Court Opinion

ID: 2964440
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:25:39.708514+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:01:51.526410
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                                 ____________________
        No. 96-1728

                           GLORIA GONZALEZ-GARCIA, ET AL.,

                                Plaintiffs, Appellees,

                                          v.

                         WILLIAMSON DICKIE MANUFACTURING CO.,

                                Defendant, Appellant.
                                _____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                           FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

                   [Hon. Daniel R. Dominguez, U.S. District Judge]
                                              ___________________
                                 ____________________

        No. 96-1737

                 IN RE:  WILLIAMSON DICKIE MANUFACTURING CO., ET AL.,

                                     Petitioner.
                                _____________________

                             PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                               Selya, Boudin and Lynch,
                                   Circuit Judges.
                                   ______________
                                 ____________________

            Radames  A. Torruella,  Ariadna Alvarez  and McConnell  Valdes  on
            _____________________   _______________      _________________
        brief for appellant.
            Luis Toro Goyco,  Nora S. Rivera  Carrasquillo and  Arturo Luciano
            _______________   ____________________________      ______________
        Delgado on brief for appellees.
        _______
            Rafael  J. Vazquez  Gonzalez and McConnell Valdes  on Petition for
            ____________________________     ________________
        Writ of Mandamus.
                                 ____________________

                                   November 8, 1996
                                 ____________________

                 Per  Curiam.     Williamson  Dickie  Manufacturing   Co.
                 ___________

            ("Williamson Dickie") has filed both a notice of appeal and a

            petition for  writ of  mandamus from  a district  court order

            remanding  a case to a Commonwealth of Puerto Rico court from

            which it had been removed.  We conclude that this court lacks

            jurisdiction  to review the order of remand, either by way of

            appeal  or  mandamus,  and therefore  summarily  dismiss  the

            appeal and deny the petition for mandamus.  Because the issue

            is a recurring one, a brief opinion explaining our result may

            be useful for guidance in the future.

                                          I.

                 In 1993, Williamson Dickie dismissed some employees when

            it  decided to close its  plants in Puerto  Rico and transfer

            its operations outside of Puerto Rico.  In November 1994, 117

            dismissed  employees  filed  suit  in a  Commonwealth  Court,

            claiming entitlement  to  severance pay  in  accordance  with

            Puerto  Rico Severance Law Statute,  Law 80 of  May 30, 1976,

            P.R. Laws Ann.  tit. 29,    185 et  seq. (1985)  (hereinafter

            "Law 80").  They also claimed that, in retaining only younger

            employees  until the  operations were  completely shut  down,

            Williamson Dickie violated the Commonwealth's law against age

            discrimination.

                 Williamson  Dickie  removed  the  suit  to  the  federal

            district  court  on the  ground that  it  was a  civil action

            arising  under the laws of  the United States,  i.e., that it
                                                            ____

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            presented  a  federal  question.    Specifically,  Williamson

            Dickie  alleged that, although  the plaintiffs' complaint did

            not mention  the Employee  Retirement Income Security  Act of

            1974 ("ERISA"), the suit,  in fact, was a claim  for benefits

            under an ERISA plan,  falling under ERISA's civil enforcement

            provision, 29 U.S.C.    1132(a)(1)(B), and thus was removable

            to federal court.

                 Plaintiffs responded with a motion to remand back to the

            Commonwealth Court, contending that their complaint was not a

            claim  for benefits  under an  ERISA plan,  but rather  was a

            claim for "indemnity for  wrongful discharge" pursuant to Law

            80.  Williamson Dickie then  moved to dismiss the plaintiffs'

            severance pay claim, arguing that this claim was preempted by

            ERISA.   Plaintiffs  filed an  opposition to  this motion  to

            dismiss, reiterating their  contention that  their claim  for

            severance pay was not ERISA-based.

                 In April 1996, the district court issued  an opinion, in

            which  it concluded that Law  80 was not  an employee benefit
                                                 ___

            plan  under  ERISA.   It  opined  that  Law  80 more  closely

            resembled  the "one-time,  lump-sum  payment  triggered by  a

            single event requir[ing] no administrative scheme," found not

            preempted  by ERISA in Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482
                                   ________________________    _____

            U.S. 1, 12 (1987), rather than the more extensive and complex

            administrative obligations imposed  by the Massachusetts "tin

            parachute" statute  that this court found  preempted by ERISA

                                         -3-

            in Simas  v. Quaker Fabric  Corp. of Fall  River, 6  F.3d 849
               _____     ___________________________________

            (1st Cir.  1993).   The district court  concluded, therefore,

            that the  cause of action under  Law 80 was not  preempted by

            ERISA.   It  determined  that Williamson  Dickie's motion  to

            dismiss the  plaintiff's Law 80  claim as preempted  by ERISA

            was  moot.   And, it  remanded the  case to  the Commonwealth

            Court.

                                         II.

                 Section  1447(d) of  Title  28 provides,  subject to  an

            exception  for civil  rights  cases not  relevant here,  that

            "[a]n order remanding a case to the State court from which it

            was  removed  is  not  reviewable on  appeal  or  otherwise."

            Section  1447(d) applies only if the case is remanded for the
                                     ____

            reasons stated in 28 U.S.C.   1447(c)--a timely raised defect

            in removal procedure or  lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

            Things  Remembered, Inc.  v. Petrarca,  116 S.  Ct.  494, 497
            ________________________     ________

            (1995).  But where  the district court order of  remand rests

            on  lack of  subject matter  jurisdiction, that order  is not

            reviewable  by  appeal  or   mandamus,  even  if   erroneous.
                                    __              ____________________

            Thermtron Products, Inc. v.  Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 343
            ________________________     _____________

            (1976); Gravitt v.  Southwestern Bell Tel. Co.,  430 U.S. 723
                    _______     __________________________

            (1977) (per curiam).

