Court Opinion

ID: 9893296
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-26 16:11:46.375625+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:02:13.317779
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Howard, 2023-Ohio-3870.]

                               COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                             EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO,                                     :

                Plaintiff-Appellee,                :
                                                            No. 112024
                v.                                 :

VINCENT HOWARD,                                    :

                Defendant-Appellant.               :

                               JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
                RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: October 26, 2023

         Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                            Case No. CR-20-652446-A

                                             Appearances:

                Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
                Attorney, and Daniel Cleary, Assistant Prosecuting
                Attorney, for appellee.

                Charles A. Koenig, for appellant.

LISA B. FORBES, J.:

                  Vincent Howard (“Howard”) appeals his convictions of three counts

of forcible rape in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(2), which are first-degree felonies,

and one count of gross sexual imposition (“GSI”) in violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(1),
which is a fourth-degree felony. After reviewing the facts of the case and pertinent

law, we affirm Howard’s convictions.

I.   Facts and Procedural History

              On February 2, 2020, 19-year-old C.S. spent the night at Howard’s

house. Howard, who was 49 years old at the time, had been a father figure to C.S.

for most of her life. C.S. and Howard engaged in sexual conduct, and the crux of this

case concerns whether this sexual conduct was consensual.

              On August 17, 2020, Howard was charged with eight counts related

to the alleged sexual assault of C.S. This case was tried to a jury, and on August 19,

2022, Howard was found guilty of three counts of forcible rape and one count of

GSI. On September 15, 2022, the court sentenced Howard to an aggregate prison

term of 15-17.5 years.

              Howard now appeals raising three assignments of error for our

review:

      I. The trial court abused its discretion by denying defense motions for
      a continuance of the trial, thereby denying appellant a meaningful
      opportunity to present a complete defense which denied him effective
      assistance of counsel in violation of his rights under the due process
      clauses of the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
      States Constitution and Sections 10 and 16, Article I, of the Ohio
      Constitution.

      II. Appellant was deprived of his constitutional rights to due process in
      violation of the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
      States Constitution and Section 10, Article I of the Ohio Constitution,
      as a consequence of the state’s prosecutorial misconduct.

      III. Appellant’s convictions were not supported by sufficient evidence
      and were against the manifest weight of the evidence in violation of his
      rights under the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
      Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Sections
      10 and 16 of the Ohio Constitution.

II. Trial Testimony and Evidence

               The state presented three witnesses: nurse Denise Robinson, C.S.,

and police officer Berri Cramer. Howard testified in his own defense.

      A. Denise Robinson

               Denise Robinson (“Robinson”) testified that she is the forensic

program coordinator for University Hospitals and “primarily works with patients

who have been victims of sexual assault, domestic violence, or victims of crimes.”

Robinson is also a SANE nurse, which means she is a certified sexual-assault nurse

examiner who performs rape kits on sexual-assault victims. Robinson was working

on February 3, 2020, and she treated C.S. as well as filled out C.S.’s sexual-assault

forensic report (the “rape-kit report”). The state introduced this rape-kit report into

evidence.

               According to Robinson, C.S. was 19 years old at the time Robinson

treated her. C.S. named Howard as the person who sexually assaulted her. C.S.

described Howard as her “Godfather.” Robinson collected swabs from “dried stains”

on C.S.’s head, breast, thighs, back, and hands because, according to C.S.’s “story[,]

those are the areas that she mentioned that may have been touched. So those are

the areas that I would swab.” Robinson further testified about direct questions that

she asked C.S., such as, “Did the finger touch or penetrate your vaginal, anal, or oral

areas?” Robinson testified that C.S. answered “yes to vaginal.”
                Robinson testified that, although C.S.’s narrative in the rape-kit

report does not “really mention” digital penetration, Robinson “documented what

[C.S.] told me in the narrative” by writing the word “yes” on the report in answer to

the question, “Did finger touch or penetrate” C.S.’s vagina. To clarify, the prosecutor

asked Robinson the following question: “But earlier [C.S.] did say that [Howard’s]

finger did go in there, but when she told you the whole story the finger wasn’t

mentioned, correct?” Robinson answered, “Yes, yes.”

                Robinson testified that C.S. stated to her as follows during the

examination: “He gave me oral. He tried to make me get on top of him when he was

giving me oral. My legs were shaking. My heart was beating real fast. He asked why

I was shaking.” According to Robinson, C.S. was “[s]oft-spoken [and] tearful

throughout” the examination, and C.S. told Robinson that she felt sick.

      B. C.S.

                C.S. testified that she has known Howard since she was four years old

when he was dating C.S.’s mother. C.S.’s mother passed away when C.S. was seven

years old, but Howard remained in C.S.’s life. C.S. referred to Howard as her

godfather, testifying that “he stepped up and fulfilled the role of father in my life.”

C.S. resided primarily with her grandmother, although she spent most weekends

while she was growing up with Howard and his children.

                On February 2, 2020, at approximately 6:00 p.m., C.S. arrived to

work at an Amazon fulfillment center. C.S. had a taser in her work bag, and when

she entered the facility, her taser set off the metal detector. C.S. was sent home from
work that evening. C.S. was upset, and she called her grandmother, then called

Howard. C.S.’s grandmother and Howard agreed that C.S. needed to be patient, and

she would be back at work in a few days. C.S. testified that Howard said to her, “[I]t’s

the Super Bowl, the game is on, you want to order a pizza and watch the game.” C.S.

then went to Howard’s house in Garfield Heights.

