Court Opinion

ID: 9482630
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 08:56:00.076457+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:49:06.626880
License: Public Domain

*1530SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
Because I must respectfully disagree with the majority, I dissent. This case presents two straightforward issues. Can this court say as a matter of law that significant exposure to ETS does not present a serious risk of harm. If we cannot, can we then say as a matter of law that defendants have not been deliberately indifferent to that serious risk. Unfortunately, the majority’s treatment of these issues is not straightforward, therefore providing little guidance on these critical issues to the lower courts and prison officials.
The majority opinion appears to hold that exposure to ETS only states a claim if a plaintiff can show that he presently suffers from its adverse effects. The majority then holds that because defendants treated Clemmons’s present symptoms, they have not been deliberately indifferent. However, this case is not about a sore throat, a runny nose, or red eyes: it is about cancer.
Alternatively, the majority grudgingly assumes that even if the potential for developing cancer may rise to a constitutionally cognizable claim, defendants have not been deliberately indifferent to that risk because they have given Clemmons a nonsmoking cellmate from time to time. In its zeal to uphold the summary judgment for defendants on this meager record, the majority disregards compelling evidence, of which we may take judicial notice, that exposure to ETS does indeed pose a serious health risk. Furthermore, in dealing with the issue of deliberate indifference, the majority makes an argument on behalf of defendants which defendants have never made, and bolsters that argument by making factfindings on a summary judgment which are not supported by the record. Such cavalier treatment is disturbing when we are deciding under what circumstances a prisoner who has not been sentenced to death can be exposed to a substance which an agency of our own government has proposed to classify as a known human carcinogen.
Turning first to the health risks posed by exposure to ETS, I note that Clemmons is sentenced to spend virtually all of his life in prison, and that under current prison policy he could be forced to live indefinitely with a smoking cellmate. The majority’s dismissal of this situation as “blind prognostication,” maj. op. at 1528, is puzzling when defendants have consistently asserted that they have no obligation to provide Clemmons a nonsmoking cellmate and have only occasionally done so in the past. Given the potential here for exposure to a heavy concentration of ETS over a long period of time, the mounting scientific evidence of the potentially lethal effects of long-term exposure to ETS creates a fact issue as to whether this exposure constitutes a health hazard at least as constitutionally significant as other conditions {i.e., inadequate ventilation, exercise, or diet) that have been held to constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
The applicable modern Eighth Amendment principles are now familiar. The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause proscribes punishments “which, although not physically barbarous, 'involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’; or are grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime. Among ‘unnecessary and wanton’ inflictions of pain are those that are ‘totally without penological justification.’ ” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 2399, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981) (citations omitted). A prisoner’s conditions of confinement may constitute punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment unless such conditions are “ ‘part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.’ ” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 1084, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1986) (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347, 101 S.Ct. at 2399). Any Eighth Amendment analysis of whether prison conditions are cruel and unusual punishment “must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101, 78 S.Ct. 590, 598, 2 L.Ed.2d 630 (1958) (plurality opinion); see also Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 108 S.Ct. 2687, 2691, 101 L.Ed.2d 702 (1988) (plurality opinion); Pen*1531ry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 2953, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989).
In Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976), the Supreme Court first held that prison officials’ deliberate indifference to an inmate’s serious medical needs constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. In Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 687, 98 S.Ct. 2565, 2571, 57 L.Ed.2d 522 (1978), the Court affirmed a district court’s holding that denial of an inmate’s basic human needs is “cruel and unusual.” These decisions arise from an essential fact of prison life: the prisoner depends totally on the state to secure those necessities fundamental to his or her very existence. An incarcerated person loses more than freedom. The prisoner must depend on the state to make the most basic decisions vital to his or her health and safety. The Eighth Amendment, as now construed, requires that the state act humanely in making these decisions on its wards’ behalf. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104, 97 S.Ct. at 291 (“ ‘[i]t is but just that the public be required to care for the prisoner, who cannot by reason of the deprivation of his liberty, care for himself’ ”) (quoting Spicer v. Williamson, 191 N.C. 487, 490, 132 S.E. 291 (1926)). See also Battle v. Anderson, 564 F.2d 388, 395 (10th Cir.1977) (“Persons are sent to prison as punishment, not for punishment”).
