Court Opinion

ID: 9946650
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-29 23:02:07.975717+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:22.286540
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/29/24 S.F. Federal Credit Union v. S.F. Municipal Transportation Auth. CA1/3
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                DIVISION THREE

 SAN FRANCSICO FEDERAL
 CREDIT UNION,
           Plaintiff and Appellant,                                     A164463

 v.                                                                     (San Francisco City & County
 SAN FRANCISCO MUNICIPAL                                                 Super. Ct. No. CGC-18-565325)
 TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY,
           Defendant and Respondent.

         Plaintiff San Francisco Federal Credit Union (SFFCU) appeals from a
jury verdict in favor of defendant San Francisco Municipal Transportation
Authority (SFMTA), rejecting SFFCU’s claims for breach of contract and
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. On appeal,
SFFCU asserts various instructional and evidentiary errors. SFFCU further
challenges the trial court’s denial of its motion for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict and new trial. We affirm the judgment.
                                                    BACKGROUND
I. Factual Background
         In 1978, voters passed Proposition K, which provided free, non-
transferrable taxi medallions distributed pursuant to a waitlist. Due to
various problems with the medallion program, including an almost 15-year
waitlist, SFMTA created a new class of taxi medallions. This new class
created transferrable taxi medallions, which were available for a $250,000
purchase price.
      SFFUC became one of two qualified lenders with SFMTA to finance the
purchase of new medallions. The parties entered into an initial lender
agreement in 2010, and a second similar lender agreement in 2013.
      Section 4, subdivision (a) of the 2013 lender agreement provides that
SFMTA “shall not set the Medallion Transfer Price for the Transfer of a
Medallion below the highest Medallion Transfer Price paid by a Medallion
Holder to whom any Qualified Lender made a loan that is still outstanding to
finance the transfer of a Medallion.” In the event of foreclosure, Section 5,
subdivision (c) provides “SFMTA and Lender shall use diligent and good faith
efforts to re-transfer each foreclosed Medallion as soon as reasonably
possible, which efforts shall include, but need not be limited to, ensuring that
Foreclosed Medallions are re-transferred prior to authorizing the issuance of
transfer or re-transfer of new Medallions.” In the event SFMTA were to
terminate transferability of some or all medallions, Section 6, subdivision (a)
provides that SFMTA would, “at the request of the Medallion Holder,”
repurchase “at the Medallion Transfer Price paid” by the medallion holder “a
Transferable Medallion that is no longer transferable or assignable.”
      In connection with the 2013 lender agreement, SFFCU executed a
“Lender’s Acknowledgements and Warranties” stating SFMTA “has made no
representations or warranties to Lender with regard to the value or
profitability of Medallions, the continued demand for Medallions, or the
SFMTA’s ability to Retransfer a Transferrable Medallion . . . .”
      Between 2010 and 2013, transportation network companies, such as
Uber and Lyft, began operating in San Francisco. These companies

                                       2
negatively impacted the profitability and demand for taxi medallions. The
value of taxi medallions fell below the set sales price of $250,000, and no
sales occurred after April 2016.
      In May 2016, SFFCU began foreclosing on taxi drivers who had loan
agreements with SFFCU to finance the purchase of their medallions. At the
time of trial, SFFCU had foreclosed on approximately 285 medallions.
II. Procedural Background
      SFFCU filed a first amended complaint against SFMTA alleging breach
of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.1
      Prior to trial, the court asked SFFCU to provide a list of its theories of
breach to guide “preliminary instructions and to be able to rule on evidence
objections at trial.” SFFCU provided a four-page list containing 16 theories
of breach of contract and 10 theories of breach of the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing. Because of the length of SFFCU’s list, the court stated it
would provide “a simple instruction on breach of contract and a simple
instruction on the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.” The court further
clarified it did “not intend to specify the breaches that are claimed. That will
be, I think, the obligation if any lawyer wishes to address it themselves.”
      The parties also submitted numerous motions in limine, including one
regarding SFMTA’s police powers. The court denied SFMTA’s police powers
motion. The court explained it needed to “hear evidence” and would defer the

      1 The complaint also alleged causes of action for breach of fiduciary

duty, negligent misrepresentation, promissory estoppel, and breach of
mandatory duty. Prior to trial, the court sustained SFMTA’s demurrer
without leave to amend on the breach of fiduciary duty, negligent
misrepresentation, and promissory estoppel claims, and granted summary
adjudication as to the breach of mandatory duty claim.

