Court Opinion

ID: 9734524
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:37:14.993883+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:49.023435
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE NEVILLE, concurring in part and dissenting in part: I concur in that part of the opinion affirming Beard’s conviction for aggravated kidnapping (720 ILCS 5/10 — 2 (West 2002)), but I write separately and dissent from that part of the majority’s opinion affirming the trial court’s order requiring Beard to register as a sex offender, pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act (730 ILCS 150/1 el seq. (West 2002)) (Registration Act) and the Sex Offender and Child Murderer Community Notification Law (730 ILCS 152/101 el seq. (West 2002)). The facts establish that once Beard was convicted of aggravated kidnapping (720 ILCS 5/10 — 2 (West 2002)), he was adjudicated a sex offender. 730 ILCS 150/2(B)(1.5) (West 2002). Although aggravated kidnapping is a Registration Act offense, it does not contain sexual elements (720 ILCS 5/10 — 2 (West 2002)2), like the registration offense of sexual exploitation of a child (720 ILCS 5/11 — 9.1 (West 2002)3). Finally, the facts do not establish that Beard engaged in a sexual act with the two kidnap victims under 18 years of age or that Beard had an intent to engage in a sexual act with the minor kidnap victims. While I accept the fact that there is a compelling need to protect children from those in our society who commit sexual offenses upon them, Beard and others convicted of the offenses in section 2(B)(1.5) of the Registration Act are brought within the purview of the Registration Act for offenses that do not involve the commission of sexual acts on children. If the majority is correct that “the General Assembly decided to protect the children of Illinois from sex crimes by creating the Registration Act,” how is that purpose served by forcing defendants to register who have not been convicted of engaging in sexual acts with children? 366 Ill. App. 3d at 201-02, citing People v. Fuller, 324 Ill. App. 3d 728, 732-33 (2001). I note the majority’s reliance on Fuller. The Fuller court justified the inclusion of aggravated kidnapping, an offense without a sexual element, in the group of sexual offenses with sexual elements (see 730 .ILCS 150/2(B)(1) (West 2002)) “because aggravated kidnapping is often a precursor to more grievous sexual offenses.” 366 Ill. App. 3d at 202, citing Fuller, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 733. While the majority relies on the Fuller court’s statement that aggravated kidnapping is often a precursor to more grievous sexual offenses, neither the majority nor the Fuller court supports this statement with a citation to a scientific study that found a nexus between aggravated kidnapping and the sex offenses codified in section 2(B)(1) of the Registration Act. See 730 ILCS 150/2(B)(1) (West 2002). Therefore, to the extent the majority relies on the Fuller court’s statement, its reliance is misplaced. “The constitution and statutes of this State provide *** that no person shall be convicted of an offense which he has not been charged with having committed.” People v. Lewis, 83 Ill. 2d 296, 300 (1980), citing Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §§ 2, 7, 8; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, pars. Ill — 3, 113 — 1, 113 — 4. I think the Lewis rule should be followed in this case: a person convicted of aggravated kidnapping of a child under 18 years of age should not be forced to register as a sex offender when he has not been charged with or convicted of a sex offense like the sex offenses codified in section 2(B)(1)4 of the Registration Act. People v. Lewis, 83 Ill. 2d at 300. Given the facts here, “there is no rational basis for requiring defendant to register as a sex offender where he has no history of committing sex offenses and his offense of aggravated kidnaping was not sexually motivated and had no sexual purpose.” People v. Johnson, 363 Ill. App. 3d 356, 363-64 (2006) (“the Registration Act *** violates [defendant’s] substantive due process rights under the state and federal constitutions where [defendant’s] designation as a sex offender bears no rational relationship to the State’s interest in protecting the public from convicted sex offenders”). Finally, in my opinion, registration acts serve a useful purpose, but if a defendant is convicted of kidnapping, he should be forced to register as a kidnapper and not as a sex offender.  A person commits the offense of aggravated kidnapping when he or she: “(1) Kidnaps for the purpose of obtaining ransom from the person kidnaped or from any other person, or (2) Takes as his victim a child under the age of 13 years, or a severely or profoundly mentally retarded person, or (3) Inflicts great bodily harm, other than by the discharge of a firearm, or commits another felony upon his victim, or (4) Wears a hood, robe or mask or conceals his identity, or (5) Commits the offense of kidnaping while armed with a dangerous weapon, other than a firearm ***, or (6) Commits the offense of kidnaping while armed with a firearm, or (7) During the commission of the offense of kidnaping, personally discharged a firearm, or (8) During the commission of the offense of kidnaping, personally discharged a firearm that proximately caused great bodily harm, permanent disability, permanent disfigurement, or death to another person.” 720 ILCS 5/10 — 2 (West 2002).   A person commits the offense of sexual exploitation of a child “if in the presence of a child and with intent or knowledge that a child would view his or her acts, that person: (1) engages in a sexual act; or (2) exposes his or her sex organs, anus or breast for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification of such person or the child.” A person also commits the sexual exploitation of a child if that person “knowingly entices, coerces, or persuades a child to remove the child’s clothing for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification of the person or the child, or both.” 720 ILCS 5/11 — 9.1 (West 2002).   “(B) As used in this Article, ‘sex offense’ means: (1) A violation of any of the following Sections of the Criminal Code of 1961: 11 — 20.1 (child pornography), 11 — 6 (indecent solicitation of a child), 11 — 9.1 (sexual exploitation of a child), 11 — 15.1 (soliciting for a juvenile prostitute), 11 — 18.1 (patronizing a juvenile prostitute), 11 — 17.1 (keeping a place of juvenile prostitution), 11 — 19.1 (juvenile pimping), 11 — 19.2 (exploitation of a child), 12 — 13 (criminal sexual assault), 12 — 14 (aggravated .criminal sexual assault), 12— 14.1 (predatory criminal sexual assault of a child), 12 — 15 (criminal sexual abuse), 12 — 16 (aggravated criminal sexual abuse), 12 — 33 (ritualized abuse of a child). An attempt to commit any of these offenses.” 730 ILCS 150/2(B)(1) (West 2002).