Court Opinion

ID: 9859610
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 22:08:54.868717+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:55:26.254731
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE KILBRIDE, concurring in part and dis- . senting in part: I agree that this cause should be remanded for a new sentencing hearing. I do not agree that the remedy of mandamus is proper in this cause. We should refrain from granting mandamus relief for two reasons. First, the remedy of mandamus does not lie to question the discretionary fact-finding authority of a trial judge. Second, the remedy of mandamus is only available when the right to relief is clear as a matter of law. The sentencing statute at issue is open to multiple interpretations and the State is not clearly entitled to mandamus relief. Accordingly, based upon the following brief analysis, I do not concur with the majority’s remedy of mandamus and I recommend that we remand this matter through the exercise of our supervisory authority. Initially, the general sentencing statute at issue in section 5 — 8—4 gives a trial judge discretion to impose “as determined by the court” either concurrent or consecutive sentences for multiple offenses. 730 ILCS 5/5— 8 — 4(a) (West 1998). The balance of the statute then limits the exercise of discretion in certain circumstances. In subparagraph (a), the discretion to impose consecutive sentences is removed when multiple offenses are committed as part of a single course of conduct and there is no substantial change in the nature of the criminal objective. The second part of subsection (a) removes that consecutive sentencing limitation and then requires consecutive sentences when, in a single course of conduct and with no substantial change in the criminal objective, the defendant commits a Class X or Class 1 felony involving severe bodily injury or the defendant commits certain enumerated sex offenses in sections 12 — 13, 12 — 14, or 12 — 14.1 of the Criminal Code of 1961, as amended. 730 ILCS 5/5 — 8—4(a) (West 1998). In subsection (a) the key factors are whether the offenses are part of a single course of conduct with no substantial change in the criminal objective and whether the sentencing is for the commission of certain crimes.. Here, the majority notes that the trial judge found that the offenses were not part of a single course of conduct and that subsection (a) is not applicable in this case. 195 Ill. 2d at 398. The majority also acknowledges that the State’s argument is focused on the subsection (b) sentencing provisions. 195 Ill. 2d at 398. Therefore, our inquiry in this case is limited to the subsection (b) sentencing provisions and whether the trial court found “no substantial change in the nature of the criminal objective.” 730 ILCS 5/5 — 8—4(b) (West 1998). In subsection (b) the trial judge’s discretion is limited and consecutive sentences can only be imposed if the trial court makes certain factual findings. 730 ILCS 5/5— 8 — 4(b) (West 1998). Under the first part of subsection (b), a trial court may make the requisite factual findings “to protect the public from further criminal conduct” as one justification for the imposition of a consecutive sentence. 730 ILCS 5/5 — 8—4(b) (West 1998). The record in this proceeding is abundantly clear that the trial judge made no public safety findings under that first part of subsection (b). Alternatively, consecutive sentences are authorized when a trial judge makes the requisite factual findings that the offenses were not part of a single course of conduct and that “there was no substantial change in the nature of the criminal objective.” 730 ILCS 5/5 — 8— 4(b) (West 1998). Again, the trial judge did not make those requisite factual findings to trigger consecutive sentences. In fact, the trial judge unequivocally stated that “ ‘the nature of the criminal objective changes.’ ” (Emphasis added.) 195 Ill. 2d at 397. Accordingly, if the nature of the criminal objective changes, then subsection (b) does not mandate the imposition of consecutive sentences. The trial judge also found as a matter of fact that the offenses were not part of a single course of conduct. That factual finding is conceded by the majority. 195 Ill. 2d at 398. The trial judge further found a change in the criminal objective involving three separate offenses. The trial judge made no public safety findings under subparagraph (a). Therefore, none of the limitations in either paragraph (a) or (b) applied to the sentence and the trial judge relied upon the general statutory grant of discretionary authority and imposed concurrent sentences. Despite the trial judge’s findings in the record, the majority opinion seems to overlook the trial court’s clear, discretionary factual finding that there had indeed been a change in the criminal objective. Unfortunately, the majority’s result is premised upon the unsupported conclusion that there was no substantial change in the criminal objective when the trial judge articulated a contrary finding. The majority’s approach amounts to a virtual de novo reversal of the trial judge’s discretionary fact-finding decision. See Lewis E. v. Spagnolo, 186 Ill. 2d 198, 229 (1999). Since the trial judge exercised his discretionary authority and in effect made a finding of fact regarding the nature of the criminal objective, the trial judge’s ruling is not subject to challenge by the remedy of mandamus. Madden v. Cronson, 114 Ill. 2d 504, 514 (1986). Therefore, even though the majority disagrees with the trial court’s exercise of discretion in finding that the criminal objective changed in this case, we simply have no legal authority to allow the challenge of that discretion through a mandamus action. The record also strongly suggests that the trial judge struggled with the uncertainty of the statute. At best, the operative language of the sentencing statute is muddy. The trial judge may have justifiably interpreted the statute in one of at least three different ways. The specific statutory sentencing provisions refer to offenses committed or not committed as part of a single course of conduct during which there was no substantial change in the nature of the criminal objective. 