Court Opinion

ID: 9635404
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:49:58.511253+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:26.595332
License: Public Domain

FLAHERTY, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent and would affirm the order of Commonwealth Court which upheld the dismissal of Chief Clites.
Appellant, Theodore E. Clites, was the chief of police for Upper Yoder Township, a township of the second class, *359from October 1974 until his discharge on October 30, 1981, for destruction of police log books. Those log books were kept in patrol cars and contained entries regarding all of the official activities involving the car for each shift, including date and time the officer entered the car, time calls were received and cleared, nature of calls and names of complainants, and time officer’s shift ended. As the majority notes, the information contained in the log books could be useful indicia of patterns or frequencies of particular types of incidents or disturbances within the township. The log books were apparently also the sole source of data regarding the use of patrol cars — expensive township equipment. No duplicates of the information contained in the log books existed. It is true the records were made for departmental control by Upper Yoder Township’s police chief and supervisors, and not because their making was mandated by statute, local ordinance or rule. Nevertheless, once made, in my view, the records became government records whose manner of disposal was regulated by statute.
The Act of May 9, 1949, P.L. 908, No. 250, deals specifically with the manner of record keeping in townships. Section 6 of that Act provides in relevant part: “Records which have been reproduced or copied in accordance with section one of this act or other records which are deemed valueless may be destroyed or otherwise disposed of, subject to the approval of the court of common pleas of the proper county.” 65 P.S. § 63.6 (1959). Likewise, Section 6 of the Municipal Records Act, Act of January 18, 1968, P.L. (1967) 961, which provides for the destruction of records in, inter alia, townships of the second class, provides, “[EJach individual act of disposition shall be approved by resolution of the governing body of the municipality.” 53 P.S. § 9006 (1972). Compare, 16 P.S. § 13004, which provides for disposition of records in counties of the second through eighth classes subject to certification of Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission; The Administrative Code of 1929, 71 P.S. § 204 (1962) providing for disposition of records of state level departments and agencies subject to *360approval of the Executive Board and the Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission; and 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 4321 and § 4322 (1981) governing disposition of court records. Whether Upper Yoder Township declared its intent to follow schedules promulgated pursuant to the Municipal Records Act does not appear of record. Regardless of which statute applies, however, it is clear that no records of the township could properly be discarded on the unilateral act of a single person. Clites admitted discarding the records without approval of any reviewing agency, and, in my view, this evidence supports the- charge of neglect or violation of an official duty, i.e. the duty to preserve the records pending permission to destroy them from the appropriate reviewing body.
Clites’ argument that no statute, ordinance or rule mandated creation of the log books is, in my view, unavailing; the records were made, and once made, their disposal was subject to the approval of either the court of common pleas or the township supervisors. Unfortunately, Clites did not secure such approval. Neither did the availability of the information from other sources relieve Clites of the duty to seek approval before these original records were discarded. See, 63 P.S. 63.6, supra; 53 P.S. § 9008 (1972).
I fully agree with the majority’s conclusion that the Board’s reliance on the criminal statute, 18 Pa.C.S,A. § 4911 as justification for Chief Clites’ removal was misplaced, but I cannot espouse the majority’s rationale. That section provides that a person commits an offense if he intentionally and unlawfully destroys the availability of any record belonging to or received or kept by the government for information or record. The majority states the log books fall outside the purview of § 4911 because their nature did not imply future use. Unless the books were kept for sentimental reasons, it is difficult to imagine what purpose other than future use was intended when the log book system was implemented. In fact, there was testimony in the Court of Common Pleas that the log books were to be used in an audit. In my view, in the absence of a *361conviction, there can be no reliance on a violation of the criminal statute as justification for Chief Clites’ dismissal.
Neither can I agree that Chief Clites has been denied due process of law, either as he alleges on grounds of improper commingling of adjudicative, prosecutive and investigative functions or on grounds of bias. It is not uncommon for administrative agencies to fulfill both the prosecutive and judicial functions, and the United States Supreme Court has declared there is. no per se denial of due process where an agency adjudicates a matter at its own contested hearing on charges evolving from its own investigation. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 95 S.Ct. 1456, 43 L.Ed.2d 712 (1975). That court wrote:
It is not surprising ... to find that “[t]he case law, both federal and state, generally rejects the idea that the combination [of] judging [and] investigating functions is a denial of due process____” 2 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 13.02, p 175 (1958). Similarly, our cases, although they reflect the substance of the problem, offer no support for the bald proposition applied in this case by the District Court that agency members who participate in an investigation are disqualified from adjudicating. The incredible variety of administrative mechanisms in this country will not yield to any single organizing principle.
