Court Opinion

ID: 9847980
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:10:51.80179+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:52.750143
License: Public Domain

AMDAHL, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. The respondents rely upon the fact that although they were found to be negligent, through operation of the comparative fault statute, they were not liable to plaintiff. Respondents argue that this absence of liability to plaintiff shields them from appellants’ contribution claim because it precludes appellants from demonstrating the element of common liability.
Minn.Stat. § 604.01 (1976) provides for contribution “to awards” by those “jointly liable” and the majority opinion is correct in stating that “the statute makes no provision for contribution by one who is not jointly liable to the plaintiff.” Thus the statute is not relevant to our present inquiry except that it does provide one basis for common liability.
Perhaps the most difficult context in which the common liability requirement must be construed is that in which, as in the case at bar, one cotortfeasor has a defense to the injured party's action. The use of the phrase “common liability” to delineate the scope of the remedy of contribution in this context is unfortunate because the literal meaning of the phrase suggests that a tortfeasor is shielded from a cotortfeasor’s claim to contribution whenever that tortfeasor has a defense which prevents the injured party from enforcing a recovery against him. Such a literal interpretation of the common liability requirement is overly formalistic and reflects an excessively restrictive view of the purposes of contribution.1
*117Contribution is an equitable remedy designed to permit a tortfeasor who has paid more than his fair share of a judgment to obtain reimbursement from those whose tortious conduct also contributed to the injury. See, e.g., Spitzack v. Schumacher, 308 Minn. 143, 145, 241 N.W.2d 641, 643 (1976). In applying the notions of fairness inherent in the remedy of contribution to specific eases, this court has repeatedly recognized that “[cjontribution is a flexible, equitable remedy designed to accomplish a fair allocation of loss among parties [which] should be utilized to achieve fairness on particular facts, unfettered by outworn technical concepts like common liability.” Jones v. Fisher, 309 N.W.2d 726, 730 n. 4 (Minn.1981), quoting Lambertson v. Cincinnati Corp., 312 Minn. 114, 128, 257 N.W.2d 679, 688 (1977). Accordingly, we have rejected a formalistic construction of the common liability requirement in a number of decisions which have permitted contribution in circumstances in which the party from whom contribution was sought was successful in asserting a defense to the plaintiffs claim.2 In such circumstances we have examined the nature of the tort-feasor’s defense to the main action and applied the principle “that defenses that do not go to the merits of a case * * * do not extinguish common liability.” Jones v. Fisher, 309 N.W.2d at 729. Rather than applying the common liability requirement by looking strictly at the plaintiffs ability to enforce recovery against a tortfeasor, this approach looks to the policies underlying the protected tortfeasor’s defense and weighs them against the equities served by contribution.
An application of this balancing test to the case at bar entails a comparison of the policies underlying the defense available to respondents under the comparative negligence statute with the policies supporting the appellants' claim to contribution. The comparative negligence statute’s provision that a plaintiff may not recover from a defendant whose negligence is less than that of the plaintiff is a modification of “pure” comparative negligence principles that essentially reduces the scope of, but does not eliminate, the bar of contributory negligence. There is apparently no important public policy which is furthered by the comparative fault statute’s contributory negligence provision.3 Unable to discern *118any apparent justification as a matter of policy, commentators have attributed the retention of a contributory negligence provision in “modified” comparative fault statutes to a legislative compromise in the course of replacing contributory negligence with a system of comparative negligence. See, e.g., Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 Mich.L.Rev. 465, 484, 490, 494 (1953).
Balanced against the policies promoted by respondents’ defense to plaintiff’s claim in the main action are the policies supporting appellants’ claim for contribution. Contribution is an equitable remedy designed to achieve a fair allocation of damages when one tortfeasor has paid a disproportionate share of an injured party’s judgment. See Lambertson v. Cincinnati Corp., 312 Minn. 114, 128, 257 N.W.2d 679, 688 (1977). As is characteristic of equitable remedies, the policy promoted by contribution is the notion of fairness. In the context of the comparative negligence statute, this notion of fairness is expressed by the requirement that losses be allocated among tortfeasors according to the degree of each party’s culpability.4
In the present case, respondents were not liable to plaintiff because they were each found to have been 2% less negligent than the plaintiff. As a result, although the jury found them to have been only 74% negligent, appellants paid 90% of plaintiff’s damages. There can be no question that it was unfair to compel appellants to pay plaintiff an amount of money that is proportionately greater than the percentage of negligence ascribed to them by the jury. The issue, therefore, is whether the rationale underlying the defense available to respondents against plaintiff’s claim is sufficiently compelling, when weighed against this unfairness, to shield respondents from appellants’ contribution claim as well.
It is my view that the benefits to be gained from remedying the unfairness in these circumstances by permitting an award of contribution considerably outweigh any countervailing policy considerations. Respondents’ contributory negligence defense works well to control damage allocations between plaintiff and a tort-feasor or between plaintiff and jointly liable tortfeasors but finds little support as a matter of policy to justify its extension to a third party context.5 Accordingly, I would hold that a tortfeasor who is directly liable for a plaintiff’s injury may obtain contribution from a cotortfeasor whose fault also caused the injury but who is not directly liable to the plaintiff because of the operation of the contributory negligence provision of the comparative fault statute.6
*119It is suggested that an award of contribution in these circumstances would be “unfair” to respondents because they have successfully defended themselves at trial. The jury found, however, that respondents breached their duty of care and that that breach contributed to the causation of plaintiffs injuries. It cannot be argued that respondents succeeded by establishing that they were without fault or by proving that they otherwise conducted themselves in a socially desirable manner. Respondent’s “success” in avoiding direct liability can primarily be attributed to the character of the plaintiffs own conduct. However, after the plaintiff has recovered under the comparative fault statute, the character of the plaintiffs conduct is no longer a relevant consideration in the determination of the equitable allocation of loss among causally negligent tortfeasors. This point was recently made by the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine in its adjudication of an appeal which raised the same issues as those presented in the case at bar:
Since the rationale supporting modified comparative negligence concerns only plaintiffs [legal] disability and does not disavow a tort-feasor’s fault, the policies underlying modified comparative negligence simply do not come into play once an injured party has been paid his judgment by a joint tort-feasor found more negligent than he was and, therefore, directly liable to him. At that point, considerations shift solely to concerns of what is fair between tort-feasors whose negligence collectively caused injury to another. Although at first blush it may seem unfair to a tort-feasor to contribute a share of the damages proportionate to his causal fault when he is not directly liable to the injured party, we think it is more unfair for a tort-feasor to pay damages in excess of his proportionate share under the circumstances presented here. The equities clearly support allowing contribution in favor of a tort-feasor * * [who has paid damages in excess of the percentage of negligence ascribed to him by the jury], especially when it is realized that the purposes underlying the injured party’s [legal] disability not only are not frustrated, but that the purposes have no application to considerations of what is just between joint tort-feasors. On the other hand, to not allow contribution would certainly frustrate the policy * * * that tort-feasors should in fairness be required to contribute a share of the total damages proportionate to their causal fault.
Otis Elevator Co. v. F. W. Cunningham & Sons, 454 A.2d 335, 339-40 (Me.1983) (citations omitted). Respondents’ fault caused the injury of another, and I find no unfairness in requiring respondents to contribute to the cost of recompensing the plaintiff.
I would reverse the judgment that respondents are not liable to appellants for contribution. Generally, judicial decisions are applied retroactively. See American Family Mutual Insurance Co. v. Ryan, *120330 N.W.2d 113, 115 (Minn.1983). However, in consideration of the possibility of reliance upon the unavailability of contribution in these circumstances by litigants currently at trial in the courts of this state, I would direct that the decision should only be applicable to cases which come to trial, or which are re-tried, after the date of this opinion.
I would reverse.
YETKA, Justice. I join in the dissent of the Chief Justice.

