Court Opinion

ID: 9890781
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-16 14:08:44.409287+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:35:21.494958
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Mercy Catholic Medical Center,          :
                 Petitioner             :
                                        :
            v.                          :
                                        :
Debra Ryan (Workers’                    :
Compensation Appeal Board),             :   No. 554 C.D. 2022
                Respondent              :   Submitted: September 15, 2023

BEFORE:     HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
            HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
            HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION
BY JUDGE FIZZANO CANNON                     FILED: October 16, 2023

             Mercy Catholic Medical Center (Employer) petitions for review of a
May 9, 2022 order of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board) on appeal
from a decision and order of a workers’ compensation judge (WCJ). The WCJ
ordered medical-only payments until August 11, 2020, but otherwise denied the
claim petition filed by Debra Ryan (Claimant) and also denied Claimant’s penalty
petition. Employer’s Br., App. B (WCJ’s Op.). On appeal, the Board affirmed the
WCJ’s denial of workers’ compensation (WC) benefits after August 11, 2020,
reversed the WCJ’s denial of the claim petition as it related to aggravation of
Claimant’s preexisting anxiety and depression, and remanded to the WCJ for a
determination of appropriate litigation costs. Employer’s Br., App. A (Bd.’s Op.).
The only issue on appeal to this Court is the award of benefits relating to aggravation
of Claimant’s preexisting anxiety and depression. Upon review, we reverse the
Board’s award of WC benefits on that issue.

                                      I. Background
              Claimant alleged that she suffered an injury to her right shoulder on
January 27, 2020, while working as a certified nursing aide. Reproduced Record
(RR) at 4a, 41a-42a & 146a. Employer accepted Claimant’s injury by a medical-
only Notice of Temporary Compensation Payable (NTCP) related to “sprain or strain
of the shoulder/arm” that later converted by operation of law to a Notice of
Compensation Payable (NCP). Id. at 43a, 341a & 343a.
              Claimant received treatment for her injuries, and Employer offered her a
light-duty position taking orders from doctors, answering telephones, assisting with
patient discharges, and entering information into computers, at no loss of pay. RR at
44a-45a. Claimant testified that she tried to perform the light-duty job, but it made
her uncomfortable and anxious, and she was unable to concentrate. Id. at 46a & 139a-
42a. She informed Employer that she preferred to seek family and medical leave
because of her issues with anxiety in the light-duty position; however, she did not
complete the paperwork to do so. Id. at 51a, 62a & 69a. Ultimately, Claimant was
terminated from her employment for not attending work. Id. at 51a-53a. She collected
unemployment benefits from March 27, 2020 to March 27, 2021. Id. at 145a.
              On April 16, 2020, Claimant filed a WC claim petition seeking ongoing
temporary total disability benefits.1 She alleged both physical disability and an

       1
         Claimant also filed a penalty petition, which was denied and which is not at issue on
review in this Court.

                                              2
aggravation of previously existing anxiety and depression. RR at 4a. On May 26,
2020, Employer filed an answer denying all material allegations of the claim
petition. Id. at 8a. It is undisputed that the answer was not timely filed.
             Claimant presented evidence in support of her claim petition that
included her testimony at hearings on June 17, 2021 and September 22, 2021.
Claimant’s evidence recounted her extensive history of medical treatment and
therapy for anxiety and depression, including a suicide attempt, during the 20-year
period preceding her work injury. See RR at 47a-48a, 50a, 65a-67a, 72a & 159a.
Claimant also offered the deposition testimony of her medical witnesses, Miteswar
Purewal, M.D. (Dr. Purewal) and Justin Wiley, Psy.D (Dr. Wiley).
             Dr. Purewal is board certified in anesthesia and pain management. RR
at 182a. He diagnosed Claimant’s work injury as “cervical radiculopathy, cervical
facet syndrome, and right shoulder internal derangement” and testified that she was
capable of doing some light-duty work as tolerated, with frequent breaks and
changes of position. Id. at 196a-97a.
             Dr. Wiley, a clinical psychologist, opined that some of Claimant’s
psychological problems are related to chronic pain and “some are independent of
chronic pain but they sort of go together.” RR at 232a & 237a. He acknowledged
Claimant’s “longstanding history of problems with both depression and anxiety
dating back to when she was about 19,” her diagnosis of “generalized anxiety
disorder,” and her preexisting treatment regimen of psychiatric medications. Id. at
238a & 243a. Dr. Wiley opined that the pain from Claimant’s injury exacerbated
her preexisting anxiety and depression and that the stress of the light-duty position
caused further exacerbation. Id. at 238a-39a. However, Dr. Wiley also expressed

