Court Opinion

ID: 9446984
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 22:22:58.064002+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:30:51.791745
License: Public Domain

BAZELON, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
I agree with Judge Fahy that appellant had standing to challenge the validity of the search warrant. (See discussion of standing issue in my dissenting opinion in Christensen v. United States, 1958, 104 U.S.App.D.C. 35, 37-44, 259 F.2d 192, 194-201, wherein the majority did not reach that issue.) But I would not decide the question of the validity of the search warrant in this case; instead, I would remand the case to the District Court for reconsideration of that issue after affording appellant full opportunity and assistance to challenge the arresting officer’s affidavit of probable cause, upon which the search warrant was issued. (For discussion of informer’s role see my statement on the petition for leave to appeal in forma pauperis in Anderson Jones v. United States, 105 U.S.App.D.C. 326, 266 F.2d 924.
The arresting officer revealed the name of the informer, Jacqueline Johnson. He testified that she telephoned him the information upon which he based his affidavit but that he did not know her present address although he did know she was free on bond in another narcotics case. Defense counsel thereupon stated to the Court:
“At this time, Your Honor, I would request the Court to issue a subpena for the appearance of Jacqueline Johnson. I will attempt to find the address, and I will go through the gamut of the bondsmen this afternoon and find out who has her bond; and once finding the address, I ask the Court to issue a subpena for her.”
On the same day, at the close of the day’s session, defense counsel requested the issuance of a subpena, and was advised by the court that the subpena would issue upon filing of an affidavit of poverty.1
Although no affidavit was filed, defense counsel did not abandon the matter. He made diligent efforts to obtain the appearance of the informer. When the case was resumed on the morning of March 14, 1958, he told the court:
“I learned that she was on bond through a Mamie Robinson. I talked to Joe Goldsmith, who is the agent for Mamie Robinson, who told me that he did not know the address of Jacqueline Johnson because of the fact that she said she had been bothered by the police and she didn’t want to disclose it and he didn’t want to know it, but she was in touch through one of his men.
“I asked him to get in touch with Jacqueline Johnson in that manner and he informed me that he would. This morning at nine o’clock Jacqueline Johnson called me and would not give me her address. I told her that she was wanted here in this court at eleven o’clock this morning.
“She said she would be here but she wouldn’t be here at eleven; she would try to be here at twelve. And that is the situation.
“I have done everything I can as counsel to learn the whereabouts of Jacqueline Johnson and that is what I have come up with.”
At the conclusion of that morning’s session, the following occurred:
[Defense Counsel] : “That is all I have., your Honor, with the exception of the testimony from this wit*319ness, Jacqueline Johnson, who is not here at the present time.
"But on the telephone this morning she did indicate that her testimony would be completely contrary to what the officer has testified to. So I do feel that she is material.
*•»*•*->:-*
“The Court: Well, I will adjourn until 2:30.” [Emphasis supplied.] When the afternoon session opened, defense counsel stated to the court:
“As per arrangement with counsel, if your Honor please, I waited here until 12:03 [12:30?] in the courtroom and the witness informed me that she would be here between twelve and 12:15 and she did not show up.
“I understand through Mr. Smithson that possibly through inadvertence I made a misrepresentation to the Court. The witness did not tell me this morning that she didn’t know Brandon. The witness did say that the conversation that she had with the Officer Aiken was not as Officer Aiken testified to; that she did tell him that Brandon and Pop-Eye were coming to town and she didn’t tell him that she [2] had narcotics.
"She also said that she didn’t make any telephone calls to him.” [Emphasis supplied.]
To which the court responded:
“Well, I believe Officer Aiken. I don’t believe her now. I believe she did tell him just as he testified.”
Thus the matter ended.
From the foregoing so much, at least, seems clear to me: that counsel, whose good faith has not been challenged, represented that the informer’s testimony would materially contradict that of Officer Aiken upon the critical issue of probable cause; that counsel made diligent effort to obtain her testimony; and that, in light of the court’s announcement that he believed Officer Aiken, defense counsel could reasonably assume that further efforts would be futile. The Government suggests the possibility that all the court meant by its announcement was that it would not postpone the proceedings to obtain the informer’s testimony. Even adoption of this speculation would not alter my view of the necessity for a remand. The integrity of the administration of criminal justice required further opportunity — and the Government’s assistance, if necessary — to obtain this critical testimony. Unless this matter is clarified upon a remand of the case, it seems impossible to square the repudiation of the informer, on the ground that she is not a credible witness, with reliance upon her information as a basis for sustaining the warrant.

. On the matter of poverty, defense counsel stated that appellant was without any funds; that counsel was retained by the family; that he received only $60.00; and that he expected no more since appellant’s “wife has just gone on relief.”

. Counsel wo appointed for appellant to prosecute tills appeal in forma pauperis filed a motion to correct transcript of record, by changing tlie underscored word “she” to “they,” meaning appellant and “Pop-Eye Bill.” An affidavit by appel-larit’s trial counsel was filed in support. The Government filed an affidavit of the court reporter in opposition. I would leave this dispute to be resolved by the testimony of the informer in the hearing upon the remand I would order.