Court Opinion

ID: 9919242
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-17 19:02:23.561697+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:06:33.770368
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/17/24 Gutierrez v. Liu CA4/1
                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 PABLO S. GUTIERREZ et al.,                                           D083004

           Plaintiffs and Respondents,

           v.
                                                                      (Super. Ct. No. CIVDS1914561)
 FEI JUNG LIU et al.,

           Defendants and Appellants.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Bernardino
County, Brian S. McCarville, Judge. Affirmed.
         Law Offices of Vincent Y. Lin, Vincent Y. Lin and Vincent Chan for
Defendants and Appellants.
         Gusdorff Law and Janet R. Gusdorff; Elder & Spencer, Chandra Gehri
Spencer, Margaret Elder, and Lanetta Rinehart for Plaintiffs and
Respondents.
         Defendants Fei Jung Liu and Oscar Wen Chieh Lin appeal from an
order denying their motion to vacate a default and default judgment that the
trial court entered against them and in favor of plaintiffs Pablo S. Gutierrez
and Gricelda San Martin. The defendants contend the trial court erred in
two ways. First, they argue the court should have granted their motion

under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (d),1 because the
default and default judgment were void for ineffective service of process.
Second, they argue that—even if the service of process was effective—the
default and default judgment should nonetheless have been vacated pursuant
to section 473.5; section 473, subdivision (b); and principles of equity. We
disagree. Thus we affirm.
                                       I.
                              INTRODUCTION
      A.    The Parties
      The plaintiffs are tenants who leased a residential apartment.
      The defendants are a husband and wife who owned and managed the
complex in which the apartment is located. They each use several different

names; and, in distinguishing among those names,2 their counsel refers to
“Oscar” and “Rachel” as “their first names,” and to the other names as their
“Chinese names.” We refer to the defendants primarily by the first names
used by their counsel (Oscar and Rachel). We do so for the sake of clarity,
intending no disrespect.
      B.    The Claims Alleged in the Complaint
      The essence of the claims the plaintiffs have alleged in their complaint
is that they entered into a lease to rent an apartment in the complex owned
and managed by Oscar and Rachel (the lease) and that, throughout the term
of the lease, the apartment was plagued with plumbing, electrical, and

1     All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
2     The husband goes by: Oscar, Oscar Wen Chieh Lin, Lin Oscar Wen
Chieh, Lin Oscar Wen Chieh Lin, Chieh, Lin, and Wen Chieh Ho. His wife
goes by: Rachel, Fei Jung Rachel Liu, Fei Jung Liu, and Liu.

                                       2
heating problems, an insufficiency of smoke detectors, a severe cockroach
infestation, and mold. According to the allegations in the complaint, the
plaintiffs repeatedly brought these deficiencies to Oscar and Rachel’s
attention, and the code enforcement division of the city in which the
apartment complex is located issued a notice requiring that the property be
brought into compliance, but Oscar and Rachel refused to make repairs.
Instead (according to the complaint), they retaliated by threatening,
harassing, and intimidating the plaintiffs, and by raising the rent.
      C.    The Matters at Issue on Appeal
      While matters pertaining to the condition of the apartment are the crux
of the complaint, the appeal turns not on an inquiry into such matters, but
rather on whether service of process on Oscar and Rachel was effective; and,
if so, whether Oscar and Rachel’s delay of over three years in responding to
the complaint should nonetheless be excused.
      We begin by examining the effectiveness of service.
                                       II.
                      EFFECTIVENESS OF SERVICE
      Few principles are as fundamental to the administration of law as the
principle that compliance with procedures for service of process is necessary
in order for the court to attain personal jurisdiction over a party. Indeed, it is
a matter of constitutional due process, such that, “if a default judgment [is]
entered against a defendant who was not served with a summons as required
by statute, [then] the judgment is void, as the court lacked jurisdiction in a
fundamental sense over the party and lacked authority to enter judgment.”
(Kremerman v. White (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 358, 370 (Kremerman).)
Consequently, when a judgment is void for improper service of process,
section 473, subdivision (d), of the Code of Civil Procedure empowers a court

                                        3
to set the judgment aside. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (d); Kremerman,
supra, at p. 369.)
      But, whereas “a trial court retains discretion [under section 473,
subdivision (d),] to grant or deny a motion to set aside a void judgment,” it
“has no statutory power under section 473, subdivision (d) to set aside a
judgment that is not void.” (Kremerman, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 369,
italics added.) Thus, when a reviewing court is asked to reverse an order
denying a request under section 473, subdivision (d), to set aside a default
judgment, the first question that must be resolved is whether the default
judgment is in fact void. If it is not void, then subdivision (d) does not offer a
party a means by which the judgment can be set aside.
      Whether a judgment is void is a question of law; thus, we review the
court’s conclusion de novo. (Kremerman, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 369; see
also Sakaguchi v. Sakaguchi (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 852, 858; Cruz v. Fagor
America, Inc. (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 488, 495-496.)
      A.      The Requirements for Service of Process by Substitute
              Service
      Appellants contend that the default judgment against them is void
because service on them was improper. In assessing their argument, we
begin by noting that among the permissible methods for service of a
summons in California are personal service under section 415.10 and
substitute service under section 415.20, subdivision (b). Whereas section
415.10 states that a “summons may be served by personal delivery of a copy
of the summons and of the complaint to the person to be served,” section
415.20, subdivision (b), states that:
           “If a copy of the summons and complaint cannot with
           reasonable diligence be personally delivered to the person
           to be served, . . . a summons may be served by leaving a
           copy of the summons and complaint at the person’s . . .

