Court Opinion

ID: 9372445
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-21 17:02:57.904671+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:35.491414
License: Public Domain

SUPERIOR COURT
                                           OF THE
                                  STATE OF DELAWARE

    VIVIAN L. MEDINILLA                                      LEONARD L. WILLIAMS JUSTICE CENTER
    JUDGE                                                    500 NORTH KING STREET, SUITE 10400
                                                                    WILMINGTON, DE 19801-3733
                                                                      TELEPHONE (302) 255-0626

                                    February 20, 2023

Beth Deborah Savitz, Esquire                             Michael Heyden, Esquire
Deputy Attorney General                                  1201 North King Street, Suite B
820 North French Street                                  Wilmington, DE 19801
Wilmington, DE 19801

            Re:   State of Delaware v. Derrick Stevens
                  Case ID No. 2203012725

Dear Counsel:

      This is the Court’s determination following the suppression hearing in the
above matter on February 17, 2023. For the following reasons, Defendant’s Motion
to Suppress is DENIED.

                                          Facts1

      The facts involve two confidential informants. During the third week of
March 2022, a confidential informant (“C.I. 1”) told Detective Matthew Jones of the
Delaware State Police’s Governor’s Task Force that Defendant Derrick Stevens
(“Defendant”) conducts illegal sales of heroin and crack cocaine, drives a black
Jaguar sedan, and stays at motels.2

      After receiving this information, Detective Jones corroborated some of the
information, mainly that Defendant and his co-defendant/girlfriend, Alexis
Wierzbicki, were staying in Room 309 at the Red Roof Plus in Newark, Delaware.3

1
  The recitation of facts is presented from the suppression hearing on February 17, 2023 and
corresponding pleadings submitted for the Court’s review by the State and Defense counsel.
2
  State’s Response, Ex. A. Probable Cause Affidavit, at 5, ¶ 1.
3
  Id. at 5, ¶ 2.
                                             1
The room was listed under Wierzbicki’s name.4 Surveillance was established in the
Red Roof Plus area, wherein law enforcement observed a black Jaguar sedan parked
in the parking lot.5

       On March 23, 2022, Detective Jones met with another confidential informant
(“C.I. 2”) to conduct a controlled purchase.6 Detective Jones testified that while C.I.
2 was in the detective’s vehicle, the detective first verified that C.I. 2 did not have
any money or illegal contraband on his person, and then supplied him/her with
money.7 In the presence of Detective Jones, C.I. 2 called a person whom the police
believed was Defendant and was instructed to go to Room 309.8

       Law enforcement had established a surveillance platform to include five or
six other officers from the Governor’s Task Force with a 360-degree view of C.I. 2.9
The Red Roof Inn’s room entrances were visible from this surveillance platform,
including Room 309. The officers observed C.I. 2 walk to the third floor, enter and
exit Room 309, and make no other contact with any other persons or rooms.10
Detective Jones and the officers never lost sight of the C.I. 2, except when he/she
entered Room 309.11 C.I. 2 confirmed that he/she met with Defendant in Room 309
and exchanged the money given to her/him by the officers for crack cocaine from
Defendant.12 The substance from this controlled buy later tested positive for crack
cocaine.13

      Detective Jones set forth the above facts in the probable cause affidavit and
obtained a nighttime search warrant for Room 309.14 The affidavit did not state
whether the confidential informants were past proven reliable or whether C.I. 1 had
any firsthand knowledge of the offenses.15 The police executed the warrant and
searched Room 309, where they found cocaine, heroin, two firearms, and documents
belonging to Defendant.16
4
  Id.
5
  Id.
6
  Id. at 5, ¶ 3.
7
  Id.
8
  Id.
9
  Detective Matthew Jones’ Testimony (Del. Super. Feb. 17, 2022).
10
   State’s Response, Ex. A. Probable Cause Affidavit, at 5, ¶ 3.
11
   Detective Matthew Jones’ Testimony (Del. Super. Feb. 17, 2022).
12
   State’s Response, Ex. A. Probable Cause Affidavit, at 5, ¶ 3.
13
   Id., at 5, ¶ 3.
14
   See State’s Response, Ex. A. Probable Cause Affidavit.
15
   See id.
16
   Id., at 2, ¶ 5.
                                              2
      While Detective Jones left the scene to obtain the search warrant, the police
then observed and stopped Defendant and Wierzbicki, who were walking toward the
black Jaguar sedan parked in the parking lot.17 The police searched Defendant’s
person and did not find any drugs or contraband.18 The police also searched the
black Jaguar sedan and did not find any drugs or contraband.19 Defendant and
Wierzbicki were detained and handcuffed.20 Both became irate and disorderly and
Detective Michael Macauley of the same task force determined it would be best to
remove Defendant from the parking lot.21

