Court Opinion

ID: 9382863
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-28 21:00:43.47792+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:42.203231
License: Public Domain

FILED
                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION
                                                                              MAR 28 2023
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                            U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

                            FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

GILBERTO ABAD RAMIREZ, AKA                       No.   19-72628
Abad Ramirez Gilberto,
                                                 Agency No. A075-476-641
              Petitioner,

 v.                                              MEMORANDUM*

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,

              Respondent.

                     On Petition for Review of an Order of the
                         Board of Immigration Appeals

                            Submitted March 10, 2023**
                               Pasadena, California

Before: KLEINFELD, WATFORD, and COLLINS, Circuit Judges.

      Gilberto Abad Ramirez (Abad) asks that we grant his petition for review of

the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (the Board) decision denying his motion to

reopen his removal proceedings. We dismiss in part and deny in part the petition.

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
      We begin with jurisdiction. Abad asks us to review the Board’s refusal to:

1) exercise its sua sponte authority to reopen his case and 2) use its equitable

power to toll the filing deadline for Abad’s motion to reopen. We have jurisdiction

over the latter issue, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1); Mata v. Lynch, 576 U.S. 143, 147-48

(2015), but lack jurisdiction over the former. As a general rule, we cannot review

the Board’s refusal to exercise its sua sponte power to reopen a case. Ekimian v.

INS, 303 F.3d 1153, 1160 (9th Cir. 2002). Although a narrow exception to that

general rule allows us to review “Board decisions denying sua sponte reopening

for the limited purpose of reviewing the reasoning behind the decisions for legal or

constitutional error,” Abad does not argue that the Board made such an error here.

Bonilla v. Lynch, 840 F.3d 575, 588 (9th Cir. 2016). Indeed, the Board chose not

to exercise its sua sponte authority because Abad had not shown the “exceptional

circumstances to warrant granting this very untimely motion to reopen.”

      We now consider the Board’s decision to not toll the filing deadline for

Abad’s motion. The Board did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion. See

Avagyan v. Holder, 646 F.3d 672, 678 (9th Cir. 2011) (standard of review). The

Board decided Abad’s initial appeal on April 5, 2002, and his motion to reopen

proceedings was due 90 days after that date. 8 C.F.R. § 3.2(c)(2) (2002 ed.). Abad

did not file his motion until September, 2018.

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      The Board did not abuse its discretion in denying Abad’s motion to reopen

based on Abad not looking into the circumstances of the alleged fraud with the

requisite due diligence or the representation not prejudicing Abad. The long delay

between Abad’s 2002 appeal and Abad filing his motion to reopen, in these

circumstances, is sufficient to justify the Board’s determination as to due diligence.

See Bonilla, 840 F.3d at 583 (upholding the Board’s determination that a petitioner

did not exercise the requisite due diligence to require the equitable tolling of the

filing requirements for a motion to reopen after a shorter delay). Although Abad

likens his case to Rodriguez-Lariz v. INS, 282 F.3d 1218 (9th Cir. 2002), the

actions of the non-attorney representing the petitioners in that case cost the

petitioners their ability to file a meaningful motion to reopen, and those petitioners

had “also satisfied the procedural prerequisites to reopen on the basis of ineffective

assistance of counsel.” Id. at 1222, 1226. Here, the non-attorney’s representation

of Abad did not prevent him from filing a motion to reopen that complied with the

regulatory requirements. Abad also does not explain how the representation

prejudiced him and it is hard to tell how it might have, especially considering that

he was represented by counsel before the immigration judge, as the Board noted.

      Insofar as the petition relates to the Board’s refusal to exercise its sua sponte

authority, the petition is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. And because the Board

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did not abuse its discretion in refusing to equitably toll the regulatory deadline for

Abad to file his motion for reopening, we must also deny the rest of the petition.

      PETITION FOR REVIEW DISMISSED IN PART AND DENIED IN

PART.

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