Court Opinion

ID: 9961538
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-19 06:06:43.857875+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:20:53.490395
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                           STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,                                     UNPUBLISHED
                                                                     April 18, 2024
               Plaintiff-Appellee,

v                                                                    No. 362747
                                                                     Kent Circuit Court
ANDRE DIMETRE SIMS,                                                  LC Nos. 21-002685-FC; 21-
                                                                              002690-FH
               Defendant-Appellant.

Before: BOONSTRA, P.J., and FEENEY and YOUNG, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        Defendant, Andre Dimetre Sims, was convicted after a jury trial of first-degree murder,
MCL 750.316; carrying a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm),
MCL 750.227b; and being a felon in possession of ammunition (felon-in-possession),
MCL 750.224f. The trial court sentenced defendant as a fourth-offense habitual offender,
MCL 769.12, to serve a life sentence without the possibility of parole for the first-degree murder
conviction, two years’ imprisonment for the felony-firearm conviction, and 48 months to 80 years’
imprisonment for the felon-in-possession conviction. Defendant now appeals by right, arguing
that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence because his arrest and the
search and seizure of his property was unlawful, and, therefore, all evidence discovered as a result
of his arrest and the search should be excluded as well. For the reasons set forth in this opinion,
we affirm defendant’s convictions and sentences.

                     I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

        This case arises out of defendant’s murder of the victim on the evening of January 3, 2021,
following a disagreement with the victim’s grandson, IG. Defendant was on parole for a separate
conviction at the time of the murder. On May 12, 2020, Defendant signed his parole conditions;
they included terms that he not engage in any criminal behavior, not own or possess a firearm or
be around anyone who was in possession of a firearm, not possess any other weapon or
ammunition, and that he was to abide by other special conditions imposed and with oral or written
orders of the field agents. His special conditions of parole included consent to have a peace officer
or parole officer search his person or property on demand as required by MCL 791.236(19).

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IG testified that on January 3, 2021, he met up with his mother’s cousin JC and defendant that
night to purchase marijuana. He testified that defendant had a gun in the back seat of the truck JC
was driving, and that defendant and JC were planning to conduct a robbery for marijuana. He
testified that he wanted to “get home” and that he reached into the backseat, grabbed defendant’s
gun, and ran away from the vehicle back to his grandmother’s home where he was living at the
time. IG testified that while he was explaining the situation to his grandmother, someone knocked
at the door, and when his grandmother answered, she was shot twice.1 He testified that he heard
defendant’s voice ask if IG was there before the shots were fired. IG was questioned by Detective
Adam Baylis of the Grand Rapids Police Department (GRPD) later that night, and the detective
testified that IG said that he heard either JC’s voice or defendant’s voice at the door.

        An expedited parole absconding violation warrant for defendant was obtained the next day,
stating that he was a person of interest in a homicide and possibly in possession of a firearm.
Detective Lucas Nagtzaam and Probation Agent Jordan Becklin arrested defendant on January 5,
2021, when he arrived in his sister’s vehicle at Alternative Directions for a meeting with his parole
agent, Agent Lorinda Beedell. His sister’s vehicle was searched with her consent, and defendant’s
backpack, located in the front passenger seat and identified by his sister as belonging to defendant,
was searched as well. Law enforcement found ammunition and firearm magazines in the
backpack, and defendant was charged with felon-in-possession.

        Defendant called his siblings from jail with “urgency,” asking his sister if the police had
come to her house and to throw away an item he always left at her home. He also told his sister “I
need you to be on it,” and talked to his siblings about getting his tablet; defendant also provided
his tablet password and asked for phone numbers. Police stopped defendant’s brother’s vehicle
while leaving the sister’s home. Law enforcement found a .45 caliber firearm in the vehicle and
later confirmed it was the one used in the shooting.

