Court Opinion

ID: 9954140
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-25 18:10:56.138624+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:11:51.153005
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Behrens v. Behrens, 2024-Ohio-1121.]

                 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                          ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                 LAKE COUNTY

DANIEL BEHRENS,                                    CASE NO. 2023-L-081

                 Plaintiff-Appellant,
                                                   Civil Appeal from the
        - vs -                                     Court of Common Pleas,
                                                   Domestic Relations Division
BRITTANY BEHRENS,

                 Defendant-Appellee.               Trial Court No. 2019 DR 000321

                                                OPINION

                                      Decided: March 25, 2024
                                        Judgment: Affirmed

Leedaun C. Williams, 6100 Oak Tree Boulevard, Suite 200, Independence, OH 44131,
and Jay F. Crook, Jay F. Crook, Attorney at Law, LLC, 30601 Euclid Avenue, Wickliffe,
OH 44092 (For Plaintiff-Appellant).

Amanda M. Pipik-Leip, Taft, Stettinius & Hollister, LLP, 200 Public Square, Suite 3500,
Cleveland, OH 44114 (For Defendant-Appellee).

EUGENE A. LUCCI, P.J.

        {¶1}     Appellant, Daniel Behrens (“Father”), appeals the July 28, 2023 entry that

adopted a magistrate’s decision and entered judgment modifying the parties’ shared

parenting plan and finding Father in contempt for his failure to pay certain tutoring

expenses. We affirm.

        {¶2}     Father and his former spouse, appellee, Brittany Behrens (“Mother”), are

the parents of two minor children, born in 2014 and 2016. In 2020, the parties were

divorced by way of an agreed decree, which incorporated the parties’ separation
agreement, including a shared parenting plan.       On September 13, 2021, Father filed a

motion to modify the shared parenting plan. On September 7, 2022, Mother filed a motion

requesting the trial court to order Father to show cause as to why he should not be held

in contempt for his failure to reimburse Mother for tutoring expenses she incurred on

behalf of the parties’ youngest child. Both motions were heard by a magistrate over the

course of two days. On January 25, 2023, the magistrate issued a decision concluding

that the shared parenting plan should be modified, that tutoring is an “educational

expense” for which Father was obligated to pay a certain portion, and that Father should

be held in contempt for his failure to pay for tutoring.

       {¶3}   On February 2, 2023, new counsel filed an appearance on behalf of Father,

and, on February 6, 2023, Father moved for an extension of time to file objections. The

trial court denied the motion for an extension on February 16, 2023. The next day, Father

filed a motion for leave to file his preliminary objections instanter together with his

preliminary objections and a request for leave to supplement his objections. On February

22, 2023, Father filed transcripts of the magistrate’s hearing with the trial court. On

February 24, 2023, Mother filed a response in opposition to Father’s motion to file his

objections instanter. On February 28, 2023, Father filed a reply in support of his motion

to file his objections instanter and renewed his request for leave to supplement the

objections.

       {¶4}   On July 28, 2023, the trial court denied Father’s motion to file objections

instanter. The same day, the trial court adopted the magistrate’s decision, granted

Father’s motion to modify the parties’ shared parenting plan, found Father in contempt for

his failure to pay his portion of the parties’ younger child’s tutoring expenses, and ordered

                                              2

Case No. 2023-L-081
that Father serve ten days in the Lake County Jail unless he purged himself of the

contempt by paying Mother $609.59 on an ordered schedule.

       {¶5}   On appeal, Father assigns three errors. Prior to reaching the merits of

Father’s assigned errors, we first address an issue raised by Mother in her answer brief,

wherein she maintains that Father’s appellant’s brief should be stricken and his appeal

dismissed because he has failed to include record references in his brief in contravention

of this court’s Local Rule (“Loc.R.”) 16(C)(4)(a) and 16(E).      In his reply brief, Father

maintains that no transcript citations were provided because he does not rely on the

transcript in support of his assigned errors. Instead, he relies only on the documents

identified in his arguments.

       {¶6}   Although Father does not rely on the transcript of the hearing before the

magistrate in his brief, Loc.R. 16(C)(4)(a) requires an appellant to cite to the “portion of

the record” wherein the trial court erred, and Loc.R. 16(E) provides that failure to comply

with the rule may result in the brief being stricken and/or dismissal of the appeal. Further,

App.R. 16(A)(3) and 16(A)(7) require an appellant’s brief to contain “a statement of the

assignments of error presented for review, with reference to the place in the record where

each error is reflected,” and “[a]n argument containing the contentions of the appellant

with respect to each assignment of error presented for review and the reasons in support

of the contentions, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record on

which appellant relies.” (Emphasis added.) Nonetheless, given the limited nature of

Father’s arguments and the specific identification of those portions of the record at issue

within the text of his arguments, any literal noncompliance with the rule is an insufficient

basis in this case to strike the brief or dismiss the appeal.

