Court Opinion

ID: 9715181
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:56:50.86787+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:32.252855
License: Public Domain

Brune, C. J.,
dissenting in part, filed the following dissenting opinion.
I think, although I concede that the matter is by no means free from doubt, that the appellant did say enough in his brief to bring before us the question as to whether or not he, as an indigent defendant, should have been furnished, without expense to himself, with a copy of the transcript of his trial for use in connection with his motion for a new trial. In the City of Baltimore, a motion for a new trial in a criminal case goes from the Criminal Court to the Supreme Bench, and is heard customarily, L believe, if not invariably, by members of the Supreme Bench other than the Judge before whom the case was tried in the Criminal Court. The Rules of the Supreme Bench require that either copies of the full transcript or an agreed statement of evidence relevant to the questions raised by the motion or a certificate of the trial judge with regard to such evidence must be filed.
The question of whether or not Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12, was applicable to Jackson’s motion for a new trial was fully considered by the Supreme Bench in the present case, and a majority of that Court held that it was not applicable. There was a vigorous (and to me, persuasive) dissent by Judge Oppenheimer, in which Judges Niles and Allen concurred. Although this Court ordinarily has no jurisdiction *462over the granting or refusal of a new trial, the question of the applicability of Griffin v. Illinois is, I think, reviewable by this Court; and on this proposition I do not believe that my view differs from that of the majority opinion.
In his brief the appellant stated that he had been denied a copy of the transcript, without expense to himself, for use on his motion for a new trial, and in the next sentence he asserted that he had been denied his rights from the beginning of the trial. .This seems to me enough to present the point, even though it is true that the Griffin case question was not one of the numerous specific grounds upon which he expressly sought a reversal of the judgment.
Whether or not Griffin v. Illinois is applicable to motions for new trials made by indigent defendants in criminal cases in the City of Baltimore, is a question of importance upon which an early decision by this Court would seem desirable.1 I am confident that counsel would have raised the question clearly on this appeal. It is, I think, unfortunate that the appellant finally elected to reject the assistance of counsel of his own selection, which had been offered him, without expense to him. That, however, was a matter of the appellant’s own choice.

. In the counties of Maryland a motion for a new trial in a criminal case is heard by the judge or judges before whom the case was tried. (A like practice prevails in civil cases at law throughout the State.) The Griffin case problem may, therefore, be quite different in criminal cases in the counties from what it is in such cases in the City of Baltimore.