Court Opinion

ID: 9949772
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-12 16:04:57.602619+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:54.331879
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                                  Mar 12 2024, 8:48 am

                                                                                      CLERK
                                                                                  Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                                     Court of Appeals
                                                                                       and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Alexander N. Moseley                                      JOSEPH TODD WELLS
Julie C. Dixon                                            Jonathan R. Deenik
Dixon & Moseley, P.C.                                     Deenik Lowe, LLC
Indianapolis, Indiana                                     Greenwood, Indiana

                                            IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Brooke Wells,                                             March 12, 2024
Appellant-Intervenor,                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                          23A-DR-990
        v.                                                Appeal from the
                                                          Marion Superior Court
Joseph Todd Wells,                                        The Honorable
Appellee-Petitioner,                                      Danielle Gaughan, Judge
                                                          Trial Court Cause No.
and                                                       49D15-0904-DR-18395

Kimberly Renay Wells,
Appellee-Respondent.

                              Opinion by Judge Foley
             Judge Pyle concurs and Judge Tavitas dissents with opinion.

Foley, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DR-990 | March 12, 2024                       Page 1 of 24
[1]   Brooke Wells (“Daughter”) challenges the sufficiency of the evidence

      supporting the trial court’s finding that she repudiated her father, Joseph Todd

      Wells (“Father”), and therefore Father was relieved of his obligation to pay for

      her to attend college. Concluding that the trial court did not clearly err in

      finding that Daughter repudiated Father, we affirm the trial court.

      Facts and Procedural History
[2]   Daughter is the child of Father and Kimberly Renay Wells (“Mother”), 1 whose

      marriage was dissolved in 2010. Under the dissolution decree, which

      incorporated the terms of a marital settlement agreement, Father was obligated

      to pay for Daughter to attend college. In July 2021, Father initiated the instant

      litigation by filing a petition for the emancipation of Daughter, who turned

      eighteen earlier that year. Daughter intervened, filing a motion to enforce the

      provisions of the dissolution decree that required Father to pay for her college

      education. Father then filed a petition alleging that Daughter had repudiated

      him, asking the trial court to either (1) relieve him of the obligation to pay for

      Daughter’s college education or (2) modify the dissolution decree.

[3]   A fact-finding hearing was held in December 2022. Evidence was presented

      that Daughter—who was born on March 5, 2003—was completing her senior

      year of high school in the spring of 2021. As of her junior year, Daughter’s plan

      was to join the Air Force. Before spring break of her senior year, Daughter had

      1
          Mother does not participate on appeal.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DR-990 | March 12, 2024          Page 2 of 24
      taken a physical and received a special assignment. Daughter went on spring

      break with her boyfriend, Bryce Bowen, and his family. During the trip, she

      confided in Bryce’s mother, telling her she did not want to go into the Air

      Force.

[4]   Before spring break, Daughter generally had a positive relationship with Father

      and his wife (“Stepmother”), with whom Daughter lived. When Daughter

      returned from spring break, she informed Father by text message that she no

      longer wished to go into the Air Force. Father and Stepmother then attempted

      to speak with Daughter about her options. At that point, Father was under the

      impression that Daughter had not submitted college applications. However,

      Daughter had in fact submitted college applications, but she did not tell Father

      because she thought he would be upset due to having other plans for Daughter.

[5]   The issue of Daughter’s post-secondary plans resulted in family conflict and the

      deterioration of Daughter’s relationships with Father, Stepmother, and

      Daughter’s older brother (“Brother”). In May 2021—by which point Daughter

      was eighteen years old, but still in high school—Daughter abruptly moved out

      of Father’s home and moved in with the Bowens. Daughter did not discuss this

      decision with Father. Father wanted Daughter to move back into his home,

      where Daughter’s clothing, bedding, and other personal belongings were

      available to her. Although Father thought Daughter might move back within a

      week or so, Daughter continued living with the Bowens, who purchased

      clothing, bedding, and other items for her. When Daughter began attending

      community college at Ivy Tech, it was the Bowens who paid the tuition. Since

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DR-990 | March 12, 2024        Page 3 of 24
      moving out in May 2021, Daughter returned twice to gather personal

      belongings. In the ensuing months, Father and Stepmother invited Daughter to

      attend family events and sit for a family portrait. Daughter did not attend

      events where Father was present, and she did not come for the family portrait.

