Court Opinion

ID: 9929431
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-02 17:01:55.108125+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:20:38.821770
License: Public Domain

U NITED S TATES A IR F ORCE
           C OURT OF C RIMINAL APPEALS
                       ________________________

                           No. ACM 40358
                       ________________________

                         UNITED STATES
                             Appellee
                                  v.
                         Chad L. REEDY
         Technical Sergeant (E-6), U.S. Air Force, Appellant
                       ________________________

       Appeal from the United States Air Force Trial Judiciary
                      Decided 2 February 2024
                       ________________________

Military Judge: Bryon T. Gleisner (Article 30a proceedings); Pilar G.
Wennrich (Article 30a proceedings); Lance R. Smith.
Sentence: Sentence adjudged 15 June 2022 by GCM convened at Royal
Air Force Mildenhall, United Kingdom. Sentence entered by military
judge on 20 July 2022: Dishonorable discharge, confinement for 225
days, reduction to E-1, and a reprimand.
For Appellant: Major Matthew L. Blyth, USAF.
For Appellee: Captain Vanessa Bairos, USAF; Captain Olivia B. Hoff,
USAF; Mary Ellen Payne, Esquire.
Before RICHARDSON, DOUGLAS, and MASON, Appellate Military
Judges.
Judge MASON delivered the opinion of the court, in which Senior Judge
RICHARDSON and Judge DOUGLAS joined.
                       ________________________

   This is an unpublished opinion and, as such, does not serve as
   precedent under AFCCA Rule of Practice and Procedure 30.4.
                      ________________________
                    United States v. Reedy, No. ACM 40358

MASON, Judge:
   A military judge sitting as a general court-martial convicted Appellant, in
accordance with his pleas and pursuant to a plea agreement, of one charge with
one specification of possession of child pornography in violation of Article 134,
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 934.1 The military judge
sentenced Appellant to a dishonorable discharge, confinement for 225 days,
reduction to the grade of E-1, and a reprimand. The convening authority took
no action on the findings. He approved the sentence in its entirety and denied
Appellant’s request for deferment of reduction in rank for six months, but
granted Appellant’s requested waiver of automatic forfeitures for six months
and directed the forfeitures be paid to Appellant’s spouse.
    Appellant raises three issues on appeal: (1) whether a plea agreement re-
quiring a dishonorable discharge renders the sentencing proceedings an
“empty ritual” and thus violates public policy; (2) whether a plea agreement
that conditions dismissal with prejudice upon completion of appellate review
is unenforceable; and (3) whether the record of trial’s omission of the court-
martial audio is a substantial omission warranting relief.
    We have carefully considered issue (2) and find Appellant is not entitled to
relief. See United States v. Matias, 25 M.J. 356, 361 (C.M.A. 1987); see also
United States v. Goldsmith, No. ACM 40148, 2023 CCA LEXIS 8, at *14–15
(A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 11 Jan. 2023) (unpub. op.) (finding plea agreement term
requiring the convening authority to dismiss the additional charges and spec-
ifications with prejudice “upon completion of appellate review where the find-
ings and sentence have been upheld” permissible because it did not violate law
or public policy). Regarding the remaining issues, we find no error that mate-
rially prejudices a substantial right of Appellant and affirm the findings and
sentence.

                                I. BACKGROUND
    From 30 September 2018 to 1 September 2020, Appellant possessed child
pornography in the form of photos and videos depicting actual minors engaged
in sexually explicit conduct and obscene depictions of animated minors per-
forming sexual acts. Appellant’s conduct was uncovered after images shared
online were flagged by an online service provider and forwarded to law enforce-
ment.
   Appellant was charged with two specifications of distribution of child por-
nography and one specification of possession of child pornography. On 1 June

1 Unless otherwise noted, all references in this opinion to the UCMJ  and Rules for
Courts-Martial are to the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (2019 ed.).

