Court Opinion

ID: 9727494
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:39:58.381405+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:38.978464
License: Public Domain

GARDNER, P. J.
I dissent.
I agree that there was no voluntary consent and I will not quibble with the majority on the issue of loitering since it is quite clear that the officers had the right to detain the defendant for investigation, and that their actions in demanding that the defendant disclose to them the object they had seen him put in his pocket were reasonable and in no way a violation of his constitutional rights.
I am troubled by the ambivalent attitude of the majority toward the right of the officer to detain the defendant for questioning, (“assuming that the officer reasonably believed that considerations of public safety indicated a necessity for temporary detention for investigation”). I gather from this that the majority have some reservation about the officers’ right to even detain a man found at 3 o’clock in the morning, walking across someone’s front yard. At the risk of displaying an attitude which may “smack of totalitarianism,” I sincerely hope that if police officers find someone walking *1041across my front yard at 3 o’clock in the morning, they will at least stop him to inquire just what in the world he is doing at that particular time and place. While it may sound like broken record litany, I should point out that the law is quite clear that circumstances short of probable cause to make an arrest may still justify officers stopping individuals at night for questioning when the circumstances are such as would indicate to a reasonable police officer that such a course of action is necessary to the proper discharge of his duties. (People v. Superior Court (Kiefer) 3 Cal.3d 807 [91 Cal.Rptr. 729, 478 P.2d 449]; People v. One 1960 Cadillac Coupe, 62 Cal.2d 92 [41 Cal.Rptr. 290, 396 P.2d 706]; People v. Michelson, 59 Cal.2d 448 [30 Cal.Rptr. 18, 380 P.2d 658]; People v. Manis, 268 Cal. App.2d 653 [74 Cal.Rptr. 423].) If the circumstances of this case are not sufficient for a temporary detention for questioning, then police officers may just as well cease patrolling residential neighborhoods and remain in the comparative safety of the station house—a procedure any officer reasonably concerned about his life and safety would probably welcome in view of the holding of the majority.
However, the portion of the majority opinion which really disturbs me is the holding that the officers could not order the defendant to remove from his pocket the object that they had seen him place therein. In these troubled times, I strongly feel that police officers are deserving of more support from the courts than that reflected by the holding of the majority.
What actually was the situation facing these officers?
(1) They were patrolling an area which had been officially declared a state of disaster because of riots due to racial disturbances. I gather that the officers were taking the sitaution seriously. A patrol car containing four officers armed with shotguns and rifles is not used to police Brownie picnics. A riot situation is an ugly one. Tensions are high and moods are explosive. During a riot, people who are ordinarily normal or even placid are apt to react in unpredictable ways. I do not suggest that a riot situation (short of martial law) changes the rights of the individual involved therein under the First Amendment, I merely suggest that the riot background is an important factor to take into consideration in determining the reasonableness of the officers’ conduct. The majority is apparently disturbed because at the moment of this incident there was not an actual rock throwing, Molotov cocktail tossing riot complete with snipers and fatalities taking place. I prefer to give the officers a little more leeway. They were faced with a situation where, as a result of a race riot, the area had been declared a state of disaster. A curfew had been imposed. By radio and newspaper, citizens had been warned to stay off the streets between 6 p.m. and 6 a.m. Upon stopping the defendant, four heavily armed officers moved *1042into position to cover the police unit and each other. I think that a reasonable reading of even this sparse record would reflect the existence of a tense situation.
(2) At 3 o’clock in the morning the officers observed the defendant walking across a residential lawn when sidewalks were available.
(3) With that as a background, the officers put a spotlight on the defendant. He turned back, looked at the officers, then placed an object he was holding in his hand in his front pants pocket. The object was small and dark and the officers thought it might be a weapon. They obviously took the situation more seriously than the majority of this court because two of them went to the other side of the street about 20 yards from the defendant, another stayed about 10 yards away, and the remaining officer approached the defendant standing back about 4 feet. All were armed with shotguns or rifles. According to the testimony, this was “normal procedure due to' problems arising from Molotov cocktails.” Officer Lingren asked the defendant where he was going and the defendant said he was going home. Officer Lingren then said, “Would you hand me what you have in your hand?” The defendant did so and it turned out to be a bottle of pills.
