Court Opinion

ID: 9590049
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:51:09.48478+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:05:02.365865
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE ANGSTMAN:
Defendant was convicted of the crime of forgery. His motion for new trial was denied and he has appealed from the judgment and from the order denying a new trial.
The information charged that defendant uttered, published and passed as true and genuine a state warrant for gasoline tax refund, made out to and indorsed "Paul Karst,” knowing the indorsement of the said "Paul Karst” to be false and forged. Defendant questions the sufficiency of the information.
The statute charged to have been violated is R. C. M. 1947, sec. 94-2001, reading: "Every person who, with intent to defraud another, falsely makes, alters, forges, or counterfeits any charter, letters patent, deed, lease, indenture, writing obligatory, will, testament, codicil, annuity, covenant, bankbill or note, post-note, check, draft, bill of exchange, contract, promissory note, due bill for the payment of money, receipt for money or property, *384passage-ticket, power-of-attorney, or any certificate of any share, right, or interest in the stock of any corporation or association, or any auditor’s warrant for the payment of money at the treasury, county order or warrant, or request for the payment of money or the delivery of goods or chattels of any kind, or for the delivery of any instrument in writing or acquittance, release or receipt for money or goods, or any acquittance, release, or discharge for any debt, account, suit, action, demand, or other thing, real or personal, or any transfer or assurance of money, certificate of shares of stock, goods, chattels, or other property whatever, or any letter-of-attorney, or other power to receive money, or to receive or transfer certificates of shares of stock or annuities, or to let, lease, dispose of, alien or convey any goods, chattels, lands or tenements, or other estate, real or personal, or any acceptance or indorsement of any bill of exchange, promissory note, draft, order, or assignment of any bond, writing-obligatory, or promissory note for money or other property, or counterfeits or forges the seal or handwriting of another on any official certificate or utters, publishes, or passes or attempts to pass as true and genuine any of the above-named false, altered, forged, or counterfeited matters as above specified and described, knowing the same to be false, altered, forged, or counterfeited, with intent to prejudice, damage, or defraud any person, or who, with intent to defraud, alters, corrupts, or falsifies any record of any will, codicil, conveyance, or other instrument, the record of which is by law evidence, or any record of any judgment of any court, or the return of any officer to any process of any court, is guilty of forgery. ’ ’
It will be noted that the first part of the statute names many different documents that may be forged but when the statute speaks of indorsements it names only a part of the instruments and omits auditors’ warrants, and hence, defendant contends that the statute when treating of the passing of an instrument containing a false indorsement does not cover the passing or uttering of an auditor’s warrant containing a false and forged indorsement.
*385Defendant’s contention in this respect cannot be sustained.  The statute, so far as it prohibits the passing of instruments containing forged indorsements, covers among other instruments “orders.” The indorsement of the warrant in question here amounted to the indorsement of an order within the meaning of the statute. State v. Barkuloo, 18 Wash. 52, 50 Pac. 577; State v. Woods, 112 La. 617, 36 So. 626; Board of Shawnee County Com’rs v. Carter, 2 Kan. 115; Protest of St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 157 Okl. 131, 11 Pac. (2d) 189; People v. Jones, 12 Cal. App. 129, 106 Pac. 724.
Defendant likewise contends that the warrant is non-negotiable  and therefore its indorsement cannot be forgery because it does not affect legal rights. But the statute expressly treats of non-negotiable instruments as well as negotiable instruments. It names promissory notes for property and the assignment of any bond, neither of which are negotiable instruments. R. C. M. 1947, sec. 55-201. The fact, if such it be, that the warrant in question is non-negotiable does not affect the question before us as to whether one who passes it when containing a known forged indorsement is guilty of forgery. Exparte Solway, 82 Mont. 89, 265 Pac. 21.
It is likewise contended that the indorsement affects no legal  rights and therefore cannot amount to forgery. It is not necessary, however, that the forged instrument should create civil liability before it can be held to be forgery. People v. Brown, 101 Cal. App. (2d) 740, 226 Pac. (2d) 647; State v. Longo, 132 N. J. L. 515, 41 A. (2d) 317; Milton v. United States, 71 App. D. C. 394, 110 F. (2d) 556.
The next contention of defendant is that there is not sufficient evidence to corroborate that of accomplices to warrant a conviction.
