Court Opinion

ID: 9960337
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-15 21:18:04.905223+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:22.553476
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                                   April 15, 2024
                                                                                   C. CASEY FORBES, CLERK

                             STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA                              SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                                      OF WEST VIRGINIA
                           SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS

In re L.M.-1 and L.M.-2

No. 23-6 (Grant County CC-12-2022-JA-23 and CC-12-2022-JA-24)

                               MEMORANDUM DECISION

        Petitioner Father D.M.1 appeals the Circuit Court of Grant County’s December 27, 2022,
order terminating his parental rights to L.M.-1 and L.M.-2.2 On appeal, petitioner argues that the
circuit court erred in terminating his parental rights when he was accused of abuse to a non-
biological child who resided in his home. Upon our review, we determine that oral argument is
unnecessary and that a memorandum decision affirming the circuit court’s order is appropriate.
See W. Va. R. App. P. 21.

        In June 2022, the DHS filed an abuse and neglect petition alleging that petitioner physically
abused then-five-year-old A.F., a child who lived in petitioner’s home along with petitioner’s then-
fiancé, A.W., and their two daughters, L.M.-1 and L.M.-2.3 Specifically, A.F.’s biological father
picked the child up from the home and discovered that his head and neck were covered in bruises.
A.F. was flown to the hospital due to brain swelling. Upon examination, A.F. was found to have

       1
        Petitioner appears by counsel Grant M. Sherman. The West Virginia Department of
Human Services appears by counsel Attorney General Patrick Morrisey and Assistant Attorney
General Lee Neizgoda. Counsel Lauren M. Wilson appears as the children’s guardian ad litem.

       Additionally, pursuant to West Virginia Code § 5F-2-1a, the agency formerly known as
the West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources was terminated. It is now three
separate agencies—the Department of Health Facilities, the Department of Health, and the
Department of Human Services. See W. Va. Code § 5F-1-2. For purposes of abuse and neglect
appeals, the agency is now the Department of Human Services (“DHS”).
       2
         We use initials where necessary to protect the identities of those involved in this case. See
W. Va. R. App. P. 40(e). Further, because the children share the same initials, we use numbers to
differentiate them.
       3
         A.F. is the grandchild of A.W. At the time the petition was filed, the DHS stated that it
was unclear whether A.W. exercised legal guardianship of A.F. Petitioner’s abuse of A.F. formed
the basis for the proceedings below, and petitioner was adjudicated of abuse to all three children.
The circuit court took no action at disposition in regard to any rights petitioner may have exercised
over this child because A.W. and petitioner had separated and were no longer in a relationship.
Also, A.F. has been placed with his biological father. Accordingly, custodial rights to A.F. are not
at issue in this appeal.
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various stages of bruising all over his body. Further, A.F. made detailed disclosures to hospital
staff and Child Protective Services (“CPS”) outlining extensive physical abuse by petitioner. That
same day, a CPS worker also interviewed A.W., who stated that A.F. had been “injuring himself
by banging his head on things.”

        Adjudicatory hearings were held across three days beginning in August 2022. The DHS
presented testimony from several of A.F.’s treating physicians and nurses. They explained that
A.F. had bruising to his head, face, and neck, with additional injuries to his wrists and legs.
Notably, A.F. had ligature marks around his neck that were consistent with strangulation, blood
behind a membrane in his ear, and a broken toe. According to the treating medical staff, the
location and pattern of the injuries indicated that they were caused by non-accidental trauma that
was inflicted upon him. The DHS also elicited testimony from the forensic interviewer who spoke
with A.F. following his discharge from the hospital. She testified that A.F. disclosed that petitioner
threw him to the ceiling and stepped on his back after he hit the floor. A.W. testified that petitioner
was the only person who could have caused A.F.’s injuries because he was the only adult with
A.F. when the injuries occurred, and A.F. was not strong enough to injure himself to that extent.
A.W. further testified that petitioner was regularly using drugs, including methamphetamine. In
addition, numerous text messages between A.W. and petitioner were admitted as evidence showing
petitioner’s disdain for and resentment of A.F.

        Petitioner testified on his own behalf and denied physically abusing A.F. Petitioner claimed
that A.F. hurt himself, was a liar, and was sexually inappropriate with L.M.-1 and L.M.-2, who
were two and three years old at the time. Petitioner admitted that A.F. was often left in his custody
and care while A.W. was at work. He acknowledged that he used physical discipline on A.F. on at
least one occasion by smacking him across the face. On cross-examination, petitioner also admitted
to sending a text message to A.W. stating that he would “beat the ass off that boy” if he touched
L.M.-1 or L.M.-2. When asked if he followed through with that, petitioner responded, “not at that
time.” Petitioner’s mother and sister offered testimony in support of petitioner stating that he was
a good father and that they did not think petitioner injured A.F. They further testified that A.F. was
a troubled child who frequently lied.

