Court Opinion

ID: 9905023
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-28 17:14:06.448128+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:13.382982
License: Public Domain

Filed
                                                                                        Washington State
                                                                                        Court of Appeals
                                                                                         Division Two

                                                                                       November 28, 2023

    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

                                         DIVISION II
 CORRINE WILLIAMS, wife,                                            No. 57145-5-II

                               Appellant,

 PAUL WILLIAMS, husband,

                               Plaintiff below,

        v.

 CITY OF CENTRALIA, a government entity;                      UNPUBLISHED OPINION
 CENTRALIA SCHOOL DISTRICT 401, a
 quasi-governmental entity,

                               Respondents.

       CRUSER, A.C.J. — Corrine Williams sued the City of Centralia and Centralia School

District for negligence after falling in Fort Borst Park and breaking her ankle. Williams was at the

park tailgating with the intention of later attending a softball tournament. Williams fell when she

stepped off a sidewalk into a grassy swale, and she alleges that the height drop-off between the

two surfaces was a hidden hazard that caused her fall. The District moved for summary judgment,

arguing it was immune from suit under recreational use immunity and that even if immunity did

not apply, Williams failed to present evidence of breach. The City joined in the summary judgment
No. 57145-5-II

motion.1 The court granted summary judgment and dismissed the case, finding that Williams failed

to present evidence of breach and that the defendants were entitled to recreational use immunity

as a matter of law.

       Williams now appeals, arguing that the court erred in granting summary judgment. She

argues that the District and the City are not entitled to summary judgment based on the recreational

use immunity statute because factual disputes remained as to whether the softball tournament was

charging fees for attendance, whether the site of her fall was integral to the park’s fee-generating

area, and whether the height difference between the sidewalk and the swale was a latent condition

not readily apparent to a recreational user.

       We affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment because Williams has failed to

present evidence showing (1) that a fee was charged, (2) that the site of the injury was integral to

any fee-generating portion of the park, or (3) that the injury-causing condition was latent.

1
  Williams filed an expert declaration in response to the motion. The City moved to strike the
declaration, and the court initially granted the motion, a decision Williams argues was in error.
The parties have dedicated much of their briefing to the issue of whether Williams’ expert should
have been excluded pursuant to Burnet v. Spokane Ambulance, 131 Wn.2d 484, 933 P.2d 1036
(1997). However, this issue is not properly before us because, although the trial court ostensibly
struck the expert’s declaration, it nevertheless considered the declaration when ruling on the
summary judgment motion. Therefore, for the purposes of our de novo review, we will consider
the expert’s declaration.

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No. 57145-5-II

                                               FACTS

                                              I. INJURY

       Fort Borst Park is a 101-acre park that sits on land owned by the City and land owned by

the District. The park does not charge an entry fee or parking fee. The park includes several softball

fields, divided across two sections of the park known as the Borst Park Softball Complex (Wheeler

Field and Fields 2-4) and the Quad Fields (Fields 6-9). Tournaments are sometimes held at the

Softball Complex for which the tournament’s host can charge a fee. Adjacent to Field 9 lies a

parking lot. A sidewalk runs between the parking lot and the Quad Fields. Between the parking lot

and the sidewalk lies a swale,2 and the swale is transected by culverts. The culvert pipes are topped

with gravel and the rest of the swale is grassy.

       On May 18, 2016, Williams drove to Fort Borst Park after work intending to watch a

softball tournament at the Softball Complex. Williams did not pay a fee to enter the park or to park

in the parking lot. After parking her car in the parking lot adjacent to Field 9, Williams joined a

group of 10-12 people drinking beer and eating pizza. Some of the tailgaters were standing in the

swale and others were on the other side of the swale. Williams walked across the swale to the

sidewalk where her grandchildren were standing. Then, she saw two of her friends in the parking

lot and called to them, intending to walk in their direction. She did not want to use one of the gravel

paths across the swale because to reach the gravel path would have required backtracking and

walking through busy parking lot traffic. Without looking down, she stepped onto the swale from

the sidewalk and immediately lost her balance due to the height drop-off. Williams fell and broke

2
 A swale is “a narrow shallow troughlike depression created to carry water during rainstorms or
collect and slowly release water into the landscape.” Clerk’s Papers at 97.

