Court Opinion

ID: 9939348
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-09 20:06:51.750021+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:41:21.462110
License: Public Domain

140 Nev., Advance Opinion (0
                       IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

                STEVE WYNN, AN INDIVIDUAL,                              No. 85804
                Appellant,
                vs.
                THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, A
                FOREIGN CORPORATION; AND
                REGINA GARCIA CANO, AN                                   FEB 08 202/t
                INDIVIDUAL,                                           ELI
                                                                    CLE
                Respondents.                                       BY
                                                                        CIIGF DEPUTY CLERK

                            Appeal from a district court order granting an anti-SLAPP
                special motion to dismiss. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County;
                Ronald J. Israel, Judge.
                            Affirmed.

                Pisanelli Bice PLLC and Todd L. Bice, Jordan T. Smith, Emily A. Buchwald,
                and Daniel R. Brady, Las Vegas,
                for Appellant.

                Ballard Spahr LLP and David Chavez, Las Vegas, and Jay Ward Brown and
                Chad R. Bowman, Washington, D.C..
                for Respondents.

                BEFORE  THE     SUPREME           COURT,     HERNDON,            LEE,        and
                PARRAGUIRRE, JJ.

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                                                 OPINION

                By the Court, PARRAGUIRRE, J.:
                            In designing its anti-SLAPP statutes, Nevada recognized the
                essential role of the First Amendment rights to petition the government for
                a redress of grievances and to free speech, and the danger posed by civil
                claims aimed at chilling the valid exercise of those rights. 1997 Nev. Stat.,

                ch. 387, at 1363-64 (preamble to bill enacting anti-SLAPP statutes). To
                limit that chilling effect, the statutes provide defendants with an
                opportunity—through a special motion to dismiss—to obtain an early and
                expeditious resolution of a meritless claim for relief that is based on
                protected activity. NRS 41.650; NRS 41.660(1)(a). District courts resolve
                such motions based on the two-prong framework laid out in NRS 41.660(3).
                Under the first prong, the court must "Hetermine whether the moving
                party has established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the claim is

                based upon a good faith communication in furtherance of the right to
                petition or the right to free speech in direct connection with an issue of
                public concern." NRS 41.660(3)(a). If the moving party makes this initial
                showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff under the second prong to show
                "with prima facie evidence a probability of prevailing on the claim." NRS

                41.660(3)(b).
                            In this appeal, we consider the proper burden a public figure
                must carry to show a probability of prevailing on a defamation claim at the
                second prong of the anti-SLAPP framework.       We clarify that, under the
                second prong, a public figure defamation plaintiff must provide sufficient
                evidence for a jury, by clear and convincing evidence, to reasonably infer
                that the publication was made with actual malice. Because respondents
                met their respective burden under prong one, and the public figure plaintiff

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                      in the underlying defamation action failed to meet his burden under prong
                      two, we affirm the district court's order granting respondents' renewed
                      special motion to dismiss.
                                          FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
                                     This appeal arises out of a defamation claim brought by
                      appellant Steve Wynn—a prominent figure in Nevada gaming and
                      politics—against respondents The Associated Press and one of its reporters,
                      Regina Garcia Cano (collectively, AP Respondents)) Following national
                      reports alleging years of misconduct by Wynn, Garcia Cano obtained from
                      the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD) redacted copies of
                      two separate citizens' complaints alleging sexual assault by Wynn in the
                      1970s. She wrote an article describing the allegations in the complaints,
                      one of which alleged that Steve Wynn had raped the complainant three
                      times at her Chicago apartment between 1973 and 1974, resulting in a
                      pregnancy and the birth of a child in a gas station bathroom under unusual
                      circumstances (the Chicago complaint).2 The Associated Press published
                      the article.
                                     Wynn filed a defamation complaint against AP Respondents,
                      asserting that the allegations of sexual assault contained in the Chicago
                      complaint were false and improbable on their face, and that AP

