Court Opinion

ID: 9795302
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:25:05.780044+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:29:20.259839
License: Public Domain

CHIEF JUSTICE GRAY,
specially concurring.
¶87 I join in the entirety of the Court’s opinion on issue two. I also join in the Court’s result, and most of its analysis, on issue one. I write separately to offer an additional perspective on why the search of Hardaway, via the swabbing of blood from his hands at the detention facility, is not a lawful search incident to arrest. This perspective is a simple and readily understandable one.
¶88 Section 46-5-102, MCA, permits a reasonable search by a peace officer of an arrested person and the area within such person’s immediate presence, for certain purposes, “[w]hen a lawful arrest is effected[.]” The first definition of the word “when” in MERRIAM Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 1345 (10th ed. 1993), is “at or during the time that.” Using that everyday definition of the statutory term “when” and applying § 46-5-102, MCA, to the facts of this case, I conclude the search via swabbing of Hardaway’s hands renders the search invalid as one incident to arrest.
¶89 The pertinent facts are as follows. The victim called law enforcement shortly after 4:30 a.m., on January 22, 1999, and Officer Helderop responded to the area very shortly thereafter. He saw a person not too far from the scene of the alleged offense who appeared to meet the description he had been provided and stopped that person, who turned out to be Hardaway. He questioned Hardaway and patted him down for weapons. He requested Officer Philippi, who was at the crime scene, to bring the victim to his location for a possible identification of Hardaway. After the victim failed to identify Hardaway as her intruder, but said she recognized him as having done some work at her residence the day before, Officer Helderop arrested Hardaway and transported him to the Yellowstone County Detention Facility. There, some of Hardaway’s clothing was seized and his hands were photographed. While Officer Helderop did not testify directly that *167the swabbing of the blood occurred during that time, he did state that he stayed at the facility for approximately one-half hour. It seems likely that the swabbing occurred during that approximate period of time.
¶90 On these facts, I would conclude that the search was not incident to arrest under § 46-5-102, MCA, because it did not occur “at or during the time that” the arrest was effected. Rather, the search occurred later, after Hardaway was transported to the detention facility and apparently after Hardaway’s clothing was seized and his hands photographed. Indeed, the State acknowledges in the Statement of the Facts portion of its brief that the “blood on [Hardaway’s] hands was swabbed during the post-arrest process.” (Emphasis added.) I would agree, and hold that the plain meaning of the statute, applied to the facts of this case, does not support the State’s position that this was a search incident to arrest.
¶91 In so holding, I would not be implying that a valid search incident to arrest must occur at the precise moment the arrest is effected, and not a moment later. Such an approach would render a legal search incident to arrest impossible, a result far from that clearly intended by the Legislature in enacting § 46-5-102, MCA. Nor does the common sense definition referenced above suggest such a result. The statute is clear, however, that a valid search incident to arrest is to be conducted at or near the time of the arrest, and not after transport of the arrestee and during-as the State puts it-“the post-arrest process” at the detention facility.
¶92 For these reasons, and in an effort to set forth in plain, everyday language what I believe the statute and the Court’s more sophisticated analysis require, I specially concur in the Court’s opinion on issue one.