Courts have applied this general principle in a variety of situations relating to the maintenance of an inmate’s physical well being. See, e.g., Caldwell v. Miller, 790 F.2d 589, 600 (7th Cir.1986) (prolonged restriction on exercise that threatens an inmate’s physical health); Hoptowit v. Spellman, 753 F.2d 779, 783-84 (9th Cir.1985) (lack of adequate ventilation and air flow, inadequate cell-cleaning supplies, vermin infestation, poor lighting); Jones v. Diamond, 636 F.2d 1364, 1374 (5th Cir.) (en banc) (gross overcrowding, filthy mattresses, extreme heat, poor diet, lack of exercise), cert. dismissed, 453 U.S. 950, 102 S.Ct. 27, 69 L.Ed.2d 1033 (1981), overruled in part on other grounds, International Woodworkers v. Champion Int’l Corp., 790 F.2d 1174, 1175 (5th Cir.1986); Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1152 (5th Cir.1982) (inadequate regular exercise), vacated in part on other grounds, 688 F.2d 266, (5th Cir.1982) cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1042, 103 S.Ct. 1438, 75 L.Ed.2d 795 (1983); Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 199-200 (9th Cir.1979) (denial of regular outdoor exercise for period of years); Miller v. Carson, 563 F.2d 741, 751 n. 12 (5th Cir.1977) (deprivation of exercise). These decisions all reflect the same well-settled principle: the state is under a constitutional mandate to take reasonable steps to provide a safe and sanitary environment for those incarcerated. See generally J. Gobert & N. Cohen, Rights of Prisoners §§ 11.10, 11.14-.15, 11.17 (1981 & 1989 Cum.Supp.); cf. Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 568 (10th Cir.1980) (state must provide inmate with a “ ‘healthy habilitative environment’ ”) (quoting Battle, 564 F.2d at 395), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041, 101 S.Ct. 1759, 68 L.Ed.2d 239 (1981).
My conclusion that there is an issue of fact regarding whether ETS exposure constitutes a constitutionally significant health hazard is supported by a recent external review draft issued by the Environmental Protection Agency on the health effects of ETS. See Health Effects of Passive Smoking; Assessment of Lung Cancer in Adults and Respiratory Disorders in Children; External Review Draft, 55 Fed. Reg. 25,874 (1990). This report
“concludes that (1) ETS is causally associated with lung cancer in nonsmoking adults and that, according to EPA guidelines for carcinogen risk assessment, ETS is a Group A (known human) carcinogen; and (2) that approximately 3800 lung cancer deaths per year among nonsmokers (neversmoker and former smokers) of both sexes in the United States are attributable to ETS.”
Id. Group A is made up of known human carcinogens including arsenic, asbestos, benzene, chromium compounds, coke oven emissions, diethylstilbestrol (DES), and vinyl chloride. See Environmental Protection Agency, Methodology for Evaluating Potential Carcinogenicity in Support of Reportable Quantity Adjustments Pursu*1532ant to CERCLA Section 102, app. at 37-42 (1988).1
The majority views any reliance on this evidence as an improper attempt “to create new standards of decency.” Maj. op. at 1529. The majority simply misperceives the issue. As we have pointed out, the benchmarks of our inquiry must be the “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. at 101, 78 S.Ct. at 598. Moreover, the extensive line of cases we have cited culminating in Wilson v. Seiter, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991), recognizes that unnecessarily subjecting a prisoner to conditions posing an unreasonable risk of harm does indeed offend these evolving standards. As our technology advances, some risks previously viewed as innocuous may be recognized as rising to constitutional significance. Surely the majority would not deny that as scientific awareness of potential harms evolves, our standards of decency evolve as well.
The relevant question in this case, therefore, is whether long-term exposure to ETS poses an unreasonable risk of harm to an inmate’s health. Our task on appeal is to review the correctness of the district court’s conclusion that it is beyond doubt that Clemmons can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. See rec., vol. I, doc. 23, at 5. Since judges are not and cannot be experts in this area, we must do here what we normally do in such circumstances, turn to evidence from experts. Taking judicial notice2 of expert evidence in the form of reports by a federal agency and the Surgeon General does not constitute an improper attempt to foist my views on society; turning a blind eye to such evidence would appear more susceptible to such a charge.
