Court Opinion

ID: 9889357
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-10 01:00:22.443999+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:38:46.913528
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
              for the Fifth Circuit
                                                                       United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                Fifth Circuit

                              ____________                                    FILED
                                                                        October 9, 2023
                               No. 23-70005                              Lyle W. Cayce
                              ____________                                    Clerk

Jedidiah Isaac Murphy,

                                                           Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                     versus

Ali Mustapha Nasser,

                                         Defendant—Appellant.
                ______________________________

                Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Western District of Texas
                          USDC No. 1:23-CV-1170
                ______________________________

Before Smith, Southwick, and Graves, Circuit Judges.
Leslie H. Southwick: Circuit Judge:
       Before us is an emergency appeal by the State of Texas seeking to
vacate a stay of execution entered by the district court. The issue on which
the district court decided to enter a stay is whether the inmate is entitled to
have DNA testing performed on certain evidence. The district court granted
a stay because similar issues were pending before this court in a case brought
by a different Texas prisoner. That related case is fully briefed and has been
orally argued, and a decision in the case is pending. We agree with the district
court that a stay is appropriate at least until a decision in that case. At that
time, this court will order additional briefing.
                                 No. 23-70005

       Before we discuss why we leave the stay in place at this time, we need
to explain our jurisdiction. The dissent’s alternative opinion contains the
same analysis, and we restate much of it here. The inmate, Jedidiah Murphy,
somewhat surprisingly argues that we do not have jurisdiction to consider
whether to leave the stay of execution in place. This circuit and others have
said previously that we have jurisdiction to review a stay of execution on
interlocutory appeal. Indeed, as defendants remind us, the practice is so
commonplace that we have a circuit rule governing it. 5th Cir. R. 8. We
discuss here why the practice is commonplace.
       The State brought this appeal asserting jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(a)(1). Generally, that section allows appeals from orders “granting,
continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing” to
enter such orders. Id. As our quotation reveals, Section 1292(a)(1) explicitly
refers to injunctions. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court stated that it had “not
allowed district courts to ‘shield [their] orders from appellate review’ by
avoiding the label ‘injunction.’” Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305, 2320 (2018)
(quoting Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 87 (1974)). That means “where an
order has the practical effect of granting or denying an injunction, it should
be treated as such for purposes of appellate jurisdiction.” Id. at 2319.
       To explain, the Court stated that when “an interlocutory injunction is
improperly granted or denied, much harm can occur before the final decision
in the district court.” Id. Orders are “effectively injunctions” when they
“barred” conduct at issue in the litigation. Id. A “stay” is more aptly applied
to a court order that “operates upon the judicial proceeding itself, either by
halting or postponing some portion of it, or by temporarily divesting an order
of enforceability.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009).
       Here, the district court order bars Texas officials from carrying out
“lawful and important conduct” because it prevents them from performing

                                       2
                                   No. 23-70005

Murphy’s execution. See Abbott, 138 S. Ct. at 2319. Moreover, the district
court’s order does not operate on the judicial proceeding but restricts the
actions of specific defendants. That is the function of an injunction. We
reject Murphy’s arguments that the defendants here, a police chief and
prosecutor, are not in a position to cause or stop the execution from being
carried out. The purpose and effect of the stay were to stop the execution.
       Consequently, we have jurisdiction to review the district court’s grant
of a stay of execution. We have no cause to believe the district court was
seeking to shield his order by calling it a stay, as that court likely recognized
our jurisdiction to review. Now, to the request by the State to vacate.
       The background is that Jedidiah Murphy was convicted of the 2000
murder of an 80-year-old woman, Bertie Cunningham. After the jury found
him to be guilty of the offense, evidence of his future dangerousness was
offered at sentencing. Among the evidence was testimony from the victim of
another vicious crime who identified Murphy as her attacker. Murphy was
not tried for that offense. Murphy is now seeking DNA testing of evidence
from that other crime that he argues could exonerate him.
       One problem with this request is that the evidence that Murphy wants
tested would not prove him innocent of the capital offense. It might
undermine the specific testimony relevant to future dangerousness.          The
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, including in a recent decision involving
Murphy, has made clear that the relevant statute providing for DNA testing
“does not authorize testing when exculpatory testing results might affect
only the punishment or sentence that [a defendant] received.” Murphy v.
State, 2023 WL 6241994 at * 4 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 26, 2023) (quoting Ex
parte Gutierrez, 337 S.W.3d 883, 901 (Tex. Crim App. 2011). Instead, such
evidence can be sought only to show that the inmate would not have been
found guilty of the offense. Id.

