Court Opinion

ID: 9905776
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-30 15:05:18.447169+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:52.873224
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

                       COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

                                 APPEALS COURT

                                                  22-P-1134

                                  COMMONWEALTH

                                       vs.

                              VICTOR M. VASQUEZ.

               MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

       A District Court jury convicted the defendant of possession

 of child pornography in violation of G. L. c. 272, § 29C.                The

 images at issue were discovered on the defendant's computer

 pursuant to the execution of a search warrant.             On appeal, the

 defendant argues that the affidavit submitted in support of the

 search warrant failed to establish probable cause to believe

 that child pornography would be found on a computer in his home.

 In addition, he claims error in the admission at trial of

 certain evidence regarding his Web browser and search histories.

 We affirm.

       1.   Search warrant.      The search warrant was issued based on

 a detailed affidavit that explained how the police came to

 believe that child pornography likely could be found on a

 computer at the defendant's home.           In February of 2019, the
search engine known as Microsoft Bing sent a report, known as a

CyberTipline report, to the National Center for Missing and

Exploited Children (NCMEC) about a suspected incident of child

pornography involving a particular Internet Protocol (IP)

address.   NCMEC in turn forwarded the CyberTipline report to the

State police.

     According to the CyberTipline report, someone at the

referenced IP address had uploaded an image of a naked child

while using a feature of Bing known as BingImage Visual Search

(BingImage).    BingImage is designed to allow users to search for

images that are similar to ones uploaded by the user and

therefore already in the user's possession.     Based on the

description of the image, there is little question that the

affidavit established that possession of it was unlawful. 1

Further police investigation, which included an administrative

warrant served on the relevant Internet service provider,

uncovered that the IP address referenced in the CyberTipline

report belonged to the defendant.     On October 21, 2019, the

1 The affidavit states that the image "depicts a nude . . .
prepubescent female positioned on her hands and knees, on the
floor. The child's legs are spread apart exposing her vagina
and anus." Based on that description, the image appears to
qualify as child pornography, which includes any images
"involving a lewd exhibition of the unclothed genitals" of a
child. G. L. c. 272, § 29C.

                                  2
State police applied for a search warrant of the home at which

the defendant lived, and they executed the warrant that day.

     The defendant's challenge to the search warrant is limited:

he argues only that the information on which the warrant relied

was stale.   In other words, the defendant claims that even if

the police had probable cause to believe that child pornography

had been on his computer in February of 2019 when the

CyberTipline report was generated, they did not have probable

cause to believe it would still be there some eight months later

when they applied for the search warrant.   For the reasons that

follow, we disagree.

     As the defendant acknowledges in his brief, where the

Commonwealth can demonstrate that someone is "interested in"

child pornography, then information that that person is in

possession of child pornography does not become stale even with

the passage of several months.   See Commonwealth v. Guastucci,

486 Mass. 22, 29-30 (2020) (information that defendant uploaded

child pornography to Skype not stale even with passage of seven

months).   That the information is not stale is based on "the

belief that individuals who are interested in child pornography

are likely to collect and retain such images in the privacy of

their own homes."   Id. at 29, citing United States v. Irving,

452 F.3d 110, 125 (2d Cir. 2006), S.C., 554 F.3d 64 (2d Cir.

2009).   The question then, as it was in Guastucci, is whether

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the search warrant affidavit sufficiently established that the

defendant was a collector of child pornography and did not

obtain the image by accident.

     Guastucci, 486 Mass. at 30-31, provides numerous

nonexclusive examples of how the Commonwealth can demonstrate

that someone is "interested in" child pornography.   The

defendant highlights the absence of evidence here regarding the

enumerated examples.   For instance, he emphasizes that there was

no evidence that the defendant previously had been identified as

a pedophile.   As the Supreme Judicial Court has recognized,

however, "in some circumstances, a reasonable inference that a

suspect is 'interested in' child pornography might be drawn

based on a single incident of possession or receipt of child

pornography where, for example, the images were obtained through

'a series of sufficiently complicated steps' suggesting a

'willful intention to view the files,' or where the suspect

redistributed the file to others."   Id. at 31, quoting United

States v. Raymonda, 780 F.3d 105, 115 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,

577 U.S. 968 (2015).   "Thus, an inference that an individual is

a collector of child pornography 'proceed[s] from circumstances

suggesting that [the suspect] accessed those images willfully

and deliberately, actively seeking them out to satisfy a

preexisting predilection.'"   Guastucci, supra, quoting Raymonda,

supra.

                                 4
     To assess whether the showing here was sufficient to meet

that standard, we turn to the particular details regarding how

the CyberTipline report was generated.   According to the

affidavit, there are three different ways in which an action

taken by a BingImage user could generate a CyberTipline report:

     "First, the user did a reverse image search by uploading
     the image to Bing. Second, the user input a URL [Uniform
     Resource Locator, that is, a Web address,] into the
     BingImage search that specifically links to a contraband
     image or video. Or third, the user clicked on the share
     button on an illegal image they found using BingImage."

