Court Opinion

ID: 9727045
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:18:19.192505+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:33.115420
License: Public Domain

LaVECCHIA, J.,
concurring and dissenting.
As Justice Felix Frankfurter once observed, in the judicial construction of a statute “there is a difference between reading what is and rewriting it.” Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S . 1, 43, 68 S.Ct. 1375, 1397, 92 L.Ed. 1787, 1812 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). At times the difference is elusive, but not this time.
The New Jersey Wrongful Death Act (Act), N.J.S.A. 2A:31-1 to -6, contains some simple, yet emphatic, words: “Every action brought under this chapter shall be commenced within 2 years after the death of the decedent, and not thereafter.” N.J.S.A. 2A:31-3. Undoubtedly, the Court is benevolently motivated when it concludes that equitable tolling principles, specifically infant tolling, are applicable to the two-year limitation period for commencing a wrongful-death action. Ante at 421, 766 A.2d at 1070. But, I must disagree because there is no place for such considerations in this statute.
The statutory wrongful-death cause of action is authorized with the clear prescription that the action be brought within two years of the date of death, not two years from some later date as determined by tolling notions. It is for the Legislature to provide relief from the two-year limitation period, not the Court.
I.
The trial court employed discovery-rule precepts before concluding that plaintiff Carmella LaFage’s wrongful-death action was untimely. The Court examines the facts from the same perspective and, upon concluding also that plaintiffs complaint was filed too late even under those discovery-rule considerations, *442pronounces that it does not reach the question of whether discovery-rule principles may apply to a wrongful-death action. Because the Court considered applying the discovery rule, but did not formally reach the issue, I am compelled to state my disagreement that the discovery rule, or other equitable tolling principles, have any application in the setting of a wrongful-death action.
First, concerning the discovery rule, the argument that the rule may be applied to plaintiffs wrongful-death action, notwithstanding the unambiguous language of N.J.S.A. 2A:31-3 setting the starting date from which a wrongful-death action must be brought at the “death of the decedent, and not thereafter,” overlooks the fact that the discovery rule was borne out of a need to judicially divine ambiguous legislative phraseology, not, as here, to avoid a clear legislative prescription.
The Court announced the discovery rule in Fernandi v. Strully, 35 N.J. 434, 173 A.2d 277 (1961). Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267, 273, 300 A.2d 563 (1973). In Femandi the Court explained that “[i]n most of the states, as in New Jersey, the legislatures have not at all expressed themselves ... preferring to leave to judicial interpretation and application the rather obscure statutory phraseology that the plaintiffs proceeding shall be instituted within a stated period after his cause of action ‘shall have accrued.’ ” Fernandi, supra, 35 N.J. at 439, 173 A.2d 277. In N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2, the personal injury statute of limitations, the New Jersey Legislature “never sought to define or specify when a cause of action shall be deemed to have accrued within the meaning of the statute.” Id. at 449, 173 A.2d 277. Courts are exercising a proper judicial function when they pass on the meaning of the “rather obscure ... legislative phraseology” of “shall have accrued.” Ibid. The Court concluded, “In the absence of legislative definition and specification, the New Jersey courts have often been called upon to delineate the statute; they have conscientiously sought to apply it with due regard to the underlying statutory policy of repose, without, however, permitting unnecessary individual injustices.” Ibid.
*443The discovery rule announced in Femandi is founded, therefore, on the “obscure statutory phraseology” of “shall have accrued” and on the Legislature’s failure to define or specify the accrual point of a personal injury cause of action. Cf. Baird v. American Med. Optics, 155 N.J. 54, 65, 713 A.2d 1019 (1998) (finding that courts determine accrual of cause of action pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:1-2 because that statute “is silent on when a cause of action will be deemed to have ‘accrued’ ”).
There is no “accrual” language in the Wrongful Death Act. Nevertheless, the Court certainly considered applying the discovery rule and only avoids declaring its applicability, or not, due to the happenstance of facts that preclude saving this plaintiffs wrongful-death action even with the benefit of tolling pursuant to the discovery rule. However, the Court’s pregnant suggestion ignores the trigger mechanism for the application of the judicially created discovery rule, that is, the presence of ambiguous “accrual” language in the relevant statute of limitations. The permutation of the discovery rule during the last forty years has not obscured the principle that produced the rule in the first instance, and it does not justify its use in connection with a wrongful-death action.
The Fernandi Court’s reasoning, linking the ability to employ the equitable notion of discovering the accrual of a personal injury cause of action to the legislative failure otherwise to specify a finite accrual point, is not an anomaly. See e.g., Lawrence v. Bauer Publ’g & Printing Ltd., 78 N.J. 371, 373, 396 A.2d 569 (1979) (holding that, despite contention relating to discovery rule, statute of limitations barred libel action pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:14-3, which provides that every action at law for libel must be commenced within “1 year next after the publication of the alleged libel....”). Noting that the doctrine of discovery derives from judicial interpretation of the statute of limitations applicable to personal injury actions, Justice Pashman in Lawrence commented that in “the absence of any legislative specification as to the precise time when a claim ‘accrues,’ our courts, in the exercise of *444their judicial function, have developed a rale which best serves the interests of justice.” Id. at 374, 396 A.2d 569 (Pashman, J., concurring). An inexorable conclusion flowed from this understanding:
The statute of limitations applicable to the present suit, however, does not measure the limitations period in terms of the “accrual” of a cause of action. Instead, it provides that an action must be brought within one year of “the publication” of the alleged libel. The Legislature has therefore fixed a precise date on which the limitations period begins to run. Once the date of publication is determined, there is no need for further judicial interpretation. Hence, the discovery rule is inapplicable to libel actions. See Rosenberg v. Town of North Bergen, 61 N.J. 190, 293 A.2d 662 (1972) (discovery rule inapplicable where statute of limitations provides that an action must be commenced within ten years “after the performance or furnishing of ... services and construction.”).
