Court Opinion

ID: 9556829
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-18 20:00:24.29163+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:02:04.735760
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     JOEL WILMOTH,                                   DOCKET NUMBER
                         Appellant,                  DA-0752-21-0109-I-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE,                    DATE: August 18, 2023
                 Agency.

             THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Daniel J. Gamino, Esquire, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for the appellant.

           Jermiah Phelix, Esquire, and Michele S. McNaughton, Esquire, Tinker Air
              Force Base, Oklahoma, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member

                                       FINAL ORDER

¶1         The agency has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     reversed its chapter 75 removal action. Generally, we grant petitions such as this
     one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous
     findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                         2

     interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous a pplication of the law to
     the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of
     the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or
     involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affec ted the outcome of
     the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite
     the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5
     of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 ( 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115).
     After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner
     has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for
     review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial
     decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b).

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2           Effective December 23, 2020, the agency removed the appellant from his
     position as a WS-11 Aircraft Engine Mechanical Work Inspector Supervisor
     pursuant to 5 U.S.C. chapter 75. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 5 at 14, 16 -19,
     80-86.    The agency’s notice of proposed removal stated as follows:           “[t]he
     reasons (sic) for this proposed action is your deliberate attempt to coerce your
     subordinate to lie.”    Id. at 80.   The notice of proposed removal thereafter
     identified the “specific reason” for the proposed action as follows: “On 13 Dec
     2019, you attempted to coerce [agency employee K.B.] to lie about a statement he
     gave confirming inappropriate comments made by you.”               Id.   The notice
     explained that K.B. had provided agency management with a written statement
     confirming that he had heard the appellant make an inappropriate comment to a
     group of agency employees in February 2019, which the appellant had, on
     December 13, 2019, asked him to retract.         Id.   The appellant appealed the
     agency’s action to the Board and requested a hearing on the matter. IAF, Tab 1
     at 2.
                                                                                               3

¶3         Following     a   hearing    conducted      via   Zoom     for   Government,      the
     administrative judge issued an initial decision finding that the agency had failed
     to prove its charge and reversing the agency’s removal action.              IAF, Tab 30,
     Initial Decision (ID) at 1, 12.        The administrative judge concluded that the
     incident described in the agency’s notice of proposed removal had occurred as
     alleged, i.e., that the appellant had asked K.B. to retract his written statement
     regarding the appellant’s February 2019 inappropriate comment. ID at 6-9. In so
     concluding, the administrative judge found “the appellant’s outright denial of the
     conversation [with K.B.] to be inherently improbable,” explaining, among other
     things, that the appellant’s demeanor and body language while testifying
     “suggested nervousness and evasiveness.” ID at 9. The administrative judge also
     concluded that the appellant had, in asking K.B. to retract his written statement,
     “acted deliberately or with intent.” ID at 9-10. To this end, he reasoned that “the
     most logical result of the appellant’s actions was to spare himself from suffering
     another disciplinary action.” 2     ID at 10.    The administrative judge concluded,
     however, that the agency failed to show that the appellant’s conduct constituted
     an attempt to coerce his subordinate to lie. ID at 10-12. To this end, he found
     that the appellant and K.B. did not have a supervisor/subordinate relationship
     during the relevant timeframe.        ID at 11.     He also found that, although the
     appellant’s request was highly inappropriate and likely constituted conduct
     unbecoming a supervisor and/or Federal employee, that was not the charge at
     issue; rather, the agency had charged the appellant with attempting to coerce his
     subordinate to lie. ID at 11-12.
¶4         The agency has filed a petition for review, and the appellant has filed a
     response. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tabs 1, 3. In its petition, the agency

     2
      As set forth in the initial decision, ID at 3 n.1, p rior to the events giving rise to this
     appeal, the appellant received written reprimands on October 31, 2018, and
     November 22, 2019, for discourteous conduct and inappropriate conduct, respectively,
     IAF, Tab 5 at 97-105.
                                                                                        4

     argues the following: (1) the administrative judge misconstrued the language of
     the agency’s charge; (2) the administrative judge erroneously analyzed whether
     the appellant coerced his subordinate instead of whether he attempted to coerce
     his subordinate; and (3) the agency proved the essence of the charge. P FR File,
     Tab 1 at 4-7.
¶5         Following the close of the record on review, the appellant filed a motion for
     interim relief.   PFR File, Tab 5 at 4-6.     He also filed a motion to strike the
     agency’s petition for review, arguing that the agency did not include a certificate
     indicating that it had complied with the administrative judge’s interim relief
     order. PFR File, Tab 4 at 4-5; ID at 13-14. The agency did not respond to either
     motion.

