Court Opinion

ID: 91132
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2010-04-28 16:03:00+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:41.085659
License: Public Domain

111 U.S. 479 (1884)
ANDERSON, Receiver,
v.
PHILADELPHIA WAREHOUSE COMPANY.
Supreme Court of United States.
Argued April 3d, 4th, 1884.
Decided April 21st, 1884.
IN ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA.
*483 Mr. P.K. Erdman, for plaintiff in error.
Mr. R.C. McMurtrie, for defendant in error.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE delivered the opinion of the court. He stated the facts in the foregoing language, and continued:
It is well settled that one who allows himself to appear on the books of a national bank as an owner of its stock is liable to creditors as a shareholder, whether he be the absolute owner or a pledgee only, and that, if a registered owner, acting in bad faith, transfers his stock in a failing bank to an irresponsible person, for the purpose of escaping liability, or if his transfer is colorable only, the transaction is void as to creditors. National Bank v. Case, 99 U.S. 628; Bowden v. Johnson, 107 U.S. 251. It is, also, undoubtedly true, that the beneficial owner of stock registered in the name of an irresponsible person may, under some circumstances, be liable to creditors as the real shareholder, but it has never, to our knowledge, been held that a mere pledgee of stock is chargeable where he is not registered as owner.
There is in this case no evidence of actual fraud or bad faith. The Warehouse Company never was the owner of the stock in question, and never held itself out as such. The transfer of Kern and Blumer & Co., was only by way of pledge, and the company was bound to return the stock whenever the debt, for which it was held, should be paid. From the verdict of the jury, under the instructions of the court, it must also be accepted as a fact, that the company never consented to a transfer of the stock to its name on the books, or to that of its president, and it is undisputed that for seven years before the failure of the bank, and at least five years before its embarrassments were known to the company or the public, the stock had been standing, with the assent of Kern, Blumer & Co. and the officers of the bank, in the name of McCloskey or Ferris. During all that time, neither the registered holders nor the Warehouse Company claimed dividends or in any way acted as shareholders. *484 On the contrary, either Kern or Blumer & Co. took the dividends as they were paid, and to all intents and purposes controlled the stock. There was no concealment on the part of the Warehouse Company, and no effort to deceive. It had possession of the certificates which represented the stock, with full power to control them for all the purposes of its security, but there was never a time, from the date of the original transfer by Kern on the books, until the failure of the bank, that it was or pretended to be anything else than a mere pledgee. Those who examined the list of shareholders would have found the name of McCloskey or of Ferris as the registered holder of four hundred and fifty shares. There was nothing on the books of the bank to connect them, or either of them, with the Warehouse Company, and, therefore, no credit could have been given on account of the apparent liability of the company as a shareholder. If inquiries had been made and all the facts ascertained, it would have been found that either Kern or Blumer & Co. were always the real owners of the stock, and that it had been placed in the name of the persons who appeared on the registry, not to shield any owner from liability, but to protect the title of the company as pledgee. Blumer & Co. and the bank were fully advised who McCloskey was, and of his probable responsibility, when they allowed the transfer to be made to him, and they undoubtedly knew who Ferris was when the stock was put in his name after McCloskey's death. The avowed purpose of both transfers was to give the company the control of the stock for the purposes of its security, without making it liable as a registered shareholder. To our minds there was neither fraud nor illegality in this. The company perfected its security as pledgee, without making itself liable as an apparent owner. Kern or Blumer & Co. still remained the owners of the stock, though registered in the name of others, and pledged as collateral security for their debt. They consented to the transfer, not to escape liability as shareholders, but to save the company from a liability it was unwilling to assume, and at the same time to perfect the security it required for the credit to be given. As between Blumer & Co. and the Warehouse Company, Blumer & Co. or Kern were the owners *485 of the stock and the company the pledgee. As between the company and the bank, or its creditors, the company was a pledgee of the stock and liable only as such. The creditors were put in no worse position by the transfers that were made than they would have been if the stock had remained in the name of Kern or Blumer & Co. who were always the real owners.
To our minds the fact that the stock stood registered in the name of Henry, President, from December 27th to January 10th, is, under the circumstances of this case, of no importance. The Warehouse Company promptly declined to allow itself to stand as a registered shareholder, because it was unwilling to incur the liability such a registry would impose. It asked that the transfer might be made to McCloskey. To this the owners of the stock and the bank assented, and from that time the case stood precisely as it would if the transfer had originally been made to McCloskey instead of Henry, President, or if Henry had retransferred to Kern or Blumer & Co., and they had at the request of the company made another transfer to McCloskey. The security of the Warehouse Company was perfected without imposing on the company a shareholder's liability. All this was done in good faith, when the bank was in good credit and paying large dividends, and years before its failure or even its embarrassment. So far as the company was concerned, the transfer was not made to escape an impending calamity, but to avoid incurring a liability it was unwilling to assume, and which it was at perfect liberty to shun.
It follows that the judgment of the Circuit Court was right, and it is consequently
Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE MILLER, with whom MR. JUSTICE MATTHEWS concurred, dissenting.
I do not concur in this judgment.
I think if in any case between private persons, one of them had placed property in the hands of minors, servants, or other irresponsible persons, for the purpose of escaping the responsibility attaching to the ownership of such property, while *486 securing all the advantages of such ownership, it would be held to be a transaction which could not be supported on any legal or equitable principle.
It does not remove this case from the control of that principle, that the parties to be injured are the unknown creditors of the bank, who are, by this means, deprived of the right which they have to resort to a responsible shareholder for the contribution which the law gives for their benefit.
If not an actual fraud, it is a fraud upon the banking law, and was so intended to be by both the original holders of the bank shares, and the officers of the Warehouse Company, by which the latter could control the shares without the responsibility which the law attaches to the owner.
It is an easy devise to make the right which the law gives to creditors of a failing bank ineffectual, and to evade it in all cases.
JUSTICE MATTHEWS agrees with me in this dissent.