Court Opinion

ID: 9411366
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-26 17:07:27.160323+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:06.321931
License: Public Domain

J-S23043-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                          :        PENNSYLVANIA
                    Appellee              :
                                          :
              v.                          :
                                          :
 AARON ROSS SMITH                         :
                                          :
                    Appellant             :        No. 2883 EDA 2022

           Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered October 11, 2022
            In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County
            Criminal Division at No(s): CP-46-CR-0001327-2019

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., KUNSELMAN, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.:                                FILED JULY 26, 2023

      Appellant, Aaron Ross Smith, appeals from the order entered in the

Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, which denied his first petition

for collateral relief pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), at 42

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

      In its opinion, the PCRA court set forth the relevant facts and procedural

history of this case as follows:

         On September 9, 2019, [Appellant], then represented by
         Abigail Leeds, Esquire, appeared before the undersigned
         and entered an open guilty plea to one count of unlawful
         contact with a minor, one count of criminal attempt of
         involuntary deviate sexual intercourse [(“IDSI”)], and one
         count of criminal use of a communication facility.
         [Appellant] filled out a standard guilty plea questionnaire
         and, due to the nature of the crimes, an additional
         Addendum to the guilty plea statement regarding the
         registration requirements of sexual offenders.       A Pre-
         Sentence Investigation and a Sexually Violent Predator
         [(“SVP”)] assessment were ordered.          [Appellant was
         ultimately deemed not to be a SVP].
J-S23043-23

          [Appellant], then represented by Paul Lang, Esquire,
          returned to court on February 10, 2020, for sentencing.
          Following a sentencing hearing, the undersigned sentenced
          [Appellant] on count 1, unlawful contact with a minor, to
          fifteen (15) to thirty (30) months, in a state correctional
          institution; on count 2, criminal attempt of IDSI, fifteen (15)
          to thirty (30) months in a state correctional institution, to
          run concurrent to count 1; and on count 3, criminal use of
          a communication facility, five (5) years’ probation to run
          consecutive to counts 1 and 2. In addition, [Appellant] was
          directed not to have contact with minors, not to access the
          internet, and to register as a Tier III sexual offender.

          [Appellant] did not file a direct appeal from his judgment of
          sentence.

          On December 29, 2021, [Appellant] filed a pro se [PCRA]
          petition… This court appointed counsel, as it was a first
          PCRA. [Appellant] instead hired private counsel, Herbert
          Terrell, Esquire, who entered his appearance on March 18,
          2022. Mr. Terrell adopted [Appellant’s] pro se petition and
          filed a motion seeking a hearing on the PCRA petition.
          Following receipt by the court of [the] Commonwealth’s
          response and [Appellant’s] response to the response, a
          PCRA hearing was held before the undersigned on August
          15, 2022. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court
          granted [Appellant] leave to file a brief regarding the
          timeliness of the PCRA petition.[1] On August 28, 2022,
          counsel filed a brief with the court and a motion seeking to
          amend [Appellant’s] PCRA petition, challenging the sexual
          offender registration requirements.

____________________________________________

1 In his pro se petition, Appellant asserted the newly-discovered facts
exception to the PCRA time-bar, stating: “The actual and factual definitions
and elements relating to the criminal charges [were] not explained by [plea
counsel], where he employed me to plead guilty to charges I never committed,
and where there was no factual basis for, in relationship to the allegations and
charges, until informed by an in-house attorney.” (PCRA Petition, filed
12/29/21, at 3). Appellant also cited the new constitutional right exception
to the PCRA time-bar, but he later abandoned that proffered exception.

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          On October 11, 2022, the undersigned entered a final Order
          dismissing [Appellant’s] PCRA petition as untimely, without
          prejudice to [Appellant] to raise his [Sexual Offender
          Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”)2] claims in an
          alternate procedural filing pursuant to Commonwealth v.
          Lacombe, [660 Pa. 568, 234 A.3d 602 (2020)3].

