Court Opinion

ID: 9948501
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-07 15:09:43.252249+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:29:50.919556
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-0038-22

ALMA PAPETTI,

          Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

ARTHUR J. PAPETTI,

     Defendant-Respondent.
_________________________

                   Submitted December 19, 2023 – Decided March 7, 2024

                   Before Judges Rose, Smith, and Perez Friscia.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
                   Chancery Division, Family Part, Morris County,
                   Docket No. FM-14-1411-19.

                   Greenbaum, Rowe, Smith & Davis, LLP, attorneys for
                   appellant (Mark H. Sobel and Barry Scott Sobel, of
                   counsel and on the briefs).

                   Donahue, Hagan, Klein & Weisberg, LLC, attorneys
                   for respondent (Stephanie Frangos Hagan and Kaitlyn
                   A. Lapi, on the brief).

PER CURIAM
      Plaintiff Alma Papetti appeals from an October 29, 2019 Family Part order

denying her motion to set aside a premarital agreement. For the following

reasons, we affirm.

                                       I.

      Plaintiff and defendant Arthur Papetti were married for twenty-six years

prior to their divorce on June 18, 2019. Plaintiff met defendant while she was

working at his family business as an accountant, and the two were married on

November 20, 1993. The parties share three children, all emancipated.

      Before the marriage, the parties executed an antenuptial agreement dated

July 30, 1993. This agreement, and the circumstances surrounding its execution,

are the subject of this appeal. The agreement waived plaintiff's entitlement to

maintenance, alimony, and other marital rights upon termination of the

marriage.    In the event of a divorce, defendant would make specific cash

disbursements to plaintiff based on two schedules incorporated into the

agreement.    Pursuant to the applicable schedule, plaintiff was entitled to

$750,000 upon termination of the marriage, adjusted for inflation.

      The agreement addressed representation by legal counsel and stated:

"Each party has had the opportunity to obtain and has in fact obtained

independent legal advice prior to the execution of this [a]greement and has been

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fully advised as to his or her rights hereunder . . . ." Both parties' signatures

were attached to the document.

      On June 18, 2019, plaintiff filed a complaint for divorce and a motion to

set aside the agreement and defendant cross-moved to enforce the agreement.

After argument, the trial court entered an order denying plaintiff's motion and

granting defendant's cross-motion. The court found that plaintiff: voluntarily

signed the agreement; received a full accounting of defendant's assets; and failed

to either make a prima facie case the agreement was unconscionable or show a

genuine issue of material fact.

      Plaintiff sought leave to appeal the interlocutory order, which we denied.

Plaintiff then moved for reconsideration and relief from the order enforcing the

agreement, which the trial court denied on February 21, 2020. We again denied

plaintiff's ensuing motion for leave to appeal.

      On July 25, 2022, the parties reached an agreement which resolved all

pending issues surrounding the dissolution of their marriage but preserved

plaintiff's right to appeal the validity of the agreement. Plaintiff then appealed,

arguing the trial court erred when it: granted summary judgment despite the

presence of genuine issues of material fact and incomplete discovery; and

enforced an antenuptial agreement which did not comply with N.J.S.A. 37:2-38.

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                                        II.

      "[W]e review the trial court's grant of summary judgment de novo under

the same standard as the trial court." Templo Fuente De Vida Corp. v. Nat’l

Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 224 N.J. 189, 199 (2016). "That standard

mandates that summary judgment be granted 'if the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if

any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and

that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law.'" Ibid.

(quoting R. 4:46-2(c)). When reviewing the trial court's factual determinations,

this court owes deference to the Family Part's specialized experience in

matrimonial matters. Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 412-13 (1998). However,

"a question regarding the interpretation or construction of a contract is a legal

one and our review is plenary, with no special deference to the trial judge's

interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from the

established facts." Barr v. Barr, 418 N.J. Super. 18, 31 (App. Div. 2011).

      "The basic contractual nature of matrimonial agreements has 'long been

recognized.'" Sachau v. Sachau, 206 N.J. 1, 5 (2011) (quoting Petersen v.

