Court Opinion

ID: 9627121
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:35:01.797197+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:39.939677
License: Public Domain

PAUL KELLY, JR., Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
Afton Callahan was arrested by the Central Utah Narcotics Task Force (the “Task Force”) for distribution and possession of methamphetamine following a warrantless entry into his residence. The warrantless entry occurred after a confidential informant consensually entered Mr. Callahan’s residence, purchased methamphetamine using funds provided by the Task Force, and gave what appeared to the officers to be a pre-arranged signal indicating that the drug deal had come to fruition. After successfully challenging the legality of the warrantless entry in Utah courts, see State v. Callahan, 93 P.3d 103 (Utah Ct.App.2004), Mr. Callahan brought a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against individual members of the Task Force, the Task Force itself, and several counties in Utah (collective!y “Defendants”).
On summary judgment, the district court granted Defendants qualified immunity. Today, the court reverses, holding *900that (1) the “consent once removed” doctrine does not justify officers’ warrantless entry into a residence, at least where the individual gaining initial, consensual entry is a confidential informant, and (2) the law was clearly established that law enforcement may not enter a residence without a warrant in order to assist a confidential informant — present in the home consensually and possessing probable cause — in effectuating an arrest. Because these holdings unnecessarily part company with at least two (and arguably three) of our sister circuits and are contrary to longstanding Fourth Amendment and qualified immunity principles, I respectfully dissent.
In order to overcome a qualified immunity defense, a plaintiff asserting a cause of action under § 1983 must demonstrate that (1) the defendant’s actions violated a federal constitutional or statutory right, and (2) the right alleged to have been violated was clearly established at the time of the conduct at issue.1 Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001).
At the highest level of abstraction, the right at issue is the Fourth Amendment “right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. Amend. IV. The Supreme Court has interpreted the Fourth Amendment to require government agents to obtain a warrant before entering a residence for purposes of search or arrest. See Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984). The warrant requirement, however, is nowhere near absolute; there are exceptions, though they are “few in number and carefully delineated.” United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 318, 92 S.Ct. 2125, 32 L.Ed.2d 752 (1972). “[0]ne of the specifically established exceptions to the requirements of both a warrant and probable cause is a search that is conducted pursuant to consent” freely and voluntarily given. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). This exception results from the recognition that the primary purpose of the Fourth Amendment — “protection of the privacy of the individual, his right to be let alone,” Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) — is forfeited when a homeowner freely allows government agents inside.
Thus, it is abundantly clear that had one or more members of the Task Force gained consent to enter Mr. Callahan’s home, there would be no Fourth Amendment violation. See United States v. Cruz-Mendez, 467 F.3d 1260, 1265-66 (10th Cir.2006). As the court notes, the same would be true had the Task Force members gained consent under the guise of being plain-clothed citizens looking to purchase methamphetamine. See Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 211, 87 S.Ct. 424, 17 L.Ed.2d 312 (1966). Analogously, the confidential informant’s consensual entry was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment, despite the fact that Mr. Cal*901lahan had no idea he was acting as a government agent at the time. See United States v. Lowe, 999 F.2d 448, 450-51 (10th Cir.1993).
What was unclear in this circuit, at least until today, was whether Mr. Callahan’s consent to the confidential informant coupled with the subsequent drug transaction so eroded his legitimate expectation of privacy that officers could enter his residence without a warrant in order to effectuate his arrest. The court answers that question in the negative, invalidating the consent once removed doctrine where confidential informants, rather than full-fledged officers, are involved. I, however, would draw the line elsewhere.
Under the doctrine of consent once removed, law enforcement officials may enter a residence without a warrant if the following conditions are met:
The undercover agent or informant: 1) entered at the express invitation of someone with authority to consent; 2) at that point established the existence of probable cause to effectuate an arrest or search; and 3) immediately summoned help from other officers.
United States v. Pollard, 215 F.3d 643, 648 (6th Cir.2000) (quoting United States v. Akinsanya, 53 F.3d 852, 856 (7th Cir.1995)). The name “consent once removed” is somewhat of a misnomer, however, because the doctrine depends on more than consent alone. See United States v. Yoon, 398 F.3d 802, 809-10 (6th Cir.2005) (concurring op.). Rather, the doctrine requires both a valid consensual entry— which alleviates the warrant requirement — and a concomitant destruction of the homeowner’s legitimate expectation of privacy — which allows officers to enter. Id.; see also United States v. Paul, 808 F.2d 645, 648 (7th Cir.1986) (“[T]he interest in the privacy of the home ... has been fatally compromised when the owner admits a confidential informant and proudly displays contraband to him.”). When one gives consent for another individual to enter his home in order to buy or sell narcotics, he not only assumes the risk that the person is an undercover government agent, but also that the individual will later testify to his observations, that he will attempt to effectuate an arrest on-the-spot, or that he will take some of the contraband and hand it over to the police. Paul, 808 F.2d at 648. Given the assumption of these risks, the marginal risk that an individual will instead invite law enforcement officials to assist in an on-the-spot arrest “is too slight to bring the requirement of obtaining a warrant into play.”2 Id.; see also United States v. Rubio, 727 F.2d 786, 797 (9th Cir.1983).
The crucial question, then, is whether a homeowner’s legitimate expectation of privacy is any greater when he allows a confidential informant into his home rather than a full-fledged officer. The court answers that question with a resounding “yes,” but I fail to see the difference in the two situations. The court draws the line at police officers because “the person with authority to consent never consented to the entry of police into the house” when only a confidential informant is admitted and “the power to arrest does not grant the citizen all of the powers and obligations of the police as agents of the state.” Ct. Op. at 897.
*902While it is technically correct that Mr. Callahan never consented to the entry of police, no one ever consents to the entry of police in these undercover situations; they instead consent to the entry of someone who might be the police (an undercover officer), or as in this case, someone who might be a government agent (a confidential informant). So long as an invitation to enter is extended to a government agent (even unknowingly), the pertinent issue is not the type of government agent allowed in, but the consequence of that invitation, combined with the subsequent sale of narcotics, on a resident’s reasonable expectation of privacy. And the only principled resolution of that issue is to hold that, no matter what type of government agent is allowed in, any previously existent legitimate expectation of privacy is abandoned.
