Court Opinion

ID: 9859685
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 22:23:54.125596+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:13:05.904768
License: Public Domain

SCHULTZ, Justice
(concurring in part, dissenting in part).
I concur in all parts of the majority opinion except part 11(C) from which I must respectfully dissent. Although I agree that the district court was correct in reversing the Commission’s decision, I disagree that there is not substantial evidence to support a finding that the reasons given for Lee’s rejection were pretextual. I would hold that there is sufficient evidence to make the alleged discrimination a question of fact. I would remand this matter to the Commission for a redetermination in accordance with this opinion.
I believe that the majority opinion contains an inconsistency. It first determines that Lee has made a prima facie case of discrimination and then it determines that there is not sufficient evidence of discrimination to produce a fact question. The prima facie showing is not a factual finding of discrimination and it may be rebutted; however, it is proof of action taken by the employer from which we infer a discriminatory intent because experience has proven *169that m the absence of explanation it is more likely than not that those actions were based on discriminatory considerations. Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 2949, 57 L.Ed.2d 957, 967 (1978). This inference creates a rebuttable presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated against the complainant and is sufficient to prevent dismissal of the case. When the employer responds by offering evidence that complainant was rejected for a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason, the presumption “drops from the case” and the “factual inquiry proceeds to a new level of specificity.” United States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens,-U.S.-,-, 103 S.Ct. 1478, 1482, 75 L.Ed.2d 403, 410 (1983). The inference drawn from the complainant’s evidence remains, however, and it may be considered in determining whether complainant has met the ultimate burden of proving discrimination. When “a presumption is based on a ‘logical core’, even though the presumption were eliminated, the inference created by the logical core would remain.” M. Ladd, Outline, 86 Iowa State Bar Association Annual Meeting (June 1959), quoted in In re Estate of Givens, 254 Iowa 1016, 1025, 119 N.W.2d 191, 194 (1963). Dean Ladd stated, “This simply means that if, in the absence of rebutting proof, the jury (or the court) would be compelled to find a certain presumed fact, they may still find that fact after rebutting testimony if they regard the logical deduction therefrom more probable than the testimony against it.” Id.
If the inference from the evidence is sufficient to make a prima facie case of discrimination, the inference is also substantial evidence of discrimination to produce a question of fact for determination by the factfinder. We infer from the evidence that was presented to show the prima facie case that it is more likely than not that the complainant was discriminated against. When the employer shows evidence of a nondiscriminatory reason for the rejection of the complainant it rebuts the presumption, but does not destroy the inference. Instead, the employer’s evidence joins the inference to produce a fact issue.
There is evidence that Lee was given an abbreviated interview and was not asked a hypothetical question asked of several other applicants. She was judged partly on subjective factors which the factfinder may determine are pretextual. The factfinder must determine Lee’s qualifications in relation to the other applicants. It must be remembered, however, that even if the Commission finds that the respondent misjudged Lee’s qualifications, this misjudgment does not necessarily prove discrimination. The finding may be probative of whether the employer’s reasons are pretext for discrimination. Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1096, 67 L.Ed.2d 207, 219 (1981).
In summary, there is substantial evidence in the record that would support a finding of discrimination. This court should not weigh the evidence and finally determine the facts. That is the Commission’s responsibility. That agency should review the entire record in accordance with the matters discussed in divisions I and 11(A) and (B) of the majority opinion, along with other appropriate statutory and established principles of law, before arriving at a factual determination.
REYNOLDSON, C.J., and HARRIS, J., join in this concurrence in part and dissent in part.