Court Opinion

ID: 9498400
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 17:16:36.137964+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:58:48.864438
License: Public Domain

BYE, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part, and dissenting in part.
I agree with the court’s holding that the district court did not err in admitting evidence of Koski’s 1996 conviction at trial. I respectfully dissent, however, from the court’s determination there was sufficient evidence to support Koski’s conviction on Count II.
“[A] statute ... which makes criminal a form of pure speech, must be interpreted with the commands of the First Amendment clearly in mind. What is a threat must be distinguished from what is constitutionally protected speech.” Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707, 89 S.Ct. 1399, 22 L.Ed.2d 664 (1969). Significantly, we have recognized “every person has a right to communicate with public officials calling attention to improper conduct and ... the language used may be vehement, vituperative or abusive without violating the law.” Martin v. United States, 691 F.2d 1235, 1240 (8th Cir.1982).
“The question of whether the language conveys a threat is an issue of fact for the jury.” Id. (citing United States v. Lincoln, 589 F.2d 379, 381 (8th Cir.1979)). However, it is the court’s responsibility to decide “whether the language of a particular communication, viewed in textual con*821text and also in the context of the totality of the circumstances in which the communication was made, affords an evidentiary basis upon which a reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Bellrichard, 994 F.2d 1318, 1323 (8th Cir.1993). “In order to sustain its burden of proof under § 876, the government must present evidence sufficiently strong to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the communication in question conveys a threat of injury.” United States v. Barcley, 452 F.2d 930, 933 (8th Cir.1971). “ ‘If a reasonable recipient, familiar with the context of the communication, would interpret it as a threat, the issue should go to the jury.’ ” United States v. Whitfield, 31 F.3d 747, 749 (8th Cir.1994) (quoting Bellrichard, 994 F.2d at 1323-24).
When Koski’s communication to Attorney General Long is viewed in context, the evidence does not show a reasonable recipient would view the communication as conveying a threat. Instead, an examination of the context of the communication shows a reasonable recipient would view Koski’s communication as Koski’s attempt to inform Attorney General Long of the injustices Koski perceived he was facing. None of the letters in the packet were addressed to or discussed Attorney General Long or any individuals or entities associated with him. Instead, the packet contained copies of letters addressed to other governmental entities in which Koski expressed complaints and documented his frustrating experiences with the IRS and his former girlfriend’s attorney. The packet also included copies of letters which were addressed to Koski and written in response to the letters Koski had written. The only reference to Attorney General Long in the materials was at the bottom of a copy of a letter to Agent Owen where it was indicated Attorney General Long was copied. In the same letter, Koski also copied President Bush, Senator Daschle, the Rapid City Journal, and the Sioux Falls Argus Leader. A reasonable recipient could not view the communication mailed to Attorney General Long, which contained copies of letters directed to others and indicated the same had been mailed to two newspapers and other government officials, as conveying a threat anymore than the members of this court could reasonably view the letters as conveying a threat if Koski had filed his own appeal in this court using the United States mail and included copies of the same letters in an appendix.
The majority states the letters “evidenced Koski’s anger about not having obtained help from the authorities despite the injustices he had reported to them” and “his rage toward his former girlfriend’s attorney, whom Koski blamed for turning his life into a nightmare by causing his imprisonment, the loss of his rights, his house, and other assets.” The majority notes the “materials included two letters Koski had mailed to the governor just two months before” and “[o]ne of them complained about the lack of action by the governor.” Additionally, Koski complained in another letter he could no longer “vote or own a gun because some no good rotten attorney had [him] labeled a convicted felon.” Essentially, the majority reasons a reasonable recipient would view the communication as conveying a threat against Attorney General Long because he is a high ranking government official and a leading member of the legal profession and in the copied letters Koski complained government officials have failed to assist him and claimed an attorney has wronged him. I disagree this is a reasonable conclusion reached from the evidence or a permissible conclusion under the First Amendment.
Furthermore, although the copied letters contained statements of complaint and frustration, none of the language explicitly *822threatened anyone. There are only two statements in the materials Koski sent to Attorney General Long that could reasonably be viewed as threatening. In a letter addressed “To Whom It May Concern,” Koski wrote, in relevant part:
The IRS, FBI and others have been harassing me. I’ve written hundreds of letters trying to find out what in the hell is going on.... I honestly believe that the Government is trying to drive me to commit suicide. I’m a born again Christian and I believe that only God can decide when it is my time to die. When all this is over, the Government will lose and God and I will win.
(emphasis added). This statement is ambiguous at best.
Additionally, in a letter addressed to Agent Owen, Koski wrote:
About two or three years ago you were at my home asking about a problem I had with the IRS. I explained that Attorney Jean Cline had me sent to jail because I wanted to keep my job as a Real Estate Agent. I had written letters explaining what happened. I was convicted and this time I was sent to Federal Prison. While I was in prison, my home was sold without my signature. The IRS was told that I got $25,100.00 on this sale. I’m once again sending you a document which shows that I only got $3,699.11. Of this the IRS wants $3,551.29. You asked me what I might do if the IRS once again seized my assets. I told you that this wouldn’t happen, because your investigation would prove that if anyone owed taxes on the sale of this house, it would be Betty Reif who made thousands. I honestly believed that this matter had been settled. Now I got served papers again saying that the IRS was giving me Final Notice before they seize my assets. What in God’s name is going on here? Why has taxpayer’s money been spent on this case all these years? What does the Government want from me? Does someone honestly want me to crack up and kill the SOB’s who have been fucking with me?
Sincerely,
Delano Koski
Cc: President Bush
Senator Daschle
Attorney General Long
Rapid City Journal
Sioux Falls Argus Leader
(emphasis added). This statement is also ambiguous. Ambiguous language in and of itself cannot support a conviction under § 876. Martin, 691 F.2d at 1239 (citing Barcley, 452 F.2d 930). Although the context and surrounding circumstances known to the reasonable recipient may show innocuous or ambiguous language is indeed a threat, in this case an examination of the context reveals the opposite, as discussed above.
The majority also cites to Assistant Attorney General Meyer’s testimony that she viewed Koski’s letters as a threat. Our cases hold the effect on the recipient of receiving the communication may be relevant to whether a reasonable recipient would view the letters as a threat. See Barcley, 452 F.2d at 934. The purpose of examining the effect on the recipient is “proof of the effect of an allegedly threatening letter upon the addressee would throw light upon the intent of the sender within the context of the dialogue between the parties to the correspondence.” Id. at 934 n. 6. In the instant case, Assistant Attorney General Meyer’s opinion about whether the communication was a threat does not shed light on the context of the communication because of the complete absence of a relationship between Koski and *823Assistant Attorney General Meyer or anyone else at the Attorney General’s Office.
For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm Koski’s convictions on Counts III and IV, but reverse the conviction on Count II.