Court Opinion

ID: 9777474
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 20:12:03.718164+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:17.890726
License: Public Domain

POPE, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. Ivy Lord inherited from his mother 16% acres of land, charged with a lien. By his 1942 deed he conveyed his inheritance to his daughter, Mary Gein. This intent to convey what he inherited was written into the deed in a separate special intention clause. When he conveyed what he inherited, and when his grantee received what he inherited, Ivy Lord could not thereafter be estopped. The opinion of the majority holds that there was a breach of warranty upon the foreclosure of the judgment lien against the 16% acres that Ivy Lord conveyed to Mary Gein and that the doctrine of after-acquired title should apply. I would hold that the evident intent of the grantor was to convey an undivided interest out of a described tract to the extent of his inheritance and that his grantee received exactly that. The grantee took the land with the debt, because that was what Ivy Lord inherited. These are the words that Ivy Lord put in his deed:
“It being understood that the interest hereby conveyed in said 200 acres of land being the interest inhearited by the said Ivy Lord, from the estate of his deceased father and mother, Lee Lord, and wife, Mrs. Lee Lord.”
Those words mean something. They are not idle recitals. The opinion of the majority reaches a result identical with that which would be compelled if the clause had been left out of the deed. To me, the words are purposeful, clear, and limiting. I would *698hold that Ivy Lord tried to tell us that he inherited something from his mother and that he intended to convey what he inherited, no more and no less.
“It being understood,” was Ivy Lord’s opening phrase. Those words mean “It is agreed.” Stanley v. Spann, 21 S.W.2d 305, 308, (Tex.Civ.App.1929, writ dism.). The thing that the grantor and grantee agreed upon was that the grantor conveyed “the interest inherited by the said Ivy Lord * * * ” An inheritance is the interest in real property which the law, immediately on the ancestor’s decease, casts on the heir. Barclay v. Cameron, 25 Tex. 233, 241 (1860). Inherent in the term is the idea that the heir takes the infirmities of the inheritance along with the strength, the assets as well as the debts. Ivy Lord inherited 16% acres from his father free of debt and a like share from his mother charged with debt. He conveyed what he inherited. When Mary Gein received all of that, as she did, she received all that the grantor and grantee intended by the deed.
Intention clauses should command attention. They serve useful purposes. Sometimes they describe and clarify. Germany v. Turner, 132 Tex. 491, 123 S.W.2d 874 (1939) ; Barfield v. W. C. Belcher Land Mortgage Co., 257 S.W. 1095, 1097 (Tex.Com.App.1924); Cullers v. Platt, 81 Tex. 258, 16 S.W. 1003, 1005 (1891) ; Hitchler v. Scanlan, 15 Tex.Civ.App. 40, 39 S.W. 633, 636 (1897, writ ref.). Sometimes they enlarge a grant or description or even convert what otherwise would be a quitclaim into a conveyance of land. Sun Oil Co. v. Burns, 125 Tex. 549, 84 S.W.2d 442 (1935) ; Cook v. Smith, 107 Tex. 119,174 S.W. 1094, 3 A.L.R. 940 (1915). Accord, Arrowwood v. Blount, Tex.Civ.App., 294 S.W. 616 (1927), affirmed 121 Tex. 52, 41 S.W.2d 412 (1931); Lauchheimer v. Saunders, 27 Tex.Civ.App. 484, 65 S.W. 500, 501 (1901, no writ). Sometimes they limit and restrict. Whatever the category, as Judge Smedley stated in Sun Oil Co. v. Burns, supra, intention clauses cannot be overlooked. He wrote in that case: “The clause declaring the intention of the grantor was, because of its plain language and manifest purpose, given the effect of enlarging both the granting clause and the terms of the description, and of converting what without it would have been a quitclaim deed into a conveyance of the land. * * *.”
An intention clause can enlarge and broaden a grant. In Cook v. Smith, supra, such a clause overcame the effect of operative words found in the granting, haben-dum and warranty clauses which would have made the instrument a pure quitclaim. In that case the grantor “bargained, sold, released and forever quitclaimed * * * all my right, title and interest * * The court stated that the habendum clause also contained the words of a quitclaim. In treating the deed in its entirety, however, the court seized upon the grantor’s intention clause to reach a result directly opposite that which would have been reached from looking at all the rest of the deed. These are the words that converted a quitclaim deed into a conveyance of land: “ * * * and it is my intention here now to convey to the said A. A. Neff all the real estate that I own in said town of Paducah in Cottle County, Texas, whether it is set out above or not.” Sun Oil Co. v. Burns, supra, is equally significant, for there too, it was the intention clause that converted the instrument into a conveyance of land.
