Court Opinion

ID: 9941648
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-16 17:11:32.672486+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:50.600601
License: Public Domain

J-A21026-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  ADONIS ABREU MARTINEZ                        :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 2988 EDA 2022

       Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 29, 2022
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-39-CR-0002122-2021

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., DUBOW, J., and NICHOLS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.:                            FILED FEBRUARY 16, 2024

       Appellant Adonis Abreu Martinez appeals from the judgment of sentence

entered by the Lehigh County Court of Common Pleas on August 29, 2022 for

Indecent Assault - Person Less than 13 Years of Age and Corruption of Minors.1

Appellant challenges the constitutionality of Revised Subchapter H of the

Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”),2 the trial court’s

classification of Appellant as a Sexually Violent Predator (“SVP”), and the

discretionary aspects of his sentence. After careful review, we affirm.

       The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows. On March 22,

2022, at a guilty plea hearing, the Commonwealth alleged that Appellant

assaulted his live-in paramour’s 11-year-old daughter (“Victim”) on May 28,

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3126(a)(7) and 6301(a)(1)(ii), respectively.

2 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.10-9799.42.
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2021. N.T. Guilty Plea, 3/22/22, at 10. The Commonwealth included in its

recitation of facts that Victim alleged that Appellant “assaulted her a total of

seven times in the home.” Id.

       Appellant’s counsel disputed the allegations of prior conduct but

acknowledged multiple incidents on May 28, 2021. Id. at 11. Upon clarifying

questioning from the trial court, Appellant admitted to touching “the pubic hair

on top of the vagina” and the “breast areas” of Victim on May 28, 2021. Id.

at 12. Following this exchange, the court accepted Appellant’s open guilty

plea to one count each of Indecent Assault and Corruption of Minors, and the

Commonwealth agreed not to pursue a charge of Aggravated Indecent

Assault. Id. at 4, 12. The court ordered a presentence investigation report

(“PSI”) and an assessment by the Sexual Offenders Assessment Board

(“SOAB”) to determine whether Appellant met the criteria of an SVP.

       On August 29, 2022, the court held an SVP and sentencing hearing.

Initially, the court addressed Appellant’s challenge to the constitutionality of

SORNA. Appellant relied upon the Chester County Court of Common Pleas’

decision holding Revised Subchapter H unconstitutional, following remand by

the Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Torsilieri, 232 A.3d 567 (Pa.

2020).3 Unlike in Torsilieri, Appellant did not introduce any expert testimony

____________________________________________

3 The Commonwealth has appealed the decision in Commonwealth v.
Torsilieri, No. CR-1570-2016 (Chester County C.C.P. Aug. 22, 2022), to the
Supreme Court, where the case is currently pending following argument in
May 2023 at docket number 97 MAP 2022.

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to support his claims of unconstitutionality. Noting that the Chester County

decision was not binding, the trial court denied Appellant’s SORNA challenge.

      The court proceeded to the SVP hearing where the SOAB expert testified

that Appellant met the criteria for an SVP because he had a “mental

abnormality” of Pedophilic Disorder and engaged in “predatory behavior.” N.T.

Sentencing, 8/29/22, at 12, 19-20.       Appellant’s counsel objected to the

expert’s evaluation, asserting that it was improperly based upon allegations

in “Children and Youth Records,” and the PSI to which he had not pled guilty,

including allegations of assault spanning ten months and a threat to kill

Victim’s mother if Victim told others about the abuse. Id. at 13-14, 21, 23-

24.   Counsel also challenged the expert’s consideration of prior criminal

complaints in 2008 and 2010, which did not result in convictions, and in 2019,

which resulted in a guilty plea to a summary offense, none of which related to

Victim.   Id.   The trial court overruled Appellant’s objections and classified

Appellant as an SVP, concluding that the Commonwealth presented the

requisite clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 15, 32-33.

