Court Opinion

ID: 9387996
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-19 16:08:08.130786+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:16.847824
License: Public Domain

J-A03004-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    PHATIMA ROUNDTREE                          :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellant               :
                                               :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    BRANDON L. WILLIAMS SMITH                  :   No. 2390 EDA 2022

                 Appeal from the Order Entered August 22, 2022
              In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
                    Domestic Relations at No(s): 0C1708193

BEFORE:      KING, J., SULLIVAN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:                           FILED APRIL 19, 2023

        Appellant, Phatima Roundtree (“Mother”), appeals from the order

entered on August 22, 2022, in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia

County, denying her request to relocate with her eight-year-old son, H.H.S.,

from Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, to Charlotte, North Carolina, and awarding

Appellee, Brandon L. Williams Smith (“Father”), primary physical custody and

Mother partial physical custody one weekend every month in Philadelphia and

during winter, spring, and summer breaks in North Carolina, inter alia. Upon

careful review, we affirm.

____________________________________________

*   Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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        The record reveals that H.H.S. has lived his entire life in Philadelphia.

Mother and Father never married. Mother initiated the underlying custody

action in July of 2017. The parties agreed to an interim order in September

that same year awarding Mother primary physical custody and Father partial

physical custody every weekend. On May 25, 2018, the interim order became

final upon agreement.

        On September 9, 2021, Mother filed pro se separate petitions to relocate

with H.H.S. to Charlotte, North Carolina, and to modify the existing custody

order.    On September 15, 2021, Father filed pro se a petition to modify,

wherein he requested primary physical custody of H.H.S. during the school

year.

        Mother relocated by herself on September 10, 2021. She left H.H.S. in

the home of his maternal grandmother in West Philadelphia, where she and

H.H.S. resided.1 N.T., 8/17/22, at 13, 28, 55. There is no dispute that Father,

who resides in Southwest Philadelphia, assumed full custody of H.H.S. one

month after Mother relocated to Charlotte. Id. at 55-56. During the 2021-

2022 school year, H.H.S. resided in Father’s home with his four-year-old half-

sister and her mother. Id. at 75.

____________________________________________

1 H.H.S.’s maternal aunt also resided in the home of maternal grandmother,
and she, along with her two children, moved to Charlotte with Mother. N.T.,
8/17/22, at 6, 17. H.H.S.’s remaining maternal and paternal relatives reside
in Philadelphia. Id. at 18-19, 67-68.

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      The trial court found that, while the petitions were pending, Mother

visited H.H.S. in Philadelphia five to seven times during the 2021-2022 school

year. Trial Court Opinion, 10/20/22, at 2 (citing N.T., 8/17/22, at 30). In

addition, H.H.S., accompanied by his maternal grandmother, visited Mother

three times in Charlotte. Id. (citing N.T., 8/17/22, at 72-73).

      By interim order dated May 26, 2022, the court awarded Mother primary

physical custody in Charlotte “after the last day of school until determination

at the next court listing.”   Trial Court Opinion, 10/20/22, at 2; see also

Interim Order, 5/26/22. By separate order the same date, the court relisted

the hearing on the pending petitions for August 17, 2022.         Thereafter, on

August 4, 2022, as the hearing approached, Father filed a counter-affidavit

objecting to both the relocation and modification of the order.

      The subject proceeding commenced as listed on August 17, 2022, during

which Mother was represented by counsel. Mother testified on her own behalf

and presented the testimony of H.H.S.’s maternal grandmother, D.T.R.

Likewise, Father was represented by counsel.      Father testified on his own

behalf and presented the testimony of H.H.S.’s paternal grandmother, M.S.

      The trial court interviewed H.H.S. in camera on August 22, 2022, who

was then eight years old and had completed second grade. H.H.S. testified

that he preferred to be with Father during the school year and with Mother

during the summer and holidays.      N.T., 8/22/22, at Volume 2, at 27, 32.

