Court Opinion

ID: 9520337
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:36:50.047418+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:46:01.183334
License: Public Domain

ROBERTS, J. (dissenting in part).
The statutory standard of true and full value in the assessment of property (SDC 1960 Supp. 57.0334) ¡is a means of attaining uniformity and equality required by law. The statute specifies a sixty per cent ratio of such assessed value as the taxable value of all property and the implicit meaning of this is that there shall be equality of treatment and burden. The assessment and equalization of property at a uniform level below the sixty percent ratio, though contrary to the statutory direction, is a common practice in this state. SDC 1960 Supp. 57.0406 authorizes the county board of equalization to correct inequalities made by the assessor in assessments of property within a taxing district. If all property therein is assessed at a uniform level below the- sixty per cent ratio, property owners are not denied uniformity and equality of treatment. Sioux Falls Savings Bank v. Minnehaha County, 29 S.D. 146, 135 N.W. 689. It is the duty of a county board to lower an assessment of an aggrieved property owner where disparity can be eliminated by reduction to a common level or ratio though it is -below the standard fixed by law. Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441, 43 S.Ct. 190, 67 L.Ed. 340.
The right here invoked is relief from taxation that is obviously excessive and discriminatory. The court found “that there is a discrimination made by the City Assessor *166in fixing the appraised value of various and different tracts of land in Rapid City * * * as shown by competent undisputed evidence.” This finding goes to the existence of discrimination in the assessment of real property and does not determine the extent of relief or reveal a fact basis for determining a ratio of assessed value to actual value in Rapid City. The court expressly found that a common level or percentage ration of true and full value at which property in the year in question was assessed could not be determined and upon this assumption reduced the assessment of appellant’s property to the statutory standard of true and full value and sixty per cent thereof as the taxable value. Appellant insists that it is entitled to have its assessment reduced to the percentage of that value at which other lands in the taxing district are taxed even though this is below the statutory standard. The ultimate conclusion of the majority opinion is that this action be remanded with instructions to. enter judgment reducing the valuation of appellant’s land to 42 per cent of the actual value found by the trial court. The initial determination of the amount or extent of relief in my opinion is for the trial court.
If the ratio or percentage of true and full value at which property in 1958 was generally assessed in Rapid City was an admitted fact, the disparity could readily be corrected by reduction of the assessment of appellant’s property to that level. The assessors emphatically disavowed the employment by them of a fixed ratio below the sixty per cent statutory standard. The county director of equalization when cross-examined by counsel for appellant testified that he had reported to the Pennington County Board of Equalization that business, lots in Rapid City were assessed ■at “some 42 per cent of true value”. This answer based on a study made by tax officials to determine the ratio of assessed values to actual values in Pennington Cbunty was in no sense conclusive. The trial court could properly have concluded that seventeen reported sales underlying this ratio was not substantial and it may too' be observed that *167the sales may have included properties outside the taxing district of Rapid City.
Evidence of reported sales of real property within the city and the amounts at which they were assessed and testimony of qualified experts as to values of land in Rapid City was received. A precise ratio or common level to true and full value at which land generally was assessed could not in the opinion of the court be found from the record. The court was justified in so concluding. If such ratio is susceptible of proof, it is too onerous a burden to impose on an aggrieved property owner. This situation emphasizes the need of a practical basis upon which relief because of lack of uniformity may be granted. The use of an average ratio appears to have been approved elsewhere in recent decisions. See Buerger v. Allegheny County Board of Property Assessment, 188 Pa.Super. 561, 149 A.2d 466; People ex rel. Yaras v. Kinnaw, 303 N.Y. 224, 101 N.E.2d 474; In re Appeals of Kents 2124 Atlantic Ave., 34 N.J. 21, 166 A.2d 763.
The trial court did not consider whether an average ratio may be used to deal with the problem of inequality and as stated made no finding in that regard. The majority opinion seemingly would give effect to an average ratio, but does not make clear what evidence may properly be considered in determining such ratio. The evidence ordinarily considered is that of reported sales. The aggregate selling prices of parcels of properties sold compared to the aggregate assessments on the same properties produce the resulting average ratio. This has the advantage of confining proof to fact evidence and excluding less reliable opinion evidence as to values. See Buerger v. Allegheny County Board of Property Assessment, supra; In re Appeals of Kents, supra. The trial court may consider as pointed out in the c'ase last cited “any weakness which may appear,, as, for example, a paucity of sales in the municipality concerned or some imbalance caused by some unusual experience” In the instant proceeding there were circumstances with respect to some sales affecting their proba*168tive weight in evidencing an average ratio. It was within the province of the trier of fact to evaluate these facts.
The cause should in my opinion be remanded for further proceedings to determine upon the present record an average ratio upon which basis appellant would be entitled to judgment. I would, therefore, reverse the judgment and remand the cause with instruction to the trial court as indicated.