Court Opinion

ID: 9651557
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 16:26:24.471266+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:35.737058
License: Public Domain

Shea, J.
(dissenting). The language of the contract was clear and unequivocal. By its terms, the plaintiff was required to “[fjurnish all labor and material required to complete the ‘Plumbing,’ including Sprinkler System.”
*586The principle is too well established to require-citation that when parties have merged all prior negotiations and agreements in a writing, intending-to make it the repository of their final understanding, evidence of those prior negotiations and agreements will not be received. Cohn v. Dunn, 111 Conn. 342, 345, 149 A. 851. The fundamental question is-one of the intent of the parties. Did they intend to-make the writing the repository of their final understanding on the particular matter as to which parol evidence is offered? If so, the evidence must be-excluded. If, however, it appears that the parties-intended to restrict the writing to specific subjects of negotiation, then agreements concerning other-subjects may be proven even though those agreements differ from the writing. 9 Wigmore, Evidence (3d Ed.) § 2431. The intention of the partieseis to be ascertained from their conduct and language- and the surrounding circumstances. Pyskoty v. Sobusiak, 109 Conn. 593, 597, 145 A. 58. “In deciding upon this intent, the chief and most satisfactory index for the judge is found in the circumstance whether or not the particular element of the-alleged extrinsic negotiation is dealt with at all in! the writing. If it is mentioned, covered, or dealt, with in the writing, then presumably the writing was-meant to represent all of the transaction on that' element; if it is not, then probably the writing was-not intended to embody that element of the negotiation. This test is the one used by most careful judges, and is in contrast with the looser and incorrect inquiry . . . whether the alleged extrinsic-negotiation contradicts the terms of the writing.”" 9 Wigmore, Evidence (3d Ed.) p. 98. In the present case, the subject matter was covered in the contract" and the parol evidence should not have been ad*587■mitted. There was no evidence upon which the court reasonably conld find that the parties intended to supplement the subcontract by a contemporaneous •oral agreement of the nature claimed by the plaintiff.
Early in May, 1954, the plaintiff submitted to the •defendant and several other general contractors an -estimate for the plumbing and heating work which was required for the erection of the school. At that time, the plaintiff had before it the plans and specifi■eations for the work. Included among the specifications were certain addenda which provided that the board of education would have the right to elect •between certain alternatives in respect to the sprinkler system. The defendant was the successful bidder, and the general contract was awarded to it in May, 1954. Later, the plaintiff and the defendant entered into negotiations concerning the execution of a subcontract for the plumbing and heating work. On October 19, 1954, nearly five months after the ■defendant had been awarded the general contract by the board of education, the plaintiff and the defendant entered into a subcontract under the terms of which the plaintiff agreed to furnish all the labor .and material necessary for the plumbing and heating work, including the installation of a sprinkler system. The plaintiff agreed to perform all of this work for a specified sum of money. It is true, as •pointed out by the majority, that the subcontract provided that the general contract between the board of education and the defendant, including the plans and specifications, should become a part of the .subcontract. But it also specifically provided that these plans and specifications became a part of the r-subcontract only so far as they were applicable.
Under the subcontract, the plaintiff was obliged *588to install a sprinkler system, and it was required to-install the system in accordance with the specifications which applied to it. When a building contract is accompanied by plans and specifications which are-referred to in the contract and made a part thereof,, the specifications cannot, in the absence of express provision to that effect in the contract, restrict the scope of the contract or extend it to subjects other than those covered by its terms. The specifications-serve the purpose of explaining and amplifying, but not of adding to, the provisions of the contract. Most important, in case of a conflict in terms, the-contract itself prevails over the specifications. Cruthers v. Donahue, 85 Conn. 629, 631, 84 A. 322. In the present case, so far as the addenda to the specifications were inconsistent with the terms of the subcontract, the addenda should be disregarded. Without resort to them, the foundation for any claim of ambiguity is destroyed.
The so-called parol evidence rule is not a rule of evidence but one of substantive law. Cohn v. Dunn, 111 Conn. 342, 346, 149 A. 851. While objection may properly be made to the introduction of evidence on the ground that its admission would be in violation of the parol evidence rule, the essence of the objection is that the evidence, if admitted, would be ineffective to determine the rights of the parties, because it could not legally affect their rights as defined in the written contract and so would be immaterial. 9 Wigmore, Evidence (3d Ed.) § 2400; Thayer, Preliminary Treatise on Evidence, p. 392. If the evidence is admitted over objection or without objection, it still remains to be decided by the court whether under the circumstances of the particular case any agreement extrinsic to the writing, even if an agreement is proved, can legally *589be effective to add to, subtract from or vary tbeterms of tbe writing. Nagel v. Modern Investment Corporation, 132 Conn. 698, 700, 46 A.2d 605.
Where, as bere, a written contract is clear, plain and unequivocal, it is not tbe province of tbe court to alter it by construction or to make a new contract, for tbe parties. Tbe court is confined to tbe contract itself, without regard to its wisdom or folly. Lakitsch v. Brand, 99 Conn. 388, 393, 121 A. 865. Tbe contract made by tbe parties bere was tbe repository of tbeir final understanding. Tbe parol evidence-should not have been admitted. Even though it was-admitted improperly, it should not now be considered to affect, alter or vary the terms of tbe contract. Nagel v. Modern Investment Corporation supra.
In this opinion Mellitz, J., concurred.