Court Opinion

ID: 9401502
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-13 14:11:32.943218+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:53.109607
License: Public Domain

Fourth Court of Appeals
                                     San Antonio, Texas
                                 MEMORANDUM OPINION

                                        No. 04-22-00161-CR

                                       Brandon Joshua VIGIL,
                                             Appellant

                                                  v.

                                        The STATE of Texas,
                                              Appellee

                    From the 454th Judicial District Court, Medina County, Texas
                                 Trial Court No. 20-06-13648-CR
                           Honorable Daniel J. Kindred, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice
Concurring Opinion by: Beth Watkins, Justice, joined by Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice

Sitting:          Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice
                  Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
                  Beth Watkins, Justice

Delivered and Filed: June 7, 2023

AFFIRMED

           A jury convicted appellant Brandon Vigil of continuous sexual abuse of a child, a first-

degree felony, and the trial court assessed punishment at forty years’ confinement in the Texas

Department of Criminal Justice. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.02. In three issues, Vigil

complains that the trial court abused its discretion in overruling his (1) hearsay objection to therapy

records; (2) objection to the State’s designation of a forensic nurse examiner as an outcry witness;

and (3) request to conduct a voir dire examination of a law enforcement officer. We affirm.
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                                        I. BACKGROUND

       At trial, the jury considered the testimony of, among others, B.V., Vigil’s daughter; B.V.’s

mother (hereinafter “Mother”); Medina County Sheriff’s Deputy Dustin Reyes; Kara Lands, a

forensic interviewer at the Bluebonnet Children’s Advocacy Center (hereinafter “BCAC”); and

Pennie Robertson, a clinical social worker at BCAC.

       When B.V. was approximately twelve or thirteen years old, her Mother noticed cuts on her

arms. B.V. testified that she was angry and sad because she “never had the courage to say

anything” about Vigil’s conduct, and these feelings caused B.V. to cut herself. Mother asked why

she was cutting herself, and B.V. responded, “my dad.” After Mother prodded, B.V. “told her all

the things that [Vigil] had done.” Mother informed law enforcement, and B.V. spoke with a “lady”

at BCAC. B.V. told the lady “mostly . . . pretty much the same” things that she had told her

mother, but “there were a few things [that B.V.] told [the lady] that [she] didn’t tell” Mother. On

cross examination by Vigil’s counsel, B.V. was asked:

       VIGIL’S COUNSEL:       Did you give [Mother] details like you did to the lady — to
                              the people at [BCAC]?

       B.V.:                  No.

       VIGIL’S COUNSEL:       You just told generally what happened, right?

       B.V.:                  Yes.

When Mother prodded B.V. for details, she responded with “very vague” answers.

       Mother testified that she asked B.V. what was wrong upon noticing cuts on B.V.’s arms.

B.V. then burst into tears and told Mother: “My dad is molesting me. My dad has touched me.

My dad has been doing things to me.” Mother reported B.V.’s allegations to the Medina County

Sheriff’s Office, and she was placed in contact with Deputy Reyes. When asked by the State, “did

[B.V.] ever give you any specific details or just vague statements,” Mother answered:

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           Yes[, to] both. She did give me specific details after. [sic] Initially, she did not
           want to disclose things with me. She was very, again very reserved with herself,
           and once she talked with Deputy Reyes and all that came out with him, then weeks
           and months went by and she would give me bits and pieces of what happened to
           her and I never — I never went and asked her anything. I never told her let’s sit
           down and let’s talk about it . . . .

           Deputy Reyes testified that he spoke with Mother over the telephone, and he advised

Mother to refrain from speaking to B.V. about Vigil’s contact. Deputy Reyes then made an

appointment for B.V. to undergo a forensic interview at BCAC. He, however, did not arrange for

a SANE examination. 1 Deputy Reyes explained that he did not request a SANE examination

because, according to B.V., the last time Vigil had sexual contact with her was approximately a

year earlier. At this point in Deputy Reyes’s testimony, Vigil’s counsel sought to conduct a voir

dire examination “about his expertise in what he’s testifying about.” The State responded that

Deputy Reyes was providing “just general information known by law enforcement in his training.”

The trial court overruled Vigil’s objection and noted that his counsel would have an opportunity

to cross examine Deputy Reyes.