               When C.S. arrived at Howard’s house, he was home alone, and he had

the television on in his bedroom. C.S. and Howard went into his bedroom to watch

the Super Bowl. C.S. sat “[o]n the bed. In the corner toward the wall on the edge of

the bed.” C.S. testified as follows about what happened next:

      After that he comes into the room and he sits at the head of the bed.
      And I was talking to him, looking at the game, not really paying
      attention to what was taking place, just trying to distract myself
      somewhat. And he said I still looked sad and to come up to the head of
      the bed so he could hold me. And he haven’t held me like that since I
      was a kid. * * * And he told me with his arms out, as a hug, to come in
      like a father.

               C.S. went to Howard and laid her head on his chest. Howard called

C.S. his “little baby.” Howard continued to watch the Super Bowl, and C.S. fell asleep

still “laying” on H0ward. At some point later, C.S. woke up to Howard “caressing”

her arm and leg. C.S.’s testimony continued: “When I woke up, my sports bra and

my shirt being lifted and all — the game was off and the lights were off and the door

was closed. * * * My shirt was being lifted and my sports bra and I was on my back.”

According to C.S., Howard’s hands were on her breasts. C.S. testified that she “[f]elt

like a dead body. Like I felt like I couldn’t move. I felt like I got stuck — just felt

stuck. I just felt real heavy and stuck. Just like my body was just paralyzed.”
              According to C.S., Howard was on top of her. “His hands were on my

breasts and he was making his way down towards my pants to pull them down. * * *

He was like on his like knees. He was laying down. As I was laying on my back, he

was maybe like laying over me. So as he was pulling my shirt up * * * he was making

his way down to pull my pants like down my body is what I am trying to tell y’all.”

              C.S. testified that when she first woke up, Howard’s head “was like on

my breast. He was playing with my breasts, licking my breasts.” Howard took C.S.’s

pants and underwear off. C.S. did not tell Howard no, and she did not “try to fight

him off.” Asked why, C.S. testified as follows:

      I was just preparing myself for what was about to happen because I was
      feeling around for my phone and my keys, where they was at before I
      fell asleep. And I couldn’t feel them nowhere. So I was just preparing
      myself for what I knew — I knew what was about to happen, thought
      was about to happened because the door was closed and my phone and
      my keys was moved from the side of me and the bedroom door was
      closed and all the lights was off. And he was on top of me. So I was
      telling myself like no fighting this because of the size. And I knew I
      can’t make a run for it because the door is closed and I can’t call nobody
      because my phone and stuff was moved from the side of me. So I just
      was bracing myself for the fact that he going to rape me and then kill
      me right afterwards. That’s all I kept trying to prepare myself for. I just
      kept telling myself over and over.

              Asked if she cried, C.S. answered, “Yeah. I cried the whole time. I

opened my eyes to realize it wasn’t a dream.”

              C.S. testified that Howard did not say anything until he pulled her

pants down. “When he pulled my pants down, he performed oral on me and was

pleasuring hisself and that’s when he started talking and saying he was so sorry.”
Asked if Howard put his mouth on her vagina, C.S. answered, “Yes.” C.S.’s testimony

continued:

      Q: While he’s down there using his mouth on your vagina, where are
      his hands? What are his hands doing?

      A: Pleasuring hisself. He was masturbating.

      Q: Are either of his hands touching your vagina that you know of? Was
      anything going inside of your vagina outside of his tongue at that point?

      A: I don’t remember. He just performed oral and was pleasuring
      himself. I don’t remember.

              According to C.S, Howard “came back up to the head of the bed and

wrapped his arms around” her. Howard again told C.S. that he was sorry, and she

was “too pretty for [her] own good.” C.S. testified that she was crying “[t]he whole

time.” C.S. testified about what happened next:

      He kept trying to force his tongue into my mouth, was like kissing me.
      I just kept my mouth shut, kept my lips shut, was crying. And then he
      asked me like do you want me to continue. And I still was just crying.
      I gave him no answer. And he said I’m going to just keep going. He
      turned me on my — he turned me on my stomach and * * * [s]aid I’m
      going to just continue.

      ***

      So when he turned me on my stomach that’s when he — put his thing
      inside of me. * * * I was on my stomach and he put his penis inside of
      my vagina.

              Asked how long this lasted, C.S. answered, “It seemed like forever. I

don’t know how long it lasted.” Asked if Howard ejaculated, C.S. testified that she

did not know. Asked how she knew that it was Howard’s penis that penetrated her

vagina, C.S. answered, “Because he was moving his hands to be able to put it in.”
Howard asked C.S. if she “liked it,” and C.S. said “no” while she was crying into the

pillow. At that time, Howard “got off of” C.S., who “ran to the corner of the room”

looking for her pants, phone, and keys. Howard told her to “close [her] eyes so he

could turn the light on.” Howard then handed C.S. her keys and phone.

               C.S. got dressed and started to walk out of the door. Howard told C.S.

that she forgot her shoes. C.S. grabbed her shoes and left the house. C.S. recalled

that Howard “was just standing there” dressed in a “wife beater” and boxer shorts.

C.S. testified that her “body just felt heavy” and she “walked like a zombie to the car.”

C.S. also recalled that, although her truck was still parked in Howard’s driveway, it

was “turned around” and was facing the opposite direction “from where [she] had

parked it at.” According to C.S., “somebody” moved her truck. C.S. got in her truck

and went to her grandmother’s house. Along the way, C.S. stopped at a light on

Miles Road to throw up. C.S. told her grandmother what happened, and her

grandmother took her to the hospital.

