Court Opinion

ID: 9963910
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-26 15:07:11.838738+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:04.598008
License: Public Domain

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

                                             No. 125,925

              IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

                                          STATE OF KANSAS,
                                              Appellee,

                                                    v.

                                     ADAM DREW HUMPHREY,
                                          Appellant.

                                   MEMORANDUM OPINION

       Appeal from Saline District Court; RENE S. YOUNG, judge. Submitted without oral argument.
Opinion filed April 26, 2024. Affirmed.

       Randall L. Hodgkinson, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant.

       Ryan J. Ott, assistant solicitor general, and Kris W. Kobach, attorney general, for appellee.

Before BRUNS, P.J., GARDNER and ISHERWOOD, JJ.

       PER CURIAM: Adam Drew Humphrey pled guilty to aggravated battery against a
law enforcement officer following a car chase and shootout with police. He appeals his
sentence and the district court's restitution order, alleging constitutional violations and
challenging the restitution decision as unsupported. Finding no error, we affirm.

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                        FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

         On August 30, 2020, Officer Cody Way witnessed a driver, later identified as
Adam Drew Humphrey, commit two traffic infractions, so he initiated a traffic stop.
Humphrey refused to stop, and a car chase ensued. At some point in this pursuit,
Humphrey directed his vehicle into a city park. While pursuing Humphrey through the
park, Way heard and saw gunshots coming from the passenger side of Humphrey's car.
Way was eventually hit by a bullet which ricocheted during the pursuit and entered his
patrol car through the floorboards, striking him in the foot. Way required hospitalization
and surgery; he also suffered broken bones, torn ligaments, and nerve damage in his foot.

         The car chase eventually ended after Humphrey crashed his car into a ditch.
Officers used dogs to track the car and when it was discovered unoccupied, they directed
the dogs to a search for any of its occupants. The officers did recover two spent handgun
cartridges from the vehicle, one each from the driver's and passenger's sides. Additional
guns and ammunition, including a rifle and two magazines, were collected from a ditch
along the route of the car chase. Later analysis established that the bullet fragments found
in Way's patrol car matched the rifle.

         Law enforcement officers also located Humphrey's brother, Shawn Humphrey, in
a nearby field. Earlier that day they had observed Shawn driving the same car involved in
the chase. Shawn told investigators that the car belonged to someone he was dating.
Investigators later learned that this owner was also the registered owner of a second car.
Officers located the second car, stopped the driver, and found Humphrey in the back seat.
Officers searched the vehicle and discovered a handgun under the front passenger seat
and ammunition in the back seat. Humphrey was arrested and later analyses revealed that
the gun matched some of the ammunition recovered from the area where the car chase
ended.

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       The State charged Humphrey with three counts of attempted murder for his
attempts on the lives of three law enforcement officers, including Way, criminal
possession of a firearm, aggravated battery against a law enforcement officer for the great
bodily harm inflicted on Way, and two counts of aggravated assault of law enforcement
officers.

       Humphrey ultimately pleaded no contest to aggravated battery of a law
enforcement officer under count 5 of the State's complaint. This charge stemmed from
the injuries Humphrey caused Way during the pursuit. The district court accepted
Humphrey's plea, found him guilty of the offense, and sentenced him to serve 247
months' imprisonment. It also found that Humphrey committed his offense with a deadly
weapon and ordered him to register as a violent offender.

       The State also requested $40,762.44 in restitution to reimburse the City of Salina
for Way's medical expenses. As support, it offered a document which purported to detail
the expenses, by way of a categorized table, that the City incurred. Defense counsel
agreed the sum reflected medical expenses and did not dispute the State's evidence, but
objected to the State's request on the grounds it was not workable. The district court
granted the State's restitution request.

       Humphrey now brings his case to this court seeking an analysis of the underlying
support for his restitution obligation and certain constitutional challenges he advances
against his sentence.

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By agreeing that the restitution amount reflected medical expenses incurred by the City
for Officer Way's treatment and failing to dispute the evidence offered by the State in
support of Officer Way's damages, Humphrey waived any challenge to the foundation of
the restitution award.

