Court Opinion

ID: 9958864
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-10 12:02:03.423222+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:17:54.689413
License: Public Domain

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                         Marshall v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles

             ANTHONY J. MARSHALL III v. COMMISSIONER
                       OF MOTOR VEHICLES
                           (SC 20703)
                           Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, Mullins,
                                  Ecker and Dannehy, Js.

                                            Syllabus

         Pursuant to statute (§ 14-227b (c)), when a person has been arrested for
            operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating
            liquor or any drug, the arresting officer ‘‘shall prepare a report of the
            incident and shall mail or otherwise transmit . . . the report and a copy
            of the results of any chemical test [of such person’s blood, breath or
            urine] to the Department of Motor Vehicles within three business days.’’
         Pursuant further to Volck v. Muzio (204 Conn. 507), an incident report
            prepared in accordance with § 14-227b (c) is admissible at a motor
            vehicle operator’s license suspension hearing, as an exception to the
            hearsay rule, without the need for testimony from the arresting officer.

         The plaintiff, who had been arrested for operating a motor vehicle while
            under the influence of intoxicating liquor, appealed to the trial court
            from the decision of the defendant, the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles,
            who temporarily suspended the plaintiff’s license to operate a motor
            vehicle. At the plaintiff’s license suspension hearing, the plaintiff’s attor-
            ney objected to the admission of an incident report that was prepared
            by the arresting officer on the ground that it was not prepared and
            mailed to the Department of Motor Vehicles within three business days,
            as required by § 14-227b (c). The arresting officer had not completed the
            report until five business days after the plaintiff’s arrest. The department
            hearing officer overruled the objection and admitted the report, which
            was the only evidence submitted at the hearing. On appeal to the trial
            court from the hearing officer’s decision, that court dismissed the appeal,
            concluding that strict adherence with the preparation and mailing
            requirement of § 14-227b (c) was not necessary for the report to be
            admissible because the report bore indicia of trustworthiness and relia-
            bility. The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment, conclud-
            ing that, because § 14-227b (c) is not accompanied by any negative
            or prohibitory language, the preparation and mailing requirement is
            directory, and, therefore, strict compliance with that requirement is not
            necessary for a report to be admissible at a license suspension hearing.
            The Appellate Court further determined that there were sufficient indicia
            of reliability of the report at issue. Accordingly, the Appellate Court
            held that the hearing officer did not abuse her discretion in admitting
            the report. On the granting of certification, the plaintiff appealed to
            this court.
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                      Marshall v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles
       Held that the hearing officer abused her discretion in admitting an incident
          report that did not strictly comply with the preparation and mailing
          provision of § 14-227b (c) in the absence of testimony from the arresting
          officer, and, accordingly, this court reversed the Appellate Court’s judg-
          ment and remanded with direction to reverse the trial court’s judgment
          and to direct the trial court to sustain the plaintiff’s appeal:

          Contrary to the Appellate Court’s conclusion that the preparation and
          mailing requirement in § 14-227b (c) is directory, this court concluded
          that that requirement was mandatory because, even though the statute
          contained no negative or prohibitory language, the substantive nature
          of the statutory provision was clear, insofar as it plainly promoted the
          accuracy and reliability of the information that ultimately will be used
          at a license suspension hearing.

          The legislature enacted § 14-277b to protect the public from drivers who
          are under the influence by authorizing the temporary revocation of their
          operating privileges prior to conviction while also affording them due
          process, to achieve that purpose, the legislature authorized the admission
          of incident reports at license suspension hearings without the need to
          produce the arresting officer, provided that the procedures set forth in
          the hearsay exception created by § 14-277b (c) are followed to ensure the
          reliability of the information contained in the report, and the legislature
          determined that requiring the arresting officer to prepare the report
          within three business days, while the officer’s recollection of the incident
          remains fresh, is an appropriate time frame to imbue the report with
          sufficient reliability.

          Having concluded that the preparation and mailing requirement of § 14-
          227b (c) is mandatory, this court clarified that § 14-227b (c) describes
          substantive requirements that incident reports must meet, and the failure
          to meet those requirements renders a report inadmissible insofar as it
          fails to satisfy the exception for the report to be admitted without the
          need to produce the arresting officer at the suspension hearing.

