Court Opinion

ID: 9946557
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-29 21:02:26.43879+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:30.045938
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/29/24 Samuel v. L.A. County Metropolitan Transportation Auth. CA2/8
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION EIGHT

MARLIN D. SAMUEL,                                               B324906

         Plaintiff and Appellant,                               Los Angeles County
                                                                Super. Ct. No. 21STCV23881
         v.

LOS ANGELES COUNTY
METROPOLITAN
TRANSPORTATION
AUTHORITY,

         Defendant and Respondent.

     APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Upinder S. Kalra, Judge. Affirmed.
     Marlin D. Samuel, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
     Gutierrez, Preciado & House and Calvin House for
Defendant and Respondent.
                       ____________________
      Bus operator Marlin D. Samuel sued his employer, the Los
Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (the
Authority) for breach of contract. Samuel says the Authority
entered a contract with him when, during a disciplinary hearing
against him, he made an unintelligible statement and the
hearing officer responded, “Okay. Noted. Anything else?” As a
matter of law there was no breach of contract, for there was no
contract. Samuel makes other unavailing arguments. The trial
court properly granted judgment on the pleadings and denied his
request to amend the complaint. We affirm.
      We outline the facts and turn to Samuel’s arguments.
      The Authority held a disciplinary hearing about Samuel’s
alleged use of a cell phone while driving a bus. The hearing
lasted about 40 minutes and 20 transcript pages. Samuel’s union
representative challenged the Authority’s video evidence.
Samuel then said he “just ha[d] a couple of questions” for the
hearing officer. For about six transcript pages, Samuel asked
questions and made statements about the Authority’s
disciplinary procedures. For example, he said the Authority
should have given him more notice before it put him on
administrative leave and the hearing officer said, “Okay. It’s
noted.”
      Then Samuel and the hearing officer had an exchange
Samuel says created a contract. Samuel read two sentences of
his union contract and said to the hearing officer, “So any
unacknowledgement of the contract would be a willful breach of
contract. And if it’s a willful breach of contract knowing the rules
and regulations set forth, then you subjugate yourself to state
and federal penalties and fines outside the contractual agreement

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between [the Authority] and [the] Union. And that’s my
conclusion.”
      The hearing officer said, “Okay. Noted. Anything else? Do
you want to review the video?”
      They went on to watch and discuss a video that showed
Samuel talking aloud while driving. Then they discussed
reporter fees and the hearing ended.
      The Authority suspended Samuel for 30 days.
      Samuel sued the Authority. His complaint had one cause of
action: breach of contract. The complaint summarized the
alleged contractual exchange we quoted above and said the
Authority “[a]ccepted. And [n]ow [h]as [d]efaulted.” Samuel
attached a transcript of the disciplinary hearing and several
other exhibits to the complaint.
      On August 16, 2022, the Authority moved for judgment on
the pleadings. It mailed the motion to Samuel’s old address. It
also emailed the motion to Samuel, who saw this email on August
23, 2022.
      Samuel filed an opposition on August 29, 2022. In one
paragraph at the end of the opposition, he requested leave to
amend. The Authority filed a reply on September 7, 2022.
Samuel filed a “Response” to the reply the same day.
      The trial court heard the motion on September 12, 2022.
Samuel proceeded without a reporter. In its ruling, the court
explained that it asked Samuel whether the notice issue
prejudiced him and whether he needed a continuance and
Samuel “acknowledged that although he felt rushed to respond,
there was no additional evidence or argument that he would
present.”

                              3
       The trial court granted the motion for judgment on the
pleadings and denied leave to amend. The court entered
judgment on September 19, 2022. Samuel’s notice of appeal says
he appeals this September 19, 2022 judgment.
       We independently review a judgment on the pleadings.
(People ex rel. Harris v. Pac Anchor Transportation, Inc. (2014) 59
Cal.4th 772, 777.) We review denial of leave to amend after a
judgment on the pleadings for abuse of discretion.
(Environmental Health Advocates, Inc. v. Sream, Inc. (2022) 83
Cal.App.5th 721, 729.)
       We begin by emphasizing several principles of appellate
review. We presume judgments are correct and it is the
appellant’s burden to prove error. (Bullock v. Philip Morris USA,
Inc. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 655, 685.) Appellate briefs must
support points by argument. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.204(a)(1)(B).) And briefs must support references to matters in
the record by citing the volume and page number of the record.
(Id. at subd. (a)(1)(C).) We may disregard unsupported or
conclusory legal arguments and we may disregard factual
contentions that are not supported by citations to the record.
(Tanguilig v. Valdez (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 514, 520.)
       Samuel’s briefing is deficient and we disregard his
unsupported factual assertions. His opening brief is devoid of
citations to the appellate record. His reply brief sometimes
directs us to pages within trial court motions and exhibits or to
the “Notice of record on appeal” without a page number. These
are not citations to volumes and page numbers of the appellate
record. We disregard Samuel’s unsupported factual assertions.
       Turning to Samuel’s appellate arguments, the trial court
correctly granted judgment on the pleadings because there was

