Court Opinion

ID: 9897475
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:14:45.913307+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:35.931119
License: Public Domain

139 Nev., Advance Opinion 36)

                       IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

                RICHARD L. CANDELARIA,                                 No. 83859
                Appellant,
                vs.
                MICHAEL EDWARD KELLY,
                Respondent.
                                                                           SEP 1 lt 2023
                                                                         ELIZAlr: ,    BP:r.)WN
                                                                      CLEF'                 C

                                                                     tr•    OE:       CLEW<

                           Appeal from a divorce decree. Eighth Judicial District Court,
                Family Division, Clark County; Gerald W. Hardcastle, Sr. Judge, and Mary
                D. Perry, Judge.
                           Affirmed.

                Greenberg Traurig, LLP, and Tami D. Cowden and Elliot Anderson, Las
                Vegas,
                for Appella.nt.

                The Dickerson Karacsonyi Law Group and Robert P. Dickerson and Sabrina
                M. Dolson, Las Vegas,
                for Respondent.

                BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT, EN BANC.

                                                OPINION

                By the Court, STIGLICH, C.J.:
                           In this appeal, we determine the date of a same-sex marriage
                for the purposes of property division in divorce.          Appellant Richard
                Candelaria and respondent Michael Kelly formally married in California in
SUPREME COURT
       OF
     NEVADA

(Op l'147A
                                                                              z_s - zoo 9 7-
                2008. At that time, Nevada did not permit same-sex marriage or recognize
                out-of-state same-sex marriages. In 2015 the United States Suprem.e Court
                held in Obergefell v. Hodges that same-sex couples have the fundamental
                right to marry on the same terms and conditions as opposite-sex couples
                and that states must recognize same-sex marriages lawfully performed in
                states that already permitted such marriages. 576 U.S. 644, 675-76, 681
                (201.5). In their 2021 divorce, Richard argued that the district court should
                backdate the start of the parties' marriage to either 1991 or 1992—when his
                relationship with Michael became serious—because they would have
                married then but for Nevada's unconstitutional ban on same-sex marriage.
                The district court declined to backdate the marriage, finding no law to
                support such. an action, and relied on 2008 as the date of the marriage.
                Richard now urges this court to adopt a factor-based test to make such a
                determination.
                              As an issue of first impression, we examine Obergefell's
                retroactive effect.   We hold that Obergefell requires Nevada courts to
                recognize same-sex marriages perforrned in other states even if, at the time
                of the out-of-state marriage, Nevada did not permit or recognize such
                marriages..    Accordingly, here, we recognize 2008 as the date of the
                marriage. Obergefell, however, does not require Nevada courts to backdate
                a marriage. Without a ma.ndate from Obergefell, we consider whether to
                craft a judicial remedy. Nevada enacted a statutory prohibitiOn on common-
                law marriage in 1943. To adopt a "but for" factor-based test is akin to
                recognizing a common-law marriage formed in Nevada, and we decline to
                craft a judicial exception to this long-standing and express ban. Because
                the district court order accords with our holdings, we affirm.

SUPREME COURT
        OF

     NEVADA

(U) 1947A
                                                     2
                                 FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
                             Appellant Richard Candelaria and respondent Michael Kelly
                 met in July 1991 and began dating. They moved in together in November
                 1991 and, over the following years, relocated to various states for lucrative
                 work opportunities for Michael. In July 1992, the couple exchanged rings.
                 When California legalized same-sex marriage in 2008, the couple purchased
                 new rings, traveled to California, and married.
                          In 2020, Michael filed for' divorce. Richard counterclaimed for
                 quantum merUit and breach of an implied contract, arguing that they' had
                 an agreement to hold property aeouired since November 1991 or July 1992
                 as community property. Eventually, Michael and Richard agreed to divide
                 most assets evenly. But they did not resolve the character of two assets:
                 (1) Michael's 401(k) account, which be opened in 1984 and did not contribute
                 to after 2008; and (2) Michael's shares of stock acquired as part of his
                 ernploym.ent between 1996 and 2004.
                             At a bench trial, Michael argued that because he.acouired these
                 assets before the 2008 marriage and did not contribute to the 401(k) account
                 afterward, they are his separate property and .not subject to division in the
                 divorce. • According to Richard, however, the marriage actuallÿ began in
                 either November 1991 or July 1992, and thus the 401(k) account andShares
                 of stoek were acquired or funda.d. durin.g marriage and are community
                 pi operty subject to division in divorce. Richard testified that he and
                 Michael would -have officially married in. November 1991 or july 1992 but
                 for Nevada's unconstitutional prohibiti.on on satne-sex marriage. Michael;