          In the present case, it was undisputed that the arresting officer failed
          to comply with the three business day requirement prescribed by § 14-
          227b (c), the plaintiff’s attorney objected to the admission of the report
          on the grounds that that requirement was not met and that the arresting
          officer was not present at the hearing to offer testimony, and, by admitting
          the report without hearing testimony from the arresting officer, the
          hearing officer abused her discretion.

          Moreover, the Appellate Court’s conclusion that an incident report that
          fails to strictly comply with § 14-227b (c) nevertheless may be admissible
          if it meets some of that provision’s requirements was based on that court’s
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                         Marshall v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles
             incorrect determination that the preparation and mailing requirement is
             directory, and, therefore, that conclusion could not stand.
                 Argued October 27, 2023—officially released April 9, 2024

                                      Procedural History

            Appeal from the decision of the defendant suspending
         the plaintiff’s motor vehicle operator’s license and requir-
         ing the installation of an ignition interlock device in the
         plaintiff’s vehicle, brought to the Superior Court in the
         judicial district of New London and transferred to the
         judicial district of New Britain, where the case was tried
         to the court, Cordani, J.; judgment dismissing the
         appeal, from which the plaintiff appealed to the Appel-
         late Court, Alexander and DiPentima, Js., with Pres-
         cott, J., dissenting, which affirmed the trial court’s
         judgment, and the plaintiff, on the granting of certifica-
         tion, appealed to this court. Reversed; judgment
         directed.
           Drzislav Coric, with whom was Brandon H. Marley,
         for the appellant (plaintiff).
           Drew S. Graham, assistant attorney general, with
         whom, on the brief, was William Tong, attorney gen-
         eral, for the appellee (defendant).
                                            Opinion

           MULLINS, J. Connecticut law provides that an inci-
         dent report prepared in accordance with General Stat-
         utes § 14-227b (c)1 is admissible in an administrative
         proceeding to suspend a motor vehicle operator’s license
         without the need for testimony from the arresting offi-
         cer. See Volck v. Muzio, 204 Conn. 507, 517–18, 529
         A.2d 177 (1987). The question presented in this case is
           1
             Although § 14-227b has been amended since the date of the incident in
         question; see, e.g., Public Acts 2022, No. 22-40, § 14; Public Acts, Spec. Sess.,
         June, 2021, No. 21-1, § 118; those amendments have no bearing on the merits
         of this appeal. In the interest of simplicity, unless otherwise indicated, we
         refer to the current revision of the statute.
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                      Marshall v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles

       whether such a report is nevertheless admissible if the
       arresting officer fails to comply with the statute’s require-
       ment that the officer prepare and mail2 the report to
       the Department of Motor Vehicles (department) within
       three business days of the incident. In answering this
       question, we are mindful that license suspension hear-
       ings are not strictly bound by the rules of evidence and
       are aimed at expeditiously protecting the public from
       individuals arrested for driving under the influence of
       alcohol or drugs prior to any conviction. At the same
       time, we must be cognizant of the fact that license
       suspension hearings seek to revoke a privilege, and,
       thus, the state may not revoke that privilege without
       furnishing the holder of the license due process as
       required by the fourteenth amendment to the United
       States constitution. See, e.g., Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S.
       535, 539, 91 S. Ct. 1586, 29 L. Ed. 2d 90 (1971); see also,
       e.g., Fishbein v. Kozlowski, 252 Conn. 38, 50–51, 743
       A.2d 1110 (1999).
         Our legislature balanced these concerns in § 14-227b
       (c) by setting forth the requirements a police report
       must meet to be used as evidence to suspend an opera-
       tor’s license.3 We previously have explained that the
         2
            Section 14-227b (c) requires the police officer to ‘‘mail or otherwise
       transmit’’ the report to the Department of Motor Vehicles within three
       business days. For convenience, we use the term ‘‘mail’’ even though the
       statute provides that the police report may be mailed or electronically trans-
       mitted.
          3
            The police report typically contains the arresting officer’s rendition of
       the four issues required to prove a license suspension. See General Statutes
       § 14-227b (g) (2) (‘‘[a] hearing based on a report submitted under subsection
       (c) of this section shall be limited to a determination of the following issues:
       (A) [d]id the police officer have probable cause to arrest the person for
       operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor
       or any drug, or both; (B) was such person placed under arrest; (C) did such
       person (i) refuse to submit to such test or nontestimonial portion of a drug
       influence evaluation, or (ii) submit to such test, commenced within two
       hours of the time of operation, and the results of such test indicated that
       such person had an elevated blood alcohol content; and (D) was such person
       operating the motor vehicle’’).
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                        Marshall v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles

         requirements of § 14-227b (c) provide sufficient indicia
         of reliability such that the report may be introduced
         into evidence at a license suspension hearing without
         the need to call the arresting officer. See Volck v. Muzio,
         supra, 204 Conn. 517–18. Consistent therewith, we con-
         clude that the failure to comply with the three business
         day preparation and mailing provision of § 14-227b (c)
         renders the report inadmissible in the absence of testi-
         mony from the arresting officer.
            The following facts and procedural history are rele-
         vant to this appeal. On July 14, 2019, Jeffrey H. Hewes,
         an officer with the Stonington Police Department, heard
         an announcement over the police radio describing a
         vehicle that had allegedly been involved in a hit-and-
         run accident. Shortly thereafter, he stopped a vehicle
         matching that description. Upon approaching the vehi-
         cle, Officer Hewes identified the plaintiff, Anthony J.
         Marshall III, as the driver and observed that his eyes
         were bloodshot, his speech was slow, and his breath
         smelled of alcohol. Officer Hewes requested that the
         plaintiff perform three standardized field sobriety tests,
         all of which the plaintiff failed.
            Officer Hewes then arrested the plaintiff and trans-
         ported him to police headquarters, where the plaintiff
         took two breath tests for alcohol. Those tests revealed
         that the plaintiff had an elevated blood alcohol content.
         As a result, the plaintiff was charged with operating a
         motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating
         liquor in violation of General Statutes § 14-227a (a).4
         Officer Hewes prepared a report of this incident that
         consisted of an A-44 form and two attachments—a nar-
         rative police report and the results of the plaintiff’s
             Although § 14-227a has been amended since the date of the incident in
             4

         question; see Public Acts, Spec. Sess., June, 2021, No. 21-1, §§ 116 and 117;
         those amendments have no bearing on the merits of this appeal. In the
         interest of simplicity, we refer to the current revision of the statute.
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                      Marshall v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles

       breath tests.5 Officer Hewes initially entered the narra-
       tive police report on July 15, 2019. He later modified,
       completed, signed, and dated the report on July 19,
       2019—five business days after the plaintiff’s arrest. The
       department did not receive the report until July 23, 2019.
          On August 9, 2019, a department hearing officer held
       an administrative hearing to determine whether the
       plaintiff’s license to operate a motor vehicle should be
       suspended pursuant to § 14-227b. At the hearing, the
       plaintiff’s attorney objected to the admission of the
       report on the ground that it was not prepared and mailed
       to the department within three business days, as required
       by § 14-227b (c). The hearing officer summarily over-
       ruled the objection and admitted the report, which was
       the only evidence submitted at the hearing.
          Solely on the basis of the report, the hearing officer
       found that the four issues necessary to support a license
       suspension were satisfied, namely, (1) Officer Hewes
       had probable cause to arrest the plaintiff for operating a
       motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating
       liquor, (2) the plaintiff was arrested, (3) the plaintiff
       submitted to breath tests for alcohol, which indicated
       that he had an elevated blood alcohol content, and
       (4) the plaintiff was operating the motor vehicle. See
       General Statutes § 14-227b (g) (2). Accordingly, on the
       basis of the hearing officer’s findings, the defendant,
       the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles (commissioner),
          5
            An A-44 form is a form used by the police to report an arrest related to
       the operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating
       liquor or drugs. See Do v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 330 Conn. 651,
       655 n.4, 200 A.3d 681 (2019). With respect to the narrative and the breath
       test results, § 14-227b-10 (b) of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies
       provides in relevant part that ‘‘[a]dditional statements or materials necessary
       to explain any item of information in the report may be attached to the
       report’’ and ‘‘shall be considered a part of the report . . . .’’
          Thus, we consider the A-44 form and its two attachments to collectively
       constitute the ‘‘report,’’ as referenced in General Statutes § 14-227b (c) and
       § 14-227b-19 (a) of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies.
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                    Marshall v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles

         suspended the plaintiff’s license to operate a motor
         vehicle for forty-five days and required the installation
         of an ignition interlock device in his vehicle for six
         months.
            Thereafter, the plaintiff appealed from the commis-
         sioner’s decision to the Superior Court pursuant to the
         Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (UAPA). See
         General Statutes § 4-183. In that appeal, the plaintiff
         argued that the hearing officer abused her discretion
         by admitting the report into evidence because the report
         did not comply with the preparation and mailing require-
         ment of § 14-227b (c). The plaintiff further argued that,
         because the improperly admitted report was the only
         evidence submitted at the administrative hearing, there
         was not substantial evidence on which to base the sus-
         pension of his license. The trial court rejected the plain-
         tiff’s arguments, concluding that adherence to the
         preparation and mailing requirement of § 14-227b (c)
         is not necessary for the report’s admissibility, so long
         as the report is ‘‘reasonably found to bear indicia of
         trustworthiness and reliability.’’ Therefore, the trial
         court dismissed the plaintiff’s appeal.
            The plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court, again
         claiming that the report was improperly admitted because
         the police had failed to comply with the statutory prepa-
         ration and mailing requirement. See Marshall v. Com-
         missioner of Motor Vehicles, 210 Conn. App. 109, 111,
         269 A.3d 816 (2022). In a divided decision, the Appellate
         Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Id., 121.
         The majority concluded that, because § 14-227b (c) is
         not accompanied by any negative or prohibitory lan-
         guage, the preparation and mailing requirement is direc-
         tory. See id., 117–18. As such, it determined that strict
         compliance with the preparation and mailing provision
         of § 14-227b (c) is not necessary for a report to be
         admissible at a hearing to suspend an operator’s license.
         See id., 116–18. The majority further reasoned that there
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                      Marshall v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles

       were sufficient indicia of reliability to ensure that the
       report was both reliable and trustworthy, and, thus, the
       hearing officer did not abuse her discretion in admitting
       it. Id., 120–21.
          In his dissenting opinion, Judge Prescott concluded
       that, in the absence of testimony by the author of the
       report, a police report is not admissible if it fails to comply
       with the strictures of § 14-227b (c). Id., 129 (Prescott,
       J., dissenting). Because the report was prepared five
       days after the incident, Judge Prescott would have con-
       cluded that it was inadmissible absent testimony from
       the arresting officer. See id., 122–23, 129 (Prescott, J.,
       dissenting). This appeal followed.6
          We begin by articulating the applicable standard of
       review. ‘‘This court reviews the trial court’s judgment
       pursuant to the . . . UAPA . . . . Under the UAPA, it
       is [not] the function . . . of this court to retry the case
       or to substitute its judgment for that of the administra-
       tive agency. . . . Even for conclusions of law, [t]he
       court’s ultimate duty is only to decide whether, in light
       of the evidence, the [agency] has acted unreasonably,
       arbitrarily, illegally, or in abuse of its discretion. . . .
       Cases that present pure questions of law, however, invoke
       a broader standard of review than is . . . involved in
       deciding whether, in light of the evidence, the agency
       has acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally or in abuse
       of its discretion. . . . Furthermore, when [as here] a
       state agency’s determination of a question of law has
          6
            We granted the plaintiff’s petition for certification to appeal, limited to
       the following issue: ‘‘Did the Appellate Court correctly determine that a
       [d]epartment . . . hearing officer conducting a motor vehicle operator’s
       license suspension hearing had the discretion to admit into evidence an A-
       44 form and its attachments, including a narrative police report, notwith-
       standing the fact that the form and attachments were neither prepared nor
       mailed to the [c]ommissioner . . . in compliance with the timelines set
       forth in . . . § 14-227b (c) and the fact that the officer preparing the form
       and the attachments was not present for cross-examination?’’ Marshall v.
       Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 342 Conn. 912, 272 A.3d 198 (2022).
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                        Marshall v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles

         not previously been subject to judicial scrutiny . . .
         the agency is not entitled to special deference. . . .
         We have determined, therefore, that the traditional def-
         erence accorded to an agency’s interpretation of a statu-
         tory term is unwarranted when the construction of a
         statute . . . has not previously been subjected to judi-
         cial scrutiny [or to] a governmental agency’s time-tested
         interpretation . . . . [Thus] [t]he issue of statutory
         interpretation presented in this case is a question of law
         subject to plenary review.’’7 (Citations omitted; internal
         quotation marks omitted.) Commissioner of Emer-
         gency Services & Public Protection v. Freedom of Infor-
         mation Commission, 330 Conn. 372, 379–80, 194 A.3d
         759 (2018).
            Beginning with the language of the statute, as required
         by General Statutes § 1-2z, we observe that § 14-227b
         (c) provides in relevant part: ‘‘The police officer shall
         prepare a report of the incident and shall mail or other-
         wise transmit in accordance with this subsection the
         report and a copy of the results of any chemical test to
         the Department of Motor Vehicles within three business
         days. The report shall contain such information as pre-
         scribed by the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles and
         shall be subscribed and sworn to under penalty of false
         statement as provided in section 53a-157b by the arresting
         officer. . . . The report shall set forth the grounds for
         the officer’s belief that there was probable cause to
         arrest such person for a violation of section 14-227a
         . . . .’’
           By the express terms of § 14-227b (c), the report shall
         be prepared and mailed to the department within three
         business days. It is well established that ‘‘the use of
         the word shall, though significant, does not invariably
            7
              We note that the commissioner does not argue that the interpretation
         of the department’s hearing officer is entitled to deference as a governmental
         agency’s time-tested interpretation.
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                   Marshall v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles

       create a mandatory duty.’’ (Internal quotation marks
       omitted.) Electrical Contractors, Inc. v. Ins. Co. of the
       State of Pennsylvania, 314 Conn. 749, 757, 104 A.3d
       713 (2014). ‘‘[T]he test to be applied in determining
       whether a statute is mandatory or directory is whether
       the prescribed mode of action is the essence of the
       thing to be accomplished, or in other words, whether
       it relates to a matter of substance or a matter of conve-
       nience. . . . If it is a matter of substance, the statutory
       provision is mandatory. If, however, the legislative pro-
       vision is designed to secure order, system and dispatch
       in the proceedings, it is generally held to be directory,
       especially [when] the requirement is stated in affirma-
       tive terms unaccompanied by negative words.’’ (Inter-
       nal quotation marks omitted.) Strand/BRC Group, LLC
       v. Board of Representatives, 342 Conn. 365, 384–85, 270
       A.3d 43 (2022).
          It is true, as the Appellate Court pointed out, that the
       legislative language at issue here is stated in affirmative
       terms, unaccompanied by any negative or prohibitory
       words. See Marshall v. Commissioner of Motor Vehi-
       cles, supra, 210 Conn. App. 117. The absence of such
       language, however, is not dispositive, particularly when
       the substantive nature of the statutory provision is clear.
       See Strand/BRC Group, LLC v. Board of Representa-
       tives, 342 Conn. 387 (concluding that certain require-
       ments in provision of city charter were mandatory despite
       lack of negative or prohibitory language because sub-
       stantive nature of requirements was clear); Blake v.
       Meyer, 145 Conn. 612, 616, 145 A.2d 584 (1958) (‘‘[i]t is
       clear that the provision under consideration is manda-
       tory, not merely directory, even in the absence of pro-
       hibitory or negative language’’). We find that, despite
       the absence of negative or prohibitory language in § 14-
       227b (c), the substantive nature of the provision is clear
       because it plainly promotes ‘‘the essence of the thing to
       be accomplished’’; (internal quotation marks omitted)
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          Strand/BRC Group, LLC v. Board of Representatives,
