Court Opinion

ID: 9941101
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-15 21:00:41.895608+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:13.319173
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     DEBBIE LOU WALKER,                              DOCKET NUMBER
                  Appellant,                         NY-1221-22-0167-W-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,                          DATE: February 14, 2024
                 Agency.

                  THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

                James R. Walker , Byron, Georgia, for the appellant.

                Ryan Devine , Esquire, Fort Gregg Adams, Virginia, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member

                                     REMAND ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     dismissed her individual right of action (IRA) appeal for lack of jurisdiction. For
     the reasons discussed below, we GRANT the appellant’s petition for review,
     VACATE the initial decision, FIND that the appellant established Board
     jurisdiction over her appeal, and REMAND the case to New York Field Office for
     further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                          2

                                       BACKGROUND
¶2         The appellant works as a GS-13 Store Director of the Mitchel Field
     Commissary at the Defense Commissary Agency (DCA).                Initial Appeal File
     (IAF), Tab 7 at 17, 30. On or about May 21, 2020, the appellant filed a complaint
     with the Office of Special Counsel (OSC) alleging whistleblower reprisal.           Id.
     at 12-54.   After OSC issued the appellant a letter notifying her that it was
     terminating its investigation into her complaint, the appellant filed an IRA appeal
     with the Board. IAF, Tabs 1, 3. The administrative judge issued a jurisdictional
     order, notifying the appellant of the IRA jurisdictional standard, and providing
     her with an opportunity to present evidence and argument establishing Board
     jurisdiction over her IRA appeal. IAF, Tab 4.
¶3         The appellant responded to the administrative judge’s order, 2 alleging that
     the agency retaliated against her because she disclosed that the Federal contractor
     providing personnel support to the commissary was fraudulently billing the
     agency in the amount of $1.275 million. IAF, Tabs 7 at 2-8, Tab 13 at 4-13.
     Without holding a hearing, the administrative judge issued an initial decision
     dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. IAF, Tab 20, Initial Decision (ID).
     First, the administrative judge found that the appellant alleged two instances of
     whistleblowing, specifically, an April 3, 2020 disclosure of “contractor
     impropriety” and a May 21, 2020 OSC complaint.                ID at 3.      Then, the
     administrative judge found that the appellant did not prove exhaustion as it
     relates to the May 21, 2020 OSC complaint. ID at 3. Next, the administrative
     judge found that, while the appellant proved exhaustion with regards to her
     April 3, 2020 disclosure, she did not make a nonfrivolous allegation that she held
     a reasonable belief that her disclosures evidenced agency wrongdoing because she

     2
       Although the appellant responded to the administrative judge’s initial jurisdictional
     order, IAF, Tabs 7-8, the administrative judge issued a second jurisdictional order,
     stating that the appellant’s response did not comply with her order, and directing the
     appellant to provide a “concise list” of her allegations, IAF, Tab 9. The appellant
     responded to the administrative judge’s second jurisdictional order. IAF, Tabs 13-14.
                                                                                             3

     disclosed wrongdoing by a non-Federal entity. ID at 3-5. Concluding that the
     April 3, 2020 disclosure was a “quintessential contractual issue,” the
     administrative judge found that the appellant did not make a nonfrivolous
     allegation that she made a protected disclosure. ID at 5.
¶4           The appellant has filed a petition for review, arguing, in part, that agency
     personnel were implicated in her disclosures, and she reasonably believed her
     disclosures evidenced agency wrongdoing. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1
     at 4-5. The agency responded in opposition to the appellant’s petition for review.
     PFR File, Tab 3.

