Court Opinion

ID: 8187314
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-09-09 23:09:58.078159+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:40:28.056791
License: Public Domain

BaedeeN, J.
I fully concur in the result reached in this case. It was not found necessary to determine whether the action taken by the city was effectual to constitute a rescission of its lighting contract. It attempted not only to rescind the contract for lighting, but also to put an end to its franchise to use the streets. As regards its attempt to oust the company of its franchise rights, granted to it by the city as the agent of the state, its action is held nugatory. That power rests in the state alone. The city claimed the right to rescind the lighting contract. That right is said to have been based upon the refusal of the company to instal some half a dozen incandescent lights ordered by the city. This refusal arose from a claim by the company that the second contract superseded the first, to the extent that further incandescent lights could not be required by the city. There was no claim that the company had abandoned its contracts, or was seeking to avoid their obligations, only in the respect just mentioned. The dispute was bond fide, and the claim of the company had some elements of plausibility. In such a case I very much doubt the power of either party to effectually terminate the contract by a mere declaration to that effect. But even if that power exists, under the facts *346here presented, the court should be slow to uphold it. The language of the supreme court of the United States in Rutland Marble Co. v. Ripley, 10 Wall. 339, is quite applicable:
“That one party to an executory contract, partly executed, has violated his engagements, is generally no sufficient reason for a decree by a court of equity, at the suit of the other party, that the contract shall be annulled.”
See Lundahl v. Hansen, 147 Ill. 504, 35 N. E. 741; Minah C. M. Co. v. Briscoe (C. C.) 47 Fed. 276. Again:
“It is not every partial neglect or refusal to comply with some of the terms of a contract by one party which will entitle the other to abandon the contract at once. In order to justify an abandonment of it, and of the proper remedy growing out of it, the failure of the opposite party must be a total one. The object of the contract must have been de feated or rendered unattainable by the misconduct or default.” Selby v. Hutchinson, 9 Ill. 319.
Another element entering into the question of rescission is that the party rescinding must, so far as possible, put the opposite party in his original position. In continuing contracts this is frequently impossible, and hence the courts, when there are bona fide disputes; often say that the injured party must come into court before the rescission can become effectual. A declaration of rescission may become the basis for the court to declare it, but it is not always the case that the party himself has the right of absolute rescission. The courts recognize the distinction between executed and execu-tory or continuing contracts in this regard, and it is one, I think, the city should have in mind in its future dealings with the company. The right of rescission at law usually rests_upon such a refusal of the one party to perform as entitles the other to believe the contract has been abandoned. Such was the case of School Dist. v. Hayne, 46 Wis. 511, 1 N. W. 170. When the matter gets into a court of equity, the court may or may not decree a rescission, according to the equity of the case, and may even relieve from forfeiture *347when the justice of the ease demands, as in Gates v. Parmly, 93 Wis. 294, 66 N. W. 253, 67 N. W. 739. While the default of the company may be, as held in this case, sufficient to prevent a recovery of periodical payments due on the contract, it does not necessarily follow that the city may consider the contract at an end. If its remedy at law is not deemed adequate, its rights may be protected and enforced in the forum of equity, either by a decree of rescission or specific performance.
Maeshall, J. I concur in the foregoing opinion by Mr. Justice BardeeN.
Both parties moved for a rehearing. The motions were denied May 13, 1902.