Court Opinion

ID: 9449857
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 16:25:53.261543+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:32:01.761130
License: Public Domain

WRIGHT, Circuit Judge, with whom BAZELON, Chief Judge, and FAHY, Circuit Judge, join, concurring in the result:
On March 22, 1962, Congress made an historic change in its approach to capital punishment in the District of Columbia. Henceforth, instead of a mandatory death sentence upon conviction of first degree murder, the question of death or life imprisonment will be submitted to the jury. As to pending cases where mandatory death sentences have been imposed but not executed, the trial judge “may, in his sole discretion, consider circumstances in mitigation and in aggravation and make a determination as to whether the case in his opinion justifies a sentence of life imprisonment, in which event he shall sentence the defendant to life imprisonment.” This case arises under the latter provision of the statute.1
Willie Jones, an illiterate, was convicted of first degree murder in the triangle slaying of a male friend of his common-law wife. He received the mandatory death sentence in effect at that time. The shooting occurred in a ward of the D. C. General Hospital in which the wife was a bed patient. After committing the crime, Jones placed the gun on the end of his wife’s bed and was immediately arrested by hospital police. On trial his primary defense was insanity. This court, sitting en banc, affirmed his conviction, five to four. Jones v. United States, 111 U.S.App.D.C. 276, 296 F.2d 398 (1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 913, 82 S.Ct. 1260, 8 L.Ed.2d 406 (1962).
On July 16, 1962, Jones, through his counsel, filed a motion under Public Law 87-423 “to reduce or modify” his mandatory death sentence to life imprisonment. The motion also stated that “request will be made that the Court authorize and direct a commitment to St. Elizabeths Hospital for an extended period to determine the mental capacity of the defendant at this time.” On October 2, 1962, appellant filed a motion “for a complete mental examination at this time.” On October 5, 1962, the trial judge denied appellant’s motion to modify his sentence, stating: “It is my judgment that there are no mitigating circumstances which would warrant the Court in granting the motion to reduce or modify the sentence and, therefore, the motion is denied.” On being reminded by appellant’s counsel that it had not yet ruled on appellant’s motion for mental examination, the court granted the motion for mental examination. The court announced that it would appoint three psychiatrists for this purpose and asked counsel for the appellant and the Government to submit suggestions.
On November 8, 1962, counsel for each side filed a list of three psychiatrists. On the same day the court appointed its panel, using two of the psychiatrists from the Government’s list, none from the appellant’s, and substituting a third *876recommended by neither. No question was raised as to the qualifications of any of the psychiatrists submitted by the parties. Appellant did object, on the ground of prejudice, to one of the Government’s nominees. That psychiatrist was nevertheless named to the panel. Further objection to the same psychiatrist, after being named, was fruitless. In its order naming the panel, the court stated that “the said Doctors [will] furnish the Court with a report as to whether the defendant is now mentally competent to understand the proceedings against him and properly assist his counsel and whether the mental condition of the defendant is such that he understands the nature and extent of his punishment in order to assist the Court in determining whether the sentence heretofore imposed in this case should be executed.” (Emphasis supplied.) The order further stated: “That the said Doctors may, if they find need so to do, employ a psychologist or psychologists to assist them in their examinations.”
On November 28, 1962, the panel filed its report, stating: “We conducted this evaluation of Willie Jones on November 22, 1962 at the District jail at 9 :,00 A.M. Willie Jones refused to talk to us in the assigned room where he was to be brought to meet with us. We then went on to the cell block and talked to him very briefly through the barred door.” (Emphasis supplied.) The report2 concluded by saying: “It is the joint opinion of the three undersigned, that Willie Jones showed no inappropriate affect, but rather was a tense individual who recognized the nature of the sentence that had been imposed upon him and it was our opinion that he was showing the severe tension in the realization and understanding of what was to happen to him.” The record reflects that no action has been taken by the trial court on the report filed by the psychiatrists.
I.
We think there was error in the approach of counsel and the court to their responsibility under Public Law 87-423. Motivated by an almost universal demand 3 for the elimination of the mandatory death sentence, Congress passed Public Law 87-423 giving the jury the right to prescribe life imprisonment in place of death on conviction of first de*877gree murder. In order to afford persons condemned to die, but not executed, prior to the passage of the Act an opportunity to benefit from its enlightened provisions, Congress provided for resentenc-ing, giving the trial judge the sole discretion to determine whether a sentence of life imprisonment or death shall be imposed. The Act does not speak in terms of “reducing or modifying” 4 the sentence. The Act refers to “[c]ases tried prior to [the effective date of the Act] and which are before the court for the purpose of sentence or resentence.” (Emphasis supplied.) The House Committee Report5 likewise refers to “resen-tencing.” It states: “In such of those cases as may come before the court for resentencing following the affirmation of an appeal or for any other reason, a procedure is established whereby discretion is vested in the resentencing judge to consider the circumstances in mitigation and in aggravation to the end he is empowered to impose either the death penalty or, life imprisonment.” (Emphasis supplied.) Thus, the plain import of the “resentencing” language, in the Act as well as in the legislative history, is that, in effect if not in law, the sentences previously imposed are vacated.6
