Court Opinion

ID: 9909560
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-13 18:02:32.004446+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:50:00.415749
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/13/23 P. v. Mayfield CA1/3
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                DIVISION THREE

 THE PEOPLE,
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                        A167825
 v.
 ALBERT ANTONIO MAYFIELD,                                               (Napa County
                                                                        Super. Ct. No. 22CR002824)
           Defendant and Appellant.

         Defendant Albert Antonio Mayfield pleaded no contest to charges of
stealing a 2006 pickup truck and evading a police officer with reckless
driving, a pursuit that ended with defendant totaling the vehicle. The trial
court awarded the victim restitution in the amount of $95,610.24, which was
the retail value of a new 2023 truck of the same make and model. Defendant
argues, and the People concede, that the trial court abused its discretion by
awarding the victim a windfall well beyond the value of his actual loss. We
agree, and so we vacate the restitution order and remand for a further
restitution hearing.
                            FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
         In 2022, a 2006 Ford F-350 pickup truck registered to Christopher
Miller was reported stolen. Defendant was found driving the stolen truck but
he refused to pull over for police officers. The pursuit ended when defendant

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crashed the truck into a residence, damaging the home and totaling the
truck.
         Defendant was charged with evading an officer against traffic (Veh.
Code, § 2800.4; count one), evading an officer with reckless driving (Veh.
Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a); count two), and unlawful driving or taking of a
vehicle with an allegation of a prior conviction (Veh. Code, § 666.5; count
three). He pleaded no contest to counts two and three and admitted the prior
conviction allegation attendant to count three, and the People dismissed
count one. The trial court sentenced defendant to a total term of five years
and four months in prison.
         The trial court held a hearing to determine an appropriate amount of
restitution to award the victims.1 The probation report stated that Miller’s
insurer had settled his claim for the stolen vehicle in the amount of
$21,568.65, but the prosecutor contended the “victim’s insurance should play
no part in calculating the restitution owed by the defendant.” The trial court
agreed. The prosecutor then argued that repairing the vehicle “wasn’t an
option,” and that Miller had been unable to locate a Ford dealership in the
area with a like vehicle. Thus, in order for Miller to obtain a replacement,
the prosecutor urged the court to award the value of a new Ford F-350 truck
in the amount of $95,610.24.
         Defense counsel countered that the insurance settlement amount was
relevant to determining the value of the stolen vehicle because “the insurance
company, which has a great deal of interest in this, took some time
investigating what the value of like property was, and paid that amount.”
Defense counsel also pointed out that the Kelley Blue Book value of a like

1    The restitution awards to the owner of the damaged residence and his
tenants are not at issue in this appeal.

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vehicle was between $11,000 to $18,000, and that the prosecutor’s request did
not “comport[] in any way with like property.”
      The trial court found that a like vehicle was not available, and that
despite defense counsel’s “argument about a windfall,” awarding Miller the
value of a new truck was a “reasonable way of compensating [him] for the
losses he suffered.” Accordingly, the court ordered defendant to pay Miller
$95,610.24 in restitution.
                                  DISCUSSION
      Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion by
(1) considering irrelevant evidence concerning the retail value of a new Ford
F-350 truck; (2) excluding evidence of the insurance settlement; and
(3) ordering a windfall to Miller. The People concede the award was not
rationally designed to determine the replacement cost of a like vehicle. We
accept the concession and vacate the restitution order.
      “[I]n every case in which a victim has suffered economic loss as a result
of the defendant’s conduct, the court shall require that the defendant make
restitution to the victim or victims in an amount established by court order,
based on the amount of loss claimed by the victim or victims or any other
showing the court.” (Pen. Code, § 1202.4, subd. (f).)2 The award “shall be of a
dollar amount that is sufficient to fully reimburse the victim or victims for
every determined economic loss incurred as the result of the defendant’s
criminal conduct,” including “[f]ull or partial payment for the value of stolen
or damaged property. The value of stolen or damaged property shall be the
replacement cost of like property, or the actual cost of repairing the property
when repair is possible.” (§ 1202.4, subd. (f)(3)(A).)

2     Further unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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      “Like” property is property of the same or similar “type and age.”
(People v. Thygesen (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 988, 995 (Thygesen).) In Thygesen,
the court provided the following apt example: “If [the victim] . . . lost a 1995
Ford Taurus, it would be entitled to the replacement value of a similar 1995
Ford Taurus, not a 1999 model.” (Thygesen, at p. 995.)
      “A restitution order is intended to compensate the victim for its actual
loss and is not intended to provide the victim with a windfall. [Citation.]
While the court need not order restitution in the precise amount of loss, it
‘must use a rational method that could reasonably be said to make the victim
whole, and may not make an order which is arbitrary or capricious.’ ” (People
v. Chappelone (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1172 (Chappelone).) A victim
restitution order should not exceed the victim’s actual loss. (People v. Nguyen
(1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 32, 45.)
      We review a trial court’s restitution order for abuse of discretion.
(Chappelone, supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at p. 1173.) In so doing, we recognize
the court’s discretion in setting the amount of restitution is broad. (People v.
Baker (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 463, 470.) So long as there is a factual and
rational basis for the amount of restitution ordered, no abuse of discretion
will be found. (Id. at p. 467.) However, a restitution order “resting on
demonstrable legal error” constitutes an abuse of discretion. (People v. Hume
(2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 990, 995.)
      We conclude the trial court’s restitution award rested on legal errors
that warrant reversal. The court refused to consider the insurance
settlement evidence based on the prosecutor’s argument that the “victim’s
insurance should play no part in calculating” restitution. But to the extent
the court believed the collateral source rule barred consideration of the
insurance settlement for purposes of valuing Miller’s loss, this was error.

