Court Opinion

ID: 9914028
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-29 14:08:57.150321+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:09:53.859427
License: Public Domain

J-S32043-23

 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  DEVEN TYLER KOHR                             :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 184 MDA 2023

           Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered January 4, 2023
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-21-CR-0003593-2016

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and NICHOLS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.:                         FILED: DECEMBER 28, 2023

       Appellant Deven Tyler Kohr appeals from the order denying his timely

first Post Conviction Relief Act1 (PCRA) petition. Appellant argues that his trial

counsel, John Shugars, Esq. (trial counsel) was ineffective for failing to

properly question witnesses and providing erroneous advice to Appellant

concerning his juvenile record, which interfered with his right to testify in his

own defense at trial. After careful review, affirm.

       A prior panel of this Court summarized the relevant facts and procedural

history of this matter as follows:

       On May 14, 2016, [Appellant] called 911 after finding his
       daughter, six-month-old Desirae Kohr [(Victim)], unresponsive
       and not breathing.      When police arrived, Kevinlee Kirsch,
       [Victim’s] grandfather, was in the process of administering CPR.
       [Victim] was transported to Harrisburg Hospital by ambulance,

____________________________________________

1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.
J-S32043-23

     along with [Appellant]. At the hospital, [Victim] never regained
     consciousness, and was declared dead.

     Two days prior to her death, on May 12, 2016, [Appellant] and
     Paula Kirsch [(Mother)], noticed that [Victim] seemed to be ill.
     Specifically, [Victim] was sleeping more than normal and
     vomiting. [Mother] took her to a physician who advised her it was
     likely a “bug.” The physician instructed [Mother] to keep [Victim]
     hydrated with Pedialyte.

     Even though [Victim] was sick, [Mother] decided to travel to New
     Jersey the day following [Victim’s] doctor’s appointment, as
     earlier in the year she had made plans to celebrate her sister’s
     twenty-first birthday in Atlantic City that weekend. While initially
     reluctant to follow through with her plans, she ultimately did go,
     and left her children in [Appellant’s] care. [Mother’s] decision to
     go to Atlantic City upset [Appellant] for various reasons, including
     his concerns of potential infidelity; however, he insisted on
     watching the children.

     On the evening of May 14, 2016, [Appellant] called [Mother] to
     inform her that [Victim] was not breathing.       [Mother] told
     [Appellant] to call an ambulance and left New Jersey for
     Pennsylvania almost immediately.          While en route to
     Pennsylvania, [Mother] was unable to contact [Appellant] despite
     numerous attempts; she then tried calling Kevinlee, who was
     unreachable due to an uncharged cell phone battery. Eventually,
     [Mother] contacted Josh, her sister’s boyfriend, who in turn
     informed Kevinlee what had happened. While the three men —
     [Appellant], Kevinlee, and Josh — were in the home at the time
     of the event, [Appellant] was the only adult present in the room
     when [Victim] became unresponsive.

     Matthew Stoner, the Chief Deputy Coroner for the Cumberland
     County Coroner’s Office, responded to Harrisburg Hospital, where
     he pronounced [Victim] dead from her injuries. The family was
     subsequently instructed not to remove the endotracheal tube
     inserted in [Victim’s] mouth, even though she was no longer alive;
     [Appellant] removed it anyway. After talking to the family,
     members of the New Cumberland Borough Police Department and
     the coroner returned to the house to attempt to develop a better
     understanding of what had happened prior to [Victim’s] death.
     While in the home, officers found unopened Pedialyte on the
     kitchen counter. Upon noticing the unopened bottle, [Appellant]
     reached for the bottle to attempt to open it, but was stopped by

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     one of the officers. [Appellant] then told law enforcement that he
     had given [Victim] a Pedialyte popsicle, instead of the actual
     Pedialyte.

     Dr. Wayne Ross, a forensic pathologist with the Cumberland
     County Coroner’s Office, performed an autopsy on [Victim’s] body.
     Dr. Ross concluded, within a reasonable degree of medical
     certainty, that her death was caused by suffocation or traumatic
     asphyxiation. While performing the autopsy, Dr. Ross found rib
     impressions on [Victim’s] liver, as well as congestion or bleeding,
     suggesting her chest was compressed down to her liver before she
     died. He also found bleeds in her head that ranged from zero to
     eight days old. These bleeds were consistent with injuries from
     high forces of deceleration from actions such as throwing the child
     into the bed. Dr. Ross further testified that traumatic brain injury
     could be the cause of nausea and vomiting, and that there was no
     indication that [Victim] was ill.

