Court Opinion

ID: 9382305
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-26 07:16:30.846483+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:38.334034
License: Public Domain

Dismissed and Memorandum Opinion filed March 21, 2023.

                                       In The

                     Fourteenth Court of Appeals

                               NO. 14-22-00159-CV

           HARRIS COUNTY APPRAISAL DISTRICT, Appellant

                                          V.
        NOMAAN K. HUSAIN AND KAMILA M. HUSAIN, Appellees

                    On Appeal from the 215th District Court
                            Harris County, Texas
                      Trial Court Cause No. 2016-64093

                           MEMORANDUM OPINION

      Appellant Harris County Appraisal District (HCAD) challenges the trial
court’s January 13, 2022 interlocutory order requiring it to pay settlement funds and
attorney’s fees to appellees Nomaan Husain and Kamila Husain. Because that
interlocutory order was implicitly vacated by the trial court’s February 18, 2022 final
judgment, we dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

      In two issues, HCAD asserts the trial court erred in issuing its January 13,
2022 order (1) compelling HCAD to pay “settlement funds,” and (2) compelling
HCAD to pay attorney’s fees. HCAD requests that this court “reverse and vacate the
trial court’s January 13, 2022 Interlocutory Order and strike Appellees’ $4,200
award of attorney’s fees and requirement that HCAD pay ‘settlement funds.’” We
conclude we need not address HCAD’s issues because the trial court’s final
judgment superseded the January 13, 2022 interlocutory order.

      By rendering a final judgment without incorporating the interlocutory order
into the final judgment, the trial court necessarily vacated its prior interlocutory
order. See Roccaforte v. Jefferson Cnty., 341 S.W.3d 919, 924 (Tex. 2011) (holding
that final judgment impliedly and necessarily replaced interlocutory summary
judgment which merged into judgment); Hernandez v. Ebrom, 289 S.W.3d 316, 319
(Tex. 2009) (concluding appeals of some interlocutory orders are mooted by
subsequent orders).

      While HCAD filed a notice of appeal purporting to challenge the trial court’s
final judgment, it has not asserted issues in its brief that challenge the final judgment.
HCAD has not provided any argument, analysis, or authority asserting that the trial
court erred in granting the relief included in the February 18, 2022 final judgment.
Appeals of some interlocutory orders become moot because the orders have been
rendered moot by subsequent orders. See, e.g., Richards v. Mena, 820 S.W.2d 372,
372 (Tex. 1991) (appeal of temporary injunction was rendered moot by rendering of
permanent injunction). To the extent HCAD challenges the interlocutory order, that
appeal has been rendered moot by the trial court’s rendition of a final judgment. See
State ex rel. Best v. Harper, 562 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex. 2018).

      In this case, HCAD appealed the final judgment but does not raise any issues
challenging that judgment. HCAD’s only complaints are with the interlocutory
order, which was superseded by the final judgment. Therefore, any decision this
court made on HCAD’s issues could not have a practical effect on the final judgment.
We must conclude, therefore, that HCAD’s challenges to the interlocutory order are
moot. See Electric Reliability Council of Tex., Inc. v. Panda Power Generation
                                            2
Infrastructure Fund, LLC, 619 S.W.3d 628, 641 (Tex. 2021).

      The Husains agree that the February 18, 2022 final judgment modified the
interlocutory order so that HCAD is no longer required to pay “settlement funds.”
Incongruously, the Husains also assert that the trial court did not err in awarding
attorney’s fees in the January 13, 2022 order. As stated above, however, the trial
court’s final judgment did not award attorney’s fees to either party. Because the final
judgment did not include an attorney’s fee award to the Husains, to the extent they
wanted to challenge this lack of award, the Husains would have had to file a notice
of appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.1(c) (“A party who seeks to alter the trial court’s
judgment or other appealable order must file a notice of appeal.”); see also Kelly v.
Tracy, No. 01-18-00913-CV, 2022 WL 2837335, at *12 n.8 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] July 21, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.). They did not do so. By failing to file
a notice of appeal from the court’s final judgment, the Husains have forfeited their
argument that they are entitled to attorney’s fees. See Kelly, 2022 WL 2837335, at
*12 n.8 (declining to address issue related to propriety of relief awarded in final
judgment when judgment did not include attorney’s fees that had been included in
superseded interlocutory order).

      Because HCAD only appeals from the moot January 13, 2022 order, we
dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(f); see also Panda
Power, 619 S.W.3d at 641.

                                        /s/       Charles A. Spain
                                                  Justice

Panel consists of Justices Zimmerer, Spain, and Hassan.

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