Court Opinion

ID: 9839020
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-11 14:08:18.068375+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:05:14.764825
License: Public Domain

Opinion issued September 7, 2023.

                                         In The

                                 Court of Appeals
                                        For The

                            First District of Texas
                               ————————————
                                 NO. 01-22-00792-CV
                              ———————————
                            IN THE MATTER OF C.P.R.

       On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 4 & Probate Court
                          Brazoria County, Texas
                       Trial Court Case No. JV24089

                            MEMORANDUM OPINION

       C.P.R., a juvenile, was charged by petition with delinquent conduct with the

offenses of aggravated sexual assault of a child, indecency with a child by contact,

and injury to a child. On the State’s motion to certify C.P.R. as an adult to face

criminal charges in criminal district court, the juvenile court issued an order waiving

its original jurisdiction and transferring three of C.P.R.’s cases to the criminal district
court.     In this accelerated appeal, C.P.R. argues the juvenile court abused its

discretion by waiving its jurisdiction over these three cases because the evidence is

legally insufficient to support the juvenile court’s finding “there is probable cause to

believe [C.P.R.] committed the offense alleged.”

         We affirm the juvenile court’s order.

                                         Background

         On April 18, 2022, Detective Evan Bissett (“Detective Bissett”) and Officer

Christopher Rivera (“Officer Rivera”) with the Lake Jackson Police Department

were dispatched to McLean Park in response to a sexual assault in progress. After

speaking with witnesses at the park, Officer Rivera arrested fifteen-year-old C.P.R.

and transported him to the Brazoria County Juvenile Detention Center (“Detention

Center”).

A.       Allegations Against C.P.R. in the State’s First Amended Petition

         In its First Amended Petition, the State alleged:1

         That on or about the 15th day of April, 2022, in Brazoria County, Texas,
         [C.P.R.] did engage in delinquent conduct by violating Section 21.11
         of the Texas Penal Code punishment by imprisonment or confinement,
         to-wit: did then and there with intent to arouse or gratify the sexual
         desire of respondent, intentionally or knowingly engage in sexual

1
         To protect the identity of the alleged child victims, we will refer to the children and
         their family members by their initials. See TEX. CONST. art. I, § 30 (granting crime
         victims “the right to be treated with fairness and with respect for the victim’s dignity
         and privacy throughout the criminal justice process”); TEX. R. APP. P. 9.10(a)(3),
         (b) (making names of minors at time offense was committed “sensitive information”
         not to be contained in court filings).

                                                2
      contact with [J.O.], a child younger than 17 years and not the spouse of
      [C.P.R.], by touching the genitals of said child;

      That on or about the 15th day of April, 2022, in Brazoria County, Texas,
      [C.P.R.] did engage in delinquent conduct by violating Section 22.021
      of the Texas Penal Code punishable by imprisonment or confinement,
      to-wit: did then and there intentionally or knowingly cause the
      penetration of the sexual organ, of [J.O.], a child younger than fourteen
      (14) years of age and not [C.P.R’s] spouse, by [C.P.R.’s] finger;

      That on or about the 18th day of April, 2022, in Brazoria County, State
      of Texas, said [C.P.R.] did engage in delinquent conduct by violating
      section 22.021 of the Texas Penal Code punishable by imprisonment or
      confinement, to-wit: did then and there intentionally or knowingly
      cause the penetration of the sexual organ of [L.T.], a child younger than
      fourteen (14) years of age and not [C.P.R.’s] spouse, by [C.P.R.’s]
      finger;

      That on or about the 18th day of April, 2022, in Brazoria County, State
      of Texas, [C.P.R.] did engage in delinquent conduct by violating
      section 22.04 of the Texas Penal Code punishable by imprisonment or
      confinement, to-wit: did then and there intentionally or knowingly
      cause bodily injury to [S.B.], a child fourteen (14) years of age or
      younger, by grabbing [S.B.’s] hand—causing pain.

B.    Transfer Hearing

      On October 19, 2022, the juvenile court held a hearing on the State’s motion

to certify C.P.R. as an adult to face criminal charges in criminal district court.

Detective Bissett, Officer Rivera, Dr. Anna Buckingham (“Dr. Buckingham”), and

Juvenile Probation Officer Melissa Rodriguez (“Officer Rodriguez”) testified at the

hearing.

      Detective Bissett testified that he was dispatched to McLean Park in response

to a “possible sexual assault of a child.” When he arrived at the park, officers on

                                         3
scene advised him “that they had multiple reports, from parents and a grandmother,

of two children that had been possibly assaulted by a white male that was described

as wearing dark jeans, dark shirt, and a ball cap, that had left the scene on a bicycle.”

