Court Opinion

ID: 9560315
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:47:24.465472+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:50.067119
License: Public Domain

Justice LOHR
dissenting:
The majority holds that the testimony and report of a psychologist appointed as an expert witness by the court pursuant to section 19-3-607, 8B C.R.S. (1993 Supp.), on the motion of an indigent parent can be presented in evidence by the People over the parent’s objection at a hearing to determine whether the parental rights of the objecting parent with respect to her minor children should be terminated. I respectfully dissent.
I.
In proceedings in the Juvenile Court of the City and County of Denver, on the petition of the Denver Department of Social Services (department), the court adjudicated three minor children, the oldest of whom was three years of age, to be dependent and neglected with respect to both their parents and adopted treatment plans in an effort to remediate the deficiencies in the care of the children. The department later moved to terminate the parental rights of both parents with respect to the children, alleging, among other things, that the parents had failed to comply with the treatment plans.
In order to assist her in preparation for the termination hearing, the mother, who was indigent and represented by appointed counsel, moved for the appointment of Dr. Richard Spiegle, a clinical psychologist, as an expert witness of her own choosing pursuant to section 19-3-607(1), 8B C.R.S. (1993 Supp.). The court granted the motion, and Dr. Spiegle met with the mother on five occasions for interviews and testing and on another occasion met with the mother and the children for an evaluation of their interaction. Based on information gathered at those sessions, as well as information obtained from other sources, the doctor prepared a written report.
At the termination hearing, the mother did not call Dr. Spiegle as a witness nor did *297she offer his report into evidence. The guardian ad litem for the children, however, called the doctor as a witness and offered his report. The mother objected to both the testimony and the report as protected by the attorney-client privilege. The court overruled the objections, received the tendered testimony and report, and terminated the parental relationship between the mother and her young children.1 The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed. People in the Interest of O.J.S., A.S.S., and D.A.S., Jr., 844 P.2d 1230 (Colo.App.1992). We granted certiorari to review the court of appeals’ determination that the trial court properly received the doctor’s testimony and report over the mother’s objection based on the attorney-client privilege.
II.
The majority holds, first, that much of the information as to which the mother claimed the attorney-client privilege was not within the scope of that privilege and, second, that the privilege is inapplicable in any event because the mother participated without objection in an interactional evaluation session involving the three children. The presence of the three young children, the majority holds, destroyed the confidentiality required to assert the attorney-client privilege and thus abrogated any privilege that might otherwise have existed. I disagree with both holdings on which the majority bases its rejection of the mother’s claim of privilege in this case.
A.
I first address the majority’s holding that the attorney-client privilege that arises between a parent and an expert witness appointed to represent the parent under section 19-3-607(1) “cannot possibly extend to all of the testimony and written conclusions of Spiegle.” Op. at 294.
Section 19-3-607(1) provides in pertinent part, “An indigent parent has the right to have appointed one expert witness of his own choosing_” In B.B. v. People, 785 P.2d 132 (Colo.1990), we held that “when an expert is appointed under section 19 — 11— 107(1) [now appearing at § 19-3-607(1)] for an indigent parent at the request of the parent’s attorney, communications between the parent and the expert are protected by the attorney-client privilege.” Id. at 138. In reaching that conclusion, we recognized that “[a] natural parent ... has a fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody and management of his or her child.” Id. at 136 (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 1394, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982); People in the Interest of A.M.D., 648 P.2d 625, 632 (Colo.1982)). It is essential, therefore, “that a state accord fundamentally fair procedures to a parent when the state seeks to terminate a parent-child legal relationship.” B.B., 785 P.2d at 136 (citing Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753-54, 102 S.Ct. at 1394-95; A.M.D., 648 P.2d at 632).
In order to provide such procedures, and in recognition of the severity of the consequence of termination of parental rights, the General Assembly adopted the Parent-Child Legal Relationship Termination Act of 1987 (the Act), §§ 19-3-601 to -610, 8B C.R.S. (1993 Supp.), of which section 19-3-607(1) is a part. See B.B., 785 P.2d at 136-37. The Act contains detailed criteria for termination of parental rights, and “due process requires that the grounds for termination of parental rights be established by clear and convincing evidence.” Id. at 137 (citing Santosky and A.M.D. for burden of proof standard). Section 19-3-607(1) “is part of the complex statutory scheme designed to accord fundamental fairness to all parties in parental rights termination proceedings.” B.B., 785 P.2d at 137.
We observed in B.B. that an indigent parent facing termination of parental rights is disadvantaged by the inability to hire expert assistance, whereas the state has resources at its disposal to prepare its *298case, and that “[i]t is apparent that section 19-11-107(1) [19-3-607(1)] was enacted in an effort to rectify this imbalance.” Id. at 138. We noted that an indigent parent has a right to appointment of counsel in termination of parental rights proceedings, § 19-3-602(2), 8B C.R.S. (1993 Supp.), and that in order to provide effective assistance, counsel must have access to expert advice and assistance in evaluating the fitness of the parent. B.B., 785 P.2d at 138.