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The collateral source rule precludes deduction of compensation that a
plaintiff has received from sources independent of the tortfeasor (e.g., the
plaintiff’s insurer) from the damages the plaintiff would otherwise collect
from the tortfeasor. (Howell v. Hamilton Meats & Provisions, Inc. (2011) 52
Cal.4th 541, 548 (Howell).) In Howell, the court held the collateral source
rule did not preclude deducting from the plaintiff’s tort recovery amounts
that were included in her medical provider’s bill but for which she never
actually incurred liability because the provider accepted a lesser amount as
full payment. “Such sums are not damages the plaintiff would otherwise
have collected from the defendant.” (Id. at pp. 548–549.)
      Likewise, the collateral source rule does not bar consideration of the
insurance settlement for purposes of valuing Miller’s loss. The insurance
settlement evidence was not offered to reduce the amount of restitution Miller
“would otherwise have collected” from defendant. (Howell, supra, 52 Cal.4th
at p. 549.) Rather, the evidence was offered to show the insurer’s valuation of
the stolen vehicle in order to determine, in the first instance, the extent of
Miller’s actual economic loss. It is akin to the evidence of the lesser amount
the medical provider accepted as full payment in Howell. That the insurance
settlement evidence was offered to counter the $95,610.24 amount requested
by the People was not in violation of the collateral source rule because
$95,610.24 was not Miller’s actual loss.3

3      To be clear, once an appropriate restitution award is determined on
remand, the collateral source rule still precludes offsetting that award by the
amounts Miller received from his insurer. We simply hold that the rule does
not bar admission of evidence of the insurer’s valuation of the stolen vehicle
to aid in determining Miller’s economic loss. Additionally, we in no way
intend to suggest the insurer’s valuation is dispositive of Miller’s economic
loss, and we leave it to the trial court to assess and weigh the probative value
of this evidence on remand.

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      The trial court also legally erred in awarding a sizeable windfall to
Miller based on the value of a new Ford F-350 truck. There is no dispute that
$95,610.24 exceeded the amount of Miller’s loss. Yet, the court awarded
restitution based on “property that was of greater quality than that which
defendant[] stole. This contravened section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(3)(A)’s
mandate that the victim is only entitled to compensation for like property. As
such, it was an abuse of discretion.” (Chappelone, supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1177.) “[I]n order to justify a restitution award that exceeds the loss
caused by the defendant, the trial court must state that such excessive award
was purposely made to serve a legitimate rehabilitative purpose.” (Thygesen,
supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at pp. 995–996.) The court did not do so here.
      Finally, substantial evidence does not support the trial court’s finding
that a like vehicle was unavailable. No evidence supporting the
unavailability of a like vehicle was submitted by the People with their
restitution brief. Instead, the prosecutor told the court at the restitution
hearing that “[t]he victim is not in a position to be able to go out and get a
2007 Ford F-350 4x4 truck. He did look. [¶] I’m looking at the dealerships
right now. Napa Ford does not have one. Concord Ford does not have one.
Vacaville Ford does not have one. Fairfield Ford does not have one.”
However, counsel’s unsworn statements were not evidence. (DiCola v. White
Brothers Performance Products, Inc. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 666, 683.)
      Moreover, the People did not cite any authority authorizing a
significant windfall simply because the victim is unable to find a replacement
of like property in the area. Granted, this may justify increasing a
restitution award, particularly if obtaining a replacement vehicle of like
make, model, and age would require the victim to incur additional costs (e.g.,
transport from a remote seller). On an adequate record, adding such actual

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costs to the restitution award would appear rationally related to
compensating the victim for his or her actual loss. But on the record before
us, we cannot say the prosecutor’s unsworn statements regarding the
unavailability of like property in the general vicinity provided the court with
a rational basis to award the sizeable windfall that it did.
         For these reasons, we vacate the restitution order and remand for a
further restitution hearing.
                                   DISPOSITION
         The restitution order is vacated. The matter is remanded to the trial
court for a further hearing to determine an appropriate amount of restitution
consistent with the views expressed above.

                                      _________________________
                                      Fujisaki, Acting P.J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
Petrou, J.

_________________________
Rodríguez, J.

People v. Mayfield (A167825)

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