Court Opinion

ID: 9901353
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-21 18:01:06.502089+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:31.889040
License: Public Domain

22-3233
    Clark v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth.

                                  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                      FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                              SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A
SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED
BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1.
WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY
MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE
NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A
COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

          At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
    held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the
    City of New York, on the 21st day of November, two thousand twenty-three.

    PRESENT:

                      JOHN M. WALKER, JR.,
                      REENA RAGGI,
                      RICHARD J. SULLIVAN,
                          Circuit Judges.
    __________________________________________________________

    LA’SHAUN CLARK,

                                  Plaintiff-Appellant,

                      v.                                                           No. 22-3233

    NEW YORK CITY HOUSING AUTHORITY,
    NEW YORK INSULATION & ENVIRONMENTAL
    SERVICES, INC., JLC ENVIRONMENTAL
    CONSULTANTS, INC.,

                                  Defendants-Appellees. *
    __________________________________________________________

    *   The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the official case caption as set forth above.
For Plaintiff-Appellant:                    LA’SHAUN      CLARK,     pro    se,
                                            Douglasville, GA.

For Defendant-Appellee New York             MIRIAM SKOLNIK, Herzfeld         &
City Housing Authority:                     Rubin, P.C., New York, NY.

For Defendant-Appellee New York             DAVID SASSER (Richard Leff, on the
Insulation & Environmental                  brief), BBC Law, LLP, New York,
Services, Inc.:                             NY.

For Defendant-Appellee JLC                  MICHAEL SCHNEIDER, Kennedys
Environmental Consultants, Inc.:            CMK LLP, New York, NY.

      Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern

District of New York (Paul A. Engelmayer, Judge).

      UPON     DUE     CONSIDERATION,         IT    IS   HEREBY     ORDERED,

ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the December 28, 2022 judgment of the

district court is AFFIRMED and the pending motions to expand the record are

DENIED.

      La’Shaun Clark, proceeding pro se, appeals a grant of summary judgment in

favor of the New York City Housing Authority (“NYCHA”), New York Insulation

& Environmental Services, Inc. (“NYIES”), and JLC Environmental Consultants,

Inc. (“JLC”) on Clark’s claims of common law negligence and fraudulent

concealment.   Clark alleges that she developed lupus and severe respiratory

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illness after two contractors – NYIES and JLC – performed defective asbestos

abatement in an apartment she later rented from NYCHA. Clark attributes her

illnesses to unabated asbestos that the contractors missed as well as to crystalline

silica, an ingredient in a chemical called Ardex that the contractors used in treating

her apartment. Despite several reminders from the magistrate judge, however,

Clark produced no expert evidence linking her ailments to either the asbestos or

the Ardex. Citing that failure, the district court granted summary judgment in

favor of the defendants and dismissed Clark’s claims with prejudice. We assume

the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case,

and the issues on appeal.

      We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, construing

facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and resolving all

ambiguities and drawing all reasonable inferences against the moving party. See

Kee v. City of New York, 12 F.4th 150, 157–58 (2d Cir. 2021). Summary judgment is

appropriate only when there is no genuine dispute of material fact that would

allow a reasonable jury to rule in favor of the non-moving party. See Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(a); Kee, 12 F.4th at 158. A fact is material if it “might affect the outcome of

the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

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248 (1986).    We construe pro se submissions liberally to raise the strongest

arguments they suggest. See Publicola v. Lomenzo, 54 F.4th 108, 111 (2d Cir. 2022).

      With respect to Clark’s common law negligence claims, the district court

found that Clark failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to causation.

We agree.     Under New York law, Clark was required to prove both general

causation – that the toxin was “capable of causing” her illnesses – and specific

causation – that she was “exposed to sufficient levels of the toxin to cause” her

illnesses. Parker v. Mobil Oil Corp., 7 N.Y.3d 434, 448 (2006). And because toxic

chemical exposure is outside the ken of judges and jurors, Clark was required to

prove both causation elements “using expert testimony.” Nemeth v. Brenntag N.

