Court Opinion

ID: 9353023
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-10 19:01:02.365384+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:06:46.337256
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-12012   Document: 11-1    Date Filed: 01/10/2023    Page: 1 of 10

                                                 [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                 In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                         ____________________

                               No. 22-12012
                         Non-Argument Calendar
                         ____________________

        JACKIE RAY ROLLER,
                                                    Plaintiff-Appellant,
        versus
        CRYSTAL HOLLOWAY,
        PAMELA BALLINGER,
        JEANIE KASPER,
        JOHN STROH,
        CARMEN GEER, et al.,

                                                Defendants-Appellees.

                         ____________________
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        2                          Opinion of the Court                      22-12012

                    Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Northern District of Georgia
                       D.C. Docket No. 4:21-cv-00065-HLM
                             ____________________

        Before LUCK, BRASHER, and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
                Jackie Roller, a Georgia prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals
        the district court’s sua sponte dismissal -- for failure to state a claim
        pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A -- of his pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983 com-
        plaint. 1 No reversible error has been shown; we affirm.
                                                   I.
               Roller filed pro se this civil action against eleven prison offi-
        cials at the Walker State Prison in Rock Spring, Georgia. Con-
        strued liberally, Roller’s complaint purported to assert claims for
        violations of the First, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments
        arising from an incident that occurred in July 2020.
               Roller’s complaint alleges these facts. While talking aloud
        to himself in the shower, Roller said the term “niggard”: a word
        Roller says he used to refer to himself having to pay filing fees in
        an unspecified state-court action. A fellow inmate overheard

        1 We read liberally briefs filed by pro se litigants. See Timson v. Sampson, 518
        F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008). We also construe liberally pro se pleadings. See
        Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998).
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        22-12012               Opinion of the Court                        3

        Roller and -- believing Roller had uttered a racial slur -- reported
        Roller to prison officials.
                Prison officials placed Roller in a “restrictive-segregation-
        isolation” unit. Roller later received a disciplinary report charging
        him with using a racial slur. The disciplinary report also cited to
        ten inmate witness statements about the incident.
               Roller attended a disciplinary hearing on 16 July 2020. At
        the conclusion of the hearing, the hearing officer found Roller
        guilty of the charged disciplinary offense. Roller was sentenced to
        14 days in isolation. During his period of isolation, Roller was de-
        nied his daily hour of recreational yard time.
               The magistrate judge conducted an initial screening of
        Roller’s complaint, as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act
        (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The magistrate judge issued a report
        and recommendation (“R&R”), recommending that the complaint
        be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
               Roller objected to the R&R. The district court overruled
        Roller’s objections, adopted the R&R, and dismissed Roller’s com-
        plaint. This appeal followed.
                                            II.
               We review de novo a district court’s sua sponte dismissal
        under section 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim, applying the
        same standards that govern dismissals under Fed. R. Civ. P.
        12(b)(6). See Leal v. Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 254 F.3d 1276, 1278-79
        (11th Cir. 2001). We view the complaint in the light most favorable
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        4                        Opinion of the Court                   22-12012

        to the plaintiff, accepting the fact allegations in the complaint as
        true. See Dimanche v. Brown, 783 F.3d 1204, 1214 (11th Cir. 2015).
               To survive dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient
        factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plau-
        sible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quo-
        tations omitted). To state a plausible claim for relief, plaintiffs must
        offer “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
        inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
        Id. “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief
        above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
        544, 555 (2007). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
        action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”
        Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
                As an initial matter, Roller has abandoned his claim alleging
        a double-jeopardy violation under the Fifth Amendment and his
        claims alleging equal-protection and substantive-due-process viola-
        tions under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Sapuppo v. Allstate
        Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681-83 (11th Cir. 2014) (“[A]n ap-
        pellant abandons a claim when he either makes only passing refer-
        ences to it or raises it in a perfunctory manner without supporting
        arguments and authority.”); Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874
        (11th Cir. 2008) (“While we read brief filed by pro se litigants liber-
        ally, issues not briefed on appeal by a pro se litigant are deemed
        abandoned.” (citations omitted)). We also need not address
        Roller’s argument -- raised for the first time on appeal -- asserting a
        violation of his right to privacy under the Health Insurance
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        22-12012                Opinion of the Court                           5

