Court Opinion

ID: 9830722
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 20:24:53.679545+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:26.010149
License: Public Domain

On Behearing.
Appellee, in his motion for rehearing, insists that the opinion herein of this court is in conflict with the decisions of the Supreme Court and Courts of Civil Appeals in the following cases: Shultz v. Lempert, 55 Tex. 273; Ford v. Bank, 34 S. W. 684; Davis v. Bingham, 46 S. W. 840; Ry. Co. v. Rowland, 3 Tex. Civ. App. 158, 22 S. W. 134; Hall v. Jankofsky, 9 Tex. Civ. App. 504, 29 S. W. 515, and Campbell v. McFadden, 9 Tex. Civ. App. 379, 31 S. W. 437—and moves that the point in conflict be certified to the Supreme Court.
We think there is no conflict. In Campbell v. McFadden it was contended that a special justice of a Court of Civil Appeals was disqualified because he was not a resident of that supreme judicial district. It was held that the special justice was not disqualified, and, if he were in fact disqualified, the question should have been raised in limine. In this ease and in each of the other cases mentioned, it will be observed that a statutory contingency had arisen which authorized the appointment of a special judge and the questions raised relate merely to questions of qualification or regularity of appointment in some matter of detail. In the case at bar, there is no question as to qualification or irregularity in the appointment; but it is a case where a contingency had not arisen which would authorize the parties to agree upon the appointment of a special judge. In other words, there was no statutory authority whatever for the appointment of a special judge by agreement It was a ease governed by article 1678, Bevised Statutes, which requires an election by the practicing attorneys present when the regular judge of the court is absent.
The authorities cited in the original opinion, without exception, lay down the rule that, independent of constitutional or statutory provision, the parties cannot confer judicial authority upon an individual, and that, where this is attempted to be done, a judgment rendered by such appointee is a mere nullity. Our attention is called to no authority to the contrary. In this connection, we call attention to the fact that in Schultze v. McLeary, 73 Tex. 92, 11 S. W, 924, the distinguished trial judge in that case held that his appointment as a special judge was unauthorized. The Supreme Court, in passing upon the validity of his appointment, based their holding upon the fact that one of the parties to the suit was in fact related to the regular judge, so as to disqualify him, and that therefore authority existed for the appointment of a special judge. It would thus seem that by inference, at least, the Supreme Court approved the view of the trial judge that, if the appointment was unauthorized, he would have no authority to exercise judicial authority in the case. If the case at bar involved merely the question of qualification of the special judge, or some irregularity of detail in his appointment and qualification, then we think it would be very clear that appellant would be precluded from raising the question by reason of his agreement and participation in the trial without any objection. But the question is quite different, and goes to the very foundation of the authority of parties to confer judicial power upon an individual by consent or agreement, when there is m> statutory or constitutional authority for them so to do. We think, under the authority cited in our original opinion, it is very clear they cannot do so.
[5, 6] But, aside from the correctness of this view, there is another consideration which imperatively demands a reversal. Appellant, Dunn, was a surety upon the note sued upon for his codefendant, Good. Good made no appearance, and in no wise participated in the agreement by which Judge Littler acted as special judge in the case. Assuredly, as to Good, the judgment which was rendered in the ease was an absolute nullity. Without a discontinuance as to Good, for some of the reasons mentioned in articles 1842 and 1843, Bevised Statutes, the judgment against the surety, Dunn, was erroneous. Douthit v. Martin, 15 Tex. Civ. App. 559, 39 S. W. 944; Woldert v. Durst, 15 Tex. Civ. App. 81, 38 S. W. 215. Good was primarily liable upon the note, and unless a valid judgment had been previously or was at the same time rendered against him, the judgment against the surety, Dunn, was improper, and, there being no valid judgment against the principal upon the note, this requires a reversal of the judgment against Dunn.
The motion for rehearing and to certify is overruled for the reasons indicated.