Court Opinion

ID: 9838942
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-08 21:00:26.943899+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:55.845384
License: Public Domain

USCA4 Appeal: 22-2091      Doc: 20         Filed: 09/07/2023      Pg: 1 of 9

                                             UNPUBLISHED

                                UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                               No. 22-2091

        HERBERT LEE PRINGLE,

                             Plaintiff - Appellant,

                      v.

        COMMISSIONER OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,

                             Defendant - Appellee.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Florence.
        Thomas E. Rogers, III, Magistrate Judge. (4:21-cv-02635-TER)

        Submitted: July 20, 2023                                      Decided: September 7, 2023

        Before KING and RUSHING, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge.

        Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: W. Daniel Mayes, SMITH, MASSEY, BRODIE, GUYNN & MAYES,
        Aiken, South Carolina, for Appellant. Adair F. Boroughs, United States Attorney, Maija
        DiDomenico, Special Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
        STATES ATTORNEY, Columbia, South Carolina; Brian C. O’Donnell, Associate General
        Counsel, Taryn Jasner, Deputy Associate General Counsel, Office of the General Counsel,
        SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
USCA4 Appeal: 22-2091         Doc: 20         Filed: 09/07/2023     Pg: 2 of 9

        PER CURIAM:

               Herbert Pringle appeals from the district court’s order 1 upholding the Social

        Security Administration’s denial of disability benefits. On appeal, Pringle challenges the

        Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) determination of Pringle’s residual functional

        capacity (“RFC”) and his consideration of the Department of Veterans Affairs’ (“VA”)

        disability rating. We affirm.

               “When examining [a Social Security Administration] disability determination, a

        reviewing court is required to uphold the determination when an ALJ has applied correct

        legal standards and the ALJ’s factual findings are supported by substantial evidence.”

        Bird v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 699 F.3d 337, 340 (4th Cir. 2012). “Substantial

        evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to

        support a conclusion.” Johnson v. Barnhart, 434 F.3d 650, 653 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal

        quotation marks omitted). “It consists of more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may

        be less than a preponderance.” Hancock v. Astrue, 667 F.3d 470, 472 (4th Cir. 2012)

        (internal quotation marks omitted). “In reviewing for substantial evidence, [the court

        should] not undertake to reweigh conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or

        substitute [its] judgment for that of the ALJ.” Johnson, 434 F.3d at 653 (internal quotation

        marks and alteration omitted). Rather, “[w]here conflicting evidence allows reasonable

        minds to differ,” we defer to the Commissioner’s decision. Id. (internal quotation marks

        omitted). To enable judicial review for substantial evidence, “[t]he record should include

               1
                   The parties consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge.

                                                       2
USCA4 Appeal: 22-2091      Doc: 20         Filed: 09/07/2023      Pg: 3 of 9

        a discussion of which evidence the ALJ found credible and why, and specific application

        of the pertinent legal requirements to the record evidence.” Radford v. Colvin, 734 F.3d

        288, 295 (4th Cir. 2013).

               A “disability” entitling a claimant to benefits under the Social Security Act, as

        relevant here, is “[the] inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of

        any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result

        in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less

        than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The claimant “bears the burden of proving

        that he is disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act.” English v. Shalala, 10

        F.3d 1080, 1082 (4th Cir. 1993). A five-step sequential process is used to evaluate a

        disability claim. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). First, the ALJ considers

        whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity. Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i),

        416.920(a)(4)(i). If he is not, the ALJ determines whether the claimant has “a severe

        medically determinable physical or mental impairment . . . or a combination of impairments

        that is severe.” Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). If he does, the ALJ decides

        whether that impairment or combination of impairments meets or equals one of the listings

        at 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If it

        does not, the ALJ assesses the claimant’s RFC to determine whether the claimant retains

        the ability to perform past relevant work. Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). If

        he does not, the burden shifts at the fifth step to the Commissioner to establish that, given

        the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and RFC, the claimant can perform

        alternative work that exists in substantial numbers in the national economy. Mascio v.

                                                     3
USCA4 Appeal: 22-2091       Doc: 20         Filed: 09/07/2023     Pg: 4 of 9

        Colvin, 780 F.3d 632, 635 (4th Cir. 2015). “The Commissioner typically offers this

        evidence through the testimony of a vocational expert responding to a hypothetical that

        incorporates the claimant’s limitations.” Id.

               Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 96-8p requires that “[t]he RFC assessment must

        first identify the individual’s functional limitations or restrictions and assess his . . .

        work-related abilities on a function-by-function basis, including the functions” listed in the

        regulations. SSR 96–8p, 61 Fed. Reg. 34,474, 34,475 (July 2, 1996). “Only after that may

        RFC be expressed in terms of the exertional levels of work, sedentary, light, medium,

        heavy, and very heavy.” Id. The SSR further explains that “[t]he RFC assessment must

        include a narrative discussion describing how the evidence supports each conclusion, citing

        specific medical facts (e.g., laboratory findings) and nonmedical evidence (e.g., daily

        activities, observations).” Id. at 34,478.

               Pringle first argues that ALJ improperly found that he had the RFC to perform light

        work, with no specific restrictions on standing or walking and no need for an assistive

        device. To the contrary, Pringle argues, he is unable to stand or walk for more than short

        periods, and he requires a cane when performing these activities. SSR 96-9p, 1996 WL

        374185, *7, which concerns an RFC of less than a full range of sedentary work, discusses

        hand-held assistive devices. The Ruling states that, “[t]o find that a hand-held assistive

        device is medically required, there must be medical documentation establishing the need

        for a hand-held assistive device to aid in walking or standing, and describing the

        circumstances for which it is needed.”

                                                        4
USCA4 Appeal: 22-2091      Doc: 20         Filed: 09/07/2023     Pg: 5 of 9

               Pringle asserts that the evidence in the record that he needed and used a cane was

        voluminous and that the attempt to portray his cane use as occasional or inconsistent was

        not substantially supported. However, the ALJ did not state that Pringle’s cane use was

        occasional or inconsistent. Instead, the ALJ noted that, on some occasions, Pringle did not

        use a cane, and the ALJ appropriately considered this evidence in concluding that a cane

        was not medically necessary.

               Pringle further asserts that the ALJ erred by failing to consider his ongoing

        complaints of burning sensations, pain, numbness, swelling, and paresthesia in his feet and

        toes and to his diagnoses of metatarsalgia, flat feet, dorsal boney exostosis, and abnormal

        gait. Pringle also avers that the ALJ did not consider his limited ability to walk both with

        and without a cane. However, the ALJ specifically outlined most of Pringle’s complaints

        and noted that his conditions had been treated conservatively. Nonetheless, the ALJ

        rejected Pringle’s assertion that his foot condition was progressively worsening, citing to

        unremarkable x-rays and an electromyogram and nerve conduction study and generally

        normal strength and sensation. Moreover, there was no medical evidence that any doctor

        had prescribed or suggested cane use or concluded that Pringle was limited in his ability to

        walk and stand, and the state consultative physicians specifically determined that a cane

        was not clinically supported. In short, while there was evidence that Pringle used a cane

        consistently and had certain documented foot conditions, the ALJ appropriately analyzed

                                                     5
USCA4 Appeal: 22-2091      Doc: 20         Filed: 09/07/2023      Pg: 6 of 9

        the record, and his determination that Pringle could walk and stand without use of a cane

        was supported by substantial evidence. 2

               Pringle next asserts that the district court did not consider the extent to which his

        symptoms of sarcoidosis, in particular, shortness of breath, fatigue, and chest pain, would

        affect his ability to perform light work. First, Pringle argues that the ALJ improperly found

        that his conditions, while declining in Spring 2014, showed marked improvement in 2015

        and 2016 through the use of steroids. Pringle relies on his self-reported inability to walk

        without getting winded. The ALJ, while recognizing that Pringle continued to complain

        of a decline in exercise tolerance, noted that pulmonary function testing showed

        improvement after steroids and pulmonary rehabilitation. Through the relevant time

        period, Pringle was prescribed inhalants, he did not require inpatient care, and his

        symptoms were not consistently present. Thus, the ALJ’s finding that Pringle showed

        improvement in his pulmonary condition was supported by substantial evidence.

               Pringle further claims that medical providers speculated that his shortness of breath

        may have been caused by water retention, cardiac sarcoidosis (as opposed to pulmonary

        sarcoidosis), diastolic dysfunction, or deconditioning. Pringle avers that his doctors never

        suggested that there was no basis for his symptoms, but instead were not sure which of his

        conditions was the primary cause. However, regardless of the cause, the ALJ noted that

               2
                 To further undermine the ALJ’s analysis of his cane use, Pringle points to evidence
        in the record that he asserts supports his claim that a specialized cane had been medically
        ordered. However, our review of the cited records does not find any indication that a doctor
        ordered a specialized cane for Pringle or that a doctor considered the cane he used to be
        necessary for physical therapy or otherwise.