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H.H.S. testified that, most recently while in Charlotte, he had not seen Father

for three months. Id. at 19. He explained:

      It was sad. I broke down every day. I just wanted to see my dad.
      And another thing I like about [being in Philadelphia] is, because
      me and my little sister, we love each other.

      We get along too. And the other thing is my dad — it don’t matter
      what he is doing. He will help me with anything. It don’t matter
      if he at work. He’ll stop his day at work and still help me.

Id. at 19-20. H.H.S. continued his testimony on inquiry by the court:

      Q: Is there anything you don’t like about being in Philadelphia —

      A: No.

      Q: — at your dad’s?

      A: No. No. No. It’s nothing I don’t like.

      Q: It sounds to me like you have a lot of extended family, like a
      lot of grandparents, cousins, aunts, uncles here in Philadelphia.
      Is that true?

      A: Mhm.

                                     ...

      A: We got a lot of family.

      Q: — a lot?

      A: Me and my family tight. Like we all — we like — we all like
      this. Like if you could put a bunch of fingers just like this, like
      this, we like this.

      Q: Wow.

      A: And we all — we go. If we got a cookout, none of my family
      is — none of my family members would miss not one single
      cookout. . . .

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Id. at 25. Following H.H.S.’s testimony, the court ruled in Father’s favor and

set forth its reasoning on the record in open court. N.T., 8/22/22 (Volume 1).

        By order dated and entered on August 22, 2022, the trial court denied

Mother’s request to relocate with H.H.S. The court awarded the parties shared

legal custody, Father primary physical custody, and Mother partial physical

custody during “winter break, spring break and summer break in North

Carolina from the day after school ends until the day before school starts.”

Order, 8/22/22, at 2. In addition, the court awarded Mother partial physical

custody of H.H.S. in Philadelphia one weekend per month during the school

year.

        Further, the order provided, “If and when Mother relocates back to

Philadelphia, Father will retain primary physical custody of the child. Mother

shall have partial physical custody of the child every weekend. . . .” Id. The

order also provided, “Neither party is to use marijuana in the presence of the

child.” Id.

        Mother timely filed a notice of appeal and concise statement of errors

complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). The

trial court filed its Rule 1925(a) opinion on October 20, 2022.

        Mother presents the following issues for review:

        [I]. Whether the judge erred as a matter of law and fact, issued a
        clearly erroneous decision and/or abused its discretion in denying
        the Mother’s relocation petition[.]

              [a]. Whether the judge erred as a matter of law and
              fact, issued a clearly erroneous decision and/or abused

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             her discretion in failing to understand that Mother was
             afraid to disobey a court order by moving the child to
             Charlotte before getting court permission.

             [b]. Whether the trial court’s decision, opinions and/or
             factual findings were based upon insufficient evidence
             and/or were misapprehension of the evidence.

             [c]. Whether the trial court’s factual and/or legal
             findings were an abuse of discretion, clearly erroneous
             and/or errors of fact based upon the evidence
             presented.

     [II]. Whether the judge erred as a matter of law and fact, issued
     a clearly erroneous decision and/or abused its discretion in taking
     away primary custody from Mother, particularly as she has been
     the primary custodial parent since birth with limited exception[.]

Mother’s Brief at 5 (suggested answers omitted).

     We review Mother’s issues according to the following scope and standard

of review:

         [T]he appellate court is not bound by the deductions or
         inferences made by the trial court from its findings of fact,
         nor must the reviewing court accept a finding that has no
         competent evidence to support it. . . . However, this broad
         scope of review does not vest in the reviewing court the
         duty or the privilege of making its own independent
         determination. . . . Thus, an appellate court is empowered
         to determine whether the trial court’s incontrovertible
         factual findings support its factual conclusions, but it may
         not interfere with those conclusions unless they are
         unreasonable in view of the trial court’s factual findings;
         and thus, represent a gross abuse of discretion.

