Court Opinion

ID: 9731581
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:50:24.385625+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:19.676989
License: Public Domain

BENSON, J., Concurring and Dissenting.
I dissent only to that portion of the majority opinion which remands to the trial court for the purpose of conducting a hearing on appellant’s motion for appointment of counsel to assist in sentencing. In my judgment the motion was heard by the trial court, considered, and judicial discretion properly exercised in denying appellant’s request.
While I might be more sympathetic to a convicted in propria persona criminal defendant who unconditionally seeks the guidance of counsel in the complicated area of posttrial sentencing, that is not the situation before this court. Here request for assistance was conditioned on the court appointment of any lawyer other than Richard Keyes.1 In effect appellant is asserting a veto over the court’s discretionary power to appoint counsel, an incursion which cannot be condoned.
The record provides no basis, in law or fact, justifying appellant’s arbitrary, whimsical rejection of attorney Keyes as counsel to assist on posttrial sentencing issues. On five separate occasions appellant’s Marsden challenges *1129to the adequacy of Keyes representation were heard by the trial court and rejected. (People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 [84 Cal.Rptr. 156, 465 P.2d 44].) Indeed, at the fourth Marsden hearing appellant acknowledged “he had been trying to get rid of his lawyer ‘not because he was incompetent’ but because appellant felt he was not interested in the case and had done nothing to help gain confidence in him.” Whatever imagined shortcomings appellant may have perceived with respect to Keyes’s representation before and during trial certainly were not germane to Keyes’s ability to provide legal assistance on sentencing issues.
Keyes’ knowledge of the case, acquired during his trial preparation over a 10-month span would have provided valuable insight on the sentencing issues to appellant’s benefit. On the other hand, appointment of new counsel would substantially increase the time and cost required to fully educate a lawyer unfamiliar with the proceeding. I see no good reason why the taxpayers should be required to subsidize a proceeding occasioned by appellant’s fanciful intransigence.
Appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied June 27, 1991. Kennard, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

 The statement to Judge DeLarios is as follows: “I’m not making new trial motion here today. I’m requesting 60 days continuance and court appoint me a lawyer to advise me on the sentencing procedure and to assist me in the new trial motion. I promise that I will work with any lawyer that the court appointments [s/c] other than Richard Keyes, and I point out to the court that it was only with the utmost reluctance that I became pro per.” (Italics added.)