Court Opinion

ID: 4062465
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2016-09-29 20:30:00.995701+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:31:55.180310
License: Public Domain

ACCEPTED
                                                                              12-15-00277-CV
                                                                 TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                               TYLER, TEXAS
                                                                         12/2/2015 5:11:54 PM
                                                                                    Pam Estes
                                                                                       CLERK

                      CASE NO. 12- 15-00277 -CV

                               IN THE                         FILED IN
                TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS               12th COURT OF APPEALS
                                                            TYLER, TEXAS
                         at Tyler                      12/2/2015 5:11:54 PM
                                                              PAM ESTES
                                                                Clerk

     fn re   t'l"l   Texas County Mutua| fnsurance Company

  Petition for Writ of Mandamus from Cause No. 2014-1365-A
            188th District Court, Gregg County, Texas
              Honorable David Brabham Presiding

REAL PARTY IN INTEREST THOMAS JACKSON'S RESPONSE
   TO RELATOR'S PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS

                                GLENN PtrRRY
                                Texas Bar No. 15801500
                                E-mail: sap@sloanfirm.com
                                JUSTIN A. SMITH
                                Texas Bar No. 24068415
                                E-mail: jsmith@sloanfirm.com
                                Sloan, Bagley, Hatcher & Perry
                                Law Firm
                                101 East Whaley Street
                                P.O. Drawer 2909
                                Longview, Texas 75606
                                Telephone: 903- 7 57 -7 OO0
                                Telecopier: 903-757 -7 57 4

                               ATTORNEYS FOR REAL PARTY
                               IN INTEREST THOMAS
                               JACKSON

  December 2,2015
                    ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

                IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL
     1. AAA Texas County Mutual Insurance Company, Relator
       Appellate Counsel for Relator       Gregory R. Ave
                                           Texas Bar No. 01448900
                                           E -mail: Gre s. ave@wbclawfrrm.com
                                           Jay R. Harris
                                           Texas Bar No. 00793907
                                           Walters, Balido & Crain, LLP
                                           Meadow Park Tower, Suite 1500
                                           I044O North Central Expressway
                                           Dallas, Texas 75231
                                           Telephone: 214-347-8310
                                           Facsimile : 2t4'347'831 1

     2. AAA   Texas County Mutual Insurance Company, Relator

       Trial Counsel for ßelatof           Carlos Balido
                                           Texas Bar No.O1631230
                                           E -mail : carlos.balido@wbclawfrrm.com
                                       Walters, Balido & Crain, LLP
                                       Meadow Park Tower, Suite 1500
                                       10440 North Central Expressway
                                       Dallas, Texas 7523L
                                       Telephone: 214-7 49-4805
                                       Facsimile : 214-7 60- 1670

3.     ßespondent
                                       The Honorable Judge David Brabham
                                       Judge of the 188th Judicial District
                                       Court of Gregg County, Texas
                                       Gregg County Courthouse
                                       101 E. Methvin St., Suite 408
                                       Longview, Texas 75601
                                       Telephone: 903-237'2588
                                       Facsimile: 903-236-8603

                                       I
4.   Thomas Jackson, Real Party in Interest

     Trial Counsel for Mr. Jackson: Glenn A. Perry
                                    Texas Bar No. 15801500
                                    E -mail: gap@sloanfrrm.com
                                    Justin A.
                                    Texas Bar No. 24068415
                                    E -mail: ismith@sloanfi.rm.com
                                    Sloan, Bagley, Hatcher & Perry Law
                                    Firm
                                    101 East Whaley Street
                                    P.O. Drawer 2909
                                    Longview, Texas 75606
                                    Telephon e: 903' 7 57 - 7000
                                    Facsimile : 903'7 57'7 57 4

                                   l1
                      TABLE OF CONTENTS
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL                                     I

TABLE OF CONTENTS                                                  tu
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES                                                V

TERMINOLOGY                                                       vu
STATEMENT OF THE CASE                                               1

 I.The UIM Lawsuit's Inception and the Genesis of the Subject
 Motion to Compel                                             4

 II.    The Motion to Sever and Abate ......                      T2

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT                                 15

ISSUES PRESENTED                                                  16

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW                                            T7

III. ARGUMENT & AUTHORITY                                         18

 I.  Relator's Petition for Writ of Mandamus is Premature and
 will likely be Rendered Moot..                         ...........18

 il.  The Standard for Severance and Abatement in First Party
 fnsurance Cases Involving Extra-contractual Claims         20

 III. Relator Did Not Plead, Allege, Argue, or Provide Evidence
 of Any Facts that Would Require Severance and Abatement,
 thus the Trial Court Could Not have Abused its Discretion .....24
 IV. Bifurcation Protects Relator from Inadmissible Evidence
 Being Presented for Determining Third Party Fault and
 Underinsured Status                                         34

                                  lll
 V.  The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Denying
 Abatement                                                   38

 VI.  Relator Has Failed to Establish that it has No Clear and
 Adequate Remedy by Appeal in Failing to Establish that the
 Trial Court Abused its Discretion or in That it Will Lose
 Substantial Rights By Being Required to Conduct Discovery on
 Jackson's Claims                                              46

 VII. Relator's Requestto Vacate the November 6, 2OI5 Order on
 Jackson's Motion to Compel is Improper............ ..........48

V. CONCLUSION &     PRAYER                            .............49

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE                                            53

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE                                         54

TABLE OF CONTENTS TO REAL PARTY IN INTEREST'S
APPENDIX                                             ...............55

                              IV
                      INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASES                                                         PAGE(S)

Liberty Nat. Fire fns. Co.   v.   Akin,927 S.W.2d 627
      (Tex. 1966)                                   17, 18,   20-24,   35

Womack v. 8eruy,291 S.W.2d 677
    (Tex. 1956)                                                        L7

Allstate fns. Co. v. Ifuntur,865 S.W.2d 189
      (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1993)                    17, 18, 25, 44

Progressive County MuL fns. Co. v. Parks,865 S.W.2d776
      (Tex.App-El Paso 1993)                                           T7

fn re Allstate fns. Co., 2005 WL 1114640
       (Tex.App.-Texarkana M"y 12, 2OO5)                         18, 34

Johnson v. Fourth Court of Appeals,700 S.W.2d 916
      (Tex.   19S5)                                              18, 34
Walker v. Packer,827 S.W.2d 833
     (Tex. 7992)                                                       18

fn re Reynolds,369 S.W.3d 638
      (Tex.App.-Tyler 2OI2)                                            25

fn re Trinity Univ. fns. Co.,2003 WL 22839280
      (Tex.App.-Tyler Nov. 26,2003, orig. proceeding)........ ..... 25

fn re Allstate Texas Lloyds,202 S.W.3D 895
      (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi-Edinburg 2006)                          25

fn re Arcababa, 2013 WL 5890109
      (Tex.App.-Waco October 31, 2013)                                 25

                                     V
Texas Farmers fns. Co. v. Cooper,916 S.W.zd 698
      (Tex.App.-El Paso 1996)                                  25     45-46

fn re State Farm Mut. Auto fns. Co., 395 S.W.3d 229
      (Tex.App.-El Paso 2012, orig. proceeding)                       26, 27,

fn re Reynolds, S.W.3d, 354
      (Tex.App.-Houston h4rt'Dist.l             2003)                  .... 28

fn re Allstate fns. Co.,232 S.W.3d 340
       (Tex.App.-Tyler 2OO7)                       29,3r-34, 38-39,   42, 47

fn re Farmers Tex. MuL fns. Co., 2OII WL 4916303
      (Tex.App.-Amarillo Octob er         17   , 2011)                29, 30

Liberty Nat. Fire fns. Co.   v.   Akin,927 S.W.2D 627
       (Tex. 1996)                                                         35

Accardo v. America First Lloyds fns. Co.,2012WL 1576022
     (S.D.Tex. 2013)                                    40, 4r

I{amburger v. State Arm Mut. Auto fns. Co.,361 F.3D 875
                                                                          4I

Aleman v. Zenith fns. Co.,343 S.W.3D 817
     (Tex.App.-El Paso 2OII, no pet.)                                     4T

Jordan v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 701S.W.zd 644
      (Tex. 19S5)                                                         43

fn re Park Cities Bank,409 S.W.3d 859
       (Tex.App.-Tyler 2013)                                              43

Texas Rules of Civil Procedure

Tex. R. Civ. P. 193.3                                                     43

                                     vl
                           TERMINOLOGY

"AAA" or "Relator"          Relator/Defendant, AAA Texas County
                            Mutual Insurance Company
"Jackson" or "ReaI Party    Real Party in Interest/Plaintiff,
in Interest"                Thomas Jackson
"Judge Brabham" or the      Honorable Davis Brabham, 188th
"trial court"               Judicial District Court, Gregg County,
                            Texas

                                vil
                       STATEMENIIT OF THE CASE

     It is interesting     how an offending party ffiây, through grand

revisionism, portray themselves as the offended. That is exactly

what AAA Texas County Mutual Insurance Company has done in

this case. The truth is that virtually none of arguments made in

Relator's petition were made in the       trial court below and not one
piece of evidence was filed with, cited to, or even mentioned in

Relator's motion to sever and abate or          in Relator's attendant
arguments to the       trial court. In fact, despite the attestations in
Mr. Balidos' affidavit, some of the evidence in the         mandamus

record, namely the extrinsic correspondence upon which Relator

relies to characteríze their offer as one for the entire contract,

labeled MR 4 and MR 5, was neverfited with or mentioned in the

trial court at all and makes its first appearance in this case on
appeal.   ,See   Affidavit of Carlos Balido, pg. 2, see MR 4-MR   5.

     Prior to the underlying wreck which caused Thomas Jackson

severe injury, Relator entered into a contract of insurance with

him, they took his premiums, they promised to provide him with

coverage    in the event he       was    injured by an uninsured or
                                     I
underinsured motorist and assumed the attendant duties of

dealing with him in good faith and fair dealing.     It is undisputed
that the policy exists and provides coverage for the underlying
wreck.   ^9ee
                MR 187.

     On June 12, 2013, Thomas Jackson was involved             in   an

automobile wreck. See MR      7-8.    The facts of the wreck were not

disputed by Relator       in the motion or in their argument on
severance and abatement. See generally MR 139-2L5. On June

12, 201fl Jackson, leaving the church where he works, was headed

west on Pliler Precise Road and came to a stop at the red light

where Pliler Precise Road intersects Judson Road. MR 7; MR 143.

When Jackson's light turned green, he entered the intersection.

MR 7, MR 143. At that same time, Patricia Tompkins was driving

north on Judson Road, disregarded the red light commanding her

to stop, entered the intersection unlawfully, and struck Jackson.

MR 7, MR I43. Jackson was transported from the scene of the

wreck by ambulance to Good Shepherd Medical Center. MR 7, MR

143. To date, Jackson has gathered evidence that he has paid or

                                  2
incurred approximately $47,000.00        in past medical expenses
alone. MR 143.

        The information relating to the wreck and Jackson's injuries

was, of course, presented to Ms. Tompkin's insurer. Ms. Tompkin's

insured tendered their policy limits of $30,000.00. MR   8-9.   Nor is

there any great mystery as to why Ms. Tompkin's insurer did         so,

in light of the fact that Jackson's past medical expenses alone are

approximately $17,000.00 in excess of Ms. Tompkin's policy limits.

        Jackson presented his claim to Relator, providing   it with the
clear facts of this case and his damages. Presumably, Relator

conducted an investigation and made their own determination of

coverage and entitlement to benefits. Based on    that investigation
and determination, Relator offered $20,000.00 in excess of Ms.

Tompkin's policy limits and the PIP benefits that had already

been disbursed. MR 1.

        Relator characterizes that offer as unequivocally being an

offer   to settle the entirety of Mr. Jackson's contract        claim,

including disputed portions of the claim, despite the fact that no

such language appears in the offer. While Jackson disagrees with
                                  J
Relator's characterization, the      truth is that for purposes of
Relator's petition these characterizations do not matter one iota.

Relator had the burden of establishing that      it   was entitled to

severance and abatement below and they did not do so.

      Despite the fact that Jackson has contended since the filing

of this suit that the $20,000.00 offer represented an amount that

was undisputedly owed to him, Relator never pled,            alleged,

argued, or contested in anyfiling prior to this mandamus that the

offer was for disputed damages and the entirety of the contract.

MR 227-228; MR 62-65; MR 93-726; MR 81-86; MR 66-80;

MR 139-182; MR 183-216. Nor did Relator offer any evidence in

support of its motion to sever and abate, let alone evidence that

Relator claimed to support its position that they had made a

settlement offer on the entirety of the contract. MR 66-80; MR

183-216. The trial court was and is entitled to hold Relator to its

burden and doing so is not an abuse of discretion.

     I.    The UIM Lawsuit's Inception and the Genesis of the

           Subject Motion to Compel

                                 4
     This suit was filed on July 16, 2014. MR 217-223. That suit

alleges breach of contract claims, a declaratory judgment claim,

and extra'contractual claims. Id. On October 17, 2014, Jackson's

counsel served Relator with their First Request for Admissions,

First Request for Production and First Set of Interrogatories. MR

88i See also Pet., Tab C. Thirty days later, Relator requested and

Pastor Jackson granted the first of four extensions for Relator to

respond   to written   discovery, extending Relator's deadline to

November 17, 2074. MR 24I. Again, on November 25, 2014,

Relator requested and was given a second extension. MR 242-

243. On December 10, 2014, Relator again requested and was

given a third extension. MR 244. On December 17, 2014, Relator

requested, and received,     a fourth extension to    respond to

discovery. MR 245

     When Relator finally responded to discovery, their responses

were abysmal, where almost every request was objected to and

virtually no responsive information was provided. MR 87-MR     90;

MR 15-65i See also Pet., Tab C. On January 16, 2015, Jackson

filed a motion to compel, which he did not set for hearing. MR
                                 5
236-245.      In a   conference following   the production of their
discovery responses, Relator's asked to table the pending issues

and engage in an early mediation, given the clear facts of thrs case

and purportedly to avoid unnecessary litigation expense. MR 145,

I47, 754, 156-157. Jackson agreed and suggested mediators.        ,See

rd. None of the mediators were acceptable and Relator requested

additional proposals, which Jackson provided. Id. Two months

after Relator's request for an early mediation in April, Relator

finally agreed to a mediator, with whom Jackson worked to obtain

more than a dozen available dates in June and July of 2OI5, which

were circulated to Relator. MR 156-157. Relator claimed they

rwere   not available for any of these dates and requested additional

dates. MR 157. In June, Jackson again circulated more than dozen

available dates for August and September of 2OI5. See id. Relator

chose    the very last available date, six months after Relator's
request for an "early mediation." See id.

        It became clear to Jackson in late June that Relator's tactics
in this case were likely dilatory in nature. On July 15, 2015,
Jackson sent his motion to compel with a letter to Relator seeking
                                   6
to confer on Relator's discovery responses and requesting a
privilege log. MR 252-260. Following that letter, Jackson's

counsel called Relator's counsel three times in an attempt to meet

and confer on discovery, with no response. MR       I57-I58, MR 91.
Jackson's motion to compel was served on Relator on August          7,

2OL5 and was        file marked on August 10, 2015. MR 87, MR      92.

Jackson did not, however, set the motion for hearing, in the hope

that filing the motion would prompt Relator to confer on the
disputes.   It   did not. Finally, on September 10, 2015, after almost

two months of attempting to confer with Relator on discovery,

Jackson set his motion to compel for hearing and served Relator

with notice of the hearing, set for October I, 2015, by both e-filing

and facsimile. MR 26I-264. Even then, however, Relator still

attempted        to delay this case by filing a motion to continue
Jackson's hearing on discovery by informing the       trial court that
the notice of hearing was not e-filed, even though it is clearly file

marked, and that        it did not receive service of the notice via
facsimile, even though the fax confirmation sheet established that

Relator had been served on September 10, 2015. MR 161-162
                                    7
Accordingly,   the trial court denied Relator's motion for
continuance and addressed the merits of Relator's objections

     Just as   it did in the trial court below, Relator attempts to
misrepresent the record here, stating that:

           At prior hearr I, 2015 the parties presented
           to the trial court their arguments as to why
           discovery as to the extra-contractual claims
           should be stayed (bv ArlvÐ and why it
           should not (by Jackson) . Yet, the court did
           not rule [on the motion to compell until
           after tlze severance and abate hearing
           where the trial court then entered an order
           retroactively dating back to October 1, 2OI5
           directing AArt to respond to the extra-
           contractual discovery requests within 45
           days - which became ten days from the date
           of the hearing.

      SeePet. pg. 10 (emphasis added).