        Law enforcement also obtained a warrant to search defendant’s sister’s house and located
an iPhone on top of a bathroom cabinet. Detective Timothy DeVries testified that he imported data
from the iPhone into Google Earth to identify where the phone’s user was located. Detective
DeVries explained that he downloaded the digital file system from the iPhone into Google Earth
“and it will tell me the dates and times and the latitudes and longitudes and approximate location
of where the phone has been.” The settings feature of the phone he analyzed, once it was opened
with the password, identified it as “Andre’s phone.” Detective DeVries testified that the iPhone
was near a Speedway station at Eastern Avenue and 44th Street at 10:51 pm. At 11:16 pm, it was
near 525 Eastern Avenue SE, where defendant’s girlfriend lived. At 11:43 pm, the iPhone was
directly in front of 1242 Alpine Avenue—the victim’s home. The phone was later found at 525
Eastern Avenue, and on January 5 at 11:34 am, the phone was located at Alternative Directions—
where defendant met with his parole agent. Defendant was charged with homicide and felony-
firearm charges as a fourth-offense habitual offender. Defendant’s charges of homicide, felony-
firearm, and felon-in-possession were consolidated. Defendant moved to represent himself in
propria persona and to waive counsel, and the trial court granted both motions.

1
    A crime scene technician found two .45 caliber shell casings at the scene of the shooting.

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       Defendant now appeals.

                                  II. MOTION TO SUPPRESS

         Relying on People v Mead, 503 Mich 205; 931 NW2d 557 (2019), defendant argues that
the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress because he did not give free and voluntary
consent to the search of his backpack and his sister lacked actual or apparent authority to consent
to the search; therefore, the search was unreasonable. Because Mead is factually distinguishable
and defendant was a parolee at the time of the search, we disagree.

        We review constitutional questions de novo. People v Sadows, 283 Mich App 65, 67; 768
NW2d 93 (2009). “This Court reviews for clear error a trial court’s findings of fact made after a
suppression hearing, but reviews de novo the ultimate decision on a motion to suppress.” People
v Rodriguez, 327 Mich App 573, 583; 935 NW2d 51 (2019). “A finding is clearly erroneous if it
leaves this Court with a definite and firm conviction that the trial court made a mistake.” People
v Dillon, 296 Mich App 506, 508; 822 NW2d 611 (2012).

        “The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and its counterpart in the
Michigan Constitution guarantee the right of persons to be secure against unreasonable searches
and seizures.” People v Kazmierczak, 461 Mich 411, 417; 605 NW2d 667 (2000); see US Const,
Am IV; Const 1963, art 1, § 11. There are three ways that we may conclude that a consent search
was unreasonable: “consent wasn’t voluntary, the consent-giver lacked authority, or the scope of
the search exceeded the consent.” Mead, 503 Mich at 216. The burden is on the prosecution to
“prove that consent was freely and voluntarily given.” Id.

        In Samson v California, 547 US 843, 852, 857; 126 S Ct 2193; 165 L Ed 2d 250 (2006),
the United States Supreme Court stated that “parolees have severely diminished privacy
expectations by virtue of their status alone” and held that “the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit
a police officer from conducting a suspicionless search of a parolee.” See also People v Glenn-
Powers, 296 Mich App 494, 502; 823 NW2d 127 (2012) (noting that probationers have a
“diminished expectation of privacy and, accordingly, may be subjected to searches that might be
unreasonable if conducted on members of the general public”).

