Court Opinion

ID: 9957604
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-04 17:15:31.050784+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:26.266779
License: Public Domain

J-A25005-23

 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  KRISTINE G. LOCHER                           :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  RONALD D. LOCHER, JR.                        :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 334 WDA 2023

             Appeal from the Order Entered February 20, 2023
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County Civil Division at No(s):
                             No. 2020-1785

BEFORE:      BOWES, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                           FILED: April 4, 2024

       Ronald D. Locher, Jr. (“Husband”) appeals from the order denying his

exceptions to the master’s report, which addressed alimony and equitable

distribution of the marital estate of Husband and Kristine G. Locher (“Wife”).

We affirm.

       On May 13, 2020, Wife initiated this action by filing a divorce complaint.

As amended, the complaint also asserted counts for alimony and equitable

distribution.    The trial court assigned the matter to a master, who held

hearings over the course of two days in 2021. The following facts were found

by the master and later adopted by the court.

       Husband and Wife were married in 1994 and are high school graduates.

They have two adult children together. During the marriage, Wife worked

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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part-time as a clerk for two years, then worked at a medical center full-time,

off and on, for twenty-five years. She stopped working in June 2019 so that

she could watch her grandson and due to substantial, continuing health issues.

Her rate of pay at the time of ceasing employment was fifteen dollars per

hour. Wife has no retirement funds, as she liquidated her only retirement plan

worth about $875 in 2019, approximately a year before the divorce

proceedings were initiated. Her only sources of income at the time of the

hearings were food stamps and spousal support of $925 per month, though

she had a pending application for Social Security Disability (“SSD”) benefits.

      Husband has a certification in asphalt preparation and paving. He was

employed with Quaker Sales from 1991 until May 2021. At the time he left

Quaker Sales, he was making nearly $80,000 per year. Husband left so that

he could participate as a 50% owner in a business he and another family

member inherited from Husband’s father in February 2021, Locher Demolition

and Excavating, LLC. In that role, Husband has earned less income, being

paid $920 a week, or $47,840 per year.       The company earned a profit of

$21,951 for the period of April 1, 2021 through October 15, 2021. Husband

continues to remain in good health and has both an IRA and an annuity, as

well as a savings plan.

      After the hearing, the special master entered a report recommending

that (1) a decree of divorce be entered; (2) the marital estate be split 65%-

35% in favor of Wife; and (3) Husband pay Wife alimony in the amount of

$1,300 per month indefinitely.     As to equitable distribution, the master

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considered each of the factors enumerated at 23 Pa.C.S. § 3502(a) in support

of the recommendation, finding that the ones deserving the most weight

favored Wife, which included her poor health; the disparity in employability

between Husband and Wife; the greater opportunity for Husband to acquire

assets and income in the future; retirement benefits; and the standard of

living    established   during   the   marriage.   See   Master’s   Report   and

Recommendation, 5/10/22 at 18-19.

         In suggesting the $1,300 monthly alimony award to Wife, the master

reviewed the seventeen factors set forth at 23 Pa.C.S. § 3701(b). It focused

on the facts that Husband had recently received an inheritance from the

passing of his father and that he owned a 50% interest in a company that he

did not have before the marriage, as well as Wife’s substantial difficulty in

maintaining gainful employment due to her health issues. Id. at 24-28. The

master also recommended that Husband’s alimony payment to Wife be

“subject, of course, to a substantial change in circumstances[.]” Id. at 29.

         Husband filed timely exceptions to the report, asserting a variety of

errors pertaining to the equitable distribution and proposed award for alimony.

After the consideration of oral argument, the trial court entered an order on

February 20, 2023, denying the exceptions.         The same day, it entered a

separate decree and order granting divorce and adopting the proposed

alimony and equitable distribution in favor of Wife.

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         This timely appeal followed. Both Husband and the trial court complied

with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. Husband raises the following five issues on appeal, which

we have reordered for ease of disposition:

    I.      Whether the trial court erred and abused its discretion in
            denying the exception to the master’s awarding Wife $1,300
            monthly alimony for an indefinite period of time, which is
            excessive and inequitable.

   II.      Whether the trial court erred and abused its discretion by
            awarding Wife 65% of the marital estate by not correctly
            applying the criteria for equitable division of marital property,
            pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 3502.

  III.      Whether the trial court erred in denying the exception to the
            master’s report that the master erred in speculating on the
            future success of Husband’s business interests.

   IV.      Whether the trial court erred in denying the exception to the
            master’s report that the master erred in relying on Wife’s
            medical records absent any testimony from her physician and
            without any corroborating evidence.