     That assertion is blatantly false, as the transcripts to the

October 1 and November 6, 2015 hearings, which Relator chose

not to make part of the record, make perfectly clear. At the
October I, 2015 hearing:

          The Court: All right. Thank yoü, Counsel.
          What relief are you asking for, Mr. Smith?...
          Mr. Smith: The easiest way of doing it is for
          the requests and the interrogatories that
          deal with the substantive underlying claim,
                                 8
           I would ask that those objections be
           overruled and they lRelator] ¡e ordered,
           compelled    to    respond    to those within   14
           days....

           The Court: I'm going to make that ruling.
           Okay. Ail right.

           Mr. Smith: With respect to the bad faith
           claims, perhaps the fairest way of dealing
           with that is to overrule the objections and
           require a response within 30 days, or maybe
           even 45 days. That will give them time to
           file their motion to sever and abate. In the
           event that it's granted, that discovery would
           be pending in the severed claim, and they
           won't have to respond to it until the
           abatement is removed. In the event that it's
           bifurcated, then we already have an order
           that compels the production of that
           information, and we can kind of keep this
           thing rolling.
           The Court:   III   make that ruling....
     MR 178-179 (emphasis added); see also MR I4I (th"
chronological index identifying where in the transcript the "court's

ruling" appears).

     In addition, Judge Brabham ordered, at the October 1, 2075
hearing, that Relator would produce a privilege log for each

category of discovery within the time frames cited, 14 days for the

                                     9
discovery relating to the underlying wreck and within 45 days for

the discovery relating to the extra-contractual claims. MR 180.

     That Relator's alternate reality       IS   purposefully crafted

cannot be doubted. Relator rwas present at the October 1, 2015

hearing, when Judge Brabham first issued his ruling on the

motion to compel. Jackson submitted his proposed order that is

identical in substance to the agreed order, which the trial court

signed on October 26, 2015, eleven (f f) aays prior to the hearing

on the motion to sever and abate. MR 270-27I. Relator itself

informed the trial court at the hearing on its motion to sever and

abate that the   trial court }:rad signed an order on the motion   to

compel    prior to that hearing. MR 189. Last, and most telling,   is

Relator's own acknowledgment of the court's October 1, 2015

ruling when Relator presented its agreed order on the motion to

compel.

             The Court: So this is the order consistent
             with my prior rulinfl....

             [Counsel for Relator]: Yes. Your IIonor.

MR 214 (emphasis added).

                                   10
        While Jackson is not surprised that Relator would
 characterize the       trial court signing the agreed order at their
request as Judge Brabham's first and only ruling on the motion to

compel, despite Relator's prior acknowledgments and, thus,

knowledge that such a characteñzation is false, the prejudice they

claim from that invented fact simply does not exist.

       Relator goes on to inform this Court that "the trial court

reviewed the following discovery requests which clearly go beyond

the scope of the evidence" required to establish Ms. Tompkin's
fault and underinsured status. See Pet. at pg. 11. This                            also

Relator knows is false. The             trial court directed         t}:re   parties to

review the discovery and determine                  if there was an agreement
regarding which discovery requests related to Ms. Tompkins' fault

and insurance status and which related to extra-contractual
claims. MR 179-180; MR 212. Jackson and Relator did confer

following the October         l, 2Ol5 hearing and the discovery requests
reflected    in the Agreed Orderl               reflect Jackson's and Relator's

l This is also true of Plaintiffls Proposed Order, filed on October 6,20t5, since by
that time the parties had conferred and reached an agreement regarding the
discovery requests. The only disagreement at that time, and that prompted the filing
                                           11
agreement as to which discovery requests relate to which claims.

MR 2T2.

       Almost half of the requests Relator now contends the trial

court reviewed and "clearly go beyond the scope of the evidence to

establish" Ms. Tompkins' fault and underinsured status, listed on

page 12 through 2O of the Petition, are those Relator itself agreed

relate to underlying claim to establish Ms. Tompkin's fault,
underinsured status, and coverage. SeePet., Tab B; MR 168-169,

MR   212.23

       II.    The Motion to Sever and Abate

       It is telling that the entirety of Relator's petition,            which it

titles "The Motion to Sever and Abate," does not actually discuss

the motion to sever and abate or the hearing on the motion, save
of the Proposed Order, was whether the trial courÇ in ruling on the motion on
October t,20L5, overruled Relator's objections. See MRZI2; MR270-272.
2 Specifically out of Relator's list of now complained of discovery requests, the
parties agreed that Requests for Production Numbers 7, LI, L3, and 18 and
Interrogatory Numbers 5,7,9, LL, L5, and 20 relate to Ms. Tompkin's fault, fackson's
damages (and, thus, Ms. Tompkins' underinsured status), and coverage. See Pet., Tab
B; MR 270-272. Relator responded to Requests for Admission Number 14 and 18
without objection and, thus, they were not subject to the motion to compel. See id.
3
  fackson has no desire to re-litigate the motion to compel or argue that which was
agreed to by the parties. However, by way of example, Request for Production
Number 11, which asks for the discovery of insurance policies which provide
coverage, which is expressly discoverable in every suit under Texas Rule of Civil
Procedure L92.3(Ð. Likewise, Request No. L8, and Interrogatories Nos. 7 and 9 ask
for information that would substantiate any claim of pre-existing injury.
                                        1,2
for making the misrepresentation discussed above that the trial

court "did not rule" on the motion to compel until after denying

severance and abatement. See Pet. pg.      I0-2I.   The entirety of the

section   is   devoted   to the motion to compel which was filed in
August and ruled on October 1, 2OI5.

     Relator's motion to sever and abate filed with the trial court

below comprises seven pages and one exhibit. MR66-MR80. The

one exhibit attached to     it is not any "evidence" that Relator urges
this Court to consideri rather, it is a copy of one of the cases cited

in Relator's motion. MR 73-80.

     Nowhere in Relator's motion to sever and abate does Relator

argue that the    trial court was required to sever and"/or abate the
case because they had made an offer to settle the entire contract

claim in offering $20,000.00, which Jackson contends               was

undisputedly owed in UM/UIM coverage at the time         it was made.
MR 66-72. Nowhere in Relator's motion does Relator claim they

had, in fact, made any offer to settle the entire contract claim or

that the $20,000.00 offer was not for an undisputed sum.     See id.

                                    13
      The $20,000.00 offer which Jackson contends Relator should

have paid upon their determination that          it   was owed, and which

Relator has attached as MRl, was not filed as evidence with their

motion and       is not referenced or cited. MR 66-80.          Jackson's

response   to that letter demanding that the amount be paid by
Relator, MR2-MR3, was also not filed as evidence with their

motion, nor is    it referenced or cited. MR 66-80.
     Despite Mr. Balidos' assertion      in his sworn affidavit to this
Court that the attached documents which comprise                      the

mandamus record are "[t]rue and correct copies of the material

documents       filed with the trial court," the letter that      Relator

contends   it   sent to Jackson and which   it   contends evidences that

the $20,000.00 offer was for a disputed sum on the entire contract,

labeled as MR     4-5,   was never filed in the   trial court at any point
time. See Affidavit of Carlos Balido, pg. 2 (emphasis added);         ,See

Affidavit of Justin Smith, pg. 4-5.

                                    t4
        STATEMEI{T REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
     Jackson asks   this Court to grant oral argument in this
matter because full discussion of the case would materially aid in

this Court's decision-making process.

                                15
                   ISSUES PRESENTED

1. Is a UM/UIM carrier entitled to severance and abatement of

     an insured's extra-contractual claims when    it   does not

     meet its burden of establishing that the carrier made an

     offer to settle the entirety of a disputed contract claim or

     other compelling circumstances.

                              t6
                     II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
     "Severance     of claims under the Texas Rules of                  Civil

Procedure rest within the sound discretion of the             trial   court."

Liberty Nat. Fire Ins. Co. v. Akin, 927 S.W.2d 627, 629 (Tex.

1996). A   trial court only   abuses   its discretion in failing to order   a

severance "when     all of the facts and circumstances of the case
unquestionably require        a   separate   trial to prevent manifest
injustice, and there    is no fact or circumstance         supporting or

tending to support a contrary conclusion and the legal rights of

the parties will not be prejudiced thereby...." Womack v. Berry,

291 S.W.2d677,683 (Tex. 1956). Prejudice is not presumed simply

because contract claims and extra-contractual claims are joined           in

the same action and accordingly,              severance   is not always
mandatory. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Ifuntur,865 S.W.2d 189, 193-

194 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1993); see also Progressive County

MuL fns. Co. v. Parks, 865 S.W.2d 776, 778 (Tex.App.-trI               Paso

1993). "To satisfy the clear abuse          of discretion standard,      the

relator must show 'that the trial court could reasonably have

                                       t7
reached only one decision."' See id. Thus, "fflor mandamus relief to

be appropriate, the trial court must have... issueld] a decision

without basis or guiding principle in law." fn re Allstate Ins.       Co.,

2005 WL 1714640, at 'kl (Tex.App.-Texarkana May 12, 2005)
(emphasis added) citing to Johnson v. Fourth Court of Appeals,

700 S.W .2d 916, 917 (Tex. 1935).

       Further, a writ of mandamus will not issue "absent a clear

abuse of discretion that leaves the aggrieved party no adequate

remedy at law." Liberty Nat. Fire fns. Co. v. Akin, 927 S.W.2d
627, 629 (Tex. 1996). "Mandamus is intended to be                      an

extraordinary remedy, available only         in limited   circumstances."

See WaLker v. Packer,827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex. 1992). "The writ

will issue only in        situations involving manifest and urgent

necessity and not for grievances that may be addressed by other

remedies." See id.

                    III. ARGUMENT & AUTHORITY
     I       Relator's Petition for Writ of Mandamus is Premature

             and   will likely   be Rendered Moot

                                      18
      Before turning to the merits of why Relator's Petition should

be denied,       it is important to note that, procedurally, this petition
is premature and will likely be rendered                  moot. The titular

contentions of Relator's petition are that "AAA has no contractual

duty to pay UIM benefits" and that "[alllowing discovery                on

Jackson's extracontractual claims before              a   determination on

Jackson's UIM claim is an abuse of discretion." SeePet. pg 22 and

25 (emphasis added). These are also the sole contentions that
Relator made below with respect to severance and abatement.

MR187-190.

      Jackson has pending now before the             trial court his Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment and No                    Evidence Summary

Judgment which,           if   granted,   will   determine Ms. Tompkin's

liability for causing the underlying wreck, the amount of Jackson's

actual liquidated damages, and thus Ms. Tompkin's underinsured

status.   ^9ee
                 Affidavit of Justin Smith, pg. 4

     In the event Jackson's Motion for Summary Judgment is
granted, there wiII be          a   determination of coverage triggering

Relator's obligation to pay under Brainard and mooting Relator's
                                        19
contention that the   trial court   abused its discretion   in permitting

discovery prior to the determination of Ms. Tompkins' liability and

underinsured status. This Court should, therefore,      lift the stay on
the underlying proceeding and deny the petition to allow the
motion for summary judgment to be decided. Alternatively, this

Court should lift the stay and withhold rendering its decision until

after the motion for summary judgment is decided. Further,
because    that course of action would expedite this proceeding and

that below, in the event that this Court lifts the stay to permit the

trial court to rule on Jackson's motion for summary            judgment,

Jackson would agree to a stay of Relator's obligation to produce

discovery regarding Jackson's extra-contractual claims        until after
the trial court's ruling on his motion for summary judgment.

     II.     The Standard for Severance and Abatement in First

             Party Insurance Cases Involving Extra-contractual
             Claims

     The Supreme Court's decision           in Liberty National Ftre
fnsurance Company v. Akin is the seminal and controlling             case

regarding the severance and abatement of insurance coverage or
                                    20
breach of contract claims from extra-contractual claims. Liberty

Nat. Fire fns. Co. v. Akin,927   S.W .2d   627,629 (Tex. 1996). There

an insured brought breach of contract and bad faith claims
against her homeowner's insurer after a denial of coverage. See id,

at 628. The insurer moved to sever the breach of contract claims
from the bad faith claims, arguing that certain              evidence

admissible for bad faith would be inadmissible on the contract

claim. See id. The insurer also sought to abate the bad faith claims

until the contract claim was finally resolved. See id. The trial
court denied the severance and abatement, which the appellate

court affirmed, and the case proceeded to the Supreme Cowrt. See

id.

        The Supreme Court stated in Akin that "insurance coverage

claims and bad faith claims are by their nature independent." See

id. at 629. While Relator's assertion that bad faith claims       can

never exist absent a preliminary determination that of coverage4

is not accurate, that is generally the case. See id. at 629. Thus, the

insurer in Akin argued exactly what Relator argued here, namely

a   SeePet.pg.23
                                  2I
that "the trial court should have required lits insured] to obtain   a

favorable finding on her contract claim before proceeding with the

bad faith claim," and that abatement should be ordered "to avoid

the effort and expense of litigating a claim that may be nullified

by a judgment for the insurer on the contract verdíct." See id. T}le

insurer also argued that   it   was entitled to severance because    it
had offered and tendered the undisputed portion of the insured's

damages. See id. at 63O

     After re-iterating that severance and abatement are matters

vested in the discretion of the   trial court, the Supreme Court held
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the insurer's

motions for severance and abatement. See id. The Supreme Court

noted, however, that:

           A severance may nevertheless be necessary
           in some bad faith cases.... One example
           would be when the insurer has made a
           settlement offer on the disputed contract
           claim. As we have noted some courts have
           concluded that the insurer would be
           unfairly prejudiced by having to defend the
           contract claim at the same time and before
           the same jury that would consider evidence
           that the insurer had offered to settle the
           entire dispute. While we concur with these
                                   22
            decisions, we hasten to add that evidence of
            this sort simply does not exist in this case.
            In the absence of a settlement offer on the
            entire contract elaim, or other compelling
            circumstances, severance is not required.
Id. at 630 (emphasis  addeÐ.

     Thus, the Supreme Court maintained that "[t]raditionally,

severance has been reserved to the    trial court's discretion, where
we leave   it   today." See id. at 631. Akin is the law       in Texas
regarding severance and abatement of         first party insurance
contractuaUcoverage claims from extra-contractual claims and the

trial court here was referred to and relied upon Akin in reaching
its decision in this case. MR193-I94.

     Under Akin, there is no special rule for bad faith insurance

claims and there is but one sltuation in first party insurance

cases, whether     that is   homeowner's insurance     or     UM/UIM

insurance, that clearly requires severance. That is,     if   the trial

court is presented with euidence that established there rs           a

settlement offer on the entire and disputed portion of a contract

claim, severance would be required to avoid undue prejudice. See

id. at 630. If the trial court is not presented with evidence that

                                 23
established there is a settlement offer on the entire contract claim,

then, under Akin "severance is not required" and the trial court

does not abuse    its discretion in refusing to order a severance. See

id. Akin was decided in 1996 and this is not new law.

      The entirety of Relator's petition, unlike its motion to sever

and abate and arguments below, revolves around
contractuaVcoverage claims being severed from extra-contractual

claims when the insurer has put on evidence that a settlement

offer for the entire contract claim has been made. SeePet.   p9.22-
39. Relator, however, misconstrues the evidence, contentions, and

arguments Relator presented           to the trial court and, thus,
completely misses the point. Relator did not contend or make any

showing to the     trial court that the rule they invoke here was
applicable.

     III.     Relator Did Not Plead, Allege, Argue,       or Provide
              Evidence of   Ary Facts that Would Require Severance
              and Abatement, thus the Trial Court Could Not have

              Abused its Discretion

                                   24
      Relator, as the party moving for severance and abatement,

had the burden of establishing in the trial court that severance

and abatement of the extra'contractual claims was required. fn re

Reynolds, 369 S.W.3d 638, 652-653 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2072)

(stating that "party seeking severance has the burden to show how

it will be prejudiced if severance is not granted and to present
evidence to the    trial court, in camera if   necessary, to support its

position .) citing tu fn re   Trinity [-Iniv. fns. Co.,2003 WL 22839280,

at *2 (Tex.App.-Tyler Nov. 26, 2003, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.)

and Allstate v. fns. Co. v. I{unter, 865 S.W.zd 189, I94
(Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1993, no writ)i see also fn re ALilstate

Texas Lloyds, 202 S.W.3d 895, 900 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi-

Edinburg 2006) ("Rather, the burden is on the party seeking

severance to show how       it will be prejudiced if the claims are tried
together and to present the evidence to the trial court, in camera     if
necessary,   that forms the basis of its claims. In other words,
relators must      still   caruy the burden    of proof to show that
severance    is   required.")i see also   fn re Arcababa, 2OI3 WL
5890109, at *8 (Tex.App.-Waco October 31, 2013); see also Texas
                                     25
Farmers fns. Co. v. Cooper, 916 S.W.2d 698, 7OI (Tex.App.-EI

Paso 1996)   ("It is and remains the movant's burden to               show

specifrcally how   it will   be prejudiced   if   abatement is not ordered,

and to show concrete euidence of how defending against plaintiffs

contract claim clashes with defending against plaintiffs bad faith

claims.") (emphasis added).

