Court Opinion

ID: 9398750
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-01 00:03:45.538523+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:36.025520
License: Public Domain

Filed 5/31/23 Dhillon v. Mangat CA1/4

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                  DIVISION FOUR

 PREET DHILLON,
         Plaintiff and Respondent,                                     A162994
                           v.                                          (Alameda County Super. Ct.
 JASJIT MANGAT,                                                        No. HF19011485)
         Defendant and Appellant.

                                       MEMORANDUM OPINION1
         Defendant Jasjit Mangat (the former husband of plaintiff Preet
Dhillon) appeals a trial court order renewing and making permanent a
domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) protecting Dhillon and the
parties’ children from Mangat. Mangat principally contends the court erred
by denying his requests for (1) a continuance of the renewal hearing, and
(2) an evidentiary hearing on the renewal request. We affirm.

       We resolve this case by a memorandum opinion pursuant to the
         1

California Standards of Judicial Administration, section 8.1.

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                                     I.
      The record reveals the following.2 The trial court (Hon. Victor
Rodriguez) entered the initial DVRO on May 13, 2019, for a term of two
years. Prior to entering the DVRO, the court considered testimony and
declarations from the parties, as well as in camera testimony from their then
13-year-old daughter. There was evidence that Mangat verbally, emotionally,
and physically abused Dhillon and the parties’ daughter. The DVRO entered
by the court prohibited Mangat from contacting Dhillon, temporarily
suspended his contact with the parties’ daughter, and allowed professionally
supervised visitation between Mangat and the parties’ then two-year-old son.
      On April 9, 2021, Dhillon filed a request to renew the DVRO, as well as
a supporting declaration setting forth alleged misconduct by Mangat. The
court (Hon. Somnath Raj Chatterjee) held a hearing on the request on May 3,
2021. Before and at the hearing, Mangat’s counsel requested that the court
continue the hearing date and hold an evidentiary hearing “at least for half a
day.” The court denied counsel’s requests, finding no good cause for a
continuance. The court noted an evidentiary record had been developed at
the 2019 hearing. The court stated in part: “There’s already been a trial.
There’s already been a hearing on the petition. The facts are known, and the
papers were served timely here. And the Court doesn’t see good cause for
continuance.”

      2 The appellate record includes clerk’s and reporter’s transcripts. In
addition, in November 2022, this court granted Mangat’s motion to augment
the record with materials in a supplemental appendix that he submitted with
his opening brief. We deny Mangat’s more recent motion to augment the
record and request for judicial notice, in which he sought to augment the
record with materials in a proposed supplemental appendix that he
submitted with his reply brief.

                                      2
         The court did allow Mangat to testify, telling Mangat’s counsel: “If you
want to get some evidence from your client, that’s fine. There’s been no
declaration provided, but I’ll hear what you have to present and after that I
will consider whether I will allow any examination of [Dhillon].” Following
direct examination of Mangat by his counsel (and the court having received
Dhillon’s declaration), the court determined there was no need for further
questioning of either party, stating, “I’m not going to open this up to cross-
examination by either side. I am ready to move forward and I am ready to
rule.”
         The court granted Dhillon’s request to renew the DVRO, concluding
Dhillon had met her burden to show a “reasonable apprehension of future
abuse.” The court stated: “Given the facts set forth in her declaration as well
as the testimony from [Mangat] the Court’s going to grant a permanent
restraining order after hearing. [¶] The allegations, the assertions—in the
underlying restraining order were quite serious, the facts set forth in the
request for renewal are quite serious and the testimony from [Mangat] shows
to me that he doesn’t understand the seriousness of this, including the
essential denial of the basis of the underlying restraining order. [¶] The
Court is going to grant the permanent restraining order after hearing.”
         Mangat appealed the court’s order renewing the DVRO.
                                       II.
         A court has discretion to renew a DVRO on the request of a party,
“either for five or more years, or permanently,” “without a showing of further
abuse since the issuance of the original order.” (Fam. Code, § 6345,
subd. (a).) Renewal is appropriate if the court finds “the protected party
entertains a ‘reasonable apprehension’ of future abuse” (Ritchie v. Konrad

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(2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 1275, 1290), a finding the court made here at the
conclusion of the May 3, 2021 hearing.
      Mangat contends the court erred by denying his requests for a
continuance and for an evidentiary hearing. We disagree. First, the court
did not abuse its discretion by declining to continue the hearing. (Qaadir v.
Figueroa (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 790, 814 [denial of trial continuance is
reviewed for abuse of discretion].)3 The court reasonably could conclude that,
based on the 2019 record and the additional evidence it permitted in the
May 3, 2021 hearing, it had a sufficient basis to determine whether the
“reasonable apprehension” standard was met.
      Rule 3.1332 of the California Rules of Court (rule 3.1332), cited by
Mangat, does not require the court to grant a continuance. Rule 3.1332
states that trial dates are “firm” (rule 3.1332(a)) and that continuances are
“disfavored” and require a showing of “good cause” (rule 3.1332(c)). Mangat
asserts good cause was present and a continuance was appropriate because
he wanted to gather more evidence, because the attorney representing him at
the May 3 hearing was not his lead counsel, or because other factors
supported delay (see rule 3.1332(c)(3), (6), (d)). But as discussed, in the
posture of this case, the court reasonably could conclude a continuance was
not warranted.
      Second, we reject Mangat’s suggestion that the court violated statutory
requirements governing the receipt of live testimony contained in Family
Code section 217 and California Rules of Court, rule 5.113. The court allowed
Mangat to present his own live testimony. Mangat did not submit a list of

      3The trial court concluded Family Code section 245, subdivision (a)
(which requires a continuance in certain circumstances) did not apply to a
request for renewal of a restraining order, and Mangat does not challenge
that ruling on appeal.

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nonparty witnesses describing their anticipated testimony. (Fam. Code,
§ 217, subd. (c); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.113(b)(5).) And as discussed, the
court was not required to continue the hearing to allow testimony on a later
date.
        Finally, since we find the court acted properly and within its discretion,
we reject Mangat’s contentions that the court violated due process or that its
alleged errors resulted in a miscarriage of justice.4
                                 DISPOSITION
        The May 3, 2021 order renewing the DVRO and making it permanent
is affirmed. Dhillon shall recover costs on appeal, if any.

                                                        STREETER, P.J.

WE CONCUR:

GOLDMAN, J.
WHITMAN, J.*

       Mangat suggests that, once the court decided to renew the DVRO, it
        4

should have renewed it for a period of five years rather than permanently.
We need not address this undeveloped argument (Meridian Financial
Services, Inc. v. Phan (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 657, 684), but we note the court
has discretion as to the length of a renewal (Fam. Code, § 6345, subd. (a)),
and in any event, a renewal remains subject to modification or termination
on motion of a party (ibid.).
       Judge of the Superior Court of California, County of Alameda,
        *

assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

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