Court Opinion

ID: 9796839
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:06:39.854496+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:50:50.180349
License: Public Domain

FABE, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I join the opinion of the court in all respects except for Part III.C. As for that part, I disagree with the court's holding that Shoreside may have had a duty to warn Robles of risks created by Shoreside's practice of refilling outdated propane tanks. However, I agree with the court's conclusion that the superior court erred in excluding all evidence of Shoreside's tank-filling practices, because this evidence might have altered the jury's finding that Shoreside's negligent failure to ensure that Robles was adequately trained was not a legal cause of his injuries. Therefore, I concur and dissent in part.
The court today imposes a novel duty on persons who supply and maintain potentially dangerous products. The court declares that evidence of Shoreside's own refilling practices, excluded by the superior court, "might have established a ... duty to warn Robles" of the danger of refilling outdated propane tanks.1 The court claims that Shoreside may owe this duty because Shoreside improperly refilled certain propane containers in violation of federal regulations, exposing dealers like Robles to enhanced risks.2
This duty to warn is only vaguely defined. First, the court implies that it is the jury's role to determine if such a duty even exists, stating that evidence presented by Robles "might have allowed the jury to conclude that, as a supplier, Shoreside owed a duty to alert Robles...."3 This delegation to the jury of the responsibility to determine whether a duty exists is contrary to our rule *847that "[the existence and extent of a duty of care are questions of law for the court to determine."4 Also, the scope of the duty is unclear. If Shoreside owed a duty to warn Robles of its improper refilling practices, this implies that Shoreside owed that same duty to all of its other dealers who were exposed to the same risk.5 It is unclear whether the scope of this duty extends still further: The opinion could be read to establish a duty owed to all members of the community who were exposed to these risks.6
The duty to warn created by the court is entirely new and is not supported by the authorities on which the court's opinion relies. The court essentially relies on two sources to support its imposition of a new duty to warn on Shoreside: (1) the Restatement (Second) of Torts $ 388, which imposes a duty to warn on certain suppliers of chattels, and (2) the rule that a supplier of liquid fuel may be liable for defects in containers or equipment that the supplier does not use or control, if the supplier had knowledge of the defect. Neither of these authorities squarely supports the creation of a duty to warn on Shoreside's part.
First, neither of these sources of law supports the imposition of a duty to warn on Shoreside, because there is no evidence that the particular tank that exploded and caused Robles's injuries was ever improperly refilled by Shoreside. As the court's opinion acknowledges, "Gannaway, the owner of the tank that exploded, could not recall if he had ever filled his tank at Shoreside."7 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 388 by its own terms only imposes lability on suppliers of a chattel for injuries caused by that chattel; and none of the decisions concerning section 388 cited by the court's opinion supports the conclusion that section 388 liability can exist in the absence of evidence that the chattel causing injury was supplied by the defendant.8
The same is true for the decisions cited by the court's opinion supporting the rule that suppliers of liquid fuel may be lable for defects in containers or equipment used if the supplier had knowledge of the defect. In the decisions applying this rule to impose liability on suppliers, the injured parties had alleged and presented evidence that the supplier had an opportunity to inspect or discover the defective condition, but failed to do so.9 These cases do not apply to the cireum-stances of this appeal, since there is no evidence that Shoreside improperly refilled the particular container involved in the accident. If such evidence is not required, the imposition of a duty to warn is too broad because it makes a supplier responsible for issuing warnings to customers who never came into contact with that supplier's containers or equipment.
Also, as the court's opinion acknowledges, suppliers are liable under this rule only if they have "actual or constructive knowledge" of the defect.10 However, courts considering the duty to warn under section 888 have *848required that the actual or constructive knowledge be of the particular defect that caused the injury.11 Indeed, in the cases relied on by the court's opinion in which liability was imposed or a possible duty to warn was found, the defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of the particular defect that caused the injury.12 None of these authorities suggests that liability could exist in the absence of such knowledge. The court's opinion claims that there was evidence that Shoreside had constructive knowledge of the "increased risk" to which Robles was exposed, because Shoreside knowingly recirculated improperly refilled propane tanks into the Seward community.13 However, this constructive knowledge of "increased risk" is not the same thing as knowledge of the actual defect that caused the injury-the defect in Gannaway's tank-and the court's opinion presents no authority that supports the proposition that liability should be imposed when the defendant has no constructive knowledge of the defect that caused the injury.
Finally, a decision by the Hawaii Supreme Court, Acoba v. General Tire, Inc.,14 also supports the proposition that no duty to warn should be created here. The court's attempt to distinguish Acoba is not convincing. In Acoba, a tire repairman died as a result of a tire explosion caused by a defect in the rim assembly.15 The repairman's wife sued, among others, the tire manufacturer, General Tire, claiming that it "negligently failed to warn [the repairman] of the dangers of explosive separation of tire rim and lock ring."16 The Hawaii Supreme Court noted the principle that "a manufacturer owes a duty to warn regarding its own product, not regarding products it did not produce, sell, or control."17 Because General Tire "did not produce, sell, or have control over the production of the subject rim assembly," the court affirmed summary judgment in favor of General Tire, noting that "General Tire [has nol duty to warn of the dangers of Firestone's rim and lock ring simply because the tire [is] compatible with Firestone's product."18
The court's opinion in this case attempts to distinguish Acoba by claiming that propane is an "inherently dangerous product," while a tire is not.19 This distinction, even if true, is irrelevant, because without special handling and maintenance, both propane and the tire in Acoba have the potential to cause injury and death, as evidenced by the accidents in this case and Acoba. The court also claims that "unlike the manufacturers in Acobg, Shoreside exercised significant control over the defective product," and that there was evidence that Shoreside's conduct "enhanced the risk of injury."20 However, as already noted, Robles presented no evidence that *849Shoreside exercised any control at all over the defective product, Gannaway's tank.21 In Acoba, the court noted that the plaintiff "submitted no evidence to show that the tire or the inner tube failed during the accident or created the alleged defect in the rim assembly that caused it to explode."22 Similarly, because Gannaway testified that he "could not recall if he had ever filled his tank at Shoreside,"23 Robles presented no evidence to show that Shoreside's conduct had anything to do with the defective tank at all.
Because the duty to warn imposed by the court's opinion is ill-defined and not supported by authority, I dissent from the court's holding that evidence of Shoreside's tank-filling practices was admissible as relevant to a duty to warn on Shoreside's part.

