Court Opinion

ID: 9647316
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 13:31:13.880964+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:47.837811
License: Public Domain

KOEHLER, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.
The majority differentiates this case from National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania v. Dominguez, 793 S.W.2d 66 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1990, writ denied) first on the basis that Moriel did not agree that the liability of Transportation was uncertain, and second, from the fact that the uncertainty of liability is merely a “preamble recital” and thus not controlling if in conflict with the adjudicative portion of the judgment. While I agree that there are some substantial differences between this case and Dominguez, I differ with the majority in that Moriel did agree, through his attorney’s unqualified approval of the partial judgment, with the recitation of the uncertainty of liability. Moreover, the recitation of uncertainty of liability is not necessarily in conflict with that portion of the judgment that “orders” that the judgment does not release Transportation from liability for bad faith in its failure to pay or delay in paying medical bills. It is unusual for a court to order rather than recite what the judgment does not cover or release and is no more appropriate than if the court had ordered that liability was uncertain. The fact that the court found, with Moriel’s *152approval, that liability was uncertain, precludes a finding of conscious indifference, or as it is called in this case heedless and reckless disregard, on the part of Transportation. Dominguez, 793 S.W.2d at 74.
Turning next to the evidentiary support for the jury’s finding of heedless and reckless disregard of Moriel’s rights, there is evidence of bad faith and negligence in the handling of the claim and the delay in paying some of the medical bills. But in view of the fact that Transportation never denied the claim, paid substantial amounts of compensation and medical on time and despite the question and delay over the impotency problem, did not ultimately refuse or deny examination and treatment of Moriel’s medical and psychological problems, the evidence that Transportation failed to pay or delayed in paying four medical bills as a result of conscious indifference of Moriel’s rights and welfare amounts to little more than a scintilla. Except for the attorney’s demand letter that Transportation pay the bill of Baylor College of Medicine Sleep Disorders and Research Center, there was little evidence that either Moriel or his attorney brought the nonpayment of the other three bills to Transportation’s attention until after Providence Memorial Hospital filed suit against Moriel to collect a relatively small bill. There is insufficient evidence to support the jury finding. I would sustain Point of Error No. Two.
Under Transportation’s third point of error complaining that the award of punitive damages exceeds the limit for such damages under Section 41.007 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, I differ markedly with my colleagues’ conclusion that the error was waived by Transportation’s failure to make a sufficiently specific objection in its posttrial motions and argument. As the majority opinion recognizes, Transportation in its Motion for Remittitur stated that the “punitive damages of $1,000,000 violates ... the statutory guidance provided in the Civil Practice and Remedies Code of Texas,” and in its argument pointed out that the Code “as the Court is now aware, remedies in effect this situation and only allows for punitives of four times actuals now.” [Emphasis added]. As stated in McKinney v. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, 772 S.W.2d 72, 74 (Tex.1989), and reiterated by the majority opinion, “[t]o preserve error, an objection must state the specific grounds for the desired ruling if those grounds are not apparent from the context of the objection. Tex.R.App.P. 52(a). A specific objection is one which enables the trial court to understand the precise grounds so as to make an informed ruling,_” [Emphasis added]. Judges are not dolts and are expected to know something of the law. Just as in McKinney where the Supreme Court held that the objection to a not-previously identified fact witness referenced to the Rules of Civil Procedure generally without specifying a particular rule was sufficiently specific, Transportation’s objection clearly brought to the court’s attention the newly enacted law and its application. In addition, from the remark by Transportation’s attorney of the court’s awareness of the relevant Code provisions, an inference can be drawn that a discussion had taken place off the record. Since from the record it appears that Mor-iel’s petition was not amended to allege for the first time grounds for exemplary damages until after the effective date (September 2, 1987) of Section 41.007, the Act would apply and exemplary damages would thus be limited to an amount not to exceed four times the amount of actual damages. Since damages for mental anguish are considered actual damages, I would on this point of error alone sustain and order a remittitur of $596,000.00 as being the excess over four times actual damages of $404,000.00.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.