                                          3
concern that the medications prescribed to Claimant might actually be “contributing
to her anxiety.” Id. at 242a; see also id. at 247a & 250a-52a.
             Employer presented the testimony of Claimant’s supervisor, Debbie
Edwards (Edwards). Edwards explained the light-duty post-injury job offered to
Claimant, the difficulties Claimant expressed regarding her anxiety over that
position, and the circumstances of Claimant’s termination from employment. RR at
90a-122a.
             Employer also presented the deposition testimony of Stephen
Mechanick, M.D. (Dr. Mechanick), a practicing psychiatrist and forensic
psychiatrist who is board certified in psychiatry.2 RR at 350a. Dr. Mechanick noted
that Claimant’s records from her treating doctor indicated previous diagnoses of
“major depression, recurrent moderate and generalized anxiety disorder” that had
not been identified as causally related to Claimant’s employment. Id. at 355a. Dr.
Mechanick similarly noted that Dr. Wiley’s initial evaluation of Claimant in April
2020 identified possible post-traumatic stress disorder but did not identify a cause.
Id. at 358a. Claimant provided a history to Dr. Mechanick in April 2021, in which
she indicated that she had been hospitalized for psychiatric treatment after
attempting suicide “a couple of years” before, i.e., prior to her work injury. Id. at
345a & 358a-59a. Claimant informed Dr. Wiley of crying spells related to thoughts
about her mother, who died of cancer in 1999; Claimant stated that she began
counseling for depression at that time and has continued with counseling and
psychiatric treatment ever since. Id. at 361a & 365a. Claimant did not report to Dr.
Mechanick any psychiatric problems directly related to her work injury. Id. at 369a.

      2
        Employer additionally provided the deposition testimony of Donald Leatherwood III,
M.D. (Dr. Leatherwood), an orthopedic surgeon. RR at 313a. Dr. Leatherman’s testimony
concerned Claimant’s physical injury and is not pertinent here.

                                            4
Her medical records, including those by the doctor who treated her after her work
injury, likewise did not indicate any psychiatric problems resulting from the injury.
Id. at 370a. Dr. Mechanick acknowledged that Claimant “did have some anxiety
and discomfort while training” for the light-duty position, but he opined that it
“didn’t cause her to develop depression or exacerbate her preexisting depression.”
Id. Dr. Mechanick did not believe Claimant’s depressive disorder was affected by
either her injury or the light-duty position. Id. at 371a. Thus, he opined that
Claimant’s alleged underlying anxiety and depression were not aggravated by the
work injury and, from a psychiatric standpoint, she was able to work. Id. at 372a-
73a.
              On November 5, 2021, the WCJ circulated a Decision and Order,
denying the claim petition, in part. The WCJ granted Claimant’s motion to deem all
well-pleaded factual averments of the claim petition admitted because of Employer’s
failure to file a timely answer, pursuant to this Court’s holding in Yellow Freight
System, Inc. v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Madara), 423 A.2d 1125
(Pa. Cmwlth. 1981). However, the WCJ determined that the injuries Claimant
asserted in the claim petition, including aggravation of her preexisting anxiety and
depression, were not well pleaded, thus allowing Employer to offer evidence
refuting Claimant’s alleged injuries. Bd.’s Op. at 2. Relevant here, the WCJ denied
the claim petition as to aggravation of Claimant’s preexisting anxiety and
depression.
              Claimant appealed to the Board, which affirmed in part, reversed in
part, and remanded in part. See Bd.’s Op. Pertinent here, the Board reversed the
WCJ’s determination that Claimant’s averments in the claim petition regarding

