Court Opinion

ID: 9683924
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:40:32.217436+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:51.339142
License: Public Domain

Annabelle Clinton Imber, Justice, concurring and dissenting. While I agree in part with the result reached by the majority, the majority neglects to address a major issue that was raised in this case. Arkansas Code Annotated § 9-10-110 (Repl. 2002) was revised by the Arkansas General Assembly in 1997. We have not interpreted the statute since its revision. An issue of statutory interpretation arises here regarding who is entitled to bring a claim under section 9-10-110. I agree that we should affirm on the issues of the expenses paid by the DePriests, the counseling fees, and the maternity clothes. However, under a proper statutory construction analysis, I believe that the circuit court abused its discretion in concluding that a claim for expenses designated “Medicaid-Pending Unpaid” was invalid under the statute. Therefore, as to that claim, I must respectfully dissent. The majority acknowledges that a person making a claim under Arkansas Code Annotated § 9-10-110 must prove that he or she has “incurred” a lying-in expense in order to make a valid claim. Yet, the majority summarily disposes of the issue without delving into any explanation concerning what proof is necessary to satisfy the “incurred” element of the statute. This issue is integral to the disposition of the case at bar. Arkansas Code Annotated § 9-10-110 provides as follows: “If it is found by the court that the accused is the father of the child, the court shall render judgment against him for the lying-in expenses in favor of the mother, person, or agency incurring the lying-in expenses, if claimed.” Ark. Code Ann. § 9-10-110(a) (Repl. 2002) (emphasis added). The circuit court interpreted the statute to require that a person must have paid an expense before he or she can bring a claim under the statute. The court relied on this reasoning to deny several of Isabelle’s claims for lying-in expenses. Such an interpretation does not comport with our well-settled rules of statutory construction. The first rule in considering the meaning and effect of a statute is to construe it just as it reads, giving the words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in common language. Weiss v. McFadden, 353 Ark. 868, 874, 120 S.W.3d 545, 550 (2003). There is no need to resort to rules of statutory construction when the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous. Id. A statute is ambiguous only where it is open to two or more constructions, or where it is of such obscure or doubtful meaning that reasonable minds might disagree or be uncertain as to its meaning. Id. When a statute is clear, however, it is given its plain meaning, and this court will not search for legislative intent; rather, that intent must be gathered from the plain meaning of the language used. Id. We are hesitant to interpret a legislative act in a manner contrary to its express language, unless it is clear that a drafting error or omission has circumvented legislative intent. Id. The word “incur” is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary as “to suffer or bring on oneself (a liability or expense).” Black’s Law Dictionary 782 (8th ed. 2004). Similarly, it means “to become liable or subject to” according to Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1146 (2002). Under a plain-language reading of Arkansas Code Annotated § 9-10-110, it is clear that a person is not required to have actually paid the expense in order for the expense to be incurred. The rationale for not requiring actual payment is clear: The fact that a debt is incurred but still remains unpaid does not mean that the liability for that debt has been extinguished. Furthermore, to require actual payment of expenses, such as hospital and doctor bills, before any claim could be made would effectively shut the proverbial “door” to most claims under the statute. Subsection (2) of Ark. Code Ann. § 9-10-110 provides a method for proving that lying-in expenses have been incurred. The statute states: (c)(1) Bills and invoices of pregnancy and childbirth expenses and paternity testing are admissible as evidence in the chancery court or juvenile division thereof without third-party foundation testimony if such bills or invoices are regular on their face. (2) Such bills or invoices shall constitute prima facie evidence of amounts incurred for such services or for testing on behalf of the child. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-10-110(c)(1), (2) (Repl. 2002) (emphasis added). In Belford v. State, 96 Ark. 274, 280, 131 S.W. 953, 955 (1910), we interpreted an earlier version of this statute and held that the amount awarded for lying-in expenses “must be confided largely to the discretion of the trial court.” Isabelle has claimed certain medical expenses that were paid by the DePriests, the potential adoptive parents of Isabelle’s child. Both parties agreed that the expenses had been paid by the DePriests, but that the DePriests had not attempted to make a claim under Arkansas Code Annotated § 9-10-110. Also, no evidence was presented by the Taylors to show that they still retained liability for those expenses. The circuit court concluded that because the DePriests had paid the expenses, they were the only ones who could claim the expenses under the statute. I disagree with this reasoning because, as discussed earlier, the statute requires a person to “incur,” and not to “pay,” in order to claim lying-in expenses. Nevertheless, I would affirm on other grounds. Under the statute, a person must prove that he or she has incurred liability for a lying-in expense in order to make a claim for it. In other words, a claimant must prove that he or she has incurred the expense and remains liable for the expense at the time the claim is made. If the status of his or her liability for the expense is challenged, then the claimant has the burden of proving that he or she still remains liable for the expense. In the instant case, it is undisputed that the Taylors initially incurred the expenses that were paid by the DePriests because the bills for these expenses were all directed to either Mrs. Taylor or Isabelle. In the absence of any proof to the contrary, such as an agreement between the DePriests and the creditors whereby the DePriests agreed to be responsible for these expenses, the Taylors incurred the expenses. However, once the DePriests paid those expenses, it would be inequitable for the Taylors to bring a claim on a debt that no longer existed. If the Taylors had presented evidence that, even though the DePriests paid the expenses, they still remained liable for the expenses, then their claim could be considered by the circuit court. For example, the Taylors could have presented evidence of an agreement between the DePriests and themselves that, if the adoption was not finalized, then the Taylors would owe the DePriests for the expenses paid by them. Because the record contains no evidence to establish that the Taylors continued to be liabile for the expenses after the DePriests paid the expenses, I cannot conclude that the circuit court abused its discretion on this issue. With regard to the claim for counseling fees, the only evidence presented to the circuit court was a receipt that did not bear any indication of who received the counseling or what it was for. Thus, I agree with the majority that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Isabelle’s claim for counseling fees. Likewise, with regard to the claim for maternity clothing, it was within the circuit court’s discretion to determine whether to include this expense in the award. Accordingly, I agree to affirm the circuit court on this point also. Finally, Isabelle has claimed medical bills that at the time of trial were marked “Medicaid — Pending Unpaid.” The majority concludes that the evidence before the circuit court is not sufficient to prove that the Taylors either paid or incurred the expenses in question. I disagree. It is undisputed that these bills were incurred by the Taylors. The bills were marked with either Isabelle or Mrs. Taylor’s name; thus, these bills were prima facie evidence pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 9-10-110(c) that the expenses had been incurred by the Taylors. Moreover, no evidence was presented to show that the bills had been paid. On this record, it is clear that the Taylors still remained liable for these bills. Consequently, I believe the circuit court abused its discretion in concluding that this claim was invalid under the statute. The issue of whether to award these bills as lying-in expenses under Ark. Code Ann. § 9-10-110 should be remanded to the circuit court for determination in a manner consistent with this court’s opinion. For the above-stated reasons, I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part. Brown, J., joins.