Court Opinion

ID: 9705229
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:00:16.287752+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:09.082636
License: Public Domain

HARDBERGER, Chief Justice,
joined by Justice LÓPEZ, concurring and dissenting on Appellant’s Motion for Rehearing En Banc.
“A good name is better than riches. ”
Cervantes, Don Quixote Part II, Book II, chpt. 33 (1615).
I fully concur in the majority’s analysis of both the jurisdictional and indemnification issues raised in this appeal. I must respectfully dissent, however, from the *35majority’s holding that the trial court properly granted the Poindexters’ motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The majority’s holding is based on its conclusion that less than a scintilla of evidence was introduced to support the jury’s finding of actual malice.
Prior to the meeting, the Poindexters had information from Dr. Radford that Scott’s loan was not in default. In addition, the only “proof’ that the Poindexters presented at the meeting to support their accusation was two default notices from the bank; however, Poindexter III testified that he and his father discussed that the Society had two loans outstanding pri- or to the meeting, and Poindexter III further testified that he knew the number on the bank notices did not match the number for Scott’s loan. Finally, the Poindexters testified that they did not know what the situation was regarding the loans when they introduced the topic as new business; however, instead of introducing the topic by inquiring into the situation, they proceeded to accuse Scott of being in default.
A trial court may only grant a judgment notwithstanding the verdict if there is no evidence to support the jury’s finding. More than a scintilla of evidence exists when the evidence rises to a level that would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to differ in their conclusions. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 711 (Tex.1997). The Texas Supreme Court has recognized that the defendant is unlikely to provide direct testimony to prove actual malice. Casso v. Brand, 776 S.W.2d 551, 558-59 (Tex.1989). For this reason, we look to the information known to the defendant to determine if it demonstrates a high degree of awareness of the probable falsity of the statements made in light of that information.
In this case, the Poindexters knew that two loans were outstanding and the loan number on the default notices did not match Scott’s loan. In addition, Dr. Rad-ford told the Poindexters that Scott’s loan was not in default. Furthermore, the Po-indexters admitted that they did not know the true situation regarding the loans prior to the meeting. The jury could rely on this evidence to support their finding that the Poindexters acted with reckless disregard for whether their accusation was true, and I would conclude that this evidence is more than a scintilla of evidence to support the jury’s finding of actual malice.
The majority’s conclusion that no evidence existed to support the jury’s finding is understandable in view of the Texas Supreme Court case law interpreting the actual malice requirement. The Poindex-ters assert in their brief that: “the Texas Supreme Court has considered the actual malice issue eleven times. In nine of those instances, the court has ruled that actual malice does not exist as a matter of law. Only twice has the Court found there to be a disputed fact issue on the point but those two cases [citations omitted] were overruled by the Court in Casso v. Brand [citation omitted ].” Despite this precedent, actual malice has a defined legal meaning, and, in my opinion, more than a scintilla of evidence was presented in this case to support the jury’s finding of actual malice.