Court Opinion

ID: 9877331
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-27 15:57:35.677596+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:45:36.487398
License: Public Domain

Garry, J.
(dissenting). We respectfully dissent. The staff of petitioner Mental Hygiene Legal Service (hereinafter MHLS) is statutorily entitled to attend a resident’s treatment planning meeting pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law §§ 29.13 (b); 47.01 (a) and 47.03 (c) and (d), and the denials of petitioners’ requests were thus based upon an error of law.
Our objective in matters of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the Legislature’s intention, and the plain and unambiguous language of a statute is the clearest indicator of legislative intent (see Matter of Shannon, 25 NY3d 345, 351 [2015]; Matter of Albany Law School v New York State Off. of Mental Retardation & Dev. Disabilities, 19 NY3d 106, 120 [2012]). Here, the plain language of Mental Hygiene Law §§ 47.01 and 47.03 establishes the broad scope of the duties of MHLS, encompassing the provision of “legal services and assistance” related to a resident’s “care and treatment” and permitting MHLS full access to these facilities in carrying out these duties (Mental Hygiene Law §§ 47.01 [a]; 47.03 [c]; see Mental Hygiene Law § 47.03 [d]). In harmonizing the statutory sections at issue, we must construe the statute as a whole and “its various sections must be considered together and with reference to each other,” and in consideration of the corresponding legislative history (Matter of Shannon, 25 NY3d at 351 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see Matter of Albany Law School v New York State Off. of Mental Retardation & Dev. Disabilities, 19 NY3d at 120; Matter of Talisman Energy USA, Inc. v New York State Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 113 AD3d 902, 905 [2014]).
As to Mental Hygiene Law § 29.13, the Legislature expressly stated that its purpose in amending the act in 1993 was for the “inclusion of a friend or advocate in treatment . . . planning activities” (L 1993, ch 135 [emphasis added]). Recognizing the inherent vulnerability of residents encompassed by Mental Hygiene Law § 29.13, MHLS properly serves its duties by providing advocacy services concerning a resident’s objections to care and treatment (see generally Rivers v Katz, 67 NY2d 485, 498-499 [1986]) and concerning whether treatment is provided in accordance with statutory and regulatory standards. It bears noting that treatment decisions may have im*122mediate consequences that cannot be reversed upon a later determination that the treatment was not rendered in compliance with the law (see e.g. Mental Hygiene Legal Serv. v Cuomo, 195 AD2d 189, 191 [1994]).
Statutory interpretation further requires that the language of a statute be construed “according to its natural and most obvious sense, without resorting to an artificial or forced construction” (McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 94), and ordinary words should “be given their usual and commonly understood meaning” (McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 232). Although the majority emphasizes the inclusion of terms related to relatives and friends, Mental Hygiene Law § 29.13 is not so limited, specifying that a “significant individual” includes “any relative, close friend or individual otherwise concerned with the welfare of the patient” (Mental Hygiene Law § 29.13 [b] [emphasis added]). Further, although not expressly defined in the statute, a representative is defined as “[s]omeone who stands for or acts on behalf of another” (Black’s Law Dictionary [10th ed 2014], representative). In according the language of the statute its plain and ordinary meaning, we agree with petitioners that MHLS counsel serves as a resident’s authorized representative and, where identified by the resident as such, an MHLS employee constitutes a significant individual concerned with the resident’s welfare.
Moreover, “where a law expressly describes a particular act, thing or person to which it shall apply, an irrefutable inference must be drawn that what is omitted or not included was intended to be omitted or excluded”* (McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 240; see Eaton v New York City Conciliation & Appeals Bd., 56 NY2d 340, 345-346 [1982]; Matter of Doe v O’Donnell, 86 AD3d 238, 241 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 713 [2011]). Here, the statute permits a facility to deny a resident’s request for the presence of “an employee of the facility,” but no such language exists as to MHLS (Mental Hygiene Law § 29.13 [b]). Had the Legislature intended to also exclude the presence of an employee of MHLS, it could have easily done so.
Finally, as a practical matter, we find it preferable that potential issues of interference be addressed if and when such may arise, rather than proscribing the attendance of an MHLS *123representative in every case based upon the mere conjecture that such problems may sometimes arise; put another way, this argument is premature and may be better addressed on a case by case basis. For the reasons above, we would reverse and find that MHLS counsel is statutorily authorized to serve in the capacity of an authorized representative or significant individual concerned with the welfare of a patient and, thus, to attend a resident’s treatment planning meeting when the resident so requests.
McCarthy, J.P., and Rose, J., concur with Devine, J.; Garry, J., dissents in a separate opinion in which Lynch, J., concurs.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.

 For those who enjoy Latin, this is also stated as “expressio unius est ex-clusio alterius.”