Court Opinion

ID: 9954684
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-26 19:02:52.572035+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:12:11.910885
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/26/24 P. v. Sibomana CA2/1
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION ONE

 THE PEOPLE,                                                           B324810

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                                   (Los Angeles County
                                                                       Super. Ct. No. LA092131)
           v.

 LEWIS ABDULKALI SIBOMANA,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Laura F. Priver, Judge. Affirmed.
      Christopher Lionel Haberman, under appointment by
the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Blythe J. Leszkay,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
       Defendant Lewis Abdulkali Sibomana pleaded no contest
to a single charge of sodomy of an unconscious or asleep person.
After completing his sentence, he unsuccessfully moved to vacate
his plea. Sibomana now appeals, arguing that the court and his
counsel failed to advise him that a no contest plea would result
in his being deported, the court did not explain the difference
between a nonviolent crime under state law and an aggravated
felony under federal immigration law, and the trial court violated
the California Racial Justice Act of 2020 (Stats. 2020, ch. 317,
§ 1) (Racial Justice Act). We disagree and affirm the trial court’s
order denying relief and deny his request to remand to the trial
court to give him an opportunity to develop his Racial Justice Act
challenge.

                  FACTUAL BACKGROUND
      A.    The Charges and the Plea Negotiations
      Sibomana, a native and citizen of Rwanda, was admitted
to the United States on a student visa in 2011. In February
2012, he unsuccessfully applied for asylum, and in September
2015, the federal government initiated removal proceedings.
      In February 2020, Sibomana was arrested in Los Angeles
and charged with sodomy of an unconscious or asleep person
(Pen. Code,1 § 286, subd. (f)(1); count 1), oral copulation of
an unconscious or asleep person (§ 287, subd.(f)(1); count 2),
misdemeanor sexual battery (§ 243.4, subd. (e)(1); count 3), and
lewd act on a child more than 10 years younger than Sibomana
(§ 288, subd. (c)(1); count 4). These alleged crimes occurred
over a period of several months and followed a similar pattern.

      1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

                                 2
Sibomana met his victims in a social setting, invited them to his
apartment where he offered them liquor, and then engaged in
sexual activity after his victims were unable to consent or resist.
       On April 9, 2021, Sibomana and his counsel attended a
trial setting conference.2 The prosecution had already offered
a deal whereby, in exchange for Sibomana pleading guilty to
count 1, the remaining counts would be dismissed and Sibomana
would be sentenced to three years imprisonment with credit for
time served. The prosecutor informed the court that she had
“generously offered . . . a low term on count 1” and that it was
her understanding that the parties were present in court “for
a disposition” and “were expecting to come here for a plea.”
Sibomana’s counsel acknowledged that the pending offer “won’t
remain open after today” and that Sibomana was “ready to take
the deal” but had a question about the effect a plea would have
on Sibomana’s immigration status.3 “I think he’s ready to take
the deal, but I just—I explained to my client that if you’re not
here—if you’re not a citizen—and this—this type of offense has
immigration consequences. You can be deported. . . . But either

      2 Sibomana does not contend, nor does the record suggest,
that he was not present at all times during the proceedings
set out in the reporter’s transcript.
      3 Sibomana’s concern arises from the classification
of certain crimes as “aggravated felon[ies]” under federal
immigration law. An aggravated felony includes a crime of
violence with a prison sentence of a year or more. (8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(43)(F).) Accepting the People’s plea offer meant
pleading no contest to an aggravated felony. An individual
convicted of an aggravated felony is subject to mandatory
removal and is ineligible for asylum. (Moncrieffe v. Holder
(2013) 569 U.S. 184, 187–188.)

