Court Opinion

ID: 9947407
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-04 19:11:10.719513+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:24.805852
License: Public Domain

Opinion issued February 29, 2024

                                     In The

                             Court of Appeals
                                    For The

                         First District of Texas
                            ————————————
                             NO. 01-21-00420-CR
                           ———————————
                  LARRY DARNELL EAGANS, Appellant
                                       V.
                      THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

                   On Appeal from the 184th District Court
                           Harris County, Texas
                       Trial Court Case No. 1614756

                         MEMORANDUM OPINION

      Appellant Larry Darnell Eagans was indicted for the offense of assault on a

person with whom he had a dating relationship. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.01(a),

(b)(2)(A). The indictment was enhanced by allegations that he had previously been

convicted of two felony offenses. Eagans pleaded guilty to the indicted offense,
and he pleaded true to two prior offenses: burglary of a habitation, for which he

was convicted on June 5, 2012, and retaliation, for which he was convicted on

November 17, 2017. The trial court deferred adjudication and placed him on

community supervision for two years. The State subsequently filed a motion to

adjudicate his guilt. Following a hearing, the trial court revoked Eagans’s

community supervision, adjudicated him guilty, and assessed his punishment at 25

years’ confinement.

      On appeal, Eagans argues that the evidence was legally insufficient because

there was a fatal variance between the allegations in the motion to adjudicate and

the evidence at trial. In particular, he argues that the motion to adjudicate did not

give him fair notice of the alleged violations because it was not sufficiently

specific.

      We hold that Eagans’s assertion that there was a fatal variance was not

preserved for appeal, and even if it were, the record does not demonstrate the

existence of a fatal variance. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                    Background

      Eagans was placed on deferred adjudication community supervision on

August 5, 2019.1 In November 2020, the State filed a motion to adjudicate, which

1
      The order of deferred adjudication specifically referenced an attached firearm
      admonishment, which advised Eagans that he was not permitted to possess a
      firearm.
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alleged 13 violations of the terms and conditions of community supervision. In

September 2022, prior to the trial court’s ruling on the motion, the State amended

the motion to adjudicate. The amended motion alleged 16 violations, including six

allegations that Eagans had committed a criminal offense. Among these alleged

criminal violations was the allegation that he committed the “criminal offense of

Felon Poss WPN.” Eagans did not file a motion to quash the motion to adjudicate.

      The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion to adjudicate.

During the hearing, three Houston Police Department officers testified that on May

19, 2020, Eagans was stopped for a traffic infraction, and a gun was found in the

car he was driving. Eagans was the only person in the vehicle at the time of the

stop. Officer Schwartz testified that the firearm was found in plain view, between

the driver’s seat and the center console, within reach of a person sitting in the

driver’s seat. He identified Eagans at trial, and he testified that the gun he

recovered was a real firearm (“a Glock 42”), and that it was not found in Eagans’s

home. Houston Police Department Officer V. Zaunbrecher, who initiated the traffic

stop, testified that Eagans was aware that the firearm was in the vehicle. Eagans

told Officer Zaunbrecher that he wanted to “clear this up” and said that the gun

belonged to his mother.

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      The trial court granted the State’s motion to adjudicate and sentenced

Eagans to 25 years’ imprisonment. The trial court made the following findings in

its judgment:

             After hearing and considering the evidence presented by both
      sides, the Court finds the following: (1) The Court previously found
      Defendant qualified for deferred adjudication community supervision;
      (2) The Court deferred further proceedings, made no finding of guilt,
      and rendered no judgment; (3) The Court issued an order placing
      Defendant on deferred adjudication community supervision for a
      period of 2 YEARS; (4) The Court assessed a fine of $N/A; (5) While
      on deferred adjudication community supervision, Defendant violated
      the conditions of community supervision, as set out in the State’s
      AMENDED Motion to Adjudicate Guilt, as follows:

      ON OR ABOUT 10/24/2019 THE DEFENDANT UNLAWFULLY
      COMMITTED THE CRIMINAL OFFENSES: ASSAULT-BODILY
      INJURY, CRIMINAL MISCH>=100<750.

      ON 05/19/2020 UNLAWFULLY COMMITTED THE CRIMINAL
      OFFENSE OF FELON POSS WPN.

