Court Opinion

ID: 9716297
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:33:27.501161+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:43.466893
License: Public Domain

Singley, J.,
delivered the opinion of the Court. Eldridge, J., dissents and filed a dissenting opinion at page 15 infra.
This case raises for the first time the extent of the rights which neighboring owners and members of the public may respectively have in the littoral at Ocean City, Maryland — that portion of the beach which lies west of the Atlantic Ocean’s mean high tide line, referred to in this opinion as “mean high water mark.”
The area involved is a development originally known as Oceanbay City, first platted in 1940. E. T. Park, Inc. (Park), one of the petitioners, is a corporation owned by Dr. Nicholas J. Kohlerman. Park owns lots 22 and 23 in block 38 *3of Oceanbay City improved by a residence occupied by Dr. Kohlerman. These lots front 100 feet on the south side of what is known locally as 71st Street with a depth of 120 feet, lying generally to the rear of an ocean front tract 100 feet in width and 120 feet in depth, known as lots 4 and 5 in the same block, owned by 71st Street, Inc. (the Developer).1 When Park learned that the Developer had filed an application for a building permit for the construction of a condominium on its ocean front tract, an action was instituted by Park in the Circuit Court for Worcester County against the Developer; the Developer’s builder; the Mayor and City Council of Ocean City (the City), and the City’s building inspector, which sought to enjoin the construction of the condominium and the issuance of a building permit by the City.
Park’s complaint was grounded on the contention that it, along with the general public, had acquired an easement by implied dedication, prescription, or custom permitting use as a public beach of the area between the mean low water mark on the east and the line of vegetation on the west, and particularly the dry sand area lying between the Developer’s lot line on the east and the line of vegetation on the west. It was contended that the building to be erected would have its eastern front at the Ocean City building limit line and would be almost entirely to the east of the dune line, which is generally the same as the line of vegetation. As a result, the dry sand beach would be narrowed and might at times be covered by wave action, thus effectively denying the public use of the beach.
On petition filed after the action had been instituted, State of Maryland, Department of Natural Resources (the State) was permitted to intervene as party plaintiff. From an order denying the injunctive relief prayed, Park and the State appealed to the Court of Special Appeals. On motion of the petitioners, we granted certiorari.
*4Ocean City is located on one of a system of barrier islands which parallels the mainland along the Atlantic coast from Florida to New England. Because of the low elevation and unprotected character of the islands on the Maryland-Delaware coast, they are particularly susceptible to wave and wind action.
There was testimony below that the beach where the Developer’s tract is located underwent a process of accretion in the 79-year period ending in 1929, when it gained width at an average of 1.6 feet annually. From 1929 to 1947, it lost some 270 feet through erosion. After the unusual storm of March, 1962, it was 450 feet narrower than it had been in 1922.
For the past 35 years, protective measures have been undertaken, at first with funds supplied by the State of Maryland. These consisted of the placing of sand fences, the construction of asphalt groins, and the bulldozing of sand.
After the 1962 storm, and the designation of the Ocean City beach as a National Disaster Area, the reconstruction of a dune line was commenced by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. The Developer’s predecessors in title joined with other property owners in granting a perpetual easement to Worcester County for the construction and maintenance of the dune.2
*5So long as the dune lay outside the limits of the City, the County Commissioners refused to issue building permits for construction east of the dune line. Some years after the 71st Street area was annexed by Ocean City in 1965, the County took the position that it was no longer responsible for the maintenance of the dune. As a consequence, the City proceeded to delineate a building limit line east of structures then existing, which in this area was east of the dune line.
As regards the public’s right to use the foreshore, the area extending easterly from the mean high water mark, there can be little doubt, Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U. S. 1 (1894). It has long been held that navigable water and the land under it is held by the State, for the benefit of the public, Smith v. Maryland, 59 U. S. 71 (1855); 1 R. Clark, Waters and Water Rights §§ 36.3 (B)-(C), at 192-94, 42.1, at 264-67 (1967); 1 Patton, Land Titles § 135, at 352-54 (2d ed. 1957).3 At the time of the grant of the Charter by Charles I to Lord Baltimore, it was owned by the Crown and transferred to the proprietor, Browne v. Kennedy, 5 H. & J. 195 (1821) and after the Revolution has been held by the State for the benefit of the public by virtue of Article 5 of our Declaration of Rights, Board of Public Works v. Larmar Corp., 262 Md. 24, 277 A. 2d 427 (1971); Kerpelman v. Board of Public Works, 261 Md. 436, 276 A. 2d 56, cert. denied, 404 U. S. 858 (1971). See also Day v. Day, 22 Md. 530 (1865); Baltimore v. McKim, 3 Bland 453 (1831). Prior to the enactment of *6Chapter 129 of the Acts of 1362, now Maryland Code (1957, 1972 Repl. Vol.) Art. 54, § 48, there were instances where the State issued patents for land under navigable water, defined by our cases as water where the tide ebbs and flows, Van Ruymbeke v. Patapsco Industrial Park, 261 Md. 470, 475, 276 A. 2d 61, 64 (1971).