      The same day, the court held a sentencing hearing at which Victim

testified that she suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder, depression,

and anxiety as a result of the abuse.     Id. at 37. Appellant’s sister-in-law

testified in support of Appellant, and Appellant stated his remorse. Id. at 40-

46. Prior to imposing the sentence, the court indicated that it had reviewed

the PSI, letters submitted in support of Appellant, and the testimony

presented. Id. at 51-52.

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       The court set forth the relevant sentencing guidelines given Appellant’s

prior record score prior to imposing an aggregate sentence of 4 to 9 years’

incarceration. For Indecent Assault, the court sentenced Appellant to 2 to 5

years of incarceration plus 3 years of probation. For Corruption of Minors, the

court imposed a consecutive sentence of 2 to 4 years of incarceration. In

imposing the sentences, the court emphasized, inter alia, the significant

impact the crimes had on the Victim, Appellant’s violation of his role as a

father figure, and the seriousness of the offense.    While the court did not

consider Appellant’s 2008 and 2010 arrests, it found his 2019 convictions for

disorderly conduct and harassment relevant as they involved “assaultive,

aggressive behavior” and the “victimization of another female.” Id. at 53.

       On September 7, 2022, Appellant filed a post-sentence motion raising

the same issues he presents on appeal. On November 2, 2022, the trial court

denied the post-sentence motion, setting forth its reasoning in an extensive

footnote.4

       On November 30, 2022, Appellant filed his Notice of Appeal.        After

Appellant timely complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), the trial court issued its

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion on December 28, 2022, which incorporated the

reasoning in its November 2, 2022 order.

____________________________________________

4 As the footnote spans five pages, when citing the court’s analysis, we
reference the page of the order on which the relevant language appears.

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      Appellant raises eleven questions for our review, challenging the

constitutionality of SORNA, his SVP designation, and the discretionary aspects

of his sentence.

                            A. SORNA challenges

      Appellant raises the following questions challenging SORNA for our

review:

      1. Whether that portion of the sentence imposing SORNA
      registration requirements should be vacated because SORNA
      (Revised Subchapter H) violates both the Pennsylvania and
      federal constitution in the following ways:

      A. Whether SORNA (Revised Subchapter H) denies the Appellant
      due process under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it
      creates an irrebuttable presumption that those convicted of
      enumerated offenses “pose a high risk of committing additional
      sexual offenses” depriving those individuals of their fundamental
      right to reputation without notice and an opportunity to be heard?

      B. Whether SORNA (Revised Subchapter H) denies the Appellant
      procedural due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth
      Amendments to the United States Constitution because it
      unlawfully restricts liberty and privacy without notice and an
      opportunity to be heard?

      C. Whether SORNA (Revised Subchapter H) violates substantive
      due process under the state and federal constitutions, U.S. Const.
      Amend. XIV; Pa. Const. Art I, § 1, because SORNA deprives
      individuals of inalienable rights and fails to satisfy strict scrutiny?

      D. Whether the recent amendment to SORNA, Revised Subchapter
      H, is in all material respects identical to SORNA and therefore a
      punitive law?

      E. Does SORNA (Revised Subchapter H), as a penal law, violate
      the separation of powers doctrine because it usurps the exclusive
      judicial function of imposing a sentence?

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       F. Whether SORNA (Revised Subchapter H) contravenes the 5th,
       6th and 14th Amendments of the United States Constitution and
       the corresponding protections of the Pennsylvania Constitution
       because as a criminal punishment, SORNA cannot be imposed
       without due process, notice and opportunity to contest its
       imposition, and ensuring that each fact necessary to support the
       mandatory sentence and a sentence beyond the authorized
       statutory maximum is submitted to a jury and proven beyond a
       reasonable doubt pursuant to Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S.
       466 (2000) and Alleyne v. United States, 1570 U.S. 99 (2013)?

       G. Whether the imposition of lifetime sex offender registration for
       all Tier I offenses under SORNA, Revised Subchapter H. is a cruel
       and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth
       Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I,
       Section 13 of the Pennsylvania Constitution?

