Court Opinion

ID: 9535755
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:52:35.436823+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:33:19.415032
License: Public Domain

EDMONDS, J.,
dissenting.
The majority holds that plaintiffs unsuccessful cross-appeal subjects him to attorney fees in the amount of $14,731.28, even though the judgment in the action is in his favor. The majority’s holding is contrary to the language of ORS 20.096(5), to Supreme Court cases that have interpreted the meaning of ORS 20.096(5) and to the principles of stare decisis. Moreover, the majority incorrectly overrules our decision in Zidell v. Greenway Landing Devel. Co., 89 Or App 525, 749 P2d 1210 (1988), a well-reasoned ten-year-old precedent.
The analysis of the issue in this case hinges on two axioms of law and one fact. First, when a contract or lease uses the term “prevailing party” and does not define it, the phrase has the same meaning as the meaning of the identical phrase in ORS 20.096(5). Carlson v. Blumenstein, 293 Or 494, 499, 500 n 3, 651 P2d 710 (1982). Second, ORS 20.096(5) says that a “ ‘prevailing party’ means the party in whose favor final judgment or decree is rendered.” Defendant lost at *381the trial level. He appealed and lost again on appeal. Final judgment has not been rendered in his favor.
The majoritys decision is contrary to the above law. The term “prevailing party” in the parties’ lease is not defined. Therefore, the meaning of the phrase in ORS 20.096(5) controls. In this case, plaintiff, having prevailed on his nonlease claim, is the party in whose favor final judgment is rendered. There can be only one prevailing party. Anderson v. Jensen Racing, Inc., 324 Or 570, 578-79, 931 P2d 763 (1997). Under the majoritys holding, there are two prevailing parties, contrary to the express language of ORS 20.096(5).
The majoritys error is further demonstrated by the following paragraph in its opinion:
“ORS 20.096 provides for an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party, which the statute defines as ‘the party in whose favor final judgment or decree is rendered.’ ORS 20.096(5). By its terms, that definition does not specify whether the prevailing party is the one in whose favor final judgment is rendered in the action or the one in whose favor it is rendered on the claims subject to ORS 20.096 in the action. * * * The term ‘prevailing party’ usually does refer to the party who prevails in an action, see Marquam Investment Corp. v. Myers, 35 Or App 23, 30, 581 P2d 545, rev den 284 Or 341 (1978), but that does not mean that the legislature intended the term to have that meaning in ORS 209.096. In context, the legislature could have intended either of the meanings identified above, which makes the statute ambiguous. Consequently, it is appropriate to look to legislative history to determine which meaning the legislature intended.” 156 Or App at 375 (emphasis in original).
In this case, there is no final judgment to be found in favor of defendant. Plaintiff is entitled to judgment in his favor based on our decision in Newell v. Weston, 150 Or App 562, 946 P2d 691 (1997), rev den 327 Or 317 (1998). Moreover, there is nothing ambiguous regarding the language of ORS 20.096(5) when it is considered with the Supreme Court cases that have interpreted it. Interpretations by the Supreme Court of statutes like ORS 20.096 become part of the statute as if they had been written into it at the time of *382their enactment. Walther v. SAIF, 312 Or 147, 149, 817 P2d 292 (1991). Such interpretations also become part of the context of the statute and are part of the first level of analysis of legislative intent regarding the interpretation of a statute. State v. Guzek, 322 Or 245, 255, 906 P2d 272 (1995). The majority’s resort to a secondary level of analysis of legislative history is improper.
Our decision in Zidell is based on several Supreme Court precedents, which are part of the context of ORS 20.096, including American Petrofina v. D & L Oil Supply, 283 Or 183, 583 P2d 521 (1978). That case began as an action by the plaintiff to recover money alleged to be due from the defendant for products and services furnished to defendant, including a claim for reimbursement by plaintiff under a painting agreement with defendant. Plaintiff sought attorney fees as provided for in the painting contract. Defendant raised a number of counterclaims and also sought attorney fees under ORS 20.096. The court concluded that the defendant was entitled to judgment for reimbursement in connection with the painting contract. When the reimbursement was taken into account in the final judgment, the reduction in the amount of the plaintiffs original claim resulted in a money judgment for the defendant. The defendant argued that for purposes of the statute, it was “the party in whose favor final judgment had been rendered.” The court noted:
“Under a strict analysis, then, [the defendant] ‘prevailed’ on the contract count and could argue (although it has not done so) that it is entitled to attorney fees on that basis. We believe, however, that such an approach would make the application of ORS 20.096 unworkable.” 283 Or at 199.
