Court Opinion

ID: 9790324
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:51:42.624598+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:28.731767
License: Public Domain

SPENCE, J., Dissenting.
I dissent. Appellant’s main contentions are first, that the evidence was insufficient to show negligence on the phrt of appellant and second, that the uncontradicted evidence showed that respondent was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.
It may be assumed for the purpose of this discussion that there was sufficient evidence to sustain an implied finding of negligence upon the part of appellant. It should be stated, however, that the evidence introduced by respondent showed that appellant was traveling no faster than approximately 25 to 30 miles per hour. It should be further stated that the uneontradicted evidence showed that appellant did not enter the intersection against the traffic signal and that appellant was not driving his car to the left of the center line of Van Ness Avenue.
Turning to appellant’s second main contention, I am of the opinion that it should be sustained. This conclusion is reached without regard to the alleged violation by respondent of section 131% of the Vehicle Act, now section 562 of the Vehicle Code (see Gaston v. Hisashi Tsuruda, 5 Cal. App. (2d) 639 [43 Pac. (2d) 355]), and without regard to the alleged violation by respondent of section 10 of Ordinance No. 7691 of the' City and County of San Francisco. (See Hopkins v. Gotland Mercantile Laundry Co., 218 Cal. *67130 [21 Pac. (2d) 553].) There are numerous authorities in this state holding either expressly or impliedly that where the only rational conclusion to be drawn from the uncontradicted evidence is that the injured pedestrian was guilty of negligence which was the proximate cause or one of the proximate causes of his injury, said pedestrian is chargeable with contributory negligence as a matter of law and may not recover. (Heiter v. Hirschfeld, 205 Cal. 625 [271 Pac. 1051] ; Horton v. Stoll, 3 Cal. App. (2d) 687 [40 Pac. (2d) 603] ; Anderson v. Market Street Ry. Co., 116 Cal. App. 282 [2 Pac. (2d) 529] ; Bence v. Teddy’s Taxi, 101 Cal. App. 748 [282 Pac. 392, 283 Pac. 86] ; Atkins v. Bouchet, 65 Cal. App. 94 [223 Pac. 87] ; Ogden v. Lee, 61 Cal. App. 493 [215 Pac. 122]; Finkle v. Tait, 55 Cal. App. 425 [203 Pac. 1031]; Spring v. Tawa, 49 Cal. App. 100 [192 Pac. 1051] ; Moss v. H. R. Boynton Co., 44 Cal. App. 474 [186 Pac. 631] ; Mayer v. Anderson, 36 Cal. App. 740 [173 Pac. 174].) In my opinion, the uncontradicted evidence in •this case brings it within the rule of the foregoing authorities in many of which, no question of the violation of a statute or ordinance by the pedestrian was involved.
The uncontradicted evidence in this case shows that the accident happened at about 9 P. M. on the evening of October 23d. Respondent alighted upon a safety zone and then attempted to cross Van „ Ness Avenue, starting his crossing between the two standing street cars. It is a matter of common knowledge that Van Ness Avenue was at all times a heavily traveled street and it was entirely lawful for automobiles as well as street cars to travel between the safety zones on said street. Respondent was therefore bound to anticipate traffic approaching from the south and going in a northerly direction between said zones. He was under a duty to “look carefully” in the direction from which traffic was to be anticipated before placing himself in a position of danger. (Horton v. Stoll, supra, p. 690; Bence v. Teddy’s Taxi, supra, p. 752.) As was said in -Moss v. Boynton, supra, at page 477, “In attempting to cross at that point a duty rested upon him to exercise a greater degree of care than if he were at ah established crossing. (Sheldon v. James, (175 Cal. 474 [166 Pac. 8, 2 A. L. R. 1493]), supra.) This was particularly true if his view was to any extent obstructed by the jitney bus.” Here *68respondent was not crossing at an established crosswalk and his view was largely, if not entirely, obstructed by the street ear which was standing in front of the one from which he had alighted. With the conditions as above indicated, respondent left his place of safety, attempted to cross the heavily traveled street and emerged from between the two street cars and directly into the path of appellant’s automobile or, as the evidence seems to show, into the side of appellant’s automobile, without first taking the precaution of ascertaining whether any traffic was approaching from the south. While respondent attempted to claim that he “looked”, it is certain that he did not discharge his duty to “look carefully” under the circumstances. His own testimony is as follows: “Q. Did you see the automobile that you collided with? A. I never seen it yet. Q. You never did see it? A. I ain’t never seen it. Q. You didn’t see it before you— A. I ain’t never seen it. Q. (Continuing)—ran into it? A. Not up till this day, I.ain’t never seen it. Q. You don’t know what kind of a car it was? A. I never seen it.” The foregoing testimony and other testimony of respondent makes it impossible to reach a rational conclusion that respondent exercised the care required of him under the circumstances. It is difficult to conceive of a case in which the testimony would more irresistibly lead to the conclusion that the injured pedestrian was guilty of negligence which was a proximate cause, if not the sole proximate cause, of his injuries.
In my opinion appellant’s motion for a directed verdict should have been granted and the judgment should be reversed.
A petition for a rehearing of this cause was denied by the District Court of Appeal on January 9, 1937, and an application by appellant to have the cause heard in the Supreme Court, after judgment in the District Court of Appeal, was denied by the Supreme Court on February 8, 1937.