Court Opinion

ID: 9584461
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:48:35.971672+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:07:54.466303
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER
wrote a dissenting opinion which was concurred in by the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice ROBERTS. This dissenting opinion brings out in bold relief the divergent views members of that court held with respect to whether the venue provisions of the F. E. L. A. limit the right of a state court to deal with citizens of its forum. The dissenting justices announced their concept of the law in the following language:
“Nor does it question the familiar doctrine of forum non conveniens under which a court having statutory jurisdiction may decline its facilities to a suit that in justice should be tried elsewhere. See Canada Malting Co. v. Paterson Steamships, 285 U. S. 413, 422, 423, 52 S. Ct. 413, [415], 76 L. Ed. 837, [842, 843]; Mass. v. Missouri, 308 U. S. 1, 19, 60 S. Ct. 39, [43], 84 L. Ed. 3, [10]; Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., 288 U. S. 123, 130, 131, 53 S. Ct. 295, [297, 298], 77 L. Ed. 652, [656, 657], 89 A L. R. 720. These manifestations of a civilized judicial system are firmly imbedded in our law. See Poster, Place of Trial in Civil Actions, 43 Harvard L. Rev. 1217; Blair, The Doctrine of Porum Non Conveniens in Anglo-American Law, 29 Columbia L. Rev. 1. Nor does the decision give new currency to the discredited notion that there is a general lack of power in the state courts to enjoin proceedings in federal courts. Cf. Princess Lida [of Thurn and Taxis] v. Thompson, 305 U. S. 456, 466, 59 S. Ct. 275, [280], 83 L. Ed. 285, [291]; Warren, Federal and State Court Interference, 43 Harvard L. Rev. 345. Nothing in Article III of the Constitution or in the legislation by which Congress has vested judicial power in the federal courts justifies such a doctrine.
“And so the basis of the decision of the Court must be found, if anywhere, in the terms of the venue provision of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act. The section provides simply, that an action under the Act ‘may be brought in a district court of the United States, in the district of the residence of the defendant, or in which the cause of action arose, or in which the defendant shall be doing business at the time of commencing such action,’ that the jurisdiction of the federal courts shall be ‘concurrent’ with that of the state courts, and that no action brought in a state court of competent jurisdiction shall be removed to a federal court. [April 5, 1910] 36 Stat. [at L.] 291, [Chap. 143], 45 U. S. C. A. § 56. The phrasing of the section is not unique; it follows the familiar *319pattern generally employed by Congress in framing venue provisions. E. g. 28 U. S. C. A. § 112 (suits based upon diversity of citizenship); 28 U. S. C. A. § 53 (suits by or against China Trade Act corporations); 28 U. S. C. A. § 104 (suits for penalties and forfeitures); 28 U. S. C. A. § 105 (suits for recovery of taxes); 28 XJ S. C. A. § 41 (26) (b) (inter-pleader). The decision cannot rest, therefore, upon any pecularities of the language of the provision.
