Court Opinion

ID: 9897204
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:08:35.67042+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:39.543239
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                            Oct 06 2023, 10:28 am

                                                                 CLERK
                                                             Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                Court of Appeals
                                                                  and Tax Court

                     IN THE

Indiana Supreme Court
         Supreme Court Case No. 23S-JV-110

                         T.D.,
                       Appellant

                          –v–

                State of Indiana,
                        Appellee

    Argued: June 22, 2023 | Decided: October 6, 2023

          Appeal from the Lake Superior Court
                 No. 45D06-2006-JD-288
        The Honorable Jeffrey Miller, Magistrate

On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals
                    No. 22A-JV-1016

            Opinion by Chief Justice Rush
   Justices Massa, Slaughter, Goff, and Molter concur.
Rush, Chief Justice.

   Indiana has long been a pioneer in safeguarding a juvenile offender’s
constitutional rights. See, e.g., Frank Sullivan, Jr., Indiana as a Forerunner in
the Juvenile Court Movement, 30 Ind. L. Rev. 279 (1997); Frank Sullivan, Jr.,
Selected Developments in Indiana Juvenile Justice Law (1993–2012), 48 Ind. L.
Rev. 1541, 1547–56 (2015). In 1903, our state became one of the first in the
nation to establish juvenile courts and the first to guarantee the right to a
jury trial to children. Decades later, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a series
of decisions guaranteeing constitutional rights to children in juvenile
proceedings. This Court, however, provided even greater protections by
requiring courts to advise children of their rights at each stage of the
juvenile proceedings along with the opportunity to consult with their
attorney, parent, or guardian before waiving those rights. Shortly
thereafter, the Legislature adopted these heightened protections in our
first juvenile-waiver statute. Today, this statute continues to provide the
procedural framework trial courts must comply with before accepting a
juvenile’s waiver.

   Here, both parties agree the trial court failed to comply with the
juvenile-waiver statute before accepting a juvenile’s delinquency
admission, but they disagree on the effect of that error. We first hold that
the court’s error did not render the judgment void, and thus, the juvenile
is not entitled to relief under Trial Rule 60(B)(6). But we then hold that the
juvenile is entitled to relief under Trial Rule 60(B)(8). He demonstrated
that the court failed to comply with the juvenile-waiver statute before
accepting his admission, and the State did not present any evidence
establishing that his waiver was nevertheless valid under the statute. As a
result, we reverse.

Facts and Procedural History
  In June 2020, fifteen-year-old T.D. was detained in the Lake County
Juvenile Detention Center after he stole a vehicle and money. The State
subsequently filed a delinquency petition, alleging that T.D. committed
auto theft and theft. That same day, appointed counsel filed a motion

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seeking T.D.’s release from detention, stating that T.D. “viewed the video
on his rights and that he has no questions regarding his rights.” It also
stated that counsel informed T.D.’s mother (“Mother”) of her son’s rights
and that she had no questions about them. The court denied the motion
and set a virtual initial hearing. Although Mother was unable to attend
that hearing, T.D. was present and denied the allegations.

   T.D. and Mother were both at the next hearing, on July 9, when T.D.’s
counsel informed the trial court that the parties had reached an agreement
by which T.D. would admit to the auto-theft charge and the State would
dismiss the theft charge. The court, without informing T.D. of his
constitutional rights or confirming that he waived those rights, asked T.D.
and Mother whether they agreed with the resolution. Mother said that
“[i]t’s up to him,” but the court told her that she had “to be in agreement”
since T.D. was a minor. After Mother agreed, T.D. admitted to committing
auto theft, prompting the court to grant the delinquency petition on that
count. The court then dismissed the theft count, the parties proceeded to
argue disposition, and the court took T.D.’s placement under advisement.

   In an order issued later that day, the trial court accepted T.D.’s
admission and found that he and Mother understood “the admission
waives those rights explained in the video.” The court subsequently
issued a dispositional order placing T.D. under the wardship of the
Department of Correction.

