Court Opinion

ID: 9568283
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:02:11.680707+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:24:32.606713
License: Public Domain

Evans, Judge,
dissenting.
Defendant’s car was left unattended on an incline adjacent to U. S. Highway 441, and while thus unattended, it started in motion and ran down the incline and into Highway 441, where it collided with the automobile in which plaintiff was riding. There was no evidence to suggest that any external force was applied which could have started the parked automobile. Defendant testified that his brakes were in good order and that the car was left with the emergency brake engaged.
But the defendant’s testimony is in conflict with the physical facts. In Georgia Highway Express v. Sturkie, 62 Ga. App. 741, at 746 (9 SE2d 683), it is held: ". . . it is a fact so patent as to amount to common knowledge that a good used car, with an effective handbrake pulled up into its proper position, will not leave its place of rest *737even on an incline, unless some external force be applied.” See also Scoggins v. Peggy Ann of Ga., Inc., 87 Ga. App. 19, at 23 (73 SE2d 79); Wright Contracting Co. v. Waller, 89 Ga. App. 827, 833 (2a) (81 SE2d 541).
If defendant did not have efficient brakes and left the car unattended, this would amount to negligence on bis part. On the other hand, if defendant’s car had efficient brakes, and he failed to engage and set same upon leaving the car, this would have been negligence on his part. No matter which theory be adopted, it adds up to negligence on defendant’s part; because common knowledge asserts that an automobile, with efficient hand (emergency) brakes, which are engaged at time of leaving the car, "will not leave its place of rest on an incline,” as is held in the Sturkie case, supra. It would not help defendant to contend the incline was so steep that his brakes would not hold the car, and that gravity from the steep incline caused the car to start up despite the efficient brakes. To have left his car on such an incline, unscotched, would itself constitute negligence. Peggy Ann of Ga., Inc. v. Scoggins, 86 Ga. App. 109, 117 (71 SE2d 89).
There was testimony from the investigating officer, a member of the State Highway Patrol, that defendant told him at the scene of the collision that defendant failed to set his brakes, when he left the car (Tr. 31). That is most likely what happened. But that is not too important here; because the defendant’s testimony that he did set the brakes flies into the face of common knowledge; because the car would not have started on the incline, absent some external force, as to which there was none.
In the face of these facts, and this law, the trial judge charged the jury, in an argumentative fashion, as follows: "The mere collision of two vehicles does not raise a presumption of negligence on the part of the defendant.” (Emphasis supplied.) But here there was no mere collision, and no evidence as to a mere collision, but a collision from which the physical facts, under the common knowledge possessed by all jurors (see Code § 38-102) resulted from negligence. There was nothing in this record to show a "mere collision,” nor to authorize the trial judge to charge on a "mere collision,” which *738could only persuade the jurors that the trial judge did not believe defendant was negligent; and that the collision was an accident.
It has been held time without number that a trial judge commits reversible error when he charges in an argumentative fashion. Parks v. Fuller, 100 Ga. App. 463 (3a) (111 SE2d 755). And even though a request for charge may be abstractly correct, it is error to charge same if it is argumentative as applied to the facts in the case on trial. Thomas v. Barnett, 107 Ga. App. 717-718 (6) (131 SE2d 818). Defendant, in his answer, pleaded that the injuries resulted from an unavoidable accident. The charge to which objection was made was argumentative and in support of the theory of accident. But there was no evidence in the case which, to any degree, supports the theory of accident; and a charge as to which no admissible evidence has been introduced is erroneous. Hastings v. Hastings, 175 Ga. 805 (3) (166 SE 192); Ware v. Martin, 209 Ga. 135 (4) (70 SE2d 759).
Enumeration of error number two complains of the foregoing charge, and objection was made thereto at the completion of the charge. This charge, under these circumstances, constitutes reversible error, and I would reverse for that reason.