     Sergeant Caroline Weber interviewed the family members
     individually after [Victim]’s death. Upon being confronted with the
     autopsy report and cause of death, [Appellant] revealed to
     Sergeant Weber that he dropped [Victim] in her swing and she hit
     her head. He said that he then picked her up and squeezed her.
     [Appellant] said that he thought that “the squeezing of her is what
     did it to her.” However, Dr. Ross testified that this explanation
     was neither scientifically nor medically possible.

     [Appellant] was arrested and charged with murder (first and third
     degree), aggravated assault, [endangering the welfare of a child
     (EWOC)], and simple assault.[FN1] The case proceeded to a jury
     trial, and, on November 3, 2017, the jury found [Appellant] guilty
     of third-degree murder, EWOC, and simple assault.[FN2] With
     regard to the charge of EWOC, the jury specifically determined
     [that Appellant] was guilty of engaging in a “course of conduct.”
     On January 23, 2018, the trial court sentenced [Appellant] as
     follows: (1) on the count of third-degree murder, a term of 20 to
     40 years’ imprisonment; (2) on the count of [EWOC], a
     consecutive term of two to five years’ imprisonment; and (3) on
     the count of simple assault, a concurrent term of one to two years’
     imprisonment.

            See 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2502(a) and (c), 2702(a)(1),
        [FN1]

        4304(a)(1), and 2701(a)(1), respectively.

            The jury found [Appellant] not guilty of first-degree
        [FN2]

        murder and aggravated assault.

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     [Appellant] filed a timely post-sentence motion in which he (1)
     challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his
     convictions, (2) asserted the Commonwealth committed
     prosecutorial misconduct and deprived him of a fair trial, and (3)
     requested the court modify or reconsider his sentence. Following
     argument on March 2, 2018, the trial court entered an order
     finding [Appellant’s] prosecutorial misconduct and fair trial claims
     waived. After reviewing briefs by the parties on the remaining
     issues, the trial court entered an order and opinion on July 5,
     2018, denying [Appellant’s] post-sentence motions.

Commonwealth v. Kohr, 1252 MDA 2018, 2019 WL 2486762, at *1-2 (Pa.

Super. filed Jun. 14, 2019) (Kohr I) (unpublished mem.) (footnote and

citations omitted and some formatting altered).      Appellant filed a timely

appeal, and this Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence. See id. at

*9. Our Supreme Court denied Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal on

November 19, 2019. See Commonwealth v. Kohr, 220 A.3d 531 (Pa. 2019)

(Kohr II).

     Appellant filed a timely pro se first PCRA petition on September 25,

2020. The PCRA court appointed Jacob Jividen, Esq., to represent Appellant,

and Attorney Jividen filed a counseled PCRA petition on February 3, 2021. On

March 24, 2021, the PCRA court vacated the appointment of Attorney Jividen

and appointed William Braught, Esq., to represent Appellant. On August 9,

2021, Attorney Braught filed an amended PCRA petition. The PCRA court held

a hearing on September 22, 2022, and on January 4, 2023, the PCRA court

denied Appellant’s PCRA petition. This timely appeal followed. Both the PCRA

court and Appellant have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

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      On appeal, Appellant raises the following issues:

      1. Trial [C]ounsel’s advice that Appellant’s prior juvenile robbery
         adjudication conviction would be admissible if he were to testify
         to show that he was a bad and violent person was so
         unreasonable that Appellant did not and could not have made
         a knowing and intelligent decision to not testify at trial.

      2. Trial [C]ounsel ineffectively cross-examined witnesses in such
         a manner as to deny Appellant a fair trial and thereby denying
         his right to due process.

         a. Trial [C]ounsel failed to elicit testimony from [Mother]
            regarding her medical care, or lack thereof, for [Victim], and
            to enter into evidence [Victim’s] medical records, thus
            depriving Appellant’s jury of this exculpatory information.

         b. Trial [C]ounsel failed to elicit testimony from Wayne Ross,
            M.D. regarding his claim that [Victim] was blind 24 to 48
            hours prior to her death thus depriving Appellant’s jury of
            this exculpatory information.