                                                     6
USCA4 Appeal: 22-2091       Doc: 20         Filed: 09/07/2023         Pg: 7 of 9

        Pringle’s complaints of chest pain and shortness of breath showed that these symptoms

        occurred only occasionally. This finding finds substantial support in the record. Moreover,

        it is undisputed that no medical tests supported a finding that Pringle’s shortness of breath

        would impact his RFC in a greater way than found by the ALJ, and no treating or examining

        physician imposed limitations on walking or standing based on Pringle’s shortness of

        breath or chest pain or otherwise. Further, the ALJ recognized Pringle’s complaints of

        shortness of breath, chest pain and fatigue, but found that the objective medical testing was

        stable and that Pringle responded well to medication. Nonetheless, the ALJ found that

        Pringle’s limitations would prevent him from climbing ladders or scaffolds regularly and

        would prevent him from working in temperature extremes, and the ALJ incorporated these

        limitations into the RFC. Accordingly, we find that the ALJ properly considered Pringle’s

        symptoms and that the ALJ’s determination of the RFC was supported by substantial

        evidence.

               Finally, Pringle asserts that the ALJ failed to give appropriate weight to the VA’s

        disability rating, specifically its rating of 30% for each lower extremity based on Pringle’s

        frostbite injury. The ALJ gave the rating little weight, finding that the VA’s own medical

        records did not document significant abnormalities or clinical findings regarding Pringle’s

        frostbite injury to his feet and subsequent osteoarthritis.

               In Bird, this Court interpreted then-existing federal regulations as requiring ALJs

        “to consider all record evidence relevant to a disability determination, including decisions

        by other agencies.” 699 F.3d at 343. The Bird court held:

                                                       7
USCA4 Appeal: 22-2091      Doc: 20          Filed: 09/07/2023     Pg: 8 of 9

               [I]n making a disability determination, the SSA must give substantial weight
               to a VA disability rating. However, because the SSA employs its own
               standards for evaluating a claimant's alleged disability, and because the
               effective date of coverage for a claimant's disability under the two programs
               likely will vary, an ALJ may give less weight to a VA disability rating when
               the record before the ALJ clearly demonstrates that such a deviation is
               appropriate.

        Id. at 343. In order to demonstrate that it is appropriate to give the VA’s decisions less

        than substantial weight, the ALJ must give “persuasive, specific, valid reasons for doing

        so that are supported by the record.” Woods v. Berryhill, 888 F.3d 686, 692 (4th Cir. 2018).

        For example, an ALJ “could explain which aspects of the prior agency decision he finds

        not credible and why, describe why he finds other evidence more credible, and discuss the

        effect of any new evidence.” Id.

               Here, the ALJ carefully explained his reasons for giving the VA decision little

        weight, and those reasons are supported by substantial evidence. In particular, despite the

        VA’s 30% rating in each lower extremity for frostbite injury, the ALJ noted that Pringle

        was able to work after his frostbite injury for numerous years as an electrician, a strenuous

        occupation. In addition, the ALJ relied upon the medical evidence (nearly all of which is

        from the VA’s own treatment notes), which did not show serious abnormalities or

        significant limitations in strength or sensation. The ALJ also noted that Pringle’s treating

        podiatrist did not document significant clinical findings or functional limitations.

               Further, the ALJ considered the VA’s 20% disability rating in each lower extremity

        for peripheral neuropathy/paralysis of the sciatic nerve. In so doing, the ALJ determined

        that Pringle’s lower extremity neuropathy was a severe impairment and provided

        appropriate limitations in the RFC. Regarding the sciatic nerve, the ALJ noted that the

                                                      8
USCA4 Appeal: 22-2091      Doc: 20         Filed: 09/07/2023      Pg: 9 of 9

        evidence did not document any such findings during the relevant time period, and Pringle

        does not dispute this finding. Based on the foregoing, we hold that the ALJ properly

        considered the VA’s disability rating and provided appropriate reasoning for giving it less

        weight.

               As such, we affirm the district court’s order. We dispense with oral argument

        because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this

        court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

                                                                                        AFFIRMED

                                                     9