Court Opinion

ID: 9702551
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:16:43.118564+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:38.746898
License: Public Domain

Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Chief Justice Bell :
I concur in the Majority’s reversal of the sentence for contempt of Court imposed upon Robert Boyer. I *167also agree with the Majority Opinion that the conduct of the appellants Bethea and William Boyer clearly amounted to direct criminal contempt; but I cannot agree with the Majority’s other holdings or conclusions. (1) A belligerent or boisterous or insulting or disruptive defendant (or witness or attorney) can and should be held for direct criminal contempt of Court, and (2) a sentence of six months or a year can be summarily imposed by the trial Judge (or trial Court) before Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, without the right of such person to a jury trial, and (3) certainly Baldwin v. New York should not be held by this Court to be retroactive.
Because of the nature of this case and the important questions involved, I believe it is wise to set forth at some length the facts, as well as the pertinent and controlling principles of law.
William Boyer
William Boyer was tried (with five other persons, including Benjamin Franklin Bethea, Jr.) on charges of participation in a riot, assault and battery, and aggravated assault on a police officer in an affray, after a high school football game at McCloskey High School. On January 24, 1969, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on all three indictments. On February 6, 1969, two petitions for contempt of Court were filed by the District Attorney of Lancaster County. The first petition alleged and the Court found that after tire jury had announced its verdict in Commonwealth v. William Boyer, and while it was being excused, appellant William Boyer said to the last juror, Eli S. Hart, as he was leaving the Courtroom, “I’ll get you and that black Chrysler for this.”* This statement was not heard by *168the Judge, but the juror reported it to the tipstaff before leaving the Courthouse that day.
The District Attorney’s second petition alleged that on January 29,1969, during the noon recess of the trial of Robert Victor Boyer for murder committed during the same rioting at McCloskey High School, the appellant William Boyer threatened William Smith, a prospective witness in Robert’s case. Smith was in the corridor outside the Courtroom waiting for the recess to end and to be called to testify. The Court found that appellant 'William Boyer, who was represented by counsel in the contempt hearing, said to (witness) Smith, “You had better say the right thing or I’ll burn your house down and hurt your family.”
These two petitions for contempt of Court were heard before the Court en bane on April 10, 1969. At this hearing, appellant William Boyer was represented by counsel from the Public Defender’s Office. The Court heard extensive testimony concerning what was said to both (a) the juror, Hart, and (b) the prospective witness, Smith. Appellant (William Boyer) admitted having spoken to Smith, but denied having made the above-quoted threats to Smith or to Hart. At the close of the contempt hearing, the Court en banc found that the appellant (William Boyer) had made both of the aforesaid threats and that they constituted “a contempt” of Court. For these two threatening and contemptuous statements—one to Hart and one to Smith —which the Majority admit constituted a direct contempt of Court, William Boyer was sentenced to the Lancaster County Prison for a period of one year* From this judgment of sentence, William Boyer took this appeal.
*169Benjamin Franklin Bethea, Jr.
Appellant Benjamin Franklin Bethea, Jr., was tried, along with William Boyer, on charges of participating in a riot, inciting to riot and two counts of aggravated assault and battery. On January 21¡, 1969, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on two of these charges, namely, participating in a riot and one count of aggravated assault and battery. The jury was then discharged. Three days later, appellant Bethea returned to the Lancaster County Courthouse to attend, the trial of Robert Victor Boyer. During the noon recess of that trial, Carl Biechler, one of the jurors in Robert’s trial, was sitting in the corridor outside the Courtroom waiting for the Court to reconvene for the afternoon session. Biechler had also served on the jury which three days before had found Bethea and William Boyer guilty of the aforesaid misdemeanors. Biechler testified that Bethea said- to him, “You beat us in Court, we’ll beat you in the street and burn your house down.” Upon hearing this threat, Biechler fainted and was later taken to a hospital for treatment. When informed of what had talien place, a petition for contempt of Court was filed by the District Attorney of Lancaster County and a hearing was scheduled before the Court en banc on April 10, 1969.
At the contempt hearing, appellant Bethea was represented by counsel and was given the opportunity and the right to cross-examine the Commonwealth’s witnesses and to present several witnesses of his own. The only Commonwealth witness who testified as to what Bethea said was the juror, Biechler.* Defendant testified that he did not speak to Biechler at all. The Court en banc believed Biechler’s testimony and found Bethea *170guilty of contempt of Court, and sentenced him to one year in the Lancaster County Prison. From this judgment of sentence, Bethea took this appeal.
These above-mentioned threatening statements effectively interfered with the business of the Court, realistically obstructed and undermined our Judicial system, degraded our Courts, and jeopardized Justice. Cf. Mack Appeal, 386 Pa. 251, 126 A. 2d 679; Savin, Petitioner, 131 U.S. 267; see also Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33.
Appellants contend that the above-mentioned facts, threats and contemptuous conduct (1) do not establish criminal contempt of Court beyond a reasonable doubt, and (2) if punishable at all, were serious offenses which entitled them to all the requirements of due process, including a jury trial.
The first contention is clearly devoid of any merit.
Jury Trial for William Boyer and Benjamin Franklin Bethea
The Majority hold that William Boyer and Benjamin Franklin Bethea were each entitled to a jury trial because their crimes were serious. They base their decision on Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S., supra. I disagree.
At the time of the threatening and contemptuous actions of William Boyer and Bethea in January 1969, and at the time of their trials and sentences in April 1969, the Supreme Court of the United States had not drawn a clear, definite and exact line between “petty” and “serious” contempts of Court. In Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (where defendant disobeyed an Order of the Federal Trade Commission), the Court held that a sentence of six months for this contemptuous action was a petty offense and did not require a trial by jury.
