Court Opinion

ID: 9942525
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-21 15:08:11.852299+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:48:11.714033
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
              APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

                                   SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                   APPELLATE DIVISION
                                   DOCKET NO. A-0291-23

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

     Plaintiff-Respondent,
                                     APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION

v.                                         February 21, 2024

                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
DAISHON I. SMITH,

     Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________

           Argued December 18, 2023 – Decided February 21, 2024

           Before Judges Gilson, DeAlmeida, and Berdote Byrne.

           On appeal from an interlocutory order of the Superior
           Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Monmouth
           County, Indictment No. 21-08-1004

           Raymond Louis Hamlin argued the cause for appellant
           (Hunt, Hamlin & Ridley, attorneys; Raymond Louis
           Hamlin, of counsel and on the briefs).

           Monica Lucinda do Outeiro, Assistant Prosecutor,
           argued the cause for respondent (Raymond S. Santiago,
           Monmouth County Prosecutor, attorney; Monica
           Lucinda do Outeiro, of counsel and on the brief).

     The opinion of the court was delivered by

GILSON, P.J.A.D.
      In this appeal we address whether an entire county prosecutor's office

must be recused from a criminal prosecution when the county prosecutor has a

personal, disqualifying conflict. We hold that so long as the prosecutor has been

completely screened from and has no oversight of the matter, the prosecutor's

office should not be disqualified. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's order

denying defendant's motion to disqualify the entire Monmouth County

Prosecutor's Office (MCPO) from continuing to prosecute defendant and

multiple co-defendants in this criminal matter.

                                       I.

      We discern the facts from the record on defendant's motion to recuse the

MCPO. In February 2020, an MCPO task force began investigating gang-related

activities in Monmouth and other New Jersey counties. That task force was led

by an MCPO detective, included several other MCPO detectives, and

coordinated some of its investigations with other law enforcement agencies.

      Ultimately, the task force came to believe that various street gangs were

coordinating an array of criminal activities into a "systematic criminal

enterprise," referred to as "Golden State." The task force developed evidence

that Golden State members acted in concert to distribute illegal drugs, use and

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transfer firearms, recruit and discipline members, and expand their criminal

activities.

      Beginning in October 2020, defendant Daishon I. Smith was charged with

multiple criminal offenses, the majority of which were based on evidence

developed by the task force. Initially, on October 4, 2020, defendant was

charged with several drug-related offenses. Later that month, defendant and

more than thirty co-defendants were charged with numerous first- and second-

degree offenses, including racketeering, drug offenses, and weapons offenses.

      Ultimately, in August 2021, based on the evidence developed by the task

force, defendant and thirty-six co-defendants were indicted for over 120 crimes.

The charges against defendant in the indictment included first-degree

racketeering   conspiracy,   N.J.S.A.   2C:5-2,   :41-2(d);   first-degree    gang

criminality, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-29; first-degree attempted murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1,

:11-3; first-degree conspiracy to commit murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2, :11-3; and

numerous weapons and drug distribution offenses.

      For approximately seven months, from October 30, 2020, to May 21,

2021, defendant was represented by Raymond S. Santiago, who was then

engaged in the private practice of law. During that time, Santiago represented

defendant at a detention hearing and filed two applications related to defendant's

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pretrial detention. Santiago also received initial discovery related to the charges

filed against defendant in October 2020.

      In May 2021, Santiago filed a motion to be relieved as defendant's

counsel. In support of that motion, Santiago certified that in late April 2021, he

had some disagreements with defendant and defendant directed him to cease

working on his case. Santiago also conferred with defendant's family before

filing his motion to be relieved as counsel. On May 21, 2021, the trial court

granted Santiago's motion to be relieved as defendant's counsel. Since then,

defendant has been represented by other counsel. His current counsel began to

represent defendant on September 8, 2021.

