Court Opinion

ID: 9680201
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:25:03.021162+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:26.716046
License: Public Domain

FINCH, Judge
(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I concur in result with the principal opinion insofar as it holds Ordinance 55381 (the anti-solicitation ordinance) valid. However, I cannot concur with reference to its conclusion with respect to Ordinance 55382. Capsulated, that ordinance says that because certain persons including real estate brokers and agents have used “For Sale,” “Open,” and “Sold” signs to create the impression of rapid racial integration of *134residential neighborhoods resulting in racial unrest and neighborhood deterioration and financial loss and because of loss in population and taxes, no person may place any such “For Sale,” “Open,” or “Sold” signs on any property public or private located in zone districts A, B, C, or D,1 unless the person first makes application and pays a fee to the St. Louis Council on Human Relations and is then granted permission for such sign by that council. In order to award such permit, the Council must make a finding that the placing of the sign will not “cause a representation that any block, neighborhood or area has undergone, will or might undergo, a change with respect to the religious, social or nationality composition of the block, neighborhood or area which would discourage the purchase or encourage the sale of any property in a particular area because of such real or possible change.”
I cannot concur that said ordinance is valid even though I recognize that the principal opinion expressly limits its holding to the ordinance as it pertains to persons engaged in the real estate business and reserves for another time the question of its validity as it relates to individual persons placing signs with reference to their own property.2
Ordinance 55382 does not limit the posting of signs to those which are posted for the purpose of or which are found to have the effect of blockbusting or panic selling. So long as the property is within zones A through D, the posting of such signs is prohibited. It makes no difference whether the house in question is occupied or vacant (or for that matter whether other houses in the block or neighborhood are occupied or vacant); whether other signs are posted; whether the house is located in an old or a new subdivision (or whether the house itself is old or new) ; whether there are other residences in that block or neighborhood; or what the existing racial composition of the block or neighborhood is. It is a flat, all inclusive prohibition of “For Sale,” “Open,” or “Sold” signs (unless the Council of Human Relations grants permission following application).
I have no quarrel with an ordinance which undertakes to prevent blockbusting or panic selling by prohibiting signs which would have such effect.3 However, every sign of this character in zones A through D will not have such effect and many do not even have that potential. I consider it to be unreasonable to prohibit all such signs unless the owner goes to city hall, pays a $5 fee and then awaits action on his application by the Council on Human Relations. The ordinance as drafted utilizes a sledgehammer approach. It reminds one of the proverbial act of throwing out the baby with the bath water in order to get rid of the bath water.
This ordinance is discussed at some length in the comment in the St. Louis University Law Journal referred to in footnote 1, supra. In its conclusion at p. 717, that article, without reaching any final conclusion of its own, points out that this ordinance is susceptible to challenge on several constitutional grounds. In part it states:
“The ordinance enacted by the City of St. Louis to prohibit blockbusting by regulation of real estate signs is sus*135ceptible to challenge on several constitutional grounds. The accomplishment of its objective may be beyond the power of the City. The methods chosen to accomplish the purpose, even if otherwise valid, may violate limitations on municipal power embodied in the due process and equal protection clauses of the State and federal constitutions. It may violate constitutional provisions prohibiting undue restrictions on freedom of expression. And it may distribute authority to accomplish its purposes contrary to basic theories of how governmental power must be divided.
“The purpose sought seems not only well within the City’s power but also highly commendable, and perhaps, even essential to the City’s continued viability. A challenge based on freedom of expression would seem to lack substance because of the commercial nature of the expressions sought to be regulated.
“The ordinance as originally enacted is quite broad in its coverage. It appears to regulate areas of the City which do not need regulation to prevent blockbusting, and it applies to brokers and property owners who do not engage in blockbusting as well as to those who do. Thus, it may not meet those due process standards requiring legislation to be reasonable and non-arbitrary, and it may violate equal protection limitations by being over-inclusive. However, there does appear to be a tendency to uphold municipal legislation directed at ending discrimination in housing and eliminating blockbusting. Therefore, depending upon the amount of discretion a court is willing to allow the legislative body, the original enactment may be upheld. The amended version is narrower in its scope and would seem to be much less objectionable on the grounds of arbitrary or unreasonable action or over-inclusiveness. It does, however, present a problem as to whether the legislative body established sufficient standards for the administrative agency’s guidance in applying it.”
I see no point in lengthening this dissent by exploring some of these other constitutional issues. Suffice it to say that they raise serious additional questions with respect to this ordinance. Furthermore, I do not entirely subscribe to the statement in the conclusion above that a challenge based on freedom of expression probably is unavailable on the theory that the sign posted by the property owner is commercial speech. I have no difficulty with the view that such signs when posted by those in the real estate business are commercial speech but find it hard to classify a mere statement by the owner of a single family residence that he wants to sell his house or that it is open for inspection as commercial speech and hence unprotected.
BARDGETT, J., concurs.

. According to a comment in 14 St. Louis University Law Journal 686, 717 entitled “The Constitutionality of a Municipal Ordinance Prohibitng ‘Por Sale,’ ‘Sold,’ or ‘Open’ Signs to Prevent Blockbusting”, all but ten to fifteen per cent of all private residences within the city are located in zone districts A through D.

. I recognize also that a rather similar ordinance was approved in Barrick Realty, Inc. v. City of Gary, Indiana, 354 F.Supp. 126 (N.D.Ind.1973), aff., 491 F.2d 161 (7th Cir.1974).

. The parties seem to agree that the City of St. Louis earlier adopted such an ordinance but apparently have not attempted to enforce it.