Court Opinion

ID: 9925624
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-22 16:00:25.180122+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:18.737839
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     PAMELA N. ADAMS,                                DOCKET NUMBER
                  Appellant,                         DC-0752-23-0426-I-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS                          DATE: January 19, 2024
       AFFAIRS,
                 Agency.

               THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Amanda Stevens , Richmond, Virginia, for the appellant.

           Michael J.A. Klein , Esquire, Baltimore, Maryland, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member

                                     REMAND ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     dismissed her alleged involuntary resignation appeal for lack of Board
     jurisdiction. For the reasons discussed below, we GRANT the appellant’s petition
     for review, VACATE the initial decision, and REMAND the case to the

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                          2

     Washington Regional Office for further adjudication in accordance with this
     Remand Order.

                                       BACKGROUND
¶2         On April 20, 2023, the appellant, a former GS-11 Respiratory Therapist,
     filed an initial appeal with the Board, indicating that she was appealing her
     involuntary resignation and demotion from Lead Respiratory Therapist. Initial
     Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 4. She filed her appeal via facsimile and, at that
     time, her designated representative did not register to be an e-filer. Id. at 7.
¶3         The administrative judge issued an order to show cause, notifying the
     appellant of her burden of proof to establish jurisdiction over her constructive
     resignation claim; however, the order did not notify her of her burden to establish
     a constructive demotion.     IAF, Tab 3 at 1-3.     According to the certificate of
     service, the appellant was served a copy of the order via U.S. Mail and her
     representative was served via electronic mail. Id. at 5. Neither party responded
     to the order to show cause. Without holding the appellant’s requested hearing,
     the administrative judge issued an initial decision dismissing the appeal for lack
     of jurisdiction. IAF, Tab 1 at 2, Tab 5, Initial Decision (ID) at 1, 7.
¶4         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision. 2 Petition
     for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1. On review, the appellant’s representative alleges
     that neither she nor the appellant received the administrative judge’s order to
     show cause because they were not registered as e-filers. Id. at 6; PFR File, Tab 4
     at 5. She also submits information and documentation regarding the merits of the
     appellant’s involuntary resignation and constructive demotion claims. PFR File,
     Tab 4 at 6-7.    The agency has responded to the petition for review and the
     appellant has replied. PFR File, Tabs 3-4.

     2
       On review, the appellant filed a new appeal via e-Appeal Online and registered as an
     e-filer. PFR File, Tab 1 at 2.
                                                                                           3

                        DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
¶5         On review, the appellant alleges that neither she nor her representative
     received   the   administrative   judge’s   order    to   show   cause   because    her
     representative was improperly served via e-Appeal, despite not being registered
     as an e-filer. PFR File, Tab 1 at 6, Tab 4 at 5. Electronic service of the Board’s
     issuances is only appropriate for properly registered e-filers who affirmatively
     consent to electronic service.     See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.14(e)(1)-(2) (noting that
     registration as an e-filer constitutes consent to accept electronic service and that
     the exclusive means for registering as an e-filer is to do so through e-Appeal
     Online), (j)(1) (identifying that paper copies of Board issuances are not ordinarily
     served on registered e-filers), (j)(3) (noting that registered e -filers are responsible
     for monitoring case activity in the e-Appeal Online Repository to ensure that they
     have received all case-related documents). The record below does not contain the
     representative’s affirmative consent to accept electronic service; therefore, the
     administrative judge’s order to show cause was improperly served on the
     appellant’s representative electronically.       IAF, Tab 1 at 7, Tab 3 at 5.
     Accordingly, because the issue of jurisdiction is always before the Board and may
     be raised at any time during a Board proceeding, we will consider the appellant’s
     newly raised evidence and arguments on review.            Poole v. Department of the
     Army, 117 M.S.P.R. 516, ¶ 9 (2012) (finding that the issue of jurisdiction is
     always before the Board and may be raised at any time during a Board
     proceeding).

