Court Opinion

ID: 9894625
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-02 15:09:57.594716+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:10:06.575400
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Dean Shultz and John Dufendach              :
                                            :
               v.                           : No. 989 C.D. 2021
                                            : Argued: September 13, 2023
The Zoning Hearing Board of Mount Joy       :
Township, Mount Joy Township, and           :
Gettysburg Concrete Company, Inc.           :
                                            :
Appeal of: Gettysburg Concrete              :
Company, Inc.                               :

BEFORE:     HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
            HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
            HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
            HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
            HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
            HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
            HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION
BY JUDGE WOJCIK                         FILED: November 2, 2023

            Gettysburg Concrete Company, Inc. (Applicant) appeals the order of
the Adams County Court of Common Pleas (trial court) reversing the decision of the
Zoning Hearing Board of Mount Joy Township (Board) that had granted Applicant’s
application for a dimensional variance. We affirm.
            New Enterprise Stone & Lime Company, Inc. (Landowner) owns two
parcels of property totaling 20.18 acres at 1745 Baltimore Pike, Mount Joy
Township, Adams County, which are located in the Baltimore Pike Corridor-
Intensive Uses Overlay (BPC-O) Zoning District.1 The northeast portion of the
property is primarily an open grassland with a few construction trailers and a storage
building. A portion of this area is used as a construction staging area and for the
storage of construction material such as crushed rock. The remainder of the property
is a wooded slope going down to Rock Creek, which runs from the northwest to the
southeast along the southwest border of the property. The property has been
intermittently used for construction storage, but is primarily open grassland with the
wooded slope to the creek.

       1
           Under the Mount Joy Township Zoning Ordinance (Ordinance), the following are
permitted as principal uses in the BPC-O Zoning District: (1) Animal Grooming and Indoor
Training; (2) Auction House or Flea Market; Billboard; (3) Car Wash; (4) Catering Facility (no
on-site consumption); (5) Construction Company or Tradesperson’s Headquarters - office only;
(6) Construction Company or Tradesperson’s Headquarters - outside storage of equipment and
materials; (7) Convenience Store; (8) Crafts or Artisan Studio; (9) Dry Cleaners, Laundries, and
Laundromats; (10) Dwelling, Single-Family; (11) Dwelling, Two-Family; Forestry; (12) Gasoline
Service Station; (13) Golf Course; (14) Grocery Store; (15) Group Home; (16) Historic Building;
(17) Hobby School; (18) Hotel or Motel; Kennel; (19) Laundromat or Dry Cleaning; (20)
Manufacturing, Light; (21) Massage Parlor; (22) Medical Office; (23) Motor Vehicle Repair
Facility; (24) Motor Vehicle Sales; (25) Nursing Home; Office; (26) Parking Lot, as a principal
use; (27) Personal Services; (28) Place of Assembly; (29) Place of Worship; (30) Plant Nursery or
Garden Center; (31) Professional Services; (32) Recreation Facility; (33) Repair Facility
(appliances, equipment, bicycles, but excluding motor vehicles); (34) Restaurant; (35) Retail (sales
and rental); (36) Self Storage; (37) Sober Living Residence; (38) Solar Energy System; (39)
Tavern or Bar; (40) Theater; (41) Trade School; (42) Veterinary Office; (43) Wholesale Sales; (44)
Wireless Communications Facility, Tower Based; and (45) Wireless Communications Facility,
Non-Tower Based (DAS, DCU, small cell). See Reproduced Record (RR) at 168a-170a.

         The following are permitted as conditional uses in the BPC-O Zoning District: (1) Adult
Use; (2) Gaming; (3) Junkyard; (4) Manufacturing, Heavy; (5) Mining Quarrying, and Related
Processing Operations; (6) Slaughterhouse; (7) Target Range; and (8) Uses Not Provided For. See
id. It is undisputed that the proposed concrete batch plant and mix asphalt batch plant for another
property in Mount Joy Township are “related processing” to the quarry use currently conducted
on the Cumberland Township property, which use is a permitted conditional use in the BPC-O
Zoning District.
                                                 2
                Applicant is the tenant of another property owned by Landowner and
operates a concrete batch plant on quarry property on the northwest side of Rock
Creek in Cumberland Township. Due to ongoing quarry operations, Applicant
desires to expand the quarrying operations and relocate the concrete batch plant to a
site that is not affected by the quarrying. Applicant also wishes to construct a hot
mix asphalt batch plant at the same location of the concrete batch plant. Applicant
wants to construct both plants on the property in Mount Joy Township, which are
permitted conditional uses in the BPC-O Zoning District.
                The concrete batch plant requires the use of silos and superstructures
that are approximately 56 feet high in order to operate appropriately. The hot mix
asphalt batch plant requires the use of silos and superstructures that are
approximately 85 feet high to operate appropriately. However, under the Ordinance,
the maximum permissible height in the BPC-O Zoning District is 50 feet. See RR
at 170a. Accordingly, Applicant submitted a variance application to the Board for a
variance from the height restriction. See id. at 80a-89a.2

