Court Opinion

ID: 9707093
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 02:02:19.59169+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:28.113166
License: Public Domain

BROSKY, J.,
dissenting statement:
I must respectfully dissent. Although I agree with the majority that we are not compelled to recognize a child’s *523cause of action for loss of parental consortium, I cannot agree with its conclusion that we should not do so. Accordingly, I would reverse the order of the court below and remand the case for appellants’ action to continue.
The majority, in essence, relies on two bases in its determination that it should deny Michael Steiner a right to be compensated for the loss of his mother’s consortium. First, it concludes that “[t]he difference in creation of spousal and filial relationships justifies the differential treatment between spouses and children.” Second, it concludes the decision whether to allow the cause of action is better left to the legislature. I find neither of these bases to be persuasive.
Assuming that the majority’s perceived distinction between the relationship of spouses and the relationship of a parent and a child exists, the majority nevertheless fails to explain why that distinction should make a difference as to which relationship is to receive protection in our courts. The majority concedes both that “[t]he emotional damages which a child suffers when a parent is injured are no more remote or uncertain than the damages for loss of spousal consortium,” and that “some monetary value can be placed on the loss [of parental consortium] and that monetary damages can alleviate the outward manifestations of the loss ...” Why then should either the fact that a child has no control over the commencement of the parent/ehild relationship or the fact that children generally strive to become independent mean that spouses should be compensated for a loss of consortium while children should not be? I see no reason why and the majority offers none.
The majority also concludes that the decision whether to allow a cause of action for loss of parental consortium is a policy determination which is best left to the legislature to resolve. I believe the majority’s position is best rebutted by reference to the case of Ferriter v. O’Connell’s Sons, 381 Mass. 507, 413 N.E.2d 690, 695 (1980), in which the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts stated the following:
*524As for the argument that we should withhold our hand until the Legislature acts, we need only repeat: “In a field long left to the common law, change may well come about by the same medium of development. Sensible reform can here be achieved without the articulation of detail or the creation of administrative mechanisms that customarily comes about by legislative enactment____ In the end the Legislature may say that we have mistaken the present public understanding of the nature of the [parent-child] relation, but that we cannot divine or anticipate.
The lack of a broad, fully articulated system in case law is a strength, not a weakness. The gaps are not filled in all at once on an abstract, theoretical basis, but gradually, case by case, as the facts of actual cases in controversy put the choices in a real-life context. This is the very genius and vitality of the common law, and we should celebrate it and exercise our proper prerogatives. Unlike the majority, I do not believe we should shrink from our historic role.
The compensation of those who have wrongfully suffered losses is the very heart of our system of civil justice. Absent an affirmative reason why a person should not be so compensated, a cause of action should be allowed to proceed. I do not believe that the majority has advanced any such affirmative reason1 and I, therefore, would reverse the order of the court below and allow appellants’ action for Michael Steiner’s loss of his mother’s consortium to proceed.

. The majority also rejects an affirmative reason for allowing appellants’ cause of action based upon a misperception of appellants’ argument. Appellants argue that a separate damage award would avoid instances where a parent might misspend the child’s portion of the parent’s damage award. This argument does not assume, as the majority believes, that the child is presently entitled to a portion of the parent’s award; it is simply a recognition that injured parents would normally spend a portion of their awards to compensate the child for the loss of consortium. The point of appellants’ argument is that since the child is not legally entitled to such a portion of the parent’s award, he may remain uncompensated for his injury. The allowance of a separate damage award for the child would assure that compensation.