Court Opinion

ID: 9750470
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 15:00:01.769249+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:26:10.802597
License: Public Domain

BROSKY, Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. I find merit to appellant’s initial contention of ineffectiveness, pertaining to the failure of trial counsel to seek suppression, and would vacate and remand for a new trial.
As noted by the majority, it is well settled that a convicted defendant may not prevail upon a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel unless he is able to demonstrate: (1) that the issue underlying the ineffectiveness claim is of arguable merit; and (2) that the course of action chosen by counsel had no reasonable basis, independent of hindsight, in the promotion of defendant’s interests. Commonwealth v. Brandt, 353 Pa.Super. 250, 253, 509 A.2d 872, 874 (1986); Commonwealth ex rel. Washington v. Maroney, 427 Pa. 599, 235 A.2d 349 (1967). Furthermore, assuming the defendant is able to meet this two-pronged test, he must then be able to demonstrate that the claimed ineffectiveness so prejudiced his defense that he did not receive a fair trial. Commonwealth v. Pierce, 345 Pa.Super. 324, 498 A.2d 423 (1985), aff’d 515 Pa. 153, 527 A.2d 973 (1987).
Moreover, I concur in the majority’s position that, while a trial court memorandum or opinion, setting forth its finding of fact as a PCHA court, would have been preferable, the record below relied upon by appellant provides this Court with an adequate factual scenario to determine the underlying merit of appellant’s suppression argument.
*145It is here, however, that I part company with the majority, beginning with the appropriate standard of review.
The majority begins by framing the standard of review below as one in which the PCHA court, sitting as a trier of fact, was free to believe “all, part, or none” of the evidence of record.1 From this, the majority concludes that this Court may now consider all evidence of record, “from whatever source”, that supports the finding of the PCHA court. This approach is clearly contradictory to our standard of review as an appellate court where suppression issues are involved. In determining whether evidence should have been suppressed, our Court is to consider only the evidence of the appellees (herein, the Commonwealth), and so much of the evidence of the appellant (herein, the defendant) which, as read in the context of the record of a whole, remains uncontradicted. Commonwealth v. White, 358 Pa.Super. 120, 123, 516 A.2d 1211, 1212 (1986); Commonwealth v. Otto, 343 Pa.Super. 457, 460, 495 A.2d 554, 555 (1985). Thus, where appellant’s testimony at trial is directly contradictory to, say, Officer Casciola’s, it is Officer Casciola’s testimony that is to be credited, even if that testimony is ultimately beneficial to appellant’s suppression claim.2
*146Reviewing the operative facts, then, as presented by the evidence of the Commonwealth, and so much of appellant’s testimony as is uncontradicted by the Commonwealth, the following scenario surfaces: On March 2, 1984, a pick-up truck belonging to one Gerald L. Shriver was stolen from the Washington Mall parking lot. Officer Lawrence Garner of the South Strabane Police Department received word that an anonymous informant had followed the stolen vehicle to a white garage, adjacent to a large, white frame house, on Wabash Avenue in Hickory. Officer Garner radioed the anonymous informant’s tip to Officer Dean Casciola of the Mount Pleasant Police Department, who then proceeded to the Wabash Avenue location to investigate. Upon arriving at the house described by the informant, Officer Casciola was greeted outside the house by Sandra Carelli, appellant’s wife. Officer Casciola informed Mrs. Carelli that he had received a noise complaint from their neighbors,3 and wanted to speak to her husband. Mrs. Carelli replied that her husband was in the garage, and that she would get him. Officer Casciola did not wait for Mrs. Carelli to return, but instead accompanied her to the garage. She knocked on the garage door, and appellant opened the door to exit. When appellant was only partially through the doorway, Officer Casciola approached appellant to shake his hand, and proceeded to look over appellant’s shoulder. Though appellant attempted to close the door quickly, Casciola was able to see part of a pick-up truck, matching the description of the stolen vehicle, in the garage. Casciola did not mention to either appellant or his wife, at that time, that he was also there to investigate a stolen vehicle complaint.
After spotting the stolen pick-up truck in appellant’s garage, Casciola radioed Officer Gamer. Later that evening, Garner arrived with two state troopers. Casciola, Garner and the troopers proceeded to the house, and spoke with Mrs. Carelli, who stated that her husband had left. *147They obtained her consent to search the garage, and found the stolen pick-up truck partially disassembled therein. They removed the truck from the garage that night.
The majority’s factual scenario is at odds with the above in two significant respects, both derived from appellant’s testimony. For one, the majority states that appellant had left the garage door ajar approximately two feet prior to Officer Casciola’s arrival; this is a clear contradiction to Casciola’s testimony that appellant had to open a closed door in order to exit the garage. Secondly, the majority asserts that Casciola was able to see the entire truck upon appellant’s exit; however, this “fact” is derived from appellant’s unsubstantiated beliefs only, and is, once again, directly in conflict with Casciola’s own testimony that he was able to see only the back end and right side of the truck. (N.T., p. 33).
