Court Opinion

ID: 9827634
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 17:43:08.003654+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:33.969244
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
The appellant in this case attempts to distinguish between the facts which we concluded showed contributory negligence and the facts in the two cases, quoted by us in our original opinion for the purpose of sustaining that position. We did not intend to convey the suggestion that the two cases cited were “blanket” cases, in every respect similar to the cause under consideration. We thought they were similar to the extent as that the principle to be deduced therefrom, based upon the facts therein exhibited, with reference to the culpability of the plaintiff, were so analogous as to preclude a recovery. It is often hard for the briefmaker, as well as for the courts, in attempting to present a principle applicable to a record, to find a “receipt,” so to speak, which would preclude discussion — to always have an absolute similitude of facts to sustain the position attempted to be maintained. In. considering the cause on the original, hearing, we thought then, and we are very strongly impressed now, that a careful consideration of the acts of the plaintiff concludes the cause. Neither the appellant nor the appellee has attempted to assist us with reference to the serious and important question of contributory negligence involved in this record by any citation of authorities; the former contended with a discrimination of facts and condemnation of the authorities and principles attempted to be invoked by us.
It may be that we have overlooked some authorities upon this question, but upon investigation we are inclined to think that, as to the direct question involved (this woman proceeding into the dark and stepping into unknown danger), the case of Buenemann v. Railway Co., 32 Minn. 390, 20 N. W. 380, decided by the Supreme Court of Minnesota, is rather in point in appellant’s favor. In that cause the passenger was upon the platform of the railway company intending to take passage upon defendant’s train, which had just arrived. He walked to the rear of the train for the purpose of obtaining a' seat in the rear car, which, of course, was a legitimate purpose, and it appeared that he did not go further than was necessary. It seems that in this cause the passenger knew that the platform was elev.ated but the night was dark and there were no lights, with the exception of the lights in the building (the same as in this record), to light the platform or approaches. The Supreme Court of Minnesota said in that cause; “lie was a stranger and was not familiar with the ground; but conceding, as we must, that he saw that it was dark and knew that the platform was elevated, and, as counsel say, ended somewhere, yet might he not assume, when he saw that the company had left the platform unlighted, that they would not leave a passenger coach so near the end of the platform as to endanger the safety of passengers who might be seeking to approach either end of the car.” The court, however, further said: “So far as we can arrive at a conclusion from the imperfect manner in which the evidence is brought before us, we admit we are personally strongly i/mpressed, mth the idea that plaintiff was negligent but by no means so clearly as to so hold as a matter of law against the verdicts of two juries and the opinion of both of the learned judges who presided at the respective trials in the court below” — and upon this history of this case this Supreme Court thought that these facts with reference to the action of the two juries and the trial judges in the court below was “entitled to some weight as tending to show that at least there is reasonable ground for a difference of opinion on the question.” The first trial resulted in a verdict in favor of the plaintiff; and we presume the trial judges, on account of the great preponderance of the testimony, indicating contributory negligence, granted a new trial but permitted a second verdict to stand, which the Supreme Court sustained. It was with considerable misgiving and reluctance that the able court in that instance affirmed the judgment of the trial court; and there is apparent in that cause an element not existing in this record, as stated, that the passenger might assume that the railroad, in bringing its train into a depot, would not leave a passenger coach so close to the end of a platform as to endanger the safety of passengers who might be seeking to approach either end of said car. The passenger in that cause “was in the act of turning upon the platform when he missed his step and fell therefrom to the ground, having evidently in the darkness gone too near the edge,” and which was the immediate act manifested by Mrs. Stamp here. If that court, impressed by the weakness of plaintiff’s case and the strength of the proof of contributory negligence, reluctantly affirmed a judgment of recovery, based to some extent upon the verdict of two juries and the final action of the trial court, in overruling the motion for a new trial, what would have been its opinion if the trial court, had peremptorily instructed the jury, as in this cause, and the evidence had been the same? The contributory negligence in this record is grounded by us upon what we deem to be the heedless action of the appellant in walking near the edge of the platform in the dark, knowing that the same must end somewhere, without knowledge of surroundings.
