Court Opinion

ID: 9384673
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-04 17:07:33.218479+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:55.455953
License: Public Domain

J-S44030-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    RAYMOND L. SPELLER                         :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 208 MDA 2022

        Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 29, 2021
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Criminal Division at
                       No(s): CP-36-CR-0005479-2019

BEFORE:      PANELLA, P.J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.:                  FILED: APRIL 4, 2023

        Raymond L. Speller appeals from the judgment of sentence following his

convictions for murder in the first degree, possession of a firearm prohibited,

and firearms not to be carried without a license.1 We affirm.

        The trial court summarized the undisputed facts as follows:

        In the mid-morning on September 23, 2019, surveillance cameras
        affixed to buildings in and around the Hillside Apartments in
        Lancaster, PA captured [Speller] shooting to death [the victim,]
        Pedro Almodovar.1 The cameras also captured the events leading
        up to and following the shooting. The footage shows a red SUV
        pull into a small parking area next to the Hillside Apartments.
        There are two occupants in the vehicle; Mr. Almodovar is sitting
        in the front passenger seat. After pulling into the lot, neither Mr.
        Almodovar nor the driver exit the vehicle. The footage then shows
        a man walk past the SUV and stop briefly by the vehicle before
        proceeding around the corner and entering 369 Howard Avenue,

____________________________________________

*   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1   18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(a), 6105(a)(1), and 6106(a)(1), respectively.
J-S44030-22

      located a short distance from the parking area. A few moments
      later, another man — [Speller] — can be seen walking out of 369
      Howard Avenue, up the sidewalk in front of the house, and around
      the corner to the area where the red SUV was parked. The footage
      then shows [Speller] walk directly up to the passenger’s side of
      the vehicle and shoot Mr. Almodovar while he is still sitting in the
      vehicle. The footage depicts [Speller] trying, unsuccessfully, to
      fire more shots at Mr. Almodovar before the magazine eventually
      falls out of the gun. [Speller] can then be seen picking something
      up from the ground, turning around, walking back toward 369
      Howard Avenue, and, eventually, walking away in the opposite
      direction of where he shot Mr. Almodovar.
         1The footage was entered into evidence as “Commonwealth
         Exhibit 7” during the jury trial in the above-captioned
         matter.

      Police were soon thereafter notified of the shooting and arrived on
      scene around 11:06 a.m. Responding officers found Mr.
      Almodovar still in the passenger side front seat with blood coming
      from his nose and mouth; Mr. Almodovar was unresponsive and
      attempts to render aid were unsuccessful.

Trial Court Opinion, filed Apr. 13, 2022, at 1-2 (citations omitted).

      Speller testified at trial that on the morning in question, he was making

breakfast at his girlfriend’s house and smoking PCP. N.T. Trial, 5/25/21-

5/28/21, at 329-31. He stated that his close friend “Red” came over. Id. at

329-30. Speller said that Red told him that Almodovar was outside “getting

out of his car to exercise or something like that.” Id. at 332-33. Speller

clarified that in “street lingo, exercise means you can rob somebody, harm

somebody, do something to somebody.” Id. at 338. Speller stated that as

soon as Red said Almodovar’s name, he “truly believed that [Almodovar] was

there for me” and he was scared for his life because he believed Almodovar

“wanted [him] dead.” Id. at 333, 338, 340. Speller testified that he walked

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outside and saw Almodovar, but he did not remember shooting him. Id. at

340-41. He stated that he “blanked out” and his judgment was affected due

to using PCP. Id. at 333-34. Speller later admitted during a police interview

that he was the shooter. Id. at 351.

      A jury found Speller guilty of murder in the first degree, possession of a

firearm prohibited, and firearms not to be carried without a license. He was

sentenced on October 29, 2021, to life in prison without parole plus seven and

one-half to 20 years. After sentencing, new counsel was appointed to

represent Speller for purposes of appeal. On the tenth day after sentencing,

counsel filed a post-sentence motion on November 8, 2021, seeking leave to

supplement the motion within 30 days after receipt of the transcripts, which

was granted. Counsel subsequently filed a motion indicating that no

supplement would be filed. The court denied post-sentence relief on January

14, 2022. This timely appeal followed.

      Speller raises the following five issues:

      1. Did the trial court err when it denied [Speller’s] request for a self-
         defense jury instruction?

      2. Did the trial court err when it denied [Speller’s] request for
         voluntary manslaughter, unreasonable belief jury instruction?

      3. Did the trial court err when it did not permit defense counsel
         to question Det. Nathan Nickel about the decedent victim’s
         violent reputation with law enforcement?