. Although a common obligation is central to a claim for contribution, it is inconsistent with the purposes of contribution to make determinations regarding the existence of this common liability solely on the basis of the plaintiffs ability to recover damages from a particular tortfeasor. This point was discussed by one commentator as follows:
Apparently common liability has been conceived as being liability which is enforceable against each tortfeasor individually at some time after the tortious occurrence; but common legal liability is inadequate as one of the necessary conditions precedent to the recovery of contribution in view of its basic rationale that "equity is equality.” Instances are not uncommon when one of the tortfeasors has at the time of the tort a personal defense against the injured person which negates the possibility of personal legal liability and thus makes common liability a logical impossibility. If the purpose of contribution is to make the wrongdoers share in the financial burden of their wrong, then the primary element of contribution should be the participation of the wrongdoers in acts or omissions which are commonly considered tortious and which result in the injury of a third person. Since the element of common liability is usually present when contribution is sought, it is possible that the courts have inadvertently considered it as one of the necessary elements of contribution without realizing that it is an inadequate basis for achieving the basic aim of contribution.
Note, Contribution and Indemnity Among Tortfeasors in Minnesota, 37 Minn.L.Rev. 470, 472 (1953) (footnote omitted). See also, Note, Contribution and Indemnity — An Examination of the Upheaval in Minnesota Tort Loss Allocation *117Concepts, 5 Wm. Mitchell L.Rev. 109, 125-27 (1979).

