Court Opinion

ID: 9939558
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-10 17:09:49.02283+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:41:24.467900
License: Public Domain

J-S03043-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    TYSHEEM CROCKER                            :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 284 MDA 2023

             Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered January 20, 2023
    In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Criminal Division at No(s):
                           CP-67-CR-0000186-1998

BEFORE: OLSON, J., NICHOLS, J., and BECK, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BECK, J.:                             FILED FEBRUARY 09, 2024

       Tysheem Crocker (“Crocker”) appeals from the order entered by the

York County Court of Common Pleas dismissing his sixth petition filed pursuant

to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”)1 without a hearing.2 Because the

petition is untimely filed and Crocker failed to establish a time-bar exception,

we affirm.

       In a prior decision, this Court summarized the facts underlying Crocker’s

convictions as follows:

____________________________________________

1   42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.

2 Rule 907 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure permits a PCRA
court to dismiss a PCRA petition without a hearing if it finds “there are no
genuine issues concerning any material fact and that the defendant is not
entitled to post-conviction collateral relief, and no purpose would be served
by any further proceedings.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1).
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           Crocker and Melvin Bethune [“Bethune”] were members of
     a gang in the York, Pennsylvania, area called “The Cream Team.”
     Also in the York area was a rival gang called “The Gods.” On
     October 5, 1997, following a dispute between the two groups,
     Crocker and Bethune traveled from York to New York to recruit
     manpower in order to retaliate against members of The Gods. The
     motivation for the retaliation was that members of The Gods had
     assaulted Bethune earlier that day.

            Crocker and Bethune returned from New York with three
     individuals, including a man named “Corleone.” This group and
     fellow Cream Team member Danny Steele (“Steele”) went to the
     Super 8 Motel in York to plan the assault. The men decided they
     would shoot “Do-Work,” who was the head of The Gods and
     whomever was with him. They planned to attack The Gods at its
     usual hangout on Maple Street.

           Crocker and the others left the motel and drove to Maple
     Street. They parked their car and entered a home on Maple Street
     where they had stored guns. They retrieved their guns and
     proceeded to a corner where they had been advised members of
     The Gods were playing dice. Do-Work was playing dice along with
     a number of people including Raymond Clark (“Clark[]”)[.]

           Crocker and his co-conspirators approached. Crocker drew
     a gun on Do-Work and stated, “What’s up now, yo?” N.T. Trial,
     1/11/99, at 54. Crocker attempted to fire his gun at Do-Work,
     but it jammed. Immediately thereafter, other members of The
     Cream Team began firing at the people playing dice. The dice
     players ran, and Crocker’s group chased them.

            Steele, Corleone, and another unnamed co-conspirator
     chased Clark. Corleone shot Clark twice, fatally wounding him.
     Do-Work escaped.       Crocker, Steele, and Bethune were all
     identified by witnesses as having been involved in the shootings
     and were arrested.         Steele agreed to testify for the
     Commonwealth in return for unspecified consideration in the
     criminal proceedings against him. Bethune went to trial with
     Crocker for Clark’s murder and was also found guilty of first-
     degree murder and conspiracy.

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Commonwealth v. Crocker, 1539 MDA 2019, *1-2, 2020 WL 6149573 (Pa.

Super. Oct. 20, 2020) (non-precedential decision) (citation and brackets

omitted).3

       On January 15, 1999, the trial court sentenced Crocker to the

mandatory term of life in prison for the murder conviction and a concurrent

term of twenty to forty years of incarceration for the conspiracy conviction.

This Court affirmed his judgment of sentence and on September 5, 2000, our

Supreme Court denied his petition for allowance of appeal. Commonwealth

v. Crocker, 483 MDA 1999 (Pa. Super. Dec. 16, 1999) (non-precedential

decision), appeal denied, 761 A.2d 548 (Pa. 2000).