      ON 08/04/2020 THE DEFENDANT UNLAWFULLY COMMITTED
      THE CRIMINAL OFFENSE OF EVADING ARREST/DETENTION
      W/VEH.

            Accordingly, the Court grants the State’s Motion to
      Adjudicate. finding that the Defendant committed the offense
      indicated above, the Court adjudges Defendant guilty of the offense.
      The Court finds that the Presentence Investigation, if so ordered, was
      done according to the applicable provisions of Subchapter F, Chapter
      42A, Tex. Code Proc.

      Eagans appealed.

                                        4
                                      Analysis

      On appeal, Eagans raises one issue, challenging the legal sufficiency of the

evidence by arguing that there were fatal variances between the allegations in the

Amended Motion to Adjudicate and the evidence admitted at the hearing. He

argues that due to the fatal variances, he did not have fair notice of the allegations

against him.

I.    Standard of review

      We review a motion to adjudicate guilt in the same manner as a motion to

revoke community supervision. See Leonard v. State, 385 S.W.3d 570, 572 n.1

(Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (holding that hearings on motion to adjudicate guilt are

subset of revocation hearings). We review a trial court’s decision to adjudicate

guilt and revoke community supervision using an abuse of discretion standard. Id.

at 576. We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling.

Cardona v. State, 665 S.W.2d 492, 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (opinion on

appellant’s petition for discretionary review). The trial court “is the sole judge of

the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony.”

Hacker v. State, 389 S.W.3d 860, 865 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).

      The State bears the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that

appellant violated a condition of his community supervision. Id. at 864–65. This

burden is met if the greater weight of the credible evidence creates a reasonable

                                          5
belief that appellant violated a condition of his community supervision. See Rickels

v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 764 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Only one sufficient ground

is necessary to support a trial court’s decision to revoke community supervision.

Smith v. State, 286 S.W.3d 333, 342 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).

      Because only one sufficient ground is necessary to affirm a trial court’s

decision to grant a motion to adjudicate, we focus our analysis on the allegation

that Eagans was unlawfully in possession of a firearm.

II.   Allegation of fatal variance is waived and, in any event, immaterial.

      Eagans argues on appeal that there was a fatal variance between the offenses

alleged in the motion to adjudicate and the proof offered at the revocation hearing.

Specifically, he argues that the allegation that he illegally possessed a weapon did

not provide the timing element required by the statute for a felony conviction and

that the State did not present evidence to support the timing element at the

adjudication hearing. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 46.04(a)(1), (2) (stating timing

elements for offense of unlawful possession of firearm by felon).

      A.     Motion to adjudicate

      At a motion to adjudicate proceeding, the defendant need not be afforded the

full range of constitutional and statutory protections available at a criminal trial.

See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 789–90 (1973); Moore v. State, 11 S.W.3d

495, 499 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.). This is so because the

                                         6
defendant’s guilt is not at issue; the trial court is not concerned with determining

the defendant’s original criminal culpability. Moore, 11 S.W.3d at 499. “The

question at a revocation hearing is whether the appellant broke the contract he

made with the court after the determination of guilt.” Id.

      A defendant is entitled to a written motion to revoke that fully informs him

of the violation of a term or condition of community supervision which he is

alleged to have breached. Garner v. State, 545 S.W.2d 178, 179 (Tex. Crim. App.

1977); Moore, 11 S.W.3d at 499–500. It need not meet the particularities of an

indictment, information, or complaint; all that is required is that the motion to

revoke fully and clearly set forth the basis on which the State seeks revocation so

that a defendant and his counsel have notice. Leyva v. State, 552 S.W.2d 158, 162

(Tex. Crim. App. 1977).

      B.     Fatal variance

      The fatal variance doctrine stands for the proposition that a variance between

the indictment and the evidence at trial may be fatal to a conviction because due

process guarantees the defendant notice of the charges against him. See Stevens v.

State, 891 S.W.2d 649, 650 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). A fatal variance between an

indictment and the evidence presented at trial occurs when the evidence presented

at trial is so different from the allegations in the indictment that the defendant was

deprived of the required notice of the nature of the accusation against him. See

                                          7
Gollihar v. State, 46 S.W.3d 243, 257–58 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). A variance is

fatal only when it is material, and it is material only when it misleads a defendant

to his prejudice or surprise. Santana v. State, 59 S.W.3d 187, 194 (Tex. Crim. App.

