Court Opinion

ID: 9899600
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-17 01:00:32.141878+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:42.042037
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-50854     Document: 00516970726         Page: 1     Date Filed: 11/16/2023

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit                                 United States Court of Appeals
                                                                               Fifth Circuit

                                ____________                                 FILED
                                                                     November 16, 2023
                                 No. 22-50854                           Lyle W. Cayce
                                ____________                                 Clerk

   Kaylee Lartigue,

                                                           Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                       versus

   Northside Independent School District,

                                            Defendant—Appellee.
                  ______________________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Western District of Texas
                            USDC No. 5:19-CV-393
                  ______________________________

   Before Higginbotham, Smith, and Elrod, Circuit Judges.
   Patrick E. Higginbotham, Circuit Judge:
          Appellant Kaylee Lartigue sued the Northside Independent School
   District, arguing that the District failed to properly accommodate her hearing
   impairment as required by the Americans with Disabilities Act. The district
   court granted summary judgment in favor of the District, holding that
   Lartigue’s ADA claim was barred by 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l), the “exhaustion
   requirement” of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. Finding that
   the district court erred in its interpretation of § 1415(l), we VACATE the
   summary judgment order and REMAND the case to the district court for
   further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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                                               No. 22-50854

                                                      I.
           This case concerns two distinct, but linked, statutes. The first is the
   Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. 1 Enacted
   in 1975, this statute offers federal funds to the states in exchange for providing
   a “free appropriate public education” (“FAPE”) to all children with certain
   physical or intellectual disabilities. 2 As the Supreme Court previously
   explained, “[a]n eligible child . . . acquires a ‘substantive right’ to such an
   education once a State accepts the IDEA’s financial assistance.” 3 The
   primary vehicle through which a child receives the benefits of their promised
   FAPE is called an “individualized education program” (“IEP”). 4 An IEP is
   developed by a group of school officials, teachers, and parents and is a
   personalized plan that details the “special education and related services”
   necessary for the child to meet their educational goals.5 The IDEA provides
   for compensatory education as a remedy, but it does not authorize
   compensatory damages as a form of relief. 6
           The second statute is the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.
   § 12131 et seq. 7 Passed in 1990, Title II of the ADA protects the rights of all

           _____________________
           1
               20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.
           2
               20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A).
           3
              Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Sch., 580 U.S. 154, 157 (2017) (citing Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S.
   992, 1010 (1984)). “Compensatory education involves discretionary, prospective injunctive relief
   crafted by a court to remedy what might be termed an educational deficit created by an educational
   agency’s failure over a given period of time to provide an individualized education program to a
   student under IDEA.” D.A. v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 716 F. Supp. 2d 603, 613 (S.D. Tex. 2009),
   aff’d sub nom. D.A. ex rel. Latasha A. v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 629 F.3d 450 (5th Cir. 2010)
   (citation omitted).
           4
               Id. at 158.
           5
               Id.
           6
               Perez v. Sturgis Public Schools, 598 U.S. 142, 149–50 (2023).
           7
               42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq.

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   individuals with disabilities (not just children) by banning discrimination by
   public entities, including schools. 8 The ADA includes a mandate to eliminate
   discrimination against individuals with disabilities, and it requires the
   Department of Justice to promulgate regulations to implement the ADA. 9
   Unlike the IDEA, the ADA authorizes “individuals to seek redress for
   violations of their substantive guarantees by bringing suits for injunctive relief
   or money damages.” 10
          As these two statutes deal with the substantive rights of individuals
   with disabilities, there is a natural overlap in coverage. This statutory overlap
   has led to some confusion in the courts—namely, when is a claim more
   properly brought under the IDEA versus under another anti-discrimination
   statute, like the ADA?
          The Supreme Court first tried to answer this question in the 1984 case
   Smith v. Robinson. 11 There, the Court held that the IDEA is “the exclusive
   avenue through which a plaintiff may assert an equal protection claim to a
   publicly financed special education.” 12 In doing so, the Court determined
   Congress had foreclosed plaintiffs from asserting their right to a FAPE as
   promised under the IDEA through other statutory schemes such as Section
   504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 794, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 13
          But Smith did not last long. Congress quickly responded to the Smith
   decision by adopting the Handicapped Children’s Protection Act of 1986,

          _____________________
          8
               Fry, 580 U.S. at 159–60.
          9
               20 U.S.C. § 12134.
          10
               Fry, 580 U.S. at 160.
          11
               468 U.S. 992 (1984).
          12
               Id. at 1009 (emphasis added).
          13
               Id.