                                        3
issue “until I see what the jury’s verdict is,” but noted “it’s an incredibly
significant issue in the case.”
        At trial, SFFCU relied on a legal memorandum drafted for the SFMTA,
which stated “if the market price of the Medallions falls precipitously, i.e., no
one is willing to buy for the price paid previously in a deal that a Qualified
Lender loaned on, SFMTA will end up making up the gap.” SFFCU elicited
testimony that this memorandum was the “basis for” Section 6, subdivision
(a), of the lender agreement and required SFMTA to terminate the medallion
transfer program and pay SFFCU for outstanding medallions once there was
no longer any meaningful medallion market. In response, SFMTA argued
Section 6, subdivision (a), was in fact negotiated to protect SFFCU against
regulatory decisions by SFMTA to eliminate the transferable nature of the
medallions.
        The jury returned a verdict in favor of SFMTA, rejecting all of SFFCU’s
breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant theories. The trial
court entered judgment in favor of SFMTA, and SFFCU timely appealed.
                                   DISCUSSION
        On appeal, SFFCU asserts (1) the jury instructions and special verdict
form contained misstatements of law, (2) the trial court erred in excluding
Exhibit 613, and (3) the trial court erred in denying its motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict and new trial. We address each argument in
turn.
I. Instructional and Special Verdict Form Errors
        SFFCU contends both CACI 325 and the special verdict form contained
misstatements of law regarding the elements of the breach of the implied
covenant claim. SFFCU also asserts the trial court erred in giving Special

                                         4
Instruction No. 397 because it created confusion regarding whether SFMTA
acted unfairly and without good faith.
      “Instructional error is subject to a de novo standard of review.” (Suffolk
Constr. Co., Inc. v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist. (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 849,
869 (Suffolk); accord Rodriguez v. Parivar, Inc. (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 739,
751 [“ ‘We analyze the special verdict form de novo.’ ”].) “However, the giving
of an erroneous jury instruction should not be disturbed unless, ‘ “after an
examination of the entire cause, including the evidence, the court shall be of
the opinion that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of
justice.” ’ [Citation.] Instructional error is prejudicial in a civil case where
‘ “ ‘it seems probable’ that the error ‘prejudicially affected the verdict.’ ” ’ ”
(Suffolk, at p. 870.)
      A. Relevant Factual Background
      The trial court circulated proposed draft preliminary jury instructions
and asked counsel to provide “any requested changes.” This draft contained
an unmodified version of CACI 325, which stated in relevant part, “To
establish this claim, SFFCU must prove all of the following: . . . 3. That, by
doing [s]o, SFMTA did not act fairly and in good faith.” In response, SFFCU
informed the court “[w]e think that the opening instructions you have
provided are correct and that no additional instructions . . . are required.”
SFMTA proposed various substantive edits not relevant to the issues in this
appeal.
      After input from the parties, the court circulated a second draft of the
preliminary instructions, identifying various changes, additions, and
deletions. This draft again contained the same version of CACI 325. The
court again requested the parties inform it of any requested edits. While