It explained:
“The better alternative is to consider the plaintiff who recovers in such a case to be the prevailing party under the statute and to consider the defendant to be the prevailing party only when the plaintiff takes nothing on account of the transaction. This interpretation of the statute is consistent with the language of subsection (3), which provides that the prevailing party is the one ‘in whose favor final judgment or decree is rendered.’ We believe it will also come closer to giving effect to the probable intent of the parties *383who have provided a contract for recovery of attorney fees in the event of litigation.
“Therefore, as we construe the statute [the defendant] is not the ‘prevailing party in this case because [the plaintiff] was held entitled to recover upon the cause of action pleaded alternatively in contract and in quasi-contract. The award of attorney fees to [the defendant] was not proper.” 283 Or at 199-200. (Footnote omitted.)
In U. S. Nat’l Bank v. Smith, 292 Or 123, 128, 637 P2d 139 (1981), the court held that even though the defendant obtained a reduction of the judgment on appeal and was entitled to an award of costs incurred on appeal, the plaintiff, in whose favor final judgment was entered, was entitled to attorney fees under ORS 20.096. The court pointed out that ORS 20.096(5) defines a prevailing party as the party in whose favor final judgment or decree is entered. It said:
“It follows, in our opinion, as contended by plaintiff, that in an action or suit to enforce the provisions of a contract which includes a provision for payment of attorney fees incurred to enforce provisions of the contract, the only question to be determined in deciding which party is entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal is the question of determining ‘the party in whose favor final judgment or decree is rendered,’ not whether the appellant has been successful on appeal in obtaining some substantial modification of the judgment or decree as entered by the trial court.” 292 Or at 127-28.
In this case, defendant is in no different position than the defendant in American Petrofina or the defendant in Smith. Defendant merely successfully defended a cross-appeal. No final judgment in the case has been or will be awarded in his favor.
There is another reason why we should not overrule our holding in Zidell. In Multnomah County v. Sliker, 10 Or 65, 66 (1881), the court said regarding the rule of stare decisis:
“[T]he rule is said to be almost universal that in construing statutes and the constitution, [courts should] adhere to the doctrine of stare decisis [even though a different conclusion might be reached], unless error is plainly shown to existf.]”
*384The pertinent language in ORS 20.095(5) was enacted in 1971. Zidell was decided in 1988, Carlson in 1982 and Jewell v. Triple B. Enterprises, 290 Or 885, 626 P2d 1383, in 1981. They interpret the intention of the legislature regarding a statute that, for purposes of the issue in this case, has remained unchanged. Our holding in Zidell has been followed by the bench and the bar for ten years, and neither the Supreme Court nor the legislature has seen fit to overrule or change it. At a minimum, that is some indication that we got it right.
Now the same court that decided Zidell, although constituted with different members, decides that the legislature had a different intention in 1971. We should be mindful that an important policy of appellate courts of this state is to afford certainty to the administration of justice within the state. The changing of the goal posts by judicial fiat without a showing of plain error can lead to nothing but uncertainty in the law. Lawyers and litigants are entitled to make decisions about whether to prosecute appeals or cross-appeals based on what they consider to be settled law. Under Zidell, plaintiff could have prosecuted a cross-appeal without fear of having attorney fees being awarded against him. Now, because of the majority’s change, he finds himself faced with over a $14,000 judgment.
Pity the poor lawyer who reads appellate decisions that purport to discuss legislative intent about an unchanged statute and advises his client accordingly. Pity the poor client who looks to settled case law as a guide through the mine field of the risks of litigation. Pity the trial bench and the public who must anticipate what the next interpretation by this court will bring from what was previously thought to be settled legislative intent.
I dissent.
Riggs, J. pro tempore joins in this dissent.