Court Opinion

ID: 9585016
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:55:15.788643+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:26:30.111939
License: Public Domain

McCORMICK, Justice
(dissenting).
Douglas Robert Polly is serving a 30-year sentence for second degree murder despite the fact he was not validly convicted. He has never had a trial, and his guilty plea was defective. He is denied relief solely because he challenges his conviction by postconviction action rather than direct appeal. This is so even though he was unaware of the grounds for appeal until after the period for appeal had expired. Because I believe this is the kind of case in which the General Assembly intended post-conviction relief to be granted, I am unable to agree with the court’s opinion.
I. The issue of statutory interpretation. Chapter 663A is Iowa’s version of the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure *859Act. See Unif. Post-Conviction Procedure Act, 11 U.L.A. 485 (1974). In the present case, the relevant statutory provision is section 663A.2 which authorizes postconviction relief when “[t]he conviction or sentence was in violation of the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution or laws of this state”. § 663A.2(1). The section also provides: “This remedy is not a substitute for nor does it affect any remedy, incident to the proceedings in the trial court, or of direct review of the sentence or conviction.” § 663A.2.
In Redding v. State, 274 N.W.2d 315, 317 (Iowa 1979), this court interpreted the limitation in section 663A.2. The postconviction applicant in that case challenged his conviction on the ground his guilty plea was involuntary and invalid because not taken in compliance with State v. Sisco, 169 N.W.2d 542 (Iowa 1969). The applicant had not appealed. The State asserted there as it does in this case that postconviction relief was barred because the applicant did not have an adequate excuse for failing to make his claims in a direct appeal.
In rejecting the State’s contention, this court found that the involuntariness claim depended on evidence extrinsic to the plea proceeding that would not have been in the record on direct review. The court separately found that the Sisco claim was not barred because the record did not show the applicant was aware of that claim in time to appeal.
The Redding court contrasted the availability of postconviction relief when the applicant has previously attacked the conviction by appeal or prior postconviction action. In that situation, governed by section 663A.8, the applicant “must establish a sufficient reason why each new ground for relief was not previously asserted.” Redding, 274 N.W.2d at 317. Section 663A.8 has no application, however, when review has not previously been sought. Therefore, to the extent the court today relies on section 663A.8 or cases applying that provision, no statutory basis exists for doing so.
In interpreting section 663A.2 in Red-ding, this court found the limitation is a proscription of abuse of process. As a result the court said:
A failure to take an appeal does not alone constitute a waiver of the right to attack the conviction by postconviction action. Failure to appeal bars relief in a postconviction action on the ground of abuse of process only as to factual and legal contentions which the postconviction applicant knew of at the time of the original trial court proceeding and which he deliberately and inexcusably failed to pursue on appeal.
Redding, 274 N.W.2d at 317. Cited in support of this interpretation of section 663A.2 was Horn v. Haugh, 209 N.W.2d 119 (Iowa 1973). In Horn this court applied an interpretation of section 663A.2 expressed in ABA Standards, Post-Conviction Remedies § 6.1(c) (Approved Draft, 1968). Horn, 209 N.W.2d at 120-21. That interpretation is the “rule” adopted in Redding.
The ABA standard provides in relevant part:
Where an applicant raised in a postcon-viction proceeding a factual or legal contention which he knew of and which he deliberately and inexcusably ... failed to raise in the proceeding leading to the judgment of conviction, or ... having raised the contention in the trial court, failed to pursue the matter on appeal, a court should deny relief on ground of abuse of process. If an application otherwise indicates a claim worthy of further consideration, the application should not be dismissed for abuse of process unless the state has raised the issue in its answer and the applicant has had an opportunity, with the assistance of counsel, to reply.
ABA Standards, Post-Conviction Remedies § 6.1(c) at 85 (Approved Draft, 1968). In its commentary the ABA committee discusses the concept of waiver as employed in the standard:
The term is subject to multiple meanings or shades of meanings which can result in confusion in communication and, perhaps, in thought. One usage employs waiver as expressive of a rule of finality *860of judgments: issues that were not presented at a specified time or in a specified way are said to have been waived.... A wholly different waiver is implied in the familiar principle that a party to a criminal action can intelligently and understandingly forego certain rights, and that his choice will be binding upon him. This suggests an active, knowing choice, in advance of the occasion when the waived right might have been useful, affirmatively expressed in the appropriate forum....
