Court Opinion

ID: 9741633
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:59:45.494613+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:25.163043
License: Public Domain

Dethmers, C. J.
This is appeal from a circuit court order affirming an order of the employment security appeal board upholding a referee’s decision that claimant, defendant John Thomas, Jr., is disqualified for benefits under the Michigan employment security act* for the duration of his unemployment, beginning April 17, 1957, because he left his work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the employer, defendant Scott Paper Company.
Claimant worked for employer from April 18, 1955, through April 2, 1957. On April 4, 1957, while driving to his employment he was arrested for driving an automobile without an operator’s license. The nest day he was convicted and sentenced to 15 days in the Detroit house of correction. On that day he notified his employer of his incarceration and that he would not be able to report for work until his release. On April 17th employer terminated his employment for failing to return to work. On April 19th he had completed serving his sentence and reported for work. He was denied admission to employer’s plant and later was notified that he had *668been discharged for failure to report for work due to jail sentence.
At the outset, it is to be observed that no claim is made here of the right to benefits for the period while claimant was in jail. During that period he did not meet the eligibility conditions of section 28 of the act in that he was not then “available” for work. (CLS 1956, § 421.28 [Stat Ann 1957 Cum Supp § 17.530].)
"With respect to his unemployment beginning on April 19th, immediately after his release from jail and when he reported for work, was he, as held by the referee, disqualified for benefits under section 29, subd (1) (a) (1) of the act because he left his work voluntarily? (CLS 1956, § 421.29 [Stat Ann 1957 Cum Supp § 17.531].)
There being no dispute as to the facts and circumstances attending and causing claimant’s absence from work while he was in jail and thereafter, we reject employer’s contention that the issue presented is not one of law but of fact requiring affirmance of the court below and the appeal board unless the decision is found to be contrary to the great weight of the evidence. Upon the record here presented the question whether claimant left his work voluntarily, within the meaning of the statute, is one of law, which we determine accordingly.
Employer points to the declaration of policy, in section 2 of the act (CL 1948, § 421.2 [Stat Ann 1950 Rev § 17.502]), that, inter alia, the reserves established under the act are “to be used for the benefit of persons unemployed through no fault of their own”. This section does not purport to spell out disqualifications for benefits. That is left to section 29. The declaration of policy might be considered helpful in arriving at the legislative intent in its expression of disqualifications if the latter were vague or ambiguous. The disqualification stated *669in section 29 and here sought to he invoiced suffers from no such infirmity, as applied to the facts at bar, and is in no need of borrowing’, for purposes of construction, from section 2.
Had claimant “left his work voluntarily”? Employer says that, although claimant knew the law required an operator’s license for driving, he deliberately drove his automobile without one, that he thus voluntarily assumed the risk of arrest, conviction and imprisonment, resulting in the necessity of absenting himself from work, and that this was the equivalent of leaving his work voluntarily. More concisely stated, it is employer’s position that an employee has left his work voluntarily if he has done a voluntary act which he knew could and which later did, in fact, cause his absence from work.
The voluntary assumption of a risk which am employee knows may, but he trusts and assumes will not, keep him from work is not the voluntary leaving of his work. Doing an act, even though voluntarily, which results, contrary to the doer’s hopes, wishes and intent, in his being kept forcibly from his work is not the same as voluntarily leaving his work. The statute mentions the latter, but not the former, as an act disqualifying for benefits. “We are not as yet prepared to accept and apply the doctrine of constructive voluntary leaving.” Copper Range Company v. Unemployment Compensation Commission, 320 Mich 460, 469. It is not the proper function of the court to amend the statute to broaden or extend the disqualifications fixed, in plain language, by the legislature. Whether one in claimant’s situation ought to be disqualified is a question of policy for the legislature, not a judicial question to be determined by the court.
Claimant was en route to his work. It was not shown that his driving voluntarily without a license was done with the purpose or intent of thereby *670becoming incarcerated and thus absent from work. As lie drove to Ms employment he intended to he on the job. Instead, be was arrested, imprisoned and so kept from bis work. There appears to have been nothing voluntary about this so far as claimant was concerned. On tbe contrary, at that juncture he was present at a place where he did not wish to be, jail, and, perforce, absent from tbe place where he did wish to be, bis place of work. We bold, therefore, that be did not leave bis work voluntarily and tbe disqualification for benefits urged against him does not apply.
Reversed.
Kelly, Smith, Black, Edwards, and Kavanagh, JJ., concurred with Dethmbrs, C. J.

 CL 1948 and CLS 1956, § 42.1.1 et seq. (Stat Ann 1950 Rev and Stat Ann 1955 Cum Supp § 17.501 et seq.).