Court Opinion

ID: 9776661
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:41:41.823477+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:09:20.479831
License: Public Domain

OPINION
TIJERINA, Justice.
This is an original mandamus proceeding. Relators, Julia Ann Almaraz and Eugene M. Guerrero, seek a writ of mandamus to compel Honorable Eugene C. Williams to vacate his order denying the relators’ petition for writ of habeas corpus for posses*924sion of their daughter Jennifer Leann Al-maraz. The writ is conditionally granted.
Relators Almaraz and Guerrero established a common-law marriage around January 1, 1979. Jennifer, Almaraz’ third child was born on September 8, 1982. In January of 1983 the relators separated. In mid February of 1983, Julia Almaraz allowed Margarita and Salvador Perez to take possession of her daughter, Jennifer. The parties agreed that the Perezes could adopt Jennifer. On March 4, 1983, the Perezes took Almaraz to their attorney for the purpose of having Almaraz execute a voluntary affidavit relinquishing her parental rights in the child. The affidavit stated that the father of the child was unknown. The Perezes filed suit on the same day that the affidavit was signed for termination of parental rights and adoption of the child. Two weeks after she signed the affidavit, Almaraz told Guerrero for the first time that the Perezes had custody of Jennifer.
The procedural facts that lead to this writ of mandamus are as follows:
1. On April 11, 1983, the Perezes obtained a judgment for termination of parental rights and adoption.
2. Almaraz and Guerrero filed an application for writ of habeas corpus on May 6, 1983.
3. The writ was denied at a hearing on May 12, 1983. It was at this hearing that relators learned of the decree obtained by the Perezes on April 11th terminating their parental rights in Jennifer.
4. On May 27, 1983, Almaraz and Guerrero filed suit attacking the Perezes April 11, 1983 decree of termination by seeking a declaratory judgment that the prior order was void on due process grounds and alternatively, requesting a new trial by bill of review on grounds of extrinsic fraud.
5. Contingent on a favorable result on either ground, relators also requested a writ of habeas corpus compelling the child’s immediate return.
6. The Perezes were both personally served with citation on June 1, 1983 and copies of the petition were also sent by certified mail to the Per-ezes' attorney of record^
7. The Perezes failed to file an answer within the prescribed time period and on July 8, 1983, Almaraz and Guerrero were granted a default judgment. The judgment: a) declared the April 11 decree void, b) granted the bill of review, c) granted the writ of habeas corpus, and d) issued a writ of attachment ordering the immediate return of Jennifer to the relators.
8. On the same day, July 8, the writ of attachment was served on the Per-ezes who refused to turn over the child to the deputy sheriff.
9. On July 20,1983, the Perezes moved for a new trial that was orally granted in part by the court on July 21. However, no order granting the new trial was ever reduced to writing and signed by the trial judge. The Perezes’ motion for new trial was therefore overruled by operation of law on September 27, 1983. TEX.R.CIV.P. 329b(e).1
10. Before the expiration of the motion for new trial, and under the mistaken belief that a new trial had been granted, the Perezes consolidated their earlier suit for termination and adoption with relators’ bill of review, and filed amended pleadings. Almaraz and Guerrero obtained visitation rights under a court order allowing them to take possession of Jennifer for four days and nights every other week, so long as the cause remained pending.
11. On September 16, 1983, trial by jury was re-set by agreement for October 26, 1983.
*92512. On October 24, 1983, relators filed a motion to dismiss and renewed their application for writ of habeas corpus on the grounds that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to alter the judgment signed on July 8, 1983.
13. On October 26, 1983, after relators’ motion to dismiss was granted, the Perezes filed a completely new suit for involuntary termination and adoption and obtained ex 'parte restraining orders against the rela-tors, while setting a hearing on the request for temporary injunctive relief for October 28th.
14. At the October 28,1983 hearing, the Honorable Eugene C. Williams, Respondent, agreed to hear both the writ of habeas corpus and the temporary orders together.
