Court Opinion

ID: 9383021
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-29 15:15:16.813203+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:43.172296
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                  No. 22-0753
                             Filed March 29, 2023

STATE OF IOWA,
     Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

ROY LEE GARNER,
     Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

      Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Poweshiek County, Shawn R.

Showers, Judge.

      Roy Garner appeals the sentences imposed following his guilty pleas to

abuse of a corpse, accessory after the fact, and obstruction of prosecution or

defense. AFFIRMED.

      Denise M. Gonyea of McKelvie Law Office, Grinnell, for appellant.

      Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Anagha Dixit, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

      Considered by Tabor, P.J., Schumacher, J., and Danilson, S.J.*

      *Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206

(2023).
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DANILSON, Senior Judge.

       Roy Garner appeals the sentences imposed following his guilty pleas to

abuse of a corpse, accessory after the fact, and obstruction of prosecution or

defense, contending the district court “abused its discretion by considering

impermissible factors.” Upon our review, we affirm.

I.     Background Facts and Proceedings

       Garner lived with his girlfriend, Julia Cox, and her son, Steven Vogel. See

State v. Vogel, No. 21-1931, 2023 WL 1810032, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2023).

Vogel murdered Michael Williams. See id. at *3–5 (affirming Vogel’s convictions

for first-degree murder and abuse of a corpse). Following the murder, Williams’

body was transported from Cox’s home to a rural area and found “burning in the

ditch.” See id. at *2.

       In connection with the aftermath of the murder, Garner eventually pled guilty

to abuse of a corpse, in violation of Iowa Code section 708.14(1)(b) (2020);

accessory after the fact, in violation of section 703.3; and obstruction of

prosecution or defense, in violation of section 719.3(1). Garner’s plea admitted his

involvement in “mutilating, disfiguring, or dismembering a human corpse with the

intent to conceal a crime”; “harbor[ing] [Vogel] with the intent to prevent the

apprehension of [Vogel]”; and “destruct[ing] evidence to prevent the prosecution”

of Vogel. Following a sentencing hearing, the district court imposed consecutive

prison terms totaling nine years. Garner appeals.

II.    Standard of Review

       Because the sentence imposed by the court was within the statutory limits,

we review Garner’s sentencing claim for an abuse of discretion. See State v.
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Wright, 340 N.W.2d 590, 592 (Iowa 1983). An abuse of discretion occurs “when

the court exercises its discretion on grounds clearly untenable or to an extent

clearly unreasonable.”     State v. Evans, 672 N.W.2d 328, 331 (Iowa 2003).

Sentencing decisions enjoy a strong presumption in their favor. State v. Loyd, 530

N.W.2d 708, 713 (Iowa 1995).

III.    Discussion

        On appeal, Garner contends the court “impermissibl[y]” “consider[ed] the

greater crimes of a co-defendant, [Vogel,] which were not charged against

[Garner]” “and in doing so imposed the maximum consecutive prison sentences

on [Garner].” Specifically, Garner claims the court “relied in large part on the

heinous murder committed by . . . Vogel in ordering that Garner’s sentences be

served consecutively rather than suspending his sentence as requested or

ordering the prison terms to be served concurrently.”

        In explaining its reasons for Garner’s sentence, the court stated in relevant

part:

               Mr. Garner, I’ve considered my sentencing options, and those
        are provided in Chapters 901 and 907, specifically [section] 907.5 of
        the Iowa Code, which is what I am to consider in sentencing you
        based on what would provide you with maximum rehabilitation and
        protect the community at the same time from further offenses by you
        and others.
               And I have considered your age. You’re an older man. You
        do have a small prior criminal history. You’re on, I believe, Social
        Security income for disability, so you’re not employed. Your family
        circumstances obviously have become known throughout this
        hearing. And the nature of the offense committed and the harm to
        the victim, which is obvious to anybody, and your rehabilitation.
               I do find that you did play a role—a significant role in
        dissolving or disposing of Mr. Michael Williams’s body by driving
        Steven Vogel and then aiding him—Mr. Vogel in setting Michael
        Williams’s body on fire in a ditch, dehumanizing him, transporting
        evidence, and then attempting to dispose of it.
                                        4

             I do find that your actions—I find them reprehensible, and
      there’s no excuse for them. And I’m sorry for your bad health now,
      but that’s not an excuse for this kind of behavior, and it’s not
      acceptable under the laws of this state or this county.
             So the Court is going to impose the prison sentence pursuant
      to the provisions of Iowa Code Sections 902.9, 907.5, 708, 703, and
      719.3, and you’re hereby committed to the custody of the Iowa
      Department of Corrections for the maximum term of not to exceed
      five years on Count I, the maximum term of not to exceed two years
      on Count II, and the same for Count III.
             ....
             The sentences just imposed shall be served consecutively to
      each other based on the heinous nature of the crime and the
      attempted cover-up and obstruction of prosecution.

      “In reaching a sentencing decision, the district court must determine which

legally authorized sentence for the offense ‘will provide maximum opportunity for

the rehabilitation of the defendant, and for the protection of the community from

further offenses by the defendant and others.’” State v. McCalley, 972 N.W.2d

672, 677 (Iowa 2022) (quoting Iowa Code § 901.5). This requires the district court

to weigh multiple factors, “including the nature of the offense, the attending

circumstances, the age, character and propensity of the offender, and the chances

of reform.” State v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 106 (Iowa 2020) (quoting State v.

Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 725 (Iowa 2002)). The court also must “consider the

defendant’s prior record of convictions or deferred judgments, employment status,

family circumstances, and any other relevant factors.” Formaro, 638 N.W.2d at

725. There is a presumption in favor of the sentence imposed, and a defendant

must overcome that presumption by affirmatively demonstrating the court relied on

an improper factor. Damme, 944 N.W.2d at 106. “However, if the defendant

demonstrates that the district court considered an improper factor, resentencing is
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required even if the improper factor was merely a secondary consideration.” State

v. Bowen, No. 22-0278, 2022 WL 16985663, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 17, 2022).

       Here, at the start of the sentencing hearing, the court clearly stated it was

sentencing Garner on abuse of a corpse, accessory after the fact, and obstruction

of prosecution or defense—three offenses related to his activities after the death

of Williams. We acknowledge some lack of clarity in the court’s statement that it

had to consider “the nature of the offense committed and the harm to the victim,

which is obvious to anybody, and your rehabilitation.” At first blush, it could imply

the court was considering the murder of Williams in addition to Garner’s

involvement in the crimes after Williams’ death. We note, however, the court never

specifically referred to the murder of the victim while imposing sentence.

Considering the court’s statement in context, we conclude the court was

referencing the crime of abuse of a corpse and did not improperly consider

Williams’ murder in sentencing Garner. See State v. Johnson, No. 02-0676, 2003

WL 118531, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 15, 2003) (“When we consider the

statements in context, we conclude they show only a proper consideration of . . .

other proper factors, rather than an improper consideration of unproven

offenses.”). Here, Garner has not affirmatively demonstrated that the court relied

on an improper factor and thus has not overcome the presumption in favor of the

sentence imposed. See Damme, 944 N.W.2d at 106.

       Similarly, with regard to the imposition of consecutive sentences, the court

explained its decision it was “based on the heinous nature of the crime and the

attempted cover-up and obstruction of prosecution.” Again, the court did not

specify whether the crime referred to was the murder of Williams or the crime of
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abuse of a corpse. Notwithstanding, for the same reasons we noted relative to the

imposition of the sentences, we conclude Garner has not affirmatively

demonstrated the court relied upon an improper factor in imposing consecutive

sentences. Accordingly, we affirm.

      AFFIRMED.