Court Opinion

ID: 9449893
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 16:27:01.757306+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:32:02.549736
License: Public Domain

J. SKELLY WRIGHT, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
Immediately after Bailey shot a man, allegedly in self-defense, he found the nearest police patrolman and turned himself in, handing over the weapon he had used. Thereafter, with commendable dispatch, Bailey was taken to the nearest precinct station and booked. He there gave the routine administrative information, see 4 D.C.Code § 134 (1961), and admitted the shooting a second time. On completion of the booking, Bailey should have been taken to a committing magistrate “as quickly as possible,” Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 454, 77 S.Ct. 1356, 1 L.Ed.2d 1479 (1957), that is, “immediately, and without delay,” 4 D.C. Code § 140 (1961). Rule 5(a), F.R.Cr.P. Instead, a Homicide Squad officer arrived at the precinct station and took Bailey “to police headquarters in order to carry out a process of inquiry that [lent] itself, even if not so designed, to eliciting damaging statements to support the arrest and ultimately his guilt,” the very thing Mallory condemned. 354 U.S. at 454, 77 S.Ct. at 1359, 1 L.Ed.2d 1479.
An hour or more was spent in the Homicide Squad Room at headquarters taking a detailed written confession 1 as to the shooting. The confession included Bailey’s claim of self-defense, but differed in significant detail from the testimony presented at trial.2 Apparently unsure of its admissibility in its case-in-chief, the Government used the confession for impeachment purposes, and made much of the discrepancies. But use of inadmissible confessions for any purpose, including impeachment, is improper. See Annot., 89 A.L.R.2d 478 (1963). A defendant “must be free to deny all the elements of the case against him without thereby giving leave to the Government to introduce by way of rebuttal evidence illegally secured by it, and therefore not available for its case in chief.” Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65, 74 S.Ct. 354, 356, 98 L.Ed. 503 (1954); see also Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 46 S.Ct. 4, 70 L.Ed. 145 (1925); Tate v. United States, 109 U.S.App.D.C. 13, 283 F.2d 377 (1960).3 As in Jones,4 the Government argues that the written confes*547sion was merely cumulative to the admissible statements made by Bailey. But we said in Jones: “It is difficult to conceive [the] admission [of a confession] being non-prejudicial to the defendant under any circumstances. Here the written confession bore on appellant’s claim of self defense, her only real defense.” Jones v. United States, supra Note 4, 113 U.S.App.D.C. at 258, 307 F.2d at 399. And of course, statements in the confession are, in no way more admissible because they may have been “ostensibly exculpatory rather than incriminating.” Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963).
After the written confession, Bailey was further held in police custody without presentation to a magistrate until the following Monday, a total detention of 60 hours, in violation of Rule 5(a), F.R. Cr.P. “While occurring after completion of the signed confession here challenged,” the continued illegal detention “displays and confirms an official disregard by police * * * of the basic rights of the defendant” and is therefore relevant to showing “[t]he undeviating intent of the officers.” Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 511 n. 8, 83 S.Ct. 1336, 1342, 10 L.Ed.2d 513 (1963). See Jones v. United States, supra.
The Government suggests that the police acted in the interest of the defendant5 in detaining him long enough to make a recorded statement as to the crime. The 60-hour delay does not strengthen this suggestion as to the police purpose. A more appropriate opportunity for any statements the accused wishes to make in his own best interest would be before “a neutral and detached magistrate” rather than an “officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.” Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14, 68 S.Ct. 367, 369, 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948). Rule 5, F.R.Cr.P.
I respectfully dissent.

. The typewritten confession recites that Bailey was advised of his constitutional right to silence. The Homicide Squad officer who took the statement, however, testified as follows:
“Q. Was he informed that he could refuse to give [a statement] and nothing would happen to him?
“A. No, sir.
“Q. Was he informed that under the Fifth Amendment he could stand on his constitutional privilege and refuse to give a statement?
“A. No, sir, he was not.”
Moreover, Rule 5(b), F.R.Cr.P., requires that an accused be advised of his constitutional rights by a judicial officer. “The Constitution does not contemplate that prisoners shall be dependent upon government agents for legal counsel and aid, however conscientious and able those
agents may be.” Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 725, 68 S.Ct. 316, 324, 92 L.Ed. 309 (1948) (opinion of Mr. Justice Black, announcing tbe judgment of the Court).

. For example, at trial the defendant testified that during the argument preceding the shooting he was wearing only shorts, and that the gun was visible in his lap. In the statement to police, Bailey is supposed to have said that he was wearing a shirt, and that the gun was under that shirt.

. The only exceptions we have recognized to this rule concern either (1) “sweeping claims” going far beyond the crime charged, to refer to police investigations of other crimes years before (compare *547Agnello v. United States, supra, with Walder v. United States, supra) and (2) statements as to “lawful proper acts” which are purely “collateral matters” to the issues at bar, Tate v. United States, supra. Neither exception is relevant here, where the testimony bore on the central issue of the instant case.

. Jones v. United States, 113 U.S.App.D.C. 256, 307 F.2d 397 (1962).

. It is uncontradicted in the record that at the time of taMng the confession, the police denied Bailey’s request to communicate with his family, and, of course, no counsel was present to advise the accused. Compare Haynes v. Washington, supra.