   V.       Whether the trial court erred in denying the exception to the
            master’s report that the master had erred in relying on Wife’s
            statement that she had filed for [SSD] when such benefits had
            not yet been awarded.

Husband’s brief at 3-4 (cleaned up).

         In his first issue, Appellant contends that the court should have granted

his exception concerning the award of $1,300 in monthly alimony to Wife.

See Husband’s brief at 9-12. This Court reviews the decision to award alimony

for an abuse of discretion.       See Conner v. Conner, 217 A.3d 301, 315

(Pa.Super. 2019).

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      A trial court is permitted to award reasonable alimony when it finds that

such is necessary. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 3701(a). Additionally, the award “may

be for a definite or an indefinite period of time which is reasonable under the

circumstances.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 3701(c). We have further explained:

      [T]he purpose of alimony is not to reward one party and to punish
      the other, but rather to ensure that the reasonable needs of the
      person who is unable to support himself or herself through
      appropriate employment, are met.         Alimony is based upon
      reasonable needs in accordance with the lifestyle and standard of
      living established by the parties during the marriage, as well as
      the payor’s ability to pay. Moreover, alimony following a divorce
      is a secondary remedy and is available only where economic
      justice and the reasonable needs of the parties cannot be achieved
      by way of an equitable distribution award and development of an
      appropriate employable skill.

Conner, 217 A.3d at 315-16 (cleaned up). The applicable statute provides

that, “[i]n determining whether alimony is necessary and in determining the

nature, amount, duration and manner of payment of alimony,” the court must

consider the following seventeen non-exclusive factors:

      (1) The relative earnings and earning capacities of the parties.

      (2) The ages and the physical, mental and emotional conditions of
      the parties.

      (3) The sources of income of both parties, including, but not
      limited to, medical, retirement, insurance or other benefits.

      (4) The expectancies and inheritances of the parties.

      (5) The duration of the marriage.

      (6) The contribution by one party to the education, training or
      increased earning power of the other party.

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      (7) The extent to which the earning power, expenses or financial
      obligations of a party will be affected by reason of serving as the
      custodian of a minor child.

      (8) The standard of living of the parties established during the
      marriage.

      (9) The relative education of the parties and the time necessary
      to acquire sufficient education or training to enable the party
      seeking alimony to find appropriate employment.

      (10) The relative assets and liabilities of the parties.

      (11) The property brought to the marriage by either party.

      (12) The contribution of a spouse as homemaker.

      (13) The relative needs of the parties.

      (14) The marital misconduct of either of the parties during the
      marriage. The marital misconduct of either of the parties from
      the date of final separation shall not be considered by the court in
      its determinations relative to alimony, except that the court shall
      consider the abuse of one party by the other party. As used in
      this paragraph, “abuse” shall have the meaning given to it under
      [§] 6102 (relating to definitions).

      (15) The Federal, State and local tax ramifications of the alimony
      award.

      (16) Whether the party seeking alimony lacks sufficient property,
      including, but not limited to, property distributed under Chapter
      35 (relating to property rights), to provide for the party’s
      reasonable needs.

      (17) Whether the party seeking alimony is incapable of self-
      support through appropriate employment.

23 Pa.C.S. § 3701(b).

      Regarding the alimony awarded to Wife, Husband argues that the court

failed to consider that he had a career change during the divorce proceedings,

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which caused his income to fall dramatically. See Husband’s brief at 9-10.

He also faults the court for not regarding Wife’s potential for employability,

especially in light of her testimony that she had some interest in cleaning

houses as a source of income. Id. at 10. Finally, Husband avers that the

court did not properly weigh Wife’s substantial award of 65% of Husband’s

retirement plans and accounts, which would help meet her ongoing needs,

before awarding alimony. Id. at 12.

      The trial court thoroughly and cogently summarized the master’s

findings, as well as its rationale for the award of alimony, as follows:

      [T]he master relied heavily on the parties’ respective earning
      capacities.      [He] outlined Wife’s significant health problems,
      including a brain tumor in 2010, two brain operations in 2014,
      bleeding in the brain in or about August 2021, stomach ulcers in
      April 2021 that required surgery, and peripheral neuropathy of the
      legs for more than [eleven] years. The master noted that Wife
      takes ten different daily medications. [He] determined that Wife’s
      health would severely impair her ability to engage in substantial
      and gainful employment. At best, Wife could potentially obtain
      light-duty part-time employment and, at worst, she would not be
      able to manage meaningful employment at all. The master further
      noted that, while Wife may not be completely incapable of self-
      support through appropriate employment, it would be difficult for
      her to find employment that accommodates her health problems
      and that pays enough for her to support herself. Wife had modest
      monthly expenditures of approximately $1,550. The master’s
      findings and conclusions are supported by the record. The master
      found Wife to be generally more credible than Husband based upon
      the consistency of her testimony with the demonstrative evidence
      . . . , her straightforward demeanor at the hearings, and the dearth
      of demonstrative evidence offered by Husband.

