Court Opinion

ID: 9908132
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-07 19:08:01.087064+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:48:54.124776
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Taylor-Hollingsworth, 2023-Ohio-4435.]

                             IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                                   TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

State of Ohio,                                       :

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,                 :
                                                                  No. 22AP-527
v.                                                   :      (C.P.C. No. 18CR-4855)

Richard J. Taylor-Hollingsworth,                     :     (REGULAR CALENDAR)

                 Defendant-Appellant.                :

                                         D E C I S I O N

                                   Rendered on December 7, 2023

                 On brief: G. Gary Tyack, Prosecuting Attorney, and
                 Michael A. Walsh for appellee.

                 On brief: Yeura R. Venters, Public Defender, and Robert D.
                 Essex for appellant.

                   APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas
MENTEL, J.
        {¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Richard J. Taylor-Hollingsworth, appeals from the
August 10, 2022 judgment entry of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas sentencing
him to an aggregate term of 16 years in prison for committing the offenses of aggravated
robbery and felonious assault. For the following reasons, we affirm.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
        {¶ 2} On September 28, 2018, appellant was indicted by a Franklin County Grand
Jury for aggravated robbery in violation of R.C. 2911.01, a felony of the first degree (Count
One); felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11, a felony of the second degree (Count
Two); and having weapons under disability in violation of R.C. 2923.13, a felony of the third
degree (Count Three). Counts One and Two also included firearm and repeat violent
offender specifications in violation of R.C. 2941.145(A) and 2941.149(A), respectively.
No. 22AP-527                                                                                 2

       {¶ 3} On October 10, 2018, appellant pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement,
to aggravated robbery and felonious assault with firearm specifications, in exchange for
dismissal of the having weapons while under disability count and the repeat violent
offender specifications. The trial court accepted appellant’s plea and immediately moved
to a sentencing hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court sentenced
appellant to serve an aggregate term of 16 years in prison. Specifically, the trial court
ordered appellant to serve ten years of incarceration for aggravated robbery, with a
consecutive three-year sentence for the firearm specification, and seven years for felonious
assault, with a consecutive three-year sentence for the firearm specification. The trial court
ordered the felonious assault and aggravated robbery sentences to be run concurrent with
each other, and the firearm specifications to run consecutive to the primary convictions.
Appellant appealed the trial court’s sentence arguing that the plea was not made knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily because the trial court did not give any advisement concerning
the mandatory imposition of post-release control. On January 30, 2020, this court found
the trial court plainly erred during the plea colloquy by failing to advise appellant that the
sentence included a mandatory term of post-release control.                State v. Taylor-
Hollingsworth, 10th Dist. No. 18AP-873, 2020-Ohio-278, discretionary appeal not
allowed, 2020-Ohio-3018. Accordingly, we vacated appellant’s plea and remanded the
matter back to the trial court.
       {¶ 4} On August 10, 2022, the trial court held a second sentencing hearing in this
matter. Appellant, after being advised of his rights pursuant to Crim.R. 11, entered a plea
of guilty to the aggravated robbery and felonious assault offenses with firearm
specifications. The having weapons while under disability charge and repeat violent
offender specifications were dismissed nolle prosequi.
       {¶ 5} The parties proceeded to a sentencing hearing pursuant to R.C. 2929.19.
During the hearing, the state delivered an oral summary of the case. Counsel for the
appellant raised no objection to the state’s recitation of the underlying facts. (Aug. 10, 2022
Tr. at 6-7.)
       {¶ 6} According to the state, on August 27, 2017, at approximately 1:32 a.m., the
victims in this case, M.B. and G.T., stopped at the Sunoco gas station located at 2281
Sullivant Avenue in Columbus, Ohio. As M.B.—wearing a large gold chain—exited his
No. 22AP-527                                                                                3