      2
          The application states the following, in pertinent part:

                The Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code[ (MPC), Act of
                July 31, 1968, P.L. 805, as amended, 53 P.S. §§10101-11202,] and
                [Ordinance Section 1101(A)(2)] provide for the granting of
                variances that satisfy several specific conditions[:]

                A.     That there are unique physical circumstances or conditions,
                including irregularity, narrowness, or shallowness of lot size or
                shape, or exceptional topographical or other physical conditions
                peculiar to the particular property and that the unnecessary
                hardship is due to such conditions, and not the circumstances or
                conditions generally created by the provisions of this Ordinance in
                the neighborhood or district in which the property is located.
                [Applicant] believes that this standard is not relevant to the request.
                As noted above, the request at hand is not for a traditional
(Footnote continued on next page…)
                                                  3
           dimensional variance in the sense that relief from a setback (for
           example) is required for the proposed use to be viable. Rather, the
           required relief from height limitations is necessary for the proposed
           use to be able to function from an engineering standpoint.

           B.      That because of such physical circumstances or conditions,
           there is no possibility that the property can be developed in strict
           conformity with the provisions of this Ordinance and that the
           authorization of a variance is therefore necessary to enable the
           reasonable use of the property. [Applicant] does not assert that the
           property cannot be developed in any way without the requested
           variance. However, the property cannot be developed with the
           proposed processing facilities (which are permitted as conditional
           uses in the BPC-O [Z]oning [D]istrict) without a variance from the
           building height restrictions of that district. The property was
           purchased by [Landowner] in 1995, shortly after the adjacent quarry
           property was purchased. However, the relative size of the subject
           property to the quarry property (less than 20% of the size of the
           quarry property) and the location of the property on the opposite side
           of Rock Creek indicates that the subject property was not purchased
           primarily for purposes of mineral extraction but rather for the
           proposed purpose of relocating processing facilities that are
           currently on the quarry property. These facilities are rapidly
           becoming encumbrances on the quarrying operation, as the facilities
           and the access to them are occupying a portion of the site that is
           primed for further extraction. It is unclear whether or not the
           dimensional requirements set by the [Ordinance] have changed
           since the subject property was purchased in 1995; however, the
           proposed use cannot be developed on the subject property under
           current zoning regulations without a variance as to structure height.

           c.       That such unnecessary hardship has not been created by the
           app[licant.] The hardship in this case is the inability to develop the
           subject property as the desired mineral processing facilities without
           relief from height restrictions. As noted above, we do not know for
           certain that dimensional requirements have become more restrictive
           as zoning regulations have changed over the last 25 years. However,
           the combination of zoning requirements and physical engineering
           requirements for the proposed permitted use are in direct conflict at
           the present time. The hardship is not being created by [Applicant]
           but is a direct result of the dimensional zoning requirements being
(Footnote continued on next page…)
                                             4
              On December 10, 2020, the Board held a hearing on Applicant’s
application. At the hearing, Dean Shultz and John Dufendach (Objectors) were
granted party status as the owners of property adjacent to, and across the street from,
the property at issue herein. Objectors did not present direct evidence, but cross-
examined witnesses offered by Applicant in support of the application. Specifically,
Applicant presented the testimony of Terrence Sheldon (Sheldon), a self-employed
civil engineer who prepared the variance application, and Greg Willi (Willi), a
goniometric specialist for Employer. Ultimately, at the conclusion of the hearing,
the Board voted 2-1 to grant the variance application. See RR at 68a.
              On January 19, 2021, the Board issued a written decision in support of
the grant of the variance, in which it made the following relevant findings of fact:
(1) the requested dimensional variance “refers to the inability of the proposed plants
to operate properly without relief from the maximum height requirement of 50 feet”;
(2) “[t]he silos and drag slat conveyor are the tallest components of the asphalt plant
and are necessary for the factory-engineered design and functioning of the asphalt
plant”; (3) “[t]he drag slat conveyor transports asphalt plant products into the silos”;
(4) “[t]he silos provide the required storage space for asphalt plant products as they
are produced and they also serve a dual function as the component that loads the
asphalt products onto trucks”; (5) “[t]he asphalt plant cannot be operated
independently of the silos, therefore, the silos are a required component of the

              insufficient to allow the development of the property with an
              expressly permitted use.

RR at 81a-82a (emphasis in original).
                                           5
asphalt plant”; and (6) “[s]imilar functions are true for the concrete batch plant,
although the height requirements are not as great.” RR at 105a.3
               Based on the foregoing findings, the Board made the following relevant
conclusions of law:

               10. The requested height variance for the proposed
               concrete batch plant and asphalt batch plant does not fit
               neatly into the first criteria for a variance because any
               unique physical conditions of the property that there may
               be have nothing to do with the height of the silos or the
               hardship. Rather, the required relief from the maximum
               height of 50 feet for the proposed silos is so that the batch
               plants and the silos can properly function from an
               engineering standpoint.

               11. The issue with regard to the second criteria for
               variance is not that the property cannot be developed
               without the variance. Rather, the proposed batch plants,
               which are permitted as conditional uses in the BPC-O
               [Z]oning [D]istrict cannot be built without a variance from
               the maximum height requirement of 50 feet because the
               concrete batch plant needs a minimum height of 56 feet
               and the asphalt plant needs a minimum height of 85 feet in
               order to operate properly. If the variance is not granted,
               otherwise permitted uses will not be permitted.