                                 3
way he’s advised that upon his release, they will most likely
check and catch any immigration issues if he has any. So unless
the court disagrees with that, I think that my client would be
satisfied upon the court’s confirmation.” In response, the court
stated, “The court is not an immigration expert. I would just say
he should understand that he will be deported, denied reentry or
naturalization.”
        Defense counsel asked for more time to consider the offer,
but the prosecutor responded that “the offer is pulled as of today.”
After an off-the-record discussion with Sibomana, defense counsel
told him, “You don’t get to . . . come in 10 days. Stop asking
that. Take the deal—now is the time if you’re not coming back
for trial some other date. You’ll be deported, everything else
that’s going to happen. That’s the federal government.” After
another conference with Sibomana, defense counsel informed
the court and prosecution, “Ready to proceed, to accept the offer.
[¶] . . . [¶] He’s going to plead no contest to count 1 for three
years.”
         Sibomana continued to ask questions, and the court
expressed its willingness to take as much time as needed.
“I think he wants to take the offer. That’s fine. He needs to
have his questions answered.” Ultimately, the court agreed to
reconvene after the lunch recess in order to resolve Sibomana’s
questions. “[I]f he has legitimate questions about the period of
parole, things that are legitimate questions—and I really—I
really—because this is a serious crime—and I want him to
understand—I will come back at 1:30 to take the plea.”
        By the time court called his case in the afternoon,
Sibomana had had more than two and a half hours to discuss
the plea offer with his counsel, and the court informed him it

                                 4
was “time to decide” whether to accept the plea. Sibomana
still had questions, but the hearing transcript confirms (and
Sibomana concedes) that none of those questions concerned
the effect of a no contest plea on Sibomana’s immigration status.
Instead, they concerned matters such as the duration of parole,
the mechanics of registering as a sex offender, and the fact
that by pleading no contest Sibomana was giving up his right
to appeal his conviction.
       Defense counsel eventually stated that Sibomana was
“ready to go forward.” Before Sibomana entered his plea, the
prosecutor advised Sibomana of the immigration consequences:
“As a result of the plea, do you understand that if you are not
a citizen of the United States, you must expect that the plea
of no contest in this case will result in deportation, exclusion
from admission or reentry to the United States, and a denial
of naturalization and amnesty?” Sibomana answered, “Yes.”
Thereafter, Sibomana pleaded no contest to count 1 and the
court dismissed counts 2 through 4.
       On May 7, 2021, the court sentenced Sibomana to
three years in state prison with credit for 909 days. Sibomana
was released from prison in August of 2021. In September,
federal immigration authorities took him into custody and
placed him in detention pending a hearing on his deportation.

      B.    Sibomana’s Motion To Vacate His Conviction
      On January 14, 2022, while in detention, Sibomana filed
a pro se motion to vacate his conviction. As grounds for his
motion, Sibomana asserted that “the court has not properly
advised [him] of the immigration consequences specified which
would be automatic deportation and exclusion from admission
to the United States.” In an accompanying declaration dated

                                5
December 15, 2021, Sibomana stated, “On April 7, 2021
the court failed to advise me that once I took a guilty plea
or nolo contendere, the conviction will result in an exclusion
from admission to the United States as required per . . .
[section] 1016.5[,] subd[.] (a).[4] [¶] Statute requires the court
to warn the defendant each of the three distinct possible
immigration consequences such as (deportation, exclusion from
admission to the United States and denial of naturalization). . . .
[¶] [T]he court has not properly advised me of the Immigration
consequences specified which would be automatic deportation
and exclusion from admission to the United States. . . . [¶]
I would not have pleaded guilty if I had known the potential
horrific outcome that could integrate during court on the day
April 7, 2021. I would have exercised my right to a jury trial.”
“My plea of no contest on April 7, 2021 was voluntary, but
completely unaware of the circumstances would lead automatic
deportation and exclusion admission to this country. [¶] I

      4 Section 1016.5, subd. (a), provides that, prior to
accepting a guilty or no contest plea, the trial court must
warn the defendant on the record that “[i]f you are not a
citizen, you are hereby advised that conviction of the offense
for which you have been charged may have the consequences
of deportation, exclusion from admission to the United States,
or denial of naturalization pursuant to the laws of the United
States.” Where, however, federal immigration law is clear
that removal is mandatory, the defendant must be so advised.
(People v. Lopez (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 698, 712 [warning
defendant that he may face adverse immigration consequences
“was insufficient to inform [him] that the conviction would
subject him to mandatory deportation and permanent exclusion
from the United States”].)

