Oak Grove Pembroke Road, Oak Grove, Tennessee 42262,” and

further described as “Lots 1 and 2 Pembroke Oak Grove Road” for $210,000. The

Searses counteroffered with the exception that “Anywhere TN is referenced shall

be replaced with Kentucky.” Clark accepted the counteroffer.

             Clark and the Searses entered a Lot/Land Purchase and Sale

Agreement which referenced instrument number 162000002717. The instrument

number matches the map number/account number listed with the Christian County,

Kentucky, Property Valuation Administrator (PVA) for the 21-acre parcel.

             Unfortunately, realtor Butts and the Searses believed Clark’s offer

concerned the purchase of the four-acre tract rather than the lots totaling 21 acres.

Accordingly, the Searses did not close.

             On March 16, 2022, Clark sued the Searses for specific performance

and damages. Clark served interrogatories, requests for production of documents,

                                          -2-
and requests for admission on the Searses, which they never answered. The

Searses were served via civil summonses on March 21, 2022, and answered on

April 19, 2022, pleading the affirmative defenses of failure to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted, statute of frauds, mistake, no meeting of the minds,

and failure to join indispensable parties.

                On April 22, 2022, Clark moved the trial court for judgment on the

pleadings. After the matter was fully briefed, including the filing of Butts’

affidavit, a hearing was held on May 11, 2022. On May 17, 2022, the trial court

entered its order granting the motion for judgment on the pleadings and ordering

the Searses to convey Lots 1 and 2 to Clark. The Searses moved the trial court to

vacate or set aside the judgment, dismiss the action, and for leave to file a

counterclaim. Their motion was denied, and this appeal followed.

                                STANDARD OF REVIEW

                Under CR1 12.03, “any party to a lawsuit may move for a judgment

on the pleadings.” City of Pioneer Vill. v. Bullitt Cnty., 104 S.W.3d 757, 759 (Ky.

2003). A judgment on the pleadings “should be granted if it appears beyond doubt

that the nonmoving party cannot prove any set of facts that would entitle him/her

to relief.” Id. The trial court is “not required to make any factual determination;

rather, the question is purely a matter of law.” James v. Wilson, 95 S.W.3d 875,

1
    Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.

                                             -3-
883-84 (Ky. App. 2002). We review a judgment on the pleadings de novo. Schultz

v. Gen. Elec. Healthcare Fin. Servs., Inc., 360 S.W.3d 171, 177 (Ky. 2012).

             Even so, CR 12.03 requires that a motion in which matters outside the

pleadings are considered be treated as a motion for summary judgment. Craft v.

Simmons, 777 S.W.2d 618 (Ky. App. 1989). See Cabinet for Human Res. v.

Women’s Health Servs., Inc., 878 S.W.2d 806 (Ky. App. 1994) (motion to dismiss

treated as motion for summary judgment because the court considered an affidavit

in support of the motion). In the case herein, affidavits and other documents

beyond public records were provided to the trial court.

             Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, stipulations, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and

that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” CR 56.03.

“[T]he proper function of summary judgment is to terminate litigation when, as a

matter of law, it appears that it would be impossible for the respondent to produce

evidence at the trial warranting a judgment in his favor.” Steelvest, Inc. v.

Scansteel Serv. Ctr., Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Ky. 1991).

             An appellate court’s role in reviewing an award of judgment based

solely on pleadings is to determine whether the trial court erred in finding no

genuine issue of material fact exists, and the moving party was entitled to

                                          -4-
judgment as a matter of law. Scifres v. Kraft, 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (Ky. App.

1996). A grant of such summary judgment is reviewed de novo because factual

findings are not at issue. Pinkston v. Audubon Area Cmty. Servs., Inc., 210 S.W.3d

188, 189 (Ky. App. 2006) (citing Blevins v. Moran, 12 S.W.3d 698 (Ky. App.

2000)).

             Here, because the trial court essentially granted summary judgment to

Clark, we review the facts in a light most favorable to the Searses and resolve all

doubts in their favor. Applying the Steelvest standard, and based on the record, we

agree with the trial court that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Therefore,

we conclude that a judgment on the pleadings was proper.

                                LEGAL ANALYSIS

             On appeal, the Searses first argue that the trial court improperly

granted Clark’s motion because there were genuine issues of material fact. The

“issues” they identify are: (1) their belief that they were selling the four-acre tract

rather than the 21 acres, and (2) the sale price was well below their mortgage

payoff, “which would make their acceptance of it, and agreement to it nonsensical

and outright absurd.”

