Court Opinion

ID: 9589493
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:45:16.47361+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:24.854798
License: Public Domain

*110Buchanan, J.,
dissenting in part, concurring in part:
I disagree with the holding in this case that a court of chancery in Virginia has no power to extend alimony payments beyond the death of the husband. That holding, in my opinion, places upon the broad and comprehensive language of the statute a limitation not found in its words and not desirable for this court to impose.
Section 20-107 of the Code provides that upon decreeing (1) the dissolution of a marriage, (2) a divorce either from the bond of matrimony or from bed and board, or (3) that neither party is entitled to a divorce, “the court may make such further decree as it shall deem expedient concerning the estate and the maintenance of the parties, or either of them, and the care, custody and maintenance of their minor children, # # .” (Emphasis added).
The power, i. <?., the jurisdiction, thus given to the court in connection with divorce and its related problems is described in language about as broad as could be used. The statute says that with respect to the estate and the maintenance, both, the court may enter such decree as it shall deem expedient. Estate is the property the parties own; maintenance is what is required for them to live on; expedient, says Webster, means apt and suitable to the end in view. The end in view in divorce proceedings is to do what is best with a bad situation.
Only last year, in Morris v. Henry, 193 Va. 631, 70 S. E. (2d) 417, we held that this same statute, section 20-107, authorized a divorce court to decree that payments for the support of a minor daughter should continue after the death of the father. We said there that a denial of that power to a court of equity would in some cases seriously impair its ability to protect the rights and interests of infants; that the death of a father does not end the need of his infant children for food and shelter.
We quoted in that case from Heninger v. Heninger, 90 Va. 271, 275, 18 S. E. 193, 195, the statement that “ ‘the evident purpose of the legislature was to give to the court *111the largest discretion in respect to the estate of the parties, and not to relieve the offending parent of any duty, moral, social, or otherwise.’ ” 193 Va. at p. 639, 70 S. E. (2d) at p. 422.
By the same token, the death of a husband does not end the need of his wife for food and shelter. It was said in Eaton v. Davis, 176 Va. 330, 341, 10 S. E. (2d) 893, 898, with respect to the power of the court to change the amount of alimony, that if the former wife becomes an invalid, she “should not remain an object of uncertain charity, and the equity court should not be prohibited by a final decree for alimony from giving her equitable relief. The right to support and maintenance or alimony is such a varying thing that its ascertainment never should be absolutely final as to future instalments. Absolute inflexibility ought not to obtain.”
The majority opinion says there are well recognized differences between alimony for the wife and support for the infant children; but this court recently said in White v. White, 181 Va. 162, 170, 24 S. E. (2d) 448, 452, that “Alimony and the obligation of a father to support his infant children exists independent of statute.” In Buchanan v. Buchanan, 174 Va. 255, 279, 6 S. E. (2d) 612, 622, we said of the contract there involved that its provisions made for the wife and the children “grew out of the same soil.”
The duty of the husband to support his wife is not less than his duty to support their infant children, and the performance of both is a matter of public concern. “A decree for alimony is something more than an order for the payment of money. A husband who has wronged his wife must continue to contribute to her support. A decree for alimony ‘is an order compelling a husband to support his wife, and this is a public as well as a marital duty—a moral as well as a legal obligation. Branch v. Branch, 144 Va. 244, 132 S. E. 303.” Capell v. Capell, 164 Va. 45, 49, 178 S. E. 894, 895. West v. West, 126 Va. 696, 101 S. E. 876; Ring v. Ring, 185 Va. 269, 38 S. E. (2d) 471.
*112A decree for alimony constitutes a lien upon all the real estate of a husband. Isaacs v. Isaacs, 117 Va. 730, 86 S. E. 105.
But in a decree for alimony, payable in future installments, the court may provide that such payments shall not be a lien on the husband’s real estate, or it may designate particular real estate on which it shall be a lien; or subsequently release such a lien for alimony either accrued or to accrue. Code, § 8-388.