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                   United States v. Reedy, No. ACM 40358

2022, Appellant submitted an offer for plea agreement wherein he offered to
plead guilty to the possession specification. Appellant offered a sentencing
range that set a confinement minimum to be adjudged as 180 days, a confine-
ment maximum to be adjudged as 240 days, and required that a dishonorable
discharge be adjudged. There were to be no other limitations or conditions on
the sentence to be adjudged apart from those normally prescribed by the Man-
ual for Courts-Martial. On 2 June 2022, the convening authority accepted Ap-
pellant’s offer for a plea agreement.
    At trial, the military judge conducted a full inquiry regarding the plea
agreement including an inquiry into the provision requiring any sentence ad-
judged including a dishonorable discharge. Appellant confirmed his under-
standing of this provision. Appellant confirmed that he understood the ramifi-
cations of a dishonorable discharge and that he had an “express desire to be
discharged from the service with a dishonorable discharge.” Moreover, the mil-
itary judge confirmed that Appellant understood that if the plea agreement
were accepted, the military judge as sentencing authority would have no dis-
cretion, and the military judge would have to include a dishonorable discharge
in the adjudged sentence. The military judge asked trial counsel and trial de-
fense counsel if they agreed that this provision did not violate law or public
policy. They agreed.
    When the military judge finished reviewing the plea agreement, he asked
trial counsel and trial defense counsel if they concurred with his interpretation
of the plea agreement. All counsel confirmed that they agreed, and the military
judge accepted the plea agreement.
   Shortly after trial, the detailed court reporter provided a compact disc (CD)
containing the audio recording of the proceedings to the Government’s case
paralegal. The court reporter retained a digital file of the audio recording on a
hard drive so she could use that recording to prepare a transcription of the
proceedings. She finished the transcription on 6 July 2022, and then promptly
forwarded it to trial counsel and trial defense counsel for review. On 15 July
2022, she received the revisions back from trial defense counsel. The court re-
porter finalized the transcript and signed the certification of its accuracy that
day.
    At some point during the next month, the court reporter’s hard drive
crashed. As a result, all digital files contained on the hard drive were rendered
irretrievable. The court reporter turned the hard drive over to her local com-
munications squadron, where two unsuccessful attempts were made to retrieve
the applicable files.
    On 30 August 2022, the case paralegal was compiling the record of trial and
attempted to access the audio recording utilizing the CD provided to her by the

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                   United States v. Reedy, No. ACM 40358

court reporter. However, the digital files containing the audio recording of the
proceedings were not accessible. After several attempts to access the audio files
by the case paralegal and members of her local communications squadron, the
audio recording of the proceedings remained inaccessible from the CD. The
case paralegal contacted the court reporter and was advised of the mishap with
her hard drive.

                                II. DISCUSSION
A. Plea Agreement to Adjudge a Dishonorable Discharge
   1. Law
    We review questions of interpretation of plea agreements de novo, as such
are questions of law. See United States v. Lundy, 63 M.J. 299, 301 (C.A.A.F.
2006) (citing United States v. Acevedo, 51 M.J. 169, 172 (C.A.A.F. 1999)) (ap-
plying de novo review to pretrial agreements). The standard is the same in our
assessment of whether a plea agreement’s terms violate the Rules for Courts-
Martial. See United States v. Hunter, 65 M.J. 399, 401 (C.A.A.F. 2008).
    Article 53a, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 853a, permits the use of plea agreements
in courts-martial. In those agreements, a convening authority and an accused
“may enter into a plea agreement with respect to such matters as—(A) the
manner in which the convening authority will dispose of one or more charges
and specifications; and (B) limitations on the sentence that may be adjudged
for one or more charges and specifications.” 10 U.S.C. § 853a(a)(1)(A), (B).
    Rule for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 705 sets forth additional regulations re-
garding plea agreements. R.C.M. 705(d)(1) through (3) state that plea agree-
ments limiting the sentence that can be adjudged by a court-martial for one or
more charges and specifications may contain limitations on the maximum pun-
ishment, the minimum punishment that may be imposed by the court-martial,
or both. R.C.M. 705(c)(1)(B) states that certain terms and conditions regarding
deprivation of certain rights may not be in plea agreements. Amongst those is
“the right to complete presentencing proceedings.” Id.
   “To ensure that the record reflects the accused understands the pretrial
agreement [or plea agreement] and that both the Government and the accused
agree to its terms, the military judge must ascertain the understanding of each
party during the inquiry into the providence of the plea.” United States v. Cron,
73 M.J. 718, 729 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2014) (citation omitted).
   A military judge must reject any plea agreement which is prohibited by
law, or is contrary to or inconsistent with applicable guidance as set forth in
the Manual for Courts-Martial with respect to terms, conditions, or other as-
pects of plea agreements. 10 U.S.C. § 853a(b)(4), (5). “To the extent that a term