       H. Whether Appellant’s sentence of lifetime registration pursuant
       to SORNA, Revised Subchapter H, is illegal as it is not a sentencing
       alternative authori[z]ed by Section 9721 of the Judicial Code and
       the trial court therefore lacked authority to impose such a
       sentence?

       I. [Whether] Appellant’s sentence of lifetime registration pursuant
       to SORNA is illegal as the statutory maximum for a felon[y] of the
       third degree as codified at Section 1103(3) of the [Crimes] Code
       is seven (7) years[?]

Appellant’s Br. at 6-7 (unnecessary capitalization removed).

       These questions are not only similar to those raised in Torsilieri, but

they are also nearly verbatim to those presented in Commonwealth v.

Villanueva-Pabon, 304 A.3d 1210, 1213-14 (Pa. Super. 2023).5

       In Villanueva-Pabon, this Court observed that the Supreme Court “in

Torsilieri ma[de] clear the importance of the scientific evidence as it
____________________________________________

5 The only substantive differences are the tier referenced in Issue G and the

statutory maximum in Issue I. We additionally observe that, like the present
case, we issued Villanueva-Pabon after the Supreme Court heard argument
in Torsilieri. Villanueva-Pabon, 304 A.3d at 1216 n.11.

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pertained to each of the constitutional issues raised[.]”6         Id. at 1217.

Villanueva-Pabon, however, “produced no scientific evidence whatsoever to

support his claims that underlying legislative policy infringes on appellant’s

rights[.]” Id. at 1218. This Court, therefore, concluded that Villanueva-Pabon

failed to demonstrate that Revised Subchapter H “clearly, palpably, and plainly

violated the constitution[.]” Id. (internal quotation marks removed).

       The same reasoning applies in this case as Appellant did not seek to

present any evidence to support his constitutional challenges. Accordingly,

we affirm the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s challenges to Revised

Subchapter H.

                                 B. SVP Designation

       Appellant next questions “[w]hether the trial court erred by designating

the Appellant as a Sexually Violent Pred[a]tor?”          Appellant’s Br. at 7.

Appellant specifically challenges the SOAB expert’s SVP recommendation to

the extent it relies upon Victim’s allegations rather than facts to which

Appellant admitted guilt. Appellant’s Br. at 55-57.

       A challenge to an SVP designation is a challenge to the sufficiency of the

evidence for which “our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review

____________________________________________

6 In Torsilieri, the Supreme Court had remanded for an evidentiary hearing

to determine whether a scientific “consensus has developed to call into
question the [following] legislative policy decisions impacting offenders’
constitutional rights[,]” specifically: “(1) that all sexual offenders pose a high
risk of recidivation and (2) that the tier-based registration system of Revised
Subchapter H protects the public from the alleged danger of recidivist sexual
offenders.” 232 A.3d at 584-85.

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is plenary.”   Commonwealth v. Meals, 912 A.2d 213, 218 (Pa. 2006)

(citation omitted). “[W]e view all evidence and reasonable inferences

therefrom in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth. We will reverse

a trial court’s determination of SVP status only if the Commonwealth has not

presented clear and convincing evidence that each element of the statute has

been satisfied.” Commonwealth v. Hollingshead, 111 A.3d 186, 189 (Pa.

Super. 2015) (citation omitted).

      Revised Subchapter H defines an SVP as an individual who, after

December 20, 2012, committed specified crimes set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.

§ 9799.14, including Indecent Assault - Person Less than 13 Years of Age, 18

Pa.C.S. § 3126(a)(7), and Corruption of Minors, id. § 6301(a)(1)(ii), and “who

is determined to be a sexually violent predator under section 9799.24 (relating

to assessments) due to a mental abnormality or personality disorder that

makes the individual likely to engage in predatory sexually violent offenses.”