This protects the public in the use of the foreshore only, however.4If a right of access is claimed over fast land, or there is an assertion of right of user of such of the dry sand littoral which lies west of the front property line, it must find support elsewhere.5 In instances where there has been a prior grant of the foreshore to the owner of the littoral, the public’s right to make use thereof is limited to navigation and fishing, 2 H. Tiffany, Law of Real Property § 659, at 697 (3d ed. 1939). The notion that the rights of the owner of the littoral must be exercised in subordination to the paramount rights of the public is no longer applicable, since rights of fishing, boating, hunting, bathing, taking shellfish and seaweed and of passing and repassing have been pro tanto extinguished by the prior grant, Town of Orange v. Resnick, 94 Conn. 573, 109 A. 864 (1920). See Comment, 31 Mich. L. Rev. 1134, at 1135-39 (1933).
In recent years, as a result of an expanding population and a limited amount of shore line, courts have been confronted more frequently with the problem posed by this case. Clark, supra, § 36.4 (B), at 200-02. In some instances, the result sought by Park has been predicated on dedication. Gewirtz v. City of Long Beach, 69 Misc. 2d 763, 330 N.Y.S.2d 495 (Sup. Ct. 1972), aff'd, 358 N.Y.S.2d 957 (1974); Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 2 Cal. 3d 29, 465 P. 2d 50, 84 Cal. Rptr. 162 (1970); Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 61 N. J. 296, 294 A. 2d 47 (1972); Seaway *7Co. v. Attorney General, 375 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964); Clark, supra, § 38.2 (B), at 227-30. Compare, United States v. Certain Land in County of Worcester, Md., 311 F. Supp. 1039 (D. Md. 1970).
Other cases have suggested that an easement may be created by prescription, Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, supra; State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 254 Or. 584, 462 P. 2d 671 (1969); Clark, supra, § 38.2 (A), at 225-27. Finally, there is some possibility that support could be found in custom, State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, supra; Knowles v. Dow, 22 N. H. 387 (1851), or by invoking a concept of public trust, Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, supra, 61 N. J. at 309-10, 294 A. 2d at 54-55. See generally Degnan, Public Rights in Ocean Beaches: A Theory of Prescription, 24 Syracuse L. Rev. 935 (1973); McKeon, Public Access to Beaches, 22 Stanford L. Rev. 564 (1970); The Public Trust in Tidal Areas: A Sometime Submerged Traditional Doctrine, 79 Yale L. J. 762 (1970).
In considering the petitioners’ contentions, the chancellor (Prettyman, J.) noted that much of the littoral in Ocean City had been dedicated to public use by recorded plats, in which areas east of the easterly lot lines had been designated “beach,” “boardwalk” or as the location of a public way, all of which had been accepted by Ocean City. Even in the absence of acceptance, however, an easement may be implied from a plat reference despite the absence of a reference in the deed transferring title, Williams Realty Co. v. Robey, 175 Md. 532, 539-40, 2 A. 2d 683, 686 (1938); 3 R. Powell, Property ¶ 409, at 424-28 (1973); 26 C.J.S. Dedication, § 23 c, at 447-48 (1956). Compare, Goodsell v. Lawson, 42 Md. 348 (1875). There was also a finding that east-west streets running to the beach, at least as far north as 94th Street, had been similarly dedicated and accepted.
However, the chancellor also found as a fact that prior to the 1962 storm, the Developer’s lots stood on high ground, were covered with grass and were not used by the public. There was a further finding that prior to the 1962 storm, the public had only used that portion of the littoral east of the *8dunes on what was then lots 4 and 5, and that no witness other than Park’s sole stockholder testified as to the use of lots 4 and 5 as they existed after 1962, a use which did not antedate 1966.6
Park and the State assign four reasons why the decree entered by the chancellor should be reversed, which we shall consider.
(i)
The area between the dune line and mean high water mark has been dedicated to the public.
Based on his findings, the chancellor concluded that there had been no express dedication of any area within the Developer’s lot line: no such dedication was noted on the recorded plat; and the deed of easement to Worcester County did not contain an express dedication, but rather was a consent to the construction and maintenance of the dune. He concluded that dedication could not be implied, because there was no proof of a clear and unequivocal manifestation of an intent to dedicate. We think this conclusion was compelled by Toney Schloss v. Berenholtz, 243 Md. 195, 204-05, 220 A. 2d 910, 914 (1966); Canton Co. v. Baltimore, 106 Md. 69, 83-84, 66 A. 679, 680 (1907); and Harbor Co. v. Smith, 85 Md. 537, 541-42, [South Baltimore Harbor & Improvement Co. v. Smith,] 37 A. 27, 28 (1897).
The distinction between dedication and prescription cannot be lost. Implying a dedication solely through long public use without regard to any intent to dedicate on the part of the landowner is but a form of prescription, and as such, all of the requisites for prescriptive rights must be met. Mt. Sinai Nursing Home, Inc. v. Pleasant Manor Corp., 254 Md. 1, 5-6, 253 A. 2d 915, 917-18 (1969). But see Conway v. Prince George’s County, 248 Md. 416, 419, [Conway v. Board of County Comm’rs,] 237 A. 2d 9, 11-12 (1968).
