Court Opinion

ID: 9562830
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:34:08.018348+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:32.541238
License: Public Domain

Townsend, J.,
dissenting. What is said herein is directed to special ground 1 specifically, but I believe it is equally applicable to all the special grounds objecting to admission of testimony offered for the purpose of showing consequential damage to portions of the tract of land not condemned. The objection in ground 1 is to testimony relating to the market value of sand which the defendant had proposed to sell to a concrete-block *712maker and which was washed away as the result of the railroad removing a dam over the creek. The objection was that the witness could not testify as to the value of sand deposits, but only to the “market value of the land as a whole, taking into consideration the sand that was there.” The court stated: “Inasmuch as under our State law the juiy is permitted to consider the damage to the land for any and all purpose, it might be appropriate. I overrule your motion in this way, by saying that this evidence is admissible as a circumstance to prove the value of the whole.” In addition -to this the court charged as follows: “The measure of consequential damages, if any, to the adjoining property of the landowner as a result of the condemnation of the land, is the lessening of the value of such adjoining property, measured by the difference between the value of such property immediately before the condemnation and immediately after the condemnation.” The testimony having been admitted for a limited and proper purpose, the jury could not possibly have been confused into believing that it could take the value of the property for each purpose and add the total possible values together in reaching an aggregate sum in excess of market value, as contended. The court here tracked the law laid down in Atlanta Terra Cotta Co. v. Ga. Ry. Co., 132 Ga. 537, 546 (64 S. E. 563) relied on by the plaintiff in error. It was there held that “there can not be a recovery both for the land as such and also for the clay in the land,” but this ruling was related to1 a request to charge that the plaintiff might recover both the value of the land and the value of the clay deposits. In the trial of the case evidence as to the market value of the land, and also as to the market value of the clay deposits, was admitted without objection. In no other way can the juiy receive a full picture from which they may determine actual damages based on decrease of market value. In this case one part of the tract was contended to be valuable for sand deposits; another part was contended to be valuable as a motel site. The plaintiff may desire to prove his consequential damages by one witness as to the sand deposits, by another as to loss of commercial uses. These are the facts by which the opinion evidence as to market value must be determined, and to say that they are not admissible in evidence for this limited purpose and under proper instructions of the court is to say that the witness *713may only give his conclusion as to value without stating facts from which value must be determined. This would make the trial of condemnation cases almost impossible. Also, it is contrary to the ruling in Housing Authority of the City of Savannah v. Savannah Iron &c. Works, 90 Ga. App. 150 (82 S. E. 2d 244) wherein this court allowed the plaintiff to plead and prove many elements of damage not entering directly into market value in order to illustrate his loss, although recovery could not be predicated directly thereon. The rule is laid down in Central Georgia Power Co. v. Preston, 137 Ga. 347, 348 (73 S. E. 505) that in estimating market value “all the capabilities of the property and all the uses to which it may be applied or for which it is adapted are to be considered ... in estimating its value.” See also Central Ga. Power Co. v. Mays, 137 Ga. 120 (72 S. E. 900); Elbert County v. Brown, 16 Ga. App. 834 (86 S. E. 651). I accordingly think this testimony was admissible for the purpose to which it was limited by the court, and that it shed light upon proper valuation of consequential damages.
I am authorized to say that Nichols, J., concurs in this dissent.