         Humphrey first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the district
court's restitution award. He claims that the State's evidence, a single document included
in the presentence investigation report, failed to sufficiently prove the restitution amount
that the district court ordered. The document lists Way's expenses as follows:

 Class                   Paid                     Outstanding          Incurred
                                                  Reserve
 EXPENSE                 $1,879.36                $0.00                $1,879.36
 IND.PPD                 $18,000.00               $0.00                $18,000.00
 IND.TTD                 $87.24                   $0.00                $87.24
 LEGAL                   $3,602.65                $0.00                $3,602.65
 MEDICAL                 $17,193.19               $0.00                $17,193.19
 Totals                  $40,762.44               $0.00                $40,762.44

         Humphrey notes that at the sentencing hearing, the State claimed that the
document calculated the total amount of damages based solely on Way's medical costs
without explaining the purpose of the categories. It also did not clarify the abbreviations
used for two of those categories. Somewhat related, Humphrey asserts that "medical"
expenses only account for $17,193.19 of the total $40,762.44 damages assessed. He also
contends that the document itself stands as proof that some of the expenses were not
based on medical costs because they fall under distinctly different categories, such as
"legal."

                                              4
Preservation and Invited Error

       Humphrey acknowledges that defense counsel objected to the restitution request
based solely on its workability but argues that this court must apply our Supreme Court's
decision in State v. Smith, 317 Kan. 130, 138-39, 526 P.3d 1047 (2023), finding the
failure to object to a proposed restitution amount did not trigger the invited error rule. We
agree that the invited error rule does not apply here.

       The State asks that Humphrey's argument be dismissed as unpreserved because
Humphrey did not make an objection specific to this issue in the district court. As
support, it cites this court's decision in State v. Palmer, No. 122,520, 2021 WL 6140368,
at *3 (Kan. App. 2021) (unpublished opinion), wherein the panel stated: "Because
Palmer failed to challenge the district court's ability to order any restitution payable to
Midwest and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting this award below, . . . he . . .
waived and abandoned these issues on appeal." (Citing State v. King, 288 Kan. 333, 354-
55, 204 P.3d 585 [2009], and State v. Hunziker, 274 Kan. 655, 659, 56 P.3d 202 ([2002].)

       The State also challenges Humphrey's framing of the question presented. It argues
that Humphrey cannot circumvent preservation rules by characterizing his claim as a
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the district court's decision. The
State maintains that this issue instead asks whether substantial competent evidence
supports a causal link between Humphrey's crime and Way's injuries. Although we do not
dismiss Humphrey's claim, we agree with the State's explanation of the actual question
presented in this issue.

       There are several exceptions to the general rule that a new legal theory may not be
asserted for the first time on appeal, including the following: (1) The newly asserted
theory involves only a question of law arising on proved or admitted facts and is finally
determinative of the case; (2) consideration of the theory is necessary to serve the ends of

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justice or to prevent denial of fundamental rights; and (3) the district court was right for
the wrong reason. State v. Allen, 314 Kan. 280, 283, 497 P.3d 566 (2021). But Supreme
Court Rule 6.02(a)(5) (2023 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 36) requires an appellant to explain why an
issue that was not raised below should be considered for the first time on appeal. State v.
Johnson, 309 Kan. 992, 995, 441 P.3d 1036 (2019). And "[a] 'decision to review an
unpreserved claim under an exception is a prudential one.' Even if an exception may
apply, we are under no obligation to review the claim. [Citations omitted.]" State v.
Rhoiney, 314 Kan. 497, 500, 501 P.3d 368 (2021).

       Humphrey concedes that he did not object to the district court's restitution order on
the specific grounds that he raises on appeal. He also does not explain why this
unpreserved evidentiary issue should be considered for the first time on appeal. When an
appellant raises a purely evidentiary issue, appellate review of an allegedly erroneous
admission of evidence should be granted only if the defendant properly objected to the
evidence in the district court. See State v. Shank, 304 Kan. 89, 94, 369 P.3d 322 (2016);
K.S.A. 60-404 ("A verdict . . . shall not be set aside . . . by reason of the erroneous
admission of evidence unless there appears of record objection to the evidence timely
interposed and so stated as to make clear the specific ground of objection."). Because
Humphrey did not object to the restitution order on the same grounds he currently raises,
he has failed to preserve this claim of error.

The Kansas Supreme Court has already found that our criminal restitution statute does
not violate Apprendi and we are duty-bound to adhere to that ruling.

       Humphrey next challenges Kansas' criminal restitution scheme as unconstitutional,
in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Apprendi v.
New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000).

