Court Opinion

ID: 9399498
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-05 10:08:29.969952+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:24.213071
License: Public Domain

In the
                     Court of Appeals
             Second Appellate District of Texas
                      at Fort Worth
                  ___________________________
                       No. 02-22-00191-CV
                  ___________________________

                    ERICA QUINN, Appellant

                                 V.

 STATE FARM LLOYDS; STATE FARM LLOYDS, INC.; JIM GOLDSWORTHY;
  HAROLD D. BAKER AS TRUSTEE OF HAROLD D. AND MADONNA A.
BAKER TRUST; RANDALL TODD BAKER AND SHELLY ZOYLA BAKER, CO-
 TRUSTEES AS TRUSTEE OF THE NEW COVENANT FAMILY REVOCABLE
   TRUST; RANDALL TODD BAKER; SHELLY ZOYLA BAKER; MICHAEL
 STEVEN WEY; RANDALL HOUSTON HARBERT; AND CHUCK PEDROSO,
                           Appellees

               On Appeal from the 235th District Court
                       Cooke County, Texas
                   Trial Court No. CV19-00103

               Before Bassel, Womack, and Wallach, JJ.
               Memorandum Opinion by Justice Bassel
                           MEMORANDUM OPINION
      This appeal arises from a lawsuit concerning a February 2017 fire loss to

Appellant Erica Quinn’s residential property located in Lake Kiowa, Texas (the

Property), and the insurance policy on the Property.

      Quinn, acting pro se, originally filed suit in March 2019. Over the course of

nearly three years, Quinn amended her petition four times, adding, removing, and re-

adding defendants in the process. At the time of appeal, Quinn’s “live” pleading was

her “Third Amended Complaint”1 in which she asserted claims against State Farm

Lloyds and certain of its agents for violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices

Act (DTPA), common law and statutory fraud, breach of contract, and defamation.

She also asserted claims against the prior Property owners based on their marketing of

the Property and supposed “defective construction” of certain improvements.

      Ultimately, the trial court entered take-nothing summary judgments or

dismissal orders disposing of Quinn’s claims against all of the defendants. Quinn

appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by granting certain of the defendants’

dispositive motions. We will affirm.

      1
        Although Quinn incorrectly labeled her pleading a “complaint,” we will refer
to it herein as her petition. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 78; see also Gentry v. Smith, No. 05-18-
01181-CV, 2019 WL 4033947, at *1 n.2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 27, 2019, pet.
denied) (mem. op.).

                                            2
                                    I. Background

      As noted above, this case stems from Quinn’s claim for insurance benefits in

connection with a February 2017 fire at the Property. Believing that she was entitled

to much more than the $700,000 in policy benefits that she had received to cover the

fire damage, on March 1, 2019, Quinn sued her insurer State Farm Lloyds2 and its

agent Jim Goldsworthy. Quinn also sued the previous owners of the Property—the

Harold D. & Madonna A. Baker Trust, New Covenant Family Revocable Trust, Shelly

Z. Baker, and Randall T. Baker (collectively, the Baker Defendants)—claiming that

their “defective installation” of an outdoor fireplace had caused the fire and that they

had misrepresented the “quality, integrity[,] and warranty” of the Property.

      Quinn’s petition mistakenly named State Farm Lloyds’s attorney-in-fact SFL

Inc. as a defendant instead of State Farm Lloyds.3 Because SFL Inc. is not an insurer

and does not investigate or handle insurance claims and thus had no interest in

      2
        As discussed in greater detail below, Quinn’s original petition erroneously
named State Farm Lloyds, Inc. (SFL Inc.) as a defendant instead of State Farm
Lloyds.
      3
        As the Fifth Circuit has explained, State Farm Lloyds and SFL Inc. “are
distinct legal entities.” De Jongh v. State Farm Lloyds, 555 F. App’x 435, 436 n.1 (5th
Cir. 2014). State Farm Lloyds “sells insurance under a so-called ‘Lloyd’s plan,’ which
consists of a group of underwriters who combine to issue insurance through an
attorney[-]in[-]fact”—SFL Inc. See id. (citing Tex. Ins. Code Ann. § 941.001). “‘[T]he
attorney[-]in[-]fact acts as an agent for the Lloyd’s group,’” but it “does not bear risks
and has no contractual relationship with the insured.” Id. (quoting Royal Ins. Co. of
Am. v. Quinn–L Cap. Corp., 3 F.3d 877, 882 (5th Cir. 1993)).

                                            3
Quinn’s suit, it filed a verified denial pointing out the defect of parties and moved for

summary judgment.

      In July 2019, Quinn filed an amended petition and a response to SFL Inc.’s

summary judgment motion. In her first amended petition, Quinn acknowledged that

she had filed a “parallel action” in federal court “seeking relief under the Federal

Racketeering Influenced Organizations Act [sic] for acts of organized crime

committed by Parent and Sister company of Defendant Lloyds, and officers of

Defendants’ parent company State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company.”

      Several weeks later, Quinn filed a “corrected” first amended petition removing

SFL Inc. as a defendant and adding State Farm Lloyds in its place. She also filed an

amended response to SFL Inc.’s summary judgment motion admitting that she had

“erroneously” named SFL Inc. as a defendant.           Because Quinn had voluntarily

dismissed SFL Inc. from the suit, the hearing on its motion for summary judgment

was canceled.

