Court Opinion

ID: 9778397
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 21:03:21.298847+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:08.333223
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Both appellant Gregorio Salinas, d/b/a Falfurrias Watermelon Sales, and appellees, Sigifredo Flores and Salvador Flores, have filed motions for rehearing. Appellees assert that we improperly denied their cross-point for prejudgment interest in that they are entitled to such interest since they plead and proved a written contract with a definite sum due on a definite date, and since they also plead for general relief. Appel-lees’ motion for rehearing is granted. We overrule appellant’s motion for rehearing.
Our opinion of May 9,1979, is changed by deleting the last two paragraphs of said opinion (on pages 815 and 816), including the footnote (on page 816), and substituting in place thereof the following:
By cross-point, appellees complain that they should have additionally been awarded prejudgment interest. We sustain this cross-point, which is controlled by the recent decision of the Supreme Court of Texas in Republic National Bank of Dallas v. Northwest National Bank of Fort Worth, 578 S.W.2d 109 (1979), where on rehearing the Court held that
under article 5069-1.03, prejudgment interest may be awarded based on a prayer for general relief if the plaintiff pleads and proves a written contract ascertaining a sum payable on a date certain. In the present case Republic has plead and proved an enforceable letter of credit. The letter of credit and accompanying documents met the requirements of the statute in that no interest rate is stipulated, an ascertainable sum is stated, and a specific time for payment is provided. Northwest should therefore be required to pay the applicable prejudgment interest rate under the statute inasmuch as it had the extended use and benefit of the principal sum.
Appellees’ pleading on which they went to trial prayed that “[they] have judgment in the sum of $11,000.00 plus $2,500.00 as reasonable attorney’s fees, costs of suit, and for such other and further relief to which Plaintiffs may show themselves justly entitled.” The prayer for general relief before us is basically similar to that involved in Republic. Texas courts have repeatedly recognized that under Article 5069-1.03 an award of prejudgment interest may be predicated on a prayer for general relief if the plaintiff pleads and proves a written contract ascertaining a sum payable at a date certain prior to judgment. Republic National Bank of Dallas v. Northwest Bank of Fort Worth, 578 S.W.2d 109 (1979) (on motion for rehearing); Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. General Insurance Corp., 517 S.W.2d 791, 798 (Tex.Civ.App.—Tyler 1974, writ ref’d n. r. e.) (on motion for rehearing); *817Combined Insurance Co. of America v. Kennedy, 495 S.W.2d 306, 308 (Tex.Civ.App.—Eastland 1973, writ ref’d n. r. e.); Dunnam v. Dillingham, 345 S.W.2d 314, 319 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1961, no writ).
In the present case appellees have plead and proved a written contract providing for a definite sum payable on a date certain. No interest rate is stipulated in the written contract and the transaction therefore meets the requirements of Article 5069-1.03. Appellees are entitled to the legal rate of interest provided for under such statute.
The judgment of the trial court is reformed so as to provide for prejudgment interest at the rate of six percent per an-num from June 23, 1975, until February 3, 1978, the date of the judgment, and thereafter postjudgment interest at the legal rate of nine per cent per annum until paid.
As so reformed, the judgment is affirmed.