      4. Did the trial court err when it limited the questioning of defense
         witness Ivan Lopez-Diaz to four questions chosen by the trial
         court, none of which involved substantive communication
         between decedent victim and Mr. Lopez-Diaz that was relayed
         to [Speller] about the decedent victim wanting to kill [Speller]?

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      5. Did the trial court err when it precluded testimony of Ronald
         Luis about threats made by the decedent victim towards
         [Speller], as they were relevant to [Speller’s] state of mind?

Speller’s Br. at 5 (issues renumbered for ease of disposition).

      Speller first argues the court erred in denying his request for a jury

instruction on self-defense. He contends he was fearful of Almodovar due to

prior threats Almodovar made against him and believed he was in imminent

danger when Almodovar was in the parking lot outside of the apartment.

Speller’s Br. at 18-19. Speller alleges that when his friend, Red, told him that

Almodovar was there to “exercise,” he believed that meant that Almodovar

would do harm to him. Id. at 18. According to Speller, he did not violate his

duty to retreat because “[t]here was no evidence that [he] could have fled the

scene without first being confronted by” Almodovar. Id. at 20. Speller

concludes that the court wrongfully “usurped the jury [when it] unilaterality

decided that self-defense was not a viable defense in this matter.” Id.

      “[O]ur standard of review when considering the denial of jury

instructions is one of deference — an appellate court will reverse a court’s

decision only when it abused its discretion or committed an error of law.”

Commonwealth v. Baker, 24 A.3d 1006, 1022 (Pa.Super. 2011) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Galvin, 985 A.2d 783, 798–99 (Pa. 2009)). “The trial

court has broad discretion in phrasing its instructions, and may choose its own

wording so long as the law is clearly, adequately, and accurately presented to

the jury for its consideration.” Id. (citation omitted). The court “is not required

to give every charge that is requested by the parties and its refusal to give a

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requested charge does not require reversal unless the appellant was

prejudiced by that refusal.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 911 A.2d 576, 583

(Pa.Super. 2006) (citation omitted). Indeed, a “trial court is not obligated to

instruct a jury upon legal principles which have no applicability to the

presented facts.” Commonwealth v. Bohonyi, 900 A.2d 877, 883 (Pa.Super.

2006) (citation omitted). Rather, “[t]here must be some relationship between

the law upon which an instruction is requested and the evidence presented at

trial.” Id. (citation omitted).

       “Before the issue of self-defense may be submitted to a jury for

consideration, a valid claim of self-defense must be made out as a matter of

law,   and   this   determination   must   be   made   by   the   trial   judge.”

Commonwealth v. Chine, 40 A.3d 1239, 1244 (Pa.Super. 2012) (citations

omitted). A claim of self-defense requires evidence of three elements: “(a)

[that the defendant] reasonably believed that he was in imminent danger of

death or serious bodily injury and that it was necessary to use deadly force

against the victim to prevent such harm; (b) that the defendant was free from

fault in provoking the difficulty which culminated in the slaying; and (c) that

the [defendant] did not violate any duty to retreat.” Commonwealth v.

Mouzon, 53 A.3d 738, 740 (Pa. 2012) (citation omitted) (alteration in

Mouzon); see also 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 505(a).

       Here, the court determined that no instruction on self-defense was

warranted because there was no evidence that Speller had acted in self-

defense. The court stated:

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      The Commonwealth’s evidence showed that Mr. Almodovar sat
      defenseless in a parked car and posed absolutely no threat to
      [Speller] when [Speller] shot him. Further, the surveillance
      footage captured by the cameras affixed to the Hill[side]
      Apartments showed [Speller] violating his duty to retreat or seek
      safety when he left his residence and walked up the sidewalk and
      around the corner toward where Mr. Almodovar sat. Indeed, the
      contrary is true. [Speller] left a place of safety to specifically
      confront and shoot an unarmed individual. [Speller] was also the
      sole aggressor; during the entirety of the incident, Mr. Almodovar
      remained seated in a parked vehicle around the corner from
      [Speller’s] residence. Officers who observed Mr. Almodovar’s dead
      body in the car described his post-mortem position – sprawled
      toward the back driver’s side of the vehicle – as indicating that
      Mr. Almodovar attempted to retreat or escape when [Speller]
      confronted him.

                                      ***

      During his trial testimony, [Speller] also readily admitted that [he]
      left his residence and walked up the sidewalk and around the
      corner to the parking area, then directly up to where Mr.
      Almodovar sat, shot him once, and tried to fire more shots.

Trial Ct. Op. at 11-12.

