Court Opinion

ID: 9640491
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:07:04.732163+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:30.278944
License: Public Domain

CLINTON, Judge,
dissenting.
The rule that “the constitutional right to counsel ... does not mean errorless counsel ... whose competency or adequacy of his representation is to be judged by hindsight” has become a litany. Ex parte Robinson, 639 S.W.2d 953, 954 (Tex.Cr.App.1982); Mercado v. State, 615 S.W.2d 225, 228 (Tex.Cr.App.1981); Ex parte Prior, 540 S.W.2d 723, 726 (Tex.Cr.App.1976); see also Clinton & Wice, Assistance of Counsel in Texas, 12 St. Mary’s Law Journal 1, at 8 (1980). Today, however, the majority would have the Court turn a deaf ear to the chant.
Rather than measure effectiveness of counsel in light of North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969), as it was then common*523ly understood, the majority truly does judge advice of trial counsel given in January 1981 by hindsight of Texas v. McCullough, 475 U.S. 134, 106 S.Ct. 976, 89 L.Ed.2d 104 (1986).
I adhere to substance of the opinion of the Court on original submission, before the Supreme Court decided McCullough.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
MILLER and CAMPBELL, JJ., join in this opinion.