Court Opinion

ID: 9817148
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 04:00:30.997277+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:49:25.692715
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing.
Opinion by
GARBRAITH, C.
It is insisted that the court was in error in the conclusion announced in the original opinion filed herein. On account of the earnestness, zeal, and diligence of counsel in presenting their contention, we have again gone over this case carefully.
It is urged that since the Supreme Court of California, in Blythe v. Ayres, 96 Cal. 532, 31 Pac. 915, 19 L. R. A. 40, held that the effect of adoption or legitimation effected under section 230 of the Code of that state, which is identical with section 4399, Rev. Laws 1910, was to make the illegitimate child an heir of the father, and this holding simply followed the earlier case of In re Jessup, 81 Cal. 408, 21 Pac. 976, 22 Pac. 742, 1028, 6 L. R. A. 594, and also since it was held by the same court in Re Jobson, 164 Cal. 312, 128 Pac. 938, 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1062, that the effect of legal adoption under the statute was to create the reciprocal relation of parent and child between the adopted child and the adopted father, and also since the state of South Dakota has a similar statute to that under consideration, and the Supreme Court of that state held in Calhoun v. Bryant, 28 S. D. 266, 133 N. W. 266, that the effect of legal adoption under the statute was to create the reciprocal relationship between the parent and the adopted child, the same as that existing between a natural-born child and its natural parent — therefore, the conclusion is urged, that, since this relationship establishes in the child the right to inherit from the father, it necessarily carries with it the reciprocal right of the father to inherit from the legit-*12matized child. We cannot agree with this conclusion. The Supreme Court of South Dakota in Calhoun v. Bryant, as well as the Supreme Court of California in Re Jobson, was dealing with different questions from those presented in this case. In each of those cases the adoption of the child had been effected by regular probate proceedings, and the adopted child was not an illegitimate child, but a stranger in blood to the adopted father.
The diligent research of counsel has failed to call to our attention a single case exactly in point sustaining their contention. Their argument overlooks the pertinent fact, pointed out by the Supreme Court of South Dakota in Calhoun v. Bryant, supra, that the devolution of property is not a natural right growing out of the relation of parent and child, but is a matter governed entirely by statute. The court said:
“The right of inheritance does not grow out of the relationship of parent and child, though it may be created and conferred in the exercise of legislative wisdom, because of the existence of that relationship. But the right of inheritance is not a necessary incident of the relationship, whether natural or adopted.”
It was said by Judge Coffey, who presided in the trial of the Blythe case:
“The whole question of devolution of property rights depends upon statutory enactments, and there is no natural right in the premises. Plaintiff claims, primarily, under section 230, Civil Code, which requires the institution of heir or adoption to be made by the father. It must be the father. The institution of heir is the primary object of the statute. The succession of property rights is incidental; it is a status that is involved; it is the relation of the child to society.” (4 Coffey, Probate Dec. 139.)
The Supreme Court of California said in this Blythe case on appeal, quoting from Barr on International Law:
“Legitimation of bastards, either by subsequent marriage or by an act of the government (rescriptum principie), is nothing but a legal equalization of certain children illegitimately begotten with legitimate children. In other words, the object and effect of section 230 is to change the status and capacitjr of an illegitimate child to the status and capacity of a child born in lawful wedlock.” (96 Cal. 560, 31 Pac. 916, 19 L. R. A. 40.)
*13We take it that these authorities sustain the conclusion announced. in the original opinion filed herein, namely, that the effect of the legitimation of Edmond Sewell was to change his status from a bastard to a legitimate child, so far as society and his father were concerned, but did not affect his status as between himself and his mother. It is true that in Allison v. Bryan, 26 Okla. 520, 109 Pac. 934, 30 L. R. A. (N. S.) 146, 138 Am. St. Rep. 988, the primary question before the court for decision was the status of Edmond Sewell after he had been legitimatized under the provision of section 4399, Rev. Laws 1910, so far as it affected the right of the mother to visit him. In the decision of this question was necessarily involved the status of Edmond Sewell as between him and his mother, when the rights of the latter were involved, and the court held that as between him and his mother he was still a bastard notwithstanding his legitimation. If he was a bastard, his father did not inherit from him as against the claim of his mother.
We are constrained to adhere to the former holding in this case, and therefore recommend that the petition for rehearing be denied.
By the Court: It is so ordered.