       In the years that followed, Crocker filed five PCRA petitions, none of

which were found to warrant substantive relief. See, e.g., Crocker, 2020 WL

6149573; Commonwealth v. Crocker, 346 MDA 2013 (Pa. Super. Aug. 1,

2014) (non-precedential decision); Commonwealth v. Crocker, 1104 MDA

2003 (Pa. Super. May 11, 2004) (non-precedential decision), appeal denied,

868 A.2d 1197 (Pa. 2005); Commonwealth v. Crocker, 1392 MDA 2001

(Pa. Super. Aug. 12, 2002) (non-precedential decision).4

____________________________________________

3 Co-defendant Bethune has also filed an appeal at 283 MDA 2023 from the

denial of his fourth PCRA petition.

4  Crocker also filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal court. See
Crocker v. Klem, Civ. No. 3:CV-03-1718 (M.D.Pa. Dec. 9, 2008). The federal
district court denied relief, and the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
affirmed. Crocker v. Klem, 450 F. App’x. 136 (3d Cir. Nov. 4, 2011).

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       On January 28, 2022, Crocker, through privately retained PCRA counsel,

filed the instant PCRA petition, his sixth. The PCRA court issued notice of its

intent to dismiss Crocker’s petition without a hearing pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P.

907, finding it untimely and that Crocker failed to establish an exception to

the PCRA’s timeliness requirements. Crocker filed objections to the Rule 907

notice pro se. On January 20, 2023, the PCRA court denied the sixth petition.5

This appeal followed.6

       Crocker presents six questions for our consideration, but as he tacitly

recognizes in his brief, the threshold question we must address is whether

Crocker’s sixth PCRA petition was timely filed or, alternatively, satisfies an

exception to the statutory time bar. See Commonwealth v. Fantauzzi, 275

____________________________________________

5  Crocker filed pro se a motion to modify the PCRA court’s denial of his sixth
petition. The PCRA court denied his request as well as his pro se objections to
the Rule 907 notice because Crocker was represented by counsel. PCRA Court
Order, 2/14/2023, at 1. See also Commonwealth v. Williams, 151 A.3d
621, 623 (Pa. Super. 2016) (explaining that generally, hybrid representation
is not permitted in Pennsylvania and pro se motions filed when a petition is
represented by counsel are legal nullities).

6 On February 13, 2023, PCRA counsel sought to withdraw as counsel in the
PCRA court. Petition to Withdraw as Counsel, 2/13/2023. The PCRA court
denied the petition because counsel had not filed a notice of appeal or attached
a signed statement from Crocker indicating he understood his rights and did
not wish to appeal the dismissal of his sixth PCRA petition. PCRA Court Order,
2/13/2023. After PCRA counsel filed the instant appeal on February 17, 2023,
the PCRA court granted counsel’s second petition to withdraw. PCRA Court
Order, 2/24/2023. Crocker is presently represented on appeal by different,
privately retained PCRA counsel, who entered his appearance in this Court on
August 11, 2023. Entry of Appearance, 8/11/2023.

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A.3d 986, 994 (Pa. Super. 2022) (“the timeliness of a PCRA petition is

jurisdictional and [] if the petition is untimely, courts lack jurisdiction over the

petition and cannot grant relief”). “As the timeliness of a PCRA petition is a

question of law, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is

plenary.”   Commonwealth v. Callahan, 101 A.3d 118, 121 (Pa. Super.

2014) (citation omitted). We therefore need not afford any deference to the

PCRA court’s legal conclusions. Commonwealth v. Benner, 147 A.3d 915,

919 (Pa. Super. 2016).

      A petition for relief under the PCRA, including a second or subsequent

petition, must be filed within one year of the date the judgment of sentence

becomes final unless that petition alleges, and the petitioner proves, that an

exception to the time limitation is met.        42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1).        The

exceptions to the one-year time bar include:

      (i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of
      interference by government officials with the presentation of the
      claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth
      or the Constitution or laws of the United States;

      (ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to
      the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise
      of due diligence; or

      (iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized
      by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court
      of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and
      has been held by that court to apply retroactively.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii).      A PCRA petition invoking a statutory

exception must be filed within one year of the date the claim could have been

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presented. Id. § 9545(b)(2). Additionally, to be eligible for PCRA relief, the

petitioner must plead and prove that the allegation of error has not been

previously litigated or waived.           Id., § 9543(a)(3).   An issue has been

previously litigated if “it has been raised and decided in a proceeding

collaterally attacking the conviction or sentence.” Id., § 9544(a)(3).

