Court Opinion

ID: 9410321
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-20 20:06:36.921863+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:56.702067
License: Public Domain

Filed 7/20/23 P. v. Scroggins CA5

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

              IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                       FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 THE PEOPLE,
                                                                                      F084113, F084665
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                              (Super. Ct. No. MF014273A)
                    v.

 JONATHAN OLIVER SCROGGINS,                                                               OPINION
           Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Charles R.
Brehmer, Judge.
         Vanessa Place, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Louis M. Vasquez and Ian
Whitney, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                                                        -ooOoo-
                                     INTRODUCTION
       A jury convicted Jonathan Oliver Scroggins (appellant) of oral copulation or
sexual penetration of a child 10 years of age or younger (Pen. Code,1 § 288.7, subd. (b);
count 1), lewd act on a child under the age of 14 years (§ 288, subd. (a); count 2), and
possession of matter depicting a minor engaged in sexual conduct (§ 311.11, subd. (a);
count 4). The trial court sentenced him to 15 years to life plus two years in state prison.
       On appeal, appellant contends the trial court was unaware of its discretion to
sentence him in accordance with newly enacted Assembly Bill No. 124 (2021-2022 Reg.
Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 695, § 5) and Assembly Bill No. 518 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.)
(Stats. 2021, ch. 441, § 1). He also claims the trial court erred in ordering restitution for
relocation expenses to the victim’s mother. We find no error. We affirm.
                                     BACKGROUND
       We need not discuss the facts underlying appellant’s conviction in detail because
they are not relevant to this appeal. In short, while babysitting his sister’s children,
appellant orally copulated his four-year-old niece. During the ensuing investigation,
officers searched appellant’s computer and discovered numerous images and videos
depicting young children engaged in sexual acts.
                                       DISCUSSION
I.     The Trial Court Was Aware of its Discretion to Sentence Appellant in
       Accordance with Assembly Bill No. 124 and Assembly Bill No. 518.
       Appellant contends he must be remanded for resentencing in light of two recent
changes to California sentencing law. Assembly Bill No. 1242 added subdivision

1      All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
2      During the 2021-2022 legislative term, three bills proposing changes to section
1170 in a variety of ways were introduced. They were Assembly Bill No. 124 (Stats.
2021, ch. 695, § 5), Assembly Bill No. 1540 (Stats. 2021, ch. 719, § 2), and Senate Bill
No. 567 (Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1.3). All three bills were passed by the Legislature in
September 2021, and approved by the Governor and filed with the Secretary of State on

                                              2.
(b)(6)(A) to section 1170, which makes the lower term presumptive where the defendant
experienced “psychological, physical, or childhood trauma” that contributed to the
offense. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6)(A).) Assembly Bill No. 518 amended section 654 to give
trial courts discretion not to impose the provision providing for the longest term of
imprisonment. (§ 654, subd. (a).) Appellant argues the trial court was unaware of the
scope of its sentencing discretion under these new laws.
       We disagree. Appellant was sentenced months after Assembly Bill No. 124 and
Assembly Bill No. 518 became effective. Thus, appellant forfeited his claims regarding
the applicability of the new laws by failing to raise them at sentencing. Even if the
claims were not forfeited, remand would be unwarranted, because nothing in the record
suggests the court was unaware of its discretion.
       A.     Background
       Prior to appellant’s sentencing hearing, defense counsel filed a sentencing
memorandum requesting the court consider a probation sentence. In addition to the
sentencing memorandum, appellant submitted several documents, including military
records showing he served two years in the Air Force, academic records and awards,
interviews of and statements from friends and family members, and a sex offender risk
assessment report from a psychologist.
       In his interview with the psychologist, appellant claimed that he was physically
and psychologically abused by his mother and stepmother, and that he began suffering
from mental health issues at the age of 23. Additionally, in statements to defense counsel

October 8, 2021. Senate Bill No. 567 bears the highest chapter number and is presumed
to be the last of the three approved by the Governor. (Gov. Code, § 9510.) As such,
Senate Bill No. 567 prevails over Assembly Bill No. 124. (Gov. Code, § 9605, subd.
(b).) To the extent there are conflicts between the three bills, Senate Bill No. 567 takes
precedence. (In re Thierry S. (1977) 19 Cal.3d 727, 738–739.) As to subdivision
(b)(6)(A) of section 1170, however, the substantive language in Assembly Bill No. 124,
Assembly Bill No. 1540, and Senate Bill No. 567 are not in conflict. For ease of
discussion, we refer to Assembly Bill No. 124 rather than Senate Bill No. 567.