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                    United States v. Reedy, No. ACM 40358

in a pretrial agreement violates public policy, it will be stricken from the pre-
trial agreement and not enforced.” United States v. Edwards, 58 M.J. 49, 52
(C.A.A.F. 2003) (citing R.C.M. 705(c)(1)(B)) (additional citation omitted).
      “In sentencing an accused under . . . [Article 53, UCMJ], a court-martial
shall impose punishment that is sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to
promote justice and to maintain good order and discipline in the armed forces
. . . .” 10 U.S.C. § 856(c)(1). Pretrial agreements or plea agreements which have
the effect of transforming sentencing proceedings into “an empty ritual” are
impermissible. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 50 M.J. 426, 429 (C.A.A.F.
1999) (quoting United States v. Allen, 25 C.M.R. 8, 11 (C.M.A. 1957)) (describ-
ing this premise as a “fundamental principle” in military jurisprudence). “A
term or condition in a plea agreement shall not be enforced if it deprives the
accused of . . . the right to complete presentencing proceedings” and “the com-
plete and effective exercise of post-trial and appellate rights.”
R.C.M. 705(c)(1)(B).
    “A [pretrial agreement] creates a constitutional contract between the ac-
cused and the convening authority wherein the accused agrees to waive consti-
tutional rights in exchange for a benefit.” Cron, 73 M.J. at 729 (citation omit-
ted). “However, due process concerns outweigh the contract principles as ‘the
[G]overnment is bound to keep its constitutional promises.’” Id. (citation omit-
ted). “To that end, a provision that denies the accused a fair hearing or other-
wise ‘substitutes the agreement for the trial, [thereby] render[ing it] an empty
ritual’ violates public policy.” Id. (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
“It is the military judge’s responsibility to police the terms of pretrial agree-
ments to [e]nsure compliance with statutory and decisional law as well as ad-
herence to basic notions of fundamental fairness.” Id. (quoting United States v.
Riley, 72 M.J. 115, 120 (C.A.A.F. 2013)).
    “This court has adopted the principle that terms in a . . . [pretrial agree-
ment] are contrary to public policy if they ‘interfere with court-martial fact-
finding, sentencing, or review functions or undermine public confidence in the
integrity and fairness of the disciplinary process.’” United States v. Hoard, No.
ACM S32424, 2018 CCA LEXIS 49, at *8 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 31 Jan. 2018)
(unpub. op.) (citing United States v. Raynor, 66 M.J. 693, 697 (A.F. Ct. Crim.
App. 2008) (quoting United States v. Cassity, 36 M.J. 759, 762 (N.M.C.M.R.
1992))).
   This court has found that plea agreement provisions requiring a military
judge to sentence an appellant to a punitive discharge did not violate the
United States Constitution, UCMJ, or public policy. See United States v.
Kroetz, No. ACM 40301, 2023 LEXIS 450, at *17 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 27 Oct.
2023) (unpub. op.); United States v. Geier, No. ACM S32679 (f rev), 2022 CCA

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                     United States v. Reedy, No. ACM 40358

