Court Opinion

ID: 9950894
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-15 05:06:32.500412+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:37:24.718536
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                   revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                            STATE OF MICHIGAN

                             COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,                                     UNPUBLISHED
                                                                     March 14, 2024
                 Plaintiff-Appellee,

v                                                                    No. 365159
                                                                     Ottawa Circuit Court
GERARD GARCIA, JR.,                                                  LC No. 21-044556-FH

                 Defendant-Appellant.

Before: SWARTZLE, P.J., and REDFORD and YATES, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        Defendant appeals as of right his convictions of fourth-degree fleeing and eluding a police
officer, MCL 257.602a(2); and two counts of resisting and obstructing a police officer, MCL
750.81d(1). The trial court sentenced defendant to one day of incarceration with credit for one
day of time served for each conviction, and sentenced defendant to two years of probation for
fleeing and eluding a police officer. On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred by
granting his request for self-representation at trial. We affirm.

                                  I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

        This case stems from a traffic stop in which a law enforcement officer initiated a traffic
stop, during which he repeatedly attempted to speak with defendant, but defendant ignored the
officer and drove away. The officer requested backup and followed defendant until a parks
department truck at train tracks boxed in defendant’s car. Defendant exited his vehicle when asked
by another officer but he resisted the officer’s placement of handcuffs and kicked the officer in his
shin during the struggle.1

1
    Much of this interaction was captured in a dash camera video recording played for the jury.

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       Defendant waived his right to legal representation and represented himself at trial. He
cross-examined witnesses, called witnesses and elicited testimony, and testified in his own
defense. A jury convicted defendant of the charged offenses. Defendant now appeals.

                                  II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

         On appeal, defendant claims that the trial court erred by permitting him to waive legal
representation and defend himself at trial. Defendant did not preserve this issue for appellate
review, but our Supreme Court recently held that the “forfeiture doctrine” set forth in People v
Carines, 460 Mich 750; 597 NW2d 130 (1999), does not apply when “a self-represented defendant
fails to object when the trial court fails to obtain a valid waiver of the right to counsel.” People v
King, 512 Mich 1, 4; ___NW2d___ (2023). Therefore, we review for clear error a trial court’s
findings whether defendant’s waiver of counsel was knowing and intelligent, but the meaning of
knowing and intelligent waiver is a question of law that courts review de novo. People v Williams,
470 Mich 634, 640; 683 NW2d 597 (2004). “Clear error occurs if the reviewing court is left with
a definite and firm conviction that the trial court made a mistake.” People v Johnson, 502 Mich
541, 565; 918 NW2d 676 (2018) (quotation marks and citation omitted). This Court “indulge[s]
every reasonable presumption against waiver of that right.” People v Adkins (After Remand), 452
Mich 702, 721; 551 NW2d (1996), abrogated on other grounds by Williams, 470 Mich 634, 641 n
7 (clarifying that the abuse-of-discretion standard does not apply to Sixth Amendment waivers).
“Credibility is crucial in determining a defendant’s level of comprehension, and the trial judge is
in the best position to make this assessment.” Williams, 470 Mich at 640 (quotation marks and
citation omitted).

                                          III. ANALYSIS

         Defendant contends that the trial court should have denied his request to represent himself
at trial because his mental illness made him incompetent to waive the right to counsel. We
disagree.

         “The right of self-representation is secured by both the Michigan Constitution, Const 1963,
art 1, § 13, and by statute, MCL 763.1.” People v Dunigan, 299 Mich App 579, 587; 831 NW2d
243 (2013). The “right is also implicitly guaranteed in the [S]ixth [A]mendment to the United
States Constitution.” People v Anderson, 398 Mich 361, 366; 247 NW2d 857 (1976). The trial
court must determine that the defendant meets the following requirements:

       To invoke the right of self-representation: (1) a defendant must make an
       unequivocal request to represent himself, (2) the trial court must determine that the
       choice to proceed without counsel is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, and (3)
       the trial court must determine that the defendant’s acting as his own counsel will
       not disrupt, unduly inconvenience and burden the court and the administration of
       the court’s business. [Dunigan, 299 Mich App at 587 (quotation marks and citation
       omitted).]

The trial court must also comply with the requirements of MCR 6.005(D). After a defendant
waives the right to counsel, the trial court must reaffirm that waiver in subsequent hearings.

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MCR 6.005(E). The trial court’s adherence to these requirements is reviewed for “substantial
compliance.” Adkins (After Remand), 452 Mich at 726-727.

