Court Opinion

ID: 9740642
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:39:21.806949+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:19.340718
License: Public Domain

GARDEBRING, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. The City of Minneapolis has at least two specific ordinances under which it could have charged and perhaps convicted Ms. Reha. Instead, the city decided to rely solely on an ordinance requiring property owners to keep their premises “clean and sanitary.” The majority strives valiantly to find specific meaning in that meaningless phrase, but the quest is futile. The “clean and sanitary” terminology is hopelessly vague and makes the Minneapolis ordinance unconstitutional.
The majority concedes that “clean and sanitary” is not capable of precise definition but tries to sidestep that problem by arguing: (1) that Ms. Reha’s house was not “clean and sanitary” by any definition; (2) that any vagueness in the ordinance did not infringe on any important rights held by Ms. Reha; and (3) that any vagueness problems were cured by the city inspector giving specific instructions on what was needed for compliance with the city code. In my view, however, those justifications are not supported by the law or the facts, and none can save this fatally flawed ordinance.

Definitions

“Clean” and “sanitary” are relative terms, inherently incapable of precise definition. Most people would agree that a room which is vacuumed, dusted and washed once a week is “clean.” But the same room would be filthy when compared with the dust-free, ionized atmosphere of a high-tech white room where white-coated, masked, bespectacled technicians assemble micro-electronic components. Similarly, a room that is scrubbed, vacuumed and dusted every two weeks, or once a month or once every three months may be “clean” by some standards and hopelessly dirty by others. It is all in the eye of the beholder. Try as it might, the majority cannot change the simple fact that there is no uniform definition of “clean.”
Similarly, the meaning of “sanitary” changes with the context. Does one microbe of bacteria make a room unsanitary? One hundred? One thousand? One hundred thousand? One million? The answer is, it all depends. A freshly washed kitchen wastebasket may be “sanitary” for purposes of trash storage, but it probably would be extremely unsanitary to eat from. The same could be said of a kitchen floor or a toilet bowl. Whether it is “sanitary” or not depends on the purpose for which it is to be used.
Because the terms “clean” and “sanitary” are impossible to define with any precision, I dissent from the majority’s holding that Ms. Reha lacks standing to assert a facial challenge to the ordinance. A law that relies on words which have no fixed meaning, or which mean substantially different things to different people, is *694vague on its face, so the reasoning of Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982), is inapplicable. The fact that many people could agree that Ms. Reha’s home was not “clean and sanitary” is irrelevant. The constitution is designed to avoid the tyranny of the majority that occurs when fundamental rights are put up for a vote.
There are two major reasons why vague laws must be struck down. One is that they deprive citizens of fair notice of what conduct is prohibited; the other is that they encourage discriminatory enforcement. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1858, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983); and State v. Newstrom, 371 N.W.2d 525, 528 (Minn.1985). And we must be especially vigilant about vague laws that can result in incarceration. Newstrom, 371 N.W.2d at 525 (citing Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358 n. 8, 103 S.Ct. at 1859 n. 8). “It has long been settled that ‘penal statutes are to be construed strictly.’ ” United States v. Campos-Serrano, 404 U.S. 293, 297, 92 S.Ct. 471, 474, 30 L.Ed.2d 457 (1971) (quoting Federal Communications Comm’n v. American Broadcasting Co., 347 U.S. 284, 296, 74 S.Ct. 593, 600, 98 L.Ed. 699 (1954)). “It is a fundamental tenet of due process that ‘[n]o one may be required at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes.’ ” United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123, 99 S.Ct. 2198, 2203, 60 L.Ed.2d 755 (1979) (quoting Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453, 59 S.Ct. 618, 619, 83 L.Ed. 888 (1939)).
When analyzed under the strict standards that apply to penal legislation, the Minneapolis ordinance clearly fails. The ordinance does not give citizens fair notice of how “clean and sanitary” their homes must be to avoid criminal prosecution. What any given homeowner considers “clean and sanitary” may well be slovenly and squalid in the eyes of the city inspector. That invites arbitrary application of the law because it is left up to the law enforcement agent to decide what “clean and sanitary” means. The inspector’s supervisor in this case testified that the definition of “clean and sanitary” was based on “the standard of the community,” but a painstaking review of the ordinance uncovers no reference to “the standard of the community” or any community standards. Totally aside from the fact that constitutional due process rights are not subject to a community vote, the inspector’s testimony on this point underlines the extent to which the ordinance is subject to arbitrary interpretation and enforcement. Such a law cannot satisfy the requirements of due process.
The majority’s other argument on this issue is that we “can never expect mathematical certainty from our language.” Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2300, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972). As a general proposition, that is correct, but in this case it is clearly wrong. The City of Minneapolis itself has managed to plainly define the prohibited conduct in its ordinances. It simply chose not to use the specific ordinances to prosecute Ms. Reha.
The Minneapolis Code of Ordinances, § 224.960 requires that every home “have a safe unobstructed means of egress.” Likewise, section 244.600 makes homeowners responsible for the elimination of insects, rodents, vermin and other pests. Minneapolis, Minn., Code of Ordinances §§ 244.960 and 244.600 (1990).
A jury hearing and seeing the city’s evidence at trial could reasonably conclude that Ms. Reha violated both of those provisions. But for reasons unknown, the city chose to prosecute Ms. Reha only under section 244.690, the vague “clean and sanitary” ordinance. For whatever reason, the prosecutor chose to rely on a facially vague ordinance when two perfectly straightforward and clear ordinances were available, each of which gives adequate notice of what is proscribed. The result was that Ms. Reha was deprived of due process of law.