          On November 9, 2022, [Appellant] filed a timely notice of
          appeal to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania. On November
          26, 2022, [Appellant] forwarded to this court his statement
          of the errors complained of on appeal, pursuant to
          Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(b).

(PCRA Court Opinion, filed December 14, 2022, at 1-3) (internal record

citations and footnotes omitted).

       Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

          The court erred by failing to ascertain, based upon a totality
____________________________________________

2 Following Commonwealth v. Muniz, 640 Pa. 699, 164 A.3d 1189 (2017)

(plurality), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 138 S.Ct. 925, 200 L.Ed.2d 213 (2018)
and Commonwealth v. Butler, 173 A.3d 1212 (Pa.Super. 2017) (“Butler
I”), rev’d, 657 Pa. 579, 226 A.3d 972 (2020) (“Butler II”), the Pennsylvania
General Assembly enacted legislation to amend SORNA I. See Act of Feb. 21,
2018, P.L. 27, No. 10 (“Act 10”). Act 10 amended several provisions of SORNA
I, and also added several new sections found at 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.42,
9799.51-9799.75. In addition, the Governor of Pennsylvania signed new
legislation striking the Act 10 amendments and reenacting several SORNA I
provisions, effective June 12, 2018. See Act of June 12, 2018, P.L. 1952, No.
29 (“Act 29”). Through Act 10, as amended in Act 29 (collectively, SORNA
II), the General Assembly split SORNA I’s former Subchapter H into a Revised
Subchapter H and Subchapter I. Subchapter I addresses sexual offenders
who committed an offense on or after April 22, 1996, but before December
20, 2012. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.51-9799.75. Subchapter I contains less
stringent reporting requirements than Revised Subchapter H, which applies to
offenders who committed an offense on or after December 20, 2012. See 42
Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.10-9799.42.         Here, Appellant’s offenses took place
between December 2018 and January 2019. Thus, the applicable registration
requirements fall under Revised Subchapter H.

3 We discuss Lacombe in our analysis of Appellant’s second issue on appeal.

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         of the facts, whether [Appellant’s] claim[ed] facts were
         unknown to [Appellant], and the court failed to make a
         finding as to whether [Appellant] exercised due diligence in
         bringing the matter to the attention of the court. The PCRA
         petition was timely based upon a statutory exception for
         untimeliness.

         The court erred by not presently considering [Appellant’s]
         challenge to his SORNA sentence.

(Appellant’s Brief at 2).

      Our standard of review of the denial of a PCRA petition is limited to

examining whether the record evidence supports the court’s determination

and whether the court’s decision is free of legal error. Commonwealth v.

Ford, 947 A.2d 1251 (Pa.Super. 2008), appeal denied, 598 Pa. 779, 959 A.2d

319 (2008). This Court grants great deference to the findings of the PCRA

court if the record contains any support for those findings. Commonwealth

v. Boyd, 923 A.2d 513 (Pa.Super. 2007), appeal denied, 593 Pa. 754, 932

A.2d 74 (2007). If the record supports a post-conviction court’s credibility

determination, it is binding on the appellate court.       Commonwealth v.

Dennis, 609 Pa. 442, 17 A.3d 297 (2011).

      In his first issue, Appellant argues that plea counsel did not explain to

him the elements of the offenses of IDSI or criminal use of a communication

facility before Appellant entered his guilty plea. Appellant asserts that plea

counsel also failed to explain to Appellant the significance of entering a guilty

plea to attempted IDSI, in that Appellant “would become not only classified

as [a SVP] but in addition that, he would be subject to lifetime reporting and

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other requirements.”4 (Appellant’s Brief at 12-13). Appellant claims that the

PCRA court failed to determine that Appellant knew the elements of the

criminal charges to which he pled guilty at the time he entered the guilty plea.