        In the present case, defendant was arrested after his sister drove him to his appointment
with Agent Beedell. In the process of executing defendant’s parole absconder warrant, Detective
Nagtzaam and Agent Becklin asked defendant’s sister if they could search her car, and she
consented to the search. “An officer must obtain consent to search from someone who has the
authority to give it,” Mead, 503 Mich at 217. Notably, the defendant in Mead was a passenger in
a vehicle that was subject to a traffic stop. He was holding his backpack and had a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the backpack. Id. at 214. He was not a parolee, however. Here,
defendant’s sister had that authority to consent to the search. She also identified the backpack in
the front passenger seat as belonging to defendant. They proceeded to search the backpack and
found empty handgun magazines, .45 caliber ammunition, and a sling for a rifle or shotgun. The
trial court held a hearing on defendant’s motion to suppress and ultimately denied defendant’s
motion, stating that “parolees have even fewer rights than probationers” and that “you can search
a parolee without even reasonable suspicion.” Indeed, this Court in People v Woods, 211 Mich
App 314, 317; 535 NW2d 259 (1995) recognized that prisoners, parolees and probationers are

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subject to searches without a warrant “as long as the searches meet reasonable legislative or
administrative standards.”

        Moreover, as part of his special conditions of parole, defendant consented to have a peace
officer or parole officer search his person or property on demand as required by MCL
791.236(19).2 We agree that “the parole authorities’ duty to supervise parolees such as [defendant]
and to obtain all facts and circumstances surrounding any parole violation required that parole
officers be vested with search powers over parolees that would be impermissible if directed against
ordinary citizens.” United States v Scott, 678 F2d 32, 34 (CA 5, 1982). Accordingly, the search
of defendant’s backpack while he was on parole did not violate the Fourth Amendment. And we
find the trial court’s decision to deny the motion to suppress supported by the evidence. Rodriguez,
327 Mich App at 583.

        In his Standard 4 Brief,3 defendant argues that his parole agent did not have “reasonable
suspicion” to submit the warrant for defendant’s arrest because she did not identify any specific or
articulable facts to corroborate the allegations that defendant was possibly in possession of a
firearm or a person of interest in a homicide.4 But this argument does not affect the validity of the
search as the search is valid based on defendant’s status as a parolee and not on the validity of the
arrest. Defendant cites United States v Scott, 678 F2d 32, 35 (CA 5, 1982), in support of his
argument, where the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit defined reasonable
suspicion:

         Less stringent a standard than probable cause, reasonable suspicion requires no
         more than that the authority acting be able to point to specific and articulable facts
         that, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant a

2
  MCL 791.236(19) states as follows: “The parole order must require the parolee to provide written
consent to submit to a search of his or her person or property upon demand by a peace officer or
parole officer. The written consent must include the prisoner's name and date of birth, his or her
physical description, the date for release on parole, and the ending date for that parole. The
prisoner shall sign the written consent before being released on parole. The department shall
promptly enter this condition of parole into the department's corrections management information
system or offender management network information system or into a corresponding records
management system that is accessible through the law enforcement information network. Consent
to a search as provided under this subsection does not authorize a search that is conducted with the
sole intent to intimidate or harass.” Defendant signed a written consent to search.
3
    See Administrative Order No. 2004-6, 471 Mich ci, cii, Standard 4 (2004).
4
  Defendant’s Standard 4 brief does not contain a statement of the issues presented as required by
court rule. See MCR 7.212(C)(5). This failure could constitute abandonment of the issues. See
People v Brown, 239 Mich App 735, 748; 610 NW2d 234 (2000). However, parties proceeding
in propria persona are entitled to more lenity in construing their pleadings than would be lawyers,
see Estelle v Gamble, 429 US 97, 106-108; 97 S Ct 285; 50 L Ed 2d 251 (1976), and we will
address his arguments accordingly.

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       belief in the conclusion mooted-in this instance, that a condition of parole has been
       or is being violated.

Scott goes on, however, to recognize that “[w]here the parole officer discovers or is apprised of
such facts, we think that he will seldom be found at fault in acting upon them as did the officer
here . . . .” Id.

        Therefore, the trial court did not err by denying defendant’s motion to suppress because
the search of defendant’s backpack was lawful given defendant’s status as a parolee. Accordingly,
defendant is not entitled to a new trial.

       Affirmed.

                                                             /s/ Mark T. Boonstra
                                                             /s/ Kathleen A. Feeney
                                                             /s/ Adrienne N. Young

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