Public Law 87-423 provided for the resentencing of Willie Jones. But his counsel, instead of waiting for the court to call the case for resentencing, filed a motion “to reduce or modify the sentence.” And the judge treated the motion as such, opening his memorandum opinion denying the motion: “This is a motion to reduce or modify sentence pursuant to the provisions of Public Law 87-423 approved March 22, 1962,” and closing it with the ruling: “The motion for reduction of sentence is denied. In so doing, the court placed the burden on the defendant, as the moving party, to show that his sentence should be reduced to life imprisonment. While the placement of the burden on the appellant is not in terms spelled out in the court’s opinion, the companion case of Coleman v. United States,7 decided by the same judge under Public Law 87-423, leaves no doubt as to the court’s position. There, in denying a similar motion, the court stated to counsel for the defendant: “It seems to me perfectly clear that under the statute you have not shown circumstances in mitigation that would warrant the Court in doing other than what the statute provides, namely, carry out the sentence which was in effect prior to the effective date of the statute.” In deciding the instant case, the trial judge referred to Coleman as a precedent and indicated he would follow the principles there announced by him.
Public Law 87-423 does not put the burden of proof upon the defendant to show that he should not be executed. It simply states that the judge, in resen-tencing, “may, in his sole discretion, consider circumstances in mitigation and in aggravation.” The House Committee Report explains this language: “If the factors in aggravation outweigh those in mitigation, [the judge] shall impose a sentence of death by electrocution. If, in his judgment, the factors in mitigation outweigh those in aggravation, he shall impose a sentence of life imprisonment.” Thus Congress placed the burden on the court to avail itself of all relevant information which may be helpful in imposing the proper sentence. “How far considerations of age, sex, ignorance, ill*878ness or intoxication, of human passion or weakness, of sympathy or clemency, or the irrevocableness of an executed sentence of death, or an apprehension that explanatory facts may exist which have not been brought to light, or any other consideration whatever, should be allowed weight in deciding the question whether the accused should or should not be capitally punished, is committed by the act8 of Congress to the sound discretion” of the court. Winston v. United States, 172 U.S. 303, 313, 19 S.Ct. 212, 215, 43 L.Ed. 456 (1899). And that discretion should be exercised with the admonition that “[i]n death cases doubts such as those presented here should be resolved in favor of the accused.” Andres v. United States, supra Note 3, 333 U.S. at 752, 68 S.Ct. at 886, 92 L.Ed. 1055.
Thus the resentencing court, in making its determination in place of the jury, was required to consider the facts surrounding the crime9 as shown in the trial record10 plus any additional information usually available to a sentencing judge.11 For example, the transcript made at his trial clearly demonstrates that the victim was appellant’s rival for the affections of appellant’s wife. Under these circumstances, the question as to what effect appellant’s mental condition may have had on his act, while resolved by the jury as to appellant’s legal responsibility for his crime, remained a primary consideration in any determination of a proper sentence.
Assuming that Public Law 87-423 did not in fact vacate the death sentence of Willie Jones, the responsibility of the resentencing judge under the Act would be unchanged. In any event, a full consideration of all the facts in the case was required — the emotional torment that produced such a crime, the background of the defendant, his prior record, if any, and most of all, in the circumstances of this case, his mental condition, both at the time of his act and at sentencing. Only with such in-depth consideration can the resentencing judge comply with the mandate of Congress to “consider circumstances in mitigation and in aggravation.”
II.
Other aspects of the “resentencing” procedure require attention. The court ordered a mental examination to determine whether the appellant “is now mentally competent to understand the proceedings against him and properly assist his counsel.” In so doing, the court was apparently acting pursuant to Section 24-301 (a) of the District of Columbia Code which provides that “[wjhenever * * * prior to the imposition of sentence * * * it shall appear to the court from the court’s own observations, or from prima facie evidence submitted to the court, that the accused is of unsound mind or is mentally incompetent so as to be unable to understand the proceedings against him or properly to assist in his owh defense, the court may order the accused committed to * * * *879[a] mental hospital” for observation as to mental competency.12 Subsection (b) of this statute provides that if and when the defendant is found mentally competent, the criminal case against him may proceed.
