Court Opinion

ID: 9545979
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:23:03.165962+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:15:50.911050
License: Public Domain

WILLIAMS, Chief Justice.
Applicants have brought this original action seeking a judicial determination that Initiative Petition No. 271, State Question No. 408, which proposed a constitutional amendment, was not legally approved by a vote of the people of Oklahoma on November 6, 1962.
If such proposed amendment was not approved they ask the issuance of appropriate writs to protect their claimed rights. This court has jurisdiction in a proper proceeding to determine whether the Constitution has been amended. State ex rel. Hayman et al. v. State Election Board et al. (1938), 181 Okl. 622, 75 P.2d 861, 862. The matter here presented for our consideration poses an important problem of public law. We have, therefore, assumed jurisdiction of appellants’ first cause of action. See State ex rel. Williamson et al. v. Carter et al., 177 Okl. 382, 59 P.2d 948, 949, and State ex rel. Carrier v. State Election Board of Oklahoma, Okl., 318 P.2d 422.
The proposed amendment would create a Legislative Apportionment Commission, and authorize it to carry into effect our present State Constitutional formulae for reapportionment of our House of Representatives and State Senate.
We have already upheld the sufficiency of the petition involved in this case. See In re Initiative Petition No. 271, State Question No. 408, Okl., 373 P.2d 1017. ■
In the present case our concern is whether the amendment therein proposed was approved.
In our State Constitution, the people vested in the Legislature the Legislative authority of the State. Art. V, § 1. But, in the same section, they reserved the power to propose laws and amendments, to the Con*824.stitution and to enact or reject the same at the polls independent of the Legislature.
Also, in Article XXIV, Constitutional Amendments, by Section 3, the people again expressed their right to amend the Constitution by initiative petition therefor.
Much of our discussion in this opinion relates to Section 3 of Article V. In pertinent part it is as follows:
“ * * * All elections on measures referred to the people of the State shall be had at the next election held throughout the State, except when the Legislature or the Governor, shall order a special election for the express purpose of making such reference. Any measure referred to the people by the initiative shall take effect and be in • force when it shall have been approved by a majority of the votes cast in such election. Any measure referred to the people by the referendum shall take effect and be in force when it shall have been approved by a majority of the votes cast thereon and not otherwise.

“Petitions and orders for the initiative and for the referendum shall be filed with the Secretary of State and addressed to the Governor of the State, who shall submit the same to the people. The Legislature shall make suitable provisions for carrying into effect the provisions of this article.”
Pursuant to the duty imposed upon the Legislature to “make suitable provisions for carrying into effect the provisions” of Article V, that body has enacted Title 34 Oklahoma Statutes 1961, Initiative and Referendum §§ 1 to 66, vitalizing and implementing the Article. See Ex parte Wagner, 21 Okl. 33, 95 P. 435, 18 Ann.Cas. 197, and Simpson v. Hill et al., 128 Okl. 269, 263 P. 635, 644, 56 A.L.R. 706.
34 O.S.1961 § 25 provides:
“Whenever, any measure shall be initiated by the people in the manner provided- by law, or whenever the referendum .shall be demanded against any ■ measure passed by the Legislature, ■ same shall be submitted to the people ' for their approval or , rejection at the next regular election; provided, the Governor shall have power, in his. discretion, to call a special election to vote upon such questions, or to designate the mandatory primary election as a special election for such purpose.”
From an examination of a portion of Section 3 of Article V, above quoted, it is to be seen that the Governor may submit a measure such as the item (constitutional amendment) presently here involved to a vote of the people either at “the next election held throughout the State” or at a special election ordered “for the express purpose of making such reference.”
It is to be noted that reference of an initiated measure to the electors pursuant to the terms of Art. V,. Sec. 3, “shall be had at the next election held .throughout the State * * * ”, while 34 O.S.1961 § 25, provides that such measure “shall be submitted * * * at the next regular election * * *.” Although the descriptive language contained in these two provisions does differ, the phrases are synonymous and both denote the next regular general election as designated and defined in 26 O.S. 1961 § 1. See State ex rel. Williamson et al. v. Carter et al., supra, 59 P.2d at p. 950.