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   which “overturned Smith’s preclusion of non-IDEA claims while also adding
   a carefully defined exhaustion requirement.” 14 Codified as 20 U.S.C. §
   1415(l), the relevant provision of that statute reads:
          Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to restrict or limit
          the rights, procedures, and remedies available under the
          Constitution, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, title
          V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, or other Federal laws
          protecting the rights of children with disabilities, except that
          before the filing of a civil action under such laws seeking relief
          that is also available under this subchapter, the procedures
          under subsections (f) and (g) shall be exhausted to the same
          extent as would be required had the action been brought under
          this subchapter. 15
          The Supreme Court recently explained in Fry v. Napoleon Community
   Schools how § 1415(l)’s “exhaustion provision” works. 16 The first part of the
   exhaustion provision (up until “except that”) re-affirms Congress’s intent
   to not prevent plaintiffs from asserting “claims under [other anti-
   discrimination] laws even if, as in Smith itself, those claims allege the denial
   of an appropriate public education (much as an IDEA claim would).” 17
   However, the second part of the provision (everything after “except that”)
   imposes a limit on the “anything goes” regime. 18 It requires a plaintiff suing
   under the ADA or other similar laws to first exhaust IDEA’s administrative
   procedures in certain circumstances, namely when “seeking relief that is also

          _____________________
          14
               Fry, 580 U.S. at 161.
          15
               20 U.S.C. § 1415(l) (emphasis added).
          16
               580 U.S. 154.
          17
               Id. at 161.
          18
               Id.

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   available under” the IDEA. 19 Under Fry, when a lawsuit asserts a denial of a
   FAPE, plaintiffs comply with § 1415(l)’s exhaustion requirement by
   submitting their case to an IDEA hearing officer prior to suing in federal court
   under the ADA. 20
          As a result, especially in situations involving children with disabilities
   in a school setting, courts must contend with the difficult task of discerning
   whether a claim is based on the denial of a FAPE (an IDEA claim) or on a
   “failure to accommodate” argument (an ADA claim). The Supreme Court
   has provided some helpful guidance. Fry states that “[w]hat matters is the
   crux—or, in legal-speak, the gravamen—of the plaintiff’s complaint, setting
   aside any attempts at artful pleading.” 21 The Supreme Court instructs that
   this examination “should consider substance, not surface,” and that a court
   “should attend to the diverse means and ends of the statutes covering
   persons with disabilities.” 22
          Even if a court determined that a disability discrimination claim was
   based on the denial of a FAPE, that is not the end of the inquiry. In Perez, the
   Supreme Court further elaborated on the scope of § 1415(l) by answering an
   analogous, but different, question than the one in Fry—namely, “whether a
   suit admittedly premised on the past denial of a free and appropriate
   education         may       nonetheless         proceed       without   exhausting   IDEA’s
   administrative processes if the remedy a plaintiff seeks is not one IDEA
   provides.” 23 The Supreme Court concluded that a plaintiff requesting

          _____________________
          19
               Id.
          20
               Id. at 168; 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l).
          21
               Fry, 580 U.S. at 169.
          22
               Id. at 170.
          23
               598 U.S. at 149–50.

