Court Opinion

ID: 9781508
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 16:50:05.650753+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:34:27.470067
License: Public Domain

BARNES, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. We do not presume that a plaintiff has assumed the risk of activities or conditions he does not know about, and “[m]oreover, he must not only know of the facts which create the danger, but he must comprehend and appreciate the nature of the danger he confronts.” Beringause v. Fogleman Truck Lines, 200 Ga. *21App. 822, 824 (4) (409 SE2d 524) (1991).
As the majority notes, here, the older children routinely climbed on the Infant Maze, using the handholds as foot rungs to climb onto the pitched roof. They would then jump off the roof. The point of making the climb was to then jump off the roof. Although the majority relies on case law that holds, as a matter of law, that the dangers of falling from a high place are so obvious that young children can appreciate the inherent risk, in this case, young Steven did not fall from the roof of the Infant Maze. The assumption of risk question in this case is not whether Steven knew he might fall from the roof — the children routinely climbed the Infant Maze using the handholds as rungs with the specific intent of then jumping from the roof. In fact, they anticipated that gravity would operate as it always had — after climbing up, they would be able to then jump down. Here, the issue is whether Steven had the requisite knowledge and understanding of the dangers and risks involved in climbing the Infant Maze.
As this Court has held: “[Wjhether a child assumed the risk is peculiarly a question for the jury[, unless] the facts are so plain and palpable that they demand a finding by the court as a matter of law. ...” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Pearson v. Small World Day Care Center, 234 Ga. App. 843, 845 (2) (b) (508 SE2d 200) (1998).
The doctrine of the assumption of the risk of danger applies only where the plaintiff, with a full appreciation of the danger involved and without restriction from his freedom of choice either by the circumstances or by coercion, deliberately chooses an obviously perilous course of conduct so that it can be said as a matter of law he has assumed all risk of injury.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Young v. Brandt, 225 Ga. App. 889, 891 (3) (485 SE2d 519) (1997).
[T]here is no legal bar to applying assumption of the risk, as a matter of law, to the conduct of a child between the[ ] ages [of seven and fourteen] when the evidence shows that the danger was obvious, that the child knew of the danger and was able to appreciate the risks associated with it, and the child voluntarily chose to run the risk.
Spooner v. City of Camilla, 256 Ga. App. 179, 182 (2) (a) (568 SE2d 109) (2002). However, “[k]nowledge of the risk is the watchword of assumption of risk, and means both actual and subjective knowledge *22on the plaintiffs part." Atlanta Affordable &c. Partnership v. Brown, 253 Ga. App. 286, 286-287 (1) (558 SE2d 827) (2002).
In his deposition, Steven said that on the day of the fall, other children who were already sitting on the roof of the Infant Maze encouraged him to try the climb, and instructed him on how to climb up to the roof. The children told him to place his feet on the horizontal handholds and to use the panel that extends away from the roof. As Steven perched on the panel, he extended one leg and arm toward the roof, lost his balance, and fell, straddling the narrow panel which resulted in serious, life-altering injuries.7
Steven’s brother explained that the trick to successfully navigating the roof was “to get on the white [horizontal] rails and then step on the plastic piece and pull yourself up there.” The older brother said that Steven was unsuccessful in two earlier attempts to climb the roof because he “would try to climb on the vertical handle side” instead of the side with the horizontal handles.
In Atlanta Affordable, a nine-year-old child was injured when she ran from behind a van parked in a no-parking zone into the path of a truck, and was struck because the van had blocked her view of the approaching truck. Id. at 286. On appeal, we found that, although “a generalized risk may be assumed, i.e., not stopping and looking both ways before crossing a street or driveway,” the child never saw the truck that hit her so that she was unaware of actual risk. Id. at 287. We further held that while the generalized risk of not stopping and looking both ways could be assumed, “for the defense of assumption of the risk to apply in this case, there must be a particularized and subjective awareness of the actual danger of the approaching truck as well, which is the subjective risk assumed of racing against the truck’s approach.” Id. More generally, the child could not undertake the subjective risk of racing against the truck if she did not know that the truck was coming. Seemingly, the majority would have the child look both ways before crossing the street only on busy streets, because the danger of being struck is not present “on a quiet street.” Parents, however, recognize that the danger of being struck by vehicles is ever present and thus caution their children to always look both ways before entering a roadway. Thus, although in Brown, “the defendants proved that the nine-year-old *23plaintiff was generally aware of the risk of crossing streets or driveways and being hit by moving vehicles and the need to stop and look,” there was no evidence that the child had “subjective knowledge of the danger from the approaching truck.” Id.8
Decided March 30, 2011
Swift, Currie, McGhee & Hiers, Cynthia L. Parker, Douglas A. Bennett, for appellants.
Here, while certainly Steven may have understood the general risk of falling, that understanding is irrelevant to whether he had a particularized and subjective awareness of the risk involved in climbing on this playground equipment, particularly given its seemingly innocuous nature, the placement of the horizontal bars, and that he had observed no other children fall from undertaking the climb. In fact, Steven’s older brother had successfully climbed the Infant Maze five times, and other children between the ages of nine and twelve would climb the apparatus as well. Steven had also attempted the climb twice before without injury.9 The “specific knowledge of the condition could not pre-exist without specific subjective observation at any given time to determine the presence or absence of danger.” Atlanta Affordable, 253 Ga. App. at 287 (1). Each child approaching that apparatus will have a different capacity to comprehend and appreciate the danger of undertaking the climb; thus, whether Steven appreciated the danger in climbing the Infant Maze is a question of fact for a jury to determine.
Accordingly, as issues of material fact exist as to whether Steven had actual knowledge of the risks associated with climbing the Infant Maze such that he assumed those risks, I respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that Judge Adams joins in this dissent.
*24Holland & Knight, John M. Hamrick, Leland H. Kynes, for appellee.

 Steven’s parents rushed him to the hospital after discovering that the boy’s bath water was “full of blood.” Steven required several surgical procedures after the accident, including the placement of a catheter in his bladder because of the extensive damage to his urethra. Long-term complications include possible sterility, which cannot be determined until Steven goes through puberty. Steven also experiences incontinence, pain, and problems with urine flow which require the periodic removal of the scar tissue that builds up around his “urethra tube.”

 The majority correctly notes that children appreciate certain inherent risks associated with fire, water and falling. Fortunately, our laws recognize that although children might be cognizant on a very general level about certain dangers, their capacity to comprehend and appreciate the danger of certain activities is quite different from the capacity of adults, hence safety latches on lighters, harnesses on climbing walls, and lifeguards at pools.

 Kane’s expert explained that the horizontal handholds on the side panels of the Infant Maze allowed children to use them as rungs on a ladder, in violation of certain Consumer Product Safety Commission (“CPSC”) guidelines and American Society for Testing and Materials (“ASTM”) standards. The handholds could be installed either vertically or horizontally, and if installed horizontally, they create an unreasonably dangerous condition. The expert detailed that “the horizontal rungs create! ] a ladderlike climber that leaves a child stranded on the edge of a metal panel without a platform for the child to exit onto for balance and stability .. . [and reflected] a clear failure to adequately address the safety of children.”