Court Opinion

ID: 9672887
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:02:16.429403+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:18.936379
License: Public Domain

Ryan, J.
(concurring). I concur in the result reached by Justice Williams and agree with the disposition of the issues found in parts II, III, IV and V of his opinion. I write separately to express my different understanding regarding the admissibility of the testimony related to the prior, out-of-court identification of defendants.
Prior Identification

A. Testimony by the Identiñer

I agree that the testimony of the witness Anderson concerning his prior identification of the defendants at the billiard hall was admissible at the time of this trial because of the precedential force *494of People v Londe, 230 Mich 484; 203 NW 93 (1925).1

B. Testimony of Third Party

At the time of the trial of this case, the admissibility of the testimony of Officer Stafford concerning Anderson’s prior, extrajudicial identification of the defendants was governed by the rule of People v Poe, 388 Mich 611; 202 NW2d 320 (1972). My understanding of the rule in Poe compels the conclusion that the officer’s testimony concerning the actual identification of defendants by Anderson at the billiard hall was inadmissible hearsay at the time of this trial.
In Poe, the Court held that it was error to admit police testimony that two witnesses who identified defendant at trial had made an earlier, positive extrajudicial identification of him. Error was also *495found in the admission of police line-up sheets containing notations of what these witnesses had said at the time of the earlier identification. This evidence was found to be inadmissible hearsay because the testimony of the witnesses and the line-up sheets could have been offered and received for no other purpose than to prove that the witnesses had made prior consistent statements identifying Poe as the man who robbed the store in which they were employed, since the witnesses had not been impeached with regard to their prior identification of Poe.
Distinguishing its holding from that part of the Londe case which approved the admission of testimony of a third person concerning an extrajudicial identification by the robbery victim, the Poe Court said:
"Londe restricts the police officer’s testimony to 'what took place’ and under 'what circumstances the identification was made’ and not, as here, the nature or quality of the identification.” 388 Mich 611, 618.
This distinction is valid and important to an understanding of the admissibility of the police officer’s testimony in the instant case. In my view, Justice Williams misapplies the distinction.
The testimony of a third person to an extrajudicial identification is admissible under the authority of Poe only insofar as such testimony is offered to prove the facts and circumstances surrounding the identification, providing such facts and circumstances had independent relevance to the issues in the case. Such facts and circumstances might tend to show whether the extrajudicial identification took place in a fair and unbiased setting, whether the lighting at the time of the identification was poor, whether an identifier who normally wears *496glasses was wearing them at the time of the identification, whether in the case of a line-up other persons in the line-up were of a similar stature, weight, age and race as the identified party, and similar matters.
However, the essence of Officer Stafford’s testimony in the instant case differs significantly from a description of such facts and circumstances.2 The officer’s testimony concerning the identification consisted of a repetition of Mr. Anderson’s words and a description of his assertive conduct when *497identifying the defendants and, as such, went beyond the limited range of the facts and circumstances of the identification setting. The admission of this testimony could only have the purpose of bolstering and fortifying Anderson’s in-court and out-of-court identification of the defendants as his assailants, the truth of which had been damagingly challenged by defense counsel on cross-examination. Serving no other valid purpose, the testimony was inadmissible hearsay under the authority of Poe.
Nonetheless, as indicated by the adoption of MRE 801(d)(1), this Court is now persuaded that testimony of the kind found inadmissible in Poe, and the kind described in footnote 1, should be admitted under certain limited circumstances.
Recognizing that identification testimony has peculiar strengths and weaknesses, including those discussed by my Brother Williams in Poe, supra, the Court has subscribed to the view of most commentators on the law of evidence, as well as the Congress and the United States Supreme Court, that a special rule should be carved out for the admissibility of extrajudicial statements of identification. In adopting MRE 801(d)(1), the Court implicitly acknowledges, in addition, that the hearsay character and cumulative effect of the testimony of a third person to an out-of-court identification, as well as that given by the identifier himself, is not so inherently prejudicial that it must necessarily be excluded in all cases. Our new rule, like its Federal counterpart, FRE 801(d)(1)(C), allows the introduction of such testimony so long as the identifier testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement of identification. It is thought that the possible prejudicial impact of the cumulative effect of such *498testimony should be mitigated by the opportunity for cross-examination of the declarant which is made a condition for the admission of the testimony.
In the case before us, Anderson did testify at trial and was subject to cross-examination concerning the prior identification. In addition, the officer was subject to cross-examination concerning his testimony.3 Consequently, defendants had the opportunity to fully explore not only the truth of the in-court and out-of-court identifications, but also the facts and circumstances of the identification, and could expose any unfairness in the setting, any hesitancy in the identification and any inconsistency in the testimony of these two witnesses.
I conclude therefore that the testimony of the police officer, while inadmissible at the time this case was tried, did not unfairly prejudice defendants and therefore does not warrant reversal. In addition, because such testimony would now be admissible under the new Michigan Rules of Evidence if a new trial were granted, ordering one would be an empty gesture. I therefore vote to affirm.
Fitzgerald, J., concurred with Ryan, J.