Appellant insists the court improperly “imputed the fact of the plea addendum

to [Appellant] as conclusive that [Appellant] knew the facts or consequences

of the plea and sentence thus, the facts or consequences could not be newly-

discovered.”     (Id. at 14-15).        Appellant maintains that the PCRA court

interrupted Appellant multiple times during the PCRA hearing.          Appellant

emphasizes that he did not discover or fully understand the nature of the

charges to which he pled guilty, and the registration requirements associated

with his plea, until he received a parole board notice of the need to participate

in a sex offender program, dated December 30, 2020.

       Appellant contends that he had difficulty receiving court docket entries

once he began his investigation into his case and that his legal research was

thwarted due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Appellant avers he filed his pro se

PCRA petition within one year of December 30, 2020, the date he received

notice about the sex offender program. Appellant submits that there is no

longer a “public record presumption” from which the court could have

presumed that Appellant had access to his court documents. Appellant posits

____________________________________________

4 We note that Appellant was not deemed to be a SVP. (See N.T. Sentencing
Hearing, 2/10/20, at 3). (See also N.T. PCRA Hearing, 8/15/22, at 6-7, 18-
19).

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that the court should have developed a “full hearing record” at which plea

counsel and Appellant’s psychiatrist could have testified regarding Appellant’s

knowledge of the charges to which he pled guilty and the associated

registration consequences.5        Appellant concludes the PCRA court erred by

denying his PCRA petition as untimely, and this Court must grant relief. We

disagree.

       The timeliness of a PCRA petition is a jurisdictional requisite.

Commonwealth v. Zeigler, 148 A.3d 849 (Pa.Super. 2016).                  A PCRA

petition, including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one

year of the date the underlying judgment of sentence becomes final.           42

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). A judgment of sentence is final “at the conclusion of

direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the

United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of

time for seeking the review.”          42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3).   The statutory

exceptions to the PCRA time-bar allow very limited circumstances to excuse

the late filing of a petition; a petitioner must also assert the exception within

one year of the date the claim could have been presented. 42 Pa.C.S.A. §

9545(b)(1) and (b)(2).

____________________________________________

5 At the PCRA hearing, Appellant claimed he wanted to present testimony from

his psychiatrist to refute that Appellant is a “predator.” The court reiterated
to Appellant that he was not deemed a SVP (contrary to Appellant’s apparent
misconception), so such testimony would be unnecessary. (See N.T. PCRA
Hearing at 12, 38).

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      To satisfy the “newly-discovered facts” timeliness exception set forth in

Section 9545(b)(1)(ii), a petitioner must demonstrate that “he did not know

the facts upon which he based his petition and could not have learned those

facts earlier by the exercise of due diligence.” Commonwealth v. Brown,

111 A.3d 171, 176 (Pa.Super. 2015), appeal denied, 633 Pa. 761, 125 A.3d

1197 (2015). Due diligence requires the petitioner to take reasonable steps

to protect his own interests.     Commonwealth v. Carr, 768 A.2d 1164

(Pa.Super. 2001). A petitioner must explain why he could not have learned

the new fact(s) earlier with the exercise of due diligence; this rule is strictly

enforced. Commonwealth v. Monaco, 996 A.2d 1076 (Pa.Super. 2010),

appeal denied, 610 Pa. 607, 20 A.3d 1210 (2011).

      In Commonwealth v. Small, 662 Pa. 309, 238 A.3d 1267 (2020), our

Supreme Court made clear there is no longer a “public record presumption”

pursuant to which a court may find that information available to the public is

not a fact that was previously “unknown” to the petitioner. Nevertheless, the

Court clarified, “that [Appellant] is relieved of the public record presumption

does not mean that [Appellant] prevails. […] The textual requirements of the

time-bar exception remain.”      Id. at 340, 238 A.3d at 1286.        Therefore,

“although Small eliminates the public record presumption, it does not

abrogate the requirement that petitioners perform due diligence to discover

the facts upon which their claim is predicated.”      See Commonwealth v.

