Court Opinion

ID: 9793643
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:50:58.718818+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:06:19.812434
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE SHEA
dissenting:
I would reverse the conviction because the record is barren of the required express personal waiver of the jury trial.
It is unfortunate that neither party nor the Court came to grips with the true issue in this case, namely, whether the defendant personally waived his right to a jury trial. The defendant asserts, on a narrow technical ground, that the trial is a nullity because he and the State did not sign a written waiver of a jury trial as provided for in section 95-1901(d), R.C.M. 1947. Clearly, if the record demonstrated a personal waiver by the defendant, regardless of whether he signed a jury waiver agreement, the purpose of the statute was fulfilled. People v. Stolofo (1977), 46 Ill.App.3d 616, 5 Ill.Dec. 101, 361 N.E.2d 101; People v. Williams (1977), 47 Ill.App.3d 798, 8 Ill.Dec. 1977, 365 N.E.2d 415. Here, however, the record does not support a personal waiver.
The State, on the other hand, relying on People v. Stolfo, supra, and People v. Williams, supra, contends the express provisions can *57be waived. In each of these cases the Court held the purpose of the statute was fulfilled because the record expressly set forth that defendant personally waived his constitutional right to a jury trial.
In the instant case, because there was no record showing personal waiver, the reasoning as set forth in U. S. v. McCurdy (9th Cir. 1971), 450 F.2d 282, should control:
“In United States v. Guerrero-Peralta, 446 F.2d 876 (9th Cir. 1971), this court recently considered the requirements for a valid waiver of jury trial under Rule 23. There we held that a twelve-member jury could not be waived by a stipulation of counsel, the defendant being present but silent. Rule 23(b). We noted that the purpose of a writing under Rule 23 is to provide ‘the best record evidence of the express consent of a defendant’ (Emphasis in the original). We then stated: ‘Express consent given orally by the defendant personally and appearing on the record, may be equally good evidence, b.ut that much, as a minimum, must appear.’” (Emphasis added.) U. S. v. McCurdy, supra at 283.
In applying this rule to the facts of the case, the Court continued:
“Ideally, counsel in the present case would have called to the attention of the trial judge the provisions of Rule 23, and McCurdy’s signature on the appropriate form would have been obtained. However, there was an intelligent, knowing, and express waiver by the defendant in open court, with the consent of both counsel, and with the approval of the trial judge given after appropriate questioning of the defendant. Where such a waiver is spread upon the record we hold that there has been compliance with Rule 23(a). (Citing cases).” (Emphasis added.) U. S. v. McCurdy, supra at 283.
The majority opinion has ignored the controlling law on the proof required to show waiver of a constitutional right. In Carnley v. Cochran (1962), 369 U.S. 506, 82 S.Ct. 884, 8 L.Ed.2d 70, the following requirement was set forth to prove waiver of a constitutional right:
“The record must show, or there must be an allegation and evidence which show, that an accused was offered counsel but intelligently and understandingly rejected the offer. Anything less is *58not waiver.” Carnley v. Cochran, supra at 516, 82 S.Ct. at 890.
It is clear therefore, the record in this case must, at a minimum, show defendant was offered the right to a jury trial but intelligently and understandingly rejected the offer of a jury trial. Here, the record is devoid of an offer of a jury trial to defendant and of his subsequent rejection of a jury trial. ■
It should be noted moreover, the majority has ignored those standards of waiver succinctly summarized in the case of State v. Lucero (1968), 151 Mont. 531, 445 P.2d 731, where stated:
“The constitutional right to counsel and the constitutional right against self-in-crimination may, of course, be waived. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461; Escobedo v. State of Illinois, [378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977] supra; Miranda v. State of Arizona, supra. However, such waiver must be made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently or it is ineffective. Escobedo v. State of Illinois, supra; Miranda v. State of Arizona, supra. The prosecution has the burden of proof of waiver of constitutional rights. Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 82 S.Ct. 884, 8 L.Ed.2d 70. This burden of proof is heavy and the standards required for waiver are high. Miranda v. State of Arizona, supra. Courts indulge in every reasonable presumption against waiver of constitutional rights and will not indulge in any presumption of waiver. Johnson v. Zerbst, supra; Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 86 S.Ct. 1245, 16 L.Ed.2d 314; Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190, 75 S.Ct. 687, 99 L.Ed. 997; Carnley v. Cochran, supra.” State v. Lucero, supra, at 538, 445 P.2d at 735.
It is unfortunate this Court can so easily ignore these rules in refusing to apply them to the facts of this case. Apparently these rules will only again be resurrected to some form of viability when our mood so dictates. We should not bé so cavalier with basic constitutional principles.
Based on the foregoing constitutional principles, I fail to see how this Court can justify its decision based on the total circumstances rule. It is noteworthy that the majority does not allude to one instance in the record where the defendant personally waived his *59right to a jury trial. Indeed, there are only two minute entries in the Court file relating to the question of whether trial was to be by jury or non-jury, and neither of them supports the majority’s position. Defendant was arraigned on May 26, 1977 (the record of the arraignment is not before us) and the minute entry of the Clerk of Court for that date states: “Case set for Jury Trial, July 20, 1977 at 10:00 a.m.” Thereafter, on July 20, 1977, without any indication of what proceedings were held, the Clerk of Court made the following minute entry: “Trial date vacated and reset for August 3, 1977, 10:00 a.m. without a jury.” Did the Clerk made this entry at the direction of the District Court judge or at the request of an attorney for one side or the other? Was the defendant present in court on that day? What evidence is there that the defendant personally participated in the decision that the trial was to be non-jury? The record is silent.
The majority concludes the “defendant does not contend that no knowing and intelligent waiver was made. His brief on appeal admits that his intention was to waive his right to trial by jury.” It is however, the State’s burden to prove that the record supports a finding that defendant made an intelligent and knowingly waiver of his right to jury trial. The State did not and cannot meet that burden. Furthermore, the defendant did not prepare and sign his brief on appeal; his counsel did. Under the circumstances here, it is manifestly unfair to bind the defendant to statements made by his counsel in the brief. How do we know that defendant even knew what his counsel said in the brief? It is not for defense counsel to waive his client’s rights to a jury trial; it is for the defendant personally to make that decision. Defense counsel did not admit in his brief that his client made a voluntary, intelligent and knowing waiver of his right to a jury trial. If the record does not clearly reflect a waiver, this Court should not cure such defect by implying a waiver.
Nor is the absence of a jury upon the commencement of the trial sufficient to hold that defendant waived his right to a jury trial. If the trial court wanted to proceed without a jury, it would have been a simple matter to inform defendant of his right to a jury trial and then question him as to his intention to waive that right. The *60circumstance of proceeding with a non-jury trial without an objection from defendant, would, at most be an implied waiver, and it is clear that to be effective the waiver must be express. Carnley v. Cochran, supra; State v. Lucero, supra, and spread upon the record, U. S. v. McCurdy, supra.
This is the kind of a case where bad law is being made solely because the Court is more concerned with the result it reaches than it is with the logic by which it has reached the result. By refusing to apply the applicable constitutional standards to the facts of this case, this Court has demonstrated that we are treating each case on an ad hoc basis, hardly an appropriate standard of appellate review.