Court Opinion

ID: 9884300
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 02:51:53.851435+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:37.449552
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Schaefer, dissenting: I concur in the opinion of the court insofar as it holds that the principles announced in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 12 L. Ed.2d 977 and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 were not applicable to the defendant’s trial. I dissent because I think that the allegations of the defendant’s post-conviction petition concerning his arrest, detention, and promises and threats allegedly made to him, entitled him to a hearing as to the voluntariness of the confession that was admitted in evidence against him. Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 16 L. Ed. 2d 895. The opinion of the court holds that the question of the voluntariness of the confession obtained by an assistant State’s Attorney from this 16-year-old defendant was forever waived by the “trial strategy’ of the public defender, who stipulated to the admission of the confession in evidence. I can see no possible advantage the defendant could have gained by reason of the “strategy” that the court attributes to his attorney. The defendant in this case did not deny that he made the confession. He did deny that he had given certain answers that were included in it, but under the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in Lee v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 742, 92 L. Ed. 330 and People v. Norfleet, 29 Ill.2d 287, his right to a hearing upon the voluntariness of the confession would not have been forfeited even if he had totally denied that he made any confession. The court apparently rests its holding upon Nelson v. California, (9th cir. 1965) 346 F.2d 73, (cert, denied 384 U.S. 964, 15 L. Ed. 2d 367.) In that case the defendant’s attorney did not make a contemporaneous objection to the admission of evidence which was allegedly the product of an illegal search. In my opinion the Nelson case has no bearing upon the issue here presented. The right involved in that case is not the right of the defendant involved in this case. The voluntariness of a confession goes to the reliability of the conviction, whereas the product of an illegal search is excluded in order to deter police misconduct. (See Note, 80 Harvard Law Review, 422, 435.) Moreover, the potential tactical advantage in refraining from moving to suppress illegally obtained evidence is clear, because if the motion is made the prosecution may, at the hearing upon the motion, offer evidence to show probable cause which would otherwise not be admissible. The considerations that moved me to dissent from the opinion of the court in People v. Richardson, 32 Ill.2d 472, are also present in this case.