   Fourteen months later, T.D. filed a motion for relief from judgment
under Trial Rules 60(B)(6) and 60(B)(8), asserting the adjudication should
be set aside because his admission was not knowing, intelligent, or
voluntary. Specifically, T.D. noted that he and Mother were not “informed
of a single right on the record.” In response, the State argued that T.D. and
Mother were previously advised of and understood T.D.’s rights and also
asserted that the waiver was valid because it was the court’s practice “that
each child, including those detained, views an advisement of rights video
before they are brought into the courtroom for a hearing.” Thus, the State
maintained T.D. “would have viewed that” video before the admission
hearing.

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   The trial court held a hearing on T.D.’s motion where counsel
submitted the transcript of the July 9 hearing and reiterated that T.D.
“entered into his admission agreement . . . without being given his rights
the day of his admission which is explicitly disallowed.” Though the State
did not enter any evidence or question T.D., it asserted that the record
revealed he “was, in fact, advised of his rights.” Agreeing with the State,
the trial court issued an order denying the motion. The court reasoned
that T.D. was “represented by counsel” at all hearings and “presented
with a video that goes over his rights several times before each court
hearing,” ultimately concluding his “admission was voluntary and
knowingly given with the adequate assistance of counsel.” T.D. appealed.

   A divided panel of our Court of Appeals reversed, finding the court’s
judgment void under Trial Rule 60(B)(6). T.D. v. State, 198 N.E.3d 1197,
1202–03 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). The majority reasoned that “a trial court’s
failure to follow the juvenile waiver statute is not a procedural error.” Id.
at 1202. Judge Bailey dissented, believing the court’s error rendered the
judgment voidable. Id. at 1203, 1205 (Bailey, J., dissenting). And, in his
view, T.D. was not entitled to relief under Trial Rule 60(B)(8) because he
failed to allege a meritorious defense. Id. at 1205 n.7.

  T.D. petitioned for transfer, which we granted, vacating the Court of
Appeals’ opinion. Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A).

Standard of Review
   Because T.D. seeks relief from judgment under Trial Rules 60(B)(6) and
60(B)(8), this case implicates two standards of review. When a judgment is
void under Rule 60(B)(6), the trial court has no discretion to enforce it, and
thus, we review the court’s decision de novo. M.H. v. State, 207 N.E.3d
412, 416 (Ind. 2023). But under Rule 60(B)(8)’s catchall provision, whether
relief is warranted “is left to the equitable discretion of the trial court,”
and thus, we review the court’s decision for an abuse of that discretion.
State v. Collier, 61 N.E.3d 265, 268 (Ind. 2016). A trial court abuses its
discretion if it misinterprets the law or if its decision clearly contravenes

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the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it. See, e.g., Smith
v. Franklin Twp. Cmty. Sch. Corp., 151 N.E.3d 271, 273 (Ind. 2020).

Discussion and Decision
   When children admit to delinquency allegations in lieu of proceeding
to fact-finding, they give up several constitutional and statutory rights
associated with trial. Though the same is true for adults who plead guilty,
“admissions and confessions by juveniles require special caution.” Wehner
v. State, 684 N.E.2d 539, 541 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). And so, to ensure a child
knowingly and voluntarily waives their rights before entering an
admission, our Legislature has codified safeguards that require strict
compliance. Hickman v. State, 654 N.E.2d 278, 281 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995).

  The Legislature first codified these safeguards in 1978 when it enacted a
new juvenile code with an express purpose of providing “a judicial
procedure that insures fair hearings and recognizes and enforces the
constitutional and other legal rights of children and their parents.” Pub. L.
No. 136, § 1, 1978 Ind. Acts 1196, 1197. To that end, the juvenile code
established a framework that provided two ways for children to waive the
rights conferred on them through state or federal law; both required adult
participation, and both required the child to “knowingly and voluntarily
join[] with the waiver on the record.” Id. at 1232. Despite a few
amendments to the statute since, its overarching limitations and
requirements remain in force today.