       Crocker’s judgment of sentence became final on December 4, 2000,

after our Supreme Court denied Crocker’s petition for allowance of appeal and

the time to seek certiorari with the United States Supreme Court expired. 42

Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3). To be timely, Crocker’s petition would have to have

been filed by December 4, 2001; thus, the instant petition, filed on January

28, 2022, is patently untimely.

       In an effort to satisfy an exception to the timeliness requirement,

Crocker implicates the governmental interference exception by asserting a

Brady7 violation. His argument centers upon the Commonwealth’s failure to

inform him that it interviewed the clerk who checked Crocker into the motel

the night of the killing, Teri Flinchbaugh,8 and its failure to turn over any notes

of the interview or a folio of motel guest and phone records. Crocker’s Brief

at 5-6, 12, 18, 21-24; Crocker’s Reply Brief at 1-2; PCRA Petition, 1/28/2022,

____________________________________________

7   Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

8 She is now known as Teri Silar. To avoid confusion with the record, we refer
to her as Flinchbaugh.

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¶ 36 & Ex. A014-A015. Crocker asserts that he first learned of the alleged

Brady violation in the investigator’s November 29, 2021 report. Crocker’s

Brief at 24.    He argues that this information was material to his defense

because it would have shown that Crocker was not at the motel at the time of

the conspiratorial meeting to plan the murder. Crocker’s Brief at 12, 18, 21-

24; Crocker’s Reply Brief at 4-5.

       The law is clear that a Brady violation may fall under the governmental

interference exception to the PCRA’s time bar.     Commonwealth v. Abu-

Jamal, 941 A.2d 1263, 1268 (Pa. 2008). A petitioner seeking relief in an

untimely PCRA petition based upon a Brady violation “must plead and prove

the failure to previously raise the claim was the result of interference by

government officials, and the information could not have been obtained earlier

with the exercise of due diligence.” Id. (citation omitted).9 “Due diligence

____________________________________________

9  We note, as Crocker does, that our Supreme Court has “acknowledge[d]
that questions may endure about the appropriateness of a due diligence
inquiry when analyzing timeliness under Section 9545(b)(1)(i) of the PCRA.”
Commonwealth v. Towles, 300 A.3d 400, 417 n.18 (Pa. 2023); id. at 418-
21 (Donohue, J., concurring); id. at 421-22 (Wecht, J., concurring); see also
Crocker’s Brief at 29-33. At the time of this writing, however, it remains the
law of this Commonwealth that a PCRA petitioner must plead and prove that
knowledge of the Commonwealth’s Brady violation could not have been
obtained earlier with the exercise of due diligence. Id. at 413 n.14, 417 n.18;
Abu-Jamal, 941 A.2d at 1268; see also Crocker’s Brief at 30 (acknowledging
our Supreme Court’s precedent on this issue). Therefore, this Court must
adhere to it. Commonwealth v. Foley, 38 A.3d 882, 892 (Pa. Super. 2012)
(stating that the Superior Court “has a duty and obligation to follow the
decisional law of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. The primary role of the
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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does not require perfect vigilance and punctilious care, but merely a showing

the party has put forth reasonable effort” to obtain the information upon which

a claim is based.” Commonwealth v. Cox, 146 A.3d 221, 230 (Pa. 2016)

(citation and quotation marks omitted).