      3. Trial [C]ounsel ineffectively examined Appellant’s own witness,
         Douglas Kohr, in such a manner as to deny Appellant a fair trial
         and thereby denying his right to due process.

Appellant’s Brief at 4 (some formatting altered).

      Our standard of review from the denial of a PCRA petition “is limited to

examining whether the PCRA court’s determination is supported by the

evidence of record and whether it is free of legal error.” Commonwealth v.

Sandusky, 203 A.3d 1033, 1043 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted). This

Court applies a de novo standard of review to the PCRA court’s legal

conclusions. Commonwealth v. Hutchinson, 25 A.3d 277, 284 (Pa. 2011).

A PCRA court’s credibility determinations, however, are binding on this Court

when such determinations are supported by the record.           Id.; see also

Commonwealth v. Davis, 262 A.3d 589, 595 (Pa. Super. 2021) (stating that

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“[t]his Court grants great deference to the findings of the PCRA court if the

record contains any support for those findings” (citation omitted)).

      [T]o establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a
      defendant must show, by a preponderance of the evidence,
      ineffective assistance of counsel which, in the circumstances of
      the particular case, so undermined the truth-determining process
      that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken
      place. The burden is on the defendant to prove all three of the
      following prongs: (1) the underlying claim is of arguable merit;
      (2) that counsel had no reasonable strategic basis for his or her
      action or inaction; and (3) but for the errors and omissions of
      counsel, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the
      proceedings would have been different.

      We have explained that a claim has arguable merit where the
      factual averments, if accurate, could establish cause for relief.
      Whether the facts rise to the level of arguable merit is a legal
      determination.

      The test for deciding whether counsel had a reasonable basis for
      his [or her] action or inaction is whether no competent counsel
      would have chosen that action or inaction, or, the alternative, not
      chosen, offered a significantly greater potential chance of success.
      Counsel’s decisions will be considered reasonable if they
      effectuated his [or her] client’s interests. We do not employ a
      hindsight analysis in comparing trial counsel’s actions with other
      efforts he may have taken.

      Prejudice is established if there is a reasonable probability that,
      but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have
      been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient
      to undermine confidence in the outcome.

      Boilerplate allegations and bald assertions of no reasonable basis
      and/or ensuing prejudice cannot satisfy a petitioner’s burden to
      prove that counsel was ineffective. Moreover, a failure to satisfy
      any prong of the ineffectiveness test requires rejection of the
      claim of ineffectiveness.

Sandusky, 203 A.3d at 1043-44 (citations omitted and formatting altered).

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                             Prior Adjudication

      Appellant first argues that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance

by advising Appellant that if he chose to testify, a prior juvenile adjudication

for robbery, would be used against him as crimen falsi. Specifically, Appellant

argues that trial counsel never explained that the crimen falsi adjudication

could only be used by the jury to assess Appellant’s credibility and that the

trial court would give the jury an instruction explaining that limitation. See

Appellant’s Brief at 14-16. Appellant asserts that trial counsel’s advice was

inaccurate and unreasonable, and it precluded Appellant from being able to

make a knowing and intelligent decision to waive his right to testify at trial.

See id. at 15-16.

      The Commonwealth contends that trial counsel was not ineffective

because he made a reasonable strategic decision and advised Appellant not to

testify because the Commonwealth would have cross-examined Appellant

regarding contradictory statements he made to the police concerning the

source of Victim’s fatal injuries.   See Commonwealth’s Brief at 13.        The

Commonwealth further notes that Appellant’s on-the-record colloquy reflects

that he voluntarily waived his right to testify. See id. at 13-14. Further, the

Commonwealth asserts that Appellant testified that the admissibility of his

juvenile record was only one factor in his choice not to testify. See id. at 14.

      This Court has explained:

         The decision of whether or not to testify on one’s own behalf
         is ultimately to be made by the defendant after full
         consultation with counsel. In order to sustain a claim that

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         counsel was ineffective for failing to advise the appellant of
         his rights in this regard, the appellant must demonstrate
         either that counsel interfered with his right to testify, or that
         counsel gave specific advice so unreasonable as to vitiate
         a knowing and intelligent decision to testify on his own
         behalf.