Here the court proceeded to “resentence” appellant without first determining whether the defendant could understand the proceedings against him and assist his counsel in his plea for mercy. On sentencing, or even on a motion to reduce sentence, particularly in a capital case, the most persuasive, if inarticulate, plea for mercy is often made by the defendant himself. Certainly the sentencing court should make sure that this final plea for life is not jeopardized by the helpless mind of the defendant. See Rule 32(a), F.R.Cr.P., and Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 82 S.Ct. 468, 7 L.Ed. 2d 417 (1962); Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301, 81 S.Ct. 653, 5 L.Ed.2d 670 (1961); Couch v. United States, 98 U.S.App.D.C. 292, 235 F.2d 519 (1956).
Moreover, the resentencing court, contrary to Rule 32(c) (1), F.R.Cr.P., did not even have before it a presentence report to assist it in making its awful decision. Without deciding whether the re-sentencing judge’s discretion under the Act is reviewable, it is clear that his action taken without consideration of the information available under the procedures prescribed by the Rule cannot be sustained.
III.
The Government concedes that under 24 D.C.Code § 301 the resentencing court, having determined that a mental examination was necessary to ascertain whether the defendant understood the proceedings against him and could assist in his defense, erred in failing to make that determination. The Government also concedes that it would have been helpful to the court, in considering matters in mitigation under Public Law 87-423, to have had before it accurate and up-to-date information concerning' the mental condition of the defendant. It argues, however, that the report as eventually filed proved the defendant to be competent and that, therefore, any procedural errors which the court may have made in considering whether the appellant should live or die were harmless.
In making this argument, the Government gives a casual reading to appellant’s rights. The mere fact that a mental examination report was filed does not amount to an adjudication by the court that the defendant is able to understand the proceedings against him and assist in his defense. But more than this, the report in this case would not, in any event, be a predicate for any such adjudication.
Two members of the psychiatric panel which filed the report were proposed by the prosecution. None of the psychiatrists proposed by the defense was placed on the panel. The manner in which the court’s panel conducted its psychiatric evaluation is also interesting. Psychiatric evaluations are usually based on a consideration of social, environmental, physical and mental factors. Such information, for the most part, is usually obtained from the patient himself.' Psychological testing ordinarily supplements this information. The testing and the observations usually proceed for a long period of time. St. Elizabeths Hospital, for example, prefers to have the patient committed for 90 days when a psychiatric evaluation is required. Here the psy*880chiatric evaluation apparently took but a few seconds and was limited to observing the patient during that time through prison bars. Based on this observation, the court’s psychiatric panel was able to report “that Willie Jones showed no inappropriate affect, but rather was a tense individual who recognized the nature of the sentence that had been imposed upon him and it was our opinion that he was showing the severe tension in the realization and understanding of what was to happen to him.”
It is true that Willie Jones refused to cooperate with the panel, a circumstance not unusual in mental cases. But a responsible psychiatric evaluation is not limited to interviewing the patient, particularly one who will not cooperate. A social history of the patient should be obtained, the family background studied and members thereof interviewed. Jones has a family here in the District of Columbia. Persons with whom the patient is in constant contact also should be interviewed. Jones’ jailers for the last five years were available for this purpose. Moreover, prior to the commission of the offense in this case, there was a full hearing before the Mental Health Commission at the time Jones was committed for mental observation on the certification of three Commission psychiatrists that he was insane. There are the reports and the testimony of the many psychiatrists who testified at Jones’ trial. All or any of these would have provided the panel with more information with respect to Jones’ mental condition than their few moments of observation through the prison bars. Yet none of this information was even sought.
It is quite conceivable that if the re-sentencing court had had occasion to make a determination as to appellant’s ability to understand the proceedings against him and to assist in his defense on the basis of the report of its psychiatric panel, it would have rejected its panel’s report, and possibly the panel too. At the very least, it is possible that the court would have required the panel to seek out more information on which to predicate a judgment in a matter as serious as life or death.
We do not reach any broad constitutional issues which may be concerned with the imposition of the death penalty in this case. We would hold only that, because of procedural errors, the matter must be remanded to the District Court for resentencing under Public Law 87-423.