                                          5
SFFCU proposed revisions to CACI 101 and 338 and proposed the addition of
CACI 456, it did not raise any concerns regarding CACI 325.
      The court then circulated a third and final version of the preliminary
instructions, which included some minor edits and the deletion of CACI 338.
The court noted “I am persuaded by the parties’ emails that there is
considerable uncertainty about what the jury will be asked to decide . . . .
With that in mind, I have simply identified the parties’ principal contentions
and provided no law.” The final version contained the same version of CACI
325, and the jury was subsequently instructed with CACI 325.
      Following the commencement of trial, the trial court circulated an
initial draft of the verdict form. Two questions asked whether SFMTA acted
“unfairly and without good faith” by engaging in certain conduct. No
questions used the phrase “unfairly or without good faith.” The court also
circulated “the applicable standard instructions and the still pertinent
instructions from the preliminary set.” This set continued to contain the
same version of CACI 325 as included in the preliminary set.
      SFFCU subsequently circulated its proposed verdict form. Six
questions utilized the phrase “unfairly and without good faith” when
discussing SFMTA’s conduct. Only Question 21 used the phrase “unfairly or
without good cause” when referencing SFMTA’s conduct. However,
Questions 22 and 23, which related to Question 21, returned to the phrase
“unfairly and without good faith.”
      Following an informal conference to address the jury instructions and
verdict form, SFFCU circulated a revised verdict form “which should
hopefully track the changes we all worked through this evening.” This draft
again used the phrase “unfairly and without good faith.” No question utilized
the phrase “unfairly or without good faith.” A later version circulated by

                                       6
SFFCU used the phrase “unfairly and without good faith,” and did not
include the phrase “unfairly or without good faith.” And, again, a final
version circulated by SFFCU only utilized the phrase “unfairly and without
good faith.”
       The trial court subsequently circulated “a near-final set of
instructions.” This set included the same version of CACI 325 as in prior
drafts. SFFCU circulated proposed edits to CACI 325, but did not alter the
“unfairly and without good faith” language.
       During this review, SFMTA proposed two additional special
instructions, one of which addressed its police powers defense. That proposed
instruction stated, “You may not find that any of SFMTA’s regulation or
failure to regulate in the following areas is a breach of the contract or the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing,” followed by thirteen categories.
       The court stated it would give the police powers special instruction in
revised form. The court explained, “I will state in substance that the jury
may not consider these actions as to the breach of contract claims but may
consider them as to the implied covenant claims on the issues of fairness and
good faith.” The court then offered the parties an opportunity to make any
remaining objections on the record before it circulated the final jury
instructions. SFFCU only objected to the exclusion of CACI 456 and the
inclusion of the special police powers instruction. It did not object to CACI
325.
       The trial court circulated a final version of the jury instructions. In
connection with the police powers instruction, SFFCU requested “the Court
consider a small clarification . . . to make clear that the areas in the bullet
point list in the new special instruction are not the only areas the jury is
permitted to consider in deciding the convent claims. We propose simply

                                         7
adding ‘but not limited to these areas’ in the second sentence.” The court
adopted this revision over SFMTA’s objections.
      B. CACI 325
      SFFCU first asserts CACI 325 erroneously instructed the jury that
they could only find a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing if
SFMTA had acted subjectively unfairly and without good faith. SFFCU
contends a breach of the covenant does not require subjective belief and
instead may be found based on objectively unreasonable conduct. In
response, SFMTA asserts SFFCU’s position is barred by the doctrine of
waiver and/or invited error. We agree SFFCU’s challenge is barred.
      “ ‘ “ ‘In a civil case, each of the parties must propose complete and
comprehensive instructions in accordance with his theory of the litigation; if
the parties do not do so, the court has no duty to instruct on its own motion.’
[Citations.]” [Citation.] Neither a trial court nor a reviewing court in a civil
action is obligated to seek out theories plaintiff might have advanced, or to
articulate for him that which he has left unspoken.’ ‘. . . Where . . . “the court
gives an instruction correct in law, but the party complains that it is too
general, lacks clarity, or is incomplete, he must request the additional or
qualifying instruction in order to have the error reviewed.” ’ ” (Metcalf v.
Cnty. of San Joaquin (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1121, 1130–1131.) “Plaintiff’s failure
to request any different instructions means he may not argue on appeal the
trial court should have instructed differently.” (Id. at p. 1131.)
      SFFCU has not identified any evidence in the record indicating it
objected to the phrase “unfairly and without good faith” in CACI 325.
SFFCU’s argument to the contrary hinges on one iteration of the special
verdict form—not CACI 325—that used the phrase “unfairly or without good
cause.” Not only did SFFCU fail to object to CACI 325, but it proactively

