Court Opinion

ID: 9483066
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 09:09:28.226726+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:49:23.478884
License: Public Domain

WINTER, Circuit Judge,
concurring in the result:
I agree with my colleagues that this matter should be affirmed. In my view, an instruction on the consequences of a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity should normally not be given.
I agree with Judge Newman that the passage quoted from the Senate Judiciary Committee’s report states that the kind of instruction requested by Bianchini should be given and does not leave the issue to the trial court’s discretion. The Committee “endorsed]” the giving of such an instruction and suggested that only a defendant’s request “that the instruction not be given” (emphasis added) be left to the discretion of the district court. S.Rep. No. 98-225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 240 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182 at 3423. However, a statement in a Committee report, however clear it may be, does not have the force of law where the statute itself lacks any relevant provision. Cf. Knapp v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 867 F.2d 749 (2d Cir.1989) (House Report stating intent of committee not authoritative when not consistent with language of statute). Still, the passage of legislation providing for a mandatory commitment period provides an appropriate occasion for us to reconsider whether the giving of the kind of instruction requested by Bianchini is mandatory. I believe it is not.
The principle that the jury is not instructed as to the sentence that will be meted out to a defendant is a salutary one. The *54likely sentence is not relevant to the jury’s task of finding facts and rendering a verdict on criminal liability. In fact, the giving of such an instruction invites juries to ponder matters that are not within their authority and creates a strong possibility of confusion.
The present case nicely illustrates the problem. The instruction requested by Bianchini was as follows:
If you find the defendant not guilty only by reason of insanity, I instruct you that, under federal law, I must commit him to á suitable facility, and hold a hearing regarding continued commitment. Unless the defendant can establish at that hearing that his release would not create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another, or of serious damage to the property of another person due to a present mental disease or defect, he will remain committed to a suitable facility. He will only be released upon certification that he has recovered from his mental disease or defect to such an extent that his release (which may be conditioned upon a prescribed regimen of treatment and/or medication) no longer creates such a risk. The government may contest any such certification, and request a further hearing before me.
I believe that, if a jury is to be instructed on this matter at all, the proposed instruction would have to be redrafted to inform the jury that an insanity acquittee is entitled to a hearing on his or her mental illness within forty days of the verdict. 18 U.S.C. § 4243(c) (1988). The only mandatory period of confinement, therefore, is the period between the verdict and the hearing, which may be held at any time within forty days. Whether a defendant would find such an instruction helpful seems doubtful to me.
More importantly, I do not think that such an instruction aids jurors in their assigned task. It all but directs them to consider the likelihood of a release date, a matter which, I reiterate, is none of their business. The only conceivable role for such an instruction is to disabuse a jury of the notion that defendants acquitted by reason of insanity are not incarcerated. We should not assume, however, that jurors hold that notion. After all, the nation’s most celebrated insanity acquittee, John Hinckley, has been confined for over 10 years. Nor should we assume that the average jury will speculate regarding the consequences of such an acquittal and violate their oaths by acting on that speculation.
Nevertheless, I agree with my colleagues that a district court has discretion to fashion and to give such an instruction in some circumstances. I believe that this discretion is limited to cases in which the trial judge has reason to believe that a particular jury may think that insanity acquittees usually go free and that there is some possibility of the jury’s acting on that belief. For example, if a witness or prosecutor made a statement implying that a particular defendant would go free if acquitted by reason of insanity, then a proper instruction on the subject would be appropriate. For another example, if a trial were to take place in the context of a well-publicized insanity acquittee being freed or a freed acquittee committing a well-publicized crime, an instruction would also be appropriate. No such circumstances confront us in the present case.
I therefore concur in the result.