      Detective Macauley then told Defendant and Wierzbicki that they were going
to obtain a nighttime search warrant unless, instead, they consented to a search of
Room 309.22 Both refused to give consent, and Defendant state, “take me to jail.”23
Detective Macauley, then read Defendant his Miranda warning.24 While Detective
Macauley transported Defendant to the police station, Defendant made incriminating
statements.25 Further, while in a holding cell, Defendant made incriminating
statements to Wierzbicki and an unknown individual.26

      Defendant and Wierzbicki are charged with two counts of Drug Dealing, two
counts of Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony, two counts
of Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited, and one count of Conspiracy
Second Degree.27 Defendant is also charged with two counts of Possession,
Purchase, Ownership, or Control of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited.28

                                     Party Contentions

      Defendant moves to suppress all evidence seized by the police. First, he
argues a violation under the fourth Amendment as to the search warrant. The bases
are two-fold: the confidential informant was not proven reliable, and the police were

17
   Defendant’s Motion to Suppress, at 2.
18
   Id.
19
   Id.
20
   Detective Michael Macauley’s Testimony (Del. Super. Feb. 20, 2023).
21
   Id.
22
   Id.
23
   See Defendant’s Motion to Suppress, at 3; State’s Response at 9, ¶ 22–24.
24
   Detective Michael Macauley’s Testimony (Del. Super. Feb. 20, 2023).
25
   Id.
26
   Id.
27
   D.I. 58.
28
   D.I. 58.
                                               3
not present when the confidential informant conducted the controlled purchase. He
further argues a violation of his Miranda rights under the fifth Amendment as to all
incriminating statements made as “fruits of the poisonous tree,”29 arguing that he
invoked his constitutional right when he said, “take me to jail.” Wierzbicki does not
challenge the validity of the warrant.30

       The State maintains the search was lawful. It argues sufficient probable cause
exists in the four corners of the search warrant and that the C.I. 1’s information was
corroborated by the initial surveillance and C.I. 2’s controlled-buy evidence that
confirmed the purchase and cocaine. And the State further argues where there was
no custodial interrogation under Miranda, the Fifth Amendment was not implicated.

                                     Standard of Review

     I.    Search Warrant

       Under the U.S. and Delaware Constitutions, a search warrant may only be
issued upon demonstrating probable cause.31 To determine whether a search warrant
affidavit establishes probable cause, Delaware Courts use the “four-corners” test.32
The search warrant must be supported by a sworn affidavit that establishes sufficient
allegation of cause for the issuance of the warrant.33 “An affidavit in support of a
search warrant need only ‘set forth facts adequate for a judicial officer to form a
reasonable belief that an offense has been committed and the property to be seized
will be found in a particular place.’”34

       “[A] magistrate may find probable cause when, considering the totality of the
circumstances, ‘there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will
be found in a particular place.’”35 “[A] determination of probable cause by the
issuing magistrate will be paid great deference by a reviewing court and will not be
invalidated by a hypertechnical, rather than a common sense, interpretation of the

29
   Defendant’s Motion to Suppress, at 4.
30
   State’s Response, at 3.
31
   U.S. Const. amend. IV; Del. Const., art. 1, § 6; Anderson v. State, 249 A.3d 785, 795 (Del. 2021)
(citations omitted).
32
   Anderson, 249 A.3d at 795 (citing Valentine v. State, 207 A.3d 566, 570 (Del. 2019)).
33
   11 Del. C. §§ 2306–07; see also Valentine, at 570.
34
   Loper v. State, 234 A.3d 159, 2020 WL 2843516, at *2 (Table) (Del. June 1, 2020).
35
   Anderson, 249 A.3d at 795 (Del. 2021) (quoting Sisson v. State, 903 A.2d 288, 296 (Del. 2006)).
                                                 4
warrant affidavit.”36 When a search warrant is challenged, the defendant bears the
burden of proving that the challenged search was not lawful.37

     II.   Rights Under Miranda v. Arizona

       The United States Supreme Court established in Miranda v. Arizona that a
person’s Fifth Amendment privileges are triggered when subjected to custodial
interrogation.38 Here, there is no question that Defendant was handcuffed and in
custody. The question is whether there was interrogation.