      [Commonwealth v.] Nieves, 746 A.2d [1102,] 1104 [(Pa.
      2000)] (internal citations omitted).

         [T]he appropriate standard for assessing whether a
         defendant was prejudiced by trial counsel’s ineffectiveness
         regarding the waiver of his right to testify is whether the
         result of the waiver proceeding would have been different
         absent counsel’s ineffectiveness, not whether the outcome
         of the trial itself would have been more favorable had the
         defendant taken the stand.

      Commonwealth v. Walker, 110 A.3d 1000, 1005 (Pa. Super.
      2015), appeal denied, 125 A.3d 777 (Pa. 2015) (emphasis in
      original).

      A trial court is not required to conduct a colloquy to determine
      whether a defendant has made a knowing, intelligent and
      voluntary waiver of his right to testify. Commonwealth v. Todd,
      820 A.2d 707, 712 (Pa. Super. 2003). Nevertheless, a criminal
      defendant must understand his decision not to testify if not by
      colloquy, then by the presumed competent advice of counsel. See
      id. (holding appellant’s waiver of right to testify was knowing,
      intelligent and voluntary, where court credited counsel’s
      testimony that he discussed right to testify with appellant on
      numerous occasions and counsel’s advice was reasonable).

Commonwealth v. Washington, 269 A.3d 1255, 1264 (Pa. Super. 2022)

(en banc) (footnote omitted and some formatting altered), appeal denied, 283

A.3d 1249 (Pa. 2022).

      In Washington, the appellant’s attorney erroneously advised the

appellant not to testify because evidence of a prior conviction for aggravated

assault would be admissible, and the jury would hear the details of that prior

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conviction. See Washington, 269 A.3d at 1261. The appellant’s attorney

admitted telling the appellant: “I don’t want you to get on the stand because

the prosecutor could bring up the aggravated assault conviction and then the

jury . . . will think you’re violent.”   Id. at 1260 (citation omitted).    The

appellant’s attorney failed to advise the appellant that because aggravated

assault was not a crimen falsi, it would not have been automatically

admissible. Id. at 1262-63. The attorney “made clear at the PCRA hearing

that his advice against testifying was based solely on fear of [the a]ppellant’s

prior aggravated assault conviction coming in for impeachment purposes and

the jury hearing details about that offense.” Id. at 1267 (citation omitted and

emphasis in original). Therefore, in Washington, the appellant’s attorney

clearly admitted providing inaccurate and erroneous legal advice. See id.

       Instantly, we conclude that Appellant’s claim is meritless. In his PCRA

petition and at the PCRA hearing, Appellant asserted that he would have

testified on his own behalf if trial counsel informed him that the

Commonwealth’s use of the prior adjudication would have been limited. See

Am. PCRA Pet., 8/9/21, at ¶12; N.T., 9/22/22, at 103-10.          At the PCRA

hearing, Appellant testified that he believed that his prior adjudication would

have been used to show that he had a violent nature, and he was concerned

that the jury would hear more facts about the robbery. See N.T., 9/22/22, at

106.     However, despite Appellant’s claim that trial counsel provided

incomplete information concerning his prior adjudication, trial counsel credibly

rebuffed Appellant’s accusation.    The PCRA court credited trial counsel’s

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testimony that counsel could not remember the specifics of the conversation,

but that he did discuss with Appellant, the potential positives and negatives

of Appellant taking the stand as a witness. See N.T., 9/22/22, at 16-18, 73.

      Further, the record reflects that the trial court conducted a colloquy

addressing Appellant’s waiver of his right to testify:

      THE COURT: Yes. Now, [Appellant], I just need to go over a
      couple of things with you. I trust that you have had ample time
      to consider whether or not you will take the stand in this case. I
      know that you have had an opportunity to discuss this with
      counsel. And now I must make sure that any decision you are
      making is knowing and voluntary. Initially can you tell me how
      far you went in school?

      [APPELLANT]: Twelfth grade.

      THE COURT: Did you graduate high school?

      [APPELLANT]: Yes.

      THE COURT: And do you understand that you are not required to
      take the stand and testify in your own behalf?

      [APPELLANT]: Yes.