... The distinction between these is clearly visible when a federal constitutional right is considered in the context of a state post-conviction proceeding: what constitutes a waiver-voluntary-relinquishment is a question of federal constitutional law; the question of the scope of a prior judgment is a question of state procedural law.... Where it is found that an applicant has relinquished a right, the decision is tantamount to holding that the right was never violated. The decision, thus, is directly on the merits....
As used in this report, “waiver” refers to voluntary relinquishment rather than foreclosure by judgment.
Id. at 88-89.
It is no coincidence that this court adopted the ABA standard in interpreting section 663A.2. The 1966 revision of the Uniform Act, adopted in Iowa in 1970, was prepared contemporaneously with the development of the ABA standards. The 1966 act was intended to mirror the standards on postconviction remedies. See Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act (1980), Commissioner’s Prefatory Note, 11 U.L.A. (Supp.1982) at 137.
Thus in Horn and Redding this court interpreted section 663A.2 in accordance with the intent of the drafters as reflected in the legislative history. The statute is the same now as it was then. Nothing in the language of the statute or its history provides any basis for abandoning the prior interpretation.
Of course, under the statute as interpreted in Horn and Redding, Polly’s invalid conviction could not stand. Applying the Redding interpretation, the postconviction court found on substantial evidence, indeed upon an uncontroverted record, that Polly was unaware of the factual and legal grounds urged in the present action until well after the period for appeal. On this statutory issue the postconviction court’s finding thus has the force of a jury verdict. Stanford v. Iowa State Reformatory, 279 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Iowa 1979).
II. The invalidity of the conviction. No one questions the invalidity of Polly’s plea. The plea was taken in a strange proceeding in which the trial court acted as an arm of the prosecution and expressed the view that the plea bargain obviated the necessity of compliance with the procedural requirements of Sisco.
The court was confronted with an emotionally disturbed young man with an IQ of 79 who had no previous encounter with the law. It is true Polly “never denied” having killed his wife, but he also consistently denied any memory of the relevant events. The record shows that after the killing he did not merely call an undertaker to report the death. He drove to the police station and collided with two motor vehicles on the way. He was incoherent when he arrived at the station. He was too emotionally distraught to be held in the local jail, and he was treated as well as evaluated upon his commitment to Oakdale.
Despite this background the court wholly failed to determine by personal colloquy with Polly that Polly understood the charge and its penal consequences. Nor does the record show the judge established a factual basis for the plea on the record. See Brainard v. State, 222 N.W.2d 711, 713 (Iowa 1974). In addition the record shows that all participants in the proceeding were unaware that the included offense of manslaughter would be considered in a degree-of-guilt hearing. See State v. Beverlin, 263 N.W.2d 535, 538 (Iowa 1978); State v. Martin, 243 Iowa 1323, 1329, 55 N.W.2d 258, 262 (1952). The trial court informed *861the defendant that unless the hearing were waived “the court must have a hearing of some kind to determine whether it’s first or second degree.” No one corrected this misadvice.
The judge resisted efforts by the prosecutor to have him comply with the Sisco standards in taking the plea. In doing so the judge said: “When he agrees to plea bargaining, if he is satisfied with the work of his attorney and is satisfied with the sentence, we don’t have to go through the Sisco warning.” Even though this court disapproves of the mishandling of the plea taking, the outcome today confirms the accuracy of this statement by the judge.
The United States Supreme Court has held that á valid waiver of federal constitutional rights on the record in a guilty plea proceeding is a federal constitutional requirement: “We cannot presume a waiver of these three important federal rights from a silent record.” Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1712, 23 L.Ed.2d 274, 279-80 (1969). A plea of guilty is a “grave and solemn act” which as a matter of federal constitutional law must not only be voluntary but knowing, intelligent and done “with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 1468-69, 25 L.Ed.2d 747, 756 (1970). Moreover, “[I]t is too late in the day to permit a guilty plea to be entered against a defendant solely on the consent of the defendant’s agent — his lawyer_ [T]he choice to plead guilty must be the defendant’s: it is he who must be informed of the consequences of his plea and what it is that he waives when he pleads, ... and it is on his admission that he is in fact guilty that his conviction will rest.” Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 650, 96 S.Ct. 2253, 2260, 49 L.Ed.2d 108, 117-18 (1976) (White, J., concurring). Polly’s plea cannot withstand analysis under these principles.