                                         5
aggravation of her preexisting anxiety and depression were not well pleaded.3 Id. at
3. Therefore, the Board concluded that Employer’s untimely answer constituted a
deemed admission of the aggravation of Claimant’s preexisting anxiety and
depression and that the WCJ should have granted the claim petition as to a resulting
disability. Id. at 11. The Board also rejected the testimony of Dr. Mechanick as
incompetent because his opinion that Claimant did not suffer an aggravation of her
preexisting anxiety and depression contravened Employer’s deemed admission as
found by the Board. Id. at 12.

                                            II. Issues4
               Employer raises three issues for review by this Court.

       3
            The Board affirmed the portion of the WCJ’s decision determining that Claimant
recovered from her injury as of August 11, 2020. The Board also remanded the matter to the WCJ
for a calculation and award of costs to Claimant. On remand, by order dated September 28, 2022,
the WCJ acknowledged Employer’s payment of costs and marked the remand as withdrawn.
Employer’s Br., App. D (WCJ’s Order on Remand). Neither of those rulings has been appealed.
       4
          In an order dated July 11, 2022, this Court directed the parties to address in their briefs
whether the Board’s decision was appealable. Presumably, this directive arose from the Board’s
partial remand, which would normally render the Board’s decision interlocutory and non-
appealable. See generally Jones v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Steris Corp.), 874 A.2d 717 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2005). However, Employer’s subsequent payment of costs, as confirmed in the WCJ’s
September 28, 2022 order, Employer’s Br., App. D, as well as the related withdrawal of the penalty
petition, as confirmed in a WCJ order circulated on September 9, 2022, Employer’s Br., App. C,
rendered the Board’s order final and appealable. Accordingly, we will treat the petition for review
as properly filed even though it was filed before the order was final. See Pa.R.A.P. 1511 (providing
that “[f]ailure of a petitioner for review to take any step other than the timely filing of a petition
for review does not affect the validity of the review proceeding but is grounds only for such action
as the appellate court deems appropriate . . .”) & Explanatory Comment (explaining that any defect
in the petition for review procedure is waivable except untimely filing of the petition for review).
       We note that the WCJ’s orders of September 9 and 28, 2022 are not part of the agency
record. See Employer’s Br. at 3 n.2 (noting that Employer’s attachment of the orders to its brief
was “for informational purposes”). However, Rule 1951(b) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate
Procedure provides:

                                                  6
              First, Employer asserts that the WCJ’s findings of fact were supported
by substantial evidence, in that the WCJ properly determined that Claimant’s
claimed injuries were not well pleaded and Employer was not precluded from
presenting evidence in opposition to the claim petition. Accordingly, Employer
contends that the Board erred by partially reversing the WCJ’s denial of the claim
petition.
              Second, Employer maintains that the WCJ properly determined that
Claimant did not suffer a work-related aggravation of her preexisting anxiety and
depression or a resulting disability. Employer argues that the WCJ’s determination
was supported by substantial evidence, and therefore, the Board erred by reversing
the WCJ’s decision on that issue.
              Third, Employer posits that it sustained its burden to rebut the legal
presumption of disability or continuing disability related to the alleged aggravation
of Claimant’s preexisting anxiety and depression. Employer similarly insists that
the Board erred in concluding that the testimony of Employer’s medical expert was
not legally competent to prove that Claimant’s alleged psychological injury had
ceased or that she had become capable of working.

