Court Opinion

ID: 9746570
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 14:27:27.177343+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:14.801408
License: Public Domain

OPINION OF THE COURT

FLAHERTY, Chief Justice.
We granted allocatur in this case solely to resolve an issue of first impression whether filing pretrial motions tolls the statutory time limitations of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD), 42 Pa.C.S. § 9101 et seq.
On December 23, 1994, the Lackawanna County district attorney, pursuant to the IAD, filed a request for temporary custody of appellant who was then serving a 168 month sentence in the U.S. penitentiary at Lewisburg, Pennsylvania for a conviction on federal drug charges. The district attorney sought to try appellant on a charge of first degree murder as an accomplice, as well as other charges, in relation to a contract killing. Appellant was transferred from federal pris*123on to state custody on February 4, 1994, and a preliminary hearing was held that day. Appellant was held for trial on all charges.
On February 17, 1994, the Commonwealth filed a motion to consolidate appellant’s case with that of the principal in the murder. A hearing on the motion was scheduled for March 24, 1994, and then continued without objection until April 28, 1994. On March 17, 1994, appellant filed an omnibus pretrial motion that included motions to quash the information, to suppress statements, and to appoint an investigator. The Commonwealth answered appellant’s motion on March 21, 1994.
In early July, appellant wrote two letters to the trial court, one stating that he was ready for trial and the other advising the court of the applicability of the IAD. On September 1, 1994, appellant filed a motion to dismiss the charges for violation of the IAD. On July 27 and September 22, the court entered orders finding appellant unable to stand trial as the motion to quash was still outstanding. On October 14, 1994, the motion to consolidate was granted and the omnibus motion was denied. Trial was scheduled for November 17, 1994.
Trial was subsequently rescheduled for January 4,1995, and after a hearing, the motion to dismiss was denied on December 20, 1994. Jury selection began on January 4, 1995, at which time appellant waived his right to a jury trial. Appellant’s trial was separated from that of the principal who did not waive his right to a jury trial. A bench trial commenced on January 6, 1995. Appellant was convicted of first degree murder and criminal conspiracy and sentenced to life imprisonment plus five to ten years. The judgment was affirmed by the superior court. Appellant has since been returned to federal custody and now argues that the courts below erred by concluding that the filing of pretrial motions rendered him unable to stand trial, thereby tolling the time limitations of the IAD. We disagree.
The IAD is an agreement between forty-eight states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and *124the United States, that establishes procedures for the transfer of prisoners incarcerated in one jurisdiction to the temporary custody of another jurisdiction which has lodged a detainer against a prisoner. Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716, 105 S.Ct. 3401, 87 L.Ed.2d 516 (1985). Unlike a request for extradition, which is a request that the state in which the prisoner is incarcerated transfer custody to the requesting state, a detainer is merely a means of informing the custodial jurisdiction that there are outstanding charges pending in another jurisdiction and a request to hold the prisoner for the requesting state or notify the requesting state of the prisoner’s imminent release. Id. The IAD is remedial legislation intended to curb previous abuses and alleviate problems associated with prisoners’ uncertainty resulting from unresolved charges pending in another jurisdiction.1 United States v. Scheer, 729 F.2d 164 (2d Cir.1984). Accordingly, the stated purpose of the IAD is to “encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition of such charges and determination of the proper status of any and all detainers based on untried indictments, informations or complaints.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9101, Article I.
When a detainer is lodged, the sending jurisdiction2 must so inform the prisoner; the prisoner may then request that the *125outstanding charges be expeditiously resolved. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9101, Article III. Upon receipt of this request, the receiving jurisdiction has 180 days to bring the prisoner to trial.3 Id. If the prisoner does not request the expeditious resolution of charges or challenges extradition, the receiving jurisdiction has 120 days to bring him to trial upon gaining custody of the prisoner. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9101, Article IV. The act also provides that the court may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance for good cause shown in open court with the prisoner or his counsel present, and that the statute is tolled “whenever and for as long as the prisoner is unable to stand trial, as determined by the court.... ” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9101, Articles IV and VI. Appellant argues that a continuance was not properly granted and that the phrase “unable to stand trial” refers only to mental or physical inability and not legal inability.
Although this is an issue of first impression in Pennsylvania, several federal jurisdictions have considered this matter with conflicting results. Some courts have strictly construed the provisions of the IAD and applied it in a prophylactic manner in favor of the defendant. See e.g., Birdwell v. Skeen, 983 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir.1993), and Stroble v. Anderson, 587 F.2d 830 (6th Cir.1978), cert. denied 440 U.S. 940, 99 S.Ct. 1289, 59 L.Ed.2d 499 (1979). However, many courts have reached the opposite conclusion and applied the IAD in a less severe manner. See e.g., United States v. Neal, 36 F.3d 1190 (1st Cir.1994); United States v. Johnson, 953 F.2d 1167 (9th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 879, 113 S.Ct. 226, 121 L.Ed.2d 163 (1992); United States v. Dawn, 900 F.2d 1132, (7th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 949, 111 S.Ct. 368, 112 L.Ed.2d 330 (1990); United States v. Scheer, supra; and United States v. Hines, 717 F.2d 1481 (4th Cir.1983), cert. *126denied, 467 U.S. 1214, 1219, 104 S.Ct. 2656, 2668, 81 L.Ed.2d 363, 373 (1984). These courts have interpreted the IAD to allow for tolling of the time limitations for delays occasioned by the defendant such as the time it takes for disposition of motions filed by the defendant. Neal, 36 F.3d at 1210; Dawn, 900 F.2d at 1136; Scheer, 729 F.2d at 168; Hines, 717 F.2d at 1486 (additionally holding that delay excludable under the speedy trial act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 et seq., was excludable under the IAD); and Johnson, 953 F.2d at 1172 (also holding that delay excludable under the speedy trial act was excludable under the IAD).
Although this court has not previously addressed tolling requirements in relation to the IAD, we find persuasive the analysis and interpretation of the courts that held that delay occasioned by the defendant is excludable, particularly in light of recent application of speedy trial provisions to IAD cases by Pennsylvania courts. See e.g., Commonwealth v. Woods, 444 Pa.Super. 321, 663 A.2d 803 (Pa.Super.1995)(applying speedy trial provisions to the IAD in holding that defendant’s continued presence in federal custody constitutes an inability to stand trial, thereby tolling the statute). Cf. Commonwealth v. Riffert, 379 Pa.Super. 1, 549 A.2d 566 (Pa.Super.1988), alloc. denied, 522 Pa. 602, 562 A.2d 825 (Pa.1989)(holding that the speedy trial provision is tolled when a defendant’s pretrial motion is pending). The Woods court determined that the IAD is consistent with the speedy trial provisions of Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100. Woods, 663 A.2d at 806.
Additionally, this court has explicitly held that the IAD may be tolled by the defendant’s own actions. Commonwealth v. Washington, 488 Pa. 133, 411 A.2d 490 (Pa.1979). In Washington, this court found no violation of the IAD where, in addition to consenting to a continuance of his trial, the defendant also delayed the start of his trial by filing a motion to dismiss one day before his trial was to begin. Id. at 491. Although the court in Washington disposed of the defendant’s motion one day later, unlike the present case in which the court took months to dispose of appellant’s motions, such a distinction is not grounds for dismissal of the charges. We *127accept the superior court’s reliance on United States v. Taylor, 861 F.2d 316 (1st Cir.1988), for the premise that inquiry into the reasonableness of the time required to dispose of the appellant’s motion is an inappropriate matter for review. The court held that it would be “imprudent and impractical” to scrutinize every motion in order to determine whether it could have been disposed of more expeditiously. Commonwealth v. Montione, 449 Pa.Super. 239, 673 A.2d 923 (1996).
In the present case, appellant filed an omnibus pretrial motion including a motion to quash the information, as well as a motion to dismiss. The trial could not commence until these motions were resolved. By filing these motions, appellant implicitly consented to allow the court the requisite amount of time in order to dispose of them.
The judgment is affirmed.
NIGRO, J., files a concurring opinion in which CASTILLE, J., joins.

