Court Opinion

ID: 9442349
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 18:44:33.970537+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:28:52.660938
License: Public Domain

WALLER, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
I am unable to find any proof of negligence on the part of the Railroad in this case. All of the positive testimony on the subject of blowing the whistle and ringing the bell is to the effect that they were appropriately sounded. Against this is merely the negative testimony of Plaintiffs and one or two other witnesses that they did not hear any bell or whistle.
Not one of such witnesses who was in position to hear the bell or whistle had his attention directed thereto, and such testimony must give way to the positive testimony of those who did observe and hear.
In Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Myrick, 91 Fla. 918, 109 So. 193, 195, the Supreme Court of Florida said:
“It is not alone sufficient for the injured plaintiff to say that he ‘did not see’ the approaching train, nor hear any whistle or hell or noise of its approach, in order to overcome positive evidence that all ordinary warnings were given of the train’s approach. When negative testimony is relied upon to contradict positive evidence, it should appear that the negative statements were made by persons whose attention was directed to the fact that they were looking, watching, and listening for the fact.”
See also decision by this Court in Van Allen et al. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 5 Cir., 109 F.2d 780, 782, where our Count, in speaking of negative testimony as to the ringing of the bell or sounding of the whistle, said:
“Such evidence will not make an issue in Florida against the positive testimony that the signals were given. Florida East Coast R. Co. v. Davis, 96 Fla. 171, 117 So. 842; Southern R. Co. v. Mann, 91 Fla. 948, 108 So. 889; Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Myrick, 91 Fla. 918, 109 So. 193.”
The only other possible ground for any finding of negligence by the Defendant is based upon the assumed speed of the locomotive in the calculation of two witnesses that if the train ran some 400 feet1 after being struck by the car it must have been going thirty or thirty-five miles per hour at the crossing. The testimony of the eye witnesses is that the train was traveling at a' speed of from twelve to twenty miles per hour. At this sparsely settled point in this small village,2 thirty-five miles per hour would not he a negligent rate of speed, but even if the contrary were true and even if the speed had been thirty or thirty-five miles per hour, it would not have been the proximate cause of the injury since the train did not run into the automobile hut the automobile ran into the side of the locomotive, hitting it considerably back of *110the front end — twenty-five feet, according to the engineer.
I think the proximate and sole cause of the injury, under the Florida decisions, was •the negligence of the driver of the automobile. A train cannot dodge an automobile. It- cannot stop with the ease and within the distance that an automobile can. It is not the law in Florida that a plaintiff who, without looking and listening, drives his car into a train, proximately causing the injury, can recover damages against the railroad.
Before undertaking to point out the pertinent decisions of Florida as to liability for crossing accidents I wish to mention certain factual aspects of this case that appear to be material and that have influenced my views.
The undisputed testimony is that the automobile hit the side of the locomotive and never got upon the railroad track.3 The only testimony of the Plaintiffs on this feature was that of Lawrence Owens, the driver of the automobile. The Plaintiff, Hadlock, testified that he was asleep anil knew nothing about the accident. Owens testified (R. 63) :
“Q. You didn’t drive in front of it, did you?
“A. I didn’t.
“Q. So you must have hit it. Didn’t you?
“A. The front end of the Buick went into the side of the locomotive.”
It is undisputed that the Bui-ck hit the locomotive back of its front, and broke its eccentric rod at the point of impact. The engineer testified that this point was twenty-five feet from the front of the locomotive. No eye witness puts the speed of the train in excess of twenty miles an hour. The Plaintiff, the driver of the car, testified that he was going twenty-five miles an hour and that he was within fifteen feet of the train before he saw it. There is no contention that he stopped or -that he looked or that1 he listened for the train. True, he said he did not realize he was approaching the crossing. Nevertheless, Plaintiffs’ photographs,4 in evidence, show clearly three crossing signals facing Plaintiffs as they approached on the south side of the track. Section 320.46, Florida Statutes Annotated, relieves the Railroad from the necessity of equipping its crossing signs with night reflectors if warning signs had been placed there by the State Road Department. The Plaintiffs by their own photographs (Exhibits 4 and 6) show three crossing signs facing south on the highway. The maj ority opinion states that “The jury might well conclude that the failure to have the reflector on the sign to draw attention to it at night was negligence contributing to the accident.” This statement seems to ignore the last part of Section 320.46, F.S.A., which provides:
“ * * * where railroad warning signs have already been placed, or shall hereafter be placed, at any railroad crossing by the state road department, said railroad companies shall not be required to erect or maintain additional signs or reflectors at such crossings(Emphasis added.)
In the case of Ouzts v. Powell, 5 Cir., arising in Florida, 125 F.2d 768, 769, in discussing the effect of the foregoing section of the Florida Statutes, it was said:
“ * * * but since the Department had placed and maintained its own warning signs at this crossing, the railroad company had no duty to place any. If the signs were insufficient it was not the fault of the railroad company. No other negligence appears. The train had a right to cross the highway, and having reached the crossing first was, so far as appears, proceeding in a cautious and proper way.”
That statement is clearly in accord with the law of Florida as construed by its own courts.
*111If the State Road Department had placed its railroad warning signs at this particular crossing there would have been no statutory duty on the part of the Railroad to equip its signboards with mirror reflectors and no inference of negligence on the part of the Railroad can be drawn from the failure to have reflectors on its signs in the absence of proof by Plaintiffs that the State Road Department had erected no signs at the crossing. And the same reasoning seems applicable to Sec. 351.03, Florida Statutes Annotated, which provides that:
“Every railroad company, whenever its track crosses a highway, shall put up large sign boards at or near said crossing with the following inscription in large letters on both sides of the boards: ‘Look out for the cars! ’ * * * This requirement for posting signs shall not apply to railroad crossings * * * as required by § 320.46.”
It is not shown that the railroad signs were not erected at the orossing as required by Section 320.46.
This accident did not occur in the busy part of a large municipality. Newberry had a population of only 752 at the last State census in 1945, and Plaintiff Owens testified that he was on the outskirts of Newberry where the accident occurred (R. 62) :
“Q. That was way out on the edge of Newberry, wasn’t it — I mean there’s nothing beyond that except a few scattered little shanties, before that — isn’t that true?
“A. A few scattered houses.
“Q. Yes. It’s on the northern outskirts; is that not true?
“A. Yes.”
Therefore, we have a case of a crossing on the outskirts of a village of 752 people at 1 o’clock in the morning; a crossing that was level and smooth; that had three crossing signs facing the Plaintiffs; a driver who admittedly did not stop, or look, or listen; a driver who admitted he had crossed the track twice before within a month; who gave no reason for not seeing the signs placed there by the Defendant and/or the State Road Department and who ran his car into the side of the locomotive.
It is true, that although none of the eye witnesses placed the speed of the train in excess of twenty miles an hour, two former railroad engineers calculated, from the distance that the train ran after the collision, the length and weight thereof, it must have been going thirty to thirty-five miles an hour at the crossing. It ought to be remembered tha't the accident occurred on the opposite side of the engine from that of the engineer, who did not see the car nor the accident, and it is not clear at what point he applied the brakes to stop the train. But even if it were traveling thirty to thirty-five miles an hour, this speed was neither excessive nor the proximate cause of the injury since the train did not run into the automobile.
In Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Timmons, 160 Fla. 754, 36 So.2d 430, 431, the Supreme Court of Florida, on July 30, 1948, said:
“The railroad has a right to assume that one crossing its tracks will at least look to see if there is an approaching train, and if so, he will not plunge into its pathway. * * *
“ * * * Some jurisdictions require that one stop, look and listen, regardless of how clear the track is in either direction. Other courts require the traveler to look and listen, the duty to stop, depending on the circumstances revealed by looking and listening. [Citing cases.] We approve the latter rule in this State and when, as here, it is conclusively shown that the plaintiff did not look or listen, that there was no obstruction whatever to the vision, that the accident took place in a rural community where looking or listening would have avoided it, he is guilty of negligence which was the sole proximate cause of his injury and oanno't recover.”
In the instant case the Plaintiffs had 140 feet of clear view of the track which the driver knew existed and also had the three crossing signs to refresh his recollection, but he neither looked at them nor did he listen.
*112In Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v.. Boles, 160 Fla. 910, 37 So.2d 578, decided by the Supreme Court of Florida on October 26, 1948, . approximately three months, after the Timmons case, the Court again said:
“In Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company v. Timmons [160] Fla. [754], 36 So. 2d 430, this Court defined the standard of prudence required of one approaching a grade crossing. like that involved in this case. He is first required to look and listen and if the way is clear he .may proceed. Circumstances may require him to stop, look and listen.”
In Brown v. Loftin et al., 154 Fla. 621, 18 So.2d 540, the first headnote is:
“In action against railroad fof death of passenger in automobile, declaration which disclosed that automobile struck seventeenth car of freight train which was crossing highway failed to' state a: cause of action, notwithstanding allegations of absence of signboards, flashlight signals', or other warning devices.”
In Bray v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 153 Fla. 619, 15 So.2d 417, the first headnote is:
“Where motorist alleged he was not familiar with highway where it intersected railroad track and blending of colors of highway and cars of railroad then obstructing crossing prevented driver from seeing freight train in time to avoid collision, driver was as a matter of law contributorily negligent precluding recovery.”
■ In Kimball v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 132 Fla. .235, 181 So. 533, the headnote is as follows:
“A petition seeking damages for injuries suffered by truck driver in collision with train standing stationary on crossing at night was demurrable in absence of allegations that truck driver did not see and could not have seen the train, since otherwise driver’s recovery would be barred by contributory negligence.”
Another significant statement in the body of the opinion was:
“The train remaining stationary on the crossing, ipso facto, could not be the proximate cause of the injury, but ¡the proximate cause was the driving of the car into the freight train while it was standing on the crossing, or the plaintiff’s own negligence. If the visibility was poor, it was the duty of the plaintiff to have driven the truck at a low rate of speed so that on short notice the emergency brakes could be applied and ■the truck stopped.”
In Clark v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 141 Fla. 155, 192 So. 621, 622, the Florida Supreme Court again said:
“A railroad company is entitled to assume that reasonable care will be exercised by automobile travelers on the highway, and that a motorist will adopt such,a rate of speed and be as vigilant to avoid collisions at crossings as the conditions warrant.”
Denton v. Atlanta & St. Andrews Bay R. Co., 141, Fla. 153, 192 So. 624, was another denial of the right of a motorist to collect from a railroad for a collision where the automobile ran into the ¡train. Numerous cases are cited therein.
In Cline v. Powell, 141 Fla. 119, 192 So. 628, 631, the Florida Supreme Court again denied recovery in a crossing accident where "thé motorist drove his car into a stationary train: Numerous Florida cases are there cited but the following statement is realistic and accurate:
“The operation of railroad trains is authorized by law. -Such a train must run on a track; and even if the track is not obvious to one approaching it at ■ a grade crossing, certainly a train is so obvious and may be seen in time to avoid accidents even at night by the use of lights required by law to be used on motorcycles.”
I deem it unnecessary to quote further from decisions of the Florida courts, but I do wish to call the court’s attention to two decisions from this Court. One, Van Allen et al. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., supra, denied recovery to a driver of a motor vehicle who had driven upon a railroad track without stopping, looking, or taking any precautions against being struck by the train, saying [109 F.2d 782] :
“We may assume that this [30 miles an hour], rather than 20 miles, was its speed and still there would be nothing to rest a verdict on, both because it is not shown that this speed was negligent and particu*113larly because it is not shown by any evidence to have been or have had any relation to, the proximate cause of ithe injury. Upon the undisputed evidence, the proximate cause was the driving on to the tracks without stopping, looking or making any effort whatever to ascertain whether a train was approaching. The Supreme Court of Florida has in repeated decisions, held that such conduct is the sole proximate cause of an injury, barring recovery alike of driver and guest. [Citing numerous cases.]
“ * * * We have here an injury solely caused by the reckless conduct of the driver of an automobile in going on to a track with full knowledge of its existence, without taking any precautions to look out for an oncoming train.”
One of the later opinions of this Court on a case from Florida involving the driving of an automobile into a moving train is that of Ouzts v. Powell, supra [125 F.2d 769], wherein it was said:
“ * . * * The train had a right to cross the highway, and having reached the crossing first was, so far as appears, proceeding in a cautious and proper way. That the engine should have left smoke behind it cannot be held negligence. The statute of Florida (Comp.Gen.Laws 1927, § 7052 [F.S.A. § 768.06]) diminishing instead of defeating recovery when both the injured person and the railroad company are at fault has no application, because no fault appears on the part of the railroad company.”
The lower Court, over the strenuous objection of counsel for the Defendant, permitted evidence to go to the jury as to other accidents or near accidents at this same crossing within two years prior to the accident in question. I think this was highly prejudicial and reversible error.
In Lowry v. Seaboard Airline R. Co., 5 Cir., 171 F.2d 625, 626, this Court, speaking through Judge Sibley, said:
“Plaintiff offered to prove that at the same crossing there had been a similar collision between a train and an automobile fifteen months previously, and another three years before that, to show the dangerous character of the crossing. The evidence was properly rejected as irrelevant. * * * If evidence be admitted of a prior collision the company would have the right to show, if it could, that its servants were not to blame and three cases would have to be tried instead of one. Fixing the blame in another case would not fix it in this one.”
See also Loftin v. McGregor, 152 Fla. 813, 14 So.2d 574.
It seems to me the admission of this evidence over the objections of the Defendant constituted reversible error.

. There is testimony that the train ran some 400 feet after the accident, but it seems to be undisputed that after the accident and after the tram had stopped the highway was stall blocked by the sixth and seventh car of this seven-car tram, which indicates that the train traveled a lesser distance than 400 feet,

. The population of Newberry in 1945, the lagt Stato census, was 752, and the accident did not occur in the main portion of the village. See Plaintiffs' Ex. bitbit 7.

. The Plaintiffs were traveling north. There were two tracks — the main track and a passing, or switching, track. The main track was on the south and the train was traveling on the main track. Therefore, the Plaintiffs hit the train before crossing any tracks.

. Plaintiffs’ Photographic Exhibits Nos. 4 and 6 show three signs clearly visible to Plaintiffs who were approaching from the south and facing the signs.