     R.M.G., Jr. v. F.M.G., 986 A.2d 1234, 1237 (Pa.Super. 2009)
     (quoting Bovard v. Baker, 775 A.2d 835, 838 (Pa.Super. 2001)).
     Moreover,

        [O]n issues of credibility and weight of the evidence, we
        defer to the findings of the trial [court] who has had the

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          opportunity to observe the proceedings and demeanor of
          the witnesses.

          The parties cannot dictate the amount of weight the trial
          court places on evidence. Rather, the paramount concern
          of the trial court is the best interest of the child. Appellate
          interference is unwarranted if the trial court’s consideration
          of the best interest of the child was careful and thorough,
          and we are unable to find any abuse of discretion.

      R.M.G., Jr., supra at 1237 (internal citations omitted). The test
      is whether the evidence of record supports the trial court’s
      conclusions. Ketterer v. Seifert, 902 A.2d 533, 539 (Pa.Super.
      2006).

A.V. v. S.T., 87 A.3d 818, 820 (Pa.Super. 2014).

      The primary concern in custody cases is the best interests of the child.

“The best-interests standard, decided on a case-by-case basis, considers all

factors that legitimately have an effect upon the child’s physical, intellectual,

moral, and spiritual well[-]being.”     Saintz v. Rinker, 902 A.2d 509, 512

(Pa.Super. 2006)(citing Arnold v. Arnold, 847 A.2d 674, 677 (Pa.Super.

2004)).

      Child custody actions are governed by the Child Custody Act (“Act”), 23

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 5321-5340, which became effective on January 24, 2011. With

respect to a request for relocation, the Act provides, “The party proposing the

relocation has the burden of establishing that the relocation will serve the best

interest of the child as shown under the factors set forth in subsection (h).”

Id. at § 5337(i)(1). Further, “Each party has the burden of establishing the

integrity of that party’s motives in either seeking the relocation or seeking to

prevent the relocation.” Id. at § 5337(i)(2).

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     Section 5337(h) provides as follows.

        (h) Relocation factors.--In determining whether to grant a
     proposed relocation, the court shall consider the following factors,
     giving weighted consideration to those factors which affect the
     safety of the child:

           (1) The nature, quality, extent of involvement and duration
     of the child’s relationship with the party proposing to relocate and
     with the nonrelocating party, siblings and other significant persons
     in the child’s life.

            (2) The age, developmental stage, needs of the child and
     the likely impact the relocation will have on the child’s physical,
     educational and emotional development, taking into consideration
     any special needs of the child.

           (3) The feasibility of preserving the relationship between the
     nonrelocating party and the child through suitable custody
     arrangements,     considering      the    logistics  and    financial
     circumstances of the parties.

          (4) The child’s preference, taking into consideration the age
     and maturity of the child.

           (5) Whether there is an established pattern of conduct of
     either party to promote or thwart the relationship of the child and
     the other party.

            (6) Whether the relocation will enhance the general quality
     of life for the party seeking the relocation, including, but not
     limited to, financial or emotional benefit or educational
     opportunity.

            (7) Whether the relocation will enhance the general quality
     of life for the child, including, but not limited to, financial or
     emotional benefit or educational opportunity.

          (8) The reasons and motivation of each party for seeking or
     opposing the relocation.

            (9) The present and past abuse committed by a party or
     member of the party’s household and whether there is a continued
     risk of harm to the child or an abused party.

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            (10) Any other factor affecting the best interest of the child.

Id. at § 5337(h).

      The trial court was also required to consider the custody factors set forth

in the Act, as follows.

      § 5328. Factors to consider when awarding custody.

            (a) Factors. – In ordering any form of custody, the court
      shall determine the best interest of the child by considering all
      relevant factors, giving weighted consideration to those factors
      which affect the safety of the child, including the following:

             (1) Which party is more likely to encourage and permit
           frequent and continuing contact between the child and
           another party.

             (2) The present and past abuse committed by a party or
           member of the party’s household, whether there is a
           continued risk of harm to the child or an abused party and
           which party can better provide adequate physical safeguards
           and supervision of the child.

