Court Opinion

ID: 9956920
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-03 14:07:46.876802+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:17:58.916370
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-0821-21

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

JAHMELL W. CROCKAM,

     Defendant-Appellant.
________________________

                   Submitted March 13, 2024 – Decided April 3, 2024

                   Before Judges Currier and Firko.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Ocean County, Indictment No. 11-03-0471.

                   Jennifer Nicole Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for
                   appellant (Howard Woodley Bailey, Designated
                   Counsel, on the brief).

                   Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney for
                   respondent (Steven A. Yomtov, Deputy Attorney
                   General, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM
      Defendant Jahmell W. Crockam appeals from an October 22, 2021 Law

Division order denying his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) alleging

ineffective assistance of trial counsel without an evidentiary hearing.       We

affirm.

                                        I.

      This matter comes before us a second time. Defendant appealed from the

denial of his first PCR petition. We affirmed in part and remanded in part

because defendant's previous PCR counsel only addressed two of the eight

claims asserted in defendant's pro se petition. We concluded PCR counsel did

not meet the necessary requirements in his representation of defendant, and

reversed the PCR court's denial of relief on the six claims that first PCR counsel

did not list or incorporate in his brief, and which were not addressed by the PCR

court. State v. Crockam, No. A-0617-18 (App. Div. Apr. 14, 2020).

      To resolve the issues raised in this PCR appeal, we need not discuss the

trial evidence, which is detailed in our unpublished opinions addressing PCR

and on direct appeal affirming defendant's convictions and sentence for the first-

degree murder of Officer Christopher Matlosz while performing his duties as a

law enforcement officer, second-degree possession of a weapon, a handgun, for

an unlawful purpose, and second-degree possession of a handgun. Defendant

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was sentenced to an aggregate sentence of life imprisonment without parole,

subject to the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. State v. Crockam, No.

A-4400-12 (App. Div. Feb. 3, 2016).

       On February 2, 2017, defendant filed a pro se petition for PCR alleging

ineffective assistance of trial counsel. In his certification in support of PCR,

defendant alleged he was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel because

trial counsel did not:    (1) challenge the warrant; (2) seek a cross-racial

identification charge; (3) investigate to determine if certain witnesses received

favorable "deals" for their testimony; (4) file a motion to dismiss the indictment;

(5) produce his grandmother, father, and mother for the Wade1 hearing; (6) file

a motion to suppress all witnesses who identified him and made statements

against him; (7) send an investigator to look into the photo that was sent out

prior to his arrest; and (8) object when a Muslim witness was sworn by placing

his hand on a Bible. Crockam, No. A-0617-18 (slip op. at 16-17).

       As noted in our PCR opinion, defendant's first PCR counsel only

addressed two of the eight claims in the supplemental brief: defense counsel (1)

was deficient because counsel did not call defendant's grandmother and failed

to obtain her cell phone records; and (2) failed to call defendant's grandmother

1
    United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
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to show that five witnesses who testified against him were identified as a result

of an illegal search of her cell phone. Id. at 17. First PCR counsel did not

incorporate defendant's other six contentions in his brief, and the first PCR court

did not address them. Ibid.

       On remand, we ordered the PCR court to assign new PCR counsel for

defendant, allow PCR counsel to submit supplemental certifications and another

brief, and permit the State to respond. Id. at 18. We also ordered the PCR court

to conduct oral argument on the petition and determine if defendant presented a

prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel. Ibid.

       Following our remand, on September 24, 2021, Judge Steven F. Nemeth

conducted oral argument and reserved decision. Upon considering the parties'

briefs and arguments, the judge entered an order accompanied by a

comprehensive twenty-five-page written decision denying defendant's PCR

petition alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel without an evidentiary

hearing.

       As a threshold matter, with respect to PCR counsel's obligations under

Rule 3:22-6(d),2 Judge Nemeth found that second PCR counsel listed and

2
    Rule 3:22-6(d) provides:

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incorporated defendant's pro se claims in her brief, and thus, met the

requirements set forth in State v. Webster, 187 N.J. 254 (2006). In accordance

with our mandate, the judge then considered each of defendant's pro se claims

not previously adjudicated by the first PCR court.

