Court Opinion

ID: 9720515
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:33:46.507102+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:18.966599
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE THOMAS, dissenting: Absent evidence that the prosecution knowingly used false or perjured testimony, a defendant is not entitled to postconviction relief. People v. Brown, 169 Ill. 2d 94, 103-08 (1995). The knowledge requirement is satisfied if there is knowledge on the part of the representatives or agents of the prosecution. Brown, 169 Ill. 2d at 103. The defendant bears the burden of proof in a postconviction proceeding. People v. Griffin, 178 Ill. 2d 65, 73 (1997). Here, the testimony of Elizondo and Waters as to whether they were offered a deal was inconsistent in the two trials. The trial court in the present postconviction proceeding made no finding as to whether there were deals and instead concluded that, even if there were, it would not change the outcome. At the postconviction proceeding, the State did not admit the existence of deals, nor does it make such an admission on appeal. I believe that, if the State’s Attorney determined at the defendant’s trial that the testimony of no deals was truthful, and that there were in fact no deals, then Diaz, 297 Ill. App. 3d 362, would not be on point. Diaz would be distinguishable, since there the witness actually was given a deal and the State failed to disclose that fact to the defendant, despite the defendant’s specific request for that information during discovery. Since the trial court did not determine whether there was a deal in this case or whether the State knowingly used false testimony, I would remand the cause for further proceedings to allow the trial court to determine whether Elizondo and Waters were offered a deal in exchange for their testimony at the defendant’s trial. Accordingly, I dissent.