Court Opinion

ID: 9793297
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:45:52.706582+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:04:23.381954
License: Public Domain

SINGLETON, Judge,
concurring.
I join in the court’s decision.
In my view, the issue in this case is much simpler than it appears to the other members of this court or to the eminent trial judge. The issue, as I see it: May a police officer (1) armed with a warrant based on probable cause, (2) authorizing the search and seizure of a particularly described closed container, (3) open that container without violating the fourth amendment or comparable provisions of our state constitution, (5) when it legally comes into his possession without recourse to the warrant, (6) where the warrant is defective1 (a) in describing potential places where the container described in the warrant might have been found or (b) because the magistrate issuing the warrant may not have had a *864basis for finding probable cause to search some or all of the potential places contemplated in the warrant? I conclude that the officer may open the closed container. This conclusion disposes of this case.
As I understand it, the trial court and all the members of this court agree that the package under discussion was properly seized (without reliance on the warrant) either incident to an arrest or because it was in plain view in the defendant’s automobile. We also all agree, I believe, that authority to seize a closed container does not automatically provide authority to open it. See Texas v. Brown, — U.S. —, —, 103 S.Ct. 1535, 1546, 75 L.Ed.2d 502, 519 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring).2 Normally, an officer legally seizing a closed container based on probable cause to believe that it contains contraband is required to take it before a magistrate and obtain a warrant to search it in the absence of exigent circumstance or consent. I assume that neither exigent circumstances nor effective consent was present here. The question is: Does the normal rule apply when the officer already has gone before a magistrate and obtained a valid warrant (albeit defective in other respects) for the closed container in question where it legally comes into his hands without recourse to the warrant? I conclude that the normal rule does not apply and that the officers could search the container previously legally seized. As the United States Supreme Court pointed out in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 1692, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081, 1091 (1961): “There is no war between the constitution and common sense.” No one contends, in this proceeding, that the magistrate issuing the warrant did not properly find probable cause to seize this package or that it was not particularly described in the warrant issued. It would serve no useful purpose to require a second warrant to search the very package described in the first warrant. See 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 4.6(f), at 111-12 (1978); cf. 2 W. LaFave, supra, § 4.8(f), at 137 (constitution does not require “useless gestures”).
Finally, I conclude that the circumstances under which the partially opened package in question was found were sufficient to enable the officers to determine with reasonable certainty that it was the package described in the warrant, see 2 W. LaFave, supra, § 4.6(a), at 96 (1978), and that it had not been materially changed in the interim. See Illinois v. Andreas, — U.S. —, 103 S.Ct. 3319, 76 L.Ed.2d —(1983). Judge Schulz found that there was probable cause to believe that it was the same package as part of his decision that it could lawfully be seized incident to an arrest. In deciding whether a given item is the one described in a warrant, I would conclude that “reasonable certainty” and “probable cause” are essentially synonymous. See Johnson v. State, 617 P.2d 1117, 1123-24 (Alaska 1980) (treating the word “positive” and the phrases “reasonably certain” and “probable cause” as essentially synonymous in a situation similar to this one). But cf. Illinois v. Andreas, — U.S. at —, 103 S.Ct. at 3325 (requiring in a similar situation, except warrant not obtained, that there be no “substantial likelihood ... that the contents of the shipping container were changed during the brief period that it was out of sight of the surveilling officer”); id. at —, 103 S.Ct. at 3329 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“virtual certainty” required).
Given these conclusions, I find it unnecessary to address the other issues debated in the parties’ briefs and the opinions of Judge Coats and Chief Judge Bryner, i.e., to determine whether the warrant in question was *865insufficiently particular in describing potential dwellings and automobiles to be searched, since no dwellings or automobiles were searched in reliance on the warrant, or to delve into the law of anticipatory warrants or controlled deliveries. See Illinois v. Andreas, — U.S. —, 103 S.Ct. 3319, 76 L.Ed.2d — (1983); Johnson v. State, 617 P.2d 1117 (Alaska 1980); State v. Witwer, 642 P.2d 828 (Alaska App.1982).

. I assume for purposes of discussion but do not decide that this warrant was defective for the reasons set out by Judge Schulz. It is a very close question.
Chief Judge Bryner and Judge Schulz are legitimately concerned that this warrant creates the risk of Morris and Burnham visiting a number of residences on their way home from the airport. Thus, officers possessing this warrant might feel justified in searching every residence visited. More likely, they might feel justified in searching that residence visited by Morris and Burnham which for reasons not disclosed to the magistrate the police had the most interest in searching. Once having access to that residence, the police could then seize any contraband found in “plain view” whether or not described in the warrant. Such a use of the warrant would expose Morris’ and Bum-ham’s social friends to all the risks of the general warrants condemned in the constitution. It is feared that to allow the search and seizure in this case will encourage the future issuance of similar warrants amenable to the same abuses and that the only way to prevent the harm is either to void the warrant ab initio as a general warrant or conclude that it died and could serve no function after Morris and Burnham left the first residence they visited after leaving the airport. I share this concern. Had the warrant been used to search any residence after the first, serious questions would be presented. I prefer to address them in a case in which they are squarely presented. I assume that the state’s prosecutors, having been warned, will ensure that warrants, including anticipatory warrants, are drafted with greater specificity in the future.

. See also Metcalfe v. State, 593 P.2d 638, 640 (Alaska 1979). But cf. Hinkel v. Anchorage, 618 P.2d 1069 (Alaska 1980) (permitting search incident to arrest of closed containers “immediately associated” with the arrestee without a warrant, consent or exigent circumstances); McCoy v. State, 491 P.2d 127 (Alaska 1971) (refusing to distinguish between right to seize closed container on arrested person and right to search container). No one has argued that the package in question was “immediately associated” with either person arrested. Nevertheless, Hinkel did indicate the common sense approach our supreme court takes to problems presented by search and seizure and supports the conclusion that two warrants should not be required for a single container.