                                        3
                                 No. 23-70005

       Murphy challenges the limitation of testing to evidence affecting guilt.
A different district court agreed with a similar argument and declared that
Texas must provide testing if a sufficient basis is shown that it would have
affected sentencing and not just the finding of guilt. See Gutierrez v. Saenz,
565 F. Supp. 3d 892, 911 (S.D. Tex. 2021). A Fifth Circuit panel heard oral
argument in that case on September 20, 2023, and a decision on that appeal
is pending. See Gutierrez v. Saenz, No. 21-70009.
       The district court relied on the pendency of a decision in Gutierrez as
a reason to grant Murphy a stay of execution. See Murphy v. Jones, No. A-23-
cv-01170-RP, slip op. at 5-6 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 6, 2023). Certainly, that appeal
has similar issues that could affect the proper resolution in this case. Waiting
for that decision is not required by any general procedural rule or by rules of
this court. Nonetheless, in light of the fact that complete briefing and
argument has occurred in Gutierrez, unlike the emergency-necessitated
accelerated consideration here, we conclude we should wait for that decision
unless there is some basis to distinguish the present appeal.
       A possible distinction concerns Murphy’s delay in filing for DNA
testing. Nonetheless, delay also is a live issue in Gutierrez. Given that delay
is a concern in both cases, and both Murphy and Gutierrez make the same
constitutional challenge, we will consider all issues regarding the stay after
the release of the opinion in Gutierrez.
       We enter no ruling on the motion to vacate the stay at this time.
Therefore, the stay of execution will remain in effect. Once the opinion of
this court issues in Gutierrez, we will order additional briefing on whether the
stay should be vacated.
       Judge Graves concurs in not making a ruling on the motion to
vacate the stay at this time. A concurring opinion will be filed.

                                       4
                                 No. 23-70005

Jerry E. Smith, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
       The majority opinion is grave error. It succumbs to a vapid last-
minute attempt to stay an execution that should have occurred decades ago.
       In the interest of time, instead of penning a long dissent pointing to
the panel majority’s and district court’s myriad mistakes, I attach the Fifth
Circuit panel opinion that should have been issued.
       I respectfully dissent.

                                      5
                               No. 23-70005

                         Attachment to Dissent

        United States Court of Appeals
             for the Fifth Circuit
                            ____________

                             No. 23-70005
                            ____________

Jedidiah Isaac Murphy,

                                                       Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                  versus

Ali Mustapha Nasser,

                                       Defendant—Appellant.
              ______________________________

              Appeal from the United States District Court
                   for the Western District of Texas
                        USDC No. 1:23-CV-1170
              ______________________________

Before Smith, Southwick, and Graves, Circuit Judges.
Jerry E. Smith, Circuit Judge.
      Jedidiah Murphy is a prisoner on Texas death row who is scheduled
to be executed on October 10, 2023. He has filed two eleventh-hour civil
rights complaints under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the Western District of Texas,
one on October 4, 2023 (“the October complaint”), and the other on
September 26, 2023 (“the September complaint”).          Each filing was

                                    6
                                  No. 23-70005

accompanied by a motion for stay of execution to allow the litigation of these
claims (the “September motion” and “October motion” respectively). The
district court denied the October motion but granted the September motion
and stayed the execution. Texas appeals and asks us to vacate the stay. As
of this writing, Murphy has not appealed the denial of the October motion.
For the reasons that follow, the district court abused its discretion in granting
the September motion to stay execution because Murphy has failed to
demonstrate that he is likely to succeed on the merits of any claim in the
September complaint, and no other equitable factors weigh in his favor.
       Accordingly, we VACATE the stay of execution in No. 1:23-cv-1170.

                                       I.
       Murphy’s journey through the federal and state judicial systems has
lasted over twenty years and is well documented in numerous opinions. See
e.g., Murphy v. Davis, 901 F.3d 578 (5th Cir. 2018) (denying one of Murphy’s
federal habeas corpus petitions). What follows is a brief recitation of the facts
and procedural history needed to understand Murphy’s current § 1983
actions and motions to stay his execution.
       In 2001, a jury convicted Murphy of capital murder, and Texas sought
the death penalty. The jury could not impose the death penalty unless it
found that “there [was] a probability that [Murphy] would commit criminal
acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society.” Tex.
Code Crim. Proc. art. 37.071(b)(1). One way—among many others—
by which Texas attempted to show Murphy’s “future dangerousness” was
to implicate him in a kidnapping case. The alleged victim of the kidnapping
gave detailed testimony and identified Murphy as the perpetrator. Murphy
attacked the credibility of the alleged victim and the reliability of her
testimony, but the jury—after hearing additional evidence of future
dangerousness—found that Murphy was a continuing threat to society and

