Court Opinion

ID: 9838695
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-07 16:09:11.82534+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:52:51.820872
License: Public Domain

J-A11024-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  H.S.                                         :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  D.S.                                         :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1166 WDA 2022

            Appeal from the Order Entered September 15, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County Civil Division at No(s):
                               859 of 2021

BEFORE:      BENDER, P.J.E., STABILE, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.:                        FILED: September 7, 2023

       Appellant, D.S., appeals from the trial court’s September 15, 2022 order

denying his petition to vacate its final protection from abuse (“PFA”) order for

lack of due process and specific jurisdiction.1 We affirm.

       On March 29, 2021, Appellee, H.S., filed a PFA petition against Appellant

in the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County. In the petition, H.S. sought

protection from abuse for herself and her minor daughter, L.S., who was two-

years old at the time. Petition for Protection from Abuse (“Petition”), 3/29/21,

at ¶¶ 1, 3, 8. H.S. averred therein that Appellant is her spouse or former

spouse, and the father of L.S. Id. at ¶¶ 5, 8. H.S. also indicated that she

and L.S. live in Nanty Glo, Pennsylvania, and that D.S. resides in Pemberville,

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 See 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 6101-6122 (“Protection from Abuse Act”).
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Ohio. Id. at ¶¶ 1, 2, 8.2 In addition, she provided the following information

about the alleged abuse, which we produce verbatim except for the parties’

names:
       10. The facts of the most recent incident of abuse are as follows:

       On about Saturday, March 27, 2021 at approximately 8:00 PM
       location: 304 Bond St.[3]

       I had gone out to his place to retrieve my things because
       he said I had 2 weeks to pick up my belongings or he was
       throwing them away. I have some family heirlooms and
       some of my daughters belongings that I needed to retrieve.
       [Appellant] had asked me to not bring anyone or contact
       the police to come with me. I was uneasy by this so I did
       ask a friend to drive me there for safety. [Appellant] had
       my belongings in a storage unit. I had called the Sherriff
       department in that local area to give his license plate and
       description in the event something happened because
       [Appellant] would not give me the address to the facility
       but insisted he meet me and I follow him there. I got my
       belongings and got back into the car and noticed
       [Appellant] still in the area. [Appellant] then started
       following us for approximately 10 miles in a direction
       opposite from his residence. I had then called [Appellant]
       to ask him to stop following us and he became defensive
       with me and he had a friend with him who started yelling
       at me over the phone and the friend then threatened to kill
       me and leave my body on the side of the road.

       I did contact the Wood County Sherriffs Dept. in Ohio
       regarding this and was able to file for and Emergency PFA
       in Cambria County

____________________________________________

2 Pemberville is located in Wood County, Ohio.

3 H.S. conveyed elsewhere in the petition that this was Appellant’s address at

the time she filed the petition. Id. at ¶ 2.

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       11. Prior incidents of abuse that Defendant has committed against
       Plaintiff or the minor child/ren, (including any threats, injuries, or
       incidents of stalking) are as follows:

       Summer 2020 I contacted the police because he and his
       family were threatening to kill me and throw me in a ditch.
       They also made threats toward my daughter with physical
       harm and threats on her life.

       Sexual abuse allegations of our 2 year old daughter from
       2018 thru 2019 made by the baby sitter that is currently
       under investigation by NCIS

       When I took our daughter to Indiana PA to visit with
       [Appellant] and he had physically struck our daughter so I
       took her home.

Id. at ¶¶ 10, 11.

       The same day that H.S. filed her petition, the trial court issued a

temporary PFA order and scheduled a hearing for April 12, 2021. On April 7,

2021, an affidavit of service was filed by Wood County’s acting sheriff, noting

that service of the ‘Notice of Hearing and Order, Petition and Temporary Order’

was made by hand delivery to Appellant at his home address on the morning

of March 31, 2021.

       On April 12, 2021, the hearing occurred.        Appellant did not attend.

