Court Opinion

ID: 9943125
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-22 18:12:26.744909+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:08.875697
License: Public Domain

38                    February 22, 2024              No. 110

           IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                   STATE OF OREGON

     CONTINENTAL CASUALTY COMPANY
      and Transportation Insurance Company,
              Plaintiff-Respondents,
                         v.
    ARGONAUT INSURANCE COMPANY et al.,
                   Defendants,
                        and
        INSURANCE COMPANY OF THE
          STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA,
             Defendant-Respondent,
                        and
 EMPLOYERS INSURANCE COMPANY OF WAUSAU,
              Defendant-Appellant.
  INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA,
              Third-Party Plaintiff,
                         v.
    ARGONAUT INSURANCE COMPANY et al.,
             Third-Party Defendants.
         Multnomah County Circuit Court
              16CV14319; A176763

     David F. Rees, Judge.
     Argued and submitted October 10, 2023.
   David C. Linder, Minnesota, argued the cause for appel-
lant. Also on the briefs were Larson King LLP, Minnesota, and
Thomas W. Sondag, Carter M. Mann, and Lane Powell PC.
   William C. Perdue, Washington, D. C., argued the cause for
respondent Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania.
Also on the brief were Robert Reeves Anderson, Colorado,
Timothy R. Macdonald, Samuel I. Ferenc, and Arnold &
Porter Kaye Scholer LLP, Washington, D. C., and Thomas W.
Brown, Julie A. Smith, and Cosgrave Vergeer Kestler LLP
and Stephen R. Wong, Kenneth H. Summer, and Sinnott,
Puebla, Campagne & Curet APLC, California.
Cite as 331 Or App 38 (2024)                              39

   Laurie J. Helper, California, argued the cause for respon-
dents Continental Casualty Company and Transportation
Insurance Company. Also on the brief were Rachel A. Beyda
and Greines Martin Stein & Richland LLP, California, and
Lawrence Gottlieb, Jeremy Schultze, H. Matthew Munson,
and Betts, Patterson & Mines, P.S., Washington.
   Louis A. Ferreira, Cameron Zangenehzadeh, and Stoel
Rives LLP, filed the brief amicus curiae for Schnitzer Steel
Industries, Inc., and MMGL, LLC.
  Before Egan, Presiding Judge, and Kamins, Judge, and
DeVore, Senior Judge.
   EGAN, P. J.
   Reversed and remanded.
   Kamins, J., dissenting.
40 Continental Casualty Co. v. Argonaut Ins. Co. (A176763)

        EGAN, P. J.
         In this contribution action under ORS 465.480(4)
arising in the context of the Portland Harbor Superfund
Site cleanup, defendant Employers Insurance Company
of Wausau (Wausau) appeals from a judgment for plain-
tiffs Continental Casualty Company and Transportation
Insurance Company (collectively, Continental) holding
that Continental is entitled to contribution from Wausau
for defense costs Continental incurred in defending its
insureds, Schnitzer Steel Industries, Inc. (SSI), and MMGL
Corp (formerly Schnitzer Investment Corp) (SIC) (collectively
“Insureds”), against claims for environmental cleanup of the
Portland harbor. We conclude that the trial court erred and
therefore reverse and remand.
         Background: The Insureds engaged in industrial
activities (including ship dismantling and scrap-metal
recycling) on properties they owned on the banks of the
Willamette River. In 2000, the Insureds were notified by
the federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) that
they had been identified as parties potentially responsi-
ble under the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) for
cleanup of pollution at the Portland Harbor Superfund Site,
as a result of their activities and the activities of their ten-
ants on the properties they owned or had owned that had
resulted in the release of contaminants into the river.
        The Insureds’ insurance: During the relevant period,
from 1937 to the present, the Insureds had comprehen-
sive general liability insurance policies, and they tendered
defense and sought coverage of their potential liability from
their multiple insurers:
    •   Wausau—appellant here—had issued two compre-
        hensive general liability policies to the Insureds
        during the relevant period, from 1965 to 1970, with
        policy limits of $100,000, and had issued 10 policies
        of insurance to tenants of the Insureds from 1977
        to 1985, under which SIC was named as an addi-
        tional insured. Wausau denied coverage under the
        policies issued directly to the Insureds but agreed
Cite as 331 Or App 38 (2024)                                41

