Court Opinion

ID: 9397223
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-24 19:04:31.48837+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:22.344951
License: Public Domain

Filed 5/24/23 In re N.V. CA5

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

             IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                     FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

    In re N.V. et al., Persons Coming Under the
    Juvenile Court Law.

    KERN COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN                                                          F085442
    SERVICES,
                                                                              (Super. Ct. No. JD142330-00;
             Plaintiff and Respondent,                                                JD142331-00)

                    v.
                                                                                          OPINION
    V.E.,

             Defendant and Appellant.

                                                   THE COURT*
            APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Kern County. Christie Canales
Norris, Judge.
            Suzanne M. Nicholson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
            Margo A. Raison, Kern County Counsel, and Elizabeth M. Giesick, Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                                                         -ooOoo-

*           Before Poochigian, Acting P. J., Franson, J. and Meehan, J.
       Appellant V.E. (father) is the father of three-year-old N.V. and one-year-old H.V.
(children), who are the subjects of a dependency case. Father challenges the juvenile
court’s orders issued at a contested Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.261 hearing
that resulted in father’s parental rights being terminated. Father contends the court erred
by failing to apply the beneficial parent-child relationship exception and considering
inappropriate factors during its determination on the exception.
                  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Initial Removal
       In July 2021, the Kern County Department of Human Services (department)
received a referral after D.V. (mother) gave birth to H.V. in an ambulance. A report was
made due to concerns that mother was suffering from mental health problems. Mother
refused to see H.V., was unaware of her pregnancy, and did not speak coherently. H.V.
and mother both tested positive for methamphetamine, but mother denied any drug use.
N.V., H.V.’s then one-year-old sibling, was at home with father. Father denied any
drug use by either himself or mother, but he admitted to methamphetamine use
three weeks earlier. Both children were taken into protective custody with the assistance
of law enforcement pursuant to a protective custody warrant.
       The department filed original petitions alleging the children were described by
section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (j). The petitions alleged the children were at
substantial risk of suffering serious physical harm as a result of parents’ substance abuse
and past neglect of N.V. The petitions further alleged that father previously neglected
another one of his children, which ultimately resulted in the termination of his parental
rights through dependency proceedings.
       The report prepared for the detention hearing set forth the reasons for the
children’s removal from the parents’ custody and described the parents’ child welfare and

1      All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

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criminal history. Mother was arrested during the previous month for willful cruelty to a
child after N.V. was discovered wandering outside by herself in 105-degree weather.
N.V. was found barefoot, disoriented, and suffering from the hot conditions. A previous
referral to the department was substantiated for general neglect due to N.V. testing
positive for amphetamine at the time of her birth. In 2010, one of father’s children was
taken into protective custody and his parental rights were terminated after he failed to
reunify with the child. Father had three pending criminal cases involving drug charges.
       At the detention hearing held on August 2, 2021, father was found to be the
presumed father of N.V. and biological father of H.V. The juvenile court ordered the
children detained from mother and father, supervised visits twice per week, and set a
combined jurisdiction and disposition hearing for September 28, 2021.
Jurisdiction and Disposition
       The department’s jurisdiction report, dated September 17, 2021, recommended the
allegations in the original petitions be found true. The disposition report, dated
September 23, 2021, recommended the children remain in out-of-home care with
family reunification services provided to mother and father. The children were placed
together in a resource family home. Father’s previously claimed tribe was determined to
be a non-federally recognized tribe. At the continued jurisdiction and disposition hearing
held on November 2, 2021, both parents submitted on the department’s recommendation.
The juvenile court found the allegations in the petitions true, ordered family reunification
services for mother and father, and set a six-month review hearing for May 2, 2022.
Father was ordered to participate in counseling for parenting, random drug testing, and
substance abuse counseling if he tested positive or missed a test without a valid excuse.
Family Reunification Period
       In December 2021, and January 2022, mother and father filed petitions pursuant to
section 388 requesting the children be returned to their custody on a plan of family
maintenance. The parents alleged that their completion of parenting classes and