Following the hearing, on April 13, 2021, the trial court entered a final PFA

order for a period of two years. That same day, it amended that order to state

that all provisions entered in the March 29, 2021 temporary PFA order shall

remain in effect.4
____________________________________________

4 The trial court sent the final PFA order and a cost order to Appellant.
However, that mailing was returned to the trial court, on the basis that it was
unable to be delivered. Similarly, the trial court mailed the amended order to
Appellant, but it was also returned as unable to be delivered.

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      Over a year later, on June 28, 2022, Appellant’s counsel filed a praecipe

for entry of appearance. Two months after that, on September 12, 2022,

Appellant filed a “Petition to Vacate PFA For Lack of Due Process and Lack of

Specific Jurisdiction.” He claimed, inter alia, that he has no connection to

Pennsylvania and that H.S. had to file the action in the state where the alleged

abuse occurred, i.e., Ohio. See Petition to Vacate, 9/12/22, at ¶¶ 26, 27.

      On September 19, 2022, the trial court entered an order denying

Appellant’s petition to vacate. In support, it pointed to Pennsylvania Rule of

Civil Procedure 1901.1, entitled “Venue.” Rule 1901.1 states, in relevant part:
      (a) Except as provided in subdivision (b), an action for protection
      from abuse may be brought in a county in which

      (1) the plaintiff resides, either temporarily or permanently, or is
      employed, or

      (2) the defendant may be served, or

      (3) the abuse occurred.

      (b) If the relief sought includes possession of the residence or
      household to the exclusion of the defendant, the action shall be
      brought only in the county in which the residence or household is
      located.

Pa.R.Civ.P. 1901.1(a), (b). The trial court explained that, in H.S.’s March 29,

2021 petition, she listed an address in Nanty Glo, Pennsylvania, as her

residence, and sought exclusion of Appellant from her residence there. Based

on these facts, it determined that Appellant’s petition lacked merit under Rule

1901.1.

      Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. That same day, he also filed a

concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.

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1925(b). The trial court later issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion, in which it relied

on the reasoning set forth in its September 19, 2022 order denying Appellant’s

petition to vacate.

       Presently, Appellant raises a single issue for our review:
       Whether the facts in … [H.S.’s] PFA petition were sufficient to
       confer specific jurisdiction over [Appellant] under the Supreme
       Court’s rationale in International Shoe [Co. v. Washington,
       326 U.S. 310 (1945)].

Appellant’s Brief at 3 (emphasis in original).5

       Before we delve into Appellant’s issue, we must address whether this

appeal is moot, as the final PFA order expired on April 13, 2023. See M.B.S.

v. W.E., 232 A.3d 922, 927 (Pa. Super. 2020) (stating that we may address

mootness sua sponte) (citations omitted). It is well-established that:
       As a general rule, an actual case or controversy must exist at all
       stages of the judicial process, or a case will be dismissed as moot.
       An issue can become moot during the pendency of an appeal due
       to an intervening change in the facts of the case or due to an
       intervening change in the applicable law. In that case, an opinion
       of this Court is rendered advisory in nature. An issue before a
       court is moot if in ruling upon the issue the court cannot enter an
       order that has any legal force or effect.

Id. (citations omitted). However,

       [t]his Court will decide questions that otherwise have been
       rendered moot when one or more of the following exceptions to
       the mootness doctrine apply: 1) the case involves a question of
       great public importance, 2) the question presented is capable of
       repetition and apt to elude appellate review, or 3) a party to the
       controversy will suffer some detriment due to the decision of the
       trial court. … [T]his Court has employed exceptions to the
       mootness doctrine to review issues stemming from expired PFA
       orders.
____________________________________________

5 H.S. has not filed an appellee’s brief.

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Ferko-Fox v. Fox, 68 A.3d 917, 920 (Pa. Super. 2013) (cleaned up).

