Court Opinion

ID: 9776061
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:17:43.881183+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:33.577700
License: Public Domain

Robert H. Dudley, Justice, dissenting. Credibility was the key issue in this trial as each party testified the other started the fight. It was crucial that each party be allowed as full an impeachment of the other’s credibility as the rules of evidence allow. Since the trial court erroneously excluded evidence to impeach the credibility of the appellee, I would reverse and remand for a new trial. Prior to the trial, in response to an interrogatory, the appellee answered under oath that he had “never been arrested and/or convicted of any crimes.” At trial, in order to impeach the credibility of appellee, appellant sought to cross-examine the appellee about the falseness of his sworn statement. The trial court erroneously sustained appellee’s objection. Appellant proffered evidence to prove false swearing by showing that appellee had been arrested for rape in 1980, for theft by receiving in 1981 and for rape in 1982. False swearing is probative of character for untruthfulness and, unless that probative value is substantially outweighed by danger of unfair prejudice, may be inquired into on cross-examination. Rule 608(b), Unif. Rules of Evid., Ark. Stat. Ann. § 28-1001 (Repl. 1979 and Supp. 1983); Gustafson v. State, 267 Ark. 278, 590 S.W.2d 853 (1979); Rhodes v. State, 276 Ark. 203, 634 S.W.2d 107 (1982). The trial judge did not rule that the probative value of the false swearing was outweighed by the danger of prejudice. See Ruel 403, Unif. Rules of Evid. Instead, he simply erroneously sustained objections to the questions. The majority opinion does not directly address the issue of false swearing, even though it is the first point of appeal. Instead, it recites that the phrase “and/or could have been interpreted as conjunctive or disjunctive” and “it is plain Qualls [appellee], no doubt advised to do so, chose the conjunctive ...” and therefore, according to the majority the evidence of false swearing was not before the trial court. Before anything else, each person who reads the majority opinion and this dissenting opinion should be aware that the appellee has never argued, or even mentioned, at trial or on appeal, nor did the trial court mention, the distinction between conjunctive and disjunctive phrasing; that rationalization for the erroneous ruling is given for the first time in the majority opinion. To demonstrate the point, and to emphasize that there was no misunderstanding at trial, and this is nothing other than an erroneous evidentiary ruling, the following is quoted directly from appellee’s brief: The appellant sought to elicit testimony concerning prior acts of misconduct by appellee to impeach his credibility. The Court excluded the testimony on the basis on Rule 609, Uniform Rules of Evidence, Ark. Stat. Ann. § 28-1001 (Repl. 1979). This rule states that “for the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted but only if the crime (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year . . . and the court determines that the probative value of admitting this outweighs its prejudicial effect to a party or witness, or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of punishment.” This rule applies to convictions of crimes. The theft and rape incidents referred to by the appellant were not convictions. So the trial court properly excluded cross-examination testimony on specific acts which did not result in conviction. Perhaps nothing demonstrates as clearly as the actual trial record that there was no misunderstanding, but only an erroneous ruling: Mr. Segers: [appellant’s attorney] Your Honor, the following evidence is proffered for the purpose of impeachment purposes only. The Court: Alright, let the record show that the jury has been excused for the lunch period, and this testimony is without the hearing of the jury. Proceed. Q. Mr. Segers: Mr. Qualls, do you recall signing an interrogatory, — answers to interrogatories, on the 22nd day of September, 1983, where I asked you specifically, “Please state if you have ever been arrested and/or convicted of any crimes?” and, you answered: “No.”? A. And/or yes, sir. Q. Mr. Segers: O.K., specifically, had you not been arrested for theft by receiving in August of 1981? Mr. Storey: [appellee’s attorney] I object, Your Honor The Court: What was the question? Mr. Segers: The question was: Is it not true that you were arrested in August of 1981 for theft by receiving? The Court: I will sustain the objection. Mr. Segers: For the purpose of the record, we would like to proffer that if he had answered the question, the answer would be, yes. Q. Mr. Segers: Were you not arrested in North Little Rock on May the 23rd on 1980 on a charge of rape? Mr. Storey: Objection, Your Honor: The Court: Sustained. Mr. Segers: For the purpose of the record, had he answered correctly and honestly, the answer would be: Yes. Q. Mr. Segers: Were you not arrested on July the 16th, 1982 for the charge of rape? Mr. Storey: Objection, Your Honor. Mr. Segers: Your Honor, let the record show that if the witness had answered fairly and honestly, the answer would be in the affirmative. Again, to clearly demonstrate that there was no misunderstanding, and to clearly show the issue of false swearing, after the proffer, appellant’s counsel stated: Mr. Segers: It is the purpose of introducing this evidence not for introducing as to Rule 609 of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure, but only to introduce the evidence to show the truth and veracity of Mr. Qualls and concerning the fact that he has sworn under oath before this court in writing and verbally that he has never been convicted of any crimes, either felony or misdemeanor, and he, in fact, has. I think that his testimony is admissible testimony that goes to impeaching his credibility. If he had signed an affidavit saying he had never been convicted of a felony, or an act involving dishonesty or a false statement, then, that would be cover, (sic) That would be proof, and there is nothing that this court could do or I could do to introduce the testimony; in that he has, in fact perjured himself in writing and verbally, — I, — I think it’s admissible. # # # Mr. Segers: Now, Your Honor, I am not arguing with the court. Please believe me, I just want to make my record. The Court: Sure, sure. Mr. Segers: And, that is that we are not trying to introduce that he committed a crime. It is our opinion that it would be different had the evidence to it said he had paid the bills, and I could come in here and show that he did not pay the bills, which would go to his honesty. He has said, I have never done something, and I think it’s admissible, — not as to the crime. I agree wholeheartedly with the court that the crime in and of itself could not be admissible. The fact that he was on the stand and made a statement under oath that I can show is not true, that would go to his truth and veracity, and would impeach him. Thank you. There was no misunderstanding over the disjunctive or conjunctive use of the phrase “and/or” and the issue of false swearing was clearly presented. The trial record demonstrates that each person involved understood that the appellee had sworn that he had never been arrested for any crimes and that the affidavit so stating constituted false swearing. The trial judge erred in excluding evidence of false swearing. It was prejudicial to appellant since he was not allowed to fully impeach the credibility of appellee. Since credibility was the key to the trial, the erroneous ruling deprived appellant of a fair trial. I would reverse and remand for a new trial. Hubbell, C.J., joins in this opinion.