Court Opinion

ID: 9739273
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:11:34.962076+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:11.265265
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE CUNNINGHAM, specially concurring: Although I concur with my colleagues in the disposition of the present appeal, I write separately to explain an additional basis for my agreement. In my opinion the adjudicatory process has not yet come into play when certification is required under section 2 — 622. The affidavit with attached written report of a health professional is a pleading requirement. If noncompliance is not raised by the defendant, the requirement is waived. The argument that the certification requirement violates the constitutional separation of powers is not valid because the health professional is not applying legal principles to the facts of a particular case. Rather, the health professional is only rendering an opinion which will assist the court in applying legal principles to the facts of a particular case. The health professional is not making a legal judgment but is making a professional judgment derived from the particular health professional’s own training and experience. Section 2 — 622 provides in part “that the reviewing health professional has determined in a written report, after a review of the medical record and other relevant material involved in the particular action that there is a reasonable and meritorious cause for the filing of such action ***.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 2— 622(a)(1).) The health professional who must review the medical record, in order to make a medical judgment, must also have some knowledge of the facts of the particular situation in order to render an opinion. This does not mean that the health professional is applying legal principles to the facts. While the word “meritorious” has a legal connotation (defined as “[possessing or characterized by ‘merit’ in the legal sense of the word” (Black’s Law Dictionary 892 (5th ed. 1979)), its use in section 2 — 622 does not grant the health professional the power to make the final determination as to whether the cause has merit. Rather, the court makes that final determination vis-avis section 2 — 619 because section 2 — 622 provides that “[t]he failure to file a certificate required by this Section shall be grounds for dismissal under Section 2 — 619.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 2 — 622(g). Section 2 — 619 sets forth the provisions for involuntary dismissal and 2 — 619(c) permits the plaintiff to establish facts “obviating the grounds of defect” and authorizes the court to hear and determine the same and to grant or deny the motion. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 2 — 619.) It is the involuntary dismissal proceeding under section 2 — 619 that brings the adjudicatory or judicial function into play. Thus, it is the trial judge, not the health professional, who makes the final determination whether a cause is to be dismissed. The trial judge is merely assisted in that determination by the opinion of the health professional. It should also be noted that section 2 — 622(c) provides that a certificate of a health professional is also required when the plaintiff relies on res ipsa loquitur. However, section 2 — 622(c) refers to res ipsa loquitur as defined in section 2 — 1113. Section 2 — 1113 provides that the court shall determine whether res ipsa loquitur applies and provides that the court, in making that determination, shall rely upon either the common knowledge of laymen, if it determines that to be adequate, or upon expert medical testimony. Thus, in deciding a motion for involuntary dismissal under section 2 — 619, not only may the court hear and determine matters obviating the defects, but in cases involving res ipsa loquitur the court may also determine whether the alleged malpractice is of the nature that does not require medical testimony but is within the common knowledge of laymen. It is not the health professional who makes that determination but the court, just as the court makes the determination whether the plaintiffs complaint is to be dismissed for failing to contain the necessary affidavit and accompanying health professional’s report. In summary, section 2 — 622 simply sets forth pleading requirements as do many other sections of the Code. The judicial function is performed under section 2 — 619 when the trial judge determines whether the case should be dismissed for failure to comply with section 2 — 622. If the required certification is not filed and the court, under section 2 — 619, determines that one should have been filed, the court may dismiss the case. That is exactly what the court is required to do at the end of the plaintiff’s case at trial if the plaintiff fails to present the testimony of an expert witness to establish the applicable standard of care and its violation. At the pleading stage, the case may be dismissed because of the plaintiff’s failure to present the affidavit of the attorney and accompanying report of a health professional with the complaint. At the end of the plaintiff’s case, it may be dismissed for failure to present evidence from a health professional. In neither case has a health professional usurped any judicial function, because in neither case has a health professional done anything but render an opinion. It is the plaintiff who has failed, in one instance, to plead properly, and in the other, to present the necessary evidence.