Court Opinion

ID: 9534937
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:43:56.616807+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:33:08.602403
License: Public Domain

SCHAUER, J.
Plaintiff appeals from a judgment for defendant in an action for divorce and to impress a trust upon defendant’s property with respect to the proceeds of an alleged joint venture or partnership between defendant and herself.
Plaintiff contends that under our decision in Vallera v. *660Vallera (1943) 21 Cal.2d 681 [134 P.2d 761], a woman who cohabits with a man knowing that they are not validly married is entitled to an interest in the property acquired in the latter’s name during the period of unwedded cohabitation “to the extent the woman renders services not included in the usual services of a housekeeper, cook and homemaker. . . .” We have concluded that the contention cannot be sustained and hence that the judgment should be affirmed.
The complaint is stated in two counts. In the first plaintiff alleges that the parties were married in 1939 in Sun Valley, Idaho, and separated in 1956 in California; that she and defendant had acquired certain community property; and that defendant had been guilty of cruelty towards her. She prays for a divorce and for a division of the alleged community property.
Responsive to this count the trial court found that plaintiff and defendant never entered into a marriage, either common law or statutory, and never acquired community property of any kind. The court further found that defendant had been married to one Nadine Keene until April 3, 1939; that “between the year 1938 and the year 1956, plaintiff and defendant did at various times and places in the State [of] California and in other states cohabit together, but that said cohabitation ceased in the year 1956”; and that “the cohabitation of the parties was at all times based solely upon a meretricious relationship existing between the parties. ’ ’ Plaintiff does not challenge these findings, each of which is supported by substantial evidence.
In the second count of the complaint plaintiff alleges that during the period from 1938 to 1956 she and defendant owned and operated, as joint venturers or partners, certain ranch properties and other businesses; that she devoted her entire time and effort to the improvement and furtherance of such properties and businesses; and that because of a confidential relationship between the parties plaintiff relied on defendant’s representations that he would share with her in all of the profits realized. Plaintiff prays that she be adjudged the owner of an undivided one-half interest in the designated property and that defendant be deemed to hold such interest in trust for her.
The evidence shows that defendant had owned the subject ranch property in Butte County for some 15 years before the inception of his relationship with plaintiff and that it was substantially improved and stocked with domestic animals. In *6611946 defendant sold the ranch and its stock, and from then until 1956 (the year in which the parties separated) engaged in the real estate and furniture businesses or spent his time with plaintiff travelling about the country for pleasure.
The trial court found, and plaintiff does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the finding, that “plaintiff and defendant did not at any time operate the ranches referred to in the complaint, or any other property, as joint venturers or partners.” In particular, the court found that “plaintiff had no interest in said ranch [in Butte County] at the time of said sale [in 1946] and that the same was the sole and separate property of defendant . . . and that the proceeds of said sale belonged to said defendant alone”; and that defendant 1 ‘ did use the proceeds of said sale to purchase certain other properties in the State of California, but that the same were not purchased by plaintiff and defendant as partners or joint venturers, . . . but the same were purchased by defendant as an individual dealing with his own separate property,...”
Responsive to the allegations of reliance upon a confidential relationship, the court found that “at no time during said period of cohabitation, ... or at any time before or after said date, were there any confidential or business relations between plaintiff and defendant”; that “It is not true that defendant at any time took title to any property with the intention or for the purpose of depriving plaintiff of any interest to which she was entitled therein”; and that “defendant at no time made any representation, promise or agreement that he would operate any business whatever or own any property whatever as a partner or joint venturer with plaintiff; and further that plaintiff did not at any time rely upon any representation claimed to have been made by defendant with regard to plaintiff’s having or acquiring any interest in property owned or acquired by defendant, nor did plaintiff rely upon any purported relationship of trust or confidence between plaintiff and defendant.” Each of these findings, supported by substantial evidence, is unchallenged by plaintiff.
Having concluded that all of the property standing in defendant’s name at the time of trial was his sole and separate property and that plaintiff had established no interest therein,1 the court rendered judgment for defendant.
