Court Opinion

ID: 9942529
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-21 15:08:15.797014+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:48:11.978843
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-3054-21

PETER C. GEARY,

          Plaintiff-Appellant/
          Cross-Respondent,

v.

LAINIE F. GEARY,

     Defendant-Respondent/
     Cross-Appellant.
________________________

                   Submitted November 13, 2023 – Decided February 21, 2024

                   Before Judges Berdote Byrne and Bishop-Thompson.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
                   Chancery Division, Family Part, Union County, Docket
                   No. FM-20-0911-13

                   DeTommaso Law Group, LLC, attorneys for
                   appellant/cross-respondent (Joseph M. Freda, III, of
                   counsel and on the briefs).

                   Lawrence Law, LLC, attorneys for respondent/cross-
                   appellant (Jeralyn L. Lawrence and Kristyl M. Berckes,
                   on the briefs).
PER CURIAM

      This post-judgment matrimonial matter involves the modification of

limited duration alimony. After holding a multi-day plenary hearing, the Family

Part entered an order on May 27, 2022, granting and denying relief in various

respects. Plaintiff Peter Geary appeals the provisions of the order that establish

the temporary modification of alimony, calculate the temporary modification,

impute income, permit defendant to file a motion to extend limited duration

alimony, and determine arrearages. Defendant Lainie Geary cross-appeals,

challenging the setting of arrearages and denying her request for attorneys' fees.

Having reviewed the record, we conclude the trial court findings are supported

by substantial, credible evidence and the trial court correctly applied the

governing principles, therefore, we affirm.

                                         I.

      We summarize the facts from the plenary hearing. Both parties were

represented by counsel during the proceedings. The parties were the only

witnesses called to testify at the hearing.

      The parties were married on July 31, 1993 and share two children. In June

2014, the parties divorced, and a Marital Settlement Agreement (MSA) was

incorporated into their Dual Final Judgment of Divorce (DFJD). Article 6 of

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the MSA governs alimony. Paragraph 6.2(A) provides plaintiff "shall pay . . .

defendant limited duration alimony commencing May 1, 2014, through

December 31, 2030, in the amount of $120,000 per year or $10,000 per month."

      Under Paragraph 6.2(C), the parties agreed defendant has a claim for

arrearages in the event plaintiff failed to advise her that his income had returned

to $325,000 or greater.     The paragraph further reads, "[o]therwise, unless

specifically noted within this Article herein, [defendant] shall not have a claim

for any arrearages of any sort or kind for periods wherein her alimony [] was

reduced."

      Pursuant to Paragraph 6.2(E), in the event plaintiff failed to advise

defendant of the change, defendant "shall have a claim for arrearages if

[plaintiff] fails to advise her that his income returned to $300,000 or greater, in

which case she [would be] entitled to alimony at the rate set forth in sub-

paragraph (A) or (B) from the time his income returned to $300,000 or greater."

This provision also stated defendant did not have a claim for any arrearages of

any sort for periods her alimony [] was reduced, unless specifically stated in the

agreement.

      Paragraph 6.2(F) states defendant's earnings or potential earnings would

not be considered unless her gross earnings reach $100,000 or defendant's

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income falls below $300,000. This paragraph also triggers an automatic review

of plaintiff's alimony obligation if defendant's income rises above $100,000 per

year, "specifically to review a downward modification of [plaintiff]'s alimony

obligations depending on [plaintiff's] income at the time the parties utilizing

mediation as the first means of resolving any disputes."

      During the marriage, plaintiff was employed as a managing director of an

advertising agency in New York, earning approximately $325,000 per year.

Plaintiff stated that due to corporate restructuring, he was terminated from

employment in September 2019 and received severance payments through

December 2019.

      Defendant earned approximately $55,000 per year at the time of the

divorce. In 2019, she earned $102,185.50 and $111,464.90 in 2020. At the

time of the hearing, defendant testified that she earned $97,000 as a part-time

office manager at a law firm and sold advertising part-time for a legal

publication.

      While plaintiff searched for other employment, he paid defendant $5,000

per month in alimony from January through April of 2020, based on the parties'

voluntary agreement. In May 2020, the parties agreed to a further reduction of

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$4,000 for the month, which plaintiff certified came from his $4,186.00

monthly unemployment benefits.