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consistent visits demonstrated changed circumstances and that placing the children in
their custody would be in the best interests of the children. On March 8, 2022, the
juvenile court denied the parents’ section 388 petitions at the conclusion of an evidentiary
hearing.
         Both parents were advised to enroll in substance abuse counseling after positive
tests for methamphetamine in May 2022. Both parents failed to enroll in substance abuse
classes by the time of the six-month review hearing. In June 2022, the children’s
care provider indicated she was not committed to adoption because she hoped the parents
would reunify. At the six-month review hearing on June 28, 2022, the juvenile court
terminated mother and father’s family reunification services and set a section 366.26
hearing for October 26, 2022.
Selection and Implementation Hearing
         In October 2022, both parents filed new section 388 petitions requesting the return
of the children under a plan of family maintenance or additional reunification services.
Father’s counsel alleged that he had completed 14 of 20 substance abuse classes,
regularly attended “NA” meetings, obtained a sponsor, and recently provided a clean
drug test.
         The department’s section 366.26 report dated October 13, 2022, recommended
that the juvenile court terminate mother and father’s parental rights and order a
permanent plan of adoption for the children. The children were placed in a new
resource family home on August 1, 2022, and the care providers were committed to
adopting the children. N.V, now three years old, was on target developmentally except in
the area of communication. H.V., now one year old, was found to be developing in an
age-appropriate manner. No medical or mental health concerns were noted for either
child.
         The department’s report provided descriptions of mother and father’s contact with
the children during the proceedings. Mother participated in 74 of 120 possible visits

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since initial removal, and the quality of her visitation was described as “adequate.”
Father had 80 documented visits with the children out of 120 possible visits since the
children’s removal. Father interacted appropriately with the children by hugging, kissing,
and telling them he loved them. No concerns were noted regarding father’s interactions
with the children during visitation.
       The social worker acknowledged the existence of a relationship between father
and N.V. based upon the year she lived with father prior to her removal. However, the
department believed the relationship was minimal because she now looked to her current
caregivers as her “primary parental figures.” H.V.’s relationship with father was
described as “less than minimal” because she was removed from her father’s custody at
only two days old. The department concluded its assessment for both children by stating
it would not be detrimental to terminate parental rights.
       At an evidentiary hearing held on October 27, 2022, father and mother testified in
support of their section 388 petitions. Father testified that he has been attending “NA”
classes weekly for the past four months and anticipated completing his substance abuse
program the following month. He claimed his date of sobriety to be May 2022, but he
disagreed with the results of his positive test for methamphetamine from that same
month. He also disputed the department’s reporting of the number of his missed visits,
and he claimed to have only missed visits due to court conflicts or transportation
problems. Father testified that N.V. ran up to him during visits and asked to go home
with him. The juvenile court ultimately denied both parents’ petitions, and it found that
father’s circumstances were still changing.
       A supplemental report prepared by the department in November 2022, provided
updates on 11 additional visits for father. The report also included a spreadsheet
documenting the number of visits attended or missed since the children’s removal, and
the provided reasons that visits were missed. Thirteen of father’s visits were missed due
to his absence or cancellation without a documented excuse.