*9(Ü)
The public has attained the right to use the area between the dune line and the mean high water mark through prescriptive use.
We believe that the chancellor was quite right when he rejected the contention that an easement had been acquired by prescription, relying on Mt. Sinai, supra, 254 Md. at 5-6, 253 A. 2d at 917-18. As Chief Judge Alvey said for the Court in Thomas v. Ford, 63 Md. 346, 351-52 (1885):
“It is certainly a settled doctrine in this State that public roads or ways of any kind can only be established by public authority, or by dedication, or by long user by the public, which, though not strictly prescription, yet bears so close an analogy to it that it is not inappropriate to apply to the right thus acquired the term prescriptive. Hence the existence of a public way may be established by evidence of an uninterrupted user by the public for twenty years; the presumption being that such long continued use and enjoyment by the public of such way had a legal rather than an illegal origin. Day v. Allender, 22 Md. 511....”
As was the case in Mt. Sinai, supra, the law would support the petitioners, if the necessary facts were available. There was simply no testimony, other than Dr. Kohlerman’s, as regards the public’s use of lots 4 and 5. In fact, there was a clear inference that the lots had been used by no one prior to 1962 because of their topography. Such use as there may have been after the storm failed to meet the test of long user. See also Code (1974), Real Property Article § 13-113.
(iii)
The public’s interest in Maryland’s coastal shores established through custom and grant requires that activities violative of the public trust be proscribed.
This contention seems to be based primarily upon Article *10IV of the Charter of Maryland, 20 June 1632, by which Charles I granted to Caecilius Calvert, Lord Baltimore
“. . . all islands and islets within the limits aforesaid, all and singular the islands and islets, from the eastern shore of the aforesaid region, towards the east, which have been, or shall be formed in the sea, situate within ten marine leagues from the said shore; with all and singular the ports, harbours, bays, rivers, and straits, belonging to the region or islands aforesaid, and all the soil, plains, woods, mountains, marshes, lakes, rivers, bays, and straits, situate, or being within the metes, bounds and limits aforesaid, with the fishings of every kind of fish, as well of whales, sturgeons, and other royal fish, as of other fish, in the sea, bays, straits or rivers, within the premises, and the fish there taken: ...” 1 Maxcy, Laws of Maryland 1, 2 (1811).
and then subjected the grant to the reservation contained in Article XVI:
“AND FURTHERMORE, of our more ample special grace, and of our certain knowledge, and mere motion, WE do, for US, our heirs and successors, grant unto the aforesaid now baron of Baltimore, his heirs and assigns, full and absolute power and authority to make, erect and constitute, within the province of Maryland, and the islands and islets aforesaid, such, and so many sea-ports, harbours, creeks, and other places of unlading and discharge of goods and merchandizes out of ships, boats, and other vessels, and of lading in the same, and in so many, and such places, and with such rights, jurisdictions, liberties and privileges, unto such ports respecting, as to him or them shall seem most expedient: And, that all and every the ships, boats, and other vessels whatsoever, coming to, or going from the province aforesaid, for the sake of *11merchandizing, shall be laden and unladen at such ports only as shall be so erected and constituted by the said now baron of Baltimore, his heirs and assigns, any usage, custom, or any other thing whatsoever to the contrary notwithstanding. Saving always to US, our heirs and successors, and to all the subjects of our kingdoms of England and Ireland, of US, our heirs and successors, the liberty of fishing for sea-fish, as well in the sea, bays, straits, and navigable rivers, as in the harbours, bays, and creeks of the province aforesaid; and the privilege of salting and drying fish on the shores of the same province; and for that cause, to cut down and take hedging-wood and twigs there growing, and to build huts and cabins, necessary in this behalf, in the same manner as heretofore they reasonably might, or have used to do. Which liberties and privileges, the said subjects of US, our heirs and successors, shall enjoy, without notable damage or injury in any wise to be done to the aforesaid now baron of Baltimore, his heirs or assigns, or to the residents and inhabitants of the same province in the ports, creeks, and shores aforesaid, and especially in the woods and trees there growing. And if any person shall do damage or injury of this kind, he shall incur the peril and pain of the heavy displeasure of US, our heirs and successors, and of the due chastisement of the laws, besides making satisfaction.” Maxcy, supra, at 7-8. (Emphasis supplied.)7
The scope of the rights reserved is strikingly reminiscent of Roman law.8 This is not surprising, since Justinian’s *12Institutes were well known in Britain by the 13th century. See 1 F. Pollock & F. Maitland, The History of English Law 119 (2d ed. 1905).