      With regard to defendant's first claim—that trial counsel failed to

challenge the search warrant—Judge Nemeth found that defendant had

previously raised this PCR claim and was thus procedurally barred under Rule

3:22-5.3 The claim was premised on the lack of a warrant and consent to obtain

information from defendant's grandmother's cell phone; and because the search

            Substitution: Withdrawal of Assigned Counsel. The
            court shall not substitute new assigned counsel at the
            request of defendant while assigned counsel is serving,
            except upon a showing of good cause and notice to the
            Office of the Public Defender. Assigned counsel may
            not seek to withdraw on the ground of lack of merit of
            the petition. Counsel should advance all of the
            legitimate arguments requested by the defendant that
            the record will support. If defendant insists upon the
            assertion of any grounds for relief that counsel deems
            to be without merit, counsel shall list such claims in the
            petition or amended petition or incorporate them by
            reference. Pro se briefs can also be submitted.
3
  Rule 3:22-5 states: "A prior adjudication upon the merits of any ground for
relief is conclusive whether made in the proceedings resulting in the conviction
or in any post-conviction proceeding brought pursuant to this [R]ule or prior to
the adoption thereof, or in any appeal taken from such proceedings."
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was unlawful, defendant contended the statements of the individuals allegedly

identified from her cell phone warranted suppression.

      However, as Judge Nemeth pointed out, the first PCR court had already

determined that defendant failed to provide sufficient evidence to support his

claim that trial counsel was deficient for not challenging the search and seizure

of the cell phone, because no affidavits were submitted to support the claim that

these individuals were identified through the search of the cell phone.

      Judge Nemeth noted that defendant only supplied an unsworn statement

from his grandmother alleging that she did not provide the police with

permission to search her cell phone and that her unsworn statement did not

mention whether the police obtained witness information as a result of th e

search.   Based upon this proffer, the first PCR judge had concluded that

defendant's claim amounted to a mere bald assertion, which did not entitle him

to an evidentiary hearing. We affirmed on direct appeal. Crockam, No. A-0617-

18, slip op. at 13-15.

      As for defendant's second claim—that trial counsel failed to seek a cross-

racial identification jury charge—Judge Nemeth found that the charge was given

and this claim lacked merit. Thus, Judge Nemeth ruled that "[t]he trial record

clearly shows that a cross-racial identification charge was provided to the jury,"

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and therefore, "trial counsel could not have been ineffective even if he did not

request one."

      With regard to defendant's third claim—that trial counsel failed to

investigate whether certain witnesses 4 received favorable "deals" for their

testimony—Judge Nemeth found this was "a mere bald assertion" because no

certifications or affidavits detailing what an investigation would have revealed

were submitted with the petition. Judge Nemeth noted plea agreements are a

matter of public record in this State, and the fact that defendant failed to provide

any record of the purported deals made by the State with these witnesses "speaks

volumes."

      Judge Nemeth found this deficiency in defendant's proofs amounted to a

"clear and convincing indication that no such 'deals' could have been used to

impeach any witnesses." In addition, the judge highlighted there were other

witnesses at trial who testified defendant had admitted to them that he murdered

Officer Matlosz.    Thus, Judge Nemeth concluded that defendant failed to

provide any explanation how such "deals," if they were made, refuted the

testimony of these other witnesses.

4
  Presumably, these witnesses are Darius Johnson, Ronnie Crippen, Tonya
Cook, and Corey Rua as identified in defendant's initial pro se PCR petition.
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      As to defendant's fourth claim—that trial counsel failed to file a motion

to dismiss the indictment—Judge Nemeth found this claim was previously raised

in the first PCR petition. Specifically, defendant asserted that the information

used by the State before the grand jury was discovered as a result of the

purported unlawful search of the cell phone, which amounted to the same

argument raised in defendant's first PCR claim. Because the first PCR judge

had already determined that defendant failed to provide sufficient evidence to

support this contention—that trial counsel was deficient by not challenging the

search and seizure of the cell phone—Judge Nemeth determined that defendant's

fourth claim was procedurally barred under Rule 3:22-5.

      As for defendant's fifth claim—that his trial counsel failed to produce his

grandmother, father, and mother for the Wade hearing—Judge Nemeth found

this was another bald assertion because defendant "fail[ed] to allege any

specificity with respect to how trial counsel was ineffective in this context." In

particular, the judge noted that defendant did not submit any affidavits or

certifications indicating what testimony these individuals would have given at

the Wade hearing.

