Court Opinion

ID: 9387454
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-18 00:00:31.379167+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:13.586533
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-10451     Document: 00516714175         Page: 1     Date Filed: 04/17/2023

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit                          United States Court of Appeals
                                                                        Fifth Circuit

                                                                      FILED
                                                                  April 17, 2023
                                  No. 22-10451
                                                                 Lyle W. Cayce
                                Summary Calendar                      Clerk

   United States of America,

                                                             Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                       versus

   Felicia Munoz,

                                                         Defendant—Appellant.

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Northern District of Texas
                            USDC No. 1:21-CR-43

   Before Wiener, Elrod, and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges.
   Jennifer Walker Elrod, Circuit Judge:
          Appellant Felicia Munoz was a caretaker for a retired Texas Depart-
   ment of Public Safety trooper and his ailing wife (known pseudonymously as
   R.R. and K.R.). Over the course of Munoz’s employment, she and her boy-
   friend stole hundreds of firearms, eight silencers, a wedding ring, two tennis
   bracelets, earrings, and two other rings from the elderly couple. Munoz even-
   tually pleaded guilty to possession of stolen firearms. 18 U.S.C. § 922(j). In
   connection with her plea agreement, she waived the right to appeal except as
   to a sentence in excess of the statutory maximum. The district court
Case: 22-10451      Document: 00516714175          Page: 2   Date Filed: 04/17/2023

                                    No. 22-10451

   sentenced Munoz to 108 months’ incarceration and ordered her to pay resti-
   tution in the amount of $75,605.97 to compensate for the stolen firearms.
   She appealed the restitution order.
          The questions presented are whether Munoz’s appeal waiver bars her
   from challenging the restitution award and, if not, whether the district court
   erred in calculating the proper amount of restitution. We agree with Munoz
   that her appeal waiver does not prevent us from considering the merits of her
   appeal. But her substantive arguments fail. The district court committed no
   error in ordering restitution in the amount of $75,605.97. Accordingly, that
   judgment is AFFIRMED.
                                          I
          As introduced above, R.R. worked as a DPS trooper for his living. In
   the words of his daughter, S.R., he was an avid gun collector and their family
   often enjoyed firearm sports together. Upon R.R.’s retirement, he and K.R.
   began to need assistance in their day-to-day life. Specifically, R.R. developed
   diabetes and K.R. was diagnosed with brain cancer. When their health con-
   tinued to decline, they hired Munoz as a caretaker.
          Munoz used her employment to steal from the couple. She took pic-
   tures of R.R. and K.R.’s possessions and sent them to her boyfriend, Albert
   Guzman. When Munoz took the couple to doctor appointments, she would
   text Guzman to alert him that then was a good time to steal whatever posses-
   sions she had previously identified. All told, Munoz and Guzman stole 130
   firearms, eight silencers, a wedding ring, two tennis bracelets, earrings, and
   two other rings. They sold many of the stolen firearms to a gun shop in San
   Antonio. And they sold others “on the street.”
          Law enforcement officers eventually discovered the scheme. Munoz
   was charged with possession of stolen firearms, aiding and abetting the pos-
   session of stolen firearms, and possession of unregistered firearms. She then