                                       7
                                      No. 23-70005

imposed the death penalty. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (“CCA”)
affirmed on direct appeal. See Murphy v. State, 112 S.W.3d 592 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2003). Thus began a decades-long post-conviction journey.
       Murphy first sought state habeas relief based on new evidence that
allegedly cast more doubt on the kidnapping victim’s identification; that
litigation ended in 2012. Murphy then sought federal habeas relief on
numerous grounds; that litigation ended in 2019. Murphy remained on death
row.
       On March 24, 2023, Murphy filed a motion for post-conviction
forensic DNA testing in state court. The trial court denied that motion, and
the CCA affirmed on September 26, 2023, though Murphy contends that the
mandate in that case has not yet issued. One day later, Murphy filed another
state habeas petition accompanied by a motion to withdraw or modify his
execution date. The trial court denied the motion to stay execution, and the
CCA affirmed on October 5, 2023. 1
       Concurrently with this flurry of state court activity, Murphy filed two
separate civil rights actions in the Western District of Texas under § 1983.
The September complaint was filed on September 26, 2023. That complaint
asserted four violations of Murphy’s federal rights. First, Murphy contended
that Texas law has created a right to demonstrate innocence of the death
penalty and that the state has violated the federal Constitution’s procedural
due process protections by denying him access to DNA evidence that he
could use to exercise that right. Second, Murphy posited that the restrictions
on his access to DNA evidence unconstitutionally limit his ability to seek
executive clemency. Third, Murphy averred that he has been deprived
meaningful access to the courts. Fourth, and finally, Murphy alleged that
       _____________________
       1
           We do not know whether the mandate has issued for that decision.

                                            8
                                     No. 23-70005

18 U.S.C. § 3599(e) preempts the state-law restrictions on access to DNA
evidence.
        Murphy’s October complaint was filed on October 4, 2023. It alleged
four violations of his federal rights. First, he alleged a violation of his
Fourteenth Amendment rights because Texas supposedly intends to execute
him via lethal injection with expired drugs that have been damaged. Second,
Murphy alleged that Texas is violating the due process and the equal
protection clauses of the U.S. Constitution by violating state pharmaceutical
laws concerning the storage of the lethal injection drugs. 2 Claims three and
four of the October complaint mirror the September complaint’s allegations
regarding deprivation of procedural due process and access to the courts. 3
        Murphy filed motions to stay his execution concurrently with each
complaint. He asked the Western District of Texas to stay his execution to
allow adjudication of his pending § 1983 claims. On October 6, 2023, the
district court granted the September motion for stay, finding that Murphy’s
procedural due process claim challenging Texas’s restrictions on DNA
evidence was likely to succeed on the merits. Also on October 6, the district
court denied the October motion for stay, holding that all claims asserted in
the October complaint were unlikely to be successful. Texas timely appealed
the grant of the September motion. As of this writing Murphy has not
appealed the denial of the October motion.

        _____________________
        2
        This allegation is confusingly pled. The above is our own attempt to summarize
what Murphy is pleading.
        3
          The October complaint includes a fifth “claim,” but that claim consists only of
broadly worded statements that Murphy’s federal constitutional rights are being violated
and that the federal courts must accordingly provide a remedy.

                                           9
                                      No. 23-70005

                                            II.
        “We review a district court’s grant of a stay of execution for abuse of
discretion.” Adams v. Thaler, 679 F.3d 312, 318 (5th Cir. 2012). A “stay of
execution is an equitable remedy” and “is not available as a matter of right.”
Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 584 (2006). “The party requesting a stay
bears the burden of showing that the circumstances can justify an exercise of
[judicial] discretion.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 433–34 (2009). In
deciding whether to grant a stay of execution, courts must consider four
factors:
       (1) [W]hether the stay applicant has made a strong showing
       that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the
       applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether
       issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties
       interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest
       lies.
Id. at 434 (quoting Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987)). 4

                                            III.
        We start, where we always must, with jurisdiction. Defendants
contend that we have jurisdiction to review the stay of execution under
28 U.S.C. § 1292(a). Murphy responds that, because the district court
entered a stay and not an injunction, the order is not immediately appealable,
and we do not have jurisdiction to review it.
        As a general matter, “only final decisions of the federal district courts
[are] reviewable on appeal.” Carson v. Am. Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 83

        _____________________
        4
          Murphy cites O’Bryan v. Estelle to contend that we must apply a more lenient
standard where we ask only whether he can show “a substantial case on the merits when a
serious legal question is involved.” 691 F.2d 706, 708 (5th Cir. 1982) (per curiam). But
O’Brian pre-dated Nken, so its standard is inapplicable. Cf. Diaz v. Stephens, 731 F.3d 370,
379 (2013) (applying the Nken factors when evaluating a motion to stay execution).

