Court Opinion

ID: 9746662
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 14:32:21.354477+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:37:52.944742
License: Public Domain

SPAETH, Judge,
concurring and dissenting:
I agree with the majority that the colloquy preceding appellant’s plea of guilty to the charge of operating a motor vehicle after his operating privileges had been suspended was inadequate, and that therefore the judgment of sentence entered on appellant’s plea must be vacated. However, I should also vacate the judgment of sentence entered on appellant’s conviction on the charge of operating a motor vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor, for in my *436opinion, appellant should not have been required to stand trial on that charge without the assistance of counsel.1
When appellant was arraigned on May 2, 1977, he appeared without counsel and entered a plea of not guilty. As the majority observes, he was informed by the court that he was not eligible for court-appointed counsel, and was advised to retain private counsel before the trial, which was scheduled for May 23, 1977. Appellant appeared for trial, but without counsel. There then occurred the following exchange between the trial judge and appellant:
THE COURT: What do you want, Mr. Wentz? Do you want to plead not guilty or guilty?
MR. WENTZ: I requested an attorney appointed by the Court. I didn’t get no answer.
MR. CASCIO [Assistant District Attorney]: He had appeared at arraignment and was advised to file application for counsel.
MR. BEACHY [Public Defender]: That isn’t true. We didn’t receive any Application at all. I understand from the Magistrate he did give the defendant a copy of an Application, and the Magistrate indicated to me he had given this individual an Application, but there was never one received.
THE COURT: We never received any from you, Mr. Wentz. What did you do with it?
MR. WENTZ: I put one in the mail. I mailed it to the Courthouse.
THE COURT: It isn’t here.
MR. WENTZ: Last Monday.
THE COURT: Aren’t you working?
MR. WENTZ: Yes, I worked last night.
*437THE COURT: How much do you make?
MR. WENTZ: I don’t have the same job all the time.
THE COURT: How much do you make?
MR. WENTZ: I make around $350 to 400 in two weeks.
THE COURT: You wouldn’t be entitled to a free lawyer. You’re going to have to make up your mind.
MR. WENTZ: I don’t know any attorneys right around here.
THE COURT: You’ve had plenty of time haven’t you?
MR. WENTZ: I don’t know any.
THE COURT: I understand, but you’ve had plenty of time. You’ve known about this trial for weeks and weeks, haven’t you?
MR. WENTZ: Yes, I have.
THE COURT: All right, you’re scheduled for trial today. We are ready to give you a trial, so you stay here and we’ll give you the trial. Did you plead in this case?
MR. WENTZ: I pleaded not guilty.
THE COURT: So you are entitled to a jury trial. We’ll give it to you.
(5/23/77, N.T. 1-2)
The trial judge directed the sheriff to help appellant pick a jury, “and [to] tell him what to do . .. He’s going to trial for Driving Under the Influence.” At trial, appellant conducted no voir dire examination; he did not testify, introduce evidence, or present a closing argument.
On this record, the majority finds that appellant waived his right to the assistance of counsel:
We hold [states the majority] that a criminal defendant who has been duly notified of the date of his trial, and who has been advised to obtain counsel to represent him and who, nevertheless, appears in court on the scheduled date without counsel and with no reasonable excuse for the lack thereof and no concrete plans for the obtaining of counsel has waived his right to counsel.
(at p. 800)
*438I cannot agree with this statement of the law.2 Waiver of the right to counsel may not be found so easily. In Commonwealth ex rel. McCray v. Rundle, 415 Pa. 65, 69-70, 202 A.2d 303, 305 (1964), our Supreme Court stated:
To evaluate whether a waiver of representation by counsel is valid, this court must determine whether or not the waiver was made “.. . with an apprehension of the nature of the charges, the statutory offenses included within them, the range of allowable punishments thereunder, possible defenses to the charges and circumstances in mitigation thereof, and all other facts essential to a broad understanding of the whole matter. A judge can make certain that an accused’s professed waiver of counsel is understandingly and wisely made only from a penetrating and comprehensive examination of all the circumstances under which such a plea is tendered”. (Emphasis in original).
