Court Opinion

ID: 9676097
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:14:47.603217+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:14:08.448966
License: Public Domain

WALKER, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
The majority having chosen to reverse and remand this ease by sustaining appellant’s points of error one and seven, necessitates my dissent.
My perception of appellant’s contention in point of error one is that the cumulative effect of defense counsel's alleged violation of the motion in limine as a whole resulted in incurable prejudice to appellant. We have here a post-trial reconstruction of the trial court’s original rulings on appellee’s motion in limine. The very thrust of appellant’s complaint in point of error one is directed to violations of the motion in limine. A motion in limine is not a valid substitute for an objection or motion to strike. On appeal, the party may not predicate his complaint on a motion in limine. See Methodist Hospitals of Dallas v. Corporate Communicators, Inc., 806 S.W.2d 879, 883 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1991, writ denied).
*115In Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. McCardell, 369 S.W.2d 331, 335 (Tex.1963), our Texas Supreme Court held:
If a motion in limine is overruled, a judgment will not be reversed unless the questions or evidence were in fact asked or offered. If they were in fact asked or offered, an objection made at that time is necessary to preserve the right to complain on appeal that such questions asked or such evidence tendered were so prejudicial that the mere asking or tendering should require a reversal.
Appellant’s failure to make timely and specific objections at the time evidence was offered, constitutes a waiver of that complaint. See Tex.R.AppP. 52(a); Tex.R.Civ.Evid. 103(a).
Appellant’s primary complaint seems to be that a witness being interviewed at trial by defense counsel referred to plaintiff’s workers’ compensation insurance company. Workers’ compensation insurance was mentioned on one occasion during trial and only after appellant’s medical witness informed the jury that the plaintiff’s medication care was being handled under “insurance” during a period of time. It was appellant who injected the existence of liability insurance into the ease. It was appellant’s responsibility to advise his witnesses regarding the motion in limine. The injection of insurance by appellant into the trial of this case could have very likely created the belief in the minds of the jurors that the railroad’s insurance was paying for medical care.
The majority recognizes that immediately following the mention of workers’ compensation, appellant’s counsel “immediately requested permission to approach the bench.” Approaching the bench is not tantamount to nor the equivalent of a proper objection by appellant. The record is clear that appellant did not object to the mention of workers’ compensation insurance at the time of admission nor did appellant request a curative instruction. Where there is a claim that evidence has been improperly admitted, the record must reflect that the party seeking to suppress the evidence made a proper objection when the evidence was actually offered at trial. See Wilkins v. Royal Indemnity Co., 592 S.W.2d 64, 66-67 (Tex.Civ.App.—Tyler 1979, no writ).
The majority also sustains appellant’s point of error one based upon the colloquy regarding a prior lawsuit. The trial court offered appellant a curative instruction which was rejected by appellant. When a party refuses to accept a “cure” to the objection the party waives the error. See Speier v. Webster College, 616 S.W.2d 617 (Tex.1981); Celotex Corp. v. Tate, 797 S.W.2d 197 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1990, no writ). See also State Bar of Texas v. Evans, 774 S.W.2d 656 (Tex.1989). An instruction to disregard would have cured any error.
I would hold that the error complained of in appellant’s point of error one was waived. Thus, the refusal by the trial court to grant a new trial should also be overruled.