Court Opinion

ID: 9610590
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:43:27.776472+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:02.112406
License: Public Domain

Given, Judge,
dissenting:
My disagreement with the majority is not as to the rule of law laid down. I think the rule a salutary one, and masterfully stated. I do not believe, however, that the facts properly pleaded, and the inferences which may be rationally drawn therefrom, bring the facts of this case within the influence of the rule.
Stripped of all explanatory language, and of many allegations of conclusions of fact, such as that the attorney made representations to defendant for the purpose of “enticing, inveigling and deceiving” him into entering McDowell County, the plea in abatement charges no more than that the attorney, by telephone, inquired at defendant’s home whether defendant intended to attend a certain social function to be held in McDowell County, to which defendant was then invited by the attorney; that the attorney, though requested to give his name, did not do so; that the attorney later, or someone for him, again by telephone, inquired whether defendant had decided to attend the social function, and was advised that defendant had made arrangements to attend; and that the attorney caused process to be served on defendant while attending the social function. Notice that *199no false or untrue statement or representation was made to defendant. The principal, if not only, fact of wrongdoing, if wrongdoing, alleged against the attorney was his failure to inform defendant of the identity of the telephone caller. The acts of the attorney subsequent to the time defendant actually decided to attend the social function, of course, should not be considered as part of any inducement, as pointed out in decisions hereinafter cited. It seems to me that the facts properly alleged can not be held to establish fraud or wrongdoing. At most, they would simply show that the attorney took advantage of an opportunity, the holding of the social function in McDowell County and the interest of defendant’s son in the holding of the function, to try to obtain proper service of process, which was no more than a duty owed his client. In considering the questions arising, it should be kept in mind that defendant had full knowledge of the institution of the action against him in McDowell County, of the fact that he had questioned the validity of the service of other process issued in that action, and of the fact that the alleged cause of action arose in McDowell County, where ordinarily it would have been triable.
Numerous opinions of this Court are to the effect that, to establish fraud, it must be clearly alleged and proved. Fraud is never presumed. See Ghiz v. Savas, 134 W. Va. 550, 60 S. E. 2d 290; Zogg v. Hedges, 126 W. Va. 523, 29 S. E. 2d 871; LaFollette v. Croft, 122 W. Va. 727, 14 S. E. 2d 917; Hunt v. Hunt, Trustee, 91 W. Va. 685, 114 S. E. 283. Certainly, the rule should not be relaxed for the mere reason that the person charged happens to be an attorney. See In Re: Marcum, 135 W. Va. 126, 62 S. E. 2d 705; In re: Damron, 131 W. Va. 66, 45 S. E. 2d 741; State v. Smith, 84 W. Va. 59, 99 S. E. 332.
An examination of the cases cited by the majority discloses that, though they fully support the rule laid down, not one of them, in my opinion, requires, or even permits, the application of the rule in a case wherein the facts are comparable, in effect, with the facts alleged in the plea involved in the instant case. The majority opinion points out no such case, and I find none. In some of the *200cases cited, the facts on which the holdings are based are much stronger than are the facts alleged in the plea, yet the Courts held such facts insufficient to establish fraud or wrongdoing. To here consider each of such cases would serve no useful purpose.
In 72 C. J. S., Process, Section 39, cited in the majority opinion, after setting forth the general rule as laid down by the Court, this language is found: “* * * but service will not be held invalid where defendant comes voluntarily into the jurisdiction, even though he is induced by misinformation to permit the process server to obtain an opportunity to serve which he would not otherwise have given him”.
In 42 Am. Jur., Process, Section 36, this language is used: “Fraud and fraudulent intent and purpose in enticing a person to come within the reach of the process of a court may be inferred from the acts and representations of the parties and all the facts and circumstances shown. But, as between honest and dishonest motives and purposes, honesty of intent and purpose will be presumed unless the facts and circumstances are such as to satisfy the mind that the acts and statements relied on are fraudulent or dishonest. The service of a writ, otherwise lawful, does not become unlawful because the hope for a chance to make it was the sole motive for other acts tending to create the chance, which other acts would themselves have been lawful except for that hope. Nor is fraud predicable of conduct by means of which the plaintiff has merely taken advantage of the usual course of business.”
It appears to have been the privilege and practice of the uninformed through ages to have assumed that an attorney at law was guilty of wrongdoing upon mere charge or suspicion, but for Courts to assume fraud or wrongdoing as to their own officers, attorneys at law practicing under oath, to me, is not understandable.
Being of the views indicated, I respectfully dissent. I am authorized to say that Judge Riley joins in this dissent.