Court Opinion

ID: 9771434
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:43:28.138126+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:31.289045
License: Public Domain

George Rose Smith, J., dissenting. I agree that the opinion of an expert witness cannot properly be based upon a set of hypothetical facts for which there is no proof in the record. For instance, in Payne v. Thurston, 148 Ark. 456, 230 S. W. 561, a medical witness was asked a hypothetical question which included an assumption that the plaintiff had suffered an injury to her left side. There was actually no evidence of such an injury. It was correctly held that the question was defective, for neither the jury nor the court could possibly determine the extent to which the witness’s opinion was based upon the fact that was assumed but not proved. That is not the situation in the case at bar. Here the physician performing the autopsy concluded that the cause of death was cerebral hemorrhage, but he did not attempt to specify the exact spot at which the hemorrhage occurred. On this point he merely reported that the entire brain was examined and that no evidence of hemorrhage within the brain was noted. Dr. Riggall simply attempted by a process of reasoning to determine the situs of the hemorrhage. He stated that within the cranium there are only three arteries of sufficient size to produce a hemorrhage such as that, disclosed by the autopsy. Two of these arteries are so situated that the jet of blood from a fatal hemorrhage would plow a channel within the brain tissue so. large that it could not be missed at the post mortem examination. But, reasoned Dr. Riggall, if the rupture occurred in the third artery — the internal carotid artery — it would account for the condition actually found and yet might not be observed by the maker of the post mortem, as the rupture would be on the floor of the brain and not readily discernible. From this conclusion Dr. Riggall went on to give his basis for thinking that the decedent’s work would not have contributed to a hemorrhage within the internal carotid artery. I think the majority are misapplying the rule which precludes an expert witness from basing his opinion upon a fact not in evidence. If, for instance, this autopsy had contained a positive finding that the hemorrhage took place in one of the two arteries first mentioned by Dr. Riggall, then of course he could not have based his opinion upon an assumption that the damage happened within the internal carotid artery. In that situation the rule in question would be properly applied. But this is not the case at hand. The autopsy actually contained an affirmative finding of a cerebral hemorrhage, and by definition such a hemorrhage must occur within the brain. But the author of the post mortem report did not attempt to say just where within the brain the hemorrhage took place; he merely stated that no evidence of the hemorrhage within the brain was noted. All that Dr. Riggall did was to attempt by a chain of logic to demonstrate where the hemorrhage probably occurred. His opinion was of course open to contradiction by other testimony and to rejection for want of persuasiveness, but it was clearly admissible. Otherwise we are driven to the patently untenable position that is being adopted by the majority. That position boils down to this: (1) If the autopsy report affirmatively shows the situs of the hemorrhage that fact cannot he disputed by expert opinion, for that would contradict the report. But (2) if the autopsy report fails to show the situs of the hemorrhage the missing fact cannot be supplied by expert opinion, for that too would contradict the report. Thus it makes no difference whether or not the post mortem examiner makes a finding of the cause of death, for in either case his report constitutes the final word. I cannot agree with such questionable logic and therefore dissent. Robinson, J., joins in this dissent.