Court Opinion

ID: 9871568
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-26 20:35:24.085976+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:46:19.517840
License: Public Domain

*968Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Cyrulnik, J.), rendered June 27, 2013, convicting him of rape in the first degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the facts and in the exercise of discretion, and a new trial is ordered.
The defendant contends that the evidence was legally insufficient to support his conviction and that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People (see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620, 621 [1983]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342 [2007]), we nevertheless accord great deference to the jury’s opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see People v Mateo, 2 NY3d 383, 420 [2004]; People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v Romero, 7 NY3d 633 [2006]).
The defendant contends that the prosecutor’s redirect examination of a police officer who took the complainant’s statement impermissibly bolstered the complainant’s testimony by introducing her prior consistent statement made at the time of the defendant’s arrest. This contention is unpreserved for appellate review. In any event, the Supreme Court properly allowed the prosecutor to elicit the substance of the complainant’s statement on redirect examination for the purpose of explaining and clarifying the police officer’s prior testimony that was introduced on cross-examination (see People v Ochoa, 14 NY3d 180, 186-187 [2010]; People v Torre, 42 NY2d 1036, 1037 [1977]; People v Holden, 82 AD3d 792, 793 [2011]; People v Melendez, 51 AD3d 1040 [2008]; People v Williams, 43 AD3d 414 [2007]; People v Johnson, 296 AD2d 422 [2002]).
A Sandoval hearing (see People v Sandoval, 34 NY2d 371 [1974]) was held prior to trial, after which the Supreme Court ruled, in part, that, should the defendant testify on his own behalf, the People would be permitted to inquire about his conviction for robbery in the first degree on December 8, 1986. Specifically, the court ruled that the People could cross-examine the defendant about the fact of the conviction and some of the underlying facts of the robbery, including that the defendant placed a knife to the complainant’s neck, but not the fact that the defendant threatened to kill the complainant. The court *969reasoned that, while it was alleged in the present case that the defendant had placed a knife to the complainant’s neck during the commission of the rape, the similarity of the alleged conduct should not shield the defendant from cross-examination. We agree with the defendant that the court improvidently exercised its discretion in making its Sandoval ruling (see People v Sandoval, 34 NY2d 371 [1974]; People v Wright, 121 AD3d 924, 928 [2014]; People v Brothers, 95 AD3d 1227, 1228-1229 [2012]; People v Finger, 166 AD2d 714, 716 [1990]; People v Moore, 156 AD2d 394, 394-395 [1989]).
In Sandoval, the Court of Appeals recognized that “cross-examination with respect to crimes or conduct similar to that of which the defendant is presently charged may be highly prejudicial, in view of the risk, despite the most clear and forceful limiting instructions to the contrary, that the evidence will be taken as some proof of the commission of the crime charged rather than be reserved solely to the issue of credibility” (People v Sandoval, 34 NY2d at 377). The Court reasoned that “a balance must here be struck between the probative worth of evidence of prior specific criminal, vicious or immoral acts on the issue of the defendant’s credibility on the one hand, and on the other the risk of unfair prejudice to the defendant, measured both by the impact of such evidence if it is admitted after his testimony and by the effect its probable introduction may have in discouraging him from taking the stand on his own behalf” (id. at 375). The Court further reasoned that when considering whether the impeachment evidence should be admitted, and whether the defendant will be deprived of a fair trial, courts should consider whether “the testimony to be elicited in cross-examination [will] have a disproportionate and improper impact on the triers of fact” and whether “the apprehension of its introduction [would] undesirably deter the defendant from taking the stand and thereby deny the jury or court significant material evidence” (id. at 376).
“In weighing prejudice to the defendant’s right to a fair trial, an important consideration may be the effect on the validity of the fact-finding process if the defendant does not testify out of fear of the impact of the impeachment testimony for reasons other than its direct effect on his credibility — as where the defendant would be the only available source of material testimony in support of his defense” (id. at 378). The inquiry, as the Court provided, “must always depend on the individual facts and circumstances of each case” (id. at 375).
A brief recitation of the facts and circumstances of this case is required for our analysis of the Supreme Court’s Sandoval *970ruling. The defendant was accused of forcibly raping the complainant at knifepoint. This incident was alleged to have occurred sometime between November 2006 and January 2007, in the defendant’s apartment. At that time, the complainant was suffering from drug addiction and smoked crack cocaine every day. Although she had been diagnosed with bipolar schizophrenia disorder, the complainant was not taking any medication for her condition at that time because she was homeless and living on the streets. On a day during this time frame, the complainant encountered the defendant at a location in Brooklyn and he invited her to his apartment so they could get high. The complainant smoked crack while in the defendant’s apartment, after which the defendant allegedly raped her at knifepoint. The complainant remained in the defendant’s apartment until the following morning. The complainant testified that, upon leaving the apartment, she saw two police officers and told them what had happened, but that the officers did not take her seriously. Until 2011, the complainant made no other attempts to report the alleged incident. On December 28, 2011, the complainant took her grandmother to Woodhull Hospital for an appointment. The complainant observed the defendant at the hospital, and thereafter she reported the alleged rape to the police. The defendant was subsequently arrested, and this prosecution ensued. The defendant did not testify at trial.
