Court Opinion

ID: 9594314
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:28:54.700345+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:57:11.909454
License: Public Domain

Utter, J.
(dissenting) — I dissent because the majority construes RCW 9.73.030 to sanction results which are arbitrary and incompatible with the statutory language.
The majority would have us hold the statute is drafted to include within its scope wiretaps and interceptions on extension telephones, but not the "tipping” of a telephone receiver to transmit the contents of the communication to a third party. Yet phone "tipping” is in every relevant sense the functional equivalent of a person listening on an extension telephone. It would therefore be more sensible to construe the statute to include, rather than exclude, the manner in which the interception was eifectuated in this case.
*665The majority’s problematic reading of the statute can be avoided by a careful examination of its pertinent language. RCW 9.73.030 provides:
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, it shall be unlawful for any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or the state of Washington, its agencies, and political subdivisions to intercept, or record any:
(a) Private communication transmitted by telephone, telegraph, radio, or other device between two or more individuals between points within or without the state by any device electronic or otherwise designed to record and/or transmit said communication regardless how such device is powered or actuated, without first obtaining the consent of all the participants in the communication^]
(Italics and boldface mine.)
Nothing in the statute suggests , the instrument used to "intercept” in subsection (1) must be a different instrument from the "device electronic or otherwise designed to record and/or transmit said communication” in subsection (l)(a). On the contrary, it would seem that had the Legislature meant the two to be necessarily different, it would have inserted the word "other” between "any” and "device” (so the statute would read "by any other device”). In this case the police did intercept a phone conversation with a device designed to transmit said communications — the telephone receiver.
The police action falls even more neatly within subsection (l)(b) which states:
Private conversation, by any device electronic or otherwise designed to record or transmit such conversation regardless how the device is powered or actuated without first obtaining the consent of all the persons engaged in the conversation.
(Italics and boldface mine.) RCW 9.73.030(1)(b).
The only relevant question, then, is whether this was a "private” conversation to begin with. If it is, the police must comply with RCW 9.73.030; otherwise, the police activity falls outside the purview of the statute, and no compliance is necessary.
*666In Kadoranian v. Bellingham Police Dep’t, 119 Wn.2d 178, 829 P.2d 1061 (1992), we established the proper analysis for determining whether a conversation should be deemed private under the privacy act. We held that the term "’private conversation’ is to be given its ordinary and usual meaning”, and that "[t]o determine whether or not a telephone conversation is private, the court must consider the intent or reasonable expectations of the participants as manifested by the facts and circumstances of each case.” Kadoranian, 119 Wn.2d at 190 (citing with approval and quoting State v. Forrester, 21 Wn. App. 855, 861, 587 P.2d 179 (1978), review denied, 92 Wn.2d 1006 (1979)).
We held further that whether a conversation is private under this statute is a question of fact. Only where reasonable minds could reach but one result is it proper to decide the question as one of law. In Kadoranian we concluded the conversation was not private as a matter of law, because reasonable minds could not differ:
When Ms. Kadoranian answered the home telephone, there is no indication she knew who the caller was. She gave general information, without requiring identification from the caller, and without asking the caller’s reason for wanting to talk to her father. There is no reason to believe that Ms. Kadoranian would have withheld this information from any caller. It does not appear that Ms. Kadoranian intended to keep the information (the fact that her father was not home) "secret” or that she had any expectation that her conversation was private.
(Italics and boldface mine.) Kadoranian, 119 Wn.2d at 190.
The proper inquiry in this case is likewise one of fact, but can properly be decided as one of law. Ascribing its ordinary meaning to the term "private”, the facts and circumstances of this case indicate this was a private conversation, because Corliss could not possibly have intended, nor could his reasonable expectation have been, otherwise. On the uncontested facts before us, I do not think reasonable minds could disagree. Indeed, the record clearly establishes the police officers purposefully designed this operation precisely *667with the goal in mind of creating an expectation of privacy in the defendant had he not had one to begin with. See majority, at 658-59 (quoting Detective Watkins’ testimony, in which he effectively concedes as much.) Accordingly, I would reverse the Court of Appeals.
Johnson, J., concurs with Utter, J.