Court Opinion

ID: 9667361
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:43:43.315923+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:57:48.550254
License: Public Domain

TERRIE LIVINGSTON, Justice,
concurring.
I respectfully concur to the majority opinion. I write separately only to disagree with the majority opinion’s analysis on the timing of appellant’s arrest. As the majority notes above, in its brief, the State conceded that appellant was arrested without a warrant. However, unlike the majority, I do not read the State’s brief to concede that appellant was arrested as soon as the officers approached him and placed him on the ground at the gas station. I believe that the State conceded that appellant was arrested, but did not concede the timing of appellant’s arrest (when the officers initially approached him, or after the officers approached him and talked to him, and appellant told the officers that he had drugs in his pocket). An appellate court must liberally construe a party’s brief. Tex.R.App. P. 38.1(e), 38.9; Burke v. State, 6 S.W.3d 312, 315 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1999, no pet.) (op. on P.D.R.). Thus, because the State did not concede when the arrest occurred, we should not assume it conceded that appellant was arrested immediately.
Similarly, during oral argument, appellant’s counsel conceded that the investigators had reasonable suspicion to approach appellant and investigate. Therefore, unlike the majority, I believe our sole inquiry is to determine whether appellant was detained for investigation when the investigators blocked appellant’s truck, drew their weapons, placed appellant on the ground, and placed him in handcuffs, or whether he was immediately under arrest.6 If the initial stop was an investigative detention as opposed to an arrest, we have nothing further to review regarding the preliminary seizure because appellant conceded reasonable suspicion to investigate. See Hill v. State, 161 S.W.3d 771, 772 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2005, no pet.) (holding appellant waived issue by conceding it in oral argument). Then, we would only proceed to determine whether the investigative detention revealed sufficient probable cause *893to arrest without a warrant. However, if the preliminary stop was truly an arrest as appellant contends, we must determine whether the arrest was a proper warrant-less arrest under article 14.01 of the code of criminal procedure at that point in time. See Tex.Code CRiM. PRoc. Ann. art. 14.01 (Vernon 2005).
Applicable Law
We must uphold the trial court’s ruling if it is supported by the record and correct under any theory of law applicable to the case even if the trial court gave the wrong reason for its ruling. Armendariz v. State, 123 S.W.3d 401, 404 (Tex.Crim.App.2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 974, 124 S.Ct. 1883, 158 L.Ed.2d 469 (2004); State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 856 (Tex.Crim.App.2000); Romero v. State, 800 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Tex.Crim.App.1990). When officers possess reasonable suspicion justifying a temporary investigative detention, they may use such force as is reasonably necessary to effect the goal of the stop: investigation, maintenance of the status quo, or officer safety. Morris v. State, 50 S.W.3d 89, 95 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2001, no pet.); see Rhodes v. State, 945 S.W.2d 115, 117 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 894, 118 S.Ct. 236, 139 L.Ed.2d 167 (1997). Reasonableness must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer at the scene, rather than with the advantage of hindsight. Rhodes, 945 S.W.2d at 118; McCraw v. State, 117 S.W.3d 47, 52 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2003, pet. ref'd). Allowances must be made for the fact that officers must make quick decisions under tense, uncertain, and rapidly changing circumstances. Rhodes, 945 S.W.2d at 118. However, if the force utilized exceeds that reasonably necessary to effect the goal of the stop, such force may transform an investigative stop into a full-blown arrest. See State v. Moore, 25 S.W.3d 383, 385-86 (Tex.App.-Austin 2000, no pet.) (holding that although officer possessed reasonable, articulable facts justifying an investigative detention, handcuffing of suspect constituted excessive force under the circumstances and transformed the detention into an arrest).
Analysis
I believe that the majority’s reliance on Burkes v. State is misplaced. 830 S.W.2d 922 (Tex.Crim.App.1991). Unlike in our case, the police in Burkes did not receive a call that a named person would be in possession of the drugs, but merely that the drugs would be taped to a dog. Further, the police in Burkes received an anonymous phone call, whereas the police in this case received a phone call from a known confidential informant. Additionally, during trial, the arresting officer testified that the defendant was under arrest when he was handcuffed. Id. at 925. The court of criminal appeals stated that “it must certainly be considered persuasive when the arresting officer admits that a suspect was under arrest.” Id. Here, the arresting officer did not testify that appellant was arrested when he was handcuffed, he merely stated that appellant was not free to leave.
Additionally, the majority’s “white horse case” is also distinguishable from the present case. See Taylor v. State, 874 S.W.2d 362 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1994, no pet.). In Taylor, the police received a tip from a person, but the opinion does not say whether they had received credible information from that person before. Id. at 363. When the police blocked the defendant’s car in the car wash bay, she was by herself, unlike in the present case, where appellant was with Maria Robles and an unidentified man. Additionally, the record in Taylor contains no indication that the defendant was in a high crime/drug area, had previous weapons charges, or that the *894police drew their weapons because of officer safety.