                                        4
         usual place of business . . . in the presence of a . . . person
         apparently in charge of his or her office [or] place of
         business, . . . at least 18 years of age, who shall be informed
         of the contents thereof, and by thereafter mailing a copy of
         the summons and of the complaint by first-class mail,
         postage prepaid to the person to be served at the place
         where a copy of the summons and complaint were left.”

In interpreting the text of sections 415.10 and 415.20, courts have concluded
that, “ ‘[o]rdinarily, . . . two or three attempts at personal service at a proper
place should fully satisfy the requirement of reasonable diligence and allow
substituted service to be made.’ ” (Espindola v. Nunez (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d
1389, 1392; see also Kremerman, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 373; Hearn v.
Howard (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1202; Bein v. Brechtel–Jochim Group,
Inc. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1387, 1391-1392 (Bein).)
      The “ ‘evident purpose’ ” of section 415.20 is not to guarantee that
papers being served are received by the person on whom they are intended to
be served, but rather “ ‘to permit service to be completed upon a good faith
attempt at physical service on a responsible person . . . [citation] . . . whose
‘relationship with the person to be served makes it more likely than not that
[the person being physically served] will deliver process to the named party.’ ”
(Bein, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at p. 1393, italics omitted). In keeping with this
evident purpose, a panel of this district concluded in the Bein case that a
guard at the entrance of a gated community was “a person apparently in
charge” of the defendant’s business for the purpose of compliance with section
415.20 (Bein, at p. 1390; accord, id. at pp. 1392-1394), and a panel of the
Second District Court of Appeal concluded in Ludka v. Memory Magnetics
International (1972) 25 Cal.App.3d 316 (Ludka) that a trial court “could well
find” that the receptionist serving a group of co-located businesses sharing “a
common reception area” “was the person who was apparently in charge” of

                                         5
the defendant’s business for purposes of section 415.20 compliance. (Id. at
p. 321.) With the foregoing principles in mind, we now turn to the service of
process that occurred in this case.
      B.    The Substitute Service in this Case
      In this case, sworn declarations of due diligence signed by registered
California process server David Alvarez indicate that Alvarez attempted, over
the course of three consecutive days in May 2019, to personally serve copies
of the summons and complaint on “Lin Oscar Wen Chieh” and “Fei Jung Liu”
(i.e., Oscar and Rachel) at an address known as “5001 Lindsay Court, Chino,

CA 91710.”3 Service was unsuccessful on the first day because the “business
[was] closed;” and it was unsuccessful on the second and third day because
the persons sought to be served were “not in.” Thus, on the afternoon of the
third day, Alvarez resorted to substitute service. He did so by leaving copies
of the summons and complaint with or in the presence of an individual
named “Alma Bobadilla,” who he described as “a person at least 18 years of
age apparently in charge at the office or other place of business of the person
to be served” (i.e. 5001 Lindsay Court); by “inform[ing] [Bobadilla] of the
general nature of the papers” and by then mailing copies of those same
documents later the same day, via first-class, with postage prepaid,
addressed to “Lin Oscar Wen Chieh” and to “Fei Jung Liu,” at the 5001
Lindsay Court address.

3     As we discuss below, the Lindsay Court address and the name “Fei
Jung Rachel Liu” appear, immediately below Rachel’s signature, in the
landlord signature block of the lease.

                                       6
      C.     The Plaintiffs’ Outreach to the Defendants After the
             Substitute Service; and the Default Proceedings
             1.    The Service of Statements of Damages
      Toward the end of July 2019, having received no response to the
complaint, the plaintiffs’ counsel caused two statements of damages (one for
each plaintiff) to be served on Oscar and Rachel in the same manner in which
copies of the summons and complaint had been served on them 11 weeks
earlier. In sworn proofs of service and declarations of mailing, registered
California process server Delbert Salgado attests that he hand-delivered
copies of the statements to Bobadilla at the 5001 Lindsay Court address,
informed Bobadilla of the statements’ general nature, and then (the same day
or the next day) mailed copies of the statements to Oscar and Rachel at that
same address. The statements were accompanied by cover letters from the
plaintiffs’ counsel, stating:
           “Our office is sending this letter as a courtesy prior to
           beginning default proceedings against you. Please be
           advised that if we do not hear from you within two weeks
           from the date of this letter, we will be forced to file a
           Request for Entry of Default and seek a judgment against
           you.”
The addressee’s name that appeared on the statements of damages, and on
the cover letter, that Salgado hand-delivered and mailed to the 5001 Lindsay
Court address for Oscar was identical to the addressee’s name that appeared
on the summons and complaint for Oscar: “Lin Oscar Wen Chieh.” Likewise,
the addressee’s name that appeared on the statements of damages, and on
the cover letter, that Salgado hand-delivered and mailed to that address for
Rachel was identical to the addressee’s name that appeared on the summons
and complaint for Rachel: “Fei Jung Liu.”