415 Pa. at 69-70, 202 A.2d at 305, quoting from Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 724, 68 S.Ct. 316, 323, 92 L.Ed. 309 (1948).
See also Commonwealth v. Barnette, 445 Pa. 288, 285 A.2d 141 (1971); Commonwealth ex rel. McKee v. Russell, 429 Pa. 402, 240 A.2d 559 (1968); Commonwealth ex rel. O’Lock v. Rundle, 415 Pa. 515, 204 A.2d 439 (1964); Commonwealth v. Grant, 229 Pa.Super. 419, 323 A.2d 354 (1974). See also Pa.R.Cr.P. 318(c) (effective Jan. 1, 1978).
Here, the trial judge made no examination at all-much less “a penetrating and comprehensive examination of all the circumstances”-regarding appellant’s understanding of what he was doing. The “examination” that' was made may fairly be summarized as follows: First, the judge decided that appellant “wouldn’t be entitled to a free lawyer.” *439Second, the judge received, and said that he “understood]”, appellant’s statement that “I don’t know any attorneys right around here.” And third, the judge received appellant’s acknowledgment that he had “known about this trial for weeks and weeks.” With only this, the judge summarily informed appellant, “[YJou’re scheduled for trial today .... we’ll give you the trial,” and instructed the sheriff “[to] tell [appellant] what to do.” In its discussion of appellant’s guilty plea, the majority properly characterizes the colloquy preceding the plea as “woefully inadequate.” (p. 800) The colloquy preceding appellant’s “waiver” of his right to counsel was even more inadequate.
Had the trial judge made the examination required by law, he would have learned that appellant had appeared without counsel not because he did not want counsel but because he did not understand the scope of his right to counsel. This is clear from the colloquy following appellant’s conviction, when the trial judge informed appellant of his right to counsel on post-verdict motions:
THE COURT: You can get an attorney anywhere in Pennsylvania [for post-verdict motions],
MR. WENTZ: I understood it would have to be in Somerset County [the county in which the court sat], that’s the reason I didn’t get any.
THE COURT: No.
MR. WENTZ: I know some where I live.
THE COURT: Where do you live?
MR. WENTZ: Bedford County. I understood it had to be up here.
THE COURT: No one told you that up here.
MR. WENTZ: That’s what I understood.
THE COURT: No one told you that.
MR. WENTZ: No sir, no one told me that. That’s what I understood.
THE COURT: So that’s all for today. You will be notified when to appear. Do you have any other questions?
*440MR. WENTZ: No, sir.
(5/23/77, N.T. 21-22)
Appellant’s mistaken belief that he needed local counsel can hardly be characterized as unreasonable, or even surprising. Indeed, until rather recently, he would have been right. There is no support in the record for the majority’s implied suggestion that appellant was “a ‘court wise’ criminal defendant” who was seeking to delay, and so to avoid, trial, (p. 800). Appellant had not so much as requested a continuance; indeed, he never requested a continuance, probably because, as a layman, he did not know that he could. Cf. Commonwealth v. Minifield, 225 Pa.Super. 149, 310 A.2d 366 (1973); Commonwealth v. Simpson, 222 Pa.Super. 296, 294 A.2d 805 (1972).
The judgment of sentence for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor should be vacated, and the case remanded for new trial.
HOFFMAN and HESTER, JJ., join in this opinion.

. The lower court has stated in its opinion filed pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) that the issue of appellant’s right to counsel was not raised during any criminal proceedings prior to appeal. This does not mean, however, that appellant may not argue on this appeal that he had the right to counsel. It is settled that failure to raise an issue in a criminal proceeding does not constitute waiver where the defendant is not represented by counsel during that proceeding. Commonwealth v. Wilson, 444 Pa. 433, 283 A.2d 78 (1971).

. The majority also states that appellant has argued that a written waiver of the right to counsel must be executed by a criminal defendant in order for the court to find waiver, (pp. 799-800) However, I do not understand appellant to make this assertion anywhere in his brief. If the assertion had been made, I should agree with the majority that written waiver is not required, for a defendant may orally waive his right to counsel, so long as the requirements of law, as stated in the cases cited in this opinion, have been satisfied.