Court Opinion

ID: 9745290
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 22:47:12.472472+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:25:49.167587
License: Public Domain

PHELAN, J.,
Dissenting.—The issue presented by this case is whether “forgetting” the name of the driver of a vehicle who causes a plaintiff injury amounts to genuine ignorance under the “Doe” amendment statute. (Code Civ. Proc., § 474 (hereafter section 474).) The majority answers this question “Yes” and equates appellant’s claimed memory lapse of the clearly once known fact of the name of respondent as the driver who struck and caused her injury with the “real” lack of knowledge required by section 474. (Snoke v. Bolen (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1427, 1432 [1 Cal.Rptr.2d 492]; Munoz v. Purdy (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 942, 947 [154 Cal.Rptr. 472].) I would not do so and therefore respectfully dissent.
Respondent’s declaration in support of his motion to quash service of summons recited: “3. Immediately after the collision, I walked up to Deanna Balón’s vehicle and asked if she was alright. She stated that she was surprised that she had been in an accident but that she was not injured. She and I decided to go across the street to a doughnut shop at the corner of Broadway and 49th Street in Oakland to call the police and exchange *491information, [fl 4. When we arrived at the doughnut shop, I immediately called the police to report the accident. I then called my girlfriend, Christine Renner, and asked her to meet me at the doughnut shop. She lives nearby and arrived within five minutes of my call, even before the police arrived. [HI 5. Deanna Balón and I realized that we needed to exchange identify cation, insurance and license information. Neither of us had a pen. I recall that we had to ask the counter attendant at the doughnut shop to loan us pens. I then handed Deanna Balón my driver’s license and observed her copy down the information on it. My girlfriend, Christine Renner, was present at the time and also observed Deanna Balón copy down the information from my license.” Respondent’s girlfriend (granddaughter of the owner of the car respondent was driving) submitted a declaration in which she stated, “I personally observed Shawn Hurley introduce himself to Deanna Balón.”
Appellant’s declaration dated October 26, 1992, submitted in opposition to the motion to quash, recited: “Only on October 20, 1992 did I ever learn the name of the driver of the other vehicle that rearended me on December 28, 1990.” In a further declaration dated November 14, 1992, submitted with the motion to reconsider, appellant amplified her previous declaration as follows: “2) After being rearended by Defendant Hurley, I was very dazed and disoriented. I had trouble thinking clearly. [^]] 3) Immediately after the accident, I could not get out of my car for a while. When I got out of my car, I went into a nearby doughnut shop to call the police. Defendant Hurley was on the telephone in the doughnut shop talking to his girlfriend. I asked him to get off the telephone so that I could call the police. By the time I finished calling the police, Hurley’s girlfriend arrived at the doughnut shop. I was still so dazed I do not remember who wrote down some information but I remember receiving a small piece of blue paper with some information from Hurley and his girlfriend on it. However, I do not know what happened to that piece of paper. I never saw that piece of paper again after the day of the accident. I remembered this after Defendant stated this in his papers responding to my Declaration in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Quash. [K] 4) I think the reason why my memory of the events which took place immediately following the accident is so foggy is because I was injured, dazed, angry, confused and in need of medical attention. At no time after I received medical help did I see a piece of paper with Shawn Hurley’s name on it nor did I hear or learn his name, [f] 5) I was so dazed and disoriented the day of the accident that when I got to work I could not even remember some of the names of my co-workers.”
In contrast to the foregoing is the following deposition testimony given by appellant some six months prior to executing her declarations. At that time *492she was questioned as follows: “Q. Did you tell any of your treating doctors or practitioners that the car hit you going 65 miles an hour? [ft A. Yes. [ft Q. Who did you tell that? [ft A. I believe I told that to Dr. Jensen. Maybe Dr. Unger, too. [ft Q. Now, do you remember two ambulances stopping at the scene? [ft A. Yes. [ft Q. Did the ambulances ask you if you’d like to be taken to the hospital? [ft A. Yes. [ft Q. Did you refuse? [ft A. Yes. [ft Q. Did you refuse because you didn’t feel you were injured at the time? [ft A. I refused because I had no broken bones or injuries that I could see, and there—the policeman said that they had injuries and accidents all over that morning.” It is also noteworthy that the police report stated: “No injuries reported.”
