Court Opinion

ID: 9398560
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-31 17:04:24.315+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:34.528567
License: Public Domain

Filed 5/30/23 In re Evan N. CA5

                   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

            IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                     FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

    In re EVAN N., a Person Coming Under the
    Juvenile Court Law.

    STANISLAUS COUNTY COMMUNITY                                                              F085511
    SERVICES AGENCY,
                                                                           (Super. Ct. No. JVDP-21-000204)
           Plaintiff and Respondent,

                    v.                                                                    OPINION
    E.N. et al.,

           Defendants and Appellants.

                                                   THE COURT*
          APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Stanislaus County. Annette
Rees, Judge.
          Lauren K. Johnson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for E.N.
Defendant and Appellant.
          Jack Love, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for A.R. Defendant and
Appellant.

*         Before Detjen, Acting P. J., Peña, J. and DeSantos, J.
       Thomas E. Boze, County Counsel, and Lindy GiacopuzziRotz, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                                          -ooOoo-
                                    INTRODUCTION
       A.R. (mother) and E.N. (father) are the parents of son Evan N. (born May 2020).
Mother and father appeal from the juvenile court’s order terminating their parental rights
pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.1 They contend the Stanislaus
County Community Services Agency (agency) and the juvenile court failed to comply
with the inquiry requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.)
(ICWA) and related California law because maternal and paternal extended family
members were not asked about Evan’s possible Indian ancestry.2 The agency concedes it
committed error in not conducting ICWA inquiry of the parents’ extended family
members. The parties filed a joint stipulation seeking a limited remand to the court for
the purposes of ICWA compliance.
       For the reasons discussed herein, we accept the agency’s concession of ICWA
error. Consistent with our decisions in In re K.H. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 566 (K.H.) and
In re E.C. (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 123 (E.C.), we conclude “the error is prejudicial
because neither the agency nor the court gathered information sufficient to ensure a
reliable finding that ICWA does not apply and remanding for an adequate inquiry in the
first instance is the only meaningful way to safeguard the rights at issue. ([In re A.R.
(2021)] 11 Cal.5th [234,] 252–254 [(A.R.)].) Accordingly, we accept the stipulation,

1     All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless
otherwise indicated.
2      “[B]ecause ICWA uses the term ‘Indian,’ we do the same for consistency, even
though we recognize that other terms, such as ‘Native American’ or ‘indigenous,’ are
preferred by many.” (In re Benjamin M. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 735, 739, fn. 1.)

                                             2.
conditionally reverse the juvenile court’s finding that ICWA does not apply, and remand
with directions.
                     FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND3
Petition and Detention
       On October 8, 2021, the agency filed a petition on behalf of Evan pursuant to
section 300, subdivisions (b)(1), (g), and (j).4
       Prior to the detention hearing, mother and father each filled out Parental
Notification of Indian Status (ICWA-020) forms. Mother denied having Indian ancestry.
Father reported he was or could be a member of, or eligible for membership in, the
Choctaw and Cherokee tribes.
       On October 12, 2021, the juvenile court held a detention hearing where it inquired
about the family’s Indian ancestry. Mother again denied having Indian ancestry. Father
confirmed he was or could be a member of the Choctaw and Cherokee tribes. The court
found ICWA could apply and ordered the agency to investigate further. The court
ordered Evan detained and set a combined jurisdiction and disposition hearing.
Jurisdiction and Disposition
       On November 17, 2021, the agency sent Notice of Child Custody Proceedings for
Indian Child (ICWA-030) forms to the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), the Cherokee
Nation of Oklahoma, the United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians, the Eastern Band
of Cherokee Indians, the Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma, the Mississippi Band of Choctaw
Indians, and the Jena Band of Choctaw.

3      Because the sole issue on appeal concerns ICWA, we restrict our facts to those
bearing on that issue or helpful for clarity.
4      The agency subsequently filed two amended petitions.