        When discussing whether a defendant asserted the right knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily, our Supreme Court noted that “[d]efendant’s competence is a pertinent consideration
in making this determination.” Anderson, 398 Mich at 368. “A defendant may not waive his or
her right to counsel if his or her mental incompetency renders him or her unable to understand the
proceeding and make a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary decision.” People v Brooks, 293 Mich
App 525, 542; 809 NW2d 644 (2011), vacated in part on other grounds 490 Mich 993 (2012). In
Indiana v Edwards, 554 US 164, 174; 128 S Ct 2379; 171 L Ed 2d 345 (2008), the United States
Supreme Court distinguished between a defendant’s competency to stand trial and his competency
to represent himself at trial. The Court explained:

       In certain instances an individual may well be able to satisfy [the] mental
       competence standard [to stand trial], for he will be able to work with counsel at
       trial, yet at the same time he may be unable to carry out the basic tasks needed to
       present his own defense without the help of counsel. [Id. at 175-176.]

A defendant’s “technical legal knowledge is not relevant to the determination.” Id. at 172
(quotation marks and citation omitted). But, a defendant’s

       [d]isorganized thinking, deficits in sustaining attention and concentration, impaired
       expressive abilities, anxiety, and other common symptoms of severe mental
       illnesses can impair the defendant’s ability to play the significantly expanded role
       required for self-representation even if he can play the lesser role of represented
       defendant. [Id. at 176 (quotation marks and citation omitted; alteration in original).]

        In this case, defendant concedes that the trial court complied with the requirements under
Anderson and MCR 6.005(D) for proper waiver of the right to counsel. However, defendant asserts
that the trial court committed clear error when it accepted defendant’s waiver because defendant’s
mental illness invalidated the trial court’s determination that the waiver was unequivocal,
knowing, and intelligent.

        The record reflects that the trial court engaged in a searching inquiry of defendant’s
competency to represent himself. Before permitting defendant to represent himself at trial, the
trial court held two separate competency hearings and reviewed two competency evaluations of
defendant. In the first report, defendant was deemed incompetent to stand trial but stated that he
could become competent to stand trial with therapy. In the second report, defendant was deemed
competent to stand trial. The report indicated that defendant had mild to moderate schizophrenia,
which manifested through delusions, but it also indicated that defendant demonstrated rational and
intellectual understanding of the criminal proceedings.

        After receiving these reports, the trial court observed defendant in various proceedings and
engaged in two separate colloquies with defendant regarding his ability to represent himself at
trial. During the trial court’s first inquiry, it expressed concern that defendant was only recently
deemed competent to stand trial and told him that he would be unwise to represent himself. The
court determined that it would revisit this issue at trial. On the first day of trial, the trial court

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granted defendant’s request to waive his right to counsel after engaging defendant in a discussion
during which defendant expressed that he had studied Michigan law and took the opportunity to
observe a trial in preparation for his own trial. We recognize that we have not had the same
opportunity to view defendant’s demeanor during these exchanges as the trial court had. See
Williams, 470 Mich at 640. However, review of the exchanges between defendant and the trial
court reveals that defendant presented himself as coherent, engaged, and rational in his discussion
with the trial court. Further, the record reflects that he had the foresight to prepare himself for trial
through study and observation of trial proceedings in advance of his own trial. The exchanges
between the trial court and defendant demonstrate that the trial court made a proper inquiry and
appropriately considered defendant’s competency to represent himself before it accepted
defendant’s waiver.

          Defendant asserts that his paranoia, which centered on police officers, prevented him from
competently performing at trial. Defendant points to several instances in the record to support his
assertion that he lacked competency to represent himself. Specifically, defendant points to his
performance during jury selection, his inability to show that someone altered the dashcam video
of the traffic stop, and his inability to meaningfully cross-examine the police officers who testified
at trial.

        As previously noted, a defendant’s “[d]isorganized thinking, deficits in sustaining attention
and concentration, impaired expressive abilities, anxiety, and other common symptoms of severe
mental illnesses can impair the defendant’s ability” to represent himself. Edwards, 554 US at 176
(quotation marks and citation omitted; alteration in original). In this case, however, defendant
does not identify which of the symptoms of severe mental illness identified in Edwards impeded
his competency to represent himself. Instead, he asserts that the paranoia associated with his
schizophrenia made him incompetent to represent himself. Addressing each of defendant’s
examples of his incompetency, we do not agree that defendant could not “carry out the basic tasks
needed to present his own defense without the help of counsel.” Id. at 175-176. The record
establishes that defendant was competent to represent himself at trial.

