Court Opinion

ID: 9486363
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 11:46:08.460271+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:51:41.081105
License: Public Domain

*480EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur in the judgment of the Court to the extent that it holds “[sjummary judgment should have been granted to defendant Ca-plinger on the grounds of qualified immunity.” However, I respectfully dissent from the Court’s judgment that “Jane Doe has, in a manner sufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment, stated a claim under § 1983 that defendant Lankford was deliberately indifferent to his subordinate’s violation of her constitutional right to bodily integrity” — essentially for the reasons so forcefully articulated by Judges Garwood and Jones in their dissenting opinions, in which I join.1
I write separately, however, to comment on an issue fundamental to § 1983 that the majority opinion essentially ignores and the concurring opinion only briefly addresses: the lack of state action.2
I
The concurring opinion correctly focuses on “the circle of liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Concurring op. at 459. “We have interpreted section 1983 to require a court to determine whether a rights violation occurred, whether it occurred under the color of state law, and whether the particular state actor or actors before the court caused the violation.” Id. (citing Bush v. Viterna, 795 F.2d 1203, 1209 (5th Cir.1986)). Under the second prong of the Bush test, the concurrence concludes that, based on Stroud’s position as a teacher, “the deprivation of liberty[ — whether such deprivation occurred on or off school grounds — joccurred under the col- or of state law”:
[T]he approval which Stroud, conferred on Doe is both one of the most common and one of the most effective tools used by teachers in affecting the behavior of their students. It is precisely this use by Stroud of his position of authority to which I point. The very official nature of this attention facilitated his efforts — and indeed enabled him — to violate her rights.
Id. at 462 (emphasis added).
Stroud’s official interactions with Doe and his sexual involvement with her together constituted an indivisible, ongoing relationship. The special attention Stroud gave Doe as her teacher afforded him the opportunity to exert his influence. He levered his authority to press upon Doe his sexual desires, while both on and off school grounds. He treated Doe differently than he treated other members of his class. He gave her good grades, required of her less work than other students, and allowed her to behave as she liked in his classroom. This manipulative course of conduct was an abuse of power conferred by the state. I am persuaded that Stroud acted under color of state law.
Id. at 462 (emphasis added). With less analysis, the majority opinion concludes that Stroud acted under color of state law because a “real nexus exists between the activity out of which the violation occurfred] and the teacher’s duties and obligations as a teacher.”3 Maj. op. at 452 n. 4. Determining whether such a “nexus” supports a finding of state action for the purposes of § 1983, suffi*481cient to withstand a motion for summary judgment, requires a review of case authority on the following issue — what grant of authority under state law to a state official is required to support a finding of state action.
II
A
“Section 1988 provides a remedy against ‘any person’ who, under color of state law, deprives another of rights protected by the Constitution.”4 Collins v. City of Harker Heights, — U.S. -, -, 112 S.Ct. 1061, 1066, 117 L.Ed.2d 261 (1992) (emphasis added). Thus, in any cause of action brought under § 1983, a fundamental “question that must be asked is whether the alleged deprivation of a federal right has been accomplished by state action.” Bush v. Viterna, 795 F.2d 1203, 1209 (5th Cir.1986) (citation omitted). To answer this question, “it will obviously be necessary to consult state law in order to decide whether the deprivation occurred ‘under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage’ of the state.” Id.
1
The Supreme Court has established two lines of cases that must be consulted when determining whether state action exists. The first line of eases, represented by Barney v. City of New York, 193 U.S. 430, 437, 24 S.Ct. 502, 503, 48 L.Ed. 737 (1904), holds that state action does not exist when the act complained of “was not only not authorized, but was forbidden by [state] legislation.”5
In Barney, the plaintiff sought to enjoin the construction of a subway tunnel adjacent to his property, contending that it would deprive him of his property in violation of the Due Process Clause because the tunnel was being built closer to his property than was authorized by the relevant resolutions. The lower court dismissed the bill for want of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed, finding that no state action occurred because “the construction of the ... tunnel section was not only not authorized, but was forbidden by the legislation, and hence was not action by the State of New York within the intent and meaning of the 14th Amendment.” Id. at 437, 24 S.Ct. at 503; see also id. at 441, 24 S.Ct. at 505 (“In the present case defendants were proceeding, not only in violation of provisions of state law, but in opposition to plain provisions.”). Consequently, the plaintiff did not state a federal cause of action because “it is for the state courts to remedy acts of state officers done without the authority of, or contrary to, state law.” Id. at 438, 24 S.Ct. at 503; see id. at 439, 24 S.Ct. at 504 (“ ‘The wrongful act of an individual, unsupported by any [state] authority, is simply a private wrong, or a crime of that individual; an invasion of the rights of the injured party, it is true, ... but if not sanctioned in some way by the state, or not done under state authority, his rights remain full in force and may presumably be vindicated by resort to the laws of the state for redress.’ ”) (quoting The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 16-17, 3 S.Ct. 18, 25-26, 27 L.Ed. 835 (1883)).6