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   compensatory damages for an alleged ADA violation premised on a FAPE
   denial was not required to exhaust the IDEA’s administrative processes
   because the relief sought (compensatory damages) was “not something
   IDEA can provide.” 24
          Putting together the text of the IDEA, the relevant precedents (Fry
   and Perez), and Congress’s explicit rebuke of Smith, the current state of the
   law is as follows: in a suit against a public school for alleged violations of the
   ADA or other similar anti-discrimination statutes, the court should first as-
   sess whether the gravamen of the complaint concerns the denial of a FAPE
   or, instead, is based on disability discrimination. 25 If the complaint does not
   concern the denial of a FAPE, then the plaintiff need not got through the
   IDEA’s administrative hurdles. 26 On the other hand, if the complaint is pred-
   icated on a FAPE denial, then the court must then ask what relief is sought. 27
   If the relief sought is not one that the IDEA can provide (such as compensa-
   tory damages), then, again, the plaintiff need not go through the IDEA’s ad-
   ministrative hurdles. 28 But if the relief sought is of the type that the IDEA
   offers, then the plaintiff must fully exhaust the administrative processes as
   required by § 1415(l). 29
                                                    II.
          Appellant Kaylee Lartigue is hearing impaired, uses a hearing aid, and
   requires interpretation services. From 2017 to 2019, Lartigue attended high

          _____________________
          24
               Id. at 143.
          25
               See Fry, 580 U.S. at 168–69.
          26
               Id.
          27
               See Perez, 598 U.S. at 149–50.
          28
               Id.
          29
               Id.

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   school at Northside Independent School District’s (“NSID” or the
   “District”) John Jay Science and Engineering Academy (the “Academy”),
   where she was the only hearing-impaired student. 30 The District recognized
   that Lartigue could not fully participate in the Academy’s programming
   absent special educational services and assistive technology, and so the
   Academy (along with Lartigue and her parents) developed an IEP.
            Lartigue argues that, throughout her years at the Academy, the
   District failed to properly accommodate her hearing impairment as required
   by her IEP. For example, Lartigue alleges that the District repeatedly failed
   to provide closed-captioning for films and videos shown in class. Lartigue
   also alleges that “the District failed to ensure that two interpreters were
   available at all times, such that one interpreter would be available if the other
   needed to take a break.” Moreover, Lartigue claims that the “counseling
   services” she requested were out in the open hallways of the high school,
   thereby depriving her of the kind of confidentiality and privacy required for
   counseling to be effective. Lastly, Lartigue argues that the District’s failure
   to timely provide her with a Communication Access Realtime Translation
   Services for a live debate competition left her unable to fully participate in
   the extracurricular activity. Taken together, Lartigue claims that “the
   District’s refusals to accommodate [her] hearing impairment left her isolated
   from her peers and unable to meaningfully participate in various educational
   programs and activities.” Lartigue left the Academy in March 2019 to be
   homeschooled.
            Parents of NISD students with hearing impairments, including
   Lartigue’s parents, originally filed a putative class action in federal court on

            _____________________
            30
              As explained further below, Lartigue was the only student with a hearing impairment at
   the Academy, but there were students at other high schools within the District that brought similar
   claims against NSID.

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   April 15, 2019, on behalf of their minor children. The parents brought claims
   under the IDEA, the ADA, Section 504, § 1983, the United States and Texas
   Constitutions, and Chapter 21 of the Texas Human Resources Code.
   However, once Lartigue left NISD to begin homeschooling, her parents
   moved to sever their case and opt-out of the class action. The district judge
   granted this motion and severed Lartigue’s case.
          After the case was severed from the class action, and consistent with
   the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement under § 1415(l), Lartigue and her
   parents filed a complaint with the Texas Education Agency on May 16, 2019,
   contending that the District had failed to provide a FAPE as outlined in
   Lartigue’s IEP. Following an administrative hearing, the hearing officer
   concluded that the District satisfied the IDEA’s requirements and provided
   Lartigue with a FAPE. After these administrative proceedings concluded, the
   district court evaluating Lartigue’s claims found that she had satisfied
   IDEA’s exhaustion requirement under § 1415(l).
          Before the district court, Lartigue amended her complaint twice,
   revised her requested remedies, and changed the caption to sue under her
   name once she reached the age of majority. As amended, Lartigue alleged
   violations of: (1) Title II of the ADA; (2) Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
   Act; and (3) the United States and Texas Constitutions. Contrary to the class
   action suit, Lartigue did not include an IDEA claim. Furthermore, Lartigue
   sought compensatory damages, a form of relief not available under the
   IDEA. 31
          The District moved to dismiss Lartigue’s case, which the district
   court granted in part and denied in part, leaving only Lartigue’s ADA claim.
   The District then moved for summary judgment on Lartigue’s ADA claim,
          _____________________
          31
               Perez, 598 U.S. at 149–50.