*662In Vallera v. Vallera (1943), supra, 21 Cal.2d 681, 684-685 [3], we considered the question “whether a woman living with a man as his wife but with no genuine belief that she is legally married to him acquires by reason of cohabitation alone the rights of a co-tenant in his earnings and accumulations during the period of their relationship.” We held that this question “has already been answered in the negative. (Flanagan v. Capital Nat. Bank, 213 Cal. 664 [3 P.2d 307].) Equitable considerations arising from the reasonable expectation of the continuation of benefits attending the status of marriage entered into in good faith are not present in such a case.” While this court has not since had occasion to speak to the precise point, we adhere to the Vallera rule.2
Seeking to avoid the effect of this rule, plaintiff quotes as applicable here our further statement in Vallera (p. 685 [4] of 21 Cal.2d) that “If a man and woman live together as husband and wife under an agreement to pool their earnings and share equally in their joint accumulations, equity will protect the interests of each in such property. [Citations.] Even in the absence of an express agreement to that effect, the woman would be entitled to share in the property jointly accumulated, in the proportion that her funds contributed toward its acquisition. [Citations.] ” We do not depart from that proposition. But here the trial court found, as stated in its memorandum decision, “no evidence of financial contributions by Plaintiff toward the property here concerned. Nor is there evidence sufficient to support any agreement upon which a joint enterprise or copartnership *663could be based.” In an effort to bring her case, nevertheless, within the purview of the just quoted language from Tallera, plaintiff stresses a finding of the trial court concerning the nature of her services during the period of cohabitation,3 and on this basis contends that in Tallera “When it used the word ‘funds’ the Court did not mean ‘money’ only. It referred to any contribution made by the woman, at least to any contribution other than her services as a housekeeper, cook and homemaker for which she may have been compensated either wholly or in part by support furnished.”
The contention is without merit.  When a word is used which has a well-established meaning in common parlance—such as “funds”—the necessities of intelligible communication require that it be assumed that the user intended that common meaning. There is no mystery surrounding the word here questioned by plaintiff.  The dictionary defines it as “available pecuniary resources ordinarily including cash and negotiable paper” (Webster’s New Internat. Dict. (3d ed. 1961), p. 921), and in a legal context the courts have also taken it to include property of value which may be converted into cash (see California Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Union Trust Co. (1918) 178 Cal. 65, 71 [172 P. 146] ; State v. Finney (1935) 141 Kan. 12 [40 P.2d 411, 421 [10]]). A simple reading of both of the Tallera opinions demonstrates that the members of the court intended and understood the word “funds” to be used in this common, everyday sense. Indeed, the dissenting opinion in Tallera expressly stated it to be “the conclusion of the majority opinion that in order to sustain the judgment of the trial court there must be proof of a definite monetary contribution by the plaintiff in the form of separate property, or a contribution of her earnings *664as a waitress or from other employment outside the home.” (Italics added.) (Vallera v. Vallera (1943), supra, 21 Cal.2d 681, 686.) Plaintiff’s reliance on subsequent decisions of this court and the District Court of Appeal which cite Vallera is misplaced, as none extends the word “funds” beyond its intended, common-sense meaning.
It follows that Vallera is not authority for plaintiff’s principal contention that a woman who cohabits with a man in a knowingly meretricious relationship is entitled to an interest in the property acquired in the latter’s name during the period of such cohabitation “to the extent the woman renders services not included in the usual services of a housekeeper, cook and homemaker. ...” Nor, as will be shown, is there any sound basis in law or in equity upon which that proposition can be sustained.