Surnnvir CounT
       OF
    NEVADA

KO 1947A
                on the other hand, testified that he did not consider himself married until
                2008.1
                            The district court entered a divorce decree rejecting Richard's
                claims and characterizing the 401(k) account and shares of stock as
                Michael's separate property. Specifically, the court found that Richard and
                Michael married in 2008 and that no law supported backdating the start of
                the marriage to the beginning of the relationship to remedy the
                unconstitutional ban on same-sex marriage. Richard appeals.2
                                               DISCUSSION
                            We review the disposition of community property for an abuse
                of discretion. Kogod v. Cioffi-Kogod, 135 Nev. 64, 75, 439 P.3d 397, 406
                (2019). IIowever, we review the interpretation of caselaw and statutes de
                novo. Liu v. Christopher Homes, LLC, 130 Nev. 147, 151, 321 P.3d 875, 877
                (2014) (caselaw); Zohar v. Zbiegien, 130 Nev. 733, 737, 334 P.3d 402, 405
                (2014) (statutes).
                            When Richard and Michael began dating, Nevada did not
                recognize same-sex marriages as a matter of statutory law. NRS 122.020(1)
                (1991). In 2002, Nevada voters amended the state constitution to provide
                "[o]nly a marriage between a male and a female person shall be recognized
                and given effect in this state." Nev. Const. art. 1, § 21 (repealed 2020). In
                2014, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Nevada's ban on same-
                sex marriage was unconstitutional and that Nevada must recognize same-

                      'Sr. Judge Gerald W. Hardcastle presided over the bench trial and
                entered findings of fact and conclusions of law. Judge Mary D. Perry signed
                the formal divorce decree incorporating Sr. Judge Hardcastle's decision.

                      20n appeal, Richard does not challenge the district court's denials of
                his implied contract and quantum meruit claims.
SUPREME COURT
        OF

     NEVADA

(i» 1947A
                                                     4
                      sex marriages. Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 476-77 (9th Cir. 2014). In 2015,
                      the United States Supreme Court in Obergefell held that "the right to marry
                      is a fundamental right," in part because of' the "constellation of benefits"
                      that attach to marriage. Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 670, 675. The court then
                      held that "same-sex couples may exercise the right to marry" on the same
                      terms and conditions as opposite-sex couples (right-to-marry holding) and
                      that states must "recognize a lawful same-sex marriage performed in
                      another State" (recognition holding). Id. at 665, 681. In 2020, Nevada
                      voters amended the state constitution to provide It]he State of
                      Nevada ... shall recognize marriages and issue marriage licenses to
                      couples regardless of gender." Nev. Const. art. 1, § 21.
                      Obergefell's recognition holding applies retroactively to require Nevada
                      courts to recognize out-of-state same-sex marriages licensed and perform.ed
                      before 2014
                                   The Supreme Court has "recognized a general rule 6f
                      retrospective effect for the constitutional decisions of th[e Supreme] Court."
                      Harper v. Va. Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 94 (1993) (internal quotation
                      marks omitted). When a new constitutional rule is applied, "that rule is the
                      controlling interpretation of federal law and must be given full retroactive
                      effect in all cases still open on direct review and as to all events. regardless
                      of whether such events predate or postdate [the] announcement of the rule."
                      Id. at 97. We join many jurisdictions in concluding that Obergefell applies
                      retroactively. See, e.g., LaFleur v. Pyfer, 479 P.3d 869, 874 (Colo. 2021)
                      ("[W]e conclude that [Obergefell] applies retroactively to marriages
                      (including common law marriages) predating that decision."); Tn. re
                      J.K.N.A., 454 P.3d 642, 649 (Mont. 2019) ("Obergefell's holding that state
                      prohibitions against same-sex marriage violate the United States
                      Constitution operates retroactively in relation to [a party's] claim that a
SUPREME COURT
       OF
    NEVADA

