Court Opinion

ID: 9624939
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:22:32.344431+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:57.123885
License: Public Domain

Carley, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
In my opinion, this case evidences no reversible abuse of that discretion which a trial court is authorized to exercise in determining whether to allow the electronic media in the courtroom during a trial. Therefore, I concur fully in the majority’s affirmance of the denial of WALE-TV’S request for such access to the trial of Karen Eckman, but respectfully dissent to the majority’s reversal of the denial of the request as to the trial of William Lematty.
As the majority correctly notes, there is a significant difference between a complete exclusion of the media from a courtroom, and a mere limitation on the extent to which the media is allowed access to cover an on-going judicial proceeding. A total bar of the media must pass the stringent test of R.W. Page Corp. v. Lumpkin, 249 Ga. 576 (292 SE2d 815) (1982). Whether only the electronic media should be barred from a judicial proceeding is, on the other hand, a matter for the trial court’s discretionary consideration under Uniform Superior Court Rule (USCR) 22. Ga. Television Co. v. State, 257 Ga. 764, 765 (2) (363 SE2d 528) (1988). USCR 22 specifically recognizes, as a general proposition, the inherently “distractive nature of electronic or photographic equipment,” and, for this reason, imposes certain “restrictions and conditions” on the use of such equipment. Among those enumerated “restrictions and conditions” is subsection (P) of USCR 22, which provides that a request for the use of such equipment in a judicial proceeding “shall be evaluated pursuant to the standards set forth in OCGA § 15-1-10.1.” That incorporated statute sets forth a number of factors which relate to the impact that access to the courtroom by the electronic media will have “on the public interest and the rights of the parties in open judicial proceedings, the impact upon the integrity and dignity of the court, and whether the proposed activity would contribute to the enhancement of or detract from the ends of justice.” OCGA § 15-1-10.1 (a). Thus, Rule 22 mandates that the trial court make its own independent discretionary determination as to the incorporated factors enumerated in OCGA § 15-1-10.1 (b).
There is no contention that the trial court in this case did not exercise its discretion under Rule 22. Compare Multimedia WMAZ v. *569State, 256 Ga. 698 (353 SE2d 173) (1987). One of the reasons set forth for denying access to the electronic media is that the presence of a camera in the courtroom would be a distraction. See OCGA § 15-1-10.1 (b) (5), (7). The majority concludes that there is no evidentiary support for this finding, because the camera would be stationary and silent. However, nothing is cited to support the conclusion that it is an abuse of the trial court’s discretion to find that such a camera still constitutes a distraction. In my opinion, a trial court is in the best position to determine whether a camera, even one which does not move or make a sound, will be distracting for the jurors, witnesses, parties and counsel in a given proceeding, since a trial court is familiar with the notoriety of the cases which are on its calendar, the citizens in its community, and the configuration of its courtroom. Here, the trial court expressed its belief that “if there is a camera in the courtroom somebody’s going to have their mind on the camera when it ought to be somewhere else.” I find nothing in the record to show that, under the circumstances of this case, the trial court abused its discretion by so finding. Moreover, as the majority notes, there is evidence that the tape in the camera would need to be changed periodically. The majority discounts this as support for the trial court’s finding, however, because the procedure would be “quick and quiet.” I submit that, simply because the majority makes its own subjective determination that the tape-changing procedure would not be dis-tractive, it does not follow that the trial court abused its discretion by making a contrary finding. What is a rapid and soundless procedure to an appellate court considering a cold record may, in the considered and informed opinion of a trial court, constitute a significant distraction in its courtroom as it attempts to preside over a capital criminal case. The majority further concludes that the fact that there will be a tape-changing procedure does not support excluding the electronic media, because the trial court was concerned only with the “presence” of the camera in the courtroom. However, it is only because the camera is present in the courtroom that performance of the tape-changing procedure during the on-going trial would become necessary. Therefore, I do not infer from the trial court’s general objection to the distractive nature of the camera that it could not have been persuaded to deny access due to the distraction of the tape-changing procedure.
In my opinion, the majority merely substitutes its own finding that the electronic media should be allowed access to Lematty’s trial for the trial court’s discretionary finding to the contrary. I submit that a trial court does not abuse its discretion simply because it exercises that discretion differently than would an appellate court. If there was a reversible abuse of discretion in this case, then, in my opinion, no trial court is authorized to exercise any discretion in its *570implementation of USCR 22. Therefore, I respectfully dissent to the majority’s reversal of the trial court’s order barring the electronic media from Lematty’s trial.
Decided July 6, 1998.
Cannon & Meyer von Bremen, William E. Cannon, Jr., for appellant.
John R. Parks, District Attorney, Cecilia M. Cooper, John V. Harper, Donald L. Lamberth, for appellees.
Powell, Goldstein, Frazer & Murphy, James C. Rawls, amicus curiae.
I am authorized to state that Justice Thompson joins in this opinion.