Court Opinion

ID: 9952558
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-20 07:17:12.183535+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:40:44.853613
License: Public Domain

Affirmed and Opinion Filed March 18, 2024

                                        In The
                             Court of Appeals
                      Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                No. 05-22-00429-CR

                       KALLIE WRIGHT, APPELLANT
                                   V.
                      THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

                On Appeal from the 291st Judicial District Court
                             Dallas County, Texas
                     Trial Court Cause No. F18-30193-U

                          MEMORANDUM OPINION
                    Before Justices Garcia, Goldstein and Miskel
                             Opinion by Justice Miskel

      Kallie Wright appeals her sentence for failing to stop and render aid after she

drove a car into, and killed, bicyclist Calvin Middleton Jr. in July 2018. TEX.

TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 550.021(c)(1)(A).            The jury convicted Wright and set

punishment at twelve years in prison. In three issues, Wright argues the trial court

abused its discretion in (1) admitting evidence of her at-home breath alcohol

monitoring device reports, (2) taking judicial notice of notifications from the pre-

trial services department, and (3) failing to include a required jury instruction.

      We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                           1
I.    Factual Background
      Early the morning of July 15, 2018, Wright was driving her friend Dana

Jordan’s car after the two spent the prior day and that night drinking alcohol,

smoking marijuana, and celebrating Jordan’s birthday at a strip club. On a highway

intersection in Grand Prairie, Texas, Wright drove the car into bicyclist Calvin

Middleton Jr. Wright immediately drove away from the collision scene. Middleton

was seriously injured and died on the roadway. Wright eventually drove back to the

scene and asked a bystander whether Middleton had died. After Wright and

witnesses heard what sounded like gunshots, Wright again drove away in Jordan’s

car and was absent from the scene when police arrived. Wright did not phone 9-1-

1 or provide anyone with her name, address, vehicle registration, or car insurance

information. The record reflects that Wright drove the wrecked car to a third-party’s

home. When the police located the car, the bloody and shattered car windshield had

been removed.

      After police found the wrecked car, identified the parties involved in the fatal

collision, and investigated the possible attempted coverup, the U.S. Marshals Service

communicated with Wright. She later turned herself in to the Marshals on the

evening of July 18, 2018. Wright was arrested on the charge of leaving the scene of

an accident without rendering aid. She posted bond and was released.

                                          2
        Less than four months later, while out on bond, Wright was stopped for

speeding in Tarrant County and arrested for DWI and illegal drug possession.

During that traffic stop, Wright told the officer that “she had been on the news and

that she ran a gentleman over and killed him.” The jury viewed the officer’s

bodycam recording of Wright making this statement.                            Wright appeared to be

intoxicated and had marijuana in the car. Wright was arrested for DWI and

possession of marijuana and was released from jail after posting bond for the new

charges. As a condition of her pretrial release on the two new charges, Wright was

ordered to undergo home breath-alcohol monitoring.

        Following a multi-day trial, the jury convicted Wright of failing to stop and

render aid after the fatal Middleton incident. At the punishment phase, over Wright’s

objection, the trial court admitted as State’s Exhibit 99 records from Wright’s at-

home alcohol monitoring device. Also over Wright’s objections, the trial court took

judicial notice of four notification letters from the Dallas County pre-trial services

department: (1) Exhibit 100, a notification of Wright’s failure to comply with her

Dallas County bond conditions requiring that she not consume alcohol as detected

by her at-home alcohol monitoring system1; (2) Exhibit 101, a notification of

Wright’s failure to comply with her Dallas County bond conditions that required her

    1
      Although the title refers to an interlock order, the records do not refer to an ignition interlock device
in her car, but rather a SCRAM continuous alcohol monitoring device.

                                                      3
to service the at-home breath testing device and her removal from the alcohol

monitoring program; (3) Exhibit 102, a notification to the Dallas County trial court

of Dallas County pretrial services’ termination of Wright’s supervision on bond for

failure to report (while a warrant was out for her arrest); and (4) Exhibit 103, a notice

to the Dallas County trial court of Wright’s pretrial bond supervision suspension in

her Tarrant County DWI case because of Wright’s active arrest warrant for more

than ninety days and her unknown whereabouts.

