Court Opinion

ID: 9613219
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:15:19.577143+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:26.842208
License: Public Domain

Hunt, Justice,
concurring specially.
While I concur in the result reached by the majority, I write separately to make two points.
First, the statement in Division 1 (a) that the plaintiffs had the burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence that the zoning constituted a “significant detriment” to the enjoyment of their property rights is an incomplete statement of the required standard and is therefore potentially misleading. It is clear beyond peradventure that the “significant detriment” must rise to the level of an unconstitutional taking of the property. Flournoy v. City of Brunswick, 248 Ga. 573 (285 SE2d 16) (1981). It must, in short, be confiscatory. Barrett v. *112Hamby, 235 Ga. 262 (219 SE2d 399) (1975). I deem it important to reiterate this standard in order to keep the nature of the issue in the forefront of our law of zoning. We deal, in cases like this, with the right of the local governing authority to govern; that is, DeKalb County has the power, committed to it by law, to control land use within its borders by enacting zoning ordinances. That power may be abrogated by the judicial branch only on a clear showing that it has been unconstitutionally exercised, that is, a showing that the ordinance, as applied to the property at issue, is arbitrary and capricious so as to result in an unconstitutional taking without compensation. Guhl v. Pinkard, 243 Ga. 129 (252 SE2d 612) (1979); Guhl v. M. E. M. Corp., 242 Ga. 354 (249 SE2d 42) (1978).1 This standard must be scrupulously honored by this court in order that the integrity of local zoning ordinances be maintained.
This leads to my second concern with the majority opinion, which is that Division 4 is likewise incomplete and may, by its brevity, be misleading. In Division 4 the court states: “While the trial court’s order certainly provides an excellent point of departure for our inquiry, we reiterate that, ‘Our focus is not whether there was evidence to support the trial court’s decision, but whether there was evidence to support the county’s decision,’ ” citing DeKalb County v. Chamblee Dunwoody Hotel Partnership, 248 Ga. 186 (281 SE2d 525) (1981). The opinion in that case, I would note, goes on to say, “If the validity of the legislative classification for zoning purposes be fairly debatable, the legislative judgment must be allowed to control.” That is simply tantamount to saying, as was held in the seminal case of Barrett v. Hamby, supra, 235 Ga. at 265, that the ordinance bears a presumption of constitutionality. It did not change the rule that the trial court’s findings of fact will not be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous. OCGA § 9-11-52 (a); City of Atlanta v. McLennan, 240 Ga. 407 (2) (240 SE2d 881) (1977); Bd. of Commrs. v. Skelton, 248 Ga. 855, 857 (286 SE2d 729) (1982). Nor did it affect the decision in Guhl v. Pinkard, 243 Ga. 129, 130, n. 1 (252 SE2d 612) (1979), where this court recognized that a zoning appeal presents a constitutional issue which is a question of law for resolution by this court.
After hearing the evidence, the trial court in this case set out some six pages of findings of fact. Having reviewed his findings and determined that they are supported by the record, I conclude that there is clear and convincing evidence that the R-100 zoning classifi*113cation is unconstitutional as applied to this property.
Decided June 25, 1986.
Jenkins, Bergman & Darroch, Frank E. Jenkins III, Robert M. Darroch, Ruth A Zaleon, for appellants.
Dillard, Greer, Westmoreland & Wilson, G. Douglas Dillard, Carl E. Westmoreland, Jr., Dick Wilson, Jr., Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan, James H. Wilson, Jr., Alston & Bird, G. Conley Ingram, A. James Elliott, Kilpatrick & Cody, Wilbur B. King, for appellees.
James F. Grubiak, Walter E. Sumner, Robert D. Clark, Timothy J. Sweeney, amici curiae.

 I note here my agreement with the trial court’s statement that: “When the case law describes a zoning ordinance as being “arbitrary,” “capricious,” or “confiscatory,” it does not use these terms in their common, vernacular meanings. These too are legal words of art, and do not connote, imply, or [impute] whimsicalness or malice on the part of the zoning authorities.”