      As to defendant's sixth claim—that trial counsel failed to file a motion to

suppress the testimony of witnesses who identified him—Judge Nemeth found

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this claim was previously raised before the first PCR court and was thus

procedurally barred under Rule 3:22-5. According to Judge Nemeth, the first

PCR court had already determined that defendant failed to provide sufficient

evidence in support of his claim that trial counsel was purportedly deficient in

not challenging the search and seizure of the grandmother's cell phone and this

claim was procedurally barred.

      As for defendant's seventh claim—that his trial counsel failed to

investigate the photo of him that was disseminated prior to his arrest—again,

Judge Nemeth found this was merely a bald assertion because defendant failed

to provide an affidavit or certification in support of his claim and advanced no

argument regarding what an investigation would have revealed.

      Finally, with regard to defendant's eighth claim—that counsel failed to

object when a witness, who was purportedly Muslim, was sworn in by placing

his hand on a Bible—Judge Nemeth found that defendant neither presented

proofs nor made any argument in support of this claim. The judge also found

defendant failed to establish that such a purported "error" would have materially

affected the outcome of the trial. This appeal followed.

      Before us, defendant raises the following sole point with subparts for our

consideration:

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            THE [PCR] COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE
            DEFENDANT'S PETITION FOR [PCR] WITHOUT
            AFFORDING HIM AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING
            TO FULLY ADDRESS HIS CONTENTION THAT HE
            RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
            COUNSEL.

            A.   THE PREVAILING LEGAL PRINCIPLES
            REGARDING    CLAIMS    OF    INEFFECTIVE
            ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, EVIDENTIARY
            HEARINGS, AND PETITIONS FOR [PCR].

            B.   DEFENDANT RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE
            ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL WHEN HIS TRIAL
            ATTORNEY FAILED TO REQUEST A MORE
            SPECIFIC JURY CHARGE ON CROSS-RACIAL
            IDENTIFICATION.

                                       II.

      We begin our analysis by acknowledging the legal principles governing

this appeal. PCR serves the same function as a federal writ of habeas corpus.

State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 459 (1992). When petitioning for PCR, a

defendant must establish, by a preponderance of the credible evidence, that he

is entitled to the requested relief. Ibid. To sustain this burden, the petitioner

must allege and articulate specific facts, "which, if believed, would provide the

court with an adequate basis on which to rest its decision." State v. Mitchell,

126 N.J. 565, 579 (1992).

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      To establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must

demonstrate: (1) "counsel's performance was deficient"; and (2) "the deficient

performance prejudiced the defense." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,

687 (1984); see also State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987) (adopting the

Strickland two-pronged analysis in New Jersey). "That is, the defendant must

establish, first, that 'counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness' and, second, that 'there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different.'" State v. Alvarez, 473 N.J. Super. 448, 455 (App. Div. 2022) (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688).

      When assessing Strickland's first prong, "[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel's

performance must be highly deferential." 466 U.S. at 669. "Merely because a

trial strategy fails does not mean that counsel was ineffective." State v. Bey,

161 N.J. 233, 251 (1999). Thus, a trial court "must indulge a strong presumption

that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional

assistance," and "the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the

circumstances, the challenged action [by counsel] 'might be considered sound

trial strategy.'" Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350

U.S. 91, 101 (1955)).

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       Under Strickland's second prong, the defendant must show "the deficient

performance prejudiced the defense." Id. at 687. That is, "counsel's errors were

so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is

reliable." Ibid. It is insufficient for the defendant to show the errors "had some

conceivable effect on the outcome." Id. at 693. Ultimately, "[a]n error by

counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the

judgment of a criminal proceeding if [it] had no effect on the judgment." Id. at

691.

       Further, "[a]ny factual assertion that provides the predicate for a claim of

relief must be made by an affidavit or certification pursuant to Rule 1:4-4 and

based upon personal knowledge of the declarant before the court may grant an

evidentiary hearing." R. 3:22-10(c); see State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super.

154, 170 (App. Div. 1999).

       Short of obtaining immediate relief, a defendant may show that an

evidentiary hearing is warranted to develop the factual record in connection with

an ineffective assistance claim. Preciose, 129 N.J. at 462-63. The mere raising

of a claim for PCR does not entitle the defendant to an evidentiary hearing.

Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. at 170. Rather, "[i]f the court perceives that holding

an evidentiary hearing will not aid the court's analysis of whether the defendant

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is entitled to [PCR], . . . then an evidentiary hearing need not be granted." State

v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 158 (1997) (citations omitted).