While these two discrepancies may on the surface appear to be small, both play a substantial role in the difference between my analysis and the majority’s analysis of the fourth amendment considerations in this case. I note these discrepancies now as a preface to my divergent view as to how the fourth amendment applies sub judice.
Appellant claims that Officer Casciola’s view into his garage constituted an illegal search which would have required suppression of the truck and various tools as the fruits of an illegal search. In opposition, the Commonwealth avers that the plain view doctrine permitted Officer Casciola to look over appellant’s shoulder and make a warrantless visual “search” of appellant’s garage. I reject the Commonwealth’s argument that the plain view doctrine validates Officer Casciola’s intrusion.
There are two distinct lines of cases which fall under the plain view doctrine. The first line of cases involves those situations in which the warrantless view takes place after an intrusion into a constitutionally protected area. Under this line of cases, fourth amendment protections apply so as to make the view a “search”, and objects sighted in “plain view” are admissible only if: (1) the original intrusion into *148the constitutionally protected area was justified by consent, hot pursuit, warrant, or other; and (2) the view of the objects in question was inadvertent. See Commonwealth v. Chiesa, 329 Pa.Super. 401, 478 A.2d 850, 852 (1984), citing Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 83 S.Ct. 1623, 10 L.Ed.2d 726 (1963).
The second line of cases involves those situations in which the view takes place before any intrusion into a constitutionally protected area. Such a view does not constitute a fourth amendment “search”, and inadvertent discovery of any objects in plain view is no longer required. Id.
Clearly, then, analysis must begin with a determination as to whether Officer Casciola’s view into appellant’s garage took place before or after any intrusion into a constitutionally protected area.
Traditionally, the fourth amendment protection from unreasonable searches and seizures has been presumed to secure the privacy of an individual in his own home; the home has been the prototype of a constitutionally protected area. Commonwealth v. Flewellen, 475 Pa. 442, 446, 380 A.2d 1217, 1220 (1977). Moreover, the protection generally accorded one’s home has been extended to include “curtilage” as well:
“Curtilage ... means a small piece of land, not necessarily enclosed, around a dwelling house and generally includes buildings used for domestic purposes in the conduct of family affairs ...” Commonwealth v. Cihylik, 337 Pa.Super. 221, 231, 486 A.2d 987, 992 (1985), citing United States v. Wolfe, 375 F.Supp. 949, 958-59 (E.D.Pa. 1974).
Whether a given area is within the protected curtilage of one’s dwelling, will depend upon a number of factors, including its proximity to the dwelling, whether it is within the enclosure surrounding the dwelling, and its use as an adjunct to the domestic economy of the family. Cihylik, supra, 337 Pa.Superior Ct. p. 230, 486 A.2d pp. 991-92.
However, as the oft-repeated doctrine of Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967), makes clear, the concept of “place”, while of relevance to a *149determination as to whether an area shall be recognized as constitutionally protected, is not dispositive of the question:
“[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection, [citations omitted]. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.” [citations omitted]. Id. at 351-52, 88 S.Ct. at 511.
Hence, where an individual fails to take reasonable measures to safeguard an area, normally thought to be private, from prying eyes, he may not be free, even in his own home, from visual intrusion by an investigating officer. As long as the officer is situated at a lawful vantage point outside the area, any incriminating evidence the officer sights within the area will not be subject to suppression, as the individual who has failed to shield the area from public view has, in effect, surrendered his privacy, and is precluded from any claim that an illegal “search” has taken place. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 107 S.Ct. 1134, 1139, 94 L.Ed.2d 326 (1987). The evidence will be admissible pursuant to the second line of cases under the “plain view” doctrine. Chiesa, supra.
By contrast, where an individual takes measures to safeguard his privacy in an area not generally thought to be private, that area may nonetheless be entitled to constitutional protection, provided society is prepared to acknowledge that individual’s expectation of privacy as reasonable under the circumstances. An intrusion into that area by an investigating officer, and a subsequent sighting of incriminating evidence within that area, will constitute a “search”. The evidence will be subject to suppression if the criteria specified in the first line of “plain view” cases, Chiesa, supra (i.e. intrusion must be justified and evidence must be discovered inadvertently), are not satisfied. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2038-39, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971).