           As the State began questioning Lands, Vigil excepted to the State’s request to designate

Lands as an outcry witness under Article 38.072 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. On

voir examination by the State, Lands testified that, on July 3, 2019, she conducted a forensic

interview of B.V. Lands recalled that B.V. told her about four instances when Vigil initiated sexual

contact with her.        First, B.V. described to Lands an incident that occurred when she was

approximately five or six years old. After Vigil isolated B.V. in his bedroom, he undressed B.V.,

and he “touched her private part with his private part.” Second, B.V. told Lands about a time when

Vigil took B.V. in a bathroom at his mother’s house, masturbated, and made her swallow his

ejaculate from a spoon. Third, B.V. told Lands that Vigil made her masturbate him in a car while

1
    A SANE examination is an exam conducted by a sexual assault nurse examiner.

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parked outside an apartment complex. Fourth, B.V. described an incident where, when she was

approximately six or seven years old, Vigil performed oral sex on her. On cross examination by

Vigil’s counsel, Lands testified that, before any forensic interview begins, she is informed whether

the allegations are sexual or physical in nature. In this case, Deputy Reyes conveyed that

information to Lands. When pressed by Vigil’s counsel, Lands could not remember what Deputy

Reyes told her about the allegations before she interviewed B.V. The trial court overruled Vigil’s

objection.

       After the forensic interview, B.V. received therapy by Pennie Robertson at BCAC.

Robertson testified that she provided B.V. with Trauma Focus Cognitive Behavioral Therapy.

During B.V.’s therapy sessions, B.V. wrote a narrative about Vigil’s sexual contact with her, and

she shared the story with Robertson. The narrative writing process, according to Robertson, helps

improve a patient’s coping skills. It was through B.V.’s narrative that Robertson learned the details

of Vigil’s sexual contact with B.V. Robertson maintained records of her therapy sessions with

B.V. These records contain Robertson’s observations about B.V.’s wellbeing and the narrative

that B.V. recounted to her.

       Ultimately, the jury convicted Vigil of continuous sexual abuse of a child, and the trial

court assessed punishment at forty years’ confinement in the Texas Department of Criminal

Justice. Vigil timely appealed.

                                          II. DISCUSSION

A.     Standard of Review

       Vigil’s first and second issues are subject to an abuse-of-discretion standard of review. See

Castillo v. State, 71 S.W.3d 812, 818–19 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2002, pet. ref’d) (recognizing that

abuse of discretion standard of review applied to a complaint that the offering party failed to lay a

proper predicate for an autopsy report to qualify for the business-record exception to the hearsay

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rule); Thomas v. State, 309 S.W.3d 576, 578 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet. ref’d)

(“We review a trial court’s designation of an outcry witness under an abuse-of-discretion

standard.” (citing Garcia v. State, 792 S.W.2d 88, 92 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990))).

B.     Therapy Records

       While examining B.V., the State asked her to review notes that Robertson had made over

the course of several therapy sessions. B.V. acknowledged that the notes pertained to therapy

Robertson provided to her. The State then offered Robertson’s therapy records for admission.

Vigil objected to them on hearsay grounds. The State countered by arguing that they were

authenticated with a business records affidavit and Vigil’s counsel had received adequate pretrial

notice of the State’s intent to offer them as evidence. The trial court overruled Vigil’s hearsay

objection.

       Vigil argues in his first issue that “the statements contained within [Robertson’s therapy

records] are hearsay and do not qualify as a business record.” He references Garcia v. State, 126

S.W.3d 921, 925–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004), for its proposition that “[w]hen a business receives

information from a person who is outside the business and who has no business duty to report or

to report accurately, those statements are not covered by the business records exception.” Id. at

926. The court in Garcia described the appellant’s trial court objection as a “hearsay within

hearsay” objection. Id. at 925 n.1 (“The only objection that is sufficiently specific under [Texas

Rule of Evidence] 103(a) is that the statements quoted within the business records are themselves

hearsay.”).

       We read Vigil’s appellate argument as a “hearsay within hearsay” argument similar to the

one he references in Garcia. However, unlike the appellant in Garcia, Vigil did not lodge a

“hearsay within hearsay” objection in the trial court. Therefore, Vigil’s complaint on appeal does

not comport with his complaint at trial, and it is waived. See e.g., Schmidt v. State, 612 S.W.3d

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359, 370 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, pet. ref’d) (citing Ponce v. State, 89 S.W.3d 110,

120 n.8 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.); Santschi v. State, No. 14-15-00771-CR, 2017

WL 3090001, at *7 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Jul. 20, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op., not

designated for publication)). Moreover, at trial and again on appeal, Vigil fails to specifically

identify the portion of Robertson’s therapy records that he contends are inadmissible. This

situation militates in favor of overruling Vigil’s first issue because Robertson’s therapy records

contain a mixture of her observations of B.V.’s emotional state and statements that B.V. made to

Robertson. See Schmidt, 612 S.W.3d at 370 (“If the complaint about admissibility fails to refer to

the objectionable portions of the evidence, then the trial court may safely admit or exclude it all.”).