                                            10
                                        No. 23-70005

(1981). But Congress has created exceptions to this general rule. One of
these exceptions gives courts of appeals jurisdiction over “[i]nterlocutory
orders of the district courts” that “grant[], continu[e], modify[], refus[e] or
dissolv[e] injunctions.”         28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).            Though the text of
§ 1292(a)(1) refers expressly to injunctions, the Supreme Court has made
clear that “district courts [cannot] shield [their] orders from appellate review
by avoiding the label ‘injunction.’” Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305, 2320
(2018) (cleaned up). That means “where an order has the practical effect of
granting or denying an injunction, it should be treated as such for purposes
of appellate jurisdiction.” Id. at 2319.
        An order has the “practical effect” of an injunction if it would cause
“lawful and important conduct [to] be barred.” Id. That stands in contrast
to stays that “‘operate[] upon the judicial proceeding itself,’ [but] not on the
conduct of a particular actor.” All. For Hippocratic Med. v. Food & Drug
Admin., No. 23-10362, 2023 WL 2913725, at *4 (5th Cir. Apr. 12, 2023)
(unpublished order) (quoting Nken, 556 U.S. at 434).
        Altho0ugh the district court used the word “stay” in its opinion, the
order undoubtably has the practical effect of an injunction. The order bars
Texas officials from carrying out “lawful and important conduct” because it
prevents them from performing Murphy’s execution. See Perez, 138 S. Ct. at
2319.       Moreover, the purported “stay” operates not on the judicial
proceeding, but to restrict the actions of specific defendants. 5 That is

        _____________________
        5
           Cf. All. For Hippocratic Med. v. Food & Drug Admin., 78 F.4th 210, 254 (5th Cir.
2023) (“[U]nlike a preliminary injunction, a stay does not actively prohibit conduct.”),
petition for cert. filed (U.S. Sept. 12, 2013) (No. 23-235), and petition for cert. filed (U.S.
Sept. 12, 2013) (No. 23-236). Murphy contends that the district court’s order was not an
injunction because the defendants in this case—the Arlington police chief and the
prosecutor—are not among those who could be effectively enjoined from carrying out an
execution in Texas. The question under Perez, however, is not whether the order was an

                                              11
                                        No. 23-70005

quintessentially the function of an injunction. Therefore, as our circuit and
others have said previously, we have jurisdiction to review a stay of execution
on interlocutory appeal. 6 Indeed, as defendants aptly point out, the practice
is so commonplace that we have a circuit rule governing it. 5th Cir. R. 8.
See also Adams, 679 F.3d at 314, 323 (vacating a stay of execution two days
after it was issued). Consequently, we have jurisdiction to review the district
court’s stay of execution.

                                             IV.
        We start with the September complaint, because the district court
granted a stay of execution to allow Murphy to litigate the procedural due
process claims raised in this complaint. Murphy contends that Chapter 64 of
the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure is facially unconstitutional. He claims
the State of Texas unconstitutionally violated his state-created right to
challenge his death penalty conviction using DNA evidence. As we explain
below, the district court abused its discretion in finding that Murphy’s
procedural due process claim is likely to succeed on the merits.
        Texas grants convicted defendants the right to seek relief through “a
subsequent application for a writ of habeas corpus” upon a showing of
“sufficient specific facts establishing . . . by clear and convincing evidence
[that], but for a violation of the United States Constitution no rational juror
would have answered in the state’s favor one or more of the special issues
that were submitted to the jury in the applicant’s trial under Article 37.071,

        _____________________
injunction, but whether it had the practical effect of an injunction. The order was a stay, but
since that stay had the practical effect of an injunction, we have jurisdiction to review it.
        6
          Cf. Cooey v. Strickland, 588 F.3d 921, 922–23 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding that a stay
of execution had the “practical effect” of an injunction); Howard v. Dretke, 157 F. App’x
667, 670 (5th Cir. 2005) (same); Mines v. Dretke, 118 F. App’x 806, 812 n.27 (5th Cir. 2007)
(same).

