Court Opinion

ID: 9964329
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-29 18:01:33.991629+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:19.093158
License: Public Domain

This opinion is subject to administrative correction before final disposition.

                               Before
                  HOLIFIELD, KIRKBY, and BLOSSER
                      Appellate Military Judges

                        _________________________

                          UNITED STATES
                              Appellee

                                     v.

                         Hleb KUKHARAU
                   Sergeant (E-5), U.S. Marine Corps
                               Appellant

                             No. 202300062

                        _________________________

                           Decided: 29 April 2024

    Appeal from the United States Navy-Marine Corps Trial Judiciary

                            Military Judges:
                     Stephen F. Keane (arraignment)
                           Yong J. Lee (trial)

 Sentence adjudged 9 November 2022 by a special court-martial con-
 vened at Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton, California, consisting of
 a military judge sitting alone. Sentence in the Entry of Judgment: no
 punishment.

                            For Appellant:
           Lieutenant Jackson M. Beach, JAGC, USN (argued)
                    Major Colin W. Hotard, USMC

                              For Appellee:
                       Major Tyler W. Blair, USMC
             United States v. Kukharau, NMCCA No. 202300062
                             Opinion of the Court

   Judge BLOSSER delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief
   Judge HOLIFIELD and Senior Judge KIRKBY joined.

                           _________________________

         This opinion does not serve as binding precedent, but
              may be cited as persuasive authority under
               NMCCA Rule of Appellate Procedure 30.2.

                           _________________________

BLOSSER, Judge:
   A special court-martial convicted Appellant, contrary to his pleas, of as-
sault consummated by a battery in violation of Article 128, Uniform Code of
Military Justice [UCMJ]. 1
    This case is before us on direct appeal submitted by Appellant pursuant to
Article 66(b)(1), UCMJ. Appellant asserts four assignments of error [AOEs],
which we rephrase as follows: (1) whether the evidence is legally and factually
sufficient to support Appellant’s conviction; (2) whether the military judge
abandoned his impartiality when he continued to ask Lance Corporal [LCpl]
Martin whether the touching of his helmet was offensive after he repeatedly
testified that it was not and was “just a regular correction” during combat
training; (3) whether trial defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object
to the military judge’s suggestive, leading questions that eventually convinced
LCpl Martin to change his testimony about whether Appellant’s touching of
his helmet was offensive; (4) whether the convening authority violated Appel-
lant’s due process right to a members panel when he referred this case to a
military judge alone special court-martial? 2 We find no prejudicial error and
affirm.

   1 10 U.S.C. § 928.

   2 We have reviewed Appellant’s fourth AOE and find it to be without merit. See

United States v. Wheeler, 83 M.J. 581 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2023) review granted, __
M.J. __, No. 23-0140/NA, 2023 CAAF LEXIS 427 (C.A.A.F. Jun. 23, 2023) (mem.).; see
also United States v. Matias, 25 M.J. 356, 363 (C.M.A. 1987).

                                        2
              United States v. Kukharau, NMCCA No. 202300062
                              Opinion of the Court

                                I. BACKGROUND

    The conduct at issue occurred while LCpl Martin 3 was a student and Ap-
pellant was his instructor during the entry-level Light Armored Reconnais-
sance Marine Course, which teaches Marines operator-level maintenance,
driving techniques, turret operations, and water operations for Light Armored
Vehicles [LAV]. During a nighttime segment of a field exercise [FEX], LCpl
Martin was driving an LAV into an assembly area where other LAVs and Ma-
rines were staged. 4 Even though the LAVs’ headlights were on, 5 Appellant dis-
mounted LCpl Martin’s LAV to provide additional safety by guiding LCpl Mar-
tin from the ground with hand and arm signals (i.e., “ground-guiding”). 6 Wit-
nesses described LCpl Martin as not paying attention and not doing what he
was told; however, LCpl Martin was eventually able to get the LAV parked
safely.
    Once LCpl Martin parked the LAV, he began its shutdown procedures, but
mistakenly shutdown the power systems in an improper sequence that can,
but did not, damage the vehicle’s communications equipment. 7 Appellant re-
turned to the LAV and climbed partway up it until his torso was next to LCpl
Martin’s head at the driver’s hatch. 8 He asked LCpl Martin what was taking
so long and LCpl Martin explained that he shut the power systems down out
of sequence. 9 Appellant then “chewed [LCpl Martin] out for it” in an “aggres-
sive demeanor” 10 before “smack[ing]” LCpl Martin on the back of his helmet
with enough force to cause LCpl Martin’s head to jerk forward, but without
causing injury. 11 On a scale from 1 to 10, LCpl Martin testified the force was a
5, meaning it was a “little bit more forceful than a tap, but less than a full
punch.” 12

   3 All names in this opinion, other than those of Appellant, the military judges, and

appellate counsel, are pseudonyms.
   4 R. at 148–49, 151.