Intention clauses which reveal the grantor’s intent to limit and restrict are entitled to equal respect. It is not unusual to include terms of agreement in a deed other than the premises, habendum and warranty clauses. In Fleming v. Ashcroft, 142 Tex. 41, 175 S.W.2d 401 (1943) the deed conveyed and warranted one-half interest in the oil under lands described by metes and bounds. Following the description and before the habendum and warranty clauses several special agreements were stated. One of them was: “It Is Understood that the sale of this royalty is for a period of fifteen years from February 19th, 1924, under the terms and provisions of oil and gas *699lease heretofore given by grantor herein as to the production of oil and gas, and at the expiration of said fifteen years the title to the minerals conveyed herein is to revert, without further notice, to grantor herein.” The Supreme Court found no repugnancy between this clear intent and other provisions of the deed, for “To hold otherwise would result in denying any effect whatsoever to the fifteen-year limitation.” The court restated the rule that intention must be gathered from a fair consideration of the whole instrument and that the construction given it should harmonize with the terms of the deed, including its scope, subject-matter, and purpose. Rio Bravo Oil v. Weed, 121 Tex. 427, 50 S.W.2d 1080, 1087, 85 A.L.R. 391.
The majority distinguishes Wilson v. Wilson, 118 S.W.2d 403 (Tex.Civ.App.1938, no writ) and Stoepler v. Silberberg, 220 Mo. 258, 119 S.W. 418 (1909). The point in those cases and others like them, is that the courts did not disregard the grantors’ special intention clauses. The clauses gave expression to the grantors’ intent to limit and were respected. The following similar clauses have served as expressions of intent which courts have considered helpful in arriving at intent:
“ * * * All that certain tract or parcels of land, situated in Shelby, County, Texas, being our one-fifth and entire interest and to the estate of Media Wilson wife of Henry J. Wilson and mother of Robert Wilson, said estate consisting of a undivided one-half interest in and to the following tracts or parcels of land, being a part of the J. Cordova four leagues situated in Shelby County, Texas, * * * ” (Description of the three tracts follows). Wilson v. Wilson, supra.
“ * * * This deed is to embrace all the interest in the aforesaid real estate that I inherited from my father, Bernard Stoepler, deceased, and devised to me in his last will and testament and also such interest that I inherited from my sisters, Mrs. Zurmuehlen, deceased, and Mary Stoepler, deceased, and also my brother, August Stoepler, deceased.” Stoepler v. Silberberg, supra.
“ * * * all my interest in and to all property real, personal or mixed to which I was entitled at the death of my father Charles Hale as heir and one of his seven children who survived him or to which I may be entitled in his said estate as such child or heir at law * * *” describing property. Hale v. Hale, 93 S.W.2d 535 (Tex.Civ.App. 1936, writ ref.).
“ * * * It being my intention to convey all my interest in and to said tracts of land by reason of being a child and legal heir of James Spangler, deceased.” Spangler v. Spangler, 42 S.W.2d 826 (Tex.Civ.App., 1931, no writ).
“ * * * Do grant, bargain, sell, and convey unto the said G. H. Hermann, of Harris County, all that certain parcels of land that we inherited from the estate of Ade Bourgeois, situated on the San Jacinto River, it being parts of the J. B. Jones 1/3 league and of the James Strange 1/3 league of land in Harris County. The intention of this deed is to convey all the interests that Matalie Bonat, formerly Bourgeois, now owns by inheritance from her parents, now deceased, in the said above described tracts of land.” West v. Hermann, 47 Tex.Civ.App. 131, 104 S.W. 428 (1907, no writ).
It is my opinion that Ivy Lord’s intent, expressed in his 1942 deed to Mary Gein, has been thwarted. Intention should be ascertained from a consideration of all parts of the instrument. Garrett v. Dils Company, 157 Tex. 92, 299 S.W.2d 904 (1957); Benskin v. Barksdale, 246 S.W. 360 (Tex.Com.App.1923). This entire controversy centers upon Ivy Lord’s intent as expressed by his deed, but the one paragraph in the deed which demonstrates that intent is the one that has been treated as *700purposeless and meaningless. “The stone which the builders rejected, the same is become the head of the corner.” I would affirm.
I respectfully dissent.
HAMILTON, J., joins in this dissent.