                                        8
informed the court that the preliminary instructions, including CACI 325,
“are correct.” Following the presentation of evidence, the court again asked
SFFCU to identify any objections to the final instructions, and SFFCU again
did not object to CACI 325.
      Apart from failing to object, SFFCU also proactively relied on CACI
325. In its closing statement, SFFCU informed the jury CACI 325 “should be
your guidepost as you go through the covenant claim.”
      We find SFFCU’s conduct analogous to the plaintiff’s conduct in
Transport Ins. Co. v. TIG Ins. Co. (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 984 (Transport). In
that case, the trial court conducted an extensive jury instruction conference,
after which the plaintiff expressly agreed to the content of a jury instruction
on the statute of limitations but later attempted to challenge the instruction
as allegedly misstating the law. The Court of Appeal rejected this argument
and held that claim of instructional error was barred by the invited error
doctrine. (Id. at pp. 999–1006; accord Scott v. C.R. Bard, Inc. (2014) 231
Cal.App.4th 763, 787 [where the appellants acquiesced in an inadequate jury
instruction on the medical standard of care, they were estopped from
asserting the instructional error on appeal; otherwise, they could employ the
“ ‘win-win’ ” gamesmanship of “wait and see what the jury did,” and if the
result was not to their liking, argue on appeal the jury was not properly
instructed].) Here, as in Transport, SFFCU expressly approved the
instructions, including CACI 325, and directed the jury to utilize it in their
deliberations.
      SFFCU relies on Lund v. San Joaquin Valley Railroad (2003) 31
Cal.4th 1, 7 (Lund), to assert that legally incorrect jury instruction errors
cannot be waived. While true, SFFCU has not demonstrated CACI 325 is
legally incorrect. In Carma Developers, Inc. v. Marathon Development

                                        9
California, Inc. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 342 (Carma), the California Supreme Court
noted the challenge of “defining what is required by [the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing],” explaining “[i]t has also been suggested the covenant
is not susceptible to firm definition but” courts should “concentrate on what is
prohibited.” (Id. at p. 372.) “Notwithstanding the difficulty in devising a rule
of all-encompassing generality,” the court recognized the covenant “can be
breached for objectively unreasonable conduct, regardless of the actor’s
motive.” (Id. at p. 373.)
      CACI 325 adequately tracks these concepts. First, CACI 325 instructs
drafters to identify the allegedly prohibited conduct—i.e., “specify conduct
that plaintiff claims prevented plaintiff from receiving the benefits under the
contract.” (CACI 325.) Next, CACI 325 states “[name of defendant] did not
act fairly and in good faith” by engaging in such conduct. (CACI 325.) While
this provision of CACI 325 does not distinguish between whether the failure
to act fairly and in good faith was based on a subjective lack of belief in the
validity of its act or objectively unreasonable actions, it also does not require
a juror to rely exclusively on subjective evidence. Nothing in the instruction
precludes a plaintiff from arguing that a defendant’s failure to act fairly and
in good faith was the result of objectively unreasonable conduct.2
      At most, SFFCU’s challenge to CACI 325 involves clarity—i.e., the
instruction did not specify the way a breach may be established (subjective
lack of belief or objectively unreasonable conduct). (See Moore v. Wells Fargo

      2 As to the fourth element of CACI 325, SFFCU argues the jury was

“never properly instructed” on SFMTA’s failure to formally declare an end to
the medallion sales program when SFMTA “exclusively controlled the market
and all aspects of the Program.” But SFFCU does not identify what
instruction should have been given to address this alleged omission or
indicate it requested such an instruction.

