Court Opinion

ID: 9961794
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-19 19:08:26.776093+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:55.926011
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Gutierrez, 2024-Ohio-1404.]

                              IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                                 FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                       ROSS COUNTY

State of Ohio,                                  :   Case No. 23CA10

        Plaintiff-Appellee,                     :   DECISION AND
                                                    JUDGMENT ENTRY
        v.                                      :

Bethany Gutierrez,                              :   RELEASED 4/12/2024

        Defendant-Appellant.                    :

______________________________________________________________________
                            APPEARANCES:

Brian T. Goldberg, Cincinnati, Ohio, for appellant.

Jeffrey C. Marks, Ross County Prosecuting Attorney, and Pamela C. Wells, Ross County
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Chillicothe, Ohio, for appellee.
______________________________________________________________________
Hess, J.

        {¶1}     Bethany Gutierrez appeals from a judgment entry of sentence of the Ross

County Court of Common Pleas convicting her, following guilty pleas, of one count of

corrupting another with drugs and one count of trafficking in a fentanyl-related compound.

Gutierrez presents three assignments of error asserting that (1) the trial court erred by

accepting a guilty plea that was not made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently; (2) the

trial court erred by failing to comply with the sentencing requirements in R.C.

2929.19(B)(2)(c); and (3) the trial court erred by stating post-release control was

discretionary in the sentencing entry when it should be mandatory for corrupting another

with drugs. However, the record reflects that there are two indictments against Gutierrez
Ross App. No. 23CA10                                                                      2

under the same case number which each allege one count of corrupting another with

drugs and one count of trafficking in a fentanyl-related compound. Evidently, Gutierrez

pleaded guilty to and was convicted of the two counts in the second indictment, which the

trial court orally referred to as a “superseding indictment” without objection. However, the

trial court did not dispose of the counts in the first indictment via journal entry. Because

of these “hanging charges,” the entry from which Gutierrez appeals is not a final

appealable order. Therefore, we lack jurisdiction to address the merits of this appeal and

dismiss it.

                              I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

       {¶2}   On May 8, 2020, a secret indictment was filed charging Gutierrez with two

counts: Count One, corrupting another with drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.02, and Count

Two, trafficking in a fentanyl-related compound in violation of R.C. 2925.03. The

indictment stated that Count One was a second-degree felony, and Count Two was a

fifth-degree felony. On October 27, 2020, the trial court conducted an arraignment

hearing at which Gutierrez pleaded not guilty.

       {¶3}   On March 5, 2021, a second indictment was filed under the same case

number charging Gutierrez with two counts: Count One, corrupting another with drugs in

violation of R.C. 2925.02, and Count Two, trafficking in a fentanyl-related compound in

violation of R.C. 2925.03. The indictment stated that Count One was a second-degree

felony, and Count Two was a fifth-degree felony. The only difference between the counts

in the first and second indictments is that the second indictment stated that the drug

involved in Count One was “any compound, mixture, preparation, or substance included

in Schedule I or II.” On March 15, 2021, the trial court conducted a second arraignment
Ross App. No. 23CA10                                                                    3

hearing at which Gutierrez pleaded not guilty to the second indictment, which the trial

court orally referred to as a “superseding indictment” without objection.

       {¶4}   On April 18, 2022, Gutierrez executed a plea of guilty form stating that she

was entering guilty pleas to Counts One and Two, evidently referring to the second

indictment as neither party challenged the trial court’s characterization of it as a

superseding indictment. The parties agreed to jointly recommend a sentence of four to

six years in prison, and the state agreed to not indict Gutierrez with respect to an

unindicted second-degree felony case. The same day, the trial court conducted a change

of plea hearing. The court accepted the guilty pleas and found Gutierrez guilty of the

offenses to which she pleaded guilty.

       {¶5}   The trial court set the matter for sentencing in May 2022, but Gutierrez did

not appear, and the court ordered that her bond be revoked and a warrant issue for her

arrest. In March 2023, Gutierrez was arrested, and the court conducted the sentencing

hearing. On March 14, 2023, the court issued a judgment entry of sentence ordering her

to serve 8 to 12 years in prison on Count One and 12 months in prison on Count Two, to

be served concurrently. The court did not impose a fine but did order Gutierrez to pay

restitution and costs. This appeal followed.

                             II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

       {¶6}   Gutierrez presents three assignments of error:

       First Assignment of Error: The trial court erred to the prejudice of Ms.
       Gutierrez by accepting a plea of guilty that was not made knowingly,
       voluntarily, and intelligently.

       Second Assignment of Error: The trial court erred to the prejudice of Ms.
       Gutierrez by failing to comply with the sentencing requirements contained
       in R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c).
Ross App. No. 23CA10                                                                        4

       Third Assignment of Error: The trial court erred by stating post-release
       control was discretionary in the sentencing entry when it should be
       mandatory for Count 1.

