Court Opinion

ID: 9758911
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 23:55:48.101582+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:01:30.673143
License: Public Domain

*528KARWACKI, Judge.
Maryland Code (1974, 1995 Repl.Vol.), § 5-101 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, Maryland’s general statute of limitations, ordinarily requires a civil lawsuit to be filed within three years from the date the action accrues. Nonetheless, section 5-201(a) of that same Article provides that
“[w]hen a cause of action subject to a limitation under Subtitle 1 of this title accrues in favor of a minor or mental incompetent, that person shall file his action within the lesser of three years or the applicable period of limitations after the date the disability is removed.”
We are asked in this appeal whether a defendant can be equitably estopped from asserting limitations when threats by the defendant have allegedly prevented or otherwise frustrated the plaintiff from bringing suit within the applicable limitations period. Without foreclosing that possibility, we nonetheless shall hold that under the circumstances presented in this case, Appellants’ claims are barred for a want of timely prosecution.
I.
The genesis of this appeal reaches back nearly twenty years to the 1970’s when twelve of the Appellants were students at the Catholic Community Middle School of South Baltimore, Inc. The Archdiocese of Baltimore, Division of Catholic Schools (“Archdiocese”), employed John Joseph Merzbacher as an instructor at that school. According to the Appellants,1 Merzbacher, with the constructive, and in some instances, actual knowledge of the Archdiocese, subjected Appellants to a systematic and brutal campaign of sexual, physical, and emotional violence during their tutelage at the Catholic Communi*529ty Middle School.2 In an effort to conceal his wrongdoing, Merzbacher allegedly threatened his victims and their families with violence and death if the authorities were ever informed of his actions. Appellants concede that the last threat by Merzbacher to any one of them occurred no later than 1980, and that all threats ceased before any of the Appellants reached the age of majority.
In January of 1994, Merzbacher was indicted in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City for the rape and sexual child abuse of Elizabeth Murphy, an Appellant in the case sub judice. On June 8,1995, a jury convicted Merzbacher of those crimes, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment plus ten years.3 The Court of Special Appeals affirmed Merzbacher’s convictions and sentences.4
On January 6, 1994, Appellant Murphy filed the first of fourteen civil complaints filed by Appellants in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City against Merzbacher and the Archdiocese. Murphy, along with the other Appellants, sought compensatory and punitive damages for various intentional and non-intentional torts resulting from their alleged sexual abuse by Merzbacher.
The Archdiocese responded with a Motion to Dismiss asserting Maryland’s three-year statute of limitations.5 Appel*530lants in turn argued that Merzbacher’s death threats should equitably estop the Archdiocese from raising limitations as a defense. On September 9, 1994, the circuit court denied Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss so that the parties could conduct limited discovery on the issue of whether the Appellants were under continuous duress from the time of the alleged threats through three years prior to the filing of the actions below.
Following discovery, the Archdiocese filed a new Motion to Dismiss, or, in the Alternative, [a Motion] for Summary Judgment, once again pleading limitations as a defense. On October 26, 1995, the circuit court issued a Memorandum and Order granting summary judgment in favor of the Archdiocese, concluding that although threats may estop a defendant from asserting limitations, Appellants’ claims were nonetheless barred since Merzbacher’s threats ceased long before “the victims reached the age of majority [and] the three year period of limitations period that followed.” Judgment was similarly entered in favor of Appellee Merzbacher on November 16,1995.
Because they contained common issues of law and fact, the court consolidated Appellants’ cases for “the purposes of discovery, pre-trial matters, and appellate review.” That Order issued on November 21, 1995, and served as a final and joint judgment in favor of Merzbacher and the Archdiocese in all of the Appellants’ cases. Appellants then noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. We issued a Writ of Certiorari on our own motion before consideration of the cases by the intermediate appellate court. Such other facts as necessary are incorporated into the discussion below.
II.
As this is an appeal from a grant of summary judgment in Appellees’ favor, our sole task is to determine whether *531the trial court was legally correct. Beatty v. Trailmaster, 330 Md. 726, 737, 625 A.2d 1005, 1011 (1993); King v. Bankerd, 303 Md. 98, 111, 492 A.2d 608, 614 (1985). In that regard, summary judgment is appropriate when there is no dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Maryland Rule 2-501; Bowen v. Smith, 342 Md. 449, 454, 677 A.2d 81, 83 (1996).
