Court Opinion

ID: 9659003
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 21:26:10.442891+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:02.894095
License: Public Domain

Currie, C. J.
(concurring). I concur in the result that this is not a proper case in which this court should interfere with the trial court’s exercise of discretion in sentencing plaintiff in error Jung. However, I am disturbed by some of the implications of the majority opinion.
If, where a gang of criminals combine to perpetrate a crime, it appears necessary to the state to grant immunity to one of the gang in order to secure his testimony to convict the other defendants, there is no denial of the equal-protection-of-the-laws clause of the Fourteenth *554amendment in imposing sentences of imprisonment on the remaining members of the gang who are convicted. This being true, it necessarily follows that there would be no denial of equal protection of the laws to impose a lesser sentence to one of the gang who cooperates with the state without grant of immunity and testifies in favor of the state. While the record before us does not positively establish that this was the basis of the lesser sentences imposed on Thomas and Venson, it strongly suggests that this is the case.
Furthermore, I believe the two Wiley Cases,1 should be restricted to their own facts. All those two cases hold is that a different sentence cannot be imposed on two defendants charged with the same crime solely on the basis that one pleads guilty and the other not guilty. The court took pains to point out that Wiley, who pleaded not guilty and had a trial, interposed a legal defense, so there was no possibility of his having committed perjury. In the first Wiley Case, the court stated:
“. . . the defense certainly was not frivolous nor does it appear to have been presented in bad faith.” 2
This extract was again quoted with approval in the second Wiley Case.3 One who testifies falsely in his own defense certainly acts in “bad faith.”
Rehabilitation is conceded to be one of the prime factors to be considered in sentencing a person convicted of crime. Therefore, a trial judge does not abuse his discretion when he metes out a more severe sentence to such a defendant than one who admits his guilt, pleads guilty, and exhibits contrition and a desire to conform his future conduct to the requirements of law. The trial judge can well conclude that such a person needs a lesser term of imprisonment to rehabilitate himself than the *555defendant who shows no remorse by perjuring himself in an attempt to avoid the infliction of any penalty. As I read the majority opinion it suggests that this may not be a proper basis for imposing a difference in sentence. I wholly disagree.
I am authorized to state that Mr. Justice Beilfuss concurs in this opinion.

 United States v. Wiley (7th Cir. 1959), 267 Fed. (2d) 453; United States v. Wiley (7th Cir. 1960), 278 Fed. (2d) 500.

 267 Fed. (2d) at page 456.

 278 Fed. (2d) at page 504.