             (2.1) The information set forth in section 5329.1(a)(1) and
           (2) (relating to consideration of child abuse and involvement
           with protective services).

             (3) The parental duties performed by each party on behalf
           of the child.

             (4) The need for stability and continuity in the child’s
           education, family life and community life.

             (5) The availability of extended family.

             (6) The child’s sibling relationships.

             (7) The well-reasoned preference of the child, based on the
           child’s maturity and judgment.

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             (8) The attempts of a parent to turn the child against the
           other parent, except in cases of domestic violence where
           reasonable safety measures are necessary to protect the
           child from harm.

             (9) Which party is more likely to maintain a loving, stable,
           consistent and nurturing relationship with the child adequate
           for the child's emotional needs.

             (10) Which party is more likely to attend to the daily
           physical, emotional, developmental, educational and special
           needs of the child.

             (11) The proximity of the residences of the parties.

             (12) Each party’s availability to care for the child or ability
           to make appropriate child-care arrangements.

             (13) The level of conflict between the parties and the
           willingness and ability of the parties to cooperate with one
           another. A party’s effort to protect a child from abuse by
           another party is not evidence of unwillingness or inability to
           cooperate with that party.

            (14) The history of drug or alcohol abuse of a party or
           member of a party’s household.

            (15) The mental and physical condition of a party or
           member of a party’s household.

             (16) Any other relevant factor.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a); see also A.M.S. v. M.R.C., 70 A.3d 830, 836

(Pa.Super. 2013) (stating that, when making a decision on relocation that also

involves a custody decision, “the trial court must consider all ten relocation

factors and all sixteen custody factors” outlined in the Act.).

      This Court has emphasized that the trial court, as the finder of fact,

determines “which factors are most salient and critical in each particular case.”

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M.J.M. v. M.L.G., 63 A.3d 331, 339 (Pa.Super. 2013)(citing A.D. v. M.A.B.,

989 A.2d 32, 35-36 (Pa.Super. 2010)).         Further, we have explained that

Section 5323(d) of the Act “requires the trial court to set forth its mandatory

assessment of the [. . .] factors prior to the deadline by which a litigant must

file a notice of appeal.” A.V., 87 A.3d at 823 (citations omitted). This Court

has stated:

      In expressing the reasons for its decision, “there is no required
      amount of detail for the trial court’s explanation; all that is
      required is that the enumerated factors are considered and that
      the custody decision is based on those considerations.” M.J.M. v.
      M.L.G., 63 A.3d 331, 336 (Pa.Super. 2013), appeal denied, [620
      Pa. 710], 68 A.3d 909 (2013). A court’s explanation of reasons
      for its decision, which adequately addresses the relevant factors,
      complies with Section 5323(d). Id.

Id. at 822-823.

      Instantly, the trial court weighed all the Section 5337(h) relocation

factors in Father’s favor except for (5), (9), and (10), which it found

inapplicable. With respect to the Section 5328(a) custody factors, the court

weighed (1), (4), (5), (6), and (7) in Father’s favor. The court weighed (14)

in Mother’s favor.   The court found (3), (9), (10), (12), and (13) neutral

between the parties, and it found inapplicable (2), (2.1), (7), (15), and (16).

      Turning on the merits of this appeal, Mother baldly asserts that in

fashioning the subject order, the court “was punishing [her] for leaving the

child behind and actually obeying the law.”     Mother’s Brief at 16.   Mother

contends the court failed to understand why she moved to Charlotte without

H.H.S. We disagree.

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        Mother does not provide citations to the record to support her claim,

and our review finds none. To the contrary, the court indicated that it

understood Mother’s reason for relocating without H.H.S. while her petitions

were pending. Mother testified on inquiry by the trial court:

        Q: [S]o you moved without [H.H.S.]?

                                       ...

        A: Because I was waiting to come to [c]ourt to get approved that
        I can take him out of state. . . .

        Q: I understand. I understand. . . .