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   entered into a plea agreement whereby she agreed to plead guilty to the first
   charge in exchange for the Government’s dropping the other two charges.
   Munoz also agreed to waive her entitlement to appeal, but reserved the right
   to, among other things, “bring a direct appeal of . . . a sentence exceeding the
   statutory maximum punishment.”
          In connection with the sentencing proceedings, the probation office
   inventoried the stolen guns. Law enforcement recovered 57 of the 130 fire-
   arms that Munoz and Guzman stole. For the other seventy-three, the proba-
   tion office listed the make, model, serial number, and an estimate of the value.
   R.R. and K.R. were unable to assist with the estimates because they passed
   in 2021. And so the probation office relied on S.R. to approximate the value
   of each firearm. According to the pre-sentence report, S.R. calculated those
   values using R.R.’s detailed records of the firearm collection, her experience
   with firearms generally, and her familiarity with the particular guns at issue.
   She also accounted for the fact that “many of the firearms were family heir-
   looms” and thus irreplaceable. Relying on S.R.’s estimates, the probation
   office calculated the value of the lost firearms as $79,039.
          Munoz objected to the probation office’s calculation. She introduced
   a competing estimate of the firearms’ value—conducted by James Hill, the
   owner of a gun range in Abilene. Hill offered two estimates: one using the
   retail (or replacement) price of the lost firearms, and one using the market
   value, which reflected a discounted price due to the guns’ used condition.
   He concluded that the stolen firearms were worth $70,716 according to retail
   value and $52,540 according to market value. Hill candidly noted that he had
   not examined the weapons and could not testify as to their precise condition.
   Munoz requested that the district court order restitution according to the
   discounted market value.
          The Government then amended its requested restitution award in two

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   respects. First, it agreed to rely on Hill’s affidavit because S.R. declined to
   testify. But it contended that the district court should use retail value instead
   of market value. This reduced the sum to $69,816. (The Government had
   recovered one additional firearm, worth $900, so it subtracted that amount
   from its request.) Second, the Government explained that S.R. had elected
   to abandon the eight silencers because she could not take possession of them
   without opening a probate proceeding and pursuing them in court. For this
   reason, the Government asserted, Munoz should pay restitution for the re-
   placement value of the silencers, which was calculated at $5,789.97. The
   Government therefore requested a revised restitution amount of $75,605.97.
          At the sentencing hearing, Munoz renewed her objection that the dis-
   trict court should use market value instead of replacement value to calculate
   the restitution award. (Notably, she did not object to the silencers’ inclusion
   in the calculation.) The district court overruled the objection—finding that
   “[t]he firearms here held unique, intangible, and sentimental value to the vic-
   tim, so the fair market value inadequately measures the harm.” The district
   court thus ordered restitution in the amount of $75,605.97.
                                           II
          Munoz presents two issues on appeal. First, she maintains that the
   district court erred by calculating the restitution award using retail value, ra-
   ther than market value. Second, she argues that the Government failed to
   prove that she proximately caused financial loss relating to the silencers. The
   Government moved to dismiss, asserting that Munoz’s appeal waiver barred
   her from pursuing the two arguments described above. The motion was de-
   nied, but the Government maintains its position at the merits stage.
                                           A
          We first consider whether Munoz’s appeal waiver applies in these cir-
   cumstances. As an initial matter, it is clear that the right to appeal is statutory

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                                          No. 22-10451

   in nature and can be waived. United States v. Meredith, 52 F.4th 984, 986 (5th
   Cir. 2022). In assessing whether an appeal waiver executed in connection
   with a plea agreement applies to a particular appeal, we ask if “the waiver was
   knowing and voluntary,” United States v. Alfred, 60 F.4th 979, 981–82 (5th
   Cir. 2023), and if it “applies to the circumstances at hand, based on the plain
   language of the agreement.” Id. at 982 (quoting United States v. Purser, 747
   F.3d 284, 289 n.10 (5th Cir. 2014)). Munoz does not dispute that her waiver
   was knowing and voluntary. Instead, she argues that her plea agreement does
   not apply to the issues she raises here. As in many plea agreements, Munoz
   reserved the right to appeal a sentence in excess of the statutory maximum.
   The question, then, is whether the substance of Munoz’s issues challenge the
   restitution order as exceeding the statutory maximum.1
           This court’s precedents recognize several ways in which a restitution
   order can exceed the statutory maximum. Among other things, such an order
   cannot exceed the victim’s loss. See, e.g., United States v. Chem. & Metal In-
   dus., Inc., 677 F.3d 750, 752 (5th Cir. 2012). Also, the Government bears the
   burden to prove that the defendant’s conduct proximately caused the victim
   damages in the amount provided by the restitution award. See, e.g., United
   States v. Winchel, 896 F.3d 387, 398 (5th Cir. 2018).
           Munoz’s challenges are consistent with these limited exceptions to
   her appeal waiver. First, she contests the district court’s finding that the