                                 III. LAW AND ANALYSIS

       {¶7}   Before we address the merits of the appeal, we must determine whether we

have jurisdiction to do so. Appellate courts “have such jurisdiction as may be provided

by law to review and affirm, modify, or reverse judgments or final orders of the courts of

record inferior to the court of appeals within the district * * *.” Ohio Constitution, Article

IV, Section 3(B)(2). “If a court’s order is not final and appealable, we have no jurisdiction

to review the matter and must dismiss the appeal.” Clifton v. Johnson, 4th Dist. Pickaway

No. 14CA22, 2015-Ohio-4246, ¶ 8.         “In the event that the parties do not raise the

jurisdictional issue, we must raise it sua sponte.” Id. Our review of the record in this case

revealed a jurisdictional issue which prevents us from reaching the merits of the appeal.

       {¶8}   “The General Assembly enacted R.C. 2505.02 to specify which orders are

final.” State v. Cutright, 4th Dist. Ross No. 20CA3718, 2021-Ohio-1582, ¶ 6, citing Smith

v. Chen, 142 Ohio St.3d 411, 2015-Ohio-1480, 31 N.E.3d 633, ¶ 8. “A judgment of

conviction is a final order subject to appeal under R.C. 2505.02 when it sets forth (1) the

fact of the conviction, (2) the sentence, (3) the judge’s signature, and (4) the time stamp

indicating the entry upon the journal by the clerk.” State v. Lester, 130 Ohio St.3d 303,

2011-Ohio-5204, 958 N.E.2d 142, paragraph one of the syllabus. “The Supreme Court

of Ohio has * * * held that in a criminal case involving multiple counts, a final order need

not contain a reiteration of those counts that were resolved on the record in other ways,

such as dismissal, nolled counts, or not guilty findings.” Cutright at ¶ 7, citing State ex

rel. Rose v. McGinty, 128 Ohio St.3d 371, 2011-Ohio-761, 944 N.E.2d 672, ¶ 3. “But
Ross App. No. 23CA10                                                                       5

unless the charges that do not result in conviction have been terminated by a journal

entry, the hanging charges prevent the conviction from being a final order under R.C.

2505.02(B) because it does not determine the action by resolving the entire case.”

(Emphasis added) Id., and cases cited therein.

       {¶9}   In this case, Gutierrez was charged in two indictments filed under the same

case number. The trial court and parties appear to have treated the first indictment as if

it had been dismissed and replaced by the second indictment, and Gutierrez evidently

pleaded guilty to and was convicted of the two counts in the second indictment. However,

“ ‘ “[i]t is axiomatic that a court speaks only through its journal entries.” ’ ” State v.

Richards, 4th Dist. Washington No. 20CA12, 2021-Ohio-389, ¶ 12, quoting State v.

Payton, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 14CA3628, 2015-Ohio-1796, ¶ 7, quoting State ex rel. Collier

v. Farley, 4th Dist. Lawrence No. 05CA4, 2005-Ohio-4204, ¶ 18. The trial court did not

dispose of the counts in the first indictment via journal entry. As a result, the two counts

in the first indictment constitute “hanging charges” which prevent the trial court’s judgment

entry of sentence from being a final appealable order. See State v. Kuntz, 4th Dist. Ross

No. 21CA3759, 2023-Ohio-669, ¶ 4, 7 (although trial court orally granted state’s motion

to dismiss two counts in first indictment, court failed to formally dismiss those counts via

journal entry, so judgment entry of sentence regarding counts in second indictment was

not a final appealable order); State v. Nesbitt, 4th Dist. Ross No. 22CA20, 2023-Ohio-

1276, ¶ 10 (although trial court and parties appeared to have treated first indictment as if

it had been dismissed and replaced by second indictment, court did not dispose of counts

in first indictment via journal entry, so judgment entry of sentence was not a final
Ross App. No. 23CA10                                                                 6

appealable order). Therefore, we lack jurisdiction to address the merits of this appeal

and dismiss it.

                                                                APPEAL DISMISSED.
Ross App. No. 23CA10                                                                      7

                                   JUDGMENT ENTRY

         It is ordered that the APPEAL IS DISMISSED and that appellant shall pay the
costs.

         The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Ross
County Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution.

       IF A STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE AND RELEASE UPON BAIL HAS
BEEN PREVIOUSLY GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT OR THIS COURT, it is
temporarily continued for a period not to exceed 60 days upon the bail previously posted.
The purpose of a continued stay is to allow appellant to file with the Supreme Court of
Ohio an application for a stay during the pendency of proceedings in that court. If a stay
is continued by this entry, it will terminate at the earlier of the expiration of the 60-day
period, or the failure of the appellant to file a notice of appeal with the Supreme Court of
Ohio in the 45-day appeal period pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of
the Supreme Court of Ohio. Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses the
appeal prior to expiration of 60 days, the stay will terminate as of the date of such
dismissal.

      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Smith, P.J. & Wilkin, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.

                                          For the Court

                                          BY: ________________________
                                              Michael D. Hess, Judge

                                 NOTICE TO COUNSEL

       Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment
entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with
the clerk.