                                              12
                                  No. 23-70005

37.0711, or 37.072.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.071 § 5(a)(3).
       One way a defendant may satisfy Article 11.071’s requirements is with
the use of DNA testing evidence. While there is no freestanding right for a
convicted defendant to obtain evidence for post-conviction DNA testing,
Dist. Atty’s Off. for Third Jud. Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 72 (2009), states
may create such a right. And that is the case for Texas. Under Chapter 64
of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, a defendant may move for post-
conviction DNA testing of evidence. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 64.01.
To do so, Chapter 64 requires a “convicted person [to] establish[] by a
preponderance of the evidence that . . . the person would not have been
convicted if the exculpatory results had been obtained through DNA
testing.” Id. art. 64.03(a)(2)(A).
       By creating a right to obtain evidence for post-conviction DNA
testing, Texas must provide convicted defendants with adequate procedures
to vindicate that right. Osborne, 557 U.S. at 72–74. Given that a defendant
has “already been found guilty at a fair trial,” he “has only a limited interest
in postconviction relief.” Id. at 69. So “‘when a state chooses to offer help
to those seeking relief from convictions,’ due process does not ‘dictate the
exact form such assistance must assume.’” Id. (quoting Pennsylvania v.
Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 559 (1987)) (cleaned up). Texas’s procedures for
postconviction relief do not violate due process rights if the procedure it
offers does not “offend[] some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions
and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental, or transgress[]
any recognized principle of fundamental fairness in operation.” Id. (internal
quotations omitted).
       Murphy asserts Chapter 64 facially violates defendants’ procedural
due process rights. Specifically, he theorizes that Article 11.07 section 5(a)(3)
is rendered illusory because Chapter 64 bars the use of DNA testing to

                                       13
                                    No. 23-70005

demonstrate a defendant is innocent of the death penalty. The district court
determined that claim is likely to succeed on the merits because a district
court in the Southern District of Texas had ruled in a prisoner’s favor on a
similar issue and that case is currently on appeal with our court. That
conclusion was an abuse of discretion for three reasons:
       First, Murphy’s procedural due process claim falters at the starting
line because he fails to make the necessary showing successfully to mount a
facial challenge to the statute. To prevail on a facial challenge, a challenger
“must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act
would be valid.” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987). Thus,
Murphy must demonstrate that Article 11.071 § 5(a)(3) does not allow any
criminal defendant to show he or she is innocent of the death penalty.
Murphy cannot meet this burden. The CCA regularly considers—and grants
merits review of—applications under Article 11.071 in which a defendant
claims he is ineligible for the death penalty. 7           Indeed, Murphy’s own
subsequent habeas petitions fatally wound his instant facial challenge: By
raising ineffective assistance of trial counsel, false testimony, suppression of
exculpatory evidence, and Eighth Amendment claims under Article 11.071
§ 5(a)(3), he has affirmatively demonstrated that section 5(a)(3) provides
ample avenues for defendants to show they are innocent of the death penalty.
Consequently, Murphy’s facial challenge fails as a matter of law.
       Second, Murphy fails to meet his burden to establish that Article 11.071
creates a substantive right to challenge a death penalty conviction with
evidence that might persuade a jury to decline to impose the death penalty.
Murphy asserts Article 11.071 codifies “the doctrine found in Sawyer v.
       _____________________
       7
         See, e.g., Ex parte Milam, No. WR-79,322-04, 2021 WL 197088, at *1 (Tex. Crim.
App. Jan. 15, 2021) (per curiam); Ex parte Weathers, No. WR-64,302-02, 2012 WL 1378105,
at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. Apr. 18, 2012) (per curiam).

                                          14
                                       No. 23-70005

Whitley.” 8 But Ex parte Blue—the very case Murphy cites—contradicts his
assertion: There, the CCA expressly declined to interpret Article 11.071
unequivocally to incorporate Sawyer in all its particulars. 9
        Regardless, assuming arguendo that Article 11.071 fully codifies Sawyer
still does Murphy’s claim no good. “Evidence that might have persuaded
the jury to decline to impose the death penalty is irrelevant under Sawyer”
because it “has no bearing on [a criminal defendant’s] claim of actual
innocence of the death penalty.” Rocha v. Thaler, 626 F.3d 815, 825–26 (5th
Cir. 2010). Murphy seeks to use DNA evidence solely for the purpose of
showing that he did not commit an extraneous offense the state presented in
support of the future-dangerousness special issue. But that claim—even if
supported by the DNA evidence—would not have changed Murphy’s
eligibility for the death penalty; at best, it would only make the death penalty
a less suitable punishment.
        The state presented multiple independent pieces of aggravating
evidence from which the jury found a probability that Murphy would be a
future danger. That aggregating evidence includes Murphy’s record of theft
convictions, testimony about a domestic-abuse call involving him and his
girlfriend, a witness who testified that he pulled a gun on her at a high school
party, testimony from one of his former coworkers, the results of his
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-II test, and his murder of

