Court Opinion

ID: 9486346
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 11:45:20.943084+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:51:40.033011
License: Public Domain

SUHRHEINRICH, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
The majority affirms the liability of the City of Cincinnati based, in my view, upon a single unconstitutional act committed by two municipal employees not vested with the authority under state law to establish policy with respect to the action taken. This holding, I believe, is contrary to Supreme Court *1120precedent and, therefore, I respectfully dissent.1
I.
The majority states the following:
The City is not accused of routinely disciplining employees for exercising First Amendment rights or of having an officially promulgated policy to the effect. Its highest officials — the Safety Director, the City Manager and the Civil Service Commission — acted together to discipline John Meyers for exercising his constitutional rights in this one case.
Maj. Op. at 1117 (emphasis added). Thus, it would seem, that the majority imposes liability solely upon the act of disciplining Meyers, rather than any policy of the city. In my view, such a result is clearly precluded by Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2037-38, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) (city not liable under respondeat superior; only liable where an injury was inflicted by the municipality’s “lawmakers or those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy”).
To avoid this obvious bar to liability, plaintiff asserts, and the majority agrees, that the act of firing Meyers was, in itself, the establishment of a City policy. This argument wears revealingly thin, however, when either the plaintiff or the majority is asked to articulate exactly what the “policy” is which underlies the City’s liability. Plaintiff argues that he was fired pursuant to a policy “to promote affirmative action at all costs and to avoid any appearance of less than full commitment to affirmative action within the City.” App.Br. at 5. At argument, plaintiff stated that the City’s policy was, simply, to “protect its image.” Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that either asserted “policy” is unconstitutional.
At argument, Judge Merritt sought to rehabilitate plaintiff’s argument by suggesting that the City’s policy was “to fire employees for making statements which are unpopular for some segment of Cincinnati.” Even this “policy” has, apparently, proven an untenable basis for liability because the majority’s opinion now studiously avoids any attempt to spell out the policy for which the City is being held liable.
II.
In an area of the law which is, admittedly, not yet settled, certain principles have been adopted by the Supreme Court which should guide the resolution of this case. First, municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, must always and only be a product of the city’s own acts; thus, an unconstitutional policy of the city must be identified as having been the moving force of the plaintiffs constitutional deprivation. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 694, 98 S.Ct. at 2037. Second, the Supreme Court has identified three means by which a plaintiff may establish such a policy: (1) an officially promulgated policy as that term is commonly understood, i.e., a general statement adopted by the city’s lawmakers with an intention of governing future conduct, id. at 690, 98 S.Ct. at 2035-36; (2) a pervasive custom or practice, of which the city lawmakers know or should know, Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823-24, 105 S.Ct. 2427, 2436, 85 L.Ed.2d 791 (1985); and (3) a single act taken by a city employee who, as a matter of state law, has final policymaking authority with respect to the area in which the action was taken. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480-81, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 1298-99, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986).
Plaintiff does not argue, and it does not appear, that either of the first two categories are applicable to this case. Instead, plaintiff contends that defendants Rager and Johnson, the city officials who were involved in disciplining Meyers, committed a single act *1121which gives rise to the City’s liability under the third category above. This argument, in my view, is precluded by City of St. Louis v. Paprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127, 108 S.Ct. 915, 926, 99 L.Ed.2d 107 (1988) (plurality opinion) (city not hable for isolated unconstitutional act unless made by one with “final policy-making authority” under state law).
The majority, recognizing that Rager and Johnson are not, in fact, vested by state law with final policymaking authority regarding personnel disciplinary actions,2 invokes “the [Civil Service] Commission’s denial of Meyers’ appeal [as] the ultimate source of liability in this case.” Maj.Op. at 1118. I agree with the majority that, u[i]f the authorized policymakers approvedd] a subordinate’s decision and the basis for it, their ratification would be chargeable to the municipality because their decision is final.” Maj.Op. at 1118 (quoting Paprotnik, 485 U.S. at 127, 108 S.Ct. at 926) (emphasis mine).
