Court Opinion

ID: 9563603
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:43:04.021938+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:57.460461
License: Public Domain

LANDAU, J.,
dissenting.
At trial, defendant responded to the trial court’s admonition to take no more than 20 minutes for closing arguments with the words, “I take exception to that — to that limiting.” Defendant did not explain to the trial court the basis for his exception, why he believed he was entitled to more time. He made reference to no rule, statute, or constitutional provision requiring the trial court to give him more time.
On appeal, defendant asserted two arguments, and two arguments only, in his brief. First, he argued that the trial court’s time limit violated Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution. Second, he argued that the trial court’s time limit violated the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In the course of his Oregon constitutional argument, defendant made the following remark:
“ORCP 58 B(5) provides that each side in a civil case ‘shall not be limited to less than two hours.’ Ironically, if the victim had sued defendant for damages, defendant would have been granted more time to address the jury.”
Thus, defendant did not assert that ORCP 58 B(5) applied to this case. Nowhere in his brief is there a reference to ORS 136.330(1). To the contrary, he noted what he understood to be the disparity between civil and criminal rules of procedure. Interestingly, the state did not mention ORS 136.330(1) in its brief on appeal either. At oral argument, defendant noted for the first time that ORCP 58 B(5) was not actually inconsistent with criminal procedure, but instead was directly applicable to criminal proceedings by way of ORS 136.330(1).
The majority nevertheless resolves this case on the basis of ORS 136.330(1), which was not cited to the trial court, not cited in the opening brief on appeal, not cited by the state, and only mentioned for the first time at oral argument. *577The majority concludes that the argument that the statute controls was preserved by defendant’s words at trial: “I take exception to that.”
There is, perhaps, some authority to support the majority’s conclusion that the matter properly has been preserved. The problem is, there also is ample authority to the contrary. In truth, the decisions of the appellate courts in this state have become difficult to reconcile, to put it charitably. For practically every decision holding that a given objection is sufficient to preserve an argument on appeal, there is a contrary decision holding that the same objection does not suffice. The majority’s decision in this case only makes matters worse. A few examples:
Point: In State v. White, 119 Or App 424, 427, 850 P2d 1158, rev den 317 Or 486 (1993), the trial attorney stated, “I object to this line of questioning.” We held that the objection “was not adequate to preserve the claimed error, because it did not identify the ground on which defendant now challenges the ruling on appeal.” Id.
Counterpoint: The defendant in this case said, “I take exception to that.” The majority holds that “it was not necessary for him to have also identified * * * the source for his position in order to preserve the argument that he now makes on appeal.” 156 Or App at 572 (emphasis in original).
Point: In State v. Riggs, 143 Or App 427, 923 P2d 683 (1996), rev den 325 Or 247 (1997), the defendant at trial asserted a double jeopardy argument. In his motion papers, he cited both the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, section 12, of the Oregon Constitution, but he argued only the federal constitutional theory. When he attempted to argue the state constitutional theory on appeal, we declared the argument not preserved, reasoning that, “[a]lthough defendant below cited Article I, section 12, as a source, he cited no Oregon cases and gave no indication to the trial court that a different analysis would apply under the Oregon Constitution.” Id. at 431 (emphasis in original).
Counterpoint: In State v. Cooper, 120 Or App 490, 852 P2d 948 (1993), rev’d on other grounds 319 Or 162, 874 P2d 822 (1994), the defendant objected to the presence of a *578police officer witness sitting at counsel table during trial. He cited OEC 615, but made a different argument under that rule on appeal than he did at trial. We held that the argument was preserved. Id. at 493-94.
Point: In Hovey v. Davis, 120 Or App 425, 427, 852 P2d 929, rev den 318 Or 26 (1993), the defendant raised an objection, citing only a case. Although we ultimately found that the argument was preserved for other reasons, we declared that “only citing a case as the ground for an objection does not preserve an objection.” Id. at 428.
Counterpoint: In State v. McCann, 144 Or App 403, 927 P2d 129 (1996), rev den 324 Or 560 (1997), the state at trial asserted an argument on the basis of a single cited appellate decision. On appeal, we held that, even though the decision was inapposite, the state had preserved the underlying argument. Id. at 406-07.
The problem, in substantial part, appears to have its source with this court’s mechanical reliance on State v. Hitz, 307 Or 183, 766 P2d 373 (1988). In that decision, the Supreme Court explained the law of preservation in the following terms:
“We have previously drawn attention to the distinctions between raising an issue at trial, identifying a source for a claimed position, and making a particular argument. The first ordinarily is essential, the second less so, the third least.”
