Court Opinion

ID: 9494620
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:42:27.823678+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:56:31.138725
License: Public Domain

WARDLAW, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
First, I note my agreement with the majority on its reversal of the district court’s grant of JMOL on Winarto’s claims under California Civil Code §§ 51.7, 52(b), and 52.1, and with its affirmance of the district court on the FEHA disability claim. Where I part company with the majority is on its reversal of the district court’s grant of JMOL on Winarto’s claim of retaliatory discharge.
In 1995, Toshiba determined that a firm-wide reduction in force was necessary. Winarto was identified as one of the employees to be laid off because (i) her department would be required to lay off one employee and (ii) in the previous year, 1994, she received the lowest performance evaluation scores in her department. After she was so identified, but before the final decision was made, Winarto filed a written claim of race, national origin, and sex discrimination. Toshiba’s Human Resources Department investigated the claim and found it meritless. Thereafter, on March 31, 1995, Toshiba notified Winarto that she would be among those laid off. The majority reverses the district court’s grant of JMOL on Winarto’s ensuing claim of retaliatory discharge, stating that the district court “misapplied the standard of review of post-verdict motions for” JMOL.
I disagree. Not only did the district court recite the correct standard for rendering JMOL under Rule 50, but, unlike the majority, it actually applied it. See Major League Baseball Players Ass’n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 121 S.Ct. 1724, 1728, 149 L.Ed.2d 740 (2001) (“To be sure the Court of Appeals here recited these principles, but its application of them is nothing short of baffling.”). Moreover, the majority does here exactly what the Supreme Court frowned upon in another recent opinion: it has drawn inferences contrary to the uncontradicted and unimpeached evidence in the record to build “a whole edifice of alleged harassment and retaliation.” 1 See Breeden, 121 S.Ct. at 1511.
First, let us be clear as to what the jury did not find in its 26-question special verdict. It did not find Toshiba or any of Winarto’s individual co-workers or supervisors liable for sexual harassment, harassment based on race or national origin, or sexual discrimination. It did not find either Toshiba or Roger Taylor liable for discrimination based on race or national origin. It did not find that Winarto suffered a disability that limited her ability to participate in major life activities. It did, *1294however, find (i) Toshiba and Taylor Hable for discriminating against Winarto based on her back and ankle injuries; (ii) Toshiba and Birtch liable for “inflicting violence or intimidation in the workplace because of [ ] Winarto’s race, national, origin or sex,” in violation of §§ 51.7, 52(b) and 52.1 of the California Civil Code; (iii) Taylor Hable for aiding and abetting in the infliction of that violence; (iv) Toshiba and Taylor liable for retaHatory termination in response to Win-arto’s complaint to Toshiba’s Human Resources department; and (v) malice, oppression, or fraud in their conduct. The jury awarded Winarto $95,000 in compensatory damages but could not agree on a punitive damages award. It is only the jury findings of discrimination based on back and ankle injuries (perceived as a disability), discriminatory workplace violence, and retaHatory termination that the district court set aside as unreasonable under Rule 50.
It is appropriate to review in full the Supreme Court’s recent statement as to the standard for granting JMOL under Rule 50. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000). JMOL is appropriate “when ‘a party has been fully heard on an issue and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue.’ ” Id. at 149, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a)). When reviewing the record as a whole, “the court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party,” keeping in mind that “ ‘[credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge.’ ” Id. at 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). Thus, the Supreme Court explained, when deciding a Rule 50 motion, the court “must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe. That is, the court should give credence to the evidence favoring the non-movant as weU as that evidence supporting the moving party that is uncontradicted and unimpeached, at least to the extent that that evidence comes from disinterested witnesses.” Id. at 151, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (internal quotation and citations omitted).
The district court did exactly that. It relied on aU the legitimate inferences that could be drawn in favor of Winarto based on the uncontroverted evidence in the record and still found that, as a matter of law, Winarto had failed to establish a prima facie case of either retaliation or disability discrimination. The majority, on the other hand, disregards the uncontroverted and unimpeached evidence on the record, instead indulging in its own speculation as to what a “reasonable juror” might have thought. Only by freeing itself from the confines of what is supported by the record could the majority find the “evidence” of pretext it sought. Upon this hypothesized house of cards, the majority builds a case for Winarto that even Winarto did not make. As the Supreme Court recently warned us in no uncertain terms, “[t]his will not do.” Breeden, 121 S.Ct. at 1511.2 We are not permitted to hypothesize causal links between adverse employment decisions and protected actions or statuses.
*1295Because Toshiba’s reduction in force constituted a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating Winarto, see Sengupta v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., Inc., 804 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir.1986), the burden of persuasion of pretext shifted to Winarto. She had to demonstrate, whether from credible evidence already in the record or through additional evidence, see Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148, 120 S.Ct. 2097, that Toshiba terminated her in retaliation for her complaints and due to discrimination based on her disability — and not because it was otherwise engaged in the work force reduction. Pretext can be established in two ways: “(1) indirectly, by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is ‘unworthy of credence’ because it is internally inconsistent or otherwise not believable, or (2) directly, by showing that unlawful discrimination more likely motivated the employer.” Chuang v. Univ. of Cal. Davis, 225 F.3d 1115, 1127 (9th Cir.2000). Both of these methods have one critical factor in common — they require evidentiary support.
Even though Human Resources employee Trubey took sufficient steps to ensure that the final decision to lay off Winarto was not itself based on retaliatory motives, the majority finds pretext in the factors that contributed to the decision to terminate Winarto. The majority finds the ratings in Taylor’s 1994 performance review to be of particular significance. It concludes that the performance evaluations provided a legally sufficient basis for finding pretext because the jury could have found Winarto’s lower evaluation resulted from Taylor’s exasperation with Winarto’s legally protected complaints about her coworkers, and because her declining performance reviews were an important factor in the termination decision.