                             'This case returns to us on appeal following our reversal of the district
                      court's grant of AP Respondents' motion to dismiss based on the fair report
                      privilege. See generally Wynn v. The Associated Press, 136 Nev. 611, 475
                      P.3d 44 (2020).
                            2Following a bench trial on a defamation clairn brought by Wynn
                      against the complainant, a district court found that the Chicago complaint
                      allegations were, in fact, false. Wynn v. The Associated Press, No. A-18-
                      772715-C (Nev. 8th Jud. Dist. Ct. Mar. 25, 2020) (Findings of Fact,
                      Conclusions of Law, and Judgment).
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                      Respondents published the article with actual malice. AP Respondents filed
                      a special motion to dismiss pursuant to Nevada's anti-SLAPP statutes.
                      Following limited discovery on the issue of actual malice, the district court

                      granted a renewed version of AP Respondents' special motion to dismiss,
                      finding that the article was a good faith communication in furtherance of

                      the right to free speech in direct connection with an issue of public concern
                      and that Wynn failed to meet his burden of establishing a probability of
                      prevailing on the merits of his claim. Wynn now appeals that decision. He
                      argues that the district court erred in finding both that AP Respondents
                      met their burden under the first prong and that he failed to meet his burden
                      under the second prong.     Specifically, he argues that the district court
                      misapplied the actual malice standard relevant to public figures under the

                      second prong.
                                                     DISCUSSION
                                  "We review a decision to grant or deny an anti-SLAPP special
                      motion to dismiss de novo." Smith v. Zilverberg, 137 Nev. 65, 67, 481 P.3d
                      1222, 1226 (2021).     As explained above, the anti-SLAPP framework
                      demands a two-prong analysis when considering a special motion to
                      dismiss. The first prong requires the court to "[d]etermine whether the
                      moving party has established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
                      claim is based upon a good faith communication in furtherance of the right
                      to petition or the right to free speech in direct connection with an issue of
                      public concern." NRS 41.660(3)(a). If the moving party makes this initial
                      showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff under the second prong to show
                      "with prima facie evidence a probability of prevailing on the claim." NRS
                      41.660(3)(b). Because Wynn challenges the district court's rulings under
                      both prongs, we will discuss each in turn.

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                AP Respondents met their burden under the first prong
                               To rneet the burden under the first prong, the defendant must
                show       "that   the   comments   at   issue   fall   into   one   of   the   four
                categories . . . enumerated in NRS 41.637." Stctrk v. Lackey, 136 Nev. 38,
                40, 458 P.3d 342, 345 (2020). The relevant category here is found under
                NRS 41.637(4), which protects a "[c]ommunication made in direct
                connection with an issue of public interest in a place open to the public or

                in a public forum, which is truthful or is made without knowledge of its
                falsehood." Wynn argues that the district court erred in concluding that the
                article by AP Respondents satisfies this category. Spe6ifically, he asserts
                that the article does not discuss an issue of public interest and that it was
                not truthful or made without knowledge of its falsehood.
                               In Shapiro v. Welt, we adopted guidelines for district courts to
                consider in distinguishing issues of private and public interest.3         133 Nev.

                       Those guidelines are:
                       3

                                    (1) "public interest" does not equate with
                               mere curiosity;
                                      (2) a matter of public interest should be
                               something of concern to a substantial number of
                               people; a matter of concern to a speaker and a
                               relatively small specific audience is not a matter of
                               public interest;
                                     (3) there should be some degree of closeness
                               between the challenged statements and the
                               asserted public interest—the assertion of a broad
                               and amorphous public interest is not sufficient;
                                     (4) the focus of the speaker's conduct should
                               be the public interest rather than a mere effort to
                               gather ammunition for another round of private
                               controversy; and

