Court Opinion

ID: 9527716
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:33:19.588912+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:26:04.437249
License: Public Domain

THOMPSON, Presiding Judge,
concurring in part, dissenting in part.
I agree with the majority’s determination of this appeal except as to the conclusion that the amended complaint was pled with the requisite specificity. I am persuaded that a heightened pleading standard such as that adopted in Elliott v. Perez, 751 F.2d 1472 (5th Cir.1985) and applied to actions against government officials as individuals properly balances the interests of citizens with valid complaints of constitutional violations and of public officials who seek to discharge then-duties appropriately. Applying such a standard, I would affirm the trial court’s dismissal of this action in toto.
In Elliott, the Fifth Circuit viewed a confusing complaint alleging, in conelusory fashion, a series of constitutional violations arising out of a bewildering welter of machinations surrounding grand jury investigations into political corruption in Plaquemines County, Louisiana. See “Shenanigans in Plaquemines,” 751 F.2d at 1473. In the face of “blunderbuss phrasing” of alleged constitutional claims, the court concluded that the legitimate interests which .support the assertion of valid immunities of public officials were imperiled, and that the costs in time, money, and deterrence and distraction from execution of public duty occasioned by ill-defined and conelusory allegations of constitutional breach created “An Absolute Need for Trial Courts to Demand Clear Pleading.” 751 P.2d at 1476. While Elliott involved, as defendants, prosecutors and a judge who potentially enjoyed absolute immunity for their actions, the heightened pleading standard also applies to police officers, as to whom immunities may be qualified. 751 F.2d at 1477, nn. 12, 13; Palmer v. City of San Antonio, 810 F.2d 514, 516-17 (5th Cir.1987). The Fifth Circuit drew support for its heightened pleading requirement in § 1983 actions from the practices in numerous other circuits and jurisdictions. Elliott, 751 F.2d at 1479, nn. 19, 20.
The United States Supreme Court has not addressed the propriety of applying a heightened pleading standard to § 1983 actions brought against individuals, although it rejected such a standard regarding actions against municipalities in Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 113 S.Ct. 1160, 122 L.Ed.2d 517 (1993). The Court rejected the Fifth Circuit’s extension of its pleading doctrine to cases against municipal defendants on two bases: that the immunities of municipalities are not diminished by liberal pleading allowances because municipalities, “unlike various government officials,” are not immune from § 1983 actions; and strict pleading requirements do not appear in the federal rules. 507 U.S. at 166-68, 113 S.Ct. at 1162-63. The Court noted that the Leatherman case afforded it “no occasion to consider whether our qualified immunity jurisprudence would require a heightened pleading in cases involving individual government officials.” 507 U.S. at 166-67, 113 S.Ct. at 1162. Notwithstanding that disclaimer, at least one federal district court, in a § 1983 action brought against public officials both individually and in their official capacities, has read Leatherman to broadly preclude application of special pleading requirements to § 1983 cases. Waldron v. Rotzler, 862 F.Supp. 763, 768 (N.D.N.Y.1994).
*542The majority measures the sufficiency of the instant complaint by reference to Hoffman v. Halden, 268 F.2d 280 (9th Cir.1959), a case which does not consider or conspicuously adopt any particular standard of pleading. Indeed, the Fifth Circuit cited a later Ninth Circuit case, Uston v. Airport Casino, Inc., 564 F.2d 1216 (9th Cir.1977) in support of its adoption of specificity requirements for civil rights actions. See Elliott, 751 F.2d at 1479, n. 20. Uston holds that merely “conclusory allegations of ‘conspiracy,’ [where] the record is devoid of specific factual allegations to support the claim” of constitutional violation, does not suffice. 564 F.2d at 1217. Conversely, the earlier case, Hoffman, seems to countenance conclusory allegations as to the existence of a conspiracy (“Hoffman also alleges the ‘defendants conspired.’ In what other way can Plaintiff plead conspiracy?” Hoffman, 268 F.2d at 294). While the Ninth Circuit has provided no clear signal as to the “height” of its standard for pleading civil rights cases, we are not in any event bound by its views on the subject. See Alicia T. v. County of Los Angeles, 222 Cal.App.3d 869, 271 Cal.Rptr. 513, 517 (1990) (California courts not bound by Ninth Circuit decision where federal circuits are in conflict on federal question).
It is clear, as may be gleaned from the excerpts from the amended complaint set forth by the majority, that the complaint does not meet the heightened pleading standard. A civil rights action should be specific in its factual allegations of constitutional violation (“we consistently require the claimant to state specific facts, not merely conclusory allegations,” in § 1983 cases; Colie v. Brazos County, Texas, 981 F.2d 237, 243 n. 27 (5th Cir.1993), quoting Elliott), and, where defenses of immunity are likely, particular factual detail as to the unavailability of such defenses supplied. Colle, 981 F.2d at 246. This complaint does not recite specific facts, but “merely conclusory allegations.” The majority says “the Plaintiffs have alluded to specific acts by the Defendants which allegedly deprived them of their rights.” The only “specific acts” “alluded” to by Plaintiffs are the execution of a search warrant and the consequent seizure of property. Such conduct by police officers and prosecutors is not, in itself, actionable. The allegations of the wrongfulness of Defendants’ conduct are very broad and completely unsupported by any specific factual averments. Further, to “allude” is to “refer casually or indirectly,” to “hint, intimate, suggest.” Random House Dictionary of the English Language, Unabridged, 57 (2d ed.1987). Hints and intimations are not enough.
In his otherwise colorful exposition of the need for specific factual pleading in civil rights cases, Judge Brown wrote:
In view of the purposes of the immunity defense, as declared by the Supreme Court and this Court, we conclude that allowing broadly-worded complaints, such as those of the plaintiffs here, which leaves to traditional pretrial depositions, interrogatories, and requests for admission the development of the real facts underlying the claim, effectively eviscerates important functions and protections of official immunity.
Elliott, 751 F.2d at 1476. I agree.
Respectfully, I dissent from the majority’s reversal of the trial court as to the sufficiency of the action against the individual defendants.