Court Opinion

ID: 9759967
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:36:15.401022+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:06.853245
License: Public Domain

Robert H. Dudley, Justice, dissenting. While the appellant was intoxicated in his own home, a deputy sheriff knocked on the front door and said the police wanted to question him. It is undisputed that the police had neither an arrest warrant nor a search warrant and did not have probable cause for either type of warrant. Appellant was taken to the police station and, after more than an hour, was arrested for being drunk in a public place, the police station. In his shirt pocket one of the officers found a #6 shot .20 gauge yellow W & W shotgun shell. The public drunkenness charge was dismissed. The trial court refused to suppress the shell as evidence in the case before us. The ruling was erroneous and prejudicial. I would reverse. The Fourth Amendment gives greatest protection to a person in the sanctity of his home. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980). This appellant was in his home and the state admitted that he was not even a suspect in the case before us, Appellant was not warned that he had no obligation to go to the police station. See A.R.Cr.P. Rule 2.3. A state policeman testified “ ... he was being detained against his will for questioning and we asked him, we asked him to come in for questioning and he didn’t tell us no, but, yes sir, we had him there. As a practical matter I did not ask him to come in for questioning as I sent a deputy out to pick him up.” This seizure of the person was either an arrest or an investigatory stop. For the purpose of discussing the issue, the distinction does not matter, for investigatory stops, just as arrests, are subject to the restraints imposed by the Fourth Amendment. Here, appellant was unreasonably seized at his home and, unless there was some intervening act by appellant which justified his arrest, the seizure of the shotgun shell was constitutionally impermissible. The state has not proven that appellant committed some new and intervening offense for which he could be validly arrested. Deputy Sheriff Ellenburg, who caused appellant to be arrested for public intoxication, testified as follows: Q. And he was at the Sheriff’s Office because you had sent somebody, Deputy Rowe, I believe to pick him up, is that correct? A. That’s correct. Q. Can you describe Nathan’s condition when he arrived at the Sheriff’s Department? A. Ah, yes, sir. Q. Would you do so. A. He, ah, that night Nathan was intoxicated. The next morning when he was brought in, ah, you could still see the affects [sic] of, ah, of being intoxicated. If I’ve explained myself. Q. All right. In other words he was more than just hung over he was still kind of intoxicated when . . . when he came into the Sheriff’s Office, was he not? A. Ah, to a certain degree, yes, sir. Q. Then your .. . your testimony was he .. . when he arrived he was kind of intoxicated but while he was there he drank some more and became intoxicated? A. Yes, sir. Q. And he was not there of his own choosing? A. No, sir. Q. You had .. . you had him there ... he was there at your request, is that correct? A. Yes, sir. That’s correct. Q. And then you ... because he was intoxicated there at the Sheriff’s Office you placed him under arrest for public intoxication, or that Deputy Simpson did. A. Yes, sir. Thus, the state has only proven that appellant was intoxicated “to a certain degree” when he was illegally seized at his home and “became intoxicated” while unwillingly and unlawfully being detained at the police station. He committed no new or intervening offense. He only continued the same conduct. P. A. Hollingsworth, Justice, dissenting. I dissent from the Court’s affirmance of this case. Appellant was in the privacy of his home when he was taken into custody by the deputy sheriff. The deputy who ordered appellant picked up was the uncle of the victim in this homicide. Because of this relationship, I'assume the unlawful police conduct was carried on throughout the investigation of the homicide. In Bolden v. State, 262 Ark. 718, 516 S.W.2d 281 (1978), we stated: Rule 8.1 is designed and has as its purpose to afford an arrestee protection against unfounded invasion of liberty and privacy. Moreover, the person under arrest taken before a judicial officer without unnecessary delay will have the charged [sic] explained, will be advised of his constitutional rights, and will have counsel appointed for him if an indigent, and arrangements for bail can be made expeditiously. Such action may avoid the loss of the suspect’s job and eliminate the prospect of the loss of income and the disruption and impairment of his family relationship. Indeed, these are basic and fundamental rights which our state and federal constitutions secure to every arrestee. Hence, we conclude that Rulé 8.1 is mandatory in its scope. The case at bar presents no circumstances that require us to retreat from this clear mandate. All custodial statements should be suppressed. The other evidence should have been suppressed also because it was obtained illegally. The Exclusionary Rule has been emasculated by the U.S. Supreme Court but not obliterated. I am not convinced that the facts of this case at bar comply with the latest pronouncement on the Exclusionary Rule from our highest Court. In Nix v. Williams, _ U.S. _, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984), the U.S. Supreme Court reiterated: Reversed and Remanded November 5, 1984 678 S.W.2d 772 The case rationale consistently advanced by this Court for extending the Exclusionary Rule to evidence that is the fruit of unlawful police conduct has been that this admittedly drastic and socially costly course is needed to deter police from violations of constitutional and statutory protections. This Court has accepted the argument that the way to ensure such protections is to exclude evidence seized as a result of such violations notwithstanding the high social cost of letting persons obviously guilty go unpunished for their crimes. We should not retreat from these legal principles that are well established. I would reverse.