     Relator cites this Court to the EI Paso court of appeals

opinion in fn re State Farm Mutua| Auto fnsurance Company as

authority which,     in Relator's own words, was decided "under
virtually identical circumstances," as guiding the outcome of this

matter. SeePet., pg. 32-33. Jackson agrees whole-heartedly that

the El Paso court of appeals rightly decided fn re State Farm and

that its opinion should guide this Court's determination of this
matter, just as it did the trial court's determination. MR194-195.

Jackson also agrees     that the decision in fn re State Farm is
virtually identical to this case, with one very important
distinctioni the insurer there actually argued and put on evidence

that "conclusively proved" that that they had made an offer on the

entire contract claim in presenting its motion to sever and abate.
                                    26
See   In re State Farm Mut. Autu fns. Co., 395 S.W.3d 229, 232
(Tex.App.-El Paso 2012, orig. proceeding).

      As here, the plaintiff in State Farm contended that payment

offered was not "an offer to settle the entire contract claim." See

id. at 236. Relying, as it was required to do, on Akin the El Paso

court held that "severance is required when an insurer offers to

settle the entire contract claim...." See id. at 234. Unlike Relator,

however, "State Farm asserted         in its motion and reply, and
prouided proof   to the trial court in the form of letters and
affidavits from its claims representative, that   it was offering to
settle in full each of' the insured's contract claims. See id.
(emphasis added). Thus, "State Farm met its evidentiary burden

by providing the trial court with letters and affidavits from its

claims representative that conclusively proved that State Farm

offered to settle" the entirety of the insured's contract claims "and

the resulting damages therefrom." See id. at 236 (emphasis
addeÐ. Therefore, because the     trial court was presented with
conclusive evidence that State Farm had made settlement offers

                                 27
on the entirety of the insured's contractual claims,         it   abused its

discretion in denying severance, contrary to Akin. See id.

      Similarly, in    fn ïe Reynolds there was a dispute over
whether the insurer had made an offer to settle the entirety of the

contract claims under Akin, thus mandating the severance of the

insured's contractuaVcoverage and extra-contractual claims. See

fn re Reynoldq     104 S.W.3d 354, 358-360 (Tex.App.-Houston

h4rt Dist.l 2003). There, the court of appeals held that            because

the insurer did   t:rot " conclusively   provel they offered to settle the

entire claim as required by Akin," as opposed to an offer on the

undisputed portion of the claim, the insurer failed to establish

that they \ryere entitled to    severance and abatement. See          id. at
359-360 (emphasis added).

     Here, unlike fn re State -Farm and fn re Reynolds, Relator

did not contend in its motion or any reply that        it made an offer to
settle the entire and disputed portions of Jackson's contract claim,

nor did   it offer any evidence that it had done so. MR66-MR80.
Similarly, Relator did not claim at the hearing on its motion that

they had made an offer on the entirety and disputed portions of
                                     28
Jackson's contract claim and again offere                d no evidence that it
done so. See generally, MR183-2165 While Jackson disagrees

with Relator's characterization of their                 $20,000.00 offer6, the

characterizations, arguments and so-called evidence Relator were

not presented to the trial court, could not have been considered by

the trial court, and, thus, cannot form the basis for an abuse of

discretion. See fn re ALlstate fns. Co., 232 S.W.3d 340, 342-343

(Tex.App.-Tyler        2007) .

s The  only reference Relator made to the $20,000.00 offer at the hearing on their
 motion to sever and abate is located at MR I99 of the transcript. In truth, Jackson is
 not certain what the argument is attempting to convey because it is nigh on
unintelligible, but it seems to be that, because Relator has no contractual obligation
to pay prior to their being a judicial determination of third party fault and uninsured
status, Relator's failure to tender the $20,000.00 Ís not a breach of contract.
6 Relator claims there is a "clear connotation" that the April 28,2014letter was to
settle a disputed contract claim, but itself is forced to rely on a document that was
not filed in the trial court below as extrinsic evidence that Relator disputed the
value of Mr. fackson's claims. See Pet. pg. 1-3. Relator's reliance on that extrinsic
evidence indicates that even Relator acknowledges that the April 28,2014letter is
not clear. Of course, the trial court could not have relied on that extrinsic evidence,
nor was it asked to rely on any evidence. The April 28,20L4letter also states that
the $20,000.00 sum was arrived at from a "review of the facts" and there are other
extrinsic facts which support fackson's position that Relator did not and could not
have disputed that he was entitled to at least $20,000.00 in damages, such as the
amount of his past medical damages, his future medical damages, the evidence of
other unliquidated damages, the clarity of Ms. Tompkins'fault for causing the wreck.
There also is likely other evidence, which has not yet been produced in discover¡
which evidences Relator's investigation of the claim and their determination that
fackson was covered and entitled to at least $20,000.00 at the time the offer was
made.
                                          29
         This is the situation that was presented to the Amarillo

court of appeals       in In re Farmers Texas Mutua| fnsurance
Company. See fn re Farmers Tex. Mut. fns. Co., 2OII WL 4916303

(Tex.App.-Amarillo October 17,2011). Farmers, as Relator did

here, filed     to abate all extra-contractual claims until after the
resolution of the UIM claim. See id.          at *1. Farmers, also as
Relator did here, did not raise that      it had made an offer to settle
the entire contract claim. See id. at     *I-2.   The   trial court denied
Farmers motion. See id.         at *1. After the trial court's ruling,
Farmers informed the       trial court that it had made "a settlement
offer to conclude [the insured's] entire contract claim" and asked

the trial court to enter an order memorializing its prior ruling for

appeal. See id. at    *I-2.   The Amarillo court of appeals noted that

"in a mandamus context, for a party to preserve its complaint that

the trial court failed to abate extra-contractual claims, that party

must have brought the issue to the trial court's attention...." See

id. at   *I.

               Farmers's mandamus petition alleges that
               Judge Schildknecht clearly abused her
               discretion by failing to abate Henrie's extra-
                                     30
              contractual claims after Farmers made a
              settlement offer on Henrie's entire contract
              claim. As such, Farmers has failed to
              preserve its complaint by failing to seek an
              abatement order from the trial court on the
              grounds upon which it now              seeks
              mandamus relief Consequently, we cannot
              conclude that the trial court clearly abused
              its discretion or that Farmers does not have
              an adequate remedy available at law.
              Having failed to establish its entitlement to
              mandamus relief, we deny Farmers's
              petition.
       See   id. at*2 (emphasis added).

       Relator asserts that this Court tn     fn re AIIstatu fns. Co.
"held that severance and abatement was necessary where an

insurer made an offer to settle." Pet. pg. 30. That is not the

holding of this Court tn Allstate, although the actual opinion is

instructive. In Allstate the insureds' vehicle was damaged by
                                                                    "
falling tree and they submitted a claim to their insurer, Allstate.

See   fn re AIIstatu fns.   Co., 232 S.W.3d 340, 341 (Tex.App.-Tyler

2007). Allstate had the vehicle damage appraised and tendered a

check for $867.34, which represented the undisputed damages less

the deductible. See id. The insureds obtained their own appraisal,

which reflected greater damage, and ultimately brought suit
                                    31
against Allstate . See rd. Allstate filed a motion to sever and abate

extra-contractual claims       until the breach of contract \ryas
determined. See id. The       trial court denied the motion.    See id.

Allstate then made a settlement offer on the entire contract and,

thereafter, filed a motion for reconsideration with the   trial court
premised on that settlement offer. See id. The motion was again

denied. See id.

       This Court recognized that "[i]n considering whether the
trial court abused its discretion in denying Allstate's motion to
sever and abate, our review is limited to the record as    it   existed

before the   trial court at the time of the decision." See id. at   343

(emphasis added). Citing to the Supreme Court's opinion ín Akin,

this Court also recognized that a "trial court has broad discretion

to sever a lawsuit into separate suits" and is only required to do so

"when there is a settlement offer on the disputed contract claim."

See   id. (emphasis added).

       While this Court determined that the trial court 'bould have

granted the severance," because the claims did not rely on the

same facts and were not inextricably intertwined, that alone is not
                                   32
sufficient. See id. T}:re question in whether the trial court abused

its discretion was whether it was required to order severance
because   it was presented with   evidence that Allstate had made an

offer on the entire contract claim. See id.In fact, this Court noted

that "if the settlement offer represented only the       undisputed

portion of the contract claim, the       trial court's denial of the
severance would not be an abuse of discretion." See id. (emphasis

added). Which is, of course, exactly what Jackson has contended

since day one and which Relator made no apparent attempt to

contradict. MR 66-80; MR 183-MR 216.

     There is, quite frankly, no evidence here that "conclusively

proves" that Relator made an offer for the entirety of a disputed

contract claim, as opposed to undisputed damages, and there was

certainly no evidence at all that Relator had presented or asked

the trial court to consider in conjunction with its motion to sever

and abate. Thus, consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion in

Akin, the El Paso court's opinion ín fn re State -Farm, the Houston

court's opinion ín fn re Reynold's, the Amarillo court's opinion in

In re Farmers and this Court's opinion in fn re Allstate, Relator
                                   JJ
did not meet its burden of establishing that the severance and

abatement was mandatory and, clearly, the        trial court did not
abuse its discretion by having "issueld] a decision without basis or

guiding principle      in law." In re Allstate fns. Co., 2005 WL
7114640,   at   *I   (Tex.App.-Texarkana May 12, 2005) (emphasis

added) citing to Johnson v. Fourth Court of Appeals,700 S.W.2d

916, 917 (Tex. 19S5).

     ry. Bifurcation Protects Relator from             Inadmissible

           Evidence Being Presented for Determining Third Party

           Fault and Underinsured Status

     Putting aside Relator's new arguments and              so-called

evidence regarding settlement under       Akin, the only argument
presented to the     trial court by Relator regarding severance   was

that certain evidence that would be admissible with respect to
Jackson's extra-contractual claims would be inadmissible for

determining whether Ms. Tompkins' was liable and underinsured

MR66-72. That was also a concern raised in fn re Allstate and,

as this Court noted there, even if the trial court could order

severance, its refusal to do so is not an abuse of discretion. See   fn
                                  34
re Allstate, 232 S.W.3d at 343. Relator's concern does not mandate

severance here just as   it did not mandate it in fn re Allstate.
       Akin suggested that a trial court "may address any undue
prejudice by instructing the juty that the evidence proves nothing

with regard to the coverage of the plaintiffs claim, but may be
considered relevant only to the bad faith claim." See Liberty Nat.

Fire fnc. Co. v. Akin, 927 S.W.2d 627, 630 (Tex. 1996). Judge

Brabham's order bifurcating         the   coverage claim     from the
remainder of the claims provides far more protection than the

instruction suggested in Akin. In fact, the trial court's order here

complies with even the "inflexible" application rejected by Akin.

See   id. at 632 (dissent) (requiring "segregation" of claims in all
first party cases, but maintaining a trial court's discretion to sever

or bifurcate, and prohibit abatement).

      Nonetheless, Relator asserts        that it will be   prejudiced

because Jackson intends to introduce the $20,000.00 offer           in   the

first trial, during which the jury will determine Ms. Tompkins'
liability and underinsured status. See Pet. pg. 8-9 (... Jackson is
going to make the settlement offer the focal point by arguing to
                                   35
the jury that   it represents (f) an admission by AAA he is entitled
to UIM benefits and Q) then to the same jury in the same
bifurcated trial portion that     &L\ acted in bad faith in not paying
him the per person policy limit.")(emphasis added).

      To be clear, Jackson has always intended and contemplated

that Ms. Tompkins' fault and Jackson actual damages, and thus

his entitlement to UIM benefits is to be tried solely and
exclusively in the first trial. MR194-195. Jackson does not now

nor has he ever expressed an intention to introduce the $20,000.00

sum as evidence in that first trial for any reason. As Jackson

stated at the hearing below, only "after that issue lof third party

fault and underinsured statusl is tried," would there be a
"bifurcated trial on the bad faith claims and the [second] breach of

contract claim that asserts that lfu\rYsl failure to tender the

amount that [it] determined to be owed was a breach of contract

and bad faith." MR195.7 Removing the potential concern of

7 Contrary to Relator's contention, Jackson's bad faith claims are not
premised on the sufficiency or adequacy of the $20,000.00 sum, such that
Jackson will be contending that "AAA acted in bad faith in not paying him
the per person limit." Pet. pg. 9.
                                     36
presenting evidence supporting both of these latter claims, which

arise from the same facts and involve the exact same issues,

during the first stage of the trial is exactly why Jackson proposed

and Judge Brabham ordered the bifurcation of this trial. See id.

Relator did not make any showing below, and does not make any

showing here, how the second breach of contract claim, asserting

that Relator's failure to tender the $20,000.00 offer upon Jackson's

request, and his remaining extra-contractual claims, asserting

that Relator's failure to tender the $20,000.00 which Jackson
contends and believes Relator determined to be owed following its

investigation of the claim, that "the extra-contractual claims are

not so interwoven with the contract action that they involve the

same facts and issues," such that severance of those two claims

would be proper. See MR 69.

     Thus, in ordering bifurcation, evidence that is inadmissible

with respect to Jackson's claims to determine    coverage remains

inadmissible and there is no prejudice to Relator      in how this
matter will be tried.

                                37
     V. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in
            Denying Abatement

     A party cannot be entitled to an abatement if it is not
entitled to a severance that would make abatement possible. As

demonstrated above, Relator completely failed        to establish its
entitlement to a severance and, thus, is also not entitled to an

abatement. However, even            if Relator had    established its

entitlement to severance, this Court has specifically rejected        a

mandatory rule requiring abatement even where severance would

be required because the       trial court was presented with evidence
that the insurer offered to settle the entire contract claim, which

was not the case here. See fn re Allstate fns. Co., 232 S.W.3d 340,

344 (Tex.App-Tyler 2007) ("We recognize that a number of our

sister courts hold that abatement is mandatory when a trial court

orders severance of extracontractual claims from contractual

claims," however, "we have avoided creating a bright line rule

requiring abatement under these circumstances.")

     This Court reached this result because "a trial court should

schedule   its   cases   in such a manner as to expeditiously   resolve
                                    38
them," and that to promote carrying out this task, the "trial court

is given broad discretion in managing its docket" which "we will

not interfere with the exercise of... absent a showing of clear
abuse." See id. Despite this Court's clear language in Allstate to

the contràyy, Relator cites to that opinion for the proposition that

this Court "held that severance and abatement is necessary where

an insurer made an offer to settle," a claim which is, as discussed

above, not accurate with respect to either severance or abatement.

SeePet. at pg. 30.

     While this Court did ultimately find that abatement was

required   1n   Allstate,   ít   rejected   the notion that   avoiding

potentially unnecessary discovery was sufficient by itself to

establish the necessity for abatement and relied on two additional

factors, the first being the insurer's showing that   it would have to
disclose privileged and protected information and, second, the fact

that the insured's did not dispute that, if severance was ordered,

abatement should be granted. See fn re Allstate         fns. Co., 232
S.W.3d 340, 344-345 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2007). This latter factor,

                                    39
of course, is conspicuously missing from Relator's block quote of

the opinion in fn re Allstate. See id. at pg. 30 (emphasis added).

      Unlike fn re Allstate, none of the factors that led this Court

to hold that abatement was required are present here. As an
initial matter, Relator offered no evidence in the trial court that
the $20,000.00 offer was for the entirety of a disputed contract

claim, thereby establishing the necessity of a severance. See infra

$IandII
     Second,    an adverse determination on coverage will            not

negate the remainder of Jackson's claims and, thus,           will not
render discovery of Jackson's extra-contractual claims and second

breach of contract claim unnecessary. As noted above,        it is not
universally true     that   extra-contractual claims require on

determination of coverage. The only case Relator cites for the

proposition is the Southern District of Texas' 20Og opinion   in Weir
v. Twin City Fire fns. Co. See Pet., pg. 26. Wief however,        rwas

rejected by the none other than the Southern District of Texas in

2013 because   it is not the law in Texas or even in the Fifth Circuit
when applying Texas law in UM/UIM bad faith cases. See Accardo
                                  40
v. America First Llotrds fns. Co., 2OI2 WL 1576022, at           *4-5
(S.D.Tex. 2013) reþing on Ifamburger v. State Farm Mut. Auto.

fns. Co.,361 F.3d 875,880   (5th Cir. 200¿). The duty of good     faith

and fair dealing, which is imposed on all first party insurers in

Texas, does not focus on whether the claim   is valid, but whether
the insurer acted reasonablyrn the handling of the claim. Aleman

v. Zenith fns. Co.,343 S.W.3d 817, 822 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2OII,

no pet.) citing to Republic fns. Co. v. Stoker, 903 S.W.zd 338, 340

(Tex.   1995). Thus, there are occasions where          the   insurer's

investigation reveals such evidence of the motorist's fault and

their own insured's damages where "the judicial determination
that triggers the insurer's obligation to pay is no more than        a

mere formality." See id. at *5. "fn such cases, an insurer may act

in bad faith by delaying payment and insisting that the insured
Iitigate liability and damages before paying benefits on a claim."