      At the hearing, plaintiff testified, despite a diligent job search throughout

the United States, he was unable to obtain employment in advertising and the

related fields of marketing, media, and sales. He also claimed his job search

was impacted by COVID-19. In support of his motion, plaintiff submitted a

spreadsheet purporting to show 1,000 entries detailing his job search.

      Within five months of his last severance payment, plaintiff notified

defendant that he was relocating to reduce expenses since the job search did not

yield results and he could no longer pay alimony. Beginning in June, plaintiff

made a single $1,000 alimony payment to defendant.

      Plaintiff relocated to Hilton Head, South Carolina and decided to become

a realtor. After becoming licensed, plaintiff established an LLC, created a

website, and began promoting his business on social media platforms, but he

never began work as a realtor and had not obtained other employment since his

relocation.

      In accordance with the terms of the MSA, the parties first attempted to

resolve their alimony dispute through mediation. When mediation proved

fruitless, in June 2020, defendant requested the court impute income of

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$325,000 to plaintiff and return plaintiff's alimony obligation to $120,000 per

year in accordance with Paragraph 6.2(A). In response, plaintiff cross-moved

in July 2020, seeking to reduce his obligation to $1,000 per month, citing a

change in financial circumstances based on his unemployment.

      On September 18, 2020, the Family Part court entered an order finding

that plaintiff had "established a prima facie case of changed circumstances for

termination/modification of his alimony" and would continue to pay annual

alimony of $100,000, or $8,333 per month, subject to reallocation pursuant to

Paragraph 6.2(D). A plenary hearing was also ordered.

      A plenary hearing was held over the course of six, nonconsecutive days

on September 21, 22, 23, 29, 2021, and October 5 and 7, 2021. On May 27,

2022, the court issued an order accompanied by a cogent oral opinion. The

court analyzed the factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23k and incorporated

them in its analysis. It determined plaintiff had "effectively" proven a prima

facie case of changed circumstances, "but only for a temporary modification of

alimony" under N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23k(9).         In making its findings, the court

focused on the factors articulated in Lepis v. Lepis: (1) an increase in the cost

of living; (2) increase or decrease in the supporting spouse's income; (3) illness,

disability or infirmity arising after the original judgment; (4) the dependent

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spouse's loss of a house or apartment, (5) the dependent spouse's cohabitation

with another; (6) subsequent employment by the dependent spouse, and changes

in the federal income tax law. 83 N.J. 139, 151 (1980) (internal citations

omitted).

      In applying the factors to the evidence adduced at the hearing, the court

found both parties decreased their living expenses. Plaintiff sold his home in

New Jersey and relocated to South Carolina. Concerning factor two, plaintiff

had been unemployed since 2019 and, when his severance concluded, he

emailed plaintiff that he was pursuing a realtor's license in South Carolina. As

to factor three, neither party suffered an illness, disability, or infirmity arising

after the original judgment. Regarding factor four, defendant voluntarily sold

the martial home in Westfield and purchased a smaller townhome in Basking

Ridge. While plaintiff asserted defendant cohabitated with her boyfriend, he

did not formally assert a cohabitation claim; and therefore, the court did not

consider and did not find any cohabitation.

      As to factor six, the court found defendant continued to work for a legal

journal and began working part time at her mother's law firm. The court further

noted defendant was unlikely to earn over $100,000 in the future because

defendant's mother would be retiring. The court iterated plaintiff's involuntary

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termination and plaintiff's job search.      The court also considered plaintiff

attempted to start a real estate career in South Carolina, and plaintiff did not

have a "stable income" at the time of the plenary hearing. Based on those

findings, plaintiff's alimony obligation was temporarily modified to $100,000

per year, from June 25, 2020, the filing date of plaintiff's motion, to September

21, 2021, the commencement of the plenary hearing, and plaintiff was directed

to make retroactive payments of $8,333 per month.