               According to C.S., the police came to the hospital to talk to her that

day, and she met with a detective about a week later at her grandmother’s house. At

the detective’s directive, C.S. called Howard on February 10, 2020, and this call was

recorded. C.S. testified that she and the detective did not discuss what C.S. “would

say on that call” before C.S. made the call. According to C.S., her conversation with

Howard was “authentic.”

               A recording of this phone call was introduced into evidence and

played for the jury. The following is relevant to the instant appeal.
               Howard asked C.S. where she was. C.S., who was audibly sobbing

during this phone conversation, responded. Howard then said to C.S., “I am so

sorry.” Howard asked C.S. to come over and talk about what happened. C.S. said,

“I’m not coming over.” C.S. told Howard that she “need[ed] to understand” what

occurred that night. Howard said, “I, I, I, I, got confused and thought you were

somebody different. I thought you were this girl with a ‘black and mild’ smell * * *

that I was dating, Shonniece.” Howard further stated, “I, I, I that’s no excuse. I don’t

know why that was in my head or anything. * * * I would never, I should never. I

don’t even know what to say or do. I should never have done that to you.”

               C.S. stated to Howard, “You really raped me. * * * I can’t sleep.”

Howard said nothing. C.S. explained in excruciating detail the effect that Howard’s

actions had on her, including wetting the bed and throwing up in her sleep. Howard

said, “You know I would never * * * want to hurt you. I don’t have anything I can do

to explain or excuse myself.”

               After the audio recording was played, the prosecutor asked C.S. if she

consented “to any of this.” C.S. answered, “No.” The prosecutor then asked C.S. the

following question: “Had another man done this to you, who would you have

called?” C.S. answered, “Vince. I would have called Vincent Howard if another man

would have done this to me.”

      C. Berri Cramer

               Berri Cramer (“Off. Cramer”) testified that she is a patrol officer with

the Garfield Heights Police Department. On February 3, 2020, Off. Cramer met with
C.S. at Ahuja Medical Center “for a possible rape report.” After speaking with C.S.,

Off. Cramer learned that Howard was the suspect of C.S.’s allegations.

      D. Howard

               Howard testified that he met C.S. in 2005 when he began dating C.S.’s

mother. At the time, C.S. was four years old. Asked what his relationship with C.S.

was, Howard testified that it “[w]as sort of a friendship, kinship to a fatherly role.”

C.S.’s mother passed away in 2007 when C.S. was six years old. C.S. was raised by

her maternal grandparents, but Howard and his children maintained their

relationship with C.S.

               On February 2, 2020, Howard was “home in bed, sick * * *. Fever,

headache.” According to Howard, he had plans to watch the Super Bowl that night

with his son, but Howard was “too sick to go into the living room and hang out with

him,” so Howard’s son went out. Howard drank “a cup and a half” of a Jack Daniel’s

“hot toddy.” In the early evening, C.S. called Howard with “a problem at work where

they wouldn’t let her go in because of [a] stun gun, so she was upset that she couldn’t

work.” Howard told C.S. that he “could just order her some pizza” and they “could

talk about it, like [they] always have.”

               C.S. arrived at Howard’s house approximately 30 minutes later.

Shortly after C.S. arrived, the pizza was delivered. Howard “grabbed a couple slices

and headed towards the bedroom.” C.S. also got pizza and took it into Howard’s

bedroom. According to Howard, he got into bed after he finished eating his pizza.

The television and the light were on, and the bedroom door was open. Howard
testified that he fell asleep watching the Super Bowl. Howard testified as follows

about what happened next:

      Yeah, so I was in bed asleep and I find somebody crawl in bed and lay
      three quarters across my chest and legs. * * * Felt the tugging and
      caressing of my beard and kissing. * * * And then I began to start to
      kiss back. * * * Then * * * my hand was on the back from the left side,
      start caressing, start rubbing, working my way down.

              According to Howard, C.S. “initiated” the kissing. Howard testified

that C.S. has “never laid in the bed with me.” Howard also testified that when he

woke up to C.S. kissing him, the television and light were off. Howard explained

that the television will go into “dark mode” after a period of nonuse, but he did not

turn the bedroom light off. Howard did not recall whether the bedroom door was

open or closed.

              Howard testified that C.S. “had her thighs, leg sliding right against my

private areas.” Asked if “at that time could you tell that it was” C.S., Howard

answered as follows: “Yeah, shortly after that, I knew it wasn’t Shonniece.” After

realizing the woman in bed with him was C.S., Howard “started to get aroused [and]

just started returning the affection.” Asked if C.S. ever told Howard to stop “or any

of those words to that effect,” Howard answered, “No.” Howard testified that he did

not restrain or threaten C.S. According to Howard, he touched and kissed C.S.’s

breasts and “went down to give oral” to C.S. Howard testified that C.S. was not

crying when this encounter occurred.       Rather, Howard stated that C.S. was

“moaning.”
              Howard testified that no other sexual activity between him and C.S.

occurred. Specifically, Howard denied penetrating C.S.’s vagina with his penis,

stating that he suffers from erectile dysfunction. Howard did not testify about

whether or not he digitally penetrated C.S.’s vagina.

              Howard testified that C.S. left his house that night, and he denied

moving C.S.’s car. Howard stated as follows regarding the phone call between him

and C.S. that was played for the jury:

      We had sex, but it should have never happened between us. I had
      always looked at her as a daughter, treated her as a daughter. We had
      sex and I just could not wrap my head around it. I could not stop
      beating myself up mentally over it. I mean, to the point where I’m
      sleeping an hour, two hours at a time in the middle of the night then
      shaking to wake up just looking around. * * * And then to hear her cry
      destroys me. It always has.