      THE COURT: Do you understand that you have a Constitutional
      right not to take the stand and testify?

      [APPELLANT]: Yes.

      THE COURT: And do you understand that you may exercise that
      right for any[]one of a number of reasons?

      [APPELLANT]: Yes.

      THE COURT: Do you understand that if you decide not to testify,
      I will instruct the jury that they are not permitted to speculate on
      your reasons, nor may they draw any inference of guilt or any
      other adverse inference to you by virtue of the fact that you do
      not testify?

      [APPELLANT]: Yes.

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     THE COURT: Do you understand everything that I have said so
     far?

     [APPELLANT]: Yes.

     THE COURT: Do you have a clear mind today?

     [APPELLANT]: Yes.

     THE: COURT: And you have been paying attention throughout the
     case, and making notes and talking with [trial counsel]. Are you
     under the influence of alcohol or any substance that might impair
     your ability to make the decision as to whether or not you should
     testify?

     [APPELLANT]: No.

     THE COURT: Have you had sufficient time to discuss this matter
     with [trial counsel]?

     [APPELLANT]: Yes.

     THE COURT: Do you understand that ultimately it is your
     decision as to whether or not you should testify and not
     [trial counsel’s]?

     [APPELLANT]: Yes.

     THE COURT: Knowing all of this, have you personally
     reached a decision regarding your desire to testify?

     [APPELLANT]: Yes.

     THE COURT: And what is your intention?

     [APPELLANT]: I will not.

     THE COURT: [Trial counsel], anything you want to add to that?

     [APPELLANT]: No, Judge. Other than that my client and I had
     discussed it. That was my recommendation to him as well. I am
     not going to get into any individual discussion.

     THE COURT: Then, [Appellant], I find that your decision not to
     testify was made knowingly and voluntarily after you had this
     opportunity to discuss that with your counsel.

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N.T. Trial, 10/30/17-11/3/17, at 451-454 (emphases added).             Appellant

testified unequivocally that he was voluntarily waiving his constitutional right

to testify and understood that ultimately, it was his decision to make, and not

for counsel to decide. See id.

         After review, we conclude that Appellant’s baseless allegations are

insufficient to support his claim that trial counsel interfered with his right to

testify. See Commonwealth v. Baker, 507 A.2d 872, 874 (Pa. Super. 1986)

(stating that “self-serving or uncorroborated statements on petitioner’s behalf

do not shift and do not necessarily sustain petitioner’s burden of proof, even

when the Commonwealth presents no rebuttal evidence” (citation omitted)).

Nothing in this record supports the conclusion that trial counsel’s specific

advice was so unreasonable that it precluded Appellant from making a

knowing and intelligent decision concerning whether to testify. See Nieves,

746 A.2d at 1104.       Therefore, Appellant’s claim is meritless.   Accordingly,

Appellant is not entitled to relief.

                               Cross-examination

         Next, Appellant argues that trial counsel was ineffective in his cross-

examination of two witnesses.          Appellant claims that Mother was Victim’s

primary care giver, and proper cross-examination could have cast Mother as

an alternate suspect. Appellant’s Brief at 18. Further, Appellant argues that

trial counsel failed to elicit testimony from Dr. Ross that Victim’s primary

physician did not document Victim’s blindness the day prior to her death. Id.

at 20.

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     We note that “[t]he scope and vigor of cross-examination is a matter

which falls within the ambit of sound trial strategy to be exercised by trial

counsel alone.” Commonwealth v. Molina, 516 A.2d 752, 757 (Pa. Super.

1986) (citation omitted).    Here, the PCRA court addressed Appellant’s

argument as follows:

     [Appellant] next contends that [trial counsel] was ineffective for
     failing to properly cross-examine [Mother] and Dr. Wayne K. Ross
     regarding their testimony at trial. Specifically, with respect to
     [Mother], [Appellant] contends that [trial counsel] failed to
     adequately question her regarding whether she sought proper
     prenatal and postnatal care for Victim, as well as questioning her
     regarding her mental health in the weeks leading up to Victim’s
     death, with the goal of advancing the theory that [Mother] was
     responsible for Victim’s death.        With respect to Dr. Ross,
     [Appellant] contends that [trial counsel] failed to question him
     regarding the Commonwealth’s timeline of events, pointing out
     that the evidence of Victim’s antemortem blindness was not
     reflected during a doctor’s visit [Mother] took Victim to on the day
     before her death. [Appellant] submits that evidence would call
     into question the findings by Dr. Ross and bring his credibility into
     doubt.