Detective Bissett spoke to G.S. who told him that she had seen L.T. playing in the

park with other children, including a teenage boy. G.S., a janitorial staff member at

a local school, told Detective Bissett that she recognized the teenage boy “as a former

student and knew that he was currently a freshman at the local high school.”

According to G.S., L.T. ran to her and told her that she “had been touched by a boy”

and “it hurt.”

      Detective Bissett testified that L.T. had been taken to a local hospital where

she was examined by a sexual assault nurse examiner (“SANE”). The SANE told

Detective Bissett that L.T. had told her that she had been “touched inside of her

underwear, that her pants had been pulled down.” According to the SANE, L.T. had

indicated “digital penetration of her private area” and the SANE had observed

“redness and inflammation consistent with vaginal trauma” and “penetration.”

      Detective Bissett also spoke to A.B. who informed him that her daughter, S.B.,

had told her that the “same boy” who had touched L.T. had also “grabbed her and

tried to pull her into the bathroom.” S.B. reported that the boy grabbed her by the

left arm and “it had hurt when he grabbed her and she tried to get away.” Detective

                                           4
Bissett testified that when he looked at S.B.’s arm, he observed “very mild redness

there at the time but no—no bruising.”

      After speaking with G.S. and A.B., Detective Bissett spoke to Officer Rivera

who informed Detective Bissett that he had detained a young man matching the

description. Officer Rivera stated that when he approached the young man and asked

him if he “had been over at the park,” the young man “said that he had been and that

he didn’t mean to hurt anybody.” Detective Bissett identified C.P.R. as the young

man Officer Rivera had detained and who was sitting in Officer Rivera’s patrol car.

      Detective Bissett testified that A.O. came to the police department a few days

later. A.O. reported that he and his two daughters were at McLean Park the prior

Friday and his daughters had been playing with a young teenage male. After they

left the park, A.O.’s daughter, J.O., told him that “the boy they had played with was

weird, that he had done some really weird things.” J.O. told her father that the boy

had “touched her and asked her to take her—her clothes off.” When Detective

Bissett asked A.O. to describe the young man he had seen at the park that day, A.O.

“gave the exact clothing description” the officers had “originally received” about

C.P.R. A.O. told Detective Bissett that he had been playing at the park that day with

a drone with a camera and that the boy had expressed an interest in the drone. A.O.

showed Detective Bissett a photo the drone had captured of the young man and

                                         5
Detective Bissett testified that he “immediately recognized the young man in the

photo to be [C.P.R.], wearing the same clothes that he had been seen in on Monday.”

      L.T., S.B., and J.O. were interviewed at the Child Advocacy Center. During

her interview, which Detective Bissett observed, J.O. “described having been

playing with [C.P.R.]” and when they were on the top level of the play set, she had

laid down and C.P.R. “had gotten on top of her and placed his hand inside the front

of her underwear.” J.O. reported that “when [C.P.R.’s] hand was in her pants, [she]

could feel his fingers moving.” Detective Bissett testified, based on his offense

report, that J.O. reported that she told C.P.R. to stop and “after he stopped, he told

her to follow him to the bathroom,” where C.P.R. told J.O. “to take her pants off.”

J.O. ran away when C.P.R. was not looking.

      Detective Bissett testified that L.T. said she had been playing tag at the park

and at “one point while she was running and chasing people, [C.P.R.] pulled her into

the bathroom area.” After consulting his offense report, Detective Bissett testified

that L.T. claimed that when they were in the bathroom, C.P.R. “touched [her]

inappropriately in the private area.” Detective Bissett testified that L.T. was 5 years

old, and S.B. was 7 or 8 years old.

      Detective Bissett’s offense report for L.T. and S.B. was admitted into

evidence as Petitioner’s Exhibit 2 over C.P.R.’s hearsay objection. Detective Bissett

testified that he also prepared a second offense report for J.O., who was 8 years old.

                                          6
J.O.’s offense report was admitted into evidence as Petitioner’s Exhibit 7 over

C.P.R.’s hearsay objection.

      Officer Rivera testified that he was dispatched to McLean Park on Monday,

April 18, 2022. When he arrived at the park, Officer Rivera spoke to G.S., who told

him that her granddaughter, LT., and L.T.’s friend, S.B., “were touched on their

private parts” by a juvenile white male with brown hair, who was wearing a black

cap, black shirt, and blue jeans and riding a bike. G.S. told Officer Rivera that the

juvenile “ran off towards the community center area of the park” after L.T. and S.B.

yelled at him. Officer Rivera went to the community center where he “observed a

subject matching that description riding his bike.” When Officer Rivera approached

the suspect and asked him “if he was involved in the incident,” the suspect told

Officer Rivera that he “didn’t mean to hurt the little girls.” Officer Rivera testified

that the suspect was “immediately apologetic” and “his hands [were] shaking.”

