Court Opinion

ID: 9891312
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-18 12:12:15.282092+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:00.327142
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                                   October 18, 2023
                              STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
                                                                                    EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK
                                                                                   SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
                            SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS                                    OF WEST VIRGINIA

West Virginia Secondary Schools
Activities Commission and David Price,
Executive Director,
Defendants Below, Petitioners

vs.) No. 21-0836 (Logan County CC-23-2021-C-93)

J.G.,
Plaintiff Below, Respondent

                               MEMORANDUM DECISION

        Petitioners, the West Virginia Secondary Schools Activities Commission and its executive
director, David Price 1, appeal the order of the Circuit Court of Logan County, entered on
September 15, 2021, enjoining them from declaring Respondent J.G. 2 ineligible to participate in a
school activity. 3 This case satisfies the “limited circumstances” requirement of Rule 21(d) of the

        1
        Pursuant to Rule 41(c) of the West Virginia Revised Rules of Appellate Procedure, the
name of the current executive director has been substituted as the respondent in this action.
        2
          We refer to respondent, a student when the underlying matter was initiated, by his initials.
See, e.g., R. App. P. 40(e).
        3
          Petitioners are represented by counsel Stephen F. Gandee of Robinson & McElwee PLLC.
Respondent is represented by counsel D. Adrian Hoosier II. The resolution of this case was
substantially delayed by respondent’s counsel’s ongoing failure to file a responsive brief or
otherwise formally seek leave to withdraw as counsel. Prior to being held in contempt for failing
to justify his noncompliance, and ultimately filing a summary response, respondent’s counsel
briefly responded to an order to show cause with a letter informing the Court that his client “takes
no position on the [a]ppeal as the matter is moot.” Counsel essentially communicated that Mr. G.
enjoyed his 2021 football season before his grade point average rendered him, as of December
2022, ineligible for further athletic participation, and neither counsel nor client have further interest
in the outcome of this appeal. We agree with petitioners, however, that though Mr. G. finished the
2021 football season, this matter remains worthy of our consideration.

                Three factors to be considered in deciding whether to address technically
        moot issues are as follows: first, the court will determine whether sufficient
        collateral consequences will result from determination of the questions presented
                                                   1
Rules of Appellate Procedure and is appropriate for a memorandum decision rather than an
opinion. For the reasons expressed below, the decision of the circuit court is vacated, and this case
is remanded to the circuit court for entry of an order consistent with this decision.

        The West Virginia Secondary Schools Activities Commission’s rules governing eligibility
for participation in school athletics provide that “[a] student may have the privilege to participate
in the interscholastic program for four consecutive years (eight consecutive semesters or
equivalent) after entering the 9th grade.” W. Va. Code R. § 127-2-5.1 (2020). They further provide
that “[t]he number of semesters of athletic eligibility of a student is determined by semesters of
enrollment and attendance and not by semesters of participation. (This applies for students in
grades 9-12 only).” W. Va. Code R. § 127-2-5.4 (2020). These provisions are found in the
“semester and season” rule.

        Mr. G. entered the ninth grade of his education in the fall of 2017. He participated as a
member of his school’s football team each successive football season other than the one for the
2019-20 school year. Petitioners learned that Mr. G. began practicing with the football team in the
summer of 2021, immediately preceding his fifth year of high school attendance. Because Mr. G.
entered the ninth grade in 2017, and thereafter had four consecutive years to enjoy participation
before the 2021-22 school year began, petitioners deemed him ineligible to participate in football
that year or thereafter. 4

        On August 30, 2021, Mr. G. petitioned the Circuit Court of Logan County for a temporary
restraining order or a writ of prohibition to prevent petitioners from deeming him ineligible. 5 In
his petition, Mr. G. cited West Virginia Code of State Rules § 127-2-5.7, which provides:

       so as to justify relief; second, while technically moot in the immediate context,
       questions of great public interest may nevertheless be addressed for the future
       guidance of the bar and of the public; and third, issues which may be repeatedly
       presented to the trial court, yet escape review at the appellate level because of their
       fleeting and determinate nature, may appropriately be decided.

