Court Opinion

ID: 9838024
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-03 08:10:25.196038+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:32:50.448701
License: Public Domain

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed August 29, 2023.

                                     In The

                    Fourteenth Court of Appeals

                             NO. 14-22-00362-CR

                     JACK FLYNN CARLIN, Appellant

                                       V.

                      THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

                   On Appeal from the 183rd District Court
                            Harris County, Texas
                       Trial Court Cause No. 1664373

                 MEMORANDUM OPINION

      A jury found Appellant Jack Flynn Carlin guilty of aggravated sexual assault
of an elderly person and assessed punishment at life imprisonment. See Tex. Penal
Code Ann. § 22.021(a)(1)(A)(i), (a)(2)(C). On appeal, Appellant asserts the trial
court erred when it denied his motion for mistrial following testimony from
Complainant that referenced an extraneous sexual assault allegedly committed by
Appellant. For the reasons below, we affirm.
                                  BACKGROUND

      Appellant was naked when he was apprehended by Houston police officers
in Complainant’s home on February 12, 2020. Appellant was arrested and charged
with aggravated sexual assault of an elderly person. Appellant proceeded to a jury
trial in May 2022.     We summarize below relevant portions of the witness
testimony and evidence presented at trial.

Complainant

      Complainant said she was 86 years old on the day of the incident and lived
alone at her Houston home. Complainant recalled hearing someone knock on her
front door at approximately 7:00 a.m. Complainant said Appellant was at her door
and told her to “let [him] in”; Complainant responded “no” and, in an attempt to
scare Appellant away, told him she had a gun.         According to Complainant,
Appellant then went to her home’s back door and entered by breaking the glass
patio door.

      Complainant testified that, after Appellant entered her home, he took off his
clothes and told her to take off her clothes, too. Complainant complied, recalling
that she “was afraid he might kill me if I didn’t.” Complainant said Appellant also
carried a leather dog leash and she was afraid “he might, you know, choke me to
death with it.”

      According to Complainant, Appellant told her to “go in the bedroom” where
he proceeded to sexually assault her. Describing this further, Complainant said
Appellant would “put his mouth on [her] vagina” before putting his penis into her
vagina. Complainant said Appellant also “tried to put [his penis] in [her] mouth.”

      Complainant testified that Appellant “threw [her] onto the floor” two or
three times during the incident, which knocked out several of her bottom teeth.

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Describing Appellant as a “big man,” Complainant said she was “afraid he would
kill me.” According to Complainant, Appellant remained in her house for four-to-
five hours and alternated between sexually assaulting her and “tak[ing] a break.”

      At one point during the ordeal, Complainant said she was able to crawl into
the living room to answer the ringing phone. Complainant said her granddaughter
was on the phone and she told her granddaughter to call 911. According to
Complainant, the police arrived approximately 20 minutes later. Complainant said
Appellant “ran to the back of the house” when the police officers began knocking
on her front door.

      Complainant said she stayed at the hospital for two-to-three weeks after the
incident. Complainant said she sustained injuries to her neck and cheek as well as
a fractured vertebrae.

Granddaughter

      According to Granddaughter, Complainant was 86 years old at the time of
the incident and lived alone at her Houston home.              Granddaughter said
Complainant “moved around with a walker” and was able to speak and
communicate clearly.

      Granddaughter said the day of the incident began as usual. Granddaughter
recalled calling Complainant at approximately 6:00 a.m. to check in on her;
Granddaughter said Complainant “was doing fine, just like any other day.”
Granddaughter hung up with Complainant and continued on with her day.

      Granddaughter testified that she called Complainant for a second time at
approximately 11:30 a.m.       Granddaughter said Complainant sounded “very
scared,” told her “there was a man in her house,” and asked Granddaughter to call
911. Granddaughter called 911 to report the incident and proceeded to drive to

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Complainant’s home.

      According to Granddaughter, when she arrived at the house she saw officers
leading Complainant down the driveway.             Granddaughter recalled that
Complainant looked “[l]ike she got beat up,” with injuries to her cheek and chest.
Granddaughter said some of Complainant’s teeth were missing and that
Complainant “looked like she was shaken up really, really bad.”

