Court Opinion

ID: 9472879
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:13:44.290971+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:43:12.521032
License: Public Domain

SNEED, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur in Parts I, II, IV and V of the majority opinion but not in Part III. We should decide the validity of the voluntary departure amendment. The issue is not moot.
Shahla contends that the amendment is invalid first, because the Commissioner did not possess the proper authority to promulgate it, and second because it conflicts with the Amity Treaty in force between the United States and Iran. To survive an attack alleging mootness, a suit must be a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief. North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246, 92 S.Ct. 402, 404, 30 L.Ed.2d 413 (1971); Bumpus v. Clark, 702 F.2d 826 (9th Cir.1983). In this case, if the challenged amendment were to be invalidated, the immigration judge’s order granting voluntary departure in lieu of an order of deportation would necessarily be void. At that point this court undoubtedly would fashion a remedy that would include a remand for redetermination of deportability as well as eligibility for voluntary departure based on current conditions. I cannot imagine this court refusing to provide such a remedy were it to accept the substance of the petitioner’s constitutional arguments. The controversy is therefore real, and the petitioner has a remedy available to him. Therefore, I shall now turn to the merits of his attacks on the regulation.
Shahla first contends that the Commissioner was without authority to promulgate the amendment to 8 C.F.R. § 244.1 (1981), which limited to 15 days the amount of time that could be granted to Iranians for voluntary departure. In support of this position, he characterizes the amendment as an act of foreign policy executed without the authority of the President. However, arguments based on presidential delegation are irrelevant. In section 244(e) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1254(e), Congress gave the Attorney General the power to grant discretionary relief in the nature of voluntary departure. The Attorney General, in turn, delegated to the Commissioner of the INS broad authority to enforce the immigration and naturalization laws and to issue regulations deemed necessary and appropriate for the exercise of that authority. 8 C.F.R. § 2.1 (1981). The Commissioner thus had the authority to promulgate the amendment. Nademi v. INS, 679 F.2d 811, 813-14 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 872, 103 S.Ct. 161, 74 L.Ed.2d 134 (1982). See also Shoaee v. INS, 704 F.2d 1079, 1083 (9th Cir.1983).
Shahla’s second contention, that the amendment is invalid as conflicting with the Amity Treaty in force between Iran and the United States,1 presents a more difficult issue. Shahla maintains that this treaty prevents the United States from discriminating against Iranian nationals in this country. He refers to Article IV(1) of the Treaty in which both countries promise to “refrain from applying unreasonable or discriminatory measures that would impair [the] legally acquired rights and interests” of the other country’s nationals. Shahla overlooks, however, Article XX, which provides in part that “[t]he present Treaty *565shall not preclude the application of measures ... (d) necessary to fill the obligations of a [party] for the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security, or necessary to protect its essential security interests.” To apply Article XX, however, would require a determination whether issuance of the amendment to 8 C.F.R. § 244.1 (1981) was a “necessary” response to the Iranian hostage crisis. This is a question not within the province of a court to decide. As the Supreme Court said in Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81, 96 S.Ct. 1883, 1892, 48 L.Ed.2d 478 (1976), “the responsibility for regulating the relationship between the United States and our alien visitors has been committed to the political branches of the Federal Government.... [Decisions in these matters ... [are] more appropriate to either the Legislature or the Executive than to the Judiciary.” This is a proper application of the doctrine of separation of powers. The judiciary cannot sensibly formulate foreign policy. This is the province of the political branches of our government. To extend relief to the petitioner based upon the Amity Treaty would be an improper exercise of judicial power.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent to part III.

. Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights Between the United States and Iran, August 15, 1955, (entered into force June 16, 1957), 8 U.S.T. 899, T.I.A.S. No. 3853.