Court Opinion

ID: 9381224
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-22 15:00:55.854667+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:30.834550
License: Public Domain

20-3683
     Li Min Lin v. Garland
                                                                              BIA
                                                                       Vomacka, IJ
                                                                      A205 894 760
                             UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                   SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION
TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED
AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS
COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX
OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A
PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

 1        At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
 2   for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
 3   United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
 4   New York, on the 22nd day of March, two thousand twenty-
 5   three.
 6
 7   PRESENT:
 8            ROSEMARY S. POOLER,
 9            JOSEPH F. BIANCO,
10            WILLIAM J. NARDINI,
11                 Circuit Judges.
12   _____________________________________
13
14   LI MIN LIN,
15            Petitioner,
16
17                     v.                                   20-3683
18                                                          NAC
19   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
20   STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
21            Respondent.
22   _____________________________________
23
24   FOR PETITIONER:                    Yee Ling Poon, Esq., New York,
25                                      NY.
26
27   FOR RESPONDENT:                    Brian Boynton, Acting Assistant
28                                      Attorney General; Song Park,
 1                                   Senior Litigation Counsel; Rosanne
 2                                   M. Perry, Trial Attorney, Office
 3                                   of Immigration Litigation, United
 4                                   States Department of Justice,
 5                                   Washington, DC.

 6       UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a

 7   Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby

 8   ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review

 9   is DENIED.

10       Petitioner Li Min Lin, a native and citizen of the

11   People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a September 29,

12   2020, decision of the BIA affirming a June 20, 2018, decision

13   of an Immigration Judge (IJ) denying her application for

14   asylum,   withholding    of     removal,    and   relief     under   the

15   Convention Against Torture (CAT).          In re Li Min Lin, No. A205

16   894 760 (B.I.A. Sept. 29, 2020), aff’g No. A 205 894 760

17   (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City June 20, 2018).         We assume the parties’

18   familiarity with the case.

19       We have reviewed the IJ’s decision as supplemented and

20   modified by the BIA.          See Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of

21   Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 2005). The applicable

22   standards of review are well established.               See 8 U.S.C.

23   § 1252(b)(4)(B)   (“[A]dministrative         findings   of    fact   are

24   conclusive   unless     any    reasonable     adjudicator    would    be
                                        2
 1   compelled to conclude to the contrary.”); Hong Fei Gao v.

 2   Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018) (reviewing adverse

 3   credibility      determination       under     substantial       evidence

 4   standard).

 5         The   IJ   may,   “[c]onsidering        the     totality   of   the

 6   circumstances, . . . base a credibility determination on . . .

 7   the inherent plausibility of the applicant’s . . . account,”

 8   and   inconsistencies    in    her       statements    or   between   her

 9   statements and other evidence, “without regard to whether an

10   inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of

11   the applicant’s claim.”       8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).          “We

12   defer . . . to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from

13   the totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no

14   reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility

15   ruling.”    Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir.

16   2008).

17         Lin asserted a claim of past persecution, alleging that

18   that she was forced to have an intrauterine device (“IUD”) in

19   1995, and an abortion and a second IUD in 1999.               The agency

20   pointed to multiple inconsistencies between her application,

21   statements at her asylum interview, hearing testimony, and

                                          3
 1   documentary evidence in concluding that she had not stated a

 2   credible claim.     See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).

 3          Substantial evidence supports the adverse credibility

 4   determination.     Lin’s statements at her asylum interview and

 5   hearing were inconsistent about when she had the IUD removed

 6   before    coming   to   the   United       States     and    whether   Chinese

 7   authorities were aware she had had it removed.                    She argues

 8   that     the   interview      record       is   unreliable       because    of

 9   translation     problems,        but    she     did    not     exhaust     this

10   explanation before the BIA, and, even if she had, asylum

11   interviews are not subject to “special scrutiny” to establish

12   their     reliability      and    the      record      does     not    reflect

13   comprehension issues.         Ming Zhang v. Holder, 585 F.3d 715,

14   723 (2d Cir. 2009).

15          Lin’s testimony contradicted itself in other places, too.

16   At one point, she testified that she and her husband had come

17   to the United States because they wanted to move to a country

18   with more reproductive freedom; elsewhere, she stated that

19   she had come to visit her son who was in the United States on

20   a student visa and learned that she might be eligible for

21   asylum only after her arrival.                  The IJ did not err in

                                            4
 1   concluding that this last allegation was not plausible under

 2   the circumstances.

 3          Lin also changed her explanation for failing to provide

 4   her family planning medical record book as evidence.             During

 5   her asylum interview, she said that she was required to bring

 6   the book to every checkup.             Later, she testified that she

 7   never had the book at home and only signed it during checkups

 8   at the family planning office.           The agency was not required

 9   to credit her explanation that the process changed over time.

10   See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A

11   petitioner must do more than offer a plausible explanation

12   for h[er] inconsistent statements to secure relief; [s]he

13   must    demonstrate   that    a   reasonable     fact-finder   would    be

14   compelled to credit h[er] testimony.” (internal quotation

15   marks omitted)).

16          Finally, the IJ did not err in relying on additional

17   minor    discrepancies       between     Lin’s   statements    and     her

18   documentary evidence about her son’s level of education and

19   her address in China.        See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu

20   Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167 (“[E]ven where an IJ relies on

21   discrepancies or lacunae that, if taken separately, concern

                                         5
 1   matters collateral or ancillary to the claim, the cumulative

 2   effect may nevertheless be deemed consequential by the fact-

 3   finder.”).

 4         The inconsistencies, taken together, provide substantial

 5   evidence for the adverse credibility determination.              See

 6   Likai Gao v. Barr, 968 F.3d 137, 145 n.8 (2d Cir. 2020)

 7   (“[E]ven a single inconsistency might preclude an alien from

 8   showing that an IJ was compelled to find him credible.”).

9    The   adverse   credibility   determination   disposes   of    Lin’s

10   asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief claims because

11   all three are based on the same factual predicate.       See Paul

12   v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156–57 (2d Cir. 2006).             To the

13   extent Lin argues that the agency failed to consider her

14   country conditions evidence, the evidence confirms a one

15   child family planning policy in China in 1999 but does not

16   resolve the inconsistencies about Lin’s own experience.          See

17   Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 169 (2d Cir. 2008)

18   (agency need not “expressly parse or refute on the record

19   each individual argument or piece of evidence offered by the

20   petitioner”).

21

                                      6
1       For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is

2   DENIED.   All pending motions and applications are DENIED and

3   stays VACATED.

4                               FOR THE COURT:
5                               Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
6                               Clerk of Court

                                  7