42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.12. The referenced Section 9799.24 establishes the SVP

assessment process, which requires the SOAB expert to consider numerous

factors and prepare a report. Id. § 9799.24(b), (d).

      This Court recently addressed the issue raised by Appellant: whether

the SOAB expert, when evaluating an offender to determine whether he is an

SVP, may consider allegations to which the offender did not plead guilty.

Commonwealth v. Aumick, 297 A.3d 770, 777 (Pa. Super. 2023) (en banc).

In so doing, this Court observed that the SOAB expert is subject to

Pennsylvania’s general rules regarding expert witnesses, including Pa.R.E.

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703, which provides that facts or data relied upon by an expert “need not be

admissible” “[i]f experts in the particular field would reasonably rely on those

kinds of facts or data[.]” Aumick, 297 A.3d at 777 (quoting Pa.R.E. 703).

The Court additionally highlighted the statutory provisions requiring the SOAB

expert to address specific factors and directing various government entities to

provide the SOAB with records and information relevant to the SVP

assessment.      Id.; 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.24(b), (c).          Given these statutory

provisions, the Court concluded “that the legislature intended that the SOAB

[expert] consider more than the limited facts included in a plea colloquy” in

making the SVP assessment and preparing the report for the court. Aumick,

297 A.3d at 782. According, the Court held that the SOAB expert in that case

was “permitted to consider the affidavit of probable cause, criminal

information, criminal complaint, preliminary hearing transcript, and the

investigative reports prepared by Child Protective Services[.]” Id. at 781.

       Following Aumick, Appellant’s claim fails.7 As the trial court held, the

SOAB expert was not restricted to relying only on admitted facts but instead

could consider “documents containing hearsay, such as the Lehigh County

Children and Youth records.”         Trial Ct. Order at 4.   Moreover, viewing the

evidence in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth, we conclude that

the trial court did not err in finding that the Commonwealth “proved by clear

and convincing evidence that the [Appellant] met the criteria for [an SVP]”
____________________________________________

7We observe that Appellant submitted his brief prior to our issuance of
Aumick.

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based upon the testimony and report of the SOAB expert, which supported

the conclusion that Appellant suffered from Pedophilic Disorder which

“predispose[d] him towards committing sexual crimes” and that his behavior

“was predatory in nature[.]”    Id. at 5.     Accordingly, we affirm the court’s

classification of Appellant as an SVP.

                    C. Discretionary Aspects of Sentence

      Finally, Appellant presents the following question:

      Did the trial court abuse its discretion in imposing an unreasonable
      sentence outside the sentencing guidelines when[ ]the trial court’s
      reasons for its diversion from the guidelines do not support such
      a sentence beyond the aggravated range?

Appellant’s Br. at 7.

      Challenges to the discretionary aspects of a sentence are not appealable

as of right.   Commonwealth v. Schroat, 272 A.3d 523, 527 (Pa. Super.

2022) Rather, an appellant must satisfy the following four criteria to invoke

our jurisdiction:

      (1) fil[e] a timely notice of appeal; (2) properly preserv[e] the
      issue at sentencing or in a post-sentence motion; (3) comply[]
      with Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f), which requires a separate section of the
      brief setting forth a concise statement of the reasons relied upon
      for allowance of appeal of the discretionary aspects of a sentence;
      and (4) present[] a substantial question that the sentence
      appealed from is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42
      Pa.C.S. § 9781(b), or sentencing norms.

Schroat, 272 A.3d at 527.       Here, Appellant has satisfied the first three

elements by filing a Notice of Appeal, preserving the issue in his Post-Sentence

Motion, and including a separate Rule 2119(f) Statement in his Brief to this

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Court.     Thus, we consider whether Appellant has presented a substantial

question for review.

      “A substantial question exists only when the appellant advances a

colorable argument that the sentencing judge’s actions were either: (1)

inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary

to   the   fundamental   norms   which   underlie   the   sentencing   process.”

