Court Opinion

ID: 9568455
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:03:53.641014+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:43:12.664576
License: Public Domain

Mallett, J.
(concurring). Because I agree that the defendant understood, albeit at a very basic level, the rights afforded him under Miranda,1 I agree with the result reached by the majority. The trial court did not clearly err in finding that Mr. Cheatham did in fact understand that he could keep silent, that if he did say anything the state could use whatever he said as evidence against him, and that he could have an attorney to represent him. I write separately to emphasize that the requirement that a waiver of Miranda rights be knowingly and intelligently made means that the officers securing the waiver must explain those rights in plain, simple English, or in non-English, or whatever may be required to assure that the individual waiving his rights truly understands.
This defendant, with an IQ suggestive of mild mental retardation, apparently did understand the nature and consequences of the rights waived. However, I am deeply troubled by the possibility that the decision we reach today could be interpreted as endorsing the standard Miranda litany as sufficient when securing a waiver from individuals with impaired or “below normal” mental abilities.
The court in United States v Yunis, 273 US App DC 290; 859 F2d 953 (1988), effectively explained the *59“knowing and intelligent” requirement in the context of a non-English-speaking defendant. In holding that the Arabic translation of the warnings was sufficient to apprise the suspect of his rights, the court emphasized that
as the Miranda decision itself suggests, the focus must be on the plain meaning of the required warnings. A defendant must comprehend, for example, that he really does not have to speak; he must recognize that anything he says actually will be used by the state against him. [Id. at 301-302 (emphasis added).]
I agree that the focus of inquiry must be on the plain meaning of the warnings and emphasize that the warnings must be plain. The validity of a waiver does not depend on a verbatim recitation of the Miranda litany, but rather depends on an actual understanding on the part of the individual of his Miranda rights and the consequences of waiving them. Colorado v Spring, 479 US 564; 107 S Ct 851; 93 L Ed 2d 954 (1987). While it is true that an officer can never definitively ascertain that an individual has actual understanding, the officer must use caution and engage in a good-faith effort when obtaining a waiver to assess the suspect’s level of understanding. The officer must make an effort to ensure that the consequences of making an in-custody statement to the police are clearly understood.

 Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966).