Court Opinion

ID: 9574351
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:04:21.391219+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:44:24.606188
License: Public Domain

WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J.
(dissenting). The purpose of bail is to assure the appearance of the accused when it is the accused's duty to appear to answer the criminal prosecution. Whitty v. State, 34 Wis. 2d 278, 286, 149 N.W.2d 557 (1967); Wis. Const. Art. I sec. 8(2). The majority today concludes that bail posted by third parties on behalf of a defendant may be applied to fines imposed at sentencing. Because bail is being used in this case for purposes for which it was not intended and is thus "excessive," and because its use in this manner will have a chilling effect upon a defendant's constitutional rights to pretrial release, I conclude that it is contrary to the dictates of the United States and Wisconsin Constitutions. Accordingly, I dissent.
*146The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that, "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required_" Bail is excessive if it is used for a purpose other than that for which bail is required to be given under the Eighth Amendment. Cohen v. United States, 82 S. Ct. 526, 528 (1962); United States v. Rose, 791 F.2d 1477, 1480 (11th Cir. 1986); Cain v. United States, 148 F.2d 182, 183 (9th Cir. 1945); Connley v. United States, 41 F.2d 49, 51 (9th Cir. 1930). Courts have consistently held that when a defendant is afforded the opportunity to post bail, the monetary condition of bail is used for the sole purpose of assuring the defendant's appearance at trial. Rose, 791 F.2d at 1480. In addition, throughout the American Bar Association's Standards For Criminal Justice, the ABA reiterates that the sole purpose of bail is to assure appearance. See, e.g., ABA Standards For Criminal Justice, 10-5.3(b) (1985):
The sole purpose of monetary conditions is to assure the defendant's appearance. Monetary conditions should not be set to punish or frighten the defendant, to placate public opinion, or to prevent anticipated criminal conduct.
Therefore, if bail is used for purposes for which it was not intended, i.e, other than to assure the appearance of the defendant, the bail is excessive and in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
The Wisconsin Constitution, Art. I sec. 6, mirrors that of the United States Constitution. In addition, Art. I sec. 8(2) of the Wisconsin Constitution provides: "Monetary conditions of release may be imposed at or after the initial appearance only upon a finding that there is a reasonable basis to believe that the conditions are necessary to assure appearance in court." *147This language indicates that monetary conditions, i.e., bail money, can only be required to assure appearance.
The majority seems to acknowledge this much. The majority rejects the conclusion, however, that using bail money for satisfying fines imposed on the defendant violates these principles. The majority arrives at this conclusion on the basis that "sec. 969.03(4) does not involve a use of bail whatsoever." Majority op. at 140. In other words, the majority concludes that the money originally collected to assure appearance in court, is no longer "bail money" at the time of entering a judgment for fines and therefore, can be used to satisfy the fines imposed. The majority illustrates this distinction by stating that prior to entry of judgment for fines, the circuit court may return bail money to the defendant. Majority op. at 145-146 n.8. After judgment, however, the circuit court may not. To me this is a matter of form over substance. The majority offers no basis in law for such a distinction, and I can discern none for I see no distinction between bail money at the time it is deposited and bail money at the time of judgment.
In addition, I find that the court's reasoning in U.S. v. Higgins, 987 F.2d 543 (8th Cir. 1993), (cited by the majority) offers no additional support for the majority's conclusion. The Higgins court simply concluded, without reason, that 28 U.S.C. sec. 2044, (which allows money posted by the defendant, in contrast to bail money posted by third parties, to be used to satisfy fines) constitutes a simple "procedural mechanism" by which to collect money and thus does not implicate the Eighth Amendment. This conclusion is as troubling to me as that of the majority's in this case. I see no basis to conclude as the majority did that once *148judgment is entered, bail money may be used for purposes other than assuring appearances.
Further, I do not agree with the majority's endorsement of the State's reading of United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987). Majority op. at 136-137. The State argues that under Salerno, bail money can be used for purposes other than assuring appearances in court as long as the purpose is statutory in origin. This is a misreading of Salerno. Salerno held that the government, in regulating pretrial release, can pursue other interests besides flight. In other words, in addition to requiring bail money for the purpose of discouraging flight, the government, through statutory means, can prohibit release altogether for reasons such as public safety. The statement immediately following that quoted by the majority, indicates this:
We believe that when Congress has mandated detention on the basis of a compelling interest other than prevention of flight, as it has here, the Eighth Amendment does not require release on bail. Id. at 754-55.
Salerno clearly does not effect in any manner the government's ability to use bail money for a purpose other than appearance.1
Because I believe 1) that money posted for bail, for the purpose of assuring a defendant's appearance, is bail money no matter the chronological status of the case and 2) that bail may only be used to assure appearances, not revenue raising as is the case here, I would join those courts that have determined that the use of *149bail for satisfying fines is unconstitutionally excessive. See, e.g., Cohen, 82 S. Ct. 526; Cain, 148 F.2d 182; United States v. Rose, 791 F.2d at 1477; State ex rel. Baker v. Troutman, 553 N.E.2d 1053 (Ohio 1990).
I would find the use of bail here unconstitutional for a second reason as well: I believe that the use of bail money posted by third parties to satisfy defendant's fines will have a chilling effect upon a defendant's constitutional rights to pretrial release for bailable crimes. In its decision, the majority suggests that the statement on the bail receipt, which warns parties that bail money may be used for fines, be printed in large, bold letters so as to adequately inform those parties posting bail. Majority op. at 145-146. I completely agree that those parties should be warned. I am concerned, however, that once third parties are made aware of the potential use of the bail money they will no longer be willing to post the bail. Indigent people who have not yet been proven guilty, who rely on friends or relatives to post bail so that they may be released prior to trial, will suffer. The ABA, in its Standards for Criminal Justice, recognizes the consequences of being detained prior to trial. These consequences become especially harsh when a defendant is detained solely on the basis of indigency:
[D]eprivation of liberty pending trial is harsh and oppressive, subjects persons to economic and psychological hardship, interferes with their ability to defend themselves, and, in many instances, deprives their families of support .... ABA Standards For Criminal Justice, sec. 10-1.1.
The district court in United States v. Davis, 47 F. Supp. 176, 179 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) commented a great deal *150on this effect, and I adopt the concerns expressed therein:
[Bjoth friends of the accused and professional sureties alike will be deterred from posting cash bail since the scope of the risk thus undertaken is generally not measurable. This will not affect those accused of crime who are in position to command a surety company bond. Surety companies deposit no cash but only their promises to pay and they are thus exempt from the hazard of being called upon to pay a fine imposed upon the defendant. But consider the case of the person who finds himself accused of crime in a strange community or of a crime which arouses public passion, who has no access to surety companies and must rely on distant friends unable to qualify as sureties by reason of their non-residence. Such a person who needs bail most will find himself as effectively denied the benefits of that great privilege as if it had never been hallowed by incorporation in the Constitution.
The United States Congress apparently recognized the potential for such an effect: 28 U.S.C. sec. 2044 (the statute at issue in Higgins) exempted third party sureties from its reach. The majority, however, as it states in its opinion, sees no distinction between applying the statute to money posted by the defendant and money posted by third parties. Majority op. at 138 n.2.2 Because I find either application unconstitutional, I dissent.
*151I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Nathan S. Heffernan and Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson join in this dissent.

 The majority even admits that bail is collected only to assure appearance. I assume that the majority would agree that even though sec. 969.03(4), Stats., states that bail may be used to pay fines, it does not make that a "purpose" of bail.

 In support of its position, the majority cites to Glidden v. Fowler, 192 Wis. 151, 212 N.W.2d 263 (1927), for the proposition that bail money is presumed to belong to the defendant until such purposes for which it was deposited are accomplished. Majority op. at 140. Although Glidden states that a purpose is to satisfy fines as provided in the statute (an earlier version of *151969.03), Glidden did not determine whether such use was constitutional. I maintain that it is not.