Court Opinion

ID: 9645704
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 21:33:13.862524+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:30.632383
License: Public Domain

Peters, J.
(concurring). I am troubled by the apparent readiness of the majority opinion to grant procedural priority to any challenge to judicial action as long as that challenge is couched in terms of jurisdiction. I recognize that the position taken by the majority has strong roots in history and in our case law. I doubt, however, that the interests of efficient administration of justice are best served by attaching talismanic effect to the label “jurisdictional,” especially when the issue is at most one of jurisdiction over the person.
Jurisdictional issues may of course, in some eases, impinge on constitutional rights to procedural due *299process. See Hodge v. Hodge, 178 Conn. 308, 318-19, 422 A.2d 280 (1979); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 207-12, 97 S. Ct. 2569, 53 L. Ed. 2d 683 (1977). For that reason, they may require extraordinary judicial responsiveness. Cf. Dobbs, “Beyond Bootstrap: Foreclosing the Issue of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction Before Final Judgment,” 51 Minn. L. Rev. 491, 520-21 (1967). Ordinarily, however, adjudication of constitutional infirmity requires a specific showing of personal injury; Weil v. Miller, 185 Conn. 495, 501, 441 A.2d 142 (1981); Hardware Mutual Casualty Co. v. Premo, 153 Conn. 465, 471, 217 A.2d 698 (1966); that is conspicuously lacking here.
There is certainly nothing inherently unconstitutional or jurisdictional in time constraints. We ourselves have refused to hold jurisdictional the provision in Practice Book § 3007 that imposes a twenty day limitation on appeals to this court. LaReau v. Reincke, 158 Conn. 486, 492-93, 264 A.2d 576 (1969). See also Reeb v. Economic Opportunity Atlanta, Inc., 516 F.2d 924, 926-27 (5th Cir. 1975); Philbrick v. Huff, 60 Cal. App. 3d 633, 640-41, 131 Cal. Rptr. 733 (1976).
On the record before us, it seems to me that the plaintiff has made out a plausible case that the statute at issue, General Statutes § 52-278j, is not jurisdictional. The statute appears to empower the trial court to exercise discretion, since it states that, in proper circumstances, “the court. . . may dismiss the prejudgment remedy.” (Emphasis added.) Authority to exercise discretion is not notably a hallmark of jurisdictional statutes. The plaintiff’s version of the facts, moreover, supports its argument that the statute is nonjurisdietional. Although *300the plaintiff does not deny that it failed to serve the defendant after the granting of the prejndgment remedy, it maintains that the defendant was properly served prior to the granting of the prejudgment remedy. As the plaintiff interprets ^ 52-278j, dismissal of the prejudgment remedy would he warranted only if the defendant had not been served at any time before the expiration of the statutory ninety day period. The statute would, in effect, establish an outer limit for the timeliness of the service of process without negating the effect of earlier service.
I concur in the result reached by the majority because it appears to me not clear whether the plaintiff’s allegations about the prior service of process are sustained by the record. The briefs of the parties are conflicting on this point and this court cannot resolve that conflict.