Court Opinion

ID: 9745636
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 23:14:41.081011+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:03.549554
License: Public Domain

SILLS, P. J., Concurring.
There is nothing wrong with the majority opinion; the result appears to be compelled by connecting the dots of precedent. I write separately, however, because today’s result is actually quite anomalous and appears ultimately contrary to what the trustor probably wanted. It is only by the twist of this state’s wholesale incorporation of other states’ law as to the status of an adopted person—the sort of jack-in-the-box effect about which a trustor is likely to be blissfully unconcerned when deciding which state’s laws should govern his trust—that we reach the result we do.
*378Consider the almost ludicrous drafting problem the rule we apply today imposes. Suppose you were drafting Jacob Paley’s trust and you wanted the California rule that treats adult adoptees as children for all purposes, not just heirship, to govern. (See, e.g., Estate of Tibbetts (1941) 48 Cal.App.2d 177, 178 [119 P.2d 368] [“Under the law of this state, there is no doubt that an adopted child is a ‘lineal descendant’ of the adopting parent. . . .”].)
You would probably think it would be sufficient to say, “this trust shall be construed according to the laws of the state of California.” That would be elegant, logical, and alas, under the rule we apply today, wrong. You would practically have to do a triple axel to accomplish your task. You might have to write something like, “this trust shall be construed according to the laws of the state of California except to the degree that the rule under California law is to adopt another state’s rule as to the status of adopted children, and in that instance the California rule of adopting another state’s rule is not to govern, rather everything is to be decided as if it all happened in California regardless of whether it did or not.” Or maybe something like, “use the California rule except where the California rule says to use another state’s rule in which case forget that particular California rule and use the usual California rule.”
The reader can get the drift: The most logical and natural inference of the trust language here is that the California substantive rule should be applied in the first instance, not the California rule that adopts another state’s substantive rule. Jacob Paley may not exactly be turning over in his grave, but today’s result can only disturb his peace.
Paley simply didn’t reckon on the fine but confusing distinction between “status” of an adopted child and “rules of inheritance” on which today’s result is predicated, in particular the idea that California law looks to the state where an adoption takes place to determine the “status” of an adopted child. Estate of Grace (1948) 88 Cal.App.2d 956 [200 P.2d 189] probably frames the idea as plainly as one is likely to find it: Whether someone has the “capacity” to “inherit personal property in California” is determined by the laws of the state where an adoption takes place. (Id. at p. 959.) Whether someone has the “right” to inherit is determined in California.
While the majority primarily cites Estate of Hebert (1941) 42 Cal.App.2d 664 [109 P.2d 729] and two other appellate cases for the rule, it ultimately traces back to In re Williams (1894) 102 Cal. 70 [36 P. 407]. Quoting from a Massachusetts case, our high court in Williams said that the status of an adopted child is fixed by another state’s law, not our own. By “status” the court meant “ ‘the relation in which [an adopted child] stands to another person.’ ” (Id. at p. 82.) Such relationships are “ ‘fixed by the law of the domicile.’ ” (Ibid.) And “ ‘this status and capacity are to be recognized and upheld in every other *379state, so far as they are not inconsistent with its own laws and policy.’ ” (Ibid., quoting Ross v. Ross (1880) 129 Mass. 243.)
One must thus savor the irony of this case. A trustor who created a trust for an adopted daughter and specifically wanted that trust governed by California law which treated that daughter as his child for all purposes ends up having his trust governed by an 1880 Massachusetts rule adopted by our high court in 1894 which makes a Colorado rule determinative as to whether adults adopted by that adopted daughter can be beneficiaries.
There may be broader issues here as well. Consider the case of an elderly parent whose spouse has died, who has one adopted adult child, but adopted in another state. If this elderly parent is in serious need of some medical decision, and has no spouse or other relative except for the adopted (er, maybe) “child,” the ability of the adopted child to make the necessary decision can be thrown into doubt. You have to do the research in another state’s law and hope you get it right, but not only that—if the other state’s mle is like Colorado’s (or like Texas’s before 1907, as explained in the Grace case)—this elderly parent ends up not really having a child when that particular child may be most needed.
Something is seriously wrong in today’s result. Life expectancies have increased considerably since 1880; there are more elderly parents who have adopted children than ever. It may be time to reexamine Williams’s “use another state’s rule” rule. That job, however, is not within the province of this court.
A petition for a rehearing was denied April 26, 2004, and the petition of appellant Animal Legal Defense Fund for review by the Supreme Court was denied July 21, 2004.