Court Opinion

ID: 9679614
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:59:50.829851+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:16.847450
License: Public Domain

*32GREENHILL, Justice
(dissenting).
The particular question in this case is whether the property of R. F. Frei may be inherited by those claiming to be his heirs or whether his property must go to the State of Texas by escheat. The Court has held that the property goes by escheat to the State.
Reduced to its simplest form, the question is this: assuming (as the majority opinion does) that the facts are that there has been an adoption by estoppel so that the child would inherit from the adoptive parents, may the adoptive parents also inherit from the child? The majority has held not; and if the child dies intestate possessed of property (even property given him by his adoptive parents), the property may not be inherited by the adoptive parents; and, under facts like those in this case, the property of the child escheats to the State. With this I cannot agree.
. ^ Of course, whether property may be inherited or not depends upon the statutes of descent and distribution. These are now contained in our Probate Code. Section 3(b) of this Code1 defines “child” as follows:
“ ‘Child’ includes an adopted child, whether adopted by any existing statutory procedure or by acts of estoppel * * * ”
The Code then continues (with matter in brackets being added here) :
“§ 40. Inheritance By and From an Adopted Child
“For purposes of inheritance under the laws of descent and distribution, an adopted child shall be regarded as the child of the parent or parents by adoption, such adopted child [which under Section 3, above, includes children adopted by acts of estoppel] * * * inheriting from and through the parent or parents by adoption and their kin the same as if such child were the natural legitimate child of such parent * * *, and such parent or parents by adoption and their kin inheriting from and through such adopted child * * *. The presence of this Section specifically relating to the rígñts of adopted children shall in no way diminish the rights of such children * * which they acquire by virtue of their inclusion in the definition of ‘child’ which is contained in this Code.”
Thus Section 40 specifically refers to the definition of “child” contained in Section 3; and Section 3 includes adoption “by acts of estoppel.” Section 40 then plainly states that such adopted child [including those adopted by acts of estoppel] shall inherit through their adoptive parent, and such adoptive parents and their kin shall inherit from and through the adopted child as defined in Section 3.
Therefore, whatever the law was before the adoption of the Probate Code, it is clear that the Legislature has provided an adoptive status whereby there shall be inheritance by the child, and from the child, rather than an escheat of the property to the State as we have here.
This legislation, to me, recognizes an adoptive status: once the acts of estoppel have occurred and matured, a status has been created. The Legislature has recognized this status and has provided for inheritance, both ways, under it.
The majority of the Court simply rejects this status. It treats adoption by estoppel as a sort of continuing contract enforceable only on one side. And thus, in my opinion, the Court has simply refused to recognize and carry out the plain provisions of the statute.
I would reverse the judgments below and remand the case for a trial on the merits.
SMITH, J., joins in this dissent.

. All references herein are to Vernon’s Annotated Texas Civil Statutes. Emphasis is mine.