                                         ANALYSIS
     The Board declines to dismiss the agency’s petition for review for failure to
     comply with the administrative judge’s interim relief order.
¶6         When, as here, the appellant was the prevailing party in the initial decision
     and the decision granted the appellant interim relief, any petition for review filed
     by the agency must be accompanied by a certification that th e agency has
     complied with the interim relief order. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.116(a). The agency’s
     failure to provide the required certification may result in the dismissal of th e
     agency’s petition for review. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.116(e). Here, the agency failed to
     provide the requisite certification with its petition; indeed, the agency’s petition
     did not address interim relief at all. PFR File, Tab 1 at 4-7.
¶7         The appellant has submitted two filings wherein he contends that the agency
     failed to comply with the administrative judge’s interim relief order and requests
     that the Board both order such relief and “strike” the agency’s petition for review.
     PFR File, Tab 4 at 4-5, Tab 5 at 4-6. The Board will not entertain a motion to
     enforce an interim relief order; rather, it will treat such a motion as a motion to
     dismiss the petition for review. Batten v. U.S. Postal Service, 101 M.S.P.R. 222,
     ¶ 6, aff’d, 208 F. App’x 868 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Accordingly, we construe both of
                                                                                      5

     the appellant’s filings as requests to dismiss the agency’s petition for review for
     noncompliance with the administrative judge’s interim relief order.
¶8         An appellant’s motion to dismiss a petition for review for noncompliance
     with an interim relief order must be filed before the record on review closes,
     unless it is based on new and material evidence that was not readily available
     before the record closed. Forma v. Department of Justice, 57 M.S.P.R. 97, 102,
     aff’d, 11 F.3d 1071 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (Table). Here, the appellant submitted both
     of his motions after the close of the record on review, i.e., more than 25 days
     after the date of service of the agency’s petition for review, and he has not shown
     that his motions are based on any information that was not readily available to
     him before the close of the record. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.116(d). Accordingly, we
     find the appellant’s motions untimely filed without good cause shown. However,
     even if the appellant’s motions had been timely filed, we would exercise our
     discretion not to dismiss the petition for review because the issue of the agency’s
     compliance with the interim relief order is now moot by virtue of our final
     decision. See Guillebeau v. Department of the Navy, 362 F.3d 1329, 1332-34
     (Fed. Cir. 2004) (explaining that the Board has discretion in deciding whether to
     dismiss a petition for review for failure to comply with an interim relief order);
     see also Elder v. Department of the Air Force, 124 M.S.P.R. 12, ¶ 20 (2016)
     (concluding that the Board’s issuance of a final decision rendered moot the
     parties’ dispute concerning the agency’s compliance with the interim relief
     order).

     The agency’s linguistic argument is unpersuasive and, in any event, is not
     material to the outcome of this appeal.
¶9         The agency contends that the administrative judge erred in finding that it
     failed to prove its charge. PFR File, Tab 1 at 4-7. To this end, the agency argues
     that the administrative judge misconstrued the language of the charge, i.e., that ,
     as written, the charge did not require the agency to prove that the appellant was
     K.B.’s direct supervisor. Id. at 7. The agency avers that the charge merely used
                                                                                            6