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       On December 13, 2022, mother and father were present for the contested
section 366.26 hearing. The social worker testified about the number of visits that were
available to the parents and how she prepared the spreadsheet detailing the parents’
visitation attendance. The juvenile court indicated it had reviewed the transcript from the
evidentiary hearing on the parents’ section 388 petitions, and it would consider the
parents’ testimony for the section 366.26 hearing.
       Counsel for mother and father both requested that the juvenile court apply the
beneficial parent-child relationship exception to adoption. Father’s counsel argued that
the description of visits between father and the children from the department’s reports
demonstrated “very, very loving interactions,” and he asserted that the children had a
strong bond with father. Counsel for the children acknowledged that the court could find
regular visitation, but she did not believe the parents demonstrated a beneficial
relationship that outweighed the benefits of adoption. The department’s counsel argued
that the parents failed to prove any of the three prongs articulated in the case of
In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614 (Caden C.).
       After hearing argument from all counsel, the juvenile court determined that the
parents failed to establish the first prong of the beneficial parent-child relationship
exception by regularly visiting and contacting the children. As to the second prong,
regarding father and the children’s relationship, the court stated, “There does seem to be a
positive visitation relationship between the father and the children, but there is no
evidence that there’s a substantial positive emotional attachment. The visits end without
problem. It seems that they—they have a good visiting time, but when it’s time for
children to go with the caretakers, there is no display of anxiety or sadness when the
visits are over.”
       The juvenile court then concluded its ruling as follows:

              “And as to the third prong, that termination of parental rights would
       be detrimental to the child, here I’m weighing the severance versus the

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       benefits of adoption that I would have to find that the detriment to the child
       of terminating parental rights would be so detrimental that it would
       outweigh any of the benefits of adoption. The court does not see any
       evidence here that there would be severe detriment, that it would outweigh
       the permanency that adoption offers. They’ve been in their placement for
       quite some time. They’ve been thriving in their placement. I don’t think
       there would be much of an adjustment period particularly because the
       parents have not visited regularly and consistently. [¶] So for those
       reasons, the court will follow the recommendations in the report.”

       The juvenile court proceeded to terminate the parental rights of mother and father
and selected a plan of adoption for the children. Father filed a timely notice of appeal on
the date of the hearing.
                                       DISCUSSION
I.     Beneficial Parent-Child Relationship Exception
       Father contends the juvenile court erred when it did not apply the beneficial
parent-child relationship exception to adoption. He asserts the court erroneously
determined that he did not maintain consistent visitation with the children or have a
positive emotional attachment with the children. Father also argues the court failed to
examine the evidence in the third step of the parental-benefit exception analysis by
engaging in a “subtle, case-specific inquiry” on the issues related to the exception.
       A.     Legal Principles
       At a section 366.26 hearing, when the juvenile court finds by clear and convincing
evidence the child is adoptable, it is generally required to terminate parental rights and
order the child be placed for adoption unless a statutory exception applies. (§ 366.26,
subd. (c)(1).) One of the statutory exceptions is the beneficial parent-child relationship
exception, which applies when “[t]he court finds a compelling reason for determining
that termination would be detrimental to the child” where “[t]he parents have maintained
regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing
the relationship.” (Id., subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).)

                                                7
       A parent claiming an exception to adoption has the burden of proof to establish by
a preponderance of evidence that the exception applies. (In re Melvin A. (2000)
82 Cal.App.4th 1243, 1252.) Thus, the parent must prove three elements in order to
prevail under the beneficial relationship exception: “(1) regular visitation and contact,
and (2) a relationship, the continuation of which would benefit the child such that (3) the
termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child.” (Caden C., supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 631.)
       The first element of the beneficial relationship determination asks the
“straightforward” question of whether the parent visited consistently, considering the
extent permitted by court orders. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) The focus is
on the best interest of the child as opposed to punishing or rewarding parents for good
behavior in maintaining contact. (Ibid.)
       The second element of the exception asks whether the child would benefit from
continuing the relationship. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) The parent-child
relationship “may be shaped by a slew of factors, such as ‘[t]he age of the child, the
portion of the child’s life spent in the parent’s custody, the “positive” or “negative” effect
of interaction between parent and child, and the child’s particular needs.’ ”
(Ibid., quoting In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 576.) The juvenile court’s
focus should again be on the child, and it “must remain mindful that rarely do
‘[p]arent-child relationships’ conform to an entirely consistent pattern.” (Caden C.,
at p. 632.)
       When considering the third element, courts must determine “how the child would
be affected by losing the parental relationship—in effect, what life would be like for the
child in an adoptive home without the parent in the child’s life.” (Caden C., supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 633.) Potential negative effects from severance of the relationship might
include “emotional instability and preoccupation leading to acting out, difficulties in
school, insomnia, anxiety, or depression.” (Ibid.) An adoptive home might provide a