       After the conclusion of the evidence, the circuit court adjudicated petitioner as an abusive
and neglectful parent. The circuit court found that the medical testimony proved that A.F.’s injuries
were not self-inflicted. Further, the testimony established that A.F.’s descriptions as to how he was
injured were consistent with his injuries. The circuit court also noted that the text messages to
A.W. threatening A.F. showed that petitioner had a motive for hurting A.F. As such, the circuit
court found that the DHS proved by clear and convincing evidence that petitioner physically
abused A.F., that A.F. was an abused and neglected child, and that L.M.-1 and L.M.-2 were
likewise abused and neglected because they resided in the same household.4

        A multi-day dispositional hearing began in October 2022. The circuit court took judicial
notice of the testimony previously provided regarding A.F.’s injuries. The DHS presented evidence

       4
        See W. Va. Code § 49-1-201 (defining “abused child” to include a child threatened by
abuse of another child in the home).

                                                  2
that petitioner had recently failed drug tests and admitted to using methamphetamine. The DHS
also presented testimony of a CPS worker who explained that the DHS recommended termination
of petitioner’s parental rights to L.M.-1 and L.M.-2 due to the egregious nature of the abuse
suffered by A.F. and that alternatives to termination would not be appropriate. Petitioner elicited
testimony of A.W. who testified that it would be in the children’s best interests to terminate
petitioner’s parental rights due to “everything on the table and the evidence that’s been presented.”
A.W. also testified that petitioner had mood swings that she believed were exacerbated by
petitioner’s drug use. Petitioner then testified that he took a parenting class from which he learned
“a few things,” however, he was unable to explain or describe what he learned. Petitioner continued
to deny that he physically abused A.F. and maintained that A.F. inflicted the injuries on himself.
Based on the evidence, the circuit court found that there was no reasonable likelihood that the
conditions of abuse could be substantially corrected in the near future and that L.M.-1’s and L.M.-
2’s best interests required termination of petitioner’s parental rights. Accordingly, the circuit court
terminated petitioner’s parental rights to the children. It is from the dispositional order that
petitioner appeals.5

        On appeal from a final order in an abuse and neglect proceeding, this Court reviews the
circuit court’s findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo. Syl. Pt. 1, In re
Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011). Before this Court, petitioner first argues that the
DHS did not prove the allegations in the petition by clear and convincing evidence at adjudication.
Petitioner avers that there was no demonstrative evidence of abuse in the form of damage to
petitioner’s home and that A.F.’s testimony was uncorroborated.6 It is well established that while
the DHS must prove the conditions existing at the time of the filing of the petition by clear and
convincing evidence, West Virginia Code § 49-4-601(i) “does not specify any particular manner
or mode of testimony or evidence by which the [DHS] is obligated to meet this burden.” Syl. Pt.
1, in part, In re Joseph A., 199 W. Va. 438, 485 S.E.2d 176 (1997) (quoting Syl. Pt. 1, W. Va. Dep’t
of Health and Hum. Res. ex rel. Wright v. Brenda C., 197 W. Va. 468, 475 S.E.2d 560 (1996)). As
such, a lack of damage to the home does not negate the mountain of medical evidence provided by
the DHS that A.F.’s injuries were non-accidental and inflicted upon him; the threatening text
messages to A.W. about hurting A.F. and indicating a motive; and A.F.’s identification of
petitioner as his abuser. Furthermore, A.F.’s description as to how petitioner injured him was
corroborated by the medical evidence. Four witnesses testified that A.F.’s description of how
petitioner injured him was consistent with the location and pattern of the bruises and ligature marks
on A.F.’s body. Accordingly, we find no error in the circuit court’s adjudication of petitioner as
an abusive parent based upon the physical abuse suffered by A.F.; the evidence clearly established
that petitioner inflicted severe injuries on A.F. See In re F.S., 233 W. Va. 538, 544, 759 S.E.2d

       5
           The permanency plan for L.M.-1 and L.M.-2 is reunification with A.W.
       6
         In further support of this assignment of error, petitioner asserts that none of the medical
professionals testified that A.F.’s injuries were attributable to petitioner “to a reasonable degree of
medical certainty or probability.” However, petitioner cites to no authority supporting this
proposition. Because petitioner fails to provide any analysis concerning this issue in his brief, we
decline to address this issue. See State v. Larry A.H., 230 W. Va. 709, 716, 742 S.E.2d 125, 132
(2013) (“Although we liberally construe briefs in determining issues presented for review, issues
. . . mentioned only in passing but are not supported with pertinent authority, are not considered
on appeal.”).
                                                  3
769, 775 (2014) (requiring “clear and convincing evidence” of “conditions existing at the time of
the filing of the petition” in order to support a finding of abuse and/or neglect).