“Nor can justification for the Court’s conclusion be found in the legislative history of the section or the clearly expressed reasons of policy underlying its enactment. As the House and Senate committee reports show, H. Rept. No. 513, pp. 6 — 7, S. Rept. No. 432, pp. 3 — 4, 61st Cong., 2d Sess., Congress was aware of the hardship by which under the original Employers’ Liability Act of April 22, 1908, 35 Stat. [at L.] 65, chap. 149, 45 U. S. C. A. § 51, the plaintiff could bring his action only at the railroad’s ‘residence.’ Cound v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., C. C., 173 P. 527. The amendment of 1910 greatly enlarged the range of a plaintiff’s convenience in bringing suit. It is not disputed that the amendment was intended to open to a plaintiff courts from which he previously was barred. But that is not the question before us. The problem is whether the Act was intended to give a plaintiff an absolute and unqualified right to compel trial of his action in any of the specified places he chooses, thereby not only depriving state courts of their old power to protect against unjustly oppressive foreign suits, but also forbidding Federal courts to decline jurisdiction ‘in the interest of justice’ on familiar grounds of forum non conveniens. See Canada Malting Co. v. Paterson Steamships, 285 U. S. 413, 422, 423, 52 S. Ct. 414 [415], 76 L. Ed. 837, 842, 843. Nothing in the history of the 1910 amendment indicates that its framers contemplated any such vast transformation in the established relationship between federal and state courts and in the duty of the federal courts to decline jurisdiction ‘in the interest of justice.’ On the contrary, the expressed considerations of policy underlying the amendment were fundamentally the same as those underlying the equitable power to restrain oppressive suits and the reciprocal doctrine of forum non conveniens: It does not comport with equity and justice to allow a suit to be litigated in a forum where, on the balance, unnecessary hardship and inconvenience would be cast upon one party without any compensatingly fair convenience to the other party, but where, on the contrary, the suit might more conveniently be litigated in another forum available equally to both parties.”
Subsequently, in 1942, in the case of Miles v. Illinois Central Railway Company, 315 U. S. 698, 62 S. Ct. 827, 830, 86 L. Ed. 1129, 146 A. L. R. 1104, the Supreme Court went one step further when it was presented with the question as to whether or not one state court could enjoin its citizens from suing a non-resident defendant carrier on an F. E. L. A. claim in a court of general jurisdiction of another state. *320In that suit, by a five to four decision, the Supreme Court of the United States held that injunctive relief could not be granted in a F. E. L. A. case. In that case a Tennessee administratrix, a resident of that state, commenced an action in Missouri against the Illinois Central Railway Company, an Illinois corporation, for the death of her husband, the cause of action arising in Memphis, Tennessee. The majority opinion, written by Mr. Justice REED, states:
“The opportunity to present causes of action arising under the F. E. L. A. in the state courts came, however, not from the state law, but from the federal. By virtue of the Constitution, the courts of the several states must remain open to such litigants on the same basis that they are open to litigants with causes of action springing from a different source. This is so because the Federal Constitution makes the laws of the United States the supreme law of the land, binding on every citizen and every court and enforceable wherever jurisdiction is adequate for the purpose. Second Employers’ Liability Cases (Mondou v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co.) 223 U. S. 1, 56-59, 32 S. Ct. 169, [177, 178), 56 L. Ed. 327, [348-350], 38 L. R. A., N. S., 44, 1 N. C. C. A. 875. The Missouri court here involved must permit this litigation. To deny citizens from other states, suitors under F. E. L. A., access to its courts would, if it permitted access to its own citizens, violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Constitution, Art. IV, § 2; McKnett v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co., 292 U. S. 230, 233, 54 S. Ct 690, [691], 78 L. Ed. 1227, [1229). Since the existence of the cause of action and privilege of vindicating rights under the F. E. L. A. in state courts spring from federal law, the right to sue in state courts of proper venue where their jurisdiction is adequate is of the same quality as the right to sue in federal courts. It is no more subject to interference by state action than was the federal venue in the Kepner Case. [Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Kepner, 137 Ohio St. 409, 30 N. E. 2d 982]” (Emphasis ours)
“This is not to say that states cannot control their courts. We do not deal here with the power of Missouri by judicial decision or legislative enactment to regulate the use of its courts generally as was approved in the Douglas or in the Chambers Cases, note 6 supra. We are considering another state’s power to so control its own citizens that they cannot exercise the federal privilege of litigating a federal right in the court of another state.” (Emphasis ours)
Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER again wrote the dissenting opinion and he comprehensively touches on the authority of Congress to direct state courts in the operation of their business. We quote from the dissenting opinion for the reason that when cqnsideration is given to the thoughts *321expressed by Mr. Justice JACKSON (later referred to) the principles here quoted appear to carry the approval of a majority of the court.