In assessing the court’s actions below, we point out that ‘"ordinary principles governing summary judgment ... continue to apply when the issue on summary judgment is limitations[.]” O’Hara v. Kovens, 305 Md. 280, 304, 503 A.2d 1313, 1325 (1986). If the plaintiff files his or her action beyond the limitations period, it is generally barred, entitling the defendant to judgment as a matter of law.
We have previously observed that a statute of limitations is nothing more than “the legislature’s judgment about the reasonable time needed to institute [a] suit.” Doe v. Maskell, 342 Md. 684, 689, 679 A.2d 1087, 1089 (1996). As the United States Supreme Court acknowledged over fifty years ago:
“Statutes of limitation find their justification in necessity and convenience rather than in logic. They represent expedients, rather than principles. They are practical and pragmatic devices to spare the courts from litigation of stale claims, and the citizen from being put to his defense after memories have faded, witnesses have died or disappeared, and evidence has been lost. (Internal citation omitted). They are by definition arbitrary, and their operation does not discriminate between the just and unjust claim, or the voidable and unavoidable delay. They have come into the law not through the judicial process but through legislation. They represent a public policy about the privilege to litigate.”
Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314, 65 S.Ct. 1137, 1142, 89 L.Ed. 1628, 1635 (1945). Thus, when plaintiffs imprudently prolong their decision to bring an action, these statutes act as a complete bar to their claims, *532relieving potential defendants from the pending burden. Doe, 342 Md. at 689-90, 679 A.2d at 1089-90.
Ordinarily, our statute of limitations begins to “accrue” on the date of the wrong. The assumption, of course, is that “a potential tort plaintiff is immediately aware that he [or she] has been wronged [and] is therefore put on notice that the statute of limitations” is running. Harig v. Johns-Manville Products, 284 Md. 70, 76, 394 A.2d 299, 303 (1978). The nature of some torts, however, belies this assumption. Thus, when stealth, subterfuge, or other difficulties of detection leave a plaintiff “blamelessly ignorant” of the facts and circumstances legally entitling him or her to relief, the statute does not begin to run against the plaintiff, unless he or she knows, or through the exercise of reasonable diligence should know, of the wrong. Doe, supra, 342 Md. at 690, 679 A.2d at 1090 (quoting Poffenberger v. Risser, 290 Md. 631, 637, 431 A.2d 677, 681 (1981)); Hecht v. Resolution Trust Corp., 333 Md. 324, 334, 635 A.2d 394, 399 (1994). This so-called “discovery rule” is not so much an exception to the statute of limitations, as it is a recognition that the Legislature, in employing the word “accrues” in § 5-101 never intended to close our courts to plaintiffs inculpably unaware of their injuries. Harig, supra, 284 Md. at 80, 394 A.2d at 305 (quoting Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 69 S.Ct. 1018, 93 L.Ed. 1282 (1949) (construing statute of limitations within Federal Employers’ Liability Act and holding unreasonable and inequitable notion that action accrues on the date of the last known exposure to an inherently unknowable harm)); see also Hecht, supra, 333 Md. at 333, 635 A.2d at 399 (when limitations are at issue, it is necessary to judicially determine when accrual occurred to trigger the operation of the statute).6
Otherwise, we have consistently held that our statutes of limitations are to be strictly construed, and absent a legislative *533creation of an exception, we “ “will not allow any implied or equitable exception to be engrafted upon it.’ ” Garay v. Overholtzer, 332 Md. 339, 359, 631 A.2d 429, 431 (1993) (quoting Booth Glass Co. v. Huntingfield Corp., 304 Md. 615, 623, 500 A.2d 641, 645 (1985)); Wallco Corp. v. Burger Chef, 281 Md. 207, 210-11, 378 A.2d 1100, 1101-02 (1977) (traditional rule concerning tolling of statutes of limitations can be fairly termed one of strict construction); McMahan v. Dorchester Fert. Co., 184 Md. 155, 160, 40 A.2d 313, 315-16 (1944).
III.
Appellants endeavor to persuade us that Merzbaeher and the Archdiocese should be equitably estopped from asserting limitations or alternatively, that this Court should recognize an exception to the general statute of limitations under a theory of duress. In our view, however, there is no meaningful distinction between the two theories advanced by Appellants. Rather, duress and estoppel share a cause and effect relationship. It is upon the grounds of duress that Appellants seek to estop Merzbaeher and the Archdiocese from asserting limitations.
Estoppel by Duress
a.