              On cross-examination, the state asked Howard the following question

after Howard testified that his penis did not penetrate C.S.’s vagina: “Why do we

find your DNA inside [C.S.’s] vagina * * *? [E]xplain why your semen is in her

vagina.” Howard responded that “if I had any kind of leakage, anything on my

shorts, or she got on top where the opening is in my boxer brief, yeah, there’s my

penis right there.” According to Howard, “[t]here was no crying when [he and C.S.]

had sex,” and C.S. was “lying about that.”

III. Law and Analysis

              For ease of discussion, we address Howard’s assignments of error out

of order.
      A. Third Assignment of Error

               In Howard’s third assignment of error, he raises two issues:

sufficiency of the evidence and manifest weight of the evidence.           Specifically,

Howard argues that “[a]ll of [his] convictions were improper as the evidence

presented at trial was insufficient and inadequate to prove beyond a reasonable

doubt that [he] compelled C.S. to submit to sexual conduct by means of force or

threat of force, an element essential to all the offenses.” Howard argues in the

alternative that “the evidence presented at trial was insufficient and inadequate to

prove that [he] digitally penetrated C.S.,” which applies only to one of this three rape

convictions.

           1. Sufficiency of the Evidence

               “[A]n appellate court’s function when reviewing the sufficiency of the

evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at

trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average

mind of defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d

259, 273, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991). “In essence, sufficiency is a test of adequacy.

Whether the evidence is legally sufficient to sustain a verdict is a question of law.”

State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997).

           2. Manifest Weight of the Evidence

               A manifest weight of the evidence challenge “addresses the evidence’s

effect of inducing belief. * * * In other words, a reviewing court asks whose evidence

is more persuasive — the state’s or the defendant’s?” State v. Wilson, 113 Ohio St.3d
382, 2007-Ohio-2202, 865 N.E.2d 1264, ¶ 25. “When a court of appeals reverses a

judgment of a trial court on the basis that the verdict is against the weight of the

evidence, the appellate court sits as the ‘thirteenth juror’ and disagrees with the

factfinder’s resolution of the conflicting testimony.” Thompkins at 387. Reversing

a conviction under a manifest weight theory “should be exercised only in the

exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.” State

v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983).

           3. Force

              Pursuant to R.C. 2901.01(A)(1), “‘Force’ means any violence,

compulsion, or constraint physically exerted by any means upon or against a person

or thing.” This definition applies to charges of rape and GSI that are based on “force

or threat of force.” R.C. 2907.02(A)(2); 2909.05(A)(1). Force or threat of force “can

be inferred from the circumstances surrounding sexual conduct * * *.” State v.

Schaim, 65 Ohio St.3d 51, 55, 600 N.E.2d 661 (1992). See also State v. Szorady, 8th

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95045, 2011-Ohio-1800, ¶ 33.

                   a. Forcible Rape

              R.C. 2907.02(A)(2) states that “[n]o person shall engage in sexual

conduct with another when the offender purposely compels the other person to

submit by force or threat of force.” R.C. 2907.01(A) defines “sexual conduct” as

follows:

      vaginal intercourse between a male and female; anal intercourse,
      fellatio, and cunnilingus between persons regardless of sex; and,
      without privilege to do so, the insertion, however slight, of any part of
      the body or any instrument, apparatus, or other object into the vaginal
      or anal opening of another. Penetration, however slight, is sufficient to
      complete vaginal or anal intercourse.

               Upon review, we find the following evidence in the record concerning

“force” as it relates to rape. C.S. testified that, when she woke up, she “felt like a

dead body,” she felt like she “couldn’t move,” and she was “just paralyzed.” Howard

took her pants and underwear off. The lights were off, the television was off, the

bedroom door was closed, and C.S.’s keys and phone were missing. She “knew” what

was about to happen, and Howard was “on top of” her. She did not “fight him off”

because of his size.

               Evidence in the record established that Howard weighed 295 pounds

at the time, and C.S. weighed approximately 100 pounds. C.S. testified that she

“cried the whole time” and she “was bracing” herself “for the fact that he [was] going

to rape [her] and then kill [her] right afterwards.” C.S. further testified that Howard

“turned” her onto her stomach and put his penis inside her vagina. “He pushed my

shoulder. He turned me over, grabbed my shoulders, and turned me specifically like

this by using his hand to push me over to my stomach from my side.”

               Howard, on the other hand, testified that he was asleep in bed when

C.S. “crawled” into bed with him and started to “caress” and kiss him. Howard “just

started returning the affection.” According to Howard, he did not restrain or

threaten C.S., and C.S. did not cry.

                       b. Forcible GSI

               R.C. 2907.05(A)(1) states that “[n]o person shall have sexual contact

with another * * * [w]hen * * * [t]he offender purposely compels the other person
* * * to submit by force or threat of force.” R.C. 2907.01(B) defines “sexual contact”

as follows: “any touching of an erogenous zone of another, including without

limitation the thigh, genitals, buttock, pubic region, or, if the person is a female, a

breast, for the purpose of sexually arousing or gratifying either person.”

               Upon review, we find the following evidence in the record concerning

“force” as it relates to GSI. C.S. testified that, when she woke up, Howard had “lifted”

her sports bra and shirt, and Howard touched her breasts with his hands and mouth.

