Court Opinion

ID: 9566006
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:31:44.591685+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:11.010753
License: Public Domain

Judge Becton
dissenting.
Believing that defendant breached the contract and that plaintiff is entitled to specific performance, I dissent. Harvey v. Linker, 226 N.C. 711, 40 S.E. 2d 202 (1946) does not limit the application of Johnson v. Noles, 224 N.C. 542, 31 S.E. 2d 637 (1944) “to cases in which the party to be charged requested the extension and it was granted solely for his benefit,” as suggested by the majority in n. 2, supra. On the contrary, the Harvey Court did not rule on the enforceability of an oral extension of the time for performance, which is mutually beneficial to the parties. Johnson controls the case sub judice.
The Harvey decision distinguished Johnson as a case dealing solely with the oral extension of the time for performance under the terms of an option contract, when “the extensions were . . . at the request and for the accommodation of the parties to be charged.” 226 N.C. at 712, 40 S.E. 2d at 203. In Johnson, the defendant sellers orally agreed to extend the time for performance to avoid breaching the contract by failing to convey good title. Our Supreme Court refused to permit the defendant sellers, the parties to be charged, to assert the Statute of Frauds, after they had requested and benefited from the oral modification. The facts in Harvey are significantly different. There, the plaintiff buyers orally negotiated an extension of the time for performance arid a reduction in the purchase price. The Harvey Court decided *438the case on the basis of the oral modification of the purchase price alone. The Court declined to enforce the modification of the purchase price, because it dealt with an essential term of the contract, the price, and had been made solely for the benefit of the plaintiffs, rather than the parties to be charged, as in Johnson. The Harvey Court’s silence on the issue of the oral modification of the time for performance leaves Johnson unimpaired. See 8A G. Thompson, Real Property § 4455, at 324 (1963).
The facts in the case sub judice are comparable to those in Johnson. Defendant seller was unable to convey good title by the expiration date of the original contract and the written extension. Defendant continued to orally assure plaintiff, between 10 March and 4 August 1981, that he intended to fulfill his contractual obligations. Plaintiff, in reliance on defendant’s assurances, incurred substantial expenses in plans to develop the land. Clearly defendant benefited by his written and oral agreements to extend the time; he avoided the loss of a sale. He should not be permitted now to assert the Statute of Frauds to commit a fraud on the plaintiff. His oral extensions of the time for performance are valid, despite the Statute of Frauds.
I now decide how long the contract remained in effect. On 4 August 1981, defendant’s attorney informed plaintiffs attorney that defendant had finally obtained a divorce and property settlement from his wife, the condition precedent to fulfilling the contract. Defendant’s attorney stated that defendant was ready to close according to the terms of the original contract. No closing date was set at that time. On 24 September 1981, plaintiffs attorney received a letter from defendant’s attorney declaring the contract void. As stated by the majority, generally “a contract for the sale of land remains valid and binding for a reasonable time after the date set for closing [citation omitted], unless the contract specifies an expiration date or clearly states that time is of the essence.” Supra, p. 4. Unilateral termination of the contract at will, upon reasonable notice to the other party, is only possible a reasonable time after closing. See Fulghum v. Town of Selma, 238 N.C. 100, 76 S.E. 2d 368 (1953). In the case sub judice, the contract did not specify an expiration date or state that time was of the essence and, in the oral extensions, no date had been set for closing; therefore, not only was the contract in effect on 24 September 1981, but it could not be unilaterally terminated at will then. *439By unilaterally terminating it at will on 24 September 1981, defendant breached the contract, and plaintiff is entitled to specific performance.
To the extent that specific performance may not have made plaintiff whole, the trial court may have erred in failing to award plaintiff damages. See E. Farnsworth, Contracts § 12.5, at 825-26 (1982). This, however, we cannot determine since the trial court failed to make findings of fact on the damages issue. I would remand for further findings of fact.