Court Opinion

ID: 9652469
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 17:24:15.652693+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:51.667136
License: Public Domain

WENDELL L. GRIFFEN, Judge, dissenting. I would reverse and remand for benefits because I believe this case is controlled by the decisions in Siders v. Southern Mattress Co., 240 Ark. 267 (1966), Price v. Little Rock Packaging Co., 42 Ark. App. 238, 856 S.W.2d 317 (1993), and Min-Ark. Pallet Co. v. Lindsey, 58 Ark. App. 309, 950 S.W.2d 468 (1997). Wilburn Daniels sustained a compensable hernia in his right groin area on December 17, 1997, while working for Affiliated Foods Southwest (Affiliated) in a work-release program. Affiliated accepted this injury as compensable and paid all appropriate benefits related to it. On April 16, 1998, Daniels was scheduled to make a 1:30 p.m. follow-up visit with Dr. Steven Williamson, the physician who performed the hernia surgery. He testified that while working for Affiliated between 12:30 and 12:45 p.m. that day, he experienced a sharp pain in his left groin area while stacking and removing boxes from a conveyor belt. He assumed that the pain was related to his old injury. He stopped work when he felt the pain, informed Butch Atwood, his supervisor, that he was experiencing pain in his groin area, but failed to tell Atwood that the pain arose from stacking and removing boxes. Daniels then reported to Jana Martin, the company nurse, to obtain the necessary paperwork for his doctor’s appointment with Dr. Williamson. Dr. Williamson discovered that Daniels had sustained a new hernia on his left side. Daniels returned to Martin’s office and told her that he had a new hernia, but failed to mention that his pain arose out of the work earlier that day. He did not file a report of injury related to the April 16 work episode until April 21. The employer controverted the left hernia claim based on testimony from Martin and Butch Atwood, the supervisor, that Daniels failed to tell them that he hurt himself at work or sustained a new hernia on April 16. Charles Dean Keterson, the lead man over the module where Daniels worked, testified that Daniels did not inform him that he injured himself at work on April 16. Keterson, Atwood, and Martin testified that they thought Daniels doctor’s appointment was merely for regular follow-up of the December 17, 1997 hernia because Daniels had not reported a new injury. Daniels testified that he assumed his pain was related to the December 17, 1997, hernia, so he did not report a new injury. Dr. Williamson testified by deposition that Daniels did not report a new injury on April 16, 1998, and that the left side hernia occurred sometime between December 1997, and April 1998; he had examined Daniels in December 1997 and specifically mentioned in his history that Daniels did not have a hernia on the left. Dr. Williamson’s April 16, 1998 office note indicated that Daniels was having no symptoms in the right groin area, but complained of pain in the left groin with cough, straining, and with bending. Although Dr. Williamson recommended that the left hernia be repaired, Affiliated did not authorize hernia repair because Daniels failed to report that he had sustained a hernia on April 16, 1998. Affiliated contended before the Commission and in response to this appeal that Daniels failed to comply with the statutory requirement in Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-523 (a) (4) that, notice of the occurrence be given to the employer within forty-eight (48) hours after the occurrence. In Min-Ark. Pallet Co. v. Lindsey, supra, our court squarely declared that the word “occurrence” in the phrase “notice of the occurrence” requires that the claimant provide notice of “the happening of the hernia itself, not necessarily the work event resulting in the hernia.” In that case the claimant suffered a hernia while lifting and stacking wooden pallets. He phoned his mother in the presence of the business owner and told his mother that his side “grabbed” him and “almost dropped me to my knees” and he told the owner that he had some really bad pains but did not know what was wrong. The Commission awarded benefits. On appeal, the employer argued that § ll-9-523(a)(4) should be interpreted to mean that the legislature intended the word “occurrence” to describe a work event that causes a hernia. We rejected that argument, citing Siders and Price where the appellate courts reversed the Commission’s denial of benefits to employees who suffered hernias. Responding to the argument that the legislature intended for the word “occurrence” to describe a work event that caused the hernia, Judge Stroud’s opinion in Min-Ark. Pallet Co. states: We disagree. Even when statutes are strictly construed, they must be construed in their entirety, harmonizing each subsection where possible. The word “occurrence” appears four times within section 11-9-523, two of which are within the phrase “occurrence of the hernia.” Ark. Code Ann. § ll-9-523(a)(l), (4) & (5). Clearly, when used within this phrase, “occurrence” means the happening of the hernia itself, not necessarily the work event resulting in the hernia. Our construction is buttressed by the fact that subsection (a)(1) addresses the work event causing the hernia: “(t)hat the occurrence of the hernia immediately followed as the result of sudden effort, severe strain, or the application of force directly to the abdominal wall[.]” Appellant’s argument would have us give two different meanings to the same word, “occurrence,” within the same statute, totally ignoring its use in the phrase “occurrence of the hernia.” Rules of strict construction do not require such a strained application of the words of the statute. Id., 58 Ark. App. at 314-15 (citations omitted). The Min-Ark. Pallet opinion also quoted from the supreme court’s opinion in Siders v. Southern Mattress Co., supra, where the supreme court observed that the employee is not “required to give notice that he has a hernia — he is not a doctor — the statute merely requires that appehant give notice of the occurrence which results in a hernia,” and that on the case as a whole “if the claimant’s disability arises soon after the accident and is logically attributable to it, with nothing to suggest any other explanation for the employee’s condition, we may say without hesitation that there is no substantial evidence to sustain the commission’s refusal to make an award.” Hall v. Pittman Constr. Co., 235 Ark. 104, 105, 357 S.W.2d 263, 264 (1962). The workers’ compensation hernia statute does not require that an employee report that he has sustained a hernia or recite the magic words, “I suffered an injury while performing my job duties.” The fact that Daniels did not tell Keterson, Atwood, Martin, or Dr. Williamson that his April 16, 1998 pain was work-related is not controlling. Daniels mistakenly beheved that his pain was related to the December 1997 hernia for which he was scheduled to see Dr. Williamson in follow-up the afternoon of April 16, 1998. Like the employee in Price v. Little Rock Packaging Co., supra, who mistakenly believed that the “awful pain” experienced while lifting loads of paper on April 26, 1990 stemmed from a fall at work in February 1990, Daniels did not complain to his physician or report to his employer that he sustained an injury on April 26, 1990. Yet, we reversed the Commission’s denial of benefits in line with the holding in Siders. Likewise, we should reverse the Commission in this case. Affiliated does not dispute that Daniels stopped working early on April 17, 1998. While emphasizing that Daniels never told his supervisors, the industrial nurse, or Dr. Williamson that he had been injured that day, Affiliated ignores the fact that it allowed Daniels to stop working for forty-five minutes to an hour before his doctor’s appointment, that Dr. Williamson clearly diagnosed a new hernia on the left side, and that when Daniels presented Nurse Martin with documentation from Dr. Williamson to that effect following the April 16, 1998 doctor’s appointment when the hernia was discovered, there was no evidence indicating that Daniels had been injured at any other time or place than at the workplace. This is not a question of Daniels being credible. All the proof supports his assertion that he thought his pain on April 16, 1998 was related to the December 17, 1997 right side hernia. The Commission has not found that Daniels lacks credibility; he was merely mistaken. That mistaken belief about the origin of his pain should not disqualify Daniels from recovering workers’ compensation benefits in the face of the decisions in Min-Ark. Pallet Co.,Price v. Little Rock Packaging, and Siders. I respectfully dissent. Robbins, C.J., Hart and Stroud, JJ., join in this dissent.