Court Opinion

ID: 9403212
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-20 18:03:34.733143+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:05.500145
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
  UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
                  AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

                                     IN THE
              ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
                                 DIVISION ONE

                              In re the Marriage of:

     OFELIA LEDEZMA KEELAN, Petitioner/Appellant/Cross-Appellee,

                                         v.

      GARY PATRICK KEELAN, Respondent/Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

                            No. 1 CA-CV 22-0280 FC
                                 FILED 6-20-2023

            Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
                           No. FN2021-090505
                   The Honorable Keith A. Miller, Judge

                                   AFFIRMED

                                    COUNSEL

Stanley David Murray, Attorney at Law, Scottsdale
By Stanley D. Murray
Counsel for Petitioner/Appellant/Cross-Appellee

Scottsdale Family Law, PLLC, Scottsdale
By Taylor S. House
Counsel for Respondent/Appellee/Cross-Appellant
                             Keelan v. Keelan
                            Decision of the Court

                       MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Daniel J. Kiley delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding
Judge Maria Elena Cruz and Judge James B. Morse Jr. joined.

K I L E Y, Judge:

¶1           After a trial, the superior court issued a decree (the “Decree”)
dissolving the marriage of Ofelia Ledezma Keelan (“Wife”) and Gary
Patrick Keelan (“Husband”). Wife appeals from provisions of the Decree
dividing the parties’ assets. Husband cross-appeals, alleging that the court
erred in denying his request for reimbursement for monthly mortgage
payments he made before the marriage and after the marital community
terminated. He also asserts that the court erred in denying his request for
an award of attorney fees under A.R.S. § 25-324.

¶2           For the following reasons, we reject both parties’ arguments
and affirm the superior court’s rulings in all respects.

                 FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY1

¶3            The parties were married in March 2018. Three months
earlier, in December 2017, they purchased a residence in Gilbert, Arizona
(the “Palomino residence”), taking title as joint tenants with right of
survivorship. Wife contributed $85,000 of her separate funds toward the
$100,000 down payment, while Husband contributed the remaining
$15,000. The parties agreed that, due to Husband’s higher credit score,
Husband alone would sign the promissory note and become the sole
obligor for the mortgage payments. In exchange, Wife agreed to be
responsible for other household expenses.

¶4              After the parties’ marriage, they did not re-deed the Palomino
residence to themselves as community property, continuing instead to hold
it as joint tenants with right of survivorship.

¶5            Prior to the marriage, Wife had a Bank of America account
(the “3746 account”) into which she deposited separate funds, including her
earnings from employment and the proceeds from the sale of her previous

1 We view the evidence in the light most favorable to upholding the
superior court’s rulings. Kohler v. Kohler, 211 Ariz. 106, 107, ¶ 2 (App. 2005).

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residence. After they married, the parties began depositing community
funds into the 3746 account and using funds in the account for community
purposes. In 2020, Wife added Husband’s name to the 3746 account. The
parties also kept cash derived from their earnings during the marriage in a
safe in the Palomino residence, using the cash for community purposes.
They did not keep a ledger of cash deposited into and withdrawn from the
safe.

¶6         During the marriage, Wife contributed $10,000 toward
Husband’s purchase of a 2015 Lincoln MKZ. Wife also made a $16,000
down payment to purchase a 2019 Toyota Tacoma for her own use.

¶7            The marital community terminated when Wife served the
petition for dissolution in February 2021. Both parties continued to reside
in the Palomino residence throughout the dissolution trial in January 2022.

¶8            At trial, each party asked to be awarded the Palomino
residence. Husband agreed to pay Wife one-half of the equity in the
residence, while Wife argued that the equity should be divided in
proportion to each party’s contribution toward the $100,000 down
payment. The parties also requested additional offsets for mortgage
payments, maintenance, and repairs for the Palomino residence to the
extent those expenses were paid with funds constituting separate property.
Both parties agreed that Husband should be awarded the Lincoln MKZ and
Wife the Toyota Tacoma, and both asked that the court order an
equalization payment to account for the difference in the value of the two
vehicles. Husband presented evidence that the Lincoln MKZ was valued at
$11,578 and the 2019 Toyota Tacoma was valued at $37,996; Wife presented
no evidence of the value of either vehicle.