      Pursuant to Caplan v. Caplan, 182 N.J. 250, 268 (2005), the court imputed

income to plaintiff in the amount of $180,000 per year as a realtor in South

Carolina, commencing September 21, 2021. The court noted plaintiff had

passed the real estate exam but had not worked since he relocated to South

Carolina. The court reasoned "given [plaintiff's] acceptance as a realtor in

Hilton Head and the thriving real estate market during the pandemic . . .

[p]laintiff certainly could have earned a substantial salary as a realtor in Hilton

Head by the time he testified after moving two years ago to South Carolina ,"

taking judicial notice under N.J.R.E. 801(c)17 of South Carolina market reports

and other commercial publications concerning the South Carolina real estate

market. Similarly, the court took judicial notice of and considered the average

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salary of Hilton Head real estate agents, imputing income to plaintiff in the

amount of $180,000 per year commencing in September 2021.

      The court, however, modified plaintiff's alimony obligation to $60,000

per year, or $5,000 per month, for 2021 and 2022. The court also continued

plaintiff's modified alimony obligation while plaintiff "builds his career," until

"the limited duration of December 31, 2030," unless he resumes a salary of

$300,000 or greater.

      Noting in paragraph 6.2(G) that plaintiff agreed to "use his best efforts to

maintain an income of at least $325,000 in his present and future endeavors in

order to meet his maximum obligations," the court ordered plaintiff to "continue

to seek meaningful employment and use his best efforts." The court found

plaintiff not "wholly believable and plausible." That finding was based on the

court's conclusion that plaintiff's job search efforts were not "entirely

sufficient" because "he could have continued to seek advertising jobs even from

Hilton Head but did not do so."        The documentation submitted to show

plaintiff's job search was "more evidence for New York unemployment rather

than genuine and specific job searches." The court pointed out plaintiff (1)

"never appeared" to follow up on applications; (2) applied to jobs on various

internet recruiting sites by just submitting his resume and "did not have the

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proper experience or an MBA," and (3) "did not follow up with advertising

agencies, nor provided [the documents] to the court."

        The court further ordered that in the event plaintiff earns $325,000, "at

or near the end of the limited term of alimony, the duration may extend upon

motion by defendant with all financials provided." The order also directed the

parties to exchange their respective tax returns each year until 2035, five years

after the expiration of the limited duration alimony. As to arrears, beginning

June 1, 2022, plaintiff was directed to pay $36,000 or $1,000 per month, for

thirty-six months. Finally, the court denied both parties' requests for counsel

fees.

                                        II.

        On appeal, plaintiff challenges the order on several grounds. He argues

the Family Part judge erred by: (1) failing to analyze the factors under N.J.S.A.

2A:34-23 after he demonstrated a substantial change in circumstances; (2)

using a mathematical formula to set alimony; (3) requiring his obligation return

to the level dictated by the MSA if his salary equaled or exceeded $300,000;

(4) ordering the parties to exchange their tax returns each year until 2035; (5)

allowing for the extension of the limited duration alimony period upon future

motion; and (6) ordering him to pay alimony arrears in the amount of $36,000.

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      On cross-appeal, defendant argues the judge erred in awarding $36,000

in alimony arrears, and denying defendant's request for counsel's fees.

      We reject the parties' arguments because they are not supported by the

record and the controlling law.

                                       III.

      Our review of a Family Part order is limited. Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J.

394, 411 (1998). "We accord deference to Family Part judges due to their

'special jurisdiction and expertise in family [law] matters.'"     Gormley v.

Gormley, 462 N.J. Super. 433, 442 (App. Div. 2019) (alteration in original)

(quoting Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998)). A court's findings "are binding on

appeal so long as their determinations are 'supported by adequate, substantial,

credible evidence.'" Id. at 442. Deference is especially appropriate where

evidence is testimonial and involves credibility determinations because the

observing court "has a better perspective than a reviewing court in evaluating

the veracity of witnesses."       Pascale v. Pascale, 113 N.J. 20, 33 (1988).

Generally, a Family Part court's finding regarding the modification of alimony

"should not be vacated unless the court clearly abused its discretion, failed to

consider all of the controlling legal principles, made mistaken findings, or

reached a conclusion that could not reasonably have been reached on sufficient

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credible evidence present in the record." J.E.V. v. K.V., 426 N.J. Super. 475,

485 (App. Div. 2012). However, while "a family court's factual findings are

entitled to considerable deference, we do not pay special deference to its

interpretation of the law." Thieme v. Aucoin-Thieme, 227 N.J. 269, 283 (2016)

(quoting D.W. v. R.W., 212 N.J. 232, 254 (2012)).