        Second, petitioner argues that abuse and neglect should not have been “imputed” on L.M.-
1 and L.M.-2 because petitioner was identified as a “caretaker” of A.F. in the petition and not a
parent, custodian, or guardian. We find no merit in this argument, as petitioner’s argument is one
of semantics. Despite the DHS’s use of the word “caretaker,” it is clear that petitioner occupied a
custodial role over A.F. as established through extensive testimony. In fact, petitioner admitted
that he regularly provided care for A.F. and that A.F. had lived in his home with L.M.-1 and L.M.-
2 for several months. See W. Va. Code § 49-1-204 (defining “custodian” as “a person who has or
shares actual physical possession or care and custody of a child, regardless of whether that person
has been granted custody of the child by any contract or agreement.”). Though the circuit court
did not make a specific finding that petitioner was a custodian of A.F., we find that the record
supports such a conclusion.

        Petitioner further argues that it was error for the circuit court to adjudicate him of abuse
and neglect of L.M.-1 and L.M.-2 because the DHS presented no evidence that they were at risk
of being abused. Petitioner acknowledges that “[w]here there is clear and convincing evidence that
a child has suffered physical . . . abuse while in the custody of his or her parent(s), guardian, or
custodian, another child residing in the home when the abuse took place who is not a direct victim
of the physical . . . abuse but is at risk of being abused is an abused child under [West Virginia
Code § 49–1–201].” Syl. Pt. 2, In re Christina L., 194 W. Va. 446, 460 S.E.2d 692 (1995).
Petitioner contends that because in Christina L. we declined “to adopt a blanket rule that parental
rights must be terminated to all the children residing in the home based merely on the finding that
one child is abused,” the DHS was required to prove that L.M.-1 and L.M.-2 were at risk of being
abused to adjudicate petitioner of abuse of L.M.-1 and L.M.-2. See Christina L., 194 W. Va. at
452, 460 S.E.2d at 698 (emphasis added). We disagree as the language to which petitioner cites
from Christina L. applies to what must be proven to terminate parental rights—not to adjudicate a
parent. Pursuant to West Virginia Code § 49-1-201, an “abused child” is “a child whose health or
welfare is harmed or threatened by . . . [a] parent . . . who knowingly inflicts . . . physical injury .
. . upon . . . another child in the home.” Because petitioner physically injured A.F. in the home
where L.M.-1 and L.M.-2 resided, the circuit court properly found them to be abused children
because of the risk of harm that physical abuse posed. Accordingly, we find that the circuit court
did not err.

        Finally, petitioner argues that it was error for the circuit court to not consider less restrictive
alternatives. We disagree. We have held as follows:

               Termination of parental rights, the most drastic remedy under the statutory
        provision covering the disposition of neglected children, [West Virginia Code § 49-
        4-604,] may be employed without the use of intervening less restrictive alternatives
        when it is found that there is no reasonable likelihood under [West Virginia Code
        § 49-4-604(d)] that conditions of neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected.
        Syllabus point 2, In re R.J.M., 164 W.Va. 496, 266 S.E.2d 114 (1980).

                                                    4
Syl. Pt. 5, In re Kristin Y., 227 W. Va. 558, 712 S.E.2d 55 (2011). Here, a review of the record
shows that there was no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of abuse and neglect could be
substantially corrected in the near future because petitioner continued to deny that he physically
abused A.F. See In re Timber M., 231 W. Va. 44, 55, 743 S.E.2d 352, 363 (2013) (“Failure to
acknowledge the . . . truth of the basic allegation pertaining to the alleged abuse and neglect . . .
results in making the problem untreatable . . . .” (quoting In re Charity H., 215 W. Va. 208, 217,
599 S.E.2d 631, 640 (2004))). As such, the circuit court had a sufficient basis upon which to make
the findings necessary to terminate petitioner’s parental rights to L.M.-1 and L.M.-2. See W. Va.
Code § 49-4-604(c)(6) (permitting termination of parental rights upon finding “there is no
reasonable likelihood that the conditions of neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected in the
near future” and that termination is necessary for the welfare of the child). Accordingly,
termination of petitioner’s parental rights without considering less restrictive alternatives was not
in error.

     For the foregoing reasons, we find no error in the decision of the circuit court, and its
December 27, 2022, order is hereby affirmed.

                                                                                          Affirmed.

ISSUED: April 15, 2024

CONCURRED IN BY:

Chief Justice Tim Armstead
Justice Elizabeth D. Walker
Justice John A. Hutchison
Justice William R. Wooton
Justice C. Haley Bunn

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