Section 13-90-107(l)(b), 6A C.R.S. (1987), articulates the attorney-client privilege and delineates its scope, as follows:
An attorney shall not be examined without the consent of his client as to any communication made by the client to him or his advice given thereon in the course of professional employment; nor shall an attorney’s secretary, paralegal, legal assistant, stenographer, or clerk be examined without the consent of his employer concerning any fact, the knowledge of which he has acquired in such capacity.
In Miller v. District Court, 737 P.2d 834 (Colo.1987), we recognized that the privilege extends to communications between the client and agents of the attorney and that “a psychiatrist retained by defense counsel to assist in the preparation of the defense is an agent of defense counsel for purposes of the attorney-client privilege.” Id. at 838. In B.B. we held that the reasoning of Miller applies as well to parental rights termination proceedings. We stated:
Were the attorney-client privilege not applicable to the present case, an indigent parent would be presented with a dilemma. The parent either could forego the assistance of an expert, with a resulting impairment of the parent’s ability to evaluate and counter the People’s evidence, or could obtain appointment of an expert, and run the risk that the expert would obtain information and form opinions adverse to the parent’s interest and that the People could then elicit the expert’s testimony to support their own case. To put the parent to such a choice would defeat the very purpose of section 19 — 11— 107(1) — to enable an indigent parent to obtain assistance from an expert of the parent’s own choosing at state expense in preparing a defense against the People’s efforts to terminate the parent-child relationship.
B.B., 785 P.2d at 139.
The majority, however, confines the holding of B.B. to communications between the mother and the psychologist and holds that opinions of the psychologist based on “observations of and conclusions regarding the children themselves,” op. at 294, and their interaction with their mother are outside the pale of the privilege. This cramped reading of B.B. ignores its philosophical underpinnings and seriously erodes the protections it was intended to provide to indigent parents facing the loss of a fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and management of their children. The essential purpose of B.B., and of Miller, is to provide the indigent person with expert advice and assistance on issues central to the case and minimize the adverse effect of the disparity in the resources available to the state and to the person for whom the expert assistance is made available. In order to effectuate this purpose, I would hold that the confidential “communications” protected under our holding in B.B. consist not only of verbal communications but of all information provided by the parent to the expert that the expert reasonably requests in order to accomplish a full and effective evaluation relevant to the issues in a termination of parental rights proceeding. Information obtained by observing the interaction of the parent and children is easily encompassed within the scope of the privilege by application of that standard.
B.
The majority goes on to hold, more broadly, that the participation of the children in the interactive evaluation, a part of the evaluative process that the mother’s attorney knew in advance to be likely, prevented the attorney-client privilege from arising because it destroyed the confidentiality required to assert that privilege. I disagree.
*299The majority first reasons that because the mother requested in her motion for appointment of the expert psychologist that he conduct an evaluation of her relationship with her minor children, the expectation of confidentiality which provides the basis for recognition of the attorney-client privilege was not present. This is so, the majority states, because “the mother was aware that at least some of the communications between herself and Spiegle would occur in the presence of the children.” Op. at 295. That the presence of the children would destroy the mother’s expectation of confidentiality strains credulity. The children were ages four, five, and six at the time of the evaluation. And, at the meetings, as Dr. Spiegle reported, “[tjhey just visited together and sat on [their mother’s] lap and talked and joked....” Factually, the majority’s loss of confidentiality analysis is most unpersuasive.
Legally, the majority’s analysis is flawed as well. The majority concedes that destruction of confidentiality “ ‘does not always occur when a person other than client and lawyer becomes a party to the communication if that person is needed to make the conference possible.’ ” Op. at 295 (quoting 2 Jack B. Weinstein et al., Wein-stein’s Evidence § 503(a)(4)[01] (1993)). It rejects the application of that principle to the presence of the children at the interactive evaluation on two bases. First, the children were represented by counsel. Op. at 295. Second, “the record does not support the finding, that the presence of the children was necessary to make Spiegle’s evaluation possible.” Id. I fail to grasp the significance of the children’s representation by counsel. Nothing in the record suggests that the children’s counsel requested access to the doctor’s report or to be advised of his findings or in any way objected to participation of the children in a confidential interactive evaluation. As to the majority’s conclusion that the presence of the children was not necessary, it imposes an inappropriately high standard. As the majority concedes, there is evidence that conducting a parent-child interactive evaluation was an “ ‘appropriate’ procedure for determining the mother’s fitness as a parent, and a procedure which was ‘standard’ for Sfüiegle to conduct.” Op. at 296. Nothing more should be required. The legislative purpose for providing expert assistance to an indigent parent would not be served if such an expert is denied the ability to obtain data appropriate to the development of a fully informed opinion. The fact that such a procedure was “standard” for Dr. Spiegle strongly suggests its importance. We should not lightly second guess the opinion of such a witness as to the scope of the evaluative activities appropriate to arrive at a fully informed opinion. I would hold that the presence of the children was needed to make the conference possible and therefore that confidentiality was not compromised and the attorney-client privilege remained intact.