II.   The Alcohol Monitoring Device Records Are Not Hearsay or Testimonial.
      In her first issue, Wright challenges the trial court’s admission of State’s

Exhibit 99 under the business records exception to the hearsay rule. See TEX. R.

EVID. 803(6), 902(10).      Additionally, Wright contends the records contained

testimonial statements that violated her rights under the Confrontation Clause of the

Sixth Amendment.

      We overrule Wright’s hearsay and Confrontation Clause challenges because

these computer-generated monitoring records do not constitute hearsay and are

nontestimonial. The reports do not implicate Wright’s entitlement to confront a

testifying witness.

A.    Standards of Review

       We review a trial court’s admission or exclusion of evidence under the abuse

 of discretion standard of review. Beham v. State, 559 S.W.3d 474, 478 (Tex. Crim.

 App. 2018). So long as the trial court’s decision falls within the “zone of

                                           4
 reasonable disagreement,” we must uphold the decision. Id. We do not disturb a

 trial court’s evidentiary ruling if it is reasonably supported by the record and is

 correct under any theory of law applicable to the case. Willover v. State, 70 S.W.3d

 841, 845 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).

       As to an alleged violation of a defendant’s confrontation rights, the standard

 of review is a hybrid one: both deferential and de novo. Mason v. State, 225

 S.W.3d 902, 906–07 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, pet. ref’d). “Although we defer to

 a trial court’s determination of historical facts and credibility, we review a

 constitutional legal ruling, i.e., whether a statement is testimonial or

 nontestimonial, de novo.” Wall v. State, 184 S.W.3d 730, 742 (Tex. Crim. App.

 2006).

B.    The Computer-Generated Records Are Not Hearsay.
      “Hearsay” means a statement that: (1) the declarant does not make while

testifying at the current trial or hearing; and (2) a party offers in evidence to prove

the truth of the matter asserted in the statement. TEX. R. EVID. 801(d). A “declarant”

means a person. TEX. R. EVID. 801(b). Likewise, a “statement” means a person’s

oral, written, or nonverbal expression. TEX. R. EVID. 801(a) (emphasis added). Data

generated by a machine, instead of by a person, is not a “statement” by a “declarant,”

nor is it hearsay. See, e.g., Stevenson v. State, 920 S.W.2d 342, 343 (Tex. App.—

Dallas 1996, no pet.) (en banc) (“The intoxilyzer instrument is a computer, not a

person. By definition, therefore, the intoxilyzer is not a declarant.”); Ly v. State, 908

S.W.2d 598, 600 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no pet.) (“A computer self-

                                           5
generated printout that does not represent the output of statements placed into the

computer by out of court declarants is not hearsay . . . . Because there is no reliance

upon human input, the determination that such computer self-generated data is not

hearsay is in accord with rule 801.”); Murray v. State, 804 S.W.2d 279, 284 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth 1991, pet. ref’d) (“This distinction between computer stored data,

which is clearly hearsay, and computer self-generated data, which . . . is not hearsay,

is in accord with Rule 801, which requires that a statement by [sic] made by a person

before it can fall within the definition of hearsay.”); Nguyen v. State, No. 05-20-

00241-CR, 2022 WL 3714494, at *8 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug 29, 2022, pet. ref’d)

(mem. op., not designated for publication) (“We conclude the crash data report

constitutes computer-generated data containing objectively recorded facts. The

black box of appellant’s vehicle is a computer and, by definition, cannot be a

declarant for purposes of the rule against hearsay.”). Therefore the trial court did

not err by overruling Wright’s hearsay objection.

