Court Opinion

ID: 9910169
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-14 22:01:15.907143+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:51:13.573818
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                             FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
           v.
                                                        Criminal Action No. 23-292-7 (CKK)
    MELVIN GREEN,
                Defendant.

                                   MEMORANDUM OPINION
                                     (December 14, 2023)

          Defendant Melvin Green is charged by indictment with accessory after the fact regarding

an armed carjacking and kidnapping of two victims (“Victim-1” and “Victim-2,” collectively, the

“Victims”) on June 9, 2023. On August 31, 2023, Magistrate Judge Zia M. Faruqui of this

jurisdiction ordered Defendant to be temporarily detained without bond. On November 9, 2023,

Magistrate Judge Faruqui held a detention hearing for Defendant and granted the Government’s

oral motion to detain Defendant pending trial.

          Before the Court is Defendant’s [54] Motion for Bond Review. Defendant requests that

the Court review his bond status and set conditions of release. Upon consideration of the

pleadings,1 the relevant legal authority, and the record before the Court, the Court shall DENY

Defendant’s [54] Motion for Bond Review.

                                      I.   BACKGROUND

          A. Procedural Background

          On August 25, 2023, the Government filed an indictment against Defendants Desmond

1
    The Court’s consideration has focused on:
       Defendant’s Motion for Bond Review, ECF No. 54 (“Motion” or “Mot.”); and
       The Government’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Review of Detention Order, ECF No. 56
         (“Gov’t’s Opp’n”) and exhibits therein.

                                                  1
Evans, Ramel Henderson, Kevon Jackson, Delonte Mundaray, Marquette Jackson, Malik Terrell,

and Melvin Green. ECF No. 1 (sealed). The indictment charged six of these defendants with Count

One, Kidnapping and Aiding and Abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1201(a)(1) and 2 (for

kidnapping Victim-1); Count Two, Kidnapping and Aiding and Abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§§ 1201(a)(1) and 2 (for kidnapping Victim-2); and Count Three, Carjacking and Aiding and

Abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2119(1) and (2) (for carjacking a vehicle used by Victim-1).

See id. With respect to Defendant Green, the indictment charged him with Count Four, Accessory

After the Fact, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3 (for assisting Defendant Mundaray). See id. On

November 3, 2023, an additional defendant was indicted, and additional firearm-related charges

were included for certain defendants. ECF No. 43 (sealed). For Defendant Green, the superseding

indictment charged him with Count Nine, Accessory After the Fact, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3

(for assisting Defendant Mundaray). See id. Following the August 2023 indictment, Magistrate

Judge G. Michael Harvey of this jurisdiction issued an arrest warrant for Defendant, which was

executed on August 31, 2023. ECF No. 10. That same day, Defendant appeared before Magistrate

Judge Faruqui, who granted the Government’s oral motion for temporary detention and held

Defendant without bond. See Aug. 31, 2023 Minute Entry. Following a series of continuances,

Defendant appeared for a detention hearing before Magistrate Judge Faruqui on November 9, 2023,

who granted the Government’s oral motion to detain Defendant pending trial. See Nov. 9, 2023

Minute Entry.

         Defendant subsequently filed the pending motion on November 16, 2023, requesting this

Court to review his bond status and set conditions of release. See generally Mot. The Government

opposes Defendant’s motion, filing its opposition on December 2, 2023. See generally Gov’t’s

Opp’n.

                                                2
       B. Factual Allegations

       In its opposition, the Government details the allegations against Defendant, appending

images extracted from video surveillance footage that depict Defendant before and during the

charged offenses in the indictment, as well as information and images related to the evidence

recovered during searches conducted by law enforcement in August 2023. See generally id.

Broadly, the Government alleges that Defendant served as a “lookout” while his co-defendants

entered and stole items from Victim-1’s vehicle, id. at 14, dealt with a potential witness to the

crimes, id. at 17, and further obtained a firearm from Defendant Mundaray while the Victims were

actively being kidnapped by Defendant’s associates, id. at 18.

       To support its claims, the Government recounts the video surveillance footage that

purportedly depicts the defendants’ conduct before, during, and after the offenses. According to

the Government, this footage shows the Victims arriving in a black Mercedes SUV in the 4400

block of F Street SE, Washington, D.C., at approximately 11:33 p.m. on June 8, 2023. Id. at 11.