      The PCR court should grant an evidentiary hearing only when: "(1) the

defendant establishes a prima facie case in support of PCR; (2) the court

determines that there are disputed issues of material fact that cannot be resolved

by review of the existing record; and (3) the court determines that an evidentiary

hearing is required to resolve the claims asserted." State v. Vanness, 474 N.J.

Super. 609, 623 (App. Div. 2023) (citing State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 354

(2013)).

      "Where, as here, the PCR court has not conducted an evidentiary hearing,

we review its legal and factual determinations de novo." State v. Aburoumi, 464

N.J. Super. 326, 338 (App. Div. 2020); see also State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518,

540-41 (2013). However, "we review under the abuse of discretion standard the

PCR court's determination to proceed without an evidentiary hearing." State v.

Brewster, 429 N.J. Super. 387, 401 (App. Div. 2013) (citing Marshall, 148 N.J.

at 157-58).

      Rule 3:22-5 provides "[a] prior adjudication upon the merits of any ground

for relief is conclusive whether made in the proceedings resulting in the

conviction or in any [PCR] proceeding, . . . or in any appeal taken from such

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proceedings." "[A] prior adjudication on the merits ordinarily constitutes a

procedural bar to the reassertion of the same ground as a basis for post -

conviction review." Preciose, 129 N.J. at 476 (citing R. 3:22-5 ). "[A] defendant

may not use a petition for [PCR] as an opportunity to relitigate a claim already

decided on the merits." State v. McQuaid, 147 N.J. 464, 483 (1997) (citation

omitted).

      Based on our review of the record and applicable law, we are satisfied that

defendant failed to make a prima facie showing of ineffectiveness of trial

counsel under the Strickland/Fritz test warranting an evidentiary hearing.

Defendant's arguments raised on appeal were more than adequately addressed

by the PCR judge and do not warrant additional discussion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).

The claims were either procedurally barred or without substantive merit. We

affirm substantially for the reasons articulated by Judge Nemeth in his

thoughtful and thorough written opinion. We add the following comments.

      Defendant alleges trial counsel was ineffective in failing to request a

cross-racial identification charge that conformed with State v. Henderson, 208

N.J. 208, 267 (2011). "A cross-racial identification occurs when an eyewitness

is asked to identify a person of another race." Id. (quoting State v. Cromedy,

158 N.J. 112, 120 (1999)). "[T]he purpose of a cross-racial instruction is to alert

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the jury through a cautionary instruction that it should pay close attention to a

possible influence of race."      Cromedy, 158 N.J. at 133; id. at 120-23

(recognizing that a witness may have more difficulty making a cross-racial

identification). A cross-racial identification charge is appropriate "whenever

cross-racial identification is an issue at trial." Henderson, 208 N.J. at 299.

      The former Model Jury Charge for cross-racial identification provided:

            The fact that an identifying witness is not of the same
            race as the perpetrator and/or defendant, and whether
            that fact might have an impact on the accuracy of the
            witness' original perception and/or the accuracy
            subsequent identification. You should consider that
            ordinary human experience of people have greater
            difficulty in accurately identifying members of a
            different race.

            [(Emphasis added).]

In contrast, the new Model Jury Charge on cross-racial identification changed

"ordinary human experience" to "research has shown."

      Here, the trial court appropriately gave the cross-racial identification

charge that was then used in the Model Jury Charge. The Henderson Court

clearly explained that its decision changing the Model Jury Charge on cross-

racial identification would apply to "future cases only" and the ruling would take

effect "thirty days from the date [the Court] approves new [M]odel [J]ury

[C]harges on eyewitness identification." Henderson, 208 N.J. at 302.

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      At the time of defendant's trial, our Court had not yet approved the new

charge, and when the Court did so—six months after defendant's trial—the new

charge was to be applied prospectively. 5 Moreover, the revised cross-racial

identification charge is not "drastically different" from the former charge as

defendant contends. Indeed, the only real difference between the two charges is

the former Cromedy charge refers to "ordinary human experience," and the

revised Henderson charge notes "research has shown" to describe the "greater

difficulty in accurately identifying members of a different race." And, there was

corroborating evidence here based on defendant's own statements to a number

of individuals that he had shot and killed an officer, coupled with being

identified by multiple witnesses. Thus, trial counsel was not ineffective, and

defendant has not shown prejudice under either Strickland/Fritz prong.

      Affirmed.

5
   Henderson was decided on August 24, 2011. Defendant's trial concluded on
March 22, 2012. The new Model Jury Charge became effective on September
4, 2012.
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