        Portability and Accountability Act of 1996. See Access Now, Inc.
        v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1331 (11th Cir. 2004) (“[A]n issue
        not raised in the district court and raised for the first time in an
        appeal will not be considered by this court.”).
           A. Eighth Amendment
                Roller challenges the district court’s dismissal of his claim for
        relief under the Eighth Amendment. Roller says he was subjected
        to cruel and unusual punishment when he was denied outside rec-
        reational time during his 18 total days of isolation. Roller also con-
        tends that -- by wrongfully labeling Roller a “racist” -- prison offi-
        cials exposed Roller to potential future bodily harm by other in-
        mates.
                To state a claim under the Eighth Amendment, a prisoner
        must allege facts sufficient to demonstrate two things: (1) an “ob-
        jectively, ‘sufficiently serious’” deprivation, and (2) that the prison
        official acted with a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.” See
        Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). “[A] prison official
        cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying
        an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official
        knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or
        safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the in-
        ference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm ex-
        ists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837.
               “In the context of an inmate’s conditions of confinement af-
        ter incarceration, the standard is that prison officials violate the
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        6                       Opinion of the Court                  22-12012

        Eighth Amendment through ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of
        pain.’” Bass v. Perrin, 170 F.3d 1312, 1316 (11th Cir. 1999). We
        have acknowledged that the deprivation “of all outdoor exercise
        time” can amount to an “infliction of pain.” See id. But a depriva-
        tion of outdoor time is neither “unnecessary” nor “wanton” when
        a “penological reason” exists for assigning a prisoner to solitary
        confinement and when prison officials are not deliberately indiffer-
        ent to “a substantial risk of serious harm to a prisoner.” Id. at 1316-
        17.
                Here, Roller has failed to allege facts showing that his being
        deprived of outdoor recreation time constituted an “unnecessary
        and wanton infliction of pain” rising to the level of an Eighth
        Amendment violation. Roller’s temporary placement in isolation
        was supported by a penological justification: Roller was found
        guilty of violating the prison’s rules prohibiting the use of racial
        slurs. Furthermore, Roller has alleged no facts sufficient to demon-
        strate that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to a known
        substantial risk of serious harm to Roller arising from the 18-day
        restriction on outdoor recreation time.
               Roller has also failed to state a plausible Eighth Amendment
        claim based on his purported potential exposure to future physical
        harm. Roller alleges no facts to support his speculative assertion
        that he will be targeted for violence by other inmates. Nor has
        Roller alleged facts sufficient to show that prison officials -- in dis-
        ciplining Roller -- acted with deliberate indifference to a known
        substantial risk that Roller would suffer serious physical harm in
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        22-12012                Opinion of the Court                          7

        the future. To the contrary, disciplining prisoners for violating
        prison rules is often necessary for prison officials to maintain order
        and to ensure prisoner safety. Cf. United States v. Mayes, 158 F.3d
        1215, 1224 (11th Cir. 1998) (recognizing that the government’s in-
        terest in maintaining order and in preventing violent altercations
        among prisoners requires “punishing individuals for violent or
        other disruptive conduct” (quotations omitted)).
           B. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
               The district court dismissed properly Roller’s procedural-
        due-process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. Roller con-
        tends that he was denied procedural due process because the
        prison’s disciplinary policy on obscene language was unduly vague,
        the disciplinary report reflected an incorrect date and time of the
        incident, and because Roller was denied copies or summaries of the
        pertinent witness statements.
               To state a claim for violation of procedural due process, a
        plaintiff must allege facts showing “(1) a deprivation of a constitu-
        tionally-protected liberty or property interest; (2) state action; and
        (3) constitutionally-inadequate process.” See Arrington v. Helms,
        438 F.3d 1336, 1347 (11th Cir. 2006). In the context of prison disci-
        plinary proceedings, a prisoner has no liberty interest to which due
        process attaches unless he can demonstrate that he suffered an
        “atypical and significant hardship . . . in relation to the ordinary in-
        cidents of prison life.” See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484-86
        (1995).
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        8                       Opinion of the Court                 22-12012