                                       7
            2.    The Default Proceedings and the Plaintiffs’
                  Additional Efforts to Engage the Defendants
      In September 2019, having still received no response from Oscar or
Rachel, plaintiffs’ counsel filed requests for entry of default. Later that same
month, the clerk entered Oscar and Rachel’s defaults. Then, in March and
June 2020, plaintiffs’ counsel made additional attempts to engage Oscar and
Rachel—by sending documents via courier and via e-mail to what they
believed (incorrectly) to be Oscar and Rachel’s home address and Oscar’s e-
mail address. Thereafter, on three separate occasions during the ensuing 21
months (in December 2020, June 2021, and April 2022), plaintiffs’ counsel
mailed copies of prove-up packages to Oscar and Rachel—again addressed to
“Lin Oscar Wen Chieh” and “Fei Jung Liu”—at the 5001 Lindsay Court
address.
      In April 2022, the court entered a default judgment for the plaintiffs
and against Oscar and Rachel, totaling $142,347.80 in damages, fees, and
costs; and, in May 2022, plaintiffs’ counsel caused a notice of entry of
judgment to be mailed to Oscar and Rachel—again addressed as “Lin Oscar
Wen Chieh” and “Fei Jung Liu”—at the 5001 Lindsay Court address.
      A.    The Enforcement Efforts, the Defendants’ Ultimate
            Engagement with the Plaintiffs, and the Motion to Vacate
      In June 2022, as part of an effort to enforce the judgment, the plaintiffs
obtained an order for appearance and examination (ORAP) addressed to
Oscar and an ORAP addressed to Rachel. According to sworn proofs of
service signed by Jim Zimmer, the third registered California process server
to surface in this case, Zimmer personally served Oscar’s ORAP on Oscar on
June 21, 2022, and then personally served Rachel’s ORAP on Rachel on
August 22, 2022, both at the 5001 Lindsay Court address.

                                        8
      But, according to sworn declarations of Oscar and Rachel, service of the
ORAPs transpired differently. Oscar and Rachel say they did not receive
either ORAP until August 22, 2022, when they say a warehouse worker
retrieved the ORAPs and handed them to Oscar after having seen an
unidentified individual place them on the dashboard of a vehicle in the
parking lot at 5001 Lindsay Court. According to Oscar and Rachel, it was not
until they spoke with their attorney three days later that they “first . . .
learned about the lawsuit.”
      On September 15, 2022—three and a half weeks after the date they say
they first became aware of the lawsuit, but more than 12 weeks after the date
Zimmer says he personally served Oscar—Oscar and Rachel filed a motion to
vacate the default and default judgment. In support of this motion, they
submitted a brief; a two-page declaration of Oscar and a nearly identical two-
page declaration of Rachel, each dated September 14, 2022; the Alvarez
proofs of service of process attesting to substitute service of copies of the
summons and complaint, some three years and four months earlier; a
proposed answer to the complaint; and a set of four pages, as to which no
foundation was laid, that appear to have been printed from the internet
during August of 2022 and that display bits of information associating each of
three businesses (MTL International Trade Inc., Mad Hornets, and SH
Logistics Inc.) with the 5001 Lindsay Court address. The moving papers did
not include a declaration from the person—Alma Bobadilla—to whom process
server Alvarez had attested to having hand-delivered copies of the summons
and complaint three years and four months earlier, and to whom process
server Salgado had attested to having hand-delivered the statements of
damages two months after that. Nor did it include any other evidence.

                                         9
      The plaintiffs filed opposition papers, and Oscar and Rachel filed a
reply. Thereafter, the plaintiffs deposed Bobadilla, the parties on both sides
filed supplemental briefs along with a copy of the Bobadilla deposition
transcript, and the motion was heard and denied.
      Oscar and Rachel then timely appealed.
      B.      Analysis and Additional Facts
      On appeal, Oscar and Rachel appear to accept all of the statements in
the Alvarez proofs of service of summons at face value, except for one. That
one statement to which they take exception is the assertion that Bobadilla
was a “person apparently in charge of . . . [their] office or other place of
business” (Code Civ. Proc., § 415, subd. (b)) within the meaning of section
415.20. Their challenge to this statement is the basis for their position that
the substitute service was ineffective.
      In support of this position, Oscar and Rachel acknowledge that
Bobadilla is the receptionist at 5001 Lindsay Court. But they invite the
court’s attention to a convergence of three circumstances that they contend
rendered Bobadilla not “a person apparently in charge,” and the substitute
service thus ineffective. First, they assert that the building at 5001 Lindsay
Court houses four different businesses, rather than just the one business—a
company named QMH—that they acknowledge is their place of business.
Based on this circumstance, they invoke an analogy to argue that:
           “If a four story building held four companies, one per
           floor[,] a process server should be required to go to the
           pertinent floor to serve a defendant, and not simply drop
           [the item being served] off with a person collecting mail for
           all four companies.

           “In this case, the person served was not apparently in
           charge of defendants’ office, but simply a person charged to
           collect mail for four companies at the same building.”