Officer Rivera then detained the young man and drove him back to the park. Officer

Rivera identified C.P.R. in court as the young man he detained at the community

center.

      Officer Rodriguez, C.P.R.’s supervisor at the Detention Center, prepared the

Brazoria County Juvenile Justice Predisposition Report (“Predisposition Report”),

which was admitted as Petitioner’s Exhibit 13. The Predisposition Report includes

Officer Rodriguez’s 7-page summary and an appendix with (1) both of Detective

                                          7
Bissett’s offense reports, (2) rule violation reports from the Detention Center, (3)

C.P.R.’s school records, (4) C.P.R.’s records from Child Protective Services, (5)

C.P.R.’s psychiatric assessment, (6) C.P.R.’s psychosexual evaluation, (7) C.P.R.’s

psychological evaluation, and (8) the Psychological Evaluation for Purpose of

Transfer to Criminal Court prepared by Dr. Buckingham. C.P.R., who did not object

to the admission of the summary portion of the Predisposition Report, objected to

the admission of the Predisposition Report’s appendix on hearsay grounds. The

court admitted Petitioner’s Exhibit 13 in its entirety because Officer Rodriguez had

relied on the documents included in the appendix in preparing the report.

      In the Predisposition Report, Officer Rodriguez summarized the evidence

supporting each charged offense against C.P.R.:

      OFFENSE SUMMARY: AGGRAVATED SEXUAL ASSAULT OF
      A CHILD (F1)

      *See Appendix A for offense reports.

      On Monday, April 18, 2022, at around 1230 hours, Reporting Officer
      Rivera was dispatched to 93 Lake Road, Lake Jackson, Texas, 77566,
      in reference to a sexual assault in progress. Officer Rivera arrived on
      scene and was met by [G.S.]. [G.S.] advised that her granddaughter,
      [L.T.] (5 y.o.) and her granddaughters’ friend, [S.B.] (7 y.o.) were lured
      into a public bathroom stall by a white male in a black shirt, black cap
      and blue jeans who then pulled [L.T.] (5 y.o.) inside, pulled her
      underwear off, and penetrated her with his finger. [S.B.] (7 y.o.) was
      grabbed by her back by the same male who attempted to pull her into a
      bathroom stall. Officer Rivera found a male matching the description,
      identified as [C.P.R.]. [C.P.R.] advised he was just playing with the
      girls, but he did touch them. Officer Rivera then placed [C.P.R.] under

                                          8
arrest and transported him to Brazoria County Juvenile Justice
Department.

OFFENSE SUMMARY: INJURY TO A CHILD (F2)

On Monday, April 18, 2022, at around 1233 hours, Reporting Officer
Cervantes, responded to a sexual assault in progress at Maclean Park,
at 93 Lake Road, Lake Jackson, Texas, 77566. Information was
obtained from call notes of a female informing that her granddaughter
had just been sexually assaulted by a male later identified as [C.P.R.].
Upon arrival contact was made with the original caller, [G.S.], and a
second female, named [A.B.], and her daughter, [S.B.] (7 y.o.). [A.B.]
informed that her daughter too had been assaulted. [A.B.] informed that
the same male grabbed [S.B.] while on the play area. [A.B.] observed
the male chasing the smaller children, thinking it was odd but that
maybe he was just a bigger kid with his parents here in the park. [A.B.]
informed that [S.B.] (7 y.o.) came to her and told her that the male
grabbed her by the right thigh and lower back, pulling [S.B.] (7 y.o.)
towards him. [S.B.] (7 y.o.) was scared and ran to get away from the
male. [A.B.] informed that [S.B.] (7 y.o.) told her it hurt when the male
grabbed her. [A.B.] refused EMS to check [S.B.] (7 y.o.) after [S.B.]
(7 y.o.) informed she was ok. [A.B.] informed she wished to pursue
with charges against the male that she would be providing a sworn
statement at a later time as she had to pick up other children from
daycare.

OFFENSE SUMMARY: AGGRAVATED SEXUAL ASSAULT OF
A CHILD (F1), INDECENCY WITH A CHILD (F2)

On Thursday, April 21, 2022, at about 11:10 am, Detective Bissett, was
dispatched to the Lake Jackson Department Lobby, in reference to a
follow up investigation, regarding LJPD Case 2022-00716. Detective
Bissett met with [A.O.], who advised that he had been at the Maclean
Park on Friday, April 15, 2022, with his daughter, [J.O.] (8 y.o.),
between the hours of 1:00pm and 3:00pm. [A.O.] advised that while
they were at the park, [J.O.] (8 y.o.) had been playing with "an older
boy.” [A.O.] advised that after about 3:00pm, he and [J.O.] (8 y.o.) left
the park, and that the boy in question had already left on a bicycle.
[A.O.] advised that while he was driving, [J.O.] (8 y.o.) stated that “that
boy was weird.” [A.O.] asked [J.O.] (8 y.o.) to explain what she meant