The story revealed by the accomplice Tomlinson was this: Tomlinson, an employee of defendant at his bar in Helena, went to Three Forks and there rented a post office box numbered 310 under the name of Paul Karst pursuant to a plan of operation proposed by defendant for “making a little extra money, good *386money;” in accordance with the plan of operations Tomlinson procured some invoice books and placed them in a locked drawer at defendant’s place of business; Tomlinson said the plan was to “run phony claims through;” defendant gave him the invoices later and the witness prepared a false claim for gasoline tax refund in the sum of $319.50 in the name of Paul Karst and sent it through the mail to the state board of equalization; a warrant was issued in payment of the claim and mailed to Paul Karst, Box 310, Three Forks; the warrant was picked up by Tomlinson from post office box 310 at Three Forks; Tomlinson showed it to defendant at his place of business in Helena; defendant asked Tomlinson to indorse the name of Paul Karst on the warrant but he refused to do so and defendant then said in substance, get Buster Lake to sign it; Tomlinson did not know Buster Lake so defendant asked Joe LaValley to call Buster Lake to the bar and to tell him that Tomlinson would buy him a drink; this was done and Lake agreed to and did indorse the name of Paul Karst on the warrant; Tomlinson handed the warrant to defendant the next day and defendant put it in his pocket. Defendant presented the warrant to the Montana Power Company in payment of his bills receiving the difference of $39 in cash.
Defendant relies upon R. C. M. 1947, sec. 94-7220, reading: “A conviction cannot be had on the testimony of an accomplice, unless he is corroborated by other evidence, which in itself, and without the aid of the testimony of the accomplice, tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense; and the corroboration is not sufficient, if it merely shows the commission of the offense, or the circumstances thereof.”
In State v. Cobb, 76 Mont. 89, 245 Pac. 265, 266, the court enumerated the rules dedueible from prior decisions as to what evidence is necessary to corroborate that of an accomplice as follows:
“(a) The corroborating evidence may be supplied by the defendant or his witnesses.
“(b) It need not be direct evidence — it may be circumstantial.
*387“(c) It need not extend to every fact to which the accomplice testifies.
“ (d) It need not be sufficient to justify a conviction or to establish a prima facie case of guilt.
“(e) It need not be sufficient to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime; it is sufficient if it tends to do so.
“(f) Whether the corroborating evidence tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense is a question of law, but the weight of the evidence — its efficacy to fortify the testimony of the accomplice and render his story trustworthy —is a matter for the consideration of the jury.”
In considering the sufficiency of corroboration the evidence  offered by defendant himself may be considered. State v. Bolton, 65 Mont. 74, 212 Pac. 504; State v. Jones, 95 Mont. 317, 26 Pac. (2d) 341; State v. Yegen, 86 Mont. 251, 283 Pac. 210; State v. Cobb, 76 Mont. 89, 245 Pac. 265.
Defendant admitted that he uttered and passed the state warrant in question and received the $39 in change.
On the question of how the warrant came to be indorsed and defendant’s knowledge thereof, Tomlinson’s explanation is corroborated by the witness Joe LaValley who testified that he goes into defendant’s bar quite frequently; that he was there on November 29, 1950, and saw George LaFontaine and Buster Lake there at that time; that he was talking with Buster Lake and George LaFontaine came in and said,- “you guys want a drink,” and they stepped up to the bar and had a drink on George LaFontaine. Defendant was present tending bar on this occasion. Also Tomlinson was present. The witness LaValley testified:
“Q. Did John Phillips call you over to the bar when you were in there the 29th day of November, 1950? A. Yes.
“Q. What did he ask you to do, if anything? A. He told me to call Lake over. He said, ‘He will buy him a drink.’
“ Q. Who was the man supposed to buy him a drink ? A. That was Ted.
“Q. Tomlinson? A. Yes.
*388“Q. Did you summon Buster Lake, for him to come over where Ted Tomlinson was at the bar? A. I said, I just called him, I said, ‘Lake, there is a drink here for you.’
“Q. On this occasion did Mr. Tomlinson buy you a drink? A. Yes, he bought me a drink.
“Q. Do you know whether he bought Lake a drink ? A. Yes, he bought a drink for him too.”
George LaFontaine testified that he purchased a drink for Lake and LaValley on the evening of November 29, 1950, at defendant’s place of business and that Tomlinson was there at that time.