It will be recalled that another part of Art. V, Sec. 3 above quoted provided for an initiative measure to take effect “ * * * when it shall have been approved by a majority of the votes cast in such election * * * ."
In the State ex rel. Carrier case, supra, there was involved a determination by the Court as to whether the affirmative vote of the people on an initiative measure, as •distinguished from a majority of the votes -cast in .the 1956 general' election when the measure was voted upon, was sufficient for the approval of an amendment to the Congressional Redistricting Statute.
*825 In the third paragraph of the syllabus of such case we held:
"In order to be adopted, an initiated measure, ■ submitted to the people for adoption or rejection at a general election, must receive an affirmative vote by a majority of the electors casting • their vote in said general election. Constitution, Article V, Section 3.”
On the other hand, in that case the Court" further said:
“If this latter situation” (i. e. the date of submission is the same date as that upon which a primary or runoff primary is being held) “prevails, the vote on the -initiated measure is a separate and independent election, irrespective of the Other election or elections being simultaneously held. To be approved and adopted thereat the measure need ■ receive only a majority of the votes cast in that particular election on the particular measure so submitted.”
On September 27, 1962, the Governor, with reference to the initiative petition involved in this case, proclaimed that (a) Question No. 408, “shall be submitted to the qualified electors * * * for their approval or rejection at a special election to be held * * * on November 6, 1962”, and (b) the election officials are “authorized, directed and ordered” to conduct on that date a special election on State Question 408. It is noted that the date fixed in the proclamation, being “the first Tuesday succeeding the first Monday in November” of an even numbered year, was coincidentally the same day as that by law designated as the day upon which the “regular general election” should be held.
State Question No. -408 was submitted and voted upon in all the precincts throughout the State on said November 6, 1962. A majority of those electors who voted upon the measure voted in favor of its approval. However, the aggregate number of affirmative votes fell short of a majority pi the total number of ballots cast throughout the State in the general election (after deducting therefrom spoiled ballots), some 27,000 or more.
The Governor on November 9, 1962, proclaimed the proposed measure to have been approved by the people as a constitutional amendment. Poliowing this proclamation, the Legislative Apportionment Commission was convened and promulgated an Order of Apportionment, and, as provided in the initiated measure, filed the same with the Secretary of State.
Respondents insist that the measure in question was voted upon at a special election.
On the other hand, applicants assert that the Governor acted without lawful authority in purportedly calling such attempted special election. They assert that the Constitution conferred no power upon the Governor to call a special election upon such initiated measure for and upon a day which coincidentally was the regular general election day and thereby, as to that item of especial interest to him, convert such general election into a special one.
They argue that this measure was submitted to the people at the general election on November 6, 1962, by direct operation of law.
In the case of Simpson v. Hill, supra, this court said:
“It is clear that such initiative measures must go to the next regular general election held throughout the state, unless the Governor or the Legislature shall order that it be submitted at a special election.” (Emphasis supplied.)
In State ex rel. Carrier v. State Election Board, supra, we said:
“By what was said and what was implied in the Williamson case, it is now a settled rule in this jurisdiction that, whether an initiated measure be a law or a constitutional amendment, it must be submitted to the people for their vote, at the next general election, with or without any act on the part of the Governor, or it may be submitted at any other time by the executive di*826rection or proclamation of the Governor, whether or not the-date of sub- - mission be the same date as that upon which a primary or run-off primary election is being held * ■ * (Emphasis supplied.)
The constitutional amendment in question stood submitted at the general election on November 6, 1962, for approval or rejection by the people by the distinct and inexorable command of the Constitution as implemented by the vitalizing legislative enactment, except for any effect achieved by the proclamation calling for a special election on the same date.
Thus it is seen that the Governor may call for a vote upon an item such as here involved at the next general election on the one hand or at a special election upon any date suitable, in his discretion, with the exception of the general election day itself.
The matter of such exception is the principal issue in this case.
May the Governor lawfully pluck an initiated measure from among those set upon the general election ballot, set it aside for consideration at the same time and by the same voters and, by the simple expedient of calling that part of the election occurring on such initiated measure a special election, make it a special election ?
