Court Opinion

ID: 9694094
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 17:22:26.810301+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:56.097815
License: Public Domain

MADDOX, Justice
(dissenting).
In Bagby, I set out, in a lengthy dissent, my reasons for believing that Act No. 788 was constitutional. I am still persuaded that I was right then, and I believe I am right now. A reasoned study of my dissent there will answer every question raised in the majority opinion. Consequently, no useful purpose would be served by restating my views again, but I would like to call attention to the fact that some other courts, both state and federal, in addition to those shown in my dissent in Bagby, have found no constitutional problem raised by such “shield” statutes. See Nevada Lakeshore Co. v. Diamond Electric, Inc., 89 Nev. 293, 511 P.2d 113 (1973); Carr v. Miss. Valley Electric Co., 285 So.2d 301 (La.App.1973); Smith v. Allen-Bradley Co. et al, 371 F.Supp. 698 (W.D.Va.1974).
In Carr, the Louisiana court said:
“The wisdom of the legislature in enacting this law cannot be questioned by this court. The law was passed for a specific purpose, i. e., to put' at an end, at some definite period of time, claims arising from construction. It has the effect of creating a hardship in some instances. At the same time it has the effect of preventing a hardship to contractors who would have to defend a suit for damages occasioned more than ten years after their performance was completed.”
A federal court, construing a Virginia “shield” law, said practically the same thing the Louisiana court said in Carr. In Smith v. Allen-Bradley Co. et al, supra, the plaintiff argued that the Virginia statute barred his cause of action before it accrued (an argument made both in Bagby and here), and because it was a bar, the statute prevented any hearing for redress of an alleged wrong committed by a private party.
The Federal District Judge held:
“ * * * The answer to this is simply that the legislature, in its infinite wisdom may, within limits of rationality, determine what are actionable wrongs and the time limits within which lawsuits must be brought to redress such wrongs. The legislative determination that there should be a five-year cut off for actions to recover damages arising out of defective improvements to real property is clearly rational particularly in light of the abolition of lack of privity as a defense to such actions.”
I think the majority is wrong, but I can do nothing about it except register my dissent respectfully, which I have done now on two occasions.
MERRILL, J., concurs.