Court Opinion

ID: 9930542
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-07 07:12:30.872791+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:19:19.503669
License: Public Domain

AFFIRMED; and Opinion Filed January 31st, 2024

                                  S   In The
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                              No. 05-22-00845-CR

                      EX PARTE NICHOLAS TULLETT

              On Appeal from the County Criminal Court No. 3
                           Dallas County, Texas
                   Trial Court Cause No. MC22A0578

                        MEMORANDUM OPINION
                   Before Justices Molberg, Reichek, and Smith
                            Opinion by Justice Smith
      Nicholas Tullett appeals the denial of his application for habeas corpus by a

visiting judge. We affirm the judge’s order.

                                   Background

      In July 1996, appellant entered a negotiated plea of no contest to public

lewdness. In accordance with the terms of the plea agreement, the trial court

convicted appellant and assessed a sentence of ninety days’ confinement, suspended

the sentence, and placed appellant on community supervision for twelve months.

      In February 2022, appellant filed an application for writ of habeas corpus,

challenging the 1996 conviction and seeking to withdraw his plea. See TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.072. The State filed a response, and, thereafter, the parties

appeared before a visiting judge for a hearing on the application. Appellant objected

to the visiting judge presiding over the matter. Arguing that habeas proceedings

were legally distinct from criminal proceedings, counsel asserted that section

74.053(b) of the Texas Government Code, which authorizes objections to visiting

judges in civil actions, should apply. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 74.053(b). The

visiting judge overruled the objection and, after receiving testimony from appellant

and hearing the arguments of counsel, denied appellant’s application for habeas

relief. This appeal followed.

                                 Standard of Review

      We review statutory interpretation, a question of law, de novo. State v.

Kahookele, 640 S.W.3d 221, 225 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). In doing so, we look to

the “literal text and attempt to discern its fair, objective meaning.” Id. (citing Boykin

v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782, 785 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)). “We give effect to the plain

meaning of the statutory text, reading it in context and construing it according to the

rules of grammar and common usage.” Id.           We also give effect to “each word,

phrase, clause, and sentence if reasonably possible” and assume each word has been

used purposely. Id. If a statute is clear and unambiguous, we may not add or subtract

from it. Boykin, 818 S.W.2d at 785. We may consider extratextual factors only if

“the language is ambiguous or would lead to absurd consequences that the

Legislature could not possibly have intended.” Kahookele, 640 S.W.3d at 225.

                                          –2–
                                 Applicable Statutes

      Chapter 11 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure governs applications for

writs of habeas corpus. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. ch. 11. Article 11.072

provides the exclusive means by which district courts may exercise original habeas

jurisdiction in cases involving an individual who is either serving, or has completed,

a term of community supervision. See id. art. 11.072; Ex parte Villanueva, 252

S.W.3d 391, 397 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).

      Chapter 74 of the Texas Government Code authorizes the assignment of

retired and former judges, provided they meet certain statutory requirements, “to

hold court when necessary to dispose of accumulated business in [an administrative

judicial] region.” TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 74.052, 74.054, 74.055. However,

“[i]f a party to a civil case files a timely objection to the assignment, the judge shall

not hear the case.” Id. § 74.053(b) (emphasis added).

                                       Analysis

      In three issues, appellant contends that the visiting judge abused her discretion

in overruling his objection to her presiding over his habeas proceeding. Specifically,

appellant asserts that the hearing was a civil proceeding and, therefore, pursuant to

the government code, his objection rendered the visiting judge disqualified to

preside.

      Appellant properly filed his application under article 11.072, which

establishes the habeas procedures for a defendant in a felony or misdemeanor case

                                          –3–
who seeks relief from an order or judgment of conviction ordering community

supervision. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.072, § 1. The Court of

Criminal Appeals has not specifically addressed whether article 11.072 proceedings

are criminal proceedings. However, it has determined that proceedings under article

11.07, which governs habeas applications seeking relief from a felony judgment

imposing a sentence other than death, are “categorized as criminal proceedings by

statute.” Ex parte Rieck, 144 S.W.3d 510, 516 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); see also

Aranda v. Dist. Clerk, 207 S.W.3d 785, 786 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (per curiam)

(vexatious litigant statute in Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code does not apply

to article 11.07 proceeding, which is criminal, not civil, in nature).

      In Rieck, the Court of Criminal Appeals observed that “courts have struggled

with how to characterize habeas proceedings and have sometimes characterized

them as ‘neither civil nor criminal but rather sui generis’ or ‘an exercise of special

constitutional and statutory jurisdiction.’” 144 S.W.3d at 516 (citations omitted).

