Court Opinion

ID: 9588484
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:34:50.178981+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:33.869602
License: Public Domain

Mowbray, L,
dissenting:
Respectfully, I must object to the issuance of the writs of prohibition and mandamus ordered by the court in its opinion filed today. Nevada precedent, in my opinion, does not support the ruling of the court.
The background of this litigation may be summarized as follows: Petitioner Maheu was the chief executive of Hughes Nevada Operations, which comprised all of Hughes Tool Company’s business activities in Nevada. On December 4, 1970, Maheu was relieved of that position. Immediately, he sought and obtained a temporary restraining order prohibiting those seeking his ouster from taking any further action to do so.1 At this time, many of the papers, files, and records of Hughes Tool Company were removed from the offices of Hughes Nevada Operations. Hughes Tool Company then filed a complaint in the district court to enjoin Maheu from asserting any control or authority over Hughes Nevada Operations.2 The two actions were consolidated. Evidentiary hearings were held before Judge Babcock, who on December 24, 1970, dissolved the temporary restraining order previously obtained by Maheu and granted the preliminary injunction sought by Hughes Tool Company, which enjoined Maheu from interfering with or exercising any control over the activities of Hughes Nevada Operations.
Maheu on December 31, 1970, filed a $50 million counterclaim against Hughes Tool Company, seeking damages for breach of his employment contract. With the filing of the counterclaim, Maheu gave notice of the taking of Hughes’s deposition, scheduled for January 11, 1971.3 Judge Babcock, however, on motion of Hughes Tool Company, vacated the January 11 date and stayed the taking of the Hughes deposition *45until further order of the court. Thereafter, on January 19, 1971, Hughes Tool Company filed a motion to stay any further action on behalf of Maheu’s $50 million counterclaim until Maheu had returned all the books, records, and files of Hughes Tool Company. On January 21, 1971, Petitioner Maheu filed a motion to disqualify Judge Babcock on the ground of actual prejudice. Recognizing that the motion to disqualify presented an impediment to further proceedings, the court, on February 3, 1971, ordered a stay of all proceedings until the motion could be heard and ruled upon by another judge. District Judge Thomas O. Craven of the Second Judicial Dictrict was assigned to hear the motion. He did so, and after hearing the motion he denied it on March 16, 1971.
Judge Babcock then called a calendar conference of all parties for April 1, 1971, for the purpose of determining and scheduling the order in which the pending matters connected with the litigation would be heard. The transcript of the proceedings of April 1, 1971, reflects the purpose of the conference:
“The Court: As the Court noted in its decision and order
of March 3, 1971, the law is well settled that the trial court has broad case discretion to manage discovery proceedings. The parties are now underway on this apparent rocky venture to discover facts and evidence in support of and in opposition to respective claims.
“It occurs to the Court that before there can be true discovery, and in the conservation of the Court’s time — and this time I am not concerned with the litigants’ time, but with the Court’s time — there should be and there must be a resolution of the matter of books and records. We are not concerned about matters of contempt.
“I am only examining the posture of these proceedings with a view of giving some expedition, because already there has been a delay of two months by reason of the filing of a motion to change the presiding judge.
“I wish to assure the parties that there will be no delay practiced in this Court on that issue. I expect the parties to be forthwith, forthright to the Court, so that there can be a real search for the truth of the matters. And certainly a search for the truth would require, and does require, that the books and records, which relate to matters material to this cause, be before the Court and be available to the parties.
“This does not interminably delay the taking of any depositions. Because this Court will give expedition to the proceedings as it relates to the matter of records, a resolution of those *46motions, and will not countenance from the parties any delaying tactics, which has been suggested by counsel for Maheu, should this Court undertake a resolution of the matter of records.”
It was decided that the court would first hear and consider Hughes Tool Company’s motion filed January 19, 1971, seeking a stay order on Maheu’s counterclaim.4 The evidentiary hearings followed at the convenience of the court’s and counsel’s calendars, on April 19-20, May 3-4, and June 21-22, 1971, until they were halted by this court on July 12, 1971, after Maheu filed this petition on June 14, 1971, seeking the extraordinary writs.