      the term “your [s]ubordinate,” and the appellant could, on occasion, dictate
      K.B.’s work assignments. Id. We find this assertion unpersuasive.
¶10         The agency is required to prove the charge as it is set out in the notice of
      proposed removal. Parbs v. U.S. Postal Service, 107 M.S.P.R. 559, ¶ 8 (2007).
      In resolving the issue of how a charge should be construed, the structure and
      language in the proposal notice and the decision notice will be examined.
      George v. Department of the Army, 104 M.S.P.R. 596, ¶ 7 (2007), aff’d,
      263 F. App’x 889 (Fed. Cir. 2008). The nature of a charge should be construed in
      light of the accompanying specifications and circumstances. Id.
¶11         Here, although the notice of proposed removal did not specifically identify
      a “charge,” it identified the “specific reason” for the appellant’s removal as
      “Deliberate Attempt to Coerce your Subordinate to Lie.” 3           IAF, Tab 5 at 80
      (emphasis added). The notice of proposed removal also stated as follows: “ [t]he
      reasons (sic) for this proposed action is your deliberate attempt to coerce your
      subordinate to lie.”   Id. (emphasis added).      The decision letter used identical
      language. Id. at 16. Thus, the charge/reason, as written, did not describe K.B. as
      “a” subordinate; rather, it used the possessive adjective “your” to signify that
      K.B. was in the appellant’s chain of command, as opposed to subordinate in a
      general sense, i.e., lower in grade. 4       Cf. Robb v. Department of Defense,
      77 M.S.P.R. 130, 133-34 (1998) (explaining the distinction between the charge

      3
        Generally, in a proposal notice, an agency sets out the charge(s) levied against the
      employee, or the reason(s) for the action, each followed by one or more specifications
      or specific instances of behavior underlying that charge. However, there is no
      requirement that the notice be in any particular form. Schifano v. Department of
      Veterans Affairs, 70 M.S.P.R. 275, 279 (1996).
      4
        K.B. had previously worked directly for the appellant. ID at 8 n.8. Moreover, at the
      time of the conversation between K.B. and the appellant, K.B. was working in the
      appellant’s building, and, therefore, the appellant could dictate K.B.’s work
      assignments for the day. ID at 11. Nevertheless, we find that a different outcome is not
      warranted; indeed, it is undisputed that the appellant could not exercise typical
      supervisory functions over K.B., e.g., he could not rate K.B.’s performance or
      approve/deny K.B.’s leave requests. Id.
                                                                                           7

      itself and the narrative outlining the charge and finding that the latter, which is
      descriptive in nature, is not an element of the charge).         In any event, this
      linguistic dispute is not material to the outcome of this appeal. Indeed, as set
      forth in greater detail below, inherent to a charge of coercion is some degree of
      threat. As discussed herein, we discern no basis to disturb the administrative
      judge’s conclusion that the agency failed to show that the appellant threatened
      K.B. in any capacity; rather, the evidence showed only that the appellant asked
      K.B. to recant his statement. ID at 11-12. Thus, even if the agency had charged
      the appellant with “Deliberate Attempt to Coerce a Subordinate to Lie,” a
      different outcome would not be warranted.

      The agency’s contention regarding coercion versus attempted coercion is both
      unclear and unpersuasive.
¶12         The agency argues that the administrative judge erroneously analyzed the
      charge by requiring it to show that the appellant coerced his subordinate instead
      of showing that he attempted to coerce his subordinate. PFR File, Tab 1 at 5 -6.
      The agency asserts that it “is axiomatic in American jurisprudence that,
      fundamental to an attempt charge, it is of no consequence if the actor succeeds or
      not, or is even capable of success – the only requirement is that the actor take
      action in furtherance of his goal.” Id. at 5. We find this assertion unpersuasive.
¶13         The Board has infrequently analyzed a charge of coercion. In Johnson v.
      Department of Transportation, 13 M.S.P.R. 652, 654 (1982), aff’d, 735 F.2d 510
      (Fed. Cir. 1984), the Board considered the appropriate legal standard for proving
      coercion in the context of an appellant’s claim of coercion as a defense for his
      having participated in a strike against the Government. In so doing, the Board
      rejected both the standard for coercion generally applicable in criminal cases, i.e.,
      threat of imminent and unavoidable death or serious bodily harm, and the
      standard generally applicable in civil cases, i.e., threats to persons and/or
                                                                                              8