     Regarding [Mother], the record reflects first that [trial counsel]
     did cross-examine her regarding whether she properly sought
     postnatal care for Victim. Notably, [trial counsel] introduced
     testimony that [Mother] failed to bring Victim to several postnatal
     care appointments, and that a letter reflecting those failures was
     mailed to her by Victim’s doctor’s office. Because this testimony
     was part of the record and available for the jury to consider, [trial
     counsel] was not ineffective for failing to cross-examine [Mother]
     regarding her purported failure to seek proper postnatal care.

     Regarding the failure of [Mother] to seek proper prenatal care for
     Victim, as well as [Mother] self-reporting feelings of depression
     prior to Victim’s death, [Appellant] failed to meet his burden to
     demonstrate that he is entitled to relief. [Appellant] failed to show
     that this claim had arguable merit, failed to show that [trial
     counsel] lacked a reasonable basis for failing to cross-examine
     [Mother] regarding prenatal care and her mental health, and failed

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     to show that he suffered prejudice as a result. In terms of
     arguable merit, [Appellant] failed to demonstrate that there was
     any connection between [Mother]’s failure to seek proper medical
     care for Victim, or her mental health prior to Victim’s death, and
     the traumatic asphyxiation of Victim, which occurred while
     [Mother] was in New Jersey.            Regarding [trial counsel’s]
     reasonable basis in not pursuing this line of questioning,
     [Appellant] failed to demonstrate that the failure by [Mother] to
     receive proper prenatal medical care was anything but repetitive
     of her failure to ensure that Victim received proper postnatal
     medical care, which was placed on the record for the jury to
     consider.    [Appellant] also failed to demonstrate that [trial
     counsel] lacked a reasonable basis for not cross-examining
     [Mother] regarding her feelings of depression in the weeks leading
     up to Victim’s death. Notably, the autopsy demonstrated that
     Victim’s cause of death was either suffocation or traumatic
     asphyxiation, and it was uncontested that Victim passed away
     while [Mother] was in New Jersey, making the lack of prenatal
     medical care and [Mother’s] mental health irrelevant to Victim’s
     demise. Likewise, [Appellant] failed to demonstrate that he
     suffered any prejudice from [trial counsel] failing to pursue this
     line of questioning, as again, it was uncontested that Victim
     passed away while [Mother] was in another state. Therefore, [trial
     counsel] was not ineffective for failing to cross-examine [Mother]
     regarding prenatal and postnatal medical care for Victim, as well
     as her mental health in the weeks leading up to Victim’s death.

     Regarding Dr. Ross, [Appellant] focuses his challenge on the
     testimony that Victim was blinded in the 24 to 48 hours preceding
     her death, while the doctor’s notes from an appointment the day
     before her death did not document that Victim was blind or note
     that she had any problems with her eyesight. [Appellant’s] theory
     was that if Dr. Ross was incorrect about the blindness, it would
     call into question his other conclusions about Victim’s death.
     Challenging Dr. Ross’ conclusions regarding Victim’s death does
     present an issue of arguable merit, as it could call into doubt
     [Appellant’s] culpability for Victim’s retinal bleeding and blindness,
     clearing the first prong of the [test for ineffectiveness] i.e., that
     the underlying claim had arguable merit.

     However, the record reflects that [trial counsel] did inquire into
     Victim’s blindness, with Dr. Ross testifying that he needed to
     perform the autopsy of Victim to discover it. Specifically, Dr. Ross
     stated that he needed to remove and then dissect Victim’s eyes to
     reveal the bleeding and blood clots in her retinas that rendered

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      her blind. Further, Dr. Ross testified that the presence of blood in
      the retinas, rather than iron deposits left by older, healed injuries,
      indicated that the blindness occurred within 24 to 48 hours prior
      to death, and not that the injury happened at least 24 to 48 hours
      before death, as [Appellant] argues. Because the testimony and
      evidence at trial demonstrated that Dr. Ross’ findings were
      consistent with the report from Victim’s doctor’s appointment from
      the day before her death, [trial counsel] acted reasonably based
      on the information available to him at trial.

