Court Opinion

ID: 9787336
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 00:15:01.766953+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:55.002823
License: Public Domain

Shearing, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I agree with the majority that the convictions of Sandra Murphy and Richard Tabish for first-degree murder, conspiracy to commit murder and/or robbery, and robbery must be reversed, but I would affirm the remaining convictions.
I agree with Justices Maupin and Leavitt that the decision not to sever the Casey counts from the Binion counts was within the district court’s discretion and did not constitute an abuse of discretion.1 However, I agree with the majority that the admission of a statement made by Binion prior to his death without any limiting instruction and the emphasis by the State on the truth of that statement are so prejudicial as to taint the convictions relating to the Binion murder.
The district court was within its discretion in admitting the testimony of Binion’s estate attorney regarding Binion’s statement to him the night before he died. The attorney testified that Binion said: “Take Sandy out of the will if she doesn’t kill me tonight. If I’m dead, you’ll know what happened.’ ’ Even though the statement is hearsay, it was admissible to show Binion’s state of mind to rebut the defense allegation that Binion may have committed suicide.2 However, Binion’s statement was clearly not admissible for the truth — namely, that if he were dead the next day, Murphy killed him. The purpose of the hearsay rule is to preserve the right of confrontation and cross-examination and to allow the jury to judge *315the credibility of the witness and the basis for the statements. If Binion had just been informed of Murphy’s affair with Tabish, it is reasonable to infer that he would have wanted to take Murphy out of his will. However, there is no indication that he had a basis for thinking she would kill him. In fact, the testimony of the people who talked to Binion, including Binion’s attorney and the attorney’s wife, indicates that Binion was casual and not in fear of his life. And if Binion had really thought he would die that night, it would be logical to infer that he would have changed his will immediately rather than putting it off to a later date.
Despite the fact that the hearsay statement was admitted for the purpose of showing Binion’s state of mind, no instruction limiting the use of the statement for that purpose was ever given. In fact, the State argued at trial that once a statement is admitted under NRS 51.105, it may be considered for its truth. That is wrong. An instruction limiting its use to consideration of Binion’s state of mind was required. In Shults v. State, this court stated: “In order for the state of mind exception to be applicable, the victim’s state of mind must be a relevant issue, the relevance must be weighed against prejudice, and a proper limiting instruction must be given or objectionable testimony deleted.”3
The district court determined that the statement was more probative than prejudicial. That determination was within the district court’s discretion.4 However, its failure to give a limiting instruction was not.
Perhaps the lack of a limiting instruction for the hearsay statement could have been considered harmless error if the evidence of murder were overwhelming, but it was not. I cannot find the admission of the hearsay statement without a limiting instruction harmless error when the State used and emphasized the truth of the statement. In closing argument, the State repeated the statement, “Take Sandy out of the will if she doesn’t kill me tonight. If I’m dead, you’ll know what happened.” The State then commented to the jury: “Truer words were never spoken.”
This use of the hearsay statement of the decedent constitutes plain error and requires reversal of the convictions for first-degree murder and conspiracy to commit murder and/or robbery.
I do not agree that the convictions for conspiracy to commit burglary and/or grand larceny, burglary and grand larceny must be reversed based on the improper admission of the hearsay statement. As to those counts, the admission of the hearsay statement without a limiting instruction was harmless error. The evidence regarding these counts relating to the taking of property was overwhelming, *316in contrast to the evidence on the homicide counts. Furthermore, the hearsay statement related strictly to a homicide, not theft.

 See Honeycutt v. State, 118 Nev. 660, 667, 56 P.3d 362, 367 (2002).

 NRS 51.105.

 96 Nev. 742, 751, 616 P.2d 388, 394 (1980).

 Petrocelli v. State, 101 Nev. 46, 52, 692 P.2d 503, 508 (1985).