Court Opinion

ID: 9674146
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:23:53.253221+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:25.809423
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Calvert,
joined by Justices Griffin and Walker, dissenting.
I agree with the statement of the majority that “each case of improper argument must be considered upon its own peculiar facts,” but I suggest that in deciding cases involving improper argument we owe it to ourselves and to practicing attorneys to adhere, as consistently as is possible, to unchanging rules and principles.
It is said by petitioner and agreed to by the majority, that the argument complained of is improper because it and the inferences to be drawn from it were either highly prejudicial and inflammatory or had the effect of bringing new evidence before the jury. The condemned inferences are itemized in the majority opinion as follows: (1). An inference that if certain witnesses had been called to the stand they would have testified for respondent. (2). An inference that the petitioner had intimidated the witness Aguilar so that he was afraid to tell the truth, and that if petitioner had had an opportunity to do so it would have intimidated the witnesses Bennett and Wagner. (3). An inference that officials of and counsel for petitioner were lacking in integrity.
*535I suggest that we do wrong when we tie into one bundle a great many items of argument and then label it all “improper,” condemn it as “prejudicial” and conclude that it was “incurable.” If we are to discharge our duty of determining whether argument is improper and whether it was calculated to cause and probably did cause the rendition of an improper judgment, I think, in fairness, we owe it to the parties, and particularly to the party from whom we take the jury verdict, to analyze the argument. In the absence of analysis, all of the argument goes into the books as improper, prejudicial and incurable.
Argument should not be condemned because of improper inferences which may be drawn from it unless it appears probable — more likely than not — that the jury drew such inferences. The very wording of Rules 434 and 503, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, prescribes that test. I submit that there is no impropriety in the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the following argument:
“ 'Second choice’ they say you are to this man, where this man is concerned. Give him a fair trial ? Do they want this man to have a fair trial ? Yes, that does make me a little sore.”
A qualification made by the trial judge to petitioner’s bill of exceptions to this particular argument contains the following recitation: “That counsel for defendant in arguing before Plaintiff’s closing argument, contended to the jury that the jury in the cause was second choice to the Plaintiff, and that he had first chosen to file his case before a California court in preference to a Texas court.” It thus appears that the argument condemned as improper, prejudicial, and incurable was openly invited. Counsel for petitioner had charged in his argument that the Texas jury was “second choice” to the respondent and had inferred that respondent would have preferred to try his case in a California court. Surely it was not improper for counsel for respondent in reply thereto to argue, in substance, that counsel for petitioner did not want the respondent to have a fair trial, else they would not seek to prejudice him before the Texas jury by charging that the jury was second choice with him as a forum for trying his case. All that counsel for respondent charged in this portion of his argument was that petitioner’s counsel had sought to create prejudice against him and thereby prevent him from obtaining a fair trial. The argument by petitioner’s counsel was reasonably calculated to create prejudice against respondent and I can think of no reason counsel for petitioner could have had in making the argument except to create prejudice. Why was it improper to say so?
*536The only argument which petitioner contends called upon the testimony of absent witnesses in support of respondent’s case is that in which it was said:
“* * * and if there was any doubt about it, they would have had Aguilar, who pushed this cart into Hubbard, and if there was any doubt about it, they would have one or a dozen or twenty-five other people who were down there.”
Argument almost identical with the first part of that here quoted, and in a fact setting almost identical also, was held harmless by this Court in Aultman v. Dallas Ry. & Term. Co., 152 Texas 509, 260 S.W. 2d 596, 600. In that case it was held that where each party commented, in the presence of the jury, on the failure of the other to use a particular witness, equally available to both, the only reasonable inference to be drawn therefrom was that the witness “would not testify for either party, else he would have been called by the one or the other.”
