Court Opinion

ID: 9514730
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:51:24.679944+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:20.425988
License: Public Domain

KONENKAMP, Justice
(concurring in result).
[¶ 25.] If we validate this search, then we may as well declare that there are no Fourth Amendment defects the good faith doctrine cannot eclipse. In State v. Saiz, 427 N.W.2d 825 (S.D.1988), we embraced this doctrine, but we also adopted its four exceptions, one of which applies here: an officer would not “manifest objective good *641faith in relying on a warrant based on an affidavit ‘so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.’ ” Id. at 828 (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. at 263-64, 103 S.Ct. at 2345—46, 76 L.Ed.2d at 564-65 (White, J., concurring in the judgment) and Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610-11, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 2265, 45 L.Ed.2d 416, 431 (Powell, J., concurring in part)); United States v. Leon, supra, 468 U.S. at 923, 104 S.Ct. at 3420, 82 L.Ed.2d at 699.
[¶ 26.] To decide whether the good faith doctrine will save this invalid search warrant, the question here is whether a reasonably well-trained officer would have known that the search was illegal despite the magistrate’s authorization. Saiz, (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922-923, fn. 23, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 3420, fn. 23, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984)). In assessing objective good faith, we consider the totality of the circumstances using a standard centering on a reasonably well-trained officer. Contrary to the suggestion in the writings of both the majority and the dissent that we review for abuse of discretion, the question of objective good faith is ultimately a legal one reviewable de novo. United States v. Accardo, 749 F.2d 1477, 1481 (11th Cir.1985). Counsel here did not address the proper standard of review. But as we are the guardians of our judicial process, we cannot leave the method by which we review a case to the vagaries of appellate advocacy. Otherwise, the standard of review might conceivably change in every appeal.
[¶ 27.] In drawing the limits of the good faith doctrine, it is vital that we set clear boundaries. Although it has similarities to Saiz, this case crosses the line. Like Saiz, the affidavit here gave nothing on the underlying circumstances for the informant data. Yet, in concluding that there was objective good faith in Saiz we observed that the affidavit contained language that the informant was “reliable” and had been “ ‘trustworthy and accurate’ in the past.” Here, in contrast, there was no language on the reliability or credibility of the informant.
[¶ 28.] At the suppression hearing in this case it was established that the Deputy Sheriff who received the information from the informant, as well as the Sheriff and Trooper who passed it on, all believed the information was reliable, accurate, and “very credible.” However, this “credible” unnamed informant was not the real informant. The affidavit is somewhat misleading on this point, though perhaps unintentionally so. It states that “[t]he information was received from a reporting party who wished to remain anonymous.” It was not disclosed in the affidavit that the “reporting party” was not the one who professed to have firsthand knowledge of the drug transaction. The true informant did not speak to anyone at the Ziebach County Sheriffs Department or any other law enforcement officer. As that fact was not mentioned in the affidavit, the magistrate could not have known when he approved the warrant that the anonymous report was from the informant’s informant.
[¶ 29.] Was it objectively reasonable for these law enforcement officers to believe probable cause existed knowing they had no information whatsoever on the reliability and credibility of the true informant, and that their unnamed “reporting party” had no firsthand information, but received whatever he or she had from yet another unknown person? Clearly, the answer must be no. See Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922, n. 23, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 3420, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (“good faith inquiry is confined to the objectively ascertainable question whether a reasonably well trained officer would have known that the search was illegal despite the magistrate’s authorization.”). If an officer’s warrant request lies outside the range of reasonable proficiency expected of an officer, then that officer cannot rely on the magistrate’s decision to issue the warrant. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 345, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 1098, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986).
*642[¶ 30.] Reasonably well-trained law enforcement officers know that corroboration of anonymous information is required because of its intrinsic unreliability., Under the Leortr-Saiz standard, officers must “have a reasonable knowledge of what the law prohibits.” Leon, 468 U.S. at 919, n. 20, 104 S.Ct. at 3418, n. 20. To uphold this search under the mantle of good faith would make the process of supporting a search warrant request with probable cause almost meaningless. “Every citizen is entitled to be secure from the possibility that angry neighbors, misguided practical jokers, ex-spouses, heartbroken ex-lovers or other personal enemies will provide anonymous information leading to police intrusion into their homes and personal effects.” People v. Rivera, 190 Cal.App.3d 1591, 236 Cal.Rptr. 116, 122 (1987). Saiz establishes a minimum threshold for sanctioning an inadequate affidavit under the good faith doctrine. Justifying a search on an uncorroborated anonymous tip given by an unnamed informant who received his or her information from yet another unnamed informant simply goes beyond objective reasonableness.
[¶ 31.] At the very least, in the absence of a showing on the reliability of a confidential informant, corroboration requires some independent verification of illegal or suspicious activity. Copious details about a person’s clothing, habits, residence, travel itinerary, and companions explain nothing if they all add up to no implication of illegal or suspicious behavior. Rivera, 236 Cal.Rptr. at 120. Of course, an affidavit detailing lawful activities does not make it an improper “bare bones” affidavit. Combinations of lawful and suspicious circumstances may lead to a justifiable inference of criminal activity. See, e.g., Gates, 462 U.S. at 243, n. 13, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (“[I]nnocent behavior frequently will provide the basis for a showing of probable cause; to require otherwise would be to sub silentio impose a drastically more rigorous definition of probable cause than the security of our citizens demands.”); United States v. Muniz-Melchor, 894 F.2d 1430, 1438 (5th Cir.1990) (“A succession of otherwise ‘innocent’ circumstances or events ... may constitute probable cause when viewed as a whole.”). But here, other than describing the travel itinerary, the person’s car involved, and similar details, no corroboration of any suspicious activity was obtained. When viewing the totality of circumstances in this case we have only an anonymous tip that illegal substances were being transported without any independent verification of illegal activity.
[¶ 32.] Other courts have reached the same conclusion. In State v. Hlavacek, 185 W.Va. 371, 407 S.E.2d 375 (1991) the court stated: “Generally, when information received from a confidential informant is relied upon in an affidavit for a search warrant, the affidavit must contain information which establishes the informant’s basis of knowledge and lends credibility to the informant’s statements.” Id. at 382. “Because the affidavit [the officer] presented to the magistrate in this case made no reference to the reliability of the informant or how he had come to possess his information, we conclude that the affidavit was ‘bare bones’ and insufficient to support the issuance of a warrant to search the appellant’s car.” Id. at 382-83. The court ruled that the illegal search could not be “redeemed through resort to [the good faith] exception,” (quoting State v. Adkins, 176 W.Va. 613, 346 S.E.2d 762, 775 (1986)), where “the affidavit in question is so conclusory with regard to its probable cause information as to render it a ‘bare bones’ affidavit” because “[e]ven under Leon, a bare bones affidavit is not subject to rehabilitation by the good faith exception.” See also United States v. Jackson, 818 F.2d 345, 350, n. 8 (5th Cir.1987) (affidavit totally lacking in indicia of reliability and basis of knowledge constitutes bare bones affidavit, thus good faith exception to the exclusionary rule not available); State v. Swearingen, 131 Ohio App.3d 124, 721 N.E.2d 1097, 1103 (1999) (reasonably well-trained officer would not have relied *643on warrant because affidavit and oral testimony were so lacking in indicia of probable cause it rendered official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable).
[¶ 33.] The officers here may have been acting with subjective good faith, but their actions were not objectively reasonable under the Saiz criteria.