       Here, Appellant’s appeal meets the third exception to the mootness

doctrine, as he will suffer some detriment due to the trial court’s final PFA

order. As this Court has recognized, “[a]t the very least, the present PFA

order may be considered by the trial court in any subsequent PFA proceedings,

as well as in any child custody proceedings.” N.H. v. M.E., 2019 WL 3780900,

at *2 (Pa. Super. filed Aug. 12, 2019) (citing 23 Pa.C.S. § 6107(a)).6 Further,

“[i]t would also appear in a criminal history record check conducted by the

Pennsylvania State Police.”         Id. (23 Pa.C.S. § 6105(e)(3)).   Accordingly,

because Appellant will suffer some detriment due to the final PFA order, we

will not deem his appeal moot. See id.

       On appeal, Appellant argues that “[t]he [t]rial [c]ourt’s exercise of

specific jurisdiction over [him] offends the traditional notions of [d]ue

[p]rocess, fair play, and substantial justice.” Appellant’s Brief at 5. He says

that “[n]othing under Pennsylvania’s long[-]arm statute applied to give the

[c]ourt jurisdiction, [Appellant] did not avail themselves [sic] to Pennsylvania

[c]ourts, and there are no contacts by [Appellant] sufficient to give

Pennsylvania jurisdiction over this matter.” Id. at 14-15. He insists that,

“[b]ecause all of the events that led to [H.S.’s] filing the PFA [petition]

occurred in Ohio, the PFA [action] needed to be adjudicated under Ohio law

____________________________________________

6 See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (stating that an unpublished non-precedential
memorandum decision filed after May 1, 2019, may be cited for its persuasive
value).

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in an Ohio [c]ourt.” Id. at 6. Consequently, Appellant claims that “the Court

of Common Pleas of Cambria County violated [his] right to [d]ue [p]rocess of

[l]aw when it adjudicated the PFA [petition] filed by [H.S]. The lack of [d]ue

[p]rocess voids the judgment entered by the [trial court] and the matter must

be dismissed.” Id. at 15.7

       Initially, we note that, in general, an objection to personal jurisdiction

must be raised in preliminary objections. Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure

1028 provides:
       (a) Preliminary objections may be filed by any party to any
       pleading and are limited to the following grounds:

          (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action
          or the person of the defendant, improper venue or improper
          form or service of a writ of summons or a complaint….

Pa.R.Civ.P. 1028(a)(1). Further, Rule 1032(a) sets forth that:
       (a) A party waives all defenses and objections which are not
       presented either by preliminary objection, answer or reply, except
       a defense which is not required to be pleaded under Rule

____________________________________________

7 Appellant also claims that the trial court did not undertake a jurisdictional

analysis, but instead wrongly focused on whether venue was proper in
Cambria County. Appellant’s Brief at 6. We agree, as jurisdiction and venue
are distinct concepts.       See Barr v. Bureau of Professional and
Occupational Affairs, 803 A.2d 243, 247 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002) (“Venue is
defined as ‘[t]he proper or a possible place for the trial of a lawsuit….’ BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 1553 (7th ed.1999). Jurisdiction is defined, on the other
hand, as ‘[a] government’s general power to exercise authority over all
persons and things within its territory….’ Id. at 855. Venue and jurisdiction
are distinguishable; venue relates to where judicial authority may be
exercised, but more important, jurisdiction is the power to adjudicate.”)
(emphasis in original; citation omitted); see also Barrett v. M&B Medical
Billing, Inc., 291 A.3d 371, 376 n.4 (Pa. Super. 2022) (“Although decisions
of the Commonwealth Court are not binding on this Court, they may provide
persuasive authority.”) (citation omitted).

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       1030(b),[8] the defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief
       can be granted, the defense of failure to join an indispensable
       party, the objection of failure to state a legal defense to a claim,
       the defenses of failure to exercise or exhaust a statutory remedy
       and an adequate remedy at law and any other nonwaivable
       defense or objection.

Pa.R.Civ.P. 1032(a).

       Thus, it would appear that Appellant has waived his personal jurisdiction

objection by not raising it in preliminary objections. However, we are aware

that special rules apply to PFA proceedings. Specifically, with respect to PFA

petitions, the Rules provide that “[t]he defendant is not required to file an

answer or other responsive pleading to the petition or the certified order, and

all averments not admitted shall be deemed denied.”           Pa.R.Civ.P. 1901.6

(emphasis added).9 As such, because Rule 1901.6 suggests that Appellant

was not required to file a responsive pleading, and because H.S. has not filed

a brief offering a contrary argument, we will assume for purposes of this

appeal that Appellant has not waived this issue by failing to file preliminary

objections.10 Accordingly, we proceed to the merits of his issue.

