Court Opinion

ID: 9717595
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:06:39.856874+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:54.198851
License: Public Domain

NIGRO, Justice,
dissenting.
I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that when Appellant was placed in the officer’s patrol car, he was not illegally arrested. Since I find that Appellant was arrested and that the arresting officer did not have probable cause, I believe the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s motion to suppress.
This Court has recognized that there are three categories of interaction between citizens and the police. As explained in Commonwealth v. Ellis, 541 Pa. 285, 293-94, 662 A.2d 1043, 1047-48 (1995):
The first of these is a “mere encounter” (or request for information) which need not be supported by any level of suspicion, but carries no official compulsion to stop or to respond. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983); Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991). The second, an “investigative detention” must be supported by a reasonable suspicion; it subjects a suspect to a stop and a period of detention, but does not involve such coercive conditions as *111to constitute the functional equivalent of an arrest. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Finally, an arrest or “custodial detention” must be supported by probable cause. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979); Commonwealth v. Rodriquez, 532 Pa. 62, 614 A.2d 1378 (1992)(footnote omitted).
As recognized by the majority, an arrest is an act that indicates an intention to take a person into custody or that subjects the person to the will and control of the person making the arrest. Commonwealth v. Lovette, 498 Pa. 665, 671, 450 A.2d 975, 978 (1982). Probable cause to arrest exists where the facts and circumstances within the police officer’s knowledge, and of which the officer has reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been committed. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964); Commonwealth v. Powers, 484 Pa. 198, 201, 398 A.2d 1013, 1014 (1979).
The majority states that a police officer saw Appellant four times between 1:15 a.m. and 1:45 a.m. in a high crime area in which he had worked for ten years. The officer testified that while he knew most of the people who frequented the area, Appellant was not familiar. The officer further testified that a burglary had been reported and that Appellant had a knapsack with something sticking out of it. He stated that each time he approached Appellant in his car, Appellant walked away from him. The fourth time the officer saw Appellant, he stopped him and asked for identification. Appellant told the officer his name and said that his identification was in his knapsack. Appellant took off the knapsack and the officer frisked him. The officer testified that he believed Appellant was going to flee because he kept moving his head. As a result, he placed Appellant inside his patrol car. The officer then called for back-up assistance and retrieved Appellant’s identification from his knapsack. The back-up officer arrived, and when they saw Appellant try to get out of the car, they handcuffed him. The officer then ran Appellant’s name *112through the Pennsylvania Crime Information Center and learned he had outstanding bench warrants.
Contrary to the majority, I do not find that the officer’s placement of Appellant in his patrol car was part of an investigative detention. The officer was justified in stopping Appellant based upon a reasonable suspicion that crime was afoot. The officer properly asked Appellant for identification. In addition, the officer lawfully frisked Appellant to dispel a concern for his safety. He found no weapon on Appellant’s person. When Appellant was then placed in the patrol car and handcuffed, he was under arrest. Appellant was taken into the officer’s custody and subjected to his will and control.
Since an arrest occurred, probable cause was required. However, when Appellant was placed inside the car, he was not engaged in any act that would cause a person of reasonable caution to believe that he committed a crime. The report of a burglary and the officer’s belief that Appellant looked suspicious did not justify arresting Appellant. Thus, probable cause was lacking and Appellant was illegally arrested. While Appellant could have been lawfully arrested after the officer learned that he had outstanding bench warrants, the officer was not free to detain Appellant while he investigated his identity. Once Appellant produced identification, he was free to go.1
The trial court also found that Appellant was arrested when he was placed in the police car but found this fact of no moment because no search took place until after probable cause to arrest him had been established based upon the discovery of the outstanding bench warrants. The trial court improperly justified the subsequent search based upon probable cause obtained during an illegal arrest. Accordingly, the trial court erred in denying the suppression motion.
Justice ZAPPALA joins in the dissenting opinion.

. The majority's conclusion would appear to entail that if information about Appellant was not readily available through the Pennsylvania Crime Information Center, the officer could have legally detained him in his car while he investigated his identity. Allowing such a detention goes well beyond a lawful investigative stop.