Court Opinion

ID: 9723022
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:00:20.717455+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:43.951886
License: Public Domain

MILLER, J.
I respectfully dissent.
The trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion excluding statements of her prior involvement with drugs was error. This appears to be clear *278from a reading of two recent California Supreme Court decisions, People v. Barraza (1979) 23 Cal.3d 675 [153 Cal.Rptr. 459, 591 P.2d 947] and People v. Hall (1980) 28 Cal.3d 143 [167 Cal.Rptr. 844, 616 P.2d 826].
In the Barraza case, the court held that the proper test of entrapment was whether the actions of the law enforcement agent was likely to persuade a normally law abiding person to commit the crime. (Pp. 689, 690.) It was concluded that conduct by the police or police agents was not permissible if it became overbearing and involved “badgering, cajoling [or] importuning . ... ” (P. 690.) The court stated that one example of such impermissible conduct was an appeal to commit the unlawful act because of friendship or sympathy. (P. 690.) An offer of exorbitant consideration was also another example of police conduct which would make the commission of the crime unusually attractive. (P. 690.) It was held that “such matters as the character of the suspect, his predisposition to commit the offense, and his subjective intent” were not relevant, since the defense of entrapment was designed primarily to deter impermissible police conduct. (Pp. 690-691, fn. 5.)
In the second case, People v. Hall, supra, the situation was one in which the defendant, who was charged with possession of a concealable firearm by a felon, offered to stipulate in the trial court to the fact that he was a convicted felon and that he would be guilty as charged if the jury found that he was in possession of a concealable firearm. After offering to so stipulate, the defendant then moved to exclude from the jury’s consideration any evidence of his prior conviction. The stipulation was refused by the prosecution, and the trial court ruled that the people were entitled to prove the fact that the defendant had been previously convicted to the jury. (P. 151.)
The Supreme Court held that this ruling constituted error. It was reasoned that section 210 of the Evidence Code defines relevant evidence as evidence which tends to prove or disprove any disputed fact, and that section 350 of the Evidence Code provides that no evidence is admissible except relevant evidence. (P. 152.) The court concluded that when a fact is not genuinely disputed, evidence offered to prove that fact is irrelevant and inadmissible. (P. 152.) Hence, where a defendant offers to admit the existence of an element of a charged offense, the prosecution must accept that offer and refrain from introducing evi*279dence to prove that element. (P. 152.) The court then observed that there were narrow exceptions to this exclusionary rule, and that evidence of a fact as to which the defendant had offered to stipulate might still be admissible if 1) it was relevant to an issue not covered by the stipulation; 2) the stipulation would force the prosecution to elect between theories of guilt or hamper the coherent presentation of evidence on the remaining issues, or 3) the stipulation or admission was ambiguous or limited in scope or was intended to deprive the prosecution of the legitimate force and effect of material evidence. (Pp. 152-153.) It was held that none of these exceptions applied in a prosecution for possession of a concealable firearm by a felon and that in view of the potential prejudice to the defendant, the jury could not be apprised in any way of his stipulated status as a convicted felon. (Pp. 156-157.)
People v. Hall, supra, appears to compel the conclusion that in this instance, the trial court should have required the prosecution to accept defendant’s offer to stipulate that she knowingly offered to sell cocaine: Further, that the courts should have ruled that evidence offered to prove the stipulated facts was irrelevant and therefore inadmissible, and that the evidence before the jury would be limited solely to that bearing upon the defense of entrapment. People v. Barraza, supra, appears to compel the additional conclusion that evidence of defendant’s various admissions to the narcotics agents that she had been involved in illegal drug activities in the past was irrelevant and inadmissible on the issue of entrapment because the statements served only to show “the character of the suspect, [her] predisposition to commit the offense, and [her] subjective intent.” (People v. Barraza, supra, at pp. 690-691.)
Attempts to defeat this reasoning, to me, are not persuasive. The Attorney General asserts that evidence of the defendant’s incriminating statements to the narcotics agents was relevant and admissible because she did not rely solely upon an entrapment defense, but also denied, during her testimony, that she had made certain of the statements which the agents had attributed to her. The fatal flaw in this argument is that defendant so testified only after the trial court had ruled that it would not compel the prosecution to accept her stipulation that she had knowingly offered to sell cocaine and would permit the prosecution to offer proof of that fact, including defendant’s incriminating statements to the agents. It seems clear to me that defendant denied certain of those statements only because the trial court had refused to exclude *280them and to limit the evidence to that bearing upon the defense of entrapment.
It is also asserted by the People that the evidence of defendant’s incriminating statements to the agents was admissible on the issue of entrapment. They are correct in pointing out that the Barraza court held that “the transactions preceding the offense [and] the suspect’s response to the inducements of the officer” are admissible on the issue of entrapment, although evidence bearing upon the suspect’s character, predisposition to commit the crime and subjective intent is not. (People v. Barraza, supra, at pp. 690-691.) The Attorney General contends that defendant’s statements fell into the former category rather than the latter and constituted transactions preceding the offense and defendant’s response to the officer’s inducements. It is clear that the Barraza court held that evidence of this nature is admissible on the issue of entrapment only if such evidence is not of the type that merely bears upon the defendant’s character, predisposition to commit the offense and subjective intent. I agree with the Attorney General in this instance that certain events surrounding the drug transaction were relevant and admissible on the entrapment issue. Thus, the prosecution was entitled to show such facts as defendant’s apparently willing participation in the drug transaction, her statements to agent Dixon that he should go ahead with the purchase and her conduct in remaining at the motel with the officers while Longstreet went to obtain the cocaine. However, defendant’s additional statements concerning her past “dope deals,” the existence of an alternative cocaine connection in San Francisco and her familiarity with the relative quality of cocaine available from various sources clearly served only to demonstrate that defendant was an individual of bad character who was predisposed to commit the offense with which she was charged. It is clear that such evidence was irrelevant and inadmissible on the entrapment issue under the Barraza holding.
There is no reason to believe that the exclusion of defendant’s statements concerning her past drug involvement would unduly hamper the presentation of the prosecution’s case on the sole remaining issue of entrapment. The prosecution could attempt to defeat defendant’s entrapment defense by proving that she actively participated in and encouraged the sale of cocaine. The exclusion of defendant’s incriminating statements concerning her prior drug involvement would merely serve to limit the jurors’ consideration to the issues properly before them and prevent them from basing their verdict upon the rationale *281that if defendant had engaged in illicit drug transactions in the past, she had probably done so again. (People v. Beagle (1972) 6 Cal.3d 441, 453 [99 Cal.Rptr. 313, 492 P.2d 1].)
It would appear that the judgment of conviction should be reversed.
A petition for a rehearing was denied July 10, 1981. Miller, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted. Appellant’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied August 26, 1981.