Syl. Pt. 1, Israel by Israel v. W. Va. Secondary Sch. Activities Comm’n, 182 W. Va. 454, 388
S.E.2d 480 (1989). The second and third Israel considerations favor our resolving the question
before us and we, thus, proceed to review the appeal.
       4
            According to petitioners’ brief, they informed Mr. G. of his ineligibility on August 30,
2021, and, at the same time, provided him detailed instructions about the review process.
Petitioners fail to support this statement with a citation to the appendix record on appeal. West
Virginia Rule of Appellate Procedure (10)(c)(7) requires an appellate brief to “contain appropriate
and specific citations to the record on appeal[.]” “[T]he Supreme Court may disregard errors that
are not adequately supported by specific references to the record on appeal.” W. Va. R. App. R.
10(c)(7). We note, however, that Mr. G. does not dispute petitioners’ statement, but instead simply
argues that if he had followed the required procedure he “would [n]ot have been heard, at earliest,
. . . until at least September 14, 2021.”
          5
            Mr. G. scheduled a hearing (for September 3, 2021, a Friday on which his high school’s
second football game of the season was scheduled) when he filed his petition with the circuit court,
                                                 2
                The Board of Directors [of the West Virginia Secondary Schools Activities
       Commission] is authorized to grant a waiver to the Semester and Season Rule when
       it feels the rule fails to accomplish the purpose for which it is intended and when
       the rule causes extreme and undue hardship upon the student. Waivers may be
       granted in the following circumstances:
                        5.7.a. The Board of Directors is authorized to consider cases
                in which a student entering 9th grade did not stay in continuous
                enrollment because of personal illness, or no school was available,
                or because of other undue hardship reasons ascertained through
                investigation.
                        5.7.b. The Board of Directors may provide release from the
                continuous enrollment restriction provided no participation has
                occurred during the semester(s) in question.
                        5.7.c. In no event may a student be allowed to participate for
                more than four seasons in any one sport in grades 9-12.

However, Mr. G. did not cite this provision to convey that he sought a waiver from petitioner’s
board of directors; rather, he cited it to persuade the circuit court that it could grant him relief
because he suffered “undue hardship” from having spent much of one of his eligible academic
years in a juvenile detention center in another state. It is undisputed that Mr. G. did not follow the
procedure described in this rule to allow the board of directors to consider his circumstances. Citing
a failure to exhaust administrative remedies, petitioners opposed Mr. G.’s petition for a temporary
restraining order or for a writ of prohibition. On September 15, 2021, the circuit court granted Mr.
G. relief in the form of a preliminary injunction. The court declared the matter inactive on its
docket, pending consideration by the board of directors. It does not appear that Mr. G. requested
administrative review, or that the board of directors reconsidered petitioners’ earlier
determination. 6

but he failed to provide notice to petitioners. His counsel appeared for the hearing. The court found
that Mr. G. was not in danger of irreparable harm “as the game . . . was postponed” and it continued
the hearing until September 7, 2021, and directed Mr. G. to serve petitioners.
       6
          This case comes before us, apparently, without the entry of a final order. The
circumstances suggest that this case is better suited for a petition for original jurisdiction relief.
However, in our scheduling order entered on October 26, 2021, we informed the parties that “[a]ny
motion to dismiss the appeal as interlocutory may be filed on or before November 8, 2021.” No
motion was filed, and we conclude that neither party objects to consideration of the merits of this
direct appeal. This Court generally does not review interlocutory orders but we have recognized
that a party may seek review of preliminary and temporary injunctions: “West Virginia
Constitution, article VIII, section 3, which grants this Court appellate jurisdiction of civil cases in
equity, includes a grant of jurisdiction to hear appeals from interlocutory orders by circuit courts
relating to preliminary and temporary injunctive relief.” Syl. Pt. 2, State ex rel. McGraw v.
Telecheck Servs., Inc., 213 W. Va. 438, 582 S.E.2d 885 (2003).

                                                  3
        On appeal, petitioners assert four assignments of error. They argue that the circuit court
erred in not requiring Mr. G. to exhaust his administrative remedies, in finding a notice of hearing
on a petition for a temporary restraining order sufficient notice to issue a preliminary injunction,
in issuing a preliminary injunction on its own motion, and in finding that Mr. G. showed that the
requirements for issuing a preliminary injunction were met.

