Court Opinion

ID: 9760977
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 01:27:27.498778+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:19.413911
License: Public Domain

SPEARS, Justice,
concurring.
The court does not address the contention of Sun Exploration and Production Company that the trial judge should have recused himself because of his relationship with the Jacksons' attorney and the Jack-sons themselves. Although the court reverses the trial court’s judgment and thus corrects any harm that may have been caused by the trial judge’s lack of impartiality, the court should not, by its silence, place its stamp of approval on the trial judge’s failure to recuse himself. For this reason, I concur separately.
The trial judge, Carroll Wilborn, Jr., was the first cousin to an attorney for the Jack-sons and was related to each one of the Jacksons — some twenty named parties — in the fourth degree. The potential for bias *206and partiality is readily apparent when a judge is related to a party or the party’s attorney. Newcome v. Light, 58 Tex. 141, 145 (1882); see also Annotation, Relationship to Attorney as Disqualifying Judge, 50 A.L.R.2d 143, 144-45 (1956 & Supp. 1987). Judge Wilborn’s significant relationship with both the Jacksons and their attorney gives rise to serious concerns about his impartiality. The potential for bias and favoritism under these circumstances taints the trial court’s judgment and raises legitimate questions about the favorable relief granted to the Jacksons and about the substantial award of attorney’s fees.
Public policy demands that the judge who sits in a case act with absolute impartiality. Pendergass v. Beale, 59 Tex. 446, 447 (1883). Beyond the demand that a judge be impartial, however, is the requirement that a judge appear to be impartial so that no doubts or suspicions exist as to the fairness or integrity of the court. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 106 S.Ct. 1580, 89 L.Ed.2d 823 (1986); Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 100 S.Ct. 1610, 64 L.Ed.2d 182 (1980). The judiciary must strive not only to give all parties a fair trial but also to maintain a high level of public trust and confidence. Indemnity Ins. Co. v. McGee, 163 Tex. 412, 356 S.W.2d 666, 668 (Tex.1962). The legitimacy of the judicial process is based on the public’s respect and on its confidence that the system settles controversies impartially and fairly. Judicial decisions rendered under circumstances that suggest bias, prejudice, or favoritism undermine the integrity of the courts, breed skepticism and mistrust, and thwart the very principles on which the judicial system is based. The judiciary must be extremely diligent in avoiding any appearance of impropriety and must hold itself to exacting standards lest it lose its legitimacy and suffer a loss of public confidence. Although the court reverses the trial court’s judgment, it remains silent on the recusal question and thus fails to cure the perception of unfairness.
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 18b mandates that “judges shall recuse themselves in proceedings in which their impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” The combination of familial relationships involved in this case clearly brings the trial judge within the ambit of Rule 18b. In order to avoid the appearance of impropriety, Judge Wilborn should have recused himself because the familial relationships cast a reasonable doubt on his impartiality.1
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 18a permits a party to file a motion at least 10 days before trial, stating grounds as to why the judge before whom the case is pending should not sit in the case. The rule, however, does not contemplate the situation in which a party does not know of the disability of the judge to sit in the case until after trial has been completed. See also Sparks, Judicial Recusal: Rule 18a— Substance or Procedure, 12 St. Mary’s L.J. 723 (1981). The Jacksons have argued for a strictly mechanical application of Rule 18a. They point out that no motion to recuse was timely filed and urge that Sun therefore waived any complaint regarding the trial judge’s qualifications to sit in the case. However, Sun did not know of the trial judge’s relationship with the Jacksons and their attorney and therefore Sun could not have waived its right to request recu-sal. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 416 S.W.2d 396, 401 (Tex.1967) (defining waiver as an intentional relinquishment of a known right). The relationship of the judge to the Jack-sons and their attorney was never revealed during trial and there was nothing to put Sun on inquiry as to the relationship.
*207The trial judge and the Jacksons’ attorney 2 should have disclosed the familial relationships. Failing to do so, it is they who should suffer the consequences and not Sun. Therefore, on remand, Sun should be permitted to present a motion for recusal pursuant to Rule 18a.
COOK, J., joins in this concurring opinion.

. Rule changes proposed for 1990, if adopted, would make even clearer the necessity of recu-sal under these circumstances. The proposal for Rule 18b(2) reads: "A judge shall recuse himself in any proceeding in which ... he or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse of such a person ... is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding." Supreme Court Advisory Committee, Report to Supreme Court of Texas (Aug. 25, 1989).

. Under an amendment to the Government Code, effective September 1, 1989, "[a]n attorney may not appear before a judge or justice in a civil case if the attorney is related to the judge or justice by affinity or consanguinity within the first degree." Tex. Gov’t Code § 82.066, ch. 866, § 4, 1989 Tex.Sess. Law Serv. 3857 (Vernon).