Court Opinion

ID: 9439169
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 06:24:00.036803+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:26:12.105577
License: Public Domain

CUDAHY, Senior Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
Terminating the office of an independent counsel when his work is completed is one of the most important obligations with which this court is charged. -An endless investigation, which the passivity of the majority invites, can serve no possible goal of justice and imposes needless burdens on the taxpayers. The approach advocated by the majority renders the termination provisions of the Independent Counsel Act, 28 U.S.C. § 596(b)(2), a dead letter. The language in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 695, 108 S.Ct. 2597, 101 L.Ed.2d 569 (1988), on which the majority relies may preclude this Division from attempting to “supervise or control” the manner in which an independent counsel carries out his duties. There is certainly no indication, however, that the Supreme Court intended *654to nullify the termination provisions of the statute.
I do seem to agree with the majority on certain preliminary questions. First, this Division must make a termination decision. Second, this decision must be based on some information. Third, the Division can request this information from an independent counsel. On the questions of how much information, what kind of information and what sort of decision the available information dictates, I emphatically disagree. The approach advocated by the majority here is in stark contrast to the aggressive performance of this Division in In re North (Walsh Show Cause Order), 10 F.3d 831 (D.C.Cir., Spec. Div., 1993).
The Independent Counsel statute provides that the Division “shall” make a determination, even if on its “own motion.” 28 U.S.C. § 596(b)(2). We need not wait for some other party to suggest that the Division exercise its powers of termination (as ex-President Reagan did in In re North). The statute also directs that our termination decision be based on specific information: whether an independent counsel’s investigations are “completed or so substantially completed that it would be appropriate for the Department of Justice to complete such investigations.... ” 28 U.S.C. § 596(b)(2). We further know that the Division can, without breaching any constitutional walls that separate powers, request that an independent counsel provide information regarding the status of his investigations so that the Division may determine whether the statutory “conditions for termination [have] been met.” In re North, 10 F.3d at 832. In fact, in the North case, the Division’s informational requests of Independent Counsel Lawrence Walsh took the emphatic form of an Order to Show Cause why his investigation should not be terminated. See id.
I have sought to have this Division request specific information from the Independent Counsel about further investigative activity that he could usefully undertake and which could not now properly be turned over to the Department of Justice. My efforts along these lines have been rebuffed. The only word which is available to me of the Independent Counsel’s possible investigative prospects are very general representations that such prospects may exist, conveyed in an informal “contact” between the Independent Counsel and the Presiding Judge of this Division. Despite the very high esteem in which I hold the Presiding Judge, I do not believe that vague intimations informally conveyed are an adequate basis for our official action. I strongly believe that the Division needs more information — of the specific kind identified in the statute' — in order to make its decision. In any event, based on what I know (or do not know) now, there is a strong case for termination, and it would be very difficult to persuade me otherwise.
This investigation is celebrating its fifth birthday, and it has led to the impeachment of the President of the United States followed by his acquittal by the Senate. This is a natural and logical point for termination, since it is not clear how additional measures against the principal subject of the investigation could be pursued. Nor is there any indication that the Independent Counsel would pursue them— whatever they might be. In addition, there apparently are no pending prosecutions against lesser figures. The past record of the Independent Counsel in procuring indictments and convictions of others implicated in the investigation is certainly of interest but is quite irrelevant to future prospects or legitimate needs at this stage of the process.
From the information at my disposal, I must conclude that there is nothing further to be done, beyond a Final Report, and certainly nothing that cannot properly be turned over to the Department of Justice, as the statute provides. Termination, of course, may be conditional on completion and submission of a Final Report. See In re North, supra. I would therefore *655terminate the office of this Independent Counsel subject to completion and submission of a Final Report.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.