Court Opinion

ID: 9840352
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-16 17:09:01.410957+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:25:11.857397
License: Public Domain

NUMBER 13-22-00540-CR

                             COURT OF APPEALS

                   THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

                      CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

RUBEN PEREZ-MORALES,                                                       Appellant,

                                            v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,                                                         Appellee.

                    On appeal from the 28th District Court
                         of Nueces County, Texas.

                          MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Benavides and Longoria
             Memorandum Opinion by Justice Longoria

      Appellant Ruben Perez-Morales was convicted of continuous sexual abuse of a

young child, a first-degree felony, and sentenced to thirty-five years’ imprisonment. See

TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.02(b). In his sole issue on appeal, appellant challenges the

sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction. We affirm.
                                           I.       BACKGROUND

        The State indicted appellant on one count of continuous sexual abuse of a young

child, six counts of aggravated sexual assault, and two counts of indecency with a child.

See id. §§ 21.02(b), 22.021(a)(2)(B), 21.11(d). As to the count of continuous sexual abuse

of a young child, the State alleged that appellant:

        did then and there in Nueces County, Texas, during a period that was 30
        days or more in duration, to-wit: from on or about February 4, 2021 through
        April 4, 2021, when [appellant] was 17 years of age or older, did commit two
        or more acts of sexual abuse against J.P.[ 1], a child younger than 14 years
        of age, and said acts having been violations of one or more of the following
        penal laws including:

        did then and there intentionally or knowingly cause the penetration of the
        mouth of J.P., a child who was then and there younger than 14 years of age
        and not the spouse of the defendant, by the defendant’s sexual organ,

        AND/OR

        did then and there intentionally or knowingly cause the sexual organ of J.P.,
        a child who was then and there younger than 14 years of age and not the
        spouse of the defendant, to contact the mouth of the defendant,

        AND/OR

        did then and there intentionally or knowingly cause the sexual organ of J.P.,
        a child who was then and there younger than 14 years of age and not the
        spouse of the defendant, to contact the sexual organ of the defendant,

        AND/OR

        did then and there intentionally or knowingly cause the anus of J.P., a child
        who was then and there younger than 14 years of age and not the spouse
        of the defendant, to contact the sexual organ of the defendant,

        AND/OR

        1 To protect the identity of the minor child, we refer to her and her relatives by their initials. See

TEX. CONST. art. I, § 30(a)(1) (providing that a crime victim has “the right to be treated . . . with respect for
the victim’s dignity and privacy throughout the criminal justice process”).
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      did then and there intentionally or knowingly cause the penetration of the
      anus of J.P., a child who was then and there younger than 14 years of age
      and not the spouse of the defendant, by defendant’s hand/finger,

      AND/OR

      did then and there intentionally or knowingly cause the penetration of the
      female sexual organ of J.P., a child who was then and there younger than
      14 years of age and not the spouse of the defendant, by defendant’s
      hand/finger,

      AND/OR

      did then and there, with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of
      the defendant, engage in sexual contact with J.P., hereafter styled the
      complainant, by touching the anus of the complainant, a child younger than
      17 years of age,

      AND/OR

      did then and there, with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of
      the defendant, engage in sexual contact with J.P., hereafter styled the
      complainant, by touching the genitals of the complainant, a child younger
      than 17 years of age[.]

A.    Trial

      L.J. and appellant were married in September 2010 and separated in 2016. They

have three children together, R.J, J.P., and A.J. J.P. was born October 7, 2012. After

separating, they continued to live together as coparents for two to three years. L.J. was

not employed during their marriage. At some point in 2016, L.J. took J.P. to the hospital

because she believed she had seen something occur between appellant and J.P., but the

hospital could not determine whether anything had happened. L.J. did not elaborate on

the incident at trial. Subsequently, after L.J. had moved out with the children on her own,

the children were able to visit with appellant. One evening, when L.J. was at work, the

children were in L.J.’s mother’s care. L.J.’s mother called her expressing concern

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regarding J.P. making an outcry against appellant, and L.J. stated that she immediately

picked J.P. up and brought her to the hospital. An examination was conducted, and J.P.

was referred for a follow up examination with the child abuse resource and evaluation

(CARE) team.

      On cross-examination, L.J. stated that there was another man, a friend of L.J.’s

that J.P. stated made her touch him sexually. L.J. could not be “sure” who the other man

was, as J.P. did not identify him by name, though L.J. thought it could have been a friend

of hers or someone she had dated.

