Court Opinion

ID: 9482323
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 08:46:38.757879+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:48:54.433122
License: Public Domain

REINHARDT, Circuit Judge,
with whom Circuit Judge PREGERSON joins,
dissenting:
Robert Alton Harris will in all likelihood be the first person to be executed in California in over twenty years — and only the second since Ronald Reagan assumed the office of Governor approximately a quarter of a century ago. I believe the opinion of this court which denies what may be Harris’ final appeal is replete with legal errors — errors that require en banc review.
I
Preliminarily, I think it important to discuss briefly one aspect of our en banc process and its relationship to the public’s right to be fully informed on the subject of capital punishment. The en banc process allows the full court the opportunity to decide whether a three-judge decision upholding a death sentence correctly construes the Constitution and correctly applies controlling legal precedent. Yet, under our court rules, when a suggestion that the court hear a case en banc is rejected we do not announce the division. All we say is that a majority of the non-recused active judges failed to vote in favor of such a hearing. That tells the public little. We do not reveal whether the vote was close or even whether a majority of the eligible judges voted against en banc review.1 Whatever the wisdom of that rule in general — and I believe the answer is that the *1540rule is wrong under all circumstances — it clearly does not serve the public interest in death penalty cases.
I believe the people have a right to know if an individual is being executed notwithstanding the fact that a substantial number of judges who have examined the constitutionality of the state’s proposed action believe further judicial review is necessary— and I believe that there is no justification for concealing the actual division in the court. There are good reasons why history should fully record the judicial votes in death penalty cases.
One of the continuing questions regarding both the propriety and constitutionality of the death penalty is whether it is arbitrary. Can the death penalty be applied in a manner that clearly and objectively separates those who should be put to death from those who are allowed to live? Is the law so clearly discernible that men and women of good will can in good conscience say — yes, a fair-minded individual would necessarily determine that the law classifies this case as one in which the taking of the defendant’s life is proper? If such an objective classification cannot be made, should we not continue to question seriously the fairness and legitimacy of the process, and its application in particular cases? Knowledge of the actual votes leading to an individual’s execution would be relevant to any attempt to answer these questions.
Ordinarily, we can tolerate the fact that the law rests on the judgment of fair-minded men and women — that law is what judges say it is. For when the law is unclear, as it often is, there is no better way of determining it than to have persons of integrity, trained in the skills of legal construction, examine the Constitution, statutes, and legal precedents and try their best to arrive at the most plausible resolution. But can we really tolerate the degree of subjectivity and built-in possibility of error inherent in such a system when deciding whether the state should take the life of one of its citizens? More particularly, can we really justify the taking of human life in a case in which, for example, four out of nine Justices of the Supreme Court, or up to half the members of this court of twenty-eight, may believe that the law prohibits us from doing so? Should life or death depend on the vote of one judge among many, when there are legitimate arguments on both sides and the decision could as easily go the other way? Under the current state of our law, the answer is clearly yes, although the Supreme Court, speaking through the Chief Justice, has recently cast some doubt on the durability, if not the legitimacy, of 5-4 decisions. See Payne v. Tennessee, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 2611, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991). This uncertainty gives rise to another question. Can decisions which may not reflect even tomorrow’s law legitimize a man’s execution? Whatever the answer to these questions, the people certainly have the right to all pertinent information relevant to the making of educated decisions about the capital punishment process.
It is clear that at present a substantial majority of the people favor capital punishment and the present Supreme Court firmly believes it is constitutional. However, law is an evolutionary process, and, at least until recently, our law has unfolded in an enlightened and progressive manner over a period of two hundred years. We can hope that over the next two hundred years further progress will be made and that we will return to a protective and expansive view of individual rights and liberties. Capital punishment will undoubtedly be one of the subjects we revisit. When we do, the historical record should be full and complete. At that time, as well as now, the people should know whether in the present case we failed to go en banc by an equally divided vote, a closely divided vote, or an overwhelming vote. For that reason, I regret that we are not now free to disclose that important information.2
*1541II
Arbitrariness in the application of the death penalty is neither an abstract nor a closed subject. The debate continues unchecked. Within the last several weeks, the state of Georgia executed Warren McCleskey notwithstanding the fact that (1) he offered proof that blacks were systematically discriminated against in death penalty cases and (2) the state had concealed material evidence that might have caused the jury to vote against capital punishment. Many jurists and other persons sensitive to individual rights believe that McCleskey’s execution was legally indefensible and morally unconscionable. Others simply argue that the determination that McCleskey should die was based on so uncertain and questionable a legal foundation that, at the very least, serious questions are raised as to whether the death penalty is being enforced in an arbitrary manner.
