Court Opinion

ID: 9379910
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-16 17:08:19.534877+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:58.350152
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Jeffrey, 2023-Ohio-817.]

                                COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                               EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                  COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO,                                     :

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,               :
                                                            No. 111763
                 v.                                :

DANIEL JEFFREY,                                    :

                 Defendant-Appellant.              :

                                 JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED IN PART, SENTENCE VACATED IN
                           PART, REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: March 16, 2023

          Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                              Case No. CR-21-663077-A

                                             Appearances:

                 Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
                 Attorney, and Jonathan Block, Assistant Prosecuting
                 Attorney, for appellee.

                 Ruth R. Fischbein-Cohen, for appellant.

EMANUELLA D. GROVES, J.:

                    Defendant-appellant Daniel Jeffrey (“appellant”) appeals his

conviction for felonious assault and other crimes following a jury trial. For the

reasons that follow, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History

                In September 2021, a grand jury indicted appellant for rape, a first-

degree felony (Count 1); felonious assault, a second-degree felony (Count 2); two

counts of abduction, third-degree felonies (Counts 3 and 4), domestic violence, a

first-degree misdemeanor (Count 5); and grand theft motor vehicle, a fourth-degree

felony (Count 6). Appellant pleaded not guilty at his arraignment; several pretrials

were conducted, and a jury trial commenced on May 10, 2022. The facts revealed at

trial follow.

                S.C. and appellant were in an on-again, off-again relationship of

approximately seven and one-half years. They also lived together off and on and had

occupied the second floor of a duplex on West 49th Street in Cleveland. However,

in February 2020, they were in an off-again phase of their relationship. S.C. moved

out and was staying with a friend A.N., who lived on West 50th Street.

                On April 18, 2020, S.C. and A.N. went to a party. They left the party

around 11:00 p.m., or midnight, and returned to A.N.’s home. S.C. contacted

appellant, who picked her up from A.N.’s home and took her to the duplex on West

49th Street. S.C. told appellant that someone she had met on a dating app was at

the party with his girlfriend but he was still sending her messages. S.C. and

appellant later had intercourse. S.C. went to sleep on a mattress in the living room.

                S.C. awoke around 7:00 a.m. the following morning. When she went

to get dressed and leave, she discovered that appellant had moved a couch and a

loveseat to block the exit.    Appellant also had taken S.C.’s phone and purse.
Appellant began to scream at her about pictures in her phone that she sent to other

men and began “smacking” her as well. S.C. attempted to reach the door, but

appellant grabbed her by her bra, ripped it off, and continued to smack her.

               At one point, appellant backed her up against the porch door. S.C.

crouched down with her arms over her bare chest. Appellant began taking pictures

of S.C. with her phone. E.F., S.C.’s brother, received a text message from his sister’s

phone later that morning. The text message included the topless pictures of S.C.

crouched against the door.

               S.C. was able to get away at one point and ran out onto the front

porch. Appellant followed her outside, and S.C. threw patio furniture at him to stop

him from approaching her. Appellant grabbed her by the hair and dragged her back

over to the door, all while striking her. S.C. slid to the ground, and she felt

appellant’s fingers enter her mouth, so she bit down as hard as she could. The next

thing she felt was appellant’s fingers inside her vagina, as he lifted her up to an

upright position. Appellant shoved her against the side of the porch. Although S.C.

tried to grab anything to hold on, appellant pushed her from the second-story

balcony to the ground, approximately 20 feet. S.C. broke her right arm as a result of

the fall.

               S.C. got up and ran to A.N.’s house, where she was able to call 911.

During the 911 call, S.C. indicated that she lived with appellant at the West 49th

street address. On cross-examination, the defense challenged S.C.’s statement that

she lived with appellant in the 911 call and that appellant inserted his fingers into
S.C.’s vagina. S.C. acknowledged that she misspoke on the 911 call about where she

lived, but also noted that she was shaken up about what had occurred and in great

pain. S.C. also acknowledged that she did not immediately report that appellant had

inserted his fingers into her vagina. She was embarrassed at the time and was still

embarrassed testifying about it in court. Although S.C. did not report vaginal

penetration until later, two separate videos from body-cam footage taken right after

the incident show S.C. motioning to her crotch when describing how appellant

grabbed her.