*150To summarize, then, the pivotal consideration in determining whether an area is constitutionally protected is not the place involved, though certain places such as homes and their curtilage are often accorded fourth amendment protection. The key inquiry, rather, is whether the individual suspect harbors a reasonable and justifiable expectation of privacy with respect to the area in question, and seeks to ensure his privacy by the taking of measures to exclude prying eyes. Commonwealth v. Weimer, 262 Pa.Super. 69, 74, 396 A.2d 649, 651 (1978), citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); Commonwealth v. Busfield, 242 Pa.Super. 194, 363 A.2d 1227, 1228-29 (1976); Commonwealth v. Soychak, 221 Pa.Super. 458, 289 A.2d 119, 122 (1972). Such a determination must be made on an individual basis, as the facts surrounding the reasonableness of a suspect’s expectations, and the strength of that belief, as evidenced by any measures taken to safeguard those expectations, will necessarily vary from case to case. Weimer, supra.
For instance, in the Busfield case, this Court determined that the defendant had failed to demonstrate an expectation of privacy as to the kitchen of his own residence, and had therefore surrendered any claim to fourth amendment protection. The defendant had been conducting marijuana transactions from his residence, and, on the evening in question, was observed through a drawn curtain, by police officers lawfully positioned on adjacent property, to be packaging marijuana, along with three male accomplices. The curtain in question was of a very sheer material, and permitted clear observation into the kitchen; moreover, a window blind was available, but left undrawn. This Court held that the defendant’s failure to draw the blind, in light of the sheer nature of the curtain, had exposed his activities to public view, negating any reasonable expectation of privacy: “The law will not shield criminal activity from visual observation when the actor shows such little regard for his privacy.” Busfield, supra, 242 Pa.Superior Ct. at p. 199, 363 A.2d at p. 1229.
*151In Soychak, on the other hand, this Court affirmed the suppression of evidence gained through what the Court determined to be an illegal search of a private billiards club. The police had received information that the club was involved in gambling operations, and, pursuant to this tip, had stationed an officer on the roof of the club. The officer observed, through a louvered exhaust fan, the defendants’ attempt to destroy gambling paraphernalia. This Court held that the defendants had demonstrated a reasonable expectation of privacy as to the interior of the club through the employment of two reinforced doors and a doorman, and, moreover, had not abandoned that expectation through the opening of the louvers on the exhaust fan, as the louvers had to remain open while the fan was in operation, and the fan was located in a bathroom, ordinarily presumed to be private. As such, the officer on the roof has intruded4 into a protected area, without justification, and had illegally “searched” the interior of the bathroom.
Finally, in the Weimer case, this Court was faced with a factual scenario similar to that in Soychak. The Weimer defendants had been conducting gambling operations at their club. Pursuant to anonymous tips, the state police, on two separate occasions, dispatched two uniformed officers to make a warrantless investigation of the premises. The troopers were admitted without any showing of membership, despite the club’s stated policy of restricting entry to members. On the latter visit, gambling paraphernalia was observed, and the defendants were arrested for possession of gambling devices. In an attempt to suppress the devices confiscated, defendants relied upon our decision in Soychak. The suppression judge agreed with their rationale, and the Commonwealth took a direct appeal. This Court reversed, *152stating in part that the factual situation presented was more akin to Busfield than Soychak, in that the defendants had been too lax in enforcing their purported security measures to deny access to non-members, thereby defeating any claim that the defendants had a reasonable and justifiable expectation of privacy as to the interior of the club.
Turning now to the matter sub judice, I believe the factual scenario presented indicates that appellant had a reasonable and justifiable expectation of privacy with respect to his garage, and, more importantly, took measures to safeguard that privacy, in a manner more akin to Soychak than to either Busfield or Weimer.
As a starting point, I encounter no difficulty, as does the majority, in concluding that appellant’s garage was part of the protected curtilage of his home. The garage is described in the record as “adjacent” to the Carellis’ dwelling,5 upon residentially zoned property (N.T. pp. 30, 38).
The majority finds the word “adjacent” to “only vaguely” indicate proximity to the house, and footnotes to the Webster’s Ninth Collegiate Dictionary (1986) discussion distinguishing “adjacent”, “adjoining”, and “contiguous”, and “juxtaposed”. The Webster’s Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary (1972) contains a similar discussion, comparing and contrasting “adjacent” with “adjoining”, “contiguous”, and “abutting”. As I would doubt that a common term such as “adjacent” has radically changed meaning in the past fourteen years, I find the following portion of the 1972 discussion instructive:
ADJACENT may or may not imply contact but always implies absence of anything of the same kind in between
In light of the above, I fail to find the term “adjacent” too “vague” to draw the common sense inference that the *153garage was in sufficiently close proximity to qualify as part of the curtilage.