                       DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
¶5           As an initial matter, the administrative judge did not capture the totality of
     the appellant’s claims, incorrectly stating that the appellant alleged only two
     instances of whistleblowing. ID at 3. Therefore, we must correct the framing of
     the appellant’s allegations. The appellant asserted in her jurisdictional responses
     that:    (1) in November 2019, she disclosed to the Department of Defense
     Inspector General (DOD IG) that the Federal contractor was fraudulently billing
     the agency; (2) in December 2019, she disclosed to the DCA’s Inspector General
     (IG) that the Federal contractor was fraudulently billing the agency; (3) in
     January 2020, she disclosed to the agency’s contracting officer that the Federal
     contractor was fraudulently billing the agency, (4) in February 2020, she
     disclosed to her first-line supervisor that the Federal contractor was fraudulently
     billing the agency; and (5) on April 3, 2020, she disclosed to her second-line
     supervisor that the Federal contractor was fraudulently billing the agency. 3 IAF,

     3
       The appellant also alleged that she made disclosures to OSC, first on April 28, 2020,
     and then by filing an OSC complaint on May 21, 2020, which is the complaint that
     serves as the basis of this appeal. IAF, Tab 13 at 4. Regarding the April 28, 2020 OSC
     disclosure, the appellant did not reference this disclosure in any other submission to the
     Board or to OSC, nor has she claimed on review that she made a disclosure to OSC on
     April 28, 2020. IAF, Tab 7 at 2-8, 12-54, Tab 13 at 4-13; PFR File, Tab 1 at 4-6.
     However, even if the appellant made a disclosure to OSC on April 28, 2020, there is no
     evidence that she raised this claim to OSC, and thus, she did not prove exhaustion.
                                                                                            4

     Tab 13 at 4-5. She also alleged that, in retaliation for her disclosures, the agency
     (i) subjected her to a hostile work environment; (ii) failed to detail her as the
     acting Store Director of another commissary; (iii) issued her an “unfair” award;
     (iv) failed to select her for three vacant positions; and (v) issued her an unfair
     performance review. Id. at 4-6.
¶6         Because the administrative judge did not accurately characterize the
     appellant’s claims, she did not properly apply the IRA jurisdictional framework.
     First, we address the issue of exhaustion, finding that the appellant exhausted
     only a portion of her claims, specifically, that the agency retaliated against her for
     her disclosures to the DOD IG, the DCA IG, and her first- and second-line
     supervisors, by subjecting her to a hostile work environment, issuing her an
     “unfair” award, and not selecting her for three positions. However, we find that
     the appellant did not make a nonfrivolous allegation that the cumulative effect of
     the agency’s actions constituted a significant change in her working conditions,
     and therefore, her hostile work environment claim is not a covered personnel
     action. Next, we find that, while the appellant nonfrivolously alleged that she
     engaged in protected activity by making disclosures to the DOD and DCA IGs,
     she did not make a nonfrivolous allegation that the protected activity was a
     contributing factor in any personnel action. Nevertheless, because we find that
     the appellant nonfrivolously alleged that she made protected disclosures to her
     first- and second-line supervisors that were a contributing factor in the agency’s
     personnel actions, we find that the Board has jurisdiction over this appeal.

     The appellant proved exhaustion with respect to a portion of her claims.
¶7         We find that the appellant proved exhaustion only with respect to a portion
     of the claims she set forth in her jurisdictional response. IAF, Tab 13 at 4-6. To
     IAF, Tab 7 at 12-54. Regarding the appellant’s May 21, 2020 OSC complaint, it is
     unclear whether the appellant is alleging that she was retaliated against for filing this
     complaint. IAF, Tab 13 at 4-6. Nevertheless, we agree with the administrative judge
     that the appellant did not prove that she exhausted her administrative remedies
     regarding the May 21, 2020 OSC complaint, ID at 3, and the appellant does not
     challenge this finding on review.
                                                                                        5

