Court Opinion

ID: 9700117
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 21:11:19.308525+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:04.710550
License: Public Domain

*602Mallett, J.
(dissenting). I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that “collateral attacks on criminal convictions may not be based solely on the fact that the defendant’s attorney continued to represent the defendant after being suspended from the practice of law.” Ante at 591. Rather, while I would not reverse per se, I would grant an automatic remand in any case in which a defendant, without knowledge, is represented at significant portions of the case by a suspended attorney.
i
Defense attorney James Cohen faced disciplinary proceedings and was ultimately suspended from the practice of law because of his plea of guilty of the high misdemeanor of attempted conspiracy to manufacture, deliver, or possess marijuana with the intent to deliver or possess marijuana.1 Despite his suspension, Mr. Cohen represented the defendant in criminal proceedings. Against this backdrop, this Court must consider whether defendant was denied his constitutionally guaranteed right to counsel.
n
There is a fundamental right to counsel afforded by the Sixth Amendment. Gideon v Wainwright, 372 US 335; 83 S Ct 792; 9 L Ed 2d 799 (1963).
The Sixth Amendment recognizes the right to the assistance of counsel because it envisions counsel’s playing a role that is critical to the ability of the adversarial system to produce just results. An accused is entitled to be assisted by an attorney, whether retained or appointed, who plays *603the role necessary to ensure that the trial is fair. For that reason, the Court has recognized that “the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.” [Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668, 685-686; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984) (citations omitted).]
The United States Supreme Court recognizes that representation of criminal defendants consists of basic duties including, but not limited to, a duty of loyalty, a duty to avoid conflicts of interest, a duty to advocate, and a duty to possess the skill and knowledge necessary to “render the trial a reliable adversarial testing process.” Id. at 688. Effectiveness of representation determinations are made in light of these duties and are guided by the prevailing norms of professional practice. Id. Courts universally acknowledge “that the constitutional guarantee of the right to effective assistance of counsel deserves the utmost protection . . . .” People v Brewer, 88 Mich App 756, 761; 279 NW2d 307 (1979). See also Beets v Scott, 65 F3d 1258 (CA 5, 1995); Gideon, supra; Solina v United States, 709 F2d 160 (CA 2, 1983).
in
Individuals endure rigorous education, examination, and character and fitness investigation to become members of the state bar.2 Persons who comply with the strict licensing procedures set forth by the Michigan Supreme Court have the “exclusive right to designate themselves as ‘attorneys and counsel*604ors . . . ”3 In return for the privilege to practice law, “licensed attorneys are subject to discipline, including loss of license for unprofessional conduct. MCLA 600.904; MSA 27A.904.” State Bar of Michigan v Cramer, 399 Mich 116, 132; 249 NW2d 1 (1976). Disciplinary procedures exist to protect the public and ensure that only attorneys who continue to meet the high standards required by the state bar will practice law.4 The suspension of an attorney evidences the state’s determination that the attorney is unfit to represent either the public or the legal profession. MCR 9.105.
The majority appears to say that even though this attorney is deemed unfit to practice and is suspended, he may continue to represent this defendant. The position articulated by the majority does not make good legal sense. The majority’s opinion appears, at least in part, to be based on its fear of burdening the courts with the duty of “ascertaining that each attorney who appears before a tribunal has a valid, current license . . . .” Ante at 600. The right to counsel is *605critical and should not be subordinated to judicial efficiency.5 As the Court of Appeals stated:
In our view, the state cannot now disavow those procedures and restrictions on the practice of law merely because it is convenient to do so in order to avoid the repercussions of having allowed an unlicensed individual to play the role of an attorney in a criminal prosecution. [206 Mich App 340, 345; 520 NW2d 724 (1994).]
The suspension of an attorney results from an administrative determination that the attorney is unfit to practice law. If the state believes an attorney is unfit to practice law, then I believe that a defendant represented by a suspended attorney is automatically entitled to a review of the effectiveness of that attorney’s representation.
IV
I would remand this case for a Ginther6 evidentiary hearing on the effectiveness of Mr. Cohen’s representation in this case. I agree with the holding of the Court of Appeals in Brewer that suspension of an *606attorney is “strong evidence that such attorney is no longer sufficiently interested in the practice of law to adequately defend his client’s interests.” Id. at 762. Given the effect of disciplinary proceedings, representation by a suspended attorney alone is sufficient grounds for a Ginther hearing.7 In the instant case, Mr. Cohen’s suspension arising out of a drug conviction, coupled with the continued representation of the defendant in violation of the rules of suspension, is enough to raise a serious question about whether defendant was denied effective counsel. A contrary holding by this Court mocks the notion of a constitutionally guaranteed right to counsel and weakens the significance of the licensing requirements of the legal profession.
v
In light of the above, I believe that representation by an unlicensed attorney casts serious doubt on the quality of representation a defendant receives. Consequently, I would modify the Court of Appeals decision and remand this case to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing consistent with this opinion.
Levin, J., concurred with Mallett, J.

 According to the prosecution brief, Mr. Cohen remains suspended to this day.

 “Michigan, as all other states, regulates the practice of law by statute. . . . These requirements include educational, character and fitness, and examination components. MCLA 600.934, 600.937, 600.940; MSA 27A.934, 27A.937, 27A.940.” State Bar of Michigan v Cramer, 399 Mich 116, 132; 249 NW2d 1 (1976).

 MCL 600.901; MSA 27A.901.

 See In re Grimes, 414 Mich 483; 326 NW2d 380 (1982). The Court of Appeals noted:
The state has undertaken elaborate means to determine who can be an attorney. The Supreme Court has developed extensive procedures by which individuals who wish to become attorneys must meet certain stringent educational requirements, must undergo a background check to determine their character and fitness to be an attorney, and must submit to a bar examination to determine their competence to be an attorney. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has in place an elaborate mechanism to ensure that attorneys, once licensed, remain fit to practice law, suspending or revoking the licenses of those attorneys who prove themselves unfit. [206 Mich App 340, 344-345; 520 NW2d 724 (1994).]

 The majority believes that the purpose of disciplinary proceedings is to “avoid the ‘irreparable harm done to the Bar and to public confidence in the administration of justice when persons known to be convicted of crimes continue to hold themselves out as officers of the court.’ State Bar Grievance Administrator v Sauer, 390 Mich 449, 456; 213 NW2d 102 (1973).” Ante at 599-600. It is unfortunate that the majority does not recognize the equally crushing harm done to the bar and the public confidence when this Court presumes that representation by a suspended attorney is justified because it is procedurally inefficient to hold otherwise. We must remember that “[r]esponsibility for ensuring that the conduct of attorneys comports with standards of professional responsibility rests with the legal profession and, ultimately, with this Court.” State Bar Grievance Administrator v McWhorter (On Rehearing), 407 Mich 278, 288; 284 NW2d 472 (1979). On issues of attorney conduct, we are the final arbiter of which characteristics will shape and define our legal profession.

 People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).

 Although I prefer an automatic remand approach, the Ohio Court of Appeals afforded a defendant reversal per se under facts similar to the instant case. State v Newcome, 62 Ohio App 3d 619; 577 NE2d 125 (1989) (the defendant did not receive his constitutional right to the assistance of counsel at the time he pleaded guilty because he was represented by counsel who was suspended from the practice of law).