Respondents argue that this Court should determine that there would be no different method of counting the votes cast on the initiated measure in question at a special election whether such special election were conducted on the day of the general election or at some other time and that, therefore, we should hold in this case that (a) the purported calling of the special election and conducting of the alleged special election involved in this case on November 6, 1962, was lawful in all respects and that (b) the proclamation of the Governor declaring that Initiative Petition No. 271, State Question No. 408, had received more yes votes than no votes and that it had been approved, was lawful.
For the reasons hereinafter discussed, we decline to so hold.
In the first place, it is to be observed that in such vitalizing legislation, the Legislature, in referring to the election days on which a special election might be called mentioned specifically- only the mandatory primary election.
It has been noted that Art. V, Sec. 3 of the Constitution states in part that: “ * * * the Legislature shall make suitable provisions for carrying into effect the provisions of this article.”
It is also to be noted, however, that the Legislature in enacting the vitalizing statute (34 O.S.1961 § 25) and in mentioning “the mandatory primary election” did not have specific authority given it by the Constitution to limit the Governor to calling a special election on some day other than general election day.
In the case of Tate v. Logan, Okl., 362 P.2d 670, in the first paragraph of the syllabus this Court said:
“Our constitution vests in the Legislature the supreme power to -enact laws tó meet the needs of the State, and its acts should be upheld unless plainly and clearly within the express prohibition and limitations fixed by the constitu- - tion. There is a presumption that an act is constitutional.”
Assuming without deciding that the Legislature could so limit the Governor, if it so intended, we move to the matter of whether it did so apparently intend.
As an indication of the interpretation placed by the Legislature on the responsibilities and duties with which it was charged by the provisions of Article V, Section 3 of the Constitution, it is noted that at page 441 of the laws of 1907-08, now Title 34 O.S.1961 Initiative and Referendum, Section 2, in setting out the form to be substantially followed in drawing an initiative petition, it was provided that the signers thereof would “respectfully order that the following proposed * * * *827amendment to the constitution * * * shall he submitted to the legal voters of the State of Oklahoma * * * for their approval or rejection at the regular general election * * *, to be held on” a designated date; and further that the signers of Initiative Petition No. 271, State Question No. 408, did so “respectfully order that the following proposed amendment to the Constitution shall be submitted to the legal voters of the State of Oklahoma for their approval or rejection at the regular general election, to be held on the 6th day of November, A. D. 1962, or a special election which might be called for said purpose, * *
Argument is advanced that the mention of the mandatory primary election in the quoted portion of the statute (34 O.S.1961 § 25) excludes the general election.
In the case of St. Louis-San Francisco R. R. Co. v. McIntosh, County Treas., 103 Okl. 246, 229 P. 1064, 1067, we said:
“ * * * It is a general principle of interpretation that the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another thing; * * * The affirmative description of the cases in which the jurisdiction may be exercised implies a negative on the exercise of such power in other cases * * *. In the case of Ex parte Ballew [20 Okl.Cr.105], 201 P. 525, the Court of Criminal Appeals said: ‘Applying the rule of statutory construction “expressio unius est exclusio alterius”, the affirmative description and enumeration of the acts constituting contempt implies a negative as to the exercise of such power in other cases not enumerated’ ”.
The very proviso in the legislative Act which vitalizes Art. V, Sec. 3, affords us an eloquent indication of the restricted scope of the power conferred upon the Governor. Its terms, " * * * the Governor shall have power, in his discretion, to call a special election to vote upon such questions, or to designate the mandatory primary election as a special election for such purpose”, do not enumerate the general election as one which may be proclaimed by executive action as a special election on an initiated measure.
“The true office of a proviso is to restrict or make clear that which has gone before”, Welch v. Key, Okl., 365 P.2d 154, 159. The mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another. We conclude that a special election upon an initiated measure may be called by the Governor only for a date prior to the general election, at which time otherwise the submission becomes mandatory by operation of law and “with or without any act on the part of the Governor”, provided same is ready for submission. State ex rel. Carrier v. State Election Board, supra.