      Additionally, [Appellant] failed to demonstrate that he was
      prejudiced by the testimony regarding Victim’s blindness, as the
      ultimate medical conclusion was that the fatal asphyxia began
      approximately five minutes prior to death, and [Appellant] did not
      present any evidence challenging that conclusion. Instead, all the
      testimony and evidence submitted at trial was consistent with
      Victim being alive when [Appellant] took over caring for her, and
      that Victim passed away while in [Appellant’s] custody due to
      injuries she sustained. Importantly, this finding tracks with the
      doctor’s report that [Appellant] attempted to rely on, because that
      report reflected that Victim was in relatively good health while
      with [Mother]. Therefore, [Appellant] failed to meet his burden
      with respect to the cross-examinations of [Mother] and Dr. Ross,
      and he is not entitled to relief on this claim.

PCRA Ct. Op., 1/4/23, at 12-15 (footnotes omitted).

      We conclude that the PCRA court’s findings are supported by the record

and free from legal error. See Sandusky, 203 A.3d at 1043. The record

reflects that the cause of Victim’s death was suffocation or traumatic

asphyxiation, and it was uncontested that Mother was in another state when

Victim died. We agree with the PCRA court that cross-examination concerning

pre- and post-natal care was immaterial to casting blame on Mother, therefore

Appellant’s claim lacks merit.

      With respect to Dr. Ross, the record reveals that Victim was alive when

Appellant began caring for her, and that Victim’s blindness occurred within

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24 to 48 hours prior to death, as opposed to more than 24 to 48 hours before

Victim’s death.   See N.T. Trial, 10/30/17-11/3/17, at 381.       Further, trial

counsel did question Dr. Ross about Victim’s blindness. See id. at 404-05.

Dr. Ross testified that an autopsy was necessary to discover Victim was blind

and to see the bleeding in Victim’s retinas. See id. at 380-81, 404-405, 414.

There is no merit to Appellant’s claim that Dr. Ross overlooked the Victim’s

blindness. Rather, Dr. Ross specifically testified that he had to remove and

dissect Victim’s eyes to uncover the bleeding and blood clots in her retinas

that rendered Victim blind, and that the injuries occurred within 24 to 48 hours

of the Victim’s death.

      On this record, we conclude that that Appellant has failed to establish

that trial counsel was ineffective in his cross-examination of Mother or Dr.

Ross. See Sandusky, 203 A.3d at 1043; Molina, 516 A.2d at 757. Appellant

is not entitled to relief on these claims.

                              Direct Examination

      In his final issue, Appellant argues that trial counsel was ineffective

when he questioned Appellant’s father, Douglas Kohr, who testified for the

defense. Appellant’s Brief at 22. Appellant contends that trial counsel was

not prepared to elicit testimony from Douglas Kohr concerning Appellant’s

parenting skills, Mother’s behavior toward Victim, and the fact that Appellant

was not “overwhelmed” by Victim’s needs and that Appellant was not an

“overwhelmed” parent. See id. at 22-23.

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       The Commonwealth argues that trial counsel was not ineffective in

pursuing this line of questioning, and trial counsel’s strategy was reasonable.

Commonwealth’s Brief at 18. The Commonwealth notes that if trial counsel

had pursued the idea that Appellant was not overwhelmed, “it would have

opened the door for the Commonwealth to change strategies and paint

Appellant as a cold, premeditating killer, and would help establish the

elements necessary for first-degree murder.” Id.

       The PCRA court addressed this issue as follows:

       At the PCRA hearing, Douglas Kohr testified that prior to Victim’s
       death, [Appellant] had not been at the house for seven weeks, but
       that he (Douglas Kohr) and his wife “were there every day” and
       “knew [Victim] was sick.” Specifically, Douglas Kohr said that
       [Appellant] was staying in a room at “Old Fashioned Heat”[2] for
       the seven and half weeks prior to Victim’s death, returning the
       Wednesday before she died. Mr. Kohr said that he was “pretty
       positive” that he had given this information to [trial counsel]
       before he testified.