*482In Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 64 S.Ct. 397, 88 L.Ed. 497 (1944), the plaintiff contended that the defendants, members of the Illinois State Primary Canvassing Board, violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights when they failed and subsequently refused to file with the Secretary of State a certificate listing the plaintiff as a candidate for a seat in the state assembly. Justice Frankfurter stated that the Board’s dereliction of its duty did not constitute state action because the Board violated state law by not filing a correct certificate:
I am unable to grasp the principle on which the State can here be said to deny the plaintiff the equal protection of the laws of the State when the foundation of his claim is that the Board had disobeyed the authentic command of the State....
I am clear, therefore, that the action of the Canvassing Board taken, as the plaintiff himself acknowledges, in defiance of the duty of that Board under Illinois law, cannot be deemed the action of the State....7
Id. at 17, 64 S.Ct. at 405 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (citing Barney).
2
The second line of Supreme Court cases holds that state action is established if the state official “ha[s] jurisdiction to [act] under the laws of the state,” Raymond v. Chicago Union Traction Co., 207 U.S. 20, 37, 28 S.Ct. 7, 13, 52 L.Ed. 78 (1907), and “misuses the power possessed to do a wrong forbidden by the [Constitution].” Home Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278, 287, 33 S.Ct. 312, 315, 57 L.Ed. 510 (1913).
In Raymond, the plaintiff company alleged that the Illinois state board of equalization— a body “provided by the state for the purpose of raising the public revenue by way of taxation” of corporations — violated the Fourteenth Amendment by making certain assessments upon it. The Supreme Court found that the board’s ratification of the challenged assessment constituted state action because “the board was making an assessment which it had jurisdiction to make under the laws of the state.” 207 U.S. at 37, 28 S.Ct. at 13. Because the state had specifically granted to the board the power to make the assessments that the plaintiff had challenged, the Court determined that Barney, which held that “where the act complained of was forbidden by the state legislature, it could not be said to be the act of the State,” id., did not control.8
*483Similarly, the plaintiff in Home Telephone alleged that the city of Los Angeles, by adopting an ordinance setting rates for telephone services at confiscatory levels, violated the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as the state constitution. The city contended that “the , [Fourteenth] Amendment deals only with acts of state officers within the strict scope of the public powers possessed by them, and does not include an abuse of power by an officer as the result of a wrong done in excess of the power delegated.” 227 U.S. at 286, 33 S.Ct. at 315. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that state action occurs “where an officer or other representative of a state, in the exercise of the authority with which he is clothed, misuses the power possessed to do a wrong forbidden by the [Fourteenth] Amendment.” Id. Where the state grants an official the authority to act and the official acts pursuant to that authority but exceeds the limits of the grant, “inquiry into whether the state has authorized the wrong is irrelevant.” Id. (emphasis added). Accordingly, the city’s conduct constituted state action because “acts done under the authority of a municipal ordinance passed in virtue of power conferred by a state are embraced by the 14th Amendment.” Id. at 292, 33 S.Ct. at 317; see also id. at 286, 33 S.Ct. at 315 (“the settled construction of the Amendment is that it presupposes the possibility of an abuse by a state officer ... of the powers possessed, and deals with such a contingency”) (emphasis added).
3
The Supreme Court first applied the lessons of the Fourteenth Amendment inquiries to the “under color of law” issue in three criminal cases: United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 61 S.Ct. 1031, 85 L.Ed. 1368 (1941); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 65 S.Ct. 1031, 89 L.Ed. 1495 (1945); and United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 80 S.Ct. 519, 4 L.Ed.2d 524 (1960).
In Classic, the government charged that the defendants, Louisiana election officials, altered and falsely counted ballots cast in a primary election, in violation of the federal criminal civil rights counterpart to § 1983. See 18 U.S.C. § 242. Relying on Home Telephone’s definition of state action, the Court held that “[m]isuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is. clothed with the authority of state law, is action taken ‘under color of state law.”9 Id. 313 U.S. at 326, 61 S.Ct. at 1043. Consequently, the officials acted under color of state law when altering and falsely counting the ballots because their acts “were committed in the course of their performance of duties under the Louisiana statute requiring them to count the ballots, to record the result of the count, and to certify the result of the election.” Id. at 325-26, 61 S.Ct. at 1042-43.
The government in Screws charged that the defendants — a Georgia sheriff, policeman, and special deputy — arrested and then beat to death Robert Hall, a young African-American, in violation of the federal criminal civil rights counterpart to § 1983. Citing Classic for the principle that misuse of authority possessed by virtue of state law constitutes action taken under color of state law, the Court held that the defendants acted under color of state law in assaulting Hall because “they were officers of the law who made the arrest [and, b]y their own admissions they assaulted Hall in order to protect themselves and to keep their prisoner from escaping. It was their duty under Georgia law to make the arrest effective.” Id. at 107-08, 65 S.Ct. at 1038.
