Court Opinion

ID: 9614421
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:25:18.998182+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:07:35.899705
License: Public Domain

*242BISTLINE, Justice
dissenting.
I.
The majority states in the course of its opinion the following:
To summarize the law: (1) the owners of domestic animals are not liable or negligent when the animals cause a highway collision in “open range” or when the animals are “lawfully on any highway,” I.C. §§ 25-2118, -2119; (2) if the “open range” or “lawful” conditions are not present, then the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur supplies an inference that the animal owner was negligent; (3) the inference can be supplemented by other evidence of the owner’s negligence; (4) the inference can be rebutted by a satisfactory explanation or showing by the animal owner of proper care, enclosures, and any other evidence tending to negate the inference of the owner’s negligence; (5) when properly placed at issue by the parties, the issues of lawful presence, inference of negligence, and rebuttal of the inference, are questions for the trier of facts; and (6) in any event, the vehicle owner may be liable for contributory negligence under various theories. Maj.op., p. 909 (emphasis added).
My review of Idaho law on this point brings me to the conclusion that item no. 4 is an incorrect statement of the law.
Once it is found that an animal is upon a roadway that is not in an open range area, it is presumed that it is not lawfully there, and it is inferred that the animal is there as a result of the owner’s negligence. Cunningham v. Bundy, 100 Idaho 456, 458-59, 600 P.2d 132, 134-35 (1979); Corthell v. Pearson, 88 Idaho 295, 298-300, 399 P.2d 266, 268-71 (1965). The owner is then allowed the opportunity to rebut the presumption that the animal is on the raod unlawfully by satisfactorily explaining its presence. Whitt v. Jarnagin, 91 Idaho 181, 187, 418 P.2d 278, 284 (1966). Not until today has Idaho also allowed an owner the opportunity to rebut the nference of negligence. This distinction is critical for the following reasons.
Under the now “old” rule — allowing an owner to contest the presumption that an animal was on the road unlawfully — only actions independent of any beyond the owner’s control could avoid liability. For example, evidence that an earthquake or landslide knocked down the owner’s fence would satisfactorily explain the animal’s presence on the road. Under the “new” rule, an owner can rebut inferred negligence by such a self-serving statement as, “I inspected the fences regularly and discovered nothing amiss; I simply have no idea how the animals got out.” Now, to rebut any inferred negligence, the majority declares that the owner need not produce any evidence of independent conduct beyond the owner’s control which was respon1 sible for the animals’ presence upon a public highway. This burden shift places livestock owners in a more advantageous position with respect to liability for their at-large livestock than ever before. This does not comport with Idaho law as it has existed, and is not in accordance with legislatively declared policy.
Idaho law has carefully made and followed the distinction to which reference has been made. In O’Connor v. Black, 80 Idaho 96, 104, 326 P.2d 376, 380 (1958), this Court stated:
Lastly appellant assigns error of the trial court in refusing appellant’s requested Instruction No. 1, reading:
“You are further instructed that the presence of livestock upon a highway at night unattended raises a presumption of negligence on the part of the owner, and that such owner, in order to avoid being found negligent in allowing such livestock upon the highway must excuse himself by showing circumstances under which the livestock got upon the highway and that such circumstances were not due to negligence on the part of the owner."
Appellant asserts that the requested instruction is consistent with the law announced in Shepard v. Smith, supra, (74 *243Idaho 459, 263 P.2d 985 (1953)]. With such assertion we are not in entire accord.
We interpret the announcements of the Shepard v. Smith case to be that the presence of livestock unattended upon a heavily traveled highway in the nighttime raises an inference of negligence on the part of the owner. In the absence of any satisfactory explanation by the owner of the presence of the animals thus on the highway at night unattended, a jury would be justified in finding that the presence of such animals on the highway was the result of negligence on the part of the owner. (Emphasis added.)
In Corthell, supra, 88 Idaho at 298-300, 399 P.2d at 268-71 the Court stated:
Appellant’s land was fenced, and was located in a herd district. The burden rested upon appellant under the provisions of the aforesaid sections of the statute to show that his domestic animal was lawfully on the highway; otherwise, under I.C. § 25-2119, the implied duty rested upon appellant to keep his animal off the highway, since the land was in a herd district and not on “open range”. See Shepard v. Smith, 74 Idaho 459, 263 P.2d 985 (1953), and O’Connor v. Black, 80 Idaho 96, 326 P.2d 376 (1958), wherein was applied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as to animals on the highway during the nighttime.