See Accardo v. America   First Lloyds fns. Co., 2O72 WL 1576022,

at *4-5 (S.D.Tex. 2013) reþing on Hamburger v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. fns. Co.,361 F.3d 875,880 (5th Cir. 2004).

                                4t
      Jackson believes that this is just such a case, as evidenced

by his motion for summary judgment. Further, Jackson's claim

that AAA's failure to tender the       $20,000.00 offer amounts   to   a

breach of contract is independent of any judicial determination of

coverage. While Relator apparently would         like to contest the
validity of that claim, arguing their interpretation of the offer and

whether there was        a   rejection and counter-offer based on

purported evidence that is not even in the record below, the truth

is that this is not an appeal from a motion for summary judgment

where the merits of Jackson's claims are         at issue. Jackson's
breach of contract claim is a live claim that is not contingent on a

judicial determination of coverage and discovery of that claim is

not contingent on a judicial determination of coverage.

     The first additional factor cited ín     fn re AIIstaúe was the
insurer's showing that   it would be required to disclose privileged
information   if the extra-contractual   claims were not abated. See

fn re Alhstate fns. Co.,232 S.W.3d 340, 344-345 (Tex.App.-Tyler

2007). Relator has not, however, been ordered        to produce any
privile ged information for any claim.
                                  42
      In   fact, Jackson has been attempting        to discover what
information Relator even contends is privileged since sending his

request for a privilege log on July 15, 2015. Jackson presumes

Relator's response to this     will be that the agreed order did not
compel them to produce a privilege log on the extra-contractual

discovery   until after the proceeding below was stayed by this
Court.

     That, however, does not excuse or explain their failure to

produce a privilege log within fifteen (fS) of the July 15, 2015

request, as required by Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 193.3, or

prior to the hearing on Jackson's motion to compel almost eighty

(gO) days   later where Relator's objections and assertions of
privilege were set for hearing and Relator was obliged to prove the

applicability of its asserted privileges. See Jordan v. Court of

Appeals, 7OI S.W.zd 644, 648-49 (Tex. 1985) ("The burden of

proof to establish the existence of a privilege rests on the one

asserting it.")i see also   fn re Park Cities Bank, 409 S.W.3d 859,
868-69 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2013). Nor        does   it explain why Relator
did not offer any privilege log or any other evidence that supports
                                   43
its claim that some privileged material wiII be disclosed and
thereby cause prejudice     in an attempt to meet its burden in
moving for severance and abatement. MR 66-MR80

     A party is not permitted to simply refuse to comply with its

obligation to produce a privilege log under Rule 193.3, or its

obligation to establish the applicability of its privileges under the

jurisprudence of the Texas Supreme Court and this judicial

district, or its obligation to meet its burden of proof in establishing

its entitlement to severance and abatement, and then claim in
seeking a mandamus that a trial judge, whose rulings have been

reasoned and fair, has abused his discretion by not finding some

amorphous prejudice which the party has refused at every single

step in the proceeding to identify or substantiate. See Allstate fns.

Co. v. Ifuntur, 865 S.W.2d 189, 794 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi

1993) (noting that the insurer failed to carry its burden of proof   in

requesting abatement where        it   provided "nothing more than

generalized allegations of prejudice" and "no evidence to the     trial
court, in open court or for in camera review, of specific settlement

offers or the nature or contents of the allegedly privileged matters,
                                  44
so   that the trial court could determine their prejudicial/beneficial
potential.")

       Which brings us to the second of the two additional factors

this Court cited in fn re AIIstaúe, specifically the insured's       non-

opposition       to abatement, which is      conveniently omitted from

consideration when Relator quotes the Allstate opinion              in   its

petition.   It   should be clear, based on the above and the transcript

from below, that Jackson is staunchly opposed to abatement in

this case. Since the filing of this suit, Relator has made every
attempt to unnecessarily delay the litigation of this matter and

this Court need only look at the facts and the actual record of
what has been filed, what has been said, and what has been done

in this   case    to understand exactly what game Relator is playing

here. Abatement is just one more means of delay and           if permitted
poses a substantial risk of prejudice to Jackson.

       As the El Paso court of appeals wrote in upholding a trial

court's denial of a UM/UIM insurer's request for abatement:

                 [I]f discovery in the extracontractual case is
                 stayed until the uninsured motorist claim is
                 final, years may pass. Witnesses may die or
                                      45
            disappear, files may be lost, and memories
            will undoubtedly fade. Rather than
            minimizing pretrial efforts, abatement may
            require that discovery be conducted twice,
            as the carrier may successfully argue it
            initially prepared for trial only on [the
            insured'sl contractual claim, not his
            extracontractual causes. Moreover, it is
            possible that the entire lawsuit, contractual
            and extracontractual, is subject to
            disposition before trial.... [And n]umerous
            pretrial rulings may effect both contractual
            and extracontractual claims.

      See Texas -Farmers Ins. Co. v. Cooper,916 S.W.2d 698,702

(Tex.App.-El Paso 1996).

      VI.   Relator Has Failed to Establish that      it has No Clear
            and Adequate Remedy by            Appeal tn     Failing to
            Establish that the Trial Court Abused its Discretion or

            in That it Wiil Lose Substantial Rights By Being
            Required to Conduct Discovery on Jackson's Claims

      As noted above, an "abuse of discretion occurs only when the

trial court's   decision was without reference to guiding principles."

See Texas Farmers fns. Co. v. Cooper,916 S.W.2d 698, 702-703

(Tex.App.-Et Paso 1996). It is clear from a review of the record in

this case that the trial court here did not abuse its discretion and
                                   46
relied on the guiding principles cited             in the briefing and
arguments below, including the Texas Supreme Court's opinion in

Akin and the El Paso Court of Appeals opinion in fn re State
Farm. The simple matter of           it that, despite its protestations,
contentions and the purported evidence offered here, Relator

placed none of it in front of the    trial court below and, thus, simply
failed to meet its burden under existing case law.

     Relator goes on, however, to claim that         it has no adequate
remedy by appeal for one reason onlyi that         it will be required    to

engage in discovery on Jackson's remaining claims. This is exactly

the same argument Relator espouses with respect to abatement

and which this Court has held is insufficient to establish an abuse

of discretion regarding abatement. See fn re Allstate fns. Co., 232
S.W.3d 340, 343 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2OO7). Since that basis is

insufficient   to   establish   an   abuse   of   discretion,   it is   also

insufficient to establish an inadequate remedy on appe al. See id.

Jackson incorporates herein by reference Section          IV, supra,    }rís

arguments as to why Relator's claim that           it will be required to
engage   in discovery that might be unnecessary       does not establish
                                     47
an inadequate remedy       by        appeal and, thus, establish an

entitlement to mandamus relief.

     VII. Relator's Request to Vacate the November 6, 2015
           Order on Jackson's Motion to Compel is Improper

     The Prayer of Relator's Petition asks this Court to "vacate

the November 6, 2015 order compelling AAA to respond to the

discovery requests associated         with or which only pertain      to

Jackson's extra-contractual claims." See Pet., pg.         4I.   Jackson

presumes that the order referenced          is the agreed order which
Relator requested the trial court sign, after the trial court signed

Jackson's proposed order, both of which memorialized the            trial
court's prior ruling on the motion to compel at the October I,2OI5

hearing.

     Jackson cannot find any briefing           in the Petition where
Relator has made     a showing that the trial court abused            its

discretion in its ruling on Jackson's motion to compel and that     it is
entitled to the vacation of the agreed order, or the proposed order,

or the trial court's October   I,   2015 ruling. Relator did not contest

that it was required to respond to aII of the discovery propounded
                                     48
upon   it. MR176-I77.     The only question was one of timing.

MR176-177. The         trial court's    October   I,2015 ruling and
subsequent orders are expressly tailored to work       in conjunction
with any subsequent severance, abatement or bifurcation. MR
176-MR 177. Relator's attempt to vacate that order, which does
not compel them to respond if severance and abatement were
required, can only be an attempt to force Jackson to re-litigate

discovery disputes    that have already been briefed, argued     and

decided by the   trial court, to   cause yet another delay and the

unnecessary expense of time and effort by Jackson's counsel and,

thus, is improper.

                     V. CONCLUSION & PRAYER
     Jackson has, since the inception of this suit, sought to

accommodate Relator. Jackson's efforts are maligned by Relator

here, accusing him of engaging      in "procedural machinations," of
being "delusional," and misrepresenting his conduct and his

statements below. See Mtn for Emergency Relief, pg. 4; see Pet.,

pg.9-11.

                                   49
          Far more important, however, is that the trial court provided

Relator with ample opportunities to offer its evidence and meet its

burdens. On October 1, 2015, the          trial court did not overrule
Relator's claims of privilege for its failure to comply with Rule

193.3 or offer any evidence to substantiate      its claims of privilege,

as   it   was well within its rights to do. Nor did the   trial court order

that Relator respond to extra-contractual discovery prior to being

afforded forty-five (¿S) days to submit its motion for severance and

abatement, along        with any and all     evidence Relator deemed

material and appropriate to meet its burden. Relator does the trial

court's efforts here grave disservice by claiming that      it did not rule
on Jackson's motion to compel until November 6, 2015, and thus

claiming prejudice because the court "retroactively" ruled on the

motion giving them ten days to respond, despite the Relator's own

acknowledgments that         its claims are not truei by claiming that
the trial court ordered them to produce discovery that "clearly"

goes beyond the scope of discovery, even though the requests are

those that Relator itself agreed are discoverable in the underlying

claimi and, not least of all, by claiming and implying that the
                                     50
arguments Relator makes here and the evidence it submits are

those which   it   presented to the    trial court below in conjunction
with its motion to sever and abate, when its arguments here are

largely new and not one piece of evidence was offered by Relator to

meet   its burden. Relator failed to meet its burden and the
necessary result was and is the denial of      its motion to sever and
abate. That the    trial court did, as it was entitled to do under the
Texas Supreme Court's opinion rn Liberty Nat. Fire fns. Co.          v.

Akin, and its progeny. The trial court, in following that guidance,

did not abuse its discretion.

     Therefore, Real       Party in Interest Thomas            Jackson

respectfully requests that this Court deny Relator's Petition for

Writ of Mandamus, lift the stay on the proceeding below, and for
any and all other relief to which he may be entitled or which the

Court deems proper.

                                  51
     Respectfully submitted,

     Sloan, Bagley, Hatcher & Perry Law
     Firm
     101 East Whaley Street
     P.O. Drawer 29Og
     Longview, Texas 75606
     Telephone: 903-757-7000
     Telecopier: 903'7 57 -7 57 4

By   /s/ Justin A.
     GLENN A. PERRY
     Texas Bar No. 15801500
     E' mail: gap@sloanfirm.com
     JUSTIN A. SMITH
     Texas Bar No. 24068415
     E - mail: j smith@sloanfirm. com

     ATTORNEYS FOR REAL PARTY IN
     II{TEREST _ THOI\{AS JACI(SON

         52
                   CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that pursuant to Rule 9.5, Texas Rules of
Appellate Procedure, that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
brief \ryas served upon the following counsel electronically, through
the electronic filing manager, and via certified mail, return receipt
requested, on this the 2"d day of December, 2015:

     Gregory R. Ave
     Jay R. Harris
     W'alters, Balido & Crain, LLP
     Meadow Park Tower, Suite 1500
     IO440 North Central Expressway
     Dallas, Texas 7523L
     Appellate Counsel for Relator

     Carlos Balido
     Walters, Balido & Crain, LLP
     Meadow Park Tower, Suite 1500
     IO44O North Central Expressway
     Dallas, Texas 75231
     Trial Counsel for Relator:

     The Honorable Judge David Brabham
     Judge of the 188th Judicial District
     Court of Gregg County, Texas
     Gregg County Courthouse
     101 E. Methvin St., Suite 408
     Longview, Texas 75601

                       By:   /s/ Justin A. Smith
                             GLENN A. PERRY
                             Texas Bar No. 15801500
                             E-mail: gap@sloanfirm.com
                             JUSTIN A. SMITH
                             Texas Bar No. 24068415
                             E' mail: j smith@sloanfirm. com

                                  53
               CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIA}ICE
    Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure g.¿(ixg), the
undersigned certified that this petition complies with the type-
volume limitations    of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure
9.4(f)(ù(B). Exclusive of the exempt portions identified by Texas
RuIe of Appellate Procedure 9.4(Ð(1), this response contains 9.647
including footnotes, headings, and quotations. In providing this
word-count, the undersigned is relying on the word count
generated by the computer program used to prepare the brief.

     This brief has been prepared in proportionally spaced, 14-
point text, and in Century font, using the computer program
known as Microsoft Word QOLZ version).

     Acknowledged: December 2, 2Ol5

                     By '- /s/ Justin A. Smith
                           JUSTIN A. SMITH

                               54
   TABLE OF CONTENTS TO REAL PARTY IN INTEREST'S
                    APPENDIX
              Description                 Tab       MR No.

Affidavit of Justin Smith                  1
Reporter's Record - Transcript of          2    MR139 - MR182
October I, 2OI5 Hearing
Reporter's Record - Transcript of          3    MR 183 - MR 216
November 6, 2075 Hearing
Plaintiffs Original Petition with          4    MR 217   - MR 226
Exhibit A - B
Defendant's Orisinal Answer                5    MR 227   - MR 228
Plaintiffs First Amended Petition          6    MR 229   - MR 235
Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Discovery      7    MR 236   - MR 245
withExhibitsA-D
Notice of Hearing on Plaintiff s Motion    8    MR 246
to Compel
Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's         I    MR 247   - MR 269
Emergency Motion to Reset Hearing
with Exhibit A 'C
Plaintiffs Proposed Order on Plaintiffs   10    MR 270 - MR 271
Motion to Compel

                                55
APPENDIX TAB   1
                                     AFFIDAVIT OF JUSTIN SMITH

STATE OF TEXAS                      s
                                    s
COUNTY OF GREGG                     s

         Before me, the undersigned notary, on this day personally appeared Justin Smith, the

affrant, a person whose identity is known to me. After           I   administered an oath to affrant, he

testif,red:

         My name is Justin Smith. I am over the age of 18 years of age, of sound mind, and

capable       of making this affidavit. The facts stated in this affidavit are within my personal
knowledge and are true and correct.