   5 R. at 149, 151.

   6 R. at 169–71.

   7 R. at 149, 172.

   8 R. at 151–54.

   9 R. at 149.

   10 R. at 150.

   11 R. at 150–51.

   12 R. at 194.

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              United States v. Kukharau, NMCCA No. 202300062
                              Opinion of the Court

    LCpl Edwards testified he observed Appellant contact LCpl Martin’s hel-
met with his hand, but opined that “struck” was a “very harsh word to use”
because Appellant “wasn’t . . . going out of his way to harm him.” 13 LCpl Ed-
wards did not observe Appellant “rear his hand back” or “come forward with
force.” 14 LCpl Edwards testified he “didn’t think too much into it at the time”
and ultimately described the contact as a “love tap.” 15
   A few minutes after striking LCpl Martin, Appellant pulled him aside and
apologized for “getting physical.” 16
    The military judge recalled LCpl Martin after the parties had presented
their cases and asked him whether the “contact” was offensive to him despite
no injuries. 17 LCpl Martin responded, “At the moment, it was not, sir.” 18 The
military judge asked LCpl Martin to explain what he meant by “[a]t the mo-
ment it was not.” LCpl Martin testified he “took it as a—just a regular correc-
tion.” 19
    The military judge then defined “battery” for LCpl Martin: “An assault in
which bodily harm is inflicted is called a battery, okay. A battery is an unlawful
infliction of bodily harm to another made with force or violence by an inten-
tional act[.]” 20 He went on to define “bodily harm” as “an offensive touching of
another however slight” then explained further: “That means it could be a tap.
It could be a punch. You know, degree of force. It could be anything from like
1, the scale that I gave you, to all the way to 10.” 21 The military judge then
asked LCpl Martin if, “based on [his] understanding of the social norms and
[his] experience,” the contact was offensive to him, however slight. LCpl Martin
testified, “I’d say, yes, sir.” 22
   The military judge sought clarification: “You told me earlier maybe it
wasn’t, but now you’re saying—because you had a chance to reflect, explain

   13 R. at 201.

   14 R. at 207.

   15 R. at 207, 209.

   16 R. at 155.

   17 R. at 378.

   18 Id.

   19 Id.

   20 R. at 379.

   21 Id.

   22 Id.

                                        4
              United States v. Kukharau, NMCCA No. 202300062
                              Opinion of the Court

why.” 23 LCpl Martin explained, “Because normally just getting chewed out
would be enough, but just, like, getting physical with somebody would just be
unnecessary.” 24 In response to a follow-on Defense question, LCpl Martin
acknowledged that he first testified the contact was not offensive. 25 In a follow-
up question, the military judge verified LCpl Martin did not previously con-
sider the contact offensive because he “thought [he] was just getting cor-
rected.” 26 The military judge then instructed LCpl Martin to “really reflect
back, right, or think about it right now, because you told me later on that you
felt it was offensive, right?” 27 The military judge asked him whether the con-
tact was “offensive to [him] during FEX-1 when this incident happened or was
it not offensive to [him], that this was something that was normally acceptable
to [him] at that time?” 28 The military judge instructed LCpl Martin to take his
time before giving a definitive answer. LCpl Martin paused for 40 seconds then
testified, “I’d say it would be offensive, sir.” 29 Throughout this examination, the
military judge was neither aggressive nor prescriptive. 30 Rather, his tone was
calm and inquisitive, and he repeatedly encouraged LCpl Martin to take his
time and think. 31
    Following announcement of the sentence—no punishment—the military
judge gave his “strongest recommendation to [the convening authority] that he
exercise his authority under Rules [sic] for Court-Martial1110(b)(2), to set
aside the finding of guilty[.]” 32 In the Statement of Trial Results, the military
judge also supplemented his oral comments with nearly 800 written words ex-
plaining his recommendation to set the finding aside. The convening authority
considered Appellant’s matters, the military judge’s recommendation, and his
Staff Judge Advocate’s advice, but chose not to set aside the finding. 33