     satisfy the exhaustion requirement of 5 U.S.C. § 1214(a)(3), an appellant must
     have provided OSC with a sufficient basis to pursue an investigation into her
     allegations of whistleblower reprisal. Skarada v. Department of Veterans Affairs,
     2022 MSPB 17, ¶ 7; Chambers v. Department of Homeland Security, 2022 MSPB
     8, ¶ 10. Generally, exhaustion can be demonstrated through the appellant’s OSC
     complaint, evidence the original complaint was amended, including but not
     limited to OSC’s determination letter and other letters from OSC referencing any
     amended allegations, and the appellant’s written responses to OSC.          Skarada,
     2022 MSPB 17, ¶ 7; Mason v. Department of Homeland Security , 116 M.S.P.R.
     135, ¶ 8 (2011).      Alternatively, exhaustion may be proven through other
     sufficiently reliable evidence, such as an affidavit attesting that the appellant
     raised with OSC the substance of the facts in her Board appeal.             Skarada,
     2022 MSPB 17, ¶ 7; Chambers, 2022 MSPB 8, ¶ 11. The appellant must prove
     exhaustion with OSC by preponderant evidence, not just present nonfrivolous
     allegations of exhaustion. Chambers, 2022 MSPB 8, ¶ 11.
¶8         The record contains a copy of the appellant’s May 21, 2020 OSC complaint,
     a detailed narrative of her claims that she provided to OSC, and a copy of OSC’s
     close-out letter.   IAF, Tab 3, Tab 7 at 12-54.     Based on our review of these
     documents, we find that the appellant raised to OSC that she disclosed the Federal
     contractor’s fraudulent billing to the DOD IG, the DCA’s IG, and her first- and
     second-line supervisors. IAF, Tab 7 at 20, 30-39. Furthermore, of the personnel
     actions alleged by the appellant in her jurisdictional response, OSC’s close-out
     letter references the hostile work environment claim, the “unfair” award, and the
     three nonselections. IAF, Tab 3. There is no evidence that the appellant raised
     DCA’s failure to detail her or her performance evaluation to OSC. 4 IAF, Tab 7 at
     12-54. Similarly, there is no evidence that the appellant alleged to OSC that she

     4
      On review, the appellant admits that she did not raise the performance evaluation to
     OSC. PFR File, Tab 1 at 5.
                                                                                          6

      made a protected disclosure to the agency’s contracting officer in January 2020,
      as she asserted in her jurisdictional response. IAF, Tab 7 at 12-54, Tab 13 at 4.
¶9         Accordingly, we find that the appellant proved exhaustion with respect to
      the following: that she disclosed allegations of fraudulent billing by the Federal
      contractor to (1) the DOD IG; (2) the DCA IG; (3) her first-line supervisor; and
      (4) her second-line supervisor, and in retaliation, the agency (i) subjected her to a
      hostile work environment; (ii) issued her an “unfair” award; and (iii) did not
      select her for three vacant positions.

      The appellant’s hostile work environment claim is not a covered personnel action
      because the appellant did not make a nonfrivolous allegation that the cumulative
      effect of the agency’s actions constituted a significant change in her working
      conditions.
¶10        The administrative judge, before issuing the initial decision, issued an order
      and findings on jurisdiction, “disallowing” the appellant’s claim of hostile work
      environment because the appellant did not allege facts that would meet the legal
      burden to allege a hostile work environment. IAF, Tab 17 at 3. Specifically, the
      administrative judge stated that, to prevail on a hostile work environment claim,
      the appellant must show that the complained-of conduct was objectively and
      subjectively discriminatory, and was so severe or pervasive as to create a working
      environment that a reasonable person would find hostile. Id. The administrative
      judge concluded that the appellant’s allegations were “lacking.” Id.
¶11        To the extent the administrative judge cited to case law interpreting
      Title VII in defining a hostile work environment for purposes of this IRA appeal,
      her reliance on this case law was in error. IAF, Tab 17 at 3 (citing Harris v.
      Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993) (explaining that under Title VII,
      an employee may pursue a claim based on conduct that is both “severe or
      pervasive enough to create . . . an environment that a reasonable person would
      find hostile or abusive” and that the victim “subjectively perceive[d]” as
      “abusive”)).   Although the term “hostile work environment” has a particular
      meaning in other contexts, the Board has clarified that allegations of a hostile
                                                                                          7

