Court Opinion

ID: 9877492
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-27 16:05:35.665606+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:30:12.058892
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                      No. 23-1093
                               Filed September 27, 2023

IN THE INTEREST OF A.P.,
Minor Child,

S.P., Mother,
       Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

      Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Clinton County, Kimberly K.

Shepherd, District Associate Judge.

      A mother appeals from the termination of her parental rights to her child.

AFFIRMED.

      J. David Zimmerman, Clinton, for appellant mother.

      Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Dion D. Trowers, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee State.

      Gina L. Kramer, Dubuque, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor child.

      Considered by Tabor, P.J., Buller, J., and Danilson, S.J.*

      *Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206

(2023).
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DANILSON, Senior Judge.

       A mother appeals from the termination of her parental rights to her child,

born in 2021.1 She contends the State failed to prove the grounds for termination

cited by the juvenile court, termination was not in the child’s best interests, and the

department failed to provide reasonable efforts. Upon our review, we affirm.

I.     Background Facts and Proceedings

       This family came to attention of the department of health and human

services in December 2021, when A.P. and the mother tested positive for illegal

substances (marijuana and THC) at the time of A.P.’s birth. Shortly thereafter, the

mother tested positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine. There were also

concerns about domestic violence in the home. In February 2022, the mother went

to inpatient substance-abuse treatment, which she completed successfully.

Shortly after her discharge in March, she was arrested for stabbing her paramour,

Chris, with scissors.2 The child was removed from the mother’s care, adjudicated

in need of assistance, and placed in foster care, where she has remained.

       In April, the mother again entered inpatient treatment, but she left the

program and relapsed. Meanwhile, the mother and Chris continued to be in a

relationship. In May, following a hearing, the juvenile court entered a dispositional

order noting the mother “reports she is getting back into a substance abuse

treatment program.” The court “emphasized to the mother the importance of time,

particularly given the age of the child, and told the mother she has no time to waste

1 The putative fathers’ parental rights were also terminated; no father appeals.
2 The State later dismissed its domestic charge against the mother, and a no-

contact order was also dismissed.
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in seeking the treatment that she clearly needs.” The mother went back to inpatient

treatment, but she was unsuccessfully discharged “due to fighting.”

       In August, following a dispositional review hearing, the court stated, “Since

the last hearing, the mother has failed to address her mental health, has been in

and out of substance abuse treatment, and has been inconsistent in staying in

contact with her child, stating she has ‘a lot going on.’” The court found the child

could not be safely placed in the mother’s care, noting, “The mother has lost

precious, crucial months in bonding time with this child.”

       By the following month, the mother had reentered inpatient treatment and

participated in visits with the child at the treatment center. Following a permanency

hearing in November, the court entered an order noting, “Since the last hearing,

the mother has been diligently working on maintaining her sobriety.” The court

further noted, “The visits between the child and the mother are going well, and the

mother is establishing a strong bond with the child.” In light of the mother’s

progress, the court granted her a six-month extension to continue to work toward

reunification.

       The mother was discharged successfully from inpatient treatment in

December. However, she moved back in with Chris and shortly thereafter, “there

was an argument between the two of them and [the mother] relapsed on

methamphetamine.” In late January 2023, the mother was arrested on an active

warrant from 2020, and she was incarcerated for ten days.

       The court entered a review order in February, noting that “[s]ince [the six-

month extension was granted], the mother has taken a giant step backward in her

progress toward completing the Case Plan goals” “[d]espite repeated warnings the
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Court has given the mother about the short timelines of this case.” The court

denied the mother’s request for a second extension and determined a change of

the permanency goal from reunification to termination of parental rights was in the

child’s best interests.

       The termination hearing took place in May. The parties agreed the mother

was employed, had “appropriate” housing, and was participating in substance-

abuse and mental-health counseling. The mother testified her last date of use was

in the “middle of January” and she felt her treatment was going “better” than it had

in the past. She further stated she was no longer in a relationship with Chris and

she had last spoken to him at the “[e]nd of February, maybe beginning of March.”

