Court Opinion

ID: 9539784
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:10:17.495863+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:59:20.280007
License: Public Domain

NOBLE, Justice (dissenting). The majority, in effect, hold that every case involving an accident to a pedestrian child by an automobile is one for the jury. By Marrajo v. Martinez, 65 N.M. 166, 334 P.2d 548, we are committed to the rule that the driver of an automobile is not an insurer of the safety of children. There, the rule of Chappie v. Sellers, 365 Pa. 503, 76 A.2d 172, 174, 30 A.L.R.2d 1, in the following language, was approved: “But an operator of an automobile is not an insurer of the safety of children. He is not responsible, for instance, if, with his car under proper control, a child deliberately steps in front of [his] car.” It is difficult to perceive how the defendant, in the instant case, could have had his car more under control nor what he could have done short of stopping his car entirely in the middle of the street, when he became aware of children at the side of the street, and remaining stopped so long as children were in the neighborhood. In Marrujo, the annotation at 30 A.L.R.2d 35, et .seq., was referred to and the decisions said to be in hopeless conflict; noting that many jurisdictions apparently hold it to be the duty of the driver to anticipate childish action such as running across the street without warning and that many others hold to the contrary. This court then aligned itself with those jurisdictions holding the driver only to that degree of care which a reasonably prudent person should exercise under the circumstances. There has not been shown, in this case, any act which the driver did or failed to do which a reasonably prudent person would have or would not have done. The driver was preceeding in low gear with his foot on the brake and was slowing the truck until he was proceeding at approximately four miles per hour. It would certainly appear that the defendant here was well within the rule of Marrujo in having his car under control, and it cannot be doubted that the child suddenly darted out from behind an approaching car directly in the path of defendant’s truck. Decisions are cited in the A.L.R. Annotation, above referred to, holding the obligation of the driver to that of being able to avoid striking a child at all events. To my mind, that is the degree of care required by the majority and is, I think, contrary to the holding in Marrujo v. Martinez, supra. It seems clear to me that there may be facts upon which the trial court, applying proper rules, should upon motion determine as a matter of law that the driver of a vehicle is not negligent and direct a verdict. On appeal, the appellate court in determining whether there is substantial evidence to support a verdict applies the same rules as does a trial court in passing upon such a motion. That responsibility of the court is denied by the majority. The question here, as it would be in the trial court upon a motion for directed verdict, is whether there is substantial evidence to support a verdict in which negligence of the driver is implicit. Ortega v. Koury, 55 N.M. 142, 227 P.2d 941, said by the majority to have been determined on facts far less convincing than those in the instant case, seems to be wholly inapplicable under the present facts. That decision was predicated upon the fact that the driver, having an unobscured view, was negligent in not seeing the child in time to have avoided the accident. Negligent failure to see the child in time to take-action to avoid the injury is not an issue in this case. Here, the driver’s view of the child was obstructed by approaching cars. His first opportunity to see her was when she suddenly darted into the street from behind the approaching car. The driver,, realizing there might be children at the side of the street, was proceeding very slowly, in low gear, and with his foot on the brake. Even so, when he was able to see the child suddenly appear, he was unable to stop in time to avoid striking her. I am unable to-perceive any act of negligence by the driver. Furthermore, there is nothing in the record to indicate to the driver that the •child would move frojn her position of safety until the way was clear. I am unable to find substantial evidence to support the finding of negligence and, therefore, dissent.