               12. With regard to the third criteria for variance, the
               hardship has not been created by [Applicant] or
               [Landowner]. The combination of the maximum height
               limitation and the physical engineering requirements for

       3
          The Board also made findings on the concerns expressed by other neighboring
landowners, the Gettysburg National Military Park (Park) and the Gettysburg Foundation, with
respect to the silos’ impact to the view from the Park. See RR at 105a-06a. The Board found that
“the effect is negligible,” “[e]ven during the winter,” “due to the presence of intervening hills and
forested land between the [Park] and the proposed batch plants,” and that “[w]hen the trees
adjacent to the Culp’s Hill tower [in the Park] have foliage, the silos will be completely invisible.”
Id. The Board also found that “[t]he foliage on the trees would also block the view of the silos
from the property of [Objector] Shultz,” but that “[t]he silos . . . will be visible from Baltimore
Pike.” Id. at 106a.
                                                  6
               the batch plants and silos are in direct conflict with one
               another. The hardship is a direct result of the maximum
               height requirement being insufficient to allow the
               development of the property with a permitted use, namely
               the batch plant and silos.
RR at 109a.
               On February 8, 2021, Objectors appealed the Board’s decision to the
trial court, and Applicant and Mount Joy Township intervened. All of the parties
submitted briefs to the court in support of their respective positions. On appeal,
Objectors asserted, inter alia, that Applicant failed to satisfy the requirements of the
Ordinance and the MPC because “there is no hardship, any such hardship would be
self-inflicted, and the property can be used for other permitted purposes.” RR at
115a. Applicant relied, inter alia, upon this Court’s opinion in In re Appeal of
Towamencin Township, 42 A.3d 366 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012),4 “to support its ruling that

      4
          As this Court has explained:

                       In Towamencin Township, we upheld the grant of a
               dimensional variance from, among other things, a zoning
               ordinance’s height requirement to allow a landowner, who operated
               a farm on his property, to construct a newer, larger silo for crop
               storage. We explained the zoning board granted the dimensional
               variance in order to sustain the reasonable, pre[]existing use of the
               property, and the record supported the zoning board’s finding that
               the landowner would suffer unnecessary financial hardship absent
               the grant of the variance. Specifically, soft, moist soils native to the
               property prevented the landowner from continuing to store crops in
               “hag bags.” We determined substantial evidence supported the
               zoning board’s finding that this storage method threatened the
               continued viability of the farm necessitating construction of the
               newer, larger silo.

DigEntGrp, LLC v. West Nantmeal Township Zoning Hearing Board (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1969 C.D.
2012, filed June 19, 2013), slip op. at 15-16 (citations omitted).
                                                  7
[Applicant] presented sufficient evidence establishing unnecessary hardship so as to
justify the grant of a dimensional variance.” Id. at 120a.
               Ultimately, on August 5, 2021, the trial court issued an opinion and
order reversing the Board’s decision granting Applicant’s application for a variance.
See RR at 110a-123a. With respect to the requisite unnecessary hardship, the trial
court explained:

                      Unlike in [Towamencin Township], in this case, the
               hardship does not attend the property, but is created based
               on [Applicant’s] decision to reconstruct the concrete batch
               plant and add a newly[-]constructed hot mix asphalt batch
               plant in Mount Joy Township so [Applicant] can expand
               its quarrying operation in Cumberland Township, to
               increase its profits. [Applicant’s] witness, [Sheldon],
               specifically testified that the dimensional variance is not
               based upon any unique physical circumstances or
               conditions peculiar to the property nor that the
               unnecessary hardship is due to such conditions from the
               property. Furthermore, [Applicant] seeks to build both
               operations on a lot in Mount Joy Township that is not
               otherwise improved for the use requested. Finally, unlike
               in [Towamencin Township], in this case, both neighbors
               and the [Park] are opposed to the dimensional variance.
Id. at 121a-22a. Applicant filed the instant timely appeal from the trial court’s order.
               On appeal to this Court,5 Applicant’s sole claim6 is that the trial court
erred in reversing the Board’s decision granting its variance application.

       5
         In a land use appeal where the trial court does not take additional evidence, our review is
limited to determining whether the Board abused its discretion or committed an error of law. In
re Thompson, 896 A.2d 659, 666 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006). The Board, as the finder of fact, is
empowered to judge the credibility of the evidence and the weight it should be afforded; a court
may not substitute its interpretation of the evidence for that of the Board. In re Richboro CD
Partners, L.P., 89 A.3d 742, 754-55 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014).