                                 6
received inaccurate advisement on the day of April 7, 2021[.] The
court failed to advise me that once I took plea guilty no contest
will be aggravated felony under federal immigration law[.] [¶]
The court did not explain to me the difference between nonviolent
crime under state law and aggravated felony under federal
immigration law.”
      Because Sibomana was in immigration detention
and unable to appear in support of his motion, the court
appointed counsel to represent him. On August 15, 2022,
counsel filed a motion to set aside Sibomana’s no contest plea
under section 1473.7, subdivision (a)(1). The motion argued
that Sibomana “would not have plead [sic] guilty to [the] § 286[,
subd.] (f) charge had he known that doing so would lead to his
deportation,” that “it was not until after the conviction that
he was made aware of the severe consequences of his plea to
the crime,” and “[h]ad he understood that the plea would lead
to deportation, he would not have accepted the plea and would
have explored alternative options to avoid any immigration
consequences.” The only evidence in support of the motion was
Sibomana’s declaration dated December 15, 2021.
      The prosecutor who had appeared at Sibomana’s plea and
sentencing hearings filed the People’s opposition to Sibomana’s
motion. The opposition quoted from the transcript of the plea
hearing, including defense counsel’s statement to Sibomana that
he would be deported, the court’s admonition that Sibomana’s
no contest plea “will” result in his being deported, excluded from
entry, and denied naturalization, the prosecutor’s statement that
the plea “will” result in deportation, exclusion from admission or
reentry to the country, and denial of naturalization and amnesty,

                                7
and Sibomana’s statement that he understood the prosecutor’s
admonition.
       On September 21, 2022, the same judge who had
presided over the plea and sentencing hearings the previous
year heard the motion to vacate the conviction. Likewise,
the same prosecutor who appeared at the plea and sentencing
hearing appeared at the motion hearing.
       In denying the motion, the court stated, “This court took
great pains and gave Mr. Sibomana a great deal of time both in
the morning and in the afternoon to make sure that this is what
he wanted to do, enter into this disposition. There’s no way to
make that clearer than to say, ‘you will be deported.’ And, I’m
sorry, I don’t have to accept his declaration as true. I do not
because I viewed him during the plea. I watched his demeanor.
I answered all his questions. When he wanted more time, I
gave him more time to speak to defense counsel. It was obvious
that immigration was in the forefront of his mind because it’s
one of the first things we talked about. [¶] . . . [¶] And I think
Mr. Sibomana is being disingenuous when he says he didn’t
understand. There’s no way he couldn’t have understood. I
do not believe his declaration. And I understand counsel filed
it, you know, based upon information and belief. That’s fine.
But I was here. I saw him. We made sure that he understood.
And I don’t know how to make it more clear than we made it to
Mr. Sibomana. So for those reasons, the court denies the motion
to vacate the conviction.”
       Sibomana filed a timely notice of appeal from the order
denying his motion.

                                 8
                          DISCUSSION
      A.    The Trial Court Correctly Found Sibomana
            Understood the Consequences of His Plea
      The motion for relief filed by Sibomana’s appointed counsel
relied on section 1473.7, subdivision (a)(1), under which “[a]
person who is no longer in criminal custody may file a motion
to vacate a conviction or sentence” that is “legally invalid due
to prejudicial error damaging the moving party’s ability to
meaningfully understand, defend against, or knowingly accept
the actual or potential adverse immigration consequences of a
conviction or sentence.”
      In People v. Espinoza (2023) 14 Cal.5th 311 (Espinoza),
our Supreme Court held that a party seeking relief under this
statute must satisfy a two-part test. “The defendant must first
show that he did not meaningfully understand the immigration
consequences of his plea.” (Id. at p. 319.) A party who
establishes his lack of understanding of the consequences of
his plea must then show that his misunderstanding constituted
prejudicial error, which “ ‘means demonstrating a reasonable
probability that the defendant would have rejected the plea if
the defendant had correctly understood its actual or potential
immigration consequences.’ ” (Ibid., quoting People v. Vivar
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 510, 529 (Vivar).)
      The trial court addressed only the first part of the test set
out in Espinoza, and rejected Sibomana’s claim that he did not
understand the effect of a no contest plea on his immigration
status. In the trial court Sibomana had the burden of proving
lack of understanding by a preponderance of the evidence.
(§ 1473.7, subd. (e)(1).) On appeal, we apply independent review
to evaluate whether Sibomana understood the consequences of

