Court Opinion

ID: 9948484
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-07 15:07:25.057001+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:29:51.141215
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

                       COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

                                 APPEALS COURT

                                                  23-P-927

                                  COMMONWEALTH

                                       vs.

                                MICHAEL MAUNEY.

               MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

       In 2004, the defendant pleaded guilty to second-degree

 murder, assault with a dangerous weapon, unlawful possession of

 a firearm, and unlawful possession of ammunition.              The defendant

 filed a motion for 730 days of jail credit, which was denied,

 and he appeals from the order denying that motion.

       Given the fact that the defendant was caught with the

 murder weapon in hand at the murder scene, he pleaded guilty.

 He was allowed to plead guilty to second-degree murder only if

 he agreed to serve the maximum sentences allowed by law for his

 remaining crimes.      See G. L. c. 265, § 15B (b) (maximum sentence

 of five years); G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a) (maximum sentence of five

 years); G. L. c. 269, § 10 (h) (maximum sentence of two years).

       The parties agree that the defendant was statutorily

 entitled to jail credit for all the time he spent in custody
before his guilty plea.   See G. L. c. 127, § 129B.      Here, the

defendant was in pretrial custody from the time of his arrest on

August 29, 2001, until he pleaded guilty on December 14, 2004,

which was a total of 1,202 days.       During that time, he was not

serving a sentence for any other crime.

    On appeal, the defendant initially claimed he was entitled

to 730 days of credit, but the Commonwealth countered that he

was only entitled to 472 days of credit because, as the motion

judge determined, the defendant already received two years,

i.e., 730 days, of credit on his sentence for unlawful

possession of ammunition, which was deemed served.       However, the

motion judge also imposed the remainder of the jail credit,

i.e., 472 days, on the same sentence, which made that sentence

longer than the maximum amount of time permitted under G. L.

c. 269, § 10 (h).   In the end, the parties now agree, and we

order, that the defendant is entitled to an additional 472 days

of credit on the sentence he is currently serving.

    The order denying the defendant's motion for jail credit is

reversed, and the case is remanded for entry of a new order that

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the defendant is entitled to 472 days of jail credit.

                                      So ordered.

                                      By the Court (Meade, Neyman &
                                        Hand, JJ.1),

                                      Assistant Clerk

Entered:    March 7, 2024.

1   The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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