      At the time of trial, J.P. was ten years old. J.P. testified that she understood that

no one was supposed to touch “her front part,” “her back part,” or her chest area without

her permission, but that appellant had done so. She explained that appellant had touched

her “front part and back part” with his “front part.” Appellant also touched her with his

tongue on her “front part.” J.P. explained that the touching happened “more than four

times” and it made her feel scared. She said that appellant would tell her not to tell

anybody what had happened. She eventually told her grandmother what happened. She

stated she decided to tell her grandmother what happened because she “didn’t want to

go with [appellant] anymore, because he was being rude to [her] dog.” After she told her

grandmother what happened, her mother took her to the hospital. J.P. admitted that she

had been asked to lie about things in the past by her mother, but that she had not been

asked to lie about what appellant did. She could not recall specific instances that her

mother had asked her to lie, but did not dispute that her mother had asked her to lie

regarding instances where her mother left her unattended. She explained that appellant

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had touched her “with his front part” and they were not wearing clothes. She also said

that “white stuff” came out of “his front part” and he would throw it to the floor.

       N.J., J.P.’s maternal grandmother, testified as the outcry witness. She explained

that she often babysat the children, and she would sometimes have appellant pick the

children up to assist her and to have visits with his children. She recalled that in April

2021, prior to appellant picking up the children one day, she told the children it was time

to get ready and J.P. began to cry, asking to stay with her instead. When N.J. asked J.P.

why she did not want to go with appellant, J.P. told her that appellant had been touching

her “in the front” and “in the back.” N.J. said the information “shock[ed]” her and she called

the Department of Child Protective Services (CPS) and her daughter. L.J. picked J.P. up

and took her to the hospital, per CPS instructions. N.J. recalled that J.P. had told her that

appellant touched her and that “she mentioned [] that he put his part to her back part. And

that he was saying it wasn’t gonna hurt.”

       N.J. also recalled that J.P. did not want to go with her father because he was mean

to her dog. N.J. further testified that she had previously called CPS and the police several

times for different reasons related to her daughter’s care of the children, including once

when L.J. left the children unattended at home while she went to work. In November 2020,

CPS gave her temporary custody of the children while L.J. completed a service program

to get her children back after leaving them home alone.

       Esmerelda Ruby Garza, a forensic interviewer with the Children’s Advocacy

Center, testified that she interviewed J.P. in April of 2021. During her interview with J.P.,

J.P. informed her that there was one time that she was sitting with appellant on the couch

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at home, when L.J. and appellant were still living together, and appellant had a blanket

over J.P. and was touching her. L.J. walked in, saw what appellant was doing, and

immediately took J.P. to the doctor. J.P. said that appellant made her remove her pants

and underwear. J.P. stated that appellant would touch himself and J.P. gestured how he

would do that, and then she said appellant would “touch[] her with the wet part.” J.P. also

recalled incidents where appellant would have her lay on the bed, and he would turn her

around and “put[] it all the way in.” When provided a diagram of the female body, she

circled her “middle part” or vagina, and her “back part” or anus. J.P. said that it was painful

and described the incidents, saying “that it sounded like two things hitting each other.”

J.P. stated that this happened twice.

       CPS investigator Christian Escamilla testified that she was assigned to the case

involving J.P.’s outcry against appellant. She interviewed L.J. and N.J. and she reviewed

the forensic interview of J.P. She also spoke to the medical professionals. Because she

does not speak Spanish, the meeting with appellant was conducted by her coworker and

translated for her. When initially speaking to appellant to inform him of the safety plan that

would be in place, the allegations against him were not specifically discussed, though he

seemed aware of what the allegations were. A safety plan was put in place where he was

not allowed to see the children during the investigation. Appellant informed the CPS

investigators that he believed that the allegations were lies being made up by L.J. There

was never a formal interview with appellant to discuss the specific allegations, though

they attempted to interview him “several times.” Ultimately, CPS determined there was

“reason to believe” for sexual abuse against J.P., which means they determined it was

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more likely than not that something happened. The determination was based on J.P.’s

outcry and interview and her positive test for chlamydia, which CPS determined

substantiated the allegations.

       Officer Samantha Gonzales of the Corpus Christi Police Department (CCPD) was

called out to N.J.’s house regarding an assault not in progress. She spoke with N.J. and

learned that N.J.’s minor granddaughter was sexually assaulted. The case was then

referred to CCPD Detective Mary Helen Leal with the crimes against children unit.