. 29 P.3d at 842.

. See id. at 843.

. Id. at 844.

. Bolieu v. Sisters of Providence in Washington, 953 P.2d 1233, 1235 (Alaska 1998) (quoting Beck v. State, Dep't of Transp. & Pub. Facilities, 837 P.2d 105, 109 (Alaska 1992)).

. See 29 P.3d at 844.

. See id. at 843-844.

._ Id. at 841.

. See Lamb v. Manitowoc Co., 570 N.W.2d 65, 68 (Iowa 1997) (declining to impose section 388 liability on manufacturer of crane involved in injury because manufacturer had no notice of dangerous condition); Lancaster Silo & Block Co. v. Northern Propane Gas Co., 75 A.D.2d 55, 427 N.Y.S.2d 1009, 1015-16 (1980) (ordering trial on issue of whether supplier of portable propane cylinder had duty to warn under section 388).

. See Skelly Oil Co. v. Holloway, 171 F.2d 670, 674, 679 (8th Cir.1948) (defendant's inspection failed to reveal leak in gas line that caused injuries); Ambriz v. Petrolane, Ltd., 49 Cal.2d 470, 319 P.2d 1, 6-7 (1957) (defendant failed to make proper inspection that would have revealed leak in gas line that caused injuries); Clay v. Butane Gas Corp., 151 Neb. 876, 39 N.W.2d 813, 820-22 (1949) (defendant failed to inspect or discover conditions of butane gas pipes and tank that caused injuries); Reeder v. Western Gas & Power Co., 42 Wash.2d 542, 256 P.2d 825, 828-29 (1953) (defendant failed to inspect pipe coupling that caused injuries).

. 29 P.3d at 842; see Reeder, 256 P.2d at 828-29; Ambriz, 319 P.2d at 5-6; Hanlon v. Lane, 98 Ohio App.3d 148, 648 N.E.2d 26, 28 (1994); Lamb, 570 N.W.2d at 68.

. See Downs v. Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co., 694 N.E.2d 1198, 1208 (Ind.App.1998) (no section 388 liability, in part because there was no evidence that the defendant "had either actual or constructive knowledge of the leaking pipe that caused the gas explosion"); Jones v. Hittle Serv., Inc., 219 Kan. 627, 549 P.2d 1383, 1391 (1976) ([The duty to warn arises only when the supplier knows or has reason to know that the chattel is or is likely to be dangerous for the use for which it is supplied. None of the defendants here knew or had reason to know that the propane gas would be piped through a leaky line and from there filter through the earth to a place where it might collect.") (quotation and citation omitted).

. See Skelly Oil Co., 171 F.2d at 674 (gas supplier assumes duty of reasonable care when supplier receives notice of defects in customer's gas lines and supplier undertakes to inspect the defects); Ambriz, 319 P.2d at 5-6 (gas company has duty to inspect particular site with reasonable care when company has actual or constructive notice of defects in the gas system at that site); Clay, 39 NW.2d at 820-22 (gas company has duty to inspect customer's gas system where company has "knowledge of a dangerous condition" there); Reeder, 256 P.2d at 828-29 (gas company installing gas system may have a duty to inspect if the company has "actual or constructive knowledge of leaks in the system").

. See 29 P.3d at 844.

. 92 Hawai'i 1, 986 P.2d 288 (1999).

. See id. at 292.

. Id. at 304.

. Id. at 305 (emphasis in original).

. Id.

. 29 P.3d at 844 n.18.

. Id.

. See id. at 842.

. 986 P.2d at 305.

. 29 P.3d at 841.