      work environment may establish a personnel action in an IRA appeal only if they
      meet the statutory criteria, i.e., constitute a “significant change in duties,
      responsibilities, or working conditions” under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A)(xii).
      Skarada, 2022 MSPB 17, ¶ 16.           Only agency actions that, individually or
      collectively, have practical and significant effects on the overall nature and
      quality of an employee’s working conditions, duties, or responsibilities will be
      found to constitute a personnel action covered by 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A)(xii).
      Skarada, 2022 MSPB 17, ¶ 16.
¶12           Although the administrative judge advised the parties of the Title VII
      definition of hostile work environment, we find that the definition she used was
      sufficient to advise the appellant of the need to identify the impact of the
      agency’s actions on her workplace, as stated in Skarada.           Specifically, the
      administrative judge identified as factors relevant in determining whether agency
      conduct rises to the level of actionable harassment as including the frequency and
      severity of the conduct and whether it interferes with performance. IAF, Tab 17
      at 3.    Under these circumstances, we conclude that the administrative judge’s
      error was not harmful.       See As’Salaam v. U.S. Postal Service, 85 M.P.S.R.
      76, ¶ 14 (2000) (finding harmless an administrative judge’s error in failing to
      notify the appellant that his burden at the jurisdictional stage of his appeal was to
      make nonfrivolous allegations when the undisputed facts made clear he could not
      meet this burden).
¶13           We also agree with the administrative judge that the appellant’s allegations
      do not amount to a nonfrivolous allegation of a significant change in her duties,
      responsibilities, or working conditions. The appellant’s hostile work environment
      claim includes the following allegations: denying her request to deep clean the
      store, denying her request to telework when she had COVID-19, denying her
      access to the commissary while she had COVID-19, requiring her to produce
      three doctor’s notes to return to work after she had COVID-19, giving awards to
      the employees who worked while she was on leave due to COVID-19, requiring
                                                                                           8

      her to contact an employee on sick leave, defaming and slandering her to the
      Command, and preventing her from filling vacant positions in the commissary
      store. IAF, Tab 13 at 4-13. The appellant does not challenge the administrative
      judge’s findings on review, nor has she explained how the listed actions impacted
      her working conditions, duties, or responsibilities. IAF, Tab 7 at 2-8, Tab 13 at
      4-13; PFR File, Tab 1 at 4-6.        Accordingly, the appellant did not make a
      nonfrivolous allegation that her hostile work environment claim is a covered
      personnel action.

      The appellant did not make a nonfrivolous allegation that her disclosures to the
      DOD or DCA IGs were a contributing factor in the issuance of the award or the
      three nonselections.
¶14        In addition to exhausting remedies with OSC, to establish Board jurisdiction
      over an IRA appeal, an appellant must make nonfrivolous allegations that (1) she
      made a protected whistleblowing disclosure under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
      engaged in protected whistleblowing activity under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),
      (B), (C), or (D); and (2) the disclosure or activity was a contributing factor in the
      agency’s decision to take, or fail to take, or threaten to take, a personnel action as
      defined by 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A). Chambers, 2022 MSPB 8, ¶ 14. Under the
      broadly worded provision of 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(C), any disclosure of
      information to an IG is protected regardless of its content as long as such
      disclosure is made in accordance with applicable provisions of law.         Fisher v.
      Department of the Interior, 2023 MSPB 11, ¶ 8. As the appellant alleged that she
      made disclosures to the DOD and DCA IGs, we find that she nonfrivolously
      alleged that she engaged in a protected activity under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(C).
¶15        Having determined that the appellant nonfrivolously alleged that she
      engaged in a protected activity, we proceed to the question of whether she
      nonfrivolously alleged that these protected activities were a contributing factor in
      the agency’s personnel actions. To satisfy the contributing criterion, an appellant
      only need raise a nonfrivolous allegation that the fact of, or the content of, the
                                                                                         9

