Court Opinion

ID: 9669714
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:07:00.983253+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:59.887455
License: Public Domain

SABERS, Justice
(dissenting).
I dissent.
I would reverse because trial counsel’s conduct (1) constituted ineffective assistance of counsel and (2) prejudiced the defendant. Jones v. State, 353 N.W.2d 781 (S.D.1984); Loop v. Solem, 398 N.W.2d 140 (S.D.1986).
Trial counsel wholly failed to object to hearsay testimony concerning the alleged threat and erred in respect to jury instructions. Far more important and prejudicial was his inconsistent handling of defendant’s involvement with drugs.
First, counsel properly asked the trial court to exclude all such testimony. Although no ruling was made, the court indicated general agreement with that proposition. Despite that, defense counsel either allowed evidence of drug activity into the record without objection or actually elicited it himself. Substantial testimony of defendant’s drug involvement, including hearsay, came before the jury without objection. The final act of desperation was to attempt to impeach the State’s main witness, Chad Lund, by showing that the debt was owed for a motorcycle not for drugs. I submit this “impeached” the defense, not the State’s witness.
The State attempts to condone this deficient performance as “defense strategy.” Defense strategy must be reasonably credible. To be reasonably credible, the plan and the execution of the plan must be reasonably consistent. It also helps to avoid undue prejudice. Here, prejudicial activity was invited, welcomed, and even used in an impeachment attempt — despite a pretrial motion to completely prohibit its admission. Finally, counsel’s performance was prejudicially deficient under all tests, including the majority’s. Jones, supra; Loop, supra; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).