             Beginning with the Searses’ first issue of error – namely, that they

mistakenly believed Addams’ Lot/Land Purchase and Sale Agreement related to

the smaller tract – this argument is unavailing. Under the rules of contract

                                          -5-
interpretation, the intentions of the parties are to be discerned from the four corners

of the document, and where there is no ambiguity, extrinsic evidence should not be

considered. Cantrell Supply, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 94 S.W.3d 381, 385

(Ky. App. 2002). “[A]bsent fraud in the inducement, a written agreement duly

executed by the party to be held, who had an opportunity to read it, will be

enforced according to its terms.” Conseco Fin. Servicing Corp. v. Wilder, 47

S.W.3d 335, 341 (Ky. App. 2001) (citing Cline v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 690

S.W.2d 764 (Ky. App. 1985)).

             In the case herein, the agreement unambiguously identifies an

instrument number and describes the land as “Lots 1 and 2.” The instrument

number matches the PVA’s report clearly identifying the 21 acres. Moreover, Lots

1 and 2 on the division plat also depict the 21 acres, while the other four acres the

Searses own – through their LLC – are Lots 4 and 5. Furthermore, there is no

allegation of fraud in this case but, rather, only a unilateral mistake. Unfortunately

for the Searses, it is well-settled that “unilateral mistake is not ground for

reforming a written instrument[.]” Cadleway Props., Inc. v. Bayview Loan

Servicing, LLC, 338 S.W.3d 280, 287 (Ky. App. 2010). Additionally, parties are

free to enter contracts even if they make a bad bargain. See Conseco Fin.

Servicing Corp., 47 S.W.3d at 341. Thus, though there may be “issues,” there are

no genuine issues of material fact that preclude a judgment in Clark’s favor.

                                          -6-
             The Searses next argue that the trial court prematurely granted

summary judgment. It is well-established that “summary judgment is only proper

after a party has been given ample opportunity to complete discovery, and then

fails to offer controverting evidence.” Pendleton Bros. Vending, Inc. v.

Commonwealth Fin. & Admin. Cabinet, 758 S.W.2d 24, 29 (Ky. 1988) (emphasis

added) (citing Hartford Ins. Grp. v. Citizens Fid. Bank & Tr. Co., 579 S.W.2d 628

(Ky. App. 1979)). Yet, it is “not necessary to show that the respondent has

actually completed discovery, but only that respondent has had an opportunity to

do so.” Hartford, 579 S.W.2d at 630.

             In Hartford, a period of approximately six months between filing of

the complaint and summary judgment was found to be a sufficient period of time

to conduct discovery. However, this is not a bright-line rule, and the appropriate

time for discovery necessarily varies from case to case depending on the

complexity, availability of information sought, and the like. See Suter v. Mazyck,

226 S.W.3d 837, 842 (Ky. App. 2007), as modified (Jul. 13, 2007).

             Here, while only a matter of months elapsed between the filing of the

complaint and the dismissal based on the terms of the parties’ contract, this is not a

complicated case, nor does it appear that any relevant information pertaining to the

contract has been withheld. Therefore, we cannot say the trial court’s grant of

summary judgment was premature.

                                         -7-
                Next, the Searses maintain that the real estate purchase contract fails

to satisfy the statute of frauds. KRS2 371.010(6) requires “any contract for the sale

of real estate . . . be in writing and signed by the party to be charged therewith[.]”

Here, the agreement was in writing and signed by the Searses. Consequently, their

argument centers solely on the sufficiency of the contract’s description of the

property and wholly ignores the first numbered paragraph of the agreement which

specifically references an instrument number identifying the property. While the

description certainly could be clearer, it is sufficient to identify the property being

purchased/sold and does not run afoul of the statute of frauds. See Gray v. Stewart,

658 S.W.3d 1, 10 (Ky. 2022), reh’g denied (Dec. 15, 2022).

                Finally, the Searses argue that the trial court erred by denying joinder

of necessary/indispensable parties – their realtor and the bank holding a mortgage

on the 21 acres. As to joinder, we are mindful,

                [t]he decision as to necessary or indispensable parties
                rests within the sound authority of the trial judge in order
                to effectuate the objectives of the rule. The exercise of
                discretion by the trial judge should be on a case-by-case
                basis rather than on arbitrary considerations and such a
                decision should not be reversed unless it is clearly
                erroneous or affects the substantial rights of the parties.

