Court Opinion

ID: 9737635
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:31:06.143844+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:00.372729
License: Public Domain

Kelly, J.
(dissenting). I concur with the majority’s chronicling of the facts and its statement of the applicable standard of review. I agree, also, with its recitation of the three common-law categories for persons who enter the land or premises of another. However, I dissent from the remainder of the majority’s opinion.
*608The issue is whether individuals who enter another’s property for noncommercial purposes are invitees for purposes of determining the standard of care a property owner or possessor owes to them. We have never held that invitee status arises solely where there is a commercial purpose for visiting the owner’s premises. Instead, we have long recognized and applied both the commercial-purpose provision and the public-invitee provision of 2 Restatement Torts, 2d, § 332 to classify visitors as invitees. The majority’s reliance on McNulty v Hurley,1 to identify visitors as invitees only when they are visiting for a commercial purpose is misplaced. The majority’s action rejects a recognized principle of Michigan law.
A
The common law and the statutes make up a major portion of the law of Michigan. Const 1963, art 3, § 7.
“The common law does not consist of definite rules which are absolute, fixed, and immutable like the statute law, but it is a flexible body of principles which are designed to meet, and are susceptible of adaption to, among other things, new institutions, public policies, conditions, usages and practices, and changes in mores, trade, commerce, inventions, and increasing knowledge, as the progress of society may require. So, changing conditions may give rise to new rights under the law . . . .” [Beech Grove Investment Co v Civil Rights Comm, 380 Mich 405, 430; 157 NW2d 213 (1968), quoting 15A CJS, Common Law, § 2, pp 43-44.1
“The Restatement is ... an attempt to categorically recite the content of the common law.” Yoder Co *609v Liberty Mut Ins Co, 92 Mich App 386, 390; 284 NW2d 810 (1979). Section 332 of the Restatement provides:
(1) An invitee is either a public invitee or a business visitor.
(2) A public invitee is a person who is invited to enter or remain on land as a member of the public for a purpose for which the land is held open to the public.
(3) A business visitor is a person who is invited to enter or remain on land for a purpose directly or indirectly connected with business dealings with the possessor of the land.
Section 332 of the Restatement is consistent with the common law of Michigan.
Our common law, as it pertains to invitees, has been developing since 1872. In numerous cases, we have recognized or applied a rule that is similar to that contained in subsection 332(2). Long ago, in Hargreaves v Deacon,2 this Court recognized a distinction between the duty owed to a trespasser and to one who enters another’s property under an inducement or a lawful right. Hargreaves, supra at 9. The distinction required something more than mere permission. Id. To be entitled to damages, the visitor had to have been invited by the landowner to be on the property. Id. at 7.
Notably, for the landowner to incur liability, the Hargreaves Court did not require that a person be on a landowner’s property solely for a commercial purpose. It stated that a suit for damages can lie when the
*610party injured has been induced to come by personal invitation, or by employment which brings him there, or by resorting there as to a place of business, or of general resort held out as open to customers or others whose lawful occasions may lead them to visit there. [Id. at 5 (emphasis added).]
Thus, Hargreaves formed the basis for recognizing several means by which a person could become an invitee. See Preston v Sleziak, 383 Mich 442, 450; 175 NW2d 759 (1970); Polston v S S Kresge Co, 324 Mich 575, 578; 37 NW2d 638 (1949); Douglas v Bergland, 216 Mich 380, 387-388; 185 NW 819 (1921).
Also long ago, in Sheldon v Flint & P M R Co,3 this Court applied the public invitee doctrine, although it did not identify it as such. The plaintiffs decedent was a child induced to enter the defendant’s property by a band playing there. Id. at 173. The child had no particular business with the defendant and was not on the property for the pecuniary gain of the defendant. Id. at 177. While there, he was struck by the defendant’s train and killed. Id. at 174.
The Court found that the music was naturally calculated to attract a crowd. The defendant should have anticipated that and made provisions to avoid the hazard that resulted in the child’s death. Id. at 177-178. It held that a jury question remained whether the defendant had exercised the degree of care owed the plaintiff’s decedent under the circumstances. Id. at 178. Notably, the Court did not merely label the child a licensee, despite the absence of any pecuniary benefit to the defendant from the decedent’s presence on its property. Id. at 177-178. Thus, we can infer that the *611Court determined that the decedent could be classified as an invitee on the basis of invitation alone, without a commercial purpose for being on the property.
In 1908, this Court quoted former Justice Cooley in Blakeley v White Star Line4 to state our common-law definition of an invitee:
“One is under no obligation to keep his premises in safe condition for the visits of trespassers. On the other hand, when he expressly or by implication invites others to come upon his premises, whether for business or for any other purpose, it is his duty to be reasonably sure that he is not inviting them into danger, and to that end he must exercise ordinary care and prudence to render the premises reasonably safe for the visit.” [Blakeley, supra at 637, quoting Cooley, Torts, p 605 (emphasis added).]
