Court Opinion

ID: 9949832
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-12 18:06:00.471769+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:34:06.237324
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/12/24 P. v. Gutierrez CA4/3

              IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                 FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION THREE

 THE PEOPLE,

     Plaintiff and Appellant,                          G062269

         v.                                            (Super. Ct. No. 22NF1269)

 DANIEL JUNIOR GUTIERREZ,                              ORDER MODIFYING OPINION;
                                                       NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT
     Defendant and Respondent.

                 It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on March 11, 2024, be modified to
correct the caption as follows:
                 Delete the following: “Plaintiff and Respondent,”
                 And in its place insert: “Plaintiff and Appellant,”
                 Delete the following: “Defendant and Appellant.”
                 And in its place insert: “Defendant and Respondent.”
          This modification does not effect a change in the judgment.

                                            GOETHALS, ACTING P. J.

WE CONCUR:

MOTOIKE, J.

GOODING, J.

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Filed 3/11/24 P. v. Gutierrez CA4/3 (unmodified opinion)

                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                     FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                  DIVISION THREE

 THE PEOPLE,

      Plaintiff and Respondent,                                        G062269

           v.                                                          (Super. Ct. No. 22NF1269)

 DANIEL JUNIOR GUTIERREZ,                                              OPINION

      Defendant and Appellant.

                   Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County, Jeff
Ferguson, Judge. Reversed and remanded.
                   Todd Spitzer, District Attorney, and Matthew Plunkett, Deputy District
Attorney, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
                   Sheila O’Connor, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Respondent.
                                              *              *              *
              Daniel Junior Gutierrez was charged in 2022 with a single count of
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violating Penal Code section 25850, subdivisions (a) and (c)(6), which prohibits the
unlicensed public carry of loaded firearms. Gutierrez moved to dismiss the charge on
constitutional grounds, citing New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen (2022)
597 U.S. 1 (Bruen), which held that the “proper cause” requirement in New York’s
public carry licensing regime violated the Second and Fourteenth Amendments.
Gutierrez asserted that section 25850 and California’s entire firearm licensing scheme,
which at the time allowed the issuance of a concealed carry permit only upon a showing
of “good cause,” among other requirements, were invalid under Bruen.
              The trial court found section 25850, subdivision (c)(6), was
unconstitutional as applied to Gutierrez and dismissed the charge. The People appealed.
While their appeal was pending, the California Legislature amended the relevant
licensing statutes to remove the “good cause” requirement, consistent with the Bruen
decision.
              We reverse the trial court’s dismissal of the charge against Gutierrez. As
other California appellate courts have recognized, Bruen invalidated the now-deleted
“good cause” requirement in two of California’s firearm licensing statutes; it did not
invalidate the entire state licensing scheme. Because the “good cause” requirement is
severable from California’s licensing scheme under the severability doctrine, the
remainder of the licensing scheme as it existed when Gutierrez was charged, including
section 25850, remains constitutional. We therefore reverse the trial court’s order
dismissing the charge against Gutierrez and remand this matter for further proceedings.

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              All further statutory references are to this code.

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                                     BACKGROUND
              Before turning to the facts of this case, we summarize the relevant statutes
at play. As noted, section 25850 makes it a crime to publicly carry a loaded firearm on
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one’s person or in a vehicle. “Although framed as a default prohibition, section 25850 is
in effect the enforcement mechanism of a regulatory regime that grants licenses to those
who may lawfully carry firearms and withholds licenses from those who may not.” (In re
T.F.-G. (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 893, 915 (T.F.-G.).) In isolation, section 25850 “appears
broadly prohibitory, [but] it exists within a framework of numerous express exemptions.”
(T.F.-G, at p. 908.) One such exemption is section 26010, which provides that section
25850 does not apply to persons with concealed carry permits issued under sections
26150 to 26235.
              Until recently, those concealed carry licensing provisions were
discretionary in nature in that they granted the issuing authority discretion to issue the
license and required the applicant to prove, among other things, that “good cause” existed
for the issuance of the license. For example, at the time Gutierrez was charged,
section 26150 provided that “the sheriff of a county may issue a [concealed carry] license
to [an eligible applicant] upon proof of all of the following: [¶] (1) The applicant is of
good moral character. [¶] (2) Good cause exists for issuance of the license. [¶] (3) The
applicant is a resident of the county or a city within the county, or the applicant’s
principal place of employment or business is in the county or a city within the county and
the applicant spends a substantial period of time in that place of employment or business.
[¶] (4) The applicant has completed a course of training [relating to firearms safety,

