Court Opinion

ID: 9561224
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:05:34.175102+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:41.598521
License: Public Domain

ON DENIAL OF PETITION FOR REHEARING
Counsel for petitioner Bruce Buck has raised a valid point which will help rationalize the application of Idaho Code, Title 6, Chapter 10. In our previous opinion, we stated that the tolling of the medical malpractice statute of limitations, I.C. § 5-219(4), as provided for in I.C. § 6-1005, could begin only upon the commencement of hearings before the prelitigation panel, not upon the filing of a claim by an injured party. Counsel has correctly pointed out that the effect of this holding would be to extinguish Mrs. James’ claim one day after she filed, well in advance of hearings by the panel.
The application of the tolling period provided in I.C. § 6-1005 requires certainty so that the rights of litigants, both plaintiffs and defendants, are protected. Both the beginning and the end of the tolling period must be clear and unambiguous. In addition, the tolling period must be applied in a manner that implements the intent of the legislature.
Regarding the beginning of the period, the twin goals of certainty and implementation of the legislative intent are satisfied by our holding that tolling begins when the injured party’s claim is received by the State Board of Medicine. This establishes a date certain.
We find an indication of the legislature’s intent in I.C. § 6-1007 which provides in part: “At the commencement of such proceedings and reasonably in advance of any hearing or testimony, the accused provider of health care in all cases shall be served a true copy of the claim to be prosecuted____” Clearly, the legislature intended the proceedings to commence at the time of filing. Otherwise, it would not have created this gap between the commencement of proceedings and the reception of testimony or the hearing.
Although we have not yet directly addressed this issue, recent opinions of this *712Court and our Court of Appeals provide additional support. In Reis v. Cox, 104 Idaho 434, 660 P.2d 46 (1983), then Justice Donaldson in dissent wrote:
Following this statute [I.C. § 6-1005] the proceeding will not toll the statute of limitations unless a claim is pending and a claim cannot be pending until it is received____ This rationale is consistent with I.C. § 5-228 that states an action in the courts commences ‘when the complaint is filed.’
Id. at 441, 660 P.2d at 53.
Justice Donaldson took issue with the majority opinion, authored by then Chief Justice Bakes, which stated, in dicta,1 that it was the sending of the injured party’s complaint, not the receipt of it by the State Board of Medicine, that tolled the statute of limitations. It should be noted that neither the majority nor the minority considered the start of the hearing to be the event that triggered tolling.
In Ogle v. DeSano, 107 Idaho 872, 693 P.2d 1074 (Ct.App.1984), Judge Swanstrom wrote in dicta:
The plaintiffs filed a request with the State Board of Medicine on May 2, 1980, for a hearing before a prelitigation panel. Under our statutes this step is mandatory and tolls the running of the statute of limitations to a period thirty days following completion of the prelitigation proceedings.
Id. at 874, 693 P.2d at 1076.
To that extent our prior opinion is modified. Remaining unchanged is our holding that I.C. § 6-1011 establishes conditions which must be satisfied before the panel’s jurisdiction is terminated. The filing of the panel’s decision and recommendations with the State Board supplies a date certain from which the additional thirty-day period, provided in I.C. § 6-1005, begins to run. The importance the legislature placed on the filing of recommendations and conclusions is indicated by the declaration of legislative intent in the 1976 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 278, § 1:
It is, therefore, further declared to be in the public interest to encourage nonlitigation of claims against physicians and hospitals by providing for prelitigation screening of such claims by a hearing panel as provided in this act.
Clearly, if the goal of settling claims without litigation is to be fostered, the parties must have the benefit of the panel’s collective wisdom in the form of recommendations and conclusions. The additional thirty days of tolling logically is intended to provide a period in which the parties engage in settlement negotiations after having the benefit of the panel’s recommendations.
To hold, as Buck urges us, that the 120 days run automatically in all cases, without satisfaction of the statute’s two conditions, creates absurd results in this and similar cases. In this case, July 27, 1983 is the date 120 days after Mrs. James’ application was received by the Board. However, through no fault of Mrs. James, the panel did not file their recommendations with the Board until August 10, 1983. Obviously, an injured party’s claim should not be extinguished simply by the untimely action of the panel.
In addition, to mechanically apply the 120-day period would violate the express legislative purpose, mentioned above, of avoiding litigation if possible. If through the panel’s untimely action the 120-day period ran in the course of proceedings, or even prior to the hearing, the injured party would have no choice but to file an action in district court in order to protect his or her claim. Buck’s position thus encourages litigation. In addition, under these circumstances, an injured party would rush to the courthouse without the benefit of the panel’s recommendations, emasculating the entire role and reason for existence of the panel.
*713Therefore, we continue to hold that the date of filing of the panel’s decision and recommendations with the State Board of Medicine establishes the start of the additional thirty-day tolling of the statute of limitations contemplated by our legislative scheme. If the panel is unable to decide the issues before it within 90 days, and it summarily concludes the proceedings, the date of filing a summary conclusion so advising the Board of Medicine and the parties shall be the date from which the additional 30 days of tolling will begin to run.
DONALDSON, C.J., and SHEPARD and HUNTLEY, JJ., concur.

. The issue in Reis was a factual dispute over when the plaintiff acquired knowledge or, by the exercise of reasonable care, should have been put on inquiry regarding the accrual of her cause of action.