      A.    Modification of Alimony

      An alimony order establishes the present support obligations of the former

spouses and is "always subject to review and modification on a showing of

'changed circumstances.'" Crews v. Crews, 164 N.J. 11, 28 (2000) (quoting

Lepis, 83 N.J. at 146). Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23, an alimony order "may

be revised and altered by the court from time to time as circumstances may

require." See Amzler v. Amzler, 463 N.J. Super. 187, 197 (App. Div. 2020).

When a party moves for a reduction in alimony, the Family Part court engages

in a two-step inquiry. Crews, 164 N.J at 28. First, the court must determine

whether the moving party has made a prima facie showing of changed

circumstances. R.K. v. F.K., 437 N.J. Super. 58, 62 (App. Div. 2014). "Changed

circumstances such as . . . employment, . . . may result in a modification of

support." Miller v. Miller, 160 N.J. 408, 420 (1999). Thus, the moving party

must demonstrate a change in circumstances from those existing when the prior

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support award was fixed. Beck v. Beck, 239 N.J. Super. 183, 190 (App. Div.

1990); see also Donnelly v. Donnelly, 405 N.J. Super. 117, 127-29 (App. Div.

2009).

      Next, the court must determine whether the party seeking modification

has demonstrated changed circumstances…"have substantially impaired the

[movant's] ability to support himself . . . ." Crews, 164 N.J. at 28 (quoting Lepis,

83 N.J. at 157).

      The trial court found plaintiff established a change in circumstances

allowing a modification of his alimony obligation. The court nonetheless found

that only a temporary modification of alimony was warranted because "plaintiff

[was] certainly capable of earning a substantial income as a realtor in Hilton

Head."

      We reject plaintiff's claim that the court failed to address the statutory

factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23b. Plaintiff misapprehends the statute the

court was required to consider when reviewing an application to modify

alimony. On an initial award of alimony, the court is required to consider the

thirteen factors in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23b. Prior to rendering findings of fact in this

matter, the court expressly stated it considered and determined plaintiff's

application based on the enumerated factors in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23k and

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incorporated them in its analysis.        Having reviewed the forty-four-page

transcript, we are satisfied the trial court's findings are based on substantial,

credible evidence and the correct statutory factors were applied.

      We reject plaintiff's argument that the court "wholly disregarded" N.J.S.A.

2A:34-23b by "utilizing a mathematical formula to establish spousal support."

We likewise reject plaintiff claims the court improperly imputed income to him.

      "If a court is satisfied that a party is not earning at his or her capacity it

then can impute income if, as already noted, it finds voluntary underemployment

without just cause." Gormley, 462 N.J. Super. at 448.

      The court is required to review whether defendant's income reduction is

"'reasonable' under the circumstances." Storey v. Storey, 373 N.J. Super 464,

468 (App. Div. 2004). Imputation of income, incapable of exactness, requires a

"trial [court] to realistically appraise capacity to earn and job availability." Id.

at 474 (citing Tash v. Tash, 353 N.J. Super. 94, 99 (App.Div.2002)). Therefore,

a trial judge's imputation of a specific amount of income "will not be overturned

unless the underlying findings are inconsistent with or unsupported by

competent evidence." Id. at 474-75.

      Here, the trial court made findings concerning plaintiff's job search and

his lack of stable income since he relocated to South Carolina. The court's

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findings that plaintiff could make a suitable living as real estate agent in Hilton

Head are all based on sufficient, credible evidence in the record. Therefore, we

are satisfied the trial court appropriately imputed income to plaintiff.

       We disagree with plaintiff's argument that the court "improperly" used a

mathematical formula to determine his alimony obligation. The court explained

the plaintiff's alimony obligation of $60,000 per year in 2021 and 2022 was

"33.3 percent of [$180,000] imputed to him as a realtor in South Carolina." The

court then noted the MSA provided for $120,000 per year in limited durational

alimony which was "36.9 percent of his income for purposes of the [MSA.]"