“This is a conventional provision. There is nothing novel or distinctive about it. Recognition of concurrent jurisdiction in the state courts to vindicate federal rights is found in the first Judiciary Act of (September 24) 1789. 1 Stat. [at L.], 73, 77. [chap. 20] And the statute books are replete with instances in which Congress has acknowledged the existence of this jurisdiction in the state courts unless explicitly withheld from them. See the discussion of Mr. Justice Bradley in Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U. S. 130, 139-143, 23 L. Ed. 833 [839, 840]. The essence of Section 6 is merely that the ‘state courts are open to a plaintiff suing under the Act, and that if he chooses to bring suit in a state court, the defendant may not remove the cause to a federal court.’ So far as language conveys ideas, the Act affords no intimation that Congress intended anything more.
“The utilization of state courts for the vindication of federal rights does not require that their established procedures be remodeled or that their customary modes for administering justice be restricted. ‘And it was of course presumably an appreciation of the principles so thoroughly settled which caused Congress, in the enactment of the Employers’ Liability Act, to clearly contemplate the existence of a concurrent power and duty of both Federal and state courts to administer the rights conferred by the statute in accordance with the modes of procedure prevailing in such courts.’ Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U. S. 211, 218, 36 S. Ct. 595, [597], 60 L. Ed. 961, [964], L. R. A. 1917 A, 86, Ann. Cas. 1916 E, 505; and see Second Employers’ Liability Cases, [Mondou v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co.] 223 U. S. 1, 56, 32 S. Ct. 169 [177], 56 L. Ed. 327, [348], 38 L. R. A., N. S., 44 [1 N. C. C. A. 875]. The mere fact that a federal right is the basis of suit cannot therefore deprive the state courts of the power to use their customary procedures for the achievement of justice. In simply taking advantage of the facilities afforded by the courts of the states, Congress cannot be deemed to have altered the settled jurisprudence of the states so as to operate more favorably for federal rights than for similar rights created by the states themselves. Such drastic inroads upon the authority of the states should be made only upon clear Congressional mandate.” (Emphasis ours.)
If we interpret Mr. Justice REED’S statement that “the Missouri court here involved must permit this litigation” as meaning that Congress intended to make the venue requirements mandatory on all state courts then this concept does not become the holding of the Court as Mr. Justice JACKSON, who was one of the five members joining in the majority opinion, expressly disagrees with the state*322ment. In his concurring opinion he makes the following comment:
“I do not, however, agree with the statement in Mr. Justice Reed’s opinion that ‘the Missouri court here involved must permit this litigation.’ It is very doubtful if any requirement can be spelled out of the federal Constitution that a state must furnish a forum for a nonresident plaintiff and a foreign corporation to fight out issues imported from another state where the cause of action arose. It seems unnecessary to decide now whether this litigation could be imposed on the Missouri court, for it appears to have embraced the litigation. Even if Missouri, by reason of its control of its own courts might refuse to open them to such- a case, it does not follow that another state may close Missouri’s courts to one with a federal cause of action. If Missouri elects to entertain the case, the courts of no other state can obstruct or prevent its exercise of jurisdiction as conferred by the federal statute or its right to obtain evidence and to distribute the proceeds, if any, in accordance with the Federal Employers’ Liability Act. I therefore favor reversal.” (Emphasis ours.)