. See, e.g., Hammerschmidt v. Moore, 274 N.W.2d 79, 81-83 (Minn.1978) (contribution permitted despite cotortfeasor’s defense of failure to provide statutory notice); Lambertson v. Cincinnati Corp., 312 Minn. 114, 127-28, 257 N.W.2d 679, 688 (1977) (contribution permitted despite cotortfeasor’s defense under the no-fault provision of the workers' compensation statute); White v. Johnson, 272 Minn. 363, 371, 137 N.W.2d 674, 680 (1965) (contribution permitted despite cotortfeasor’s defense of plaintiff’s failure to provide statutory notice), overruled on other grounds, Tolbert v. Gerber Industries, Inc., 255 N.W.2d 362, 368 n. 11 (Minn.1977); Employers Mutual Casualty Co. v. Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha Railway Co., 235 Minn. 304, 310, 50 N.W.2d 689, 693 (1951) (contribution permitted despite cotortfeasor’s defense of a covenant not to sue). See also Nerenhausen v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad Co., 479 F.Supp. 750, 756 n. 3 (D.Minn.1979) (common liability requirement modified under Minnesota law where third-party defendant not liable to plaintiff due to plaintiffs mistake in pleading).

. Because it is inconsistent with the favored principles of fault-based loss allocation which underlie the comparative fault system, the doctrine of contributory negligence has been widely criticized as inequitable. In this regard, the Supreme Court of California noted the following:
It is unnecessary for us to catalogue the enormous amount of critical comment that has been directed over the years against the "all-or-nothing" approach of the doctrine of contributory negligence. The essence of that criticism has been constant and clear: the doctrine is inequitable in its operation because it fails to distribute responsibility in proportion to fault. Against this have been raised several arguments in justification, but none have [sic] proved even remotely adequate to the task. The basic objection to the doctrine — grounded in the primal concept that in a system in which liability is based on fault, the extent of fault should govern the extent of liability — remains irresistible to reason and all intelligent notions of fairness.
Li. v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal.3d 804, 810-11, 532 P.2d 1226, 1230-31, 119 Cal.Rptr. 858, 862-63 (1975) (footnotes omitted).

. The principle of fault-based loss allocation is reflected in the contribution provision of the comparative fault statutes: "When there are two or more persons who are jointly liable, contributions to awards shall be in proportion to the percentage of negligence attributable to each, provided, however, that each shall remain jointly and severally liable for the whole award.” Minn.Stat. § 604.01, subd. 1 (1976) (current version at Minn.Stat. § 604.02, subd. 1 (1982)).

. In this regard, I agree with the view of a recent commentator:
"[T]he plaintiff's contributory negligence should not bar contribution by the second tortfeasor against the first. Both defendants have negligently and jointly caused injury to the plaintiff. The first defendant’s defense is based solely on the fact that the plaintiff has contributed in part to his own damage. There is no reason why that fortuity should insulate the first defendant from contributing to the second. Allowing recovery in contribution will not reward the plaintiff nor encourage his negligence; nor will it undercut any policy encouraging socially desirable activity by the protected defendant. Whatever purpose contributory negligence serves, its chief thrust is a comparison of responsibility for injury between a plaintiff and a defendant who is permitted to rely upon the defense. There is no reason to carry over that comparison to enhance the protected tortfeasor’s position relative to the claiming tortfeasor.
Hertz, The Tort Triangle: Contribution From Defendants Whom Plaintiffs Cannot Sue, 32 Me. L.Rev. 83, 131-32 (1980) (footnote omitted).

.This holding is consistent with that recently reached in Hudson v. Snyder Body, Inc., 326 N.W.2d 149 (Minn.1982). Hudson involved a personal injury action brought by an injured worker and presented the issue of the apportionment of damages between a negligent employer who is liable to the employee for workers’ compensation benefits and a negligent third party. The exclusive remedy provision of Minn. Stat. § 176.061, subd. 6 (1982), restricts the in*119jured worker from recovering damages from the employer in excess of workers’ compensation benefits. In recognition of this limitation of an employer’s liability under the workers’ compensation statutes, we have held that a third-party tortfeasor can recover contribution from the employer in an action brought by the employee, but only in proportion to the employer’s percentage of negligence and not in an amount which exceeds the amount of workers’ compensation benefits payable to the employee. See Johnson v. Raske Building Systems, Inc., 276 N.W.2d 79, 80-81 (Minn.1977). To protect the employer from double liability, the employee is required to reimburse the employer to the extent that workers’ compensation benefits paid to the employee have also been paid to the third-party for contribution. Id.
In Hudson the percentage of negligence attributed to the employer was an amount which, under the comparative negligence statute then in force, would have shielded the employer from direct liability to the plaintiff. Therefore, the employer in Hudson defended against the third-party tortfeasor’s contribution claim on the ground that, through the operation of the comparative fault statute, the tortfeasors shared no common liability. We rejected the employer’s argument and permitted contribution, holding “that a third-party tortfeasor may recover contribution from a negligent employer * * * whether or not the employee, in a direct suit, would have been barred from recovery under the comparative-fault statute.” Hudson, 326 N.W.2d at 158.