*471. Maheu in this proceeding seeks a writ of prohibition enjoining Judge Babcock from taking any further action on the January 19 stay motion of Hughes Tool Company. Hughes Tool Company’s principal reason in seeking the stay is that the company is unable to respond to Maheu’s claims while Maheu retains possession of the Company’s records. Maheu asserts that he has returned all the Company’s records. The Company claims that he has not done so. Cf. Rasbury v. Bainum, 387 P.2d 239 (Utah 1963). Judge Babcock was conducting evidentiary hearings to determine this very issue when our court stayed all proceedings below on July 12, 1971. In my opinion, Judge Babcock as the trial judge should be permitted to resolve the question. By the ruling announced by this court today, he is now barred from doing so. Writs of mandamus and prohibition are extraordinary writs and are traditionally never granted unless the court is acting without jurisdiction. They may not be utilized as a substitute for an appeal. The reason for the rule is obvious, as this case demonstrates. To utilize the writs as a substitute for an appeal delays the processing of the case and can conceivably emasculate the orderly administration of justice. That is the basis for the rule that writs of prohibition and mandamus are available only if the lower court’s actions are in excess of its jurisdiction or if there is no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. Both the Nevada statutes and Nevada case law have so held. NRS 34.170 provides:
“This writ [of mandate] shall be issued in all cases where there is not a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. It shall be issued upon affidavit, on the application of the party beneficially interested.”
NRS 34.320 provides:
“The writ of prohibition is the counterpart of the writ of mandate. It arrests the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board or person exercising judicial functions, when such proceedings are without or in excess of the jurisdiction of such tribunal, corporation, board or person.”
And, finally, NRS 34.330 provides:
“The writ [of prohibition] may be issued only by the supreme court to an inferior tribunal, or to a corporation, board or person, in all cases where there is not a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. It is issued upon affidavit, on the application of the person beneficially interested.”
This court ruled in Pinana v. District Court, 75 Nev. 74, 75, 334 P.2d 843 (1959):
*48“It is the settled law of this state that mandamus will not lie to control judicial discretion or to review the propriety of judicial action. State ex rel. Phillips v. District Court, 46 Nev. 25, 207 P. 80; State ex rel. Webber [sic] v. McFadden, 46 Nev. 1, 205 P. 594; State v. Ninth Judicial District Court, 40 Nev. 163, 161 P. 510.”
The concurring majority opinion states:
“The general rule in Nevada is that mandamus will not lie to review the discretionary acts of a trial judge. This has been the inflexible rule as exemplified by the following citations of its application. Only a relatively small handful of exceptions have been made even in light of the extensive changes which have occurred in criminal and civil discovery. Those cases which recite the rule include:
“1. Mears v. State, 83 Nev. 3, 7, 422 P.2d 230 (1967) (mandamus and prohibition — criminal discovery).
“2. Jowers v. Compton, 82 Nev. 95, 96, 411 P.2d 479 (1966) (mandamus — civil—will contest).
“3. Wilmurth v. District Court, 80 Nev. 337, 340, 393 P.2d 302 (1964) (mandamus — civil—request to vacate pretrial order).
“4. Marshall v. District Court, 79 Nev. 280, 283, 382 P.2d 214 (1963) (certiorari — criminal discovery).
“5. Franklin v. District Court, 85 Nev. 401, 402, 455 P.2d 919 (1969) (certiorari — criminal discovery).
“6. Pinana v. District Court, 75 Nev. 74, 75, 334 P.2d 843 (1959) (mandamus — criminal discovery).
“7. State v. McFadden, 46 Nev. 1, 6, 205 P. 594 (1922) (mandamus — civil-—to expunge grand jury report).
“8. State v. District Court, 40 Nev. 163, 166, 161 P. 510 (1916) (mandamus — civil—removal of administrator).
“9. State v. Curler, 26 Nev. 347, 356, 67 P. 1075 (1902) (mandamus — civil—refusal to appoint appraisers).
“10. Hoole v. Kinkead, 16 Nev. 217, 222 (1881) (mandamus — civil—commissioners’ determination of best bid).
“11. State ex rel. Hetzel v. Board of Commissioners of Eureka County, 8 Nev. 309, 310 (1873) (mandamus — civil— election of county officers).
“12. State v. Curler, 4 Nev. 445, 447 (1869) (mandamus —civil—transfer of cause).”
I agree with that part of the concurring majority opinion.
2. In Hughes Tool Co. v. Maheu, District Court Case No. 84259, designated No. 6597 on appeal, the court granted a preliminary injunction on December 24, 1970, enjoining Maheu from interfering with or exercising any control over *49the activities of Hughes Nevada Operations, from which preliminary injunction Maheu has taken appeal, the merits of which are not before us in this proceeding. The order granting the injunction also provided:
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants, their respective agents, servants, employees and attorneys, and all persons in active concert and participation with any of them, shall forthwith return or cause the return to plaintiff of all books, documents, records and communications of plaintiff or pertaining directly or indirectly to the business operations or affairs of plaintiff, including all copies or other reproductions [sic] of same, and all other property belonging to plaintiff, as may be in the possession, custody or control of defendants directly or indirectly.”
On December 31, 1970, Maheu filed his $50 million counterclaim in the Hughes Tool Company action for damages resulting from the breach of an alleged oral contract of lifetime employment. It was on this day, December 31, 1970, that Maheu gave notice to take Hughes’s deposition for 10:00 a.m., January 11, 1971. On January 11, 1971, Maheu also filed formal notice of appeal from the order of December 24, 1970, granting the preliminary injunction. He also sought an order under the provisions of NRCP 73(d) directing the filing of a supersedeas bond, as he claimed he had a right to have bond set and thereby obtain a stay of the preliminary injunction pending appeal to this court. Judge Babcock denied the application for an order setting the amount of supersedeas bond and refused, thereby, to stay the preliminary injunction. It is this action, as I understand the majority opinion, that is the predicate for their finding that Judge Babcock has exceeded his jurisdiction in entertaining the evidentiary hearings on the Hughes Tool Company motion to stay further action on Maheu’s counterclaim.
