Court Opinion

ID: 9783703
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 20:02:27.59824+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:35:33.548182
License: Public Domain

CUNNINGHAM, J.,
dissenting:
Respectfully, I must dissent because I do not believe the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to strike Jurors S.W. and A.W. for cause.
In Shane v. Commonwealth, 243 S.W.3d 336 (Ky.2007), this Court leveled the playing field by not forcing the defendant to give up a peremptory strike to get an ineligible juror removed from the panel. However, in doing so, we enhanced the consequences of a court failing to properly excuse a juror for cause. Therefore, we should more closely scrutinize juror questioning so as to be especially careful that we do not reverse serious criminal cases, such as this one, because of imperfect answers given by prospective jurors.
Because jurors are often unable to precisely articulate their answers to confusing and hypothetical voir dire questions, we have repeatedly stressed that a trial judge must assess the totality of a prospective juror’s responses. Id. at 338. Just as there are no “magic” words to rehabilitate a juror, there should be no “magic” words that automatically disqualify a juror. Along with the actual content of the responses, a juror’s demeanor, credibility, and sincerity should be taken into account. Adkins v. Commonwealth, 96 S.W.3d 779 (Ky.2003).
For this reason, we continually observe that the trial court, being physically present to observe the juror, is in the best position to assess that juror’s qualifications. Having set forth these standards for our trial courts, I believe this Court is obliged to likewise look to the totality of the juror’s responses and demeanor. In this case, the majority has disregarded these directives and based its decision solely on extracted responses and without any consideration of the demeanor or affect of Jurors S.W. and A.W.
*98In reviewing the video record of Juror S.W.’s responses, it is clear that her sincerity and credibility were immediately questioned. She first informed the court that she couldn’t be fair because some years earlier she had worked with “the girl,” referring to Gerald Sizemore’s wife, Bobbie. In fact, S.W. could not even remember Bobbie’s name and had to ask the trial court to remind her. She then continued that she couldn’t be fair because she knew “all about the case.” When pressed, she admitted that this personal knowledge was gleaned solely from articles in the newspaper. The majority is correct that S.W. gave equivocal answers, such as, “I guess,” and “It’s hard to say,” when asked if she could be fair and impartial in her deliberations. However, it is equally clear that S.W. had no articulable basis for her supposed bias and never identified any concrete reason for an inability to be impartial.
More compelling than S.W.’s responses is her demeanor, which is plainly evident, even on the video record. S.W. is smiling and, at times, chuckles while giving her responses to the trial court. When pressed by the court about her stated inability to be impartial, S.W. has no concrete response and simply smiles. Her sincerity was obviously doubted by the trial judge, who finally told her that he could “never seat a jury” if he had to rely only on people who actually wanted to be there.
We must not allow prospective jurors to manipulate the system by giving evasive and insincere answers in an attempt to evade their duty to serve. Trial judges must be given great latitude in dealing with such people. I see no abuse of discretion with respect to Juror S.W. Neither her relationship with Bobbie Sizemore nor her knowledge of the case was sufficient to automatically disqualify her. See Sholler v. Commonwealth, 969 S.W.2d 706, 709 (Ky. 1998); Foley v. Commonwealth, 953 S.W.2d 924, 932 (Ky.1997). When considered in their totality, S.W.’s demeanor and responses indicate an unwillingness — not an inability — to serve on the jury. The video record clearly supports this conclusion and, therefore, it cannot be said that the trial court abused its discretion.
The voir dire examination of Juror A.W. presents a similar situation. A.W. initially told the trial court that he was unable to serve because his back and neck were bothered by prolonged sitting. After being assured that periodic breaks would be provided, A.W. then revealed that he used to work with Gerald Sizemore for a period of three years about “fifteen or more” years ago. A.W. was pressed on this issue and gave inconsistent responses about his ability to put aside his personal acquaintance with the victim. Finally, A.W. interjected that, as a deacon in his church, he could not “judge anybody.” Again, when questioned further, A.W. provided inconsistent responses. Replying to leading questions, he stated both that he believed “it’s wrong” to sit in judgment of others, and that he “probably” could base a decision on the evidence alone and “do what’s right.”
The record very fairly supports the conclusion that A.W. was hesitant — but not unable — to serve as a juror. While, like S.W., this juror at times gave equivocal responses, he also provided assurance that he could be fair and impartial. “The trial judge properly may chose to believe those statements that were the most fully articulated or that appeared to have been least influenced by leading.” Mabe v. Commonwealth, 884 S.W.2d 668, 671 (Ky.1994) (quoting Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1038-39, 104 S.Ct. 2885, 81 L.Ed.2d 847 (1984)). We also cannot expect the trial court to ignore the fact that a juror provides reason after reason for disqualifica*99tion. Under such circumstance, it is reasonable for the trial court to doubt the juror’s sincerity.
I fear that we have recently diverged from a practical, real-world consideration of voir dire decisions and have adopted a hyper-technical approach that relies almost solely on “magic” words which automatically disqualify a juror. Here, the trial court assessed the totality of the responses of Jurors S.W. and A.W. and drew fair conclusions therefrom. Our review is for abuse of discretion and none occurred here. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.