               When the police went to the scene to contact appellant, a neighbor

called to the police. She conversed in Spanish with one of the officers, Officer Tania

Torres (“Officer Torres), who also spoke Spanish. Officer Torres testified that the

neighbor told her she saw S.C. leave, and S.C. was “half-naked.” The conversation

between Officer Torres and the neighbor was captured on body-cam. Appellant’s

attorney did not object to the testimony but challenged Officer Torres’ translation of

what the neighbor said.

               Testimony was also taken regarding S.C.’s Jeep. The prior owner

testified that she had given the car to appellant but had left the buyer information

blank. S.C. claimed that the Jeep was in her name and that appellant did not have

permission to drive it on April 19, 2020.

               Appellant remained in possession of S.C.’s phone after the incident.

S.C. tried to have the phone turned off but was unsuccessful. She believed this was

because appellant had the phone and was able to request service. Shortly after the
incident and in the days that followed, several suspicious messages were posted to

S.C.’s Facebook account. S.C. maintained those messages were posted by appellant

impersonating S.C. in order to exonerate himself.

              The jury found appellant guilty of Count 2 felonious assault; guilty of

Counts 3 and 4, abduction; and guilty of Count 5, domestic violence. The jury found

appellant not guilty of Count 1, rape; and not guilty of Count 6, grand theft motor

vehicle.

              At a later date, the trial court sentenced appellant to six years to nine

years on Count 2; 36 months each on Counts 3 and 4; and credit for time served on

Count 5. The trial court noted that Counts 3 and 4 would merge and ordered them

to be served concurrent to Count 2.

              Appellant appeals and presents the following errors for our review:

                          Assignment of Error No. 1

      The conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

                          Assignment of Error No. 2

      Although a sentence is to run concurrent, it still implicates appellant’s
      double jeopardy clause.

                          Assignment of Error No. 3

      The counts for felonious assault; domestic violence; and abduction
      constitute double jeopardy.
Law and Analysis

                For ease of analysis, we will address the assignments of error out of

order, where practical. In this case, we will start with the first assignment of error,

in which appellant alleges that his convictions were against the manifest weight of

the evidence.

Weight of the Evidence

                When we analyze the weight of the evidence, we “must consider all of

the evidence in the record, the reasonable inferences [that can be made] from it, and

the credibility of the witnesses to determine ‘“whether in resolving conflicts in the

evidence, the factfinder clearly lost its way and created such a miscarriage of justice

that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.”’” State v. Stratford,

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110767, 2022-Ohio-1497, ¶ 21, citing State v. Harris, 8th

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109060, 2021-Ohio-856, ¶ 32, citing State v. Thompkins, 78

Ohio St.3d 380, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997), quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d

172, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983).

                The weight of the evidence

      concerns “the inclination of the greater amount of credible evidence,
      offered in a trial, to support one side of the issue rather than the other.
      It indicates clearly to the jury that the party having the burden of proof
      will be entitled to their verdict, if, on weighing the evidence in their
      minds, they shall find the greater amount of credible evidence sustains
      the issue which is to be established before them. Weight is not a
      question of mathematics, but depends on its effect in inducing belief.”
      (Emphasis added.) Black’s [Law Dictionary], supra, at 1594.
Thompkins at 387, quoting State v. Robinson, 162 Ohio St. 486, 487, 124 N.E.2d 148

(1955).

               For weight of the evidence, “the issue is whether ‘there is substantial

evidence upon which a jury could reasonably conclude that all the elements have

been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.’” (Emphasis sic.) State v. Monroe, 105

Ohio St.3d 384, 2005-Ohio-2282, 827 N.E.2d 285 ¶ 52, quoting State v. Getsy, 84

Ohio St.3d 180, 702 N.E.2d 866 (1998), citing State v. Eley, 56 Ohio St.2d 169, 383

N.E.2d 132 (1978) syllabus.