          supra, 384–85; namely, the accuracy and reliability of
          the information that will be used at the license suspen-
          sion hearing.8
             We arrive at this conclusion by first looking at what
          the legislature intended with respect to § 14-227b in
          general and subsection (c) in particular. In doing so,
          we do not write on a clean slate. We previously have
          explained that, in drafting § 14-227b, the legislature
          intended ‘‘to protect the public by temporarily revoking,
          prior to conviction, the operating privileges of those
          who have demonstrated a reckless disregard for the
          safety of others, while at the same time providing proce-
          dures to afford due process to those [who] come within
          its ambit.’’ State v. Hickam, 235 Conn. 614, 626, 668
          A.2d 1321 (1995) (overruled on other grounds by State
          v. Crawford, 257 Conn. 769, 778 A.2d 947 (2001), cert.
          denied, 534 U.S. 1138, 122 S. Ct. 1086, 151 L. Ed. 2d 985
          (2002)), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1221, 116 S. Ct. 1851, 134
          L. Ed. 2d 951 (1996); see also Fishbein v. Kozlowski,
          supra, 252 Conn. 50. To achieve these purposes, the
          legislature permitted the admission of police reports
          at the license suspension hearing without the need to
          produce the arresting officer, provided that certain pro-
          cedures are followed to ensure the reliability of the
          information contained in the report.
            8
              The Appellate Court has addressed the admission of reports that did
          not strictly comply with the preparation and mailing requirement. See, e.g.,
          Bialowas v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 44 Conn. App. 702, 710 and
          n.6, 711–12 n.8, 692 A.2d 834 (1997) (upholding admission of report that
          was mailed to department four days after plaintiff’s arrest); see also, e.g.,
          Packard v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, Superior Court, judicial district of New
          London, Docket No. KNL-CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (September 18, 1991) (5 Conn. L.
          Rptr. 5, 7) (upholding admission of report that was not mailed to department
          within three business days), aff’d, 29 Conn. App. 923, 616 A.2d 1177 (1992);
          Peters v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford-
          New Britain at Hartford, Docket No. 701413 (July 11, 1991) (4 Conn. L. Rptr.
          301, 301) (same), aff’d, 26 Conn. App. 937, 601 A.2d 1 (1992). However, this
          court has never squarely addressed the issue. Now that we do, we conclude
          that the preparation and mailing provision is mandatory.
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          Section 14-227b (c) provides those procedures by
       describing the specific information that must be con-
       tained in the report, and that information is both
       detailed in nature and crucial to the determination that
       must be made in the license suspension hearing. The
       provision requires that the arresting officer not only
       mail the report within three business days, but also
       prepare the report within that time frame, while the
       officer’s recollection of the incident remains fresh. Our
       law recognizes that time is a key indicator of the reliabil-
       ity, and subsequent admissibility, of evidence. See, e.g.,
       E. Prescott, Tait’s Handbook of Connecticut Evidence
       (6th Ed. 2019) § 8.4.2 (b) (1), p. 507 (‘‘[s]tatements are
       frequently admitted under an exception when made
       while observing events or shortly thereafter because
       there is little time to forget or little opportunity to pre-
       varicate or fabricate’’). Statements are often admitted
       under a hearsay exception when they are made tempo-
       rally near the event. See, e.g., Calcano v. Calcano, 257
       Conn. 230, 240, 777 A.2d 633 (2001) (business records
       are admissible only if made ‘‘at the time of the act
       described . . . or within a reasonable time thereafter’’
       (internal quotation marks omitted)); Gigliotti v. United
       Illuminating Co., 151 Conn. 114, 124, 193 A.2d 718
       (1963) (written statement is admissible as past recollec-
       tion recorded only if ‘‘made at or about the time of the
       events’’); Martin v. Sherwood, 74 Conn. 475, 482, 51
       A. 526 (1902) (statements about then existing physical
       condition are admissible, but statements regarding past
       conditions are inadmissible).