At approximately 11:44 p.m., a large group of individuals, including the Victims, departed from

the area in multiple vehicles. Id. On June 9, 2023, at approximately 12:09 a.m., video footage

shows the Victims and many of the defendants in this case, including Defendant Green, enter Saint

Yves, a club located at 1220 Connecticut Avenue NW, Washington, D.C. Id. Saint Yves is

approximately eight (8) miles from the 4400 block of F Street SE. Id. Then, at approximately

1:56 a.m., a group of individuals, including the Victims and multiple “subjects,” exit Saint Yves

before entering various vehicles and departing at approximately 1:59 a.m. Id.

       The Government appends still images extracted from video surveillance footage to

corroborate its claims. The first depicts Defendant right outside Saint Yves at approximately 12:10

a.m. on June 9, 2023. Id. at 12. The second depicts Defendant at the 4400 block of F Street SE,

                                                3
at approximately 3:01 a.m. that same night. Id.

See id. The Government then alleges that, at approximately 2:21 a.m., multiple “subjects” and the

Victims return to the 4400 block of F Street SE. Id. at 13. At approximately 2:33 a.m., prior to

the armed carjacking and kidnapping of the Victims, Defendants Henderson, Mundaray, and M.

Jackson, and Marquise Jackson (the twin brother of Defendant Jackson) begin stealing multiple

items from Victim-1’s Mercedes SUV “while it was parked and unoccupied at that same location.”

Id. Specifically, Defendants Henderson, Mundaray, and M. Jackson approach the rear of the SUV

and begin searching the SUV via the passenger-side rear door at approximately 2:33 a.m. Id.

Marquise Jackson then joined the group as Defendant Henderson continued to search the vehicle.

Id. During this time, Defendant Mundaray and Marquise Jackson stand near the rear of the SUV

and act as lookouts. Id. Eventually, Defendant Henderson gains access to the SUV, and Defendant

Mundaray and Marquise Jackson assist Defendant Henderson at the passenger-side rear door. Id.

Defendant Mundaray subsequently appears on video with a black backpack, and Defendant

Henderson is seen inside the vehicle, utilizing a flashlight to search the driver and front passenger

                                                  4
seats. Id. At approximately 2:36 a.m., Defendants Mundaray, Henderson, and M. Jackson, and

Marquise Jackson all leave the vehicle, with Defendant Mundaray wearing the black backpack and

Defendant Henderson carrying a black bag. Id. At approximately 2:50 a.m., Defendant Mundaray

is seen tucking a “black, L-Shaped object, that appears to be a firearm, into his front waistband.”

Id. at 14.

        Of relevance here, Defendant Green served as a lookout while his co-defendants were

entering and stealing multiple items from the Mercedes SUV. Id. The Government alleges that

when Defendants Mundaray, Henderson, and M. Jackson first approached the SUV, Defendant

Mundaray “waved multiple times” to Defendant Green to “signal that other persons should stay

away and move away from his location.” Id. Defendant, in turn, responded by “turning and

waiving other persons in the vicinity away and back from the road, sidewalk, and grass hill area

overlooking the street” where the SUV was located. Id.

                                                5
See id. at 15–16. The Government then recounts the armed carjacking and kidnapping of the

Victims. At approximately 3:43 a.m., eleven subjects are seen on video surveillance footage

“committing an armed robbery, carjacking, and kidnapping of [the Victims] as the Victims

approached the [] SUV” located in the 4400 block of F Street SE. Id. at 16. According to the

Government, Defendant Green committed the following actions between 3:44 a.m. and 3:46 a.m.:

(1) Defendant is seen on camera walking from the side of 4431 F Street SE; (2) Defendant walks

past an unknown individual, toward a witness and subsequently grabs the witness’s arm and pulls

him back; (3) Defendant speaks with the witness as the witness turns his head toward the Mercedes

SUV; (4) Defendant, the witness, and the unknown individual walk toward the side of 4431 F

Street SE, toward the SUV, before they are out of view of the camera; (5) Defendant is visible on

camera when Victim-1 “has already been forced into the rear, driver side passenger seat and