In the case of Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U. S. 117, 122, 65 S. Ct. 459, 460, 89 L. Ed. 789, decided February 5, 1945, and which involved the venue of F. E. L. A. cases, Mr. Justice JACKSON, speaking for the United States Supreme Court, said:
“Whether any case is pending in the Illinois courts is a question to be determined by Illinois law, as interpreted by the Illinois Supreme Court. For as we have said of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, ‘we deem it well to observe that there is not here involved any attempt by Congress to enlarge or regulate the jurisdiction of state courts, or to control or affect their modes of procedure, but only a question of the duty of such a court when its ordinary jurisdiction, as prescribed by local laws, is appropriate to the occasion, and is invoked in conformity with those laws, to take cognisance of an action to enforce a right of civil recovery arising under the act of Congress, and susceptible of adjudication according to the prevailing rules of procedure.’ Mondou v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. 223 U. S. 1, 56, 57, 32 S. Ct. 169, 178, 56 L. Ed. 327, 38 L. R. A. N. S., 44. ‘As to the grant of jurisdiction in the Employers’ Liability Act, that statute does not purport to require State Courts to entertain suits arising under it but only to empower them to do so, so far as the authority of the United States is concerned. * * * But there is nothing in the Act of Congress that purports to force a duty upon such courts as against an otherwise valid excuse.’ Douglas v. New York, N. H., & H. R. Co., 279 U. S. 377, 387, 388, 49 S. Ct. 355, 356, 73 L. Ed. 747. And see Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 207 U. S. 142, 148, 149, 28 S. Ct. 34, 35, 36, 52 L. Ed. 143; St. Louis I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Taylor, 210 U. S. 281, 28 S. Ct. 616, 52 L. Ed. 1061; John v. Paullin, 231, U. S. 583, 34 S. Ct. 178, 58 L. Ed. 381.” (Emphasis ours.)
*323In the case of Gulf Oil Corporation v. Gilbert, 330 U. S. 501, 67 S. Ct. 839, 840, 91 L. Ed. 1055, the Supreme Court of the United States in March, 1947, fully discussed the doctrine of forum non conveniens and its application to courts of the Federal system. Mr. Justice JACKSON, speaking for a majority of the court, set out the history and development of the doctrine in the following language:
“It is conceded that the venue statutes of the United States permitted the plaintiff to commence his action in the Southern District of New York and empower that court to entertain it But that does not settle the question whether it must do so. Indeed, the doctrine of forum non conveniens can never apply if there is absence of jurisdiction or mistake of venue.
“This Court, in one form of words, or another, has repeatedly recognized the existence of the power to decline jurisdiction in exceptional circumstances. As formulated by Mr. Justice Brandéis the rule is: ‘Obviously, the proposition that a court having jurisdiction must exercise it, is not universally true; else the admiralty court could never decline jurisdiction on the ground that the litigation is between foreigners. Nor is it true of courts administering other systems of our law. Courts of equity and of law also occasionally decline, in the interest of justice, to exercise jurisdiction, where the suit is between aliens or non-residents or where for kindred reasons the litigation can more appropriately be conducted in a foreign tribunal.’ Canada Malting Co. v. Paterson Steamships, 285 U. S. 413, 422, 423, 52 S. Ct. 413, [415], 76 L. Ed. 837 [842, 843],
“We later expressly said that a state court ‘may in appropriate cases apply the doctrine of forum non conveniens.’ Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U. S. 629, 643, 55 S. Ct. 589, [592], 79 L. Ed. 1100, [1107], 100 A. L. R. 1133; Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287, 294, note 5, 63 S. Ct. 207, [211], 87 L. Ed. 279, [283], 143 A. L. R. 1273. Even where federal rights binding on state courts under the Constitution are sought to be adjudged, this Court has sustained state courts in a refusal to entertain a litigation between a non-resident and a foreign corporation or between two foreign corporations. Douglas v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 279 U. S. 377, 49 S. Ct. 355, 73 L. Ed. 747; Anglo-American Provision Co. v. Davis Provision Co. [No. 1], 191 U. S. 373, 24 S. Ct. 93, 48 L. Ed 225. It [has] held the use of an inappropriate forum in one case an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce. Davis v. Farmers’ Co-op. Equity Co. 262 U. S. 312, 43 S. Ct. 556, 67 L. Ed. 996. On substantially forum non conveniens grounds we have required federal courts to relinquish decision of cases within their jurisdiction where the court would have to participate in the administrative policy of a state. Railroad Commission [of Texas] v. Rowan & N. Oil Co., 311 U. S. 570, 61 S. Ct. 343, 85 L. Ed. 358; Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U. S. 315, 63 S. Ct. 1098, 87 L. Ed. 1424; but cf. Meredith v. [City of] Winter Haven, 320 U. S. 228, 64 S. Ct. 7, 88 L. Ed. 9. And most recently we decided Williams v. Green Bay & W. R. Co., 326 U. S. 549, [90 L. Ed. 311], 66 S. *324Ct, 284, in which the Court, without questioning the validity of the doctrine, held it had been applied in that case without justification.