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                35, 39, :389 P.3d 262, 268 (2017). Here, the article and its surrounding
                context point to an issue of clear public interest. The article discusses two
                new allegations of sexual misconduct by Wynn on the heels of national
                reports alleging a pattern of misconduct spanning decades. In the weeks
                preceding publication of this article, Wynn resigned as CEO of Wynn
                Resorts and as Finance Chair of the Republican National Comrnittee due to
                the national reports of alleged misconduct; and contemporaneously, Wynn
                Casinos, the Nevada Gaming Control Board, and other regulators launched
                investigations into his conduct. The allegations undoubtedly affected his
                public business and political affairs, and additional reports of sexual
                misconduct would be of concern to a substantial number of people, including
                consumers, voters,     and   the business and governmental entities
                investigating precisely this kind of behavior. The public had an interest in
                understanding the history of misconduct alleged to have been committed by
                one of the most recognized figures in Nevada, and the article directly relates
                to that interest.
                            Wynn further argues that, even if the article relates to an issue
                of public interest, the district court erred in concluding the communication
                was published without knowledge of its falsehood (i.e., that it was published
                in "good faith," NRS 41.637; NRS 41.660(3)(a)). "[Mil affidavit stating that
                the defendant believed the communications to be truthful or made them
                without knowledge of their falsehood is sufficient to meet the defendant's

                                  (5) a person cannot turn otherwise private
                            information into a niatter of public interest simply
                            by communicating it to a large number of people.
                Shapiro, 133 Nev. at 39, 389 P.3d at 268 (quoting Piping Rock Partners, Inc.
                v. David Lerner Assocs., Inc., 946 F. Supp. 2d 957, 968 (N.D. Cal_ 2013)).
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                    burden absent contradictory evidence in the record." Stark, 136 Nev. at 43,
                    458 P.3d at 347. Here, AP Respondents filed such an affidavit.
                                 In rebuttal, Wynn points to what he claims to be contradictory
                    evidence in the record. Most notably, he asserts that the Chicago complaint
                    was absurd on its face, and therefore, AP Respondents must have known it
                    was false. He also points to a text sent by Garcia Cano to a coworker shortly
                    after reviewing the complaint in which she wrote "[o[ne of [the complaints]
                    is crazy." However, we agree with the district court that this evidence is
                    not sufficient to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that AP
                    Respondents were aware of the complaint's falsity. While the narrative
                    contained in the complaint is unusual, it was not so unrealistic as to put AP
                    Respondents on notice as to its falsity, and Garcia Cano's characterization
                    of the complaint as "crazy" is not persuasive evidence that she knew it to be
                    false.4   Importantly, because the identifying information in the complaint
                    received by Garcia Cano was redacted, it would have been fruitless for AP
                    Respondents to investigate further at the time, and nothing in LVMPD's
                    response to the unredacted complaint would have put AP Respondents on
                    notice that the story was false.
                                 Therefore, we agree with the district court that the article was
                    a good faith communication in furtherance of the right to free speech in
                    direct connection with an issue of public importance.               Because AP
                    Respondents met their burden under the first prong, we now turn to the
                    second prong of the anti -SLAPP analysis, first discussing the burden
                    required of a public figure plaintiff to establish actual malice.

                          We have considered the additional evidence Wynn points to in this
                          4

                    regard and are not persuaded that it demonstrates that AP Respondents
                    knew the complaint was false.
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             ,
                  A public figure plaintiff's burden under the second prong
                               As noted, under the second prong of the relevant framework,