Officer Whang

      On the day of the incident, Officer Whang was dispatched to Complainant’s
house with reports of a “burglary in progress.” According to Officer Whang, he
knocked on Complainant’s door, which she answered after “probably a minute or
so.” Officer Whang recalled that Complainant was “very nervous, shaking, [and]
trembling.” Officer Whang said he “could immediately tell something happened to
her inside.”

      After Complainant was escorted away from the house, Officer Whang said
the officers waited for the K-9 unit to arrive before entering the home. According
to Officer Whang, the K-9 dog apprehended Appellant in the home. Officer
Whang recalled that Appellant was naked and his clothes were scattered
throughout the house. Officer Whang found Appellant’s pants, which contained
his wallet and driver’s license.

      Officer Whang said he handcuffed Appellant. Officer Whang “suspected
[Appellant] being high on — possibly high on drugs” and noted that Appellant was
“lost,” “confused,” and “sweating a lot.”

Karin Hoffmann

      Hoffmann is a sexual assault nurse examiner and examined Complainant the
day of the incident. Hoffmann noted bruising on Complainant’s face, shoulders,

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arms, hands, neck, chest, and hips as well as a fracture to her lower spine.
Hoffmann also documented tears in Complainant’s genitalia and opined that these
types of injuries “require[d] penetration.”

Conclusion of Trial

      After the parties rested, the jury deliberated and found Appellant guilty of
aggravated sexual assault of an elderly person. At the punishment phase of trial,
the State introduced evidence showing that Appellant previously had been
convicted of burglary of a habitation and aggravated assault, as well as two
convictions for misdemeanor indecent exposure.

      Granddaughter also testified at the punishment hearing regarding the
incident’s effects on Complainant. Granddaughter said Complainant used to be
“very independent” and “would always do everything by herself.” But after the
incident, Granddaughter said Complainant “doesn’t want to leave the house ever”
and “doesn’t want to be alone for more than five minutes.” Although Complainant
used to live alone at her home, Granddaughter said Complainant now lives with
Granddaughter at her apartment.

      The jury assessed Appellant’s punishment at life imprisonment. Appellant
timely appealed.

                                      ANALYSIS

      On appeal, Appellant asserts the trial court erred when it denied his motion
for mistrial following testimony from Complainant that referenced an alleged
extraneous sexual assault committed by Appellant. Specifically, during cross-
examination, Complainant and defense counsel had the following exchange:

       Defense Counsel: Did [Officer Whang] ask you about what happened to
                        you?

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          Complainant:      Yes, sir, and I told him.
          Defense Counsel: And you told him?
          Complainant:      Yes, sir.
          Defense Counsel: Did you tell him anything about — about [Appellant]
                           ejaculating?
          Complainant:      Yes, sir.
          Defense Counsel: What did you tell him?
          Complainant:      I told him that he raped me, and he said he did it before
                            and he slipped through the crack.

Defense counsel objected, and the trial court instructed the jury to disregard
Complainant’s answer. Defense counsel moved for a mistrial, which the trial court
denied.

      When the jury took its afternoon break, defense counsel re-urged
Appellant’s motion for mistrial based on Complainant’s reference to Appellant’s
alleged commission of an extraneous sexual assault. The following discussion was
had at the bench:

