Court Opinion

ID: 9492476
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:42:08.843716+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:19.536975
License: Public Domain

GILMAN, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
As stated by this court in Van Dorn Plastic Machinery Co. v. NLRB, 736 F.2d 343, 348 (6th Cir.1984), the fact that a union makes misleading representations does not per se justify setting aside an election. Rather, we will set aside an election only in cases in which “the misrepresentation is so pervasive and the deception so artful that employees will be unable to separate truth from untruth and where their right to a free and fair choice will be affected.” Id. Unlike the majority, I find no evidence that the Gormac employees were unable to recognize the pamphlet as anything other than union propaganda, or that the union’s conduct “ ‘materially affected the result of the election.’ ” Maremont Corp. v. NLRB, 177 F.3d 573, 577 (6th Cir.1999) (quoting NLRB v. Shrader’s, Inc., 928 F.2d 194,196 (6th Cir.1991)).
The majority opinion places significant weight on the five-factor test set forth in Mitchellace, Inc. v. NLRB, 90 F.3d 1150, 1155 (6th Cir.1996), and finds that four of the five factors weigh in favor of Gormac. I agree that the first two factors (the timing of the leaflet and Gormac’s awareness) weigh in favor of Gormac, and that the timing of the leaflet appears particularly calculated to give the union the last word. The law is clear, however, that misleading conduct, without proof that such conduct affected the employees’ free *752and fair choice, is not grounds for setting aside an election. See Midland Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 127, 133, 1982 WL 23832 (1982) (“[W]e will no longer probe into the truth or falsity of the parties’ campaign statements, and ... we will not set elections aside on the basis of misleading campaign statements”).
In contrast, I find that the remaining Mitchellace factors weigh in favor of the union. I especially find it hard to believe that there was any “artful deception” in light of (a) the authorization cards signed by the employees, (b) the clearly identified source of the handout, and (c) the lack of evidence that the election results were actually affected by the leaflet. In fact, as noted by the majority in its footnote 9, only 20 of the 31 employees who signed the leaflet actually voted for the union. The fact that over 35% of those signing exercised their own judgment when it came time to cast their votes makes it difficult to believe that the petition interfered with the employees’ free and fair choice, or that “the false picture of the extent of the Union support that was created in all probability had an impact on the election.”
I further find this case indistinguishable in principle from Maremont Corp. v. NLRB, 177 F.3d 573 (6th Cir.1999), and Keeler Die Cast v. NLRB, 185 F.3d 535 (6th Cir.1999). In both of these cases, the employees explicitly agreed to “vote yes” for the union and to have their signatures used in a leaflet to let others know that they would do so. This court upheld the election in each case, finding that such a “vote yes” petition is neither per se coercive nor objectionable on the basis that it affects the employees’ right to a free and fair choice. See Maremont, 111 F.3d at 578; Keeler, 185 F.3d at 538-39.
In the instant case, the Gormac employees signed authorization cards that expressed both their desire for the union to represent them and allowed the union to use their names in leaflets. (See footnote 5 in the majority opinion.) I frankly find it difficult to believe that this could be interpreted in any manner other than that they intended to “vote yes” for the union and had no objections to letting others know of that fact. Like the two prior cases, there is no evidence in the instant case to support Gormac’s contention that the employees were threatened or coerced into signing the authorization cards or that the union leaflet affected the result of the election. As to the three employees now claiming that they were assured of confidentiality, there is no evidence that, even if what they say is true, the union’s alleged misrepresentation substantially affected the outcome of the election.
On the other hand, the instant case is distinguishable from this court’s earlier decision in NLRB v. Shrader’s, Inc., 928 F.2d 194 (6th Cir.1991). In that case, the court held that the employer presented a prima facie case for invalidating the union election on the grounds of improper coercion, thereby requiring an evidentiary hearing before the NLRB. The union in Shrader’s was charged with distributing hats and T-shirts to the employees before and during voting periods as a bribe or reward for voting for the union. See id. at 196. The court held that these items were “sufficiently valuable and desirable in the eyes of the person to whom they are offered, to have the potential to influence that person’s vote.” Id. at 198. In contrast, there is no evidence in the instant case that the employees were offered any bribe or reward in exchange for their votes. The fact that an evidentiary hearing was required in Shrader’s, therefore, does not necessitate such a hearing in the present case.
Finally, the fact that the NLRB has granted evidentiary hearings in other cases provides no basis to believe that it abused its discretion in declining to grant such a hearing in the instant ease. A hearing is required only if Gormac is able to show the existence of “substantial and material factual issues.” Office Depot, Inc. v. NLRB, 184 F.3d 506, 510 (6th Cir.1999) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 102.69(d)). For the reasons stated above, I do not believe that *753any such issues exist in this case. In any event, to the extent that this is a close question, we would be hard pressed to find that the Board abused its discretion in declining to hold an evidentiary hearing.
I would therefore affirm the decision of the NLRB. Footnotes