Court Opinion

ID: 9915011
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-04 01:00:41.17714+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:16:13.066630
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-20107    Document: 00517020482       Page: 1    Date Filed: 01/03/2024

          United States Court of Appeals
               for the Fifth Circuit
                              ____________                United States Court of Appeals
                                                                   Fifth Circuit

                                                                 FILED
                                No. 23-20107
                                                           January 3, 2024
                              ____________
                                                            Lyle W. Cayce
   Jessica Banks,                                                Clerk

                                                         Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                    versus

   Daniel Herbrich; Robin Williams; Linda Juarez;
   Michael Matchett,

                                         Defendants—Appellants.
                 ______________________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Southern District of Texas
                          USDC No. 4:18-CV-2023
                 ______________________________

   Before Wiener, Willett, and Douglas, Circuit Judges.
   Dana M. Douglas, Circuit Judge:
         This appeal arises out of the removal of R.B., then a four-year-old
   child, from the custody and care of his mother, Jessica Banks, without
   parental consent or a court order. After commencing an investigation
   premised on an anonymous report alleging neglect and abuse, the Texas
   Department of Family and Protective Services (DFPS) concluded that
   exigent circumstances existed justifying the emergency removal of R.B.
   Banks sued DFPS on behalf of herself and her minor son pursuant to 42
   U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth
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                                        No. 23-20107

   Amendments. The district court denied DFPS’s motion for summary
   judgment, concluding that its employees were not entitled to qualified
   immunity because they violated clearly established law by removing R.B.
   without court order, parental consent, or exigent circumstances.                   We
   AFFIRM IN PART and REVERSE IN PART.
                                              I
                                             A
          On June 10, 2016, DFPS received an anonymous report alleging that
   Jessica Banks mistreated her four-year-old son, R.B. It specifically alleged
   that Banks drank with her family and did drugs while R.B. was in the home,
   had people in the home who used drugs, had hit R.B. on the back of his head
   with an open hand, and had threatened R.B., saying things like “give me my
   f’ing phone before I kill you.” It also alleged that Banks was a sex worker and
   a stripper, and that it was unknown who cared for R.B. while she worked, as
   R.B. allegedly did not go to day care or school. In addition, the report noted
   that R.B. was “not underweight or malnourished” and that there was “no
   known concern with gang involvement, weapons or domestic violence.”
          On June 15, 2016, Investigator Robin Williams was assigned to
   Banks’s case. Special Investigator Daniel Herbrich joined the investigation
   the next day. Linda Juarez and Michael Matchett, Investigation Supervisors,
   also assisted in the investigation. 1
           The investigation lasted from Wednesday, June 15 to Sunday, June 19,
   2016. Throughout the course of the investigation, Banks provided conflicting

           _____________________
          1
             DFPS did not appeal the denial of qualified immunity as to Matchett.
   Accordingly, we do not consider the district court’s ruling that Matchett had sufficient
   personal involvement to warrant the denial of qualified immunity.

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   information about where she and R.B. lived. 2 However, when Williams
   spoke with Banks on June 16, 2016, she expressly denied the allegations in the
   anonymous report. She denied abusing R.B. She admitted that residents of
   the Berger Road Home had a history of drug use, but she was unaware of drug
   use occurring in R.B.’s presence. She also admitted that R.B. had been
   present for a fight between her mother, Shirley Banks, and Shirley’s
   boyfriend, Justin Muesse, that occurred outside the Berger Road Home, but
   that she told him to lock the front door and hide in a bedroom. Significantly,
   Banks passed a drug test administered that same day.
           On June 17, 2016, Herbrich gathered additional information on Banks
   from Fayette County Assistant Attorney (ADA) James Herbrich.                              He
   learned that Banks physically fought another woman at the Berger Road
   Home while R.B. was present and that Shirley Banks and Muesse were
   methamphetamine users with a history of multiple assaults. Based on the
   allegations in the anonymous report, Banks’s evasiveness as to where she
   lived, and the information provided by ADA Herbrich, Williams and
   Herbrich relayed their concerns about R.B.’s safety to Juarez and Matchett.
   Juarez then involved Child Protective Services Program Director Dora
   Montoya and Fayette County District Attorney Peggy Supak to discuss
   whether there were sufficient grounds to remove R.B. if Banks was unable to
   identify a Parental Child Safety Placement (PCSP)—a temporary, short-
   term placement for R.B. Supak indicated that she believed there were
   sufficient grounds to remove R.B.

