Court Opinion

ID: 9388681
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-21 14:04:29.314338+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:21.849876
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: APRIL 14, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                          Court of Appeals

                             NO. 2022-CA-0862-MR

GARY MILLER                                                          APPELLANT

                   APPEAL FROM ESTILL CIRCUIT COURT
v.                 HONORABLE MICHAEL DEAN, JUDGE
                         ACTION NO. 19-CI-00259

DANIEL MUCHOW                                                           APPELLEE

                                OPINION
                        REVERSING AND REMANDING

                                  ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: EASTON, LAMBERT, AND MCNEILL, JUDGES.

EASTON, JUDGE: This is an appeal of a summary judgment granted on a claim

of negligence. The Appellee failed to file a brief. We reverse the circuit court and

remand for further proceedings on the negligence claim.

              FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

             The Appellant Gary Miller (“Miller”) leased an apartment from the

Appellee Daniel Muchow (“Muchow”). A disagreement arose about rent
payments. Miller decided certain expenditures he made were the responsibility of

Muchow as the landlord, and Miller decided to deduct these amounts from his rent.

As this disagreement continued, Muchow decided to take action to force Miller out

of the apartment. Muchow did not file a forcible detainer complaint against Miller.

             Miller alleges he paid for the electricity for the apartment with the

utility account in his name. Muchow is an electrician. Muchow turned off the

electricity to Miller’s apartment, padlocked the circuit box for that apartment, and

told Miller that, if he tried to remove the lock, Muchow would have Miller

arrested.

             Miller has chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (“COPD”). He

depends upon machinery to supply a sufficient level of oxygen. While he has a

temporary battery-operated machine, other equipment was in his apartment and

requires electricity. Miller took a hacksaw to the padlock. With about ninety

seconds of effort, Miller was able to turn the electricity back on. Miller alleges he

suffered a “flare up” of his COPD due to this physical exertion and stress of these

events.

             Miller initially pled several claims in his complaint, but this appeal

addresses only the negligence claim, which is therefore the only claim remaining.

Muchow asked for summary judgment. After the parties briefed the issues, the

circuit court heard oral argument. The circuit court granted summary judgment

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concluding Miller’s actions were not foreseeable to Muchow and thus could not be

a basis for negligence.

                Miller filed this appeal. The trial court counsel for Muchow withdrew

from the representation in this appeal. Muchow did not have substitute counsel

enter an appearance and did not file a brief in this case. Having examined the

record, we conclude the brief filed by the Appellant reasonably appears to sustain

reversal on the negligence claim. RAP1 31(H)(3)(b). We need not accept the

failure to file a brief as a confession of error by Muchow, although this was an

option in these circumstances and would separately sustain the result we reach.

RAP 31(H)(3)(c).

                                STANDARD OF REVIEW

               “The standard of review on appeal of a summary judgment is whether

the circuit judge correctly found that there were no issues as to any material fact

and that the moving party was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Pearson

ex rel. Trent v. Nat’l Feeding Systems, Inc., 90 S.W.3d 46, 49 (Ky. 2002).

Summary judgment is only proper when “it would be impossible for the

respondent to produce evidence at the trial warranting a judgment in his favor.”

Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Ky. 1991).

1
    Kentucky Rules of Appellate Procedure.

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In Steelvest the word “‘impossible’ is used in a practical sense, not in an absolute

sense.” Perkins v. Hausladen, 828 S.W.2d 652, 654 (Ky. 1992).

            In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court is required to

construe the record “in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion

. . . and all doubts are to be resolved in his favor.” Steelvest, 807 S.W.2d at 480.

Even though success on the merits appears “highly doubtful,” summary judgment

should not be granted based upon only an assessment of the strength of the claim.

Huddleston v. Hughes, 843 S.W.2d 901, 907 (Ky. App. 1992) (Gudgel, J.,

concurring). Summary judgment is particularly difficult to apply to claims of

negligence. Hill v. Alvey, 558 S.W.2d 613 (Ky. 1977). Because summary

judgment involves only legal questions, as there can be no genuine issues of

material fact, an appellate court does not defer to the trial court’s decision and will

review the issue de novo. Lewis v. B & R Corp., 56 S.W.3d 432, 436 (Ky. App.

2001).

                                 ANALYSIS

             The circuit court concluded it was not foreseeable to Muchow that

Miller would try to cut the lock off the electrical box to get back into his apartment

to access his medical equipment. As a result, the circuit court ruled Muchow did

not breach any duty owed to Miller, leaving no viable claim for negligence.

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               First, it may be helpful to recognize what this case is not. This is not

a case about an electricity provider cutting off electricity. Pursuant to the publicly

regulated contracts for providing such a service, the electric company can cut off

power for unpaid bills. Huff v. Electric Plant Bd. of Monticello, 299 S.W.2d 817

(Ky. 1957).

           This case is also not about proper interactions between a landlord and a

tenant which do not lead to any discernable damage. Nothing prohibits a landlord

from asking a defaulting tenant to leave and reaching some terms to result in

vacating the property without recourse to legal proceedings. But when a tenant

refuses to leave, the law provides a remedy to avoid violence and injury which may

occur with eviction by physical force.

              Unfortunately, this case is not a review of such a forcible entry and

detainer proceeding for leased premises. Had this been the course chosen by

Muchow, the negligence claim could have been avoided. This case cautions

against rash actions which may cause foreseeable injury.