       Thus, assuming (without deciding) the Commonwealth’s failure to

disclose the motel clerk’s interview or turn over motel records constituted a

Brady violation,10 Crocker is not entitled to an indefinite period to raise the

claim by invoking the government interference exception. Our review of the

record reveals instances, dating back nearly twenty years, where Crocker

pursued post-conviction relief based on what time Flinchbaugh worked on the

night of the killing and when he checked into the motel. The record reflects

that Crocker hired at least two private investigators, in addition to the private

investigator noted in the instant petition, to obtain information relating to

Flinchbaugh’s shift on the night of the killing. The first was in 2003, which

resulted   in   Crocker     obtaining,    inter   alia,   motel   records   relating   to

____________________________________________

Superior Court is to apply existing law to the cases that come before us.”)
(internal quotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted).

10  “In order for a defendant to establish the existence of a Brady violation,
he must establish that there has been a suppression by the prosecution of
either exculpatory or impeachment evidence that was favorable to the
accused, and that the omission of such evidence prejudiced the defendant.
Commonwealth v. Morris, 822 A.2d 684, 696 (Pa. 2003) (citation omitted).
There is no Brady violation “where the parties had equal access to the
information or if the defendant knew or could have uncovered such evidence
with reasonable diligence.” Id. (citation omitted).

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Flinchbaugh’s shift and the night audit report/guest folio on the night in

question. Crocker’s Rule 1925(b) Statement, 8/11/2003, ¶¶ 18.1-18.7, 20.1

& Exs. (Flinchbaugh’s employee time record and night audit report/guest folio

on night of killing).11

       Crocker hired a second private investigator in 2007. See PCRA Petition,

8/20/2012, at 24, 26-28 & Ex. C. This investigator found and interviewed

Flinchbaugh about her recollection of, and work schedule on, the night of the

murder, including her review of motel records (employee time record, night

audit report/guest folio, and registration card).     Id. at Ex. C.    Crocker’s

counsel received the investigator’s report in 2007, which Crocker presented

pro se to the PCRA court in his fourth PCRA petition, filed several years later

in 2012.    Id. at 24, 26-28 & Ex. C (asserting Flinchbaugh could not have

checked Crocker into motel until after 11:00 p.m. on the night of the killing

based on her employee time record and attaching the February 24, 2007

report of the private investigator).

____________________________________________

11 Crocker failed to raise this information in his third PCRA petition filed on
May 16, 2003. Crocker attempted to raise it for the first time in his Rule
1925(b) statement filed in conjunction with his appeal of the denial of his third
PCRA petition and this Court therefore found the claim was waived. Crocker,
1104 MDA 2003, at *9-10.

Notably, in Crocker’s related federal case, the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit stated that a “private investigator’s letter to Crocker dated December
2, 2002, indicates that Crocker was pursuing information regarding the date
and time he checked into the Super 8 Motel well before he filed his third PCRA
petition on March 1[6], 2003.” Crocker, 450 F. App’x. at 139.

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      The PCRA court granted Crocker a hearing on his fourth PCRA petition,

which was held on January 22, 2013, and at which Crocker was represented

by counsel. At the hearing, Crocker asserted, in pertinent part, a claim for

relief based on the time he checked into the motel.         In support thereof,

Crocker provided Flinchbaugh’s testimony, which had been taken at the PCRA

hearing of co-defendant Bethune on March 1, 2010, wherein she testified that

she always worked 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. as the night auditor and desk

clerk and could not have checked anyone into the motel before 11:00 p.m. on

the night of the murder. N.T., 1/22/2013, at Ex. 6 (N.T., 3/1/2010, at 12-

23); see also id. at Exs. 4 (Report of private investigator relating to

Flinchbaugh, 2/24/2007), 7 (Flinchbaugh’s employee time record and night

audit report/guest folio on night of killing).

      The PCRA court denied relief on Crocker’s fourth petition. PCRA Court

Order, 1/22/2013. As it relates to Flinchbaugh, the court ruled, inter alia, that

Crocker failed to establish a PCRA time-bar exception because he did not bring

the claim within the required statutory timeframe from the date the claim

could have first been presented as required by the PCRA. Id.; see also 42

Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2) (2012) (amended effective Dec. 23, 2018).