We cite the case of Bennett v. Railway Co., 57 Conn. 422, 18 Atl. 668, by the Supreme Court of Connecticut, not upon the similitude of facts in that record to this cause, but for the applicability of an observation in that case upon an element we considered quite *455potent and suggestive in tins record. Tbe appellant, Annie Stamp, in this cause testified that after proceeding upon the platform a certain distance, and while in the- dark, she lost her bearings and became turned around, evidently not knowing the course that she was pursuing. In the Bennett Case, supra, it seems that plaintiff knew the premises, which, with the fact of passing three lighted stairways, distinguishes it from this cause, and knew that passengers were accustomed to indiscriminately use three of the stairways at the station, and passed the three which were lighted and missed his calculation in approaching the fourth, which was unlighted, and was injured. The court said; “He has now passed from a place of safety into one of great danger,” and “the law, instead of being satisfied with slight care, requires the utmost care. Slight negligence became gross negligence, because none will be tolerated.” We are not prepared to adopt this statement in full as a legal principle but think the following observation . quite relevant and pertinent: “Every one knows how difficult it is in walking in utter darkness to correctly calculate courses and distances even in very familiar localities. The record does not disclose that any’precautions were taken to know and keep in mind his whereabouts, except perhaps to reply upon his general knowledge of. the premises, to inform him when he reached the stairs. If that is so, he was inexcusable.” The court further said that the appellant in that cause disregarded “the instinct of self-preservation,” and the darkness, coupled of course with the other act/of plaintiff, was a moving consideration, evidently, in the opinion of that in concluding contributory is a matter of law.
the ease Massey v. Sellar, 43 Or. 267, Pac. 399, not wholly applicable, upon the facts, it being a case ¡.tor was by invitation, and where of premises had an unguarded id where the visitor had stepped was seeking a water-closet in a r. The observation of the court think pertinent is as follows: t was so dark in there that he nothing,’ it was certainly an act his part to enter on a cruise of and discovery without determin-f it was safe to proceed. To bolt nto a place little known, and senses cannot take note of it, is of a prudent man, and there is no any other inference or deduction it. Reasonable minds could not y other conclusion touching it, so thing for the jury to determine,”
, Also the case of Emery v. Railway Co., 77 Minn. 465, 80 N. W. 627, is cited, where a lady was a visitor upon the premises of the railway company and fell from the platform of the defendant upon her return home, after having accompanied a relative to. the train, and was familiar with the platform, and, the court said, “hence must have known the' danger of Valking off the north end of it in the darkness, for she testified it was the darkest night she ever saw. If so,- the danger was proportionate to the darkness; but she made not the slightest effort to avoid danger and secure her safety, for she testifies she walked right off the end of the platform and was thereby injured,” We believe it will be readily understood, without attempting to discriminate, the purpose of the quotations and the limit of their applicability to the record here.
In regard to the matter of the foreign law and the question of a free pass concluding a recovery, the appellant again vigorously insists -that the foreign law is not proven, and that further the pass on which appellant rode was not a free pass, and upon the latter question cites the following authorities: Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1, 10 L. Ed. 870; Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Stevens, 95 U. S. 655, 24 L. Ed. 536; B. & O. Ry. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U. S. 368, 13 Sup. Ct. 914, 37 L. Ed. 774; Doyle v. Railway Co., 166 Mass. 492, 44 N. E. 611, 33 L. R. A. 845, 55 Am. St. Rep. 417; also s. c., 162 Mass. 66, 37 N. E. 770, 25 L. R. A. 157, 44 Am. St. Rep. 335; U. S. Statutes Annotated, Supplement of 1912, p. 114 (Act June 18, 1910, c. 309, §'7, 36 Stat. 547 [U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1911, p. 1286]). The case of Railway Co. v. Stevens, supra, decided by the federal Supreme Court, was one where the plaintiff was the owner of a patented, car coupling; the railway company, negotiating for its adoption as an appliance upon its road, had agreed to pay plaintiff’s expenses if he would make a “joint errand for himself and the company,” as the appellant expresses it, and the Supreme Court said: “His expenses in making that journey were to be paid by the defendant, and of these expenses the expense of his transportation was a part.” Also holding the transportation an express contract: “The transportation of the plaintiff in the defendant’s cars, though not paid for by him in money, was not a matter of charity nor of gratuity in any sense. It was by virtue of an agreement in which the mutual interests of the parties were consulted.” “Drovers passes” are of course part of the consideration of the transportation and are also contracts.
The case of Doyle, Adm’r, v. Railway, decided by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, supra, involved a ticket or pass which was issued to the holder monthly, clearly in consideration and as a part of his empíoyment. The facts of this case are explained by a reading of another case between the same parties, Doyle, Adm’r, v. Railway Co., the latter reported in 166 Mass. 492, 44. N. E. 611, 33 L. R. A 844, 55 Am. St. Rep. 417, showing that the issuance of the transportation to the deceased was an express ingredient of the contract of employ*456ment, by virtue of which the defendant; by the issuance of this character of transportation, “was enabled to obtain the services of those who did not live in Boston? and thus draw its employSs from a larger body, subject only to the expense of transportation, and the plaintiff's intestate was enabled to enter the defendant’s employment on equal terms as to wages with those living in Boston,” and held that “the ticket (in both cases) could not properly be regarded as a gratuity.” This transportation is by virtue of a contract, express or implied, or lacks the elements of one; if there is no consideration to the company by virtue of such contract, there is no contract and it is in the nature of a gratuity.
