Court Opinion

ID: 9387012
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-14 15:01:00.786407+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:10.589335
License: Public Domain

20-2241
    Garcia v. Garland
                                                                                   BIA
                                                                               Kolbe, IJ
                                                                           A201 347 244

                             UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                   SUMMARY ORDER
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         At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
    for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
    United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
    New York, on the 14th day of April, two thousand twenty-
    three.

    PRESENT:
             JOSEPH F. BIANCO,
             STEVEN J. MENASHI,
             BETH ROBINSON,
                  Circuit Judges.
    _____________________________________

    MARIO RENE GARCIA,
             Petitioner,

                        v.                                       20-2241
                                                                 NAC
    MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
    STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
             Respondent.
    _____________________________________

    FOR PETITIONER:                     Edgar L. Fankbonner, Goldberger &
                                        Dubin, PC, New York, NY.
FOR RESPONDENT:                Brian Boynton, Acting Assistant
                               Attorney General; Claire L.
                               Workman, Senior Litigation
                               Counsel; John F. Stanton, Trial
                               Attorney, Office of Immigration
                               Litigation, United States
                               Department of Justice, Washington,
                               DC.

      UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a

Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review

is DENIED.

      Petitioner Mario Rene Garcia, a native and citizen of

Guatemala, seeks review of a June 15, 2020, decision of the

BIA affirming a November 13, 2019, decision of an Immigration

Judge (“IJ”) denying his application for asylum, withholding

of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture

(“CAT”), and his motion for a continuance.        In re Mario Rene

Garcia, No. A201 347 244 (B.I.A. June 15, 2020), aff’g No.

A201 347 244 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Nov. 13, 2019).        We assume

the   parties’   familiarity    with   the   underlying   facts   and

procedural history.

      We have reviewed the IJ’s        decision   as modified and

supplemented by the BIA.       See Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of

Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 2005); Yan Chen v.

Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 2005).         The agency did

                                  2
not err in finding that Garcia                   failed to establish his

eligibility for relief based on his claim that gang members

assaulted him when he was 15 years old or in denying his

request     for     a    continuance       to     obtain   a     psychological

examination       to    determine   whether        he   suffers    from   post-

traumatic         stress     disorder           (“PTSD”)    or      attention-

deficit/hyperactivity disorder (“ADHD”).

    Asylum and Withholding of Removal

    The applicable standards of review are well established.

“[T]he administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless

any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to

the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).                   Thus, “we review

the agency’s decision for substantial evidence and must defer

to the factfinder’s findings based on such relevant evidence

as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a

conclusion. . . . By contrast, we review legal conclusions de

novo.” Singh v. Garland, 11 F.4th 106, 113 (2d Cir. 2021)

(internal quotation marks omitted).

    An applicant for asylum and withholding of removal “must

establish that race, religion, nationality, membership in a

particular social group, or political opinion was or will be

at least one central reason for persecuting the applicant.”

                                       3
8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i); see also id. § 1231(b)(3)(A);

Quituizaca v. Garland, 52 F.4th 103, 105–06, 114 (2d Cir.

2022).    Garcia failed to establish that the harm he suffered

and fears was or would be on account of a protected ground.

       Garcia asserted that gang members had and would target

him on account of his membership in social groups comprised

of “skilled tradespersons” and “Guatemalans who have informed

on the gangs to local authorities” and on account of an

imputed    anti-gang       political    opinion.      “To   succeed   on   a

particular social group claim, the applicant must establish

both that the group itself was cognizable, and that the

alleged persecutors targeted the applicant on account of

h[is] membership in that group.”             Paloka v. Holder, 762 F.3d

191,    195   (2d       Cir.   2014)   (quotation   marks   and   citation

omitted).     For a political opinion claim, “[t]he applicant

must . . . show, through direct or circumstantial evidence,

that the persecutor’s motive to persecute arises from the

applicant’s political belief,” Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 426

F.3d 540, 545 (2d Cir. 2005), which “must involve some support

for or disagreement with the belief system, policies, or

practices     of    a    government    and   its   instrumentalities,      an

entity that seeks to directly influence laws, regulations, or

                                        4
policy,     an   organization        that    aims     to   overthrow     the

government, or a group that plays some other similar role in

society,” Zelaya-Moreno v. Wilkinson, 989 F.3d 190, 199–200

(2d Cir. 2021) (citations omitted).

     The agency reasonably concluded that Garcia failed to

establish a nexus between the harm he suffered and fears and

his proposed social groups or an imputed anti-gang opinion.

He   testified   that    gang   members       twice    targeted    him   for

recruitment and financial purposes.            He did not testify that

they were interested in him on account of his trade.                     And

aside from his testimony that gang members called him a

“snitch,” among other names, as he rode public transport

sometime between the attack he reported to police in 1994 and

his departure from Guatemala in 2006, Garcia did not testify

that gang members were aware of his police report or that

they ever mentioned it to him.              Nor did he testify that he

had expressed a disagreement with the gang’s “belief system,

policies, or practices,” or that the gang members accused him

of   such   opinion.      Zelaya-Moreno,        989    F.3d   at   199–200.

Accordingly, Garcia did not provide facts connecting his

attacks and his fears based on those attacks to his membership

in   the    social     groups   of     “skilled       tradespersons”     and

                                      5
“Guatemalans     who   have   informed      on    the   gangs     to   local

authorities” or to an imputed anti-gang political opinion.