In determining the People’s Sandoval application, the Supreme Court ruled, inter alia, that if the defendant elected to testify, he could be cross-examined on the fact of his conviction for robbery in the first degree on December 8, 1986, as well as some of the underlying facts, including that he had placed a knife to the robbery complainant’s neck during the commission of that crime.
While we recognize that, under Sandoval and its progeny, the mere similarity of crimes or conduct to the charge for which a defendant stands trial does not automatically preclude inquiry, here, under the particular facts and circumstances of this case, a proper balancing of the probative value of the defendant’s prior conduct of placing a knife to the robbery complainant’s neck, in connection with the issue of credibility, against the risk of unfair prejudice to the defendant, should have resulted in a ruling precluding the People’s proposed line of questioning (see People v Anderson, 130 AD3d 1055, 1056 [2015], Iv granted 26 NY3d 1142 [2016]; cf. People v Grant, 7 NY3d 421, 425 [2006]). Moreover, the error was not harmless (see People v Grant, 7 NY3d at 423; People v Williams, 56 NY2d *971236, 240-241 [1982]; People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230, 241-242 [1975]). The proof of the defendant’s guilt was far from overwhelming, and the defendant was the only available source of material testimony in support of his defense (see People v Sandoval, 34 NY2d at 378). Inasmuch as the pretrial ruling affected the defendant’s decision whether to testify and denied the jury potentially significant material evidence, the Supreme Court’s Sandoval ruling cannot be considered harmless (see People v Grant, 7 NY3d at 424; People v Williams, 56 NY2d at 241).
The two cases most heavily relied upon by our dissenting colleague are, respectfully, distinguishable on the facts.
In People v Hayes (278 AD2d 592 [2000], revd 97 NY2d 203 [2002]), the defendant was charged with rape in the first degree, coercion in the first degree, burglary in the second degree, unlawful imprisonment in the second degree, and assault in the third degree. The hearing court ruled that, if the defendant were to take the stand, he could be cross-examined on the existence and nature of various prior convictions, some of which included sexual offenses. However, the court precluded the People from eliciting the underlying facts of those convictions (see id. at 593-594). The Appellate Division, Third Department, reversed the judgment of conviction, on the law, and held that the court erred in permitting cross-examination regarding the nature of the defendant’s prior similar crimes (see id.). The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellant Division, and held that the Appellate Division erred in requiring that cross-examination should have been limited to the mere existence, rather than the nature, of the defendant’s prior convictions (see People v Hayes, 97 NY2d at 208). The Court noted that the similarity of the defendant’s prior convictions did not require that impeachment should be limited only to the existence of those convictions (see id. at 208).
Here, however, the Supreme Court permitted cross-examination on the existence and nature of the defendant’s conviction for robbery in the first degree, and also certain underlying facts, including that the defendant placed a knife to the complainant’s neck during the commission of the robbery. In that this particular underlying fact was identical to the complainant’s allegation in this case as to what occurred during the rape, any probative value it may have had on the defendant’s credibility was clearly outweighed by its potential prejudicial effect on the jury, based upon the particular facts and circumstances of this case.
We recognize that, in certain instances, the prior commission *972of a particular crime of calculated violence, or of specified vicious or immoral acts by a defendant, can reveal a willingness on the defendant’s part to place the advancement of his or her self-interests ahead of the interests of society, and therefore, that proof thereof may be relevant to the defendant’s credibility (see People v Sandoval, 34 NY2d at 377). Here, however, the likelihood that evidence that the defendant placed a knife to a complainant’s neck during the commission of a prior crime would have influenced the jury to believe that the defendant had a propensity to commit the crime in the case at bar was great, and far outweighed the likelihood that the jury would have considered the evidence only as it bore on the defendant’s credibility.
In People v Levy (290 AD2d 565 [2002]), our determination that the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in ruling that the prosecution could inquire into the defendant’s prior knifepoint assault on a woman was based upon the facts and circumstances of that case. Since each case requires a balancing of its own particular facts, our determination in Levy is not dispositive. Here, as previously indicated, the proof of the defendant’s guilt was far from overwhelming, and the defendant was the only available source of material testimony in support of his defense. The Supreme Court’s Sandoval ruling in this case likely deterred the defendant from taking the stand, and thereby denied the jury potentially significant material evidence (see People v Sandoval, 34 NY2d at 376; People v Moore, 156 AD2d at 395).
To suggest, as our dissenting colleague does, that the jury was not deprived of significant, material evidence merely because the defendant’s statement to the police was introduced into evidence during the People’s case-in-chief, completely ignores a cornerstone of the judicial process, that being the jury’s ability to see and hear a witness testify, in this case the defendant, in order to assess his or her credibility and weigh his or her testimony. The suggestion also incorrectly presumes that the defendant’s testimony would have mirrored his statement to the police, and would not have contradicted the contents of the statement, or the testimony related thereto by the People’s witness.
Contrary to the view expressed by our dissenting colleague, our determination in this case that the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in making its Sandoval ruling was based upon our examination and consideration of all the individual facts and circumstances of the case (see People v Sandoval, 34 NY2d at 375).
*973Accordingly, the judgment must be reversed, and a new trial ordered.
Austin, Miller and LaSalle, JJ., concur.