                                               6
Victim-2 has been forced into the rear tailgate area” of the SUV; (6) Defendant passes Defendant

Terrell, who is holding a clear bag that was retrieved from underneath the SUV; (7) Defendant

approaches the SUV and “assists with opening the driver-side door” while conversing with

Defendant Mundaray; (8) Defendant Mundaray retrieves an item from his pocket and hands that

item to Defendant before the driver-side door of the SUV is closed; (9) Defendant tucks “a black,

L-Shaped object, that appears to be a firearm, into his front waistband” before walking back to

4431 F Street SE and walking out of view. Id. at 17–18.

See id. at 19. The Government claims that during this time a struggle ensued between Victim-1

and the subjects while the latter group “attempted to kidnap Victim-1, remove his clothing, and

force him into the rear passenger area of the Mercedes SUV.” Id. at 9. Similarly, Victim-2 was

“stripped at gunpoint” and forced into the rear tailgate area of the SUV. Id. At approximately

4:39 a.m., the Mercedes SUV and a white Nissan Altima are seen on video surveillance footage

                                               7
entering an apartment complex in Suitland, Maryland.2 Id. The footage shows at least five

individuals exiting those vehicles and moving toward an apartment that was subsequently

burglarized, which law enforcement later determined was associated with Victim-1. Id. Then, at

approximately 5:39 a.m., the Mercedes SUV is seen on video surveillance footage in front of

Victim-1’s apartment building in Waldorf, Maryland. Id. at 10. At least four subjects are seen

exiting the SUV at “various times to aid in an armed robbery of [the] apartment.” Id. During this

time, Victim-3—the romantic partner of Victim-1—was robbed at gunpoint. Id. Four minutes

later, at approximately 5:43 a.m., video surveillance footage shows at least three subjects

“engag[ed] in a shootout with Victim-1,” in which Victim-1 and Marquise Jackson are both

“struck” and subsequently pronounced deceased after the “shootout.” Id. At 6:45 a.m., the Nissan

Altima is seen on video surveillance footage at the intersection of Kayak Avenue and Emo Street

in Capitol Heights, Maryland, “just prior to the arrival” of first responders at 819 Kayak Street,

where the Mercedes SUV was found to be on fire. Id. Finally, at approximately 8:02 a.m., the

Metropolitan Police Department (“MPD”) responded to the area of 4517 C Street SE, Washington,

D.C., and, upon arrival, made contact with Victim-2, who was “naked except for one sock.” Id.

Victim-2 informed the officers that he was robbed of his clothing and shoes but managed to escape

his captors, though with multiple lacerations across his body. Id. Victim-2 later informed officers

that his captors “violently pistol-whipped [the] Victims,” and demanded addresses from Victim-1.

Id. at 10–11.

       Lastly, the Government explains that the investigation following June 9, 2023 indicated

that the defendants and others who participated in the offenses are “close personal associates.” Id.

2
  The Government alleges that the Mercedes SUV contained Defendants Mundaray (who was driving),
Henderson, Evans, as well as Marquise Jackson and Juvenile-1, while the Victims were being held inside.
Gov’t’s Opp’n at 8. The Nissan Altima contained Defendants Terrell (who was driving), M. Jackson, K.
Jackson, and Harvey. Id.

                                                  8
at 22; id. (explaining that connection was made after analyzing toll and cell phone location records,

physical observations, social media records, and video captured by cameras). On August 31, 2023,

law enforcement executed searches of twelve (12) premises and one (1) vehicle associated with

the defendants and their associates in the District of Columbia and Maryland. Id. These searches

resulted in law enforcement seizing numerous items, including but not limited to thirteen (13)

firearms, firearm magazines and ammunition, clothing matching the appearance of items worn by

various defendants and their associates during the offenses, and digital devices. Id. With respect

to Defendant Green, law enforcement located and arrested him and a co-defendant at 4425 F Street

SE, Washington, D.C. Id. However, the Government proffers that Defendant primarily resides at

4935 Collingtons Bounty Drive, Bowie, Maryland. Id. at 22–23; see id. at 23 (explaining that

Defendant’s cellphone device “repeatedly generated GPS data in or near the vicinity” of that

residence); id. at 23 (explaining that law enforcement observed Defendant, Defendant Henderson,

and a third individual leaving that residence on August 22, 2023).           At that location, law

enforcement recovered various items, including but not limited to: three Glock pistols (two of

which were previously reported stolen); one AK-variant pistol; ammunition and firearm

magazines; paperwork in Defendant’s name located in a kitchen drawer; and the black and gray

Nike hooded jacket matching the appearance of an item worn by Defendant during the offenses,

which was located on a sofa next to the “loaded stolen MPD firearm.” Id. at 25–26.

