Court Opinion

ID: 9536191
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 06:56:04.730454+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:33:28.813338
License: Public Domain

BAKES, Justice,
dissenting:
Sixty years ago the Supreme Court of Idaho had this to say about the predecessor to I.C. § 6-602: “This is not a quo warranto proceeding under the common law. It is usually called a proceeding in the nature of quo warranto . . .” People v. Burnham, 35 Idaho 522, 525, 207 P. 589, 590 (1922). Such being the case, we should *397think twice before defeating a claim brought pursuant to I.C. § 6-602 solely on the basis of the technical nuances of the antiquated writ of quo warranto. Indeed, in Taylor v. Beneficial Protective Ass’n, 60 Idaho 587, 94 P.2d 787 (1939), we held that some of the procedural and technical requirements of the common law writ of quo warranto were not applicable to an action brought under I.C. § 6-602 (then § 9-602).
I believe therefore that we should avoid placing undue emphasis on the common law origins of this statutory action, and instead determine whether, under the language of the statute, the state is entitled to the relief it requests. It seems to me the ultimate issue is whether the respondent held his office with authority of law. The narrower issue is whether a candidate who is disqualified at both the time of election and the time of taking the oath of office can cure the disqualification during his term of office. I think that issue is fairly well settled in Idaho. “Under Idaho law, a candidate may be elected to an office while under a disqualification, provided such disqualification can be and is removed before the new term of office begins.” Jordan v. Pearce, 91 Idaho 687, 691, 429 P.2d 419, 423 (1967). See Bradfield v. Avery, 16 Idaho 769, 102 P. 687 (1909). The majority rule is in accord. E. g., Cox v. Starkweather, 128 Colo. 89, 260 P.2d 587 (1953); Hulgan v. Thornton, 205 Ga. 753, 55 S.E.2d 115 (1949); Lee v. Byrd, 169 Ga. 622, 151 S.E. 28 (1929); McAlmond v. Meyers, 262 Or. 521, 500 P.2d 457 (1972); Commonwealth ex rel. Kelley v. Keiser, 340 Pa. 59, 16 A.2d 307 (1940); Slater v. Varney, 136 W.Va. 406, 68 S.E.2d 757 (1952), upheld on rehearing, 70 S.E.2d 477 (1952). Contra, Widincamp v. Wood, 167 Ga. 57, 144 S.E. 900 (1928). See generally Annots., 88 A.L.R. 812, 831 (1934) and 143 A.L.R. 1026, 1031 (1943). As the Supreme Court of West Virginia put it, a candidate “must remove his disqualification before the beginning of the regular term of that office . and that if he has failed to do so his ineligibility to that office becomes permanent and irremovable from and after that time.” Slater v. Varney, 68 S.E.2d at 770. If respondent was ineligible at the time he was sworn into office, he held that office without lawful authority, even on the day that the state filed this action.
I am also troubled by the majority’s disposition of the issue concerning attorney fees. It is true that Gooding County has already paid the attorney fees awarded to respondent by the court below. However, I must emphatically disagree with the Court’s conclusion that the appellant has therefore acquiesced in that portion of the judgment and lost its right to appellate review. As I.C. § 6-602 points out, this action is brought “in the name of the people of the state.” The appellant in this case is the State of Idaho on behalf of all the people. Gooding County was not a party. Whether or not the county paid the attorney fees, the state has brought this appeal and the state has done nothing to acquiesce in that portion of the judgment awarding attorney fees to the respondent.
McPADDEN, J., concurs.