Likewise, the Court recognized that, in Texas, a habeas proceeding is considered

“separate from the criminal prosecution—being a collateral, rather than direct, attack

on the judgment of conviction.” Id. The Court noted, however, that “Texas has gone

further in eschewing the civil label for habeas proceedings arising from criminal

prosecutions or convictions” and categorizes such proceedings as criminal for

jurisdictional purposes. Id. And, because section 5 of article 11.07 confers on the

Court of Criminal Appeals the exclusive authority to grant post-conviction habeas

                                          –4–
relief after a final felony conviction, an article 11.07 habeas proceeding also is

categorized a criminal proceeding by statute. Rieck, 144 S.W.3d at 516.

      Unlike article 11.07, article 11.072 does not provide the Court of Criminal

Appeals with exclusive authority to grant habeas relief. Article 11.072’s plain

language, however, similarly reflects the criminal nature of habeas proceedings in

which a defendant seeks relief from an order or judgment of conviction ordering

community supervision. Specifically, it requires that an applicant who wishes to

appeal a trial court’s denial of habeas relief must follow Texas Code of Criminal

Procedure article 44.02, which governs a criminal defendant’s right to appeal, and

Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 31, which governs appeals in habeas corpus, bail,

and extradition proceedings “in criminal cases” and provides for the availability of

a petition for discretionary review to the Court of Criminal Appeals. See TEX. CODE

CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 11.072, §8, 44.02; TEX. RS. APP. P. 31.4, 31.5; see also TEX.

RS. APP. P. 31.1, 31.2 (providing that appellate court should use the same briefing

rules and deadlines, submission schedules, and hearing schedules that apply to direct

appeals from criminal cases in an appeal from a habeas corpus proceeding

challenging a conviction or an order placing the defendant on community

supervision). Accordingly, we conclude that article 11.072 proceedings, like article

11.07 proceedings, are categorized as criminal proceedings by statute.

      In concluding that an article 11.072 proceeding is criminal, and not civil, we

are in accord with our sister court in Texarkana. See Giddens v. State, No. 06-08-

                                        –5–
00196-CR, 2008 WL 5627203, at *1 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Oct. 22, 2008, pet.

ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication). In Giddens, the appellant appealed

the trial court’s denial of an application for writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to

article 11.072. Id. The notice of appeal, however, was untimely, and the appellant

urged the court to treat his habeas proceeding as a civil proceeding and apply Texas

Rule of Civil Procedure 306a to extend the timetable for filing the notice of appeal.

Id. The Texarkana Court of Appeals declined to do so. Id.

      Our conclusion also is supported by the El Paso Court of Appeals, which has

concluded that habeas proceedings under chapter 11 are criminal proceedings. See

Gibson v. State, 921 S.W.2d 747, 752–53 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1996, writ denied)

(“A writ of habeas corpus pursuant to Article 11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure

is a criminal proceeding despite its availability to persons not accused of crimes.”);

see also, e.g., Ex parte Tarango, 116 S.W.3d 201, 202–03 (Tex. App.—El Paso

2003, no pet.) (habeas corpus proceeding brought by defendant pursuant to article

11.09 to collaterally attack misdemeanor conviction is criminal, not civil, proceeding

and, therefore, Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 25.2, which governs perfecting

appeals in criminal cases, applies); Ex parte Woodall, No. 08-03-00184-CR, 2003

WL 21711397, at *2 (Tex. App.—El Paso July 24, 2003, no pet.) (not designated

for publication) (same).

      Appellant acknowledges that the visiting judge was a retired and former judge

who could be assigned to preside over his habeas proceeding. See TEX. GOV’T CODE

                                         –6–
ANN. §§ 74.052, 74.054, 74.055. In providing that an assigned visiting judge may

not preside when “a party to a civil case” files a timely objection, section 74.053 of

the government code plainly does not apply to a party in a criminal proceeding. See

id. § 74.053(b); Anderson v. State, No. A14-89-00730-CR, 1990 WL 110164, at *1

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 2, 1990, no pet.) (not designated for

publication) (wording of section 74.053(b) is unambiguous; no right to object is

“accorded to a criminal defendant”). Appellant was not a party to a civil case, and

his section 11.072 habeas proceeding was a criminal proceeding. Accordingly, the

visiting judge did not err in overruling his objection and presiding over the

proceeding. We overrule appellant’s first, second, and third issues.

                                    Conclusion

      We affirm the trial court’s order denying habeas relief.

                                           /Craig Smith/
                                           CRAIG SMITH
                                           JUSTICE

Do Not Publish
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b)
220845F.U05

                                         –7–
                                  S
                           Court of Appeals
                    Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                 JUDGMENT

EX PARTE NICHOLAS TULLETT                    On Appeal from the County Criminal
                                             Court No. 3, Dallas County, Texas
No. 05-22-00845-CR                           Trial Court Cause No. MC22A0578.
                                             Opinion delivered by Justice Smith.
                                             Justices Molberg and Reichek
                                             participating.

      Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the trial court’s order denying
habeas relief is AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered this 31st day of January, 2024.

                                       –8–