Court Opinion

ID: 9669366
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 02:53:58.301985+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:55.952693
License: Public Domain

Adams, J.
(dissenting). I am unable to agree with Justice Kelly that the trial court misinterpreted Lyshak v. City of Detroit, 351 Mich 230, or Nielsen v. Henry H. Stevens, Inc., 359 Mich 130. The trial judge found:
“Defendant company certainly was carrying on a legitimate business enterprise on its own premises. It was quite clear from all the evidence in the case, however, that an extremely deceptive and treacherous condition existed in the surface of the ice around the pipe discharging water into the pond. Defendant easily could have employed some sort of .a warning device and sign to serve as a notice or caution to trappers and trespassers who were known to use that area frequently. That would not have limited or interfered in any way with defendant’s profitable conduct of its business.” (Emphasis added.)
There is ample evidence in the record to support the findings of the court and jury that defendant’s *511property was frequented by trappers, hunters, skaters, and other trespassers. Richard Jahr, an employee of Michigan Sugar, testified:
“Q. Do you conduct any activity on these ponds?
“A. Well, I’ve trapped them, being within that area I would say for at least 20 years. * * *
“Q. Well, did they give you permission or didn’t they?
“A. They actually did not give me permission, he says in his own words, for all of them they would like to get rid of the muskrats because they do damage on the ponds, but if I went onto them I was on my own risk.
“Q. Now, have you ever seen any evidence while you are trapping that other people trapped up there ? * * *
“A. Yes, I seen others out there trap.
“Q. How many people do you know of that trap out there?
“A. Three that I know of.” (Emphasis added.)
Max Meissner, also an employee of Michigan Sugar, testified that he had been aware of the fact that people were trapping in the area and that hunters often used the land in question, as many as 30 or 40 during a hunting season.
Floyd Taylor, a truck driver living in Sebewaing, testified it was common knowledge in the community that the Sugar Company premises were a good area for trapping:
“Yes, I think that just about everybody that did any trapping around town knew that that was one of the best areas around, to trap.”
He testified that his own boy, when 14 and 15 years old, trapped on the ponds. There was also evidence of the presence of children, small footprints having been seen and the ponds having been used for skating.
*512The trial judge then went on to apply the proper-legal principles. Justice. Kelly would now restrict the rule “to trespassers only where the facts disclose that defendant owner was aware that child trespassers were entering his property and subjecting themselves to danger and possible harm.” The requirement of reasonable care for the safety of a trespasser is subject to no such condition. Swanson v. City of Marquette, 357 Mich 424. I am unable to perceive the legal or lethal difference between a-“powerfully driven golf ball in flight” {Lyshak), “a negligently driven truck” {Nielsen), “an improperly maintained electrical substation or transformer vault” {Swdnson), and “an extremely deceptive and treacherous condition * * * in the surface of the ice around the pipe discharging water into the pond.”
As Justice Talbot Smith observed in Lyshak (p 239):
“We accept as commonplace today the principle that there is a duty upon all men so to conduct' their activities as to minimize the likelihood of harm to others.” (Emphasis added.)
Special findings were made by the jury in answer to the following questions:
“'Question No. 1 — Was the pond where the boys met their death a place where the Michigan Sugar Company knew, or should have known, that children were likely to trespass? [x] Y.es [ ] No
“Question No. 2 — Was the place where the boys met their death a place where a condition existed which the Michigan Sugar Company knew, or should have known, involved an unreasonable risk of death to child trespassers? [x] Yes [ ] No
“Question No. 3 — Was the utility of maintaining the pond by the Michigan Sugar Company in the condition it was slight as compared to the risk to child trespassers as involved therein? [x] Yes [ ] No” . .
*513Likelihood and foreseeability are much the same thing. I do not disagree with Justice Kelly’s quotation of the rule in Slinker v. Wallner (1960), 258 Minn 243 (103 NW2d 377), but I do with his interpretation of the facts in these two cases where, in my opinion, likelihood of or foreseeability of possible harm existed before the tragedies occurred.