I am similarly unconvinced by the court’s reliance on the distinction between those powers possessed by police officers and those possessed by other citizens. The confidential informant in this case was doubtless a government agent for Fourth Amendment purposes. “In deciding whether a private person has become an ... agent of the government, two important inquiries are: 1) whether the government knew of and acquiesced in the intrusive conduct, and 2) whether the party performing the search intended to assist law enforcement efforts or to further his own ends.” Pleasant v. Lovell, 876 F.2d 787, 797 (10th Cir.1989). In this case — as is the same in nearly all cases involving undercover stings utilizing confidential informants — law enforcement knew of the confidential informant’s intrusive actions beforehand, and those actions were undertaken with the purpose of assisting the police.
There is also no denying that citizens (including confidential informants) in Utah, and nearly every other state, possess the power to arrest another individual who commits a felony in their presence. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-3 (2003). To be sure, the ordinary citizen does not possess all the powers and obligations attendant to being a police officer. But once that citizen becomes a government agent and embarks on a joint venture with the police, as the confidential informant in this case did, both he and the officers for whom he works face civil liability for any of his actions later deemed unconstitutional. See Pleasant, 876 F.2d at 798-99. Police have no greater obligation than to respect citizens’ constitutional rights, but that obligation carries over to the confidential informant once he agrees to work closely with the government and is imbued with state action. This fact distinguishes confidential informants from other citizens and, combined with the citizens’ arrest power, renders application of the consent once removed doctrine to them abundantly reasonable.
Finally, the line the court draws creates odd results. Although police officers themselves may enter a residence to assist a fellow officer in effectuating an arrest, other government agents — such as agents of the Internal Revenue Service — might not have the same capacity. I fear future cases will turn on how closely the “powers and obligations” of the government agent in question resemble those of the classic police officer, rather than on Fourth Amendment reasonableness, see Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 183-85, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990).3
*903Because I see no principled distinction between police officers and other government agents, including confidential informants, in regard to a resident’s legitimate expectation of privacy following consensual entry, I would join the Sixth and Seventh Circuits in clearly extending the consent once removed doctrine to confidential informants. Thus, I would hold that no constitutional violation occurred in this ease and that qualified immunity was properly granted.
Although the extension of the consent once removed doctrine to confidential informants is an issue on which reasonable minds might differ, there is no doubt that the right at issue was not clearly established at the time the Task Force acted. “[T]he affirmative defense of qualified immunity ... protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Medina v. Cram, 252 F.3d 1124, 1127 (10th Cir.2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). To be clearly established, the contours of a right “must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Hope v. Pelzer, 586 U.S. 730, 739, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002). Moreover, the clearly established law inquiry is an objective one, see Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987), and “must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151. A right is “clearly established” if Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit case law exists on point or if the “clearly established weight of authority from other circuits” found a constitutional violation from similar actions. Murrell v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 186 F.3d 1238, 1251 (10th Cir.1999).
Properly characterized, the right at issue in this case is not simply the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Instead, it is the right to be free from the warrantless entry of police officers into one’s home to effectuate an arrest after one has granted voluntary, consensual entry to a confidential informant and undertaken criminal activity giving rise to probable cause. As the district court observed, no Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision has ever granted or even discussed that right. The court is no more successful in identifying such a decision. Instead, it relies upon cases holding that a warrantless search of a home is per se unreasonable unless officers gain consent or exigent circumstances exist.4 See Ct. Op. at 897-99 (citing Katz, Wilson, Groh, Franz, and Falcon). The court’s approach is flawed, however, because it characterizes the right in overly broad terms and begs the question — what is the effect on a resident’s legitimate expectation of privacy where the consent exception to the warrant requirement applies? Because neither the Supreme Court nor the Tenth Circuit has previously addressed this issue in the context of a warrantless *904entry of officers where a confidential informant is involved, we must look to other circuits for guidance.
Prior to the events giving rise to this litigation, three circuits had issued opinions which could have led a reasonable officer to believe that a warrantless entry was legal in this case. First, the Seventh Circuit, in 1986, clearly held that the consent once removed doctrine applies equally where confidential informants are involved, relying on a reduced expectation of privacy. See Paul, 808 F.2d at 648. Second, the Sixth Circuit, in 2000, applied the consent once removed doctrine in a situation in which both an officer and a confidential informant were granted consent to enter and “the informant accompanying the officer immediately summoned the other officers for assistance.” Pollard, 215 F.3d at 648-49 (emphasis added). Importantly, the Sixth Circuit stated that the consent once removed doctrine applies where “[t]he undercover agent or informant” consensually enters a residence, establishes probable cause, and immediately summons help. See id. at 648 (emphasis added). Finally, the Ninth Circuit, in 1996, explained that the consent once removed doctrine applies where “undercover agent[s]” are involved, see United States v. Bramble, 103 F.3d 1475, 1478 (9th Cir.1996); and a reasonable officer could have believed the term “undercover agent[s]” includes confidential informants acting as government agents.
In sum, because neither the Supreme Court nor the Tenth Circuit has heretofore addressed the propriety of the consent once removed doctrine as applied to confidential informants, and the clear weight of authority from other circuits strongly suggested that the Task Force’s actions in this case were legal, I would hold that the right at issue was not clearly established and would affirm the grant of qualified immunity.

