Court Opinion

ID: 9743992
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:51:44.976458+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:46.059533
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE INGLIS, concurring in part and dissenting in part: I concur in the majority’s opinion as to counts III, IV and VI. I respectfully dissent from that portion of the opinion which reversed the trial court’s dismissal with prejudice of count I. The well-reasoned decision of Morton v. Hartigan (1986), 145 Ill. App. 3d 417, 495 N.E.2d 1159, should be followed, and we should refuse to expand the tort of retaliatory discharge in the manner now adopted by the majority. Our supreme court’s recent admonition in Barr v. Kelso-Burnett Co. (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 520, 478 N.E.2d 1354, against expanding the retaliatory discharge tort should not be ignored. In Barr, the court stated that “this court has not, by its Palmateer and Kelsay decisions, ‘rejected a narrow interpretation of the retaliatory discharge tort’ and does not ‘strongly support’ the expansion of the tort.” (Barr, 106 Ill. 2d at 525.) Furthermore, the court in Morton refused to expand the tort to include supervisors of an employee, holding that the only proper party defendant is the employee’s actual employer. Morton, 145 Ill. App. 3d at 421-22. In the case at bar, the majority acts to expand the retaliatory discharge cause of action by allowing a new class of party defendants (supervisors, co-employees and agents of employers) to be added and endeavors to distinguish Barr by asserting that the supreme court was considering “clearly mandated public policy” in defining the scope of the limited tort of retaliatory discharge. The supreme court’s hesitation to expand the definition of “clearly mandated public policy” certainly was not an invitation to add a whole new class of party defendants. A disagreement over what is or is not a “clearly mandated public policy” is certainly not the major expansion of the tort that the majority has adopted. To hold with the majority is to promote the expansion of a cause of action for a tort unknown at common law. Such a broad expansion, for whatever salutary purpose, is more appropriate for the legislature. Giving every discharged person a potential cause of action against a supervisor, co-employee or agent of their employer should not be undertaken in the manner presented. I respectfully dissent.