To begin with, it will be observed that plaintiff is not seeking to recover the reasonable value of services rendered to defendant, but rather is claiming an interest in the property standing in defendant’s name and acquired during the period of cohabitation. This being so, plaintiff cannot rely on either (1) a theory of contract “implied in fact” or (2) a theory of quasi contract or contract “implied in law.” (See Civ. Code, § 1621 ; Desny v. Wilder (1956) 46 Cal.2d 715, 735 [20]—737 [24] [299 P.2d 257].)  Under the former theory, where one party performs for another, with expectation of payment, a special service of a character which is ordinarily charged for and the latter knowingly accepts it in circumstances negating an inference of gift, a contract to pay the reasonable value thereof will be implied.4
                   Under the latter theory (quasi contract) it has been held that, where no “marital” property has been jointly accumulated, a bona fide putative spouse may recover the reasonable value of her services over and above the value of the support and maintenance furnished by the other party. (Sanguinetti v. Sanguinetti (1937) 9 Cal.2d 95, 100 [5]—101 [6] [69 P.2d 845, 111 A.L.R. 342] ; cf. Caldwell v. Odisio (1956) 142 Cal.App.2d 732, 735—736 [3] [299 P.2d 14].)  While either theory would be available to plaintiff if she could otherwise *665comply with its specific requirements, no such compliance appears on the present record; and in any event, under neither theory can there be recovery of a share of the property that might have been benefited by her services.5
It is code law that “when a transfer of real property is made to one person, and the consideration therefor is paid by or for another, a trust is presumed to result in favor of the person by or for whom such payment is made.” (Civ. Code, § 853.) This rule “applies to personal property as well as to real property.” (Goes v. Perry (1941) 18 Cal.2d 373, 379 [6] [115 P.2d 441].)  And “a resulting trust may be established in a fractional interest in property where the one urging the trust pays only a portion of the purchase price.” (Watson v. Poore (1941) 18 Cal.2d 302, 317 [14] [115 P.2d 478].) These principles are settled beyond question, and have been applied to real property acquired by the parties to a meretricious relationship (Padilla v. Padilla (1940) 38 Cal.App.2d 319, 321 [1] [100 P.2d 1093]). But they are of no avail to plaintiff.  “It is also a familiar rule that it is incumbent upon him who would claim that a trust exists in his favor to establish the fact by clear, convincing, and unambiguous testimony; that the presumption that the person in whose name the legal title to land is vested is the absolute owner thereof is not to be overcome by surmise or conjecture . . .; and that, if [the person asserting the trust] would claim an interest pro tanto according to the proportion of the consideration furnished by him, he must show the precise amount paid by him, as well as the amount for which the purchase was made, in order that the court may determine the respective rights of the parties in the property purchased.” (Woodside v. Hewel (1895) 109 Cal. 481, 484-485 [42 P. 152] ; accord, Socol v. King (1950) 36 Cal.2d 342, 348 [7] [223 P.2d 627], and cases there cited.) Plaintiff did not, and manifestly cannot, sustain that burden.
*666In the majority of cases involving a resulting trust the consideration furnished by the beneficiary of the trust for the purchase of the property is, of course, money or other property of value. Here plaintiff does not contend that she furnished any consideration in the form of money or property, but rather that she furnished “services not included in the usual services of a housekeeper, cook and homemaker. . . .” The issue, therefore, is whether such services may constitute consideration for an interest in defendant’s property upon which a resulting trust may be declared.
In appropriate circumstances “where A performs services in consideration of which land is transferred to B, B presumptively holds upon a resulting trust for A; and if the services are a part of the consideration, B holds upon a resulting trust pro tanto.” (4 Scott on Trusts (2d ed. 1956), p. 3080.) In the reported eases applying this rule, however, A renders services to X, the grantor, with the understanding that A will be compensated therefor, and X then transfers to B legal title to certain property in payment for such services. Thus, in Robarts v. Haley (1884) 65 Cal. 397 [4 P. 385], the plaintiff and the defendant, both attorneys, had jointly represented a group of litigants in an action for partition of land. At a time when the plaintiff Avas absent from the state the defendant procured from their clients, as “full pay and satisfaction for” such joint services, a deed to himself of certain valuable property. The plaintiff brought suit to compel the defendant to convey to him an undivided one-half interest in that property. In affirming a judgment for plaintiff the court held (id. at p. 402) that “This land here was purchased by professional services rendered by plaintiff and defendant under a contract made with them; the conveyance having been made to the defendant under these circumstances, a trust results to the plaintiff by operation of law.” (See also Dougherty v. California Kettleman Oil Royalties,Inc. (1937) 9 Cal.2d 58, 81 [10] [69 P.2d 155] [services of a promoter, under an agreement to obtain an oil prospecting permit in exchange for an interest in the profits] ; Aborn v. Searles (1893) 18 R.I. 357 [27 A. 796, 797] [services.of a real estate agent, the conveyance of the property to be in lieu of commission] ; White v. Sheldon (1868) 3-4 Nev. 739, 746 [services of attorney, under an agreement to hold the property in trust for the attorney in lieu of paying his fees].)