Based on the sufficient credible evidence in the record, we discern no factual or

legal basis to conclude the court abused its discretionary authority by utilizing

the same percentages as those utilized when his income was established in the

MSA.

       We are not convinced by plaintiff's remaining arguments that the court's

findings as to defendant's income were contrary to defendant's testimony and

constituted reversible error. In finding defendant's income was an "isolated

event," the trial court's findings are supported by credible evidence in the record.

Nor does any consideration of defendant's income alter plaintiff's downward

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modification of alimony. Again, we discern no error in the court's consideration

of evidence as applied to the law.

      B.    Limited Duration Alimony

      Plaintiff argues the court committed reversible error by extending his

limited duration alimony obligation contrary to the MSA. Contrary to plaintiff's

argument, the court rejected defendant's request to extend the term of alimony

to pay back the arrears. The court enforced Paragraph 6.4 of the MSA providing

the length of the limited duration alimony "should not be modified, or otherwise

subject to reduction." Consistent with the MSA and N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(c), the

court did not preclude defendant from making an application later to modify

alimony based on an increase in plaintiff's income. We are satisfied the court's

findings and order comports with the statute and the MSA. See N.J.S.A. 2A:34-

23(c); Gonzalez-Posse v. Ricciardulli, 410 N.J. Super. 340 (App. Div. 2009).

We discern no abuse of discretion with the court's analysis or in its order because

a modification of a limited duration alimony term will be dependent on a future

application and an analysis of the facts at that time.

      C.    Arrearages

      A trial court "possesses broad equitable powers to accomplish substantial

justice" and may tailor an appropriate remedy for violation of its orders. Finger

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v. Zenn, 335 N.J. Super. 438, 446 (App. Div. 2000). Indeed, pursuant to Rule

5:3-7(b), a Family Part court is entitled to use various remedies to enforce a

judgment or order concerning alimony after finding a violation of same,

including "fixing the amount of arrearages," imposing "economic sanctions,"

and "any other appropriate equitable remedy." R. 5:3-7(b)(1), (4) and (8).

      Defendant now argues that the court erred in awarding $36,000 in

arrearages by failing to consider the effective date of its decision and calculating

plaintiff's arrears from the last day of the plenary hearing, October 7, 2021, to

the date of the court's decision, May 27, 2022. We disagree. At the September

2020 hearing on plaintiff's motion, plaintiff requested that arrears "be effective

as of the filing date of [her] motion" because plaintiff had not paid alimony from

January through July 2020. Following defendant's undisputed testimony at the

plenary hearing on the issue of the $36,000 in arrears, the trial court properly

awarded arrears based on plaintiff's failure to comply with the September order.

We are also satisfied the trial court correctly found that under Paragraph 6.2(C)

or (E), defendant is precluded from claiming arrearages from the last day of the

plenary because the MSA does not provide for such award.

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      D.    Attorneys' fees

      Defendant challenges the denial of her request for attorneys' fees,

asserting the court failed to conduct an analysis of plaintiff's counsel's affidavit

of services or the reasonableness of his fees and failed to consider plaintiff's

superior financial circumstances, plaintiff's ability to pay, and plaintiff's bad

faith. We disagree.

      Counsel fee determinations "rest[] in the sound discretion of the trial

court." Bisbing v. Bisbing, 468 N.J. Super. 112, 121 (App. Div. 2021) (citing

Williams v. Williams, 59 N.J. 229, 233 (1971)). We "will disturb a trial court's

determination on counsel fees only on the 'rarest occasion,' and then only

because of clear abuse of discretion." Slutsky v. Slutsky, 451 N.J. Super. 332,

365 (App. Div. 2017) (quoting Strahan v. Strahan, 402 N.J. Super. 298, 317

(App. Div. 2008)).

      Governed by these principles, we perceive no reason to disturb the May

27, 2022 order. The court properly considered Rule 5:3-5(c) factors and results

of the plenary hearing. We agree with the court that it "[did] not find that either

party [was] more entitled to counsel fees than the other." Therefore, we discern

no abuse of discretion in the trial court's denial of the award of fees.

      Affirmed.

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