Petersen, 85 N.J. 638, 642 (1981)). "Pre-nuptial agreements establishing post-

divorce obligations and rights should be held valid and enforceable." Hawxhurst

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v. Hawxhurst, 318 N.J. Super. 72, 80 (App. Div. 1998). "[P]rinciples governing

property settlement agreements should be viewed as equally applicable to

antenuptial agreements governing those same issues." Rogers v. Gordon, 404

N.J. Super. 213, 219 (App. Div. 2008) (internal quotations omitted).

                                      III.

                                       A.

      We first consider plaintiff's contention that the trial court erred by

granting summary judgment. Plaintiff disputes that she had an opportunity to

consult with independent counsel, in that she did not meet or consult with her

attorney before she signed the agreement. Plaintiff also posits that genuine

issues of material fact exist regarding the negotiation and drafting of the

agreement as well as her receipt of the complete agreement.

      A court should grant summary judgment only when "the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits . . . show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact

challenged and that the moving party is entitled to judgment or order as a matter

of law." R. 4:46-2. While genuine issues of material fact defeat summary

judgment, factual issues "of an insubstantial nature" do not. Brill v. Guardian

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Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 530 (1995) (quoting Judson v. Peoples Bank

& Tr. Co. of Westfield, 17 N.J. 67, 75 (1954)).

      While plaintiff contends there are factual disputes regarding her selection

of counsel and the details surrounding the negotiation and signing of the

agreement, the record shows she produced no competent evidence to support

that claim. We note the signed agreement includes an acknowledgment that the

parties "each has had the right and opportunity to seek, and each has in fact

obtained, independent legal advice . . . . Each party is fully satisfied with the

services and advice of such counsel . . . ." Additionally, the signature page—

which plaintiff admitted she read and signed—states: "[e]ach party . . . has been

fully advised as to his or her rights hereunder." Plaintiff certified she "has fully

read this [a]greement"; and "has been advised or had ample opportunity to be

advised by legal counsel." Plaintiff relies on her own unsupported assertions

but cannot rebut her written acknowledgment. Our review of the record shows

no genuine issue of material fact regarding plaintiff's counsel's representation or

her execution of the agreement.

      Plaintiff next contends defendant did not produce evidence that: she

retained her attorney; there exists any correspondence sent or received by her

attorney regarding plaintiff; plaintiff received legal advice; and plaintiff ever

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reviewed the other pages of the agreement. However, defendant need not rebut

these claims.     Since defendant produced the signed agreement, including

plaintiff's certification on the signature page, there is no genuine issue of

material fact created by plaintiff's absence of proof theory. See R. 4:46-2(c).

The trial court's finding that there was no genuine issue of material fact on the

various arguments raised by plaintiff was sound and supported by the record.

                                        B.

        We next consider plaintiff's contention that the agreement was not valid

and enforceable under the law governing premarital and pre-civil union

agreements. In New Jersey, premarital agreements are governed by the Uniform

Premarital and Pre-Civil Union Agreement Act, N.J.S.A. 37:2-31 to -39. A

properly executed premarital agreement is presumed valid unless the party

seeking to set aside the agreement proves "by clear and convincing evidence,"

that:

              a. The party executed the agreement involuntarily; or

              b. The agreement was unconscionable at the time
              enforcement was sought; or

              c. The agreement was unconscionable when it was
              executed because that party, before execution of the
              agreement:

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                  (1) Was not provided full and fair disclosure of
                  the earnings, property and financial obligations
                  of the other party;

                  (2) Did not voluntarily and expressly waive, in
                  writing, any right to disclosure of the property or
                  financial obligations of the other party beyond
                  the disclosure provided;

                  (3) Did not have, or reasonably could not have
                  had, an adequate knowledge of the property or
                  financial obligations of the other party; or

                  (4) Did not consult with independent legal
                  counsel and did not voluntarily and expressly
                  waive, in writing, the opportunity to consult with
                  independent legal counsel.

            d. The issue of unconscionability of a premarital or pre-
            civil union agreement shall be determined by the court
            as a matter of law. An agreement shall not be deemed
            unconscionable unless the circumstances set out in
            subsection c. of this section are applicable.

            [N.J.S.A. 37:2-38.]