[Id. at 374-75, 396 A.2d 569 (Pashman, J., concurring).]
As opposed to the accrual statute in Femandi, the Wrongful Death Act, as with the libel statute in Lawrence, is an “absolute” statute, with a fixed objective event: the legislatively deemed date of death as the finite accrual point. The decision in Presslaff v. Robins, 168 N.J.Super. 543, 546, 403 A.2d 939 (App.Div.1979), correctly contrasted the “accrual” category of limitations provisions from statutes such as the wrongful-death provision that “fixes a specified objective event to incept” the running of the limitations period. The Presslaff court, quoting the extensive discussion in Evernham v. Selected Risks Insurance Co., 163 N.J.Super. 132, 136, 394 A.2d 373 (App.Div.1978), properly noted that the equitable tolling principle set forth in the discovery rule is peculiar to statutes of limitations with “accrual” language. Presslaff, supra, 168 N.J.Super. at 546-47, 403 A.2d 939.
In summary, the discovery rule presupposes the absence of a definition of “accrual,” allowing interstitial judicial decision making of the type embodied in the creation of the discovery rule. When a statute is not silent on when a cause of action accrues, the determination of the accrual of a cause of action for timeliness purposes is legislatively defined, and that judgment must be respected. In such circumstances, there is no ambiguity to settle through application of equitable notions such as the judicially created discovery rule. The Wrongful Death Act differs from the *445personal injury statute of limitations in that the Act indelibly marks a date definite for the running of the limitations period. Thus, to apply the discovery rule to the Act would be more than a mere evolution of “discovery rule” law; it would mutate the discovery rule, loosing the rule from its doctrinal mooring.
II.
A.
Numerous states have considered the very issue of application of various equitable tolling principles to a wrongful-death action. New Jersey should not join the distinct minority of states whose courts have engaged in statutory construction engrafting equitable tolling principles, such as the discovery rule, onto a wrongful-death statute’s limitation period, despite the absence of any ambiguity inviting that judicial interpretation. Commentators examining the issue have helpfully organized the analysis by classifying wrongful-death statutes by type.
Wrongful-death statutes generally can be classified into four groups:
(1) those that merely state that the action must be brought with a specified period of time, without fixing any starting date;
(2) those that specify that the action must be brought within a certain time from the date of death;
(3) those that specify that the action must be brought within a certain time from the accrual of the cause of action, without referring to when the cause of action accrues; and
(4) those that provide that the action must be commenced within a certain time from the date of injury or negligent act.
[Judy E. Zelin, Annotation, Time of Discovery as Affecting Running of Statute of Limitations in Wrongful Death Action, 49 AL.i?.4th 972, 977 (1986).]
New Jersey’s wrongful-death statute unquestionably falls into the second category, the category carrying the least ambiguity. The categorization is important because the terms of the wrongful-death statutes constitute one of the two major factors courts have considered in determining the applicability of equitable tolling principles to the statute of limitations in wrongful-death actions. *446Id. at 978. The other factor — the specific cause of decedent’s death- — is not implicated in this case.
The cases rejecting application of the discovery rule to wrongful-death statutes are legion. For example, when confronted with the assertion that the discovery rule should apply to wrongful-death actions, the Supreme Court of Texas methodically dismantled the argument, in part, by reference to New Jersey decisional law. Moreno v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 787 S.W.2d 348 (Tex.1990). The relevant limitations statute provided as follows:
(a) A person must bring suit for ... personal injury ... not later than two years after the cause of action accrued.
(b) A person must bring suit not later than two years after the day the cause of action accrues in an action for injury resulting in death. The cause of action accrues on the death of the injured person.
[Id. at 350.]
The plaintiff there argued “that if subparts (a) and (b) are not interpreted consistently it will result in the absurdity of allowing a defendant to be exonerated for conduct which kills but held liable for conduct which merely maims.” Id. at 350-51. The Texas Supreme Court rejected that argument, stating that subpart (b) specifies that a cause of action “accrues” at a certain time — the date of death. Id. at 351. In contrast, when the legislature uses the term “accrues” without an accompanying definition, as in subpart (a), “the courts must determine when that cause of action accrues and thus when the statute of limitations commences to run.” Ibid. The court went on to note that in three previous cases it had adopted and relied on the principles announced in Fernandi, supra, 35 N.J. at 449, 173 A.2d 277. Moreno, supra, 787 S.W.2d at 351. Taking the lesson gleaned from Femandi, the court restated that the discovery rule “is a judicially constructed test which is used to determine when a plaintiffs cause of action accrued” and that the rule has been applied “to a statute of limitations which left the phrase ‘accrual’ undefined.” Ibid. In contrast, subpart (b) specifically defines “accrual” as the date of death. Ibid.
*447Moreno presented the question of “whether the discovery rule should be applied to a limitations statute which has clearly and unequivocally prescribed that a cause of action accrues upon the occurrence of a specified event.” Ibid. The court held that it should not for three reasons. The plain meaning of the statute “evidences the legislative intent to fix the only date of accrual____” Id. at 353; see also Morano v. St. Francis Hosp., 100 Misc.2d 621, 420 N.Y.S.2d 92, 94-95 (App.Div.1979) (examining wrongful-death statute requiring that action “must be commenced within two years after decedent’s death,” and finding conclusion “inescapable that the clearly expressed intention of the Legislature ... was to provide that an action for wrongful death must be commenced within two years after the date of death”). Second, the judicially created discovery rule applies only to “accrual” limitation statutes, “i.e., statutes which have failed to define when a cause of action accrues.” Moreno, supra, 787 S.W.2d at 353. Finally, “[t]he overwhelming majority of states construing absolute statutes with similar or identical language to that found in [the Texas statute] have held that the discovery rule does not apply.” Ibid.