Keener, No. 1165 WDA 2021, 2022 WL 2359373, at *4 (Pa.Super. June 30,

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2022)    (unpublished      memorandum).          See   also   Commonwealth    v.

Robinson, No. 208 MDA 2020, 2021 WL 2935696, at *4 (Pa.Super. July 13,

2021) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, ___ Pa ___, 273 A.3d 504

(2022) (holding that even without public record presumption, appellant is still

expected to undertake reasonable efforts to uncover facts that may support

claim for collateral relief).6

       Instantly, the court sentenced Appellant on February 10, 2020.

Appellant did not file a direct appeal. Thus, his judgment of sentence became

final thirty days later on March 11, 2020, upon expiration of the time for filing

a notice of appeal with this Court. See Pa.R.A.P. 903(a) (allowing 30 days to

file notice of appeal). See also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). Appellant had

until March 11, 2021 to file a timely PCRA petition.          See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §

9545(b)(1). Appellant filed the current PCRA petition on December 29, 2021,

which is facially untimely.

       Appellant now attempts to invoke the “newly-discovered facts”

exception to the PCRA time-bar at Section 9545(b)(1)(ii). The PCRA court

evaluated Appellant’s claimed exception and denied relief, reasoning:

          At the time of [Appellant’s] guilty plea he filled out an eight-
          page guilty plea colloquy form where he initialed every page
          and checked all of the appropriate boxes indicating that he
          understood his actions of entering a guilty plea. In addition
          to the standard guilty plea form [Appellant] filled out an
          Addendum regarding sexual offenders. [Appellant] initialed
____________________________________________

6 See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (stating we may rely on non-precedential decisions
from this Court filed after May 1, 2019, for persuasive value).

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          each point of the two page addendum indicating that he
          read and understood each point. Specifically, he initialed
          Point 3 indicating he understood that he was a Tier 3
          offender, and as such would have to:

              “register my current address with the Pennsylvania
              State Police and provide other information required by
              law to the Pennsylvania State Police prior to my
              release from incarceration, prior to parole from a
              State or county correction facility or upon beginning a
              sentence of intermediate punishment or probation.”
              (See Addendum to Guilty Plea Statement dated
              September 6, 2019).

          [Appellant] also initialed Point 10, acknowledging that he
          read and understood that “if I have a conviction for a Tier
          Three offense ... I will be subject to lifetime registration.
          The period of registration shall be Lifetime.”           (See
          Addendum to Guilty Plea Statement dated September 6,
          2019). In initialing the addendum, [Appellant] indicated
          that he understood that he was a Tier 3 offender, and that
          as a Tier 3 offender he was subject to a lifetime registration
          requirement.[7] The word lifetime is not a legal term of art,
          but rather a word in the daily lexicon that is obvious in its
          meaning and intention.

          In addition to the written colloquies, [Appellant] was
          colloquied on the record at the time of his guilty plea. He
          stated while under oath that he understood that he was
          pleading guilty and that he did not have any questions for
          his attorney. Additionally, [Appellant] indicated on the
          record that he understood the requirements associated with
          the sexual offenders addendum and that he understood he
          would be a lifetime registrant.

          At the PCRA hearing held before the court on August 15,
          2022, [Appellant] acknowledged initialing the guilty plea
____________________________________________

7 Further, the record includes an Appendix to the Addendum which specifies

the crimes that fall under the respective tiers. The description of Tier III
offenses expressly includes the crime of IDSI, as well as an attempt,
conspiracy, or solicitation to commit any of the crimes listed under that
section.

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         and addendum, yet stated that he didn’t fully understand
         the aforementioned plain language of the guilty plea. When
         questioned by the court, [Appellant] stated that he did not
         question his lawyers about this lack of understanding. To
         qualify for the timeliness exception [Appellant] would have
         to be unable to ascertain the unknown facts despite the
         exercise of due diligence. As the court indicated at the
         hearing, [Appellant] needed only to speak with his lawyer in
         the months following either his guilty plea or sentencing so
         as to understand his sentence.