                                             3.
and letters to the court, appellant’s sister and aunt stated appellant was raised in an
abusive household and exposed to sexual conduct at a young age.
       Appellant was sentenced on March 23, 2022. At sentencing, the court confirmed
that it had received the above documents, and that it “read everything in detail.”
       Defense counsel argued that appellant’s conduct, while serious, involved only a
single act, and was not the “wors[t] of the wors[t]” with regards to sex offenses against
children. He asked the court to consider appellant’s upbringing, claiming the submitted
materials show appellant had a “very dysfunctional youth,” and was “exposed to sexual
elements.” He also noted appellant served in the military, attended college, and
demonstrated remorse.
       Prior to imposing sentence, the trial court expressed agreement that appellant came
from a “very difficult childhood” and was remorseful. It also agreed that appellant’s
conduct was “not the wors[t] factual scenario for this type of crime or for these counts.”
It stated it did not believe appellant was an “evil guy,” but that he “did some evil things.”
       The trial court sentenced appellant on count 1 to 15 years to life. On count 2, the
trial court imposed the middle term of six years, but stayed sentence pursuant to section
654. On count 4, the trial court imposed the middle term of two years, to be served
consecutively to count 1.
       In imposing sentence, the trial court did not specifically address its reasons for
imposing sentence on count 1 and staying count 2 pursuant to section 654, as amended by
Assembly Bill No. 518. Defense counsel did not request the court do the opposite:
impose sentence in count 2 and stay sentence in count 1. As to counts 2 and 4, the court
stated it had considered “factors in mitigation and aggravation,” and was imposing the
middle term. The court and parties did not address the applicability of Assembly Bill No.
124; namely, whether appellant experienced “childhood trauma” that was a “contributing
factor in the commission of the offense[s].” (§ 1170, subdivision (b)(6)(A).)

                                              4.
        B.     Standard of review
        Sentencing decisions are subject to the abuse of discretion standard. (People v.
Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 847; People v. Hicks (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 496, 512.)
“[A] trial court does not abuse its discretion unless its decision is so irrational or arbitrary
that no reasonable person could agree with it.” (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th
367, 377.)
        “ ‘Defendants are entitled to sentencing decisions made in the exercise of the
“informed discretion” of the sentencing court.’ ” (People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th
1354, 1391 (Gutierrez).) Thus, “[a]n abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court ... is
unaware of its discretion.” (In re White (2020) 9 Cal.5th 455, 470.) However, “[a]bsent
evidence to the contrary, we presume that the trial court knew and applied the governing
law.” (Gutierrez, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 1390; see People v. Myers (1999) 69
Cal.App.4th 305, 310 [“The court is presumed to have considered all of the relevant
factors.”].) The burden is on the party attacking the sentence to demonstrate an abuse of
discretion occurred. (People v. Superior Court (Alvarez) (1997) 14 Cal.4th 968, 977.)
“To meet this burden, the [appellant] must ‘affirmatively demonstrate that the trial court
misunderstood its sentencing discretion.’ ” (People v. Lee (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 861,
866.)
        Appellant suggests the appropriate standard of review is whether “the record
‘clearly indicate[s]’ that the trial court would have reached the same conclusion ‘even if it
had been aware that it had such discretion.’ ” (Gutierrez, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 1391.)
But this standard does not apply until it has been established that the trial court was
unaware of its discretion, and the appellate court must determine if remand for
resentencing is necessary. (Ibid.) The instant case does not involve a retroactive change
in law after the defendant was sentenced, where it is clear the trial court was unaware of
its discretion. (See Gutierrez, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 1391; People v. Flores (2020) 9
Cal.5th 371, 431–432.) Assembly Bill No. 124 and Assembly Bill No. 518 were both

                                               5.
effective January 1, 2022, almost three months before appellant was sentenced. Thus, we
presume the trial court was aware of and applied the law as amended, and it is appellant’s
burden to prove otherwise.
       C.     Forfeiture
       As a threshold matter, respondent contends appellant forfeited his claims that the
trial court was unaware of the scope of its sentencing discretion by failing to object or
otherwise raise the issues at sentencing. We agree. “[C]laims involving the trial court’s
failure to properly make or articulate its discretionary sentencing choices” are subject to
forfeiture and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. (People v. Scott (1994) 9
Cal.4th 331, 353.) This includes “cases in which the stated reasons allegedly do not
apply to the particular case, and cases in which the court purportedly erred because it
double-counted a particular sentencing factor, misweighed the various factors, or failed to
state any reasons or give a sufficient number of valid reasons.” (Ibid.)
       Here, appellant did not request the trial court impose sentence on count 2, the
shorter of the two terms, and stay sentence on count 1 pursuant to section 654,
subdivision (a). Nor did he argue he was entitled to the presumptive lower term on
counts 2 and 4 based on his “psychological, physical, or childhood trauma.” (§ 1170,
subd. (b)(6)(A).) Accordingly, his sentencing claims are forfeited.
       D.     Assembly Bill No. 518
       Prior to the enactment of Assembly Bill No. 518, section 654, former
subdivision (a) required that a defendant who committed an act punishable by two or
more provisions of law be punished under the provision that provided for the longest
possible term. (Stats. 1997, ch. 410, § 1.) Effective January 1, 2022, Assembly Bill
No. 518 amended section 654, subdivision (a) to permit an act or omission punishable
under two or more provisions of law to “be punished under either of such provisions.” In
other words, Assembly Bill No. 518 amended section 654, subdivision (a), to give trial