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No. 57145-5-II

multiple bones in her ankle, an injury that required multiple surgeries and left Williams in constant,

intense pain that impacts her quality of life.

                                            II. LITIGATION

        Williams sued the City of Centralia and Centralia School District for negligence in July

2019. She alleged that her fall was caused by “the deceptive discrepancy in the height difference

between grass culvert and concrete walkway.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 4. The City and the District

asserted recreational use immunity as an affirmative defense.

        In the sole deposition in this litigation, Williams was deposed in September 2020. She

testified that she was not charged a fee to enter the park or to park in the parking lot. As to whether

she would have been charged a fee to enter the softball tournament, she was “not a hundred percent

sure that they were charging entries into district tournaments at that time, but that’s a standard

now.” Id. at 234. With respect to the condition of the ground, she testified that when she stepped

up from the swale onto the sidewalk, she did not notice any overgrown grass in the area. She did

testify that “[t]here was a drop between the concrete and the base of that grass” and that “everybody

was drawing attention to it” after she fell. Id. at 239.

        Williams was questioned about an exhibit consisting of her unsigned and undated

handwritten notes. Williams did not recall when she wrote the notes. In the notes, she wrote

“[s]tepped down off edge of sidewalk to grass that appeared even – it wasn’t.” Id. at 92. She

continued, “4-6 inch ‘hole’ with overgrown grass.” Id. When asked, she clarified that what her

notes called a hole would be better described as a drop-off or ledge, but did not elaborate on the

length of the grass. She stated, “there was grass all around it” and that she “couldn’t see that”

referring to the drop-off. Id. at 240.

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No. 57145-5-II

       On June 10, 2022, the District moved for summary judgment, arguing that (1) it was

immune from liability as a matter of law under recreational use immunity, (2) Williams failed to

present sufficient evidence that the District breached any duty, and (3) Williams caused her own

injury by failing to exercise reasonable care. It attached portions of Williams’ deposition and a

declaration by its Director of Facilities and Maintenance, Eric Wilson. Wilson declared that

“[w]hen the park’s Softball Complex is used for tournaments, the host of the tournament generally

charges a fee for admission to the [S]oftball [C]omplex.” Id. at 96. The City joined in the District’s

motion.

       Williams responded that genuine issues of material fact remained as to (1) whether the area

where Williams fell was an integral part of the fee-generating part of the park, which would

preclude recreational use immunity as a matter of law; (2) whether the height difference was a

known, artificial, dangerous, latent condition; (3) whether the defendants breached their duty to

Williams by failing to keep the park reasonably safe for invitees; and (4) whether and to what

extent Williams was contributorily negligent.

       In support of her response, Williams provided the declaration of safety expert Tom Baird.

She hired Baird on June 8, conducted a site visit with Baird on June 16, received Baird’s report on

June 21, filed the declaration and provided a copy of Baird’s report to the defendants on June 27,

2022. In his declaration, Baird defined “hazard” as “a condition that can cause injury to a person.”

Id. at 364. He defined “unreasonably hazardous and dangerous condition” as “a condition that

could have, and should have, been eliminated prior to an injury incident.” Id. He opined as follows:

              Opinion #1 - The elevated walkway with grass overgrowing it created a
       hidden change in elevation and a trip hazard that was an unreasonably hazardous
       and dangerous condition that presented an unreasonable and foreseeable risk of

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No. 57145-5-II

       injury to Ms. Williams as she [was] crossing from the walkway across a dry swale
       to the parking lot abutting the swale.

               Opinion #2 - The unreasonably hazardous and dangerous condition of the
       elevated walkway with grass overgrowing it created a hidden change in elevation
       and a trip hazard and was such that the owners and managers of the property should
       have discovered the condition through reasonable care.

               Opinion #3 - The owners and managers of the property failed to perform
       adequate inspections to discover the unreasonably hazardous and dangerous
       [condition] of the elevated walkway with grass overgrowing it that created a change
       in elevation and a hidden trip hazard.

               Opinion #4 - The owners and managers of the property failed to maintain
       the incident area in a reasonably safe condition so that the hidden trip hazard was
       not present.

              Opinion #5 - No warnings were placed to warn Ms. Williams of the
       unreasonably hazardous and dangerous condition of the elevated walkway with
       grass overgrowing it that created a change in elevation and a hidden trip hazard.