The petitioners argue, with some force, that fish cannot be salted or dried, or cabins or huts constructed, or twigs and branches gathered on the foreshore, which is subject to continuous tidal action, therefore placing some of it under water a considerable portion of each day. A fair reading of Article XVI’s provisions, they say, contemplates the right of the public to carry on such activities on the littoral owned by others adjacent to the foreshore, seaward of the vegetation line, so long as there is no significant interference with an owner’s rights.
It seems to us that there are obstacles which must be considered. First, was the right reserved only to the king, his heirs and his subjects? Second, does a fair reading of the Charter limit the reservation to the ocean shore? Third, did the reservation apply to the 17th century configuration of the shoreline, or as the shore receded westward, did property which formerly lay at a distance from the ocean become subject to the reservation?9 Finally, may rights *13oriented about the 17th century fishing industry be regarded as encompassing the uses to which a beach is customarily put 300 years later? 10
Intriguing as these questions are, we find it unnecessary to consider them in this case for a very simple reason. What the petitioners are attempting to do here, under an assertion of the public’s right to picnic and sunbathe on the dune, is to deny the Developer a use of his property to which he has an otherwise lawful right: the right to build to Ocean City’s building limit line. This is the “notable damage or injury in any wise to be done ... to the residents and inhabitants of the same province in the . . . shores aforesaid, . . .” which Article XVI of the Charter specifically proscribed. Accordingly, we do not reach the question of the type of incursion, if any, which might be permitted by the Charter.
As did the chancellor below, we decline to rely on the rule of State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, supra, 254 Or. at 595, 462 P.2d at 676, that the right of the public to use a dry sand area contained within the legal description of a water front tract may be grounded solely on a custom of public use.
Insofar as Park sought to rest its claim on custom, we are quite satisfied to adopt the rationale explicated by the chancellor. No one, other than Dr. Kohlerman, alleged a right to venture upon the Developer’s lots, and even he could go back no further than a half dozen years — certainly not “so long, that the memory of man runneth not to the contrary,” 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *76.11 Moreover, just as there is no way that the Developer can challenge the right of others to use the beach between the mean high water mark and its lot line, there is no way, under the facts of this case, that the use by the public of the beach east of *14the easterly lot line can be extended to the lot itself in a manner which would deny to the owner a use permitted by law and local regulation.
The petitioners attempt to buttress their argument by contending that the area between the mean high water mark and the dune line has become impressed with a public trust, either because of the substantial sums expended in restoring the dune line after the 1962 storm, or because recreational and environmental considerations would thereby be served.
The lower court rejected this argument, as do we. There was no evidence that the public had acquired any interest in lots 4 and 5, nor is any authority cited in support of the notion that such an interest may come into being simply as a consequence of the expenditure of public funds. Moreover, it is clear from the record that the army engineers regarded the work which was done at public expense as a necessary emergency measure in a disaster area, in order to bring back the situation which existed prior to the storm, so that the ocean highway, far west of the dunes, could be kept open as an evacuation route. Property owners received positive and unequivocal assurance that the work on the dune line would in no way affect the ownership, use, improvement, or disposition of their property — an assurance inconsistent with the idea that the work was undertaken to insure that the general public would be able to use a portion of the ocean front lots.
(iv)
Land inundated by mean high water reverts to State ownership: areas reclaimed by governmental efforts remain State property.
The first phrase of this proposition is a correct statement of the law of submergence, and is applicable when, as a result of gradual erosion, fast land becomes submerged. We are not called upon here to pass on the correctness of the second phrase, for which reliance is made on Carolina Beach Fishing Pier, Inc. v. Town of Carolina Beach, 277 N. C. 297, 177 S.E.2d 513 (1970) and on People v. Hecker, 179 Cal. App. 2d 823, 4 Cal. Rptr. 334 (1960).
*15The rule applicable to a gradual erosion is not applicable to an avulsion, defined as a sudden or violent change, which does not generally affect land boundaries, 1 H. Farnham, Law of Waters and Water Rights § 74, at 331-32 (1904); 11 C.J.S. Boundaries § 34, at 579-80 (1938); 56 Am. Jur. Waters § 477, at 892-95 (1945). The March, 1962 storm at Ocean City would clearly be classified as an avulsion. It was of short duration, flooding much of Ocean City at its height, and destroying or extensively damaging houses and other structures. When it was over, the waters receded, leaving most of the land unchanged, except for the disappearance of the dunes which had lined the beach. The idea that title reverted to the State once the land was temporarily flooded is simply not a tenable contention.