¶9             In March 2022, the superior court issued the Decree in which
the court, inter alia, (1) ordered the sale of the Palomino residence, with the
net proceeds to be shared equally between Husband and Wife; (2) awarded
Husband and Wife the Lincoln MKZ and the Toyota Tacoma, respectively;
(3) awarded Husband all of the cash, in the amount of $5,000, that remained
in the safe in the Palomino residence; (4) allocated various accounts with a
combined value of $47,661.62 to Wife and accounts with a combined value
of $9,727.45 to Husband; (5) ordered Wife to pay Husband an equalization
payment of $29,200; and (6) denied each party’s request for an award of
attorney fees and costs. In denying each party’s request for attorney fees
and costs, the court found no substantial disparity in the parties’ financial
resources and that neither Husband nor Wife acted unreasonably in the
litigation.

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¶10           Wife timely appealed. Husband cross-appealed from the
denial of his request for reimbursement for mortgage payments for the
Palomino residence and his request for an award of attorney fees and costs.

¶11            In February 2022, after the trial concluded but before the court
issued the Decree, Husband severed the joint tenancy of the Palomino
residence by recording an affidavit terminating right of survivorship under
A.R.S. § 33-431(E), changing the parties’ shared ownership of the residence
to that of tenants in common.2 When Wife learned of the affidavit in August
2022, she filed a motion for relief from the Decree under Arizona Rule of
Family Law Procedure (“Rule”) 85(b), arguing that “the Decree was based
on this Court’s finding that the parties owned the property as joint tenants
with right of survivorship but newly discovered evidence shows that the
property was converted to a tenancy in common prior to the entry of the
Decree.” The superior court denied Wife’s motion and awarded Husband
attorney fees and costs.

¶12          Wife then supplemented her notice of appeal to challenge
both the denial of her Rule 85(b) motion and the award of fees to Husband.
We have jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1).

                               DISCUSSION

    I.    The Palomino Residence

          a. Equal Net Proceeds Ordered by the Decree

¶13           We review the superior court’s classification of property as
separate or community property de novo but review the court’s distribution
of property for an abuse of discretion. Bell-Kilbourn v. Bell-Kilbourn, 216
Ariz. 521, 523, ¶ 4 (App. 2007). We will find no abuse of discretion if the
evidence reasonably supports the court’s decision. Kohler, 211 Ariz. at 107,
¶ 2.

¶14           Wife argues that the superior court erred when it awarded the
parties equal shares of the proceeds of the sale of the Palomino residence.

2 Husband later explained that he recorded the affidavit to sever the joint
tenancy because he was undergoing potentially risky medical treatment
and wanted his interest in the Palomino residence left to other family
members instead of Wife if he did not survive. See In re Estate of Estelle, 122
Ariz. 109, 111 (1979) (“[T]he right of survivorship by which the [surviving
joint tenant] takes the estate free of any claim of a deceased joint tenant” is
“[t]he distinguishing feature of a joint tenancy.”).

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She argues, first, that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter
any orders with regard to the residence because it was held in joint tenancy.
Because property held in joint tenancy is the sole and separate property of
each joint tenant, she asserts, the court “should have affirmed the
[Palomino] residence as [the parties’] sole and separate property” to be
partitioned pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-1218(C).

¶15             Property held in joint tenancy is the separate property of each
joint tenant. Toth v. Toth, 190 Ariz. 218, 220 (1997). Because “[p]roperty takes
its character as separate or community at the time it is acquired,” Honnas v.
Honnas, 133 Ariz. 39, 40 (1982), the parties continued to hold their equal
interests in the Palomino residence as separate property after they married.
See State v. Superior Court, 188 Ariz. 372, 373 (App. 1997) (“Married joint
tenants . . . each hold[] his or her ownership interest as separate property.”).
Although married joint tenants hold their respective interests as separate
property, the court in a dissolution action is statutorily authorized to divide
spouses’ joint tenancy property. A.R.S. § 25-318(A); see also Toth, 190 Ariz.
at 220 (“[U]nder [A.R.S. § 25-318(A)], joint tenancy property and
community property are to be treated alike . . . for dissolution purposes.”).