                                              3

Case No. 2023-L-081
       {¶7}   Accordingly, we proceed to review Father’s assigned errors.

       {¶8}   In his first assigned error, Father maintains:

       {¶9}   “The trial court abused its discretion in not granting appellant’s request for

an exte[n]sion of time and then not considering out of rule filed objections.”

       {¶10} Initially, we briefly address a finality issue raised by Mother in her answer

brief relative to Father’s first assigned error.    Mother maintains that Father cannot

challenge the trial court’s rulings on his motions for an extension and to file the objections

instanter, as the trial court’s rulings on these issues were not final orders. Although

Mother is correct that these rulings were not final orders, they merged with the final order

issued in this matter on July 28, 2023. See Crowley v. Warren, 11th Dist. Trumbull No.

2002-T-0177, 2003-Ohio-5692, ¶ 19; see also Eckmeyer ex rel. Eckmeyer v. Kent City

School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 11th Dist. Lake No. 99-P-0117, 2000 WL 1651308, *3-4 (Nov.

3, 2000). Thus, the interlocutory orders denying extension and leave to file objections to

the magistrate’s decision became subject to review when the trial court entered judgment

on the magistrate’s decision.

       {¶11} We review a trial court’s decision as to whether to grant an extension to file

objections to a magistrate’s decision for an abuse of discretion. May v. Jarosz, 11th Dist.

Lake No. 2022-L-063, 2023-Ohio-511, ¶ 12. “An abuse of discretion may be found in a

trial court’s “‘“failure to exercise sound, reasonable, and legal decision-making.”’” May at

¶ 13, quoting State v. Beechler, 2d Dist. Clark No. 09-CA-54, 2010-Ohio-1900, ¶ 62,

quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 11 (8th Ed.Rev.2004). “[W]here the issue on review has

been confided to the discretion of the trial court, the mere fact that the reviewing court

                                              4

Case No. 2023-L-081
would have reached a different result is not enough, without more, to find error.” May at

¶ 14, citing Beechler at ¶ 67.

       {¶12} Civ.R. 53(D)(5) provides, “For good cause shown, the court shall allow a

reasonable extension of time for a party to * * * file objections to a magistrate’s decision.

‘Good cause’ includes, but is not limited to, a failure by the clerk to timely serve the party

seeking the extension with the magistrate’s order or decision.” Thus, aside from the

singular example of “good cause” contained in Civ.R. 53(D)(5), the rule does not define

“good cause.” “As a general rule, ‘good cause’ means a ‘“[s]ubstantial reason, one that

affords legal excuse.”’” White v. Grange Ins. Co., 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 29151, 2022-

Ohio-497, ¶ 28, quoting State v. Brown, 38 Ohio St.3d 305, 308, 528 N.E.2d 523 (1988),

quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 622 (5th Ed.1979). “The determination of what constitutes

good cause can be made only on a case-by-case basis.” White at ¶ 28, quoting Brown

at 308.

       {¶13} Prior to the adoption of Civ.R. 53(D)(5) in 2006, a motion for extension to

file objections was governed by Civ.R. 6. Hasch v. Hasch, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2007-L-

127, 2008-Ohio-1689, ¶ 26. “Under Civ.R.6(B), a trial court may grant an extension in its

discretion after the time for doing an act has expired where the failure to act was the result

of excusable neglect of the party or of his counsel.” Hasch at ¶ 26. “The cases decided

under that rule provide guidance as to the meaning of ‘good cause’ under Civ.R.

53(D)(5).” Hasch at ¶ 26. See also White at ¶ 28 (standards for good cause and

excusable neglect are similar).

       {¶14} “The determination of whether neglect is excusable or inexcusable must

take into consideration all the surrounding facts and circumstances, and courts must be

                                              5

Case No. 2023-L-081
mindful of the admonition that cases should be decided on their merits, where possible,

rather than procedural grounds.” State ex rel. Lindenschmidt v. Butler Cty. Bd. of

Commrs., 72 Ohio St.3d 464, 466, 650 N.E.2d 1343 (1995), citing Marion Production

Credit Assn. v. Cochran, 40 Ohio St.3d 265, 271, 533 N.E.2d 325 (1988). “Although

excusable neglect cannot be defined in the abstract, the test for excusable neglect under

Civ.R. 6(B)(2) is less stringent than that applied under Civ.R. 60(B).” (Citations omitted.)