        to defend the Insureds with regard to the policies it
        had issued to the Insureds’ tenants, with a reser-
        vation of rights to dispute its duty to indemnify the
        Insureds for the costs of actual cleanup.
    •   El Dorado Insurance Company had issued seven
        policies to the Insureds during the relevant period,
        from 1970 to 1977, with policy limits of $100,000
        and $250,000. El Dorado ceases to exist.
    •   Continental—respondent on appeal—had issued
        seven policies to the Insureds during the relevant
        period, from 1977 to 1983, with limits of $500,000.
        Continental agreed to defend the Insureds, under a
        reservation of rights to withdraw from the defense
        in the event of any determination that the Insureds’
        potential liability on the claims was subject to a cov-
        erage exclusion or in the event the coverage limits
        of Continental’s policies were exhausted by indem-
        nity payments.
    •   Insurance Company of North America (now known
        as Century Indemnity Company (Century)) had
        issued a single policy to the Insureds during the rel-
        evant period, 1983 to 1984, with limits of $500,000.
        Century, like Continental, agreed to defend, under
        a reservation of rights to withdraw from the defense
        in the event of a determination that the Insureds’
        potential liability on the claims was subject to a
        coverage exclusion or in the event the coverage lim-
        its of Century’s policy was exhausted by indemnity
        payments, among other reservations.
    •   Argonaut, which has settled with the Insureds and
        is not involved in any appeal, had issued policies to
        the Insureds during the relevant period.
         The Insureds also had “umbrella” policies with
Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania (ICSOP),
which provided excess coverage with limits of $5,000,000, to
five underlying primary insurance policies. ICSOP denied
the Insureds’ claim, contending that, based on policy provi-
sions, the excess liability policies had not been triggered.
42 Continental Casualty Co. v. Argonaut Ins. Co. (A176763)

         Insurers Continental, Wausau, and Century, each
of whom had agreed to defend the Insureds under a reser-
vation of rights, subsequently entered into a cost-sharing
agreement, under which Continental would pay 70 percent
of the Insureds’ defense costs, Wausau would pay 20 per-
cent, and Century would pay the remaining 10 percent.
Continental, Wausau, and Century began paying a portion
of the Insureds’ defense costs beginning in 2001 but did not
fully reimburse the Insureds for legal fees incurred that
they asserted were excessive.
         The attorney fee dispute: In 2003, the Insureds’
legal counsel at Stoel Rives developed a conflict of interest
that prevented the firm from continuing to represent the
Insureds. Having the view that there were no nonconflicted
Portland attorneys available with the necessary expertise
to represent them, the Insureds retained Jim Dragna, of the
Los Angeles firm Bingham McCutchen, to represent them
in the Portland Harbor litigation. Bingham McCutchen’s
billing rate was 40 percent higher than rates charged by
Portland firms identified by Continental. But Continental
and the other insurers ultimately agreed that the Insureds
could retain Bingham McCutchen. They agreed, however, to
reimburse the Insureds only at the rate charged by Portland
firms.
         The Oregon Environmental Cleanup Assistance Act
(OECAA): In 1999, finding that the state has a substantial
public interest to “promot[e] the fair and efficient resolu-
tion of environmental claims while encouraging voluntary
compliance and regulatory cooperation,” ORS 465.478, the
Legislative Assembly adopted the Oregon Environmental
Cleanup Assistance Act (OECAA), ORS 465.475 to 465.485.
ORS 465.475(1) defines an “environmental claim” as
   “a claim for defense or indemnity submitted under a general
   liability insurance policy by an insured facing, or allegedly
   facing, potential liability for bodily injury or property dam-
   age arising from a release of pollutants onto or into land,
   air or water.”
        The Legislative Assembly recognized that often,
multiple general liability insurers have insured a person
potentially responsible for environmental cleanup. Under
Cite as 331 Or App 38 (2024)                                 43

ORS 465.480(3)(b), if an insured has made an environmen-
tal claim against multiple general liability insurance pol-
icies and the claim is not fully satisfied, the insured may
choose to file suit against less than all the insurers.
         The Insureds’ federal claim for breach of contract
against Continental: In 1999 and 2000, after they were
identified by the Oregon Department of Environmental
Quality and the EPA as potentially responsible parties for
the Portland Harbor Superfund Site cleanup, the Insureds
tendered claims for defense and indemnity to all of their
insurers. As noted, Continental, Wausau, and Century had
agreed to defend the Insureds, with reservations. And fur-
ther as noted, the insurers had been sharing defense costs
but had declined to pay the full amount of the Insureds’
defense-related attorney fees from Bingham McCutchen.
         In 2010, having been unable to resolve their dis-
agreement with the insurers over reimbursement for attor-
ney fees, the Insureds brought a claim in the federal dis-
trict court for breach of contract (the federal action) against
Continental, seeking reimbursement from Continental of all
defense-related legal costs previously paid by the Insureds
on their potential liability for Portland Harbor cleanup as
well as a declaration that Continental is responsible for
future defense costs. The primary issue in the federal action
was the determination of recoverable legal fees incurred by
the Insureds as part of defense costs. The case went to trial
in 2014.
         The federal court determined that Continental had
a duty to defend the entire action. And a federal jury agreed
with the Insureds that no competent nonconflicted Portland
legal counsel was available to represent the Insureds in the
Portland Harbor litigation, and that no competent nonlocal
counsel would work for Portland legal fees. The jury also
found that the legal fees charged by Bingham McCutchen
were reasonable under the circumstances and rejected other
arguments that Continental offered in support of deductions
it had made in reimbursing the Insureds. The jury awarded
to the Insureds (and Continental satisfied) all of the Insureds’
unpaid legal defense costs to date—$8,601,700.
44 Continental Casualty Co. v. Argonaut Ins. Co. (A176763)

