Court Opinion

ID: 9940153
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-13 17:15:25.430047+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:42:38.367806
License: Public Domain

I concur with the majority opinion under compulsion of Breed
v. Jones (1975) 421 U.S. 519 [44 L.Ed.2d 346, 95 S.Ct. 1779], to the extent that it orders petitioner's murder conviction vacated. It is likely that the United States Supreme Court when called upon will *Page 789 
declare retroactive its decision in Breed. I respectfully dissent, however, from the majority's conclusion that Breed
would require that petitioner's separate conviction for assault with intent to commit murder also be vacated. The assault charge, involving a second victim, was dismissed during the course of the juvenile court proceedings, and no evidence was introduced, or plea taken, regarding that charge. Under these circumstances, I cannot join the majority in their holding that ". . . jeopardy attached for both assault and murder in the 1971 juvenile adjudication."
According to the record, in 1969 two separate petitions were filed in juvenile court, the first alleging that petitioner murdered Jerry Maddox and the second alleging that he assaulted F. Benavidez with intent to commit murder. These offenses allegedly arose out of a single incident during which petitioner shot and killed Police Officer Maddox and fired three times at, and missed, Officer Benavidez.
At the juvenile court hearing in question, before any evidence or plea was taken regarding either petition, the district attorney and defense counsel agreed that the assault petition should be dismissed. The court concurred, stating "very well," although no formal order of dismissal was entered at that time. (The clerk's minutes confirm that the assault petition was dismissed.) Evidently, both the People and the defense deemed the assault petition superfluous in view of the more serious uncontested charges alleged in the murder petition. Immediately after the foregoing colloquy regarding dismissal of the assault petition, the court formally advised petitioner that a petition had been filed against him alleging the murder of Jerry Maddox.No mention was made of the assault petition. The court explained to petitioner his various constitutional rights, and obtained from him the admission that the allegations of the murder petition were true and that he had killed Maddox. Thereupon, petitioner was ordered committed to the California Youth Authority.
It seems very apparent to me that petitioner was never placed in jeopardy with respect to the assault charge during the juvenile proceedings, and that accordingly petitioner was properly brought to trial in superior court for that offense. Jeopardy attaches in juvenile proceedings when the jurisdictional hearing is "entered upon." (Bryan v. Superior Court (1972)7 Cal.3d 575, 582 [102 Cal.Rptr. 831, 498 P.2d 1079]; Richard M.
v. Superior Court (1971) 4 Cal.3d 370, 376 [93 Cal.Rptr. 752,482 P.2d 664]; In re Gary J. (1971) 17 Cal.App.3d 704, 710 [95 Cal.Rptr. 185].) Borrowing from the analogy in criminal cases tried by the court, in *Page 790 
which jeopardy attaches when the first witness is sworn, we held in Richard M. that jeopardy attached in a juvenile court proceeding once the minor, though unsworn, commenced to testify regarding the offense in question. We noted that "The petition was sufficient in form and substance to sustain an adjudication of delinquency. The People actively prosecuted the charges by filing the petition and having the matter set for a jurisdictional hearing. . . . The court proceeded to examine the minor in the presence of his parents and they all testified. Theminor was exposed to the possibility that an adjudication wouldbe made; that the court might then proceed to the dispositional phase. . . ." (Id., at p. 376, italics added.)
The United States Supreme Court likewise has recently stated that "In a nonjury trial, jeopardy attaches when the court begins to hear evidence. [Citations.] The Court has consistently adhered to the view that jeopardy does not attach, and the constitutional prohibition can have no application, until a defendant is `put to trial before the trier of facts, whether the trier be a jury or a judge.' [Citations.]" (Serfass v. United States (1975)420 U.S. 377, 388 [43 L.Ed.2d 265, 274, 95 S.Ct. 1055]; see alsoBunnell v. Superior Court (1975) 13 Cal.3d 592, 601 [119 Cal.Rptr. 302, 531 P.2d 1086] [jeopardy attaches when a nonjury trial is "`entered upon' by the reception of evidence or otherwise"].)
I conclude that at no time during the juvenile proceedings was petitioner exposed to jeopardy on the assault charge within the meaning of the foregoing cases. No evidence of the assault was introduced at the hearing, and petitioner's admissions were limited entirely to the murder charge. Although petitioner's murder conviction should be vacated, the assault conviction should stand. Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to release from custody.
McComb, J., and Clark, J., concurred.
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied May 26, 1976. McComb, J., Clark, J., and Richardson, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted. *Page 791