Court Opinion

ID: 9572969
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:46:21.432859+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:34:52.218849
License: Public Domain

WARREN, J.,
concurring.
I agree with the majority and write only to express my concern over the lack of any effective procedure by which a record can be made in the trial court to facilitate appellate review.
Both this court and the Supreme Court have identified a need for prompt judicial scrutiny of claims of inadequacy of counsel in termination cases. In this case, we now recognize that need in juvenile wardship cases.
In State ex rel Juv. Dept. v. Geist, 310 Or 176, 796 P2d 1193 (1990), the Supreme Court held that, because the legislature has not provided a procedure for vindicating the statutory right to adequate counsel in parental termination proceedings, the Court had to fashion an appropriate procedure. The procedure must be available on direct appeal, even though the issue had not been preserved in the trial court. 310 Or at 184 n 9. The problem is that, in the absence of preservation of error and the making of a record for appellate review, appellate review will almost always be a futile gesture.
This case provides a good example of that futility. Petitioner can only point to certain actions that her trial counsel did not take. There is nothing in the record to explain why her attorney chose the course of action that he took. There could have been valid tactical reasons for the counsel’s actions. Or, the counsel could have been inept, as petitioner alleges. The problem is that the adequacy of counsel cannot be realistically tested in the absence of a record on that issue. As I stated in my concurrence in Geist in this court, an inadequately developed record does not make a question unreviewable on direct appeal; it merely makes review of that record unlikely to reveal error. State ex rel Juv. Dept. v. Geist, 97 Or App 10, 19, 775 P2d 843 (1989).
The cumbersome procedure suggested by the Supreme Court in State ex rel Juv. Dept. v. Geist, supra, 310 Or *636at 192 n 16, to afford a hearing after a direct appeal by a remand from the Court of Appeals to the trial court will only delay proceedings that need to be expedited. The issue we deal with here is one of great importance and deserves legislative attention.