              If a landlord wants an unwilling tenant to leave, there is a legal remedy

provided by our forcible entry and detainer statutes. KRS 383.200 et seq. This is

the exclusive remedy. Hoskins v. Morgan, 61 S.W.2d 30 (Ky. 1933). Citing

Hoskins, the encyclopedia known as American Jurisprudence, explains self-help,

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including private entry and personal force, are not permitted. 35A AM. JUR. 2D

Forcible Entry and Detainer § 8 (2023).

           Muchow tried to do indirectly what he could not do directly. Muchow

took the first step toward a constructive eviction by turning off the electricity.

Muchow did this by interfering with the electrical service for which Miller paid.

This first step was unsuccessful. Miller did not leave. Still, Muchow did not enter

the premises, nor did he physically remove Miller.

            A landlord may be held liable for damages sustained because of a self-

help physical eviction, even if the damages are humiliation alone. Maddix v.

Gammon, 169 S.W.2d 594 (Ky. 1943). When a landlord takes an action against a

tenant, “she must be held responsible for the natural and probable consequences of

her wrongful act[.]” Kearns v. Sparks, 296 S.W.2d 731, 733 (Ky. 1956). Because

a physical eviction did not take place, again we look at the case through the lens

only of negligence. Muchow’s actions may still serve as the basis for liability for a

negligence claim.

            For a negligence claim, the duty of care to the other person includes

assessment of the foreseeability of harm. The assessment of foreseeability in some

negligence cases has changed in recent years. “The questions are not changing,

their locations are. To say, as we have in the past, that a defendant had no duty,

under particular circumstances, to foresee a particular harm is really no different

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from saying that the defendant’s duty to take reasonable care was not breached,

under those circumstances, by its failure to foresee the unforeseeable.” Shelton v.

Kentucky Easter Seals Soc., Inc., 413 S.W.3d 901, 917 (Ky. 2013) (internal

quotations marks omitted).

             Shelton addressed foreseeability only in the context of conditions on

property. It does not apply to actions taken by individuals on property, such as

criminal acts by third persons against tenants or customers of businesses. It also

does not apply to an affirmative action by the landlord as opposed to some

dangerous condition existing on the property. We must evaluate foreseeability in

this context different from Shelton.

             Foreseeability is often conflated with causation, which appears to

have happened here as evidenced by the circuit court’s reference to Miller’s

“intervening” act of sawing off the padlock. See Kendall v. Godbey, 537 S.W.3d

326, 332 (Ky. App. 2017). In this case, there may be a causation argument about

whether Muchow’s act resulted in compensable damages. But that is not to be

confused with the assessment of duty, including foreseeability of the harm caused

by Muchow’s preceding act.

             The circuit court essentially reasoned Miller’s intervening act was not

foreseeable. To the extent the circuit court intended to rule Miller’s act was a

superseding intervening cause, that doctrine does apply to these alleged facts.

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“The superseding intervening cause doctrine interplays with proximate causation in

that a superseding cause breaks the chain of causation so that an otherwise

negligent actor is relieved from liability.” Howard v. Spradlin, 562 S.W.3d 281,

288 (Ky. App. 2018).

             The Howard case recounts several elements for a superseding

intervening cause, which cannot apply here. Id. For example, Miller’s act does

not involve the unforeseen actions of a third party. The only two parties involved

were Miller and Muchow.

            We then return to the foreseeability component of negligence duty

analysis. In these alleged circumstances, it was clearly foreseeable that Miller

would try to turn his electricity back on. Indeed, Muchow contemplated this

specifically by warning Miller of Muchow’s intent to arrest Miller if he tried.

            In some cases, foreseeability as a component of duty may be decided

as a matter of law. See City of Barbourville v. Hoskins, 655 S.W.3d 137 (Ky.

2022). We conclude this is not such a case. The foreseeable injury to Miller from

the lack of access to his electrically powered equipment was an exacerbation of his

medical condition. That is what is alleged to have happened.

            Without electricity, Miller had access only to a portable oxygen tank

with limited capacity. The fact Miller’s sawing off the padlock contributed to the

exacerbation of his medical condition does not make the harm suffered

                                         -8-
unforeseeable. Whether a harm was foreseeable depends on the general

foreseeability of such harm. Howard, 562 S.W.3d at 288. The precise mechanism

of the harm is not what must be foreseen. Id.

            In other words, Muchow did not need to know the precise injury Miller

might suffer after turning off the electricity, only that injury to Miller was

generally foreseeable. Whether this harm occurred because Miller took desperate

steps to turn back on his electricity or just from a continued lack of access to the

needed equipment, the injury to Miller was generally foreseeable. This created a

genuine issue of material fact as to whether Muchow breached his duty to avoid

injury to Miller. Breach of this duty is a question of fact for the jury to decide in

this case. Kendall, 537 S.W.3d at 331. Therefore, the circuit court erred in

granting summary judgment.

                                 CONCLUSION

             As there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Muchow

breached his duty to exercise reasonable care to avoid injury to Miller, summary

judgment was not authorized. The judgment entered by the Estill Circuit Court is

REVERSED, and this case is remanded to that court for further proceedings

consistent with this Opinion.

             ALL CONCUR.

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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:     NO BRIEF FOR APPELLEE.

Ryan Robey
Lexington, Kentucky

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