      protected disclosure was one factor that tended to affect the personnel action in
      any way. Skarada, 2022 MSPB 17, ¶ 19. One way to establish this criterion is
      the knowledge/timing test, under which an employee may nonfrivolously allege
      that the disclosure was a contributing factor in a personnel action through
      circumstantial evidence, such as evidence that the official taking the personnel
      action knew of the disclosure and that the personnel action occurred within a
      period of time such that a reasonable person could conclude that the disclosure
      was a contributing factor in the personnel action. Id. The Board has held that a
      personnel action taken within approximately 1 to 2 years of the appellant’s
      disclosures satisfies the knowledge/timing test. Id.
¶16          With respect to her IG disclosures, the appellant does not satisfy the
      knowledge/timing test. The appellant did not allege, in any submission to the
      Board or OSC, that the individuals identified as responsible for the personnel
      actions at issue had any knowledge of her contact with the DOD IG or DCA IG.
      IAF, Tab 7 at 2-8, 12-54, Tab 13 at 4-13. Furthermore, the appellant has not
      alleged that either IG investigated her claims or contacted any personnel related
      to her disclosures. IAF, Tab 7 at 2-8, 12-54, Tab 13 at 4-13. Accordingly, we
      find    that   the   appellant   does   meet   the     knowledge   prong    of   the
      knowledge/timing test.
¶17          However, the Board has held that if an appellant has failed to satisfy the
      knowledge/timing test, it will consider other evidence, such as evidence
      pertaining to the strength or weakness of the agency’s reasons for taking the
      personnel action, whether the whistleblowing was personally directed towards the
      officials taking the action, and whether these individuals had a desire or motive to
      retaliate against the appellant. Dorney v. Department of the Army, 117 M.S.P.R.
      480, ¶ 15 (2012). Here, the appellant has not provided any evidence pertaining to
      the strength or weakness of the agency’s reasons for taking the personnel actions,
      nor has she explained whether the individuals responsible for taking the personnel
      actions against her had a desire or motive to retaliate. Furthermore, the appellant
                                                                                            10

      does not allege that she named her supervisors in her disclosures to the DOD IG
      or the DCA IG, or that her whistleblowing was personally directed at them. IAF,
      Tab 7 at 2-8, 12-54, Tab 13 at 4-13. Accordingly, we find that the appellant has
      failed to nonfrivolously allege that her protected activities, i.e., her disclosures to
      the DOD and DCA IGs, were a contributing factor in the agency’s personnel
      actions.

      The appellant made a nonfrivolous allegation that she made protected disclosures
      to her first- and second-line supervisors that were a contributing factor in the
      issuance of an unfair award and three nonselections.
¶18          The administrative judge found that the appellant failed to nonfrivolously
      allege that her disclosures to her first- and second-line supervisors of wrongdoing
      by a Federal contractor implicated the Government. ID at 4-5. We disagree and
      further find that the appellant established Board jurisdiction because she
      nonfrivolously alleged that her protected disclosures were a contributing factor in
      the agency’s personnel actions. 5
¶19          A nonfrivolous allegation of a protected whistleblowing disclosure is an
      allegation of facts that, if proven, would show that the appellant disclosed a
      matter that a reasonable person in her position would believe evidenced one of
      the categories of wrongdoing specified in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8).               Gabel v.
      Department of Veterans Affairs, 2023 MSPB 4, ¶ 6.               The test to determine
      whether a whistleblower has a reasonable belief in the disclosure is an objective
      one:    whether a disinterested observer with knowledge of the essential facts
      known to and readily ascertainable by the employee could reasonably conclude
      that the actions of the agency evidence a violation of law, rule, or regulation,
      gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a
      substantial and specific danger to public health or safety. Id. A disclosure of
      wrongdoing committed by a non-Federal Government entity may be protected
      only when the Government’s interests and good name are implicated in the
      5
        The statutory definition of a personnel action expressly includes the personnel actions
      at issue, i.e., nonselections and awards. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A)(i)-(ii), (ix).
                                                                                            11