More significantly, however, appellant did not abandon his privacy, but, on the contrary, took reasonable measures to prevent intrusion by prying eyes. It is uncontradicted, in the record at trial, that the windows to the garage were boarded, and that access to the garage was possible only through the garage door. Moreover, according to the testimony of the Commonwealth’s own witness, Officer Casciola, appellant, upon exiting the garage, attempted to protect the garage and its contents from the officer’s visual inspection by quickly closing the door after him. (N.T., p. 32). Such behavior does not constitute the type of lax enforcement of privacy demonstrated by the sheer curtain in Bus-field, or the “open door” policy in Weimer. Rather, it is more akin to Soychak, wherein the defendants took specific measures to shield their actions from observation, and were exposed only through the taking of unavoidable means to operate the bathroom fan, i.e. the opening of the louvers. Here, appellant took security measures, and exposed the interior of his garage only when it became unavoidable to shield it from view i.e. upon opening the garage in order to exit and respond to police questioning.
It is here that the majority’s differing construction of the facts comes into play. The majority relies, in part, upon appellant’s testimony to conclude that appellant abandoned any expectation of privacy by: (1) leaving the door ajar by two feet; and (2) thereby permitting Officer Casciola to see the entire truck. The majority's reliance is misplaced for two reasons.
Initially, presuming that the majority has construed appellant’s testimony correctly, i.e. as contradictory to that of Casciola’s, the majority has failed, as noted previously, to apply the correct standard of review. Where the testimony given by appellant contradicts that of Casciola, it is the testimony of Casciola that is to be credited. White, supra; Otto, supra. This would seem particularly apropos with respect to how much of the stolen truck was visible to *154Casciola; as appellant could only have assumed how much of the truck was visible to Casciola, Casciola’s testimony that he could only view a limited portion of the truck would certainly seem the more reliable testimony.
Moreover, I cannot agree that appellant’s testimony was so inherently contradictory to that of Casciola:
Q. Your garage has windows, is that correct?
A. But they’re boarded up.
Q. And the garage door was open?
Q. About two foot.
Q. And you opened it whenever you greeted him?
A. Chief Casciola, no. When I went in I opened them up and turned the lights on and walked over to my box and got my stuff and I was right where I was getting my stuff and my wife said, ‘Ron, there is a police officer out there who would like to see you.’ And I said, ‘Alright, I’ll be right out.’ (N.T., p. 64).
The majority gleans from the above exchange that appellant opened the door, and left it ajar immediately prior to Casciola’s arrival. However, the time sequence involved appears to me somewhat vague. While it is certain that appellant had opened the door, in order to enter the garage, the above does not clarify whether appellant left the door ajar before or after Casciola’s arrival. The lack of clarity is even more apparent when reviewing appellant’s testimony only moments before:
Q. And did you have some conversation with him as you were coming out of the garage?
A. First, my wife, she just called and says, she says, “Ron, there is an officer out here that would like to talk to you.” So, I just said, “Alright, I’ll be out in a minute.” I had grabbed my tools and I just walked outside. The garage door was slid like two feet open, you know, and the lights were still on. (Emphasis added) (N.T., p. 57).
*155As the above-emphasized assertions demonstrate, it is just as likely that appellant was trying to say that the door was opened and left ajar two feet upon his exit from the garage.
As the majority’s construction of the rather vague testimony given by appellant brings that testimony directly into conflict with Casciola’s recollection of the sequence of events, I would be loathe to construe appellant’s testimony in such a manner, and, more importantly, to rely upon that construction to conclude that appellant surrendered his privacy as to the interior of the garage. All are agreed that appellant quickly closed the garage door behind him upon exiting, an action inconsistent with a surrender of privacy.
The majority also construes a surrender of privacy from the uncontradicted testimony at trial that appellant’s friends and relatives frequently used the garage, with appellant’s understood permission. However, an invitation to some is not an invitation to all. As Soychak and Weimer indicate, an individual does not abandon an expectation of privacy by permitting a select group to come into the protected area, even if that select group be a large one, such as the membership roster of a private club. The important factor is whether an individual who has given permission to others attempts to exclude official prying eyes. Here, appellant closed the garage door quickly behind him to exclude Casciola’s prying eyes. I fail to appreciate the significance of appellant’s prior consent to others, in light of his obvious denial of consent, by conduct, to any visual intrusion by Casciola.
Thus, I conclude that Casciola’s visual intrusion into appellant’s garage constituted a “search” of a constitutionally protected area, similar to that in the Soychak case. Further analysis must proceed, then, in accordance with the first line of cases under the “plain view” doctrine, often referred to as the “plain view exception” cases. It must now be determined if the intrusion was both: (1) justified, and (2) inadvertent.
*156Initially, I do not believe that Casciola’s presence at the garage door was justified by any implied consent he obtained from appellant’s wife to follow her to the door.