C.S. also testified that Howard “kept trying to force his tongue into [her] mouth.”

C.S. further testified that Howard pulled her pants down and put his mouth on her

vagina.

                    c. Analysis of Force

               In following the precedent of this district, we find that the state

presented sufficient evidence of force to support Howard’s convictions for rape and

GSI. See State v. Blankenship, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 77900, 2001 Ohio App.

LEXIS 5520 (Dec. 13, 2001) (finding that a rape victim’s “testimony, if believed, is

sufficient to prove each element of the offense * * *. There is no requirement that a

rape victim’s testimony be corroborated as a condition precedent to conviction.”).

               In State v. Bradley, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98216, 2013-Ohio-485,

this court affirmed the defendant’s GSI conviction under circumstances similar to

the case at hand. The victim was Bradley’s 23-year-old daughter, and this court

found that Bradley used force to have sexual contact with her. “K.B. testified that

she fell asleep wearing a shirt and shorts but when she woke up her shorts were
completely removed and her shirt was up above her chest. Bradley was standing

above her, exposing himself, and used his hands to touch her inner thigh and try to

push her legs apart.” Id. at ¶ 24. “This court has held that separating a victim’s legs

and pulling down the victim’s clothing while the victim sleeps can only be

accomplished through force. * * * This court has also previously held that the

manipulation of a sleeping victim’s clothing in order to facilitate sexual contact can

constitute force under R.C. 2901.01(A)(1) even though such force requires only

minimal physical exertion.” Id. at ¶ 22-23. See also State v. Graves, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 88845, 2007-Ohio-5430, ¶ 28 (“Graves pulled down M.S.’s pants and

said act satisfies the element of force.”); State v. Clark, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga

No. 90148, 2008-Ohio-3358, ¶ 17 (“In the situation where the victim is sleeping and

thus not aware of the defendant’s intentions, only minimal force is necessary to

facilitate the act.”).

                We further find that, as to the use of force, Howard’s convictions for

rape and GSI are not against the manifest weight of the evidence. This court has

consistently held that “when considering a manifest weight challenge, the trier of

fact is in the best position to take into account inconsistencies, along with the

witness’s manner, demeanor, gestures, and voice inflections, in determining

whether the proffered testimony is credible.” State v. Holloway, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga

No. 101289, 2015-Ohio-1015, ¶ 42.         In reviewing C.S.’s testimony, which is

consistent with Robinson’s testimony and the rape-kit report, we cannot say that the
jury lost its way in finding C.S. credible and in finding that Howard used force

against her concerning his forcible rape and forcible GSI convictions.

           4. Digital-Penetration Rape

              Howard next argues under his third assignment of error that his

conviction for rape in Count 3 is not supported by sufficient evidence and is against

the manifest weight of the evidence. Count 3 of Howard’s indictment states that he

“did engage in sexual conduct, to wit: digital penetration, with [C.S.] by purposely

compelling her to submit by force or threat of force.” Specifically, Howard argues

that the only evidence of digital penetration was Robinson stating that “on the

forensic report [C.S.] filled out, she checked the block indicating there had been

digital penetration.” Howard further argues that neither he nor C.S. provided any

testimony “regarding digital penetration.”

              By Howard’s own admission on appeal, there is sufficient evidence to

convict him of digital-penetration rape as shown by Robinson’s testimony and the

rape-kit report, which both indicate that Howard’s fingers penetrated C.S.’s vagina.

              We turn to whether Howard’s conviction for digital-penetration rape

is against the manifest weight of the evidence in the record. Upon review, we find

that Howard did not testify specifically about digital penetration. Rather, Howard

denied that sexual conduct other than oral penetration occurred. C.S., on the other

hand, answered as follows when asked if “anything [was] going inside of your vagina

outside of [Howard’s] tongue”: “I don’t remember. He just performed oral and was

pleasuring himself. I don’t remember.” C.S. was also asked how she knew that
Howard’s penis penetrated her vagina. C.S. answered, “Because he was moving his

hands to be able to put it in.”

               Additionally, Robinson testified that C.S. answered “yes to vaginal”

when asked if Howard’s finger penetrated anything.              This is bolstered by

information in C.S.’s rape-kit report indicating that Howard digitally penetrated her

vagina. In other words, Robinson testified that the only reason she wrote the word

“yes” next to digital penetration on the rape-kit report is because C.S. told her that

was true.

               Upon review, we find that the weight of the evidence in the record

does not go against Howard’s conviction for digital-penetration rape. A reasonable

jury could have found Howard guilty of this offense by believing Robinson’s

testimony, the rape-kit report, and C.S.’s testimony that Howard used his hands to

put his penis in her vagina. Although we acknowledge that C.S. first testified she did

not remember if anything was “going inside” her vagina other than Howard’s

tongue, Ohio courts have consistently held that a “trier of fact is free to believe all,

some, or none of the testimony of each witness testifying at trial. * * * Thus, a

conviction is not against the manifest weight of the evidence ‘solely because the jury

heard inconsistent or contradictory testimony.’” State v. Penland, 2023-Ohio-806,

210 N.E.3d 1103, ¶ 51 (8th Dist.), quoting State v. Rudd, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga

No. 102754, 2016-Ohio-106, ¶ 72. See also State v. Nitsche, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga

No. 103174, 2016-Ohio-3170, ¶ 45 (“[A] defendant is not entitled to reversal on
manifest weight grounds merely because certain aspects of a witness’s testimony are

not credible or were inconsistent or contradictory.”).

