Court Opinion

ID: 9684256
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:52:04.602692+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:54.445877
License: Public Domain

HARBISON, Judge,
concurring in part, dissenting in part.
I concur in the majority opinion overruling the petition for rehearing, except that portion dealing with the prospective operation of the decision of the Court.
As pointed out in the majority opinion, this case was before the Court on a limited, expedited interlocutory appeal, in which only two questions had been certified by the trial judge. This was emphasized in the principal brief filed on behalf of the lending agencies, in which it was stated that the case was in this Court “for consideration solely of the two questions he certified . .” Again, in their brief, appellants stated:
“The general, abstract, constitutional question is the sole determinative issue in this case, and it will be so treated here.”
In my opinion the Court answered the two certified questions fully and completely in its principal opinion and remanded the case to the trial court for further testimony and for final decision. As was pointed out in the case of Tennessee Department of Mental Health v. Hughes, 531 S.W.2d 299, 300 (Tenn.1975), in dealing with interlocutory appeals the Court requires the exact and precise questions to be reviewed to be stated in the order granting the appeal, and limits its decision to those specific questions. For this reason, it seems inappropriate to me to attempt to deal with the ramifications of the decision or with any other questions pertaining to it, in light of the incomplete and undeveloped record which is before the Court.
Further, I do not consider that the decision in the principal opinion was a material or major departure from prior decisional law in this State. On the contrary, it seems to me to be entirely consistent with the previous cases. In Pugh v. Hermitage Loan Company, 167 Tenn. 389, 393, 70 S.W.2d 22, 23 (1934), the Court said:
“A statute permitting a lender to charge sums as compensation for the use of money which amount to more than at the rate of ten per cent per annum is in clear conflict with the Constitution, whether the charge be denominated in the statute interest or fees or by any other name.”
For these reasons, at this time and on the present record, I am unable to concur in so much of the Opinion on Petition to Rehear as deals with the issue of prospective application of the decision. Interlocutory appeals, no doubt, serve a useful purpose, but parties utilizing this special appellate procedure, occurring, as it were, in the midst of the handling of the case in the trial court, should not expect the Court to respond to any issues except those certified here.
I am authorized to state that Mr. Justice BROCK concurs in this Opinion.