Court Opinion

ID: 9688679
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 18:00:28.322749+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:06:43.403220
License: Public Domain

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

                      UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

                                      No. 22-1628

                              CALVIN E. BRACKBILL,

                                                    Appellant

                                          v.

            STEPHEN J. RUFF; GREGORY A. HILL; IAN L. DAWSON;
                TYRON E. MEIK; CITY OF HARRISBURG, PA

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
                               (D.C. No. 1-17-cv-01046)
                     District Judge: Honorable Jennifer P. Wilson

                                 Argued June 13, 2023

              Before: PORTER, FREEMAN, and FISHER Circuit Judges.

                           (Opinion Filed: August 24, 2023)

Caleb Kruckenberg [Argued]
Brian Zeiger
Levin & Zeiger
1500 John F. Kennedy Boulevard
Suite 620
Philadelphia, PA 19102
              Counsel for Appellant
Frank J. Lavery, Jr.
Andrew W. Norfleet [Argued]
Lavery Law
225 Market Street
Suite 304, P.O. Box 1245
Harrisburg, PA 17108
              Counsel for Appellees

                                          OPINION*

FREEMAN, Circuit Judge.

          Harrisburg police officer Stephen Ruff arrested Calvin Brackbill for driving under

the influence (“DUI”) after observing that a portion of Brackbill’s bumper cover was

detached from his vehicle. Blood testing later showed that Brackbill was not under the

influence of alcohol at the time of his arrest. Ruff cited Brackbill for summary traffic

offenses but not for DUI. Brackbill was later found not guilty of one traffic offense and

the remaining citation was dismissed. He brought state and federal law claims against

Ruff and Gregory Hill, the other officer present at the time of arrest. The District Court

granted summary judgment for the officers on all claims. For the reasons below, we will

affirm.

                                                   I.

          In the early morning of June 28, 2015, Brackbill was driving in downtown

Harrisburg when he heard a scraping noise from the front of his car. He stopped his car

          *
        This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, under I.O.P. 5.7, is not
binding precedent.
                                               2
in the middle of the road and got out to inspect it. He discovered that the bumper cover

was partially detached from the front of the car, so he clipped the bumper cover back into

place. While Brackbill was attending to the bumper cover, Hill arrived on foot, followed

by Ruff, who arrived by vehicle after hearing the scraping sound from a block away. Hill

said he smelled alcohol on Brackbill, and both officers asked what he had hit with his car.

Brackbill denied hitting anything or drinking alcohol and accused the officers of

harassing him. A supervising police officer arrived on the scene and told Brackbill that it

looked like he had been drinking. Despite Brackbill’s denials, Ruff arrested him for DUI

without a warrant and without conducting a field sobriety test. Brackbill consented to a

blood draw at the police station.

       Later that day, Ruff asked his supervisor about what he should do if the blood test

results showed Brackbill was not intoxicated. The supervisor responded that he should

issue citations for any traffic violations.

       Three weeks after the arrest, the police received a toxicology report that showed

Brackbill had a blood alcohol content of 0.0% shortly after his arrest. Ruff issued

Brackbill traffic citations for violating 67 Pa. Code § 175.78(e)(1) (governing bumper

strength and mounting) and 75 Pa. Code § 1786 (requiring proof of insurance while

operating a vehicle). Brackbill was not charged with DUI.

       Brackbill contested the citations with the aid of counsel. At a traffic court hearing

in November 2015, Ruff testified that he heard a loud scraping noise, and saw Brackbill

driving with a bumper that “was completely off the front of the vehicle being pushed by

the vehicle.” Brackbill testified that his bumper cover (not the bumper itself) had been

                                              3
partially detached and made a dragging sound against the road while he was driving. The

traffic court found Brackbill guilty of the bumper offense but dismissed the citation for

lack of insurance. Brackbill sought review in the Court of Common Pleas, which found

him not guilty of the bumper offense after the Commonwealth was unprepared to proceed

with a hearing.

       Brackbill brought 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against Ruff for false arrest and

fabrication of evidence and against Hill for failure to intervene in a false arrest. He also

brought Pennsylvania law claims against Ruff for malicious prosecution and abuse of

process.1

       Five years after the arrest, Brackbill deposed Ruff and Hill. Ruff testified that he

did not recall whether he had seen Brackbill driving the vehicle on the morning of the

arrest; to the best of Ruff’s recollection, Brackbill had already exited his vehicle and was

attending to his bumper when Ruff arrived on the scene. Hill testified that he had seen

Brackbill driving the vehicle, and the bumper was partially detached—enough so that the

metal scraped against the roadway.