[6]   Since May 2021, Father has physically seen Daughter on three occasions: (1)

      her high school graduation; (2) an appointment for the extraction of Daughter’s

      wisdom teeth, where Father paid for the procedure; and (3) a brief luncheon. In

      November 2021, Father became seriously ill and was hospitalized. Daughter

      did not visit Father, and she engaged in only minimal communications about

      his health. As Daughter attended community college and later enrolled at

      Indiana University, Daughter did not provide Father with specific information

      regarding the costs of attendance, the classes she was taking, or her grades.

      Although Father would periodically send Daughter text messages, and

      Daughter would sometimes respond—at times expressing well-wishes and

      telling Father she loved and missed him—Father testified that Daughter’s

      actions belied her words. Father ultimately testified that he believes Daughter

      “doesn’t have the desire to have a relationship” with him. Tr. Vol. 3 p. 14.

[7]   The trial court took the matter under advisement. It later entered sua sponte

      findings and conclusions, writing that Daughter “repudiated her relationship

      with Father and Father is therefore relieved of his obligation to contribute to

      [Daughter’s] college expenses.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 p. 27. Daughter

      moved to correct error, claiming the judgment was “contrary to relevant case

      law on repudiation and post-secondary educational support orders.” Id. at 131.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DR-990 | March 12, 2024        Page 4 of 24
      Daughter challenged several of the court’s findings, and she sought relief due to

      the alleged “misinterpretation of relevant case law, or a mistake having been

      made[.]” Id. at 147. The trial court denied the motion. Daughter now appeals.

      Discussion and Decision
[8]   Daughter appeals the denial of her motion to correct error. That motion

      challenged the trial court’s determination that Daughter repudiated Father and,

      therefore, Father was relieved of his obligation to pay for her college expenses.

      We review the denial of a motion to correct error for an abuse of discretion.

      Berg v. Berg, 170 N.E.3d 224, 227 (Ind. 2021). Under this standard, we “only

      reverse ‘where the trial court’s judgment is clearly against the logic and effect of

      the facts and circumstances before it or where the trial court errs on a matter of

      law.’” Id. (quoting Perkinson v. Perkinson, 989 N.E.2d 758, 767 (Ind. 2021)).

      However, to the extent the ruling turns on a question of law, our review is de

      novo. Id. Furthermore, where—as here—the trial court entered sua sponte

      findings, those findings control only “the issues or matters covered thereby[.]”

      Ind. Trial Rule 52(D). As to other issues, “the judgment or general finding . . .

      shall control[.]” Id. Under Trial Rule 52(A), we “shall not set aside the

      findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to

      the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.” A

      finding is clearly erroneous only if the record contains no facts to support the

      finding, either directly or by inference. Yanoff v. Muncy, 688 N.E.2d 1259, 1262

      (Ind. 1997). “A judgment is clearly erroneous if it applies the wrong legal

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DR-990 | March 12, 2024          Page 5 of 24
      standard to properly found facts.” Id. We ultimately look to whether the

      evidence supports the findings and the findings support the judgment. Id. In

      doing so, “we neither reweigh the evidence nor assess the credibility of

      witnesses, but consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment.”

      Staresnick v. Staresnick, 830 N.E.2d 127, 131 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied.

      We will affirm unless our review leaves us “with the firm conviction that a

      mistake has been made.” Yanoff, 688 N.E.2d at 1262.

[9]   “[W]here a child, as an adult over eighteen years of age, repudiates a parent,

      that parent must be allowed to dictate what effect this will have on his or her

      contribution to college expenses for that child.” Lovold v. Ellis, 988 N.E.2d

      1144, 1150 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting McKay v. McKay, 644 N.E.2d 164, 168

      (Ind. Ct. App. 1994)). Repudiation is the “complete refusal to participate in a

      relationship with the parent” after the child turns eighteen. Lovold, 988 N.E.2d

      at 1150. In relieving a parent of the obligation to pay for college expenses upon

      the child’s repudiation, we emphasized that, “[b]y college age, children of

      divorced parents must be expected to begin to come to terms with the reality of

      their family’s situation. They must begin to realize that their attitude and

      actions are their individual responsibilities.” Messner v. Messner, 118 N.E.3d 64,

      68–69 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (quoting McKay, 644 N.E.2d at 166), trans. denied.

      Thus, “[w]hatever their biases and resentments”—even if “one can understand

      how they got that way”—“when they become adults it is no longer appropriate

      to allow them to stay that way without consequence.” Id. (emphasis removed).