       Section 6103 of the Protection from Abuse Act provides:

____________________________________________

8 Rule 1030(b) states that “[t]he affirmative defenses of assumption of risk,

comparative negligence and contributory negligence need not be pleaded.”
Pa.R.Civ.P. 1030(b).

9 We also note that “[a] protection order or approved consent agreement shall

be for a fixed period of time not to exceed three years. The court may amend
its order or agreement at any time upon subsequent petition filed by either
party.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 6108(d).

10 Perhaps with more complete advocacy in the future, we would reach a
different conclusion.

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     (a) General rule.--The court shall have jurisdiction over all
     proceedings under this chapter.

     (b) Effect of departure and nonresidence.--The right of the
     plaintiff to relief under this chapter shall not be affected by either
     of the following:

        (1) The plaintiff’s leaving the residence or household to
        avoid further abuse.

        (2) The defendant’s absence from this Commonwealth or
        the defendant’s nonresidence in this Commonwealth,
        provided that the court has personal jurisdiction over the
        defendant in accordance with 42 Pa.C.S. § 5322 (relating to
        bases of personal jurisdiction over persons outside this
        Commonwealth).

23 Pa.C.S. § 6103.       Therefore, H.S.’s right to relief is not affected by

Appellant’s absence from and/or nonresidence in Pennsylvania, so long as the

court has personal jurisdiction over Appellant in accordance with our long-arm

statute, Section 5322.

     With respect to Section 5322, this Court has observed:
     Section 5322(a) contains ten paragraphs that specify particular
     types of contact with Pennsylvania deemed sufficient to warrant
     the exercise of specific jurisdiction. In addition, [S]ection 5322(b)
     operates as a “catchall,” providing that jurisdiction may be
     exercised over persons who do not fall within the express
     provisions of [S]ection 5322(a) to the fullest extent permitted by
     the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution.
     Regardless, if a defendant’s activities in Pennsylvania only give
     rise to jurisdiction under [S]ection 5322(a) or (b), the plaintiff’s
     cause of action is limited to those activities which formed the basis
     of jurisdiction. See 42 Pa.C.S.[] § 5322(c).

N.T. ex rel. K.R.T. v. F.F., 118 A.3d 1130, 1134-35 (Pa. Super. 2015)

(quoting Mendel v. Williams, 53 A.3d 810, 820-21 (Pa. Super. 2012); some

brackets added).

     In addition, we have noted:

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     [E]ach of the ten subsections of [Section] 5322(a) [is] wholly
     subsumed within the catchall provision of [Section] 5322(b).
     Consequently, the only appropriate focus … is whether the
     minimum requisites of due process have been met, for if they have
     not, the various subsections of [Section] 5322(a) cannot
     statutorily authorize an unconstitutional exercise of in personam
     jurisdiction.   If they have been met, any analysis of the
     subsections of [Section] 5322(a) would be superfluous.

Id. at 1135 n.5 (citations omitted; some brackets added).

     As mentioned supra, “Pennsylvania courts have recognized that Section

5322(b) renders the reach of the long-arm statute coextensive with that

permitted by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”            Id.

(cleaned up). Regarding the specific jurisdiction permitted by the Due Process

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, our Supreme Court has explained:
     [A]t its most simplistic, the question for specific personal
     jurisdiction continues to be whether the defendant has sufficient
     “minimum contacts with the state such that the maintenance of
     the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and
     substantial justice.” International Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316 …
     (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).           Requiring
     minimum contacts satisfies due process by ensuring that the
     defendant may “reasonably anticipate” where it may be “haled
     into court” based upon which forums it has “purposefully avail[ed]
     itself of the privilege of conducting activities.” Burger King Corp.
     [v. Rudzewicz], 471 U.S. [462,] 474[ (1985)]. The High Court
     has opined that this requirement ensures that a defendant will not
     be subject to jurisdiction “solely as a result of random, fortuitous,
     or attenuated contacts.” Id. at 475 … (internal quotation marks
     omitted).

