Court Opinion

ID: 9859705
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 22:26:10.634191+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:13:33.999943
License: Public Domain

Magnet, Justice
(dissenting).
The majority opinion concludes that a judgment entered upon a stipulation of property settlement in a divorce action is a consent decree, or in the nature of a consent decree; that plaintiff did not really consent to the judgment; that defendant perpetrated a fraud upon plaintiff; and that the judgment could therefore be vacated and a new judgment substituted.
M. S. A. 518.19 and 518.20, the sections of the statutes applicable to this case, provide for a division of property in a divorce action. These sections provide for incorporation of such provisions in the judgment as the court deems just and reasonable, having regard to the circumstances of the case, including the character, ability, and situation of the parties. The court is therefore affirmatively required to adjudicate the property rights and liabilities of the parties. This affirmative duty of the court to adjudicate — to pass upon the merits — is inconsistent with calling any judgment in a divorce action relative to property adjustment a “consent judgment.” A consent judgment is based wholly on the consent of the parties, and there is no judicial inquiry into the facts or law applicable to the controversy. 3 Freeman, Judgments (5 ed.) § 1350. Moreover, in the case of a consent judgment, it is the duty of the court to enter judgment in accordance with the agreement of the parties. Id. § 1344, and the court’s authority is limited by the consent or stipulation. Id. § 1348. Cf. Wright v. Krabbenhoft, 104 Minn. 460, 116 N. W. 940. It is well settled that the courts in Minnesota are not bound to accept the stipulation of the parties to a divorce action, and may incorporate or refuse to incorporate the stipulation in the decree, as is proper in the situation as disclosed *435by the evidence. Warren v. Warren, 116 Minn. 458, 133 N. W. 1009.
A consent judgment may be vacated for fraud or mutual mistake, but may not be modified. 1 Black, Judgments (2 ed.) § 319. Here, the judgment is being modified. But M. S. A. 518.23 provides that the court may from time to time revise and alter a decree respecting the amount of alimony or other allowance; and the court may do so notwithstanding the fact that alimony or allowance provisions in the decree were based upon the stipulation of the parties. Warren v. Warren, supra; Erickson v. Erickson, 181 Minn. 421, 232 N. W. 793; see, Vassar v. Vassar, 204 Minn. 326, 283 N. W. 483.
Courts of other states have held that the terms of divorce judgments incorporating stipulations of the parties for property and alimony settlement are “consent decrees.” However, in my opinion, the distinctions pointed out above are so significant that we should not adopt that view. A judgment in which the court adopts a recommendation of the parties — a proposed adjudication to which the parties consent — is not a consent decree warranting application to divorce decrees the distinct rules of law applicable to consent decrees.
Even if the judgment in the instant case is not a consent judgment, it remains to be determined what authority, if any, exists in the trial court to modify and amend upon the facts here presented.
One of the grounds upon which the court based its order amending the decree was mutual mistake in the description of the property in the stipulation for property settlement. There is absolutely nothing in the record to sustain a finding of mutual mistake. Defendant testified that he knew when he signed the stipulation that the north 50 feet of the lots did not extend to the filling station fence. He testified that he intended to move the fence as soon as the divorce action was settled. There is nothing in the record to indicate that defendant was mistaken as to what property was included when he signed the stipulation of property settlement. It may be found from the evidence that plaintiff was under a misapprehension as to what property she was to get under the stipula*436tion, but her unilateral mistake cannot be enlarged into a mutual mistake.
The trial court also found that defendant “fraudulently permitted plaintiff to enter into a stipulation which proposed to award to her the residential property in an erroneous legal description, and that his conduct amounted to a fraud on the plaintiff and an overreaching to the extent that this Court should amend and reform the judgment and decree to reflect the true intent and understanding of the parties herein.” I have already inferred that the stipulation reflected the true intent and understanding of defendant. The majority opinion affirms the above conclusion of the trial court upon the ground that there was such a confidential relationship between the parties which would require a full disclosure of all facts, and that the failure to disclose to plaintiff her mistake was fraud, and a sufficient basis for amending a consent judgment. The testimony would support a finding that defendant was aware that, although plaintiff agreed to take a conveyance for the north 50 feet of the lots, she believed that by the conveyance she would acquire the property up to the fence. He said that he did not feel obligated to disclose anything, since he felt that the “legal description” was enough.
Plaintiff testified that she had not been on speaking terms with defendant for over five years prior to the divorce, and that conversation between the parties was limited to business matters. When negotiations for the stipulation for property settlement were being conducted, plaintiff did not talk to defendant at all. Negotiations were carried on by the attorneys in a corridor, while plaintiff and defendant remained in the courtroom. Plaintiff said that she mistrusted her husband at that time and would not depend on what he might say. She said that she depended on her attorney. Both parties presented to the attorneys the papers covering the description of the property from which the stipulation was drawn. She knew that her husband was conveying to her the north 50 feet of the two lots, but assumed, as she claims, that took in the property up to the fence.
*437Prior to December 12, 1925, the northerly 50 feet of the two lots in question were owned by defendant and his father in joint tenancy. On that day, through a third party, the northerly 50 feet were conveyed to plaintiff and defendant in joint tenancy. She knew that they were given the northerly 50 feet of those two lots. There was no east and west fence on the property at that time. It was not put in until about 1930. On December 16, 1925, plaintiff and defendant placed a $5,000 mortgage on the northerly 50 feet of the lots above described. On December 16, 1933, the parties again placed a mortgage for $2,500 on the northerly 50 feet of the lots. She knew that they built the duplex on the northerly 50 feet. The duplex was built in the fall of 1925, and was placed about 17 feet from the south line of the 50 feet. The distance from the south line of the 50 feet to the filling station is a little over 15 feet.
Plaintiff and defendant were husband and wife at the time the stipulation was entered into. Because of that relationship it is said that there was such a confidential relationship between the parties as would require a full disclosure of all facts. As a matter of fact, the confidential relationship between these parties had ceased to exist many years prior to the entry of the stipulation. They had not spoken to each other for over five years, and she testified that at the time of the stipulation he said nothing, that she mistrusted him, and that she depended on her lawyers. There was here no confidence and reliance. Marriage alone does not conclusively establish the fact that a confidential relationship in fact exists. Here, the evidence is conclusive that no confidential relationship in fact existed. Neither party had particular dominance over or confidence in the other. See, In re Estate of Malchow, 143 Minn. 53, 172 N. W. 915. They were here dealing at arm’s length, with capable attorneys to assist them in fighting for advantage.
There are well-recognized rules applicable to fraud perpetrated by silence, but I do not think that they are applicable here.
Plaintiff had been a joint owner of this property since 1925 and had lived on the premises since 1926. The description in the stipu*438lation is the same description found in the deed conveying an interest in the property to her. The physical facts should have been as well known to her as to her joint owner. It does not seem reasonable to me to hold that one joint owner can be held guilty of fraud as to another joint owner relative to the boundary and area of the property which they jointly own — particularly when the claimed fraud consisted merely of silence.
•I am unable to go along and hold that under the facts here defendant perpetrated a fraud upon plaintiff by his mere silence; therefore, I respectfully dissent.