              If anything material to any party is omitted from the record or is
              misstated therein, the parties may at any time supply the omission
              or correct the misstatement by stipulation, or the court may at any
              time direct that the omission or misstatement be corrected and, if
              necessary, that a supplemental record be prepared and filed. Failure
              of the agency to transmit part of the record of agency proceedings
              to the appellate court shall not be the basis for a finding of waiver.
Pa.R.A.P. 1951(b). Both parties aver that Employer paid the agreed costs. See Employer’s Br. at
2-3; Claimant’s Br. at 9 n.1. Therefore, pursuant to Rule 1951(b), we deem the record corrected
to include the WCJ’s September 9 and 28, 2022 orders, without the necessity of filing a
supplemental record.

                                                7
                                  III. Discussion
            This Court has often observed:
            In a workers’ compensation proceeding, the WCJ is the
            ultimate finder of the facts . . . . Thus, determinations as
            to witness credibility and evidentiary weight are within the
            exclusive province of the WCJ and are not subject to
            appellate review, absent a lack of substantial evidence to
            underpin those determinations. As the fact finder, the
            WCJ is entitled to accept or reject the testimony of any
            witnesses, including a medical witness, in whole or in part.

Chik-Fil-A v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Mollick), 792 A.2d 678, 687-88 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2002) (first citing Hayden v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. (Wheeling
Pittsburgh Steel Corp.), 479 A.2d 631 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1984); and then citing Gen.
Elec. Co. v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. (Valsamaki), 593 A.2d 921 (Pa. Cmwlth.
1991)). Accordingly, our review of the Board’s order is limited to determining
whether the WCJ’s necessary findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence,
whether constitutional rights were violated, or whether an error of law was
committed. Chik-Fil-A, 792 A.2d at 685 n.8 (additional citation omitted). “It is the
purpose of the reviewing board and/or appellate court to review the WCJ’s
conclusions of law, while at the same time ascertaining that the facts found by the
WCJ are supported by substantial evidence.” Id. With these applicable standards in
mind, we address Employer’s issues raised for review.

               A. Deemed Admission of Well-Pleaded Averments
            Employer first asserts that, although it filed its answer to the claim
petition late, it was not precluded from asserting affirmative defenses to the claim
petition. Employer posits that the WCJ was correct in finding that portions of
Claimant’s petition were not well pleaded, and therefore, those averments were not

                                         8
deemed admitted as a result of Employer’s late answer. We agree with Employer
that the portion of the claim petition relating to aggravation of a preexisting anxiety
and depression was not well pleaded and that Employer was not precluded from
offering evidence on that issue.
               Section 416 of the WC Act5 provides:

               Within twenty days after a copy of any claim petition or
               other petition has been served upon an adverse party, he
               may file with the department or its [WCJ] an answer in the
               form prescribed by the [D]epartment [of Labor and
               Industry].
               Every fact alleged in a claim petition not specifically
               denied by an answer so filed by an adverse party shall be
               deemed to be admitted by him. But the failure of any party
               or of all of them to deny a fact alleged in any other petition
               shall not preclude the [WCJ] before whom the petition is
               heard from requiring, of his own motion, proof of such
               fact. If a party fails to file an answer and/or fails to appear
               in person or by counsel at the hearing without adequate
               excuse, the [WCJ] hearing the petition shall decide the
               matter on the basis of the petition and evidence presented.

77 P.S. § 821. Here, Employer’s answer was due by May 7, 2020, but Employer did
not file its answer until May 26, 2020. Accordingly, the deemed admission provision
of Section 416 was triggered.
               In Yellow Freight, this Court held that where an answer is untimely, the
WCJ must proceed as though no answer has been filed and must “decide the matter
on the basis of the petition and evidence presented . . . by the petitioner.” 423 A.2d
at 1127 (emphasis original).           Subsequently, in Heraeus Electro Nite Co. v.
Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Ulrich), 697 A.2d 603 (Pa. Cmwlth.
1997), appeal dismissed, 721 A.2d 1095 (Pa. 1999), we explained:

      5
          Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. §§ 1-1041.4, 2501-2710.