On January 15, 1971, Maheu filed an unsworn statement in which he represented that he had fully complied with the provisions of the preliminary injunction directing him to return all the books, records, and files of Hughes Nevada Operations. A miniscule amount of material was returned by Maheu; yet Hughes Tool Company alleges that some 24 four-drawer file cabinets were left completely empty after Maheu’s departure. Hughes Tool Company then filed, on January 19, 1971, its motion to stay further proceedings on Maheu’s counterclaim until the court could determine the status of the alleged missing records.
The majority have ruled that prohibition will issue to bar *50Judge Babcock from concluding the evidentiary hearings because the hearings are nothing more than an attempt to enforce the mandatory provisions of the preliminary injunction that Judge Babcock refused to stay pending appeal to this court, by not fixing a supersedeas bond. In support of their ruling that prohibition will lie, the majority have cited Clute v. Superior Court, 99 P. 362 (Cal. 1908); Kettenhofen v. Superior Court, 358 P.2d 684 (Cal. 1961); Schwarz v. Superior Court, 43 P. 580 (Cal. 1896); and Dewey v. Superior Court, 22 P. 333 (Cal. 1889). All of these cases involved contempt proceedings. The petitioners seeking the extraordinary writs had been found guilty of contempt of court and ordered punished therefor. They sought review of the orders finding them in contempt of court and a stay of their punishment pending appeal therefrom. The appellate court in each case properly granted the writ staying the enforcement of the contempt order until it was reviewed; otherwise, the appeal would have been moot. Not so in the instant proceedings. The hearings on Hughes Tool Company’s stay order are not contempt proceedings. They arise out of Maheu’s counterclaim for alleged breach of contract of employment, and they are totally independent of the preliminary injunction proceedings.5 Therefore, I would rule that Hughes Tool Company’s motion to stay is merely an evidentiary proceeding that arises out of Maheu’s counterclaim for breach of contract and that the hearing is not in the nature of a contempt proceeding and that Judge Babcock did not act in excess of his jurisdiction.
3. Judge Babcock has never denied petitioner the right to take the deposition of Howard R. Hughes. He has merely postponed the scheduling of the Hughes deposition. The cases cited by the majority as a basis for the issuance of the writ mandating Judge Babcock to set aside the order staying Hughes’s deposition are, in my opinion, not relevant in these proceedings. Those cases all involved a factual situation where a trial judge had flatly denied the petitioner a clear legal right and from which petitioner had no redress but to seek the relief of an extraordinary writ, or they involved direct appeals to the appellate courts from final judgments. For example, in Texaco, Inc. v. Borda, 383 F.2d 607 (3d Cir. 1967), cited by the *51majority, the trial judge had denied the petitioner’s right to take a 71-year-old woman’s deposition, and he would not entertain petitioner’s motion to depose the witness until after the termination of certain criminal proceedings that conceivably would not be concluded for several years. Even in the Borda case, the court said, at 608:
“We do not agree that Judge Augelli [the trial judge] abused his discretion in staying all other proceedings in Borda’s case pending determination of the Government’s criminal action.
“On the latter score it is settled law that * * the power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with the economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants. How this can best be done calls for the exercise of judgment, which must weigh competing interests and maintain an even balance.’ Landis v. North American Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254-255, 57 S.Ct. 163, 166, 81 L.Ed. 153 (1936).”
Judge Babcock was attempting to do this very thing until this court interrupted and stayed all pending proceedings in July 1971.
The concurring majority opinion cites as authority for the granting of the writ of mandate Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hughes, 332 F.2d 602, 614 (1964). This case is not applicable, because it was an appeal from a final default judgment.6
For these reasons, I would deny the petition for the writs. Judge Babcock has not exceeded his jurisdiction. His scheduling of the stay motion before the other pending motions was a discretionary act inherent in his power to control the disposition of the motions on his docket. He has not denied petitioner the right to depose Hughes. Petitioner may not complain about delays in these proceedings. He delayed the proceedings with his motion for a new judge. A reading of the transcripts of the April, May, and June hearings reveals multiple delays. I can foresee, by the pronouncement made by the court today, the filing of unlimited petitions for extraordinary relief from litigants who feel aggrieved by the management of their cases, which petitions will result in further continuances and frustrations in the already painful delay in the disposition of litigation.