       The officers moved for summary judgment on all claims, and the District Court

granted their motion. Brackbill timely appealed.

       1
         Brackbill brought additional claims against Ruff, Hill, and three additional
defendants. The District Court dismissed those claims, and Brackbill does not appeal
those dismissals.
                                              4
                                                  II.

       The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367(a), and we

have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

       We exercise plenary review over a district court’s grant of summary judgment.

Harvard v. Cesnalis, 973 F.3d 190, 199 (3d Cir. 2020). We apply “the same standard as

a district court” and “determine whether there was any genuine dispute as to any material

fact.” Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 287 (3d Cir. 2014) (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted). We view “the facts in the light most favorable to [the

nonmoving party],” who “is entitled to every reasonable inference that can be drawn from

the record.” Dempsey v. Bucknell Univ., 834 F.3d 457, 467 (3d Cir. 2016) (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted). We can affirm the District Court’s judgment on any

ground supported by the record. Laurel Gardens, LLC v. Mckenna, 948 F.3d 105, 116

(3d Cir. 2020).

                                               III.

                  A. False Arrest

       To bring a false arrest claim, a plaintiff must establish “(1) that there was an arrest;

and (2) that the arrest was made without probable cause.” Harvard, 973 F.3d at 199

(citation omitted). Brackbill’s arrest is undisputed, so we will affirm the summary

judgment for Ruff if no reasonable jury could find probable cause lacking. See Anderson

v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). “Because probable cause is an

objective standard, an arrest is lawful if the officer had probable cause to arrest for any

offense, not just the offense cited at the time of arrest or booking.” District of Columbia

                                              5
v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 584 n.2 (2018); see also Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146,

153 (2004) (holding the offense for which there was probable cause need not be closely

related to or based on the same conduct as the offense identified by the officer at the time

of the arrest). Probable cause exists when the “facts and circumstances within the

officer’s knowledge” would cause “a prudent person” to believe “that the suspect has

committed . . . an offense.” Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979).2

       No reasonable jury could find that Ruff lacked probable cause to arrest Brackbill

for a traffic offense.3 Title 75, Section 4107(b)(1) of the Pennsylvania Code makes it

“unlawful for any person” to “[o]perate . . . on any highway in this Commonwealth any

vehicle” that does not comply with Pennsylvania’s vehicle equipment standards. Those

equipment standards include 67 Pa. Code § 175.78(e)(1), which provides that “[a]

bumper shall be of at least equivalent strength and mounting as the original equipment,”

       2
         Neither the Supreme Court nor this Court has determined whether the Fourth
Amendment forbids a warrantless arrest for a non-criminal traffic offense. See Atwater v.
City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001) (holding that the Fourth Amendment does
not bar a warrantless arrest for “even a very minor criminal offense” that the officer has
probable cause to believe the individual committed in his presence (emphasis added)).
But Brackbill did not raise this issue in the District Court or on appeal. We address only
the issue Brackbill raised: whether Ruff had probable cause to arrest him for a traffic
offense. United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 140 S. Ct. 1575, 1579 (2020) (“[W]e rely on
the parties to frame the issues for decision and assign to courts the role of neutral arbiter
of matters the parties present.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

       3
         In the District Court, Brackbill argued that Ruff lacked authority under state law
to arrest him for traffic offenses. But Brackbill forfeited that argument in this Court by
not including it in his brief. Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 182 (3d Cir.1993).

                                             6
and 67 Pa. Code § 175.78(e)(2), which provides that “[n]o portion of a bumper may be

broken, torn or protruding to create a hazard.”

       It is undisputed that Brackbill operated his car on a highway when his bumper

cover was partially detached, and that the bumper and bumper cover were integrated. It

is also undisputed that Ruff heard the scraping noise that the detached bumper cover

made while Brackbill was driving his car, that the detached bumper cover led to

Brackbill’s interaction with the police, and that Brackbill discussed the detached bumper

cover with the officers while his car was stopped in the middle of the road. So Ruff had

probable cause to arrest Brackbill for either of the bumper violations cited here.

