Court Opinion

ID: 9851748
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:18:56.202053+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:14.415536
License: Public Domain

Littlejohn, Justice
(dissenting) :
I respecftully dissent and would affirm the order of Judge Price of the Greenville County Court. The essence of the opinion of Justice Ness is that a contract such as involved here is against the public policy of the State and should not be tolerated and enforced.
*60In my view there is nothing in the contract of an evil nature warranting the intervention of the judicial process of this State to declare it unlawful.
There is certainly nothing in the contract of an illegal or immoral nature, nor is the public so adversely affected that the courts should frown upon the establishment of a profit sharing plan with the provision quoted in the opinion of- Justice Ness. Although the term “public policy” is difficult to define, it seems to be generally agreed that the courts should consider the interest of the employer, the employee, and the public. There is no showing- in the record before this Court that the public will suffer if the plaintiff in this case is required to live up to the conditions of the contract.
There is no fast rule or definition of public policy applicable to all cases. Generally, it forbids one to do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the public welfare. What is and is not contrary to public policy is primarily a matter for the legislature to determine. From the fact that our legislature has not declared such contracts unlawful, we may infer that the contracts are not obnoxious to that branch of the government primarily charged with the duty of declaring public policy.
The courts should exercise judicial restraint and stay out of this field of legislation as relates to contracts unless the agreement is manifestly injurious to the public welfare, since it is the policy of the law to hold persons to contracts to which they are voluntary parties.
“The courts are averse to' holding contracts unenforceable on the ground of public policy unless their illegality is clear and certain. Since the right of private contract is no small part of the liberty of the citizen, the usual and most important function of courts of justice is to maintain and enforce contracts rather than to enable parties thereto to escape from their obligations on the pretext of public policy, unless it clearly appears that they contravene public right or the public welfare. Rules which say that a given agree*61ment is void as being against public policy are not to be extended arbitrarily, because, ‘if there is one thing which more than another public policy requires it is that men of full age and competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty of contracting, and that their contracts, when entered into freely and voluntarily, shall be enforced by courts of justice.’
“Many courts have cautioned against recklessness in condemning agreements as being in violation of public policy. Public policy, some courts have said, is a term of vague and uncertain meaning which it is the duty of the lawmaking power to define, and courts are apt to encroach upon the domain of that branch of the government if they characterize a transaction as invalid because it is contrary to public policy, unless the transaction contravenes some positive statute or some well-established rule of law. Other courts have approved the statement of an English judge that public policy is an unruly horse astride of which one may be carried into unknown paths. Considerations such as these have led to the statement that the power of the courts to declare an agreement void for being in contravention of sound public policy is a very delicate and undefined power and, like the power to declare a statute unconstitutional, should be exercised only in cases free from doubt.” 17 Am. Jur. Contracts § 178.
With this rather limited discussion of public policy, we proceed to set forth the facts involved in this case. The plaintiff and SCN voluntarily entered into a contract of employment. Obviously, the plaintiff enjoyed many promotions such that he became high in the administrative organization of the bank. SCN voluntarily established a profit sharing plan. Although the employees made no conrtibution to the plan, after they worked under it, the same took on a contractual nature. The contract provided that if the plaintiff entered into an employment in this State which was, in the opinion of the board, in competition with SCN, no benefits would be paid. The plaintiff would' now accept all of the *62benefits of the, plan and asks this Court to outlaw those parts of the contract which are not helpful to him in his particular situation. Under the terms of the profit sharing plan, those persons who leave the employment to compete with the bank are denied benefits and the benefits which a departing employee would have received inure to the benefit of all of the other employees. Accordingly, this not solely ■a dispute between SCN and the plaintiff. It is more of a contest between the plaintiff and the remaining employees of SCN. In no event can SCN retrieve for its own use and benefit the approximately $20,000.00 which the plaintiff would now drain out of the profit sharing plan. The remaining employees suffer the detriment.
It is interesting to note that other employees have heretofore left SCN to accept employment with other competing banks and have been denied benefits by the administration of which this plaintiff was an important part. The benefits which the plaintiff now seeks are enhanced by such action.
Contrary to the view of Justice Ness’ opinion, I think that a clear distinction should be made between those cases which deal with agreements not to compete and agreements, like the one now before the Court, which involve forfeitures only. The reason for declaring agreements not to compete void is the desirability of permitting a person to use his talents to make a livelihood. Such is not involved here because the plaintiff has a job of his own choosing. The public is not deprived of this plaintiff’s talents. In either employment he devotes his skills to his employer, which in turn, at least indirectly and at least theoretically, benefits the public.
I find no wickedness in the fact that the bank gets a benefit from the contract which established the voluntary profit sharing plan. There is nothing wrong with an employer, who has trained its employee, entering into a contract or setting up a profit sharing plan which encourages the em*63ployees to remain. An employer may agree to raise the salary of an employee a stipulated amount every year over a period of years in order to encourage them to remain. Such does not contravene public policy, although it obviously would encourage an employee not to change jobs.
Although many of the cases refer to that which the employee gives up when he leaves the employment as being a forfeiture, in my view there is no genuine forfeiture in the usual sense of the word. In order to receive the benefits provided in the plan the employee must comply with his part of the contract, and upon failing to comply he simply is not entitled to any benefits. In other words, one cannot forfeit that to which he was never entitled.
I consider the public policy issue the primary ground of appeal in this case. However, the plaintiff also contends that he should be entitled to relief because the profit sharing committee abused its discretion in determining that his employment was competitive or detrimental to SCN. The plaintiff was a vice president in charge of the installment loan department at SCN’s Charleston office. He accepted employment, assuming the position of vice president and comptroller with the Southern Bank and Trust Company in Greenville, a competing bank with SCN which has branches in Greenville. The duties of the plaintiff are substantially the same, and it is clearly inferable that he is using the vast training and experience which he obtained through employment with SCN for the benefit of a competitor. The contentions of the plaintiff on this issue are clearly without merit.
I would affirm the order of the lower court.