Decree affirmed, costs to be paid by petitioners.

. Lots 4 and 5 were platted as ocean front lots in 1940. In 1963, the front lot lines were moved bach 150 feet to reflect the erosion occasioned by the March, 1962 storm, and six lots were eliminated from the block.

. The agreement creating the easement grants, in pertinent part:
"... a perpetual easement across the aforesaid property for the purpose of constructing, reconstructing and maintaining a sand dune barrier (to be constructed or reconstructed originally by the Corps of Engineers of the U.S. Army) for the protection of our property, the other property in this vicinity and the public generally, but in connection therewith do grant the further right to construct and maintain across our property sand fences or such other protective devices as may be necessary, it being understood and agreed that the County Commissioners of Worcester County, their agents, employees, successors and assigns are hereby vested with all rights, powers and authority necessary for the construction, reconstruction, repair and maintenance of said dune barrier, sand fences or other protective devices, including the right to enlarge said dune barrier if it is subsequently determined that such action is necessary for the protection of property.”
There is a further provision:
“... that any improvements or other facilities to be constructed or *5erected on the aforesaid premises will be done in accordance with permits to be issued by said County Commissioners and will be constructed or erected in such manner as will permit the free and unhampered flow of littoral currents and sand, thus avoiding as much as possible any disturbance or destruction of said dune barrier, sand fences or other protective devices, it being UNDERSTOOD AND AGREED that at such times as said County Commissioners, their successors and assigns may determine that the rights and easements herein granted are no longer necessary for the purposes intended, then and in that event the same shall cease to exist.”