           _____________________
           2
             For example, Williams spoke to Banks outside a courthouse in La Grange, where
   she had been subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury. Banks informed him that she no
   longer lived at the Berger Road Home and had moved to Houston with her boyfriend, but
   she could not identify the address. Later that day, Banks was arrested for outstanding
   warrants and driving without a license, and at that time, told arresting officers she lived in
   Giddings, Texas.

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          After being unable to locate Banks and R.B. on June 17 and 18,
   Herbrich saw R.B. playing in the front yard of the Berger Road Home on
   Sunday, June 19. Shirley Banks and Muesse were at the Berger Road Home
   with R.B. Banks arrived home shortly after Herbrich called Williams and
   local deputies to assist.    Banks identified several possible PCSPs, but
   Herbrich and Williams rejected each for drug use or criminal history. After
   several hours, Herbrich contacted Matchett, who advised that Banks had
   been given enough time to find an appropriate PCSP and that R.B. should be
   removed. Banks did not consent to DFPS removing R.B., and DFPS did not
   get a court order because it was a Sunday.
                                          B
          Individually and on behalf of her son, R.B., Banks brought this § 1983
   suit against Herbrich, Williams, Juarez, and Matchett, all DFPS employees
   (referred to collectively as “DFPS” herein). DFPS moved to dismiss
   Banks’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims, arguing they were
   entitled to qualified immunity.
          In its initial ruling on the motion to dismiss, the district court denied
   qualified immunity, determining that the allegations in the anonymous
   report, denied by Banks, were not specific enough to suggest that R.B.’s
   alleged abuse or exposure to drugs were so recent and frequent to rise to the
   level of imminent danger. The district court further noted that there was no
   evidence that Herbrich and Williams learned any new information or
   witnessed any abusive conduct toward R.B.—beyond the allegations in the
   anonymous report—particularly on the day of removal. The district court
   stated that “[t]o the contrary, Herbrich and Williams found R.B. under the
   supervision of his grandmother playing in an age-appropriate manner without
   any indication of abuse, an altercation, or illegal drug use.” Accordingly, the

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   district court concluded that DFPS had violated Banks’s and R.B.’s
   constitutional rights.
          Relying on Gates v. Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory
   Services, 537 F.3d 404 (5th Cir. 2008), the district court further concluded
   that at the time of R.B.’s removal, the law was clearly established that it was
   a constitutional violation to remove children from their homes without
   consent, a court order, or exigent circumstances. The district court also
   relied on an “Urgent Legal Advisory” memo (“Gates Memo”) sent to all
   DFPS personnel outlining the higher threshold for emergency removals
   following the holding in Gates.
          DFPS then reurged qualified immunity in their motion for summary
   judgment. The district court again determined that the record did not reveal
   the kind of urgency or immediacy contemplated by either the Gates opinion
   or Gates Memo. Accordingly, the district court denied the motion for
   summary judgment and rejected qualified immunity to all named defendants
   for the same reasons asserted in its order on the motion to dismiss.
          DFPS timely appealed the denial of qualified immunity as to Herbrich,
   Williams, and Juarez. We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28
   U.S.C. § 1291.
                                         II
          While a denial of summary judgment is not a final judgment, the
   Supreme Court has held that it is a collateral order capable of immediate
   review when “(1) the defendant is a public official asserting qualified
   immunity, and (2) ‘the issue appealed concerned, not which facts the parties
   might be able to prove, but, rather, whether or not certain given facts show a
   violation of clearly established law.’” Walsh v. Hodge, 975 F.3d 475, 480 (5th
   Cir. 2020) (quoting Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 311 (1995)).

