Court Opinion

ID: 9684463
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:58:06.71879+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:56.070502
License: Public Domain

SCOTT BRISTER, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
Lonnie Butler had a single claim: that his employer took several macros he developed. For reasons perhaps known only to his lawyers, he filed the claim in the form of a dozen different causes of action. All have been tossed out — first by the First Court of Appeals,1 and later by a federal court in Houston.2
Both courts held that half a dozen of Butler’s causes of action were preempted by the federal Copyright Act. But both also held that half a dozen others were not,3 thus affirming Butler’s right to bring them as separate actions.
But where? The First Court held they could be brought only in federal court.4 On exactly the same issue, the federal court held they could not.5 One of these courts must be wrong. This is not merely a difference of opinion — though acknowledging Butler can assert non-copyright claims, every court where he has tried to do so has shut its doors.
Federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction to try cases arising under the Copyright Act.6 But Butler has never alleged a copyright claim; instead, Continental has argued as a defense to his claims that the Copyright Act precludes them. The First Court of Appeals held this was enough, pointing to an opinion by the federal Second Circuit that a claim arises under the Copyright Act if “it asserts a claim requiring construction of the Act.”7 The federal court in Houston disagreed, pointing to a subsequent Second Circuit opinion clarifying that this test looks only to what the plaintiff’s complaint alleges, not what defense might be proffered.8
*289The issue before us is not which court was right, but whether Butler can be shut out of a forum by the conflicting denials. I agree with the Court that a dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction normally should preclude litigation of that jurisdictional question again; if the rule were otherwise, the same claim could be filed repeatedly and never decided finally.
But the Restatement recognizes a limitation to the application of res judicata when inconsistent final judgments are rendered:
When in two actions inconsistent final judgments are rendered, it is the later, not the earlier, judgment that is accorded conclusive effect in a third action under the rules of res judicata.9
As the Restatement explains, the policy considerations supporting res judicata are not strong when the party claiming it has taken an inconsistent position in intervening litigation.10
That is exactly what Continental did here. After urging the First Court to hold the federal courts had exclusive jurisdiction of Butler’s claims, Continental urged exactly the opposite when he filed them there. In accordance with the Restatement, I would hold that preclusive effect should be given only to the later ruling— the federal court’s decision that Butler’s claims belonged in state court. Because the Court holds otherwise, I respectfully dissent.

. See Butler v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 31 S.W.3d 642 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. denied) (“Butler I ”).

. See Butler v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., No. Civ.A. 01-2194, 2001 WL 1509545 (S.D.Tex.2001) ("Butler II”).

. Namely, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, quantum meruit, estoppel, quasi-estoppel, and constructive trust.

. Butler I, 31 S.W.3d at 652.

. Butler II, 2001 WL 1509545 at *5.

. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a).

. Butler I, 31 S.W.3d at 652 (citing T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 828 (2d Cir.1964)).

. Butler II, 2001 WL 1509545 at *5 (citing Bassett v. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, 204 F.3d 343, 353 (2d Cir.2000)).

. Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 15 (1982).

. Id. cmt. b.