Raines involved government allegations that a Georgia county Board of Registrars had racially discriminated against African-Americans who sought to register to vote, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1971. The court held that “the conduct charged — discrimination by state officials, within the course of their official duties, against the voting rights of United States citizens, on grounds of race or color — [was] certainly ... ‘state action.’ ” Id. at 25, 80 S.Ct. at 525. The Court also *484rejected the defendants’ argument that their conduct did not constitute state action because the “higher echelons of authority in the State” had not yet approved it: “every state official, high and low, is bound by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.”10 Id. Clearly, by 1960 a state official could not argue that he did not act under color of state law because his conduct violated state law if, at the time of acting, he possessed a general grant of authority from the state and misused it.11
The Supreme Court first addressed § 1983’s “under color of law” requirement in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961), overruled in part on other grounds, Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). The Monroes sued the city of Chicago, among others, under § 1983, alleging that thirteen Chicago police officers broke into their home without a warrant, roused them from bed, made them stand naked while the officers ransacked their home, and then took James Monroe to the police station where he was interrogated for ten hours. The city argued that because the officers’ conduct violated both the Illinois constitution and state laws prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures, § 1983’s requirement that the challenged acts be taken under color of state law had not been met. 365 U.S. at 172, 81 S.Ct. at 476. The Court rejected this argument, holding that the phrase “under color of state law” includes deprivations of constitutional rights effected by state officials acting in violation of state law.12 Id. at 183, 81 S.Ct. at 482. The Court then held that the police officers acted under color of state law by abusing the authority granted to them by the state to effect searches and seizures.13
B
Although it has been stated that Barney has been “ ‘so restricted by ... later deci*485sions’ ” that it “must be regarded as having ‘been worn away by the erosion of time’ ... and of contrary authority,”14 Raines, 362 U.S. at 26, 80 S.Ct. at 525 (citations omitted), Barney, like Doe’s claim, can be distinguished from the later eases on one ground particularly relevant to today’s decision: Barney involved a state official acting in the complete absence of authority,15 while all the later cases involved state officials acting pursuant to, but exceeding, a general grant of authority from the state. See Raymond, 207 U.S. at 37, 28 S.Ct. at 13 (“the board was making an assessment which it had jurisdiction to make under the laws of the state”); Home Telephone, 227 U.S. at 294, 33 S.Ct. at 317 (the challenged “acts [were] done under the authority of a municipal ordinance passed in virtue of power conferred by a state”); Classic, 313 U.S. at 325-26, 61 S.Ct. at 1042-43 (challenged acts “were committed in the course of [the officials’] performance of duties under the Louisiana statute”); Screws, 325 U.S. at 107-08, 65 S.Ct. at 1038 (officials were fulfilling “their duty under Georgia law”); Raines, 362 U.S. at 25, 80 S.Ct. at 525 (“discrimination by state officials, within the course of their official duties”); Monroe, 365 U.S. at 183, 81 S.Ct. at 482 (police officers abusing the authority granted to them by the state to effect reasonable searches and seizures).
Accordingly, Barney appears to be at odds with Home Telephone and its progeny only if one fails to examine the relevant grant of authority to the state actor under state law in each case. For example, as Monroe held, acts taken pursuant to — but exceeding — a general grant of authority will give rise to a § 1983 claim when such acts deprive a person of a constitutionally protected right. Thus, the police officers in Monroe, while unquestionably violating state law, acted under color of state law because. they acted pursuant to a general grant of authority. In other words, the police officers exercised the legitimate authority granted by the state to conduct searches of homes and arrest persons suspected of criminal activity. However, the officers exceeded the limits of that authority by effecting an unreasonable search and seizure. Consequently, the Mon-roes could sue under § 1983 because the officers misused or abused the otherwise legitimate authority granted to them by state law.16 Cf. Screws, 325 U.S. at 110, 65 S.Ct. at 1039 (noting that in both Classic and Screws, the “officers of the State were performing their official duties; in each the power which they were authorized to exercise was misused.”).17
*486However, not all unlawful actions taken by state officials are taken under color of law. See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 111, 65 S.Ct. 1031, 1040, 89 L.Ed. 1495 (1945) (“It is clear that under ‘color’ of law means under ‘pretense’ of law. Thus acts of officers in the ambit of their personal pursuits are plainly excluded. Acts of officers who undertake to perform their official duties are included whether they hew to the line of their authority or overstep it.”); see also Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 146, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 2696, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979) (noting that even intentional torts do not become constitutional violations merely because the tortfeasors are state officials). In Barney, the board did not have the power to allow the construction of the railroad tunnel in a place different from that authorized by the relevant resolutions because the board had no general authority to depart from the resolutions.18 Consequently, by approving a different construction site, the state officials did not exceed the limits of their authority, as in Monroe, but rather acted in the complete absence of authority. As a result, the board’s departure from the approved plans constituted a breach of state law and could not constitute action taken under color of state law. Thus, the Court found that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was not violated by the board’s illegal acts.19
Ill
