Court Opinion

ID: 9573029
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:46:48.335099+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:35:51.590084
License: Public Domain

Moore, J.,
concurring in result:
When land is ¡subdivided into lots and a map is made thereof showing streets, and lots are sold with reference to ¡such map, the owner of the subdivision thereby dedicates the streets to- the use of those who purchase the lots for ingress and egress. The lot purchasers acquire easements of ingress and egress, but are entitled to exercise only such *86nights thereunder ais may be necessary to <a reasonable and proper enjoyment of their premises. Hine v. Blumenthal, 239 N.C. 537, 80 S.E. 2d 458; Rudolph v. Glendale Improvement Co., 137 S.E. 349 (W. Va.). In the instant case, tire deed from defendant to plaintiff sets out this right of ingress .amid egress in express terms, as follows: “The parties of the first part give, grant, 'and ©onivey unto the parties of the second part ia right of way and easement of egress, ingress and regress over and upon that certain road or roads, adjoining the above described lot
Nothing passes by implication -as incident to. the grant of easement except what is reasonably necessary to. its fair enjoyment. Hine v. Blumenthal, supra. In construing the grant of easement, the court will look to the circumstances attending the transaction, the situation of the parties and the object to be obtained. Stevens v. Bird-Jex Co., 18 P. 2d 292 (Utah).
Plaintiff’s lot is residential property and restricted to one residence. It was undoubtedly 'contemplated that plaintiff might own one or more automobiles for use of himself and family, and would require one or more entrances to the street and road abutting his lot on the west and south, respectively, for the car or cars. It was not contemplated that plaintiff would be permitted to enter the street at every point ■along the 205 feet of south frontage. Barrett v. Duchaine, 149 N.E. 632 (Mass.). This is true for .two reasons. Such extensive use is not necessary to the fair and reasonable enj oymenf of the easement. An easement roust not unreasonably interfere with the rights of the owner of tire servient estate. Ingelson v. Olson, 272 N.W. 270, 110 A.L.R. 167 (Minn.).
Plaintiff’s easement as set out in the deed does not fix the location of the entrairoe or entrances to plaintiff’s lot. When .an express easement does not fix the location of the way, tire grantor of tire easement has the right to designate the location in a reasonable manner with due regard to the rights of grantee. If grantor does not locate the way, grantee may do iso if he takes into consideration the interest and convenience of grantor. Andrews v. Lovejoy, 247 N.C. 554, 101 S.E. 2d 395; Cooke v. Electric Membership Corp., 245 N.C. 453, 96 S.E. 2d 351; Anno: 110 A.L.R. 176-178.
“When the grant of an easement of way does not definitely locate it, it has been consistently held that a reasonable -and convenient way for all parties is thereby implied, in view of all tire circumstances.” 110 A.L.R. 175. When plaintiff purchased his lot the road in question had not been opened. There was a “dirt road from Bast Shore Drive (the street along the west end of plaintiff’s lot) along the south of plain*87tiff's lot, outting across it at the rear,” but there is no contention that this was the -road shown on the map, or that the proposed road when opened would be the -same in 'construction, elevation or exact location ■ — -“They did not discuss the manner in which the road was to be constructed. ” Plaintiff's lot was low at the east and west endis and high in the middle. At the place where the proposed -road was to be constructed the terrain eloped downward to the south so that the lot on the south side of the proposed road was a low place, much lower than the high point on plaintiff’s lot. The purchaser of a lot is fixed with notice of its natural iconditiom. 41 A.L.R. 1443. In constructing the street it was necessary for defendant .to take many things into consideration. Plaintiff’s witness, Mr. Von Oesen, a civil engineer, testified:
“The .streets and roadways in a subdivision, in being graded, after they are located are generally governed by several factors, each of which has a certain kind of bearing on the elevations -and grading of the streets. The natural factor is always economy, and it is necessary -to build a good street economically, and that means you would balance your cuts and fills so that the areas you cut down can fill the areas you have to fill in. The next governing factor would probably be drainage, and the roadway levels to provide adequate drainage to remove rain waters from surrounding areas of the street. There must be a surface sufficient to drive on, and also as for the elimination of 'sight obstructions. Another factor which is involved is the matter of 'Conformity to adjacent lands, and access thereto, for the street is built primarily for the people building nearby; the access to adjacent lands. Normally the roadways serve areas they pass through.
Thus defendant was required to consider the suitability of the ¡road as a thoroughfare, ¡drainage and obstructions, as well as its adaptability to access to plaintiff’s lot and the lot directly opposite. Whether defendant ¡could reasonably provide an entrance to plaintiff’s lot at the point plaintiff ¡desired and also meet the ¡other requirements is a question for the jury. When the road was opened, it was about at even grade with plaintiff’s lot at the east and west endis of the lot; in the center the lot was much higher than the street. The difference in elevation between ¡the edge of the pavement and the floor of plaintiff’s ■carport is 6 feet — it does not appear how far above the surface of the lot the floor of the ¡carport is. Plaintiff ¡could not enter his carport from a driveway (if constructed) leading 'directly to the ¡street because the elevation is such that a car would “scrape.” But at many points both east and west of the carport a car can enter the lot at grade or by an *88'entrañice of slight elevation. The door- of the carport is 18 feet from toe edge of the lot and at least 20 feet from the point where the out begins. A oar 'entering ¡the lot to> the east or west of the carport “could go in (tire carport) with ia skillful driver.” It does not appear in evidence how .wide the 'door to. the carport is, but it is common knowledge that ordinary automobile operators drive cars into’ narrow 'driveways and parking .spaces .at right angles from highways and streets with less turning space than 18 to 20 feet. Plaintiff is not entitled, at all events, to the most convenient and direct route to his carport, else all streets and roadways in subdivisions must be approximately at lot grade regardless of the natural contour of the land. What plaintiff is entitled to is a reasonably convenient and prop.er entrance or entrañices to his lot under the 'circumstances.
The location of an easement of way may be determined and fixed by implied agreement, acquiescence, or by parol agreement. 110 A.L.R. 178-180. And once it is located and fixed, it may not be altered except :by mutual consent. Smith v. Jackson, 180 N.C. 115, 104 S.E. 169; Mullen v. Canal & Water Co., 130 N.C. 496, 41 S.E. 1027; International Pottery Co. v. Richardson, 43 A. 692 (N.J.); Tripp v. Bagley, 276 P. 912, 69 A.L.R. 1417 (Utah). Plaintiff contends that by approving hiis house .plans, including the plans for the carport, and by an “understanding” that the house would be .built near the center of the lot with the carport facing the road in question, defendant assented to an entrance from the road directly into the carport. Defendant, of course, ■contends otherwise. This is also a question for jury determination.
I do not agree with the following statements in toe majority opinion, ais legal conclusions and principles: (1) . . . “Access from the street was not limited to any particular portion of the lot.” (2) “It is apparent that toe parties contemplated direct, practical, and reasonable access to all parts of toe lot .from the street whenever it was opened.” For reasons already stated, it is my .opinion that these statements are toio broad and assume toe truth of much plaintiff must prove by the •greater weight of the evidence if he is to prevail.
PARKER and Bobbitt, JJ. join in this concurring opinion.