Court Opinion

ID: 9730843
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:26:11.970348+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:09.307832
License: Public Domain

Pashmah", J.,
dissenting. I dissent from the Court’s holding for substantially the reasons stated by the Appellate Division majority. Its opinion is both well-reasoned and persuasive. A few remarks are necessary, however, to refute the misinterpretation of Germain v. Cool-Rite Corp., 70 N. J. 1 (1976), by this Court’s majority.
The majority states that under Germain:
* * * even if petitioner had made out a prima faoie case of unem-ployability and respondent offered no proof of employment availability, the Judge of Worker’s Compensation, when reviewing the entire record, might still find that petitioner had not satisfied his ultimate burden of proof.
[Ante at 534, emphasis added]
This conclusion is manifestly incorrect. Caselaw dealing with the odd lot doctrine has established that where petitioner makes out a prima facie case the burden iof coming forward *536with proof of employability rests upon the employer. Germain, supra, 70 N. J. at 10. See, e. g., Oglesby v. American Dredging Co., 64 N. J. 538, 548 (1974); Barbato v. Alsan Masonry, 64 N. J. 514, 529-530 (1974); Zanchi v. S & K Construction Co., 63 N. J. 331 (1973); Lightner v. Cohn, 76 N. J. Super. 461, 468 (App. Div.), certif. den. 38 N. J. 611 (1962). This burden of coming forward, also known as the burden of producing evidence, clearly subjects the party bearing the burden to judgment against him if he fails to introduce any evidence at all. Germain, supra, 70 N. J. at 9; In re Weeks, 29 N. J. Super. 533, 536-538 (App. Div. 1954); Evid. R. 1(5); 9 Wigmore on Evidence, § 2487 (1940); McCormick, Evidence, § 336, § 338 (2d Ed. 1972).1
The burden of proof, sometimes called the burden of persuasion, is the ultimate requirement of convincing the trier of fact that an alleged fact is true. See Wigmore; McCormick, supra. This burden does not shift, see, e. g., Bornstein v. Metropolitan Bottling Co., 26 N. J. 263, 269 (1958); Hughes v. Atlantic City & Shore R.R. Co., 85 N. J. L. 212, 216 (E. & A. 1914), except in certain special cases. See, e.g., In re Davis’ Will, 14 N. J. 166 ,(1953) (presumption of undue influence). The petitioner in an odd lot case always retains this burden. Germain, supra, 70 N. J. at 9-10. The burden of producing evidence, on the other hand, operates *537as a presumption, requiring the party bearing the burden to introduce contrary evidence. This does not shift the burden of proof. The burdened party need not show more evidence than that offered by the party who has made a prima facie ease, but need only show some substantial evidence. In re Weeks, supra. However, if he fails to produce any such evidence, the plaintiff’s “presumption” has not been “rebutted,” and plaintiff is entitled to judgment. Evid. R. 1(5).2
What this means in the context of the odd lot doctrine is that once a prima facie case has been made out, the burden of producing evidence of employability rests on the employer. If he fails to introduce any evidence, judgment should be entered in favor of the petitioner. If, however, the employer does introduce some substantial evidence of employability, the burden of proof comes into effect and the compensation judge, in order to hold for the petitioner, must find that the petitioner has established his unemployability by the preponderance of the evidence. This was the situation clearly envisioned in Germain. The reference there to “burden of proof” related to a hearing on remand at which it was assumed that the employer would introduce evidence. In such a situation the petitioner would bear the burden of proof as discussed above.
Even apart from the clear language in 'Germain mandating that the employer produce evidence of employability, the procedure there suggested indicates that such a burden is *538placed upon the employer. The Court stated that the employer may, at the close of petitioner’s case, request a ruling from the judge “as to whether petitioner has established a prima facie case of total permanent disability under the odd-lot doctrine * * 70 N. J. at 10. Upon such a request “the judge shall make such a determination so that the respondent can know whether it has the burden of coming forward with proof of employability.” Id. (Emphasis added.) Such a procedure would be meaningless unless a ruling that a prima facie ease was made out requires that the employer produce some evidence. If, as advocated by the majority, the existence of a prima facie case has no legal effect, there would be no reason for establishing a special procedure to inform the employer whether such a showing had been made. Inasmuch as the majority’s interpretation of Germain would render nugatory the procedure specifically there suggested, that interpretation must be rejected. In essence, the majority is, in the guise of interpreting Germain, overruling much of its substance.
Por the foregoing reasons, I believe that it is the bare majority of this Court, and not the Appellate Division, that has misconstrued Germain. Therefore, I would affirm.
Hughes, C. J., and Handler, J., dissenting: We would affirm the judgment substantially for the reasons expressed in the majority opinion of the Appellate Division, reported at 164 N. J. Super. 467 (1978).
For modification and reinstatement — Justices Mountain, Sullivan, Clieeord and Schreiber — 4.
For affirmance — Chief Justice Hughes and Justices Pashman and Handler — 3.

Some confusion may exist because of the dual judicial meanings of the phrase prima facie. The term is sometimes used to describe the quantity of evidence a party must introduce as to a disputed fact to avoid a directed verdict as to that fact. In such a case, the opponent need not produce any evidence in order to allow the question to be submitted to the trier of fact. In the second sense, prima facie is used to denote when the proponent of a fact has shown sufficient proof to warrant what may be called a presumption of that fact. Here, the burden of producing evidence does shift to the opponent and he must introduce contrary evidence in order to avoid a directed verdict as to that fact. See Wigmore, McCormick, supra. The latter use of the word prima facie is clearly the one envisioned by Germain, as that opinion specifically spoke of the “burden of coming forward” resting upon the employer. 70 N. J. at 10.

The relationship between these two burdens is addressed in the Official Comments to Evid. R. 1(5). It is there stated that:
The burden of producing evidence may differ from the burden of proof during the course of a trial, as where the proponent of a fact is aided by a presumption. When the presumption is validly invoked, the opponent of the fact to be presumed must produce evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption, or risk a peremptory finding against him. * * * Once a defendant against whom a presumption would work comes forth with sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption (See Kule 14), the burden of proof remains on the plaintiff, and if he does not meet it, he will suffer a judgment against him. **'*'*