Courts of equity have inherent jurisdiction in a proper case to grant alimony independently of statute. Heflin v. Heflin, 177 Va. 385, 14 S. E. (2d) 317.
If any sort of difference exists, in origin, purpose or duty, between alimony for the wife and support for the children, it seems clear that the statute, section 20-107, makes no distinction between them with respect to the power given to the court to deal with them. As to both the statute says that the court shall make such decree as it shall deem expedient.
Although we held in Morris v. Henry, supra, that the equity court had power to make the support of the child a charge on the parent’s estate, it is now held under the same statute that the same court is without power to make the support of the wife a charge on the husband’s estate although the statute in terms applies to both alike.
While the court, so the opinion holds, has no power to make alimony payments extend beyond the death of the husband, regardless of the needs of the wife or the wealth of the husband, yet if the husband is willing to agree voluntarily that this be done, his agreement may be embodied in the decree and approved by the court. Jurisdiction is thus made to depend on the consent of the parties, contrary to the general rule. 11 Mich. Jur., Jurisdiction, § 20, p. 444. Such, it seems to me, ought not to be the state of law. Even though the husband will not agree, the court ought to have the power, and I think the statute gives it the power, to require that the estate of the delinquent husband should be charged with the support of his helpless wife when the cir*113cumstances clearly demand it. We said in Capell v. Capell, supra, 164 Va. at p. 52, 178 S. E. at p. 896, with respect to an agreement which undertook to change the amount of alimony previously provided by a decree, that “because it touches a public as well as a marital duty, jurisdiction cannot be ousted by any agreement of the parties in pais which the court itself does not adopt and approve.”
In a case of absolute divorce, if alimony payments upon which the wife solely depends for her support stop with the death of the husband, then regardless of the value of the husband’s estate she must look to charity for help. She cannot otherwise share in her husband’s estate because a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony extinguishes her marital right in his property. Code, § 20-111.
I do not believe the power to remedy such a situation, which power it seems to me the statute gives to the courts, ought to be rejected. As we said in Morris v. Henry, supra, of similar power there held to be vested in the courts with respect to the support of children, the possession of it would not result in its being exercised in all cases. The courts of equity could be trusted to use the power only when the necessities of the case and the ends of justice required.
In Hale v. Hale, 108 W. Va. 337, 150 S. E. 748, the West Virginia court said that the statute of that State, in the same language as our section 20-107, was “of sufficient breadth to warrant a requirement by the trial court that permanent alimony be paid out of a husband’s estate after his death, when, in the chancellor’s opinion, such course is just and right.”
I do not think we are precluded from so holding by what was said in Francis v. Francis, 72 Va. (31 Gratt.) 283, or Eaton v. Davis, supra, 176 Va. 330, 10 S. E. (2d) 893. Neither case involved a construction of section 20-107. The Francis Case was concerned with the construction of an act to legalize the marriage of colored persons. The husband had been required to make a monthly payment for the support of his wife, but with no attempt to charge his estate. The husband died after the appeal was granted and *114the court held that the alimony ceased with his death. The Eaton Case involved a question of changing the amount of alimony under what is now section 20-109 of the Code. Neither case deals with the provision of the statute with which we are now concerned, and neither requires it to be said now that under section 20-107 equity is without power to charge a husband’s estate with the payment of alimony. Each of those cases merely holds in accord with the general rule thus stated in 27 C. J. S., Divorce, § 240 b, page 999:
. “The right to receive alimony, and the corresponding duty to pay it, being personal, are generally considered as terminating on the death of either of the parties, where no statute to the contrary exists and the judgment or decree is silent on the subject.”
I agree with that part of the opinion which holds that the decree here was not sufficient to extend the payments beyond the husband’s death. Since such a provision is not the usual practice, and when made should be based on circumstances out of the ordinary, the intention to require it should be expressly stated in the decree or be an unmistakable inference from the language used. Murphy v. Shelton, 183 Wash. 180, 48 P. (2d) 247; 27 C. J. S., supra, p. 1000.