               However, “‘[t]he discretionary power to grant a new trial should be

exercised only in the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against

the conviction.’” State v. Drummond, 111 Ohio St.3d 14, 2006-Ohio-5084, 854

N.E.2d 1038, ¶ 193, citing Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387, 678 N.E.2d 541, quoting

Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d at 175, 485 N.E.2d 717.

               In the instant case, appellant argues that S.C. lied during her

testimony, and in fact describes her as a “pathological liar” who should not be

believed. Further, he suggests that evidence of one lie is sufficient to establish that

S.C.’s testimony should not be believed in its entirety. However, a jury is permitted

to “believe or disbelieve any witness or accept part of what a witness says and reject

the rest.” State v. Doyle, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 84575, 2005-Ohio-2006, ¶ 9, citing

State v. Antill, 176 Ohio St. 61, 197 N.E.2d 548 (1964).

               Appellant focuses on four aspects of S.C.’s testimony that he argues

demonstrate that she was lying. First, he points to the fact that on the 911 call, S.C.
claimed to live at appellant’s address. At trial, S.C. acknowledged that she had

actually moved out of the apartment in February and was living with A.N. She

attributed her misstatement on the 911 call to being “shook-up” because of what

occurred.

                Even so, there was evidence that S.C.’s statement was a convenient

shorthand rather than a lie or attempt to deceive. Both A.N., S.C.’s friend, and

Holley Ray Moore (“Moore”), appellant’s boss and friend, testified to the on-again,

off-again nature of S.C. and appellant’s relationship. Moore testified that S.C. would

come and go from the apartment. A.N. similarly testified that they would break up

and get back together. Additionally, although they were off again on April 19, 2020,

A.N. testified that most of S.C.’s belongings were still at appellant’s home. When

S.C. moved in with A.N. in February, she only had her clothes and some hygiene

products. Given the foregoing and the heightened circumstances of the time, we

find the jury could reasonably conclude that S.C. was not intentionally deceptive on

the 911 call.

                Second, appellant claims S.C. lied when she alleged that he

threatened to shave her head. The evidence of this lie, according to appellant, is the

fact that he did not, in fact, shave her head. Initially, we note that the fact that

someone did not act on a threat, does not mean they did not make a threat.

Additionally, there was evidence that the appellant likely did make the threat. The

text message S.C.’s brother received from her phone stated, “I should of shaved her

head so everyone knows how she is.” The phone was in appellant’s possession at
that time. The jury could reasonably conclude that the threat was made by appellant

during the altercation.

               Thirdly, appellant alleges that S.C. lied about the rape allegations.

Notably, victims do not make charging decisions. In the instant case, the record is

clear that the rape charge was not added to the indictment until September 2021.

Detective John Freehoffer (“Det. Freehoffer”) testified that he was assigned the case

a day or two after it occurred in 2020. However, he did not speak to the victim until

September 2021, after the first indictment had already been filed. At that point, he

learned from S.C. that appellant had allegedly penetrated her vaginally during the

altercation. Det. Freehoffer then presented the information to the prosecutor’s

office and a charge of rape was added to the indictment.

               Nevertheless, a review of the early body-cam video in the case, calls

into question the suggestion that S.C. lied. During the first video encounter, S.C.

described how appellant picked her up by motioning with an open hand in front of

her crotch with her fingers curled towards her body. Similarly, body-cam footage

taken while S.C. was in the emergency room showed her making a similar motion.

Finally, on the witness stand, S.C. explained that she did not immediately tell law

enforcement what happened because she was embarrassed and that it was hard to

say it out loud.

               Finally, appellant alleges that S.C. lied about being pushed off the

porch because she testified there was a tree blocking the edge. The body-cam video

used at trial, however, establishes that the tree could not prevent appellant from
pushing S.C. off the porch. The tree was several feet from the porch, but from the

angle in the video, the tree momentarily blocked the view of the porch.

               Consequently, after independently reviewing the entire record,

weighing the evidence and all reasonable inferences and considering the credibility

of witnesses, we find that the jury did not, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, lose

its way and create a manifest miscarriage of justice necessitating a reversal of the

conviction and a new trial.

               Accordingly, appellant’s first assignment of error is overruled.

