Court Opinion

ID: 9384900
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-05 15:03:22.248799+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:57.421456
License: Public Domain

Third District Court of Appeal
                               State of Florida

                          Opinion filed April 5, 2023.
       Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

                            ________________

                             No. 3D21-2229
                       Lower Tribunal No. 19-17725
                          ________________

                              City of Miami,
                                  Appellant,

                                     vs.

         Fraternal Order of Police, Miami Lodge No. 20,
                                  Appellee.

    An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Carlos
Guzman, Judge.

      Victoria Méndez, City Attorney and Kerri L. McNulty, Senior Appellate
Counsel, and Stephanie K. Panoff, and Bryan E. Capdevila, Assistant City
Attorneys, for appellant.

     Buschel Gibbons, P.A., and Robert C. Buschel and Eugene G.
Gibbons (Fort Lauderdale), for appellee.

Before SCALES, GORDO and BOKOR, JJ.

     BOKOR, J.
      In the action below, the City of Miami sought a declaration barring the

Fraternal Order of Police, Miami Lodge No. 20 (FOP), from arbitrating a

grievance based on Adrian Rodriguez’s termination as a City of Miami police

officer. Both the City and the FOP sought summary judgment. The trial court

granted summary judgment in favor of the FOP and against the City,

determining that the FOP correctly sought arbitration of its grievance filed on

behalf of Rodriguez. 1 Because we find that Rodriguez waived his right to

arbitrate and that, alternatively, Rodriguez is collaterally estopped from

arbitrating this issue, we reverse.

                  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

      Rodriguez, a City of Miami police officer, challenged a prior termination

of employment at arbitration. The arbitration resulted in an order reinstating

him “with no loss of service credit for the purposes of determination of

benefits to which he [was] entitled.” The City sought relief from the arbitral

award in circuit court. The trial court upheld the arbitration award, and this

court affirmed such decision. City of Miami v. Fraternal Ord. of Police Lodge

1
  We have jurisdiction pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure
9.030(b)(1)(A).

                                      2
#20, 252 So. 3d 221 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018). Accordingly, the City reinstated

Rodriguez.

      Soon after, the City relieved Rodriguez of duty without pay because

his Florida Department of Law Enforcement retraining requirement, which

required him to submit to drug testing, lapsed during his absence. Rodriguez

didn’t submit to drug testing and instead sought relief in circuit court with an

“emergency amended motion for order to show cause why the chief of police

and city manager should not be held in contempt for failing to follow this

court’s order,” arguing that the City failed to comply with the arbitration order

reinstating him.   The trial court denied Rodriguez’s motion finding that

Rodriguez’s placement back on the City’s payroll, even though he was not

returned to active-duty status, satisfied its obligations pursuant to the

arbitration order. Notably, the trial court did not decide the issue of the

propriety of the City’s requirement that Rodriguez submit to a drug test,

finding that “[t]he purported misconduct upon which the City relies to justify

termination of Rodriguez did not occur until after the original arbitration.

Thus, the City’s actions would, at best, constitute an independent basis for

grievance.” Rodriguez appealed the trial court’s decision to this court, raising

extensive argument as to the propriety of the required drug test. This court

issued an opinion which determined, in pertinent part:

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            Rodriguez interprets the Arbitration Order to mean
            that there was no break in service, and, as a result,
            his two-year absence from the force should be
            considered a continuous employment relieving him
            of any obligation to comply with FDLE rules
            regulating reinstatement and recertification. That is
            not what the order says. It says: “Mr. Rodriguez shall
            be reinstated forthwith to his position as a police
            officer with no loss of service credit for the purposes
            of determination of benefits to which he is entitled.”
            Rodriguez’s City benefits are thus considered
            uninterrupted by his two year break in service, but the
            Arbitration Order says nothing about his FDLE
            certifications. The record indicates that Rodriquez’s
            FDLE certifications lapsed during his two-year break
            in service. The City was unable to reinstate
            Rodriguez to active duty without FDLE approval.
            When Rodriguez refused to fulfill the toxicology
            requirement, the City was within its rights to
            terminate him under the CBA.

Fraternal Ord. of Police Lodge #20 v. City of Miami, 276 So. 3d 881, 883–84

(Fla. 3d DCA 2019) (boldface added).

      Rodriguez filed a grievance for “improper termination” and “violation of

drug policy,” which the City denied. Later, the City filed a complaint for

declaratory relief seeking clarification on the interpretation of the collective

bargaining agreement (CBA) regarding the arbitrability of Rodriguez’s

grievance, in which the City argued that the filing of the grievance violated

the election of remedies provision of the CBA since Rodriguez already raised

the pertinent issue of the propriety of the drug test in prior litigation.

