Court Opinion

ID: 9645259
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 21:18:55.277115+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:26.218748
License: Public Domain

MALONEY, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent.
Although neither appellants nor appellee argue causation on appeal, the majority resolves this case on proximate cause. The majority acknowledges that when Perry hired McCoy and participated in the hiring of Thomas, he may have assumed a duty to hire competent consultants and administrators. However, then the majority concludes as a matter of law that negligent hiring was not a proximate cause of the Portlocks’ injuries.
ISSUE ON APPEAL
Perry moved for summary judgment solely on the contention that, as a corporate officer or director, he could not be held personally liable. He maintained he violated no legal duty nor did he owe any legal duty to the Portlocks. He argued below and argues on appeal that his only connection to the Duncanville Diagnostic Center was that he was its president.
The Portlocks did not contend that Perry was responsible for their injuries because he was the clinic’s president. They argued that his direct actions in negligent hiring of personnel and failure to implement and monitor patient safety procedure and personnel training caused their injury. Only the Portlocks’ summary judgment response mentions proximate cause.
The briefs before this Court explore whether Perry is shielded from liability because he is a corporate officer. Neither brief ever argues that Perry’s actions were or were not the proximate cause of the Portlock’s injuries. Certainly, neither side brings us any authorities or cites us to any evidence to address the issue of proximate cause.
An appellate court should confine itself to resolution of issues that the parties present and fully argue. See State v. Valmont Plantations, 346 S.W.2d 853, 878-79 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1961), aff'd, 163 Tex. 381, 355 S.W.2d 502 (1962). This Court has previously adhered to this position:
Our judicial system rests upon the foundation of adversary presentation which affords the theoretical guarantee that diligent antagonists, by developing all aspects of the dispute, will prevent a court from being misled by inadequate understanding of the facts and law and adopting a position unjust to the parties and possibly damaging to the community-
C & C Partners v. Sun Exploration & Prod. Co., 783 S.W.2d 707, 723 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1989, writ denied).
PROXIMATE CAUSE
The majority summarily concludes as a matter of law that an independent cause— the negligent administering of a drug— broke the causal connection between any negligent hiring and Erica Portlock’s death. In reaching this conclusion, it cites no pertinent authority. The majority appears to hold that this negligent administration of the drug was the sole cause in fact of the injury and Perry could not have foreseen its occurrence. The majority states that *585“Perry merely hired the people who hired and supervised the technicians and doctors.” The majority concludes as a matter of law that the negligent hiring had nothing to do with the improper drug administration. Because the majority opinion reaches beyond the appellate briefs and argument to raise its own issue, lack of proximate cause, I am obligated to address proximate cause.
1. Applicable Law
Whether a defendant’s negligence was a proximate cause of a plaintiff’s injuries is a question of fact. Clark v. Waggoner, 452 S.W.2d 437, 440 (Tex.1970). Proximate cause encompasses the elements of cause in fact and foreseeability. Brown v. Edwards Transfer Co., 764 S.W.2d 220, 223 (Tex.1988); Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 549 (Tex.1985).
a. Cause in Fact
Cause in fact takes into consideration omissions and affirmative acts. East Texas Theatres, Inc. v. Rutledge, 453 S.W.2d 466, 469 (Tex.1970). Cause in fact requires that the negligent act or omission be a substantial factor in causing the injury. In other words, without such negligence no harm would have resulted. Brown, 764 S.W.2d at 223; Nixon, 690 S.W.2d at 549.
b. Foreseeability
A person of ordinary intelligence should anticipate the dangers that his negligence creates for others. Brown, 764 S.W.2d at 223; Nixon, 690 S.W.2d at 549-50. Texas law does not require that an actor foresee the particular accident or injury that occurs, nor does it require that the actor anticipate exactly how the injury will develop from a particular dangerous situation. Foreseeability only requires that the injury be of such a general character as an actor might reasonably have anticipated, and that the injured party be so situated in relation to the negligence that an actor might reasonably have foreseen the injury. Brown, 764 S.W.2d at 223-24.