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no contract. Judgment on the pleadings is proper if the
complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of
action. (Code Civ. Proc., §438, subd. (c).) Where material facts
are certain or undisputed, the existence of a contract is a
question of law. (Bustamante v. Intuit, Inc. (2006) 141
Cal.App.4th 199, 208.) Samuel submitted the transcript of the
disciplinary hearing with his complaint and relied on it for the
facts of the alleged contract formation. We use this certain and
undisputed source to answer the legal issue in this case.
       Contracts require mutual assent, which is absent here.
(Donovan v. RRL Corp. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 261, 270 (Donovan);
Civ. Code, §§ 1550, 1565.) Contracting typically consists of the
familiar steps of offer and acceptance. (Donovan, at p. 271.) A
party’s objective manifestation controls. (Ibid.) Objectively,
Samuel’s statement about “unacknowledgement” of another
contract that ended with, “And that’s my conclusion,” gave no
reason to believe this was an offer. Nor did the hearing officer’s
attempt to move things along by saying, “Okay. Noted. Anything
else?” give reason to believe the hearing officer was accepting
anything. There was no mutual assent. Judgment on the
pleadings was proper.
       The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying leave
to amend. Samuel has the burden to demonstrate a reasonable
possibility he could cure his complaint’s defects by amending it.
(Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) His appellate
briefing focuses on whether amendment would prejudice the
Authority. This is irrelevant to whether he has a reasonable
possibility of curing the complaint’s defects by amending it. The
end of Samuel’s opening brief seemingly quotes (without
quotation marks) several statutes and lists elements of

                                 5
intentional infliction of emotional distress. This portion of the
brief has a paragraph of facts that we disregard because there
are no record citations. Samuel does not explain the connection
between the laws he lists and his brief or his case. He has not
proven the court abused its discretion by denying leave to amend.
       There is no prejudicial notice issue. Unless a defect in the
proceedings is prejudicial, it does not constitute reversible error.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 475; Reedy v. Bussell (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th
1272, 1289 [applying rule to issue of defective notice] (Reedy).)
The appellant has the burden to demonstrate prejudice. (Reedy,
at p. 1289.) Samuel says the Authority violated notice
procedures, but he fails to explain how this prejudiced him. He
received actual notice of the motion weeks before the hearing and
responded with not one, but two written filings. According to the
trial court’s ruling, Samuel said there was no additional evidence
or argument he would present. Samuel quibbles with the trial
court’s account of the hearing and says the court “briefly
interrupted” him when he was “explaining that procedurally [the
Authority] failed to give proper notice.” Because he has not
provided a reporter’s transcript, we presume what happened at
the hearing supports the judgment. (Hearn v. Howard (2009) 177
Cal.App.4th 1193, 1201.) Samuel has not demonstrated
prejudice.
       Samuel complains the Authority did not follow meet and
confer requirements, but he does not explain the effect of this.
An insufficient meet and confer process is not grounds to deny a
motion for judgment on the pleadings. (Code Civ. Proc., § 439,
subd. (a)(4).) Samuel does not explain how the meet and confer
issue prejudiced him. This argument fails.

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      Despite his complaint having only one cause of action,
Samuel’s reply brief claims he had seven causes of action. We do
not address this or any other new argument Samuel failed to
present in his opening brief. (REO Broadcasting Consultants v.
Martin (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 489, 500.)
      This appeal is not about a reconsideration ruling that
postdates Samuel’s notice of appeal. Samuel has included in the
appellate record dozens of pages related to his motion for
reconsideration, which the trial court denied on December 21,
2022. Before that, on November 16, 2022, Samuel filed the notice
of appeal in this case. Samuel’s notice of appeal therefore did not
encompass the ruling on the motion for reconsideration, nor did
he include the relevant ruling in the appellate record. This
opinion does not and cannot address this ruling.
      We grant the Authority’s August 7, 2023 request for
judicial notice of excerpts of the Authority’s administrative code
and ordinances. The trial court properly noticed these excerpts,
so we notice them as well. (Evid. Code, § 459.)
                           DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed. We award costs to the Los
Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority.

                                          WILEY, J.

We concur:

             STRATTON, P. J.              VIRAMONTES, J.

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