Since statehood, thirty-four initiative petitions have been voted upon at regular general elections. Only four of such petitions have received a majority of all the votes respectively cast at said general elections. Eleven of such petitions have received a majority of the “yes” and “no” votes cast on the measures proposed by such petitions. It is to be noted that none of the fifteen Governors who preceded the present one and several of whom were members of our constitutional convention, ever proclaimed a special election on the date of the regular general election for the purpose of voting on any of the said thirty-four initiative measures. In the past many initiative measures have been voted upon by the people at special elections called by the different Governors prior to this instance, but none at special elections purportedly set on the date of a regular general election.
The Attorney General, in brief, refers to opinions by him in 1946 to the State Superintendent of Public Instruction and the then Governor. The Governor had inquired if he could issue a proclamation calling a special election at the time-of the general election on four initiative petitions. The Attorney General in opinions to both officials held, in effect, that on the date of the general election a special election could *828not legally be called for the purpose of voting on initiative petitions.
In the case of State ex rel. Carrier v. State Election Board supra, we said:
“Our determination of the intent of the framers of the constitution as expressed in Article V, section 3, thereof, discussed in' the preceding paragraph above, when augmented by the administrative interpretation of the section and acquiescence in such interpretation, furnishes a well established rule of construction of constitutional provisions, for ‘the object of construction, applied to a constitution, is to give ef-feet to the intent of its framers and of the people adopting it, and when the text of a constitutional provision is not ambiguous, the courts, in giving construction thereto, are not at liberty to search for its meaning beyond the instrument.’ Also ‘the long and continued interpretation of the constitution by * * * acquiescence is an aid in removing doubt as to the meaning of such constitutional provisions as intended by the framers thereof.’ Latting v. Cordell, 197 Okl. 369, 172 P.2d 397, 400.” See also Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Liberty National Bank and Trust Co., etc., Okl., 289 P.2d 388 and Williams v. Continental Const. Corp., 168 Okl. 510, 34 P.2d 254.
We find that the administrative interpretation of the portion of Article V, Section 3, Oklahoma Constitution, involved in the determination of the answer to the principal issue in this case supports our conclusion above stated. We believe it appropriate to observe that the people of Oklahoma have accepted this interpretation.
The purpose of calling a special election on an initiated measure would appear to be that it would afford the people an opportunity to vote on such item either at an earlier date than that of the general election or at an election at which the inaction ■of electors not voting for or against the item would not count against it, or both. It is noted that without affording the people an opportunity for an early vote on an initiated measure, the Governor, by calling a special election on such an item on the day of the general election, and not calling a special election on another such item, could thereby discriminate in favor of the one and against the other.
At the regular biennial general election when the voters receive their several ballots they have the right to freely give such consideration as they desire to all proposed constitutional amendments appearing on the ballot, as if they were normally submitted at such general election then and there being conducted, without the confusion or complication of being required to consider one such amendment as if it were in some manner segregated from the general election and being then and there submitted at a so-called separate special election. There is no authority for any such segregation or separate special election by Executive Proclamation, or by order of election officials.
Referring to the case of State ex rel. Babb v. Mathews, Judge et al., 134 Okl. 288, 273 P. 352, respondents contend that: “this case adds the significant finding that a Governor could call a special election at the next election held throughout the State or to put it otherwise at an election other than a special election, and when he does the majority rules.” This Court in the Mathews case held that the State Election Board had authority to submit an initiative measure to a vote of the people at a special election conducted on the date of the primary because the Governor had issued a proclamation calling a special election for such date. The question of whether a special election could be held on an initiated measure at the regular general election was not before the Court.
In the case of State ex rel. Carrier v. State Election Board, supra, we said:
“Plaintiffs support their position by reliance upon statements of this court made in the case of State ex rel. Babb *829v. Mathews, 134 Okl. 288, 273 P. 352, 356, to the effect that ‘The words “such election” and “all elections” used above, have reference to the election upon the special measure, which the people have petitioned the Governor to have submitted, .and which has been submitted by the Governor’. However, that case is not controlling here because, as pointed out in the case of State ex rel. Williamson v. Carter, 177 Okl. 382, 59 P.2d 948, 949, the initiated measure being considered in the Mathews case was, by a proclamation of the Governor, submitted at a special election (the primary election) and such election did not constitute the ‘next election held throughout the state’ within the constitutional provision above quoted * *
Such case is not authority, as contended, for “sustaining the action of a Governor calling a special election on the same day as the next election held throughout the State.”