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new source of stability that alleviates emotional instability and preoccupation leading to
those problems, making the loss “not, at least on balance, detrimental.” (Ibid.) Under
this element, the court is again guided by the child’s best interest, but in a “specific way:
it decides whether the harm of severing the relationship outweighs ‘the security and the
sense of belonging a new family would confer.’ ” (Ibid.)
       In Caden C., the Court of Appeal held “that because the parent continued to
struggle with substance abuse and mental health issues and because of the risks of
foster care and benefits of the potential adoptive home, no reasonable court could find the
child’s relationship with his parent outweighed the benefits of adoption.” (Caden C.,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 625–626.) Rejecting that conclusion, our Supreme Court found
“[t]he Court of Appeal did not explain how the parent’s struggles related to the specific
elements of the statutory exception: the importance of the child’s relationship with the
parent or the detriment of losing that relationship.” (Id. at p. 626.) A parent’s struggles
with issues that led to dependency were determined to be relevant only to the extent they
inform whether the child would “benefit from continuing the relationship and be harmed,
on balance, by losing it[.]” (Id. at p. 638.)
       B.     Standard of Review
       Appellate courts review a juvenile court’s ruling on the application of the
beneficial parent-child relationship exception using a “hybrid” standard. (Caden C.,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 641.) The substantial evidence standard applies to the first
two elements of regular visitation and existence of a beneficial relationship. (Id. at
pp. 639–640.) The court’s decision as to the third element—whether termination of
parental rights would be detrimental to the child—is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
(Id. at p. 640.) “Review for abuse of discretion is subtly different, focused not primarily
on the evidence but the application of a legal standard. A court abuses its discretion only
when ‘ “ ‘the trial court has exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making an
arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination.’ ” ’ ” (Id. at p. 641.)

                                                9
       The standard of review of a court’s determination that a parent did not meet his or
her burden to prove an exception to termination of parental rights is “whether the
evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of law.” (In re I.W.
(2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1528, disapproved on other grounds by
Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1010, fn. 7.) Specifically, the question is
“whether the appellant’s evidence was (1) ‘uncontradicted and unimpeached’ and (2) ‘of
such a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that it was
insufficient to support a finding.’ ” (In re I.W., at p. 1528.)
       C.     Analysis
       In the present case, the juvenile court determined that father did not meet his
burden of proof as to the application of the beneficial parent-child relationship exception.
Father contends that evidence was presented that would support a finding of the existence
of a beneficial parent-child relationship. The department’s counsel disputed father’s
claim of maintaining regular visitation and contact with the children throughout the
proceedings. In fact, the department provided evidence that father missed at least
40 visits, and father merely disputed the department’s calculation without providing a
different number of missed visits. However, even if we were to accept that father
maintained regular contact with the child, he is unable to establish that the benefits of
maintaining the parental relationship outweighed those provided by adoption.
       In support of his contention, father cites to evidence that the children had positive
interactions with him during visits. Father’s suggestion that there was evidence that
would support a finding that such a beneficial relationship existed ignores the fact that it
was his burden to prove the exception. (See In re Travis C. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 1219,
1225 [“ ‘The judgment will be upheld if it is supported by substantial evidence, even
though substantial evidence to the contrary also exists and the trial court might have
reached a different result had it believed [the] other evidence.’ ”].) Evidence that the
children had pleasant visits with father is not enough to preserve parental rights.