vehicle, he observed G.T. speaking with two individuals, one of which was later identified
as appellant. G.T. heard the two individuals state that they could rob M.B. Appellant then
proceeded to brandish a firearm. To avoid an altercation, M.B. continued into the Sunoco
gas station store. Surveillance video showed that appellant followed M.B. and chased him
around the inside of the store. Appellant pursued M.B out of the store and down a nearby
alleyway. Appellant then shot M.B. in the back. While on the ground, appellant ripped the
chain off M.B.’s neck. While the unidentified individual told appellant to kill M.B, appellant
declined and fled the scene.
          {¶ 7} At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court imposed an aggregate term of
16 years in prison.       Specifically, the trial court sentenced appellant to ten years of
incarceration for aggravated robbery with an additional three-year sentence for the firearm
specification. The trial court also imposed seven years of incarceration for the felonious
assault with an additional three-year sentence for the firearm specification. While trial
court determined that the aggravated robbery and felonious assault convictions did not
merge, it ordered the convictions to run concurrent with each other but consecutive to the
firearms specifications. The trial court found appellant was entitled to 225 days of jail-time
credit.
          {¶ 8} Appellant filed a timely appeal in this matter.
II. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
          {¶ 9} Appellant assigns the following as trial court error:
          The trial court erred in failing to merge Mr. Taylor Hollingsworth’s
          convictions in counts one and two at sentencing in violation of R.C. 2941.25,
          the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and
          Article I, Section 10 and 16 of the Ohio Constitution.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
          {¶ 10} A trial court’s decision as to whether multiple offenses merge, pursuant to
R.C. 2941.25, is a judicial determination, which we review de novo. State v. Bailey, __
Ohio St. __, 2022-Ohio-4407, ¶ 6, citing State v. Williams, 134 Ohio St.3d 482, 2012-Ohio-
5699, ¶ 1; State v. McKnight, 10th Dist. No. 20AP-595, 2022-Ohio-591, ¶ 34, citing State v.
Flood, 10th Dist. No. 18AP-206, 2019-Ohio-2524, ¶ 25.
No. 22AP-527                                                                                4

IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS
       A. Appellant’s Sole Assignment of Error
       {¶ 11} In appellant’s sole assignment of error, he argues that the trial court erred by
failing to merge the aggravated robbery and felonious assault convictions.
       {¶ 12} The legal doctrine of merger is rooted in the Double Jeopardy Clause of the
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution as made applicable to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment. State v. Pendleton, 163 Ohio St.3d 114, 2020-Ohio-
6833, ¶ 8. The Ohio Constitution similarly provides, “[n]o person shall be twice put in
jeopardy for the same offense.” Ohio Constitution, Article I, Section 10. Among the
protections afforded under the Double Jeopardy Clause, is the protection against multiple
punishments for the same offense. State v. Ruff, 143 Ohio St.3d 114, 2015-Ohio-995, ¶ 10.
       {¶ 13} The General Assembly codified the judicial doctrine of merger in
R.C. 2941.25. The statute precludes the “cumulative punishment of a defendant for the
same criminal act where his conduct can be construed to constitute two statutory offenses,
when in substance and effect, only one offense has been committed.” State v. Roberts, 62
Ohio St.2d 170, 172-73 (1980). R.C. 2941.25 directs:
       (A) Where the same conduct by defendant can be construed to constitute two
       or more allied offenses of similar import, the indictment or information may
       contain counts for all such offenses, but the defendant may be convicted of
       only one.

       (B) Where the defendant’s conduct constitutes two or more offenses of
       dissimilar import, or where his conduct results in two or more offenses of the
       same or similar kind committed separately or with a separate animus as to
       each, the indictment or information may contain counts for all such offenses,
       and the defendant may be convicted of all of them.

