Court Opinion

ID: 9880911
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-28 23:03:29.727071+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:58:01.420517
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/28/23 Bird v. Great American Chicken Corp. CA2/2
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION TWO

 PAMELA BIRD,                                                B320644

           Plaintiff and Appellant,                          (Los Angeles County
                                                             Super. Ct. No.
           v.                                                20AVCV00506)

 GREAT AMERICAN
 CHICKEN CORPORATION,

      Defendant and
 Respondent.

      APPEAL from a judgment and order of the Superior Court
of Los Angeles County, Stephen T. Morgan, Judge. Affirmed.

     Law Offices of Akudinobi & Ikonte, Emmanuel C.
Akudinobi, and Chijioke O. Ikonte for Plaintiff and Appellant.

     Robinson Di Lando, Michael A. Di Lando, and Tobias Mark
Kane for Defendant and Respondent.
                            ******
      A woman in a fast food restaurant started yelling and
eventually punched a fellow customer in the face. The customer
sued the fast food restaurant for negligently maintaining its
property because the restaurant (1) did not hire security guards
or use intensive, two-way security monitoring, and (2) did not call
911 soon enough when the woman started yelling at the
customer. The trial court granted summary judgment for the
restaurant. Because this was proper and because the customer’s
subsequent motion for reconsideration was not well taken, we
affirm.
         FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I.    Facts1
      On September 1, 2018, Pamela Bird (Bird) went to a
Kentucky Fried Chicken restaurant in Lancaster, California (the
KFC) with her sister and an acquaintance to have lunch and
convene a Bible study group.
      The group was at the KFC for about 30 minutes when a
woman they perceived to be “homeless” came inside the
restaurant with an empty KFC cup and was denied service at the
register. As the woman sat down in a booth across the
restaurant from Bird and started “screaming and . . . cursing” to

1     Consistent with the standard governing our review of
summary judgments, we construe the record in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party and resolve all doubts
concerning the evidence in favor of that party. (Hartford
Casualty Ins. Co. v. Swift Distribution, Inc. (2014) 59 Cal.4th 277,
286 (Hartford).) Thus, the deposition testimony of the restaurant
employees here providing a different account of the incident at
issue—namely, that no physical altercation occurred at all—are
irrelevant for purposes of our analysis.

                                 2
herself, Bird and her group continued their Bible study session.
After about 10 minutes, the woman threw cigarette lighters at
Bird and her group, “rush[ed]” toward them, and “scream[ed] and
yell[ed]” that they “[s]top talking about [her]” or she would
“demonize” them. Bird and her group tried to calm the woman
down, and Bird implored the KFC employees to call the police.
Just when Bird believed the woman had decided to “bag[] up” and
leave, the woman “out of the blue” punched Bird in the left side of
her jaw. Bird responded by hitting the woman with a tablet, and
the group then surrounded the woman. The woman retreated,
the group helped her pick up the cigarette lighters, and she left
the KFC—but not without taking Bird’s Bible on her way out.
       The manager of the KFC location called law enforcement
after Bird was punched, and deputies from the Los Angeles
County Sheriff’s Department responded to the scene 42 minutes
later.
       Other than this occurrence, the KFC had no internal record
of any reported incidents of violence against a customer. It also
had no knowledge of similarly violent incidents that may have
occurred in the surrounding area of Lancaster.
II.    Procedural Background
       A.    Complaint
       In July 2020, Bird filed a form complaint against Great
American Chicken Corporation (defendant), which was the owner
and operator of the Lancaster KFC franchise location where the
incident occurred. Bird asserted a single cause of action for
premises liability. More specifically, Bird alleged that defendant
was liable because it (1) “failed to provide security to protect its
visitors,” and (2) failed to take “any steps to protect visitors
despite harassment . . . by patrons inside the restaurant.”