       6
         Initially, Applicant also asserted in the alternative that the trial court erred in failing to
consider the Board’s grant of the variance application as a “recognition” that the Ordinance’s
(Footnote continued on next page…)
                                                  8
Specifically, Applicant asserts that the trial court erred in disregarding the Board’s
findings of fact establishing an unnecessary hardship and in distinguishing
Towamencin Township, which supports the grant of a dimensional variance herein.
We do not agree.
                As referenced above, with respect to Applicant’s application for a
dimensional variance herein, Ordinance Section 1101(A)(2) states:

                The [Board] may grant a dimensional variance, provided
                that the applicant submits sufficient evidence for the
                [Board] to make the following required findings where
                relevant in a given case. These findings repeat the criteria
                for the grant of a dimensional variance set forth in Section
                910.2 of the MPC[7] and shall, at all times be consistent
                with the criteria then current in the MPC:

                a.     That there are unique physical circumstances or
                conditions, including irregularity, narrowness, or
                shallowness of lot size or shape, or exceptional
                topographical or other physical conditions peculiar to the
                particular property and that the unnecessary hardship is
                due to such conditions, and not the circumstances or
                conditions generally created by the provisions of this
                Ordinance in the neighborhood or district in which the
                property is located;

                b.    That because of such physical circumstances or
                conditions, there is no possibility that the property can be
                developed in strict conformity with the provisions of this
                Ordinance and that the authorization of a variance is
                therefore necessary to enable the reasonable use of the
                property;

                c.    That such unnecessary hardship has not been
                created by the app[licant];

height limitation constitutes a de facto exclusion of a permitted use. However, Applicant withdrew
this claim at oral argument.

       7
           Added by the Act of December 21, 1988, P.L. 1329, as amended, 53 P.S. §10910.2.
                                                9
           d.    That the variance, if authorized, will not alter the
           essential character of the district or neighborhood in which
           the property is located, nor substantially or permanently
           impair the appropriate use or development of adjacent
           property, nor be detrimental to the public welfare;

           e.     That the variance, if authorized, will represent the
           minimum variance that will afford relief and will represent
           the least modification possible of the regulations in issue[;
           and]

           f.     In considering the application for a dimensional
           variance, the [Board], for purposes of determining whether
           the lot (not the person) is subject to unnecessary hardship,
           may consider such other fact[or]s as have been established
           by the Courts of Pennsylvania, which under current law
           include economic detriments to the applicant if the
           variance is denied, the financial hardship created by any
           work necessary to bring the building into strict compliance
           with the zoning requirement from which variance is
           sought, and the characteristics of the surrounding
           neighborhood if the lot that is the subject of the application
           is located in a blighted area and the application will
           advance the neighborhood’s rehabilitation.
RR at 290a-91a.
           As this Court has observed:

                  We view this language through the lens of our well-
           established case law in this realm:

                  A variance . . . is issued by a zoning hearing
                  board [and] is not provided for in the zoning
                  ordinance, but [rather] is permission to
                  deviate from the ordinance in either the
                  dimensions of the improvements made to the
                  land or in the use of the land. . . . Although
                  zoning ordinances are to be liberally
                  construed to allow for the broadest possible
                  use of the land, the applicant seeking a
                  variance bears a heavy burden. See Beers ex
                  rel. P/O/A Beers v. Zoning Hearing B[oard]

                                         10
      of Towamensing T[ownship], 933 A.2d 1067,
      1069 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007) (the letter of the
      ordinance cannot be disregarded under the
      pretext of pursuing the spirit). . . . The
      reasons for granting a variance must be
      substantial, serious, and compelling. Valley
      View[ Civic Association v. Zoning Board of
      Adjustment, 462 A.2d 637, 640 (Pa. 1983)].

Nowicki v. Zoning Hearing B[oard] of Borough of
Monaca, 91 A.3d 287, 291 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014).

       With regard to dimensional variances in particular,
they “involve[] a request to adjust zoning regulations to
use[] property in a manner consistent with [those]
regulations,” in contrast to use variances, which “involve[]
a request to use property in a manner that is wholly outside
zoning regulations.” Tri-C[ounty] Landfill, Inc. v. Pine
T[ownship] Zoning Hearing B[oard], 83 A.3d 488, 520
(Pa. Cmwlth. 2014). Dimensional variances consequently
pose a lesser potential threat to the public interest, as they
do not create the same degree of deviation from zoning
regulations as their brethren. Bawa Muhaiyaddeen
Fellowship v. Phila[delphia] Zoning B[oard] of
Adjustment, 19 A.3d 36, 40 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011). In
keeping with this, “[t]he quantum of proof required to
establish unnecessary hardship is indeed lesser when a
dimensional variance, as opposed to a use variance, is
sought.” Hertzberg v. Zoning B[oard] of Adjustment of
City of Pittsburgh, 721 A.2d 43, 48 (Pa. 1998). “To justify
the grant of a dimensional variance, courts may consider
multiple factors, including the economic detriment to the
applicant if the variance was denied, the financial hardship
created by any work necessary to bring the building [or
property] into strict compliance with the zoning
requirements[,] and the characteristics of the surrounding
neighborhood.” Id. at 48.

