Court Opinion

ID: 9962177
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-22 21:19:05.340421+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:58.136415
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

 IN RE POST-SENTENCE REVIEW
 OF:                                             No. 84706-6-I

 AIKEEM ROBERTS,                                 DIVISION ONE

                     Respondent.                 PUBLISHED OPINION

      MANN, J. — When a defendant has been sentenced to a drug offender

sentencing alternative (DOSA) and violated its terms or requirements, a court has

discretion under RCW 9.94A.660(7) to revoke the DOSA and impose a term of total

confinement within the standard range for the defendant’s current offense. Here, the

trial court exceeded its authority under RCW 9.94A.660(7) by revoking the defendant’s

residential treatment-based DOSA and converting the sentence to a prison-based

DOSA. As a result, we grant the Department of Corrections’ postsentence petition for

review. We reverse and remand for the trial court to impose a term of confinement

within the standard range as required by RCW 9.94A.660(7)(c).

                                           I

      Aikeem Roberts pleaded guilty to malicious mischief in the second degree, and in

March 2022, the trial court imposed a residential DOSA. The court imposed 30 days of

jail time and 24 months of community custody, to be supervised by the Department of
No. 84706-6-I/2

Corrections (Department), on the condition that Roberts enter and remain in a

residential substance use disorder treatment program for a period of up to six months.

       In April 2022, Roberts was scheduled to be released from jail and transferred to a

treatment facility, but he refused to go. The Department charged Roberts with violating

the conditions of his DOSA, but the trial court declined to impose sanctions, and instead

allowed Roberts another opportunity to enter a treatment facility.

       On July 25, 2022, Roberts was admitted to a treatment facility and completed the

intake process. But the next day—less than 24 hours after reporting for treatment—

Roberts left the facility.

       The court held a hearing on August 19, 2022, to address new allegations that

Roberts violated his DOSA by aborting treatment and failing to contact his community

corrections officer afterward. Roberts conceded guilt as to both allegations, but urged

the court to return him to treatment. The court declined to return Roberts to treatment

for a third time and revoked his DOSA, as the State recommended. The court

continued the hearing and ordered supplemental briefing on whether it was appropriate

to impose sanctions under the general statute that applies to all DOSAs, RCW

9.94A.660(7) (requiring, upon revocation, a term of confinement within the standard

range), or under a statute applicable only to residential DOSAs, RCW 9.94A.664(4)

(providing for the imposition of a term of confinement of one-half of the midpoint of the

standard range, followed by community custody, if authorized).

       Based on the briefing and argument at a subsequent hearing, the court

determined that the residential DOSA provision, RCW 9.94A.664(4), was inapplicable

because the statutory prerequisites for those sanctions to apply were not met. Based

                                                2
No. 84706-6-I/3

on the standard range of between 22 and 29 months, the State recommended that the

court impose a term of 22 months. The defense requested an exceptional sentence

below the standard range. But also, for the first time at the hearing, Roberts argued in

the alternative that the trial court had authority to convert his residential DOSA to a

prison-based DOSA under RCW 9.94A.662. The court continued the hearing again to

allow the State to respond.

       At the third hearing, on October 7, 2022, the court found no basis to impose an

exceptional sentence below the range, but decided to impose a prison-based DOSA,

over the State’s objection. The court found that RCW 9.94A.660(7) did not clearly

preclude conversion of Roberts’s DOSA to a prison-based DOSA. The court also

observed that allowing a defendant to be transferred from one DOSA program to

another is consistent with the DOSA statutes’ objective of providing meaningful

treatment.

       The court entered an order revoking Roberts’s residential DOSA. The

“commitment order” portion of the order provides, in preprinted language, that

“[p]ursuant to RCW 9.94A.660(7), the court orders the defendant to serve a term of total

confinement within the standard range of the defendant’s current offense,” and correctly

identifies the range as between 22 and 29 months. But in the next part of that section,

the court imposed a 12.75-month term of confinement, explaining by handwritten

notation that the sentence is a “Prison-based DOSA” to be followed by an equal-length

term of community custody.

       After unsuccessfully petitioning the court to impose a term of confinement under

RCW 9.94A.660(7), the Department sought review in this court.

                                                 3
No. 84706-6-I/4

                                                  II

       The Department argues, and the State agrees, that the trial court exceeded its

authority under RCW 9.94A.660(7) when it revoked Roberts’s residential treatment-

based DOSA and converted his sentence to a prison-based DOSA under RCW

9.94A.662.

       A trial court may only impose a sentence that is authorized by statute. In re

Postsentence Rev. of Leach, 161 Wn.2d 180, 184, 163 P.3d 782 (2007). The trial

court’s discretion in sentencing is limited to discretion specifically conferred by the

legislature. State v. Ammons, 105 Wn.2d 175, 181, 713 P.2d 719 (1986); State v.