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(See In re Derek W. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 823, 827 [“The parent must do more than
demonstrate ‘frequent and loving contact[,]’ [citation] an emotional bond with the child,
or that parent and child find their visits pleasant”].) The children need permanency and
stability in a safe and loving home, which the current care providers are willing and able
to provide. Father’s limited relationship with the children is not that extraordinary case
where preservation of parental rights outweighs the preference for adoption. (In re G.B.
(2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1147, 1166.) Based on the present record, we cannot find that
the evidence compels a contrary finding as a matter of law.
       Father cites the case of In re J.D. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 833 (J.D.) in support of
his contention that the juvenile court’s orders must be reversed for improper
consideration of certain factors. In J.D., the appellate court concluded that it was unclear
to what extent the juvenile court—there, acting before Caden C.—considered improper
factors at the second step of analyzing the parent-child beneficial relationship exception,
and it reversed and remanded for a new section 366.26 hearing in accordance with
Caden C. (J.D., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at pp. 865, 870.) Specifically, it observed that the
court had appeared to improperly consider “the mere fact [that mother] had been unable
to succeed in overcoming her parenting struggles[,]” “the suitability of [the minor’s]
current placement[,]” the minor’s attachment to his current caregiver, and the court’s
determination that mother did not occupy a “parental” role—all factors improper under
Caden C. (J.D., at pp. 864–865.)
       The case cited by father is inapposite because the children’s section 366.26
hearing was held in December 2022, more than a year after Caden C., so the juvenile
court had the benefit of the Supreme Court’s analysis, which was cited by the
department’s counsel in closing argument. Furthermore, the court in this case did not
refuse to apply the beneficial parent-child relationship exception based on an improper
comparison concerning the relationship between the children and their parents and their
care providers. There is also no indication that the court relied on the social worker’s

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statement that the parents lacked a primary attachment to bar the beneficial parent-child
relationship exception.
       In considering the beneficial parent-child relationship exception here, the
juvenile court began by explaining the minimal portion of the children’s lives spent in the
parents’ custody, positive interactions during father’s visitation, and absence of anxiety
or sadness when visits were over—all factors approved for consideration by our Supreme
Court in Caden C. (See Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632 [“the focus is the child.
And the relationship may be shaped by a slew of factors, such as ‘[t]he age of the child,
the portion of the child's life spent in the parent's custody, the “positive” or “negative”
effect of interaction between parent and child, and the child's particular needs.’ ”].) We
do not find that, in making its determination that the children lacked a substantial,
positive emotional attachment with father, the court abused its discretion by relying on
impermissible factors. The court’s ruling on the exception did not consider the children’s
bond with their care providers without an assessment of their relative bond with father.
       Finally, we reject father’s claim that the juvenile court did not engage in the
“subtle, case-specific inquiry” required because it erroneously found that father did not
prove the first two prongs of the exception. While section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(D)
requires the court to “ ‘state its reasons in writing or on the record’ ” in concluding that
termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child, the court is not required
to recite specific findings when it concludes that terminating parental rights would not be
detrimental to the child. (In re A.L. (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1131, 1156.) Although a
trial court’s statement of its findings or an explanation of the reasons for its decision may
be helpful in conducting appellate review, it is not a legal requirement. (Ibid.) We do not
presume the court erred. Rather, we indulge in every presumption to uphold the
judgment and it is the appellant’s burden to affirmatively demonstrate error. (A.L.,
at p. 1161.)

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       In sum, the evidence in the record weighed in favor of the preferred permanency
option of adoption. Given the fact that the children spent the last 17 months of their
very young lives in foster care and had care providers committed to providing a
permanent plan of adoption, we find the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion.
Under these circumstances, the court’s ruling is entitled to a presumption of correctness,
and remand is unwarranted. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 640.) Therefore, the court
did not err in declining to apply the beneficial parent-child relationship exception, and its
orders terminating father’s parental rights were proper.
                                      DISPOSITION
       The juvenile court’s orders are affirmed.

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