       However, this does not mean that “dimensional
requirements . . . [are] ‘freefire zones’ for which variances
could be granted when the party seeking the variance
merely articulated a reason that it would be financially
‘hurt’ if it could not do what it wanted to do with the
                             11
              property[.]” Soc[iet]y Created to Reduce Urban Blight v.
              Zoning B[oard] of Adjustment of City of Phila[delphia],
              771 A.2d 874, 877 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001). “Although a
              property owner is not required to show that his or her
              property is valueless unless a variance is granted, mere
              economic hardship will not[, in and] of itself[,] justify a
              grant of a variance.” Marshall v. City of Phila[delphia],
              97 A.3d 323, 330 (Pa. 2014) (some punctuation omitted).
              Nor are “personal . . . considerations . . . sufficient
              grounds upon which to base the grant of a variance.”
              Borough of Latrobe v. Sweeney, 331 A.2d 925, 927 (Pa.
              Cmwlth. 1975).           “A variance, whether labeled
              dimensional or use, is appropriate ‘only where the
              property, not the person, is subject to hardship.’” Yeager
              v. Zoning Hearing B[oard] of City of Allentown, 779 A.2d
              595, 598 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001) (quoting Szmigiel v.
              Kranker, 298 A.2d 629, 631 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1972))
              (emphasis in original). The onus is thus on the applicant
              to firmly establish that “a substantial burden . . . attend[s]
              all dimensionally compliant uses of the property, not just
              the particular use [that the applicant has chosen].” Id. at
              598 (emphasis in original). Accordingly, our appellate
              courts have “consistently reject[ed] requests for
              dimensional variances where proof of hardship is lacking.
              Where no hardship is shown, or where the asserted
              hardship amounts to a landowner’s desire to [develop a
              property as it sees fit], the unnecessary hardship criterion
              required to obtain a variance is not satisfied[.]” Soc[iet]y
              Hill Civic Ass[ociatio]n v. Phila[delphia] Zoning B[oard]
              of Adjustment, 42 A.3d 1178, 1187 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012);
              accord Singer v. Phila[delphia] Zoning B[oard] of
              Adjustment, 29 A.3d 144, 150 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011);
              Yeager, 779 A.2d at 598.
Plum Borough v. Koromvokis and Zoning Hearing Board of the Borough of Plum
(Pa. Cmwlth., No. 179 C.D. 2021, filed November 15, 2021), slip op. at 8-10
(emphasis in original).8 See also Township of East Caln v. Zoning Hearing Board

       8
         See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (“As used in this rule, ‘non-precedential decision’ refers to an
unpublished non-precedential memorandum decision of . . . th[is] Court filed after January 15,
2008. Non-precedential decisions . . . may be cited for their persuasive value.”).
                                             12
of East Caln Township, 915 A.2d 1249, 1254 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007) (“A variance may
be granted only upon proof that a substantial burden attends all dimensionally
compliant uses of the applicant’s property, which is simply not the case here.”)
(emphasis added); Yeager, 779 A.2d at 598 (“[Hertzberg] did not alter the principle
that a substantial burden must attend all dimensionally compliant uses of the
property, not just the particular use the owner chooses.”) (emphasis in original).
             In this case, the variance application that Applicant submitted to the
Board concedes that “[A]pplicant does not assert that the property cannot be
developed in any way without the requested variance. However, the property cannot
be developed with the proposed processing facilities (which are permitted as
conditional uses in the BPC-O [Z]oning [D]istrict) without a variance from the
building height restrictions of that district.” RR at 82a. The application also states
that “[t]he hardship in this case is the inability to develop the subject property as the
desired mineral processing facility without relief from the height restrictions.” Id.
             Moreover, at the Board hearing, Sheldon also conceded that the
requested dimensional variance “does[ not] have anything specifically to do with the
lot. It has to do with the operations” of the proposed concrete and hot mix asphalt
batch plants. Id. at 28a. He continued: “[T]he dimensional variance that we’re
seeking is not . . . the traditional way that we think of a dimensional variance. It’s a
height variance. It really doesn’t have anything specifically to do with the property.”
Id. at 31a-32a. Sheldon added: “The issue is that we cannot develop the property
with this particular use, the asphalt and concrete batch plants, in strict conformity
with the Ordinance.” Id. at 32a. Further, Willi testified regarding the necessity of
the relevant silo heights to the operations of the plants. See id. at 47a-50a.

                                           13
             However, as outlined above, the requisite hardship sufficient to support
the Board’s grant of a variance must apply to “all dimensionally compliant uses of
the applicant’s property, which is simply not the case here.” Township of East Caln,
915 A.2d at 1254 (emphasis added). Stated simply, Applicant did not demonstrate
that the physical characteristics of the property did not allow the property to be used
for any of the more than 40 other uses that are permitted by right, or the other 7 uses
permitted as a conditional use, in the BPC-O Zoning District. Rather, Applicant
merely demonstrated that the property cannot be used for the proposed conditional
use due to the height restriction. As outlined above, standing alone, this is not a
sufficient basis upon which the Board could grant the requested variance.
             Nevertheless, Applicant contends that our holding in Towamencin
Township compels a different result. We do not agree.
             As this Court has noted:

                    [The a]pplicant’s reliance on Towamencin
             Township is misplaced for several reasons. First, in
             Towamencin Township, we specifically rejected an
             argument that the variance relief sought was in the nature
             of a use variance rather than a dimensional variance. In so
             doing, we stated, “the silo’s increased dimensions will not
             reach into a buffer zone or a district that . . . does not
             permit agricultural use.” Here, unlike in Towamencin
             Township, [the a]pplicant’s proposed [evapotranspiration
             sewage] system and accessory greenhouse would, in fact,
             be located in an overlay district that prohibits an on-lot
             sewage disposal system.

