Court Opinion

ID: 9962955
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-24 13:00:54.224706+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:54.927466
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-11407    Document: 29-1      Date Filed: 04/24/2024   Page: 1 of 7

                                                   [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                          Nos. 23-11407 & 23-11506
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
       versus
       MATTHEW MORAN,

                                                   Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeals from the United States District Court
                     for the Northern District of Georgia
                  D.C. Docket No. 3:20-cr-00009-TCB-RGV-1
                           ____________________
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       2                      Opinion of the Court                 23-11407

       Before WILSON, LUCK, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Matthew Moran appeals his sentence of 60 months’ impris-
       onment, following his conviction for a single count of wire fraud.
       On appeal, Moran argues that the district court abused its discre-
       tion by imposing an upward-variance sentence from his guideline
       range of 33 to 41 months’ imprisonment because the court failed
       to properly consider mitigating character evidence, gave too much
       weight to the victim impact statement, and failed to articulate a
       suﬃcient rationale for an upward variance.
               We review the substantive reasonableness of the district
       court’s sentence under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.
       Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). The abuse-of-discretion
       standard of review “allows a range of choice for the district court,
       including reasonable choices that we must aﬃrm even though we
       would have gone the other way had it been our call.” United States
       v. Castaneda, 997 F.3d 1318, 1331 (11th Cir. 2021) (internal quota-
       tions and citation omitted). The defendant bears the burden of
       showing that the district court’s chosen sentence is unreasonable
       considering the totality of the record and the § 3553(a) factors.
       United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2008).
              In evaluating the substantive reasonableness of a sentence,
       the relevant § 3553(a) factors include the nature and circumstances
       of the oﬀense and the history and characteristics of the defendant;
       the need for the sentence to reﬂect the seriousness of the oﬀense,
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       23-11407               Opinion of the Court                          3

       to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for
       the oﬀense; to aﬀord adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; to
       protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; the kinds
       of sentences available and the sentencing range; and the need to
       avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities among similarly-situated
       defendants convicted of similar conduct. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1),
       (a)(2)(A), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), (a)(4), (a)(6).
               We must give “due deference” to the district court because
       it has an “institutional advantage” in making sentencing determi-
       nations. United States v. Shaw, 560 F.3d 1230, 1238 (11th Cir. 2009)
       (citations omitted). While the district court must consider all ap-
       plicable § 3553(a) factors, the district court is permitted to engage
       in a “holistic” weighing of the § 3553(a) factors. United States v.
       Rosales Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1254 (11th Cir. 2015). The decision of
       how much weight to assign to a particular sentencing factor is
       “committed to the sound discretion of the district court,” and the
       district court is “permitted to attach ‘great weight’ to one factor
       over others.” Id. (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 57). The district court is
       not required to state or discuss each § 3553(a) factor explicitly, and
       “[a]n acknowledgement [that] the district court has considered the
       defendant’s arguments and the § 3553(a) factors will suﬃce.” Gon-
       zalez, 550 F.3d at 1324. In assigning weight to the § 3553(a) factors,
       the district court should consider the “particularized, speciﬁc facts”
       of the defendant’s case. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d at 1260. We have
       rejected “any across-the-board prescription regarding the appropri-
       ate deference to give the [Sentencing] Guidelines,” instead giving
       the district court signiﬁcant discretion to give heavier weight to any
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       4                      Opinion of the Court                23-11407

       of the § 3553(a) factors or a combination of factors than to the de-
       fendant’s guideline range. Id. at 1254.
               When the district court decides to impose an upward vari-
       ance, its justiﬁcations for doing so must be compelling enough “to
       support the degree of the variance and complete enough to allow
       [for] meaningful appellate review.” Shaw, 560 F.3d at 1238 (internal
       quotations and citation omitted). However, the district court re-
       tains wide discretion to decide whether the § 3553(a) factors justify
       a variance. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51-52. In imposing an upward variance,
       the district court “may consider conduct that a probation oﬃcer
       already had considered in calculating the defendant’s advisory
       guidelines range.” United States v. Johnson, 803 F.3d 610, 619 (11th
       Cir. 2015). The Supreme Court has stated that it is “uncontrover-
       sial” to require that a major variance be supported by “a more sig-
       niﬁcant justiﬁcation” than a minor variance. Gall, 552 U.S. at 50.
       However, even as to a substantial variance, we “will not reverse a
       sentence unless we are left with the deﬁnite and ﬁrm conviction
       that the district court committed a clear error of judgment in
       weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies
       outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of
       the case.” Johnson, 803 F.3d at 618-19.
              The district court’s sentence “need not be the most appro-
       priate one, it need only be a reasonable one.” United States v. Irey,
       612 F.3d 1160, 1191 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc). An indicator of a
       reasonable sentence is one that is well below the statutory maxi-
       mum for the crime. United States v. Dougherty, 754 F.3d 1353, 1364
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       23-11407               Opinion of the Court                          5