As we read the affidavit, it is not clear which of these three

potential actions the person using the IP address took with

respect to the illegal image.   We address each in turn.

     Based on what the image that triggered the CyberTipline

report depicted, see note 1, supra, the nature of it as child

pornography would have been apparent to anyone who possessed it.

See Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 82 Mass. App. Ct. 293, 302-307

(2012) (describing what constitutes "lewd" image of naked

child).   Although the search warrant affidavit does not reveal

how the person using BingImage originally came into possession

of the image, if that user had uploaded the image into a search

engine designed to provide users with similar images, that would

be enough to show the user's "willful intention" to possess such

images.   The same is true if -- instead of uploading the

offending image itself -- the person had entered an image-

                                 5
specific URL assigned to it.    Finally, if someone in possession

of such an image had taken steps to share the image with others,

that itself indicates an interest in child pornography.

Accordingly, even though we do not know what specific action the

user here took that triggered the report, any of the three

possibilities was sufficient to demonstrate the user's interest

in child pornography.

      Of course, even where an interest in child pornography has

been demonstrated, the Commonwealth cannot delay a search

forever.    As the Supreme Judicial Court has put it, "Every

investigation, including the possession and distribution of

child pornography, has a shelf life."    Guastucci, 486 Mass. at

30.   However, the delay here was less than eight months, which

was only slightly longer than the seven-month delay in

Guastucci, supra at 23.    Although we acknowledge that the

Guastucci court warned that a "delay of seven months may be at

the outer limit in these circumstances," id. at 27, we do not

find the slightly longer period here dictates a different

result.    Accordingly, we conclude that the motion judge did not

err in rejecting the defendant's argument that the information

provided in the report to NCMEC was stale.

      2.   Search and website browsing histories.   At trial, the

Commonwealth offered evidence that the defendant had an

extensive history of searching for child pornography on his

                                  6
computer and of visiting websites that -- based on their names -

- likely contained it.   For example, there was evidence that

around 2:30 A.M. on November 29, 2018, the defendant used Bing

to search for "Ls Nude RU Girls Budding." 2   On appeal, the

defendant argues that such evidence amounted to improper

propensity evidence and that, in any event, its potential for

undue prejudice outweighed any probative value.    Because the

defendant did not object to such evidence at trial, our review

is limited to whether any error in the admission of such

evidence caused a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.

Commonwealth v. McCoy, 456 Mass. 838, 845-846 (2010).

     Although evidence of prior bad acts may not be admitted

"for the purpose of showing [a defendant's] bad character or

propensity to commit the crime charged, . . . [s]uch

conduct . . . may be admissible for other purposes" such as

proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,

knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of knowledge.

Commonwealth v. Vera, 88 Mass. App. Ct. 313, 319 (2015), quoting

Commonwealth v. Copney, 468 Mass. 405, 412 (2014).    We agree

with the Commonwealth that evidence of the defendant's search

and Web browser histories had significant probative value.       For

2 There was testimony that "Ls" typically stands for "Lolita
series," and that "RU" stands for "Russian," where there is a
developed market for child pornography.

                                 7
one thing, such evidence made it more likely that it was the

defendant and not another who downloaded the child pornography

found on his computer.    Id. at 322.   For another, it made it

more likely that the downloading of the images was intentional,

not accidental.   See Commonwealth v. Coates, 89 Mass. App. Ct.

728, 738-739 (2016).    Had the defendant objected to such

evidence, the judge would not have abused his discretion by

admitting it.   It may be, as the defendant suggests, that faced

with such an objection, the judge might have placed some

quantitative limits on such evidence, but even if we were to

assume that the judge should have done so sua sponte, we would

not find that such error created a substantial risk of a

miscarriage of justice.    The evidence of the defendant's guilt

was overwhelming.    Not only was child pornography found on his

personal computer to which no one else had access, 3 but the

defendant admitted to the police that he regularly downloaded

such images there.    We are confident that the jury's verdict

3 The defendant lived alone with his mother who testified that
she never used his computer. During his interview with the
police, which was admitted in evidence and played for the jury,
the defendant stated that he never left the house and that only
he knew the password to his wireless network.

                                  8
would have been the same even if the defendant's search and Web

browser histories had been limited, or even excluded altogether. 4

                                      Judgment affirmed.

                                      By the Court (Vuono, Milkey &
                                        Hand, JJ. 5),

                                      Clerk

Entered:    November 30, 2023.

4 We recognize that had he requested it, the defendant would have
been entitled to an instruction that his search and browser
history evidence could not be used as propensity evidence.
However, the judge had no duty to provide such a limiting
instruction sua sponte. See Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 436 Mass.
799, 809 (2002). In any event, the absence of such an
instruction did not create a substantial risk of a miscarriage
of justice.

5   The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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