Court Opinion

ID: 9585692
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:02:54.398368+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:54.805850
License: Public Domain

Sognier, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
OCGA § 44-14-362, the predecessor of the current OCGA § 44-14-361.1, and the statute in effect at the time appellee brought its action against the contractor, provided in pertinent part as follows: “To make good the liens specified in Code Section 44-14-361, they must be created and declared in accordance with the following provisions, and on failure of any of them the lien shall not be effective: ... (3) The commencement of an action for the recovery of the amount of his claim within 12 months from the time the same shall become due. In addition, at the time of filing such action, the party claiming the lien shall file a notice with the clerk of the superior court of the county wherein the subject lien was filed. . . . Failure to bring action and to file the notice described in this paragraph within the time required shall extinguish the subject claim of lien and render the same unenforceable. . . .” (Emphasis supplied.) See Ga. L. 1981, pp. 846, 847.
We find no ambiguity in the statute, which is explicit that notice is to be filed “at the time of filing such action. ...” “It is an elementary rule of construction that when the words of a statute are plain and unambiguous, and their meaning so obvious so as to eliminate any need for construction, it is the duty of the court to give expres*794sion to the obvious meaning of the General Assembly. [Cits.]” Irwin v. Busbee, 241 Ga. 567 (247 SE2d 103) (1978). See Hollowell v. Jove, 247 Ga. 678, 681 (279 SE2d 430) (1981); Seaboard Coast Line R. Co. v. Blackmon, 129 Ga. App. 342, 344 (199 SE2d 581) (1973). We are therefore bound to follow the express language of the statute.
The language of the statute is phrased in unequivocal terms: “[0]n failure of any [of the statute’s provisions] the lien shall not be effective: . . . (3) . . . Failure to bring action and to file the notice . . . within the time required shall extinguish the subject claim of lien and render the same unenforceable. . . .” OCGA § 44-14-362. Repetition within the statute of the provision that the lien shall be ineffective if all statutory conditions are not met further demonstrates its mandatory nature. “This mandatory language leaves no doubt that the General Assembly placed strong significance upon compelling [compliance with all requirements as preconditions to the effectiveness of the lien.]” Jones v. State Farm &c. Ins. Co., 156 Ga. App. 230, 232 (274 SE2d 623) (1980).
“[IJnasmuch as our lien laws and procedures are in derogation of the common law, they must be construed strictly against the creditor and in favor of the debtor. [Cit.]” Brockett Road Apts. v. Ga.-Pacific Corp., 138 Ga. App. 198, 199 (225 SE2d 771) (1976). See Kwilecki v. Young, 180 Ga. 602 (180 SE 137) (1935). “ ‘If there are degrees of strict construction, certainly an act of the General Assembly which has for its purpose the giving of a lien upon property of one in favor of the creditor of another should be dealt with according to the strictest rules of strict construction.’ ” Cowart v. Reeves, 80 Ga. App. 161, 164 (55 SE2d 911) (1949).
Appellee’s failure to comply with the notice of suit provisions of the statute rendered its lien ineffective and unenforceable. See Statham Machinery &c. Co. v. Howard Constr. Co., 160 Ga. App. 466 (287 SE2d 249) (1981); Bettis v. McClure, 160 Ga. App. 412 (287 SE2d 291) (1981); Hancor, Inc. v. Fleming Farms, 155 Ga. App. 579 (271 SE2d 712) (1980).
I would reverse.
I am authorized to state that Judge Birdsong joins in this dissent.