Court Opinion

ID: 9569001
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:09:32.355015+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:18:28.688775
License: Public Domain

*530Cureton, Judge,
(dissenting):
I respectfully dissent. As noted by the majority, summary judgment is proper only when it is clear that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c) SCRCP. In determining whether triable issues of fact exist, the evidence and all inferences which can be reasonably drawn from the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Koester v. Carolina Rental Center, 313 S.C. 490, 443 S.E. (2d) 392 (1994). Moreover, even when there is no dispute as to the evidentiary facts, but only as to the conclusions or inferences to be drawn from them, summary judgment should be denied. Id. I believe the question of whether Northwest Apartments had a duty to warn Pryor of a perilous condition and whether Pryor voluntarily assumed the risk of being injured are disputed questions of fact and summary judgment was therefore inappropriate.
The facts, viewed in the light most favorable to Pryor are as follows. Pryor was a tenant in an apartment development owned by Northwest. The apartment building has a paved walk, situated perpendicular to the long axis of the building, which leads directly to a parking area. On the night of February 1, 1991, Pryor was walking from her apartment to the parking area when she found her access to the parking lot blocked by a truck parked in a parking space situated directly in front of the paved walk. Pryor attempted to walk through an unpaved common area but slipped on an area of mud devoid of grass but covered with pine straw. The ground had become wet due to an earlier rainfall. Pryor suffered a broken leg as a result of her fall.
The majority correctly concludes that this is a negligence action sounding in tort under the Residential Landlord and Tenant Act. S.C. Code Ann. § 27-40-10 et seq. (Rev. 1991); See Watson v. Sellers, 299 S.C. 426, 385 S.E. (2d) 369 (Ct. App. 1989) (the RLTA creates a right in tort for breach of a duty owed by the landlord to the tenant). The majority also notes that under the RLTA, a landlord must keep all common areas of the premises in a reasonably safe condition. S.C. Code Ann. § 27-40-440(a)(3) (Rev. 1991).
The majority concludes the trial court properly granted summary judgment against Pryor because, under the applica*531ble statutes and case law, there exists no evidence Northwest breached its duty of care to Pryor. In reaching this conclusion, the majority likens the facts of this case to those of Meadows v. Heritage Village Church § Missionary Fellowship, Inc., 305 S.C. 375, 409 S.E. (2d) 349 (1991). I think the cases are distinguishable despite certain similarities between the two.
In Meadows, the issue was whether a premises owner has a duty to warn an invitee of the danger inherent in walking on wet grass. 305 S.C. 375, 409 S.E. (2d) 349. The plaintiff in Meadows decided to walk to the hotel from a parking lot across a grassy area because a gravel path had been flooded during a rainstorm. 305 S.C. at 376, 409 S.E. (2d) at 350. The Meadows plaintiff took the shortest path back to the hotel despite the availability of at least two other routes: a paved driveway and a sidewalk. 305 S.C. 375, 409 S.E. (2d) 349. Our Supreme Court held that (1) a possessor of land has no duty to warn an invitee of a natural condition, the peril of which is obvious; (2) the plaintiff did not show that the landowner could have reasonably foreseen that she would try to cross wet grass instead of using another way back to the hotel from the parking lot; and (3) the plaintiff knew and appreciated the danger inherent in walking across the wet grass, and therefore assumed the risk of injury. Id.
Here, although the majority concludes that an otherwise naturally occurring condition (the muddy spot where Pryor was injured) was only “immaterially” altered by a resident who raked pine straw over the area, the fact that the area had been altered in such a manner gives rise to the inference that the condition was rendered neither naturally occurring nor obviously dangerous. Indeed, since Northwest was on notice that the area was dangerously muddy and that a resident had raked pine straw over the mud, a jury could have concluded Northwest had a duty to at least warn residents that the pine straw was not placed over the mud as a remedial measure. Moreover, based on Pryor’s testimony that she would not have fallen on the muddy spot had it not been for the pine straw, a jury could have concluded Northwest negligently acquiesced in making an otherwise naturally occurring and obviously dangerous condition both latent and more dangerous. I think that by concluding the placing of pine straw over the muddy area was an “immaterial” alteration of a natural condition, the *532majority has impermissibly viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to Northwest.
Further, I disagree with the majority’s opinion that Northwest could not have foreseen Pryor would choose to walk through the common area rather than take an alternate route. Despite the majority’s conclusion to the contrary the evidence in this case gives rise to at least the inference that Pryor took the only route reasonably available to her on the night in question. The majority states Pryor could have chosen either to walk between parked cars or to walk around a dumpster. However, Pryor testified she initially tried to walk between the track parked in front of the paved walk and another vehicle, but the mirrors on the truck were so wide that she could not go through. She also testified she did not feel it was feasible to walk under the mirrors. As to walking around the dumpster, Pryor testified she would have had to leave the paved area in any case, and that her mother had previously slipped on mud while walking in that area. Moreover, it is uncontested Northwest was aware Pryor’s mother had fallen in the area near the dumpster and that the truck which blocked Pryor’s access to the parking lot was parked in an established parking space.
I would also hold the trial court erred in finding, as a matter of law, that Pryor voluntarily assumed the risk of injury in choosing to walk across the common area. A defense based on the doctrine of assumption of the risk requires a showing that the plaintiff (1) had knowledge of the facts constituting a dangerous condition; (2) knew the condition was dangerous; (3) appreciated the nature and extent of the danger; and (4) voluntarily exposed herself to the danger. Senn v. Sun Printing Co., 295 S.C. 169, 367 S.E. (2d) 456 (Ct. App. 1988); see Hoeffner v. The Citadel, 311 S.C. 361, 429 S.E. (2d) 190 (1993) (the defense of assumption of the risk applies where the plaintiff assumes a risk of harm arising from the defendant’s negligent or reckless conduct); Mayes v. Paxton, 313 S.C. 109, 437 S.E. (2d) 66 (1993) (in the absence of express consent to assume the risk, the plaintiff consent can be implied where he understands and appreciates a known danger created by the defendant, and then freely and voluntarily exposes himself to it). Whether a party has assumed the risk of injury is ordinarily a question of fact to be determined by the jury and only rarely *533becomes a question of law for the court. Smalls v. Pioneer Mach., 316 S.C. 479,450 S.E. (2d) 609 (Ct. App. 1994); Wallace v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 300 S.C. 518, 389 S.E. (2d) 155 (Ct. App. 1989).
It is uncontested Pryor knew, prior to the accident, that the common area was dangerously slick when wet due to the lack of grass in some areas. However, on the night of her accident, the muddy area she knew to be dangerous had been covered with pine straw. Pryor testified that while she knew before her accident that pine straw had been placed over spots in the common area, she was unaware the pine straw was placed there by another resident until after her fall. Pryor further testified Northwest was aware the pine straw had been placed over the bare spots by the resident.
Viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to Pryor, she could have assumed Northwest placed the pine straw in the common area as a remedial measure. Thus, there exists a factual dispute as to whether Pryor knew and appreciated the nature and extent of the peril in which she placed herself on the night of her fall. I would hold the trial court erred in falling to submit the issue to the jury for determination.
Because I would reverse the trial court’s decision to grant Northwest’s motion for summary judgment, I will not address Pryor’s remaining argument on appeal.