Court Opinion

ID: 9550613
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:38:23.467824+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:21:59.545130
License: Public Domain

Donworth, J.
(concurring in the result)—I concur in all of the foregoing opinion except the last paragraph. I think its implications are too broad and that in the future this case will be cited as having disposed' of several important questions which appellant has attempted to raise but is not entitled to raise in this case.
For example, appellant complains that a seller of real estate is taxed by chapter 11 at the same rate on the sale of property worth $20,000 whether he owns it in fee or has only a $500 equity in it.
He also complains that a lease with an option to purchase is defined as a sale under chapter 11, as amended, and is taxed as such.
These and possibly other matters of which he complains purport to be disposed of adversely to the taxpayer in this decision.
In my opinion, these matters are not before us for decision because there is no allegation in appellant’s complaint that he is affected by the portions of chapter 11 applicable thereto. He merely alleges
“That plaintiff is a property owner in King County, as well as other counties in the State of Washington, and he has sold, is presently selling and will be selling various parcels of real estate in King County, as well as in various other counties in the State of Washington. That he will be directly damaged in his property by the enforcement of *414Chapter 11, Laws Ex. Sess. 1951, and the Resolution adopted by the Commissioners of King County pursuant thereto.”
There is no allegation that he intends to enter into a lease with an option to buy or that he proposes to sell an equity in real property.
Under the declaratory judgment act this court may not render advisory opinions.
In Washington Beauty College v. Huse, 195 Wash. 160, 80 P. (2d) 403, we said:
“It should be remembered that this court is not authorized to render advisory opinions or pronouncements upon abstract or speculative questions under the declaratory judgment act. The action still must be adversary in character between real parties and upon real issues, that is-, between a plaintiff and defendant having opposing interests, and the interests must be direct and substantial and involve an actual as distinguished from a possible or potential dispute, to meet the requirements of justiciability.
“The term ‘substantial interest’ is not susceptible of a precise definition. It is a matter for judicial determination in each particular case.”
In concluding his brief, appellant requests this court to advise him concerning the following questions:
“I. Is an earnest money real estate agreement a ‘contract’ within the meaning of Chapter 11?
“2. May a seller and buyer contract for the payment of the tax pro rata or entirely by the buyer, and is such a contract enforceable?
“3. Does the sale price against which the tax percentage is applied include only the equity of a contract buyer when he sells his interest under the contract, or does it include the entire purchase price, composed of his equity plus the balance due on the contract?
“4. Is this tax payable to the County Treasurer at the time a real estate contract is executed or when the deed conveying title is filed?
“5. Is this tax payable on a ‘sale to satisfy a debt’?”
For the reasons stated in the case above cited, the court has properly declined to answer these questions and I think that it should be specifically stated that the court is not, by what is said in the last paragraph of the opinion, passing *415upon any questions other than those properly before the court.
With this exception, I concur in the opinion.