                                        10
Bank, N.A. (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 280, 290–291.) This argument required
SFFCU to object at trial. SFFCU failed to do so, and it may not now
challenge CACI 325 on appeal.
      C. Special Verdict Form
      The parties next raise similar arguments regarding the special verdict
form’s use of the phrase “unfairly and without good faith.” We conclude
SFFCU also has failed to preserve this issue.
      An appellant “must object to or otherwise challenge [a] special verdict
form in the trial court to allege error on appeal.” (Fuller-Austin Insulation
Co. v. Highlands Ins. Co. (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 958, 1005; see also Behr v.
Redmond (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 517, 530 [“A party who fails to object to a
special verdict form ordinarily waives any objection to the form.”].) “The risk
of error falls solely on the plaintiff because it is the plaintiff, as the party
with the burden of proof, who has the ‘responsibility for submitting a verdict
form sufficient to support her causes of action.’ ” (Drink Tank Ventures LLC
v. Real Soda in Real Bottles, Ltd. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 528, 545.)
      Here, SFFCU fails to identify any objection they raised in the trial
court to the phrase “unfairly and without good faith.” SFFCU’s entire
argument hinges on one iteration of the special verdict form that used the
phrase “unfairly or without good cause” in one question. However, the record
demonstrates (1) that same draft also used the phrase “unfairly and without
good faith” in multiple other questions, (2) none of SFFCU’s correspondence
to the court on the special verdict forms advocated for the phrase “unfairly or
without good cause,” and (3) later drafts of the special verdict form circulated
by SFFCU uniformly used the phrase, “unfairly and without good faith.” The
record thus indicates the single use of “unfairly or without good cause” was
likely a typographical error rather than an argued position by SFFCU.

                                         11
      Electronic Equipment Express, Inc. v. Donald H. Seiler & Co. (1981)
122 Cal.App.3d 834 is instructive. There, the jury requested a definition of
“appreciable” as used in a special verdict question. (Id. at p. 856.) The
appellants advocated on the record for one definition. (Ibid.) In response, the
court asked if they objected to an alternative definition, and “[a]ppellants’
counsel said ‘No, I guess not.’ ” (Ibid.) On appeal, this court agreed
appellants’ objection had been waived, explaining “In all of [the cases cited by
appellants,] the party alleging error had strenuously made his objection and
then acted defensively to lessen the impact of the error. No waiver can be
predicated on this course of action. [Citations.] Here appellants did not
formally make an objection except to offer an alternative definition, and they
ultimately and expressly stated that they had no objection to the court’s
definition.” (Id. at p. 857.)
      Likewise here, the single use of the phrase “unfairly or without good
cause” does not constitute an objection to the final version of the special
verdict form, even assuming it was not a typographical error. At most, the
record can be interpreted as SFFCU proposing an alternative phrasing that
ultimately was not adopted. While SFFCU expressly raised other objections
to the special verdict form, it did not raise an objection to the use of the
phrase “unfairly and without good faith.” SFFCU thus has waived its
challenge to the special verdict form.
      D. Special Jury Instruction No. 397
      Finally, SFFCU asserts Special Jury Instruction No. 397 improperly
“called attention to specific evidence and arguments made by [SFMTA] in
defense of the breach of implied covenant claim.” It claims the instruction
“essentially told the jury that ‘here’s the list of lots of things [SFMTA] did in
good faith.’ ”