Id. at 188 (emphasis in original; citation omitted). With no examination of the distinction between an issue, a source, and an argument, however, Hitz becomes no more than a handy citation to support a desired outcome by simply lodging a particular contention not raised at trial in the appropriate pigeonhole. Witness, for example, the fact that the majority relies on Hitz to justify its decision in this case, in which defendant took “exception” to the trial court’s ruling but identified no particular rule, case, statute, constitutional provision, theory, or argument. 156 Or App at 572. Contrast that with our reliance on Hitz in Riggs, in which the defendant did *579raise his double jeopardy claim and cited the Oregon Constitution, but still was held not to have preserved his state constitutional double jeopardy claim of error. Riggs, 143 Or App at 430-31.
In my view, preservation issues should not be resolved by appeal to such empty and elastic verbal formulae. The result is a body of cases that can only be a source of confusion to the bench and the practicing bar. Preservation is better viewed in practical terms. It is not so much a technicality of trial and appellate practice as it is a matter of fairness and efficiency: Did the trial court have a realistic opportunity to make the right call? The explanation of the Chief Judge in J. Arlie Bryant, Inc. v. Columbia River Gorge Comm., 132 Or App 565, 568, 889 P2d 383, rev den 321 Or 47 (1995), is especially helpful in making that point:
“Adherence to preservation requirements is important to the proper performance of appellate review. There are at least two reasons why that is so. First, the requirement that an issue be presented to the lower tribunal in order for it to be raised on appeal serves to prevent error. If the first tribunal is given the opportunity to make a ruling, its ruling may well be correct. Relatedly, it would be a disservice to the economy of the process to require the lower tribunal to conduct further proceedings in order to rectify an error that it was never given the initial opportunity to avoid.
“The second reason is that requiring a party to present its issues at each adjudicative level is essential to a fair process for the other parties and participants. Generally, the opportunity to respond at the appellate level does not cure the denial of that opportunity in trial court and agency proceedings, where all of the factual and much of the legal development of cases must occur.”
I would approach this case with precisely that sort of practical focus. Was the trial court given a realistic opportunity to make the right decision? I think not. Given the abbreviated objection — “I take exception to that” — there was no realistic way for the trial judge to know the nature of defendant’s complaint. Was there a rule that required a longer time? Defendant did not say. Was there a statute that prohibited such a short argument time? Defendant did not say. Was *580there a constitutional problem with the trial court’s ruling? Defendant did not say.
The majority appears to base its opinion as to preservation on the fact that the rule so obviously permits at least two hours of closing argument. 156 Or App at 572. That argument cuts both ways, however. Can anyone seriously suggest that the trial judge in this case, acting in good faith when confronted with a citation to the proper rule, would have failed to make the right decision? Clearly, the only reason for the ruling below was that no one informed the court of the application of the controlling rule. Preservation is supposed to prevent precisely that sort of thing from happening.
The majority suggests alternatively that, even if not preserved, the error of which defendant complains is apparent on the face of the record and, as such, remains reviewable. Id. at 572 n 4. In making the argument, however, the majority forgets that an unpreserved argument is not instantly reviewable merely because it involves apparent legal error. As the Supreme Court explained in Ailes v. Portland Meadows, Inc., 312 Or 376, 382, 823 P2d 956 (1991), even if an error is plain on the face of the record,
“the appellate court must exercise its discretion to consider or not to consider the error, and if the court chooses to consider the error, the court must articulate its reasons for doing so. This is not a requirement of mere form. A court’s decision to recognize unpreserved or unraised error in this manner should be made with utmost caution. Such an action is contrary to the strong policies requiring preservation and raising of error.”
(Citation omitted.) The court held that, in deciding whether to exercise our discretion to consider an error of law apparent on the face of the record, we must consider various factors, including the competing interests of the parties, the nature of the case, the gravity of the error, the ends of justice, the manner in which the error came to the attention of the trial court, and whether the policies behind the general rule of preservation have been served in some other way. Id. at 382 n 6.
*581In my view, assuming for the sake of argument that we are confronted with error apparent on the face of the record, this is not a case in which we should exercise our discretion to review the unpreserved error. I arrive at that conclusion principally because defendant has identified no harm that has flowed from the trial court’s ruling. He argued his case in the allotted time and did not so much as suggest that he had anything further to say. Even on appeal, defendant fails to identify how he was prejudiced by the time limitation. In the absence of any identifiable harm that flowed from the trial court’s ruling, and in light of the Supreme Court’s cautionary instructions in Ailes, I find no basis for overcoming the general rule that this court does not review unpreserved error.
I would, therefore, affirm the judgment on preservation grounds and would not address the merits of defendant’s contentions on appeal. I respectfully dissent from the majority’s contrary decision.
Warren and Haselton, JJ., join in this dissent.