State ex rel. Lindenschmidt at 466.

       {¶15} Here, the magistrate’s hearing was held over two days in 2022, and both

parties were represented by counsel. The magistrate issued a decision on January 25,

2023. On February 2, 2023, a notice of appearance was filed by a new attorney on behalf

of Father. On February 6, 2023, Father, through new counsel, moved for a 30-day

extension of time to file objections. Father maintained that it was “imperative that counsel

obtain the audio recording and transcript of the hearing to determine and prepare

Plaintiff’s Objections to the Magistrate’s Decision because counsel was not present at the

hearing.”    In support of new counsel’s need to review the transcript prior to filing

objections, Father cited to the trial court’s local rules which require objections to “be

specific and state with particularity the grounds for the objection.” (Emphasis sic.)

Lake County Domestic Relations Court Local Rule 12.04. See also Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(ii)

(“An objection to a magistrate’s decision shall be specific and state with particularity all

grounds for objection.”).

       {¶16} On February 16, 2023, the trial court denied Father’s motion for an

extension, reasoning that Father could have filed his objections prior to the preparation

of the transcript and then sought leave to supplement the objections. The next day,

                                             6

Case No. 2023-L-081
Father moved for leave to file his preliminary objections instanter, together with the

preliminary objections, and a motion for an extension of time to file supplemental

objections. In his motion for leave to file preliminary objections, Father cited another trial

court case wherein he maintained that the court granted the objecting party a 30-day

extension to file objections when the extension was requested within the 14-day objection

period. Further, Father again argued that it was not possible for his attorney to prepare

objections that complied with Lake County Domestic Relations Court Local Rule 12.04

without review of the transcript. See also Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(ii). However, because the

court had denied his motion for an extension, Father stated that he was submitting

preliminary objections without the benefit of the transcript.

       {¶17} Thereafter, Mother filed a response in opposition to Father’s motion,

maintaining that Father was not required to file a transcript simultaneously with his

objections pursuant to Civ.R. 53. On February 28, 2023, Father filed a reply to Mother’s

response and a renewed motion for leave to supplement his objections to the magistrate’s

decision. In his reply, Father maintained that he required the transcript prior to the filing

of objections to allow his newly retained counsel to ascertain what had occurred during

the two-day hearing in this matter, not because of any misapprehension that he was

required to file the transcript contemporaneously with the objections. On July 28, 2023,

shortly prior to issuing the order on appeal, the trial court issued a judgment entry denying

Father’s February 17, 2023 motion for leave to file the objections instanter.

       {¶18} On appeal, in support of his argument that the trial court should have

permitted him an extension to file objections, Father relies on this court’s decision in

Linville v. Kratochvill, 11th Dist. Geauga No. 2013-G-3161, 2014-Ohio-1153. In Linville,

                                              7

Case No. 2023-L-081
the trial court denied a defendant’s motion for leave to file an answer and counterclaim

instanter and granted the plaintiff’s motion for default judgment. Id. at ¶ 8, 10. In that

case, the request to file the answer and counterclaim instanter was made one-week after

the answer was due by counsel who had just recently been retained. Id. at ¶ 20. This

court concluded that Linville was “not a case where there was a significant delay, such

that neglect or unresponsiveness is manifested, which would support a trial court’s

conclusion that leave should not be granted.” Id. at ¶ 21, citing Colley v. Bazell, 64 Ohio

St.2d 243, 248, 416 N.E.2d 605 (1980). “Such a short delay in filing an answer does not

warrant granting default judgment and disregards the mandate that cases should be

resolved on their merits.” Linville at ¶ 21, citing Maggard v. Ohio Dept. of Commerce,

11th Dist. Lake No. 2002-L-042, 2003-Ohio-4098, ¶ 18 (“courts must be mindful of the

admonition that cases should be decided on their merits when possible, instead of on

procedural grounds”).