         The federal court also awarded to the Insureds
(and Continental paid) $2,812,185 in prejudgment interest
under ORS 82.010, and $3,756,037 in attorney fees under
ORS 742.061 (providing for attorney fees for an insurer’s
failure to settle or pay within six months of a proof of claim
against).
          Under the declaratory judgment portion of the judg-
ment, the court ordered Continental to pay the Insureds’ rea-
sonable and necessary defense costs at the rates charged by
Bingham McCutchen for all past and future defense costs,
until such time as Continental’s limits are exhausted by
indemnity payments. Continental’s total defense cost liabil-
ity is estimated to be $23.3 million, including prejudgment
interest and attorney fees recovered from Continental by
the Insured in the federal action. The Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals upheld the federal district court’s judgment.
         Continental’s contribution claim: To offset the effects
of allowing an insured to bring an action against only one or
fewer than all of multiple potentially responsible insurers,
the OECAA allows the targeted insurer(s) to seek contribu-
tion from other insurers. ORS 465.480(4)(a) (1999) provided
that “[a]n insurer that has paid all or part of an environmen-
tal claim may seek contribution from any other insurer that
is liable or potentially liable to the insured * * * regarding
the environmental claim.” See Allianz Global Risks v. ACE
Property and Casualty, 367 Or 711, 743, 483 P3d 1124, adh’d
to as modified on recons, 368 Or 229, 489 P3d 115 (2021)
(describing insurer’s right to seek contribution from other
“liable or potentially liable” insurers).
         In 2013, while the federal action was pending, the
Legislative Assembly amended ORS 465.480(4)(a) to add,
among other provisions, a statement that the insurer’s right
to contribution extends only to “any other insurer * * * that
has not entered into a good faith settlement agreement
with the insured regarding the environmental claim.” Or
Laws 2013, ch 350, § 4. In its current form, ORS 465.480(4)
provides:
      “(a) An insurer that has paid all or part of an environ-
   mental claim may seek contribution from any other insurer
   that is liable or potentially liable to the insured and that
Cite as 331 Or App 38 (2024)                                        45

   has not entered into a good-faith settlement agreement
   with the insured regarding the environmental claim.
      “(b) There is a rebuttable presumption that all binding
   settlement agreements entered into between an insured
   and an insurer are good-faith settlements. A settlement
   agreement between an insured and insurer that has been
   approved by a court of competent jurisdiction after 30 days’
   notice to other insurers is a good-faith settlement agree-
   ment with respect to all such insurers to whom such notice
   was provided.
       “(c) For purposes of ascertaining whether a right of
   contribution exists between insurers, an insurer that seeks
   to avoid or minimize payment of contribution may not
   assert a defense that the insurer is not liable or potentially
   liable because another insurer has fully satisfied the envi-
   ronmental claim of the insured and damages or coverage
   obligations are no longer owed to the insured.
      “(d) Contribution rights by and among insurers under
   this section preempt all common law contribution rights, if
   any, by and between insurers for environmental claims.”
The amendment’s purpose based on legislative history was
“to facilitate speedy cleanup of hazardous waste sites by
encouraging good-faith settlements and precluding lengthy
contribution claims from non-settling insurers.” Certain
Underwriters v. Mass. Bonding and Ins. Co., 287 Or App 279,
291, 401 P3d 1212 (2017).
         In 2016, Continental filed this proceeding against
the Insureds’ other insurers, Wausau, Century, Argonaut,
and ICSOP, in the Oregon circuit court, seeking contribu-
tion for the costs that Continental had incurred and would
incur in defense of the Insureds’ potential liability for the
Portland Harbor cleanup.
         Wausau’s settlement of defense costs and coverage.
Under the federal judgment, Continental’s prospective defense
obligation lasts only until Continental’s indemnity limits are
fully exhausted. In May 2019, after entry of judgment in
the federal action, and after Continental had filed its con-
tribution claim in this proceeding, the Insureds entered into
a settlement agreement with Wausau under which Wausau
agreed to pay the Insureds $8.5 million in exchange for the
46 Continental Casualty Co. v. Argonaut Ins. Co. (A176763)

