Court Opinion

ID: 9699323
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 20:19:29.095115+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:48.768087
License: Public Domain

KING, Associate Judge,
concurring:
I join the opinion of the court. I write separately only to express my view that a report of rape1 should be admitted without limiting instruction on the ground that it is analogous to admitting, as substantive evidence, testimony relating to the identity of the perpetrator of the offense.2 I see no difference, in terms of the reliability of the declaration, between testimony that the assailant was a certain person or possessed certain described physical features, and *226testimony setting forth in brief outline the circumstances of the offense that the assailant committed. Neither is any more nor less reliable than the other, and both should be admitted as substantive evidence. I appreciate that the en banc court has held, as the panel opinion recognizes, that testimony regarding the circumstances of the offense may not be admitted for the truth of the declaration and that the trial judge should give a limiting instruction3 if requested. See Fitzgerald v. United States, 443 A.2d 1295, 1305 (D.C.1982) (en banc). Perhaps that holding can be reevaluated if the issue presents itself in some future case.

. I would leave open the question of whether the admissibility of a report of a crime, whether for the purpose of showing that a complaint was made or as substantive evidence, should be limited to reports of sexual offenses. Admissibility of such reports on either theory might well be appropriate for violent crimes such as armed robbery and spousal abuse, or possibly other offenses as well.

. I agree with the panel opinion’s conclusion that the details of the offense provided by the witnesses in this case went beyond that which is now permitted under the prior identification exception to the hearsay rule. See Sherrod v. United States, 478 A.2d 644, 660-61 (D.C.1984).

. Having given scores of limiting instructions as a trial judge, I doubt whether any instruction is more confusing and less understood than the one that informs the jury that a statement or declaration which the jury has heard may not be considered "as establishing the truth of any fact contained in that statement.” Criminal Jury Instruction for the District of Columbia No. 1.06 at 17 (3d ed. 1978). It remains to be seen whether the formulation in the most recent edition of the criminal jury instructions will be any clearer: "you may not consider [the] ... statement as proof that what was said in the ... statement was true.” Criminal Jury Instruction for the District of Columbia No. 1.10 at 26 (4th ed. 1993); Id. No. 1.11 at 32.