       According to the evidence produced at trial, Victim was taken to
       the hospital on Saturday, May 14, 2016. Crediting Douglas Kohr’s
       testimony as truthful, [Appellant] was still at the house for four
       days with [Victim], Wednesday through Saturday; before she was
       taken by ambulance [to a hospital] and ultimately pronounced
       dead. Furthermore, [Mother] took [Victim] to the doctor’s office
       on Friday, the day before [Victim] died, and none of the injuries
       discovered in the autopsy were observed or recorded by Victim’s
       physician. [Mother] then left for Atlantic City, leaving [Victim]
       with [Appellant], where she died approximately 24 hours later.
       The absence of [Appellant] from Victim’s presence in the seven
____________________________________________

2 “Old Fashioned Heat” is a chimney cleaning and wood stove installation
company in New Cumberland, Pennsylvania, and it is Douglas Kohr’s
employer. See N.T. Trial, 10/30/17-11/3/17, at 431. The record reveals that
Appellant rented a room in the same building as Old Fashioned Heat. See
N.T., 9/22/22, at 96.

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     weeks prior to her death is irrelevant in the face of the evidence
     that he was present with her in the four days immediately
     preceding her death.

     Douglas Kohr also testified at the PCRA hearing that he and
     [Appellant’s] mother were in the area during the days leading up
     to Victim’s death, and [Appellant’s] mother actually was at the
     house with [Appellant] and Victim until around ten o’clock on
     Friday evening before her death. [Appellant] argues that the
     availability of his family to help him with Victim’s care is
     significant, because one of the Commonwealth’s arguments was
     that [Appellant] was overwhelmed by caring for Victim, and those
     feelings led to his inflicting the injuries which ultimately caused
     her death.

     The court is not convinced that Douglas Kohr’s testimony, as he
     testified at the PCRA hearing, would have aided [Appellant] at
     trial. While he testified that [Appellant] was not involved with
     Victim for almost two months prior to her death, Douglas Kohr
     also testified that [Appellant] returned to the house with Victim
     for the four days leading up to her death, including the 24 hours
     before her death, when she was in [Appellant’s] primary care.
     That time frame was consistent with Dr. Ross’ findings that the
     injuries leading to Victim’s blindness were inflicted no more than
     24 to 48 hours prior to death, and that the fatal asphyxiation
     began within approximately five minutes prior to death, when
     [Appellant] was directly caring for Victim. Clearly, this testimony
     is not necessarily exculpatory, and [trial counsel’s] decision not to
     elicit this testimony from [Douglas Kohr] was not unreasonable,
     nor was the lack of this testimony so prejudicial as to have denied
     [Appellant] a fair trial. Therefore, [Appellant] is not entitled to
     relief on this claim.

PCRA Ct. Op., 1/4/23, at 16-18 (footnotes omitted).

     We discern no error in the PCRA court’s conclusion. The record reflects

that trial counsel questioned Douglas Kohr to show that Appellant provided

Victim food, played with her, and cared for her prior to her death. See N.T.

Trial, 10/30/17-11/3/17, at 432. We discern no prejudice to Appellant by trial

counsel not questioning Douglas Kohr about Appellant’s parenting skills,

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Mother’s behavior toward Victim, and whether Appellant was an overwhelmed

parent, because we cannot conclude that if Douglas Kohr testified to the claims

Appellant now raises, the result of the trial would have been different. See

Sandusky, 203 A.3d at 1043-44. The evidence at trial revealed that Mother

was out of town, Victim was uninjured when she was first placed in Appellant’s

care, and Victim was in Appellant’s care when the fatal injuries occurred.

Further, we agree with the PCRA court that on this record, Douglas Kohr’s

observations concerning Appellant’s whereabouts in the two months preceding

Victim’s death are not exculpatory because the fatal asphyxiation began within

approximately five minutes prior to death, when Appellant was directly caring

for Victim. Additionally, trial counsel testified that if he argued that Appellant

was not an overwhelmed parent, it might have precluded the third-degree

murder conviction, which could have resulted in Appellant’s conviction for

first-degree murder. See N.T., 9/22/22, at 57. On this record, we conclude

that Appellant is not entitled to relief.

                                   Conclusion

      For the reasons set forth above, Appellant is not entitled to relief on his

claims. Accordingly, we affirm the PCRA court’s order.

      Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

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Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 12/28/2023

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