 It is observed in passing, however, that correct and consistent application of the hearsay rule would have required the exclusion of the testimony of the complaining witness Kay in Londe and that given by Anderson here. Inadmissible hearsay traditionally has been defined as an extrajudicial statement which is offered for the purpose of proving the truth of the thing said. People v Hallaway, 389 Mich 265; 205 NW2d 451 (1973) (opinion of T. E. Brennan, J.). Both the Anderson testimony here in question and that of witness Kay in Londe fit that definition precisely and should have been rejected since, as Justice Brennan said in Hallaway, supra:
"While some writers have suggested that the hearsay rule need not be applied to the extrajudicial statements of a declarant, who later testifies as a witness, this Court has not recognized such an exception to the hearsay rule.” 389 Mich 265, 275-276.
Not even, it might be added, when the statement is one of identification.
Nevertheless, the Londe Court, in single sentence conclusory language, admitted similar testimony apparently without even recognizing that it was hearsay and without any analysis, discussion or citation of authority to support its admissibility. Thus the Londe decision can only be characterized as one of those cases providing support for the admissibility of extrajudicial statements of identifications without any recognition of the hearsay problem inherent in such testimony. McCormick, Evidence (2d ed), § 251, p 603; 71 ALR2d 449.

 The objectionable portions of the officer’s testimony are found in the following colloquy between the prosecutor and the officer:
”Q. (By Mr. Morgan): After Mr. Booker Anderson came in, what happened next?

"A. Mr. Anderson came into the pool hall and pointed out a gentleman, saying, ’That is one of them.’

”Q. What happened next, after that?
’’A. Mr. Anderson pointed to one of the defendants. My partner walked up behind him and asked him to come to the door.
"Q. What happened next?
"A. He was placed in custody.
"Q. What happened after that?

"A. Mr. Anderson then pointed out the other gentleman, when we were outside. He said, 'The other one is inside. ’

"Q. Then what happened next?
"A. We also went and got that defendant.
"Q. And placed him under arrest also?
"A. We did, sir.
"Q. Officer Stafford, do you see either of those two persons who you arrested at the billiard hall in court this morning?
"A. I do, sir.
"Q. Would you point to them and indicate what they are wearing.

"A. The Srst one pointed out to us is the gentleman wearing the black and green trousers.

"Mr. Morgan: Indicating for the record, Mr. Reginald Gardner.

"A. And sitting down at the checker table inside the pool hall is the gentleman in the green pullover sweater.

"Mr. Morgan: Indicating for the record, Mr. Dwight Sanford.
"Q. (By Mr. Morgan): You say he was seated at the checker table?
"A. Yes. Mr. Gardner was playing pool, and Mr. Sanford was playing checkers.” (Emphasis added.) Trial Transcript, pp 78-79.
The line-up sheets found to be inadmissible in Poe contained the notations of the witnesses’ statements: "That’s him with the trench coat on” and "That’s him, that’s him”. 388 Mich 611, 617.

 It is recognized that the truth of Anderson’s extrajudicial identification of the defendants as his attackers cannot be probed and tested by the cross-examination of one who merely repeats the statements of identification. There are, of course, other values in such cross-examination.