Court Opinion

ID: 9962075
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-22 16:13:17.800311+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:48.186582
License: Public Domain

04/22/2024
        IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
                         AT KNOXVILLE
                              February 27, 2024 Session

             STATE OF TENNESSEE v. JAMES LEON PARKER

                Appeal from the Criminal Court for Sullivan County
               Nos. S51099, S53084    James F. Goodwin, Jr., Judge
                      ___________________________________

                           No. E2023-00149-CCA-R3-CD
                       ___________________________________

Defendant, James Leon Parker, appeals the Sullivan County Criminal Court’s summary
dismissal of his motion for resentencing pursuant to the Drug Free Zone Act (“DFZA”).
Defendant was convicted in 2008 of several drug-related offenses, including one count of
sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school (Count 6) and one count
of delivery of .5 grams or more of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school (Count 7). The
trial court merged Counts 6 and 7 and imposed a sentence of 25 years on those counts,
which the court ordered to run consecutively to his effective eight-year sentence in the
other counts, for a total effective sentence of 33 years. In 2022, Defendant filed a pro se
motion for resentencing under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-432(h), and the
trial court appointed counsel. While Defendant’s motion was pending in the trial court,
Governor Bill Lee granted Defendant executive clemency, ordering that Defendant’s 25-
year sentence in Counts 6 and 7 be commuted, which allowed Defendant to immediately
become parole eligible on those counts. Based on Governor Lee’s commutation order, the
trial court determined that Defendant was ineligible for resentencing and dismissed
Defendant’s motion “without a hearing due to that ineligibility.” Defendant appeals that
dismissal and asks this Court to review it under as a writ of certiorari. Following our
review, we grant certiorari and reverse and remand for a hearing on Defendant’s motion.

    Writ of Certiorari; Judgment of the Circuit Court Reversed and Remanded

TIMOTHY L. EASTER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ROBERT W.
WEDEMEYER, J., and CAMILLE R. MCMULLEN, P.J., joined.

Jessica F. Butler, Assistant Public Defender – Appellate Division, Franklin, Tennessee, for
the appellant, James Leon Parker.
Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Garrett D. Ward, Senior Assistant
Attorney General; Barry P. Staubus, District Attorney General; and Kristen E. Rose,
Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

                                          OPINION

                                     Procedural history

       The facts underlying Defendant’s 2008 convictions are only relevant to the issue in
this appeal to the extent that on three occasions in 2005, the Kingsport Police Department
conducted controlled drug transactions, in which Defendant sold crack cocaine to a
confidential informant with the third transaction being at the M & M Market located
“directly across the street from the Dobyns-Dennett High School tennis courts.” See State
v. Parker, E2009-02353-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 4812746, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov.
23, 2010), no perm. app. filed. For the sale and delivery of .5 grams or more of cocaine
within 1,000 feet of a school, Defendant was sentenced to 25 years. Id. at *1. His sentence
was enhanced, in part, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-432(b)(1),
which provided that “[a] violation of § 39-17-417 . . . that occurs on the grounds or facilities
of any school or within one thousand feet (1,000') of the real property that comprises a
public . . . secondary school . . . shall be punished one (1) classification higher than is
provided in § 39-17-417(b)-(i) for such violation.” T.C.A. § 39-17-432(b)(1) (2004)
(emphasis added).

        In 2020, the Tennessee General Assembly amended the DFZA to reduce the drug-
free zone radius from 1,000 feet to 500 feet. See T.C.A. § 39-17-432(b)(1)(B) (2020).
Additionally, the previous DFZA’s requirements that a defendant be punished one
classification higher, pay additional fines, and serve at least the minimum sentence for the
defendant’s appropriate range of sentence became discretionary. See T.C.A. § 39-17-
432(b)(1), (b)(2), (c)(1) (2020). Finally, the 2020 amendments to the DFZA created a
rebuttable presumption that a defendant was not required to serve the minimum sentence
for the defendant’s appropriate range of sentence at 100 percent but provided that the
presumption was overcome if the trial court found that the defendant’s conduct “exposed
vulnerable persons to the distractions and dangers that are incident to the occurrence of
illegal drug activity.” T.C.A. § 39-17-432(c)(2) (2020).

