Court Opinion

ID: 9727924
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:53:06.208311+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:22:27.673174
License: Public Domain

BROSKY, Judge,
concurring:
I join in the opinion of the majority, but I believe the issue of which party should bear the burden of proof on the question of harmless error merits further discussion. That question was left unsettled in Commonwealth v. Garvin, 335 Pa.Super. 560, 485 A.2d 36 (1984) (en banc). The majority holds that “the defendant must establish that *339counsel’s ineffectiveness so prejudiced his case that he was deprived of a fair trial.” I agree with this holding.
I believe, however, that the placement of the burden of proof, in fact, makes no difference where the claim of ineffectiveness arises from trial proceedings. In that situation, there is no need for any further proceeding at which one of the parties must be assigned the burden of proof; this Court simply reviews the evidence already adduced at trial and determines whether the error (trial counsel’s ineffective assistance) is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Commonwealth v. Story, 476 Pa. 391, 383 A.2d 155 (1978). We determine, for example, whether, from the record before us, it is established beyond a reasonable doubt that the properly admitted evidence of guilt is so overwhelming and the prejudicial effect of the error so insignificant by comparison that the error could not have contributed to the verdict; or that the prejudice was so minimal (de minimus) that it did not influence the jury. Id. I do not believe that such an analysis itself or the result of such an analysis could differ depending upon to whom the burden of proof is assigned.
However, I do believe that the assignment of the burden of proof could make a difference where the claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel does not arise from trial proceedings. Perhaps, the clearest example of such a claim is where trial counsel is alleged to have been ineffective for failing to interview witnesses. Case law has established that in order for a defendant to prove counsel’s performance was deficient in that regard, he must prove at an appropriate hearing that counsel was aware of the witnesses and had some indication that their testimony would develop more than was already known to counsel. See e.g., Commonwealth v. Ford, 491 Pa. 586, 421 A.2d 1040 (1980); Commonwealth v. Mabie, 467 Pa. 464, 359 A.2d 369 (1976). However, in order to be entitled to any relief, the defendant must also show that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced him by proving that the testimony would have been helpful to his case, i.e., that counsel’s deficient performance *340was not harmless error. See Commonwealth v. Leonard, 499 Pa. 357, 453 A.2d 587 (1982).1
In this situation, it makes a difference to whom the burden of proof is assigned. If we were to assign to the Commonwealth the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that counsel’s ineffectiveness did not contribute to the verdict, the Commonwealth, in the situation described above, would have to demonstrate that the witnesses’ testimony would not have been helpful to the defense. I think that, in many instances, such a burden would be unfairly difficult for the Commonwealth to meet. Moreover, to place the burden of proof on the Commonwealth would be to impermissibly mandate that the Commonwealth prove that which our Supreme Court has already stated the defendant must prove. Therefore, although I believe it makes no difference in the instant case, I agree with the majority’s holding that a defendant, after proving that his counsel was ineffective, must go on to establish that counsel’s error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

. This description of what Leonard and similar cases required a defendant to prove in order to prevail on a claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to interview witnesses is put in terms of the analytical framework established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); Garvin, supra. As held by the majority in Garvin, Strickland’s articulation of a separate prejudice component reflects an analysis which our courts have employed only sub silentio in deciding ineffective assistance of counsel claims. In other words, Leonard, and similar cases, did not expressly use a harmless error analysis, but simply stated that counsel could not, be held to be ineffective unless the defendant proved that the witnesses’ testimony would have been helpful to his case. The Garvin majority holding is that, in the light of Strickland, the question of whether the testimony of the witnesses would have been helpful is asked not to determine whether counsel was ineffective, but to determine whether counsel's proved ineffectiveness was harmless.