      Over a year later, on October 7, 2022, Santiago was sworn in as Acting

Monmouth County Prosecutor. The following month, the Senate approved

Santiago's appointment, and he was sworn in as the Monmouth County

Prosecutor.

      In February 2023, defendant moved to recuse the entire MCPO from

prosecuting him in this matter. More than ten co-defendants joined in that

motion. In response, the MCPO submitted a certification from its Deputy First

Assistant Prosecutor representing that Santiago had been and would continue to

be screened from any involvement in this matter.

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      In that regard, the Deputy First Assistant explained that when Santiago

began acting as county prosecutor, the Attorney General's Office advised the

MCPO that Santiago should be screened from any cases involving defendants

whom Santiago had previously represented. The certification also represented

that Santiago was not involved with the case and had no communications about

the case with MCPO personnel handling the matter.

      After receiving defendant's recusal motion, the MCPO notified the

Attorney General's Office. In reply, the Attorney General's Office sent a March

24, 2023 letter, which stated that the MCPO could "continue to investigate and

prosecute the matter as [it] deem[ed] appropriate," provided Santiago continued

to be "wall[ed] off . . . from any involvement in this matter" and that the First

Assistant Prosecutor or Deputy First Assistant Prosecutor "assume[d]

supervisory authority over this matter."

      In summary, the MCPO has represented that since Santiago began acting

as county prosecutor, he has not been involved in this prosecution, has always

been screened from the prosecution, has not shared any information he received

as counsel for defendant, and has had no supervisory authority over the

prosecution.

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      After hearing oral argument, on May 1, 2023, the trial court issued an

order and written opinion denying the motion. In its comprehensive opinion,

the trial court found that the MCPO's representations were reliable and that there

were no legal grounds for the court to compel the recusal of the entire MCPO.

The trial court accepted, as conceded by the MCPO, that Santiago had a conflict

that required he not be personally involved in the prosecution of defendant. The

trial court went on to reason that there was no basis for imputing that conflict to

the entire MCPO because Santiago had always been screened from the

prosecution, had never shared confidential information about defendant, and

was not supervising the prosecution.

      Defendant moved for a stay of the case pending his request for appellate

interlocutory review. On May 3, 2023, the trial court denied that motion.

Thereafter, we granted defendant's motion for leave to appeal. Defendant did

not file a motion with us for a stay of the criminal matter pending this appeal.

                                        II.

      On appeal, defendant presents four arguments, which he articulates as

follows:

            I.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS CONFLICTS
            INVOLVING    APPOINTED    OR  ELECTED
            PROSECUTORS CALL FOR IMPUTING THE
            CONFLICT TO THE ENTIRE OFFICE

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            II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING
            THAT THE STATE WAS UNDER NO OBLIGATION
            TO NOTIFY [] DEFENDANT, THE COURT, OR THE
            ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE UPON THE
            APPOINTMENT OF RAYMOND SANTIAGO AS
            MONMOUTH COUNTY PROSECUTOR

            A.    THE STATE FAILED TO OBTAIN
                  WRITTEN    CONSENT FROM  []
                  DEFENDANT AND THE ATTORNEY
                  GENERAL'S OFFICE

            B.    SCREENING DOES NOT CURE THE
                  PREJUDICE TO [] DEFENDANT

            III. THE SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE
            WILL NOT BAR A COURT FROM ADDRESSING A
            LEGAL ERROR

            IV. THE COURT WAS IN ERROR IN THE
            FAILURE TO GRANT A STAY

      Whether counsel, or an entire firm or office, should be disqualified is an

issue of law "subject to de novo plenary appellate review." City of Atlantic City

v. Trupos, 201 N.J. 447, 463 (2010); State v. Hudson, 443 N.J. Super. 276, 282

(App. Div. 2015). Moreover, when "'the trial judge had no factual disputes to

resolve on credibility grounds and only legal conclusions to draw,' reviewing

courts do not 'defer to the trial judge's findings' or ultimate decision." Hudson,

443 N.J. Super. at 282 (quoting State v. Bruno, 323 N.J. Super. 322, 331-32

(App. Div. 1999)).