¶16             In support of her contention that the court “did not have
authority over the parties’ sole and separate jointly held residence,” Wife
cites McCready v. McCready, 168 Ariz. 1 (App. 1991) for the proposition that
joint tenancy property can be divided only in a partition action, not a
dissolution case. McCready, however, is inapposite. In McCready, ex-spouses
purchased a residence as joint tenants almost two years after the dissolution
of their marriage. Id. at 1-2. Over ten years later, the ex-husband filed a post-
decree petition in the dissolution case seeking an order for the sale of the
residence. Id. at 2. After the superior court ruled that the ex-wife could
purchase the ex-husband’s interest in the residence, this Court reversed,
holding that “the trial court lacked jurisdiction to render the particular
order entered.” Id. at 2-3. Absent agreement of the joint tenants, the
McCready court stated, “the only lawful means for disposing of the subject
property” was by partition action under A.R.S. §§ 12-1211 et seq. Id. at 3.
Because the joint tenancy property at issue in McCready was not purchased
until after the parties’ marriage ended, nothing in McCready supports Wife’s
position that the court in a dissolution action lacks jurisdiction over joint
tenancy property owned by the spouses.

¶17           Because A.R.S. § 25-318(A) authorizes the court in a
dissolution action to divide property held in joint tenancy, we reject Wife’s
contention that the superior court lacked jurisdiction over the Palomino
residence. See also Toth, 190 Ariz. at 220 (rejecting appellant’s argument that

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court “must treat her share of property held in joint tenancy as separate
property upon dissolution”).

¶18          Wife argues, next, that the superior court erred in
characterizing the Palomino residence as community property.

¶19           The Decree describes the Palomino residence as the “[m]arital
residence located at [street address], Gilbert, AZ, 85296, which is community
property.” (Emphasis added.) The Decree goes on, however, to state that

       [t]he parties took title to the home as joint tenants when still
       single persons. They never redeeded the property, but the
       Court finds that forming the marriage community did not
       change the undivided 50% interest in the property that each
       owned.

A review of the Decree as a whole, therefore, makes clear that despite the
erroneous use of the term “community property,” the court understood that
the Palomino residence was held in joint tenancy. In any event, joint
tenancy property and community property are treated alike in dissolution
cases. Toth, 190 Ariz. at 220. We therefore agree with Husband that the
superior court’s erroneous reference to “community property” was
“harmless and did not affect either party’s substantial rights.”

¶20           Wife next argues that because she contributed $85,000 toward
the $100,000 down payment, she should have received 85% of the sales
proceeds. “The parties did not intend to gift to each other equal ownership
in the property,” she contends, and so it was “not fair and equitable to order
both parties to equally share in the net sale proceeds.”

¶21            Upon their acquisition of the residence as joint tenants,
Husband and Wife each acquired a one-half interest in the property. See
Superior Court, 188 Ariz. at 373 (“Joint tenants hold an equal, undivided
interest in the subject property.”); Tenancy, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed.
2019) (defining “joint tenancy” as “[a] tenancy with two or more coowners
who are not spouses on the date of acquisition and have identical interests
in a property with the same right of possession.”). The court therefore did
not abuse its discretion in dividing the residence’s net sale proceeds equally
between the parties. Indeed, the court would have abused its discretion had
it adopted Wife’s proposal to divide the sale proceeds in proportion to the
parties’ initial contributions toward the purchase price. See Valladee v.
Valladee, 149 Ariz. 304, 311 (App. 1986) (holding that court abused its
discretion in making a substantially unequal division of real property that
spouses held in joint tenancy “solely in order to reimburse husband for