                  B. Failure to Intervene

       Officers are liable under a failure-to-intervene theory when they “fail[] or refuse[]

to intervene when a constitutional violation such as an unprovoked beating takes place in

[their] presence.” Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 650 (3d Cir. 2002) (citation

omitted). This Court has yet to determine whether a failure to intervene claim based on a

false arrest is cognizable. Lozano v. New Jersey, 9 F.4th 239, 246 n.4 (3d Cir. 2021). We

need not decide that here because, even if cognizable, Brackbill’s claim necessarily fails.

       Brackbill’s failure to intervene claim against Hill rises and falls on his false arrest

claim against Ruff. Because we hold that Ruff had probable cause to arrest Brackbill for

a traffic offense, there is no constitutional violation that Hill could have intervened in to

prevent.

                                              7
                 C. Fabrication of Evidence

       A fabrication of evidence claim requires “a reasonable likelihood that, absent

fabricated evidence, [the plaintiff] would not have been criminally charged.” Black v.

Montgomery Cnty., 835 F.3d 358, 371 (3d Cir. 2016) , as amended (Sept. 16, 2016), or

convicted, Halsey, 750 F.3d at 294. “There must be persuasive evidence supporting a

conclusion that the proponents of the evidence are aware that evidence is incorrect or that

the evidence is offered in bad faith.” Black, 835 F.3d at 372 (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted). And while reasonable inferences must be drawn in the

nonmoving party’s favor, “an inference” of fabrication “based upon a speculation or

conjecture does not create a material factual dispute sufficient to defeat summary

judgment.” Halsey, 750 F.3d at 287 (citation omitted).

       Brackbill argues that Ruff fabricated his traffic court testimony about having seen

Brackbill drive a vehicle with a detached bumper. He argues that the traffic court would

not have convicted him of a bumper offense but for Ruff’s fabricated testimony.4 He

posits that Ruff fabricated evidence to deflect attention from an unsupported DUI arrest,

and he points to Ruff’s and Hill’s deposition testimony as evidence that Ruff’s traffic

court testimony was fabricated.

       We agree with the District Court that Brackbill has not met his “notable” burden to

produce evidence upon which a reasonable jury could conclude that Ruff’s traffic court

       4
        We have recognized fabrication of evidence claims only in the context of
criminal proceedings, not summary traffic proceedings. See generally Black, 835 F.3d at
358; Halsey, 750 F.3d at 273. For the purposes of this appeal, we assume without
deciding that Brackbill’s fabrication of evidence claim is cognizable.
                                             8
testimony was fabricated, as opposed to merely incorrect. Black, 835 F.3d at 372. And

even if Brackbill had produced evidence of fabrication, Ruff would still be entitled to

summary judgment because the challenged testimony could not have affected the traffic

court verdict. Brackbill admitted to the traffic court that he operated a vehicle with a

partially detached bumper cover, and Ruff gave uncontested testimony that he heard the

bumper cover scraping against the road. There is no reasonable likelihood that the traffic

court would have acquitted Brackbill but for Ruff’s testimony about seeing the fully

detached bumper.

                 D. Malicious Prosecution & Abuse of Process

       An officer is entitled to immunity from malicious prosecution and abuse of

process claims under the Pennsylvania Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (“PSTCA”)

if he “in good faith reasonably believed the conduct” that gave rise to the claim “was

authorized or required by law.” 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8546. He loses the PSTCA’s

protection if he injured the plaintiff through “willful misconduct.” Id. § 8550. Willful

misconduct occurs when the actor “desired to bring about the result that followed or at

least was aware that it was substantially certain to follow, so that such desire can be

implied.” Sanford v. Stiles, 456 F.3d 298, 315 (3d Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).

       Brackbill asks us to rely on the same argument he advances for his fabrication

claim to find that Ruff engaged in willful misconduct and abuse of process. But as with

the fabrication claim, no reasonable jury could find that Ruff willfully presented false

testimony in traffic court to maliciously prosecute Brackbill or abuse the legal process.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Brackbill, at most a jury could

                                              9
conclude that Ruff’s statements were incorrect. So Ruff is entitled to PSTCA immunity

on both state law claims.

                                        *****

      For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.

                                           10