               Upon review of the evidence presented at trial, we find no basis to

conclude that the jury lost its way and created a manifest miscarriage of justice

concerning Howard’s conviction for digital-penetration rape. The jury was in the

best position to weigh the credibility of the trial testimony and evidence, and we will

not disturb this verdict on appeal.

               Accordingly, Howard’s third assignment of error is overruled.

      B. Second Assignment of Error

               In Howard’s second assignment of error, he argues that he was

deprived of constitutional rights as a consequence of prosecutorial misconduct.

Specifically, Howard argues that the state engaged in misconduct when it asked him

how his DNA and semen was found in C.S.’s vagina if, as Howard testified to, he and

C.S. only engaged in oral sex. Howard argues that this line of questioning amounts

to misconduct because no evidence was ever presented regarding DNA or semen.

Howard further argues that the state engaged in misconduct when it repeated this

same “misinformation” during closing arguments by stating that there was evidence

of Howard’s semen from two sources: C.S.’s medical record and Howard’s

admission.

             1. Prosecutorial Misconduct — Standard of Review

               The Ohio Supreme Court set forth the following test regarding

prosecutorial misconduct:
      To evaluate allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, we “must
      determine (1) whether the prosecutor’s conduct was improper and (2)
      if so, whether it prejudicially affected [the defendant’s] substantial
      rights.” [Sic] State v. LaMar, 95 Ohio St.3d 181, 2002-Ohio-2128, 767
      N.E.2d 166, ¶ 121. Because prosecutorial misconduct implicates due-
      process concerns, “[t]he touchstone of the analysis ‘is the fairness of the
      trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor.’” State v. Jones, 135 Ohio
      St.3d 10, 2012-Ohio-5677, 984 N.E.2d 948, ¶ 200, quoting Smith v.
      Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219, 102 S.Ct. 940, 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982). We
      “will not deem a trial unfair, if, in the context of the entire trial, it
      appears clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have
      found the defendant guilty even” absent the misconduct. LaMar at
      ¶ 121.

State v. Thompson, 141 Ohio St.3d 254, 2014-Ohio-4751, 23 N.E.3d 1096, ¶ 162.

           2. The Misconduct in Question

                The following colloquy occurred during Howard’s case-in-chief, when

the prosecutor cross-examined Howard:

      Q: And, you know, typically I don’t want to — when I cross a defendant,
      I don’t want to start with this, but I have to.

      You just told the Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury that you didn’t
      penetrate her vagina, right?

      A: Yes.

      Q: With your penis, I should say. With your penis?

      A: Yes.

      Q: Why do we find your DNA inside her vagina then, Mr. Howard?
      Explain that to them. Turn to them and explain why your semen is in
      her vagina. Please. I’ll wait.

                The prosecutor further stated the following to Howard: “And your

semen magically appeared in her —”; “And your semen ended up inside her vagina
—”; “So you don’t know there is semen inside the victim’s vagina?”; and “You are

telling me now all of a sudden you don’t know your semen is in her vagina, correct?”

              Additionally, during closing argument, the prosecutor stated as

follows: “To stand here and argue to you that his semen isn’t in that rape kit is

ridiculous. It’s untrue. He admitted that to you.”

           3. Prosecutorial Misconduct Analysis

              C.S.’s rape-kit report contained the following information: Under a

heading entitled “detailed body surface findings,” Robinson observed, through

“Direct Visualization” and “Colposcope/Alternate Light Source,” “Dried Stains” on

C.S.’s head, breasts, thighs, back, and hands. Robinson also noted in the report that

“blind sweeps for internal swabs collected[.]           [C.S.] declined speculum”

examination. It is undisputed that no follow-up evidence was introduced at trial

concerning these “dried stains” or “blind sweeps.” In other words, there is no

mention of DNA or semen in the rape-kit report.

              C.S. testified that, during the rape examination at the hospital, “[t]hey

swabbed my whole body. They collected DNA with the rape kit.” This testimony is

the only evidence in the record about DNA. There is no evidence in the record

whatsoever about semen.

              Howard’s attorney repeatedly objected to the state’s line of

questioning regarding DNA and semen, stating that “[t]here was no medical

evidence admitted by the State of Ohio with regards to the semen.” The court

repeatedly overruled defense counsel’s objections.
               In applying the prosecutorial misconduct test to the case at hand, we

first find that the prosecutor’s conduct in questioning Howard about his DNA and

semen that was “found” in C.S.’s vagina was improper. It is unequivocal that the

state did not present any evidence concerning Howard’s DNA and semen, or

anybody’s DNA and semen for that matter.1

               We further find that Howard did not admit that his semen or DNA

was found in C.S.’s vagina. To take the words of the prosecutor himself, for the state

to argue that Howard’s semen is in the rape-kit report is “ridiculous.” See State v.

Smith, 14 Ohio St.3d 13, 14, 470 N.E.2d 883 (1984) (“[A]n attorney is not to allude

to matters which will not be supported by admissible evidence * * *. Such conduct

is well beyond the normal latitude allowed in closing arguments and is clearly

improper.”).

