Court Opinion

ID: 9377222
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-07 14:03:20.245425+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:13.011123
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
  Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
  opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
  prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
  official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

                                                  Decided: March 7, 2023

                         S23A0377. BEHL v. THE STATE.

       PETERSON, Presiding Justice.

       Edward Behl appeals convictions for felony murder and a

weapons charge stemming from the death of Joseph Billings, a

fellow resident of a homeless encampment. 1 Behl argues for a new

trial on the grounds that (1) the trial court plainly erred in not

charging the jury on voluntary manslaughter, and (2) Behl was

       1The crimes took place on January 10, 2017. A Chatham County grand
jury returned an indictment against Behl on March 29, 2017, charging Behl
with malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, and two counts of
possession of a knife during the commission of a felony. At an October 2019
trial, a jury found Behl not guilty of malice murder but guilty of all other
counts. The trial court on October 16, 2019, sentenced Behl to life in prison for
felony murder and a five year consecutive, probated sentence for one of the
weapon counts; the other counts merged. Behl filed a motion for new trial on
October 24, 2019, that was amended by appellate counsel on October 29, 2021.
Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion in an order entered on
October 21, 2022. Behl filed a timely notice of appeal. The case was docketed
to this Court’s term beginning in December 2022 and submitted for
consideration on the briefs.
unable to view digital discovery while incarcerated and while

exercising the right to self-representation. We conclude that the trial

court did not plainly err in failing to charge the jury on voluntary

manslaughter, and that Behl did not preserve the issue of access to

discovery. Accordingly, we affirm.

     The evidence at trial showed that Behl moved into a homeless

encampment in Chatham County in January 2017. On the evening

of January 9, 2017, Behl, Billings, and other residents of the camp

were drinking beer by a campfire. Later that night, Behl was

observed touching Billings’s penis and kissing him, while Billings

was passed out.

     The next morning, another encampment resident informed

Billings about what had happened the previous night. Billings and

Behl engaged in a physical altercation as a result, but other

residents were able to separate the two. Behl moved to another

location nearby.

     Billings and another resident twice left the camp and went to

the store that day. When Billings and the other resident returned to

                                  2
the camp the second time, they encountered Behl. Billings and Behl

began to argue again about the previous evening, swearing and

calling each other names. Behl convinced Billings to come to Behl’s

tent, then fatally stabbed Billings in the neck.

     1. Behl argues that the trial court plainly erred in failing to

instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter. We disagree.

     Behl requested a jury charge on voluntary manslaughter. At

the charge conference, the trial court indicated it was disinclined to

give such an instruction, citing “a substantial cooling-off period.”

The trial court ultimately did not give the voluntary manslaughter

charge, although it did give instructions on justification and self-

defense. Behl’s only objection to the jury charge at the time that it

was given was “the failure to charge my involuntary.” (Emphasis

supplied.)2

     Behl concedes on appeal that failure to object to the omission

of an instruction on voluntary manslaughter from the charge as

given means that we review that omission from the instruction only

     2   Behl also had requested an instruction on involuntary manslaughter.
                                      3
for plain error. See White v. State, 291 Ga. 7, 8 (2) (727 SE2d 109)

(2012) (“[T]he failure to object to the charge as given precludes

appellate review ‘unless such portion of the jury charge constitutes

plain error which affects substantial rights of the parties.’” (quoting

OCGA § 17-8-58 (b))). Under plain error review, we can reverse only

if the trial court made a clear or obvious error that was not

affirmatively waived, likely affected the outcome of the proceedings,

and seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of

judicial proceedings. See Morris v. State, 303 Ga. 192, 197 (V) (811

SE2d 321) (2018). Behl’s claim fails because there was no obvious

error in failing to charge on voluntary manslaughter.

     “Even slight evidence showing that the victim seriously

provoked the defendant requires the trial court to give a requested

charge on voluntary manslaughter.” Dugger v. State, 297 Ga. 120,

124 (7) (772 SE2d 695) (2015) (citation and punctuation omitted).