Recently, also, the Supreme Court upheld the Commonwealth of Virginia’s decision to execute Roger Coleman, notwithstanding the fact that the constitutionality of Coleman’s death sentence will never be determined because his lawyer inadvertently filed a notice of appeal three days late. See Coleman v. Thompson, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991). Despite the magnitude of the price exacted, the Court stated that a capital defendant must “bear[ ] the risk ... for all attorney errors made in the course of representation.” Id. 111 S.Ct. at 2567. Again, the question arises whether the death penalty is imposed on those most deserving of such punishment or whether arbitrary factors play a major role in determining who shall live and who shall die.
McCleskey’s and Coleman’s cases will surely be hotly debated whenever the question whether the death penalty is arbitrary is discussed. Would McCleskey have been put to death had the state not concealed evidence of its own duplicity? Would Coleman now be facing death if his lawyer had filed his notice of appeal three days earlier? We will never know. But we must nevertheless ask whether the factors that determine if a man is to be put to death are rational factors or not.
The uniqueness and severity of the death penalty require that we determine whether “valid penological reason[s]” support the selection “from among the many criminal defendants [of] the few who are sentenced to death.” Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 460 n. 7, 104 S.Ct. 8154, 3162 n. 7, 82 L.Ed.2d 340 (1984). Yet, under our present rules, whether a man lives or dies often seems to depend more on his lawyer’s ability to negotiate the procedural morass we have made of the writ of habeas corpus than on the “relevant facets of the character and record of the individual offender [and] the circumstances of the particular offense.” Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 2991, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976). If that is so, we are clearly failing in our constitutional duty.
Ill
In the present ease, the constitutional arguments on the defendant’s side are not as compelling as in McCleskey’s case nor the facts as dramatic as in Coleman’s. However, the procedural morass is present in the extreme, although this time it is the court not counsel which has fallen victim to it. The majority’s procedural ruling regarding the retroactivity of McCleskey v. Zant, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 1454, 113 L.Ed.2d 517 (1991) [McCleskey II], is just plain wrong. The error is critical because it is dispositive. It forecloses full and fair consideration of Harris’ habeas petition. It *1542is true that in this ease the majority goes on to discuss the merits of Harris’ petition, but such discussion (1) is dicta, (2) is influenced by the fact that the majority has already held that the petition is procedurally barred, and (3) as Judge Noonan ably demonstrates in his dissenting opinion, is itself clearly erroneous in a number of respects.
To return to the procedural issue, the majority holds that regardless of the merits of Harris’ constitutional challenges to his capital sentence he is barred from habe-as relief because he has abused the writ within the meaning of McCleskey II. It is worth noting that the government argued three years ago that Harris’ second habeas petition constituted an abuse of the writ and should be summarily dismissed, but the very same judges who form the majority here joined with Judge Noonan in rejecting that argument. See Harris v. Pulley, 852 F.2d 1546, 1572 (9th Cir.1988) (citing Richmond v. Ricketts, 774 F.2d 957, 961 (9th Cir.1985)), reaffirmed upon amendment, 885 F.2d 1354, 1380 (9th Cir.1988). The difference in the result today is due to a single erroneous determination made by the present majority: that McCleskey II, decided subsequent to the filing of all of Harris’ petitions, applies retroactively and bars a federal court from considering his current, earlier-filed claims. That determination is not only wrong; it is an error that may have caused the majority to view the merits of the petition with considerably less care than it might have exercised had it not deemed itself barred from considering them.