     The appellant has alleged facts that, if true, could establish that she was subjected
     to a constructive demotion.
¶6         The Board’s jurisdiction is limited to those matters over which it has been
     given jurisdiction by law, rule, or regulation.           Maddox v. Merit Systems
     Protection Board, 759 F.2d 9, 10 (Fed. Cir. 1985). An appellant is entitled to a
     jurisdictional hearing only if she makes a nonfrivolous allegation of Board
     jurisdiction. Francis v. Department of the Air Force, 120 M.S.P.R. 138, ¶ 14
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     (2013). A nonfrivolous allegation of Board jurisdiction is an allegation of fact
     that, if proven, could establish that the Board has jurisdiction over the matter at
     issue. Id.; 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(s).
¶7        On review, the appellant alleges for the first time that she was subjected to a
     constructive demotion because the agency reassigned her to a “lesser position,”
     and then the agency converted her former position to a higher grade. PFR File,
     Tab 4 at 6-7.     As mentioned above, although the appellant generally alleged
     below that she was demoted and required to work in a higher-graded position
     without compensation, the administrative judge did not give the appellant notice
     of the standard for establishing jurisdiction over a constructive demotion claim,
     nor did he address a constructive demotion claim in his initial decision. IAF,
     Tab 1 at 4; ID at 5.      Therefore, we consider the appellant’s evidence and
     arguments and find that the appellant has nonfrivolously alleged facts that, if
     proven, could establish that the Board has jurisdiction over her constructive
     demotion claim.
¶8        In support of her involuntary resignation and constructive demotion claim,
     the appellant, through her representative, certifies the following on review. In
     March 2021, her agency underwent a reorganization. PFR File, Tab 4 at 6. Prior
     to the reorganization, she was a GS-9 Lead Respiratory Therapist and alleges that
     “typically non-lead Respiratory Therapists [were] at the GS-8 level.”       Id. On
     March 14, 2021, the agency “initiated a national promotion event that was
     supposed to convert all the Respiratory Therapists to the GS[-]11 level, and all
     Lead Respiratory Therapists to the GS-12 level.” PFR File, Tab 4 at 6. From
     March 14, 2021, through February 8, 2023, she claims she was “reassigned” to a
     GS-11 Respiratory Therapist position because she was “coded” as a GS-11
     Respiratory Therapist, instead of a GS-12, even though she continued to perform
     the duties of a Lead Respiratory Therapist. Id. at 6-7. On May 31, 2022, the
     Chief of Service told the appellant that “the Leads . . . positions have to be
     re-announced” and “those who are already in these positions will have to
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     re-apply.” Id. at 7, 9. The appellant further alleges that on unspecified dates she
     reapplied for the Lead Respiratory Therapist position, was not selected, suffered a
     loss in pay and a hostile work environment, and eventually resigned.      Id. at 7;
     IAF, Tab 1 at 4, 6.
¶9        A reassignment without loss of grade or pay is not appealable to the Board.
     Marcheggiani v. Department of Defense, 90 M.S.P.R. 212, ¶ 7 (2001). A narrow
     exception exists when an employee is deemed to have suffered a constructive
     demotion and she is assigned from a position which, due to issuance of a new
     classification standard or correction of a classification error, was worth a higher
     grade, the employee met the legal and qualification requirements for promotion to
     the higher grade, and she was permanently reassigned to a position classified at a
     grade level lower than the grade level to which she would otherwise have been
     promoted. Russell v. Department of the Navy, 6 M.S.P.R. 698, 711 (1981). In
     Russell, the appellant was reassigned from the position of GS-11, Supervisory
     Employee Development Specialist to a GS-11, Employee Development Specialist.
     Russell, 6 M.S.P.R. 698, 700. Five months later, the agency established a GS-12
     Supervisor Employee Development Specialist position, for which the appellant
     was not selected. Id. at 701. The appellant alleged that the GS-11, Supervisory
     Employee Development Specialist he held prior to his reassignment and the
     GS-12 position were identical and that he was constructively reduced in grade
     because the original GS-11 position he held should have been classified at GS-12.
     Id. Similarly, here the appellant has nonfrivolously alleged that her Lead position
     was reclassified upward to a GS-12, she is entitled to a noncompetitive promotion
     to the higher-graded GS-12 Lead position because she successfully performed
     Lead duties and allegedly continued to perform Lead duties even after the
     reorganization, and she was reassigned to the GS-11 position at a grade level
     lower than the GS-12 grade level to which she would otherwise have been
     promoted.    Thus, we find that the Board may exercise jurisdiction over her
     constructive demotion claim. See Marcheggiani, 90 M.S.P.R. 212, ¶¶ 8-9 (stating
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      that the Board may exercise its jurisdiction in a constructive demotion appeal
      only when a position actually has been reclassified upward and the employee
      claims entitlement to a noncompetitive promotion to the higher-graded position);
      Burrell v. Environmental Protection Agency , 81 M.S.P.R. 427, ¶ 17 (1999)
      (finding that an employee raised a nonfrivolous allegation of constructive
      demotion when he asserted that his GM-13 position was upgraded to GS-14,
      without a significant change in duties or responsibilities, at the time he was
      reassigned to another position).