                                              3.
       On December 9, 2021, the juvenile court held a combined jurisdiction and
disposition hearing where it stated that it was unknown whether ICWA applied. The
hearing was set for a contested hearing.
       On February 15, 2022, the juvenile court held the contested hearing. Again, the
court stated it was unknown whether ICWA applied. The court noted ICWA notices had
been sent and the 10-day waiting period had perfected. The court found the allegations in
the amended petition true, bypassed the parents for reunification services, and set a
section 366.26 hearing.
Section 366.26
       On February 28, 2022, the agency filed a “MOTION FOR DETERMINATION
OF ICWA APPLICABILITY” and attached letters from all six tribes it noticed. All of
the tribes reported Evan did not qualify as an Indian child within the meaning of ICWA.
The BIA sent a response acknowledging the agency noticed the tribes and stating that
tribal eligibility was up to the individual tribes.
       On June 9, 2022, the juvenile court held a section 366.26 hearing and found
ICWA did not apply. The hearing was continued.
       On December 22, 2022, the juvenile court terminated parental rights and ordered a
permanent plan of adoption. The court again found ICWA did not apply.
       Mother and father timely filed notices of appeal.
                                        DISCUSSION
I.     ICWA
       A.      Legal Principles
       “ ‘ICWA is a federal law giving Indian tribes concurrent jurisdiction over state
court child custody proceedings that involve Indian children living off of a reservation’
[citations], in furtherance of ‘federal policy “ ‘that, where possible, an Indian child should
remain in the Indian community’ ” ’ [citations]. ‘ICWA establishes minimum federal
standards, both procedural and substantive, governing the removal of Indian children

                                               4.
from their families’ [citations], and ‘[w]hen ICWA applies, the Indian tribe has a right to
intervene in or exercise jurisdiction over the proceeding.’ ” (K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th
566, 594, fn. omitted; accord, E.C., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 138, fn. omitted.)
       “ ‘In 2006, California adopted various procedural and substantive provisions of
ICWA.’ [Citations.] The Legislature’s ‘primary objective … was to increase
compliance with ICWA. California Indian Legal Services (CILS), a proponent of the
bill, observed that courts and county agencies still had difficulty complying with ICWA
25 years after its enactment, and CILS believed codification of [ICWA’s] requirements
into state law would help alleviate the problem. [Citation.]’ ” (K.H., supra, 84
Cal.App.5th at p. 595; accord, E.C., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at pp. 138–139.)
       “ ‘In 2016, new federal regulations were adopted concerning ICWA compliance.
[Citation.] Following the enactment of the federal regulations, California made
conforming amendments to its statutes, including portions of the Welfare and Institutions
Code related to ICWA notice and inquiry requirements. [Citations.] Those changes
became effective January 1, 2019 .…’ [Citation.] Subsequently, the Legislature
amended section 224.2, subdivision (e), to define ‘reason to believe,’ effective
September 18, 2020.” (K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at pp. 595–596, fn. omitted; accord,
E.C., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 139.)
              1.     Summary of Duties of Inquiry and Notice
       “[W]hether a child is a member, or is eligible for membership, in a particular tribe
is a determination that rests exclusively with the tribe, and neither the agency nor the
court plays any role in making that determination. [Citations.] ‘ “Because it typically is
not self-evident whether a child is an Indian child, both federal and state law mandate
certain inquiries to be made in each case.” ’ ” (K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 596;
accord, E.C., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at pp. 139–140.)
       “In California, section 224.2 ‘codifies and elaborates on ICWA’s requirements of
notice to a child’s parents or legal guardian, Indian custodian, and Indian tribe, and to the