         I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Texas and admitted to practice in

the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals, the United States District Courts for the

Northern, Eastern and Southern Districts of the State of Texas, and the United States Court           of
Federal Claims. I and my firm are the attorneys of record for Thomas Jackson in Cause Number

2014-1365-4, styled Thomas Jaclcpedite this proceeding, t,hat
l7        bifurcaÈion will provide any kind of protection they need
18        from the jury hearing inadmíssible evídence. That would be
L9        evidence that would be Ínadmissíble on a termínation of
20        whether the third party was 1íable and that the actual
21-       damages exceeded per policy limíts. whereas, severance and,
22        abatement is going to cause a great deal of delay in this
23        case.
24                          Sínce the Court retains the díscretion of
25        whab    it wants to do and what it feels ís proper, we feel the
                         GREI,YIü FREEMA¡ü, TEXAS CSR 81?9
                              188TH DISTRICT COURT
                           ]-01 E. METIÍVIN, SUITE 408
                       LONGVIEW, TEXAS 7560L 903 -237.2688

                                                              MR   I98
                                                                             L7

     t_    Court should enter ín a bifurcaEion if it feels that       some

     2     protection is necessary in order to protect the Defendant,'s
     3     interesE but also keep this thing movíng along so that we
     4     can get it resolved as quickly as possible.
     5                    THE COART: Thank you, Mr. Smith.
     6                    Bríef response, Counsel?
     7                    MS. R.AI¡IE.. Yes, Your Honor. Your Honor,
     I    this is not a motion to enforce seEtlement. This is not a
 9        breach of contract. The insurer, A-?\A Texas, is under no
10        contractual duty to pay a claim brought under a UIM policy
11        until liability ís establÍshed and actual damages are proven
L2        and the tort-feasor status, period. There this is noE a
13        breach of contract c1aim.
L4                        Plaintiff keeps bríngíng up the $20,000 offer
15        to settle Ëhis case. This !'ras an of f er Èo settle, plaintif f
L6        would not sign a full and final release of all claims
I7        because they wanted that to be a partíal    a partial amount
18        that they only wanEed - - so t.here was no thís is no
t9        breach of contract. This i-s not a Motíon to Enforce
20        Settlement.
2L                          Your Honor, bifurcaEion is not proper in this
22        case. We're asking the Court to abate because of the
23        discovery that Plaíntiff has already put forth, and may
24        continue to put forth, in terms of the reqr:irements of
25        havíng to answer all the inEerrogatoríes, requests for
                          GREIJnV FREEIUAìI, TEXAS CSR 8L79
                                188TH DISTRICT COURT
                             t_0L E. METIÍVIN, SUITE 408
                        TJONGVIEW, TEXAS 7550]. 903. 237 .2688

                                                                 MR   I99
                                                                          18

      1    production, and admíssions that have been presented to the
      2    Defendant.
     3                      Your Honor, we just feel líke, although the
     4     law is very clear on the issue, thaÈ werre not     vr¡erre just
     5     not there yeÈ. Thís is      praintiffs first have to prove
     6     that t,hey are confounded and have a judicial determinatíon
     7     regarding the conditions precedent.
     I                      THE COURT: Do   you excuse me. Do you
     9      agree that this is within the discretion of the court to
 L0         make the decisÍon to sever and to abate?
 11                        MS. RÄIIVE'.- Not ín this case, your Honor,
 L2        because this is not a breach of contract case. And. r
13         belíeve the courts wilr support an ord.er to dírect the court
1-4        to abate and sever the extra-conEractuar claims in this case
15         because there's been no breach of contract. There's only a
16         breach of contract if Èhere's been a judgment presented to
t7         the Defendant after the conditions precedent have been met,
18         and then the Defendant doesn't pay their judgment that's
19        owed less any credíts or offsets Ehat were made.
20                         So, f mean, bottom line is if there's a trial
2L        in t.his case and praintiffs are t,hey get an award of
22        damages from the jury as to       as to the liability
23        established, how much Mr. ,Jackson's damages are, and that
24        the tort-feasor driver, Ms. Autrey (sic). was under she
25        was underinsured, there's going to be a boEtom line number
                        GREIJYTÙFREEMAN, TEXAS CSR 81?9
                             ].88TH DTSTRICT COI'RT
                           rO1 E. METIil/IN, SUITE 408
                     r,oNGVrEW, TEXAS 7560]- 903.237 .2698

                                                              MR 2OO
                                                                        19

      1    of Èhat.   From that bottom line number, we,re going to
      )     subtract ouE the amount thaE Ms. Autrey's (sic) insurance
      3    has already paid and any plp payments to offset.. Then
      4    there's goíng to be a balance Ehat's owed. AAA Texas has 30
      5    days Èo pay any balance that is owed. If they fail to do
     5     Ehat within 30 days, that coul-d be a breach of contract.
     7                     THE COURT: Thank you. Counsel, bríefly
     I     respond to that last issue, Mr. Smíth.
     9                     MR. SMITH: Yes, I will.   And this kind of
10        overlaps with the Special Exceptions Íssue as welI.
1_   l_   Ms. Raines keeps on saying this is not a breach of contract
I2        case, it's not a breach of contract case. Every síng1e case
13        that she cites in her motion, every single case that's cited.
L4        in our response, talks about contractual c1aíms versus
15        extra-contract,ual claims.
16                        And so, you know, she says that    and this
L7        was ínitiaIly thaE ít,s not a breach of contract,, Ít's not a
18        declaratory judgment, ít,s just a request for a judícial
19        determination of tiability and underinsured status- r don't
20        know how you do thaÈ without a cause of action. r mean, you
21-       have to have somethíng to put t,hese things in, in ord.er to
22        put ít in front of È,he jury and have them fifl out the jury
23        verdict form. rtts not going to be a questionnaire that
24        says, you know, is she liab1e, ís she an underinsured
25        motorist. It's going Èo be in the conEext of is t,here a
                        GRET,YN FREEMAN, TEXAS CSR 81.79
                               188TH DTSTRICT   COURT
                             101 E. METIil/IN, SUITE 408
                      LONGVTEhT, TEXAS   75601 903.237 .2688

                                                               MR 2OI
                                                                          20

     1   breached contract. And the declaratory judgment provides
     2   the framework for the remainder of it.
     3                  So I don't understand -- and I haven,t seen
     4   any law thaÈ says that t,hese are not breach of conÈract
     5   claims. Every case Èhat I,ve seen, wheEher it's cited in
     6   her motion or ours, characterizes Èhís issue as contractual
     7   claims versus extra-contracÈual claims.
  8                      And     f will agree that therets   some confusion
  9      in the law gíven Brainard, given what Brainard saíd. is, you
10       know, you're entitled    yourre legalIy entitled to recover.
11       You're legally entítled to recover when you established that
L2       the third party ís liable and that she ís an underinsured
l_3      motorist.
L4                      But there's no f ramework in which t,o make
r_5      that judicial determination absent breach of contract and/or
16       declaratory judgment. There's no cause of action that says,
77       you know, are you an underinsured moÈorist status, are you
18       liable for the third party. There has to be something that
t9       you put these thíngs in ín terms of a cause of action.
20                      Notrl, the last thÍng that she said r¡ùas on thís
2L       contingenE claims, rig}:^iu? You can'È, have a   an
22       enÈitlement to recover until you get a judicial
23       determination of the Iíabilit.y of the third parÈ,y and the
24       unínsured status. That's not any different than any other
25       contíngent claim that's broughE togebher. f mean, you think
                       GRELW FREEMAII, TEXAS CSR 8179
                            1-88TH DTSTRTCT COURT
                          1O]-   E. METI{VIN, SUITE 408
                     ITONGVIEW, TEXAS   75601 903.237 .2688

                                                                MR 2O2
                                                                           2L

      1    about negligence and gross negligence. The punitive damages
      z    question is always contíngent upon a finding of negligence
      3    by unanimous verdÍct ín the underlying case.
     4                     And the case from      EI Paso that f was quoti-ng
     5      from a moment ago also brought up that íssue about, how
     6      there's aII kinds of lawsuits where contingenE and
     7      derívative cl-aims are brought together. And the courÈs have
     I      always dealt with these by either Erying them together,
  9        bifurcating or severing and abating them. The fact that you
10         canlt have what you need in order to satÍsfy thís 1egalIy
l-1        entítIed to recover language ís judicial determination,
L2         therefore, bad faith claims are contingent, ís not any
13         dÍfferent than any other contingent claim.
L4                          Now, f will say Èhat, there is a dífference
15        because all Ehe cases that we've been talking about, with
t6         the exception of Ehe El Paso Court of Appeals case, where
L7        they put on evidence thaE it was a settlement offer for Èhe
l_8       entire amount of the c1aim, every single one in the IIM/UIM
19        context talks abouÈ the inadequacy of the seEtlement offer.
20                          fn .In Re .t'jre L'7oyds, whích is out of San
2t        Antonj-o, they had made a settlement offer for g1oo,0O0 for
22        the entire contract claim at a mediation. And then after
23        that settlement offer for Ehe enti-re contract claim was
24        made, Ehey fited a Motion for Severance and Abatement. And
25        that was found to be mandatory.
                        GREIJII'ÀT FREEMA¡T, TEXÀ,S CSR   8179
                                188TH DISTRICT COT'RT
                           101 E. METITVIN, SUITE 408
                      toNGVIEW, TEXAS 75601 903.237.2688

                                                                 MR 2O3
                                                                            22

     1                   In MiTLard, you had a bad faiEn case that         was
     2    premised on the perceÍved deficÍencies ín Ehe settlement
     3    offer. And f think it's Malmard (phonetic), it was Ehe
     4    inadequacy of the seEtlement offer thaE gave rise to the
     5    severance and abaÈement.
     6                  Every single one of those cases you have the
     1   bad faith premised on inadequacy of the settrement, offer,
     I   not the fact     thaE. you had apparently
                                               a determination of
     9    coverage, an ínvestigation in coverage, and a determínation
10        that youlre entitred to a certain amount of money and then
11-       we just don't pay it because we bry to strong-arm a fult and
T2        final release ouE of you for the undisputed amount.
13                       Now, Ms. Raines wants to say that Ehat's a
L4       settrement offer for the entire amount of the contract, buE
15       she has to put on evidence that thaÈ's true because this Ís
16       her Motion for severance and Abatement, and she has to prove
L7       that E.hose elements are met. And Èhere's no evidence here
18       thaE this was a settlement offer for the ent.ire amount of
L9       the claim.
20                         THE COURT:   All right.   Thank you, Counsel.
2L       Very good work on both sídes.
22                       f'm going to deny the Motion to Sever and
23       deny E,he Motion to Abate. I will bj_furcate the case.
24                       Irlhere does thís leave us on Èhese Special
25       Exceptions?
                         GRELYN FREEMAII, TEXAS CSR 8179
                               188TH DISTRICT COI]RT
                            101 E.   METT{VTN, SUITE 408
                       IJONGVIEIV, TEXAS 7560L 903.237 .2688

                                                               MR 2O4
                                                                        23

     1                   MR. SMTTH: lr1ith  the Special ExceptÍons, Ehis
     2     ís the confusion thaÈ u¡e were Ealking abouÈ a second. ago.
     3     rÈ's either got to be a breach of conËract claim or a
     4    declaratory judgment claim or both. r mean, we have to have
     5    a cause of actíon to put thÍs in front of the jury.
     6    Ms- Raines says iÈ's not a breach of conEract. we1l, if
     7    j-t's not a breach of contracÈ, then we have to have
     I    something Èo put in front of the jury, cause of action. And.
     9    that's why the declaratory judgment craim is pred. in there,
 10      because of this confusion that aríses and. because ure have,
11       you know, statements they're saying it's not a breach of
L2       contract craim. we've got to have something as a cause of
13       action Eo bring -- to bring thís in front of the jury. rf
L4       i-t's     if it's not one of those two, r have no i-dea what it
15       ís.
16                       THE COURT:   Ms. Raine?
L7                      MS. RÄIIVE.- Your Honor, you can caII ít
L8       whatever you wanÈ to call it. Bottom line is prainËíffs do
19       not get to recover aLtorney fees on this cause of action.
20       They can leave ít     they can carl ít a declaratory actíon.
2L       They can call it whatever.
22                       THE COURT: Is thaE what your Specj_a1
23       Exceptions address or is there other things?
24                      MS. RÄÍJVE.- It addresses
25                       THE COURT: Let me just say herers where r¡¡e
                      GREI,YTI FREEIUAN, TEXAS CSR 8179
                           188TH DISTRICT    COURT
                         101 E. METITVIN, SUITE 408
                   rroNcvrEhl, TEXAS 75601 903.237 .2688

                                                            MR 2O5
                                                                       24

      1    are, Counsel. I'm going to have Eo briefly recess us
     2     because Irve got a case comíng up behind where they're going
     3     to call in at 10:55. So f donrt wanÈ Eo get in a bínd here
     4     on that.
     5                    MS. R.4ItrIE: My order to the Court was going
     6     to be to granL our -- grant that plaintiff replead this case
     7     Eo to Eake out the declaratory judgment and to         and our
     I    claim for attorney's fees- So if I may approach the CourÈ?
  9                       THE COURT: Mr. Smith, what's your response
10        to that?
11                        MR. SùIITH: f 'd like to see some law that
L2        says that you can't recover attorney's fees on a declaratory
13        judgment case ín a IIM/UIM contexE . I haven,t seen law t,hat
L4        says t.hat
15                         MS. R.åIÀrE.- Your Honor,I have a Supreme
16        Court case Ehat's going to say that, if Èhis ís not a
L7        declaratory judgment, which it is not, ít is not to
18        esEablish the construction of thís      of t,his policy. It's
1_9       not a    itrs not asking bhe Court to establish the
20        constructive íssues of this policy- Therefore, iÈ ís noÈ a
2L        declaratory judgment, and you cannot collect attorney,s fees
22        on a case that Ís not    on an issue that is not declarat,ory
23        judgment. It violates the American rule that the parties
24        are responsíble for theír o\¡ûn att,orney's fees.
25                       THE COURT: Mr. Smith, I mean --
                        GREI,YN FREEIUAÀI, TEXAS CSR 8]-79
                              188TH DISTRTCÎ COI'RT
                           101 E. METITVIN, SUITE 408
                       LONGVIEW, TEXAS 75601 903 .237.2688

                                                             MR 206
                                                                            25

      1                    MR. SMITH:  I'd like to have an opportunity
      2    to review the case law. And r think thís is probably
      3    something we can deal wíth at a later date on, you know,
      4    more fulI briefíng for the Court after frve had an
      5    opportunity to look at exacEty what the issues are and
      6    determine if this    this is the rure in un/urM context.
      7                    THE COURT: How much    time would you need to
     I     do that?
     9                     ¡4R. SMITH: Oh,probably a week to two    weeks
 10                        THE COURT: A1I right.
 11                        MS- RA.IÀIE.- Your Honor, if f may approach I
L2        can give Ehe Court a copy of thisZ
13                         THE COURT: Sure.
L4                        MR. SIUIITH: Is thís copy for me, Ms. Raínes?
15                        MS. RAT¡TE.. Yes.
16                         THE COURT:I wíIl take that, the issue of
I7        the specíal Exceptions under advisement, give Mr. smith two
t_8       weeks to respond. And is there anything erse, counsel, vre
L9        need to do aÈ this hearing?
20                        MS. RÄ.ItrIE: Your Honor, if you could sígn an
2L        order today denying the Motion to Sever    and. Abate.
22                        THE COURT:    If you have it prepared I wilI.
23                         - RÄIJ\IE: Do you have an order?
                          MS

24                       MR. SMITH: I do not have an order, but I'lI
25        present one to Ms. Raines-
                         GREr,nV FREEMAN, TEXAS CSR 8l_?9
                               188TH DTSTRTCT COURT
                            ].01 E. METIÍVTN, SUITE 408
                      r,oNGVrEW, TEXAS 75601 903 -237 .2688

                                                               MR 2O7
                                                                                26

     1                   MS. RAIÀIE; I just vrant to make sure I walk
     2   out of here wíth a signed copy today.
     3                   THE COURT: SuTe.
     4                  MS. RÀ-I¡IE.. If that.'s all right wÍth you?
     5                   MR. SITIITH: yeah. And we should probably put
     6   in here the bifurcation,   sínce that is what the Court
     7   ordered to do, right?
     I                   THE COURT:    I did.     y,all want to add that?
     9   Y'all want to add that on the one I sign?
10                      MS. RAI¡IE'.. Your Honor, standard for Court
11_      that if you sign an order can    hre   go and get a copy,   a

I2       conformed copy of what the Court signed, or do you want us
l_3      to make copies here?
L4                      THE COART:     Sure. No, w€'11 get you the
15       conformed copy. But do we need to add t,he bifurcation
16       issue? Do y'aII want to work on that language here?
t7                      MR. SMITH: yeah, I think thatts fine.            That
18       way we've got
19                      THE COURT:  f tell you what I,m going to do.
20       I'm goíng to recess this hearíng and let y'alI work on that
2I       order, because I've got a phone call coming Ín on this next
22       hearing. And I can come back to you if f need to go on the
23       record- ilust give me just a few minutes, okay?
24                      IIIR. SMITH:   Yes, Your Honor.
25                      THE COURT:     Okay. frm going to recess this
                      GRELYN FREEUAN, TEXAS CSR 8179
                            188TH DISTRTCT COURT
                         ]-01 E. METI{VIN, SUTTE 408
                   IJONGVIEW, TEXAS 75601 903.237 .2698

                                                               MR 2O8
                                                                              27

     L    maE,ter, and thank you very much.    We'lI   come   right back to
     2    it íf   we need to.
     3                     MR. SMITH: Thank you, your Honor.
     4                     MS. R.AIIVE; Thank you, Your Honor.
     5                     (Recess   )

     6                     THE COURT: All right. Let's go back on the
     7   record if we cou1d, Counsel, ín the Jackson matter.
     I                  Have yraII worked on an order that's
     9   agreeable in form at least?
10                      IzIR. SI{ITH: Yes, Your Honor, f belíeve we
11       have.
L2                        Ms. Raines, is that language agreeable to
l_3      you?
L4                        MS. RA-IJVE.- Well, Your Honor,     I just want to
15        crarify. rs your íntention Èo bifurcate Èhe Ería1 and abate
I6        the extra-contractual claims as well so $re,11 have
L7       because we berieve that we need to have a separate Erial?
18       üIe need to have a separate jury hear the extra-contractual
19       claims. Otherwíse, $rê're picking a jury for t,he underlying
20       UIM claims, but also adding in all the extra-contractual
2L       claims, which, agaín, is what we are opposed to. So Irm
22       asking the court, is the court's intention to bifurcate the
23       extra-contractual claims as well as to abaÈe to abate
24       those extra-contractual claíms?
25                      And for, Your Honor, we were talkíng
                        GREI,NV FREEMA¡I, TEXAS CSR 8179
                              188TH DISTRICT COURT
                           101- E. METITVIN, SUITE 408
                      IJONGVIEW, TEXAS 75601 903 -237 .2688

