Court Opinion

ID: 9695144
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:09:29.989384+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:09.155920
License: Public Domain

LARSON, Justice
(dissenting).
I dissent because the plurality fails to recognize and apply the well-established principle that a defendant’s possession of recently stolen property creates an inference that the defendant stole it. In concluding that proof of intent was not established in this case, the plurality expressly relies on State v. Schminkey, 597 N.W.2d 785 (Iowa 1999), stating, “fw]e agree with the court of appeals’ reading of Schminkey and its application to the present facts.”
Even if the holding in Schminkey, was correct, I disagree with the plurality’s reliance on it in this case. Both Schminkey and the present case involve the sufficiency of evidence on the element of intent to deprive the owner of possession of a vehicle. With that, however, the similarity ends. Schminkey was a guilty-plea case, while the present case was tried to a jury. In a guilty-plea case, the State may not rely on inferences to establish a factual basis. In contrast, a jury-tried case is one in which inferences are standard stock-in-trade. See County Court of Ulster County, New York v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 99 S.Ct. 2213, 60 L.Ed.2d 777 (1979).
Inferences and presumptions are a staple of our adversary system of fact-*790finding. It is often necessary for the trier of fact to determine the existencé of an element of the crime — that is, an “ultimate” or “elemental” fact — from the existence of one or more “evidentiary” or “basic” facts.
Id. at 156, 99 S.Ct. at 2224, 60 L.Ed.2d at 791. The Supreme Court has further said that:
The most common evidentiary device is the entirely permissive inference or presumption, which allows — but does not require — the trier of fact to infer the elemental fact from proof by the prosecutor of the basic one and that places no burden of any kind on the defendant. In that situation the basic fact may constitute prima facie evidence of the elemental fact. When reviewing this type of device, the Court has required the party challenging it to demonstrate its invalidity as applied to him.
Id. at 157, 99 S.Ct. at 2224-25, 60 L.Ed.2d at 792 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
In a guilty-plea case, it is not permissible for a judge to fill gaps in the factual-basis record by inferring elements, of the crime. The difference between guilty-plea cases and fact-tried cases vis-a-vis the function of inferences is significant. In one case, the court observed:
The government argues that this court can infer that [the defendant] had an intent to defraud when he obtained the American Express card using a false name and a false date of birth. Although we agree that a rational fact finder could infer an intent to. defraud from such evidence, in the context of a challenge to the factual basis supporting a guilty plea, we have previously rejected a request by the government to infer a “critical element” of the offense charged.
United States v. Tunning, 69 F.3d 107, 113 (6th Cir.1995) (emphasis added) (citation omitted); see also McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 467, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 1171, 22 L.Ed.2d 418, 426 (1969) (holding that a factual-basis record on a guilty plea cannot be supplemented by a district court’s “assumptions” of facts). In United States v. Goldberg, 862 F.2d 101 (6th Cir.1988), the court stated:
In our judgment, to permit the district court to infer a factual basis in the absence of a record demonstrating the existence of a factual basis would tend to negate the well-established safeguards inherent in the [federal guilty-plea-rule] mandate.
Goldberg, 862 F.2d at 106.
The problem for the state in motor-vehicle larceny cases is that it must prove the defendant knowingly took the vehicle, but it also must prove the defendant took it with the intent to deprive the owner of it. Establishing the first element does not establish the second. We have so held in guilty-plea cases involving theft, holding a factual basis on intent was not established. Schminkey, of course, was one of them. In addition, other cases support that proposition. See, e.g., State v. Auerbach, 283 N.W.2d 278, 280 (Iowa 1979); Brainard v. State, 222 N.W.2d 711, 721 (Iowa 1974). However, in cases that have gone to trial, we have accepted inferences arising from possession of recently stolen property as a means of proving theft. See, e.g., State v. Rosewall, 239 N.W.2d 171, 173 (Iowa 1976); State v. Morrison, 183 N.W.2d 696, 697 (Iowa 1971); State v. Everett, 157 N.W.2d 144, 146 (Iowa 1968). The reliance on use of inferences recognizes the difficulty of proving subjective intent by direct evidence.
