Court Opinion

ID: 9738283
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:48:21.668007+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:38:47.757996
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE CAHILL delivered the opinion of the court: This appeal arises out of a dissolution of marriage proceeding brought by Deborah A. Thompson against Lawrence E. Thompson. The Muller Firm Ltd. (the firm) was appointed by the trial court to represent the parties’ children in the proceeding. At issue here is whether the trial court erred in granting the firm’s fee petition without first holding an evidentiary hearing on that petition. We hold it did and reverse and remand for further proceedings. We recite only those facts necessary to this dispute. Deborah filed a petition for dissolution of marriage on October 12, 2001. The parties sought joint custody of their two minor children. On March 1, 2002, the trial court appointed the firm to represent the children under section 506 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Act) (750 ILCS 5/506 (West 2002)). The order listed Todd Walters as the firm’s contact. The firm filed a petition for interim attorney fees on July 30, 2002. On August 23, 2002, Lawrence moved to disqualify Walters and the firm. Lawrence argued, among other things, that there was a conflict of interest in the firm’s representation and Walters was unqualified to hold the position of child representative. The firm moved to strike the motion. After a hearing held on March 18, 2003, the trial court granted the firm’s motion to strike. The court held that Walters and the firm acted professionally throughout the proceedings and committed no wrongdoing. Despite this, the court, on its own motion, discharged Walters and the firm from their appointment as the child representative, noting the delays caused by the disqualification dispute. The court directed the firm to file a “final fee petition” within 30 days and appointed a successor child representative. The firm filed a “petition for setting final fees and costs” on March 26, 2003. The trial court granted the petition on June 26, 2003. The court awarded the firm $20,000. Lawrence was ordered to pay $13,000 of that amount and Deborah was ordered to pay the remaining $7,000. Lawrence moved to vacate the award on July 24, 2003, arguing he was not afforded sufficient discovery to contest the petition. The trial court granted Lawrence’s motion and vacated the June 26, 2003, fee award. The court continued the firm’s petition for fees until after trial on the dissolution proceedings. The firm filed an “amended petition for setting final fees and costs” on October 2, 2003. The court denied Lawrence’s request for an evidentiary hearing and granted the firm’s petition on January 11, 2006. The court awarded the firm $15,000 in fees and costs. Lawrence was ordered to pay $12,500 of that amount and Deborah was ordered to pay the remaining $2,500. Lawrence argues on appeal that the trial court erred in denying his request for an evidentiary hearing on the firm’s fee petition. We agree.  Section 506(b) of the Act requires that a child representative be compensated for “reasonable and necessary” attorney fees. Sections 501 and 508 of the Act (750 ILCS 5/501, 508 (West 2002)) govern fee petitions brought under section 506(b). 750 ILCS 5/506(b) (West 2002); see also In re Marriage of Beyer, 324 Ill. App. 3d 305, 753 N.E.2d 1032 (2001) (describing interplay between sections 501 and 508 of the Act). Section 501 relates to temporary relief and authorizes courts to award “interim attorney’s fees and costs,” defined by the statute as “attorney’s fees and costs assessed from time to time while a case is pending, in favor of the petitioning party’s current counsel, for reasonable fees and costs either already incurred or to be incurred.” (Emphasis added.) 750 ILCS 5/501(c — 1) (West 2002). “Except for good cause shown, a proceeding for (or relating to) interim attorney’s fees and costs shall be nonevidentiary, summary in nature, and expeditious.” 750 ILCS 5/501(c — 1)(1) (West 2002). Section 508 of the Act, on the other hand, governs attorney petitions for final fees and costs. Petitions brought under section 508 require due notice and a hearing. 750 ILCS 5/508 (West 2002). When a petition for fees under section 508 is contested and a hearing is requested, the trial court must hold an evidentiary hearing on the petition. Kaufman v. Kaufman, 22 Ill. App. 3d 1045, 1051, 318 N.E.2d 282, 287 (1974). “ ‘The rule of law is that the value of such services must be established [by proof] and that such proof must be preserved in the record, or the decree must show that such evidence was in fact introduced, and that upon a consideration thereof the court found that such fees were reasonable, customary and usual fees for such services.’ ” Jones v. Jones, 48 Ill. App. 2d 232, 240, 198 N.E.2d 195, 199 (1964), quoting Gehlbach v. Gehlbach, 219 Ill. App. 503, 505 (1920). Only where a party fails to request a hearing may a trial judge rely on the pleadings, affidavits on file and his own experience to award attorney fees in a divorce case. Kaufman, 22 Ill. App. 3d at 1051.  The firm’s March 26, 2003, petition, as well as the amended petition filed October 2, 2003, sought final fees and costs. As such, the petitions fell within the ambit of section 508 of the Act. Because Lawrence challenged the petition and requested an evidentiary hearing, the trial court erred by refusing to hold such hearing. We reverse on this ground and remand the cause to the trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing on the firm’s petition for final fees and costs. The dissent maintains that the petition for fees was brought under section 501 of the Act, rendering an evidentiary hearing unnecessary in the absence of good cause shown. See 750 ILCS 5/50l(c — 1)(1) (West 2002). It clearly was not. The firm was no longer representing the children at the time the petition was filed. See 750 ILCS 5/501(c — 1) (West 2002) (defining “interim attorney fees and costs” as “attorney’s fees and costs assessed from time to time while a case is pending, in favor of the petitioning party’s current counsel, for reasonable fees and costs either already incurred or to be incurred” (emphasis added)). Also, the petition sought a determination of final fees and costs. If, as the dissent suggests, the trial court treated the petition as one falling under section 501 of the Act, it erred in doing so. The judgment of the circuit court is reversed and the cause remanded with directions. Reversed and remanded. R.E. GORDON, J., concurs.