“Jane Doe brought this § 1983 civil rights lawsuit against Stroud, the school district, Superintendent Caplinger, and Principal Lankford[,] ... charging] inter alia that these defendants, while acting under color of state law, deprived her of her constitutional rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Maj. op. at 449-50. After initially finding that “the Constitution protects a schoolchild from physical sexual abuse — here, sexually fondling a 15-year old school girl and statutory rape — by a public school teacher,” id. slip op. at 2868, the majority interprets Doe’s claim against defendants Caplinger and Lankford as alleging “failures of supervisors to prevent substantive due process violations occasioned by [Stroud]” that demonstrate a “deliberate indifference to ... her constitutional rights.” Id. at 451. Accordingly, for the supervisors to be liable, Stroud must have been acting under color of state law when committing the acts that Doe alleges violated her right to due process.20 The majority, however, gives short shrift to this *487initial question:21 whether an actor, engaged in the physical sexual abuse of a student, is acting under color of state law.
The concurring opinion concludes that, because (1) the school district placed Stroud in a position of authority, (2) the special attention Stroud gave Doe as her teacher afforded him the opportunity to exert an influence over her, and (3) Stroud used this influence to press his sexual desires upon her, Stroud’s manipulative conduct constituted an abuse of power conferred by the state. I agree that the school placed Stroud in a position of authority, that Stroud’s position afforded him the opportunity to exert an influence over Doe, and that Stroud used his position in his attempts to persuade Doe to have sex with him. However, “eonsult[ing] state law” as required by Bush, 795 F.2d at 1209,1 do not believe that these facts justify finding that Stroud acted under color of state law.
Clearly, the State of Texas did not authorize, “under color of any statute, ordinance, or regulation, custom, or usage,” either the sexually fondling of a 15-year old student or statutory rape. In fact, Texas has specifically proscribed such conduct.22 To paraphrase the majority opinion, [n]o reasonable public school official in 1987 would have assumed that he could, with [state criminal] immunity, sexually molest a minor student.” Maj. op. at 455. Thus, the state, by authorizing Stroud to teach students, did not give him the authority to violate state criminal law by sexually abusing his students. Accordingly, it is only in the sense that Stroud had no grant of authority to sexually abuse Doe that one can suggest or argue that Stroud misused or abused his position as a teacher. Consequently, Stroud, bent upon violating state criminal law, did not act under color of state law when doing so.23
Nor is the fact that Stroud used his position as teacher to press his sexual desires upon Doe sufficient to conclude that Stroud acted under color of state law. If misuse or abuse of position was sufficient to demonstrate action occurring under color of state law, then every intentional tort committed by a state official — which is, essentially, what Stroud’s conduct amounts to — would give rise to a § 1983 claim. Both the Supreme Court and this Court, however, have rejected this view. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 544, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 1917, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 *488(1981) (noting that not every injury inflicted by a state official acting under color of state law is actionable under § 1988); Baker, 443 U.S. at 146, 99 S.Ct. at 2696 (noting that intentional torts do not become constitutional violations merely because the tortfeasors are state officials); Doe v. State of La., 2 F.3d 1412, 1421 (5th Cir.1993) (concurring opinion) (noting that while “the actions of which Doe complains are egregious”, that fact alone “does not mean that he has asserted the violation of a federally protected right, as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1983”); Fee v. Herndon, 900 F.2d 804, 808 (5th Cir.) (“[T]he Constitution is not a criminal or civil code to be invoked invariably for the crimes or torts of state educators who act in contravention of the very laws designed to thwart [abuse by teachers].”), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 908, 111 S.Ct. 279, 112 L.Ed.2d 233 (1990). In fact, this Court has even held that a rape perpetrated by a state official was not an act under color of state law.24 City of Green Cove Springs v. Donaldson, 348 F.2d 197 (5th Cir.1965) (holding that a police officer’s rape of an “arrestee” was outside the scope of his employment); see also Screws, 325 U.S. at 108-09, 65 S.Ct. at 1039 (“The fact that a prisoner is assaulted, injured, or even murdered by state officials does not necessarily mean that he is deprived of any right protected or secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.”). Although Stroud unquestionably abused his position as a teacher, he did not abuse the authority granted to him by the state — the state did not grant him any authority, as a teacher or otherwise, to engage in sexual relations with or sexually fondle minor students.25 Stroud’s motive was lust; his intent, perversion; his actions, immoral and criminal — none of which are remotely pedagogic, rather pedophilic.
Accordingly, this case is not similar to Home Telephone or Monroe, where a state official had authority to take certain actions but exceeded the limits of that authority.26 *489Instead, this case is governed by Barney because Stroud had absolutely no state-sanctioned authority to engage in any type of sexual activity with Doe; Stroud, in this regard, had no authority to misuse or abuse. Cf. Screws, 325 U.S. at 111, 65 S.Ct. at 1040 (“We are not dealing here with a case where an officer not authorized to act nevertheless takes action.”). Because the laws of the State of Texas neither authorized or condoned, but rather proscribed the very acts of which Doe alleges violated her constitutional rights, I would hold that Stroud did not act under color of state law when statutorily raping or sexually fondling Doe. Consequently, Doe does not have a § 1983 cause of action against Lankford and Caplinger based upon their “failures [as] supervisors to prevent substantive due process violations occasioned by their subordinates,” and, therefore, I respectfully dissent.

