Court Opinion

ID: 9520422
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:39:35.633827+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:46:14.179914
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE HUTCHINSON, dissenting: Although I agree that defendant’s arrest violated neither the United States nor the Illinois Constitution, I believe that defendant’s arrest was invalid under Supreme Court Rule 526(a). The Illinois Supreme Court has promulgated rules governing proceedings in traffic cases, including rules regarding the charging and posting of bail for traffic offenses. As the majority notes, these rules provide police officers alternative procedures to placing an offender under custodial arrest and having the offender appear before a court to obtain bail, as required by the Code of Criminal Procedure. See 210 Ill. 2d Rs. 526(a), 552; 166 Ill. 2d R. 553. Where an offender is unable to secure release from custody on bail, Rule 553(d) provides that a police officer has the discretion to release the offender by giving an individual bond. See 166 Ill. 2d R. 553(d). Additionally, in a note introducing article V, part B of the supreme court rules, the drafting committee indicated that the bail provisions contained in the supreme court rules were not intended to limit a police officer’s discretion to issue a notice to appear, in lieu of bond, in appropriate cases as provided for in section 107 — 12 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (725 ILCS 5/107 — 12 (West 2004)). See 210 Ill. 2d art. V, pt. B, Note, at ccxxvi. In the present case, Thompson’s testimony at the suppression hearing indicated that he elected to process defendant’s arrest according to the provisions of Rule 526(a). The record reflects that, following his stop of defendant, Thompson did not immediately place defendant under custodial arrest; nor did Thompson issue to defendant a notice to appear or an individual bond. Instead, after advising defendant of the reason for the stop, Thompson inquired whether defendant possessed a driver’s license or $75 that he could post as bail. Thompson’s reference to the bail provisions of Rule 526(a) plainly indicates that Thompson intended to release defendant on bail pursuant to the provisions of this rule in the event that defendant was able to comply. After defendant indicated that he had neither a driver’s license nor $75, Thompson placed defendant under custodial arrest. In processing defendant’s arrest under Rule 526(a), however, Thompson clearly failed to comply with the requirements of that rule. A defendant’s obligation to post bail under Rule 526(a) is triggered only upon being arrested for a traffic offense and being “personally served by the arresting officer with a Citation and Complaint.” 210 Ill. 2d R. 526(a). During his testimony at the suppression hearing, Thompson admitted that he never prepared or served a citation upon defendant prior to requesting defendant to post bail or placing him under custodial arrest. Lacking service of the predicate citation, defendant’s obligation to furnish bail was never triggered under Rule 526(a). Because defendant’s obligation to furnish bail was never triggered, his failure to provide bail did not provide a lawful basis to place him under custodial arrest for purposes of the rule. See Robidoux v. Oliphant, 201 Ill. 2d 324, 332 (2002) (holding that the supreme court rules should be construed and applied according to their plain language). The majority does not dispute that Thompson failed to follow Rule 526(a) when he failed to personally serve a citation at the time of the arrest. However, I believe the majority’s response understates the force and effect of the supreme court rules, which have the force of law and must be obeyed and enforced as written. See People v. Houston, 226 Ill. 2d 135, 152 (2007); Harris v. Annunzio, 411 Ill. 124, 126 (1952). Although the supreme court rules generally speak to the obligation of the courts and the parties appearing before them, those rules governing procedures in traffic cases apply equally to the police who are charged with executing them. Indeed, the rules contain numerous provisions requiring police officers to take certain actions in traffic cases. See, e.g., 166 Ill. 2d R. 504 (providing that arresting officer shall set the date for the offender’s first court appearance between 14 and 60 days of the arrest); 166 Ill. 2d R. 505 (providing that officer issuing traffic citation shall also issue to the offender the prescribed notice regarding avoiding multiple court appearances); 210 Ill. 2d R. 552 (requiring arresting officer to complete citation and transmit citation to clerk of the circuit court within 48 hours of arrest). For these reasons, I believe that Rule 526(a) had the force of law and required Thompson to issue defendant a citation before requiring him to post bail. In my view, the question then becomes whether defendant is entitled to any relief as a result of Thompson’s failure to issue a citation. The answer depends on whether the language contained in Rule 526(a) is construed to be directory or mandatory. See People v. Hanna, 185 Ill. App. 3d 404, 408-09 (1989) (construing language of Rule 552). In determining whether the language of a supreme court rule is mandatory or directory, our supreme court has applied the rules applicable to the construction of statutes: “ ‘Ordinarily a statute which specifies the time for the performance of an official duty will be considered directory only where the rights of the parties cannot be injuriously affected by failure to act within the time indicated. However, where such statute contains negative words, denying the exercise of the power after the time named, or where a disregard of its provisions would injuriously affect public interests or private rights, it is not directory but mandatory.’ ” Village of Park Forest v. Fagan, 64 Ill. 2d 264, 268 (1976), quoting Corrigan v. Liquor Control Comm’n, 19 Ill. 2d 230, 233 (1960). A defendant is entitled to relief only where a public official has failed to perform an official duty that is mandatory. Hanna, 185 Ill. App. 3d at 409-10. Applying these principles of construction to Rule 526(a), I believe that the rule specifies the time for the performance of an official duty. Rule 526(a) provides that the arresting officer must personally serve a citation upon the defendant before the defendant’s obligation of posting bond arises. See 210 Ill. 2d R. 526(a) (“[A] person arrested for a traffic offense and personally served by the arresting officer with a Citation and Complaint shall post bail ***”). I find further support for this conclusion in the language of Rule 552, which provides that the arresting officer “shall complete the [citation] form or ticket.” 210 Ill. 2d R. 552; see also People v. Woolridge, 292 Ill. App. 3d 788, 791 (1997) (noting that supreme court rules should be construed together in order to give effect to each rule). I believe that an arresting officer’s failure to personally serve a citation on an offender prior to requesting the offender to post bond injuriously affects public and private interests. All defendants have a fundamental constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the charges against them. U.S. Const., amend. VI; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §8; People v. Brogan, 352 Ill. App. 3d 477, 488 (2004); People v. Swartwout, 311 Ill. App. 3d 250, 256 (2000). This fundamental right has been codified in section 111 — 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (725 ILCS 5/111 — 3 (West 2004)). See People v. Meyers, 158 Ill. 2d 46, 51 (1994). Moreover, section 109 — 1(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure requires that “[a] person arrested with or without a warrant shall be taken without unnecessary delay before the nearest and most accessible judge *** and a charge shall be filed.” 725 ILCS 5/109 — 1(a) (West 2004). Section 109 — 1(b)(1) further requires the trial judge to then advise the defendant of the charge against him or her and provide the defendant with a copy of the charge. 725 ILCS 5/109 — 1(b)(1) (West 2004). At this point, after a written charge has been filed and the defendant has been advised of its contents, the trial judge shall “[ajdmit the defendant to bail in accordance with the provisions of Article 110 of this Code.” 725 ILCS 5/109 — 1(b)(4) (West 2004). In view of the constitutional and statutory authority requiring a defendant to be provided with the written charges, I believe that an officer’s failure to personally serve a traffic citation on an offender as required by Rule 526(a) injuriously affects the offender’s private rights and the interest of the greater public. Under the statutory provisions detailed above, a defendant is entitled to receive the written charges against him before the obligation to post bail arises. I see no reason why a defendant who is arrested and processed pursuant to the traffic provisions contained in article V of the Illinois Supreme Court rules should receive disparate treatment. See People v. Joseph, 113 Ill. 2d 36, 58 (1986) (Simon, J., dissenting) (noting that supreme court rules should be construed in harmony with applicable statutes whenever possible). Where a police officer, rather than the trial court, is responsible for admitting the defendant to bail, fairness requires that the officer write a citation and personally serve it on the defendant prior to requesting the defendant to post bail. Accordingly, I construe that Rule 526(a)’s requirement that the arresting officer personally serve the offender a citation is mandatory rather than directory. By his own admission, Thompson failed to write or personally serve a traffic citation prior to asking defendant whether he could post bail. Indeed, the record reflects that Thompson never wrote a traffic citation for the offenses for which he stopped defendant and for which he placed defendant under custodial arrest. Due to Thompson’s failure to comply with the mandatory language of Rule 526(a), his custodial arrest of defendant was unlawful. Lacking a lawful custodial arrest, Thompson had no lawful basis to search defendant. See People v. Spann, 332 Ill. App. 3d 425, 438 (2002) (noting that evidence obtained during search after unlawful arrest must be suppressed). Accordingly, I believe that the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to quash his arrest and suppress evidence, and I believe that we should have reversed outright defendant’s convictions and sentences. I respectfully dissent.