Court Opinion

ID: 9664613
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:22:37.620718+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:07.623605
License: Public Domain

ONION, Presiding Judge
(concurring).
I feel compelled to state why I concur in the reversal.
The motion to revoke probation alleged that on or about August 12, 1972, appellant broke into the home of Ruby Waters without her consent and with the intent to commit theft. The evidence showed such house was located at 1161 Fitzhugh in Paris.
The uncorroborated confession reads as follows:
“My name is Charles Coleman. I live at 403 Booker T. Washington Homes in Paris, Texas. On August 12, 1972, me, Roy Stevens, and James Ricksman went to 1151 Fitzhugh. I picked the lock on the screen and went in. I heard a noise in the house and a lady come towards me and I jumped out the window. * * * * This happened early in the morning.
“I can read and write nad (sic) have read and had read to me this statement and it is true and correct.
“This happened in Paris, Lamar County, Texas.
“/s/ Charles Coleman”
(Emphasis supplied).
It is true that this court has held on a number of occasions that an uncorroborated confession of a probationer constitutes *882sufficient evidence for the court to revoke probation. See Smith v. State, 160 Tex. Cr.R. 438, 272 S.W.2d 104, (1954); Hulsey v. State, 447 S.W.2d 165 (Tex.Cr.App. 1969); Tollett v. State, 456 S.W.2d 909 (Tex.Cr.App.1970); Campbell v. State, 456 S.W.2d 918 (Tex.Cr.App.1970); De Leon v. State, 466 S.W.2d 573 (Tex.Cr.App. 1971); Hicks v. State, 476 S.W.2d 671 (Tex.Cr.App.1972).
An examination of these cases indicates that the confessions involved completely met the allegations of the revocation motions, unlike the instant case. Surely the rule in those cases was never intended to extend to cases like the present one.
If the confession does not, standing alone sustain the allegations in the revocation motion, is there other evidence to corroborate the confession ?
Ruby Waters testified she lived at 1161 Fitzhugh, not 1151 Fitzhugh, and on direct examination testified the burglary occurred on January 13, 1972, rather than August 12, 1972, as alleged. Later, in response to the court’s inquiry, she testified the burglary occurred in 1972 when “it was turning Spring.” On cross-examination she related it “must have been along about April the 4th or the 5th.” She further testified she did not know the man who broke into her house, but recalled letting the man out the door after her confrontation with him. This was in sharp contrast to the statement in the confession as to the manner of exit.
The record further shows that shortly after the burglary an officer brought two photographs to her home for her to identify, and she believed both photographs were those of the appellant. She knew at the time the man in the photographs was in jail. When asked what the unidentified officer who brought the photographs to her said, she replied: “He said that is the boy.”
In her other testimony set out in the majority opinion, she testified that her in-court identification was based on the picture or pictures and she was “not going to say” she could have identified him without having seen the pictures.
It is clear, as pointed out in the majority opinion, that her in-court identification was tainted by the photographic display.
For the reasons stated, I concur.