Court Opinion

ID: 9723948
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:39:06.365331+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:53.656574
License: Public Domain

HOFFMAN, Presiding Judge,
concurring in result.
I concur in the result reached by the majority. However, I disagree with their assertion that the Porter Juvenile Court was without subject-matter jurisdiction. A more careful docketing procedure of causes to insure they are placed in the court with appropriate jurisdiction should be followed. While I do not wish to condone what happened in this cause, I do not believe reversal is warranted on that ground.
The Porter Circuit Court is a court of general jurisdiction which includes juvenile and probate matters, since no other court in that county has exclusive jurisdiction over those matters. IC 1971, 33-12-3-1 — 33-12-3-2 (1980 Burns Supp.). Simply because the judge of that court reached beneath his bench that morning and pulled out his juvenile court hat rather than his probate court hat does not mean he was without subject-matter jurisdiction. As long as the appropriate law was applied, the hat he wore was of little significance.
Trial Rule 4(A) states:
“The court acquires jurisdiction over a party or person who under these rules commences or joins in the action, is served with summons or enters an appearance, or who is subjected to the power of the court under any other law.”
Ms. Klahn did not commence or join the action, was not served with summons and did not enter an appearance.
IC 1971, 31-3-1-6 (Burns 1980 Repl.) requires that legal notice be given to the natural mother of the child. No manner of service required by TR. 4 was accomplished on the natural mother, Dorothea Klahn. Trial Rule 4.1 provides as follows:
“SUMMONS: SERVICE ON INDIVIDUALS
(A) In general. Service may be made upon an individual, or an individual acting in a representative capacity, by
(1) sending a copy of the summons and complaint by registered or certified mail or other public means by which a written acknowledgement of receipt may be requested and obtained to his residence, place of business or employment with return receipt requested and returned showing receipt of the letter; or
(2) delivering a copy of the summons and complaint to him personally; or
(3) leaving a copy of the summons and complaint at his dwelling house or usual place of abode.
(4) serving his agent as provided by rule, statute or valid agreement.
(B) Copy service to be followed with mail. Whenever service is made under part (3) or (4) of subdivision (A), the person making the service also shall send by first class mail, a copy of the summons without the complaint to the last known address of the person being served, and this fact shall be shown upon the return.”
The only attempts made to comply with this rule were two certified letters which were returned to the sender and never received *731by Ms. Klahn because they were sent to incorrect addresses.
Publication was made in the Porter County Herald newspaper; however, this publication was not directed at Ms. Klahn and did not satisfy TR. 4.13. Trial Rule 4.13(B)(1) requires the publication to contain the name of the person to whom the notice is directed. The publication here was directed solely to the “unknown father of Angel Lee Klahn.” Furthermore, TR. 4.13(C) requires that the notice be published three times. The record is silent as to the number of times it was published and appellant’s brief refers to only one date.
As this Court stated in Fox v. Galvin (1978), Ind.App., 381 N.E.2d 103, at 108:
“A basic tenet of our Rules of Trial Procedure is that a defendant falls within the trial court’s jurisdiction for a particular civil action only when he has been served with process.”
Dorothea Klahn was not served with process pursuant to TR. 4 and consequently, the trial court had no jurisdiction over her. Fox, supra.
While it is true that notice can be waived and jurisdiction can be obtained if the party enters an appearance, neither Ms. Klahn nor any counsel representing her appeared at the hearing or filed an appearance before that time.
Because of lack of service of summons, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over Ms. Klahn and therefore, judgment of the trial court should be reversed with instructions to the court to vacate its decree of adoption.