            Husband, on the other hand, has [thirty] years of
      experience in the asphalt and paving business, where he made
      approximately $80,000 per year when he voluntarily left his
      employment in May 2021. Husband quit and took over his father’s

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      existing demolition and excavating business after separation in
      May 2021, along with Husband’s nephew.                 The master
      acknowledge[d] that Husband’s business prospects are
      speculative because of the [short] length of time Husband has
      been operating the business. However, Husband failed to submit
      evidence regarding the financial history of the previously-existing
      business and what it may be capable of generating for its new
      owners. Moreover, Husband only provided an income statement
      and ledgers from Locher Demolition and Excavating, LLC, for the
      period of April 1, 2021 to October 15, 2021, after trial. For these
      reasons, it is disingenuous for Husband to complain that his
      income is speculative when he largely failed or refused to provide
      available information to confirm his prior earnings, the financial
      history of the existing business, and his financial prospects.

Trial Court Opinion, 2/20/23, at 2-3 (cleaned up, emphasis in original).

      Under the facts of this case, we do not find that the court abused its

discretion in awarding alimony for an indefinite period.      A review of the

master’s report makes it clear that the master extensively considered all

statutorily-required factors, and the trial court properly adopted those

supported findings.   Wife’s health issues create a substantial disparity in

income potential for both parties moving forward.       Further, Wife provided

documentation identifying her reasonable monthly expenses, which were

greater than Husband’s modest monthly budget. Finally, there is no indication

that in considering whether alimony was appropriate, the court neglected to

weigh the fact that Wife will receive a portion of Husband’s retirements

accounts. Since Wife was only fifty-one years old as of the hearing date, it

would be years before she could withdraw any retirement funds without

penalty to cover her monthly expenses.         Therefore, Husband has not

convinced us that the alimony award is inappropriate.

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      Husband next contends that the trial court erred in ordering a 65%

equitable distribution award favoring Wife. We consider this argument mindful

of the following:

      Our standard of review in assessing the propriety of a marital
      property distribution is whether the trial court abused its
      discretion by a misapplication of the law or failure to follow proper
      legal procedure. An abuse of discretion is not found lightly, but
      only upon a showing of clear and convincing evidence.

Busse v. Busse, 921 A.2d 1248, 1257 (Pa.Super. 2007) (citation omitted).

Additionally,

      [t]his Court will not find an abuse of discretion unless the law has
      been overridden or misapplied or the judgment exercised was
      manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice,
      bias, or ill will, as shown by the evidence in the certified record.
      In determining the propriety of an equitable distribution award,
      courts must consider the distribution scheme as a whole. We
      measure the circumstances of the case against the objective of
      effectuating economic justice between the parties and achieving a
      just determination of their property rights.

      Moreover, it is within the province of the trial court to weigh the
      evidence and decide credibility and this Court will not reverse
      those determinations so long as they are supported by the
      evidence.    We are also aware that a master’s report and
      recommendation, although only advisory, is to be given the fullest
      consideration, particularly on the question of credibility of
      witnesses, because the master has the opportunity to observe and
      assess the behavior and demeanor of the parties.

Carney v. Carney, 167 A.3d 127, 131 (Pa.Super. 2017) (cleaned up).

      In order to fashion an equitable distribution award, “the trial court must

consider, at a minimum, the eleven factors set forth in 23 Pa.C.S. § 3502[.]”

Gates v. Gates, 933 A.2d 102, 105 (Pa.Super. 2007) (cleaned up). These

are as follows:

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     (1) The length of the marriage.

     (2) Any prior marriage of either party.

     (3) The age, health, station, amount and sources of income,
     vocational skills, employability, estate, liabilities and needs of
     each of the parties.

     (4) The contribution by one party to the education, training or
     increased earning power of the other party.

     (5) The opportunity of each party for future acquisitions of capital
     assets and income.

     (6) The sources of income of both parties, including, but not
     limited to, medical, retirement, insurance or other benefits.

     (7) The contribution or dissipation of each party in the acquisition,
     preservation, depreciation or appreciation of the marital property,
     including the contribution of a party as homemaker.

     (8) The value of the property set apart to each party.

     (9) The standard of living of the parties established during the
     marriage.

     (10) The economic circumstances of each party at the time the
     division of property is to become effective.