Detective Leal was present for J.P.’s forensic interview. She described J.P. as “small” and

“dainty.” In regard to her demeanor, Detective Leal stated that J.P. was animated in her

descriptions of the allegations against appellant. Detective Leal was surprised that an

eight-year-old knew the terms she was using and by the way she was expressing herself,

and she opined “[t]hat [J.P.] would [not] know what that was unless she actually saw it or

it was done to her.” In her interview of appellant, he denied the allegations against him.

On cross-examination, Detective Leal stated she was unaware of any sexually

transmitted disease testing done on appellant.

       Juliann Denney, a sexual assault nurse examiner (SANE) with Driscoll Children’s

Hospital’s CARE team, testified that J.P. was first brought in for parental concern of sexual

assault at age three, but the examination yielded no findings indicative of sexual assault.

J.P. was then brought in again at age eight. Denney read directly from J.P.’s record

wherein J.P. stated, among other things, that appellant touched her on her female sexual

organ “since she was little” and that appellant “kept putting his part,” indicating his

genitals, in her female sexual organ. According to the records, J.P. told the nurse that

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there were times that appellant put “his part in all the way” and stated that it hurt. She

said he put it in her front and back part, indicating her vagina and anus. She said appellant

also put his fingers in her “front part and [her] back part” and that, when she “was little,”

appellant made her put “his front part in [her] mouth” which made her feel like she was

going to throw up. She said clear stuff would come out “of his part.” She also told the

nurse that appellant would put his mouth on her “middle part.” J.P. also stated that

“mommy’s friend only made me hold his front part like my daddy’s one time.”

       Records indicated that J.P. was cooperative, active, a good historian, and

maintained good eye contact during the examination. As to the physical examination,

Denney noted no physical trauma to J.P.’s vagina or anus. She explained that it is not

uncommon for there not to be any physical trauma in cases of sexual abuse. J.P. tested

positive for chlamydia in her urine and rectum, for which she was treated.

       Appellant testified in his own defense. He denied ever having inappropriately

touched J.P. He stated that the only reason he could think of for why J.P. would make the

allegations against him is because “her mom has been having problems.” He testified that

L.J. had been under investigation by CPS and was not completing the tasks under her

service plan. He noted that the timing of the outcry coincided with the timeframe that L.J.

was set to get her children back from N.J.’s temporary custody. He stated that there were

times in the past that L.J. had instructed J.P. to lie, specifically detailing a time when L.J.

told J.P. to lie about having been left alone in a vehicle by L.J. He also stated that he had

never had chlamydia nor any symptoms of chlamydia. He had also never taken

antibiotics.

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       Jesus Angel Morales, appellant’s friend, testified that he has known appellant

about thirteen years. He stated that he believed appellant to be a family man and a good

father. He was testifying on appellant’s behalf because he “kn[e]w he didn’t do it.”

       The jury found appellant guilty on all charges. The State moved to dismiss counts

two through nine, which was granted. The case proceeded to sentencing on the sole

remaining count of continuous sexual abuse of a young child. Appellant was sentenced

to a term of thirty-five years’ incarceration. This appeal followed.

                            II.    SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

       By his sole issue on appeal, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence

against him, arguing it was insufficient to sustain a conviction for continuous sexual abuse

of a young child.

A.     Standard of Review

       In evaluating a challenge to sufficiency of the evidence supporting a criminal

conviction, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine,

based on that evidence and any reasonable inferences from it, whether any rational trier

of fact could have found the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Gear v.

State, 340 S.W.3d 743, 746 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); see also Jackson v. Virginia, 443

U.S. 307, 318–19 (1979). The jury is the exclusive judge of the credibility of the witnesses

and the weight to be given to the evidence. Isassi v. State, 330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2010). Further, we defer to the jury’s responsibility to fairly resolve conflicts in

testimony, weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to

ultimate facts. Id. This standard applies to both circumstantial and direct evidence. Id. We

                                              9
do not engage in a second evaluation of the weight and credibility of the evidence, but

only ensure the jury reached a rational decision. Muniz v. State, 851 S.W.2d 238, 246

(Tex. Crim. App. 1993).

       The determination of what weight to give testimonial evidence rests within the sole

province of the jury because it turns on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Davis

v. State, 177 S.W.3d 355, 359 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.). The trier of

fact may choose to believe or disbelieve any portion of a witness’s testimony. See Sharp

v. State, 707 S.W.2d 611, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).