                                         12
      SFFCU’s argument is contradicted by the express language of Special
Instruction No. 397. Nowhere does the instruction state that the enumerated
actions were taken by SFMTA “in good faith.” To the contrary, it states the
jury “may consider SFMTA’s conduct as to these areas, but not limited to
these areas, in determining whether or not SFMTA acted unfairly and
without good faith as to the breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing claims.” This language instructs the jury they may consider the
enumerated conduct in finding a breach of the implied covenant. In the
absence of a contrary showing, and none has been shown here, we presume
the jury followed the court’s instructions. (Cassim v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2004)
33 Cal.4th 780, 803.)3
II. Exclusion of Trial Exhibit 613
      Exhibit 613 constituted a video of a San Francisco Board of Supervisors
committee meeting in which two supervisors questioned Kate Toran, the
director of Taxis, Access and Mobility Services for the SFMTA, regarding the
medallion program. SFFCU asserts the trial court erred in excluding this
exhibit because it is “highly probative” of its breach of the implied covenant
claim and the validity of the ongoing medallion program. We disagree.
      A. Relevant Background
      During trial, SFFCU sought to introduce into evidence Exhibit 613.
The court stated SFFCU could offer “a statement that two supervisors asked
the question of why hasn’t the [medallion] program been closed down” and
then show the video of SFMTA’s representative responding to that question.
The court explained, “The elimination of [the supervisors’] comments are

      3 Because we conclude SFFCU has failed to demonstrate error, we need

not reach the parties’ arguments regarding whether any error was
prejudicial.

                                       13
based on my view that they are unduly prejudicial and their undue prejudice
substantially outweighs the probative value of what they said. [¶] What is
important of what they said, in my view, is to ask the question why haven’t
you closed down the program, not in the way that they said it. It was
sarcastic, it was poor language, and I believe that’s – presents a prejudicial
view.”
      The court indicated it could create a paraphrase of the supervisors’
questions, if necessary, but instructed counsel to “first take a shot at it, see if
they can agree amongst themselves.”
      During his examination of Ms. Toran, SFFCU’s counsel did not seek to
introduce any version of Exhibit 613. Instead, he questioned Ms. Toran as
follows:
           “Q. Has the board of supervisors questioned you about the
      purchased medallion program?

            A. Yeah, I have attended hearings at the board of supervisors
      and it has certainly come up. And I have had some briefings with the
      board of supervisors and we have talked about taxis, the taxi program,
      yes.

             Q. And do you recall any of those supervisors asking you why the
      fiction of purchased medallions still exists?

           A. I had a lot of feedback and a lot of meetings and there were
      some very, I guess, dramatic statements from some corners. I don’t
      remember that exact phrasing, but certainly there were some intense
      meetings.

              Q. And was there also a question posed to you about why you are
      still trying to sell medallions that no one wants to buy?

           A. I think there were questions along those lines. Again, I can’t
      remember exactly, but it was certainly along those lines, yes.”

                                        14
        B. Analysis
        “ ‘A trial court’s exercise of discretion in admitting or excluding
evidence is reviewable for abuse [citation] and will not be disturbed except on
a showing the trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious,
or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of
justice.’ ” (Christ v. Schwartz (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 440, 446–447.)
        As an initial matter, SFFCU claims the trial court “prohibited [SFFCU]
from introducing Exhibit 613 into evidence and from showing the jury the
video clip of [Ms.] Toran’s dialogue with” two members of the San Francisco
Board of Supervisors. This assertion misrepresents the record. The trial
court limited how Exhibit 613 could be presented to the jury. Specifically, it
stated the questions posed by the two supervisors would be read to the jury,
and the video of Ms. Toran’s responses could be played for the jury. The court
did not exclude Exhibit 613 in its entirety, and SFFCU remained able to
present all of the substantive information contained in Exhibit 613 to the
jury.
        SFFCU next argues the tone and language used by the two supervisors
would have substantiated its breach of the implied covenant claim by
demonstrating SFMTA’s position was objectively unreasonable and providing
insight into its decision to continue the medallion program. However,
SFFCU does not explain why the tone of two supervisors reflects more than
just their own subjective beliefs. SFFCU does not identify any evidence
indicating these supervisors were involved in the medallion program, the
lease agreement between SFMTA and SFFCU, or any ongoing discussions
between SFMTA and SFFCU regarding the medallion program. As such,
SFFCU has not demonstrated the excluded portions of Exhibit 613 have
probative value.

