Court Opinion

ID: 9673611
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:15:05.191157+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:23.058186
License: Public Domain

Becker, J.
I concur in the result. I dissent from dicta
expressed in the first four of the last six paragraphs of the majority opinion. The majority states that we should express our opinions on procedure to- determine the question of voluntariness of defendant’s confession and admissibility of evidence. To- this extent I concur, and I concur in what precedes those paragraphs.
I. I do- not concur in material which analyzes the record in this ease nor do I concur in adoption of -the orthodox rule. Denno approves- both the orthodox procedure and the Massachusetts procedure re voluntariness of confessions, distinguishing the two as follows: “In jurisdictions, following -the orthodox rule, under which the judge himself solely and finally determines the voluntariness of the confession, or those following the Massachusetts procedure, under which the jury passes on voluntariness only after the judge has fully and independently resolved the issue against the accused, * * Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368, 378, 84 S. Ct. 1774, 1781, 12 L. Ed.2d 908, 916, 1 A. L. R.3d 1205, 1214.
After extended hearing and careful findings the trial court instructed:
“Instruction 20. A written statement which the State claims defendant, James Lewis Holland, gave to- officers has been offered in evidence, relating to the matters now charged by the State.
“Now, this document purports to- be a statement relating to acts committed by defendant, and you are instructed that the *217law so guards the rights of persons accused of crime that such a statement cannot be considered unless the State proves by the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the same was given by defendant voluntarily, that is, without fear, promises, or deception, and with knowledge of the contents of the document.
“If the State has not sustained its burden of proof with respect to this document, then you must disregard it. On the other hand, if the State has sustained its burden, then you may give the document great weight as to- matters -therein recited, but the weight to- be given is for you to determine. However, under our law such -a statement will not warrant a conviction unless accompanied by other proof that the offense charged was committed.”
We are not concerned with the sufficiency of the instruction. We are concerned with wha.t it does. I believe it again submits the issue of voluntariness to- the jury in substantial conformance with the Massachusetts rule.
Thus the majority approves use of the Massachusetts rule in this case but approves the orthodox rule for the future. The confusion is compounded.
II. More important is objection to acceptance by the majority of the orthodox rule supported by citation of State ex rel. Goodchild v. Burke, 27 Wis.2d 244, 133 N.W.2d 753; People v. Walker, 374 Mich. 331, 132 N.W.2d 87.
Many states are choosiug between the procedures. The rationale of each group is best expressed by the following quotations :
“If we arrogate to the trial judge the right to- adjudicate voluntariness, even though that question involves issues of fact, we find no basis in logic in submitting the same question over again to the jury to second-guess him.” (Emphasis supplied.) People v. Walker, 374 Mich. 331, 337, 132 N.W.2d 87, 91. Decision : to- follow the orthodox rule.
“The orthodox rule is generally recommended by legal scholars, and has been approved by the Supreme Court o-f the United States. The Massachusetts rule, however, appeals- to us as the better rule because by allowing the jury -also to- pass on the issue of voluntariness, it preserves to the defendcmt his right to a jury *218trial on this critical issue. The Supreme Court of the United States has also indicated in Jackson v. Denno, supra, its. approval of the Massachusetts rule.” (Emphasis supplied.) State v. Brewton, 238 Ore. 590, 601, 395 P.2d 874, 879. Decision: to follow Massachusetts rule.
Quotation of the foregoing opposing rationale would seem to be sufficient to point the way for this court. The “second guessing” concept seems out of place in such a grave matter. The function of the jury is to resolve issues of fact. This function should not be taken from it because constitutional rights require a preliminary finding by the court for the purpose of the admissibility of the evidence in the first instance.
State v. Tharp is currently under consideration here (now published, 258 Iowa 224, 138 N.W.2d 78). There the trial judge also, submitted alleged confessions under the Massachusetts rule. It is interesting to note1 that two competent conscientious trial judges (without referring to the rule by name) adopted the Massachusetts, rule as the procedure which would most fairly effectuate justice.
I would affirm the trial court’s procedures in this case as submission under the Massachusetts rule and approve that procedure for future use in this state.