I think it is a matter of some note that the officer had no hint that the defendant was carrying drugs. This was no “roust,” no subterfuge search, no going through pockets, no shaking down the defendant under the pretext of looking for weapons. The officers were not using this incident as an excuse to perform an exploratory search of the defendant, nor did they cause him to' empty his pockets of everything they contained. All Officer Lingren did was ask the defendant to show him what was in the hand he had just thrust into his pocket upon seeing them. The officer reasonably believed it to be a weapon. In this connection, the United States Supreme Court has stated: “The officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger.” (Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 [20 L.Ed.2d 889, 909, 88 S.Ct. 1868].) Here, Officer Lingren was not absolutely sure that defendant was armed, but, as a reasonably prudent man, under these particular circumstances he was entitled to a reasonable belief that his safety and that of his fellow officers was in danger. “The plainest dictates of prudence required that 'the officers proceed with utmost caution.” (People v. Spencer, 22 Cal.App.3d 786, 797 [99 Cal.Rptr. 681].) “When an officer has reasonable cause to- believe a person subject to investigation is in possession of a weapon he has a right to direct the person to deliver the weapon to him.” (People v. Fry, 271 Cal.App.2d 350, 354 [76 Cal.Rptr. 718].)
The majority in a rigid and ritualistic application of the “patdown” *1043procedure insist that the officer approach the defendant whom they had just seen thrust into his front pants pocket that which they reasonably believed was a weapon and which he still had in his hand (“Would you hand me what you have in your hand?”) and pat him down. I think that a recent comment by Mr. Justice Thompson in his concurring opinion in People v. Rhodes, ante, pp. 257, 265 [100 Cal.Rptr. 487] is apropos: “No police officer possessed of his faculties will be convinced by a rhetoric of judges, whose exposure to danger has been strictly vicarious, that he should not search beyond a patdown if he feels the person detained by him may conceivably have a weapon in his possession.”
I am aware of the sentence in People v. Mosher, 1 Cal.3d 379, at page 394 [82 Cal.Rptr. 379, 461 P.2d 659], quoted by the majority, which reads: “Unless the officer feels an object which a prudent man could believe was an object usable as an instrument of assault, the officer may not remove the object from the inside of the suspect’s clothing, require the subject to take the object out of his pocket, or demand that the suspect empty his pockets.” This statement must be evaluated within the context of the factual situation presented in Mosher and must be balanced against the factual situation in the instant case. Mosher simply arose from the arrest of a defendant by two officers as a result of which a normal patdown ensued. The portion of the above sentence having to do with an officer requiring a suspect to take an object from his pocket was dictum. (See People v. Superior Court, 20 Cal.App.3d 1085 [98 Cal.Rptr. 161]; People v. Gregg, 5 Cal.App.3d 502 [85 Cal.Rptr. 273].) It does not apply to a situation such as the instant case in which the officer confronted with a race riot, public tension and an explosive situation sees an individual place in his pocket that which he reasonably believes to be a weapon. Under these circumstances, it is quite reasonable for an officer to stand away from a defendant and ask him to hand over that which the officer has reasonable cause to believe is a weapon.
Under the circumstances of this case, the law does not demand that officers approach an individual close enough for the traditional patdown. Had Officer Lingren done so under the instant circumstances, and had the object been a gun, razor, knife, or even a rock, his safety or even his life might have been endangered. Under circumstances such as these, it was eminently reasonable, practical and legal for the officer to stand off at a safe distance and demand the supposed weapon rather than subject himself to additional danger by approaching close enough for a patdown. A reasonable officer is a practical officer, a practical officer is a live officer. The actions of Officer Lingren in this case were completely reasonable and in no way infringed on the defendant’s constitutional rights.
*1044The majority terminates its opinion with the following statement with which I am, of course, in complete accord: “While the state of emergency stemming from the race riots may have justified the imposition of the curfew ordinance and called for extra vigilance on the part of the officers, it did not abrogate a citizen’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable police intrusion. Excessive police zeal under such circumstances can only tend to exacerbate rather than ease racial tensions.”
I will terminate this dissent with the following observation. We on the courts are faced with an eternal dilemma, the everlasting knife edge on which we are asked to balance the freedom of the individual versus the need for social discipline as reflected by appropriate law enforcement in order that we may all enjoy the ordered amenities of life. In order that we may all have this protection of the law, those charged with enforcing the law must have the right to protect their own lives and safety in enforcing the law. According to the news media, 12 police officers were killed in the line of duty during the month of January of this year. Surviving police officers are going to receive little comfort from a holding that they must engage in patdown searches under conditions such as those disclosed in the instant case or risk the charge of violating the constitutional rights of the individual involved.
I would affirm the order granting probation.
A petition for a rehearing was denied March 24, 1972, and respondent’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied May 4, 1972. McComb, J., and Burke, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.