Maheu v. Davis, District Court Case No. 84241, designated No. 6598 on appeal.

 Hughes Tool Co. v. Maheu, District Court Case No. 84259, designated No. 6597 on appeal.

 Hughes is the sole stockholder of Hughes Tool Company.

 Counsel for Maheu objected to the scheduling given the evidentiary hearings. The following colloquy occurred between Judge Babcock and counsel for petitioner at the calendar meeting:
‘The Court: Counsel, I wish to assure you that Mr. Maheu, nor the Hughes Tool Company, is not going to manage the proceedings that are before this Court. I assure you of that fact.
“Mr. Galane: Well, I would like to answer the Court, why they will accomplish everything that they want through priority of hearing.
“Now, your Honor, I would like to be heard. I am not suggesting either litigant will control the Court. What I am saying is the Court, once it starts—
“The Court: Are you suggesting that this Court does not have sense enough to terminate a hearing when it has determined that it has heard enough evidence?
“Mr. Galane: Sometimes a Court cannot terminate a hearing without violating due process. I am not speaking of the Court’s sense. Does your Honor think that I would suggest that this Court lacks the perception and intelligence not to analyze a proceeding? But a Court sometimes doesn’t have the power to terminate a hearing.
“The Court: You are suggesting, Mr. Galane, that if we go to the matter of records, that Hughes Tool Company can keep this Court on the bench day after day after day, or hearing after hearing after hearing, ad infinitum?
“Mr. Galane: Look at the motion.
“The Court: And I can assure you that if that is your representation or belief, that this, sir, will not be the fact, depending upon the matter upon which this Court determines.
“Mr. Galane: If I can avoid it, I don’t argue with the Judge. But I will show you how skillfully they can manipulate it, with ease. May I remind the Court that I was the one who said to the Court that they may have in the back of their mind — and Miss Lea was the spokesman, and as long as I live I will never forget it — I said they will try to manipulate this record to file some motion to block proceedings, and she stood up and said, Mr. Galane is overanticipating. And I live to see the truth of my prediction.
“So if your Honor will bear with me.
“The Court: I will bear with you, Mr. Galane. But I just want you to understand that this Court is the manager of this Court, not the litigants.”

 Maheu testified in the court below that he did remove certain Hughes Tool Company records. He represented that he returned all the documents. Yet in his present argument he urges that he had no duty to release the documents and that the order requiring him to do so should be stayed pending appeal. It would be quite anomalous if petitioner had a right to a stay of the injunction requiring him to do acts that he concedes should have been done and that he claims were done.

 Likewise, the Arizona authorities cited by the majority are not the law of Nevada.