Insureds’ release of Wausau from all past, present, and future
insurance claims “of any kind arising out of the [Portland
Harbor Superfund Site].” Although the settlement agreement
did not explicitly allocate between defense costs and indem-
nity damages, Wausau and the Insureds agree that it was
intended to cover Wausau’s liability for unpaid defense costs
as well as future defense and indemnity costs. As a condition
precedent to its obligations to pay the agreed-upon amount,
Wausau required court approval that the settlements were
made in “good faith” and dismissal of Continental’s contri-
bution claims against it under ORS 465.480(4). Continental
responded that it was entitled to contribution as to defense
costs that had been or would be incurred by Continental.
         The trial court’s rulings: The trial court ordered
that each of the named insurers must contribute.1 Among
its many rulings, the trial court rejected Wausau’s motion
to dismiss Continental’s contribution claim against it
based on Wausau’s settlement with the Insureds.2 In reject-
ing Wausau’s motion, the trial court reasoned that, under
ORS 465.480(4)(a), a purported settlement that would free
an insurer from contribution from defense costs must be a
settlement “regarding the environmental claim.” The trial
court reasoned that an environmental claim is one brought
against a targeted insurer, as permitted by ORS 465.480,
and that the Insureds’ breach of contract claim in federal
court seeking to establish Continental’s duty to defend was
the environmental claim. The court reasoned that, at the
time of the Insureds’ settlement with Wausau, the Insureds
did not then possess a claim for defense costs on their policy
against Wausau, because the Insureds’ claim for all unpaid
defense costs had been reduced to a judgment against
Continental (until Continental’s indemnity limits would be
exhausted). The court explained:
    “I understand reasonable minds can disagree on my char-
    acterization of ‘the environmental claim.’ My characteriza-
    tion of ‘the environmental claim’ is a claim for defense costs

     1
       ICSOP has filed a separate appeal from the trial court’s determination that
it had a duty to defend, which we have decided this date. 331 Or App 26, ___ P3d
___ (2024).
     2
       Century had filed a similar motion, which the trial court also denied, and
which is the subject of a separate appeal, Court of Appeals A176706.
Cite as 331 Or App 38 (2024)                                        47

   at the Portland Harbor Superfund site. And currently and
   until Continental’s policy is exhausted, Schnitzer does not
   possess a claim for it.”
In effect, the trial court determined that, insofar as defense
costs were concerned, the Insureds had nothing that they
could settle. Whatever the Insureds’ settlement with Wausau
might have been, the trial court did not consider it to be one
that, within the meaning ORS 465.480(4)(a), would provide
a bar to contribution. The court explained that, in electing
to bring its environmental claim against a single insurer—
Continental—and in obtaining complete relief—a determi-
nation that Continental had “to pay 100%” of the Insureds’
Portland Harbor defense costs “until Continental’s policies
are exhausted,”—the Insureds no longer had an environ-
mental claim for defense costs; their environmental claim
for defense costs was, effectively, exhausted as resolved by
the federal judgment. Thus, the trial court explained, the
Insureds’ settlement with Wausau after that judgment
was not within or “regarding” the environmental claim.
Accordingly, the court concluded, Wausau’s settlement did
not shelter it from Continental’s right to contribution.
         Despite comments by the court that it did not see
any showing that the Wausau settlement with the Insureds
was not an arms’-length transaction or that Wausau lacked
good faith, the trial court determined that a good faith deter-
mination was not dispositive. The court’s judgment states:
   “The court finds that the settlement does not lack good faith,
   however, it cannot bar contribution claims by [Continental]
   for defense costs they incurred for the Portland Harbor
   Superfund Site. Wausau’s settlement does bar contribution
   claims for all other environmental claims released by the
   settlement.”
         Because Wausau’s challenge to the trial court’s
denial of its motion to dismiss is dispositive of this appeal,
we address that assignment now without further description
of the trial court’s thorough amended findings of fact and
conclusions of law. In the first of five assignments of error,
Wausau contends that the trial court erred in failing to dis-
miss Continental’s contribution claim against Wausau for
defense costs, for the reason that Continental’s contribution
48 Continental Casualty Co. v. Argonaut Ins. Co. (A176763)

claim against Wausau is barred by ORS 465.480(4)(a),
because Wausau entered into a good faith settlement with
the Insureds. Wausau argues that the trial court erred in
narrowly construing an “environmental claim” as only the
Insureds’ claim resulting in judgment against Continental,
and further erred in failing to give effect to the evident pur-
pose of the OECAA, as amended, to include a bar to con-
tribution for good faith settlements. Those errors, Wausau
argues, precluded the trial court from following through on
its express finding that the settlement was in good faith.
Specifically, Wausau disputes that the OECAA is correctly
construed to provide that there may be only one “environ-
mental claim.” Wausau disputes the trial court’s ruling that
the Insureds did not possess a claim against Wausau for
defense costs. Finally, Wausau asserts that the purpose of
the amendment of ORS 465.480 to insert a bar to contribu-
tion as against settling insurers was to encourage insurers
to settle rather than to hold out for a delayed and protracted
determination of who pays and how much.
        In support of the rulings below, Continental argues
that the trial court rightly concluded that the insureds
could not settle the “same claim” with Wausau as the
Insureds’ claim with Continental. Continental argues, as
the trial court ruled, that the Insureds did not “possess”
their policy claim against Wausau after the Insureds were
awarded a judgment against Continental for defense costs.
In Continental’s view, the reason is “merger.” Continental
argues, quoting two Supreme Court opinions:
   “ ‘Once a claim is reduced to a judgment, the claim is extin-
   guished because it is ‘merged’ into judgment and rights
   upon the judgment are substituted for the former claim.’
   [Barrett and Barrett, 320 Or 372, 378, 886 P2d 1 (1994).]
   ‘For that reason, the plaintiff can no longer maintain an
   action on the underlying claim.’ [State ex rel English v.
   Multnomah County, 348 Or 417, 432, 238 P3d 980 (2010)].”
Next, Continental, like the trial court, asserts that an “envi-
ronmental claim” can only mean the Insureds’ claim against
Continental, which has resulted in a judgment. Assuming
that to be correct, Continental reasons that the Insureds’
judgment against Continental “vested in Continental alone”
the Insureds’ claim against Wausau—to be realized in
Cite as 331 Or App 38 (2024)                                                49