                                 3
       B.     Motion for summary judgment
       Defendant moved for summary judgment on the grounds
that (1) it owed Bird no duty to (a) provide security guards, or (b)
respond to the incident, and (2) even if it had a duty to respond,
any breach of that duty did not cause Bird’s injuries. After
further briefing that included an unauthorized sur-reply filed by
Bird, evidentiary objections filed by defendant, and a hearing, the
trial court granted the motion for summary judgment in a
statement of decision issued January 21, 2022.
       In its order granting summary judgment, the court first
ruled that defendant owed no duty to take preventative measures
because Bird’s injury was not foreseeable under the “heightened”
foreseeability standard applicable when assessing whether
landowners owe a duty to hire security guards. Although Bird
had offered two exhibits to show that similar incidents had
occurred at the KFC location, the trial court ruled that those
exhibits—and an expert witness declaration repeating the
content of those exhibits and offering an opinion based on that
content regarding what measures defendant should have taken—
were inadmissible. The court sidestepped defendant’s argument
that it owed no duty to respond to Bird’s injuries by calling 911
by instead holding that any breach of that duty did not cause
Bird’s injuries in light of the undisputed fact that law
enforcement would not have arrived in time to halt the battery,
even if the KFC employees had called sooner.
       C.     Motion for reconsideration
       Seventeen days after the trial court issued its order
granting summary judgment, Bird filed a motion for
reconsideration. The motion advanced two grounds: (1) Bird had
“inadvertently omitted” a few pages from the deposition of

                                 4
defendant’s director of human resources, and (2) Bird’s expert
witness sought to change his declaration to replace his initial
opinion regarding the likelihood that certain measures would
have prevented the battery on Bird. After a full round of briefing
and a hearing, the trial court issued an order on March 10, 2022,
denying the motion.
       D.    Appeal
       Following entry of judgment for defendant, Bird filed this
timely appeal.
                              DISCUSSION
       Bird argues that the trial court erred in entering summary
judgment for defendant and in denying her motion for
reconsideration of the summary judgment order.
I.     Motion for Summary Judgment
       A.    Applicable law
             1.      Law governing summary judgment motions
       “A defendant is entitled to summary judgment if it can
‘show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact.’ (Code
Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) The defendant bears the initial
burden of establishing that the plaintiff’s cause of action has ‘no
merit’ by showing that the plaintiff cannot establish ‘[o]ne or
more elements of [her] cause of action.’ (Id., subds. (o) & (p)(2).)
If this burden is met, the ‘burden shifts’ to the plaintiff ‘to show
that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that
cause of action . . . .’ (Id., subd. (p)(2); see Aguilar v. Atlantic
Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 849 [citation].)” (Issakhani v.
Shadow Glen Homeowners Assn., Inc. (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 917,
924 (Issakhani).) We review the trial court’s grant of summary
judgment de novo, considering all the evidence set forth in the
moving and opposing papers except that to which evidentiary

                                 5
objections were sustained and not challenged on appeal, and
construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the party
opposing summary judgment. (Hartford, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p.
286; Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512, 534-535 (Reid).)
To the extent our review turns on challenges to the evidentiary
rulings the trial court made in connection with the summary
judgment motion, the weight of authority dictates that we review
those rulings for an abuse of discretion. (Serri v. Santa Clara
University (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 830, 852; Carnes v. Superior
Court (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 688, 694; Walker v. Countrywide
Home Loans, Inc. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1158, 1169; but see Reid,
at p. 535 [leaving open question as to whether evidentiary rulings
reviewed de novo or for abuse of discretion].) The party
challenging the evidentiary rulings bears the burden of showing
they were erroneous. (Mackey v. Trustees of California State
University (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 640, 657.)
             2.    Law governing premises liability for third-party
misconduct
       To establish a cause of action for premises liability based on
negligence, the plaintiff must show that the defendant owed her a
legal duty, that the defendant breached that duty, and that the
breach was a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries. (Saelzler
v. Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 767 (Saelzler);
Issakhani, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 924.) The existence and
scope of a duty is a question of law. (Issakhani, at p. 924; Sharon
P. v. Arman, Ltd. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1181, 1188 (Sharon P.),
disapproved on another ground in Reid, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p.
527, fn. 5; Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center (1993) 6
Cal.4th 666, 674 (Ann M.), disapproved on another ground in
Reid, at p. 527, fn. 5; Delgado v. Trax Bar & Grill (2005) 36