In this case Aguilar was placed under subpoena by the respondent. During the course of the trial petitioner introduced the subpoena in evidence, an act quite evidently calculated and intended to create in the minds of the jury the impression that Aguilar would not confirm respondent’s account of the accident else he would have been used as a witness by respondent. Respondent then made the above-quoted argument to the jury, an argument quite evidntly calculated and intended to create in the minds of the jury the impression that Aguilar would not dispute respondent’s account of the accident else he would have been used as a witness by petitioner. In reply to respondent’s argument petitioner’s counsel then commented to the jury on the failure of respondent’s counsel to call Aguilar as a witness, an argument quite evidently calculated and intended to create in the minds of the jury the impression that Aguilar would not support respondent’s account of the accident. I respectfully submit that the first part of the argument above quoted, even if improper and uninvited, was harmless, and that the point is specifiically ruled, with no basis of distinction, by Aultman v. Dallas Ry. & Term. Co., supra. Other cases decided since the adoption of Rules 434 and 503, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, holding much stronger argument of this general character not to be so highly prejudicial as to be incurable are King v. Underwriters Exchange, 144 Texas 531, 191 S.W. 2d 855, 856, and Goforth v. Alvey, 153 Texas 449, 271 S.W. 2d 404.
The latter part of the quoted argument, to wit, “and if *537there was any doubt about it they would have one or a dozen or twenty-five other people who were down there” is but a way of saying that petitioner had offered no testimony in contradiction of that of respondent and had thereby left the testimony of respondent undisputed in the record. Such argument is not improper. Wade v. Texas Empl. Ins. Ass’n., 150 Texas 557, 244 S.W. 2d 197, 201.
With respect to the remaining excerpts of argument quoted in the majority opinion, some undoubtedly were of a prejudicial and inflammatory character. Into this category we may place the statements that “anybody that sues the railroad for injuries and their wife and anybody that says ‘good morning’ to ’em is probably a thief and a liar,” and that “anybody who sues this railroad is less than honorable, can’t tell the truth, and they lie, and anybody else that comes in, even under subpoena of the court, if they dare say anything in our favor, they are not telling the truth.”
Other items of argument, quoted in the majority opinion, undoubtedly were calculated to give rise to the inference that petitioner had intimidated the witness Aguilar by threatening him with loss of his employment so that he was afraid to tell the truth, and that it would have intimidated the witnesses Bennett and Wagner in the same manner if it had had the opportunity to do so. I think it may be fairly said also that inference was probably drawn from the argument by the jury. Likewise it may be fairly said that certain of the argument was reasonably calculated to give rise to an inference that officials and counsel for petitioner had induced Aguilar to forego an appearance for the purpose of telling the truth. I think it probable that the jury drew this inference from the argument. But assuming that all of the argument here referred to may be properly labeled as improper and prejudicial, the real question with respect thereto is whether a reversal should be ordered in the absence of timely objction. In arriving at an answer to this question we must assume that all means would have been availed of to eliminate any possible prejudice arising out of the argument; we must assume that if proper objection had been made, counsel for respondent would have apologized for the argument and would have withdrawn it, and that the trial judge would have instructed the jury not to consider it for any purpose and would have reprimanded counsel for respondent for having made it. Considered in this light, it is my opinion, judged on the basis of the majority of the more recent decisions of this Court, that the vice in the argument could have been cured and that a reversal should not be ordered.
*538Cases which seem to me to compel the conclusion I have reached are Ramirez v. Acker, 134 Texas 647, 138 S.W. 2d 1054; Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Sturgeon, 142 Texas 222, 177 S.W. 2d 264 and King v. Federal Underwriters Exchange, 144 Texas 531, 191 S.W. 2d 855.
In Ramirez v. Acker, supra, argument which inferred that plaintiff’s counsel had practiced a fraud on the plaintiff and ought to be indicted for filing the suit; that the defendant was being highjacked for “blood money” and that the suit, although brought in the name of an individual, was brought primarily for the benefit of an oil company was “of such a nature that, if it had been objected to, a reprimand by the court to counsel for making such an argument and an instruction by the court to the jury to disregard such argument would have rendered it harmless.”
In Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Sturgeon, supra, argument that “I don’t think a man on this jury would sell his leg for $100,-000” was held to be curable, the court saying: “The objection should have been sustained and requested instruction given. Prompt action on the part of the court, in response to the objection and request, would have removed the harmful effect. It was also said in that case that argument that a particular witness “was lying on the witness stand ‘to keep his job with the railroad’ ” and similar argument made with respect to another witness was only “border-line argument.” The necessary inferences from that argument were the same as the inferences in this case, that is, that the witnesses were intimidated by the railroad and would be discharged if they did not testify falsely. All of this argument was held by this Court to be curable.
In King v. Federal Underwriters Exchange, supra, several items of argument were claimed to be improper and prejudicial. One item of argument contrasted the wealth of the defendant with the poverty of the plaintiff. Another deliberately and specifically inferred that if a witness had been permitted to do so, over objection, he would have testified on plaintiff’s behalf. Another inferred that unless given a lump sum payment those who held a mortgage against the same would take the plaintiff’s store and his house. Another informed the jury that if the insurance company had been going to settle the case it would already have done it. It thus appears that the argument was replete with prejudicial statements and statements introducing new testimony and yet, the trial court having sustained *539objection to each such item of argument and having directed -the jury not to consider it, this Court held that the harmful effect of the argument was eliminated and that a reversal would not be justified. This Court further held that the cumulative effect of all of these items of argument would not require a reversal.
The cases cited by the majority are not authoritative on the -question here involved. Many of them were decided before the adoption of Rules 434 and 503, T.R.C.P. and were specifically and pointedly decided on the basis of presumed harm. Into this category fall the cases of Robbins v. Wynne (Com. App.), 44 S.W. 2d 946; Morrison v. Smith, Texas Civ. App., 138 S.W. 2d 280, no writ history, and Smerke v. Office Equipment Company, 138 Texas 236, 158 S.W. 2d 302.
In Robbins v. Wynne reversal was ordered in spite of the fact that counsel withdrew the argument and the court instructed the jury not to consider it. The decision can hardly be held to compel a reversal in this case, however, because it was specifically predicated on the conclusion that the withdrawal would not render it possible for the court “to say beyond a reasonable doubt that no injury resulted.” In Morrison v. Smith it was held that a reversal was required because there was in the case “a reasonable doubt of the harmful effect of such argument.” In Smerke v. Office Equipment Company a reversal was ordered because of the cumulative effect of a number of items of improper argument, in spite of the failure to object thereto, because they were “of such nature that withdrawal or instruction would not render their harmful effect free from doubt."
In other cases cited by the majority timely objection was made but was ignored or overruled. Obviously, these cases are not in point. Into this category fall the cases of Stephens v. Smith, Texas Civ. App., 208 S.W. 2d 689, writ refused, n.r.e.; Southwestern Greyhound Lines v. Dickson, 149 Texas 599, 236 S.W. 2d 115, and U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Company v. Lewis, Texas Civ. App., 266 S.W. 2d 194, writ refused, n.r.e In Stephens v. Smith, counsel argued that an attorney for the plaintiff had deliberately planted a lie in the mouth of a minor witness. Vigorous objection thereto was overruled. In United States F. & G. Co. v. Lewis, there were nine items of improper argument. Objection was overruled to two of the items and reversal rested heavily on these two items. The opinion in Southwestern Greyhound Lines v. Dickson indicates that counsel was *540constantly objecting to the improper argument but that the court was either ignoring the objections or was overruling them.
There are two other cases cited by the majority; Airline Motor Coaches v. Campbell, Texas Civ. App., 184 S.W. 2d 532, writ refused, w.m., and Houseman v. De Cuir, 155 Texas 127, 283 S.W. 2d 732, 735. A reversal was ordered in Airline Motor Coaches v. Campbell because of improper argument, but the opinion of the court does not reflect whether there was or was not objection to such argument. The decision in Houseman v. De Cuir is specifically rested on the idea that a sufficient objection had been made and had been overruled. The court was-sharply split over whether a sufficient objection had been made. The majority held there had been, and as a basis for their decision the majority said: “We think that on the bill of exception as a whole, the case is substantially the same as if no instruction to the jury had been given, or even as if the objection, had been overruled.”