C.    The Computer-Generated Records Are Not Testimonial and Do Not
      Implicate the Confrontation Clause.

       A criminal defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to question witnesses

 offering testimony against him. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Gonzalez v. State, 195

 S.W.3d 114, 116 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). “Even when hearsay offered against a

 defendant is admissible under evidentiary rules, that evidence may implicate the

 Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment if the defendant is not afforded the

                                          6
opportunity to confront the out-of-court declarant.” Gonzalez, 195 S.W.3d at 116.

However, the Confrontation Clause applies only to statements that are testimonial

in nature. See Woods v. State, 152 S.W.3d 105, 113–14 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)

(citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004)).

      Data generated only by machines or produced by scientific instruments are

not testimonial and do not implicate the Confrontation Clause. See Hamilton v.

State, 300 S.W.3d 14, 21–22 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2009, pet. ref’d); see also

Paredes v. State, 462 S.W.3d 510, 519 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). Raw data

produced by scientific instruments are not testimonial statements, as the data are

in essence “statements” by the machine rather than the operator of the instrument.

Hamilton, 300 S.W.3d at 21–22. The Confrontation Clause applies to statements

made by persons, not machines. Id.

      The trial record establishes that Wright’s at-home breath alcohol testing

device was a computer that self-generated monitoring and photo data, and the

summary reports were printouts of that raw computer-generated data. No human-

generated comments appear in any of Wright’s summary reports.

      The summary reports generated from the data stored and transmitted by the

device did not rely upon the assistance, observations, or reports of a human

declarant, the data are not a statement of a person, and therefore they are not

testimonial statements. See, e.g., Paredes, 462 S.W.3d at 519; Stevenson, 920

S.W.2d at 343; Ly, 908 S.W.2d at 600; Murray, 804 S.W.2d at 284; Nguyen, 2022

WL 3714494, at *8. Because the reports are computer-generated records—

“statements of a machine”—they are not testimonial. Hamilton, 300 S.W.3d at

                                        7
21–22. The raw data “are not the functional equivalent of live, in-court testimony

because they did not come from a witness capable of being cross-examined. They

came from a computer.” Paredes, 462 S.W.3d at 519. The mere fact that the data

collected by the device were ultimately formatted into a legible report does not

convert them into testimonial statements. Nguyen, 2022 WL 3714494 at *8.

      Here, Wright’s computer-generated alcohol monitoring device records were

not testimonial. Thus, as a matter of law, the trial court’s admission of these

records could not have violated Wright’s Confrontation Clause protections under

the Sixth Amendment.

D.   The Issue of Whether Computer-Generated Alcohol Testing Records
     Can Be Authenticated by a Business Records Affidavit Was Not Briefed.
     At trial, Wright objected to Exhibit 99 as follows:

     State:                 At this time, Your Honor, State will offer State’s
                            Exhibit No. 99 under 902.10, which is a business
                            record affidavit accompanied by the Intoxalock
                            records.

     Trial Court:           Any objection?
     Appellant:             I do, Judge. I object to her – the affidavit. I
                            would need to cross-examine these people to
                            make sure that these records are accurate.

     ....

     Trial Court:           What’s your objection?

     Appellant:             Hearsay, Melendez-Diaz vs. Massachusetts says
                            – I mean, Bullcoming v. New Mexico, all those
                            cases say I’m entitled to cross-examine the
                            analyst that put together the records.

                                        8
       State:                 And it’s a self-authenticating business record
                              with affidavit. So therefore, I don’t have to call
                              a sponsoring witness in order to get them in.

       Appellant:             They’re testimonial, Judge. That’s the problem.

       Trial Court:           Okay, I know what you’re saying. Objection is
                              overruled. 99 is admitted….

        Although Wright objected at trial to the lack of a witness to cross-examine

 about the accuracy of the records, Wright does not analyze this issue on appeal.

 Wright asserts that Exhibit 99 was unreliable and notes in passing that the business

 records exception to the hearsay rule must be shown by an affidavit complying

 with Rule 902(10).      However, Wright’s brief focuses on her hearsay and

 Confrontation Clause complaints, not her accuracy objection. Wright does not

 spell out a reliability or authentication argument against the admission of business

 records relating to alcohol testing or support it with legal analysis. Wright has

 inadequately briefed this issue by neglecting to present argument and authorities.