                                 6
Cal.4th 224, 237-238 (Delgado); Castaneda v. Olsher (2007) 41
Cal.4th 1205, 1213 (Castaneda).) Although the question of
whether the breach of a duty has caused the plaintiff’s injury is
typically one for the jury, the court may resolve it on summary
judgment where reasonable minds could not differ on the absence
of causation. (Lopez v. McDonald’s Corp. (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d
495, 513 (Lopez); Barber v. Southern Cal. Edison Co. (2022) 80
Cal.App.5th 227, 246 (Barber).)
       Although every person owes a duty of care to all others who
are foreseeably endangered by the person’s own negligent
conduct (Civ. Code, § 1714, subd. (a); Delgado, supra, 36 Cal.4th
at pp. 234-235), as a general matter, a person owes no duty to
protect others from the conduct—including criminal conduct—of
third parties (Delgado, at pp. 235, 237). However, it is
undisputed in this case that a “special relationship” runs between
a restaurant and its patrons, and that this special relationship
can impose a duty upon a restaurant—as an entity in control over
the premises—to protect its patrons from the criminal conduct of
third parties on or near those premises. (Morris v. De La Torre
(2005) 36 Cal.4th 260, 269 (Morris); Delgado, at p. 235; Kentucky
Fried Chicken of Cal., Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 14 Cal.4th
814, 823 (Kentucky Fried Chicken); Lopez, supra, 193 Cal.App.3d
at pp. 504, 506.)
       More specifically, courts have identified two potential
duties restaurants owe their patrons—namely, (1) a duty to
prevent their patrons from being harmed by a third party’s
criminal conduct (Ann M., supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 674 [“duty to
take reasonable steps” including “precautionary measures”]), and
(2) a duty to provide aid or assistance to their patrons in response
to a third party’s criminal conduct once that conduct is imminent

                                 7
or is ongoing (Delgado, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 241 [“duty to
undertake relatively simple measures such as providing
‘assistance [to] their customers’”]). Because “random, violent
crime” is unfortunately “endemic in today’s society,” and because
actions to prevent criminal activity on a restaurant’s premises—
such as the hiring of security guards—are typically very
expensive and impose a “[]significant” burden on the restaurant,
a restaurant’s duty to prevent criminal conduct (the first duty
noted above) only exists when the restaurant is aware that
“similar incidents of violent crime” have occurred on its
premises.2 (Ann M., at pp. 678, 679 & fn. 7; Sharon P., supra, 21
Cal.4th at pp. 1190-1191; Verdugo v. Target Corp. (2014) 59
Cal.4th 312, 338-339.) Because providing responsive aid or
assistance to patrons imposes a more “minimal” burden, a
restaurant’s duty to provide responsive aid (such as by calling
911 or the police) exists—like most tort duties—as long as injury
from its failure to do so is reasonably foreseeable (Delgado,
supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 241; Morris, supra, 36 Cal.4th at pp. 270,
276-278; Kentucky Fried Chicken, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 823
[restaurant has duty to respond to ongoing conduct by taking
“such appropriate action as is reasonable under the
circumstances to protect patrons”]; see Weirum v. RKO General,
Inc. (1975) 15 Cal.3d 40, 49 [“nonfeasance is found when the
defendant has failed to aid plaintiff through beneficial

2     Ann M. also noted the “possibility” that similar incidents
occurring on the premises of “substantially similar business
establishment[s]” in the “immediate proximity” of the defendant-
premises owner may also satisfy the heightened foreseeability
requirement (Ann M., supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 679, fn. 7), but did
not reach the issue because no such evidence was present. The
same is true here.

