Court Opinion

ID: 9547803
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:52:41.807976+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:18:07.580948
License: Public Domain

BURKE, J.
I concur in the opinion to the extent it affirms defendant’s conviction. However, I strongly dissent from the reversal of the penalty trial.
The majority reverse the penalty trial on the ground that defendant was incompetent to represent himself during the penalty phase. This contention *220should have been summarily disposed of by application of the well-established rule that the trial judge has wide discretion in determining the competence of defendant to waive counsel and that his determination cannot be set aside in the absence of an abuse of discretion. (People v. Daniels, 71 Cal.2d 1119, 1142 [80 Cal.Rptr. 897, 459 P.2d 225]; People v. Carter, 66 Cal.2d 666, 672 [58 Cal.Rptr. 614, 427 P.2d 214]; People v. Ashley, 59 Cal.2d 339, 361 [29 Cal.Rptr. 16, 379 P.2d 496].)
Under the application of this rule the determination of defendant's competence to waive counsel is properly left to the discretion of the trial judge, who is in the best position to adjudge that matter. This determination “involves a consideration of the nature of the charge, the facts and circumstances of the case, and the education, experience, mental competence and conduct of the accused. [Citations.]” (People v. Stanworth, 71 Cal.2d 820, 834 [80 Cal.Rptr. 49, 457 P.2d 889], quoting from an earlier case.)
Although the majority acknowledge the existence of this basic rule, ante, page 218 of the opinion, they proceed to decide the issue de novo, stating that “On the record before us there is no basis for a conclusion that Robles was competent to waive counsel and represent himself.”
The reference to a few significant facts from the trial record will suffice to indicate ample support for the trial judge’s determination and that the majority here are simply substituting their own weighing of the facts for that of the trial judge; that this is impermissible is clear from the authorities cited above.
Prior to ruling on the matter, the trial judge and jury had heard extensive testimony from eight experts regarding defendant’s mental capacity and background. At the conclusion of a four-day sanity trial, the jury concluded that defendant “now has the ability to understand the nature of the charges against him and to cooperate with his attorney in a rational manner in the conduct of his defense."
The trial judge had also heard 21 days of testimony during the guilt phase, including defendant’s own testimony on the witness stand and frequent colloquy in chambers. Thus, the trial judge had a most unusual, in fact an excellent, opportunity to adjudge and determine defendant’s competence. The majority attach great significance to the trial judge’s refusal to permit defendant to represent himself at the guilt trial. However, this was largely because of defendant’s evident unfamiliarity with the legal defenses which might be available to him. The majority seem to suggest *221that this determination somehow estopped the trial judge from reaching a different conclusion at the penalty trial. However, it is evident to me that the trial judge should have discretion to determine that although a particular defendant may be incompetent to represent himself during a guilt trial, he may be entirely competent to do so during the penalty phase wherein knowledge of legal principles plays a less important role and the entire purpose is to afford the jury with a more comprehensive picture of the individual who is the subject of the inquiry concerning penalty.
The defendant had completed 11th grade in high school, and his testimony was ordinarily coherent, though occasionally vague and crude. After guilt verdicts were rendered against him, he pleaded with the judge to permit him to represent himself so that he might present to the jury “a new approach towards my behavior” which might prove more effective than the tactics planned by defendant’s trial counsel. The judge carefully examined defendant on the question and explained to him the significance of his request, the general nature of a penalty trial, the broadened evidentiary scope of the proceedings, the possibility of a death sentence, and the availability of an automatic appeal. The record indicates that defendant understood and fully appreciated the nature of the proceedings and the risks involved.
The trial judge went farther than was legally necessary to protect defendant and to insure that he received a fair trial. In permitting defendant to represent himself the judge attached the condition that he accept the advice and counsel of his two trial attorneys, who were thereupon appointed to serve as defendant’s “advisors” during the penalty trial. Defendant accepted this condition and frequently consulted with his advisers during the ensuing trial regarding the examination of witnesses, the introduction of evidence, and the making of objections. On several occasions, these advisers actually argued legal points for defendant. Although, personally, I do not favor dividing responsibility in this manner and if I were counsel so appointed I would hesitate to accept the assignment, nevertheless the system does add substantial protection to a defendant while permitting him to exercise his constitutional right (Cal. Const., art. I, § 13) to conduct his own defense.
Indeed the record discloses that defendant competently represented himself during the penalty trial, making opening and closing arguments to the jury, calling and examining 16 witnesses, cross-examining prosecution witnesses, and making objections during the course of the trial.
In People v. Ashley, supra, 59 Cal.2d 339, 361, defendant was charged with the murder of a six-year-old girl. Although he had been found to be insane when he first appeared in court, he was subsequently found to have *222regained his sanity. Accordingly, he was arraigned and tried for murder. Defendant insisted on representing himself during the entire trial which consisted of guilt, sanity and penalty phases. He requested, but was denied, counsel to advise him during the trial. Acting as his own counsel, defendant made few objections, cross-examined few witnesses, acted as his own sole witness, and made incomprehensible arguments to the jury. Nevertheless, on appeal, this court rejected defendant’s contentions that he was entitled to the aid of an attorney-adviser, and that he was incompetent to act as his own attorney, stating that “Counsel suggests that because of defendant’s mental condition he may have been mentally in a condition to assist counsel in his defense, but was in no mental condition to defend himself. . . . These were matters for the trial court to weigh. If at any time before or during the trial the judge entertained a doubt of defendant’s sanity it was his duty to stop proceedings and try the issue of present sanity. (Pen. Code, § 1368.) He was in the best position to weigh such matters [citation]. . . . [B]efore the trial court allowed defendant to represent himself, the trial court sought the advice of three pychiatrists, was assured by them that defendant was presently sane within the meaning of the section, and had several discussions with defendant about the problem. The record sustains the conclusion that defendant was aware of his situation when he insisted on representing himself. These factors are controlling. (People v. Linden ... 52 Cal.2d 1, 18 [338 P.2d 397].)” (Italics added.)
Since the trial court did not abuse its discretion in People v. Ashley, supra, wherein defendant had neither a section 1368 sanity hearing nor the aid of attorney-advisers, certainly no abuse occurred in the instant case where he was afforded both safeguards. I would affirm the judgment in its entirety.
McComb, J., concurred.