730 ILCS 5/5 — 8— 4(a), (b) (West 1998). In People v. Bole, 155 Ill. 2d 188, 193 (1993), we questioned whether the phrase “no substantial change” might possibly (1) define, (2) describe, or (3) limit the “single course of conduct” phrase in a similar sentencing provision. Bole, 155 Ill. 2d at 193. Hence, this court previously pondered but never determined the meaning of the operative sentencing phrase now at issue in this case. Since Bole, this court has not resolved the questions posed in that case. Furthermore, mandamus relief is only appropriate when the application involves a clear right to relief. Lewis E. v. Spagnolo, 186 Ill. 2d 198, 229 (1999). In light of Bole, it seems premature to ascribe a level of certainty to the statute when the interpretation of the statute remains not so certain. The Bole questions prevent us from holding that the State is clearly entitled to the statutory right of a mandatory consecutive sentence. Additionally, the questions raised in Bole were neither briefed nor argued in this case and we Eire now hindered in attempting to resolve those questions at this time. Thus, the State cannot satisfy the burden of entitlement to a clear, legal right to relief. On a final point, the trial judge may have innocently confused the change of the criminal objective standard with the change of victims. For exEimple, the trial judge stated: “ ‘The problem is not only the time span, but the single course, the nature of the criminal objective. In my opinion, we have three victims, the nature of the criminal objective changes.’’ ” (Emphasis added.) 195 Ill. 2d at 397. Without a doubt, the trial judge attempted to address the necessary sentencing standards involving the single course of conduct and criminal objective standards. On the other hand it is unclear whether the trial judge properly interpreted the criminal objective standard in the sentencing statute. The trial judge’s above-referenced statement suggests that he may have equated the statutory reference to “victim” with the statutory phrase “criminal objective.” The trial judge may have concluded that the criminal objective changed because the defendant sexually offended three different victims. The mere involvement of one or more victims does not, however, exclusively describe or define a change or lack of change in the criminal objective. For instance, an individual may commit the offense of a robbery at three different stores. The robberies may not occur within a single course of conduct, thus bringing the offenses arguably within subsection (b) of the sentencing statute. The criminal objective is to obtain money from each of the three stores. Thus, the criminal objective does not change merely because the robberies were committed at three different stores. The criminal objective remains the same, namely, the illegal taking of property. In the present case, it appears that the criminal objective probably remained constant, namely, the defendant’s sexual gratification involving three separate victims. The victim is the conduit for the defendant’s pursuit of a common criminal objective of sexual gratification. The victim is not the criminal objective. The defendant’s attacks upon three different victims do not change the common criminal objective of sexual gratification. It seems that the trial judge’s ruling is based in part upon a misapprehension of the criminal objective standard. Despite any apparent misapprehension, the determination of any change in the criminal objective rests within the trial court’s sole discretionary, fact-finding authority. Therefore, acknowledging our unresolved questions in Bole and the trial judge’s apparent misapprehension of the criminal objective standard, we should not subject the trial judge in this case to an order of mandamus. Instead this court should exercise its supervisory authority and provide guidance to the trial court in interpreting and applying a confusing sentencing statute. We should also note that this case does not involve a judge who blatantly disregarded the clear mandatory provisions of a sentencing statute. At worst this case involves a judge who might have slightly missed the mark in attempting to untangle a confusing statute. In conclusion, I readily agree with the majority that upon remand the trial court may exercise discretion to determine the appropriate sentence within the permissible statutory sentencing range. In short, the remand should be cloaked in a supervisory order and not in mandamus. Therefore, I specially concur in the remand and I respectfully dissent from granting the remedy of mandamus.