Court Opinion

ID: 9855558
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:27:15.471978+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:36:12.442594
License: Public Domain

BAKES, Chief Justice,
dissenting:
The majority opinion incorrectly analyzes the abuse of discretion issue by applying the wrong standard. The issue is presented as a “question of abuse of discretion in applying I.R.C.P. 41(b) to dismiss the cause for failure to timely prosecute____” (Op. at 616, 778 P.2d at 738.) Ultimately the majority rules that “the trial court’s conclusion that Motorola had shown actual prejudice was not supported by substantial competent evidence and was in error.” (Op. at 620, 778 P.2d at 742, emphasis added.) The correct standard of review of the trial court’s I.R.C.P. 41(b) order to dismiss is not whether the trial court’s ruling is supported by substantial competent evidence, although it is, contrary to the Court's opinion. Rather, it is whether the trial court has manifestly abused its discretion. Bartlett v. Peak, 107 Idaho 284, 688 P.2d 1189 (1984).
I.R.C.P. 41(b) provides in pertinent part: “For failure of the appellant to prosecute or to comply with these rules or any order of court, a defendant may move for dismissal of an action or of any claim against him.” Hence, the court has the power to dismiss for failure to prosecute, and the standard of review for the district court’s determination to dismiss is “manifest abuse of discretion.” Kirkham v. 4.60 Acres of Land, 100 Idaho 781, 605 P.2d 959 (1980).
*621Bartlett v. Peak, 107 Idaho at 285, 688 P.2d at 1190.
“When an exercise of discretion is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry. The sequence of the inquiry is (1) whether the lower court rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted within the outer boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific choices; and (3) whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of reason.” State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989); Associates Northwest, Inc. v. Beets, 112 Idaho 603, 605, 733 P.2d 824, 826 (Ct.App.1987). Here, the trial court recognized it was being called on to make a discretionary ruling. The trial court also recognized that absent actual prejudice to defendant, mere delay was insufficient grounds upon which to grant defendant’s I.R.C.P. 41(b) dismissal motion. See Day v. CIBA Geigy Corp., 115 Idaho 1015, 772 P.2d 222 (1989). However, the trial court found “that defendant in this case has shown actual prejudice.” Pursuant to the Hedger abuse of discretion analysis, the issue is whether the .trial court’s finding was “reached by an exercise of reason.” Our prior cases do not support this Court’s remeasuring the substantiality of the evidence.
As a factual basis for its ruling, the trial court cited the uncontradicted deposition of plaintiff Dahmer in which he stated that he did not recall previous conversations which the trial court described as “very important” to the case. Also, the trial court reasoned, “Prejudice is also demonstrated by the defendant’s unrefuted statements that key witnesses had been reassigned or have left the corporation, and that memories have dimmed.” “[Ejvidence, uncontradicted, must be accepted as true.” Swanson v. State, 114 Idaho 607, 609, 759 P.2d 898, 900 (1988); see also Dinneen v. Finch, 100 Idaho 620, 603 P.2d 575 (1979); Pierstorff v. Gray’s Auto Shop, 58 Idaho 438, 74 P.2d 171 (1937). An adjudicatory body may not “arbitrarily or capriciously disregard the testimony of a witness unimpeached by any of the modes known to the law, if such testimony does not exceed probability.” Pierstorff v. Gray’s Auto Shop, 58 Idaho 438, 447-448, 74 P.2d 171, 175 (1937). The trial court was bound to “accept as true the positive uncontradicted testimony of a credible witness, unless his testimony is inherently improbable, or rendered so by facts and circumstances disclosed at the hearing or trial.” Id. Here, the trial court, as the finder of fact, accepted the truth of the unrefuted statements by Dahmer and defendants. Now this Court faults the trial court for doing what our prior cases say he must do. Swanson v. State, 114 Idaho 607, 759 P.2d 898 (1988); Pierstorff v. Gray’s Auto Shop, 58 Idaho 438, 74 P.2d 171 (1937).
The majority opinion rejects the trial court’s analysis for two reasons. First, the majority opinion recharacterizes Dahmer’s deposition testimony, stating, “Failure to recall something that never happened is not an example of a prejudicing factor.” (Op. at 619-620, 778 P.2d at 741-42.) However, just because Dahmer testified at one point in his deposition that he did not tell “anyone else at Motorola that the things [he was] doing to the Motorola equipment [were] confidential or secret,” does not negate the fact that twice during his deposition Dahmer said he did not recall if he told Mike Gerhardt that “any of the things [he was] doing to the Motorola equipment [were] confidential or secret.” It is for the trial courts to resolve such conflicts. The majority’s second rationale for rejecting the trial court’s reasoning is because the lower court “patently disregarded plaintiff’s argument that Motorola has continually maintained possession of all pertinent files since it first learned of the suit and that it still has all of that information on file so that it is in the same position now as it was two months after being served with the summons.” (Op. at 620, 778 P.2d at 742.) Even if plaintiff’s argument was supported by facts in the record, the majority wrongly concludes that just because Motorola possesses “pertinent files,” it is not prejudiced by its inability to present witnesses or Dahmer’s inability to recollect. The majority draws *622its own factual inferences from the record, essentially discarding the uncontradicted facts relied on by the trial court. Ignoring the applicable standard of appellate review, i.e., “manifest abuse of discretion,” the majority then refinds the facts to suit its own point of view.
The majority fails to inquire whether the trial court’s ruling was “reached by exercise of reason.” Contrary to the majority’s erroneous conclusion that the trial court’s ruling was “not supported by substantial competent evidence,” the ruling was “reached by exercise of reason ” applied to evidence which stands unrefuted in the record. The trial court accepted the evidence presented by defendant, i.e., Dahmer’s inability to recollect and the unavailability of Motorola’s key witnesses, and properly disregarded plaintiff’s “argument” (not evidence) that Motorola was not prejudiced because it still had its “pertinent files.” The trial court heard the evidence, believed it, and made a ruling based on it. Accordingly, the trial court did not “manifestly abuse its discretion” when it dismissed plaintiff’s cause for failure to timely prosecute. The trial court’s ruling should be affirmed.