Court Opinion

ID: 9570825
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:26:44.401722+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:18:30.570006
License: Public Domain

McCORMICK, Justice
(dissenting).
I am unable to agree that the federal constitutional right against double jeopardy in a state court is limited by state notions of what constitutes former jeopardy. I believe federal double jeopardy standards control. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 796, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 2063, 23 L.Ed.2d 707, 717 (1969) (“petitioner’s larceny conviction cannot stand once federal double jeopardy standards are applied”).
I. The initial question in this case should be: what is the federal standard for determining whether an accused has twice been put in jeopardy for the same offense? The federal “same offense” standard was formulated in Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338, 31 S.Ct. 421, 55 L.Ed.2d 489 (1911). There the court adopted what has been called the “same evidence” test from Morey v. Commonwealth, 108 Mass. 433, 434 (1871):
“A conviction or acquittal upon one indictment is no bar to a subsequent conviction and sentence upon another, unless the evidence required to support a conviction upon one of them would have been sufficient to warrant a conviction upon the other. The test is not whether the defendant has already been tried for the same act, but whether he has been put in jeopardy for the same offense. A single act may be an offense against two statutes; and if each statute requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction under either statute does not exempt the defendant from prosecution and punishment under the other.”
The United States Supreme Court has maintained this standard despite arguments by some members of that court for “episodic immunity” or a “same transaction” test. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970); Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 78 S.Ct. 1280, 2 L.Ed.2d 1405 (1958); Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932); State v. O’Kelly, 211 N.W.2d 589, 593 (Iowa 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 936, 94 S.Ct. 2652, 41 L.Ed.2d 240 (1974).
However, in Ashe v. Swenson, supra, the court extended the right where successive *254prosecutions are involved by holding collateral estoppel to be part of the constitutional guarantee. And, of course, in Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387, 90 S.Ct. 1184, 25 L.Ed.2d 435 (1970), the court rejected the argument that offenses which violate laws of separate sovereigns cannot be the same for double jeopardy purposes. The Benton, Ashe, and Waller decisions have broadened federal double jeopardy standards and demonstrate those standards are fully applicable in state prosecutions. State v. Brown, 262 Or. 442, 497 P.2d 1191 (1972).
II. The next question should be: under federal standards was defendant in this case twice put in jeopardy for the same offense? The majority opinion seems to limit the “same offense” concept to situations where offenses, are identical or where one is “necessarily included” within the other under Iowa law. I do not believe the federal constitutional right against double jeopardy is dependent upon Iowa’s standard for determining what constitutes an included offense.
Under Iowa law, for the reasons noted in the majority opinion, the crime of reckless driving is not “necessarily included” in the crime of manslaughter. Yet, when one is prosecuted under our manslaughter statute for a motor vehicle homicide, we have recognized only two “unlawful acts” which the State may rely on. One is reckless operation of the motor vehicle and the other is operation of the motor vehicle under the influence of an alcoholic beverage. State v. Kellison, 233 Iowa 1274, 11 N.W.2d 371 (1943).
When recklessness is the basis of the prosecution it is necessary for the State to prove the defendant directly caused the death of another by driving recklessly in violation of Code § 321.283. Recklessness becomes an essential element of a charge predicated on that basis. State v. Wallin, 195 N.W.2d 95, 99 (Iowa 1972); State v. Boner, 186 N.W.2d 161, 166-167 (Iowa 1971); State v. McLaughlin, 250 Iowa 435, 94 N.W.2d 303 (1959); State v. Graff, 228 Iowa 159, 290 N.W. 97 (1940), and citations. Proof of reckless driving and proof of manslaughter based on the same reckless driving depend upon the same law and facts.
Double jeopardy occurs when a person is twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. Offenses are the same when one is an essential ingredient of the other. See Harris v. United States, 359 U.S. 19, 79 S.Ct. 560, 3 L.Ed.2d 597 (1959); Blockburger v. United States, supra; Ex Parte Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176, 9 S.Ct. 672, 33 L.Ed. 118 (1889). When a manslaughter charge is based on recklessness in the operation of a motor vehicle, recklessness becomes an essential ingredient of the offense. Proof of manslaughter on that basis necessarily proves recklessness. Successive prosecutions for recklessness and manslaughter based on the same recklessness present a classic situation for application of the federal double jeopardy “same offense” standard. The accused is wrongly subjected to jeopardy twice for the same reckless driving. Unlike the situation in State v. Cook, 261 Iowa 1341, 158 N.W.2d 26 (1968), each offense does not require proof of an element not required for conviction of the other.
In the present case the plea of former jeopardy should have been sustained to the extent the manslaughter charge was predicated on reckless driving. It should have been overruled to the extent the manslaughter charge was predicated on the alternative basis of operating the motor vehicle under the influence of an alcoholic beverage.
The record shows both bases were submitted to the jury, but the ground of the verdict does not appear. Since the verdict may have rested on the recklessness basis, the case should be reversed. State v. Means, 211 N.W.2d 283 (Iowa 1973). Upon remand, the State would be free to try defendant for manslaughter on the alternative basis alone.
I would reverse the case.
MASON, RAWLINGS and UHLEN-HOPP, JJ., join in this dissent.