        _____________________
        8
         The Court in Sawyer defined the term “innocent of the death penalty” to include
both “innocence of the capital crime itself” and “a showing that there was no aggravating
circumstance or that some other condition of eligibility had not been met.” 505 U.S. 333,
345 (1992).
        9
          Ex parte Blue, 230 S.W.3d at 160 n.42 (“We hesitate to declare that Article 11.071,
Section 5(a)(3) wholly codifies the Supreme Court’s doctrine of ‘actual innocence of the
death penalty,’ even inasmuch as it has tied the exception to the bar on subsequent writs to
the statutory criteria for the death penalty under Article 37.071.”).

                                             15
                                      No. 23-70005

eighty-year-old Bertie Cunningham. 10 Thus, even under his erroneous
interpretation of Article 11.071, Murphy still fails to show the DNA testing
he seeks would make him innocent of the death penalty. 11
        Third, Murphy misapplies Chapter 64 to Article 11.071. His claim—
that Chapter 64 precludes him from challenging his death sentence by
denying the DNA testing he seeks—is belied by the text and structure of the
statute. Chapter 64 allows a convicted person to “submit to the convicting
court a motion for forensic DNA testing of evidence,” Tex. Code Crim.
Proc. art. 64.01, which would, in turn, allow the convicting court to “order
forensic DNA testing” provided certain statutory conditions are met, id.
art. 64.03(a).
        The statute thus creates an additional mechanism by which a
defendant can obtain potentially exculpatory DNA test results. DNA testing
results obtained through Chapter 64 could be used as part of a defendant’s
Article 11.071 application to show there are “sufficient specific facts
establishing that . . . by clear and convincing evidence, but for a violation of
the United States Constitution no rational juror would have answered in the
state’s favor one or more of the special issues that were submitted to the jury
in the applicant's trial under Article 37.071, 37.0711, or 37.072.”                    Id.
art. 11.071 § 5(a)(3).
        But Article 11.071 certainly doesn’t require that DNA test results
come exclusively from a defendant’s Chapter 64 motion. Section 5(a)

        _____________________
        10
          Davis, 901 F.3d at 583, 585; see also Guevara v. State, 97 S.W.3d 579, 581 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2003) (noting that “[t]he facts of the crime alone can be sufficient to support
the affirmative finding to the future dangerousness special issue”).
        11
         See Rocha, 626 F.3d at 825 (“The quality of the mitigation evidence the petitioner
would have introduced at sentencing has no bearing on his claim of actual innocence of the
death penalty.”).

                                            16
                                 No. 23-70005

requires that a subsequent habeas application “contain[] sufficient specific
facts,” and that neither favors nor disfavors Chapter 64 DNA test results
over DNA test results obtained through other means. In sum, Chapter 64—
contrary to Murphy’s assertion—expands the available sources of evidence
convicted defendants may use in their subsequent habeas petitions.
Consequently, Murphy has failed to identify any facial constitutional
infirmity.
       The district court ignored all this authority and instead relied solely
on Gutierrez v. Saenz, 565 F. Supp. 3d 892 (S.D. Tex. 2021). The court in
Gutierrez first observed that Article 11.071 “grants the substantive right to
file a second habeas petition with a clear and convincing showing of
innocence of the death penalty.” Id. at 910. It then found that “Chapter 64
denies the petitioner access to DNA evidence by which a person can avail
himself of that right” and violates a petitioner’s procedural due process
rights. Id. at 910–11.
       The district court abused its discretion in relying exclusively on
Gutierrez. That case cites Rocha for the proposition that the CCA construed
“Article 11.071 . . . to mean that petitioners must make a threshold showing
that the applicant is actually innocent of the death penalty.” Id. But Rocha
obligates us “to construe and apply section 5(a)(3) as the [CCA] construes
and applies it.” 626 F.3d at 822. Gutierrez disregards that command; it fails
to cite any case in which the CCA has held that Article 11.071 creates a
substantive right to challenge a death penalty conviction with evidence that
might persuade a jury to decline to impose the death penalty. Thus, the
district court could not have relied on Gutierrez’s reasoning to conclude that
Murphy had met his burden of showing a cognizable liberty or property
interest—as is necessary for a procedural due process claim. See Richardson
v. Hughs, 978 F.3d 220, 229 (5th Cir. 2020).

