Court Opinion

ID: 9627679
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:50:17.688502+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:38:47.452325
License: Public Domain

Justice WALTERS,
dissenting.
I concur with Chief Justice Trout’s dissent, and also dissent separately for the following reasons.
This is not a case where an insurer has breached its contract with the insured and should be required to compensate the insured, through prejudgment interest, for the delay in paying over to the insured the sum rightfully due under the insurance contract. The insured was not required to file this action in order to achieve a recovery from the insurer. The question of the amount of the recovery was cooperatively submitted to arbitration, pursuant to the terms of the insurance contract. The insurer complied with the terms of its contract with the Schillings by submitting the question of the amount of Schilling’s recovery to arbitration under the underinsured motorist provisions of the insurance contract. The arbitrators determined the amount of Schilling’s recovery to be for a sum that was within the $100,000 coverage of the policy. The nominal policy limits for the underinsured motorist coverage were $100,000 for one person. Under the terms of the insurance contract, however, those limits are reduced by amounts recovered from the liable tortfeasor. In this case, because Schilling had resolved his claim against the primary tortfeasor for $25,000, there was available to him the sum of $75,000 as the limit of underinsured motorist benefits. The arbitrators decided that Schilling was damaged in the amount of $98,-000, which resulted in a net award of $73,000 after reducing the damages by the $25,000 Schilling received from the tortfeasor. The amount found due in the arbitration proceeding was immediately paid over by Allstate to the Schillings.
The amount found by the arbitrators presumptively included consideration for the loss of the use of the money from the time of the accident, and thus would not necessitate the calculation of any amount of “interest” due. Personal injury judgments routinely compensate the injured person for damages which have not yet occurred, i.e., future medical expenses, future lost wages, pain, suffering, disfigurement, etc. It is basically illogical, unjust and unconscionable to award prejudgment interest on sums of money representing damages which have not yet occurred, but which will only occur sometime in the future. To require Allstate to pay interest in addition to the amount of the loss determined by the arbitrators clearly constitutes a double recovery by Schilling for a portion of his loss.
Furthermore, I concur with the dissent written by Chief Justice Trout holding that the district court lacked authority to' modify the arbitrators’ award by adding an amount for prejudgment interest. There was no “evident miscalculation of figures” by the arbitrators, no award by the arbitrators “upon a matter not submitted to them,” nor was the *934award “imperfect in a matter of form,” the three grounds specified in Idaho Code § 7-913 that permit a court to modify an arbitration award. Indeed, the arbitrators relied upon another provision of the code, I.C. § 7-912(a)(3), as the reason for declining to award interest. That section provides for relief where it is determined that “[t]he arbitrators exceeded their powers.” The arbitrators’ focus on that provision of the statute as a basis for their decision indicates that the arbitrators understood that they lacked the power to award prejudgment interest in addition to the amount that they had determined would properly, and legally, compensate Schilling totally for his loss. Upholding the district court’s interference with the award in this case, when the arbitrators declined to add interest to the award after a request by the Schillings to include it, appears to be an unwarranted invasion of the legislature’s power to declare in the statutes the limited authority for the court’s involvement in the arbitration process. The decision of the arbitrators that they were without power to award prejudgment interest, even if erroneous, was not subject to review by the district court. It is well settled that arbitrators’ decisions as to both fact and law, even when erroneous, are final and binding on the parties. Chicoine v. Bignall, 127 Idaho 225, 227-28, 899 P.2d 438, 440-41 (1995); Bingham County Comm’n v. Interstate Elec. Co., 105 Idaho 36, 665 P.2d 1046 (1983).
Inasmuch as the district court lacked authority to modify the arbitration award by the addition of prejudgment interest, the court’s decision should be reversed.