... Under the law heretofore cited, appellant had the burden of proving that the animal was lawfully on the highway, which was within a herd district and not on “open range”. The ani-mat’s presence on the highway was ipso facto unlawful which, in the absence of proof to show that its presence thereon was lawful, cannot absolve appellant from liability for damages____
The law itself supplies the presumption that the animal was unlawfully on the highway at the time and place of the collision unless satisfactorily explained by the owner. Whether appellant did or did not satisfactorily explain the animal’s presence upon the highway as being lawful at the time and place of the collision, in the light of the evidence, was for the trier of the facts; and the trier of the facts resolved that issue in favor of respondent and against appellant. (Emphasis added.)
In Cunningham, supra, 100 Idaho at 458, 600 P.2d at 134, this Court rejected the defendant’s argument that she was not negligent and pointed to the fact that she had not provided any substantial evidence to rebutt the presumption that her horse was illegally on the road.
In this case, too, the district court held that the defendants had not presented any substantial and competent evidence to rebut the presumption that their horses were unlawfully on the road. The evidence in this case shows that there was no dispute as to the place or manner in which the horses exited the enclosure. Although the defendants presented a good deal of testimony concerning the general reliability of their fences, they admitted that the horses escaped through a gate which had fallen down, falling away from the enclosure, and that the horses exited over the fallen gate.1 The gate was constructed of pine poles, *244with the hardware for hinging consisting of an “L” bolt screwed into the fence’s anchor pole and an eye bolt screwed into the gate pole with the eye bolt fitting onto the post of the “L.” The “L” bolt merely screwed into the pole and had no template or other apparatus to keep it tight or keep it from turning once it was in place. For some reason, both unexplained and unexplainable by the defendants, the “L” bolt turned, allowing the eye to slide off the post of the “L” and causing the gate to fall. There is no evidence as to how long it took the “L” bolts to turn, although the defendants admitted that they had not made any specific inspection of the hinging mechanism immediately prior to the horses’ escape.
A witness for the defendants testified that he felt it would be good practice, if such a hinge mechanism were used, that there be a device to anchor the “L” bolt so that it could not turn once in place. He also testified that he had used such hardware on his own fence.
There was absolutely no evidence that the gate was exposed to any extraordinary force nor was any damage done to the gate in the escape of the horses. All appearances are that it merely fell over, allowing the horses to escape.
This is clearly a circumstance where the gate was under the control and management of the defendants, and the circumstances are such that an accident would not normally occur without some negligence. Gates should not simply fall over. Defendants were unable to present any evidence at trial that satisfactorily explained the presence of their animals on the roadway nor were they able to explain why or what caused the “L” bolts on the gate post to turn, allowing the gate to fall. They made no attempt to demonstrate that anything extraordinary would have caused the horses to force the gate or that they had made regular inspections of the hinge apparatus to insure that it was in continuing good condition. In reviewing this evidence, the district court stated:
All right. Well, the Court has taken the view on the record that there’s no substantial evidence of any force, cause, what have you, outside of the confining facility itself and the animals themselves and legal analysis, we like to believe to point to concepts that are applicable to the proposition of the Defendants. The Court talks in terms of duty to keep the animals confined and of negligence and the failure to do so and the Court sometimes talks in terms of an inference from the failure to do so of negligence and of a burden on behalf of the Defendants to either go forward to show circumstances that rebut such an inference or sometimes it’s been talked of going forward to show that animals were lawfully on the highway.
I am having some difficulties rectifying the things that Supreme Court has said into some specific category that historically I should be able to clearly understand. I agree with the proposition the use of the word “lawfully” on the highway or their inference resulting from their being unlawfully on the highway as those terms “lawfully” or “unlawfully” then relate to the concept they have to be negligent.
A little different vein when I think about someone having to prove that they were lawfully on the highway and what comes to my mind is that they’re being driven, led, herded. So we have a little different — at least I do, when I get — I don’t know, the concept of those things that are rightfully leading in terms of lawfully and necessarily or unlawfully and necessary.