         Certainly, defendant made remarks during trial that were odd or irrelevant to the charges
at issue. However, review of the entire trial reveals that defendant exhibited attentiveness,
concentration, and clear, rational thought throughout trial. During jury selection, defendant
expressed concern over jury bias, asking a potential juror, “Over the course of U.S. United States
history, would you agree that white lives matter more due to the majority who are raised in hate?”
He also called the jury “closed minded.” But racial bias in the jury is a legitimate concern for a
fair trial. See Ham v South Carolina, 409 US 524, 527; 93 S Ct 848; 35 L Ed 2d 46 (1973).
Although defendant may not have articulated his inquiry into any potential racial bias in the most
eloquent manner, such is not a requirement for competency. The record indicates that defendant
could focus on the task of picking an impartial jury and effectuated his goal of ensuring an unbiased
jury. His voir dire of potential jurors did not demonstrate a lack of organized thinking, deficits in
attention or concentration, impaired expressive ability, or anxiety. See Edwards, 554 US at 176.

         Next, defendant asserts that his inability to prove that someone altered the video of the
traffic stop and his inability to cross-examine the police officers showed his incompetency. These
arguments, however, address defendant’s lack of legal skill instead of his mental capacity. See id.
at 172. Both of these arguments boil down to the fact that defendant did not present a winning

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defense theory. Neither of these examples necessarily dictate that defendant exhibited
disorganized thinking, deficient attention and concentration, impaired expressive ability, anxiety,
or other symptoms of mental illness that impaired his ability to present a defense. See id. at 176.

        Defendant’s theory of the case asserted that the police officers involved in this case had
been surveilling and harassing him after they arrested his roommate. Further, according to
defendant’s theory of the case, defendant did not respond to Holland Department of Public Safety
Sergeant Caleb Dullock out of fear because Sergeant Dullock attacked defendant’s vehicle and
someone altered the video evidence of this. His defense theory was not a winning legal argument
sustained by the evidence presented at trial. We are not persuaded that we must interpret this as
indicative of paranoia, when the record indicates that defendant presented his theory coherently to
the jury by eliciting testimony during cross-examination and through his own testimony.

         During his opening statement, defendant told the jury that his failure to stop occurred
because of a misunderstanding and that he had a reason for not stopping his vehicle when Sergeant
Dullock approached him. In support of this theory, defendant elicited testimony during cross-
examination of Sergeant Dullock and Officer Jose Mendoza that they had previous run-ins with
defendant, including an incident involving the arrest of his roommate. Defendant also elicited
testimony from Detective Meghan Rohn that she was conducting surveillance when she saw
defendant and called Sergeant Dullock to watch for defendant’s vehicle. Finally, when defendant
testified on his own behalf, he provided his version of the events to the jury. He testified that the
video of the traffic stop was doctored to exclude evidence of Sergeant Dullock attacking his vehicle
and that defendant did not respond to Sergeant Dullock because he feared for his own safety.
During closing argument, defendant reiterated his theory that the police orchestrated the traffic
stop and that Sergeant Dullock attacked him.

        Through both his direct and cross-examination of witnesses, defendant conveyed his theory
of the case that the officers had a vendetta against him and that he did not comply during the traffic
stop out of fear. His questions remained focused on the traffic stop and his concerns regarding his
run-ins with officers before the incident. He ably presented his theory of the case to the jury. The
record reflects that he focused on the task at hand. Although he ultimately failed to persuade the
jury of his defense theory, he presented it in a coherent, concentrated fashion. Accordingly, we
reject defendant’s argument that defendant’s performance at trial undermined the trial court’s
determination that defendant was competent to represent himself.

        Despite claiming that he lacked the mental capacity to represent himself at trial, defendant
demonstrated that he had the mental capacity to “carry out the basic tasks needed to present his
own defense without the help of counsel.” Id. at 175-176. The trial court first determined
defendant’s competency to stand trial. The trial court also made proper inquiry and correctly
determined defendant’s competency to waive legal representation at trial. The record indicates
that defendant competently carried out the basic task of presenting a defense. In sum, the trial
court did not clearly err when it determined that defendant unequivocally, knowingly, and
intelligently waived representation. Defendant did not exhibit “[d]isorganized thinking, deficits
in sustaining attention and concentration, impaired expressive abilities, anxiety, and other common

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symptoms of severe mental illnesses . . . .” Id. at 176 (quotation marks and citation omitted;
alteration in original). Therefore, defendant is not entitled to a new trial.

       Affirmed.

                                                         /s/ Brock A. Swartzle
                                                         /s/ James Robert Redford
                                                         /s/ Christopher P. Yates

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