Court Opinion

ID: 9619980
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:36:19.672339+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:04:46.233196
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION OP
LEWIS, J.,
WITH WHOM
CASSIDY, J., JOINS.
Defendant testified he had had three cans of beer after work, and shortly thereafter, while he was on his way home, the accident occurred. The principal question in the case was whether the defendant exercised due care in making a left turn into Kaimuki Avenue when he did.
With respect to contributory negligence, the evidence consisted in (1) the testimony of William DeBolt that he was traveling at 30 miles per hour when decedent passed him, together with his testimony as to the point he had' reached when deceased, ahead of him, collided with defendant’s automobile, and (2) the evidence as to the force of the collision and the mark laid down by the motorcycle tire. DeBolt’s testimony was of very slight weight and was not even referred to in appellee’s brief. The evidence as to the force of the collision was inconclusive. There was no evidence whatsoever that a motorcycle of the type and weight involved, if traveling within the legal speed limit, could have been brought to a halt within a distance of 117 feet, the distance from the beginning of the motorcycle’s skid mark. Appellant’s witness, Robert Sato, though cited by appellee, did not testify that the motorcycle could have been brought to a stop within this distance. He did testify that at 35 miles per hour the motorcycle would lay down a skid mark1 of 100-115 feet on the rear wheel alone. It was controlled by both *475a foot brake and a hand brake. In making a sudden stop, the operator had to depend on the foot brake and could not apply the foot and hand brakes together. As Sato testified: “If the front wheel is not rolling, you cannot control the motorcycle.”
Decedent’s motorcycle was a light motorcycle weighing 350 lbs. and requiring a longer distance to stop than a heavier motorcycle according to the witness Sato, who explained that this was due to the fact that the wider tire of the heavier motorcycle would afford more traction. Sergeant Huch, speaking of a motorcycle twice as heavy, testified that in making a sudden stop both brakes should not be applied simultaneously as “The momentum of stopping the front and rear wheels would automatically jog your bike,” “Almost like a jackknife, if both applied simultaneously.” His testimony further showed that at 35 miles per hour even a heavy motorcycle could not be stopped within 100 feet.
A witness testified that deceased “did not drink, smoke, or even drink coffee.” A laboratory test showed that deceased’s blood contained .5 milligrams per cubic centimeter or .05 per cent, the lowest positive grade, but this was not shown to be significant. The doctor performing the autopsy testified that a trace of alcohol may be from natural causes and “If there results any normal trace of alcohol, we cannot tell whether the deceased had acquired that alcohol in the blood through drinking or other means.”
In my view the case turned on the testimony of defendant. No other eye witness testified to the circumstances attending the actual collision. Defendant testified that he let five cars pass and when he made his left turn saw nothing else approaching. Did he correctly appraise the situation or should he have taken heed of the deceased approaching on his motorcycle? That was the issue for *476the jury. The jury necessarily considered defendant’s appearance on the stand, forming an opinion as to his prudence and judgment. But was that judgment affected at the time by the three cans of beer the defendant had just had? Defendant had had nothing to eat since noon.
What concerns me is the impression left with the jury that the use of intoxicants was sanctioned by the court. The material facts are the manner in which the drinks were ordered by the bailiff at the Halekulani Hotel and charged to the Territory, also the subsequent events at the dinner table at which jurors were permitted to order further drinks at their own expense.
The bailiff testified that he told the waitress he “had instructions from the Judge that these people may have one drink.” According to the bailiff the judge did in fact instruct him that the jurors might have the usual cocktail if they were used to having one before dinner. While the bailiff further testified that his conversation with the waitress was outside the presence of the jurors, they could not have failed to receive the impression that drinking by a jury is officially sanctioned.
It generally is recognized that drinking of intoxicating liquor by a jury is not to be condoned. As stated by this court in the decision at 42 Haw. 630, 639: “We look with strong disapproval upon * * * consumption of liquor by the jurors during deliberation.” The reason is that the consumption of intoxicating liquor does tend to affect the deliberate judgment of the jurors. Any indulgence by members of a jury, particularly when occurring during deliberation, is bound to cast suspicion on its verdict. However, in the present instance it is not so much the effect of the intoxicants themselves on the jury that concerns me as the improper influence on the jury of the official sanction given to their use of intoxicants at a time when they had retired to consider their verdict and *477were about to resume deliberation. I am unable to perceive how they could fail to conclude that the drinking of intoxicants in moderation was to be viewed as a matter of little or no consequence. Had the court commented to that effect it of course would have been reversible error. Cf., Territory v. Cutad, 37 Haw. 182, 186. Here the only difference is that the comment was made outside the courtroom and conveyed to the jury through the bailiff’s actions.
It is the general rule that if misconduct is such that prejudice might have resulted a presumption of prejudice arises. Kaanaana v. Keahi, 9 Haw. 318, 322; Rigsby v. State, 64 Tex. Crim. 504, 142 S.W. 901. The posture of the evidence in this case is such that this rule applies. The presumption of prejudice has not been rebutted and a new trial should have been ordered.

The term “skid mark” is that used by the witnesses. It does not signify any sideslip of the vehicle, as the record shows.