                    Further, unlike in Towamencin Township, the
             factfinder here determined [the a]pplicant did not prove
             unnecessary hardship justifying the grant of a variance,
             and the record supports that determination. Also, unlike
             the landowner in Towamencin Township, here [the
             a]pplicant does not require a variance in order to ensure
             the continued viability of a pre[]existing, permitted use. In

                                          14
               fact, as explained above, an alternative, permitted use of
               the property exists.
DigEntGrp, LLC v. West Nantmeal Township Zoning Hearing Board (Pa. Cmwlth.,
No. 1969 C.D. 2012, filed June 19, 2013), slip op. at 16 (citation omitted).
               Likewise, in the instant case, Applicant does not rely on a specific
characteristic of the property at issue, such as the soft, moist soils in Towamencin
Township, to demonstrate the requisite unnecessary hardship. Rather, Applicant
relies on a height requirement that is applicable to all properties within the BPC-O
Zoning District.
               In addition, unlike the landowner in Towamencin Township, Applicant
does not need a dimensional variance to ensure the continuation of a preexisting,
permitted use. The property herein has been used intermittently for construction
storage and remains primarily open grassland with the wooded slope to the creek.
See RR at 104a. Importantly, Applicant did not demonstrate that it would suffer an
economic loss due to its inability to continue the existing use as in Towamencin
Township. Rather, Applicant merely wants the dimensional variance to move the
processing facilities from its present site to maximize the quarrying operations on
the adjoining property in Cumberland Township. Applicant is merely seeking to
maximize economic benefit of its use of the property. In short, the trial court did not
err in reversing the Board’s decision granting the requested variance, and
Towamencin Township does not compel a different result.9

       9
           As a corollary to this claim, Applicant asserts that the Board’s determination of
unnecessary hardship required by Section 1101(A)(2)(a) of the Ordinance is a “finding of fact”
that the trial court erred in “disregarding.” See Brief of Appellant at 3, 9-11. However, as outlined
above, with respect to the requirement of Section 1101(A)(2)(a), the Board specifically determined
that “[t]he requested height variance for the proposed concrete batch plant and asphalt batch plant
does not fit neatly into the first criteri[on] for a variance because any unique physical conditions
(Footnote continued on next page…)
                                                15
               Accordingly, the trial court’s order is affirmed.

                                              MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

Judge Wallace did not participate in the decision of this case.

of the property that there may be have nothing to do with the height of the silos or the hardship.”
RR at 108a.

       To the contrary, as indicated herein, Applicant was required to demonstrate that the
hardship attached to the property was unique to that property and not all of the other properties in
the BPC-O Zoning District. Accordingly:

               The failure of a zoning board to consider each requirement of a
               zoning ordinance prior to granting a variance is an error of law.
               Sweeney [v. Zoning Hearing Board of Lower Merion Township, 626
               A.2d 1147, 1153 (Pa. 1993)]. Here, the zoning board failed to
               consider each of these requirements. Furthermore, the record
               reveals that [the] appellants failed to provide evidence that would
               satisfy even the first criteria. Accordingly, [the] appellants’ claim
               must fail.

Larsen v. Zoning Board of Adjustment of City of Pittsburgh, 672 A.2d 286, 289-90 (Pa. 1996).
                                                16
         IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Dean Shultz and John Dufendach          :
                                        :
               v.                       : No. 989 C.D. 2021
                                        :
The Zoning Hearing Board of Mount Joy   :
Township, Mount Joy Township, and       :
Gettysburg Concrete Company, Inc.       :
                                        :
Appeal of: Gettysburg Concrete          :
Company, Inc.                           :

                                 ORDER

            AND NOW, this 2nd day of November, 2023, the order of the Adams
County Court of Common Pleas dated August 5, 2021, is AFFIRMED.

                                  __________________________________
                                  MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
          IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Dean Shultz and John Dufendach        :
                                      :
            v.                        :
                                      :
The Zoning Hearing Board of Mount     :
Joy Township, Mount Joy Township,     :
and Gettysburg Concrete Company, Inc. :
                                      :
Appeal of: Gettysburg Concrete        :       No. 989 C.D. 2021
Company, Inc.                         :       Argued: September 13, 2023

BEFORE:      HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
             HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
             HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
             HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
             HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
             HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
             HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