 Cardenas v. State, 30 S.W.3d 384, 393 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). The issue of

 whether it is possible to authenticate computer-generated alcohol testing records

 pursuant to a business records affidavit was not briefed, and we will not reach it in

 this case.

        We overrule Wright’s first issue.

III.   The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion in Admitting Notifications from
       Pretrial Services, but Wright’s Substantial Rights Were Not Affected.

        In Wright’s second issue, she contends that the trial court abused its

 discretion when it took judicial notice of letters from the pre-trial services

                                            9
department to the court as State’s Exhibits 100 through 103. Wright’s counsel

lodged hearsay objections. The State asserted that these exhibits were “a copy of

the Court’s record” and noted that Exhibits 101 through 103 had “Court Record”

stamped on them. The trial court overruled Wright’s objections and admitted all

these exhibits.

      With no objection from Wright, the State also offered, and the trial court

admitted into evidence, Wright’s Tarrant County convictions for DWI and

possession of marijuana as State’s Exhibits 104 and 105.

A.   Standard of Review
      We review a trial court’s admission or exclusion of evidence under the abuse

of discretion standard of review. Beham, 559 S.W.3d at 478. So long as the trial

court’s decision falls within the “zone of reasonable disagreement,” we must

uphold the decision. Id.

      Article 37.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure governs the

admission of evidence during the punishment phase of trial and expressly permits

the State and the defendant to offer evidence of “any matter the court deems

relevant to sentencing, including but not limited to the prior criminal record of the

defendant . . . and . . . any other evidence of an extraneous crime or bad act that is

shown beyond a reasonable doubt by evidence to have been committed by the

defendant.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 37.07, § 3(a)(1).

B.   The Law Governing Judicial Notice

      “Adjudicative facts” are facts specific to the pending case and are typically

required to be established by evidence. Kubosh v. State, 241 S.W.3d 60, 64 (Tex.

                                         10
Crim. App. 2007). Under Rule 201, a trial court has discretion to take judicial

notice of an adjudicative fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it

can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot

reasonably be questioned. TEX. R. EVID. 201(b)(2). “Adjudicative facts which

may be judicially noticed are relevant to the ultimate issue in dispute, but are not

themselves the subject of any controversy.” Watts v. State, 99 S.W.3d 604, 610

(Tex. Crim. App. 2003). “When a trial judge takes judicial notice of adjudicative

facts, he authorizes the factfinder to accept the truth or existence of those specific

facts without requiring formal proof.” Id. at 609–10. In a criminal case, the rules

direct that “the court must instruct the jury that it may or may not accept the noticed

facts as conclusive.” TEX. R. EVID. 201(f).

C.   The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion in Taking Judicial Notice of the
     Notifications from Pretrial Services.
      Here, the exhibits contain statements made by out-of-court declarants

relating to Wright’s alleged failures to comply with the conditions of her bond and

the subsequent termination of her bond supervision. State’s Exhibits 100–103 are

out-of-court statements offered for their truth, and they contain disputed factual

assertions not subject to judicial notice under Texas Rule of Evidence 201. They

should not have been admitted into evidence over Wright’s timely hearsay

objection. TEX. R. EVID. 801–02.

      The trial court was empowered, at most, to take judicial notice of the

existence of these notifications. A court may take judicial notice of its own

records. Brown v. Brown, 145 S.W.3d 745, 750 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, pet.

                                          11
denied) (citing Tschirhart v. Tschirhart, 876 S.W.2d 507, 508 (Tex. App.—Austin

1994, no writ)). However, while a court may take judicial notice that a document

has been filed, the trial court may not take judicial notice of the truth of factual

statements and allegations contained in the pleadings, affidavits, or other

documents in the file. See O’Donnell v. Vargo, No. 05-14-00404-CV, 2015 WL

4722459, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 10, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.); Gruber v.