               “In reviewing the exceptions to the findings of fact and conclusions of law
       supporting the granting of a temporary or preliminary injunction, we will apply a
       three-pronged deferential standard of review. We review the final order granting
       the temporary injunction and the ultimate disposition under an abuse of discretion
       standard, West v. National Mines Corp., 168 W.Va. 578, 590, 285 S.E.2d 670, 678
       (1981), we review the circuit court’s underlying factual findings under a clearly
       erroneous standard, and we review questions of law de novo. Syllabus Point 4,
       Burgess v. Porterfield, 196 W.Va. 178, 469 S.E.2d 114 (1996).” Syllabus Point 1,
       State By & Through McGraw v. Imperial Mktg., 196 W. Va. 346, 472 S.E.2d 792
       (1996).

Syl. Pt. 2, Northeast Nat. Energy LLC v. Pachira Energy LLC, 243 W. Va. 362, 844 S.E.2d 133,
135 (2020).

        We find that the circuit court abused its discretion in granting Mr. G. a preliminary
injunction. We recently articulated a standard for circuit courts to use when considering motions
to grant injunctive relief:

               The customary standard applied in West Virginia for issuing a preliminary
       injunction is that a party seeking the temporary relief must demonstrate by a clear
       showing of a reasonable likelihood of the presence of irreparable harm; the absence
       of any other appropriate remedy at law; and the necessity of a balancing of hardship
       test including: (1) the likelihood of irreparable harm to the plaintiff without the
       injunction; (2) the likelihood of harm to the defendant with an injunction; (3) the
       plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the merits; and (4) the public interest.

Id. at 366, 844 S.E.2d at 133 (quoting Imperial Mktg., 196 W. Va. at 352 n.8, 472 S.E.2d at 798
n.8).

         Here, the circuit court inappropriately granted Mr. G. preliminary, injunctive relief because
Mr. G. could not succeed on the merits of his case. A fundamental basis of our school activities
jurisprudence is that the manner in which the Secondary Schools Activities Commission applies
its rules is not subject to judicial review:

              Decisions properly within the purview of the legislative grant of authority
       to the West Virginia Secondary Schools Activities Commission under West
       Virginia Code § 18-2-25 (2008), such as the application of [West Virginia
       Secondary Schools Activities Commission] Rules and the review of calls or rulings
       made by game officials, are not subject to judicial review.

                                                  4
Syl. Pt. 3, State ex rel. W. Va. Secondary Sch. Activity Comm’n v. Webster, 228 W. Va. 75, 717
S.E.2d 859 (2011). The determination about “how the [s]emester and [s]eason [r]ule should be
applied to determine whether an individual student is eligible to participate in a sanctioned activity
and whether a waiver of the Rule is warranted” falls within that purview. See State ex rel. W. Va.
Secondary Sch. Activities Comm.n v. Sweeney, No. 22-0268, 2022 WL 17069200, at *4 (W. Va.
Nov. 17, 2022) (memorandum decision) (emphasis added).

         In Sweeney, a high school athlete unsuccessfully challenged petitioners’ board of directors’
denial of a waiver that would effectively grant him a fifth year of athletic eligibility after the athlete
(who had an impressive 4.0 grade point average) decided to repeat his final high school year
because many of his tenth-grade year experiences—including his entire baseball season—were
lost to the COVID pandemic. As in Sweeney, Mr. G. did not challenge the validity of the semester
and season rule, but instead the manner in which petitioners applied it. Moreover, while the
student-athlete in Sweeney failed to produce to this Court an administrative record that would allow
the Court to consider the fundamental fairness of the board of directors hearing, Mr. G. failed even
to present his concerns at an administrative hearing. Though Mr. G. might have sought a waiver
for reasons different than those of the athlete in Sweeney, the result is the same. In both cases the
circuit court improperly assessed the manner in which petitioners applied activities eligibility rules,
and the circuit court invaded the authority of the commission.

        As noted above, the parties agree that this matter is moot because Mr. G. has completed
both his athletic and academic careers in the West Virginia secondary school system. While we
find that the preliminary injunction was improvidently granted by the circuit court and must be
vacated, we further direct that the circuit court dismiss this matter from its docket because it is
undisputed that the controversy between the parties is no longer live.

        For the foregoing reasons, we vacate and remand with directions.

                                                              Vacated and remanded, with directions.

ISSUED: October 18, 2023

CONCURRED IN BY:

Chief Justice Elizabeth D. Walker
Justice Tim Armstead
Justice John A. Hutchison
Justice C. Haley Bunn

DISQUALIFIED:

Justice William R. Wooton

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