Court Opinion

ID: 9483229
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 09:14:54.945881+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:49:30.278998
License: Public Domain

EBEL, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the result of the majority opinion in this case because I agree that this panel is bound by our precedent in United States v. Mittleider, 835 F.2d 769 (10th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 980, 108 S.Ct. 1279, 99 L.Ed.2d 490 (1988). I write separately because in my view the growing trend in the law is to require the government to prove knowledge of the characteristics of the weapon that make its possession a crime.
Like the instant case, Mittleider dealt with possession of an unregistered automatic weapon. In Mittleider, we held that the government need only prove that the defendant knowingly possessed a gun and need not “prove actual knowledge of a weapon’s physical properties” to convict under the National Firearms Act (“NFA”). Id. at 774. In Mittleider, however, the defendant “had actual knowledge that [the rifle] had been converted into an automatic weapon,” id., and thus the government’s lessened burden of proof did not lead to an unjust result in that case.
In cases in which the defendant is truly ignorant of the automatic characteristics of the gun, on the other hand, the law as construed in Mittleider may lead to draconian results. Consider, for example, a situation in which a person who knows nothing about guns inherits a rifle from a relative. Unbeknownst to the recipient, the gun is defective and occasionally discharges two rounds of ammunition after a single pull of the trigger, or perhaps it has been converted by a prior owner into an automatic weapon. Because he has no use for the rifle, the recipient stores it with other unnecessary possessions in his basement or attic without having ever used it or indeed even examined it. Under Mittleider, that person may be prosecuted and convicted for violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861 and may receive a sentence of twenty-seven to thirty-three months’ imprisonment. See U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(5).
Whether the appellant in the instant case is such an innocent victim is an open question because the jury was precluded from considering his knowledge of the gun’s capabilities. Principles of justice and fair play suggest that we ought to overturn Mittleider and let the jury decide whether the defendant knowingly possessed an automatic weapon.
I start with the basic premise that strict liability is disfavored and generally should be reserved for less serious crimes in which the potential punishment is not severe. Congress’ mere failure specifically to include an intent requirement when defining an offense is not adequate by itself to indicate Congress’ desire to depart from the normal assumption in criminal law that scienter is a necessary part of the offense. See Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 426, 105 S.Ct. 2084, 2088, 85 L.Ed.2d 434 (1985) (“criminal offenses requiring no mens rea have a ‘generally disfavored status’ ”) (citation omitted); United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 438, 98 S.Ct. 2864, 2874, 57 L.Ed.2d 854 (1978) (“far more than the simple omission of the appropriate phrase from the statutory definition is necessary to justify dispensing with an intent requirement”); Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250, 72 S.Ct. 240, 243, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952) (“The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by intention is no provincial or transient notion. It is as universal and persistent in mature systems of law as belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to choose between good and evil”) (footnote omitted); Wayne R. *618LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Criminal Law § 3.8(c), at 248 (2d ed. 1986). Against this backdrop, I look to the law.
As I read the case law, four circuits, including our own, have held that a defendant is strictly liable for possession of an automatic weapon even though the defendant did not know the automatic characteristics of the weapon. In other words, the defendant need not know that the gun can fire more than one round after a single pull of the trigger. See United States v. Ross, 917 F.2d 997, 999-1001 (7th Cir.1990) (per curiam), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 1078, 112 L.Ed.2d 1183 (1991); Mittleider, 835 F.2d at 774; United States v. Shilling, 826 F.2d 1365, 1367-68 (4th Cir. 1987) (per curiam), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1043, 108 S.Ct. 777, 98 L.Ed.2d 863 (1988); Morgan v. United States, 564 F.2d 803, 805-06 (8th Cir.1977) (per curiam).