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DR-990 | March 12, 2024          Page 6 of 24
[10]   Although not raised by the parties, the dissent would hold that the doctrine of

       repudiation is not available to Father because Father’s obligation to contribute

       to Daughter’s educational expenses was included in a marital settlement

       agreement. Critically, however, a parent’s obligation to contribute to the

       educational expenses of a child is not found at common law but, instead, arises

       solely from our dissolution of marriage statutes. See I.C. § 31-16-6-2. And,

       similar to a child support order, an educational support order is subject to

       modification. See generally Svenstrup v. Svenstrup, 981 N.E.2d 138, 145 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 2012) (“Generally, provisions for the payment of educational expenses are

       . . . modifiable because educational expenses are in the nature of child

       support.”); see also Panfil v. Fell, 19 N.E.3d 772, 778 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014)

       (involving circumstances where “the dissolution decree incorporated an

       agreement of the parties” requiring one parent to pay “one-third of [the child’s]

       expenses for . . . college education,” and the trial court “later modified its order

       to condition [the] support obligation” on, among other things, the maintenance

       of a certain GPA), trans. denied. We find no proper basis to limit the doctrine of

       repudiation to instances where the provision of educational expenses was a

       contested matter—particularly in this instance, where more than ten years have

       passed since the original agreed entry. 2 We therefore proceed to address

       Daughter’s challenges to the trial court’s findings and judgment.

       2
        To the extent the dissent expresses concerns about the repudiation doctrine itself—suggesting that this
       doctrine “opens the door to damaging parent-child relationships,” infra p. 24—those types of public policy

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DR-990 | March 12, 2024                                Page 7 of 24
[11]   Daughter challenges the trial court’s ultimate determination that “[Daughter]

       has repudiated her relationship with Father[.]” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 27.

       She specifically challenges four underlying findings, including the finding that

       she “failed to attend a counseling session on May 17, 2021, as the parties had

       agreed to in a Partial Mediated Agreed Entry that was approved by the Court

       on September 28, 2022.” Id. at 26. Daughter points out that she could not have

       been subject to an agreed entry in May 2021, which was well before the

       litigation commenced. Regardless, it is well-settled that “[s]pecial findings,

       even if erroneous, do not warrant reversal if they amount to mere surplusage

       and add nothing to the trial court’s decision.” Bell v. Clark, 653 N.E.2d 483, 489

       (Ind. Ct. App. 1995), expressly adopted, Bell v. Clark, 670 N.E.1290, 1294 (Ind.

       1996). Here, we conclude that this challenged finding amounts to surplusage.

       We focus on specific findings regarding Daughter’s relationship with Father.

[12]   Daughter challenges the following finding regarding whether Daughter was

       meaningfully engaged with the family after moving out of Father’s residence:

                The communication between Father and [Daughter] has been by
                Facebook Messenger and text. [Daughter] was invited to several
                family celebrations by Father and Stepmother and was included
                in an invitation for a family portrait. [Daughter] failed to show
                up for any family celebrations and did not respond to the
                invitations. [Daughter] stated she intended to show up for the

       concerns are best addressed by our legislature. Moreover, restricting the repudiation doctrine implicates
       other policy issues in that, if repudiation did not apply whenever a parent initially agreed to educational
       support, parents might be dissuaded from including this type of support in their settlement agreements.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DR-990 | March 12, 2024                                   Page 8 of 24
               family portrait but concedes that she did not because she ‘lost
               track of time.’

       Id. at 26. According to Daughter, “[t]his finding is clearly erroneous to the

       extent that it states Daughter did not show up for any family celebrations or

       respond to the invitations.” Appellant’s Br. p. 13. Daughter points out that she

       attended at least some “family events during the relevant time period,” and she

       “did respond to Father when he would invite her” to certain events. Id.

       Daughter is correct in that there is, for example, evidence that she attended a

       Christmas gathering with Mother. At the same time, the evidence indicates

       that Daughter left early without explanation. In any case, the essence of the

       challenged finding was that Daughter lacked meaningful engagement with the

       family, and Father in particular. And there is ample evidence that Daughter

       withdrew from Father after she moved out, declining to attend family events

       where he was present. Indeed, there was evidence that Father’s door was open

       to her, but she saw him in person on just three occasions in the eighteen months

       between the date she moved in with the Bowens and the evidentiary hearing.

[13]   Daughter also challenges the trial court’s finding that she “failed to include

       either of her parents in her college choices or provide either of them with

       meaningful information regarding costs, classes, or grades.” Id. Daughter

       directs us to evidence that she alerted Father when she was accepted to Indiana

       University, that she and Father briefly discussed student loans, and she “was

       sending information to Father as early as April of 2021 regarding schools she

       would like to attend, as well as attempting to discuss financial information.” Id.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DR-990 | March 12, 2024         Page 9 of 24
       at 14. In challenging the foregoing finding, Daughter focuses on the evidence

       favorable to her. However, she omits evidence indicating that Father was

       concerned that Daughter was making a rash decision about post-secondary

       plans, after suddenly abandoning her plans to go into the Air Force. Father

       testified that, although Daughter “changed her mind overnight,” he was

       ultimately supportive of Daughter’s decision to go to college. Tr. Vol. 2 p. 91.