The mother believed she would be ready to care for the child “[i]n the very near

future,” and she requested “a very short amount of additional time” for her to “work

for the return of [A.P.] to her care.”

       The juvenile court denied the request for an extension and entered an order

terminated the mother’s parental rights under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(d),

(e), (h), and (l) (2023). She appeals.

II.    Standard of Review

       Appellate review of termination-of-parental-rights proceedings is de novo.

In re A.B., 957 N.W.2d 280, 293 (Iowa 2021).           Our paramount concern in

termination proceedings is the best interests of the children. In re L.T., 924 N.W.2d

521, 529 (Iowa 2019).

III.   Grounds for Termination

       The mother’s rights were terminated on multiple grounds; we affirm if any

one of the grounds is supported by the record. See In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764,
                                          5

774 (Iowa 2012) (“When the juvenile court terminates parental rights on more than

one statutory ground, we may affirm the juvenile court’s order on any ground we

find supported by the record.”). We will focus on paragraph (h). With regard to

that section, the mother only appears to challenge the fourth element—whether

the child could be returned to her care. This element is satisfied when the State

establishes the children cannot be safely returned to the parent at the time of the

termination hearing. In re T.W., No. 20-0145, 2020 WL 1881115, at *2–3 (Iowa

Ct. App. Apr. 15, 2020).

       The mother claims, “Reunification between [her] and A.P. was imminent.”

Perhaps in November 2022 the mother’s claim would have been more persuasive.

But even after the court granted her additional time, she continued involvement in

a domestically-violent relationship and used illegal substances. The mother went

to four inpatient treatment programs “during the life of this case”; her last date of

discharge was in December 2022. She tested positive for methamphetamine that

same month, and she tested positive for THC in February 2023, but she stated her

last date of use was in the “middle of January.” The mother is twenty-five years

old. She testified she first tried drugs at age thirteen and started to use regularly

at age seventeen. But she testified her substance-abuse treatment was “going

good”—“better” than her “previous attempts.”

       We commend the mother’s continued effort to work on her sobriety. And

although the mother appeared to be turning her life around in the several months

prior to the termination hearing, her actions were too little too late. See In re C.B.,

611 N.W.2d 489, 495 (Iowa 2000) (“The changes in the two or three months before

the termination hearing, in light of the preceding eighteen months, are
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insufficient. . . . [The mother] needed to begin her efforts to pull her life together

and resume care for her children much earlier.”). The State proved the child could

not be safely returned to the mother at the time of the hearing. The mother’s

challenge to the statutory grounds for termination fails.

IV.    Best Interests

       Termination also must serve the child’s best interests. See Iowa Code

§ 232.116(2). The guardian ad litem expressed her “concern[ ] about the judgment

or the inability to keep [A.P.] safe that [the mother’s history of drug use and

involvement in domestic violence] shows. [A.P.] is very young. She is fully

dependent on a caretaker to keep her safe.”         A caseworker further testified,

“Although [the mother] has made some progress, it’s recent progress. There’s not

a significant length of stability or sobriety demonstrated, and so it’s uncertain

whether she will maintain that and be able to be a safe and sober caregiver for her

daughter.”

       We concur the child deserves permanency and an opportunity to be raised

in a safe and stable home free of drugs and domestic abuse. See id. (noting our

statutory best-interests framework considers “the child’s safety, . . . the best

placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child, and . . .

the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child”); In re A.M.,

843 N.W.2d 100, 112 (Iowa 2014) (“It is well-settled law that we cannot deprive a

child of permanency after the State has proved a ground for termination under

section 232.116(1) by hoping someday a parent will learn to be a parent and be

able to provide a stable home for the child.”). Upon our review, we conclude

termination is in the child’s best interests.
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V.     Exceptions to Termination

