Court Opinion

ID: 9695065
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:05:24.823218+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:07.995384
License: Public Domain

RALPH J. ERICKSTAD, Surrogate Judge,
specially concurring.
I specially concur in the majority opinion written by Justice Meschke in this case to expedite its release so that, if the Legislature which is now in session does not believe that we have accurately discerned its intent in this area of the law, it may yet act within this session of the Legislature to clarify the law.
I am concerned not only about who may request arbitration, but also about whether or not an appeal may be taken from a decision of an arbitration panel, and if so, what the scope of review by this Court on appeal will be.
Language which especially requires clarification is that part of Section 65-02-18 N.D.C.C., which reads:
“A decision of the workers’ compensation binding arbitration panel is final and non-reviewable by a district court....”
Does this mean that the decision of the arbitration panel is final, or does it mean that an appeal must be taken directly to the Supreme Court and not first to the district court and then to the Supreme Court. If it means that there is an appeal available, is the appeal to be taken under Section 28-32-19, N.D.C.C., in the interpretation of which we have said we must affirm a decision of a Workers Compensation Bureau unless its findings of fact are not supported by a preponderance of the evi*707dence, or its conclusions are not supported by its findings of fact. Howes v. North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau, 429 N.W.2d 730 (N.D.1988). In determining whether or not the findings of fact are supported by a preponderance of the evidence, we have applied the rule laid down in Power Fuels, Inc. v. Elkin, 283 N.W.2d 214, at 220 (N.D.1979). In Power Fuels, in construing the “preponderance of the evidence” standard to permit us to apply the weight-of-the-evidence test to the factual findings of an administrative agency, we said:
“[W]e do not make independent findings of fact or substitute our judgment for that of the agency. We determine only whether a reasoning mind reasonably could have determined that the factual conclusions reached were approved by the weight of the evidence from the entire record.”
This standard of review on appeal is to be contrasted with the standard of review we have applied when considering appeals from an arbitration panel. After considerable discussion of case law from other states construing the statutes comparable to our own, we said:
“In conformity with the decisions discussed herein construing arbitration statutes similar to our own, we conclude that our review of a judgment entered upon an arbitration award is strictly limited. We adopt the New York rule which is to the effect that save for complete irrationality, arbitrators are free to fashion the applicable rules and determine the facts of a dispute before them without their award being subject to judicial revision. When a motion to vacate an arbitration award is made under subsection 4 of Section 32-29-08, N.D.C.C., the award will not be set aside unless it is completely irrational.”
Nelson Paving Co., Inc. v. Hjelle, 207 N.W.2d 225, 234 (N.D.1973)
Subsequent to Nelson Paving, the Legislature repealed Chapter 32-29, and replaced it with Chapter 32-29.2 N.D.C.C., when it adopted the Uniform Arbitration Act with the passage of Chapter 408 of the Session Laws of 1987. The pertinent sections in the current code are Section 32-29.2-12 relating to vacating an award, and Section 32-29.2-13 relating to the modification or correction of an award.
In 1989, when considering the Uniform Arbitration Act, and more particularly subsection 32-29.2-12(l)(c), N.D.C.C., this Court, speaking through Justice Gierke, said:
“When a court is requested to vacate an arbitration award because the arbitrators ‘exceeded their powers,’ the award will be vacated only if it is ‘completely irrational.’ Scherbenske Excavating v. North Dakota State Highway Department, 365 N.W.2d 485 (N.D.1985). ‘The mistakes that will void an award are those appearing on its face or gross mistakes of the arbitrators extraneously appearing as to their powers or duties, which result in real injustice or constructive fraud.’ Nelson Paving Co., Inc. v. Hjelle, 207 N.W.2d 225, 230 (N.D.1973). The purpose and effect of this limited review of an arbitration award was succinctly stated for the court by Justice Levine in Scherbenske, 365 N.W.2d at 489:
‘Obviously, the effect of applying the clearly irrational standard of review is to give to the arbitrators every benefit of every doubt. It affords them the widest latitude to exercise their authority and arrive at their decision without the customary restraints of traditional judicial review. It is but a reflection of the strong public policy favoring the arbitration process.’ ”
Byron’s Construction Company v. North Dakota State Highway Department, 448 N.W.2d 630, 632-633 (N.D.1989) (footnote omitted).
The essence of all this is that there is some weighing done by this Court on an appeal when the Administrative Agencies Practice Act is applied, but very little when the provisions of the Uniform Arbitration Act are applied.
*708Because I believe that unless these issues are considered and the law in this area is clarified during this current session of the Legislature, the interim between this session of the Legislature and the next will be filled with confusion and uncertainty.1

. Not significant from a legal standpoint for a determination of the main issue in this case on appeal, but very interesting from a practical standpoint, is an amendment which is contained in House Bill 1138 in the current Legislative Session which purports to amend Section 65-02-20, N.D.C.C., relating to managed care in Workers Compensation cases. It reads as follows:
“If an employee, employer, or medical provider disputes the recommendation of the managed care administrator, the employee, employer, or medical provider may request binding dispute resolution on the recommendation. The bureau shall make rules providing for the procedures for dispute resolution. Dispute resolution under this section is not subject to chapter 28-32 or section 65-01-14 or 65-02-17 and is not reviewable by any court.”
This bill passed the House of Representatives on February 1, 1993, with an amendment which does not affect directly the issues in this case, by a vote of 95 yeas and 0 nays, and is now pending in the Senate where it has been referred to the committee on industry, business and labor.