Court Opinion

ID: 9513301
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:33:58.566056+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:05:48.756634
License: Public Domain

[¶ 50]
VANDE WALLE, Chief Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
[¶ 51] I join in parts I and II of the majority opinion. I dissent to part III of the majority opinion.
[¶ 52] In reversing the trial court’s summary judgment on the claim of negligent supervision, the majority relies on the “phenomenon” of “transference.” If the phenomenon does apply to a therapist, there is doubt in my mind whether or not social workers are “therapists” in the same sense as used by the authorities cited in the majority opinion. We have, for example, refused under Rule 503, N.D.R.Ev., to recognize a social worker as a therapist so that disclosure of an incestuous relationship to a social worker, who was not a physician or a psychologist, was not a privileged communication. State v. Copeland, 448 N.W.2d 611 (N.D.1989). Although a social worker is defined as a therapist under section 12.1-20-06.1, N.D.C.C., for purposes of the statute making sexual exploitation a crime if the social worker “purports to perform psychotherapy,” a psychotherapist is defined by Rule 503(a)(3) of the N.D.R.Ev. as:
“(i) a person authorized to practice medicine in any state or nation, or reasonably believed by the patient so to be, while engaged in the diagnosis or treatment of a mental or emotional condition, including alcohol or drug addiction, or, (ii) a person licensed or certified as a psychologist under the laws of any state or nation, while similarly engaged.”
I do not believe the record supports a finding that Gillette sought to treat Nelson for a “mental or emotional condition, including alcohol or drug addiction.” Indeed, we have recognized that a social worker is often recognized as the antagonist rather than the therapist by those placed in the social workers caseload. E.g., In Interest of J.K.S., 356 N.W.2d 88, 93 (N.D.1984) (VandeWalle, J., concurring specially).
*343[¶ 53] I agree the County has a duty to prevent the sexual abuse of its wards, but the duty is held to those injuries which are foreseeable. I cannot agree with Nelson’s claim that a duty is established merely because the County knew she was sexually promiscuous. Only the most cynical view could justify a conclusion that knowledge on the part of the County of Nelson’s history should, without more, cause the County to foresee its employees would naturally take advantage of the situation.
[¶ 54] Had the County in any way been alerted that Gillette, as an individual, might take advantage of Nelson, I would agree with the majority. But, there is, as Nelson concedes, nothing in this record to demonstrate the County should have foreseen Gillette would sexually abuse Nelson as a result of her sexual promiscuity. Unfortunately, the majority opinion reinforces a stereotype that men will succumb to a young woman’s wiles, teaching that hereafter men are not to be totally trusted with young women. The conclusion to be drawn from the majority opinion is that Nelson can prove her case based on her known promiscuity and the fact Gillette was a male. That conclusion is at best a disservice, if not an indication of gender bias, to the many male social workers who would not have acted as did Gillette.
[¶ 55] I would affirm the entire judgment of the trial court.
[¶ 56] Gerald W. Vande Walle, C.J.