       2
              Section 25850, subdivision (a), provides: “A person is guilty of carrying a
loaded firearm when the person carries a loaded firearm on the person or in a vehicle
while in any public place or on any public street in an incorporated city, city or county, or
in any public place or on any public street in a prohibited area of an unincorporated area
of a county or city and county.”

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handling, shooting, and permissible usage].” (Former § 26150, subd. (a)(1-4), as adopted
by Stats. 2015, ch. 785, § 2, italics added.) Section 26155 employed similar language.
(See former § 26155, subd. (a), added by Stats. 2010, ch. 711, § 6 [“the chief or other
head of a municipal police department of any city or city and county” may similarly issue
licenses]; see also former § 26202, added by Stats. 2011, ch. 741, § 3 [if the licensing
authority determines good cause does not exist, it must state the reason for that
determination].)
              The issue in this case is whether this licensing scheme runs afoul of the
Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms. We therefore briefly summarize the
decisions that led up to the present case.
              In District of Columbia v. Heller, the United States Supreme Court held
that the Second Amendment confers an individual right to keep and bear arms for the
core lawful purpose of self-defense and that a district ban on handgun possession in
homes was therefore unconstitutional. (District of Columbia v. Heller (2008) 554 U.S.
570, 595, 630 (Heller).) But the court also noted that “the right secured by the Second
Amendment is not unlimited” and does not include “a right to keep and carry any weapon
whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.” (Id. at p. 626.) For
example, “prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill [and]
laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and
government buildings” (ibid.) are “presumptively lawful regulatory measures” (id. at
p. 627, fn. 26).
              Following Heller, California courts rejected various Second Amendment
challenges to California firearms regulations. (See People v. Yarbrough (2008)
169 Cal.App.4th 303, 309-314 (Yarbrough) [upholding conviction for possessing
concealed weapon on private property (former § 12025, subd. (a)(2))]; People v. Flores
(2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 568, 573-577 [upholding convictions for possessing firearm by
person prohibited from possessing a firearm (former § 12021, subd. (c)(1)), carrying a

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concealed firearm (former § 12025, subd. (a)(2)), and carrying a loaded firearm in a
public place (former § 12031, subd. (a)(1))].)
              In Yarbrough, the court observed “the Heller opinion specifically expressed
constitutional approval of the accepted statutory proscriptions against carrying concealed
weapons,” so “in the aftermath of Heller the prohibition ‘on the carrying of a concealed
weapon without a permit, continues to be a lawful exercise by the state of its regulatory
authority notwithstanding the Second Amendment.’” (Yarbrough, 169 Cal.App.4th at
p. 314.)
              Then came Bruen. In 2022, in a six-to-three decision, the United States
Supreme Court extended Heller to recognize “an individual’s right to carry a handgun for
self-defense outside the home.” (Bruen, supra, 597 U.S. at p. 10, italics added.) After
clarifying the proper test for analyzing challenges under the Second Amendment (id. at
pp. 22-24), Bruen held that New York’s concealed carry licensing scheme, which
required applicants to demonstrate “proper cause” to get a license, was unconstitutional
because it prevented law-abiding citizens with ordinary self-defense needs from
exercising their right to keep and bear arms (id. at p. 71). In reaching its conclusion, the
court contrasted the proper cause requirement in “may issue” concealed carry licensing
regimes, such as New York’s and California’s, with “shall issue” jurisdictions, where
authorities must issue concealed-carry licenses whenever applicants satisfy specific
threshold requirements. (Id. at pp. 13-15.)
              The day after the Bruen decision was issued, the California Attorney
General issued an alert recognizing that the “good cause” requirements in former
sections 26150, subdivision (a)(2), and 26155, subdivision (a)(2), were no longer
constitutional or enforceable. The alert instructed local officials not to enforce the good
cause requirement but to otherwise continue to apply and enforce all other statutory
prerequisites to obtaining a public-carry license (e.g., the requirements of showing good
moral character, residency, training, fingerprinting, and a background check). (See

