Court Opinion

ID: 9773575
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:50:16.573698+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:55.252370
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
DODSON, Justice.
After reviewing Appellant’s Motion for Rehearing and accompanying brief, we have determined that our original opinion correctly states the applicable law in this case. However, the basic contention in the motion for rehearing merits further discussion of the application of Chapter 2 (Sales) of the Texas Uniform Commercial Code to the building contract.
The chapter’s provisions are limited to transactions involving the sale of goods. Tex.Bus. & Comm.Code Ann. § 2.102 (1968). Most building contracts, on the other hand, involve the sale of both goods and services. In such hybrid transactions the question becomes whether the dominant factor or “essence” of the transaction is the sale of goods or services. As explained in Bonebrake v. Cox, 499 F.2d 951, 960 (8th Cir. 1974):
The test for inclusion or exclusion is not whether [goods and services] are mixed, but, . . . whether their predominant factor, their thrust, their purpose . is the rendition of service, with goods incidentally involved ... or is a transaction of sale, with labor incidentally involved .
Shannon was the general construction contractor on the Bell Tower Apartment project located in Amarillo, Texas. Shannon, as general contractor, entered into two contractual agreements with Freeman as subcontractor for certain cement work on the project. The first contract, dated 20 November- 1972, described the work and services to be performed by Freeman as follows:1
In accordance with the architectural and structural drawings and specifications *739prepared by T. R. Daniel, furnish all labor, material and equipment in order to perform the following concrete and related work.
1) Slabs, curbs, and gutters related to site work as modified by the removal of flat gutters between asphalt paving. Flat curbs to be upended to provide wheel stops.
2) Building foundations as modified with architect’s approval.
3) Expansion and construction joints.
4) Concrete reinforcement including mesh for slabs.
5) Cast in place concrete for:
a) slabs on grade
b) bond beams
c) slabs over metal centering
d) balconies (exterior) formed and with adequate shoring or support
6) Curing and/or protection.
7) Embedded items.
The aforementioned work to be performed for the sum of One Hundred Eighty Four Thousand and Thirty-four Dollars ($184,034).
And the second contract dated 22 October 1973 described the work and services to be performed by Freeman as follows:
In accordance with architectural and structural drawings dated 10-14-73 by Keeva J. Kekst, Assoc., Inc. but not limited to. Furnish all labor and material to complete the following:
a) a complete concrete tennis court area approx. 120' X 102' X 4" with wire mesh and base expansion joints and saw cuts as directed.
b) sidewalks and exterior concrete patio and pool area cut into 5' squares, curbs at planted.
c) all interior concrete slabs in the ree. bldg, corridors and pool bldg.
d) curing and/or protection.
All as directed by the job superintendent. The aforementioned work to be performed for the total sum of $9,750.00.
Appellant Freeman attempts to show that the essence of his contract with Shannon Construction was the sale of over 4,815 cubic yards of cement. The bulk sale and delivery of cement is not mentioned in the contracts or supported by the record in this case. Freeman’s contracts called for labor, material and equipment to perform the concrete and related work to construct and finish the concrete structures for Shannon, the general contractor. Clearly, the “predominant factor” or the “essence” of the transaction between Freeman and Shannon was the furnishing of services and performance of work required for erecting the structures in the apartment complex. Accordingly, Chapter 2 of the Texas Uniform Commercial Code does not apply.
As noted in two cases cited by appellant Freeman, the sale of bulk cement is readily distinguishable from the overriding service of forming cement into completed structures. In S. M. Wilson & Co. v. Reeves Red-E-Mix Concrete, Inc., 39 Ill.App.3d 353, 350 N.E.2d 321 (1976), the court presumed the transaction was governed by the Code 2 when a subcontractor agreed to sell and deliver a specified quantitymf cement. The court noted, however, that the general contractor removed the concrete from the trucks, transported it to where it would be used, poured, cured, and finished. Likewise, in Wilson v. Daniel International Corporation, 260 N.C. 548, 197 S.E.2d 686 (1973), a workman’s compensation case, the Supreme Court of South Carolina distinguished between a sale of cement that was merely delivered and poured into the general contractor’s forms and a situation in which the subcontractor went further to execute part of the construction work of the general contractor.
After considering all matters set out in Appellant’s Motion for Rehearing, we adhere to our former disposition of the case. Appellant’s Motion for Rehearing is overruled.

. These items were further explained by addendums dated 22 January 1973 and 31 January 1973, being Exhibits P-2 and P-3 respectively, which are the original exhibits in the case.

. Uniform Commercial Code, Ill.Rev.Stat.1975.