                                8
intervention”]); the “heightened” degree of foreseeability that
triggers the duty to prevent is not required for the duty to respond
(Delgado, at pp. 241, 243).
       B.    Analysis
             1.    Absence of preventative measures
       We independently agree with the trial court that defendant
did not owe Bird a duty to prevent crime by hiring security
guards or implementing an interactive video monitoring system.
As noted above, “the burden of hiring security guards”—when
considering the monetary costs, social costs, and minimal
deterrent effect—is “extremely high.” (Wiener v. Southcoast
Childcare Centers, Inc. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1138, 1147 (Wiener);
Ann M., supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 679; Sharon P., supra, 21 Cal.4th
at pp. 1192, 1199; Delgado, supra, 36 Cal.4th at pp. 239-240.)
And contrary to what Bird asserts, the burden of installing—and,
more to the point, staffing—a two-way video monitoring system is
equally if not more onerous because the only way such a system
is interactive enough to allow for the monitor to “voice down” at
persons in the restaurant is if it is staffed whenever the
restaurant is open. As noted above, a duty to prevent crime by
implementing such burdensome measures exists only if the
restaurant is aware of “prior similar incidents” of criminal
conduct at that restaurant. (Wiener, at p. 1147; Ann M., at p. 679;
Sharon P., at p. 1199; Delgado, at pp. 239-240.) But it is
undisputed that defendant had no records—and hence no
knowledge—of similar incidents of battery on its patrons in the
past. This undisputed fact means defendant owed Bird no duty
to employ security guards or to install an interactive monitoring
system, and means Bird’s premises liability claim fails as a
matter of law. (Ann M., at pp. 679-680 [no duty to employ

                                 9
security guards where shopping plaza had no records of prior
violent acts on premises]; Melton v. Boustred (2010) 183
Cal.App.4th 521, 539 [heightened standard of foreseeability “not
met” where there was an “absence of prior similar incidents” of
stabbings at parties]; Margaret W. v. Kelley R. (2006) 139
Cal.App.4th 141, 156 [“foreseeability must be measured by what
the defendant actually knew”].) That the KFC was not located in
a wealthy neighborhood, as Bird suggests, does not mean
defendant knew a battery against a customer would occur.
(Lopez, supra, 193 Cal.App.3d at p. 511 [“a fast-food restaurant
does not create ‘an especial temptation and opportunity for
criminal misconduct’”]; Williams v. Fremont Corners, Inc. (2019)
37 Cal.App.5th 654, 668 (Williams) [“a general knowledge of the
possibility of violent criminal conduct is not in itself enough to
create a duty under California law”].)
      Bird responds with what boils down to three arguments.
      First, she argues that she presented two exhibits
constituting evidence of prior similar incidents occurring at the
Lancaster KFC, but the trial court erroneously excluded that
evidence. If those exhibits were admitted, Bird continues, triable
issues of fact would preclude summary judgment.
      The first of the two exhibits are Sheriff’s Department
dispatch logs memorializing calls asking for law enforcement
intervention at the KFC location. Those logs show 41 calls over a
more than five-year period preceding the incident involving Bird.
The trial court properly excluded the logs as inadmissible
hearsay. The logs reflect two layers of out-of-court statements
admitted for their truth: (1) what the caller told the dispatcher,
and (2) what the dispatcher recorded in the dispatch logs. The
public records exception to the hearsay rule applies to the second