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   which the court denied. After the District filed a motion for reconsideration,
   the parties filed supplemental briefs, and the district court held a hearing.
   Ultimately, the court granted the District’s motion for reconsideration and
   dismissed Lartigue’s ADA claim with prejudice. The court’s September 9,
   2022, order found that Lartigue did not have a standalone claim under the
   ADA because the gravamen of her complaint was the denial of a FAPE. On
   April 19, 2023, Lartigue moved for relief from the judgment under Federal
   Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 60(b), arguing that the district court’s dismissal
   of Lartigue’s ADA claim was a straightforward mistake of law. 32
                                                   III.
            This Court reviews grants of summary judgment de novo. 33 This
   standard continues to apply on motions for reconsideration. 34
                                                   A.
            The issue before this Court is whether the district court erred in
   concluding as a matter of law that a student cannot bring a standalone claim
   against a school district under Title II of the ADA if the “gravamen” of the
   complaint is a denial of a FAPE. Because the district court’s order is contrary
   to the plain text of § 1415(l) and the Supreme Court’s opinions in Fry and
   Perez, we find the district court committed reversible error.
            The district court started off on the right path but ultimately reached
   the incorrect legal conclusion. First, in its initial order denying summary
   judgment, the district court correctly found that Lartigue had “exhausted her

            _____________________
            32
                 See FED. R. CIV. P. 60.
            33
              Pioneer Nat. Res. USA, Inc. v. Paper, Allied Indus., Chem. & Energy Workers Int’l Union
   Loc. 4-487, 328 F.3d 818, 820 (5th Cir. 2003), opinion modified on denial of reh’g sub nom., 338 F.3d
   440 (5th Cir. 2003).
            34
                 Id.

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   administrative remedies” under § 1415(l) of the IDEA by pursuing her claim
   before a Special Education Hearing Officer for the State of Texas. 35 Second,
   the district court was correct to find that the gravamen of Lartigue’s
   complaint was the denial of a FAPE. Neither of the parties dispute this
   finding. And third, the court properly understood that Lartigue’s federal
   claims were not precluded by the TEA’s findings because the legal standards
   applicable in an IDEA due process hearing and those that apply in a
   courtroom for a “failure to accommodate” claim under the ADA were
   different. 36

            _____________________
            35
               Section 1415(l) requires that “except that before the filing of a civil action under such
   laws seeking relief that is also available under this subchapter, the procedures under subsections (f)
   and (g) shall be exhausted to the same extent as would be required had the action been brought under
   this subchapter.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l). In turn, § 1415(f) establishes the protocol and elements of
   procedural due process that are owed whenever complaints are filed with appropriate agency. In
   particular, once “a complaint has been received under subsection (b)(6) or (k), the parents or the
   local educational agency involved in such complaint shall have an opportunity for an impartial due
   process hearing, which shall be conducted by the State educational agency or by the local educational
   agency, as determined by State law or by the State educational agency.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(A).
   Subsection (g) governs the right to appeal the findings and decisions rendered in a subsection (f)
   hearing. Id. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(g)(1) (“If the hearing required by subsection (f) is conducted by a local
   educational agency, any party aggrieved by the findings and decision rendered in such a hearing may
   appeal such findings and decision to the State educational agency.”) (emphasis added).
            On summary judgment, the district court evaluated whether Lartigue was required to not
   only pursue a subsection (f) hearing, but also to appeal any decisions to the state educational agency.
   Citing TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 89.1185, the district court found that Texas law provided no avenue by
   which Lartigue could appeal her hearing officer’s decision to the Texas Education Agency. After
   further determining that “nothing in subsection 1415(l) requires [Lartigue to] appeal to state or
   federal court as a prerequisite to administrative exhaustion,” the court found she exhausted her
   administrative remedies.
            36
               The court explained, “the legal standards applied by the hearing officer in Lartigue’s
   [sic] due process hearing and the Court in this case are significantly different. The purpose of the
   due process hearing was to determine whether NISD provided an educational program reasonably
   calculated to enable Lartigue’s [sic.] progress. Lartigue’s [sic] ADA claim turns on whether NISD
   discriminated against her on account of her disability. That issue was not considered in the due
   process hearing. Therefore, the Court finds Lartigue’s [sic] ADA claim is not precluded by the due
   process hearing and is not barred by the collateral estoppel doctrine.”