. In some states, notably Massachusetts, Maine and New Hampshire, private ownership of the littoral extends to mean low water, subject, however, to public right of passage — see Lakeman v. Burnham, 73 Mass. 437 (1856); Gerrish v. Proprietors of Union Wharf, 26 Me. 384 (1847); M. Frankel, Law of Seashore Waters and Water Courses (1969); 3 American Law of Property § 12.34, at 273-75 (A. J. Casner ed. 1952).

. The English rule is sometimes said to be more restrictive as regards the use of the foreshore, relying on Blundell v. Catterall, 5 B. & Ald. 268, 100 Eng. Rep. 1190 (1821). See J. Angell, The Right of Property in Tide Waters, at 17-35 (2d ed. 1847).

. At argument, counsel for the respondent 71st Street, Inc. conceded that there was no challenge to public access to the foreshore by the use of dedicated streets which ended at the beach.

. This was Dr. Nicholas J. Kohlerman, who had built a house on lots 22 and 23, acquired by Park in 1966 and 1967, respectively.

. The original Charter, in Latin, appears in 3 Archives of Maryland, Proceedings of the Council of Maryland, 1636-1667, at 3-12 (Browne ed. 1885).

. T. Cooper, The Institutes of Justinian, Book 2, Title 1, 67-68 (1812):
“§ 1
“Things common to mankind by the law of nature, are the air, running water, the sea, and consequently the shores of the sea; *12no man therefore is prohibited from approaching any part of the sea-shore, whilst he abstains from damaging farms, monuments, edifices, & c. which are not in common as the sea is.”
“§ 3
“All that tract of land, over which the greatest winter flood extends itself, is the sea-shore.”
“§ 5
“The use of the sea-shore, as well as of the sea, is also public by the law of nations; and therefore any person may erect a cottage upon it, to which he may resort to dry his nets, and hawl them from the water; for the shores are not understood to be property in any man, but are compared to the sea itself, and to the sand or ground which is under the sea.”
The Latin text of the Institutes uses the word casa in § 5 which is translated as cottage. Alternate translations are cabin, shed, or hut. The Latin text of the Maryland Charter uses the words casa (cabin) and “tuguriola.” Compare tugurium (hut). See The White Latin Dictionary 97, 622 (1948).

. See Hay v. Bruno, 344 F. Supp. 286 (D. Or. 1972); State ex rel. *13Thornton v. Hay, 254 Or. 584, 462 P. 2d 671 (1969) which recognized that the dry sand area might move as much as 200 feet in a single year.

. See Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 61 N. J. 296, 309-10, 294 A. 2d 47, 54-55 (1972); Degnan, Public Rights in Ocean Beaches: A Theory of Prescription, 24 Syracuse L. Rev. 935, 955-59 (1973).

. Additionally, Blackstone notes that in order to be enforceable, a custom must be: continued, peaceable, reasonable, certain, compulsory, and consistent with other customs, 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *77-78.