contribution. Therefore, Continental contends, “it was not
legally possible for [the insureds] to settle with Wausau.”3
          As noted, the trial court’s primary rationale was
that the Wausau settlement was not with regard to the
Insureds’ “environmental claim.” That conclusion was based
on the trial court’s reasoning that the environmental claim
was the federal action that the Insureds brought against
Continental for defense costs. Once that claim was brought
to final judgment, the trial court reasoned, the Insureds no
longer had an environmental claim that could be settled.
          We reject the trial court’s narrow understanding of
what constituted the “environmental claim.” We find nothing
in the OECAA that would require that, in a complex situa-
tion like this, there can only be one “environmental claim.”
          As noted, an “environmental claim” is defined in
ORS 465.475(1) as “claim for defense or indemnity submitted
under a general liability insurance policy by an insured fac-
ing, or allegedly facing, potential liability for bodily injury
or property damage arising from a release of pollutants onto
or into land, air or water.” (Emphasis added.) Here, each of
the Insureds’ contract claims against their various liability
insurers was an “environmental claim,” whether resolved
without dispute, disputed but settled, or litigated to judg-
ment. The Insureds brought their environmental claims,
seeking defense and indemnity, against all of their insurers;
and as permitted by ORS 465.480, they brought their breach
of contract claim for defense costs only against Continental.
Nonetheless, the Insureds’ settlement with Wausau was a
settlement of an environmental claim.
          We also reject Continental’s argument that the
Insureds did not “possess” a claim on their policy against
Wausau, because their claim against Wausau had “merged”
with the judgment against Continental. “Under the ‘merger’
doctrine, once a claim is reduced to a judgment, the claim
is extinguished, because it is ‘merged’ into the judgment
and rights upon the judgment are substituted for the former
claim.” Barrett, 320 Or at 378; see State ex rel English, 348
    3
      Continental further contends in a cross-assignment of error that, in the
event that we determine that Wausau is not subject to contribution, the judgment
should be remanded for a reallocation of contribution.
50 Continental Casualty Co. v. Argonaut Ins. Co. (A176763)

Or at 434 (“[T]he county is prohibited, by the rule of merger,
from raising any defenses in this mandamus proceeding that
it could have raised, or that it raised and lost, in the original
trial court proceeding.”). But merger concerns the claims of
parties to a proceeding; it does not implicate strangers to
the proceeding. And we find no authority for the conclusion
that the judgment against Continental caused the Insureds’
independent contract claim against Wausau to merge in
the judgment against Continental—a judgment to which
Wausau was not a party. The Insureds possessed an envi-
ronmental claim against Wausau based on their contract of
insurance, which they could settle in good faith for indem-
nity damages or defense costs.
         Finally, we agree with Wausau on the evident pur-
pose of the OECAA to encourage earlier settlements and ear-
lier remedial clean up. Certain Underwriters, 287 Or App at
291. We agree that the OECAA allows insureds to negotiate
with individual insurers who, by settling, can resolve their
risk sooner, reduce further litigation cost, and be involved
in negotiating a finite sum. Continental’s view defeats that
purpose.
         As noted, Wausau sought a determination from the
trial court that its settlement was in good faith. The trial
court said, “I am not finding that * * * this is a settlement
that lacks good faith.” The court found, essentially, that it
had no evidence on which to base a finding that the settle-
ment was not in good faith. However, the court reasoned,
essentially, that a good faith determination was superflu-
ous, because the settlement was not regarding the environ-
mental claim—that is, the federal action, and, for that rea-
son, concluded that Continental was entitled to contribution
from Wausau.
         The trial court also reasoned that, under the stat-
utes, it did not seem right (or fair) that Continental should
have borne responsibility for the Insureds’ full defense costs
and not be permitted to seek contribution from insurers who
settled after Continental made defense cost payments and
after Continental sought contribution. The court inquired
of the parties whether the statutes might be construed to
provide a right to contribution with respect to defense costs
Cite as 331 Or App 38 (2024)                                                51

