Court Opinion

ID: 9961635
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-19 14:07:54.92017+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:21:13.047118
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: APRIL 12, 2024; 10:00 A.M.
                   TO BE PUBLISHED

          Commonwealth of Kentucky
                    Court of Appeals
                     NO. 2022-CA-0686-MR

CHRISTOPHER SMITH                                  APPELLANT

          APPEAL FROM HENDERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v.        HONORABLE KAREN LYNN WILSON, JUDGE
                  ACTION NO. 16-CR-00166

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                            APPELLEE

AND

                     NO. 2022-CA-0687-MR

CHRISTOPHER SMITH                                  APPELLANT

          APPEAL FROM HENDERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v.        HONORABLE KAREN LYNN WILSON, JUDGE
                  ACTION NO. 16-CR-00271

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                            APPELLEE

                        OPINION
                  AFFIRMING IN PART,
           REVERSING IN PART, AND REMANDING

                        ** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ACREE, CALDWELL, AND LAMBERT, JUDGES.

CALDWELL, JUDGE: Christopher Smith (Smith) appeals from the Henderson

Circuit Court order finding him competent, revoking his probation, and imposing a

ten (10) year sentence of imprisonment. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and

remand for proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

                                      FACTS

             In April of 2016, Smith was indicted by the Henderson County Grand

Jury on various drug offenses and being a persistent felony offender (PFO) in the

first degree. At arraignment, counsel raised the question of whether Smith was

competent to stand trial as he had previously been found to be incompetent

pursuant to a court order for a competency evaluation. This competency

evaluation determination counsel was referring to also came with a determination

that Smith would likely not be able to gain competency in the future.

             As the most recent evaluation provided to the court was completed

several years earlier, the trial court desired a more current evaluation be conducted

and ordered Smith evaluated once more. Smith was then evaluated by Dr. Steven

Sparks (Dr. Sparks) of the Kentucky Correctional Psychiatric Center (KCPC). Dr.

Sparks’ report stated he was not able to come to a conclusion about whether Smith

was competent to stand trial because he believed Smith was malingering.

Regardless, Dr. Sparks opined Smith was likely competent.

                                         -2-
             Smith ultimately entered a guilty plea to various drug offenses in

exchange for dismissal of the PFO charge and was sentenced to ten (10) years’

imprisonment. Contemporaneously, he entered a guilty plea to unrelated third-

degree assault case and was sentenced to five (5) years, to run concurrently with

the ten (10) year sentence for a total sentence of ten (10) years. At the time of the

entry of this plea, counsel stated having no concerns about Smith’s competency.

Shortly thereafter, his sentence was suspended by the court and he was placed on

five (5) years’ probation.

             Approximately one year later, Smith was indicted on new drug

charges. His probation officer also informed the court Smith violated his probation

by failing to complete drug treatment and by using synthetic marijuana. Smith

admitted the violations and his probation was revoked, though he was soon granted

five (5) years’ shock probation. The trial court ordered Smith to remain

incarcerated until a bed could be found for him in a drug rehabilitation facility.

When no bed could be located because there were other charges pending against

Smith, he was released on home incarceration in November of 2018.

             Four months later a warrant was issued for Smith’s arrest for

probation violation when he failed a drug test, testing positive for marijuana. The

trial court ordered Smith be again evaluated for competency. Following evaluation

                                         -3-
both at KCPC and by a defense expert, a competency hearing was held. The

matter was dismissed after the trial court found Smith not competent to stand trial.

             In August of 2019, Smith again picked up new charges – a DUI and

possession of a controlled substance, cocaine – in Hopkins County. A motion was

filed seeking revocation of probation in Henderson County based upon the fact

Smith was criminally charged in Hopkins County. The Henderson Circuit Court

opted to wait until competency proceedings had been conducted in Hopkins

County before taking any action as to the revocation.

             In July of 2020, the Henderson Circuit Court, relying upon

evaluations and actions taken as part of the Hopkins County case, found Smith

competent. Counsel filed a motion to reconsider, which was denied. However in

May of 2021, as Hopkins County had not yet held a competency hearing despite

the completion of the KCPC evaluation, the Henderson Circuit Court ordered

Smith to be again evaluated for competency.

             Following evaluations by Dr. Sparks of KCPC and defense expert Dr.

Eric Drogin (Dr. Drogin), a competency hearing was conducted in March of 2022.