In the past, it was customary for our courts to instruct specifically on the inferences to be drawn from possession of re*791cently stolen property. See, e.g., Morrison, 183 N.W.2d at 697. This practice, however, has been criticized:
The instruction on the inferences to be drawn from possession of recently stolen property should be condemned. It is nothing more nor less than a singling out of, and judicial comment on, a specific item of evidence.
Id. at 699 (Becker, J., dissenting). Now, juries are presumably instructed in a manner that does not emphasize the defendant’s possession of stolen property. Under our uniform instructions, that intent may be based on “circumstances” in the case, but the instructions do not refer to the defendant’s possession of recently stolen property as the basis for a presumption. This sanitized form of the instruction was given in the present case, as I will discuss later.
In this case, the court instructed the jury on the elements of both larceny and the lesser offense of operating a vehicle without the owner’s consent. The distinguishing feature of the theft charge is the element of intent to deprive the owner of the property. The jury was instructed that, to prove the higher offense of larceny, the State must prove the defendant acted “with the specific intent to deprive [the owner] of the automobile.” “Deprivation” was defined in a separate instruction:
To “deprive the [owner]” of the property, means to withhold permanently or to withhold for so long or under such circumstances the value or benefit of the property is lost to the owner. If a person disposes of property so that it is unlikely the owner will recover it, you may conclude, but are not required to conclude, that the person disposed of the property with the intent to permanently deprive the owner of its use.
The key element of larceny, the intent to deprive, was explained in this instruction:
Specific intent means not only being aware of doing an act and doing it voluntarily, but also doing it with a specific purpose in mind. Specific intent need not exist for any particular length of time before the act.
Determining a defendant’s specific intent requires you to decide what the defendant was thinking when the defendant did an act. It is seldom capable of direct proof. Consider the facts and circumstances surrounding the act to determine the defendant’s specific intent. You may conclude, but are not required to conclude, that people intend the natural results of their acts.
(Emphasis added.) This instruction, substantially the same as Uniform Criminal Instruction 200.2, incorporates the concept of inferences.
The facts presented at trial are briefly stated in the plurality opinion. It is undisputed that Morris took the truck, at about 4:30 a.m., without the owner’s consent. The owner immediately called the police who soon located the vehicle and began to give chase. When the police stopped the vehicle, Morris fled on foot. These facts are clearly sufficient to give rise to an inference of guilt, including the element of intent.
The Supreme Court has discussed the nature and limitations on inferences and their status under the Constitution:
[T]he entirely permissive inference or presumption ... allows — but does not require — the trier of fact to infer the elemental fact from proof by the prosecutor of the basic one and that places no burden of any kind on the defendant. ... Because this permissive presumption leaves the trier of fact free to credit or reject the inference and does not shift the burden of proof, it affects the application of the “beyond a reason*792able doubt” standard only if, under the facts of the case, there is no rational way the trier could make the connection permitted by the inference. For only in that situation is there any risk that an explanation of the permissible inference to a jury, or its use by a jury, has caused the presumptively rational factfinder to make an erroneous factual determination.
Allen, 442 U.S. at 157, 99 S.Ct. at 2224-25, 60 L.Ed.2d at 792.
The plurality points to facts it contends militate against proof of an intent to deprive the owner of possession. These facts include the distance Morris traveled with the truck (approximately five miles) before he was apprehended and the time he had the truck (approximately thirty minutes). These facts are not necessarily helpful to Morris’s case, however; his relatively short time of possession might well have been viewed by the jury to be the result of speedy police work — not evidence that he lacked the intent to keep it. In any event, that was a question for the jury. While the facts relied on by Morris may affect the strength of the inference, they do not preclude, as a matter of law, an inference of intent. There is clearly a “rational way the [jury] could make the connection permitted by the inference” under the Allen test.
I believe the plurality erred in relying on Schminkey, in refusing to recognize the inference of intent, and in failing to conclude that sufficient evidence supports the conviction. I would vacate the decision of the court of appeals and affirm the judgment of the district court.
CADY and STREIT, JJ., join this dissent.