       He “wanted the best for [Daughter]” and, by the end of May 2021, “was trying

       to figure out how [the family could] get [Daughter] to college,” but Daughter

       would not participate in a “deliberate, thoughtful” planning process or abide by

       Father’s basic rules for living in his home as a college-bound adult. Id. at 94.

[14]   Daughter also challenges the following finding:

               [Daughter] has repudiated her relationship with Father and has
               rejected Father’s efforts to reconcile their relationship. There is
               no question that [Daughter] could have returned to Father’s
               home at any time after she left on May 12, 2021, in the final
               semester of her senior year of high school. Unlike the fact
               patterns in case law regarding repudiation where the child is
               usually in the home of the custodial parent and is alleged to have
               repudiated the non-custodial parent, [Daughter] has repudiated
               both of her parents and even separated herself from her older
               brother, to whom she was once close.

       Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 26. As to this finding—and other related findings

       that Daughter has repudiated her relationship with Father—Daughter seems to

       acknowledge that the parent-child relationship was severely strained. However,

       she maintains that there is insufficient evidence that she completely refused to

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DR-990 | March 12, 2024        Page 10 of 24
       participate in the relationship so as to support a finding of repudiation. She

       asserts that, “from a practical standpoint, it is understandable why Daughter

       would not want to move back in with Father while there was pending litigation

       between [them], as it surely would have created a tense situation.” Appellant’s

       Br. p. 16. She asserts that “[a]n adult child’s decision to move out of [her]

       parent’s home cannot lead to an inference that [she] no longer wants a

       relationship with that parent.” Id. Daughter generally directs us to the

       evidence most favorable to her position, focusing on evidence that she loved

       Father and “desir[ed] to have a relationship” with him. Id. at 21. Daughter

       ultimately claims that “the testimony presented at the final hearing[] prohibits a

       finding that Daughter repudiated her relationship” with Father. Id.

[15]   Daughter characterizes the strain in the parent-child relationship as merely a

       “rough patch,” id. at 22, and she directs us to Redd v. Redd, 901 N.E.2d 545, 552

       (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), where this Court reversed a finding of repudiation. We

       note, however, that family law cases involving the alleged repudiation of a

       parent-child relationship are especially fact-intensive, and we are not at liberty

       to reweigh the evidence. Furthermore, since Redd was decided, our Supreme

       Court has repeatedly “expressed the importance of appellate deference in family

       law matters[.]” D.C. v. J.A.C., 977 N.E.2d 951, 956 (Ind. 2012). Critically, the

       trial court has the “unique” opportunity to have “direct interactions with the

       parties”—often “over an extended period of time.” Id. (quoting Best v. Best, 941

       N.E.2d 499, 502 (Ind. 2011)). But “appellate courts ‘are in a poor position to

       look at a cold transcript of the record, and conclude that the trial judge, who

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DR-990 | March 12, 2024        Page 11 of 24
       saw the witnesses, observed their demeanor, and scrutinized their testimony as

       it came from the witness stand, did not properly understand the significance of

       the evidence.’” Id. (quoting Kirk v. Kirk, 770 N.E.2d 304, 307 (Ind. 2002)).

[16]   Here, there is evidence that, although Daughter periodically corresponded with

       Father through written messages, she was at times “manipulative” and her

       engagement was insincere. Tr. Vol. 3 p. 84. Father emphasized that “actions

       speak louder than words.” Id. at 90. He pointed to Daughter’s lack of

       meaningful communication when he was hospitalized on multiple occasions. It

       was ultimately Father’s position that Daughter wanted him to pay for college,

       but without collaborating with him to form a thoughtful plan for her career.

[17]   Whereas the dissent concludes that “nothing in the record supports a finding

       that Daughter ha[d] completely rejected a relationship with Father,” in light of

       the foregoing evidence, we respectfully disagree. Infra p. 24. All in all, the

       doctrine of repudiation contemplates intervening acts of the child to sever the

       parent’s duty to contribute to educational expenses, and this case involved

       conflicting evidence regarding the status and prognosis of the parent-child

       relationship. Under the circumstances, we must adhere to our standard of

       review and defer to the trial court, which was in the best position to assess

       witness credibility and make a factual determination regarding Daughter’s

       intended relationship with Father. Cf. D.C. v. J.A.C., 977 N.E.2d 951, 956 (Ind.

