Court Opinion

ID: 9757861
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 23:02:21.160034+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:45.069518
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Me. Justice Eagen :
This action in equity was instituted under the provisions of the Liquor Code, Act of April 12, 1951, P. L. 90, §611, as amended, 47 P.S. §6-611. The statute provides in relevant part that any building or place (ex-*126eept a private residence) wherein liquor, alcohol or malt beverages are possessed or sold in violation of the Liquor Code is a common nuisance; and if the existence of such a nuisance is established, the court “in its discretion”1 may enjoin further possession and sale of alcohol on the premises; or enjoin use and occupancy of the premises for any purpose for the period of one year; or permit the use and occupancy to continue providing that a penal bond is filed in the sum of not less than $500, conditioned upon the fact that no further violations of the act shall occur.
The complaint in the instant case included several serious allegations which the evidence did not substantiate. And after an extensive hearing, it became apparent that the principal problem which concerned the residents of the neighborhood was the presence of many drunks on the sidewalks and streets near the Wheel Bar, who constantly abused passers-by with word and action.
The chancellor, whose findings and conclusions were subsequently approved by the court en banc, found that the deplorable condition, described before, existed all over the immediate neighborhood, and for years before the present owner of the Wheel Bar took over the management; that the present internal management of the Wheel Bar “provides very little source of annoyance to the neighbors”; and, that “the real nuisance emanates” from drunks and “winos” who come from all over the city and purchase wine in a nearby Commonwealth-operated liquor store and who then congregate and openly imbibe the wine from the bottles in the street. Movies introduced in evidence showed intoxicated persons coming out of the liquor store with bottles purchased therein and groups gathered in the street waiting their turn to obtain a drink from the bottles.
*127The chancellor concluded that to hold the management of the licensed premises responsible for the conditions existing in the street, which emanated from the operation of the Commonwealth’s own liquor store, would be a rank injustice. However, he found that since certain enumerated violations of the Liquor Code had occurred within and on the licensed premises that a nuisance as defined by the statute did exist. But, exercising the discretion clearly given by the statute, the chancellor decided against imposing the severe sanctions statutorily permitted and ordered the filing of a bond in the sum of |10,000, to guarantee no further violations would ensue or be tolerated. The conclusion against the imposition of a more severe penalty took into account: (1) that the licensee had operated similar businesses for many years at other locations with an unblemished record; (2) that the business and premises involved were purchased in 1964 and with improvements, which included rebuilding and renovating both the interior and exterior, the investment exceeded f60,000; (3) that the premises could not be used for another commercial purpose without a further substantial expenditure.
It is fundamental that for this Court to rule the trial court abused its discretion, it must clearly appear from the record that the law was overridden or misapplied, or the judgment entered was manifestly unreasonable, or was the result of partiality, bias or ill will. See Mielcuszny v. Rosol, 317 Pa. 91, 176 A. 236 (1934).
After an examination of the record, I personally am not persuaded that such an abuse of discretion occurred in the court below.
Finally, I would analogize the instant situation to one wherein a trial judge sentences a defendant following his conviction for violation of a criminal statute, for cut to its marrow, that is precisely what this case *128involves, viz., a sentence or punishment for violation of the law. If the trial judge sentences a defendant to punishment within the limits the statute prescribes but does not impose the maximum punishment allowed, would this Court even entertain an appeal or complaint by the district attorney asserting the punishment imposed was not as severe as it should have been? Or, further, would this Court on appeal change the sentence and impose a more severe one? I personally know of no such precedent and, until this case, never even assumed I would “live to see the day”.
I dissent.
Mr. Justice Cohen and Mr. Justice O’Bbien join in this dissenting opinion.

 47 p.S. §6-611 (c). Emphasis supplied.