Court Opinion

ID: 9750595
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 15:09:45.561275+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:40.459199
License: Public Domain

VENTERS, J.,
concurring, in part, and dissenting, in part:
While I otherwise agree with the sound rationale expressed by the Chief Justice in the majority opinion, I must part company with my colleagues regarding the burglary convictions. Appellants Paulley and Gunn should have been granted a directed verdict dismissing the burglary charges because the evidence presented, when viewed most favorably to the Commonwealth, failed to prove the essential element of entry into the residence.
*731I have no quarrel with our longstanding and well-settled rule of law that the element of entry contained in our burglary statutes is satisfied by proof of a slight entry into a building by a perpetrator’s head, hand, foot, or other body part, or the extension of same by an instrument with which he or she intends to commit a crime. But conviction still requires proof beyond reasonable doubt of some entry, however slight. Evidence of slight entry is far different from slight evidence of entry.
Here, there is no evidence of entry. There is only an inference of slight entry. As stated in the majority opinion: “The evidence showed that, at most, the front door of Stone’s residence opened slightly when it was kicked by Gunn. So Gunn’s foot could have crossed the threshold when the door was ajar.” (Emphasis added.) In its entirety, the evidence established that Gunn knocked on the door; and when no one opened it, he kicked it, twice according to some witnesses and two or three times according to another. When the door still failed to open, Gunn fired the fatal shots through the door and left the porch. When the police arrived, the door was still locked with the victim leaned against it. It had never completely separated from the door jamb. At most, Gunn’s kicking flexed the lower portion of the door enough to allow witnesses to see light shine through. No one saw a foot or any part of Gunn’s body, nor even his shoe or any instrument cross the threshold. That his foot “could have” done so may amount to probable cause, but it falls far short of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Under the facts of this case, it was clearly unreasonable for a jury to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that Gunn or any part of his body even slightly entered the building.
There was no doubt whatsoever that Gunn kicked the door in an unsuccessful attempt to gain entry. If that constitutes burglary, what then constitutes an attempted burglary? Stepping onto the porch? Knocking on the door?
Given the evil deeds of Gunn and Paul-ley and the multiple sentences imposed upon them for crimes that were properly supported by sufficient evidence, one might be tempted to regard this issue as having no real consequences. The burglary sentences are totally subsumed by the life sentences imposed for the murder of Rocky Brown. But the majority’s holding that this evidence is sufficient to support a burglary conviction will henceforth govern when a burglary conviction matters mightily. We must not forget that this was a capital murder case in which the burglary charge was an essential aggravating factor for the imposition of a death penalty. This holding will also revisit us with the most distasteful consequences when the scant inference of slight entry converts a hard knock on a door into a Persistent Felony Offender (PFO) sentence of twenty-plus years; or when we see a young man, who should have been convicted for harassment or attempted burglary, become a felon because he pounded too hard on a door before giving up and going home.
For the reason set forth above, I would reverse the burglary convictions. I respectfully concur, in part, and dissent, in part, with the majority opinion.
CUNNINGHAM and SCHRODER, JJ., join.