CACV of Colo., LLC, No. 05-07-00379-CV, 2008 WL 867459, at *2 (Tex. App.—

Dallas, April 2, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.); see also Tschirhart, 876 S.W.2d at 508.

      Here, the notifications and attached documents were generated not by the

trial court, but instead by the third-party pretrial services department. Instead of

merely taking judicial notice that notifications had been filed, the trial court took

judicial notice of their contents, without limitation, and admitted the

unauthenticated hearsay documents into evidence for the truth of the allegations in

those documents. This error of law constitutes an abuse of discretion. In re

Shifflet, 462 S.W.3d 528, 539 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.).

D.   The Judicial Notice Error did Not Affect Wright’s Substantial Rights.
      A trial court’s error in applying an evidentiary rule is non-constitutional

error. Jones v. State, 111 S.W.3d 600, 604 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, pet. ref’d)

(citing King v. State, 953 S.W.2d 266, 271 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). A reviewing

court disregards non-constitutional error that does not affect a defendant’s

substantial rights. TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b).       A substantial right is affected

when the error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining

the jury’s verdict. Thomas v. State, 505 S.W.3d 916, 926 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016).

                                         12
In analyzing whether a jury’s decision was adversely impacted by alleged error,

the reviewing court “should consider everything in the record, including any

testimony or physical evidence admitted for the jury’s consideration, the nature of

the evidence supporting the verdict, the character of the alleged error and how it

might be considered in connection with other evidence in the case.” Motilla v.

State, 78 S.W.3d 352, 355 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). The jury’s determination

should not be overturned for such alleged error if, after examining the entire

record, we have fair assurance that the claimed error did not influence the jury or

had only a slight effect on the jury’s verdict. Johnson v. State, 967 S.W.2d 410,

417 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).

      As to State’s Exhibits 100–103, we conclude that in the context of the entire

evidentiary record, these documents did not influence, or had only a slight

influence on, the jury’s mid-range punishment verdict. Although the notices were

erroneously admitted, the substantive evidence of Wright’s alcohol testing (State’s

Exhibit 99) and her two later convictions (State’s Exhibits 104-05) referred to in

the notices was independently admitted into evidence for the jury’s consideration.

      After examining the entire record, we conclude that the jury’s decision to

return its verdict of twelve years’ imprisonment—approximately midway between

the State’s requested twenty years and Wright’s requested probation—was not

adversely affected by the error. The jury heard evidence of Wright’s conduct in

the instant case: drinking alcohol and smoking marijuana for hours, possibly

driving intoxicated, driving into and killing bicyclist Middleton, failing to identify

herself, driving away from the scene twice, possibly attempting to destroy

                                         13
evidence, and failing to turn herself in to authorities for two days and only after

law enforcement found her. The alcohol monitoring device records were in

evidence showing Wright missed and failed tests while on bond, as discussed in

the previous section. With no objection from Wright, the jury further considered

the Tarrant County convictions for DWI and possession of marijuana while

Wright was on bond in this case, including the police–camera evidence that, during

that arrest, Wright verbally abused and insulted the arresting officers with explicit

sexual, derogatory language and spat on a hospital floor, announcing, “It’s a

hospital and somebody will clean it up.”           The four improperly admitted

notifications from pretrial services were consistent with, and cumulative of, the

other evidence of her similar conduct during the same time period, and were

unlikely to have affected Wright substantially.

      For example, this Court previously held, in Quezada v. State, that even if

the trial court had abused its discretion in admitting computer-generated data and

testimony about the defendant’s alcohol monitoring reports, prohibited

consumption of alcohol pending trial, and tampering with the SCRAM device, the

totality of evidence surrounding the charged crime and the defendant’s

independent bad acts negated the contention that the defendant’s substantial rights

were violated at sentencing, especially where the trial court sentenced the first-

time offender to ten years in prison, the middle of the twenty-year sentencing

range. Quezada v. State, No. 05-11-01270-CR, 2013 WL 1277852, at *3-5 (Tex.