       Once the State has proven grounds for termination, the burden shifts to the

parent to prove a permissive exception under section 232.116(3). In re A.S., 906

N.W.2d 467, 475–76 (Iowa 2018). The mother claims the closeness of the parent-

child bond should prompt the court to apply an exception to termination. See Iowa

Code § 232.116(3)(c). Both caseworkers acknowledged a “strong” bond between

the mother and A.P., and commented “they seem comfortable when they engage

with each other.”    However, application of the exception under paragraph (c)

“requires clear and convincing evidence that ‘termination would be detrimental to

the child at the time due to the closeness of the parent-child relationship.’” In re

A.B., 956 N.W.2d 162, 169 (Iowa 2021) (quoting Iowa Code § 232.116(3)(c)). The

mother has not established termination of her rights will be detrimental to the child.

VI.    Reasonable Efforts

       The mother asserts on appeal the department failed to provide reasonable

efforts by not “increase[ing] her interactions with A.P.” after she “made substantial

strides in addressing her substance-abuse and mental-health issues.”3 The State

responds that waiting until the termination hearing to raise her complaints about

services was too late to preserve error.4 We agree. See In re T.S., 868 N.W.2d

3 Reasonable efforts “covers both the efforts to prevent and eliminate the need for

removal.” In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 493 (Iowa 2000). “The reasonable efforts
concept would broadly include a visitation arrangement designed to facilitate
reunification while protecting the child from the harm responsible for the removal.”
In re L.M., 904 N.W.2d 835, 839 (Iowa 2017) (citation omitted).
4 Indeed, at the termination hearing, the guardian ad litem observed,

        I think the Court has every hearing we’ve had warned [the mother]
        up and down that time was very short and progress needed to be
        made. And unfortunately, we’re still, even after a six-month
        extension of time, at fully supervised visits. There has been talk
                                         8

425, 442 (Iowa Ct. App. 2015) (noting the parent has the responsibility “to demand

other, different, or addition services prior to the termination hearing” and when the

parent “fails to request other services at the proper time, the parent waives the

issue and may not later challenge it at the termination proceeding” or on appeal

(citations omitted)). While the record indicates the mother “asked [department

caseworkers] for unsupervised or partially supervised” visitation, “raising the issue

to someone other than the court does not preserve error.” In re A.M., No. 23-1022,

2023 WL 5092472, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 9, 2023) (citing In re C.H., 652 N.W.2d

144, 148 (Iowa 2002)); In re L.P., No. 22-1824, 2023 WL 1814772, at *3 (Iowa Ct.

App. Feb. 8, 2023) (“The mother did not file a motion with the juvenile court

requesting increased visitation or moving the location of visitation, waiving the

claims on appeal.”).

       In any event, we find reasonable efforts were made. The juvenile court

noted the following services were provided, “Parent Partners, [solutions-based

casework], supervised interactions, inpatient and outpatient substance abuse

treatment, random drug testing, mental health treatment, SafePath, Parent Pals,

transportation, and solution focused meetings.” Further, while the mother was in

her latest stint of inpatient treatment, the department allowed partial supervised

interactions and “some overnights.” As the caseworker explained, “Those were

granted knowing that they have people there who can supervise.” But after the

mother’s discharge from treatment, the department determined unsupervised visits

       about more visits, medical appointments, that sort of thing. There’s
       been no formal request to the Court to—for anything different or that
       reasonable efforts are not being made.
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were not “appropriate yet” because “there’s no reassurance that certain individuals

aren’t around” and “[t]here’s no indication that [the mother’s sobriety] will be long-

term.” Under the circumstances, the department’s decision to decline the mother’s

request for unsupervised visitation in her home at this time was reasonable. See

L.M., 904 N.W.2d at 839; L.T., 924 N.W.2d at 529 (“[T]he interests of the child take

precedence over family reunification.”).

       We affirm the termination of the mother’s parental rights.

       AFFIRMED.