          Defense Counsel: Judge, I’d like to re-urge my motion for a mistrial
                           based on the comments blurted out by [Complainant].
                            Just to clarify what happened — and I believe the
                            record would bear out — was I asked a question
                            unrelated to what she ended up blurting out, and she
                            stated the officer told her that [Appellant] had done this
                            before and gotten away with it and blurted that out to
                            the jury.
                            It’s violating my motion in limine, which the State is —
                            it’s incumbent on them to inform her of what she can
                            and can’t say.
                            And, second, it’s extremely prejudicial towards my
                            client, not only in guilt/innocence but in punishment
                            particularly, that this jury will be under the impression
                            that he is a repeat offender who has gotten away with
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                          this before.
                          And, third, it’s not even true, according to any evidence
                          I’ve been given, that he’s ever been charged with
                          sexual assault before or gotten away with it, for that
                          matter, as the officer told her.
                          So, judge, I don’t think just a simple curative
                          instruction is sufficient to undo the prejudice to my
                          client, both as far as the guilt/innocence — the guilt or
                          not guilty determination, but particularly if we end up
                          in a punishment hearing that they are under the
                          impression that he is a repeat offender.
       Prosecutor:        It was elicited — I think the question was about what
                          an officer told her, and she simply answered the
                          Defense’s question.        I didn’t elicit any such
                          information. The Court itself didn’t understand what
                          she said. I think it was very much harmless and — if it
                          was caught or picked up on at all.
       Trial Court:       Yeah, I mean, I was — as I told you, I was sitting right
                          next to her and I couldn’t understand what she said.
                          And so you may have understood it because she was
                          facing you. I thought she was talking about a crack in
                          her body. I didn’t know what she said. I’m not sure
                          that the jury did.
                          But I sustained your objection and gave them an
                          instruction to disregard, and I think the fact that it was
                          mentioned in passing once is cured by an instruction to
                          disregard.
                                             *         *             *
                          Like I said, I’m sitting right next to her and I couldn’t
                          understand her. Her testimony in general has been
                          somewhat hard to hear and garbled. And so given the
                          fact that I couldn’t understand it, I don’t know if the
                          jurors did or not. But I’m confident that my instruction
                          cured it if they did.

Asserting that the trial court erred by denying his motion for mistrial, Appellant
argues that the jury assessed punishment at life imprisonment “because it heard

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 exactly what the eighty-six-year-old Complainant said” with respect to the alleged
 extraneous sexual assault.

I.         Standard of Review

           We review a trial court’s denial of a motion for mistrial for an abuse of
 discretion. Ocon v. State, 284 S.W.3d 880, 884 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Jackson
 v. State, 495 S.W.3d 398, 421 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. ref’d).
 We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling and will
     uphold the ruling if it falls within the zone of reasonable disagreement. Ocon, 284
     S.W.3d at 884. A mistrial is an extreme remedy reserved for a narrow class of
     cases in which the error is highly prejudicial and incurable. Id.; see Hawkins v.
 State, 135 S.W.3d 72, 77 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (en banc) (“Only in extreme
 circumstances, where the prejudice is incurable, will a mistrial be required.”).

           To evaluate whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying the
 motion for mistrial, we balance the three “Mosley” factors: (1) the severity of the
 misconduct (the magnitude of the prejudicial effect of the challenged remarks);
 (2) the measures adopted to cure the misconduct (the efficacy of any cautionary
     instruction by the judge); and (3) the certainty of the punishment assessed absent
     the misconduct (likelihood of the same punishment being assessed). Archie v.
     State, 340 S.W.3d 734, 739 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (citing Mosley v. State, 983
     S.W.2d 249 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (en banc)); see also Hawkins, 135 S.W.3d at
     77 (applying the Mosley factors to punishment proceedings in a non-capital case).
     In sum, the grant of a mistrial is proper “when error is so prejudicial that
     expenditure of further time and expense would be wasteful and futile.” Ladd v.
     State, 3 S.W.3d 547, 567 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).

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II.    Application

       We address the Mosley factors individually.

Severity of the Misconduct

       Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling (see
Ocon, 284 S.W.3d at 884), we conclude that the prejudicial effect of
Complainant’s testimony was low because the challenged testimony was brief,
non-specific, and not repeated at either the guilt/innocence or punishment phases
of trial. See, e.g., Rojas v. State, 986 S.W.2d 241, 250 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998)
(mistrial not warranted when reference to extraneous offense was “not [] concrete”
but “merely vague speculation”).

       Moreover, as the trial court stated, Complainant’s testimony had been “hard
to hear” during trial. Discussing this specific line of questioning, the trial judge
said she “couldn’t understand” the substance of Complainant’s response even
though she was “sitting right next to” Complainant. Accordingly, it is likely the
jury also had difficulty understanding Complainant’s testimony and the challenged
response, further mitigating the prejudicial effect of her reference to the alleged
extraneous sexual assault.