       (11th Cir. 2014). We may set aside a sentence only if we determine,
       after giving “a full measure of deference to [the district court], that
       the sentence imposed truly is unreasonable.” Irey, 612 F.3d at 1191.
       It is “only the rare sentence that will be substantively unreasona-
       ble.” United States v. Dixon, 901 F.3d 1322, 1351 (11th Cir. 2018) (ci-
       tation omitted).
              While the district court can and should consider “the history
       and characteristics of the defendant” pursuant to § 3553(a)(1), “that
       history cannot be considered in isolation and without regard to the
       criminal conduct for which the defendant has been convicted and
       the characteristics it reveals.” United States v. Howard, 28 F.4th 180,
       219-20 (11th Cir. 2022) (noting that, while the letters and oral state-
       ments of the defendant’s supporters were strong and relevant evi-
       dence of pre-criminal personal history and personal characteristics,
       “that factor cannot reasonably be held to outweigh all of the other
       § 3553 factors in [the] case” in light of the totality of the circum-
       stances). Furthermore, pursuant to the Crime Victims’ Rights Act
       (“CVRA”), victims have “[t]he right to be reasonably heard at any
       public proceeding in the district court involving release, plea, sen-
       tencing, or any parole proceeding.” 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(4).
               Here, Moran’s sentence was substantively reasonable. The
       district court considered the proper § 3553(a) factors and based its
       weighing of the § 3553(a) factors on the particularized, speciﬁc
       facts of Moran’s case. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d at 1260. The court
       stated initially that it found “the high end [of the guideline range]
       woefully inadequate.” The court then stated that there was a need
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       6                       Opinion of the Court                  23-11407

       for both speciﬁc and general deterrence because it believed that
       white-collar criminals, including Moran, needed to know that “you
       don’t commit a crime like this and then get probation.” 18 U.S.C.
       § 3553(a)(2)(B). The court also found that the nature and circum-
       stances of the oﬀense justiﬁed an upward-variance sentence be-
       cause Moran “repeatedly lied and manufactured evidence and ba-
       sically stole $3 million” in a manner that made him highly culpable.
       18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). The court stated, “I have been on the bench
       17 years . . . [and] I haven’t seen a whole lot of fraud cases that were
       more vicious and involved repeated misrepresentations,” which
       justiﬁed an upward variance to reﬂect the seriousness of the of-
       fense, even if the loss amount already was a factor considered in
       the calculation of the advisory guideline range. 18 U.S.C.
       § 3553(a)(2)(A); Johnson, 803 F.3d at 619. Considering the applicable
       § 3553(a) factors, the upward variance of 19 months to a total sen-
       tence of 60 months’ imprisonment was not an abuse of discretion
       by the court. Additionally, Moran’s sentence of 60 months’ impris-
       onment was well below the statutory maximum of 20 years’ im-
       prisonment, which is an indicator of a reasonable sentence.
       Dougherty, 754 F.3d at 1364.
               Furthermore, it was not an abuse of discretion for the dis-
       trict court to allow the admission of Paynter’s victim impact state-
       ment and to consider it as part of formulating an appropriate sen-
       tence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(4). The court agreed with Moran’s
       argument that Paynter’s victim impact statement should not be
       taken completely at face value because it obviously was not objec-
       tive, and thus contrary to Moran’s contention on appeal, the court
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       23-11407               Opinion of the Court                         7

       did not improperly rely on the content of the victim impact state-
       ment. The court reasonably could have concluded that aggravat-
       ing factors—such as the substantial loss amount of $3 million, Mo-
       ran engaging in repeated patterns of lying and falsifying docu-
       ments, and Moran taking the money so early after it was pro-
       vided—outweighed other mitigating factors, such as Moran’s gen-
       eral lack of criminal history and the fact others were willing to
       write letters or speak to Moran’s good character. Howard, 28 F.4th
       at 219-20. Furthermore, the district court clearly considered this
       mitigating evidence, as it noted that Moran’s sentence “[was] actu-
       ally a relaxation of how [the court] felt before [it] came in here” to
       listen to arguments for a sentence at the lower end of Moran’s
       guideline range. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). Thus, after giving “a full
       measure of deference to [the district court],” it is evident that Mo-
       ran’s case is not one where “the sentence imposed truly is unrea-
       sonable.” Irey, 612 F.3d at 1191.
             AFFIRMED.