Court Opinion

ID: 9633672
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:56:26.625139+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:08:39.604505
License: Public Domain

ZIMMERMAN, Justice:
(concurring).
I join in the majority’s analysis. However, I feel compelled to add several comments.
First, I find particularly outrageous the State’s attempt to justify the stop of Mendoza and Mendieta by citing the fact that they reacted anxiously to the pursuit and surveillance conduct of the two INS officers. In the 4:50 a.m. darkness on March 16th, Mendoza and Mendieta were driving along 1-15 in the left lane. Suddenly, a car approached from the rear at a very high rate of speed. When it approached the Mendoza/Mendieta vehicle, it abruptly slowed down and then trailed Mendoza and Mendieta at freeway speeds, separated from their rear bumper by only two to six feet. Only the headlights of the officers’ car were illuminated. In the dark, there was nothing that would alert Mendoza and Mendieta that the vehicle behind them was a police car. Mendoza and Mendieta then pulled into the right lane and slowed down. At this point, they appeared “nervous” to the officers.
Any sane person would appear nervous if something like this occurred while traveling along a lonely stretch of one of our interstates in the early morning hours. I find ludicrous the State’s argument that because these individuals appeared to have been unsettled by the officers’ extraordinary conduct, the officers had justification for suspecting that something improper was going on, and on this basis, they were entitled to pull the vehicle over and institute an investigation that led to a search of the vehicle. This is pretextual fourth amendment gamesmanship at its worst.
Second, I agree with the majority that the “good faith” exception suggested in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984), cannot be applied generally to warrantless searches. However, even if this reading of Leon were in error, the Fourth Amendment Enforcement Act would not necessarily be saved. As I have observed previously in State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264, 271-74 (Utah 1985) (Zimmerman, J., concurring), the whole question of the protections that are afforded by and the remedies available under article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution, our own search and seizure provision, has never been carefully considered by this Court.