The Texas Supreme Court summarized its conclusion as follows:
The language used in [subpart (b) ] reflects a clear legislative intent to adopt an absolute two-year- limitations period for wrongful death actions. The legislature could have either left “accrual” undefined in [that subpart] or could have stated that the cause of action accrues “on the death of the injured person or upon discovery of the cause of death”; either route would have allowed the discovery rule to be applied to [subpart (b) ]. Instead, the statute unambiguously specifies one event — death—and only that one event as the date upon which the action accrues. By specifying that date, the legislature has foreclosed judicial application of the discovery rule. If we concluded otherwise, we would be disregarding the plain meaning of [subpart (b) ], distorting the clear function of the discovery rule, frustrating the legitimate purposes of limitation statutes, and ignoring the well-reasoned opinions of most other jurisdictions.
[Id. at 354-55.]
Similarly, in Vermont, the wrongful-death statute read: “[S]uch action shall be brought in the name of the personal representative of such deceased person and commenced within two years from his decease.” Leo v. Hillman, 164 Vt. 94, 665 A.2d 572, 575 (1995). *448The Supreme Court of Vermont found that “[t]he statute is clear on its face and therefore requires no additional interpretation.” Ibid.; see also Cadieux v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 593 F.2d 142, 144 (1st Cir.1979) (considering Rhode Island statute commanding wrongful-death action “shall be commenced within two years after the death of such person” and finding that, although the term “accrued” leaves room for judicial interpretation, “[t]he directive that suit must be brought within two years of death leaves no such room”); Anthony v. Koppers Co., 496 Pa. 119, 436 A.2d 181, 183-84 (1981) (plurality opinion) (examining statute requiring wrongful-death action “shall be brought within one year of death, and not thereafter” and finding the requirement that a wrongful death action be brought within one year after a “definitely established event, — ‘death’—leaves no room for construction”). The Vermont Court held that the wrongful-death statute “prescribes a limitation period that is necessarily determinable where facts are known and indisputable.” Leo, supra, 665 A.2d at 575. When “accrues” appears in statutes of limitations, it implies “the need to ascertain a subsidiary fact in order to apply the limitations formula to a given provision.” Ibid. In contrast, the date of accrual in a wrongful-death action under the Vermont statute “is a determinable fact, and the statutory language ... does not invite further inquiry.” Id. at 575-76; see also Trimper v. Porter-Hayden, 305 Md. 31, 501 A.2d 446, 448-49 (1985) (considering wrongful-death statute mandating action “shall be filed within three years after the death of the injured person” and determining plain language precludes application of discovery rule “in the guise of statutory construction” because statute leaves “no room for judicial interpretation”); Morano, supra, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 95 (holding plain language of New York statute “leaves no room for judicial construction and there are no statutory spaces to be filled”).
Those cases are but a few examples of those states that have employed the same or similar analyses to hold that equitable tolling principles, such as that embodied in the discovery rule, do not apply to their wrongful-death statutes. Other examples *449abound. Many states follow the same rule as Texas and Vermont. See, e.g., With v. General Elec. Co., 653 P.2d 764, 765 (Colo.Ct. App.1982) (finding that death provides notice of potential tort claim); Miles v. Ashland Chem. Co., 261 Ga. 726, 410 S.E.2d 290, 291-92 (1991) (declining to extend discovery rule to statute of limitations by adopting discovery rule in wrongful-death cases); Wyness v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 131 Ill.2d 403, 137 Ill.Dec. 623, 546 N.E.2d 568, 571 (1989) (stating that plaintiffs “ignore the plain language” of wrongful-death statute, which requires actions be filed within two years “after the death”); Schultze v. Landmark Hotel Corp., 463 N.W.2d 47, 51 (Iowa 1990) (finding no “unjust unfairness” because plaintiff was put on notice as of date of death to determine whether wrongful act of defendants caused decedent’s death); Szlinis v. Moulded Fiber Glass Cos., 80 Mich.App. 55, 263 N.W.2d 282, 287 (1978) (finding three-year limitation period for wrongful-death action commences at death); Hubbard v. Libi, 229 N.W.2d 82, 84 (N.D.1975) (noting both individual litigant and society have interest in definite limitation period); Eldridge v. Eastmoreland Gen. Hosp., 307 Or. 500, 769 P.2d 775, 776 (1989) (en banc) (holding “no matter what plaintiff knew or should have known,” statute of limitations on plaintiffs wrongful-death action expired three years after decedent’s death).
B.
The decidedly minority view, favoring application of the equitable tolling principles embodied in the discovery rule despite the absence of accrual language in a wrongful-death statute, comes from only a handful of states. The decisions of those states are unpersuasive and distinguishable. Although all deal with wrongful-death statutes that explicitly set the time for the accrual of the action, none of the statutes does so as emphatically as does New Jersey. None has the additional emphatic language of “and not thereafter” contained in New Jersey’s Act, which provides yet *450another affirmative indication of the legislative intent to fix accrual at the date of death, irrespective of equitable principles.
Secondly, and more importantly, those decisions involving application of the discovery rule to a wrongful death act appear to me to exemplify judicial revision of legislative judgments. The retort to the assertion that judicial construction of a wrongful-death statute was essential to correcting the absurd or tragic result of timé-barring a tortfeasor whose conduct caused death, while extending through equitable tolling principles the time for holding accountable a tortfeasor whose conduct only caused injury, was made by the Supreme Court of Texas in Moreno:
[Application of the discovery rule in personal injury cases is reasonable because the live plaintiff may either be unaware of an injury at the time of its occurrence, or in need of time to recover before beginning an investigation. Neither of these considerations, however, are present in wrongful death actions because survivors are put on immediate notice by the event of death that an investigation into the cause of action must occur to preserve the claim. This definitive notice is what differentiates wrongful death and survival actions from personal injury actions. By disallowing application of the discovery rule to [subpart (b) ], our opinion recognizes this distinction and effectuates the state interest in the prompt settlement of a decedent’s affairs.