                                10
layer (Evid. Code, § 1280; Murphey v. Shiomoto (2017) 13
Cal.App.5th 1052, 1064-1065; People v. Baeske (1976) 58
Cal.App.3d 775, 780), but Bird did not carry her burden as the
proponent of the evidence because she offered no exception to the
hearsay rule for admitting the first layer (Evid. Code, §§ 1200,
subd. (b), 1201, 702, subd. (a); People v. Reed (1996) 13 Cal.4th
217, 224-225 [“As with all multiple hearsay, the question is
whether each hearsay statement fell within an exception to the
hearsay rule”]). For the same reason, the trial court properly
excluded the portions of the expert’s declaration repeating and
analyzing the information in the dispatch logs. Although, as Bird
notes, an expert may rely on inadmissible evidence in reaching
their opinions (Evid. Code, § 801, subd. (b)), experts may not
relay case-specific facts when explaining the basis for the opinion
unless those facts are covered by a hearsay exception (Evid. Code,
§ 802; People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665, 684, 686). In
other words, and contrary to what Bird seems to suggest, the fact
that her expert relied on inadmissible evidence in forming an
opinion does not somehow make that evidence admissible.
      What is more, even if we assume for purposes of argument
that the dispatch logs should have been admitted (because the
callers’ statements to the dispatchers may qualify as excited
utterances (Evid. Code, § 1240)), admission of those logs does not
create a triable issue of fact as to whether defendant knew that
prior similar incidents occurred at the Lancaster KFC. Most of
the 41 calls did not report violence at all; of the violent incidents,
most involved disgruntled patrons acting aggressively toward
employees (who can be trained and protected in different ways
than patrons). By Bird’s own count, there was only one similar
incident—an altercation in which a patron threw a bucket of

                                 11
loose change at a customer—in the over five years preceding the
incident with Bird. Because this single incident of attempted
battery on a patron is not sufficiently similar to the completed
battery, the dispatch logs do not rebut defendant’s prima facie
showing of no heightened foreseeability or otherwise raise a
triable issue of fact regarding foreseeability. Thus, any error by
the trial court in excluding the dispatch call logs was harmless.
(Evid. Code, § 354; Twenty-Nine Palms Enterprises Corp. v.
Bardos (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1435, 1449 [“erroneous
evidentiary ruling requires reversal only if ‘there is a reasonable
probability that a result more favorable to the appealing party
would have been reached in the absence of the error’”].)
       The second of the two exhibits is a “CRIMECAST report”
prepared by CAP Index, Inc., which set forth a numerical index
score regarding the severity of crime in the area around the KFC
location. The trial court properly excluded the report (as well as
Bird’s expert’s recitation of its contents in his declaration)
because Bird laid no foundation for the report’s admission and
because Bird offered nothing but the report’s own cursory
explanation of what data was used to formulate the numerical
index score, and no explanation at all regarding whether that
data was reliable, whether security experts typically rely on that
type of data, and what methodology was used to create that score.
(Evid. Code, § 403, subd. (a) [proponent of evidence has burden of
establishing foundation for, and authenticity of, that evidence];
People v. Goldsmith (2014) 59 Cal.4th 258, 266 [writings must be
authenticated]; Evid. Code, § 801, subd. (b) [expert witness’s
testimony must be “[b]ased on matter . . . that is of a type that
reasonably may be relied upon by an expert in forming an opinion
upon the subject to which [the expert’s] testimony relates”].) The

                                12
court also properly excluded her expert’s opinion relying on the
report. Under Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern
California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747 (Sargon), a trial court may
decline to credit non-scientific evidence if its methodology has
“‘too great an analytical gap’” or is “speculative.” (Sargon, at pp.
770-772.) Bird’s expert did nothing to shore up the report’s
cursory explanation regarding the data and methodology used to
calculate the numerical index score. Bird responds that defects
in an expert’s methodology are always questions for the jury, but
she is wrong: Sargon itself preserves a role for trial courts in
rejecting expert testimony, such as the testimony here, that they
determine is too unreliable because it lacks basic methodological
grounding and soundness.
       What is more, even if we assume for purposes of argument
that the CRIMECAST report should have been admitted,
evidence of the “statistical crime rate of the surrounding area”
like what Bird proffered in the report is not “of a type sufficient
to” impose a duty on defendant to take those precautionary
measures. (Ann M., supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 680; Williams, supra,
37 Cal.App.5th at pp. 668-669.)
       Second, Bird argues that a security guard or interactive
monitoring system would have prevented her assailant from
hitting her. But this argument is relevant to causation; it has no
bearing on whether defendant owed her a duty in the first place.
(See Lopez v. Baca (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1008, 1020, fn. 11
[declining to reach causation argument where no duty found];
Lucas v. George T.R. Murai Farms, Inc. (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th
1578, 1591 [same].)
       Third and lastly, Bird argues that defendant’s employees
failed to adequately document prior incidents at the KFC