/) 1, 47A   .,41Dgv
               1
                                                             5
                common law marriage existed with [h.er same-sex partner] . . . ."). Here,
                Obergefell's holding that states must recognize same-sex marriages lawfully
                licensed and performed in another state applies retroactively so th.at we
                must recognize the 2008 California marriage despite Nevada's prohibition
                at that time. See LaFrance v. Cline, No. 76161, 2020 WL 7663476, at *2
                (Nev. Dec. 23, 2020) (Order Affirming in Part, Reversing in Part, and
                Remanding) (holding that Obergefell's recognition holding applies
                retroactively so that • Nevada courts must recognize a 2003 marriage
                between a same-sex couple).
                Obergefell 's right-to-marry holding cannot be given pre-marriage retroactive
                effect in this case
                              While recognition may apply retroactively, -Obergefell d.oes not
                say that same-sex couples in committed relationships will be deemed
                married before they meet the legal requirements of marriage—which
                Richard and Michael did.when they married in 2008 in California. Rather,
                Obergefell demands that same-sex couples be afforded the oPportu.nity to
                marry and the benefits attached to marriage on the same terms and
                conditions as opposite-sex couples. Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 6'15-76.
                Accordingly, in states recognizing common-law • marriages, Obergefell's
                right-to-marry holding has *retroactive effect because in those states
                opposite-sex couples may prove a common-law marriage formed before the
                Obergefell decision, so same-sex couples must be afforded the same
                opportunity. See, e.g., LaFleur, 479 P.3d at 882 ("Because a different-sex
                couple may prove a common law marriage in Colorado predating 2014, a
                same-sex couple must also have that opportunity."); In re J.K.N.A., 454 P.3d
                at 649. (holding that Obergefell applies retroactively for a claim that a
                common-law marriage existed).

Surncmc COURT
      OF
   NFVADA

    7 \
                                                     6
                            In contrast, the right-to-marry holding has no retroactive effect
                here because Nevada does not recognize common-law marriages.               In
                Nevada, Iclonsent alone will not constitute marriage; it must be followed
                by solemnization as authorized and provided by [NRS Chapter 122]." NRS
                122.010(1). Solemnization requires the parties to declare, in the presence
                of an authorized official and at least one witness, that "they take each other
                as spouses." NRS 122.11.0(1), (2). Nevada does not recognize common-law
                marriages formed after March 29, 1943, NRS 122.010(2), and this court ha.s
                consistently reaffirmed that Nevada does not recognize such marriages,
                Gilman u. Gilrnan, 114 Nev. 416, 421 n.1, 956 P.2d 761, 764 n.1 (1998);
                Watson u. Watson, 95 Nev. 495, 496, 596 P.2d 507, 507 (1979).            The
                solemnization requirement and ban on common-law marriage apply to all
                couples regardless of gender or sexual orientation. Here, it is undisputed
                that there was no solemnization prior to 2008.3      Just as an opposite-sex
                couple could not have married in 1.991 or 1992 absent solemnization,
                Richard and Michael were not and could not have been married under
                Nevada law in 1991. or 1992.

                       'Accordingly, Richard's reliance on Schuett v. FedEx Corp., 119 F.
                Supp. 3d 1155 (N.D. Cal. 2016), is misplaced. There, a federal district court
                discussed a state court decision to cure a defect in a same-sex couple's
                marriage in a case seeking to recover employment benefits. Id. at 1160-62.
                The same-sex couple's marriage was solemnized, but they could not obtain
                a marriage license because of the same-sex marriage ban. Id. at 1158. The
                state court declared that the couple married on the date of the
                solemnization. Id. The federal district court noted that it lacked authority
                to set aside the state court order declaring the date of the marriage. Id. at
                11.61.. It is unclear on what basis the state court declared that the couple
                married on the date of the solemnization. Assuming, however, the state
                relied on retroactivity, the court could refer back to solemnization. Here,
                there was no solemnization in 1991 or 1992 to refer back to.
SUPREME COURT
        OF
     NEVADA