         It is clear to this court that [Appellant] was provided all of
         the necessary facts. The mere fact that [Appellant] is not
         happy with the reality of the registration requirements does
         not qualify as unknown or newly discovered facts for the
         purpose of the PCRA time bar exceptions.6

            6 Any allegation that [Appellant’s] guilty plea was not

            knowing, intelligent and voluntary is not the same as
            an allegation that there were facts unknown to
            [Appellant]. [Appellant] had an opportunity on post-
            sentence motion, direct appeal or via a timely PCRA
            petition to assert that his guilty plea wasn’t knowing,
            intelligent or voluntary, or that counsel was ineffective
            in procuring a guilty plea that was not knowing,
            intelligent or voluntary. [Appellant] did not file a post-
            sentence motion, he did not file a direct appeal, nor
            did he file a timely PCRA. [Appellant] cannot now
            assert that his guilty plea was not knowing, intelligent,
            or voluntary.

(PCRA Court Opinion at 5-7) (some internal record citations omitted).

      The record supports the court’s analysis.       See Ford, supra.    Here,

Appellant would have known since the time of his guilty plea whether plea

counsel explained to him the elements of the offenses to which he was

pleading guilty. Additionally, the record makes clear Appellant knew at the

time of his guilty plea the registration requirements he was facing as a result

of his plea. Even if Appellant did not fully understand the consequences of his

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plea at that time, Appellant failed to exercise due diligence in discovering

those consequences, to satisfy the time-bar exception. See Monaco, supra;

Carr, supra. Further, even if we do not presume that Appellant had access

to his own public records, any lack of access to those records does not excuse

Appellant’s failure to exercise due diligence.     See Small, supra; Keener,

supra; Robinson, supra.           Therefore, we agree with the PCRA court that

Appellant’s PCRA petition remains time barred.

       In his second issue, Appellant argues that the court erred by denying

his request to amend his PCRA petition to challenge the constitutionality of

the SORNA registration requirements. Appellant recognizes that our Supreme

Court set forth in Lacombe that the PCRA is not the exclusive avenue for

challenging the registration requirements. Nevertheless, Appellant claims that

“no court has held…that a post conviction challenge must or should be

undertaken in a proceeding separate and distinct from a pending PCRA case.”

(Appellant’s Brief at 19). Appellant insists that Pa.R.Crim.P. 9058 is intended

to provide PCRA petitioners an opportunity to amend their pleadings.

Appellant concludes the court erred by denying him a chance to amend his

PCRA petition to attack the constitutionality of SORNA, and this Court must

grant relief. We disagree.

____________________________________________

8 See Pa.R.Crim.P. 905(A) (stating: “The judge may grant leave to amend or

withdraw a petition for post-conviction collateral relief at any time.
Amendment shall be freely allowed to achieve substantial justice”).

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     In general, the plain language of the PCRA mandates that claims which

could be brought under the PCRA, must be brought under the PCRA.            See

Commonwealth v. Hall, 565 Pa. 92, 96-97, 771 A.2d 1232, 1235 (2001).

Significantly, however, our Supreme Court “has not yet required that sexual

offender registration statutes be challenged through the PCRA or some other

procedural mechanism.”     Lacombe, supra at 594, 234 A.3d at 617. The

Lacombe Court explained:

        Indeed, we have consistently decided cases regarding
        sexual offender registration statutes that were challenged
        via different types of filings. See Muniz, supra (successful
        challenge to constitutionality of SORNA via direct appeal);
        Commonwealth v. Martinez, 147 A.3d 517 (Pa. 2016)
        (successful challenge to increase of registration term
        through “Petition to Enforce Plea Agreement or for a Writ of
        Habeas Corpus” where PCRA petition would have been
        untimely), A.S. v. Pa. State Police, 143 A.3d 896, 903 n.7
        (Pa. 2016) (successful challenge to registration term
        through mandamus action against PSP), [Commonwealth
        v. Williams, 832 A.2d 962 (Pa. 2003)] (unsuccessful
        challenge to constitutionality of Megan’s Law II through
        “Motion for Extraordinary Relief” and “Motion for Relief”).
        Our approach in this regard takes into account the fact that
        frequent changes to sexual offender registration statutes,
        along with more onerous requirements and retroactive
        application, complicate registrants’ ability to challenge new
        requirements imposed years after their sentences become
        final.

