Court Opinion

ID: 9525804
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:08:09.260748+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:17:03.369766
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE HEIPLE, dissenting: A learned professor of the zoological sciences was performing tests on a frog. He observed that if he stood several feet behind the frog and clapped his hands sharply, the frog would jump three feet. The professor cut off the frog’s left hind leg and repeated the hand clapping. This time the frog jumped only two feet. He then cut off the frog’s right hind leg and again clapped his hands. This time the frog didn’t jump at all. The learned professor concluded that cutting off a frog’s hind legs causes deafness. The moral of the story is that it is possible to have almost everything right and still draw the wrong conclusion. So it is with the majority opinion in the instant case. The law is well stated and the facts are marshalled correctly. Unfortunately, however, the opinion draws the wrong conclusion. This is a case which is grounded on a noncustodial former spouse, Decker, violating child visitation privileges by taking a child for visitation and then secreting the child and not returning him to the custodial parent. In a word, kidnapping. Seeking information as to the child’s whereabouts, the mother, as custodial parent, sought to depose Kristen H. Fischer, the lawyer for the noncustodial father. Fischer refused to answer any questions, based on the attorney-client privilege. The trial judge offered an in camera inquiry and further offered that the in camera hearing be conducted before a different judge. The lawyer again refused on the grounds of privilege. She was held in contempt and the appellate court, in a well-reasoned opinion, affirmed. 204 Ill. App. 3d 566. As the majority opinion correctly notes, disclosures to a lawyer in furtherance of criminal or fraudulent activity are outside the protection of the attorney-client privilege. That is to say, such communications are not privileged. Neither are such communications protected by the rule of confidentiality. What the trial judge sought in this case was to conduct an in camera inquiry of the lawyer to elicit any communication that was outside the privilege. In other words, if, for instance, the client had disclosed to his lawyer that he was planning to kidnap the child and take him to some secret place, such a communication would not be privileged and would be discoverable. The majority is apparently concerned that the trial judge may have been on a fishing expedition and failed to articulate a factual basis to support a good-faith belief that the crime-fraud exception applied. To the contrary, Judge Ford, the trial judge, stated: “The court has reviewed the Petitioner’s verified motion and found reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has been committed.” The truth is, the facts overwhelmingly support Judge Ford’s inquiry and order. Mr. Decker was with his child contrary to custody orders and was nowhere to be found. The hearing itself was an emergency hearing in response to Mr. Decker’s failure to return the child. Fischer had recently filed a motion to withdraw as Mr. Decker’s attorney, citing a number of reasons including acting against advice of counsel. Keeping in mind that the trial court had at the time of its order no directive from this court to make any particular factual finding before investigating the existence of an alleged attorney-client privilege, it is clear that the judge did all that was necessary to support his order compelling Fischer to cooperate with the questioning in camera. Any differences between what he did and the after-the-fact requirements that the majority opinion lays out today are insignificant and inconsequential. The majority also finds error in the court’s questioning of Fischer after it quashed Mrs. Decker’s subpoena, claiming that it was an improper, sua sponte investigation. This results from a tortured reading of the proceedings, and again, the majority draws the wrong conclusion. Judge Ford had three matters relating to this case before him on the day in question. One was Mrs. Decker’s subpoena, and the other two were the requests contained in Mrs. Decker’s motion. Contrary to the majority’s assertion that the two requests were treated as one matter, Fischer had provided two separate responses to these matters: a motion to quash the subpoena and a prayer to dismiss the motion. Judge Ford denied Mrs. Decker’s request to amend the child custody order, as he felt that such a modification would be premature. He also granted Fischer’s motion to quash the subpoena on the grounds that it was too vague. However, there was still one matter to be considered: that part of the motion asking the court to compel Fischer to disclose information. The majority’s thorough recitation of the proceedings underscores that this portion of the motion was not disposed of. As the majority points out, the judge said, “the motion to quash the subpoena is well taken,” and then, “[a]s to the motion to quash the subpoena, the subpoena is quashed.” (Emphasis omitted.) (153 Ill. 2d at 307.) The trial judge had not ruled on the contemnor’s prayer to dismiss the motion to compel disclosure. It was on this final matter that Judge Ford asked his questions. This was not sua sponte, but rather in direct response to a motion before him on that day. In order to decide whether the motion to compel disclosure should be granted, he had to learn whether the information was protected by the attorney-client privilege. His questioning, therefore, was wholly appropriate and was certainly not error. Moreover, in light of the facts before the court, a sua sponte inquiry would have been in order and entirely appropriate in any case. A trial court has a perfect right to make sua sponte inquiries relative to perceived violations of its orders. The majority next complains that the trial judge’s inquiry was overly broad when he asked, “[A]re you in possession of statements by Mr. Decker of his intention to commit a crime?” The majority mistakenly interprets this as the sort of fishing expedition the Supreme Court warned against when it articulated this standard in United States v. Zolin (1989), 491 U.S. 554, 570-71, 105 L. Ed. 2d 469, 489-90,109 S. Ct. 2619, 2630-31. The majority’s concern is ill-founded. I would agree with the majority that, standing alone, this question is broad. However, the majority blithely ignores the context in which the request was made. In context, it is clear that the judge was asking no more than whether Mr. Decker had talked to Fischer about kidnapping his child. This is not a fishing expedition. There is but one crime that the judge could have possibly anticipated, or that would have even been relevant. Further, as already noted, the trial judge offered to have the in camera inspection conducted by another judge. This is not only consistent with today’s opinion, it also shows both forbearance and respect for the attorney-client privilege. Fischer, however, refused to cooperate with any inquiry, regardless of who conducted it or how tailored it might have been. Her refusal could not and cannot be justified, and the court was right to hold her in contempt. Finally, the majority rules that the trial court’s order was in error on the hypertechnical and legalistic grounds that it ordered contemnor to disclose information pursuant to Rule 4 — 101(d)(3) (107 Ill. 2d R. 4-101(d)(3)) instead of Rule 4 — 101(d)(2) (107 Ill. 2d R. 4-101(d)(2)) (153 Ill. 2d at 328). The court had, earlier in the proceedings, determined that Rule 4 — 101(d)(2) did not apply. This ruling epitomizes the cliche “form over substance.” Rule 4 — 101(d)(2) allows an attorney to disclose information pursuant to a court order without repercussion. Rule 4 — 101(d)(3) gives an attorney the discretion to disclose, also without punishment, a client’s intent to commit a crime, even when not required to do so by Rule 4 — 101(c). However, a court may order an attorney to disclose a client’s intent to commit such a crime. No one disputes this power. We are faced here with a court order to disclose the intent to commit the type of crime anticipated by Supreme Court rules and pursuant thereto. The majority voids the order, not because the judge was without the power to issue it nor because the attorney retained the discretion to disobey it; but rather because, although the subsection of the rule was cited by the judge, the subsection of the subsection was not cited. This type of hyper-technicality and legalism is deserving of scorn rather than official approbation. The majority opinion lays down the correct threshold that must be met before an in camera inspection may be held to determine the existence of the attorney-client privilege. I have no quarrel with that threshold. However, that threshold was met de facto in this case, and the trial judge’s order should not be vacated. Without the benefit of the precise procedural steps articulated in today’s opinion, the trial judge gave Fischer process closely approximate to what the majority opinion now requires. Any difference can only be classified as harmless. We do the public a disservice when we disarm the judiciary of its only weapon against those whose actions undermine its authority and impede the administration of justice. The majority overturns a proper contempt conviction, and from that decision I respectfully dissent.