Court Opinion

ID: 9479998
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:35:02.190075+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:47:25.262651
License: Public Domain

HATCHETT, Circuit Judge,
specially concurring:
I write separately to describe the kind of record evidence a defendant must produce to facilitate a meaningful review of a Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986) claim.
Under Batson v. Kentucky, a defendant in a criminal case has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of race discrimination in the jury selection process. Once the defendant establishes a prima fa-cie case, the burden shifts to the prosecution to articulate a neutral explanation for challenging Afro-American (black) jurors. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97, 106 S.Ct. at 1723. The prosecutor cannot rebut the defendant’s prima facie case by merely denying a discriminatory motive or affirming that the actions were taken in good faith. Rather, the prosecutor must articulate a neutral explanation related to the particular case to be tried. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98, 106 S.Ct. at 1724. The prosecutor’s explanation need not rise to the level justifying exercise of a challenge for cause. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97, 106 S.Ct. at 1723.
The district court determines whether the defendant has established a prima facie case of race discrimination and whether the prosecutor has articulated a neutral explanation for removing each of the excluded black jurors. United States v. David, 844 F.2d 767, 769 (11th Cir.1988). On review, we will uphold the district court’s findings unless they are clearly erroneous. David, 844 F.2d at 769.
In this case, the district court found that Alston met his burden of establishing a prima facie case of race discrimination because the prosecutor used four of six peremptory strikes to remove four of five black jurors. The district court also found that the prosecutor articulated neutral and legitimate reasons for removing the jurors. Thus, the district court concluded that the prosecutor complied with Batson.
Alston contends that the prosecutor’s explanations for removing black jurors were pretextual, and therefore legally insufficient to satisfy the requirements of Bat-son. The government, on the other hand, contends that the prosecutor complied with Batson by articulating a neutral explanation for striking each of the excluded black jurors. According to the government, the four black prospective jurors were removed for one or more of the following reasons: (1) knowledge of the defendant or co-defen*1374dant; (2) a family member who had been charged in a drug offense; (3) family members who were involved in law enforcement; (4) elderly and/or hard of hearing; and (5) unemployed.
The district court’s finding that the government has rebutted a prima facie case of discrimination turns on an evaluation of the prosecutor’s credibility, and thus, is given great deference. See David, 844 F.2d at 769. Notwithstanding the deference given to the district court’s findings, we will not hesitate to strike down arbitrary and vague explanations. For example, in United States v. Horsley, 864 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir.1989), the court concluded that the explanation “I just got a feeling about him” is legally insufficient to refute a prima facie case of purposeful racial discrimination. Horsley, 864 F.2d at 1546. Likewise, pretextual explanations are legally insufficient to refute a prima facie case of discrimination. See United States v. Thompson, 827 F.2d 1254, 1260 (9th Cir.1987) (recognizing that a prosecutor’s removal of black jurors for “seempngly] legitimate reasons” may be legally impermissible if the defendant can point out “that the stated reasons were pretextual because others similarly situated were allowed to serve.”); United States v. Wilson, 853 F.2d 606, 610 (8th Cir.1988) (“in order to have a neutral explanation, the characteristics of the struck individual cannot be present in those white panel members not struck by the Government.”).
When an allegation of pretext is raised, the defendant bears the burden of convincing the district court that the proffered reasons are pretextual by introducing evidence of comparability. To do so, the defendant must be allowed “the opportunity to offer rebuttal evidence pertaining to the Government’s reasons.” United States v. Gordon, 817 F.2d 1538, 1541 (11th Cir.1987) (holding that the defendant was entitled to a hearing on remand because the district court failed to make an independent inquiry or allow the defendant to offer rebuttal evidence pertaining to the government’s reasons).
A defendant who seeks to establish pretext may attack the government’s reasons by direct, objective, or otherwise concrete evidence. The defendant may also rely on other subjective or testimonial evidence which can only be determined by assessing the credibility of the evidence. We can better review a Batson claim based on pretext where the underlying claim involves “concrete” evidence (e.g., old age, prior criminal history, knowledge of witnesses, etc.), rather than subjective evidence. In cases involving “concrete” evidence, the defendant is not relying heavily on credibility choices but rather on objective facts easily discovered and presented. In cases “in which the evidence [is] largely testimonial, and the district court ha[s] the advantage of observing the witnesses and evaluating their credibility firsthand,” we will rely heavily on the district court’s credibility choices. Lincoln v. Board of Regents of University System of Georgia, 697 F.2d 928, 939 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 826, 104 S.Ct. 97, 78 L.Ed.2d 102 (1983).
If the defendant alleges that the prosecutor’s reasons are pretextual because the prosecutor failed to strike white jurors who possessed similar “concrete” characteristics as the black jurors who were removed, the district court must allow the defendant to establish those facts. See Gordon, 817 F.2d 1538. Such a showing need not turn into a full blown trial. But, the hearing must provide an adequate record to enable this court to conduct a meaningful review of the district court’s findings.
In this case, Alston sought to establish pretext based on both “concrete” facts and other evidence. Despite his allegations, Alston’s claim fails because the record reveals that he did not satisfactorily establish “concrete” facts for comparison — i.e., the age of all jurors, a list of jurors who had family members who were involved in drugs, or a list of jurors who had knowledge of the defendant or co-defendant. Because he failed to make the requisite showing, I conclude that the district court properly rejected the Batson claim.
The lesson to claimants of Batson violations and prosecutors is that comparisons *1375must be made between the black jurors removed from jury service and the white jurors remaining for service.