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      A.    Whether a Prosecutor's Personal Conflict Should Be Imputed to the
            Entire Office.

      All parties agree that Santiago has a conflict based on his prior

representation of defendant that disqualifies him from being involved in the

criminal prosecution of defendant. The disputed issue is whether Santiago's

personal conflict should be imputed to the entire MCPO.           To answer that

question, we look to the Rules of Professional Conduct (the RPCs) and cases

analyzing the RPCs.

      We begin by considering whether an entire prosecutor's office should be

disqualified where the county prosecutor previously represented a defendant.

The RPCs set forth the "enforceable standards of behavior for lawyers." State

v. Rue, 175 N.J. 1, 14 (2002). A court's determination of whether an attorney

has a conflict of interest is guided by the RPCs. See Trupos, 210 N.J. at 461-

62. The RPCs applicable to this appeal are RPC 1.9, RPC 1.11, and RPC 1.10.

      RPC 1.9 addresses conflicts of interest related to former clients. That Rule

prohibits a lawyer who has previously represented a client from representing

another client "in the same or a substantially related matter" where the former

client's and the current client's interests are materially adverse. RPC 1.9(a).

RPC 1.9 also prohibits a lawyer from using or disclosing information related to

his or her prior representation to the disadvantage of the former client, except if

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other provisions in the RPCs would permit or require disclosure of that

information or if the information has become generally known. RPC 1.9(c).

      RPC 1.11 addresses successive government and private employment.

Subsection (d) of this Rule addresses lawyers formerly in private practice who

become government lawyers or public officials. RPC 1.11(d). This subsection

restricts a government lawyer's participation in matters with which he or she was

involved while in private practice, or in which the lawyer's former client had

interests adverse to the interests of the government agency or office for which

the lawyer now works. RPC 1.11(d)(2). In that regard, RPC 1.11(d) states in

relevant part:

            Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer
            serving as a government lawyer or public officer or
            employee of the government:

                  ....

                  (2) shall not participate in a matter (i) in
                  which the lawyer participated personally
                  and substantially while in private practice
                  or nongovernmental employment, or (ii)
                  for which the lawyer had substantial
                  responsibility while in private practice or
                  nongovernmental employment, or (iii) with
                  respect to which the interests of the
                  appropriate government agency are
                  materially adverse to the interests of a
                  private party represented by the lawyer
                  while     in     private     practice     or

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                  nongovernmental employment, unless
                  under applicable law no one is, or by lawful
                  delegation may be, authorized to act in the
                  lawyer's stead in the matter or unless the
                  private party gives its informed consent,
                  confirmed in writing . . . .

RPC 1.11 also prohibits a government lawyer from disclosing confidential

information obtained while representing a private party. RPC 1.11(d)(1).

      RPC 1.10(a) prohibits a lawyer associated with a firm from representing

a client when any other lawyer in the firm would be precluded from doing so by

RPC 1.9 or RPC 1.7. 1 That prohibition does not apply if the conflict is "based

on a personal interest of the prohibited lawyer and does not present a significant

risk of materially limiting the representation of the client by the remaining

lawyers in the firm." RPC 1.10(a). Additionally, RPC 1.10(c) provides that:

            When a lawyer becomes associated with a firm, no
            lawyer associated in the firm shall knowingly represent
            a person in a matter in which that lawyer is disqualified
            under RPC 1.9 unless:

                  (1) the matter does not involve a
                  proceeding in which the personally
                  disqualified    lawyer had primary
                  responsibility;

1
    RPC 1.7 prohibits a lawyer from representing a client where that
representation would create a concurrent conflict of interest, except under
certain defined circumstances.
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                  (2) the personally disqualified lawyer is
                  timely screened from any participation in
                  the matter and is apportioned no part of the
                  fee therefrom; and

                  (3) written notice is promptly given to any
                  affected former client to enable it to
                  ascertain compliance with the provisions of
                  this Rule.