This is not a reasonable inference, however, when the uncontroverted evidence of the timing of the termination decision and the completion of the performance evaluation are also considered. Taylor completed Winarto’s evaluation in December, 1994. There is no evidence in the record that, at that time, Taylor knew Toshiba was going to downsize in 1995, that their department would be asked to reduce its head count by one, or that if he gave Winarto low scores she would be the one terminated. Not only does the majority draw an unreasonable inference here, it is one the jury could not make consistently with its own response to Question Nineteen in the special verdict form. There, the jury found that the protected conduct for which Winarto was allegedly terminated was Winarto’s “complaint to Toshiba’s Human Resources department.” This complaint was not filed until March, 1995, close to four months *1296after the 1994 evaluation was completed and close to three months after Winarto was recommended as a candidate for layoff during Toshiba’s downsizing in January, 1995. Thus, the majority’s unsupported hypothesis that Taylor gave Winarto low evaluation scores in retaliation for something that had yet to happen is patently unreasonable.
The majority sidesteps the central issue of the case — whether Toshiba terminated Winarto in a retaliatory manner — by focusing exclusively on Taylor’s evaluations and not on Trubey’s independent “Reduction In Force” (RIF) analysis. The uncon-troverted evidence demonstrates that the termination decision was made by individuals who had no knowledge of Winarto’s 1995 Human Resources complaint. Roger Taylor proposed Winarto as a likely candidate for layoff, but before any decisions were made, Trubey conducted the RIF analysis. Use of the RIF analysis ensured that Trubey, as a neutral observer, looked at the performance of various employees, what skills they had, whether their skills would be beneficial to the business, their ratings, and their ages to ensure that the best candidate for termination was selected and that there was no discrimination in the decision. Trubey reviewed all the members of the MIS department, including the members of Taylor’s team. However, as Trubey testified at trial, others in the department had “comparable, if not stronger software skills, and they had more flexibility.” Specifically, Winarto was criticized as being “very linear and very focused.... If a call came through to her, she would say Well, that’s not my product. Please call again.’ ”
Breeden does not allow us to make the inferential leap that the majority makes in connecting Taylor’s supposed discriminatory ratings with Toshiba’s later decision to terminate Winarto. Taylor’s evaluations, although relevant, do not prove discriminatory retaliation sufficient to show pretext in Trubey’s decision to terminate Winarto. Trubey’s decision was independently based on several other factors besides Winarto’s low evaluation scores, such as Winarto’s skill and experience. The uncontroverted evidence demonstrates that Winarto was given a full, fair, and independent consideration by Trubey. In fact, Toshiba terminated five other individuals3 along with Winarto for similar reasons. Uncontro-verted trial testimony revealed that Winar-to’s skills were no longer key because her responsibilities were absorbed by remaining teammates. No one was hired to replace Winarto. Because there was no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for the jury’s verdict, the district court did not err in granting JMOL.
As additional support for its finding of pretext, the majority relies on Winarto’s belief that Taylor resented her. Winarto’s opinion that, after she informed Taylor of her temporary lifting restrictions, he looked at her “rudely, angrily, and with such intensity that she almost ‘fell to the ground,’ ” cannot support this inference. Winarto’s perception of Taylor’s facial expressions is not evidence of Taylor’s discriminatory motive — it is only evidence of her impressions.
Nor do the comments contained in Win-arto’s 1994 evaluation support the majority’s finding of pretext. The majority concludes that Taylor’s observations that *1297Winarto “does not assume responsibility and help resolve conflicts” and needs to “improve teamwork with more participation and challenges” support the conclusion that Taylor’s explanations were “pre-textual as both unworthy of credence and likely motivated by unlawful retaliation.” There is no evidence in the record to support this inference, and as the Supreme Court held in Breeden, the mere fact that a particular inference is possible does not allow us to rely on it in deciding whether to grant JMOL. Breeden, 121 S.Ct. at 1511.
Winarto could show pretext by providing evidence that Toshiba did not terminate other employees who were similarly situated. See, e.g., Shapolia v. Los Alamos Nat’l Lab., 992 F.2d 1033, 1039 (10th Cir.1993) (poor evaluations are not enough to establish pretext unless the plaintiff can show direct evidence of discriminatory retaliation). But she presented no such evidence to the district court. Faced with declining profits, Toshiba was forced to lower its operating costs by reducing its workforce. The entire department of Documentation and Training was eliminated, and a number of other departments, including Winarto’s Management Information Systems Department (“MIS”), were asked to reduce their head count by one. Not only did Winarto have the lowest performance evaluations in her department, but, unlike each of her co-workers, Winar-to possessed no unique skill that made her irreplaceable. Although Winarto received praise for her efforts in 1994, ramming skills were no longer essential to the MIS department, so it is speculative to assume, as does the majority, that even if Winarto’s scores were higher, she would not have been laid off due to her current lack of skills.
Lastly, the majority relies on Winarto’s argument that she was discriminatorily denied the opportunity to attend training seminars as further evidence that the evaluation scores were pretextual. The uncon-troverted evidence, however, demonstrates that Winarto attended four training seminars. She was not allowed to attend only those seminars for which she was unqualified or that focused on duties unrelated to her own. There was no evidence that the rejection of these seminar requests was a pretext for discrimination.
Because, as the district court concluded, there is no evidence in the record that Winarto was terminated in retaliation for her complaint to the Human Resources Department and, indeed, Winarto’s own undisputed testimony establishes that her discrimination and harassment complaint was fully and appropriately investigated, I would affirm the district court’s grant of Toshiba’s Rule 50 motion as to retaliatory discharge.
I would therefore affirm the district court’s judgment on all claims except liability under California Civil Code §§ 51.7, 52(b) and 52.1.