                                 13
location, which enabled defendant to remain “willfully ignorant”
of the foreseeability of violence by patrons at the location. Even if
we assume that defendant had internal records and, therefore,
knowledge of the prior incidents described in the dispatch call
logs, that fact would not alter our analysis that the heightened
standard of foreseeability necessary to impose such burdensome
precautionary measures still was absent as a matter of law. (See
Ann M., supra, 6 Cal.4th at pp. 679-680 [even assuming shopping
center had notice of prior assaults and robberies on premises,
those incidents “were not similar in nature to the” sexual assault
suffered by the plaintiff].)
              2.    Sufficiency of responsive measures
       We also independently agree with the trial court that, even
if there is a triable issue of material fact as to whether
defendant’s employees breached their duty to respond to the
battery of Bird once it was imminent, the undisputed evidence
shows that any breach of that duty did not cause Bird’s injury as
a matter of law. (Morris, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 278 [even if duty
and breach established, factfinder still “required to consider
whether the breach was a proximate cause of plaintiff’s
injuries”].) Causation requires proof that the restaurant’s
possible breach of a duty was a “substantial factor” in causing the
patron’s injuries. (Saelzler, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 772.) Here,
the undisputed facts show it was not. It is undisputed that Bird’s
assailant entered the KFC location approximately 10 minutes
before she approached Bird and, after a brief interaction,
punched Bird in the jaw. It is also undisputed that law
enforcement did not arrive until 42 minutes after the KFC
manager called 911. Thus, it is undisputed that an earlier 911
call—even one made the moment the assailant walked into the

                                 14
KFC—would not have resulted in law enforcement arriving in
time to have prevented the battery on Bird. Thus, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to Bird, the record contains
insufficient evidence to find that the timing of the 911 call was a
substantial factor in causing her injury. (Castaneda, supra, 41
Cal.4th at pp. 1222-1223; cf. Lopez, supra, 193 Cal.App.3d at p.
515 [to show “proximate, or legal, causation,” plaintiff must show
that business’s “nonfeasance in some way contributed to their
resulting injuries”].)
       To the extent Bird’s expert implied in his declaration that
the KFC manager should have called 911 earlier, this conclusion
ignores the undisputed facts. A patron suing for premises
liability “must do more than simply criticize, through the
speculative testimony of supposed security ‘experts,’ the extent
and worth of the [business’s] security measures, and instead
must show the injury was actually caused by the failure to
provide greater measures.” (Saelzler, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 774;
id. at p. 775 [where evidence is that altercation “could have
occurred even in the absence of [business’s] negligence, proof of
causation cannot be based on mere speculation, conjecture[, or]
inferences,” including in an expert’s opinion, “to reach a
conclusion unsupported by any real evidence”]; Nola M. v.
University of Southern California (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 421,
435.)
       Bird resists our conclusion with four arguments. First, she
argues that defendant breached its duty to protect because the
employees at the KFC chose to record the altercation on a cell
phone rather than heed Bird’s requests to call the police. This
point is irrelevant to the element of causation. Second, Bird
argues that the assailant may have been dissuaded from

                                15
attacking her if a KFC employee had called the police and told
the assailant the police had been called. But the assertion that
the assailant would have been dissuaded is based on speculation
rather than evidence; what is more, it is refuted by the
undisputed evidence that the assailant was not dissuaded when
Bird explicitly asked the KFC employees to call the police in her
assailant’s presence. Third, Bird argues that causation is always
a question for the jury. Although causation is generally a
question of fact for the jury, causation can be resolved as a
matter of law on summary judgment where, as here, the
undisputed facts indicate that reasonable minds could not differ
on the absence of causation. (Lopez, supra, 193 Cal.App.3d at p.
513; Barber, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 246.) Fourth and lastly,
Bird argues that when her expert said that the timing of the 911
call “may” have caused her injuries, he really meant the timing of
the call “more likely than not” caused her injuries. We reject this
argument because our task is to evaluate the evidence presented
to the trial court (rather than the litigant’s self-interested
reworking of that evidence), and because the expert’s opinion—as
noted above—ignores the undisputed evidence.
II.    Motion for Reconsideration
       A.     Applicable law
       A trial court may reconsider a prior order if, within 10 days
of that order, (1) a party raises “‘new or different facts,
circumstances, or law,’” and (2) the party “show[s] diligence with
a satisfactory explanation for not presenting the new or different
information earlier.”3 (Code Civ. Proc., § 1008, subd. (a); Even