When seeking to justify a search on consent grounds, the Commonwealth has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the consent was voluntarily given. See Commonwealth v. Walsh, 314 Pa.Super. 65, 75, 460 A.2d 767, 772 (1983), citing Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548, 88 S.Ct. 1788, 1792, 20 L.Ed.2d 797, 802 (1968); see also Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 256 Pa.Super. 259, 389 A.2d 1113, 1118 (1978). The issue of whether consent has been freely given is a question of fact which must be determined in each case from the totality of the circumstances. Pertinent factors may include the education, intelligence, and experience of the consenter, and the degree to which the consenter understands investigating procedures. Walsh, supra, 314 Pa.Superior Ct. at pp. 74, 75, 460 A.2d at pp. 771, 772. Further, it is well established that consent may not be gained through stealth, deceit, or misrepresentation; a consent gained through such measures is neither knowing nor intelligent, and is tantamount to a consent obtained by means of implied coercion or duress. Id.
This does not mean that every consent obtained through the employment of an undercover agent, or a planted informant, is automatically vitiated as the product of misrepresentation. It has been recognized that certain crimes, by their very nature, such as vice, racketeering, and narcotics trafficking, require the police to employ ruses and deceptions to investigate. See Commonwealth v. Poteete, 274 Pa.Super. 490, 418 A.2d 513, 516, 517 (1980), citing Hoff a v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 408, 17 L.Ed.2d 374 (1966). Rather, it is where an officer, who identifies himself as such, misrepresents his purpose in order to gain entrance into a private area, such as one’s home, that any consent given has been rendered involuntary. It is generally recognized that officers, by virtue of their status and authority, exercise some degree of coercion whenever they make requests in their official capacity; this coercion, cou*157pled with deception, deprives a home owner of the ability to make an intelligent assessment of the risks involved in consenting to entry, and thereby incapable of rendering a voluntary, intelligent, and knowing consent. Walsh, supra, 314 Pa.Superior Ct. at p. 75, 460 A.2d at p. 772; Poteete, supra, 274 Pa.Superior Ct. at p. 496, 418 A.2d at p. 516.
Before applying the above law to the facts sub judice, the majority’s position that Poteete is no longer valid precedent must be addressed.
The majority cites Commonwealth v. Morrison, 275 Pa. Super. 454, 418 A.2d 1378 (1980) (en banc), for the proposition that Poteete, as the progeny of Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 Pa. 81, 190 A.2d 709 (1963), is no longer precedential, in that Wright was decided prior to Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). In Schneckloth, the U.S. Supreme Court formulated a test for voluntariness of consent to a search, wherein any consent “coerced by threats or force, or granted only in submission to a claim of lawful authority”, would be involuntary. Id. at 227, 233, 93 S.Ct. at 2048, 2051. Noting that Wright was decided on the basis of pre-Schneckloth federal case precedent, and that the Morrison majority adopted the Schneckloth test for voluntariness, the majority herein concludes that stealth and misrepresentation may no longer render a consent involuntary. I disagree.
Initially, the Concurring Opinion in Morrison authored by Spaeth, J., and joined by Wieand, J., aptly points out that the Morrison majority over-extends the Schneckloth test in a manner clearly inconsistent with prior precedent:
“In its most obvious interpretation, the (majority) opinion seems to say that the only limits on police deception are that the deception must not amount to ‘force or other coercion’____ This proposition, however, is so plainly contrary to settled law that one must ask whether perhaps the opinion is not intended to mean something else____ Perhaps the principal difficulty with the majority’s opinion is its reliance on Schneckloth (cite omitted). Schneckloth, however, is not on point____ *158In Schneckloth there was no police deception; accordingly, the Court had no occasion to address, and did not address, the issue before us. ” Morrison, supra, 275 Pa.Superior Ct. at pp. 463-464, 418 A.2d at pp. 1382-83. (Emphasis supplied.)
Moreover, as our Court pointed out in Walsh, it is well settled that constitutional rights may be protected by a state-court system which has developed its own test for voluntariness of consent; the state has the power to impose standards on searches and seizures higher than those required by the Federal Constitution. Walsh, supra, 314 Pa.Superior Ct. at p. 74, 460 A.2d at p. 771, citing Cooper v. State of California, 386 U.S. 58, 87 S.Ct. 788, 17 L.Ed.2d 730 (1967). The Wright decision has never been overruled by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, and cannot be overruled by an en banc panel of the Superior Court. Until such time that Wright is expressly disavowed, its prohibition against procuring consent through deceit remains the law of this Commonwealth,6 *159upon Wright, remains valid precedent.7
Applying, then, the Poteete and Walsh criteria to Casciola’s presence at the door of the garage, I cannot find that the record below demonstrates, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Casciola followed Mrs. Carelli to the garage with her consent. All testimony at trial indicates that Mrs. Carelli said that she would “go get” her husband, and did not say “follow me”. The plain meaning of “go get” certainly does not imply an invitation to be followed.8 In the absence of any testimony to the effect that the officer was somehow invited, I cannot imagine that Mrs. Carelli did not feel pressured to permit the officer to follow her, once he began to do so. Moreover, the record is clear that Casciola misrepresented the nature of his visit, as a followup on a noise complaint. (N.T., p. 35). Hence, even if Mrs. Carelli’s silence when Casciola followed her was not the result of pressure, the Commonwealth certainly has not demonstrated that her silence was not the result of Cascio*160la’s misrepresentation of his purpose.9 Were I to concede, however, that Casciola was lawfully positioned at the garage door with Mrs. Carelli’s consent, I nonetheless am compelled to the conclusion that his view of the interior of appellant’s garage was anything but inadvertent.