     (10.1) The Federal, State and local tax ramifications associated
     with each asset to be divided, distributed or assigned, which
     ramifications need not be immediate and certain.

     (10.2) The expense of sale, transfer or liquidation associated with
     a particular asset, which expense need not be immediate and
     certain.

     (11) Whether the party will be serving as the custodian of any
     dependent minor children.

23 Pa.C.S. § 3502(a).

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      We have stated that “[t]he [§] 3502 factors are not a simple formula,

rather they serve as a guideline for consideration. The facts of a particular

case mandate how the [§] 3502 factors will be applied.” Gates, 933 A.2d at

105. In reviewing a trial court’s distribution order, this Court will not engage

in a factor-by-factor review of the trial court’s rulings. Rather, we reiterate

that “we look at the distribution as a whole, in light of the court’s overall

application of the . . . § 3502(a) factors for consideration in awarding equitable

distribution. If we fail to find an abuse of discretion, the order must stand.”

Lee v. Lee, 978 A.2d 380, 383 (Pa.Super. 2009) (cleaned up).

      Husband argues that the trial court erred in awarding Wife 65% of the

marital estate and, as a general matter, improperly applied the factors in

§ 3502. See Husband’s brief at 13-15. He repeats that the court disregarded

his new, reduced income in considering the economic circumstances of each

party. Id. at 13. Husband believes that the court also improperly attributed

earning potential to his new business venture based upon evidence not

introduced into the record, such as Husband’s business contacts developed

while he worked with Quaker Sales, which is not an entity dealing with

demolition.   Id. at 13-14.     He further maintains that the court erred in

determining that Wife left her employment for health-related issues, instead

of based on her testimony that she quit so that she could provide care for her

grandson. Id. at 14-15. Finally, Husband opines that the court neglected to

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consider that Wife voluntarily liquidated her retirement account in 2019 when

she stopped working. Id. at 15.

     As discussed above, the record reflects that in its report, the master

went through the statutory factors seriatim, and concluded that while a

number were neutral, six favored Wife. See Master’s Report, 5/10/22, at 12-

19 (placing particular focus on Wife’s health problems, the disparity in

employability between Husband and Wife, the greater opportunity for

Husband to acquire assets and income in the future, Wife’s lack of retirement

benefits, the standard of living established during the marriage, and the

economic circumstances Husband and Wife at the time of division of the

marital estate). The trial court, finding that Husband articulated this issue

generally in his exceptions without offering any argument more specific than

those otherwise raised in his exceptions, did not provide a detailed analysis

with respect to this claim.   Instead, it incorporated its analysis as to the

alimony award and the issues that will be discussed below, and concluded that

the master did not err in making this recommendation.        See Trial Court

Opinion, 2/20/23, at 4.

     On review, we find no abuse of discretion with the equitable distribution

award.   Contrary to Husband’s assertions, the court plainly considered

Husband’s reduced income in light of the fact that the parties provided

substantial testimony concerning Husband’s new business venture. As the

court indicated in it Rule 1925(a) opinion, Husband cannot now complain that

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the master overlapped similarities between Husband’s previous job and his

new business when making its recommendation because Husband “failed or

refused to provide available information to confirm his prior earnings, the

financial history of the existing business, and his financial prospects.” Trial

Court Opinion, 2/20/23, at 3.    Additionally, the record confirms that Wife

liquidated her sole retirement account in 2019 both to pay marital debts and

because she was unable to continue working based upon her health issues.

We note, moreover, that while Appellant now asserts that the court should

have weighed against Wife the fact that she retired in part to watch her

grandson, the credited testimony from the hearing was that Husband

encouraged Wife to do this so that the grandson need not attend daycare.

See N.T. Hearing, 8/19/21, at 8-9. In looking at the distribution as a whole,

we discern no abuse of discretion in how the court weighed the § 3502(a)

factors, and therefore the order must stand. See Lee, 978 A.2d at 383.

      Husband’s remaining arguments attack specific evidence considered by

the court, as a general matter, in fashioning the equitable distribution and

alimony awards. His third claim is that the court erred when it denied his

exception relating to the master’s valuation of Husband’s business interest.

See Husband’s brief at 17-19.     Husband contends that because his then-

newly-acquired business was only established months prior to the hearing

before the master, he was “only able to give a small snapshot of the financial

records” available for it. Id. at 17. Similar to arguments we have considered

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and rejected above, he faults the court and master for considering his contacts

in the unrelated business of asphalt and pavement to speculate that he will

achieve success in demolition and excavating. Id. at 17-18.

