Court Opinion

ID: 9803304
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 15:30:06.547477+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:03:01.168012
License: Public Domain

DeGrasse, J.,
dissents in a memorandum as follows: Contrary to what the majority has determined, the motion court properly denied plaintiffs motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability. Plaintiff, a passenger on a crowded commuter train, was injured when a ceiling panel swung open and struck her head. Plaintiff invoked the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as the only ground for summary judgment. Res ipsa loquitur is an evidentiary doctrine that permits an inference of negligence “solely from the happening of the accident upon the theory that ‘certain occurrences contain within themselves a sufficient basis for an inference of negligence’ ” (Dermatossian v New York City Tr. Auth., 67 NY2d 219, 226 [1986] [citation omitted]). The majority correctly recites the three elements that must be established to warrant the submission of a case to a jury on the theory of res ipsa loquitur (see id.). I dissent because there is a triable issue of fact as to whether, under the second element, the accident was caused “by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant” (id. [citation omitted]).
As noted above, this case involves an event that occurred within a commuter train car. It cannot be assumed that a common carrier, such as defendant, has exclusive control over its facilities that are accessible to the riding public. Dermatossian is on point. The plaintiff in Dermatossian was struck in the head by a defective grab handle on a city bus. The case against the Transit Authority was submitted to the jury under the theory of *1027res ipsa loquitur. In reversing the judgment entered on the plaintiffs verdict and ordering the dismissal of the complaint, the Court found that “[t]he proof did not adequately exclude the chance that the handle had been damaged by one or more of defendant’s passengers who were invited to use it” (Dermatossian, 67 NY2d at 228 [emphasis added]). Where there is extensive public contact with an instrumentality, the standard articulated by Dermatossian is one of “sufficient exclusivity to fairly rule out the chance that [a defect] was caused by some agency other than defendant’s negligence” (id. [emphasis added]; see also Ebanks v New York City Tr. Auth., 70 NY2d 621, 623 [1987]).
A foreman, who was deposed on behalf of defendant, testified that the ceiling panel could have been loosened by use of a standard flathead screwdriver. Given the exposure of the panel to daily public contact, the majority misplaces its reliance on the foreman’s testimony that “to his knowledge,” no one other than defendant’s employees accessed the ceiling panels. Contrary to the majority’s view, this testimony is insufficient to establish defendant’s exclusive control of the publicly accessible ceiling panel as a matter of law. Like the proof considered by the Court in Dermatossian, the foreman’s testimony does not adequately exclude the chance that the panel had been loosened by one or more of defendant’s passengers (67 NY2d at 228; see also Bazne v Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 61 AD3d 583 [1st Dept 2009]). By application of Dermatossian, it was plaintiffs burden to establish the absence of a triable issue of fact as to whether there was any chance that the panel had been loosened by another passenger. This is because plaintiff made the underlying motion for summary judgment. This distinction seems to have eluded the majority as evidenced by its belief that Pavon v Rudin (254 AD2d 143 [1st Dept 1998]) is “directly on point.”* In Pavon, we reversed an order that granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, finding the record sufficient to warrant submission of the case to a jury on the theory of res ipsa loquitur. In so doing, we noted that in order to raise an issue of fact under the doctrine it was “not necessary for plaintiff to rule out all other possible causes [other than defendants’ negligence], only to show that they are less likely” (id. at 145 [citation omitted]). Here, by contrast, the majority’s grant of summary judgment in favor of plaintiff amounts to a finding *1028that defendant’s negligence is the only possible cause of the accident. In my view, such a finding is not supported by the record. In addition, the instant motion for summary judgment does not call for a determination of which party has proffered the more “logical conclusion,” as the majority seems to suggest. The question is whether there exists a triable issue of fact.
Moreover, given the fact that the ceiling panel was within the reach of any passenger on the commuter train, the majority misplaces its reliance on the absence of evidence that passengers “generally handled the overhead panel.” Bazne, for example, involved a bus terminal escalator that shook suddenly and stopped, causing the plaintiff to fall (61 AD3d at 583). In affirming an order granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, we found res ipsa loquitur inapplicable in light of the extensive daily public contact with the escalator (id. at 583-584). The result reached in this case cannot be reconciled with our decision in Bazne in which there is no indication that the component parts of the malfunctioning escalator were handled by members of the'public (see also Parris v Port of N.Y. Auth., 47 AD3d 460 [1st Dept 2008]). Accordingly, this case should not have given us occasion to depart from the general rule that “only in the rarest of res ipsa loquitur cases may a plaintiff win summary judgment or a directed verdict” (Morejon v Rais Constr. Co., 7 NY3d 203, 209 [2006]).

 Nesbit v New York City Tr. Auth. (170 AD2d 92 [1st Dept 1991]), another case the majority relies upon, is even more distinguishable because it involves a post-trial motion to set aside a jury’s verdict, implicating standards that have no application to a motion for summary judgment.