Commonwealth v. Summers, 245 A.3d 686, 692 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citation

omitted). We have found that a substantial question exists when an appellant

asserts that “the sentencing court relied on an impermissible factor and

ignored mitigating evidence when imposing an aggravated-range sentence[.]”

Commonwealth v. Mulkin, 228 A.3d 913, 916 (Pa. Super. 2020); see also

Commonwealth v. Durazo, 210 A.3d 316, 320 (Pa. Super. 2019) (finding

substantial question based upon allegation that the court “exceeded the

recommended range in the sentencing guidelines without providing an

adequate basis”).

      We conclude that Appellant presents a substantial question because he

claims that the court “did not provide adequate reasons” for imposing a

sentence “outside the aggravated range” and instead improperly relied upon

the “seriousness of the offense and victim impact without consideration of

[his] mitigating factors.” Appellant’s Br. at 59.

      When reviewing a challenge to the discretionary aspects of sentence,

this Court will not disturb a sentence “absent a manifest abuse of discretion[,]”

which requires not merely an error of judgment but, rather, “that the

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sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its judgment for

reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or arrived at a manifestly

unreasonable decision.” Commonwealth v. Conte, 198 A.3d 1169, 1176

(Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted).

      Nevertheless, an appellate court “shall vacate” a sentence when “the

sentencing court purported to sentence within the sentencing guidelines but

applied the guidelines erroneously” or when the court imposes a sentence that

is “outside the sentencing guidelines and the sentence is unreasonable.” 42

Pa.C.S. § 9781(c)(1), (3).   While not defined in the Sentencing Code, the

concept of an unreasonable sentence “connotes a decision that is ‘irrational’

or ‘not guided by sound judgment.’” Commonwealth v. Velez, 273 A.3d 6,

12 (Pa. Super. 2022) appeal denied, 283 A.3d 792 (Pa. 2022) (citation

omitted).

      In reviewing the discretionary aspects of a sentence, this Court should

“consider the nature and circumstances of the crime; the history and

characteristics of the defendant; the sentencing court’s findings as well as the

[sentencing] court’s opportunity to observe the defendant, including through

presentence investigation; and the sentencing guidelines.” Id. at 9 (citing 42

Pa.C.S. § 9781(d)).

      In turn, the sentencing court in imposing a sentence should consider

“the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the

impact on the life of the victim and on the community, and the rehabilitative

needs of the defendant[,]” in addition to the sentencing guidelines. 42 Pa.C.S.

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§ 9721(b). We reiterate, however, that the guidelines are “purely advisory”

and “not mandatory.” Velez, 273 A.3d at 10. A court may sentence outside

the guidelines if it states it reasons on the record and “does not exceed the

maximum sentence allowed by statute.”              Id. Where a presentence report

exists, we “presume that the sentencing judge was aware of relevant

information     regarding    the    defendant’s    character   and   weighed   those

considerations along with mitigating statutory factors.” Commonwealth v.

Watson, 228 A.3d 928, 936 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation omitted).

       Appellant presents several claims that his sentence is unreasonable.

First, Appellant asserts that the sentence should be vacated because the court

intended to impose a sentence in the aggravated range, but instead imposed

a sentence that ”went well beyond the aggravated ranges” on each count.8

Appellant’s Br. 62-64. This claim is belied by the record as the court set forth

the correct sentencing guidelines, including the aggravated range and the

maximum sentence prior to imposing the sentence.9              While the trial court
____________________________________________

8  Specifically, Appellant observes that the court imposed a minimum
incarceration sentence for indecent assault that is “12 months beyond the
aggravated range of sentence” and the minimum sentence imposed for
Corruption of Minors is “6 months beyond the aggravated range sentence.”
Appellant’s Br. at 10-11.