Commonwealth, Dep’t of Fish & Wildlife Res. v. Garner, 896 S.W.2d 10, 14 (Ky.

1995) (quoting West v. Goldstein, 830 S.W.2d 379 (Ky. 1992)).

2
    Kentucky Revised Statutes.

                                            -8-
             CR 19.01 permits joinder of additional parties to a lawsuit under

certain limited circumstances. CR 19.01, titled “Persons to be joined if feasible[,]”

provides:

             [a] person who is subject to service of process, either
             personal or constructive, shall be joined as a party in the
             action if (a) in his absence complete relief cannot be
             accorded among those already parties, or (b) he claims an
             interest relating to the subject of the action and is so
             situated that the disposition of the action in his absence
             may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability
             to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons
             already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring
             double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by
             reason of his claimed interest. If he has not been so
             joined, the court shall order that he be made a party. If
             he should join as a plaintiff but refuses to do so, he may
             be made a defendant, or, in a proper case an involuntary
             plaintiff. If the joined party objects to venue and his
             joinder would render the venue of the action improper, he
             shall be dismissed from the action.

Kentucky courts have interpreted CR 19.01 stating:

             “[a]n indispensable party is one whose absence prevents
             the Court from granting complete relief among those
             already parties.” Milligan v. Schenley Distillers, Inc.,
             584 S.W.2d 751, 753 (Ky. App. 1979) (superseded by
             statute on other grounds). Likewise, the Court in [West,
             830 S.W.2d 379], characterized a necessary party as one
             whose interest would be divested by an adverse
             judgment.

Kentucky Ass’n of Fire Chiefs, Inc. v. Kentucky Bd. of Hous., Bldgs. & Const., 344

S.W.3d 129, 134 (Ky. App. 2010), as modified (Jan. 14, 2011).

                                         -9-
                 CR 19.01 is patterned after Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP)

19.3 The only significant difference between the two concerns jurisdiction.

3
    FRCP 19, in pertinent part, states:

                 (a) Persons Required to Be Joined if Feasible.

                         (1) Required Party. A person who is subject to service of
                             process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of
                             subject-matter jurisdiction must be joined as a party if:

                                 (A) in that person’s absence, the court cannot
                                     accord complete relief among existing parties;
                                     or

                                 (B) that person claims an interest relating to the
                                     subject of the action and is so situated that
                                     disposing of the action in the person’s absence
                                     may:

                                            (i) as a practical matter impair or
                                                impede the person’s ability to protect
                                                the interest; or

                                            (ii) leave an existing party subject to a
                                                 substantial risk of incurring double,
                                                 multiple, or otherwise inconsistent
                                                 obligations because of the interest.

                         (2) Joinder by Court Order. If a person has not been
                         joined as required, the court must order that the person be
                         made a party. A person who refuses to join as a plaintiff
                         may be made either a defendant or, in a proper case, an
                         involuntary plaintiff.

                 (b) When Joinder Is Not Feasible. If a person who is required to
                 be joined if feasible cannot be joined, the court must determine
                 whether, in equity and good conscience, the action should proceed
                 among the existing parties or should be dismissed. The factors for
                 the court to consider include:

                         (1) the extent to which a judgment rendered in the person’s
                         absence might prejudice that person or the existing parties;

                                                 -10-
Therefore, cases analyzing FRCP 19 are relevant in determining the proper

interpretation and application of CR 19.01.

              Under FRCP 19, there is a bifurcated process for determining whether

a non-party is either necessary under subsection (a) or indispensable under

subsection (b).4 The Court in Am. Express Travel Related Services, Company v.

Bank One-Dearborn, N.A. set forth the framework for how joinder determinations

are to be made under this bifurcated process, observing:

              Rule 19 lays out a three-step test for courts to use in
              determining whether an absent party must be joined.
              [FRCP] 19. First, the court must determine whether the
              party is necessary and should be joined under Rule 19(a).
              If the person or entity is a necessary party, the court
              looks to whether joinder is feasible, or if a lack of subject
              matter or personal jurisdiction makes joinder impossible.
              Third, if joinder is not possible, the court must weigh the

                     (2) the extent to which any prejudice could be lessened or
                     avoided by:

                            (A) protective provisions in the judgment;

                            (B) shaping the relief; or

                            (C) other measures;

                     (3) whether a judgment rendered in the person’s absence
                     would be adequate; and

                     (4) whether the plaintiff would have an adequate remedy if
                     the action were dismissed for nonjoinder.
4
  In Kentucky, FRCP 19 is divided into CR 19.01 and CR 19.02. CR 19.01 is used to determine
whether a party is necessary, like FRCP 19(a). CR 19.02 addresses indispensability and is
essentially identical to FRCP 19(b).