. Public Law 87-423, 76 Stat. 46, 22 D.C. Code § 2404. It reads, in pertinent part:
“The punishment of murder in the first degree shall be death by electrocution unless the jury by unanimous vote recommends life imprisonment; or if the jury, having determined by unanimous vote the guilt of the defendant as charged, is unable to agree as to punishment it shall inform the court and the court shall thereupon have jurisdiction to impose and shall impose either a sentence of death by electrocution or life imprisonment.
*****
“Cases tried prior to March 22, 1962, and which are before the court for the purpose of sentence or resentence shall be governed by the provisions of law in effect prior to March 22, 1962: Provided, That the judge may, in his sole discretion, consider circumstances in mitigation and in aggravation and make a determination as to whether the case in his opinion justifies a sentence of life imprisonment, in which event he shall sentence the defendant to life imprisonment. Such a sentence of life imprisonment shall be in accordance with the provisions of this Act.”

. The entire report reads:
“November 26, 1962
“The Honorable Joseph O.
McGarraghy, Judge.
United States District Court for the District of Columbia
Constitution Avenue and John Marshall Place, N.W.
Washington, D. C.
“Dear Judge McGarraghy:
“We, the three undersigned, are submitting our joint report on Willie Jones, whom you asked us to see as a panel. We conducted this evaluation of Willie Jones on November 22, 1962 at the District jail at 9:00 A.M.
“Willie Jones refused to talk to us in the assigned room where he was to be brought to meet with us. We then went on to the cell block and talked to him very briefly through the barred door. He was advised why we were there and that it was under order of the Court and that we wanted to ask him some questions. He said, T have nothing to talk about, I am going to die, that is all there is to it, therefore, there’s nothing to say.’ He then turned around and walked away and would not come back. During this brief contact with bim he was restless, shrugged his shoulders frequently and was quite tense, obviously.
“It is the joint opinion of the three undersigned, that Willie Jones showed no inappropriate affect, but rather was a tense individual who recognized the nature of the sentence that had been imposed upon him and it was our opinion that he was showing the severe tension in the realization and understanding of what was to happen to him. It is our opinion that he is completely oriented and understands the nature of his problem.
“Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Robert H. Groh
Robert H. Groh, M.D.
/s/ John R. Gavanagh
John R. Cavanagh, M.D'.
/s/ Albert E. Marland
Albert E. Marland, Sr. M.D.”

. See Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740, 752-770, 68 S.Ct. 880, 92 L.Ed. 1055 (1948) (concurrring opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter).

. Congress was, of course, aware of the procedure provided by Rule 35, F.R.Cr. P., for reduction of sentence. By providing for “resentencing” in Public Law 87-423, for reasons developed in the text of this opinion infra, it deliberately 'chose not to use Rule 35.

. H.R.Rep. No. 677, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. See also S.Rep. No. 373, 87th Cong., 1st Sess.

. Even if the meaning of the statute were doubtful, this being a capital case the doubt would have to be resolved in favor of the defendant. Andres v. United States, supra Note 3, 333 U.S. at 752, 68 S.Ct. at 885-886, 92 L.Ed. 1055.

. D.D.C., Criminal No. 163-60 (appeal pending D.C.Cir., Nos. 17, 176 and 17,-177).

. The Winston and Andres cases interpreted 18 U.S.C. § 1111, which is the na- . tional equivalent of Public Law 87-423 in that on conviction of first degree murder the jury prescribes the punishment. Under 18 U.S.C. § 1111, however, there is no provision for sentencing by the judge in the event of disagreement by the jury.

. See Winston v. United States, supra.

. Appellant testified on trial that he remembered nothing of the actual shooting; that for a long period of time he had been having domestic trouble because his wife was constantly visiting and seeing the deceased Reginald Winters; that he was in fear of Reginald Winters and that he had been assaulted by him on prior occasions. He testified that on one occasion he was severely beaten by the deceased and sought an arrest warrant against Winters. He also testified that on the day in question, as he approached the bed, the deceased approached him and pushed the railing of the bed against the appellant; that he believed.at that moment the deceased was attempting to inflict a mortal wound upon him. He testified he had taken the gun to the hospital to commit suicide in his wife’s presence.

. See Williams v. People of State of New York, 337 U.S. 241, 69 S.Ct. 1079, 93 L.Ed. 1337 (1949).

. Any doubt, in spite of its expressed language, as to the applicability of 24 D.C.Code § 301(a) prior to sentence •was dissolved by Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, at page 718, 82 S.Ct. 1063, at page 1071, 8 L.Ed.2d 211 (1962), in which the Court stated: “That section [24 D.C.Code § 301(a)] permits the trial judge to act ‘prior to the imposition of sentence or prior to the expiration of any period of probation,’ if he has reason to believe that the accused ‘is of unsound mind or is mentally incompetent so as to be unable to understand the proceedings against him.’ ” But, as this court has recently decided, application of § 301(a) to effect a commitment is not available where the criminal proceeding has been terminated. Cameron v. Fisher, 116 U.S.App.D.C. 9, 320 F.2d 731 (1963).