.These dissenting opinions address the two prong analytical structure for claims of qualified immunity recently established by the Supreme Court. See Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, -, 111 S.Ct. 1789, 1793, 114 L.Ed.2d 277 (1992) (“A necessary concomitant to determination of whether the constitutional right asserted by a plaintiff is ‘clearly established’ at the time the defendant acted is the determination of whether the plaintiff has asserted a violation of a constitutional right at all.”) (“We think the Court of Appeals should not have assumed without deciding this preliminary issue in the case.”) Judge Jones has presented her arguments on the first prong of the Siegert analysis — “has [the plaintiff] asserted a violation of a constitutional right at all[?]” Judge Garwood has addressed the second prong — “whether the constitutional right asserted by [the] plaintiff is 'clearly established' at the time of the defendants] acted[?]”

. See infra note 5.

. See also infra note 21.

. Section 1983 states, in relevant part: "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, or regulation, custom, or usage, of any state ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. ..." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis added). Significantly, neither the word "position" nor “office” is used in the statute. Cf. Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 135, 109 S.Ct. 959, 968, 103 L.Ed.2d 99 (1989) (defining "under color of office” to mean “in the performance of [the official’s] duties”).

. Technically, Barney and the other Fourteenth Amendment cases referred to infra involve the question whether the actions of a state official constituted “state action” for the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment. However, these cases are relevant to the under-color-of-state-law inquiry because "in a § 1983 action brought against a state official, the statutory requirement of action 'under color of state law’ and the 'state action’ requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment are identical.” Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 929, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 2749, 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982).

. See also Lugar, 457 U.S. at 933, 102 S.Ct. at 2744, where a debtor brought a § 1983 claim against his corporate creditor and its president, alleging that they deprived him of his property without due process by obtaining a prejudgment attachment of the property pursuant to a Virginia *482statute. The Court agreed with the defendants’ contention that no state action occurred. "As a matter of substantive constitutional law the state-action requirement reflects judicial recognition of the fact that most rights secured by the Constitution are protected only against infringement by governments." Id. at 936, 102 S.Ct. at 2753 (citation omitted).
“In 1883, this Court in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 [3 S.Ct. 18, 27 L.Ed. 835], affirmed the essential dichotomy set forth in [the Fourteenth] Amendment between deprivation by the State, subject to scrutiny under its provisions, and private conduct, 'however discriminatory or wrongful,’ against which the Fourteenth Amendment offers no shield."
Id. (quoting Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349, 95 S.Ct. 449, 453, 42 L.Ed.2d 477 (1974)). Accordingly, “the conduct allegedly causing the deprivation of a federal right [must] be fairly attributable to the State" for a § 1983 cause of action to lie. Id. at 937, 102 S.Ct. at 2753. The Court held that the plaintiff had not stated a cause of action under § 1983 for misuse of the state statutory scheme because "the conduct of which [plaintiff] complained could not be ascribed to any governmental decision; rather, [defendants] were acting contrary to the relevant policy articulated by the State. Nor did they have the authority of state officials to put the weight of the State behind their private decision....” Id. at 940, 102 S.Ct. at 2755 (emphasis added).