[Moreno, supra, 787 S.W.2d at 854 n. 6.]
That a legislative policy decision is debatable does not necessarily render that policy statement absurd or irrational. A legislature reasonably could distinguish a wrongful-death action from personal injury actions. Death itself is a significant discovery event. It generally signals to survivors “a starting point for inquiry regarding a cause of action for wrongful death.” Krueger v. St. Joseph’s Hosp., 305 N.W.2d 18, 23 (N.D.1981). Death puts survivors on notice that they should take steps to determine the cause of death, and they “have the opportunity to proceed with scientific examinations aimed at determining the exact cause of death so that a wrongful death action, if warranted, can be filed without additional delay.” Pastierik v. Duquesne Light Co., 514 Pa. 517, 526 A.2d 323, 326 (1987). In the face of the unequivocal command of N.J.S.A. 2A:31-3, the remediation of any perceived policy inadequacies in the Act is the business of the Legislature. Schultze, supra, 463 N.W.2d at 51 (rejecting cases in the minority view as *451“unsound authority because they are based on judicial discretion used to implement notions of fairness rather than giving effect to the priorities that the legislature has set forth in an express statutory provision”).
Indeed, when faced with a perceived shortcoming in the application of our Act, the New Jersey Legislature has acted recently to correct an unfairness caused by the two-year limitations period of the statute. On October 5, 2000, both chambers of the New Jersey Legislature unanimously passed a bill that eliminated the two-year statute of limitations for a wrongful-death action when the decedent dies as a result of murder, aggravated manslaughter, or manslaughter. The bill was signed into law on November 17, 2000. L. 2000, c. 157. The Act now reads:
Every action brought under this chapter shall be commenced within 2 years after the death of the decedent, and not thereafter, provided, however, that if the death resulted from murder, aggravated manslaughter or manslaughter for which the defendant has been convicted, found not guilty by reason of insanity or adjudicated delinquent the action may be brought at any time.
This act shall take effect immediately and shall apply to any action filed on or after the effective date including actions filed where the murder, aggravated manslaughter or manslaughter occurred prior to the effective date of this act.
If it were appropriate to look beyond the plain language of the Act to discern the legislative understanding of the statute, one need look no farther than the Legislature’s Statement in connection with the bill: “Under present law, an action for wrongful death must be brought within two years of the death of the decedent.”
Thus, the Legislature already has acted to address fairness concerns in a murder or manslaughter set of circumstances, eviscerating the need for the Court to consider applying broad-based equitable tolling remedies. Furthermore, that the Legislature passed recent legislation eliminating the wrongful-death limitations period in the specific circumstances presented by a murder reveals the Legislature’s perception that the statute of limitations for a wrongful-death action does not permit modification through equitable principles.
*452Principles of “fairness” and “justice” apply to defendants as well as plaintiffs. Plaintiffs in wrongful-death actions possess no monopoly on their invocation. Statutes of limitations embody competing equitable considerations. As this Court stated in Lopez, supra, 62 N.J. at 274, 300 A.2d 563, “[i]t may also be unjust ... to compel a person to defend a law suit long after the alleged injury has occurred____After all, ... the principal consideration underlying ... [enactment of statutes of limitations] is one of fairness to the defendant.”
This theme of bilateral justice was emphasized in strong dissents in two state supreme court cases that held that equitable tolling principles were applicable to a wrongful death statute. In a vigorous dissent in Hanebuth v. Bell Helicopter International, 694 P.2d 143, 148 (Alaska 1984) (Moore, J., dissenting), Justice Moore stated that the period of limitation in the wrongful-death statute “represents a legislative judgment that affords plaintiffs a reasonable time to present their claims, while protecting defendants and courts from the potential injustice of dealing with stale claims.” Ibid. The court was wrong to “blithely interfere with the balance struck by the legislature.” Ibid. The dissent reminded the court:
Application of a statute of limitation may often make it impossible to enforce a previously valid claim. However, the legislature unequivocally prescribed that a cause of action for wrongful death accrues on the date of death and we should enforce that mandate. Preclusion of a legal remedy alone does not justify a judicial exception to the statute. To engraft the discovery rule on [the statute] completely ignores the statutoi'y directive.
[Id. at 149.]
Similar views are found in Chief Justice Moyer’s dissent in the four-to-three decision in Collins v. Sotka, 81 Ohio St. 3d 506, 692 N.E.2d 581, 586 (1998)(Moyer, C.J., dissenting). Stating that the judicial branch must temper its empathy and exercise restraint in those cases in which emotion tempts members of courts to expand the use of their judicial powers, the dissent suggested that “[t]he expansive holding adopted by the majority today could not be more illustrative of the harm effected upon our jurisprudence when the judiciary does not follow the principle that courts are ill *453suited and not designed to substitute their policy judgment for that clearly stated by the legislature.” Ibid.
Like the majority, I would acknowledge that application of the wrongful-death statute of limitations may occasionally be unfair. But, I do not believe that the remedy is to employ equitable notions of tolling developed to explicate ambiguous terms of “accrual.” There is no ambiguity here to invite our judicial intervention. The Wrongful Death Act is clear and should be enforced. The duty of a self-restrained judiciary “is to give the words of the statute their plain and ordinary meaning unless otherwise defined.” Ibid. Accordingly, I perceive no role for equitable tolling notions in the face of the New Jersey Legislature’s apparent preference for the public policy of finality concerning a decedent’s affairs. A plaintiff must bring a wrongful-death action within two years of the date certain of the decedent’s death, and not thereafter.
III.