                                    9
and advised that [J.O.] (8 y.o.) told him that the boy had pulled her into
the bathroom area at the park and told her to take her pants off. [A.O.]
advised that he began to ask [J.O.] (8 y.o.) if the boy had touched her
in anyway, or if she had taken her pants off. [A.O.] advised that [J.O.]
(8 y.o.) denied having removed her pants and stated that the boy had
not touched her. [A.O.] stated that due to knowing that the boy had
already left the scene and given that [J.O.] (8 y.o.) stated that the boy
had not touched her, he left the issue alone. However, upon seeing the
Facebook post describing a teenage boy assaulting a young female at
Maclean Park just a few days later, [A.O.] believed that the situation
maybe more serious that he had believed on Friday. Detective Bissett
asked [A.O.] to describe the subject, and he stated the boy was believed
to be around the age of 10-12, and that he was riding a bicycle. [A.O.]
advised that he had been operating a drone that day and he had a photo
of the subject. [A.O.] pulled up a screenshot on his phone and handed
the phone to detective Bissett, who immediately recognized the subject
in the photos as [C.P.R.]. On April 26, 2022, at approximately 10:10
am, a forensic interview was conducted by Kristi Belloumini at the
Brazoria County Alliance for Children, with [J.O.]. During the
interview, [J.O.] (8 y.o.) spoke about going to the park with her parents
and also playing with friends at school. When asked about the park,
[J.O.] (8 y.o.) spoke about going to Maclean Park with her dad before
Easter and playing hide and seek with her sister [V.] and an older boy,
who had been identified as [C.P.R.]. When asked about her interactions
with [C.P.R.], [J.O.] (8 y.o.) initially stated that she did not want to talk
about it because it was “disgusting.” [J.O.] (8 y.o.) advised that she
doesn’t like to talk or think about it, because she didn’t like having the
thoughts in her head. Upon being asked again about the things that
happened at McLean Park, [J.O.] (8 y.o.) advised that [C.P.R.] had gone
up into the top of the playground where she was hiding and laid down
to hide with her. [J.O.] (8 y.o.) then advised that [C.P.R.] put his hand
inside of her underwear and touched her private area. [J.O.] (8 y.o.)
raised her right hand indicating that to be the hand that [C.P.R.] used
and said that he touched her in the front under her underwear. [J.O.] (8
y.o.) further advised that when [C.P.R.] was touching her, she could
feel his fingers moving. [J.O.] (8 y.o.) would not clarify whether
[C.P.R.] had inserted his fingers inside of her or if the touching was
external only. [J.O.] stated that she told [C.P.R.] to stop, and that after
he stopped, he told her to follow him to the bathroom. [J.O.] (8 y.o.)
advised that once they had reached the bathroom area, [C.P.R.] told her
                                     10
      to take off her pants. [J.O.] (8 y.o.) advised that she told [C.P.R.] no
      and he kept telling her to take off her pants. [J.O.] (8 y.o.) stated that
      when [C.P.R.] turned to look at something else, she left the bathroom.

      Dr. Buckingham, a forensic, clinical, and medical psychologist with the

Brazoria County Juvenile Justice Department, testified that she performed a

diagnostic study, a social evaluation, and a full investigation of C.P.R.’s

circumstances and offenses. Dr. Buckingham’s evaluation was admitted without

objection (Petitioner’s Exhibit 8).

      At the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court found, among other things,

that there is probable cause to believe C.P.R. committed three of the four offenses

alleged in the First Amended Petition: (1) aggravated sexual assault against L.T., (2)

indecency with a child against J.O., and (3) injury to a child against S.B. The

juvenile court made detailed findings in the Waiver of Jurisdiction and Order of

Transfer to Criminal Court.

                                        Issue 1

      In his sole issue, C.P.R. argues the juvenile court abused its discretion by

waiving its jurisdiction over his three cases because the evidence is legally

insufficient to support the juvenile court’s finding “there is probable cause to believe

[C.P.R.] committed” the alleged offenses of aggravated sexual assault against L.T.,

indecency with a child against J.O., and injury to a child against S.B. According to

C.P.R., there is legally insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s probable

                                          11
cause finding because the State “presented no legitimate evidence” and no “direct

evidence from the alleged victims was presented to the Court, only hearsay from a

parent, what the parent was told, then told to the officer, then told again in Court.”

C.P.R. also asserts that the alleged victims’ failure to testify violated his right to

confrontation under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See In

re M.P., 220 S.W.3d 99, 109 (Tex. App.—Waco 2007, pet. denied) (stating Juvenile

Justice Code expressly recognizes that juveniles must be provided “fair hearing” and

his “constitutional and other legal rights” must be “recognized and enforced”)

(quoting TEX. FAM. CODE § 51.01(6)); id. (holding “juvenile has a limited right of

confrontation under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment rather

than under the Sixth Amendment”).