In further support of its determination that no confidentiality was intended, the majority notes that Dr. Spiegle’s report was provided to all counsel involved in the termination proceeding prior to its admission at trial. The majority states that dissemination of the report, presumably by Dr. Spiegle himself, “strongly suggests that, at least as ■ far as Spiegle was concerned, the report prepared by him was not intended to be treated as confidential.” Op. at 295. Dr. Spiegle’s post-analysis actions, however, cannot be read as evidence of an intention on the part of the mother not to hold the communications confidential. The attorney-client privilege is personal with the client and thus may be waived only by the client herself. Losavio v. District Court In and For Tenth Judicial District, 188 Colo. 127, 132-133, 533 P.2d 32, 35 (1975). The burden of establishing a waiver is on the party seeking to overcome the claim of privilege. Clark v. District Court, Second Judicial Disk, City and County of Denver, 668 P.2d 3, 8 (Colo.1983). Waiver of the privilege must be established by evidence showing that the privilege holder herself has expressly or impliedly forsaken her claim of confidentiality with respect to the information in question. Id. There is no evidence in the record that the mother authorized or assented to distribution of the report. In *300fact, when the report was offered in evidence, her attorney disavowecP'having distributed the report and said that “if somebody else has a copy, I assume they received it directly from [Dr. Spiegle].” In short, the record does not support a conclusion that distribution of Dr. Spiegle’s report vitiated or impaired the mother’s claim of confidentiality.
III.
Finally, I believe it necessary to address that portion of the court of appeals’ opinion relying in part on section 19-3-203(2) for rejection of the mother’s claim of privilege in this case.2 That section provides in pertinent part:
The guardian ad litem shall be provided with all reports relevant to a case submitted to or made by any agency or person pursuant to this article, including reports of examination of the child or persons responsible for the neglect or dependency of the child....
Section 19-3-203(2), 8B C.R.S. (1993 Supp.) (enacted as of 1987, ch. 138, sec. 1, § 19-3-203, 1987 Colo.Sess.Laws 695, 761) (emphasis added). The court of appeals, without detailed analysis, determined that this section required that communications between the mother and the psychologist be disclosed to the guardian ad litem in the present case, with the result that the attorney-client privilege was abrogated. The wording of this section has been in existence since 1975, yet has never been held to abrogate the attorney-client privilege applicable to communications between a parent and an expert appointed to assist the parent under section 19-3-607(1). Rather, it is intended to negate the testimonial privilege of those classes of persons listed within the article.
The reports referred to in section 19-3-203(2) are the reports of suspected child abuse or neglect required to be made by certain classes of professionals and other persons. Among the persons so classified are psychologists. Section 19-3-304(2)(p), 8B C.R.S. (1993 Supp.). The psychologist-client privilege has thereby been abolished to the extent necessary to allow reporting of suspected child abuse. The privilege operating in this case, and in B.B., however, is the attorney-client privilege not the psychologist-client privilege. As in B.B., information obtained by Dr. Speigle “was not for purposes of diagnosing or treating [the mother] but rather to assist [the mother] in pending litigation, and thus was not within the psychologist-client privilege.” B.B., 785 P.2d at 140.
Attorneys are not among the classes of persons required by section 19-3-304 to report suspected child abuse or neglect. The legislature must have meant the attorney-client privilege to remain intact. Within the Child Protection Act of 1987, §§ 19-3-301 to -316, 8B C.R.S. (1993 Supp.), section 19-3-311, which specifically lists evidence not privileged, is entirely consistent with this legislative intent. Again, only evidence gathered by certain of those classes of persons listed in section 19 — 3— 304 is included:
The incident of privileged communication between patient and physician, between patient and registered professional nurse, or between any person licensed pursuant to article 43 of title 12, C.R.S. [concerning licensure of mental health professionals], or certified school psychologist and client, which is the basis for a report pursuant to section 19-3-304, shall not be a ground for excluding evidence in any judicial proceeding resulting from a report pursuant to this part 3....
Section 19-3-311(1), C.R.S. (1993 Supp.) (emphasis added).
No section within the Child Protection Act evinces an intent to abrogate the attorney-client privilege. To hold otherwise would obliterate the privilege recognized in B.B. The reliance by the court of appeals on section 19-3-203(2) in rejecting the mother’s claim of privilege was therefore erroneous.
*301For all of the above reasons, I respectfully dissent.
KIRSHBAUM and SCOTT, JJ., join in this dissent.

. The court also terminated the parental relationship between the father and the children; that determination is not before us for review.

. As we have previously indicated, evaluation by an expert appointed under § 19-3-607(1), 8B C.R.S. (1993 Supp.), does not amount to an "ordered evaluation" that must be provided to all parties pursuant to § 19-3-607(2). See B.B., 785 P.2d at 135 n. 5.