Court Opinion

ID: 9464238
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 23:28:14.107113+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:38:31.511112
License: Public Domain

EUGENE A. WRIGHT, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
With respect, I dissent. I conclude reluctantly that there was an abuse of the district court’s discretion.
I would hold that sending a copy of the reply letter to the court clerk was a “presentation or submission to the court” sufficient to constitute an appearance for purposes of F.R.Civ.P. 55. 10 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2686 (1973). Furthermore, it is undenied that Moore also telephoned the court clerk and was told that no action on the complaint was pending before the court and that he would be notified of any change. These actions clearly displayed Moore’s intention to defend and should have triggered Rule 55(b)(2)’s three-day notice requirement. Annot., 27 A.L.R.Fed. 620, 624-25 (1976).1 See, e. g., H. F. Livermore Corp. v. Aktiengesellschaft Gebruder Loepfe, 139 U.S.App.D.C. 256, 432 F.2d 689 (1976).
I do not share the majority’s fear that reversal here would compel district courts to vacate default judgments whenever a defendant communicates with the plaintiff after service of the complaint. The facts of this case show more than a minimal response. The letter-answer that defendant sent to the plaintiff’s attorney — and filed with the clerk — shows that he was determined to defend, and that he was indeed showing due regard for the judicial process.
Rule 55(b)(2) was promulgated to protect “parties who, although delaying in a formal sense by failing to file pleadings within the twenty-day period, have otherwise indicated to the moving party a clear purpose to defend the suit.” H. F. Livermore Corp. v. Aktiengesellschaft Gebruder Loepfe, supra, 139 U.S.App.D.C. at 258, 432 F.2d at 691.
Port-Wide Container Co. v. Interstate Maintenance Corp., 440 F.2d 1195 (3d Cir. 1971), upon which the majority relies, is a case in which the court found that the defendant had not appeared. The parties had negotiated extensively, and the defendant failed to file an answer in the face of plaintiff’s definite warning that, if an answer were not filed before a given date, he would seek a default judgment. In this case the defendant communicated with the court and plaintiff gave only a vague, infor*371mal warning that defendant might, at some unspecified time, be “in default.”2
Because I think that Moore initially appeared, “informal contacts” with the plaintiff could not dissipate his right to notice of application for default judgment. “A party’s failure to appear or be represented at any stage of the proceedings following an initial appearance does not affect [Rule 55(b)(2)’s] notice requirement.” 10 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, supra, § 2687 (emphasis added).
The majority does not hold that the defendant was given such notice here. The absence of such notice is a serious procedural defect that generally justifies reversing a trial court’s failure to set aside a default judgment. 6 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 55.05[3] (1976).
The district court’s refusal to vacate the default judgment is even more disturbing in light of relevant policy considerations. Rule 60(b)’s remedial character, our traditional preference for hearing a case on the merits, and the fact that the defendant has a seemingly meritorious defense all require that we carefully scrutinize a trial court’s discretionary refusal to vacate a default judgment. Schwab v. Bullock’s Inc., 508 F.2d 353 (9th Cir. 1974).
Furthermore, the plaintiff does not contend that setting aside the judgment would result in prejudice to her ease. “[A] default judgment is ... a drastic sanction that should be employed only in an extreme situation.” Affanato v. Merrill Bros., 547 F.2d 138, 140 (1st Cir. 1977), quoting Luis C. Forteza e Hijos, Inc. v. Mills, 534 F.2d 415 (1st Cir. 1976).
Finally, I am disturbed by the conduct of plaintiff-appellee’s attorney from the Legal Aid Society of Hawaii. The Society, partially funded with public moneys, has a responsibility to represent the public interest in the broad sense, as well as to adhere to the ethical standards of the Hawaii bar. I consider it improper for counsel to take advantage of a layman opponent whom she knew had a meritorious defense.
While an attorney has a duty to his client, he also has duties to the profession, to society, and to the administration of justice. Often these duties conflict. See Aronson, “Professional Responsibility: Education and Enforcement,” 51 Wash.L.Rev. 273, 287 (1976). See also Preamble and Preliminary Statement to ABA Code at 1; Canons 4, 5, 6 & 7 (duty to client); 1, 2, 8 (duty to profession); 3, 9 (duty to public).
In this case all of these duties could have been fulfilled by informing the district court of all relevant circumstances, notifying defendant of application for a default judgment and, in general, pursuing the goal of a full hearing on the merits.
Review of a trial court’s discretionary acts is narrow. National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 96 S.Ct. 2778, 49 L.Ed.2d 747 (1976). But I believe an injustice has been done here. Policy considerations should be applied and any doubt should be resolved against entry of the default judgment.
I would remand with directions to vacate the default.

. While Moore’s actions may not have been legally sufficient to constitute a formal Answer, they did not evidence a disregard for the judicial process that would justify refusal to vacate the default judgment. See, e. g., Kinnear Corp. v. Crawford Door Sales Co., 49 F.R.D. 3 (D.S.C. 1970). 6 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 55.05[3] (1976).

. An alternative reading of Port-Wide would be to say that because the plaintiff gave proper notice the court did not reach the appearance issue. The differences in the notice given in Port-Wide and in the case at bar, discussed above, render the case equally unpersuasive under this interpretation, as well.