      After dismissing SFL Inc.—the only defendant Quinn had served with process

up to that point—Quinn did not attempt to serve State Farm Lloyds or any other

defendant and did nothing to advance this case for nearly two years while she pursued

her parallel action in federal court.      Quinn’s federal action was dismissed in

November 2020 because Quinn and her co-plaintiff John S. Vanderbol III had

failed—despite amending their complaint multiple times—to provide a short and

plain statement of their claims as required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

                                           4
See generally Vanderbol v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., No. 4:19-cv-119, 2020 WL

6866393 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 23, 2020), aff’d, No. 20-40875, 2021 WL 2577611 (5th Cir.

Mar. 1, 2021).

      In March 2021, shortly after the Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Quinn’s

parallel action, the trial court placed this case on its dismissal docket, meaning that

unless Quinn took certain steps, her lawsuit would be dismissed for want of

prosecution. To prevent dismissal of her lawsuit, Quinn filed a motion to retain the

case on the court’s docket.

      On July 20, 2021, Quinn filed a second amended petition adding new

defendants and removing others. Specifically, she added Charles Pedroso, Michael

Steven Wey, and Randall Houston Harbert 4 and removed the Baker Defendants.5

      On July 29, 2021, the trial court signed an order retaining the case on its docket

but requiring Quinn to perfect service on all of the defendants named in her second

amended petition on or before December 1, 2021. In response to the trial court’s

      4
        Quinn’s second amended petition alleges, among other things, that Pedroso
was “employed by Defendant Lloyds” and “engaged in deceptive trade practices” “as
instructed by Defendant Lloyds”; that Wey “acted as the President of Defendant
Lloyds during the entire time the Defendants engaged in the unlawful conduct”; and
that Harbert “is the chief architect” of State Farm Lloyds’s supposed scheme to
defraud Quinn and “acted to cause Defendant Lloyds . . . to engage in deceptive trade
practices.”
      At the time that Quinn filed her second amended petition removing the Baker
      5

Defendants from the lawsuit, they had not been served with process.

                                          5
directive, Quinn served three of the defendants: State Farm Lloyds, Goldsworthy, and

Pedroso.

      State Farm Lloyds, Goldsworthy, and Pedroso each answered the suit and filed

dispositive motions. Among other things, they asserted that the trial court should

dismiss Quinn’s causes of action against them or, alternatively, grant them summary

judgment because Quinn’s claims were barred by limitations.

      Shortly before the hearing on State Farm Lloyds’s, Goldsworthy’s, and

Pedroso’s dispositive motions, Quinn filed a response to the motions and amended

her petition again. This time, Quinn re-added SFL Inc. and the Baker Defendants as

defendants even though she had voluntarily dismissed them in her prior pleadings.

      On November 12, 2021, the trial court heard State Farm Lloyds’s,

Goldsworthy’s, and Pedroso’s dispositive motions. Following the hearing, the trial

court signed an order granting State Farm Lloyds’s, Goldsworthy’s, and Pedroso’s

summary judgment motions and dismissing Quinn’s claims against them with

prejudice.

      At that point in time, Quinn still had not served any of the other defendants

and, in fact, had not even paid for citations to be issued to SFL Inc. or the Baker

Defendants. But after Quinn’s claims against State Farm Lloyds, Goldsworthy, and

Pedroso were dismissed, she began to make efforts to serve the other defendants.

                                         6
      On November 12, 2021—the date of the summary judgment hearing—Quinn

filed a motion requesting authorization to serve Wey by alternative means. The trial

court granted this motion, and Quinn later perfected service on Wey.

      Shortly thereafter, Quinn filed a similar motion to serve Harbert by alternative

means, but the trial court denied it. As a result, Quinn never served Harbert.

      On November 23, 2021, citations and returns of service for Randall T. Baker,

Shelly Z. Baker, and New Covenant Family Revocable Trust were filed.

      In December 2021, SFL Inc., Wey, the Bakers, and New Covenant timely filed

answers to Quinn’s third amended petition. In their answers, each defendant raised

the defense of limitations and requested dismissal of Quinn’s claims under Rule 91a

or, in the alternative, the entry of a take-nothing summary judgment.

      Following a February 1, 2022 hearing on SFL Inc.’s, Wey’s, the Bakers’, and

New Covenant’s dispositive motions, the trial court signed take-nothing summary

judgments dismissing Quinn’s claims against SFL Inc. and Wey with prejudice and

dismissed with prejudice Quinn’s claims against Harbert for want of prosecution. At

the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court also indicated that Quinn’s claims against

the Harold D. and Madonna A. Baker Trust and New Covenant would be dismissed

but took the Bakers’ individual dispositive motions under advisement and requested

additional briefing on those motions.

      In April 2022, the trial court signed orders dismissing Quinn’s claims against

New Covenant and the Harold D. and Madonna A. Baker Trust. In addition, the trial

                                           7
court signed orders granting the Bakers both take-nothing summary judgments and

Rule 91a dismissals.

      This appeal followed.

                                   II. Discussion

      In five issues, Quinn argues that the trial court erred by (1) granting summary

judgments to State Farm Lloyds, SFL Inc., Goldsworthy, Wey, and Pedroso

(collectively, the SF Appellees); (2) granting both summary judgments and Rule 91a

dismissals to the Bakers (as opposed to granting one form of relief or the other);

(3) dismissing Quinn’s claims against New Covenant; (4) granting summary judgments

to the Bakers; and (5) dismissing Quinn’s claims against Harbert with prejudice. We

will address each of these issues below.

A. The Trial Court Did Not Err by Granting Summary Judgments to the SF
   Appellees
      In her first issue, Quinn asserts that the trial court erred by granting the SF

Appellees summary judgments on limitations grounds. We disagree.