       Alternatively, assuming, without deciding, that the trial court abused its discretion in

overruling Vigil’s objection, such an error in this case would be harmless. See Gonzales v. State,

455 S.W.3d 198, 205 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. ref’d) (finding admission of a

page of the complainant’s psychotherapy records to be harmless). Vigil highlights that, during the

jury’s deliberation, it sought additional copies of Robertson’s therapy records. He argues that such

a request coupled with the State’s focus on B.V.’s credibility and what she “had to endure” is

evidence that the State emphasized Robertson’s therapy records. However, Vigil fails to direct us

to any portion of the State’s opening and closing arguments wherein it specifically emphasized

Robertson’s therapy records. Moreover, B.V. provided firsthand testimony about Vigil’s sexual

contact with her, and Robertson testified about the narrative process that she employed during her

therapy sessions with B.V. Thus, B.V.’s narrative, contained in Robertson’s therapy records, is

cumulative of B.V.’s unobjected testimony. See Lamerand v. State, 540 S.W.3d 252, 257 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. ref’d) (harmless error from the admission of a medical report

containing inadmissible hearsay from the child complainant because the doctor testified about the

same statements without objection).

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         We overrule Vigil’s first issue.

C.       Designation of Outcry Witness

         In Vigil’s second issue, he complains that the trial court abused its discretion by overruling

his objection to the designation of Lands as the outcry witness. Vigil highlights B.V.’s testimony

that she told the “lady” at BCAC “mostly . . . pretty much the same” things that she had told her

mother, but “there were a few things [that B.V.] told [the lady] that [she] didn’t tell” Mother. The

State responds by arguing that B.V.’s remarks to Mother were “merely general allusions to

potential issues regarding the conduct of [Vigil] towards [B.V.]”

         “Article 38.072 is a rule of admissibility of hearsay evidence,” allowing for the admission

of a child victim’s out-of-court statements describing the alleged sexual or physical abuse under

specified, enumerated circumstances. Martinez v. State, 178 S.W.3d 806, 810 (Tex. Crim. App.

2005) (discussing the limitations of article 38.072); see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.072,

§ 2(a). Article 38.072 only applies to statements that (1) “describe . . . the alleged offense,” (2)

“were made by the child . . . against whom the charged offense . . . was allegedly committed,” and

(3) “were made to the first person, 18 years of age or older, other than the defendant, to whom the

child . . . made a statement about the offense.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN art. 38.072, § 2(a);

see Sanchez v. State, 354 S.W.3d 476, 484–85 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). The Texas Court of

Criminal Appeals has explained that, under article 38.072, the proper outcry witness is the first

adult person to whom the child describes the offense in some discernible manner beyond general

insinuations that sexual abuse occurred. Lopez v. State, 343 S.W.3d 137, 140 (Tex. Crim. App.

2011).

         In announcing its ruling, the trial court stated:

         I do believe the testimony did say that the child made her mother aware that
         something happened but as to details, I mean, I think the mother was clear she didn’t

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       get details until quite some time. So I’ll overrule your objection and I’ll allow Ms.
       Lands to testify as the outcry witness.

       We conclude that the trial court, in considering the testimony before it at the time it

overruled Vigil’s objection, did not abuse its discretion. As the trial court stated, it considered

B.V.’s testimony that Vigil highlights, B.V.’s later elaboration that she told the “lady” at BCAC

more details, and Mother’s testimony that B.V. initially shared only “bits and pieces” of what B.V.

recalled had happened. See Thomas v. State, 309 S.W.3d 576, 577–79 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

Dist.] 2010, pet. ref’d) (concluding that a child victim’s statements to her mother that appellant

used his hands to touch her was insufficient to designate mother as outcry witness because it was

a “general allusion” that failed to describe the alleged offense in a discernible manner); Reyes v.

State, 274 S.W.3d 724, 728–29 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2008, pet. ref’d) (providing that,

although the child first acknowledged to social worker she had been abused, the trial court did not

err when it concluded that such general acknowledgment did not provide sufficient detail).

       We overrule Vigil’s second issue.

D.     Voir Dire of Deputy Reyes

       In Vigil’s third issue, he complains that Deputy Reyes testified as an expert and the trial

court erred in overruling his counsel’s request to conduct a voir dire examination of Deputy Reyes.

Vigil further complains that his trial counsel was deprived of the “underlying facts or data” relied

on by Deputy Reyes and that the lack of a voir dire examination allowed Deputy Reyes, as an

expert, to “provide damaging and inadmissible testimony.”

       Texas Rule of Evidence 702 provides:

       A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training,
       or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if the expert’s
       scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to
       understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.

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TEX. R. EVID. 702. Vigil neither explains how Deputy Reyes’s investigative decision to forgo

subjecting B.V. to a SANE examination constitutes an expert “opinion” nor references any legal

authority that supports such a proposition. Additionally, Vigil does not specify what “damaging

and inadmissible testimony” Deputy Reyes provided. I conclude that Vigil’s third issue is

inadequately briefed, and therefore, waived. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i) (“The brief must contain

a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities

and to the record.”); see also Wood v. State, 18 S.W.3d 642, 650–51 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)

(finding issue waived when appellant failed to adequately develop his argument).

                                       III. CONCLUSION

       We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice

DO NOT PUBLISH

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