        This is especially so under the PCRA as many
        registrants…would be ineligible for relief on timeliness
        grounds. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1) (PCRA petition
        must be filed within one year of judgment of sentence
        becoming final unless exception applies). Other registrants
        may be ineligible because their sentence has expired while
        their registration requirements continue. See 42 Pa.C.S.A.
        § 9543(a)(1) (PCRA petitioner must be serving sentence to
        be eligible for relief). Both situations arise from the fact that

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          the registration period does not begin until registrants are
          released from prison, which may be well after their sentence
          has become final or may signal the completion of their
          sentence. Accordingly, we decline to find the PCRA, or any
          other procedural mechanism, is the exclusive method for
          challenging sexual offender registration statutes….

Id. at 594-95, 234 A.3d at 617-18.9

       Instantly, the PCRA court reasoned:

          Following the hearing, prior to this court’s Order, [Appellant]
          sought permission for leave to amend the PCRA petition so
          as to raise a challenge to the constitutionality of SORNA. As
          addressed infra, [Appellant] does not then overcome one
          of the PCRA timeliness exceptions [regarding the claims
          raised in his first PCRA petition]. As such, this court denied
          the motion to amend as an amended PCRA petition would
          still be untimely. However, pursuant to [Lacombe], this
          court’s Order was entered without prejudice to [Appellant’s]
          right to raise his SORNA claims in a proper alternate
          pleading. Lacombe determined that the PCRA is not the
          sole procedural method for raising challenges to the SORNA
          requirements, due to the strict one-year PCRA filing
          limitation.     Rather, the Supreme Court allowed for
          alternative motions that would not be subjected to the one-
          year limitation of the PCRA to raise objections to the SORNA
          requirements.

          Despite this court’s order granting [Appellant] leave to file
          a motion raising his objections to the SORNA requirements,
          [Appellant] opted to appeal this court’s order denying the
____________________________________________

9 We recognize that Lacombe dealt with registration requirements under
Subchapter I, whereas Appellant’s reporting requirements arise under Revised
Subchapter H. Nevertheless, this Court has applied this aspect of the
Lacombe decision (relative to the avenue by which challenges to registration
requirements can be raised) in cases involving Revised Subchapter H
offenders. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Ward, No. 1580 EDA 2020
(Pa.Super. filed Aug. 9, 2021) (unpublished memorandum) (holding that
lower court had jurisdiction to review appellant’s Revised Subchapter H
SORNA challenges outside framework of PCRA under Lacombe). See also
Pa.R.A.P. 126(b).

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         PCRA. [Appellant] has not, as of this date, filed a separate
         SORNA motion.

(PCRA Court Opinion at 7-8) (internal citations omitted).

      Here, the PCRA court correctly noted that the challenges to the SORNA

registration requirements which Appellant sought to raise in his amended

PCRA petition, could not somehow render timely the claims raised in his initial

PCRA petition. Given that some of Appellant’s claims would be time-barred

(as discussed in our analysis of Appellant’s first issue), while the court could

consider the SORNA-related challenges outside of the PCRA’s time restrictions

(see Lacombe, supra), we see no reason to disrupt the court’s denial of

Appellant’s petition to amend without prejudice to his right to raise the

SORNA-related challenges in a separate filing. See Ford, supra. Accordingly,

we affirm the order denying PCRA relief.

      Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 7/26/2023

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