The majority holds that the Wrongful Death Act may be equitably tolled for minors. Despite the clear and emphatic language of the limitation period governing wrongful-death actions, the majority rules that tolling principles should apply for minors until they reach their eighteenth birthday. Such a holding ignores the plain language of not only the Act, but also New Jersey’s general infant tolling statute, N.J.S.A 2A:14-21. N.J.S.A 2A:14-21 provides:
If any person entitled to any of the actions or proceedings specified in sections 2A:14-1 to 2A:14-8 or sections 2A:14-16 to 2A:14-20 of this title or to a right or title of entry under section 2A:14-6 of this title is or shall be, at the time of any such cause of action or right or title accruing, under the age of [18] years, or insane, such person may commence such action or make such entry, within such time as limited by said sections, after his coming to or being of full age or of sane mind.
[N.J.S.A. 2A:14-21.]
The Legislature’s specific delineation of causes of action for which infant tolling applies bespeaks deliberation; noticeably absent is any reference to a wrongful-death cause of action.
*454As a launching point for its consideration of whether wrongful-death claims should be tolled for minors, the majority notes that “[i]n Negron, we observed that equitable tolling or the discovery rule ‘in appropriate circumstances ... can be relevant in determining whether the statute of limitations [N.J.S.A. 2A:31-3] should be tolled.’ ” Ante at 421, 766 A.2d at 1070. Examination of that dictum from Negron v. Llarena, 156 N.J. 296, 716 A.2d 1158 (1998), in its original context reveals, however, that the underpinnings for that statement in Negron are not present here. Stated in its entirety, the Court’s decision in Negron observed that equitable tolling or application of the discovery rule
in appropnate circumstances, such as those presented by this case, can be relevant in determining whether the statute of limitations should be tolled. See, e.g., Galligan v. Westfield Centre Serv., Inc., 82 N.J. 188, 412 A.2d 122 (1980) (holding that the statute of limitations for a survivorship ease would be equitably tolled by the timely filing of an action in federal court improperly based on diversity of citizenship jurisdiction); Mitzner v. West Ridgelawn Cemetery, Inc., 311 N.J.Super. 233, 709 A.2d 825 (App.Div.1998) (applying Galligan).
[Negron, supra, 156 N.J. at 307, 716 A.2d 1158 (emphasis added).]
The definition of “appropriate circumstances” in Negron hinged on the timely filing of a complaint. In Negron, although there was a question whether strict or substantial compliance with the statute of limitations was required, plaintiff in any event had complied fundamentally with the statute by filing a complaint prior to the expiration of the two-year limitations period.
The cases the Court in Negron cited also define “appropriate circumstances” by reference to a complaint filed within the two-year limitation period set by the Act. In Galligan, supra, 82 N.J. at 190, 412 A.2d 122, the plaintiff filed a timely wrongful-death complaint in the Federal District Court of New Jersey, and, based on the absence of diversity, the defendants moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The plaintiff then filed the same cause of action in the Superior Court of New Jersey while the motion was pending, but twenty-two days after the statute of limitations had run. Ibid. The Court concluded that the second complaint should not be time barred because a timely, albeit jurisdictionally deficient, federal complaint had been filed. Id. at *455195, 412 A.2d 122. Galligan thus “stands for the proposition that, where a timely action is dismissed by the federal court for lack of jurisdiction, the same action filed prior to the federal court dismissal, but brought out of time in state court, will not be dismissed when dismissal will not further the legislature’s purpose of insuring repose.” Knight v. Brown Transp. Corp., 806 F.2d 479, 485 (3d Cir.1986); see also Young v. Clantech, Inc., 863 F.2d 300, 301 (3d Cir.1988) (concluding that Court in Galligan held that “filing of a complaint in a court which lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the case will toll the New Jersey statute of limitations if, in the particular circumstances of the case, the purposes underlying the statute are not compromised”); Byrd v. Manning, 253 N.J.Super. 307, 314, 601 A.2d 770 (App.Div.1992) (concluding that statute of limitations in the Act could not be tolled because, “in sharp contrast to Galligan, both complaints filed by plaintiff were filed beyond the two-year statutory period ... ”). Negron simply does not support the expansive application of equitable principles to a wrongful-death action that the majority ascribes to it.
To this point New Jersey case law has rejected the application of equitable tolling principles to wrongful-death actions brought on behalf of minors. The courts have considered the fact that the Act specifically sets forth a two-year limitation period and does not provide for minority tolling within its provisions. See, e.g., Lombardi v. Simon, 266 N.J.Super. 708, 712, 630 A.2d 426 (Law Div.1993) (refusing to toll wrongful-death statute of limitations); Cockinos v. GAF Corp., 259 N.J.Super. 204, 208, 611 A.2d 1154 (Law Div.1992) (holding that infant tolling does not apply to wrongful-death actions because statute does not include minority tolling provision).
The New Jersey Legislature, unlike other state legislatures, has not amended the Act to provide tolling for infants. See, e.g., Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 18012 (West 2000) (“Every such action shall be commenced within 2 years after the death * * *. However, if [an omitted person] is, at the time the cause of action accrued, within *456the age of 18 years, he or she may cause such action to be brought within 2 years after attainment of the age of 18”); see also Taylor v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 21 Ohio App.3d 186, 486 N.E.2d 1173, 1177 (1984) (concluding that if legislature intended to change wrongful-death statute of limitations “which requires that a cause of action be brought within two years after decedent’s death, it would have amended the wrongful death statute so as to provide for such a change”).