                                         15
      Based on the record before us, we do not find the trial court abused its
discretion in limiting how SFFCU could utilize Exhibit 613 at trial. The trial
court watched the video, explained its concern regarding the prejudicial
impact of the tone and manner of questioning, and invited counsel to submit
a stipulated summary of the supervisors’ questions. The record reflects that
the trial court properly considered Exhibit 613’s admissibility and did not
abuse its discretion in limiting its use.
      Moreover, even if the ruling was in error, SFFCU has failed to
demonstrate any resulting prejudice. “Claims of evidentiary error under
California law are reviewed for prejudice applying the ‘miscarriage of justice’
or ‘reasonably probable’ harmless error standard of People v. Watson (1956)
46 Cal.2d 818, 836, 299 P.2d 243, that is embodied in article VI, section 13 of
the California Constitution. Under the Watson harmless error standard, it is
the burden of appellants to show that it is reasonably probable that they
would have received a more favorable result at trial had the error not
occurred.” (Christ v. Schwartz, supra, 2 Cal.App.5th at p. 447.) Here,
SFFCU opted not to utilize Exhibit 613 or offer it into evidence. SFFCU thus
asks this court to compare two scenarios, neither of which occurred—i.e.,
offering the exhibit in its entirety verses in its limited form. We decline to do
so and conclude SFFCU has failed to demonstrate any resulting harm.
III. Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and New
    Trial
      SFFCU contends the trial court erred in denying its motion for new
trial because such a motion may appropriately be based on an instructional
error. We lack jurisdiction to resolve this issue because SFFCU did not file
an appeal from this order.

                                        16
      “ ‘ “Where several judgments and/or orders occurring close in time are
separately appealable . . . each appealable judgment and order must be
expressly specified—in either a single notice of appeal or multiple notices of
appeal—in order to be reviewable on appeal.” ’ ” (Sole Energy Co. v.
Petrominerals Corp. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 212, 239.) While a notice of
appeal must be liberally construed, our jurisdiction is necessarily limited to
the notice of appeal and those judgments or orders identified therein.
(Conservatorship of Edde (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 883, 889–890; Morton v.
Wagner (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 963, 967.) We have no jurisdiction over an
order not mentioned in the notice of appeal. (In re J.F. (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th
70, 75.)
      Here, SFFCU’s notice of appeal only identifies (1) the November 3,
2021 judgment, and (2) the December 30, 2021 order on SFFCU’s motion to
tax costs. Moreover, we note SFFCU filed its notice of appeal on January 11,
2022, and the trial court did not enter its order on SFFCU’s motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict and new trial until January 26, 2022.
When an appellant “wishes to challenge an appealable postjudgment order
that is rendered after appellant files a notice of appeal from the judgment,
appellant must file a separate notice of appeal from the postjudgment order.
Appellant cannot obtain review of the postjudgment order simply by
including the postjudgment proceedings in the record on appeal from the
judgment.” (Eisenberg et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Appeals and Writs
(The Rutter Group 2020) ¶ 3:119.2; see also Code Civ. Proc. § 904.1, subd.
(a)(2).) Accordingly, the trial court’s order denying SFFCU’s motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict and new trial is outside the scope of
this appeal, and we lack jurisdiction to review it.

                                       17
                                  DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed.4 SFMTA may recover its costs on appeal.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1), (2).)

      4 Because we affirm the judgment, we deny SFFCU’s request that we

reverse the order taxing costs and awarding SFMTA costs.

                                         18
                                                   _________________________
                                                   Petrou, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
Rodríguez, P. J.

_________________________
Jackson, J.*

A164463/San Francisco Federal Credit Union v. San Francisco Municipal Transportation Authority

       * Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate District,

assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

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