Court Opinion

ID: 9853340
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:46:53.683547+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:46.010394
License: Public Domain

Carley, Judge,
concurring specially.
I agree with the majority that the conviction of the defendant should be affirmed. I also agree that if the challenged portion of the trial court’s first charge on involuntary manslaughter is error, it is not reversible error when the charge is considered as a whole. Holliday v. State, 23 Ga. App. 400 (4) (98 SE 386) (1918). In this connection, both the majority and the dissent—and indeed the briefs of both the state and the defendant — assume that the allegedly inarticulate language in the first involuntary manslaughter charge is error. The majority quotes the entire charge on involuntary manslaughter and emphasizes the purportedly erroneous language as being: “a person *442convicted under this section is guilty of a misdemeanor.” It appears to me that it has been assumed by all that this charge is error because it is further assumed by all that — as the dissent phrases it — the trial court actually “clearly informed the jury that involuntary manslaughter occasioned by a simple battery was viewed in the eyes of the law as a misdemeanor.” With this basic assumption by the majority, the dissent and both parties, I must respectfully disagree.
In order to place in perspective my view of the law which is applicable to the attacked portion of the charge I must not only repeat herein the original involuntary manslaughter charge with the supposedly incorrect language therein, but I must also set forth the “re-charge” on involuntary manslaughter given by the trial court after being requested to do so by the jury. During the original charge, the trial court instructed the jury as follows: “Now, a person commits involuntary manslaughter in the commission of an unlawful act, when he causes the death of another human being without any intention to do so by the commission of an unlawful act other than a felony. A person convicted under this subsection is guilty of a misdemeanor. I therefore charge you simple battery, ladies and gentlemen, is a commission of an unlawful act other than a felony. A person commits simple battery when he either intentionally makes physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature with the person of another, or intentionally causes physical harm to another. A person convicted, ladies and gentlemen, would be convicted under this section on the basis of a simple battery, if any.” (Emphasis supplied.) As did the majority, I have emphasized the part of the charge enumerated as error.
After the jury had retired and deliberated for some time, the jury simply sent word to the judge that they wanted to be re-charged on involuntary manslaughter. Acceding to the request of the jury, the trial court charged as follows: “A person commits involuntary manslaughter in the commission of an unlawful act when he causes the death of another human being without any intention to do so by the commission of an unlawful act other than a felony. A person convicted under this section, ladies and gentlemen, must have committed some unlawful act. And in that regard I charge you, simple battery is the commission of an unlawful act other than a felony. A person commits simple battery when he intentionally makes physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature with the person of another, or intentionally causes physical harm to another.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Returning now to the language described as “inappropriate” in the first charge on involuntary manslaughter, I submit that this language — while not overwhelmingly clear to a layman — is a correct *443statement of the law. The trial court charged that “a person convicted under this subsection is guilty of a misdemeanor.” This is true because in order to be convicted of involuntary manslaughter in the commission of an unlawful act, a defendant must he guilty of an unlawful act other than a felony. An unlawful act other than a felony is a misdemeanor. See OCGA § 16-1-3 (9) (Code Ann. § 26-401) and OCGA § 16-2-1 (Code Ann. § 26-601). In this case, the misdemeanor was simple battery. Thus, the trial court was not describing the status of the offense of involuntary manslaughter; to the contrary, the trial court was telling the jury that in order to convict the defendant of this lesser included crime of murder, the jury must first find that the defendant killed the victim while the defendant was engaged in an unlawful act other than a felony. When the recharge is read in conjunction with the original charge, the meaning of the challenged phrase becomes clear.
As I have stated above, I believe that the portion of the charge attacked by the defendant is subject to criticism only because it may not be perfectly adapted for delivery to laymen and that it does not suffer from any imperfection as a statement of law. When the charge is so construed, there is no basis for reversal. Urban v. State, 152 Ga. App. 110(3) (262 SE2d 259) (1979). However, even if the statement were to be construed as misstating the law vis-a-vis the offense of involuntary manslaughter, its inclusion in the original charge does not constitute reversible error. In characterizing the “error” as harmful and reversible, the dissent focuses at length upon its conception of the collective mind of the jury as vacillating between conviction, if its verdict of guilty related to a misdemeanor, and acquittal, if its only other choice would be a felony. In the first place, there is no logical way to conclude that the simple request for a recharge on involuntary manslaughter indicated “the jury’s interest in the least serious degree of the crime of homicide and presented the court with their potential concern for a choice of options between an acquittal or rejection of the defense of justification and conviction of a misdemeanor, the crime in its lowest degree.” Furthermore — and more importantly — the legal status of the crime (felony or misdemeanor) and the resulting punishment if a guilty verdict is returned, is of absolutely no concern to the jury. Cf. Evans v. State, 146 Ga. App. 480 (2) (246 SE2d 482) (1978). In determining whether the defendant was guilty of the crime of involuntary manslaughter or was innocent of any crime because of self defense, the jury was required to make its decision on the basis of the evidence and the evidence alone. Therefore, even if the technically correct language of the trial court could be viewed as being subject to misinterpretation by a layman, that use of language — relating as it does only to the *444severity of the classification of the crime — cannot be reversible error. See Scoggins v. State, 98 Ga. App. 360 (106 SE2d 39) (1958). Accordingly, I join the majority’s decision to affirm the conviction.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Deen and Judge Banke join in this special concurrence.