Court Opinion

ID: 9734359
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:32:44.242669+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:48.143137
License: Public Domain

Riley, J.
(dissenting). This case arises out of the rejection by defendants township and township *643board of a plat submitted by plaintiffs-developer. Because I believe that the township lacked authority to reject the plat pursuant, to the Subdivision Control Act, I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals reversing the grant of summary disposition in favor of defendants and remanding to the trial court.
I dissent from my colleagues because SCA § 182(4)(a)1 provides for rejection by the governing body of a plat that "is isolated from or which isolates other lands from existing public streets, unless suitable access is provided.” (Emphasis added.) Defendants assert that a plat is to be considered "isolated” where there is no "suitable” access. Because the Creekwood-Haslett intersection is considered dangerous and unsafe, access to the proposed plat is not "suitable,” and the plat is thus "isolated.” Defendants conclude, therefore, that it properly rejected plaintiffs’ proposed plat because it was isolated and did not provide for suitable access.
As conceded by the circuit judge, "Creekwood is literally, a public street itself, and . . . provides some access to the outside world.” The Court of Appeals also found that "§ 182(4) does not apply to the instant situation since access to the subdivision is gained by Creekwood Drive, an existing public street.” Id. at 4.
Twenty-five homes currently utilize Creekwood. Creekwood in fact is already equipped to accommodate an extension to a new subdivision by way of the stub street that was constructed as part of the *644Creekwood subdivision. The developer of the Creekwood subdivision, a different developer than in the present appeal, was permitted to prepare Creekwood for additional traffic in the future. In addition, the township has a policy of allowing single access routes for developments of fifty homes or less. Plaintiffs planned the size of the initial plat in conformance with that policy. The Creekwood subdivision has twenty-five homes, and plaintiffs’ proposed development consists of twenty-five homes. Plaintiffs’ proposed plat not only has access to a public street that is currently used for vehicular traffic, but, by the policy of the township, plaintiffs complied with the number of residences that could employ a single access to larger public routes. Had the township desired to limit the access to Creekwood, it would not have allowed the building of the stub street, and would have indicated at the time the Creekwood subdivision was developed that its own policy of allowing single accesses to developments of fifty homes or less would not apply to that subdivision.
Furthermore, the finding that the defendants’ rejection of plaintiffs’ plat was unwarranted is consistent with a fair reading of the sca and applicable Michigan case law. Approving authorities, such as defendant township board, have no inherent power to approve or reject a proposed development plat. Any power they do have is given by the Legislature, through the sca.2 Section *645106 of the sca mandates that an approving authority consider only the requirements enumerated in § 105 when determining whether to approve or reject a plat.3 Section 105, in part pertinent to the instant case, states:
Approval of preliminary and final plats shall be conditioned upon compliance with:
(a) The provisions of this act.
(b) Any ordinance or published rules of a municipality or county adopted to carry out the provisions of this act.
(c) Any published rules of a county drain commissioner, county road commission, or county plat board adopted to carry out the provisions of this act.
In the instant case, defendants argue that they assumed a secondary access to Haslett Road would be built because it was included in plaintiffs’ larger plan submitted with their rezoning request. Proper zoning is a prerequisite to plat approval. Oakland Court v York Twp, 128 Mich App 199, 201; 339 NW2d 873 (1983). A zoning plan is not, however, a plat for purposes of the sca. Because the governing body must act only within the limits of authority given to it by the sca, it must rely only upon a plat submitted pursuant to the sca, *646rather than a plan submitted for rezoning purposes.4
Our decision in Arrowhead Development Co v Livingston Co Road Comm, 413 Mich 505; 322 NW2d 702 (1982), does not control the issue in the instant case. Whether or not an alteration could be required outside the plat, but on land owned by the developer and intended to be part of the same subdivision, was not at issue in Arrowhead. The road commission in Arrowhead required that the developer make several alterations to his plat before approval would be granted. Of all the requirements, only the one which involved land outside the submitted plat was stricken by this Court as unwarranted. The commission could have required the developer to relocate Navajo Trail, a road entirely within the boundaries of the proposed plat. 413 Mich 518. Improvements upon the county road which abutted the developer’s property could not be required, for they were entirely outside the land to be partitioned and divided by the developer. Id.
Other cases cited by the parties do not support a contrary result. The pre-Arrowhead decision of Carlson v City of Troy5 reflects simply that a governing body has no authority to reject a plat *647aside from that given to it by the sca. Therefore, the rejection of a plat not supported by provisions of the sca, or by an ordinance enacted to carry out the provisions of the sca, was improper, and the city could not require that the developer indicate its future subdivision plans for all lands the proprietor owned which adjoined the land within the submitted plat.
Similarly, in Eversdyk v Wyoming City Council6 and Eyde Construction Co v Meridian Charter Twp7 the grounds upon which the approving authorities based their rejection of the developers’ proposed plats were not supported by the sca. In Eversdyk8 the city council rejected the plat because the city planned to rezone the area to a designation which would be incompatible with the developer’s proposed development. While the sca allows the governing authority to reject a plat on the basis of existing and published rules, rejection on the basis of proposed rules which are not yet operative was improper.
In Eyde9 the township attempted to require that the developer dedicate recreation land to the township in order to have the plat approved. Such authority is not expressed in the sca, nor could it be fairly implied. The writ of mandamus ordering the township to remove the condition was therefore affirmed.
*648Only in CPW Investments No 2 v City of Troy,10 was the governing authority arguably allowed to require that the developer make improvements on land that was not to be divided or partitioned. This case is also distinguishable, however. The developer owned the land in question and could have included it in his plat had it not been previously dedicated to public use under the doctrine of "highway by user.” The land did not have to be included within the plat, but the Court found that it was included to enhance the value and salability of the lots within the subdivided tract, and not as a reference point to fix the location of the proposed plat to be divided. Furthermore, because the developer had presumably recouped its costs from the new owners of the development homes, the Court also applied equitable considerations in its finding that the developer should not receive a windfall from the city.11
Thus with all respect to my colleagues, I would hold that defendants’ rejection of plaintiffs’ proposed plat was not authorized by the powers conferred upon it by the sca. I would therefore affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals, reversing the *649grant of summary disposition in favor of defendants, and remand to the trial court.
Brickley and Mallett, JJ., concurred with Riley, J.

 MCL 560.182(4)(a); MSA 26.430(182)(4)(a).

 Arrowhead Development Co v Livingston Co Road Comm, 413 Mich 505, 513; 322 NW2d 702 (1982).

 See Arrowhead, 413 Mich 519.

 I disagree with the assumption made by the majority in n 8 of its opinion that the township may consider whatever evidence it chooses, as long as consideration of that evidence is not prohibited by the sca. I read the sca not as a limit on the township’s authority, but rather as the sole grant of authority. If the sca does not allow consideration of land not included within the submitted plat, then the township may not consider it.

 90 Mich App 543; 282 NW2d 387 (1979).

 167 Mich App 64; 421 NW2d 574 (1988).

 149 Mich App 802; 386 NW2d 687 (1986).

 See n 6 supra.

 See n 7 supra.

 156 Mich App 577; 401 NW2d 864 (1986).

 The Court’s finding on page 583 that because the plat actually-included the disputed land, the land was "shown” on the plat for purposes of the sca, is erroneous to the extent it holds that any land indicated on a plat is to be considered land to be partitioned and divided. Property may be indicated on a plat as a tool for orientation of the platted property without being subject by the governing body to the requirement of improvement to be completed by the developer.