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          However, the district court erred when it held that Lartigue did not
   have a standalone claim under the ADA because the gravamen of her
   complaint was the denial of a FAPE. Under the plain text of § 1415(l),
   “[n]othing in [the IDEA]” “restrict[s] or limit[s]” Lartigue’s ability to
   assert her claim “under . . . the Americans with Disabilities Act.” 37 As Fry
   explained, “the IDEA does not prevent a plaintiff from asserting claims
   under [other federal] laws”—including “the ADA”—“even if . . . those
   claims allege the denial of an appropriate public education (much as an IDEA
   claim would).” 38
          Under Fry, finding that the gravamen of an ADA complaint is the
   denial of a FAPE only leads to the conclusion that a plaintiff must exhaust
   the state’s administrative remedies before filing suit in federal court. 39 Here,
   because the district court properly found that the gravamen of the complaint
   was the denial of a FAPE, Lartigue was only required to exhaust the state’s
   administrative remedies before filing suit in the district court. And the parties
   agree that Lartigue did just that. The district court should have stopped
   there, after finding that Lartigue had met the exhaustion requirement of §
   1415(l). Instead, the district court stretched the bounds of Fry to bar
   Lartigue’s claim altogether.
          The district court stated that while “Fry’s holding does not directly
   apply to this case . . . its reasoning does apply.” Under the district court’s
   reading of Fry, “[if] the gravamen of Lartigue’s complaint is a denial of a
   FAPE, she has no stand alone [sic] ADA claim.” This is an incorrect
   statement of the law on two fronts. First, Fry’s holding does directly apply to

          _____________________
          37
               20 U.S.C. § 1415(l).
          38
               Fry, 580 U.S. at 161.
          39
               See id. at 168–69.

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   this case; as explained above, Lartigue complied with § 1415(l)’s exhaustion
   requirement. Second, the district court described Fry’s reasoning as
   motivated by a concern with “plaintiffs [evading] IDEA’s statutory
   limitations through artful pleading.” Fair enough, but this concern is
   irrelevant here, as Lartigue evades no statutory limitations by filing her ADA
   complaint. The only relevant statutory limitation is § 1415(l)’s exhaustion
   requirement which Lartigue fulfilled. In other words, Lartigue is not
   attempting to “resurrect her abandoned IDEA claim” through artful
   pleading—in fact, her amended complaint abandons her IDEA claim—she is
   merely exercising her right under the ADA to pursue a failure to
   accommodate claim against her school district.
          In any event, Perez forecloses the district court’s interpretation of
   § 1415(l). “The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Perez provides
   unmistakable new guidance.” 40 In that case, the plaintiff’s ADA claim was
   “admittedly premised on the [school district’s] past denial of a free and
   appropriate education.” 41 Notwithstanding that the gravamen of the
   plaintiff’s complaint was the denial of a FAPE and that the plaintiff never
   exhausted the IDEA’s administrative procedures, the Court allowed the
   plaintiff’s standalone ADA claim to proceed because the relief sought
   (compensatory damages) was not one the IDEA provided. 42
          Similarly, in this case, it is undisputed that the gravamen of Lartigue’s
   claim is the denial of a FAPE. Like the plaintiff in Perez, Lartigue seeks
   compensatory damages, relief which the IDEA does not provide. As such, to
   the extent Lartigue seeks a form of relief that that the IDEA does not offer,

          _____________________
          40
               J.W. v. Paley, No. 21-20671, 2023 WL 5526787, at *4 (5th Cir. Aug. 28, 2023).
          41
               Perez, 598 U.S. at 150.
          42
               Id.