Accordingly, the agency did not err in finding that the gang

targeted him based on the gang’s interest in recruiting

members and accumulating wealth, which are not protected

grounds.   See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(i), 1231(b)(3)(A);

Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 70, 73 (2d Cir. 2007) (“When

the harm visited upon members of a group is attributable to

the incentives presented to ordinary criminals rather than to

persecution, the scales are tipped away from considering

those people a ‘particular social group.’”); see also Zelaya-

Moreno, 989 F.3d at 200 (“[R]efusing to join a gang without

more does not constitute a political opinion.”); Yueqing

Zhang, 426 F.3d at 545 (requiring “direct or circumstantial

evidence” of nexus); Melgar de Torres v. Reno, 191 F.3d 307,

313–14 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting that “random violence” and

“general crime conditions” are not grounds for asylum).

    Because Garcia failed to establish a nexus between the

harm he suffered and fears and a protected ground, which was

dispositive of asylum and withholding of removal, we do not

consider   the   agency’s     alternative        finding   that   Garcia’s

proposed   groups      were   not       cognizable.        See     8 U.S.C.

                                    6
§§ 1101(a)(42),   1158(b)(1)(A),   (B)(i),   1231(b)(3)(A);   see

also INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (“As a general

rule courts and agencies are not required to make findings on

issues the decision of which is unnecessary to the results

they reach.”).

    CAT Relief

    Unlike asylum and withholding of removal, protection

under the CAT does not require a nexus to a protected ground.

See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c), 1208.17(a).      CAT applicants have

the burden to show they would “more likely than not” be

tortured by or with the acquiescence of government officials.

8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c), 1208.18(a).     The agency reasonably

concluded that Garcia did not establish a likelihood of

torture because he was attacked decades earlier, he had

remained unharmed in Guatemala for more than a decade after

he was attacked, his teenage children remain unharmed in his

hometown, and gang members had not threatened him with future

harm.   See Jian Xing Huang v. U.S. INS, 421 F.3d 125, 129 (2d

Cir. 2005) (“In the absence of solid support in the record

. . . [an applicant’s] fear is speculative at best.”); Mu-

Xing Wang v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 130, 144 n.20 (2d Cir. 2003)

(providing that a likelihood of torture requires an applicant

                              7
to “establish that there is greater than a fifty percent

chance . . . that he will be tortured upon return to his . . .

country of origin”).      Because Garcia failed to establish a

likelihood   of     torture,   we       do     not   reach   the   agency’s

alternative finding that he did not demonstrate the requisite

government    acquiescence      to           torture.        See   8 C.F.R.

§§ 1208.16(c), 1208.18(a); see also Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. at

25.

      Continuance

      Garcia argues that the agency abused its discretion and

violated due process by failing to grant a continuance for a

psychologist to evaluate him.           We review the agency’s denial

of a continuance for abuse of discretion, Morgan v. Gonzales,

445 F.3d 549, 551 (2d Cir. 2006), and constitutional claims

de novo, Gjerjaj v. Holder, 691 F.3d 288, 292 (2d Cir. 2012).

An IJ “may grant a motion for continuance for good cause

shown,” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.29, and only “abuse[s] his discretion

in denying a continuance if (1) his decision rests on an error

of law (such as the application of the wrong legal principle)

or a clearly erroneous factual finding or (2) his decision—

though not necessarily the product of a legal error or a

clearly erroneous factual finding—cannot be located within

                                    8
the range of permissible decisions,” Morgan, 445 F.3d at 551–

52 (quotation marks and brackets omitted).      “Parties claiming

denial of due process in immigration cases must, in order to

prevail, allege some cognizable prejudice fairly attributable

to the challenged process.”      Garcia-Villeda v. Mukasey, 531

F.3d 141, 149 (2d Cir. 2008) (quotation marks omitted).          “In

order . . . to show . . . actual prejudice, [a petitioner]

must make a prima facie showing that he would have been

eligible for the relief and that he could have made a strong

showing in support of his application.”         Rabiu v. INS, 41

F.3d 879, 882–83 (2d Cir. 1994).

    The agency did not abuse its discretion or violate due

process   in   denying   a   continuance   because,   contrary    to

Garcia’s argument, a psychological report diagnosing him with

PTSD and ADHD would not have changed the outcome of his case

by excusing the untimely filing of his asylum application,

demonstrating his incompetence to proceed, or establishing

his eligibility for humanitarian asylum.         See Morgan, 445

F.3d at 551–52; Rabiu, 41 F.3d at 882–83; cf. Elbahja v.

Keisler, 505 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir. 2007) (concluding that an

IJ does not abuse his discretion by denying a continuance

sought to pursue relief that is speculative).          First, the

                                 9
agency did not rely on the untimeliness of Garcia’s asylum

application to deny relief.                   Second, Garcia’s attorney never

expressed concern with his competency and the record did not

include     indicia         of    mental           incompetence,          such    as     the

“inability      to    understand             and    respond       to    questions,       the

inability       to    stay       on     topic,       . . .        a    high      level     of

distraction[,]         . . .          [or]    evidence       of       mental     illness.”

Matter of M-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 474, 479 (B.I.A. 2011).

Third,    Garcia      was     not       eligible       for    humanitarian          asylum

because    he    failed          to    establish       that       he     suffered        past

persecution on account of a protected ground.                              See 8 C.F.R.

§ 1208.13(b)(1)(iii) (humanitarian asylum provision); Kone v.

Holder,    596       F.3d    141,       153    (2d     Cir.       2010)    (recognizing

“humanitarian         asylum’s         foundational          requirement         that    the

applicant must herself establish past persecution and herself

be a refugee”).             Accordingly, the agency did not abuse its

discretion or violate Garcia’s due process rights in denying

a continuance.          See Morgan, 445 F.3d at 551-52; Garcia-

Villeda, 531 F.3d at 149.

                                              10
    For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is

DENIED.   All pending motions and applications are DENIED and

stays VACATED.

                            FOR THE COURT:
                            Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
                            Clerk of Court

                              11