          Here, the legislature determined that the appropriate
       time frame to imbue the report with sufficient reliability
       is three business days. So long as the preparation and
       mailing requirement is met, the report is automatically
       admissible in a license suspension proceeding without
       any further inquiry into its reliability for admission. See
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          Do v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 330 Conn. 651,
          668–69, 200 A.3d 681 (2019).
             Additionally, preparation of the report, by the terms
          of the statute, must include both the results of any
          blood, breath or urine test and the basis for probable
          cause; see General Statutes § 14-227b (a) and (c); which
          are two of the four issues that must be established at
          a license suspension hearing. See General Statutes § 14-
          227b (g) (2). Thus, those issues and their timely prepara-
          tion and subsequent mailing go to the essence of the
          license suspension hearing. Consequently, the prepara-
          tion and mailing requirement in § 14-227b (c) is manda-
          tory, despite the lack of negative or prohibitory language.
          See Strand/BRC Group, LLC v. Board of Representa-
          tives, supra, 342 Conn. 387.
             This very point underlies our decision in Volck, in
          which this court stated that ‘‘[s]ubsection (c) was added
          to § 14-227b . . . when the issues related to license
          suspension were removed from the criminal setting and
          transferred . . . to the department . . . for adminis-
          trative determination. . . . Its evident purpose is to
          provide sufficient indicia of reliability so that the report
          can be introduced [into] evidence as an exception to
          the hearsay rule, especially in license suspension pro-
          ceedings, without the necessity of producing the arresting
          officer.’’ (Emphasis added; citation omitted.) Volck v.
          Muzio, supra, 204 Conn. 517–18.
             Furthermore, this court has previously noted that
          ‘‘§ 14-227b-19 (a) of the Regulations of Connecticut
          State Agencies, which has the force and effect of a
          statute . . . provides in clear and straightforward
          terms that a police officer’s report concerning the arrest
          of a drunk driving suspect shall be admissible into evi-
          dence at [a license suspension] hearing if it conforms
          to the requirements of subsection (c) of [§] 14-227b
          . . . .’’ (Citation omitted; emphasis altered; internal
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       quotation marks omitted.) Do v. Commissioner of
       Motor Vehicles, supra, 330 Conn. 668.
         Thus, the statutory language, the purpose of the stat-
       ute, and the applicable regulations demonstrate that
       the legislature intended for the report to meet the
       requirements of § 14-227b (c) before the report could
       be automatically admissible, thereby providing a regula-
       tory scheme to remove reckless drivers from the road
       expeditiously while also affording the operator the nec-
       essary due process. Permitting the admission of the
       report without the need for police officer testimony
       accomplishes that legislative aim. Requiring the arresting
       officer to be present at a license suspension hearing to
       establish a report’s reliability and admissibility would
       substantially slow the process and interfere with the
       legislative goal of quickly protecting the public from
       intoxicated drivers—hence, the creation of § 14-227b
       (c) and the automatic admissibility of a report that is in
       compliance therewith without the need for an arresting
       office’s presence.
          The issue posed by the present case, however, is
       whether the failure to comply with the preparation and
       mailing requirement of § 14-227b (c) renders the report
       inadmissible in a license suspension hearing. Because
       we have now determined that the requirement is manda-
       tory, we conclude that, in the absence of the testimony
       of the arresting officer, it does. Although this court
       has not directly addressed whether a report may be
       admissible even if it does not comply with the prepara-
       tion and mailing requirement of § 14-227b (c), on two
       occasions, we have suggested that the failure to meet
       the requirements of the provision would be a basis to
       exclude a report from admission into evidence at a
       license suspension hearing, unless the arresting offi-
       cer testifies.
         First, in Volck, the plaintiff refused to submit to a
       blood, breath or urine test that would help determine
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          whether he had been operating a motor vehicle while
          under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs. See
          Volck v. Muzio, supra, 204 Conn. 508–509. Under those
          circumstances, General Statutes (Rev. to 1987) § 14-
          227b (c) required that a report be endorsed by a third
          person who witnessed the refusal. See id., 516; see also
          General Statutes (Rev. to 1987) § 14-227b (c) (‘‘[i]f the
          person arrested refuses to submit to such test or analy-
          sis . . . a written report of such refusal . . . shall be
          endorsed by a third person who witnessed such refusal’’).
          The report at issue did not include that third person’s
          endorsement. Volck v. Muzio, supra, 509–10, 516. We
          noted that ‘‘[t]he absence of the endorsement of a third
          person who witnessed the [plaintiff’s] refusal of testing
          would have rendered [the police officer’s] report inad-
          missible if the plaintiff had objected thereto. No objec-
          tion was raised, however, to its use at the license
          suspension hearing.’’ (Emphasis added.) Id., 518.
          Because there was no objection, the report was prop-
          erly considered like any unobjected to hearsay evi-
          dence. Id. We further explained that ‘‘[t]he restriction
          of the license suspension hearing to the four issues
          contained in [what is now § 14-227b (g) (2)] indicates