               Having found that the prosecutor’s comments and questions were

improper, we turn to the second prong of the prosecutorial misconduct test. We

look to the following factors to determine whether these improper comments and

questions were prejudicial: “(1) the nature of the remarks, (2) whether an objection

      1 On appeal, the state argues in part as follows: “The State will assume that

[Howard’s] counsel has not reviewed the trial discovery in this case. Had counsel
reviewed it, counsel would find out that [Howard’s] semen was, in fact, found in C.S.’s
rape kit. Unlike [Howard], the State will not argue why those witnesses did not testify
since it is outside the record. However, that does not change the fact that the information
exists.”
        The state essentially admits that any information concerning Howard’s semen was
“outside the record.” It is axiomatic that convictions must be based on evidence produced
at trial. See, e.g., State v. Waddy, 63 Ohio St.3d 424, 436, 588 N.E.2d 819 (1992) (“Of
course, a prosecutor may not deliberately misstate evidence or argue facts not in the
record.”).
was made by counsel, (3) whether corrective instructions were given by the court,

and (4) the strength of the evidence against the defendant.” State v. Braxton, 102

Ohio App.3d 28, 41, 656 N.E.2d 970 (8th Dist.1995).

              Although we cannot stress enough how improper these unsupported

questions and comments were, we are not able to say that they affected the outcome

of Howard’s trial. We found that Howard’s convictions were supported by sufficient

evidence in the record and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The

evidence consisted primarily of C.S.’s detailed testimony about the events that

occurred on the night in question. This testimony is substantially similar to the

narrative account that C.S. gave Robinson hours after Howard sexually assaulted

her. Robinson’s testimony and the rape-kit report support C.S.’s testimony. For the

same reasons that we overruled Howard’s third assignment of error, we find that

Howard was not prejudiced by the prosecutor’s improper questions and comments

in the case at hand.

              Accordingly, Howard’s second assignment of error is overruled.

      C. First Assignment of Error

              In Howard’s first assignment of error, he raises three issues: denial of

continuance, meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense, and ineffective

assistance of counsel. Specifically, Howard argues that “[o]nly [he] testified with

respect to his [erectile dysfunction] disorder; had he been able to corroborate his

claim through third-party testimony and documentation, it would have created
doubt as to whether C.S. was embellishing her story by adding an allegation of

vaginal intercourse.”

           1. Denial of Continuance

              “The grant or denial of a continuance is a matter which is entrusted

to the broad, sound discretion of the trial judge. An appellate court must not reverse

the denial of a continuance unless there has been an abuse of discretion.” State v.

Unger, 67 Ohio St.2d 65, 67, 426 N.E.2d 1078 (1981). “There are no mechanical

tests for deciding when a denial of a continuance is so arbitrary as to violate due

process. The answer must be found in the circumstances present in every case,

particularly in the reasons presented to the trial judge at the time the request is

denied.” Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589, 84 S.Ct. 841, 11 L.Ed.2d 921 (1964).

              On August 12, 2022, three days prior to trial, Howard filed a motion

for continuance. In this motion, Howard argued as follows:

      * * * due to the fact that defendant is facing possible conviction on an
      eight count (8) count indictment, counsel finds it imperative that she
      “pulls out all the stops” in advocating on his behalf. Accordingly, per
      information recently provided to counsel via [a] Private Investigator,
      counsel has been advised that documents have been recently
      subpoenaed, which could prove imperative to defendants’ defense, and
      in addition the private investigator further provides that there’s
      potential testimony from witnesses from whom she has yet to
      interview, which could further be crucial to defendants’ defense.

              Attached to Howard’s motion was an affidavit from a private

investigator who stated that she was retained to work on the case at hand in March

2022; she has a “significant case load”; she has “spent many hours investigating”

other cases, but she needs “additional time to track and locate all necessary
witnesses” and “acquire related * * * medical records” concerning Howard’s case;

and she “just discovered on August 8, 2022, * * * something * * * that is very critical

* * *.”

               On August 15, 2022, prior to trial commencing, defense counsel

renewed Howard’s motion for continuance, which had not yet been ruled on. The

court denied this motion, stating that the “last time I granted it[,] I indicated very

clearly that that was the last continuance.”

           2. Meaningful Opportunity to Present a Complete Defense

               Howard argues on appeal that “if [he] had been able to establish that

vaginal intercourse was not possible,” by presenting corroborating evidence

concerning his alleged erectile dysfunction, it would have called into question C.S.’s

credibility when she testified that his penis penetrated her vagina. Howard further

argues that this issue “could not be explored or answered at trial because the court

refused [his] reasonable request for a continuance, needed to give his investigator

additional time to complete her investigation of [his] medical records and procure

witnesses to testify on his behalf.”

               Our review of the record shows that, if Howard was unable to present

a “complete defense,” it was not because the court denied his requests for

continuance three days before trial and on the day of trial. We think it is a

reasonable presumption that Howard was aware of his own erectile dysfunction.

And Howard became aware that C.S. accused him of rape, in which his penis

penetrated her vagina, on August 17, 2020, when he was indicted. Two years later,
in August 2022, Howard requested a continuance to explore this issue that surfaced

at the time of his indictment. We cannot say that the court abused its discretion, or

thwarted Howard’s opportunity to present a complete defense, by denying his last-

minute motion for continuance. See State v. Sanders, 92 Ohio St.3d 245, 276, 750

N.E.2d 90 (2001) (finding no abuse of discretion when the court denied the

defendant’s request for a continuance to “prepare for trial” because “[l]ead counsel

was appointed nearly two months before trial” and “co-counsel had been on the case

fifteen months before trial * * *”).

            3. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

               To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant

must establish that his or her attorney’s performance was deficient and that the

defendant was prejudiced by the deficient performance. Strickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). However, “a court need not

determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient before examining the

prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies. The object

of an ineffectiveness claim is not to grade counsel’s performance.” Id. at 697. See

also State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St. 3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373 (1989).