                                             6.
courts discretion not to impose the provision providing for the longest term of
imprisonment.
       Appellant contends that the record does not clearly indicate that the trial court was
aware of its discretion under section 654 to stay count 1, the indeterminant term of 15
years to life, and instead impose sentence for count 2, a determinate term of six years. He
argues the trial court did not “clearly opine that a life term fit appellant’s crime,” which
suggests it was unaware of its ability not to impose sentence on count 1.
       Appellant’s argument is based on the incorrect assumption that the record must
affirmatively show the trial court was aware of its discretion under section 654 as
amended. As we explained above, the burden is on appellant to “ ‘affirmatively
demonstrate that the trial court misunderstood its sentencing discretion.’ ” (People v.
Lee, supra, 16 Cal.App.5th at p. 866.) Nothing in the record suggests the trial court
believed it was compelled to impose sentence as to count 1 instead of count 2. Absent
affirmative evidence to the contrary, we presume the trial court understood its sentencing
discretion, and appellant has not met the burden of showing an abuse of discretion
occurred.
       E.     Assembly Bill No. 124
       Assembly Bill No. 124 amended section 1170 by adding paragraph (6) to
subdivision (b), which provides, in pertinent part: “Notwithstanding paragraph (1), and
unless the court finds that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating
circumstances that imposition of the lower term would be contrary to the interests of
justice, the court shall order imposition of the lower term if any of the following was a
contributing factor in the commission of the offense: [¶] (A) The person has experienced
psychological, physical, or childhood trauma, including, but not limited to, abuse,
neglect, exploitation, or sexual violence.”

                                              7.
       Appellant argues the record does not show the trial court was aware of its
obligation under Assembly Bill No. 124 to consider evidence of trauma. He argues that
had the trial court considered such evidence, it would have concluded imposition of the
low term on counts 2 and 4 was “both appropriate and required.”
       Appellant again applies the wrong standard of review. The record shows the trial
court read and considered all evidence and documents presented to it. Prior to
sentencing, the court confirmed it had reviewed all the materials submitted by appellant.
Nothing in the record affirmatively shows the court was unaware of Assembly Bill
No. 124 or section 1170, subdivision (b)(6)(A). Although the materials provided by
defense counsel suggest appellant may have had an abusive childhood, the extent of such
abuse or trauma was not fleshed out in detail, and appellant made no effort to show that it
contributed to the commission of the offense. Thus, on this record we presume the trial
court found section 1170, subdivision (b)(6)(A) was inapplicable and did not address it
on the record because it was not raised by counsel. Given this presumption, appellant has
not met the burden of affirmatively showing the court abused its discretion.
       Appellant also suggests the trial court was unaware of section 1170.91,
subdivision (a), which requires a sentencing court to consider whether a defendant was
“suffering from sexual trauma, traumatic brain injury, post-traumatic stress disorder,
substance abuse, or mental health problems as a result of the defendant’s military
service.” But like Assembly Bill No. 124 and Assembly Bill No. 518, section 1170.91,
subdivision (a) was effective long before appellant was sentenced. (Stats. 2014, ch. 163,
§ 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2015.) Thus, the same presumption that the trial court was aware of
section 1170.91, subdivision (a) applies. (See People v. Gutierrez, supra, 58 Cal.4th at
p. 1390.) Nothing in the record suggests the trial court believed section 1170.91,
subdivision (a) was inapplicable to appellant. Moreover, while defense counsel