The United States Supreme Court has defined the term “inadvertency”, for purposes of search and seizure cases, to mean that an officer must discover the incriminating evidence by accident; that is, he may not know the location of the evidence in advance of discovery, and intend to seize it, relying on the plain view doctrine as a pretext. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. at 470, 91 S.Ct. at 2040 (1971); see also Commonwealth v. Kendrick, 340 Pa.Super. 563, 569, 490 A.2d 923, 926 (1985).
Applying this definition to the testimony adduced at trial, it is obvious that Casciola’s sighting of the stolen truck was anything but inadvertent. He was well aware, prior to his arrival at the Carelli home, that an anonymous tipster had reported the vehicle to be located in the big white garage adjacent to appellant’s residence. (N.T., p. 30). He did not wait for Mrs. Carelli to get appellant, but walked over to the garage with her, and deliberately looked over appellant’s shoulder in an attempt to determine if the vehicle within the garage matched the description of the stolen vehicle. (N.T., pp. 30, 32). Under such circumstances, the Commonwealth’s assertions that this was an inadvertent sighting of evidence in plain view are unpersuasive.
The majority, incredibly enough, cites Commonwealth v. Casuccio, 308 Pa.Super. 450, 468-469, 454 A.2d 621, 630-31 *161(1982), for the proposition that, where an officer has reasonable suspicions, but not probable cause, to believe evidence of a crime will be discovered in a certain area, deliberate observation of that area will qualify as “inadvertent”. This is a patent misreading of Casuccio. In Casuccio, the authorities were searching a garage for a stolen Hobart Welder, and, in the same garage, discovered a stolen trailer. While the officers knew the trailer to be stolen, they “had no way of knowing that (the trailer was) to be found on the premises to be searched”. Id., 308 Pa.Superior Ct. at p. 468, 454 A.2d at p. 630. The discovery of the trailer was purely accidental. In holding the discovery of the trailer to be admissible at trial, our Court held that “the ‘plain view’ doctrine permits the seizure of items found while executing a valid warrant naming other objects” provided that there is a “prior valid intrusion”, and an “inadvertent” discovery of evidence, in plain view. Id. This does not mean that an officer may have a reasonable suspicion that a certain item is in a certain place, gain entry to that place, and claim that his discovery of the certain item was “inadvertent”! Such a construction of the term “inadvertent” would pervert the plain meaning of the term beyond reason.
I therefore cannot but conclude that Officer Casciola’s visual intrusion into appellant’s garage constituted an unlawful search of a constitutionally protected area.
However, the inquiry into the admissibility of the stolen truck does not end here. In deciding whether evidence obtained following illegal police conduct must be suppressed as a “fruit of the poisonous tree”, it must be considered:
“whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.” Commonwealth v. Shaw, 476 Pa. 543, 383 A.2d 496, 554, 501-02 (1978), citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488, 83 S.Ct. 407, 417, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963).
*162As the factual history to this matter indicates, Casciola later returned to the Carelli home with Officer Garner and two state troopers, and allegedly obtained the consent of Mrs. Carelli to a second “search” of the garage. It must be resolved, then, whether her consent to the second “search” was voluntary, and purged the taint of illegality remaining from the first “search”. Once again, I would find that the Commonwealth failed to meet its burden of demonstrating voluntariness.
When Casciola returned with Officer Garner and two state troopers, Mrs. Carelli was home alone; the officers then “talked to her”, and she gave her consent to a search of the garage. (N.T., p. 32). This scenario, in the absence of any testimony as to what the officers “talked to her” about during the second visit, militates against a free and knowing consent. There is no indication that the officers ever explained to Mrs. Carelli the true nature of their investigation, or the serious consequences of her consent. Moreover, despite appellant’s absence from the home, which effectively eliminated any concern that the truck was about to be moved, the officers did not wait for appellant’s return, but obtained Mrs. Carelli’s consent then and there. It is difficult to imagine that Mrs. Carelli would not have felt some degree of duress from four police officers pressing her for an immediate consent; this, coupled with the fact that Mrs. Carelli, by all appearances, did not know or understand the full nature of the officer’s investigation, implies a situation fraught with deceit and coercion.10
I therefore conclude that a motion to suppress the pick-up truck, and other items seized from appellant’s garage, as the fruits of Chief Casciola’s illegal visual search, would have had arguable merit. It would have been the Commonwealth’s burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the items in question were somehow admissible. Pa.R.Crim.Proc. 323 (h); Commonwealth v. Ryan, 300 Pa. Super. 156, 173, 446 A.2d 277, 285 (1982). Taking all the Commonwealth’s evidence, and so much of the defense evidence *163as remains uncontradicted, Ryan, supra, 300 Pa.Superior Ct. at p. 169, 446 A.2d at p. 283,1 am of the view, as is apparent from the preceding discussion, that the Commonwealth would have encountered some measure of difficulty in satisfying its burden. A motion to suppress would have a more than reasonable chance of success. Appellant, therefore, has satisfied the first prong of the two-pronged Maroney test for ineffectiveness, by demonstrating that the underlying issue is of arguable merit.