      {¶19} However, the present case is distinguishable from Linville. This case does

not involve default judgment. The case was heard over two days by a magistrate, and

both parties were represented by counsel. Father retained counsel of his choosing, and

counsel’s actions are imputed to him. See GTE Automatic Elec., Inc. v. ARC Industries,

Inc., 47 Ohio St.2d 146, 152, 351 N.E.2d 113 (1976), quoting Link v. Wabash RR. Co.,

370 U.S. 626, 633-34, 82 S.Ct. 1386, 8 L.Ed.2d 734 (1962) (“‘Petitioner voluntarily chose

this attorney as his representative in the action, and he cannot now avoid the

consequences of the acts or omissions of this freely selected agent.’”). It was Father’s

choice to replace his counsel after the magistrate issued a decision. Although Father

contends that he premised his decision on his prior attorney’s failure to properly file a

                                            8

Case No. 2023-L-081
closing argument as directed by the magistrate, Father’s decision to replace counsel

created the situation that gave rise to his requests for an extension and for leave.

Although this court may have ruled differently, we cannot say that the trial court abused

its discretion in denying the motions for an extension and for leave to file the objections

instanter.

       {¶20} Father further maintains that the trial court’s decision to deny an extension

in this case was arbitrary because the same court reached a different result in Lanza v.

Lanza, Lake County Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations, Case No.

16 DR 000595, which Father asserts “is factually and procedurally squarely on point with

the issue at hand.” Father indicates that, in Lanza, a magistrate’s decision was issued

on February 11, 2022, and, on February 28, 2022, the trial court granted the Lanza

defendant’s motion for a 30-day extension to file objections.

       {¶21} However, we do not have the Lanza case before us. Moreover, there is no

indication in Father’s brief that the Lanza defendant requested an extension due to a

change in counsel during the objection period. The trial court is not obliged to grant an

extension in every case where it is requested within 14 days of the magistrate’s decision.

Instead, as set forth above, the court’s “determination of what constitutes good cause can

be made only on a case-by-case basis.” White, 2022-Ohio-497, at ¶ 28, citing Brown, 38

Ohio St.3d at 308.

       {¶22} Accordingly, Father’s first assigned error lacks merit.

       {¶23} In his second and third assigned errors, Father contends:

              [2.] It was plain error for the magistrate to interp[r]et
              language of the divorce decree and all incorporated exhibits
              to find that private tutoring qual[i]fied as a[n] “education
              expense.”
                                            9

Case No. 2023-L-081
                [3.] The magistrate committed plain error in finding that
                appellant was in contempt for failing to pay private tutoring
                expenses.

        {¶24} In his second and third assigned errors, Father maintains that the

magistrate committed plain error in (1) determining that the provision in the parties’

separation agreement dividing their children’s educational expenses between them

included tutoring costs incurred due to Mother’s unilateral decision to employ a private

tutor and (2) finding Father in contempt for his failure to pay his share of the tutoring costs.

        {¶25} First, we note that appellate courts generally do not directly review a

magistrate’s actions. Instead, we review the actions of the trial court relative to the

magistrate’s decision. See Spurlock v. Pemberton, 4th Dist. Lawrence No. 13CA1, 2013-

Ohio-4002, ¶ 10; see also Stevens v. Stevens, 9th Dist. Medina No. 17CA0084-M, 2019-

Ohio-264, ¶ 17, citing Lathan v. Andrews, 9th Dist. Summit No. 28382, 2017-Ohio-4419,

¶ 14 (“[T]his Court has held that claims of error on appeal must be based on the actions

of the trial court.”).

        {¶26} Next, as set forth above, Father did not file timely objections to the

magistrate’s decision, and we concluded in our discussion of Father’s first assigned error

that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Father’s motions for extension

and leave to file the objections.       Accordingly, Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(iv) applies, which

provides, “Except for a claim of plain error, a party shall not assign as error on appeal the

court’s adoption of any factual finding or legal conclusion, whether or not specifically

designated as a finding of fact or conclusion of law under Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(a)(ii), unless

the party has objected to that finding or conclusion as required by Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b).”