Though Dr. Sparks performed an evaluation of Smith, he was once again unable to

provide the court with an opinion as to Smith’s competency. Dr. Drogin, citing

with particularity Smith’s limited intellectual functioning and the intractable nature

                                         -4-
of his chronic developmental disability, provided his professional opinion Smith

was not competent and unlikely to regain competency.

               Following the hearing, the Henderson Circuit Court found Smith

competent. The court later revoked his probation. It is from this latest

determination of his competency and the subsequent revocation of probation Smith

now appeals.1 We affirm in part and reverse in part and remand this matter back to

the Henderson Circuit Court.

1
  Smith also argues he was not criminally responsible for the offenses charged, due again to his
mental health and developmental disabilities. We need not reach this argument at the present
time, due to our holding as explained herein. Criminal responsibility is a defense to a criminal
prosecution and is a jury question, not a threshold question for the court, as is competency. See
Powell v. Graham, 185 S.W.3d 624, 632 (Ky. 2006). Should Smith face revocation after
proceedings consistent with this Opinion, he could forward the defense again at that time. As
this Court observed in Smith’s prior appeal concerning a previous probation revocation:

                       If, however, the court determines that Smith was not
               criminally responsible for his probation violations, it should
               consider whether the lack of criminal responsibility, under the
               circumstances of this case, is a defense to his probation violations,
               is not a defense to his probation violations, or is simply a
               mitigating factor to be considered in the revocation determination,
               and issue a revocation determination accordingly.

Smith v. Commonwealth, No. 2006-CA-002206-MR, 2007 WL 2745378, at *5 (Ky. App. Sep.
21, 2007).

        Smith also claims the trial court did not comply with Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS)
439.3106 in revoking probation. Again, as we are reversing for competency procedures, it is not
necessary to determine whether the trial court complied with the statute in revoking as we hold
herein the trial court erred in conducting the probation revocation hearing without properly
considering competency.

                                                -5-
                           STANDARD OF REVIEW

             A trial court’s determination as to the competency of an accused must

be supported by substantial evidence.

             “A competency determination is based on the
             preponderance of the evidence standard.” Chapman v.
             Commonwealth, 265 S.W.3d 156, 174 (Ky. 2007). We
             review a trial court’s finding of competency for clear
             error and will reverse only if it is not supported by
             substantial evidence. Id.
Jackson v. Commonwealth, 319 S.W.3d 347, 349 (Ky. 2010). “Since the trial

judge’s conclusion was supported by substantial evidence, it was not clearly

erroneous. Plumb v. Commonwealth, Ky., 490 S.W.2d 729, 731 (1973).” Fugate

v. Commonwealth, 62 S.W.3d 15, 18 (Ky. 2001).

                                   ANALYSIS

             The threshold question raised in this case is whether a person facing

probation revocation must be competent before a revocation hearing can be held.

We hold if a court has a reasonable belief that an accused might not be competent

any time during a revocation proceeding, that court must ensure an accused is

competent prior to proceeding to a revocation hearing. We affirm the trial court’s

order seeking a competency evaluation and opinion of an expert as to Smith’s

competency under KRS 504.100.

             Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 8.06 requires a defendant

be competent during all critical stages of the proceedings against him:

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                      If upon arraignment or during the proceedings
               there are reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant
               lacks the capacity to appreciate the nature and
               consequences of the proceedings against him or her, or to
               participate rationally in his or her defense, all
               proceedings shall be postponed until the issue of
               incapacity is determined as provided by KRS 504.100.

               KRS 504.100:

            (1) If upon arraignment, or during any stage of the
                proceedings, the court has reasonable grounds to believe
                the defendant is incompetent to stand trial, the court shall
                appoint at least one (1) psychologist or psychiatrist to
                examine, treat and report on the defendant’s mental
                condition.

            (2) The report of the psychologist or psychiatrist shall state
                whether or not he finds the defendant incompetent to
                stand trial. If he finds the defendant is incompetent, the
                report shall state:

                  (a) Whether there is a substantial probability of his
                      attaining competency in the foreseeable future; and

                  (b) What type treatment and what type treatment
                      facility the examiner recommends.

               (3) After the filing of a report (or reports), the court shall
                   hold a hearing to determine whether or not the
                   defendant is competent to stand trial.