Shove, 113 Wn.2d 83, 89 n.3, 776 P.2d 132 (1989).

       RCW 9.94A.585(7) authorizes the Department to seek review of legally

erroneous sentences. We review such claims of error de novo. In re Postsentence

Rev. of Combs, 176 Wn. App. 112, 116, 308 P.3d 763 (2013). In particular, whether a

trial court exceeded its authority under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA),

chapter 9.94A RCW, is a question of law we review de novo. State v. Button, 184 Wn.

App. 442, 446, 339 P.3d 182 (2014). “When a trial court exceeds its sentencing

authority under the SRA, it commits reversible error.” State v. Murray, 118 Wn. App.

518, 522, 77 P.3d 1188 (2003).

        Issues of statutory interpretation are also legal questions subject to de novo

review. State v. Evans, 177 Wn.2d 186, 191, 298 P.3d 724 (2013). “The primary goal

in statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature.”

Nat’l Elec. Contractors Ass’n, Cascade Chapter v. Riveland, 138 Wn.2d 9, 19, 978 P.2d

481 (1999). Legislative intent is derived, when possible, “solely from the plain language

                                                  4
No. 84706-6-I/5

enacted by the legislature, considering the text of the provision in question, the context

of the statute in which the provision is found, related provisions, amendments to the

provision, and the statutory scheme as a whole.” Cashmere Valley Bank v. Dep’t of

Revenue, 181 Wn.2d 622, 631, 344 P.3d 1100 (2014). “Where the meaning of statutory

language is plain on its face, we must give effect to that plain meaning as an expression

of legislative intent.” State v. Alvarado, 164 Wn.2d 556, 562, 192 P.3d 345 (2008).

       RCW 9.94A.660 governs both prison-based and residential treatment-based

DOSAs. If an offender meets the requirements in RCW 9.94A.660(1), then the court will

“waive” the standard range sentence and “impose a sentence consisting of either a

prison-based alternative under RCW 9.94A.662 or a residential substance use disorder

treatment-based alternative under RCW 9.94A.664.” RCW 9.94A.660(3). RCW

9.94A.660 also includes provisions that allow the court to adjust a DOSA’s conditions or

impose sanctions if a defendant violates the conditions or requirements or fails to make

satisfactory progress in treatment.

       RCW 9.94A.660(7) provides, in relevant part:

       (a)    The court may bring any offender sentenced under this section back
              into court at any time on its own initiative to evaluate the offender’s
              progress in treatment or to determine if any violations of the
              conditions of the sentence have occurred.

       (b)    If the offender is brought back to court, the court may modify the
              conditions of the community custody, or impose sanctions under (c) of
              this subsection.

       (c)    The court may order the offender to serve a term of total confinement
              within the standard range of the offender’s current offense at any time
              during the period of community custody if the offender violates the
              conditions or requirements of the sentence or if the offender is failing
              to make satisfactory progress in treatment.

(Emphasis added.)

                                                5
No. 84706-6-I/6

         The residential treatment-based DOSA statute, RCW 9.94A.664(4), provides for

alternative sanctions in certain circumstances. State v. Church, 5 Wn. App. 2d 577,

582, 428 P.3d 150 (2018) (authority to impose sanctions under RCW 9.94A.664

requires satisfaction of the statute’s prerequisites). But here, after finding that sanctions

under the residential DOSA statute did not apply, the trial court expressly proceeded

under the general DOSA provision, RCW 9.94A.660(7).

         The only sanction authorized by RCW 9.94A.660(7)(c) is a term of confinement

within the standard range. The trial court here imposed a term of confinement of 12.75

months, which falls outside the standard range. The court also imposed 12.75 months

of community custody, when the governing statute, RCW 9.94A.701, does not authorize

community custody for Roberts’s crime of conviction. See RCW 9.94A.701; RCW

9.94A.030(58) (community custody is not applicable to nonviolent crime against

property).

         Roberts contends that the trial court acted within its discretion because a prison-

based DOSA is a form of a standard range sentence. Roberts also claims that RCW

9.94A.660(7) is ambiguous and the rule of lenity applies. See State v. Roberts, 117

Wn.2d 576, 586, 817 P.2d 855 (1991) (ambiguous criminal statute should be construed

leniently). And finally, Roberts relies on State v. W.C.F., 97 Wn. App. 401, 403-04, 985

P.2d 946 (1999), to argue that the permissive language of RCW 9.94A.660(7) allows

the court to impose sanctions other than a term of confinement within the standard

range.

