Court Opinion

ID: 9727509
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:41:03.13019+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:39.590168
License: Public Domain

STEVENS, J.,
Dissenting.
¶ 1 I conclude that Officer Kenneth Neidinger had probable cause to stop Ap-pellee’s vehicle, and, therefore, I conclude that the trial court erred in granting Ap-pellee’s motion to suppress. As such, I respectfully dissent.
¶ 2 While one does not loose all expectation of privacy while traveling in an automobile, our courts recognize that the Commonwealth has an interest in maintaining the safety of those who use its roads. Therefore, the police should be permitted a reasonable degree of latitude when stopping automobiles to meet this obligation. Commonwealth v. Gleason, 567 Pa. 111, 785 A.2d 983 (2001). Relevant case law establishes that a police officer may stop a vehicle based on reckless driving, even if only out of the concern for the driver’s own safety. Commonwealth v. Masters, 737 A.2d 1229 (Pa.Super.1999).
¶ 3 The facts in this case reveal that Appellee was driving recklessly, and, therefore, Officer Neidinger was permitted to stop Appellee’s vehicle. Specifically, Appellee drove recklessly for over two and one half miles, involving travel on more than one road. Officer Neidinger testified that when he observed Appellee driving on the Harrisburg Pike, Appellee’s car was weaving inappropriately from side to side, in .contrast to the normal weave of the car behind Appellee’s vehicle. N.T. 3/9/01 at 8-9. Appellee traveled onto Route 283, making an inappropriate wide turn onto the shoulder of the ramp. While on Route 282, which is a four-lane divided highway, Officer Neidinger observed Appellee’s vehicle for one mile as it wove from the right hand driving lane partially into the left hand passing lane, and back again, without a credible explanation. In this instance, the totality of the circumstances indicated that, at the very least, the driver’s safety *658was at issue giving the officer probable cause to stop the vehicle.
¶ 4 Based on the aforementioned, I conclude that Officer Neidinger had probable cause to stop Appellee’s vehicle, and, therefore, the trial court erred in granting Appellee’s motion to suppress. As such, I would reverse the trial court’s suppression order.