Court Opinion

ID: 9578008
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:40:34.345671+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:22:19.235686
License: Public Domain

Krivosha, C.J.,
dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent. I do so on the very narrow ground that I believe it error to declare as a matter of law that “it is an abuse of the trial court’s discretion under [Neb. Rev. Stat.] § 42-372 [(Reissue 1984)] to set aside a dissolution decree, properly entered, on the sole basis that notice of hearing was not sent to the party in default of filing any pleading or entering an appearance in the case.” The use of the term “discretion” *268implies that a hard-and-fast rule cannot be invoked. See Pettegrew v. Pettegrew, 128 Neb. 783, 260 N.W. 287 (1935). To therefore suggest that while the rule cannot be hard and fast, the evidence of its abuse can be, is not itself a good rule for this court to adopt. I believe that to be true, particularly in view of the fact that we have said that “[i]n this jurisdiction the law is established that courts of general jurisdiction possess inherent power to vacate or modify their own judgments at any time during the term at which they were pronounced.” (Emphasis supplied.) Gasper v. Mazur, 155 Neb. 856, 859, 54 N.W.2d 66, 68 (1952). See, also, Meier v. Nelsen, 156 Neb. 666, 57 N.W.2d 273 (1953); Lyman v. Dunn, 125 Neb. 770, 252 N.W. 197 (1934); Bradley v. Slater, 58 Neb. 554, 78 N.W. 1069 (1899).
Appellate courts generally consider an abuse of discretion to occur when the act of the trial court was clearly untenable or unreasonable, if its action clearly amounts to a denial of justice, or if clearly against justice or conscience, reason and evidence. See Pettegrew v. Pettegrew, supra. See, also, Mabry v. Mudd, 132 Neb. 610, 272 N.W. 574 (1937). That is a matter of fact to be decided in each case, on a case-by-case basis.
As we observed recently in Guggenmos v. Guggenmos, 218 Neb. 746, 748, 359 N.W.2d 87, 90 (1984):
A review to determine whether an abuse of discretion has taken place is much narrower. Although an abuse of discretion does not imply an improper motive, willful purpose, or intentional wrong, it does require the reasons or rulings of the trial judge to be clearly untenable and to deprive a party of a substantial right such as to amount to a denial of justice.
While I do not, by dissenting, in any manner condone the practice followed by the appellee in this case, and do not mean by dissenting to suggest that I approve of a party’s failing to file an appropriate pleading and then seeking to have a judgment set aside, I do, however, mean to imply that that is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court. Had the trial court in the instant case refused to set aside the judgment, I would have likewise supported that view. I simply believe that establishing a flat rule to dictate when and how a trial judge should exercise his or her discretion is inappropriate. For that *269reason I would have affirmed the action of the trial judge in setting aside the default judgment and permitting the case to be heard on the merits.