. The majority, apparently disagreeing with Justice Frankfurter's analysis, found that the right alleged by the plaintiff to have been violated simply was "one secured to him by state statute and the deprivation of right [was] alleged to result solely from the Board’s failure to obey state law.” Id. 321 U.S. at 7, 64 S.Ct. at 400. Because the plaintiff did not contend "that the statutes of the state [were] in any respect inconsistent with the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment," id., the Court held that he had failed to allege a federal cause of action. Id. at 11, 64 S.Ct. at 402 ("Mere violation of a state statute does not infringe the federal Constitution.”).

. Justice Holmes — "unable to grasp the principle on which a state is said to deprive the [plaintiff] of its property without due process because a subordinate board, subject to the control of the supreme court of the state, is said to have violated the express requirement of the state in its *483Constitution” — disagreed. Id. 207 U.S. at 39, 28 S.Ct. at 14 (Holmes, J., dissenting).

. This statement is "founded on the rule announced in Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346-47, 25 L.Ed. 676 (1880), that the actions of a state officer who exceeds the limit of his authority constitute state action for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Lugar, 457 U.S. at 929, 102 S.Ct. at 2750 (emphasis added).

. The Court in Raines also stated that where the state official's conduct constitutes state action, "it makes no difference that the discrimination in question ... is also violative of state law.” 362 U.S. at 25, 80 S.Ct. at 525 (citing Snowden, 321 U.S. at 11, 64 S.Ct. at 403). The import of this statement is unclear, as the Court appeared to be responding to the defendants’ argument that state action does not exist until a lower official's conduct has been approved by a higher official— i.e., if the higher official reverses the lower official’s decision, the lower official’s decision then contravenes state law and does not constitute state action. Whatever the merits of this type of after-the-fact declaration, it is not relevant here because state criminal law unquestionably prohibited Stroud’s conduct.

. When a state gives an official a “general grant of authority,” the state empowers the official to act in the name of the state in certain diverse factual settings. Inherent in such a grant, then, is the discretion given to the official to determine exactly when and how to act. For example, by authorizing police officers to effect searches and seizures, the state gives the officers discretion to decide when and where to search. The state then attempts to control the officers' exercise of discretion by outlawing unreasonable searches and seizures. However, because the grant of authority necessarily entails that the officers exercise discretion, and because it is inevitable that police officers on occasion will mistakenly exercise their discretion to make an unreasonable search or seizure, the grant of authority implicitly recognizes that the officers can use it to violate state law. Thus, the officers, in effecting an unreasonable search, act under color of state law despite the fact that the state has outlawed the officers' actions.

. In so holding, the Monroe court relied upon Classic's construction of "under color of law” in the criminal context. Classic, in turn, relied upon Home Telephone's construction of "state action” in the Fourteenth Amendment context. Justice Frankfurter, although he joined in the opinion in Classic, dissented in Monroe, arguing that “police intrusion in violation of state law is not a wrong remediable under [§ 1983].” 365 U.S. at 242, 81 S.Ct. at 513.

. The Supreme Court initially defined the question presented in Monroe as "whether Congress, in enacting § [1983], meant to give a remedy to parties deprived of constitutional rights, privileges and immunities by an official’s abuse of his position." 365 U.S. at 172, 81 S.Ct. at 476 (emphasis added). However, the Court apparently considered this phrasing of the issue merely to be a restatement of Classic’s holding that “action taken under color of law” includes " '[mjisuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.' " Id. 365 U.S. at 184, 81 S.Ct. at 482 (quoting Classic, 313 U.S. at 326, 61 S.Ct. at 1043); see id. 365 U.S. at 186, 81 S.Ct. at 484 ("concluding] that the meaning given 'under color of' law in the Classic case and in the Screws ... case[ ] was the correct one”); see also Lugar, 457 U.S. at 940, 102 S.Ct. at 2755 (stating that Monroe *485adopted “the abuse of authority doctrine” in § 1983 cases).

. Justice Frankfurter, on the other hand, found "[n]either the wisdom of [Barney's] reasoning nor its holding ... impaired by subsequent decisions.” Snowden, 321 U.S. at 17, 64 S.Ct. at 405 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); see also Screws, 325 U.S. at 147-48, 65 S.Ct. at 1057 (dissenting opinion) ("It has never been satisfactorily explained how a State can be said to deprive a person of liberty or property without due process of law when the foundation of the claim is that a minor official has disobeyed the authentic command of his State.... [Barney ], which ruled otherwise, although questioned, has never been overruled.”).