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Attorney General Legal Alert dated June 24, 2022,
https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/media/legal-alert-oag-2022-02.pdf [as of March 7, 2024],
archived at https://perma.cc/6RU3-7XDB.)
                 About that same time, Gutierrez was arrested and charged with a single
count of violating section 25850, subdivisions (a) and (c)(6). He filed a demurrer and
nonstatutory motion to dismiss the charge as unconstitutional. In his moving papers,
Gutierrez asserted the “good cause” requirement for concealed carry licenses in
California is unconstitutional under Bruen, and since section 25850 operates as a total
ban on public carry it is also unconstitutional.
                 The trial court granted Gutierrez’s motion and dismissed the charge against
him. Although it declined to reach the issue of whether California’s licensing scheme as
a whole is constitutionally void, the trial court concluded that under the “expansive”
Bruen decision, section 25850 was unconstitutional as applied to Gutierrez, whom the
court described as “a law-abiding adult in possession of the firearm for the purposes of
self defense.”
                 The People filed a notice of appeal. While their appeal was pending, the
California Legislature amended sections 26150 and 26155 to remove the “good cause”
and good character requirements and to make issuance of a concealed carry license
mandatory if certain requirements are met (“shall issue”), rather than discretionary (“may
issue”). (See Stats. 2023, ch. 249, §§ 10-11, eff. Jan. 1, 2024.)

                                        DISCUSSION
                 As an initial matter, the People contend Gutierrez lacks standing to
challenge California’s concealed carry licensing scheme, since he never applied for a
concealed carry permit. We assume without deciding that Gutierrez does have standing
to challenge the scheme’s constitutionality. (See People v. Miller (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th
935, 942 (Miller) [“We assume without deciding that Miller had standing to raise the

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arguments she asserted in her demurrer” on the constitutionality of California’s concealed
carry prohibitions]; cf. In re D.L. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 144, 161 (D.L.) [juvenile who
was subjected to a true finding that he unlawfully possessed a loaded firearm had
standing to bring facial challenge to the constitutionality of section 25850].)
              According to Gutierrez, California’s entire concealed carry licensing
scheme is facially unconstitutional because, just like New York’s statutory licensing
scheme at issue in Bruen, California’s licensing procedure is discretionary in nature and
allows an official to deny a concealed carry permit if he determines there is no “good
cause” to issue it. The People concede the now-removed “good cause” requirement in
sections 26150 and 26155 of California’s concealed carry licensing scheme is
unconstitutional under Bruen, but assert the “good cause” requirement is severable from
the rest of the statutory scheme, which otherwise remains constitutional.
              Gutierrez’s facial challenge to the concealed carry licensing scheme
presents a pure question of law, which we review de novo. (D.L., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th
at p. 156.) After conducting a de novo review, we conclude Gutierrez’s constitutional
challenge is without merit.
              Bruen invalidated only one of California’s statutory prerequisites for
obtaining a public carry license—the “good cause” requirement in former sections 26150
and 26155. It did not invalidate all public carry licensing statutes or prohibit states from
requiring individuals to submit to certain licensing requirements in order to legally
possess a firearm. Indeed, the Bruen court confirmed that states may validly impose
“reasonable, well-defined restrictions” on the “right to bear commonly used arms in
public.” (Bruen, supra, 597 U.S. at p. 70.) It also noted that nothing in the opinion
should be interpreted to suggest that “shall-issue” licensing regimes, “which often require
applicants to undergo a background check or pass a firearms safety course,” are
unconstitutional. (Id. at p. 38, fn. 9; see also id. at pp. 79-80 (conc. opn. of
Kavanaugh, J.) [noting the court’s “decision does not prohibit States from imposing

