Court Opinion

ID: 9755376
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 20:36:09.70311+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:06.594000
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by BELL, C.J.
The Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia disbarred H. Allen Whitehead, the respondent, by consent, for having paid, when acting, as a “conservator,” legal fees to himself for his services without prior court approval.1 Attorney Griev*266ance Comm’n v. Whitehead, 390 Md. 663, 667, n. 6, 890 A.2d 751, 753-54, n. 6 (2006). Following the completion of reciprocal discipline proceedings, subsequently initiated by the petitioner, the Attorney Grievance Commission, this Court rejected the disbarment sanction—expressly refusing to defer to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals—and imposed, instead, an indefinite suspension. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Whitehead, 390 Md. 663, 683, 890 A.2d 751, 763 (2006).
Although it may not have been the basis for the order of disbarment, the conduct at issue in this case was not unknown to this Court; in fact, the record of that case contained the respondent’s admission that he had engaged in the conduct. Specifically, the Superior Court’s Order removing the respondent as conservator for the Reginald Grayson, Jr. estate, stated:
“The Court heard the representations and admissions from Michael Grady, made on behalf of the Conservator, H. Allen Whitehead. The Conservator, by and through his attorney, admitted on the record that he had violated D.C.Code § 21-2060, D.C.Code 21-2068, SCR-PD 5(c) and SCR-PD 308. Specifically, the Conservator admitted that he paid legal fees of $40,200.00 to himself without prior authorization and he entered into a self-dealing mortgage investment transaction, $600,000.00 of the adult ward’s assets for the purchase of property located in New York City for himself and Aric Johnson—such an investment by the Conservator represents a clear conflict of interest.
Notwithstanding the Conservator’s on the record admissions, Conservator seeks to tender his resignation to the Court, in lieu of removal from his post.” (emphasis added). Further, in the attorney discipline case, Bar Counsel for the District of Columbia specifically averred that the respondent had misappropriated funds on two occasions, began an investigation on both counts, and sought consent from respondent on both bases.”
Id. at 686, 890 A.2d at 765 (Bell, C. J., dissenting). Nevertheless, the Court justified the lesser sanction by determining *267that only the improper fee payment charge was at issue, refusing to consider the conduct at issue here, the self-dealing mortgage investment transaction and by concluding that the respondent had demonstrated extenuating circumstances under Rule 16-773(e)(4).2
I dissented, believing that in the absence of exceptional circumstances, the proper application of Rule 16-773, consistent with its purpose, “to ensure consistency of sanction and to demonstrate comity towards our sister jurisdictions[,]” Whitehead, 390 Md. at 690, 890 A.2d at 767, required this Court to defer to the sanction imposed by the disciplining court, especially as was the case there Maryland was not the respondent’s primary place of practice, id. at 689-691, 890 A.2d at 767-68, and disbar the respondent on the basis that, and for the reason, that court did. That was not the only basis on which I relied to justify the sanction imposed by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, however. Pointing out the consequences of the respondent’s consent to disbarment, I explained:
*268“Moreover, in this Court the respondent’s status is not simply that of one who has consented to disbarment; rather, on the basis of that consent—from the admission it contained—he has been found by the hearing court to have violated Rule 8.4(a), (b), (c) and (d) [of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct]. Either subsection (b) or (c) constitutes a finding of intentional misappropriation of estate funds. That finding, in turn, is supported by the respondent’s admission that he took fees from the estate, as to which he was conservator, without court permission. In re Reginald Grayson, Jr., No. 195-94, Superior Court of the District of Columbia. In other cases, in which the hearing court has found a violation of Rule 8.4(b) or (c), where there has been an inappropriate handling of monies or in which a trust account has been out of balance, we have refused to allow a respondent to be heard to say, and certainly not to succeed in the argument, that there was no misappropriation found or that it was not intentional. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Cafferty, 376 Md. 700, 723, 831 A.2d 1042, 1056-7 (2003); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Sabghir, 350 Md. 67, 68, 710 A.2d 926, 926 (1998); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Gittens, 346 Md. 316, 325, 697 A.2d 83, 88 (1997); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Willcher, 340 Md. 217, 221-222, 665 A.2d 1059, 1061 (1995); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Sparrow, 314 Md. 421, 425, 550 A.2d 1150, 1152 (1988).