       {¶ 14} Ohio’s felonious assault statute, R.C. 2903.11(A), provides: “(A) No person
shall knowingly do either of the following: (1) Cause serious physical harm to another or to
another’s unborn; (2) Cause or attempt to cause physical harm to another or to another’s
unborn by means of a deadly weapon or dangerous ordnance.” Additionally, the offense of
aggravated robbery, as set forth under R.C. 2911.01, is defined as:
       (A) No person, in attempting or committing a theft offense, as defined in
       section 2913.01 of the Revised Code, or in fleeing immediately after the
       attempt or offense, shall do any of the following:
No. 22AP-527                                                                              5

       (1) Have a deadly weapon on or about the offender’s person or under the
       offender’s control and either display the weapon, brandish it, indicate that
       the offender possesses it, or use it;

       (2) Have a dangerous ordnance on or about the offender’s person or under
       the offender’s control;

       (3) Inflict, or attempt to inflict, serious physical harm on another.

       {¶ 15} The Supreme Court of Ohio has shaped the nature of our allied-offenses
analysis under R.C. 2941.25 through its evolving interpretations of the statute. See, e.g.,
State v. Logan, 60 Ohio St.2d 126 (1979); State v. Roberts, 62 Ohio St.2d 170 (1980); State
v. Thomas, 61 Ohio St.2d 254 (1980); State v. Donald, 57 Ohio St.2d 73 (1979); State v.
Blankenship, 38 Ohio St.3d 116 (1988); State v. Rance, 85 Ohio St.3d 632 (1999); State v.
Cabrales, 118 Ohio St.3d 54, 2008-Ohio-1625; State v. Johnson, 128 Ohio St.3d 153, 2010-
Ohio-6314.
       {¶ 16} In Ruff, the Supreme Court revisited its decision in Johnson to resolve when
two or more offenses are allied offenses of a similar import as contemplated under
R.C. 2941.25. State v. Ruff, 143 Ohio St.3d 114, 2015-Ohio-995, ¶ 1. The Ruff court found
that when engaging in R.C. 2941.25 analysis, “courts must evaluate three separate factors—
the conduct, the animus, and the import.” Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus; State v.
Harris, 10th Dist. No. 15AP-683, 2016-Ohio-3424, ¶ 42. The Supreme Court explained that
when determining whether two or more offenses are allied offenses of a similar import as
contemplated under R.C. 2941.25, courts must ask three questions:
       (1) Were the offenses dissimilar in import or significance? (2) Were they
       committed separately? and (3) Were they committed with separate animus
       or motivation?
       Ruff at ¶ 31.

       {¶ 17} An answer in the affirmative to any of the above questions will permit
separate convictions. State v. Bailey, __Ohio St.3d __, 2022-Ohio-4407, ¶ 10, citing State
v. Earley, 145 Ohio St.3d 281, 2015-Ohio-4615, ¶ 12, citing Ruff at ¶ 31. “At its heart, the
allied-offense analysis is dependent upon the facts of a case because R.C. 2941.25 focuses
on the defendant’s conduct.” Ruff at ¶ 26. When determining whether multiple offenses
merge pursuant to R.C. 2941.25, a court must review the entire record. State v. Junod, 3d
No. 22AP-527                                                                                                   6

Dist. No. 10-18-08, 2019-Ohio-743, ¶ 60, citing State v. Washington, 137 Ohio St.3d 427,
2013-Ohio-4982, ¶ 24.
        {¶ 18} Since Ruff, the Supreme Court has rejected “a bright-line rule for analyzing
the issue of multiple punishments because a one-size-fits-all rule will not work in every
situation. [Ruff] at ¶ 30. Rather, an allied-offenses analysis must be driven by the facts of
each case.” State v. Ramunas, __Ohio St.3d__, 2022-Ohio-4199, ¶ 22 (Fischer, J.,
dissenting). “[B]ecause an offense may be committed in a variety of ways[,] and the
offenses committed may have different import,” the Ruff analysis must focus on the
appellant’s conduct to resolve whether one or more convictions may result. Ramunas at
¶ 22 (Fischer, J., dissenting). While a court’s R.C. 2941.25 analysis has been properly
applied as a legal question, “it necessarily turns on an analysis of the facts, which can lead
to exceedingly fine distinctions.” Bailey, 2022-Ohio-4407, at ¶ 11.
        {¶ 19} Whether two offenses merge is a sentencing question and not an additional
burden of proof shouldered by the state. Washington at ¶ 18. The defendant holds the
burden to establish their entitlement to the protections under R.C. 2941.25 against multiple
punishments for a single criminal act. Id.; see also State v. Morris, 12th Dist. No. CA2019-
12-205, 2020-Ohio-4103, ¶ 15, citing State v. Conrad, 12th Dist. No. CA2018-01-016, 2018-
Ohio-5291, ¶ 44 (finding defendant failed to meet their burden to demonstrate that his
convictions for aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and kidnapping were allied
offenses as the facts indicated that the crimes were each committed separately and with a
separate animus).1