With regard to the question of damages and whether the awards were excessive or insufficient, it is necessary first of all to determine the persons who would be entitled to share in recovery. In the case of James D. Heider, the trial court equated the term “pecuniary injury” as used in the wrongful death act (CL 1948, § 691.581 et seq. [Stat Ann 1959 Cum Supp §27.711 et seq.])* with our former requirement that the beneficiary of the statutory action suffering pecuniary injury be one who was entitled to financial support from the deceased, citing MacDonald v. Quimby, 350 Mich 21. At the very latest, since our decision in Wycko v. Gnodtke, 361 Mich 331, however, we have allowed recovery of damages for pecuniary injury in such actions notwithstanding the absence of an obligation by the deceased to support the person suffering such pecuniary injury. MacDonald v. Quimby is applicable yet to the extent that it was there held, by all members of the Court, that the persons whose “pecuniary injury” is compensable under the death act are those who, in the variant circumstances of intestate succession, might be entitled to inherit the personal property of one dying intestate. In MacDonald, the deceased left surviving him a widow and children, but the Court permitted recovery of the pecuniary injury suffered by deceased’s mother notwithstanding the fact that, because deceased left a widow and children surviving him, his mother would not have *514been entitled to inherit any of his personal estate had he died intestate.
The restriction of the class to Donald Heider, father of James D. Heider, by the trial judge was improper, since, in this case, there were other members of the class who should have been considered. The trial court said:
“This court finds from the evidence at the trial that the deceased James Heider had lived long enough to be able to demonstrate much more clearly than his younger brother David the talents, abilities, character, and accomplishments which gave such distinct and definite promise of a useful life and a good citizen. As a consequence, it would seem to follow irrefutably that his death would occasion the greater loss, not only to the community but also to his whole family, and that therefore the damages should be higher in his than in his brother’s case. This court would be inclined to reach such a conclusion as a matter of simple and obvious justice.”
Since the court did not make an award to cover the pecuniary injury to all of James’ next-of-kin, it will be necessary to remand the case for a reconsideration of such award.
Some further comment is appropriate with regard to the assessment of damages which the trial judge did make. He awarded $10,989.65 for the cost of raising James. The sum was incorrectly allocated to Donald Heider, father of James, who did not provide such cost. It should have been allocated to James D. Heider’s grandfather, who incurred the cost, and who, being within the statutory class, would be entitled to recover.
The trial judge also awarded $30,000 for loss of the society and companionship of James Heider by his father, Donald Heider, who was 33 years old at the time of the trial. James was the son of his first marriage. His wife deserted the child. Her *515whereabouts are -unknown. Heider contributed nothing to the support of James. He was separated from his second wife. In 1953, he was arrested for nonsupport. In 1957, he pleaded guilty to robbery and was sentenced to the State prison of southern Michigan. He contracted cancer and was discharged from prison July 6, 1959, on special parole. He saw James frequently and went hunting and fishing with him. At the time of trial he had a life expectancy of 2 to 5 years. An assessment of $30,000 for the loss of society and companionship by this father upon this record cannot but raise questions. Since the assessment of damages should be redetermined, on remand for further proceedings, we need not determine whether the award made for loss of the child’s society and companionship by his father was excessive. Upon retrial the court should consider carefully all elements of pecuniary injury suffered by all members of the statutory class and he should issue the certificate authorized by the wrongful death act setting forth the amount of such damages and the proportion thereof which represents the pecuniary loss suffered by each of the members of the statutory class.
In the case of 8-year-old David Heider, the jury awarded damages of $125,000. It is asserted that this sum is excessive, against the clear preponderance of the evidence and contrary to its great weight. Appellant states:
“Mrs. Heider, with the $125,000, at her present age would be able to purchase an annuity which would pay her a guaranteed monthly income of $455 for her lifetime.”
The loss of companionship in David’s case runs not only to the father and mother but also to a younger brother and sister. The amount of damages recoverable in actions for death by wrongful act *516is one peculiarly within the province of the jury. Taking into account the total family relationship, the probable dependency of the mother upon David, and the loss to the family group of the life of David over a useful lifetime, we do not find the verdict excessive.