       2012) (emphasizing “the importance of appellate deference in family law

       matters”).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DR-990 | March 12, 2024        Page 12 of 24
[18]   As we have recognized, “[b]y college age, children of divorced parents must be

       expected to begin to come to terms with the reality of their family’s situation.

       They must begin to realize that their attitude and actions are their individual

       responsibilities.” Messner, 118 N.E.3d at 68–69. Indeed, “[w]hatever their

       biases and resentments”—even if “one can understand how they got that

       way”—“when they become adults it is no longer appropriate to allow them to

       stay that way without consequence.” Id. (emphasis removed). And “where a

       child, as an adult over eighteen years of age, repudiates a parent, that parent

       must be allowed to dictate what effect this will have on his or her contribution

       to college expenses for that child.” Lovold, 988 N.E.2d at 1150 (quoting McKay,

       644 N.E.2d at 168). In this case, the record discloses clear and convincing

       evidence that Daughter repudiated Father thereby relieving Father of the

       obligation to pay for college. See, e.g., Tr. Vol. 3 p. 14 (involving testimony that

       Daughter “doesn’t have the desire to have a relationship” with Father).

       Declining to reweigh the evidence, we affirm the trial court.

[19]   Affirmed.

       Pyle, J., concurs.

       Tavitas, J., dissents with opinion

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DR-990 | March 12, 2024         Page 13 of 24
       Tavitas, Judge, dissenting.

[20]   I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to affirm the trial court’s

       determination that Father is not required to pay for Daughter’s college expenses

       because she repudiated her relationship with Father. First, the repudiation

       doctrine should not even apply to Father because he agreed to pay for all of

       Daughter’s college expenses in the settlement agreement between Father and

       Mother during the dissolution of their marriage. And, even if the repudiation

       doctrine could apply in such situations, the evidence does not support the trial

       court’s determination that Daughter completely repudiated her relationship

       with Father.

       I. Repudiation Should Not Apply to Settlement Agreements

[21]   When Father and Mother divorced, they entered into a settlement agreement.

       In this agreement, Father agreed to pay for 100 percent of Daughter’s college

       expenses. Because Father agreed to pay for Daughter’s college expenses, I am

       not convinced that the doctrine of repudiation should even apply.

[22]   The doctrine that a child’s repudiation of a parent could relieve that parent of

       the obligation to pay for college expenses was first adopted by this Court in

       McKay v. McKay, 644 N.E.2d 164 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994). In that case, we noted

       the general rule that “there is no absolute legal duty on the part of parents to

       provide a college education for their children.” Id. at 166 (citing Neudecker v.

       Neudecker, 577 N.E.2d 960, 962 (Ind. 1991)). We then observed:

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DR-990 | March 12, 2024         Page 14 of 24
               However, the statutory authorization for the divorce court to
               order either or both parents to pay sums toward their child’s
               college education constitutes a reasonable manner in which to
               enforce the expectation that most families would encourage their
               qualified children to pursue a college education consistent with
               individual family values. In determining whether to order either
               or both parents to pay sums toward their child’s college
               education, the court must consider whether and to what extent
               the parents, if still married, would have contributed to the child’s
               college expenses.

       Id. (citations omitted). Thus, a court may require parents to contribute to their

       child’s college expenses if, had the parents remained married, they would have

       contributed to such expenses. Importantly, however, the McKay Court also

       held, “[t]he expectation that a parent would ordinarily be inclined to contribute

       toward his child’s college education (which may be enforced under our laws of

       dissolution) does not continue, and should not be enforced where an adult child

       has repudiated his relationship with his parent.” Id. at 168.

[23]   Although our Supreme Court has never addressed the repudiation doctrine, this

       Court has repeatedly done so. A review of these cases reveals that a vast

       majority dealt with situations in which a parent was ordered to pay for their

       child’s college expenses, not where the parent had already agreed to do so. See

       Cunningham v. Barton, 139 N.E.3d 1081, 1086 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (trial court

       granted petition to require parent to pay for college expenses); Duncan v.

       Duncan, 81 N.E.3d 219, 222 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (same); In re Paternity of

       Pickett, 44 N.E.3d 756, 761 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (same); Staresnick v. Staresnick,

       830 N.E.2d 127, 128 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (same); Loden v. Loden, 740 N.E.2d

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DR-990 | March 12, 2024         Page 15 of 24
       865, 869 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (same); Thacker v. Thacker, 710 N.E.2d 942, 946

       (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (same); McKay, 644 N.E.2d 164 (same); see also Messner v.