The principal reason the majority reaches its erroneous procedural determination is that it applies the wrong retroactivity standard. Without discussion, it assumes that the proper standard is that of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989), which turns almost entirely on the “newness” of the rule at issue. However, the proper standard is that developed in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 85 S.Ct. 1731, 14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965), Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967), and Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 104 S.Ct. 1338, 79 L.Ed.2d 579 (1984) and applied by this circuit in United States v. Givens, 767 F.2d 574 (9th Cir.1985). The latter standard depends on a variety of factors designed to measure whether the defendant reasonably relied on an earlier rule and whether it would be inequitable to thwart this reliance by retroactively applying a new rule. Under the proper standard (and indeed, as I shall discuss later, even under the proper application of the wrong standard), McCleskey II is not retroactive and Harris is entitled to have his petition considered on the merits. Thus does procedure bring life (or death) to substantive rights — and to liberty interests.
The reason the Teague standard is not applicable is simple. That standard determines when the state’s reliance on an earlier rule warrants nonretroactive application of the new one. Boiled down to its essentials, Teague (and its complement Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 107 S.Ct. 708, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987)) holds that, with some exceptions, a state is entitled to rely on the rule in effect at the time of trial in any cases in which direct review becomes final prior to the creation of the new rule; under Teague, in most instances a new rule is applicable only if its creation precedes final direct review. The date at which the defendant’s avenues of direct review are exhausted is significant because Teague equates the state’s reliance interest with its interest in the finality of its convictions. Prior to the defendant’s conviction becoming final (that is, to direct review being exhausted), the state’s interest is, supposedly, small and new rules will apply. Once the conviction is final, however, the state is presumed to have a strong interest in maintaining that finality. Further, according to Teague, the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus — ensuring state court faithfulness to federal law — is not defeated by restricting the writ to applications of law that should have been anticipated by the state courts. Accordingly, rules created after a defendant’s conviction becomes final do not apply.
Of course, the state’s reliance on an earlier rule is only implicated when the new *1543rule expands the defendant’s rights. When the new rule contracts those rights, the state would be only too happy to have the new rule apply retroactively. In rights-contracting cases, it is the defendant’s reliance on the old rule that is implicated. The defendant’s reliance cannot, of course, be equated with an interest in maintaining the finality of his conviction; habeas petitioners by definition are attacking that very finality. Thus, application of the Teague standard to rights-eontracting decisions borders on the irrational or the absurd.
The proper standard is that stated in Givens:
(1) whether the decision establishes a new principle of law, (2) whether retroactive application will further or retard the purposes of the rule in question, and (3) whether applying the new decision [retroactively] will produce substantial inequitable results.
767 F.2d at 578. Under this (or any) standard, McCleskey II cannot properly be held to be retroactive, at least in the Ninth Circuit. First, McCleskey II is clearly new law in our circuit. Indeed, the very same panel that now holds McCleskey II retroactive, told Harris what the pre-McCleskey II standard for abuse of the writ was in Harris v. Pulley, 852 F.2d at 1572. The standard applied in Harris’ earlier case was far more permissive of successive petitions than the standard imposed by McCleskey II.3 Harris certainly was entitled to assume that the rule for successive petitions was the rule that was reaffirmed in his own prior case. Cf. United States v. Albertini, 830 F.2d 985, 989 (9th Cir.1987) (“If the due process clause is to mean anything, it should mean that a person who holds the latest controlling court opinion declaring his activities constitutionally protected should be able to depend on that ruling to protect like activities from criminal conviction until that opinion is reversed, or at least until the Supreme Court has granted certiorari.”).