(lb I 947A
                                                      7
                               Other jurisdictions agree that Obergefell does not require courts
                   to retroactively construct a marriage when the jurisdiction does not
                   recognize common-law ,marriage. In Phillip Morris USA, Inc. v. Rintoul,
                   the Florida District Court of Appeal considered whether Obergefell required
                   the court to retroactively find that a same-sex couple were raarried if one
                   partner could prove that but for Florida's unconstitutional ban, the couple
                   would have married earlier. 342 So. 3d 656, 665 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2022).
                   In rejecting that argument, the court reasoned that Florida does not
                   recognize common-law marriages and that Obergefell "did not compel states
                   to convert all same-sex relationships predating that decision into formally
                   recognized marriages." Id. at 666. Similarly, a New York appellate court
                   observed that Obergefell did not require the court to retroactively recognize
                   a commitment ceremony between a same-sex couple as a legally valid
                   marriage. In re Estate of Leyton, 22 N.Y.S.3d 422, 423 (App. Div. 2016).
                   The Supreme Court of South Dakota also coneluded that even assuming
                   Obergefell applies retroactively, there is no marriage to retroactively
                   recognize when there has been "no marriage, act of solemnization, or
                   common-law marriage to refer back to." Ander,son v. S.D. Ret. Sys., 924
                   N.W.2d 146, 150 (S.D. 2019); cf. Charron v. Amaral, 889 N.E.2d 946, 950-
                   51 (Mass. 2008) (rejecting an argument that the court must construct a
                   marriage if a same-sex couple would have married earlier but for the
                   unconstitutional ban on same-sex marriage based on a 2004 Massachusetts
                   Supreme Court case decided on similar grounds to Obergefell).
                   We ca.nnot recognize a common-law marriage in Nevada in the face of NRS
                   .722.010
                              Richard argues that this court should backdate the start of his
                   marriage to either November 1991 or July 1992 because he would have
                   married Michael then but for Nevada's unconstitutional ban on same-sex
SUPREME COURT
          OF
       NEVADA

I()   1,17A    ,
                                                        8
                marriage. He emphasizes that he is not advocating for this court to adopt
                common-law marriage because he is asking this court to fashion a remedy
                to the unconstitutional ban.
                            Richard relies on an Oregon Court of Appeals case, In re
                Madrone, :350 P.3d 495 (Or. Ct. App. 2015). There, the statute at issue
                presumed the husband of a woman who carries a child conceived by
                artificial insemination is the legal father if the husband consented to the
                insemination. Id. at 496. In a. previous case, the Oregon Court of Appeals
                declared the statute uncOnstitutional under the state constitution becauSe
                it afforded the privilege of a parentage assumption on the basis of sexual
                orientation and in part because same-sex couples could not marry at the
                time. Id. Rather than striking the law, the court "extended th.e statute so
                that it applies when the same-sex partner of the biological mother consented
                to the artificial insemination." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). In
                re Madrone determined how same-sex couples are entitled to legal
                parentage under the statute. Because the legislature's intent was tó confer
                the benefit of the statute on married couples, not on unmarried couples, "the
                salient question [was] whether the same-sex partner would have chosen to
                marry before the child's birth had they been permitted to." Id. at 501. In
                other words, the inquiry was whether but for the ban on same-sex Marriage,
                the couple would have married earlier.
                            Preliminarily, the Oregon Court of Appeal's interpretation of its
                state constitution is not binding on this court.    That said, we are not
                persuaded by Richard's claim that he is not advocating for this court to
                adopt common-law marriage in Nevada because adopting the In re Madrone
                but-for test would in effect recognize a common-law marriage in violation of
                NRS 122.010, and he has not shown, absent a constitutional challenge, that