                                         Discussion

     I. The Affidavit in Support of the Search Warrant for the Motel Room Set
        Forth Sufficient Probable Cause.

     Defendant argues that the facts in this case fall squarely within State v.
Spady.39 They do not.

      In Spady, a confidential informant (C.I.) told a detective that the defendant
and another individual were selling crack cocaine and heroin at their apartment.40
That C.I.’s information was not corroborated by any surveillance or investigation.41
In Spady, the detective observed the C.I. enter and exit the front door of an apartment
building.42 The detective’s only investigation was the C.I.’s verification of the
defendant’s identity.43 The Superior Court granted suppression, primarily where law
enforcement failed to verify that the C.I. bought the cocaine and heroin from the
defendant. The detective was not present during the controlled buys and merely
watched the C.I. enter and exit the front door of a building.44 The building had two
businesses on the first level and three apartments on the upper levels—all of which
were accessible from the front door—the C.I. could have gone to any of those
places.45

36
   Id. (quoting Jensen v. State, 482 A.2d 105, 111 (Del. 1984)).
37
   State v. Sisson, 883 A.2d 868, 875 (Del. Super. 2005).
38
   Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467–68 (1966).
39
   State v. Spady, 2018 WL 4896335 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 8, 2018).
40
   Id. at *1.
41
   Id.
42
   Id.
43
   Id.
44
   Id. at *3–4.
45
   Id. at *1.
                                               5
       Spady is distinguishable. The Court finds the facts here are more akin to
Loper v. State,46 where the Supreme Court validated the search where that affidavit
included three confidential informants and corroborating police surveillance.47
Similarly here, the affidavit for the search warrant for Room 309 set forth
information obtained from two confidential informants and corroborating police
surveillance. The information from C.I. 1 was corroborated by the police’s own
investigation—Defendant’s girlfriend rented Room 309 under her name, the black
Jaguar sedan was indeed found in the motel’s parking lot, and C.I. 2 made a
controlled buy.

       Unlike Spady, here, the controlled buy was observed by various police officers
on a surveillance platform with 360-degree visual and never lost sight of the C.I.
except when he/she walked into Room 309, the very room he/she was directed to go
to for the drug transaction. He/she was checked prior to walking into the room and
was given money to make the buy. He/she came out without the money and
presented to the police with what was later tested for crack cocaine. The affidavit
further noted that C.I. 2 did not make any contact with any other persons during the
observation of C.I. 2’s controlled buy.

      Defendant fails to meet his burden that the search warrant is invalid. The
Court finds the magistrate had sufficient probable cause to issue the warrant that
focused on what would be found in Room 309.

     II. Defendant’s Miranda Rights Were Not Violated.

      Defendant next argues that the statements made by Defendant while having
conversations with the police officers he was handcuffed must be suppressed
because the police did not give him a Miranda warning.48 He is incorrect.

       Although Defendant was in custody during his detention, the only question
that the officer asked was whether he would consent to a search of Room 309. The
question called for a yes or no answer. This question was not meant to elicit any
incriminating statements and his next comments, without prompting were made
voluntarily, namely “take me to jail.” Notably, once Defendant made this voluntary

46
   Loper v. State, 234 A.3d 159, 2020 WL 2843516 (Table) (Del. June 1, 2020).
47
   Id. at *2.
48
   Defendant’s Motion to Suppress, at 3.
                                              6
statement, he was read his Miranda warnings.49

       Nothing in this record suggests that police conducted an interrogation, nor
does Defendant claim as such. Instead, he argues that once he said, “take me to jail,”
in response to whether he would consent to a search of Room 309, that this was an
invocation, and all further questioning should have stopped. He offers no case law
to support that this was an invocation. Even if he had properly invoked his right to
counsel or remain silent, on this record, it is clear that any statements that he made
in the vehicle after he was given his Miranda warnings were similarly voluntary, not
prompted by any questions from police. Lastly, any statements he made at the
station to his co-defendant girlfriend and an unknown individual are also not in
response to custodial interrogation. Thus, there was no custodial interrogation, and
therefore no Miranda violation.

          Therefore, Defendant’s Motion to Suppress is DENIED.

                                       /s/ Vivian L. Medinilla
                                        Judge

cc:       Prothonotary

49
     State’s Response, at 9, ¶ 23.
                                          7