                                 9
his no contest plea. (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 319.)
“When courts engage in independent review, they should be
mindful that ‘ “[i]ndependent review is not the equivalent of
de novo review . . . .” ’ [Citation.] An appellate court may not
simply second-guess factual findings that are based on the trial
court’s own observations.” (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 527,
italics omitted.) Instead, “[w]hen courts engage in independent
review, they must give deference to the trial court’s factual
determinations if they are based on ‘ “ ‘the credibility of witnesses
the [superior court] heard and observed.’ ” ’ ” (Espinoza, supra,
14 Cal.5th at p. 320; Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 527–528
[“[i]n section 1473.7 proceedings, appellate courts should . . . give
particular deference to factual findings based on the trial court’s
personal observations of witnesses”].)
       Applying the independent review standard, we affirm
the trial court’s order. The trial court’s findings that Sibomana’s
declaration was untruthful, and that Sibomana understood the
consequences of his no contest plea, are based on the court’s
observation of Sibomana at his plea and sentencing hearings.
We defer to those findings. We have also reviewed the reporter’s
transcript of the plea and sentencing hearings, which confirm
that the court told Sibomana if he pleaded no contest he “will
be deported, denied reentry or naturalization.” Also, just before
entering his plea the prosecutor told Sibomana that he “must
expect that the plea of no contest in this case will result in
deportation, exclusion from admission or reentry to the United
States, and a denial of naturalization and amnesty.” When asked
by the prosecutor, “Do you understand that?” Sibomana replied,
“Yes.”

                                 10
        The only evidence supporting Sibomana’s motion is his
declaration stating he was never advised that accepting the
prosecution’s plea offer would result in his being deported.
A defendant making a section 1473.7 motion “must provide
‘ “ ‘objective evidence’ ” ’ to corroborate factual assertions.
[Citation.] Objective evidence includes facts provided by
declarations, contemporaneous documentation of the defendant’s
immigration concerns or interactions with counsel, and evidence
of the charges the defendant faced.” (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th
at p. 321.) Sibomana’s assertion that he was never given the
warnings required by section 1016.5, subdivision (a) is plainly
at odds with the objective evidence of the reporter’s transcript of
the plea hearing, which confirms that Sibomana was specifically
told that his plea would result in his deportation, exclusion from
admission to the United States and denial of naturalization.
        Sibomana also argues that he is entitled to relief because
he was not specifically advised he was pleading no contest to
an “aggravated felony.” (Boldface omitted.) Even if true, that
too does not change the result. It is sufficient that Sibomana
was warned of the consequences of pleading no contest to such
a felony. The court has no duty to advise the defendant about
federal immigration law other than to warn of the consequences
of a guilty or no contest plea as provided in section 1016.5,
subdivision (a). (People v. Gregor (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 147,
164 [trial court that “properly advised defendant of the possible
direct immigration consequences of his plea, that it may result
in his being deported, or excluded from admission to the
United States, or denied citizenship,” had no obligation to warn
that a guilty plea would prevent defendant from sponsoring other
family members for citizenship or a visa]; People v. Arendtsz