                                                                 MR 2O9
                                                                             28

      1   earlier -- f have a case for the Court, Eo revíew. It's a
      z   ít's In Re Fazmers Texas County Mutual Insurance Company,
     3    texas Court of Appeals out of Austin. The case number is
     4    03-15-00527.
     5                      May   f approach, Your   Honor?
     6                      THE COURT: SuTe.
     7                      MS. RÄII\IE.. Your Honor,   that case deals with
     I    that the Court needs to     shaIl sever and abate
   9      extra-contractual claims from UIM claims. So I just wanted
10        to clarify if that's the Court's ruling was to bifurcate the
1- 1_     case and abate the extra-contracEual claims to a separate
L2        jury.
13                         THE COURTT My    understanding was   a

1-4       bífurcation is just     íE's before the same jury.
15                       Mr. Smith, is that your understanding?
16                        MR. SþIITH: Mine as well, Judge.
T7                       THE COURT: I mean. that's what bifurcation
l_8       is. Otherwise, you would abate it, and ít would be before
19        another jury. But is this the case, Mr. Smith, f/ou had --
20        were you aware of this case when you r^rere responding?
2L                       MR. SMITH: I don't Ehink that       and
22        Ms. Raines can correct me if I'm mistaken -- but I don't
23        believe this ís the case that was cited in their motíon. ft
24        may be a case that has been cited by some of Ehe cases that
25        are cited ín their motion.
                         GREL]TI\I FREEMAÀI, TEXAS CSR 8179
                              188TH DISTRTCT   COURT
                          101 E. METITVTN, SUTTE 408
                    r,oNGvrEbI, TE)AS 75601 903 .237 .2688

                                                                    MR 2IO
                                                                           29

     1                    MS. RÄIJVE.- Your Honor,   this case was not
     2   cited in our motion, ro.
     3                    MR. SMITH¡   I don't   know how   it would -- let
     4   me see   real quick.
     5                    THE COURT: Well-, they severed here but
     6   denied t.he abatemenÈ; is that what the judge did?
     7                                        Honor. And so it was
                          MS- RÄ-I¡IE.. Yes, Your
     I   an appeal wíthin the Court to rule that it should be severed
 9       and abated.
10                        THE COURT:lrlel1, I think that,s a different
11       situation. Because I'm going to       I'm denying the
L2       abatement, and we're going to bifurcate. And so       then the
13       íssue would be, we're goíng to proceed with full díscovery
L4       on all issues.
15                        So Ehís orderthatrs presented Èo me says
L6       that MotÍon for Severance and plea in Abatement is denied in
I7       íts entirety. Extra-contractual claims will not be severed.
18       Extra-contractual cl-aims are not abated- The Court orders
19       that the trial shaIl be bifurcated as to the plaintiff's
20       extra-contractual claims .
2L                       I'm prepared to sign this order.
22                       Mr. SmiEh, anything further?
23                       I4R. SMITH: I don't have anything further at
24       this time, ,Judge.
25                       THE C)URT: All right.   All right. I'I1 get,
                        GRELhI FREEMAN, TEXAS CSR 8179
                             1-88TH DISTRICT COI]RT
                          101 E. METITVIN, SUITE 408
                     IJONGVTEW, TEXAS '15601 9 03 .237 -2688

                                                                MR   2II
                                                                          30

     1    each one   of you a conformed copy here.
     2                     (of f - the-record discussion)

     3                     THE COURT:   Counsel, do y'a1l have another
     4    issue?
     5                     MR. SMITH: Yeah,I think we may, your Honor.
     6                  As you recall- at the 1asÈ hearing that we
     7   had, we had had a discussion about we wourd get t,ogether and
     I   Èalk about whÍch discovery related to which issue.
     9                    THE COURT:    Correct.
10                        MR. SMITH: üIe did that, and we reached an
11        agreement as to whj-ch discovery related to which issue. hle
t2        had a dísagreement about -- my recollect.ion of what, the
13        court's order was is that the objections were overruled and
L4       they would respond to discovery. Ms. Raine,s recollection
15       was Èhat bhe Court did not overrule theír objections. And
L6       so r have submiÈted a proposed order with my recollection
L7       overruling the objections.
18                       f don't know that we have a signed copy of
19       that, and thatrs what Ms. Raines and I were discussíng.
20                       THE COURT: After that hearing, I recall      I
2L       never got     I thought what I was going to get was an agreed
22       order as to form. And f don't thínk I ever got, that. So I
23       sent some orders back on the queue e-file. Maybe each of
24       you had sent a proposed order. f can'È remember now.
25                       MR. SMITH: f think f 'm the only one who sent
                        GRELn\T FREEMAIV, TEXAS CSR 8179
                             ]-88TH DISTRTCT COURT
                           101 E. METITVTN, SUITE 408
                     IJONGVIEI^I, TEXAS 75501- 903.237 .Z6BB

                                                               Ì{tR 212
                                                                                          31

     1    a proposed order.
     2                               THE COART:   Okay- Did I not sign that?
     3    I¡eE, I   s   see.
     4                  Let's see, here's a proposed order that I
     5   returned. rJet's see if that's the one you sent, Mr. smith.
     6                  MR. SMITH: Yes, this is Ehe one that I senE,
     7   to you.
     I                              THE COURT:    Here is one         let, me look at
     9   thís one. Here's a proposed order that                        r returned it
10       because r said the lawyers would submit an ord.er urith
L1       signatures as to form, and r never got that. r think                           ret
L2       me see if r can copy this.
13                                  MS. R.4.IJVE': Your Honor, we have an agreed
L4       order that Plaintíff's              counser prepared that we díscussed.
15       And then r think there was just               some miscommunication      as to
t6       if it was agreed as to form.
L7                      And, Your Honor, w€'re ready at this tíme to
18       present that to you as an agreed order on the motion,
19       Plaintiff's Motion to compel hearing. And it's agreed. by
20       the parties to form.
2L                       THE COURT: Okay. Ir11 sign that then.
22                      MS. RåItrIE; Your Honor, I would just also
23       rike to make clear for bhe record., that is the order that r
24       referenced in my argument here today because ít crarifies
25       the extra-contract,uar discovery questions and responses that
                                 GREL]TI\I FREEMAN, TEXAS CSR 81_?9
                                      188TH DISTRICT   COURT
                                     101 E. METITVIN, SUITE 408
                               r.oNGvIEW, TEXAS 75601_ 903 .237 .2688

                                                                             MR   2I3
                                                                               32

      1   have been propounded to Defendant         to answer as paït of the
      2   extra- contracEual díscovery.
      3                    THE COURT: Okay. So
     4                   MS. RAfiüS.. And I apologize, I thought the
     5    order had been signed earlier and maybe it's a mistake Èhat
     6    f just did not receÍve a copy.
     7                   THE COART: So thís is the order consístent
     I    with my prior ruling?
     9                   MR. SMITH: That's my recollection of it.
10        Apparently, \^re're nor¡¡ agreed t,o form.
11                        MS. RÄIÀIE: Yes, Your Honor.
L2                         THE COURT:Okay. f 'm going to sign it and
13        I'11 get you a conformed copy, each one of you, on this one
T4                         MR. SNIITH: Thank      you, Your Honor.
15                         THE COURT:     Sorry for the
l_6                                 f apologize. I didn't, know that
                          MR. SIUIITH:
L7        was sent back. I'm sure ít was, and f just guess f dídn,t
18        see it.
1_9                     THE COURT: AIt this e-filing is new to me.
20                      I4R. SMTTH: Technology is a blessing and a
21-       curse   -

22                        THE COWT:       All right.    AnyÈhing further,
23        Counsel, from either side?
24                        MR. SMTTH:      No,   Your Honor.
25                        MS.   RÄTÂIE;   No,   Your Honor.
                        GREr,irt\T FREEMA¡ü, TEXAS CSR 8179
                             ]-88TH DISTRICT COIJRT
                           1O]- E. METITVIN, SUITE 408
                      LONGVTEW, TEXAS 75601_ 903 .237 .2688

                                                                     MR214
                                                                           33

      1                  THE COURT:   AtI right.    Good   luck.   Y'aIl
      2   have a safe Èrip back.
      3                  MR. SMITH: Thank    you, Your Honor.
     4                   THE COURT: Okay.
      5                   (End of proceedings)
     6

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                      GREIJYÀI FREEMAI{, TEXAS CSR 8179
                           188TH DTSTRTCT   COURT
                         101 E. METTIVTN, SUITE 408
                    ïJONGVIET¡¡, ÎEXAS 75601, 903.231 .2688

                                                               MR   2I5
                                                                                 34

     1    STATE OF TE)GS

     2   COI'NTY OF GREGG

     3        T, Gre1yn Freeman, Official Court Reporter ín and
     4   for the 188th District Court of Gregg, State of Texas,
     5   do hereby cerÈify that the above and foregoing contains
     6   a t,rue and correct transcrÍption of all portions of
     7   evidence and other proceedings requesbed in writing by
     8   counsel for the partíes to be included in this volume of
 9       the Reporter's Record Ín the above-styled and numbered
1_0      cause, all of which occurred in open court or in
1t_      chambers and were reported by me.
L2           f furEher certífy that this Reporter's Record of the
L3       proceedings truly and correctly reflects the exhibits,
L4       if any, of fered by the respect,ive parties.
15           f further certify that the total cosE for the
L6       preparatíon of thís Reporter's Record ís g204.OO and was
L7       paid by Sloan. Baqlev.       Ha tcher 5E Perry Law     Firm.
L8            !ìTITNESS MY OFFICIAIJ HA¡üD    Ihis The 25Th day of
L9       November   ,   207-5.

20
                                         /s/ erelyn   Freeman
2L                                      Gre1yn Freeman, CSR
                                        Texas CSR 8179
22                                      official Court Reporter
                                        1-88th DistricL CourE
23                                      Gregg County, Texas
                                        101 E. MeE,hvín, Suite 408
24                                      Irongview, Texas 7560L
                                        Telephone: 903-23'7-26e9
25                                      Expirat,ion: 1,2/3t/201,s
                           GREL]T\T FREEMAIü, TEXAS CSR 81-79
                                 188TH DISTRTCT COI]RT
                              1.01 E. METHVTN, SUITE 408
                        r,oNGvIEW, TEXAS 7560L 903.237 .2688

                                                                        MR 216
APPENDIX TAB 4
                                                                                              Electronically Submitted
                                                                                               711612014   l1:11:41 AM
                                                                                           Gregg County District Clerk
                                                                                           By: Debbie Kinney ,deputy

                                                 2014-1365-A
                                  CAUSE NO.

THOMAS JACKSON                                      $                  IN THE DISTRICT COURT
  Plaintiff,                                        $
                                                    $
vs.                                                 $                   GREGG COUNTY, TEXAS
                                                    $
AAA TEXAS COUNTY MUTUÀL                             $
INSURANCE COMPANY                                   $
      Defendant                                     $                        JUDICIAL DISTRICT

           PLAINTIFF''S ORIGINAL PETITION & R.EOUEST F'OR DISCLOSURE

         Thomas Jackson, Plaintiff, files this Original Petilion, and in support thereof would

respectfully show the Court as follows:

                                 A. DISCOVERY CONTROL PLAN

          l.      Discovery is intended to be conducted uncler Level 3 of Tex. R. Civ. P, 190.4.

                                             B. PARTIES

          2.      Plaintiff, Thomas Jackson, is a resident of Gregg County, Texas. Plaintiff    s

Driver's License number is XXXXX037. Plaintiff s Social Security number is XXX-XX-X454.

          3.     Defendant,   AAA Texas County Mutual lnsurance Company, is an entity doing

business in the State of I'exas, This Defendant may be served with due process herein by serving

its registered agent for service, C T Corporation System    , l02I Main Street, Suite   I 150, Houston,

Texas 77002.

                                   C. JURISDICTION        & VENUE

          4.     The Court has jurisdiction over the controversy because the damages are within

the   jurisdictional limits of the court. Plaintiff seeks monetary relief in excess of $ 100,000.00 but

not rnore than $ 200,000.00.

                                                    L

                                                                                        MR217
            5,   Pursuant to Tex. Ins. Code $ 1952.110, venue is proper in Gregg County as the

 county in which the accident occurred.

                            D. AGENCY/RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR

        6.       Whenever   it is alleged in this petition   that Defendant,    AAA Texas County Mutual

Insurance Company, did any act, omission or thing,             it is meant that Defèndant's    employees,

agents, officers, directors, servants, apparent agents, ostensible agents, agents by estoppel and./or

representatives did such act, omission or thing and that at the time such act, omission or thing

was done it was done with the actual or implied knowledge of Defendant, AAA Texas County

Mutual Insurance Company, or was done wíth the full authorization or ratification of Defendant,

AAA    Texas County Mutual Insurance Company, or was done in the normal and routine course

and scope of agency or employment of Defendant's employees, agents, officers, ditectors,

sewants, apparent agents or ostensible agents, agents by estoppel and/or representatives.

                                               E. FACTS

        7   -    Thís lawsuit results from a collision that occurred on June 72, 2013                  at

approximately 8:58 p.m.     in Longview, Gregg Uounty. 'l'exas. Plaintifl            I'homas Jackson, was

operating his vehicle westbound on Pliler Preoise Road in a saf'e, reasonable and lawful manner,

when he stopped in obedienceto a traffic control device at the intersection of Judson Road and

Pliler Precise Road. After stopping, and in obedience to the traffic control device, Plaintiff

proceeded to continue traveling westbound into the intersection                of Pliler Precise Road and

Judson Road. Patricia Tompkins was traveling northbound on Judson Road when, with complete

disregard for the saf'ety and welfare of other persons or property, she disregarded the traffic

control device striking the driver's side of the vehicle being driven by Plaintiff, causing the

collision made the basis of this lawsuit.

                                                    I

                                                                                           MR    2I8
        8.      At the time of the collision, PlaintifTs vehicle was        covered by a policy of

 automobile insurance in full force and effect, which is the subject of this lawsuit. The policy of

 automobile insurance was issued by Defendant and included uninsured/underinsured motorist

 coverage as defined under the policy and/or by statute.

        9.      Plaintiff timely and properly notified Defendant of the motor vehicle collision that

is the subject of this suit. Plaintiff has fully complíed with all of the conditions of that insurance

policy prior to his filing suit against Defendant. All conditions precedent have been performed or

have occurred. Further, Plaintiff has complied with requests for provision of information to the

Defendant,

        10.    As a result of the collision     caused   by Patricia 'fompkins, Plaíntiff    sustained

damages that exceed the amount     of available and collectible liability insurance coverage    issued

to Patricia Tompkins and which covered her negligent actions. Defèndant refused to consider

Plaintift's injuries, medical billing paid or incured by or on behalf of Plaintiff and failed, and

continues to fail, to fully compensate Plaintiff for tlie injuries caused by Patricia Tompkins, an

underinsured motorist, and gìve Plaintiff the benefit of the bargain of his uninsuredl/underinsured

motorist coverage present in the insurance policy, in violation of Texas law as described herein

below. As a result of their acts and/or omissions, and unlawful conduct as described herein

below, Defendant proximately caused Plaintiff injury.

                         F. BRßACH OF INSURAIïCE CONTRACT

       ll.     All of the premiums that were due on the AAA Texas County Mutual              Insurance

Company policy wíth Thomas Jackson as the named insured, at the time         of the wreck,   had been

paid and the policy was in full tbrce and effect at the time of the collision. Defendant, AAA

Texas County Mutual lnsurance Company, kept its insured's rnoney and had obligations as

                                                 3

                                                                                      MR      2I9
 described in the insurance policy that was in effect at the time of the incident      in   question,

 Defendant to date has failed and refused to pay the money due under the policy, despite denrand,

Specifically, Defendant has determined that Plaintiff s underinsured motorist claim is worth at

least $ 25,000, as evidenced by its offer to pay $ 20,000 in addition to $ 5,000 previously paid      as

personal injury protection policy limits (see Exhibit A). I'Iowever, despite Plaintiffls demand for

payment of this undisputed portion      of his   underinsured motorist coverage (see Exhibit B),

Defendant has refused to tender this amount. This failure and reñrsal to pay constitutes a breach

of contract and demonstrates bad faith. Further, Defendant's failure to properly value and fully

pay Plaintifls damages pursuant to its obligatíons in the policy at issue likewise constitute a

breach of contract and demonstrate bad faith,

                       G. PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF

        12.    Based on the foregoing facts, and pursuant to the policy of insurance in tbrce and

effect between Plaintiff and Defendant AAA Texas County Mutual Insurance Company at the

time of the wreck, Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment pursuant to Tex. Civ. Prac.       &   Rem,

Code Ch. 37 construing the contract of insurance and declaring Plaintiffls rights and obligations

under the contract. Specifically, Plaintiff seeks      a finding that Patricia   Tompkins       is   an

underinsured motorist, that PlaintitT is entitled to recover from Defendant Plaintiffls damages

resulting fronr the motor vehicle collision the subject of this suit, that Plaintiffls damages fall

within the coverage afforded Plaintiff under the policy with Defendant, and specifying               the

amount of damages, attorney's fees, interest, and court costs that Defbndant is obligated to pay.

