Court Opinion

ID: 9353330
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-11 17:05:55.599972+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:07:19.355870
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                   No. 22-0155
                             Filed January 11, 2023

JENNIFER KATHERYN LENORE FISHER,
     Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

BRADLEY EDWIN CASNER,
     Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

       Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, David W. Nelmark,

Judge.

       An ex-husband appeals from an order granting his ex-wife’s motion to

enforce a settlement agreement. AFFIRMED AND REMANDED.

       Jason S. Rieper of Rieper Law, P.C., Des Moines, for appellant.

       Jacob Van Cleaf of Van Cleaf & McCormack Law Firm, LLP, Des Moines,

for appellee.

       Considered by Ahlers, P.J., and Badding and Chicchelly, JJ.
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CHICCHELLY, Judge.

       Bradley Casner appeals from an order granting his ex-wife Jennifer Fisher’s

motion to enforce a settlement agreement. Casner argues there was not an

enforceable agreement due to a mutual mistake. However, an apparent mistake

between Casner and his counsel does not constitute a mutual mistake with Fisher.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order but remand for the court to

determine a potential award of Fisher’s appellate attorney fees.

   I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

       In July 2020, Casner filed an application for modification of decree of

custody because Fisher moved to a different town in Iowa with the parties’ three

minor children. The matter was set for trial in October 2021. In the week leading

up to trial, Casner’s counsel reached out to discuss potential settlement. On

October 25, the parties believed they reached an agreement. The court entered

an order the following day requiring the parties to file a stipulation and proposed

decree within thirty days.

       When Fisher’s counsel sent a proposed stipulation, Casner realized the

agreement did not reflect what he intended regarding the location to exchange the

children. Since Casner refused to sign the stipulation, Fisher filed a motion to

enforce their agreement on November 19. After a hearing on the matter, the court

issued an order granting Fisher’s motion in December. The ruling instructed

Casner to sign the stipulation within seven days. Casner did so on January 4,

2022. He filed a notice of appeal on January 24.
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   II. Review.

      As this appeal concerns enforcement of a settlement agreement in a

dissolution matter and was heard in equity, our review is de novo. See Iowa R.

App. P. 6.907; In re Marriage of Jones, 653 N.W.2d 589, 592 (Iowa 2002). We

give weight to the district court’s factual findings and credibility determinations,

though we are not bound by them. Jones, 653 N.W.2d at 592.

   III. Discussion.

      Casner contends Fisher’s motion should have failed because there was not

a valid agreement to enforce. He argues there was no meeting of the minds due

to a mutual mistake regarding an essential fact. See State ex rel. Palmer v. Unisys

Corp., 637 N.W.2d 142, 150 (Iowa 2001) (“Generally, mutual mistake will render a

contract voidable by the party who is adversely affected by the mistake when the

parties are mistaken on a basic assumption on which the contract was made,

unless the adversely affected party bears the risk of mistake.”). Casner’s counsel

recounted that, during a phone call to discuss settlement with Fisher’s counsel in

October 2021, he shared Casner’s desire to maintain the parties’ then-current

transportation arrangement and exchange location. Fisher’s counsel mentioned

the Pleasantville commuter lot, to which Casner’s counsel agreed that sounded

right and reiterated that they wanted to maintain the present arrangement. Fisher’s

counsel stated that Casner’s counsel specifically identified the commuter lot.

      In any event, Fisher’s counsel sent an email recapping their discussion,

which stated explicitly: “All exchanges will happen at the commuter lot south of

Pleasantville unless mutually agreed otherwise in advance.” Casner’s counsel

informed Casner that Fisher agreed to their transportation proposal, and the
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parties continued negotiating other issues. Eventually, Casner’s counsel wrote

back, “You have a deal.” When it came time to sign the stipulation, Casner claimed

the terms did not reflect his intent to continue with the parties’ voluntary

transportation arrangement that had been in place since Fisher’s move, which was

that he pick up the children from the commuter lot but Fisher pick up the children

from his home. The district court found there was an enforceable agreement

because there was no mutual, or even unilateral, mistake between the parties.

The transportation term was explicit and unambiguous. The district court also

determined that Casner’s counsel had the authority to bind Casner to the

agreement because he was acting within the scope of his duties. Casner does not

raise this issue of agency on appeal.

       Fisher argues Casner’s appeal is moot because the transportation issue

was resolved by his voluntary execution of the stipulation after the district court’s

ruling. Fisher does not offer supporting authority for her contention. However, it

is true that an appeal suspends enforcement of an order, and Casner already

complied with the order from which he now appeals. See Peoples Trust & Sav.

Bank v. Security Sav. Bank, 815 N.W.2d 744, 749 (Iowa 2012) (“[A] party waives

appeal when it satisfies a judgment before or simultaneously with a notice of

appeal.”). Regardless, we affirm the district court’s ruling on the merits. No mutual

mistake rendered the parties’ agreement voidable, so it should be enforced as

ordered. See Peak v. Adams, 799 N.W.2d 535, 542 (Iowa 2011) (finding extrinsic

evidence of one party’s undisclosed, unilateral intent “cannot alter the legal effect

of the unambiguous contract language”).
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       Fisher requests that Casner be ordered to pay $3000 of her appellate

attorney fees for defending the district court’s decision on appeal. An award of

attorney fees is a matter of our discretion and not merely a matter of course. In re

Marriage of Benson, 545 N.W.2d 252, 258 (Iowa 1996). “We are to consider the

needs of the party making the request, the ability of the other party to pay, and

whether the party making the request was obligated to defend the district court’s

decision on appeal.” In re Marriage of Ales, 592 N.W.2d 698, 703 (Iowa 1999).

We conclude Fisher may be entitled to appellate attorney fees but find ourselves

without information concerning Casner’s ability to pay or Fisher’s need. We are

furthermore unable to determine a reasonable sum because Fisher failed to file a

fee affidavit.   Accordingly, we remand the matter to the district court for

development of the record and a determination of Fisher’s appellate attorney fee

award, if any. See In re Marriage of Heiar, 954 N.W.2d 464, 473–74 (Iowa Ct.

App. 2020).

       AFFIRMED AND REMANDED.