                                 II.    LEGAL STANDARD

       A defendant ordered detained by a magistrate judge may file “a motion for revocation or

amendment of the order” with “the court having original jurisdiction over the offense.”

18 U.S.C. § 3145(b). The Court applies de novo review to the question and is “free to use in its

analysis any evidence or reasons relied on by the magistrate judge, but it may also hear additional

                                                 9
evidence and rely on its own reasons.” United States v. Sheffield, 799 F. Supp. 2d 18, 20 (D.D.C.

2011) (BAH) (quoting United States v. Hanson, 613 F. Supp. 2d 85, 88 (D.D.C. 2009) (PLF)).

“The motion shall be determined promptly.” 18 U.S.C. § 3145(b).

       In our society, “liberty is the norm” and “detention prior to trial or without trial is the

carefully limited exception.” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987). The Bail Reform

Act permits pretrial detention in only “carefully defined circumstances.”            United States v.

Simpkins, 826 F.2d 94, 95–96 (D.C. Cir. 1987). A detention hearing must be held only if a case

involves any of an enumerated set of offenses, including a “crime of violence” or a felony that

involves the use of a dangerous weapon, 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(A), or if the defendant poses a

serious risk of flight or of trying to obstruct justice or threaten, injure, or intimidate a witness or

juror, id. § 3142(f)(2)(A)–(B).

       The question for the Court is whether any “condition or combination of conditions will

reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other person and

the community.” Id. § 3142(e)(1). “In common parlance, the relevant inquiry is whether the

defendant is a ‘flight risk’ or a ‘danger to the community.’” United States v. Vasquez-Benitez,

919 F.3d 546, 550 (D.C. Cir. 2019). In determining whether a defendant should be detained

pending trial, the Court must consider “the available information” concerning four enumerated

factors: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense charged; (2) the weight of the evidence

against the defendant; (3) the history and characteristics of the defendant; and (4) the nature and

seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that would be posed by the defendant’s

release. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g).

       “To justify detention on the basis of dangerousness, the government must prove by ‘clear

and convincing evidence’ that ‘no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure

                                                  10
the safety of any other person and the community.’” United States v. Munchel, 991 F.3d 1273,

1279–80 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)). That standard requires the Government

to establish that the defendant “poses a concrete, prospective threat to public safety” that cannot

be sufficiently mitigated by release conditions. Id. at 1280; see also Salerno, 481 U.S. at 751

(requiring the Government to “prove[ ] by clear and convincing evidence that an arrestee presents

an identified and articulable threat to an individual or the community”). “Detention cannot be

based on a finding that defendant is unlikely to comply with conditions of release absent the

requisite finding of dangerousness or risk of flight; otherwise[,] the scope of detention would

extend beyond the limits set by Congress.” Munchel, 991 F.3d at 1283.

                                   III.      DISCUSSION

       The Court concludes that the evidence presented by the Government in its briefing requires

Defendant Green’s detention pending trial.

       A. Legal Principles

       As a threshold matter, the Court must address the proper standard to apply at this stage of

proceedings.   As explained above, Defendant has appealed his detention order pursuant to

18 U.S.C. § 3145(b). Such an appeal is subject to de novo review, in which the Court must engage

in a searching, “factbound inquiry” to determine danger to the community and/or risk of flight.

United States v. Sabol, 534 F. Supp. 3d 58, 69 (D.D.C. 2021) (EGS) (citing Munchel, 991 F.3d at

1283) (cleaned up).

