Court Opinion

ID: 9676091
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:14:37.005986+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:14:05.088919
License: Public Domain

FREDERICO G. HINOJOSA, Jr., Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the evidence is insufficient to corroborate the testimony of accomplice witness Martin Flores. See Tex. Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 38.14 (Vernon 1979) (testimony of accomplice witness must be corroborated). The majority holds that the evidence does not directly or circumstantially place appellant where the crime occurred or with Verduzco, and that, while suspicious, the circumstances do not tend to connect appellant to the commission of the offense. I disagree.
Appellant was in Verduzeo’s presence two hours before the killing, and Verduzco told his wife they planned to go drinking. And while we do not know from the independent evidence that appellant and Flores went with Verduzco “to go drinking,” we know that was Verduzco’s plan. There is no evidence that the men deviated from that plan. Indeed, the victim’s blood alcohol level shows that he did “go drinking.”
The circumstantial evidence supports the theory that two persons were involved in shooting Verduzco. We know from the non-accomplice testimony that Flores was involved; Flores’ sandal was found at the scene of the murder. The independent evidence does not place Verduzco with anyone other than appellant and Flores. Inferentially, appellant was the second shooter.
Furthermore, there is some evidence from which it can be inferred that appellant “fled” between the time Verduzco attempted to get money from his wife to go drinking and the following day. This inference arises from the following evidence. Appellant told Cisneros he would return the next day to pick up his trucks. He did not. Appellant did not return the movies he rented the night before. After the incident, appellant’s wife told the police she did not know where he was.
When unexplained, flight has long been deemed indicative of a consciousness of guilt. Cawley v. State, 166 Tex.Crim. 37, 310 S.W.2d 340, 342 (1957). “The wicked flee when no man pursueth.” Id. (citing Proverbs 28:1).
The non-accomplice testimony also shows that appellant drank Lite Beer on the evening before Verduzco was killed. A can of Lite Beer was found by Verduzco’s body. Furthermore, appellant was known to have possessed the type of weapon (pump shotgun) which was used to kill Verduzco.
Appellant’s presence with Verduzco shortly before the killing and appellant’s immediate flight are strong circumstances of guilt. The other factors are consistent with appellant’s guilt and, in combination with flight and likely presence, strengthen the circumstances against appellant. These facts tend to connect appellant to the commission of the offense.
I would hold that the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction. Accordingly, I would overrule appellant’s fourth point of error.
By his third point of error, appellant contends that trial counsel was ineffective for, among other reasons, not requesting an accomplice witness instruction.
We review the effectiveness of counsel by the standard articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) and adopted in Hernandez v. State, 726 S.W.2d 53, 56-57 (Tex.Crim.App.1986). Strickland requires a two-step analysis for ineffective assistance of counsel claims. The reviewing court must first decide whether trial counsel’s performance failed to constitute reasonably effective assistance, or, in other words, whether attorney representation fell below objective standards of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms. If the reviewing court answers this question affirmatively, then it must decide whether there is a reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been different but for counsel’s deficient performance. Vasquez v. State, 830 S.W.2d 948, 949 (Tex.Crim.App.1992). “Reasonable *660probability” is defined as probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2067; Vasquez, 830 S.W.2d at 949.
The first prong of Strickland requires us to determine whether trial counsel’s performance failed to constitute reasonably effective assistance. The failure of counsel to request an accomplice witness instruction when the facts warrant such an instruction constitutes deficient performance. See Ex parte Zepeda, 819 S.W.2d 874, 875-77 (Tex.Crim.App.1991). In the instant case, Flores was an accomplice as a matter of law. Thus, I would hold that appellant’s counsel’s performance failed to constitute reasonably effective assistance when he failed to request an accomplice witness instruction.
The second prong of Strickland requires us to determine whether there is a reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been different but for counsel’s deficient performance. The circumstantial nature of the evidence precludes a conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury, in considering only the non-accomplice testimony, would have convicted appellant. There is a reasonable probability that, if the jury had been correctly charged and had been required to assess the non-accomplice evidence independently, the jury would not have convicted appellant. Accordingly, I would sustain appellant’s third .point of error.
Having found ineffective assistance of counsel, I would reverse the judgment of the trial court. Having found sufficient evidence to support the conviction, I would remand the ease to the trial court for a new trial.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.
CHAVEZ and RODRIGUEZ, JJ., join in the dissent.