Court Opinion

ID: 9587859
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:27:14.063068+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:00:56.218078
License: Public Domain

MEYERSON, Judge,
specially concurring:
Even assuming that the dissent is correct that the trial court properly considered the estoppel argument, in my view the evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates that Mrs. Howe was not estopped from asserting title to the vehicle. Mrs. Howe did everything she possibly could to protect herself against misuse of the title. She acted with promptness and persistence in securing the duplicate title. Wallace, on the other hand, paid for a vehicle which was only three months old without ever questioning the seller, Mr. Howe. Wallace failed to ask to see the vehicle registration; had the salesman done so he would have discovered that there was no registration in the vehicle. It would have been a simple matter for Wallace to call Mrs. Howe to ascertain her consent to the sale. This was not done. Finally, had Wallace checked the records at the Motor Vehicle Department, it would have been discovered that the title had been changed one month previously and placed in the name of Mrs. Howe alone. “When one of two persons must — under these circumstances — bear the loss, it should fall on the one whose business is the handling of such transactions, rather than upon the one who enters into an isolated purchase of an automobile.” Price v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 102 Ariz. 227, 231, 427 P.2d 919, 923 (1967).
The “estoppel” cases relied upon by the dissent are easily distinguishable and demonstrate that the innocent actions of Mrs. Howe in placing the initial title in both her name and her husband’s name are plainly insufficient to invoke the doctrine of estoppel against her. For example in Kearby v. Western States Securities Co., relied upon by the dissent, the court held that the finance company (the owner of the vehicle) was estopped to assert its title because it “clothed” the seller with the power to resell the vehicle. The car was driven by a salesman for the seller and carried a dealer’s license plate used by the seller. The seller called upon the purchaser at the purchaser’s home to demonstrate the vehicle and drove the vehicle to the seller’s place of business and offered the vehicle for sale at a discount because it had been used as a demonstrator. In General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Hill, 95 Ariz. 347, 390 P.2d 843 (1964), estoppel was applied because the seller, who retained a lien on the vehicle, delivered title to the purchaser in violation of Pennsylvania law which required that the lien holder retain title until the entire amount of the lien is fully paid. When the purchaser sold the vehicle to the “innocent” third party, the original seller was held to be estopped from asserting title because of non-compliance with the Pennsylvania statute. Finally, in Kelsoe v. Grouskay, 70 Ariz. 152, 217 P.2d 915 (1950), the owner of the vehicle relinquished possession of the car to the purchaser and delivered the certificate of title endorsed in blank to the *226purchaser. These actions were held to es-top the owner from asserting title. These cases easily demonstrate that Mrs. Howe took no action in this case which would amount to such an estoppel.
Having determined that Mrs. Howe was not estopped from asserting her ownership of the vehicle, it must now be determined whether her duplicate title superseded the original title to the vehicle which Mr. Howe presented to Wallace. As the majority opinion points out, the applicable statutes are somewhat confusing. Under, the circumstances, great weight must be given to the determination of the administrative agency charged with enforcing the motor vehicle statutes. The Motor Vehicle Department ruled that the duplicate title issued to Mrs. Howe was valid and that the original title issued to both Mr. and Mrs. Howe was null and void. In my judgment, the trial court erred in ignoring that finding. Thus, because Mrs. Howe had title to the vehicle and did not clothe Mr. Howe with any authority to sell the vehicle on her behalf, and further because Wallace was in the best position to avoid the loss, I agree with the conclusion expressed in the majority opinion that the decision of the trial court should be reversed and that the order of the administrative agency be reinstated.