Plaintiff’s claim of a “foggy” memory of the events immediately following the accident is belied by her further deposition testimony detailing events after the accident. She testified: “Q. Did you get out of your car at the scene of the accident? [ft A. Yes. I went into the doughnut shop, [ft Q. Did you talk with the other driver in the doughnut shop? [ft A. I asked him to get off the phone so I could call the police, [ft Q. Did he do that? [ft A. After a while, [ft Q. Did you have trouble with him? [ft A. I don’t think I had trouble with him. He just was more interested in talking to his girlfriend than he was to letting the police know that—about the accident, [ft Q. Did you see the girlfriend at the scene? [ft A. Uh-uh. [ft Q. Did she arrive before or after the police? [ft A. She arrived before the police, [ft Q. Did you tell her that you thought you were injured? [ft A. I didn’t talk to her at all. [ft Q. Did she ask you if you were injured? [ft A. She didn’t talk to me at all. And I can’t recall even—they were having a very deep conversation between the two of them, [ft Q. Did he seem to be doing all right with his injuries, or could you tell? [ft A. I asked him how he was feeling, would he like to come to the hospital. He said he was gonna go home with his girlfriend, [ft Q. Okay, [ft A. I suggested to him that he—maybe he should come to the hospital, because he was very pale, [ft Q. Was he nervous? Did he say anything about being concerned about the car? [ft A. He was—well, the policeman made a comment about him. [ft Q. What was that? [ft A. ‘The poor bastard.’ [ft Q. Do you have any—-did you understand what he was talking about? [ft A. He was getting a lot of heck from his girlfriend. Heavy duty, [ft Q. Did you—did he tell you or anybody at the scene that you heard that that was his girlfriend’s grandmother’s car? [ft A. Yes. Yes. I heard him say that it was his grandmother’s car. Her grandmother’s car.”
The majority conclude appellant “felt dazed from the collision, and subsequently forgot about the slip of paper and respondent’s identity.” (Maj. opn., ante, p. 486.) I find this conclusion suspect, but nevertheless am willing to accept it for purposes of this discussion.
*493The trial court found that appellant simply “ignored” the knowledge she undeniably possessed at the time her complaint was filed—that is, she met with respondent after the accident, exchanged names, and gave the police a report. The trial court concluded that plaintiff “clearly knew that there was somebody else involved, and made no effort to find out who they were. And essentially could have known when the complaint was filed. Just never bothered to ask. That’s not the sort of mistake that I can give you relief for, even under Munoz, [f] . . . [ft] . . .1 think she ignored as opposed to being just uninformed. And that’s a difference. ...[][]... She did ignore the fact that there was another party that she could easily have identified.”
In my view the observation of the court in Ingram v. Superior Court (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 483, 491 [159 Cal.Rptr. 557] is apropos: “While we recognize the Supreme Court’s liberal attitude toward allowing amendments of pleadings to avoid the harsh result imposed by a statute of limitations, that attitude is not unfettered by reasonable requirements. Some discipline in pleading is still essential to the efficient processing of litigation.” Moreover, “[t]he policy behind the statute of limitations is equally as meritorious a consideration as is the policy of trying cases upon their merits.” (Scherer v. Mark (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 834, 844 [135 Cal.Rptr. 90].) And, while I have no quarrel with the settled rule under section 474 which absolves a genuinely ignorant plaintiff of any duty to discover the identity of a “Doe” defendant or of the facts which give rise to a cause of action against a party whose identity is known, the facts of this case do not fall within that principle. In short, the “ignorance” required by section 474 should not be equated with forgetfulness. Here, plaintiff not only once knew the identity of the driver of the car which struck her, she also knew he was the boyfriend of the granddaughter of the car’s owner whom she sued.
In Schroeter v. Lowers (1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 695 [67 Cal.Rptr. 270], the court observed that a plaintiff’s ignorance of the true name of a defendant “must not be wilful ignorance, or such as might be removed by some inquiry or resort to information easily accessible.” (Id. at p. 700.) The majority dismisses this proposition as dicta and also as contrary to the venerable Supreme Court decision in Irving v. Carpentier (1886) 70 Cal. 23 [11 P. 264]. (See also Munoz v. Purdy, supra, 91 Cal.App.3d at p. 947 [similarly treating the comment as dicta].) However, even the Irving court impliedly recognized that where resort to “readily accessible” information is available to ascertain a true name, a tardy “Doe” amendment should not be allowed. Thus, the court observed, “Sometimes there is no means readily accessible of ascertaining the true names. The statute above referred to was enacted to afford a remedy in such cases.” (Irving v. Carpentier, supra, 70 Cal. at p. 26, italics added.)
*494The “burden of discovery” which the early Supreme Court refused to impose in Irving and in Hoffman v. Keeton (1901) 132 Cal. 195 [64 P. 264] (also cited by the majority), involved the search of title records in a county recorder’s office. Here, by contrast, a simple telephone call, even to plaintiff’s own insurer, would have “refreshed” her failed recollection of the driver’s name. I believe that this is a trivial burden of rediscovery of “readily accessible” information which section 474 should require. (Irving v. Carpentier, supra, 70 Cal. at p. 26.) The majority’s decision allows a plaintiff to “forget” a defendant’s identity, ignore the abundant available sources for relearning it, and treat her no differently than plaintiffs in complex product liability cases, medical malpractice cases and similar matters, who are excused from the burden of discovery. This is simply a case of “wilful ignorance” (Schroeter v. Lowers, supra, 260 Cal.App.2d at p. 700), and I would construe the trial judge’s comments as so finding. Thus, I would conclude there was no good faith, bona fide ignorance as required by section 474.