       Messner, 118 N.E.3d 64, 66 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (trial court denied petition to

       require parent to pay for college expenses); Lovold v. Ellis, 988 N.E.2d 1144,

       1146 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (same); Lechien v. Wren, 950 N.E.2d 838, 841 (Ind.

       Ct. App. 2011) (same); Redd v. Redd, 901 N.E.2d 545, 549 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009)

       (same); Scales v. Scales, 891 N.E.2d 1116, 1118 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (same).

[24]   In contrast, I have found only three cases in which we addressed a claim of

       repudiation of a parent where the parent had agreed to pay for college expenses.

       See Himes v. Himes, 57 N.E.3d 820 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (mediated agreement);

       Norris v. Pethe, 833 N.E.2d 1024, 1035 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (settlement

       agreement); Cure v. Cure, 767 N.E.2d 997, 999 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (settlement

       agreement).

[25]   Only in Norris did we hold that the daughter’s complete repudiation of her

       father relieved the father of his agreed-to obligation to pay for college expenses.

       833 N.E.2d at 1034–35. In Cure, we held that the child did not repudiate her

       relationship with her father and did not directly address whether such

       repudiation, if found, could relieve the father of his obligation to pay for college

       expenses. 767 N.E.2d at 1002–03. And in Himes, the father moved to modify

       the mediated agreement in which he agreed to contribute to his daughter’s

       college expenses. 57 N.E.3d at 828. The trial court denied this motion, and we

       affirmed. Id. We concluded that the father did not demonstrate “a change[] in

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DR-990 | March 12, 2024         Page 16 of 24
       circumstances as substantial and continuing as to make Father’s agreed

       contribution unreasonable.” Id. at 829. We noted, however,

               Indiana’s policy is to encourage parents to settle their own
               affairs. Reno v. Haler, 734 N.E.2d 1095, 1100 (Ind. Ct. App.
               2000), trans. denied. We have previously pointed out that a child
               support order and an educational support order are separate and
               distinct because an educational support order can be terminated
               if a child repudiates a parent. Lovold[, 988 N.E.2d at 1152]. We
               do not have that here. What we do have here are two parents
               that properly executed a mediated agreement, which stated that
               they both gave up any “right to revoke their signature or the
               effectiveness of this Mediated Agreement.” There is no evidence
               in the record of fraud, duress, misrepresentation, or manifest
               inequities. See Pond v. Pond, 700 N.E.2d 1130, 1136 (Ind. 1998).
               As a result, even if there was evidence to support a modification,
               it is likely that the trial court would still have been bound to
               enforce the terms of the parties’ Mediated Agreement. However,
               we do not reach that conclusion today.

       Hines, 57 N.E.3d at 829 n.1 (record citation omitted).

[26]   Here too, the trial court did not enter an education support order. Instead,

       Mother and Father freely entered into a settlement agreement in which Father

       agreed to pay 100 percent of Daughter’s college expenses. The only conditions

       placed on Father’s obligation to pay for college expenses are that Daughter

       remain a full-time student and maintain at least a C grade average. Appellant’s

       App. Vol. II p. 36. The settlement agreement also contains an integration

       clause and further states that the terms of the agreement could not be modified

       except by written agreement of the parties. Id. at 42.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DR-990 | March 12, 2024       Page 17 of 24
[27]   Given these facts, a parent should not be able to escape their freely-bargained-

       for obligation to contribute to their child’s college expenses. McKay and its

       progeny only stand for the proposition that, when one parent seeks a court

       order requiring the other parent to contribute toward their child’s college

       expenses, the latter cannot be required to do so when the child has completely

       refused to have a relationship with that parent. This is simply not the case here.

[28]   Here, Father agreed to pay 100 percent of Daughter’s college expenses as part

       of the settlement agreement. Clearly, Mother and Father negotiated this

       financial obligation as part of the overall financial settlement. This term of the

       settlement agreement is not conditioned on Father’s desire or ability to pay.

       Father agreed to assume all responsibility. Father should be held to his end of

       the bargain. See Himes, 57 N.E.3d at 829 n.1.

