Court Opinion

ID: 9836744
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-02 03:14:56.356304+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:45:18.727437
License: Public Domain

*486SULLIVAN, Judge
(concurring in part and in the result):
I would hold that Fed.R.Evid. 413, as incorporated by Mil.R.Evid. 1102, was applicable to appellant’s court-martial in March of 1997 and it was constitutional. See United States v. Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427, 1430 (10th Cir.1998) (holding that Fed.R.Evid. 413 is facially constitutional because Fed.R.Evid. 403 balancing test applies), citing Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352-53, 110 S.Ct. 668, 107 L.Ed.2d 708 (1990); accord United States v. Castillo, 140 F.3d 874, 881-83 (10th Cir.1998). However, I agree with Judge Gierke in his view that evidence of conduct that occurs after the charged offense but before the trial is objectionable under Mil.R.Evid. 403. See United States v. Matthews, 53 MJ 465 (2000) (Sullivan, J., concurring in the result).* Nevertheless, I would find no plain error here. See Article 59(a), UCMJ, 10 USC § 859(a).

 My concurrence in Matthews, which rested on Mil.R.Evid. 403's protection against undue prejudice, is legally distinct from other cases in which this Court has dealt with such evidence on grounds other than undue prejudice. E.g., United States v. Caniete, 28 MJ 426, 427-28 (1989); United States v. Dorsey, 38 MJ 244, 247 (1993); United States v. Colon-Angueira, 16 MJ 20, 25 (1983), citing J. Wigmore, A Treatise on the Anglo-American System of Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 399 (3d ed.1940).