Court Opinion

ID: 9914871
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-03 16:03:28.886338+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:14:50.312057
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                              FOURTH DISTRICT

                 CHERRY ROOFING ENTERPRISES, INC.,
                            Appellant,

                                      v.

                              DIANE BADER,
                                 Appellee.

                             No. 4D2023-1365

                             [January 3, 2024]

   Appeal from the County Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit,
Broward County; Ellen Feld, Judge; L.T. Case No. COWE-22-000852.

   Lawrence R. Metsch of Metschlaw, P.A., Hollywood, for appellant.

  Gabriel A. Alonso and Ian Kravitz of Malka & Kravitz, P.A., Fort
Lauderdale, for appellee.

DAMOORGIAN, J.

   This case arises from a dispute between Diane Bader (“Homeowner”)
and Cherry Roofing Enterprises, Inc. (“the roofer”) due to alleged defective
re-roofing work performed by the roofer at Homeowner’s residence. At
issue is whether the county court committed reversable error by entering
a default final judgment against the roofer for failing to obtain legal counsel
within the time period set by the court. For the reasons outlined below,
we reverse the default judgment.

   Homeowner filed a complaint against the roofer. The roofer, through
counsel, timely filed an answer and affirmative defenses. Several months
later, the roofer’s then-counsel filed a motion to withdraw, which the
county court granted. The order on the motion to withdraw also provided
that the roofer was required to obtain new counsel within thirty days from
the date of the order, which was no later than January 27, 2023. After
the roofer failed to retain counsel within that time period, Homeowner filed
a motion for default. On February 26, 2023, the roofer’s new counsel,
Metschlaw, P.A., filed a notice of appearance.
   On March 6, 2023, the county court granted Homeowner’s motion for
default against the roofer. That same day, the roofer filed a motion to set
aside the default, arguing the filing of the notice of appearance prevented
the entry of a default under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.500(c). The
county court denied the motion and entered default final judgment against
the roofer. This appeal follows.

   Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.500(c) states: “A party may plead or
otherwise defend at any time before default is entered.” “Florida’s
appellate courts ‘have uniformly interpreted rule 1.500(c) as providing that
the entry of default is improper when a party has filed a responsive
pleading or otherwise defended before the entry of default.’” Cano v. Cano,
321 So. 3d 237, 238 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021) (quoting Pro-Art Dental Lab, Inc.
v. V-Strategic Grp., LLC, 986 So. 2d 1244, 1259 (Fla. 2008)). “Under the
plain language of Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.500(c), an answer filed
prior to entry of default precludes the entry of default final judgment.”
Azure-Moore Invs. LLC v. Hoyen, 300 So. 3d 1268, 1269 (Fla. 4th DCA
2020).

   Our holding in Carillon Corp. v. Devick, 554 So. 2d 630 (Fla. 4th DCA
1989), is dispositive. There, the appellant failed to comply with the trial
court’s order to obtain new counsel and the trial court struck its pleadings
and entered default. Id. at 631. In reversing, we held:

      [T]he order of the trial court required the appellant to secure
      counsel within fifteen days.         Although this was not
      accomplished, a notice of appearance of counsel for appellant
      was filed prior to the entry of the order of default. Therefore,
      pursuant to rule 1.500(c), appellant had “otherwise defended”
      prior to the time the default was entered, and the trial court
      was without authority to enter a default under rule 1.500.

Id. at 632. We went on to explain “the appellant did secure counsel prior
to the hearing granting the dismissal, and the trial court made no finding
that appellant had intentionally disregarded the order of the court. Such
an express written finding is essential to justify the severe sanction of
default.” Id.; see also Munoz v. Alvarez, 774 So. 2d 801, 801 (Fla. 3d DCA
2000) (reversing order dismissing case for failure to comply with a court
order to retain new counsel “[b]ecause the order does not, as required,
state that the claimed noncompliance was willful or deliberate”); Visoly v.
Kluger, Peretz, Kaplan & Berlin, P.A., 707 So. 2d 427, 428 (Fla. 3d DCA
1998) (reversing order dismissing complaint with prejudice for failure to
timely comply with order to retain new counsel “where there was no finding
by the lower court or record evidence to suggest that appellant’s failure to

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comply with this order was deliberate and in contumacious disregard of
the court’s authority”).

    Here, as in Carillon, the roofer secured new counsel who filed a notice
of appearance prior to entry of the default. Moreover, up to that point, the
roofer had defended the action by filing an answer and affirmative
defenses. Equally as compelling is the fact that prior to entry of the
default, the county court made no findings that the roofer had
intentionally disregarded the court’s order. We hold that the filing of the
notice of appearance prior to the entry of the default order meant that the
roofer had “otherwise defended.” Therefore, the county court was without
authority to enter a subsequent default or default final judgment. See
Carillon, 554 So. 2d at 632; Onyx Fin. Grp., Inc. v. Int’l Waste Sys., Inc.,
619 So. 2d 1036, 1036 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993) (holding that the default was
erroneously entered “[b]ecause (1) the defendants did, in fact, obtain
counsel in the cause prior to the entry of the order granting a default,
although not within the prescribed twenty-day time period . . . and (2) no
finding was made by the court that the defendants intentionally disobeyed
the court’s order”). Accordingly, we reverse the default and default final
judgment and remand for further proceedings.

   Reversed and remanded.

MAY and FORST, JJ., concur.

                           *         *         *

   Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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