*171In Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (where a defendant had been indicted for assault and battery), the Supreme Court held that the right to trial by jury guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment applies to the States by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment and further held that a two-year sentence required a jury trial.
In Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194—a companion case to Duncan v. Louisiana, supra—the Court decided that the right to a jury trial granted in Duncan extended to persons accused of criminal contempt of Court. Bloom was convicted in an Illinois State Court for wilfully petitioning to admit to probate a will falsely prepared and executed after the death of the putative testator and received a sentence of 21/ months in jail. The Court noted that where no maximum sentence was statutorily provided, the Court would look to the sentence actually imposed, and if it exceeded six months’ imprisonment the crime would be considered serious.
In DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968), the Supreme Court held that the decisions in Duncan v. Louisiana and Bloom v. Illinois should receive only prospective application, i.e., “where trials began prior to May 20, 1968, the date of this Court’s decisions in Duncan v. Louisiana and Bloom v. Illinois.” The Court said (page 633) : “Both Duncan and Bloom left open the question whether a contempt punished by imprisonment for one year is, by virtue of that sentence, a sufficiently serious matter to require that a request for jury trial be honored. These two issues posed in Nos. 941 and 559 must be considered at this time only if the decisions in Duncan and Bloom apply retroactively. We hold, however, that Duncan v. Louisiana and Bloom v. Illinois should receive only prospective application. Accordingly, the denials of collateral relief to petitioners must be affirmed regardless of whether, for cases to which the rales announced in Duncan and Bloom apply, *172the. Fourteenth Amendment . . . affords a right to jury trial for. criminal contempts punished by imprisonment for one year.”
The precise line between petty and serious offenses was finally drawn and established by the Supreme Court in Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S., supra (June 22, 1970). That case held that where the authorized maximum potential sentence exceeded six months’ imprisonment, the crime was serious and the defendant had to be afforded the right to a trial by jury. However, the Court expressed no opinion as to the retro-activity of Baldwin, which was handed down after the sentences in the present appeals.
Pennsylvania has no statutorily established maximum sentence for direct criminal contempt. Therefore, the actual sentences imposed in these direct criminal contempt cases—imprisonment for one year for the two separate direct criminal contempts by William Boyer, and one year for Bethea—supply the only test of the “seriousness” of the crimes.
We are confronted with the important issue of retro-activity and, even more important, the basic power of a Court to adequately protect itself, and its power to administer Justice free from belligerent threats and unruly Court disruptions.
Is Baldwin retroactive? I believe it is not and certainly should not be retroactively applied to direct criminal contempts of Court.
In Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, the Court reiterated the test or guidelines to be applied for the determination of retroactivity or nonretroactivity. These guidelines for a Judicial evaluation and determination are set forth at page 249, where the Court, quoting from Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, said: “ ‘. . . (a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (e) the effect on the administration *173of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards.’ ” Accord: Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719; Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406; Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618; Commonwealth v. Richbourg, 442 Pa. 147, 275 A. 2d 345; Commonwealth v. Godfrey, 434 Pa. 532, 254 A. 2d 923. In light of these tests and standards, I strongly believe that the decision in Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S., supra, should and must be given prospective application only.
Additional Reasons
Furthermore, and in addition to the reasons for my conclusions which are hereinabove set forth at length, the Court in the recent cases of Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, and Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, impliedly support and strengthen my Opinion. In those cases, the Supreme Court emphasized the vital importance of the third branch of our wonderful Government, and indeed the realistic necessity of preserving our Courts from contemptuous acts and actions and from any disruption of their Judicial proceedings.
In Illinois v. Allen, where defendant was convicted of armed robbery, the defendant had contumaciously and by threats, abusive language and disorderly conduct disrupted the Court proceedings. The Supreme Court sustained the right and power of the trial Judge to gag him and remove him from the Courtroom, in spite of the clear right given him by the Constitution’s Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. The Supreme Court of the United States proclaimed (1) that our Courts are “a citadel of Justice for all persons” in the United States, and (2) “[0]ur courts, palladiums of liberty as they are, cannot be treated disrespectfully with impunity. ... It would degrade our country and judicial system to permit our courts to be bullied, insulted, and humiliated and their orderly pro*174gress thwarted and obstructed by defendants brought before them charged with crimes.” Is this clarion declaration of majestic palladia of Liberty and their protection and preservation against insults and disorderly disruptions to be realistically meaningless?
The Court further pertinently said (pages 338, 340, 341, 343-344) :
“The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that: ‘In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him. One of the most basic of the rights guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause is the accused’s right to be present in the courtroom at every stage of his trial. Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370 (1892). The question presented in this case is whether an accused can claim the benefit of this constitutional right to remain in the courtroom while at the same time he engages in speech and conduct which is so noisy, disorderly, and disruptive that it is exceedingly difficult or wholly impossible to carry on the trial.