SUPREME COURT
         OF
      NEVADA

0), I ,U7A
                                                     9
this court has equitable power to deviate from a statute. Under the In re
Madrone's test, a court would consider various factors in determining
whether a same-sex couple would have married at some earlier date but for
the unconstitutional ban on same-sex marriage. Id. at 501-02. For
example, courts would consider, among other factors, "whether the parties
held each other out as spouses," whether the parties "commingled their
assets and finances," and whether the parties "made significant financial
decisions together." Id. Jurisdictions recognizing common-law marriage
apply similar factors to determine whether a couple is common-law married.
In those states, the proponent of a common-law marriage generally must
show: (1) "[present] intent and agreement . . . to be married by both parties;
(2) continuous cohabitation; and (3) public declaration that the parties are
husband and wife." In re Marriage of Winegard, 278 N.W.2d 505, 510 (Iowa
1979); see also In re Estate of Hunsaker, 968 P.2d 281, 285 (Mont. 1998)
(listing similar elements). Because of the similarity between the tests, we
conclude Richard is asking this court to craft a judicial exception to this
state's ban on common-law marriage. Cf. Charron, 889 N.E.2d at 952-53
(Marshall, C.J., concurring) ("Granting such relief would create in effect a
common-law or de facto quasi marital status that would promote litigation,
permit judges to select from among marital benefits to which quasi married
couples might or might not be entitled, .. . and undercut the Legislature's
role in defining the qualifications and characteristics of civil marriage."
(footnote omitted)). Additionally, In re Madrone crafted a remedy to an
unconstitutional statute, whereas here, Richard does not challenge the
constitutionality of NRS 122.010, which prohibits common-law marriage.
Whatever discretion this court has. to fashion remedies in equity, Richard

                                     10
                has not shown that such equitable discretion authorizes this court to deviate
                from a statute absent a constitutional challenge.
                            This court is not blind to the fact of inequality today. But
                "[w]hen a statute is clear, unambiguous, not in conflict with other statues
                and is constitutional, the judicial branch may not refuse to enforce the
                statute on public policy grounds." Beazer Homes Nev., Inc. v. Eighth
                Judicial Dist. Court, 120 Nev. 575, 578 n.4, 97 P.3d 1132, 1134 n.4 (2004).
                Nor can we rewrite a *statute because it may have an unfair apPlication in
                certain circumstances. See Holiday Ret. Corp. v. State, Div. of Indus.
                Relations, 128 Nev. 150, 154, 274 P.3d 759, 761 (2012) ("It is the prerogative
                of the Legislature, not this court, to change or rewrite a statute.").
                           The "fair" result under the circumstances of this case is unclear.
                On the one hand, Richard could not marry Michael when he purportedly
                wanted to because of Nevada's unconstitutional ban on same-sex marriage:
                On the other hand, because of the ban, Michael had a reasonable belief that
                he was in fact not married to Richard prior to the 2008 marriage. And if
                Michael wanted the property he acquired before 2008 to be comrn unity
                property, he could have given his separate property to the com.munity as a
                gift. Cf. Schmanski v. Schrnanski, 115 Nev. 247, 250, 984 P.2d 752; 755
                (1999) (recognizing that separate property may be given as a gift to the
                community). Michael did not do so.
                             If this case concerned common-law or judicially created
                doctrines, rather than statutory law, we might have more leeway to fashion
                a remedy. The cases Richard cites support this prospect. For example, in
                Mueller v. Tepler, 95 A.3d 1011 (Conn. 2014), the Supreme Court of
                Connecticut expanded the common-law tort for loss of consortium to same-
                sex couples who at the time of the injury could not legally marry. 95 A.3d
SUPREME COURT
         OF
      NEVADA

10, 14147A
                                                     11
                at 1030. In doing so, the coint emphasized it was altering a "judicially
                created right," which the court was free to reshape. Id. at 1029 (emphasis
                omitted), The court suggested it may have taken a different position had
                there been a statute on point by observing that "in determining whetb.er we
                should expand a common-law action, we are not constrained by any
                considerations of the constitutional separation of powers or respect for the
                authority of a coordinate branch of government, as we would be when
                determining whether a plaintiff is retroactivelY entitled to .a statutory
                benefit." Id. at 1030.
                            Likewise, in Rainey v. Sutton, 362 P.3d 217, 218-21 (Okla..
                201.5), the Oklahoma Supreme Court extended equitable standin.g to a
                same-sex partner seeking custody and visitation of a child Who was the
                prod.uct of a long-term, same-sex relationship that began before saine-sex
                couples had the right to marry. In doing so, it relied on a judicially created
                concept that provides "when persons assume the status and obligations of a
                parent without formal adoption they stand in loco parentis to the child and,
                as such, may be awarded custody even against the biological parent.' Id. at
                221. These authorities show that courts have exercised their discretion to
                alter judicially made or common-law d.octrines.4