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            “A denial of summary judgment based on qualified immunity is
   reviewed de novo.” Wallace v. Cnty. of Comal, 400 F.3d 284, 288 (5th Cir.
   2005). Summary judgment is appropriate when “the movant shows that
   there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled
   to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “When assessing
   an interlocutory appeal for qualified immunity, however, we cannot review a
   district court’s conclusions that a genuine issue of fact exists concerning
   whether a defendant engaged in certain conduct.” Walsh, 975 F.3d at 481
   (citing Kinney v. Weaver, 367 F.3d 337, 346 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc)). In
   other words, “we can review the materiality of any factual disputes, but not
   their genuineness.” Wagner v. Bay City, 227 F.3d 316, 320 (5th Cir. 2000).
            This analysis involves two steps: (1) we must determine whether the
   plaintiffs suffered a violation of their rights as a matter of law, and then (2) we
   must decide whether the right at issue was clearly established at the time of
   the alleged misconduct. Morrow v. Meachum, 917 F.3d 870, 874 (5th Cir.
   2019).
                                          III
            Banks alleges that Herbrich and Williams violated the Fourth and
   Fourteenth Amendments. It is well established in this circuit that the Fourth
   Amendment regulates social workers’ civil investigations, Roe v. Tex. Dep’t
   of Protective & Regul. Servs., 299 F.3d 395, 401 (5th Cir. 2002), and protects
   against unreasonable seizures of children from their homes, Wooley v. City of
   Baton Rouge, 211 F.3d 913, 925 (5th Cir. 2000). Likewise, we have held that
   “[b]ecause a parent’s custody and control of her children is a fundamental
   liberty interest, the government may violate substantive due process [under
   the Fourteenth Amendment] when it takes away that right.” Romero v.
   Brown, 937 F.3d 514, 519 (5th Cir. 2019). “The procedures required for a
   constitutional search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment are adequate

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   to protect [parents’] procedural due process rights and liberty interest in
   directing the upbringing of their children.” Gates, 537 F.3d at 435.
          We first address the denial of qualified immunity as to DFPS agents
   Herbrich and Williams. We then address whether the district court properly
   denied qualified immunity to Juarez, an Investigation Supervisor.
                                         A
          The first prong of a qualified immunity analysis asks whether the
   plaintiff has suffered a constitutional violation. Walsh, 975 F.3d at 481. The
   Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee that “the government may
   not seize a child from his or her parents absent a court order, parental
   consent, or exigent circumstances.” Gates, 537 F.3d at 435. “Exigent
   circumstances in this context means that, based on the totality of the
   circumstances, there is reasonable cause to believe that the child is in
   imminent danger of physical or sexual abuse if he remains in his home.” Id.
   at 429. “This is a flexible inquiry that considers all of the facts and
   circumstances with no one factor being dispositive.” Id. In Gates, we
   enumerated a non-exhaustive list of factors to consider in abuse cases. See id.
   We tailored those factors for cases of neglect in Wernecke v. Garcia, 591 F.3d
   386 (2009). Here, we consider the following Wernecke factors:
             (1) Available time to obtain a court order;
             (2) Risk that a parent might flee with the child;
             (3) Availability of less extreme solutions;
             (4) Any harm to the child that might arise from his removal;
             (5) Nature of the danger facing the child (its severity, duration,
                 frequency, and imminence);
             (6) Strength of the evidence supporting immediate removal; and
             (7) Presence or absence of parental supervision.