               Roller has failed to allege facts sufficient to demonstrate that
        being placed in isolation for 18 days caused him to suffer an atypical
        and significant hardship. See id. (concluding that a prisoner had no
        liberty interest protecting against a 30-day disciplinary assignment
        to segregated confinement because the confinement did not “pre-
        sent a dramatic departure from the basic conditions of [the in-
        mate’s] sentence”); Rodgers v. Singletary, 142 F.3d 1252, 1252-53
        (11th Cir. 1998) (concluding that placement in administrative con-
        finement for two months does not present the type of atypical, sig-
        nificant deprivation that might create a constitutionally-protected
        liberty interest). Because Roller has shown no constitutionally-pro-
        tected liberty interest, he can state no claim for relief based upon
        the alleged inadequacies of the prison’s disciplinary process.
            C. First Amendment Retaliation
                 “The First Amendment forbids prison officials from retaliat-
        ing against prisoners for exercising the right of free speech.” See
        Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1248 (11th Cir. 2003). To state a
        viable First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must allege
        facts sufficient to establish: (1) that he engaged in constitutionally-
        protected speech; (2) that he was subjected to “retaliatory conduct
        . . . likely to deter a person or ordinary firmness from engaging in
        such speech”; and (3) that a causal connection exists between the
        retaliatory conduct and the protected speech. See Smith v. Mosley,
        532 F.3d 1270, 1276 (11th Cir. 2008). To establish a causal connec-
        tion, a prisoner must demonstrate prison officials were motivated
        subjectively by the prisoner’s protected speech. See id. at 1278.
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        22-12012                   Opinion of the Court                                 9

                Roller contends that he was disciplined in retaliation for ex-
        ercising his right to petition the government: his use of the word
        “niggard” while complaining aloud to himself about having to pay
        fees in his state-court action. But Roller has failed to allege facts
        establishing plausibly a causal connection between these com-
        plaints and the discipline he received. Never has Roller alleged that
        prison officials understood Roller’s use of the word “niggard” as a
        complaint related to Roller’s state-court proceedings. To the con-
        trary, prison officials disciplined Roller based on a determination
        that Roller’s speech constituted a racial slur prohibited by prison
        rules. 2 Roller cannot show that prison officials were motivated
        subjectively by Roller’s supposed complaints about having to pay
        state-court fees. The district court committed no error in conclud-
        ing that Roller failed to state a claim for retaliation under the First
        Amendment.
            D. Leave to Amend
                We reject Roller’s assertion that the district court erred in
        dismissing his complaint without first granting him leave to
        amend. Generally speaking -- “[w]here a more carefully drafted
        complaint might state a claim” -- a pro se plaintiff “must be given
        at least one chance to amend the complaint before the district court

        2 That a prisoner’s use of a prohibited racial slur constitutes no constitution-
        ally-protected speech is undisputed. See Smith, 532 F.3d at 1277 (noting that,
        “if a prisoner violates a legitimate prison regulation, he is not engaged in ‘pro-
        tected conduct’”).
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                 22-12012

        dismisses the action with prejudice.” See Bank v. Pitt, 928 F.2d
        1108, 1112 (11th Cir. 1991), overruled in part by Wagner v. Dae-
        woo Heavy Indus. Am. Corp., 314 F.3d 541, 542 & n.1 (11th Cir.
        2002) (en banc) (holding that the rule in Bank does not apply to
        counseled plaintiffs). This rule applies even when -- as in this case
        -- the plaintiff never seeks leave to amend the complaint in the dis-
        trict court. See id.
                Roller contends -- without elaboration -- that the district
        court should have granted him leave to amend. Roller offers no
        details about what proposed amendments he would make. In-
        stead, Roller reiterates the same factual allegations and arguments
        asserted in his initial complaint. Given the factual allegations and
        claims involved in this case, we are unpersuaded that “a more care-
        fully drafted complaint might state a claim.” The district court
        committed no error in concluding that Roller’s complaint was sub-
        ject to dismissal for failing to state a claim upon which relief could
        be granted.
              AFFIRMED.