Court Opinion

ID: 9635215
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:42:05.263921+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:21.705766
License: Public Domain

BILL VANCE, Justice,
concurring.
The record does not demonstrate that Officer Ritter had a reasonable belief that Joubert had committed a traffic violation. However, because he consented to the search, I join in affirming the judgment.
I would find the stop to be illegal. The question then becomes whether Joubert’s consent purged the contamination from the illegal stop, i.e., whether the taint from the stop was attenuated by the consent. Herrera v. State, 80 S.W.3d 283, 289 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2002, pet. ref d); see also Sims v. State, 84 S.W.3d 805, 810 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (at*690tenuation doctrine applies to art. 38.23). The Court of Criminal Appeals has devised the following set of factors to be used in the attenuation analysis in a consent-to-search case:
1. The proximity of the consent to the illegal police conduct and what occurred in that time period.
2. Whether the illegal conduct brought about police observation of the particular object which they sought consent to search.
3. Whether the illegal conduct was “flagrant police misconduct.”
4. Whether the consent was volunteered rather than requested by the detaining officers.
5. Whether the arrestee was made fully aware of the fact that he could decline to consent and thus prevent an immediate search.
6. Whether the police purpose underlying the illegal conduct was to obtain the consent.
See Boyle v. State, 820 S.W.2d 122, 131-32 (Tex.Crim.App.1989); Herrera, 80 S.W.3d at 289 (citing Boyle). Applying the factors to this case:
1. Consent was given very soon after the illegal stop, and there were no intervening events to purge the taint. This factor weighs in Jou-bert’s favor.
2. Although the stop brought about Ritter’s observation of the inside of the vehicle, the contraband was found in a partially open bag in plain view. We cannot say this factor weighs in either side’s favor.
3. The stop, while misguided, was not flagrant police misconduct. This factor weighs in the State’s favor.
4. Consent was not volunteered but rather came at Ritter’s request. This factor weighs in Joubert’s favor.
5. Joubert was not given his Miranda rights or otherwise informed of his right to deny consent. This factor weighs in Joubert’s favor.
6. The record does not show that the stop had the underlying purpose of searching the vehicle. This factor weighs in the State’s favor.
Joubert was illegally stopped late at night, not informed of his Miranda rights, asked to consent to a search, and afforded little time to reflect. However, he freely gave consent (a) under circumstances not tainted by flagrant police misconduct or coercion and (b) to a simple request for a search after the officer learned he had stopped a driver with no license and a criminal history. While some Boyle factors favor each side, after weighing the factors under these circumstances, I conclude that the taint was attenuated by the consent.
Because the taint from an illegal stop was attenuated by Joubert’s consent, I join in affirming the judgment.