       In determining whether Defendant is a danger to the community or a flight risk, the Court

considers the Section 3142(g) factors including: (1) “the nature and circumstances of the offense

charged”; (2) “the weight of the evidence”; (3) “the history and characteristics” of the defendant;

                                                11
and (4) “the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that would be

posed by the [defendant’s] release.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g).

          The Court shall consider these factors based upon the present record without holding an

additional hearing. See Sheffield, 799 F. Supp. 2d at 20 (permitting district court to use in its

analysis the evidence relied on by the magistrate judge); see also United States v. Anderson, 384 F.

Supp. 2d 32, 33–34 (D.D.C. 2005) (PLF) (taking into consideration the indictment, “the briefs and

other papers submitted by the parties, the proceedings before [the magistrate judge], the

[magistrate’s] findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the evidence and proffers before [the

court]”). Based on the current record, the Court concludes that clear and convincing evidence

supports a finding that no condition or combination of conditions will “reasonably assure” the

“safety of any other person and the community” or flight in advance of trial.              18 U.S.C.

§ 3142(e)(1). Accordingly, the Court orders that Defendant shall remain detained pending trial.

See id.

          B. Nature and Circumstances of the Offense Charged

          Turning to the Section 3142(g) factors, the Court first considers the “nature and

circumstances of the offense charged” including whether the offense is a “crime of violence” or

involved a firearm. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(1). Under the Bail Reform Act, a “crime of violence”

includes “an offense that has as an element of the offense the use, attempted use, or threatened use

of physical force against the person or property of another,” and “any other offense that is a felony

and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property

or another may be used in the course of committing the offense.” Id. § 3156(a)(4)(A)–(B).

          Here, the Government notes that the charge against Defendant relates to his conduct in

connection with the armed carjacking and kidnapping of the Victims on June 9, 2023. Gov’t’s

                                                  12
Opp’n at 7. Specifically, the other defendants in this case “threatened the Victims with firearms,

took Victim-1’s vehicle [(the Mercedes SUV)], clothing and other belongings from the Victims,

and proceeded to commit a burglary and armed home invasion of two residences associated with

Victim-1 in Maryland.” Id. As for Defendant Green, the Government emphasizes that he assisted

the other defendants in perpetrating these crimes by serving as a lookout, speaking with potential

witnesses, and retrieving a firearm from Defendant Mundaray while the Victims were being

forcibly placed inside the SUV. Id. at 14, 17–18.

       The Government’s specific allegations against Defendant are grave and indicate

Defendant’s willingness to assist—in any way he can—in serious crimes of violence. Multiple

images depict Defendant at the scene of the initial crime (at the 4400 block of F Street SE), serving

as a lookout and either “waving other persons in the vicinity away,” Gov’t’s Opp’n at 14, or

speaking with a witness while the Victims are actively being kidnapped, id. at 17–18. Furthermore,

video surveillance footage shows Defendant retrieving a firearm from Defendant Mundaray, a fact

that Defendant does not seriously contest in his motion. See Mot. at 3–4 (“Video conference . . .

depict [Defendant Green] receiving what appears to be a firearm from one of his co-defendants[,

but] [i]t is unclear whether the firearm was employed to facilitate the kidnapping and robbery or

was removed from the victim’s vehicle by the co-defendant and given to [Defendant].”). In all,

Defendant Green’s alleged conduct “demonstrates a flagrant disregard for the rule of law” and for

the safety of others and the community. United States v. Munchel, 521 F. Supp. 3d 54, 61 (D.D.C.

2021) (RCL), remanded, 991 F.3d 1273 (D.C. Cir. 2021).

       Moreover, the charged offense carries significant potential penalties for Defendant. If

convicted of Count Nine, Defendant would face a sentencing guidelines range of at least 63 to 78

months of imprisonment (i.e., approximately five to seven years), and a statutory maximum of

                                                 13
fifteen (15) years of imprisonment. Gov’t’s Opp’n at 4. Accordingly, the nature and circumstances

of the crimes charged, as well as the heavy sentence to which Defendant is subject if convicted,

militate heavily against pretrial release. See United States v. Mercedes, 254 F.3d 433, 437 (2d Cir.