Despite our historically strict stance on statutes of limitations, this Court first intimated in 1972 that “unconscionable, inequitable, or fraudulent act[s] of commission or omission upon which another relie[s] and has been mislead to his [or her] injury,” may equitably estop a defendant from raising limitations as a defense under a general statute of limitations.7 *534Leonhart v. Atkinson, 265 Md. 219, 227-28, 289 A.2d 1, 6 (1972). In that case, the Leonharts and their corporation brought suit outside the then applicable limitations period8 against Atkinson, a certified public account, for alleged professional malpractice. The trial court granted a defense motion for summary judgment on limitations grounds. In affirming that decision, our predecessors declined to find conduct giving rise to an estoppel, noting that at no time did Atkinson “ask[ ] the Leonharts to forbear bringing suit against him, ... indicate [that] he would waive the defense of limitations should the [Leonharts] make a later claim, or that he induced them not to file suit by giving assurances that he would settle any claim they might make.” Leonhart, 265 Md. at 228, 289 A.2d at 6.
A few months later, a similar result obtained in Nyitrai v. Bonis, 266 Md. 295, 292 A.2d 642 (1972), but for a different reason. In Nyitrai, our predecessors recognized that
“where the inducement for delay or the hindrance to the commencement of an action has ceased to operate before the expiration of the limitation period so as to afford the plaintiff ample time thereafter in which to institute his action prior to the running of the statute of limitations, he cannot excuse his failure to do so on the ground of estoppel.” (Citations omitted).
*535266 Md. at 299-300, 292 A.2d at 644. The Court concluded that although the plaintiff was entitled to raise an estoppel against the defendant, she had unreasonably delayed her suit by waiting eleven months to bring her action after the grounds for the estoppel had ceased. Thus, the defendant in the action was entitled to raise limitations as a defense.
Stated succinctly, “equitable estoppel will not toll the running of limitations absent a showing that the defendant ‘held out any inducements not to file suit or indicated that limitations would not be pleaded,’ ” Booth Glass, supra, 304 Md. at 624, 500 A.2d at 645 (quoting Nyitrai, supra, 266 Md. at 300, 292 A.2d at 645), and that the plaintiff brought his or her action within a reasonable time after the conclusion of the events giving rise to the estoppel.
b.
The inducements to which Appellants point are Merzbacher’s alleged threats. Although a novel application of the estoppel rule in Maryland, we, like the First Appellate District of the Courts of Appeal of California, agree that such an application is “plausible.” See DeRose v. Carswell, 196 Cal.App.3d 1011, 1026, 242 Cal.Rptr. 368, 377 (1987); see also Jones v. Jones, 242 N.J.Super. 195, 208, 576 A.2d 316, 322 (1990) (duress tolls the statute of limitations, at least, when, as here, it is either an element of or inherent in the underlying cause of action). Indeed, a potential tort plaintiff can as much be induced to delay his or her action by an affirmative threat, as he or she can by a false promise.
In a case factually similar to the instant case, the Supreme Court of California considered the timeliness of a sexual assault claim under the one-year statute of limitations set forth in California’s Tort Claims Act. As that court observed
“[e]stoppel most commonly results from misleading statements about the need for or advisability of a claim; actual *536fraud or the intent to mislead is not essential.9 (Internal citations omitted). A fortiori, estoppel may certainly be invoked when there are acts of violence or intimidation that are intended to prevent the filing of a claim. (Original emphasis).”
John R. v. Oakland Unified School Dist., 48 Cal.3d 438, 445, 256 Cal.Rptr. 766, 769 P.2d 948, 951 (1989).
New York takes a similar view of limitations with respect to estoppel by duress in minority sexual assault cases. See Zoe v. Frederick F.G., 617 N.Y.S.2d 370, 208 A.D.2d 675 (1994); Doe v. Roe, 596 N.Y.S.2d 620, 192 A.D.2d 1089 (1993); Hoffman v. Hoffman, 556 N.Y.S.2d 608, 162 A.D.2d 249 (1990). Under New York law, as in our holding in Nyitrai, supra, plaintiffs seeking to avoid limitations on the grounds of duress must show that they brought their actions within a reasonable time after the events giving rise to the estoppel have ceased. Zoe, 617 N.Y.S.2d at 371, 208 A.D.2d at 675; Doe, 192 A.D.2d at 1090-91, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 621; Hoffman, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 608, 162 A.D.2d at 249. We note, however, that in none of these cases did the court permit the plaintiff to escape limitations under a theory of estoppel by duress.
Although Appellants suggest otherwise, California parallels the New York approach. For example, in DeRose, supra, the *537First Appellate District of the Courts of Appeal of California rejected a sexual abuse victim’s claim that “threat[s], and fear of harm from the defendant” prevented her from filing suit within the applicable limitations period because “she did nothing to pursue her claims even after [the defendant’s] conduct [that gave rise to the estoppel] ceased.” 196 Cal.App.3d at 1026, 242 Cal.Rptr. at 377 (citing Lobrovich v. Georgison, 144 Cal.App.2d 567, 301 P.2d 460 (1956)).10
In so holding, that court observed that:
“[the plaintiff] expressly alleged that [the offensive] conduct occurred ... “when she was approximately four years old and until she was 11 years old (1966-1973).’ The Court in ... Lobrovich [, supra] held that five weeks were sufficient time for the plaintiff to institute an action after the conduct giving rise to an estoppel ceased. In this case, [the plaintiff] had a year to file suit as an adult.”
196 Cal.App.3d at 1026, 242 Cal.Rptr. at 377.
Despite the holding in the above cases, Appellants direct our attention to John R., supra. Although the precise issue in John R. was the timeliness of a minor’s claim against the Oakland Unified School District (“District”) for alleged acts of sexual molestation by a teacher under the doctrine of respondent superior, the estoppel argument raised against the District is identical to the argument Appellants press here. In order to fully appreciate the relevance of John R., a review of its pertinent facts and law will serve to illuminate the present controversy.
c.
Fourteen year-old John R. was allegedly molested by his mathematics teacher over a period of several months, with the *538last act occurring in February, 1981. Ten months later, in December, 1981, John R. reported the alleged incidents to his father. John’s mother in turn shared her son’s accusations with the District that same month. She was advised to let the police, who were promptly notified by the District, intervene. John’s mother then contacted an attorney, who advised her to wait for criminal charges to be substantiated prior to pursuing any civil remedy. For reasons not relevant here, the criminal charges against the teacher were eventually dismissed. See John R., 48 Cal.3d at 442 n. 2, 256 Cal.Rptr. at 768 n. 2, 769 P.2d at 950 n. 2.
Thereafter, John’s parents brought suit on his behalf and in their own right against the teacher and the District. At the trial’s outset, judgment was entered in favor of the District on all counts, based upon, inter alia, limitations.
Under California law, limitations ordinarily do not accrue against a minor until he or she reaches the age of majority, after which time any action has to be brought within one year. See Cal.Civ.Proc.Code § 352 (West 1989). The California Tort Claims Act, however, affords minors no grace period. See Cal.Gov’t Code §§ 901, 911.2 and 911.4(b) (West 1989). Any claims accruing in favor of a minor against a public entity must be made in writing within 100 days of the date the action accrues. Cal.Gov’t Code § 911.2. Failing that, Cal.Gov’t Code § 911.4(b) requires that leave to file a late claim be made within one year of the action’s accrual date. John R.’s parents first filed suit some fifteen months beyond the date John R. was last assaulted. Thus, the trial court held that limitations barred all claims against the District.
A California intermediate appellate court reversed, concluding that at least with respect to the limitations issue, the plaintiffs should have enjoyed the benefit of the “delayed discovery” doctrine. John R., 48 Cal.3d at 444, 256 Cal.Rptr. at 769, 769 P.2d at 951. The District appealed that decision.
Though questioning the soundness of the lower appellate court’s application of “delayed discovery,” the Supreme Court of California nonetheless thought a remand to the trial court *539was in order so that the court could determine whether the District should be estopped from asserting limitations under what could fairly be called a theory of vicarious equitable estoppe11—a theory incidentally, that we neither address nor adopt today. See Part IV., infra.
Noting that the trial court failed to undertake such an analysis of the timeliness of John R.’s claims, California’s highest court ordered that factual findings be made with respect to “(1) whether any threats were in fact made by the teacher, (2) when the effect of any such threats ceased, or (3) whether the plaintiffs acted within a reasonable time after the coercive effect of the threats ceased.”12 It is this factual *540inquiry that Appellants maintain was improperly left unresolved in the instant case. Thus, the argument goes, a remand is necessary. We see it differently.
IV.
There is a critical, and in our view, dispositive difference between facts of John R. and the case sub judice. The running of the California statutes was not tolled by John R.’s minority, and the cessation of his teacher’s conduct triggered the statutes’ march towards finality. Thus, John R. and his parents were arguably deprived of a portion of their limitations period by the alleged acts and omissions of the defendants. But see n. 13, supra. In the instant case, Appellants cannot and do not claim that they were so deprived. Indeed, Md.Code (1995 Repl.Vol., 1996 Supp.), § 5-201 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article provides in relevant part:
“§ 5-201. Persons under a disability.
(a) Extension of time.—When a cause of action subject to a limitation under Subtitle 1 of this title accrues in favor of a minor or mental incompetent, that person shall file his action within the lesser of three years or the applicable period of limitations after the date the disability is removed.