         Although some courts have characterized a DOSA as “an alternative form of [a]

standard range sentence,” rather than an “exceptional sentence,” RCW 9.94A.660(7)(c)

                                                  6
No. 84706-6-I/7

requires not merely a standard range sentence, but requires imposition of a “term of

total confinement within the standard range” for the current offense. State v. Murray,

128 Wn. App. 718, 726, 116 P.3d 1072 (2005); RCW 9.94A.660(7)(c). RCW

9.94A.660(7) is susceptible to only one reasonable interpretation. The statute uses

“may” and not “must” to convey that when a defendant is brought to court to address

alleged violations or inadequate progress in treatment, the court is authorized, but not

required, to modify the DOSA conditions or impose sanctions under subsection (c).

Nothing in the statute implies that the court has discretion to impose sanctions other

than those described in subsection (c). In other words, while the sanction authorized by

RCW 9.94A.660(7)(c) is discretionary, it is the only sanction that the court may impose

when the court acts under the authority of the statute. See State v. Salazar, 13 Wn.

App. 2d 880, 883, 468 P.3d 661 (2020) (when an offender serving a DOSA sentence in

the community violates DOSA conditions, “the trial court has carte blanche to maintain

the DOSA sentence, modify it, or impose its own prison sentence within the standard

range”).

      Because RCW 9.94A.660(7) is not subject to more than one reasonable

interpretation, the rule of lenity does not apply. See State v. McGee, 122 Wn.2d 783,

787, 864 P.2d 912 (1993). Moreover, as the Department points out, Roberts’s reliance

on W.C.F. is unavailing. As we observed in W.C.F., in matters governed by the SRA,

trial courts are “constrained by the enforcement measures expressly authorized” by

those provisions, while the Juvenile Justice Act of 1977, chapter 13.40 RCW, does not

                                                7
No. 84706-6-I/8

prescribe specific enforcement measures and confers “broad authority” to the juvenile

court to modify the disposition order. 1 W.C.F., 97 Wn. App. at 405-06.

                                                     III

        Alternatively, Roberts contends the trial court erred in determining that RCW

9.94A.664(4) did not apply. Roberts thus maintains that we should remand with

instructions for the court to consider whether to impose sanctions under RCW

9.94A.664(4). 2

        RCW 9.94A.664 provides specific provisions for residential treatment-based

DOSAs. An individual sentenced under the residential DOSA statute does not serve a

term of confinement and is subject only to a term of community custody “conditioned on

the offender entering and remaining in a residential substance use disorder treatment

program” for a period of up to six months. RCW 9.94A.664(1). Under RCW

9.94A.664(4), at a “progress hearing” or a “treatment termination hearing,” the court

may modify conditions of community custody or impose, as a sanction, a sentence that

resembles a prison-based DOSA, comprised of “a term of total confinement equal to

one-half the midpoint of the standard sentence range, followed by a term of community

         1 Because we conclude that RCW 9.94A.660(7) unambiguously required the trial court to impose

a term of confinement within the standard range, we do not address the parties’ disagreement about
whether the October 2022 order imposing a prison-based DOSA amounts to Roberts’s third DOSA within
a 10-year period and whether Roberts is ineligible for that sentence under RCW 9.94A.660(1)(g) (an
offender is only eligible for a DOSA if they have not received a DOSA sentence “more than once in the
prior ten years before the current offense”).
         2 The Department contends that because its petition did not challenge the trial court’s decision to

apply RCW 9.94A.660(7), and not RCW 9.94A.664(4), we should decline to reach this “new issue”
Roberts raises in his response. But unlike the authority cited by the Department, Roberts’s argument is
responsive to the Department’s petition because the trial court’s sentencing decision was premised, in
part, on its determination that RCW 9.94A.664 did not apply. See, e.g., In re Pers. Restraint of Bercier,
178 Wn. App. 148, 151, 313 P.3d 491 (2013) (in response to the Department’s petition asserting trial
court error in prohibiting petitioner from receiving credit for community custody time served, petitioner
could not challenge trial court’s authority to revoke a DOSA).

                                                           8
No. 84706-6-I/9

custody under RCW 9.94A.701.” RCW 9.94A.664(4)(b), (c). A progress hearing must

be held “during the period of treatment,” and the treatment termination hearing must

occur “three months before the expiration of the term of community custody.” RCW

9.94A.664(3)(b).

       Roberts points out that the residential DOSA statute does not define “progress

hearing.” Roberts contends that the purpose of the August 19, 2022 hearing was to

address his lack of progress in treatment and therefore, the court could have applied

either .660(7) or .664(4). And as between the two statutes, Roberts maintains that

RCW 9.94A.664, the more specific statute, should have applied. See O.S.T. v.

Regence Blueshield, 181 Wn.2d 691, 701, 335 P.3d 416 (2014) (describing the general

rule of statutory construction when statutes governing the same subject matter conflict,

the specific statute prevails over a general statute).