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licensing requirements for carrying a handgun for self-defense,” and explaining that
‘“shall-issue’ regimes,” which often require the applicant “to undergo fingerprinting, a
background check, a mental health records check, and training in firearms handling and
in laws regarding the use of force,” are “constitutionally permissible”].)
              The key question then is what impact the unconstitutional, now-deleted
“good cause” licensing requirement has on the rest of California’s licensing laws. The
answer is little or none. As several courts have already recognized, the “good cause”
requirement is severable from the balance of California’s licensing requirements under
the severability doctrine. (D.L., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at pp. 163-165; see also T.F.-G.,
supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 916.) After severing the now-deleted “good cause”
requirement, a valid and functioning licensing regime which is enforceable remains in
place.
              We are not alone in reaching this conclusion. Our sister courts have
uniformly rejected the argument that California’s licensing scheme is unconstitutional
under Bruen. (People v. Mosqueda (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 399, 403 [“Bruen did not
render California’s entire licensing scheme or the charges against them unconstitutional”
because “[t]he offending ‘good cause’ requirement is severable from the remainder of the
licensing statute, as is the ‘good moral character’ element”]; T.F.-G., supra,
94 Cal.App.5th at p. 899 [“Although California’s ‘good cause’ licensing requirement is
undisputedly unconstitutional under Bruen, [that] . . . does not render section 25850
facially unconstitutional”]; D.L., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at pp. 147-148 [rejecting facial
challenge to § 25850, subd. (a) (carrying a loaded firearm) and concluding “[i]t remains
constitutional to punish someone without a license for carrying a loaded gun in public”];
Miller, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 943-946 [reversing order sustaining demurrer to
charge of carrying a concealed firearm in a vehicle under one’s control (§ 25400), finding
charge was constitutional].)

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              In D.L., our colleagues in the First District found that after severing the
“good cause” licensing requirement from former sections 26150 and 26155, “California’s
firearm licensing framework—and the criminal penalties under section 25850—remain
valid.” (D.L., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 165.) The court reasoned that “the Bruen
majority’s actual holding was quite limited—that New York’s ‘proper-cause’ licensing
requirement was unconstitutional,” and “Bruen did not undermine regulation of guns
based on objective criteria.” (Ibid.) We agree.
              The D.L. court also rejected constitutional challenges to the “may issue”
language and “good moral character” requirement in sections 26150 and 26155. (D.L.,
supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 166.) The defendant in D.L. made arguments similar to those
offered by Gutierrez here: that even if the “good cause” condition can be severed,
sections 26150 and 26155 are still unconstitutional under Bruen because (1) they afford
unfettered discretion to the relevant law enforcement official who “may issue” a license
under each statute, and (2) the statutes still include a subjective condition that the
applicant be of “good moral character.” (Ibid.)
              The D.L. court rejected those arguments on several grounds. It reasoned
that “D.L.’s argument is not supported by the actual holding in Bruen. As described
above, that holding was based on the ‘proper cause’ language in the New York statute,
not on its use of the phrase ‘may issue.’ [Citation.] Nor did Bruen include any holding
regarding the ‘good moral character’ condition. [Finally,] D.L.’s new argument
concerning the ‘may issue’ language in sections 26150 and 26155 is an ‘as applied’
constitutional challenge and not a facial challenge because the argument would not apply
in all circumstances.” (D.L., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 166.) “For all of these reasons,”
the D.L. court “conclude[d] that section 25850 is enforceable and is not unconstitutional
on its face. It does not pose a present total and fatal conflict with applicable
constitutional prohibitions.” (Id. at p. 167.) Again, we agree.

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                                     DISPOSITION
              The trial court’s order dismissing the charge against Gutierrez is reversed,
and the matter is remanded with directions to reinstate the case against him.

                                                 GOETHALS, ACTING P. J.

WE CONCUR:

MOTOIKE, J.

GOODING, J.

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