       13.     Defendant   AAA Texas County Mutual          Insurance Company's conduct          is    a

proximate and producing cause of damages to Plaintiff. Such damages include, but are not

limited to, unpaid benefìts, medical expenses, physical impairment, lost eamíng capacity, and

                                                  4

                                                                                   MR 22O
pain and mental anguish, Such damages have occurred in the past and are likely to continue in

the future.

        14.       As a result of Def'endant AAA Texas County Mutual lnsurance Company's

conduct, Plaintiff has incurred attomey's fees through trial and appeal.

                H. BREACH OF DUTY OF GOOD X'AITH AND FAIR DEALING

        15.       Without adequate explanation or justification, AAA Texas County Mutual

lnsurance Company, by and through its agents, breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing

by denying or delaying payment of benefrts to Plaintiff in accordance with his                     insurance

agreenrent when     it   was reasonably clear that     it   should do so. As a result, AAA Texas County

Mutual Insurance Company is in violation of Tex. Ins, Code, Chapter 542, et. søq. Further, AAA

Texas County Mutual Insurance Conrpany has engaged in unfair claim settlement practices in

violation of Tex. Ins. Code, $$542,056, 542,057, and 542.058. As a proximate result of these

actions, Plaintiff suffered damages, which are more fully outlined herein below'

                                                T.   DAMAGES

        16.      As a proxirnate result of the collision, Plaintiff, Thomas Jackson,               sustained

serious personal injuries, specihoally including neck, back, and head injuries and injuries to his

body generally. Plaintiff believes some of his injuries are perrnanent in nature and have had a

serious effect on his health and well-being.          In connection with such injuries Plaintife Thomas

Jackson, has suffered physical pain and mental anguish              in the past, is suffering at the   present,

and in all reasonable probability    will   continue to suffer for the rest of his life. Futther, it has been

necessary     for Plaintifl Thomas Jackson, to pay or incur reasonable and necessary                   medical

expenses in the past and in all reasonable probability         will incur   reasonable and necessary medical

€xpenses    for the treatment of his iqjuries in the future. In additíon, he has sustained loss of

                                                        5

                                                                                             l,IlR 221
eamings and physical impairment in the past and         will in all probability continue to sustain a loss

of eaming capacity and physical impairment in the future. Ptaintiff, Thomas Jackson, sues for the

recovery of past and future medical expenses, past and future physical pain and mental anguish,

past Ioss of earnings, past and future loss of earning capacity, and past and future physical

impairment; all    in an amount in     excess   of the minimum jurisdictional limits of this          Court.

Plaintiff is seeking a reasonable amount to be determined by the jury for his injtries.

        17.      In addition, Plaintiff is entitled to recover attorney's fees pursuant to Tex,         Ins.

Code 9542.06 and interest at eighteen percent (18%) pursuant to Tex. fns. Code $542.060.

                                  J. DOCUMENTS TO BE USED

        18.      Pursuant   to Tex. R. Civ. P.      193.7, Plaintiff intends     to   use   all   documents

exchanged and produced between the parties including, but not limited to, correspondence and

discovery responses, during the trial of the above-entitled and numbeted cause.

                                K. REOUEST FOR DISCLOSURE

        19.      Pursuant   to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 194, you are requested to disclose,

within frfty (50) days of service of this request, the information or material described in Rule

lea.2 (a)-(l).

                                             L. PRAYER

        \ryHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Plaintifï request that the Defendant be

cited to appear and answer and that upon hnal hearing hereon Plaintiff recover as follows:

        a.   Actual damages within the jurisdictional limits of this Court;

        b.   Prejudgment and post-judgment interest as allowed by law;

        c.   Declaratory relief as outlined in the petition;

                                                    5

                                                                                            v,R222
d. Costs of Court and attorney fees; and
e. All other relief the Court deems appropriate.

                              Respectfu   lly subnritted,

                              SLOAN,               Y         & PERRY LAW FIRM

                              By:
                              M.              Hatcher
                              State Ba¡ No.24002243
                             Alan J. Robertson
                             State Bar No.24067952
                             Post Office Drawer2909
                             101 East Whaley Street
                             Longview, Texas 75606
                             Telephone : (903) 757-7000
                             Facsimile : (903) 757-7574
                             Email      : rhatcher@sloanfirrn.com

                             ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF

                                          7

                                                                    rurR   223
ørl2E/2øø2       L7tiL6      4Ë922L6ø25                             AAA ÍEXAS CLAIM5                               PAGE   øLIø1.

                                                     A¡AA fsx¿s County Mutual Insurance Gompany
 (t I \                                              O-SàO Hortn State Hlghwal
                                                                               101
    I                                                f   rving, Texas   7   5039-2.402
        Texas

    April2E,2014

    M. Ravmond Hatcher, Esq'
    Sloan, BagleY, Hetoher & Perry
    101 EastWhalcY St'
    Longvicw,       TX 75601

               RE:       Insured:          Thomas Jackson
                                           Thomas Jackson
                         Client(e):
                         Clairr#:          01'1137187
                         Loss Date:        6t1Aß

    Elcar Mr- Hatcher;
                                                                                                       ived in our
                                                   comPact                                             ed Motorlst
                                                  etter You
                                                                                                       dmedical
                                                  ofYour"
                                           ain to Your client's care'
                                                                                                            the
                                                         y review the facts and circr¡nstanoes sunounding
    We    have                                                      you have  provided'  unfortunately' we arÊ
        rBfetsnce                                        m"ntàt¡on
        unable to
                                                                                  rYour client $20,000'(X) UIM to
                                                                                   ¡l tne adverse canier and the
                                                                                  aid'
                                                                                              below so
        Plcase oresent our ofier to your client and
                                                    contad me at the tolephone number li'sted
        .n m"y Oi"arss and concludc this matter'

        Clalms Service

        6s5s N. State HighwaY 161
        lwlng,  TX 75039
        'ir¡wri'a;óe.222.9208É21837eor469.221'837s

                                                                                                                   ^rtt
                                                                                                                   NI)

         lngurf,ncoptovldedtogutl[IEdAAATðtasmcmblrsbylhêlnterlnsul€nceExchangeofthoAutomoblþGlubendilgañlllateg
                                                                                                        Ì,llR 224
                                                                                           I
                                                                                          I:T
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                                                                                                                                                                r
LAURIIEN ll, BAGLIIY
                                                                            SLOAN, BAGLEY                                               AlrtNJ. RODERTSoN
M. NAYMOND II.{'I'CHER                                                     HA¡:CHER & PERRY                                             CARSONR. RUNGE
GI,ßNN A. PIìRRY¡+                                                                                                                      JUSTTN         sMrTrr
'Borrd (.ìcttil¡cú I'cnr¡rd Ltiury liirl llt
                                                                                    I.AVV FIRM                                                   ^A.
                                                                                                                                        WILLTAMX, KING
r   N¡ri¡rt¡l lJo¿rl ol 1'rìrl i\lvoc*1,                                       LONGVIDW. f TOUSTON

                                                                                     May2,2014

                  Mr, Frederick Annour                                                                      Yía Facstmile No,:   ß69   221-6025
                  AAA Texas County Mutual lnsurance Company
                  6555 N. State Highway 161
                  Inring, Texas 75039

                                   Re:         Ou¡ ClienVYour lnsured:                  Thomas Jackson
                                               Date of [ncident:                        hne 12,2013
                                               Claim No.:                               ottt57387

                  Dear Mr. Armour:

                          Thank you for contactíng our offrce rec€lrtly regarding your evaluation of rny client and
                 yotrr insurcd, Thomas Jackson's, underinsured motorist claim.

                        In your letter of April28,20l4, you indicate that you are offedng $20,000.00 in addition
                 to the $5,000.00 PIP benefits proviously paid to Mr. Jackson by AAA for his injuries, as
                 settlemcnt of his claims (over and above of the $30,000.00 third-party policy limits received by
                 Mr. Jackson). By offering this arnount, it is clear that AuAú{ has performed iæ evaluation of l\dr.
                 Jackson's UIM claim and determined that the UIM claim is worth at least $25,000.00
                 ($20,000.00 plus $5,000.00 previously paid PIP bcncfits). As such, thcrc is no rcasor that AAA
                 should delay payment of this amount that iself acknowledges is due on this first party claim.

                        This letter is to request that you forward a check in the amount of your evaluation
                payable to this firm and your insured, Mr. Jackson. Because yoru insured vehemently disagrces
                l\'ith AAA's evaluation of the value of his claim, the payment of this amount is in no way to be
                considered "settlement" of Mr. Jackson UIM claim with AAA for the injuries that he sustained in
                the subject collisíon.

                                         in writing that you will forward the $20,000.00 payment as requested and
                                 Please confirm
                that your insured may negotiate the check without the negotiation being considered any type of
                rclease of her rights to seek additional amounts under the policy in the future.

                Tharù you for your attention to this matter.

                                                                   101 Eest \Whaley Srreet, Longview, Texas 7560 t
                                                   Phone   9Q3.7   57.7000 I Facsirnile 903.7 57,7574 I www.sloanfi rm.c<¡rn
SrceN,   Blolnv, Hnrcnen & PBnny Llw Fn¡r¡
lvlay2,2014
Page2

                                         Yor¡rs
                                         Slon¡,           & PBnny LnwFm¡r,r

                                             RI\,   HATCHER

MRlVpau
Japkson 1392{101

                                                               MR 226
APPENDIX TAB   5
A/   LB/2ØI4 LØ24Ø 2t4-76Ø-167Ø ?!4-?ãØ-t6?ø                                                                        D 2/3
                                                                                                       El€ctron¡cally Submitted
                                                                                                          911120144i421o1 pM
                                                                                                    cregg County District Clerk
                                                                                                    By; Debble Kinney ,deputy

                                                   CAUSE NO. 2014-1365-A
                                                                                                B\\     \t{
          THO¡vÍAS JACKSON                                $        fN THE DISTRICT COIIRT OF
                                                          $
          VS                                              $        GRECG COUNTY, TEXAS
                                                          0
          fuAÁ TÐLTS COUNTY MUTUAL                        6
         Ij\TSTIRáNCE COMPANY                             I        188N IuDIcIAL DTSTRICT

                                         DEFENDANT' S ORIGN{AI, ANS WER

                   COMES      NOW AAA Texas County Mutual          Insura:rse Company, Defenda¡rt in the above

         styled and nurnbered cause and files íts Oliginal Answcr to the Plaintiffs Original Petition and in

         support thereof would rcspcctfirlly represerú and show unto the Court the following:

                                                              I.

                  Defendânt AAA Texas County lVfutual lnsurance Cornpany denies eaoh and every, a]l and

         singular, tbe material allegations contain€d in Plaintiffs Original Petition and demands strict

         proof thereof-

                                                              u.

                  Defendaut AAA Texas County Mutual Insurance Company demands a hial byjury,

                  WHEREFORE, PRDMISDS CONSIDIIRED, Defendant AAA Tcxas County Mutual

         I¡su¡ance Company prays that upon finalhial andheæing hueof, that ao tecovory be had from

        Defendant AAA Texas County Mutual Insurance Company, but that Defendant AAA Texas

        Comty Mutual Insruance Company go hence without delay and recover its costs, and for such

        other and ñrther relief to which Defendaut AAA Texas County Mutual Insurance Company may

        be   justty entitled and will ever pray,

        DEFBNDANT'      S   ORIGINAL ANSWER                                                            Page   1

                                                                                                  MR227
A/   L8/2øL4 LØtAØ    21.4-2Gø-1.6?Ø, ?1,4-?6ø-L6?Ø
                                                                                                              t   3/3

                                               Respectfully submitted,

                                               WALTERS, BALIDO & CRAIN, L,L.P

                                                L
                                               CARLOS A. BALIDO
                                               State Bâr No, 01631230
                                               MeadowPark Tower, 15ü Floor
                                               10440 North Central Expressway
                                              Dallas, T)(7523l
                                              TeL:214-749-4805
                                              Fax: 214-760- 1670
                                              oarlo s, bali do @w-b cl¡rwlìrm,   co   nr

                                          qERInTcATE OF SERVTCE

                This ís to certiffttrat a true and correct copy ofthe foregoing document has been mailed,
        faxe{ or hand delivercd to parties of               ín compliarrce with Rulc 2la of thc Texas Rulee
        of Civil Procedure, on                                              20r4_

        M. RaymondHatcher
        Alan J. Robenson
        Sloa4 Bagle¡ Hatchor &Pwry lawFirm
        P, O. Drawer2909
        101 East Whaley St¡eet
       Longview, TX 75606
       lel: 903-757-7000
       fax: 903-757-7574
       úatpþçr@sloarrfi rm. com

                                               L
                                             CARLOS A. BALIDO
                                                                            I

       DEFÞNDAI.IT'S ORIGINA.L ANSWER
                                                                                                   Page2

                                                                                               MR 228
APPENDIX TAB 6
                                                                                         Electronically Submitted
                                                                                            91312014 8:47:54 AM
                                                                                     Gregg County District Clerk
                                                                                     By; Natalie Goodan ,deputy

                                   CAUSE NO.2014       -    136s   -A
 THOMAS JACKSON                                   $    IN THE DISTRICT COURT
                                                  $
 vs,                                              $   oF GREGG COLTNTY, TEXAS
                                                  $
 AAA TEXAS COUNTY MUTUAL                          $
 INSURANCE COMPANY                                $   188fh   JUDICIAL DISTRICT

                         PLAINTIFF'S FIRST AMBNDED PETITION

 TO THE HONORABLE COURT:

        Plaintiff Thomas Jackson files this, his First Amencled Petition, and in support thereof

 respectfully shows the Court the following:

                              A. DISCOVERY CONTROL PLAN
        1.     Plaintilï intends that cliscovery will be conducted pursuant to a Level 3 discovery

controlplan. Tex. R, Clv, P. 190.4.

                                          B. PARTIES
       2,      Plaintiff Thomas Jackson, an individual, is a resident of Gregg County, Texas.

Plaintiff s Texas driver's license number is XXXXX037. Plaintiff s Social Securitv number is

XXX-XX-X454,

       3.      Defendant     AAA Texas County Mutual Insurance          Cornpany has generally

appeared herein and is before the Court for all purposes.

                               C. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

       4.      The Court has jurisdiction over the controversy because the damages well exceed

the Court's jurisdictional minimum. Plaintiff seeks monetary relief in excess of $100,000.00 but

not exceeding $200,000.00.

       5,     Pursuant to Texas Insurance Code $ 1952.110, venue is proper in Gregg County.

Texas, which is the county in which the subject wreck occured.

                                                                                  MR 229
                              D. AGENCY / RESPONDEA'I SUPEIITOR
        6.          Whenever it is alleged in this petition that Defendant,   AAA Texas County Mutual

Insurance Company,         did any act, omission or thing, it is meant that Defendant's     employees,

agents, officers, directors, servants, apparent agents, ostensible agents, agents by estoppel and/ot

representatives did such act, omission or thing and that at the titne such act, omission or thíng

was done     it   was done with the actual or implied knowledge of Detèndant,       AAA   Texas County

Mutual Insurance Company, or was done with the lull authorizatíon or ratifìcation of Defendant,

AAA Texas County Mutual Insurance Company, or was done in the normal and routine                  course

and scope     of agcncy or      employrnent   of   Defendant's employees, ageuts, officers, directors,

servants, apparent agents or ostensible agents, agents by estoppe[, and/or representatives.

