Court Opinion

ID: 9589779
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:48:36.711399+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:04.210508
License: Public Domain

Nichols, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
The Act authorizing the appointment of a special master to make findings and report to the trial judge does not confer upon him the authority vested in superior courts by the Constitution (Code Ann. § 2-3901) to grant affirmative equitable relief.
It has been held many times by this court that equitable jurisdiction in this state is conferred upon the superior courts and not upon the judges thereof, and that judges sitting in vacation were not courts of equity. Code § 37-101. Arrington v. Cherry, 10 Ga. 429 (2) (1851); Webb v. Hicks, 117 Ga. 335 (43 SE 738) (1903); Morehead v. Allen, 131 Ga. 807 (63 SE 507) (1908);Powell v. Heyman, 143 Ga. 728 (85 SE 891) (1915); Ethridge v. Pitts, 152 Ga. 1, 8 (108 *367SE 543) (1921); Humber v. Garrard, 205 Ga. 357, 359 (53 SE2d 748) (1949).
To hold that a special master has the authority under the statutory quia timet Act to grant affirmative equitable relief would be an unconstitutional application of the statute. This court has held many times that in interpreting a statute, one of which would be constitutional and one unconstitutional, the constitutional interpretation should be preferred. To allow the special master to clothe himself with the equitable jurisdiction conferred on the superior courts by the Constitution would be an unconstitutional application of the statute.
I respectfully dissent from the judgment of affirmance in this case.