                                          10
      Second, Oscar and Rachel assert that Bobadilla “does not know” Oscar
and Rachel,” or at least “did not know [them] by name” or “did not know
[their] Chinese names, but only their first names”—the implication being
that, even if Bobadilla had had some sort of acquaintance with Oscar and
Rachel in 2019, she nonetheless would not have known enough to realize that
the “Lin Oscar Wen Chieh” and “Fei Jung Liu” whose names appeared on the
copies of the summons and complaint that the process server left with her
were the individuals she knew only as Oscar and Rachel.
      Third, Oscar and Rachel assert that, even if Bobadilla had known them
by their Chinese names, the protocols governing how items delivered to 5001
Lindsay Court are to be sorted and distributed to tenants would nonetheless
have prevented her from seeing to it that items addressed to Oscar and
Rachel were distributed to them directly. This, they say, is because the
protocols required that any items addressed other than to Oscar and Rachel’s
employer, QMH, be placed in a bin that was accessible to all tenants in the
building, so that employees of the various different tenants could search
through the bin and retrieve whatever might be addressed to their
businesses, their colleagues or themselves. According to their opening brief
on this appeal (and in keeping with the deposition testimony of Bobadilla):
         “[W]hen [Bobadilla] receives mail or packages, the QMH
         mail stays with her, and all other mail goes into a bin [just
         behind the wall separating the reception area from the rest
         of the building’s interior,] where the three other tenants
         and Oscar can go and look for it.”

Thus, Oscar and Rachel argue, the way in which the copies of the summons
and complaint were delivered to Bobadilla “is tantamount to going to a four
story building with four business[es], one on each floor, [] simply handing
documents to whoever the receptionist is on the ground floor instead of going

                                      11
to the actual business,” and expecting the documents to come into the
possession of their intended recipients.
      Oscar and Rachel’s argument has a certain surface appeal, inasmuch as
nothing in the record indicates that any of the items that the plaintiffs
caused to be delivered or mailed to 5001 Lindsay Court was addressed to
Oscar or Rachel in the care of QMH at that address; and it could be argued
that the receptionist for a building that houses several different businesses
might not know the name and employer of each individual who works in the
building and might make no effort to ensure that deliveries make it to the
proper person. But, as we explain below, we are not persuaded that the
service of process that occurred in this case was defective.
      We begin with an examination of evidence bearing on Oscar and
Rachel’s relationship to 5001 Lindsay Court and to their employer (QMH),
and then turn to evidence bearing on Oscar and Rachel’s relationship with
Bobadilla, followed by evidence bearing on protocols for sorting and
distributing items delivered to 5001 Lindsay Court.
            1.   The Defendants’ Relationship to the Place of
                 Business—5001 Lindsay Court—Where the Substitute
                 Service Occurred
      Oscar and Rachel acknowledge that “[w]e . . . work at QMH, Inc.,
located at 5001 Lindsay Ct, Chino.” This statement is correct as far as it
goes. But it obscures four pertinent facts: First, Oscar and Rachel own the
property at 5001 Lindsay Court. Second, they control QMH. Oscar is its
CEO, Rachel is its CFO, secretary, and agent for service of process, and the
two of them, together, are the sole directors. Third, Oscar and Rachel have
owned 5001 Lindsay Court and been affiliated with QMH since well before
this lawsuit was filed. And fourth, 5001 Lindsay Court has long been Oscar

                                       12
and Rachel’s place of business, not only in their roles on behalf of QMH, but
also in their roles as residential landlords.
      In this latter regard, the 5001 Lindsay Court address appears in the
pre-printed portion of a form that served as the template for the lease.
Specifically, it appears in the landlord signature block, which reads: “Fei
Jung Rachel Liu, 5001 Lindsay Ct., Chino, CA 91710.” It also appears, added
by hand, in a clause specifying to whom and how rent is to be paid. This
provision states that “monthly rent . . . shall be paid to Fei Jung Liu [at] 5001
Lindsey Ct., Chino, CA 91710” (italics added to distinguish text added by

hand from pre-printed text). Neither of these clauses references QMH.4
      A reference to 5001 Lindsay Court (but not to QMH) also appears in the
pre-printed portion of another form—this one the template for a three-day
notice that was sent to Gutierrez, directing him to pay rent. The notice to
pay rent identifies “Fei Jung Liu” (i.e., Rachel) as the “Owner/Agent” of the
apartment; and, in keeping with the instructions that were added by hand to
the lease form, it states that “[p]ayment . . . shall be made to Fei Jung
Liu . . . at 5001 Lindsay Ct. Ontario, CA 91710”—again without reference to
QMH. This form also makes clear that tenants could “deliver[] payment [to
that address] in person.”

4     A reference to QMH does appear in a clause in which the lease
identifies a different address where service of process “may” be delivered to
the attention of “Wen Chieh Ho & Fei Jung Liu” at QMH. Inasmuch as the
language in this clause is permissive (“may”) rather than mandatory
(“must”), and because neither party contends that this different address,
instead of the Lindsay Court address, should have been used for service, we
deem it of no consequence to our analysis.

