Court Opinion

ID: 9466733
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 01:25:53.254919+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:39:55.439294
License: Public Domain

HENLEY, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part, dissenting in part.
The result reached by the majority is acceptable except as it deals with the issue of negligent assignment.
Since the district court did not reach the negligent assignment claim and the parties did not brief the issue, it might have been preferable to have remanded that entire issue for initial findings and conclusions by the district court. However, a majority of this panel has found that there was an assignment to heavy labor continuing beyond June 8, 1974, the critical date for limitations purposes, and has remanded for determination of the question whether that assignment was negligent and, if so, for determination of the amount of damages. I accept the majority’s finding of fact.
It seems to be conceded by all that appellant took leave of absence from heavy work as a sectionhand on December 7, 1973. Thus, we have a final date of injury no later than December 7, 1973 but perhaps a continuing technical assignment as a sectionhand after June 8, 1974.
In such circumstances the holding of the majority that there is a timely claim or tolling of the statute of limitations is troubling indeed.
It is elemental that for a statute of limitations to begin to run on a negligent act, some injury or damage must occur which will entitle the victim to maintain the cause of action. Continental Grain Co. v. Fegles Const. Co., 480 F.2d 793, 797 (8th Cir. 1973) (Minn. law). By extension it seems to follow that occurrence of a mere negligent act without injury cannot constitute a continuing tort sufficient to toll the statute of limitations. Garelick v. Goerlich’s, Inc., 323 F.2d 854, 856 (6th Cir. 1963). See also Fitzgerald v. Seamans, 553 F.2d 220, 230 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
It is one thing to say that a continuing or repetitive injury within the statutory period may bring forward earlier injuries or aggravations, Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 529 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated on other grounds, 422 U.S. 563, 95 S.Ct. 2486, 45 L.Ed.2d 396, on remand, 519 F.2d 59 (1975); Fowkes v. Pennsylvania R. R., 264 F.2d 397, 399 (3d Cir. 1959); it is quite another to say that a continuing tort extending into the statutory period but unaccompanied by injury within that period will bring forward pre-period injuries. Since I am not prepared to go that far, I respectfully dissent from so much of the opinion and result reached by the majority as would reverse or remand in part.