Court Opinion

ID: 9706119
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:31:55.471098+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:19.409610
License: Public Domain

CAVANAUGH, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent because the majority opinion permits the court below to increase the total sentence of imprisonment imposed in circumstances that are legally impermissible. The appellant was originally sentenced to an aggregate term of four to fourteen years imprisonment for various offenses, and seven years probation for criminal trespass.
Following a Post Conviction Hearing Act petition, the court determined that it had erred in sentencing the defendant to one to two years imprisonment for simple assault and vacated the sentence for that offense. It then replaced the sentence of probation for criminal trespass with a sentence of one to seven years imprisonment. Consequent ly, the new sentence was for a term of imprisonment of four to nineteen years.
The court below and the majority opinion justify the increase in the sentence on the basis that the trial court intended to carry out its original sentencing scheme after it properly realized that it erred in imposing a separate sentence for simple assault and recklessly endangering another *92person. We fail to see how an increase in a sentence of imprisonment from four to fourteen years, and seven years probation, to a sentence of imprisonment to four to nineteen years, with no sentence of probation, sets forth the same sentencing scheme. No matter how one attempts to characterize the amended sentence of incarceration, it was substantially increased. Even if the appellant were to be considered for parole prior to serving the maximum sentence, the adverse results of the increased sentence to imprisonment are manifest. Parole is a matter of grace and not of right, and is within the discretion of the court. Commonwealth v. Gooslin, 280 Pa.Super. 384, 421 A.2d 775 (1980). The implications of parole violation are far more severe than violation of probation. A defendant who violates his parole may be recommitted to serve the remainder of his sentence. 61 Pa.C.S. § 331.21 and § 331.22a. Parole is the legal equivalent of imprisonment, Commonwealth v. Thomas, 291 Pa.Super. 263, 435 A.2d 901 (1981), whereas probation is a suspended sentence of imprisonment. Fleagle v. Commonwealth Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 110 Pa.Cmwlth. 227, 532 A.2d 898 (1987).
In my opinion, the increase in sentence violates the appellant’s rights to due process of law. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969) established the principle that due process requires that vindictiveness against a defendant must play no part in resentencing. In order to assure that there is no vindictiveness in increasing a sentence, the trial judge must affirmatively state justifiable reasons for doing so, otherwise, there is a presumption that the sentence was increased for vindictive purposes. Texas v. McCullough, 475 U.S. 134, 106 S.Ct. 976, 89 L.Ed.2d 104 (1986). The recent case of Alabama v. Smith, — U.S.-, 109 S.Ct. 2201, 104 L.Ed.2d 865 (1989) held that where there is no likelihood of vindictiveness, the burden is on the defendant to prove actual vindictiveness. In that case, the defendant was granted a new trial after he succeeded in withdrawing his guilty plea. His sentence after a jury trial was greater than it would *93have been under the guilty plea, but the trial judge who was the same judge who had accepted the guilty plea, had a fuller appreciation of the nature and extent of the crime involved following the jury trial.
In the case before us, the defendant did not receive a new trial and no additional facts were brought to the court’s attention. All the defendant did was properly complain that the trial judge erred in imposing separate sentences for assault and recklessly endangering another person. The court agreed and then increased the sentence for criminal trespass from seven years probation to one to seven years imprisonment.
The majority cites Commonwealth v. Greer, 382 Pa.Super. 127, 554 A.2d 980 (1989) to sustain the proposition that in resentencing, a court has a valid interest in preserving the integrity of a prior sentencing scheme. In Greer, supra, the defendant was sentenced by two different judges for factually similar but unrelated offenses. Judge Erb vacated his sentence and then resentenced the defendant for a term of imprisonment to run consecutively to that imposed by Judge Cassimatis. We stated at 382 Pa.Super. 141, 554 A.2d 980:
However, it is abundantly clear from the record that the trial court, in effect, did not impose a harsher sentence. At the time of the original sentencing, it was the intention of the sentencing judges to have the sentences at 1009 C.A.1979 and 1060 C.A.1979 run consecutively. Instantly, Judge Erb’s decision to have the present sentences run consecutively to those imposed by Judge Cassimatis merely gives effect to the original sentencing scheme. Simply put, the appellant will first serve the sentences imposed by Judge Cassimatis at 1060 C.A.1979 and then will serve the sentences imposed by Judge Erb, rather than vice versa as originally intended. (Emphasis added.)
In the case before us, the sentence to imprisonment was substantially increased and did not merely carry out the original sentencing scheme. For these reasons, I dissent and would remand for resentencing.