CONCURRING OPINION
BY JUDGE FIZZANO CANNON                                FILED: November 2, 2023

             I concur in the Majority’s conclusion affirming the order of the Court
of Common Pleas of Adams County (trial court). I write separately, however, to
clarify what I believe to be the correct legal standard applicable to dimensional
variance applications like the one at issue here.
                 The Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code (MPC),1 addressing
the standards for granting either a use or dimensional variance, provides, in relevant
part:
                 (a) The [zoning hearing board (board)] shall hear requests
                 for variances where it is alleged that the provisions of the
                 zoning ordinance inflict unnecessary hardship upon the
                 applicant. The board may by rule prescribe the form of
                 application and may require preliminary application to the
                 zoning officer. The board may grant a variance, provided
                 that all of the following findings are made where relevant
                 in a given case:
                         (1) That there are unique physical circumstances or
                         conditions, including irregularity, narrowness, or
                         shallowness of lot size or shape, or exceptional
                         topographical or other physical conditions peculiar
                         to the particular property and that the unnecessary
                         hardship is due to such conditions and not the
                         circumstances or conditions generally created by
                         the provisions of the zoning ordinance in the
                         neighborhood or district in which the property is
                         located.
                         (2) That because of such physical circumstances or
                         conditions, there is no possibility that the property
                         can be developed in strict conformity with the
                         provisions of the zoning ordinance and that the
                         authorization of a variance is therefore necessary to
                         enable the reasonable use of the property.
                         (3) That such unnecessary hardship has not been
                         created by the appellant.
                         (4) That the variance, if authorized, will not alter the
                         essential character of the neighborhood or district in
                         which the property is located, nor substantially or
                         permanently impair the appropriate use or
                         development of adjacent property, nor be
                         detrimental to the public welfare.

        1
            Act of July 31, 1968, P.L. 805, as amended, 53 P.S. § 10101-11202.

                                             CFC - 2
                   (5) That the variance, if authorized, will represent
                   the minimum variance that will afford relief and
                   will represent the least modification possible of the
                   regulation in issue.
Section 910.2(a) of the MPC, added by the Act of December 21, 1988, P.L. 1329,
53 P.S. § 10910.2(a) (emphasis added). However, in Hertzberg v. Zoning Board
of Adjustment, 721 A.2d 43 (Pa. 1998), our Supreme Court held that, within this
framework, the criteria for demonstrating unnecessary hardship to obtain a
dimensional variance may be less onerous than for a use variance:
             To justify the grant of a dimensional variance, courts may
             consider multiple factors, including the economic
             detriment to the applicant if the variance was denied, the
             financial hardship created by any work necessary to bring
             the building into strict compliance with the zoning
             requirements and the characteristics of the surrounding
             neighborhood.
Id. at 50. Thus, Hertzberg includes and contemplates consideration of multiple
factors and circumstances, not only topography or other physical characteristics of
the property itself, in determining whether a hardship exists for purposes of a
dimensional variance. Although the Hertzberg Court offered examples of the
multiple factors that might be considered, its list was not exclusive. Accord Mitchell
v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 838 A.2d 819, 829 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003) (explaining that
“Hertzberg did not limit its holding to the facts in that case. Under Hertzberg, the
characteristics and conditions of the surrounding neighborhood is not a determining
factor, but only one of many factors to be considered in determining unnecessary
hardship for a dimensional variance.”) (emphasis added).
             Here, Gettysburg Concrete Company, Inc. (Applicant) suggests that the
zoning ordinance itself, by virtue of the fact that it excludes a particular permitted
use as applied, creates the “unnecessary hardship” needed to establish the criteria

                                      CFC - 3
required by Hertzberg and its progeny for a dimensional variance. Stated otherwise,
the exclusionary nature of the property’s zoning itself may be considered a
characteristic of the property for purposes of determining whether there is a hardship
sufficient to support a variance. Specifically, Applicant maintains that the zoning
ordinance allows its proposed plant as a conditional use in the zoning district at issue,
while at the same time precluding that use by reason of the general height limitation.
This argument suggests that the zoning ordinance itself excludes a permitted use and
thereby creates the hardship that supports a dimensional variance.
                 The Majority states that “[i]nitially, Applicant also asserted in the
alternative that the trial court erred in failing to consider the [Zoning Hearing Board
of Mount Joy Township’s (Board)] grant of the variance application as a
‘recognition’ that the Ordinance’s height limitation constitutes a de facto exclusion
of a permitted use. However, Applicant withdrew this claim at oral argument.”
Shultz v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Mount Joy Twp. (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 989 C.D. 2021,
filed November 2, 2023), slip op. at 8-9 n.6. I agree that Applicant is not raising a
validity challenge to the zoning ordinance and is not requesting a constitutional
analysis or curative amendment to the zoning ordinance in the form of site-specific
relief.       However, counsel also clarified at oral argument that Applicant was
nevertheless continuing to argue that the exclusionary effect of the Ordinance created
the hardship that supported a dimensional variance.2
                 I agree with Applicant that a validity challenge is not necessary in order
to argue that a zoning ordinance is exclusionary so as to create an unreasonable

          2
        In that regard, I note that, other than unrestricted height for normal agricultural uses and
a 65-foot limit on the height of amateur radio antennas, the 50-foot height restriction in the
Baltimore Pike Corridor Intensive Uses Overlay is the highest in Mount Joy Township
(Township); other zoning districts have height limitations varying from 35 to 40 feet. MOUNT JOY
TWP., ADAMS CNTY., PA., ZONING ORDINANCE, § 302.A (Nov. 2, 2017).