                      4  However, the Michigan Supreme Court recently held that extending
                its equitable parent. doctrine, a judicially created doctrine similar to the one
                at issue in. Rainey, to same-sex couples is mandatory, not discretionary.
                Pueblo v. Haas,        N.W.2d            (Mich. July 24, 2023). The majority
                held.. that "as a matter of equity and constitutional law," they must extend
                the doctrine to same-sex couples who could not marry earlier because of the
                unconstitutional same-sex marriage ban. Id. at           _. The constitutional
                analysis is unclear, and the court noted that failing to extend the doctrine
                would perpetuate inequalities identified in Obergefell. Id. at         _. While
                that may be true, that does not explain how Obergefell requires a court to
SUPREME COURT
        OF
     NEVADA

0) i 947A
                                                      1   2
                            In surn, Richard's call to adopt a factor-based test to determine
                whether, but for Nevada's unconstitutional ban on same-sex marriage, he
                would have married Michael in 1991 or 1992 is a request to craft an
                equitable remedy that plainly contradicts NRS 122.01.0(2), the ban on
                common-law rnarriage. Richard fails to demonstrate that this court has
                equitable authority to deviate from a statute absent a constitutional
                challenge. Thus, the district court did not err in refusing to backdate the
                marriage to either 1991 or 1992.5

                create a marriage if a proponent can show but for the ban they would have
                married. As a result, we agree with the dissent in Pueblo that "the majority
                actually extends Obergefell to, in turn, extend the equitable-parent doctrine,
                and it. does so without adequately explaining why this extension is
                constitutionally required." Id. at      (Zahra, J., dissenting).

                      5 Richard also cites to two federal district court cases certifying class
                action lawsuits in support of backdating. In one case, same-sex partners
                married when it became legal, but one partner died before the marriage
                lasted nine months. Ely v. Saul, 572 F. Supp. 3d 751, 759-60 (D. Ariz. 2020).
                Because the marriage lasted less than nine months, the surviving spouses
                did not qualify for benefits under a Social Security Act provision. Id. The
                surviving spouses challenged the nine-month duration requirement as
                unconstitutional. Id. at 761. The other case challenged a similar provision.
                Thornton v. Cornm'r Soc. Sec., 570 F. Supp. 3d 1010, 1018 (W.D. Wash.
                2020). We find these cases distinguishable. These cases waived durational
                requirements for benefits but did not involve backdating marriages to a
                specific earlier date. Determining whether parties are eligible for a benefit
                involves reviewing that benefit, not judicially resolving that the parties
                were married at an earlier date. Ely and Thornton concluded that the
                claimants were eligible for benefits notwithstanding the durational
                requirement. They did not hold that the couples actually married earlier,
                which is precisely in dispute here. For instance, in Thornton, it was
                "undisputed" that the couple would have married earlier but for the
                unconstitutional ban. Id. Here, Michael disagrees that he and Richard
                would have married in 1991 or 1992.
SUPREME COURT
       OF
     NEVADA

),    'A
                                                     13
                                                 CONCLUSION
                                Obergefell applies retroactively so that Nevada courts must
                  recognize same-sex marriages licensed and performed out of state before
                  Nevada's ban on recognizing same-sex marriages was overturned.
                  Obergefell, however, does not require this court to backdate a marriage
                  before the couple solemnized their union. Although we recognize that
                  Obergefell in and of itself did not remedy all of the vestiges of discrimination
                  against same-sex couples, Nevada does not recognize common-law
                  marriages, and we decline to craft a judicial exception to that ban.
                  Therefore, we conclude that the effective date of a marriage will not predate
                  the solemnized marriage itself for property division purposes in a divorce,
                  even if a party asserts that the couple would have married earlier but for
                  the later-held-to-be-unconstitutional ban on marriage between same-sex
                  couples. Because the district court order accords with our holdings, we
                  affirm.

                                                                                     , c.j.
                                                      Stiglich

                  We concur:

                                                                      A                   , J.
                  Cadish                                      Pickering

                                             , J.                                         , J.
                  Herndon

                                                                                              J.
SUPDEME COURT
                  Pairaguirre
            OF
         NEVADA

It )1   1947A
                                                        14