1 There is no dispute regarding the underlying facts that form the basis for the felonious assault conviction,

i.e., appellant shooting M.B. in the back causing him serious physical harm. However, the state contends there
are three separate incidents that could constitute aggravated robbery: (1) when M.B. saw appellant outside
the Sunoco and overheard, “we can rob this guy” before appellant pulled out a gun, which resulted in M.B.
fleeing into the store; (2) when appellant chased M.B. around the interior of the store while brandishing a
firearm; and (3) when appellant, while holding a gun and having just shot M.B, ripped the chain from the
victim’s neck. While appellant solely discusses the third theory in its brief, the state argues the first two
theories are equally available as a basis to find that the felonious assault and aggravated robbery convictions
were separate offenses. The state reasons that because appellant pleaded guilty to aggravated robbery in
violation of R.C. 2911.01, felony of the first degree, the nature of the aggravated robbery was never narrowed
to a single theory. The state also points to the language in the indictment and bill of particulars that support
both R.C. 2911.01(A)(1) and (A)(2) analysis. Concerning the first two theories, the state posits that because the
aggravated robbery was completed before the felonious assault, the offenses were committed separately and
do not merge. “[I]f one offense is completed before the other begins, the offenses are considered separately
for sentencing purposes even though the two offenses may have been committed in close proximity in time.”
State v. Fields, 12th Dist. No. CA2014-3-025, 2015-Ohio-1345, ¶ 18. However, because we find that the
No. 22AP-527                                                                                      7

        1. Offenses dissimilar in import or significance
        {¶ 20} Our analysis begins and ends with the first prong of the Ruff analysis—
whether the offenses were dissimilar in import and significance.                  There are two
circumstances in which offenses will be considered dissimilar in import making sentences
of multiple counts permissible. The first is “ ‘[w]hen a defendant’s conduct victimizes more
than one person [because] the harm for each person is separate and distinct.’ * * * The
second circumstance is when a defendant’s conduct against a single victim constitutes two
or more offenses and ‘the harm that results from each offense is separate and identifiable
from the harm of the other offense.’ ” Ramunas at ¶ 23 (Fischer, J., dissenting), quoting
Ruff at ¶ 26. As this case concerns a single victim, we will focus our analysis on whether the
harm from the offenses of felonious assault and aggravated robbery was separate and
identifiable.
        {¶ 21} Offenses are “ ‘not allied offenses of similar import if neither [offense] is
incident to the other.’ ” State v. Bishop, 1st Dist. No. C-220231, 2023-Ohio-947, ¶ 18,
quoting Ruff at ¶ 23. In conducting an analysis of whether two offenses are allied offenses
of similar import, we must look beyond the statutory elements and focus on the defendant’s
conduct. Flood, 2019-Ohio-2524, at ¶ 29. The evidence at trial, or during a plea and
sentencing hearing, will determine whether the offenses are of a similar import. Ruff at
¶ 26.
        {¶ 22} In the present case, first harm occurred when appellant committed the
felonious assault by shooting M.B. in the back as he fled down an alleyway. This harm
would have occurred had appellant elected not to steal the victim’s chain. The second harm,
derived from the aggravated robbery, occurred when appellant stole M.B.’s chain resulting
in the loss of property. These are two, separate and identifiable harms that preclude merger
under R.C. 2941.25(B).
        {¶ 23} Likewise, the resulting harms are fundamentally distinct in their import. The
word “import” in the context of allied offenses means “ ‘offenses of similar importance,
consequence and signification.’ ” Thundercloud v. Ross Corr. Inst., S.D.Ohio No. 2:20-cv-
4747, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48869, *21 (Mar. 16, 2021), quoting State v. Baer, 67 Ohio