Particularly significant is the fact that Justice COOLEY identified two different means by which one could be classified as an invitee: (1) by a finding that the person was invited upon the property for business, or (2) by a finding that the person was invited for any other purpose. Id.
On the basis of Justice Cooley’s definition of an invitee, the Blakeley Court expressly formulated the applicable rule: “Invitation is sufficient. Pecuniary profit to the owner is not essential.” Id. at 639. Thus, in Blakeley, we again recognized that our common law does not require a commercial purpose for one to be an invitee.4
5
*612Forty-one years later, in Polston, supra, this Court continued to recognize that it could assign invitee status on the basis of invitation alone. It derived the following definition of an invitee:
From Hargreaves v Deacon, [supra], it appears that damages for accidental injuries sustained on private premises resulting from the negligence of the owner may not be recovered by one on the theory that he is an invitee “unless the party injured has been induced to come by personal invitation, or by employment which brings him there, or by resorting there as to a place of business, or of general resort held out as open to customers,” et cetera. [Polston, supra at 578 (emphasis added).]
Only after the Court concluded that the plaintiff did not fall within the definition of an invitee did it confer licensee status on him. Id.
In Preston, supra, we find again that the licensee-invitee distinction does not turn on whether the invitor has the expectation of a pecuniary gain from the invitation. Id. at 449-450. “[I]n this state the status of an invitee is tested not only by the theory of economic benefit, but also upon the concept of invitation.” Id. at 450 (emphasis added).
The majority argues that Preston is “internally inconsistent on this point.” Ante at 599. However, a close reading of Preston indicates that its analysis is actually consistent with our common-law rule and the Restatement definition of a public invitee.
*613In Preston, we considered whether social guests invited to another’s home were invitees or licensees. The Court of Appeals had relied on Genesee Merchants Bank & Trust Co v Payne6 to hold that Michigan law classifies the social guest as an invitee. Preston, supra at 447.
This Court rejected the Genesee Merchants Bank decision and reversed the Court of Appeals. 383 Mich 455. In so doing, we stated:
“An invitation may be inferred when there is a common interest or mutual advantage, a license when the object is the mere pleasure or benefit of the person using it. ‘To come under an implied invitation, as distinguished from a mere license, the visitor must come for a purpose connected with the business with which the occupant of the premises is engaged, or which he permits to be carried on there. There must be some mutuality of interest in the subject to which the visitor’s business relates, although the particular business which is the object of the visit may not be for the benefit of the occupant.’
“ ‘The distinction between a visitor who is a mere licensee and one who is on the premises by invitation turns largely on the nature of the business that brings him there, rather than on the words or acts of the owner which precede his coming____’ ” [Id. at 448, quoting 3 Cooley, Torts (4th ed), § 440.]
The majority latches onto the quotation from Cooley as proof that Michigan classifies a visitor as an invitee only when there is a commercial purpose for the visit. Ante at 600. However, the majority ignores the context of the quotation. The Preston Court quoted Cooley to preserve the historical distinction between a social guest and invitee. Preston, *614supra at 448. The quotation was not meant to provide the general rule for assigning invitee status,to visitors in all other situations.
Later in its opinion, the Court quoted § 332 of the Restatement as the general definition of an invitee. Id. at 450. It stated that the Restatement “definition fairly represents the law of this state pertaining to what constitutes the legal status of an invitee.” Id. at 451 (citations omitted). The Court then identified that the comment accompanying § 332 states that invitee status under the Restatement definition does not apply to social guests. Id. at 450-451. A social guest “ ‘does not come as a member of the public upon premises held open to the public for that puipose, and he does not enter for a purpose directly or indirectly connected with business dealings with the possessor.’ ” Id. at 451, quoting 2 Restatement Torts, 2d, § 330, comment h. Thus, the Court held that social guests were not invitees and went on to classify them as licensees. Id. at 453.
Comparable Michigan appellate cases decided after Preston have focused exclusively on the business invitee provision of § 332.7 They did not consider the public invitee provision of § 332. In each, however, it *615was unnecessary to consider the public invitee provision, because invitee status was established on the basis of an economic benefit to the property owner.8
In order to consider further the public invitee provision of § 332, we had to await a case in which liability was premised on the basis of an injured party being a public invitee. See, e.g., Roberts v Auto-Owners Ins Co, 422 Mich 594, 611; 374 NW2d 905 (1985). This case presents that basis, and we should not hesitate to apply the public invitee provision to it.
As identified above, the concept that invitee status is determined by either an economic benefit to, or an invitation by, the property owner is well established in our common law. It has been recognized as the law in Michigan since 1970 in Preston. See Leveque v Leveque, 41 Mich App 127, 129; 199 NW2d 675 (1972); Sendelbach v Grad, 246 NW2d 496, 499 (ND, 1976); 62 Am Jur 2d, Premises Liability, § 88, p 442, n 54. In *616fact, I would interpret Preston as implicitly adopting the Restatement definition of an invitee.