Here, the investigators blocked appellant’s car in the parking lot, drew their weapons, placed appellant on the ground, and handcuffed him. Appellant contends that he was arrested when the police officers approached his truck. However, it cannot be said that whenever police draw weapons on a person that the resulting seizure must be an arrest rather than an investigatory detention. Morris v. State, 195 S.W.3d 740, 745 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2006, no pet.); see Rhodes, 945 S.W.2d at 117. Similarly, ordering a suspect to the ground does not necessarily convert an investigatory detention into an arrest. Morris, 195 S.W.3d at 745; Nargi v. State, 895 S.W.2d 820, 822 (Tex.App.Houston [14th DistJ 1995), pet. dism’d as improvidently granted, 922 S.W.2d 180, 181 (Tex.Crim.App.1996). As stated above, officers may use such force as is reasonably necessary to effect the goal of the stop, including handcuffing the defendant. See Morris, 50 S.W.3d at 95. Further, reasonableness must not be judged from the advantage of hindsight, but rather by the perspective of the officer at the time of the detention. See McCraw, 117 S.W.3d at 52.
A police officer’s belief that a suspect is armed may be predicated on the nature of the suspected criminal activity. Morris, 195 S.W.3d at 745. Because weapons are closely associated with drug dealing, a reasonable suspicion that a suspect is dealing drugs supports a reasonable inference that the suspect is armed. Id.; see Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 330 (Tex.Crim.App.2000). Investigator Davis testified that he knew that appellant had a lengthy criminal history and prior weapons charges, and that he knew appellant from prior drug investigations. Investigator Davis stated that the gas station was in an area of high drug activity. He stated that the confidential informant told him, and he confirmed before approaching appellant, that appellant would be at the gas station with Maria Robles. The confidential informant also gave Investigator Davis a description of appellant’s vehicle, including the license plate number, and that Robles would be with him in a maroon minivan. He confirmed these facts at the gas station. He stated that the officers approached appellant because they thought that he had drugs on his person and was about to leave the location. He stated that he did not think that they would be able to follow appellant because it was a semi-rural area and appellant would most likely get away. Investigator Davis testified that he did not get a warrant before approaching appellant because he did not have time to get the warrant before appellant left the gas station. Investigator Davis testified that the police officers approached appellant with their weapons drawn out of concern for officer safety. While there were no weapons recovered, I would hold that the totality of circumstances justified the police officers’ actions as reasonably necessary to protect the officers.
Additionally, Investigator Davis testified that after handcuffing appellant, an officer patted appellant down to determine if he had weapons on him. Because there is no evidence that appellant was patted down to determine if he had any weapons on his person before being handcuffed, I would hold that handcuffing appellant in these circumstances was reasonable and did not convert the detention into an arrest. See Morris, 195 S.W.3d at 746. Additionally, Investigator Davis investigated appellant’s possible drug possession. But cf. Amores v. State, 816 S.W.2d 407, 412 (Tex.Crim.App.1991) (holding detention was an arrest after an officer blocked the defendant’s car, drew his weapon, ordered the defendant out of the car at gunpoint, ordered him to lie on the pavement, and told him *895that if he did not obey he would be shot, when officer did not ask defendant any questions). Investigator Davis testified that he asked appellant if he had methamphetamine, and appellant stated that he did.
As stated above, the opinion of the officer does not conclusively determine the nature of the detention. See McCraw, 117 S.W.3d at 52. The fact that Investigator Davis stated that appellant was not “free to leave” does not convert the investigative detention into an arrest. The officer’s statements, when taken together with the other evidence, demonstrate that appellant was not under arrest when the investigators handcuffed him and asked him questions.
Thus, after reviewing Investigator Davis’s testimony, I would hold that the investigators used reasonably necessary force when they blocked appellant’s car in the parking lot, drew their weapons, placed appellant on the ground, and handcuffed him. I believe that the investigators did not have probable cause to arrest appellant until after appellant stated that he had methamphetamine in his pocket. Thus, I would hold that, under the present facts and circumstances, such force was necessary to safely conduct the investigation and that the investigative detention did not become an arrest until after appellant admitted that he possessed methamphetamine and was then searched. At that point, it became a warrantless arrest for an offense committed within the officer’s view. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 14.01(b) (Vernon 2005).
While the result would remain the same under my analysis or the majority’s, I respectfully concur based upon the foregoing.

. Appellant addresses only a probable cause argument in his brief. The State addresses both probable cause and reasonable suspicion in its brief.