“There is, consequently, another basis for imposing the sanction the District of Columbia court imposed. That basis, moreover, is consistent with the majority’s desire and apparent determination, to attain, and to maintain, internal consistency in attorney discipline cases. As we have so often stated, disbarment is the inexorable result of a finding of misappropriation, absent compelling extenuating circumstances. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Bakas, 323 Md. 395, 403, 593 A.2d 1087, 1091 (1991); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Spery, 371 Md. 560, 568, 810 A.2d 487, 491-92 (2002); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Sullivan, 369 Md. 650, 655-56, 801 A.2d 1077, 1080 (2002); Attorney Grievance *269Comm’n v. Vanderlinde, 364 Md. 376, 410, 773 A.2d 463, 483 (2001). That the respondent did not appreciate, or was not told, that disbarment need not be the sanction for the premature taking of a fee is neither a compelling nor extenuating circumstance.”
Id. at 688-89, 890 A.2d at 766 (footnote omitted).
Therefore, it is not the sanction that was has been imposed in this case that causes me to dissent. This is the sanction that I have believed to be the correct one since this case first was presented to this Court in the posture of a reciprocal discipline case; finally, I would say ordinarily, the Court got it right, albeit belatedly. No, I write separately, in dissent, to express my disagreement with a trend that more and more, recently, has become evident and threatens to swallow our misappropriation jurisprudence.
It is well settled in this State that “disbarment will inevitably follow any unmitigated misappropriation of client, or any third party’s funds.” See e.g. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Hayes, 367 Md. 504, 512-513, 789 A.2d 119, 124-125 (2002); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Vanderlinde, 364 Md. 376, 413-14, 773 A.2d 463, 485 (2001); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Bernstein, 363 Md. 208, 226, 768 A.2d 607, 617 (2001); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Tomaino, 362 Md. 483, 498, 765 A.2d 653, 661 (2001); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Williams, 335 Md. 458, 474, 644 A.2d 490, 497 (1994); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. White, 328 Md. 412, 417, 614 A.2d 955, 958 (1992); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Bakas, 323 Md. 395, 403, 593 A.2d 1087, 1091 (1991); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Owrutsky, 322 Md. 334, 345, 587 A.2d 511, 516 (1991); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Kolodner, 321 Md. 545 546-47, 583 A.2d 724, 725 (1991); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Ezrin, 312 Md. 603, 608-09, 541 A.2d 966, 969 (1988); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Bloom, 306 Md. 609, 611, 510 A.2d 589, 590 (1986); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Cockrell, 304 Md. 379, 393-94, 499 A.2d 928, 935 (1985); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Boehm, 293 Md. 476, 481, 446 A.2d 52, 54 (1982); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Burka, 292 Md. 221, 225, 438 A.2d 514, 517 (1981); Attorney Grievance *270Comm’n v. Micka, 289 Md. 131, 133, 422 A.2d 383, 384 (1980); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Garson, 287 Md. 502, 503, 413 A.2d 564, 564 (1980); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. McBurney, 283 Md. 628, 631, 392 A.2d 81, 82-83 (1978); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Andresen, 281 Md. 152, 160, 379 A.2d 159, 163 (1977); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Silk, 279 Md. 345, 347, 369 A.2d 70, 71 (1977); Bar Ass’n of Baltimore City v. Carruth, 271 Md. 720, 728, 319 A.2d 532, 536 (1974); Bar Ass’n of Baltimore City v. Marshall, 269 Md. 510, 519, 307 A.2d 677, 682 (1973). Misappropriation, however, is not a strict liability offense. That this is so is reflected in the emphasis this Court has placed on the requirement that the misappropriation be “intentional.” See e.g., Attorney Grievance Comm’n of Maryland v. Webster, 402 Md. 448, 473, 937 A.2d 161, 175 (2007) (“We have stated that intentional misappropriation of funds entrusted to an attorney’s care is an act infected with deceit and dishonesty, and, in the absence of compelling extenuating circumstances justifying a lesser sanction, will result in disbarment.”) and cases therein cited; Vanderlinde, 364 Md. at 413-14, 773 A.2d at 485 (identifying “the intentional misappropriation of funds” as among the conduct for which only circumstances that are “utterly compelling” will be considered for mitigation). Moreover, the absence of a dishonest or selfish motive is a factor that this Court has determined to be a mitigating factor, entitled to some weight with regard to sanction. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Thompson, 367 Md. 315, 330, 786 A.2d 763, 772-73 (2001); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Jaseb, 364 Md. 464, 481-82, 773 A.2d 516, 526 (2001); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Glenn, 341 Md. 448, 488-89, 671 A.2d 463, 483 (1996). See also Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Nussbaum, 401 Md. 612, 645-46, 934 A.2d 1, 20-21 (2007), cataloging the misappropriation cases in which there was a finding of the misuse of client funds, but did not result in disbarment, Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Goff, 399 Md. 1, 922 A.2d 554 (2007); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Rees, 396 Md. 248, 913 A.2d 68 (2006); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Calhoun, 391 Md. 532, 894 A.2d 518 (2006); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Whitehead, *271390 Md. 663, 890 A.2d 751 (2006); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Maignan, 390 Md. 287, 888 A.2d 344 (2005); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Zuckerman, 386 Md. 341, 872 A.2d 693 (2005); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Rose, 383 Md. 385, 859 A.2d 659 (2004); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. DiCicco, 369 Md. 662, 802 A.2d 1014 (2002); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Hayes, 367 Md. 504, 789 A.2d 119 (2002), and explaining their rationale:
“In every case cited, except Calhoun,[3] however, the hearing judge did not find a violation of MRPC 8.4(c). Goff, 399 Md. at 16, 922 A.2d at 563 (hearing court declined to find violation of MRPC 8.4(c)); Rees, 396 Md. at 251 n. 7, 913 A.2d at 69 n. 7 (hearing court found allegation that Rees violated MRPC 8.4(c) to be “frivolous”); Whitehead, 390 Md. at 669, 890 A.2d at 755 (reciprocal discipline case in which District of Columbia Court of Appeals did not specifically find violation of the equivalent of MRPC 8.4(c)); Maignan, 390 Md. at 292, 888 A.2d at 347 (hearing court declined to find violation of MRPC 8.4(c)); Zuckerman, 386 Md. at 360, 872 A.2d at 704-05 (attorney was not charged with a violation of 8.4(c)); Rose, 383 Md. at 391, 859 A.2d at 662 (same); DiCicco, 369 Md. at 666, 684, 802 A.2d at 1016, 1026 (hearing court declined to find violation of MRPC 8.4(c); Bar Counsel excepted to the finding and this Court overruled the exception, holding that the evidence showed the respondent to be negligent, not “willful or deceitful”); Hayes, 367 Md. at 511, 789 A.2d at 123-24 (respondent was not charged with a violation of MRPC 8.4(c).)”
In the case sub judice, the hearing court concluded that the respondent misappropriated funds of the estate as to which he was conservator, by violating Rules 1. 15,4 8.4(a), (c) and (d),5 *272and Sections 10-3066 and 10-3077 of the Business Occupations and Professions Article, Maryland Code (1989, 2000 Repl.Vol.). The conclusions were based on pertinent factual findings, as follows: with regard to Rule 1.15, that the respondent violated MRPC 1.15 by utilizing estate property for his own benefit; however, somewhat consistently with the respondent’s argument, the court indicated its belief in the respondent’s sincerity in wanting to maximize the assets of the estate, but decried the manner in which he chose to do so; as to Rule 8.4, “that the Respondent clearly knew what he was doing when he utilized estate funds to purchase real property that he would personally own and that he exhibited poor judgment in doing so. Although his actions may not have been a deliberate attempt to deceive, the net effect of his actions is that he engaged in self-dealing[;]” as to § 10-306,
*273“that [the respondent] had not bothered to read the District of Columbia Code or rules governing conservatorships. Had he taken the time to do so, he would have more than likely known that prior court approval was needed regarding investing estate assets in real estate venture in which he was a principal.
“The court does not find that the Respondent harbored a nefarious intent to deprive the estate of its assets. The court does find, however, that the Respondent’s actions resulted in monies entrusted to him being utilized for unauthorized investments.”
Although the misappropriation will have been established with the sustaining of any one of the charged Rule violations or of § 10-306, only Rule 8—4(c) involves proof of an intent that would require disbarment as the default position, that would require the respondent to establish compelling extenuating circumstances to avoid that disposition. Accordingly, the respondent excepted to the conclusion that the petitioner had proven that Rule violation and that Rule violation only. It is significant, I think, that the hearing court did not specifically address each paragraph of the Rule alleged to have been violated, stating simply what the petitioner alleged and concluding that the respondent “violated MPRC 8.4.” Rather than state clearly and unequivocally that the respondent engaged in conduct that was dishonest, fraudulent or deceitful, it characterized his actions in using estate funds without permission as “using poor judgment” and acknowledged that “his actions may not have been a deliberate attempt to deceive,” although their “net effect” was “self-dealing.” I have a hard time finding support for an 8.4(c) violation from this finding; it is hardly a ringing indictment for “intentional misappropriation.”