                                             CFC - 4
hardship and justify a dimensional variance under circumstances like those alleged
in this case. I believe it is important to recognize that where a permitted conditional
use in the relevant zoning district is impossible due to other zoning district
restrictions, such as the general height limitation in this case, the ostensible
authorization for that use becomes illusory, and an applicant has a viable argument
that the zoning ordinance itself has created an unreasonable hardship.
               The Majority focuses on the fact that Applicant wants this use on this
property but that other uses could be built on the property. However, the Majority’s
analysis does not consider whether the Ordinance itself works a hardship on the
permitted use at issue. Hertzberg teaches, and the Township conceded at argument,
that an applicant is “not required to prove that the property was unmarketable
without the desired variance, but only that the zoning requirements work an
unreasonable hardship in the owner’s pursuit of a permitted use.” Hertzberg, 721
A.2d at 47 (quoting trial court with approval) (emphasis added) (quotation marks
omitted).3
               I agree with Applicant that an exclusionary effect of the zoning
ordinance on the property may constitute a unique feature of the property or a unique
circumstance creating an unreasonable hardship. Hardship must be attendant to the

       3
         This does not mean that the ordinance must work an unreasonable hardship in the owner’s
pursuit of every permitted use. As our Supreme Court explained in Hertzberg, “the standard . . .
which would deny a variance to any applicant who failed to demonstrate that the property could
not be used for any permitted purpose, is in direct contradiction to this Court’s holding in
Halberstadt [v. Borough of Nazareth, 687 A.2d 371 (Pa. 1997)]” (reversing this Court’s denial of
a dimensional variance, where the denial was based on the availability of alternative permitted
uses that did not require a variance). Hertzberg, 721 A.2d at 49. See also Vitti v. Zoning Bd. of
Adjustment of the City of Pittsburgh, 710 A.2d 653, 658 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998) (rejecting an
objector’s argument that there were “literally dozens of permitted uses” available for the property
and that a dimensional variance required a showing that the property could not be used for any
permitted purpose).

                                            CFC - 5
property and not the person, but it does not always have to relate to the physical
features or characteristics of the land (i.e., topography, lot size, etc.). For example,
a feature consisting of a dilapidated building in a blighted neighborhood, rather than
the land, may be the relevant and unique circumstance attendant to the property that
must be considered in evaluating hardship. Hertzberg, 721 A.2d at 49 (citing Vitti,
710 A.2d at 658). As Hertzberg explained, multiple factors should be considered in
determining whether there is a hardship supporting a dimensional variance, and
those factors are not limited to the few enumerated in Hertzberg itself. Hertzberg;
Mitchell. As the Board’s solicitor acknowledged at oral argument, “[a]lthough
unnecessary hardship usually relates to the physical characteristics of the land, at
times, the unnecessary hardship can relate to the building itself.” Hertzberg, 721
A.2d at 49 (quoting Wagner v. City of Erie Zoning Hearing Bd., 675 A.2d 791, 799
(Pa. Cmwlth. 1996) (additional quotation marks omitted)). For example, where a
permitted use of a property is possible only through extensive reconstruction or
demolition of a building, that circumstance may establish an unnecessary hardship.
Hertzberg. That is one example of the many circumstances that may be considered
pursuant to Hertzberg, but it is not the only one. Another is that where a zoning
ordinance names as a specific permitted use one that in fact cannot be exercised
because of general dimensional provisions, the ordinance effectively gives the use
with one hand and withdraws it with the other. The interplay of the ordinance
provisions in such a circumstance operates to create an unreasonable hardship that
justifies a dimensional variance.
             Of course, this does not mean that an applicant may obtain a
dimensional variance any time it chooses a permitted use that does not fit within the
zoning ordinance’s dimensional limitations. The applicant still must demonstrate an

                                       CFC - 6
unreasonable hardship imposed by the applicant’s inability to engage in the
permitted use without a dimensional variance. The difficulty Applicant faces here
is that the record does not establish whether the Zoning Ordinance’s height restriction
excludes the proposed use altogether or whether it excludes only Applicant’s
specific proposed design for the plant it wants to build. Applicant neither pleaded
nor offered any evidence addressing whether a concrete or hot asphalt plant could
be constructed employing a different design that would meet the applicable height
restriction. Indeed, when pressed at oral argument to point to any such evidence in
the record, Applicant’s counsel stated that such a question was never asked. Rather,
the record reflects only that this particular concrete plant and asphalt plant could not
be constructed within the height limitation. Thus, Applicant could not and did not
meet its burden of proving a hardship not of its own creation. Cf. Tri-Cnty. Landfill
v. Pine Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 83 A.3d 488, 520 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014) (concluding
that a variance from a height restriction to allow construction of a landfill was
properly denied where the applicant failed to demonstrate that a landfill structure
complying with the height restriction would not be economically viable); APT
Pittsburgh Ltd. P’ship v. Penn Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 196 F.3d 469, 477 (3d Cir.
1999) (applying Pennsylvania law and explaining that although the applicant’s
chosen design allowed it to build only in a few locations, restrictions on exclusionary
zoning “does not impose upon a township the duty to assure that all [applicants],
regardless of the systems they have chosen to construct, will have a suitable site for
a functioning tower within the township”). For that reason, I agree with the outcome
reached by the Majority.

                                        __________________________________
                                        CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

                                       CFC - 7