Court Opinion

ID: 9788091
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 00:30:07.354625+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:04.252195
License: Public Domain

Judge CONNELLY
dissenting.
I would not reach the merits of defendant's challenge to the pretrial order excluding evi-denee of plaintiff's immigration status. Because defendant failed to make any offer of proof regarding what the evidence would have shown, she cannot show its exelusion affected her substantial rights See CRE 108(a). Rather than remand to make a belated record, I would affirm the judgment.
Difficult issues would be presented had it been shown plaintiff could not work legally in the United States. It could be argued that such status would bar recovery of future lost wages, that it should be considered on a case-by-case base by trial courts and juries, or that it should not limit tort recovery. See Jerry Joe Knauff, Jr., Defending Against Suits Brought by Illegal Aliens, 76 Def. Couns. J. 319 (2009); Wendy Andre, Undoc-wmented Immigrants and Their Personal Injury Actions: Keeping Immigration Policy out of Lost Wage Awards and Enforcing the Compensatory and Deterrent Functions of Tort Law, 18 Roger Williams U.L.Rev. 530 (2008); Hugh Alexander Fuller, Imnmugrotion, Compensation, and Preemption: The Proper Measure of Lost Future Earning Capacity Damages After Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 58 Baylor L.Rev. 985 (2006).
But we do not know from the record whether plaintiff was entitled to be present and work in the United States. As the majority notes, the trial court never precluded defendant from seeking pretrial discovery of plaintiff's immigration status. After discovery closed, plaintiff filed an in limine motion seeking (among other things) to preclude evidence of his having a Mexican driver's license and of his immigration status. Defendant's response agreed the license was irrelevant but argued that plaintiffs immigration status might be relevant to the lost future wages claim depending on whether he was legally entitled to work here. The court entered a written order granting plaintiffs motion on these points. Defendant never again pursued the issue and made no offer of proof.
In my view, defendant's appeal of this issue should be precluded by CRE 108(a)(2). Rule 103(a)(2) provides in pertinent part that "[eJrror may not be predicated upon a ruling which ... excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected, and ... the substance of the evidence was made known to the court by offer or was apparent from the context within which questions were asked." Id.
Offers of proof are required to "establish a basis in the record for appellate review of the trial court's ultimate ruling." People v. Saiz, 32 P.3d 441, 446-47 (Colo.2001) (citing Lanari v. People, 827 P.2d 495, 508 (Colo.1992)). An adequate record is necessary to decide if there was trial error and if it affected substantial rights. See 1 Kenneth S. Broun, McCormick on Evidence § 51, at 249 (6th ed.2006); 21 Charles Alan Wright & Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., Federal Practice and Procedure § 5040, at 877-80 (8d ed.2005). Thus, in both criminal and civil eases, divisions of this court have declined to review the merits of rulings excluding evidence where it was never shown what the evidence would have been. See, e.g., People v. Walden, 224 P.3d 369, 377, 2009 WL 1798603, at *9 (Colo.App. No. 08CA0859, June 25, 2009); People v. Washington, 179 P.8d 158, 165-66 (Colo.App. 2007), aff'd, 186 P.3d 594 (Colo.2008); Vu v. *139Fouts, 924 P2d 1129, 1180-31 (Colo.App. 1996).
Here, because we do not know what the excluded evidence would have shown, we cannot determine whether it was error to exclude it or whether the exclusion affected defendant's substantial rights. I would not grant defendant a remand to create the ree-ord she bore the burden of creating in the first place.
A remand or even outright reversal might be warranted if the trial court prevented defendant from discovering or producing the necessary evidence of plaintiff's immigration status. Here, however, nothing prevented defendant from discovering or presenting that evidence. I recognize that in opposing plaintiff's in limine motion, defendant requested an evidentiary hearing on the issue. But by then the discovery deadline had expired and, as the majority holds, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion to extend discovery. Under these circumstances, therefore, defendant's request for an evidentiary hearing to explore facts she had not previously sought to explore was simply another means of extending the discovery period.
Accordingly, I would reject defendant's challenge as not having been adequately preserved, without reaching the merits of the immigration issue. Because I concur in the remainder of the majority opinion, I would affirm the judgment.