A.    Standard of Review

      We apply a two-prong standard of review with respect to a juvenile court’s

order waiving its exclusive jurisdiction. First, we review the sufficiency of the

evidence supporting the juvenile court’s findings under Texas Family Code Section

54.02, and if the juvenile court’s findings are supported by sufficient evidence, then

we review the juvenile court’s ultimate waiver decision under an abuse-of-discretion

standard. In re C.M.M., 503 S.W.3d 692, 701 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]

2016, pet. denied); see also In re M.S., No. 01-21-00374-CV, 2022 WL 17981563,

at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 29, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.).

                                         12
      A juvenile court abuses its discretion when it acts without reference to any

guiding rules and principles. In re M.S., 2022 WL 17981563, at *4. In other words,

a juvenile court abuses its discretion “when its decision to transfer is essentially

arbitrary, given the evidence upon which it was based.” Id. (quoting In re C.M.M.,

503 S.W.3d at 701). “By contrast, a waiver decision representing a reasonably

principled application of the legislative criteria generally will pass muster under this

standard of review.” Id. (quoting In re C.M.M., 503 S.W.3d at 701) (internal

quotation omitted).

      Juvenile cases are reviewed under the civil standards of review for legal and

factual sufficiency. In re V.L.T., 570 S.W.3d 867, 869 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2018,

no pet.). Under a legal sufficiency analysis, we view the evidence in the light most

favorable to the court’s findings and disregard contrary evidence unless a reasonable

fact finder could not reject the evidence. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802,

807, 827 (Tex. 2005); see also In re C.R., 571 S.W.3d 849, 857 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.). We may sustain a legal sufficiency challenge

only when (1) the record discloses a complete absence of evidence of a vital fact, (2)

the court is barred by rules of law or of evidence from giving weight to the only

evidence offered to prove a vital fact, (3) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is

no more than a mere scintilla, or (4) the evidence establishes conclusively the

opposite of a vital fact. Ford Motor Co. v. Castillo, 444 S.W.3d 616, 620 (Tex.

                                           13
2014). Anything more than a scintilla of evidence is legally sufficient to support a

finding. In re C.R., 571 S.W.3d at 857; see also King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118

S.W.3d 742, 751 (Tex. 2003) (stating more than scintilla of evidence exists when

reasonable and fair-minded individuals could differ in their conclusions).

B.    Applicable Law

      Juvenile courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over cases involving

delinquent conduct by children. See TEX. FAM. CODE §§ 51.02(2)(b) (defining

“[c]hild” as relevant here as “person who is . . . seventeen years of age or older and

under 18 years of age who is alleged or found to have engaged in delinquent conduct

. . . as a result of acts committed before becoming 17 years of age”), 51.03(a)(1)

(defining “[d]elinquent conduct” as “conduct, other than a traffic offense, that

violates a penal law of this state or of the United States punishable by imprisonment

or by confinement in jail”). When committed by a minor, aggravated sexual assault

of a child, indecency with a child by contact, and injury to a child constitute

delinquent conduct. See id. § 51.03(a)(1); see also TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 21.11(a)(1)

(defining indecency with child by contact), 22.021(a)(1)(B)(i), (2)(B) (defining

aggravated sexual assault of child), 22.04(a)(3) (defining injury to child).

      “A juvenile court may waive its exclusive original jurisdiction and transfer a

juvenile case to the appropriate district court for criminal proceedings if certain

statutory and constitutional requirements are met.” Ex parte Thomas, 623 S.W.3d

                                          14
370, 372 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). As relevant here, Texas Family Code Section

54.02(a) states that a juvenile court may waive its exclusive original jurisdiction and

transfer a child’s case to the criminal district court for criminal proceedings if:

      (1)    the child is alleged to have violated a penal law of the grade of
             felony;

      (2)    the child was:

             (A)    14 years of age or older at the time he is alleged to have
                    committed the offense, if the offense is . . . a felony of the
                    first degree, and no adjudication hearing has been
                    conducted concerning that offense;

             (B)    15 years of age or older at the time the child is alleged to
                    have committed the offense, if the offense is a felony of
                    the second or third degree or a state jail felony, and no
                    adjudication hearing has been conducted concerning the
                    offense; and

      ...

      (3)    after a full investigation and a hearing, the juvenile court
             determines that there is probable cause to believe that the child
             before the court committed the offense alleged and that because
             of the seriousness of the offense alleged or the background of the
             child the welfare of the community requires criminal
             proceedings.