Respondents argue that the applicants herein have been guilty of unethical conduct in failing to re-apportion according to our State Constitution and in allegedly delaying other lawsuits concerned with this proposed amendment. The conduct of the applicants is not an issue in this case. Applicants by their conduct cannot confer upon the Governor power which the Constitution did not grant to him.
Respondents contend that “a timely action in mandamus would have been the proper remedy when the special election proclamation was made, if it was invalid as contended, to require the election officials to put the question to the people at the general election.” They argue that this attack comes too late, and that the applicants have been guilty of laches. We do not agree.
In the case of In re Initiative Petitions, etc., 153 Okl. 205, 6 P.2d 703, we said:
“When the copy of the petitions were filed in the office of the secretary of the state, and thereafter signed .by what . seemed to be a sufficient number of the voters of the state to initiate the measure, it placed in motion the process of the people’s exercising their reserved legislative power, and a court of equity, as a general rule, will not assume, in advance, jurisdiction to determine whether the proposed act, i-f adopted, is submitted and adopted in accordance with the law governing the same.”
See, also City Council of City of McAlester v. Milwee, 31 Okl. 620, 122 P. 173, 40 L.R.A.,N.S., 576. See also Associated Industries of Okl. v. Okl. Tax Comm., 176 Okl. 120, 55 P.2d 79.
Respondents further argue “that it would be a violation of the rights of the citizens of Oklahoma, secured to them by the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, to hold that State Question 408 did not receive the requisite vote for passage.” They argue that to “count the votes of citizens who did not cast a ballot on the special measure as being against the measure, is, we submit, as much an impairment of the right to vote as if the ballot box had been stuffed with a like number of no votes.” Such argument is contrary to our holding in State ex rel. Carrier v. State Election Board, supra. Respondents cite no cases holding such opinion to be in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
Their real contention is that in the face of the Fourteenth Amendment a State is powerless to require that its own constitutional amendments be adopted by an affirmative vote of more electors than a simple majority of those who cast a ballot upon a proposed amendment. They cite no decisions in support of the precise proposition so raised.
As a general rule it may be said that in its internal administration the state has an entire freedom of choice within the limits circumscribed by the Fourteenth Amendments’ inhibition against invidious discrimination.
*830The provisions of Art. V, Sec. 3, and 34 O.S.1961 § 25, as construed by this court are neither discriminatory on their face nor in their application. There is no showing here of an invidious discrimination against any group of voters; neither has it been demonstrated that anyone, or any group, is sought to be singled out for prejudicial treatment, or one that is different from that which the state law usually accords.
We hold that our construction of Art. V, Sec. 3, and the vitalizing statute does not operate to deprive any elector, or group of electors, of rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.
Amici curiae argue that a special election may be held on the same day as a general election day. They cite authorities from other jurisdictions concerning local elections and other matters not pertinent to this discussion which seem to be contrary to our view but upon a closer examination do not appear to fit the situation herein involved, when viewed in the light of our applicable constitutional and statutory provisions.
For the reasons hereinbefore set forth, absent specific authority therefor in Section 3 of said Art. V, we hold the Governor may not lawfully call a special election on an initiated measure on and for a day which coincidentally is general election day.
We conclude that State Question 408 voted upon on November 6, 1962, stood submitted at the general election on that date by direct operation of law. The Governor’s proclamation purporting to submit the question at a special election was more sur-plusage and did not alter the character of the election so held.
State Question No. 408 is hereby declared •to have failed of adoption for lack of sufficient affirmative votes.
Writ granted:
■BLACKBIRD, V. C. J., and WELCH, DAVISON, HALLEY, and JOHNSON, JJ-., concur.
JACKSON and IRWIN, JJ., concur specially.
BERRY, J., dissents.