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expending his separate funds to acquire” the property); Whitmore v.
Mitchell, 152 Ariz. 425, 427 (App. 1987) (“[A]bsent an agreement to the
contrary, a court may not, upon dissolution, order a substantially unequal
division of joint tenancy property solely for the purpose of reimbursing one
of the parties for expending his or her separate funds to initially acquire the
property.”).3

           b. Husband’s Affidavit Terminating Right of Survivorship

¶22            Wife argues that the superior court erred in denying her Rule
85(b) motion, insisting that Husband’s post-trial recording of the affidavit
terminating right of survivorship under A.R.S. § 33-431(E) supports her
claim to 85% of the proceeds from the sale of the Palomino residence. The
recording of the affidavit, she explains, “converted their [joint tenancy]
ownership into a tenancy in common,” “a form of ownership in which each
co-tenant owns a separate fractional share” of the subject property. Because
the recording of the affidavit left the parties “tenants in common,” they
were each entitled to an interest “in the sale proceeds in proportion to their
initial contributions [to] the purchase of the property.” We review the
“denial of a motion for relief from judgment under Rule 85 for an abuse of
discretion, giving deference to the superior court’s factual findings.”
Johnson v. Edelstein, 252 Ariz. 230, 233, ¶ 12 (App. 2021).

¶23            “Joint tenancy requires the presence of . . . four unities: time,
title, possession, and interest.” Estate of Estelle, 122 Ariz. at 111. Action by a
joint tenant that severs any of the four unities “severs the joint tenancy
relationship, leaving the joint tenants as tenants in common.” Brant v.
Hargrove, 129 Ariz. 475, 478 (App. 1981). A joint tenant can unilaterally sever
a joint tenancy in various ways, including by filing an affidavit with the
county recorder terminating the right of survivorship. A.R.S. § 33-431(E).

¶24            Husband’s recording of the affidavit thus converted the
parties’ joint tenancy of the Palomino residence to one of tenancy in
common. The severance of the joint tenancy did not, however, alter the one-
half interest in the Palomino residence that each party held at the time of
the severance. See Register v. Coleman, 130 Ariz. 9, 12 (1981) (finding that
mother “destroyed” the “joint tenancy ownership” and transferred her

3 After Oral Argument, Wife filed a supplemental notice of legal authority
citing Duston v. Duston, 498 P.2d 1174 (Colo. App. 1972) and Jezo v. Jezo, 127
N.W.2d 246 (Wis. 1964) in support of her position. To the extent these out-
of-state cases support a result different from the one required by the
Arizona authorities cited herein, we decline to follow them.

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“one-half, undivided interest” in residence, which she owned in joint
tenancy with son, upon quitclaiming her interest to daughters); see also In re
Estate of Bates, 492 N.W.2d 704, 707 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992) (holding that
former spouses became tenants in common, each with “an interest in one-
half of the property,” upon severance of joint tenancy); Olney Tr. Bank v.
Pitts, 558 N.E.2d 398, 401 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (holding that husband severed
joint tenancy by conveying his interest in property to bank, leaving bank
and wife each with a half interest). The superior court correctly found that
“[c]onverting the joint tenancy to tenancy in common in February 2022[]
still [left] each spouse with an entitlement to 50% of the net proceeds of that
asset upon sale.”

¶25           Wife further contends that she was entitled to relief under
Rule 85(b) because Husband purportedly engaged in misconduct by failing
to notify her and the court that he had recorded the affidavit terminating
right of survivorship, leaving the court under the misconception, when it
entered the Decree, “that the [Palomino residence] was held in joint tenancy
rather than as a tenancy in common.”

¶26            We disagree. Consent of the other joint tenants is not required
to convert a joint tenancy into a tenancy in common. See Lonergan v. Strom,
145 Ariz. 195, 198 (App. 1985); A.R.S. § 33-431(E). Nor is personal notice
required; merely recording the affidavit provides “notice to all persons of
[its] existence.” A.R.S. § 33-416. Wife cites no authority requiring Husband
to notify the court when he recorded the affidavit terminating right of
survivorship, and we are aware of none.

¶27            Further, we agree with Husband that he cannot be said to
have acted improperly by recording the affidavit terminating right of
survivorship to ensure that “his share of the Palomino residence would be
distributed to his family rather than Wife if he were to unexpectedly pass
away before the decree was entered.” Husband’s actions did not violate
A.R.S. § 25-315, which enjoins the parties to a dissolution from
“transferring, encumbering, concealing, selling or otherwise disposing of”
joint property. That statute serves to “preserve the property of the marital
estate and to keep it within the reach of the court, pending a considered
determination of how it should be divided.” Lonergan, 145 Ariz. at 199.
Husband’s severance of the joint tenancy did not remove the Palomino
residence from the marital estate. A transaction that merely changes the
“form in which the parties held title to the marital property” without
removing it from the marital estate is not prohibited by A.R.S. § 25-315. See
id. at 198-99.

