Court Opinion

ID: 9481468
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 08:19:52.566532+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:48:20.121763
License: Public Domain

CAMPBELL, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
Because I believe that the evidence in this case, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, requires us to affirm appellant’s conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1955, I respectfully dissent.
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence following a jury’s verdict of guilty, we must indulge all reasonable inferences in favor of the prosecution. Although the majority recites this standard, supra at 1244, it later seems to assume the role of factfinder, delineating inferences the jury should have drawn rather than simply determining whether a reasonable jury could have found as it did. See supra at 1248. As the majority notes, the Willow Bar operation involved (a) four clear and solid participants; and (b) a total of six others who helped on a part-time basis on seventeen occasions.1 Construing the evidence most favorably to the prosecution, I believe that the jury was entitled to treat this aggregate of six people as the equivalent of just one more active participant.
Surveying the cases, there is strong language supporting affirmance in United States v. Marrifield, 515 F.2d 877 (5th Cir.1975). There, the evidence showed four active participants plus one substitute. Finding that this arrangement met the statutory requirement, the court explained:
All the evidence need demonstrate is that five or more participated in whole or in part during the more than thirty day period when the gambling business was in substantially continuous operation____ The fact that only four of them were engaged at any particular time in running a business which contemplated and took advantage of five is without deci-sional significance here.
Id. at 881; see also United States v. Tucker, 638 F.2d 1292, 1297 (1981) (holding that § 1955 “is satisfied by evidence that a gambling business was operated by five or more persons for more than 30 days where there is no evidence that the same five persons operated the business for more than 30 days”) (emphasis in original).
In United States v. Gresko, 632 F.2d 1128 (4th Cir.1980), the court cites Marri-field in support of the proposition that “[a] four person operation with changing personnel would be outside the reach of the statute.” Id. at 1133. In Marrifield, the court indicated that a conviction could not stand if the evidence showed that one of the participants had left the operation permanently, leaving only four “conductors.” Marrifield, 515 F.2d at 882. Thus, the Gresko language, interpreted in light of Marrifield, should not be understood to mean that “substitutes” or “alternates” may not be included in the jurisdictional five. Rather, Gresko and Marrifield suggest only that the government may not rely on proof that at one time the operation involved five people in order to convict an individual who joined the operation after the size had been reduced to fewer than five people.
Moreover, unlike the majority, the Gres-ko court was willing to assume that all of the individuals who had been observed taking bets could be counted in the operation and that the jury could have concluded that the individuals were involved during the periods between the days they were actual*1253ly observed. Gresko, 632 F.2d at 1133. Nevertheless, even under these assumptions, the evidence in Gresko was not sufficient to establish that more than three people were involved during any thirty-day period. Id. at 1134.
Following the analysis of these cases, I believe that the evidence here was sufficient to permit a jury reasonably to conclude that the Willow Bar operation was a five-person operation in business for at least thirty days. I reason as follows:
1. O’Hare and Mazza owned the bar and could be considered to have financed or conducted that operation throughout the period. They were frequently there and participated on occasion.
2. Murray and Bruno were the two principal bookmakers. Murray was observed taking bets on eleven occasions throughout the observation period. Bruno was observed twenty-five times.
3. Besides Murray and Bruno, there is evidence of bet-taking by six others (Ber-gami, Sheehan, Boyden, Morgan, O’Donnell, and Grady) between August and mid-December on a total of seventeen occasions. If one adds up all the observed bet-taking during that period by everyone (including the basic four, see 1 & 2 above), there seem to have been between 11 and 15 bets each month, with Murray and Bruno taking about sixty percent and the others taking the remainder.
From this evidence, the jury could reasonably conclude that, in order to meet the demand for betting each month, part-time or alternate bookmakers had to take up the slack, Boyden being the most active of these. (The government records Boyden as taking bets five times, namely on 9/6/86, 10/4/86, 10/18/86, 10/20/86, and 10/23/86.) Given these factors, I am convinced that a reasonable jury could conclude that, in addition to the four regulars, the Willow Bar operation required the regular availability of an additional person (or persons) to meet the needs of the bettors and continue the business. In other words, this was a five-person operation that was staffed by four regulars and a group of others.
The majority opinion states that the government need not show that the same five persons were involved for thirty days nor that the five participants were involved every day. Supra at 1246. I agree. However, the majority does not seem to apply this standard. Rather, it examines the evidence as to each of the potential “fifth” participants separately, rejecting each as too insignificant. The issue, however, is not whether any one of the part-time bet-takers was involved for thirty days but whether, as a group, they may be deemed to constitute a fifth participant in a gambling business in operation for at least thirty days. I think that this interpretation of the statute permits the result reached by the jury.
I accept that this case falls close to the jurisdictional limit defined by § 1955. Nevertheless, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, I simply cannot conclude that the jury erred in finding that participation of the group of substitutes was sufficient to bring this gambling operation within the scope of the statute.

. I base the calculations on the summary of the evidence contained in the government's brief, Addendum A, page 30.