Court Opinion

ID: 9819107
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 06:18:31.659908+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:38:28.989655
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE THOMAS, specially concurring: I agree with the majority’s conclusion that section 4 — 103.2(b) is unconstitutional as applied to special mobile equipment. I also agree with the majority’s decision to reverse the trial court’s ruling that section 1 — 191 is unconstitutionally vague. However, I disagree with the majority’s assertion that it is too early to decide this question. I would address the issue and hold that section 1 — 191 is not unconstitutionally vague. The majority asserts that it cannot determine if the statute is unconstitutionally vague because there has been no fact-finding. The rule that the majority relies on to avoid the issue is the following statement from In re R.C., 195 Ill. 2d 291, 299 (2001): “As this was a civil case, not involving the first amendment, the vagueness challenge could not properly have been resolved except by application to the facts of the case.” Here, no more facts are required to decide the issue. We know from the indictment that defendant was charged with unlawfully possessing a “Case Wheeled Loader Model 1845C with Product Identification Number JAF 0196424.” In its response to defendant’s motion to dismiss, the State noted that in the construction industry the wheeled loader is commonly referred to as a “uni-loader,” a “skid steer,” or a “Bob Cat.” Thus, when defendant was indicted, he was given notice exactly what equipment he was charged with possessing unlawfully. In criminal cases, the most common time for a defendant to bring a vagueness challenge to a statute is after indictment but before trial. As in this case, the argument is generally raised in the form of a motion to dismiss the indictment or information. See, e.g., People v. Law, 202 Ill. 2d 578 (2002); People v. Izzo, 195 Ill. 2d 109 (2001); People v. Russell, 158 Ill. 2d 23 (1994); People v. Capitol News, Inc., 137 Ill. 2d 162 (1990); People v. Ryan, 117 Ill. 2d 28 (1987). That is exactly what defendant did here. It should be noted that section 1 — 191 is not the statute defendant challenged as unconstitutionally vague in his original motion to dismiss the indictment. Rather, defendant argued that section 4 — 103.2(a)(5), the section defining the offense with which defendant was charged, was unconstitutionally vague. This section makes it an offense to possess, receive, conceal, dispose of, or transfer special mobile equipment, if the person doing so knows it to be stolen or converted. Defendant argued that this section was unconstitutionally vague because, “There is no definition found in the Statute which clearly defines ‘special mobile equipment.’ ” The State immediately responded that there was indeed such a statute, section 1 — 191, which gives a detailed and comprehensive definition of “special mobile equipment.” Surprisingly, defendant did not withdraw his vagueness argument. Rather, he simply transferred the argument to section 1 — 191, despite the fact that this section is a textbook example of a nonvague statute. Section 1 — 191, set out in full in the majority opinion, defines special mobile equipment as “every vehicle1 not designed or used primarily for the transportation of persons or property and only incidentally operated or moved over a highway.” The statute then lists several examples of vehicles that are special mobile equipment and several types of vehicles that are not. The vehicles that are listed are indeed ones that are not designed or used primarily for the transportation of persons or property and are only incidentally operated or moved over a highway. Likewise, the vehicles that are excluded are ones that are used primarily for the transportation of persons or property. The statute is clear, detailed, and easy to follow, and no one could seriously contend that this is a vague statute. The majority’s position seems to be that we do not yet have enough facts to determine if a wheeled loader is “special mobile equipment,” and thus it is too early to decide the vagueness question. Two problems are immediately apparent. First, defendant had the burden to demonstrate that the statute was invalid. Law, 202 111. 2d at 582. Defendant argued in his memorandum of law in support of his motion to dismiss that “we have no idea what a ‘Bobcat’ is or how it relates to the vague definition of special mobile equipment.” If this is true, then defendant has failed in his burden to demonstrate that the statute is unconstitutionally vague as applied to a wheeled loader. Second, the majority’s position rests on a subtle fallacy. As the majority correctly notes, a statute is void for vagueness only if it fails to (1) “provide the kind of notice that would enable a person of ordinary intelligence to understand what conduct is prohibited,” or (2) “provide explicit standards for those who apply it, thus authorizing or even encouraging arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” Law, 202 Ill. 2d at 582-83. Here, the statute that “prohibits conduct” is not section 1 — 191 but section 4 — 103.2(a)(5), which makes it an offense to possess, receive, conceal, dispose of, or transfer special mobile equipment, if the person doing so knows it to be stolen or converted. Section 1 — 191 merely provides a comprehensive definition of “special mobile equipment.” It is also a crime, however, for a person to exert control over stolen “property” in general if the person knows it to be stolen or obtains it under circumstances that would reasonably lead him to believe the property was stolen. See 720 ILCS 5/16 — 1(a) (West 2000). It is also a felony to “receive, possess, conceal, sell, dispose, or transfer” a “vehicle” if the person knows that the vehicle is stolen or converted. See 625 ILCS 5/4 — 103(a)(1) (West 2000). Thus, no matter what a “wheeled loader” is, it was unlawful of defendant to possess it if he knew that it was stolen. Defendant has not argued that he thought it' would be permissible to possess a stolen wheeled loader if it was not considered “special mobile equipment.” All that the designation of the property as “special mobile equipment” does is change the class of the offense. Unlawful possession of stolen special mobile equipment is a Class 1 felony (625 ILCS 5/4 — 103.2(c) (West 2000)), while unlawful possession of a stolen vehicle is a Class 2 felony (625 ILCS 5/4 — 103(b) (West 2000)), and theft can be anywhere from a Class A misdemeanor to a Class X felony, depending on what was stolen and how it was taken2 (720 ILCS 5/16 — 1(b) (West 2000)). Thus, no matter what a “wheeled loader” is, defendant was on notice that he was not entitled to possess it if he knew that it was stolen, and he was thus given fair warning what conduct was prohibited. Similarly, the statute does not fail to give explicit standards for those who apply it, and arbitrary enforcement is neither authorized nor encouraged. If law enforcement officials believe that a person is in possession of stolen property, the statutes set forth above are sufficiently clear for them to determine how to charge the offense. Likewise, the statutory definitions are sufficiently clear to be applied by a trier of fact. It would be extraordinarily difficult and burdensome for the legislature to list every conceivable type of vehicle that is “special mobile equipment.” Instead, they have provided a clear definition, with specific examples of the types of vehicles that are included in the definition and those that are not. The majority seems to be implying that if subsequent facts show that a “wheeled loader” is not included in the definition, then the statute is unconstitutionally vague as applied to a wheeled loader. I disagree. If it is determined that a “wheeled loader” is “not designed or used primarily for the transportation of persons or property” and is “only incidentally operated or moved over a highway,” and defendant is shown to have possessed it, knowing that it was stolen, then defendant is guilty of the charged offense. If it turns out that a “wheeled loader” does not meet that definition, then the State has mischarged these counts of the indictment and defendant is not guilty of this particular offense. Either way, the statute is not unconstitutionally vague. We have sufficient information to decide this issue now, and I would hold that the statute is not unconstitutionally vague.  The term “vehicle” is defined in section 1 — 217 (625 ILCS 5/1 — 217 (West 2000)).   Defendant in this case was charged with theft of property-worth more than $10,000 but less than $100,000, which is a Class 2 felony. See 720 ILCS 5/16 — 1(b)(5) (West 2000).