Court Opinion

ID: 9364848
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-20 15:04:31.922837+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:40.726150
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: JANUARY 13, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                           Court of Appeals

                              NO. 2021-CA-1310-MR

PIERETTE THOMPSON                                                  APPELLANT

                 APPEAL FROM MARTIN CIRCUIT COURT
v.              HONORABLE JOHN DAVID PRESTON, JUDGE
                       ACTION NO. 20-CI-00071

STATE FARM MUTUAL
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
COMPANY                                                              APPELLEE

                                       OPINION
                                      AFFIRMING

                                      ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: CALDWELL, DIXON, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.

DIXON, JUDGE: Pierette Thompson appeals from the order granting State Farm

Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm) summary judgment, entered

on October 7, 2021, by the Martin Circuit Court. Following a careful review of the

record, briefs, and law, we affirm.
          BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

             On November 30, 2018, Thompson paid Earnest Dingess, Sr., to give

her a ride to a local Cash Express. Thompson alleges that while they were in

Dingess’s car in the parking lot, another vehicle ran into them. She claims Dingess

exited his vehicle and spoke with the other driver but let the driver leave without

obtaining any personal information. No police report was filed.

             On January 26, 2019, Thompson contacted Dingess’s insurance

company, State Farm, seeking uninsured motorist benefits. When State Farm

questioned Dingess about the incident, he admitted he drove Thompson to Cash

Express but denied having an automobile accident. Because no police report was

filed and State Farm was not notified about an accident within 30 days as required

by the policy, State Farm denied coverage.

             Thompson eventually sued Dingess, State Farm, and an unknown

defendant – the other driver. Both Dingess and State Farm moved the trial court

for summary judgment, which was granted. This appeal followed.

                            STANDARD OF REVIEW

             Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, stipulations, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and

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that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” CR1 56.03. An

appellate court’s role in reviewing a summary judgment is to determine whether

the trial court erred in finding no genuine issue of material fact exists and the

moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Scifres v. Kraft, 916

S.W.2d 779, 781 (Ky. App. 1996). A grant of summary judgment is reviewed de

novo because factual findings are not at issue. Pinkston v. Audubon Area Cmty.

Servs., Inc., 210 S.W.3d 188, 189 (Ky. App. 2006) (citing Blevins v. Moran, 12

S.W.3d 698 (Ky. App. 2000)).

                                         ANALYSIS

                On appeal, Thompson asserts the trial court erred in dismissing her

claims against State Farm. She argues State Farm’s 30-day notification

requirement impermissibly shortens the statute of limitations for making an

uninsured motorist claim, citing Elkins v. Kentucky Farm Bureau Mutual

Insurance Company, 844 S.W.2d 423 (Ky. App. 1992), in which a one-year

limitation for filing suit was held unreasonable. However, the case herein differs

factually and legally from Elkins, including the fact this case arises from an alleged

hit-and-run accident.

                Under KRS2 304.20-020(2), an “uninsured motor vehicle” includes:

1
    Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
2
    Kentucky Revised Statutes.

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             an insured motor vehicle where the liability insurer
             thereof is unable to make payment with respect to the
             legal liability of its insured within the limits specified
             therein because of insolvency; an insured motor vehicle
             with respect to which the amounts provided, under the
             bodily injury liability bond or insurance policy applicable
             at the time of the accident with respect to any person or
             organization legally responsible for the use of such motor
             vehicle, are less than the limits described in KRS 304.39-
             110; and an insured motor vehicle to the extent that the
             amounts provided in the liability coverage applicable at
             the time of the accident is denied by the insurer writing
             the same.

This definition “does not provide that a motor vehicle will be considered uninsured

when the driver flees the scene and cannot be identified. If the legislature had

intended to include ‘hit and run’ vehicles within the mandated coverage, it could

have done so.” Huelsman v. Nat’l Emblem Ins. Co., 551 S.W.2d 579, 580 (Ky.

App. 1977). It did not, nor may we do so on its behalf.

             Shortly after the passage of Kentucky’s Motor Vehicle Reparations

Act, it was established by the Supreme Court of Kentucky that although insurers

are required by KRS 304.20-020 to provide uninsured motorist coverage, “there is

no requirement that coverage against loss caused by hit-and-run vehicles be

afforded.” Jett v. Doe, 551 S.W.2d 221, 222-23 (Ky. 1977). It further held:

             the statute recognizes by its language “subject to the
             terms and conditions of such coverage” contained in
             subsection (2), that insurers may insert restrictions in
             their policies’ provisions defining what is an “uninsured
             motor vehicle.” The matter herein is thus a purely
             contractual issue between the insurer and its insured

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               which we cannot disturb. By issuing an automobile
               liability policy providing for uninsured motorist coverage
               in hit-and-run cases, even though such coverage be
               subject to the restriction under consideration here, the
               insurer is providing coverage greater than that required
               by KRS 304.20-020. The insurer, in affording this
               additional coverage, has the right to require whatever
               conditions precedent to such protection as it sees fit,
               and once such a condition is clearly expressed in the
               policy and agreed upon by the parties, the courts
               must give it full force and effect and abstain from
               making a new or different contract under the guise of
               interpretation at the instance of a disappointed party.
               [Mullins v. Nat’l Cas. Co.,] 273 Ky. 686, 117 S.W.2d
               928 (1938). In bringing a claim under the hit-and-run
               provision here, it was incumbent upon the insured to
               bring herself within its requirements. This the appellant
               admits she has not done. We therefore must conclude
               there to have been no error in the circuit court’s judgment
               denying coverage.

Id. at 223 (emphasis added).

               Turning to the case herein, there is no dispute that even if there was an

accident, it was a hit-and-run. Accordingly, compliance with the terms of the

policy was mandatory for coverage, and any failure to do so forfeited said

coverage. Thompson’s contention that she should not be held to the terms of the

policy is nonsensical because a second-class insured3 is not afforded greater rights

3
   Ordinarily, there are two classes of insureds. The first class generally consists of “the named
insured, the insured who bought and paid for the protection and who has a statutory right to
reject uninsured motorist coverage, and the members of his family residing in the same
household.” Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Stanfield, 581 S.W.2d 555, 557 (Ky. 1979). The second class
is normally comprised of others in the vehicle at the time of the accident. While the protection
afforded to the first class is typically broad, that of the second class can be more limited.

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and coverage than a first-class insured who procured and paid premiums for said

coverage. Thus, the trial court did not err in dismissing Thompson’s claims against

State Farm.

                                  CONCLUSION

              Therefore, and for the foregoing reasons, the order entered by the

Martin Circuit Court is AFFIRMED.

              ALL CONCUR.

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:                       BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Travis O. Terry                            Darrin W. Banks
Hindman, Kentucky                          John V. Porter
                                           Cameron D. Allen
                                           Paintsville, Kentucky

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