               The Commonwealth questions on appeal whether a competency

determination is necessary in the context of a probation revocation, citing this

Court’s unpublished opinion in Cook v. Commonwealth.2 In Cook, this Court

2
    No. 2012-CA-0163-MR, 2013 WL 4710344 (Ky. App. Aug. 30, 2013).

                                            -7-
observed, “This court is unaware of any law entitling a probationer to a

competency hearing prior to a probation revocation.” Id. at *2. Perhaps this

Opinion will ameliorate that deficit in our caselaw.

             In Nelson v. Shake, the Kentucky Supreme Court held a reasonable

interpretation of RCr 8.06’s use of the word “proceedings” would encompass post-

indictment proceedings, holding there is no right to a competency hearing prior to

Grand Jury proceedings. 82 S.W.3d 914, 916 (Ky. 2002). The Court held, “A

proceeding of the Grand Jury does not fall within RCr 8.06 because the

competency of an individual is irrelevant to indictment.” Id. Further, the Court

held RCr 8.06 “relates to a defendant’s ability to rationally participate in his

defense.” While a potential defendant possesses no right to present evidence

before a Grand Jury, one is entitled to due process in a probation revocation, and

the ability of the probationer to assist in his defense is meaningful.

             Coincidentally, in a prior opinion of this Court considering whether

Smith’s prior probationary period was properly revoked in 2006, this explanation

of the due process rights of a probationer was provided:

                   A probationer is not entitled to the full panoply of
             due process rights required for criminal prosecutions.
             Marshall v. Commonwealth, 638 S.W.2d 288, 289 (Ky.
             App. 1982). The United States Supreme Court set out
             the minimum due process rights for parole revocation
             proceedings in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.
             Ct. 2593, 33 L. Ed. 2d 484 (1972). These rights were
             subsequently held to be equally applicable to probation

                                          -8-
            revocation proceedings. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S.
            778, 782, 93 S. Ct. 1756, 1759-60, 36 L. Ed. 2d 656
            (1973). Those minimum due process requirements are:

                   (a) written notice of the claimed violations of
                   (probation or) parole; (b) disclosure to the
                   (probationer or) parolee of evidence against him;
                   (c) opportunity to be heard in person and to present
                   witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right
                   to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses
                   (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good
                   cause for not allowing confrontation); (e) a
                   “neutral and detached” hearing body such as a
                   traditional parole board, members of which need
                   not be judicial officers or lawyers; and (f) a written
                   statement by the factfinders as to the evidence
                   relied on and reasons for revoking (probation or)
                   parole.

            Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 786, 93 S. Ct. at 1761-62, quoting
            from Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489, 92 S. Ct. at 2604.

                   Further “[i]t is clear in this Commonwealth that
            probation is a privilege rather than a right.” Brown v.
            Commonwealth, 564 S.W.2d 21 (Ky. App. 1977).”
            Kentucky courts have repeatedly held that there is no
            constitutional right to [probation or] parole, but rather
            [they are] matter[s] of legislative grace or executive
            clemency.” Land v. Commonwealth, 986 S.W.2d 440,
            442 (Ky. 1999); Tiryung v. Commonwealth, 717 S.W.2d
            503 (Ky. App. 1986).

Smith, 2007 WL 2745378, at *2-3.

            While probation may be a matter of grace, the clear language of

Gagnon, supra, indicates competency is nonetheless implicated in revocation

proceedings. Items (b), (c), and (d), listed by the United States Supreme Court in

                                         -9-
Gagnon clearly contemplate the probationer be able to assist counsel in preparing a

defense to the revocation.3

              Our Supreme Court has recognized it is this ability to assist counsel in

preparing a defense which strikes at the heart of a competency determination, i.e.,

if one is not competent to stand trial, it is in large measure because one is unable to