that were incurred before settlement. The parties discussed
a construction of the statute that places a temporal limita-
tion on the effect of settlement on the right to seek contribu-
tion. But the trial court ultimately rejected that construc-
tion, returning to the rationale that Wausau’s settlement
was not a settlement of the environmental claim. As we’ve
explained, we reject that rationale. Wausau’s settlement was
a settlement of the environmental claim that the Insureds
had against Wausau.
         Continental was entitled to seek contribution “from
any other insurer that is liable or potentially liable to the
insured,” except for an insurer that “has entered into a good-
faith settlement agreement with the insured regarding
the environmental claim.” ORS 465.480(4)(a). Continental
was precluded from seeking contribution from Wausau
if Wausau’s settlement was entered into in good faith.
Continental asserted that its right to contribution attached
upon payment of defense costs, and it makes no argument
in its briefing that that bar to contribution is subject to a
temporal restriction, such as, for example, a limitation to
defense costs paid after the contribution claim is filed or
after the settlement.4 The trial court found that “the settle-
ment does not lack good faith.” That finding is, in our view,
sufficient to satisfy ORS 465.480(4)(a). We conclude, there-
fore, that Continental was not entitled to seek contribution
from Wausau and that the trial court erred in denying
Wausau’s motion to dismiss. We therefore reverse the judg-
ment and remand for a redetermination of the allocation on
Continental’s claim for contribution to defense costs.
           Reversed and remanded.
KAMINS, J., dissenting.
        Schnitzer Steel Industries, Inc. (SSI), as was its
statutory right, selected Continental Casualty Company
and Transportation Insurance Company (collectively,
Continental) from its many insurance providers to bear
   4
     As the dissent notes, although Continental did not make a temporal argu-
ment in its brief, it did address the issue during oral argument, in response to
questions from the court. However, we conclude that a statutory construction
argument has not been fully developed by parties, and we therefore decline to
address whether the statute’s text lends itself to the dissent’s construction.
52 Continental Casualty Co. v. Argonaut Ins. Co. (A176763)

the costs of defense and cleanup stemming from its prop-
erty on the Portland Harbor Superfund site. Continental,
as was its statutory right, sought contribution from those
many insurance providers, including Employers Insurance
Company of Wausau (Wausau), to cover some of the tens of
millions of dollars in defense costs it was incurring. After
that contribution action had been filed and litigated for sev-
eral years, SSI “settled” its environmental claim with one of
the insurer defendants, Wausau (the same claim for which it
had already targeted Continental). The majority concludes
that that settlement between SSI and Wausau rendered
Wausau immune from Continental’s ongoing contribution
action, essentially plucking Wausau out of that case through
a settlement with a nonparty. Because I disagree that the
legislature intended that a defendant in an ongoing contri-
bution action could evade its obligations in that suit by set-
tling with the insured, I respectfully dissent.
         The OECAA governs the allocation of costs between
insurance providers liable for environmental cleanup
claims. The statute contains an “all-sums provision,” allow-
ing an insured with multiple insurers to select any of those
insurers whose policy requires it to “pay all sums arising
out of a risk covered by the policy.” ORS 465.480(3)(a). That
targeted insurer “must pay all defense or indemnity costs,
or both.” Id. That obligation is unaffected by the presence
of other insurers; the targeted insurer must pay those costs
“independent and unaffected by other insurance that may
provide coverage for the same claim.” Id. That provision
thus “transfer[s] the risk of an intransigent insurer from
the insured to its other insurers, where it is more easily and
more fairly borne.” Allianz Global Risks v. ACE Property &
Casualty Ins. Co., 367 Or 711, 745, 483 P3d 1124, adh’d to as
modified on recons, 368 Or 229, 489 P3d 115 (2021) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted). The “potential sweep” of that
transfer of risk is offset by the statutory right of contribu-
tion for the targeted insurer, ORS 465.480(4)(a), which pro-
vides that a targeted insurer may seek contribution from
any other potentially liable insurer “that has not entered
into a good-faith settlement agreement with the insured.”
Id.
Cite as 331 Or App 38 (2024)                                                      53