      RPC 1.11 and RPC 1.9 clearly prohibit Santiago from having any

involvement in the prosecution of defendant. RPC 1.10 addresses imputing

conflicts among lawyers in a private law firm. It does not expressly address

government lawyers, such as prosecutors. The question then becomes whether

the imputation in RPC 1.10 should be applied to a prosecutor, and in particular

to a county prosecutor who oversees the county prosecutor's office.

      No New Jersey case has expressly addressed whether the personal conflict

of a county prosecutor should be imputed to the entire county prosecutor's office.

Existing New Jersey caselaw makes clear that requests for disqualification of an

entire prosecutor's office should be scrutinized and have rarely been granted.

See State v. Harvey, 176 N.J. 522, 529-33 (2003) (reversing a trial court order

disqualifying a prosecutor's office from handling a petition for post-conviction

relief based on allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, primarily concerning

one prosecutor); State v. Marshall, 123 N.J. 1, 176-78 (1991), cert. denied, 507

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                                       11
U.S. 929 (1993) (declining to disqualify a prosecutor's office based on a claim

that the office had an "interest in vindicating its management of the discovery

file" in a prior related case); State v. Irizarry, 271 N.J. Super. 577, 591, 601

(App. Div. 1994) (holding that an entire prosecutor's office need not be

disqualified where some members of the office were familiar with immunized

testimony or could be called as witnesses); see also State v. Marshall, 148 N.J.

89, 285, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 850 (1997) (declining to disqualify Attorney

General from representing the State where the Director of the Division of

Criminal Justice was First Assistant Prosecutor at the time of remand and

defendant alleged prosecutorial misconduct).      Thus, whether a prosecutor's

personal conflict should be imputed to the entire county prosecutor's office is a

question of first impression in New Jersey. Accordingly, we consider how other

jurisdictions have addressed this issue.

      Several states have adopted a per se rule of disqualifying the entire office

where a member of the prosecutor's office previously represented a defendant in

the same or a related matter. Many states that have employed this approach

reason that a per se rule is required because it eliminates any appearance of

impropriety and preserves public confidence in the criminal justice system. See

State v. Nickels, 456 P.3d 795, 800 (Wash. 2020) (holding that where the county

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prosecutor     previously     represented      the    defendant,     "office-wide

disqualification—not screening—is required to preserve the appearance of a just

proceeding and the public's confidence in the impartial administration of

justice"); People v. Stevens, 642 P.2d 39, 41 (Colo. App. 1981) (disqualifying

entire prosecutor's office after attorney who formerly represented the defendant

became employed by prosecutor's office, and noting that "[t]he most compelling

rationale for requiring the appointment of a special prosecutor is avoidance of

the appearance of impropriety"); see also State v. Ross, 829 S.W.2d 948, 951

(Mo. 1992) (holding that where two members of law firm representing the

defendant in a suit by an assault victim also worked part-time as assistant

prosecutors, the entire prosecutor's office should be disqualified from handling

the case against the defendant because those "interconnections" created

"suspicions and appearances of impropriety").

      Additionally, some states that have adopted this approach reason that the

county prosecutor's supervisory authority over assistant prosecutors necessitates

disqualification of the entire prosecutor's office. See People v. Lepe, 211 Cal.

Rptr. 432, 434-35 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (explaining that because deputies were

hired, evaluated, promoted, and fired by the district attorney, the court could not

"say the office can be sanitized such to assume the deputy who prosecutes the

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case will not be influenced by the considerations that bar [the district attorney]

himself from participation in the case"); State v. Tippecanoe Cnty. Ct., 432

N.E.2d 1377, 1379 (Ind. 1982) (noting that "the prosecuting attorney exercises

authority over and speaks through his deputies" in holding that disqualific ation

of the entire prosecutor's office was required).