assist his counsel in a meaningful manner. In Bishop v. Caudill, the Court

provided a cogent explanation of the need for competency in any proceeding

3
              It has long been accepted that a person whose mental condition is
              such that he lacks the capacity to understand the nature and object
              of the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to
              assist in preparing his defense may not be subjected to a trial.
              Thus, Blackstone wrote that one who became ‘mad’ after the
              commission of an offense should not be arraigned for it ‘because
              he is not able to plead to it with that advice and caution that he
              ought.’ Similarly, if he became ‘mad’ after pleading, he should not
              be tried, ‘for how can he make his defense?’ 4 W. Blackstone
              Commentaries, *24, See Youtsey v. United States, 97 F. 937, 940-
              946 (CA6 1899). Some have viewed the common-law prohibition
              ‘as a by-product of the ban against trials in absentia; the mentally
              incompetent defendant, though physically present in the
              courtroom, is in reality afforded no opportunity to defend himself.’
              Foote, A Comment on Pre-Trial Commitment of Criminal
              Defendants, 108 U.Pa.L.Rev. 832, 834 (1960). See Thomas v.
              Cunningham, 313 F.2d 934, 938 (CA4 1963). For our purposes, it
              suffices to note that the prohibition is fundamental to an adversary
              system of justice. See generally Note, Incompetency to Stand Trial,
              81 Harv.L.Rev. 455, 457-459 (1967). Accordingly, as to federal
              cases, we have approved a test of incompetence which seeks to
              ascertain whether a criminal defendant “has sufficient present
              ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of
              rational understanding – and whether he has a rational as well as
              factual understanding of the proceedings against him.” Dusky v.
              United States, [362 U.S. 402], 80 S. Ct. 788, 4 L. Ed. 2d 824
              [(1960)].

Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171-72, 95 S. Ct. 896, 903-04, 43 L. Ed. 2d 103 (1975).

                                             -10-
wherein evidence is adduced and factual allegations are forwarded, like a probation

revocation proceeding:

            As further explained by Professors Fortune and Lawson
            in Kentucky Criminal Law, § 5-4(b) p. 210 (Lexis 1998):

                   The focus in these determinations is on the
                   defendant’s mental condition at the time of the
                   proceeding (not at the time of the criminal act).
                   The following statement describes the nature of the
                   inquiry:

                         ‘Under this test, there are two distinct
                         matters to be determined:

                             (1) whether the defendant is sufficiently
                                 coherent to provide his counsel with
                                 information necessary or relevant to
                                 constructing a defense; and

                             (2) whether he is able to comprehend the
                                 significance of the trial and his
                                 relation to it. The defendant must
                                 have an ‘ability to confer
                                 intelligently, to testify coherently, and
                                 to follow the evidence presented.’ It
                                 is necessary that the defendant have a
                                 rational as well as a factual
                                 understanding of the proceedings.’

                    Would defendant recognize false testimony by a
            witness and would he know to advise counsel of that
            fact? Does he understand the roles of trial participants
            (i.e. that the prosecutor is his adversary, that the judge
            decides his fate, that his counsel acts in his best interest,
            etc.)? Does he understand that convictions will result in
            sanctions? The inquiry is a factual one that necessarily
            depends upon the peculiar facts and circumstances of the

                                        -11-
             case. (quoting LaFave & Scott, Criminal Law, 333-34
             (2d ed.1986)).

118 S.W.3d 159, 163 (Ky. 2003).

             During a probation revocation proceeding, witnesses will testify

against the interests of the probationer. Further, there may be factual allegations

lofted of which the probationer may possess particular knowledge. In this regard,

the importance of competency becomes clear. The ability to assist counsel and

appreciate the proceedings is essential where, as here, there are allegations of the

commission of new offenses which provide a basis, or partial basis, for the motion

to revoke. In such cases, assisting counsel and understanding the proceedings is

vital. The probationer must be competent, lest his incompetence lead not only to

revocation, but possibly to additional criminal convictions.

             Having now held a trial court has a responsibility to ensure

competency before conducting a probation revocation hearing, we affirm the trial

court’s act in the present case of ordering an evaluation of competency before

proceeding with revocation. We now move to a review of the trial court’s

determination as to competency in the present case.

             The KCPC report provided pursuant to the trial court’s order in this

matter offered no opinion as to Smith’s competency, though Dr. Sparks indicated

in his report he “strongly suspected” Smith was competent. Such report fails to

assist the court and fails to meet the requirements of KRS 504.100.

                                         -12-
             The language of the statute is clear. The expert appointed by the trial

court to assist it in determining competency is required to provide the court with

an opinion as to competency. KRS 504.100(2) (“The report of the psychologist or

psychiatrist shall state whether or not he finds the defendant incompetent to stand

trial.”) (emphasis added). Indeed, the Kentucky Supreme Court has held the

requirement of a finding is compulsory as to the expert appointed by the court to

provide an evaluation.

