Court Opinion

ID: 9494976
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:51:32.326405+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:56:44.542175
License: Public Domain

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I am in complete agreement with my colleagues that there are no special pleading requirements for civil rights matters. The Supreme Court made that proposition clear in Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 113 S.Ct. 1160, 122 L.Ed.2d 517 (1993), and again recently in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 122 S.Ct. 992, 998, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002) (noting this general rule in a discussion concerning pleading requirements under Title VII). These cases have worked a sea change in our circuit’s earlier jurisprudence. Cf. Patton v. Przybylski, 822 F.2d 697 (7th Cir.1987).
As my colleagues note, to satisfy the mandate of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading merely must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Except in a limited set of cases,1 this notice pleading regime eschews any requirement that “a claimant [ ] set out in detail the facts upon which he bases his claim.” Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168, 113 S.Ct. 1160 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. *101199, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). Indeed, a complaint need not reference every element of a legal theory to satisfy Rule 8(a)(2)’s requirements. See Scott v. City of Chicago, 195 F.3d 950, 951 (7th Cir.1999). To the contrary, through his pleading, a party simply must provide the “defendant fair notice of what the plaintiffs claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168, 113 S.Ct. 1160 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). Accordingly, so long as the pleading contains facts sufficient to permit the district court and defendant “to understand the gravamen of the plaintiffs complaint,” Scott, 195 F.3d at 951, it satisfies notice pleading requirements.2
In the wake of Swierkiewicz, this court has emphasized that there are no special pleading requirements in prisoners’ civil rights cases. See Higgs v. Carver, 286 F.3d 437 at 439 (7th Cir.2002). In Higgs, the district court dismissed a prisoner’s claims of retaliation because the complaint failed to allege a chronology of events from which retaliation could be inferred. This court reversed, noting that “[a]ll that need be specified is the bare minimum facts necessary to put the defendant on notice of the claim so he can file an answer.” Id. The plaintiff had not asserted a bald claim of retaliation, failing to identify the suit and act comprising the retaliatory activity. See id. Rather, he had identified both the suit and the retaliatory act, providing the defendant with adequate notice of his claims thereby satisfying the pleading requirements of Rule 8(a)(2). See id.
In Higgs, we rejected a district court’s insistence on the allegation of a “chronology of events” because that requirement, as understood and applied by the district court in that case, was at odds with the “plain statement” standard of pleading required by the rules. Indeed, in many, perhaps most, cases, requiring the pleading of a chronology of events will be at odds with the liberal notice pleading requirements of Rule 8(a)(2). Plaintiffs, including prisoners, need not articulate detailed facts in order to state a claim for retaliation. A litany of particularized facts might be appropriate if the purpose of the complaint were to establish the plausibility of the plaintiffs allegations. But, as my colleagues note, the complaint is simply not designed to perform that function.
Having stated my agreement with the general proposition expressed in today’s opinion, I must also note that it would be an overstatement to assert that the pleading of a chronology of facts is, in all cases, symptomatic of adherence to a heightened pleading standard. As some of our cases make clear,3 this formulation is not always *1012an attempt to impose a heightened pleading requirement. Rather, a chronology of events formulation simply can serve as a shorthand for the proposition that, to provide a defendant and the court with adequate notice of the nature of the pending claims, a prisoner must allege more than the simple legal conclusion of retaliation. Indeed, a chronology of events is often the most expeditious way for a plaintiff to provide a defendant with adequate notice of the nature of the plaintiffs claims. As Higgs implicitly recognized, a plaintiff alleging retaliation must reference, at a minimum, the suit or grievance spawning the retaliation and the acts constituting retaliatory conduct. Higgs, 286 F.3d 437, at 439. Absent these allegations, a defendant would not know how to respond to the complaint.
In short, in the context of a retaliation allegation, the obligation of adequate notice to the defendant is sometimes most easily accomplished by the statement of the essential events that constitute the retaliation. This situation arises especially when the alleged retaliation constitutes a series of acts, inconsequential in themselves, that in the aggregate constitute actionable retaliatory conduct.

. Rule 9(b) enumerates these exceptions. See Swierkiewicz, 122 S.Ct. at 998; Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168, 113 S.Ct. 1160. In particular, a party must plead with particularity the facts constituting fraud or mistake. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b). The Supreme Court has expressed reluctance to expand the particularity requirement beyond those cases enumerated in Rule 9(b). See Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168, 113 S.Ct. 1160 (noting the maxim expres-sio unius est exclusio alterius).

. Indeed, courts often reference Form 9 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Forms as an exemplar of the notice pleading requirements. See, e.g., Swierkiewicz, 122 S.Ct. at 998 n. 4. Form 9, which sets forth a claim for negligence, states: "On June 1, 1936, in a public highway called Boylston Street in Boston, Massachusetts, defendant negligently drove a motor vehicle against plaintiff who was then crossing said highway.” This short statement suffices under Rule 8(a)(2).

. In Black v. Lane, 22 F.3d 1395 (7th Cir.1994), we emphasized, in the context of a retaliation claim, that "a heightened pleading rule does not apply to § 1983 claims” and that the prisoner's complaint need only conform "with the liberal system of notice pleading” set forth in Rule 8. Id. at 1399. By alleging the acts of harassment and beatings he allegedly had suffered, the plaintiff had fulfilled his obligation of notice. In Zimmerman v. Tribble, 226 F.3d 568 (7th Cir.2000), the court reversed the dismissal of Zimmerman’s complaint for retaliation because the plaintiff, by alleging a short chronology of the events constituting the alleged retaliation had not merely asserted a "legal conclusion of retaliation.” Id. at 573. Rather, the plaintiff stated sufficient facts — the simple allegation that he had been denied access to the library after he filed a grievance against a prison official — to survive dismissal. Indeed, the court noted that "[ajlthough we would wish *1012for more detail, we find that the chronology alleges the bare minimum necessary.” Id.