Court Opinion

ID: 9747343
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 15:11:51.80133+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:22.856466
License: Public Domain

COOPER, P. J.,
Dissenting. — I respectfully dissent. The majority states and I agree that the ultimate “issue on appeal is whether appellants qualified under the 2003 revival provision on the theory they had raised triable issues of fact that the Diocese was on notice of Herdegen’s unlawful sexual conduct as required by [Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1,] subdivision (b)(2).” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 10.) The parties agreed that “the only possible evidence of notice rested on deposition testimony that Herdegen’s part-time parish housekeeper knew or should have known that Herdegen was sexually abusing appellants.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 7.) The majority concludes that the trial judge erred in granting the summary judgment motion because, under an agency theory, if the agent (Zeilman) was under a duty to disclose certain information, the principal (the Diocese) is bound by the agent’s knowledge of that information whether or not the agent communicated it to the principal. (Civ. Code, § 2332.) I dissent because I do not believe the evidence raises a triable issue of fact on the notice requirement.
Appellant strives to establish the notice element first via proof that the part-time housekeeper either suspected Herdegen of sexual abuse or had knowledge of alleged abuse and had a duty to pass that information on to her employer, the Diocese. Although the evidence is relatively weak and circumstantial, I agree there are triable issues of fact about Zeilman’s contemporaneous knowledge of the alleged abuse. The evidence of her behavior, when confronted with questions about her knowledge, is sufficient to raise this issue.
However, there is not sufficient evidence to raise a triable issue of fact that Zeilman had a duty to pass on her knowledge or suspicions to the Diocese. The majority opinion identifies the evidence suggesting that Zeilman’s employment included a duty to report such misconduct as testimony from Cardinal Mahony that “he would have expected Zeilman to tell ‘somebody’ if she had any well-founded suspicions of sexual misconduct.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 12.) The majority agrees with the trial court’s conclusion that this *14evidence was ambiguous. Nevertheless, because “Mahony held various high level positions at the Diocese while much of the alleged abuse occurred,” the majority concludes that “an inference could be drawn that his expectation was based on his knowledge of the duties of parish employees such as Zeilman.” (Ibid.)
I do not agree with this evaluation of the evidence. Mahony’s testimony is neither sufficient to support such an inference, nor is it ambiguous enough to create a triable issue of fact about the existence of such a duty. Mahony’s testimony that he would have “expected” Zeilman to report suspect behavior does not support an inference that she had a duty as a Diocese employee to make such a report. Mahony’s personal expectation is irrelevant unless it arose from his knowledge of the employee’s actual duty to report the abuse. There is no direct evidence, disputed or otherwise, of the existence of such a duty. During his deposition, Mahony could have easily been asked directly, “does Zeilman (or any similarly situated employee) have a duty, as a condition of their employment, to report incidents of suspected or known child sexual or physical abuse.” The referenced testimony by Mahony is the only evidence even marginally suggestive of notice identified in this case. It is inadequate to raise a triable issue of material fact regarding the knowledge of the Diocese.
In order to reach the agent/principal notice conclusion suggested by the majority, a complicated multistep analysis is required. We begin with the evidence regarding the housekeeper’s behavior when asked about the suspected abuse. Next, we infer from her reaction that she had actual knowledge or a suspicion of abuse. Then we have evidence from Mahony that he would “expect” Zeilman to report any suspicions. Mahony’s testimony is then offered to support the indispensable inference that his expectation was based his knowledge of the employee’s actual duty to report such activity. This inferential analysis is the only method offered to identify a triable issue of fact whether the Diocese had notice. Although I would hope that in our society any person of good conscience would report suspicions of child abuse, I do not believe that the evidence available in this case is adequate to support an inference that such reporting occurred.
Regarding the reasonableness of the inferences which are critical to the majority position, it is noteworthy that in 1963, the State of California found it necessary to enact penal provisions mandating the reporting of child abuse.1 Contemporaneous records indicate that it was the reluctance of physicians to report child abuse, despite strong circumstantial evidence of abuse, that was the impetus for the legislation to establish mandated reporting *15laws.2 However, even given the risk of sanctions, the California Department of Justice estimated in November 1978 that only about 10 percent of all cases of child abuse were being reported. (Krikorian v. Barry (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 1211, 1216-1217 [242 Cal.Rptr. 312]; Stecks v. Young (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 365 [45 Cal.Rptr.2d 475].) Even though these initial reporting requirements were in place, in 1980 the California Legislature was compelled to enact the Child Abuse Reporting Law (Pen. Code, § 11165 et seq.), “a comprehensive scheme of reporting requirements ‘aimed at increasing the likelihood that child abuse victims are identified.’ ” (Stecks, at p. 371.) Subsequently, the Legislature renamed the law the Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act. (Pen. Code, § 11164.) (Stats. 1987, ch. 1444, § 1.5, p. 5369.) “These statutes, all of which reflect the state’s compelling interest in preventing child abuse, are premised on the belief that reporting suspected abuse is fundamental to protecting children.” (Stecks, at p. 371.)
Given the fact that the State of California found it necessary to impose criminal sanctions for failure to report suspected abuse by professionals in fields where the moral imperative to protect children was already extant within the obligations of the profession, I find it difficult to rely on the slender thread of Mahony’s “expectation” that a part-time housekeeper would report suspected abuse to provide the factual foundation to proceed with this litigation.
Respondent’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied August 13, 2008, S164554.
Baxter, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

 Penal Code section 11166 imposed criminal sanctions for noncompliance on physicians and surgeons.

 Kalichman, Mandated Reporting of Suspected Child Abuse: Ethics, Law, & Policy (2d ed. 1999) page 14.