Court Opinion

ID: 9811715
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 22:27:43.867744+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:21:14.051206
License: Public Domain

TOM GRAY, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
The issue of whether correspondence from a trial court constitutes an order is a recurring problem. See Beard v. Beard, 49 S.W.3d 40, 66 (Tex.App.-Waco 2001, pet. denied); Keeter v. State, 105 S.W.3d 137, 152 fn. 2 (Tex.App.-Waco 2003, pet. granted)(Gray, J., dissenting). The Texas Supreme Court has said that letters to counsel are not the kind of documents that constitute a judgment, decision, or order. Goff v. Tuchscherer, 627 S.W.2d 397, 398 (Tex.1982). Granted, this statement was used in connection with the start of the appellate timetable, but I see no reason why it would not be applicable in this setting. See Dunn v. County of Dallas, 794 S.W.2d 560, 563 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1990, no writ)(Ovard, J., dissenting). It was clear that the trial court signed a judgment granting Helena’s motion for summary judgment. It is not clear that the court signed an order setting aside that judgment. One should be as clear as the other.
Although it appears there are several factors used by courts of appeals to determine whether a trial court’s letter to the *381parties is a formal order,1 one particular factor, language indicating a present act, is sorely missing from the letter in this case. See General Elec. Capital Auto Financial Leasing Services, Inc. v. Stanfield, 71 S.W.3d B51, 355 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2001, no pet.); In re Fuentes, 960 S.W.2d 261, 265 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi, 1997, no writ); Schaeffer Homes, Inc. v. Esterak, 792 S.W.2d 567, 569 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1990, no -writ). The rendition of a judgment is a present act, either by spoken word or signed memorandum, which decides the issues upon which the ruling is made. Reese v. Piperi, 534 S.W.2d 329, 330 (Tex.1976). A judge’s intention to render judgment in the future cannot be a present rendition of judgment. Id.
The letter the trial court sent to the parties in this case stated: “I will withdraw my ruling and the summary judgment previously signed. I will reconsider the same on February 1, 2003.” (Emphasis added). It is not clear that the trial court intended a present ruling withdrawing his earlier order. This is especially true when, as here, the trial court indicated a specific date in the future when he intends to reconsider the ruling and the summary judgment. By stating he intended to “reconsider the same” in the second sentence of the letter, and having referenced only his “ruling and summary judgment previously signed” in the first sentence, the logical construction of the letter is that on February 1, 2003, he will reconsider the earlier ruling and summary judgment, in essence the judgment he signed on January 10, 2003. His use of the term “will,” not once but twice, in the letter also indicates an event to occur in the future, not a present act.
This letter is not an order. Because the majority finds that it is, I respectfully dissent to the majority’s decision to deny the petition for writ of mandamus.2

. See, e.g. McCall v. Tana Oil and Gas Corp., 82 S.W.3d 337, 342 (Tex.App.-Austin 2001), rev’d on other grounds, 104 S.W.3d 80 (Tex.2003)(whether letter was filed with district clerk); General Elec. Capital Auto Financial Leasing Services, Inc. v. Stanfield, 71 S.W.3d 351, 355 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2001, no pet.)(whether letter is noted on docket sheet); Schaeffer Homes, Inc. v. Esterak, 792 S.W.2d 567, 569 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1990, no writ)(whether letter is dated, signed, identifies the parties, and indicates the trial court cause number).

. This does not address whether or not the real-parties-in-interest could pursue their claims in a proceeding filed in the trial court as new and separate claims.