           1
              We would ask the same question even if Munoz had not expressly reserved the
   right to assert this issue on appeal. The parties agree that the Mandatory Victims Restitu-
   tion Act applies to the offense for which Munoz was convicted. We have interpreted the
   MVRA (and other restitution statutes) to place various restrictions on restitution orders.
   See United States v. Kim, 988 F.3d 803, 809–10 (5th Cir. 2021); United States v. Oliver, No.
   21-11173, 2023 WL 1529730, at *1 (5th Cir. Feb. 3, 2023) (discussing the “well-established
   statutory limits on restitution awards”). A criminal defendant can raise these issues on
   appeal even if the plea agreement lacks an express reservation of that right. Kim, 988 F.3d
   at 809; see also United States v. Leal, 933 F.3d 426, 431–32 (5th Cir. 2019).

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   firearms she stole are unique, and therefore warrant the use of replacement
   value to calculate the restitution award. This objection goes to the amount
   of the loss Munoz caused R.R. and K.R., and in turn caused S.R. If Munoz is
   correct, the Government’s evidence does not show that she proximately
   caused damages in the amount of $75,605.97. Said another way, if R.R. and
   K.R.’s firearm collection is not unique in nature, a restitution award of
   $75,605.97 would exceed the victims’ loss. Whether it be six of one or half a
   dozen of the other, such an award would violate the statutory maximum. See
   Winchel, 896 F.3d at 398; Chem. & Metal Indus., Inc., 677 F.3d at 752. The
   same is true of the argument that Munoz did not proximately cause S.R. to
   lose the value of the eight silencers. See Kim, 988 F.3d at 812.
          To be sure, not every disagreement about the methods used to calcu-
   late restitution will allow a criminal defendant to avoid her appeal waiver. As
   this court has recognized, an appeal waiver may not be circumvented merely
   because a defendant invokes the magic words “in excess of the statutory max-
   imum.” See Meredith, 52 F.4th at 987 (explaining that a criminal defendant
   may not “use the statutory-maximum boilerplate as an appeal-authorizing es-
   cape hatch”). For that reason, we have rejected arguments that in substance
   merely disagreed with the district court’s calculation of the restitution award.
          In United States v. Oliver, for instance, the defendant objected to the
   district court’s use of the defendant’s gain as evidence to approximate the
   victims’ loss. 2023 WL 1529730, at *1–2. Oliver framed this issue in terms
   of “exceeding the statutory maximum,” but he did not contest that the vic-
   tim had suffered damages of at least the amount of restitution ordered by the
   district court, or that he had proximately caused at least that much loss. The
   objection therefore reduced to a disagreement on how the district court cal-
   culated restitution—and that is insufficient to invoke one of the limited ex-
   ceptions to an appeal waiver.