(b) Exception.—This section does not apply if the statute of limitations has more than three years to run when the disability is removed.”
Appellants concede that none of them had any contact with Merzbacher whatsoever after reaching the age of majority, and some of the Appellants’ last contact with him occurred well before that time. Thus, by their own admissions, Appellants enjoyed the full limitations period provided to them by the General Assembly.
Nonetheless, Appellants attempt to elude this inconvenient fact by two different, but related routes. First, they maintain that “as a general rule ... whether a cause of action is barred *541by the statute of limitations is ordinarily a mixed question of law and fact that may be taken from the jury only when the court determines as a matter of law that the suit was not instituted within the proper time.” James v. Weisheit, 279 Md. 41, 46, 367 A.2d 482, 485 (1977); see also Impala Platinum v. Impala Sales, 283 Md. 296, 323, 389 A.2d 887, 903 (1978). Appellants contend that although the conduct of Merzbacher ceased before the statute of limitations began to run against their claims, the effect of Merzbacher’s threats lasted until the filing of the actions below, or at the very least, a reasonable jury could so find. See O’Hara v. Kovens, supra, 305 Md. at 301, 503 A.2d at 1323 (questions of fact on which a limitations defense will turn are to be decided by the fact finder).
Appellants also maintain that the policy reasons undergirding statutes of limitations militate towards tolling in the instant case. In the Appellants’ view, those policies are not implicated when, as here, their claims are not fraudulent, the witnesses are presently available and willing to testify, the evidence is still fresh, and no inconvenience would accrue to Merzbacher or the Archdiocese. See generally Doe v. Maskell, supra, 342 Md. at 689, 679 A.2d at 1089; Pennwalt Corp. v. Nasios, 314 Md. 433, 437, 550 A.2d 1155, 1158 (1988); Hecht v. Resolution Trust Corp., 333 Md. 324, 333, 635 A.2d 394, 399 (1994); Pierce v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 296 Md. 656, 665, 464 A.2d 1020, 1026 (1983); Goldstein v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 285 Md. 673, 684, 404 A.2d 1064, 1069 (1979); Harig v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., supra, 284 Md. at 75, 394 A.2d at 302.
We disagree for several reasons. First and foremost, we conclude as a matter of law that under the applicable principles of estoppel, no jury could find that Appellants acted within a reasonable period of time following the cessation of Merzbacher’s conduct. There was absolutely no evidence that Merzbacher made any threats to the appellants or that he engaged in any overt acts after 1980, and consequently during the three-year period which followed their attaining the age of majority, that prevented Appellants from filing timely actions. *542Minority is a valid excuse for not commencing suit within the three year general limitations period; unsubstantiated fear of retaliation is not.
Under this Court’s holding in Nyitrai, supra, if the cessation of the defendant’s conduct affords the plaintiff ample time thereafter in which to institute his or her action prior to the running of the statute of limitations, he or she cannot raise an estoppel argument to bar a defense of limitations. 266 Md. at 299-300, 292 A.2d at 644. It follows that if the alleged conduct ceases before the statute begins to run, the same holds true.
Further, as we indicated in Doe v. Maskell, supra, a statute of limitations is nothing more than a legislative judgment about the amount of time needed to initiate a suit.' 342 Md. at 689, 679 A.2d at 1089. Appellants implore this Court to ignore that judgment and substitute its own. Recognizing the peculiar difficulties visited upon those of tender years who are injured in their minority, our Legislature has already determined the amount of time reasonably needed to bring an action after reaching the age of majority. We cannot disturb that determination.
Also, whether or not the concerns prompting statutes of limitations are absent in the instant case is quite beside the point. Again, it is neither the duty nor the province of this Court to rewrite a legislative enactment simply because it is socially useful or judicially expedient to do so. That function belongs solely to the General Assembly.
Accordingly, we hold that in view of the fact that Merzbacher’s alleged threats ceased before any of the Appellants reached the age of majority, their failure to maintain their actions within the applicable limitations period after that date was unreasonable as a matter of law and absolutely bars their claims against Merzbacher.
Y.
Appellants also contend that Merzbacher’s alleged threats should be imputed to the Archdiocese to similarly prevent it *543from raising limitations as a defense to Appellants’ claims. Because we conclude that those claims are barred against Merzbacher, Appellants’ claims are likewise barred against the Archdiocese. Thus, we need not reach the issue of whether Merzbacher’s conduct should be imputed to the Archdiocese for the purpose of applying equitable tolling principles.