    Indeed, the statute explains that the rights conferred on children
through state or federal law can be waived in only three ways: (1) by
counsel if the juvenile knowingly and voluntarily joins the waiver; (2) by
the juvenile’s custodial parent, guardian, custodian, or guardian ad litem
if that individual knowingly and voluntarily waives the rights, they have
no adverse interests to the juvenile, they engaged in meaningful
consultation with the juvenile, and the juvenile knowingly and voluntarily
joins the waiver; or (3) by the juvenile if they are emancipated and
knowingly and voluntarily consent to the waiver. Ind. Code § 31-32-5-1
(“Juvenile Waiver Statute”). By permitting a court to find waiver in only

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these limited circumstances, “the statute affords juveniles with greater
rights than the Constitution requires.” R.R. v. State, 106 N.E.3d 1037, 1043
(Ind. 2018). Accordingly, our trial courts must take particular care to
ensure a valid waiver of rights before accepting a juvenile’s admission. See
Bryant v. State, 802 N.E.2d 486, 493 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied.

   When, as here, the court fails to confirm or secure a waiver as required
by the Juvenile Waiver Statute, Trial Rule 60(B) is the appropriate avenue
for a juvenile to challenge their agreed delinquency adjudication. J.W. v.
State, 113 N.E.3d 1202, 1207–08 (Ind. 2019). And, under this rule, the
burden is on the juvenile to establish grounds for relief. G.B. v. State, 715
N.E.2d 951, 953 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). T.D. sought relief under Rules
60(B)(6) and 60(B)(8). While the former permits relief when a court’s
“judgment is void,” Ind. Trial Rule 60(B)(6), the latter permits relief for
“any reason” other than those set forth in other subsections that are not
relevant here, T.R. 60(B)(8). Additionally, Rule 60(B)(8) requires the party
to file their motion “within a reasonable time” and “allege a meritorious
claim or defense.” Id. T.D. and the State do not dispute that the court erred
by failing to comply with the Juvenile Waiver Statute; they disagree on the
effect of that error.

   We first hold that T.D. is not entitled to relief under Rule 60(B)(6)
because a violation of the Juvenile Waiver Statute renders a judgment
entering an agreed delinquency adjudication voidable rather than void.
Accordingly, when the statute is violated, Rule 60(B)(8) is the proper
vehicle for a juvenile to collaterally attack their adjudication. We then hold
that T.D. is entitled to relief under Rule 60(B)(8). The State concedes T.D.’s
motion was timely, and we conclude he demonstrated a meritorious claim
by showing that the trial court did not follow the Juvenile Waiver Statute’s
heightened protections. Because the State has failed to establish that T.D.’s
waiver was nevertheless valid under the statute before the court accepted
his admission, the trial court abused its discretion in denying T.D.’s
motion for relief from judgment.

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    I. T.D. is not entitled to relief under Trial Rule
       60(B)(6).
   Trial Rule 60(B)(6) allows a party to move for relief at any time if “the
judgment is void.” T.R. 60(B)(6); see also Anderson v. Wayne Post 64, Am.
Legion Corp., 4 N.E.3d 1200, 1205 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. So, to
be entitled to relief, the party must establish that the judgment is void, not
voidable. Koonce v. Finney, 68 N.E.3d 1086, 1090 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans.
denied. The distinction between these two terms is “no mere semantic
quibble.” Stidham v. Whelchel, 698 N.E.2d 1152, 1154 (Ind. 1998). While a
void judgment “is a complete nullity” without legal effect from its
inception, id. (quoting 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments § 31 (1994)), a voidable
judgment “is capable of confirmation or ratification,” making it subject to
ordinary appellate or other direct procedures to correct it, id. (quoting 46
Am. Jur. 2d Judgments § 30 (1994)).