On the merits, I would hold that Polly’s conviction should be vacated and that he should be permitted to plead anew.
III. The “cause and prejudice” standard. The court today superimposes on chapter 663A a court-made limitation of an applicant’s statutory right to postconviction relief. This is an exercise of raw judicial power that is neither warranted nor wise.
The judicial limitation is taken from Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977). Sykes involves an interpretation of the federal habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. section 2254, concerning the circumstances in which a state procedural default will bar federal habeas relief. The case has no bearing on the meaning that should be given our post-conviction statute. The present issue is one of interpreting section 663A.2; this is not an occasion for judicial rulemaking. Nor is any reason suggested for believing this court’s previous interpretation of section 663A.2 is incorrect.
In addition, as observed by Chief Justice Burger in his concurring opinion in Sykes, the standard for habeas review adopted in that case should not apply to decisions that cannot be delegated to counsel, such as the decision whether to appeal. See 433 U.S. at 93, 97 S.Ct. at 2509, 53 L.Ed.2d at 612 (Burger, C.J., concurring). Thus, even if the Sykes holding were otherwise relevant, it should be inapplicable to the kind of decision in the present case.
This result follows from the nature of the right to appeal. Just as the decision to plead guilty or to waive the constitutional rights relinquished by a guilty plea cannot be lost through a default by counsel, the right to appeal should not be forfeited through any act short of a knowing and intelligent waiver by the defendant. The lawyer is not the defendant’s agent for purposes of that decision. The decision is entrusted to the defendant alone. It is artificial and false to forfeit the defendant’s right to appeal when the defendant was eoncededly unaware of the grounds for the right’s exercise and was denied the opportunity to make an informed choice.
It is no answer to say that Polly has failed to prove he would have appealed if he were aware of the deficiencies in the *862proceeding. This response in effect puts the burden on a postconviction applicant to prove a defective conviction did not result from harmless error. One might as well refuse to vacate a guilty plea proceeding in any case where this court is not persuaded the result would be different if the proceeding had been valid. A standard of this kind reverses the presumption of innocence. Hereafter the State may deem any person accused of crime to be guilty. The accused then will have the burden not only to show the invalidity of the conviction but that the conviction would not have occurred if the proceedings had been valid. Here a person who has admittedly never been validly convicted has lost his right to challenge his conviction because this court imputes a decision to him that he never had an opportunity to make.
None of the evidence against Polly discussed by this court was ever introduced in an adversary proceeding. It is all taken from the State’s summary of grand jury testimony. Because the court relies on this evidence in barring Polly from postconviction relief, the result is a conviction that will stand, not because of a guilty verdict or a valid guilty plea, but because of this court’s impression of the probative force of the prosecutor’s unsworn summary of the testimony that preceded the indictment. All of this occurs despite the fact the evidence heard by the grand jury and the indictment itself could have no probative force in the adjudication of the accused’s guilt. See State v. Hall, 235 N.W.2d 702, 712 (Iowa 1975), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 822, 98 S.Ct. 66, 54 L.Ed.2d 79 (1977).
The State in its brief disparages the right of prisoners “who have nothing but time [to] encumber the judicial process, disrupt attempts at rehabilitation, and flout any notion of finality of judgment.” The State requested and now has obtained a judicial barrier to postconviction relief even for prisoners who have been invalidly convicted and who were unaware of the defects in their convictions in time to appeal. Before now prisoners were entitled to one review of their convictions, either on appeal or, under the Redding interpretation of section 663A.2, through postconviction action. Today’s decision establishes a category of invalid convictions that will never be reviewed in Iowa courts even when the right of appeal has not been deliberately bypassed.
The wrong in this case was not the prisoner’s delay in seeking vindication of his rights until he became aware his rights had been violated. The wrong was the failure of a judge to follow procedures dictated by the United States Constitution and this court in receiving a guilty plea. It is difficult to believe that the Constitution is served or justice is done by penalizing the prisoner for the judge’s mistake.