Court Opinion

ID: 9849287
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:37:54.03365+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:14.938571
License: Public Domain

Boslaugh, J.,
dissenting.
The evidence in these cases was such that findings of no consequential damage could not have been sustained. Swanson v. State, 178 Neb. 671, 134 N. W. 2d 810. But the jury was instructed as follows:
“You are instructed that the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, the fair and reasonable market value on the date of the taking of the two tracts of land taken for highway right of way purposes, and that before the plaintiff can recover any further amount in consequential damages for any alleged depreciation in value to property remaining after severing the aforesaid tracts, he must prove, by a'preponderance of the evidence, that:
“(1) The severance of said tracts has caused a depreciation in the value of the property remaining after said severance, and ■
“(2) The-amount of said depreciation in valué, if áiiy.
*257“If the plaintiff has established both of the aforesaid propositions, (1) and (2), by a preponderance of the evidence, then the amount of damages awarded the plaintiff may include said damages for depreciation in value, if any. However, if the evidence on said propositions (1) and (2) is equally balanced, or preponderates in favor of the defendant, then said plaintiff cannot recover any damages for the depreciation in value to the remaining property after severance of the aforesaid tracts of land, and the plaintiff can then only recover the fair and reasonable market value of the aforesaid tracts taken by the defendant as hereafter defined.”
In my opinion the instruction was both erroneous and prejudicial. The verdicts in these cases, although within the range of the testimony, were much lower than the awards made by the appraisers. I am unable to say that it is obvious that no prejudice resulted.
McCown, J., concurring in dissent.