      We decline to disturb the administrative judge’s finding that the appellant failed
      to nonfrivolously allege jurisdiction over her involuntary resignation claim.
¶10         On review, the appellant generally challenges the administrative judge’s
      finding that the appellant failed to establish jurisdiction over her involuntary
      resignation claim. PFR File, Tab 1 at 5; ID at 5-7. As mentioned above, she
      claims that she did not receive the administrative judge’s order to show cause,
      which gave her notice of her jurisdictional burden with respect to her involuntary
      resignation claim. PFR File, Tab 1 at 6. However, the appellant received the
      administrative judge’s initial decision, which also contained this notice.       ID
      at 3-5;   see Parker   v. Department of Housing and Urban Development ,
      106 M.S.P.R. 329, ¶¶ 7-8 (2007) (stating that an administrative judge’s failure to
      provide an appellant with specific notice of his jurisdictional burden can be cured
      if the agency’s pleadings or the initial decision contain the required notice). Even
      after considering the appellant’s submissions on review, we discern no basis to
      disturb the administrative judge’s finding that the appellant failed to establish
      jurisdiction over her involuntary resignation claim.
¶11         A resignation is presumed to be voluntary, and thus outside the Board’s
      jurisdiction, unless the employee presents sufficient evidence to establish that the
      action was obtained through duress or coercion or shows that a reasonable person
      would have been misled by the agency. Searcy v. Department of Commerce,
      114 M.S.P.R. 281, ¶ 12 (2010). An appellant claiming that her resignation is
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      involuntary is entitled to a hearing on jurisdiction only if she makes nonfrivolous
      allegations casting doubt on the presumption of voluntariness. Id., ¶ 10. The
      touchstone of the voluntariness analysis is whether, considering the totality of the
      circumstances, factors operated on the employee’s decision-making process that
      deprived her of freedom of choice. Id. Intolerable working conditions may
      render an action involuntary if the employee demonstrates that the employer or
      agency engaged in a course of action that made working conditions so difficult or
      unpleasant that a reasonable person in the employee’s position would have felt
      compelled to resign.     Searcy, 114 M.S.P.R. 281, ¶ 12; see Middleton v.
      Department of Defense, 185 F.3d 1374, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (explaining that a
      determination as to whether an employee’s resignation was coerced is based on an
      objective test). The Board will consider claims of discrimination and harassment
      only insofar as those allegations relate to the issue of voluntariness. Brown v.
      U.S. Postal Service, 115 M.S.P.R. 609, ¶ 10, aff’d per curiam, 469 F. App’x 852
      (Fed. Cir. 2011).
¶12        Other than alleging that the agency constructively demoted her and
      subjected her to a “hostile” environment, the appellant does not allege facts that
      would show that her work conditions were so intolerable that she had no choice
      but to resign. PFR File, Tab 1 at 17. Even if we accept as true the appellant’s
      allegations that she was improperly reassigned to a GS-11 position and that the
      agency continued to “have [her] working at a higher graded duty without
      compensation,” such an allegation is insufficient to establish that her resignation
      was involuntary.    Dissatisfaction with work assignments, a feeling of being
      unfairly criticized, or difficult or unpleasant working conditions are generally not
      so intolerable as to compel a reasonable person to resign. Miller v. Department of
      Defense, 85 M.S.P.R. 310, 322 (2000).      Moreover, though the appellant alleges
      that she served in her reassignment for almost 2 years, she did not allege that she
      attempted to exhaust any remedial avenues prior to resigning. Because she could
      have remained in her position and contested the validity of the agency’s actions
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      but chose not to, we agree with the administrative judge that she has failed to
      nonfrivolously allege that her resignation was involuntary.        See Brown, 115
      M.S.P.R. 609, ¶ 15; cf. Heining v. General Services Administration, 68 M.S.P.R.
      513, 523 (1995) (finding an involuntary resignation after the appellant offered
      overwhelming evidence supporting an intolerable working environment and did
      not resign until she pursued many grievances and two complaints, receiving an
      adverse decision on her grievances just prior to her resignation).        Thus, we
      decline to disturb the administrative judge’s finding that the appellant failed to
      establish jurisdiction over her involuntary resignation claim.

                                           ORDER
¶13        For the reasons discussed above, we remand this case to the Washington
      Regional Office for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.
      On remand, the administrative judge shall permit the parties to conduct discovery
      and submit additional evidence and argument and shall afford the appellant a
      jurisdictional hearing on the appellant’s claim of a constructive demotion. If the
      administrative judge finds that the Board has jurisdiction over that claim, he shall
      adjudicate the merits of that claim.        In his remand initial decision, the
      administrative judge may adopt his prior finding that the appellant failed to
      establish jurisdiction over her involuntary resignation claim.

      FOR THE BOARD:                         ______________________________
                                             Jennifer Everling
                                             Acting Clerk of the Board
      Washington, D.C.