Court Opinion

ID: 9617528
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:56:59.97486+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:04:11.051198
License: Public Domain

Weltner, Justice,
dissenting.
I agree with the majority that the property of one spouse that was owned by that spouse before the marriage cannot be awarded to the other spouse by way of equitable distribution. I disagree, however, with reversing the judgment under the facts of this case.
1. Under our law, alimony may be barred under certain circumstances (e.g., adultery or desertion. OCGA § 19-6-1 (b)). And where no alimony is sought, none may be awarded. In this case, however, the wife sought alimony, and the trial court found that some award of alimony was appropriate.
2. The trial judge, as the finder of fact, had the power to award any asset of the husband to the wife as alimony — independent of the *133character of any such asset as “marital property.”3 Thus, the award to the wife of “premarital property” (whether called “equitable distribution,” “alimony,” or any other label) was within the authority of the trial court. Hence, I would affirm the judgment, rather than remand the case for further exercises in taxonomy. See Shapiro v. Lipman, 259 Ga. 85 (377 SE2d 673) (1989).
Decided March 16, 1989.
Watson & Dana, Dennis D. Watson, for appellant.
Jones & Murphy, Howard W. Jones, for appellee.

 “Alimony is an allowance out of one party’s estate, made for the support of the other party . . . .” OCGA § 19-6-1. “The finder of fact may grant permanent alimony to either party, either from the corpus of the estate or otherwise.” OCGA § 19-6-5.