Court Opinion

ID: 9754151
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 19:46:35.430704+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:49.900256
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION BY
STRASSBURGER, J.:
I respectfully dissent.
A judgment of non pros protects a party from prejudice caused by an adverse party’s unreasonable delay in pursuing claims. In Penn Piping, Inc. v. Insurance Company of North America, 529 Pa. 350, 603 A.2d 1006 (1992), our Supreme Court held that prejudice could be presumed from two years of inactivity on the docket. However, in Jacobs v. Halloran, 551 Pa. 350, 710 A.2d 1098 (1998), our Supreme Court rejected the Penn Piping presumption and required that a defendant show actual prejudice to secure a non pros.
The courts of Pennsylvania have long recognized the existence of the power of the court to enter a judgment of non pros in consequence of long delay of *385prosecution of a cause. This power originated in common law, prior to the passage of any statute. The grant of non pros was traditionally based not upon a statute of limitations, but rather upon the equitable principle of laches which does not involve the passage of a specific amount of time. Laches arises when a defendant’s position or rights are so 'prejudiced by length of time and inexcusable delay, plus attendant facts and circumstances, that it would be an injustice to permit presently the assertion of a claim against him.
Id. at 1101-02 (internal quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis added in cited case).
In Stephens v. Messick, 799 A.2d 793, 797 (Pa.Super.2002), this Court set forth the requirements a defendant must show in order to obtain a judgment of non pros:
A court may properly enter a judgment of non pros when a party to the proceeding has shown a want of due diligence in failing to proceed with reasonable promptitude, and there has been no compelling reason for the delay, and the delay has caused some prejudice to the adverse party, such as the death or unexplained absence of material witnesses.
Id. at 797 (citing James Brothers Limber Company v. Union Banking and Trust Company of Du Bois, 432 Pa. 129, 247 A.2d 587, 589 (1968)). Thus, a trial court may not enter a judgment of non pros without finding that the defendant has suffered actual prejudice, even if there is no compelling reason for a delay. Id. at 798.
On the other hand, in ascertaining whether a party is entitled to relief from a judgment of non pros, a different test applies. We examine whether (1) the petition for relief was promptly filed, (2) there is a reasonable explanation for the delay that resulted in the entry of the non pros, and (3) the petitioning party has a meritorious cause of action. Florig v. O’Hara, 912 A.2d 318, 323 (Pa.Super.2006). See also Pa.R.C.P. 3051(b).
There is some support for the proposition that the petition to open a judgment of non pros should be granted unless the respondent can show prejudice. In Ledger v. Eddy, 710 A.2d 1227 (Pa.Super.1998), filed 27 days after Jacobs, supra, this Court was faced with an appeal from an order denying appellant’s request for relief from entry of a judgment of non pros. Without having first examined whether the Rule 3051 petition was promptly filed, offered a good excuse for the delay, and alleged a meritorious case, this Court remanded for a determination of whether the appellee suffered prejudice.
However, six months later in LaCaffinie v. Mirk, Inc., 719 A.2d 361, 362-63 (Pa.Super.1998), without mentioning Ledger, supra, we stated:
In April 1998, our Supreme Court reversed Penn Piping in Jacobs v. Halloran, [ ], Shope v. Eagle, [551 Pa. 360, 710 A.2d 1104 (1998) ], and Marino v. Hackman, [551 Pa. 369, 710 A.2d 1108 (1998) ]. In these cases the Court abandoned the presumption of prejudice enunciated in Penn Piping and held a defendant must establish actual prejudice from the delay before non pros is appropriate. Appellants suggest the reversal of Penn Piping in Jacobs, Shope and Marino prohibited the trial court from entering the judgment of non pros without first determining appellee actually suffered prejudice.
While appellants accurately state the change in the law, their petition still needed to meet the three required elements set forth in Pa.R.C.P. 3051.... The abandonment of the presumptive prejudice of Penn Piping does not equate to the abandonment of Rule 3051.
*386Appellants have failed to meet the obligations necessary to grant them relief from the non pros. The decisions in Jacobs, Shope and Marino specifically recognize the long-standing requirements for removal of a judgment of non pros, and do not relieve a party seeking to remove a non pros of the need to comply with the Rule.
Id. at 362-63.
Hence, the state of the law is this: although a reasonable excuse for delay is not required to thwart entry of a non pros judgment, it is required to open one; despite actual prejudice being the sine qua non of a proper entry of a judgment of non pros, the question of prejudice is completely ignored when considering relief from one. This legal anomaly defies reason, and I implore our Supreme Court and its Rules Committee to rectify it in our jurisprudence.5
Because Appellee was required to show actual prejudice to get the non pros, Appellants should be entitled to have the non pros opened if the record does not show that Appellee suffered prejudice.
Appellee claims three ways in which it was prejudiced by Appellants’ delays: (1) the death of witness Nicholas DeConti, (2) the diminished recollections of other witnesses, and (3) reduced access to documents since it currently leases the ski area to another entity. I see no merit in any of these arguments.
First, Mr. DeConti passed away in March 2007 while discovery was ongoing in the case. Any ill effects Appellee may suffer due to Mr. DeConti’s unavailability cannot be related to any delay caused by Appellants. See Florig, 912 A.2d at 326-27 n. 11 (noting the death of a witness in the early stages of the litigation did not affect the progress of the case).