      1. Standard of Review

      We review a summary judgment de novo. Travelers Ins. v. Joachim, 315 S.W.3d

860, 862 (Tex. 2010). We consider the evidence presented in the light most favorable

to the nonmovant, crediting evidence favorable to the nonmovant if reasonable jurors

could, and disregarding evidence contrary to the nonmovant unless reasonable jurors

could not. Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding, 289 S.W.3d 844, 848

                                           8
(Tex. 2009). We indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in the

nonmovant’s favor. 20801, Inc. v. Parker, 249 S.W.3d 392, 399 (Tex. 2008). A

defendant is entitled to summary judgment on an affirmative defense if the defendant

conclusively proves all elements of that defense. Frost Nat’l Bank v. Fernandez, 315

S.W.3d 494, 508–09 (Tex. 2010); see Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(b), (c). To accomplish this,

the defendant must present summary judgment evidence that conclusively establishes

each element of the affirmative defense. See Chau v. Riddle, 254 S.W.3d 453, 455 (Tex.

2008).

         2. Applicable Law Regarding Statutes of Limitations

         A statute of limitations establishes a time limit for suing in a civil case. Goetsch

v. Rolls, No. 02-20-00263-CV, 2021 WL 733090, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb.

25, 2021, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing Statute of Limitations, Black’s Law Dictionary

(11th ed. 2019)). A statute of limitations operates as an affirmative defense to a cause

of action. Dunmore v. Chi. Title Ins. Co., 400 S.W.3d 635, 640 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013,

no pet.).

         A statute of limitations begins to run on the accrual date, which is the date that

the cause of action accrues. See JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Pro. Pharmacy II, 508

S.W.3d 391, 414 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2014, no pet.). Generally, a cause of action

accrues when facts giving rise to the cause of action come into existence, even if those

facts are not discovered, or the resulting injuries do not occur, until later. See Exxon

                                              9
Corp. v. Emerald Oil & Gas Co., 348 S.W.3d 194, 202 (Tex. 2011) (op. on reh’g);

Dunmore, 400 S.W.3d at 640.

      The discovery rule is a narrow exception to the general rule that a cause of

action accrues when facts giving rise to it come into existence. Berry v. Berry, 646

S.W.3d 516, 524 (Tex. 2022). This rule, which “is only applied in exceptional cases,”

defers the accrual date until the claimant discovers, or reasonably should have

discovered, the facts giving rise to the cause of action.       Id. (internal quotations

omitted).

      The discovery rule only applies to a cause of action if (1) the injury incurred is

inherently undiscoverable and (2) the evidence of the injury is objectively verifiable.

Shell Oil Co. v. Ross, 356 S.W.3d 924, 930 (Tex. 2011). “An injury is inherently

undiscoverable if it is by nature unlikely to be discovered within the prescribed

limitations period despite due diligence.” Berry, 646 S.W.3d at 524. Whether an injury

is inherently undiscoverable is determined categorically. Archer v. Tregellas, 566 S.W.3d

281, 290 (Tex. 2018). Thus, the analysis focuses on the class of injury and whether

someone is likely to discover, through reasonable diligence, the type of injury

sustained within the limitations period—not whether a specific plaintiff is likely to

discover, through reasonable diligence, its particular injury. Id.; see Wagner & Brown,

Ltd. v. Horwood, 58 S.W.3d 732, 735 (Tex. 2001).

      A defendant who moves for summary judgment based on the statute of

limitations bears the burden of proving when the cause of action accrued. Erikson v.

                                           10
Renda, 590 S.W.3d 557, 563 (Tex. 2019). The plaintiff may plead the discovery rule in

response to a limitations defense, see Schlumberger Tech. Corp. v. Pasko, 544 S.W.3d 830,

834 (Tex. 2018), but the defendant need not negate the discovery rule to prove when

the cause of action accrued unless the plaintiff pleads it, Erikson, 590 S.W.3d at 563; In

re Est. of Matejek, 960 S.W.2d 650, 651 (Tex. 1997).         If the plaintiff pleads the

discovery rule, the defendant may disprove it by proving that (1) it does not apply or

(2) it applies but summary judgment evidence demonstrates that the plaintiff

discovered, or reasonably should have discovered, its injury within the limitations

period. Schlumberger, 544 S.W.3d at 834.

      3. Quinn’s Claims Against the SF Appellees Are Barred by Limitations

      Although Quinn’s petition is prolix and difficult to decipher, the SF Appellees

have grouped her claims into four broad, subject-matter-based categories that provide

a useful framework for our analysis: (i) Quinn’s acquisition of the insurance policy on

the Property in Spring 2016; (ii) Quinn’s dissatisfaction with the handling of, and June

2017 payment on, her fire damage claim; (iii) certain acts that allegedly occurred

between April and August 2017 pertaining to the subrogation process; and (iv) reports

allegedly made to a national insurance database in December 2017.

      Based on these four broad categories of conduct, Quinn asserted claims against

the SF Appellees for (1) breach of contract; (2) violations of the DTPA and Chapter

                                           11
541 of the Texas Insurance Code; (3) fraud; and (4) defamation.6 Because Quinn

argues that the trial court erred by granting the SF Appellees summary judgments on

limitations grounds, we begin our analysis with an examination of the statutes of

limitations applicable to each of Quinn’s claims.

              a. We set forth the statutes of limitations applicable to Quinn’s
                 claims against the SF Appellees.
       Ordinarily, the limitations period for a breach-of-contract claim is four years.

See Cosgrove v. Cade, 468 S.W.3d 32, 35 (Tex. 2015); see also Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.

Code Ann. § 16.051 (prescribing a residual limitations period of four years).

