Court Opinion

ID: 9650096
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 15:24:40.335292+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:18.192124
License: Public Domain

PAPADAKOS, Justice,
dissenting.
The central issue in this case is whether the underlying dispute between the parties, involving a decision by Appellee, the Harbor Creek School District, to transfer duties to non-bargaining unit personnel, is subject to resolution by arbitration. The majority holds that it was not subject to arbitration. I dissent. A full statement of the facts includes the following.
Appellant, the Harbor Creek Education Association is the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board (“PLRB”) certified exclusive representative of a collective bargaining unit comprised of certain public school employees in the Harbor Creek School District, including teachers. The part-time position of athletic director for the District ,had been included in the collective bargaining agreement between Appellant and Appellee for at least eighteen years, and the part-time position had always been filled by a bargaining unit member. During the seven years prior to the beginning of the 1989-1990 school year, the position was filled by Mr. William O’Neil, an elementary school teacher and a bargaining unit member. When the 1989-1990 school year commenced, the Appellee School District assigned Mr. O’Neil to the newly created position of “Assistant Principal for Student and Supplemental Activities.” The new position was clearly supervisory in nature and thus the individual holding it could not continue to be a member of the bargaining unit. However, part of the job description for this new position was to “assume all the duties previously discharged by the part-time position known as athletic director.” (R., p. 171a).
Viewing the School District’s action to be a unilateral transfer of bargaining unit work to non-bargaining unit personnel, the Appellant Association filed a grievance which went to arbitration. At the arbitration hearing, Appellee School Dis*581trict argued that since the matter at issue concerned termination of a supplemental contract for the old position of athletic director, the grievance was not arbitrable. The Appellant Association argued that the grievance was arbitrable based upon the fact that the grievance concerned the non-negotiated removal of bargaining unit work specifically included in the parties’ collective bargaining agreement.
On April 11,1990, the arbitrator issued a decision sustaining the grievance. The Appellee School District filed an Application for Vacation of Arbitration Award before the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County. Appellant filed a motion to quash which was granted by the trial court. On appeal, the Commonwealth Court concluded that the dispute in question was not arbitrable and reversed. This Court granted allocatur because the Commonwealth Court decision appeared contrary to our decision in Leechburg Area School District v. Dale, 492 Pa. 515, 424 A.2d 1309 (1981). Amazingly, the majority ignores Dale and affirms.
The Commonwealth Court held the instant dispute to be non-arbitrable on the grounds that the athletic director position was a supplementary agreement and the collective bargaining agreement of the parties specifically states that it covers professional employees. In my judgment, the Commonwealth Court analysis is clearly wrong. Here, the transfer of the duties of the athletic director was in direct contradiction to specific articles of the collective bargaining agreement itself. Hence, the content or existence of later supplemental contracts was irrelevant to the instant dispute about arbitrability.
The collective bargaining agreement provides as follows: Article XXII:
(A) Except as this agreement shall otherwise provide, all terms and conditions of employment applicable on the signing date of this Agreement as established by the rules, regulations and/or policies of the Board in force on said date, shall continue to be so applicable during the term of this Agreement. Unless otherwise provided in the Agree*582ment, nothing contained herein shall be interpreted and/or applied so as to eliminate, reduce nor otherwise detract from any teacher benefit existing prior to its effective date. (B) All conditions of employment, teaching hours, extra compensation for duties outside teaching hours, relief period, leaves and general teaching conditions shall be maintained at not less than the highest minimum standards in effect at the time this Agreement is signed, provided that such conditions shall be improved for the benefit of teachers as required by the express provisions of this Agreement. This Agreement shall not be interpreted or applied to deprive teachers of professional advantages heretofore enjoyed unless expressly stated therein.
Article XXIII:
(B) This Agreement shall not be modified in whole or in part by the parties except by an instrument, in writing, duly executed by both parties.
The collective bargaining agreement also contains Appendix B, a schedule of coaching salaries which lists the position of athletic director, and Appendix D which is addressed to “supplemental positions,” including those of “head coach/director/sponsor” of activities. The provisions of Appendix D to the collective bargaining agreement clearly state that qualified bargaining unit members have priority in selection for the supplemental positions, and that “established posting procedures will be used to fill vacancies.”
Clearly, the position of athletic director is bargaining unit work. To transfer that work without an agreement between the parties explicitly violated the collective bargaining agreement.
There is a more fundamental vice to the majority’s decision in the instant case however. When a matter is arguably and reasonably within the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, as here, arbitrability is for the arbitrator. As we held in Dale, supra:
Where it is determined that the subject matter of the dispute is encompassed within the terms of the agreement, *583the validity of the arbitrator’s interpretation is not a matter of concern to the court. 424 A.2d at 1312-1313.
The arbitrator’s decision on arbitrability and on substance should have been upheld. By not doing so, the majority mischievously encourages endless appeals from arbitration decisions (and subtle attempts to evade collective bargaining agreements as well). That is directly contrary to an overriding purpose of arbitration — to avoid lengthy and expensive appeals to the courts.
Hence, I dissent.
Mr. Justice MONTEMURO joins this Dissenting Opinion.