On the other hand, six circuits have rejected strict liability to varying degrees, holding that the individual must have actual or constructive knowledge that the weapon was not an ordinary gun. See United States v. Harris, 959 F.2d 246, 257-61 (D.C.Cir.1992) (“We believe that if Congress, against the background of widespread lawful gun ownership, wished to criminalize the mere unregistered possession of certain types of firearms — often indistinguishable from other, non-prohibited types — it would have spoken clearly to that effect.... Because the jury was not charged that it had to find that [appellants] knew they were receiving a proscribed firearm (machine gun) ..., appellants’ convictions ... must be reversed.”), petition for cert, filed (May 7, 1992) (No. 91-8167) and petition for cert, filed (May 19, 1992) (No. 91-8328); United States v. Kindred, 931 F.2d 609, 612 (9th Cir.1991) (“[T]he district court erred by instructing that the government need only prove that the defendant knew that the object was a gun. To secure a conviction under the act, the government must prove that the defendant knew that he possessed a dangerous device of a type that would alert one to the likelihood of regulation.”); United States v. Anderson, 885 F.2d 1248, 1254-55 (5th Cir.1989) (en banc) (“We think it far too severe for our community to bear — and plainly not intended by Congress — to subject to ten years’ imprisonment one who possesses what appears to be, and what he innocently and reasonably believes to be, a wholly ordinary and legal pistol merely because it has been, unknown to him, modified to be fully automatic.”); United States v. Williams, 872 F.2d 773, 777 (6th Cir.1989) (“the government was required to prove defendants’ knowledge of the weapon’s automatic quality” because strict liability for a felony may offend due process); United States v. Gonzalez, 719 F.2d 1516, 1522 (11th Cir.1983) (“There are two elements the government had to prove ... to sustain a conviction under Section 5861(d): (1) that [the defendant] ... knowingly possessed an automatic weapon, and (2) that the automatic weapon was not ... reg-istered_”) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1037, 104 S.Ct. 1312, 79 L.Ed.2d 710 (1984);1 United States v. De-Bartolo, 482 F.2d 312, 316 (1st Cir.1973) (“The Government need not prove that a defendant knows he is dealing with ... a weapon possessing every last characteristic which subjects it to regulation. It is enough to prove he knows that he is deal*619ing with a dangerous device of such type as would alert one to the likelihood of regulation.”) (emphasis added).2 Moreover, of the last five circuits that have considered this issue, four have rejected strict liability for possession of an automatic weapon, which supports my view that the trend is to reject the Mittleider view of strict liability under this statute.
There is some confusion in the above cases regarding the word scienter. Scien-ter under section 5861 requires that the defendant know of the physical characteristics of the gun that make it registerable. Scienter does not require that the defendant know that the law requires a gun with such characteristics to be registered, nor does it require that the defendant know that the gun is a “firearm” within the definition of the statute. In other words, ignorance of the law is no defense, but a mistake of fact is. By analogy, to be guilty of larceny, an individual need not know that the taking of the property of another is illegal, but he must know that the property he is taking belongs to another.
Similar reasoning applies in United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 91 S.Ct. 1112, 28 L.Ed.2d 356 (1971), a case that every circuit, regardless of whether or not it favors strict liability, has cited in support of its resolution of the issue. In Freed, the Supreme Court held that the government need not prove that the defendant knew that hand grenades had to be registered or that his hand grenades were not registered. However, the Court did require the government to prove that the defendant had “knowledge that the instrument possessed was a firearm.” Id. at 607, 91 S.Ct. at 1117. The statute defined “firearms” to include hand grenades, so presumably the government had to prove that the defen*620dant knew the items in his possession were, in fact, hand grenades. Id. One must assume that if the defendant had believed the items were merely movie props simulating hand grenades, he would have lacked the requisite intent necessary for conviction. Similarly, automatic weapons (but not unmodified rifles) are defined as “firearms” under the NFA. As I read Freed, the government must prove that the defendant “had knowledge that the instrument possessed was a firearm” — that is, that it was an automatic weapon. Id. If the defendant did not know he possessed a weapon that was capable of firing multiple times after a single pull of the trigger, then he did not know he possessed a “firearm.” Freed requires at least that much knowledge or scienter before a defendant can be convicted under section 5861. The scienter rejected in Freed related to knowledge of regulation, not knowledge of the reality of what one possessed.
Although the defendant does not need to know the statutory definition of “firearm,” the court must look to the statutory definition to see what physical items are described therein as requiring registration. The defendant must know that he possesses such a physical item. Here, although the statute uses the generic term “firearm,” it defines that term as a term of art to exclude unmodified rifles, but to include automatic weapons. Thus, it is necessary to show that the defendant knew he possessed not simply an ordinary rifle, but one with the capability of firing multiple shots after a single pull of the trigger.
Were we not bound by precedent, I would have voted to reverse the appellant’s conviction and to remand for a new trial. While there were some external signs that the gun in question had been modified, there was also some evidence that the appellant did not know of the gun’s apparent automatic capabilities. Thus, whether the appellant did have such knowledge was a question for the jury, but the jury instructions in this case prevented the jury from considering this question. It is not within our province to substitute our factfinding for that of the jury on this critical issue.