I am most troubled by the majority’s apparent conclusion that the Eighth Amendment does not include claims based on latent harms to health. See maj. op. at 1528, 1529. Under this holding, defendants could continue to expose a prisoner to asbestos or any other known human carcinogen until that prisoner falls ill. Thus, for those prisoners subjected to substances which result in cumulative harm that does not manifest itself for a considerable period of time, the protection afforded by the Constitution is meaningless. Surely the Eighth Amendment does not require a claimant to wait until the risk to his health results in disease if that risk is known and can be prevented. See, e.g., Powell v. Lennon, 914 F.2d 1459, 1464 & n. 10 (11th Cir.1990) (Eighth Amendment claim grounded on deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s request for preventive treatment in seeking placement in asbestos-free environment). Equally disturbing is the majority’s conclusion that our evaluation of the serious risk of harm and of the concomitant deliberate indifference standard imposed on defendants was frozen at the time Clem-mons filed his suit. See maj. op. at 1529. To the contrary, evolving standards of decency by their very nature require that courts impose upon defendants a continu*1533ing duty to apprise themselves of conditions that pose a serious risk of harm and to adjust their conduct accordingly.
I must also disagree with the majority’s statement that, as a matter of law, defendants could not have done more than they did to minimize Clemmons’ exposure to ETS. Maj. op. at 1528. The majority begins by erroneously stating that, in order to prevail in this appeal, the plaintiff would have to show or allege “that defendants forced him to live with others who smoked and that they did so intentionally, knowing the smoke would have serious medical consequences for him.” Maj. op. at 1528 (emphasis added). The Court in Wilson held specifically to the contrary, rejecting as too high the state of mind under which acts must be done “ ‘for the very purpose of causing harm,’ ” Wilson, 111 S.Ct. at 2326. In so doing, the Court distinguished and did not apply Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 1084-85, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1986), under which an Eighth Amendment claim arising from an emergency situation requires that the defendant act “ ‘maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.’ ” As the cases cited by the Court in Wilson make clear, arbitrarily refusing to protect an inmate from a known risk of serious harm can constitute deliberate indifference notwithstanding the absence of proof of an intent to cause the harm. See, e.g., LaFaut v. Smith, 834 F.2d 389, 392 n. 4 (4th Cir.1987) (claimant need only show that the defendant was deliberately indifferent to his needs, not that she affirmatively intended to deprive him of the means of satisfying his needs”).3
Second, the majority reaches its result by asserting that defendants have made reasonable attempts to reduce Clemmons’ exposure to ETS, an argument defendants do not themselves make. Rather, defendants have consistently contended that exposure to ETS does not pose a serious risk to health and that they therefore have no obligation to minimize Clemmons’ exposure to it. Indeed, virtually all of defendants’ brief on rehearing is devoted to an attempt to show that ETS does not, as a matter of law, pose a serious risk of harm. To the extent defendants appear to acknowledge any risk of harm, they erroneously contend, as does the majority, that Clemmons must show an intent to cause that harm.
Finally, the majority asserts that it “simply [does] not believe the defendants could have made a more reasonable accommodation than that which they extended.” Maj. op. at 1528. Because this appeal comes to us on the grant of summary judgment, *1534such a factfinding against the non-moving party must be established by undisputed evidence. However, defendants indisputably have not minimized Clemmons’ exposure to ETS. Most importantly, they offered no evidence tending to show a legitimate administrative reason for this failure. While overcrowding might justify a refusal to give Clemmons a single cell, nothing in this record indicates that it would be administratively inconvenient for defendants to cell nonsmokers together upon request.4 Although defendants have upon occasion given Clemmons a nonsmoking cellmate for a short period of time, they have also, without explanation, given him smoking cellmates for the great majority of the time.5 Moreover, and most significantly, they take the position that they are entitled to continue to do so at their discretion. The majority’s result can certainly be read as a tacit approval of this position.
Accordingly, lower courts and prison officials are left to wonder. Does the Eighth Amendment require only that long-term exposure to ETS be treated with cough drops and nasal sprays. Is it enough, as the majority implies, maj. op. at 1528, that prison officials provide a nonsmoking cellmate when a prisoner goes to court, or on other occasions at their discretion, which is all the record demonstrates was done here. Given the potential risk of harm at stake, the deliberate indifferent standard demands that defendants at a minimum be required to articulate real and legitimate administrative considerations to justify their celling policy. Unfortunately, perhaps the only clear message conveyed by the majority opinion is that in this circuit officials need not do so.
McKAY, C.J., and HOLLOWAY, J., join this dissent.

