Court Opinion

ID: 9914147
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-29 18:00:41.939986+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:10:24.631151
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                         FILED
                      UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                     DEC 29 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                             FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                       No.    21-10296

                  Plaintiff-Appellee,           D.C. Nos.
                                                3:19-cr-00026-LRH-WGC-1
    v.                                          3:19-cr-00026-LRH-WGC

MYRON MOTLEY,
                                                MEMORANDUM*
                  Defendant-Appellant.

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                              for the District of Nevada
                      Larry R. Hicks, District Judge, Presiding

                              Argued March 10, 2023
                            Submitted December 29, 2023
                                Las Vegas, Nevada

Before: GRABER, CLIFTON, and BENNETT, Circuit Judges.

         Myron Motley appeals his conviction and sentence arising from his

involvement in a conspiracy to distribute oxycodone and hydrocodone.1 We have

         *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
1
 In a concurrently filed opinion, we address Motley’s challenge to the district
court’s order declining to suppress evidence obtained from two tracking warrants
and determining that the wiretap warrant was necessary and was supported by
probable cause. We address his remaining arguments in this disposition.
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). We affirm Motley’s

conviction, affirm his sentence in part and vacate it in part, and remand for limited

resentencing consistent with this disposition.

      1.     Motley waived his Speedy Trial Act claim because he never moved to

dismiss before trial. See 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2); United States v. Tanh Huu Lam,

251 F.3d 852, 860–61 (9th Cir.), as amended on denial of reh’g and reh’g en banc

sub nom. United States v. Lam, 262 F.3d 1033 (9th Cir. 2001).

      We review Motley’s speedy trial claim under the Sixth Amendment for plain

error, as he raises it for the first time on appeal. See United States v. Sykes, 658

F.3d 1140, 1149 (9th Cir. 2011). “In assessing the merits of a claimed violation of

the Sixth Amendment speedy trial right, courts are to conduct a balancing test

involving four separate factors: the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the

defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant.” Tanh Huu Lam,

251 F.3d at 855.

      On balance, the factors do not support the claim. Even assuming that the

government should bear the responsibility for the COVID-related delay, the

“focal” factor—reason for the delay—is neutral because Motley and his

codefendants were also responsible for a substantial amount of the two-year delay.

United States v. King, 483 F.3d 969, 976 (9th Cir. 2007). Further, the remaining

factors do not weigh heavily in favor of a violation. The two-year delay was not

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excessive. See id. Motley did not consistently assert his speedy trial rights. See

id. Finally, Motley’s claim of prejudice is weak, as he provides only general

assertions that he experienced anxiety and concern from his incarceration during

the COVID-19 pandemic and fails to show that the delay prejudiced his defense.

      2.     Even assuming that de novo review applies, as Motley urges, his

Batson claim fails. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). Because the first

step of Batson’s three-step burden shifting framework is not at issue, we analyze

only the second and third steps. See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 358–

59 (1991) (plurality opinion). As to the second step, the government offered race-

neutral reasons for striking the alternative juror: he was young (twenty-two) and

unemployed, and he lacked a significant work history. Moving to step three,

Motley fails to show purposeful discrimination. Given the juror’s characteristics,

the prosecutor reasonably could have believed that the juror lacked the maturity

and experience to serve responsibly on a jury. Nor did the prosecutor challenge

three other Latino or Hispanic jurors, and Motley’s comparative analysis fails to

show pretext. These circumstances bolster our conclusion that Motley has not

proved purposeful discrimination.2 See Palmer v. Estelle, 985 F.2d 456, 458 (9th

2
  To the extent that Motley claims that the trial court found the government’s
reasons were pretextual, we disagree. At best, the transcript reflects that the court
thought that they were not Batson-prohibited reasons or may have questioned the
strength of the reasons.

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Cir. 1993); United States v. Hernandez-Garcia, 44 F.4th 1157, 1167 (9th Cir.),

cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 508 (2022).

      3.     The government argues that plain error review applies to Motley’s

sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges because, after the close of all the evidence,

he failed to renew his motion for judgment of acquittal under Federal Rule of

Criminal Procedure 29. But even assuming that de novo review applies, as Motley

argues, his insufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges fail. A conviction must be

upheld if, “viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).