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          But here, Munoz raises a bona fide question as to whether the restitu-
   tion ordered by the district court exceeds the victim’s loss or whether the
   Government failed to prove that Munoz proximately caused damages in that
   amount. She may therefore pursue those issues notwithstanding the fact that
   she otherwise waived her right to appeal.
                                          B
          And so we turn to the merits. Recall that Munoz presents two inde-
   pendent arguments: that the district court erred in using retail value to calcu-
   late restitution, and that the Government failed to prove that she proximately
   caused S.R. to lose the value of the eight silencers.
                                           1
          We consider de novo the legality of a restitution award and the method
   used to calculate loss. See United States v. Isiwele, 635 F.3d 196, 202 (5th Cir.
   2011). But we review the factual findings supporting the restitution order for
   clear error. See United States v. Sharma, 703 F.3d 318, 322 (5th Cir. 2012).
          As an initial matter, we find no clear error in the district court’s deter-
   mination that R.R. and K.R.’s gun collection was unique in nature. The dis-
   trict court considered the question at length, ultimately finding that “the fire-
   arms here held unique, intangible, and sentimental value to the victim.” We
   cannot say that this finding leaves us with the “definite and firm conviction
   that a mistake has been committed.” Sharma, 703 F.3d at 322.
          That holding in mind, we conclude that the district court did not err
   in choosing to use replacement value to calculate the amount of restitution.
   This court and several of our sister circuits have recognized that the MVRA
   is silent on how restitution is to be calculated, and “contemplate[s] the exer-
   cise of discretion by sentencing courts in determining the measure of value
   appropriate to restitution calculation in a given case.” United States v.

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   Gunselman, 643 F. Appx. 348, 356 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v.
   Boccagna, 450 F.3d 107, 114 (2d Cir. 2006)). And so although the fair market
   value of property will ordinarily compensate a victim for her loss, that metric
   may at times “inadequately measure” the relevant harm. Id. (quoting
   U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(C)(i)). In such a case, replacement cost may be
   “best suited to make [the] victims whole.” Id. (collecting cases). Having
   determined that the firearm collection was unique in nature, the district court
   committed no legal error by calculating the amount of restitution by using the
   replacement value instead of the fair market value.
                                                2
           We now turn to the question of whether the Government proved that
   Munoz proximately caused S.R. to lose the value of the silencers S.R. elected
   to abandon rather than pursue in probate proceedings. At the outset, how-
   ever, we emphasize that Munoz did not raise this objection in the district
   court. In fact, the record is devoid of any objection to including the silencers
   in the restitution calculation. Thus, we review for plain error only. United
   States v. Melendez, 57 F.4th 505, 507 (5th Cir. 2023).2
           To demonstrate plain error, Munoz must show “(1) the district court
   erred; (2) the error was clear and obvious; and (3) the error affected [her]
   substantial rights.” Id. (quoting United States v. Vargas, 21 F.4th 332, 334
   (5th Cir. 2021)). And even then, we have discretion to decline to correct the
   error if our doing so would not “seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or
   public reputation of the proceeding.” Id. (quoting Vargas, 21 F.4th at 334).
           Assuming arguendo that the district court erred, we cannot say that the

           2
            The Government argued for plain-error review for this issue in its brief. Munoz
   neither addressed this topic in her opening brief nor filed a reply brief. As such, it is un-
   contested that this standard of review applies.

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   error was clear and obvious. Munoz does not dispute that she stole the eight
   silencers, or that her actions put S.R. in a position to choose whether to aban-
   don them or initiate probate proceedings to claim them. Instead, she argues
   that S.R.’s actions sever the chain of causation with respect to her stealing
   the silencers, or at least sufficiently dilutes it such that she cannot be said to
   have proximately caused S.R.’s loss. The Government responds that it
   would be impracticable for S.R. to claim the silencers. Gov. Br. at 24–25
   (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(b)(1)(B)) (the defendant must pay the value of
   the property “if return of the property under subparagraph (A) is impossible,
   impracticable, or inadequate”). Supposing the Government failed to carry
   its burden to prove that Munoz proximately caused harm relating to the si-
   lencers, and supposing that the district court erred in including the value of
   the silencers in the restitution calculation, we conclude that any such error
   was not clear and obvious. Munoz thus fails to demonstrate plain error.

                                   *        *         *
          The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. Contra the Gov-
   ernment’s assertion, Munoz’s plea waiver does not bar her from pursuing
   her issues on appeal. That is so because the substance of her arguments call
   into question whether the restitution award exceeds the statutory maximum.
   But those arguments fail on the merits. The district court did not err in or-
   dering restitution in the amount of $75,605.97.

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