U

“. . . The petitioner was removed from the courtroom [and] the voir dire examination was then continued and the jury ivas selected in the absence of the petitioner. . . .’
“After this second removal, Allen remained out of the courtroom during the presentation of the State's case-in-chief. . . .

(Í

“It is essential to the proper administration of criminal justice that dignity, order, and decorum be the hallmarks of all court proceedings in our country. The flagrant disregard in the courtroom of elementary standards of proper conduct should not and cannot be tolerated. We believe trial judges confronted with disruptive, contumacious, stubbornly defiant defendants *175must be given sufficient discretion to meet the circumstances of each case. No one formula for maintaining the appropriate courtroom atmosphere will be best in all situations. We think there are at least three constitutionally permissible ways for a trial judge to handle an obstreperous defendant like Allen: (1) bind and gag him, thereby keeping him present; (2) cite him for contempt; (3) take him out of the courtroom until he promises to conduct himself properly.”
In the recent case of Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S., supra, which was decided January 20, 1971, the Court, speaking through Justice Douglas, pertinently said (pages 455, 456, 462-463, 463-464, 467, 469) :
“Petitioner and two codefendants were tried in a state court for prison breach and holding hostages in a penal institution. . . . The trial ended with a jury verdict of guilty of both charges on the 21st day, which was a Friday. The defendants were brought in for sentencing on the following Monday. Before imposing sentence on the verdicts the judge pronounced them guilty of [direct] criminal contempt. He found that petitioner had committed one or more contempts on 11 of the 21 days of trial and sentenced him to not less than one nor more than two years for each of the 11 contempts or a total of 11 to 22 years, u
“Petitioner’s conduct at the trial comes as a shock to those raised in the western tradition that considers a courtroom a hallowed place of quiet dignity as far removed as possible from the emotions of the street.

a

“These brazen efforts to denounce, insult, and slander the court and to paralyze the trial are at war with the concept of justice under law. . . . We have here downright insults of a trial judge, and tactics taken from street brawls and transported to the courtroom. This is conduct not ‘befitting an American courtroom,’ *176as we said in Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 346; and criminal contempt is one appropriate remedy. Id., at 344-345.
“As these separate acts or outbursts took place, the arsenal of authority described in Allen was available to the trial judge to keep order in the courtroom. He could, with propriety, have instantly acted, holding petitioner in contempt, or excluding him from the courtroom, or otherwise insulating his vulgarity from the courtroom.*

ÍÍ

 Italics throughout mine, unless otherwise noted.

 It would have been wiser and more appropriate if he had been sentenced to imprisonment for six months for each of these totally separate criminal contempts, which this Court would have had to sustain without the slightest doubt.

 He testified, that the alleged threat was not said in a very loud voice and that he did not know whether or not anyone else had heard it.

 The Court further said: “A judge cannot be driven out of a case. Where, however, he does not act the instant the contempt is committed, but waits until the end of the trial, on balance, it is generally wise where the marks of the unseemly conduct have left personal stings to ask a fellow judge to take his place. . . . Vacated and remanded.”