              Opinion #6 - The unreasonably hazardous and dangerous condition of the
       elevated walkway with grass overgrowing it that created a change in elevation and
       a hidden trip hazard, could have, and should have, been eliminated prior to the
       incident.

              Opinion #7 - The unreasonably hazardous and dangerous condition of the
       elevated walkway with grass overgrowing that created a change in elevation and a
       hidden trip hazard was the cause of Ms. Williams’ trip and fall.

              Opinion #8 - Signage should have been placed to guide persons to a
       designated walkway to the baseball fields and to prohibit persons from crossing
       from the parking lot over the swale to the walkway.

               Opinion #9 - It is more likely than not that Ms. Williams stepped onto the
       walkway without realizing that there was a change in elevation because the change
       in elevation was hidden from view because of the grass overgrowing it.

Id. at 365-66. Baird’s opinions were based in part on his observations and photos of conditions in

the park on June 16, 2022. He also examined photos of Williams lying on the grass immediately

after her fall and photos of the park taken by Williams’ former attorney on an unknown date.

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No. 57145-5-II

       The City and the District jointly moved to strike Baird’s declaration pursuant to the test

outlined in Burnet v. Spokane Ambulance, 131 Wn.2d 484, 933 P.2d 1036 (1997), as a sanction

for violating the rules of discovery. The court initially granted the motion to strike Baird’s

declaration for summary judgment purposes. However, the court would later explain, “[e]ven

though I have granted the motion to strike, for purposes of my [summary judgment] analysis I will

address and include Mr. Baird’s material in the event that any reviewing Court finds that I was in

error in not – in granting the motion to strike.” Verbatim Rep. of Proc. (VRP) at 26. The court’s

written summary judgment ruling noted, “[n]otwithstanding the court’s ruling striking Mr. Baird’s

report, the court, even considering the contents thereof, finds that it does not affect the outcome of

this motion.” CP at 472.

       After hearing oral argument, the court granted the summary judgment motion and

dismissed the case. It found that the recreational use immunity statute protected the defendants

from suit as a matter of law, reasoning that Williams did not present evidence showing that fees

were collected at the tournament, and even if they were, Williams was not on her way to the game

but engaging in separate recreational activities when she fell. It further reasoned that Williams had

not created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the condition was latent because her own

testimony indicated that the condition was obvious. Finally, it granted summary judgment on the

alternative ground that Williams failed to present sufficient evidence showing that the swale was

unreasonably dangerous. Upon considering Baird’s testimony, the court reasoned that any

evidentiary inconsistencies created by Baird’s declaration were “confined to inconsistencies within

the plaintiff’s evidence, not between the evidence presented by the opposing parties.” VRP at 27.

It thus concluded that Baird’s report did not raise any genuine issues of dispute that would preclude

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No. 57145-5-II

summary judgment. The court declined to grant summary judgment on the ground of contributory

negligence.

                                           DISCUSSION

                                      I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT

       Williams argues that the City and the District are not entitled to summary judgment because

they are not immune from suit under Washington’s recreational use immunity statute, RCW

4.24.210. She contends that her expert’s declaration created factual disputes as to whether the

injury-causing condition was latent. She also argued below, but does not3 argue before this court,

that summary judgment is improper because she raised issues of material fact as to whether the

defendants breached the ordinary duty of reasonable care owed to invitees absent recreational use

immunity. We disagree with Williams and affirm the trial court.

3
  The District points out in its brief that Williams entirely ignored the trial court’s alternate basis
for granting summary judgment—that she failed to show a genuine issue of material fact on
whether the District or City breached the duty of ordinary care. Williams asserts in her reply brief
that she had “ma[de] her position very clear” on this issue throughout her opening brief. Reply at
12. However, Williams’ opening brief did not address the issue in any detail or include it in her
assignments of error. We decline to consider Williams’ claim that the defendants breached their
duty of ordinary care because “[p]assing treatment of an issue or lack of reasoned argument” does
not merit our consideration. Holland v. City of Tacoma, 90 Wn. App. 533, 538, 954 P.2d 290
(1998).

