Court Opinion

ID: 9473763
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:38:50.901607+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:43:42.559649
License: Public Domain

EUGENE A. WRIGHT, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
The majority conclude that the district court properly exercised its discretion when it quashed the government’s subpoena of Dadaian, because no formal grant of immunity had been requested pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 6003. I dissent because Dadaian did not argue and the district court did not address this issue below.
Counsel for Dadaian characterized the issue before the court as “whether any immunity which could be conferred upon Mr. Dadaian under such an order would be coextensive of the privilege he would have in the absence of such an order.” Reporter’s Transcript September 21, 1984 (TR), Excerpt of Record (E/R) at 46.
My review of the record convinces me that the district court quashed the subpoena because it concluded that use immunity would be inadequate to avoid infringing upon Dadaian’s Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. In light of this, it would be unfair to affirm because the government failed to formally request immunity for Dadaian since the district court made it clear such a request would be futile.
He argued that compelling him to testify in Berberian’s trial, would chill his Fourth Amendment rights because testimony brought out during cross-examination at his suppression hearing provided the government with information leading to his subpoena. My analysis of the other issues requires that I reach Dadaian’s Fourth Amendment claim.
Dadaian has no Fifth Amendment privilege to refuse to testify to “protect others from punishment.” Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 371, 71 S.Ct. 438, 441, 95 L.Ed. 344 (1951). See also United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 572, 96 S.Ct. 1768, 1774, 48 L.Ed.2d 212 (1976). The considerations that caused the Supreme Court to “find it intolerable that one constitutional right [Fifth Amendment] should have to be surrendered in order to assert another [Fourth Amendment]”, are not present here. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394, 88 S.Ct. 967, 976, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968) (testimony given at suppression hearing by defendant is not admissible as evidence at his trial on the issue of guilt).
“The criminal process, like the rest of the legal system, is replete with situations requiring ‘the making of difficult judgments’ as to which course to follow.” McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 213, 91 S.Ct. 1454, 1470, 28 L.Ed.2d 711 (1971) (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 769, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 1448, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970)). The issue here is whether “compelling the election impairs to an appreciable extent any of the policies behind [any] rights involved.” Id.
*1328Dadaian has identified no right or privilege curtailed by virtue of his having to testify at the suppression hearing. “The public has a right to every man’s evidence.” Mandujano, 425 U.S. at 564, 96 S.Ct. at 1768 (quoting United States v. Burr, 25 F.Cas. 38 (No. 14,692e) (CC Va. 1807)). “[Arriving at the truth is a fundamental goal of our legal system.” United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 621, 100 S.Ct. 1912, 1913, 64 L.Ed.2d 559 (1980). Against this important cornerstone of our criminal justice system, Dadaian asserts a vague right to testify at his suppression hearing and thereby cast a protective cloak over evidence he would otherwise be compelled to give against his codefendant, if properly immunized.
The policies advanced by the Fourth Amendment are satisfied by allowing a defendant to testify at a suppression hearing without fear of providing the government with incriminating evidence for use against him later at trial. Once Dadaian’s Fifth Amendment privilege is adequately protected, he “is much like any other potential witness.” United States v. Moore, 682 F.2d 853, 857 n. 2 (9th Cir.1982).
No policy would be served by allowing him to insulate third parties from the untoward effects of his testimony at a subsequent trial, solely because he covered the same material while testifying at a suppression hearing. The Fourth Amendment does not require alleviation of any personal reservations a particular defendant may have about the effects of testifying at his suppression hearing.
He argues that allowing the government to subpoena him and compel his immunized testimony against a codefendant permits the government to manipulate the order of trials in multiple defendant cases and utilize suppression hearings as a discovery tool. Whatever validity this argument may have under different facts, it is inapposite here. Berberian moved to sever his trial, the government merely acquiesced. The government’s cross-examination of Dadaian was well within the bounds of his testimony on direct examination and was properly allowed by the trial judge. There is no evidence here of government manipulation. I would not announce a per se rule based on hypothetical facts. The district court may deal with potential governmental abuse if and when it occurs.
I agree with the majority opinion that Dadaian’s Fifth Amendment privilege extends to testimony that may tend to subject him to state prosecution. However, I disagree with the majority that the government must in every case request blanket immunity or have its subpoena quashed.
The majority cites United States v. Roberts, 503 F.2d 598, 600 (9th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1113, 95 S.Ct. 791, 42 L.Ed.2d 811 (1975), for the proposition that Dadaian need not wait until called to testify to assert his privilege against self-incrimination. Roberts and the cases cited therein hold that a witness may not be called to be forced to justifiably invoke the Fifth Amendment in front of the jury. If the court does so and thereby introduces prejudicial evidence “in a form not subject to cross-examination,” the defendant’s confrontation rights may be violated. Sanders v. United States, 373 F.2d 735 (9th Cir.1967).
Although these rights may be protected by pretrial motion or objection at trial by the aggrieved defendant, I see nothing inherently wrong with addressing the issue and avoiding the potential problem in a motion to quash. However, that is not this case. The government has never objected to granting Dadaian use immunity nor has it attempted to elicit the invocation of the Fifth Amendment by Dadaian on the stand. Nor has the government on appeal argued that the court impose constructive use immunity without a formal statutory request. See United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 104 S.Ct. 1237, 1248, 79 L.Ed.2d 552 (1984).
Ordinarily, a “witness must be faced with substantial hazards of self-incrimination that are real and appreciable, and must have reasonable cause to apprehend such danger from direct answers to questions asked.” United States v. Tsui, 646 F.2d 365, 367 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 991, 102 S.Ct. 1617, 71 L.Ed.2d 852 *1329(1982). This generally requires that a “Fifth Amendment claim be raised in response to specific questions propounded by the investigating body.” Id. (quoting United States v. Pierce, 561 F.2d 735 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 923, 98 S.Ct. 1486, 55 L.Ed.2d 516 (1978)).
However, we have recognized an exception when the trial court “based on its knowledge of the case and of the testimony expected from the witness, can conclude that the witness could ‘legitimately refuse to answer essentially all relevant question.’ ” Id. (quoting United States v. Goodwin, 625 F.2d 693, 701 (5th Cir.1980)). The record indicates that both parties agree this may be such a case. However, the trial court quashed the subpoena because it felt use immunity would inadequately preserve Dadaian’s constitutional rights.
I would reverse and remand for the trial court to exercise its discretion and determine whether this case fits the narrow exception “that allows evaluation of the claimed [Fjifth [A]mendment privilege even in the absence of specific questions to the witness.” Moore, 682 F.2d at 856.