Court Opinion

ID: 9483496
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 09:22:09.802232+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:49:39.430479
License: Public Domain

BRIGHT, Senior Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I dissent because this court’s failure to discuss, let alone decide, this case within the context and parameters of the appropriate review standard, in my opinion, leads to an erroneous decision.
The majority appears, although never so states, to review this case de novo. Our jurisdictional scheme, however, denies us the opportunity to take a fresh, new look at the record. Rather, we are compelled to affirm the Board’s decision if it is “substantially supported by the evidence and reasonably based in law.” WCCO Radio, Inc. v. NLRB, 844 F.2d 511, 514 (8th Cir.1988) (citing Bauer Welding & Metal Fabricators, Inc. v. NLRB, 758 F.2d 308, 309 (8th Cir.1985) and NLRB v. Vincent Brass & Aluminum Co., 731 F.2d 564, 566 (8th Cir.1984)).1 We must apply this standard even though we might hold otherwise if we were empowered to review the matter de novo. See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488, 71 S.Ct. 456, 464, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1951); Hall v. NLRB, 941 F.2d 684, 687 (8th Cir.1991); Roseville *1171Dodge, Inc. v. NLRB, 882 F.2d 1355, 1358 (8th Cir.1989).
The narrow issue is whether the Board’s decision that Parsons violated § 8(a)(1) and (5) of the NLRA by refusing to provide the Union with information about Von Ruden is “substantially supported by the evidence and reasonably based in law.” In my opinion it is.
An employer under a collective-bargaining agreement has an obligation to furnish an employees’ bargaining representative with the information it requires to administer and police its agreement. NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432, 435-36, 87 S.Ct. 565, 567-68, 17 L.Ed.2d 495 (1967); Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 603 F.2d 1310, 1315 (8th Cir.1979). This duty includes requests for information pertaining to grievance proceedings. WCCO Radio, Inc. v. NLRB, 844 F.2d 511, 514-15 (8th Cir.1988). An employer’s refusal to supply this information constitutes a violation of § 8(a)(1) and (5) of the NLRA. Id.
The test for determining when and under what circumstances an employer must furnish information turns on a question of relevancy. The information requested must have some relevance to a “legitimate union bargaining need.” WCCO Radio, 844 F.2d at 514 (quoting Emeryville Research Center, Shell Dev. Co. v. NLRB, 441 F.2d 880, 883 (9th Cir.1971)). This relevancy test resembles the liberal “discovery-type standard.” NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432, 437, 87 S.Ct. 565, 568, 17 L.Ed.2d 495 (1967).2
In making a determination of relevancy, the Board does not resolve the ultimate merits of the issue for which the information is sought. NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. at 437-39, 87 S.Ct. at 568-69. Rather, the Board determines only whether there is a “probability” the information is relevant and would be helpful to the Union in satisfying its duties and responsibilities under the NLRA. Id. at 437, 87 S.Ct. at 568.
The Union asserts, and I agree, that the Board properly found that the information the Union seeks is relevant to its grievance processing function, as well as to its general responsibility for administering the hiring hall under the collective-bargaining agreement.
Prior to requesting the information, the Union filed a grievance alleging Parsons had rejected Von Ruden because of his activities as a union steward five years earlier when employed by Parsons. The information is relevant because it goes to the question of whether Parsons, in violation of Section 3.18(a)3 of the collective-bargaining agreement, discriminated against Von Ruden because of his former steward position.
The majority narrowly construes Section 3.18(a) of the agreement. Assuming the majority is correct — that the provision only protects current stewards, an assumption inapposite to both the Board’s interpretation and, I suggest, common sense — the information is certainly relevant in determining whether, in a broader sense, Parsons discriminated against Von Ruden because of his union membership, in contravention of Section 4.014 of the agreement *1172and Section 8(a)(3)5 of the NLRA. This argument is particularly tenable in light of Parsons’ claim, made prior to the Union’s request for the information, that Parsons rejected him because of unspecified “past problems.” 6
As set forth in the record, the information sought is also relevant to the Union’s administration of its hiring hall. Knowing the reasons for Parsons’ rejection of a member enables the Union to identify for that member the areas in which further skill improvement is required. This information may also help correct errors employers may make in their selection processes.
Finally, the majority places great import on Section 4.03 of the collective-bargaining agreement, which provides “[t]he Employer shall have the right to reject any applicant for employment.” The majority seems to suggest that Parsons may invoke this provision any time it wishes to avoid furnishing the Union with information concerning why it rejected someone sent from the Union Hall. Such a position is unfounded, as it exempts Parsons from complying with discrimination proscriptions set forth in the collective-bargaining agreement, the NLRA and all other state and federal anti-discrimination laws.7
Of equal concern are the dire policy consequences flowing from such unfettered authority. Under this scheme, the employer, in effect, assumes plenary police and enforcement authority over the Union’s rights pertaining to the placement of its members. Such a position not only undermines both the spirit and policy bases on which so much of our modern federal labor law is premised, but portends deeper incursions into union sovereignty.
In my opinion, the Board’s decision is reasonably based in law, and substantially supported by both the weight of the evidence presented at trial and public policy concerns. WCCO Radio, Inc. v. NLRB, 844 F.2d 511, 514 (8th Cir.1988). Accordingly, I would affirm the Board’s decision and enforce its order.

. Accord Schnuck Markets, Inc. v. NLRB, 961 F.2d 700, 703-04 (8th Cir.1992); Inter-Collegiate Press, Graphic Arts Div. v. NLRB, 486 F.2d 837, 840 (8th Cir.1973).

. See also Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 603 F.2d 1310, 1315 (8th Cir.1979) (“a broad range of potentially useful information should be allowed to the union for the purpose of effectuating the bargaining process [whether information is relevant], unless [the information] is clearly irrelevant”).

. Section 3.18(a) provides, in part: "No Steward shall be discriminated against by any Employer because of his faithful performance of duties as Steward.”

. Section 4.01 of the agreement provides that,
[i]n the interest of maintaining an efficient system of production in the industry, providing for an orderly procedure of referral of applicants for employment, preserving the legitimate interests of the employees in their employment status within the area and of eliminating discrimination in employment because of membership or non-membership in the Union, the parties hereto agree to the following system of referral of applicants for employment. (Emphasis added).
Parsons argues this section, like Section 4.04, applies only to the Union's discrimination of its members. Although .this seems true as to Section 4.04, it is not true of Section 4.01.

. Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA provides, in relevant part: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer ... by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment ... to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization....” 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1988) (emphasis added).

. The Board need not prove the information resolves the grievance, the complaint is sound, or the relief sought is supported by the facts. NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432, 437, 87 S.Ct. 565, 568, 17 L.Ed.2d 495 (1967).

.The record indicates Parsons recognized as much when, in resolving another grievance, it conceded "age discrimination is a violation of both federal law and the collective bargaining agreement.” General Counsel's Ex. 7.