                                               9
             This does not necessarily mean, however, that the case is
             over merely because the employer failed to file a timely
             answer. Failure of an employer to timely file an answer is
             not the equivalent of a default judgment. The claimant still
             bears the burden of proving all elements necessary to
             support an award of compensation. To the extent that a
             claim petition does not allege all the facts necessary to
             support all the elements necessary in presenting the claim,
             the claimant must proffer such evidence before the WCJ
             to sustain her burden of proof. Therefore, any evidence
             introduced before the WCJ regarding facts that were not
             well[ ]pleaded in the claim petition may be rebutted by
             evidence presented by the defendant. Such rebuttal is
             permitted because the WCJ cannot deem the defendant to
             have admitted, by operation of law, specific facts or
             averments not present in the claim petition itself.

Id. at 608. Averments deemed admitted typically include such facts as notice, wage
rate, and the date and place of the injury; however, “questions of law are reviewable
and cannot be waived by the failure to file a timely answer.” Chik-Fil-A, 792 A.2d
at 688 (citing D’Errico v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (City of Phila.), 735 A.2d 161
(Pa. Cmwlth. 1999) (en banc)).
             Notably, a claimant retains her “burden to establish all the elements
necessary to support an award of benefits, including proof of a causal relationship
between her injury and her disability through competent medical testimony.” Sw.
Airlines v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (King), 985 A.2d 280, 288 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2009). Specifically, “whether an injury is causally related to employment requires
a legal determination”; as such, it cannot be established by default based on an
employer’s late answer to a claim petition. Ascencio v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd.
(Commonwealth/Dep’t of Corr.) (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 471 C.D. 2017, filed Nov. 28,

                                         10
2017), slip op. at 96 (first citing Neidlinger v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Quaker
Alloy/CMI, Int’l), 798 A.2d 334 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002); then citing Dandenault v.
Workers’ Comp Appeal Bd. (Phila. Flyers, Ltd.), 728 A.2d 1001 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999);
and then citing D’Errico).
              Moreover, the claimant must “relate the alleged work injury to the
period for which [s]he seeks compensation.” Ascencio, slip op. at 9. In Chik-Fil-A,
we clarified that while a late answer bars an employer from asserting affirmative
defenses to the allegations in the claim petition, the claimant is entitled only to “a
rebuttable presumption that her disability continues after the last date that the
employer should have filed an answer. [The e]mployer is not barred, therefore, from
presenting evidence itself, or attempting to discredit the [c]laimant’s evidence, to
rebut the presumption that the [c]laimant’s disability continues into the indefinite
future.” 792 A.2d at 689; see also Heraeus, 697 A.2d at 609 (observing that,
notwithstanding its late answer, the employer was still entitled to “prove a reduction
or cessation of the facts alleged in the petition, such as the extent of disability
existing after the last day on which [the e]mployer should have filed its answer”).
              Here, the description of injury in the claim petition stated simply:
“Right shoulder. And aggravation of preexisting anxiety and depression[.]” RR at
3a. We agree with Employer that the claim petition did not present a well-pleaded
averment regarding the alleged aggravation of Claimant’s preexisting anxiety and
depression. There was a complete absence of explanation of this alleged injury. The
vagueness of the averment is illustrated by Claimant’s failure even to indicate
whether the alleged aggravation arose from the shoulder injury itself or from

       6
         This unreported decision is cited as persuasive authority pursuant to Section 414(a) of
this Court’s Internal Operating Procedures, 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(a).

                                              11
Claimant’s emotional discomfort with the light-duty job Employer offered her
thereafter. As this Court has explained:
             For purposes of receiving [WC] benefits under the [WC]
             Act . . . , the influence of the psychological element has
             been divided into three categories: (1) the “mental/
             physical” injury where a psychological stimulus causes a
             physical injury, (2) the “physical/mental” injury where a
             physical stimulus causes a psychic injury and (3) the
             “mental/mental” injury where a psychological stimulus
             causes a psychic injury . . . . The distinction is highly
             relevant, as the classification determines the claimant’s
             burden of proof. In “mental/physical” and “mental/
             mental” claims, the claimant bears the burden of showing
             abnormal working conditions . . . . In “physical/mental”
             claims, the claimant need only demonstrate that a physical
             stimulus resulted in a mental disability. . . .

