Court Opinion

ID: 9767454
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 05:20:02.741235+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:30.445107
License: Public Domain

OPINION
BURGESS, Justice.
Appellant was convicted, in a consolidated trial, of two offenses of felony bail jumping. The jury assessed punishment at 45 years confinement in the Texas Department of Corrections in each case. Appellant urges five points of error applicable to each conviction. We find point one disposi-tive of each appeal.
The first point argues the trial court erred in denying a motion to quash the indictments and plea to the jurisdiction claiming the indictments are fundamentally defective or contain defects in form. Omitting the formal parts, the indictments state:
“... James Thomas Doucette on or about the 14th day of July A.D. 1987 ... did ... after being lawfully released from custody on condition that he subsequently appear in Court, intentionally and knowingly fail to appear in accordance with the terms of his release, to-wit: the said James Thomas Doucette failed to appear on the 14th day of July, 1987, in Cause Number 16,745 in the 75th Judicial District Court of Liberty County, Texas, and the offense for which the said James Thomas Doucette’s appearance was required was Theft — Habitual Offender. ...”
“... James Thomas Doucette on or about the 14th day of July A.D. 1987 ... did ... after being lawfully released from custody on condition that he subsequently appear in court, intentionally and knowingly fail to appear in accordance with the terms of his release, to-wit: the said James Thomas Doucette failed to appear on the 14th day of July, 1987, in Cause Number 16,746 in the 75th Judicial District Court of Liberty County, Texas, *89and the offense for which the said James Thomas Doucette’s appearance was required was Theft — Habitual Offender....”
Appellant relies upon Standley v. State, 517 S.W.2d 538, 540 (Tex.Crim.App.1975), for the proposition that an indictment is fundamentally defective when it does not show whether the offense alleged is a misdemeanor or felony. Standley is a theft case where value is the determining factor in the punishment range and the value was not pled. See also Fee v. State, 722 S.W.2d 234, 241 (Tex.App. — San Antonio 1986, pet. granted). Benoit v. State, 561 S.W.2d 810 (Tex.Crim.App.1977), follows Standley and has a detailed discussion on the reasoning behind the proposition. Benoit was a controlled substance case where the amount of the controlled substance determined the penalty range and the amount was not pled. Accord: Wilson v. State, 520 S.W.2d 377 (Tex.Crim.App.1975), and Mears v. State, 520 S.W.2d 380 (Tex.Crim.App.1975). Compare Bailey v. State, 543 S.W.2d 653 (Tex.Crim.App.1976), where the substance alleged was lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) which had only one possible penalty range and that was a second degree felony.
Yuncevich v. State, 626 S.W.2d 784 (Tex. Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1982), listed the elements of the offense of bail jumping, pursuant to TEX.PENAL CODE ANN. sec. 38.11 (Vernon 1989), as follows:
“ ‘(1) a person
(2) released from custody
(3) conditioned upon appearing again
(4) intentionally or knowingly
(5) fails to appear in accordance with the terms of his release.’ ”
Bail jumping, like theft or possession of a controlled substance, is an offense that can either be a felony or misdemeanor. The determining factor is the classification of the offense for which the appearance was required. In the instant cases, the indictments alleged that appellant failed to appear in cause number 16,745 (and number 16,746) in the 75th District Court of Liberty County, Texas, and the offense for which the appearance was required was Theft— Habitual Offender. The offense of theft can either be a misdemeanor or felony and there are both misdemeanor and felony habitual offender statutes. They argue, however, that the inclusion of the cause numbers in which it was alleged appellant failed to appear can reasonably substitute for the missing word “felony”, citing Chance v. State, 563 S.W.2d 812 (Tex.Crim. App.1978) (opinion on rehearing), and TEX. CODE CRIM.PROC.ANN. art. 21.17 (Vernon 1989) which states:
“Words used in a statute to define an offense need not be strictly pursued in the indictment; it is sufficient to use other words conveying the same meaning, or which include the sense of the statutory words.”
They state the instant indictments make specific references to the indictment cause numbers and the court in which Appellant was required to appear and an examination of these indictments reveals they are felony indictments. There is a general rule that when a written instrument enters into an offense as a part or basis thereof, the instrument should be set out in the indictment. Atkins v. State, 667 S.W.2d 540, 543 (Tex.App. — Dallas 1983, no pet.), and cases cited therein. Thus the State cannot rely upon an examination of the instruments in the cause number. Next, simply alleging a cause number in a district court does not necessarily infer a felony. District courts may have jurisdition over certain misdemeanors. TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC.ANN. art. 4.05 (Vernon 1977). Also, simply because the court alleged is a district court and the offense alleged is theft does not necessarily infer the offense is a felony. TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC.ANN. art. 21.26 (Vernon 1989) recognizes there may be indictments filed in the district court which charge an offense over which such court has no jurisdiction and directs a transfer in such an instance.
The issue here is whether the face of the two indictments confer jurisdiction upon the district court. If they do not, they are void. We hold the indictments fail to confer jurisdiction upon the district court because they fail to show whether the offense charged is a felony or misdemeanor.
*90The judgments are reversed and the causes remanded.1

. Prior to the adoption of TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC.ANN. art. 28.10 (Vernon 1989), cases of this nature resulted in the void indictment being dismissed. Arguably, art. 2810 would allow the indictment to be amended, thus a dismissal from this court is not appropriate.