                  the court must determine whether the plaintiff has demonstrated with
                  prima facie evidence a probability of prevailing on the claim.               NRS
                  41.660(3)(b). Because Wynn is a public figure, to prevail at trial on his
                  defamation claim, he must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the
                  publication at issue was rnade with actual rnalice.5            Pegasus v. Reno
                  Newspapers, Inc., 118 Nev. 706, 719, 57 P.3d 82, 90 (2002). Wynn argues
                  that his evidence of actual malice at this stage need not meet the clear and
                  convincing standard in order to establish a probability of prevailing on his
                  claim because prong two merely requires a "prima facie" probability of
                  prevailing on the claim. AP Respondents, however, assert that Wynn's
                  evidence of actual malice must meet the clear and convincing standard. We
                  have never directly discussed a plaintiff s burden under the second prong
                  when that prong requires "prima facie" evidence of success but the plaintiff s
                  claim requires "clear and convincing" evidence to prevail at trial.
                               We have described the second prong of an anti-SLAPP analysis
                  as requiring the plaintiff to show that his claim has at least "minimal
                  merit." Abrams v. Sanson, 136 Nev. 83, 91, 458 P.3d 1062, 1069 (2020).
                  Minimal merit exists when the plaintiff makes "a sufficient prima facie
                  showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted
                  by the plaintiff is credited." Wilson v. Parker, Covert & Chidester, 50 P.3d

                        5 To prevail on his defamation claim, Wynn is also required to show
                  "(1) a false and defamatory statement by [the] defendant concerning the
                  plaintiff; (2) an unprivileged publication to a third person; (3) fault . . . ; and
                  (4) actual or presumed damages." Pegasus v. Reno Newspapers, Inc., 118
                  Nev. 706, 718, 57 P.3d 82, 90 (2002). However, the only element reasonably
                  in controversy on appeal is Wynn's ability to establish actual malice.
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                733, 739 (Cal. 2002) (quoting Matson v. Dvorak, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 880, 886
                (Ct. App. 1995)). But a favorable judgment in a public figure defamation
                claim may only be sustained if the evidence is sufficient for the jury, by clear

                and convincing evidence, to infer that the publication was made with actual
                malice. Pegasus, 118 Nev. at 721-22, 57 P.3d at 92.
                            The Legislature has declared that "[w]hen a plaintiff rnust
                demonstrate a probability of success of prevailing on a claim pursuant to
                NRS 41.660, . . . the plaintiff must meet the same burden of proof that a
                plaintiff has been required to meet pursuant to California's [anti-SLAPP]
                law." NRS 41.665(2). Thus, we turn to California law to resolve the issue
                at hand.
                            California caselaw regarding a plaintiff s burden of putting
                forth prima facie evidence supports the conclusion that, under the second
                prong, a plaintiff must provide evidence that would be sufficient for a jury,
                by clear and convincing evidence, to reasonably infer that the publication
                was made with actual malice. See, e.g., Padres L.P. v. Henderson., 8 Cal.
                Rptr. 3d 584, 594 (Ct. App. 2003) ("The plaintiff must make a prima facie
                showing of facts that would be sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment
                under the applicable evidentiary standard."); Robertson v. Rodriguez, 42
                Cal. Rptr. 2d 464, 470 (Ct. App. 1995) (holding that where an element of a
                claim must be proven by clear and convincing evidence at trial, the
                sufficiency of the plaintiff s prima facie showing on an anti-SLAPP motion
                is determined with the higher standard of proof in mind); Looney v. Superior
                Ct., 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 182, 192-93 (Ct. App. 1993) (concluding that at the
                summary judgment [stage] in a case where plaintiffs ultimate burden of
                proof will be by clear and convincing evidence ... the evidence and all

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                inferences which can reasonably be drawn therefrom must meet that higher
                standard" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
                               We therefore hold that to demonstrate by prima facie evidence
                a probability of success on the merits of a public figure defamation claim,
                the plaintiff s evidence must be sufficient for a jury, by clear and convincing
                evidence, to reasonably infer that the publication was made with actual
                malice. In other words, while the plaintiff at this prong must prove only
                that their claim has minimal merit, a public figure defarnation claim does
                not have minimal rnerit, as a matter of law, if the plaintiff s evidence of
                actual malice would not be sufficient to sustain a favorable verdict under
                the clear and convincing standard. If a public figure plaintiff could prevail
                on an anti-SLAPP special motion to dismiss by putting forth only minimal
                evidence of actual malice, the statutes' mechanism for providing an early
                and expeditious resolution of meritless claims would be rendered
                ineffectual.
                               Wynn argues that requiring him to meet a clear and convincing
                evidence standard at this stage of the proceedings would violate his
                constitutional right to a civil jury trial. See Leiendecker v. Asian Wornen
                United of Minn., 895 N.W.2d 623, 635 (Minn. 2017) (holding that a portion
                of Minnesota's anti-SLAPP law violated the constitutional right to a jury
                trial because it required the nonmoving party to produce "clear and
                convincing [evidence] ... that the moving party's acts are not immune"
                (internal quotation marks omitted)). To be sure, in Taylor v. Colon, we
                previously upheld the second prong of Nevada's anti-SLAPP statutes as
                constitutional, partly because the prima facie standard does not interfere
                with a jury's fact-finding abilities. 136 Nev. 434, 439, 482 P.3d 1212, 1216