TEX. FAM. CODE § 54.02(a).2 “At the transfer hearing the court may consider written

reports from probation officers, professional court employees, guardians ad litem

2
      C.P.R. does not appear to be challenging the juvenile court’s finding “that because
      of the seriousness of the offense alleged or the background of the child the welfare
      of the community requires criminal proceedings.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 54.02(a)(3).

                                           15
appointed under Section 51.11(d), or professional consultants in addition to the

testimony of witnesses.” Id. § 54.02(e).

      In evaluating a determination of probable cause under Section 54.029(a)(3),

we consider whether there are sufficient facts and circumstances to support a prudent

person’s belief that the accused child committed the offense. In re C.R., 571 S.W.3d

at 858; see also In re C.M.M., 503 S.W.3d at 702. Probable cause “requires more

than mere suspicion but less evidence than that needed to support a conviction or

support a finding by a preponderance of the evidence.” In re C.M.M., 503 S.W.3d

at 702.    Courts apply a “totality-of-the-circumstances” analysis to determine

probable cause. In re C.R., 571 S.W.3d at 858 (citations omitted).

      A person commits aggravated sexual assault of a child if he intentionally or

knowingly causes the penetration of the sexual organ of a child under fourteen years

of age by any means. TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.021(a)(1)(B)(i), (2)(B). A person

commits indecency with a child by contact if, with a child younger than seventeen

years of age, he engages in sexual contact with the child. Id. § 21.11(a)(1); see id.

§ 21.01(2) (defining “sexual contact,” in part, as “any touching of . . . the genitals of

another person with intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person”). A

person commits injury to a child if he intentionally or knowingly by act causes bodily

injury to a child. Id. § 22.04(a)(3); see id. § 1.07(a)(8) (defining “bodily injury” as

“physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition”).

                                           16
      The State has the burden to produce evidence to establish waiver of

jurisdiction is appropriate in a particular case. In re T.S., 548 S.W.3d 711, 721 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.). A transfer hearing, however, is not held

to determine the child’s guilt or innocence; instead, it is held for “the purpose of

establishing whether the child’s and society’s best interests are met by maintaining

juvenile custody of the child or by transferring [the child] to district court for adult

proceedings.” In re M.D.B., 757 S.W.2d 415, 417 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]

1988, no pet.); In re B.M., No. 01-18-00898-CV, 2019 WL 1388561, at *8 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 28, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.).

C.    Due Process Clause

      C.P.R. argues he has “a limited right of confrontation under the Due Process

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which requires a balancing test, which was

violated due to the fact that no alleged victim’s testimony was offered or confronted”

at the hearing. See In re M.P., 220 S.W.3d at 109 (holding “juvenile has a limited

right of confrontation under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

rather than under the Sixth Amendment”). A failure to object to constitutional errors,

including Due Process Clause violations, waives appellate review of those claims.

See Low v. Henry, 221 S.W.3d 609, 619 (Tex. 2007) (concluding due process claim

not preserved because defendant failed to raise claim before trial court); In re I.N.A.,

No. 03-22-00206-CV, 2022 WL 4830785, at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin Oct. 4, 2022,

                                          17
no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Due-process complaints in juvenile proceedings are subject to

the general error preservation rules.”). Because he did not raise a Due Process

Clause challenge in the juvenile court, C.P.R. has waived this issue for appellate

review. See Low, 221 S.W.3d at 619.

D.    Legal Sufficiency of the Evidence

      C.P.R. argues the juvenile court abused its discretion by waiving its

jurisdiction over his three criminal cases because the evidence is legally insufficient

to support the juvenile court’s finding “there is probable cause to believe [C.P.R.]

committed” the alleged offenses of aggravated sexual assault against L.T., indecency

with a child against J.O., and injury to a child against S.B. According to C.P.R.,

there is legally insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s probable cause

finding because the State “presented no legitimate evidence” and no “direct evidence

from the alleged victims was presented to the Court, only hearsay from a parent,

what the parent was told, then told to the officer, then told again in Court.”

      C.P.R. is not challenging any of the juvenile court’s evidentiary rulings on

appeal. That is, he does not argue on appeal that the juvenile court abused its

discretion by admitting any testimony or exhibit, on any ground. Instead, C.P.R.