JUDGMENTS AFFIRMED, WITH COSTS.

ELDRIDGE and RAKER, JJ., dissent.

. Sharon Bruce, Jane Doe, Mike Doe, Maryland Lewandowski, Bryan House, Elizabeth Murphy, James Doe, Katherine Micolowski, Mary Doe, Melody Smith, Steven Melnick, Angela Farley, Jane Roe and Edward Blair.

. Petitioners Bryan House and Angela Farley were never enrolled in the Catholic Community Middle School, although Mr. House did attend summer classes at the school on an informal basis and lived with Merzbacher for a period of time. Ms. Farley was apparently a friend of Mr. House. Both maintain that they were victims of Merzbacher’s attacks.

. Merzbacher’s sentencing took place on July 21, 1995.

. John J. Merzbacher v. State of Maryland, No. 1400, September Term, 1995, 111 Md.App. 745 (1996) (unreported), cert. granted, 344 Md. 115, 685 A.2d 450 (1996).

. To the extent Appellants’ Complaints alleged counts of assault, those claims are governed by Maryland Code (1974, 1995 Repl.Vol.), § 5-105 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article which provides that “[a]n action for assault ... shall be filed within one year from the date it accrues.” Otherwise, Appellants’ claims are subject to Maryland’s general three-year statute of limitations. It provides:
*530"§ 5-101. Three-year limitation in general.
A civil action at law shall be filed within three years from the date it accrues unless another provision of the Code provides a different period of time within which an action shall be commenced.”

. Petitioners do not attempt, and indeed cannot attempt, to argue that they were only recently aware of their injuries. Such an argument would strain credulity. See, e.g., Doe v. Archdiocese of Washington, et al., 114 Md.App. 169, 689 A.2d 634 (1997).