However, an insurance contract may provide for a shorter limitations period, and

       6
         Although Quinn did not label any of her causes of action as a “defamation
claim,” her claim that the SF Appellees made “fraudulent statements” to “national
insurance databases falsely alleging [Quinn] to be responsible for damages to
[Quinn’s] vehicles” sounds in defamation, not fraud. To prove a fraud claim, a
plaintiff must show, among other things, that the speaker made a false representation
with the intent that the plaintiff would rely upon it and that the plaintiff did, in fact,
act in reliance on the representation. See Italian Cowboy Partners, Ltd. v. Prudential Ins.
Co. of Am., 341 S.W.3d 323, 337 (Tex. 2011) (listing elements of fraud cause of action).
However, Quinn did not plead that these so-called fraudulent statements were made
with the intent that she rely upon them or that she in fact did so; indeed, she did not
even plead that the statements were made to her. See id. Thus, to the extent it has any
viability, Quinn’s claim based on the SF Appellees’ alleged statements about Quinn to
“national insurance databases” is properly characterized as a defamation claim. See
Surgitek, Bristol-Myers Corp. v. Abel, 997 S.W.2d 598, 601 (Tex. 1999) (“[W]e look to the
substance of a motion to determine the relief sought, not merely to its title.”);
Karagounis v. Bexar Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 70 S.W.3d 145, 147 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
2001, pet. denied) (“The true nature of a lawsuit depends on the facts alleged in the
petition, the rights asserted and the relief sought, and not on the terms used to
describe the cause of action.” (quoting Billings v. Concordia Heritage Ass’n, 960 S.W.2d
688, 693 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1997, pet. denied))); see also WFAA–TV, Inc. v.
McLemore, 978 S.W.2d 568, 571 (Tex. 1998) (listing elements of defamation).

                                            12
such contractual limitations provisions are valid and enforceable as long as they do

“not create a limitations period shorter than two years.” Sheppard v. Travelers Lloyds of

Tex. Ins. Co., No. 14-08-00248-CV, 2009 WL 3294997, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston

[14th Dist.] Oct. 15, 2009, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.

Code Ann. § 16.070). Because Quinn’s policy contains a clause requiring any “suit or

action” against State Farm Lloyds to be filed within “two years and one day after the

cause of action accrues,” the applicable limitations period for Quinn’s breach-of-

contract claim is two years. See id.

       Like breach-of-contract claims, fraud claims are also typically subject to a four-

year limitations period. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 16.004(a)(4); Agar Corp.,

Inc. v. Electro Circuits Int’l, LLC, 580 S.W.3d 136, 139 (Tex. 2019). Thus, the limitations

period for Quinn’s fraud claims against the SF Appellees other than State Farm

Lloyds is four years.     But because of the aforementioned limitations-shortening

provision in Quinn’s insurance policy, the limitations period for her fraud claim

against State Farm Lloyds is two years. See Stevens v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.,

929 S.W.2d 665, 671 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1996, writ denied) (applying two-year

limitations period to fraud claim based on similar limitations-shortening provision); see

also Sheppard, 2009 WL 3294997, at *2.

       The limitations period for Quinn’s DTPA and Insurance Code claims is two

years. See Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 17.565; Tex. Ins. Code Ann. § 541.162.

                                            13
       The limitations period applicable to Quinn’s defamation claim is one year. See

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 16.002(a).

              b. To forestall the running of limitations, a party must act
                 diligently to effect service of process; Quinn was not diligent.
       Filing a lawsuit does not stop the limitations period from running “unless the

plaintiff exercises due diligence in the issuance and service of citation.” Proulx v. Wells,

235 S.W.3d 213, 215 (Tex. 2007). The date of service will relate back to the filing date

only “if service is diligently effected after limitations has expired.” Id.

       In a summary judgment context, there are shifting burdens on the question of

whether a plaintiff exercised due diligence in effecting service. A defendant meets its

initial burden to establish a limitations defense by showing that service occurred after

the limitations period expired. Flanigan v. Nekkalapu, 613 S.W.3d 361, 364 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth 2020, no pet.). With this showing in place, “the burden shifts to

the plaintiff to explain the delay and to raise a fact question regarding diligence of

service.” Id. (citing Butler v. Skegrud, No. 02-14-00168-CV, 2015 WL 4148474, at *2

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 9, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.)). This burden includes the

need to explain every “lapse in effort or period of delay.”              Id. (citing Proulx,

235 S.W.3d at 216). Should the plaintiff raise a fact question on the issue of diligence,

“the burden shifts back to the defendant to conclusively show why the explanation is

insufficient.” Id. at 365.

                                             14
       The standard to assess diligence is whether “the plaintiff acted as an ordinarily

prudent person would have acted under the same or similar circumstances and was

diligent up until the time the defendant was served.” Proulx, 235 S.W.3d at 216.

“Generally, the question of the plaintiff’s diligence in effecting service is one of fact[]

and is determined by examining the time it took to secure citation, service, or both,

and the type of effort or lack of effort the plaintiff expended in procuring service.”

Id. But “the plaintiff’s explanation of its service efforts may demonstrate a lack of due

diligence as a matter of law, as when one or more lapses between service efforts are

unexplained or patently unreasonable.” Id.

