Court Opinion

ID: 4210467
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2017-10-10 20:00:56.080791+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:47:41.017206
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       OCT 10 2017
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                       No.    16-50207

                Plaintiff-Appellee,             D.C. No.
                                                3:15-cr-01789-LAB-1
 v.

FIDENCIO CASTRO-VERDUGO, AKA                    MEMORANDUM*
Fidel Castro-Verdugo,

                Defendant-Appellant.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Southern District of California
                    Larry A. Burns, District Judge, Presiding

                            Submitted October 3, 2017**
                               Pasadena, California

Before: GRABER, MURGUIA, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.

      Defendant Fidencio Castro-Verdugo appealed the district court’s denial of

his 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d) motion to dismiss the indictment, in which he argued that

his underlying removal proceeding did not comport with due process and could not

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
serve as the basis for his charge under 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Reviewing de novo, United

States v. Pallares-Galan, 359 F.3d 1088, 1094 (9th Cir. 2004), we affirm.

      The district court did not err in denying Castro-Verdugo’s motion to dismiss

the indictment. The IJ complied with the procedural due process requirement to

inform Castro-Verdugo of his eligibility to apply for relief from removal and

afford him the opportunity to apply for such relief. See United States v. Gonzalez-

Flores, 804 F.3d 920, 927 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1234 (2016). The

IJ “meaningfully advised” Castro-Verdugo of his rights where the IJ informed him

of the right to present evidence, identified the specific relief he might be eligible

for, and engaged in a one-on-one discussion with him giving him an opportunity to

understand what the IJ was considering and to respond. See United States v.

Melendez-Castro, 671 F.3d 950, 954 (9th Cir. 2012) (per curiam).

      Castro-Verdugo also argues that his case is analogous to Melendez-Castro in

which the court held Melendez-Castro was not meaningfully advised of his right to

seek voluntary departure because the IJ told Melendez-Castro that he was eligible

for relief, but immediately stated he would not grant the relief because of

Melendez-Castro’s criminal history. Id. However, Melendez-Castro is

distinguishable because here there is no indication in the record before us that the

IJ prejudged Castro-Verdugo’s possible application for relief.

       Accordingly, Castro-Verdugo’s underlying removal order is not

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fundamentally unfair and stands as a predicate element for his charge under 8

U.S.C. § 1326, removed alien found in the United States.

      AFFIRMED.

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