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   Id. at 398. DFPS claims these factors support removal. Banks argues that the
   record supports a finding that no exigent circumstances warranted removal.
   In applying these factors to R.B.’s removal, we must view the summary
   judgment evidence in the light most favorable to Banks, as the non-moving
   party. See id. (citing Kinney, 367 F.3d at 350). The record before us shows no
   evidence whatsoever of exigent circumstances.
           Consider our approach in Gates.           There, we focused on the
   information known to defendants at the time they made the decision to
   remove the children from the home. 537 F.3d at 429. Applying the abuse
   factors, we found that there were allegations of recent (same day) physical
   abuse, corroborated by several of the children in the home. Id. at 430. There
   was no evidence that defendants could have gathered all this information
   before the courts closed that day, so it was not possible to obtain a court order
   in a timely fashion. Id. Further, defendants considered and ruled out less
   drastic options such as having the plaintiff father vacate the house or place
   the children with a family friend, but concluded he was unlikely to stay away.
   Id.   We determined that the defendants did not violate the Fourth
   Amendment rights of plaintiffs by seizing the children without a court order
   because, though a “close call,” exigent circumstances existed. Id.
          Here, the information known to DFPS at the time of removal—June
   19—included anonymous allegations that were uncorroborated and expressly
   denied by Banks, unlike the corroborated abuse found in Gates. DFPS claims
   that it could not have sought a court order before June 19 because they had
   not seriously considered removal until June 17, when Williams and Herbrich
   learned some of the “most alarming” information about R.B.’s
   circumstances. However, DFPS knew most of the information on June 16,
   when Williams first met with Banks. At that time, Banks misrepresented her
   address, admitted her family had a history of drug use, and noted that she was
   subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury about a fight between Shirley and

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   Muesse. Thus, according to DFPS’s own timeline of events, they had
   relevant information prior to Sunday, June 19, to seek a court order, a less
   extreme alternative.
          Similarly, in Wernecke, we found a Fourth Amendment violation after
   concluding that exigent circumstances to remove the children did not exist:
          Although several factors seem to weigh towards the
          reasonableness of the removal—(1) business hours were
          concluded and obtaining a court order would likely not be
          possible in a timely fashion, (2) the risk of flight was high as
          Mrs. Wernecke had already absconded with KW, and (3)
          [defendant] attempted to institute both a safety plan and a
          placement with extended family before placing the boys in
          state custody—the sum of the Werneckes’ facts does not
          indicate the existence of truly exigent circumstances. The
          presence of medications and syringes in the home, in
          childproof containers and under parental supervision, does not
          rise to the level of exigency. Nor does mere clutter in the
          home. In the light most favorable to the Werneckes, a
          reasonable person would not believe that an immediate danger
          would be posed by JW and JW remaining in the home.
   591 F.3d at 399. While drug use and violence in the home are unquestionably
   concerning, the evidence here does not establish exigent circumstances
   justifying R.B.’s removal. Notably, Banks passed a drug test administered the
   day she was located at the courthouse in La Grange. DFPS has put forth no
   evidence—or     even alleged—that Shirley and Muesse had used
   methamphetamines while supervising R.B., simply claiming that their history
   of drug use was sufficient. When Williams interviewed Banks, however, she
   indicated that the allegations in the anonymous report were false and that she
   had no knowledge of anyone doing drugs around R.B. As to physical violence
   in the home, even DFPS admits that R.B. exhibited no signs of “physical[]
   injur[y].” Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Banks, a

