Court Opinion

ID: 9767615
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 05:22:46.034386+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:32.071317
License: Public Domain

MILLER, Judge,
dissenting.
I do not agree with the majority that the State’s interest in providing the flag as a symbol of unity is inadequate to support Sec. 42.09(a)(3), V.A.P.C. I find the discussion of the symbolism of the flag in this Court’s unanimous opinion in Deeds v. State, 474 S.W.2d 718 (Tex.Cr.App.1972), both viable and highly persuasive, and I would apply the rationale of that case to the present cause.
In Deeds, supra, we held that the State had a right to regulate the nonspeech aspect of the burning of the flag of the United States. See Deeds, supra at 721, citing United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968). In considering the Deeds discussion about our national flag and the facts of this flag desecration case, I believe the regulation of appellant’s nonverbal conduct, albeit admittedly symbolic speech, under Sec. 42.-09(a)(3) is justified. The valid State interest of preserving the flag as a symbol of national unity clearly, in my view, supersedes whatever first amendment rights this appellant sought to assert. See dissenting opinions of Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black, Fortas, and White, in Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 604, 89 S.Ct. 1354, 1371-72, 22 L.Ed.2d 572 (1969); Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34, 27 S.Ct. 419, 51 L.Ed. 696 (1907). As noted in Deeds, supra:
“Since the flag symbolizes the entire nation, not just one particular political philosophy, the state may determine that it be kept above the turmoil created by competing ideologies. (emphasis supplied)
Though it may not pass muster in other fact situations or under other statutes, see e.g. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 94 S.Ct. 1242, 39 L.Ed.2d 605 (1973), Sec. 42.-09, supra, passes constitutional muster in its application to destroying a United States flag, even as an exercise of “speech”, in a manner “the actor knows will seriously offend” persons observing the action. Section 42.09, supra, is here being narrowly applied to a fact situation involving total destruction of the United States’ national symbol. I do not agree that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to appellant or that he has grounds to make such challenge. Cf. Briggs v. State, 740 S.W.2d 803 (Tex.Cr.App.1987) (defendant must show that statute is unconstitutional as applied to him in his situation).
I dissent.