       We measure the sufficiency of the evidence by the elements of an offense as

defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge. Hammack v. State, 622 S.W.3d 910, 914

(Tex. Crim. App. 2021) “Such a charge [is] one that accurately sets out the law, is

authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof

or unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the

particular offense for which the defendant was tried.” Id. (quoting Malik v. State, 953

S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)).

B.     Discussion

       A person commits the offense of “continuous sexual abuse of a young child,” as

applicable here, if: (1) during a period that is thirty or more days in duration, the person

commits two or more acts of sexual abuse; and (2) at the time of the commission of each

of the acts of sexual abuse, the actor is seventeen years of age or older and the victim is

a child younger than fourteen years of age. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.02(b); see Turner

v. State, 573 S.W.3d 455, 462 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2019, no pet.) (noting that “during a

                                            10
period that is 30 or more days in duration” means “that the last act of sexual abuse

occurred on or after the twenty-ninth day after the day the first act of sexual abuse

occurred”); Smith v. State, 340 S.W.3d 41, 51 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no

pet.) (same). An “act of sexual abuse” is an act that violates one or more specified penal

laws, including § 22.021, entitled “Aggravated Sexual Assault.” Id. § 21.02(c)(4). A person

commits the offense of aggravated sexual assault if the person intentionally or knowingly

causes the penetration of the sexual organ of a child under the age of fourteen by any

means. See id. §§ 22.021(a)(1)(B)(ii), (a)(2)(B). In this case, the indictment alleged that,

from on or about February 4, 2021, through April 4, 2021, appellant committed at least

two acts of sexual abuse against J.P., including an act constituting aggravated sexual

assault. The indictment alleged that, during these acts, appellant was seventeen years of

age or older and J.P. was a child younger than fourteen years of age.

          While appellant concedes that a child victim’s testimony alone is enough to prove

a conviction for child sexual assault, he contends that there is evidence here that the child

victim was not truthful and that “this Court should not follow Tex[as] Code [of] Crim[inal]

Proc[edure] art[icle] 38.07 which provides that the uncorroborated testimony of a child is

sufficient for conviction. This statute assumes that the child is not a liar or capable of

lying.”

          Under Article 38.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, when the victim is

seventeen or younger, a conviction for a sexual offense “is supportable on the

uncorroborated testimony of the victim of the sexual offense.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.

ANN. art. 38.07(a), (b)(1). Here, J.P. testified to the abuse she endured from appellant.

                                             11
She testified that appellant touched her “front part” and her “back part” with his “front part”

and with his hands and tongue. Her testimony established that the abuse occurred more

than once. Appellant asks us to discount J.P.’s testimony because she had admitted to

having told lies in the past regarding other issues; however, we will not invade the

province of the jury as it relates to issues of credibility. See Isassi, 330 S.W.3d at 638.

We may not substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder. Thornton v. State, 425

S.W.3d 289, 303 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). And whatever appellant may think of J.P.’s

testimony, the jury clearly found her credible. See Hernandez v. State, 610 S.W.3d 106,

111 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, pet. ref’d) (noting that in a sufficiency review,

“we presume that the jury credited the complainant’s testimony”); see also Moreno v.

State, No. 13-22-00267-CR, 2023 WL 4945083, at *3 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–

Edinburg Aug. 3, 2023, no pet. h.).

       Appellant also challenges the State’s evidence to support the duration element of

the charged offense. J.P. testified that the abuse occurred in the “old house” and at

appellant’s house. L.J. testified that the family lived together in the “old house” until

sometime in 2018 or 2019. J.P.’s outcry to her grandmother happened in 2021 and J.P.

testified that there was abuse occurring at that time when she would stay with appellant

in his trailer, where he did not live until sometime after 2018, more than two years after

the first incident of abuse. In cases of continuous sexual abuse, the trier of fact is entitled

to “fit[] the pieces of the jigsaw puzzle together and weigh[] the credibility of each piece.”

Flowers v. State, 220 S.W.3d 919, 923 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).

                                              12
       Deferring to the jury’s determination of the credibility of the witnesses and the

weight to be given their testimony, based on the cumulative force of all the evidence when

viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, and considering the reasonable

inferences to be drawn from that evidence, we conclude a rational trier of fact could have

found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellant’s sole

issue is overruled.

                                    III.   CONCLUSION

       The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

                                                              NORA L. LONGORIA
                                                              Justice

Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2 (b).

Delivered and filed on the
14th day of September, 2023.

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