                 Contrary to Williamson Dickie's contention, we interpret

            the district court's order of remand as a  determination that

            it lacked  subject matter jurisdiction over  the removed case

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            because no federal  claim had  been presented  to invoke  the

            court's   federal  question   jurisdiction.     Rejection  of

            Williamson  Dickie's preemption  defense  was a  link in  the

            chain of reasoning.  But the preemption ruling, "rather  than

            being apart from the question of subject matter jurisdiction,

            [is]  necessary   to  determine  whether   such  jurisdiction

            existed."  Hansen v. Blue Cross of California, 891 F.2d 1384,
                       ______    ________________________

            1388 (9th Cir. 1989); Nutter v. Monongahela Power Co., 4 F.3d
                                  ______    _____________________

            319,  321  (4th Cir.  1993)  ("The  preemption findings  were

            merely  'subsidiary   legal  step[s]   on  the  way   to  its

            determination  that  the case  was  not properly  removed.'")

            (citation omitted).

                 After  remand,  the  district court's  ruling  that  the

            plaintiff's claim is not  completely preempted by federal law

            "has no preclusive effect  on the state court's consideration

            of the  substantive preemption defense."   Whitman v. Raley's
                                                       _______    _______

            Inc.,  886  F.2d  1177,  1181  (9th  Cir.  1989);  Nutter  v.
            ____                                               ______

            Monongahela Power  Co., 4  F.3d at  321-22  (same); Soley  v.
            ______________________                              _____

            First Nat'l Bank  of Commerce,  923 F.2d 406,  409 (5th  Cir.
            _____________________________

            1991) (same); Glasser v.  Amalgamated Workers Union Local 88,
                          _______     __________________________________

            806 F.2d  1539, 1540  (11th Cir.  1987) (per  curiam) (same).

            Because   the  district   court's   preemption   finding   is

            unreviewable, principles  of  collateral estoppel  would  not

            apply  to preclude relitigation of the  issue in state court.

                                         -5-

            Nutter v. Monongahela Power Co., 4 F.3d at 321-22; Whitman v.
            ______    _____________________                    _______

            Raley's Inc., 886 F.2d at 1181.
            ____________

                 The approach we  take in declining to  review the remand

            order is supported  by at  least four circuits.   See,  e.g.,
                                                              __________

            Nutter v. Monongahela Power  Co., 4 F.3d at 320-23;  Soley v.
            ______    ______________________                     _____

            First Nat'l Bank of  Commerce, 923 F.2d at 407-10;  Hansen v.
            _____________________________                       ______

            Blue Cross  of California,  891 F.2d  at 1387-90; Glasser  v.
            _________________________                         _______

            Amalgamated Workers Union Local 88, 806 F.2d  1539 (11th Cir.
            __________________________________

            1987) (per curiam).  Section 1447(d) recites that "[a]n order

            remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed

            is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise."  Thus, a number of

            circuits have considered mandamus as a vehicle for review and

            rejected  it as well.  See, e.g., Nutter v. Monongahela Power
                                   _________  ______    _________________

            Co., 4 F.3d at 320-23; Soley v. First Nat'l Bank of Commerce,
            ___                    _____    ____________________________

            923 F.2d at  407-10; In  re Business Men's  Assurance Co.  of
                                 ________________________________________

            Am., 992 F.2d 181, 182-83 (8th Cir. 1993) (per curiam).
            ___

                 Two circuit court opinions point in the other direction.

            In In  re Life Ins. Co.,  857 F.2d 1190 (8th  Cir. 1988), the
               ____________________

            Eighth  Circuit considered  mandamus appropriate  in somewhat

            comparable circumstances and gave as its reason the otherwise

            lack of  appellate review  and the  preclusive effect  of the

            district court's  ruling on  the  state court.   Because  the

            district   court's   preemption   finding  is   unreviewable,

            principles of collateral estoppel would not apply to preclude

            relitigation of the issue in state court.  As for the lack of

                                         -6-

            appellate  review, this  is  just what  Congress directed  in

            section 1447(d).

                 In Tingley v. Pixley-Richards  West, Inc., 953 F.2d 1124
                    _______    ___________________________

            (9th Cir. 1992), the  Ninth Circuit regarded appellate review

            of a  remand order, substantially  identical to the  order at

            issue in the  case before  us, as  not barred  by    1447(d).

            This approach  taken by  the Tingley panel,  however, appears
                                         _______

            inconsistent with the Ninth Circuit's own case  law in Hansen
                                                                   ______

            v. Blue Cross of California, 891 F.2d at 1388-89, and Whitman
               ________________________                           _______

            v.  Raley's  Inc., 886  F.2d at  1178,  neither of  which was
                _____________

            cited,  nor appears to  have been considered,  by the Tingley
                                                                  _______

            panel.    We agree  with the  Fourth  Circuit, see  Nutter v.
                                                           ___  ______

            Monongahela  Power Co.,  4 F.3d at  322-23, that  the Tingley
            ______________________                                _______

            opinion therefore ought not be given weight.  

                 The appeal in No. 96-1728 is summarily dismissed.   Loc.
                 ________________________________________________________

            R. 27.1.  The petition for writ of mandamus in No. 96-1737 is
            ________  ___________________________________________________

            denied.
            _______

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