Lake testified that he was in the Blue Moon Bar operated by defendant in the evening of November 29, 1950. Defendant was tending bar at the time. Tomlinson was also present. He was not then acquainted with Tomlinson but met him at the bar and Tomlinson bought him a drink which was served by defendant. He corroborated the testimony given by Tomlinson as to the circumstances under which he indorsed the name of Paul Karst on the warrant.
As above noted the corroboration of an accomplice need not  connect defendant with the commission of the crime charged in order to be sufficient to sustain a conviction. It is sufficient if it tends to do so. The foregoing evidence given by LaValley and Lake so dovetails into that given by Tomlinson as to the circumstances under which the indorsement of the fictitious name Paul Karst was procured as to constitute corroboration tending to connect defendant with knowledge of the indorsement sufficient to make the question one for the jury, particularly when considered in the light of the fact that defendant had possession of the warrant and uttered it in payment of his bills, and considering the weakness of his testimony designed to show that his possession and passing of the warrant were consistent with innocence.
Defendant on direct examination testified:
‘ ‘ Q. State when, if at all, you first saw this warrant marked Plaintiff’s Exhibit No. 9? A. First time I saw this warrant, I *389won’t say exactly the time, but in my own mind it was November 30 in my cash register down there at noon, when I came down to go to bank to get change and relieve the bartender.
‘ ‘ Q. What did you do with that warrant then f A. I take the warrant, I had to pay some bills, I endorsed it and went to the Montana Power and paid my bills and brought the change back and put it in the cash register for us to work with.”
On cross examination he said: “I remember taking warrant out but I don’t remember exactly hour and date naturally.” He further said: “I must have took it out and endorsed it; otherwise how would it get endorsed?” Asked on cross examination whether he closed up his place of business on the night of November 29, 1950, he said: “Yes, I did.
“Q. Was that warrant in the cash register at that time? A. Yes, sir, I endorsed that that night.
“Q. Then you didn’t see it for the first time on November 30th as you testified a while ago? A. I didn’t testify that a while ago. I go through the cash register, if I close at night and sign all of the checks in the till there and correct my till, and leave everything there until next morning when I go to work, because it don’t do any good to put it in my pocket. I just as well leave it there then cash it next morning or next day. ’ ’
Asked whether the warrant was in the cash register at noon on November 29, 1950, when he relieved the bartender during the noon hour he said: “I couldn’t say. I don’t know. It couldn’t be there at noon; if it was there at noon I would take it and cash it to get the money in so they could work with it. If it was there at all, it was 29th, late at night.” He was at this point again asked: “When did you endorse your name on the back of the warrant ? ’ ’ and answered, “29th or 30th.” He then testified:
“Q. Which one, do you remember? A. I don’t remember, no. If I didn’t endorse it 29th, when I checked up till, I endorsed it next morning. * * *
‘ ‘ Q. Now, if Austin Breck was working on the 29th, he would have cashed that warrant, wouldn’t he? A. Yes, that’s right.
*390“Q. So the warrant wasn’t taken in at your place on the 30th but on the 29th, wasn’t it? A. I couldn’t say that.”
“Possession of a forged instrument by one who utters or seeks  to utter it or otherwise to realize on it or profit by it, without a reasonable explanation of how the possessor acquired it, warrants an inference that the possessor himself committed the forgery or was a guilty accessory to its commission.” State v. Earley, 119 Kan. 446, 239 Pac. 981.
. It follows as a matter of course that if defendant either committed the forgery or was an accessory to its commission then he had knowledge of the forgerj'' when he passed the instrument. And “when the evidence shows the name attached to the instrument has been forged, the inference arises that the person who uttered it as genuine either forged the instrument or knew it to be forged”. Hatton v. Commonwealth, 294 Ky. 740, 172 S. W. (2d) 564, 565. For other cases supporting the rule see 23 Am. Jur., Forgery, sec. 57, pp. 701, 702, and note in 164 A. L. R. 621; State v. Allen, 53 Idaho 737, 27 Pac. (2d) 482 and McGhee v. State, 183 Tenn. 20, 189 S. W. (2d) 826, 164 A. L. R. 617.