                                              10

Case No. 2023-L-081
       {¶27} “In appeals of civil cases, the plain error doctrine is not favored and may be

applied only in the extremely rare case involving exceptional circumstances where error,

to which no objection was made at the trial court, seriously affects the basic fairness,

integrity, or public reputation of the judicial process, thereby challenging the legitimacy of

the underlying judicial process itself.” (Citations omitted.) Goldfuss v. Davidson, 79 Ohio

St.3d 116, 679 N.E.2d 1099 (1997), syllabus. “[R]eviewing courts applying civil plain-

error review ‘must proceed with the utmost caution, limiting the doctrine strictly to those

extremely rare cases where exceptional circumstances require its application to prevent

a manifest miscarriage of justice.’” State v. Morgan, 153 Ohio St.3d 196, 2017-Ohio-7565,

103 N.E.3d 784, ¶ 41, quoting Goldfuss at 121.

       {¶28} Here, Father challenges as plain error the court’s finding that he was in

contempt for failure to pay a share of the younger child’s tutoring expenses. Father

maintains this finding resulted from the trial court’s plain error of interpreting the parties’

separation agreement to include tutoring expenses as education expenses, the costs of

which were allocated proportionately between the parties regardless of whether they

agreed to incur the expense. The magistrate’s decision summarized Father’s testimony

on this issue as follows:

              With respect to mother’s Motion to Show Cause, father
              testified that mother contacted him during the last school year
              to tell him that [their younger child] needed tutoring. She
              advised father that she had arranged for [the child] to be
              tutored by [the parties’ older child’s] former teacher at Hershey
              Montessori. Father reached out to [the younger child’s] first
              grade teacher at Kirtland Elementary School, who advised
              him that in her opinion, tutoring for [the child] should start
              during the summer months. The teacher advised father that
              tutoring for [the child] was available through his school’s Title
              1 program at no cost to the parents. [The youngest child] was
              a participant in the Title 1 program as a result of his academic
                                              11

Case No. 2023-L-081
             struggles. Although father advised mother he preferred to
             follow the recommendations of [the child’s] teacher, mother
             started [the child] in private tutoring in late February with [the
             older child’s] former teacher, Jayne, against father’s wishes.

             [The younger child] attends tutoring twice a week. Father
             complained that mother has not provided him with the tutor’s
             contact information and he has had no communication with
             the tutor regarding [the child’s] progress.        On cross-
             examination, father admitted he had made no attempt to
             obtain the tutor’s contact information. Father acknowledged
             that he has seen an improvement in [the child’s] school work
             and test scores since he started working with the tutor.

             Mother uploaded [the child’s] tutoring expense into Our Family
             Wizard for the time period from February 2022 through
             September 2022. Father testified that he believes the amount
             Jayne is charging for tutoring is reasonable and in line with
             the expense of other tutors. However, he has not reimbursed
             mother for any of the tutoring expense because the shared
             parenting plan requires him to reimburse only for agreed-upon
             activities. While he has no problem with Jayne doing the
             tutoring, he does object to mother enrolling [the child] in
             tutoring without his consent.

       {¶29} The magistrate’s decision summarized Mother’s testimony on this issue as

follows:

             With respect to the dispute over [the younger child’s] tutoring,
             mother testified that the parties’ eldest child * * * struggled at
             Montessori when he was four years old. He worked with
             Jayne at that time, and it helped him. Father was aware at
             the time that Jayne was helping [the older child]. Jayne
             recently retired from the Montessori school but continues to
             tutor. Mother became aware that [the younger child] was
             struggling when he was screened for Kindergarten at Kirtland
             Elementary school. She testified that [the younger child was]
             “at the bottom of the barrel” when he was screened. [The
             younger child] was enrolled in Title 1 in September of 2020.
             The Title 1 program at Kirtland Elementary was a once per
             week pull out program, and [the child] received one-on-one
             tutoring for thirty minutes a week. Mother testified that [the
             child] did not receive enough help from the Title 1 program,
             and she felt he needed additional help. Father told her he
             wanted to wait and use the program offered by the school, but
                                            12

Case No. 2023-L-081
             never provided her with any additional information. She did
             not follow up with the school about the Title 1 program.
             Mother arranged for [the child] to receive tutoring from Jayne
             twice a week, on Mondays and Thursdays during her
             parenting time. The cost of tutoring with Jayne is very
             reasonable. She charges $30 per session, and $35 per
             session when she comes to mother’s home. That happens
             occasionally when mother has to work late. Mother has
             uploaded the tutoring fees to Our Family Wizard. Father has
             never reimbursed her. [The child] no longer qualifies for Title
             1 services. His grades have improved since he started
             receiving tutoring. He is more confident and is learning how
             to work through issues instead of getting frustrated and giving
             up. Jayne and [the child] have developed a rapport.

