Court Opinion

ID: 9774215
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:11:40.387884+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:03.465195
License: Public Domain

MURPHY, J.,
concurring and dissenting.
I agree with the majority “that there was probable cause to arrest Petitioner.” I dissent, however, from the holding that Petitioner is entitled to a new trial because of the “improper” comments made by the prosecutor during the State’s closing and rebuttal arguments.
According to the majority, Petitioner is entitled to a new trial because (1) during the State’s closing argument, “the prosecutor stated that drug dealers are ‘the root of all evil’ and that Petitioner was ‘the problem[,']’ ” and (2) during the State’s rebuttal argument, “the prosecutor argued that the jury should believe the police officers who testified against Petitioner because ‘[tjhey want to keep their job’ and because ‘what gets them to keep their job’ is ‘their credibility and their integrity.’ ”
In Rheubottom v. State, 99 Md.App. 335, 637 A.2d 501 (1994), while citing several opinions of this Court, the Court of Special Appeals stated:
It is, of course, true that just because a prosecutor makes an improper jury argument this does not necessarily “constitute reversible error.” Wilhelm [v. State ], 272 Md. [404] at 431, 326 A.2d 707 [at 724 (1974) ] ... In Wilhelm, Judge O’Donnell stated:
There are no hard-and-fast limitations within which the argument of earnest counsel must be confined—no well-*502defined bounds beyond which the eloquence of an advocate shall not soar.
Id. at 413, 326 A.2d [at 714]. While we do not disagree with that proposition, surely there are also depths into which the unfair argument of a too zealous advocate cannot be permitted to sink.
The rule is that reversal is warranted if “it appears that the jury were actually misled or were likely to have been misled or influenced to the prejudice of the accused.” Wood v. State, 192 Md. 643, 652, 65 A.2d 316[, 320] (1949); see also Shoemaker v. State, 228 Md. 462, 473-74,180 A.2d 682[, 688] (1962); Kellum v. State, 223 Md. 80, 88, 162 A.2d 473[, 478] (1960) (quoting Wood, supra).
Id. at 341-42, 637 A.2d at 504.
As to the statements made during the State’s closing argument, the record shows that during his cross-examination, Detective Taylor did express the opinion that drug dealers are the root of all evil. Although it was improper for the prosecutor to characterize Petitioner as “the problem>” I am persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that this comment was not likely to influence the jury “to the prejudice of the accused.”
As to the “improper vouching” comments made during the State’s rebuttal argument, I find it impossible to hypothesize a single juror who would have (1) convicted Petitioner on the basis of these isolated comments about a police officer’s motivation to testify truthfully, but (2) acquitted Petitioner if reminded by the Circuit Court, immediately after Petitioner’s trial counsel had objected to the “they want to keep their job” argument, that “arguments of counsel are not evidence.” Moreover, as this Court noted over 100 years ago:
In the case of Dunlop v. The United States, 165 U.S. 486 [17 S.Ct. 375, 41 L.Ed. 799 (1897)], the [United States Supreme] Court said: “If every remark made by counsel outside of the testimony were ground for a reversal, comparatively few verdicts would stand, since in the ardor of advocacy, and in the excitement of trial, even the most *503experienced counsel are occasionally carried a way by this temptation.”
Toomer v. State, 112 Md. 285, 293, 76 A. 118, 122 (1910).
It is presumed that the jurors who convicted Petitioner (1) responded truthfully when voir direct during the jury selection process, and (2) during deliberations, followed the instructions they received from the Circuit Court. We should therefore presume that the jury (1) did not give greater weight to Detective Taylor’s testimony on the ground that he is a member of the Baltimore City Police Department, and (2) decided the case based upon the evidence presented rather than upon statements made during closing arguments. Applying these presumptions to the record of the case at bar, I am persuaded that the improper comments at issue neither misled the jury nor influenced the jury’s verdict. I would therefore affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court.