Court Opinion

ID: 9774519
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:22:47.993532+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:09.418950
License: Public Domain

ON APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
Centex Corporation (“Centex”) has filed a motion for rehearing. For the most part, it reurges and reargues the same points that it raised in its original appeal. However, it now contends for the first time that “since this case was submitted the OTS has taken action to make it clear that the government intends to prohibit Centex from paying the fees” pursuant to its contract with John Dalton. Centex, in support of its position, has attached to its motion, as an exhibit, a certified copy of a Resolution by the Office of Thrift Supervision, dated December 11, 1990, together with a copy of the Order to Cease and Desist, and a copy of the Stipulation and Consent to the issuance of the Order to Cease and Desist, signed by Billy C. Wood, Director of the Dallas Regional Office of the Office of Thrift Supervision, and Centex, acting by John G. Jones, its Vice President. The Order to Cease and Desist, hereafter the “Order,” in pertinent part, reads:
ORDER AND CEASE AND DESIST
WHEREAS, Centex Corporation, Dallas, Texas, a savings and loan holding company, through its directors, has executed a Stipulation and Consent to Issuance of Order to Cease and Desist, which is incorporated herein by reference (“Stipulation”) and is accepted and approved by the Office of Thrift Supervision (“OTS”), acting through its Director for the Dallas Regional Office; and
WHEREAS, Centex Corporation, in the Stipulation, has consented and agreed to the issuance of this Order to *823Cease and Desist (“Order”) pursuant to Section 8(b) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (“FDIA”), as amended by the Financial Institutions Reform Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub.L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (“FIRREA”) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)).
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that Centex Corporation (“Centex”) and its directors, officers, employees, agents, service corporations, and other persons acting on behalf of Centex Corporation shall not cause Centex Corporation, or Texas Trust Savings Bank, F.S.B., Llano, Texas, or any other of its affiliates, affiliated persons, subsidiaries, or service corporations (“Texas Trust”), to pay, directly or indirectly, any advisory fees, finders fees, investment bankers fees or other such fees incurred in connection with the approval of Centex Corporation’s holding company application or with Texas Trust’s acquisition of the four institutions comprising the “Lamb Package.”
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The Office of Thrift Supervision
By: /s - Billy C. Wood, Director Dallas Regional Office
The Resolution, in relevant part, provided:
WHEREAS, The Director Dallas Regional Office, OTS: (1) has reviewed a proposed Order to Cease and Desist against Centex Corporation, and (2) has determined that it is appropriate for the OTS to issue the order; and NOW THEREFORE, IT IS RESOLVED that the Order and Stipulation are hereby approved and issued on behalf of the OTS, and the Director Dallas Regional Office is directed to execute said documents on behalf of the OTS and to serve them with this resolution on Cen-tex Corporation, in accordance with the General Regulations of the OTS.
Dallas District
By: /s - Billy C. Wood, Director Dallas Regional Office Office of Thrift Supervision
Centex consented to the issuance of the Order and waived “its right to a notice of charges and administrative hearing provided by Section 8(b) of the FDIA, as amended by FIRREA,” and further waived “any right provided by Section 1818(b) of the FDIA, as amended by FIRREA ... or otherwise to challenge the validity of the Order.”
The Order was promulgated and signed more than two years after judgment was rendered by the trial court and almost two months after the cause was submitted to this Court on October 25, 1990. Our opinion and judgment was delivered and rendered on March 20, 1991. The motion for rehearing was filed in this Court on April 4, 1991. The threshold question is whether the contents of the Order set out in the exhibit are properly before this Court for consideration.
All of the appellate courts when confronted with a situation comparable to the questions here presented, according to our research, have held that documents which were not part of the record in the trial court at the time judgment was rendered are not to be considered by the appellate court, absent unusual circumstances. Chapman v. Mitsui Eng’g. & Shipbuilding, Co., 781 S.W.2d 312, 317-318 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, writ denied); First Bank of Deer Park v. Deer Park Indep. School Dist., 770 S.W.2d 849, 852 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1989, writ denied); Advertising Displays, Inc. v. Cote, 732 S.W.2d 360, 363 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no writ); Missouri-K. T.R. Co. v. Alvarez, 670 S.W.2d 338, 353-354 (Tex.App.-Austin), rev’d on other grounds, 683 S.W.2d 375 (Tex.1984); Tankard-Smith, Inc. General Contractors v. Thursby, 663 S.W.2d 473, 476 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Zodiac Corp. v. General Elec. Credit Corp., 566 S.W.2d 341, 347 (Tex.Civ.App.—Tyler 1978, no writ); Whitmarsh v. Buckley, 324 S.W.2d 298, 303 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston 1959, no writ); Freeman v. Anderson, 119 S.W.2d 1081, 1083 (Tex.Civ. App.-Waco 1938, no writ). Neither the Resolution nor the Order was in existence *824at the time judgment was rendered by the trial court or at the time this Court took the case under submission. Therefore, it was not, and could not be, part of the record upon which the trial court rendered judgment. Neither document relates in any way to our jurisdiction of the appeal. There is nothing in the motion for rehearing, in the Resolution or the Order, which shows any unusual circumstances which justify our considering the exhibit as part of the record in this case. As noted in our original opinion, this is an appeal from a summary judgment. We cannot consider the contents of the exhibits (the Resolution and Order) which were not before the trial court at the time when summary judgment was rendered.
Centex intimates that this Court may take judicial notice of the Resolution and Order in question pursuant to TEX.R. CIY.EYID. 202. We do not agree. That Rule does not provide for judicial notice of federal resolutions or orders of boards, departments and commissions promulgated under federal statutes, but is limited to judicial notice of the “constitutions, public statutes, rules, regulations, ordinances, court decisions, and common law of every other state, territory, or jurisdiction of the United States.” Moreover, while as a general rule, judicial notice may be taken of the public acts and orders of a federal governmental department, agency or commission, private orders may not be judicially noticed. See 35 TEX.JUR.3d Evidence § 56 (1984). Here, the Order was private, not public.
An appellate court, in reviewing the proceedings in the trial court, is limited to the record that is before it on appeal and may take judicial notice only of: 1) facts that could have been properly judicially noticed by the trial judge; 2) facts that are necessary to determine whether the appellate court has jurisdiction of the appeal; and 3) whether the appellant has taken the proper steps to have the record timely and properly filed. 1 R. RAY, TEXAS LAW OF EVIDENCE CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 185 (Texas Practice, 3d ed. 1980, Supp.1990). See also A & M College of Texas v. Guinn, 280 S.W.2d 373, 377 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1955, writ ref’d n.r. e.). In the instant case, the Resolution and Order could not have been judicially noticed by the trial court because neither was in existence at the time of trial or when judgment was rendered.
We are not authorized to take judicial notice of the Resolution and Order under the record in this case. The motion for rehearing is denied.