Court Opinion

ID: 9584067
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:44:24.358582+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:06:28.190650
License: Public Domain

SHORT, Judge
(concurring in part, dissenting in part).
I concur insofar as the majority concludes the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Pillsbury Company on Bryson’s “risk of cancer” claim. I respectfully dissent on the narrow remand concerning Bryson’s “chromosome breakage” claim because there is no evidence supporting an award of damages for present physical injury. Compare Werlein v. United States, 746 F.Supp. 887, 901 (D.Minn.1990) (holding summary judgment inappropriate where increased risk of harm damages are supported by evidence of present physical injury), vacated in part on other grounds, 793 F.Supp. 898 (D.Minn.1992) with Reliance Ins. Co. v. Arneson, 322 N.W.2d 604, 607 (Minn.1982) (concluding threat of future harm, not yet realized, will not satisfy damage requirement in negligence action). Mere allegations of emotional distress and possible medical monitoring expenses are insufficient to create a fact issue on whether Bryson now suffers from a present physical injury. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.05 (stating nonmoving party may not rest on pleading averments or denials, but must present specific facts showing genuine issue for trial); Nicollet Restoration, Inc. v. City of St. Paul, 533 N.W.2d 845, 848 (Minn.1995) (holding speculation and general assertions are not sufficient to create genuine issue of material fact for trial).
Even if an asymptomatic chromosome condition constitutes evidence of a present physical injury, Bryson also failed to offer any evidence that her alleged damages are capable of proof to a reasonable certainty. See Fabio v. Bellomo, 504 N.W.2d 758, 762-63 (Minn.1993) (concluding, even if court were to adopt “loss of chance” theory in medical malpractice actions, summary judgment was appropriate on “loss of chance” theory because patient failed to present evidence that it was more probable than not that her cancer would recur or that she had diminished life expectancy); see also Abuan v. General Elec. Co., 3 F.3d 329, 334 (9th Cir.1993) (concluding plaintiff who seeks damages for increased risk of future illness or injury can recover only where toxic exposure more probably than not will lead to malady); Laswell v. Brown, 683 F.2d 261, 269 (8th Cir.1982) (concluding lawsuit for personal injuries cannot be based only upon mere possibility of some future harm); Thomas v. FAG Bearings Corp., 846 F.Supp. 1400, 1408 (W.D.Mo.1994) (concluding claim for increased risk of cancer is not compensable unless reasonably certain to occur); Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 106 N.J. 557, 525 A.2d 287, 308 (1987) (declining to recognize plaintiffs’ cause of action for unquantified enhanced risk of disease because of speculative nature of an unquantified enhanced risk claim and difficulties inherent in adjudicating such claims). Under these circumstances, Bryson has no compensable injury and Pillsbury Company is entitled to judgment as a *723matter of law. I would affirm the trial eourt’s grant of summary judgment.