Court Opinion

ID: 9380821
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-21 15:00:34.157884+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:27.831290
License: Public Domain

20-4152
     Sylla v. Garland
                                                                              BIA
                                                                         Cassin, IJ
                                                                      A079 106 370
                             UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                   SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION
TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED
AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS
COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX
OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A
PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

 1        At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
 2   for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
 3   United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
 4   New York, on the 21st day of March, two thousand twenty-
 5   three.
 6
 7   PRESENT:
 8            JOHN M. WALKER, JR.,
 9            RICHARD J. SULLIVAN,
10            SARAH A. L. MERRIAM,
11                 Circuit Judges.
12   _____________________________________
13
14   ALHOUSSENY SYLLA,
15            Petitioner,
16
17                      v.                                  20-4152
18                                                          NAC
19   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
20   STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
21            Respondent.
22   _____________________________________
23
24   FOR PETITIONER:                    Victor Essien, Esq., New York, NY.
25
26   FOR RESPONDENT:                    Brian M. Boynton, Acting Assistant
27                                      Attorney General; Sabatino F. Leo,
28                                      Assistant Director; Aaron D.
 1                                      Nelson, Trial Attorney, Office of
 2                                      Immigration Litigation, United
 3                                      States Department of Justice,
 4                                      Washington, DC.

 5         UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a

 6   Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby

 7   ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review

 8   is DENIED.

 9         Petitioner Alhousseny Sylla, a native and citizen of

10   Ivory Coast, seeks review of a November 16, 2020 decision of

11   the   BIA     affirming     a    November    28,   2018   decision   of    an

12   Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying his motion for a continuance

13   and ordering removal.            In re Alhousseny Sylla, No. A079-106-

14   370 (B.I.A. Nov. 16, 2020), aff’g No. A079-106-370 (Immigr.

15   Ct. N.Y.C. Nov. 28, 2018). We assume the parties’ familiarity

16   with the underlying facts and procedural history.

17         We have reviewed both the BIA’s and IJ’s decisions “for

18   the sake of completeness.”              Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland

19   Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006).                    We review the

20   agency’s      factual     findings     for   substantial    evidence      and

21   questions of law and constitutional issues de novo.                       See

22   Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir. 2009); Dale

23   v.    Barr,    967   F.3d       133,   138   (2d   Cir.   2020).     “[T]he
                                             2
 1   administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any

 2   reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the

 3   contrary.”    8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).      We review an IJ’s

 4   denial of a continuance for abuse of discretion.      See Sanusi

 5   v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 193, 199 (2d Cir. 2006).

 6        “The [IJ] may grant a motion for continuance for good

 7   cause shown.”   8 C.F.R. § 1003.29. *    “IJs are accorded wide

 8   latitude in calendar management.”       Morgan v. Gonzales, 445

 9   F.3d 549, 551 (2d Cir. 2006).    An IJ abuses her discretion in

10   denying a continuance “if (1) [her] decision rests on an error

11   of law (such as application of the wrong legal principle) or

12   a clearly erroneous factual finding or (2) [her] decision—

13   though not necessarily the product of a legal error or a

14   clearly erroneous factual finding—cannot be located within

15   the range of permissible decisions.”     Id. at 551–52 (internal

16   quotation marks omitted).

17        The IJ did not abuse her discretion.      Even after Sylla

18   had been granted three continuances, he failed to demonstrate

19   a diligent, good-faith effort to be ready to proceed at his

     * We cite the version of the regulations in place at the time of
     the agency’s proceedings.
                                     3
 1   November 2018 hearing as he did not produce an application

 2   for relief from removal or evidence requested by the IJ.                   See

 3   Matter of Sibrun, 18 I. & N. Dec. 354, 356 (B.I.A. 1983)

 4   (requiring “a reasonable showing that the lack of preparation

 5   occurred despite a diligent good faith effort to be ready to

 6   proceed”).      The     IJ’s    consideration      of     the    history    of

 7   continuances in Sylla’s case was proper.                  See Morgan, 445

 8   F.3d at 553 (“[I]mmigration cases are not games . . . .                    [A]n

 9   IJ [should not] be required to[] indulge . . . attempts to

10   introduce needless delay into what are meant to be streamlined

11   proceedings.”     (internal       quotation       marks    and    citations

12   omitted)).

13        Finally, to the extent Sylla argues that he was deprived

14   of due process or received ineffective assistance of counsel,

15   he has not demonstrated the prejudice required to state a due

16   process claim, e.g., that he has a basis for asylum, or that

17   he   complied    with    the     procedural       requirements      for     an

18   ineffective assistance of counsel claim.             See Garcia-Villeda

19   v.   Mukasey,   531   F.3d     141,   149   (2d   Cir.    2008)   (“Parties

20   claiming denial of due process in immigration cases must, in

21   order to prevail, allege some cognizable prejudice fairly

                                           4
 1   attributable to the challenged process.” (internal quotation

 2   marks omitted)); Jian Yun Zheng v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 409

 3   F.3d 43, 47 (2d Cir. 2005)(holding that a petitioner who fails

 4   to comply substantially with the procedural requirements for

 5   an ineffective assistance claim “forfeits” that claim in this

 6   court).

 7       For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is

 8   DENIED.   All pending motions and applications are DENIED and

 9   stays VACATED.

10                               FOR THE COURT:
11                               Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
12                               Clerk of Court
13

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