. This language is borrowed from Judge Fernandez’s dissent from the unpublished panel decision in Breeden v. Clark County School District, 232 F.3d 893 (9th Cir.2000), which was reversed by the United States Supreme Court in Clark County School District v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 121 S.Ct. 1508, 149 L.Ed.2d 509 (2001) (per curiam).

. In Clark County School District v. Breeden, Shirley Breeden claimed that she was transferred in retaliation for filing charges against Clark County School District with the Nevada Equal Rights Commission and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), and for filing her federal lawsuit. Breeden, 121 S.Ct. at 1510. The uncontro-verted evidence showed that Clark County was not aware of Breeden’s lawsuit until after *1295the decision to transfer was announced. We, however, found a causal connection existed between Breeden's protected activities and the transfer because the EEOC’s right-to-sue letter was issued before the transfer was announced and because the transfer occurred one month after Clark County learned of the lawsuit. Id. at 1510-11. We therefore reasoned "that the letter provided petitioner with its first notice of respondent's charge before the EEOC, and hence allowed the inference that the transfer proposal made three months later was petitioner's reaction to the charge.” Id. at 1511. The Supreme Court determined that the majority went astray when it engaged in this unreasonable inference drawing. Id. The Court found no evidence that Clark County knew of the right-to-sue letter, and even if it had known, the temporal proximity — 20 months — did not support the inference we drew. Thus, the Court determined that "neither the grounds that respondent presented to the District Court, nor the ground she added on appeal, nor even the ground the Court of Appeals developed on its own, sufficed to establish a dispute substantial enough to withstand the motion for summary judgment.” Id.

. As the district court noted, "except for plaintiff, all other employees designated for layoff were Caucasian” men and women.