      Our review of the record confirms the court’s finding that there was no

evidence that would have permitted the jury to conclude that Speller acted in

self-defense. Speller had no justification for killing Almodovar at a moment

when he posed no threat to him, based merely on a belief that Almodovar

allegedly threatened Speller in the past, and Speller did not demonstrate that

he was in immediate danger that necessitated protection by force. Moreover,

there was no evidence that Speller was free from fault in provoking the

incident and that he did not violate his duty to retreat. The opposite is true.

The only evidence was that he voluntarily left his girlfriend’s apartment and

approached Almodovar and shot him, when Almodovar never got out of his

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vehicle, never approached Speller, and never communicated with Speller.

Thus, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying Speller’s request for a

jury instruction on self-defense.

      Speller’s second issue challenges the trial court’s denial of his request

for an “unreasonable belief” voluntary manslaughter jury instruction. He

argues, again, that he feared Almodovar because he had allegedly threatened

his life before. Speller’s Br. at 22. Speller maintains that whether that belief

was unreasonable was a question for the jury and that the court improperly

usurped the jury’s role by refusing a voluntary manslaughter jury instruction.

Id.

      We reiterate that our standard of review when considering a denial of a

jury instruction is an abuse of discretion. Baker, 24 A.3d at 1022.

      Voluntary manslaughter is “an intentional killing. . . committed as a

result of an unreasonable belief in the need for deadly force in self-defense.”

Commonwealth v. Washington, 692 A.2d 1024, 1029 (Pa. 1997); see also

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2503(b). It is sometimes referred to as “imperfect self-

defense.” Commonwealth v. Tilley, 595 A.2d 575, 582 (Pa. 1991). “This

self-defense claim is imperfect in only one respect — an unreasonable rather

than a reasonable belief that deadly force was required to save the actor’s

life.” Id. Indeed, “[a]ll other principles of justification under 18 Pa.C.S.[A.]

505” must be met before a defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on

unreasonable belief voluntary manslaughter. Id. (emphasis added); see also

Commonwealth v. Truong, 36 A.3d 592, 599 (Pa.Super. 2012) (en banc)

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(stating “all other principles of self-defense must still be met in order to

establish this defense”).

      As discussed above, the evidence presented at trial failed to establish

any of the factors necessary to support Speller’s claim of self-defense. Even if

Speller unreasonably believed that deadly force was necessary, there was no

evidence to support the remaining elements of self-defense, i.e., that Speller

was free from fault in provoking the incident and that he did not violate his

duty to retreat. Accordingly, Speller’s claim that he was entitled to a jury

instruction on voluntary manslaughter is meritless.

      Speller’s third issue challenges the court’s decision that precluded his

trial counsel from soliciting testimony about Almodovar’s violent reputation

with law enforcement. At trial, the Commonwealth presented Detective

Nathan Nickel of the Lancaster City Bureau of Police who testified about his

investigation   in   this   matter.   On    cross-examination,   Speller’s   counsel

attempted to ask Detective Nickel whether he had ever investigated

Almodovar for violent crimes and whether Almodovar had a reputation for

violence. N.T. at 205-06. The Commonwealth objected, and the trial court

sustained the objection. Id. at 206.

      Speller argues that Almodovar’s prior acts of violence and “reputation

for violence in the community” should have been admissible to support his

“reasonableness in being fearful for his life.” Speller’s Br. at 13-14. He asserts

that “[t]he evidence was relevant to [his] state of mind in whether he was

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justified in his actions that day or at least to put in perspective [his]

unreasonable belief that he was in danger.” Id. at 14.

        The admissibility of evidence is within the discretion of the trial court.

Commonwealth v. Saez, 225 A.3d 169, 177 (Pa.Super. 2019). “An abuse of

discretion occurs when the law is overridden or misapplied, or the judgment

exercised was either manifestly unreasonable or the product of partiality,

prejudice, bias, or ill will.” Commonwealth v. Rogers, 250 A.3d 1209, 1215

(Pa. 2021).

        Evidence of a person’s character is inadmissible to prove that the person

acted in conformity with that character or character trait on a particular

occasion. See Pa.R.E. 404(a). However, in criminal cases, the accused may

offer   evidence    of   a   victim’s   pertinent   character   trait.   See   Pa.R.E.

404(a)(2)(B). “[I]n a criminal case where character evidence of the victim is

admissible pursuant to Rule 404(a)(2)(B), the accused may establish the

victim’s relevant character trait by utilizing specific instances of conduct,

including the victim’s criminal history.” Commonwealth v. Buterbaugh, 91

A.3d 1247, 1256 (Pa.Super. 2014) (en banc). However, evidence of a victim’s

violent history is admissible only where self-defense is properly at issue. See

id. (stating “the accused may offer character evidence of the victim only

where self-defense is alleged”) (emphasis in original); see also Mouzon, 53

A.3d at 741 (observing that “when self-defense is properly at issue, evidence

of the victim’s prior convictions involving aggression may be admitted”).