LEXIS 468, at *13 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2 Aug. 2022) (unpub. op.), rev denied,
83 M.J. 86 (C.A.A.F. 2022).
   2. Analysis
   On appeal, for the first time, Appellant argues that the plea agreement
provision requiring a minimum sentence include a dishonorable discharge was
prohibited by law or prohibited by public policy. We disagree.
    R.C.M. 705 expressly authorizes not only maximum punishment limits, but
also minimum punishment limits. Therefore, Appellant’s plea agreement pro-
vision requiring a minimum sentence of a dishonorable discharge is not pro-
hibited by law; instead, it is a permitted term authorized by R.C.M. 705(d)(1).
   Despite R.C.M. 705 expressly permitting limitations on the minimum pun-
ishment in a plea agreement, Appellant claims that his plea agreement man-
dating dishonorable discharge “hollowed out the presentencing proceeding and
deprived [him] of his opportunity to secure a fair and just sentence” and was
therefore against public policy.
   Appellant avers that because Congress chose not to make the offense of
which Appellant was convicted carry a “mandatory dishonorable discharge,” a
plea agreement to a dishonorable discharge violates public policy. See 10
U.S.C. § 856(b) (listing offenses which carry sentence minimums). Appellant
argues “statutes codified by the legislature and rules enacted pursuant to those
laws by the executive, are public policy.” (Emphasis added). Therefore, Appel-
lant claims public policy dictates plea agreements may not mandate a dishon-
orable discharge for non-listed offenses.
    The military judge discussed this matter during the guilty plea inquiry.
After he did so, both trial counsel and trial defense counsel concurred that this
provision did not violate public policy prior to the military judge’s acceptance
of this plea agreement.
    While we are aware that additional changes to the Military Justice Act of
20162 included minimum sentences for certain offenses, we reject Appellant’s
suggestion that because no minimum sentence existed for Appellant’s offenses
under law, it is impermissible to have a minimum sentence in a plea agree-
ment. We are not convinced Congress intended to limit plea agreements for
offenses they did not list as having mandatory minimums. To hold otherwise
is to render inoperable the language in R.C.M. 705(d) that permits plea-agree-
ment limitations on minimum punishments that may be imposed by the court-
martial.

2 Pub. L. No. 114-328, §§ 5001-5542, 130 Stat. 2943 (23 Dec. 2016).

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                     United States v. Reedy, No. ACM 40358

    To further his public policy argument, Appellant asks this court to find that
the dishonorable discharge clause violates public policy because it “prevents
the sentencing authority from adjudging—in its sole discretion—a punishment
that is sufficient, but not greater than necessary,” and therefore is inconsistent
with the mandate of Article 56(c), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 856(c)(1) (second empha-
sis added). Appellant’s argument implies that no minimum sentence could be
agreed to in a plea agreement, because doing so would take away the sentenc-
ing authority’s sole discretion to determine what is both sufficient and neces-
sary.
    We find no “sole discretion” requirement written into Article 56(c), UCMJ.
Any plea agreement with a limitation on sentence by its nature removes some
of the sentencing authority’s discretion. While the sentencing authority’s min-
imum and maximum sentence options were limited by the plea agreement—
instead of limited solely by statute and executive order—within those param-
eters, the military judge still had “sole discretion” to determine what punish-
ment is sufficient and necessary considering the nature and the circumstances
of the offense, the impact of the offense, and the need for the sentence to ac-
complish other requirements in Article 56, UCMJ.3
    The military justice system is evolving, and new sentencing proceedings
are different from previous practice. R.C.M 705(d)(1) was re-written, in part,
to allow plea agreements to contain minimum punishments, along with maxi-
mum punishments. “The fact that military justice evolves is not . . . against
public policy.” United States v. Rivero, 82 M.J. 629, 635 (N.M. Ct. Crim. App.
2022) (finding that appellant’s plea agreement punishment limitations did not
render sentencing proceedings meaningless, and therefore did not violate pub-
lic policy), rev. denied, 83 M.J. 35 (C.A.A.F. 2022). Appellant exercised a rela-
tively new option to agree to a minimum sentence in exchange for other terms
in the plea agreement. Appellant was free to not sign the plea agreement. Ap-
pellant and the convening authority were also free to agree to other factors
such as stipulated facts and pleas to various offenses. The sentencing proceed-
ing provided Appellant an opportunity to put forward evidence in mitigation

