Court Opinion

ID: 9788554
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 00:59:05.093174+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:04.077171
License: Public Domain

C. JOHNSON, P.J.,
Concurring in result:
11 I concur in the Court's decision to remand this case for a new trial, due to the admission of unfairly prejudicial hearsay statements made by the victim several weeks *520before the homicide. I write separately to make a few important points about the so-called "forfeiture by wrongdoing" exception to the general ban on hearsay. First, while this exception has its roots in the common law, it has never been a part of our Evidence Code, and I believe that the Legislature should have an opportunity to consider whether such a rule is appropriate in our state. Even if such a rule were appropriate, the United States Supreme Court's recent ruling in Files v. California, - U.S. -, 128 S.Ct. 2678, 171 L.Ed.2d 488 (2008), recognizes reasonable limitations on this doe-trine, to keep it from violating the Sixth Amendment right to confront one's accusers.
T2 In Giles, the Supreme Court recognized that, as a matter of fairness, a defendant should not profit from his own wrongdoing. If he prevents a witness from testifying, then he forfeits his constitutional right to confront that witness about any out-of-court statements the witness may have made, and the same may be admitted against him. A majority of the Court in Giles found historical evidence for requiring some showing that the defendant had in mind the particular purpose of making the declarant unavailable as a witness, before the declarant's hearsay statements could be admitted under the "forfeiture by wrongdoing" exception. The exception should not be carte blanche to allow all hearsay statements made by a person that the defendant is accused of unlawfully killing.1 Any future consideration of such a rule in Oklahoma should, of course, heed the Supreme Court's interpretation in Giles. If it is the intent of the majority to judicially adopt this hearsay exception, it should give the trial courts of this State guidance in how to evaluate and apply the doctrine.2

. The State's argument in favor of admissibility goes thus: "If Defendant wanted to confront [the declarant] as a witness in a court of law regarding her statements of December 18, 2003, to the 911 operator and police, he should not have murdered her." (Appellee's Brief at 20) Obviously, whether the defendant murdered the de-clarant is the whole point of the trial. The circularity of such reasoning was noted by Justice Souter's separate opinion in Giles. See Giles, - U.S. at -, 128 S.Ct. at 2694 (Souter, J., concurring in part) (Equity demands something more than this near circularity before the right to confrontation is forfeited, and more is supplied by showing intent to prevent the witness from testifying").

. The "forfeiture by wrongdoing" exception found in the Federal Rules of Evidence (Rule 804(b)(6)) was added in 1997. It makes an exception from the general ban on hearsay for "[a] statement offered against a party thal has engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing that was intended to, and did, procure the unavailability of the declarant as a witness." The exception applies to all parties, including the government. Comments to this rule indicate that the court should evaluate the admissibility of such statements under a preponderance-of-evidence standard.