The majority argues that the issue “whether to adopt the Restatement definition of ‘public invitee’ was not before this Court in Preston . . . .” Ante at 603. However, in that case we were required to consider whether a social guest was an invitee or a licensee. Preston, supra at 445. In considering that issue, we were obliged to examine the definition of an invitee and a social guest to determine whether the two were compatible. Id. at 450-451. We determined that they were not and that the status of a social guest is more consistent with that of a licensee. Id. at 451-452. Thus, our discussion of what constitutes an invitee was essential to the resolution of the case.
Accordingly, I find that the issue whether to adopt the Restatement definition of an invitee was squarely before the Court in Preston. I would apply Preston as precedent, binding on this case.9
B
The majority rejects the public invitee provision of § 332 and adopts the reasoning contained in the Flor*617ida case of McNulty, supra, as more consistent with our state’s legal tradition. Ante at 604. In McNulty, the Florida Supreme Court held that, to be classified an invitee, one must have been on the property for a material or commercial puxpose that benefited the invitor. Id. at 188. The Court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the defendant church received a benefit from his presence at a worship service, and labeled him a licensee. Id. at 189.
For over a century, Michigan has recognized that one can be classified as an invitee when on an invitor’s property for a commercial purpose or pursuant to an invitation. See Hargreaves, supra. Thus, the McNulty decision runs contrary to recognized principles of Michigan law by imposing a commercial purpose requirement to the designation of an invitee. This Court has expressly stated, “Invitation is sufficient. Pecuniary profit to the owner is not essential.” Blakeley, supra at 639. Therefore, the majority’s reliance on McNulty is misplaced.
Furthermore, Florida itself has rejected the McNulty decision. See Post v Lunney, 261 So 2d 146 (Fla, 1972). In Post, the Florida Supreme Court adopted § 332, including the public invitee provision. Id. at 148. It pointed out that the McNulty mutual benefit test was too narrow and had the potential to cause unjust results. Id. at 149.
For example, it would prohibit recovery for damages due to ordinary negligence to a “window-shopping” visitor to a store, while permitting recovery to a person who made a purchase, however small. To avoid these and similar results, “the economic benefit theory has been strained to the breaking point.” [Id., quoting Smith v Montgomery Ward & Co, 232 So 2d 195, 198 (Fla App, 1970).]
*618The Florida court applied the public invitee provision of § 332 to the case. Id. at 148. It concluded that the plaintiff was an invitee because she had been invited to enter property opened to members of the public for tours. Id. at 148-149.
The recognized law of Michigan is more consistent with the decision in Post than it is with the decision in McNulty. We have long recognized that one could be an invitee without benefiting the owner or being on the property for a commercial purpose. That principle is contained in the public invitee provision of § 332. Therefore, as the Florida court did in Post, this Court should find that the public invitee provision of § 332 is applicable to this plaintiff.10
c
Michigan’s definition of a common-law invitee is identical to that contained in § 332, and § 332 has been, at least implicitly, adopted by Preston. However, even if I were to agree with the majority that the Restatement rule is not the law, public policy supports adoption of the Restatement view at this time. As previously stated, our common law is a flexible body of principles and is adaptable to changes in public policy. Beech Grove, supra. The application of the public invitee provision to this case is entirely consistent with that view. It is responsive to the public interest that is implicated when premises are opened *619to the public. Furthermore, § 332 provides greater protection to the public without unduly burdening property owners.
I agree with the Indiana Court of Appeals when it stated:
The public invitee test set out in Restatement section 332(2) would require that the occupant open his premises to the public or to some broad segment of it. Thus, it would not extend invitee status to social guests. When premises are opened to the public, their use and condition begin to affect the public interest, so that it is reasonable for courts to impose upon the occupant a standard of reasonable care toward those members of the public who enter for the purpose for which they were invited. Prosser, [Business visitors and invitees, 26 Minn L R 573, 587 (1942)].
The occupant does not lose control of his property; he can withdraw the invitation or restrict entry as he sees fit.
Id. Neither does he owe a duly of reasonable care to the public in general. The test would further require that the visitor enter the premises for the particular purpose for which the occupant has encouraged the public to do so. It is this latter fact which raises the inference that the occupant will use reasonable care to keep the premises safe for the visitor.
Given the public interest involved and our recognition of the implication of safety which arises when the public is encouraged to enter premises for a particular purpose, we conclude that the public invitee test is a proper guide for determining invitee status. [Fleischer v Hebrew Orthodox Congregation, 504 NE2d 320, 323 (Ind App, 1987).]
CONCLUSION
The public invitee provision of § 332 accurately reflects the common law of Michigan. It was adopted *620by this Court in Preston and should be applied here. Furthermore, it reflects the sound public policy of protecting members of the public when premises are open to them.
I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. This case should be remanded to the trial court for a new trial in which the jury is instructed according to both provisions of the § 332 definition of an invitee.
Cavanagh, J., concurred with Kelly, J.