      Contrary to Motley’s position, the prosecution could prove the requisite

mens rea under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) by showing that Motley “knew the identity

of the substance[s] he possessed.” McFadden v. United States, 576 U.S. 186, 192

(2015). There was more than sufficient evidence supporting the mens rea element.

The doctor involved in the conspiracy, Dr. Math, wrote Motley many prescriptions

for oxycodone. Motley provided a coconspirator with a prescription for

hydrocodone written by Dr. Math and, after filling the prescription, the

coconspirator gave Motley the prescription bottle so that Motley could take his

share of the pills. The label on the bottle explained that the substance contained

“hydrocod/acetam,” short for hydrocodone and acetaminophen. Based on this

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evidence, a rational juror could have found that Motley knew the substances were

oxycodone and hydrocodone.

      We also reject Motley’s claim that the evidence was insufficient to prove a

conspiratorial agreement to possess with intent to distribute, or to distribute, the

controlled substances. Motley obtained monthly prescriptions for large amounts of

oxycodone or hydrocodone from Dr. Math in his own name and in his

coconspirators’ names. Motley paid Dr. Math between $600 and $800 for each

prescription, and Dr. Math knew that Motley and his coconspirators were selling

the pills and knew that he was vital to the conspiracy. During a recorded phone

call between Motley and a coconspirator, they discussed how many pills the

coconspirator had received, who should sell the pills, and the exchange of money.

Another coconspirator testified that Motley would take a portion of her pills to

resell. Viewing all this evidence in the government’s favor, a rational juror could

have found that Motley agreed with his coconspirators to possess with intent to

distribute or to distribute oxycodone and hydrocodone. See United States v.

Loveland, 825 F.3d 555, 557 (9th Cir. 2016) (noting that a conspiratorial

agreement can be proved by circumstantial evidence).

      4.     Motley’s jury instruction challenges are unavailing. Under

McFadden, the district court correctly refused to instruct the jury that the

government had to prove that Motley knew the substances were listed as controlled

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substances. 576 U.S. at 192. A multiple conspiracies instruction was unnecessary

because Motley was the only defendant at trial, and so there was no risk of

spillover of guilt from a codefendant. See United States v. Liu, 631 F.3d 993, 1000

(9th Cir. 2011). The evidence also did not support a multiple conspiracies defense

because the evidence showed that Motley was a key participant in the charged

conspiracy, rather than a person involved only in a separate uncharged conspiracy.

See United States v. Moe, 781 F.3d 1120, 1127 (9th Cir. 2015). Finally, the court

instructed the jury that it had to find that “there was a plan to commit at least one

of the crimes alleged in the indictment as an object or purpose of the conspiracy

with all of you agreeing as to the particular crime which the conspirators agreed to

commit,” (emphasis added), and that Motley “joined in the agreement.” These

instructions amounted to a specific unanimity instruction, as they informed the jury

that it had to agree on which conspiracy supported the conspiracy conviction.

      The indictment was not improperly amended by the jury instructions. “For a

constructive amendment to inhere, jury instructions must ‘diverge materially’ from

the indictment and evidence must have been ‘introduced at trial that would enable

the jury to convict the defendant for conduct with which he was not charged.’”

United States v. Alvarez-Ulloa, 784 F.3d 558, 570 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting United

States v. Ward, 747 F.3d 1184, 1191 (9th Cir. 2014)). Although the instruction on

the conspiracy charge omitted the indictment’s text that the conspiracy was “not

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for a legitimate medical purpose and not in the usual course of professional

practice,” the court gave, verbatim, a separate instruction proposed by Motley:

      A person who works with or for a pharmacy or a physician may not be
      convicted when he or she distributes or dispenses controlled substances
      in good faith for a legitimate medical purpose and in the usual course
      of professional practice.

             A controlled substance is distributed or dispensed by a physician
      or pharmacist in the usual course of his or her professional practice and,
      therefore, lawfully, if the substance is distributed or dispensed by him
      or her in good faith in medically treating a patient.

             When you consider the good faith defense, it is the defendant’s
      belief that is important. It is the sincerity of his belief that determines
      if he acted in good faith.

            If the defendant’s belief is unreasonable, you may consider that
      in determining his sincerity of belief, but an unreasonable belief
      sincerely held is good faith.