       The 2020 amendments to the DFZA applied to offenses committed on or after
September 1, 2020. However, effective April 29, 2022, our legislature enacted Tennessee
Code Annotated section 39-17-432(h), which allows defendants sentenced for offenses
committed before September 1, 2020, to file a motion for resentencing under the amended
version of the DFZA. The new provision reads:
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      [T]he court that imposed a sentence for an offense committed under this
      section that occurred prior to September 1, 2020, may, upon motion of the
      defendant or the district attorney general or the court’s own motion,
      resentence the defendant pursuant to subsections (a)-(g). The court shall hold
      an evidentiary hearing on the motion, at which the defendant and district
      attorney general may present evidence. The defendant shall bear the burden
      of proof to show that the defendant would be sentenced to a shorter period of
      confinement under this section if the defendant’s offense had occurred on or
      after September 1, 2020. The court shall not resentence the defendant if the
      new sentence would be greater than the sentence originally imposed or if the
      court finds that resentencing the defendant would not be in the interests of
      justice. In determining whether a new sentence would be in the interests of
      justice, the court may consider:

      (A) The defendant’s criminal record, including subsequent criminal
      convictions;

      (B) The defendant’s behavior while incarcerated;

      (C) The circumstances surrounding the offense, including, but not limited to,
      whether the conviction was entered into pursuant to a plea deal; and

      (D) Any other factors the court deems relevant.

T.C.A. § 39-17-432(h)(1) (2022).

       On June 2, 2022, Defendant filed a pro se motion seeking to be resentenced under
section 39-17-432(h). In his motion, Defendant alleged that he would be sentenced to a
shorter period of confinement under the 2020 amended statute, and Defendant attached to
his motion a plethora of exhibits, including letters of recommendation and certificates of
completion exemplifying his achievements while incarcerated. The State filed a response
to Defendant’s motion for resentencing, arguing that Defendant had not demonstrated that
“he would have been sentenced to a shorter period of confinement if [his] offenses would
have occurred on or after September 1, 2020.” The State also argued that resentencing
Defendant would not be in “the interests of justice.”

                                          -3-
      On December 22, 2022, Governor Bill Lee granted Defendant executive clemency
and commuted Defendant’s sentence making him immediately eligible for parole on his
25-year sentence.1 The commutation order states as follows:

       After [Defendant]’s commission of the offense, the Tennessee General
       Assembly amended the drug-free school zone statute by changing the
       circumstances in which enhanced sentencing may apply. The circumstances
       of [Defendant]’s offense do not appear to warrant enhanced sentencing under
       the drug-free school zone statute as amended.

        A hearing on Defendant’s motion for resentencing had been scheduled for January
13, 2023. Prior to the hearing, however, the trial court became aware of Governor Lee’s
commutation order and concluded that Defendant was thus ineligible for resentencing. The
trial court dismissed Defendant’s motion “without a hearing due to that ineligibility.”

       Defendant appeals.

                                               Analysis

        We must first address the issue of jurisdiction. Defendant asserts that he has a
statutory right of appeal under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(b) because
Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-432(h) provides a “statutory right to be heard on
the [resentencing] motion.” Alternatively, Defendant asserts that this Court should treat
his notice of appeal as a petition for writ of certiorari because it is the only available
remedy. Defendant argues that a writ is warranted because he was denied his day in court
and the trial court lacked authority to dismiss Defendant’s motion without a hearing. The
State responds that this case does not warrant the “extraordinary judicial remedy” of a writ
of certiorari.

       In State v. Bobo, 672 S.W.3d 299, 302 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2023), this Court held that
neither Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3 nor the recent amendments to Tennessee
Code Annotated section 39-17-432(h) provides for an appeal as of right from the denial of
a motion seeking resentencing under the DFZA. See also State v. Billingsley, No. E2022-
01419-CCA-R3-CD, 2023 WL 4417531, at *6 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 10, 2023) (adopting
Bobo and “similarly conclud[ing] that the [d]efendant in this case does not have a right to
an appeal on this issue”), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Nov. 20, 2023); cf. State v. Watson,
No. E2022-01321-CCA-R3-CD, 2023 WL 5925717, at *7 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 12,
2023) (holding, by contrast, that Rule 3(b) allows an appeal when a defendant is granted a

       1
           Defendant’s 8-year sentence in Counts 1-5 was not subject to the DFZA enhancement.
                                                 -4-
resentencing because the resentencing will produce a new sentence with an amended final
judgment), no perm. app. filed.

        Defendant attempts to distinguish his case from Billingsley and Bobo in that those
defendants received a hearing on their motions and Defendant did not. Defendant asks this
Court to exercise jurisdiction under Rule 3 because “the statute [section 39-17-432(h)]
itself affords an appropriate procedural avenue to receive a remedy when that right is
thwarted by a trial court’s summary dismissal of a resentencing motion without holding
the statutorily required hearing.” We decline to deviate from our holding in Bobo. An
appeal as of right must be specifically provided for by statute or rule. Neither Rule 3 nor
section 39-17-432(h) specifically provides for a right of appeal from the denial of a motion
for resentencing. Bobo, 672 S.W.3d at 302.