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¶28            The severance of the joint tenancy terminated Wife’s right of
survivorship but otherwise left unaffected each party’s one-half interest in
the Palomino residence. See A.R.S. § 33-431(E); see also Register, 130 Ariz. at
12 (noting that joint tenant can sever the joint tenancy by conveying his
interest but cannot convey the entire estate unless authorized by co-tenant).
Thus, Husband’s recording of the affidavit did not deprive Wife of her
interest in the Palomino residence or otherwise constitute improper
conduct entitling Wife to relief under Rule 85(b). We agree with the superior
court that Husband’s recording of the affidavit terminating right of
survivorship “is of merely trivial import” and find that the court did not
abuse its discretion in denying Wife’s Rule 85(b) motion.

          c. Separate Contributions Made Toward the Palomino Residence

¶29             Husband and Wife both contend that they are entitled to
reimbursement for the contributions they made with their separate funds
toward expenses for the Palomino residence. The court ordered no such
reimbursement in the Decree, thereby tacitly denying each party’s request.
Chopin v. Chopin, 224 Ariz. 425, 431, ¶ 22 (App. 2010) (deeming request for
award of attorney fees that “trial court did not rule on” denied). We review
the issue of reimbursement under the clearly erroneous standard. Hrudka v.
Hrudka, 186 Ariz. 84, 94 (App. 1995), superseded by statute on other grounds as
stated in Myrick v. Maloney, 235 Ariz. 491, 494, ¶ 8 (App. 2014) (“The question
of reimbursement” for payment of community debts with separate funds
“is a factual issue . . . subject to the clearly erroneous standard.”).

¶30          Wife argues that she “presented evidence at the trial that she
had paid over $25,000.00 from her sole and separate funds for repairs and
maintenance to the residence” and was entitled to “reimbursement for
those contributions.” Husband likewise argues that he is entitled to
reimbursement in the amount of $10,598.98 for the mortgage payments he
made prior to the marriage and after the marital community terminated.

¶31           “Under the general rules of joint tenancy, a tenant has a right
to contribution from his cotenants for expenditures or obligations made for
the benefit of the common property.” Valladee, 149 Ariz. at 309. No such
right to contribution exists, however, unless “there existed a common
obligation or liability among the cotenants at the time the contributing
tenant made the expenditure.” Id. Here, the expenses for which each party
seeks reimbursement were not a common obligation of the parties because
they had agreed that Wife would pay some of the expenses in exchange for
Husband’s payment of certain others. Because the parties agreed that they
would each be responsible for paying certain expenses for the residence

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using their separate funds, the court did not err in failing to award either
party reimbursement for expenses paid with separate funds.

¶32            “Where a co-tenant makes improvements in good faith, which
are permanent and useful or necessary to the enjoyment of the property,
the court as a general rule awards him the resulting increase in the value of
the estate.” In re Marriage of Berger, 140 Ariz. 156, 163 (App. 1983). Wife
invokes this principle on appeal, arguing that if she cannot recover “the
actual cost of the improvements,” she is entitled to the “resulting increase
in the value of the estate.” Wife never asserted a claim for a share of the
enhanced value of the residence during the proceedings below, however,
and so any such claim is waived. See BMO Harris Bank N.A. v. Espiau, 251
Ariz. 588, 593-94, ¶ 25 (App. 2021) (explaining that legal theories not
presented to the trial court are waived on appeal).

¶33           In any event, Wife presented no evidence at trial of the
Palomino residence’s purportedly enhanced value nor suggested a means
of calculation, rendering it impossible to make any determination of the
residence’s allegedly enhanced value resulting from her expenditure of her
separate funds. We therefore reject Wife’s alternative claim for
reimbursement based on the purportedly enhanced value of the Palomino
residence.