      Crocker now claims that it was not until October 24, 2021 – more than

eighteen years after he first interviewed Flinchbaugh – that he learned the

Commonwealth had failed to disclose that it interviewed her prior to trial.

PCRA Petition, 1/28/2022, ¶¶ 31-37, Ex. A014-015.          In the instant PCRA

                                      - 10 -
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petition, Crocker provides no explanation of why he could not have discovered

the Commonwealth’s failure to disclose information related to its interview

with Flinchbaugh sooner.12 In his brief on appeal, Crocker asserts that he

could not have discovered the alleged Brady violation sooner because of his

lack of resources.       Crocker’s Brief at 35-36.      As detailed hereinabove,

however, Crocker hired multiple private investigators over the last twenty

years who obtained motel records and/or interviewed Flinchbaugh. See PCRA

Petition, 8/20/2012, Ex. C; Crocker’s Rule 1925(b) Statement, 8/11/2003,

¶¶ 18.1-18.7, 20.1 & Exs. (Flinchbaugh’s employee time record and night

audit report/guest folio on night of killing). He fails to recognize, let alone

address, the lengthy time gap between when he learned of Flinchbaugh’s

potential testimony and when he obtained a statement from her.

       Further, Crocker concedes that he has almost continuously been in court

– both state and federal – litigating serial petitions for collateral relief and that

he previously raised newly discovered evidence claims related to the motel

records and Flinchbaugh’s testimony about her work schedule on the night of

the murder. Id. at 35; Crocker’s Reply Brief at 3. His attempt to recast this

____________________________________________

12  Ordinarily, failure to raise a claim before the PCRA court results in waiver.
Commonwealth v. Washington, 927 A.2d 586, 601 (Pa. 2007) (“Any claim
not raised in the PCRA petition is waived and not cognizable on appeal.”);
Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot
be raised for the first time on appeal.”). However, we find waiver unnecessary
here given our resolution of the due diligence claim and the Commonwealth’s
failure to object to our consideration of this argument.

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previously litigated argument as a governmental interference claim does not

entitle him to relief. See Commonwealth v. Bond, 819 A.2d 33, 39 (Pa.

2002) (stating the well-settled law that a PCRA petitioner cannot obtain review

of previously litigated claims by presenting new theories of relief to relitigate

them).

       Based on the record before us, we are unpersuaded that Crocker could

not have learned of Flinchbaugh’s interview with the prosecution earlier with

the exercise of due diligence. As due diligence is required to establish a Brady

claim, Abu-Jamal, 941 A.2d at 1268, we find no error in the PCRA court’s

conclusion that Crocker failed to meet the governmental interference

exception set forth in section 9545(b)(i). We therefore affirm the PCRA court’s

order dismissing his sixth PCRA petition without a hearing.13

       Application for remand denied. Order affirmed.

____________________________________________

13  On September 13, 2023, Crocker filed an application for remand in this
Court. Crocker argues that counsel who represented him before the PCRA
court had a conflict of interest arising from her dual representation of Crocker
and Bethune. Application for Remand, 9/13/2023, at 4-6. Crocker argues
that he and Bethune had diverging interests related to their most recent PCRA
petitions, which he contends adversely impacted PCRA counsel’s ability to
establish an exception to the time bar. Id. at 9-13. Specifically, Crocker
asserts PCRA counsel could not make a showing of Crocker’s due diligence
“without concurrently having to acknowledge that her other client, Bethune,
was unquestionably prohibited from raising this claim.” Id. at 11. Crocker
sought remand for renewed PCRA proceedings without conflicted counsel or,
alternatively, for a hearing on the conflict issue. We recognize that the PCRA
court based its finding of no due diligence by Crocker on Bethune having raised
the issue in a prior PCRA petition. PCRA Court Opinion, 3/31/2023, at 3. In
light of our disposition, however, which is based solely on the record in
Crocker’s case, we deny Crocker’s application for remand.

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Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 02/09/2024

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