Behl argues that a voluntary manslaughter instruction was justified

by the “heated arguments and physical beatings” that preceded the

stabbing, such that Behl “had a reasonable fear of some danger

                                  4
from” Billings. But “neither fear that someone is going to pull a

[weapon] nor fighting are the types of provocation [that] demand a

voluntary manslaughter charge.” Smith v. State, 296 Ga. 731, 737

(3) (770 SE2d 610) (2015). And “it is well established that words

alone, regardless of the degree of their insulting nature, will not in

any case justify the excitement of passion so as to reduce the crime

from murder to manslaughter [when] the killing is done solely on

account of the indignation aroused by use of opprobrious words.”

Hudson v. State, 308 Ga. 443, 446 (2) (a) (841 SE2d 696) (2020)

(citation, punctuation, and emphasis omitted). Moreover, “[t]o

warrant a jury charge on voluntary manslaughter, there must be at

least slight evidence that the accused was so influenced and excited

that he reacted passionately rather than simply in an attempt to

defend himself.” Collins v. State, 312 Ga. 727, 739 (6) (864 SE2d 85)

(2021) (citation and punctuation omitted). Here, Behl offers no

evidence that Behl “was angry or mad or . . . had any other response

showing [Behl] might have reacted passionately” as opposed to

acting based on fear or in self-defense. See id. at 740 (6).

                                   5
      Behl argues that a voluntary manslaughter instruction was

required because the jury “could have inferred that the name calling,

heated arguments, and physical beatings[] were a result of a

fundamental element of . . . Behl’s identity — homosexuality.” But

Behl points to no evidence that Billings made any particular

remarks or slurs targeting Behl’s sexual orientation.3 Moreover, “an

error is plain only if it is clear or obvious under current law. An error

cannot be plain where there is no controlling authority on point.”

Davis v. State, 312 Ga. 870, 874 (2) (866 SE2d 390) (2021) (citation

and punctuation omitted). Behl “cites no precedent requiring a

voluntary manslaughter instruction under circumstances similar to

those presented here. And we have found none.” Id. at 874 (2)

(citation and punctuation omitted); cf. Collins, 312 Ga. at 740 (6) (no

error in denying request for voluntary manslaughter instruction

where defendant testified that victim called him a “mother f***er”

to his face, threatened to kill him, and pulled a handgun on him, but

      3 We note that although Behl was identified in the trial transcript as
“Ms. Behl” and uses female pronouns in briefing before this Court, Behl frames
this argument in terms of sexual orientation, not gender identity.
                                      6
“never testified that he was angry or mad or that he had any other

response showing he might have reacted passionately — only that

was he was scared and was defending himself (as well as [a co-

defendant])”); Hudson, 308 Ga. at 446 (2) (a) (no error in denying

request for voluntary manslaughter instruction based on evidence

that the victim called the defendant a “mother f***er” shortly after

the death of the defendant’s mother). 4 It was not at all obvious that

a voluntary manslaughter instruction was required on this record.

Therefore, the trial court did not plainly err in failing to give one.

      2.    Behl also argues that the Georgia constitutional right to

due process was violated when, while acting pro se, Behl was

prevented from viewing discovery due to being incarcerated. 5 We

      4  The cases Behl cites in which a Georgia appellate court found error in
a refusal to give a voluntary manslaughter charge involved facts unlike this
case. See Woody v. State, 262 Ga. 327, 328 (2) (418 SE2d 35) (1992) (shooting
occurred “within seconds” of fight in which victim had beaten defendant to the
point where defendant “twice begged for his life”); Washington v. State, 249 Ga.
728, 730-731 (3) (292 SE2d 836) (1982) (victim had cut defendant’s son, leaving
son hospitalized, and victim in the presence of defendant was making taunts
and threatening the life of defendant’s son).
       5 To the extent Behl claims a denial of the right to self-represent

“effectively,” there is no such right. See Williams v. State, 298 Ga. 538, 540 (3)
(783 SE2d 594) (2016) (“[W]hen a criminal defendant elects to represent

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conclude that this claim of error was not preserved.

     Charged with malice murder and other offenses, Behl was

represented by the public defender’s office until about two months

before trial, when counsel successfully moved to withdraw and Behl

was given permission by the court to self-represent. The record

indicates that, prior to counsel withdrawing, the State provided to

Behl’s counsel a number of discs containing digital evidence,

including photographs, police body-worn camera footage, and audio-

and/or video-recorded statements, filing those items with the trial

court. At the August 6, 2019, hearing pursuant to Faretta v.