 II.      Distribution of Other Property

          a. The 3746 Account

¶34           Arguing that the evidence at trial established “that [the 3746
account] consisted of her sole and separate funds,” Wife contends that the
superior court improperly characterized the 3746 account as community
property. We review the court’s classification of property de novo. Bell-
Kilbourn, 216 Ariz. at 523, ¶ 4.

¶35            The entire balance in an account in which community and
separate funds are commingled is presumed to be community property
“unless the separate property can be explicitly traced.” Cooper v. Cooper, 130
Ariz. 257, 259 (1981) (citation omitted). Although Wife does not dispute that
community funds were deposited into the 3746 account during the
marriage, she asserts that at trial she was “able to trace her sole and separate
funds such that commingling did not occur.”

¶36           The record does not support Wife’s assertion. Wife testified at
trial that community funds were deposited into the 3746 account and that
funds in the account were used to pay community expenses. She further

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testified that the $100,000 balance in the account in January 2018
represented the proceeds of her sale of the residence she owned before the
marriage but admitted that she did not know the amount of community
funds that were subsequently deposited into the 3746 account during the
marriage. Moreover, the monthly bank statements from the 3746 account
that Wife presented as exhibits at trial are incomplete, and so do not permit
the tracing of deposits and withdrawals.4

¶37          Wife argues that the amount of community funds deposited
into the 3746 account was “negligible” and therefore the funds in the
account were never transmuted from separate to community property.

¶38            An account established by one spouse prior to marriage may
retain its character as separate property if the amount of community funds
deposited into it is “negligible.” Noble v. Noble, 26 Ariz. App. 89, 95-96 (App.
1976). As the party that invokes this principle, Wife bears the burden of
rebutting the presumption that the 3746 account is community property by
clear and convincing evidence. See Cooper, 130 Ariz. at 259-60.

¶39           Wife cannot be said to have met her burden of proof. She
admitted that she did not know the amount of community funds that were
deposited into the 3746 account during the marriage. The monthly bank
statements that Wife presented, though incomplete, make clear that the
balance in the 3746 account fluctuated widely, from $84,382.63 as of
February 13, 2018 down to $25,167.87 as of November 14, 2018, before
increasing to $39,064.23 as of February 10, 2021. The record provides no
evidentiary support for Wife’s contention that the amount of community
funds deposited into the account could be considered negligible. Because
community and separate funds were commingled in the account and no
tracing of separate funds is possible, the funds in the account transmuted
into community property by operation of law. See Porter v. Porter, 67 Ariz.
273, 281 (1948), overruled in part on other grounds by Cockrill v. Cockrill, 124
Ariz. 50, 53-54 (1979) (“Where community property and separate property
are commingled, the entire fund is presumed to be community property
unless the separate property can be explicitly traced.”) The Decree thus
correctly characterized the 3746 account as community property.

          b.   The Parties’ Vehicles

4 All of the even-numbered pages are missing from the monthly bank
statements that Wife provided, and statements for the three-month period,
from August 16, 2019 through November 13, 2019, are missing entirely.

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¶40             Wife claims that the superior court erred in characterizing the
parties’ vehicles as community property, insisting that she made a down
payment on both vehicles “using her sole and separate funds.” She does not
dispute that monthly payments were “made using community funds
during the marriage” but argues that “at most, the community was entitled
to a lien for reimbursement of those payments.”

¶41           Wife expressly identified the vehicles as community property
in her petition for dissolution and her pretrial statement, and again at trial
when she testified that the vehicles were purchased “under community
property.”5 At no point did Wife claim that either vehicle was separate
property, nor did she request reimbursement for her contributions toward
the down payments for the vehicles. Wife has therefore waived this
argument, and we need not address it further. See Payne v. Payne, 12 Ariz.
App. 434, 435 (App. 1970) (“[A] matter raised for the first time on appeal
will not be considered.”).

          c. Community Funds in the Parties’ Safe and Wife’s Equalization
             Payment

¶42           Husband testified at trial that when Wife notified him that she
intended to file for dissolution, he counted the cash in the safe, which came
to $9,230. He further testified that he later removed $400 from the safe to
pay certain household expenses, but when he next counted the cash in the
safe in April 2021, he found only $5,000. The Decree awarded Husband all
of the $5,000 in the safe. Wife argues that the court erred in awarding
Husband all of the cash in the safe, insisting that, despite Husband’s
implication that “Wife had taken the missing $4,000.00,” there was “no
evidence that Wife took any funds from the safe for her own purposes.”
Accordingly, she contends, she was entitled to one-half of the cash in the
safe.