2001).

      “The fatal variance doctrine is applicable to revocations of community

supervision,” as well as to motions to adjudicate. Moore, 11 S.W.3d at 499; see

Velez v. State, No. 05-16-00571-CR, 2017 WL 2774446, at *1–3 (Tex. App.—

Dallas June 27, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.; not designated for publication) (applying

fatal variance doctrine to motion to adjudicate).

     C.      Preservation of error

     Generally, appellate courts will not consider any error that defense counsel

could have, but did not, call to the trial court’s attention at a time when such error

could have been avoided or corrected. See, e.g., Rogers v. State, 640 S.W.2d 248,

263 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (opinion on State’s second motion for rehearing)

(holding that defendant waived his due process objection when he failed to present

it to trial court). A failure to object to constitutional errors waives appellate review.

Clark v. State, 365 S.W.3d 333, 339 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); see also Neal v.

State, 150 S.W.3d 169, 175, 178 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (concluding that due

process claim not preserved because appellant failed to raise claim in trial court);

Alexander v. State, 137 S.W.3d 127, 130–31 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

                                           8
2004, pet. ref’d) (failure to object to trial court’s alleged violations of federal and

state due process rights waives appellate review of those claims). Appellant cannot

complain on appeal that the trial court deprived him of due process when he failed

to make a timely due process objection. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1; Williams v. State,

No. 01-18-00152-CR, 2019 WL 2528187, at *7 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

June 20, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.; not designated for publication) (stating that

party must object as soon as grounds for complaint become apparent).

      D.     Fatal variance complaint is waived.

      Eagans argues on appeal that the motion to adjudicate failed to give him fair

notice of the allegations against him and, therefore, there was a fatal variance

between the allegations in the motion to adjudicate and the evidence presented at

the adjudication hearing. He did not make this complaint known to the trial court.

He did not file a motion to quash the motion to adjudicate. Therefore, we conclude

that he failed to preserve this complaint, and his issue on appeal leaves nothing for

our review. See Bowker v. State, 481 S.W.2d 141, 142 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972)

(overruling issue asserting fatal variance when defendant did not file motion to

quash); Caldwell v. State, No. 08-01-00036-CR, 2002 WL 831158, at *6 (Tex.

App.—El Paso May 2, 2002, pet. ref’d) (mem. op.; not designated for publication)

(holding that challenge to indictment not preserved when defendant argued fatal

variance existed).

                                          9
        E.   Alleged discrepancy is immaterial.

        Moreover, even if we assume that Eagans had properly preserved his

challenge to the lack of notice in the motion to adjudicate, we would nevertheless

find that there was no fatal variance in this case.

        Eagans pleaded guilty to the offense of assault on a person with whom he

previously had a dating relationship. When he pleaded guilty, he also pleaded true

to two enhancement paragraphs, which alleged that prior to the commission of the

indicted offense, he was finally convicted of the felony of burglary of a habitation

in June 2012, and that after the burglary of a habitation conviction and before the

indicted offense, he was convicted of the felony offense of retaliation in November

2017.

        Texas Penal Code § 46.04 makes it an offense for a person who has been

convicted of a felony to possess a firearm. TEX. PENAL CODE § 46.04. Under the

statute, a convicted felon commits an offense by possessing a firearm anywhere

before the fifth anniversary of his release from confinement or supervision. Id.

§ 46.04 (a)(1). After the fifth anniversary of his release from confinement or

supervision, a convicted felon commits an offense by possessing a firearm

anywhere other than his home. Id. § 46.04 (a)(2). The evidence admitted at the

adjudication hearing was that Eagans was found in possession of a firearm in his

car, not in his home. This behavior would satisfy either subsection of section

                                           10
46.04(a), making the failure to allege how many years had passed since his release

from confinement or supervision for a felony immaterial. See Santana, 59 S.W.3d

at 194. We overrule Eagans’s sole issue.

                                   Conclusion

      We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                                Peter Kelly
                                                Justice

Panel consists of Justices Kelly, Hightower, and Guerra.

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