         The majority concludes that that subsection—
designed to mitigate the risk faced by a targeted insurer
such as Continental—shields Wausau from liability to
Continental for contribution because Wausau entered into
a settlement with SSI long after the defense costs had been
accrued and borne by Continental. Although the statute is
far from a model of clarity, the more logical and equitable
construction of ORS 465.480(4)(a) is that an insurer may
seek contributions from another insurer who has not, at the
time contribution is sought, entered into a settlement agree-
ment with the insured.1
          “In interpreting a statute, the court’s task is to dis-
cern the intent of the legislature.” PGE v. Bureau of Labor
and Industries, 317 Or 606, 610, 859 P2d 1143 (1993). “To do
so, we consider the statutory text and context, along with
any relevant and helpful legislative history.” Clark v. Eddie
Bauer LLC, 371 Or 177, 185, 532 P3d 880 (2023). At the out-
set, it is worth noting that the statute’s wording is subject
to multiple constructions and the parties did not present
fulsome statutory construction arguments, but, absent clar-
ification from the legislature or the Oregon Supreme Court,
I offer an interpretation using our conventional statutory
construction framework.
           Here, the statutory text provides:
        “An insurer that has paid all or part of an environmen-
    tal claim may seek contribution from any other insurer that
    is liable or potentially liable to the insured and that has not
    entered into a good-faith settlement agreement with the
    insured regarding the environmental claim.”
    1
      The majority does not address this argument because “Continental * * *
makes no argument [that the bar against seeking contribution from Wausau] is
subject to a temporal restriction[.]” 331 Or App at 51. Although the briefing focused
on other arguments, Continental did contend at oral argument that “[t]he statute’s
verb tenses certainly do suggest that, if the targeted insurer seeks contribution
before a co-insurer settles with the insured, that settlement is not eligible * * * to
bar the contribution claim.” Moreover, the interpretation of the statute is at the
heart of this appeal, and an appellate court has “an independent duty to correctly
interpret any statute that comes before [it], regardless of the arguments and inter-
pretations offered by the parties.” Strasser v. State of Oregon, 368 Or 238, 260, 489
P3d 1025 (2021); see also Hunters Ridge Condominium Ass’n v. Sherwood Crossing,
LLC, 285 Or App 416, 441 n 12, 395 P3d 892 (2017) (“We note that neither party
offers arguments bearing upon the construction of the statute * * *. Regardless, we
have an independent duty to correctly construe the statute.”).
54 Continental Casualty Co. v. Argonaut Ins. Co. (A176763)

ORS 465.480(4)(a) (emphases added). The common-sense
reading of that text is that an insurer may not seek (present
tense) contribution from another insurer that has already
entered (past tense) into a settlement agreement. The most
relevant definitions of “seek” include “to inquire for,” “to ask
for,” and “to try to acquire or gain.” Webster’s Third New Int’l
Dictionary 2055 (unabridged ed 2002). Those definitions
contemplate a point in time at which a subject “asks for”
or attempts to “acquire or gain.” Here, as permitted by the
plain text of the statute, Continental did “ask for” contri-
bution from Wausau in 2016—long before Wausau “entered
into a good-faith settlement agreement” with SSI. When a
statute contains different verb tenses, “ ‘[w]e do not lightly
disregard the legislature’s choice of verb tense, because we
assume that the legislature’s choice is purposeful.’ ” State v.
Gonzalez-Valenzuela, 358 Or 451, 466, 365 P3d 116 (2015)
(quoting Martin v. City of Albany, 320 Or 175, 181, 880
P2d 926 (1994)). At the time that Continental did “seek”
contribution from Wausau, Wausau had not “entered into
a good-faith settlement agreement” with SSI; therefore,
Continental should not be barred from seeking contribu-
tions from Wausau for costs accrued before the settlement.
See SAIF v. Ward, 369 Or 384, 394, 506 P3d 386 (2022)
(“[T]here is no more persuasive evidence of the intent of the
legislature than the words by which the legislature under-
took to give expression to its wishes.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.)).
         The legislative history supports that plain reading
of the text. The OECAA was enacted in 1999 to “promot[e]
the fair and efficient resolution of environmental claims
while encouraging voluntary compliance and regulatory
cooperation.” ORS 465.478. The relevant language was
added in 2013 “to facilitate speedy cleanup of hazardous
waste sites by encouraging good-faith settlements and pre-
cluding lengthy contributions claims for non-settling insur-
ers.” Certain Underwriters v. Mass. Bonding and Ins. Co.,
287 Or App 279, 291, 401 P3d 1212 (2017). The 2013 amend-
ment containing the relevant language in ORS 465.480(4)
was enacted “to specifically address” the situation in which
“insurance companies denied coverage and thereby slowed
down the clean up process” by transferring the risk of that
Cite as 331 Or App 38 (2024)                                 55