   23 Id.

   24 Id.

   25 R. at 380.

   26 R. at 382–83.

   27 R. at 383.

   28 Id.

   29 Id.; Official Audio R. of Court-Martial Proceedings at 31:59–32:39.

   30 Official Audio R. of Court-Martial Proceedings at 25:00–32.45.

   31 Id.

   32 R. at 471; Statement of Trial Results at 2.

   33 Entry of Judgment; Convening Authority’s Action.

                                           5
               United States v. Kukharau, NMCCA No. 202300062
                               Opinion of the Court

                                  II. DISCUSSION

A. The evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support Appel-
lant’s conviction.

   1. Standard of Review and Law
    We review legal sufficiency de novo. To determine legal sufficiency, we ask
whether, “considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecu-
tion, a reasonable fact-finder could have found all the essential elements be-
yond a reasonable doubt.” 34 In conducting this analysis, we must “draw every
reasonable inference from the evidence of record in favor of the prosecution.” 35
In doing so, we are mindful that “[f]indings may be based on direct or circum-
stantial evidence.” 36
    To trigger this Court’s factual sufficiency review, an appellant must request
the review and “identify a weakness in the evidence admitted at trial to sup-
port an element . . . and explain why, on balance, the evidence (or lack thereof)
admitted at trial contradicts a guilty finding.” 37 After an appellant has made a
specific showing of a deficiency in proof, we “may weigh the evidence and de-
termine controverted questions of fact.” 38 We are to give “appropriate defer-
ence to the fact that the trial court saw and heard the witnesses and other
evidence” and to “findings of fact entered into the record by the military
judge.” 39 We may not “dismiss, set aside, or modify [a] finding, or affirm a lesser
finding” unless we are “clearly convinced that the finding of guilty was against
the weight of the evidence.” 40

   34 United States v. Turner, 25 M.J. 324, 324 (C.M.A. 1987) (citation omitted).

   35 United States v. Gutierrez, 74 M.J. 61, 65 (C.A.A.F. 2015) (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted).
   36 United States v. Long, 81 M.J. 362, 368 (C.A.A.F. 2021) (citing R.CM. 918(c); see

also United States v. King, 78 M.J. 218, 221 (C.A.A.F. 2019) (“[T]he government is free
to meet its burden of proof with circumstantial evidence.”).
   37 United States v. Harvey, 83 M.J. 685, 691 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2023) review

granted, __ M.J. __, No. 23-0239/NA, 2024 CAAF LEXIS 13 (C.A.A.F. Jan. 10, 2024)
(mem.).
   38 Article 66(d)(1)(B)(ii), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 866(d)(1)(B)(ii).

   39 Article 66(d)(1)(B)(ii), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 866(d)(1)(B)(ii).

   40 Article 66(d)(1)(B)(iii), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 866(d)(1)(B)(iii); see also Harvey, 83

M.J. at 692.

                                           6
              United States v. Kukharau, NMCCA No. 202300062
                              Opinion of the Court

    To prove Appellant committed an assault consummated by a battery upon
LCpl Martin, the Government was required to show that: 1) Appellant did bod-
ily harm to LCpl Martin; 2) the bodily harm was done unlawfully; and 3) the
bodily harm was done with force or violence. 41 “‘Bodily harm’ means an offen-
sive touching of another, however slight.” 42 Combined, the second and third
elements mean the Appellant “wrongfully caused the contact, in that no legally
cognizable reason existed that would excuse or justify the contact.” 43 An act
“done in the proper performance of a legal duty is justified and not unlawful.” 44
“It is . . . not a battery to touch another to attract the other’s attention or to
prevent injury.” 45
   It is axiomatic that the determination of whether a touching is offensive is
an objective one. Evidence showing that a victim perceives a strike as offensive
may be relevant for the ultimate question, but it is not dispositive.
   2. Analysis
    On appeal, Appellant does not dispute that he struck LCpl Martin on the
head. Rather, he only challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evi-
dence relating to the second and third elements, asserting there exists a “defi-
ciency of proof that the touching of [LCpl Martin’s] helmet was (a) offensive
and (b) unlawful.” 46
    To support his argument that the evidence was insufficient to prove the
strike was offensive, Appellant relies on LCpl Martin’s initial answer to the
military judge’s question that he took the strike as “just a regular correction,”
the protective design of a crewman’s helmet, LCpl Martin’s lack of a reaction
or reporting of the strike, and LCpl Martin’s favorable end-of-course critique.
Connected with his second and third AOEs, Appellant argues for us to disre-
gard LCpl Martin’s subsequent testimony that the strike was offensive, con-
tending that LCpl Martin felt pressured by the military judge to change his
testimony. 47

   41  Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (2019 ed.) [MCM], pt. IV, para.
77.b.(2).
   42 MCM, pt. IV, para. 77.c.(1)(a).