Rodriguez moved for summary judgment and to compel arbitration and the

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City filed its cross-motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted

summary judgment in Rodriguez’s favor. This appeal followed.

                                  ANALYSIS

      “We review a trial court order granting summary judgment de novo.”

Fernandez v. Cruz, 341 So. 3d 410, 412 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022). On appeal,

the City argues that Rodriguez waived his right to arbitrate because he

previously litigated the issues (the propriety of the drug test and his

subsequent termination) and further, that the doctrines of res judicata and

collateral estoppel bar arbitration. In response, Rodriguez argues that he

could not have elected a remedy by challenging the order for an illegal drug

test because, at the time he filed his grievance, he had not yet been

terminated.

      Preliminarily, section 6.4 of the CBA reads, in pertinent part,

“[s]election of redress other than through the Grievance Procedure

contained herein shall preclude the aggrieved party or parties from utilizing

said Grievance Procedure for adjustment of said grievance.” This provision

of the CBA mirrors section 447.401, Florida Statutes, which governs

grievance procedures between public employers and bargaining agents and

provides, “[a] career service employee shall have the option of utilizing . . . a

grievance procedure established under this section, but such employee is

                                       5
precluded from availing himself or herself of more than one of these

procedures.” § 447.401, Fla. Stat. Therefore, if this court determines that

Rodriguez previously elected to pursue a remedy outside of the contractual

grievance procedure, both section 6.4 of the CBA as well as section 447.401,

Florida Statues would bar arbitration of Rodriguez’s grievance.

      In considering whether Rodriguez waived his right to arbitrate by

pursuing an inconsistent remedy, we first examine whether Rodriguez

actively participated in litigation pertaining to the issue underlying the

termination. 2 See Sitarik v. JFK Med. Ctr. Ltd. P’ships, 11 So. 3d 973, 974

(Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (“A party who actively participates in the litigation waives

its right to compel arbitration. A party’s responses to the litigation constitute

active participation when they are an attack on the merits.”) (citations

omitted); see also Green Tree, 15 So. 3d at 687 (“[O]nce a party has waived

the right to arbitration by active participation in a lawsuit, the party may not

2
  “Generally, whether a party has waived his right to arbitrate is a question
of fact, reviewed on appeal for competent, substantial evidence to support
the lower court’s findings.” Green Tree Servicing, LLC v. McLeod, 15 So. 3d
682, 686 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (citation omitted); see also City of Jacksonville
v. Cowen, 973 So. 2d 503, 507 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (same). Here, the record
is devoid of factual findings from the trial court. Although the record includes
the transcript of the hearing on the cross-motions for summary judgment, the
transcript was limited to argument between the parties and contains no
findings. Similarly, the final order on appeal contains no factual findings.
Where the record does not contain any factual findings, the question of
waiver should be ruled on as a matter of law. Cowen, 973 So. 2d at 507.

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reclaim the arbitration right without the consent of his or her adversary.”).

Rodriguez sought relief from this court based on his arguments regarding

the propriety of the required drug test. This constitutes active participation

on the merits, as contemplated by Sitarik. Rodriguez filed his grievance for

“improper termination” based on “violation of drug policy,” an issue that he

not only previously brought before this court, but which resulted in an opinion

squarely addressing the issue. Rodriguez’s argument that his previous

appeal did not challenge any court order recognizing, reviewing, or upholding

his new second termination misses the point. He elected to have a court

review the very issue he now seeks to present to an arbitrator. This violates

not only election of remedies, but also, because this court considered and

ruled on the issue, violates principles of res judicata. As such, we find that

Rodriguez has waived his right to arbitrate having actively participated in

litigation which has already determined the issues contained in the current

grievance.

      Alternatively, we find that Rodriguez is collaterally estopped from filing

a grievance challenging his termination. Collateral estoppel applies when

“the question common to both causes of action was actually adjudicated in

the prior litigation.” Fernandez, 341 So. 3d at 415 (quotation omitted). “The

doctrine of collateral estoppel bars relitigation by parties or their privies of

                                       7
issues common both to the present action and to the action previously

litigated.” United Auto. Ins. Co. v. Law Offices of Michael I. Libman, 46 So.

3d 1101, 1104 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010) (quotation omitted). Here, it is clear that

the issue of the propriety of the drug test was litigated in the previous action,

and specifically addressed in a prior opinion of this court.

      Because we find that Rodriguez has waived his right to arbitrate, and

alternatively, that the doctrine of collateral estoppel applies, both section 6.4

of the CBA as well as section 447.401, Florida Statues bar arbitration of

Rodriguez’s grievance.

      Reversed.

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