. Despite heated debate among the Justices on the matter, the Supreme Court has explained that the lower federal courts are obliged to consider the qualified immunity questions in turn and may not skip the first step — whether a constitutional or statutory right was violated — simply because the case can be disposed of on the second. See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151. The district court below clearly violated this corn-mand when it assumed a constitutional violation and nonetheless held in Defendants’ favor on the second Saucier step. Disregarding the district court's failure, the majority faithfully fulfills its obligation "to set forth principles which will become the basis for a holding that a right is clearly established," id.-, unfortunately, it arrives at an erroneous conclusion.

. The court misconceives the conceptual underpinnings of the consent once removed doctrine, suggesting the doctrine is premised upon the existence of two consents — one from the homeowner to the confidential informant and one from the confidential informant to the police. Viewed in that light, however, the doctrine could not operate as to either confidential informants or police officers. Police officers have just as little authority to subsequently admit other officers into a home as confidential informants do.

. Despite the district court's suggestion to the contrary, the Supreme Court's recent decision in Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 126 S.Ct. 1515, 164 L.Ed.2d 208 (2006), does not affect the viability of the consent once removed doctrine. In that case, the Court held that police may not reasonably enter premises under dual control when one occupant is *903physically present and refuses admittance. Id. at 1519. Beyond the fact that Randolph may have slightly altered the circumstances under which a confidential informant or undercover officer may enter and remain in a residence under the first prong of the consent once removed doctrine, it is inapposite because it does not address whether, once valid consent is granted to a government agent and probable cause of criminal activity is established, a search is rendered unreasonable if additional officers enter a residence to help effectuate an arrest.

. United States v. Falcon, 766 F.2d 1469 (10th Cir.1985), relied upon by the court, discusses what is required for one to possess the power to grant consent, not the consequences of a proper grant of consent on a homeowner’s legitimate expectation of privacy. See id. at 1474.