      The majority of states that have considered this issue, however, have

rejected a per se rule. Instead, most states have adopted a rule calling for

disqualification of the entire office only when the prosecutor who formerly

represented a defendant divulged confidential information to other prosecutors

or participated in the prosecution of the defendant. See, e.g., State v. Camacho,

406 S.E.2d 868, 875 (N.C. 1991); State v. McKibben, 722 P.2d 518, 526 (Kan.

1986); Young v. State, 465 A.2d 1149, 1155 (Md. 1983); State v. Pennington,

851 P.2d 494, 500 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993) (adopting majority rule in case

involving investigator who previously worked for the defendant before joining

the prosecutor's office, and holding that the ruling applied to any employee of

the prosecutor's office); see also United States v. Shah, 43 F.4th 356, 362-63 (3d

Cir. 2022) (relying on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's Rules of Professional

Conduct in declining to disqualify entire United States Attorney's Office so long

as supervisory attorney that previously represented the defendant remained

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properly screened); United States v. Goot, 894 F.2d 231, 234-35, 237 (7th Cir.

1990) (declining to disqualify entire United States Attorney's Office where

United States Attorney previously represented the defendant and had been

properly screened); see also State v. Kinkennon, 747 N.W.2d 437, 444 (Neb.

2008) (noting that while "extreme case[s]" requiring disqualification of the

entire prosecutor's office "might exist," screening of the disqualified attorney is

generally sufficient and the entire office need not be disqualified).

      In short, those states reasoned that the entire prosecutor's office need not

be disqualified if the prosecutor who had a prior relationship with the defendant

is effectively screened from participation in the prosecution and does not divulge

any confidential information. Camacho, 406 S.E.2d at 875; McKibben, 722 P.2d

at 526; Young, 465 A.2d at 1155; Pennington, 851 P.2d at 500; Kinkennon, 747

N.W.2d at 444. We note that while many states have adopted the majority rule

on this issue, only some have expressly clarified that the rule applies the same

way to the county prosecutor or district attorney as it does to other attorneys

employed by the prosecutor's office. See, e.g., Camacho, 406 S.E.2d at 875.

      We believe that the majority rule is the better rule and is more consistent

with New Jersey caselaw. The RPCs treat lawyers in private practice differently

than lawyers in government service. See RPC 1.10; RPC 1.11; see also State v.

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Bell, 90 N.J. 163, 168 (1982). There are sound public policy reasons for that

distinction. Moreover, our Supreme Court has reasoned that disqualifying an

attorney or an office of attorneys based on a conflict "must have some reasonable

basis" grounded in an actual conflict. Harvey, 176 N.J. at 529 (quoting In re

Op. No. 653 of the Advisory Comm. on Pro. Ethics, 132 N.J. 124, 132 (1992)).

      In that regard, in 2006, our Supreme Court decided that New Jersey would

not consider the appearance of impropriety in determining whether a lawyer has

a disqualifying conflict. See In re Sup. Ct. Advisory Comm. on Pro. Ethics Op.

No. 697, 188 N.J. 549, 568 (2006). The Court explained that the concept of the

appearance of impropriety should not be considered in determining whether a

conflict of interest exists under RPC 1.9 as its use "injects an unneeded element

of confusion." Id. at 562 n.5.

      We, therefore, adopt the majority rule and conclude automatic

disqualification of the entire prosecutor's office is not required. Instead, this

rule requires disqualification of the entire prosecutor's office only where the

prosecutor was not effectively screened or has shared confidential information

he or she learned while representing the defendant. In short, our analysis of t he

law on conflicts and our consideration of the policies embodied in the RPCs

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support a rule where individual, personal conflicts of county prosecutors are not

imputed to the entire office.

