Court Opinion

ID: 9663427
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:38:42.458443+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:49.523589
License: Public Domain

Caporale, J.,
dissenting.
While I agree that the mother’s parental rights in and to her son probably must be terminated, I must nonetheless regretfully dissent. I do so because the State simply chose to ignore the fact it was dealing with a mentally ill mother who, through no fault of her own, could not care for her son, and treated her as if she were of sound mind and had consciously elected to neglect her parental responsibilities. Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the court below, with the instruction that the son be kept in foster care until the State *113performs its task of proving its right to terminate the mother’s parental rights in the manner prescribed by law.
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-292 (Reissue 1984) provides that the juvenile court may terminate parental rights on a variety of grounds, including when:
(2) The parents have substantially and continuously or repeatedly neglected the juvenile and refused to give the juvenile necessary parental care and protection;
(5) The parents are unable to discharge parental responsibilities because of mental illness or mental deficiency and there are reasonable grounds to believe that such condition will continue for a prolonged indeterminate period.
The statute further provides that when “termination of the parent-juvenile relationship is sought under subdivision (5) of this section, the court shall appoint a guardian ad litem for the alleged incompetent parent.”
Thus, while the majority opinion makes no distinction between a mentally ill parent and one who is not, § 43-292 does make such a distinction.
There is good reason for making such a distinction. The notion of neglect contemplates the existence, among other things, of intelligence, judgment, and reason, rendering one capable of recognizing and adhering to a required standard of care. It is for that reason that in negligence actions we require a child to exercise only that degree of care which an ordinarily prudent child of the same capacity to appreciate and avoid danger would use in the same situation. Gadeken v. Langhorst, 193 Neb. 299, 226 N.W.2d 632 (1975).
Therefore, under the State’s pleading, the real question in this case is not whether a mother can neglect a son whom she does not have in her possession but whether the mother had the capacity to neglect her son. The evidence clearly establishes she did not have such capacity and that she therefore does not come within the purview of § 43-292(2).
The evidence establishes, however, that she may come within the purview of § 43-292(5). The difficulty is that the State did not give the mother notice, through a guardian ad litem, that it *114was her mental ability to be a parent which was at issue. In Orr v. Knowles, 215 Neb. 49, 337 N.W.2d 699 (1983), we noted, in connection with a statute empowering a court to appoint a guardian ad litem for a minor seeking an abortion, that the duties of a guardian ad litem are not coextensive with those of an attorney representing the minor. We observed that the guardian ad litem was to determine the best interests of the minor without reference to the minor’s wishes.
The majority opinion ignores a statutory requirement and deprives a mentally ill mother of the valuable right to have her interests protected by a guardian ad litem. Proper notice is more than a matter of form, it is a constitutional requirement which is met only when one is advised of the matters to be considered in a manner which is fair in view of the circumstances and conditions existent at the time. Black v. Black, 223 Neb. 203, 388 N.W.2d 815 (1986). It is fundamentally unfair to tell a mother it is the neglect of her son which is at issue and then try her for lacking the mental capacity to carry out her parental responsibilities. See Tuch v. Tuch, 210 Neb. 601, 316 N.W.2d 304 (1982).
The majority’s opinion, although expedient, is, in my view, legally incorrect.
Krivosha, C. J., and Shanahan, J., join in this dissent.