. See Barney, 193 U.S. at 437, 24 S.Ct. at 503 (noting that the defendants’ act "was not only not authorized, but was forbidden by [state legislation]”); Lugar, 457 U.S. at 940, 102 S.Ct. at 2753 (finding that no state action occurred because the defendants "were acting contrary to the relevant policy articulated by the State ... [and did not] have the authority of state officials to put the weight of the State behind their private decision”).

. In each of this Circuit's cases, cited in either the majority or concurring opinion, the state actor — whether it be a police officer or a school teacher — -was generally authorized by the State to use force in certain situations. In none of these cases, however, did the state actor violate state law simply by using force or administering corporal punishment. Instead, it was only when the state actor exceeded his or her authority under state law that a constitutional violation occurred. Shillingford v. Holmes, 634 F.2d 263 (5th Cir.1981) (riot control during Mardi Gras); Jefferson v. Yselta Independent School Dist., 817 F.2d 303 (5th Cir.1987) (classroom discipline); Fee v. Herndon, 900 F.2d 804 (5th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 908, 111 S.Ct. 279, 112 L.Ed.2d 233 (1990). Accordingly, the challenged actions were taken under color of state law because they were taken pursuant to a general grant of authority.

. Similarly, Home Telephone did not squarely address the issue whether actions that were both taken in violation of state law and inconsistent with the actor’s grant of authority constitute state action. In that case, state law gave the city authority to enact ordinances setting telephone rates. Thus, when the city set the unlawful rates, it misused the authority granted to it but did not *486act without authority. Accordingly, the city's acts constituted state action even though they also violated state law. 227 U.S. at 292, 33 S.Ct. at 317.

. The board was "empowered to prescribe the routes and general plan of any proposed rapid transit railroad within the city.” Barney, 193 U.S. at 437, 24 S.Ct. at 503. However, the "[c]onsents of the municipal authorities and the abutting property owners to construction on the routes and plans adopted must be obtained, and any change in the detailed plans and specifications must accord with the general plan of construction, and, if not, like consents must be obtained to such change.” Id. Because the board had previously prescribed the routes and general plan of the tunnel by two resolutions, "which received the assent of the local authorities and of the appellate division of the supreme court in lieu of the consent of the abutting property owners,” id. at 431, 24 S.Ct. at 502, the board was required to obtain the consent of the local authorities and abutting property owners before making any changes to the plan of construction.

. This reading of Barney is supported by the Supreme Court's pronouncements on the liability of municipalities under § 1983 for acts taken by government officials. “[A] local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 694, 98 S.Ct. at 2037. Instead, it is only when "execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government entity is responsible under § 1983.” Id., 436 U.S. at 694, 98 S.Ct. at 2037-38; see also Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 486, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 1301, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986) (White, J., concurring) ("Local law enforcement officers are expected to obey the law.... Where the controlling law places limits on their authority, they cannot be said to have the authority to make contrary policy.”). Accordingly, if a state official without policy-making authority acts contrary to established policy, his conduct is not imputed to the state.

.If Stroud was not acting under color of state law when he engaged in intercourse with or fondled Doe, the supervisory defendants cannot be held liable under § 1983 because "nothing in the Due Process Clause requires the State to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by private actors.” DeSha-*487ney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 109 S.Ct. 998, 1003, 103 L.Ed.2d 249 (1989); see also Maldonado v. Josey, 975 F.2d 727, 731 (10th Cir.1992) (compulsory school attendance laws do not give rise to an affirmative constitutional duty to protect students from deprivations of constitutional rights by private actors), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 113 S.Ct. 1266, 122 L.Ed.2d 662 (1993); D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1372-73 (3d Cir.1992) (school authorities do not have an affirmative constitutional duty to protect students from sexual abuse by other students), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 1045, 122 L.Ed.2d 354 (1993); J.O. v. Alton Community Sch. Dist. 11, 909 F.2d 267, 272-73 (7th Cir.1990) (school officials do not have an affirmative constitutional duty arising out of their "special relationship” with students to protect students from sexual assault by a teacher).

.See maj. op. at 452 n. 4 ("As the court in D.T. recognized, if a ‘real nexus' exists between the activity out of which the violation occurs and the teacher's duty and obligations as a teacher, then the teacher’s conduct is taken under color of state law. [D.T. v. Independent Sch. Dist., 894 F.2d 1176, 1188 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 879, 111 S.Ct. 213, 112 L.Ed.2d 172 (1990)]. As demonstrated by the above facts, the nexus that was missing in D.T. was clearly present in this case. We therefore reject the school’s officials’ argument that Stroud's acts were not under col- or of state law.”). This statement of the issue begs the essential question.