                                11
(2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 613, 618–619 [court’s duty to warn
of immigration consequences is limited to that required by
section 1016.5, subd. (a)]; People v. Gari (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th
510, 518 [reversing order granting relief from guilty plea by
naturalized citizen; trial court had no duty to advise defendant
that failure to disclose crimes could result in denaturalization].)
       In People v. Tapia (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 942, 953, the court
rejected a contention identical to the one Sibomana is asserting.
“Both in his motion and his declaration, [the defendant]
emphasizes he was not told he was pleading to an ‘aggravated
felony,’ apparently because that specific term was not used.
Whether the offense to which [the defendant] pled is classified
by the federal government as an aggravated felony is not a
consequence of the plea; it is simply a legal classification for
certain offenses. The consequence of the plea is that the charge
to which [the defendant] pled would lead to his deportation and
would bar him from reentry if he left the United States, and
[the defendant] was advised of these consequences.” (Ibid.)
       The cases Sibomana cites for authority that the trial
court erred in denying his motion are inapposite. For example,
the defendant in Espinoza pleaded no contest to various crimes
based on the assurance of his counsel’s assistant that “if he
pleaded no contest, ‘everything was going to be fine.’ ” (Espinoza,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 318.) The defendant’s counsel never
advised him about the consequences of pleading no contest.
The trial court who took the defendant’s plea advised him that
conviction “ ‘may’ ” have adverse immigration consequences.
(Ibid.) In People v. Manzanilla (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 891, 901,
the defendant’s counsel advised him that he would have an
immigration hearing following his no contest plea, but not that

                                12
he was virtually certain to be deported. He initialed a form
stating he understood that “ ‘I must expect my plea of guilty
or no contest will result in my deportation’ ” (id. at p. 899), but
explained that because of a visual impairment he was unable to
read the form and signed it based on his counsel’s assurance that
“ ‘it covered everything we had already talked about.’ ” (Id. at
p. 901.) Finally, in People v. Ruiz (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 1061,
the defendant was advised only that her no contest plea “may”
result in deportation, which was “not an adequate advisement
given the nature of her offense.” (Id. at p. 1065.)
        Sibomana’s circumstances are materially different.
He was expressly advised by his own counsel that “you’ll be
deported,” and by both the court and the prosecutor that his no
contest plea “will” result in deportation, exclusion from admission
to the United States, and a denial of naturalization. Sibomana
has pointed to no language barrier or other difficulty that could
account for his not understanding the plain meaning of the
warning that he was given. Unlike the cases he relies on, there
is neither a credible declaration by Sibomana establishing his
lack of understanding of the effects of his plea, nor objective
evidence that he did not understand the consequences. Thus,
Sibomana has not presented any reason why we should not defer
to the credibility findings of the judge who presided over both the
plea and sentencing hearings.

      B.    Even if Not Waived, Sibomana’s Racial Justice
            Act Claim Lacks Merit
       In his opening brief, Sibomana asserts that his no contest
plea should be vacated under the Racial Justice Act, Penal Code
section 745. This statute, which took effect in 2021, provides
that “[t]he state shall not seek or obtain a criminal conviction or

                                 13
seek, obtain, or impose a sentence on the basis of race, ethnicity,
or national origin.” (§ 745, subd. (a).) Violations of the statute
include an exhibition of “bias or animus towards the defendant
because of the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin”
(§ 745, subd. (a)(1)); the use of “racially discriminatory language
about the defendant’s race, ethnicity or national origin” (§ 745,
subd. (a)(2)); that the defendant “was charged or convicted of a
more serious offense than defendants of other races, ethnicities,
or national origins who have engaged in similar conduct and
are similarly situated” (§ 745, subd. (a)(3)); or that “[a] longer or
more severe sentence was imposed on the defendant than was
imposed on other similarly situated individuals [of other races,
ethnicities, or national origins] convicted of the same offense”
(§ 745, subd (a)(4)(A) & (B)). Procedurally, an aggrieved party
may file a motion pursuant to section 745 or “a petition for
writ of habeas corpus or a motion under [s]ection 1473.7, in a
court of competent jurisdiction.” (§ 745, subd. (b).) Under the
statute, it is the defendant’s burden to prove a violation “by a
preponderance of the evidence.” (§ 745, subd. (a).)
       The Attorney General first argues that Sibomana has
waived any claim under the Racial Justice Act by failing to raise
it in the trial court as part of his motion for relief. In response,
Sibomana argues that a motion under the Racial Justice Act
may be made in a “court of competent jurisdiction,” which, he
insists, includes the Court of Appeal. Whether a Racial Justice
Act claim may be made in the Court of Appeal in the first
instance was recently addressed in People v. Lashon (2024)
98 Cal.App.5th 804. In Lashon, the Court of Appeal reviewed
the Racial Justice Act, including amendments taking effect
on January 1, 2024, and concluded that language providing