Second, Appellee has not demonstrated that any witness’s recollection of the events is any worse now than it was two or three years ago. Appellee offers the affidavit of Matthew Zakrzewski, in which he states that he fits the description of the person who was working at the tubing hill on the date of the injury, but that he presently has no recollection of the incident. Appellee does not offer evidence that the lack of recollection is related to any delay caused by Appellants. To the contrary, the deposition testimony offered by Mr. DeConti before his death was that he spoke with Mr. Zakrzewski in early 2007, and even at that time Mr. Zakrzew-ski did not remember the incident. Appel-lee also names at this time another witness who was employed by Appellee at the time of the incident but who now is not, claiming that he will have diminished recollection of the events. Appellee offers no evidence that this witness ever had relevant information, let alone information that has been lost to time.
Third, Appellee claims that because it now leases the ski area to another entity, it “no longer has the kind of access to records and personnel which it had when it was both the owner and operator of the ski area.” Appellee’s Brief at 13. At most, this vague, unsupported claim establishes inconvenience, not actual prejudice.
Because Appellee failed to establish that it suffered actual prejudice as a result of any delay caused by Appellants, I would hold that the trial court erred in granting Appellee’s motion to dismiss for lack of prosecution, and would open the judgment of non pros.
*387Even accepting the framework of Rule 3051, I still dissent because I believe the majority has misapplied the Rule 3051 standard. First, the majority holds that Appellants failed to file their petition for relief in a timely fashion. The majority counts 56 days between the entry of the non pros judgment and the date Appellants filed the petition, and cites prior decisions in which delays of less time than this were held to render the petition to open wanting for promptness. The majority does not exclude from its calculation the time during which Appellants awaited resolution of their first appeal.
While I agree with the majority that ignorance of procedural rules does not justify failure to comply, in prior cases we have excluded such time from our promptness calculation. For example, in Stephens, supra, the appellant also erroneously filed an appeal from the entry of the non pros judgment rather than file a petition for relief from the judgment of non pros. We determined that the appellant did not have a good excuse for waiting four years and two months between the quashal of the appeal and the filing of the Rule 3051 petition. Id. at 796. In Sclmtte v. Valley Bargain Center, 248 Pa.Super. 532, 375 A.2d 368 (1977), which the majority cites to show this Court has held a delay of 47 days rendered a petition untimely, we did not include in the calculation 44 days during which the appellant had been operating under the mistaken belief that it had taken the steps necessary to protect its interests.
In the instant case, Appellants filed their Rule 3051 petition a mere ten days after the Superior Court Central Legal Staff informed them that the appeal was likely premature. I would hold that Appellants’ petition was promptly filed.
Second, the majority determined that Appellants did not provide an explanation for 2]é years of inactivity in the underlying case. While there was no docket activity, I do not believe that the record supports a finding of 2J£ years of inactivity. There is no indication that Appellants failed to act diligently from the time the case was filed in December 2005 until the last docket entry in September 2007. In July 2009, Appellants’ counsel contacted Appellee’s counsel to inquire whether Appellee wished to schedule a medical examination of Appellant, and to inform Appellee that Appellants were ready to proceed with settlement negotiations or trial. Rather than respond to this letter, Appellee’s counsel waited six months and then filed the motion for non pros. This is not a case that languished in the system for years without action. I would hold that the minor delays that preceded the entry of the non pros judgment were not unreasonable.
Third, the majority opines that Appellants failed to establish that they have a meritorious cause of action. The majority states that Appellants’ averment that the record shows the existence of a valid cause of action, supported by the denial of Appel-lee’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and motion for summary judgment, falls short of the requirement established by Stephens, supra, in which we noted that the appellant failed to “aver any specific facts elicited during discovery that would tend to show that her cause of action is meritorious.” Id. at 800.
This in an inaccurate statement of the requirement that a party seeking relief from a judgment of non pros establish the existence of a meritorious cause of action. Our Supreme Court has explained this requirement “is satisfied if the claim as pleaded and proved at trial would entitle [the plaintiff] to relief.” Simmons v. Luallen, 563 Pa. 589, 763 A.2d 810, 813 (2000). We have expressly rejected as *388contrary to Simmons the dicta in Stephens cited by the majority:
It bears mention that the citation by appellees to this Court’s decision in Stephens [ ], which suggested in dicta, that the inquiry into whether a meritorious cause of action has been pleaded necessitates an examination of “facts elicited during discovery,” is not persuasive. The Court in Stephens, supra, specifically held that a party could not evade the requirements of filing a petition under Pa.R.C.P. 3051, by relying on a petition for reconsideration and an improperly filed appeal. The Court did not specifically address the requirements of stating a meritorious cause of action, or otherwise alter the law as stated in Simmons [ ]. Moreover, since the decision in Simmons, supra, was rendered by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, any inconsistencies between the two cases would be resolved in favor of following the law as stated by the Supreme Court.
Florig, 912 A.2d at 329 n. 14. Because Appellants’ complaint alleges facts that, if proven at trial, would entitle them to relief, I would hold that they have established the existence of a meritorious cause of action.
As I believe that Appellants have met the requirements of Rule 3051, I would hold that the trial court erred in granting Appellee’s motion to dismiss and would open the judgment of non pros.

. It should be noted that Rule 3051 was adopted in 1991 and amended in 1994, both prior to the Jacobs trilogy.