Court Opinion

ID: 9523303
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:38:47.405764+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:04:52.254475
License: Public Domain

Concurring Opinion
Emmert, C. J.
The issue presented is not primarily concerned with whether the prisoner waived his right to representation by counsel; but he- does attempt to present the issue that his plea of guilty was not entered freely and understandingly. If it was not entered freely and understandingly a demurrer was properly overruled. Eagle v. State (1943), 221 Ind. 475, 48 N. E. 2d 811; Kellums v. State (1943), 221 Ind. 588, 50 N. E. 2d 662; Adams v. State (1951), 230 Ind. 53, 101 N. E. 2d 424; Dobosky v. State (1915), 183 Ind. 488, 109 N. E. 742; Batchelor v. State (1920), 189 Ind. 69, 76, 125 N. E. 773.
For several years I have been convinced that some of the broad language in Hoelscher v. State (1944), 223 Ind. 62, 57 N. E. 2d 770, no longer stated the law. The Hoelscher case, at page 69 of the official reports states that if a defendant waived the services of an attorney it was not necessary he be instructed concerning the nature and punishment for lesser offenses. The next sentence states, “It is required only that he be advised of the nature of the charge against him and his right to have an attorney to advise him concerning the law if he so desires.” This case involved a charge of murder in the first degree and every law school student who has had a course in criminal law knows that in Indiana such a charge includes also the charge of murder in the *586second degree and manslaughter. The statute on included offenses makes an indictment for murder in the first degree an indictment also for murder in the second degree, and manslaughter. It is within the power of the jury after a trial to return a verdict under such an indictment that the defendant is guilty of murder in the second degree or manslaughter. How can it be held logically that a defendant has been informed of the charge against him when he is only informed concerning the higher offense? If the indictment had been in three separate counts certainly this court could not hold that a defendant had understanding^ made his plea if the court did not inform him of the nature of each of the three offenses and the penalty therefor and that a verdict of murder in the second degree would be an acquittal of murder in the first degree, and that a verdict of guilty of manslaughter would be an acquittal on the charges of murder in the first degree and murder in the second degree.
The record in the Hoelscher case discloses the prisoner was only nineteen years of age. No record was made pursuant to the present requirements of Rule 1-11. The order book recitals that the prisoner Hoelscher knew the nature and consequences of the crime of which he was charged were mere generalities not conclusive against the positive statement of facts in his petition.
When a prisoner is merely advised that he has a constitutional right to a trial by jury without more, he is not thereby sufficiently informed to enter his plea knowingly and understandingly. The law on included offenses has been in the books so long and is so well understood that it can hardly be said it is one of the “intricacies” of the law. It seems to me that the opinion by Mr. Justice Black in Von Moltke v. Gillies (1948), 332 U. S. 708, 68 S. Ct. 316, 92 L. Ed. 309, correctly laid down the test for a plea of guilty to be made *587understandingly, as follows: “To be valid such waiver must be made with an apprehension of the nature of the charges, the statutory offenses included within them, the range of allowable punishments thereunder, possible defenses to the charges and circumstances in mitigation thereof, and all other facts essential to a broad understanding of the whole matter.”
But in the appeal at bar I concur in the reversal of the judgment for the reason that the proceedings had under Rule 1-11 show he was informed of the amount of fine and term of imprisonment for the plea of guilty on the charge of forgery. What the prisoner complains about is the failure of the court on its own motion to inform him when the forgery judgment would begin to be served. The prisoner made no request on this, and he knew he was on parole and had violated it. I know of no precedent which requires a trial court on his own motion to instruct a prisoner as to when he shall begin to serve his sentence. If the prisoner had asked, and the court had misinformed him, a different question would be presented. The fact that the prisoner may have been under misapprehension as to the effect of. the parole statutes did not make the plea voidable.
Therefore, I concur in the reversal of the judgment.
Note.—Reported in 130 N. E. 2d 226.