       Since this Court’s opinion in Bobo, panels of this Court, in recognizing that no
appeal lies from a trial court’s denial of resentencing, have treated defendants’ notices of
appeal as requests for writs of certiorari. See State v. Patton, No. M2023-00801-CCA-
WR-CO, 2024 WL 634887 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 15, 2024); State v. Potee, No. M2023-
00179-CCA-R3-CD, 2024 WL 748606 (Tenn. February 23, 2024). In Patton and Potee,
the defendants were afforded evidentiary hearings, after which the trial courts considered
and weighed the statutory factors and determined that the interests of justice did not support
resentencing the defendants. Both Patton and Potee were reviewed by this Court as a
request for a writ of certiorari. We find no reason to depart from the reasoning stated in
Patton and Potee for considering Defendant’s request as a petition for writ of certiorari,
and thus apply the standard of review for such a request to Defendant here.

      The common law writ of certiorari lies “[w]here no appeal is given[.]” T.C.A. § 27-
8-102(a)(2) (2023). The General Assembly codified the common law writ of certiorari in
Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-8-101 (2000). State v. Adler, 92 S.W.3d 397, 401
(Tenn. 2002), superseded on other grounds by statute, as recognized in State v. Rowland,
520 S.W.3d 542, 545 (Tenn. 2017). Section 27-8-101 provides:

       The writ of certiorari may be granted whenever authorized by law, and also
       in all cases where an inferior tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial
       functions has exceeded the jurisdiction conferred, or is acting illegally, when,
       in the judgment of the court, there is no other plain, speedy, or adequate
       remedy.

T.C.A. § 27-8-101.

      The common law writ of certiorari is an “extraordinary judicial remedy,” State v.
Lane, 254 S.W.3d 349, 355 (Tenn. 2008), and may not be used “to inquire into the
                                            -5-
correctness of a judgment issued by a court with jurisdiction.” Adler, 92 S.W.3d at 401
(citing State v. Johnson, 569 S.W.2d 808, 815 (Tenn. 1978)). Instead, the writ of certiorari
is available “to correct ‘(1) fundamentally illegal rulings; (2) proceedings inconsistent with
essential legal requirements; (3) proceedings that effectively deny a party his or her day in
court; (4) decisions beyond the lower tribunal’s authority; and (5) plain and palpable abuses
of discretion.’” Lane, 254 S.W.3d at 355 (citation omitted). As our supreme court decided
in Adler, where there is “an allegation that the trial court acted without legal authority and
because ‘there is no other plain, speedy, or adequate remedy,’” certiorari review may be
warranted. Adler, 92 S.W.3d at 401 (quoting T.C.A. § 27-8-101).

       We agree that there is no other “plain, speedy, or adequate remedy” for the denial
of a motion for resentencing. Turning to whether a writ is warranted in the present case,
we must determine whether the trial court acted without authority or denied Defendant his
day in court by dismissing Defendant’s motion for resentencing without a hearing.

        The 2022 amendment to the DFZA mandates that a court “shall hold an evidentiary
hearing” on a defendant’s motion to resentence under the statute. T.C.A. § 39-17-432(h)(1)
(2022) (emphasis added). The statute specifically provides for three instances in which the
trial court “shall not entertain a motion[:]”

       (A) A previous motion made under this subsection (h) to reduce the sentence
       was denied after a review of the motion on the merits;

       (B) Resentencing the defendant to a shorter period of confinement for this
       offense would not reduce the defendant’s overall sentence or lead to an
       earlier release; or

       (C) The defendant has previously applied to the governor for a grant of
       executive clemency on or after December 2, 2021, for the same offense and
       has been denied.

T.C.A. § 39-17-432(h)(2) (2022) (emphasis added).

       The issue of whether the trial court was statutorily required to hold a hearing on
Defendant’s motion turns on whether the governor’s commutation order was a grant or
denial of executive clemency. The State argues that the governor “partially granted and
denied Defendant’s commutation request[.]” The State asks this Court to view the
commutation order as a denial of clemency because the governor “declined to lower the
number of overall years or to fully commute [Defendant’s] sentence[.]” In Defendant’s
view, the governor granted Defendant’s request for clemency by commuting his sentence

                                            -6-
and, therefore, the trial court should have held a hearing on Defendant’s motion for
resentencing.

       Additionally, Defendant argues that while the clemency order did commute his
sentence to one that made him immediately parole eligible, it did not “guarantee that
[Defendant] would make parole, nor did [the grant of clemency] reduce his overall
sentence.” Defendant’s position is that although he was released to parole by the
governor’s commutation, “his overall 33-year sentence remains in effect” in the form of
parole with “all the punitive restrictions associated with that classification, until at least
2030.”