                                             -11-
             equities of the situation pursuant to Rule 19(b) and
             determine if the suit can continue in the party’s absence
             or if the case should be dismissed because the party is
             indispensable. See [FRCP] 19; Hooper v. Wolfe, 396
             F.3d 744, 747 (6th Cir. 2005); Glancy v. Taubman Ctrs.,
             Inc., 373 F.3d 656, 666 (6th Cir. 2004).

195 F.App’x 458, 460 (2006). Applying this framework, rather than reviewing the

applicability of each provision of FRCP 19, the analysis begins and ends with

subsection (a) – the equivalent of CR 19.01 – if a non-party is determined not to be

necessary to the litigation.

             In Delgado v. Plaza Las Americas, Inc., 139 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1998),

the Court analyzed whether a non-party was necessary. Therein, Delgado’s

daughter was sexually abused and raped at a shopping center. Delgado sued the

shopping center seeking damages for emotional pain and suffering he experienced

because of his daughter’s rape. The trial court determined Delgado’s daughter was

a necessary party to the litigation under FRCP 19(a)(2)(ii), reasoning:

             the potential for inconsistent verdicts in [Daughter’s]
             state action and Delgado’s federal action subjected
             defendants to a substantial risk of incurring multiple or
             otherwise inconsistent obligations. The court also
             observed that allowing the two actions to proceed would
             be an inefficient use of judicial resources and raised the
             specter of one of the plaintiffs using “offensive collateral
             estoppel” against defendants.

139 F.3d at 2. On appeal, the Court considered the correct interpretation and

application of FRCP 19. Noting a plaintiff has the right to control their litigation,

                                         -12-
FRCP 19(a) balances those rights “against the defendants’ (and systemic) interests

in avoiding judgments giving rise to ‘inconsistent obligations.’” 139 F.3d at 3.

The Court went on to explain the meaning of “inconsistent obligations” under the

Rule:

             “Inconsistent obligations” are not, however, the same as
             inconsistent adjudications or results. See Micheel v.
             Haralson, 586 F.Supp. 169, 171 (E.D. Pa. 1983); see also
             4 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice ¶
             19.03 (3d ed. 1997). Inconsistent obligations occur when
             a party is unable to comply with one court’s order
             without breaching another court’s order concerning the
             same incident. See 4 Moore’s at ¶ 19.03. Inconsistent
             adjudications or results, by contrast, occur when a
             defendant successfully defends a claim in one forum, yet
             loses on another claim arising from the same incident in
             another forum. See [Nat’l] Union Fire Ins. Co. of
             Pittsburgh v. Massachusetts Mun. Wholesale Elec. Co.,
             117 F.R.D. 321, 322 (D.Mass. 1987) (citing Bedel v.
             Thompson, 103 F.R.D. 78, 81 (S.D. Ohio 1984)); see also
             Boone v. [Gen.] Motors Acceptance Corp., 682 F.2d 552,
             554 (5th Cir. 1982) (the threat of inconsistent obligations,
             not multiple litigations, informs [FRCP] 19(a)
             considerations); Field v. Volkswagenwerk AG, 626 F.2d
             293, 301 (3d Cir. 1980) (similar). Unlike a risk of
             inconsistent obligations, a risk that a defendant who has
             successfully defended against a party may be found liable
             to another party in a subsequent action arising from the
             same incident – i.e., a risk of inconsistent adjudications
             or results – does not necessitate joinder of all of the
             parties into one action pursuant to [FRCP] 19(a). See
             Field, 626 F.2d at 301. Moreover, where two suits
             arising from the same incident involve different causes of
             action, defendants are not faced with the potential for
             double liability because separate suits have different
             consequences and different measures of damages. See In
             re Torcise, 116 F.3d 860, 866 (11th Cir. 1997).