      alleged wrongdoing, and the employee shows that she reasonably believed that
      the information she disclosed evidenced that wrongdoing.                  Covington v.
      Department of the Interior, 2023 MSPB 5, ¶ 20.
¶20         Contrary to the administrative judge’s findings, ID at 3-5, we conclude that
      the appellant’s disclosure necessarily implicates agency wrongdoing.                The
      appellant alleged that she disclosed to her first-line supervisor in February 2020
      and her second-line supervisor on April 3, 2020, that the Federal contractor was
      fraudulently billing the agency at least $1.275 million annually for work that it
      did not perform. IAF, Tab 13 at 4-5. The appellant’s allegations, if true, could
      constitute a gross waste of funds, which is defined as a more than debatable
      expenditure that is significantly out of proportion to the benefit reasonably
      expected to accrue to the Government.         See Smith v. Department of the Army,
      80 M.S.P.R. 311, ¶ 8 (1998) (so defining a gross waste of funds). The appellant
      alleged that the $1.275 million was a relatively large amount given the small size
      of the store. 6   IAF, Tab 13 at 5.       She further alleged that an acting Store
      Director’s lack of oversight permitted the fraudulent overcharging. Id. at 4, 9.
      While lacking in detail, we find that the allegations are sufficient to suggest that
      the Government enabled a contractor to charge for services that the Government
      did not receive and thus that the payment for these services was disproportionate
      to the benefit accrued. Therefore, the appellant nonfrivolously alleged that she
      made a protected disclosure.
¶21         We also find that the appellant nonfrivolously alleged that these protected
      disclosures were a contributing factor in the issuance of the “unfair” award and
      the three nonselections, because the appellant made the protected disclosures to
      her first- and second-line supervisors, i.e., the individuals responsible for the
      6
       The Board does not require, as a basis for its jurisdiction, that an appellant in an IRA
      appeal correctly label a category of wrongdoing. El v. Department of Commerce,
      123 M.S.P.R. 76, ¶ 11 (2015), aff’d, 663 F. App’x 921 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Therefore, we
      need not consider here whether the appellant’s allegations might constitute another
      category of wrongdoing, such as gross mismanagement. The administrative judge
      should consider this issue on remand at the merits stage of this appeal.
                                                                                            12

      personnel actions, and the personnel actions occurred within 1 to 2 years of her
      protected disclosures.         See Skarada, 2022 MSPB 17, ¶ 19 (finding that an
      appellant    satisfies   the    contributing   factor   standard   if   she   meets   the
      knowledge/timing test).

      The appellant made a nonfrivolous allegation of Board jurisdiction and is entitled
      to a hearing.
¶22        In conclusion, we find that the appellant nonfrivolously alleged that she
      made protected disclosures that were a contributing factor in certain personnel
      actions.    Therefore, the appellant has established Board jurisdiction over her
      appeal, and she is entitled to a hearing on the merits. Graves v. Department of
      Veterans Affairs, 123 M.S.P.R. 434, ¶ 22 (2016) (explaining that an appellant is
      entitled to a hearing on the merits once she establishes Board jurisdiction over her
      IRA appeal). On remand, the administrative judge shall schedule the hearing the
      appellant requested and afford her an opportunity to prove by preponderant
      evidence that she made protected disclosures to her first- and second-line
      supervisors that were a contributing factor in the issuance of the unfair award and
      the three nonselections.        IAF, Tab 1 at 2; see Skarada, 2022 MSPB 17, ¶ 22
      (explaining that, when reviewing the merits of an IRA appeal, the Board must
      determine whether the appellant established by preponderant evidence that he
      made a protected disclosure that was a contributing factor in the agency’s
      personnel action). If the administrative judge finds that the appellant proved her
      prima face case of whistleblower reprisal, the administrative judge must then
      determine whether the agency has proved by clear and convincing evidence that it
      would have taken the same personnel actions notwithstanding the appellant’s
      protected disclosures. See Turner v. Department of Agriculture, 2023 MSPB 25,
      ¶ 12 (explaining that if an appellant proves that a protected disclosure or activity
      was a contributing factor in a personnel action by preponderant evidence, the
      agency is given an opportunity to prove by clear and convincing evidence that it
                                                                                   13

      would have taken the same personnel action absent the protected disclosure or
      activity).

                                          ORDER
¶23         For the reasons discussed above, we remand this case to the New York Field
      Office for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

      FOR THE BOARD:                       ______________________________
                                           Gina K. Grippando
                                           Clerk of the Board
      Washington, D.C.