The findings underlying the other Rule and statutory charges do not help or strengthen the petitioner’s case or the hearing court’s conclusion. As we have seen, while finding a violation of Rule 1.15 and decrying the manner in which he chose to do so, the hearing court the court indicated that it believed in the respondent’s sincerity in wanting to maximize *274the assets of the estate. With regard to § 10-306, not only-does the hearing court acknowledge the petitioner’s negligence in failing to become conversant with the rules regarding District of Columbia Conservatorships, negating intentional conduct, but it expressly “does not find that the Respondent harbored a nefarious intent to deprive the estate of its assets.” The further finding that the respondent’s actions resulted in monies entrusted to him being utilized for unauthorized investments simply does not conflict with, or override, the earlier ones.
My problem is that, under the majority’s analysis, intent is not an element to be considered when the charge is misappropriation and that the motive underlying the conduct, although relevant, need not seriously be considered, even on the question of the appropriate sanction.8 This is not the first time I have addressed the latter point. In Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Pennington, 387 Md. 565, 876 A.2d 642 (2005), in which the hearing court found that the respondent “intend[ed] the natural consequences of her action and nonaction,” but concluded that, by those actions and nonactions, the respondent had no intent to harm her client, I dissented, reasoning that, given the court’s conclusions, a finding that Rule 8.4(c) had been violated did not, as a matter of law, mean that the respondent acted with a dishonest or selfish motive. Id. at 602, 876 A.2d at 664. On the contrary, I concluded that the opposite was true, that the respondent acted without a dishonest or selfish motive. That the hearing court could have reached the opposite conclusion and, more to the point, that the opposite conclusion is the one that a reviewing court may prefer and, as factfinder, would have reached, can, and should, not change that reality. Id.
*275As I have demonstrated, our cases require consideration of intent both in determining whether misappropriation has occurred and on the sanction and of motive on the issue of sanction.
Moreover, the majority’s analysis is inconsistent with this Court’s analysis of this very issue in prior cases. Indeed, to make the point, we need go no further than the reciprocal discipline case involving this very respondent, Whitehead, 390 Md. 663, 890 A.2d 751. In that case, in justifying a sanction different from, and more lenient than, that imposed by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, we clearly relied on the lack of the proof of intent to misappropriate the premature fee payment, stating “[f]rom the record it is not apparent that respondent’s conduct was intentional.” Id. at 676, 890 A.2d at 759.9
Calhoun is also instructive and relevant on this point. As promised, see note 3, its significance lies in the way in which this Court distinguished it in Nussbaum, 401 Md. 612, 934 A.2d 1. There, Judge Battaglia, writing for a unanimous Court, explained:
“In the singular case in which a violation of 8.4(c) was found and disbarment was not ordered, Calhoun, 391 Md. at 532, 894 A.2d at 518, the respondent was charged with violating multiple rules of professional conduct, including 8.4(c), in connection with her representation of a client in a sexual harassment suit. The hearing court found that Calhoun had commingled trust funds and personal funds by failing to deposit two $5,000.00 payments for fees and an $8,000.00 settlement check into a properly designated attorney trust account. The hearing judge found that Calhoun had misled her client concerning legal fees and costs owed by failing to keep him informed of the accrual of those fees and costs in a *276timely fashion, as was required by her representation agreement. Specifically, the court found that she ‘mis[led] by silence and lack of communication,’ id. at 548, 894 A.2d at 527, and that she violated 8.4(c) by her ‘failure to communicate properly.’ Id. at 552, 894 A.2d at 530. In determining Calhoun’s sanction, this Court noted that ‘while the hearing judge did find that respondent violated MRPC 8.4(c), he did not find specifically that respondent engaged in dishonest or fraudulent conduct,’ id. at 571, 894 A.2d at 541, and focused on the respondent’s treatment of the $8,000.00 in settlement funds. We noted that the hearing court did not find that Calhoun had intentionally misappropriated the settlement funds, but rather that the facts indicated that she may have believed, albeit erroneously, that the settlement funds were owed to her to cover fees and costs associated with representation. Id. at 574, 894 A.2d at 543.”
Id. at 646-47, 934 A.2d at 21.
I dissent. As I said in Pennington, 387 Md. at 602, 876 A.2d at 664:
“There really is no good reason, and the public is not protected, when an attorney, acting, as found by the hearing court, without a selfish or dishonest motive is disbarred. Imposition of such a sanction under those circumstances, amounts to nothing more than punishment.”