The second prong of the two-pronged Maroney test is a showing that the course of action chosen by counsel could not have had a reasonable basis in the promotion of appellant’s interests.
I would hold that trial counsel could not possibly have had a reasonable basis in failing to file a suppression motion.
To convict a defendant of receiving stolen property, the Commonwealth is required to establish: (1) possession, control, or dominion over the stolen goods by the accused; and (2) knowledge, whether actual or inferred from the circumstances surrounding receipt, on the part of the accused that the goods were, in fact, stolen. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 3925; see also Commonwealth v. Worrell, 277 Pa.Super. 386, 419 A.2d 1199, 1201 (1980) and Commonwealth v. Davis, 444 Pa. 11, 280 A.2d 119, 121 (1971). Without some evidence of possession or receipt, an accused cannot be convicted of the crime. Therefore, an attempt at suppression of items seized from appellant’s garage, including the truck, would have, at its most successful, left the Commonwealth without a case against appellant. At its least successful, it could not have possibly harmed appellant’s interests. Trial counsel’s failure to even attempt suppression was patently unreasonable, and denied appellant effective assistance of counsel.
The majority takes the rather novel position that, as any suppression testimony by appellant, concerning measures he took to exclude prying eyes from his garage, could have been used against him at trial for impeachment purposes, *164and as his theory of defense was that he did not know the truck was stolen and had “nothing to hide”, the decision by trial counsel to refrain from filing a suppression motion was a reasonable tactical decision. I find this strained attempt by the majority to construe trial counsel’s behavior as reasonable incomprehensible.
For one, the Commonwealth was free at trial, even in the absence of any suppression testimony, to put Casciola on the stand, and give testimony concerning the measures appellant took to safeguard his privacy. In point of fact, this is precisely what happened at trial. As such, the failure to file a suppression motion did not block the introduction of what the majority believes was incriminating evidence; it only deprived appellant of his chance to suppress the fruits of the garage search, and have the Commonwealth’s case against him dismissed. Moreover, that Casciola would have given such testimony at trial, could have easily been anticipated, without benefit of hindsight, by trial counsel, if indeed such testimony was so terribly damaging to appellant’s theory of defense.
More frightening, however, is the majority’s underlying assumption that an individual cannot seek to exclude prying eyes from invading his privacy without having “something to hide”, or taking on the appearance of guilt. Unlike the majority, I detect no inherent contradiction in appellant’s theory of defense, i.e. that he did not know the truck to be stolen, and the actions appellant took to deny the world at large from examining the contents of his garage. It has always been my understanding that the fourth amendment protects all citizens, be they guilty or innocent of wrongdoing, from unwelcome police surveillance, and that the assertion of one’s fourth amendment rights is not, in and of itself, indicative of criminal activity afoot.
Moving, then to the third prong of the ineffectiveness test, as set forth in Pierce, supra, I would find that trial counsel’s ineffectiveness so prejudiced appellant that he did not receive a fair trial.
*165As mentioned above, the contents of appellant’s garage were the sum and substance of the Commonwealth’s case. To aver in this instance that the outcome of appellant’s trial was not affected by the admission of the tainted evidence, and the testimony of the police officers as to how it was discovered, would be specious.
In light of the foregoing, I would find that trial counsel was ineffective as a matter of law, and that counsel’s ineffectiveness so prejudiced appellant as to deprive him of a fair trial. I would vacate the judgment of sentence, and remand for a new trial.

. In support of its position, the majority cites Commonwealth v. Arms, 489 Pa. 35, 39, 413 A.2d 684, 686 (1980). However, as the statement of law in Arms, concerning function of the trier of fact, pertained to the propriety of our Court disturbing a jury verdict, based upon an assessment of witness credibility, and did not involve either suppression issues, or our Court's scope of review in suppression matters, Arms is essentially inapplicable.

. The majority suggests that my approach to the standard of review flies in the face of "common sense”, in that it would require us to ignore relevant, albeit contradicted, testimony from appellant that arguably supports the Commonwealth’s position as appellee, on suppression. However, it is not the function of an appellate court to refashion its well defined standard of review, under the guise of “common sense", in order to achieve a somewhat desirable result, i.e. the affirmance of a conviction and the avoidance of retrial. Where the Commonwealth has undermined its own position through Commonwealth testimony, I cannot accept that it is our function to circumvent our scope of review, and repair the flaws in the Commonwealth’s case with the contradicted testimony of the defendant.