Here defendant’s explanation of his possession and uttering  the forged instrument was so contradictory and unsatisfactory as to justify a finding that the inference arising from the passing of the warrant that he knew of the forgery, had not been satisfactorily overcome. It is noteworthy that no one working at defendant’s place of business who should have been familiar with the facts relative to the manner of gaining possession of the warrant was called as a witness to show that defendant came into possession of the warrant without knowledge of the forged indorsement. One of the bartenders working on November 29th and 30th, Adolphus Salois, was not even called as a witness. Austin Breck, the other bartender on November 29th and 30th, said he did not see the warrant in the cash register. The court was warranted in applying the inference that defendant wms implicated in the matter of procuring the forged indorsement or at least knew of it at the time the instrument was passed, by him in payment of his obligations and in *391holding there was sufficient corroboration of the accomplice’s story to tend to connect defendant with the commission of the offense charged and to make the question of its weight one for the jury.
Defendant contends that the witness Lake was an accomplice and that evidence given by him cannot be considered in determining whether the requirements of R. C. M. 1947, sec. 94-7220, have been met.
"We do not agree with that contention. The crime of uttering  an instrument known to contain a forged indorsement is a crime, separate and distinct from that of forging the indorsement. State v. Williams, 152 Mo. 115, 53 S. W. 424; State v. Blodgett, 143 Iowa 578, 121 N. W. 685; Ball v. State, 48 Ark. 94, 2 S. W. 462; State v. Andrews, 297 Mo. 281, 248 S. W. 967. Wharton’s Criminal Procedure, 10th Ed., Vol. 1, see. 693. pp. 956, 957.
When only one instrument is involved and both the making  of the forged indorsement and the uttering of the instrument are by the same person and in the course of the same transaction, they are regarded as acts or steps in the same crime and both acts may be charged in the same information without being duplicitous. Wharton’s Criminal Procedure, 10th Ed., Vol. 1, sec. 694, pp. 958, 959; Territory of Montana v. Poulier, 8 Mont. 146, 19 Pac. 594 and State v. Mitton, 37 Mont. 366, 96 Pac. 926, 127 Am. St. Rep. 732.
But the two crimes though both constitute forgery are  considered separate and distinct when committed by different li ersons and where the acts constituting one crime were committed by one person and' the acts constituting the other were committed by another.
A person making the forged indorsement with the fraudulent intent is guilty of forgery though he made no attempt to utter or pass the instrument. Ex parte Solway, supra. Likewise one who utters or passes an instrument with a felonious intent knowing it to contain a forged indorsement is guilty of forgery even *392though he did not make the forged indorsement. State v. MittOn, supra.
.Here it was shown that the making of the forged indorsement was by some one other than the defendant, viz., by Buster Lake.
The circumstances under which he made the indorsement make it questionable whether Lake had any intention to defraud anyone so as to be guilty of either type of forgery under the statute, but certainly he was not implicated in the matter of passing or uttering the instrument.
Lake, so far as the record disclosed, was not present when the  instrument was uttered or passed, did not aid or abet its passing, did not consent to its passing- and did not procure it to be done or know anything about its passing. Under the evidence here Lake was not an accomplice in the commission of the offense of passing the warrant in question. He could not have been prosecuted for the crime of uttering or passing the warrant under R. C. M. 1947, sec. 94-204.
The relation between the forger and one passing the instrument knowing it to contain a forged indorsement is analogous to that between a thief and one receiving the property knowing it to have been stolen. It has been held that one who steals property is not an accomplice of one who receives the property knowing it to have been stolen unless the thief and the receiver act in concert in advance of the larceny, because they are separate and distinct crimes. State v. Keithley, 83 Mont. 177, 271 Pac. 449. That same principle governs this case.
•Defendant contends that the court erred in permitting the witness Richard Walter (Buster) Lake to testify. The objection to his testimony rests upon the ground that his name was not indorsed on the information until after the jury had been selected and sworn to try the case, and after the opening statement was made to the jury by the county attorney.
