Court Opinion

ID: 9854626
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:10:21.063811+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:11.165050
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Moore
specially concurring in the result.
Plaintiffs in error were convicted of violating an ordinance of the City and County of Denver which prohibited gambling. The question for determination presented by the record is whether the prohibition of gambling is a matter which is “local and municipal” within the meaning of Article XX, section 6 of the Constitution of Colorado. In that section of the constitution it" is provided that a home rule city may adopt a charter “which shall be its organic law and extend to all its local and municipal matters.” It is further provided that, “Such charter and the ordinances made pursuant thereto in such matters shall supersede within the territorial limits and other jurisdiction of said city or town any law of the state in conflict therewith.” Home rule cities have been granted “* * * all other powers necessary, requisite or proper for the government and administration of its local and municipal matters, * * The expressed intention of the constitutional provision was to grant to home rule cities, “* * * the full right of self-government in both local and municipal matters * * *.” It is expressly provided that “The statutes of the state of Colorado, so far as applicable, shall continue to apply to such cities and towns, except in so far as superseded by the charters of such cities and towns or by ordinance passed pursuant to such charters.”
*265By the adoption of Article XX the people unquestionably intended to enlarge the powers of home rule cities beyond those possessed by cities and towns prior to its adoption. Long prior to the adoption of Article XX, cities and towns had been given the power, “* * * to suppress gaming and gambling houses, * * C.R.S. ’53, 139-32-1 (52). This would clearly indicate that the General Assembly viewed questions relating to the suppression of gambling as matters which were essentially “local and municipal.”
C.R.S. ’53, 139-33-1 provides that cities and towns shall “have power to make and publish, from time to time, ordinances not inconsistent with the laws of the state, for carrying into effect or discharging the powers and duties conferred by this chapter, * * *.” Obviously this section does not place limitations upon the authority of home rule cities which have roots in the constitution. Article XX unquestionably contemplates that in matters local and municipal state law may be “superseded” by an ordinance within the boundaries of the home rule city.
It is suggested that the ordinance of the city of Denver imposes a greater penalty for gambling than does the state statute and that even assuming the premise that gambling is a matter which presents “local and municipal” problems the “inconsistency” of punishment between the statute and the ordinance would necessarily invalidate the ordinance. It is not true that all differences between an ordinance and a statute result in an inconsistency which is fatal to the ordinance.
It is a fundmental principle applicable to home rule cities, as well as other cities and towns, that a municipal ordinance can neither destroy a basic right created by statute nor can it authorize an act which the state law prohibits. A municipal ordinance could not legalize gambling, prostitution or other vice prohibited by state law. See 37 Am. Jur. p. 787, McQuillan on Municipal Corporations 2nd ed. Vol. 2, 697, sec. 683. There are numerous authorities for the proposition that although *266the state has prohibited certain conduct or regulated conduct in a particular way, nevertheless a municipality may exact additional requirements without creating a conflict which is fatal to the ordinance.
A number of authorities have prescribed tests for the determination of the existence of a conflict between statute and ordinance which would be fatal to the ordinance. In State v. Carran, 133 Ohio St. 50, 11 N.E. (2d) 245, we find the following:
“In determining whether an ordinance is in ‘conflict’ with general laws, the test is whether the ordinance permits or licenses that which the statute forbids or prohibits, and vice versa.”
In 37 Am. Jur. p. 790, sec. 165, we find the following pertinent sentence:
“Thus, where both an ordinance and a statute are prohibitory and the only difference between them is that the ordinance goes further in its prohibition, but not counter to the prohibition under the statute, and the municipality does not attempt to authorize by the ordinance what the legislature has forbidden or forbid what the legislature has expressly licensed, authorized, or required, there is nothing contradictory between the provisions of the statute and the ordinance because of which they cannot coexist and be effective.”
The foregoing principles were approved, discussed and applied by this court in Ray v. Denver, 109 Colo. 74, 121 P. (2d) 886.
In Ex Parte Hoffman, 155 Cal. 114, 99 Pac. 517, it was said:
“It may often, and does often, happen that the requirements which the state sees fit to impose may not be adequate to meet the demands of densely populated municipalities so that it becomes proper, and even necessary, for municipalities to add to state regulations provisions adapted to their special requirements.”
I am of the opinion that Denver as a home rule city has the power to adopt an ordinance prohibiting gam*267bling because it is a matter which is local and municipal and presents special problems in urban communities which warrant special treatment at the local level. The Denver ordinance does not permit or license that which the state law forbids; nor does it prohibit a course of conduct by any citizen which as a matter of right is conferred upon him by statute. The increased burden by way of a greater penalty which is imposed by the ordinance is not “in conflict” with the state law in a legal sense.
Solely on the grounds expressed, and not for the reasons set forth in the opinion of Mr. Justice Doyle, I would affirm the judgment.