[29]   Furthermore, I am concerned about the potential for damage to parent-child

       relationships if we allow a parent to cause the very conflict that results in the

       alleged “repudiation” by exploiting child’s desire to go to college knowing her

       parents had agreed to this at the time of their divorce. Children are greatly

       affected by divorce, and to allow a parent to “repudiate” an agreed-upon term

       of their settlement agreement that was negotiated for a child gives the parent the

       ability to renege on their obligations. Here, the source of the conflict between

       Father and Daughter is Father’s refusal to pay for Daughter’s college expenses,

       despite his agreement to do so. By permitting Daughter’s understandable

       frustration at this refusal to form the basis of a “repudiation” finding allows

       Father to benefit from his obstinance.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DR-990 | March 12, 2024         Page 18 of 24
       II. Insufficient Evidence of Repudiation

[30]   Even if I agreed with the majority that the repudiation doctrine could apply in

       situations where a parent has entered into an agreement to pay for college

       expenses, the evidence does not support the trial court’s determination that

       Daughter repudiated her relationship with Father. As the majority notes,

       “[r]epudiation of a parent is ‘a complete refusal to participate in a relationship

       with his or her parent.’” Redd, 901 N.E.2d at 550 (quoting Norris, 833 N.E.2d

       at 1033) (emphasis added); see also McKay, 644 N.E.2d at 165 (holding that trial

       court erred by ordering father to pay for son’s college expenses even though the

       son had “steadfastly refused to have any relationship with [f]ather despite

       [f]ather’s on-going efforts to reconcile their relationship”). In fact, the word

       “repudiate” is defined to mean “[t]o disown (a child, for example),” and “[t]o

       refuse to have any dealings with.” Repudiate, American Heritage Dictionary

       (5th ed. 2022); see also Repudiate, Dictionary.com (defining “repudiate” as “to

       cast off or disown.”).

[31]   In the present case, the facts most favorable to the trial court’s judgment show

       that Daughter’s relationship with Father became strained after, contrary to her

       earlier plans, Daughter decided not to enlist in the United States Air Force—a

       decision with which Father vehemently disagreed. This culminated in her

       moving out of Father’s home and into the home of her boyfriend’s parents.

       Thereafter, Daughter’s in-person communications with Father were minimal.

[32]   Undisputed evidence in the record, however, shows that Father and Daughter

       still had significant communication during this period. Indeed, in his brief,
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DR-990 | March 12, 2024         Page 19 of 24
       Father “concedes that there was a significant amount of communication as

       demonstrated by the exhibits presented to the trial court.” Appellee’s Br. p. 9.

       Father claims, however, that this evidence also shows that, although he sent

       daughter hundreds of messages, she responded to only approximately forty

       percent of his messages. At a minimum, however, this demonstrates that

       Father and Daughter still had significant communication after she moved out.

[33]   Moreover, in these messages, Daughter repeatedly stated that she loved Father

       and wanted a relationship with him. See, e.g., Ex. Vol. II pp. 10 (Daughter

       messaging Father, “Happy birthday dad. I love you. � I just want you to

       know that I haven't stopped loving and I never will. I hope one day we can

       have a close relationship. I hope you have a great day. Love you.”); id. at 14

       (“Dad I never wanted to do any of this. I love you so much and the family. I

       miss everyone so much. . . . [Y]ou’re crazy if you think I abandoned the family

       and that I wanted to leave. I did what I had to in order for me to have a future.

       I’m doing this because it was already an agreement and I deserve to get what

       [brother] got. . . . I love you dad and I will never stop.”); id. at 70–71 (“Just

       know you will see me again. One day I will prove you wrong and make

       something out of myself. I hope you . . . can find it in your heart to come to my

       grad party.”) (errors in originals).

[34]   I do not deny that the parties’ relationship is strained and that the

       communication between the parties is not entirely amicable. I simply do not

       find, however, that Daughter’s actions evidence a “complete refusal” to

       participate in a relationship with Father. Redd, 901 N.E.2d at 550.
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DR-990 | March 12, 2024          Page 20 of 24
[35]   Although the parental-repudiation determination is necessarily fact sensitive, a

       review of cases in which we affirmed a finding of parental repudiation shows

       that those cases were quite different than the present case. For example, in

       Lovold, we held that the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s

       determination of parental repudiation. 988 N.E.2d at 1151. There, when the

       son was younger, he did not see his father for eight years and did not contact

       father in any way. Id. This behavior continued after son was eighteen years of

       age. Although the son claimed during an in-camera interview that he was

       interested in having a relationship with his father, the trial court determined

       that this statement was not worthy of credit. Id. The son still refused to meet

       with his father after receiving his father’s contact information. Accordingly, we

       held that the evidence supported a finding that the son refused to participate in

       a relationship with his father. Id.