3     Because Bird’s arguments regarding the trial court’s denial
of her motion are unavailing on their merits, we do not separately
analyze the untimeliness of her motion or whether she filed that

                                16
Zohar Construction & Remodeling, Inc. v. Bellaire Townhouses,
LLC (2015) 61 Cal.4th 830, 833, 842-843; California Correctional
Peace Officers Assn. v. Virga (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 30, 46, fn. 14
[showing of diligence required for motions brought under Code of
Civil Procedure section 1008, subd. (a)].) We review the denial of
a motion for reconsideration for abuse of discretion. (Schep v.
Capital One, N.A. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 1331, 1339.)
      B.     Analysis
      The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Bird’s
motion for reconsideration because neither the “inadvertently
omitted” deposition pages nor the amended expert declaration
constitutes “new or different facts, circumstances, or law,” which
Bird could not have offered earlier with her opposition to the
summary judgment motion.
      The “inadvertently omitted” pages of the deposition of
defendant’s human resources director were available to Bird
during the original round of briefing and the hearing, so they
clearly are not “new or different facts” that would justify
reconsideration of the court’s summary judgment order.

motion prematurely (by seeking reconsideration of the
unappealable order granting summary judgment rather than the
judgment itself). (Code Civ. Proc, § 1008, subds. (a) [10-day
deadline to file motion] & (g) [order denying motion for
reconsideration not separately appealable]; In re Marriage of
Herr (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1468 [“plainly” untimely
motion for reconsideration “could properly have been denied on
that ground alone”]; Levy v. Skywalker Sound (2003) 108
Cal.App.4th 753, 761, fn. 7 [order granting summary judgment
not appealable]; Garcia v. Hejmadi (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 674,
680 (Garcia) [appeal from summary judgment must be taken
from “judgment of dismissal”]; Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd.
(m)(1).)

                                17
(Hennigan v. White (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 395, 405-406; Morris
v. AGFA Corp. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1452, 1460 [“evidence that
should have been included in the initial . . . motion but was not”
is “not a proper basis for reconsideration”]; New York Times Co. v.
Superior Court (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 206, 213 [evidence that
was “new to the trial court” but “was available” to the parties and
“easily obtainable” “does not constitute new or different facts
within the meaning of [Code of Civil Procedure] section 1008”];
Garcia, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th at p. 690 [information previously
available to a party does not satisfy the requirements of Code of
Civil Procedure section 1008].) Nor are the revisions to the
expert’s declaration, which were designed to provide Bird with a
second bite at the apple by revising the exact part of the expert’s
declaration the trial court determined was pure speculation on
the element of causation. (Shiffer v. CBS Corp. (2015) 240
Cal.App.4th 246, 255-256 [expert declaration “purporting to reach
new opinions based on [previously available] evidence was not,
itself, new evidence”]; cf. In re H.S. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 103,
105 [“belated submission of an expert’s opinion, formed based on
evidence that was available” earlier, does not “constitute[] ‘new
evidence’”]; see also Sargon, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 770 [“‘expert
opinion based on speculation or conjecture is inadmissible’”].)

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                         DISPOSITION
       The judgment for defendant and order denying Bird’s
motion for reconsideration are affirmed. Defendant is entitled to
its costs on appeal.
       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

                                     ______________________, J.
                                     HOFFSTADT
We concur:

_________________________, P. J.
LUI

_________________________, J.
ASHMANN-GERST

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