But in the ease at bench plaintiff admittedly rendered no services to any grantor of property standing in defendant’s name; and it cannot be said that the services which *667she rendered to defendant “purchased” any of that property within the meaning of the law of resulting trusts. The property before the court was principally derived from the operation and sale of (1) defendant’s ranch in Butte County and (2) defendant's real estate and furniture businesses. As noted above, the evidence shows that defendant owned the ranch for some 15 years before the inception of his relationship with plaintiff, and that at the time he met plaintiff the property was substantially improved and stocked with domestic animals. In the finding on which plaintiff relies in this connection {ante, fn. 3) the court accurately described plaintiff’s “non-wifely” services as “consisting of helping in the performance of farm, labor, including the raising of turkeys, chickens, sheep, cattle, the clearing of land, the sowing, raising and harvesting of grain crops and the growing and harvesting of nut crops.” (Italics added.) In short, plaintiff did various farm chores and assisted in the operation of the ranch.  But it is settled in this state that even actual monetary contributions to make improvements on real property do not raise a resulting trust in favor of the contributor. (Elliott v. Wood (1949) 95 Cal.App.2d 314, 318 [6] [212 P.2d 906] ; McQuin v. Rice (1948), supra, 88 Cal.App.2d 914, 917—918 [4], and cases there cited; 4 Scott, op. cit. supra, p. 3078.)  A fortiori, a resulting trust cannot be predicated on plaintiff’s contribution of services to the operation of the ranch, long after legal title thereto had vested in defendant alone. And as plaintiff thus acquired no interest in the property itself while it was owned by defendant, she acquired no interest in the proceeds of its sale in 1946.6
*668After the sale of the ranch defendant engaged, at least part of the time, in the real estate and furniture businesses. There is neither allegation nor evidence that plaintiff furnished any of the funds or properties used in such businesses ; and with respect to her asserted contribution of services in this connection the court found (ante, fn. 3) only that “on a few occasions during the years 1947 through 1956, the plaintiff assisted defendant in connection with the operation of his real estate brokerage business, furniture business and the buying and selling of real estate, timber and timber lands.” (Italics added.) The evidence as to plaintiff’s role in defendant’s real estate business, for example, shows that she occasionally took telephone messages for him while he was out, and sometimes accompanied him on longer trips. A resulting trust in defendant’s businesses cannot be predicated on such services.
It is not enough simply to assert that if by her work on defendant’s ranch or in defendant’s businesses plaintiff "increased the value” of that ranch or those businesses, she thereby furnished “consideration” in the amount of such increase and is entitled to a proportionate share in the proceeds of sale. The labor of a farm hand or the sales effort of a realtor’s agent or a furniture store employe also “increases the value” of the ranch or the business where he works; yet it is manifest that he thereby acquires no interest in the property itself or in the proceeds of its sale, in the absence of a specific agreement to that effect with the owner. The rule is not different when the parties are a man and a woman knowingly living in unwed cohabitation. If anything, in such a situation the implication is even stronger that any services performed by one party in assisting in the operation of the other’s business or trade, without an express agreement for compensation or for sharing in joint accumulations, are intended by the one performing them as gifts or as his or her contribution to the general living expenses of both. (McQuim, v. Rice (1948), supra, 88 Cal.App.2d 914, 918 [6] ; Baskett v. Crook (1948), supra, 86 Cal.App.2d 355, 359 [1].)
For the reasons above stated the judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Traynor, J., McComb, J., White, J., and Dooling, J., concurred.

At the start of trial the parties stipulated that the issue would first be limited to whether plaintiff was entitled to anything under the theories of the complaint; and that only if that issue was resolved in the affirma*662tive would they try "the issue of the accounting as to how much money was accumulated over the period of time in question, and what amounts, if any, the plaintiff would be entitled to.”

The rule has been applied in a number of District Court of Appeal decisions since Vallera (e.g., Lazzarevich v. Lazzarevich (1948) 88 Cal.App.2d 708, 719 [7] [200 P.2d 49] ; Baskett v. Crook (1948) 86 Cal.App.2d 355, 361-362 [4] [195 P.2d 39] ; Oakley v. Oakley (1947) 82 Cal.App.2d 188, 190 [4]—192 [5] [185 P.2d 848]), and has recently been invoked by the highest courts of several sister jurisdictions (e.g., Stevens v. Anderson (1953) 75 Ariz. 331 [256 P.2d 712, 715 [7]] ; Wellmaker v. Roberts (1958) 213 Ga. 740 [101 S.E.2d 712, 713] ; Sparrow v. Sparrow (1957) 231 La. 966 [93 So.2d 232, 234 [1]] ; Smith v. Smith (1949) 255 Wis. 96 [38 N.W.2d 12, 14 [2]]).