[36]   In Norris, the daughter rejected her father’s birthday gifts and returned them to

       him; she also only communicated with her father to tell him that she did not

       want to have a relationship with him. 833 N.E.2d at 1034. When the father

       went to one of his daughter’s school events, she told him to leave. Id. The

       daughter also stated that she did not want her father to attend her graduation.

       Id. The daughter in Norris even stated that she would not visit her father if he

       were dying. Under those circumstances, we affirmed the trial court's

       repudiation determination. Id. at 1035.

[37]   Lastly, in McKay, 644 N.E.2d at 165, the father voluntarily relinquished his

       visitation rights with his son after their relationship soured. Although he did

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DR-990 | March 12, 2024        Page 21 of 24
       not exercise his visitation, the father did occasionally send his son gifts and

       cards. Id. Years later, the father tried to reconcile with his son and attempted

       to reinstate his visitation rights. Id. This resulted in court-ordered counseling,

       after which the son still refused to have anything to do with his father. Id. The

       son testified that he desired no relationship or contact with his father and that

       he considered his mother and stepfather to be his parents. Id. at 166. On

       appeal from the trial court’s order requiring the father to pay a portion of the

       son’s college expenses, we held that the son had repudiated his relationship

       with his father and reversed. Id. at 168.

[38]   In contrast, in Tew v. Tew, 924 N.E.2d 1262, 1269 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), we

       affirmed the trial court’s determination that the daughter did not repudiate her

       relationship with her father. In that case, the daughter had not had an

       overnight visit with her father, but she did participate in group visits that

       included her father, grandmother, and brother. Id. She also attended a

       birthday dinner with her father. We concluded, therefore, that “the record does

       not support a showing that [the daughter] ha[d] exhibited a complete refusal to

       engage in a relationship with [her father].” Id.

[39]   In Redd, supra, the son’s behavior toward his mother was described by the trial

       court as “deplorable and included defiance, physical threats, open scorn and

       repudiation of her authority as a mother.” 901 N.E.2d at 552. Despite this, the

       son attended the graduation party his mother’s family threw for him. Id. The

       mother also spoke with her son on the phone when he would answer. Id. The

       son also told both his parents that he wished to have a relationship with his

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DR-990 | March 12, 2024         Page 22 of 24
       mother. Id. Yet the son also stated that he hated his mother and wanted

       nothing to do with her and never wanted to see her again. Id. “[D]espite these

       statements, [son] called [m]other the night before the hearing and asked if he

       could see her,” and when the mother agreed, the son acted like “nothing had

       happened.” Id. After this meeting, however, the mother thought that she

       would never speak with her son again. Id. Given those facts, we nevertheless

       held that the son did not repudiate his relationship with his mother. Id. “While

       we certainly d[id] not condone [the son]’s deplorable behavior, [he] ha[d] not

       completely rejected a relationship with his [m]other.” Id. We therefore

       reversed the trial court’s determination and noted that “repudiation occurs only

       when the child completely rejects a relationship with the parent in question.”

       Id.

[40]   And in Staresnick v. Staresnick, 830 N.E.2d 127 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), we

       affirmed the trial court’s determination that the son had not repudiated his

       relationship with his father. In that case, the son expressed a desire to have a

       relationship with his father and was even amenable to counseling. The son did

       not consult with his father in making decisions regarding his post-secondary

       education, nor did he inform his father of his address at college. The son also

       had only two telephone conversations with his father during a two-year period

       and had told his father more than once that he did not respect him and no

       longer wished to see him. Id. at 132–33. Still, we affirmed the trial court’s

       finding of non-repudiation because the son indicated a willingness to rebuild his

       relationship with his father. Id.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DR-990 | March 12, 2024       Page 23 of 24
[41]   The facts of this case align more with those in Tew, Redd, and Staresnick than

       Lovold, Norris, or McKay. That is, Daughter and Father have a strained

       relationship, and some of Daughter’s behavior has been, admittedly,

       disrespectful. But nothing in the record supports a finding that Daughter has

       completely rejected a relationship with Father.

       Conclusion

[42]   The repudiation doctrine only applies when a child completely repudiates his or

       her relationship with a parent. To hold otherwise incentivizes parents to create

       situations that can lead to strained relationships in an effort to avoid a

       bargained-for obligation under the guise of repudiation. I fear that the

       majority’s holding opens the door to damaging parent-child relationships. The

       fragility of teenage relationships with divorced parents has received another

       blow with the majority’s holding. Moreover, the evidence does not support a

       determination that Daughter has repudiated her relationship with Father here.

[43]   For these reasons, I would reverse the trial court’s repudiation determination.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DR-990 | March 12, 2024            Page 24 of 24