felonious assault and aggravated robbery do not merge under the third theory, which is the basis for
appellant’s argument, we decline to resolve the state’s alternative arguments.
No. 22AP-527                                                                               8

St.2d 220, 226 (1981). “[O]ffenses are not allied offenses of similar import if they are not
alike in their significance and their resulting harm.” Ruff at ¶ 21. Here, the harm from the
felonious assault was a serious bodily injury, i.e., a bullet wound to M.B.’s back, while the
harm suffered from the aggravated robbery was the loss of a gold chain. Due to the disparity
in the resulting harm caused by a bullet wound as compared to the loss of property, we
cannot find that these offenses are of a similar import.
       {¶ 24} Our resolution of the first prong in the Ruff analysis aligns with numerous
Ohio courts that have found the offenses of felonious assault and aggravated robbery were
dissimilar in import and significance. See, e.g., State v. Gambino, 11th Dist. No. 2021-T-
0018, 2022-Ohio-1554, ¶ 49 (finding the “grave injuries” inflicted upon the victim during
the felonious assault and the subsequent harm from the aggregated robbery—the loss of a
wallet, keys, and cellphone after appellant shot the victim—were separate, identifiable
harms); State v. Gillespie, 12th Dist. No. CA2021-01-004, 2021-Ohio-3650, ¶ 46-47
(finding merger did not apply to appellant’s aggravated robbery and felonious assault
convictions as the harm from depriving the victim of $18 cash was separate and identifiable
from the harm of repeatedly hitting the victim with a revolver); State v. Martin, 6th Dist.
No. L-19-1133, 2021-Ohio-1615, ¶ 37 (concluding the harm from the felonious assault—
physical injury to the victim caused by several strikes to his head and body—and the harm
from the aggravated robbery—loss of property—were separate and identifiable); State v.
Shannon, 5th Dist. No. 2020 CA 51, 2021-Ohio-1396, ¶ 18-19 (concluding the offenses of
aiding and abetting felonious assault and aiding and abetting aggravated robbery resulted
in separate, identifiable harms); State v. Tellis, 6th Dist. No. WD-19-050, 2020-Ohio-6982,
¶ 80 (finding the harm and injuries from the felonious assault—striking the victim with a
pistol and causing her to hit the concrete floor—prior to the harm caused by the aggravated
robbery—the loss of her cellphone and $1,200—were separate and identifiable harms);
State v. Evans, 8th Dist. No. 108648, 2020-Ohio-3968, ¶ 123 (finding the offenses of
felonious assault and aggravated robbery were dissimilar in import, and therefore did not
merge, as they caused separate, identifiable harms); State v. McLaughlin, 5th Dist. No.
CT2017-0104, 2018-Ohio-2333, ¶ 30 (finding the felonious assault did not merge with the
aggravated robbery, kidnapping, or theft offenses as the harm to the victim was separate
and distinct); State v. Harmon, 2d Dist. No. 26883, 2017-Ohio-8106, ¶ 65 (concluding the
No. 22AP-527                                                                               9