With regard to PA 1953, No 201 (CLS 1961, § 300.-201 [Stat Ann 1958 Rev § 13.1485]), I am unable to agree with Justice Kelly. The declarations do not disclose the applicability of PA 1953, No 201, to bar plaintiff’s asserted causes of action. Paragraphs 4, 5, and 6 of each declaration allege that the defendant knew that people went upon defendant’s lands to hunt, trap, fish, and for other purposes; paragraph 27 of each declaration alleges that the two deceased boys and their dog “set out muskrat trapping”; and paragraph 28 of each declaration alleges that the boys and their dog entered the defendant’s premises and walked upon one of the defendant’s chemical ponds. Standing alone, such allegations are not sufficient, as it is claimed, to invoke the statutory bar of PA 1953, No 201, on the conelusionary assumption that the boys were “on the lands of another * * * for the purpose of fishing, hunting or trapping.” Nor, of course, did the defendant plead any facts from which either the trial court or we properly could conclude that the boys’ purpose in going upon defendant’s land was one of the purposes named in the statute which would bar the causes of action sought to be asserted. Finally, the record as made below fails to disclose any direct evidence that the boys in fact went upon the defendant’s lands to fish, hunt, or trap.
Dation v. Ford Motor Co., 314 Mich 152 (99 NCCA NS 158), is cited by Justice Kelly in support of the proposition that, while usually a question may not be raised for the first time on appeal to the *517Supreme Court, the rule is not inflexible. In Dation, this Court was dealing with an appeal from the workmen’s compensation department. A question of law arose upon the appeal whieh admittedly the department (as a fact finding body) could not settle even if the matter had been remanded to it. The entire question being before this Court, the Court elected to pass upon it.
The problem has not received uniform treatment. Plaintiff cites Hollister v. Kinyon’s Estate, 195 Mich 261; Lewis J. Selznick Enterprises v. Harry I. Garson Productions, 202 Mich 106; D. & W. Rottschafer Real Estate v. Morris, 245 Mich 192; and Shaver v. Associated Truck Lines, 322 Mich 323. Counsel for defendant stress Morris v. Radley, 306 Mich 689, in support of the exception to the rule and argue that we should apply the exception here to avoid a miscarriage of justice because of the inadvertence of counsel in overlooking and failing to raise the application of the statute before the trial court. This •is not a proper case to apply the exception. Only when the matter was presented to ■ the trial judge and he refused to rule, or, under the clearest of circumstances, where it is unquestioned that the entire matter is before this. Court, should the exception prevail.
Such is not this case in whieh the question is first presented here as an afterthought and accorded cursory treatment and briefing. For these reasons it is not applicable at this late juncture in the case of David Heider. Litigation must come to an end. Defendant has had its day in court with ample opportunity to raise and present all defenses. It is not the function of this Court to correct, on review, the inadvertence or failure of counsel to present what might have been a defense.
In the case of James D. Heider, upon remand the trial court should determine any questions of fact *518which may be raised and especially the question as to whether he went on “the lands of another * * * for the purpose of fishing, hunting or trapping.” The court will also consider and determine any issues with regard to the legality and construction of the act which may be raised, such as whether a minor is a “person” within the meaning of the statute, the word “person” being undefined and subject to construction in the light of a strong public policy favoring the protection of minors; whether the classification of the statute violates the due process clauses of the United States and Michigan Constitutions and the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution.
The judgment in the case of Donald Heider, administrator for the estate of James D. Heider, should be remanded for consideration of the applicability of PA 1953, No 201, supra, and for possible reassessment of the damages therein. Costs to neither party, each having prevailed in part.
The judgment in the case of Donald Heider, administrator for the estate of David Heider, should be affirmed. Costs to appellee.
T. M. Kavanagh, C. J., and Souris, J., concurred with Adams, J.

 See, currently, OLS 1961, § 600.2922 . (Stat Ann 1962 Kev § 27A.2922).