California, 422 U.S. 806 (95 SCt 2525, 45 LE2d 562) (1975), the trial

court warned Behl that Behl was “not going to get any extra time to

prepare” and would “have less of a chance to investigate things and

research [Behl’s] case in advance” by proceeding pro se. During a

discussion about a prior case of Behl’s that the State planned to

introduce for sentencing purposes, the public defender represented

himself[,] he will not thereafter be heard to assert a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel with respect to any stage of the proceedings wherein he
was counsel.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).
                                     8
that “[i]f it’s a question as to prior representation, I believe I have

that information and I can provide that to [Behl] through

discovery[.]” The public defender then represented that he would

give Behl “all of the discovery,” upon which the trial court asked

Behl whether Behl was “comfortable knowing you’re going to get all

of that information and have access to it through all of the discovery

materials,” and Behl responded, “Yeah, once I get the replacement

copy.” When Behl asked about what options might be available in

the event that Behl were not provided necessary resources, the trial

court responded, “If you feel like you’re being denied resources that

you’re constitutionally entitled to, then you can file a motion in that

respect.” In an order entered on September 20, 2019, the trial court

directed the sheriff, his deputies, and the staff at the Chatham

County Detention Center to give Behl “priority access to the law

library and legal research materials at the jail” so that Behl could

prepare for trial.

     A brief in support of the amended motion for new trial filed by

appellate counsel claimed that, after electing self-representation,

                                  9
Behl was unable to review any of the discs provided in discovery.

The brief also represented that “[t]he Chatham County Detention

Center does not permit pro se inmates to review discovery contained

on DVDs and CDs.” For this proposition, the brief cited an attached

document purportedly approved by the Chatham County sheriff that

does not appear to address whether pro se defendants may examine

such materials. 6 A hearing on the motion was held, but Behl

introduced no evidence.

      The trial court denied the motion for new trial, finding that

“the bulk of” the State’s discovery was disclosed to Behl on August

16, 2017, nearly two years before Behl elected self-representation,

such that Behl was able to review the materials with prior counsel.

The trial court noted that Behl acknowledged awareness of the

discovery at the Faretta hearing. The trial court stated that the

Chatham County jail “does not allow inmates to review discovery

      6 Part of the document appears to have been cut off in the copy in the
Court’s record, possibly due to a poor photocopying job. But as explained below,
our resolution of this enumeration does not depend on the contents of the
policy.
                                      10
contained on DVDs or CDs” but noted that in other cases the court

had permitted pro se defendants to view video recordings provided

in discovery in open court as part of their trial preparation. The

court also wrote that the paper discovery materials in Behl’s

possession referenced the digital materials, yet Behl did not ask the

court for assistance in reviewing them.

      Behl claims that the inability to review all of the discovery

materials while self-represented and incarcerated amounted to a

due process violation. The State argues that this claim fails for

various reasons, including that the claim is untimely, that Behl has

not shown that any state action caused any inability to review

discovery materials, and that Behl has not demonstrated prejudice

from any such inability. Without reaching the merits of Behl’s claim,

we agree that this claim was waived.7

      7Although we do not reach the merits of whether any denial of access to
discovery violated Behl’s constitutional rights, we note that some of us are
concerned about the possibility — apparently accepted as true by the trial court
— that a jail would as a matter of policy categorically deny a self-represented
inmate access to all digital discovery materials, including materials the
possession of which is not generally proscribed by law.
                                      11
     The Georgia Constitution provides that “[n]o person shall be

deprived of life, liberty, or property except by due process of law.”

Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. I. But a due process claim

such as this must be asserted in a timely fashion. See Benton v.