I think I do clearly understand that if they have escaped a confinement and in any breach of the duty to keep them confined, we can then say they’re not lawfully on the highway. I can conceive the nature of the duty as announced by the Court and is derived from duties to be a special duty. I don’t know whether you call it a heightened duty, but a special duty, a specific duty to keep them confined. And I believe that encompasses the proposition that you are charged with the propensity of your animals to want to escape confinement. We have a specific gate, its characteristics are in the *245record and the fact that it was flat on the ground and the tracks of the horses lead therefrom, there’s no evidence of any other tracks caused other than the sheer activity of the horses themselves. And under those circumstances, I believe that it is a summary of law, the record shows that the breach of duty occurred. If we’re talking about negligence then negligence is shown or in any event by law there’s a presumption of negligence that has not been rebutted in the evidence or being substantial evidence of any kind of an agency or anything else outside of the facility and the animals themselves. Tr., Vol. 2, pp. 487-89 (emphasis added).
I fail to discern how the majority is able to conclude that the district court erred in refusing to submit this question to the jury. Upon the evidence of this case it can in no way be stated that the district court erred. Stephens v. Stearns, 106 Idaho 249, 252-53, 678 P.2d 41, 44-45 (1984). I suggest only that the majority may be guilty of not closely reading the record. Furthermore, I am now fully convinced that prior case law more accurately ascertained and applied the legislature’s intent and principles of common law.
II.
The majority’s holding that violation of a speed limit is negligence per se is directly in contravention to established Idaho law. The majority concedes that prior to 1977, former I.C. § 49-701 “contained Idaho’s basic rule and maximum speed limits and specifically set out that the violation of the maximum speed limit was prima facie evidence that the speed was not reasonable or prudent. This was interpreted as creating a rebuttable prima facie case of negligence.” Maj.op., p. 910. The majority then acknowledges three cases directly on point and which held sway until 1977. See Stanberry v. Gem County, 90 Idaho 222, 409 P.2d 430 (1965); State v. Trimming, 89 Idaho 440, 406 P.2d 118 (1965); Jones v. Talbot, 87 Idaho 498, 394 P.2d 316 (1964).
What mystical event, then, occurred in 1977 which required this Court to interpret I.C. § 49-681 as now mandating that violation of a posted speed limit is elevated to negligence per se ? The answer is not readily discernible. All that happened in 1977 was that I.C. § 49-681 was recodified; the language regarding the effect of a speed violation was wholly omitted. Subsection (2) of § 49-681 was added. It states that violation of a speed limit “shall not be construed to relieve the plaintiff in any civil action from the burden of proving negligence on the part of the defendant as the proximate cause of an accident.” To my mind, the legislature’s action in 1977 establishes a fortiori that violation of a speed limit shall not constitute negligence per se.
The majority erects a straw man and then attacks it when it goes so far as to say that the district court erred in holding that the federally imposed 55 m.p.h. speed limit was merely an energy saving statute. That is not the issue which needs deciding. Rather, the underlying issue here is to consider the reasons why the 1977 legislature enacted I.C. §§ 49-681 and 49-686. It is well-known that the 55 m.p.h. speed limit was established in order to guarantee Idaho’s continued receipt of federal transportation funds. This is borne out by I.C. § 49-681(3)2 which states that a driver exceeding 55 m.p.h. shall be fined a mere $5.00. Furthermore, the same section states that such a fine shall not be deemed a moving violation (true legal fiction) for the purpose of establishing rates of motor *246vehicle insurance charged by an insurer. Had the legislature sincerely intended I.C. § 49-681 to be a safety statute, would it treat the consequences of breaking that statute so lightly? Most people of reason would think not.
The majority implicitly acknowledges the difficulty of its position by relying heavily upon a New Mexico Court of Appeals case decided 17 long years ago, Dahl v. Turner, 80 N.M. 564, 458 P.2d 816, 823 (N.M.App.1969), cert. denied, 80 N.M. 608, 458 P.2d 860 (1969). This was before the day of the first petroleum shortage crisis. The majority out of necessity falls back on tha case as a route to take more expediently than attempting to discuss or definitively distinguish Stanberry, supra, Trimming, supra, or Talbot, supra, all of which run opposite to today’s majority opinion.
It is to be noted that the majority does acknowledge that, under its comprehension of what the law should be, there remains the issue of whether plaintiff’s speeding violation proximately caused the accident. A close look at the evidence at the first trial suggests that it is entirely possible that the district court, upon an independent, complete and careful review of the record, may again hold that the negligence of the plaintiff, as a matter of law, did not proximately cause the accident nor her injuries.