                                      17
                                   No. 23-70005

       Furthermore, the defendant in Gutierrez sought DNA evidence under
Chapter 64 to demonstrate innocence of the death penalty by casting doubt
on whether he had committed the underlying crime for which he was
convicted. 12 He wanted DNA evidence to show that he was not in the home
of the victim at the time of the murder. That means the DNA evidence
sought in Gutierrez would provide evidence directly relevant to the degree of
culpability of the crime for which he was being sentenced. Here, in contrast,
Murphy seeks DNA evidence not to challenge his guilt of the underlying
crime, but to show that he did not commit an extraneous offense the state
presented in support of the future-dangerousness special issue.
       That factual distinction makes all the difference: As we explained
above, “[e]vidence that might have persuaded the jury to decline to impose
the death penalty . . . has no bearing on [a criminal defendant’s] claim of
actual innocence of the death penalty.”           Rocha, 626 F.3d at 825–26.
Therefore, even if Gutierrez was correctly decided, it is not applicable to
Murphy’s situation because Murphy is not attempting to demonstrate
innocence of the death penalty by attacking his underlying conviction.
Rather, the DNA evidence he seeks is relevant to the special issue on future
dangerousness, which encompasses a much broader category of potential
evidence.
       Despite Gutierrez’s non-binding nature as an opinion from a district
court, and further despite its questionable reasoning and inapplicability to our
facts, the district court à quo used Gutierrez to conclude that Murphy has
shown a likelihood of success on the merits because the issue Murphy seeks

       _____________________
       12
          See Ex parte Gutierrez, 337 S.W.3d 883, 888 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (noting
Gutierrez’s argument that “exculpatory DNA test results . . . would show, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that he would not have been convicted of capital
murder.”).

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                                       No. 23-70005

a stay of execution to litigate is now on appeal before our court. Rank
speculation about the potential outcome of a case pending appeal does not
support the district court’s finding of a likelihood of success on the merits. 13
The district court abused its discretion by relying on the fact that Gutierrez is
pending on appeal to grant a stay of execution.
        Even if our precedent allowed the district court to rely on a pending
appeal, the unique procedural history of Gutierrez counsels strongly against
doing so in this case. In 2020, Gutierrez sought a stay of execution so he
could litigate “the constitutionality of Chapter 64 of the Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure” and Texas’s “policy refusing to allow chaplains to
accompany inmates into the execution chamber itself.” Gutierrez v. Saenz,
818 Fed. App’x 309, 311 (5th Cir. 2020). The district court granted a stay of
execution, but our court reversed. Id. at 313. We rejected Gutierrez’s facial
and as-applied procedural due process challenges to Chapter 64 as well as his
spiritual-advisor claim. Id. at 312.              The Supreme Court then granted
certiorari, vacated, and remanded for further consideration of the spiritual-
advisor claim. See Gutierrez v. Saenz, 141 S. Ct. 1260, 1260 (2021).
        On remand, Gutierrez again challenged Chapter 64, and the district
court again ruled in his favor. Gutierrez, 565 F. Supp. 3d at 908. The
Gutierrez district court distinguished our earlier reasoning on the sole basis
that Gutierrez’s new Chapter 64 claim was “legally distinct” from the one
we had rejected because the new claim challenged Chapter 64’s denial of

        _____________________
        13
           Cf. Wicker v. McCotter, 798 F.2d 155, 158 (5th Cir. 1986) (“In the absence of a
declaration by the [higher court] that the executions should be stayed in cases presenting
the issue raised by [Murphy], we must follow our circuit’s precedents and deny . . . a stay
of execution on this issue.”); Moreno v. Collins, No. 94-50026, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS
41477, at *3 (5th Cir. Jan. 17, 1994) (per curiam) (“[T]he grant of certiorari by the United
States Supreme Court to review an issue settled in this circuit does not itself require a stay
of execution.”).

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                                 No. 23-70005

