Court Opinion

ID: 9763261
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:39:47.331707+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:40.254432
License: Public Domain

HARBISON, Justice,
concurring.
I concur in the result reached by the majority, but, in my view, an extremely close question is presented as to whether the jury verdict should be disturbed.
This Court dealt at some length with the issue of paranoid schizophrenia in the case of Forbes v. State, 559 S.W.2d 318 (Tenn.1977). There the accused had suffered from that mental illness for many years prior to the date of the crime of which he was accused. Expert testimony was unanimous that he suffered from that mental illness, but this Court upheld a jury conviction on the basis that the evidence failed to show that the accused was not in remission on the date of the crime. The Court said:
“Three inescapable conclusions emerge from the proof, i.e. (1) that a paranoid schizophrenic is not legally insane under the M’Naghten rules when he is in a period of remission; (2) a prima facie case of legal insanity in such a case may only be established by proof that at the time of the crime the accused was not in *354remission; and (3) that proof of proper job functioning and normal appearance on the part of a paranoid schizophrenic is of questionable value.” 559 S.W.2d at 325.
The Court held that a prima facie case was not shown by the record because there was insufficient evidence that on the date of the crime the accused was psychotic rather than being in a state of remission.
Viewed in light of those principles, which I think' are controlling, the questions presented here are close indeed. The accused in this case had been pronounced competent to stand trial on other charges in September 1978, about ten months prior to the date of the crime in question, July 2, 1979. He was receiving injections at two-week intervals for his illness at least until January 1979. .The record becomes very unsatisfactory as to whether he did or did not have much medication after that date. He was hospitalized for a gunshot wound for ten days in April and May 1979, a little over two months prior to the crime, and nothing in those hospital records mentions any deviant behavior or need of medication. His mother testified that she took him to a Veterans Administration institution a few weeks before the crime, but no records from that institution were filed in evidence.
Appellant was first examined by a psychiatrist nine days after the crime and was found at that time to be psychotic. That psychiatrist and three others testified that they were of the opinion that on the date of the crime the accused lacked mental capacity to be held responsible under the principles stated in Graham v. State, 547 S.W.2d 531 (Tenn.1977). The testimony of these witnesses, however, was, to say the least, contradictory and complex. At least two of these witnesses were very positive in their conclusion that the accused could not have distinguished right from wrong on the date of the crime; the other two felt that he probably could make that distinction but that he could not control his conduct so as to conform it to the requirements of law. The first two were less certain on that point and at least one of them stated that in some degree, at least, the accused could conform his conduct.
Issues such as this generally present classic questions for determination by a jury, who are not bound to accept opinions and may reject them wholly or in part. Edwards v. State, 540 S.W.2d 641 (Tenn.1976).
Further, I do not believe that the trier of fact was bound to accept uncritically or at face value the very partisan and also contradictory testimony of the mother and sisters of the accused. This is an appeal from a jury verdict, and the State, not the accused, is entitled to the most favorable view of the evidentiary record. Partisan testimony of this nature, which has been rejected by a jury, ordinarily is entitled to little weight in an appellate court. Certainly the portions quoted in the majority opinion omit other evidence which was before the jury. In my view they were free to disregard in its entirety the testimony of the mother and sisters, all of whom denied any knowledge of the appellant’s long history of drug abuse. Further, the mother personally drove the appellant in her automobile from her home to the streets of downtown Memphis on the night before the crime, releasing him to spend the night in a nearby “mission” where he had been staying “off and on.” If she really feared he was becoming psychotic again, as she indicated, some other course of conduct would have been more appropriate, or at least a jury might so conclude.
The State made a very close issue in this case as to whether the murder resulted from mental illness or from drug abuse and drug intoxication. The accused did not testify. He gave different statements to different persons who interviewed him, but at least some of the expert witnesses were told by him that on the morning of the crime he had smoked marijuana. Records from his last hospitalization for mental illness before the date of the crime state:
“The social history reveals that he has been in trouble many times with the law, being arrested for carrying a pistol, larceny twice and for marijuana possession. Before the age of fifteen, he had been on *355drugs, using Speed, acid, downers and marijuana. He also smokes marijuana off and on and drinks occasionally.”
Records from a hospitalization in 1976 state:
“He gives a history of drinking a quart of beer and smoking 3 to 4 joints every day for the past 3 years.”
The last question asked on cross-examination of Dr. Bursten, one of the principal witnesses for appellant, was this:
“Q. Let me ask you, Doctor, your opinion then. Wouldn’t it be your opinion that the smoking of the marijuana cigarette, coupled with some mental problems he would have— would that not contribute to his actions?
“A. • It could very well.”
The doctor then explained that he had not obtained much history as to drug consumption by the accused, who was teetering on a “see-saw of mental balance, in, out, and so on.” The doctor concluded:
“So, this certainly could have had an effect, I just don’t know, I didn’t get a firm enough story here to allow me to say with any certainty whether indeed it did.”
There was also evidence that on the morning of the crime the accused attempted to speak to some girls on two occasions and that they rebuffed him. He went to a store, bought a butcher knife and apparently was very angry. He waited for an hour or more, then decided to kill the next person who came down the street. He stabbed a young boy to death, interrupting to straighten his knife while in the process; then fled when pursued. His flight and later his request when apprehended that he not be harmed — that he was sick — were not inconsistent with mental competency. The murder, of course, was senseless, as most homicides are, but a trier of fact could have attributed it to anger and to drug ingestion rather than to mental illness.1
It seems to me, therefore, that most of the questions involved in this case were proper for submission to the jury for their determination.
Under the principles of the Forbes case, however, the combined effect of the expert testimony in this case — which was very strong — probably created a prima facie case that the accused was not in remission on the date of the crime. The trial judge was deeply concerned over this question when the motion for a new trial was argued, and he kept the matter under advisement for some time.
Only because the defense may have established sufficient doubt as to the mental competence of the accused on the date of the crime can I concur in setting aside the jury verdict.
COOPER, J., concurs.

. While there is in the record evidence that the accused was of “dull normal” intelligence, this is not the most favorable evidence toward the jury verdict. There is proof that he was normal, had been a student at Shelby State Community College, and at one time had planned to study computer programming. The jurors were not bound to conclude that he was retarded or impaired as to comprehension or intelligence except when his illness was out of remission, nor is this the preponderance of the evidence, in my opinion.