Court Opinion

ID: 9589142
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:41:39.639144+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:27:52.609130
License: Public Domain

Benham, Judge,
dissenting.
I must dissent since I do not agree with the conclusion reached in Division 2 of the majority opinion.
As has been often stated, “[o]n a prosecution for a particular crime, evidence which in any manner shows or tends to show that the accused has committed another crime wholly distinct, independent, and separate from that for which he is on trial, even though it be a crime of the same sort, is irrelevant and inadmissible, unless there be shown some logical connection between the two from which it can be said that proof of the one tends to establish the other. [Cit.] Before evidence of independent crimes is admissible two conditions must be satisfied. First, there must be evidence that the defendant was in fact the perpetrator of the independent crime. Second, there must be sufficient similarity or connection between the independent crime and the offense charged, that proof of the former tends to prove the latter. [Cits.]” Thomas v. State, 166 Ga. App. 650 (1) (305 SE2d 182) (1983). “In addition, there are two other specific limitations pertinent to the admissibility of evidence of independent crimes. One is that regard-
less of the similarity of the two crimes, evidence of the separate offense should never be admitted unless the prejudice it creates is outweighed by its relevancy to the issues on trial. [Cits.] The other is that lapse of time is one of the more important factors to weigh in considering the admissibility of the evidence in question although it is not wholly determinative. [Cit.]” Millwood v. State, 164 Ga. App. 699, 700 (296 SE2d 239) (1982).
Having taken into account the factors which must be considered before evidence of an independent crime can be admitted, I conclude that the prejudice inherent in the admission of evidence of the earlier crime outweighs any relevancy the earlier crime had to the charge for which appellant was being tried. In the more recent incident, appellant was engaged in a brawl when he stabbed the victim; seven years earlier he had brandished a knife when surprised during the commission of a felony. The only constant was the use of a knife to inflict injury. While incidents need not be mirror images of each in order to be similar, more than identity of instrument is necessary. In addition, *7while the lapse of time between incidents did not render the evidence inadmissible per se (see Rich v. State, 254 Ga. 11 (1) (325 SE2d 761) (1985)), it is one of the more important factors to weigh. Campbell v. State, 234 Ga. 130, 132 (214 SE2d 656) (1975). The dissimilarities of the crimes, when considered with the lapse of time between them and the prejudice resulting from the portrayal of appellant as a man who has a propensity to use a knife against those with whom he is at odds, should have rendered the rebuttal evidence inadmissible. Because I cannot discern what the jury might have done had it been unaware of appellant’s past and concentrated only on the crime alleged, I would remand the case to the trial court for retrial.
Decided July 16, 1986
Rehearing denied July 29, 1986
H. William Sams, Jr., for appellant.
Sam B. Sibley, Jr., District Attorney, Charles R. Sheppard, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
The rebuttal witness’ reference to the burglary only added insult to injury. The record is unclear as to whether the witness was present when the trial court cautioned against any reference to the burglary charge. If the witness was present, his deliberate disregard of the trial court’s admonition is disconcerting, at the least; if he was not present the assistant district attorney was less than circumspect in failing to caution his. witness to avoid any mention of the burglary.
I am authorized to state that Judge Pope and Judge Beasley join in this dissent.