Court Opinion

ID: 9919185
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-17 18:00:53.563603+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:05:52.613390
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        JAN 17 2024
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                       No.    23-10024

                Plaintiff-Appellee,             D.C. No.
                                                4:22-cr-00375-HSG-1
 v.

PHILONG HUA CHUONG,                             MEMORANDUM*

                Defendant-Appellant.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Northern District of California
                 Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr., District Judge, Presiding

                           Submitted January 11, 2024**
                             San Francisco, California

Before: SILER,*** CLIFTON, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

      Philong Chuong appeals from the district court’s order denying his motion for

early termination of supervised release under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1). We review

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
      ***
            The Honorable Eugene E. Siler, United States Circuit Judge for the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.
the denial of a motion for the termination of supervised release under § 3583(e)(1)

for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Ponce, 22 F.4th 1045, 1046 (9th Cir.

2022). Because the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not recount them here,

except as necessary to provide context to our ruling. We have jurisdiction pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.

      The district court applied the proper legal standard and did not abuse its

discretion in denying the motion. “[A] court may terminate a term of supervised

release ‘if it is satisfied that such action is warranted by the conduct of the defendant

released and the interest of justice.’” United States v. Emmett, 749 F.3d 817, 819

(9th Cir. 2014) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1)). “The expansive phrases ‘conduct

of the defendant’ and ‘interest of justice’ make clear that a district court enjoys

discretion to consider a wide range of circumstances when determining whether to

grant early termination.” Id.

      The district court denied Chuong’s motion after considering the appropriate

statutory factors. When reviewing a motion for early termination of supervised

release, a district court must consider certain factors outlined in § 3553(a). See 18

U.S.C. §§ 3553(a), 3583(e)(1). The court did so here. The court considered “the

nature and circumstances of the offense,” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), including

Chuong’s organizational or leadership role in a large-scale narcotics distribution

operation, and noted the “need for specific and general deterrence.” The district

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court was not required to make specific findings of fact with respect to each relevant

factor. See United States v. Trujillo, 713 F.3d 1003, 1009 (9th Cir. 2013).

      The district court did not erroneously apply an “exceptionally good behavior”

standard for early termination. Cf. Ponce, 22 F.4th at 1047 (clarifying that the

district court may not require exceptional behavior as a predicate for early

termination). Had it applied such a categorical rule, the district court would have

ended its inquiry after determining that Chuong’s “[c]ompliance with the terms of

supervised release is expected (and required), and does not by itself constitute a basis

for terminating supervision.” Instead, consistent with § 3583(e), the court continued

with its consideration of “a broad range of factors.” See Emmett, 749 F.3d at 819.

Only after considering these factors did the district court conclude that Chuong

“ha[d] not shown that the interests of justice warrant termination of supervised

release.”

      Nor did the district court require a showing of “undue hardship.” Although

the “text of § 3583(e) does not support a legal standard that categorically requires a

petitioner to demonstrate undue hardship,” a district court can “consider as one

factor among others whether continued supervised release pose[s] an undue

hardship.” Id. at 819–20. Here, the district court considered the hardship of

supervision as one factor among many. No language in the district court’s order

indicates that a showing of undue hardship was a single, dispositive factor in the

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court’s analysis.

      Nor did the district court abuse its discretion by considering the need for

specific and general deterrence. Section 3583(e)(1) expressly requires the court to

consider the need “to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct” and “to protect

the public from future crimes of the defendant.” 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(2)(B), (C),

3583(e)(1).

      Chuong argues for the first time in his reply brief that the district court abused

its discretion by requiring him to serve half of his five-year term of supervised

release before he would be eligible for early termination. The argument is waived.

See Bazuaye v. I.N.S., 79 F.3d 118, 120 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Issues raised for the first

time in the reply brief are waived.”).

      AFFIRMED.

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