      property, to include economic compulsion. 5         Johnson, 13 M.S.P.R. at 656-59.
      Instead, the Board held that the appellant was required to show “ that his failure to
      report for work was the result of a threat or other intimidating conduct, directed
      toward him, sufficient to instill in him a reasonable fear of physical danger to
      himself or others, which a person of ordinary firmness would not be expected to
      resist.” Id. at 656, 661.
¶14         Here, we find that the agency failed to satisfy any of the above-discussed
      standards regarding coercion; indeed, the record is devoid of evidence that the
      appellant threatened K.B., either explicitly or implicitly, 6 in any capacity. As set
      forth in the initial decision, K.B. never indicated that “the appellant threatened
      his job or job duties, made quid pro quo promises to take certain actions if [K.B.]
      agreed to do as he requested, or that the appellant even ordered him to retract the
      statement.” ID at 11 (emphasis in original). Indeed, K.B. did not testify as to the
      possible consequences of his refusal. Id. Instead, the record reflected that the
      appellant asked K.B. to recant his statement, that K.B. declined to do so, and that
      K.B. thereafter “went about his business without further incident.” ID at 11-12.
¶15         The agency’s contention—that the administrative judge                  erroneously
      analyzed the charge by requiring the agency to show that the appellant coerced
      his subordinate instead of requiring the agency to show that he attempted to
      coerce his subordinate—is unclear.          PFR File, Tab 1 at 5-6.         The agency

      5
        In his initial decision, the administrative judge stated that “[t]he Board has held that
      coercion may be found where it is based on threats to, among other things, i nterfere
      with a business or occupation.”          ID at 10 (citing Johnson v. Department of
      Transportation, 13 M.S.P.R. 652, 657-58 (1982)). This statement was imprecise. In
      Johnson, the Board referenced interference with a business or occupation in the context
      of summarizing the test of duress or undue influence generally appli cable in civil
      actions; the Board, however, rejected this standard. Johnson, 13 M.S.P.R. at 657-58.
      This imprecision is not material to the outcome of this appeal. See Panter v.
      Department of the Air Force, 22 M.S.P.R. 281, 282 (1984).
      6
        Indeed, as discussed above, the appellant did not have typical supervisory authority
      over K.B.; thus, the appellant’s request could not reasonably be construed as an implicit
      threat to K.B.’s position at the agency. ID at 11.
                                                                                            9

      seemingly argues that it proved attempted coercion because the administrative
      judge found that the appellant intentionally requested that K.B. retract his
      statement so as to avoid discipline. Id. at 5 & n.1. This finding, however, is not
      material to an attempted coercion charge; indeed, the finding pertains to the
      appellant’s intent to avoid discipline, not his intent to threaten to exert undue
      influence on K.B., i.e., to coerce him. 7 ID at 9-10; see United States v. Isabella,
      918 F.3d 816, 831 (10th Cir. 2019) (explaining, in the criminal law context, that,
      to prove an “attempt,” the Government must show both specific intent to commit
      the charged crime and a substantial step towards completion of the same) . Thus,
      the agency’s argument does not provide a basis to disturb the initial decision.

      The agency failed to prove the essence of the charge.
¶16         Last, the agency contends that it proved “the essence” of the charge because
      “the [administrative judge] found that the [a]gency proved every other aspect of
      the charge besides coercion.” PFR File, Tab 1 at 6. To this end, the agency avers
      that the administrative judge found that the conversation between the appellant
      and K.B. underlying the charge had taken place as alleged and that the appellant
      had acted deliberately. Id. We find these assertions unavailing.
¶17         If an agency chooses to label an act of misconduct, it is bound to prove the
      elements that make up the legal definition of that charge. Otero v. U.S. Postal
      Service, 73 M.S.P.R. 198, 202 (1997).         Here, the agency did not charge the
      appellant with misconduct or with having an inappropriate conversation with
      K.B.; rather, it elected to charge him with attempting to coerce his subordinate.

      7
        For purposes of his analysis, the administrative judge broke the charge of “Deliberate
      Attempt to Coerce your Subordinate to Lie” into three distinct elements: (1) whether
      the factual allegations were true, i.e., whether the December 13, 2019 conversation
      between the appellant and K.B. took place as alleged; (2) whether the appellant acted
      deliberately, or with intent, during the course of the same, i.e., whether the appellant
      intentionally requested that K.B. retract his statement so as to avoid discipline; and
      (3) whether the appellant’s request constituted an attempt to coerce his subordinate to
      lie. IAF, Tab 5 at 80; ID at 5-12. The agency’s apparent argument conflates the latter
      two elements. PFR File, Tab 1 at 5-6.
                                                                                          10

      IAF, Tab 5 at 80. Thus, the agency did not prove the charge as written. See
      Burroughs v. Department of the Army, 918 F.2d 170, 172 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
      (explaining that the Board may not split a single charge into several independent
      charges and then sustain one of the newly formulated charges, which represents
      only a portion of the original); see also Alvarado v. Department of the Air Force,
      103 M.S.P.R. 1, ¶ 9 (2006) (stating that the Board is bound to decide cases
      according to how the charge is written, not how it could or should have been
      written). Accordingly, we find no basis to disturb the initial decision.