15. Following a two day hearing, Judge Williams denied the Almaraz and Guerrero application for writ of ha-beas corpus based on the finding that “it is in the best interest of the child” that Jennifer remain in the custody of the Perezes. The order was signed November 7, 1983.
Almaraz and Guerrero contend that the judge breached his statutory duty by (1) denying their application for writ of habeas corpus because they had a clear right to exclusive possession of the child under a prior court order (2) failing to disregard the allegedly pending suit affecting the parent-child relationship, in direct contradiction to § 14.10,2 and (3) by entering temporary orders restricting relators’ access to and possession of the child. We agree.
Relators sought an application for writ of habeas corpus for the return of their daughter Jennifer, under two alternative theories of § 14.10 of the Family Code. These provisions are:
§ 14.10 Habeas Corpus
(a) If the right to possession of a child is presently governed by a court order, the court in a habeas corpus proceeding involving the right to possession of the child shall compel return of the child to the relator if and only if it finds that the relator is presently entitled to possession by virtue of the court order.
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(e) If the right to possession of a child is not governed by a court order, the court in a habeas corpus proceeding involving the right of possession of the child shall compel return of the child to the relator if, and only if, it finds that the relator has a superior right to possession of the child by virtue of the rights, privileges, duties, and powers of a parent as set forth in Section 12.04 of this Code.
Both of these subsections require the judge to grant a writ of habeas corpus once rela-tors have demonstrated their bare legal right to possession of the child. Greene v. Schuble, 654 S.W.2d 436, 438 (Tex.1983). The issuance of the writ should be automatic, immediate, and ministerial. Armstrong v. Reiter, 628 S.W.2d 439, 440 (Tex.1982). The judgment signed on July 8, 1983, granted Almaraz and Guerrero a writ of habeas corpus and a writ of attachment for Jennifer based on a necessary finding that both relators are the natural parents of the child. Based on the default judgment, the writ of habeas corpus ordering the return of the child is a prior court order governing the right to possession of the child. Whatley v. Bacon, 649 S.W.2d 297, 300 (Tex.1983).
The Legislature has provided that obedience to existing court orders shall be compelled by habeas corpus proceedings. Saucier v. Pena, 559 S.W.2d 654, 656 (Tex.1977); Standley v. Stewart, 539 S.W.2d 882, 883 (Tex.1976). The general rule is that upon proof of the prior order and absent dire emergency, the writ should be granted. McElreath v. Stewart, 545 S.W.2d 955, 958 (Tex.1977). The right to possession may not be relitigated in the habeas corpus hearing; the relators are entitled to an issuance of the writ immediately on a showing of their right to custody. Strobel v. Thurman, 565 S.W.2d 238, *926239 (Tex.1978). Further, mandamus is a proper remedy to compel enforcement of the relators’ right to possession. Lamphere v. Chrisman, 554 S.W.2d 935, 937 (Tex.1977); Saucier, supra.
The Perezes contend that the order of Judge Williams is nevertheless sustainable under Subsection (c) of § 14.10 which reads:
(c) The court may issue any appropriate temporary order if there is a serious immediate question concerning the welfare of the child.
But it is apparent from the face of the order that the judge did not invoke this subsection. His order does not purport to rest upon, and there is no finding with respect to, a serious immediate question concerning the welfare of the child. It recites only “that it is in the best interest of the child, JENNIFER LEANN ALMAR-AZ, that she remain in the custody and control of the Respondents, SALVADOR P. PEREZ and MARGARITA A. PEREZ,” for which reason the relators’ application for writ of habeas corpus was denied. Saucier, supra.3
It is assumed that Judge Williams will vacate his order denying-relators’ petition for habeas corpus and that he will issue the requested writ. A writ of mandamus will issue only if he declines to do so.

. Attorney Victor O. Enriquez was not counsel for the Perezes at the earlier proceedings. His representation was limited to this appeal and the new suit for termination.

. All statutory references are to TEX.FAM. CODE ANN. unless otherwise indicated.

. The dissent fails to recognize the Supreme Court holding in Saucier v. Pena, 559 S.W.2d 654 (Tex.1977).