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   reasonable person would not believe that an immediate danger was posed to
   R.B., who was playing in the front yard in an age-appropriate manner under
   the supervision of his grandmother when he was removed.
          Finally, contrary to DFPS’s assertion, Pate v. Harbers is not analogous
   to the instant case. See 667 F. App’x 487, 487 (5th Cir. 2016) (unpublished)
   (affirming the district court’s grant of qualified immunity). In Pate, the
   district court weighed the Gates and Wernecke factors and concluded that
   there was no constitutional violation, as exigent circumstances existed,
   particularly where there was “significant evidence” of recent drug
   possession and use. Pate v. Harbers, 2015 WL 4911407, at *7 (W.D. Tex. Aug.
   17, 2015). Specifically, Pate admitted to using marijuana and subsequently
   tested positive for amphetamines. Id. at *8. At the time of the child’s
   removal, the totality of the circumstances warranted a finding of exigent
   circumstances. Pate left the child in the care of her boyfriend, who did not
   adequately supervise him, and the two-year-old was found by defendants
   with a diaper full of urine and pen marks on his body. Id.
          In contrast, Banks denied using drugs and tested negative for any illicit
   substances. DFPS does not include any allegation that Banks, Shirley, or
   Muesse, who supervised R.B. at various times, were using drugs around R.B.
   beyond the refuted allegations in the anonymous report. DFPS characterizes
   Banks and her family in the most inflammatory terms to elicit an emotional
   response, but there was insufficient evidence to support the conclusion that
   R.B.’s life and limb were in imminent danger. “The mere possibility of
   danger arising in the future is not enough.” McMurry v. Brunner, No. 21-
   50888, 2022 WL 17493708, at *3 (5th Cir. Dec. 7, 2022) (citing Gates, 537
   F.3d at 429). Unsuitable as R.B.’s living situation may have been, it did not
   constitute exigent circumstances necessitating warrantless removal from his
   mother. Thus, the seizure of R.B. by DFPS violated the constitutional rights
   of both R.B. and Banks.

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                                        B
          The second prong of a qualified immunity analysis asks whether the
   right at issue was clearly established at the time of the misconduct. Morrow,
   917 F.3d at 874. The focus of this prong “should be on ‘fair warning’:
   qualified immunity is unavailable ‘despite notable factual distinctions
   between the precedents relied on and the cases then before the Court, so long
   as the prior decisions gave reasonable warning that the conduct then at issue
   violated constitutional rights.’” Wernecke, 591 F.3d at 393 (quoting Hope v.
   Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 740 (2002)).
          DFPS argues that to overcome qualified immunity, Banks “had to
   identify caselaw holding an emergency child removal was unconstitutional
   under similar circumstances.” It claims she cannot do so because, although
   the Fifth Circuit has previously analyzed qualified immunity in the context
   of emergency child removals, “none of these cases dealt with the unique
   dangers present to R.B.” DFPS further faults the district court’s qualified
   immunity analysis as failing to identify on-point precedent, overemphasizing
   internal DFPS policies, and shifting the burden to DFPS to demonstrate that
   their conduct was constitutional. We address each argument below.
          Our precedent clearly establishes that removal of a child without
   parental consent, court order, or exigent circumstances violates the Fourth
   and Fourteenth Amendments. Gates, 537 F.3d at 438 (“[N]ow that we have
   clearly established the law in this area, we expect that [DFPS], law
   enforcement agencies, and their agents and employees will abide by these
   constitutional rules and seek to involve the state courts, who act as neutral
   magistrates in these complicated matters, as early in the process as is
   practicable.”); Wernecke, 591 F.3d at 399-401 (“Fifth Circuit law clearly
   established in June 2005 that the warrantless seizure of the Wernecke boys—
   in the absence of any imminent danger—was a constitutional violation.”);

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   Romero, 937 F.3d at 521-22 (“It is thus clearly established that a court order
   or exigency is the predeprivation process that is due when social workers
   remove a child.”); McMurry, 2022 WL 17493708, at *4 (“Brunner’s actions
   violated the parents’ right to procedural due process under the Fourteenth
   Amendment, law that was clearly established as Gates placed officials ‘on
   notice that they violate procedural due process when they remove children
   without a court order or exigent circumstances.’”(citation omitted)). These
   cases have clearly established that R.B. and Banks had the right not to have
   their child-parent relationship invaded by government actors without court
   order, consent, or exigent circumstances.
           Contrary to DFPS’s claim, our precedent does not require that the
   district court identify caselaw holding that an emergency child removal was
   specifically unconstitutional under similar circumstances, nor does it require
   a case directly on point. “[I]t is not necessary that ‘the very action in
   question has previously been held unlawful.’” Austin v. City of Pasadena,
   Tex., 74 F.4th 312, 326 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483
   U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). “Instead, there can be notable factual distinctions
   between the precedents relied on . . . so long as the prior decisions gave
   reasonable warning that the conduct then at issue violated constitutional
   rights.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Accordingly,
   this argument lacks merit. 3
           Further, “[w]e do not require a case directly on point, but existing
   precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond
   debate.” Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd,