. D.C.Code § 21-2011 (2001) defines a "conservator” as "a person who is appointed by a court to manage the estate of a protected individual. ...”

. I characterized the misconduct in the reciprocal discipline case as "misappropriation,” whether referring to the improper fee payment or the self dealing mortgage transaction, as both involved misuse of client funds. Given the analysis employed by the majority in arriving at a sanction, I conclude that it treated the improper fee payment as a misappropriation as well. Explaining why a sanction other than disbarment was appropriate, it pointed out:
"In the case at bar, respondent did not take the fees before they were improperly accounted for or earned. Respondent practiced in Maryland for twenty-six years before moving to New York and petitioner did not provide any evidence that respondent was disciplined on any other occasion. From the record it is not apparent that respondent's conduct was intentional. Furthermore, he returned the unapproved fees upon learning that taking them without approval was inappropriate.”
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Whitehead, 390 Md. 663, 676, 890 A.2d 751, 759 (2006). The majority seemed, in other words, to have determined that extenuating circumstances existed that mitigated the sanction. That also is consistent with Rule 16-773(d)(4):
"(e) Exceptional circumstances. Reciprocal discipline shall not be ordered if Bar Counsel or the attorney demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that: ... (4) the conduct established does not constitute misconduct in this State or it warrants substantially different discipline in this State....”

. How we distinguished Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Calhoun, 391 Md. 532, 894 A.2d 518 (2006), is instructive and relevant to this case, as we shall see infra.

. Maryland Rule 1. 15 provides, in pertinent part:
"(a) A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons that is in a lawyer’s possession in connection with a representation separate *272from the lawyer’s own property. Funds shall be kept in a separate account maintained pursuant to Title 16, Chapter 600 of the Maryland Rules. Other property shall be identified as such and appropriately safeguarded. Complete records of such account funds and of other property shall be kept by the lawyer and shall be preserved for a period of five years after termination of the representation.

. Rule 8.4, Misconduct, of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct, provides, as relevant:
"It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
“(a) violate or attempt to violate the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another;
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"(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation;
"(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.”

. Section 10-306 proscribes a lawyer’s "use [of] trust money for any purpose other than the purpose for which the trust money is entrusted to the lawyer.”

. Section 10-307 provides:
“A lawyer who willfully violates any provision of this Part I of this subtitle, except for the requirement that a lawyer deposit trust moneys in an attorney trust account for charitable purposes under § 10-303 of this subtitle, is subject to disciplinary proceedings as the Maryland Rules provide.”

. I must confess that I also have a hard time squaring the use of the reciprocal discipline case as a prior disciplinary proceeding. As the opinion in that case made clear, the mortgage investment matter was fully revealed, even admitted by the respondent in that case. Indeed, as I point out supra and at Whitehead, 390 Md. at 688-89, 890 A.2d at 766, so well developed was the issue that it could have been used in the reciprocal discipline case as another basis for deferring to the sanction of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

. It may also be worth mentioning that, when the Court was trying to justify a different, more lenient sanction than the sanctioning court, it was willing even to consider that the respondent “returned the unapproved fees upon learning that taking them without approval was inappropriate.” Whitehead, 390 Md. at 676, 890 A.2d at 759 (2006). Dare I say it?—so much for internal consistency!