      Plaintiff argues the trial court erred by enforcing the agreement despite its

non-compliance with the requirements of N.J.S.A. 37:2-38. She tracks the

statute to make several points in support of her position she did not: enter the

agreement voluntarily; consult with independent counsel; receive a full and fair

disclosure of defendant’s financial obligations; waive her right to disclosure;

and have adequate knowledge of defendant's property and other obligations. We

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are not persuaded, and conclude the agreement complies with the requirements

of N.J.S.A. 37:2-38.

      Plaintiff first argues that she did not enter into the agreement voluntarily

under subsection (a). She reprises her summary judgment arguments regarding

involuntariness, and repackages those arguments in the context this subsection.

This approach has no merit. We concluded plaintiff's proofs were insufficient

to defeat summary judgment. It follows, on the same record, that plaintiff cannot

show by clear and convincing evidence that her execution of the agreement was

involuntary.

      We turn to plaintiff's second point under subsection (c)(4) that she did not

consult with independent counsel or waive her right to do so consistent with

N.J.S.A. 37:2-38(d). Plaintiff asserts she never retained her attorney, never met

with him prior to the agreement's execution, and does not recall receiving any

legal advice from him. Again, we concluded plaintiff's proofs on this issue were

insufficient to defeat summary judgment, and we find plaintiff cannot show by

clear and convincing evidence that she did not consult with independent counsel

or waive her right to do so.     For these reasons, plaintiff's argument under

subsection (c)(4) fails.

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      Plaintiff contends in her third point that she did not receive a full and fair

disclosure of defendant's assets in violation of subsection (c)(1). She makes

three arguments in support of this contention.         First, she states that "no

explanation was provided to her" concerning what the schedules represented and

no supporting documents were supplied to her at the time. Second, she argues

the disclosure did not include any reference to financial obligations as required

by statute. Finally, plaintiff asserts that she did not effectively waive disclosure

or have adequate knowledge of defendant's property or obligations. We look to

our well-settled jurisprudence.

      We concluded in Orgler v. Orgler that full and fair disclosure is not

satisfied when there are no schedules of assets attached to the agreement and

neither party knows the true value of defendant's holdings. 237 N.J. Super. 342,

350 (App. Div. 1989). In In re Estate of Shinn, we concluded there existed clear

and convincing evidence of inadequate disclosure when the disclosure omitted

accurate values of interest in several businesses, yearly income, value of union

benefits, and cash holdings. 394 N.J. Super. 55, 63-65 (App. Div. 2007). Both

cases stand for the proposition that plaintiffs cannot waive their right to

disclosure if they do not have adequate knowledge of defendant’s financial

assets. Id. at 64; Orgler, 237 N.J. Super. at 342.

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      The record shows plaintiff received a full and fair disclosure of

defendant's assets. Plaintiff acknowledged reviewing both schedules before

signing the agreement. Schedule A contained defendant's interest in family

business holdings, and the value of various investment accounts, cash holdings,

real estate, and other property and annual income. Plaintiff's assertion that she

could not have understood the disclosure is unpersuasive given her background

in finance and accounting.      Plaintiff submitted no proofs to support her

assertions that the disclosure was inaccurate or deficient.       While plaintiff

accurately notes the absence of any disclosure of financial obligations owed by

defendant, plaintiff failed to offer proof that such obligations existed.

Consequently, plaintiff has not met her burden to show by clear and convincing

evidence the financial disclosure was inadequate.

      Even if plaintiff could show that she did not receive a full disclosure of

defendant’s assets, she voluntarily signed the express waiver contained in the

agreement and relinquished her right to additional disclosure. The waiver states

that "[e]ach party hereby voluntarily waives . . . all right to disclosure of such

property, assets, and income of the other party beyond the disclosure provided."

      Plaintiff argues she could not have waived disclosure because the

agreement was unenforceable, and she didn't have the opportunity to consult

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with counsel. However, these circular arguments fall short. Plaintiff's voluntary

execution of the agreement precludes the argument that she did not read or

understand its terms. Similarly, plaintiff's waiver of the opportunity to consult

with counsel precludes that challenge to her waiver of additional disclosure.

      There is nothing in the record to support plaintiff's claims about the

validity of the agreement as executed.       She relies solely on unsupported

assertions to buttress her claims, which are undermined by her own actions. The

trial court correctly found the agreement valid and enforceable as a matter of

law, and we discern no error.

      To the extent not addressed, plaintiff's remaining arguments lack

sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

      Affirmed.

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