Court Opinion

ID: 9754674
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 20:09:17.951124+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:56.310666
License: Public Domain

WILNER, Judge,
concurring.
I concur with the result reached by Judges Bishop and Weant, but I do so by simply construing the Maryland “rape shield” law — art. 27, § 461A.
The evidence proffered by appellant concerned an alleged specific instance of the victim’s prior sexual conduct. The statute places three conditions, all of which must be satisfied, on the admissibility of such evidence: (1) it must be relevant and material to a fact in issue in the case; (2) its inflammatory or prejudicial nature must not outweigh its probative value; and (3) it must fall within one or more of the four categories enumerated in the statute. It seems clear to me that the proffered evidence did not meet any of those three conditions.
Appellant was not charged in this case with having, himself, had sexual intercourse with the victim. His culpability was in actively restraining the victim so that at least *249one other male, Brian H., could have intercourse with her, by force and without her consent. At some point, other males entered the room and some or all of them also had intercourse with the victim, one after another. There was no evidence that appellant actively assisted in these subsequent attacks; indeed, the victim stated that he had left the room for a while. Terry Hutton and Darryl Herbert were not involved in this episode; the record gives no indication that either of them was even present in the house.
The initial proffer, presumably to be established through the testimony of Hutton or Herbert or both was that “a[n] episode took place with Terry Hutton, as well as Darryl Herbert, as well as my client [i.e., appellant] and it was a sexual relationship with [the victim] with four people and it was a voluntary act on or around November....” The proffer was subsequently restated as follows: “that on or around August there was an incident that took place between the defendant, as well... Darryl Herbert as well as Terry Hutton as well as perhaps one other individual unnamed, with [the victim]. And it was a sexual act between those five people with consent [of the victim].” (Emphasis supplied.)
Taking the proffer as stated, appellant wished to show that, on November 29, 1982, the 15-year old victim consented to sequential intercourse with Brian H., John L., and perhaps six other males because in August she had participated in what appeared to be a group sexual encounter with appellant, Terry Hutton, Darryl Herbert, and “perhaps one other individual unnamed.” That is what we’re dealing with in this case.
To me, that proffered evidence plainly is not relevant or material to the issues in this case, its inflammatory nature clearly would outweigh any probative value it might have, and it falls within none of the enumerated categories. That the victim, who admitted a sexual relationship with appellant, may have engaged in “a sexual act” with him, Hutton, *250Herbert, and one other male has no bearing whatever on whether she might agree to sequential intercourse with as many as eight other people. Its probative value is therefore virtually nil, while the inflammatory or prejudicial nature of such testimony, even in a court trial (open to the public) is obvious. As to the two enumerated categories urged by appellant — § 461A(a)(l) and (4) — the evidence was unnecessary for purposes of (a)(1) as the victim had admitted past sexual conduct with appellant and, as the majority notes, (a)(4) does not apply because the prosecutor never put the victim’s prior sexual conduct in issue.
I therefore would affirm without regard to what courts in Vermont or Missouri or California have done. To me, the Maryland statute is clear and its conditions were not satisfied in this case.