Am., 38 N.Y.3d 336, 343 (2022).         Put simply, Clark could not “rely on

circumstantial, lay evidence alone to create a genuine issue of material fact as to

whether toxins emitted from [a particular source] caused” her illnesses. Wills v.

Amerada Hess Corp., 379 F.3d 32, 46 (2d Cir. 2004).

      As the district court noted, Clark failed to submit any expert reports. In

lieu of such evidence, Clark offered her own opinions about the cause of her

illnesses. She explained, for instance, that silica and asbestos in her apartment

must have caused her ongoing health issues because she was not sick before she

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moved in. Clark also offered several doctor’s notes attached to her motion for

summary judgment, but those reflected only that she told her doctors that silica

and asbestos caused her illnesses, not the other way around. In addition, Clark

testified at her deposition that two doctors told her it was “possible” that asbestos

or silica had caused her lupus diagnosis.          But those unsupported hearsay

statements are not enough to create a genuine dispute over causation. In sum,

Clark’s failure to come forward with expert evidence to prove causation was fatal

to her negligence claim, and, as such, summary judgment on that claim was

correctly granted in favor of the defendants.

      The same is true for Clark’s fraudulent concealment claim. Though Clark

alleged that NYCHA should have alerted her that the Ardex treatment had left a

hazardous condition – leftover silica – in her apartment, Clark produced no

evidence to show that this hazardous condition in fact existed. She did not, for

example, offer test results indicating the levels of silica in her apartment, much less

expert evidence that those levels would have been harmful. Without such proof,

Clark could not create a genuine dispute of fact and the district court was correct

to dismiss her claim.

      We also reject Clark’s argument that NYCHA admitted her allegations (thus

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alleviating the need for her to submit expert evidence) because it did not file an

answer to her amended complaint. As the district court explained, Clark initially

filed her amended complaint by attaching it to a letter seeking leave to amend,

prompting NYCHA to file an amended answer.              When Clark later filed her

amended complaint as its own docket entry, NYCHA did not refile its amended

answer. Not surprisingly, the district court deemed NYCHA’s previously filed

amended answer to be its responsive pleading.          Though Clark says this was

improper, the district court had discretion to accept NYCHA’s amended answer

as it did. See Com/Tech Commc’n Techs., Inc. v. Wireless Data Sys., Inc., 163 F.3d 149,

151 (2d Cir. 1998) (explaining that district courts have “discretion” to deem

“papers already submitted to be the complaint and answer”); see also Fed. R. Civ.

P. 1 (directing district courts to “construe[]” the Federal Rules, including Rule 8’s

pleading parameters, “to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination

of every action and proceeding”). Indeed, if Clark thought otherwise, she should

have moved for default judgment. She did not, and in any event, such a motion

would have been meritless, since NYCHA was obviously defending itself in the

action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55 (providing that default can be entered only when the

opposing party “has failed to plead or otherwise defend”).

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       Finally, Clark moves to expand the appellate record with documents

reflecting her recent diagnoses of pneumoconiosis and asbestos pleurisy. 1 But

even if these diagnoses were included in the record, our conclusion would remain

the same, because neither contains expert evidence that could establish the

existence of hazardous conditions in her apartment or causation. We therefore

deny those motions.

       We recognize, as the district court did, that Clark’s medical challenges

warrant sympathy.         We do not question the sincerity of her allegations.

However, our judgment must turn on whether Clark has provided sufficient

evidence to permit a reasonable jury to find that NYCHA, NYIES, and JLS are

liable for the injuries she describes. She has not done so.

1 We construe Clark’s motion for judicial notice of a Medicare claim report reflecting
her diagnosis for pneumoconiosis as a motion to supplement the record because it
would not be proper to take judicial notice of a claim report to establish her diagnosis.
See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b) (limiting judicial notice to facts that are “not subject to
reasonable dispute”).
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     We have considered Clark’s remaining arguments and find them to be

without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. All

pending motions are DENIED.

                                   FOR THE COURT:
                                   Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

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