 97 So 2d 185 (Fla, 1957).

 25 Mich 1 (1872).

 59 Mich 172; 26 NW 507 (1886).

 154 Mich 635; 118 NW 482 (1908).

 The majority completely ignores the Blakeley definition of an invitee. It states that there are several cases that “appear” to support a commercial purpose requirement. Ante at 598. It recognizes that there are cases that are suggestive of the Restatement’s public invitee definition. But, it *612finds that the contours of the definition are difficult to discern. While the contours of the definition to this point may not be a model of clarity, I ask what is difficult to discern regarding the statement in Blakeley that “[pecuniary profit to the owner is not essential”? Blakeley, supra at 639. From that statement, one can scarcely fail to discern that Michigan law does not require a commercial purpose for someone to be classified as an invitee.

 6 Mich App 204; 148 NW2d 503 (1967).

 See Stanley v Town Square Cooperative, 203 Mich App 143, 147; 512 NW2d 51 (1993) (“The distinguishing characteristic that fixes the duty depends upon whether the licensee’s visit is related to the pecuniary interests of the possessor of the land”); White v Badalamenti, 200 Mich App 434, 436; 505 NW2d 8 (1993) (“To be an invitee, plaintiff’s presence on defendants’ land must have been related to an activity of some tangible benefit to defendants”); Doran v Combs, 135 Mich App 492, 496; 354 NW2d 804 (1984) (“An invitee is one who is on the owner’s premises for a purpose mutually beneficial to both parties”); Danaher v Partridge Creek Country Club, 116 Mich App 305, 312; 323 NW2d 376 (1982) (“[A]n invitee is one who is on the owner’s premises for a purpose mutually beneficial to both parties”); Socha v Passino, 105 Mich App 445, 447-448; 306 NW2d 316 (1981) (“An individual can be an invitee if the visit may reasonably be *615said to confer or anticipate a business, commercial, monetary, or other tangible benefit to the occupant”).

 See Stanley, n 7 supra (the guest of a co-op resident was an invitee because the co-op obtained pecuniary gain in exchange for giving the resident the right to license visitors); White, n 7 supra (the question for the jury to decide is whether an unpaid babysitter who slipped on ice at the defendant’s home was an invitee); Doran, n 7 supra (a former mother-in-law who fell on the defendant’s driveway while returning children from the former husband’s home was an invitee because of the pecuniary benefit received by the defendant); Danaher, n 7 supra (the plaintiff was deemed an invitee when he arrived at the defendant’s golf course to play golf); Socha, n 7 supra (the plaintiff was a licensee when injured in the defendant’s house while removing a piece of furniture that benefited him, but provided no benefit to the defendant).
This is especially true with regard to the cases cited by the majority in which courts have recognized invitee liability for churches. See ante at 601-602. In each case this Court or the Court of Appeals classified the visitor as an invitee because the church received a commercial benefit from the visitor’s presence. Id. There simply was no need to rely on the concept of invitation and apply the public invitee definition.

 I note that, in other instances, we have adopted Restatement sections as the law of this state without formally identifying that we were doing so. See Senior Accountants, Analysts & Appraisers Ass’n v Detroit, 399 Mich 449, 458; 249 NW2d 121 (1976). In Senior Accountants, it was sufficient for us to have mentioned the Restatement section and applied it to that case for later Courts to recognize that we adopted it. See Nummer v Dep’t of Treasury, 448 Mich 534, 557, n 2; 533 NW2d 250 (1995) (Mallett, J., dissenting).
Similar to the manner of adoption we employed in Senior Accountants, in Preston we mentioned § 332 and then applied it to find that the plaintiff was not an invitee. Preston, supra at 451. Therefore, I disagree with the majority when it states that we have never adopted the public invitee provision of § 332.

 The majority recognizes that most jurisdictions have adopted the public invitee definition provided in § 332. However, it states that our role is “not simply to ‘count heads.’ ” Ante at 607. I agree that we should not “simply count heads,” but neither should we “bury our heads in the sand” to avoid recognizing that our common law includes the public-invitee definition of an invitee.