R. C. M. 1947, sec. 94-6208, provides: “The county attorney  must indorse upon the information at the time of filing the same, the names of the witnesses for the state, if known.” It is not error to allow the indorsement of the names of witnesses *393discovered after the filing of the information or to allow witnesses to testify whose names were not indorsed on the information and who were discovered after the information was filed. State v. Harkins, 85 Mont. 585, 281 Pac. 551; State v. Akers, 106 Mont. 43, 74 Pac. (2d) 1138; State v. Gaffney, 106 Mont. 310, 77 Pac. (2d) 398, and cases therein cited. It was shown without dispute that the county attorney did not know of witness Lake when the information was filed. The record shows that two days before the trial began the county attorney filed a petition asking the court for an order directing that Lake be brought from Deer Lodge to the county jail for the purpose of testifying in this case. The order was granted; the trial began on June 16, 1952; the impaneling of the jury was completed on June 18th; on that day, and after the jury had been impaneled, the county attorney made application to indorse the name of Lake on the information as a witness. The record shows that on June 19th written notice was given by the county attorney to defendant and his counsel that Lake was being held in the county jail at Helena where he was available for questioning by defendant and his counsel and offering to agree to any reasonable delay in the .trial in order to prepare and secure evidence to meet his testimony; the record shows that the county attorney thought the name of Lake had been indorsed on the information and didn’t learn that it had not been so indorsed until after his opening statement had been made to the jury. Lake did not testify until June 20, 1952, and defendant made no request for delay in the trial in order to meet the evidence given by him.
The reason for the statutory requirement that the names of  witnesses be indorsed on the information is to safeguard defendant against surprise and unfair advantage. State v. McDonald, 51 Mont. 1, 149 Pac. 279. There was no unfair advantage taken of defendant here. He contends that he should have been afforded the opportunity of examining jurors as to their acquaintance or relationship to the witness Lake. This court, however, has held that it is not error to examine witnesses whose names are not indorsed on the information until after the jury *394is impaneled and the trial has commenced. State v. Schnepel, 23 Mont. 523, 59 Pac. 927; State v. Akers, 106 Mont. 43, 74 Pac. (2d) 1138; State v. McDonald, 51 Mont. 1, 149 Pac. 279.
Defendant complains of the reception of evidence of other  crimes. Evidence of other crimes in which defendant was implicated was a part of the evidence going' to make the crime charged against him. In other words, the forgery by Lake or someone else had to be shown in order to show that the instrument passed by defendant contained a forged indorsement known by defendant to be a forgery. The presentation of fraudulent claims to the state and the renting of a post office box in Three Forks, were all part of the operations employed to defraud the state of its money and were circumstances showing defendant’s knowledge of the forged indorsement.
The general rule applicable here is stated in 20 Am. Jur., Evidence, sec. 314, pp. 296, 297, as follows: “Where one crime is committed to prepare the way for another and the commission of the second crime is made to depend upon the perpetration of the first, the two become connected and related transactions, and proof of the commission of the first offense becomes relevant to show the motive for the perpetration of the second. It is competent to show that the crime charged consisted of several stages or continuous acts, all constituting one transaction.”
In 22 C. J. S., Criminal Law, see. 691, page 1138, it is said:  “transactions which are so related to, and connected with, the forgery charged as to be otherwise admissible are not inadmissible because they tend to prove a wholly dissimilar crime, particularly where they constitute part of a connected or continuous transaction on the part of accused.”
This court has held that the history of the transaction may be shown to establish defendant’s knowledge of the forgery. State v. Mitton, 37 Mont. 366, 96 Pac. 926, 127 Am. St. Rep. 732. This conclusion is not at variance with the holding in State v. Hale, 126 Mont., 326, 249 Pac. (2d) 495, as contended by defendant for here there was no proof of other crimes committed by defendant as in the Hale ease. To make this case comparable to that there *395would have to be evidence that defendant passed warrants other than the one in question here knowing them to contain forged indorsements. There was no such evidence here.
The fact that evidence'of other crimes comes from the mouth  of an accomplice is no objection to its admissibility. If the jury places the stamp of trustworthiness on the testimony of the accomplice, then all of his testimony may properly be considered, even though some of ■ it is not corroborated. The fact that proof of other offenses showing defendant’s knowledge of the forged indorsement is prejudicial to defendant is no reason w'hy it should be excluded.
Defendant complains of an instruction given by the court  on the subject of reasonable doubt. The instruction complained of is verbatim with the first three paragraphs of the instruction under consideration, and held not prejudicial, in State v. Wong Sun, 114 Mont. 185, 133 Pac. (2d) 761. It was approved in the early case of Territory of Montana v. McAndrews, 3 Mont. 158, and in State v. Zorn, 99 Mont. 63, 41 Pac. (2d) 513.
Finding no reversible error in the record, the judgment is affirmed.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE ADAIR, and ME. JUSTICE BOTTOMLY, concur.