   43 United States v. Bonner, 70 M.J. 1, 3 (C.A.A.F. 2011) (citing United States v.

Johnson, 54 M.J. 67, 69 (C.A.A.F. 2000)).
   44 Rule for Courts-Martial [R.C.M.] 916(c).

   45 MCM, pt. IV, para. 77.c.(3)(d).

   46 Appellant’s Br. at 22.

   47 Appellant’s Br. at 23–24.

                                            7
              United States v. Kukharau, NMCCA No. 202300062
                              Opinion of the Court

     LCpl Martin described the force of Appellant’s strike as a 5 out of 10, a
“little bit more forceful than a tap, but less than a full punch.” 48 LCpl Edwards,
an eyewitness, described Appellant’s strike as a “love tap.” 49 Appellant, him-
self, recognized the impropriety of striking LCpl Martin, and apologized to
LCpl Martin for “getting physical” with him. 50 Once LCpl Martin understood
the legal meaning of “offensive,” he testified that he found Appellant’s strike
offensive “[b]ecause normally just getting chewed out would be enough, but
just, like, getting physical with somebody would just be unnecessary.” 51
    Appellant asserts “the helmet slap was performed in the line of duty by a
combat training instructor to get the attention of an inattentive Marine while
he was operating a massive, dangerous, armored vehicle, to prevent him from
injuring the equipment or any of the Marines in the vicinity.” 52 We disagree.
The evidence showed Appellant struck LCpl Martin after his corrective instruc-
tion began—specifically, after LCpl Martin informed Appellant he had exe-
cuted the shutdown procedure out of sequence. The evidence also showed Ap-
pellant struck LCpl Martin after the LAV was safely parked and no longer in
operation—i.e., the strike was in response to the incorrect shutdown proce-
dures.
    While operating a 14-ton combat vehicle in a crowded assembly area at
night is certainly a dangerous endeavor, that does not justify an instructor
striking a student while correcting his previous actions—doubly so when in a
noncombat, training environment and the potential dangers of the vehicle’s
operation no longer exist because it is stationary. 53
     Considering this evidence in the light most favorable to the Government,
we conclude that a reasonable factfinder could have found all the essential el-
ements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, the evidence is legally
sufficient to support the conviction.

   48 R. at 194.

   49 R. at 207.

   50 R. at 155.

   51 R. at 379.

   52 Appellant’s Br. at 27–28.

   53 We similarly reject Appellant’s legal contention that slapping a Marine’s helmet

and a “good chewing out” are simply part of Marine Corps culture. See Appellant’s Br.
at 29–30.

                                         8
              United States v. Kukharau, NMCCA No. 202300062
                              Opinion of the Court

    Appellant has met the threshold requirement for factual sufficiency review
and made a specific showing of a deficiency in proof under Article 66(d)(1)(B)(i),
UCMJ. Giving appropriate deference to the fact that the trial court saw and
heard the witnesses and other evidence, we are not clearly convinced that the
finding of guilty is against the weight of the evidence in this case. Accordingly,
we find the evidence factually sufficient to support the conviction.

B. The military judge did not abandon his impartiality.
    Appellant asserts the military judge abandoned his impartiality when, af-
ter LCpl Martin testified Appellant’s strike to his helmet was “just a regular
correction,” the military judge continued to ask LCpl Martin whether he con-
sidered the strike offensive. Appellant characterizes the military judge’s ac-
tions as badgering the witness by “‘the most dominant figure in a trial by court-
martial.’” 54

    1. Standard of Review and Law
    If not raised until appeal, the issue of military judge disqualification is re-
viewed for plain error. 55 To establish plain error, an appellant must show that:
(1) error exists, (2) the error is plain or obvious, and (3) the error resulted in
material prejudice. 56 A criminal accused has a constitutional right to an im-
partial judge. 57 Thus, the test for prejudice asks whether any error is harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. 58
    “There is a strong presumption that a military judge is impartial in the
conduct of judicial proceedings.” 59 “When a military judge’s impartiality is
challenged on appeal, the test is whether, taken as a whole in the context of
this trial, a court-martial’s legality, fairness, and impartiality were put into

    54Appellant’s Br. at 37 (quoting United States v. Hardy, 30 M.J. 757, 760–61
(A.C.M.R. 1990)).
    55 United States v. Martinez, 70 M.J. 154, 157 (C.A.A.F. 2011).