       Roberts’s argument is inconsistent with the language of RCW 9.94A.664 and our

decision in Church. In Church, after the court imposed a residential DOSA, the

defendant twice failed to report to the treatment facility. 5 Wn. App. 2d at 579-80. The

trial court revoked Church’s DOSA and, rejecting Church’s argument that the applicable

sanctions were those set forth in RCW 9.94A.664(4)(c), the court imposed a term of

confinement within the standard range under RCW 9.94A.660(7)(c). Church, 5 Wn.

App. 2d at 580.

       We affirmed on appeal, concluding that Church did not qualify for the “more

lenient sanction allowed under RCW 9.94A.664(4)(c).” Church, 5 Wn. App. 2d at 582.

We reasoned that the authority to impose sanctions under .664(4) depends on

satisfaction of a number of statutory preconditions. Church, 5 Wn. App. 2d at 582. For

                                                 9
No. 84706-6-I/10

example, RCW 9.94A.664(3)(a) requires the treatment provider to send a treatment

plan to the court “within thirty days of the offender’s arrival to the residential substance

use disorder treatment program.” RCW 9.94A.664(3)(a). And RCW 9.94A.664(3)(b)

requires the court to schedule both a “progress hearing” and a “treatment termination

hearing.” The court must schedule both hearings “[u]pon receipt of the plan” from the

treatment provider. RCW 9.94A.664(3)(b). “Before the progress hearing and treatment

termination hearing, the treatment provider and the department shall submit written

reports to the court and parties regarding the offender’s compliance with treatment and

monitoring requirements.” RCW 9.94A.664(3)(c). Since Church did not report for

treatment, a treatment provider did not develop and send a treatment plan and the court

had no opportunity to schedule or hold a progress hearing. Church, 5 Wn. App.2d at

582. Thus, sanctions under RCW 9.94A.664(4)(c) were not applicable to Church.

Church, 5 Wn. App.2d at 582.

       Although Roberts did report for treatment, the result here is the same. Contrary

to Roberts’s argument, we did not hold or imply in Church that once treatment is

initiated, the court has discretion to apply either .664 or .660. Instead, we concluded

that reporting for treatment is one of the statutory prerequisites that must be satisfied for

RCW 9.94A.664(4)(c) to apply. Church, 5 Wn. App.2d at 582. Because the “plain

language in RCW 9.94A.664 is unambiguous” we declined to address the apparent

conflict between the sanctions set forth in .664 and .660. Church, 5 Wn. App.2d at 583.

In a footnote, we noted the State’s suggestion that the two statutes could be

harmonized if, upon revocation of a residential DOSA, the trial court could select the

confinement sanction that best fits the circumstances, and observed that this approach

                                                 10
No. 84706-6-I/11

appears to be consistent with the purposes of the DOSA statutes. Church, 5 Wn. App.

2d at 583, n.16. But this observation assumes circumstances not present here—i.e.,

satisfaction of RCW 9.94A.664(4)’s preconditions.

       As the trial court noted in this matter, Roberts completed the intake process at

the assigned treatment facility and a treatment provider sent a report of the intake to the

court. But that report indicated that there was not yet a treatment plan in place for

Roberts and it is undisputed that Roberts left the residential treatment facility the day

after he arrived. As in Church, no treatment plan was developed and provided to the

court and the court had no opportunity to schedule or hold a progress hearing “during

the period of treatment.” RCW 9.94A.664(3)(b). The trial court did not err in concluding

that according to the statute and under Church, the statutory prerequisites to apply the

sanctions under RCW 9.94A.664(4) were not satisfied.

       We also observed in Church that the purpose of the DOSA statutes is “‘to provide

meaningful treatment and rehabilitation incentives’” and that the same interests are at

stake when the court determines appropriate sanctions for noncompliance. Church, 5

Wn. App. 2d at 583 (quoting State v. Grayson, 154 Wn.2d 333, 343, 111 P.3d 1183

(2005)). And we noted that application of lenient sanctions under RCW 9.94A.664(4)

when an offender receives a residential DOSA but fails to undergo any treatment would

undermine the DOSA statutes’ purpose by creating a disincentive to comply with the

terms of a residential DOSA. Church, 5 Wn. App.2d at 583. Here also, if, following a

failure to participate in treatment, the court may simply shift a defendant from a

residential DOSA to a prison-based DOSA with a substantially reduced term of

                                                11
No. 84706-6-I/12

confinement, the incentives to adhere to the DOSA requirements are reduced and the

likelihood of success within the residential DOSA framework is also reduced.

      The Department of Corrections’ petition for postsentence review is granted. We

reverse and remand for the trial court to impose a term of confinement within the

standard range as required by RCW 9.94A.660(7)(c).

WE CONCUR:

                                              12