                                  14
that claims under the Racial Justice Act may be raised “on
direct appeal” did not mean that a defendant could bypass the
trial court and assert a Racial Justice Act claim in the Court
of Appeal in the first instance. (Lashon, supra, at pp. 810, 812.)
The court in Lashon relied on “well-settled general appellate
rules of forfeiture” to conclude that under the Racial Justice Act,
including amendments effective January 1, 2024, a defendant
forfeited a claim by not first presenting it in the trial court.
(Lashon, supra, at p. 810.) “It makes little sense for the
Legislature to prescribe a comprehensive procedure for making
and adjudicating a section 745 motion at the trial level (including
a specific waiver provision for untimely motions), only to allow
defendants who could have but did not use that procedure
(thereby preserving their claim for review) to bypass that
procedure and pursue a section 745 claim for the first time
on direct appeal.” (Lashon, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 813.)
       We need not decide whether Lashon was correctly decided
on this point because Sibomana has failed to establish any
right to relief under that statute. It is his burden to establish
a violation by a preponderance of the evidence, but there is no
evidence in the record of a violation of the Racial Justice Act.
Sibomana has not directed us to any statements by the trial
judge or by counsel indicating racial animus, and our review
of the transcripts of the plea and sentencing hearings disclosed
none. To the contrary, the reporter’s transcripts show that the
trial court treated Sibomana with respect and expressed nothing
but concern that his questions be answered before accepting
his plea. As far as Sibomana receiving a greater sentence than
others similarly situated, the only evidence in the record is that
his plea deal was viewed by both the court and the prosecution

                                15
as a generous one. Finally, Sibomana points to no evidence in
the record, and our review has disclosed none, indicating that
Sibomana was charged with more serious offenses than others
who committed similar acts.
       Rather than address any of the indicia of bias set out in the
Racial Justice Act, Sibomana points to the trial court’s warning
that Sibomana “will” be deported if he pleads no contest.5
Sibomana argues that advising defendants that a guilty or no
contest plea “may” result in adverse immigration consequences
“is designed to protect the noncitizens by encouraging them to
obtain immigration advice and understand the consequences
of a conviction before they accept a plea bargain, and therefore
does not exhibit bias or animus, [whereas] the ‘will’ version
harms the noncitizen’s interests, discourages communication
with counsel and bargaining for immigration-safe dispositions,
and disregards the legislative intent of the advisement.”
       Far from an exercise in anti-immigrant bias, the warning
given was not only correct under the circumstances, it was
also required by law. Our Supreme Court has repeatedly held
that warning a defendant that a plea “may” have immigration
consequences is not sufficient, where the plea will in fact subject
the defendant to mandatory removal or exclusion. (Vivar, supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 523 [trial counsel’s failure to advise defendant of
“ ‘the certain immigration consequences of his plea’ ” renders his
representation “ ‘constitutionally deficient’ ”]; People v. Patterson
(2017) 2 Cal.5th 885, 895–896 [where deportation is a mandatory

      5 For purposes of this argument, Sibomana’s appellate
counsel is apparently conceding that Sibomana received this
warning, notwithstanding Sibomana’s declaration to the
contrary.

                                 16
consequence of a conviction, warning that a conviction “ ‘may
have’ ” immigration consequences is insufficient].)
      In short, even if Sibomana has not waived his Racial
Justice Act claim by failing to assert it in the trial court, we
conclude that he has failed to prove a violation of the Act by a
preponderance of the evidence.

      C.    Remand Is Not Appropriate
      Sibomana’s final argument is that we should remand this
case to the trial court to afford him an opportunity to further
develop the record in support of his Racial Justice Act claim. He
does not, however, identify any specific evidence that he believes
he could find, and offers no explanation why evidence could not
have been obtained before the date of the motion hearing.
Accordingly, we deny Sibomana’s request for a remand.

                                 17
                         DISPOSITION
     The order dated September 21, 2022 denying Sibomana’s
motion to vacate his conviction is affirmed.
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                      ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
We concur:

                BENDIX, J.

                WEINGART, J.

                             18