argues we cannot, as part of our legal sufficiency analysis, consider Detective

Bissett’s testimony concerning the statements the complainants and their family

members made to him because the evidence amounts to hearsay. This Court’s

                                          18
opinion in In re B.M., No. 01-18-00898-CV, 2019 WL 1388561 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 28, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) is not only binding precedent,

but it is also instructive. In that case, the State alleged that B.M. had committed

seven separate felony offenses of aggravated robbery, one of which was perpetrated

against Tran. On appeal, B.M. argued there was insufficient evidence to support the

trial court’s finding there was probable cause to believe B.M. had committed

aggravated robbery against Tran because Tran “made no identification of B.M. at

th[e] [transfer] hearing.” 2019 WL 1388561, at *12. Although Tran did not testify

at the transfer hearing, a police officer testified about the details of the alleged

offense, as conveyed to him by Tran. Id. The B.M. Court noted that “because the

transfer hearing is a nonadversary preliminary hearing, the juvenile court may rely

upon hearsay as well as written and oral testimony in making its probable-cause

findings.” Id. (citing Navarro v. State, No. 01-11-00139-CR, 2012 WL 3776372, at

*5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 30, 2012 pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not

designated for publication); see also L.M.C. v. State, 861 S.W.2d 541, 542 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, no pet.) (stating transfer hearing is “nonadversary

preliminary hearing” and “appellant’s rights will be fully protected when the case

reaches trial”). The court explained that “a juvenile court may rely on the testimony

of law enforcement officers to support a probable-cause finding, including testimony

regarding any statements a complainant made to the officers.” In re B.M., 2019 WL

                                         19
1388561, at *13. Relying on the officer’s testimony, the court concluded there was

more than a scintilla of evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding that B.M.

committed the offense of aggravated robbery against Tran. Id. at *14.

      Section 54.02(e) of the Family Code also expressly provides that during the

transfer hearing, juvenile courts are permitted to “consider written reports from

probation officers, professional court employees, guardians ad litem appointed under

Section 51.11(d), or professional consultants in addition to the testimony of

witnesses.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 54.02(e). This statute “provides an explicit exception

to the hearsay rule in a transfer to criminal court proceeding.” In re J.A.W., 976

S.W.2d 260, 264 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, no pet.).3

      1.     Aggravated Sexual Assault of Child against L.T.

      At the hearing, Officer Rivera testified when he arrived at the park, he spoke

to G.S., who told him that her granddaughter, L.T., and L.T.’s friend, S.B., who had

been playing at the park, “were touched on their private parts” by a juvenile white

male with brown hair, who was wearing a black cap, black shirt, and blue jeans and

riding a bike. G.S. said that the young man ran towards the park’s community center

3
      We note that C.P.R. did not object on hearsay grounds to the summary of the
      Predisposition Report prepared by Officer Rodriguez or to all of Detective Bissett’s
      testimony. C.P.R. objected only to Detective Bissett’s offense reports, some
      portions of Detective Bissett’s testimony, and the documents included in the
      appendix to the Predisposition Report, none of which we rely upon in our legal
      sufficiency analysis.

                                           20
area after L.T. and S.B. yelled at him. After speaking with G.S., Officer Rivera saw

someone riding a bike at the community center who matched G.S.’s description of

the suspect. When Officer Rivera asked the suspect, who Officer Rivera identified

as C.P.R., “if he was involved in the incident,” C.P.R. told Officer Rivera that he

“didn’t mean to hurt the little girls.” Detective Bissett testified that G.S. told him

that L.T., who had been playing in the park with a teenage boy, told her that she “had

been touched by a boy” and “it hurt.” The SANE who examined L.T. told Detective

Bissett that L.T., who was 5 years old, told her that she had been “touched inside of

her underwear, that her pants had been pulled down.” According to the SANE, L.T.

had indicated “digital penetration of her private area” and the SANE had observed

“redness and inflammation consistent with vaginal trauma” and “penetration.”

      Detective Bissett and Officer Rivera thus provided sufficient facts and

circumstances to support a prudent person’s belief that C.P.R. had intentionally or

knowingly penetrated the sexual organ of L.T., a five-year-old child, with his finger,

as alleged by the State. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.021(a)(1)(B)(i), (2)(B) (stating

person commits aggravated sexual assault of child if he intentionally or knowingly

causes penetration of the sexual organ of child under fourteen years of age by any

means); In re C.M.M., 503 S.W.3d at 702 (stating probable cause “requires more

than mere suspicion but less evidence than that needed to support a conviction or

support a finding by a preponderance of the evidence”).

                                         21
      The summary portion of Officer Rodriguez’s Predisposition Report, which

was admitted into evidence without objection, summarizes the evidence supporting

each charge against C.P.R., based in part on the information contained in Detective

Bissett’s offense reports. The Predisposition Report’s summary, which is consistent

with Detective Bissett’s testimony, also provides sufficient facts and circumstances

to support a prudent person’s belief that C.P.R. intentionally or knowingly

penetrated the sexual organ of L.T., a five-year-old child, with his finger, as alleged

by the State. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.021(a)(1)(B)(i), (2)(B); TEX. FAM. CODE

§ 54.02(e) (allowing juvenile courts to consider written reports from probation

officers when determining whether to waive jurisdiction and transfer juvenile’s case

to criminal court).