   The State asserts that because the trial court had both personal and
subject matter jurisdiction, T.D.’s agreed delinquency adjudication
“cannot be considered void.” T.D. concedes that the court had both
personal and subject matter jurisdiction, but he argues the judgment is
void because the court lacked authority to find him delinquent without
first securing a valid waiver of his rights. We partially agree with both
parties. A judgment is void when the issuing court lacks personal
jurisdiction, subject matter jurisdiction, or the authority to render the
judgment. But a court’s failure to comply with the Juvenile Waiver Statute
falls outside of that scope because, despite the statutory violation, the
court still has the authority to adjudicate the juvenile as a delinquent.

    A. Void judgments are those issued by a court that lacks
       personal jurisdiction, subject matter jurisdiction, or the
       authority to render the judgment.

   It is well-settled that judgments rendered by a court lacking either
personal or subject matter jurisdiction are void, see, e.g., Stidham, 698
N.E.2d at 1154; Troxel v. Troxel, 737 N.E.2d 745, 749 (Ind. 2000)—so well-
settled in fact that we have previously held a judgment is void only if the

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court lacks personal or subject matter jurisdiction, see K.S. v. State, 849
N.E.2d 538, 541-42 (Ind. 2006); Packard v. Shoopman, 852 N.E.2d 927, 931–32
(Ind. 2006). We explained that any other error in a judgment is “legal
error,” rendering the judgment voidable. See Packard, 852 N.E.2d at 929–
30; K.S., 849 N.E.2d at 542. But since those pronouncements, our appellate
courts have held, on multiple occasions, that a judgment is also void if the
issuing court lacked the authority to render the judgment.

   For example, a judgment is void if it grants rights or relief to a party
that the court is not legally authorized to provide. In re Guardianship of
A.J.A., 991 N.E.2d 110, 115 (Ind. 2013); Mosley v. State, 171, N.E.3d 1031,
1034 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021); In re Adoption of P.A.H., 992 N.E.2d 774, 775–76
(Ind. Ct. App. 2013); M.S. v. C.S., 938 N.E.2d 278, 284 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).
Similarly, a judgment is void if it grants rights or relief to a party that does
not have standing to pursue the action. In re Paternity of S.A.M., 85 N.E.3d
879, 889 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017); In re I.E., 997 N.E.2d 358, 366 (Ind. Ct. App.
2013), trans. denied; Kitchen v. Kitchen, 953 N.E.2d 646, 651 (Ind. Ct. App.
2011). Or, as we recently held, a judgment is void if it interferes with
issues pending on appeal. Conroad Assocs., L.P. v. Castleton Corner Owners
Ass’n, 205 N.E.3d 1001, 1004–05 (Ind. 2023). In each of these circumstances,
the trial court lacked the authority to render the judgment from the
outset—a hallmark of a void judgment and akin to a jurisdictional defect
rather than a legal error. See 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments § 25 (2023) (“A ‘void
judgment’ is one that has a defect apparent on its face.”)

   Accordingly, we clarify that a trial court’s judgment is void if the court
lacks personal jurisdiction, subject matter jurisdiction, or the authority to
render the judgment. That said, we construe “authority” narrowly to
distinguish void errors from voidable legal or procedural errors. See K.S.,
849 N.E.2d at 541. There is a distinct difference between a judgment that
the law does not authorize under any circumstances (a void judgment),
and a judgment authorized by law but derived in violation of law (a
voidable judgment). In the latter scenario, the trial court still has the
requisite authority to act, and thus, the error is a procedural irregularity
that can be cured. See 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments § 15 (2023) (“The fact that a
[trial] court acts in violation of a statute does not mean that the resulting

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judgment is void.”) Mindful of these principles, we now consider whether
a trial court’s failure to comply with the Juvenile Waiver Statute renders
an agreed delinquency adjudication void or voidable.

    B. A trial court’s failure to comply with the Juvenile
       Waiver Statute renders an agreed delinquency
       adjudication voidable.
   As explained above, since 1978, the Juvenile Waiver Statute has
provided a framework by which juveniles, their lawyers, and their parents
can give up “[a]ny rights guaranteed to a child” under the Federal
Constitution, the Indiana Constitution, “or any other law.” I.C. § 31-32-5-1.
Since the rights associated with fact-finding fall within this broad
category, trial courts are required to comply with the statute by either
confirming or securing waiver during the hearing at which the court
obtains the juvenile’s admission. Such compliance not only adheres with
our Legislature’s decision to provide “special protections for juveniles,”
B.A. v. State, 100 N.E.3d 225, 231 (Ind. 2018), but it also comports with the
requirements for advisements in the adult context before a court accepts a
defendant’s guilty plea, Ponce v. State, 9 N.E.3d 1265, 1270 (Ind. 2014); I.C.
§ 35-35-1-2(a).

   Given the special caution afforded to juvenile admissions, a trial court’s
failure to comply with the Juvenile Waiver Statute is particularly
alarming. But that failure does not mean the court lacks the legal authority
under any set of circumstances to adjudicate a juvenile as a delinquent.
Indeed, nothing in the juvenile code prohibits a court from entering
judgment on an agreed delinquency adjudication despite an invalid
waiver of rights. Thus, violations of the Juvenile Waiver Statute do not
render a subsequent delinquency adjudication void; they render it
voidable because the error can be cured if challenged.

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   As a result, Trial Rule 60(B)(8) is the proper vehicle for juveniles to
collaterally attack an adjudication based on an invalid waiver of rights. 1
See G.B., 715 N.E.2d at 954. When relief is granted under this rule, the
juvenile will have an opportunity to reevaluate whether to admit to the
allegations raised in the delinquency petition or to proceed to fact-finding.
Because the trial court’s judgment here was voidable, the court did not err
in denying T.D.’s motion for relief under Trial Rule 60(B)(6). We next
consider whether the court erred in denying T.D.’s motion under Rule
60(B)(8).

    II. T.D. is entitled to relief under Trial Rule
       60(B)(8).
   Trial Rule 60(B)(8) permits a party to obtain relief from judgment for
“any reason” other than those set forth in other subsections of the rule that
are not relevant here. T.R. 60(B)(8). To be entitled to relief under this rule,
the movant must file their motion “within a reasonable time” and “allege
a meritorious claim or defense.” Id. Additionally, our precedent requires
the moving party to “demonstrate some extraordinary or exceptional
circumstances justifying equitable relief.” Collier, 61 N.E.3d at 268
(collecting cases). Having abandoned any challenge to the timeliness of
T.D.’s motion, the State asserts that T.D. is not entitled to relief because he
has failed to show either a meritorious claim or exceptional circumstances.
We disagree.

   Alleging a meritorious claim or defense “requires a prima facie
showing . . . that will prevail until contradicted and overcome by other
evidence.” Outback Steakhouse of Fla., Inc. v. Markley, 856 N.E.2d 65, 73 (Ind.
2006) (quotation omitted). In this context, the proper “analysis begins and
ends with the juvenile-waiver statute, which governs ‘any rights’
guaranteed to a juvenile.” R.R., 106 N.E.3d at 1042. Thus, a juvenile

1We disapprove of other opinions reaching a contrary conclusion. See A.S. v. State, 923 N.E.2d
486 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).

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collaterally attacking an agreed delinquency adjudication must make a
prima facie showing that the court failed to either secure or confirm
waiver in one of the three ways required by the statute before accepting
the juvenile’s admission.

   For unemancipated juveniles like T.D., assessing the waiver’s validity
potentially requires two separate analyses: (1) whether counsel waived the
juvenile’s rights and the juvenile knowingly and voluntarily joined that
waiver; or (2) whether the juvenile’s parent, guardian, custodian, or
guardian ad litem knowingly and voluntarily waived the juvenile’s rights,
has no interest adverse to the juvenile, took part in meaningful
consultation with the juvenile, and the juvenile knowingly and voluntarily
joined that waiver. I.C. § 31-32-5-1(1), (2). Under the second inquiry, when
the juvenile’s custodial parent is present at the admission hearing, the
court “must inquire of the juvenile and his parent[] . . . to insure that the
waiver is voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently given.” Bridges v. State,
260 Ind. 651, 299 N.E.2d 616, 618 (1973); see also R.W. v. State, 901 N.E.2d
539, 545 & n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009); D.H. v. State, 688 N.E.2d 221, 224 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1997); cf. Ponce, 9 N.E.3d at 1270 (holding that a post-conviction
defendant has met their threshold burden for relief by demonstrating that
the trial court failed to give the requisite advisements during the guilty
plea hearing).