In this cause, upon the whole testimony, we are unable to say that the mother was a dependent member of the family, if that was a requirement for the successful solicitation of a pass; nor that the custom to give passes to the emplóyés, or rules to that effect, extended to the son for the benefit of his mother and was a part of the employment, express or implied; the proof is too uncertain. Could the son, upon refusal to issue the pass, have sued and recovered for the transportation if he had paid' the fare for his mother under 'the proof here? We cléarly do not think so.
In this cause the appellant sues for $12,000. In the cáse of Sims v. Sims, 175 U. S. 162, 20 Sup. Ct. 58, 44 L. Ed. 117, the Supreme Court of the United States, with reference to appeals and writs of error to the Supreme Court of the United States from the Supreme' Court' of a territory, said: “Under the existing acts of Congress, therefore (except in the cases so transferred to the Circuit Courts of Appeals, and in cases of habeas corpus, cases involving the validity of a copyright, and cases depending upon the Constitution or a statute or treaty of the United States, none of which classes includes the case at bar), the appellate jurisdiction of this court to review and reverse or affirm the final judgments and decrees of the Supreme Court of a territory includes those cases, and those cases only, at law or in equity, in which ‘the matter in dispute, exclusive of costs, shall exceed the sum of $5,000.’ ” With reference to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United States over causes upon appeal or writs of error from the Supreme Court of a territory, the statutes governing the matter', since the rendition of the opinion of the Sims Case, supra, have been modified by the additional prescription in procedure requiring ascertainment of the sum in dispute to be under oath;, the last change directly applicable to New Mexico is indicated by the congressional act of March 3, 1911 (chapter 231, § 245, 36 Stat. 1158 [U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1911, p. 229], Federal Statutes Annotated, vol. 1 [Supplement] p. 233), as follows: “Sec. 245 (writs of error and appeals from the Supreme Courts of Arizona and New Mexico). Writs of error and appeals from the final judgments and decrees of the Supreme Courts of the territories of Arizona and New Mexico may be taken and prosecuted to the Supreme Court of the United States in any case wherein is involved the validity of any copyright, or in which is drawn in question the validity of a treaty or statute of, or authority exercised under the United States, without regard to the sum or value of the matter in dispute; and in all other cases in which the sum or value of the matter in dispute, exclusive of costs, to be ascertained by the oath of either party or of other competent witnesses, exceeds the sum or value of five thousand dollars.”
The matter of the ascertainment of the sum in dispute under oath as a condition of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United States is a mere matter of pleading and procedure and could not affect the proposition of the rule of law prevailing in New Mexico, as evidenced by the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in two cases.
Appellant argues quite ingeniously that the law as announced by courts is subject to change, and on account of its mutability it should not overcome the presumption that the law of New Mexico is the same as we interpret it. True, the courts change their decisions, but the'logic, pushing it to a forced conclusion, lands appellant upon the proposition that the rule of law decided in this state that the law of ánother state is presumed to be the same as ours is a fallacy, because our own courts may change the law at any time, when in realityMt is a salutary rule where applicable.
The case of Boering v. Railway "Co., infra, and the last case by the Supreme Court, uses very strong language in regard to a free pass, and we would not be any more at liberty in believing that that court would change its decision than that our Supreme Courtiwould change its decisions when several yearsvprevi-;ously it had twice decided the same proposition. If we are correct and this transportation is not á contract, we think the lalv of this case as a part of the law of New Mexico is that introduced in evidence by appellee contained in the cases of Railway Co. v. Adams, 192 U. S. 440, 24 Sup. Ct. 408, 48 L. Ed. 513, and Boering v. Railway Co., 193 U.S. 449, 24 Sup. Ct. 515, 48 L. Ed. 742, wlierte transportation of this character was held tt> • be gratuity. The case of Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Etta White, 162 S. W. 905, decided by us December 6, 1913, is clearly) distinguishable from this case, patent upon) reading the two cases, and does not apply. ( The question of diverse citizenship is not l in this record. If this transportation was ] not based upon a consideration, the law of j the Supreme Court of the United States is r the law of this very case, and, if sued upon ’ in New Mexico, we believe the result there would have been the result here. A further *457inspection and consideration of tile congressional act with, reference to free passes causes ns to reiterate that the same is not applicable to the record here.
The motion for rehearing is overruled.