Notwithstanding those formidable impediments to its reasoning, the Court finds support for its conclusion concerning infant tolling in the Appellate Division’s decision in Barbaria v. Sayreville, 191 N.J.Super. 395, 404, 467 A.2d 259 (App.Div.1983). The majority states that the Barbaria court “reasoned that the death of a parent was essentially an injury to the child, much like a child’s own physical injury, and therefore the child’s wrongful death claim should be tolled, in the same way that his or her injury would be tolled under N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2 [the general statute of limitations for wrongful acts].” Ante at 427, 766 A.2d at 1073. But, reliance on Barbaria is misplaced. In fact, the Appellate Division in Barbaria declined to address the issue of whether the infant tolling statute applied to wrongful-death actions. Barbaria, supra, 191 N.J.Super. at 403, 467 A.2d 259 (“The only issue before us is the timeliness of the claim under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act.”).
Moreover, the seeming acceptance of the Barbaria court’s broad language is at odds with the Court’s view of the next-of-kin’s status as stated in Giardina v. Bennett, 111 N.J. 412, 545 A.2d 139 (1988). In Giardina, the Court unequivocally concluded that a wrongful-death action is not an opportunity for next-of-kin to be compensated for injuries suffered to themselves. Id. at 423-24, 545 A.2d 139. The Court specifically stated that the wrongful-death action is “based on the harm done to the decedent, and is thus differentiated from personal injury actions brought by ... survivors resulting from injuries they directly suffered due to the wrongful death.” Ibid.
*457New Jersey courts historically have held that exceptions may not be made for minors when the statutory language itself is silent. See, e.g., Uscienski v. National Sugar Ref. Co., 19 N.J. Misc. 240, 242, 18 A.2d 611 (1941) (finding that no exception can be claimed in favor of minors in a statutory provision limiting the time for commencing actions given by such statute, unless they are expressly mentioned by statute as excepted). More recently in Cockinos, supra, 259 N.J.Super. at 206-07, 611 A.2d 1154, the Appellate Division held that application of the equitable principles of infant tolling would be contrary to the clear terms of the Wrongful Death Act. Further, the Appellate Division stated, “The factor which distinguishes Barbaria from the [wrongful death] ease sub judice is that the Legislature provided a specific extension for filing on behalf of infants in the Torts Claim Act.” Id. at 208, 611 A.2d 1154.
The Act’s statute of limitations provides no exception for minors, nor a savings clause. Many other jurisdictions have ruled that a statute’s omission of an express exception for infants or a savings clause must be enforced as the will of the legislature. See, e.g., Nicholson v. Lockwood Greene Eng’rs, Inc., 278 Ala. 497, 179 So.2d 76, 79 (1965) (holding in absence of savings clause minority status of plaintiff does not toll operation of statute of limitations); Group Health Ass’n v. Gatlin, 463 A.2d 700, 701 (D.C.1983) (holding statute could not be clearer; statute states plainly that action thereunder must be brought within one year); Arender v. Smith County Hosp., 431 So.2d 491, 492 (Miss.1983) (holding relief from provisions of statute of limitations on account of disability will not be granted unless statute contains savings clause); Short v. Flynn, 118 R.I. 441, 374 A.2d 787, 789 (1977) (holding statute’s two-year limitation period not tolled; statute did not provide for exception to running of limitation period).
If the New Jersey Legislature intended the Act’s statute of limitations to toll on the account of minors, it would have so provided for this statutorily created cause of action. It easily could have included the Wrongful Death Act as among those *458actions added to the infant tolling statute by the 1951 amendment to that provision. The Legislature was on notice that no tolling for minors was being applied in wrongful-death actions or other actions unless the minors were specifically made exempt. See Uscienski, supra, 19 N.J. Misc. at 242, 18 A.2d 611 (stating that statute that contains savings clause in favor of infants “in any of the personal actions before mentioned” applies only to actions mentioned in such statutes). Or, the Legislature could have acted to remedy the problem of tolling for minors when in 2000 that body addressed a different perceived injustice concerning the Act and instances of murder or manslaughter. The Legislature did not and the Act’s unambiguous terms leave no room for judicial construction engrafting a tolling provision for minors where there is none.
Furthermore, the legislative choice on this matter is entirely reasonable. Under the Act, an infant may not bring an action:
Every action commenced under this chapter shall be brought in the name of an administrator ad prosequendum of the decedent for whose death damages are sought, except where decedent dies testate and his will is probated, in which event the executor named in the will and qualifying, or the administrator with the will annexed, as the case may be, shall bring the action.
[N.J.S.A. 2A.-3-2]
Because the minor children may not bring an action under the Act, the limitation period need not be subjected to a judicially devised tolling. An administrator brings the action on behalf of the minor; it is not the case that a minor is burdened with an unrealistic obligation to file his or her claim at an early age. Gomez v. Leverton, 19 Ariz.App. 604, 509 P.2d 735, 737-38 (1973) (finding decedent’s children merely beneficiaries of wrongful-death action, thus tolling statute does not apply); Fanio v. John W. Breslin Co., 51 Ill.2d 366, 282 N.E.2d 443, 444 (1972) (stating that because plaintiff administrator, as party imposed with burden of bringing action, is not minor, reasons inherent in removing minors from scope of limitation requirement are totally lacking). For similar reasons, see Beverage v. Harvey, 602 F.2d 657 (4th Cir. 1979); Hemingway v. Shull, 286 F.Supp. 243 (D.S.C.1968); Hunt *459ington v. Samaritan Hosp., 101 Wash.2d 466, 680 P.2d 58 (1984) (en banc).
IV.
To buttress the" argument for applying equitable tolling doctrines and infant tolling to the Act, the Court today adopts the historical analysis of wrongful-death actions in Justice Handler’s concurrence in Negron, supra, 156 N.J. at 307-20, 716 A.2d 1158. The majority now holds that such an action existed at common law. Through that holding, the majority seemingly maintains that the Court would be free of any need to defer to legislative restrictions on the bringing of such actions. Thus, the employment of equitable notions to this statutory cause of action is legitimized.