          that compliance with [§ 14-227b (c)] was not intended
          to be a prerequisite for a suspension.’’ Id., 517.
             Second, more recently, in Do, in which the police
          report satisfied all of the statutory requirements of § 14-
          227b (c), but the report itself contained several signifi-
          cant factual errors, the plaintiff claimed that the dis-
          crepancies rendered the report unreliable despite its
          compliance with the statute. See Do v. Commissioner
          of Motor Vehicles, supra, 330 Conn. 655–56. Again, even
          though compliance with the admissibility requirements
          of § 14-227b (c) was not the issue, in addressing whether
          a police report with internal inconsistencies bearing on
          the report’s reliability was nevertheless admissible, we
          noted that subsection (c) sets forth ‘‘admissibility
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       requirements’’; id., 668; and that ‘‘[n]either this court
       nor the Appellate Court has ever recognized any basis
       for excluding a police report from evidence at a license
       suspension hearing other than the failure to comply
       with § 14-227b (c). Indeed, we consistently have rejected
       claims that a report should be excluded for any other
       reason.’’ (Emphasis added.) Id., 669.
          We now make clear what we suggested in Volck and
       Do. That is, § 14-227b (c) describes substantive require-
       ments that police reports must meet, and the failure to
       meet those requirements renders a report inadmissible
       because it fails to satisfy the exception for the report
       to be admitted without the need to produce the arresting
       officer at the license suspension hearing. The provision
       serves an ‘‘obvious and important purpose’’; Strand/
       BRC Group, LLC v. Board of Representatives, supra,
       342 Conn. 380; namely, to hasten the speed with which
       unsafe drivers can be removed from the road without
       posing due process concerns to the formal disposses-
       sion of an operator’s license. The provision is thus sub-
       stantive and mandatory, and the failure to comply with
       it means that the report has not met the requirements
       for admissibility.
          Consequently, a report that does not comply with the
       hearsay exception created by § 14-227b (c) cannot be
       admitted into evidence without producing the arresting
       officer. We acknowledge that a license suspension hear-
       ing is limited to the four issues identified in § 14-227b
       (g) (2) and that compliance with subsection (c) was
       not intended to be a prerequisite to proving those ele-
       ments. See Volck v. Muzio, supra, 204 Conn. 517; see
       also Do v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, supra, 330
       Conn. 674–75. Our conclusion today that a report is
       inadmissible if it fails to comply with § 14-227b (c) is
       not inconsistent with the fact that license suspension
       hearings are limited to the four inquiries of § 14-227b
       (g) (2). Rather, we point out that § 14-227b (c) speaks
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          not to the proof necessary to support a license suspen-
          sion but, rather, to the admissibility requirements of a
          report used to prove the four issues identified in § 14-
          227b (g) (2). In other words, compliance with subsec-
          tion (c) is not a prerequisite for license suspension, but
          it is a procedural hurdle that must be cleared if the
          report is the means by which the four inquiries are
          sought to be proven.
             Turning now to the present case, we note that the
          arresting officer did not complete the report until he
          signed and dated it five business days after the plaintiff’s
          arrest. It is undisputed that the arresting officer failed
          to comply with the three business day preparation and
          mailing requirement of § 14-227b (c). The plaintiff’s
          attorney objected to the admission of the report on
          that ground. The hearing officer simply overruled the
          objection and admitted the report without hearing testi-
          mony from the arresting officer. Because the report
          failed to satisfy the preparation and mailing require-
          ment, we conclude that the hearing officer abused her
          discretion by admitting the noncompliant report with-
          out the testimony of the arresting officer.
             Although the Appellate Court concluded that the
          report was admissible because there were other indicia
          of reliability; see Marshall v. Commissioner of Motor
          Vehicles, supra, 210 Conn. App. 120; we disagree that
          a report that fails to comply with § 14-227b (c) is never-
          theless admissible. Specifically, the Appellate Court
          concluded that, because the report met some of the
          requirements of § 14-227b (c)—in particular, the arresting
          officer signed the report, set forth the grounds for his
          belief that there was probable cause to arrest the plain-
          tiff, and stated that the plaintiff had submitted to breath
          tests—the report was sufficiently reliable to be admissi-
          ble, even though it was not in strict compliance with
          subsection (c). Id., 120–21. That conclusion was based
          on the Appellate Court’s determination that the prepara-
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       tion and mailing requirement is directory. Id., 118. How-
       ever, in light of our determination that the requirements
       of subsection (c) are mandatory, this conclusion, which
       allows a report to be admissible if it meets some of the
       requirements of § 14-227b (c), cannot stand. Accord-
       ingly, we conclude that a report must comply with the
       preparation and mailing requirement of § 14-227b (c)
       to be admitted without the necessity of producing the
       arresting officer.
         The judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed and
       the case is remanded to that court with direction to
       reverse the judgment of the trial court and to remand
       the case to the trial court with direction to sustain the
       plaintiff’s appeal.
         In this opinion the other justices concurred.