                                             5.
[Bureau of Indian Affairs].’ ” (In re A.R. (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 197, 204.) California
law imposes “an affirmative and continuing duty [on the court and the county welfare
agency] to inquire whether a child for whom a petition under [s]ection 300, … may be or
has been filed, is or may be an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (a).)
       “The [state law] duty to inquire begins with the initial contact, including, but not
limited to, asking the party reporting child abuse or neglect whether the party has any
information that the child may be an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (a).) “If a child is
placed into the temporary custody of a county welfare [agency] pursuant to
[s]ection 306 … the county welfare [agency] … has a duty to inquire whether that child is
an Indian child. Inquiry includes, but is not limited to, asking the child, parents, legal
guardian, Indian custodian, extended family members, others who have an interest in the
child, and the party reporting child abuse or neglect, whether the child is, or may be, an
Indian child and where the child, the parents, or Indian custodian is domiciled.” (§ 224.2,
subd. (b).) Additionally, “[a]t the first appearance in court of each party, the court shall
ask each participant present in the hearing whether the participant knows or has reason to
know that the child is an Indian child. The court shall instruct the parties to inform the
court if they subsequently receive information that provides reason to know the child is
an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (c).)
       “If the initial inquiry provides ‘reason to believe’ that an Indian child is involved
in a proceeding—that is, if the court or social worker ‘has information suggesting that
either the parent of the child or the child is a member or may be eligible for membership
in an Indian tribe’—then the court or social worker ‘shall make further inquiry’ regarding
the child’s possible Indian status as soon as practicable.” (In re Ezequiel G. (2022) 81
Cal.App.5th 984, 999 (Ezequiel G.), citing § 224.2, subd. (e).) “Further inquiry
‘includes, but is not limited to, all of the following: [¶] (A) Interviewing the parents,
Indian custodian, and extended family members[;] [¶] (B) Contacting the Bureau of
Indian Affairs and the State Department of Social Services[; and] [¶] (C) Contacting the

                                              6.
tribe or tribes and any other person that may reasonably be expected to have information
regarding the child’s membership, citizenship status, or eligibility.’ ” (Ezequiel G., at
p. 999.)
       “If there is ‘reason to know’ a child is an Indian child, the agency shall provide
notice to the relevant tribes and agencies in accordance with section 224.3,
subdivision (a)(5).” (Ezequiel G., supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 999, citing § 224.2,
subd. (f).) “There is ‘reason to know’ a child is an Indian child if any one of six statutory
criteria is met—i.e., if the court is advised that the child ‘is an Indian child,’ the child’s or
parent’s residence is on a reservation, the child is or has been a ward of a tribal court, or
either parent or the child possess an identification card indicating membership or
citizenship in an Indian tribe.” (Ezequiel G., at p. 999, citing § 224.2, subd. (d).)
       County welfare agencies “must on an ongoing basis include in its filings a detailed
description of all inquiries, and further inquiries it has undertaken, and all information
received pertaining to the child’s Indian status, as well as evidence of how and when this
information was provided to the relevant tribes. Whenever new information is received,
that information must be expeditiously provided to the tribes.” (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 5.481(a)(5).)5
       B.     Analysis
              1.      Summary of ICWA Inquiry and Notice
       In the present case, the parents each completed ICWA-020 forms prior to the
detention hearing. Mother denied having Indian ancestry, but father indicated he had
ancestry with the Choctaw and Cherokee tribes. At the detention hearing, the parents
made the same representations, and the juvenile court ordered the agency to investigate
further. Thereafter, the agency sent ICWA-030 notices to the BIA and the six Choctaw
and Cherokee tribes. All of the tribes responded that Evan did not qualify as an Indian