      2.     Injury to a Child against S.B

      Officer Rivera testified that G.S. told him that L.T. and S.B. had been playing

with an older boy with brown hair, who was wearing a black cap, black shirt, and

blue jeans and riding a bike and the boy ran towards the community center after the

girls yelled at him. Officer Rivera detained C.P.R., who matched the description

G.S. had provided, at the community center. When asked if he had been involved

in the incident at the park, C.P.R. told Officer Rivera that he had not meant to hurt

anyone. A.B., S.B.’s mother, told Detective Bissett that S.B. told her the “same boy”

who had touched L.T. had also grabbed S.B.’s left arm and tried to pull her into the

                                          22
bathroom. According to S.B., her arm hurt when C.P.R. “grabbed her and she tried

to get away.” Detective Bissett testified that when he looked at S.B.’s arm, he

observed “very mild redness there at the time but no—no bruising.” According to

Detective Bissett, S.B. was 7 or 8 years old when the incident at the park occurred.

      Detective Bissett and Officer Rivera thus provided sufficient facts and

circumstances to support a prudent person’s belief that C.P.R. intentionally or

knowingly caused S.B., a seven- or eight-year-old child, physical pain when he

grabbed her arm. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.04(a)(3) (stating person commits injury

to child if he intentionally or knowingly by act causes bodily injury to child); see id.

§ 1.07(a)(8) (defining “bodily injury” as “physical pain”); In re C.M.M., 503 S.W.3d

at 702 (stating probable cause “requires more than mere suspicion but less evidence

than that needed to support a conviction or support a finding by a preponderance of

the evidence”).

      The Predisposition Report’s summary, which was admitted into evidence

without objection and is consistent with Detective Bissett’s and Officer Rodriguez’s

testimony, also provides sufficient facts and circumstances to support a prudent

person’s belief that C.P.R. intentionally or knowingly caused S.B., a seven- or eight-

year-old child, physical pain when he grabbed her arm. See TEX. PENAL CODE §§

1.07(a)(8), 22.04(a)(3); TEX. FAM. CODE § 54.02(e) (allowing juvenile courts to

                                          23
consider written reports from probation officers when determining whether to waive

jurisdiction and transfer juvenile’s case to criminal court).

      3.     Indecency with a Child against J.O.

      Detective Bissett testified that A.O. told him that his daughter, J.O., told him

the boy she had been playing with at the park had “touched her and asked her to take

her—her clothes off” and when A.O. showed Detective Bissett a photograph of the

boy at the park, Detective Bissett recognized him as C.P.R. Detective Bissett also

testified that J.O., who was 8 years old, told the forensic interviewer at the Child

Advocacy Center that the boy at the park had laid down on top of her when they

were on the top level of the play structure, and he placed his hand inside the front of

her underwear. J.O. said she “could feel his fingers moving.”

      Detective Bissett thus provided sufficient facts and circumstances to support

a prudent person’s belief that C.P.R. touched the genitals of J.O., an eight-year-old

child, with intent to arouse or gratify his sexual desire. See TEX. PENAL CODE

§ 21.11(a)(1) (stating person commits indecency with child by contact if, with child

younger than seventeen years of age, he engages in sexual contact with child; see id.

§ 21.01(2) (defining “sexual contact,” in part, as “any touching of . . . the genitals of

another person with intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person”); see

also In re C.M.M., 503 S.W.3d at 702 (stating probable cause “requires more than

                                           24
mere suspicion but less evidence than that needed to support a conviction or support

a finding by a preponderance of the evidence”).

      The Predisposition Report’s summary, which was admitted into evidence

without objection and is consistent with Detective Bissett’s testimony, also provides

sufficient facts and circumstances to support a prudent person’s belief that C.P.R.

touched the genitals of J.O., an eight-year-old child, with intent to arouse or gratify

his sexual desire. See TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 21.01(2), 21.11(a)(1); TEX. FAM. CODE

§ 54.02(e) (allowing juvenile courts to consider written reports from probation

officers when determining whether to waive jurisdiction and transfer juvenile’s case

to criminal court).

      After considering the totality of the circumstances and viewing the evidence

in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s findings, we conclude there is more

than a scintilla of evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding that a prudent

person would be justified in believing that C.P.R. committed the alleged offenses of

aggravated sexual assault against L.T., indecency with a child against J.O., and

injury to a child against S.B. See In re C.R., 571 S.W.3d at 857 (stating evidence is

legally sufficient when there is more than scintilla to support determination); id. at

858 (stating there is legally sufficient evidence to support probable cause finding

under Section 54.029(a)(3) if there are sufficient facts and circumstances to support

prudent person’s belief accused child committed alleged offense).

                                          25
      We overrule C.P.R.’s sole issue.

                                   Conclusion

      We affirm the juvenile court’s order.

                                              Veronica Rivas-Molloy
                                              Justice

Panel consists of Justices Goodman, Landau, and Rivas-Molloy.

                                         26