Court Opinion

ID: 9915539
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-05 18:00:34.852759+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:15:32.260453
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                               FILED
                  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                             JAN 5 2024
                                                                     MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                          FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                       No. 21-10368

            Plaintiff-Appellee,                 D.C. No. 4:18-cr-00158-JD-1
 v.

DAHRYL LAMONT REYNOLDS,                         MEMORANDUM*

            Defendant-Appellant.

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Northern District of California
                    James Donato, District Judge, Presiding

                          Submitted January 3, 2024**
                           San Francisco, California

Before: MILLER, SANCHEZ, and MENDOZA, Circuit Judges.

      Defendant Dahryl Reynolds appeals the district court’s imposition of a

condition of supervised release requiring that he obtain approval from a

probation officer before knowingly associating with any person convicted of a

felony. On the Government’s motion under Federal Rule of Appellate

Procedure 27 and Ninth Circuit Rule 27-1, we stayed this appeal pending en

      *
            This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not
precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
banc proceedings in United States v. Montoya, 82 F.4th 640 (9th Cir. 2023) (en

banc). With those proceedings now concluded, we now vacate and remand to

the district court.

       1.     In Montoya, we held that “a district court must orally pronounce all

discretionary conditions of supervised release [in the presence of the defendant],

including those referred to as ‘standard’ in § 5D1.3(c) of the United States

Sentencing Guidelines Manual.” Id. at 644–45 (overruling in part United States

v. Napier, 463 F.3d 1040 (9th Cir. 2006)). To satisfy this due process

requirement, the district court can either “recite each condition it elects to

impose” or, “where the defendant has been informed of the proposed conditions

of supervised release in advance of sentencing, the court can incorporate those

conditions by reference at the hearing.” Id. at 651. “When the court states at

the sentencing hearing in the presence of the defendant that it is incorporating

by reference one or more discretionary conditions from a document or list

provided to the defendant in advance of the hearing, the defendant has a

meaningful opportunity to challenge those conditions.” Id. at 652.

       2.      At Reynolds’s sentencing hearing, the district court orally

announced that his supervised release would be subject to “all the standard

conditions of supervised release that have been adopted in this district.” As the

Government acknowledges, the district court did not recite each standard

condition of supervised release or reference any list or document provided to

Reynolds in advance of the sentencing hearing that enumerated these

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conditions. The Presentencing Report, which Reynolds received several weeks

before the hearing, did not list any proposed standard condition of supervised

release. It was only in the written judgment that Reynolds discovered the court

had imposed a felon association ban as a condition of his supervised release.

Reynolds’s due process right to be present during the pronouncement of

standard conditions of supervised release was therefore violated. Montoya, 82

F.4th at 655.

       3.       Consistent with the remedy in Montoya, we vacate the imposition

of any standard conditions of supervised release that were not orally

pronounced at the time of Reynolds’s sentencing hearing and remand to the

district court for the limited purpose of reconsidering those conditions.1 Id. at

656.

       VACATED AND REMANDED.

1
 Reynolds raises other procedural and substantive challenges to the felon
association condition. On remand, he will have an opportunity to raise these
claims before the district court in the first instance.

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