                                            8.
referenced appellant’s military service at sentencing, he did not claim appellant’s mental
health issues were the result of said military service.
       Based on this record, appellant has not demonstrated the trial court was unaware
of the scope of its sentencing discretion. We, therefore, conclude no abuse of discretion
occurred, and appellant’s sentencing claims lack merit.
II.    The Trial Court did not Abuse its Discretion in Awarding Relocation
       Expenses to the Victim’s Mother.
       At a restitution hearing following trial, the trial court awarded the victim’s mother
$3,919.97 in relocation expenses. Appellant contends this portion of the restitution order
must be stricken because there was insufficient evidence that the expenses were
“verified … by a mental health treatment provider to be necessary for the emotional
well-being of the victim.” (§ 1202.4, subd. (f)(3)(I).) We conclude that the victim’s
mother’s testimony that her therapist told her it would be best to move to a new residence
when she is able was sufficient to satisfy the verification requirement.
       A.     Background
       The trial court held the restitution hearing in July 2022, approximately four
months after appellant was sentenced. The People called the victim’s mother as a
witness. She testified that she was requesting restitution for various expenses and losses,
including relocation expenses. She stated she had not moved yet because she could not
afford it and was waiting for “Section 8,” but that her goal was to move by the end of the
year. She believed relocation was necessary because her children experienced trauma in
their current residence and expressed they no longer felt safe living there.
       On cross-examination, defense counsel asked the victim’s mother if she had
spoken with “a psychologist or mental health expert about relocating.” The victim’s
mother replied she had spoken with her “recovery coordinator.”

                                              9.
       On redirect, the victim’s mother clarified that the recovery coordinator is a
“therapist-type counselor.” She explained that she told the recovery coordinator that her
family no longer felt comfortable in their residence because it is a “constant reminder” of
appellant’s conduct. The recovery coordinator responded that relocation “would be the
best bet.”
       The trial court awarded the requested relocation expenses over appellant’s
objection, reasoning: “[The victim’s mother’s] testimony that there was a mental health
person that recommended it or suggested it along with the facts of the case and kind of
the dynamics in that house or apartment makes sense, and I believe that’s an appropriate
amount.”
       B.     Standard of Review
       “Section 1202.4, subdivision (f) provides for a direct restitution order ‘in every
case in which a victim has suffered economic loss as a result of the defendant’s
conduct.’ ” (People v. Brasure (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1037, 1074.) Section 1202.4,
subdivision (f)(3)(I) authorizes restitution for “[e]xpenses incurred by an adult victim in
relocating away from the defendant, including, but not limited to, deposits for utilities
and telephone service, deposits for rental housing, temporary lodging and food expenses,
clothing, and personal items.” However, such expenses must be “verified by law
enforcement to be necessary for the personal safety of the victim or by a mental health
treatment provider to be necessary for the emotional well-being of the victim.”
(§ 1202.4, subd. (f)(3)(I).)
       A criminal defendant “has the right to a hearing before a judge to dispute the
determination of the amount of restitution.” (§ 1202.4, subd. (f)(1).) The applicable
standard of proof is preponderance of the evidence. (People v. Millard (2009) 175
Cal.App.4th 7, 26.)

                                             10.
       “We review a restitution order for abuse of discretion.” (People v. Mearns (2002)
97 Cal.App.4th 493, 498.) Abuse is established only if the trial court’s decision is
arbitrary or capricious (People v. Akins (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1376, 1382) or is based
on a demonstrable error of law (People v. Jennings (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 42, 49). “In
reviewing restitution orders, we do not reweigh the evidence or make credibility
decisions. Our review is to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to support the
inferences made by the trial court.” (People v. Baudoin (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 1184,
1191.) “A victim’s restitution right is to be broadly and liberally construed.” (People v.
Mearns, supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 500.)
       C.     Analysis
       Appellant argues the testimony of the victim’s mother was insufficient to establish
that the relocation expenses were “verified” within the meaning of section 1202.4,
subdivision (f)(3)(I). He notes the recovery coordinator was not called as a witness, her
qualifications were not established, and she did not personally attest that she believed
relocation was necessary.
       Nothing in section 1202.4 requires the People to make such an evidentiary
showing. “[T]he verification requirement serves simply to confirm the necessity of [the]
expenses,” and to prevent “abusive or improper requests.” (People v. Baudoin, supra, 85
Cal.App.5th at pp. 1195–1196.)
       Here, the victim’s mother testified that she spoke with the recovery coordinator,
who agreed that relocation was necessary for the mental health of the victim and her
family. The trial court’s ruling demonstrates it found the victim’s mother’s testimony
credible. It is not our role to second-guess the trial court’s credibility determinations or
reweigh the evidence. (People v. Baker (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 463, 468–469.)
Moreover, appellant did not object to the admissibility of the victim’s mother’s testimony
describing her conversation with the recovery coordinator. In fact, defense counsel was

                                             11.
the first to ask the victim’s mother about speaking with a mental health professional
about relocation. Therefore, our review for an abuse of discretion reveals the trial court
did not err in awarding relocation expenses.
                                     DISPOSITION
       The judgment is affirmed.

                                                                                  LEVY, J.
WE CONCUR:

HILL, P. J.

MEEHAN, J.

                                            12.