     As Justice Sotomayor cited in her dissenting opinion in [Bristol-
     Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, San
     Francisco County, 582 U.S. 255 (2017)], a preeminent treatise
     on federal practice and procedure observed that courts have
     synthesized the specific personal jurisdiction caselaw into a more
     manageable three-part test:

        (1) Did the plaintiff’s cause of action arise out of or relate to
        the out-of-state defendant’s forum-related contacts?

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          (2) Did the defendant purposely direct its activities,
          particularly as they relate to the plaintiff’s cause of action,
          toward the forum state or did the defendant purposely avail
          itself of the privilege of conducting activities therein?

          (3) Would the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the
          nonresident defendant in the forum state satisfy the
          requirement that it be reasonable and fair?23
              23 To determine whether personal jurisdiction would
              be “reasonable and fair” under the third part of the
              test, courts will consider the following factors: “the
              burden on the defendant, the forum State’s interest in
              adjudicating the dispute, the plaintiff’s interest in
              obtaining convenient and effective relief, the
              interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the
              most efficient resolution of controversies, and the
              shared interest of the several States in furthering
              fundamental substantive social policies.”      Burger
              King Corp., 471 U.S. at 477 … (quoting World-Wide
              Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 …
              (1980)) (internal quotations marks removed).

       4 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Adam N. Steinman,
       Federal Practice & Procedure Civil § 1069 (4th ed. 2015 & Supp.
       2020) (“Federal Practice & Procedure Civil”); [Bristol-Myers
       Squibb Co., 582 U.S. at 271-72] (Sotomayor, J. dissenting).

Hammons v. Ethicon, Inc., 240 A.3d 537, 556-57 (Pa. 2020) (original

brackets omitted).11

       We consider Appellant’s jurisdictional challenge unavailing. To begin,

regarding the first two prongs of the above-stated, three-part test, Appellant’s

argument is premised on his insistence that he has had no contact with
____________________________________________

11 Further, when challenging the exercise of in personam jurisdiction, the
moving party must support its objections to personal jurisdiction and, once it
has done so, the burden of proving personal jurisdiction is placed upon the
party asserting it. N.T. ex rel. K.R.T., 118 A.3d at 1134 (citation omitted).
In addition, “when deciding a motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction[,] the court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party.” Id. (citation omitted).

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Pennsylvania. Appellant’s Brief at 5. He says that “everything [H.S.] alleged

occurred in Ohio, not Pennsylvania[,]” and insists that the “only link” to

Pennsylvania is H.S.’s address. Id. at 6, 13. See also id. at 5 (“Can the

purported victim of abuse that occurs in another state flee to Pennsylvania

and   obtain   a   [PFA]   order,   when   [Appellant]   has   no   contact   with

Pennsylvania?”); id. at 10 (“Further from [H.S.’s] complaint[,] all the things

occurred in Ohio, no tortious conduct occurred within Pennsylvania.”).

Problematically, the record does not support the premise of Appellant’s

argument, and we therefore cannot accept his claim that the court lacked

jurisdiction over him because H.S.’s petition shows that he has had no contact

with Pennsylvania.

      Instead, our review of the record supports that Appellant has had

contact with H.S. and L.S. in Pennsylvania. In H.S.’s petition, she alleged a

prior incident of abuse where she took their daughter, L.S., to visit with

Appellant in Indiana, Pennsylvania, and he physically struck L.S., prompting

H.S. to take L.S. home. Petition at ¶ 11. While H.S. did not aver when this

incident took place, we reiterate that L.S. was only two-years old at the time

the petition was filed and, as such, this incident could not have happened very

far in the past. Appellant does not address this specific incident at all, nor

does he explain how his coming to Pennsylvania — and seeing L.S. and H.S.