Rights at stake

The majority’s assertion that the “clean and sanitary” ordinance does not threaten *695any constitutionally protected rights is clearly wrong. The ordinance, as applied in this case, tramples upon one of Ms. Reha’s most fundamental rights, the right to be left alone, especially in the privacy of her home. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748, 98 S.Ct. 3026, 3039, 57 L.Ed.2d 1073 (1978); and Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 77, 103 S.Ct. 2875, 2886, 77 L.Ed.2d 469 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., concurring). See also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 1681-82, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965); Jarvis v. Levine, 418 N.W.2d 139, 147-49 (Minn.1988); and State v. Gray, 413 N.W.2d 107, 111 (Minn.1987).
In this case, there are competing interests: Ms. Reha’s right to live in the home environment of her choosing versus the city’s power and duty to promote health and safety. It must be conceded that Ms. Reha’s privacy rights must at some point give way to the city’s interest in general health and welfare. But that point was not reached in this case. The city’s interest in health and safety is not implicated by a failure to keep a “clean and sanitary” home because there is no way to know what that phrase means.
The city does have a strong interest in ensuring that homeowners maintain an unblocked path of egress, and probably of ingress, so that residents can escape fire, flood or other disaster and emergency personnel can enter to do their jobs without unnecessary risk to their safety. And the city has a strong interest in preventing vermin infestations and the spread of germs and disease. Both of those interests are reflected in sections 244.600 and 244.-960, mentioned above. And if this case had been brought under those ordinances, the city’s important interests in health and safety probably would have outweighed Ms. Reha’s right to the lifestyle of her choice. But that is not the case here. The city can show no legitimate interest in “clean and sanitary” homes without first defining what those terms mean.1 Because the city has failed to do so in this ordinance, its interest must be subordinated to the important right of Ms. Reha to live the way she chooses.

Administrative conduct

The majority’s other attempt to salvage this flawed ordinance is to argue that city inspectors cured any vagueness problems by informing Ms. Reha of specific ordinances requiring that exits be kept free of clutter and requiring property owners to eradicate insects, rodents, vermin or other pests. The problem with the majority’s analysis is that the thing which must be specific is the law,2 not the instructions from the government agent enforcing the law. What happened here was that Ms. Reha got specific notice of what the inspector thought was required. The inspector issued a notice citing three Minneapolis ordinances which she believed were violated by the condition of the house. But when it came time for trial, Ms. Reha’s guilt was judged solely on the vague “clean and sanitary” ordinance.
The unfairness of this can be illustrated by looking at an analogous traffic situation. Under the majority’s reasoning, the legislature could enact a statute making “bad driving” an offense. A police officer then could stop a motorist and issue a ticket for “bad driving.” When the driver asks for an explanation, the officer could say that the driver went 50 miles per hour in a 35-mile-per-hour zone in violation of Minn.Stat. § 169.14, subd. 2; drove with an obstructed view in violation of Minn.Stat. § 169.37; and failed to yield the right of way in violation of Minn.Stat. § 169.20, subd. 1. But when the case comes to trial, the driver must defend solely against the vague accusation of “bad driving.”
*696In such a case, the only specific notice the driver has of the prohibited conduct is what the officer says. Similarly, the only specific notice Ms. Reha had of the prohibited conduct was what the housing inspector said. But that is not good enough. A criminal defendant is entitled to specific notice of the alleged misconduct. That notice must come from the law and from the judge in court, not from an agent of the prosecutor.
Kolender and Newstrom stand for the proposition that vague laws are unconstitutional because they encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. What could be more arbitrary than leaving the definition of the offense to the discretion of the arresting officer? In effect, the majority is saying that any vagueness was cured when the inspector notified Ms. Reha of what the ordinance means. That would be like leaving it to police officers, instead of the courts, to determine whether searches are reasonable under the fourth amendment.
Such an approach flies in the face of almost 200 years of American jurisprudence. It is not for the executive branch to say what the law means. “It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803). In the same opinion, the great Chief Justice Marshall spoke of the American system as “a government of laws, and not of men.” Id. at 163. Yet, we are ignoring that simple legal principle today by holding that if a law doesn’t speak clearly, the words of the man or woman enforcing the law can cure the problem. I cannot join is such a result.

. In its case, the city emphasizes that Ms. Reha’s house was filled with “clutter." But by itself, the presence of "clutter" is irrelevant. It only becomes relevant if the so-called “clutter” blocks egress or harbors vermin. In addition, "clutter” may be even more vague than “clean and sanitary,” if that is possible.

. At argument, even the city’s counsel conceded that “clean and sanitary” has little independent meaning without reference to the rest of the Minneapolis Code of Ordinances.