App.—Dallas Feb. 26, 2013, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

                                         14
      Considering the entire record, we have fair assurance that the four

complained-of exhibits had no more than a slight effect on the jury’s sentence or

the jury’s conclusion that Wright was an unsuitable candidate for probation. Thus,

the jury’s punishment decision should be affirmed. Id.

      We overrule Wright’s second issue.

IV.   Failure to Submit a Jury Charge on Judicial Notice Was Not Harmful
      Error.
      Wright’s third issue complains that, after taking judicial notice of the

aforementioned exhibits, the court was required to instruct the jury that it was not

required to accept those judicially noticed facts as true. During the charge

conference, Wright made no objection or request as to Texas Rule of Evidence

201(f)—that rule provides, “In a criminal case, the court must instruct the jury that

it may or may not accept the noticed fact as conclusive.”

A.    Standard of Review
      Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 36.14 requires the trial court to

“deliver to the jury . . . a written charge distinctly setting forth the law applicable

to the case . . . .” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 36.14. The purpose of the jury

charge is to inform the jury of the applicable law and guide them in its application

to the case. Delgado v. State, 235 S.W.3d 244, 249 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Here,

the trial court’s charge omitted Rule 201(f)’s requirement to “instruct the jury that

it may, but is not required to, accept as conclusive any fact judicially noticed.”

                                          15
TEX. R. EVID. 201(f); see also Lyle v. State, 418 S.W.3d 901, 904–05 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.).

      Where claimed charge error was the subject of a timely objection in the trial

court, reversal is required if there is a showing of some harm to the defendant.

Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (op. on reh’g). In

contrast, if the defendant failed to object, reversal is warranted only if the error

caused egregious harm such that the defendant was deprived of a fair and impartial

trial. Id.; Allen v. State, 253 S.W.3d 260, 264 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (“Jury

charge error is egregiously harmful if it affects the very basis of the case, deprives

the defendant of a valuable right, or vitally affects a defensive theory.”); Lyle, 418

S.W.3d at 906–07 (rejecting claim of egregious harm where court’s charge omitted

Rule 201 instruction).

      Because Wright did not object to the trial court’s omission or request a Rule

201(f) limiting instruction in the jury charge, she must show that she suffered

egregious harm. Delgado, 235 S.W.3d at 249; Narasimha v. State, No. 05-15-

01410-CR , 2016 WL 6462400 at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Oct. 31, 2016, pet. ref’d)

(mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding that the omission of a Rule

201(f) instruction is not structural error and is subject to Almanza review). The

error must have created such harm that Wright “has not had a fair and impartial

trial.” Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171.

                                         16
      Harm is determined considering the totality of the jury charge and the

evidence, “including the contested issues and weight of probative evidence, the

argument of counsel and any other relevant information revealed by the record of

the trial as a whole.” Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171; see also Zinger v. State, 899

S.W.2d 423, 434 (Tex. App.—Austin 1995) (reviewing trial court’s failure to give

a Rule 201 instruction for egregious harm and concluding no such harm occurred),

rev’d on other grounds, 932 S.W.2d 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).

B.   No Egregious Harm Resulted from the Jury Charge Error.
      Here, the jury charge provided the correct punishment range and properly

informed the jury that it could assess prison time or probation if it assessed

punishment that was no more than ten years’ confinement in the Texas Department

of Criminal Justice. The charge also instructed that the jury could consider

Wright’s extraneous conduct only if it was proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

Nothing in the charge or the trial record suggests that the jury was ever told it was

required to credit the judicially noticed documents. The charge and record are

silent as to what weight, if any, the jury gave to these materials. The same jury

had already convicted Wright for failing to stop and render aid after fatally driving

into bicyclist Middleton.     Against this backdrop and Wright’s undisputed

successive convictions for DWI and possession of illegal drugs (arising from a

traffic stop just four months after Wright killed Middleton), it is difficult to

imagine a reasonable jury giving meaningful weight to out-of-court statements on

                                         17
Wright’s alleged failures to comply with the conditions of her bond and the

subsequent termination of her bond supervision.