Double Jeopardy and Allied Offenses of Similar Import

               Next, we will address appellant’s third assignment of error. Appellant

argues that double jeopardy was violated because felonious assault, abduction, and

domestic violence are allied offenses of similar import. Therefore, he should not

have been sentenced to all three. Further appellant alleges that the fact that the

sentences are concurrent makes no difference because he is still doubly punished.

               The double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United

States Constitution, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment,

and Section 10, Article I of the Ohio Constitution both “protect a defendant against

a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, a second prosecution for

the same offense after conviction, and multiple punishments for the same offense.”

State v. Boyd, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109052, 2020-Ohio-5181, ¶ 35, citing North

Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969); State v.

Martello, 97 Ohio St.3d 398, 2002-Ohio-6661, 780 N.E.2d 250, ¶ 7.
              However, both the Ohio Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of the

United States have found that the clause “‘does no more than prevent the sentencing

court from prescribing greater punishment than the legislature intended.’” Id.,

quoting Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 103 S.Ct. 673, 74 L.Ed.2d 535 (1983).

Courts have also expressed this idea by saying that the double jeopardy clause

“allow[s] multiple convictions from the same conduct, as long as that conduct does

not constitute the ‘same offense.’” State v. White, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 92972,

2010-Ohio-2342, ¶ 19, quoting Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct.

180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932).

              R.C. 2941.25, which codifies the double jeopardy protections (see

State v. Reyes, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108947, 2019-Ohio-4795, ¶ 6, citing State v.

Underwood, 124 Ohio St. 3d 365, 2010-Ohio-1, 922 N.E.2d 923, ¶ 23), instructs the

courts to determine whether a defendant’s conduct, which violates multiple statutes,

are separate offenses or can be merged. It provides:

      (A) Where the same conduct by defendant can be construed to
      constitute two or more allied offenses of similar import, the indictment
      or information may contain counts for all such offenses, but the
      defendant may be convicted of only one.

      (B) Where the defendant’s conduct constitutes two or more offenses
      of dissimilar import, or where his conduct results in two or more
      offenses of the same or similar kind committed separately or with a
      separate animus as to each, the indictment or information may contain
      counts for all such offenses, and the defendant may be convicted of all
      of them.

R.C. 2941.25(A) and (B)
               The defendant’s conduct is the pivotal consideration when

determining whether offenses are allied offenses of similar import. Boyd, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 109052, 2020-Ohio-5181, at ¶ 38, citing State v. Ruff, 143 Ohio St.3d

114, 2015-Ohio-995, 34 N.E.3d 892, ¶ 26. When the defendant’s conduct supports

multiple offenses, he may be convicted of all of them if “any one of the following is

true: (1) the conduct constitutes offenses of dissimilar import or significance, (2) the

conduct shows the offenses were committed separately, or (3) the conduct shows the

offenses were committed with separate animus or motivation.” Id., citing Ruff at

paragraph three of the syllabus, citing R.C. 2941.25(B).

               Our review of whether offenses are allied offenses of similar import

requires a de novo standard of review. Id. at ¶ 40, citing State v. Williams, 134 Ohio

St.3d 482, 2012-Ohio-5699, 983 N.E.2d 1245, ¶ 28; see also State v. Bailey, Slip

Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-4407, ¶ 11 (“Although determining whether R.C. 2941.25

has been properly applied is a legal question, it necessarily turns on an analysis of

the facts, which can lead to exceedingly fine distinctions.”). De novo review requires

this court to “review the trial court’s judgment independently and without deference

to the trial court’s determinations while applying the same standard as that

employed by the trial court.” Bellaire Corp. v. Am. Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co.,

2018-Ohio-2517, 115 N.E.3d 805, ¶ 13 (8th Dist.).

               Appellant     was     convicted     of   felonious     assault    under

R.C. 2903.11(A)(1), which provides that no one shall knowingly cause serious

physical harm to another.
               Appellant was also convicted of two counts of abduction under

R.C. 2905.02(A)(1) and 2905.02(A)(2). R.C. 2905.02(A)(1) provides that no one,

without privilege to do so, shall knowingly, by force or threat, remove a person from

the place where they are found. R.C. 2905.02(A)(2) provides that no one, without

privilege to do so, shall knowingly, by force or threat, restrain the liberty of another

under circumstances that create a risk of physical harm to the person or place them

in fear.

