Court Opinion

ID: 9521298
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:02:12.896433+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:32.588235
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE NICKELS, specially concurring: I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the Unified Code of Corrections does not authorize consecutive sentences of imprisonment and probation for a single conviction. However, I do not agree with the manner in which the majority reaches the merits of defendant’s sentencing challenge. The State argues that defendant waived the right to challenge his sentence by failing to move to withdraw his guilty plea in the trial court. See People v. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d 320 (1996). The majority determines that defendant cannot waive this claim because his sentence is contrary to the sentencing provisions of the Unified Code of Corrections and is therefore "void.” In support of the finding that defendant’s sentence is void, the majority cites to People v. Arna, 168 Ill. 2d 107 (1995). I dissented in Arna and I continue to believe that case was wrongly decided. See People v. Arna, 168 Ill. 2d at 115 (Nickels, J., dissenting); see also People v. Garcia, 179 Ill. 2d 55, 78-79 (1997) (Nickels, J., dissenting, joined by Harrison and McMorrow, JJ.). This case is distinguishable from Arna. In Arna, the trial court imposed concurrent sentences on the defendant pursuant to section 5 — 8—4(a) of the Unified Code (730 ILCS 5/5 — 8—4(a) (West 1992)). The trial court therefore possessed the statutory authority to impose concurrent sentences if it found that the offenses were not committed as part of a single course of conduct or that there was a substantial change in criminal objective. On appeal, this court in Arna came to a different factual conclusion in order to determine that the concurrent sentences were contrary to the statute and therefore "void.” In this way, the majority was able to sidestep our rules which provide that the State may not appeal sentencing issues (145 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)) and that a defendant may not have his sentence increased on appeal (134 Ill. 2d R. 615(b)). In contrast, the trial court in the instant case had no statutory authority to impose consecutive sentences of imprisonment and probation for one offense. Moreover, there are no rules that prohibit a defendant from appealing sentencing issues or having a sentence reduced on appeal. Putting aside the propriety of Arna, I agree with the majority’s decision to address this case on the merits. This court has held that the traditional waiver analysis does not apply to a defendant’s challenge of a court’s statutory authority to impose a particular sentence. See People v. Singleton, 103 Ill. 2d 339, 346 (1984). A sentence imposed without statutory authority is plain error. I therefore concur in the judgment reversing defendant’s sentence. JUSTICE McMORROW joins in this special concurrence.