Court Opinion

ID: 9476309
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:52:32.634365+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:45:14.430544
License: Public Domain

WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge,
concurring and dissenting:
I agree with the majority that Rule 60(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure vests courts with discretion to set aside a voluntary dismissal. However, I believe that the district court abused this discretion in vacating the Randalls’ second dismissal.
The Randalls first attempted to prosecute their claim in the Northern District of California. After that court ordered the case transferred to Washington, D.C. and while a motion to dismiss was pending there, the Randalls voluntarily dismissed the action under Rule 41(a)(1). Meanwhile they started again in California, this time in the Eastern District. That court likewise ordered the case transferred to Washington, D.C.; the Randalls again voluntarily dismissed the action. Less than two months later they started yet a third litigation, presenting the claim to the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., for arbitration in San Francisco.
This pattern of sustained maneuvering to have their claim heard in California belies the notion that intense financial and medical pressures compelled the Randalls to enter the dismissals. They were quite capable of pursuing the claim, but wished to exhaust every possible gambit to assure that the litigation would occur in California. They were represented by counsel, who advised them that voluntarily dismissing the action a second time might operate as dismissal on the merits. See Fed.R. Civ.P. 41(a)(1). Nonetheless they proceeded with the second dismissal, without pursuing any of the precautionary steps open to them, such as seeking a stay pending arbitration or requesting the court to dismiss without prejudice under Rule 41(a)(2). On this record it is impossible to conclude that the second dismissal was other than a “free,” “calculated,” and “deliberate” choice that does not justify relief under Rule 60(b)(6). See, e.g., Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 198, 71 S.Ct. 209, 211, 95 L.Ed. 207 (1950).
Nor can I agree that the Randalls' “previous, abortive litigation can hardly have imposed significant costs on Merrill Lynch.” Ante at 1322. Twice now the Randalls have forced Merrill Lynch to gear up for litigation. Each time Merrill Lynch filed and briefed motions to transfer and motions to dismiss. Each time Merrill Lynch prevailed in getting the action transferred over the strenuous objections of the Randalls, only to have the Randalls abort the action before the motion to dismiss could be considered. Under Rule 41(d) the court could have forced them to compensate Merrill Lynch for the costs of the first action before permitting the second to go forward. I see no basis for concluding that these costs are not significant (and the majority has not suggested one), or for believing that the costs Merrill Lynch will have to incur preparing for trial yet a third time will not also be substantial. Compare Werner v. Carbo, 731 F.2d 204, 206 (4th Cir.1984) (judgment against professional corporation vacated where corporation’s liability coextensive with that of principal and retrial of suit against principal required in any event).
“There must be an end to litigation someday.” Ackermann v. United States, 340 *1323U.S. at 198, 71 S.Ct. at 211. If this means anything, it means that the interest in repose counts as a powerful equity against re-opening a judgment under Rule 60(b)(6). Often it is the only equity. Indeed, that was the case in Ackermann itself, where the Court insisted that relief should be granted under Rule 60(b)(6) only under “extraordinary circumstances.” Id. at 200, 202, 71 S.Ct. at 212, 213. The judgment against the Randalls did not result from extraordinary circumstances, but from a litigation strategy gone sour.
I would reverse.