¶43            Wife reads too much into the Decree, which contains no
finding, express or implied, that Wife removed $4,000 from the safe before
filing the petition for dissolution. Indeed, the Decree makes no reference to
either party’s removal of cash from the safe. Instead, the Decree awards the
remaining $5,000 in the safe to Husband as part of its overall division of
marital property. Because A.R.S. § 25-318(A)’s provision that the court
divide marital property “equitably” does not require the court to divide

5Specifically, Wife testified at trial, “even though I put 10,000 towards the
vehicle that [Husband] drives, I believe that we still should equalize that,
because it was under community property.”

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each marital asset in half, the court did not abuse its discretion in awarding
the entire sum of cash in the safe to Husband as part of its overall division
of marital property. See Miller v. Miller, 140 Ariz. 520, 522 (App. 1984) (“The
apportionment of community property . . . need not be in kind or exactly
equal, but must result in substantial equality.”); Lee v. Lee, 133 Ariz. 118, 121
(App. 1982) (“The only inherent limitation on the power of the trial court to
apportion community property is that the division, in the final analysis,
must result in a substantially equal distribution which neither rewards nor
punishes either party.”).

¶44           Wife argues that the $29,200 equalization payment ordered in
the Decree should be set aside as unsupported by the evidence. She does
not challenge the value that the court placed on the parties’ assets but
argues that the court erred in treating some of those assets—specifically, the
3746 account and the parties’ vehicles—as community property. The court’s
improper “characterization of [her] sole and separate property” as
community property, Wife contends, resulted in a miscalculation of the
equalization payment.

¶45            Because, as discussed above, the court properly classified the
3746 account and the parties’ vehicles as community property, the court did
not err in considering the value of those assets when calculating the amount
of the equalization payment.

¶46           In her opening brief, Wife states that the Decree does not
explain the manner in which the court “arrived at [its] calculation of the
[$29,200] payment.” To the extent this passing statement constitutes a
challenge to the calculation of the equalization payment, we find that Wife
is entitled to no relief. The Decree awarded Wife financial accounts
(including the 3746 account) with a combined value of $47,661.62, while the
value of the accounts awarded to Husband, along with the cash in the safe,
totaled only $14,727.45. Wife does not challenge the court’s valuation or
division of the parties’ accounts. Further, the Decree contains findings that
Wife’s vehicle had a value of $35,000 while Husband’s vehicle had a value
of $11,578 subject to a $9,048.03 lien. The difference in values of the accounts
and cash awarded to each party and the net value of each party’s vehicle is
$65,404.20, which is more than double the amount of the $29,200
equalization payment that the court ordered Wife to pay. As Husband
correctly argues, the amount of the equalization payment “favored Wife,
and [so] she has no basis” to challenge it. Cf. Maffeo v. Wood, 16 Ariz. App.
389, 393 (App. 1972) (holding that appellants “cannot complain of an error
which is favorable to them”).

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                             Keelan v. Keelan
                            Decision of the Court

III.      Attorney Fees

          a. Decree’s Denial of Husband’s Attorney Fees

¶47            In the Decree, the superior court denied each party’s request
for an award of attorney fees pursuant to A.R.S. § 25-324(A). In doing so,
the court found that neither party “act[ed] unreasonably in the litigation.”
It further observed that, “[w]hile Wife has a greater net worth than
Husband, the Court does not find that that disparity is a ‘substantial’
disparity justifying an award of attorney’s fees.”

¶48            Husband argues that the court “abused its discretion by
denying [his] request for attorney’s fees.” He does not challenge the court’s
determination that neither party took unreasonable positions at trial but
argues that the court erred in denying his fee request in view of “the
significant financial disparity between the parties.” “Wife’s net worth,” he
explains, is “approximately ten times that of Husband.” We will not disturb
the superior court’s determination of a fee request absent an abuse of
discretion. Myrick, 235 Ariz. at 494, ¶ 6.