evidence “that would demonstrate he is innocent of the death penalty,”
whereas the claim we had ruled on previously challenged Chapter 64’s denial
of evidence that would “demonstrate innocence of capital murder.” See id.
       We do not, and cannot, know how our court will ultimately resolve
Gutierrez. But the difference between Gutierrez’s rejected Chapter 64 claim
and his current one is so small that it cannot be fairly said that the pending
appeal gives Murphy a likelihood of success in this case.
       Finally, the district court also determined that the possibility of
irreparable harm weighs heavily in Murphy’s favor. It is true that this factor
typically favors the movant in a capital case. See O’Bryan, 691 F.2d at 708.
However, the procedural posture of this case is unique. The CCA denied
Murphy’s request for DNA testing both because Chapter 64 bars it as a
matter of law and because Murphy had unreasonably delayed in requesting
DNA testing. See Murphy v. State, No. AP-77,112, 2023 WL 6241994, at *4–
5 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 26, 2023). This second holding is crucial because,
even if the application of Chapter 64 violates Murphy’s procedural due
process rights, he still would not be entitled to the DNA testing he seeks
under the state court’s alternative holding of unreasonable delay.
       Therefore, the district court erred in concluding that Murphy would
suffer irreparable harm in not being able to pursue his procedural due process
claims. Rather, the balance of equities weighs against granting Murphy’s
motion for stay of execution: Both the state and victims of crime have a
“powerful and legitimate interest in punishing the guilty.” Calderon v.
Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 556 (1998) (internal quotations omitted). And
“[b]oth the State and the victims of crime have an important interest in the
timely enforcement of a [death] sentence.” Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct.
1112, 1133 (2019) (internal quotations omitted).       Even apart from the
likelihood-of-success inquiry, the district court abused its discretion in

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                                      No. 23-70005

concluding the balance of equities weighs in favor of granting Murphy’s
motion for stay of execution.

                                           V.
        It does not appear that the district court relied on any other claim in
Murphy’s September complaint when granting the stay of execution. To the
extent that it did, it abused its discretion because none of Murphy’s other
claims is likely to succeed.
        First, Murphy contends Chapter 64 unconstitutionally limits his
ability to seek executive clemency. Problematically for him, Murphy’s claim
is premised on his assumption that Chapter 64 facially violates defendants’
procedural due process rights under Article 11.071. But as we have already
explained, that assumption holds no water. If anything, Chapter 64 makes it
easier for convicted defendants to seek executive clemency since it expands
the avenues by which a defendant may obtain DNA test results.
Furthermore, Murphy fails to cite any case in which the denial of DNA
testing violated a defendant’s procedural due process right to present a
clemency claim. 14 Murphy has therefore failed to bear his burden of proving
that any procedural due process violation exists. 15
        Next, Murphy contends the denial of DNA testing deprives him of his
right to adequate, effective, and meaningful access to the courts. That
contention lacks merit. The right of access to the courts does not include the

        _____________________
        14
           Nor is there a substantive due process right to executive clemency. See Conn.
Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 464 (1981).
        15
          See Richardson, 978 F.3d at 229 (noting plaintiff bears the burden of establishing
a cognizable liberty or property interest to state a procedural due process claim).

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                                       No. 23-70005

ability “to discover grievances[] and to litigate effectively once in court.” 16
Murphy seeks to compel the state to provide DNA testing on the mere hope
that its results would support some speculative and hypothetical claim in the
future. That is nothing more than an attempt “to discover grievances.”
Casey, 518 U.S. at 354 (emphasis removed).
        A request for DNA testing, by itself, does not tend to prove or
disprove Murphy’s claim that he is innocent of the death penalty. The DNA
testing “may prove exculpatory, inculpatory, or inconclusive. In no event
will a judgment that simply orders DNA tests necessarily impl[y] the
unlawfulness of the State’s custody.” Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 525
(2011) (internal quotations omitted). As a result, Murphy fails to show he
has been denied his right of access to the courts.
        Finally, Murphy contends 18 U.S.C. § 3599(e) entitles him to
representation through all available post-conviction process, including
applications for stays of execution and clemency proceedings. There is no
merit to Murphy’s final theory. That statute “authorizes federal courts to
provide funding to a party who is facing the prospect of a death sentence and
is ‘financially unable to obtain adequate representation or investigative,
expert, or other reasonably necessary services.’” Ayestas v. Davis, 138 S. Ct.
1080, 1092 (2018) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3599(a)(1)). It is merely a funding
law and “not a law that grants federal courts authority to oversee the scope
and nature of federally funded legal representation.” Beatty v. Lumpkin,
52 F.4th 632, 634 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 416 (2022).
        For these reasons, Murphy has failed to show a likelihood of success

        _____________________
        16
           Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 354 (1996); see Whitaker v. Livingston, 732 F.3d 465,
467 (5th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (“One is not entitled to access the courts merely to argue
that there might be some remote possibility of some constitutional violation.”).

                                             22
                                No. 23-70005

on the merits on any claim in his September complaint. To the extent the
district court relied on any claim other that the Chapter 64 challenge in
granting the September motion to stay, it abused its discretion.
                                * * * * *
       Accordingly, the district court abused its discretion in granting
Murphy’s September motion to stay execution. Accordingly, we VACATE
the stay of execution entered in No. 1:23-cv-1170. The mandate shall issue
forthwith.

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