2001) (noting nature of the crime—conspiracy to commit armed robbery of a drug-dealer—weighs

heavily against release)

       C. Weight of the Evidence

       The weight of the evidence against Defendant also favors continued pretrial detention. The

Government presents multiple still images extracted from video surveillance footage depicting

Defendant assisting his co-defendants in committing an armed carjacking and kidnapping of the

Victims by serving as the lookout and handling potential witnesses. Gov’t’s Opp’n at 15–17, 19.

Furthermore, Defendant is seen going toward the Mercedes SUV to converse with Defendant

Mundaray and retrieve a firearm, while the Victims are simultaneously being forcibly held in that

same vehicle. Id. at 19, 21.

       Law enforcement also identified social media accounts used by Defendant and his

associates, including other defendants in this case. Id. at 26. Images from social media depict

Defendant socializing with a group of individuals, including Defendants M. Jackson, Terrell, and

Henderson. Id. Notably, these photographs were published online in August 2023, approximately

one month after the offenses involving the Victims. Id. Similarly, the investigation following

June 9, 2023 revealed connections between Defendant’s alleged telephone number and telephone

numbers allegedly used by Defendants Henderson and Terrell, and “other subjects and witnesses

of the offenses.” Id. at 22. Finally, during the search of the 4935 Collingtons Bounty Drive

residence, law enforcement recovered paperwork in Defendant’s name in a kitchen drawer, as well

as a Nike jacket matching the appearance of the jacket worn by Defendant on June 9, 2023. Id. at

                                                14
26, 27. In all, the Government argues this evidence demonstrates Defendant’s close relationship

with his co-defendants, as well as his willingness to assist his associates with “such crimes as he

did on June 9, 2023.” Id. at 27.

        Defendant, on the other hand, maintains that while he “may have witnessed these events,”

there is “no evidence that he discharged or brandished the firearm,” but rather the evidence

“establishes at best that once in possession of the item he simply walked away.” Mot. at 4.

Defendant also notes that he is not charged with Counts One, Two, or Three, unlike his co-

defendants, and therefore his “position is clearly distinguishable” from the other defendants in this

case. Id. Finally, with respect to the law enforcement searches in August 2023, Defendant states

that he is “not the leaseholder” of either location, he has not used either address as his residence,

and none of the firearms recovered during these searches “were recovered from [his] person.” Id.

at 5.

        The Court disagrees with Defendant’s suggestion that the evidence indicates that he had

little to no involvement in the charged offenses. The Government has provided compelling

evidence that Defendant knowingly and intentionally assisted his co-defendants on June 9, 2023.

See generally Gov’t’s Opp’n. First, images from video surveillance footage depict Defendant

serving as a lookout and “waving other persons in the vicinity away” while some of his co-

defendants break into the Mercedes SUV and subsequently steal items located therein. Id. at 14–

15. Additional video surveillance footage shows Defendant dealing with a potential witness while

the Victims are actively being forced into the Mercedes SUV. Id. at 17–18. The footage then

shows Defendant approaching the SUV to communicate with Defendant Mundaray, again while

the Victims are being forcibly held inside, and retrieve a firearm from Defendant Mundaray before

walking away from that scene. Id. at 18–19. Regardless of the reasons why Defendant retrieved

                                                 15
the firearm from Defendant Mundaray and walked out of view of the camera, Defendant still

actively assisted in the crimes committed on June 9, 2023. Finally, while Defendant contends that

he does not reside at the 4935 Collingtons Bounty Drive residence, Mot. at 5, the investigation and

the evidence recovered at that location nonetheless demonstrates his close association with the

residence and his co-defendants, see Gov’t’s Opp’n at 26 (a “folder of paperwork in [Defendant’s]

name in a kitchen drawer”); id. at 27 (finding Defendant’s “black and gray Nike hooded jacket

that he wore during the offenses” at the residence); id. at 23 (Defendant’s alleged cellular device

“repeatedly generated GPS data in or near” the vicinity of the residence); id. at 23 (Defendant seen

with Defendant Henderson leaving the residence in August 2023).

          Given the evidence to date, including the multiple images of Defendant at the scene of the

crime, this factor weighs in favor of detention. See United States v. Brockhoff, 590 F. Supp. 3d

295, 304 (D.D.C. 2022) (CKK).