¶49            Although A.R.S. § 25-324(A) requires a court to “consider[]
the financial resources of both parties” when evaluating attorney fees
requests, it does not mandate an award of fees to the party of lesser means.
Myrick, 235 Ariz. at 494, ¶ 9 (“[A] relative financial disparity in income
and/or assets . . . alone does not mandate an award of fees.” (citation
omitted)). The purpose of A.R.S. § 25-324(A) is to “insure that the poorer
party has the proper means to litigate the action.” Quijada v. Quijada, 246
Ariz. 217, 222, ¶ 17 (App. 2019) (citation omitted). As long as neither party
takes unreasonable positions, A.R.S. § 25-324(A) cannot reasonably be read
to entitle either party to a fee award if both parties have sufficient means to
litigate the action. See Bobrow v. Bobrow, 241 Ariz. 592, 599, ¶ 33 (App. 2017)
(“Financial disparity alone does not mandate an award of attorney’s fees to
the poorer party.”). The disparity in the parties’ respective financial
conditions thus did not entitle Husband to an award of attorney fees. We
find no abuse of discretion in the denial of Husband’s request for an award
of attorney fees incurred through trial.

          b. Husband’s Attorney Fees Granted from Wife’s Rule 85(b) Motion

¶50           Husband requested an award of attorney fees and costs of
$2,103.11 incurred in responding to Wife’s Rule 85(b) motion. Over Wife’s
objection, the court awarded Husband fees and costs of $1,000. On appeal,
Wife asserts that the court erred in awarding such fees and costs to
Husband because the court had “previously denied both parties’ requests

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                             Keelan v. Keelan
                            Decision of the Court

for attorney’s fees” and “[n]o explanation was given as to why Husband
was awarded attorney’s fees in responding to” her Rule 85(b) motion.

¶51           The court’s determination of the reasonableness of the
positions the parties took at trial has no bearing on the reasonableness of
Wife’s post-trial Rule 85(b) motion. Further, the court’s failure to articulate
the basis for its fee award entitles Wife to no relief since “there is no
obligation for the trial court to make findings of fact under A.R.S. § 25-324.”
See MacMillan v. Schwartz, 226 Ariz. 584, 592, ¶ 39 (App. 2011). In any event,
the basis for the court’s fee award is evident; Wife herself observes that,
“[a]pparently[,] the award was based impliedly upon a finding that Wife
had taken an unreasonable position in” her Rule 85(b) Motion.

¶52           Although Wife insists that she “did not take an unreasonable
position in pursuing her [Rule 85(b) motion],” the court did not abuse its
discretion in making a contrary determination. While an abuse of discretion
will be found “where there has been an error of law committed in the
process of reaching a discretionary conclusion,” Hurd v. Hurd, 223 Ariz. 48,
52, ¶ 19 (App. 2009) (cleaned up), none will be found merely because
another court might have reached a different conclusion in similar
circumstances, see In re Marriage of Inboden, 223 Ariz. 542, 544, ¶ 7 (App.
2010). Moreover, the court awarded Husband less than half of the $2,103.11
he requested, making clear that, in awarding fees and costs, the court took
into account Wife’s arguments in opposition to Husband’s fee request.
Because the superior court “is in the best position to observe and assess the
conduct of the parties before it,” MacMillan, 226 Ariz. at 592, ¶ 38, we find
no abuse of discretion and will not disturb the court’s post-Decree award
of fees and costs to Husband.

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                             Keelan v. Keelan
                            Decision of the Court

          c. Parties’ Request for Attorney Fees on Appeal

¶53            Husband and Wife request attorney fees on appeal under
A.R.S. § 25-324 and ARCAP 21. After considering the reasonableness of
both parties’ positions and their respective financial resources, we deny
both parties’ requests in the exercise of our discretion. See Myrick, 235 Ariz.
at 496, ¶ 16.

                               CONCLUSION

¶54           For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Decree in its entirety.

                          AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
                          FILED: AA

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