9 During the sentencing hearing, the trial court stated the following sentencing

guidelines, which the parties acknowledged as accurate. N.T. Sentencing, at
33-34. For Indecent Assault, the standard range was RS to 9 months’
incarceration, with an aggravated range of 12 months, and a maximum
sentence of 5 years, plus a mandatory 3 years of probation. Id. For
Corruption of Minors, the standard range was 3 to 12 months’ incarceration,
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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stated during sentencing that it was imposing sentences “in the aggravated

range,” it clarified that statement in its order denying Appellant’s post-

sentence motion and explaining its reasons for sentencing Appellant “beyond

the aggravated range” on both counts. N.T. Sentencing, at 54-55; Trial Ct.

Order at 4. As the court was aware of the accurate sentencing guidelines and

expressed its reasons for exceeding them, we find this claim has no merit.

       Appellant next argues that the sentence should be vacated as

“unreasonable” pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(c)(3). Appellant’s Br. at 65-

71. He contends that the court’s reasons for imposing sentences outside the

standard range, specifically the impact of the crimes on Victim, the fact that

Appellant served as a father-figure to Victim, and the multiple incidents of

abuse in one day, do not support upward deviation from the guidelines. He

argues that these factors are common in cases “of this type” and thus would

have been considered in setting the guideline ranges. Id. at 65. Accordingly,

he asserts, the court cannot rely on these factors to exceed the standard

range.

       Appellant also urges the court to find the sentence “unreasonable” based

upon his “history and characteristics[.]”. Appellant’s Br.at 67-69 (quoting 42

Pa.C.S. § 9781(d)(1)).        Appellant cites in support his remorse, his work

history, and his “spotless” criminal record other than one summary

____________________________________________

with an aggravated range of 18 months, and a maximum sentence of 7 years.
Id. Thus, the total potential maximum sentence was 6 to 12 years of
incarceration. Appellant’s aggregate term of incarceration is 4 to 9 years.

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harassment and disorderly conduct conviction. Id. at 68. He also emphasizes

that the PSI recommended a sentence at the top of the standard range for

each count, rather than above the aggravated range. Id. at 70. After careful

review, we reject Appellant’s claim that the sentences were unreasonable.

      The trial court explained that, in imposing the sentence, it considered

the factors set forth in Section 9721 and reviewed the PSI, which included

information relating to Appellant’s asserted mitigation factors, specifically his

“employment history, his family support, and his minimal prior record.” Trial

Ct. Order at 3. While acknowledging Appellant’s mitigating factors, the court

reiterated its reasons for sentencing Appellant “beyond the aggravated range”

for Indecent Assault:

      (1) the impact on [V]ictim in that she has been diagnosed with
      Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, she takes medication regularly,
      and she attends therapy twice a week; (2) the relationship of
      [Appellant] to [V]ictim in that he was the live-in boyfriend of
      [V]ictim’s mother, thereby placing him in a “father figure” role;
      and (3) the seriousness of the offense in that it was comprised of
      a series of sexual events throughout the day.

Id. at 4. Similarly, in regard to the Corruption of Minors sentence, the court

repeated the first reason and added its consideration of “the seriousness of

the offense in that it entailed sexual touching of the genitalia by a ‘father

figure’ who was three times [V]ictim’s age.” Id. The court also highlighted

Appellant’s “previous assaultive behavior towards his girlfriend” in 2019. Id.

      We conclude that the sentencing court did not impose an unreasonable

sentence.   Rather, the court accurately stated the sentencing guidelines,

considered the sentencing factors, acknowledged the mitigation factors

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presented in the PSI and during the sentencing hearing, and articulated its

reasons for deviating from the guidelines on the record. Further, we reject

Appellant’s suggestion that these factors are so common to the crimes of

Indecent Assault and Corruption of Minors that we should assume that they

were taken into account by the drafters of the Sentencing Guidelines. Given

the sentencing court’s developed reasons for imposing aggravated sentences

with reference to the facts of this case and the impact on Victim, we conclude

that the court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Appellant.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Date: 2/16/2024

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