N.T., 8/17/22, at 28. There is no evidence that the court fashioned the order

to punish Mother. As detailed below, the court thoroughly considered all of

the statutory relocation and custody factors and issued the order based on

them.

        The crux of Mother’s first issue is that the trial court failed to place

determinative weight on her assertion that the proposed relocation would

substantially enhance her quality of life and that of H.H.S. Mother’s Brief at

16-17.     In support, Mother relies upon Gruber v. Gruber, 583 A.2d 434

(Pa.Super. 1990), wherein this Court reversed, in part, the order denying the

mother’s request to move with the children out of Pennsylvania. In that case,

we concluded that the court erred in denying the mother’s request because

she satisfied her burden of proving that the proposed move “would

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significantly and directly improve the quality of her life for herself and

therefore her children.”2 Id. at 441. Mother’s issue is without merit.

        Gruber predated the effective date of the Act.             This Court has

recognized, “The Gruber test has been incorporated into the ten factors

enumerated in Section 5337(h); specifically, they are embodied in the third,

sixth, seventh and eighth factors.”            C.R.F. v. S.E.F., 45 A.3d 441, 446

(Pa.Super. 2012). As such, in C.R.F., this Court vacated the custody order

granting the mother’s request to relocate with the children because the trial

court based its decision on the Gruber test and not on the Section 5337(h)

____________________________________________

2   In Gruber, this Court set forth the following three-factor test for trial courts

to use in relocation cases.

        First, the court must assess the potential advantages of the
        proposed move and the likelihood that the move would
        substantially improve the quality of life for the custodial parent
        and the children and is not the result of a momentary whim on
        the part of the custodial parent.

                                           ...

        Next, the court must establish the integrity of the motives of both
        the custodial and non-custodial parent in either seeking the move
        or seeking to prevent it.

                                           ...

        Finally, the court must consider the availability of realistic,
        substitute visitation arrangements which will adequately foster an
        ongoing relationship between the child and the non-custodial
        parent.

Gruber, 583 A.2d at 439.

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relocation factors. Thus, Mother’s reliance on Gruber is misplaced. Mother’s

argument fails insofar as the trial court considered all of the Section 5337(h)

relocation factors and based its decision on them.

      In this case, Mother assails the court for not placing determinative

weight on her testimony that Charlotte provides both a better lifestyle and

physical safety for H.H.S. than Philadelphia. See N.T., 8/17/22, at 43 (Mother

testified “that it’s a better opportunity for him in Charlotte than it is in

Philadelphia; when it comes to like him going outside, and playing, enjoying

himself, and being a kid. . . . Dad lives in [S]outhwest. And I live in West

Philly. I don’t think that’s two great neighborhoods for a kid to go outside and

play by [him]self.”). Mother’s argument implicates Section 5447(h)(1), (6),

and (7).

      With respect to Section 5337(h)(1), the nature, quality, extent of

involvement and duration of the child’s relationship with the party proposing

to relocate and with the nonrelocating party, siblings and other significant

persons in the child’s life, the court found, in relevant part:

      Both Mother, the relocating party, and Father, the non-relocating
      party, have played an active role in raising child. The child has
      extensive extended family in Philadelphia, on both sides of his
      family. Mother moved to North Carolina with maternal aunt and
      child’s cousins. Mother does not have any other family in North
      Carolina. The child has a close relationship with his father, [half-
      ]sister and his stepmother in Philadelphia. The court concludes
      that this factor weighs against relocation.        N.T., 8/22/22,
      [Volume] 1 at 8.

Trial Court Opinion, 10/20/22, at 10.

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      With respect to Section 5337(h)(6) and (7), whether the relocation will

enhance the general quality of life for the parties seeking the relocation and

the child, the trial court found, in part:

      The only reason that Mother provided for moving to North
      Carolina, other than to open a nail salon, was safety concerns with
      the child living in Philadelphia. However, the [c]ourt finds that
      this does not outweigh the strong familial, community, and
      educational bonds the child has in Philadelphia.