5      All further references to rules are to the California Rules of Court.

                                               7.
child within the meaning of ICWA. The court found ICWA did not apply. The record
shows, however, that the agency was in contact with several extended maternal and
paternal family members. There is no indication any of these family members were
inquired of and it is unknown whether they had information that was, or could have been
included in the ICWA-030 notices.
       In K.H. and E.C., we addressed ICWA error at the inquiry stage. There, we
explained our decision not to follow the approaches articulated by other appellate courts
for determining whether ICWA error requires reversal and concluded that the Supreme
Court’s decision in A.R. supplies the appropriate framework for assessing prejudice in
this context. (K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at pp. 607–608, citing A.R., supra, 11 Cal.5th
at pp. 252–254; accord, E.C., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 152.) Applying the standards
we articulated in K.H. and E.C., as we will discuss below, we agree with the parties and
conclude the agency’s error is prejudicial and remand for the agency to conduct a proper,
adequate, and duly diligent inquiry is necessary.
              2.     Standard of Review
       “The juvenile court’s finding that ICWA does not apply to the proceeding rests on
two elemental determinations, ‘subject to reversal based on sufficiency of the
evidence.’ ” (K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 601, quoting § 224.2, subd. (i)(2); accord,
E.C., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at pp. 142–143.) First, “[t]he court must find there is ‘no
reason to know whether the child is an Indian child,’ which is dependent upon whether
any of the six circumstances set forth in subdivision (d) of section 224.2 apply.” (K.H., at
p. 601, quoting § 224.2, subd. (i)(2); accord, E.C., supra, at p. 143.) Second, “ ‘[t]he
juvenile court must … find a ‘proper and adequate further inquiry and due
diligence .…” ’ ” (K.H., at p. 601.)
       Under the substantial evidence standard, “ ‘a reviewing court should “not reweigh
the evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or resolve evidentiary conflicts.”
[Citation.] The determinations should “be upheld if … supported by substantial

                                             8.
evidence, even though substantial evidence to the contrary also exists and the trial court
might have reached a different result had it believed other evidence.” ’ [Citations.] The
standard recognizes that ‘[t]rial courts “generally are in a better position to evaluate and
weigh the evidence” than appellate courts’ [citation], and ‘an appellate court should
accept a trial court’s factual findings if they are reasonable and supported by substantial
evidence in the record’ [citation]. ‘[I]f a court holds an evidentiary hearing, it may make
credibility determinations, to which an appellate court would generally defer.’ ” (K.H.,
supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 601; accord, E.C., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 143.)
       The juvenile court’s finding on the second element, however, “is ultimately
discretionary because it requires the juvenile court to ‘engage in a delicate balancing of’
various factors in assessing whether the agency’s inquiry was proper and adequate within
the context of ICWA and California law, and whether the agency acted with due
diligence.” (K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 601, quoting, In re Caden C. 11 Cal.5th
614, 640; accord, E.C., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 143; Ezequiel G., supra, 81
Cal.App.5th at pp. 1004–1005.) Therefore, we employ a hybrid standard and review the
court’s determination for substantial evidence and abuse of discretion. (K.H., at p. 601;
accord, E.C., at pp. 143–144; Ezequiel G., at pp. 1004–1005.)
       “ ‘Review for abuse of discretion is subtly different [from review for substantial
evidence], focused not primarily on the evidence but the application of a legal standard.
A court abuses its discretion only when “ ‘ “the trial court has exceeded the limits of legal
discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination.” ’ ”
[Citation.] But “ ‘ “[w]hen two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the
facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial
court.” ’ ” [Citations.] [¶] While each standard here fits a distinct type of determination
under review, the practical difference between the standards is not likely to be very
pronounced.’ ” (K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 602; accord, E.C., supra, 85
Cal.App.5th at pp. 143–144.)