                                             ORDER
¶18         We ORDER the agency to cancel the removal action and to restore the
      appellant effective December 23, 2020. See Kerr v. National Endowment for the
      Arts, 726 F.2d 730 (Fed. Cir. 1984). The agency must complete this action no
      later than 20 days after the date of this decision.
¶19         We also ORDER the agency to pay the appellant the correct amount of back
      pay, interest on back pay, and other benefits under the Back Pay Act an d/or Postal
      Service regulations, as appropriate, no later than 60 calendar days after the date
      of this decision.   We ORDER the appellant to cooperate in good faith in the
      agency’s efforts to calculate the amount of back pay, interest, and benefits due,
      and to provide all necessary information the agency requests to help it carry out
      the Board’s Order. If there is a dispute about the amount of back pay, interest
      due, and/or other benefits, we ORDER the agency to pay the appellant the
      undisputed amount no later than 60 calendar days after the date of this decision.
¶20         We further ORDER the agency to tell the appellant promptly in writing
      when it believes it has fully carried out the Board’s Order and of the actions it has
      taken to carry out the Board’s Order. The appellant, if not notified, should ask
      the agency about its progress. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.181(b).
¶21         No later than 30 days after the agency tells the appellant that it has fully
      carried out the Board’s Order, the appellant may file a petition for enforcement
                                                                                     11

      with the office that issued the initial decision on this appeal if the appellant
      believes that the agency did not fully carry out the Board’s Order. The petition
      should contain specific reasons why the appellant believes that the agency has not
      fully carried out the Board’s Order, and should include the dates and results of
      any communications with the agency. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.182(a).
¶22         For agencies whose payroll is administered by either the National Finance
      Center of the Department of Agriculture (NFC) or the Defense Finance and
      Accounting Service (DFAS), two lists of the information and documentation
      necessary to process payments and adjustments resulting from a Board decision
      are attached. The agency is ORDERED to timely provide DFAS or NFC with all
      documentation necessary to process payments and adjustments resulting from the
      Board’s decision in accordance with the attached lists so that payment can be
      made within the 60-day period set forth above.

                      NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT REGARDING
                            YOUR RIGHT TO REQUEST
                           ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS
            You may be entitled to be paid by the agency for your reasonable attorney
      fees and costs. To be paid, you must meet the requirements set forth at Title 5 of
      the United States Code (5 U.S.C.), sections 7701(g), 1221(g), or 1214(g). The
      regulations may be found at 5 C.F.R. §§ 1201.201, 1201.202, and 1201.203. If
      you believe you meet these requirements, you must file a motion for attorney fees
      and costs WITHIN 60 CALENDAR DAYS OF THE DATE OF THIS DECISION.
      You must file your motion for attorney fees and costs with the of fice that issued
      the initial decision on your appeal.
                                                                                        12

                           NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 8
      You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By
statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such
review and the appropriate forum with which to file.               5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).
Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit
Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most
appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a
statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their
jurisdiction.   If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should
immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all
filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time
limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.
      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which mu st be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.                 5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you    must   submit   your   petition   to    the   court    at   the
following address:

8
  Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                   13

                             U.S. Court of Appeals
                             for the Federal Circuit
                            717 Madison Place, N.W.
                            Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or   EEOC     review   of   cases     involving   a   claim   of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.     5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative
receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be
entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any
                                                                                14

requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security.        See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                  P.O. Box 77960
                             Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant   to   the   Whistleblower    Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
                                                                                     15

disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section
2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),
(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of
competent jurisdiction. 9   The court of appeals must receive your petition for
review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.               5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                               U.S. Court of Appeals
                               for the Federal Circuit
                              717 Madison Place, N.W.
                              Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

9
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                       16

      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                          /s/ for
                                        Jennifer Everling
                                        Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.