        The issue is one of statutory construction. “The most basic principle of statutory
construction is to ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent without unduly
restricting or expanding a statute’s coverage beyond its intended scope.” State v. Howard,
504 S.W.3d 260, 269 (Tenn. 2016) (quoting Owens v. State, 908 S.W.2d 923, 926 (Tenn.
1995)). “When statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we must apply its plain
meaning in its normal and accepted use, without a forced interpretation that would extend
the meaning of the language. . . .” Carter v. Bell, 279 S.W.3d 560, 564 (Tenn. 2009)
(citation omitted); Eastman Chem. Co. v. Johnson, 151 S.W.3d 503, 507 (Tenn. 2004). A
statute is ambiguous when “the parties derive different interpretations from the statutory
language.” Howard, 504 S.W.3d at 270 (quoting Owens, 908 S.W.2d at 926). If a statute
is ambiguous, the Court “‘may reference the broader statutory scheme, the history of the
legislation, or other sources’ to determine the statute’s meaning.” Frazier v. State, 495
S.W.3d 246 (Tenn. 2016) (quoting Sherman, 266 S.W.3d at 401).

        The power of executive clemency is constitutional. Tenn. Const. art. III, §6. The
governor has the “power to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons in all criminal cases
after conviction, except impeachment.” T.C.A. § 40-27-101. The governor can grant
conditional pardons upon such conditions and with such restrictions and limitations as he
deems proper. Id. § 40-27-102. “The same principle applies to the lesser grant, the
commutation.” Rowell v. Dutton, 688 S.W.2d 474, 477 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1985); see
T.C.A. § 40-37-104. Furthermore, the governor has the power to revoke a commutation
and recommit the prisoner upon the violation of one of the conditions, restrictions or
limitations. State ex rel. Bedford v. McCorkle, 40 S.W.2d 1015, 1016 (1931). Upon
application for a pardon by a person sentenced to death, the governor may commute the
sentence to life imprisonment if he or she “is of [the] opinion that the facts and
circumstances adduced are not sufficient to warrant a total pardon.” T.C.A. § 40-27-105.
This Court has no role in clemency proceedings except for that provided by Tennessee
Code Annotated section 40-27-106. Under that provision, the governor may commute the
punishment from death to life imprisonment upon the certificate of this Court, “that in its

                                            -7-
opinion, there are extenuating circumstances attending the case, and that the punishment
ought to be commuted.”

        The power of executive clemency is discretionary. The governor may grant full
pardons, conditional pardons, full commutations, and commutations with restrictions and
limitations. We are not persuaded by the State’s argument that the governor’s commutation
of Defendant’s sentence was only a “partial” grant and, therefore, the equivalent of a
“denial” of clemency as contemplated by Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-
432(h)(3). Courts must presume that the legislature “deliberately used each word in a
statute and that the use of each word conveys a specific purpose and meaning.” That the
governor granted less than a full commutation of Defendant’s sentence does not mean that
Defendant’s request for clemency was denied. The State argues Defendant should not be
given “the opportunity to seek additional resentencing beyond that which was ordained by
the governor.” Notably, this argument concedes a grant of relief. If the legislature intended
anything less than a full commutation of a defendant’s sentence to be construed as a denial
of clemency, then the statute would have made such a distinction.

       We agree with Defendant that he was denied his day in court by the trial court’s
dismissal without a hearing on his motion for resentencing. The State asserts that
“Defendant has received the relief that he would seek in his day in court” by having
received a commutation of his sentence. Nevertheless, Defendant remains on parole. A
full commutation of Defendant’s sentence would not result in Defendant’s being on parole.

       In the unique posture we find this case, we hold that the trial court exceeded its
statutory authority by not holding an evidentiary hearing. In so holding, however, we make
no determination on the merits of Defendant’s motion for resentencing and request to
modify his parole status. The State invites this Court to “construe the trial court’s denial
as a determination that the interests of justice were not in favor of resentencing a defendant
who had already received executive clemency in the form of a partial commutation.” It is
not the role of this Court to determine the merits of Defendant’s motion.

        Accordingly, we grant Defendant’s request for a writ of certiorari and reverse the
trial court’s summary dismissal of Defendant’s motion for resentencing. This case is
remanded for a hearing to determine if Defendant’s parole status should be modified
pursuant to T.C.A. §39-17-432(h).

                                              ____________________________________
                                              TIMOTHY L. EASTER, JUDGE

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