Bogdanski v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (City of Pittsburgh), 813 A.2d 949, 952
(Pa. Cmwlth. 2002) (first citing Ryan v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. (Cmty. Health
Servs.), 707 A.2d 1130 (Pa. 1998); and then citing Donovan v. Workers’ Comp.
Appeal Bd. (Acad. Med. Realty), 739 A.2d 1156 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999)) (additional
citations omitted). Here, the vagueness of Claimant’s averment of an aggravation
of preexisting anxiety and depression failed to relate the alleged aggravation to either
work injury or the light-duty position and was insufficient to establish the applicable
burden of proof. For these reasons, we conclude that averment was not well pleaded.
             Moreover, the record as a whole appears to relate the alleged
aggravation mainly to the stress Claimant avers she suffered in trying to learn the
light-duty job. See, e.g., RR at 90a-122a & 369a-70a. However, the claim petition
made no mention of the light-duty position. Thus, to the extent that Claimant’s light-
duty assignment allegedly caused an aggravation of her preexisting anxiety and

                                           12
depression, we conclude that the causal connection between Claimant’s shoulder
injury and such alleged aggravation was not well-pleaded.
            Accordingly, we conclude that Employer did not lose its ability to
contest that issue by filing a late answer to the claim petition. The Board erred in
determining otherwise.

             B. Aggravation of Preexisting Anxiety and Depression
            Employer next asserts that the Board erred in reversing the WCJ’s
determination that Claimant failed to sustain her burden of proving a work-related
aggravation of her preexisting anxiety and depression. Employer posits that the
record contains substantial evidence to support the WCJ’s findings, including
Claimant’s extensive and longstanding treatment for anxiety and depression, the
WCJ’s credibility findings regarding the expert opinion of Employer’s medical
witness, and the lack of credibility of Claimant’s testimony on the issue. We agree.
            As we explained in Chik-Fil-A,
            [a]n employee who experiences an injury based on the
            aggravation of a pre-existing condition is entitled to
            benefits if she shows that the aggravation arose in the
            course of employment, the aggravation was related to the
            employment, and disability resulted . . . . To show that an
            injury was related to employment, the employee must
            establish a causal connection between work and the injury
            . . . . When the connection between the injury or the
            aggravation and work is not obvious, unequivocal medical
            testimony is necessary . . . . Moreover, where a claimant
            had an underlying condition that is not work related, she
            must show continuing existing disability in order to
            receive benefits.

                                        13
792 A.2d at 688-89 (first citing Povanda v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. (Giant
Eagle Mkts., Inc.), 605 A.2d 478 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1992); and then citing McCabe v.
Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Dep’t of Revenue), 738 A.2d 503 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999).
             In Ascencio, this Court observed that a “significant gap between the
alleged injury and the period of disability invites an explanation . . . .” Slip op. at
10. Where the claim petition did not offer such an explanation, and the causal
connection between the work incident and the alleged disability was “not so obvious
as to be clear to a layperson,” the claimant was required to establish that causal
connection by unequivocal medical evidence. Id. (citing and distinguishing Cardyn
v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. (Heppenstall), 534 A.2d 1389 (Pa. 1987)).
             Here, Claimant did not allege any mental issues until about two months
after her injury. Moreover, the claim petition did not explain any causal connection
between either the injury or the stress of the light-duty position and the alleged
aggravation of Claimant’s preexisting anxiety and depression. These circumstances,
together with the evidence of Claimant’s serious and longstanding preexisting
anxiety and depression, required Claimant to establish that causal connection
through unequivocal medical evidence. Ascencio. However, the Board removed the
Claimant’s burden of proof by deeming the causal connection to be admitted. As
explained in the previous section, that determination by the Board was error.
             We agree with Employer that the record contains substantial evidence
supporting the WCJ’s fact and credibility findings. See, e.g., RR at 238a & 243a
(reciting Claimant’s “longstanding history of problems with both depression and
anxiety dating back to when she was about 19,” her diagnosis of “generalized anxiety
disorder,” and her preexisting treatment regimen of psychiatric medications); id. at
242a, 247a & 250a-52a (opinion by Claimant’s medical witness, Dr. Wiley, that

