Court Opinion

ID: 9833030
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 22:22:48.069439+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:57.938136
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
In our original opinion we recited the facts that upon an application made to the Eleventh district court of Harris county the appellant prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, and that upon a final hearing a permanent injunction be issued; that the cause was then transferred to the Fifty-fifth district court for further disposition; that on the 11th day of June, 1932, the presiding judge of the Fifty-fifth district court, sitting in chambers, entered an order granting the temporary restraining, order prayed for by appellant, the same to continue in force pending a hearing to be held before Roy F. Campbell, judge of the Eightieth district court, on the 17th day of June, 1932; that respondent on said 17th day of June, 1932, answered praying for the dissolution of the- temporary restraining order theretofore granted, and that a temporary injunction be not granted upon the application of the complainant.
On said 17th day of June, 1932, complainant denied generally the allegations of respondent’s answer, and prayed that the temporary restraining order theretofore granted be made effective in the final decree in the ' cause, and on the same day, upon a hearing before the Eightieth district court sitting in chambers, the judge of that court rendered . judgment refusing to dissolve the temporary restraining order theretofore granted, and in ' such judgment it is recited that, pending a final determination of the cause, the defendant F. McAnally is hereby enjoined, etc.
In our opinion, in stating the prayer of,complainant, we unnecessarily stated that complainant made “a broad prayer for in-junctive relief upon final hearing,” in addition to the showing that complainant had prayed for a temporary restraining order upon which the judge of the Eightieth district' court granted the temporary injunction above stated.
Appellant has filed his motion for rehear-' ing in this court and asks that such motion he granted, asserting that “this court erred in ' holding in its opinion that ‘a broad prayer for injunctive, relief upon final hearing, and for such other 'and further relief, general and special, legal and equitable, to which he may show himself justly entitled’ would support the issuance of a temporary injunction pen-dente lite, although such temporary injunction is not specifically prayed foy by complainant.”
This court did not intend to make any such holding as asserted by the motion, nor ¡has it done so.
We concluded that the prayer for a temporary restraining order was synonymous with a prayer for temporary injunction. A holding to the contrary, in our opinion, would be the substitution of a myth for common sense.
A prayer for either a temporary restraining order or a temporary injunction is amply specific to support the jurisdiction of the court to grant relief by preliminary injunction as distinguished from a permanent or perpetual-injunction. A prayer for either a temporary restraining order or a temporary injunction is all the authorities require.
In Riggins v. Thompson, 96 Tex. 154, 71 S. W. 14, 16, our Supreme Court held that a restraining ' order and a temporary injunction is of the same identical character of relief, to wit, preliminary relief, as' distinguished from a permanent or perpetual injunction. The court said: “The learned judge, in effect, directs that a restraining order shall be granted until it is determined whether a permanent injunction shall issue, which means an injunction to remain in force until the final determination of the suit, and not an injunction granted upon the final trial, which is ealled a ‘perpetual injunction.’ ”
The case of Ely v. Elliott (Tex. Civ. App.) 55 S.W.(2d) 1080, cited and quoted from by appellant as supporting his contention, is one, as shown by that part of the opinion quoted in appellant’s motion for rehearing, in which there was no prayer for either a restraining order or a temporary injunction. The court in that-case said: “One of the errors assigned by appellants is that the temporary injunction was erroneously - granted because there was no prayer for such relief by appel-lees. -With their position we must agree. Nowhere in the pleadings do the appellees seek- a: temporary injunction or a temporary restraining .order and .without such a prayer the court could not grant such relief.”
As already shown, there was a prayer for a temporary restraining order which, in our opinion, is sufficient to sustain an order for a temporary injunction. An inspection of; appellant’s answer, including his prayer, will clearly show that he interpreted complainant’s prayer as one for preliminary relief, either a temporary restraining order or temporary injunction. It is clear that the case was tried upon such interpretation by the trial court, and both parties to the suit, and that *952appellant’s contention that there was no plea authorizing the issuance of a temporary injunction was for the first time made in this court on appeal.
The motion for rehearing is refused.
Refused.