“It is true that in cases under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, [45 U. S. C. A. § 51 et seq.], we have held that plaintiff’s choice of a forum cannot be defeated on the basis of forum non conveniens. But this was because the special venue act under which those cases are brought was believed to require it. Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Kepner, 314 U. S. 44, 62 S. Ct. 6, 86 L. Ed. 28, 136 A. L. R. 1222; Miles v. Illinois C. R. Co., 315 U. S. 698, 62 S. Ct. 827, 86 L. Ed. 1129, 146 A. L. R. 1104. Those decisions do not purport to modify the doctrine as to other cases governed by the general venue statutes.
*!* v ‡ 'i*
“The principle of forum non conveniens is simply that a court may resist imposition upon its jurisdiction even when jurisdiction is authorized by the letter of a general venue statute. These statutes are drawn with a necessary generality and usually give a plaintiff a choice of courts, so that he may be quite sure of some place in which to pursue his remedy. But the open door may admit those who seek not simply justice, but perhaps justice blended with some harassment. A plaintiff sometimes is under temptation to resort to a strategy of forcing the trial at a most inconvenient place for an adversary, even at some inconvenience to himself.
“Many of the states have met misuse of venue by investing courts with a discretion to change the place of trial on various grounds, such as the convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice. The federal law contains no such express criteria to guide the district court in exercising its power. But the problem is a very old one affecting the administration of the courts as well as the rights of litigants, and both in England and in this country the common law worked out techniques and criteria for dealing with it.’’ (Emphasis ours.)
In the two latest cases dealing with this subject there is language which might be construed to mean that prior to the time Congress enacted Section 1404 (a) forum non con-veniens was never available on F. E. L. A. suits. However, in both instances it must be considered that the Court was disposing of cases which reached the Supreme Court through the Federal Court system. In Ex parte Collett, 337 U. S. 55, 69 S. Ct. 944, 945, 93 L. Ed. 1207, 10 A. L. R. 2d 921, decided May 31, 1949, Mr. Chief Justice VINSON delivered the opinion of the court, and in the course of the opinion made the following statement:
“Prior to the current revision of Title 28 of the United States Code, forum non conveniens was not available in Federal Employers’ Liability Act suits. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Kepner, 1941, 314 U. S. 44, 62 S. Ct. 6, 86 L. Ed. 28, 136 A. L. R. 1222; Miles v. Illinois Central R Co., 1942, 315 U. S. 698, *32562 S. Ct. 827, 86 L. Ed. 1129, 146 A. L. R. 1104; see Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 1947, 330 U. S. 501, 505, 67 S. Ct..839, 91 L. Ed. 1055. The new Code, however, provides that ‘Por the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought. This is § 1404 * * *>>
In a companion case, decided the same day, United States v. National City Lines, Inc., 337 U. S. 78, 69 S. Ct. 955, 956, 93 L. Ed. 1226, Mr. Chief Justice VINSON in disposing of the doctrine of forum non conveniens in antitrust suits stated:
“This is the second time that an order of the court below, the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, attempting to effectuate a transfer of the case from Los Angeles to Chicago, has been before this Court. When respondents’ motion was first granted, the District Court dismissed the action, 1947, 7 P. R. D. 456, inasmuch as the federal courts then lacked statutory power to transfer cases. We reversed, holding that forum non conveniens was not applicable in anti-trust suits. United States v. National City Lines [1948], 334 U. S. 573, 68 S. Ct. 1169, 92 L. Ed. 1584, [June 7, 1948]. After September 1, 1948, the effective date of the present Judicial Code, respondents filed a new motion under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, citing § 1404 (a), which reads as follows: ‘Por the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought.’ Again the District Court below granted the motion. It ordered the case transferred. • D. C. 1948, 80 P. Supp. 734. The Government thereupon submitted in this Court a motion for leave to file petition for writ of certiorari. We assigned the case for hearing on this motion. 1948, 335 U. S. 897, 69 S. Ct. 296 [93 L. Ed. 432].”