The Court’s ruling has New Jersey deviate from the near-universal acceptance of “the rule that a civil action for wrongful death was not recognized at common law, and that no such cause of action may be maintained except under the terms and authority of a statute.” W.E. Shipley, Annotation, Modern Status of Rule Denying a Common Law Recovery for Wrongful Death, 61 A.L.R.3d 906, 909 (1975). Until today, this Court has never exhibited any inclination but to adhere to the settled law of this State that no action for wrongful death existed at common law. Justice Handler’s concurrence in Negron acknowledges as much. In the nineteenth century, the Court of Errors and Appeals adopted the reasoning of Grosso v. Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Railroad Co., 50 N.J.L. 317, 13 A. 233 (Sup.Ct.1888), and determined that ever since Grosso, “it has been considered as settled law in this state that no action will lie for injury caused by the death of a human being” other than those brought pursuant to the Wrongful Death Act. Myers v. Holborn, 58 N.J.L. 193, 195-96, 33 A. 389 (1895).
Since 1888, therefore, New Jersey courts have followed an unwavering course:
*460[New Jersey eases subsequent to Myers ] accepted the Grosso logic and conclusion as the settled state of the law. See, e.g., Consolidated Traction Co. v. Hone, 60 N.J.L. 444, 38 A. 759 (E. & A. 1897); Callaghan v. Lake Hopatcong Ice Co., 69 N.J.L. 100, 54 A. 223 (Sup.Ct.1903). That has been carried through in modern cases as well. Turon v. J. & L. Constr. Co., 8 N.J. 543, 556, 86 A.2d 192 (1952); Schmoll v. Creecy, 54 N.J. 194, 197, 254 A.2d 525 (1969); Alfone v. Sarno, 87 N.J. 99, 104, 432 A.2d 857 (1981).
[Negron, supra, 156 N.J. at 317, 716 A.2d 1158 (Handler, J., concurring).]
Exactly one-hundred years later in 1988, this Court left no doubt that wrongful-death actions “were unrecognized at common law” and that “New Jersey fully adopted this common law rule.” Giardina, supra, 111 N.J. at 422, 545 A.2d 139. The legislative purpose behind the Wrongful Death Act “clearly embraces the intent to create an entirely new and distinctive cause of action where none existed before.” Id. at 424, 545 A.2d 139 (emphasis added); see also Schmoll, supra, 54 N.J. at 197, 254 A.2d 525 (“The wrongful death action was unknown to the common law and hence is the creature of statute.”). In finding that an unborn fetus is not a “person” within the meaning of the Wrongful Death Act, the Giardina Court relied, in large part, on the history underlying the development of wrongful-death actions. Giardina, supra, 111 N.J. at 422, 545 A.2d 139 (interpreting narrowly term “person” because of “distinctive statutory nature” of wrongful-death action, “historical origins of the statute,” and later “history and evolution” of Act).
Therefore, since 1888 an unbroken line of precedent has recognized the absence of a common-law cause of action for wrongful death in New Jersey. That long line of cases and the overwhelming weight of authority throughout the nation militate against the Court’s rejection of precedent. Moreover, even if a common-law action for wrongful death existed in New Jersey, that fact is of no moment for an absolute statute such as our Act. The Legislature is free to expand, modify, or abrogate common law as it may reasonably determine. The Giardina Court recognized that the framers of the Wrongful Death Act “intended to ‘occupy the field’” with respect to wrongful-death actions. Id. at 424, 545 A.2d 139. The course of subsequent legislative amendments to *461the Act both confirms the legislative intent to create an entirely new cause of action for wrongful death and reflects the legislative intent “to control the scope of the statute and nature of this remedy.” Ibid. A newly minted common-law cause of action might be of historical interest, but would carry no interpretive import.
That lack of interpretive significance is evident from actions of two courts to which the majority refers. The majority seeks support in Gaudette v. Webb, 362 Mass. 60, 284 N.E.2d 222 (1972), in which the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, which recognized a common-law wrongful death action, held that the statute of limitations for wrongful death could be tolled by the infant-tolling provision in the Massachusetts code. The majority also looks to Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 90 S.Ct. 1772, 26 L.Ed.2d 339 (1970), in which the United States Supreme Court concluded in the maritime context that the common law recognizes recovery for wrongful death. However, subsequent decisions from those courts conflict with the argument that recognizing a common-law wrongful death action supports the application of equitable tolling principles. As Justice Handler duly mentioned in Negron, although Moragne and Gaudette remain sound law, “[b]oth the United States Supreme Court and the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court have since put limits on the causes of action recognized in Moragne and Gaudette, respectively.” Negron, supra, 156 N.J. at 314 n. 2, 716 A.2d 1158 (Handler, J., concurring).
In Pobieglo v. Monsanto Co., 402 Mass. 112, 521 N.E.2d 728, 730 (1988), the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that the equitable tolling principle of the discovery rule may not be applied to the statute of limitations for claims under the wrongful-death statute, which provided that a claim for wrongful death must be brought within “three years from the date of death.” The court stated unequivocally:
Here it is of no significance that the wrongful death claim has common law origins, since we are first concerned with the meaning of the [wrongful death statute], which limits the right to bring such claims. Only if the statute is ambiguous, or *462couched in terms that suggest that we do so, do we look beyond the express statutory language.
[Id. at 731.]
The court continued:
The Legislature has unambiguously stated that a claim for wrongful death must be brought within “three years from the date of death.” Application of a rule which would delay accrual until discovery would be in clear contravention of the legislative directive that the period of limitation runs from the date of death. Furthermore, it must be understood that the discovery rule grew out of the need to determine when a cause of action “accrued.” When the Legislature limits the time within which suit can commence from the date of accrual, it leaves to the court the determination of the precise meaning of the term accrued.

[Ibid.]