Second, thwarting Harris’ reliance by applying McCleskey II retroactively works a substantial inequity. When Harris filed his second petition, he had no reason not to pursue those claims while investigating his current ones. Harris did everything necessary to preserve his then-existing right to file successive petitions; it is unjust to apply retroactively new requirements which Harris can no longer meet. See Givens, 767 F.2d at 579 (“[W]e refuse to impose subsequently-created requirements for preserving a claim on appeal on a defendant who did all that was necessary to comply with the law applicable at the time of his trial.”). To impose on Harris the new requirements is to commit “ ‘the brutal absurdity of commanding a man today to do something yesterday.' ” United States v. Portillo, 633 F.2d 1313, 1321 (9th Cir.1980) (quoting Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law 59 (1964), and denying retroactive effect to new procedural requirements for preserving the right to appeal rulings on the admissibility of prior convictions), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1043, 101 S.Ct. 1763, 1764, 68 L.Ed.2d 241 (1981). Accordingly, under Givens, McCleskey II does not apply retroactively.4
As I noted earlier, even if Teague were the correct standard, a proper application of its criteria would preclude the retroactive application of McCleskey II. Teague, *1544as discussed above, holds that new rules do not apply on collateral review. In order to apply McCleskey II to Harris’ petition, the majority finds that McCleskey II did not create a new rule. For reasons I have already alluded to in part, that finding is difficult to understand. In fact, it is remarkable. According to the Supreme Court, a decision announces a new rule if prior to its adoption a “reasonable, good-faith interpretation of existing precedents” could have constructed a different rule. Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 110 S.Ct. 1212, 1217, 108 L.Ed.2d 347 (1990). Specifically, if the standard for abuse of the writ was “susceptible to debate among reasonable minds” prior to McCleskey II, then McCleskey II created a new rule. Id. Because Harris v. Pulley actually applied a different, narrower standard for abuse of the writ, see 852 F.2d 1546, 1572 (9th Cir.1988) (citing Richmond v. Ricketts, 774 F.2d 957, 961 (9th Cir.1985)), reaffirmed upon amendment, 885 F.2d 1354, 1380 (9th Cir.1988), the majority’s current conclusion that McCleskey II is not new law is equivalent to the conclusion that its own earlier decision was one that could not have been reached by reasonable judges, see Butler, 110 S.Ct. at 1219 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that under the rule announced in Butler, a new decision would apply retroactively to overrule an earlier decision only if the earlier decision “was so clearly invalid under then-prevailing legal standards that the decision could not be defended by any reasonable jurist.”).5
I cannot believe that the majority’s intent is to hold that its own earlier decision was irrational. Instead, the only plausible explanation is that it inadvertently overlooked the Butler rule, which it cites only in a different part of its opinion. Accordingly, having thus far erred twice with respect to Teague, the majority arrives at the wrong conclusion regarding retroactivity and deprives Harris of his right to a full and fair hearing. Ironically, regardless of which standard is applied, Teague or Givens, a proper application of the rule would result in the determination that McCleskey II is not retroactive and would thus allow review of Harris’ petition.
The majority makes other mistakes, ably documented in Judge Noonan’s dissent. Two errors are particularly disturbing: its determination that Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985) does not afford the accused the right to be assisted by competent psychiatric experts during a capital sentencing proceeding in which the prosecution introduces psychiatric testimony, and its determination that such a rule would in any event not apply retroactively under Teague (yet another Teague retroactivity error). These determinations are not only erroneous; they are contrary to the view of the only other circuit to have decided the same Ake question. See Buttrum v. Black, 908 F.2d 695 (11th Cir.1990), aff'g, 721 F.Supp. 1268, 1312-13 (N.D.Georgia 1989). However, as I noted earlier, these errors may be somewhat more excusable given the majority’s acknowledgment that the discussion in which they appear is not necessary to its disposition. And, because the errors are contained in dicta, they may not be as harmful in the long run as the holding regarding the retroactivity of McCleskey II. Nevertheless, the errors the majority commits in discussing the merits of Harris’ petition, when added to the errors it commits in dismissing the petition under McCleskey II, make it clear that no sound legal basis has yet been advanced for rejecting Harris’ claim for an evidentiary hearing.
IV
We may expect an increasing flood of capital cases to come before us in the near future, including appeals from federal death sentences. As a result, we will be *1545faced with a substantial addition to our workload. The proper resolution of death penalty appeals usually requires complex factual and doctrinal inquiries. Moreover, the severity and permanence of capital punishment mandates a greater scrutiny of the merits of capital appeals than we have time for in other cases. See Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 459-60, 104 S.Ct. 3154, 3161-62, 82 L.Ed.2d 340 (1984). Despite the inordinate burden these death penalty cases will place on the court and its individual judges, we must assiduously perform our constitutional duty to provide the most careful scrutiny and thorough examination in every death row appeal.