                    We would agree that the language of subsection
             (2) requires a specific finding of competency. However,
             in reading the statute as a whole, we believe the
             requirements of specificity in subsection (2) apply only
             to the report of the court-appointed neutral expert, and
             not to the defendant’s independent expert. The language
             of subsection (2) is clearly in reference to the court-
             appointed psychologist or psychiatrist in subsection (1),
             and applies to the report from that examiner, who is
             working for the court and not the defense or the
             prosecution.
Commonwealth v. Wooten, 269 S.W.3d 857, 863 (Ky. 2008) (citation omitted).

             The report of Dr. Sparks, appointed by the court in this matter to assist

it in determining Smith’s competency, fails to comply with the statute. As such,

the report fails to meet the requirements of the statute. It was clear error for the

trial court to consider a report which does not meet the requirements of the statute

and it was error to conduct a competency hearing without having a proper report of

the appointed expert in hand.

                                         -13-
                The trial court erred in making a competency determination without a

statutorily compliant report before it. We hold it would have been error for the

trial court to have relied solely upon the report of defense expert. Although Dr.

Drogin determined Smith was incompetent, as an expert hired by the defense, he is

not neutral. The report of a defense expert does not meet the requirements of the

statute.

                Prosecution of a person who is not competent to stand trial offends

due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment. Medina v. California, 505

U.S. 437, 439, 112 S. Ct. 2572, 2574, 120 L. Ed. 2d 353 (1992); Henderson v.

Commonwealth, 563 S.W.3d 651, 664 (Ky. 2018). The trial court erred when it

ruled on Smith’s competency without having a report complying with KRS

504.100(2) before it. Because there was no complying report before the trial court,

there was a lack of substantial evidence to support the competency determination,

which renders the determination clear error.4

4
    See Moore v. Asente, 110 S.W.3d 336, 354 (Ky. 2003):

         And, the dispositive question that we must answer, therefore, is whether the trial court’s
         findings of fact are clearly erroneous, i.e., whether or not those findings are supported by
         substantial evidence. “[S]ubstantial evidence” is “[e]vidence that a reasonable mind
         would accept as adequate to support a conclusion” and evidence that, when “taken alone
         or in the light of all the evidence, . . . has sufficient probative value to induce conviction
         in the minds of reasonable men.”

(Footnote omitted.)

                                                  -14-
             The statute requires the court, having reason to question the

competency of an accused and having entered an order seeking an expert opinion

on competency, cannot proceed to hold a competency hearing until that report has

been provided. See Padgett v. Commonwealth, 312 S.W.3d 336 (Ky. 2010);5

Woolfolk v. Commonwealth, 339 S.W.3d 411 (Ky. 2011), as corrected (Apr. 27,

2011).6

                                     CONCLUSION

             The trial court properly ordered an evaluation of Smith’s competency

be conducted pursuant to KRS 504.100 and RCr 8.06 before considering the

motion to revoke his probation. However, when the expert failed to return a report

which complied with the dictates of KRS 504.100(2), the trial court erred in

proceeding to the competency hearing and entering a finding as to competency.

5
             In contrast, the statutory right to a hearing requires only that, once
             an exam and report have been ordered based on reasonable
             grounds and the report has been filed with the court, the court shall
             conduct a competency hearing. KRS 504.100(3). The obvious
             inference is that, lacking substantial evidence of incompetency,
             constitutional grounds are not implicated, though statutory grounds
             may be.

312 S.W.3d at 347.
6
             Thus, while the failure to conduct a competency hearing implicates
             constitutional protections only when “substantial evidence” of
             incompetence exists, mere “reasonable grounds” to believe the
             defendant is incompetent implicates the statutory right to an
             examination and hearing.

339 S.W.3d at 422.

                                             -15-
Only once the trial court has a report meeting the requirements of the statute, i.e.,

providing an expert opinion as to competency, may the court hold a competency

hearing and make a competency determination. The trial court committed clear

error when it proceeded without a complying report as the reception of a report

containing an expert opinion on competency is a condition precedent to proceeding

to a hearing and then a determination.

             Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s order seeking a competency

evaluation, but reverse both the holding as to competency and the ultimate

determination to revoke Smith’s probation as there was no proper determination of

his competency prior to the revocation hearing. The trial court shall first conduct a

proper competency procedure and shall only proceed to a revocation hearing after

such and a resultant finding of competency.

             ALL CONCUR.

 BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:                      BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

 Kayley V. Barnes                           Daniel Cameron
 Frankfort, Kentucky                        Attorney General of Kentucky

                                            Jenny L. Sanders
                                            Assistant Attorney General
                                            Frankfort, Kentucky

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