      Moreover, we adopt the majority rule with respect to both prior

representation by assistant county prosecutors and the county prosecutor. A

more flexible rule is particularly well-suited in New Jersey because the State

Attorney General has ultimate supervision over county prosecutors. While the

county prosecutor supervises the county office, the county prosecutors and the

county prosecutors' offices are ultimately subject to the Attorney General's

supervision and control. N.J.S.A. 52:17B-103; see also Yurick v. State, 184 N.J.

70, 79-80 (2005) (explaining the Attorney General's supervisory powers over

county prosecutors).    Consequently, the Attorney General may supervise a

county prosecutor and his or her office and, where appropriate, decide to step in

and take over a prosecution. N.J.S.A 52:17B-106 to -107; Wright v. State, 169

N.J. 422, 438 (2001) (explaining that "'the Attorney General's supersedure

power appears to have been bestowed with the understanding that it was

intended to ensure the proper and efficient handling of the county prosecutors'

"criminal business"'" (quoting Coleman v. Kaye, 87 F.3d 1491, 1501 (3d Cir.

1996))). So, unlike the situations where other states have adopted a per se rule,

in New Jersey the county prosecutor is not the ultimate supervisor because that

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responsibility rests with the Attorney General. Thus, we are satisfied that the

Attorney General's supervision over county prosecutors will ensure that

complete disqualification of the entire prosecutor's office is not necessary so

long as the county prosecutor is properly screened and has no oversight of the

matter.

      B.    Whether the MCPO Should Be Disqualified Based on Santiago's
            Prior Representation of Defendant.

      Having declined to adopt the per se rule requiring disqualification of an

entire prosecutor's office, we hold that the MCPO need not be recused from

continuing to prosecute defendant and his co-defendants, provided Santiago

continues to be completely screened from the prosecution and does not share

any confidential information he learned while he represented defendant.

Santiago has been screened from this case since he began acting as county

prosecutor, and he has had no communications about this case with the MCPO

prosecutors and investigators assigned to it. Therefore, we conclude that his

prior representation of defendant in this matter does not create a conflict

requiring disqualification of the MCPO in its entirety.

      C.    Defendant's Other Arguments.

      Given our holding that New Jersey will apply a fact-specific and personal

disqualification rule for prosecutors, defendant's remaining arguments can be

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analyzed and rejected summarily. In analyzing the rationales for the majority

and minority rules in other jurisdictions, we have effectively analyzed and

rejected defendant's principal arguments concerning the appearance of

impropriety and Santiago's role as a supervisor.

      Defendant also argues that Santiago or the MCPO was obligated to obtain

defendant's and the Attorney General's Office's consent. The RPCs prohibit a

government lawyer from participating in matters "in which the lawyer

participated personally and substantially" or "had substantial responsibility"

while in private practice, or where the interests of the government agency "are

materially adverse to the interests of a private party" the lawyer represented

while in private practice, unless the lawyer obtains the affected former client's

informed consent. RPC 1.11(d)(2). The MCPO has represented that it consulted

with the Attorney General when Santiago first became Acting Monmouth

County Prosecutor and Santiago has always been screened from matters where

he had previously represented a defendant.         That screening eliminates the

conflict, and thus the need to obtain defendant's consent. We see no reason to

impose a rule that would require Santiago or the MCPO to notify all defend ants

Santiago had previously represented who are now being prosecuted by the

MCPO.

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      In making that ruling, we, like the trial court, accept the representations

of the MCPO. Defendant questions whether those representations should be

accepted and suggests that discovery and fact-finding on whether Santiago was

properly screened may be necessary. Absent a showing of a specific factual

concern, we reject defendant's argument because it is based on speculation.

      Finally, we need not address the separation of powers issue. Defendant

pointed out that the trial court noted that the doctrine of separation of powers

supported its ruling because to require recusal of the entire MCPO would

effectively be to direct the Attorney General's Office to supersede the MCPO in

the prosecution of this matter. Given that we have held that there is no reason

to disqualify the entire MCPO, we do not reach that issue.

      Affirmed.

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