                                        13
            2.   The Defendants’ Relationship with the Person—
                 Receptionist Alma Bobadilla—Through Whom the
                 Substitute Service Was Effected
      In much the same way that Oscar and Rachel’s statements about 5001
Lindsay Court downplay their connection to it, so too do their statements
about Alma Bobadilla downplay their connection to her. This they do by
portraying Bobadilla as an employee of the management of what they
describe as a “huge warehouse,” and themselves as merely employees of one
of a number of commercial tenants in the building. Thus, for example, they
state that “Bobadilla is not an employee of QMH,” but that “[w]e do work at
QMH.” Moreover, they add, “[d]ue to the nature of our work, we often travel
around the country and overseas” and, “[s]ince the outbreak of
coronavirus . . . , we have been working from home” In this fashion, they
insinuate that—apart from the fact that Bobadilla happened to work in the
same building in which they sometimes worked—they had no meaningful
connection to her.
      But Bobadilla refutes this.
      When asked at her deposition to say where she was employed and how
long she had worked there, Bobadilla answered that her employer is, and
since 2014 has been, QMH. Pressed further and asked whether “[t]he pay
records that you get at the end of [the] year for your taxes . . . have QMH’s
name on them,” she responded emphatically: “Of course they do.”
      When questioned about Oscar and Rachel, Bobadilla responded in ways
that demonstrated she was well acquainted with each of them. By way of
example: She described each of them as her “boss”—with one of them (Oscar)
being her “direct supervisor,” who had hired her eight years earlier and for
whom she had worked ever since, and the other (Rachel) being “very nice”
and “just a great boss to work for.” Asked to describe Oscar’s appearance, she

                                       14
testified that he was about “five-[foot]-six, I think,” “bald,” “maybe in his 50s
or 40s,” about “140 pounds;” and she described Rachel as “pretty” with “short
hair.”
         When asked about colleagues with whom she interacted, Bobadilla
testified that, apart from Mandy in Accounting and Alberto and Luis in the
warehouse, Oscar and Rachel were the only QMH personnel with whom she
interacted. She further testified that, in 2019 (when the substitute service
occurred), Oscar was present at the QMH premises at 5001 Lindsay Court
about three or four days each week, and Rachel was there about one or two
days each week. Thus, it is evident that Bobadilla was quite familiar with
the defendants.
         Our examination of the relationship between Bobadilla and Oscar and
Rachel does not end here, however, because we must factor into our analysis
the fact that Oscar and Rachel each use a variety of different names. In light
of this circumstance, it is possible that a person with whom Oscar and Rachel
engage in one facet of their lives (say, one of their employees) might know
them only by a name or names with which a person who engages with them
in a different facet of their lives (for example, a tenant) is not familiar.
Indeed, this possibility appears—at least in part—to be an actuality here.
For, when Bobadilla was asked in her deposition if she had ever heard of “Fei
Jung Liu”—the name that was used by the defendants to refer to Rachel in
the lease and in the notice to pay rent, and that was used by the plaintiffs to
refer to Rachel in the summons and complaint—the name did not register
with her:
           “Q. Have you ever heard of a person named—and I’m going
           to mispronounce this, I’m sure—Fei Jung Liu?
           “A. No.
           “Q. F-e-i, J-u-n-g, L-i-u?

                                        15
        “A. No.”
Then, somewhat (but not entirely) similarly, when Bobadilla was asked if she
had ever heard of Lin Oscar Wen Chieh—one of the amalgams of first name
and Chinese names that is used by the defendants to refer to Oscar, and that
the plaintiffs used to refer to Oscar in the summons and complaint—that
name registered with her only in part:
        “Q. Have you ever heard of a person by the name of Lin
        Oscar Wen Chieh?

        “A. Oscar, but I don’t know the other names.”
              3.   The Protocols for Sorting and Distributing Items
                   Delivered to 5001 Lindsay Court
     As noted above, Oscar and Rachel assert that the building at 5001
Lindsay Court houses, not just QMH, but three other businesses as well; and
Bobadilla confirms as much in the testimony she furnished at her deposition
in 2022. Bobadilla also describes in that testimony the way in which items
delivered to 5001 Lindsay Court were sorted and distributed to the four
businesses:
        “Q. When you receive packages or mail for Oscar, what do
        you do with it?
        “A. If it’s QMH, it stays with me. When it’s a different
        name, I put it [in the bin].
        “[¶ . . . ¶]
        “Q. So when you receive packages with Oscar’s name on
        them, where do you put them?
        “A. I put them in the [bin] where all the packages go.
        “Q. Where all the QMH packages go?
        “A. No, where all the [other tenants’ packages] go. I only
        keep what I’m told to do which is just QMH, keep the
        packages of QMH.”

                                     16
         “Q.: So you leave it up to [Oscar] to check in that bin for
         anything that belongs to him?
         “A. Yes, that’s how I was told to do.”
         “Q. And when you place packages for Oscar in that bin,
         have you ever noted that they were still in there for some
         period of time after you placed them in there?
         “A. No, it’s always gone. They pick up everything.
         “Q. So everything gets picked up on a daily basis?
         “A. Yeah . . . it’s always gone by the next morning.”
Arguably, Bobadilla’s evidence with regard to how deliveries to 5001 Lindsay
Court were sorted and distributed is of questionable utility inasmuch as it
was stated in the present tense—which is to say that, while Bobadilla clearly
was speaking to the number of businesses that operated, and to how
deliveries were sorted and distributed, at 5001 Lindsay Court in 2022 (when
the deposition occurred), it is unclear whether she also was speaking to such