       Here, where applicable,7 the SF Appellees raised the issue of Quinn’s diligence

in effecting service. The record shows gaps of more than two years between the dates

       7
        As detailed above, Quinn named SFL Inc. as a defendant in her original
petition in March 2019 and effected service in June 2019. But Quinn later effectively
nonsuited SFL Inc. by filing her “corrected” first amended petition removing SFL
Inc. as a defendant and adding State Farm Lloyds instead. See Johnson v. Coca-Cola Co.,
727 S.W.2d 756, 758 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1987, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (explaining that “[t]he
filing of an amended petition omitting an individual or entity as a party has the effect
of dismissing such party the same as if a formal dismissal order had been entered”).
Quinn later re-added SFL Inc. as a defendant in her third amended petition, which
was filed November 5, 2021, and effected service on November 29, 2021. Because
SFL Inc. was technically served only twenty-four days after Quinn filed her third
amended petition, SFL Inc. did not raise the issue of Quinn’s diligence in effecting
service in its answer or dispositive motions. However, because Quinn effectively
dismissed SFL Inc. from the case, limitations on Quinn’s claims against SFL Inc. are
calculated to run through the date she re-added it to the lawsuit, not the initial filing
date. See Clary Corp. v. Smith, 949 S.W.2d 452, 459 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1997, pet.
denied) (“When a cause of action is dismissed and later refiled, limitations are
calculated to run from the time the cause of action accrued until the date that the
claim is refiled.”); Johnson, 727 S.W.2d at 758 (affirming summary judgment on

                                            15
that State Farm Lloyds and Goldsworthy were added as defendants and the dates that

they were served; a gap of four months for Wey; and a gap of two months for

Pedroso. Indeed, Quinn did not serve any defendants other than SFL Inc. until more

than two years had passed since she initially filed suit and only began attempting to

effect service on the other defendants after the trial court threatened to dismiss her

lawsuit for want of prosecution. However, Quinn offered no explanation for these

delays.

          Given the unexplained, prolonged lapses in Quinn’s service efforts, we

conclude that she lacked due diligence as a matter of law. See Proulx, 235 S.W.3d at

216. Accordingly, the dates of service of the SF Appellees do not relate back to the

filing date, and the dates of service, not the filing date, are the relevant dates for

determining whether Quinn’s claims against the SF Appellees are time-barred. See id.

at 215–16.

                c. All of Quinn’s claims against the SF Appellees that are subject
                   to one- or two-year limitations periods are time-barred.
          As set forth above, while the limitations period for Quinn’s fraud claims against

the SF Appellees other than State Farm Lloyds is four years, the remainder of her

claims are subject to either a one-year or two-year limitations period. Regardless of

what the actual accrual dates of Quinn’s claims were, her claims must have accrued no

limitations grounds where previously dismissed defendant was re-added after
limitations had run).

                                             16
later than March 1, 2019—the date on which she filed suit. 8 See Russell v. Ingersoll-Rand

Co., 841 S.W.2d 343, 344 n.3 (Tex. 1992). Assuming a March 1, 2019 accrual date, the

one-year limitations period would have expired on March 1, 2020, and the two-year

limitations period would have expired on March 1, 2021. However, as of March 1,

2021, Quinn had not served any of the SF Appellees—and had not even named Wey

or Pedroso as a defendant. 9

      Because Quinn served the SF Appellees after the one-year and two-year

limitations periods had expired and her service efforts lacked diligence as a matter of

law, all of her claims that are subject to either a one- or two-year limitations period—

that is, all of her claims except for her fraud claims against SFL Inc., Goldsworthy,

Wey, and Pedroso—are time-barred. Thus, the trial court did not err by granting the

SF Appellees summary judgment on those claims. See Velsicol Chem. Corp. v. Winograd,

956 S.W.2d 529, 532 (Tex. 1997).

      8
        Although, as detailed above, Quinn amended her petition numerous times,
adding and removing parties in the process, she alleged the same essential insurance-
related claims—fraud, breach of contract, violations of the DTPA and Chapter 541 of
the Insurance Code, and defamation—in her original petition as she did in her third
amended petition.
      9
        As previously noted, while Quinn named SFL Inc. as a defendant in her
original petition and effected service in June 2019, she later dismissed SFL Inc. from
the lawsuit and did not re-add it as a defendant until she filed her third amended
petition in November 2021.

                                           17
              d. Quinn’s remaining claims against the SF Appellees are also
                 time-barred.
       Quinn’s fraud claims against SFL Inc., Goldsworthy, Wey, and Pedroso—her

only claims subject to a four-year limitations period—are also time-barred. Quinn’s

fraud claim pertains to her acquisition of the insurance policy on the Property in

Spring 2016.10     Specifically, her petition alleges that in March 2016 she paid a

premium for a “five-million-dollar State Farm Homeowners Insurance Policy” but

that when she received her policy on April 5, 2016, she “noticed the amount of

‘homeowners’ coverage’ was significantly less than” five million dollars and that the

insurer was not “State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company” (SF Auto) but

rather State Farm Lloyds, “a company of significantly less asset value” than SF Auto.

Quinn claims that the SF Appellees defrauded her by, among other things,

misrepresenting the insurer that would be issuing the policy and the amount of

coverage she would receive.

       Thus, by Quinn’s own admission, facts giving rise to her fraud causes of action

came into existence on April 5, 2016. She alleges that as of that date, she had paid a

premium for what she believed to be a five-million-dollar insurance policy from SF

       10
         In her petition, Quinn makes a myriad of allegations concerning alleged
statements made by certain of the SF Appellees after the February 2017 fire loss. It is
unclear whether Quinn attempts to base any of her fraud claims on these post-loss
statements, but regardless of Quinn’s intentions, such statements generally do not give
rise to fraud claims because an insured could not have relied on such statements to
her detriment. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Ind., No. 18-CV-00851, 2019 WL
650437, at *5 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 7, 2019) (citing Partain v. Mid-Continent Specialty Ins. Servs.,
Inc., No. H-10-2580, 2012 WL 201864, at *7–10 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 20, 2012)).