There may be more than one proximate cause of an event. Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Perez, 819 S.W.2d 470, 471 (Tex.1991). Proximate cause need not be the immediate or nearest cause. Atchison v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 143 Tex. 466, 473, 186 S.W.2d 228, 231 (1945); Galveston-Houston Breweries, Inc. v. Naylor, 249 S.W.2d 262, 268 (Tex.Civ.App.—Galveston 1952, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (op. on reh’g). Even when some new cause or agency combines with the original negligence to produce an injury, the original negligence remains a proximate cause of the injury. The concurring cause or agency does not relieve the original wrongdoer of liability. Atchison, 143 Tex. at 473, 186 S.W.2d at 231; see Northwest Mall, Inc. v. Lubri-lon Int’l, Inc., 681 S.W.2d 797, 803-04 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
If a separate and independent agent’s acts or omissions destroy the causal connection between the defendant’s original negligence and the injury, we consider those acts or omissions to be a new and independent cause. Young v. Massey, 128 Tex. 638, 641, 101 S.W.2d 809, 810 (1937); Galvan v. Fedder, 678 S.W.2d 596, 598 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). However, a new and independent cause must be one which the original wrongdoer, in the exercise of ordinary care, could not have foreseen. Texas Indus., Inc. v. Lucas, 634 S.W.2d 748, 755 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1982), rev’d on other grounds, 696 S.W.2d 372 (Tex.1984); see City of Austin v. Schmedes, 154 Tex. 416, 424, 279 S.W.2d 326, 331 (1955); Bell Helicopter Co. v. Bradshaw, 594 S.W.2d 519, 533 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1979, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
2. Application of Law
The majority concludes, without explanation, that a fact finder could not possibly find for the Portlocks on proximate cause. I am not as confident as the majority that Perry’s acts and omissions had nothing to do with the Portlocks’ injuries.
The record has ample summary judgment evidence showing that Perry hired McCoy because he had a background in *586medical business management. Perry’s financing bank recommended hiring McCoy to bring the clinics1 to a better financial level. McCoy had no training in quality control, patient safety, or quality assurance of medical procedures. His determination of hospital staffing levels were for business office purposes and from a cash flow analysis only. McCoy had never operated a free-standing radiology center before he went to Duncanville Diagnostic Center.
Perry approved of McCoy’s hiring Thomas even though Perry knew nothing about Thomas’s background. Perry interviewed Thomas before he was hired. Although Thomas ran the diagnostic radiology clinic on a day-to-day basis, Perry never inquired if he had any health care expertise. Neither Perry, McCoy, nor Thomas ever inquired if any patient safety procedures existed.
Perry had the ultimate authority to change personnel and make decisions. McCoy had to have Perry's approval in all matters. Because Perry retained ultimate control, I cannot characterize the person or persons who administered the drug as independent from Perry and those whom Perry hired.
When I review this evidence and resolve any doubts in favor of the Portlocks, I do not agree that a jury could not find that:
(1) Perry’s negligent hiring of McCoy and Thomas was a substantial factor in bringing about the injury;
(2) the injury would not have occurred absent such negligence; and
(3) Perry should have foreseen that this type of injury could have occurred.
A properly instructed jury could have found that Perry should have foreseen the injury, and that the negligent administration of the drug was a concurring cause, not an independent cause.
CONCLUSION
The majority decides issues as a matter of law that are precisely the issues that should be resolved by a trier of fact. Neither appellant or appellee requested that this Court decide whether proximate cause existed. That the majority seeks out its own issue suggests unwarranted judicial activism.
The Portlocks may or may not satisfy a jury that Perry’s alleged negligent hiring was a proximate cause of their injuries. Nevertheless, they are entitled to an opportunity to try to do so and to have this Court review the issue of proximate cause only after a full adversarial and evidentiary hearing on proximate cause.
Based on the briefs and the record, I would reverse the summary judgment and remand this cause for further proceedings.

. Perry owned several clinics as investments. McCoy divided his time between all of the clinics. For purposes of this opinion, the other clinics are immaterial.