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   Perez is clear that Lartigue was not even required to exhaust her administrative
   remedies under § 1415(l) of the IDEA. Like in Perez then, nothing in the text
   of § 1415(l) or Fry forecloses Lartigue’s ability to pursue her standalone ADA
   claim even when it is “admittedly premised” on the denial of a FAPE.
                                         B.
          The District now offers two alternative grounds for affirmance: one
   based on issue preclusion, and another related to damages. Neither are
   convincing.
          First, the District argued that Lartigue’s “‘collateral attack’ on the
   findings of the due process hearing officer are [sic] barred by the collateral
   estoppel doctrine.” In other words, the District believes the state hearing
   officer’s finding that Lartigue was not denied her FAPE precludes Lartigue’s
   ADA claim in federal court. The district court already rejected this issue
   preclusion argument twice, and again the District’s argument fails on appeal.
   As the district court correctly explained:
          The legal standards applied by the hearing officer in Lartigue’s
          due process hearing and the Court in this case are significantly
          different. The purpose of the due process hearing was to
          determine whether NISD provided an educational program
          reasonably calculated to enable Lartigue’s progress. Lartigue’s
          ADA claim turns on whether NISD discriminated against her
          on account of her disability. That issue was not considered in
          the due process hearing. Therefore, the Court finds Lartigue’s
          ADA claim is not precluded by the due process hearing and is
          not barred by the collateral estoppel doctrine.
          Perez’s emphasis on “remedies” is also instructive here. In Perez, the
   plaintiff pursued his claims through the state’s administrative proceedings
   and ultimately settled the case, thereby securing forward-looking relief in the

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   form of compensatory education. 43 Although the plaintiff in Perez obtained
   forward-looking relief, he was not foreclosed from bringing his ADA claim in
   federal court because he was seeking a different form of relief—namely,
   compensatory damages for the harms suffered in the past. 44 Similarly, in this
   case, Lartigue is seeking compensatory damages for the harms she suffered
   during her time at the Academy and is no longer seeking forward-looking
   relief. Lartigue, pursuant to Perez, cannot then be estopped from pursuing
   this claim for compensatory damages simply because she followed the
   procedures set out in § 1415(l).
          In sum, because the issues involved are different (as explained by the
   district court), Congressionally mandated administrative proceedings are
   inherently non-preclusive (as explained by the Supreme Court), and Lartigue
   seeks a different form of relief (compensatory education versus
   compensatory damages), Appellee’s issue preclusion argument does not
   provide valid alternative grounds to uphold the district court’s grant of
   summary judgment.
          Second, the District claims that Lartigue has no recoverable damages
   for her ADA claim. This argument is based on the Supreme Court’s recent
   decision in Cummings v. Premier Rehab Keller, P.L.L.C., which found that
   emotional distress damages are not recoverable under Section 504 of the
   Rehabilitation Act and under Section 1557 of the Patient Protection and
   Affordable Care Act, two statutes enacted under the Spending Clause. 45 The
   Fifth Circuit expressly declined to decide whether Cummings extends to
   claims under Title II of the ADA which, unlike Section 504 of the

          _____________________
          43
               Perez, 598 U.S. at 145.
          44
               See id. at 147.
          45
               142 S. Ct. 1562 (2022).

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   Rehabilitation Act and Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act, is not a
   Spending Clause statute. Moreover, the district court specifically declined to
   address this damages argument, which itself counsels against this Court
   entertaining the argument for the first time on a motion for reconsideration.
   On remand, the district court may consider this issue if need be.
                                       *****
          We cannot affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment, as
   it would return this Circuit to the Smith era—an erroneous decision that
   would have “consequences . . . for a great many children with disabilities and
   their parents,” 46 and one which Congress directly abandoned by enacting
   § 1415(l). Because the district court’s order was contrary to the text of
   § 1415(l) and foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s pronouncements in Fry and
   Perez, we vacate the grant of summary judgment and remand this case to the
   district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

          _____________________
          46
               Id. at 146.

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                                        No. 22-50854