                                       17
matters as of 2019 (when the substitute service occurred).5 Nonetheless,
because the parties appear to interpret this testimony as applicable to the
2019 timeframe, we do, too.
      C.    Conclusion with Regard to Effectiveness of Service
      For purposes of this discussion, we accept that Bobadilla may not have
been familiar with Oscar and Rachel’s Chinese names, and we accept that the
protocols for sorting and distributing deliveries to 5001 Lindsay Court in May
of 2019 might have resulted in items addressed to “Lin Oscar Wen Chieh”
and “Fei Jung Liu” not being delivered directly by Bobadilla to Oscar and
Rachel. But we nevertheless conclude that the evidence in this case supports
a finding that Bobadilla was “a person apparently in charge” of Oscar and

5      The plaintiffs included, in their opposition submission, evidence
tending to rebut the inference that QMH was just one of several business
that occupied the premises at 5001 Lindsay Court and the inference that
Bobadilla would have been responsible for receiving and distributing
deliveries for businesses other than those operated by Oscar and Rachel. By
way of example, they presented (a) records on file with the Secretary of State
and other sources of information revealing that one of the three other
businesses that Oscar and Rachel identified as tenants at 5001 Lindsay
Court (MTL) was suspended and had been inactive since 2016, and that the
address of each of the other two such businesses (Mad Hornets and SH
Logistics) was 5005 Lindsay Court, rather than 5001 Lindsay Court. They
also presented a declaration of counsel, buttressed by photographs, indicating
that, notwithstanding the fact that these two different street numbers (5001
and 5005) attach to the same building, (b) each street number has its own
separate entrance (i.e., there is one entrance that corresponds to 5001
Lindsay Court and an altogether different entrance that corresponds to 5005
Lindsay Court); (c) the signage at the exterior of the 5001 Lindsay Court
entrance identifies no business other than QMH; and (d) the signage in the
reception area just inside that entrance likewise identifies no business other
than QMH. But, except for the records on file with the Secretary of State, all
of this evidence speaks to circumstances as they existed in 2022, not 2019.

                                      18
Rachel’s usual place of business within the meaning of section 415.20,
subdivision (b).
      Indeed, if the gate guard and shared receptionist in the Bein and
Ludka cases (discussed ante) each qualify as “a person apparently in charge,”
then so, too, does Bobadilla: She was the proverbial gatekeeper with whom
anyone making a delivery to 5001 Lindsay Court—including any tenant
delivering a rent check pursuant to the instructions in Oscar and Rachel’s
lease and rent-notice forms—would be required to interface. She also was a
direct report to Oscar and Rachel at a business they controlled on property
they owned; and Oscar and Rachel had given her the responsibility for
receiving and handling important items, such as rent payments, even if only
to set such items aside in a bin for them to pick up later. These
circumstances alone rendered her “a responsible person . . . [citation]. . .
whose ‘relationship with the person to be served makes it more likely than
not that they will deliver process to the named party.’ ” (Bein, supra,
6 Cal.App.4th at p. 1393.)
      Moreover, if we credit Oscar and Rachel’s statements regarding the
extent to which they traveled and worked remotely, and Bobadilla’s
testimony about the limited number and roles of the colleagues with whom
she interacted—such that, in the absence of Oscar and Rachel, the only other
individuals to whom Bobadilla might have referred a process server would
have been a warehouse worker or an accountant—then: Who better to be
deemed “a person apparently in charge” (not “the person . . . ,” but, per the
code, “a person apparently in charge” (italics added)) than the receptionist?

                                       19
      For these reasons, on the record presented, we conclude the substitute
service was effective and that the default and default judgment are therefore

valid, not void.6
      Consequently, we now turn to the defense’s assertion that the trial
court erred in refraining from exercising its statutory and equitable
discretion to excuse Oscar and Rachel’s tardiness in responding to the
complaint and to set aside the default and default judgment on grounds other
than voidness.
                                        III.
   RELIEF NOTWITHSTANDING EFFECTIVENESS OF SERVICE
      In examining the trial court’s decision to refrain from excusing Oscar
and Rachel’s tardiness in responding to the complaint, we begin by observing
that the court’s rationale for denying Oscar and Rachel’s motion is not

revealed in the record.7 However, this circumstance does not prevent us
from reviewing the trial court’s ruling for error, as “[i]t is judicial action and

6     As a result of this conclusion, we need not consider the exercise of the
court’s discretion in setting aside a judgment that is void. Kremerman,
supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 369.

7      The minute order that issued on the day the motion was argued states
that, at the motion hearing, the trial court recited a tentative ruling and
then, following oral argument, stated its findings on the record. But the
hearing transcript reveals that neither of these statements is correct.
Instead, shortly after the hearing commenced, the trial court made passing
reference to a tentative ruling; and then later, near the conclusion of the
hearing, it stated that “the Court’s tentative is the Court’s order.” But the
existence of a tentative ruling notwithstanding, we remain unaware of the
trial court’s reasoning because the parties did not include the tentative ruling
in the record they assembled for this appeal.