                                          14
medications prescribed for Claimant’s anxiety and depression since before her injury
might be increasing her anxiety); id. at 355a (observation by Employer’s medical
witness, Dr. Mechanick, that Dr. Wiley’s initial evaluation did not identify a cause
of Claimant’s mental issues); id. at 370a (observing that the medical records of the
doctor who treated Claimant for her work injury did not indicate any psychiatric
issues arising from the injury); WCJ’s Op. at 10 (finding Claimant “not credible with
respect to her lack of capability for the performance of the light-duty job as a result
of her anxiety and depression because she contradicted herself during her subsequent
testimony . . . and on the basis of her clearer thinking processes”). Accordingly, we
cannot disturb those findings on appeal. Chik-Fil-A, 792 A.2d at 687-88.

                 C. Competence of Medical Expert’s Testimony
             In its final argument, Employer maintains that the Board erred in
determining that the opinion of Dr. Mechanick, one of Employer’s medical experts,
was incompetent. The Board found that Dr. Mechanick was not competent to testify
that Claimant did not sustain an aggravation of her preexisting anxiety and
depression, because such aggravation was a work-related injury that was established
as a fact by Employer’s late answer to the claim petition. As discussed in Section A
above, we have concluded that Claimant’s averment concerning aggravation of her
preexisting anxiety and depression was not well pleaded, and therefore, Employer’s
lateness in answering the claim petition did not establish such aggravation as a fact.
Accordingly, Dr. Mechanick’s opinion on that issue was not incompetent for that
reason.
             We also agree with Employer that Dr. Mechanick did not base his
opinion solely on the absence of any aggravation of Claimant’s preexisting anxiety

                                          15
and depression. Taking his testimony as a whole, Dr. Mechanick opined that
Claimant was not psychologically disabled as a result of her work injury. See, e.g.,
RR at 370a-73a. Employer correctly asserts that Dr. Mechanick’s expert medical
testimony, which the WCJ found credible, constituted substantial evidence rebutting
any presumption of a work-related psychological disability. See id. Therefore, Dr.
Mechanick’s opinion was competent as rebuttal of any presumption of disability
theoretically imposed under Yellow Freight.
             We reiterate that we cannot disturb the WCJ’s credibility findings.
Chik-Fil-A, 792 A.2d at 687-88.       We conclude that, contrary to the Board’s
determination, Dr. Mechanick’s opinion was competent, was properly credited by
the WCJ, and constituted substantial evidence in support of the WCJ’s decision that
Claimant suffered no work-related aggravation of her preexisting anxiety and
depression. Therefore, the Board erred in reversing the WCJ’s finding.

                                  IV. Conclusion
             Based on the foregoing discussion, the Board’s order reversing the
WCJ’s denial of that part of the claim petition relating to aggravation of Claimant’s
preexisting anxiety and depression is reversed.

                                        __________________________________
                                        CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

Judge Dumas did not participate in the decision of this case.

                                         16
         IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Mercy Catholic Medical Center,        :
                 Petitioner           :
                                      :
            v.                        :
                                      :
Debra Ryan (Workers’                  :
Compensation Appeal Board),           :     No. 554 C.D. 2022
                Respondent            :

                                  ORDER

      AND NOW, this 16th day of October, 2023, the May 9, 2022 order of the
Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board reversing the workers’ compensation judge’s
denial of the claim petition is REVERSED.

                                     __________________________________
                                     CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge