Court Opinion

ID: 9580486
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:05:21.951322+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:18.324936
License: Public Domain

Banke, Judge,
dissenting.
It is undisputed that although Roy and Catherine Stoker were married at the time the collision occurred they had been residing apart in separate trailers for about seven years. Roy had secured the financing for Catherine’s trailer, which was mortgaged in his name, though he considered it hers. He would help out with payments if she needed such help, and he also provided her $60 per week for her own support and for the support of their three children. Roy had not spent a night in Catherine’s trailer in the seven years they had been separated; and, to the best of his knowledge, she had not spent a night in his trailer. He had, on occasion, taken Catherine and the kids out for a meal. Catherine went out with other men. The children regularly spent the weekdays with Catherine and weekends with Roy.
State Farm’s liability and obligation to defend depend upon whether Catherine is an "insured” within the meaning of the policy which defines insured in pertinent part as "the first person named in the declarations, and while residents of his household, his spouse and the relatives of either.” (Emphasis supplied.)
It is clear from the uncontested facts set forth above that Catherine Stoker was not a resident of Roy Stoker’s household at the time of the collision. Accord, Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. McEachern, 135 Ga. App. 628 (218 SE2d 645) (1975). Appellee’s reliance upon this court’s decision in Varnadoe v. State Farm &c. Ins. Co., 112 Ga. App. 366 (145 SE2d 104) (1965), is misplaced. In that case the husband and wife, although experiencing marital difficulty and sleeping in separate rooms, were living in the same house. "The critical distinction . . . should therefore be whether separate domestic establishments are maintained.” State Farm &c. Ins. Co. v. Snyder, 122 Ga. App. 584, 586 (178 SE2d 215) (1970). It is apparent in this case that separate households were maintained. It follows .that appellant’s motion for summary judgment should have been granted.
*723I respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that Judge Shulman, Judge Birdsong and Judge Underwood join in this dissent.