. A noise complaint had been lodged by the Carellis’ neighbors the previous day.

. The Soychak Court noted that, while a physical intrusion by an officer into a protected area is the usual scenario in illegal search cases, the absence of a physical intrusion does not per se demonstrate that a police surveillance was reasonable. Citing Katz, they stated “even a non-trespassory surveillance can be unreasonable and therefore unconstitutional ... the presence or absence of an accompanying trespass is merely a factor to consider in determining the reasonableness of the visual intrusion.” Soychak, supra.

. I note only in passing that appellant did not own his residence, or the accompanying garage, but, rather, rented the premises. However, it is well established that a tenant has an expectation of privacy, with respect to rented premises, that is understood by society, and hence "reasonable.” See Commonwealth v. Lowery, 305 Pa.Super. 66, 451 A.2d 245, 247 (1982).

. The majority cites Commonwealth v. Brown, 437 Pa. 1, 261 A.2d 879 (1970), for the proposition that even the Supreme Court has declined to apply the Wright proscription against deception, which is indicative that Wright's value as continuing precedent is at best questionable. This, however, ignores the basis upon which Brown distinguishes Wright.
Brown notes that two distinct lines of Supreme Court cases have developed pertaining to deceptive conduct in obtaining consent. The first is the Gouled line, based upon Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 41 S.Ct. 261, 65 L.Ed. 647 (1921), which is cited in Wright for the proposition that consent gained through stealth is "tantamount to implied coercion.” Wright supra, 190 A.2d at p. 711. The second line is the Lopez-Hoffa-Lewis line, based upon the holdings in, respectively, Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 83 S.Ct. 1381, 10 L.Ed.2d 462 (1963); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 408, 17 L.Ed.2d 374 (1966); and Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 87 S.Ct. 424, 17 L.Ed.2d 312 (1966), in which various exceptions to the Gouled test for consent were delineated for situations in which undercover work was involved. The Brown court found the Lopez-Hoffa-Lewis line to be applicable to the facts in Brown, as the defendant in Brown had voluntarily surrendered the gun he had used as a murder weapon, to a known policeman, who was "undercover” as to his motives in wanting the gun, i.e. he had offered to sell the defendant’s gun:
Neither this Court nor any member of it has expressed the view that the Fourth Amendment protects a wrongdoer’s misplaced belief that a person to whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it. Brown, supra, [261 A.2d], at p. 882, citing Hoffa, supra, 385 U.S. at 302, 87 S.Ct. at 413.

. The majority notes that Commonwealth v. Markman, 320 Pa.Super. 304, 467 A.2d 336 (1983) cites the Morrison holding pertaining to voluntariness of consent, and not Poteete. The majority believes this to be significant, in light of the fact that Hoffman, J., the author of Poteete, was on the Markman panel and joined in the majority opinion. However, the Markman panel expressly found that the officer in question, a Lieutenant Caldwell, had not employed fraud or deceit to obtain consent to search the premises in question. As such, the Markman cite to Morrison was dictum, and Judge Hoffman’s joinder in Markman can in no way be construed as a disavowal of his position as the author of Poteete.

. This alone distinguishes the matter sub judice from Commonwealth v. Daniels, 280 Pa.Super. 278, 421 A.2d 721 (1980), authored by this writer and cited by the majority. In Daniels, the police were investigating a report of a woman’s screams coming from the appellant’s apartment. Upon the arrival of the police, in response to police questioning, the appellant made no response whatsoever, but re-entered his apartment, leaving the door open. I found appellant’s behavior under the circumstances suspicious, and held that the police had no option but to follow appellant in order to continue their interrogation.
This, of course, is a far cry from the situation herein, where appellant’s wife was not silently refusing to respond to questioning, nor attempting to evade further questioning by walking away. Rather, she was attempting to bring her husband to Officer Casciola. Such behavior was not suspicious, and did not require of Officer Casciola that he follow her to the garage to continue his interrogation.

. The majority consistently refers to my characterization of the record, with reference to the issue of Mrs. Carelli’s consent here, and at a later point in time, as the product of conjecture and speculation, and asserts that, without any testimony demonstrating coercion, appellant cannot meet his burden of proving coercion. This, once again, is an improper approach to the standard of review. As noted infra., the Commonwealth has the initial burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that consent was freely given; where the record does not enable the Commonwealth to meet its burden, the burden of showing coercion never shifts to the defendant. Walsh, supra, 314 Pa.Superior Ct. at p. 75, 460 A.2d at p. 772.

. Id.