3 Article 56, UCMJ, indicates:

        a court-martial shall impose punishment . . . taking into consideration
        the need for the sentence—(i) to reflect on the seriousness of the of-
        fense; (ii) to promote respect for the law; (iii) to provide just punish-
        ment for the offense; (iv) to promote adequate deterrence of miscon-
        duct; (v) to protect others from further crimes by the accused; (vi) to
        rehabilitate the accused; and (vii) to provide, in appropriate cases, the
        opportunity for retraining and return to duty to meet the needs of the
        service.
10 U.S.C. § 856(c)(1)(C).

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                    United States v. Reedy, No. ACM 40358

and extenuation, call witnesses, and provide argument, including whether any
sentence component was appropriate. Additionally, the military judge still had
latitude with other punishment options, to include the term of confinement
between 180 and 240 days.
    Given all the options still available to Appellant and the sentencing author-
ity, the plea agreement in this case did not preclude the sentencing authority’s
ability to determine a sentence that was sufficient and necessary, but not
greater than necessary, to promote justice and to maintain good order and dis-
cipline in the armed forces, taking into consideration other aspects of Article
56, UCMJ.
    In conclusion, Appellant’s plea agreement term regarding a dishonorable
discharge was not prohibited by law or public policy. It did not deprive Appel-
lant of his opportunity to secure a fair and just sentence, nor did it render the
sentencing proceeding an “empty ritual.” Therefore, no relief is warranted.
B. Missing Audio Recording
   1. Law
    “Proper completion of post-trial processing is a question of law this court
reviews de novo.” United States v. Valentin-Andino, 83 M.J. 537, 540 (A.F. Ct.
Crim. App. 2023) (citation omitted). “Because they are matters of law, we re-
view interpretations of statutes and Rules for Courts-Martial de novo.” Id. (ci-
tation omitted).
    Article 54, UCMJ, requires the keeping of a record of proceedings in each
general or special court-martial. It states that “[i]n accordance with regula-
tions prescribed by the President, a complete record of proceedings and testi-
mony shall be prepared in any case of a sentence of death, dismissal, discharge,
confinement for more than six months, or forfeiture of pay for more than six
months.” 10 U.S.C. § 854.
    Article 1, UCMJ, defines the term “record,” when used in connection with
the proceedings of a court-martial, as either: “(A) an official written transcript,
written summary, or other writing relating to the proceedings; or (B) an official
audiotape, videotape, or similar material from which sound, or sound and vis-
ual images, depicting the proceedings may be reproduced.” 10 U.S.C.
§ 801(13)(A), (B).
    In R.C.M. 1112(b), the President lists the required contents of the record of
trial. Amongst those contents that shall be included is “[a] substantially ver-
batim recording of the court-martial proceedings except sessions closed for de-
liberations and voting.” R.C.M. 1112(b)(1).
    R.C.M. 1112(f) identifies items a court reporter must attach to the record
of trial when it is sent to The Judge Advocate General for appellate review.

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                    United States v. Reedy, No. ACM 40358