      After incorporating its other discussions concerning the value of

Husband’s business, the trial court disputed Husband’s assertions thusly:

      [T]he master did not speculate as to the future success of
      Husband’s business interest but, instead, noted that the “snapshot
      of Husband’s business is too limited to tell how successful it will
      be down the road.” The master found that Husband will have
      better opportunities to acquire capital assets and income in the
      future because he is in better health than Wife. Moreover, either
      party may petition for modification or termination of the court-
      ordered alimony upon changed circumstances of either party of a
      substantial and continuing nature.

Trial Court Opinion, 2/20/23, at 4 (cleaned up).

      We cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion. Husband

provided limited information concerning the financial health of Locher

Demolition and Excavating, LLC, including for the period when his father

operated the business before his passing in 2021. Husband has not convinced

us that the court erroneously valued his business, since, as the master

acknowledged, the potential success of the business could not be ascertained

without speculation.    Rather, the business’s likelihood of success was

considered as merely one factor within the totality of the circumstances, which

bear out that in any event, Husband has a greater potential to gain assets and

income in the future due to Wife’s serious health concerns.

      Next, Husband avers that the master erred in considering medical

records introduced by Wife, and that the court should have granted his

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exception as to that issue. See Husband’s brief at 15-17. Specifically, he

believes the evidence was improperly admitted, and prejudice ensued from

his inability to cross-examine the physician’s findings in the records. Id. at

16. This was particularly so because the divorce complaint was not amended

to include a request for alimony until after Wife testified before the master.

Id. at 16-17.

      As to this claim, the trial court noted that the special master found Wife

to have limited employability based on two factors: the medical evidence she

presented and her credible testimony. See Trial Court Opinion, 2/20/23, at

3. It also recounted that Husband never objected to the admission of Wife’s

medical records. Id. Furthermore, the court determined that “Husband has

failed to establish how the master erred in relying on Wife’s testimony

regarding her health and employability, nor has Husband established a basis

for this court to displace the master’s credibility determination.” Id. at 3-4

(unnecessary capitalization omitted).

      Upon review, we agree with the trial court that this claim does not entitle

Husband to relief. To the extent his argument is premised upon improperly

admitted evidence, Husband has waived that contention by failing to lodge an

objection at the time the evidence was admitted.           See Thompson v.

Thompson, 963 A.2d 474, 475-76 (Pa.Super. 2008) (“[I]n order to preserve

an issue for appellate review, a party must make a timely and specific

objection at the appropriate stage of the proceedings . . . . Failure to timely

object to a basic and fundamental error will result in waiver of that issue.”).

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      Moreover, to the extent that Husband disputes the credibility of Wife’s

testimony as to her medical issues, he has provided us no reason to disturb

the court’s assessment, especially because he agreed with counsel that Wife

suffers from “pretty serious health problems.” N.T. Hearing, 10/27/21, at 54.

Finally, we find that Husband raises for the first time on appeal the argument

that the divorce complaint was belatedly amended to include a request for

alimony. Since this was not presented in Husband’s exceptions to the trial

court, it was not preserved for review. See Thompson, 963 A.2d at 475-76.

      In his last claim, Husband asserts that the court erroneously rejected

his exception pertaining to the fact that the master considered Wife’s

testimony that she had applied for SSD benefits. See Husband’ brief at 19-

20.   He maintains that Wife was never awarded such payments, and

accordingly, it was error to consider this testimony instead of the relevant

factors pertaining to equitable distribution and alimony. Id. at 19.

      Here, the court recounted that while the master noted Wife’s application

for SSD, it did not rely on that in its determination. See Trial Court Opinion,

2/20/23, at 4. Instead, the master concluded that even if the application for

SSD was denied, Wife nonetheless had extremely limited potential for

employability, for the reasons discussed infra. Id.

      This finding is supported by the record. Neither the master nor the court

placed any great emphasis on Wife’s statement concerning her application for

SSD. Instead, the bulk of the court’s findings related to Wife’s testimony and

documentation supporting the plethora of health issues that have plagued her,

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as well as her monthly expenses and lack of income. If any party emphasized

Wife’s SSD application, it was Husband, who raised it multiple times on Wife’s

cross-examination, though it was only mentioned in passing during direct.

See N.T. Hearing, 8/19/21, at 81-82, 95-96, 98 (inquiring as to status of the

SSD proceedings and potential benefits she may receive). We also find that

Husband never objected to this testimony when it was presented to the

master, which constitutes waiver. Thompson, 963 A.2d at 475-76. Husband

is therefore not entitled to relief on this claim.

      Since Husband has not convinced us that his exceptions to the master’s

report were improperly rejected, we will not disturb the trial court’s order

denying those exceptions.

      Order affirmed.

4/4/2024

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