. Prior to the IAD, the lodging of a detainer against a prisoner may have had many prejudicial effects. For example, efforts at rehabilitation are thwarted due to the anxiety and apprehension a prisoner experiences when faced with outstanding charges in another jurisdiction. United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 98 S.Ct. 1834, 56 L.Ed.2d 329 (1978). Furthermore, the prisoner is often considered a higher risk of escape and is ineligible for more desirable work assignments or parole. Id. Additionally, the very informality of detainer proceedings, which did not carry with them the procedural protections of extradition proceedings, left them open for abuse. Id. For example, detainers "may be filed groundlessly, or even in bad faith,” resulting in prejudices such as those described herein. Id. at 358 n. 25, 98 S.Ct. at 1846 n. 25, 56 L.Ed.2d at 345 n. 25. One final concern is that sentencing courts may be reluctant to impose as long a sentence as might otherwise be appropriate since the prisoner would be facing additional prison time upon completion of his sentence. Id. at 360, 98 S.Ct. at 1847, 56 L.Ed.2d at 346-47.

. For purposes of the IAD, the sending jurisdiction is the jurisdiction where the prisoner is incarcerated when he requests disposition of the *125charges or when a request for custody is made. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9101, Article II. The receiving jurisdiction is the jurisdiction where the prisoner will be tried on the pending charges upon which the detainer is based. Id.

. The prisoner is deemed to have waived extradition upon making a request for expeditious disposition of pending charges. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9101, Article III. The IAD provides procedures for the subsequent transfer of custody. 42 Pa.C.S § 9101, Article V.