    56 United States v. Maynard, 66 M.J. 242, 244 (C.A.A.F. 2008) (citation omitted).

    57 United States v. Butcher, 56 M.J. 87, 90 (C.A.A.F. 2001) (citations omitted).

    58 United States v. Tovarchavez, 78 M.J. 458, 460 (C.A.A.F. 2019); see also United

States v. Cooper, 51 M.J. 247, 250 (C.A.A.F. 1999) (an accused’s right to an impartial
judge stems from due process) (citations omitted).
    59 United States v. Foster, 64 M.J. 331, 333 (C.A.A.F. 2007) (citing to United States

v. Quintanilla, 56 M.J. 37, 44 (C.A.A.F. 2001)).

                                           9
               United States v. Kukharau, NMCCA No. 202300062
                               Opinion of the Court

doubt by the military judge’s questions.” 60 The test is objective, assessed from
the perspective of a reasonable person observing the proceedings. 61
    “A military judge has wide latitude to ask questions of witnesses.” 62
“[W]hile a military judge must maintain his fulcrum position of impartiality,
the judge can and sometimes must ask questions in order to clear up uncer-
tainties in the evidence or to develop the facts further.” 63 Neither rules nor case
law preclude a military judge from eliciting evidence which may favor one
party or another. A military judge is not prohibited from asking the same ques-
tion a different way when the witness appears to be confused. Where the de-
fense fails to object at trial to a military judge’s alleged partiality, it may pre-
sent an inference the defense believed the military judge remained impartial. 64
    While an expert witness may provide opinion testimony that embraces an
ultimate issue, opinion testimony from lay witnesses is very limited. 65 “[Mili-
tary Rule of Evidence] 701 establishes a two-part test for admissibility of lay
opinion: (1) the opinion must be rationally based on the witness’s perception;
and (2) the opinion must be helpful to the determination of a fact in issue.” 66
“It is generally held . . . that opinion testimony is not helpful where it does no
more than instruct the factfinder as to what result it should reach.” 67

    2. No Plain or Obvious Error
    We find nothing impermissible about the military judge asking an alleged
victim if he felt a strike was offensive or seeking clarification when the witness
qualifies his response with “[a]t the moment.” These questions are well within
the latitude afforded a military judge. However, the military judge went on to
provide LCpl Martin with the legal definitions of “battery,” “bodily harm,” and
“offensive touching” before asking him if he found the strike offensive “based
on [his] understanding of the social norms and [his] experience.” By doing this,

    60 United States v. Burton, 52 M.J. 223, 226 (C.A.A.F. 2000) (citations and quota-

tions omitted).
    61 Burton, 52 M.J. at 226.

    62 Id. (citing United States v. Acosta, 49 M.J. 14, 17 (1998)).

    63 United States v. Ramos, 42 M.J. 392, 396 (C.A.A.F. 1995) (citing United States

v. Dock, 40 M.J. 112 (CMA 1994); United States v. Tolppa, 25 M.J. 352 (CMA 1987);
United States v. Reynolds, 24 M.J. 261 (CMA 1987)).
    64 Foster, 64 M.J. at 333 (citing Burton, 52 M.J. at 226) (citation omitted).

    65 Compare Mil. R. Evid. 701 with Mil. R. Evid. 704.

    66 United States v. Byrd, 60 M.J. 4, 6 (C.A.A.F. 2004).

    67 United States v. Littlewood, 53 M.J. 349, 353 (C.A.A.F. 2000) (citation omitted).

                                            10
              United States v. Kukharau, NMCCA No. 202300062
                              Opinion of the Court

the military judge strayed beyond the latitude afforded to him because it
sought an improper opinion. In essence, the military judge asked a lay witness
for his opinion on whether an element of the crime was met, which exceeds the
limits of Military Rule of Evidence 701. However, since there was no objection
at trial and this issue was not raised on appeal, we consider this line of ques-
tions only as it relates to the military judge’s impartiality.
   The military judge questioned LCpl Martin in a non-aggressive, inquisitive,
neutral manner; found Appellant guilty; adjudged no punishment; and pro-
vided a detailed oral and written explanation of why he felt justice would best
be served by setting the finding aside. Taken as a whole, we conclude that a
reasonable person observing Appellant’s court-martial would not doubt the
military judge’s impartiality.
   Accordingly, we find no error, plain or otherwise.