That court reiterated that “ ‘Gaudette does not stand for the proposition that the requirements of the statute may be disregarded.’ ” Ibid. (quoting Hallett v. Town of Wrentham, 398 Mass. 550, 499 N.E.2d 1189, 1192 (1986)). The wrongful-death claim may be of common-law origin, but the statute still specifies the recovery and procedure. Pobieglo, supra, 521 N.E.2d at 731. The Legislature might reasonably choose to put a wrongful-death claimant on different footing from one claiming injury, and it cannot be said that such a result is absurd or illogical. Id. at 731-32. Although arguments regarding hardship are appropriate in relation to the enactment of legislation, such arguments are noncontrolling when interpreting existing statutes. Id. at 732. Thus, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that, the common-law background of wrongful-death actions notwithstanding, when the Legislature “has specifically provided that claims for wrongful death must be brought within three years from the date of death, it would be inappropriate for this court to vitiate that legislative determination and apply a discovery rule to claims brought pursuant to [the wrongful death statute].” Ibid.; see also Ratka v. St. Francis Hosp., 44 N.Y.2d 604, 407 N.Y.S.2d 458, 378 N.E.2d 1027, 1032 (1978) (holding statutory entitlement to wrongful-death action in New York renders it “neither necessary nor appropriate to change established law as a means of saving [a] cause of action for wrongful death from the bar of the Statute of Limitations”).
*463A later decision of the United States Supreme Court also contradicts the expansive support the majority finds in Moragne. In Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 98 S.Ct. 2010, 56 L.Ed.2d 581 (1978), the Supreme Court stated:
In Moragne, the Court recognized a wrongful-death remedy that supplements federal statutory remedies. But that holding depended on our conclusion that Congress withheld a statutory remedy in coastal waters in order to encourage and preserve supplemental remedies____There is a basic difference between filling a gap left by Congress’ silence and rewriting rales that Congress has affirmatively and specifically enacted. In the area covered by statute, it would be no more appropriate to prescribe a different measure of damages than to prescribe a different statute of limitations, or a different class of beneficiaries____[W]e have no authority to substitute our views for those expressed by Congress in a duly enacted statute.
[Id. at 625-26, 98 S.Ct at 2015, 56 L.Ed.2d at 587 (emphasis added).]
See also Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 27, 111 S.Ct. 317, 323, 112 L.Ed.2d 275, 287 (1990) (“Congress retains superior authority in these matters, and an admiralty court must be vigilant not to overstep the well-considered boundaries imposed by federal legislation. These statutes both direct and delimit our actions.”).
Similarly, the court in Holzsager v. Warburton, 452 F.Supp. 1267 (D.N.J.1978), found that there was no common-law right of action for wrongful death in New Jersey, but stated that the extended discussion of this alleged historical error was immaterial in any event:
Since the States supposedly labored under an erroneous view of the common law, they created remedies by statute. Thus, even if it be said now that there really was an action at common law (which no one knew), the statutes replace it, and so the result at the State level is the same either way.
[Id. at 1272 n. 4.]
The court continued:
Whether they create new actions or modify existing ones, legislatures have the authority to specify conditions and prerequisites that must be satisfied, as essential ingredients of the cause of action. Whatever freedom courts have to modify decisional law, the equal status of these two branches of government acts as a restraint — a check and balance — on what one or the other might do alone.
[Id. at 1272 n. 5.]
*464Common-law action or not, the analysis remains the same, according to the very courts cited for the proposition that the common law allowed a wrongful-death cause of action. The strength of the majority’s position is not advanced by a pronouncement of the existence of a wrongful-death action at common law.
As previously noted, many jurisdictions have rejected the approach that a common-law wrongful death action did exist. Those courts have adhered to the view that the wrongful-death cause of action is statutorily created and best left to the Legislature to decide the preconditions of its existence. Nicholson, supra, 179 So.2d at 78-79 (concluding that statutorily created cause of action is fixed in Wrongful Death Act; limitation goes to essence of right, affecting .liability itself, not merely remedy); Sandusky v. First Elec. Coop., 266 Ark. 588, 587 S.W.2d 37, 38 (1979) (finding it well established in Arkansas that right of action for wrongful death of statutory origin only because no such cause of action existed at common law; therefore limitation time fixed by wrongful death statute is limitation on right of action and thus essential element of right to sue); Taylor, supra, 486 N.E.2d at 1177; Short, supra, 374 A.2d at 789 (“We are not persuaded by the Massachusetts court’s resort to the device of creating a common law right of action as a means of supplying a remedy for otherwise remediless minors.”).
Similarly here, the pronouncement of a common-law wrongful death action does not bolster the majority’s determination that deviates from the plain language of the Act. The Act’s language does not compel a result that is absurd or illogical. In my view, the majority’s holding, altering a considered choice of the Legislature on a matter of policy, is compelled by a premise that the Court’s resolution is one which produces a “fairer” or more “just” result than the Act’s plain terms. But, the Act is unambiguous and emphatic in its terms, thus we need delve no further than the statutory words to understand the legislative intent and then give it effect. See State v. Butler, 89 N.J. 220, 226, 445 A.2d 399 (1982) (observing that where “statute is clear and unambiguous on its *465face and admits of only one interpretation, we need delve no deeper than the act’s literal terms to divine the Legislature’s intent”).
V.
I respect the majority’s motives'but reject its action in sustaining the cause of action on behalf of the infants in this case. Unfortunately, plaintiff brought a wrongful-death action outside the time limits allowed by the Act. The Court should not strain to import equitable tolling principles, specifically infant tolling, into a setting where the Legislature has left no room for such adjustments in order to breathe life into plaintiffs time-barred action. The majority’s opinion contravenes basic tenets of statutory construction and the cardinal rule that a court should accord respect and deference to the considered judgments of other branches of government when they act within their designated spheres of authority. Because the Legislature has made its choice concerning when and how a statutory wrongful-death action may be brought, I would leave any correction of those parameters to the will of that body. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
Justice VERNIERO joins in this opinion.