                                                E. FACTS
        7.         This lawsuit results from a collision that occuned on Jutre 12,2013,               at

approximately 8:58 p.m. in Longview, Gregg County, Texas. Plaintiff Thomas Jackson was

operating his vehicle westbound on Pliler Precise Road in a safe, reasonable and        lawtil   manner)

when he stopped in obedience to a traffic control device at the inter.section of Judson Road and

Pliler Precise Road. After stopping, and in obedience to the traffic control device, Plaintiff

proceeded    to continue traveling lvestbound into the intersection of Pliler Precise Road and

Judson Road. Patricia Tompkins was traveling northbound on Judson Road when, with complete

disregald for the safety and welfare of other persons or property, she disregarded the traffic

control device striking the driver's side of the vehicle being driven by Plaíntiff and causing the

collision made the basis of this lawsuit.

       8.          When the collision occurred, Plaintiffs vehicle was covered by a policy of

automobile insurance in full force and etI'ect, which ís the subject of this lawsuit. The polícy of

                                                      2

                                                                                       MR 23O
automobile insurance was issued by Defendant and included uninsured/underinsured motorist

coverage as defined under the policy and/or by statute.

        9.       Plaintiff timely and properly notified l)efendant of the motot vehicle collision that

is the subject of this   suit. PlaÍntiff   has   tilly   complied with all of the conditions of that insurance

policy prior to his hling suit against Defèndant. All conditions precedent have been performed

or have occuned. Further, PlaintifÏ has complied wíth requests for provision of information to

the Defendant.

        10.      As a result of the collision            caused   by Patricia Tompkins, Plaíntiff sustained

damages that exceed the amount         of available and collectibte liability insurance coverage       issued

to Patricia Tompkins and which covered her negligent actions. Delendant refused to consider

Plaintifï s ir{uries" medical billing paid or incurred by ot on behalf of Plaintiff and failed, and

continues to fail, to    fully compensate Plaintiff for the injuries caused by Patricia Tornpkins,         an

underinsured motorist, and give Plaintifithe benefit of the bargain of his uninsured/underinsured

motorist coverage present in the insurance policy, in violation of Texas law as described herein

below. As a result of their acts and/or omissíons, and unlawful conduct as described herein

below. Defendant proximately causecl Plaintiff injury,

                            F.. BREACH OF INSURANCE CONTRACT

       I   l,    All of the premiums that were due on the AAA               Texas County Mutual Insurance

Company policy with Thomas Jackson as the named insured had, at the time of the wreck, been

paid and the policy was in full force and effect at the time of the collision. Defendant, AAA

Texas Courrty Mutual Insurance Company, kept its insured's premiums and had obligations as

described in the insurance policy that was in effect at the time of the incident in question,

Defendant to date has failed and refused to pay the money due under the policy, despite demand.

                                                           J

                                                                                             MR     23I
 Specifically, Defendant has determined that Plaintiff s underiusured motorist claim is worth at

 least $ 25,000, as evidenced by its offer to pay $ 20,000 in addition to $ 5,000 previously paid as

 personal injury protection policy limits (see Exhibit   A). However, despite Plaintiff's demand for
 payment     of this undisputed portion of his underinsured motorist coverage (see Exhibit B),

 Defendant has refused to tender this amount. This failure and ref'usal to pay constitutes a breach

 of contract and demonstrates bad faith. Further, Defendant's f'ailure to properly value and fully

 pay Plaintiffs damages pursuant to its obligations in the policy at issue likewise constitutes a

 breach of contract and demonstrate bad faith^

                         G. PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF

        12.      Based on the foregoing facts, and pursuant to the policy of insurance in force and

effect between Plaintiff and Defendant AAA Texas County Mutual Insurance Company at the

time of the wreck, Plaintifi seeks a declaratory judgment pursuant to Chapter 37 of the Texas

Civil Practice and Remedies Code construing the contract of insurance       ancl declaring   Plaintiff   s

rights and obligations under the contract. Specitically, Plaintiff seeks finclings that   (l)   Patricia

Tompkins is an underinsured motorist, (2) that Plaintiff is entitled to recover from Defendant

Plaintiff s damages resulting from the motor vehicle collision the subject of this suit, (3) that

Plaintiffs   damages   fall within the coverage afl'orded Plaintiff under the policy with Defendant,

and (4) a finding specifying the amount of damages, attomey's fees, interest, and court costs that

Defendant is obligated to pay.

       13.      Det'endant   AAA Texas County Muttnl          Insurance Company's conduct          is    a

proximate and producing cause of damages to Plaintifï, Such damages include, but are not

limited to, unpaid benefìts, medical expenses, physical impainnent, lost earning capacity,          and

                                                  4

                                                                                    MR232
 pain and mental anguish. Such damages have occurred in the past and are likely to continue in

 the future.

         14,     As a result of Defendant AAA Texas County lVfutual Insurance               Company's

 concluct, Plaintiff has incurred attorney's fees through trial and appeal.

               H. BRE.,\CH OF DUTY OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING

         15.     Without adequate explanation or justification, Delendant AAA Texas County

Mutual Insurance Cornpany, by and through its âgents, breached its duty of good faith and fair

dealing by denying or delaying payment of benefits to Plaintiff in accordance with its insurance

agreement with    Plaintiff when it was reasonably clear that it should pay said benefits to Plaintiffl

Accordingly, Det'endant is in violation of 'fexas Insurance Codc, Chapter 542. et seq. Further,

Defendant has engaged in unfair claim settlement practices in violation of Texas Insurance Code

$$ 542,056, 542.057, and 542.058. As a proximate result of these actions, Plaintitt suffèred

damages, which al'e more    fully outlined herein bclow.

                                             I.   DAMAGES

        ló.      As a proxirnate result of the collision, Plaintiff Thomas Jackson sustained serious

personal injuries, specifically including neck, back, and head ínjuries and injuries to his body

generally. Plaintiff believes some of his injuries are permanent in nature and have had a serious

etfèct on his health and well-being. [n connection with such injuries, Plaintiff Thomas Jackson

has sufTered physical pain and mental anguish in the past, is suffering at the present, and, in all

reasonable probability,   will   continue   to suffer f-or the rest ol'his lifb. Fuúher, it has been

necessary    for Plaintiff, Thomas Jackson, to pay or incur      reasonable and nece.ssary medical

expenses in the past and in all reasonable probability   will incul reasonable and   necessary medical

expenses    fbr the treatment ol his ínjuries in the future. In addition, he has sustained physical

                                                    5

                                                                                       MR 233
impainnent in the past arrd wilt in all probabilíty continue to sustain physical impairment in the

futurc. Plaintiff Thomas Jackson sues f'or the recovery of past and fluture medical expenses, past

and future physical pain and mental anguish, antl past and future physical impairment; all in an

amount in excess of the minimum jurisdictional limits of this Court. Plaintiff seeks a reasonable

amount to be determined by the     jury for his injuries.

         17,      In addition, Plaintiff is entitled to recover attorney's tèes and interest on the

amount of his claim at eighteen percent (1S%) per year pursuant to Texas Insurance Code                 $

542,060.

                                  J.   DOCUMENTS TO BE USED

         18.      Pursuant to Texas Rule     of Civil     Procedure 193.7, Plaintii'f intends   to use all

documents exchanged and produced between the parties including                     but not lirnited to

correspondence and discovery responses during the             trial of the above-entitled and numbered

cause,

                                     K.   PRAYER FOR RELIEF

         PREMISES CONSIDERED, Plaintiff requests that the Defendant be cited to appear and

answer and that, upon tìnal hearing hereon, PlaintitTrecover as t-ollows:

         a.   Actual damages within the jurisdictional limits of this Court;

         b.   Prejudgment and post-judgment interest as allowed by law;

         c.   Declmatory relief as outlined in the petition;

         d.   Costs of Couft and attorney's fees; and

         e. All otlier relief to which Plaintiff   may show himselfjustly entitled.

                                                      6

                                                                                       MR 234
                                                   Respectfu   lly submitted,

                                                   SLoAN,   Bacuy,    H,qrcHeR & Pennv L¡.w Ftnvt

                                                   M, RA                        R
                                                   State Bar No,24002243
                                                   rhatcher@slo anfirm. com
                                                ALAN        J. ROBERTSON
                                                State Bar No,24067952
                                                arobertson@ sloanfirm. com
                                                101 East Whaley Street
                                                Longview, TX 75601
                                                Telephone 903-7 57 -7000
                                                Facsimile 903-7 57 -757 4

                                                ATTORNEYS FOR PLATNTIFF

                                 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
                                     e'rd
       i hereby certify that on this J_ lay of September,2}74, a true  and correct copy of the
ftrregoing document was sent by certitied mail, retum receipt requested, facsimile transmission,
and/or e-mail in accordance with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure to the following counsel of
record:

       Mr. Carlos A, Balido
       WALTERS, Balroo & CnR¡w, L.L.P
       Meadow Park Tower, l5tl' Floor
       10440 North Central Expressway
       Dallas, TX 75231

                                                M. RAYM
                                                ALAN J.                T'SON

                                               7

                                                                                    MR 235
APPENDIX TAB 7
                                                                                                    Electronically Submitterl
                                                                                                      1 l'l 6 /20 1 5 3:02:45 P l\A

                                                                                                 Grsgg County Dis(rict Clerk
                                                                                                 By: Debbie Kinney ,deputy

                                         CAUSE NO. 2014 - l36s _ A

   THOMAS JACKSON                                          $   IN THB DISTRICT COURT
                                                           $
   vs                                                          OF' GREGG COTINTY,
                                                           $                               Tf,XAS
                                                          $
   AAA TEXAS COUNTY MUTU.{L
                                                          $
   INSURANCE COMPANY                                           T88'h   JUDICIAL DISTRICT
                                                          $

                       PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COI}ÍPEL DISCOVERY

  TO TIJE HONORABLE COURT:

          Plairrtiff Thotnas .faokson fiIes this, his lVfotion ro Compel Discovery. plainriff
                                                                                              requests

  that this CoLu't sign an otcJer compelling Delenclant AAA Texas County
                                                                         Mutual lnsr¡rance
  Cornpany ("AA,A")      to fully   ans'uvet'/responcl   to PlaintitÏ Thomas    .fack¡-on's Fírst Request ttr¡

  Admissions. First Set of Interrogatories, and First Request lor procluction.
                                                                               In support thereof,
 PlaintitlLespectfully shows the Court the following:

                                             I.   TNTRODUCTION

         This lawsuit results fì'om a motor vehicle collisior, occurring on or about
                                                                                     June           I   z, 2013,
 in Glegg Courrty, J'exas, The collision occurrecl at the intersection of pliler. precise
                                                                                          Roaci and

 Juclson Road   in Lortgview. Texas. At that time, Plaintiff           Thornas Jackson was the dr.iver      of   a

vel:ìcle lawfully and safely traveling westbound on Pliler Precise Roacl, Jackson
                                                                                  stoppecl                      i.
obedicnce to a traffic   lighl at the intersection of Juclson Road and pliler precise Road, After

stopping' md in obedience to the tratTc light, Jackson continued traveling
                                                                           westbouncl into t6c

intersection of' Plì.]er precise Road ancl Judscrn Roa.d.               paÍicia lompkins was traveling
nofthbourrd on .Iudson Road when, with complete rlisregarcl for the satbty
                                                                           ancl welfare of other

persons or properfy, she disregarded the red light, struck the driver's
                                                                        side of Jackson,s vehícle,

and caused the collisíon made the basís of'this lawsuit.

                                                                                               MR 236
          When the collisiorr occllrted, AAA covered Jtckson with a personal aLrtomobile ínsurance

 policy. AAA's policy inclucled underinsruecl rnotorist coverage,                     .Iackson's injuries and

 damages exhausted the          limits of Ms. Tompkins's liability insurancc coverage, so Jackson now

 seeks to enforce against       AAA the itrsurance policy for which both hc    anct   AAA bargained and for

 which Jackson paid premiurns.

         A.4A has prevíously ottþred to pay Jackson $20.000.00 of its $100,000.00 unclerinsured

 motorist coverage in additíon to the $5,000.00 personrrl injury protection coverage             it previously
paid and the $30,000.00 of liabiliry insurance paicl by N4s, Tompkins's insurer Despite

J¿tckson's demand th¿rt        ¡\AA pay this t)mount   (ancl thc pru'ties continue   to Iitigatc the amount(s)

about which they disagree), AÂA let-r.¡ses to pay the $20,000.00 which it has ah.eacly oU'erecl.

        Discovery in this malter is governed by a Level 3 discovery control            plan. This mattcr has
not yct been set f'or trial.

            fl.   DBF'TCIENCIES IN DB¡-¡]NDAIíT''S DISCOVERY RESPONSES

        No pafty to this lawsuit disputes that the e vent.s listecl below occurred on                     the

con'esponding dates listed      ;

   o    Octobcl l7r 2014: Jackson's counsel servrs AAA with Jackson's First Request for
        Admissions. First Request for Procfuctiou, And Filst Set of intenogatolies.

   o   Novembcr 11r 20t{; AAA's couusel requests (ancl Jackson's counsel grants) the firstof
       fotlt' extcnsions of AAA's deadlìne to respoud to Jackson's written id. On December 10,2014, Plaintiff

provided a third extension to Defèndant, moving the deadline to December 17,2014. See id. On

December 17,2014, Plaintiff provicled a fourlh extension, moving the deadline tid.

         On December 23,201,4, after more than sixty days and four extensions, Plaintiff finally

received Defendant's responses to discovery, which were sorely deficient. The parties proceeded

with certaín discovery and motion practice, On April 22,2014, Defendants' called to confer on

Plaintiffs Motion to Quash certain unlimited depositions on written questions to Plaintifls

medical providers. During that conversation, Defendant expressed its interest to engage in early

mediation to avoid íncurring substantial litigation costs. The parties resolved their differences

regarding the depositions on written questions and Plaintiff tabled his motion to compel began

attempting to schedule mediation. Plaintiffls counsel circulated fourteen (14) available dates in

June and July. Defendant was unavailable     for all of them. At Defendant's request, Plaintiff    s

counsel circulated twelve (12) additional available dates in August and September.

         On June 24, 2015, after more than two months of attempting to scheclule mediation,

Defendant, despite its expressed desire for early mediation, finally provided a mediation date. In

Plalntiff s Re spo ns e eo D efe nda nt's
Emergency Motlon to Reset Heoring                                                            Page 3

                                                                                  MR 249
 the four month window of time for which Plaintiff had provided available dates, Def'endant

 selected the very last available date    of   September 29,2015. This course     of dilatory conduct,

 which became apparent on June 24, 2015, is what prompted Plaintiff to complete his motion to

 oompel and begin the process of attempting to confer on July 15,2015.In the more than sixty

 days ftrllowing that letter, despite repeated attempts to confer, the flrling of the motion, the filing

 and service of the notice of hearing (again, by two separate means), Defendant has been as

 unresponsive to Plaintiff s attempt to diligently litigate this case as it was in Octobet of last year,

 when Plaintitïprovided f-our separate extensions to Defendant's deadline to respond to the vety

discovery that forms the basis of Plaintiff's Motion to Compel.

                                     I. CONCLTJSION AND PRAYER

        For the reasons expressed above, Plaintiff respectftllly requests that the Court deny

Defendant's Ernergency Motion to Reset the Hearing on Plaintiffls Motion to Compel, and for

any and all other relief to which Plaintiff rnay be justly entitled.

                                                 Respectf ully submitted,
                                                 SLoAN. BAcLEy, HRrcu¡n& Pennv Lnw           FInv

                                                 /s/ Justin A. Smith
                                                 GLENN A, PERRY
                                                 State Bar No, 15801500
                                                 qperrv@,sloanfirm, com
                                                 JUSTIN A. SMITH
                                                 State Bar No, 24068415
                                                 jsmith@sloanfirm.com
                                                  101 East Whaley Street
                                                 Longview, Texas 75601
                                                 Telephone 903-757-7000
                                                 Facsimile 903-75'1-7574
                                                 ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF

Plointìffs Response to Defendunt's
Emergency Motion to Reset Hear[ng                                                                Page 4

                                                                                        MR 25O
                                  CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

       I hereby certify that on this the l't day of October, 2015 a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document was served in accordance with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedtre on the
following counsel of record:

      Mr. Carlos A. Balido
      Wllrens, B¡ltoo & CRerN, L.L.P.
      10440 North Central Expressway, Suite 1500
      Dallas. Texas 7523I

                                                   /s/.Iustin A. Smith
                                                   GLENN A. PERRY
                                                   JUSTIN A. SMITH

Plølntiffs Response to Delendant's
ßmergenq Motion to    Reset Hearlng                                                       Page 5

                                                                                 tutR   25t
                                                                                 *
JOHN D. SLOÂN r+
LAUR.EEN        1¡,   BACLEY
                                                                      SLOAN, BAGLEY                                            J, RYAN FOWI.eR,
                                                                                                                               A¡J|Nr. ROBERTSON
M. RÂYMOND HATCHER                                                   HATCHER & PERRY                                           CA.RSON R- RUNGE
GLENN.4. PERRY'+
'llo¡nl C