Thus, I concur in the result reached in the opinion. However, I would welcome the opportunity for our circuit to reexamine this issue if the appellant files a timely suggestion for rehearing en banc. See Fed.R.App.P. 35; 10th Cir.R. 35.

. Several cases cite Gonzalez as support for the strict liability view. See, e.g., Harris, 959 F.2d at 260; Williams, 872 F.2d at 775. In Gonzalez, the defendant made no contention that he believed the machinegun to be an ordinary gun. The court held that the government must prove that the defendant "knowingly possessed an automatic weapon,” but that the government need not "prove that the defendant knew that the weapon in his possession was a ‘firearm’ within the meaning of the statute.... There is no scienter required to be proven.” Gonzalez, 719 F.2d at 1522. The court in Gonzalez cited United States v. Cheramie, 520 F.2d 325, 329 (5th Cir.1975), which approved a jury instruction stating that "for purposes of [26 U.S.C. § 5861] . the defendant’s knowledge that his acts violated the law is not a prerequisite to a guilty verdict.” I read Gonzalez to mean that the government must prove that the defendant knew the weapon was automatic but need not prove that the defendant knew that such a weapon was illegal under the statute. This states no more than that ignorance of the law is no excuse, but ignorance of fact is an excuse if it deprives the actor of the requisite intent. See discussion of this distinction infra.

. Several courts have also cited DeBartolo as a case supporting strict liability for possession of an automatic weapon. See, e.g., Harris, 959 F.2d at 260; Williams, 872 F.2d at 775. However, while this case does not go as far as the D.C. Circuit, Sixth Circuit, and Fifth Circuit in holding that the government must prove actual knowledge of the characteristics that render the weapon a “firearm” within the meaning of the statute, it does require, like the Ninth Circuit, that the government prove knowledge that the weapon is “a dangerous device of such type as would alert one to the likelihood of regulation.” DeBartolo, 482 F.2d at 316; see Kindred, 931 F.2d at 612; United States v. Herbert, 698 F.2d 981, 986 (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 464 U.S. 821, 104 S.Ct. 87, 78 L.Ed.2d 95 (1983). In contrast, the strict liability circuits have held that the government need only prove that the defendant knew the item in question was a firearm in the ordinary sense, i.e., a gun. See Ross, 917 F.2d at 999; Mittleider, 835 F.2d at 774; Shilling, 826 F.2d at 1368; Morgan, 564 F.2d at 805. The First Circuit in DeBartolo held that a shotgun was a sufficiently dangerous device that it would put the owner on notice of the possible need for registration. Although I would not necessarily agree with that conclusion, here we are dealing with a rifle. As the Ninth Circuit has recognized explicitly, an ordinary firearm (such as a rifle) may not necessarily be a "dangerous device of such type as would alert one to the likelihood of regulation.” Kindred, 931 F.2d at 612; Herbert, 698 F.2d at 986.
I note that the jury instruction in the instant case might arguably pass muster under the First and Ninth Circuits’ approach, because it stated in part that "[t]he Government need not prove
that a defendant knows he is dealing with a weapon possessing every last characteristic which subjects it to regulation. It is enough to prove he knows that he is dealing with a dangerous device of such type as would alert one to the likelihood of regulation.” 1 Appellant’s App., Tab D at 25. However, the court later instructed the jury that “[mjere possession of an unregistered firearm is a violation of the law of the United States.” Id., Tab D at 26. This instruction seemingly contradicts the previous instruction and would appear to impose strict liability for possession of an unregistered firearm, even if it was not a "dangerous device of such type as would alert one to the likelihood of regulation." Because we cannot tell which instruction the jury followed, we must assume that it based its decision on the strict liability instruction. Cf. Griffin v. United States, — U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 466, 471, 116 L.Ed.2d 371 (1991) (“where a provision of the Constitution forbids conviction on a particular ground, the constitutional guarantee is violated by a general verdict that may have rested on that ground”). Moreover, Mitt-leider does not require even the above instruction. It Mittleider, we approved the following instruction:
The mere possession of a firearm which is required to be registered and has not been registered is a violation of the laws of the United States. It is not necessary for the government to prove that the defendant knew that the weapon in his possession was a machine gun within the meaning of the statute. ... It is sufficient if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly possessed it.
Mittleider, 835 F.2d at 774.