      As discussed above, after examining the entire record, we have fair

assurance that the improperly noticed exhibits themselves did not influence the

jury or had only a slight effect on the jury’s verdict. As such, Wright suffered no

egregious harm. Similarly, the court’s failure to instruct the jury that it may or

may not accept the exhibits as conclusive also did not cause Wright egregious

harm. Zinger, 899 S.W.2d at 434, rev’d on other grounds, 932 S.W.2d 511 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1996); cf. Quezada, 2013 WL 1277852 at *3-5.

       At punishment, the contested issue was whether Wright was a suitable

candidate for probation. The jury had already convicted Wright in the incident

where she drove over and killed bicyclist Middleton right after she had dedicated

a day and night to drinking alcohol and using illegal drugs. The jury had heard

evidence that, just four months later while on bond for that offense, Wright was

arrested and convicted of additional charges relating to driving under the influence

and possessing illegal drugs. The records from Wright’s alcohol monitoring

device, showing missed and failed tests, were also in evidence. The only note from

the jury to the trial court inquired about whether Wright had received criminal

convictions from her other alleged criminal wrongdoings in 2002 and 2015.

Wright’s counsel agreed that the trial court should instruct the jury that Wright had

no convictions from those occasions.

       In response to the four judicially noticed exhibits, the jury heard Wright’s

evidence that cast doubt on whether the missed alcohol tests were due to Wright’s

                                         18
skipping tests or, instead, due to malfunction of the monitoring device. Character

witness Smith testified that Wright had repeated issues with the breathalyzer not

working, and Smith attributed the missed tests to the device malfunctioning. The

four exhibits therefore were not conclusive evidence on any issue, and the jury

could weigh the properly admitted conflicting testimony from Wright’s witness.

The weight of the evidence and the contested issue both weigh against finding

egregious harm.

      Similarly, counsel’s respective arguments to the jury fail to support any

showing of egregious harm. Wright argued for a two to ten years’ sentence with

probation and stated that her fatal crime was a tragic accident. Wright claimed she

had already “emotionally paid” for killing Middleton and that the incident may

have contributed to her subsequent alcohol abuse. The State did refer to the

contents of the four judicially noticed exhibits in its argument. However, the

underlying records from the alcohol monitoring device and the subsequent arrests

and convictions were separately in evidence, and the State invited the jury to

consider those records.     To the extent that the judicially noticed exhibits

summarized and referred to this evidence, they were cumulative of other admitted

evidence.

      Ultimately, the jury returned a verdict of twelve years’ confinement—

considerably less than the twenty-year maximum the State recommended. On

balance, we conclude that Wright was not egregiously harmed by the trial court’s

charge error at the punishment phase. Jones, 111 S.W.3d at 609–10 (holding there

was no egregious harm in the trial court’s erroneous failure to give a reasonable

                                        19
doubt instruction for extraneous bad acts, in part, because the jury assessed

punishment far below the maximum available punishment the State had requested).

The trial court’s failure to give an instruction about judicial notice did not affect

the very basis of the case, deprive Wright of a valuable right, or vitally affect a

defensive theory. See Sanchez v. State, 209 S.W.3d 117, 121 (Tex. Crim. App.

2006).

         After reviewing the entire record, we determine the erroneous omission of

the Texas Rule of Evidence 201(f) instruction in the jury charge did not cause

Wright to suffer egregious harm.

      We overrule Wright’s third issue.

V.    Conclusion
      Having overruled all of Wright’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

220429f.u05                                /Emily Miskel/
Do Not Publish                             EMILY MISKEL
TEX. R. APP. P. 47                         JUSTICE

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                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                 JUDGMENT

KALLIE WRIGHT, Appellant                     On Appeal from the 291st Judicial
                                             District Court, Dallas County, Texas
No. 05-22-00429-CR          V.               Trial Court Cause No. F-1830193-U.
                                             Opinion delivered by Justice Miskel.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee                 Justices Goldstein and Garcia
                                             participating.

    Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered this 18th day of March, 2024.

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