Court Opinion

ID: 9533459
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:31:57.24706+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:29:03.618980
License: Public Domain

MOSK, J.
I concur in the judgment.
I write separately to prevent any misapprehension on the part of the reader as to the meaning of People v. Hendricks (1987) 43 Cal.3d 584 [238 Cal.Rptr. 66, 737 P.2d 1350], and the vitality of People v. Wright (1987) 43 Cal.3d 487 [233 Cal.Rptr. 69, 729 P.2d 260]. Both Hendricks and Wright deal with the requirement of Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238 [23 L.Ed.2d 274, 89 S.Ct. 1709], and In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122 [81 Cal.Rptr. 577, 460 P.2d 449], that, under specified circumstances, a trial court must obtain from a criminal defendant a personal, on-the-record waiver of certain of his rights under the United States Constitution—namely, his privilege against self-incrimination, his right to a jury trial, and his right to confront adverse witnesses. Hendricks expressly holds that those circumstances obtain “only when the defendant agrees to a submission procedure . . . by virtue of which he surrenders one or more of the three specified rights.” (People v. Hendricks, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 592.) It impliedly holds *86that the court must take a waiver only as to the right or rights actually surrendered. To the extent that Wright, which was decided earlier, is to the contrary, it is no longer good law.
Appellant’s petition for a rehearing was denied February 21, 1996, and the opinion was modified to read as printed above. Mosk, J., and Kennard, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.