Court Opinion

ID: 9562322
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:26:26.470295+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:17.674217
License: Public Domain

DURHAM, Justice,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. As the majority notes, its opinion “decline[s] to strictly apply standard bailment principles” and in effect creates a new rule for livestock grazed on *1388public rangeland. While it may reflect a legitimate policy choice, it is indeed a significant departure from existing law, a result not fully acknowledged in the opinion.
Wilcox contends that there was insufficient evidence to support a jury verdict that he had the legal right to exclude plaintiffs from possession of their cattle. He directs our attention to the undisputed evidence that the cattle were grazed for an extensive length of time on public land to which the general public had access. The record shows that throughout the duration of the pasture agreements, plaintiffs’ cattle were spread in groups over both private and public land. This undisputed evidence should compel a finding that, as a matter of law, defendant did not have the legal right to exclude plaintiffs from their cattle. Thus, under Utah agistment law, reasonable minds could not have concluded that defendant had exclusive possession and control of the cattle.
This case is similar to CFC Fabrication, Inc. v. Dunn Constr. Co., 917 F.2d 1385 (5th Cir.1990), which reversed a denial of a directed verdict on the issue of exclusive possession and control. The CFC court held that if a bailor and a bailee have simultaneous access to the bailed property when the loss or damage occurs, the law does not presume the bailee negligent. Id. at 1389. In drawing this conclusion, CFC discussed the rationale in Staheli v. Farmers’ Coop, of S. Utah, 655 P.2d 680, 683 (Utah 1982), that a bailee who exclusively possesses bailed property is in a better position to control or ascertain the cause of any loss or damage. CFC, 917 F.2d at 1388. “In contrast, when the bailee does not solely possess the property, he is no more able to prevent or explain the loss than others simultaneously in possession and thus should not be required to explain the loss under pain of liability.” Id. (citing United States v. Mowbray’s Floating Equip. Exck, Inc., 601 F.2d 645, 647 (2d Cir.1979)).
Similarly, if the parties possess the property consecutively and it is unknown whether the loss and damage occurred when the bail-ee was in possession, the law does not presume the bailee negligent. Id. Under the reasoning of the CFC court, throughout the duration of the pasture agreements, plaintiffs’ cattle were grazed on both private and public rangeland. Because plaintiffs failed to show that their cattle were on defendant’s private land at the time of their loss, i.e., that defendant had a legal right to preclude them from access to their cattle, I would find, as a matter of law, that a presumption of defendant’s negligence should not arise. Indeed, it is arguably unjust in such a situation, with no showing of negligence, to require the bail-ee to account for the loss.
As defendant points out, grazing cattle are susceptible to loss and damage from many causes which the agister would not be able to ascertain. For example, grazing cattle can die, wander off, or be stolen without the agister’s knowledge, even if the agister is providing due care. The presumption of negligence is, of course, not a perfectly functioning principle but arises from necessity, due to the fact that an agister who is in exclusive possession is in a better position than the bailee to ascertain the cause of loss or damage to the property. However, it does not appear in this case that reasonable minds could find that defendant alone had access to information about the loss and damage or that defendant alone was able to prevent the loss and damage. Accordingly, I would find the uncontroverted evidence establishes, as a matter of law, that defendant did not have exclusive access to and control of the cattle.1 Therefore, the trial court *1389should have granted defendant’s motion for a directed verdict. Plaintiffs’ evidence failed to create a presumption of negligence, and as plaintiffs concede, they put forth no evidence of negligence.2
RUSSON, J., concurs in the dissenting opinion of Justice DURHAM.

. In marshaling the evidence, both parties point out that, pursuant to the written pasture agreements, defendant agreed to provide "total care” of plaintiffs’ cattle. Although plaintiffs agreed to share responsibility for branding, vaccinating, and trucking, all other responsibilities in relationship to the cattle were assumed by defendant. This is only marginally relevant. Although the party who agrees to provide total care for property is most likely to be the party who has access to the property, the responsibility for total care does not establish the existence or absence of exclusive possession and control.

. This conclusion makes it unnecessary to treat defendant's challenge to the court's instruction setting out the requirement for a presumption of bailee’s negligence under a bailment contract. In addition, due to this conclusion, there is no need to address the issues of damages and interest raised in the cross-appeal.