                                             18
Auto but instead had received a policy issued by State Farm Lloyds that clearly

reflected a lesser coverage amount. Accordingly, her fraud claims against the SF

Appellees accrued as of April 5, 2016. See Exxon Corp., 348 S.W.3d at 202; Dunmore,

400 S.W.3d at 640.

      Quinn’s arguments in favor of a later accrual date for her fraud claims are

unavailing. First, Quinn, pointing to her allegation in her petition that she “was not

aware of the [SF Appellees’] intentional frauds, misrepresentations, deceptions, and

acts to conceal the material facts at the time of inducement . . . for many years

thereafter,” argues that she could neither have known that she had been defrauded

nor incurred any damages until she made a claim under the policy and failed to receive

the coverage benefits to which she believed she was entitled. However, as shown

above, Quinn herself admitted that on April 5, 2016, she was aware that she had not

received the insurance policy for which she believed she had paid. Thus, as of that

date, she knew that she had not received what she believed to be the benefit of her

bargain and, accordingly, all of the alleged facts necessary for Quinn to pursue her

fraud claims existed. See Exxon Corp., 348 S.W.3d at 202. Because the value of the

policy Quinn had received was less than the value of the policy that she thought she

had paid for, she had an immediate claim for damages; her assertion that damages did

not accrue until she filed a claim under the policy is simply incorrect. See Formosa

Plastics Corp. USA v. Presidio Eng’rs & Contractors, Inc., 960 S.W.2d 41, 49 (Tex. 1998)

(op. on reh’g) (explaining that Texas recognizes two measures of damages for

                                          19
common law fraud, including “the benefit-of-the-bargain measure,” which “computes

the difference between the value as represented and the value received”).

      Quinn also argues for a later accrual date based on the discovery rule.

However, this argument fails for several reasons. First, Quinn did not properly

invoke the discovery rule by pleading it as a matter of confession and avoidance and

alleging in her petition that her injuries were inherently undiscoverable. See L.C. v.

A.D., 971 S.W.2d 512, 514 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1997, pet. denied) (op. on reh’g) (“The

discovery rule is a plea in confession and avoidance; thus, the party seeking to avail

itself of the discovery rule must plead it.” (citing Woods v. William M. Mercer, Inc., 769

S.W.2d 515, 517–18 (Tex. 1988))). Second, even if Quinn had properly invoked the

discovery rule, it is inapplicable to her fraud claims. As set forth above, the discovery

rule only applies to a cause of action if, among other things, the injury incurred is

inherently undiscoverable. Shell Oil Co., 356 S.W.3d at 930. But the injury giving rise

to Quinn’s fraud claims was not inherently undiscoverable. Indeed, Quinn alleged

that she did, in fact, discover it when she received her policy on April 5, 2016. Thus,

the discovery rule does not apply.

      Because Quinn’s fraud claims against the SF Appellees accrued on April 5,

2016, the four-year limitations period for her claims against SFL Inc., Goldsworthy,

Wey, and Pedroso expired on April 5, 2020. As of that date, Quinn had not served

                                           20
with the requisite diligence any of the SF Appellees—or even named Pedroso or Wey

as defendants.11 Thus, her fraud claims are time-barred.

             e. Summary judgment was proper.

      Because the SF Appellees conclusively established that all of Quinn’s claims

against them were time-barred, the trial court properly granted them summary

judgments on limitations grounds.       See Velsicol Chem. Corp., 956 S.W.2d at 532.

Accordingly, we overrule Quinn’s first issue.

B. Any Error Concerning the Trial Court’s Dismissal with Prejudice of Quinn’s
   Claims Against Harbert Was Both Unpreserved and Harmless
      In her fifth issue,12 Quinn asserts that the trial court erred by dismissing her

claims against Harbert with prejudice. However, Quinn did not present this issue to

the trial court via a post-judgment motion and therefore has failed to preserve it for

appeal. See Bird v. Kornman, 152 S.W.3d 154, 161 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, pet.

denied) (“[E]rror in dismissing a case with prejudice cannot be raised for the first time

on appeal and must be presented to the trial court.”); see also Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a).

Moreover, even if Quinn had preserved this issue, any error would be harmless. See

Kutch v. Del Mar Coll., 831 S.W.2d 506, 513 n.5 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg

      11
        As noted above, Quinn had previously served and then nonsuited SFL Inc.
but did not re-add SFL Inc. as a defendant until after limitations had expired. See
supra note 7.
      12
        Because Quinn asserts the same claims against Harbert and the SF Appellees,
we address her appellate issues out of order for ease of discussion. See, e.g., Hockins v.
U.S. Certified Contractors, Inc., No. 02-17-00180-CV, 2018 WL 2248487, at *2 n.2 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth May 17, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.).

                                           21
1992, no writ) (recognizing that “[d]ismissal with prejudice is not necessarily harmful

error”). Quinn’s claims against Harbert are, in all material respects, identical to her

claims against the SF Appellees and arise from the same facts. Thus, even if the

dismissal had been without prejudice, Quinn would be unable to pursue her claims

against Harbert because they would be time-barred.

      We overrule Quinn’s fifth issue.

C. The Trial Court Did Not Err by Dismissing Quinn’s Claims Against the
   Bakers and New Covenant
      Quinn’s second, third, and fourth issues concern the trial court’s dismissal of

her claims against the Bakers and New Covenant. 13 Specifically, Quinn argues that

the trial court erred by granting both summary judgments and Rule 91a dismissals to

the Bakers (as opposed to granting one form of relief or the other); dismissing

Quinn’s claims against New Covenant; and granting summary judgments to the

Bakers. Because these issues are interrelated, we address them together. See Vann v.