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      As set forth above, neither self-defense nor imperfect self-defense were

proper issues at trial. Accordingly, the court did not abuse its discretion by

prohibiting counsel from questioning Detective Nickel about Almodovar’s

character and reputation for violence.

      Speller’s fourth issue challenges the court’s decision to limit the

questioning of defense witness Ivan Lopez-Diaz. Speller sought to present

Lopez-Diaz to testify that he told Speller that Speller should be concerned for

his life based on his conversations with Almodovar. N.T. at 6. Speller proposed

asking Lopez-Diaz four questions:

      •   “[D]o you know Speller and Pedro Almodovar?” Id. at 165.

      •   “[Did] you ha[ve] any conversations with [Almodovar] concerning
          Raymond Speller[?]” Id.

      •   “[A]fter speaking with [Almodovar]. . . was it your impression that. .
          . Raymond Speller should be fearful for his life?” Id.

      •   “Did you communicate that to Raymond Speller prior to September
          23rd?” Id.

Counsel stated that he would ask, “Nothing more. Nothing less.” Id. at 166.

      After considering Speller’s proffered evidence, the court permitted

Lopez-Diaz to testify, but stated that counsel could ask the following four

questions:

      Did you know Pedro Almodovar?

      Do you know Raymond Speller?

      Did you have conversations with Pedro Almodovar about Raymond
      Speller?

      And prior to Mr. Almodovar's death, did you tell Raymond Speller
      about those conversations?

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Id. at 302.

      Speller argues that “[b]y limiting the questioning as it did, the trial court

improperly excluded the violent and threatening context of the conversation

that prompted the witness to fear for Mr. Speller’s life.” Speller’s Br. at 17.

According to Speller, “[t]he fact that the witness was worried for Mr. Speller’s

life and relayed the violent and threatening context of the conversation to Mr.

Speller was relevant to [his] state of mind on the date of the shooting.” Id.

      We are mindful that our standard of review on the admissibility of

evidence is an abuse of discretion. Saez, 225 A.3d at 177. To be admissible,

evidence must be relevant. Pa.R.E. 402. However, the trial court “may exclude

relevant evidence if its probative value is outweighed by a danger of one or

more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the

jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative

evidence.” Pa.R.E. 403. A trial court has broad discretion to exclude potentially

misleading or confusing evidence. Rohe v. Vinson, 158 A.3d 88, 95

(Pa.Super. 2016). “The function of the trial court is to balance the alleged

prejudicial effect of the evidence against its probative value and it is not for

an appellate court to usurp that function.” Lykes v. Yates, 77 A.3d 27, 33

(Pa.Super. 2013) (citation omitted).

      Here, the court decided to limit Lopez-Diaz’s testimony because

Speller’s alleged fear of Almodovar was largely irrelevant since self-defense

was not properly at issue during the trial. Trial Ct. Op. at 17. The court also

noted that “[b]oth [Speller’s] trial counsel and the Commonwealth engaged in

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thorough questioning of [Speller] regarding his mental state at the time he

killed Mr. Almodovar, as well as the role that [Speller’s] alleged PCP high may

have played on the morning of September 23rd.” Id. at 18. The court found

that the limited relevance of further questioning Lopez-Diaz regarding

Speller’s fear of Almodovar would have been duplicative and was outweighed

by the danger of confusing the jury. Id.

      The court did not err. The court’s four questions were substantially the

same as Speller’s proposed questions, and the court was properly within its

discretion to limit the questioning of the witness.

      Finally, Speller argues that the court erred in precluding the testimony

of Ronald Luis about threats made by Almodovar towards Speller. At trial,

Speller’s counsel sought to present Luis as a witness. N.T. at 311. He stated

that Luis would testify that “he had a conversation with [Almodovar] around

th[e] time before his death, and my understanding was he wanted Raymond

Speller dead.” Id. at 312. The court precluded this testimony because it was

“textbook hearsay” and was not relevant because self-defense was not at

issue. Id. Speller alleges that Luis should have been permitted to testify

because the testimony was relevant to Speller’s state of mind at the time of

the incident. Speller’s Br. at 15.

      We discern no abuse of discretion. Again, self-defense and imperfect

self-defense were not properly in issue. Any testimony by Luis regarding

Speller’s alleged fear of Almodovar would have been of limited relevance and

needlessly cumulative.

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     Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 4/4/2023

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