Such a finding would be harmonious with a case relied upon by the majority, Theonnes v. Hazen, 37 Wash.App. 644, 681 P.2d 1284 (1984). The district court there had granted a summary judgment for a defendant who was alleged to have struck a child who had ridden his bicycle out of a driveway and onto the street. An expert had calculated that the defendant was traveling at 42 m.p.h. at the time of collision in a 35 m.p.h. zone. The evidence also suggested that had the defendant been proceeding within the maximum speed limit, she still would not have been able to respond to the situation she encountered in time to have avoided collision with the child. Theonnes, supra, 681 P.2d at 1285. Evidence in the case revealed that even had the driver been proceeding at the maximum posted speed limit, she would have had no more than one-quarter second additional time to appraise the situation and react. The court reasoned:
Reasonable minds cannot differ. The collision would have happened even if the car was traveling at the 35 m.p.h. speed limit. It would be sheer speculation that anything could have been done by the driver in that pl/4%p second to avoid the collision. Since the collision would have occurred even at the legal speed, the evidence of 42 m.p.h. speed could not be proximate cause....
It would be speculation that the driver could have avoided the child during the period of slightly over lVb seconds from the time she first saw him or during the period of sightly over .38 seconds after the brakes first engaged. The collision would have occurred at the legal speed, even accepting appellant’s evidence of 59 feet between the first sighting and impact. Appellant’s evidence would not support a finding that there was any negligent act of the driver which was a proximate cause of the collision. Id. at 1286.
See also Kilde v. Sorwak, 1 Wash.App. 742, 463 P.2d 265 (1970) (4 seconds); Clark v. King, 178 Wash. 421, 34 P.2d 1105 (1934) (4.16 seconds).
The plaintiff in this case had the right-of-way on the highway on the night in question. That right-of-way was interfered with and violated by the illegal presence of the defendants’ horses on the roadway. Nevertheless, defendants would have the jury speculate with the type of “maze of details arising from split-second computation of time and distance,” which the Washington courts have rejected as a matter of law in circumstances such as here. It seems clear, therefore, that the trial court has full authority to deal with the issue of proximate causation, upon retrial, in any manner allowed under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and that it need not necessarily present the issue of proximate causation to the jury — although the majority opinion seemingly dictates that it would do so were it only a trial court.
A counterclaim was filed against the plaintiff for the value of defendants’ horses *247destroyed. It seems that the defendant continues to see the Idaho maximum speed limit statute as cloaking the plaintiff with the mantle of negligence per se and the proximate cause of the loss of those animals. However, even from the language of the majority opinion, the purpose of I.C. § 49-681 is safety related, as related to the safety of those persons who are using the highways, not for the protection of horses unlawfully at large on highways.
In order for a violation of statute to be pertinent in a particular case, the statute must be applicable; that is, the statute must be designed to protect the class of person from the type of harm inflicted as a result of the statutory violation. See Leliefeld v. Johnson, 104 Idaho 357, 659 P.2d 111 (1983); Kinney v. Smith, 95 Idaho 328, 508 P.2d 1234 (1973).

. Defendant William Schmidt testified as follows:
Q. What evidence did you find to show how the horses got out?
[MR. SCHMIDT] A: The gate was knocked over and I seen the horse tracks going through the gate.
Q. Now, when you saw the gate after the horses got out, you say it was down. Will you describe to us the manner in which it was down?
A. It was just tipped over into our yard.
Q. Was any part of it remaining suspended?
A. I can’t remember that.
Q. You say you saw horse tracks?
A. Yes.
Q. And that’s the only evidence you have as to how the horses got out ?
A. Yes. Tr., pp. 56-58 (emphasis added).

. (3) Penalty. — When the maximum speed on a given highway is set at fifty-five (55) miles per hour and the maximum posted speed was more than fifty-five (55) miles per hour prior to the emergency declared by P.L. 93-239, or when the maximum speed on a portion of the interstate highway system is fifty-five (55) miles per hour and the speed of the vehicle was seventy (70) miles per hour or less, the maximum fine that shall be imposed for exceeding fifty-five (55) miles per hour, but not exceeding the posted limits prior to the emergency, shall be five dollars ($5.00). In addition, no jail sentence shall be imposed on such a conviction, nor shall a conviction result in violation point counts as prescribed in section 49-330, Idaho Code. A conviction under this paragraph shall not be deemed to be a moving traffic violation for the purpose of establishing rates of motor vehicle insurance charged by a casualty insurer.