State, 300 Ga. 202, 205 (2) (794 SE2d 97) (2016) (“Of course, a

criminal defendant may forfeit a constitutional right by failing to

timely assert it.”); Scudder v. State, 298 Ga. 438, 440 (2) (782 SE2d

638) (2016) (defendant waived due process claim based on judge

meeting privately with a witness, where defense raised no objection

when judge announced that he was leaving courtroom to speak with

witness in chambers, and defense failed to ask court reporter to

reveal what had been said in private). Here, Behl points to no

instance prior to or during trial in which Behl raised with the State

or the trial court any issue with the ability to access the materials

in question, and we have found none in the record. Behl filed no

motion seeking access to the materials — despite the trial court

having explained to Behl that filing a motion was an option if Behl

were denied necessary resources. Behl did not seek a continuance to

                                 12
review the materials in the courtroom. Behl did not object to the

admission of any testimony or other evidence — including

photographs and the one digital recording, body-worn camera

footage, that was admitted at trial — on the basis that Behl had not

been able to review any digital materials. And Behl does not contest

the trial court’s finding that Behl was aware that the materials had

been provided in discovery. Indeed, the record shows that the State

filed a list of “all discoverable material,” including references to

audio and video recordings, with the trial court on August 16, 2017,

nearly two years before Behl was granted the ability to proceed pro

se.

      Under these circumstances, we conclude that Behl waived any

claim of a violation of due process based on any inability to access

the materials in question. Cf. Williams v. State, 298 Ga. 538, 542 (7)

(783 SE2d 594) (2016) (“We find no support in the record to support

appellant’s assertion that the trial court refused to allow him to

subpoena witnesses for the motion for new trial hearing. In fact, the

record shows that appellant was given the opportunity to subpoena

                                 13
witnesses for that hearing but that having elected to proceed pro se,

he simply failed to take the steps to ensure the presence of his

witnesses.”); State v. Dickerson, 273 Ga. 408, 411 (2) (542 SE2d 487)

(2001) (finding waiver of right to assert error under criminal

discovery statute given defendant’s failure to seek a continuance;

“Generally a defendant has a duty to request a continuance to cure

any prejudice which may have resulted from the State’s failure to

comply with the requirements of OCGA § 17-16-1 et seq.”); Sheppard

v. State, 297 Ga. App. 806, 812 (3) (678 SE2d 509) (2009) (rejecting

argument that pro se defendant was deprived of constitutional right

to compel attendance of witnesses; “The record does not disclose that

Sheppard ever requested issuance of subpoenas or the trial court’s

assistance in enforcing them, and, as such, his right to compulsory

process was not violated. To the extent Sheppard is arguing that the

trial court should have continued his trial to allow him to subpoena

witnesses, his claim is barred because he never moved for a

continuance.”).

     Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

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     MCMILLIAN, Justice, concurring.

     I am writing to make clear that I do not share the same concern

expressed in footnote 7 of the opinion, which provides:

     Although we do not reach the merits of whether any
     denial of access to discovery violated Behl’s constitutional
     rights, we note that some of us are concerned about the
     possibility – apparently accepted as true by the trial court
     – that a jail would as a matter of policy categorically deny
     a self-represented inmate access to all digital discovery
     materials, including materials the possession of which is
     not generally proscribed by law.

     As an initial matter, I do not construe the record as a

categorical denial of access to digital materials. As stated by the trial

court, upon request, pro se defendants were allowed to view video

recordings provided in discovery in open court as part of their trial

preparation.

     To the extent that members of the Court are expressing

concern that the jail did not provide a DVD player, CD player, or

computer to review the digital materials in the jail, I am not aware

of any authority for this Court to require a jail or prison to fund and

provide certain equipment for use by pro se defendants. “Meaningful

                                   15
access [to the courts] means that state authorities must ensure that

inmates have a reasonably adequate opportunity to present claimed

violations of fundamental constitutional rights to the courts. . . .”

Gibson v. Turpin, 270 Ga. 855, 858 (1) (513 SE2d 186) (1999) (such

access “does not mean that a state must help inmates discover

grievances, or litigate effectively when in court”) (punctuation

omitted), citing Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 356 (II) (B) (116 SCt

2174, 135 LE2d 606) (1996). See also Blaine v. State, 305 Ga. 513,

520 (3) (826 SE2d 82) (2019) (citing Lewis). However, meaningful

access does not guarantee any “particular methodology but rather

the   conferral   of   a    capability—the   capability   of   bringing

contemplated challenges to sentences or conditions of confinement

before the courts.” Lewis, 518 U.S. at 356 (II) (B). Again, if the jail

policy was to allow pro se defendants to use the trial court’s

equipment to review digital materials upon request, I do not see a

concern with that policy.

      Otherwise, I concur fully in the Court’s opinion. I am

authorized to state that Justice LaGrua joins in this concurrence.

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