Court Opinion

ID: 9745412
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 22:54:47.533375+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:00.301659
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE BILANDIC, concurring in part and dissenting in part: I concur with that portion of the majority opinion which holds that the plaintiff’s complaint properly stated a cause of action for negligence. I respectfully dissent, however, from that portion of the opinion which holds that the plaintiff does not have a cause of action under the Structural Work Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 48, par. 60 et seq.). The question presented is one of statutory construction. In construing a statute, our duty is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. (City of Springfield v. Board of Election Commissioners (1985), 105 Ill. 2d 336, 340-41.) That inquiry properly begins with the language of the statute. (First National Bank v. Mutual Trust Life Insurance Co. (1988), 122 Ill. 2d 116, 121.) Section 1 of the Structural Work Act states in relevant part: “All scaffolds *** ladders, supports, or other mechanical contrivances, erected or constructed *** for the use in the erection, repairing, alteration, removal or painting of any house, building, bridge, viaduct, or other structure, shall be so erected and constructed, in a safe, suitable and proper manner, and shall be so erected and constructed, placed and operated as to give proper and adequate protection to the life and limb of any person or persons employed or engaged thereon, or passing under or by the same, and in such a manner as to prevent the falling of any material that may be used or deposited thereon.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 48, par. 60.) It is undisputed that the plaintiff’s decedent used the ladder and walk rail at issue here to perform an activity (painting) protected under the Act. In addition, the majority concedes that the Act requires proper placement of such structural devices. Thus, the only question for our review is whether the plaintiff's complaint adequately alleged that the defendants breached their statutory duty to properly place the structural devices. The language of section 1 unequivocally creates a broad duty with regard to placement of structural devices. That section mandates that a structural device, such as the ladder and walk rail at issue here, shall be so “placed *** as to give proper and adequate protection to the life and limb of any person or persons employed or engaged thereon.” (Emphasis added.) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 48, par. 60.) The plaintiff’s allegation that the ladder or walk rail were improperly-placed so close to a power line that the decedent was thereby electrocuted certainly falls within the language of the Act. The majority holds, however, that the Act has no application in this case. The majority rewrites the Act, under the guise of construing it, and holds that the statute only requires that a structural device be placed in a manner which “ensures stable support” to structural workers. The majority offers two rationales in support of its novel interpretation of the statute. First, the court determines that the Act was intended to prevent workers and materials from falling off of inadequate structural devices. Second, the court suggests that the Act should not be interpreted to apply in circumstances where the plaintiff may have another remedy. Neither the language nor the history of the Act supports the narrow construction which the majority adopts. Nothing in the language of section 1 suggests that the duty to properly place a structural device is satisfied if the device offers adequate support to structural workers. On the contrary, the language of the statute unequivocally states that all structural devices shall be placed as to give proper and adequate protection to the life and limb of any person engaged thereon. If the legislature simply intended to prevent workers and materials from falling from improperly placed structural devices, it could have clarified the statute by inserting specific language to that effect. In fact, a close reading of other sections of the statute reveals that, when the legislature’s purpose was to protect workers and materials from falling, it inserted specific language stating that purpose. (See, e.g., Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 48, par. 60 (requiring structural devices to be erected, constructed, placed and operated “in such manner as to prevent the falling of any material that may be used or deposited thereon” (emphasis added)); Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 48, par. 64 (requiring a secondary support device underneath a working scaffold “for the purpose of preventing the person or persons performing such labor, from falling in case of any accident to such working scaffold” (emphasis added)).) No such limiting language is found in the portion of the statute at issue here. Instead, the broad language of the statute reflects the legislature’s intent to extend maximum protection to structural workers. The risk that a worker will fall from an improperly placed structural device is only one of the many risks that the legislature intended to address when it drafted section 1. The majority opinion also conflicts with the purpose of the Structural Work Act. The primary purpose of the Act is to encourage safe construction practices so as to prevent injury to persons employed in hazardous occupations. (Harvel v. City of Johnston City (1992), 146 Ill. 2d 277, 284; Halberstadt v. Harris Trust & Savings Bank (1973), 55 Ill. 2d 121, 127.) The legislature recognized that structural workers, who are generally the victims of safety violations, are often in the poorest position to provide for their own safety. Workers often lack the knowledge and/or time to appreciate all of the dangers which confront them at a construction site. In addition, workers may be unaware of measures which might be taken to enhance their safety. Even in circumstances where workers recognize a dangerous condition at a work site, they generally lack the authority to reduce or eliminate the danger. Workers frequently have no choice but to accept employment upon such terms as are offered. The Structural Work Act was enacted to encourage those in charge of structural work to implement safe construction practices and to prevent accidents before they occur. Our courts have liberally construed the Act so as to effectuate this preventative purpose. (See Simmons v. Union Electric Co. (Í984), 104 Ill. 2d 444.) The remedial provisions of the Act carry out the legislature’s strategy of reducing hazards at the work site. Because persons having charge of structural work bear the burden of fully compensating injured workers, the Act encourages them to take active measures to enhance safety at the work site. The majority’s interpretation of the Act undermines the legislature’s intent to encourage active measures to enhance safety so as to prevent' injuries to structural workers. Under the majority opinion, persons responsible for construction activities are no longer liable for injuries that workers suffer because of an improperly placed structural device. As a result, they no longer have an incentive to insure that structural devices are placed in a safe area. According to the majority, the Act is satisfied as long as a device is structurally sound and stable, even if it is placed in an area which exposes workers to danger. Now, scaffolds used in repairing a viaduct may be improperly placed in an area where workers are in danger of being struck by oncoming traffic. Scaffolds used in the construction of a building may be improperly placed in an area where workers are in danger of being struck by objects falling or intentionally discarded from above. Indeed, those having charge of structural work may now erect scaffolds only inches away from high-voltage power lines without fear of liability for injuries which foresee-ably result. The majority suggests that the Act should not apply because an injured worker may have another remedy. The court then goes on to discuss whether the plaintiff is precluded from bringing a common law negligence action because the power lines were an “open and obvious” danger. Although the majority upholds the plaintiff’s negligence claim here, there undoubtedly will be future cases where plaintiffs will be barred from bringing a common law negligence claim because the improperly placed scaffold exposed them to an “open and obvious” danger. The majority’s analysis simply illustrates the problem which the legislature sought to remedy when it enacted the Structural Work Act. When a structural device is improperly placed in an unsafe area, workers frequently have no choice but to use the device despite the danger. Even if workers recognize that the placement of a device exposes them to an “open and obvious” danger, they generally are not in a position to insist that the device be moved for their protection. The legislature recognized this dilemma and enacted the Structural Work Act to remedy the problem. The Act is intended to encourage persons “in charge” of a work site to place scaffolds in a safe area by holding them liable for injuries suffered as a result of improperly placed structural devices. Because the majority has completely thwarted the legislature’s intent to encourage safe working conditions, I dissent. JUSTICE FREEMAN joins in this partial concurrence and partial dissent.