Court Opinion

ID: 9739171
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:09:56.168146+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:10.406358
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE BARRY, dissenting: Helen has the burden of demonstrating a substantial change in the circumstances by showing that John’s ability to pay additional maintenance has increased and that her needs for maintenance have increased since the original maintenance order. (In re Marriage of Munford (1988), 173 Ill. App. 3d 576, 580, 527 N.E.2d 892, 894.) Although the modification of a maintenance award rests within the sound discretion of the trial judge (Gorman v. Gorman (1979), 72 Ill. App. 3d 658, 662, 391 N.E.2d 70, 73), the record in this case does not support the trial court’s finding of a substantial change in the circumstances. Therefore, I respectfully dissent. The record indicates that John’s net income from Caterpillar increased $153.62 per month and that his monthly expenses increased $107 between the original maintenance order and the October 15, 1992, hearing on the petition to modify. We also note that John’s income has decreased by $17,000 since the initial maintenance award and that the trial court originally anticipated this decrease in its initial judgment. The record further indicates that at the time of Helen’s petition to modify maintenance her net income was approximately $92 per month higher than her income at the time of the original maintenance order, and her monthly expenses had decreased from $2,354 to $1,866.86. According to the record, Helen was unemployed for several months and she received unemployment compensation during the time she was without a job. However, evidence showing fluctuations in her income subsequent to the original divorce judgment but before the petition to modify is irrelevant to the question of current earnings. (Robin v. Robin (1977), 45 Ill. App. 3d 365, 371, 359 N.E.2d 809, 814.) Consequently, I find erroneous the majority’s conclusion that Helen’s income has decreased substantially, when the evidence demonstrates that her income has not decreased whatsoever, but has increased almost $100 per month. In sum, Helen is now employed and earning income comparable to her income at the time of the original maintenance award and her monthly expenses have decreased. I also note that pursuant to the original maintenance award, Helen received one-half of John’s profit-sharing plan at Caterpillar, one-half of his Caterpillar government securities investment and one-half of his Caterpillar and Army Reserves pensions. John additionally pays the amount necessary to maintain Helen’s health insurance with Caterpillar and to maintain Helen as a beneficiary of his life insurance. I also find that the court obviously considered the remarriage of the defendant for the purpose of finding a reduction in the defendant’s financial needs. However, the record lacks any evidence whatsoever establishing that John’s new spouse shared any of his $4,174 in monthly expenses. Thus, I believe that the trial court erred by deciding that "in this case...Seven Hundred Dollars ($700) of Defendant’s monthly expenses are found to be shared.” The record contains no evidence reflecting John’s new wife’s income other than the fact that she is a nurse and that his new wife has two college-aged sons who depend on her for support. In fact, the only other testimony on this subject was John’s uncontested statement that his new wife did not contribute to the monthly expenses listed in his affidavit. The Garelick court stated that "[t]he financial status of a divorced party’s spouse has no bearing in a proceeding for modification of maintenance or child support.” (In re Marriage of Garelick (1988), 168 Ill. App. 3d 321, 327, 522 N.E.2d 738, 743.) I believe the rule might be better stated as follows: A trial court may look at the financial status of a party’s new spouse only to the extent that the new spouse actually contributes to the expenses claimed by the party in the maintenance proceeding to determine a party’s ability to pay maintenance. Of course, there must be evidence in the record of such contributions. I believe it is improper for a court to assume that a party’s new spouse contributes to such expenses based only on the fact that the two are married. The majority suggests that the trial court and this court can properly infer that "half of the $700 mortgage payment went to the benefit of the husband’s new wife.” (260 Ill. App. 3d at 734.) However, the new wife paid the entire $52,000 down payment for the $149,000 house, thus reducing the principal owed on the house to $97,000. Has the wife not paid her share of the purchase price for her benefit? I do not agree with the majority’s inference. I believe that in light of the testimony, if an inference is to be made, it is that the defendant makes the $700 mortgage payment for his share of the home. It is axiomatic, as the Garelick court properly stated, that "a reviewing court will not set aside a modification of a maintenance award unless the trial court clearly abused its discretion.” (Garelick, 168 Ill. App. 3d at 326, 522 N.E.2d at 743.) In the present case I believe that the trial court clearly abused its discretion by making the unsupported conclusion that some of John’s listed expenses were paid by his new wife. Although a trial court should look at all of the factors considered in making an initial maintenance award when adjudicating a petition for a change of maintenance (In re Marriage of Plotz (1992), 229 Ill. App. 3d 389, 391, 594 N.E.2d 366, 368), I find nothing in the record to support the court’s finding that Helen has increased needs or that John’s ability to pay justifies a $250-per-month increase in maintenance to Helen. Section 510 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act states that "the obligation to pay future maintenance is terminated upon *** the remarriage of the party receiving maintenance.” (750 ILCS 5/510(c) (West 1992).) The legislature has made no such rule affirmatively setting forth the public policy regarding the remarriage of the party paying maintenance. Consequently, I believe that the party seeking an increase in maintenance and alleging shared expenses of the paying party has the burden of setting forth some evidence establishing that the paying party’s new spouse contributes to that party’s expenses, other than the fact that they are married. Helen offered no such evidence in the present case. I read the majority opinion to imply that the remarriage of a party paying maintenance results in a per se reduction in that party’s expenses and, consequently, an increase in that party’s ability to pay maintenance. Had the legislature intended such a presumption, it would have been included in the statute. Here, the trial court made a finding unsupported by the record that $1,492 of John’s expenses were for the benefit of his new wife. The parties in this case have gone their separate ways, and upon dissolution of the marriage, the trial court granted Helen a reasonable maintenance award. Helen has suffered no sudden illness, loss of resources or incurred increased needs. Parties to such an equitable disposition upon divorce should not be allowed to come back to court seeking modification for insubstantial reasons. My interpretation of the opinions of our courts leads me to conclude that the record in the present case does not establish a "substantial” change in circumstances as contemplated by section 510(a) of the Act. In light of the foregoing, I would hold that the trial court’s finding that there has been a substantial change in circumstances justifying an increase of the original maintenance award in the amount of $250 per month was against the manifest weight of the evidence.