C. The trial defense counsel was not ineffective.
    Appellant argues his trial defense counsel was ineffective for failing to ob-
ject to the military judge’s continued questioning of LCpl Martin. Appellant
contends,
       [T]he military judge’s questions warranted objections on multi-
       ple grounds: (1) he shed his impartiality by asking questions
       that were not prospectively neutral; (2) his question of whether
       the touch was offensive had been asked and answered (in the
       negative), and (3) he asked several leading questions that were
       designed to get Lance Corporal Mike to change his testimony to
       say the helmet tap was offensive. 68
    Appellant argues, “But for the trial defense counsel’s failure to object, [LCpl
Martin] would not have reversed his initial testimony that the alleged touch
was not offensive.” 69 LCpl Martin first opined that he did not find the touch
offensive. If this testimony remained unchanged due to sustained objections to
the follow-on questions, Appellant reasons that it would have negated an ele-
ment of the offense. 70

   68 Appellant’s Br. at 41.

   69 Appellant’s Br. at 42.

   70 Id.

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              United States v. Kukharau, NMCCA No. 202300062
                              Opinion of the Court

    1. Standard of Review and Law
    This Court reviews ineffective assistance of counsel claims de novo. 71 In
order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, an appellant
must show both deficient performance and prejudice. To establish ineffective
assistance of counsel, “an appellant must demonstrate both (1) that his coun-
sel’s performance was deficient, and (2) that this deficiency resulted in preju-
dice.” 72 Appellant has the burden of demonstrating both deficiency and preju-
dice including establishing the truth of factual matters underlying his claim of
ineffective assistance. 73 “Failure to raise a meritless argument does not consti-
tute ineffective assistance.” 74
    With regard to the second prong of the test, Appellant must show “a rea-
sonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, there would have been a dif-
ferent result.” 75

    2. Trial Defense Counsel’s Performance was not Deficient
   We address each of Appellant’s proposed objections separately and find
each without merit.
    As stated supra, we reject Appellant’s argument that the military judge’s
questions were not neutral and were evidence of impartiality. No question en-
couraged a particular answer. Accordingly, we find the first and third proposed
objections would have been meritless.
    Similarly, we reject Appellant’s contention that an “asked and answered”
objection would have been meritorious. Each time the military judge asked a
question related to whether the touch was offensive, he sought additional ex-
planation or clarification, including after trial defense counsel’s follow-up ques-
tions.

    71 United States v. Rivero, 82 M.J. 629, 635, (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2022); United

States v. Furth, 81 M.J. 114, 117 (C.A.A.F. 2021); United States v. Carter, 79 M.J. 478,
480 (C.A.A.F. 2020) (citations omitted).
    72 United States v. Green, 68 M.J. 360, 361 (C.A.A.F. 2010) (citing Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984)).
    73 See United States v. Polk, 32 M.J. 150, 153 (C.M.A. 1991); Denedo v. United

States, 66 M.J. 114, 129 (C.A.A.F. 2008), aff’d, 556 U.S. 904, 129 S. Ct 2213 (2009).
    74 United States v. Napoleon, 46 M.J. 279, 284 (C.A.A.F. 1997) (citations omitted).

    75 United States v. Quick, 59 M.J. 383, 386-87 (C.A.A.F. 2004) (citing Strickland,

466 U.S. at 694); see United States v. Bradley, 71 M.J. 13, 16 (C.A.A.F. 2012) (Such
reasonable probability requires “a substantial, not just conceivable, likelihood of a dif-
ferent result.”) (citation and internal quotations omitted).

                                           12
             United States v. Kukharau, NMCCA No. 202300062
                             Opinion of the Court

   We find no deficiency in trial defense counsel’s performance.

   3. Prejudice
    Even if trial defense counsel’s performance was deficient, Appellant has
shown no reasonable probability of a different result. Notwithstanding LCpl
Martin’s recall testimony, the evidence was more than sufficient to convict Ap-
pellant, including whether it is objectively offensive to slap a student’s helmet
to emphasize corrective instruction.

                                III. CONCLUSION

   After careful consideration of the record and briefs of appellate counsel, we
have determined that the findings and sentence are correct in law and fact and
that no error materially prejudicial to Appellant’s substantial rights oc-
curred. 76
   The findings and sentence are AFFIRMED.

                                 FOR THE COURT:

                                 MARK K. JAMISON
                                 Clerk of Court

   76 Articles 59 & 66, UCMJ.

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