   In short, if a juvenile makes a prima facie showing in proceedings on a
motion for relief from judgment that the court failed to comply with the
Juvenile Waiver Statute’s requirements, the juvenile has established a
meritorious claim that amounts to exceptional circumstances justifying
relief. See Stewart v. State, 754 N.E.2d 492, 494–95 (Ind. 2001). Upon such a
showing, the burden shifts to the State to produce evidence establishing
that, before the court accepted the juvenile’s admission, the waiver was
nevertheless valid under the statute.

   Here, T.D. made the requisite prima facie showing. He sought relief in
his motion based on the court’s failure to comply with the statute before
accepting his admission. Then, at the subsequent hearing, T.D.’s counsel
submitted the transcript from the admission hearing. The transcript shows
the trial court failed to ascertain on the date of T.D.’s admission that (1)

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counsel waived T.D.’s rights and T.D. knowingly and voluntarily joined
that waiver, or (2) Mother knowingly and voluntarily waived T.D.’s rights
and T.D. knowingly and voluntarily joined that waiver. In fact, the record
is devoid of evidence that the court mentioned any of T.D.’s rights during
any hearing, including the initial hearing at which Indiana law requires
the court to “inform the child” of certain rights. See I.C. § 31-37-12-5(2).
Additionally, the State did not present any evidence during the hearing on
T.D.’s motion for relief, and it did not question T.D. to learn whether,
before entering his admission, he waived his rights.

   Yet, the State maintains that the waiver was nevertheless valid under
the Juvenile Waiver Statute because T.D. and Mother watched a video
advisement before each hearing that explained his rights. We
acknowledge T.D.’s counsel confirmed that, before the detention hearing,
T.D. was advised of his rights by video and counsel informed Mother of
T.D.’s rights. But that hearing took place three weeks before the hearing at
which T.D. entered his admission. Additionally, such outside-the-
courtroom video advisements alone are insufficient to comply with the
Juvenile Waiver Statute—the court must also personally question the
juvenile and his parent, if present, on the record as to whether both
understand and voluntarily waive the juvenile’s rights. N.M. v. State, 791
N.E.2d 802, 806–07 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003); Bridges, 299 N.E.2d at 618. That
did not happen here. Finally, we acknowledge, as the trial court pointed
out, that T.D. was represented by counsel “at every stage of the juvenile
proceedings.” But, under the statute, simply being represented by counsel
does not establish that T.D. knowingly and voluntarily waived each of the
rights conferred on him through state or federal law. See D.D.B. v. State,
691 N.E.2d 486, 487 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998).

   To summarize, T.D. met his burden for relief under Trial Rule 60(B)(8)
by making a prima facie showing that the trial court failed to comply with
the Juvenile Waiver Statute before accepting his admission. And the State
did not present any evidence establishing that T.D.’s waiver was
nevertheless valid under the statute. As a result, the trial court abused its
discretion by denying his motion for relief from judgment.

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Conclusion
   For these reasons, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand
with instructions to hold a hearing during which T.D. either admits to the
allegations raised in the delinquency petition after the court complies with
the Juvenile Waiver Statute or proceeds to fact-finding.

Massa, Slaughter, Goff, and Molter, JJ., concur.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
Amy E. Karozos
Public Defender of Indiana

Mark S. Koselke
Katherine Province
Deputy Public Defenders
Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Theodore E. Rokita
Attorney General of Indiana

Angela Sanchez
Chief Counsel for Appeals

Evan Matthew Comer
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana

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