. I note in addition the Surgeon General 1986 Report setting out the scientific evidence concerning the harmful effects of ETS. In that report, the Surgeon General stated:
“[T]he time for delay is past; measures to protect the public health are required now. The scientific case against involuntary smoking as a health risk is more than sufficient to justify appropriate remedial action, and the goal of any remedial action must be to protect the nonsmoker from environmental tobacco smoke.”
1986 Report at xii (emphasis added).

. See Fed.R.Evid. 201 (court may take judicial notice of adjudicative facts in absence of request of party at any stage of the proceeding). In this case, for purposes of determining whether Clemmons raises fact issues sufficient to survive summary judgment, I have taken judicial notice of government reports referred to or incorporated into the Congressional Record. Although some of this information was not noticed by the district court, appellate courts may notice facts not noticed below. See Advisory Committee’s Notes to Fed.R.Evid. 201(f); Mills v. Denver Tramway Corp., 155 F.2d 808, 812 (10th Cir.1946) (appellate court has discretion to take judicial notice of facts not called to the attention of the trial court); E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence § 333 (3d ed.1984). We may also take notice of official government publications, see Clappier v. Flynn, 605 F.2d 519, 535 (10th Cir.1979).

. A recent Seventh Circuit decision rejected a prisoner’s claim that his involuntary exposure to ETS constituted cruel and unusual punishment. See Steading v. Thompson, 941 F.2d 498 (7th Cir.1991). Although the basis for its decision is unclear, the court in Steading rests its result in part on its observation that ETS is commonly found in public places and that the prison officials themselves breathe smoky air. In addition to disregarding the fact that bans on smoking in public areas are increasing in response to the mounting evidence of health risks, the court also ignores the critical distinction between the public at large and a prison inmate. It would hardly seem necessary to point out that while the public is free to avoid smoky restaurants and offices, a prisoner confined with a smoking cellmate has no choice in the matter. Moreover, the fact that people who are free to do so choose to expose themselves to serious health risks cannot justify the arbitrary, involuntary exposure of a prisoner to those risks. It would be absurd to suggest that because people ride with drunk drivers, practice bungee jumping, sky-dive, and ride motorcycles without helmets, a prison official could therefore require an inmate to do so over his objection. The court’s reference to the intent of the drafters of the Eighth Amendment likewise requires no comment other than to point out that the touchstones of this area of the law are "the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101, 78 S.Ct. 590, 598, 2 L.Ed.2d 630 (1958) (plurality opinion). Most troublesome is Stead-ing’s apparent conclusion that the deliberate indifference standard articulated in Wilson, 111 S.Ct. at 2326-27, requires an intent to punish. The court in Steading states that if prison officials "do not intend [a prisoner’s] discomfiture they have not punished him, and so do not violate the cruel and unusual punishment clause as Wilson interprets that amendment.” 941 F.2d at 500 (emphasis added). As we have pointed out above, however, the Court in Wilson held specifically to the contrary, rejecting as too high the state of mind under which acts must be done " 'for the very purpose of causing harm.’ ” Wilson, 111 S.Ct. at 2326.

. In this regard, I find it significant that in federal prisons officials are required, to the extent practicable, to
"accommodate nonsmoking inmates in nonsmoking living quarters. The sharing of a cell or living area between a smoker and a nonsmoker will be avoided except where impractical due to circumstances, and then may be done only for limited duration.”
28 C.F.R. § 551.162(b) (1991). The mandate under which federal prison officials must operate undercuts the majority’s conclusion as a matter of law that defendants here could not do more than they have to minimize Clemmons’s exposure to ETS.

. Clemmons, in a multitude of written requests and letters to corrections officials, has repeatedly requested either a single cell or a nonsmoking cellmate. His single-cell requests were denied because of lack of space. The responses to his requests for a nonsmoking cellmate were more varied. On one occasion, his request was approved but he was thereafter assigned with a smoker. On other occasions, he was told his request would "be considered.” See rec., vol. I, doc. 22, ex. 4, at 1. In response to yet other requests, he was told that since prison officials had “no way of knowing who smokes or doesn’t,” id. at 7, he should "find a nonsmoker and let [them] know,” see id. at 4. On some occasions, Clemmons would reply that he was unable to find such a person, while at other times he would submit a list of nonsmoking inmates. Neither reply appears to have made a difference.
When Clemmons asked at one point to remain cellmates with a nonsmoker because they ”desire[d] to protect [their] health from exposure to tobacco smoke in [their] cell breathing space where [they] live,” id. at 9, his request was denied for unexplained reasons. Id. Clem-mons attached letters recommending minimizing his ETS exposure written by the prison physician and his assistant to yet another written request for a nonsmoking cellmate. He was told that if he found an "appropriate” nonsmoker, they could be moved together. The upshot of this exchange is not evident in the record.