Court Opinion

ID: 9550622
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:38:57.740689+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:22:01.968546
License: Public Domain

Wertz, J.
(dissenting): I cannot agree with all that has been said in the majority opinion, which fell to my lot to write. I do not agree that it was the intent of our legislature in enacting G. S. *6091949, 8-122b, the so-called guest statute, to classify a child of tender years or a person under mental disability within the term “guest” as defined in the majority opinion. To say that a child who has been placed by its parents in the unrestricted care of another and taken by such other for a ride in a vehicle, is a guest of the driver on such occasion, takes from the term “guest” as used in the statute, its ordinary and well accepted meaning.
Our judicial history is replete with instances of legislative acts and judicial decisions to the effect that a child is conclusively presumed to be non sui juris, incapable of committing crime, not responsible for its torts, not guilty of contributory negligence, and incapable of making a binding contract. In the light of these and many other considerations given persons under disability, can it now be said that our legislature intended to eliminate the advantageous position that a child has heretofore enjoyed? I think not. To me the statute implies that in order to become a guest one must exercise a choice in the matter, and I think that a four-year-old lacks the legal capacity to exercise that choice, just as it is incapable of responsibility for its torts and so forth. Surely the law should not be construed to say that these helpless children are bound by the same standards applicable to persons of mature years who have the ability and mentality to contract for transportation or to object and remonstrate to the manner in which the car is driven while riding in the vehicle under circumstances which make the guest statute applicable. It appears to me to be a harsh rule of law which denies the innocent victim of tender years or the mentally disabled redress against the negligent wrongdoer. (Fuller v. Thrun, 109 Ind. App. 407, 31 N. E. 2d 670; Kudrna v. Adamski, 188 Ore. 396, 216 P. 2d 262.)
It is my opinion that application of the guest statute should not be extended beyond correction of the evils which it may be assumed were the motivating reasons for its enactment.
Smith, J., concurs in the foregoing dissent.