       This factor weighs in favor of the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s motion
for mistrial.

Measures Adopted to Cure the Misconduct

       As stated above, after defense counsel objected to Complainant’s response,
the trial court promptly instructed the jury to “disregard the witness’s last answer.”
The trial court did not reference the substance of the answer or its allusion to an
extraneous sexual assault.

       A prompt instruction to disregard will usually cure any prejudice resulting
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from improper testimony regarding extraneous offenses. See Ovalle v. State, 13
S.W.3d 774, 783 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (en banc); Austin v. State, 222 S.W.3d
801, 815 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. ref’d). Appellate courts
generally presume that a jury follows a trial court’s instruction to disregard the
improper testimony. Thrift v. State, 176 S.W.3d 221, 224 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
Appellant did not point out — and our review of the record did not find — any
evidence suggesting that the jury failed to follow the trial court’s instruction to
disregard.

      Moreover, courts generally have held that, when a witness inadvertently,
non-responsively references an extraneous offense attributable to the defendant,
that error is usually cured by a prompt instruction to disregard. See, e.g., Rojas,
986 S.W.2d at 250 (witness’s reference to the appellant’s “past anger” and “past
violence” cured by instruction to disregard); Tennard v. State, 802 S.W.2d 678,
685 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (en banc) (per curiam) (holding that a witness’s
reference to meeting up with the appellant “[w]hen he first got out of the
penitentiary” was cured by prompt instruction to disregard); Hebert v. State, 489
S.W.3d 15, 20-21 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.) (reference to a
bag of marijuana found in the appellant’s vehicle cured by instruction to
disregard); Rogers v. State, 200 S.W.3d 233, 238 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2006, pet. ref’d) (“brief and equivocal mention of drug use” cured by
instruction to disregard); Drake v. State, 123 S.W.3d 596, 604 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. ref’d) (witness’s statement that officers “were
working so many burglaries on [the appellant]” mitigated by curative instruction).
Here too, any harm from Complainant’s vague reference to an alleged extraneous
sexual assault was significantly mitigated by the trial court’s instruction to
disregard.

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       This factor weighs in favor of the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s motion
for mistrial.

The Certainty of the Punishment Assessed Absent the Misconduct

       Finally, considering the record as a whole, Complainant’s reference to the
alleged extraneous sexual assault likely did not influence the jury’s assessment of
punishment.

       First, as noted by the trial court, Complainant’s testimony was difficult to
hear and understand. The trial court did not catch the challenged reference until it
was objected to by defense counsel, despite sitting next to Complainant as she
testified. These circumstances suggest the jury also was unlikely to understand
Complainant’s reference to the alleged extraneous sexual assault.

       Second, the trial court promptly instructed the jury to disregard the answer.
The trial court did not reiterate the substance of Complainant’s challenged
response and the alleged sexual assault was not referenced again during either the
guilt/innocence or punishment phases of trial.

       Finally, any effects from the vague reference to an alleged extraneous sexual
assault likely were overshadowed by the other testimony and evidence heard by the
jury. The jury heard a significant amount of testimony from Complainant in which
she detailed the violent sexual assault. The jury also saw numerous pictures of
Complainant showing the extent of the injuries to her face and neck.
Granddaughter testified at the punishment hearing about the effects of the sexual
assault on Complainant and how she can no longer live alone. Moreover, identity
was never an issue in this case — Appellant was apprehended at Complainant’s
house shortly after the police officers arrived.          Against this backdrop,
Complainant’s passing, non-specific reference to an alleged extraneous sexual

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assault likely did not affect the punishment assessed.

       This factor weighs in favor of the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s motion
for mistrial.

       Given these circumstances and the record as a whole, we conclude that the
trial court’s denial of Appellant’s motion for mistrial does not constitute an abuse
of discretion. We overrule Appellant’s sole issue on appeal.

                                   CONCLUSION

       We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                       /s/     Meagan Hassan
                                               Justice

Panel consists of Justices Jewell, Hassan, and Wilson.
Do Not Publish — Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).

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