           _____________________
           3
              Even if this were required, the Wernecke court specifically found that an
   emergency child removal violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, so the district
   court did identify a case holding that an emergency child removal was unconstitutional. See
   Wernecke, 591 F.3d at 400-01.

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   563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)). Here, there is no question, based on the ample
   precedent before us, that the constitutional rights of a child and his parents
   are violated when the government seizes the child absent consent, court
   order, and exigent circumstances. Moreover, exigent circumstances have
   been clearly defined at least since Gates in 2008 to require imminent danger
   of physical or sexual abuse. See Gates, 537 F.3d at 429. That evidence is
   entirely absent here.
           Turning to the district court’s reliance on the internal policies of
   DFPS, specifically the Gates Memo, we find no error. 4 The district court
   permissibly consulted the Gates Memo in the context of notice and found
   that DFPS’s conduct contradicts it. See, e.g., Hope, 536 at744-45 (finding that
   a DOJ report buttressed its conclusion that respondents violated clearly
   established law).       Under our current caselaw, violations of internal
   procedures or policies are insufficient to give rise to constitutional violations.
   See Fraire v. City of Arlington, 957 F.2d 1268, 1276 (5th Cir. 1992) (stating
   that “even a negligent departure from established police procedure does not
   necessarily signal violation of constitutional protections”); Harris v. Payne,
   254 F. App’x 410, 416-17 (5th Cir. 2007) (unpublished) (per curiam) (finding
   no Fourth Amendment violation where, inter alia, defendants’ violation of
   internal policies “[did] not transform [plaintiff’s] claim into one of
   constitutional dimension”). But when properly supported by precedent,

           _____________________
           4
               The district court referenced the Gates Memo, an internal DFPS document
   created in the aftermath of the Gates decision which requires DFPS employees to “obtain
   consent or file for a court order prior to removal of the child unless life or limb is in
   immediate jeopardy or sexual abuse is about to occur.” It further states that a “neglect
   case will rarely support an emergency removal without a court order” and that employees
   “must have information that suggests that the child in question is in danger of harm now.”
   It lists examples of neglect cases warranting emergency removal, including “an infant at
   home alone, a case of medical neglect that has become urgent, or a toddler found wandering
   in the street.”

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   these internal procedures bolster a finding that defendants had “fair and clear
   warning” of the clearly established right at issue. Hope, 536 U.S. at 745-46
   (“Even if there might once have been a question regarding the
   constitutionality of this practice, the Eleventh Circuit precedent . . . as well
   as the DOJ report condemning the practice, put a reasonable officer on
   notice. . ..”); Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 564 (2004) (“In fact, the
   guidelines of petitioner’s own department placed him on notice that he might
   be liable. . ..”). Thus, the district court properly concluded that the Gates
   Memo undercut DFPS’s argument that exigent circumstances existed
   warranting removal.
          Finally, the district court did not improperly shift the burden onto
   DFPS, but appropriately addressed and relied on the correct standard
   concerning burdens of proof. DFPS cherry picks one statement made by the
   district court, in which it claimed that DFPS failed to offer any authority
   supporting the argument that a child’s prior exposure to drugs indicates that
   life or limb is in immediate jeopardy, supporting emergency warrantless
   removal. But, as Banks correctly argues, the district court was simply
   observing that DFPS did not point to any circumstances on June 19 to
   remotely suggest that R.B. was in imminent danger.
          In sum, relying on our ample precedent outlining the contours of the
   constitutional rights at issue, bolstered by DFPS’s own internal memo to its
   employees clarifying the higher burden for emergency removals following
   Gates, we conclude that DFPS’s conduct violated the clearly established
   rights of R.B. and Banks. This precludes the defense of qualified immunity
   at the summary judgment stage as to Herbrich and Williams.
                                         C.
          Finally, DFPS argues that Linda Juarez, an Investigation Supervisor,
   was not meaningfully involved in R.B.’s removal because “she did not