                                        -13-
Id. With these considerations in mind, the Court then rejected the trial court’s

holding as to joinder, stating:

             In this situation, defendants faced a federal action and a
             state action arising from the same incident. In reasoning
             that defendants could be facing “inconsistent
             obligations,” the district court noted that defendants
             could be found liable to Delgado in federal court, but not
             liable to [Daughter] in state court, or vice versa.
             Although the court also looked to other factors in
             reaching its conclusion, it is this determination – which is
             really a determination that defendants faced the threat of
             inconsistent results – that grounded the court’s ruling
             that [Daughter] was a necessary party to this lawsuit. Yet
             as we have explained, the mere possibility of inconsistent
             results in separate actions does not make the plaintiff in
             each action a necessary party to the other.

Id. (emphasis added). Applied to the case herein, failure to join additional parties

poses no threat of inconsistent obligations under the Rule for those already parties.

             CR 19.01 and FRCP 19(a) permit joinder if “in [the party’s] absence

complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties.” In Janney

Montgomery Scott, Inc. v. Shepard Niles, Inc., the Court noted,

             Under Rule 19(a), we ask first whether complete relief
             can be accorded to the parties to the action in the absence
             of the unjoined party. [FRCP] 19(a)(1). A Rule 19(a)(1)
             inquiry is limited to whether the district court can grant
             complete relief to the persons already parties to the
             action. The effect a decision may have on the absent
             party is not material.

                                        -14-
11 F.3d 399, 404 (1993) (emphasis added). “It is a misapplication of Rule 19(a) to

add parties who are neither necessary nor indispensable, who are not essential for

just adjudication and who have a separate cause of action entirely.” Bakia v. Cty.

of Los Angeles, 687 F.2d 299, 301 (9th Cir. 1982) (citation omitted). The criteria

of “necessary” has been further explained as follows:

             [i]f the interests of necessary parties are separable from
             those of parties before the court, so that the court can
             proceed to a decree, and do complete and final justice,
             without affecting other persons not before the court, the
             persons not before the court are not [necessary] parties,
             and the court may proceed with the case and adjudicate
             upon the rights of those who are made parties.

59 Am.Jur.2d Parties § 130 (2002). Here, complete, and final justice can be

obtained without joining the additional parties.

             As explained in Corpus Juris Secundum,

             Parties are not necessary to a complete determination of
             the controversy unless they have rights which must be
             ascertained and settled before the rights of the parties to
             the suit can be determined. Accordingly, a person is not
             a necessary party where he or she has no interest in the
             subject matter of the litigation which can be affected by a
             judgment or decree rendered therein as where an
             adjudication of the rights of the other parties would in no
             way affect his or her rights or where his or her presence
             before the court is not necessary to a determination of the
             issues joined between the parties to the action.

67A C.J.S. Parties § 3 (2020) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).

                                        -15-
             Here, there is no indication that interests of additional parties, if any,

in the subject matter of this litigation would be affected by a failure to join. Thus,

there is no valid basis pursuant to CR 19.01 to mandate joinder. Since the

additional parties cannot be viewed as necessary parties, we need not address any

other provision of the Rule.

                                   CONCLUSION

             Therefore, and for the foregoing reasons, the orders of the Christian

Circuit Court are AFFIRMED.

             ECKERLE, JUDGE, CONCURS.

             CALDWELL, JUDGE, DISSENTS AND FILES SEPARATE
OPINION.

             CALDWELL, JUDGE, DISSENTING: I respectfully dissent. The

contract is ambiguous and fails to identify the property sufficiently to satisfy the

statute of frauds. So, it was not proper to consider extrinsic evidence to

“designate” the property. See generally Gray v. Stewart, 658 S.W.3d 1 (Ky. 2022).

Clark was not entitled to summary judgment based on the evidence in the record

before us, and the trial court erred in granting his request for specific performance

and ordering that the 21-acre property be conveyed to him.

             According to the majority:

             In the case herein, the agreement unambiguously
             identifies an instrument number and describes the land as
             “Lots 1 and 2.” The instrument number matches the

                                          -16-
             PVA’s report clearly identifying the 21 acres. Moreover,
             Lots 1 and 2 on the division plat also depict the 21 acres,
             while the other four acres the Searses own – through their
             LLC – are Lots 4 and 5.

(Opinion, p. 6.) But the written contract does not explicitly refer to any PVA

document nor to any plat.