      {¶30} Thereafter, in the decision’s combined “findings of fact and conclusions of

law,” the magistrate stated:

             Both parties testified that [the younger child] was struggling in
             school and qualified for Title 1 services based upon poor
             academic performance. Father did not disagree that [the
             child] needed tutoring. He testified that he reached out to [the
             child’s] teacher, who felt tutoring could wait until summer.
             Father objected to mother making arrangements for [the child]
             to receive tutoring from Jayne without his consent, and he was
             not provided with contact information for her. He admitted he
             has never asked for the tutor’s contact information. He agreed
             the cost of the tutor is reasonable. Mother testified that [the
             child] was receiving Title 1 services at school for thirty minutes
             per week but continued to struggle. Mother enrolled [the child]
             in tutoring in February of 2022 without father’s agreement.
             [The child’s] tutoring is scheduled on Mondays and
             Thursdays, during mother’s parenting time.                   Since
             commencing tutoring, [the child’s] academic performance has
             measurably improved, and as a result he is no longer eligible
             for Title 1 services.

             Father argues he is not responsible for any portion of [the
             child’s] tutoring expenses because mother enrolled [the child]
             in tutoring without his agreement. The parties’ separation
             agreement reads, in pertinent part, as follows:

             “C. CHILDREN'S ACTIVITY EXPENSES

                                            13

Case No. 2023-L-081
              The parents shall share the cost of education expenses for
              the children and any mutually agreed upon extracurricular or
              enrichment activity for the children, including the cost of all
              necessary clothing and equipment in accordance with Line 17
              of the attached Ohio Child Support Computation Worksheet
              (Exhibit C).”

              The Magistrate finds that academic tutoring is an educational
              expense, not an extracurricular or enrichment activity. The
              Magistrate further finds the plain language of the separation
              agreement provides that the parties will share the cost of the
              children’s education expenses. The Magistrate further finds
              there is no order requiring agreement with respect to
              educational expenses. [The child’s] academic performance
              has improved significantly since tutoring commenced, and the
              tutoring is in [the child’s] best interest.

(Underlining and italicizing sic.) The magistrate then found Father in contempt for his

failure to pay his share of the child’s tutoring expenses.

       {¶31} As noted above, the trial court adopted the magistrate’s decision and

determined that Father was in contempt of the divorce decree for his failure to pay his

share of their younger child’s tutoring expenses incurred between February 28, 2022 and

September 1, 2022, in the sum of $609.59.

       {¶32} On appeal, Father maintains that the magistrate failed to consider the

meaning of “education expenses” when read in the context of the entire separation

agreement and shared parenting plan, particularly the subsection in the separation

agreement pertaining to the “children’s activity expenses” and the subsection in the

shared parenting plan pertaining to “extracurricular activities.” Father also relies on a

dictionary definition of “extracurricular” as meaning “‘not falling within the scope of a

regular curriculum.’” Father argues that the plain meaning of the terms of the separation

agreement and shared parenting plan provide that tutoring expenses are extracurricular

                                             14

Case No. 2023-L-081
expenses, not education expenses, and the cost for tutoring should have been allocated

to mother because the parties did not mutually agree on the private tutoring.

       {¶33} However, as set forth above, we generally review the trial court’s actions,

not the magistrate’s actions, on appeal.     When no timely objections are filed, the trial

court may adopt a magistrate’s decision unless there is an “error of law or other defect

evident on the face of the magistrate’s decision.” (Emphasis added.) Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(c).

Father’s argument as to the interpretation of the separation agreement and shared

parenting plan would have required the trial court to look beyond the face of the

magistrate’s decision. See Abdulshafi v. Abdulshafi, 2020-Ohio-2692, 154 N.E.3d 338, ¶

18 (10th Dist.) (the lack of objections limited the scope of the trial court’s required review

of the magistrate’s decision).     Moreover, assuming that this court may review the

magistrate’s interpretation of the decree and its attachments for plain error, and further

assuming that the magistrate did error in interpreting the decree, we cannot say this is

the extremely rare case where exceptional circumstances require application of the plain

error doctrine to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice. Accordingly, Father’s second

assigned error lacks merit.

                                             15

Case No. 2023-L-081
      {¶34} In his third assigned error, Father maintains that, based upon his argument

contained in his second assigned error, the finding of contempt for his failure to pay a

share of the tutoring expenses must be reversed because he “cannot be held in contempt

for violating an incorrect and legally unnecessary interpretation of the Agreement that

modifies the terms of the Agreement.” However, as we did not find plain error with respect

to the second assigned error, Father’s third assigned error likewise lacks merit.

      {¶35} The judgment is affirmed.

MATT LYNCH, J.,

JOHN J. EKLUND, J.,

concur.

                                            16

Case No. 2023-L-081