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   conduct the investigation into R.B.’s situation, nor did she order his
   removal.” Banks argues that the evidence supports that Juarez was directly
   involved in the decision to remove R.B.
          The district court found that “[a]lthough Juarez was not the ultimate
   decisionmaker, it is clear that she was personally involved in the decision to
   remove R.B.” It considered her specific involvement, including staffing the
   case with Montoya, who decided on removal, and participating in the phone
   conference with ADA Supak, who also recommended removal. Therefore,
   the district court concluded that “Juarez’s actions were causally connected
   to the alleged constitutional violation,” and denied qualified immunity. We
   disagree.
          “[T]o state a cause of action under section 1983, the plaintiff must
   identify defendants who were either personally involved in the constitutional
   violation or whose acts are causally connected to the constitutional violations
   alleged.” DeMarco v. Davis, 914 F.3d 383, 390 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Woods
   v. Edwards, 51 F.3d 577, 583 (5th Cir. 1995) (per curiam)). “A supervisory
   official is held to a standard of ‘deliberate indifference,’ which requires proof
   that the supervisor ‘disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his
   action.’” Evett v. DETNTFF, 330 F.3d 681, 689 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting
   Southard v. Tex. Bd. of Crim. Just., 114 F.3d 539, 551 (5th Cir. 1997)).
          Juarez is entitled to qualified immunity because, like the supervisor in
   Wernecke, she was “neither the ultimate decision maker, nor was she actively
   involved in the decision to remove the [child].” See 591 F.3d at 401. Juarez
   neither conducted the investigation into R.B. nor ordered his removal; she
   even admitted her lack of authority to order R.B.’s removal. She merely
   escalated the case to Program Director Montoya and remained on the phone
   while Williams contacted ADA Supak. On the date of removal, it was
   Matchett, Montoya, and Supak who instructed R.B.’s removal—not Juarez.

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          Juarez was, at most, “merely a conduit for information between” the
   investigators and the program director. See Wernecke, 591 F.3d at 402.
   Though the dissent views Juarez as more than a conduit of information
   because she escalated the case to Montoya, the supervisor did the same in
   Wernecke and we nonetheless concluded that she was entitled to qualified
   immunity. Wernecke is not distinguishable based on the number or type of
   depositions in the record. We must instead look to what the available
   evidence shows. In Wernecke, the court evaluated the available record
   evidence and concluded that it showed that the supervisor was a mere
   conduit for information, lacked authority to order removal, and was thus
   entitled to qualified immunity. So too here. Even though the quantity of
   record evidence describing Juarez’s role in DFPS is greater here than in
   Wernecke, it nonetheless shows that Juarez, like the supervisor in Wernecke,
   lacked independent authority to order removal and was a conduit of
   information between Williams and the program director. Wernecke controls
   and Juarez is entitled to qualified immunity.
                                        IV
          For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of
   qualified immunity as to Williams and Herbrich and REVERSE the district
   court’s denial of qualified immunity as to Juarez.

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                                     No. 23-20107