      Mother stated that if the [c]ourt denied Mother’s relocation,
      Mother would return to Philadelphia. N.T., 8/22/22, [Volume] 1
      at 8. This contradicts Mother’s need to relocate with the child.
      Further, it calls into question Mother’s safety concerns she voiced
      regarding the child living in Philadelphia. The [c]ourt concludes
      that factors 6, 7, and 8 weigh against relocation.

Id. at 12 (some citation to record omitted) (emphasis added). The testimonial

evidence supports the court’s findings. See N.T., 8/17/22, at 98 (on inquiry

by the court about whether H.H.S. is safer in North Carolina, the paternal

grandmother testified, “I know Philadelphia is going through some challenges

right now. But [H.H.S.] has never gotten hurt. . . . He spent every weekend

at [Father’s house]. . . . [Y]ou just never know what will happen. It can

happen here. It can happen in North Carolina. . . .”). We will not disturb the

court’s weight determinations of Section 5337(h)(1), (6), and (7).          See

M.J.M., 63 A.3d at 339 (the trial court, as the finder of fact, determines “which

factors are most salient and critical in each particular case.”).

      In addition, Mother asserts that the court failed to consider that H.H.S.

“had always primarily lived and been raised by [M]other, maternal

grandmother and maternal aunt.” Mother’s Brief at 17. She asserts then that

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H.H.S.’s “primary household was intact even in Charlotte.”           Id. at 18.

Mother’s argument fails because the trial court was not required to give

weighted consideration to her prior role as primary caretaker when

considering the relocation factors. See W.C.F. v. M.G., 115 A.3d 323, 330

(Pa.Super. 2015) (citing to M.J.M., 63 A.3d at 339).

      Mother also raises in her first issue that the court abused its discretion

in denying her relocation request because Father admitted to smoking

marijuana. Mother’s Brief at 19. Mother asserts that Father smokes it in front

of H.H.S. We discern no abuse of discretion.

      Father acknowledged that he smokes marijuana. N.T., 8/17/22, at 78.

He testified he smokes it “probably . . . every weekend.” Id. However, Father

testified he does not smoke it in H.H.S.’s presence. Id. On rebuttal, Mother

testified on inquiry by the trial court:

      Q: If you were real worried about Dad smoking weed, you could
      have stayed here and not moved to North Carolina.

      A: But also [paternal grandmother] and my mother reassured me
      that everything will be okay. That they was going to help [Father]
      with [H.H.S.].

Id. at 102.

      With respect to the Section 5328(a) custody factors, the trial court

weighed only one in Mother’s favor, that is, (a)(14), the history of drug or

alcohol abuse of a party. We discern no abuse of discretion by the court in

not placing determinative weight on this factor. In addition, the court included

in the subject order the directive that “Neither party is to use marijuana in the

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presence of the child.” Order, 8/22/22, at 2. As such, Mother is not entitled

to relief on this claim.

          Mother’s final contention in her first issue raises a procedural question.

She emphasizes that Father filed a counter-affidavit objecting to both the

relocation and modification of the existing custody order on August 4, 2022.

Mother asserts that Father’s counter-affidavit was untimely and should have

been       stricken.      Mother’s   Brief   at   23;   see    also    23   Pa.C.S.

§ 5337(d)(2)(“An objection made under this subsection shall be filed with the

court within 30 days of receipt of the proposed relocation notice. . . .”).     We

disagree.

          In response to Mother’s September 9, 2021 petitions to relocate and to

modify the existing custody order, Father filed pro se a petition to modify on

September 15, 2021, wherein he requested primary physical custody of H.H.S.

during the school year. This remained his position at the time of the subject

proceeding nearly twelve months later. To the extent that Mother argues that

Father waived his objection to H.H.S.’s relocation during the school year to

Charlotte, we disagree. We conclude that he sufficiently preserved his claim.

          In her second issue, Mother assails the weight that the court placed on

the Section 5328(a) custody factors, and she repeats many of the same

assertions she made regarding the weight the court attributed to the Section

5337(h) relocation factors, which we have concluded do not entitle her to

relief.

