Court Opinion

ID: 9536892
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:09:02.533092+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:55:29.243959
License: Public Domain

*531Mr. Justice McWilliams
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent and shall briefly state my reasons therefor.
The majority reverses this case because the trial court gave an instruction to the jury which included the statutory definition of a so-called “accessory during the fact.” According to the majority, the inclusion of such was error.
I agree with the majority that under the facts and circumstances of the instant case it was probably error for the trial court to give the jury an instruction embodying the statutory definition of an accessory during the fact. The defendant was not charged with being an accessory during the fact, nor in my view would the evidence have supported such a charge. The defendant was charged with burglary and conspiracy and in my analysis of the situation he was either guilty or not guilty of the two specific crimes with which he was charged. By instructing on the statutory definition of an accessory during the fact, the judicial waters were unduly muddied.
Assuming then that it was error to instruct the jury on the statutory definition of an accessory during the fact, which is the holding of the majority, let us see just how this particular error was brought about.
Though the record is not too clear in this regard, as I read it the defendant did not object to the giving of an instruction setting forth the statutory definition of an accessory during the fact. Not only did the defendant not object to the giving of such instruction, but on the contrary, and the record is quite clear in this regard, the defendant by tendered instruction specifically asked that the jury be given an instruction setting forth the statutory definition of an accessory during the fact. The trial court refused the tendered instruction on the ground that it was “already covered.” And indeed it was “already covered” by Instruction No. 12. In other *532words, though the trial court refused the defendant’s tendered instruction which set forth the statutory definition of an accessory during the fact, the court obviously acquiesced in the request of the defendant that such an instruction be given the jury. And the instruction given was in precisely the same language as the tendered instruction. So, the defendant sought and obtained an instruction which gave the jury the statutory definition of an accessory during the fact. Hence, any error in this regard was of the defendant’s own making and he should not now be permitted to profit thereby.
It seems strange to me that the defendant in a criminal proceeding can prevail upon a trial court to give a particular instruction and, when convicted, thereafter obtain a reversal from us on the ground that it was error for the trial court to give the very instruction which the defendant himself foisted upon the trial court. This, to me, is a rather classical example of a bootstrap operation and should find no sanction in the law. On this state of the record, I would give effect to Colo. E. Crim. P. 30, which provides that the only objections to instructions which will be considered by us on review are those which are interposed and specified before the instructions are given the jury.