Court Opinion

ID: 9680927
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:41:19.386767+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:31.451085
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON STATE’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
PHILLIPS, Judge.
On original submission, appellant’s conviction for forgery was reversed by Panel No. 3 for the second quarter of 1978, per opinion of Judge Tom Davis. The State’s motion for rehearing alleges that the facts adduced at the trial of appellant circumstantially establish that appellant attempted to cash the forged check with the requisite intent to defraud another. We remain convinced that the opinion on original submission was correct in its conclusion, especially in light of its reliance on Stuebgen v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 547 S.W.2d 29. The only facts among those cataloged by the State in its motion for rehearing that are probative are that the check was made out to the appellant, the appellant’s name appears on the back of the check, and the appellant had no prior dealings with Carl Potts, the purported maker of the check. The only fact which would distinguish this case from that of Stuebgen, supra, is the fact that appellant had no preexisting relationship with the purported maker of the check. In Stuebgen the appellant had a preexisting employer-employee relationship with the maker of the check. This Court wrote in Stuebgen :
“ . . . Although appellant had access to Chitwood’s [the employer] checkbook, and Chitwood normally paid his employees personally, we do not find that this evidence is sufficient to discharge the State’s burden of showing that appellant acted with intent ‘to defraud or harm another.’ ” Id. at 32.
The facts of this case are even stronger in light of the fact that there was no preexisting relationship of any degree between the appellant and Potts which would create a basis for the payee [appellant] to know that she was passing an instrument that was forged. In this case, as in Stuebgen :
“ . . . Appellant was listed as the payee, and appellant did not falsely represent himself [herself]. No evidence was introduced to show that anything appearing on the check was in appellant’s handwriting.” Id. at 32.
It is noted that the forged check in the instant case had the appellant’s name hand-printed as the payee. Testimony at appellant’s trial established that the check was endorsed, although none of the witnesses actually observed her endorsing the check. If Stuebgen’s conviction could not stand in light of his preexisting relationship with the purported maker of the check, appellant’s conviction must, a fortiori, fall as well. As in Stuebgen, supra, the State has failed to discharge its burden of proof in the instant case.
The State’s motion for rehearing is hereby overruled. The judgment of conviction remains reversed. However, in light of Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19, 98 S.Ct. 2151, 57 L.Ed.2d 15 (1978), and Burks v. U. S., 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978), the judgment is hereby reformed to reflect an acquittal and the cause is remanded for proceedings under Article 37.-12, V.A.C.C.P.