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      Here, we review Mother’s contentions with respect to Section

5328(a)(3), the parental duties performed by the parties, and (10), which

party is more likely to attend to the daily physical, emotional, developmental,

educational and special needs of the child. The trial court weighed both of

these factors neutrally between the parties.     Mother argues that the court

should have weighed them in her favor because she “is the one who met all

of the child’s medical needs. . . .” Mother’s Brief 27. Further, she asserts that

Father testified that paternal grandmother “is the one who often took the child

out on adventures or to events.” Id. at 26.

      There is no dispute that H.H.S. is a healthy child with no special needs.

Father   acknowledged    that   Mother   scheduled    “most   of   the   doctor’s

appointments.” N.T., 8/17/22, at 77. Father testified that he went to medical

appointments with H.H.S., and there is no evidence on this record that he is

incapable of scheduling them for H.H.S. during the school year. Id. Father

testified that, despite the existing custody order awarding him partial physical

custody every weekend, H.H.S. began living with him on a consistent basis in

May of 2020. Id. at 62. Father testified that this new custody arrangement

began during the COVID-19 pandemic.            Id.    He explained on direct

examination that H.H.S.’s first grade classes were held by Zoom and

      this is no shade to Mom at all, but Mom can’t help him. When
      . . . he used to do Zoom classes, she used to have so much trouble
      trying to help [H.H.S.] she would have to call me.

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       And then I would have to literally be on a FaceTime with my son,
       and through his whole class any time he needed help. And this is
       when I was working remotely. So even —

       THE COURT: But I thought he was with you.

       A.    — To the couple days where Mom was off of work, and he
       spent with Mom. And I lie to you not. It may have been one to
       two days every three weeks.

       The couple days that he was with Mom, she would be calling me.
       “He needs help with this.” And it became so much of a problem
       that he started to stay with me full time.

Id. at 66, 69. Moreover, Father testified, “I felt like anything regarding school

I always had to handle that with [H.H.S.]. Like [Mother] has never been a —

like a force, like a force in school.” Id. at 63. Further, he testified:

       Q. So do you think that if the child were to live in North Carolina,
       what type of support he would get down there . . . in the home
       with Mom and her sister as far as his academics are concerned?

       A. Not a lot. And again, that’s no shade at all. But I really just
       feel like as far as school is not a priority to them. [A]nd school
       doesn’t stop when your child leaves the door at school. He still
       needs assistance after that.

Id. at 70-71.3

       In addition, Father testified that he enrolled H.H.S. in karate class prior

to him going to Charlotte in the summer of 2022. N.T., 8/17/22, at 68. He

testified that H.H.S. and his four-year-old half-sister “both attended

swimming. [H.H.S.] did basketball at the YMCA. And he also – he raps. So

____________________________________________

3 The trial court found H.H.S. “super smart.” N.T., 8/22/22, Volume 2, at 23.
In addition, Mother testified that H.H.S. is “very smart.” N.T., 8/17/22, at 22.

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we keep him into that. Like he has little videos.” Id. at 64. With respect to

the paternal grandmother’s involvement with H.H.S., Father testified that she

takes H.H.S. and his half-sister “everywhere. Like anything they want to do

as far as amusement parks, things like that. Takes them out shopping to the

mall and things like that.” Id. at 67.

      Finally, we observe that Father confirmed his strong relationship with

H.H.S. He testified, “Me and my son are extremely close. . . . It does not go

a day where I don’t speak to him.” Id. at 71.

      Based on this testimony, and our review of the totality of the record

evidence, we conclude that the court reasonably weighed Section 5328(a)(3)

and (10) neutrally between the parties. We will not disturb the custody order

awarding Father primary physical custody and Mother partial physical custody

one weekend per month during the school year, and during winter, spring,

and summer breaks, where the trial court carefully and thoroughly considered

H.H.S.’s best interests, and we discern no abuse of discretion. Accordingly,

we affirm the order.

      Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 4/19/2023

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