Court Opinion

ID: 9761665
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 01:49:17.897864+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:25.303463
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Cohen :
The writer of the majority opinion apparently operates under the self-created irrebuttable presumption that the plaintiffs must recover. Fortunately, the law, reason and logic have not yet seen fit to create such a presumption. Not wedded to this presumption, I feel compelled to express my disagreement with the result reached by the majority of this Court.
Plaintiffs’ theory of the case was as follows: On the night in question defendant’s employee negligently placed hot ashes in a cardboard box under a table in the basement heating room, which box subsequently caught fire causing the table to generate and apply heat to the gas meter resulting in the fire damaging plaintiffs’ property. In an effort to establish defendant’s negligence, based upon the doctrine of respondeat superior, plaintiffs produced as their witness defendant’s employee who allegedly committed the tortious act causing the fire. On direct examination the employee testified in pertinent part as follows: “Q. And did you empty some ashes out of that incinerator? A. Empty some ashes out? Q. Yes. A. Yes, from the night before, when I first went in. Q. When you first went in you emptied some ashes out of the incinerator? A. Yes. Q. What did you empty them in? A. A container. Q. What kind of a container? A. Box. Q. Cardboard box? A. Cardboard box that Duffy had in there. Q. And then did you place that, or leave that, *340in the heater room? A. Yes, along the wall right in front of the heater. Q. All right. And this is the heater shown on Exhibit D-2? A. Yes. . . .”
The employee testified on cross-examination as follows: “Q. Now, the cardboard boxes that you’re referring to along the wall, were they near the incinerator or were they near the wall where the gas meter was? A. They were along the wall right in front of the incinerator. . . . Q. . . . where was the door that was used to come in and out of the incinerator room? Was it near the incinerator or near the gas meter? A. Yes, near the incinerator. . . .
“Q. Would it be necessary for you to walk completely across the room to put ashes in a box across underneath the gas meter? Would you have to walk completely across the room, or would the cardboard box near the door be more convenient? A. No, near the door. I emptied it in the box near the door. Q. Did you at any time ever put any ashes in a cardboard box under a gas meter? A. No, I didn’t. . . .
“Q. Did you ever dust it or touch it or do anything about it? A. No, I didn’t go that far back. Q. Do you know what was even there? A. No, I don’t. Just a table, that’s all. . . .
“Q. What procedure did you follow then? A. Well, when I first went in I always checked the incinerator, you know, see had anyone burned any trash that day, you know. . . .
“Q. What did you do then with what was in there then? A. I pulled the bottom tray out and I checked the ashes, you know, stirred to see was it cold. If it be cold I would pour the ashes in the box. Q. The ashes from the day before? These ashes were from *341May the 6th, the day before, is that correct? A. Yes. Q. And were they cold ashes? A. Yes. Q. Did yon ascertain that fact? A. Yes. Q. After you had taken them out from the incinerator, where did you put them? A. I put them in the box along the wall in front of the incinerator. Q. Is that anywhere near the box referred to under the gas meter? A. No. . . .”
Redirect examination revealed that the employee determined that the ashes were cold by stirring them with his hand in order to feel if they were hot. In essence the employee viewing his entire testimony testified that (1) the ashes were cold and (2) he never put ashes in the cardboard box under the table next to the gas meter, but on the contrary deposited the ashes in a box located near the door of the heater room some ten to twelve feet away from the alleged origin of the fire. Despite this uncontradicted testimony, the court below and the majority of this Court hold that the question of defendant’s liability was for the jury’s determination, a conclusion which has absolutely no foundation in law, logic or reason. The law is quite clear in Pennsylvania with respect to uncontradicted testimony of a witness produced by a party to the action. In Evans v. Penn Mutual Life Insurance Company of Philadelphia, 322 Pa. 547, 558, 186 Atl. 133 (1936), Justice Dkew speaking for a unanimous Court enunciated the general rule with respect to the uncontradicted testimony of one’s own witness. He remarked: “. . . It is a fundamental doctrine in the common law that ordinarily a party may not, in the absence of surprise or other special circumstance, discredit his own witness or impeach his general credibility. Since a party may not cast doubt upon his witness’s veracity, he will not be heard to claim that the credibility of the witness’s uncontradicted testimony must be tested by a jury. Even where the wit*342ness is an adverse party, called as upon cross-examination, the party calling him is concluded by his testimony, if uncontradicted: Readshaw v. Montgomery, 313 Pa. 206, 209, and cases there cited. . . ."1
Plaintiffs, in their brief and at argument in an effort to circumvent the principles laid down in Evans, take the position that they produced sufficient contradictory testimony. After carefully and thoroughly perusing the record, I am unable to locate a scintilla of evidence contradicting the two essential facts testified to by defendant’s employee. In order to establish liability, it was incumbent upon the plaintiffs to demonstrate that the ashes placed in the cardboard box were indeed hot, since that was the alleged negli-gent act. However, the only evidence in this regard was the employee’s uncontradicted, unrebutted statements that he stirred the ashes and “they were cold.” Since plaintiffs are bound by the uncontradicted testimony of their own witness, it is obvious that the most important aspect of their case could not be established, namely, that defendant’s employee placed hot ashes in a cardboard box. Secondly, the employee testified, without contradiction, that he never deposited any ashes in the cardboard box under the table directly underneath the gas meter. Being bound by this testimony, plaintiffs likewise have failed to establish any nexus between the employee and the origin of the fire since there is absolutely no evidence suggesting *343that the employee actually put ashes in the particular cardboard box wherein the fire originated.
Moreover, plaintiffs seek to accomplish something which neither reason nor logic will or should permit. Here plaintiffs offer as their own witness defendant’s employee who then testified completely contrary to plaintiffs’ version of what actually transpired. Notwithstanding this uncontradicted testimony, plaintiffs still argue that their case, in any event, should be submitted to the jury since the jury could choose to disbelieve the employee and infer the opposite to be true. Thus, the jury could only find defendant’s employee negligent by inferring from what they thought was false, that the opposite was true. In other words, plaintiffs seek to bottom their entire case on the theory that the jury should be permitted to reject their own witness’ uncontradicted testimony as unworthy of belief and at the same time use the incredible testimony as positive evidence that the negative is true in order to establish the essential facts of negligence on the part of defendant. If the law were to permit a case of this nature to be submitted to the jury on that theory, it certainly would have the deleterious effect of opening the proverbial “Pandora’s box” for almost every negligence case to be submitted to the jury.
Apparently the majority of this Court fails to recognize the awesome implications and ramifications of its decision which is not only contrary to the law in this Commonwealth, but defies all sound reasoning and logical explanation. For these reasons, I find it necessary to disassociate myself from the result reached by the majority.
I dissent.

 Smith v. Price, 8 Watts 447; Bank of Nor. Liberties v. Davis, 6 W. & S. 285, 287; Stearns v. Merchants’ Bank, 53 Pa. 490, 492; Peoples Nat. Bank v. Hazard, 231 Pa. 552, 555; Dinger v. Friedman, 279 Pa. 8, “As a general rule a party who produces a witness thereby holds him out as being worthy of belief”: Henry, Pennsylvania Trial Evidence (2d ed.), §478. See Wigmore on Evidence (2d ed.), §896 et seq., for a full discussion and criticism-of this rule.