          D. History and Characteristics of the Defendant

          Under the third Section 3142(g) factor, the Court must consider a defendant’s “history and

characteristics,” including his “character, physical and mental condition, family ties, employment,

financial resources, length of residence in the community, community ties, past conduct, history

related to drug or alcohol abuse, criminal history, and record concerning appearance at court

proceedings.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(3).

          Admittedly, Defendant’s lack of a serious criminal history weighs against pretrial

detention.3 Defendant also appears to have family and community ties in the area. See Mot. at 5

3
    Defendant’s Pretrial Services Report states that Defendant has one prior arrest.

                                                       16
(stating Defendant is a life-long resident of the District of Columbia). His mother and sister also

both live in the area. Id. at 6.

        However, according to the Government, Defendant’s characteristics demonstrate his

eagerness and willingness to assist the other defendants in this case. See Gov’t’s Opp’n at 26–27.

The Government emphasizes that Defendant was seen, on multiple occasions, interacting with

various co-defendants, specifically Defendants M. Jackson, Terrell, and Henderson, in August

2023. Id. In addition, the fact that Defendant’s Nike jacket, which was worn by him during the

offenses, was recovered by law enforcement “right next to a loaded Glock pistol that was

previously reported stolen by MPD” only further demonstrates that Defendant’s “criminal conduct

on June 9, 2023 was not an aberration.” Id. at 27. Rather, Defendant is a “close associate of

multiple co-defendants, is familiar with their activities, and indeed has demonstrated the will and

means to further assist his associates with such crimes as he did on June 9, 2023.” Id.

        In all, the Court finds that this factor stands in equipoise for Defendant.

        E. The Nature and Seriousness of the Danger Posed by Defendant’s Release

        The final factor that the Court must consider is “the nature and seriousness of the danger

to any person or the community that would be posed by the person’s release.” 18 U.S.C.

§ 3142(g)(4).

        Defendant argues that his proposed conditions of release would be sufficient to not imperil

the safety of any other person or the community. Mot. at 6. Specifically, Defendant proposes that

he be released on the condition that he resides with his mother and sister in the District of

Columbia.4 Id. Defendant further consents to electronic monitoring and substance abuse testing,

4
 Defendant also states that six other individuals, who were “screened and approved by pretrial services,”
would also assist in assuring his compliance with any conditions of release. Mot. at 6–7. Defendant does
not explain the extent of his relationships with these individuals. Id. at 7.

                                                   17
id. at 7–8, and agrees to any condition that would prevent him from having contact with any

witness or any other defendant in this case, id. at 8.

       However, as noted above, the Government has provided strong evidence indicating that

Defendant not only knowingly and intentionally served, at a minimum, as a lookout during the

commission of an armed carjacking and kidnapping of two victims by his associates, but he

obtained access to a firearm during the commission of these crimes and maintained access to

firearms following June 9, 2023. See generally Gov’t’s Opp’n. Furthermore, the significant

statutory penalties Defendant faces provide him with a strong incentive to flee. Overall, the

Court’s concerns regarding the safety of the community and Defendant’s risk of flight are not

alleviated. Therefore, this factor also weighs in favor of detention.

                                          *       *      *

       All in all, the Court finds that no set of conditions can address the threat of danger

Defendant poses to the community in the District of Columbia or mitigate his risk of flight.

Notably, Defendant’s Pretrial Services Report states: “No condition or combination of conditions

can reasonably assure the defendant’s appearance or safety to the community.” The Government

has shown that Defendant has a strong incentive to flee given the seriousness of the charges, the

apparent weight of the evidence, and the statutory penalties he is facing. Therefore, the Court

concludes that the Section 3142 factors require pretrial detention.

                                    IV.       CONCLUSION

       The record as a whole establishes, by clear and convincing evidence, that no condition or

combination of conditions can be imposed that would reasonably assure the safety of the

community or Defendant’s presence at trial if he was released pending trial.          18 U.S.C.

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§ 3142(e)(1). As such, the Court DENIES Defendant’s [54] Motion for Bond Review. An

appropriate order accompanies this memorandum opinion.

      Dated: December 14, 2023

                                                  /s/
                                                COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY
                                                United States District Judge

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