               Our review of the trial transcript in this case shows that Howard

testified he had erectile dysfunction. “So I suffer from erectile dysfunction. Took

me a couple of years to actually go to a doctor to see about it. I have been on

medication since 2017. And to prepare for sex, you would have to take the pill at

least an hour ahead of time.” Nothing in the record suggests that Howard was
prejudiced because he did not present evidence corroborating his claim of erectile

dysfunction. Furthermore, Howard does not identify with particularity, beyond

“medical records” and “witnesses,” what information his investigator needed more

time to find. See State v. Krzywkowski, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 83599, 83842, and

84056, 2004-Ohio-5966, ¶ 22, quoting State v. Glover, 12th Dist. Clermont

No. CA2001-12-102, 2002-Ohio-6392, ¶ 25 (“In many criminal cases, trial counsel’s

decision not to seek expert testimony ‘is unquestionably tactical because such an

expert might uncover evidence that further inculpates the defendant.’”) As such,

Howard has failed to establish the prejudice prong of the Strickland test.

              Upon review, we find that the court did not abuse its discretion when

it denied Howard’s last-minute request for a continuance, Howard was not deprived

of the opportunity to present his defense, and Howard’s counsel did not render

ineffective assistance. Accordingly, Howard’s first assignment of error is overruled.

              Judgment affirmed.

      It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.          The defendant’s

conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case

remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.
      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

LISA B. FORBES, JUDGE

ANITA LASTER MAYS, A.J., CONCURS WITH THE MAJORITY AND CONCURS
WITH THE SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION;
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J., CONCURS (WITH SEPARATE OPINION)

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J., CONCURRING:

              I concur with the majority’s decision, but write separately to address

the prosecutor’s line of questioning during Howard’s testimony regarding the

presence of his semen in the victim’s vagina. As the majority pointed out, the state

presented absolutely no evidence or testimony to the jury during the trial that

Howard’s semen was found in the victim’s vagina. Although the victim testified that

Howard engaged in vaginal intercourse with her, she did not know if Howard had

ejaculated. Her testimony was consistent with Robinson’s testimony that the victim

told her during the exam that the victim did not know if Howard had ejaculated.

Finally, Robinson testified that she swabbed areas that the victim mentioned may

have been touched, but the state did not present any forensic testimony or evidence

about the presence of any DNA taken from the victim or found in the rape kit.

              Howard admitted that he engaged in oral sex with the victim.

Accordingly, it is undisputable that Howard’s DNA by means of saliva would be

present in the victim’s rape kit. But Howard denied that he had vaginal intercourse

with the victim. Accordingly, it was within the province of the jury to determine
whether the victim or Howard was more credible. However, the state attempted to

tip the credibility scale in its favor by making unsupported assertions.

               If the state had evidence of Howard’s DNA in some form other than

saliva, it should have presented that evidence rather than attempt to permeate the

trial by commenting on evidence outside the record.          Instead, the state used

unsupported innuendo to “prove” that Howard’s semen was present in the victim’s

vagina. To further exacerbate the improper line of question, the state during closing

argument, claimed that Howard admitted to the presence of his semen in the

victim’s vagina. This is simply not true.

               However, I cannot entirely fault the prosecutor because the mistake

arguably rests with the trial court by allowing the questions. Howard’s defense

counsel repeatedly objected to the prosecutor’s questioning, stating that no forensic

evidence or testimony was admitted regarding the presence of semen. See tr. 566-

567. The trial court as the gatekeeper of evidence should not have allowed the state

to continue with its line of questioning absent some credible showing that the state

had a good faith belief for its assertions. State v. Gillard, 40 Ohio St.3d 226, 231,

533 N.E.2d 272, 535 N.E.2d 315 (1988) (a cross-examiner may ask a question if the

examiner has a good-faith belief that a factual predicate for the question exists).

“The scope of cross-examination * * * lies within the sound discretion of the trial

court, viewed in relation to the particular facts of each case.” State v. Metcalf, 12th

Dist. Butler No. CA2010-12-326, 2012-Ohio-674, ¶ 26, citing State v. Cox, 12th Dist.

No. CA2000-07-144, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 2829, 4 (June 25, 2001), citing State v.
Acre, 6 Ohio St.3d 140, 145, 451 N.E.2d 802 (1983). In Metcalf, this court found

that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the state to mischaracterize DNA

evidence, but found no prejudice because the improper characterization occurred

only in two instances. Id. at ¶ 27-28. Much like Metcalf, this case highlights the

importance of a trial court understanding the impact of DNA evidence, its presence,

and characterization. In cases involving the balancing of credibility, DNA evidence

and testimony often tips the scale in favor of one side or the other because most

often, DNA evidence is irrefutable.

               The problem for Howard, however, is that he did not assign as error

the trial court’s decision overruling his objections and thus allowing the state to ask

questions that it may or may not have had a good faith basis for asking. The

assignment of error he raises focuses on the prosecutor’s conduct — not the trial

court’s discretion. When the trial court repeatedly overruled Howard’s objections,

the prosecutor was not entirely precluded from continuing with its line of

questioning.

               Based on the assignment of error raised and the entire record,

including Howard’s admissions regarding his conduct, the jury’s verdict revealing

that it carefully considered each count separately, and the evidence presented, I

cannot say that the state engaged in such misconduct to infect the entire trial, which

would have denied Howard a fair trial. Accordingly, I concur with the majority’s

decision to affirm the convictions.