                                                  8
No. 57145-5-II

A. LEGAL PRINCIPLES

       We review summary judgment rulings de novo, viewing the facts in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party. Davies v. Multicare Health Sys., 199 Wn.2d 608, 616, 510 P.3d

346 (2022). We consider only the evidence that was brought to the trial court’s attention. RAP

9.12. Summary judgment is proper if there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. CR 56(c). A genuine issue of material fact exists

where the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict in favor of the nonmoving

party. Zonnebloem, LLC v. Blue Bay Holdings, LLC, 200 Wn. App. 178, 183, 401 P.3d 468 (2017).

       A party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of showing there is no

genuine issue of material fact. Id. After the moving party meets this initial burden, “the burden

shifts to the nonmoving party to set forth specific facts that rebut the moving party’s contentions

and show a genuine issue of material fact.” Id. If, at this point, the nonmoving party “ ‘fails to

make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case,

and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial,’ then the trial court should grant the

motion.” Young v. Key Pharm., Inc., 112 Wn.2d 216, 225, 770 P.2d 182 (1989) (quoting Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986)).

       To rebut the moving party’s contentions, the nonmoving party’s response must be based

on “personal knowledge, must set forth facts that would be admissible in evidence, and must show

affirmatively that the declarant of such facts is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.”

Lane v. Harborview Med. Ctr., 154 Wn. App. 279, 286, 227 P.3d 297 (2010). Expert opinion on

an ultimate question of fact generally is sufficient to defeat summary judgment. Strauss v. Premera

Blue Cross, 194 Wn.2d 296, 301, 449 P.3d 640 (2019). This is true so long as the opinion is not

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No. 57145-5-II

speculative, conclusory, or based on assumptions. Id. Conclusory statements, speculation, and

argumentative assertions are insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. Greenhalgh v.

Dep’t of Corrs., 160 Wn. App. 706, 714, 248 P.3d 150 (2011).

       Plaintiffs suing for negligence must prove: “(1) the existence of a duty owed, (2) breach of

that duty, (3) a resulting injury, and (4) a proximate cause between the breach and the injury.”

Tincani v. Inland Empire Zoological Soc., 124 Wn.2d 121, 127-28, 875 P.2d 621 (1994). The

existence of a duty is a threshold question of law. Id. at 128. In actions for premises liability, the

scope of the landowner’s duty depends on the common law classification of the injured party; i.e.

whether the plaintiff is an invitee, a licensee, or a trespasser. Id. “A landowner generally owes

trespassers and licensees the duty to refrain from willfully or wantonly injuring them, whereas to

invitees the landowner owes an affirmative duty to use ordinary care to keep the premises in a

reasonably safe condition.” Van Dinter v. City of Kennewick, 121 Wn.2d 38, 41-42, 846 P.2d 522

(1993).4

       Recreational use immunity, defined in RCW 4.24.210, essentially “creates an exception to

Washington’s premise liability law regarding public invitees.” Camicia v. Howard S. Wright

Const. Co., 179 Wn.2d 684, 694, 317 P.3d 987 (2014). Landowners are entitled to recreational use

immunity if the land in question is “(1) open to members of the public (2) for recreational purposes

and (3) for which ‘no fee of any kind [is] charged.’ ” Hively v. Port of Skamania County, 193 Wn.

App. 11, 15, 372 P.3d 781 (2016) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)

(quoting Camicia, 179 Wn.2d at 695-96). Because recreational use immunity is an affirmative

4
  Williams argued below that she was an invitee, and the District accepted this point for summary
judgment purposes. The City does not appear to oppose such treatment for summary judgment
purposes.

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No. 57145-5-II

defense, the landowner bears the burden of proving immunity applies. Schwartz v. King County,

200 Wn.2d 231, 238, 516 P.3d 360 (2022). When the supporting facts are undisputed, the trial

court may determine immunity as a question of law. Camicia, 179 Wn.2d at 693.

        Landowners may retain recreational use immunity for part of their land despite charging a

fee to use another part. Plano v. City of Renton, 103 Wn. App. 910, 914, 14 P.3d 871 (2000). In

this scenario, the landowner “must show only that it charges no fee for using the land or water area

where the injury occurred.” Id. at 915. A landowner is not entitled to immunity when the place

where the injury occurred is a “necessary and integral part” of the fee-generating area. Id.

