Court Opinion

ID: 9792059
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:22:31.082384+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:40.414368
License: Public Domain

JOHNSON, Justice
(dissenting).
I am unable to agree with the conclusions reached in the majority opinion and therefore register my dissent.
It is established beyond question in this jurisdiction that while a constructive trust may be established by parol evidence, such evidence must be clear and- convincing, not doubtful, uncertain and contradictory. It must be full, clear, and satisfactory. Smith v. Connor, 87 Ariz. 6, 347 P.2d 568; Murillo v. Hernandez, 79 Ariz. 1, 281 P.2d 786; Stewart v. Schnepf, 62 Ariz. 440, 158 P.2d 529; Costello v. Gleeson, 19 Ariz. 532, 172 P. 730; Costello v. Cunningham, 16 Ariz. 447, 147 P. 701 and Butler v. Shumaker, 4 Ariz. 16, 32 P. 265.
It would serve no useful purpose to detail the testimony of the witnesses in the lower court, however, I believe a brief summary of the evidence will well illustrate that the appellant utterly failed to prove a constructive trust as required by the settled principles of law.
The decedent, George F. Tibsherany, obtained a deed to the subject property in 1931, which on its face was an absolute and unconditional conveyance and that he con*212tinued to be the sole record owner of such property until his death in 1954.
There is' a presumption that the holder of the legal title owns the full beneficial interest in the property and that the evidence to overcome this presumption and establish that the property is held in trust must be clear and convincing. Glasgow v. Andrews, 129 Cal.App.2d 660, 277 P.2d 400; In re Schechtman’s Estate, 162 Cal.App.2d 365, 328 P.2d 478 and Rench v. McMullen, 82 Cal.App.2d 872, 187 P.2d 111.
The record before us discloses that the complaint of the appellant, Anna M. Joseph, alleges that decedent purchased a mortgage on the hotel property involved, later acquiring title in his name, under an alleged agreement made in January, 1931, that such property be held in trust for the use and benefit of appellant. The testimony of appellant given in court twenty-six years after the transaction was alleged to have been made and after the death of George F. Tibsherany, reveals that the appellant never during the intervening years made any claim or exercised any control over the property in the presence of her brother and any third party.
The appellant explained the agreement with her brother as follows:
“Q. Mrs. Joseph, just so we can get-this clear, I wish you would in your own words‘please explain to the Court what this agreement was between you - and your brother.
“A. He leave the hotel to me and $200 a month income. I said, ‘Maybe' the hotel wouldn’t, because lots of times you don’t make 200 from the hotel.’
“Well, he said, T leave you’—and that is my hotel—he leave it for me; if I don’t make enough in the hotel, he leave me $200 with it so I can make it, because I loaned him more money than what I loaned him for the hotel, what I bought my hotel with. ' I give him $36,000, all my lifetime work, and he got rich.”
* * * Sfc * *
“Q. Now, Mrs. Joseph, can you tell us whether or not your brother—in other words, just tell the Court what understanding you and your brother had if you would leave hotel in his name. What did he tell you if you did that ?
“A. He said if I leave the hotel in his name for his finance, he will give me $200 with it, and that the hotel is mine anyhow, but for his financing, you know, if I leave it in his name, he will give me $200 with it. I said, ‘The hotel will never make that much.’ He says, I will give you $200.”
Considering this testimony in the light most favorable to the appellant, it fails to *213meet the requirements and the conditions we stated in Costello v. Cunningham, supra, [16 Ariz. 447, 147 P. 714.] that must exist; we said in that case: “ * * * A common requirement is that the evidence be clear, explicit and convincing, not only as to the existence of the trust, but as to its terns and conditions”. In my opinion the evidence in the case at bar cannot be clear, explict and convincing as required by our decisions, and I agree with the frequent quoted statement that oral testimony of oral statements against interest made by deceased persons many years before is the weakest of all evidence. Fagan v. Fisher, 74 Colo. 473, 222 P. 647; Ward v. Ward, 197 Okl. 551, 172 P.2d 978 and Buxbaum v. Priddy, Okl., 312 P.2d 961.
Besides the testimony of appellant all the evidence is built upon alleged declarations of the decedent to mere strangers to the transaction, some alleged to have been made nearly twenty-five years ago, and it is probable that after the lapse of such a period the memory would be inaccurate as to the facts and conditions of the transaction. These alleged statements were made in chance conversations to persons who would have no occasion to accurately remember or perfectly recall the conversations allegedly made. No one of the witnesses testified that Tibsherany ever intimated he was holding the hotel in trust for the use and benefit of the appellant, or that he was to pay her $200 a month for. life by. reason of the absolute title being in his name.
There is, moreover, another substantial reason disclosed by the record that cast suspicion upon the position taken by the appellant in the present action. At the time the last will and testament of George F. Tibsherany was offered for probate the appellant in the instant matter filed a contest to the admission of the will, alleging that while the real property herein involved belonged to the estate of George F. Tibsherany, nevertheless, she was entitled to receive it by virtue of an alleged prior will. The court denied her contest and the will was admitted to probate. Thereafter the present action was filed and the appellant took the inconsistent position, that the decedent had for twenty-six years held the property in trust for her use and benefit. The trial court undoubtedly, and I believe properly so, considered the appellant’s testimony to be seriously impaired by the fact that she first assumed an inconsistent and opposite theory from that advanced in the case at bar and being unsuccessful in that action, then sought to obtain the property under an alleged trust.
I am in accord and approve the statement contained in Turman v. Ellison, 37 Cal.App. 204, 174 P. 396, 398, as follows:
“ *' * * Indeed, it is true that actions to enforce oral agreements claimed to have been made with persons who. *214are dead involve a dangerous assault upon property rights, and they are often supported by false testimony, and they naturally and reasonably excite suspicion. And while they may be genuine and worthy of confirmation, they require the closest and most careful scrutiny to prevent injustice being done. (Citing cases.) They afford and carry opportunity for fraud against the estates of deceased persons and a great temptation to perjury on the part of disappointed or avaricious relatives”.
After a full consideration of the record I reached the conclusion, as did the trial court, that the evidence taken in the light most favorable to the appellant falls far short of the requirements necessary to justify the overthrow of a deed absolute on its face, for the presumption is that such a deed is what it purports to be and there should not be a finding to the contrary unless the evidence is almost overwhelmingly the other way. Spaulding v. Jones, 117 Cal.App.2d 541, 256 P.2d 637 and Lombardi v. Tranchina, 129 Cal.App.2d 778, 277 P.2d 938. The security of titles and sound public policy require such a rule.
Appellant having failed to support the allegations of her complaint by evidence that was clear, cogent and convincing which is necessary to establish a constructive trust I would affirm the judgment of the lower court.