We have attempted to set out the important United States Supreme Court cases dealing with the doctrine of forum non conveniens. At first blush it may appear that there are inconsistent statements and holdings in those cases discussing the doctrine as applied in Federal Employers’ Liability Act cases. However, by limiting the statements to context and the issues involved we have concluded the various cases are consistent and each can be reconciled with the others. This conclusion is based upon the evolution of the doctrine and the system to which it was being applied by the United States Supreme Court at the time of the decision. Included in the previously cited cases *326are those which deal with the powers of Federal Courts under the federal system and those which deal with the power of State Courts under state procedures. A more rigid and inflexible rule has been announced when the power of the Federal Courts has been the issue.
Prior to the enactment of Section 1404 (a) neither the Constitution nor federal statutes specifically authorized federal courts to refuse jurisdiction of any case. The early federal cases apparently required the exercise of jurisdiction in all cases. Accordingly, when the Federal Employers’ Liability Act was passed and venue was extended to any district in which the defendant was an inhabitant or where either of the parties resided, the Supreme Court of the United States reiterated the previous holdings that in federal cases jurisdiction must be assumed. The Federal Employers’ Liability Act having enlarged the venue provisions has uniformly been interpreted by the United States Supreme Court to permit the plaintiff a choice of forum and if he elected a Federal forum under the federal practice the cause could neither be transferred nor dismissed. As stated in some of the quoted opinions there was no provision or authority by which a federal court could transfer a cause to another federal district or dismiss the same because of inconvenience. This reason seems to account for the holding of and the statements included in the cases of Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Keener, supra; Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, supra; Ex parte Collett, supra; and United States v. National City Lines, supra. The language used in those cases must be interpreted in light of the fact that the actions were dealing with the powers, rights, and limitations of federal courts and the practice approved by the Supreme Court in the federal system. If we limit the discussions in those cases to the federal system the concept is established that Congress could and did dictate to the federal courts that they must accept and exercise the *327jurisdiction conferred by the F. E. L. A. and that transfers or dismissals for convenience were inapplicable.
A different principle is involved and, we believe, has been announced when a suit is instituted in a state court. In practically every cited case we find statements to the effect that the state concerned determines the limitations of the jurisdiction of its courts and the character of the controversy which it will hear. Each separate state decides whether and to what extent it will entertain in its courts transitory causes of action when they arise in other jurisdictions. It seems that weaving throughout the cases is the principle announced in the Second Employers’ Liability Act Cases, supra. There the Supreme Court held that when Congress enacted the Federal Employers’ Liability Act it did not attempt to enlarge, regulate or control the jurisdiction of the state courts or affect their modes of procedure. All that was intended by that enactment was to confer jurisdiction on the state courts to hear and try the issues if consistent with the practice then in vogue. It would indeed be bringing into imbalance the respective powers of the federal and state governments to permit the Congress to dictate the terms and conditions under which a state court must administer the law. As the majority of the Supreme Court held in Miles v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., supra, the state court was not required to permit F. E. L. A. litigation under all causes and under all circumstances.
While the United States Supreme Court has held that one state may not enjoin one of its citizens from prosecuting a cause of action under a F. E. L. A. statute in another state or Federal Court, there are principles other than forum non conveniens involved in those holdings. There is the problem that Congress has permitted suit in the courts of all states and there may be some limitation on a state’á right to prevent its citizens from taking advantages of rights given by federal statutes when the state entertaining *328the suit is willing to assume jurisdiction. That question involves principles separate and distinct from the right of a state to attach some conditions to the use of its courts by nonresidents.