One of those items is “[a]ny transcription of the court-martial proceedings cre-
ated pursuant to R.C.M. 1114.” R.C.M. 1112(f)(8).
   R.C.M. 1114 states:
       A certified verbatim transcript of the record of trial shall be pre-
       pared—
       (1) When the judgment entered into the record includes a sen-
       tence of death, dismissal of a commissioned officer, cadet, or mid-
       shipman, a dishonorable or bad-conduct discharge, or confine-
       ment for more than six months; or
       (2) As otherwise required by court rule, court order or under reg-
       ulations prescribed by the Secretary concerned.
    Department of the Air Force Instruction 51-201, Administration of Military
Justice, ¶ 15.12 (28 Sep. 2023), states that transcription requirements for Ar-
ticle 30(a), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 830(a), proceedings and courts-martial are set
forth in Department of the Air Force Manual (DAFMAN) 51-203, Records of
Trial (12 Apr. 2021).
   DAFMAN 51-203 provides technical guidance on compiling records of trial
(ROT). It states, “[a] completed ROT consists of two parts: the required con-
tents of the certified ROT as listed in R.C.M. 1112(b) . . . and the required ROT
Attachments (R.C.M. 1112(f)) and allied papers required by this manual . . . .”
DAFMAN 51-203, ¶ 1.4.
    “A substantial omission renders a record of trial incomplete and raises a
presumption of prejudice that the Government must rebut.” United States v.
Henry, 53 M.J. 108, 111 (C.A.A.F. 2000) (citations omitted). “Insubstantial
omissions from a record of trial do not raise a presumption of prejudice or affect
that record’s characterization as a complete one.” Id. The threshold question is
whether the item is substantial, either qualitatively or quantitatively. United
States v. Davenport, 73 M.J. 373, 377 (C.A.A.F. 2014) (citing United States v.
Lashley, 14 M.J. 7, 9 (C.M.A. 1982)). Omissions may be quantitatively insub-
stantial when in light of the entire record the omission is “so unimportant and
so uninfluential . . . that it approaches nothingness.” Id. (omission in original)
(citation omitted).
   2. Analysis
    The court reporter in this case created an audio recording of the court-mar-
tial proceedings. This audio recording is not included in the record of trial. Ra-
ther, it is irretrievable due to the combination of the court reporter’s hard drive
crashing and the digital files on the CD with the case paralegal being inacces-
sible. As a result, Appellant argues that the record is not complete and there-
fore we should reduce his sentence by changing the dishonorable discharge to

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                    United States v. Reedy, No. ACM 40358

a bad-conduct discharge. Appellant is not entitled to this reduction because
there is no omission in the record of trial, let alone a substantial omission.
    Both Article 54, UCMJ, and R.C.M. 1112 require the compilation of a record
of trial. Appellant argues “[t]he absence of any court-martial audio renders the
record incomplete” regardless of whether a written transcript is included. How-
ever, R.C.M. 1112(b) states the record of trial must contain “[a] substantially
verbatim recording of the court-martial proceedings.” For a court-martial like
Appellant’s, Article 1, UCMJ, defines “record” as either the transcript or the
audio recording. 10 U.S.C. § 801. Though it is often that both are included in
Air Force records of trial, there are instances where both are required and in-
stances where they are not. In this case, the Government compiled a record of
trial and utilized a certified transcription of the court-martial proceedings to
meet the applicable requirements. This is sufficient. Thus, no omission exists
in the record, at least as far as what is required to be included with this record
of trial.
    Even assuming arguendo that the absence of the audio recording in the
record of trial amounted to an omission, such omission was insubstantial as
the certified transcription is available for all to reference. Trial defense counsel
was provided an opportunity to and did, in fact, review the prepared transcrip-
tion and provide revisions before it was finalized and certified by the court re-
porter. Appellant concedes that he has “no reason to question its contents.”
Yet, he urges us to exercise our broad authority under Article 66, UCMJ, 10
U.S.C. § 866, to provide his requested relief without substantiating how the
lack of audio recording materially prejudiced any of his rights or negatively
impacted him any particular way. We decline to provide relief under these cir-
cumstances.

                                III. CONCLUSION
    The findings and sentence as entered are correct in law and fact, and no
error materially prejudicial to the substantial rights of the Appellant occurred.
Articles 59(a) and 66(d), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 859(a), 866(d). Accordingly, the
findings and sentence are AFFIRMED.

                     FOR THE COURT

                     CAROL K. JOYCE
                     Clerk of the Court

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