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                (2020).6     But importantly, "whether the evidence in the record in a
                defamation case is sufficient to support a finding of actual malice is a
                question of law." Harte-Hank.s Commc'ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S.

                657, 685 (1989).     And even outside of the anti-SLAPP context, "Nile
                question of actual malice goes to the jury only if there is sufficient evidence
                for the jury, by clear and convincing evidence, to reasonably infer that the
                publication was made with actual malice." Pegasus, 118 Nev. at 721-22, 57

                P.3d at 92 (emphases added). Because actual malice is a question that does
                not go to a jury unless the evidence is sufficient to meet the clear and
                convincing standard, requiring the plaintiffs evidence to meet that
                standard at the second prong of an anti-SLAPP analysis does not deny a
                plaintiff their constitutional right to a civil jury trial. Our holding in Taylor

                did not preclude a requirement that when an element of a particular claim
                requires the plaintiff to satisfy a clear and convincing evidence standard
                before the claim goes to a jury, the plaintiffs evidence at the second prong
                must satisfy that standard.      In holding today that such a requirement
                exists, we do not replace the prima facie evidence standard; rather, the
                requirement that evidence of actual malice meet the clear and convincing
                standard is merely a part of the plaintiff s prima facie showing.

                      6 In a previous version of NRS 41.660, plaintiffs bore a clear and
                convincing burden of proof standard at the second prong. The Legislature
                amended that statute in 2015 to require only prima facie evidence. 2015
                Nev. Stat., ch. 428, § 13, at 2455. Our holding does not rewrite the statute
                to return the plaintiffs burden of proof to a clear and convincing standard;
                it merely recognizes that evidence of actual malice must meet the clear and
                convincing standard to sufficiently demonstrate with prima facie evidence
                a probability of prevailing on this type of claim.
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                     Wynn failed to meet his burden under the second prong
                                  "[A]ctual malice is proven when a statement is published with
                     knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard for its veracity."
                     Pegasus, 118 Nev. at 722, 57 P.3d at 92. "Reckless disregard for the truth
                     may be found when the 'defendant entertained serious doubts as to the
                     truth of the statement. but published it anyway." Id. (quoting Posadas v.

                     Cit,y of Reno, 109 Nev. 448, 454, 851 P.2d 438, 443 (1993)).
                                  This court has routinely looked to California courts for guidance
                     in the area of anti-SLAPP law. Coker v. Sassone, 135 Nev. 8, 11, 432 P.3d
                     746, 749 (2019). California courts treat this prong as they do a motion for
                     summary judgment; thus, under comparable Nevada law regarding motions
                     for summary judgment, "the evidence, and any reasonable inferences drawn
                     from it, must be viewed in [the] light most favorable to the nonmoving
                     party."    Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724, 729, 121 P.3d 1026, 1029
                     (2005).7    Here, even when the evidence is considered in the light most
                     favorable to him, Wynn has failed to establish actual malice by sufficient
                     evidence to sustain a favorable verdict.      His attempts to establish AP
                     Respondents' knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the veracity of
                     the complaint fall short of the heightened clear and convincing standard.
                     See Gruber v. Baker, 20 Nev. 453, 477, 23 P. 858, 865 (1890) (describing