En banc review is a critical safeguard in the capital punishment process. Ordinary concerns regarding judicial administration should not influence our judgment whether to grant further review to death penalty decisions that may be flawed by substantial errors of law. We have a special responsibility in death penalty cases to see that the Constitution and applicable statutes are fully complied with. There is no margin for error. In capital punishment appeals, neither judicial or administrative convenience nor any other reason can justify our deferring to the views of a three-judge panel if the majority of the court might, after further study, conclude that the conviction or sentence is unlawful. When a human life is at stake, we should provide en banc review in all cases in which legitimate questions exist concerning a panel’s decision in favor of the state.6 Harris most certainly qualifies under that standard, as he would under any reasonable test. Common decency and fairness — as well as due process — require that we rehear his case en banc. In the absence of such a hearing, the state of California should not be permitted to execute him. I deeply regret that we have decided otherwise.
ORDER
Nov. 15, 1991.
Before ALARCON, BRUNETTI and NOONAN, Circuit Judges.
Appellant’s motion for a stay of the mandate pending his application for a writ of certiorari is granted. Pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure, the mandate is stayed for a period of 60 days from the date of the filing of this order.
If, during the period of this stay, the Clerk of the Supreme Court shall file a notice that a petition for certiorari has been filed, the stay shall continue until final disposition of the petition for certiorari by the Supreme Court. If the Clerk of the Supreme Court should notify the Clerk of this court that the petition for a writ of certiorari has been denied, the mandate shall issue immediately.

. All active judges are eligible to vote. Under our rules, an en banc call fails unless a majority of the eligible non-recused judges casts affirmative votes. Thus, a failure to vote has the same effect as a negative vote, and a tie-vote defeats the call.

. The vote by which the Supreme Court denies certiorari is also not disclosed. However, the Supreme Court's certiorari procedure and our process for granting en banc review differ in at least two significant aspects. The Supreme Court’s "rule of four” ensures that a decision not to review a case is favored by at least a two-to-one majority. Thus, disclosure of the vote *1541would not impart much information that the denial of certiorari does not already convey. By contrast, our rules allow a case to go unre-viewed even when the vote is tied or there is only a one vote difference. The widely varying margins by which a suggestion for rehearing en banc can be rejected by our court of twenty-eight judges makes disclosure important.
In addition, Supreme Court Justices are free to record their votes in favor of granting certio-rari if they so choose. In our circuit, the rules do not permit judges to disclose their votes except to the extent that such disclosure results incidentally from their participation in a dissent from a refusal to convene an en banc court. Thus, our rules result in the withholding of far more information than do the Supreme Court’s.

. Under the former standard,
Previously unadjudicated claims must be decided on the merits unless [1] the petitioner has made a conscious decision deliberately to withhold them, [2] is pursuing "needless piecemeal litigation," or [3] has raised the claims only to "vex, harass, or delay.”
Harris v. Pulley, 852 F.2d at 1572 (citing Richmond, 774 F.2d at 961). The McCleskey II standard is far stricter. Under McCleskey II, the petitioner must demonstrate “cause and prejudice” for his failure to bring the unadjudicated claims in the earlier petition. 111 S.Ct. at 1470. It is doubtful that the state could have demonstrated that Harris abused the writ within the meaning of the old standard; had the state been able to do so, the majority would have had no reason to reach the question of McCleskey II'ss retroactivity.

. It is unclear which way the remaining Givens criterion cuts. However, it is unnecessary to resolve the uncertainty because, under Givens, when "the first and third factors militate so strongly against retroactive application," retroactive application must be denied. 767 F.2d at 578.

. The majority’s conclusion that McCleskey II is not a new rule conflicts with a host of cases applying Teague. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 Harv.L.Rev. 1731, 1796 (1991) (discussing and agreeing with the conclusion of the Federal Courts Study Committee that the term "new rules” as used in Teague has been given an extremely broad definition in recent decisions) (citing I Federal Courts Study Committee, Working Papers and Subcommittee Reports 499-502 (1990)).

. Fed.R.App.P. 35 provides for en banc review when “necessary to secure or maintain uniformity" or “when the proceeding involves a question of exceptional importance.” In my view, a death penalty case in which one or more substantial questions of law exists constitutes a case of "exceptional importance.”