                                               9.
       “Review of the juvenile court’s findings under the foregoing standards is
deferential, but ‘ “an appellate court [nevertheless] exercises its independent judgment to
determine whether the facts satisfy the rule of law.” ’ [Citations.] Where the material
facts are undisputed, courts have applied independent review to determine whether
ICWA’s requirements were satisfied.” (K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 602; accord,
E.C., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 144.)
              3.     Agency and Juvenile Court Erred
       As previously mentioned, “[a]t the first appearance in court of each party, the
court shall ask each participant present in the hearing whether the participant knows or
has reason to know that the child is an Indian child. The court shall instruct the parties to
inform the court if they subsequently receive information that provides reason to know
the child is an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (c).) Moreover, when “a child is placed into
the temporary custody of a county welfare [agency] …, the county welfare [agency] …
has a duty to inquire whether [the] child is an Indian child. Inquiry includes, but is not
limited to, asking the child, parents, legal guardian, Indian custodian, extended family
members, others who have an interest in the child, and the party reporting child abuse or
neglect, whether the child is, or may be, an Indian child and where the child, the parents,
or Indian custodian is domiciled.” (§ 224.2, subd. (b).) Extended family members
include adult grandparents, siblings, brothers- or sisters-in-law, aunts, uncles, nieces,
nephews, and first or second cousins. (25 U.S.C. § 1903(2); § 224.1, subd. (c).)
       Here, the agency inquired only of the parents, which fell short of complying with
the plain language of section 224.2, subdivision (b). “[T]he law demands more than
merely inquiring of [the parents]” (K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 620, citing In re
Antonio R. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 421, 431; accord, In re M.M. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th
61, 74, review granted Oct. 12, 2022, S276099 (dis. opn. of Wiley, J.)), a point the
agency does not dispute. There may be cases in which there is no one else to ask, but if
that is so, the record must be developed to reflect that fact and supported by

                                             10.
documentation. (Rule 5.481(a)(5).) “On a well-developed record, the court has relatively
broad discretion [in such cases] to determine [that] the agency’s inquiry was proper,
adequate, and duly diligent on the specific facts of the case.” (K.H., at p. 589; accord,
E.C., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 157.) Accordingly, the juvenile court’s finding that
ICWA did not apply was not supported by substantial evidence, and its contrary
conclusion was an abuse of discretion. (§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2).)
              4.     Prejudice
       “Where, as here, the deficiency lies with the agency’s duty of […] inquiry and a
juvenile court’s related finding of ‘proper and adequate further inquiry and due diligence’
(§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2)), the error is one of state law ([In re] Benjamin M., supra, 70
Cal.App.5th at p. 742). Under the California Constitution, ‘[n]o judgment shall be set
aside, or new trial granted, in any cause, on the ground of misdirection of the jury, or of
the improper admission or rejection of evidence, or for any error as to any matter of
pleading, or for any error as to any matter of procedure, unless, after an examination of
the entire cause, including the evidence, the court shall be of the opinion that the error
complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.’ (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.)”
(K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 606; accord, E.C., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 151.)
       “ ‘[T]o be entitled to relief on appeal from an alleged abuse of discretion, it must
clearly appear the resulting injury is sufficiently grave to manifest a miscarriage of
justice’ [citations], and California law generally interprets its constitutional miscarriage
of justice requirement ‘as permitting reversal only if the reviewing court finds it
reasonably probable the result would have been more favorable to the appealing party but
for the error.’ ” (K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at pp. 606–607; accord, E.C., supra, 85
Cal.App.5th at pp. 151–152.)

                                             11.
       However, in A.R., the Supreme Court “recognized that while we generally apply a
Watson[6] likelihood-of-success test to assess prejudice, a merits-based outcome-focused
test is not always appropriate because it cannot always adequately measure the relevant
harm. [Citation.] In other words, where the injury caused by the error is unrelated to an
outcome on the merits, tethering the showing of prejudice to such an outcome misplaces
the measure, at the expense of the rights the law in question was designed to protect.”
(K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 609, italics omitted.)
       As we explained in K.H., “ ‘ICWA compliance presents a unique situation .…’ ”
(K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 608.) “ICWA is not directed at reaching, or
protecting, a specific outcome on the merits.” (Id. at p. 609; accord, E.C., supra, 85
Cal.App.5th at p. 154.) Rather, “ ‘[t]he purpose of ICWA and related California statutes
is to provide notice to the tribe sufficient to allow it to determine whether the child is an
Indian child, and whether the tribe wishes to intervene in the proceedings’ [citation], and
an adequate initial inquiry facilitates the information gathering upon which the court’s
ICWA determination will rest.” (K.H., at p. 608; accord, E.C., at pp. 152–153.) Yet,
“while the appealing party is usually a parent, parents do not bear the burden of gathering
information in compliance with ICWA [citations], and parents may raise the claim of
error for the first time on appeal.” (K.H., at p. 608; accord, E.C., at p. 153.) Further, the
ultimate determination whether a child is an Indian child rests with the tribe, not with a
parent, the agency, or the juvenile court. (K.H., at p. 590; accord, E.C., at pp. 139–140.)
“[W]here the opportunity to gather the relevant information critical to determining
whether the child is or may be an Indian child is lost because there has not been adequate
inquiry and due diligence, reversal for correction is generally the only effective
safeguard.” (K.H., at p. 610, citing A.R., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 252–254; accord, E.C.,
at p. 155.)