                                                 6
       The State first asserts that Humphrey's argument is unpreserved, but it
acknowledges that our appellate courts have considered this issue for the first time on
appeal to "prevent a denial of fundamental rights." See State v. Robison, 314 Kan. 245,
248, 496 P.3d 892 (2021), cert. denied 142 S. Ct. 2868 (2022); State v. Craige, No.
124,599, at *6 (Kan. App. 2022) (unpublished opinion), rev. denied 317 Kan. 847 (2023).
The State thus also claims that this court is duty-bound by Kansas Supreme Court
precedent already deciding this issue. We agree and affirm Humphrey's sentence.

       A statute's constitutionality raises a question of law subject to unlimited review.
State v. Soto, 299 Kan. 102, 121, 322 P.3d 334 (2014).

       Humphrey challenges our state restitution statute under the federal Constitution.
But our Supreme Court has held that restitution does not implicate a defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial as contemplated by Apprendi and its progeny because
restitution is not considered a punishment. State v. Brown, 314 Kan. 292, 308, 498 P.3d
167 (2021); Robison, 314 Kan. at 249-51; State v. Arnett, 314 Kan. 183, 186-88, 496 P.3d
928 (2021), cert. denied 142 S. Ct. 2868 (2022).

       Humphrey does not specifically reference section 5 of the Kansas Constitution Bill
of Rights but suggests that his claim should also prevail under this standard. In Arnett,
314 Kan. at 189-93, our Supreme Court found that the Kansas restitution statutes violate
section 5 to the extent they allow a conversion of any restitution orders into civil
judgments. Such a scheme effectively bypasses the traditional function of juries to
determine civil damages. 314 Kan. at 194. But the Arnett court also determined that the
proper remedy was to sever the offending portions of the statutory scheme, rather than to
vacate every restitution order. 314 Kan. at 194-95. So, even where Kansas' restitution
statutes implicate section 5 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights, the severance of the
unconstitutional provisions renders a defendant's restitution order constitutionally valid.
See 314 Kan. at 194-96; State v. Owens, 314 Kan. 210, 242-44, 496 P.3d 902 (2021).

                                              7
       This court is duty-bound to follow Kansas Supreme Court precedent unless there
is some indication that court is departing from its previous position. State v. Rodriguez,
305 Kan. 1139, 1144, 390 P.3d 903 (2017). There is nothing indicating such a departure,
so we deny Humphrey's claim according to these rulings.

As the Kansas Supreme Court has previously found, the action taken by the district court
in ordering Humphrey to register as a violent offender for his use of a deadly weapon
during the crime of conviction did not constitute impermissible judicial fact-finding in
violation of Apprendi.

       Finally, Humphrey claims that the district court violated his Sixth Amendment
rights as contemplated by Apprendi when it sentenced him to register as a violent
offender by making a finding that he used a deadly weapon during his offense.

       The record before us reflects that Humphrey never objected to the district court's
imposition of the registration requirement. Still, he claims that this court should reach the
issue because consideration of his claim is necessary to serve the ends of justice. We
recognize that a panel of this court has previously employed this exception to consider a
similar claim. See State v. Unruh, No. 122,472, 2021 WL 4808279, at *2 (Kan. App.
2021) (unpublished opinion). While we are not obligated to do so, we also elect to apply
the exception. See Rhoiney, 314 Kan. at 500. In doing so, we find that our Supreme Court
has repeatedly held that a district court's deadly weapon finding under K.S.A. 22-
4902(e)(2) does not constitute impermissible judicial fact-finding as discussed in
Apprendi. See, e.g., State v. Carter, 311 Kan. 206, 217, 459 P.3d 186 (2020); State v.
Huey, 306 Kan. 1005, 1006, 399 P.3d 211 (2017). This court is duty-bound to follow this
precedent. See Rodriguez, 305 Kan. at 1144. Thus, Humphrey's final argument also
necessarily fails.

                                              8
                                      CONCLUSION

       Humphrey raises three unpreserved claims. The first of those, the challenge to his
restitution order, we conclude was waived given Humphrey's actions before the district
court in accepting the award as one for medical expenses and in failing to dispute the
State's evidence supporting Officer Way's damages for restitution. Applying established
Kansas Supreme Court precedent to his remaining two arguments, we review but
necessarily deny those claims. We thus affirm Humphrey's sentence and the district
court's restitution judgment.

       Affirmed.

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