Court Opinion

ID: 9723643
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:24:37.214058+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:50.559713
License: Public Domain

REYNOSO, J.
I dissent in part and concur in part.
My dissent goes to the jurisdictional question. In my view Code of Civil Procedure does apply to a motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to act.
*892Simply stated, a party responding to such a motion manifestly must act; that is, exercise a right. Code of Civil Procedure section 437c specifically tells us what must happen—opposing party must file affidavits sufficient to present a triable issue of fact. That a party may default places this motion in no different circumstance than any other noticed motion. Legislative draftsmanship proved to be inartful; reasonable minds can differ in interpreting Code of Civil Procedure section 1013. I am persuaded that the importance of the summary judgment motion and the need for time to prepare and file papers in opposition, including counteraffidavits, argues that the 15-day notice period applies to such a motion.
While I disagree with the majority on the jurisdictional question, I agree that the summary judgment, assuming jurisdiction, was correctly entered. We must focus on the character of the prosecutor’s conduct. The record'discloses that the individual defendants acted in their official (and proper) capacity in the exercise of their prosecutorial responsibilities. Such conduct is immune. (Hampton v. City of Chicago, Cook County, Illinois (7th Cir. 1973) 484 F.2d 602, 609.)
On August 21, 1981, the opinion was modified to read as printed above.