It may be pointed out that in denying relief in eases of this nature the courts have not discriminated against the woman, but have also rejected where appropriate the claim of the man. (See, e.g., Gjurich v. Fieg (1913) 164 Cal. 429 [129 P. 464, Ann.Cas. 1916B 111] ; McQuin v. Rice (1948) 88 Cal.App.2d 914 [199 P.2d 742] ; Baskett v. Crook (1948), supra, 86 Cal.App.2d 355 ; cf. Beuck v. Howe (1946) 71 S.D. 288 [23 N.W.2d 744] ; Orth v. Wood (1946) 354 Pa. 121 [47 A.2d 140] ; Wosche v. Kraning (1946) 353 Pa. 481 [46 A.2d 220].)

‘‘The court further Suds that during said period of cohabitation the plaintiff did perform the usual and customary work of a housewife, such as cooking, housecleaning, laundry, shopping and running household errands and generally managing the household, and further that during a portion of the period of cohabitation between the parties, to wit, the years 1938 to 1946, plaintiff did perform work and labor for the mutual benefit of defendant and plaintiff on a certain ranch situate in Butte County, California, standing of record in the name of and owned by defendant, said services consisting of helping in the performance of farm labor, including the raising of turkeys, chickens, sheep, cattle, the clearing of land, the sowing, raising and harvesting of grain crops and the growing and harvesting of nut crops. The court further finds that on a few occasions during the years 1947 through 1956, the plaintiff assisted defendant in connection with the operation of his real estate brokerage business, furniture business and the buying and selling of real estate, timber and timber lands.’’

See, e.g., Bush v. Lane (1958) 161 Cal.App.2d 278 [326 P.2d 640] [warehouse storage of personal effects] ; Nikolaus v. Howe (1954) 122 Cal.App.2d 422 [265 P.2d 99] [haulage of ore to dump] ; Medina v. Van Camp Sea Food Co. (1946) 75 Cal.App.2d 551 [171 P.2d 445] [transportation of cargo of fish from Canal Zone to San Diego]; W. R. Campbell Co. v. Herbert’s of Los Angeles (1930) 110 Cal.App. 244 [293 P. 805] [real estate brokerage services].

A constructive trust, of course, will not be imposed for the value of services rendered. “A constructive trust does not arise unless there is property [i.e., property transferred to the trustee] on which the constructive trust can be fastened, . . . Thus, although a constructive trust arises where a transfer of the title to land or a chattel or a chose in action is obtained by fraud, yet where by fraud a person is induced to render services, no constructive trust arises, even though the person rendering the services is entitled to recover the value of his services.” (Rest., Restitution, § 160, com. i.) For the reasons given hereinafter in discussing the law of resulting trusts, it is apparent that there is no “property” of plaintiff standing in defendant’s name “on which [a] constructive trust can be fastened. ...”

The point is illustrated by Hayworth v. Williams (1909) 102 Tex. 308 [116 S.W. 43, 45, 132 Am.St.Rep. 879], one of the two decisions cited in Vallera v. Vallera (1943), supra, 21 Cal.2d 681, 685 [4], in support of the passage now relied on by plaintiff (quoted ante, p. 662). In that case the real property in issue had been conveyed by deed to the decedent for a recited cash consideration while he and Margreth Williams were knowingly living in unwedded cohabitation. The Texas court held that “If Margreth Williams can show that the money with which the land was purchased was acquired in whole or in part by her labor in connection with [decedent] Thomas Jefferson before the time when the land was purchased, then she would be entitled to a share in the land in the proportion that her labor contributed in producing the purchase money. Nothing which she did in contributing to the improvement of the property or otherwise in connection with Thomas Jefferson after the deed was made and the land paid for can affect the title. Her right must have existed in the fund which purchased the land, and no trust in favor of Margreth Williams will arise out of the dealings between her and Jefferson after the title had vested in him.” (Italics added.)