   Jacques L. Wiener, Jr., Circuit Judge, concurring in part and
   dissenting in part:
          I concur in my colleague’s thoughtful qualified immunity analysis and
   agree that DFPS’s conduct violated the Plaintiffs–Appellees’ clearly
   established rights. However, I would further hold that no DFPS Defendant
   is entitled to qualified immunity—including Linda Juarez. I therefore
   respectfully dissent from Part III.C of the majority opinion.
          I first highlight a few relevant facts. Robin Williams was the DFPS
   investigator assigned to the Banks case. Michael Matchett was Williams’s
   supervisor, but, because he was new on the job, Investigation Supervisor
   Linda Juarez “provided him with assistance and back up as needed.” As
   such, Williams went to Juarez with concerns about the Banks family. Juarez
   believed that the facts, recounted by Williams, were sufficiently serious as to
   require elevation to the Program Director, Defendant Dora Montoya, who
   ultimately approved R.B.’s removal. The district court denied wholesale
   DFPS’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that Juarez was
   personally involved in the alleged deprivation of Plaintiffs’ rights. I would
   affirm that wholesale denial of summary judgment.
          To state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a defendant must
   have been either “personally involved in the constitutional violation,” or
   their acts “causally connected” to the violation. Magnolia Island Plantation,
   L.L.C. v. Whittington, 29 F.4th 246, 251 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting Anderson v.
   Pasadena Indep. Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 439, 443 (5th Cir. 1999)). “[I]ndividual
   liability for a government official who violates constitutional rights . . . turns
   on traditional tort principles of ‘but-for’ causation.” Sims v. City of
   Madisonville, 894 F.3d 632, 639 (5th Cir. 2018); see also id. at 641 (focusing on
   whether the defendant “set in motion” the violation) (quoting Maestas v.
   Segura, 416 F.3d 1182, 1191 (10th Cir. 2005)). The final decisionmaker is not

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   the only defendant who can be held liable in a § 1983 case. Wernecke v. Garcia,
   591 F.3d 386, 401 (5th Cir. 2009) (holding that a defendant is personally
   involved when they are “the ultimate decisionmaker” or is “actively
   involved in the decision to remove the [child]”); see also Sims, 894 F.3d at
   639, 641 (“[S]omeone who is not a final decision maker and makes a
   recommendation that leads to the plaintiff being harmed can be liable . . . .”);
   Jett v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist., 798 F.2d 748, 758 (5th Cir. 1986) (affirming a
   defendant’s conviction even though “he only had recommending
   authority”).
          Here, Juarez “set in motion” R.B.’s removal by deciding whether to
   “approve the worker’s [i.e., Williams’s] decisions or provide directions on
   changing them.” See Sims, 894 F.3d at 641. Had Juarez disagreed with
   Williams’s analysis of the Banks case, it never would have been brought to
   Montoya, the ultimate decisionmaker, and R.B. would not have been
   removed. This is not liability based on bare respondeat superior, see Evett v.
   DETNTFF, 330 F.3d 681, 689 (5th Cir. 2003), or based on Juarez’s role as a
   supervisor, see Gates v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Reg. Servs., 537 F.3d 404,
   436 (5th Cir. 2008). It is instead based on Juarez’s personal decision to
   elevate the case to Montoya, which constitutes “an affirmative link between
   the incident and some act by the defendant.” Murphy v. Kellar, 950 F.2d 290,
   292 n.7 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371 (1976)).
          The majority analogizes to Wernecke v. Garcia, in which we held that
   serving as a “conduit for information” was insufficient to establish personal
   involvement. 591 F.3d at 402. But the level of discretion and decision-making
   power enjoyed by Juarez goes beyond serving as a mere “conduit.” See id.
   Unlike in Wernecke, in which no other record evidence linked the supervisor
   to the case, Williams’s deposition describes Juarez’s involvement. See id. at
   401 (“Notably, Mr. Wernecke’s affidavit does not mention Trainer . . . .”);
   id. at 402 (emphasizing that Trainer’s own deposition was “the only piece of

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   evidence in the record put forth by the Werneckes that contains any
   information about her knowledge and involvement”). Finally, as noted in the
   majority opinion, DFPS does not contest Matchett’s personal involvement;
   however, he did not become involved in the case at all until removal had
   already been approved. It is unclear how Matchett—but not Juarez—could
   be personally involved in the alleged constitutional violation.
          Especially given the stage in litigation, I would affirm the district court
   in its entirety, including the holding that Juarez was causally connected to the
   alleged constitutional deprivation.

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