Court Opinion

ID: 9684143
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:48:01.413501+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:53.273335
License: Public Domain

OPINION CONCURRING IN PART AND IN RESULT
DANIEL E. SCOTT, Judge.
I agree with the court’s opinion as to Points I, II, IV, and V. I also concur in the result despite some concern about the merits of Point III. Research has not settled my difficulties interpreting our “high managerial agent” (HMA) definition or applying it to this case, in which the State focuses on definitional language about supervising subordinate employees, while Defendant emphasizes the clause about authority comparable to a corporate officer. Given the dearth of Missouri authority,1 I consulted outside sources to try to better understand Missouri’s HMA text (which is not unique) and evaluate the competing arguments, but with little success.2
Defendant claims Ms. Collura’s supervisory authority as lead person over two of *748its facilities was not comparable to that of its corporate officers. Corporate officers derive their authority from the by-laws or board resolutions. § 351.360.2. There is no suggestion of “inherent” officer authority vis-á-vis Missouri’s HMA definition. This is not surprising since corporations range from one-man shows to multinational enterprises with thousands of branch locations. Even in the latter scenario, the flexibility of modern corporate laws and structures could enable “branch managers” to exercise authority comparable to that of a corporate officer, at least within their sphere of influence and with respect to their subordinate employees. To the extent a corporation authorized or permitted branch managers to so act, it would seem appropriate to impute corporate criminal responsibility arising from or relating to those actions.3
Thus, the principal opinion rightly notes that we must consider functions within a corporate structure, not merely job titles. It is on such matters that I believe Defendant has not carried its burden. Defendant seeks to distinguish Ms. Collura’s supervisory authority from that of its corporate officers, without providing the bylaws or resolutions that establish or describe its officers’ authority per § 351.360.2.4 Defendant offered an organizational chart into evidence at trial, but has not provided that document either. Indeed, while the transcript references trial exhibits numbered into the hundreds — the organizational chart was admitted as Exhibit 728 — no exhibits have been filed with this court. It was Defendant’s “duty to file a complete record including all evidence necessary to determine all questions presented to this [cjourt for review.” State v. Morin, 873 S.W.2d 858, 867 (Mo.App.1994). Exhibits not produced in compliance with Rule 30.05 may, pursuant to that rule, be considered by the appellate court as immaterial to the issues on appeal. Id. See also State v. McElvain, 228 S.W.3d 592, 599 (Mo.App.2007). Also, without exhibits, we often have been reduced to speculating on the import of witness testimony about those exhibits and the Point III issues to which they were directed.
Nor are we sufficiently aided by the one-sided, argumentative statement of facts in Defendant’s brief. It is unnecessary to recount the discussion, at oral argument, about this and other briefing deficiencies. The problem is that under these circumstances, and given our standard of review, we must become an advocate for Point III in order to adequately consider it. It is to ensure that appellate courts do not become advocates that Rule 84.04 exists and its briefing rules are mandatory. Lueker v. *749Missouri Western State Univ., 241 S.W.3d 865, 867 (Mo.App.2008).
Could we seine over 1400 transcript pages, unaided by exhibits or proper briefing, in an attempt to evaluate Defendant’s arguments and build a case for reversing as to Point III? Perhaps. But not only are we not so obliged; we are prohibited from doing so. “The adversarial process clearly defines and distinguishes the roles of advocates and judges. Judges must not be advocates but instead must be free to impartially evaluate the arguments of the parties.” Id. (citations omitted). “An appellate court has no duty to search the transcript or record to discover the facts which substantiate a point on appeal. This court consistently has refused to become an advocate for one party in this fashion.” Nolan v. Degussa Admixtures, Inc., 246 S.W.3d 1, 3 (Mo.App.2008). Accordingly, I join Points I, II, IV, and V of the court’s opinion and concur in the result.

. HMA status apparently was not truly contested in either Missouri case I found. See State v. Barnes, 245 S.W.3d 885, 887, 890, 891 (Mo.App.2008)(individual defendant Jeffery Barnes was president and sole owner of corporate defendant “Jeff Barnes, Inc.”); State v. Boone Retirement Center, Inc., 26 S.W.3d 265, 271 n. 6 (Mo.App.2000)(HMA status expressly not at issue).

. To briefly summarize that research, the Model Penal Code’s HMA definition speaks of *748officers or agents whose “conduct may fairly be assumed to represent the policy of the corporation," which approaches Defendant's implicit position in this case. But most states have opted for broader HMA definitions that specifically mention, in some respect, persons who manage or supervise employees. See Steven Walt and William S. Laufer, Why Personhood Doesn’t Matter: Corporate Criminal Liability and Sanctions, 18 Am. J.Crim. L. 263, 268-69 (1991); Kathleen Brickey, Rethinking Corporate Liability Under The Model Penal Code, 19 Rutgers L.J. 593, 631 (1987). Although several states have HMA definitions similar to Missouri’s, few reported cases are even arguably relevant to Point III, and none particularly persuasive, since they are distinguishable, or lack analysis, or both.

. That said, I reject the State's arguments to the extent they suggest that any manager who supervises subordinate employees could be deemed a HMA. I believe this interpretation could extend corporate criminal liability far beyond our legislature’s intent.

. That is not to say that such documents necessarily would be decisive or even persuasive in any given case. See, e.g., the apparent (as opposed to inherent) authority and corporate acquiescence concepts described in Rice v. Bol, 116 S.W.3d 599, 608-09 (Mo.App.2003).