. See Tex.Civ.Prac. and Rem.Code §§ 101.021 and .051 (1986); Tex.Educ.Code § 21.912(b) (1987); Tex. Penal Code § 22.011(a)(2) (1989); Salinas v. Fort Worth Cab & Baggage Co., 725 S.W.2d 701 (Tex.1987) (suit against cab company based on its employee’s rape of plaintiff). Stroud, in fact, "pled guilty to criminal charges stemming from his molestation of Jane Doe.” Maj. op. at 449.

. The fatal flaw in the majority’s analysis can be shown with one hypothetical: assume that a teacher shoots a student for not turning in his or her homework. Following the majority's approach, there exists a "real nexus” between the activity out of which the violation — i.e., the shooting — occurred and the teacher's duties and obligations as a teacher. Thus, the teacher acted under color of state law, and the student may bring a § 1983 action. Consequently, the majority essentially raises to the level of a constitutional violation all torts committed by teachers against students.

. See McLaren v. Imperial Casualty & Indem. Co., 767 F.Supp. 1364, 1370-71 (N.D.Tex.1991) (finding that a sexual assault committed by a police officer was, under Texas law, committed outside the scope of his employment), aff'd, 968 F.2d 17 (5th Cir.1992) (table: unpublished opinion), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 1269, 122 L.Ed.2d 665 (1993); Smith v. M Sys. Food Stores, Inc., 156 Tex. 484, 297 S.W.2d 112, 114 (1957) (holding as a matter of law that a police officer was not acting within the scope of his employment when assaulting an acquaintance of a woman he had detained); see also Morgan v. Tice, 862 F.2d 1495, 1499 (11th Cir.1989) (holding that a town manager did not act under color of state law when making allegedly defamatory statements about the plaintiff); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1467 (8th Cir.) (noting that if court-appointed guardians, therapists, and attorneys act beyond the scope of their official duties, they do not act under color of state law), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828, 108 S.Ct. 97, 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (1987); Bonsignore v. City of New York, 683 F.2d 635, 638-39 (2d Cir.1982) (finding that an off-duty police office did not act under color of state law when shooting his wife with his police-issued revolver because "his actions were not 'committed in the performance of any actual or pretended duty,' but were performed 'in the ambit of [his] personal pursuits’") (citations omitted); Delcambre v. Delcambre, 635 F.2d 407 (5th Cir. Unit A Jan. 26, 1981) (finding that a police chief was not acting under color of state law when involved in an altercation with his sister-in-law while he was on duty); Thomas v. Cannon, 751 F.Supp. 765 (N.D.Ill.1990) (“Assuming that [the defendant] was clothed in the authority of the state when performing his duties as a [transit worker], the attempt to rape two young girls [was] not an act even remotely related to the performance of his job. Thus, [he had] not acted under color of state law....").

. Although the state gave Stroud the authority to teach students, which implicitly gives Stroud the discretion regarding certain matters related to teaching the students, see supra note 11, the state did not give Stroud any authority to engage in any type of sexual relationship with students. Thus, this is not a case like Monroe — where the state gave police officers the discretion to effect reasonable searches and seizures and then tried to limit the officers’ exercise of discretion pursuant to that authority by outlawing unreasonable searches and seizures — but one where the state gave Stroud absolutely no discretion to engage in sexual relations with or sexually fondle his students. Stroud thus had no state-sanctioned power to engage in the acts Doe now challenges.

. Similarly, United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 86 S.Ct. 1152, 16 L.Ed.2d 267 (1966), involved state officials — and private citizens acting in conjunction with state officials — acting beyond the permissible limits of otherwise legitimate authority granted by the state. In Price, the defendant deputy sheriff detained three civil rights workers and then released them from state custody so that he could later intercept them and place them "in an official automobile of the ... Sheriff's office,” and transport them to an area so they could be assaulted and killed. Id. at 790, 86 S.Ct. at 1155; see also id. at 795, 86 S.Ct. at *4891157 ("the brutal joint adventure was made possible by state detention and calculated release of the prisoners by an officer of the State"); id. at 796, 86 S.Ct. at 1158 ("it was the purpose of the conspiracy that Deputy Sheriff Price would release [the victims] from custody” so that the other conspirators could kill them); id. at 799, 86 S.Ct. at 1159 (noting that the state officials used the state’s "sovereign power and office to release the victims from jail so that they ... could be intercepted and killed"). Because the deputy sheriff exceeded the limits of the authority granted to him by the state — i.e., the authority to arrest persons and release prisoners from state custody — he, along with his coconspirators, acted trader color of law.