In order to reconcile the doctrine announced in the case of Douglas v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., supra, with the holdings in the other cases and for us to give full force and effect to the language used in each of the decisions we must necessarily conclude that the United States  Supreme Court has held that prior to the enactment of Section 1404 (a) the doctrine of forum non conveniens was unavailable in the Federal Court system because of the special venue provisions; that in state courts the doctrine was available in all types of cases; and, that even though available under state procedures the doctrine could not be used by a sister state as the foundation for enjoining a resident from using the courts of another state which was willing to keep its courts open for F. E. L. A. litigants. If we have correctly interpreted the holdings, then unless we deny to the plaintiff equal protection of the law we are constitutionally permitted to require him to try his cause in a more convenient jurisdiction.
A search of the reporters for state cases dealing with this subject discloses that the states of New York, Ohio, New Jersey and .Illinois have passed on this or a closely related principle and have adopted the doctrine that forum non conveniens can be used in all types of cases, including F.E. L.A. action's; and the states of Missouri and California have reached a contrary result. For the benefit of the parties and for those interested in the use and application of this doctrine, we quote from some of the cases which treat with the doctrine. We first cite those cases denying the power of the state court to dismiss on the grounds of inconvenience.
The Supreme Court of California in the case of Leet v. Union Pacific R. Co. 25 Cal. 2d 605, 155 P. 2d 42, 44, *329decided in December, 1944, held that a state court having jurisdiction of actions under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act may not refuse to act on the doctrine of forum non conveniens. We set out the quotations from the majority and the dissenting opinions to illustrate the different views concerning the powers of state courts to refuse jurisdiction. Mr. Justice Carter, speaking for the court, said:
“Whatever may have been the rule on the subject from time to time it is now settled that the state court having jurisdiction may not refuse to exercise it. The doctrine of forum non conveniens, claim of a burden on interstate commerce, or war conditions constitute no justification for a refusal to exercise jurisdiction.
“The rule of forum non conveniens is an equitable one embracing the discretionary power of a court to decline to exercise the jurisdiction it has over a transitory cause of action when it believes that the action before it may be more appropriately and justly tried elsewhere. If the plaintiff by reason of section 56 has an absolute right to have the action tried in the named courts, there is no room for the doctrine. It has been repeatedly held that the right to have an action brought under the act tried in one of the mentioned federal district courts is absolute. Connelly v. Central R. Co. of New Jersey, D.C., 238 F. 932; see Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Kepner, 314 U. S. 44, 62 S. Ct. 6, 86 L. Ed. 28, 136 A.L.R. 1222; Miles v. Illinois Central R. Co., 315 U.S. 698, 62 S. Ct. 827, 86 L. Ed. 1129, 146 A.L.R. 1104; Trapp v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., D.C., 283 F. 655. And that right cannot be defeated by the doctrine of forum non conveniens, convenience, or other equitable grounds such as vexatious suits or anything else except congressional action; the court has a duty to exercise its jurisdiction. Schendel v. McGee, 8 Cir. 300 F. 273; Southern R. Co v. Painter, 8 Cir., 117 F.2d 100; Southern R. Co. v. Cochran, 6 Cir., 56 F. 2d. 1019; Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co. v. Vigor, 6 Cir., 90 F. 2d. *3307, certiorari denied 302 U.S. 705, 58 S. Ct. 25, 82 L. Ed. 545; Rader v. Baltimor & Ohio R. Co., 7 Cir., 108 F. 2d 980; Miles v. Illinois Central R. Co., supra; Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co. v. Kepner, supra; Union Pac. R. Co. v. Utterback, supra (Union Pac. R. Co. v. Thatcher) [173 Or. 572, 146 P. 2d 76, 769].”