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— affects Pennsylvania’s jurisdiction over him.12 We decline to conduct this

jurisdictional analysis on his behalf. See Commonwealth v. Frey, 41 A.3d

605, 613-14 (Pa. Super. 2012) (“It would be improper for this Court to act as

counsel for a party. That is, we must not write a party’s brief and develop the

analysis necessary to support the party’s position.”) (citations omitted).

       Moreover, as for the third prong of the three-part test, whether the

exercise of personal jurisdiction over Appellant in Pennsylvania is reasonable

and fair, Appellant proffers no developed argument on this point.         Despite

listing the factors that courts are to consider when ascertaining whether

personal jurisdiction would be “reasonable and fair,” see Appellant’s Brief at

12-13, he does not meaningfully discuss any of them. See Hammons, supra

(“To determine whether personal jurisdiction would be ‘reasonable and fair’

under the third part of the test, courts will consider the following factors: ‘the

____________________________________________

12 Appellant generally argues that “any allegation of abuse concerning the
parties’ minor child cannot be used to bootstrap jurisdiction. Clearly the
allegations that give rise to the PFA [order] involve an incident between two
adults. The allegations that give rise to the PFA [order] do not involve the
parties’ minor child.” Appellant’s Brief at 13-14 (footnote omitted). We
disagree. The allegations that gave rise to the PFA order did involve the
parties’ minor child, and H.S. requested protection for both herself and L.S.
therein. See Petition at ¶¶ 3, 4, 11. Further, to the extent that Appellant
claims lack of notice that L.S. was involved, see Appellant’s Brief at 14 n.2,
we note that the petition, notice of hearing, and temporary order were hand
delivered to Appellant at his home address on March 31, 2021. The caption
of the Notice of Hearing and Order stated “[H.S.] individually and on behalf of
minor[,]” and the trial court included L.S. as a protected person in its
temporary order. Notice of Hearing and Order, 3/29/21. Further, H.S.’s
petition was captioned “[H.S.] Et. Al.[,]” and stated that she and L.S. sought
protection from abuse. See Petition at ¶¶ 3, 4.

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burden on the defendant, the forum State’s interest in adjudicating the

dispute, the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief, the

interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution

of controversies, and the shared interest of the several States in furthering

fundamental substantive social policies.’”). Instead, he merely states:
      Applying these principles to the case at bar[,] it is clear the
      Cambria County Court of Common Pleas lacked jurisdiction to hear
      this matter. From the allegations in the PFA [petition] and the
      motion to vacate, it is a dispute between ex-husband and ex-wife
      over an incident that occurred in Ohio. [Appellant] did not avail
      themselves [sic] to Pennsylvania [l]aw and could not reasonably
      be held to expect being [haled] into [c]ourt in Pennsylvania. It is
      not fair for a Pennsylvania [c]ourt to exercise jurisdiction over the
      matter especially when all of the witnesses and other evidence is
      located in Ohio. The only link to Pennsylvania is [H.S.’s] address.

Appellant’s Brief at 13.

      “When briefing the various issues that have been preserved, it is an

appellant’s duty to present arguments that are sufficiently developed for our

review.   The brief must support the claims with pertinent discussion, with

references   to   the   record   and    with    citations   to   legal   authorities.”

Commonwealth v. Hardy, 918 A.2d 766, 771 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations

omitted). Further, “[t]his Court will not act as counsel and will not develop

arguments on behalf of an appellant.” Id. (citation omitted).

      Appellant has failed to meaningfully discuss the relevant factors, and we

again decline to conduct this analysis for him. As such, he has not convinced

us that Pennsylvania’s exercising jurisdiction over him is not fair and

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reasonable under the circumstances. Based on the foregoing, we affirm the

trial court’s order denying Appellant’s petition to vacate.13

       Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 9/7/2023

____________________________________________

13 While we affirm the trial court’s order, we acknowledge that our reasoning

differs from the rationale used by the trial court. Nevertheless, “this Court is
not bound by the reasoning of the trial court, and we may affirm the trial
court’s order on any valid basis.” Dockery v. Thomas Jefferson University
Hospitals, Inc., 253 A.3d 716, 721 (Pa. Super. 2021) (cleaned up).

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