Court Opinion

ID: 9454821
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 19:00:12.748335+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:34:19.678942
License: Public Domain

CELEBREZZE, Circuit Judge
(dissenting) .
I dissent for the reasons set forth in my dissenting opinion in DiPiazza v. United States and Deming v. United States, 415 F.2d 99. In my opinion, Government agents procurred the search warrants against premises occupied by Deming and Kuhn through abuse of the administrative summons authorized under 26 U.S.C. § 7602 which resulted in a wrongful invasion of rights secured to them under § 605 of the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 605.
In January of 1966, I.R.S. special agents purporting to act únder the authority spelled out by Congress in 26 U.S.C. § 76021 summoned telephone company toll records for Deming’s telephone numbers. These records disclosed calls from two telephones used by Deming to a telephone number in .New Orleans, La., used by DiPiazza, and two telephone numbers used by Kuhn in Lexington, Kentucky. The agents then summoned telephone company toll records for Kuhn’s Lexington numbers. These records showed a large number of calls going to Deming’s two telephones. In June of 1966, on the basis of this lead, an I.R.S. special agent called Kuhn’s Lexington telephone numbers and placed wagers with parties there. On July 22, 1966, Government agents obtained search warrants and simultaneously raided premises occupied by Deming and Kuhn. Appellants were convicted on the basis of the evidence seized in these raids.
Appellants moved to suppress the evidence seized. During the hearing on the motions, the I.R.S. special agent who was in charge of the investigation in these cases and led the raid against Deming’s premises testified that he made his investigation “for the purpose of prosecution.” In Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 449, 84 S.Ct. 508, 513, 11 L.Ed.2d 459 (1964), however, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the § 7602 summons could not be used “for the improper purpose of obtaining evidence for use in a criminal prosecution.” Consequently, I submit that the summons used by the Government to obtain Appellants’ toll records were not “other lawful authority” within the meaning of § 605. Since I believe that the judgments should be reversed on this basis, I express no opinion regarding Appellants’ contention *113that the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 88 S.Ct. 697, 19 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) and Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62, 88 S.Ct. 709, 19 L.Ed.2d 906 (1968) bar the introduction of the evidence seized during the raid of their premises.

. Section 7602 authorizes I.R.S. agents to summon records for these purposes: “[T]o ascertain [ing] the correctness of any return * * * where none has been made, determin[e] the liability of any person for any internal revenue tax or the liability at law or in equity of any transferee or fiduciary of any person in respect of any internal revenue tax, or collecting any such liability * *