It thus appears that none of the cases cited by the majority and decided since the adoption of Rules 434 and 503 support their conclusion that argument of the type made in this case should work a reversal where complaining counsel sat idly by and took a chance on obtaining a verdict before raising any question concerning the argument. On more than one occasion this Court has declared it to be the duty of counsel to object to improper argument at the time it is made if a reversal is to be expected. It has been said by the Court that the trial court “in most instances can prevent harmful results from improper argument, but can more easily do so, and with less likelihood of having his action misinterpreted by the jury as indicating his view of the merits of the case, if counsel is reprimanded and the jury is instructed, at the time the argument is; made, and in response to a timely objection.” Texas Company v. Gibson, 131 Texas 598, 116 S.W. 2d 686, 687.
I agree that much of the argument of respondent’s counsel was improper and prejudicial in character. No objection was made to this type of argument. If timely objection had been made and had been overruled I would join unhesitatingly in the reversal of the judgment because I would then conceive the case to be ruled by such former decisions as Stephens v. Smith, Southwestern Greyhound Lines v. Dickson and Houseman v. De Cuir. In the complete absence of objection, I cannot agree to reversal. It does not add to reversibility that several *541items of improper argument are involved. If counsel had properly objected to one instance of improper argument the objection might have brought forth from the trial judge such a prompt and devastating rebuke that none of the other improper arguments would have been made. We should not presume the contrary. When we do we revert to the rule of presumed harm. Counsel should not be permitted to sit idly and quietly while improper argument is being made with the knowledge that he is secure in his right to take a transcript of the argument to his office and for thirty days comb it with a fine-tooth comb for statements which he can later present to an appellate court with the successful claim that if no one of the items he has found is sufficiently prejudicial to require a reversal, the cumulative effect of all of them is sufficient. To permit this procedure is to authorize an attorney to abdicate his duties as counsel in the case. He could as well return to his office to attend to other business while opposing counsel is presenting argument, trusting to the Court Reporter to record the argument and to the courts to grant him a new trial in spite of his own failure to perform his duties as an attorney.
Perhaps mention should be made at this point of Texas Emp. Ins. Ass’n. v. Haywood, 153 Texas 242, 266 S.W. 2d 856. Reversal was ordered in that case although the argument was not objected to, but the argument there was a direct appeal to the jury to disbelieve the defendant’s only witnesses on a vital fact issue because they were negroes. Nothing was left to inference. The case should be and is an exception to the general rule. A stronger direct appeal to prejudice could hardly be imagined.
The majority’s conclusion that most of the argument in this case could not have been rendered harmless by instruction seems to me to be based upon an erroneous test. They say: “No instruction from the court could make the jury ignorant of these alleged facts stated by Hubbard’s attorney.” Of course, an instruction could not make the jury ignorant of the argument. It is not pretended that it could. What is pretended, however, is that we have a right to assume that, having knowledge of the argument and the matters involved in it, the jury, nevertheless, would have obeyed the instruction of the court and would not have permitted that knowledge to enter into or otherwise affect their verdict. The “prejudice” would thus have been eliminated. When improper argument is held to be curable the question of harm is not reached. If proper steps are taken to remove its prejudicial effect, no prejudice remains to be harm*542ful. And if no objection is made, thus calling forth remedial measures from offending counsel and the court, the complaining party is held to have waived his right to have the question of harm reviewed.
On the whole it seems to me that the opinion of the majority in this case and the judgment they enter is wholly out of harmony and out of keeping with the late decisions of this Court. I would affirm the judgments of the Court of Civil Appeals and of the trial court.
Mr. Justice Nor veil not sitting.
Opinion delivered December 12, 1956.
Rehearing overruled January 23, 1957.