Unlike the majority, however, I find no evidence to support its statement that the Civil Service Commission “affirmatively approved” Rager’s and Johnson’s acts in this case, let alone that the Commission “ratified” the unconstitutional basis for those acts. It is undisputed that the Commission refused Meyers’ appeal on the grounds that he freely chose to retire and that only “suspensions, demotions and removals” were appealable. Even if the Commission’s refusal to consider the merits of Meyers’ case were considered, in some sense, an approval of the discipline, there is no evidence from which to infer that the Commission “approved” the unconstitutional “basis” for the decision as the majority’s own quote from Paprotnik illustrates is clearly required.
This case is remarkably similar to Paprot-nik and I conclude that the same result should obtain. In Paprotnik, as here, the plaintiff alleged that the city, his employer, had transferred him in retaliation for exercising his First Amendment rights. Paprotnik, 485 U.S. at 116, 108 S.Ct. at 920. There, as here, the Civil Service Commission, as final policymaker under state law, refused to consider plaintiffs appeal because it did not fall within the grounds for which appeals are provided. Id. Without a decision from a “final policymaker,” approving the action and the unconstitutional basis for it, the Court’s plurality held that there was no basis for liability under Monell.
[T]he mere failure" to investigate the basis of a subordinate’s discretionary decisions does not amount to delegation of policy-making authority, especially where (as here) the wrongfulness.of the subordinate’s decision arises from a retaliatory motive or other unstated rationale. In such circumstances, the purposes of § 1983 would not be served by treating a subordinate employee’s decision as if it were a reflection of municipal policy.
Id. at 130,108 S.Ct. at 928. See, also, Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 483 n. 12, 106 S.Ct. at 1300 n. 12 (plurality opinion) (noting that even the unconstitutional exercise of discretion in implementing personnel policy will not give rise to ' municipal liability where authority to make personnel policy rests elsewhere); Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 823-24, 105 S.Ct. at 2436 (“Proof of a single incident of unconstitutional activity is not sufficient to impose liability under Monell, unless proof of the incident includes proof that it was caused by an existing, unconstitutional municipal policy, which policy can be attributed to a municipal policymaker.”).
Based upon Paprotnik, I would hold that plaintiff has not established facts sufficient to impose liability on the City for the unconstitutional acts of its employees.
III.
In Meyers I, we held that state law provided a remedy for the Commission’s failure to consider Meyers’ appeal. Meyers I, 934 F.2d at 731. Implicit in that holding is our understanding that the state courts could, if relief were merited, have afforded Meyers either complete relief by reinstating him or, at a minimum, procedural relief by ordering the *1122Commission to consider his appeal. Id. (Ohio law provides a “complete judicial corrective process fully adequate to review” Meyers’ claims). In the latter circumstance, even if the Commission had ruled against him, Meyers would have had a decision from the body with “final policymaking authority” upon which he could properly attempt to impose liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Maj.Op. at 1118-19 (recognizing this procedure in the context of Paprotnik without attempting to apply it the present case). Meyers’ failure to pursue this state remedy, in my opinion, should be as fatal to his present claim as it was to his procedural due process claim.
There is no question in this case that Mey-r ers suffered a constitutional deprivation at the hands of City employees. Such is the beginning of the inquiry under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, however, not the end of the inquiry. The majority holds the City liable for a policy it cannot identify and imputes the rogue actions of Rager and Johnson to the City without justification or basis in state law. Judgment should be entered for the City and this case dismissed.

. The majority states that the district court "concluded that the City was liable under Mo-nell...." Maj. Op. at 1116. I disagree. The district court's order plainly states that, in the district court's opinion, this issue was “foreclosed” by an earlier opinion of this court in this case. In this, the district court was clearly wrong, as the language of the remand in Meyers v. City of Cincinnati, 934 F.2d 726, 732 (6th Cir.1991) (Meyers I), shows. Thus, the majority "affirms” a decision the district court did not make. On this basis, alone, affirmance is improper.

. As the majority notes, Ohio Rev.Codé Ann. §§ 124.34, 124.40, vest the final policymaking authority for personnel actions in the City's Civil Service Commission. Certainly the City’s Safety Director and City Manager have discretion in recommending and imposing discipline in individual cases, but each case is ultimately appeal-able to the Civil Service Commission.