. In Chandlee v. Shockley, 219 Md. 493, 150 A.2d 438 (1959) this Court noted that some statutes limit the right of recovery (such as § 5-101) and some create a new cause of action but employ a time limit as a condition precedent (such as then Md.Code (1957), Art. 93, § 112) (granting the right of third parties to sue estate executors or administrators “in any action which might have been maintained against the deceased^]).” Nevertheless, both species of statutes are subject to being tolled by affirmative acts of waiver or fraud on the part of the *534defendant. Accord Cornett v. Sandbower, Adm’r, 235 Md. 339, 201 A.2d 678 (1964); Jordan v. Morgan, Adm’x, 252 Md. 122, 249 A.2d 124 (1969). This Court nodded approvingly to the decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Scarborough v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 178 F.2d 253 (4th Cir.1949). The Scarborough court held that because the railroad’s claim agent erroneously informed the claimant regarding the amount of time he had to initiate suit thereby inducing him to delay his action until the applicable limitations period had expired, equity estopped the railroad from raising limitations as a defense.

. Then Maryland Code (1957, 1972 Repl.Vol.), Art. 57, § 1 provided that ”[a]ll actions of account, actions of assumpsit, or on the case ... shall be commenced, sued or issued within three years from the time the cause of action accrued[.]”

. This view of estoppel is consistent with Maryland law. In Knill v. Knill, this Court observed that it has consistently viewed equitable estoppel as
" 'the effect of the voluntary conduct of a party whereby he is absolutely precluded both at law and in equity, from asserting rights which might perhaps have otherwise have existed, either of property, of contract, or of remedy, as against another person, who has in good faith relied upon such conduct, and has been led thereby to change his position for the worse and who on his part acquires some corresponding right, either of property, of contract, or of remedy.' ”
306 Md. 527, 534, 510 A.2d 546, 549 (1986) (quoting 3 J. Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, § 804 (5th ed. 1941)). The court also noted that "[ajlthough wrongful or unconscionable conduct is generally an element of estoppel, an estoppel may arise even where there is no intent to mislead, if the actions of one party cause a prejudicial change in the conduct of the other.” Knill, 306 Md. at 534, 510 A.2d at 549-50 (citations omitted).

. The Lobrovich court held that "[i]f there is still ample time to institute the action within the statutory period after the circumstances inducing delay have ceased to operate, the plaintiff who failed to do so cannot claim an estoppel.” Lobrovich v. Georgison, 144 Cal.App.2d 567, 573, 301 P.2d 460, 464 (1956). This view accords with our holding in Nyitrai v. Bonis, 266 Md. 295, 292 A.2d 642 (1972).

. In so holding, the Supreme Court of California opined that "assuming plaintiffs can establish their case, it would plainly be inequitable to permit the [District to escape liability only because the teacher’s threats succeeded in preventing his victim from disclosing the molestation until the time for filing a claim against the [District had elapsed. We conclude that, for purposes of applying equitable estoppel, the time for filing a claim against the [District was tolled during the period that the teacher’s threats prevented plaintiffs from pursuing their claims.”
John R. v. Oakland Unified School Dist., 48 Cal.3d 438, 446, 256 Cal.Rptr. 766, 770, 769 P.2d 948, 952 (1989).

. In light of the facts as alleged by the plaintiffs in John R., its holding gives us pause. Equitable estoppel will bar a defendant from raising limitations as a defense so long as the defendant’s voluntary conduct prevented the plaintiff from filing suit within the applicable limitations period, and the plaintiff pursued his or her claim within a reasonable amount of time following the cessation of the events prompting the estoppel. The plaintiffs in John R., however, expressly acknowledged that the teacher’s acts were disclosed to the parents ten (10) months after the molestation had terminated and that the plaintiffs delayed their suit pending the resolution of criminal charges against the teacher on the advice of their attorney. The first claim against the teacher and District was thus not brought until fifteen (15) months after the teacher’s alleged conduct had ceased.
While conceivably the teacher’s actions could have delayed plaintiffs’ suit beyond the 100 day limitations period set forth in Cal. Gov’t Code § 911.2, no such assertion can be made with respect to the plaintiffs’ failure to apply for leave to file a late claim within one year as required by Cal. Gov’t Code § 911.4(b). Indeed, plaintiffs’ own counsel instructed them not to file suit until resolution of the criminal proceedings. That aside, the defendant’s conduct in no way prevented plaintiffs from filing suit within the two months after John R. disclosed the abuse. *540Stated otherwise, there was no cause/effect relationship between the defendant's conduct and plaintiffs’ failure to comply with § 911.4(b).