                                        20
not judicial reasoning which is the subject of review.” (El Centro Grain Co. v.
Bank of Italy, etc. (1932) 123 Cal.App. 564, 567; accord United Pacific Ins. Co.
v. Hanover Ins. Co. (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 925, 933; cf. Howard v. Thrifty
Drug & Discount Stores (1995) 10 Cal.4th 424, 443 [“even if there is no
indication of the trial court’s rationale . . . , the court’s decision will be upheld
on appeal if reasonable justification for it can be found”].)
      Here, the judicial action we review is the trial court’s order implicitly
rejecting each of three different grounds that Oscar and Rachel put forward
as a basis on which to grant their request that the default and default
judgment be vacated even if valid. Those three bases are: (1) Code of Civil
Procedure section 473.5, which allows a court to set aside a default judgment
where a party did not receive actual notice in time to defend the action;
(2) Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b), which empowers a
court to “relieve a party . . . from a judgment . . . or other proceeding taken
against him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect”; and (3) the court’s equitable powers. We address each of
these three grounds, in this same sequence, below.
      A.     Relief Based on Section 473.5 of the Code of Civil
             Procedure
      The first of the three bases on which Oscar and Rachel contend the
trial court should have granted them relief irrespective of the judgment’s
validity is section 473.5, which permits a court to grant relief from a default
or default judgment in situations in which service of a summons, though
valid, has not resulted in actual notice to a party in time for him to defend
himself. (See also Anastos v. Lee (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1314, 1319
(Anastos).) Under that section, a trial court, in the exercise of its discretion,
“may” set aside the default or default judgment—provided it makes certain
findings of fact, including: that the party requesting relief did not receive

                                         21
“actual notice” in time to defend himself; and that that party’s lack of actual
notice was “through no inexcusable fault of his own.” (Judicial Council Com.
15 West’s Ann. Code Civ. Proc. (2022 ed.) § 473.5, p. 239.)
      Focusing on the use of the word “may” in subdivision (c) of section 473.5
and on the discretion it confers, some reviewing courts have stated,
expansively, that a trial court’s decision to grant or deny relief under section
473.5 is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. (See, e.g., Rios v. Singh (2021)
65 Cal.App.5th 871, 885 [“We review a trial court’s decision to grant or deny
relief under section 473.5 for abuse of discretion.”]; accord Sakaguchi v.
Sakaguchi (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 852, 862.) However, parsing section 473.5
somewhat more closely than the courts in the cases just cited have had cause
to do, we believe it is more precise to say that the trial court’s exercise of its
discretion after the necessary factual findings have been made is to be
reviewed for an abuse of discretion; but that, inasmuch as reviewing courts
“[g]enerally . . . apply the substantial evidence standard to a superior court’s
findings of fact” (SFPP v. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. (2004)
121 Cal.App.4th 452, 461), the factual findings themselves must be reviewed
under the substantial evidence standard. Be this as it may, we conclude that
the trial court did not err irrespective of which standard of review is applied,
because (as we explain below) under either standard, the evidence in the
record supports the conclusion that, even giving Oscar and Rachel the
benefit of the doubt with regard to their claim that they did not receive actual

                                        22
notice in time to defend,8 such failure of notice resulted from their own
inexcusable neglect in failing to align their instructions to their tenants with
the delivery protocols they communicated to their staff at 5001 Lindsay
Court.
      In this regard, the parties’ lease recited “Fei Jung Liu [of] 5001 Lindsay
Ct., Chino CA 91710” as the name and address of the landlord and “Fei Jung
Liu [at] 5001 Lindsay Ct., Chino CA 91710” as the person and location to
whom rent should be delivered. In similar fashion, the notice to pay rent
made clear that any “[p]ayment . . . shall be made to Fei Jung Liu . . . at 5001
Lindsay Ct.” Neither of these documents indicated that items to be delivered
to “Fei Jung Liu” should be addressed to her in care of QMH at that location,
and even if it had, the only difference would have been that Bobadilla would
have set such items aside, presumably to route them at some point to Oscar
or Rachel, rather than placing them in the bin for their later collection (as
may have been the protocol for rent payments, for example).
      Under these circumstances, and given the level of control that Oscar
and Rachel exercised over operations at 5001 Lindsay Court and QMH, one

8     We view with skepticism Oscar and Rachel’s testimony that they did
not become aware of this lawsuit until August 25, 2022. That testimony not
only is contradicted, at least with respect to Oscar, by the sworn statement of
Zimmer, the professional process server who attests to having personally
served Oscar on June 21, 2022. It also is impeached by the extent to which
Bobadilla’s testimony contradicts Oscar and Rachel’s assertions about their
connections to Bobadilla and their roles with regard to 5001 Lindsay Court
and QMH. Moreover, Oscar and Rachel’s credibility is further undercut by
the body of evidence attesting to the multiplicity of occasions (starting in May
2019), and variety of methods, on and by which documents generated in this
lawsuit were transmitted to Oscar and Rachel at their place of business.