[T]he mere exposure to evidence presented in nonadversary investigative procedures is insufficient in itself to impugn the fairness of the Board members at a later adversary hearing. Without a showing to the contrary, state administrators ‘are assumed to be men of conscience and intellectual discipline, capable of judging a particular controversy fairly on the basis of its own circumstances.’ United States v. Morgan, 313 US 409, 421, 85 L.Ed 1429, 61 S.Ct. 999 (1941).
Id. 421 U.S. at 52-55; 95 S.Ct. at 1467-69, 43 L.Ed.2d at 726-728.
*362The township supervisors are statutorily charged with the ultimate responsibility for general supervision of township affairs, 53 P.S. § 65510 (1984-1985), including operation of the police force, and this function is non-delegable. The chief of police is employed by the supervisors and reports directly to them. Inherent in the nature of this employer-employee relationship is the near certainty that the need for disciplinary action will arise. Section 4 of the police tenure act expressly requires the township supervisors, as the appointing authority, to adjudicate the propriety of its own action preferring charges if the police chief demands a hearing on the charges, 53 P.S. § 814 (1974). The General Assembly has propounded a reasonable mechanism for governmental' operations and employee supervision and there is no authority for the supervisors to delegate either the responsibility to oversee the operation of the police force or the power to adjudicate the necessity or propriety of disciplinary measures. Delegatus non potest delegare,1 All that can be required is that the supervisors make their adjudication fairly on the basis of the evidence presented at the § 814 hearing where such a hearing, is requested.
‘ Chief Clites was employed by and reported directly to the township supervisors. The supervisors, for whatever reason, requested all the records regarding the operation of the police force, which they had a right to do. When the requested records were not produced, the township supervisors apparently assumed Chief Clites had violated a directive and, on this basis, they concluded there was insubordination justifying his removal. Clites then demanded a public hearing, as was his right, 53 P.S. § 814. At that *363hearing, Clites was represented by counsel, the township solicitor acted as prosecutor and a third' attorney presided over the hearing to guard against possible procedural defects. The parties stipulated that the records had- been destroyed. On' this evidence, the supervisors decided to remove Clites for unauthorized destruction of government property, which they believed to be illegal. What constitutes due process depends on what process is due under the particular circumstances of each case. The procedures employed in this case were entirely in order, and Clites’ argument that the supervisors improperly commingled investigative, prosecutive and adjudicative functions is meritless. Any holding to the contrary would deprive the supervisors of their inherent supervisory powers. We should not “second guess” those eiected to fulfill this responsibility. The majority view, taken to its extreme, would work to nullify the inherent powers of supervision in the elected supervisors, which surely include investigating and calling into question the activities of the township’s police employees.
On appeal, the Court of Common Pleas took additional testimony,' and, thus, made a de novo factual determination. Based on this additional testimony, the Court affirmed the Board’s conclusion that Clites improperly destroyed the log books on his own initiative. If as the majority suggests, the supervisors had in fact prejudged Clites’ case, the de novo proceedings in Common Pleas Court effectively cured any prejudice.
I cannot agree that bias on the part of one of the supervisors tainted the proceeding before the Board. Clites had initiated criminal charges against one of the supervisors, which culminated in disposition under the Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition program. That supervisor testified in the de novo proceeding before Judge Creany that he was not biased, and Judge Creany, who was in a position to observe the demeanor of the witness and evaluate his credibility, held the proceeding before the Board was proper. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that all three supervisors joined in the order dismissing Clites as chief of police. *364Clites’ case is clearly distinguishable from Gardner v. Repasky, 434 Pa. 126, 252 A.2d 704 (1969) where the complainant cast the deciding vote for removal (2-1) and there was no de novo proceeding in the Court of Common Pleas, and we suggested the protection of due process was denied. I cannot agree that the conclusion of the Board was the product of bias.
I would hold that conduct short of a criminal conviction may, nonetheless, constitute cause for removal of a police chief under 53 P.S. § 812. Although perhaps not amounting to inefficiency, intemperance, disobedience of orders, or conduct unbecoming an officer, in my view, destruction of township records without prior approval certainly constitutes neglect or violation of an official duty justifying removal of a police chief. I would affirm the order of Commonwealth Court.
ZAPPALA, J., joins this dissenting opinion.

. The instant case is clearly distinguishable from Dussia v. Barger, 466 Pa. 152, 351 A.2d 667 (1976). There we invalidated a state police field regulatory scheme which vested the Commissioner with sole discretion to investigate whether a purely advisory panel should be convened to investigate state troopers and make recommendations whether court-martial proceedings should be initiated where the Commissioner, as head of an administrative hierarchy, also had authority to determine guilt or innocence and impose sanctions. Here the township board of supervisors, a duly elected governing body, has a non-delegable duty to oversee all the operations of the township, including the duty to monitor and, if need be, discipline employees.