             The written offer submitted by Clark refers to a parcel of property he

identifies as 0 Oak Grove Pembroke Road, Oak Grove, Tennessee. No deed book

reference is provided in the written offer.

             The offer has “162000002714” in a blank before “instrument number”

and contains the further description: “Lots 1 and 2 Pembroke Oak Grove Road.”

The offer does not refer to any plat. The offer does not identify “162000002714”

as a number assigned by any PVA office – much less clearly identify that number

as a map number assigned by the PVA office in Christian County, Kentucky.

Indeed, Clark’s argument that those numerals clearly refer to a PVA plat from

Christian County, Kentucky, is contrary to the indisputable fact that the offer itself

plainly states that it was made for property located in Tennessee.

             The counteroffer – which the Searses submitted, and Clark accepted –

refers to the property being sold as located in Kentucky, not Tennessee. It

identifies the property being sold simply as “0 Oak Grove Pembroke Road, Oak

Grove KY 42262.” The counteroffer makes no reference to any deed book,

instrument number or recorded plat. And, unlike the original offer, the

                                         -17-
counteroffer does not contain the description “Lots 1 and 2 Pembroke Oak Grove

Road.”

             Neither the offer nor the counteroffer describes the acreage of the

property being sold. Neither identifies the property being sold as all of the

Searses’ property at the 0 Oak Grove Pembroke Road address. See Gray v.

Stewart, 658 S.W.3d at 19-20 (descriptions of acreage or of the property for sale

being all of the owner’s property at a particular location serve to identify the

information necessary for conveying property – ownership, location and area or

amount).

             Neither the offer nor counteroffer identifies the property by any MLS

listing number either. And while the offer refers to Lots 1 and 2 on Oak Grove

Pembroke Road, the counteroffer does not refer to any numbered lots. While Clark

may perceive that the property being sold is a 21-acre property due to his

references to Lot 1 and 2 in his offer, perhaps others (such as the Searses) might

perceive that the property being sold was not the 21-acre property – especially

since the counteroffer did not repeat the reference to Lots 1 and 2.

             In short, the descriptions in the written contract fail to “identify the

specific property upon which the minds of the parties have met” as they do not

identify all “information essential to conveying a particular piece of property” –

i.e., area or amount as well as ownership and location. See Gray, 658 S.W.3d at

                                         -18-
19-20. At most, the descriptions in the written contract indicate the property for

sale was owned by the Searses and is located on Oak Grove Pembroke Road. But

these descriptions do not identify the acreage of the property or whether it was all

of the property owned by the Searses at this location.

             Under these circumstances, the writing did not – by itself – clearly

identify the property being sold. Notwithstanding the “instrument number” of

“162000002714,” which is neither in the usual dashes-and-decimals format of a

typical PVA number nor described as a PVA number in the written contract, the

written contract document did not refer to any other writing identifying the

property. Thus, neither the written contract document itself nor any other writing

referenced therein clearly identified the property being conveyed.

             Even though the written contract document indicates the Searses’

ownership of and the general Oak Grove Pembroke Road location of the property

to be sold, one would have to resort to verbal testimony to determine the property’s

boundaries and acreage. This is not sufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds. See

Gray, 658 S.W.3d at 20 (real estate sale contract unenforceable under the statute of

frauds because there was nothing in the writing itself to resolve the dispute about

the acreage intended to be conveyed, despite contract generally identifying

ownership and location and stating the parties had agreed on boundaries).

                                        -19-
             Furthermore, especially viewing the record in the light most favorable

to the Searses, the written sales contract document does not reflect a meeting of the

minds about what property was being sold. While the statute of frauds is not

intended to preclude the enforcement of valid written contracts, id. at 9, there is no

valid contract where there is no meeting of the minds. In fact, longstanding

Kentucky precedent describes a meeting of the minds as “the most essential factor

to constitute a binding contract.” See Utilities Elec. Mach. Corp. v. Joseph E.

Seagram & Sons, 300 Ky. 69, 75, 187 S.W.2d 1015, 1018 (1945).

             In sum, I would reverse the grant of specific performance because the

contract was ambiguous and failed to sufficiently identify the property in such a

way as to satisfy the statute of frauds or to reflect a true meeting of the minds.

 BRIEFS FOR APPELLANTS:                     BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

 Matthew J. Baker                           James G. Adams III
 Bowling Green, Kentucky                    Hopkinsville, Kentucky

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