Gaines, No. 02-06-00148-CV, 2007 WL 865870, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar.

22, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op.).

      1. Rule 91a Dismissals: Applicable Law and Standard of Review

      Rule 91a allows a party to move to dismiss a claim brought against it if the

claim has “no basis in law or fact.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 91a.1. “A cause of action has no

basis in law if the allegations, taken as true, together with inferences reasonably drawn

      13
         On appeal, Quinn does not challenge the trial court’s dismissal of her claims
against the Harold D. & Madonna A. Baker Trust.

                                           22
from them, do not entitle the claimant to the relief sought.” Id. “A cause of action

has no basis in fact if no reasonable person could believe the facts pleaded.” Id. We

review the merits of a Rule 91a ruling de novo. In re Farmers Tex. Cnty. Mut. Ins., 621

S.W.3d 261, 266 (Tex. 2021) (orig. proceeding).

       The Texas Supreme Court has specifically held that Rule 91a “permits motions

to dismiss based on affirmative defenses” if they are “conclusively established by the

facts in a plaintiff’s petition.” Bethel v. Quilling, Selander, Lownds, Winslett & Moser, P.C.,

595 S.W.3d 651, 656 (Tex. 2020) (citing Tex. R. Civ. P. 91a.1). Thus, a court may

grant a Rule 91a motion to dismiss on limitations grounds. See In re Springs Condos.,

L.L.C., No. 03-21-00493-CV, 2021 WL 5814292, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin Dec. 8,

2021, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]) (mem. op.). When considering a Rule 91a

motion, the trial court’s factual inquiry is limited to “the pleading of the cause of

action” and any pleading exhibits permitted by Rule 59, which are those attached to or

copied into the plaintiff’s pleadings.14 Tex. R. Civ. P. 91a.6, 59; see Bethel, 595 S.W.3d

at 656. But a trial court’s legal inquiry is not as limited, and thus “[i]n deciding a Rule

        Quinn asserts that the trial court could not grant the Bakers’ and New
       14

Covenant’s Rule 91a motions on limitations grounds because determining when the
claim accrued required considering the exhibits attached to her petition. However,
this argument fails for a number of reasons. First, it does not appear that Quinn
raised this issue in the trial court, and thus she has failed to preserve any claimed
error. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a). Second, as we will discuss in greater detail below,
because Quinn’s petition itself contains allegations concerning the date that she
purchased the Property and the date that the fire occurred, the trial court was not
required to consider the exhibits to establish the accrual dates for Quinn’s claims.
Third, Rule 91a expressly allows courts to consider the plaintiff’s pleading exhibits in
ruling on a motion to dismiss. Tex. R. Civ. P. 91a.6.

                                              23
91a motion, a court may consider the defendant’s pleadings if doing so is necessary to

make the legal determination of whether an affirmative defense is properly before the

court.” Bethel, 595 S.W.3d at 656.

      2. Quinn’s Claims Against the Bakers and New Covenant Are Barred by
         Limitations
      In their Rule 91a motions, the Bakers and New Covenant sought dismissal of

Quinn’s claims on the grounds that, among other things, they were barred by

limitations. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that the facts alleged in

Quinn’s petition conclusively established that her claims against the Bakers and New

Covenant are time-barred and that, therefore, the trial court did not err by dismissing

those claims under Rule 91a. See Bethel, 595 S.W.3d at 656; Springs Condos., L.L.C.,

2021 WL 5814292, at *3.

             a. We set forth the statutes of limitations applicable to Quinn’s
                claims against the Bakers and New Covenant.
      As noted above, Quinn’s third amended petition is difficult to decipher. While

the only titled cause of action against the Bakers and New Covenant is “defective

construction,” which is more accurately characterized as a claim for fraud, negligent

misrepresentation, or negligence, see Karagounis, 70 S.W.3d at 147, Quinn also appears

to assert a claim for breach of contract or breach of warranty against the Bakers and

New Covenant. 15

      15
         Quinn’s own briefing in this court highlights the difficulties in deciphering her
petition. Quinn maintains that she “did not sue [the Bakers or New Covenant] for

                                           24
      As set forth above, fraud claims are subject to a four-year limitations period.16

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 16.004(a)(4); Agar Corp., Inc., 580 S.W.3d at 139.

      Breach-of-contract and breach-of-warranty claims are also subject to a four-

year limitations period. See Cosgrove, 468 S.W.3d at 35 (breach of contract); Hyundai

Motor Co. v. Rodriguez ex rel. Rodriguez, 995 S.W.2d 661, 668 (Tex. 1999) (breach of

warranty); see also Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 16.051.

      Negligence and negligent misrepresentation claims are each subject to a two-

year limitations period. See KPMG Peat Marwick v. Harrison Cnty. Hous. Fin. Corp., 988

S.W.2d 746, 750 (Tex. 1999) (negligence); Weaver & Tidwell, L.L.P. v. Guarantee Co. of

N. Am. USA, 427 S.W.3d 559, 565 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, pets. denied) (negligent

misrepresentation).

             b. Quinn’s claims against the Bakers and New Covenant are time-
                barred.
      As previously noted, a statute of limitations begins to run on the accrual date,

see JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 508 S.W.3d at 414, which is the date when facts giving

breach of contract” while at the same time arguing that her petition did not “fail[] to
state a ‘recognized cause of action’” because the Bakers and New Covenant “were
able to read into the pleading other claims, for DTPA violations, breach of contract,
and fraud.”
      16
         In her briefing in the trial court, Quinn asserted that her “defective
construction” claim was subject to a six-year limitations period, but she has not raised
this argument on appeal and has thus forfeited the issue. See Fort Bend Cnty. Drainage
Dist. v. Sbrusch, 818 S.W.2d 392, 395 (Tex. 1991) (holding that because “grounds of
error not asserted by points of error or argument in the court of appeals are waived,”
the court could not consider an argument that appellant had abandoned on appeal).