offense of felonious assault—brandishing the firearm and shooting the victim in the face—
prior to the robbery—taking a t-shirt from the victim’s bedroom—resulted in separate and
identifiable harms); State v. Knight, 12th Dist. No. CA2016-02-028, 2016-Ohio-7991, ¶ 19
(finding merger did not apply to appellant’s felonious assault and aggravated robbery
convictions when the harm of robbing the victim at gunpoint while stealing money from a
vault was separate from the harm of striking the victim in the head with a gun); State v.
Napier, 5th Dist. No. CT2015-0044, 2016-Ohio-2967, ¶ 32 (finding the commission of the
felonious assault offense—striking the victim in the mouth knocking out his tooth—prior to
the aggravated robbery offense—using a firearm to take the victim’s money—caused
separate, identifiable harms).
       {¶ 25} Appellant alleges that the “felonious assault was incidental to and in
furtherance of the aggravated robbery.” (Appellant’s Brief at 9.) Appellant cites the Eighth
District Court of Appeals decision in State v. Sutton, 8th Dist. No. 102300, 2015-Ohio-4074
as instructive. Appellant acknowledges that while Sutton did not find the felonious assault
and aggravated robbery merged, the facts of this case fill in the gaps that were fatal to the
analysis in Sutton. A brief review is instructive.
       {¶ 26} In Sutton, the defendant lured the victim to her home for the alleged purpose
to have sex for hire but with the true intention of robbing him by force. Once the victim
entered the home and undressed in the bedroom, the defendant’s boyfriend entered the
room. Upon the boyfriend entering the bedroom, Swanson reached for his firearm, which
was located in his discarded pants. An altercation ensued over control of a firearm. Id. at
¶ 4. During the altercation, the boyfriend obtained control of the gun and shot the victim
from a distance of ten feet. Sutton then threw the victim’s car keys outside and left the
residence with the boyfriend, who was carrying the victim’s firearm. Id. at ¶ 6. Sutton was
later found guilty of, among other offenses, aggravated robbery and felonious assault. The
trial court concluded that the offenses did not merge as they were not allied offenses. While
the Eighth District Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that the felonious assault
and aggravated robbery did not merge as the offenses were committed with a separate
animus, it did find that because the serious physical harm element in both counts reference
the same gun-related injuries suffered by the victim, the offenses were of a similar import.
Id. at ¶ 60.
No. 22AP-527                                                                              10

       {¶ 27} Upon review, Sutton is distinct from the instant case in several ways. In
Sutton, the shot occurred after an altercation over control of the gun. Here, the felonious
assault and resulting harm, i.e., gunshot wound, occurred after M.B. attempted to evade
appellant by fleeing down an alleyway. Moreover, unlike Sutton, the indictment in this case
was not specific as to the serious physical harm element in the aggravated robbery charge.
As such, even under appellant’s theory of the case, the possession or brandishing of the
firearm while taking the chain could just as easily form the basis for an aggravated robbery
conviction as utilizing the serious physical harm element, i.e., the gunshot wound. Finally,
Sutton was charged with setting up the victim while her boyfriend committed the
aggravated robbery. Here, appellant acted alone in shooting M.B. before stealing his gold
chain. As often is the case when resolving whether offenses are of a similar import, the
R.C. 2941.25 analysis turns on the particular facts, “which can lead to exceedingly fine
distinctions.” Bailey, 2022-Ohio-4407, at ¶ 11. Given the differing fact patterns, as well as
the abundance of caselaw that has found felonious assault and aggravated robbery offenses
resulted in separate, identifiable harms, appellant’s reliance on Sutton is misplaced.
       {¶ 28} Accordingly, we find that the offenses of felonious assault and aggravated
robbery were dissimilar in their import and significance. Because appellant has failed to
demonstrate all the elements under the Ruff analysis, we decline to examine the remaining
factors. McKnight, 2022-Ohio-591, at ¶ 35 (“We note again that Ruff directed that if any
one of the three prongs is met, the counts do not merge.”).
       {¶ 29} Appellant’s sole assignment of error is overruled.
V. CONCLUSION
       {¶ 30} Based on the foregoing reasons, we overrule appellant’s sole assignment of
error and affirm the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.
                                                           Judgment affirmed.
                   LUPER SCHUSTER and EDELSTEIN, JJ., concur.

                                    _____________