Court Opinion

ID: 9716591
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:45:13.596158+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:47.044016
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE RYAN, dissenting: The majority opinion cites all the correct propositions of law, but comes to the wrong conclusion by not properly applying them. I, therefore, dissent. No other inferences can be logically drawn than that the deceased was not in the course of his employment at the time of the accident, but was on a “frolic” of his own. He was sent to Rockford to take a test. As agreed by the parties, it is not disputed that he would have been in the course of his employment during the taking of the test and during travel incident thereto. However, the accident happened 21/2 hours after the test was completed, and at a place where his employment would not have taken him. The most direct route between Rockford and the deceased’s home is Interstate Highway 90. The next most direct route is U.S. Highway 20. The deceased was on neither of these highways at the time of the accident. The majority opinion seems to imply that he was traveling in an area he could be expected to travel on his way home from Rockford. He was not. He was traveling south on a country road, two miles north of U.S. Highway 20. He was coming from the north and not from Rockford, which is directly west of the scene of the accident. The country road on which he was traveling is not a shortcut to Rockford. In fact, it does not even lead to Rockford. Rather, it is directly south of Capron, Illinois, the town in which the deceased formerly lived. One need only look at a road map of Illinois to be convinced that the deceased’s employment did not place him at the scene of the accident. Travel incident to the employment in which the deceased was engaged would have taken him to Rockford and then back to his home. It would not have taken him on a tour of northern Illinois. Furthermore, at the time of the accident, the deceased’s blood-alcohol content was .187, nearly twice the legal limit for driving of .10. Possibly a beer or two, or even a slight overindulgence alone, would not have jeopardized the deceased’s course-of-employment status. However, he so deviated from his assigned mission that he became intoxicated to the extent that he was committing a serious criminal act by driving. That, coupled with the deviation in time and travel, prevents me from agreeing with the majority’s conclusion that there exists a question of fact as to whether the deceased was in the course of his employment. Summarizing, the accident happened 2V2 hours after the test was completed, at a place where the deceased’s employment did not take him, and he was so intoxicated that he could not lawfully drive. This was not a case of a slight deviation from the deceased’s employment. He had so departed from his assigned purposed that as a matter of law, it cannot be said he was performing within the course of his employment. He was, instead, serving solely his own personal purpose. The mere fact that he was driving in the general direction of his home did not bring him back within the scope of his employment. (See Sauer v. Iskowich (1967), 80 Ill. App. 2d 202, 209.) An employer may be liable to a third person for the acts of his employee when such acts are committed in the course of employment and in furtherance of the business of the employer. However, the employer is not liable to an injured third party where the acts complained of were committed solely for the benefit of the employee. Webb v. Jewel Cos. (1985), 137 Ill. App. 3d 1004, 1006; Hoover v. University of Chicago Hospitals (1977), 51 Ill. App. 3d 263, 266-67. For the above reasons, I dissent. JUSTICE MILLER joins in this dissent.