Court Opinion

ID: 9455456
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 19:22:58.940448+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:34:36.245587
License: Public Domain

McCREE, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
The majority opinion affirms the District Judge’s holding that the search conducted at the motel was incident to a lawful arrest and therefore valid. It then concludes that the subsequent search of the suitcase at the police station, which produced the incriminating evidence, was also valid, either because it was a continuation of the first search or because it was an incident of the police department’s inventory procedure.
Initially, I question the validity of the first search at the motel. The rule which permits police officers to conduct a warrantless search incident to a valid arrest is based on “the need to seize weapons and other things which might be used to assault an officer or effect an escape, as well as * * * the need to prevent the destruction of evidence of the crime * * Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367, 84 S.Ct. 881, 883, 11 L.Ed.2d 777 (1964). In the instant case, the District Judge found that the four occupants of the motel rooms “were in handcuffs” at the time the officers commenced the search of the premises. Accordingly, it is doubtful that the contents of the suitcases could have been used to harm the officers or to effectuate an escape or that the evidence in the suitcases could have been *60destroyed. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-763, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L. Ed.2d 685 (1969).
However, even if one assumes the search at the motel was valid, the majority opinion’s holding that the subsequent search at the police station is also valid is untenable. The proposition that this subsequent search can be considered a continuation of the first search completely ignores the Supreme Court’s express limitation that “a search can be incident to an arrest only if it is substantially contemporaneous with the arrest and is confined to the immediate vicinity of the arrest.” Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 486, 84 S.Ct. 889, 891, 11 L.Ed.2d 856 (1964) (emphasis added). Accord, James v. Louisiana, 382 U.S. 36, 37, 86 S.Ct. 151, 15 L.Ed.2d 30 (1965). Further, the Court has stated that, “Once an accused is under arrest and in custody, then a search made at another place * * * is simply not incident to the arrest.” (emphasis added). Preston v. United States, supra, 376 U.S. at 367, 84 S.Ct. at 883. Accord, Colosimo v. Perini, 415 F.2d 804 (6th Cir. 1969); United States v. Cain, 332 F.2d 999 (6th Cir. 1964).
Here, the warrantless search conducted at the police station was neither “substantially contemporaneous with the arrest”, nor was it “confined to the immediate vicinity of the arrest.” It was a search conducted at another time and “at another place”, and the aforementioned justifications for permitting warrantless searches did not exist. Accordingly, the officers should have obtained a search warrant before again exploring the contents of the suitcases.
The majority opinion’s alternative suggestion that the search at the police station was lawful because it was related to the police department’s inventory procedure is indefensible on the facts of this case. The government has not denied that this second examination of the suitcases was for the purpose of discovering fruits of the crime appellant was suspected of committing, and not for the purpose of inventorying the contents of the suitcases. Moreover, it is questionable whether examining a glove for its contents can be considered a legitimate aspect of an inventory procedure. Such close scrutiny of the contents of the suitcase necessarily would seem to come within the definition of a search.
Since the examination of the glove was a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, the requirement that “the police must, whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure,” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) (emphasis added), was applicable. As the Fifth Circuit has observed,
The fact that the police have custody of a prisoner’s property for the purpose of protecting it while he is incarcerated does not alone constitute a basis for an exception to the requirement of a search warrant. Brett v. United States, 412 F.2d 401, 406 (5th Cir. 1969).
I would hold that the warrantless search of the suitcase at the police station was contrary to express holdings of the Supreme Court and was therefore invalid. I would reverse appellant’s conviction.