               Finally, appellant was convicted of domestic violence under

R.C. 2919.25(A), which provides that no one shall knowingly cause or attempt to

cause physical harm to a family or household member.

               Looking at the elements of all three crimes, as well as appellant’s

conduct, we find that the offenses were committed separately.             Offenses are

committed separately when “‘one offense was complete before the other offense

occurred, * * * notwithstanding their proximity in time and that one [offense] was

committed in order to commit the other.’” State v. Woodard, 2d Dist. Montgomery

No. 29110, 2022-Ohio-3081, ¶ 38, quoting State v. Turner, 2d Dist. Montgomery

No. 24421, 2011-Ohio-6714, ¶ 24.

               In the instant case, appellant abducted S.C. when he blocked the exit

to his apartment and refused to allow her to leave. Once she was trapped, appellant

stripped her bra off and assaulted her repeatedly. The abduction statute does not

require a showing of physical harm, therefore, the act of trapping S.C. completed the

abduction.   The domestic violence offense then began when appellant began
smacking S.C. repeatedly and ripping her bra off. S.C. subsequently managed to

escape onto the porch, at which time, appellant grabbed her and pushed her over

the edge to the ground below, beginning and completing the felonious assault.

Although the offenses involved the same victim and occurred within a relatively

short period of time, there is a beginning and end to each crime. They are, therefore,

not allied offenses of similar import. See Boyd, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109052,

2020-Ohio-5181, at ¶ 45; State v. Black, 2016-Ohio-383, 58 N.E.3d 561, ¶ 27 (8th

Dist.), discretionary appeal not allowed, 145 Ohio St.3d 1461, 2016-Ohio-2807, 49

N.E.3d 322.

              Accordingly, appellant’s third assignment of error is overruled.

Requirements for Offenses deemed Allied Offenses of Similar Import

              Finally, in his second assignment of error, appellant argues that his

right against double jeopardy was violated when the trial court gave him multiple

sentences for the “same” crime. In this assignment of error, he focuses primarily on

the merged abduction convictions.

              The trial court determined that the two counts of abduction were

allied offenses of similar import and therefore merged. We agree. However, the trial

court then proceeded to sentence appellant to 36 months on each count, to run

concurrently. The law is clear that “the trial court has no authority to impose

separate sentences on offenses that are deemed to be allied under R.C. 2941.25.”

State v. Vintson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108477, 2019-Ohio-3894, ¶ 5, citing State

v. Shearer, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107335, 2019-Ohio-1352, ¶ 4. Furthermore, ‘“the
court has a mandatory duty to merge the allied offenses by imposing a single

sentence, and the imposition of separate sentences for those offenses — even if

imposed concurrently — is contrary to law because of the mandate of

R.C. 2941.25(A).’” Id., quoting State v. Williams, 148 Ohio St.3d 403, 2016-Ohio-

7658, 71 N.E.3d 234, ¶ 28.

              When a court finds that a defendant has been found guilty of two or

more allied offenses of similar import, the court “should permit the state to select

the allied offense to proceed on for purposes of imposing sentence and it should

impose sentence for only that offense.” Williams at ¶ 2.

              Accordingly, we sustain appellant’s second assignment of error as to

the two counts of abduction. Accordingly, appellant’s sentence on Counts 3 and 4

are vacated, and the case is remanded for resentencing. On remand, the state has

the right to elect which offense to pursue at sentencing. State v. Whitfield, 124 Ohio

St.3d 319, 2010-Ohio-2, 922 N.E.2d 182, ¶ 21.

              Judgment affirmed in part, sentence vacated in part, remanded for

resentencing on Counts 3 and 4.

      It is ordered that appellant and appellee split the costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment

into execution.
      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

                       ___
EMANUELLA D. GROVES, JUDGE

ANITA LASTER MAYS, A.J., and
LISA B. FORBES, J., CONCUR