   Jerry E. Smith, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
          I respectfully dissent from the majority’s detailed, well-crafted
   opinion. We can affirm on any ground that appears in the record. I would
   affirm the summary judgment on a ground that the school district raised but
   the district court rejected: Recovery is barred by collateral estoppel.
          Dismissal of Lartigue’s claim is proper because the issues of fact that
   make up her ADA claim are the same as those in her already-decided IDEA
   claim. She does not get a second bite at the apple. 1 The theories of liability
   making up her instant ADA suit rest on questions of fact that have already
   been decided in the IDEA administrative hearing.
          The administrative hearing officer found against Lartigue and
   determined that NISD did provide her with a FAPE. That is, the hearing
   officer determined that NISD adequately (1) provided her with closed
   captioning for audio-visual content, (2) ensured the availability of multiple
   interpreters,     (3) provided       private     counseling,      and     (4) secured
   Communication Access Realtime Translation Services (“CARTS”) for her
   debate activity.        Lartigue never challenged the hearing officer’s
   determinations in state or federal court. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A). That
   is a final and binding judgment. Powers v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 951 F.3d
   298, 310 (5th Cir. 2020) (holding a TEA hearing officer’s findings were
   entitled to preclusive effect); 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(1)(B).
          Collateral estoppel applies if (1) the identical issue was previously
   adjudicated; (2) the issue was actually litigated; and (3) the previous
   determination was necessary to the decision. Pace v. Bogalusa City Sch. Bd.,

          _____________________
          1
            “You only get one shot, do not miss your chance to blow—[t]his opportunity
   comes once in a lifetime, yo.” Eminem, Lose Yourself, on 8 Mile: Music from and Inspired
   by the Motion Picture (2002).

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                                     No. 22-50854

   403 F.3d 272, 290 (5th Cir. 2005). To satisfy the first requirement for collateral
   estoppel, two things must be true: Both (a) the facts and (b) the legal standard
   used to assess those facts must be the same in both proceedings. Id. (quoting
   Southmark Corp. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 163 F.3d 925, 932 (5th Cir. 1999)).

          The second and third requirements for collateral estoppel are easily
   met:    (2) The parties fully litigated Lartigue’s FAPE claims in the
   administrative hearing, and (3) determining whether Lartigue received a
   FAPE was the whole point of the hearing. Prong (a) of the first requirement
   is also met because the operative facts are identical between the TEA hearing
   and this case.
          Prong (b) of the first requirement is met as well. The district court
   incorrectly believed the legal standards were different because “the purpose
   of the [administrative] hearing was to determine whether NISD provided an
   educational program reasonably calculated to enable Lartigue’s progress.
   Lartigue’s ADA claim turns on whether NISD discriminated against her on
   account of her disability.” That abstract distinction, by itself, is not enough
   to find that collateral estoppel does not apply. In-circuit precedent confirms
   that it is the legal standard raised by the theory of liability advanced in the
   subsequent ADA claim that determines whether the prior FAPE denial
   determination has preclusive effect. Id. (applying collateral estoppel to bar
   ADA claim premised on issues of fact resolved in prior IDEA proceeding).
          In Pace, the plaintiff’s IDEA and ADA suits both claimed that “parts
   of the Bogalusa High School campus [we]re inaccessible to him.” Id. at 291.
   The prior IDEA suit determined that the high school provided plaintiff with
   a FAPE because it met the accessibility standards required under IDEA. Id.
   Pace held that that determination was entitled to preclusive effect under the
   doctrine of collateral estoppel because “Pace present[ed] no argument that
   the accessibility standards for new construction of school buildings under the

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                                           No. 22-50854

   ADA or § 504 [were] more demanding[ 2] or even different from the
   standards required under the 1997 amendment to the IDEA.” Id. at 292.
   Pace thus stands for the proposition that a legal standard is “identical” for
   purposes of collateral estoppel when the legal standard used to determine the
   existence of a fact in the subsequent suit is identical to—or more demanding
   than—that of the prior proceeding. 3
           Here, the ADA is the more demanding standard: “To establish a
   claim for disability discrimination, in the education context, something more
   than a mere failure to provide the FAPE required by IDEA must be shown.” 4
   As the district court carefully explained, “all of the accommodations that
   Lartigue claims the School District failed to provide were in some way
   associated with its obligation to provide a FAPE.” For Lartigue to prevail on
   the theories of liability advanced in her ADA claim, the district court would
   have to hold, implicitly, that NISD denied Lartigue a FAPE. But that would
   require the district court to ignore the administrative hearing officer’s final
   determinations, which bind Lartigue. See Powers, 951 F.3d at 310. Conse-
   quently, collateral estoppel bars her ADA claim.
           Lartigue could have pursued claims under the Rehabilitation Act or
   the ADA that are “predicated on other theories of liability,” and those would

