Court Opinion

ID: 9849566
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:42:41.152407+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:18.130737
License: Public Domain

Stafford, J.
(concurring) — Neither party relied on RCW 44.04.090 at any stage of this litigation. However, the resolution of an apparent conflict between the majority and dissenting opinions demands that the statute be considered. Justice Finley’s dissent states in part:
. . . I have no doubt that the legislature legally and constitutionally can provide funds and authorize reimbursement for living expenses actually incurred and, in fact, paid by members while away from home attending sessions of the legislature at the state capital.
(Italics his.)
The dissent appears to recognize the legislature’s constitutional authority to provide for the payment of funds “in *174lieu of subsistence and lodging” if the funds are paid as reimbursement for expenses actually incurred by legislators. RCW 44.04.090 supplies the link which establishes the element of actual “reimbursement” required by State ex rel. Todd v. Yelle, 7 Wn.2d 443, 110 P.2d 162 (1941).
Warrants for subsistence and lodging.
The state auditor shall issue warrants for said reimbursement on vouchers supported by affidavits that the reimbursement is claimed for expenses of subsistence and lodging actually incurred without itemization and without receipts. Such warrants shall be immediately paid from any funds appropriated for the purpose.
RCW 44.04.0809 and RCW 44.04.090 relate to the same general subject. Where possible the court should attempt to harmonize statutes pertaining to the same subject and give effect to each. State v. Bell, 59 Wn.2d 338, 368 P.2d 177 (1962), and cases cited therein. The statutory sections should be considered as units of a total scheme so that the integrity of each is maintained. Beach v. Board of Adjustment, 73 Wn.2d 343, 438 P.2d 617 (1968). Furthermore, where a legislative enactment is subject to two interpretations, one rendering it constitutional and the other unconstitutional, the constitutionality of the enactment should be upheld. George v. Day, 69 Wn.2d 836, 420 P.2d 677 (1966); Tembruell v. Seattle, 64 Wn.2d 503, 392 P.2d 453 (1964).
When the two statutory provisions are read together, it is clear that the State Auditor’s authority to issue warrants in payment of the per diem allowance permitted by RCW 44.04.080 is dependent upon the receipt of vouchers from legislators establishing that the funds claimed are for “expenses of subsistence and lodging actually incurred”. RCW 44.04.090. Funds so paid fall within the purview of actual “reimbursement” required by State ex rel. Todd v. Yelle, supra, thus rendering the challenged enactment constitutional. Any other interpretation would render RCW 44.04.090 futile and meaningless. The court does not indulge *175in such presumptions. Davis v. State Toll Bridge Auth., 57 Wn.2d 428, 357 P.2d 710 (1960); Kelleher v. Ephrata School Dist. 165, 56 Wn.2d 866, 355 P.2d 989 (1960).
In short, joint consideration of RCW 44.04.080 and RCW 44.04.090 makes it apparent that RCW 44.04.080 does not authorize an increase in compensation during a legislator’s term of office.

RCW 44.04.080 is the challenged statute. It is referred to in the majority and dissenting opinions as Laws of 1969, ch. 3, p. 12.