Court Opinion

ID: 9849275
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:37:31.104325+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:13.135887
License: Public Domain

McCown, J.
I respectfully dissent. In considering a motion for a directed verdict, the party against whom the motion is made is entitled to have every disputed question of fact in the evidence resolved in his favor and to have the benefit of every inference that can reasonably be drawn therefrom. Carley v. Meinke, 181 Neb. 648, 150 N. W. 2d 256.
There was no dispute whatever but that a statement to the driver about a stop sign was made by the passenger Campbell. His direct testimony as to the wording was: “ T think we passed a stop sign back there.’ ” The driver responded: “ ‘Did I?’ ” and then the accident happened. On cross-examination, Campbell conceded that he might have, or probably did, testify under oath in a previous proceeding that he saw a stop sign ahead and that he believed he said: “ ‘There is a stop sign ahead,’ ” *197and that he did not recall any response from the driver. Campbell also conceded, without reference to any statements, that he, may have seen the sign that said “Stop Ahead” but did not recall specifically, or may have looked at it but it did not register in his mind. All of this evidence was admitted without objection. The majority opinion terms the evidence on cross-examination “admitted only for the purpose of impeachment” and, in effect, holds that no inference could be drawn that the statement as to a stop sign was made at any earlier time, or in any different form than that testified to on direct examination.
There was considerably more involved here than momentary inattention or inadvertence, even aside from the problem of a warning. Certain facts are undisputed. The radio in the car was not on. There was no conversation in the automobile to divert the driver’s attention in any respect. The accident occurred about 10 p.m. The driver drove past a reflectorized “Pavement Ends” sign 1,000 feet west of the intersection at which he expected to turn. He passed a reflectorized “Stop Ahead” sign approximately 400 feet from the intersection. He drove through a reflectorized “Stop” sign at the intersection. He failed to see the headlights of another vehicle approaching the intersection at approximately the same time. A statement was made about a stop sign by the passenger Campbell but the driver never applied his brakes. At no time during the entire 1,000 feet traveled did the defendant Fischer change or reduce his speed or apply his brakes.
The majority opinion here divides the total factual picture into segments and relies upon prior cases holding certain facts insufficient to establish gross negligence. Callen v. Knopp, 180 Neb. 421, 143 N. W. 2d 266, is relied on to establish that failure, to see a stop sign or the Peterson automobile was not gross negligence. In that case, the accident was in the daytime and the driver was driving on an arterial street generally protected by *198stop signs. He did not realize he was entering an intersection, where there was a stop sign on the arterial, and was looking in the opposite direction from the approaching vehicle. Under such circumstances, his negligence was characterized as momentary in nature rather than persisting over a period of time.
Boismier v. Maragues, 176 Neb. 547, 126 N. W. 2d 844, is relied on to establish that failure to observe warning signs is not gross negligence. In that case, the accident was at night and involved a “T” intersection, and no other vehicles. None of the signs involved any illumination qualities; the location of the only sign apparently not at the intersection itself was not shown; and the driver put on his brakes as soon as he recognized the danger ahead.
In Carley v. Meinke, supra, this court held that while each of several acts standing alone may not exceed the bounds of ordinary negligence, yet, when considered together, they may constitute evidence of gross negligencé. In such a case, whether or not gross negligence exists is for the jury.
Where the violation of a stop sign is intentional or where there are other breaches of the host driver’s duties in conjunction with a failure to stop for a stop sign, the situation may well be one in which a jury might properly find gross negligence. See Annotation, 3 A. L. R. 3d 180, particularly sections 42 and 43 at page 430.
Negligence and gross negligence cannot be determined in the abstract. “The rule is that in each case the existence or nonexistence of gross negligence must be ascertained from the facts of each particular case, and that in case of doubt the existence of evidence as to gross negligence must be resolved in favor of its existence in which event the question is for the jury, otherwise it is one of law for the court.” Boismier v. Maragues, supra.
• It should also be obvious that standards of care by which both negligence and gross negligence are measured may, and do, change with the passage, of time'and the de*199velopment and experience of society. Negligence and gross negligence, and standards of due care are all grounded on the legal concept of the “reasonable man.” “The reasonable man” should not be bound in a legal strait jacket lace,d with prior precedents. Under the facts in this case, this court should not say, as a matter of law, that there was insufficient evidence upon which a jury could properly find there was gross negligence on the part of Fischer. The issue was properly submitted to the jury by the trial court and the defendant Fischer’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was properly overruled.
The majority opinion also holds that a hypothetical question as to the rate of speed of a vehicle, put to an expert witness, must include all factors necessary for a reasonably accurate opinion. The opinion also concludes that the testimony of an expert witness, who was an Associate Professor of Engineering Mechanics, was essentially a mathematical computation in which it was necessary to determine a large number of factors and variables, none of which can be assumed, and all of which must be established by the evidence. This approach treats expert testimony in the field of physics as though it were an exact science which did not involve elements of knowledge, skill, or experience in applying its laws to the specific factual circumstances of an automobile accident. This position also requires a court to be expert itself in every field in which an expert witness may testify in order to determine what factors are necessary for the witness to give a reasonably accurate opinion.
It is conceded by the majority opinion that various factors, such as skid marks, distance traveled after impact, and force of impact, constitute pertinent evidence in arriving at an estimate of the rate of speed of an automobile. The answer to the objections that some necessary factors were not established is found in the record.
*200The expert witness conducted a skid test at approximately the same location, on the same highway, approximately 1 year after the accident. The length of skid marks of all four wheels to the point of impact was established. The point of impact on the highway and the point of impact of the Peterson vehicle on the Fischer vehicle were established. The physical movement and relative distance and direction of movement of both vehicles after the impact were established. The weight of both vehicles, the speed of the Fischer automobile, and the relative directions of movement of both vehicles prior to impact were established. The physical marks on the highway following the impact were established. Photographs of both vehicles were examined. All of these factors were taken into account in the testimony of the expert witness. In response to cross-examination as to the effect of application of brakes continuing after the collision, the effect of striking other objects, or of parts dragging on the roadway and similar matters, they were all conceded to have some effect on some methods of computations, but that if any allowances were made for such factors, it would increase the minimum speed of the automobile to be determined. The expert witness explained that the method he used did not make any adjustment for such factors for that reason. His opinion was that the minimum speed of the Peterson vehicle at the time it commenced to> skid would be 57 miles an hour, plus or minus 5 miles an hour, or an absolute minimum speed of 52 miles per hour. Neither his opinion nor his assumptions were contradicted in any way by any other expert witness.
The majority opinion also holds that such opinion evidence should be excluded whenever the point is reached at which the trier of fact is being told that which it is itself entirely equipped to determine. The same objection might be made as to any expert opinion evidence as to speed. The basic question is whether or not the testimony of an expert witness will be of aid to the jury *201in detennining the facts it is required to determine, and ordinarily the trial court has broad discretion in determining that basic issue.
Whether the opinion of a qualified expert witness is based on sufficient facts or evidence to sustain it is a question of law for the court. The dividing line is difficult to determine. In this case, the opinion of the expert witness was based on and supported by sufficient facts and evidence to sustain it. The objections sustained by the majority opinion go to issues of credibility rather than to admissibility.