           _____________________
           2
               In Pace, a “more demanding” accessibility standard would lower the bar for
   liability in the ADA claim relative to the IDEA claim.
           3
            And that only makes common sense. Say there are three rides at an amusement
   park: Riders must be 4 feet tall for Rides A and B; 5 feet for Ride C. A kid who is too short
   for Ride A is obviously too short for Rides B and C.
           4
             Estate of Lance v. Lewisville Indep. Sch. Dist., 743 F.3d 982, 995 (5th Cir. 2014)
   (quoting D.A. ex rel. Latasha A. v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 629 F.3d 450, 454 (5th Cir. 2010))
   (cleaned up); see also Delano-Pyle v. Victoria Cnty., 302 F.3d 567, 575 (5th Cir. 2002)
   (requiring intentional discrimination to recover compensatory damages under Title II of
   the ADA).

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                                           No. 22-50854

   not be “precluded by a determination that the student has been provided an
   IDEA FAPE.” Lance, 743 F.3d at 993. 5 But she did not pursue them.
   Instead, her theories of liability under the ADA all rely on the premise that
   NISD did not provide her with a FAPE. That includes her assertion that
   NISD’s failure to provide CARTS for her debate activity is a non-FAPE
   related accommodation. 6            Not only was the CARTS accommodation
   “undeniably part of a student’s academic experience” and thus part of her
   FAPE claim, but, as the district court said, she “raise[d] her CARTS request

           _____________________
           5
            For example, “a peer-on-peer harassment claim is not necessarily predicated on
   the denial of FAPE.” Lance, 743 F.3d at 993.
           6
             Plaintiff’s reply brief implies the hearing officer did not determine whether NISD
   adequately provided CART services for Lartigue’s debate competition. According to the
   brief, the hearing officer found that “Lartigue received the requisite educational benefit
   because she ‘was still able to participate in [other] debate competitions and other
   extracurricular activities.’” There’s only one problem—the briefing badly misrepresents
   the record. Here’s what the hearing officer actually said:
              The ARD Committee was not aware Student would require CART
           services to participate in Congress debate during the May 2018 ARD
           meeting. That need arose during the fall of 2018. The ARD Committee
           convened and approved CART services in November 2018 after the need
           arose. Student began using the CART services in January 2019 and even
           participated in Congress debate competitions in the spring. Throughout
           that time, Student was participating in competitions in two other forms of
           debate with two ASL interpreters provided by the District present. She
           also participated in other extracurricular activities—including volleyball,
           JROTC, and she started a sign language club—with the assistance of ASL
           interpreters provided by the District.
               The ARD Committee adjusted Student’s IEP once it knew of the need
           to do so. Even if it had not, Student was still able to participate in debate
           competitions and other extracurricular activities without the use of CART
           services “to the extent required to confer educational benefit,” a fact
           conceded by Petitioner. See Rettig v. Kent City Sch. Dist., 788 F.2d 328,
           332 (6th Cir. 1986). Thus, the District fulfilled its responsibilities in regard
           to the debate competition specifically and extracurricular activities more
           generally.

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                                    No. 22-50854

   in her administrative hearing—and the hearing officer found the School
   District’s response to her request to be consistent with its FAPE
   obligations.” In sum, all of Lartigue’s ADA theories of liability depend on
   NISD’s denying her a FAPE.
                                   * * * * *
          The district court’s conclusion was correct, but its reasoning was not.
   Lartigue’s ADA claim should be dismissed with prejudice because it is barred
   by collateral estoppel. Section 1415(l) has nothing to do with the disposition
   of this case.
          Because this court should use an alternate ground and affirm the
   summary judgment, I respectfully dissent.

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