                           7We note that prior to 2013, NRS 41.660 required the district court to
                     treat a special motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment. See
                     2013 Nev. Stat., ch. 176, § 3, at 623. Though the Legislature removed this
                     language in 2013, subsequent amendments in 2015 restructured the statute
                     in a way that once again tracks the procedural standards that apply to a
                     motion for summary judgment. See Coker, 135 Nev. at 10, 432 P.3d at 748
                     (recognizing that "[a]s amended, the special motion to dismiss again
                     functions like a summary judgment motion procedurally").
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                clear and convincing evidence as satisfactory proof that is "so strong and
                cogent as to satisfy the mind and conscience of a common man").
                               Similar to his arguments under prong one, Wynn argues that

                the Chicago complaint was implausible and points to the failure by AP
                Respondents to investigate further before publishing as evidence of actual
                malice. Again, while the complaint contained unusual elements, that does
                not mean that the gist of the allegations reported by AP Respondents—that

                Wynn sexually assaulted a woman in Chicago in the 1970s—was untrue or
                that AP Respondents should have held serious doubt about those
                allegations.    As explained, because all identifying information in the
                complaint was redacted, it was not possible to meaningfully investigate
                further as long as that information was unknown. Wynn again points to
                Garcia Cano's text describing the complaint as "crazy" to establish her
                subjective doubt.     But calling the complaint "crazy" is not clear and
                convincing evidence that Garcia Cano believed it to be false or that she
                recklessly disregarded whether it was true.8        Wynn also attempts to
                establish reckless disregard by highlighting AP Respondents' motivation to
                publish the story quickly. But news organizations often have a motivation
                to publish stories before their competitors, and in the absence of serious
                doubt regarding the veracity of the statement, such a desire does not

                      8Looking at Wynn's evidence in the light most favorable to him does
                not require us to assume that by "crazy" Garcia Cano meant "not believable"
                or "unreliable." A more reasonable inference from her characterization is
                that she believed the complaint to be "shocking," "disturbing," or, as Garcia
                Cano put it in her testimony, "explosive and impactful."
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                establish a reckless disregard for the truth." Pegasus, 118 Nev. at 722, 57
                P.3d at 92.
                              This evidence would not be sufficient for a jury to find, by clear
                and convincing evidence, that AP Respondents published the story with
                knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard for its truth.1°
                Because Wynn did not produce sufficient evidence of actual malice, he failed
                to establish with prima facie evidence a probability of prevailing on his
                claim, requiring dismissal.
                                              CONCLUSION
                              Nevada's anti-SLAPP statutes were designed to limit precisely
                the type of claim at issue here, which involves a news organization
                publishing an article in a good faith effort to inform their readers regarding
                an issue of clear public interest. AP Respondents met their burden under
                the first prong to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that their
                article was a good faith communication in furtherance of the right to free
                speech in direct connection with an issue of public concern. Wynn, on the
                other hand, did not establish with prima facie evidence a probability of
                prevailing on the merits of his defamation claim because he failed to meet
                the clear and convincing evidence standard under the second prong that is

                      9At  most, the evidence shows that AP Respondents rnay have held
                some doubt as to the veracity of the complaint. But that is not enough to
                meet the standard; the defendant must hold serious doubt. See Wynn v.
                Smith, 117 Nev. 6, 17, 16 P.3d 424, 431 (2001) (reversing a jury verdict
                finding actual malice because the jury instructions omitted "serious" before
                "doubt," leading the jury to apply a lower standard).
                      "Wynn points to some additional evidence of actual malice not
                discussed in this opinion, but we are not convinced that it is sufficient to
                meet his burden under this prong.
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                 applicable to his public figure defamation claim. We therefore affirm the
                 district court's order granting the renewed special motion to dismiss the
                 complaint.

                                                    arraguirre

                 We concur:

                                               J.
                 Herndon

                 Lee
                           Osc,                J.

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