6      People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.

                                             12.
       Here, the agency’s inquiry, limited only to the parents, “ ‘fell well short of that
required to gather the information needed to meaningfully safeguard the rights of the
tribes, as intended under ICWA and California law’ ” (E.C., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at
p. 156, quoting K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 620), and “[a] finding of harmlessness
on this record would necessarily require speculation and ‘is at odds with the statutory
protections that ICWA and California law intend to afford Indian children and Indian
tribes.’ ” (E.C., at p. 155, quoting K.H., at p. 611.) Therefore, the error is prejudicial and
reversal is required.
       Before reversing or vacating a judgment based upon a stipulation of the parties, an
appellate court must find “both of the following: [¶] (A) There is no reasonable
possibility that the interests of nonparties or the public will be adversely affected by the
reversal. [¶] (B) The reasons of the parties for requesting reversal outweigh the erosion of
public trust that may result from the nullification of a judgment and the risk that the
availability of stipulated reversal will reduce the incentive for pretrial settlement.” (Code
Civ. Proc., § 128, subd. (a)(8)(A) & (B).) Because this case would be subject to reversal
to permit compliance with ICWA and corresponding California statutes and rules absent
the parties’ stipulation, a stipulated remand advances the interests identified by Code of
Civil Procedure section 128, subdivision (a)(8). (See In re Rashad H. (2000) 78
Cal.App.4th 376, 379–382.)
       Accordingly, the juvenile court’s finding that ICWA does not apply is
conditionally reversed and the matter is remanded. The court is instructed to ensure the
agency conducts “ ‘a proper, adequate, and duly diligent inquiry under section 224.2,
subdivision[s] (b) [and (e)], and document its inquiry in the record in compliance with
rule 5.481(a)(5).’ ” (E.C., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 157, quoting K.H., supra, 84
Cal.App.5th at p. 621.) “ ‘This should not be interpreted as requiring an exhaustive
search for and questioning of every living relative of [Evan]’ but ‘[w]e leave that
determination for the juvenile court in the first instance because it is better positioned to

                                             13.
evaluate the evidence provided by the [agency]. So long as the court ensures the inquiry
is reasonable and of sufficient reach to accomplish the legislative purpose underlying
ICWA and related California law, the court will have an adequate factual foundation
upon which to make its ICWA finding. (§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2).)’ ” (E.C., at p. 157,
quoting K.H., at p. 621.)
                                      DISPOSITION
       The juvenile court’s finding that ICWA does not apply is conditionally reversed,
and the matter is remanded to the juvenile court with directions to order the agency to
comply with the inquiry and documentation provisions set forth in section 224.2,
subdivisions (b) and (e), and rule 5.481(a)(5). The court is directed to comply with the
inquiry provisions of section 224.2, subdivision (c). If, after determining that an
adequate inquiry was made consistent with the reasoning in this opinion, the court finds
that ICWA applies, the court shall vacate its existing order and proceed in compliance
with ICWA and related California law. If the court instead finds that ICWA does not
apply, its ICWA finding shall be reinstated. In all other respects, the juvenile court’s
order is affirmed.

                                            14.