Considering this instruction, which tracks the relevant wording in the indictment,

the jury instructions did not “diverge materially” from the indictment. Id.

      5.     In sentencing Motley, the district court did not clearly err in finding

that Motley was an organizer or leader. See United States v. Avila, 95 F.3d 887,

889 (9th Cir. 1996). Considering all the evidence, the district court reasonably

concluded that Motley exercised control over or organized others, as he arranged

for, bought, and obtained his coconspirators’ prescriptions. See id. And after the

prescriptions were filled, Motley took or acquired large amounts of the pills so that

he could resell them.

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      6.     Nothing in the record suggests that the district court failed to

appreciate its discretion to vary from the Sentencing Guidelines on policy grounds

under Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007). Motley points to a single

statement made by the district court: “[T]he Court’s policy, of course, [is] to be

guided in every case by the sentencing guidelines.” But that statement accurately

describes the Guidelines’ purpose. See Beckles v. United States, 580 U.S. 256, 263

(2017) (“[The Guidelines] guide the exercise of a court’s discretion in choosing an

appropriate sentence within the statutory range.” (emphasis added)).

      7.     We reject Motley’s challenges to the district court’s total converted

drug weight calculation. Contrary to Motley’s argument, the district court did not

improperly shift the burden by requiring him to prove a weight calculation. The

record shows that the court found that the government had met its burden and then

simply permitted Motley to challenge the court’s finding.

      Further, the court’s calculation was not clearly erroneous. See United States

v. Alvarez, 358 F.3d 1194, 1212 (9th Cir. 2004). Based on the evidence—

including that Dr. Math regularly delivered the coconspirators’ prescriptions to

Motley directly and that Motley paid Dr. Math for his coconspirators’

prescriptions—the court reasonably concluded that the government had proved by

a preponderance that all the pills prescribed by Dr. Math to Motley and his

coconspirators during the relevant period were within the scope and in furtherance

                                          8
of the conspiracy and reasonably foreseeable. See id.; U.S. Sent’g Guidelines

Manual § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A)–(B) (U.S. Sent’g Comm’n 2018) [hereinafter U.S.S.G.].

      8.     The district court did not impose a substantively unreasonable

sentence. The record shows that the court considered the required factors under 18

U.S.C. § 3553(a) in a “rational and meaningful” manner. United States v. Ressam,

679 F.3d 1069, 1089 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (quoting United States v. Tomko,

562 F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc)). Further, the sentence of 179 months

fell within the Guidelines range. See United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 988

(9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (“[W]e recognize that a correctly calculated Guidelines

sentence will normally not be found unreasonable on appeal.”). Considering the

totality of the circumstances, the district court did not abuse its discretion by

imposing a substantively unreasonable sentence. See id. at 993.

      9.     The district court did not orally pronounce the discretionary

“standard” supervised release conditions set forth in U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(c), but they

appear in the written judgment. Under our recent decision in United States v.

Montoya, 82 F.4th 640, 644–45 (9th Cir. 2023) (en banc), this was error. Thus, as

in Montoya, we vacate the conditions of supervised release that were referred to as

the “standard conditions” in the written judgment and remand “so that the district

court can cure its error by orally pronouncing any of the standard conditions of

supervised release that it chooses to impose and by giving [Motley] a chance to

                                           9
object to them.” Id. at 656. Because the circumstances here are materially

indistinguishable from those in Montoya, see id. at 645, we reject Motley’s

contention that we should simply strike the standard conditions. See Dkt. No. 51.

      10.     The district court plainly erred by imposing Special Condition 2,

which improperly delegated to the probation officer the authority to decide whether

Motley must participate in outpatient substance abuse treatment. Like the error in

United States v. Nishida, the district court here delegated a decision that goes to the

“nature or extent” of the punishment imposed. 53 F.4th 1144, 1152–53 (9th Cir.

2022). Under Nishida, Motley has shown that he is entitled to plain-error relief.

See id. We therefore vacate Special Condition 2 and remand for the district court

to reconsider that condition. See Montoya, 82 F.4th at 656 (noting that we have

discretion whether to “vacate only a particular portion of the supervised release

sentence”).

      CONVICTION AFFIRMED; SENTENCE AFFIRMED IN PART AND

VACATED IN PART; and REMANDED.

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