Court Opinion

ID: 9468900
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 02:26:19.840226+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:41:06.311590
License: Public Domain

POOLE, Circuit Judge,
concurring specially:
I concur in parts I, II, III, and V of the majority opinion, but not in part IV.
Whether the allocation of racing dates under the somewhat unique facts here constitutes a potential per se violation of the Sherman Act because it amounts to a horizontal restraint between competitors on the same level — an impermissible division of territories — was not decided by the district court. Such a determination was apparently seen by the district judge as a complex and troublesome antitrust issue, the resolution of which became unnecessary because he found (although he did not articulate) an alternate and sufficient basis for dismissal of the action under Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 63 S.Ct. 307, 87 L.Ed. 315 (1943). The majority here also finds that there is the same alternate ground upon which to rest its affirmance and I have concurred in that determination.
I would, however, postpone to another day the responsibility for deciding an issue whose disposition is not nearly as easy or as clear as the majority assumes and which we simply do not need to tackle at this time.
Were the holding on this point really to be taken as a live precedent, I would find it necessary to express dissent. Since, however, that discussion seems mainly to be an interesting analysis rather than overtly de-cisional, I prefer to limit my concurrence to *826the majority’s opinion (which I find otherwise quite satisfactory) in the manner I have set forth above.