Court Opinion

ID: 9879498
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-27 18:21:52.529861+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:47:55.539891
License: Public Domain

COMBS, C.J.,
with whom WYRICK, J., joins, dissenting:
¶ 1 While I agree with the majority’s determination that Respondent’s criminal conduct and Ms condition demonstrate his unfitness to practice law, I disagree as to what constitutes appropriate discipline under the circumstances. The Oklahoma Bar Association and the Professional Responsibility Tribunal both recommended Respondent be suspended for two years and one day, and I would adhere to those recommendations.
¶ 2 The majority departs from these recommendations and suspends Respondent for two years. In doing so, the majority attempts to distingmsh tMs attorney disciplinary proceeding from others involving criminal domestic violence that resulted m suspensions of two years and one day, such as State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Conra*561dy, 2012 OK 29, 275 P.3d 133 and State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Givens, 2014 OK 103, 343 P.3d 214. The majority stresses the single instance of conduct in this matter and Respondent’s remorse and dedication to recovery, in contrast to the extended behavior of the respondents in Conrady and Givens. Moreover, the majority focuses on the past misconduct of Respondent’s ex-wife as a major mitigating factor, rather than on Respondent’s own dangerous actions that are the basis for this disciplinary proceeding.
¶ 3 Respondent pointed a firearm at his ex-wife and stated “you are going to die today. Where do you want it, the gut or the head?”1 In addition, Respondent entered into a standoff with a police special operations team and had to be forced from his home with tear gas, potentially endangering not only himself, but also neighbors and law enforcement officers. Respondent’s intoxicated threat to his ex-wife and resulting standoff with law enforcement were “reckless and potentially deadly.” Conrady, 2012 OK 29, ¶18, 275 P.3d 133. Respondent’s conduct also thoroughly embarrassed and undermined the legal profession as a whole, as his standoff was the subject of intense media coverage.
¶ 4 On multiple occasions, despite his commitment to treatment and sobriety, Respondent has refused to accept full responsibility for the acts he committed, going so far as to have originally denied committing them at all. In a response to this Court, Respondent flat out denied pointing a weapon at his ex-wife:
I did possess a handgun but never did I point it at the alleged victim and this can be verified by my oldest son David Hastings who was present and witnessed the entire event.
Respondent’s Response as to Why a Pinal Order of Suspension Should Not Be Imposed on Respondent (Response), 12.
In the same document, Respondent claimed: “I subsequently surrendered to the police without incident 7 hours after they called me.” Response, 15. He further initially denied threatening his ex-wife during a hearing before the Professional Responsibility Tribunal until confronted with evidence to the contrary. All witnesses to the event contradicted Respondent’s denial concerning threatening his ex-wife. Similarly, Respondent hardly surrendered ‘(without incident” to law enforcement.
¶ 5 Given the nature of Respondent’s conduct, I would suspend him for two years and one day, thereby requiring him to petition for reinstatement pursuant to Rule 11.1 of the Rules Governing Disciplinary Proceedings (RGDP), 5 O.S. 2011, Ch. 1, App. 1-A. This would require Respondent to demonstrate that he meets the high standard required by Rule 11.4, RGDP2, and demonstrate that he still possesses the requisite learning in the law required for competent practice. See In re Reinstatement of Blake, 2016 OK 33, ¶9, 371 P.3d 465; In re Reinstatement of Page, 2004 OK 49, ¶2, 94 P.3d 80 (noting petitioners seeking reinstatement possess “the heavy burden of showing, by clear and convincing *562evidence, that reinstatement is warranted.”)Further, while the majority would give Respondent six months to pay assessed costs, I would require Respondent to pay all outstanding costs in this matter before any petition for reinstatement under Rule 11.1 would be granted.3

. Respondent directly threatened his ex-wife with a weapon in front of several witnesses, in contrast to the Respondent in Conrady, who unloaded his firearm into the property of his former girlfriend and her boyfriend while they were not present. 2012 OK 29, ¶3, 275 P.3d 133.

. Rule 11.4, RGDP, provides:
An applicant for reinstatement must establish affirmatively that, if readmitted or if the suspension from practice is removed, the applicant's conduct will conform to the high standards required of a member of the Bar. The severity of the original offense and the circumstances surrounding it shall be considered in evaluating an application for reinstatement. The burden of proof, by clear and convincing evidence, in all such reinstatement proceedings shall be on the applicant. An applicant seeking such reinstatement will be required to present stronger proof of qualifications than one seeking admission for the first time. The proof presented must be sufficient to overcome the Supreme Court's former judgment adverse to the applicant. Feelings of sympathy toward the’ applicant must be disregarded. If applicable, restitution, or the lack thereof, by the applicant to an injured party will be taken into consideration by the Trial Panel on an application for reinstatement. Further, if applicable, the Trial Panel shall satisfy itself that the applicant complied with Rule 9.1 of these Rules.

. This six-month period conflicts with Rule 6.16, RGDP, which requires costs be paid within 90 days and provides in pertinent part:
Where discipline results, the cost of the investigation, the record, and disciplinary proceedings shall be surcharged against the disciplined lawyer unless remitted in whole or in part by the Supreme Court for good cause shown. Failure of the disciplined lawyer to pay such costs within ninety (90) days after the Supreme Court’s order becomes effective shall result in automatic suspension from the practice of law until further order of the Court.