        Even where the three elements of recreational use immunity are met, immunity

nevertheless will not apply to known dangerous artificial latent conditions for which the landowner

fails to warn the public invitee. Camicia, 179 Wn.2d at 702; RCW 4.24.210(4)(a). The landowner

may retain recreational use immunity upon a showing that any one of the characteristics is absent.

Schwartz, 200 Wn.2d at 239. A latent condition is one that is not readily apparent to the general

class of recreational users. Id. at 241.

B. APPLICATION

        We conclude that Williams failed to rebut the affirmative defense of recreational use

immunity as a matter of law. The evidence suggesting that a fee would have been charged is

speculative and is insufficient for any reasonable jury to find that the City or the District was

charging any such fee on the day in question. Nor could a reasonable jury find that Williams fell

in an area that was integral to the fee-generating portion of the park. Therefore, the trial court

correctly granted summary judgment.

                                                11
No. 57145-5-II

       Williams fails to raise a genuine dispute of fact about whether a fee was charged. Williams

admits she did not pay a fee to enter the park on the day that she fell. Williams was “not a hundred

percent sure” that any fee would have been charged for a softball tournament in 2016. CP at 234.

She testified only that such fees were “standard” at the time of her deposition in 2020, and

speculated that the same would have been true in 2016. Id. She presented no evidence that either

defendant was the entity charging fees for tournament entry, failing to rebut the defense evidence

that “[w]hen the park’s Softball Complex is used for tournaments, the host of the tournament

generally charges a fee for admission to the softball complex.” Id. at 96 (emphasis added).

       Even if Williams did show that a fee was charged in 2016, she would still need to show

that her fall occurred in an area integral to the fee-generating portion of the park. Williams relies

on Plano v. City of Renton to argue that the area where she fell was integral to the fee-generating

portion of the park as a matter of law. In Plano, the plaintiff was injured on a marina ramp leading

to the park’s fee-generating dock, but had not yet paid the fee. Plano, 103 Wn. App. at 915. Patrons

could not access the dock without walking up one of the ramps. Id. The ramps were built

specifically for dock access. Id. On these facts, the court held that the ramps were a necessary and

integral part of the fee-generating area and that the landowner was not entitled to immunity as a

matter of law. Id.

       In Hively v. Port of Skamania County, this court applied Plano to facts similar to those at

issue here. In Hively, the plaintiff was injured on a path along the waterfront on her way to the

restroom in a park owned by the Port of Skamania County. Hively, 193 Wn. App. at 13. The path

and restroom were open to the public without a fee, but the Port charged moorage fees to cruise

ships and charged fees for private event rentals at the park. Id. This court reasoned that the path

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No. 57145-5-II

was not integral to the fee-generating portion of the park because “[a] person is not required to

pay for or use either the path or the restroom as a part of any paid access” and because “[n]o

evidence suggests that the path where Hively’s injury occurred was constructed specifically for

the purpose of providing access to the Port’s fee-generating areas.” Id. at 16. We affirmed the trial

court’s grant of summary judgment to the Port. Id. at 13.

       Here, Williams did not present evidence showing that the location where she fell was

integral to the fee-generating part of the park. The facts here resemble Hively: Williams does not

dispute that she fell while tailgating, does not allege that crossing the swale was necessary to reach

the softball tournament, and does not even show that she was walking in the direction of the

tournament when she was injured. Indeed, she agrees that she was walking back toward the parking

lot, for a social purpose, when she fell. The undisputed facts show that the area where Williams

fell was not integral to the fee-generating portion of the park.

       Finally, Williams argues that even if recreational use immunity applied, the defendants

breached their duty under the immunity statute to warn of a known dangerous artificial latent

condition. We disagree. The swale and corresponding height difference were open and obvious,

not hidden. The condition is visible in many photos, and Baird’s declaration cannot overcome such

photographic evidence. We affirm.

                                          CONCLUSION

       We affirm the trial court’s summary judgment ruling. We decline to consider whether the

plaintiff’s expert declaration should have been struck pursuant to the Burnet factors.

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No. 57145-5-II

        A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the

Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040,

it is so ordered.

                                                    CRUSER, A.C.J.
 We concur:

 MAXA, J.

 LEE, J.

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