Court Opinion

ID: 9735941
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 18:37:20.585947+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:27:02.839730
License: Public Domain

SALSMAN, J.
I dissent.
The Carmel zoning ordinance contemplates that R-l building sites shall have an area of 4,000 square feet. It is silent, however, upon the question whether the area of private road easements, such as that proposed by respondents Doud and Watson, may be included in the computation of the total area required. No appellate court in this state seems to have considered this question, although it has engaged the attention of courts in other jurisdictions and has been the subject of comment by some authorities on zoning and planning. Thus in 1 Rathkopf, The Law of Zoning and Planning (3d. ed.) page 34-11, the author discusses the minimum area requirements established by zoning ordinances and states that: “In computing the size of lots, land contained in streets, public or private, which give access to the lot is excluded.” In Loveladies Property Owners Assn. v. Barnegat City Service Co., 60 N.J. Super. 491 [159 A.2d 417], the court held that the area of certain road easement strips over which access was gained to the building lots there established could not be considered for the purpose of meeting the minimum area requirements of the ordinance under consideration. Substantially the same result was arrived at in Sommers v. City Council of Baltimore, 215 Md. 1 [135 A.2d 625] ; Clarks Lane Garden Apts. v. Schloss, 197 Md. 457 [79 A.2d 538], and San-Lan Builders, Inc. v. Baxendale, 28 N.J. 148 [145 A.2d 457]. (See also the annotation in 95 A.L.R.2d 751, 766-767, 782-783.) These decisions are not controlling, of course, but are persuasive.
There are good reasons for holding that minimum area requirements for a single family residential building site cannot reasonably be construed so as to include the area of private easements. Although road easements, such as are pro*67posed here, are private, they have a public character also, and of necessity are available for uses which are not strictly private. Here, for example, the easements proposed would be open to use by municipal officers for police and fire purposes, and equally available for such public utility vehicles as are necessary to serve water, gas and electrical installations, and remove refuse. No single resident could make exclusive use of the road easement, but it would be available to all alike, including the guests and invitees of each. The general purpose of minimum area requirements for an R-l building site is to control population density and thus avoid the overcrowding of land. (Clemons v. City of Los Angeles, 36 Cal.2d 95, 101 [222 P.2d 439].) That objective is diminished rather than advanced if the area of private road easements is included in the computation of the minimum area required for an R-l building site.
The comprehensive zoning ordinance of the city describes Carmel as “... primarily, essentially and predominantly a residential City...” with business and commerce subordinated to its residential character. Thus, open spaces on all R-l sites are required, and front, side and rear setback lines are established. No building may cover more than 35 per cent of the site area, and no more than one room on any building site may be used as a kitchen. These and other provisions of the ordinance disclose an intention to restrict the overuse of land for residential purposes, a legitimate objective and one long upheld.
Authority to include the area of private easements in computing the minimum area required for an R-l building site has not been given to the Board of Adjustments. Although the board is given the power to interpret the ordinance, it is fundamental that this grants only the power to ascertain what is in the ordinance itself, not to insert what has been omitted or to omit what has been inserted. Here no power has been given to the board to include any area of a private easement in the total area required for an R-l building site. To imply such a power would tend to defeat the declared objectives and purposes of the ordinance. If the board may include the area of the private road easement here proposed in reaching the minimum area required for an R-l building site, it might in other cases include a larger area of private road easement. Thus the determination of the inim'TTmm area of an R-l building site could be decided by the board on a case-by-case basis, whereas the ordinance, reasonably interpreted, *68requires an unencumbered minimum area of 4,000 square feet. The ordinance may not be read so as to find an implied power in the hoard to vary the minimum area by more than the 10 per cent (10%) allowed by section 1332(a). In granting the use permit here challenged, the board exceeded its jurisdiction and its ruling should not stand.
Beading the ordinance to exclude from the minimum area of B-l building sites the area of private road easements does not foreclose the city from reaching a contrary result. If the city council, on behalf of the citizens it represents, decides that local objectives will best be realized by permitting the area of private road easements to be included in the computation of the minimum area required for an B-l building site, the zoning ordinance may readily be amended to accomplish that result. On the other hand, a conclusion that a zoning ordinance which does not expressly exclude the area of private road easements in a determination of the required minimum area for an B-l building site may be construed so as to permit the inclusion of such area in arriving at the required total may well have application to other California communities having ordinances similar to that of Carmel.
Bespondents seek to argue that we are bound by the administrative interpretation of the zoning ordinance heretofore made by the city building inspector. At trial the building inspector testified that: “Any building site on which there may be some type of private easement, I take the entire area including the easement.” He also testified that in 1946 a use permit was granted for two building sites of 4,000 square feet each, both of which included an easement strip.
It is true that the contemporaneous and practical construction of a statute by those whose duty it is to carry it into effect is entitled to great respect. (Christensen v. Thurber, 120 Cal.App.2d 517, 519 [261 P.2d 312].) It is not controlling, however, and the construction put upon a zoning ordinance by city officials cannot alter its true meaning. The final responsibility for the interpretation of an ordinance or statute rests with the courts rather than administrative officials. Administrative interpretation of an ordinance or statute has been said to be “ '... a weight in the scale, to be considered but not to be inevitably followed.’ ” (Johnston v. Board of Supervisors, 31 Cal.2d 66, 74 [187 P.2d 686], and cases cited; see also 45 Cal.Jur.2d, Statutes, § 176, pp. 674-5.) Here there has been little administrative interpretation of the zoning ordinance insofar as it relates to the inclusion or exclusion of the area of private road easements in the com*69putation of the minimum area necessary for an R-l building site. The building inspector’s testimony concerning two building sites established in 1946 in which the area of private road easements was included in the total site area appears to have involved a single application. The question was not again raised until the Doud-Watson application was made which ultimately gave rise to this appeal.
In my view of this case, the city council has abdicated its legislative responsibilities in behalf of an administrative board not directly answerable to the people. I would reverse the judgment and invite the council to clarify its ordinance.
Appellant’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied June 23, 1965. Traynor, C. J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.