intransigence to the nonsettling insurer. Id. (internal quota-
tion marks omitted); Allianz Global Risks, 367 Or at 743.
         In a letter of support for Senate Bill (SB) 814 (2013),
which amended the OECAA to add the good-faith settle-
ment provision to ORS 465.480(4), Joan Snyder—attorney
for insured SSI—explained, “In order to encourage settle-
ment of environmental claims, it is important to clarify that
an insurer that settles an environmental claim in good faith
with its policy holder cannot later be the target of a suit
by a different insurer seeking to make the settling insurer
pay even more.” Testimony, House Committee on Consumer
Protection and Government Efficiency, SB 814, May 9, 2013
(statement of Joan Snyder), https://olis.oregonlegislature.
gov (accessed Dec 6, 2023) (emphasis added). Moreover,
Executive Director of the Columbia Corridor Corky Collier
stated that the bill would contribute to cleaning up the har-
bor by “promoting settlements by affording insurers who
desire to enter into early good faith settlements some protec-
tion against contribution claims by other non-settling insur-
ers.” Testimony, House Committee on Consumer Protection
and Government Efficiency, SB 814, May 9, 2013 (statement
of Corky Collier), https://olis.oregonlegislature.gov (accessed
Dec 6, 2023) (emphasis added). General Manager of Harbor
Environmental Jessica Hamilton expressed a similar sen-
timent: “Policyholders that are subject to long-tail environ-
mental claims should be free to negotiate settlements with
one or more of their insurers without fear that such settle-
ments will later be subject to baseless challenges by recal-
citrant, non-settling insurers. Allowing such settlements to
go forward, without undue risk of later litigation, helps to
promote the timely restoration of the Portland Harbor and
other contamination sites.” Testimony, House Committee on
Consumer Protection and Government Efficiency, SB 814,
May 9, 2013 (statement of Jessica Hamilton), https://olis.ore-
gonlegislature.gov (accessed Dec 6, 2023) (emphases added).
The bill’s supporters interpreted the good-faith settlement
provision to buttress the statute’s goal of expediting cleanup
by promoting early settlements. Indeed, as the testimony
quoted above reflects, they believed that the good-faith set-
tlement must occur before an insurer seeks contribution
from the settling insurer.
56 Continental Casualty Co. v. Argonaut Ins. Co. (A176763)

         That interpretation is consistent with the
common-law right of contribution upon which the OECAA
is based. In addressing a similar dispute between insurers
of a Portland Superfund site, the Supreme Court recognized
that the right to contribution “is grounded in principles of
equity and is a right that inures to the benefit of the insurer—
not the insured.” Allianz Global Risks, 367 Or at 739
(emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In that case, the targeted insurer sought contribution from
other potentially liable insurers who argued that, despite
their policy agreements, they had no duty to defend or cover
the cost of cleanup because of “side agreements” they made
with the insured’s parent company. The court rejected that
argument, concluding that the four corners of the insurance
policy—not the side agreements—governed the insurer’s
coverage. In reaching that conclusion, the court rejected the
notion that an insured can negotiate around the liability in
an insurance policy with its insurers because “the right is
not the insured’s to disclaim. It is a right of other insurers,
who are not parties to the insurance policy, and it is a right
founded * * * on notions of equity and unjust enrichment.”
Id. at 742 (internal quotation marks omitted). Although
the court did not address the good-faith settlement provi-
sion at issue in this case, the OECAA intended to codify,
not supplant, common law contribution principles. See id.
at 744 (“The OECAA is * * * consistent with our longstand-
ing recognition of common-law inter-insurer contribution
claims[.]”).2
         Against that backdrop, it is difficult to imagine
that the legislature intended ORS 465.480(4)(a) to facili-
tate depriving a targeted insurer such as Continental the
right to contribution on these facts—where it has already
been adjudicated to be liable for 100 percent of defense costs,
     2
       The settlement with Wausau appears to offer no offset to the costs already
incurred and shouldered by Continental, meaning that the settlement with
Wausau has no impact on the statutory responsibility of other insurers to pay
the total cost of SSI’s defense and cleanup. The majority’s approach of allowing
that settlement to exist alongside—and not reduce—the total liability owed by
Continental is potentially inconsistent with the overall approach to contribution
envisioned by the OECAA. See ORS 465.325(6)(b) (providing that, in the context
of a settlement of an environmental claim with the Department of Environmental
Quality, any such settlement “reduces the potential liability of the other [poten-
tially responsible parties] by the amount of the settlement”).
Cite as 331 Or App 38 (2024)                                 57

shouldered tens of millions of dollars in such costs, and
poured substantial additional resources into years-long con-
tribution lawsuits (a right of contribution expressly created
by the OECAA), only to have a nontargeted insurer settle
with the insured in the midst of that contribution litigation.
As explained, the intent behind the OECAA is to provide
insureds with a timely way to access money to begin the
cleanup process of hazardous sites by encouraging early set-
tlement of claims. But the approach taken by the majority
does the opposite—it encourages nonsettling insurers to take
a “wait and see” approach, only settling after costs have been
accrued and a contribution claim has been asserted against
them. Moreover, under the majority’s approach, a targeted
insurer is left in a state of perpetual uncertainty—a settle-
ment between another responsible insurer and the insured
may come at any point—thus further undermining efforts
to facilitate “speedy clean up of hazardous waste sites[.]”
Certain Underwriters, 287 Or App at 291. Simply put, it is
neither fair nor efficient to permit an insurer to avoid liabil-
ity for contribution to a targeted insurer by entering into a
settlement agreement with the insured years after the tar-
geted insurer sought contribution.
         Because I read ORS 465.480(4)(a) to permit insur-
ers to seek contributions from other potentially responsible
insurers who have not, at the time contribution is sought,
settled with an insured, I respectfully dissent.