                                          25
rise to the cause of action come into existence, even if those facts are not discovered,

or the resulting injuries do not occur, until later, see Exxon Corp., 348 S.W.3d at 202;

Dunmore, 400 S.W.3d at 640.

      Quinn’s claims against the Bakers and New Covenant are based on their alleged

“defective construction” of the outdoor fireplace on the Property and their alleged

misrepresentations about the quality of this construction, all of which occurred prior

to Quinn’s purchase of the Property in March 2016. Thus, while Quinn’s claims may

have accrued earlier,17 there is no doubt that they accrued, at the latest, on the date of

the fire—that is, February 17, 2017.18 See In re Jorden, 249 S.W.3d 416, 422 (Tex. 2008)

(orig. proceeding) (“[A] cause of action accrues for limitations purposes when a

claimant learns of an injury, even if the rest of the essential facts are unknown.”).

Indeed, Quinn acknowledged in her response to the Bakers’ and New Covenant’s

      17
         As the Bakers and New Covenant pointed out in their briefing in support of
their motions to dismiss, the alleged construction defects—and thus the Bakers’
alleged misrepresentations about the quality of the construction—could have, and
likely should have, been discovered prior to Quinn’s purchase of the property as part
of an inspection by a qualified housing inspector.
      18
        In her original petition, Quinn explicitly stated that “the first discovery of
Defendants[’] unlawful activities occurred on February 17[], 2017[,] when [the
Property] was completely destroyed due to a total loss fire. The source of the fire was
determined to be an act of negligence on behalf of [the Baker Defendants].” Thus,
even if we were to assume without deciding that the discovery rule applied to Quinn’s
claims against the Bakers and New Covenant, Quinn has conceded that she had
discovered the Bakers’ and New Covenant’s alleged “unlawful activities” by February
17, 2017.

                                           26
Rule 91a motions to dismiss that February 17, 2017, “is likely . . . the proper

‘discovery of flaw date.’”

        Because Quinn’s claims accrued no later than February 17, 2017, the two-year

statute of limitations on her negligence and negligent misrepresentation claims expired

no later than February 17, 2019, and the four-year limitations period on her fraud,

breach-of-contract, and breach-of-warranty claims expired no later than February 17,

2021.

        While Quinn initially sued the Bakers and New Covenant on March 1, 2019,

she later effectively dismissed them from the lawsuit by failing to name them as

defendants in her second amended petition filed in July 2021. See Johnson, 727 S.W.2d

at 758. Thus, the Bakers and New Covenant were no longer parties to the lawsuit

after Quinn filed her second amended petition. See id. Because both the two-year and

four-year limitations periods had expired before Quinn attempted to re-add the

Bakers and New Covenant as defendants in November 2021, all of her claims against

them are time-barred. See id.; see also Clary Corp., 949 S.W.2d at 459.

              c. Dismissal under Rule 91a was appropriate.

        The Bakers’ and New Covenant’s limitations defense was apparent from the

pleadings and “amply supported” their motions to dismiss under Rule 91a. See

Johnson, 727 S.W.2d at 758; see also Tex. R. Civ. P. 91a.6; Bethel, 595 S.W.3d at 656.

Quinn’s petition sets forth the alleged dates of the Bakers’ renovations to the

Property, her purchase of the Property, and the occurrence of the fire. Thus, the facts

                                            27
in Quinn’s petition conclusively established that her claims against the Bakers and

New Covenant were time-barred, and accordingly, limitations constituted appropriate

grounds for dismissal under Rule 91a. See Bethel, 595 S.W.3d at 656; Springs Condos.,

L.L.C., 2021 WL 5814292, at *3.

      3. We Discern No Reversible Error Regarding the Trial Court’s
         Dismissal of Quinn’s Claims Against the Bakers and New Covenant
      In her third issue, Quinn asserts that the trial court erred by dismissing her

claims against New Covenant pursuant to Rule 91a.           Having determined that

limitations provided an appropriate basis for the dismissal of Quinn’s claims against

New Covenant, we overrule Quinn’s third issue.

      In her second and fourth issues, Quinn argues that the trial court erred by

granting the Bakers summary judgments. Specifically, she contends that the trial court

committed procedural error by granting the Bakers both take-nothing summary

judgments and Rule 91a dismissals because these forms of relief are mutually

exclusive and committed substantive error by granting the Bakers’ summary judgment

motions even though—in Quinn’s view—the Bakers had not proven that they were

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. However, having determined that the trial

court did not err by dismissing Quinn’s claims against the Bakers on limitations

grounds pursuant to Rule 91a, we conclude that any error in the trial court’s granting

of summary judgments to the Bakers is harmless. See Diamond v. Eighth Ave. 92, L.C.,

105 S.W.3d 691, 697 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.) (concluding that because

                                         28
the trial court had properly granted summary judgment for appellee on limitations

grounds, any error concerning the court’s granting appellee’s separately filed motion

to dismiss was harmless). Accordingly, we overrule Quinn’s second and fourth issues.

                                  III. Conclusion

      Having overruled all of Quinn’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

                                                     /s/ Dabney Bassel

                                                     Dabney Bassel
                                                     Justice

Delivered: June 1, 2023

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