                                       23
would reasonably expect them to have instructed their staff responsible for
receiving, sorting, and distributing mail and other incoming deliveries that
“Fei Jung Liu” was Rachel, and that any incoming delivery addressed to “Fei
Jung Liu” or to a name that included “Oscar” must be routed securely to
Rachel, to Oscar, or to a person or persons within their organization who
reported to them and knew what those names meant, instead of being placed
in a bin for personnel of unaffiliated businesses to rummage through. Yet,
according to Bobadilla, this is virtually the opposite of what she “was told to
do.” Further, if, as Oscar and Rachel would have us believe, the use of the
bin had ever actually resulted in the loss of any important mail or deliveries,
such as rent checks, there is no doubt that a responsible landlord / manager
would have immediately changed that delivery protocol to ensure such loss
would not happen again.
      Moreover, if Oscar and Rachel’s testimony regarding the frequency
with which they travel and the extent to which they work remotely is to be
credited, then it would have been even more incumbent upon them to see to it
that the delivery-processing protocols to which their staff adhered were
secure enough to ensure that items of potential importance that were
addressed to Oscar and Rachel’s Chinese names (or to amalgams of their first
names and Chinese names) would be routed to their attention, or set aside for
them, in a manner that would minimize the risk of their going astray.
      In the absence of precautions such as those discussed above, we
conclude that substantial evidence supports a finding that any lack of actual
notice was the result of Oscar and Rachel’s inexcusable neglect, and,
therefore, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the
motion to vacate the default judgment pursuant to section 473.5.

                                       24
      B.    Relief Based on Section 473, Subdivision (b), of the Code
            of Civil Procedure
      We now turn to the second of the three bases on which Oscar and
Rachel contend the trial court should have granted them relief irrespective of
the judgment’s validity: section 473, subdivision (b). That subdivision
empowers a court to “relieve a party . . . from a judgment . . . or other
proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” Inasmuch as this provision
permits, but does not obligate, a trial court to grant relief when its
requirements are met, it is discretionary. We review the trial court’s decision
to deny relief under section 473, subdivision (b), for an abuse of its discretion.
(See Fasuyi v. Permatex, Inc. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 681, 694 [“Section 473,
subdivision (b) . . . is recognized as invoking the trial court’s discretion, and
the judgment of the trial court ‘ “shall not be disturbed on appeal absent a
clear showing of abuse.” ’ ” ].)
      Applying this standard of review, we find no abuse of discretion here
because, in order for a court to grant a motion for relief under section 473,
subdivision (b), “the motion must be made within six months after entry of
the default” and the “six-month period runs from entry of default, not entry of
judgment” (Manson, Iver & York v. Black (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 36, 42;
accord Pulte Homes Corp. v. Williams Mechanical, Inc. (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th
267, 273, Weiss v. Blumencranc (1976) 61 Cal.App.3d 536, 541), and in this
case that requirement has not been met. “The six-month time limit . . . is
jurisdictional and the court may not consider a motion for relief made after
that period has elapsed.” (Manson, 176 Cal.App.4th at p. 42; accord
Stevenson v. Turner (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 315, 318.) Here, the default was
entered on September 25, 2019, and the motion for relief was not filed until
three years later, on September 15, 2022. Thus, to the extent the request for

                                        25
relief is premised on section 473, subdivision (b), the motion was untimely
and the trial court was without jurisdiction to grant it.
      C.    Relief Based on Principles of Equity
      We now turn to Oscar and Rachel’s third basis for requesting relief
irrespective of the judgment’s validity, namely equity. Our Supreme Court
has held that, “[a]fter six months from entry of default, a trial court
may . . . vacate a default on equitable grounds even if statutory relief is
unavailable.” (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 981, (Rappleyea).)
A trial court may also grant equitable relief from a default judgment;
however, it may do so “only in exceptional circumstances” because, once a
judgment has been entered, the “strong public policy in favor of granting
relief and allowing the requesting party his or her day in court” must yield to
the “strong public policy in favor of the finality of judgments.” (Id. at
pp. 981–982.) The denial of a request that equity be invoked to set aside a
default or default judgment is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. (Id. at
pp. 978, 981, 984.)
      In advocating that equity required the trial court to grant their motion
in this lawsuit, Oscar and Rachel invoke a three-part inquiry that has been
applied to motions for equitable relief from defaults and default judgments in
a number of cases involving claims of extrinsic fraud or mistake: “ ‘First, the
defaulted party must demonstrate that it has a meritorious case. Second[ ],
the party seeking to set aside the default must articulate a satisfactory
excuse for not presenting a defense to the original action. Last[ly], the
moving party must demonstrate diligence in seeking to set aside the default
once . . . discovered.’ ” (Rappleyea, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 982 [extrinsic
mistake]; see also Stiles v. Wallis (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 1143, 1147–1148
[claimed extrinsic mistake]; In re Marriage of Stevenot (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d

                                        26
1051, 1070 [claimed extrinsic fraud].) Our Supreme Court has referred to
this three-party inquiry as “a stringent test.” (Rappleyea, at p. 982.)
      In arguing that they meet this stringent test, Oscar and Rachel say the
test’s satisfactory-excuse element “normally . . . proves most important”; and
they argue, with regard to this element, that:
         “Bobadilla’s testimony that she did not know Liu and Lin’s
         Chinese names, but only their first names and that any
         deliveries or mail other than addressed to QMH was put in
         a bin for three other companies and outside the general
         purview of QMH provide an excellent explanation.”

But for the reasons articulated above in our discussion of section 473.5, we
agree with the finding implicit in the trial court’s ruling that the excuses
offered by the defendants are not satisfactory; and this drives a conclusion
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it refrained from
drawing on its equitable powers to grant the requested relief.
                                       IV.
                                DISPOSITION
      The order is affirmed. The plaintiffs are entitled to costs on appeal.

                                                                    KELETY, J.

WE CONCUR:

HUFFMAN, P. J.

CASTILLO, J.

                                       27